

## The Formation and Execution of Indian Defence Policy - A Precis

During the 1947-62 period the Indian Government fostered the attitude that its policies represented a fresh approach to inter-state relations. Non-alignment with power blocs, peaceful co-existence, disarmament and the peaceful settlement of disputes were put forward as the 'Indian formula' for national and international security. In actual practice, however, was New Delhi immune from the very fears, complexes and neuroses it suspected and condemned in others? Was there anything particularly unique in the manner in which a sovereign India moved among world realities to seek the achievement of vital national interests - the most important of which was the military security of the state? The purpose of this research is to contribute at least partial answers to these general questions - and to many more specific ones - through an examination of the manner in which the Nehru administration sought to secure India and its vital external interests against interference or attack by other powers.

The historical background to the main discussion is provided by a review of the defence policy of the British Raj. The British recognised that the security of India must be organised on a sub-continental basis and could not be divorced from the disposition of power throughout the Indian Ocean region and the world. In view of India's financial weakness and pressing internal development needs, India's military liability was confined to the provision of local defence of the Indian Empire against a minor power and with suitable provision for aid to the civil authority in the maintenance of law and order; in the event of an attack upon India by a major power, it was accepted that India must necessarily rely upon the speedy arrival of Imperial aid. The liability of India to aid Britain in military operations outside the boundaries of the Indian Empire remained conditional on the situation prevailing within India and on its borders at the particular time, and such forces as were periodically

drawn from India for employment in other parts of the world were usually charged against the British Exchequer. The major and only continuing military pre-occupation was with the security of the North-West Frontier against the recurring hostility of the tribals and the real or imagined threats posed by Afghanistan and Russia. Periodic adjustments, however, were effected in policy to accord with changing strategic needs within the limitations imposed by India's limited financial resources.

India's nationalist leadership had developed a tradition of general opposition to the defence policy of the Raj and a marked tendency to assume that a free India would be relatively free from the threat of external attack. In various speeches and writings between 1928 and 1946, Jawaharlal Nehru defined his personal assessment of India's defence requirements and concluded that, while a free India would have little to fear from other powers for reasons of geography, size and great power rivalries, prudence required the speedy reconstruction of the defence forces and a vigilant posture on the North-West Frontier. The tentative defence planning of the Interim Government appears to have closely adhered to the conception of India's postwar defence requirements arrived at by British planners prior to the conclusion of World War II. This planning was undercut by partition in its various manifestations and a limited conflict in Kashmir was prevented from possible escalation into a general Indo-Pakistan war only by the mutual exhaustion of both combatants. Instead of the desired joint cooperation with Pakistan in defence (and other spheres), the Indian Government was forced by prudence and the mood of the Indian people to formulate its defence policy against the contingency of renewed conflict with Pakistan with additional provision for internal security. The adoption of a non-aligned policy towards the opposing power blocs was envisaged as minimising the possibility of an attack against India by a major power but, in the event that such an attack did occur, Indian leaders accepted that a country with India's



economic problems had no choice but to rely upon external aid, the availability of which was regarded as well-nigh rendered axiomatic by the balance of power concept.

The implications for Indian security of the emergence of a China united under militant communist leadership and its assertion of control over Tibet was not overlooked in official Indian circles. The possibility of attack was generally dismissed on various grounds, but the need to preserve the integrity of India's Himalayan frontiers and her vital interests in the strategic kingdoms of Nepal, Sikkim and Bhutan was recognised. The Assam Rifles were re-organised and expanded, administration was extended in NEFA, the intelligence network was developed in the northern border areas, the economic development of these areas was promoted and communications were extended. The Indian Government adopted and pursued the former British policy of direct or indirect control over Nepal, Sikkim and Bhutan and sought to promote social, political and economic development in these states under its benevolent guidance while striving to minimise contacts between these states and other powers. The Indian response to the Chinese occupation of Tibet in 1950-51 was politically discreet, diplomatically cautious, economical of financial and material resources and projected over the long-term.

Chinese activities in the Himalayan region up to early 1959 provoked no apparent increase in the precautionary measures conceived in the 1950-53 period, seemingly due to a general disbelief in the possibility of a Chinese attack and the desire not to provoke Peking into more openly hostile activities by actions which might be interpreted as challenging China's public professions of friendship. The circumstances surrounding the Tibetan revolt in early 1959 forced Nehru to adopt, with undisguised reluctance, a firmer stand against China's declared designs in the Himalayan region; the 'new' policy involved declarations of the Government's intention to preserve the country's integrity, honour

and self-respect and the integrity of the Himalayan kingdoms, accelerated aid to the Himalayan kingdoms, the assignment of Himalayan security to the Army and a 'crash' programme of road-building in the Himalayan region. With the exception of the Army's involvement, India's response to the Tibetan revolt and its repercussions followed the pattern of its earlier response to the Chinese occupation of Tibet, albeit on a more comprehensive scale. Planning continued to be based on the political assumption that a serious Chinese attack was most unlikely. India's military strategy thus continued to be oriented towards the contingency of conflict with Pakistan in the North-West.

Throughout the period, Indian military policy reflected continual and usually unsatisfactory compromises between what was politically desirable, financially possible and militarily prudent.

The Indian Navy represented a compromise between self-reliance and explicit dependence upon friendly powers, between direct involvement in conflict with a neighbouring country and at least indirect involvement in an East-West war. The development of a navy powerful enough to secure India's coastline and maritime interests against a major power was beyond India's financial capacities, while continued explicit reliance upon the Royal Navy was neither politically wise nor particularly practical. India thus developed a small task force large enough to give her local superiority against any neighbouring country and so constituted as to facilitate cooperation with with Western navies in defence of mutual interests in the Indian Ocean against Soviet-bloc submarines in any general war. To some extent, the Indian Navy assumed the functions of the former East Indies squadron of the Royal Navy. The development programme was affected to a considerable extent by financial stringency, but to no apparent extent by Pakistani or Chinese postures.

The Indian Air Force was developed largely in accordance with a plan which originated with British planners prior to the end of World War II and

was unaffected by partition and the altered operational requirements. It was developed as a balanced tactical force possessing local superiority against any neighbouring country, save China. The development of the Service was affected less by financial considerations than was the case with the other two Services and proceeded up to about 1955 within the limitations imposed by the availability of trained personnel and suitable aircraft rather than money. The scope of the subsequent expansion of the fighter, bomber and transport formations appears to have been attributable to various factors relating to general prudence, concern with specific Chinese and Pakistani actions, domestic politics and national prestige. Equipment policy was determined by a general desire to retain British weapons systems and organisation qualified by a deliberate policy of avoiding excessive dependence on a single source of external supply, efforts to obtain the most economical types, an initial reluctance to acquire Soviet aircraft for fear of provoking a hostile reaction in the West, and a later desire to acquire aircraft from this communist source for political and diplomatic reasons.

Long-term planning for the Army was generally deferred in the period immediately following independence as ad hoc measures were undertaken to meet the demands of internal security, the integration of the States and the operations in Kashmir. Pakistani postures precluded the reduction of the Army to the desired size and the resultant establishment caused a general deferral of the desired re-equipment programme. The size of the Army was increased to meet the needs of the operations in Nagaland and Himalayan commitments undertaken in late 1959 but, while contingency planning was prepared by Army Headquarters to meet possible limited Chinese attacks, the deployment of the Army remained oriented against Pakistan. Persistent requests from the Army for new re-equipment were rejected by the Government on financial grounds. The officer corps was rapidly Indianised but a chronic shortage of suitable officers

persisted, despite various attempts to alleviate it, and the corps continued to contain a disproportionate element from the Punjab.

Recruitment to the Service was thrown open to all Indians as an explicit policy, but no attempts were made to alter the traditional class/caste composition of the infantry regiments. Training and tactics remained conventional and traditional and British weapons systems, drill manuals and unit tables of organisation remained in use. Various para-military organisations were created primarily to inculcate discipline and some sense of purpose into masses lacking in both characteristics; special stress was placed upon the youth and the peoples in the border areas.

The development of defence industries was undertaken for military, political, diplomatic, financial and emotional considerations. Maximum self-sufficiency was desired to enable the country to pursue its foreign policy objectives free of the limitations imposed by dependence upon foreign sources of supply, to relieve the drain of external purchases on India's meagre foreign exchange reserves, etc. The approach to broadening indigenous defence production facilities during the first decade would appear to have been a considered one and in accordance with India's needs and capabilities. From about 1955, however, planning embarked upon ambitious schemes which were not warranted either by India's immediate military requirements or by the capacities of local technology and industry. Evidence suggests that politics emerged as a primary determinant of defence production policy during the tenure of Krishna Menon at Defence.

The pattern of civil-military relations in India during the period was characterised by the stable subordination of the military to the civil power. The Government retained the professional military establishment inherited from the British Raj but it deliberately reduced the status of the military in both state and society through various measures. The ability of the military to influence military policy was severely compromised by its excessive subordination to

financial and bureaucratic controls, the absence of a unified Service command, the absence of military access to the highest levels of government on a continuing basis, the general complacency with which the political executive viewed national defence and the unwillingness of successive Defence Ministers to seek to influence Cabinet in a manner beneficial to a realistic and long-term approach to defence planning. In the context which prevailed up to the late 'fifties, the military were inhibited from arguing too forcefully against official defence and military policy but increasing concern with Himalayan developments and the conduct of Defence Minister Menon provoked the celebrated incident in August-September 1959 involving the attempt by General Thimayya to resign. Nehru managed to persuade Thimayya to withdraw his resignation, but Service resentment at Menon's manipulations of promotions heightened during the following three years although the previous civil-military disagreements over policy would appear to have eased to some extent.

Complacency continued to affect India's Himalayan policy, however, and the decision to challenge Chinese control of certain border areas from the spring of 1961 was clearly based on the political assumption that the Chinese would not risk a major conflict with India for the sake of a few square miles of Himalayan frontier. The result was that the Army was committed to operations for which it was neither trained, equipped or suitably led and suffered a humiliating reverse.

The border war of October-November 1962 provided many useful lessons for Indian defence planners. India's defence strategy has been re-oriented to provide for contingencies involving China although there remains some concern regarding Pakistan's intentions. New Delhi has declared its intention to have a strong military defence as a national policy and the five-year defence plan for doubling India's military capabilities is not solely related to Himalayan requirements. It is unlikely, though, that India will assume external military commitments to assist the West in

its efforts to contain China in South-East Asia in the foreseeable future. India will continue to depend upon Western military power to secure the Middle East and South-East Asia against communist inroads while restricting its own military liability to defence of its frontiers (and the integrity of the Himalayan kingdoms) against overt and covert Chinese designs and such minor adventures that Pakistan might embark upon, as in Kutch in early 1965. Indian military policy will seek to deter overt and covert designs by China and Pakistan and to provide the necessary sanction for Indian diplomacy and influence in a power-conscious world. India's acquisition of a nuclear capability is probably only a matter of time for reasons related to the latter factor more so than to the former.

THE FORMATION AND EXECUTION OF

INDIAN DEFENCE POLICY

by

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Thesis submitted for the degree  
of Doctor of Philosophy in the  
Australian National University,  
Canberra. July 1965.

51615

**This dissertation is based entirely upon my own  
original research.**

*J. Kavic*



Negotiate from strength, not from weakness, else you will find yourself negotiating first at some one else's expense - which is dirty - and than at your own - which is disastrous.

Lord Vansittart

In the domain of India's foreign politics, I know of one fixed and immutable rule only: What India has, let India hold. India is large enough to covet not a single square mile of ground that is not already her own. But India is not large enough to allow any invader of India - be he independent tribesman or foreign power, from south or north or east or west - more of her soil than a plot of ground 7 feet by  $2\frac{1}{2}$  and 4 feet deep.

Denis Bray,  
Foreign Secretary to the Government of India, in  
the Legislative Assembly on 5 March 1923.

### ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

This study is indebted to many organizations and individuals. The Australian Commonwealth Scholarship Committee and the Australian National University provided the opportunity for this research to be undertaken during a period of three years in Australia and a visit of several months' duration to India and Pakistan.

I wish to record my appreciation to the staffs of the Institute of Advanced Studies Library at the Australian National University, the Australian National Library, the Australian War Memorial, and Sapru House, New Delhi, for their assistance in providing required materials.

I am thankful to those many individuals who interrupted their busy schedules to discuss various aspects of the subject with the writer but whose identities cannot be disclosed. I should also like to express my gratitude for the hospitality extended to me during my presence in New Delhi and Karachi by Julie and Bill Montgomery and Dick Seaborn.

To Dr T.B. Millar I am indebted for his constructive suggestions throughout the preparation of this paper and for his patience and encouragement. Final thanks are due to Mrs Bonnie Press who typed the manuscript in its present form.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

	Page
INTRODUCTION	1
CHAPTER I THE DEFENCE POLICY OF THE BRITISH RAJ	16
II THE ORIGINS, BASES AND AIMS OF INDIAN DEFENCE POLICY	57
III HIMALAYAN POLICY I	108
IV HIMALAYAN POLICY II	146
V THE INDIAN ARMY 1947-1962	190
VI THE INDIAN AIR FORCE 1947-1962	243
VII THE INDIAN NAVAL PROGRAMME	277
VIII DEFENCE PRODUCTION 1947-1962	300
IX CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS	341
X HIMALAYAN CONFLICT	404
XI THE NEW INDIAN DEFENCE PROGRAMME	445
CONCLUSIONS	495
SELECT BIBLIOGRAPHY	512
APPENDICES	530
MAPS	605

## INTRODUCTION

Two of the unshakable realities of international politics are the primacy of the national self-interest and the importance of military power as a factor in inter-state relations. No government, however pacific-minded, has ever been able to rely solely upon the political ethics of other states or upon its own diplomacy to deter direct attack or interference with its external interests. Armies have, therefore, been a feature of every state in recorded history.

Total security has rarely proved obtainable even for the most powerful of nations, and the basic dilemma of defence policy - how best to acquire maximum security through the minimum expenditure on the armed forces - has never allowed of a simple solution. Every contingency cannot be provided for, and strategy, like politics to which it is closely bound, is always a choice between alternatives. The quest for security can never be conducted heedless of the antagonisms which that search may provoke among other powers or upon the domestic scene. There must always be a considered relationship between commitments and power and between power and resources. There must also be a

willingness to employ such forms of power as may be required to preserve vital interests, of which the most basic is usually considered to be the preservation of the territorial integrity and political independence of the state. The essence of a sound national security policy is for government to define the nation's vital interests and to develop sufficient power, alone or in concert with others as the situation may be deemed to require, to secure those interests.

How did the Government of India approach the issues of national security during the first fifteen years of the country's existence as an independent state? What was its conception of the national interest? From what sources did it perceive of possible hostile action, and in what fashion? What precautions were taken against the various contingencies of conflict? Three years after the humiliation inflicted by Chinese military forces, the manner in which the Nehru administration sought to secure India against attack remains subject to extensive speculation largely unsupported by factual evidence.

The public postures of the Indian Government during the period are well-known as a result of the extensive international interest shown in Indian affairs and the ambitious diplomacy which characterised Jawaharlal Nehru's tenure of office as Prime Minister of the Indian Union. His

Government professed to see no threat to India from the Communist bloc<sup>1</sup>. New Delhi fostered, with considerable success, the attitude that Indian policy represented a fresh approach to inter-state relations in which moral force was superior to physical force. Nehru advanced the view that the 'right approach to defence is...friendly relations with other countries'<sup>2</sup> and professed to see no value in the adoption of 'an attitude which just irritates and which induces the other party into doing something irritating to you, without producing any other good results'<sup>3</sup>. He argued the need for all countries to lay aside past grievances and approach each other 'in a spirit of tolerance and forbearance with "charity towards all and malice towards none"...'<sup>4</sup>. He claimed in 1960 that India's policy was rooted in a certain line of thinking which was wholly opposed to the purely military line of thinking<sup>5</sup>. Non-alignment, peaceful co-existence, disarmament and the peaceful settlement of disputes were put forward as the 'Indian formula' for world peace.

In practice, however, was New Delhi immune from the very fears, complexes and neuroses it suspected and condemned in others? Did the Indian Government pursue policies distinct from the traditional approach in which, though moral and other considerations or means are not ruled out, power is

viewed as the principal means for achieving the nation's ends? Was India's approach to international politics free from considerations of power politics? Various statements made by Nehru and the more significant actions taken by his administration suggest that there was nothing particularly unique in the manner in which a sovereign India moved among world realities to seek the achievement of the national interests.

While New Delhi fostered the attitude that India's approach to external issues was based upon higher ideals than motivated other governments, Nehru admitted that 'Every country's foreign policy, first of all, is concerned with its own security'<sup>6</sup>. The Gandhian creed of non-violence was eulogised, but its practicability was rejected by Nehru and his colleagues in government. As the Indian Prime Minister declared in Parliament on 15 February 1956:

I am not aware of our government having ever said that they adopted the doctrine of Ahimsa [non-violence] to our activities. They may respect it, they may honour that doctrine, but as a government it is patent that we do not consider ourselves capable of adopting the doctrine of Ahimsa.<sup>7</sup>

Defending the virtues of a friendly approach to relations with other countries, Nehru nonetheless cautioned 'To that friendly approach must necessarily be allied the watchful, the vigilant approach and a "preparations approach"<sup>8</sup>.

Speaking in the Lok Sabha on 29 September 1954, the Prime Minister stated: 'It would be unrealistic for me to suggest that any country in South-East Asia or India should live in a false sense of security or tell themselves "Let us sing the song of peace and nothing will happen" - I realise that responsible governments and countries cannot behave in that manner'<sup>9</sup>. Although consistently arguing the need for countries to approach one another with less distrust, Nehru conceded in the Rajya Sabha on 9 December 1959 that 'no country finally puts its trust in any other country...in the ultimate analysis they have always to keep a loop-hole in their minds that the other party will not play up or that other things may happen or national interests may come into play'<sup>10</sup>.

While urging other states to resolve disputes through negotiation, the Nehru administration resorted to force on a number of occasions to effect a solution favourable to its policy goals<sup>11</sup>. The princely states of Junagadh and Hyderabad were coerced into the Union, army and police units were despatched to aid the legally-constituted authorities in the strategic hill-states of Sikkim and Nepal against disaffected elements and military campaigns were waged against tribals and Pakistani regulars in Kashmir, against the Portuguese in Goa, and ultimately against the Chinese in



NEFA and Ladakh. Naga demands for the right to determine their own political future were rejected and a force which eventually comprised some 30,000 troops and police was deployed in Nagaland to deal with the dissident tribesmen<sup>12</sup>. India provided an infantry battalion for the United Nations peace-keeping force in the Gaza strip in 1956 and an infantry brigade group for a similar force established in the former Belgian Congo in 1961 - permitting this brigade group to spearhead a United Nations action aimed at crushing the secessionist Katanga government of Moïse Tshombe.

While lecturing the great powers on the evils of the armaments race, the Indian Government expended on defence during the 1947-62 period a sum exceeding Rs 3000 crores (about £stg 2,250 million)<sup>13</sup>. Writing as late as 1963, Nehru stated that his Government's pre-occupation with internal problems of poverty and illiteracy had caused it to be content to assign a relatively low priority to defence requirements in the conventional sense<sup>14</sup>; by 1962, however, 'pacifist' India possessed the largest navy and air force of any country located in the Indian Ocean region and one of the largest standing armies in the world. There were, in addition, a number of para-military organizations embracing several millions of students and adults.

The raison d'être of this defence programme was never made clear by the Government, on the grounds that it was not considered to be in the national interest to reveal information about such matters<sup>15</sup>. The attitude of the Indian public was, in any case, generally apathetic<sup>16</sup>, and Parliament consistently passed by unanimous vote whatever defence estimates were placed before it. The annual debate on the defence grants has aptly been described as the 'duet of the deaf'<sup>17</sup> and as 'an elegant or inelegant repetition...spiced with Opposition criticisms, interspersed with sallies and enlivened occasionally by an odd fresh incident, such as the buying of MIGs or appointment of the chief of staff'<sup>18</sup>. In the 1962 debate on the defence grants, held at a time of national concern with Himalayan developments, an Opposition cut motion censuring the Government 'for failure to effectively guard the land frontiers of India and preserve inviolate India's territorial integrity' was defeated by 183 votes to 35. The vote evidenced rather sharply that only slightly more than one-third of the members of the House were sufficiently interested in the disposition of over one-quarter of the budget to appear to record their judgement. Commenting on the vote, the military correspondent of a leading Indian newspaper concluded that 'after this one discovers not that defence is such a miserably dull topic, but that how few men

in democracy [i.e. the Indian Cabinet] could indeed have such tremendous power<sup>19</sup>.

In the absence of any useful official explanation regarding the rationale for the Indian military programme, the popular view was to attribute much of the expenditure on defence (at least up to late 1959) to the existence of strained relations with Pakistan<sup>20</sup>. As the Indian weekly, Thought, stated in 1955, the Indian Government and people both looked upon Pakistan as King Charles' head and 'No amount of expense and effort is, therefore, regarded as too much if that helps maintain the superiority we have hitherto enjoyed and apparently still enjoy over Pakistan...Fear of Pakistan clouds thinking in India as much as that of Israel did in Egypt'<sup>21</sup>. Pakistan's receipt of United States military aid from 1954 onwards was thus widely viewed both inside and outside India as provoking significant increases in Indian defence expenditures<sup>22</sup>.

With the notable exception of V.K. Krishna Menon - whose political appeal in India was largely built upon an extreme anti-Pakistani stance - Indian Government leaders did not openly encourage this viewpoint, but neither did they discourage it. In retrospect, however, Nehru claimed that his Government had, from the entry of the Chinese into Tibet in 1950-51, been engaged in developing a proper war machine

for the 'inevitable' confrontation with China<sup>23</sup>. Does the evidence bear out Nehru's contention of a considered and long-term response to the Chinese threat faulty only in timing? What was the actual relative influence of Pakistani and Chinese postures on Indian defence planning? Was the contingency of an East-West conflict and India's possible involvement therein completely ignored?

Any study of Indian defence must also include a discussion of the manner in which policy was formulated, particularly in view of Nehru's death in early 1964 and the possible repercussions on Indian defence and foreign policy of his passing from the scene. Although no exhaustive examination has yet appeared of the process by which India's defence and foreign policies were made during the 1947-62 period, the evidence would seem to bear out the opinion of Nehru's biographer, Michael Brecher, that the Indian Prime Minister was the 'philosopher, the architect, the engineer and the voice of his country's policy towards the outside world'<sup>24</sup>. Or as Percival Griffiths once observed:

People may disagree with him, but they do what he says. There may be divisions of opinion inside the Cabinet, but when those divisions are put to the test it is Pandit Nehru and Pandit Nehru alone, who really takes the decision. That is true in the Cabinet, it is true in the Congress Party and it is true in the country at large.<sup>25</sup>

To what extent did Indian defence and foreign policy reflect

Nehru's hopes, fears and predelictions? What was the nature of the military contribution to policy, and of the relationship between the civil and military branches of government? A discussion of these and other related questions involving the influence of Parliament, public opinion and pressure groups will permit of some assessment of the future trends of Indian defence policy.

Lastly, it is important to study the nature of India's reactions to the traumatic experience of October-November 1962. What is the nature of the official assessment that has been made of the Chinese threat? Concern is being expressed about Sino-Pakistani collusion against India, but is military policy being formulated on this premise? What is the significance of India's five-year defence programme, and what are its local, regional and even global implications? Has the policy-making process in India become unduly over-weighted in favour of extreme chauvinism, as Pakistan professes to fear, or in favour of a military establishment excessive to current needs and national capabilities?

The purpose of this study is to contribute at least partial answers to the many questions associated with Indian defence in the past and at present. The subject has been approached in a topical fashion, rather than chronologically, although the discussion of the various aspects is treated

largely in the latter manner. Contemporaneous developments have been referred to wherever it seemed relevant. The historical background to the main discussion is provided by a review of the defence policy of the British Raj during the 1858-1947 period. The origins, bases and aims of the Nehru Government's defence policy are the subject of the second chapter. Chapters III to IX deal with the elaboration of policy as conditioned by the country's resources and the wisdom or otherwise of those to whose hands was entrusted the responsibility for the formation and implementation of policy. Chapter X discusses the fate of policy as conditioned by human skill and fallibility and as illustrated by the response of China and other countries. India's response to the traumatic experience of the Chinese attacks is reviewed in Chapter XI. The implications of that response for India and for other countries is commented upon in a brief concluding chapter.

The material used in this thesis has been collated from diverse sources, including the written works and published speeches of Mr Nehru, Indian parliamentary debates and such official documents as the annual reports of the Ministries of Defence and External Affairs and the White Papers on Sino-Indian relations for the period from 1954 to 1962. Substantial reliance, however, has been placed upon press

items, military and technical journals and personal interviews with serving and retired officers and officials - both Indian and non-Indian - who have understandably insisted upon remaining anonymous.

### Notes

1 The Deputy Prime Minister and strong anti-communist, Vallabhbhai Patel, declared in 1948 that no foreign country would 'dare' attack India. Cited, Hindustan Times, 6 December 1948. Nehru informed Trygve Lie in Paris on 18 January 1951 that 'he was not concerned about the security of his country'. Trygve Lie, In The Cause Of Peace (New York; Macmillan, 1954), pp. 360-2. In 1953, the Indian Prime Minister purported to see no threat to India from external communism or any other source. Remark on a B.B.C. interview, 12 June 1953. Cited as footnote in J.C. Kundra, Indian Foreign Policy 1947-1954: A Study of Relations with the Western Bloc (Groningen, J.B. Wolters, 1955), p. 69. Writing under a pseudonym in 1954, Sir Narayana Raghavan Pillai, a high-ranking official of the External Affairs Ministry, expressed the view, with regard to Western warnings about the communist threat, that 'We may be stupid or completely blind but where we do not see the menace, we cannot pretend to do so, merely because we are so advised by no doubt wiser people'. "P", "Middle Ground Between Russia and America: an Indian View", Foreign Affairs (January 1954), p. 261.

2 LSD, pt 2, vol. 2, 31 March 1956, col. 3274.

3 Ibid, pt 2, vol. 14, 21 September 1957, col. 11,322.

4 Broadcast speech from Colombo, 2 May 1954. Jawaharlal Nehru, Speeches 1953-1957 (New Delhi, Publications Division, G.O.I., 1958), p. 252.

5 Speech to the Bangalore session of the Indian National Congress at Sadasivanagar, 17 January 1960. Ibid., pp. 266-7.

6 LSD, pt 2, vol. 23, 8 December 1958, col. 3959.

7 Ibid, pt 2, vol. 1, cols 814-15. Such illusions regarding the efficacy of non-violence as may have persisted beyond independence must have been largely dissipated by the communal bloodshed, the conflict in Kashmir and the Chinese forced entry into Tibet in 1950-51 - Tibet having since been described as 'the supreme example of an unarmed people, anxious only to live, the world forgetting, by the world forgot, careful to avoid getting mixed up with power blocs by seeking the protection of powerful allies'. The Eastern Economist, 13 September 1957.

8 Statement in Parliament on 8 December 1959. Cited in Prime Minister on Sino-Indian Relations (New Delhi, Ministry of External Affairs, G.O.I., undated), vol. 1, p. 232.

9 LSD, pt 2, vol. 1, cols 814-15.

10 Cited in Prime Minister on Sino-Indian Relations, p. 245.

11 As an official publication declared in defence of the Goa action: 'A nation has the ultimate right to use force in situations where methods of peace and persuasion have failed and where justice and one's own rights demanded positive action'. Goa Regains Freedom (Sydney, Information Service of India, December 1961).

12 See chapter three.

13 For a breakdown of Central revenues and expenditures for the 1950-60 period, see appendix I. For a breakdown of defence expenditure, see appendices II and III. A comparison of Indian defence expenditures with that of selected countries for the 1957-59 period is given in appendix IV.

14 "Changing India", Foreign Affairs, 41:3 (April 1963), p. 459.

15 For various reasons advanced by official spokesmen in defence of this policy, see Defence Minister Baldev Singh, CAD, vol. 3, 1948, pp. 2098-9; Defence Minister Krishna Menon, LSD, vol. 54, 1961, col. 10,517.

16 An urban poll conducted by the Indian Institute of Public Opinion in 1958 revealed that only 27 per cent of respondents considered India's level of defence expenditure to be excessive - 11.8 per cent because it contradicted Gandhian policy and 15.4 per cent because it hindered the Plan. For further details, see The Eastern Economist, 14 November 1958, p. 759.



- 17 Hindu Weekly Review, 23 March 1959.
- 18 Military correspondent in the Indian Express, 9 June 1962.
- 19 Ibid.
- 20 In 1951, Maurice Zinkin expressed the view that the prevailing level of defence expenditure 'might' drop by £ 45 million (about Rs 55 crores) once the Kashmir issue was settled. Asia and the West (London, Chatto & Windus, 1951), p. 240. Lord Birdwood wrote in 1952 that 'at least half' of the 'abnormal' defence outlay of India and Pakistan could be related to the Kashmir issue. "The Need for Agreement in the Indian Sub-Continent", Asiatic Review, 48:173 (January 1952), p. 7. Selig Harrison wrote in 1959 that responsible officials of both the Indian and Pakistani governments privately admit that, if it were not for Indo-Pakistani tension, the two standing armies of both sides could be reduced by as much as one-third. New Republic, 7 September 1959, p. 13.
- 21 1 June 1955, p. 1.
- 22 See, for example, The Eastern Economist, 30 December 1955 and 13 March 1959; The Sydney Morning Herald, 13 February 1956; M.A. Fitzsimons, "British Foreign Policy and Southern and Far Eastern Asia", The Review of Politics, vol. 24 (1962), p. 133.
- 23 Statement in the Rajya Sabha, 9 November 1962. Cited in Hindu, 11 November 1962. He excused inadequacies on the grounds that the timing of the 'final challenge' from China had been misjudged, and explained that 'broadly speaking' his Government had not wanted to be half or quarter prepared before ejecting the Chinese from Indian territory and 'So we tried to hold them and prepar to make ourselves stronger for the future tussle'.
- 24 Indian Foreign Policy: An Interpretation (New York, Institute of Pacific Relations, 1958), p. 9. A former High Commissioner for Canada in India, Escott Reid, wrote in a despatch in 1957 that 'For the People of India, he [Nehru] is George Washington, Lincoln, Roosevelt and Eisenhower rolled into one...He is king as well as prophet and priest, for he is the symbol of the unity of India; he is the spokesman of India, the head of its government. Sometimes he behaves as if he were also the leader of the opposition'. "Nehru: An Assessment in 1957", International Journal (Summer 1964), p. 279.

25 "The Republics of the Indian Sub-Continent", Asian Review, vol. XLX, p. 105. For similar viewpoints, see W.C.B. Tunstall, The Commonwealth and Regional Defence (University of London, Athlone Press, 1959), p. 52; Vivek, India Without Illusions (Bombay, New Book Co., 1953), pp. 95 and 116; Frank Moraes, India Today (New York, Macmillan, 1960), p. 217; C.L. Sulzberger in The New York Times (city edition), 16 February 1955.

## CHAPTER I

### THE DEFENCE POLICY OF THE BRITISH RAJ

The period of Crown rule in India extended from Queen Victoria's Royal Proclamation on 1 November 1858 to the formal withdrawal of British authority from the sub-continent on 15 August 1947. During this era, the Indian peoples dwelt united under one paramount rule and in remarkable security from internal disorder and external aggression. Internal tranquillity was largely preserved and external threats were countered through a combination of astute British diplomacy and a generally conservative use of military power (the two world wars excepted) employed on or beyond India's political frontiers. The price of such security imposed a considerable burden on India's meagre resources<sup>1</sup>, but must necessarily be viewed with reference to the chaotic state of pre-British India and the turmoil which afflicted other parts of the world during the 1858-1947 period.

This noteworthy achievement was effected by a government headed by Englishmen and subordinate to the ultimate dictates of Britain in all spheres of administration.

Defence and foreign policy were 'reserved' subjects over which the Indian peoples exercised no direct controls, immediate responsibility for these matters being vested in the Governor General in Council and the ultimate authority resting with the British Cabinet acting through the office of the Secretary of State for India. Despite the primacy of Imperial considerations, however, the policies of the British rulers of India were based upon what were - rightly or wrongly - considered to be the best interests of the Indian peoples and polity. The inter-dependence of India and Britain in defence was a basic premise of policy, and the British Government was under a constant liability to reinforce India with troops in the event of an emergency; at the same time, the liability of India to aid Britain in times of Imperial need remained conditional on the situation prevailing within India and on its frontiers at the particular time. In instances where troops were actually drawn from India to protect British interests in other parts of the world (interests from which India could not divorce itself), their transportation and maintenance was usually a charge on the Home Exchequer.

The foreign policy of the British rulers of India was directed towards securing the alliance, integrity or neutralization of the borderlands and minor states covering the land

approaches to the Indian Empire. The system which resulted from these efforts came to be known as the 'Ring Fence' and comprised two more or less concentric half-circles. The 'inner ring' consisted of the Himalayan kingdoms of Nepal, Bhutan and Sikkim and the tribal areas in north and north-east Assam and on the North-West Frontier. The 'outer ring' consisted of the sheikhdoms of the Persian Gulf, Persia, Afghanistan, Tibet and Siam. The 'inner ring' was gradually brought under varying forms of control<sup>2</sup> while intensive diplomatic activity, backed by the threat or use of force, succeeded in denying a foothold in any of the 'buffer' states in the 'outer ring' to a major power without compensatory advantage.

The success with which the 'Ring Fence' was maintained during a century of intense rivalries among the great powers, including two destructive global conflicts, was due to a number of factors. Great power rivalries and skilful British manipulation of the balance of power minimised the possibility of a serious threat to India. British naval domination of the Indian Ocean was unchallenged down to the brief eruption of Japanese naval power in 1942. America was distant, isolationist and friendly. Japan was distant and pre-occupied with Far Eastern and Pacific issues and, from 1902 to 1921, in alliance. China was weak and pre-occupied

with internal issues and foreign designs upon her territory. Russia was concerned with internal issues and had more vital interests in the Far East, the Near East and Europe. The smaller states located immediately beyond India's frontiers were too weak to pose any serious threat to British rule in India. Nonetheless, the authorities responsible for Indian defence could not ignore the possibilities of external and internal threats to their authority and domains.

The defence of British India was, therefore, bifurcate. The diversity of the Indian peoples posed a constant threat to internal security. The existence of half-civilized and militant tribes in the north-east and north-west represented a serious and continuing danger to the settled areas and to the tranquillity of India generally. The tribal problem on the North-West Frontier was closely bound up with the disposition of power in Afghanistan and the attitudes of that country's leaders towards British rule in India. Afghanistan itself occupied a position of great strategic significance astride the traditional invasion routes linking Central Asia with the northern plains of India, and its existence as an independent or friendly state was a sine qua non of Indian security.

As a result of the foregoing factors, the major pre-occupation of the defence planners of British India was the

security of the North-West Frontier against the recurring hostility of the fanatical tribals and unfriendly actions by Afghanistan and Russia. Suitable provision had also to be made against the contingency of internal disorder and possible rebellion. Persistent efforts were made to effect economies in military expenditure and periodic adjustments in military planning were carried out in accordance with both financial and strategic considerations.

At the time of the transfer of India to the direct control of the Crown in 1858, the Russian threat was distant behind the intervening khanates of Central Asia and the tribals and Afghanistan were quiescent. After the successful quelling of the 'Indian Mutiny', India's defences were thus reconstructed, against a background of drastic financial retrenchment, to provide for internal security and the local defence of the frontier<sup>3</sup>. The armies bequeathed by the British East India Company<sup>4</sup> were re-organized into a force of 60,000 British and 120,000 Indian troops, the artillery being placed in British hands and the Indian battalions recruited on the less explosive basis of class and caste. The Indian Navy<sup>5</sup> was abolished in 1863, in an economy move, and the Royal Navy was entrusted with the naval defence of India<sup>6</sup>.

The Second Afghan War (1878-79) had no appreciable effect on India's defence posture in the North-West aside

from the fact that it resulted in a specific undertaking by Britain to aid the Amir against unprovoked aggression - i.e. from Russia. Russia's absorption of the Central Asia khanates following the Crimean War and the advance of Russian forces up to the borders of Afghanistan (and Persia) culminating in the border incidents at Nerv (1884) and Panjdeh (1885), required that the possibility of war with Russia be seriously contemplated and prepared for<sup>7</sup>. The Army in India was accordingly strengthened by 30,000 men<sup>8</sup>, and the construction of fortifications, strategic roads and railways on the North-West Frontier was pursued with urgency. The war scare passed and the conclusion of the Pamir Boundary Agreement in 1895 settled the question of the Russo-Afghan frontier, but the continuation of British and Russian suspicions regarding each other's intentions in Central Asia provoked a major reconstruction of India's defence posture between 1899 and 1907.

Shortly after being appointed Viceroy, Lord Curzon created (in 1901) the North-West Frontier Province and substituted 'a policy of frontier garrisons drawn from the people themselves, for the costly experiment of large forts and isolated posts thrown forward into a turbulent and fanatical country...it is a policy of military concentration as against diffusion and of tribal conciliation in place of



exasperation'<sup>9</sup>. It represented, in effect, a compromise between the 'forward' and 'stationary' schools of frontier policy<sup>10</sup>.

The reorganization and redistribution of the army was undertaken by Lord Kitchener following his appointment as Commander-in-Chief in India in 1902. Since the Mutiny, the army had been allowed to fall below the standard required for modern field operations, its organization and deployment remained based on obsolete conceptions (only four divisions could be fielded for operations), and the quality of the Indian troops remained a source of concern<sup>11</sup>.

Lord Kitchener's scheme was based upon four major principles:

- a) That the main function of the army was to defend the North-West Frontier against an aggressive enemy;
- b) That the army in peace should be organised, distributed and trained in units of command similar to those in which it would take the field in war;
- c) That the maintenance of internal security was a means to an end, namely, to set free the field army to carry out its functions;
- d) That all fighting units, in their several spheres, should be equally capable of carrying out all the roles of an army in the field, and that they should be given equal chances, in experience and training, of bearing these roles.<sup>12</sup>

The army was accordingly reorganized to enable the mobilization of nine infantry divisions and five cavalry brigades

(about 152,000 men), leaving 82,000 troops to deal with internal security. Two great Commands were formed: Southern Army with headquarters at Poona and its striking point at Quetta; and Northern Army with headquarters at Murree and its striking point at Peshawar<sup>13</sup>. The proportion of Gurkhas and Punjabis in the army was increased at the expense of Madrassi units.

In the ordnance sphere, efforts proceeded towards making India more self-sufficient in its normal military requirements. For purposes of efficiency, the Madras harness and saddle factory was closed in 1899 and all work of this type was concentrated at the Cawnpore factory, the capacity of the unit - which dated from 1873 - being expanded accordingly. A central gun carriage factory was constructed at Jubbulpore and, with its completion in 1905, the out-dated plants at Fategarh, Bombay and Madras were closed. The introduction of cordite led to the building of a cordite factory at Aruvankadu and the closure of the gunpowder factory at Kirki. A lydritte-filling plant was inaugurated at Kirki in 1901 and a rifle factory and rolling mills were constructed at Ishapore<sup>14</sup>.

On the eve of the Great War, India's defence outlay totalled Rs 29.8 crores (1913-14) or 24 per cent of the total expenditure of the Government of India. The army

consisted of 75,000 British and 160,000 Indians exclusive of non-combatant Indian personnel, who numbered about 46,000. This regular force was backed by a Reserve of 36,000 Indian other ranks, a Volunteer Force comprised of 39,000 Europeans and Anglo-Indians, and Imperial Service troops from 29 native States totalling 21,000 officers and men<sup>15</sup>. The organization and distribution of the army remained unchanged from 1907. A Royal Air Force establishment was in the process of being set up. The Royal Indian Marine consisted of nine ocean-going vessels and a number of smaller steamers and launches charged with miscellaneous non-combatant duties<sup>16</sup>. The ordnance establishment comprised, in addition to the units mentioned above, a small arms ammunition factory at Dum Dum and a clothing factory at Shahjahanpur - the latter being opened in 1914.

By 1914 the army was prepared, in accordance with the limitations imposed by India's meagre financial resources, for internal security, tribal control on the north-east and north-west frontiers, and defence against a minor power like Afghanistan and against a major power like Russia pending the arrival of Imperial aid. The limited military responsibilities of India had been reaffirmed by a majority report of the Army in India Committee, prepared in 1913 under the chairmanship of Field Marshal Lord Nicholson, and accepted

by the Indian Government in that same year:

While India should provide for her own defence against local aggression and, if necessary, for an attack on the Indian Empire by a great Power until reinforcements can come from home, she is not called upon to maintain troops for the specific purpose of placing them at the disposal of the Home Government for wars outside the Indian Sphere.<sup>17</sup>

The whole measure of preparedness was thus based upon a principle of limitation which specifically excluded the external role which the army was to undertake during World War I.

The outbreak of war, however, provoked an enthusiasm among all sections of the Indian populace<sup>18</sup> that apparently came as much of a surprise to the British as to the Germans, who had envisaged that the Indian peoples would capitalize upon Britain's peril and revolt. Nepal placed its entire resources at the disposal of the British Government, the Dalai Lama offered a contingent of 1,000 troops, and Amir Habibullah of Afghanistan remained loyal to his treaty obligations despite approaches by German and Turkish agents and demands by the mullahs for a jehad against India.

During the course of the conflict, India recruited 680,000 combatants and 400,000 non-combatants on a voluntary basis, despatched 1,215,000 men overseas and incurred 101,000 casualties in numerous theatres of war. India supplied equipment and stores for the various theatres to

the value of £ 80 million and, in 1917-18, made Britain a free gift of £ 113,500,000, which was equivalent to an entire year's revenue and added 30 per cent to her own national debt<sup>19</sup>. She thus made a remarkable contribution to the Allied war effort.

Demobilization was delayed by the Third Afghan War, initiated by Afghanistan in 1919, and by consequent tribal risings and the heavy involvement of Indian troops in the suppression of the Arab revolt in Iraq in 1920-22. The assessment of India's peacetime military requirements was once again made in the context of drastic financial retrenchment aimed at sharp reductions in both civil and military expenditure.

The army was reconstituted on the principle that 'a relatively small army, which is efficient, well-equipped, mobile and capable of large expansion in war, is of greater value than an army large in numbers but deficient in essential ancillary services and up-to-date equipment'<sup>20</sup>. The establishment was reduced by 37,000 (as against 1914) to 200,000 combatants organized in a field army of four infantry divisions and five cavalry brigades, a covering force of about twelve brigades for the North-West Frontier, and formations assigned to internal security duties. The necessary adjustments were made to permit of rapid expansion

in war, and India's wartime military potential was augmented by the organization of a more efficient Reserve of 40,000 personnel, and the establishment in 1920 of an Auxiliary Force<sup>21</sup> and an Indian Territorial Force<sup>22</sup>.

The Royal Air Force in India was established with a front-line strength of six squadrons. The Government announced its intention to create an Indian Air Force in 1928 and, following delays occasioned by financial considerations, the new service was created in 1932 - its first 'flight' being organized the following year.

The Government of India accepted, without reservation, the conclusion of the Imperial Conference in 1926 to the effect that each of the self-governing dominions and India should accept the liability of providing for its own local naval defence. The Royal Indian Marine was accordingly restored as a combatant service in 1928 and was slowly built up towards its sanctioned strength of four sloops, two patrol vessels and two surveying vessels.

The creation of an Indian officer cadre was undertaken in 1917, at which time Indians were made eligible for the King's commission and ten vacancies per annum were reserved for Indian officer cadets at the Royal Military College, Sandhurst. In March 1922, the Prince of Wales Royal Indian Military College was opened at Dehra Dun with a capacity of

70 cadets to prepare Indians for Sandhurst and effect a reduction in the prevailing high rate of failures among Indian cadets sent to England<sup>23</sup>. The Government commenced the 'Indianization' of eight infantry and cavalry units in 1923<sup>24</sup> and, in response to comprehensive Assembly resolutions passed in 1923 and 1925 which criticized the pace and scope of the Indianization scheme, the India Sandhurst Committee was convened in June 1925. The Committee investigated the possibility of establishing a Sandhurst-style military college in India and its proposals<sup>25</sup> led to the establishment of the Indian Military Academy at Dehra Dun in October 1932 with a capacity of 60 cadets. By 31 March 1935, there were 150 Indian King's Commissioned Officers (KCOs) and the first had successfully graduated from the Staff College at Quetta. In 1935, the Kitchener College was inaugurated at Nowgong to train promising cadets from the ranks and, in 1936, an Army Class was started at Government College, Lahore.

India's military liabilities in the inter-war period remained consistent with pre-war policy until the eve of World War II. Section 22 of the Government of India Act of 1919 specifically limited India's military liability to local defence while reiterating the obligation of His Majesty's Government to come to India's aid in a grave emergency. In

1920, the Imperial Defence Committee defined India's responsibility in the event of a Central Asian war as involving the 'minor danger' of internal security and frontier defence. The 'major danger' of meeting an attack by a great power upon India or upon the Empire through India was declared to be an Imperial responsibility. Defence planning accordingly proceeded on this basis with appropriate attention being paid to the increasingly onerous problems of internal security (arising from the nationalist non-co-operation movement and increasing Hindu-Moslem animosity), and tribal control on the turbulent North-West Frontier<sup>26</sup>.

Concern with Soviet Russian intentions, reinforced by Moscow's claim to the island of Urta Tagai in the river Oxus in 1926 (the island having been under de facto Afghan possession for many years) led to the formulation by the War Office in November 1927 of the Defence of India Plan to counter any Russian attack on Afghanistan. The plan assumed the friendliness of the latter and a generally quiescent tribal attitude, and it proposed action only in the event of a Soviet invasion of Afghanistan - and at the invitation of the Afghan Government, whose co-operation in such an event was anticipated. The plan involved the employment of the Army in India and a British Expeditionary Force and 'The main object was to defeat the Russian forces of invasion,



to delay and embarrass their advance as soon as they had threatened the integrity of Afghanistan thereby reducing their efficiency and either forcing them to abandon the campaign in its earlier stages, or so reducing their efficiency that the main battles would take place under most favourable circumstances<sup>27</sup>.

The outline of the plan was largely prepared in 1928-29 but official interest quickly waned due to Russia's internal pre-occupations, her involvement in border conflict with Japan in the Far East, and Britain's growing concern with the rising power of Nazi Germany. By 1937, the plan was of only academic significance and had been shelved for all practical purposes. At best it was a scheme, incompletely pursued, to defend Afghanistan and ultimately India against a Russian attack from Central Asia as far from India frontiers as possible<sup>28</sup>.

The authorities immediately responsible for Indian defence disagreed with the assumptions underlying the Defence of India Plan. They were mainly concerned with the traditional contingency of waging a limited war with Afghanistan from India's own resources - i.e. a plan to meet possible Afghan and tribal hostility which could, if necessary, be expanded to include operations against an invading Russian army. The result of this viewpoint was the Blue Plan of

1927, which was designed to meet the former need by means of an offensive against Afghanistan on two lines of advance aimed at Kabul and Kandahar with the aim of compelling the Afghan Government to sue for peace at an early date<sup>29</sup>.

The Blue Plan was jettisoned in 1931 for the Pink Plan<sup>30</sup>. This scheme was limited in scope and constituted a restraining action in the event that the ruler of Afghanistan showed symptoms of hostility or seemed inclined to go over to the side of Russia. The operations would consist of an advance by the Northern and Western Armies to occupy Dakha and Wat Thana respectively, and thence continue onwards to Jalalabad and Kandahar. There was no provision for any advance beyond these last two points. The plan was, in effect, a peacetime exercise based upon hypothetical diplomatic appreciations, conceived for a limited purpose and based upon the resources available in India.

Both the Defence of India Plan and the Pink Plan were framed upon the assumption of Soviet antagonism with or without the collaboration of Afghanistan. The only threat against which provision was made was that to the North-West Frontier, and no fear was entertained concerning the security of the north-eastern approaches, the coastline, or the interior of the country. This complacency was dispelled by German rearmament, the conclusion of the Rome-Berlin Axis

and of the Anti-Comintern Pact between Germany, Italy and Japan in 1936, and Italian activities in Abyssinia and Afghanistan. German and Italian policies posed an increasing threat to Britain in the West while Japan's ambitions for a 'co-prosperity sphere' in the south-western Pacific, her successes in China and growing influence in Siam represented a potential threat to Indian security from the East. At the same time, British authorities remained of the view that Russia continued to pose a threat to the North-Western Frontier. These changes in the international situation were considered to 'have materially increased India's vulnerability and her potential commitments'<sup>31</sup>.

These new circumstances, coupled with certain conditional external commitments previously accepted by the Government of India<sup>32</sup>, compelled reconsideration of the Pink Plan. A revision of this plan was contemplated as early as 1936 but had been deferred by the operations in Waziristan in 1936-37 and the fluidity of the general situation. The decision had been taken, however, to adjust the Pink Plan as, in view of India's growing (especially external) commitments, the available land forces were not adequate for a simultaneous offensive in both the Kabul & Jalalabad and Kandahar areas. Thus it had been decided to abandon, or at least defer until a later stage of the war, the advance on Kandahar and to

concentrate on a vigorous offensive on the Jalalabad line.

A revision of the Pink Plan was taken up in earnest in 1938 when an Outline Plan of Operations was drafted and considered by the General Staff (India)<sup>33</sup>. The Outline Plan envisaged the possibility of war with Afghanistan and included within its scope the control of the cis-frontier tribes, the maintenance of internal security in India and the provision of a striking force at the frontier railheads. The appreciation of Afghan military strength was based on active support to Kabul by the cis- and trans-frontier tribes. Assistance to Afghanistan from a foreign country was not taken into account as in that event the war would become an Imperial responsibility.

The plan had the limited object of ensuring that the Afghan Government would seek an early peace so as to avoid disintegration or prolonged occupation of the country. Economic pressure on Afghanistan in the event of a war was impracticable as that country's trade routes to the north and west did not admit of blockade, hence it was proposed to prevent the supply of war material or the furnishing of credit to Kabul by foreign powers. The appreciation also took into account that Muslim sympathy in India for the Afghans in any such war might result in widespread disaffection against the Government and constitute a threat to internal security.

The plan of operations was based on the hypothesis that the Afghans would have the initiative in launching any attack and that the war would commence with air raids and anti-British propaganda in the frontier districts and Waziristan on a large scale. Such a situation would be countered by a determined and rapid advance into Afghanistan by the field army, with the Covering Troops engaging the tribal forces. The hostile forces would be met as near to the frontiers as was practicable, most likely on the Khyber-Jalalabad-Kabul line of advance. The British campaign would commence with air action aimed at destroying the Afghan air force and various military objectives concurrently with the occupation of Jalalabad; it was hoped that this latter action combined with air attacks and minor diversionary actions on the Kandahar line of advance would compel Kabul to sue for peace. If the expected result did not materialise immediately, a further advance towards Kabul was contemplated, mainly by the Khyber route, with utilization of the Chaman-Kandahar approach for executing diversions and thereby preventing Afghanistan from concentrating its forces against the main advance.

The Outline Plan was rendered obsolete by a change in policy in mid-1938, whereby Afghanistan was considered by the Commander-in-Chief (India) to be an Imperial, rather

than a local Indian, concern. Subsequent planning was thus based on a purely defensive policy which included defence of the frontiers and coastline; any idea of a large-scale offensive into Afghanistan was excluded from the calculations, although small localised counter-actions were not ruled out.

The altered basis of policy led to the issuance of an Interim Plan of Operations in August 1938, this scheme being replaced later in the year by the 'Plan of Operations (India) 1938' though without any substantial change<sup>34</sup>. This latter plan governed Indian defence policy at the time of the commencement of World War II.

The underlying note of these two plans was that an isolated attack against India by Afghanistan was most unlikely and that the latter would launch such an attack only if compelled to do so by circumstances beyond its immediate control. If such an attack were launched, it was conceived as involving regular land and air forces enjoying foreign assistance and supported by tribals from both sides of the Durand Line. In reply to such an event, the army in India would adopt a purely defensive role - no immediate counter-advance into Afghanistan being envisaged. Specified vital areas would be defended and the existing position maintained against the tribes. As the plan was eminently defensive in character, it was comprehensive enough to provide

simultaneously for the defence of the North-West Frontier, internal security, coastal defence and overseas commitments.

In the meantime, the maintenance of an efficient and up-to-date Indian military and naval establishment had been hampered by fluctuating revenues and the opposition of Indian nationalist opinion to increased defence expenditures. This situation led the Government of India towards increasing reliance upon the Home Exchequer. In 1933, His Majesty's Government commenced payment of an annual subsidy of £1.5 million towards the modernization of Indian defences and, in 1938, further negotiations were held between the British and Indian Governments regarding Indian defence problems.

In an agreement concluded between the two governments in January 1938, Britain agreed to the cessation of India's annual naval subvention of £100,000 on condition that India maintained an ocean-going squadron of not less than six modern escort vessels to co-operate with the Royal Navy. In subsequent negotiations, His Majesty's Government indicated its willingness to increase the annual grant towards Indian defence by £500,000 from 1st April 1939, and to transfer four British battalions stationed in India from the Indian to the Imperial Establishment. It also proposed to ask Parliament to authorize a capital grant to India of up to £5 million for the re-equipment of certain British and Indian

units in India and to provide aircraft for the re-equipment of certain squadrons of the Royal Air Force based in India<sup>35</sup>. The offers were, however, conditional upon the Imperial Reserve being definitely assigned and a clear and precise definition of its role being accepted. The Government of India agreed to these conditions<sup>36</sup>.

The problems of Indian defence were assessed later in the year by an expert committee appointed by His Majesty's Government at the request of the Government of India and presided over by Admiral of the Fleet, Lord Chatfield<sup>37</sup>. The findings of the committee were submitted to Whitehall on 6 February 1939 and, together with the recorded views of the Chiefs of Staff, were considered by the Cabinet on 28 June 1939<sup>38</sup>. The Chatfield Committee Report was published on 4 September 1939 with the announcement that His Majesty's Government had accepted it with minor modifications. In the meantime, in anticipation of acceptance of the report by Whitehall, the Indian Government had commenced the modernization and mechanization of the army, the improvement of port defences and the raising of the first Indian Air Force squadron and of some flights for coastal defence. Although the Imperial Reserve as such had not been formed up to the outbreak of World War II, elements assigned to it were despatched overseas in August.



The defence expenditure of India for the last inter-war year (1938-39) totalled Rs 46.68 crores - about 23 per cent of the total revenues of the Central Government. The British subsidy towards Indian defence represented about three per cent of India's total defence costs, and the maintenance of the several Indian battalions who formed part of the normal peacetime garrisons in Malaya and Hong Kong was charged to the Home Exchequer.

The Army in India consisted of about 57,000 British and 200,000 Indian combatants<sup>39</sup>, a Reserve of 40,000, an Auxiliary Force of 24,000, the Indian Territorial Force of 20,000 and the Indian States Force of 40,000. There were tribal levies on the North-West Frontier and sanction for British authority in the frontier areas of Assam was provided by five battalions of Assam Rifles - a semi-military force, mostly Gurkha, which was commanded by British officers seconded from the Indian Army; its cost was charged against the revenues of the Assam Government.

The regular army was organized in four Commands (Northern, Southern, Eastern and Western) with a field force of four divisions (one of which was earmarked as an expeditionary force, with an infantry brigade already in Egypt and an infantry brigade group and a mountain artillery regiment in Malaya/Singapore), a covering force of about twelve mixed

brigades on the North-West Frontier, and internal security formations. There was a general shortage of anti-tank guns, light machine-guns, mortars, pistols, sub-machine guns and modern field artillery. The deployment of the army was traditional. The officer cadre was largely British and, on 1st October 1939, there were only 396 Indian officers (including three brigadiers) in the combatant arms as against a total officer cadre in these arms of 4,424 - a ratio of 1:10.1<sup>40</sup>. The Service was responsible for internal security, tribal control on the North-West Frontier, defence of India against sporadic attacks by hostile air and naval forces in co-operation with the navy and air force, defence of India against attack by a minor power like Afghanistan, and defence of Imperial outposts in the Middle East and the Far East as bastions of India's external defences<sup>41</sup>.

The Indian Navy was comprised of eight minor vessels<sup>42</sup> and was responsible for the naval defence of India's ports and coastline and a contribution towards safeguarding the maritime communications of the Empire. India was also required to provide bases and facilities for the repair and fuelling of Imperial vessels.

The air force in India consisted of one incomplete IAF squadron<sup>43</sup> and six RAF squadrons<sup>44</sup> and preparations were underway for the formation of some coastal defence flights.

With the exception of the Blenheims, all the aircraft were obsolete. There were no bases suitable for an up-to-date air force; the few bases available were all located on the North-West Frontier<sup>45</sup> and none possessed an all-weather runway over 1,100 yards in length<sup>46</sup>. This force was responsible for air aspects of internal security, tribal control on the North-West Frontier, resisting a threat from Afghanistan or Russia, defence of India's ports and coastline against enemy raiders in co-operation with the other two services, and reinforcement of 'the bastions of India's external defences'<sup>47</sup>.

The general needs of the army were met by a modest ordnance establishment consisting of a Metal and Steel Factory (Ishapore), a Rifle Factory (Ishapore), a Gun and Shell Factory (Cossipore), a Gun Carriage Factory (Jubbulpore), an Ammunition Factory (Kirki), a Cordite Factory (Aruvankadu), a Harness and Boot Factory (Cawnpore) and an ordnance clothing factory at Shahjahanpur. The armed services, however, were dependent upon external (mainly British) sources of supply for all major items of weaponry and technical equipment. Ford and General Motors' assembly plants in India met most of the civilian needs of vehicles but military vehicles were provided by Canadian and American suppliers. Shipbuilding capacity was limited to minor

vessels and there was no aircraft industry or even aircraft repair facilities in India.

The war provoked another noteworthy military effort by India. The army was expanded to a force of over two million men, the navy to 126 vessels of all types and the air force to nine squadrons<sup>48</sup>. Shipyards in Bombay, Calcutta and Karachi constructed merchant vessels and small naval craft. Aircraft repair and maintenance facilities ~~erre~~<sup>were</sup> established at Bangalore under the registered name of Hindustan Aircraft Limited<sup>49</sup>. The ordnance establishment was expanded to a total of 30 production units, including 17 'ordnance', nine clothing, two parachute and two harness and saddlery<sup>50</sup>. India was developed into the staging and supply base for the South-East Asian theatre. Indian forces served with distinction in East and North Africa, the Middle East, Sicily and Italy and throughout South-East Asia, their major effort being in the last theatre<sup>51</sup>. Some 50,000 Indian servicemen lost their lives during the course of the conflict.

In the financial sphere, however, the Government of India did not repeat the policy followed in the Great War (1914-18) of accepting financial liability for its regular peacetime forces employed outside India's frontiers. India's financial commitments in the defence sphere throughout the war were thus determined by the provisions of the financial

settlement concluded between the British and Indian Governments in November 1939<sup>52</sup>. All heavy equipment was either provided by America under Lend-Lease or by Britain without charge, the British Exchequer bore the expenses of all Indian troops serving outside India, including Burma, and the costs of all airfields constructed in India in connection with the operations in South-East Asia Command were absorbed by Britain and the United States<sup>53</sup>.

The Second World War provided many useful lessons for the planners of Indian defence.

It confirmed the conclusion of the Chatfield Committee regarding the need for India to associate itself, for its very survival, with the defence of the Middle East and South-East Asia. In the West, the approach of Nazi armies to India's very borders had been thwarted only by Imperial forces in the Western desert and by Russia's tenacious resistance at Leningrad, Stalingrad and in the Caucasus. In the East, the occupation of Vietnam had given Japan control of the sea and air routes from north and north-east Asia to the south-east. Thailand had provided Japan with the spring-board for the conquest of Burma and Malaya/Singapore, while the Japanese capture of Malaya/Singapore and the Philippines, coupled with naval supremacy, had rendered the Netherlands East Indies indefensible. The loss of Singapore and Burma

had in turn exposed eastern India to attack by land, sea and air.

There had been an excessive reliance upon distance, physical geography and potential, as opposed to actual, allied military power to deter a would-be aggressor and to contain his advances distant from India's land and maritime frontiers. Despite ominous indications of Japanese hostility and territorial designs since at least the late 1930s, India's defence planners had concentrated on countering the 'historical bogey' of a possible invasion through the traditional invasion route in the north-west. As the official British war historian has written:

An invasion of India's north-eastern frontier across the grain of the country had never been visualised because of the distance of any possible enemy, the difficulties of the terrain and the fact that such communications as there were in Burma ran north and south. The traditional threat had always been from the north-west and India's defences had been planned to meet it.<sup>54</sup>

Thus, the army and the logistical infra-structure had been disposed for operations in the north-west and had actually been strengthened from 1939 to 1941<sup>55</sup>. On the other hand, the only force maintained in Burma after its separation from India in 1937 had comprised two British infantry battalions, four battalions of Burma Rifles, a small engineer force, a mountain battery and a field company loaned from India, three battalions of Burma Military

Police, six battalions of the Burma Frontier Force (converted from Burma Military Police in 1937) and the Burma Auxiliary Force drawn from the European, Anglo-Burmese and Anglo-Indian communities<sup>56</sup>. There had been virtually no defence works on Burma's eastern frontier and the absence of anything but the most rudimentary communications had rendered the deployment and maintenance of large forces to counter the Japanese threat a difficult and costly task far in excess of India's capabilities.

The Japanese threat had illustrated Britain's inability to secure India against attack by a major power from the east while simultaneously waging a desperate struggle for her own existence against a modern military foe west of Suez. It attested to the relatively limited military capabilities of India, without major external succour. The famine in Bengal in 1942-43 and the mass panic which had gripped eastern India at the appearance of Japanese naval units and aircraft in the Bay of Bengal in 1942 were pointed reminders of certain problems of resources and national morale which could have far-reaching consequences for Indian defence in times of acute national danger. Also, as the Government of India noted in a statement on industrial policy released in 1945: 'The experience of two wars has demonstrated the dangers, both to India and to the rest of

the Commonwealth, inherent in India's dependence on overseas supplies for vital commodities required for defence,<sup>57</sup>.

With the successful conclusion of the Pacific War, the question of India's postwar defence requirements was the subject of a number of articles by various British and Indian military writers. Most of these observers argued the need for a regional approach to Indian security, the most popular proposal being for a regional Commonwealth strategy in which India would play a focal role<sup>58</sup>. The most comprehensive argumentation for a scheme was advanced by K.M. Panikkar, a man described by Alan Campbell-Johnson in 1951 (at which time he was India's ambassador to the People's Republic of China) as 'one of about half a dozen men who may well have a great influence in the shaping of Indian policy at home and abroad'<sup>59</sup>.

Writing in 1945, Panikkar recognized that 'The present war has altered the character of Indian defence. It has extended the geography of defence so far as India is concerned. The outer rim on which India's security was based - the Ring Fence system - inherited from the Company, must now, with the increasing range of modern weapons, extend beyond the buffer-states of Curzon'<sup>60</sup>. In a pamphlet published the same year, he stated that 'Indian freedom can be achieved and upheld only by firmly deciding to shoulder our share at



all costs in the active defence of the areas necessary for our own security,<sup>61</sup>.

Panikkar's conception of the desired regional defence organization was put forth in a series of essays published between 1943 and 1946. In his first paper, published in 1943, he suggested the establishment of a Triune Commonwealth comprising India, Pakistan and Burma united as a single defence area with full British support and co-operation to form the main structure for peace and security in Asia<sup>62</sup>. Expanding on this theme in a second monograph, published two years later, he argued that it was India's responsibility - as Britain's natural successor state - to provide the main forces to man the series of air and naval bases guarding the approaches to the Indian Ocean. Such an Indo-British association would, in his view, usher in the Fourth British Empire which could justly claim the moral leadership of the world<sup>63</sup>. In a 1946 essay concerning the geo-political situation of India in the atomic age, Panikkar declared that India would, in association with Russian land power, be nothing more than an appendage and that she should ally herself with Britain in organizing the Rimland to counter the Russian-dominated Heartland<sup>64</sup>.

In the meantime, the British authorities had made their own assessment of India's postwar military requirements<sup>65</sup>

and, as of October 1946, planning appears to have aimed at the creation of an army comprised of a 'few' infantry divisions, an armoured division, an airborne division and 'some' frontier brigade groups; the development of a balanced fleet having a nucleus of three cruisers; and the expansion of the existing ten RIAF squadrons into a balanced force of twenty fighter, bomber and transport squadrons backed by the necessary repair, maintenance and administrative facilities<sup>66</sup>.

Due to the political situation, however, such planning was necessarily tentative; the ultimate decisions as regards the postwar defence policy of India were left to the political leadership of emerging nationalist India which had assumed the responsibilities of de facto power with the formation of the Interim Government, headed by Jawaharlal Nehru, in September 1946.

#### Notes

1 See appendix V for the progress of defence expenditure for selected years between 1858 and 1947. For a comparison of Indian defence expenditure with selected other countries for the years 1928-29 and 1936-37, or as otherwise signified, see appendix VI.

2 In view of its relevance to the post-1947 period, the policy pursued by the British Indian Government in the Himalayan region has been briefly reviewed and enclosed as appendix VII.

3 As one observer has written, with reference to the assessment made at the time, there was 'no question of using

the Indian Army against a European foe...the [Army] committee's proposals were naturally framed primarily with a view to internal security'. Sir Michael O'Dwyer, "India's Manpower in the War", The Army Quarterly, 2:2 (July 1921), p. 251.

4 For the establishment of the Company's armies on the eve of the Mutiny, see appendix VIII. The expenditure of the Company on defence had increased from £1,447,576 (1765-66) to £3 millions (1793), £7 millions (1834-35), nearly £12 millions (1846-47) and in 1856-57 totalled about £15 millions out of a total expenditure of £31.9 millions - nearly 50 per cent. P.J. Thomas, The Growth of Federal Finance in India (Madras, Oxford University Press, 1939), pp. 48-51.

5 The service, which had a distinguished record in local and foreign wars, was comprised in 1857 of 24 steam vessels, 18 sailing ships, 19 river steamers and three surveying vessels. Marine charges for that year totalled £2,370,030. Thomas, ibid, p. 51.

6 The Indian Navy was replaced by the non-combatant Bombay Marine which, in 1877, was amalgamated with the other naval establishments in India to form Her Majesty's Indian Marine (renamed Royal Indian Marine in 1892). The RIM was responsible for: the transport of troops and government stores; the maintenance of station ships in Burma, the Andamans, Aden and the Persian Gulf for political, police, lighting and other purposes; the maintenance of gunboats on the Irrawaddy and the Euphrates; and the construction, repair, manning and general supervision of all local government craft for military purposes. H.H. Dodwell (ed.), The Cambridge History of the British Empire (hereinafter called The Cambridge History), vol. 5: The Indian Empire 1858-1918 (London, Cambridge University Press, 1932), pp. 150-1. In 1869, India commenced payment of a subvention towards the Royal Navy which, from 1896, totalled £100,000 per annum.

7 The official attitude towards the problem posed to India by the Russian threat was aptly summed up by the Secretary of State for India, Lord Kimberly, in a letter to the Viceroy, Lord Dufferin, dated 28 May 1885: 'It is sad that instead of devoting ourselves to internal improvements, we must give our principal thoughts to warlike preparations, but there is no help for it. Russia is not a Power to be lightly dealt with, and the only argument she pays attention to is, unhappily, force'. Cited, Rose Louise Greaves, Persia and the Defence of India (University of London, Athlone Press

1959), p. 13. In the view of one British official, however, from the approach of Russia to the North-West Frontier the British 'may well pluck the flower of internal safety: for we may say to the Russians what Charles II said to his brother: "Depend upon it, they will never kill me to make you king". Sir Mounstuart Elphinstone Grant-Duff, cited in ibid, p. 12.

8 For the resulting army establishment, which remained fairly static until the Great War, see appendix IX.

9 Extract from Lord Curzon's budget speech, 27 May 1901. Cited, Lord Curzon in India (London, Macmillan 1906), p. 408. When completed in 1904, the system consisted of 5,000 regulars and tribal levies sited beyond the administrative boundary, backed by support columns at Peshawar, Kohat, Chakdarra, Malakhand, Dargai and Dera Ismail Khan.

10 As one observer has written, Lord Curzon was 'emphatically against a forward movement [occupation of the tribal areas] except that he wished to remain in Chitral. He was equally against any procedure which might imply a definite retreat. He chose a middle course'. Lovat Fraser, India Under Curzon And After (London, William Heinemann, 1911), p. 51.

11 The Mutiny had led to a substantial change in recruitment policy in favour of major reliance upon the 'martial classes' of the north and north-west (Sikhs, Gurkhas, Rajputs, etc.) who had remained loyal to Britain during the Mutiny. The Russian threat and the financially motivated emphasis upon quality rather than numbers prompted the deliberate enlistment of these classes to the exclusion of other regions and communities. For the changes in the communal and regional composition of the Indian Army during the 1856-1930 period, and the response during the Great War of 1914-18, see appendix X.

12 The Army in India and its Evolution (Calcutta, Superintendent Government Printing, 1924), p. 27.

13 The divisions were echeloned back from the North-West Frontier along the strategic railway lines, facilitating the despatch - in the event of a Russian threat to Afghanistan - of one army to the line of the Helmund and the other to the heights beyond Kabul. For the resulting composition and distribution of the army, see appendix XI.

14 For a useful survey of ordnance development under the Company, see Brigadier-General H.A. Young, The East India Company's Arsenals and Manufactories (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1937).

15 For the composition of the army as of 1914, see appendix XII. Indian troops were organized into 39 cavalry regiments, 95 single-battalion infantry regiments, eleven two-battalion infantry regiments and twelve single-battalion Pioneer regiments; about two-thirds of the units were organized in class companies, with the remainder in class regiments (all ranks being of the same class, such as Sikh, Rajput, etc.). The British troops were organized in nine cavalry regiments and 51 infantry battalions.

16 India paid an annual naval subvention of £100,000 towards the upkeep of three ships of the Royal Navy which, without the consent of the Government of India, could not normally be employed south of an imaginary line drawn from Aden to the south of Socotra and thence to Bombay.

17 Cited, The Cambridge History, vol. 5, p. 476. India's provision of forces and units for employment in China (1860), Abyssinia (1867-68), Perak (1875), Malta (1878), Egypt (1882), Suakim and Mombassa (1896), South Africa (1899-1902), China (1900-01) and Somaliland (1902-04) had been on an ad hoc basis and the expenses associated with their use had usually been charged against Britain.

18 For comments from the Indian press and leaders of Indian opinion, see India and the War (London, Hodder & Stoughton), pp. 54-74.

19 It must be noted, however, that India bore only the expenses of her normal peacetime army, the remaining troops being maintained at British expense.

20 The Army in India and its Evolution, p. 47. For the establishment of the army as of 1923, valid until the eve of the Second World War, see appendix XIII.

21 Enrolment for this force was voluntary but restricted to persons of British or mixed descent. The force was liable for local service in an emergency.

22 The Indian Territorial Force was designed to stimulate Indian interest in defence. It consisted of provincial battalions (affiliated to regular regiments and liable for

external service in an emergency), urban battalions (liable for service only in their province of origin) and a university training corps subject to no liability.

23 The first Indian cadet was appointed to Sandhurst in 1918 but, of the first 83 entrants (of whom 35 were from the Punjab and twelve from the Bombay Presidency), approximately 30 per cent failed to pass out - as against three per cent of the British cadets. William Gutteridge, "The Indianisation of the Indian Army 1918-45", Race, 4 (May 1963), p. 41. Gutteridge expresses the view that the cost of sending a son to Sandhurst (Rs 7,000-11,000) may have inhibited many parents of well-qualified youths. In a private view recorded in 1924, however, the Commander-in-Chief, General Rawlinson, speculated that the educated class had a dislike for discipline and hard work, and that the average Indian boy lacked the love of leadership and of soldiering. See C.H. Philips (general ed.), Select Documents on the History of India and Pakistan (hereinafter referred to as Select Documents), vol. 4: The Evolution of India and Pakistan 1858-1947 (London, Oxford University Press, 1962), p. 530.

24 The units comprised: 7th Light Cavalry, 17th Light Cavalry, 2/1st Madras Pioneers, 4/19th Hyderabad Regiment, 5th Royal Battalion - 5th Mahratta Light Infantry, 1/7th Rajput Regiment, 1/14th Punjab Regiment and 2/1st Punjab Regiment.

25 The committee attributed the dearth of good Indian officer candidates to the narrow scope of the Indianization scheme and the inhibitions imposed by the high standards and the high rate of failures. It recommended a substantial and progressive scheme of Indianization involving an immediate increase from ten to twenty in the number of vacancies reserved for Indians at Sandhurst, a further increase of four places per annum up to 1933, and the establishment in that year of an Indian Sandhurst with a capacity for 100 cadets. If its proposals were accepted and implemented, the committee envisaged that, by 1945, half of the annual intake of officers for the Indian Army would be Indians and that, by 1952, half of the officer cadre of the Indian Army would be Indian. The relevant extracts from the report are cited in Select Documents, vol. 4., pp. 531-2.

26 The Curzon scheme of tribal control had completely broken down in 1919, forcing reversion to a policy of 'pacification through civilisation' which involved the reoccupation of the tribal areas by regular troops based upon good

communications and augmented by tribal levies. The burden was heavy, amounting to about £30 millions for the inter-war period, of which £3-4 millions was expended on military expeditions against the fanatical tribals - including the sweep of 40,000 troops through Waziristan in 1936-37. For a good review of the entire problem, see Sir William Barton, India's North Western Frontier (London, John Murray, 1939).

27 Bisheshwar Prasad, Defence of India: Policy and Plans, Combined Inter-Services Historical Section, India and Pakistan (Orient Longmans, 1963), p. 23.

28 For further details, see ibid, pp. 22-9.

29 See ibid, p. 30.

30 See ibid, pp. 30-3.

31 "Defence Policy in India 1936-37, 'Change in the International Situation affecting India's Defence Policy and Commitments'", p. 5. Cited in ibid, p. 35.

32 By 1937, the G.O.I. had accepted various conditional commitments in the Middle East, Malaya, Singapore and Hong Kong amounting to over a division. Due to confusion resulting from certain schemes being held in abeyance and lack of clarity as to whether the schemes were alternative ones, the British War Office, in early 1937, endorsed a classification of the schemes according to priority. See appendix XIV.

33 For further details, see Defence of India: Policy and Plans, pp. 36-9.

34 See ibid, pp. 40-54.

35 Copy of Military Despatch No. 5, dated 10/8/39, from Secretary of State, pp. 1-2.

36 The principle enunciated was that Recent changes in international and strategical conditions have made it imperative that there shall be a more precise and definite standing agreement between His Majesty's Government and the Government of India that forces to the extent of one division and four air squadrons re-equipped according to modern standards, shall be maintained in India for the primary purpose of furnishing reinforcements in an emergency to areas East of the Mediterranean. These

forces, if not required for their primary role, as described above, may be made available for the defence of India against aggression from an external enemy or for the maintenance of the Internal Security of India. The decision as to the actual employment of these forces in an emergency will rest with His Majesty's Government and they will therefore only be available for employment under the Government of India after consultation with His Majesty's Government.

Telegram from Viceroy to Secretary of State, XX No. 1265-S dated 24 September 1938, para. 4. Cited in Defence of India: Policy and Plans, p. 7.

37 The Committee's terms of reference were

In the light of the recent Report of the Chiefs of Staff and of the Reports of the Cabinet Committee on the Defence of India, and having regard to the increased cost of modern armaments to the desirability of organising, equipping and maintaining the Forces of India in accordance with modern requirements, and to the limited resources available in India for defence expenditure, to examine and report in the light of experience gained in executing the British rearmament programme, how these resources can be used to the best advantage and to make recommendations.

Chatfield Committee Report 1938-9, introduction, p. 4.

38 For a summary of the committee's report, see appendix XV.

39 For the composition of the Indian Army on the eve of the war, see appendix XVI.

40 Nandan Prasad, Expansion of the Armed Forces and Defence Organisation 1939-45, Combined Inter-Services Historical Section, India and Pakistan (London, Orient Longmans, 1956), p. 182.

41 Ibid, p. 393.

42 See appendix XVII.

43 These comprised: No. 5 (army co-operation) and No. 27 (bomber) equipped with Wapiti aircraft; No's 20 and 28 (army co-operation) equipped with Audax aircraft; No. 31 (bomber transport) equipped with Valentias; and No. 60 (bomber)



equipped with Blenheim Is. S. Woodburn Kirby, The War Against Japan, vol. I (London, H.M.S.O., 1957), p. 38. Personnel consisted of 219 commissioned officers, 31 warrant officers and 1,888 other ranks. Expansion of the Armed Forces and Defence Organisation, 1939-45, pp. 408-9.

45 As near as can be ascertained, the bases were sited at Ambala, Quetta, Risalpur, Peshawar, Kohat and Miranshah, with an advanced base at Arawali in the upper Kurram.

46 Kirby, op. cit., p. 38.

47 Expansion of the Armed Forces and Defence Organisation 1939-45, pp. 398-9. Two RAF bomber squadrons had been sent to Malaya/Singapore in August.

48 For the composition of these Services at the conclusion of the European conflict, see appendix XVIII. Details regarding the provincial, state, communal and class compositions of the Services is given in appendix XIX.

49 The company was formed in 1940, with the financial aid of the Indian Government, by a Mr W.D. Pawley, President of Inter-Continental Corporation of New York (a large exporter of American aircraft to the Far East) with the purpose of manufacturing light aircraft for the Indian market. It passed under the control of the Indian Government in April 1942 and was managed and operated by the United States Tenth Army Air Force from September 1943 to December 1945 for the maintenance, repair and overhaul of aero-frames, -engines and accessories. At its peak, the factory employed 18,000 personnel. Leonard Bridgman (ed.) Jane's All The World's Aircraft (London, Sampson Low Marston & Co., 1947), p. 103c. According to a British war historian, however, the Indian Government sponsored the plant to overcome the difficulty in obtaining aircraft from overseas sources. The War Cabinet purportedly did not favour the scheme in the belief that greater use could be made of valuable raw materials for construction of operational aircraft by the well-established aircraft factories in England. The Indian Government nonetheless went ahead with the scheme. Plans envisaged the production of the first training-type aircraft by May 1941 and of light bombers in December 1941, but these plans were not realised due mainly to the difficulty experienced in finding skilled technicians and mechanics in India - confirming thereby the fears of the British Government. See Kirby, op. cit., vol. 1, p. 40.

50 See Lt. General Sir Wilfred Lindsell, "The Development of India as a Base for Military Operations", RUSI Journal (May 1947), p. 223. Training schemes turned out 50,000 workers, supervisors, tool-setters and highly-skilled artisans, and the labour force in the ordnance factories increased from 15,000 (1939) to 100,000 by 1944. See letter by Sir Gerald Butler published in The Daily Telegraph on 17 November 1962.

51 Indian personnel comprised 80 per cent of the British Commonwealth and Empire forces in Malaya, China, Indochina and Indonesia on V-J day, totalling about 700,000 men. Brigadier J.N. Chaudhuri, "The Indian Army", Asiatic Review (January 1947, p. 306.

52 Under the agreement (which remained in force until 31 March 1947), India was to meet: (a) a fixed annual sum representing normal net effective cost of the forces in India under peace conditions. This was fixed at Rs 36,77 crores, being the net budget estimate for defence services, excluding non-effective charges, for 1939-40; (b) an addition to allow for the rise in prices; (c) the cost of such war measures as were purely Indian liabilities by reason of their having been undertaken by India in her own interest; and (d) a lump sum payment of Rs 1 crore towards the cost of maintaining India's external defence troops overseas. The total amount by which the defence expenditure exceeded the sum of items (a) to (c) was recoverable from the British Government. R.N. Bhargava, The Theory and Working of Union Finance in India (London, Allen & Unwin, 1956), p. 281.

53 The total recoverable war expenditure for the period 1939-40 to 1946-47 was Rs 1,791.35 crores as against Rs 1,763.19 on India's account. Ibid, p. 282, footnote.

54 Kirby, op. cit., vol. 2 (London, HMSO 1958), xvi.

55 For details of planning during this period, see Defence of India: Policy and Plans, pp. 61-135.

56 Kirby, op. cit., vol. II, p. 8.

57 Cited in Select Documents, p. 700.

58 See, for example, Lt. Colonel G.L.W. Armstrong, "The Defence of the Indian Ocean and the Far East", USI Journal, 77:326 (January 1947), pp. 71-3; Lt. Colonel S.G. Chaphekar, "A Frank Survey of India's Defence Problems", ibid, 78:327

(April 1947), pp. 240-5; Lt. Colonel G.N. Molesworth, "Some Aspects of Future Security in the Indian Ocean Area", Asiatic Review (January 1946), pp. 28-9.

59 Mission With Mountbatten (London, Robert Hale 1951), p. 269.

60 "Defence and National Efficiency", Asiatic Review (July 1945), p. 293.

61 India and the Indian Ocean (London, Allen & Unwin, 1945), p. 16.

62 The Future of South-East Asia (London, Allen & Unwin, 1943).

63 India and the Indian Ocean, .

64 The Basis of an Indo-British Treaty (London, ICWA, 1946). For a similar viewpoint, see Lt. General H.G. Martin, "India's New National Army", The Daily Telegraph, 22 November 1946.

65 See appendix XX.

66 See Field Marshal Sir Claude Auchinleck, "Planning India's Post-War Armed Forces", USI Journal, 76:325 (October 1946), pp. 321-2.

## CHAPTER II

### THE ORIGINS, BASES AND AIMS OF INDIAN DEFENCE POLICY

The nationalist leaders of independent India brought with them into responsible office a long tradition of opposition to the defence policy of the British Raj.

During the period up to 1919, Indian nationalist opinion, as expressed through the Indian National Congress, reflected prevailing opinion in influential British circles. In the context of India's pressing poverty, Congress argued the need to lessen the military burden on Indian revenues. There was no opposition to the stationing of an Imperial Reserve in India but it was felt that India's military liability should be confined to internal security and defence of the actual frontiers, thus excluding the costs of military operations carried on beyond those frontiers, military formations believed to be maintained in the sub-continent for this purpose and charges incurred by the British Army in India in excess of those that would otherwise be absorbed by a comparable body of Indian troops. There developed a general disbelief in the possibility of any Russian invasion

and a marked tendency to minimize the threats posed by Afghanistan and the militant tribes on the North-West Frontier - and to attribute much of the problem in this quarter to the imperialist urges of British authorities. A natural corollary of these premises was strong opposition to the 'forward policy' of projecting defence strategy beyond India's natural frontiers, particularly into the tribal territories in both the North-West and North-East, and general support for the reform effected by Lord Curzon on the North-West Frontier during the 1899-1904 period. There were persistent demands for greater Indian participation in defence - a broadening of the basis for recruitment to the Army and the grant of Army commissions to Indians<sup>1</sup>.

The general identification of Indian and British imperial interests was attested by the wholehearted support advanced by the INC for the Imperial war effort throughout World War I<sup>2</sup>. In the immediate aftermath of the war the Delhi Congress, meeting in December 1918, reiterated its loyalty to the Crown<sup>3</sup> and the militant nationalist and orthodox Hindi, B.G. Tilak, even envisaged in 1919 that India could function as a powerful steward of the League of Nations for maintaining the peace of the world and the stability of the British Empire against all aggressors and disturbers of peace whether in Asia or elsewhere<sup>4</sup>.

The identification of Indian and British interests vanished in 1920-21, however, with the emergence of a more independent and militant Congress under the leadership of Mohandas K. Gandhi. In September 1920, Congress adopted Gandhi's plan of non-co-operation with British authority and association with the Khilafat movement<sup>5</sup>, calling upon Indians not to offer themselves as recruits for service in Mesopotamia. In May 1921, Gandhi threatened to preach non-support for the Government in the event of hostilities between Britain and Afghanistan. The following month, the Congress Working Committee advised Indian soldiers not to co-operate with the British Government in the event of hostilities with the Turkish Nationalist Government. In November of the same year, the All India Congress Committee adopted its first formal declaration of independence from British foreign policy and the first statement of the foreign policy which a free India would like to pursue<sup>6</sup>. In accordance with its hardening attitude towards colonialism, Congress demanded in 1927 the withdrawal of all Indian troops from China, Mesopotamia, Persia and all British colonies and foreign countries<sup>7</sup>. At the same session, Congress recorded its opposition to the 'warlike' preparations of the British Indian Government, demanded their cessation and warned that it would not co-operate with any warlike adventures<sup>8</sup>. At its

Calcutta session the following year, Congress charged that the policy of the Government 'has been traditionally guided by considerations of holding India under subjection and not of protecting her frontiers' <sup>9</sup>.

The Congress was particularly emphatic in its condemnation of the reversion, after the Great War, to a 'forward policy' on the North-West Frontier. In 1931, it recorded the opinion that 'the military and financial resources of India should not be employed in furtherance of this policy and that the military occupation of the tribesmen's territory should be terminated' <sup>10</sup>. In 1936, Congress condemned the policy as a 'total failure', rejected the charge that the frontier Pathan tribes were truculent and aggressive as 'without foundation' and charged: 'This policy has been pursued in the interests of imperialism and mostly with the object of justifying the heavy military expenditure in India and of providing training under semi-war conditions for otherwise idle troops maintained for imperial purposes' <sup>11</sup>. There was a marked tendency, almost amounting to a conviction, to envisage a free India relatively secure against attack. While this view was based to a considerable degree upon emotion and the fact that nationalist leaders did not have the responsibilities of office, it was supported by pragmatic reasoning on the part of the influential Jawaharlal Nehru.

In his presidential address to the Kerala Provincial Conference of the INC at Payyanur on 28 May 1928, Nehru declared that India was protected by the balance of power. He dismissed the specific threats which might face a free India on various grounds. France, Germany and Italy were

too much involved in their mutual hatred and jealousies and are too afraid of each other to trouble us at all. The United States of America [the imperialism of which was feared by Nehru at this time as 'the great problem of the near future'<sup>12</sup>] are too far away for effective action. Japan has to face hostility of the United States and even of the Western European Powers and cannot dare embark on a new adventure, which would be fraught with the greatest risks for her. Afghanistan is strong in defence but weak in attack and it is inconceivable that with its limited resources it can do us any harm. It may at most carry out a number of successful raids before we can defeat it and hold it in check...<sup>13</sup>

He felt that Russia therefore

remains the sole danger but even this danger is largely imaginary, as every one knows or ought to know, that no country is in greater need of peace than Russia. The Great War, the civil war, the famine and the blockade have shaken her foundations and done her tremendous injury. She had made good much of her losses but above everything else she desires peace to build up the new social order she has established. Experts tell us that although strong in defence she is weak in attack. Her whole government is based on the good-will of the peasantry and she cannot count on this good-will in an oppressive campaign. She has so many enemies that she dare not of her own accord start an invasion of India and leave her Western flanks exposed to attack. Nor has she any economic reason to covet India... She wants capital and machinery and India can supply neither. We thus see that no danger threatens India from any direction and even if there is any danger we shall be able to cope with it.<sup>14</sup>



In his most comprehensive statement on Indian defence, contained in two articles published in 1931, Nehru expanded on his balance of power thesis as it related to India:

It may be that some will covet her, but the master desire will be to prevent any other nation from possessing India. No country will tolerate the idea of another acquiring the commanding position which England occupied for so long. If any power was covetous enough to make the attempt, all the others would combine to trounce the intruder. This mutual rivalry would in itself be the surest guarantee against an attack on India.

Thus, he concluded, an independent India would occupy a favourable position in the world largely free from the danger of external invasion and more secure than if she continued to be involved in British imperial policy<sup>15</sup>.

Speaking in London on 4 February 1936 under the auspices of the Indian Conciliation Group and in the context of a deteriorating international situation, Nehru once again advanced the view that a free India would enjoy relative security against external aggression. He felt that the frontier problem was not very difficult of solution and could be solved by a 'friendly approach' and on economic lines, as tribal restlessness was due to their harsh environment. Afghanistan was dismissed as a threat on the grounds that it possessed no offensive strength. Nehru felt that there was no Power in the contemporary world which was more peaceful and less inclined to aggression than the Soviet Union.

Russia 'does not require India in the least' from the economic point of view and, furthermore, dared not attack India 'not so much because of the strength of India but because any such thing involves to-day international complications, whether the invader is Japan or Russia...' He considered Japanese aggression against India as virtually precluded by Japan's fear of exposing her flanks to America and Russia, her (supposed) need to absorb China prior to any descent upon India and the fact that she would have to traverse South East Asia and overcome the (Western) naval forces there<sup>16</sup>.

Nehru's last pre-war pronouncement on defence was contained in an article entitled 'The Unity of India' written in January 1938. He again dismissed the possibility of an attack by a European power on the grounds that each was too fearful of its neighbours.

Soviet Russia is definitely out of the picture so far as aggression goes; she seeks a policy of international peace, and the question of Indian territory would fulfill no want of hers. Afghanistan and the border tribes also need not be considered in this connection. Our policy towards them will be one of close friendship and co-operation, utterly unlike the "Forward Policy" of the British which relies on bombing combatants and non-combatants alike. But even if these people were hostile and aggressive they are too backward industrially to meet a modern army outside their own mountains.

Nehru professed to have no fear of any attack by Japan which, in his view, would first have to absorb China, which

was a 'monumental task'; would have to engage in conflict with other great powers at some stage; the overland route was blocked by deserts and the Himalayas offered 'an effective barrier, and not even air fleets can come that way'; the maritime approach was long, intricate and dangerous. 'A Japanese invasion of India could become a practical proposition only if China has been completely crushed, and if the United States, the Soviet Union and England have all been effectively humbled. That is a large undertaking'<sup>17</sup>.

Thus we see that, normally speaking, there is no great or obvious danger of the invasion of India from without. Still, we live in an abnormal world, full of wars and aggression. International law has ceased to be, treaties and undertakings have no value, gangsterism prevails unabashed among the nations. We realise that anything may happen in this epoch of revolution and wars and that the only thing to be done to protect ourselves is to rely on our own strength at the same time that we pursue consciously a policy of peace. Risks have to be taken whatever the path we follow. These we are prepared to take, for we must.<sup>18</sup>

By the eve of World War II, therefore, the framework of Indian defence policy had been defined by the man whose pre-dispositions were to be mirrored in the defence posture ultimately adopted by the Indian Union. Nehru envisaged a free India secured against attack either by its geo-strategic position, its size or the balance of power. He did not dismiss the possibility of aggressive actions against India by Afghanistan or the tribes on the North-West Frontier, but he

was inclined to minimize the threat and regard even these contingencies as mostly of nuisance value and containable by relatively small but efficient armed forces. He contemplated the speedy development of an effective defence force and its employment in defence of the country's territorial integrity - primarily, it would seem, in accordance with the Curzon scheme in vogue on the North-West Frontier from 1904 to 1919<sup>19</sup>. The speedy withdrawal of British forces from a sovereign India was envisaged and the strong suspicion of, and aversion to, great power politics clearly weighed heavily against India's assumption of external military entanglements.

The attitude of Congress towards India's involvement in the Second World War was determined by the over-riding political desire to force political concessions from Britain as the price of co-operation. The price in these circumstances was nothing short of self-government immediately and the offer of independence upon the conclusion of hostilities, made by the Cripps Mission in March 1942, was rejected as inadequate. With seeming indifference to the Japanese threat to India's eastern frontiers, Congress supported Gandhi's 'Quit India' campaign in August 1942. When the Government replied by outlawing the Party and interning its leaders, a campaign of sabotage commenced only to be crushed within six weeks. The conduct of Congress, however, does not appear to

have unduly affected the mass of the Indian population whose support for the war effort exceeded that of the Great War - at least in terms of men, money and materials.

India's significant contribution to the Allied victory stimulated the nationalist view that a free India would exert a major influence in world affairs. Sir Mohammad Zafrullah Khan, chairman of the Indian delegation to the Third Unofficial Commonwealth Relations Conference (London 1945) and subsequently to serve as Foreign Minister of Pakistan, declared in his opening speech that 'The war has brought to India a forcible and vivid realisation of her own strategic importance and indeed of her own potential strategic domination in all the vast area of oceans and lands that lie between Australia and the west coast of Africa'<sup>20</sup>. Another prominent Indian stated in a book published at about this same time:

As a potential world power India has heavy obligations to discharge to any future world order. If she realises her potentiality, she must necessarily become dominant in the whole area from Australia to the West Coast of Africa and a vital factor in the protection of that area from internal or external aggression.<sup>21</sup>

This optimistic view was also reflected at the highest levels of the Congress Party. The deputy leader of the party, Asaf Ali, envisaged in early 1946 that an independent India would be capable of functioning as the 'policeman and arsenal

of the East'<sup>22</sup>. While in prison in 1944, Nehru recorded the view that both India and China were potentially capable of joining America, the Soviet Union and Britain (if the resources of the Empire were added to her own) as great powers and he estimated India's potential resources as probably even more varied and extensive than China's. Though he recognized that India was not a Pacific power, he felt that she would inevitably exercise great influence there while developing as the centre of political and economic activity in the Indian Ocean area, in South-East Asia and up to the Middle East<sup>23</sup>. The All India Congress Committee declared in September 1945 that a free India would 'especially seek to develop common policies for defence, trade and economic and cultural development with China, Burma, Malaya, Indonesia and Ceylon as well as the countries of the Middle East'<sup>24</sup>.

Nehru made a number of subsequent references to the strategic indivisibility of the Indian Ocean region. In a message to the youth of Ceylon delivered from Bombay on 9 October 1945, he declared that India 'is likely to become the centre for defence purposes and trade for Southern and South-East Asia. It is my hope that regional arrangements within the four corners of a world agreement will bind together all these countries of South and South-East Asia'<sup>25</sup>. In a speech in Karachi on 9 January 1946, Nehru claimed that

the defence of the Indian Ocean could not be organized without India's co-operation and that in the natural course of events these countries and India should come together for mutual protection as well as mutual trade<sup>26</sup>. Speaking in Bombay on 15 March 1946, he stated that 'The Indian Ocean region depends for its defence greatly on India, which is strategically situated in the centre. Thus both South-East Asia and the Middle East defence arrangements will partly depend on India'<sup>27</sup>. On 22 August 1946, he declared that the Middle East, Middle West, South-East Asia and China 'all impinge on India; all depend on India, economically, politically or for defence purposes...India is also the centre viewed in terms of the defence of the countries of Western Asia. It is obvious that India has to be some kind of base for defence'<sup>28</sup>.

Though clearly cognisant that Indian security was closely bound up with that of those countries contiguous by land, Nehru expressed the view at Bombay on 15 March 1946 that 'The whole question of defence in future warfare is so much in a fluid state, owing to scientific developments, that it is difficult to prophesy about the future'<sup>29</sup>. He declared that 'It is quite impossible for me to say what military or other alliances a free India may give approval of. Generally speaking, she would not like to entangle herself with other

peoples' feuds and imperialist rivalries'<sup>30</sup>. In any case, as Nehru informed an audience in Bombay on 6 June 1946, if India was threatened she would 'inevitably' try to defend herself by all means at her disposal - with the clear implication that such means did not exclude atomic bombs<sup>31</sup>.

In a broadcast from New Delhi on 7 September 1946, Nehru reaffirmed the intention of a free India 'as far as possible, to keep away from the power politics of groups aligned against one another...'<sup>32</sup> and expressed the hope that India would develop close and friendly contacts with other nations, including England and the British Commonwealth, the United States, the Soviet Union and China. In accordance with its anti-colonial stance - but also reflecting a desire to divest India of external military commitments - the Interim Government (which held office from 2 September 1946 to 14 August 1947) ordered the withdrawal of Indian forces which remained outside the sub-continent - from Egypt and Palestine immediately, from Japan as soon as it could be arranged and from Burma and Malaya after consultation with the parties concerned. A small force was, however, permitted to remain in Iraq temporarily to guard military stores at the Shaiba base<sup>33</sup>. Significantly enough Nehru, while stressing India's geo-strategic importance in his inaugural address to the Asian Relations Conference in Delhi on 23 March 1947, denied any



Indian pretensions to 'leadership' of Asia in the formal sense and made no reference whatever to any scheme for an Asian federation<sup>34</sup>.

Demobilization continued, apparently towards the provisional targets set earlier by the British authorities within the limitations imposed by the serious communal rioting and the more general problems associated with demobilization<sup>35</sup>. On the recommendation of an Expert Committee on Ordnance Factories, the Interim Government decided to retain 15 of the existing ordnance plants as the peacetime Ordnance establishment and to dispose of the other 21 units as an integral part of the Government's policy to divert capacity from war to peacetime production<sup>36</sup>. The Interim Government accepted the view adopted in Britain and other Western countries at the conclusion of World War II that there would probably be ten years before another general war and thus there was 'no question' of the Indian arms industry being developed on a crash basis - existing sources of armaments would continue to be utilized for the time being<sup>37</sup>. An Armed Forces Nationalisation Committee was set up to enquire into ways and means of speeding up the replacement of non-Indians in the armed forces. A National War Academy Committee was established to prepare a scheme for the creation of a military academy along the lines of West Point, and a National Cadet Corps Committee

was convened to investigate the practicability of a cadet corps scheme embracing schools and universities.

The Interim Government gave its early attention to the problem of the strength and composition of India's peacetime armed forces. Its basic approach to the general question was described by the Defence Secretary, G.S. Bhalja, during the debate on the defence grants on 14 March 1947. He did not propose to go into the ethics of maintaining armed forces. 'I would only say', he stated, 'that whatever our ideology may be...as practical men, as wise men, as men on whom the responsibility for the defence of the country lies, it would be foolish, it would be imprudent on our part to wildly cut down the forces to a figure which would put us at the mercy of any invader'<sup>38</sup>. The basis of planning for the post-war armed forces was described thus:

The Indian Armed Forces have been built up as a whole for the defence of India as a whole, and so far at least as defence is concerned, planning can only proceed on the basis of an undivided India. By reason of her geographical position, natural resources and great potentialities for future development, India occupies a key position in Asia. It is clear that in a major war no one power, however great, will be able to stand alone except for a short initial period. In present world conditions security can only be guaranteed by the maintenance of sufficient armed forces to encourage friends and deter possible aggressors, thus ensuring from all a healthy and friendly respect.

The minimum requirement to ensure this, he continued, was a

highly efficient field army, a balanced air force and a sufficient naval force to guard India's long coastline and her seaborne trade<sup>39</sup>.

Although the Interim Government was unable to take firm decisions regarding either the size of the peacetime defence budget or the strength and composition of the armed forces (notwithstanding acceptance of the 'ten year' rule), it appears to have reached certain tentative conclusions. It was envisaged that the annual outlay on defence might be fixed at about Rs 110 crores<sup>40</sup> for a military programme which appears to have involved a reduction of the Army to a well-equipped and mobile force of about 200,000 men backed by a reserve and a large territorial Army, an Air Force of 20 squadrons of all types and a small naval task force built around three light cruisers and including two aircraft carriers<sup>41</sup>. The plans, in effect, represented a very slight modification in the 'lowest limit' prepared by British planners prior to the end of World War II and apparently referred to by Field Marshal Auchinleck in his article on post-war defence planning for India's armed forces published in October 1946<sup>42</sup>.

This planning would seem to reflect broad agreement with the appreciation of the post-war situation and India's minimum defence requirements underlying the 'lowest limit'.

Relations with the Soviet Union and China were likely to remain generally friendly for a few years while their energies were directed towards rehabilitation of their shattered economies, but aggression could not be ruled out thereafter. The problems of internal security and the North-West Frontier had undergone no radical change and required the maintenance of strong military forces<sup>43</sup>. In accordance with India's weak finances and pressing internal development needs, her military liability was restricted to the maintenance of law and order in India, the maintenance of order among the tribes and peoples of the North-West and North-East Frontiers, defence against Afghanistan (neither side having allies) and the protection of India's coasts, coastal merchant shipping and fisheries and assistance towards the protection of ocean shipping. In the event of an attack by a major power like Russia or China, Indian planning clearly envisaged the intervention of friendly major powers including Britain to provide the necessary succour. It is probable that operational planning for the North-West Frontier reverted to some form of the Interim Plan of 1938.

The defence planning of the Interim Government was undercut by the formation of the Moslem state of Pakistan simultaneous with the formal withdrawal of British power from the sub-continent at midnight on 14/15 August 1947.

There was some recognition, however, of the need to arrange 'some kind of permanent joint defence council of the two states, since the defence of India as a whole must be of supreme concern to both dominions'<sup>44</sup>. The matter was discussed by Indian and Pakistani representatives on the Joint Defence Council<sup>45</sup> in 1947 but, as Defence Minister Sardar Baldev Singh explained to the Indian Parliament in early 1949, 'after careful consideration of the matter we came to the conclusion that the time was not ripe then to have an organisation of this kind. Both Pakistan and we were reluctant due to the intense feelings then prevailing'<sup>46</sup>.

The 'intense feelings' arose from the communal blood-bath which both preceded and accompanied partition, related differences involving the division of the cash balances and military stores of an undivided India between the two new Dominions and a feeling of mutual suspicion and animosity provoked by the manner in which the princely states of Junagadh, Hyderabad and Kashmir were integrated into the Indian Union<sup>47</sup>.

The forced accession of Junagadh was a small affair; when the Moslem ruler acceded the state to Pakistan on 15 August an agitation was fomented and Indian troops proceeded to occupy the small Kathiawar states of Babariawad and Mangrol (both tributaries of Junagadah) on 1st November and

Junagadh itself on 9 November. The ruler (Nizam) of land-locked Hyderabad resisted Indian pressures (including a total blockade of the state) to accede to the Union and the Indian Government used the excuse of internal disorders to initiate a 'police action' on 13 September 1948 which was spear-headed by the 1st armoured division and supported by the RIAF. Individual columns struck eastwards from Sholapur, westwards from Bezwada, southwards from the Central Provinces, south-east from Bombay Province and north across the Tungabhadra River. Despite some spirited resistance by the Nizam's forces the issue was never in doubt and the Hyderabad authorities formally surrendered on 17 September.

The dispute over Kashmir, which has been well-documented<sup>48</sup>, grew out of a Moslem revolt in Poonch against the despotic Dogra-Hindu regime which escalated into an invasion by Pathan tribals on 22 October 1947. Desperate for military aid to stem the rapid tribal advance on his capital, Srinagar, the Maharajah, acceded to the Union on 26 October as the essential prerequisite of Indian aid.

In the early hours of 27 October, over 100 Indian civil and military aircraft were hastily mobilized to fly troops, equipment and supplies to Srinagar. The only unit immediately available, the 1/11th Sikh battalion (which was engaged in internal security duties in the Gurgaon District near

Delhi), was flown to Srinagar and succeeded in imposing a brake on the tribal advance at Baramula (30 miles north-west of Srinagar) though forced back to within 17 miles of the capital. Reinforced to brigade strength and organized into a new divisional headquarters (Jammu and Kashmir Division) under Major-General Kalwant Singh, Indian troops counter-attacked on 3 November and broke through tribal defences astride the Baramula road on 7 November, recapturing Baramula the following day. Advancing westwards along the Srinagar-Rawalpindi road against extensive demolitions and roadblocks, the steadily increasing Indian force occupied Mahura and Uri on 12 and 14 November, respectively. With the Vale cleared of hostile forces save for isolated pockets, the Indian drive proceeded in the direction of Pakistan's frontiers and relieved Poonch (40 miles south-west of Srinagar) on 23 November. Kotli (15 miles south-west of Poonch) was relieved three days later only to be evacuated on 1st December because of logistics problems.

The initiative thereupon passed to the tribal and Azad (Free) Kashmir forces who commenced, on 23 December, an offensive in southern Kashmir along a 90-mile front extending from Jammu to the Jhangar-Naoshera area. In the severe fighting which ensued, Indian troops were driven from the important road junction of Jhangar on 31 December but managed

to hold Naoshera against heavy attacks in early February 1948.

With the return of better weather in the early spring the Indian forces, which had meanwhile been reorganized in Srinagar and Kashmir divisional commands, resumed their offensive and recaptured Jhangar on 18 March. Localized activities continued through the summer while a build-up of Indian forces proceeded to the equivalent of three divisions, plus State forces and a newly-organized Militia. In November, the Indian Army launched twin offensives in the south-west and north-east supported by tanks, artillery and aircraft. The Srinagar Division (Major-General K.S. Thimayya) forced Zoji La pass and recaptured Dras (22 miles north of Srinagar) on 16 November, entered Khalatse, the gateway to the Ladakh valley, on 23 November and recaptured the communications centre of Kargil (85 miles north-east of Srinagar) on 24 November. The Jammu Division (Major-General Atma Singh) relieved Poonch on 22 November.

From the outset of the hostilities, the buildup of Indian forces in Kashmir had caused increasing alarm in Pakistan, which included the fear that the new nation's defences in the Punjab would be hopelessly compromised by Indian control of the contiguous areas in Kashmir. The immediate despatch of Pakistani troops into the state was



prevented only by the knowledge that such an act would lead to the immediate resignation of all British military personnel serving in the Pakistan armed forces - and whose services were essential to the development of an efficient military establishment. The result was that the involvement of the Pakistan Army was set back by at least several months and ultimately came about in an unobtrusive fashion. 'Leave' was liberally granted to regular Army personnel who proceeded to take it with the Azad Kashmir forces and, early in 1948, the 7th (Pakistan) Division was deployed behind Azad Kashmir forces to forestall any sudden collapse which might enable Indian troops to drive through to the frontiers of Pakistan. On 17 March 1948, a battery of mountain guns with an infantry escort went into action near Poonch and, on 10 May, the 10th Brigade of the 9th Division advanced from Muzaffarabad towards Tithwal and drove Indian troops back some distance. In the latter part of June, Pakistan shifted its 9th Division to Abbotabad and into positions extending from Bagh to Tithwal. In response to the rapid Indian advances in November, the Pakistani Government pulled troops away from the vulnerable Lahore front - where India had deployed two armoured brigades - and concentrated the 10th Brigade, a parachute brigade, two field regiments of artillery and a medium artillery battery west of Jammu town. From this

position they could threaten the tenuous communications of the Indian forces in Kashmir which extended from Amritsar through Pathankot and Jammu to Poonch.

It had early become apparent to the Indian Government that Kashmir could only be ultimately secured if Pakistan denied aid and refuge to the tribal and Azad Kashmir forces. India accordingly had taken the matter to the Security Council of the United Nations on 1st January 1948 with the request that it intervene to prevent further Pakistani interference in Kashmir. The efforts of that body to find a solution acceptable to India and Pakistan as a basis for negotiations proved unavailing until the progress of the conflict forced both parties into a more accommodating mood in December 1948. RIAF aircraft attacked a Pakistani arms dump at Palak on 13 December and, on the following day, Pakistani artillery commenced a 36-hour barrage of Indian lines of communications near Akhnur which shattered Indian ammunition dumps and communications and successfully searched out Indian divisional headquarters at Naoshera. The threat of general war loomed - a war which must have spelt disaster for both countries in the prevailing context of pressing internal problems, communal strife and military weakness. It appears to have been just such a conclusion, arrived at independently by both Governments with the strong

encouragement of high-ranking British officers serving with both armies, that led to the ceasefire effected on 1st January 1949 under United Nations' auspices and the subsequent acceptance of a ceasefire line defined by U.N. observers.

The conclusion of the ceasefire coincided with the return of some degree of normalcy to the Indian internal scene and provoked fresh interest in the question of Indo-Pak co-operation in defence (and other spheres)<sup>49</sup>. The Governor-General of India, C. Rajagopalachari, called in early January for an end to the hatred and distrust which affected the relations of the two Dominions<sup>50</sup>, and Pakistan's Foreign Minister, Sir Zafrullah Khan, emphasized the need for friendly relations due to the strategic, political and economic inter-dependence of the two countries<sup>51</sup>. Defence Minister Singh expressed the view in Parliament in March 1949 that he felt confident that the proposal for joint defence would be examined when relations between the two countries improved<sup>52</sup>. In April, the Governor-General of Pakistan, Khwaja Nazimuddin, declared that 'A joint defence plan is a possibility when relations between India and Pakistan improve, or it may develop as necessity may compel' and 'high officials of the Indian Defence Ministry' were reported as having stated that, while the present moment was 'premature', they envisaged joint Indo-Pakistan defence arrangements in the 'near

future,<sup>53</sup>. Even after a crisis in March-April 1950 in which Indian forces were concentrated near Pakistan's borders in the Punjab - seemingly as a deterrent to any hasty actions contemplated by Pakistani politicians - Nehru expressed the hope to an American correspondent that

...ultimately we [India and Pakistan] should surmount the difficulties. Ultimately we should develop a common economic and defence policy. Forces may well be gradually driving us in that direction - joint policies for transportation, irrigation, communications and national defence.<sup>54</sup>

It must have been clear to Indian leaders almost from the outset, however, that there was little likelihood of overcoming the deep suspicions with which the two Dominions viewed each other except over an extended period. In the prevailing context, prudence and the mood of the Indian public required that certain precautions be taken against a renewal of hostilities arising from the Kashmir dispute.

In an assessment of the military threat posed by Pakistan undertaken in early 1949, Indian military planners are understood to have regarded the possibility of Pakistani attacks across the Punjab plains, the Rajasthan desert or from East Pakistan as extremely unlikely. Border incidents in all frontier areas contiguous to Pakistani territory were viewed as inevitable, but the only probable military contingency was believed to be a 'tribal' invasion of the Indian-occupied portion of Kashmir more elaborate in scale and

conception than had occurred in 1947-48 and built from the outset around a sizeable core of Pakistani regulars.

It was evident to the planners that the advantages in any renewed conflict limited to Kashmir would lie with Pakistan due to geographical reasons. Pakistan could easily provide arms and supplies to the tribals and thereby create a situation which would tie down considerable Indian forces at slight cost to itself and ease the imbalance between Indian and Pakistani military forces elsewhere along the joint frontiers. In the event that Pakistan chose to undertake direct action in Kashmir, its forces would enjoy relative ease of access to the operational theatre and at a time and in places of its own choosing. India, on the other hand, would be forced to deploy large forces for an essentially police function to counter a tribal/Azad Kashmir threat along the lengthy ceasefire line in times of general Indo-Pakistan 'peace' or, in the event of regular Pakistani forces intervening in Kashmir, to engage these units in a manner in which India's greater military power could be brought to bear only at disproportionate expense and inconvenience. Even then, India would not have the assurance of gaining a decisive decision in its favour of lasting value if Pakistani regulars, tribals and Azad Kashmir forces could retire to sanctuary in the territory of West Pakistan.

The only practicable alternative was to refuse to make a distinction between tribal/Azad Kashmir and official Pakistani actions or to concede the possibility of another limited war in Kashmir at a time and on a scale determined by Karachi. Such a policy would place the onus on the Pakistan Government to deter large-scale tribal depredations against the Indian sector of Kashmir and to exercise similar restraint upon the Azad Kashmir forces<sup>55</sup> on the penalty of general war. In the event of general hostilities, it was clear that India would enjoy marked superiority in military resources, both in being and capable of mobilization over an extended period, and in material resources. Strategically, also, India had great advantages. Indian territory surrounded East Pakistan, whose nearest point was a thousand miles from West Pakistan; West Pakistan was long and narrow with few trunk roads, only one trunk railway and a single port (Karachi); and every centre of importance in Pakistan save Quetta was within 150 miles of Indian territory. Furthermore, Pakistan had no domestic source of modern arms and military stores and her ability to wage war could be severely restricted by an Indian blockade of Karachi and diplomatic efforts aimed at preventing, or at least minimizing, the possibility of Pakistan's acquiring military aid from any other country or countries.

The Indian Cabinet accepted the thesis advanced by its military advisers and contingency planning proceeded on the basis of possible operations in Kashmir, Punjab and Rajasthan with precautionary measures on the borders of East Pakistan. The plan was based on the hypothesis that Pakistan would have the initiative in launching an attack in Kashmir with possible diversionary attacks in other sectors. In the event of such actions, Indian troops in Kashmir would seek to contain the opposing forces while the main field army would make a determined and rapid advance towards Lahore and Siakhot from its deployment areas in the East Punjab. Such an advance would relieve the pressure on the garrison in Kashmir and release some formations in that theatre for offensive counter-actions in the direction of Lahore and <sup>Siakhot</sup>~~Siakhot~~ - with also a possible diversionary action towards Rawalpindi to prevent a concentration of Pakistani forces in the major operational theatre in the East Punjab. The primary aim of this strategy was to inflict a decisive defeat on Pakistan's field army at the earliest possible time and by such an event, coupled probably with the occupation of Lahore, to compel the Pakistan Government to seek peace. The role of the Army would be decisive, with the other two Services providing support<sup>56</sup>. Simultaneous efforts would be made in the diplomatic sphere to prevent the supply of war material or the furnishing

of credits to Pakistan by foreign powers. In the event that Pakistan did not seek an early peace, the Indian Government would appear to have placed its reliance upon the major powers to intervene and provide the necessary pressure on Karachi leading to a cessation of hostilities and some sort of political settlement. India's strategy was punitive, there being no intention either to overrun large areas of Pakistan or to occupy Pakistani territory for any period following a ceasefire - either policy being clearly in excess of Indian military capabilities. This basic strategy remained unchanged right up to October 1962 as, despite Pakistan's membership in CENTO and SEATO, it was assumed that Pakistan's Western allies would provide her with no support for an 'aggressive' policy vis-a-vis India but would direct their efforts at effecting an early cessation of hostilities.

This strategy was conceived at a time when the Indian Government could regard the cold war - restricted up to late 1949 to Europe - with certain detachment. With the establishment of the People's Republic of China in October 1949, however, India could no longer be a distant onlooker. This was particularly true from October 1950, when Chinese communist troops entered Tibet to re-assert Chinese control.

India's vital interests had remained basically unchanged by the withdrawal of British power from the sub-continent



and the formation of Pakistan. While Pakistan had inherited responsibility for the historical problem of the North-West Frontier, India could not remain unaffected by Pakistan's involvement in hostilities in this quarter or elsewhere. India's location at the head of the Indian Ocean gave her a strategic stake in the power-political rivalries affecting all states in the Indian Ocean region. The fulfillment of the country's ambitious social and economic goals required continued and unrestricted access to the raw materials and food surpluses of South-East Asia, the oil of Burma and the Persian Gulf, the markets of the world for her manufactures and products and the financial and technical aid of the developed countries. The Government could not ignore India's dependence upon foreign (largely British) shipping, the reliance upon Britain for military stores and equipment and reliance upon friendly powers for naval and air security pending the development of adequate Indian air and naval services. Indian politicians could also not remain unmindful to the fate of the Indian minorities in the various countries on the Indian Ocean littoral and of the effect of Indian policies upon the treatment accorded them in these countries.

There is little doubt that responsible Indian leaders were mindful of their country's stake in the containment of communist expansionism by either covert or overt means.

There is also no reason to suppose that there was not a genuine consensus among Nehru and his associates - many of whom were far more outspoken about communism than was the Prime Minister - that formal alignment with the Western bloc would not be to India's advantage in the prevailing geo-political context.

The foremost aim of the Nehru administration was to pursue rapid economic development and thereby provide the impoverished Indian masses with at least the basic requirements of life on a scale above the traditional one of bare subsistence. For purely practical reasons, therefore, India had to minimize military expenditure within the limitations imposed by prudence. The Indian Government publicly professed its intention to seek social and economic progress with due regard for individual rights, and it early dealt severely with the Indian Communist Party's challenge to public peace and the foundations of democratic government. It was not prepared, however, to pick quarrels with the communist states or to embark in company with the colonialist-tainted Western powers upon any moral crusade against the adherents of a doctrine certain features of which held considerable attraction for many educated Indians<sup>57</sup>. Proud of their independent nationhood, convinced that India was a potential great power and was destined to play a major role in international

affairs, Indians were zealous to exercise this independence to the maximum extent - and free of the suspected inhibitions imposed by membership of a bloc dominated by powers disposing of far superior industrial and military resources.

Acutely aware of the country's economic and military weakness, Nehru viewed alignment as beyond India's means and felt moreover that 'it would not be in consonance with dignity...to interfere without any effect being produced'<sup>58</sup>. In an article published in 1952 and entitled "India and the Balance of Power", the influential G.S. Bajpai, the first Secretary-General of the Indian Ministry of External Affairs, expressed the view that no immediate Indian interest would be served by the country's implicating herself 'by artificial ties...in the ordinary combinations or coalitions of the friendships or enmities of the two camps in which the major part of the world is to-day unfortunately divided'<sup>59</sup>. He declared that in a world of power politics armed power constituted the only safeguard against a threat to a country's independence - a fact which India could no more ignore than Switzerland and Sweden. He felt that India must develop her strength as a sanction for her foreign policy, to safeguard her independence and so as to maintain an equilibrium in Asia. Expanding on the last contention, Bajpai argued that power developed by India in the defence of neutrality could

help create an enduring balance of power for the reason that:

a certain equipoise between political combatants can introduce a certain element of caution regarding the attitude of neutrals into their calculations and thus prevent an outbreak of hostilities. But this can be true only of a potentially great Power like India...In Asia she alone can help to create and maintain a political equilibrium which no potential aggressor would lightly dare to disturb.

'Thus viewed', he concluded 'the idea of a balance of power is nothing evil nor incompatible with India's highest ideals'<sup>60</sup>.

The adoption of a posture of non-alignment vis-a-vis the two power blocs was thus primarily conceived as a means of achieving a modus vivendi with the two Communist land powers and thereby afford neither with sufficient provocation to engage in hostile acts against India either in an isolated manner or as part of a general attack against the non-Communist world<sup>61</sup>.

The adoption by India of a non-aligned posture did not appear to involve unnecessary risks in the opinion of India's leaders. Pakistan had inherited the troublesome problem of the North-West Frontier with probably a better chance of resolving the vexatious issue posed by her co-religionists among the tribes and Afghanistan<sup>62</sup>. Pakistan itself posed more a serious nuisance than a mortal threat to Indian security and could be handled without external assistance; in any event, the contingency of conflict with Pakistan was regarded

in high military circles as remote<sup>63</sup>. The Western nuclear deterrent secured the countries lying on the peripheries of the Russian and Chinese states against overt aggression. Russia's severe losses in World War II appeared to necessitate a lengthy pre-occupation with internal reconstruction. In the event of general war, the sub-continent would offer few if any economic enticements to an aggressor and would generally enjoy a low priority in Soviet war plans<sup>64</sup>. In the event that India were attacked in strength by a major power like Russia or China, her leaders were probably confident that the requisite Western aid would be speedily forthcoming. Writing in 1955, Colin Welch observed that Nehru was probably fully mindful of the fact that Indian neutrality would be worthless if the West withdrew its military sanction: 'But he knows that the West can declare no such thing. India is of vital importance to us. Mr Nehru peacefully tills his plot in no-man's land. It looks a dangerous position. But he knows in the last resort that our guns still command the approaches'<sup>65</sup>. Or as The Economist commented on 12 May 1956: 'Its leaders calculate that it is safe from any Western aggression and that if it were threatened by the Communist bloc, the West could not fail to stand by it, if for no reason than to prevent its vast resources from falling to the enemy'<sup>66</sup>. On the assumption

that Moscow and Peking appreciated this fact, New Delhi virtually dismissed the possibility of an attack by either or both of the Communist powers. China nevertheless posed a problem requiring close attention.

Prior to the establishment of the People's Republic of China on 1st October 1949, the Kuomintang had given notice that it meant to restore itself to its former primacy in Asia and to regard an independent India with certain condescension<sup>67</sup>. Of immediate concern to Indian leaders, however, was the fact that no Chinese Government recognized the validity of India's treaty rights in Tibet or of the McMahon Line and the Kuomintang made it clear that they intended to give both issues their attention<sup>68</sup>. Even as the communists swept to victory over the Chinese mainland, however, New Delhi 'did not consider that it need apprehend any hostile activity' from the north for the reason that the vast Tibetan plateau and the Himalayas posed a formidable barrier to aggression from that direction<sup>69</sup>. This view was undoubtedly reinforced by the assumption that any Chinese Government which emerged from the civil war must devote its entire energies to the massive task of reconstruction<sup>70</sup>.

The actual emergence of a People's Republic in China, however, appears to have dispelled some of this complacency in the context of communist insurrections in India, Burma,

Malaya and the Philippines and the 'hard line' pursued by Russia towards the West. The Chinese Communist leadership of China was at least as dedicated to the restoration of China's historical power and influence as the Kuomintang had been, and had the added motivation of communist ideology and the sense of purpose associated with a revolutionary movement. Its attitude towards India was anything but friendly; Mao Tse-tung, in his book, The Chinese Revolution and the Chinese Communist Party, published in 1939, had listed Burma, Nepal and Bhutan (among other areas) as Chinese territory and, even before its actual triumph in China, the communist leadership had depicted India as a 'semi-colonialist country' requiring communist liberation through the establishment of a communist regime<sup>71</sup>. On 1st January 1950, Peking declared its intention to 'liberate' Tibet. In a written ultimatum to the Khampa leader, Topgay Pangdatshang, in the same month, the Chinese Communist Government allegedly declared its intention to 'liberate' Tibet and after that Nepal, Sikkim and Bhutan and warned the Kham Tibetans to co-operate in this scheme or be annihilated<sup>72</sup>.

The emergence of a communist regime in China provoked considerable alarm in certain quarters in India. The Premier of Assam, Gopinath Bardolai, viewed the establishment of a communist regime in China and its repercussions in Tibet and

Burma as constituting a 'grave danger to our country and particularly to Assam'<sup>73</sup>. With obvious reference to Peking's declared intention to 'liberate' Tibet and to the communist insurrections in progress in South-East Asia, the parliamentary representative of the Anglo-Indian community, Frank Anthony, stated on 17 March 1950 that India's borders lay in Tibet and Indochina<sup>74</sup>. Another member, M.R. Masani, warned on 4 August 1950 that 'if Indochina, Thailand and Burma fall, we shall be next on the Russian menu just as surely as chicken follows fish'<sup>75</sup>. Consequent on China's actual re-entry into Tibet in October 1950, Basil Gould, a former British Political Representative in Tibet, wrote that the Chinese action had as its ultimate objective, India - the Chinese would establish themselves in south-east Tibet where they could develop 'serious nuisance value' to India<sup>76</sup>.

The implications of these developments were not lost upon the Indian Government<sup>77</sup> and Panikkar claims to have expressed the view to Nehru in early 1950, prior to his departure as India's first ambassador to Communist China, that 'with a communist China cordial and intimate relations were out of the question' - a view with which Nehru allegedly agreed<sup>78</sup>. The response to these developments, however, had necessarily to take note of geography and China's superior power. The national Indian Government accepted the Tibetan



policy of the British Indian Government to the extent that, while Tibetan autonomy was recognized, so was China's suzerainty (as distinct from sovereignty). Thus, when an observer from the Chinese (Kuomintang) Foreign Ministry had protested to Nehru at the Asian Relations Conference held in New Delhi in March 1947 regarding a map displayed in the conference hall on which Tibet was shown as a political entity separate from China, the map had been removed<sup>79</sup>. Following Peking's announced intention to 'liberate' Tibet, a 'high official of the External Affairs Ministry' informed an American correspondent in February that India would not commit troops to defence the regime of the Dalai Lama but would employ only diplomatic means in defence of Tibetan autonomy<sup>80</sup>. India defended the legality of the Chinese action at the United Nations, opposing any debate on the grounds that it was an internal affair of China, restricting her own response to criticisms of the Chinese resort to force - the method, not the right. Having conceded the Tibetan 'buffer' of the Raj, the Indian Government moved to seek a modus vivendi with the new China.

The desire for close relations with China was a natural manifestation of the anti-colonialism and 'Asian-ness' resulting from Indian colonial subjection, but the strategic motivation was perhaps an even more basic factor in

determining the subsequent efforts of the Indian Government to assiduously cultivate Chinese friendship. As the Deputy Minister for External Affairs, B.V. Keskar, explained in Parliament on 28 March 1951:

The Government is not unmindful of the protection of our frontiers adjoining Tibet. I may go further and say that the Government feels that the best way of protecting that frontier is to have a friendly Tibet and a friendly China. It is obvious that such a complicated and big frontier cannot be well protected if we have a border country which becomes hostile to us. Therefore, we feel that in tackling the question of Tibet and China, we should always keep in mind that a friendly China and a friendly Tibet are the best guarantee of the defence of our country.<sup>81</sup>

India's speedy recognition of the People's Republic (30 December 1949), passive acquiescence to China's forceful re-entry into Tibet in October 1950, her defence of China's legal right to assert her control of Tibet and her support for Peking's claim to the Chinese seat at the United Nations were manifestations of this conclusion - if not solely provoked by it. A further corollary was the 'normalisation' of relations with China regarding Tibet in the much-publicized agreement concluded, after lengthy negotiations initiated by India, in Peking on 29 April 1954 in which India relinquished her inherited treaty rights<sup>82</sup>. Significantly enough, Nehru regarded the preamble containing the five principles of panch sheel or peaceful co-existence<sup>83</sup> as the most important, for 'though not formally stated as

such, but practically speaking' it was an agreement not to commit aggression on each other<sup>84</sup>.

Certain sections of the press nonetheless sounded words of caution regarding Peking's bona fides. Pioneer felt that 'nothing has been secured to rule out further penetration of Chinese communists into regions bordering on India'<sup>85</sup>.

Tribune warned that 'the Central Asian borders of India need to be watched more attentively than ever before'<sup>86</sup>, and the Times of India declared that, while Nehru was justified in believing China to be too pre-occupied with internal problems to undertake aggression, 'that it is an assumption is something of which Mr Nehru himself is very much aware'<sup>87</sup>.

That the Prime Minister himself had doubts regarding the value of China's professed friendship was evidenced by a circular on foreign policy addressed to presidents of the Congress Party's provincial units shortly after the conclusion of the Sino-Indian agreement on Tibet. In this he stated: 'Surely it is better, with nations as well as individuals, to hope for and expect the best, but at the same time to be prepared for any eventuality'<sup>88</sup>. That his Government was mindful of the implications of China's occupation of Tibet had long been evident by its response in the Himalayan region.

Notes

1 For the relevant resolutions passed by Congress at its annual sessions during the period 1885-1914, see Dr N.V. Rajkumar (ed.), The Background of India's Foreign Policy (Delhi, Navin Press, 1952). See also Bimla Prasad, The Origins of Indian Foreign Policy (Calcutta, Bookland Private Ltd., 1960).

2 See Resolutions IV-VII passed at Madras in 1914; Resolution VI passed at Bombay in 1915; Resolution XIV passed at Lucknow in 1916. Cited in Rajkumar, op. cit., pp. 37-40.

3 Resolution II passed at Delhi in 1918, cited in ibid, p. 40.

4 Cited in Prasad, op. cit., p. 64.

5 This pan-Islamic movement arose following the publication of the Treaty of Sevres in 1919, which liquidated the power of the Caliph. Gandhi determined to utilize the occasion to further Moslem-Hindu unity in the struggle against British power but the movement collapsed in March 1924, when Kemal Ataturk abolished the office of Caliph.

6 The declaration informed 'neighbouring and other non-Indian States':

(1) that the present Government of India in no way represent Indian opinion and that their policy has been traditionally guided by considerations more of holding India in subjection than of protecting her borders; (2) that India as a self-governing country can have nothing to fear from the neighbouring states or any state, as her people have no designs upon any of them and hence no intention of establishing any trade relations hostile to or not desired by the people of such states; (3) and that the people of India regard most treaties entered into with the Imperial Government by neighbouring states as mainly designed by the latter to perpetuate the exploitation of India by the Imperial Power, and would therefore urge the states having no ill-will against the people of India and having no desire to injure her interests, to refrain from entering into any treaty with the Imperial Power.

Resolution VI passed by the All India Congress Committee at Delhi in 1921. Cited in Rajkumar, op. cit., pp. 44-5.

- 7 Resolution IV passed at Madras in 1927, cited in ibid, pp. 45-6.
- 8 Resolution VI, cited in ibid, pp. 46-7.
- 9 Resolution IX, cited in ibid, p. 48.
- 10 Resolution XI, passed at Karachi in 1931, cited in ibid, p. 49.
- 11 Resolution VIII passed at Faizpur in 1936, cited in ibid, p. 53.
- 12 See extract from Nehru's "Report on the International Congress against Imperialism" held in Brussels in 1927. Cited in Prasad, op. cit., p. 87.
- 13 Cited, Jagat S. Bright (ed.), Important Speeches of Jawaharlal Nehru (Lahore, Indian Printing Works, undated), p. 138.
- 14 Cited in ibid, p. 153.
- 15 See Appendix XX.
- 16 Jawaharlal Nehru, India and the World (London, Allen & Unwin, 1936), pp. 251-2.
- 17 The Unity of India: Collected Writings 1937-40 (London, Lindsay Drummond, 1948, 3rd impression), pp. 24-5.
- 18 Ibid, p. 252.
- 19 Indian leaders had advanced 'solutions' to the problem of the tribals. The Faizpur Congress in 1936 stated: 'In the opinion of the Congress the right way to deal with the Frontier situation is for an enquiry to be made into the economic, political and military situation with a view to settle finally and peacefully the problem of the Frontier in co-operation with the border tribes'. Resolution VIII, cited in Rajkumar, op. cit., p. 53. In an interview with Sir C. Sankaran Nair, which appears to have taken place in the late 1920s, Gandhi expressed the view that Afghan (i.e. tribal) attacks on the territory of a free India could be deterred by providing them with a little subsidy and by introducing the spinning wheel (i.e. cottage industries) among them. Cited in Patricia Kendall, India and the British (London,

Charles Scribner's Sons, 1931), p. 402. That a popular Indian Government meant to be firm with the tribals, however, was never in doubt. See, for example, footnote 43.

20 Cited in Richard Frost, The British Commonwealth and World Society (London, Oxford University Press, 1947), p. 155.

21 Penderal Moon, The Future of India (London, Pilot Press, 1945), p. 57.

22 LAD, vol. 3, 4 March 1946, p. 1818.

23 The Discovery of India (London, Meridian Books, 1945), pp. 547-8.

24 Cited in Rajkumar, op. cit., p. 90.

25 Cited in Bright, op. cit., p. 71.

26 Cited in ibid, p. 262.

27 Cited in ibid, p. 359.

28 Cited, Professor M. Venkatarangaiya, "Indo-American Political Relations", in Aspects of India's Foreign Relations paper No. 2 (ICWA, August 1949), p. 2. Nehru had envisaged India's membership in a regional federation in 1936, 1940 and as late as August 1946. See, respectively, Jawaharlal Nehru, Towards Freedom (New York, John Day, 1941), p. 367; The Unity of India, p. 327; Jawaharlal Nehru, "Inter-Asian Relations", India Quarterly (October-December 1946), p. 327.

29 Cited in Bright, op. cit., p. 360.

30 Cited in ibid.

31 The Unity of India, pp. 353-4. The view was expressed in reply to a query as to whether the future GOI would have atomic bombs in its arsenal. Nehru stated his hope that India would develop atomic power for peaceful uses but warned that, so long as the world was constituted as it was, every country would have to devise and use the latest scientific devices for its protection.

32 Nehru's broadcast from New Delhi, 7 September 1946. Cited in Independence and After, p. 341.

33 Britain bore the expense of all these 'external' Indian forces save those in Japan, which comprised 268 Indian Infantry Brigade, No. 4 (Spitfire) Squadron RIAF and two RIN sloops. The Interim Government agreed to assume the costs of this force for reason that its presence in Japan marked the growth of India to nationhood and was 'a mark of her prestige as being one of the major Allied Powers in the last war'. Defence Secretary G.S. Bhalja, LAD, vol. 3, 14 March 1947, p. 1951. The last of the Army contingent left Japan on 25 October 1947 and returned to India as the last undivided contingent of the Indian Army.

34 Speeches 1946-1949, p. 302. Too much significance should not, therefore, be attached to the fact that Nehru acknowledged - and did not reject - Evatt's proposal of February 1947 regarding the possible formation of a regional instrumentality in South-East Asia and the Western Pacific.

35 For the progress of demobilization, see appendix XXI. Plans originally envisaged a provisional target of 449,000 (including British personnel) by 1st April 1947 but were later revised to 500,000 by the same date and to 300,000 by 1st December 1947. See statements by Bhalja, LAD, vol. 2, 4 March 1947, p. 1496; ibid, vol. 3, 14 March 1947, p. 1953. Provisional planning thus involved a reduction to the approximate pre-war establishment of British and Indian troops combined.

36 As the peactime demands on the plants earmarked for retention were considered 'negligible', the Interim Government decided that spare capacity in these factories should be utilized for civilian production as a temporary measure to narrow the gap between supply and demand. See statement by Finance Minister Liaquat Ali Khan, LAD, vol. 2, 1947, p. 1320.

37 See Nehru's statement in the Rajya Sabha, 9 November 1962. Cited in Hindu, 11 November 1962.

38 LAD, vol. 3, 14 March 1947, p. 1953.

39 Ibid, vol. 2, 4 March 1947, p. 1496.

40 See statement by Dr John Matthai, a former Finance Minister to the local Rotary Club at Kottayam in October 1952. Cited in R.N. Bhargava, The Theory and Working of Union Finance in India (London, Allen & Unwin, 1956), p. 284.

41 Information obtained from informed Indian civil and military authorities and deductions from such data as is available.

42 As this article appeared the month following the formation of the Interim Government, it may have reflected early tentative conclusions by that authority but this cannot be confirmed.

43 The communal disorder which swept India preceding the formation of the Interim Government and its continuation on a steadily increasing scale during the tenure of this Government must have removed any illusion in official quarters that internal harmony would automatically be restored following the removal of alien rule. Nehru also made it clear at a press conference in New Delhi on 26 September 1946 that the Government meant to maintain order among the tribes on the North-West Frontier for reasons involving both internal tranquility and external defence. He described the tribes as 'the guardians of the northern doorway to India and [stated that] the security and well-being of these areas is, therefore, a definite factor in the defence of this country'. He declared that the issue involved, for India, an 'international obligation. For our friends, the Afghans, look to us to preserve peace and security in the tribal areas in the interests of the tranquillity of their own country...our approach to the question should be as friendly as possible but also as firm as possible'. Cited in D.R. Bose (ed.), New India Speaks (Calcutta, A. Mukerjee & Co., 1949), p. 33.

44 Times of India, 7 July 1947. W.C.B. Tunstall has written that 'it appears to have been generally assumed during the negotiations leading to independence and partition that both India and Pakistan would eventually bear some part in whatever Commonwealth defence arrangement - regional or general - might emerge from the immediate postwar situation'. The Commonwealth and Regional Defence, op. cit., pp. 51-2. That such a possibility was not dismissed out-of-hand is apparently substantiated by a report in the Hindustan Times in early 1947 which outlined plans for the defence of India allegedly passed by the Interim Government with the concurrence of both its Congress and Moslem League members. The plans envisaged a relatively small aggregate expenditure on defence based on the assumption of a co-ordinated external defence of the sub-continent - whether a state of Pakistan existed or not - and of a defence agreement with the British Commonwealth. See reference to the report in The Economist, 17 May 1947, p. 748.



45 The Joint Defence Council was set up to coordinate the division of the armed forces between India and Pakistan and comprised Lord Mountbatten, the Commander-in-Chief (Field Marshal Auchinleck) now styled Supreme Commander and the Defence Ministers of India and Pakistan.

46 CAD, pt 2, vol. 2, 19 March, p. 1220.

47 Junagadh was a tiny state located on the seacoast of Kathiawar and ruled by a Moslem hierarchy although about 80 per cent of its population of 670,000 was Hindu. Hyderabad embraced 82,000 square miles of territory almost in the heart of the Indian Union with no outlet to the sea; its ruler and the governing hierarchy were Moslem but the population of almost 18 million was predominantly Hindu. Kashmir was a polygot state consisting of just over four million persons (75 per cent of which were Moslems) inhabiting an area of 84,000 square miles and ruled by a Dogra-Hindu regime.

48 See, for example, Michael Brecher, The Struggle for Kashmir (Toronto, Ryerson Press, 1953); Josef Korbel, Danger in Kashmir (Princeton University Press, 1954); Lord Birdwood, A Continent Decides (London, Robert Hale, 1953) part III; Two Nations and Kashmir (London, Robert Hale, 1956); V.P. Menon, The Integration of the Indian States (Calcutta, Orient Longmans, 1956), Chapter XX. Details of the military operations have been collated from press reports for the period, from published official and unofficial reports and observations and from interviews with informed individuals.

49 Even while the conflict was raging, Prime Minister Jinnah of Pakistan had informally proposed joint defence in early 1948. While Nehru claimed to have received no such offer either officially or unofficially, he declared in Parliament on 30 March 1948: 'The question of joint defence, however, is important from the point of view of both India and Pakistan, and Government will gladly consider this when the time is ripe for it'. CAD, vol. 4, p. 2722.

50 Cited in Hindu, 10 January 1949.

51 Cited in ibid, 17 January 1949.

52 CAD, pt 2, vol. 2, 19 March 1949, p. 1220.

53 Cited by Robert Trumbull in New York Times, 22 April 1949.

54 Cited by C.L. Sulzberger in ibid, 26 April 1950.

55 These forces have totalled about 32 battalions since 1948 and are recruited from some of the finest military manpower in the sub-continent - the Poonch Moslems.

56 It seems unlikely that either side would deliberately strike at major population centres for fear of reciprocal action not commensurate with any short-term gain that might be achieved. The Indian Government would also have to be particularly concerned to avoid exacerbating a sharp deterioration in communal relationships in the Union that would inevitably accompany any general Indo-Pakistani war.

57 Commenting on India's practical and dispassionate approach to the East-West conflict, one American observer wrote:

India as a nation hardly has such a luxurious social structure that the mass of the people are fiercely determined to defend the way of life against communist efforts to take it over...Indians generally lack that loathing of communism that so deeply influences United States policies.

This, he explained, was the reason for India's separation from the forefront of the ideological conflict. Robert Trumbull in New York Times, 28 January 1951.

58 Statement in Parliament 8 March 1948. Independence & After, See also his reference to India's weakness relative to other (215) nations in his article, "Nationalism in Asia", International Journal (Winter 1950-51), p. 9. Panikkar expressed the view to Lord Birdwood in January 1951 that an India in alliance with the West would constitute a liability rather than an asset. Lord Birdwood, A Continent Decides, op. cit., p. 185.

59 G.S. Bajpai, "India and the Balance of Power", Indian Year Book of International Affairs, vol. 1 (Madras, 1952), p. 4.

60 Ibid. In a similar vein H.M. Patel, a former Defence Secretary, writing in mid-1962 stated that 'If anything disturbs that balance a policy of neutrality may well become impossible. It can, in any case, scarcely be to our interest to do anything to allow that balance to be disturbed'. "Realities of the Situation", Seminar (July 1962), p. 24. Or, as the noted commentator 'INSAF' commented in November 1954 with reference to Nehru's trip to China in that month: 'India's Prime Minister knows that the smaller states in

South East Asia will feel more assured if India developed sufficient strength to maintain the balance of power in Asia - meaning that he should hold China to her word'. Hindustan Times, 2 November 1954.

61 The adoption of a non-aligned posture was believed to render the possibility of an attack on India from a major power as 'negligible, if not nil'. H.M. Patel, The Defence of India (R.R. Kale Memorial Lecture 1963, Gorkhale Institute of Politics and Economics, Asia Publishing House, 1963), p. 3. Panch sheel and the conception of a peace area were natural corollaries to such a posture - all of which were attempts, first and foremost, to buffer India against East-West (i.e. great power) rivalries. Panikkar thus described the main aims of Indian foreign policy as 'the creation of an area of primary and strategic importance around her; creation of a secondary area of strategic importance; and lastly, development of a policy conducive to world peace and progress'. Cited as footnote in J.C. Kundra, Indian Foreign Policy 1947-1954: A Study of Relations with the Western Bloc (Groningen, Wolters, 1955), p. 71.

62 As one unidentified Moslem publicist claimed prior to partition:

The north-west frontier will lose all importance once a Muslim State is established in the North-West. The tribesmen and the people beyond the frontier are all Muslims. They will lose all religious and political fervour for jehad against non-Muslims once they find that they have to reckon with their brothers in Islam. If the frontier between Afghanistan and Persia or that between Persia and Turkey can be easily defended by comparatively small armies, there is no reason why the same should not be possible in the case of the frontier between Afghanistan and the Muslim North-West.

Cited in R. Coupland, The Future of India: Report on the Constitutional Problem in India, part 3 (London, Oxford University Press, 1943), p. 77.

63 See, for example, General K.S. Thimayya, "Adequate Insurance", Seminar (July 1962).

64 Nehru told Brecher in 1956 that he could not conceive of any kind of attack or invasion of India, not because of every country's love for India, but for the reason that,

given India's poverty, an aggressor would merely acquire further problems instead of profits. Michael Brecher, The New States of Asia (London, Oxford University Press, 1963), p. 205. He told Norman Cousins in 1951 that a major conflict would not affect Indian territory directly because 'India does not come into the picture at all as an important theatre'. Norman Cousins, Talks With Nehru (Recorded Interview, New York, John Day, 1951), p. 51.

65 Daily Telegraph, 8 March 1955.

66 The Economist, 12 May 1956, p. 586.

67 As India's first ambassador to China, Panikkar has noted:

It did not take me long to discover that the Kuomintang attitude towards India, while generally friendly, was inclined to be a bit patronising. It was the attitude of an elder brother who was considerably older and well established in the world, prepared to give his advice to a younger brother struggling to make his way. Independence of India was welcome, but of course it was understood that China as the recognised Great Power in the East after the war expected India to know her place.

In Two Chinas (London, Allen & Unwin, 1955), p.

68 Official Chinese maps issued in 1943 had embodied territorial claims down to the pre-1914 'Outer Line' and the Kuomintang had protested against the activities of Indian Government officials in the Assam tribal areas south of the McMahon Line in notes to the British Embassy in July, September and November 1946, and in January 1947 and to the Indian Embassy in February 1947. See note from the Chinese Foreign Affairs Ministry to the Indian Embassy dated 26 December 1959 in White Paper, III, pp. 64-5. Needless to say, the protests were rejected.

69 H.M. Patel, The Defence of India, p. 3.

70 As C.P. Fitzgerald has commented with regard to this period:

China in 1949 was a ruined land. Communications were almost wholly disrupted, many cities were still half derelict from war damage, industry was negligible, commerce was a gamble, starvation was widespread, agriculture was reduced to subsistence level.

The first task of any government acquiring full authority was sheer rescue work, a restoration of internal order, a resuscitation of basic economic activity.

"A Fresh Look at the Chinese Revolution", Pacific Affairs (Spring 1963), p. 47.

71 See reply from Mao Tse-tung to a message of greeting from the Indian Communist Party, cited in P.C. Chakravarti, India's China Policy (Bloomington, Indiana University Press, 1962), p. 4.

72 George N. Patterson, Tragic Destiny (London, Faber, 1959), p. 31.

73 Cited in Hindustan Times, 5 December 1949.

74 CAD, pt 2, vol. 2, p. 1720.

75 Ibid, pt 2, vol. 5, p. 301.

76 Cited in Hindustan Times, 15 November 1950.

77 As Nehru stated in Parliament on 27 November 1959:  
Ever since the Chinese Revolution, we naturally had to think of what the new China was likely to be. We realised that this revolution was going to be a very big factor in Asia, in the world, in regard to us. We realised - we knew that amount of history - that a strong China is normally an expansionist China...And we felt that the great push toward industrialisation of that country, plus the amazing pace of its population increase, would together create a most dangerous situation...we realised the danger to India...

Cited in Prime Minister on Sino-Indian Relations, vol. I: In Parliament (New Delhi, Ministry of External Affairs, 1961), p. 213.

78 In Two Chinas,

79 Chakravarti, op. cit., p. 8.

80 Robert Trumbull in New York Times, 15 February 1950. He correctly concluded that 'Tibet appears to be written off by New Delhi'.

81 LSD, pt 2, vol. 9, col. 5320.

82 Text in Foreign Policy of India: Texts of Documents 1947-59 (New Delhi, Lok Sabha Secretariat, December 1959), pp. 101-9.

83 The principles, as enunciated in the preamble, are: mutual respect for each other's territorial integrity and sovereignty, mutual non-aggression, mutual non-interference in each other's internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit and peaceful co-existence.

84 Responsible sections of the Indian press also interpreted the agreement as China's acknowledgment of India's Himalayan frontiers. See Times of India, 1st May 1954; 'INSAF' in Hindustan Times, 1st May 1954; Indian Express, 4 May 1954.

85 1st May 1954.

86 1st May 1954.

87 4 November 1954.

88 Extract from Congress Bulletin, June-July 1954, cited in M.W. Fisher and J.V. Bondurant, Indian Views on Sino-Indian Relations, Indian Press Digests, Monograph Series.

## CHAPTER III

### HIMALAYAN POLICY I

The long-term aspects of Himalayan security were investigated by a high-level North and North-Eastern Border Defence Committee established in February 1951 at the request of the Defence Ministry<sup>1</sup>. The report of the Committee was submitted to the Ministry in early 1953<sup>2</sup> and included a large number of recommendations. Among the major proposals were 'the re-organisation and expansion of the Assam Rifles, the extension of administration in the NEFA, development of intelligence network along the border, development of the border areas, development of civil armed police, development of communications and check posts'<sup>3</sup>.

The recommendations were examined by an ad hoc committee of Secretaries from the Ministries concerned and finally by the Defence Committee of the Cabinet. The recommendations, with several exceptions, were accepted and implemented. The Ministry of Home Affairs took up the development of the border areas with the relevant State Governments and provision was made for the various schemes in the Five Year Plans with 'substantial help' being advanced by the Union

Government. The construction of a number of roads was entrusted to Army engineers, while other road construction was undertaken by the Ministry of Transport. A few of the roads proposed by the Committee, however, were not accepted or proceeded with, either for tactical reasons or because expenditure on the construction of such roads was colossal and out of proportion to the good that they may do<sup>4</sup>.

The Indian Government appears to have viewed the immediate danger from Chinese activities as presenting itself in the North-Eastern Frontier Agency (NEFA).

Following the formal transfer of power from Britain on 15 August 1947, the Nehru administration had continued British policy vis-à-vis the tribals in north and north-east Assam in an unobtrusive manner. The NEFA and the remote tribal areas continued to be treated for administrative purposes as a responsibility of the Ministry of External Affairs, consistent with British practice and the special attention required by these areas for reasons of tribal welfare and strategic considerations<sup>5</sup>. Regular administration was extended to the Subansiri Division in 1949, the Abhor and Mishmi Hills districts were set up as administrative areas in 1949-50 and regular administration was extended to Tawang in February 1951<sup>6</sup>. In 1953, a special section was established in the External Affairs Ministry to administer



the NEFA and the Indian Frontier Administrative Service . (IFAS) was created for this purpose<sup>7</sup>.

Although these measures were undoubtedly influenced in the later stages by Tibetan developments, their basic motivation was seemingly in accord with the explanation Nehru later made in a letter to the Premier of the People's Republic of China, Chou En-lai, dated 26 September 1959:

Shortly after India attained independence in 1947 the Government of India decided, as a matter of policy, to bring these frontier areas under more direct administrative control to enable them to share in the benefits of a welfare state, subject to the protection of their distinct social and cultural patterns.<sup>8</sup>

Following the Chinese entry into Tibet in October 1950, however, strategic factors became paramount as the Government publicly declared its strategic interests in the area. Speaking in Parliament on 20 November 1950, Nehru stated that, notwithstanding Chinese pretensions to sovereignty over areas in Assam south of the line fixed by the 1914 Simla treaty (i.e. the McMahon Line), 'The MacMahon Line is our boundary, map or no map. We will not allow anybody to come across that boundary'<sup>9</sup>. In an announcement released the same day, the Indian Defence Ministry declared that it was continuing to reinforce the northern border<sup>10</sup>. On 23 November, Nehru assured Parliament that northern border defences

were being kept 'constantly under review' and that no invader would be permitted to cross that border<sup>11</sup>.

In response to reports received by the Government late in 1950 of Chinese troops in some strength near the MacMahon Line, about 100 Army paratroops were dropped into unreconnoitred frontier areas to establish an Indian presence and thereby deter surreptitious Chinese intrusions<sup>12</sup>. The Assam Rifles were re-organized in 1953, albeit without any apparent increase in strength<sup>13</sup>. In 1954, the Government approved a considerable expansion of the Security Intelligence Services<sup>14</sup> for the eastern and northern frontiers, with particular emphasis on the NEFA; the Director of the Intelligence Bureau invited applications for appointments in the Security Services from candidates from the 14 different tribes (including the Nagas) who fulfilled the necessary educational qualifications<sup>15</sup>. Tribal youngmen were also encouraged to enter the Army as a career<sup>16</sup>.

Immediate steps were also taken to improve communications throughout the tribal areas, the NEFA containing only about 100 miles of road (including the first 30 miles of the projected Sadiya-Rima link) as of 1950 - and much of this being badly damaged by the earthquake which struck Assam in that year<sup>17</sup>. A special five-year development plan for NEFA, sanctioned in 1953, included a provision of Rs 304.45 lakhs

for roads<sup>18</sup> and this allocation was increased in a subsequent revised plan to Rs 571.43 lakhs - as against a total development outlay of Rs 950.4 lakhs<sup>19</sup>. In view of the difficulties of terrain and the thick forests, the Union Government concluded that the construction of motorable roads would be an extremely difficult and expensive undertaking which would involve a disproportionate cost in money and effort. As an alternative, it was decided to develop air communications and to construct inexpensive bridle paths and mule tracks, and engineers from the Army and Air Force undertook a survey of prospective sites for landing strips. The committees set up for NEFA communications - which included representatives from the Ministries of Defence, External Affairs and Transport and from the Army and the Air Force - worked out an integrated plan of airfields, motorable and jeepable roads, bridle paths and mule and porter tracks. Included in the programme was the construction of fair-weather airstrips at Along and Ziro and of roads to link Dirrang Dzong with Foothills and Kimin with Ziro<sup>20</sup>.

Army engineers arrived in 1953 to commence construction of the proposed road links and by 1957 had pushed through a road from Tezpur half way to Bomdila and were almost all the way to Ziro. They were relieved in that year by the NEFA Public Works Development Organisation (PWDO) which carried

out work in the Tirap Division and continued the Foothills-Dirrang Dzong link, completing the 28-mile stretch from Bompila to Dirrang Dzong in 119 days late in 1959.

Related to the security of the MacMahon Line, though the area involved did not lie immediately contiguous to it, was the unresolved question of the Naga tribes. These peoples<sup>21</sup> inhabited the area astride the Indo-Burmese border and had been largely left alone by the British until the rapid Japanese advance through Burma in 1942 gave the area and its inhabitants considerable military significance. Taking advantage of the situation, the British had armed the Nagas and these tribesmen had quickly shown a capacity for skilled guerilla warfare.

The war gave an impetus to Naga 'self-identity'. The Naga National Council was formed in 1946 and a delegation visited Delhi in early 1947 in an unsuccessful effort to persuade the British Government to declare independence for the Naga people when the Crown formally relinquished power in India. There was a reluctance by many Nagas - and an adamant refusal by some - to accept their automatic transfer from British to Indian rule on 15 August 1947. The Nagas boycotted the 1952 Indian elections and discontent steadily grew and, in early 1956, it erupted into open insurrection against Indian authority.

The policy of the Nehru administration towards the Nagas had, up to this point, been basically a continuation of British policy - the minimum possible interference with the traditional society consistent with the maintenance of law and order and loose political control. The first attempt to administer the Eastern Nagas had occurred in 1951 when they were included in the Tuensang Frontier Division of NEFA, while the Naga Hills had remained a centrally-administered autonomous hills district attached to Assam. The Indian Government would not tolerate any Naga demands for independence, however, and it replied to the insurrection by rejecting any possible negotiations and moving to crush the Naga revolt by force. A thick curtain of secrecy was clamped over the situation and the area was declared closed to all persons save those sanctioned by the Defence Ministry.

On the suggestion of the Political Officer (Tuensang Frontier Division), three companies of Indian troops had been moved into the southern sector of the Division in August 1955. In early 1956, however, the strength of the Assam Rifles and of the armed police units in the Naga Hills was augmented, security forces on the Assam-Burmese border were reinforced and elaborate precautionary measures were taken in the Naga area of eastern Assam. On 15 April 1956, army units, elements of the Assam Rifles and armed police units from

various states initiated counter-actions under the overall command of Major-General R.K. Kocher, whose headquarters were sited at Kohima. The hard core of perhaps 1,500-2,500 'effectives', however, managed to elude all efforts aimed at their destruction while continuing their activities with skilful 'hit and run' tactics.

The burden of this 'pacification' campaign on the Indian Government steadily mounted as an increasing number of Army battalions were drafted to the area, police forces were strengthened and several fresh battalions of Assam Rifles were raised<sup>22</sup>. In an attempt to conciliate Naga sentiment, New Delhi responded to a resolution passed by a Naga Convention held at Kohima in 1957 and, on 1st December 1957, united the Naga Hills autonomous district and the Tuensang Frontier Division to form the Naga Hills-Tuensang Area (NHTA). The new unit embraced approximately 6,100 square miles and 400,000 Nagas inhabiting 700 villages. The NHTA continued as a contrally-administered area under the control of the Ministry of External Affairs and administered by the President of India through his agent, the Governor of Assam<sup>23</sup>. In 1959, the Indian authorities made an effort to associate 'loyal' Nagas with the pacification campaign by creating a force of Naga Home (Village) Guards as a military-cum-police force to be posted near 'troubled' villages, i.e. those of suspect loyalty.

In 1950, there were only two checkpoints in the middle sector (i.e. Punjab, Himachal Pradesh and Uttar Pradesh) - both on the Himachal Pradesh-Tibet border<sup>24</sup>. The number of checkpoints in the middle sector, however, was increased in 1951 and the posts were moved closer to the border with Tibet in 1954<sup>25</sup>. At the beginning of 1954, the Uttar Pradesh State Government voted a supplementary grant of over Rs 170,000 for expenses incurred on special police guarding the border with Tibet<sup>26</sup>. It was announced in Lucknow in mid-October that the strength of the State's armed frontier constabulary was to be doubled and the force re-organized with a stronger headquarters<sup>27</sup>. In September, the Ministry of External Affairs created a new section under a Deputy Secretary, P.D. Roy, to extend the administered areas - the Centre thereby taking over or co-ordinating much of the administration in the frontier areas of Kashmir, Punjab, Uttar Pradesh and Himachal Pradesh<sup>28</sup>.

Improvements were made to communications in these areas. Work commenced in 1951 on the Hindustan-Tibet road which was eventually to extend from Simla to the Tibetan border<sup>29</sup>. In June 1954, the Uttar Pradesh authorities announced that a £ 2 million road-building programme financed by the Centre was shortly to be launched to link places of strategic importance in the Kumaon Hills adjoining the borders with Nepal

and Tibet<sup>30</sup>. The first air link with the Kulu Valley was opened on 18 January 1956 when a Heron aircraft touched down at the newly-completed Bhunter airstrip located seven miles from Kulu town<sup>31</sup>. On 25 May 1956, a seven-mile jeepable road linking Sainwala to Kandaiwala (Himichal Pradesh) was officially inaugurated with plans envisaging the extension of the road to the Tibetan border via Chini within three years<sup>32</sup>. The opening of the Rohin bridge on 15 November 1958 provided for an all-weather road between Gorakhpur (Uttar Pradesh) and eastern Nepal<sup>33</sup>. During the Second Plan period (1956-61), the Punjab State Government constructed a nine-mile road connecting Grampjoo and Keylong.

Indian attention on Ladakh had initially been provoked by the advances of Pakistani forces into the area early in the Kashmir conflict. Their capture of Kargil had temporarily cut the 200-mile mule track linking Srinagar and Leh via the 11,500 foot-high Zoji La pass, forcing the Indian Army to improvise an airstrip at Leh and hastily construct an alternate and less vulnerable land route to Leh from Manali in the East Punjab via the 16,200 foot-high Bara Lacha pass. With the recapture of Kargul by Indian forces in November 1948, Ladakh returned to Indian control. An infantry battalion and supporting arms were thereupon permanently sited at Leh against the contingency of renewed conflict with Pakistan.



The Chinese entry into western Tibet late in 1950 does not appear to have provoked any appreciable alarm in New Delhi as to the security of adjacent Indian territory - perhaps because of a belief that the barren Ladakhi landscape constituted a physical deterrent to Chinese aggrandizement. Certain precautions were nonetheless taken to establish a more permanent Indian presence in this area. In 1950 posts were established at Chushul and Demchok<sup>34</sup> and, in 1951, 'army' units were purportedly stationed in various checkpoints and 'expeditions' were sent by the Army and the police to the farthest points of Indian territory<sup>35</sup>. In mid-1954, the Ministry of External Affairs assumed control of the 300-mile Ladakh-Tibet border and re-organized the system of checkpoints which had hitherto been manned somewhat haphazardly by the State police<sup>36</sup>. In response to successive Chinese intrusions after 1954, further posts were established - except in Aksai Chin for the reason that it was a very difficult area of access and the Government was 'busy elsewhere'<sup>37</sup>.

Construction of a motorable road from Srinagar to Leh commenced in 1954 and, in early 1956, it was reported that work was being speeded up on the road which was designed 'to provide a closer link with Kashmir's northernmost strategic areas of Ladakh whose 37,000 square miles border with Tibet on the east and Chinese Sinkiang on the north'<sup>38</sup>. Work on

this project was suspended in 1958, however, following the discovery by the authorities of financial irregularities; the engineers were suspended and an enquiry was initiated.

In accordance with the dictates of national security - but in contradiction of his avowed policy of anti-imperialism and non-intervention in the internal affairs of other states - Nehru adopted and pursued the former British policy of direct or indirect control over the Himalayan states of Sikkim, Bhutan and Nepal.

Under the provisions of the Sino-British treaties concluded in 1890 and 1893, the tiny state of Sikkim, which occupied a strategic position astride the main trade route between India and Tibet, had become a British protectorate. On 15 August 1947 the Indian Union inherited these treaties and the right to send a political officer to assist the Maharajah in the administration of the country - Indo-Sikkimese relations being temporarily governed by a stand-still arrangement.

In early 1949, considerable unrest and occasional rioting developed throughout the state as a result of dissatisfaction with the feudal system. Acting on the request of the Maharajah and ostensibly 'in the interests of law and order'<sup>39</sup>, the Indian Government intervened on 7 June through the despatch into the state of a company of troops, who

functioned under the general direction of the political officer resident in Gangtok, the capital. Indo-Sikkimese relations were regularized in a treaty signed on 5 December 1950 which re-affirmed the relationship in existence on 15 August 1947. Sikkim was therein designated a 'Protectorate of India' and India retained responsibility for the defence and territorial integrity of the tiny state with the right to construct and maintain communications for strategic purposes and to take such measures as it considered necessary for the defence of Sikkim and the security of India, preparatory or otherwise and whether within or without the kingdom<sup>40</sup>.

In 1951, the Indian Government seconded an experienced political officer, J.S. Lall, to serve as dewan or chief minister of Sikkim and under his guidance extensive administrative, land and tax reforms were subsequently introduced. The Indian subsidy totalled £ 60,000 in each of 1951, 1952 and 1953 and rose to £ 170,624 in 1954 and £ 399,375 in 1955<sup>41</sup>. The latter year marked the commencement of a seven-year development plan underwritten by India<sup>42</sup> in which the emphasis was placed upon communications; included were such projects as a 12½ mile aerial ropeway from Gangtok to Nathu La pass on the Tibetan border and a road between the same two points which Nehru formally opened in September 1958 while en route to Bhutan<sup>43</sup>. The Government of India

maintained the three strategic roads in the state, including the two main trade routes to Tibet. In the absence of either railroads or airstrips, Sikkim's direct surface contact with the external world remained restricted to the narrow, twisting, partly-paved and partly-gravel road linking Gangtok with the Indian railhead at Siliguri, seven miles to the south via Rangpo. The Rangpo-Gangtok link via Singtam was, however, closed to heavy traffic during the monsoon season during which period Sikkim was virtually isolated. Consistent with the practice followed by the British Indian Government, a permit from Indian authorities remained necessary for any foreigner wishing to visit Sikkim - and such permits were granted sparingly.

India also inherited the Anglo-Bhutanese treaties of 1865 and 1910 and a standstill agreement was concluded, with effect from 15 August 1947, to govern Indo-Bhutanese relations pending discussions as to their future relationships.

In 1946, after the British Government had declared its intention to withdraw its authority from the sub-continent, a Bhutanese delegation had visited New Delhi for discussions with the Congress leadership concerning Bhutan's status vis-à-vis Britain and a sovereign India. These discussions continued into mid-1949. On 23 April 1948, a Bhutanese delegation headed by D.S.T. Dorji visited Delhi and handed the

Secretary to the Minister for External Affairs, K.P.S. Menon, a written document containing a request by the Bhutanese Government for revision of the 1865 treaty. Bhutan demanded return of 800 square miles of territory ceded to British India in the 1865 treaty and promised to forego claims to a subsidy or, as an alternative, requested the return of 300 square miles of forest land adjoining Bhutan in West Bengal and Assam and an increase in the existing subsidy from Rs 200,000 to Rs 800,000. Desirous of retaining a special position in the strategic kingdom, New Delhi was able to effect a compromise arrangement in a treaty of friendship concluded at Darjeeling on 8 August 1949<sup>44</sup>.

Under the provisions of the treaty, the Indian Government guaranteed Bhutan's internal autonomy and increased the annual subsidy to Rs 500,000 while obtaining the right of consultation on matters involving Bhutan's external relations<sup>45</sup> and supervisory privileges over the importation into Bhutan of warlike material or stores which might be required or desired for the strength and welfare of Bhutan. India also agreed to return to Bhutan 32 square miles of territory in the Dewangiri district of Assam, a cession sanctioned by Parliament on 8 August 1951<sup>46</sup>.

Following the Chinese occupation of Tibet in 1950-51, Indian-sponsored defence activities in Bhutan - such as the

construction of road links and defensive posts - reportedly increased steadily both in tempo and scope<sup>47</sup>. The Reserve Bank of India undertook to meet all of Bhutan's needs of foreign exchange for development purposes at request and with no fixed ceiling; fortunately for India, the Bhutanese authorities apparently felt no inclination to make other than modest requests. Bhutan continued, however, to regulate the entry of outsiders<sup>48</sup>, including Indians, and India's official representative continued, as in the past, to reside in Gangtok.

The isolation of the kingdom was a cause of increasing concern in New Delhi in view of Chinese activities in Tibet and the appearance of Chinese cartographic claims to portions of the state. In September 1958, Nehru accordingly undertook an arduous five-day journey to Bhutan by pony, mule and yak via Sikkim and Yatung (Tibet) - a visit 'intended to remind its feudal authorities that their lawful overlord is in Delhi and not Peking'<sup>49</sup>. Nehru also sought the Maharaja's agreement to the construction of a direct road from India to Bhutan<sup>50</sup>. The Indian Prime Minister duly discussed the road issue with the Maharaja and his Prime Minister, Jigme Dorji, and it was announced in New Delhi on 7 October 1958 that steps were being taken to construct two direct road links between India and Bhutan. The two proposed projects would

link Jayanti (on the North Trunk Road in Bengal) with Sentula (on the Indo-Bhutan border) and Garubhada (Assam) with Hatisar on the Indo-Bhutan border. By the end of the 1958 fiscal year, the Indian Government had commenced work on the construction of these approach roads and had also agreed to make available Rs 150,000 for road development within the Himalayan state<sup>51</sup>.

Nepal covers 600 miles of India's northern frontier, and its stability and integrity are, therefore, of vital concern to any Indian Government. The Indian Union inherited the relationship laid down in the Anglo-Nepalese treaty of 1923 wherein Britain recognized the complete independence of Nepal. Shortly after partition, New Delhi concluded a tripartite agreement with Britain and Nepal whereby she obtained the right to recruit Gurkhas for her army - a right previously restricted to Britain alone. During the troubled 1947-49 period, India was also able to obtain the services of a Nepalese force of about one brigade for internal security duties<sup>52</sup>. Unlike Britain in the past, however, the Indian Union could not hope to monopolize Nepal's external relations. British-Nepalese diplomatic relations were raised to the level of an embassy, the United States and Nepal agreed on 25 April 1947 to exchange diplomatic representatives and France recognized the sovereignty of the

Himalayan state in 1949. Nepal subsequently entered into diplomatic relations with a number of other states.

The Union Government approached the issue of relations with Nepal with circumspection and not until it became clear that a communist victory in China was imminent did it state publicly, and in categorical terms, its deep interest in Nepalese affairs. In early 1950, immediately the intention of the newly-established Chinese communist regime to 'liberate' Tibet was announced, the Indian and Nepalese Governments undertook bilateral discussions relating to defence matters<sup>53</sup>. In a strongly-worded statement in Parliament on 17 March 1950, Nehru noted the 'identical interests' of the two countries and declared:

It is not necessary for us to have a military alliance with Nepal...[but] the fact remains that we cannot tolerate any foreign invasion from any foreign country in any part of the sub-continent. Any possible invasion of Nepal would inevitably involve the safety of India.

He also said, however:

I have not the slightest apprehension of any invasion of Nepal. I do not think any such invasion of Nepal is easy or possible, nor do I think it is at all likely';

he only wished to make it clear to Parliament the official policy 'in such matters'<sup>54</sup>. Nehru visited Nepal in June.

The interdependence of the two countries was re-affirmed in a treaty of peace and friendship signed between



representatives of the two governments in Kathmandu on 31 July 1950<sup>55</sup>. In letters exchanged between the two governments on the same occasion, which Nehru described in December 1959 as 'an essential operative part of the treaty'<sup>56</sup>, it was stipulated that 'Neither Government shall tolerate any threat to the security of the other by a foreign aggressor. To deal with any such threat the two Governments shall consult together with each other and devise effective counter-measures'<sup>57</sup>. In apparent accordance with the provisions of the treaty Nepal, in response to Tibetan developments, tightened its system of frontier guards on its northern border with the aid of Indian personnel<sup>58</sup>. The extent of these precautionary measures is reflected in the rise in the cost of these defence posts on the Nepalese-Tibet border from £15,000 (1952) to £100,000 (1954)<sup>59</sup>.

India's deep interest in developments affecting Nepal was re-stated by Nehru following the outbreak (in late 1950) of a revolt against the feudal Rana regime by armed supporters of the Nepalese Congress operating from bases in India. Speaking in Parliament on 6 December, the Indian Prime Minister declared:

So far as the Himalayas are concerned, they lie on the other side of Nepal, not on this side. Therefore, the principal barrier to India lies on the other side of Nepal. We are not going to tolerate any person coming over that barrier. Therefore, much as we can appreciate the independence of

Nepal, we cannot risk our own security by anything not done in Nepal which permits either that barrier to be crossed or otherwise leads to the weakening of our frontiers.<sup>60</sup>

This declaration was incompatible with the non-interventionist pledge entered into by the Indian Government in the July treaty. The preparation and launching of the attacks into Nepal from Indian soil - and with the complicity of at least the Bihar Government - were also scarcely consistent with the same solemn undertaking. The Union Government continued to profess its neutrality in the entire affair but its actions were unmistakably anti-Rana.

King Tribhuvan and his family were granted refuge in the Indian Embassy on 6 November and were flown to Delhi in an Indian Air Force aircraft on 11 November. Deposed by an emergency session of the Nepalese Parliament on 7 November in favour of the three-year-old crown prince, the King was nevertheless received by the President of India on 13 November and the Indian Government continued to recognize him as the Nepalese head of state - and apparently influenced Britain and the United States into adopting a similar policy. Indian authorities gave constant advice to both parties to the dispute during the period of change-over in Nepal<sup>61</sup>, and Nehru acted as mediator in discussions held between the representatives of the Ranas and of the King Tribhuvan-Nepalese Congress alliance in New Delhi in January-February 1951.

This culminated in an agreement which ended the lengthy (1846-1951) tenure of the Rana oligarchy.

India's involvement in Nepal steadily deepened thereafter. In response to Dr K.I. Singh's abortive coup on 22 January 1952, Indian troops were despatched to Nepal to assist the authorities in suppressing this ostensibly communist-inspired peasant uprising and were instrumental in Singh's capture. Alarmed at Singh's relationship with elements of the poorly-armed, organized and equipped Royal Army of some 25,000<sup>62</sup>, the Nepalese Government requested the assistance of Indian Army officers to re-organize the force. An Indian military mission was accordingly established on 7 April 1952<sup>63</sup> and proceeded with a sweeping re-organization of the Royal Nepal Army into a light division of 6,000 men with better quarters, rations, pay and equipment (than theretofore) and dispersed from Kathmandu to garrisons in the provinces<sup>64</sup>. In 1953-54, Indian troops and police were still sometimes involved in internal security actions in Nepal<sup>65</sup>.

The Indian aid programme to Nepal steadily increased in scope<sup>66</sup> and involved the despatch of experts to improve the civil service, and irrigation projects, aerial geological surveys, the construction of schools and hospitals, training facilities for Nepalese in India and the development of communications internally and with India. In 1952, India

pledged an annual subsidy of about Rs 800,000 and extended a loan of about Rs 1.35 crores. Following political and economic talks in New Delhi during the period 18-22 July 1953 between Prime Minister M.P. Koirala and Nehru, the Indian Government agreed not to levy excise duty on Indian goods exported to Nepal and to provide Rs 1 million per annum over a five-year period for seven or eight minor irrigation projects. India pledged further aid totalling Rs 7 crores in 1954 and made available Rs 10 crores towards Nepal's first Five-Year Plan, which was announced on 21 September 1956. When Nepal was struck by widespread drought in 1957, India rushed food from its own lean stocks and New Delhi continued to provide all of Nepal's oil and petroleum needs for rupee payment although itself forced to expend scarce foreign exchange to acquire these items.

Indian Army engineers, aided by Nepalese labourers, constructed a temporary fair-weather airstrip at Gauchar in 1951-52 and a daily DC-3 air service between Patna and Kathmandu commenced. Subsequent improvements to the airstrip culminated in the formal inauguration of the country's first all-weather airport by King Mahendra on 13 June 1955. In 1953 Indian Army engineers began construction of the 80-mile Tribhuvan Rajpath to link Thankot (near Kathmandu) with Bhainse Dhoban (near Amlekganj - the railhead close to the

Indian frontier)<sup>67</sup>; the project involved an estimated outlay of Rs 1.5 crores and had a target date of December 1956. A narrow jeepable road was cut through in December 1953 but severe damage resulting from heavy floods in 1954 set the project back many months and forced the drafting of more engineers to the scheme. The road was opened in May 1955 by a special convoy of 20 Indian Army trucks carrying 50 tons of rice to Kathmandu and it was formally handed over to the Nepalese Government on 30 June 1957. In a tripartite agreement between the Governments of Nepal, the United States and India signed on 2 January 1958, 900 miles of road were to be constructed in Nepal over a five-year period at an estimated cost of nearly \$ 7.5 million, towards which the United States pledged \$ 5 million, India promised \$ 1,875,000 and Nepal agreed to allocate \$ 525,000<sup>68</sup>.

These various Indian activities evidenced that New Delhi appreciated that Nepal was crucial to Indian national security. As one American observer aptly commented: 'Once a hermit, then a buffer, she has now become the meat of the sandwich'<sup>69</sup>.

The Indo-Nepalese relationship, however, remained subject to a constant series of crises directly or indirectly attributable to the pervasive Indian influence and presence in the country. Nepalese were sensitive to their country's

total dependence upon India for markets and imports and the restrictions placed upon Nepal's imports and exports by the trade agreement concluded in October 1950 merely made Indian intentions seem even more suspect. The large numbers of personnel demobilized from the Royal Nepal Army consequent on its re-organization by the Indian Military Mission, as well as civil servants affected by the presence of Indian administrators, communists whose party was banned on 25 January 1952 probably with Indian encouragement, opposition politicians who viewed New Delhi as the main bulwark of any incumbent authority in Kathmandu - all possessed grievances which could readily be fanned into open demonstrations of ill-will towards India.

When the King passed over the strongman of the Nepalese Congress, B.P. Koirala, for M.P. Koirala as the first commoner Prime Minister, the followers of the former blamed the move on the aggressive Indian Ambassador, C.P.N. Singh, and B.P. Koirala himself charged Singh with taking an 'undue interest' in Nepal's internal affairs. Anti-Indian feeling in the Kathmandu Valley was aggravated by a chronic budgetary and trade deficit. When Nehru visited Kathmandu in the summer of 1951, he was met with a black flag demonstration organized by Tanka Prasad's Praja Pareshad party. An Indian parliamentary delegation on a goodwill visit to the Nepalese

capital in May 1954 met with a hostile public reception organized by the Nepali Congress and protesting against the activities of the military mission<sup>70</sup>.

Following the conclusion of the Sino-Indian agreement on Tibet in April 1954, the Indian Government encouraged Nepal to 'regularize' its own relationship with Tibet. Up to 1954, Nepalese-Tibetan relations had been governed by an 1856 treaty whereby Tibet paid an annual tribute to Nepal. Payment of this tribute continued up to 1954, in which year no tribute mission arrived and Chinese authorities apparently suggested to the Indian representatives in Peking engaged in the treaty negotiations that Nepal's relations with Tibet should also be 'regularised against a proper perspective'<sup>71</sup>. In May, the Nepalese King and two of his Ministers held talks with Indian officials in New Delhi following which Foreign Minister D.R. Regmi announced that his Government would take up the question of Nepal-Tibetan talks 'very soon'<sup>72</sup>. Prime Minister Koirala had talks with Nehru before and after the latter's visit to China in October and, at a press conference in New Delhi on 13 November 1954, the Indian Prime Minister stated that the question of diplomatic relations between Nepal and China was a matter for the Nepalese Government. On 1st August 1955, a joint communiqué issued in Kathmandu by representatives of the Nepalese and

Chinese Governments declared that an agreement had been reached which affirmed panch shila as the basis of Sino-Nepalese relations and provided for the establishment of diplomatic relations.

New Delhi's apparently passive acquiescence in the establishment of Sino-Nepalese diplomatic relations was, in the view of a leading Indian weekly, 'opening the sluice gate to a veritable flood and unknowingly heading for tragic consequences in her mistaken belief that such crumbs of friendship will keep Peking in good humour'<sup>73</sup>. The Nehru Government could hardly have been unmindful of the dangers of formal relations between Kathmandu and Peking, but it probably regarded such a development as inevitable, and opposition as futile. Its attitude was probably similar towards the Nepalese-Soviet agreement in July 1956 regarding the exchange of diplomatic representatives.

Any hopes that India may have had that Chinese (and Soviet) penetration of Nepal could be restricted to a diplomatic presence were quickly dashed as both countries offered economic aid towards Nepal's first Five Year Plan. The alarm with which the Indian Government viewed the Sino-Nepalese aid agreement of October 1957<sup>74</sup> was revealed in several ways. The former rebel, Dr K.I. Singh, who on his return from exile in China had professed to hold the same views



concerning his country's future as did the Indian Government<sup>75</sup>, visited New Delhi in the second week of October and was received by Nehru, the President of India and the Indian Home Minister. Evidently voicing beliefs which he considered would enhance his attractiveness to Indian officialdom, Singh declared that he opposed Nepal's accepting Chinese aid, disapproved of Nepal's receipt of foreign aid from any country other than India and opposed the presence of other than an Indian Embassy in Kathmandu<sup>76</sup>. In the second week of the same month, President Prasad visited Nepal and declared in Kathmandu on 22 October 1956 that 'Any threat to the peace and security of Nepal is as much a threat to the peace and security of India. Your friends are our friends and our friends yours'<sup>77</sup>. The resignation of Prime Minister Archarya on 9 July 1957 and his replacement by Singh could, therefore, be regarded as somewhat of a pro-Indian shift in Kathmandu which was not perceptibly affected by the King's imposition of direct rule later in the year, on 14 November.

The significance of India's activities in the Himalayan region during this 1947-59 period, though generally unnoticed by observers pre-occupied with studying Nehru's global diplomacy in all its peculiar manifestations, did not pass without comment in the Western press. In later 1954, one observer declared that 'All along the frontier from Kashmir to Assam

doors are being guarded more closely than before. India's small but efficient Army is watching the Himalayan passes,<sup>78</sup>.

An American political columnist wrote in June 1956:

The dominantly realistic side of Mr Nehru's foreign policy is Himalayan. Tibet's great plateau with a southern border of no less than 2500 miles overshadows the Indian plain. India has taken care to put the intervening Himalayan countries of Sikkim, Bhutan and Nepal under its protection. Included in the category of prudent diplomacy of course is exchange of words about co-existence with Peiping. But roads and airfield construction which has marked Red China's transformation of Tibet offsets all these assurances. Security rises superior to fine sounding phrases even in India.<sup>79</sup>

Or, as an English weekly commented in 1958:

Mr Nehru becomes more of a realist every day about the relationship between India and China. A large part of India's growing military budget is being quietly spent on building strategic roads and strengthening patrols on the Tibetan border and not as is commonly supposed on the border of Pakistan.<sup>80</sup>

While fully aware of the strategic implications of China's occupation of Tibet, the Indian Government had responded to the altered Himalayan situation in a manner that must be described as politically discreet, diplomatically cautious, economical of financial and material resources and projected over the long-term. The over-riding determinant of policy was to avoid giving provocation to Peking at almost all costs and to secure continued tranquillity in the Himalayan region primarily by astute diplomacy. Prudence

dictated that certain precautionary measures had to be taken to deter surreptitious Chinese intrusions of the long and difficult Himalayan frontiers, subversion of the frontier tribes and inroads into India's dominant position in the Himalayan kingdoms - but these measures were modest in scope. In the absence of a clearly recognizable challenge from China, priority had for understandable reasons to be given to national economic development in the allocation of very limited resources and certain risks had to be taken. A vigorous and publicised programme of Himalayan security measures was also virtually precluded by the fear that such activities would compromise the Government's professions of friendship and goodwill towards China and provoke the very response from Peking which Indian diplomacy sought to prevent - an overt challenge along the long Himalayan frontier. The measures actually undertaken by India in the Himalayan region, therefore, were diplomatic, administrative and police measures - anything which could be construed by Peking as indicating concerted preparations against future military contingencies was studiously avoided.

#### Notes

1 The committee was under the chairmanship of the Deputy Defence Minister, Major-General Himmatsinghji, with the incumbent Chief of the Army General Staff, Lt General Kalwant

Singh, and a representative of the External Affairs Ministry as members.

2 Information obtained in an interview with several prominent Indian civil and military figures.

3 Prime Minister Nehru, replying to the debate on India-China relations in the Rajya Sabha on 9 December 1959. Cited, Prime Minister on Sino-Indian Relations, vol. I: In Parliament (Ministry of External Affairs, GOI, undated), p. 251. The assessment, insofar as it pertains to the policing of the north-east frontier, appears to have been virtually indistinguishable from the views recorded by the Army in India (Esher) Committee 1920 - although the parallel between the situation in 1951-53 and that which prevailed in 1920 was at best superficial. In its report, the Esher Committee had concluded, with reference to the Burma and Assam Military Police (subsequently re-named the Assam Rifles) that it concurred with the views of the General Staff in India, viz.:

- a) That the transfer to the army of responsibility for policing the north-east frontier, involving a large increase of expenditure, could not be justified on grounds of military necessity.
- b) That the circumstances of the case necessitated the location of the military police in a number of small posts, scattered all over the frontier. This dispersion is opposed to military principles and incompatible with a sound system of military defence, though doubtless suited to the purpose for which the force is primarily employed, namely, the policing of the frontier. For such duties, it is desirable to employ local forces, which can be split up into detachments and moved about by the local civil authority without the delay involved by references to superior military officers.
- c) If regular troops co-operate with the military police, it is essential that the operations should be conducted under military direction. But this affords no justification for the suggestion that the military police should be brought permanently under military control. On the contrary, the present system, under which the military police are controlled by the local Government, suffices to meet all normal requirements, and should not be changed.

The Army in India Committee 1920, pt VIII, p. 94.

4 Prime Minister Nehru, replying to the debate of India-China relations in the Rajya Sabha on 9 December 1959. Cited, Prime Minister on Sino-Indian Relations, pp. 251-2. It is worth noting, however, that at his monthly press conference in early November 1959 Nehru declined to answer a question as to whether the Chiefs of Staff had ever proposed forward planning for northern defence. See Times of India, 6 November 1959.

5 The NEFA is constitutionally a part of Assam administered by External Affairs with the Governor of Assam acting as the agent of the President of India.

6 Ministry of External Affairs, Report, 1949-50, p. 9.

7 Ibid, 1953-54, p. 33. As of this date, NEFA comprised the Kameng, Lohit, Subansiri, Siang, Tirap and Tuensang Frontier Divisions. See map B.

8 White Paper, II, p. 42.

9 LSD, pt 1, vol. 5, col. 155.

10 Cited, New York Times, 21 November 1950.

11 Cited, ibid, 24 November 1950.

12 Information obtained in an interview with a high-ranking Indian Army officer. According to one observer, the number of border checkpoints was increased in NEFA from the three in existence in 1950 to 18 major posts and 15 outposts in 1951 and to 44 major posts and 56 outposts by 1954. P.C. Chakravarti, India's China Policy (Bloomington, Indiana University Press, 1962), footnote on p. 165. Nehru claimed in Parliament on 23 February 1961 that, within a year of the Chinese invasion of Tibet, his Government had increased the number of checkpoints in NEFA from three to 25 covering 'most of the important routes and that a 'little later this number was further increased all along the NEFA border and the middle sector' and in 1954 these checkpoints were moved closer to the actual border. Prime Minister on Sino-Indian Relations, vol. I, p. 386.

13 The Assam Rifles is a semi-military police force which operates under the control of the Ministry of External Affairs. It is recruited from Hindus, Christians and Moslems residing in the Brahmaputra Valley, from Naga, Chin, Kachin,

Loshi, Khasi and Kuki tribals from the Shillong area and from Indian-domiciled Gurkhas. The Nagas comprise about 30 per cent of the personnel with the Gurkhas being perhaps even more prominent. Most of the officers are seconded from the regular Army. The cost of this force as early as 1952-3 was Rs 1.83 crores. See statement by the Deputy Minister for External Affairs, Anil K. Chanda, LSD, pt 1, vol. 3, 27 August 1953, col. 1222.

14 The mainstay of Government intelligence is the Director Intelligence Bureau which functions under the control of the Home Ministry and is responsible for all intelligence activity, including that beyond India's frontiers. The armed forces have a smaller and subordinate military intelligence service, but its scope is limited to internal military security and to intelligence within operational areas.

15 Colin Reid, The Daily Telegraph, 8 June 1954. He stated that 'Attempts by political groups and other organisations to cause estrangement between the India Government and tribesmen are said to be the reason for the measures'.

16 Ministry of External Affairs, Report, 1958-59, p. 10.

17 This minor system of roads was also not off-set by good supporting systems to the south in Assam proper, which itself was linked directly by land to the rest of India by a single rail link connecting Kishanganj in north Bihar to the railway in Assam via Darjeeling and the narrow corridor passing between Bhutan and the northern tip of East Pakistan. This link was constructed between early 1948 and December 1949.

18 Chanda, loc. cit. It was announced in Assam on 14 June 1954 that the State Government had decided to give the highest priority to the development of a network of communications in the interests of border security. See Reid, loc. cit.

19 Ministry of External Affairs, Report, 1956-57, p. 6. This involved the improvement, completion and construction of 465 miles of roads. See statement by the Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of External Affairs, J.N. Hazarika, LSD, pt 1, vol. 2, 16 March 1956, col. 1098.

20 See statement by Hazarika in Parliament on 16 March 1956, ibid, cols 1097-8. See also his statement in ibid, pt 1, vol. 2, 6 April 1955, cols 1911-12.

21 The Nagas number about 600,000 and are divided into 14 main tribes - Aos, Angamis, Semas, Konyaks, Lothas, Rengmas,

Chakasangs, Zeliangs (including Kukis), Changs, Sangtams, Phoms, Pangshas, Kacharis and Yimchungers. For brief articles on the Nagas, see P.M. Jones, "India and the Nagas", Far Eastern Economic Review, 30 August 1962; articles by Easwar Sagar in Hindu, 2 and 4 September, and 3 October 1960; Vishnu Dutt in Times of India, 27 and 29 December 1960.

22 For press reports on the situation in Nagaland, see The Times, 28 October 1956; Kenneth Ames in The Daily Mail, 3 April 1956; Jonathan Swayne in The Scotsman, 23 April 1956; Manchester Guardian, 28 April 1956; Anthony Mann in The Daily Telegraph, 20 March 1957; The Times, 19 December 1960; The New York Times, 27 December 1960; The New York Herald Tribune, 6 January 1961; Gavin Long in The Observer, 1st May 1961.

23 The remaining 200,000 Nagas remained in the contiguous areas of Manipur and the Tirap Frontier Division. In the administration of the NHTA, the Governor of Assam was assisted by his Adviser at Shillong, a Commissioner at Kohima, Deputy Commissioners in each of the Kohima, Mokokchung and Tuensang districts, Assistant Commissioners Grade I and Grade II, Circle Officers and village chiefs.

24 See Nehru's statement in Parliament on 23 February 1961. Prime Minister on Sino-Indian Relations, vol. I, p. 386.

25 See ibid. Robert Trumbull reported in The New York Times on 4 August 1951 that eight new police checkpoints had been established on the Uttar Pradesh-Tibet border, all reinforced with more than the usual complement of police and two of them equipped with wireless.

26 Thought, 9 January 1954, p. 4.

27 New Delhi correspondent in The Times, 19 October 1954.

28 Ibid.

29 A Hindustan-Tibet road was first suggested in 1841 by an official of the East India Company, J.D. Cunningham, as an inducement to merchants from Amritsar to Delhi to undertake the journey to Gartok in search of shawl wool. In 1850, Lord Dalhousie authorised work on a road that was to stretch from the plains to Simla, whence it would eventually be extended up the Sutlej to the border with Tibet via Chini. Dalhousie also envisaged military and political advantages in the projected road. The project, however, was not proceeded with

vigorously and doubts were expressed as to the military advisability of creating such an easy route through the Himalayan barrier. The road had been extended only as far as the vice-regal bungalow at Chini by 1858, at which time the project was virtually abandoned in favour of a concentration of effort on the construction of the Grand Trunk road. See Alastair Lamb, Britain and Chinese Central Asia (London, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1960), p. 83.

30 Colin Reid, The Daily Telegraph, 5 June 1954.

31 Asian Recorder, 14-20 January 1956, 628K.

32 Ibid, 26 May-1st June 1956, 856G.

33 Ibid, 29 November-5 December 1958, 2374I.

34 The Round Table, No. 211 (June 1963), p. 216.

35 See Nehru's statement in Parliament on 23 February 1961. Prime Minister on Sino-Indian Relations, vol. I, p. 386. He described the expeditions as 'in the nature of mountain expeditions, mountaineers and others, a group of 10 or 15 persons going ahead' and claimed that 16 such parties were sent to various parts of Ladakh during the 1950-59 period.

36 Delhi correspondent in The Times, 19 October 1954.

37 Nehru, loc. cit. He claimed, however, that Indian survey parties and patrols had visited the area - a party had gone from Leh to Lingzi Tang and Aksai Chin in 1951; another party visited Lanak La via Kongka Pass in 1952; patrols visited Lanak La in 1954 and 1956; and a party had visited the Qara Tagh area in September 1957.

38 Delhi correspondent in The Times, 29 May 1956. Srinagar is linked to the main Indian road network via Pathankot.

39 The Hindustan Times, 8 June 1949.

40 For the text of the treaty, see appendix XXI. The preface to the treaty as reprinted in an official publication is a comment by The Hindustan Times dated 7 December 1950 which states:

This treaty will be hailed as a big step in strengthening the frontier defences. Now that the Himalayas are no longer insuperable barriers as of



old, it is a matter of vital import to India to ensure adequate safeguards along the frontiers. Foreign Policy of India: Texts of Documents (New Delhi, Lok Sabha Secretariat, October 1958), p. 35.

41 Rosemary Brissenden, "India and the Northern Frontier", Australian Outlook (April 1960), p. 21.

42 For the plan, which ended on 31 March 1961, India sanctioned an expenditure of Rs 3.07 crores but the Sikkimese authorities ultimately expended Rs 3.24 crores. Times of India, 11 June 1961.

43 Ministry of External Affairs, Report, 1955-56, p. 8; 1957-58, p. 9; 1958-59, p. 12. According to a progress report issued by the Sikkimese Government in late 1962, the Central Public Works Department (CPWD) and the Border Roads Development Board (BRDB) constructed over 300 miles of roads during this plan period. See Hindu, 2 January 1963.

44 For the text, see appendix XXII.

45 This clause has been described, in a rather paternal fashion, by one Indian daily as 'designated as a shield for Bhutan inasmuch as it secures her against the danger of being sucked into the vortex of the cold war'. Times of India leader, 3 February 1961.

46 Nehru claimed at a New Delhi press conference on 24 June 1960 that the cession had been made because the Bhutanese regarded this area as sacred. Cited, Times of India, 25 June 1960.

47 New York Times, 9 May 1952; Chester Bowles, Ambassador's Report (London, Gollancz, 1954), pp. 256-7. The writer has not, however, been able to uncover any evidence to this effect prior to 1958.

48 The first American reporter, Paul Grimes of the New York Times, was only allowed to enter Bhutan in 1960.

49 The Economist, 26 September 1958.

50 Time and Tide, 10 October 1958.

51 Ministry of External Affairs, Report, 1958-59, p. 12.

52 Lt General Sir Francis Taker, Gorkha: The Story of the Gurkhas of Nepal (London, Constable & Co., 1957), p. 261.

53 The initiative reportedly came from Nepal. See New York Times, 16 February 1950. Trumbull also cited an External Affairs Ministry spokesman as stating that, while India would not commit troops in defence of the Dalai Lama's regime, she would regard an attack on Nepal as an attack on India.

54 The Director of the Nepalese Foreign Affairs Ministry, Major-General Bijaya Shumshere Jung Rana, also professed at this time to be unconcerned about invasion from the north for the pragmatic reason that 'The passes are too narrow for large-scale movement and no heavy equipment could be brought across'. He conceded that the 'communists' might infiltrate but stated that this was not anticipated at that time. Cited by Robert Trumbull in New York Times, 31 July 1950.

55 For the text, see appendix XXIII.

56 LSD, 8 December 1959,

57 Ibid.

58 Robert Trumbull, New York Times, 31 July 1950; Girilal Jain, India Meets China in Nepal (Bombay, Asia Publishing House, 1959), p. 113.

59 L.G. Pine (ed.), The International Year Book and Statesmen's Who's Who 1959 (London, Burke's Peerage Ltd.), p. 449.

60 Speeches 1949-53, p. 176.

61 Ministry of External Affairs, Report, 1950-51, p. 9; 1951-52, p. 13.

62 These troops had to provide their own quarters and rations for a monthly remuneration of Rs 10.

63 According to one high-ranking Indian Army officer interviewed by the writer, the Indian Government had initially proposed to bring Nepalese Army personnel to India for training but were persuaded by their military advisers to arrange for a mission to be established inside Nepal so as to permit its members to familiarize themselves with the country

against future contingencies. The nomenclature of this mission was subsequently changed to Indian Military Training Group and, in 1963, to Indian Military Liaison Group.

64 Following the establishment of the Indian military mission, which never numbered more than about two dozen instructors plus cooks, etc., the pay scale for Other Ranks in the Royal Nepalese Army was increased to Rs 30 per month with rations and quarters provided. Selected personnel were also sent for training as officers at the Indian National Defence Academy.

65 Werner Levi, "Political Rivalries in Nepal", Far Eastern Survey, 23:7 (July 1954), p. 107. For example, communist rebels captured Bellauri, a town near the Indian border, in July 1953 and, in response, the Indian Government provided transit for Nepalese troops assigned to re-capture the town and also placed a strong force of armed police at the disposal of the Nepalese Government.

66 Nepal had utilized about Rs 4 crores of Indian aid by 1956 and used another Rs 5 crores during the First Plan (1956-61). This aid did not include training facilities provided to Nepalese students and technicians under the Colombo Plan or the Kosi and Gandak irrigation projects.

67 At the time the project commenced, a 30-mile long railway built in 1927 linked Raxaul with Amlekganj, a 31-mile long bridle path connected Amlekhganj to Thankot and a rough road proceeded thence to Kathmandu; a ropeway built in 1924 linked Amlekhganj to Kathmandu; and a 33-mile long railway extended from the Indian town of Janjagar to Janakpur in eastern Nepal and thence to Bijutpaira. The eventual cost of the Tribhuvan Rajpath was Rs 3 crores.

68 The agreement was subsequently terminated by mutual decision of the three parties for unexplained reasons after only 300 miles of road had been completed.

69 A.M. Rosenthal, "Grim Shadows Over The Cobra Throne", New York Times Magazine, 27 May 1956, p. 47.

70 The situation caused the Indian Ambassador to issue a formal statement in June, denying any Indian desire to interfere in Nepali affairs and explaining the co-operative nature of the Indian military mission and aid programme. See Times of India, 18 June 1954.

- 71 The Statesman, 16 April 1954.
- 72 Cited, Hindu, 7 May 1954.
- 73 Thought, 13 August 1955, p. 3.
- 74 Text in Jain, op. cit., pp. 166-70.
- 75 See The Statesman, 19 November 1955.
- 76 See Times of India, 12 October 1956.
- 77 Cited in ibid.
- 78 Ferdinand Kuhn, Washington Post, 27 December 1954.
- 79 Herbert Elliston, ibid, 10 June 1956.
- 80 Time and Tide, 10 October 1956.

## CHAPTER IV

### HIMALAYAN POLICY II

The inadequacy of such a cautious and limited response to Chinese policy should have become progressively more apparent to the Indian Government. Only a few short weeks after the conclusion of the much-publicized 1954 agreement Chinese patrols commenced a series of intrusions into territory claimed by Peking as terra irridenta<sup>1</sup>. Chinese maps continued to appear which showed large areas of the Himalayan region as within the international boundaries of the People's Republic of China. Perhaps most ominous was China's speedy development of an operational infrastructure along the entire Himalayan frontier.

By 1954, the Chinese had completed a road from Sinkiang to Golno and a motor road from Kashgar to Golno via Urumchi. A 362-mile motor road was built linking Lhasa to Phari (in the tip of Tibet between Bhutan and Sikkim) and the Phari-Yatung link of 55 miles, which extended Chinese communications to within several miles of the Indian frontier, was completed in November 1954. The North China-Chamdo-Lhasa road, capable of bearing three-ton lorries, was completed in

January 1955 and work began shortly thereafter on a road from Lhasa towards Kuti Pass on the Nepalese-Tibetan border. Surveys commenced for the Aksai Chin road in 1955 and actual construction was carried out in 1956-57. The completion of the road was announced in the Peking press on 5 October 1957, its location being noted on a map appended to the announcement<sup>2</sup>.

The Indian Government was well-informed on Chinese border activities<sup>3</sup> and could scarcely have regarded the new roads and airstrips being constructed throughout southern Tibet as having only an internal significance<sup>4</sup>. Nor were Peking's actions elsewhere viewed with equanimity. The New Delhi correspondent of a leading English weekly wrote in early 1957 that China's support of the Soviet suppression of the Hungarian revolt and its attitude towards the Burmese frontier and Nepalese internal affairs 'has dimmed the faith of the External Affairs Ministry in neutralism - at any rate as far as south-east Asia is concerned'; he claimed that 'Senior officials in New Delhi have now reached a point at which they have written off the Panch Sheela as scraps of paper'<sup>5</sup>. The 'discovery' of the Aksai Chin road later that year must have served to confirm earlier suspicions.

In an aide memoire dated 24 September 1956 regarding the Shipki Pass incident, the Indian Government informed the

Chinese Government that the border Security Force had been directed 'on no account to retire from their position or to permit Chinese personnel to go beyond where they are even if this involves a clash' and warned that if China did not take immediate action to desist from such activities 'there might be an unfortunate clash on our borders'<sup>6</sup>. New Delhi was apparently more fearful of such an eventuality than was Peking, however, and her response to subsequent intrusions of her northern frontiers remained restricted to the submission of diplomatic notes and the continuation of certain road projects in threatened areas. Persistent reports by traders, pilots and police officials regarding Chinese activity along the Aksai Chin route were either dismissed as unimportant or totally ignored<sup>7</sup>. Excessive caution characterized the Indian Government's response to China's public revelation of the road's existence (itself a blatant challenge from Peking); two patrols (one of which was subsequently captured by Chinese 'frontier guards') were sent to check the co-ordinates of the road in the spring of 1958 and not until 18 October 1958 was a formal protest submitted through diplomatic channels about the road<sup>8</sup>.

The road could not be interpreted as other than a clear indication of Peking's intention to assert her authority over terra irredenta in total disregard for the feelings of

the Nehru administration. It also focused closer attention on other territorial claims which had been appearing periodically in a succession of Chinese (and Russian) maps. In October 1954, Nehru had raised the issue of such maps with Chou En-lai and claimed to have been told that they were merely 'reproductions of the old pre-liberation maps' which the Chinese Government had not had time to revise<sup>9</sup>. Nehru appears to have accepted this as implying that corrections would be made in due course to accord with his own interpretation of the Sino-Indian frontier<sup>10</sup> and to have chosen to regard subsequent intrusions as minor issues initiated by local Chinese authorities and resolvable by secret negotiations. The Aksai Chin road, however, could not be rationalized in this fashion and the appearance of further maps challenging India's conception of her Himalayan frontier, which appeared in both the China Pictorial and The New Times (Moscow) in July 1958, added to New Delhi's growing alarm and provoked yet another protest note to Peking<sup>11</sup>. In a lengthy letter to Chou En-lai dated 14 December 1958, Nehru protested at the 'incorrect' Sino-Indian boundary shown in an official Chinese journal and clearly sought a definitive reply as to China's position on the entire frontier question<sup>12</sup>.

The reply of the Chinese Premier dated 23 January 1959 could have left no illusions in Nehru's mind that he was now



faced with an unequivocal Chinese refusal to recognize the Indian conception of the Sino-Indian frontier almost in its entirety. Chou declared that his Government had never recognized the MacMahon Line; that the Sino-Indian boundary had never been formally delimited; that the boundaries shown on Chinese maps were consistent with those on earlier maps; and that the issue had not been raised previously because the 'time was not yet ripe'<sup>13</sup>. The Chinese Government thereby laid claim to over 40,000 square miles of territory which India regarded as within its own frontiers - over 15,000 square miles in Ladakh, about 200 square miles in the middle sector and some 32,000 square miles in NEFA.

Scarcely had New Delhi been able to absorb the full import of Chou's momentous letter than the border question was considerably aggravated by the eruption of the long-simmering Tibetan revolt. Sporadic fighting had been in progress between Chinese troops and Tibetan guerilla bands, particularly in Kham, since about 1955 and Peking's cancellation of Nehru's proposed visit to Tibet in July 1958 was a direct result of such activity. Desirous of avoiding provocation to China, Nehru persisted with efforts to play down the developments in Tibet. He told a Delhi press conference on 7 March that press reports of events in Tibet were often 'grossly exaggerated'<sup>14</sup> and, on 17 March, even as the Dalai

Lama was fleeing from Lhasa towards asylum in India, the Prime Minister referred to events in Tibet as 'more of a clash of wills at present than a clash of arms or physical bodies',<sup>15</sup>. Such a posture in the face of credible evidence to the contrary became subject to a rising tide of domestic and foreign criticism and, in defence of his policy, Nehru was forced to argue the primacy of the 'honour and dignity and the interest of India' over 'the honour and dignity of the causes for which we stand',<sup>16</sup>. At a press conference on 6 April, he admitted that his Tibetan policy had to take note first and foremost, of Indian security:

...we have to keep the various factors in view, the major factor being, of course, our own security. After all, every Government's first duty is to protect its country in every way. The second factor, our desire to have and continue to have friendly relations with China. The third factor, our strong feeling about developments in Tibet. Now, sometimes there is certain contradiction in these. That is inevitable.

He concluded nebulously that 'One has, therefore, in so far as one can to make difficult choices',<sup>17</sup>.

The situation posed him with such a choice from which the repercussions would be incalculable whatever choice was made. But, as an English journal warned prophetically:

Mr Nehru must choose. There can be honour in neutrality, but people who truckle to bullies cannot hope to lead their fellow men. On the contrary, it is all too likely that those who today ignore the cries of the oppressed will tomorrow themselves be the victims of the evil forces which they sought to ignore.<sup>18</sup>

Mr Nehru could not ignore Indian public opinion, whose sympathy for the Tibetans was unmistakably clear. Nor could he ignore India's 'image' in the world, based as his Government had persistently claimed on a higher moral plane than was the case with other governments. Lastly, he could not overlook the symbolic importance of the Dalai Lama and the effect on the large Buddhist population throughout Asia of India's treatment of this personage.

The result was the grant of political asylum in India to the Dalai Lama and thousands of other refugees from the Tibetan fighting - an act which Peking could hardly be expected to regard as other than an unfriendly one. The contingency of such a flight by the Dalai Lama had been foreseen<sup>19</sup>. According to one usually well-informed source:

Mr Nehru was sounded, very discreetly, on the possibility of the Dalai Lama's finding refuge in one of the border states: Bhutan, Sikkim or even Nepal. These possibilities were all dismissed in favour of India itself as the lesser evil, presumably because of the possibility that China might over-run these countries in pursuit of the Dalai Lama.<sup>20</sup>

That such fears were not entirely groundless was evidenced by the pursuit by Chinese forces of the Dalai Lama and Khampa refugees right up to the Indian border, Chinese aircraft strafing and bombing up to the border in NEFA and Chinese troops at times crossing into Indian and Nepalese territory. The Dalai Lama and his party of eight crossed

into NEFA on the evening of 31 March and were received by the Assistant Political Officer of the Tawang sub-division of the Kameng Frontier Division<sup>21</sup>.

The Indian Government stepped up its watchfulness on the NEFA frontier; patrols of the Assam Rifles became active by day and night, checkpoints were strengthened and security was tightened to include even the re-routing of messages from Tawang from the military network to a special frequency<sup>22</sup>. But Nehru remained hopeful that if sufficient restraint were shown by his Government, Peking would reciprocate after the initial resentment at India's grant of asylum to the Dalai Lama eased. He ordered the Khampas to be disarmed as they entered Indian territory and made it clear that there was no question of a Tibetan Government-in-exile being established on Indian soil and that Tibetans in India should refrain from political activities while 'guests' of India<sup>23</sup>. He also re-affirmed his belief in panch sheel and rudely rebuffed informal suggestions from Ayub Khan for a joint Indo-Pakistan defence of the sub-continent on the grounds that such an arrangement was tantamount to a military alliance and contrary to non-alignment; he even asked, ingeniously, defence arrangements 'against whom?'<sup>24</sup>

The Chinese Government was not prepared, however, to facilitate an easing of tension and extricate Nehru from the

painful dilemma into which he had manoeuvred himself. Chinese officers in Tibet talked of liberating Sikkim, Bhutan, Ladakh and NEFA. Every conceivable obstacle was placed in the way of the proper functioning of the Indian trade agencies, consulate-general, traders and pilgrims in Tibet and new currency regulations suddenly introduced in Tibet in July made Indian currency illegal with consequent heavy losses to Indian traders and an immediate plummeting of Indo-Tibetan trade. China also commenced a new series of border intrusions. On 28 July, a Chinese party appeared in the eastern Pangyong Lake region of Ladakh, arrested six Indian policemen and established a camp at Spanngur. On 7 August, another party ejected ten to twelve personnel of the Assam Rifles from the border post at Khinzemane in NEFA, provoking an Indian note dated 11 August which stated that 'Our security forces have instructions to resist trespassers and to use minimum force necessary for this purpose if warning given by them remains unheeded' and warned that China remove its personnel as 'otherwise this may lead to avoidable clash'<sup>25</sup>. The contempt in which Peking held the warning was reflected on 26 August, when a Chinese force ejected twelve personnel of the Assam Rifles from the border post at Longju, located 3-4 miles south of the MacMahon Line and five days march from the larger post at Limeking and about three weeks

march from the nearest roadhead. An abortive attempt was made to air-drop supplies to the approximately 38 Indian personnel manning the picket and post but it was not considered desirable or worthwhile to attempt to drop paratroops in such terrain<sup>26</sup>. The Indian detachment fell back to Gallen, about two days march from Longju.

Nehru was no longer able to maintain the secrecy of the previous five years relating to the border intrusions and, in reply to a series of questions and adjournment motions in the Lok Sabha on 28 August, he gave a full account of the Longju incident and revealed the years of Chinese perfidy which his Government had deliberately concealed from the public view in the hopes of a negotiated settlement free from public emotions<sup>27</sup>. He declared that 'While I do not wish to take an alarmist view of the situation, we should naturally be prepared for any eventuality and without fuss or shouting keep vigilant'<sup>28</sup>. In a note to China of the same date, his Government warned that its frontier posts had been directed to use force to maintain the integrity of Indian soil<sup>29</sup> and, to lend substance to this determination, the Army was assigned responsibility for the NEFA-Tibet border.

Nehru was prepared for minor adjustments on the border but he stood by the watershed principle<sup>30</sup>. Unwilling to accept the Chinese challenge in all its reality, however, he

persisted in the belief that somehow Peking would become more reasonable. For a brief period in late September-early November 1959, there were some indications of just such a shift by China; after weeks of frustration, the Indian Ambassador in Peking was received cordially by the Foreign Ministry and Chou replied with a very warm telegram to Nehru's congratulations of the tenth anniversary of the People's Republic. Elated, the Indian Government made every attempt to play down the dispute with China - but its hopes were quickly proven illusory. On 20 October, Chinese forces ambushed a patrol from the Indian Tibet Boundary Force in the Kongka Pass area of Ladakh, killing a number of the patrol and capturing the remainder.

The incident inflamed Indian public opinion and provoked an emergency meeting of the Cabinet, consequent on which the Army was assigned responsibility for the borders with Tibet of Jammu and Kashmir (Ladakh), Punjab, Himachal Pradesh and Uttar Pradesh. The security of the Sikkim-Tibet border was entrusted to the Army in November. Nehru gave assurances that chances would no longer be taken with the northern borders, that past mistakes would not be repeated and that his Government would not hesitate to employ force in defence of the country's territorial integrity<sup>31</sup>. Speaking in the Rajya Sabha on 22 December 1959 during the debate on the

correspondence exchanged in the past between himself and Chou En-lai, he declared:

We are committed from every point of view to defend our country, to preserve its integrity, to preserve its honour and self-respect. That is not a matter for argument...Opinions may differ as to how to do it...But the basic thing is clear, and in doing that, in the ultimate analysis, almost any price has to be paid. One cannot proceed on the basis of barter, haggling and the tactics of the market-place where a nation's honour and self-respect are concerned.<sup>32</sup>

Unlike in the past, substance had to be lent to such a determination beyond verbal pronouncements, and a re-assessment was made of the defence posture of the country which had, up to this point, been conceived to meet a military threat, however remote, from Pakistan.

The undisguised territorial designs of China had provoked renewed public discussion of a possible defence arrangement with Pakistan to accord with the strategic indivisibility of the sub-continent. Ayub had informally proposed such an arrangement in May 1959 and, on 22 June, he had declared: 'The North-West Frontier is not the frontier of Pakistan only but also of India. As such India owes us a great obligation and we are entitled to claim a share of this enormous expense'<sup>33</sup>. Despite Nehru's public rebuff of any Indo-Pakistan defence arrangement, Ayub repeated his offer to Nehru during his visit to Delhi on 1st September, arguing that the sub-continent's internal strife had always invited



invasion from the north and that to avert such a recurrence India and Pakistan should compose their differences on a lasting basis 'to defend themselves against the common enemy'<sup>34</sup>. He referred to the proposal again at a press conference in Peshawar on 6 November<sup>35</sup> and repeated the offer during a tour of East Pakistan in January 1960<sup>36</sup>.

Strong support for such a rapprochement came, significantly, from a respected former Commander-in-Chief of the Indian Army, General K.M. Cariappa. In a New Delhi interview on 1st November 1959, he declared if immediate steps were not taken to dislodge the Chinese from Ladakh and NEFA 'it certainly will become a hundredfold more difficult and costly in all respects to do so later' as 'delay and hesitation on our part to act will encourage the Chinese to take more liberties, to keep on making more claims on our territory and to send forward more troops across the frontiers'. He did not see how the political and military implications of the Chinese moves could be separated and favoured Indian initiative to bring about defence co-operation with Pakistan<sup>37</sup>.

He argued even more forcefully for such a rapprochement in an article published later in the same month. The solution of the Kashmir issue would, General Cariappa claimed, release large numbers of troops from both sides for use along the external borders and would help India to honour her

promises when required to protect the security of Bhutan, Sikkim and Nepal.

The defence problems of India and Pakistan are indivisible...So, we could with profit to both enter into a regional joint defence agreement against this Chinese aggression...Pride and prestige factors must be subordinated to achieving the actual need of the hour - which is the security and economic prosperity of the millions in our two countries.<sup>38</sup>

Support for a common defence pact with Pakistan was also expressed by Balraj Madhok, President of the Delhi State branch of the Jan Sangh - the Hindu communalist party<sup>39</sup>.

That there were many difficulties impeding such an arrangement was clear - the Hindu fear of the 'historical ghost'; Pakistani fears of being 'submerged' by the Hindu majority in the sub-continent; Pakistan's declared sectarianism as opposed to India's professed secularism; Pakistan's military alignment with the West as against India's avowed devotion to non-alignment almost as an end in itself.

President Ayub dealt with the latter aspect at his Peshawar press conference on 6 November 1959, at which time he contended that joint defence did not necessarily mean association in foreign policy as it was a 'simple and straightforward matter' which meant 'simply defending the frontiers' and involved no politics<sup>40</sup>. Although such a contention lends itself to extensive debate, the important fact is that not only did New Delhi show no interest but it chose to

regard the question, publicly at least, with that air of superiority and arrogance all too characteristic of the Nehru administration during the 1947-62 period<sup>41</sup>. Thus, for example, Nehru's response to General Cariappa's well-reasoned viewpoint of 1st November was to inform a press conference on 5 November that 'There is such extraordinary little sense in it that it amazes me. I think General Cariappa is completely off the track mentally and otherwise'<sup>42</sup>.

The incident evidenced Nehru's extreme sensitivity to implicit criticisms of his own viewpoints, particularly on matters of foreign policy. It also reflected the Government's view that Pakistan still posed a threat<sup>43</sup> and that a serious Chinese assault against the Himalayan frontiers was neither likely nor feasible in the near future<sup>44</sup> - the latter view being shared by the Army on logistical grounds<sup>45</sup>. The need for closer relations with Pakistan was not, therefore, viewed by the Government as pressing. Nehru may have felt that any concerted effort to effect a reconciliation with Pakistan, though basically desirable, would at such a juncture entail a strategic re-alignment against China, who would interpret it as such and adopt an even more bellicose attitude in which a peaceful settlement of the border dispute would be impossible. He may also have feared that such a direct alignment with a member of the Western alliance

against Peking would have alienated Moscow, towards whom he looked as a restraining influence on China's rulers and as a diplomatic counter-weight.

The Prime Minister's response to the Himalayan challenge posed by China was cautious - the double policy of defence against further intrusions and demanding a withdrawal of Chinese forces from Indian territory while seeking a settlement of the border issue by conference<sup>46</sup>. This approach was, in effect, a restatement of the policy adopted in 1950-51 with the notable exception that there was no longer any attempt to conceal the fact that military preparations were being undertaken to counter Chinese designs. This new attitude was dictated by prudence, domestic politics, and the international attention focused on the dispute (and involving Indian prestige), as well as by considerations of national honour and self-respect to which the Nehru administration was no less responsive than any other national government.

Simultaneous with certain military precautions which did not basically alter defence policy vis-à-vis Pakistan<sup>47</sup>, steps were taken to strengthen the administration in the strategic border areas, accelerate economic development in these areas and improve communications.

Six border districts, modelled more or less on the pattern of the political divisions in NEFA, were established

in 1960 - Pithoragarh, Chamoli and Uttarkashi in Uttar Pradesh<sup>48</sup>; Lahaul-Spiti in Punjab<sup>49</sup>; and Kinnaur in Himachal Pradesh. Senior Indian Frontier Administrative Service (IFAS) officers were deputed from NEFA to head the new districts in the capacity of Deputy Commissioners and were given wide administrative and financial powers<sup>50</sup>. A retired Chief of Army Staff, General S.M. Shrinagesh, was appointed on 14 November 1959 to succeed Saiyad Fazl Ali as Governor of Assam consequent on the latter's death, thus becoming the first Indian military leader to hold the post as a representative of the Union Government<sup>51</sup>. In early 1960, NEFA, the Naga Hills and the Tuensang area were united under a single administration headed by N.K. Rustomji, Adviser to the Assam Government and the former head of the NEFA unit<sup>52</sup>.

The police patrolling the Indo-Tibetan border in the middle sector were placed under overall military control in late 1959 and steps were taken to strengthen this constabulary and to raise their efficiency to something approaching that of the Assam Rifles<sup>53</sup>. Security measures were further tightened in January 1960 when the Centre extended the Punjab Security of the State Act 1954 to Himachal Pradesh<sup>54</sup>. Following the outbreak of disorders in the Anini area of the Lohit Frontier Division (which had caused troops to be temporarily diverted to deal with the disturbances), it was

decided in December 1960 to establish a NEFA police force of about twelve platoons to deal with the increasing lawlessness in the Agency<sup>55</sup>. In an order published in the Gazette of India on 31 March 1962, the Indian Government declared most of the districts of Pithoragarh, Chamoli and Uttarkashi, the whole of the Darjeeling district in West Bengal, and what is known as the area beyond the 'inner line' in the Kinnaur district to be 'notified areas' under the Criminal Law Amendment Act 1961 - an action clearly aimed at facilitating control over the movements of persons suspected of being engaged in activities prejudicial to Indian security.

Further efforts were undertaken to restore tranquility in the Naga areas, where Naga dissidents were tying down nearly 30,000 troops and police. Pursuant to the demands of a Naga convention held in 1959, Nehru sanctioned the creation of a state of Nagaland - which was inaugurated on 15 February 1961. Development of the Naga area was accelerated; whereas Rs 4 crores had been spent on the area during the Second Plan, the Planning Commission allocated Rs 7.15 crores for development schemes in Nagaland during the Third Plan (1961-66)<sup>56</sup>. A major reshuffle of the Nagaland administration was made in late 1961 following the assassination of Dr Imkengliba Ao, the head of the Nagaland Interim Body (viz. Legislative Assembly).

In early 1960, a committee was set up in the Cabinet Secretariat to ensure effective co-ordination by the Union Government of development programmes in the strategic border areas towards which it undertook to provide financial aid. Development schemes prepared by the states concerned were examined at the Centre and authority was given the State authorities to proceed with urgent schemes in anticipation of approval from the Centre<sup>57</sup>. For the period of the Third Plan, an outlay of Rs 5 crores was envisaged for roads, buildings and irrigation works in Ladakh<sup>58</sup>. The Punjab State Government increased its allocation for development schemes in the Lahaul-Spiti district for fiscal 1960 to over Rs 2 crores (as against less than Rs 1 crores for 1959)<sup>59</sup>, and it planned for the development of 100 miles of roads at an estimated cost of Rs 68.38 crores in this area during the Third Plan<sup>60</sup>. The Government of Uttar Pradesh undertook twelve road projects in the hill regions bordering Tibet which would ultimately involve an outlay of Rs 65.84 crores, the Centre bearing half the cost<sup>61</sup>. The expenditure on NEFA for the Third Plan was estimated at Rs 7.21 crores (double the amount expended during the Second Plan)<sup>62</sup>, while plans were drawn up for the construction of further airport and landing-ground facilities and for greatly increased expenditure on roads<sup>63</sup>.

A high-level Border Roads Development Board (BRDB) was created in March 1960 to co-ordinate the various state construction projects with the Army's own hastily-conceived road-building programme in the strategic border areas<sup>64</sup>. The scheme involved the construction of 2,500 miles of new roads and the improvement of 1,500 miles of existing roads at an estimated cost of Rs 120 crores over a three-year period<sup>65</sup>. The implementation of the programme was assigned to various project units - Vartak (Tusker) in Assam and NEFA<sup>66</sup>; Dhantok in Bhutan; Dragon in Sikkim; Deepak in Himachal Pradesh; and Beacon in Ladakh. The heavy burden on the Army engineering corps was partially alleviated through the recruitment, in mid-1960, of a semi-military construction force designated the General Reserve Engineering Force (GREF) at bonus rates 50 per cent above the usual level; this force was assigned responsibility for primary work, leaving Army engineers to concentrate on the vital bridging<sup>67</sup>. Extra supplies of bulldozers and excavators were diverted from the armed services and national development projects and scarce foreign exchange was expended for United States-made helicopters and transport aircraft to supply these projects. Soviet-made helicopters and transports were also secured for rupee payment<sup>68</sup>.



From its inception up to June 1963, the BRDB carried out the cutting of nearly 1,600 miles of road, developed land communications over 600 miles and surveyed and did a complete reconnaissance of about 2,700 miles<sup>69</sup>.

The 95-mile Dirrang-Along road was completed in 1960 and new roads were constructed in the foothills north of Sadiya, the military rail junction in northern Assam. The 79-mile Mokokchung road was nearing completion in March 1962<sup>70</sup>. The track to Gangtok was improved to accommodate truck convoys and work began in 1961 on an alternative Rangpo-Gangtok link via Pakyang, suitable for uninterrupted heavy vehicular traffic during the monsoon season. In October 1958, the Central Public Works Department (CPWD) had begun work on the 150-mile North Sikkim highway extending from Gangtok to Phodan and thence to Mangan and Singhih, at which point it forks towards Lachen and Lachung villages and onwards to the border areas. In October 1960 the CPWD, having completed about 50 miles of the project, was relieved by the BRDB which proceeded with the completion of the last 100 miles<sup>71</sup>.

On 13 January 1960, construction commenced on the 107-mile road from Phuntsholing in West Bengal to Paro, Bhutan's combination fort, Buddhist monastery and winter capital in the western sector of the state. The project was formally completed on 13 February 1962 and the road, which is twelve

feet wide and sufficient for one-way traffic with occasional turn-outs to permit a controlled two-way flow of traffic, reduced the travelling time between the two points from six days by mule and on foot to ten hours by jeep. The Dirrang-Tashigang project was initially undertaken by the Bhutanese authorities who turned it over to the BRDB for completion in early 1961<sup>72</sup>; the road was expected to be completed in mid-1962. At the request of Bhutan, the Government of West Bengal undertook in 1961 to improve the old road from Jalpaiguri to the Indo-Bhutan border suitable for vehicular traffic<sup>73</sup>. Communications were also improved along the Indo-Nepal border.

Work on the 153-mile Kargil-Leh pilot road was re-started in early 1959 consequent on a special request made by Nehru to Premier Bhakshi Ghulam Mohammed of the Indian-administered portion of Kashmir. Army engineers were deputed to assist the state authorities and the road, which passes over Kapi La (11,000 feet), Namika (12,000 feet) and Fote La (13,432 feet), was opened to traffic at Kargil on 1st August 1960. Improvements were made to the 61-mile long motorable road linking Leh and Baltal, the 67-mile Baltal-Kargil section was rendered suitable for three-ton vehicles and work proceeded on a road to connect Leh with Nubra via Khardung La. A 75-mile jeepable track was completed from Leh to Chushul

via Hemis and Changa on the eve of the border conflict, by which time work had also begun on a jeepable track from Chushul to the border post at Dungti.

The developments in Tibet and China's aggressive border policy caused the Indian Government to develop even closer relations with the strategic hill-states of Nepal, Bhutan and Sikkim. On 24 August and 26 November 1959, Nehru re-stated the intention of his Government to defend Bhutan and Sikkim against any act of aggression and, on 27 November, he declared again that any attack on Nepal would be regarded as an attack on India<sup>74</sup>.

In August 1959, India gave to Sikkim a grant equivalent to \$ 6 million, over half of which was allocated for transportation and communication<sup>75</sup>. A former Indian Consul-General in Lhasa, Major S.L. Chibber, was appointed First Secretary at the Indian Political Office in Gangtok and a military officer was appointed to the important post of administrative officer in the Kalimpong district<sup>76</sup>. In response to a request from the Maharajkumar, an expert team from the Planning Commission visited Sikkim in April 1961 and drew up a five-year plan of economic development which involved the expenditure of an estimated Rs 8.2 crores on the expansion of agriculture, development of power, exploitation of forests, improvement of communications and transport,

and the establishment of village and small-scale industries<sup>77</sup>. The entire plan was to be underwritten by India, Nehru apparently insisting that India provide the aid as a grant although it had been envisaged as a loan when the plans were being drawn up<sup>78</sup>.

During his visit to Delhi in January 1961, the Maharajkumar proposed that a militia be raised in the northern frontier areas of the state as a means of associating the Sikkimese people with the defence of their country<sup>79</sup>. The proposal met with a cool reception from the Indian Government, however, for both military and political reasons. It would represent some derogation from the sole responsibility for Sikkim's defence exercised by the Indian Army and, as such a militia would consist of Lepch~~as~~ and Bhutias while excluding the important Nepalese community in the south, it was feared that Indian support for the proposal would involve her in an internal political issue and exacerbate relations with Nepal<sup>80</sup>. New Delhi was, however, able to effect a compromise scheme in an agreement formally concluded on 9 June 1961 whereby the Maharajkumar's palace guard of 60 men under a Junior Commissioned Officer would be expanded to two companies and commanded by an officer of the Indian Army. One of the companies was to function for normal palace duties and the other was to be attached to the Indian

Army for border security duties. The Indian Government agreed to finance the expanded guard and to assist in its recruitment, training and equipment<sup>81</sup>.

An interesting sidelight to Indo-Sikkimese relations was provided by the engagement of Prince Palden Thondup Namgyal to an American, Miss Hope Cook of New York City, in late 1961. The announcement was preceded by six months of negotiations between the Governments of India and Sikkim<sup>82</sup>, and evidenced Indian concern at the presence of a foreigner (perhaps particularly a citizen of one of the major aligned powers) so close to the source of authority in strategic Sikkim. Perhaps more significant, however, is that the Indian Government was unable to prevent the marriage - if it did, indeed, attempt to do so.

Bhutan's reaction to the Tibetan revolt and its aftermath was initially very cautious, Tibetan refugees not being welcomed in the country, and China's seizure of Bhutan's eight Tibetan enclaves in July appeared to instill in some Bhutanese officials a belief that there was a need to enter into closer relations with Peking.

Prime Minister Dorji did not apparently regard the situation as requiring such a dramatic step (which would have required re-negotiation of the treaty with India) and visited India in August-September in search of further economic aid

and, according to one observer, a written guarantee of Indian support in the event of a Chinese attack<sup>83</sup>. At a Delhi press conference on 15 September, he undoubtedly relieved Indian anxieties concerning a possible divergence from the intimate relationship with India by placing great stress on the untroubled amity between India and Bhutan and making it clear that his Government had not contemplated asking for aid from any other country<sup>84</sup>. An announcement released in New Delhi on 17 September stated that India had agreed to increase its annual subsidy to Bhutan from Rs 500,000 to Rs 1,200,000 - the increase to replace ad hoc grants for development schemes<sup>85</sup> - and would bear the estimated Rs 15 crore cost of five all-weather roads to link the two countries<sup>86</sup>. Dorji also revealed the intention of his Government to raise a standing army of 2,500 men equipped with modern rifles, sten and bren guns to augment the country's 5,000 strong militia as soon as finances permitted<sup>87</sup>.

Indo-Bhutanese relations subsequently underwent some strain due to Bhutanese sensitivities towards India's often over-bearing postures, and Peking's indirect overtures to Dorji via some 'private persons' in 1960 for direct Sino-Bhutanese talks on their border dispute<sup>88</sup> clearly sought to capitalize on such feeling. The approach was ignored, however, and, in response to Chinese maps claiming 300 square

miles of territory in north-east Bhutan and north of Punakha, the Bhutanese Government proceeded in early 1961 to completely seal the border in the disputed area and to increase its checkpoints there<sup>89</sup>.

In January 1961 the Maharajah made his first trip to India since 1954. Speaking to the press at Calcutta on 30 January, he declared that the Chinese proposal for direct talks on the border dispute had some merit in view of the present stalemate in Sino-Indian border discussions and that he might raise the issue with Nehru<sup>90</sup>. He stated, however, that Bhutan had not received offers of aid from any country save India and did not propose to seek aid from other sources at the present time<sup>91</sup>. Either possibility was something which the Indian Government clearly meant to prevent so as to preserve its position of dominant influence in the state.

A high-level meeting held in February, presided over by Nehru and attended by the Maharajah, Defence Minister V.K. Krishna Menon and the three Indian Chiefs of Staff, reportedly worked out a new programme for the discharge of India's responsibility for the defence of Bhutan. Provision was made for a substantial increase in the strength of the Indian forces available for speedy despatch to Bhutan in a crisis, more modern helicopters were made available to Indian forces for possible operations in Bhutan, and an

intensive study of the facilities for Indian Air Force operations over the state was undertaken. At the invitation of the Bhutanese Government, senior Indian military officers visited Bhutan in 1961 and made an elaborate survey of defence requirements; following their advice the Bhutanese Government proceeded with the strengthening of its militia<sup>92</sup>.

Nehru successfully persuaded the Maharajah not to seek direct talks with China. A press statement issued by the Bhutanese ruler on 15 February prior to his departure from Delhi revealed that his Government had requested the Government of India to 'negotiate or take up any questions with China' relating to the kingdom's northern border<sup>93</sup>.

In response to the Maharajah's request for the assistance of experts to formulate development plans, a team from the Planning Commission visited Bhutan in June 1961. The result of its visit was a five-year development plan estimated to cost Rs 17.5 crores - which India agreed to underwrite - of which Rs 12 crores was allocated for roads<sup>94</sup>. A Survey of India team joined local authorities in the preparation of a detailed map of the state, including the hitherto undelimited and undemarcated (i.e., to China's viewpoint) 190-mile Bhutan-Tibet border<sup>95</sup>. In September 1961, Bhutan and India signed a pact to harness the Jaldhaka River for hydro-electric power, Bhutan to receive 250 kilowatts free



per annum and also a royalty from India of Rs 8 per kilowatt per annum from a project which will generate 18,000 kilowatts of power annually.

Nehru visited Nepal in June 1959 where, even while expressing the view that he did not envisage a threat to Nepal from the north due to developments in Tibet, he stated that Indian troops had been sent to man 18 posts on the Nepal-Tibet border at the request of the Nepalese Government<sup>96</sup>. In August, Nepal announced a 14 per cent increase in its outlay on defence<sup>97</sup> and accepted an Indian offer equivalent to \$ 20 million worth of technical and economic aid, including equipment and training for the 10,000 strong Royal Nepal Army<sup>98</sup>. In November, the two governments reached agreement on the Gandak irrigation project after three years' negotiation, with Kathmandu reportedly driving a hard bargain<sup>99</sup>.

Nehru's declaration of 27 November that any attack on Nepal would be regarded as an attack on India, though rightly described as 'nothing more than recognition of physical imperatives and...addressed as much to the people of India as to foreign powers'<sup>100</sup>, touched off anti-Indian resentment in Nepal and forced Prime Minister Koirala to publicly stress Nepal's sovereignty. At the same time, however, he declared that Nepal would provide such assistance as New Delhi might seek in the event of India being attacked - an assurance

viewed by a leading Indian daily as 'welcome evidence that the Government of Nepal is fully aware that the vital interests of the two countries coincide'<sup>101</sup>. Koirala visited New Delhi in January 1960 and secured an Indian pledge of Rs 18 crores in economic aid<sup>102</sup>. A communiqué issued on 28 January, at the conclusion of the visit, attested to the vital interest of each country in the other's 'freedom, integrity, security and progress', their similarity in approach to international problems and desire to co-operate with regard to them, and their agreement on the need to maintain close consultation in matters of common interest<sup>103</sup>.

King Mahendra and members of his Government visited New Delhi in April 1960 for further talks, and a joint communiqué issued at their conclusion declared that 'India and Nepal have a vital interest in each other's sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity and re-affirmed their intention to consult together on appropriate measures of mutual assistance at the request of either party'<sup>104</sup>. King Mahendra returned to New Delhi for a four-day private visit for the period 3-20 July and Prime Minister Koirala held talks with Nehru in New Delhi on 9 August while en route to Israel. In an agreement signed in Kathmandu on 31 August, India extended a further Rs 91.5 lakhs in economic aid<sup>105</sup> and the two governments concluded a trade and transit treaty in the same place on 11 September.

Indian aid could not, however, prevent, nor Indo-Nepali professions of mutual interest conceal, a perceptible and deliberate shift by Kathmandu into a neutral posture on the Sino-Indian border dispute and into closer diplomatic and economic relations with both of India's suspect neighbours - China and Pakistan. Prudence dictated neutrality as regards the respective merits of China's and India's opposed border claims and the conscious efforts to promote closer economic and political relations with China and Pakistan reflected a desire to lessen Nepal's economic (and, by consequence, political) dependence upon India.

Prime Minister Koirala visited China in April 1960 and agreements were concluded involving a delimitation of the Nepal-Tibet border favourable to Nepal's viewpoint and a Chinese pledge of economic aid worth Rs 10 crores. Chou En-lai returned the visit between 21-29 April, during the course of which the two governments reached agreement on the establishment of a commission to demarcate the boundary and concluded a Treaty of Peace and Friendship. Nepal declined, however, to include in the treaty an undertaking not to join a military alliance on the grounds that this was rendered superfluous by the 1956 treaty and by the fact that panch sheel constituted the basis of Nepal's foreign policy<sup>106</sup>. The appearance of Chinese claims to Mt Everest and Chinese

military operations against Khampa rebels near Nepal's northern borders in the spring of 1960 - which resulted in clashes between Chinese and Nepalese frontier guards with loss of life to the latter - momentarily caused concern in Kathmandu regarding Chinese intentions and led to a strengthening of the posts on the northern border. The Chinese Government was quick to apologise for the incidents, however, and paid compensation with the result that relations were cordial at the time of King Mahendra's coup in December 1960.

The coup<sup>107</sup> provoked a tactless response from New Delhi and directly led to a concerted effort by King Mahendra to loosen the somewhat oppressive tie with India. The action may well have seemed, as one Indian daily described it, 'One step forward, two steps backward'<sup>108</sup> but the attitude adopted by Nehru understandably provoked intense resentment in Nepal. On 16 December, while admitting that it was not for him to criticize the King's action, Nehru stated that 'obviously, it is a matter of regret for all of us that the democratic experiment or practice going on there has suffered a setback'<sup>109</sup>. Initiating the debate on foreign affairs in the Rajya Sabha on 20 December, moreover, the Indian Prime Minister came out in sharp criticism of the coup<sup>110</sup> and persisted with such comments in subsequent weeks.

In response, Radio Nepal blacked out Nehru's references to Nepal in his Rajya Sabha speech and an anti-Indian press campaign began in Nepal. As each side criticized the attitudes of the other, relations were further strained by the beginning of a campaign in the fall of 1961 by armed followers of the Nepali Congress, which involved raids on district arsenals and treasuries in Nepal and clashes with Nepali police and army units. Many of the raids were launched from Indian territory, as in 1950, and the absence of effective action by New Delhi to prevent such activity suggested at least tacit official support of or acquiescence in the rebel activity. The refusal of the Indian Government to detain and hand over rebel leaders to the Nepalese authorities as per the latter's request was legally defensible. The refusal, however, to restrain rebel spokesmen from making statements against the Mahendra Government from Indian soil<sup>111</sup> was inconsistent with the attitude adopted towards refugee Tibetan leaders, including the Dalai Lama, and certain Western correspondents (particularly George Patterson) concerning their expression of views on issues relating to Tibetan developments. It is not at all surprising, therefore, that the King should have considered it to be in his country's short- and long-term interests to bring about closer ties with neighbouring China and Pakistan. He visited Pakistan in

September 1961 and, during a visit to China in October 1961, signed an agreement for the construction with Chinese aid of a 45-mile road from Kathmandu to Koderi Pass via Bhadgaon, Banepa, Panchkhal, Dolalght and Barabesne<sup>112</sup>. In October 1962, Nepal signed a trade agreement with China.

The strategic implications of the road were self-evident; it would link up with the Tribhuvan Rajpath and provide China with an all-weather highway through Nepal to the Indian plains. The Indian Government informally communicated its views to Kathmandu on the subject<sup>113</sup> but to no apparent avail. Notwithstanding this setback, India continued her policy of economic aid to Nepal with the pledge of the equivalent of \$ 40 million towards Nepal's second (but three-year) Plan which commenced in 1962.

Notes

1 See map C.

2 The road enters territory India regards as its own just east of Sarigh Jilgnang, runs north-west to Amtogar and the west bank of Amtogar Lake, and then proceeds north-west through Yangpa, Khitai Dawan and Haji Langar to Rudok and Gartok in western Tibet. An inner route, constructed in 1959-60, runs from Malik Shah in Sinkiang through the Qara Tagh and Kongka passes to Quizil Jilga, Samzungling and Lanakla in western Tibet. See map C.

3 See White Paper, I.

4 As several American observers commented in retrospect: That new major east-west roads have avoided the normal route along the Tsangpo is highly suggestive. It would appear from the maps that Chinese road building in Tibet has been designed primarily for military purposes and secondarily for the exploitation of the gold and uranium deposits in Western Tibet.

Margaret W. Fisher, Leo E. Rose and Robert A. Huttenback, Himalayan Battleground: Sino-Indian Rivalry in Ladakh (New York, Frederick A. Praeger, 1963), p. 8.

5 The Economist, 16 March 1957, p. 920.

6 White Paper, I, p. 19.

7 Information obtained in an interview with a high-ranking Indian military officer.

8 Text in White Paper, I, pp. 26-7.

9 See letter from Nehru to Chou En-lai dated 14 December 1958 in ibid., p. 49.

10 See ibid. In a statement in the Rajya Sabha on 9 December 1959, Nehru admitted, however, to having had doubts about whether Peking really recognized the MacMahon Line. Rather than raise the issue with China and ascertain the actual Chinese attitude - which might have revealed a Chinese claim 'which would pose a serious policy challenge to India with far-reaching consequences', his Government had decided to make it clear in every possible way that there was, from the

Indian viewpoint, no doubt as to the alignment of the border in the hope that 'the lapse of time and events will confirm it'. Cited, Prime Minister on Sino-Indian Relations, vol. I, pp. 1249-50. Writing in April 1963, however, Nehru stated that in 1954 there 'was no reason even to suspect that there was any major question about the frontiers with China'. "Changing India", Foreign Affairs, 41:3 (April 1963), p. 459.

11 See Indian note dated 21 August 1958, cited in White Paper, I, p. 46.

12 Text in ibid, pp. 48-51.

13 Text in ibid, pp. 52-4.

14 Cited, The Times, 7 March 1959.

15 Cited, Prime Minister on Sino-Indian Relations, vol. I, p. 1.

16 Statement in the Lok Sabha, 2 April 1959. LSD, 2nd Sess., vol. 28, col. 9269.

17 Cited, Prime Minister on Sino-Indian Relations, vol. II: Press Conferences (Ministry of External Affairs, GOI, undated), hereinafter referred to as Press Conferences, p. 16.

18 Time and Tide, 3 April 1959.

19 Nehru informed the Lok Sabha on 27 April 1959 that 'the Dalai Lama entered India entirely of his own volition. At no time had we suggested that he should come to India. We had naturally given thought to the possibility of his seeking asylum in India and when such a request came, we readily granted it'. LSD, 2nd Sess., vol. 30, col. 13498.

20 Foreign Report, 9 April 1959, p. 8.

21 On 1st April, the Indian Government received a message via Shillong dated the evening of 31 March stating that an emissary from the Dalai Lama had arrived at the border post of Chutangmu on 29 March with the news that the Dalai Lama requested political asylum and expected to reach the border on 30 March. As Nehru told the Lok Sabha on 3 April, 'Expecting that some such development might occur, we had instructed the various check-posts round about there what to do in case such a development takes place'. LSD, 2nd Sess., vol. 28, col. 9559.



- 22 John Osman, The Daily Telegraph, 8 April 1959.
- 23 See, for example, his statement in the Lok Sabha on 27 April 1959. LSD, 2nd Sess., vol. 30, col. 13499.
- 24 See his statement in the Rajya Sabha, 4 May 1959. Cited in Prime Minister on Sino-Indian Relations, vol. I, p. 42.
- 25 Cited, White Paper, I, p. 41.
- 26 See Nehru's statement in the Lok Sabha, 28 August 1959. LSD, 2nd Sess., vol. 33, Nos 16-20, col. 4866.
- 27 Ibid, col. 4866-70.
- 28 Ibid, col. 4870.
- 29 Cited, White Paper, I, pp. 44-5.
- 30 See, for example, Nehru's reply to a debate of India-China relations in the Lok Sabha on 12 September 1959. LSD, 2nd Sess., vol. 34, Nos 27-31, col. 8113-14.
- 31 See his statement cited in The Hindustan Times, 29 October 1959.
- 32 Cited, Prime Minister on Sino-Indian Relations, vol. I, p. 278.
- 33 Cited in Aslam Siddiqi, "Pakistan and Security", part 2, Dawn, 2 November 1960.
- 34 Cited, The Statesman, 2 September 1959.
- 35 See Thought, 7 November 1959, p. 1.
- 36 Hindu, 22 January 1960; Dawn, ibid.
- 37 Cited, Hindu, 3 November 1959.
- 38 Hindu, 14 November 1959.
- 39 See Times of India, 26 November 1959.
- 40 Cited, Thought, 7 November 1959, p. 1.
- 41 Thought, commenting on New Delhi's attitude in retrospect, felt that it evidenced an incredible complacency and naiveté.

which 'sprung from the confusion between basic interest and temporary predeliction or pre-occupation'. 3 November 1962, p. 2.

42 Cited, Hindu, 6 November 1959. It is understood that Nehru later sent a written apology to General Cariappa for having made such intemperate remarks. Addressing the Asia-African Society in Bangalore on 5 November 1959 (of which he is President), Cariappa stated that he would be the last man to suggest that India go to war with China - but he reiterated the need for defence preparations, including joint defence with Pakistan. See Hindu, 7 November 1959.

43 Times of India, 4 January 1960. It is understood that the military leadership did not share this view other than accepting the need for precautions pending an improvement of political relations.

44 For reports regarding official thinking on the nature of the Chinese threat during the 1959-61 period, see K. Rangaswami in Hindu Weekly Review, 21 September 1959, and in Hindu, 27 October 1959 and 19 June 1961; Times of India, 4 January 1960.

45 The Chief of the Army Staff, General K.A. Thimayya, was reported to have told a conference of civil and military officers in October 1959 that he did 'not visualise immediate danger of any magnitude in the China-India frontier on account of the vast distance involved and the difficult nature of the terrain'. Lt Colonel H.E. Crocker, "The Northern States of India", Quarterly Review (January 1960), p. 215.

46 See statement by Nehru in the Rajya Sabha, 31 August 1959. Cited, Prime Minister on Sino-Indian Relations, vol. I, p. 103.

47 See chapter V.

48 On 24 February 1960, a Commissioner's Division of Uttarkhand was formed through the union of the three districts.

49 This district was constituted on 1st July 1960. District headquarters are at Keylong with the headquarters of the Lahaul and Spiti tehsils sited at Keylong and Kaza respectively.

50 For reports on the administrative adjustments in Ladakh, see Times of India, 16 January, 10 February and 16 August 1960; Hindu, 15 March, 17 April and 24 July 1960; Asian Recorder, 22-28 October 1960, 3598V.

51 In August 1962, General Shrinagesh was appointed Governor of Andhra Pradesh, being succeeded in Assam by Vishnu Sahay, a former member of the Planning Commission.

52 Replacing Rustomji as Commissioner of NEFA was Colonel G.S. Puri, a Deputy Secretary in the Ministry of External Affairs, Times of India, 10 February 1960.

53 Ibid, 16 January 1960.

54 The Act, which was comprised of about 13 clauses, empowered the Lieutenant-Governor of Himachal Pradesh to take 'special measures to prevent activities prejudicial to the security of the State or the maintenance of public order'. A similar measure was already in force in Uttar Pradesh.

55 Times of India, 16 December 1960.

56 The Nagaland administration had requested Rs 12 crores. Times of India, 2 December 1961.

57 Hindu, 2 April 1960.

58 Times of India, 16 August 1960.

59 Hindu, 24 July 1960.

60 Asian Recorder, 22-28 October 1960, 3598V. This programme was exclusive of the one financed by the Centre and carried out by the BRDB.

61 See announcement made in New Delhi on 26 December 1959 and cited in Asian Recorder, 23-29 January 1960, 3118A. The projects comprised: Jipti-Garbyang (Rs 4.51 crores); Malari-Bara Hoti hill track along the Girthi and Hong rivers (Rs 2.74 crores); Nilang Village-Nilang Pass hill track (Rs 5.25 crores); widening and metalling of the Narendranagar-Dharasu road (Rs 7.5 crores); Khela-Darma bridle path (Rs 2.6 crores); Gadoliya-Maletha road (Rs 4 crores); Girgaon-Dung bridle path (Rs 2.5 crores); Untadhura-Topidhunga-Lapthal-Balchadhura bridle path (Rs 96 lakhs); Topidhunga-Girthi-Malari bridle road (Rs 96 lakhs); Dung-Untadhura bridle road (Rs 75 lakhs) and the Garjia-Munshiari bridle road (Rs 75 lakhs).

- 62 Indian and Foreign Review, 1st December 1964, p. 14.
- 63 Hindu, 30 December 1959. Over Rs 45 lakhs was allocated for road and airstrip construction during fiscal 1960.
- 64 The Board has the powers of a department of government with its own financial adviser and held its first meeting on 29 March 1960. Defence Minister Menon was vice-chairman of the Board and members included the Secretary of the Transport Ministry, the Consulting Engineer (Roads) of the Transport Ministry and the Secretary for Kashmir Affairs in the Home Ministry. First co-ordinator of the border roads scheme was the Quarter-Master General of the Army, Lt General B.M. Kaul.
- 65 According to the Times of India (16 January 1960), however, the programme was to be implemented over a six-year period.
- 66 BRDB plans for Nagaland included a 156-mile Chakhabama-Meluri-Imphal road and others linking Kohima-Chakhabama-Mokokcha; Mokokchang-Tuensang; Meluri-Tuensang and Kohima-Mokokchang. See statement by Deputy Defence Minister D.R. Chavan, LSD, 3rd Series, vol. 14, 16 March 1963, col. 4070.
- 67 The predecessor of this construction force was a force of the same designation formed in April 1943 by South-East Asia Command and charged with responsibility for the construction and maintenance of all airfields, roads and pipelines in Assam east of the Brahmaputra.
- 68 See chapter VI.
- 69 See statement by Defence Minister Chavan in the Lok Sabha, 9 September 1963. LSD, 3rd Series, vol. 20, Nos 16-20, col. 5097.
- 70 Hindu, 11 March 1962.
- 71 Times of Viet Nam, 18 October 1961. The road was completed in 1962 and includes a branch which extends to Thimbu, the new permanent capital.
- 72 Times of India, 27 February 1961.
- 73 Ibid, 28 April 1961.
- 74 See New York Times, 26 August and 28 November 1959.

75 Ibid, 3 August 1959.

76 Ibid, 4 January 1960.

77 The Planning Commission's proposals represented a sharp reduction from the outlay of Rs 14 crores proposed by Sikkimese authorities. See Times of India, 11 June 1961.

78 See statement by Maharajah Thomdup Namgyal at his monthly press conference in Gangtok, 3 November 1964. Cited, Times of India, 4 November 1964.

79 Hindu, 20 April 1961.

80 Ibid. See also ibid, 11 June 1961; Times of India, 10 June 1961. The Nepalese majority in Sikkim only received Sikkimese citizenship with the passage of the Sikkim Subjects' Regulation legislation in 1961 and, even then, they were still prohibited from settling in the northern valleys.

81 Hindu, 11 June 1961; Times of India, 10 June 1961.

82 Pradyumna P. Karan and William M. Jenkins Jr., The Himalayan Kingdoms (New York, D. Van Nostrand, 1963), p. 74.

83 See despatch from George Patterson in The Daily Telegraph, 13 August 1959, in which he cites a personal interview with Bhutan's Prime Minister. It is not known whether he was able to obtain a written guarantee from Nehru but it is significant as revealing that even Dorji, who was by no means cool towards India, held doubts as to whether New Delhi could be counted on in a crisis.

84 See The Times, 16 September 1959.

85 Hindu, 20 November 1959.

86 The projected roads comprised: the Jaigon (West Bengal)-Hashimera (in the Alipur Duars of northern West Bengal)-Paro (western Bhutan) link of about 120 miles; the 100-mile Darrang (Assam)-Tashigang (eastern Bhutan) road; Farkigram-Sarbhanga; Garubasha-Hatisar; and Rangi-Dorangmala. See Times of India, 18 September and 17 November 1959 and 8 February 1961; Hindu, 20 November 1959, 28 April 1960 and 16 February 1962. The Times of India (8 February 1961) also refers to a 300-mile Paro-Tashigang link as part of the east-west highway, while Hindu (16 February 1962) refers to the Alipur-Duars project and three other roads.

87 See statement by Dorji in Calcutta on 17 November 1959. Cited in Times of India, 18 November 1959.

88 See statement by the Maharaja at a Calcutta press conference on 30 January 1960. Cited in ibid, 31 January 1961; Hindu, ibid.

89 Times of India, 24 January 1961.

90 Cited, ibid, 31 January 1961.

91 Ibid.

92 Himalayan Kingdoms, p. 55.

93 Cited, Times of India, 15 February 1961.

94 Hindu, 31 July 1961. The Bhutanese Government reportedly requested the Indian Government to channel to them some of the funds available from the United States under Public Law 480. Clearly desirous of monopolizing aid to Bhutan, however, New Delhi informed Bhutan that there was no need for such a diversion as India could meet all of the state's needs. Himalayan Kingdoms, p. 53.

95 Hindu, 20 November 1959 and 28 April 1960; Times of India, 17 November 1959.

96 The Daily Telegraph, 15 June 1959. The Indian personnel were to be replaced as qualified Nepalis became available.

97 George Patterson, ibid, 13 August 1959.

98 New York Times, 3 August 1959. According to this source, part of this aid was designed to prepare the Royal Nepal Army to relieve Indian personnel at the 20 posts on the Nepal-Tibet border.

99 Hindu, 27 November 1959.

100 Times of India, 1st December 1959.

101 Ibid.

102 Ibid, 29 January 1960. The figure of Rs 18 crores included about Rs 4 crores unspent from the amount India pledged to the previous Plan and Rs 3-4 crores allocated for the Chatra Canal project.

103 Cited, Hindu, 30 January 1960. For other reports of the visit, see Times of India, 25, 28 and 29 January 1960. A member of Koirala's party was the Director-General of Military Operations, Brigadier-General Padam Bahadur Khatri, who held talks with officials of the Indian Defence Ministry.

104 Cited, Times of India, 27 April 1960.

105 Hindu, 5 September 1960.

106 See The Times, 28 April 1960.

107 On 15 December, Mahendra dissolved the elected Parliament in which the Nepali Congress held a two-thirds majority, ordered the arrest of Koirala, other Ministers and a large proportion of the leaders of the political parties, and assumed emergency powers under the provisions of the 1959 Constitution and supplementary legislation. For a report of the political system which the King subsequently initiated, see Leo E. Rose, "Nepal's Experiment with 'Traditional Democracy'", Pacific Affairs (Spring 1963), pp. 16-31.

108 Times of India, 19 December 1960.

109 Cited, ibid, 17 December 1960.

110 See Hindu, 22 December 1960.

111 For example, Subarna Shumshere, Koirala's deputy Prime Minister, was permitted to set up the headquarters of the Nepali Congress in Calcutta, address press conferences and make statements against Mahendra's coup.

112 This route was apparently chosen over the alternative Kathmandu-Rasusgarhi-Lhasa route for the reason that, while it was longer, it opened up greater areas of northern Nepal. China undertook to provide the equivalent of £ 3.5 million in materials, machinery, technicians and training during the 1962-66 period. The importance with which Peking viewed the project is evidenced by the speed with which Chinese technicians pushed through surveys for the road in early 1962.

113 See statement by Nehru in the Lok Sabha, 24 November 1961. LSD, 2nd Series, vol. 54, col. 95.

## CHAPTER V

### THE INDIAN ARMY 1947-1962

The decision to partition British India into two sovereign states resulted in the division of the existing army<sup>1</sup> on a roughly 2:1 basis, with the larger share going to the Indian Union. India's share comprised the equivalent of 15 infantry regiments, 12 armoured regiments, 18½ artillery regiments and 61 engineer units totalling about 280,000 personnel of all categories<sup>2</sup>. The infantry units consisted of the 2nd Punjab Regiment, Madras Regiment, Indian Grenadiers<sup>3</sup>, Mahratta Light Infantry, Rajputana Rifles, Rajput Regiment, Jat Regiment, Sikh Regiment, Dogra Regiment, Garhwal Rifles, Kumaon Regiment<sup>4</sup>, Assam Regiment, Sikh Light Infantry, Bihar Regiment and the Mahar Regiment. The armoured formations included Skinner's Horse, Gardner's Horse, Hodson's Horse, King George V's Own Light Cavalry and King Edward's Own Light Cavalry. Under the provisions of a tripartite agreement concluded between the Governments of Nepal, Britain and India in November 1947, India retained the 1st, 3rd, 4th, 5th, 8th and 9th Gurkha Rifles totalling 16 battalions<sup>5</sup>.



In the immediate aftermath of partition, it was found impossible for the Defence Ministry to undertake long-term planning for the armed forces. In his presentation of the budget to Parliament in early 1948, Finance Minister R.K. Shanmukham Chetty explained that

the recrudescence of communal disturbances and the necessity in present circumstances of having to retain substantial forces till normal conditions return have made it impossible to undertake the long-term planning of the Armed Forces so as to keep the expenditure on them at a level appropriate to the financial resources of the country.<sup>6</sup>

Pending the return of 'normal conditions' and decisions as to the future strength and composition of the armed forces, the Army was expected to be maintained at its existing level<sup>7</sup>.

The onerous needs of internal security and the military operations against the princely state of Hyderabad (which was spearheaded by the 1st armoured division) and against Pakistani tribals and ultimately regular units of the Pakistan Army in Kashmir necessitated, however, a considerable strengthening of the security and defence forces. The Army was augmented by fresh recruitment for both temporary and permanent service, larger numbers of personnel from the State Forces were inducted and troops were loaned by Nepal for internal security duties<sup>8</sup>.

In accordance with the recommendations of a special committee appointed in 1946, the Indian Government established

a National Cadet Corps in 1948. The Corps consisted of three divisions (Senior, Junior and Girls) and was designed to stimulate interest in the defence of India and to develop character, ideals of service, comradeship and leadership qualities in the country's youth<sup>9</sup>. Enrolment was voluntary, but the Government early made it clear that it would consider conscription if the expected good response to the scheme did not materialize<sup>10</sup>.

A Territorial Army was constituted by an Act of Parliament in 1948 and was officially inaugurated on 9 October 1949 with an initial target of 130,000 personnel<sup>11</sup>. Modelled on the British organization, this force was designed to create a reserve of citizen soldiers which would function as the second line of defence and, in times of emergency, release regular troops for field service<sup>12</sup>.

In early 1949, the ceasefire in Kashmir and the return of the internal situation to general normalcy permitted the Government to give its first serious consideration to the question of the size and composition of the peacetime Army. Faced with the need for maximum economy in defence expenditure simultaneous with the development of an Air Force and Navy, the Defence Ministry proposed to effect economy at the expense of the Army<sup>13</sup>. The authorities are understood to have envisaged a highly mechanized and mobile force of about

150,000 men backed by a large reserve, a Territorial Army and various para-military formations<sup>14</sup>.

No decision was taken regarding the peacetime establishment of the Army, however, due to the communist insurrections in progress within India and throughout South-East Asia, and the emergence of a united China under militant communist leadership dedicated at least to the restoration of ancient glories and domains. President Rajendra Prasad admitted the concern with which the Government viewed developments in his first address to Parliament delivered on 31 January 1950. He declared that, while it was the Government's desire to reduce defence expenditure 'as a measure of economy as well as a gesture of peace',

With all the desire to reduce defence expenditure, they could not take the risk of putting the country in jeopardy at a time when evil forces were endangering its security both within and from outside.

'The first essential of freedom', he concluded, 'is the strength to preserve it and no country can take any risk in such a vital matter'<sup>15</sup>.

This prudent attitude was reinforced by the continuance of poor relations with Pakistan. A sharp deterioration in this relationship in February and March 1950 followed serious communal rioting in West Bengal, a mass exodus of Moslems from that state to East Pakistan and the resulting

outbreak of anti-Hindu riots in the area. As a precautionary measure against the possible outbreak of war, Indian forces were moved towards the borders of West and East Pakistan and a crisis was only averted by talks held in New Delhi in April between Nehru and the Prime Minister of Pakistan, Liaquat Ali Khan. Further caution was warranted by developments outside the sub-continent - the invasion of South Korea by North Korean communist armies in June 1950<sup>16</sup>, the Chinese re-entry into Tibet in early October and major intervention in Korea in November.

Shortly after the entry of Chinese troops into Tibet, however, it was reported by a leading Indian daily that the Government was considering a proposal to progressively reduce defence expenditure on the assumption that the Korean War would soon end and would not, in any case, develop into a world war<sup>17</sup>. Such an intention was officially confirmed on 17 November, when Nehru intervened during question period in Parliament to declare that he had directed the Defence Ministry to reduce defence expenditure and the size of the Army - his Government desiring a highly efficient and mobile Army which, he claimed, did not depend on numbers<sup>18</sup>. Referring to the subject again in the same forum on 21 December, the Prime Minister stated that the Government preferred a highly mechanized and relatively small Army to a large and

ill-equipped 'foot' force and intended to effect a reduction in its size for economy reasons<sup>19</sup>.

In accordance with this policy, about 50,000 personnel were demobilized in early 1951. Announcing the move in Parliament on 26 March 1951, Defence Minister Baldev Singh declared that further demobilization would depend on many factors including the internal situation, the international situation and, above all, the question of Kashmir<sup>20</sup>. Ostensibly because of Pakistan's 'war propaganda' and the absence of any corresponding reduction in her armed forces, a further reduction proposed for 1951-52 (which it is understood would have involved some 100,000 men) was not proceeded with<sup>21</sup>. With reference to this issue, Nehru informed the Rajya Sabha in September 1963 that the Government had decided after the ceasefire in Kashmir to reduce the size of the Army, in the belief that no country was going to attack her. He claimed that this policy had been pursued for 'a couple of years', at the end of which time the Government had accepted the advice of its 'military advisers' that Pakistan's postures made further reductions unwise<sup>22</sup>.

Too much significance should not, however, be attached to the release of the 50,000 personnel in early 1951 or of other personnel between 1949 and 1953. Speculating on the demobilization on the eve of its occurrence, Deputy Defence

Minister, Major-General Himmatsinghji, stated that the reduction 'might' be possible by continuing the demobilization of World War II personnel and by dispensing with such units as 'reserve and garrison' battalions which he described as more or less semi-police forces required during the period of partition<sup>23</sup>. The actual reduction was indeed effected in this manner - by the demobilization of the Defence Battalions and Pioneer Corps, the return to Nepal of those forces borrowed from it, the release of 'unsuitable' officers and men from the States Forces and the resumption of demobilization of personnel from the Second World War who either desired to return to civil life or were considered unsuitable for the peacetime establishment, but whose release had been deferred following partition.

These releases were more than offset, however, by fresh enlistments, the integration of the States Forces into the regular Service effective 1st April 1950<sup>24</sup>, and the re-induction between 15 August 1947 and March 1953 of 441 officers and 121,322 other ranks who had been demobilized following the end of the Second World War<sup>25</sup>. The rate of the aggregate increase in the size of the Army between 1949 and 1953 is indicated by the outlay on pay and allowances during this period: Rs 32.56 crores (1949-50), Rs 37.71 crores (1950-51), Rs 42.15 crores (1951-52) and Rs 44.75 crores (1952-53)<sup>26</sup>.

As of this last date, the Indian Army comprised 325-350,000 personnel of all categories, organized into the 4th, 5th, 10th, 19th, 26th and 27th infantry divisions, 1st armoured division, 1st independent armoured brigade, 50th paratroop brigade (comprised of the parachute regiment of three battalions plus support units) and several unattached battalions and brigades<sup>27</sup>. Three infantry divisions were sited in the Vale, Jammu and the Poonch-Mendhar-Rajaori area)<sup>28</sup> with an infantry battalion and supporting arms at Leh. The main counter-strike force against Pakistan, designated Punjab Force, comprised a corps which consisted of two infantry divisions based at Ferezpore, Ambala, Jullundur, Amritsar, Khasali and Gurdaspur and the armoured division, sited in its training area at Jhansi, south of Delhi and 72 hours removed by train from its operational 'take-off' point in the East Punjab. The independent armoured brigade was based at Patiala in the East Punjab and an infantry brigade group was located at Jaipur (Rajasthan) with one battalion at Jodhpur. There was an infantry brigade and a light armoured regiment in the vicinity of Calcutta; an independent infantry brigade group in Kutch; one infantry brigade at Secunderabad; one infantry battalion in each of Madras, Bangalore and Trivandrum; and the paratroop brigade at Agra.

The deployment of these forces at this time indicated a compromise between likely operational contingencies, the continuing demands of internal security and financial stringency. From the purely military viewpoint, the concentration of the field army in a 100 square mile area in Madhya Pradesh enclosing Agra and Gwalior would have resulted in the most effective defence posture, permitting rapid aid to the civil power whenever and wherever required and a speedy concentration of the requisite forces against any threat to India's long land frontiers from west to east. For financial reasons, however, the Government was not prepared to sanction such a measure, and considerations of civilian morale in the areas contiguous to Pakistani territory and the military sanction required for the administration of Indian-occupied Kashmir resulted in a 'tight' defence of the Indo-Pakistan frontiers, particularly in the west. Since the main operational theatre remained in the north-west, no major re-deployment of the Indian Army was required - except as regards Kashmir. Thus, pre-1947 cantonments were utilized to a large extent.

The size and deployment of the Army remained fairly static from 1953 to 1956. In early 1956, however, its commitments were expanded to encompass an active role in the pacification campaign against rebellious Naga tribesmen in



the existing checkpoints from the Central Reserve Police<sup>31</sup> and forward patrol bases were established in areas where logistics permitted - i.e. along the Shyok Valley up to Daulet Beg Oldi, near the southern entrance to the Karakoram Pass<sup>32</sup>. Chushul was conceived of as the anchor for this system of posts, which were designed to check further surreptitious Chinese advances, and was flanked by about ten posts extending towards both the east and west for a distance of some 40 miles in each direction. Leh and Chushul airstrips were speedily re-commissioned.

In the Sikkim-Bhutan sector, planning envisaged the ultimate deployment of an infantry division with one brigade and divisional headquarters at Siliguri, one brigade at Kalimpong and one brigade at Gangtok with its forward elements extending up to Natu La pass on the Sikkim-Tibet border. A force deployed in this manner was considered to afford defence in depth against any attack from the north while simultaneously covering the narrow corridor lying between the northern tip of East Pakistan and Bhutan from interference from the former state. As the initial stage of this plan, an infantry brigade was shifted from Lucknow during the period December 1959-January 1960 and sited with brigade headquarters and one battalion at Siliguri, one battalion at Kalimpong and one battalion at Gangtok with its forward elements extending up to Natu La pass.

the strategically important region of eastern Assam. Initially, units were drawn from Eastern Command but, as the Army's involvement deepened, it was necessary to draft battalions from the Punjab and Kashmir and replace them through the raising of fresh units. The outlay on pay and allowances in the Army budget accordingly rose from Rs 45.11 crores (1956-57) to Rs 49.07 crores (1957-58) and Rs 52.61 crores (1958-59)<sup>29</sup>.

In August-November 1959, the Army's responsibilities were greatly increased when they were directed to secure the Himalayan frontiers against hostile actions by China. In their assessment of the Chinese military threat, India's military leaders viewed NEFA, the Sikkim-Bhutan sector and Ladakh as the likely 'danger areas' - although it was felt that serious attacks were, for the present, precluded by logistical factors. Large-scale re-deployment of troops to these areas was, in any case, prevented by the paucity of communications. The extent of immediate military preparations was, therefore, primarily determined by the logistics factor.

Planning for Ladakh envisaged the development of an eventual brigade group consequent on the development of a suitable operational infrastructure. As immediate measures, the battalion at Leh was strengthened<sup>30</sup>, the Army took over

With regards to NEFA, the 4th infantry division was shifted from Ambala during the period December 1959-January 1960 and sited with divisional headquarters at Tezpur, two brigades in the foothills and one brigade forward at Tawang. This force was assigned the task of undertaking a thorough reconnaissance of the area. The Army Command at Jorhat, which exercised overall command of the border force with an advance command post at Foothills, was expanded<sup>33</sup> and development of a base at Misamari began<sup>34</sup>. Provision was made for the Army to gradually take over border security duties from the Assam Rifles<sup>35</sup> but this semi-military force, though strongly reinforced<sup>36</sup>, was not immediately replaced by regular troops - ostensibly so as to avoid unrest among the tribals<sup>37</sup>.

In the event of a serious Chinese assault against these forces, it was decided to concede the untenable forward areas and retire to more defensible positions where artillery and tank support could be utilized to effect<sup>38</sup>.

Further military contingency planning was undertaken by Army leaders in January 1961, at which time a sand-model exercise concerned with the defence of the MacMahon Line was held in Lucknow (or Tezpur). The 'Chinese syndicate' employed as the most likely Chinese strategy a three-pronged attack basically similar to the one actually employed by Peking in

October-November 1962. The force required to defend against such an attack was estimated at three infantry divisions, with two on the line and one in reserve. For contingency purposes, the units allotted to the plan were the 4th (already in NEFA), the 'Naga' division of approximately 14 battalions in three brigades deployed against the Nagas, and the 5th division from the Punjab. If and when an attack seemed imminent, it was proposed to implement the plan immediately. In such an event, the forward brigade at Tawang was to fall back and join the other two brigades of the 4th in the main defensive position in the vicinity of Bomdila with all forward checkpoints being abandoned; two brigades from Nagaland would fall back to positions near the 4th, picking up a brigade from Ranchi or Calcutta to replace the formation left in Nagaland and the 5th division would be rushed to act as the reserve at Bomdila - the main defence anchor. The main defence line would be strengthened with light tanks drawn from the armoured regiment at Calcutta and artillery drawn from the most readily available source, such as the 50th paratroop brigade at Agra.

Contingency planning for the Sikkim area remained unchanged, although some provisions, details of which are not in the writer's possession, were made to counter any Chinese attack on Bhutan.

As regards Ladakh, the military authorities remained of the view that the existing logistics deficiencies severely limited the preparation of a successful defence against a serious and sustained Chinese attack. In the event of such an attack, it was recognized that the troops in the area could only fight as best they could and would, in all probability, be forced to concede a major part of Ladakh.

All contingency planning was based upon the assumption that Pakistan would not seek to take advantage of any major Indian military involvement against China in the Himalayan region, thereby permitting the re-deployment of the requisite forces against China in any emergency.

To enable the Army to meet its new Himalayan commitments, an expansion programme was undertaken which involved an increase in the establishment of existing combatant and support arms and the raising of a new infantry division - the 17th - to replace the 4th in Punjab Force. Although a shortage of officers and equipment limited expansion to one division at a time, the fact that only one was raised during the three years preceding the border war in October 1962 suggests that the Government was not seriously concerned with the prospect of open war with China.

This relative complacency about a Chinese military threat was virtually characteristic of the Government's attitude towards the country's security as a whole.

Although Nehru had early declared his preference for well-equipped forces, he was strongly disinclined to concede requests from the Army for a phased re-equipment programme<sup>39</sup> for reasons of finance. Speaking in the Lok Sabha in August 1963, the Prime Minister admitted that 'repeatedly demands were made from the Defence Ministry or the Army Headquarters for more expenditure, but we discouraged them; sometimes, we might have cut them down, too; they were in such fantastic figures, in geometrical proportion'. Such expenditure, he claimed, was 'always difficult except when you are faced with a war situation, when the country and Parliament and everybody thinks differently'<sup>40</sup>. Referring to the matter in the Rajha Sabha the following month, he declared:

When you are faced with extreme difficulty, like the Chinese invasion, you have to do it whatever happens. You can get it too from friendly countries. You can tax your people much more than normally you could. But, imagine in peacetime, how far can you create that atmosphere? How far will people bear such heavy burdens of taxation and how far will other countries be prepared to help you to that extent? It is only when danger comes and shakes you up that you can get more money by taxation, loans, credits and gifts from outside.

Thus, Nehru concluded, requests from Army authorities when referred by the Defence Ministry to the Defence Committee of the Cabinet were 'possibly' agreed to by the Committee to the extent of one-tenth what was asked<sup>41</sup>.

The Government was sympathetic to the provision of tanks, in the belief that this arm would be decisive in any Indo-Pakistan war. The need for newer tanks had been illustrated during the Kashmir conflict, when the obsolete Stuarts, Churchills and obsolescent Shermans had been kept operational (in the context of the Anglo-American embargo on arms shipments to both the disputants) only by the despatch of teams to acquire available spares from World War II theatres of action. At least 30 Shermans were purchased from the United States in 1953 as a stop-gap measure while enquiries were made regarding the availability of modern tanks and brief consideration was given to the possible indigenous manufacture of a foreign design under licence<sup>42</sup>. The latter proposal was shortly discarded as premature, given India's technological backwardness, and negotiations commenced with Britain and France which culminated in the purchase of 200 British Centurion heavy tanks in 1956-57 and of 150 French AMX light tanks in 1957-58. Following a subsequent decision to undertake the manufacture of a modern tank during the Third Five-Year Plan (1961-66), assessments were made of the AMX and a light Panzer tank of West German design but it was ultimately decided to accept an offer by the British company of Vickers-Armstrong which involved a medium tank based on the Chieftain design and modified to Indian specifications<sup>43</sup>.

The vehicular fleet was augmented by a small number of jeeps purchased from private British firms in the 1948-51 period<sup>44</sup> and by an unknown number of general service trucks acquired from American sources in subsequent years. General reliance continued to be placed upon the large stocks of vehicles left from World War II, however, in the belief that the consequent heavy burden placed upon the Electrical and Mechanical Engineers (EMEs) was preferable to the expenditure of scarce foreign exchange. A phased programme of replacement of vehicles was drawn up in 1956 but could not be implemented at that time due to the acute shortage of foreign exchange experienced by India in 1957-58 and inadequate indigenous capacity for the manufacture of 4-wheel drive vehicles<sup>45</sup>. Sanction was thereupon given for the long-overdue streamlining of the vehicle fleet. Some 20,000 vehicles were reconditioned by Army engineers<sup>46</sup> and, in May 1959, 3,630 units (three-ton and 15 cwt 4x2) were declared for disposal as surplus to Army needs<sup>47</sup>. In the 1959-61 period, the Government sanctioned indigenous production schemes to meet the Army's requirements of light and medium vehicles with Japanese Nissan patrol jeeps and one-ton trucks and West German three-ton trucks<sup>48</sup>. Throughout the 1947-62 period, policy was to retain one-ton and three-ton vehicles for about 15 years and two major overhauls<sup>49</sup>.



Serious consideration was not given by the Government to the replacement of the .303 rifle, the Army's standard infantry weapon in two world wars, until the Himalayan situation sharply deteriorated in late 1959. Army interest was considerable in the Colt AR-15, an American design which had first appeared in 1958, although it was regarded by some officers as lacking sufficient 'punch' and requiring a divergence from the standard .303 bore with consequent supply problems. The Belgian FN was highly regarded and lesser interest was also shown in Army circles in a West German design and the indigenous Ishapore model then undergoing development<sup>50</sup>.

A number of models of each of the four types were acquired and were subjected to extensive tests by frontline units under all conditions. According to an informed source, the tests revealed a consensus in favour of the AR-15 and Army Headquarters accordingly submitted its recommendation for the adoption of the American rifle in late 1960.

The Government, however, was not inclined to act upon the proposal; it remained very reluctant to expend the foreign exchange involved in such a measure, certain of its hierarchy were emotionally opposed to dealing with a private arms supplier in the 'arms racket' and there was a long-standing aversion to the acquisition of 'offensive'

armaments from either of the two major participants in the cold war. As an alternative, which appeared to be far more attractive, consideration was given to the possible licensed manufacture of the FN. While it is not known to what extent the proposal was pursued, the alleged involvement of the particular Belgian firm in a 'scandal' apparently confirmed the strong predilections of certain influential members of the political executive concerning the immorality of private arms manufacturers. With the encouragement of the Defence Minister, V.K. Krishna Menon, the decision was taken to proceed with the development and production of the Ishapore design - despite the fact that Army circles regarded it as but a 'poor copy of the FN', too heavy and too bulky, and were not happy with the further delay inherent in the decision. Their fears were well-founded as a satisfactory prototype of the Ishapore design was not forthcoming until mid-1962 and production had not commenced when the border conflict erupted.

Requests by the Army for new mortars met with no positive response from the Government. The proposed purchase of the French Brandt heavy mortar in the early 'fifties was rejected on the grounds that it was too expensive and that it was preferable to develop an indigenous type. Professional interest was shown in a Finnish mortar which appeared in

1959 or 1960 but enquiries were apparently inhibited for political reasons: Israel was the only country licensed to produce it, and direct or indirect purchase from this source was considered by the Government as a possible source of offence to the Arab bloc, with whom there was a strong and continuing desire to maintain close relations.

Persistent requests from Army Headquarters for consideration to be given the early replacement of the 25-pounder field artillery and the acquisition of modern mountain howitzers provoked a qualified response from the Government. It viewed the items as having a relatively low priority, rejected external purchase on financial grounds, and was content to await the development and production of designs undergoing development in the research sector of the Defence Ministry's ordnance establishment.

The problem of Indianization of the officer corps had posed an acute issue even prior to partition and the loss of the greater part of the Moslem component. India emerged from World War II with an indigenous Army officer cadre totalling 8,340, exclusive of the medical services<sup>51</sup>. Many of these wartime entrants were, however, either below the desired peacetime standard or were disinclined to seek a career in the Service. The Commander-in-Chief, Sir Claude Auchinleck, informed the Council of State in New Delhi on

8 April 1946 that there were only 5,100 suitable officer personnel available against a tentative estimated need of 9,000. He also stated that the quality of the individuals offering themselves for the cadet course was relatively poor; only 126 of the 1,236 applicants for the 300 vacancies in the first postwar course in the Indian Military Academy were considered acceptable and there were only 900 applicants for the second course beginning in May<sup>52</sup>.

Partition considerably aggravated the situation by removing most of the Moslem element, who were particularly prominent in the infantry arm; 2,110 commissioned officers and 3,424 VCOs of the Moslem faith went to Pakistan plus 177 commissioned officers and 223 VCOs who, though non-Moslem, were of Pakistani domicile, while only 215 commissioned officers and 339 VCOs of the Moslem faith opted for India<sup>53</sup>. The resulting situation, as revealed by a statement tabled in the Constituent Assembly on 4 March 1948, was the expectation that the Army would be 400 officers short of establishment by 31 March - 40 armour, 100 artillery, 150 engineers, 40 ordnance and 70 EMEs<sup>54</sup>. This figure excluded 182 British officers who had volunteered to serve with the Army for periods in excess of three months.

For political and psychological reasons, however, the decision on rapid Indianization was proceeded with, and only

selected British personnel were retained for varying periods. Thus, whereas at independence Indians held only six brigade and sub-area commands, one area but no division or army commands<sup>55</sup>, by April 1948 all battalion and regimental commands save three regimental centres were held by Indians. By the end of April, the three army and all division, area, sub-area and brigade commands had been Indianized and General K.M. Cariappa became the first Indian Commander-in-Chief on 15 January 1949. British personnel were progressively replaced thereafter as qualified Indians became available. The number of British officers, which totalled 244 on 1st April 1948 and comprised six generals, twelve brigadiers, 21 colonels, 58 lieutenant-colonels and 146 major and below had been reduced to 57 by March 1953, of which 52 were specialists<sup>56</sup>. By 1955 it was intended that there would only be a few British EME technicians remaining on the strength of the Army<sup>57</sup>. This target appears to have been adhered to although statistical confirmation is not readily available.

There continued to be an acute shortage of officers, however, due to the Army's inability to attract the required number of suitable applicants. The Director, Selection of Personnel at Army HQ, Brigadier N.D. Bilimoria, declared at a Bombay press conference on 1st April 1949 that the response for vacancies at the newly-established Inter-Services

Wing of the Armed Forces Academy (Khadakavasala) had been 'disappointing'. Only 75 per cent of the vacancies for the first course in January had been filled and, of the 250 applicants for the second course examinations conducted by the Public Service Commission, only 45 had passed and only 35 of these were expected to be accepted by the selection boards. In an effort to retrieve the situation, a supplementary examination for the 237 places in the July course was to be held in May, but the most optimistic estimate was that only 100 candidates would qualify, leaving a deficit of about 137<sup>58</sup>.

Even more disturbing in Brigadier Bilimoria's view was the disparity in the response of the various provinces. Of the approximately 180 cadets in the Wing at the time he spoke, over 50 came from the East Punjab, about 40 from Delhi Province, and about 36 from Uttar Pradesh, leaving only about 50 from the rest of India. In further illustration of his contention, Bilimoria noted that, of the 300 applicants received to that date for the second course beginning in July, about 80 were from each of the Punjab, Uttar Pradesh and Delhi Province with 'an insignificant number of 60 candidates' from the rest of India - 18 from Bombay, eleven from Madras, eleven from Bengal, ten from Central Provinces and Berar and four from Bihar. He felt that if this 'very

serious state of affairs' continued and over 75 per cent of the officer recruits came from northern India 'we will be faced with the problem of a martial class again'<sup>59</sup>.

There continued to be a poor response, however, to the courses at the Joint Services Wing. Only 166 of 1,423 candidates were admitted to the January 1951 course, 159 of 1,940 candidates to the August 1951 course, and 145 of 2,095 to the course beginning in January 1952<sup>60</sup>. The situation for the Military Wing Course was even more disturbing; only 30 of 3,214 applicants were found suitable for admission to the January 1951 course, only 64 of 1,940 applicants to the August 1951 course, and only 52 of 1,820 applicants for the course commencing in January 1952<sup>61</sup>. The number of cadets admitted to the Indian Military Academy further attested to the inability of the Army to attract qualified cadets in the required numbers - 247 for the second course, 274 for the third course, 202 for the fourth course, 182 for the fifth, 147 for the sixth and 156 for the seventh<sup>62</sup>.

The initial shortage of officers was partially eased by the granting of Short Service Permanent Regular Commissions to former officers<sup>63</sup>, and the employment of civilian engineers on a contract basis in certain technical services<sup>64</sup>. As the required number of recruits failed to come forward, various other measures were introduced to alleviate the

deficiency. Special List commissions were introduced in 1953 with the primary aim of utilizing the services of those Junior Commissioned Officers (JCOs) and Non-Commissioned Officers (NCOs) who had acquired specialized knowledge in their respective trades and capacities<sup>65</sup>. In mid-1957, 2,000 officers holding temporary commissions were granted permanent ones<sup>66</sup> and the decision was taken that retired officers could be re-employed for a maximum of three years. In 1959, this period of re-employment was extended beyond three years so long as no officer was retained beyond 55 years of age.

By 1960 the officer cadre was about 3,000 short of establishment with some infantry battalions having only eleven or twelve officers out of an establishment of 35-40. The situation was rendered more acute by the expansion programme begun in late 1959, and by the release of World War II entrants who were nearing the maximum age limits for which majors and below had already been extended by several years. The 1956-60 period had witnessed the virtual disappearance of the war-experienced NCO cadre and the rural background and low educational standards of most of the recruits in the combatant arms precluded undue haste in the training of NCOs without damaging the efficiency of the Army<sup>67</sup>.



The situation prompted further actions by the responsible authorities to augment the officer corps. The intake to Dehra Dun (the Indian Military Academy) was increased by 50 per cent and standards were lowered for entry to the National Defence Academy at Khadakvasala<sup>68</sup>. Five Sainik<sup>69</sup> schools were established in 1961 and six in 1962 with the dual aim of providing educationally qualified young men for the armed forces and reducing the imbalance of representation from the Punjab. The Special List cadre was substantially increased, promotion for certain categories of NCOs was liberalized and an unspecified number of JCOs were employed as Administrative Officers in National Cadet Corps units. The World War II Army Cadet College at Nowgong (Madhya Pradesh) was re-established in May 1960 with a capacity of 260 cadets to train suitable JCOs and NCOs possessing the minimal educational qualifications so as to enable them to compete successfully with others for entry into the Indian Military Academy and for regular commissions.

The character, organization and 'outlook' of the Army remained largely unchanged during the 15 years from the re-constitution of the Service in 1947 to the border war with China in 1962.

Shortly after independence, the Government announced that thenceforth recruitment to the Army would, as an explicit

policy, be open to all persons of Indian domicile irrespective of class, creed or religion. Furthermore, no definite proportion would be allotted to any class or creed<sup>70</sup>. The practice introduced during the Second World War of 'mixed'<sup>71</sup> artillery, signals, administrative and other ancillary and support arms and services was retained and a Brigade of Guards<sup>72</sup> and a Parachute Regiment were formed as 'mixed' units. The class/caste basis of the infantry regiments was, however, not tampered with in recognition both of the effects of such a policy on esprit de corps and the peculiar social patterns of India. This tradition was applied to the Jammu and Kashmir Regiment raised after partition, this unit recruiting only Sikhs, Dogras and Moslems from that state. The Gurkha Rifles, once despised by Congress politicians as despicable mercenaries, were retained and are coveted<sup>73</sup>. The Viceroy's Bodyguard was retained as the President's Bodyguard<sup>74</sup> and kept its gold and scarlet uniforms, high boots and lances with the Asoka Lion replacing the imperial crown and insignia on the breastplate. The only structural change occurred with the conversion of the Mahar Regiment from an infantry to a machine-gun formation. Thus, while the so-called 'non-martial' classes are well represented in the non-combatant arms, the frontline infantry remained dominated by the 'martial' classes of the north and north-west - Sikhs,

Jats, Rajputs, Dogras, Garhwalis and Gurkhas. India's large Moslem community contributed only a few thousands to the successor of the Army in which their community (albeit largely from the north-western areas incorporated in West Pakistan) were once so prominent<sup>75</sup>.

Various suggestions were put forward from time to time regarding beneficial changes in the organization and character of the Army. One Indian military writer suggested a reduction in the logistical branches for reason that the order of battle contained a number of administrative and engineer units required for operations in 'Eastern theatres of war where administrative backing would be poor, and the line of communication long and indifferent' but not required for the Army's existing commitments to defence of India's frontiers. He proposed that the divisional organization could be replaced by 'brigade groups with fixed organisations, including an allotment of armour...[and] grouped under divisional headquarters for co-ordination or, should the necessity arise, for fighting concentrated as a division'<sup>76</sup>. Another proposal advanced with minor variations periodically concerned reliance upon large militia-style forces as either a temporary arrangement pending the development of indigenous sources of modern costly armaments<sup>77</sup> or as a permanent policy<sup>78</sup>. The latter proposal envisaged a militia force,

trained in mass tactics for guerilla warfare and organized around a small and well-equipped regular force which would serve as a hard-hitting offensive force and as a nucleus for training and organization.

The brigade group proposal provoked some discussion in Army circles, but it was ultimately decided that 'by and large' it was best to retain the divisional organization while altering the infantry battalion in favour of greater firepower, mobility and fewer frills<sup>79</sup>. The establishment of the Lok Sahayak Sena (viz. National Volunteer Force) in May 1955 with the declared aim of reducing dependence upon the standing Army (the Army being given no control over the force) suggested a political desire to prevent a concentration of authority in Army Headquarters. It is doubtful, however, if the position of the standing Army was ever threatened for either political or economic reasons - India's responsible political leaders undoubtedly agreed with the observation of one Indian military commentator, recorded in 1955, that a regular Army with a little streamlining and modern equipment was far better than any large and half-trained peasant militia<sup>80</sup>.

The need for some units to be trained and equipped for operations in the mountainous and jungle terrain of the Himalayan region was advanced by a British officer in an

article published in early 1947<sup>81</sup>. In the aftermath of China's occupation of Tibet in 1950-51, at least a section of the Army leadership appreciated that it would be prudent to form a small specialized force to maintain a constant surveillance of the Himalayan frontier. Political disinterest was primarily responsible for the proposal not being pursued. Army Headquarters also felt the need to make at least some preparations against the contingency of future operations in this area, and decided in 1951-52 on the preparation of a manual on Chinese infantry tactics, organization and equipment; material was to be obtained from British and American sources and based upon the experience of British and American forces in Korea. Upon learning of the project, however, Nehru ordered it to be dropped. Political attitudes towards military precautions in the Himalayan region during this early period were in accordance with Nehru's strong belief (which virtually amounted to a conviction) that the Chinese military threat to India's Himalayan frontiers and interests in the hill-states was distant and should not be stimulated by any Indian actions or attitudes which might be regarded by Peking as provocative<sup>82</sup>.

As the Himalayan situation steadily deteriorated after 1954, there was increasing concern in military circles at the seeming refusal by the political authorities to

appreciate the need for phased adjustments to the situation<sup>83</sup>. The Army moved to acquaint personnel with the problems of mountain and jungle warfare by establishing a Jungle Warfare School at Dehra Dun in 1958 and introducing a course on guerilla tactics at the Infantry School (Mhow) in the same year. In the latter part of 1960 the Chief of Army Staff, General K.S. Thimayya, was permitted to make a long-desired study of alpine troops, organization and tactics in the Mount Blanc area at the invitation of the Italian Government<sup>84</sup>. Upon his return to India, General Thimayya is understood to have recommended to the Defence Ministry the raising of some mountain divisions and to have made proposals regarding the organization, training and equipment of such formations. The resulting scheme of Himalayan defence would consist of lightly equipped and mobile infantry deployed in forward areas backed by a strong and highly mobile mechanized force based in the plains.

The proposal was rejected by the Government for reasons which had become quite irrelevant. Defence Minister Menon and Prime Minister Nehru would seem to have felt that the formation of such divisions would constitute a basic shift in strategic policy with far-reaching repercussions on foreign policy - an eventuality which was to be avoided if at all possible. The cost of such a measure would also

increase the country's already heavy defence burden. Desirous of an eventual peaceful settlement of the border dispute and having ruled out the possibility of large-scale Chinese attacks in the immediate future and even beyond, the political leadership of the ruling Congress Party viewed the expensive response proposed by the Army as not warranted<sup>85</sup>. The only adjustment to the Army training programme after 1959 that related to Himalayan operations was the establishment of a High Altitude Warfare School in March 1962, although the need for mountain formations deployed in the Himalayas continued to be advanced in responsible journals<sup>86</sup>.

On the eve of the border conflict in October 1962, the Indian Army comprised some 550,000 personnel, including about 35,000 unenrolled (civilian) personnel and a substantial body of enrolled non-combatants. The Service was organized in three Commands (Western with headquarters at Delhi, Eastern based at Ranchi and Southern based at Poona) with sub-areas. Field formations consisted of eight infantry divisional organizations (2nd 'Naga', 4th, 5th, 10th, 17th, 19th, 26th and 27th), the 1st armoured division, 1st independent armoured brigade, 50th paratroop brigade and various unattached formations. There were approximately 1,000 tanks (150 AMX, 200 Centurions, 600 Shermans and Stuarts and a number of Churchills) spread in operational, training and

reserve categories. This regular force was backed by a Reserve of 250,000 officers and men serving seven-year engagements (of which only about 30,000 could be regarded as first-line reserves), two battalions of the Jammu and Kashmir State Militia, the semi-military Assam Rifles organization of perhaps 15,000 personnel, 15 battalions of the Central Reserve Police and a number of battalions of Armed Police from the various states<sup>87</sup>.

Para-military organizations embraced several million civilians. The Territorial Army consisted of 177 units with an actual strength of 419,580 as against an authorised establishment of 468,970<sup>88</sup>. The Lok Sahayak Sena scheme, which had imparted elementary military training to 435,083 civilians by December 1959<sup>89</sup> and had been re-organized effective 1st January 1960 with increased stress on border areas<sup>90</sup>, had imparted training to 470,000 by March 1961<sup>91</sup> and to 619,114 by March 1962<sup>92</sup>. The National Cadet Corps scheme had been expanded by the creation of the NCC Rifles<sup>93</sup> and an Auxiliary Cadet Corps (ACC)<sup>94</sup> and all schemes were reported to be making satisfactory progress. On 31 March 1962 there were 2,403 officers and 127,667 cadets in the Senior Division, 3,794 officers and 170,730 cadets in the Junior Division, 1,400 officers and 280,000 cadets in the NCC Rifles and 20,214 teachers and 1,212,840 cadets in the ACC<sup>95</sup>.



The regular Service continued to reflect its development as an adjunct to the imperial British military system. British weapons, drill manuals, unit tables of organization and British-style uniforms remained in use. There was extensive stress on the regimental tradition and the infantry arm continued to be recruited largely from the so-called 'martial classes'<sup>96</sup>. Although plans envisaged the eventual replacement of English by Hindi as the language of command<sup>97</sup>, English remained the vehicle of administration, operation and training, and Hindustani continued to be the lingua franca of the Service. The distinction between the senior (KCO and ICO) and junior (JCO) forms of commission remained in vogue and the JCOs (formerly designated Viceroy's Commissioned Officers or VCOs) remained as a liaison - albeit a less significant one than hitherto - between the ranks and the senior (i.e. ICO) commissioned officers. By virtue of their long service and their conservative and rural origins, the JCOs continued to knit together the regimental structure and to perpetuate the traditional flavour of the Service. The formal regimental mess remained in prominent use, complete with traditional taboos and ceremonies like the 'Loyal Toast' to the head of state<sup>98</sup>. Formal ceremonies like 'beating the retreat' and the presentation and trooping

of the colours continued to be performed with meticulous care for tradition.

The weapons and ancillary equipment of the Army dated from World War II and, in some cases, before - the bolt action .303 Lee Enfield rifle of various numbers and marks, 'Sten' machine carbines, 'Bren' light and 'Vickers' medium machine guns, 2-inch, 3-inch and 4.2-inch mortars, 75 mm. pack howitzers, 25 pounder field artillery and 4.5-inch and 5.5-inch medium artillery. Armoured units were equipped with Centurion and Sherman heavy tanks and AMX light tanks, with obsolete Churchill and Stuart models still to be found in training formations and the latter frequently utilized in an internal security role. Communications equipment was old and suited for static conditions. The vehicular fleet was generally old and well-worn, the proportion of units acquired prior to 1948 representing 15 per cent (jeeps), 38 per cent (3-ton general service) and 68 per cent (1-ton general service)<sup>99</sup>.

Combat formations were deployed to meet the demands of frontier defence against Pakistan in the west and east and China in the north-west and north-east, of internal security (including the internal security-cum-frontier security campaign against the Naga dissidents) and certain international obligations voluntarily assumed by the Government:

Kashmir - Three infantry divisions along the ceasefire line as in 1953, each brigade supported by mortars and one battery of mountain guns; two battalions of the Jammu and Kashmir Militia; approximately two brigades in Ladakh; perhaps a squadron of Stuart light tanks in the Vale.

Punjab - Two infantry divisions (5th and 17th) each with a regiment of AMX tanks and sited as in 1953; 1st independent armoured brigade at Patiala.

Delhi-Rajasthan - One infantry brigade based at Jaipur with one battalion at Jodhpur as per 1953; 1st armoured division at Jhansi as in 1953.

NEFA/Assam - One infantry division (4th) based at Tezpur with two brigades in foothills and one brigade along the Tawang-Dhola axis; 14 infantry battalions in three brigade groups in Nagaland and immediately contiguous areas of Assam.

Sikkim/Bhutan sector - One infantry brigade based at Siliguri with one battalion at Siliguri, one battalion at Kalimpong and one battalion along the Gangtok-Natu La axis.

Miscellaneous internal - One infantry brigade at Ranchi; one infantry brigade and one armoured regiment equipped with Stuart tanks in the Calcutta area;

one infantry brigade group in Kutch; one infantry brigade in Secunderabad; one infantry battalion in each of Madras, Bangalore and Trivandrum; the 50th paratroop brigade at Agra.

External - A 5,000-strong brigade group plus about 500 ancillary personnel with the United Nations in the Congo; one infantry battalion plus support units totalling about 1,200 personnel with the UNEF in Gaza; and several hundred personnel with the International Supervisory Commission in the Indo-Chinese states.

Contingency planning had been prepared to meet the requirements of operations against Pakistan in Kashmir, Punjab and Rajasthan with precautionary measures along the borders of East Pakistan, and to counter possible Chinese attacks in Ladakh, the Sikkim-Bhutan sector and the Tawang area of NEFA.

The Army was reasonably well-prepared for conventional operations against a markedly weaker Pakistani adversary possessing similar organization, training and equipment and deployed in a defensive posture<sup>100</sup>. In the event of attacks by tribals, Azad (Free) Kashmir forces or Pakistani regulars across the ceasefire line in Kashmir, the garrison in that area (with possible support from the armoured brigade at Patiala) would seek to contain the attacks and to regain the

initiative by means of offensive operations directed towards <sup>Sialkhot</sup> ~~Sialkot~~ and perhaps also Peshawar and Rawalpindi. In the meantime, Punjab Force would strike towards Lahore and seek decisive action with the opposing Pakistani forces. The resultant pincer movement, coupled with India's superior military power, was regarded as adequate to deal a crippling blow to Pakistan's field army and force an early peace. Only watch and ward duties appear to have been envisaged vis-a-vis East Pakistan.

For the contingency of Himalayan operations against China, however, the Service was ill-prepared.

The forces in Ladakh consisted of an infantry brigade based on Leh with perhaps two other battalions dispersed among 40-43 small posts spread over nearly 400 miles of difficult terrain extending from the Karakoram Pass to Demchok with Chushul as base and anchor strongpoint. The primary purpose of these posts was to demarcate the forward line and discourage by their presence further Chinese advances; they were not designed to withstand any serious attack and had strict orders not to engage in any offensive action<sup>101</sup>. Srinagar and Leh were linked by road via Kargil and Dras<sup>102</sup> and Leh was connected by road with Chushul and thence to Demchok and also to Manali. Air supply originated at Chandigarh (Punjab) with airfields of variable capacity at

Srinagar, Kargil, Leh and Chushul. The forward outposts were almost exclusively dependent upon this source of supply which, for reasons of weather, was operative for only about 180 days of the year.

The frontier in the middle sector (i.e. Punjab, Uttar Pradesh and Himachal Pradesh) was guarded by a number of small police checkpoints under Army control linked to rear areas only by bridle paths and mule tracks. As of mid-1961, light vehicles could proceed no further towards the border than Dharchula (60 miles from Lipulek Pass), Joshimath (42 miles from Mana Pass and 52 miles from Niti Pass) and Uttarkashi (38 miles from Walang Pass) and the remaining stretches to the frontier posts were not expected to be completed until March 1963<sup>103</sup>.

In the Sikkim area, the approach route from Natu La was covered by a brigade deployed in staggered fashion from north to south and assisted by two companies of Sikkimese militia totalling about 280 men. Supplies and transport for this meagre force were dependent upon the road extending north from Siliguri over the Tista River at the frontier town of Rangpo and thence to Gangtok and beyond to Natu La on the border with Tibet.

In NEFA, there were two brigades in the Tezpur-Bomdila-Dirrang Dzong area with a third brigade deployed from Tawang

to Dhola, near the tri-junction of NEFA, Bhutan and Tibet. The frontier was watched by a series of small posts manned chiefly by the Assam Rifles, which were backed by several strongpoints garrisoned by regulars; these strongpoints constituted bases between which a communications system was being developed. Positions on the Namka Chu River were only 15 miles from the Tibetan border but five days march from Tawang. The defensive positions in this most threatened of areas were weak: heavy entrenching tools had only begun to arrive shortly before the major Chinese attack, there were no wire obstacles, ammunition was in short supply, the troops were not acclimatized to the 14-17,000 feet altitudes and warm clothing was generally conspicuous by its absence. The logistical support in the Kameng Division was restricted to the newly-completed 220-mile road linking Tezpur with Tawang via Se La (13,700 feet) Dirrang Dzong and Bomdi La (9,000 feet) which was barely capable of taking one-ton traffic. A series of defensive posts were in the process of being established along this route.

The remaining forward posts extending eastwards along the MacMahon Line were isolated and, although in some cases inter-connected by goat/mule tracks, were dependent for their main requirements upon air supply. The border post at Kibithoo in the Lohit Division was 15 miles (at least two days

march) from Walong with forward positions on a 15,000 feet high ridge near the banks of the unfordable Lohit River. Walong was 100 miles (or about two weeks march) from the nearest roadhead and was dependent for supply upon an Otter airstrip.

Contingency plans prepared in 1960-61 envisaged a general retirement from the systems of small posts in Ladakh and NEFA to more defensible positions which were to be rapidly reinforced to permit of a successful defence followed by counter-actions at the appropriate time. The capacity of the Army to carry out successful defensive and offensive actions against sizable Chinese forces on a major scale was, however, virtually non-existent.

The shortage of officers had inevitably led to a deterioration in the quality of the corps which was aggravated by its apathy and complacency arising from the Government's efforts to project a pacific image in international affairs, from low pay as compared to the civil service and private industry, obsolete equipment and the conduct of the Defence Minister towards the Service in general and promotions in particular. Few officers evinced serious interest in techniques useful for operations against a Chinese opponent who, according to the politicians, really posed no serious threat. The shortage of qualified officers had inhibited Army



Headquarters from establishing a Planning Group, and the Government's refusal to allocate suitable training areas had limited the ability of the Army leadership to ascertain Service effectiveness on a continuing and useful basis and under various physical conditions. There was an inadequate appreciation of the logistics requirements of modern warfare: supplies were located in scattered depots sited often with only marginal relevance to likely operational needs and to the delays in despatching them to frontline formations occasioned by weather, mechanical and human errors, etc.

Many of these deficiencies had been illustrated by 'Operation Vijay', launched against Goa on 17 December 1961. The action had been used by the Defence Ministry as a tactical exercise on a tri-Service basis on a scale which was lavish relative to operational needs<sup>104</sup>. According to reports, the 17th division took nearly a month to prepare for the operation and the troop movements so disorganized the railway system in central India that the steel mills at Ahmedabad ran out of coal and had to temporarily shut down. On D + 4, the roads leading into Goa from Savantvadi, Maneri, Coleman and Polem were choked with columns of medium artillery, trucks and tank transport. A considerable number of troops arrived for action equipped only with canvas shoes due to a shift in the contract for army boots from a major

recognized firm to a smaller company which failed to fulfil its obligations. Some troops were without field rations for 48 hours due to a breakdown in the supply system, and inadequate co-ordination between the air and ground forces resulted on one occasion in aircraft being nine miles off target and discharging their bombs onto Army transport<sup>105</sup>.

It is understood that the exercise was subjected to considerable scrutiny and comment in Service (particularly Army) circles, and that various proposals were made to the Defence Ministry regarding their correction. As the events of October–November 1962 were to reveal, however, little action was sanctioned in the interim period to enhance the Army's operational effectiveness.

#### Notes

1 As of July 1947, the undivided Indian Army comprised about 500,000 men and the divisional organizations in existence consisted of the 4th, 5th, 7th and 10th infantry divisions, 1st armoured division and 2nd airborne division. An unofficial estimate of the communal composition of the Service at this time was, in percentages of officers and other ranks: Hindus (47.8 and 55.7), Moslems (23.7 and 33.8), Sikhs (17.3 and 7.5) and others (12.2 and 3.0). Robert Trumbull, New York Times, 29 July 1947. See also appendix XXII; The Economist, 31 May 1947, p. 841; Defence Minister Singh, LAD, vol. 1, 9 February 1948, p. 433.

2 India also retained Southern and Eastern Commands and the 4th, 5th and 10th divisional organizations. Pakistan received 34 engineer units, 8½ artillery regiments, eight infantry regiments and six armoured units totalling about

150,000 personnel. The infantry regiments consisted of the 1st, 8th, 14th, 15th and 16th Punjab Regiments, the Frontier Force Regiment, the Frontier Force Rifles and the Baluch Regiment. The armoured units included Probyn's Horse, the 6th and 13th Lancers, King George V's Own Lancers and Prince Albert Victor's Own Cavalry.

3 Formerly the 4th Punjab Regiment but renamed in October 1945.

4 Formerly the 19th Hyderabad Regiment but renamed in October 1945.

5 Britain retained the 1st and 2nd battalions of each of the 2nd, 6th, 7th and 10th Gurkha Rifles.

6 CAD, vol. 2, 28 February 1948, p. 1336.

7 Ibid, p. 1337.

8 See statements by Defence Minister Baldev Singh, CAD, vol. 4, 5 April 1948, p. 3179; Finance Minister Dr John Matthai, ibid, pt 2, vol. 2, 1949, pp. 973-4. Temporary formations raised were Defence Battalions, designed to release regular troops from internal security duties, and the Pioneer Corps, a primarily labour formation which was smaller in size than the Defence Battalions.

9 The official view of the scheme was explained by Nehru in a speech in New Delhi on 21 November 1959 with stress on the non-military aspects.

I have often thought [he stated] that it would be a good thing if all school and college-going children above 18 years were given some military education.

We do not want to lay so much stress on military training as on developing the good qualities of military discipline, organisational ability and the spirit of working with a co-operative spirit as a united team, so much evident in an army.

Cited, Hindu, 23 November 1959. It is worth noting, however, that the NCC provides over half the cadets admitted to the National Defence Academy and is widely regarded as a valuable source of officer-cadets.

10 See statement by Defence Minister Singh, CAD, vol. 3, 13 March 1948, p. 2062.

11 The response was so poor that, in 1951 (18 months after its inauguration) the TA's provincial units had attained only about 50 per cent of their sanctioned strength while the response to the urban units was even worse due to a marked apathy among the urban population and, in particular, the professional classes. The continuing poor response led to the passage through the Lok Sabha on 23 November 1956 of the Territorial Army (Amendment) Bill, which provided for compulsory enrolment of Government servants and employees of specified public utility concerns in selected age groups so as to relieve the shortages of technicians in the urban units.

12 It is responsible for anti-aircraft and coastal defence and is meant to relieve the Army of its internal security role. It includes all arms with rural and urban units and is open to all able-bodied males between 18 and 35 years of age with recruitment on a zonal basis. An Auxiliary Territorial Army was created in 1953 as an experimental measure to give elementary military training to 500,000 people over a five-year basis. It was abolished, however, by decision of the Central Advisory Committee for the TA at its meeting in New Delhi on 13 November 1954 and replaced by the National Volunteer Force (subsequently renamed Lok Sahayak Sena) on 1st May 1955. The LSS is open to all able-bodied males between the ages of 18 and 40 years of age with the exception of ex-servicemen and NCC cadets and aims at inculcating civilians with a sense of discipline by means of a short course of elementary military training.

13 H.M. Patel, "Balance of Hopes and Fears: A Review of the Past Five Years", USI Journal, 83: 352:353 (July-October 1953), p. 145. Mr Patel was Secretary of the Defence Ministry during the period 1948-53.

14 During a visit to Ottawa in May 1949, at the head of an Indian military mission, Patel was reported as stating on 10 May that he was 'profoundly impressed' by the Canadian military system of a light defence force designed for rapid expansion in a crisis and that India would 'probably' adopt this system. Cited, Hindu, 12 May 1949.

15 CAD, pt 2, vol. 1, p. 24.

16 India's contribution to the United Nations' force consisted of the 60th Field Ambulance (Paratroop) which landed in Korea on 20 November 1950.

17 The Statesman, 13 October 1950. According to the report, the Government was considering a proposal to progressively reduce defence expenditure on the revenue side to Rs 165 crores (1951-52), Rs 160 crores (1952-53) and to a 'stable' figure of Rs 140 crores (1953-54 and thereafter). It was also proposed to fix capital outlay at about Rs 35 crores per annum.

18 Cited, New York Times, 18 November 1950.

19 Ibid, 22 December 1950.

20 CAD, pt 2, vol. 9, cols 5110-11.

21 See Nehru's statement in Parliament. Cited, The Times, 25 July 1951. Speaking during the defence debate on 16 April 1958, Defence Minister Menon also claimed that further demobilization was not implemented due to lack of reciprocal action (by Pakistan) and he charged that 'the response was in reverse ratio'. LSD, pt 2, vol. 15, cols 10,257-8.

22 Statement cited in Hindu Weekly Review, 9 September 1963.

23 Cited, Hindu, 4 January 1951. See also The Statesman, 11 January 1951.

24 These forces, which were maintained by the Princely States, totalled perhaps 35,000 personnel at this time (v. 60,000 in August 1947) and, with some exceptions, were not designed, trained, organized or equipped to participate in military operations. With the exception of the 61st cavalry regiment, formed in 1954 from the Gwalior Lancers, Mysore Lancers, Jodhpur Sardar Risala and Jaipur Horse, all personnel from the States Forces appear to have either been demobilized or absorbed into existing regular formations following the assumption by the Central Government on 1st April 1950 of complete financial responsibility and overall control of the Indian States Forces.

25 Deputy Defence Minister S.S. Majithia, LSD, pt 1, vol. 1, 10 March 1953, col. 897. During the period 15 August 1947 and 31 January 1953, 1507 Indian officers were released. Deputy Defence Minister Satish Chanda, LSD, pt 1, vol. 2, 4 April 1953, col. 1745.

26 See appendix II.

- 27 It must be noted that these formations were still in the process of consolidation to a substantial degree and varied considerably in operational effectiveness.
- 28 India started reinforcing her garrison in Kashmir in June 1951 and probably continued to augment these forces for some time thereafter.
- 29 See appendix II.
- 30 Times of India, 25 October 1959.
- 31 Hindu, 2 November 1959.
- 32 The Round Table, No. 211 (June 1963), p. 216.
- 33 Hindu, 5 November 1959. According to the report, plans envisaged the immediate establishment of an Army Command in each of the Kameng, Subansiri and Siang Divisions, with another to be set up in the Tirap Division in another month's time - i.e. December.
- 34 Times of India, 2 November 1959.
- 35 Ibid.
- 36 Skilled and unskilled personnel were recruited in 'sizeable numbers' for the Assam Rifles, Border Security Forces and the General Reserve Engineer Force in 1960-61. Ministry of Defence, Report, 1960-61, p. 4.
- 37 New York Times, 9 January 1960.
- 38 The information relating to all contingency planning was obtained from a high-ranking Indian military source. Nehru told a Delhi public meeting on 11 November 1962 that Indian military plans prepared in 1960 against the possibility of Chinese attacks along the northern borders provided for initial withdrawals in recognition of logistical factors, with resistance to be stiffened to weaken the Chinese attack before Indian forces launched the decisive counter-attack. See The Times, 12 November 1962.
- 39 The last comprehensive assessment of the Army's equipment needs made up to October 1962 is understood to have been drawn up by Army HQ in 1957-58 and to have been submitted to the Defence Ministry at that time. The proposals envisaged an

outlay of Rs 500 crores and comprised, in order of priority: a) replacement of the .303 rifle with a semi-automatic; b) replacement of the 4.2-inch mortar, possibly by the Brandt; c) re-equipment of the tank units with a universal light/medium model; d) replacement of the 25-pounder field piece; e) acquisition of more mountain guns; and, f) replacement of the vehicle fleet.

40 LSD, 5th Sess., vol. 19, 22 August 1963, col. 2215.

41 Cited, Hindu Weekly Review, 9 September 1963.

42 For further details, see chapter VIII.

43 The AMX was rejected as the basis of a possible universal tank partly as it lacked the extra seat desired by the armoured corps. The German model was 39 tons, armed with a British 105 mm. gun and capable of a maximum speed of 37 mph; it had been developed on the basis of experience gained by the German Army in Russia in World War II for the NATO competition. It evoked keen interest in India but the Germans remained secretive about it pending the NATO decision and only responded to Indian enquiries after the Chieftain design had been decided upon.

44 These purchases coincided with the tenure of Krishna Menon as High Commissioner in London and were characterized by financial irregularities which were to persist as a choice political item for over a decade. For some comments, see Welles Hangen, After Nehru, Who? (London, Rupert Hart-Davis, 1963), pp. 75-6.

45 Ministry of Defence, Report, 1963-64, p. 37.

46 Menon stated in the Lok Sabha on 9 April 1960 that 20,000 'junk' vehicles were being reconditioned by Army engineers. LSD, 2nd Sess., vol. 42, col. 10,813. Speaking in the Lok Sabha on 5 December 1958, he explained that the Ministry's attempts to procure parts through purchase organizations in India and abroad by the normal process of tender had not been successful and had thereby 'seriously' hampered the overhaul programme. After protracted negotiations Messrs Levy Auto Parts of Canada had offered assurances that they could supply almost the entire range of spare parts within on year. LSD, 2nd Sess., vol. 23, cols 3412-14.

47 Ministry of Defence, Report, 1959-60, p. 42.

48 For further details, see chapter VIII.

49 Ministry of Defence, Report, 1963-64, p. 38.

50 The Ishapore is a self-loading, semi-automatic, gas-operated design. The AR-15 is made of aluminium alloys with a butt and handguard of glass fibre, weighs 6 lbs as against 9 lb 9 oz for the FN and its small calibre of .223 is offset to some extent by its greater velocity.

51 Nandan Prasad, op. cit., p. 182.

52 Cited, The Times, 9 April 1946. Those available consisted of 1,000 emergency commissioned officers, 1,000 VCOs, Indian warrant officers and NCOs, 1,100 from the postwar courses then in progress at the Academy and 3,000 prewar British and Indian regular officers. Writing in November 1946, another British officer expressed the view that the lack of suitable officer recruits in the required numbers, and the regional disparity of interest, were due to leadership qualities in India being very definitely limited to certain classes and education to others with few combining both talents; to unattractive pay; and to the disinclination of Moslems and Hindus to risk service under members of the opposing community in a situation in which official policy was that officers must be interchangeable throughout the Army. Lt. General H.G. Martin, "India's Army in the New Era", The Daily Telegraph, 20 November 1946.

53 Defence Minister Singh, CAD, vol. 1, 3 February 1948, p. 164.

54 See ibid, vol. 2, p. 1585. Defence Minister Singh stated in New Delhi on 22 December 1947 that the Army might ask for the loan of American officers to serve as technical instructors in training schools if sufficient British personnel did not offer to remain with the Army after 1st April 1948. Cited, New York Times, 23 December 1947. It was not apparently found necessary to do so.

55 Defence Minister Singh, CAD, vol. 2, 23 February 1948, p. 1079.

56 Minister of Defence Organisation, Mahavir Tyagi. LSD, 25 March 1953, col. 2815. This number consisted of one Lt. General, two Major-Generals, six Brigadiers, four Colonels, 19 Lt. Colonels, 24 Majors and 17 civilians.



57 Ibid. The last major post, that of Engineer-in-Chief, Army HQ, was Indianized in October 1955.

58 Cited, Hindu, 4 April 1949.

59 Ibid.

60 See statement by Defence Minister Gopaldaswami Ayyangar, LSD, pt 1, 11 June 1952, col. 799.

61 Ibid.

62 See statement by Defence Minister Baldev Singh, CAD, pt 1, vol. 2, 23 March 1950, p. 1014.

63 441 officers were re-employed during the period 15 August 1947-March 1953. See statement by Deputy Defence Minister S.S. Majithia, LSD, pt 1, vol. 1, 10 March 1953, col. 897.

64 See statement by Defence Minister Singh, CAD, vol. 2, 4 March 1948, p. 1586.

65 Ten per cent of the annual vacancies for Permanent Regular Commissions were traditionally reserved for Other Ranks in the 21-27 year age group who possessed the matriculation certificate or its equivalent. In 1951, for example, 25 of the 489 commissions granted by the Services were given to ORs. See statement by Defence Minister Gopaldaswami Ayyangar, LSD, pt 1, 28 June 1952, col. 1334. The percentage was allotted on the rough basis of  $7\frac{1}{2}$  per cent to regular Army personnel and  $2\frac{1}{2}$  per cent to members of the Territorial Army.

66 See statement by Defence Minister Menon in the Lok Sabha on 1st June 1962. Cited, Hindu, 2 June 1962.

67 See article by an Indian military correspondent entitled "The Indian Army", The Round Table, No. 211 (June 1963), pp. 217-18.

68 See statement by Defence Minister Menon in the Lok Sabha on 31 May 1962, LSD, 3rd Sess., vol. 4, col. 8075.

69 These schools offer the equivalent of an English public school education for boys wishing to enter the National Defence Academy. The schools established in this period were located in the Punjab, Maharashtra, Rajasthan, Gujarat, West Bengal, Andhra Pradesh, Madras, Kerala, Madya Pradesh and Orissa.

70 See statement by Defence Minister Singh, LAD, vol. 1, 9 February 1948, p. 433.

71 Recruitment in this manner was irrespective of class and caste distinctions.

72 The Brigade was organized in 1949-50 by conversion and re-organization of one battalion from each of the Punjab Regiment, Indian Grenadiers and Rajputana Rifles and their augmentation with volunteers from other units and by fresh recruitment. Modelled on the British unit, the Brigade has the same function - protection of the head of state - and it is customary for the Army Chief-of-Staff to be appointed Colonel of the unit. Height specifications are: 6 feet and over for 1 Battalion, 5'6"-6' for 2 Battalion and 5'3"-5'6" for 3 Battalion, for which Gurkhas of 5' are also eligible.

73 The abilities of the Gurkhas are well known; their retention would appear to be due to various factors: recognition of the importance of remittances from the Gurkha Rifles to the economy of the poverty-stricken areas from which their recruits have been traditionally drawn; the effects on Indo-Nepalese relations of any termination of their services; the substantial link thereby created between India and the strategic Himalayan state; and the neutrality of such a force in Indian national politics and communal disorders. Many of the Gurkhas are domiciled in India, however, and are thus classed as Indian nationals.

74 This unit is recruited from Sikhs, Jats and Rajputs of 6 feet in height and over. It is the senior unit in the Army and, while it is the only ceremonial unit in the Service, it is trained for war.

75 For brief comments on the classes and castes recruited to the Army, see Brigadier Rajendra Singh, History of the Indian Army (SAS, Army Educational Stores, New Delhi, 1963), pp. 257-83.

76 Brigadier B.S. Bhagat, "Reorganisation of Defence Services", USI Journal, 89:375 (April-June 1959), p. 172. For similar criticism of the disproportionate 'tail' of the Army, see Major-General E. Habibullah, "Facing Facts", Seminar (July 1962).

77 See Brigadier B.S. Bhagat, Gold Medal Essay 1951, USI Journal, 82:346,347 (January-April 1952), pp. 17-19. He

proposed that, as an interim measure pending development of indigenous capacity adequate to meet the needs of a modern army, one part of the Army could remain equipped in the 'lavish' Western style while the other part was equipped with material procurable from local sources.

78 See Lt. Colonel D.K. Palit, "The Military Lessons of the Korean War", USI Journal, 82:348,349 (July-October 1952), pp. 157-74; Palit, "Manpower and Modern Arms", ibid, 84:355 (April 1954), pp. 138-55.

79 Brigadier G.I.S. Kullar, "A Glance at our Infantry", ibid, 90:379 (April-June 1960), pp. 116-24.

80 Kullar, "A Militia Versus A Standing Army", ibid, 85:358 (January 1955), pp. 44-54.

81 Lt. Colonel A. Green, "The Case for a Himalayan Division", ibid, 78:327 (April 1947), pp. 324-6. He felt that for too long there had been subscription to the platitudes of 'India's impenetrable northern mountain barriers' which were no longer valid. The terrain of the northern frontier was such as to justify, in his opinion, the formation of a specialized mountain division. In conclusion, he warned: 'A military power of the magnitude of the future India with a Northern Frontier impinging on major Powers, cannot afford to be without a Himalayan Division...' (p. 326).

82 In appreciation of the political aspect, Army HQ had proposed to keep the existence of the pamphlet a tightly guarded secret and to issue it only when, as in 1959, there was no danger of compromising the Government's political and diplomatic objectives. This information was obtained from a high-ranking Indian military source.

83 For the background to the Thimayya-Menon rift in 1959 see Chapter IX.

84 The visit followed the conclusion of the annual CIGS conference in London, General Thimayya being accompanied by Lt. General J.N. Chaudhuri who was then GOC, Southern Command.

85 The belief that Himalayan operations would remain at the level of patrol clashes was even widespread in the officer cadre of the Army and was reflected in the disinterest with which many officers are understood to have viewed the courses on jungle and guerilla tactics.

86 See, for example, Major M.L. Tuli, "Reorganisation of an Infantry Battalion", USI Journal, 92:386 (January-March 1962), pp. 33-9; Lt. Colonel M.R.P. Varma, "The Himalayan Frontier Force", ibid, pp. 12-17; General K.S. Thimayya, "Adequate insurance", Seminar (July 1962), pp. 13-15. General K.M. Cariappa, cited in Times of India, 20 November 1961.

87 As of February 1960 there were also 450,000 police. Hindu, 9 February 1960.

88 Ministry of Defence, Report, 1963-64, p. 40.

89 Ibid, 1959-60, p. 8.

90 Ibid, 1960-61, p. 1. The duration of the camps in border areas was increased to 60 days, as against 30 days for other areas.

91 Ibid.

92 Ibid, 1961-62, p. 19. A further 43,518 were 'trained' in 1962-63. Ibid, 1963-64, p. 42.

93 This scheme was devised to provide military training for an estimated 250,000 college students over 16 years of age by 31 March 1963.

94 This organization was designed to provide military training for boys and girls in schools and colleges who could not join the NCC.

95 Ministry for Defence, Report, 1961-62, p. 53. The total strength of the cadet corps by 1st January 1963 was 31,291 teachers and 2,247,893 students. See ibid, 1962-63, p. 36.

96 The diversity of the Army's composition is evidenced by the publication of the enlisted men's newspaper, the Sainik Samachar, in nine languages - English, Hindi, Marathi, Gorkhali, Urdu, Roman-Hindi, Punjabi, Tamil and Telegu.

97 1,000 Hindi words of command had been composed and adopted and all officers are required to pass an exam in Hindi.

98 From 1st July 1955, all toasts in armed forces' messes in India have been given in non-alcoholic drinks.

99 Ministry of Defence, Report, 1963-64, p. 37. Many of the vehicles acquired before 1948 were, of course, of prewar or wartime manufacture.

Sialkot

100 Pakistan's army was largely deployed in the Lahore-Sialkot-Rawalpindi-Peshawar area with a small body of troops in each of the Quetta and Karachi areas and in East Pakistan. It comprised about 225,000 men organized in six infantry divisions (one of which was in East Bengal), two independent infantry brigades, one paratroop brigade, one armoured division and one independent armoured brigade. There was also a militia of 250,000 and 25-30,000 Azad (Free) Kashmir troops.

101 General K.S. Thimayya, "Chinese Aggression and After", International Studies, 5:1,2 (July-October 1963), p. 50. With the exception of a few manned in company strength, the posts contained a platoon or even less. In the Lok Sabha on 28 November 1961, Nehru stated that the 'about half dozen' military posts established in Ladakh since 1959 contained 40-50 men each and that each post required another 1,000 men to maintain it. Cited, Hindu, 29 November 1961. Speaking in the Lok Sabha on 25 January 1963, the Prime Minister declared: 'You will see that it is difficult to explain what a post is, because a post is either a fairly strong fortified post or just a half dozen men sitting there with a flag, more to prevent others from capturing that place than for anything else. It is not a sign of strength, but a sign of visible sovereignty of a nation'. LSD, 3rd Sess., vol. 12, col. 6545.

102 The road permits of two-way traffic from Srinagar to the Sonamarg transit camp from whence it proceeds onwards as a single-lane artery via 11,000 feet high Zoji La, Dras and Kargil to Leh - a 300-mile journey traversable only five months of the year by vehicle, during which period it takes truck/jeep convoys three days and nights to cover the route. The Leh to Chushul road proceeds via Chang La and, at an elevation of 18,000 feet, is probably the highest vehicular route in the world.

103 Times of India, 19 June 1961.

104 Stephen Barber reported in The Daily Telegraph on 20 November 1962 that Indian officers had told him weeks before the operation was actually launched that Goa 'could be taken by telephone'.

105 For some comments on the operation, see ibid; Frank Moraes, Indian Express, 7 May 1962.

## CHAPTER VI

### THE INDIAN AIR FORCE 1947-1962

India retained at partition roughly two-thirds of the Royal Indian Air Force. This comprised seven fighter squadrons equipped with Tempest 2s and Spitfires, one transport/communication squadron of Douglas C-47s and de Havilland Devons, one artillery observation post flight of Auster 5s and miscellaneous Tiger Moth, Percival Prentice and Spitfire training aircraft. Most of the prewar training establishments and permanent air force stations went to Pakistan by virtue of their location within the territory embraced by West Pakistan<sup>1</sup>. The development of the Service had necessarily to be a phased and expensive undertaking and its size and composition were dependent upon the strategic role assigned it by the Government.

Partition and the altered strategic requirements consequent on the existence of less than cordial relations with Pakistan does not appear to have altered New Delhi's conception of the type and size of the air force required by the Union. The Indian Defence Minister, Baldev Singh, informed

Parliament in early 1949 that it was the Government's intention to create a balanced air force of 20 squadrons by 1960<sup>2</sup>. This programme involved, as the initial phase, the organization of the units retained at partition into one jet fighter and six reciprocal-engine squadrons, a photo/reconnaissance and two observation units, and the expansion of training, maintenance and administrative facilities. Phase two involved the re-equipment and expansion of the Service up to the force-level decided upon by the Government<sup>3</sup>.

One hundred Spitfire and Tempest fighter aircraft - 33 constituting India's share of the old RIAF and 67 representing purchases from surplus British stock<sup>4</sup> - were shifted from Royal Air Force bases at Karachi to Bombay in the spring of 1948<sup>5</sup>. Three Vampire F.3 fighters were obtained in late 1948, 52 Vampire F.B.9s and N.F.54s in 1949-50<sup>6</sup> and 71 Dassault MD-450 Ouragan fighter-bombers in 1953-54<sup>7</sup>. Several heavy bomber and reconnaissance units were formed from about 40 B-24J 'Liberator' heavy bomber aircraft reconstituted by Hindustan Aircraft Limited (HAL) from World War II salvage yards at Kanpur<sup>8</sup>. The C-47 (viz. DC-3) transport/communication unit was expanded to perhaps 40 aircraft shortly after partition, a number of de Havilland Devon light transports were purchased in 1948-49 and, in 1953-54, the transport arm of the Air Force was augmented further through

purchase of 26 Fairchild C-119G short- and medium-range transports<sup>9</sup> and six Sikorsky S-55 twelve-seat utility helicopters.

Simultaneous with the acquisition of new aircraft, training establishments were set up to replace the facilities of the old RIAF which had been located within the boundaries of the new state of Pakistan. A Staff College was opened at Ootacamund in May 1949. No. 1 Flying School, initially sited at Ambala, was moved to Hyderabad and equipped with Tiger Moths and Prentices, and No. 2 Flying School was set up at Jodhpur equipped with Prentices and Harvards. Colleges were organized at Jodhpur, Begumpet and Coimbatore for the training of navigators, signallers and ground officers. The Prentice was selected in 1948 as the interim trainer pending the availability of the Hindustan HT-2 primary trainer then undergoing development at HAL and 62 units were received from a production scheme at HAL during the period from 1948 to 1953.

Indianization of the Service proceeded within the limitations imposed by the need to maintain efficiency and the acute shortage in the immediate post-partition period of officers - which in March 1949 amounted to 207 general duties branch, 68 technical, 27 equipment, 42 education, two legal, eleven medical and 33 accounts<sup>10</sup>. To alleviate the



shortage, civilians were recruited to the general duties branch, senior NCOs possessing the requisite qualifications and experience were commissioned and British personnel were retained in key posts for which qualified Indians were not immediately available. By March 1953, however, only nine officers and 54 civilians of British nationality remained in the Indian Air Force<sup>11</sup> and the top post of Chief of Air Staff was assumed by Air Marshal Sobrito Mukerjee in April 1954. The Service continued to experience difficulties, however, in attracting suitable recruits and the problem was further aggravated by the introduction by various States of local languages as the medium of instruction in preference to English - the knowledge of which was important in such a highly technical Service<sup>12</sup>.

The appointment of Air Marshal Mukerjee coincided with the general completion of the first phase of the Air Force programme. The implementation of stage two involved the re-equipment of the existing units and the phased expansion of frontline operational strength to the target of 20 squadrons envisaged as early as 1946 - and confirmed in 1949 - with such adjustments, if any, that might be regarded as warranted by the regional strategic situation and advances in aircraft and weapons technology.

The IAF appears to have been initially interested in procuring 80 Dassault Mystere IVA sweptwing interceptors with the manufacture under licence of the Folland Gnat lightweight fighter-bomber as a possible alternative; it was believed, however, that the Ouragans in service with the IAF gave the Mystere the edge in future orders<sup>13</sup>. In the event, the Government purchased another 33 Ouragans<sup>14</sup> and decided to proceed with both the Mystere and Gnat projects simultaneously. One hundred and ten Mysteres were ordered as replacements for the Ouragans<sup>15</sup> and negotiations commenced with Folland Aircraft for a licence to produce the Gnat in India. Discussions appeared to be nearing completion in February 1956, at which time it was reported that an Indian mission would shortly proceed to Britain to conclude an agreement for about 60 aircraft - of which three-quarters would be built in India<sup>16</sup>. India's hesitation to sign a firm order over the summer provoked speculation that Russia had made an attractive offer of MIGs, but in September the Indian Government contracted for 20 'whole' Gnats, 20 sets of components for assembly in India and the licensed manufacture of 100 units by HAL at Bangalore<sup>17</sup>. Even as the first Mysteres and further Ouragans were arriving<sup>18</sup> and the Gnat project was getting underway, India placed an order for 160 Hawker Hunter Mk 56 FGAs and 22 Mk 66 two-seat trainers<sup>19</sup>.

Negotiations with Britain for the English Electric Canberra as a replacement for the obsolete B-24J 'Liberator' in the bomber and reconnaissance units began in 1954 and continued through 1956. Although Russia reportedly offered the Ilyushin-28 bomber (which is roughly comparable to the Canberra) at one-quarter to one-half the market price of the latter<sup>20</sup>, the Indian Government decided in principle on 1st April 1956 to obtain the Canberra<sup>21</sup>. The number of aircraft desired by India was initially believed to total about 40 but, in January 1957, the Government placed an order for 54 B(1).58 light bombers, eight P.R.57 photo/reconnaissance aircraft and six T.4 dual-control trainers<sup>22</sup>. A supplementary order for twelve more B(1).58s was placed in September 1957<sup>23</sup> and it is understood from a reliable source that a further 20-30 Canberras of all types were ordered in 1961, with deliveries of this latter order continuing through 1962<sup>24</sup>.

The transport capacity of the Air Force was substantially increased during the 1955-62 period. Twenty-six de Havilland DHC-3 Otter utility transports were purchased in 1956 to augment and replace the Devons, and four Bell 47G-2 three-seat utility helicopters were acquired in 1957. Two Vickers Viscount 730 commercial transports were obtained for VIP use in 1955-56 (one of which represented a British gift

to the Indian President) and the Soviet Union presented India with two Ilyushin Il-14 commercial transport aircraft at about the same time - one of which represented a gift for Nehru. Both the Viscounts and the Ilyushins are believed to have been tested by the IAF in order that their respective suitabilities for military use could be assessed, but neither was regarded as a satisfactory replacement for the aging DC-3s. By early 1959, the Avro-748 had been selected as the DC-3 replacement. Although the managing director of Hawker Siddeley, Sir Roy Dobson, stated publicly in early May that India was expected to order a 'considerable number' of Avro-748s<sup>25</sup>, an agreement signed in Delhi on 7 July 1959 provided only for the licensed production of the Avro-748 in India.

The Army's commitment to Himalayan security operations in late 1959 caused the Defence Ministry, in November 1959, to initiate a search for helicopters and transport aircraft capable of high altitude operations<sup>26</sup>. Six companies quickly entered bids, which involved the Bell 204 Iroquois, Sikorsky S-62, Kaman H-43B, Westland Wessex, Saunders-Roe P.531 and Sud Aviation's Alouette II and III<sup>27</sup> - with Sikorsky, who demonstrated the S-62 in New Delhi in December 1959, seemingly having the initial edge. In May 1960 India was reportedly examining a Sikorsky proposal to build the S-62 in India<sup>28</sup>

and an Indian technical delegation visited the Sikorsky plant in June during the course of a United States tour in which a further 29 C-119G transport aircraft were purchased<sup>29</sup>. The placing of an order for two S-62s in August appeared to pre-  
sage a larger order with provision for licensed production in India<sup>30</sup> but India subsequently obtained from American sources only six S-62s and six Bell 47G-3 units in mid-1961<sup>31</sup> and six further Bell 47G-3s in August 1962<sup>32</sup>. For the greater portion of its increased transport requirements, New Delhi turned to the Soviet Union which had reportedly offered the Mi-4 helicopter on attractive terms<sup>33</sup>. An eight-man Indian mission led by the Scientific Adviser to the Defence Ministry, Dr D.S. Kothari, visited Moscow in October 1960 for discussions regarding the possible purchase of Soviet transport aircraft, helicopters and road-building equipment and negotiated the purchase of ten Mi-4 'Hound' general purpose/transport helicopters, 24 Il-14 transports and eight Antonov An-12 heavy air freighters<sup>34</sup>. A further order for eight An-12s and 16 Mi-4s was placed in early 1962<sup>35</sup> despite reported Indian dissatisfaction with the performance of the Soviet aircraft at the high Himalayan altitudes<sup>36</sup>. To conserve foreign exchange, the Defence Ministry also purchased a number of aircraft (probably DC-3s) from Indian civil and private sources<sup>37</sup>.

At about the same time as the Government was engaged in augmenting its transport capacity, it was reportedly making enquiries of the availability of air-to-air missiles from American sources<sup>38</sup>. The Defence Mission which Defence Secretary O. Pulla Reddy led to the United States in June 1960 reportedly discussed with American officials the possibility of obtaining Sidewinder air-to-air missiles for the IAF's subsonic fighter arm, but their request was evidently refused<sup>39</sup>. A similar request was reportedly made again in 1961 with the same result<sup>40</sup>, and three separate requests to the State Department for permission to obtain detailed data on the Hughes HM-55 air-to-air missile system were apparently rejected on each occasion<sup>41</sup>. Mr Nehru's claim in the Rajya Sabha on 23 August 1961 that India could have 'easily' bought some guided missiles from America, Britain or Russia but preferred to develop her own would, therefore, appear to be as misleading as another claim made by him on the same occasion - that India was reaching the stage where she could produce such missiles in abundance - was premature<sup>42</sup>.

In any case, by early 1962 the HF-24 project continued to make only slow progress as the search continued for a suitable engine to power the Mk 2 (supersonic) version. At some point in the early spring of 1962, the Indian Government accepted the view - which the IAF must have been putting

forward for some time previously - that several squadrons must be re-equipped as quickly as practicable with a world-class supersonic fighter comparable to the Lockheed F-104 Starfighter in service with a number of Western air forces and Pakistan - the latter having obtained twelve of these aircraft in 1961-62. In May 1962, several Indian newspapers reported that the Government was interested in the Soviet MIG-21 fighter. The Indian Express stated on 8 May that India was to buy two squadrons of MIGs and cited 'defence experts' as believing that India was also likely to buy guided missiles and radar equipment for the MIGs from Russia. The Times of India had reported several days earlier that the Defence Ministry had negotiated for the purchase of two squadrons of MIG-21s and their licenced production eventually<sup>43</sup>. A correspondent of yet another Indian daily denied in an article published on 9 May that any agreement for MIGs had yet been signed and suggested that, as India's interest was in the production of a supersonic fighter under licence, 'Immediate orders may be placed for about two squadrons as an inducement with that country which would satisfactorily fulfill, [India's stated requirements as regards, price, etc.]<sup>44</sup>.

The reports provoked immediate reactions in the United States where Congress happened to be engaged in discussion

of the Administration's request for economic aid to India. On 11 May, the United States Foreign Relations Committee voted 8-7 to cut aid to India by some 25 per cent (i.e. over \$ 200 million) for the fiscal year beginning 1st July. This action was rescinded by a 9-7 vote of the Senate Committee which, however, rejected the proposed \$ 90 million rise in the fiscal 1963 funds requested by the Administration. In its turn, the House of Representatives Committee over-ruled the Senate action on the proposed increase and voted an \$ 88 million increase in aid to India in fiscal 1963<sup>45</sup>.

Following the appearance of the first press reports concerning its interest in the MIG - reports which were probably inspired - the Government maintained a discreet silence for reasons that were clearly not unrelated to Congressional discussion of economic aid to India. Nehru left for a Kashmir vacation on 16 May without comment on the MIG issue while Menon's only remark to newsmen after seeing the Prime Minister off was to declare that India had the right to purchase arms wherever she wished<sup>46</sup>. With the passage of the aid bill through the United States Congress, Indian political leaders became more ready to offer opinions regarding the relative merits of the MIG. Menon admitted publicly, for the first time, during the debate on the defence demands in Parliament on 23 May that the Government was indeed



weighing the purchase of Soviet jet aircraft and he listed price, ease of maintenance, etc. as advantages which the MIG possessed over comparable Western types<sup>47</sup>. At a press conference on 13 June, Nehru expressed the view that he was leaning towards acceptance of the Soviet 'offer' for reason that MIGs were most suited to India's needs<sup>48</sup> but he admitted in the Rajya Sabha on 20 June that Russia had actually made no 'formal offer' to supply MIGs and that his Government had only stated its 'intention' to obtain them<sup>49</sup>.

While the attitude of the Government remained ambiguous and seemingly aimed largely at convincing the public that their political leadership would assert its independence of judgement, considerable concern was aroused in British and American official circles at the possibility of India acquiring Soviet military aircraft. Prime Minister Macmillan and President Kennedy reportedly undertook urgent bilateral consultations involving an attractive counter-offer to India of British or French jets<sup>50</sup>. The British Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations, Duncan Sandys, flew to New Delhi on 15 June and held talks with Nehru and Menon over a period of three days during which time 'diplomatic sources' revealed that Nehru had assured Sandys that India would consult Britain and the United States before making any decision on the purchase of MIGs<sup>51</sup>. Sandys announced on 19 June that

Britain would make 'precise proposals' to counter the MIG offer<sup>52</sup> which, according to one press source, was believed to involve provision of the Lightning at a unit cost of \$ 750,000 (about one-half the market price) and a willingness to discuss the production of the model under licence in India<sup>53</sup>. Another report stated that the British had offered one squadron of Lightnings (i.e. twelve aircraft) to India but on the condition that the Royal Air Force immediately receive an equivalent number of F-104s from the United States<sup>54</sup>.

'Informed sources' reported the Defence Ministry as 'inclined' to shelve the MIG deal indefinitely or at least until Britain's counter-proposals could be evaluated<sup>55</sup> and a three-man mission led by Air Vice-Marshal Harjinder Singh, AOC Maintenance Command, left for Britain on 7 July ostensibly to evaluate the Lightning. Simultaneously, the Indian Government reportedly made an exploratory approach to the U.S. State Department for McDonnell F-101 'Voodoos'<sup>56</sup> and enquired of the Dassault Company concerning possible purchase of about 50 Mirage IIIs<sup>57</sup>. Nothing was to eventuate from Western sources to the satisfaction of New Delhi, however, and an Indian evaluation team led by Dr S. Bhagavantam, Scientific Adviser to the Defence Ministry, left for Moscow on 31 July to discuss the possible purchase of two squadrons

(24 planes) of operational MIG-21s, their production under licence in India, and the purchase of air-to-air missiles to arm them<sup>58</sup>. An agreement was subsequently concluded in August which provided for Indian purchase of twelve MIG-21s and for Soviet technical assistance in the establishment of production facilities for this model in India<sup>59</sup>.

On the eve of the border conflict with Communist China in October 1962, the Indian Air Force constituted the largest and most effective national air force in the Indian Ocean region. As nearly as the writer has been able to ascertain, the IAF comprised about 30,000 regular personnel and about 400 frontline and 600 reserve, training and miscellaneous aircraft<sup>60</sup> organized in 25 regular and seven reserve squadrons<sup>61</sup>.

The composition of the regular Service was thus:-

- a) fighters - four squadrons of Dassault Mystere IVAs, two squadrons of Folland Gnat Mk Is.
- b) fighter/bombers - six squadrons of Hawker Hunter Mk 56 FGAs, two squadrons of Ouragans, one squadron of de Havilland Vampire F.B. 9s.
- c) light bomber - three-four squadrons of English Electric Canberra B(1).58s.
- d) reconnaissance - one squadron of Canberra P.R.57s.
- e) transports - six squadrons comprised of Fairchild C-119Gs,

Douglas DC-3s (C-47s), de Havilland Devons,  
Ilyushin Il-14s, de Havilland DHC-3 Otters,  
Antonov An-12s.

- f) helicopters - about 60 units comprised of Bell 47G-2s and 47G-3s, Sikorsky S-55s and S-62s. Mi-4s.
- g) trainers - Hawker Hunter Mk 66s, English Electric Canberra T.4s, de Havilland Vampire T.55s, North American T-6G Texans, Hindustan HT-2s, Dassault Ouragans, Douglas DC-3s, Percival Prentice T.3s.
- h) air observation post - Auster A.O.P. Mk 9s.
- i) miscellaneous - Convair B-24 Js, Vickers Viscount 730, Harvards.

The IAF was organized in four commands. The two operational commands were Western Air Command based at Palam (New Delhi) and Eastern Air Command, formed at Calcutta in 1960 to meet the growing commitments of the IAF for air defence and support operations in the areas bordering China, Burma and East Pakistan. Maintenance Command, which had been formed on 26 January 1955, was located at Kanpur and was responsible, among its duties, for the Avro-748 project. Training Command comprised the Air Force Flying College at Jodhpur, the two Flying Training Wings at Hyderabad and the various training colleges. In addition to the Auxiliary Air Force, the reserve included the Air Defence Reserve,

consisting of technical and flying personnel associated with aviation, and the Regular Reserve of IAF personnel who had either retired or been released from the regular Service.

The development of the Service had been affected less by financial stringency than was the case with the Army and Navy. The first phase of the programme conceived at independence was implemented within the limitations imposed by the availability of trained personnel and suitable aircraft rather than money<sup>62</sup>. The re-equipment and expansion comprising stage two began uneventfully with the placing of the orders for Canberras, Gnats and Mysteres. The Hunter purchase and the supplementary orders for further Ouragans and Canberras, however, represented an expansion in the bomber and fighter-bomber formations which does not appear to have been envisaged in the original scheme<sup>63</sup>. As the Hunter purchase followed upon reports of Pakistan's impending receipt of North American F-86F Sabre day fighters from the United States, leading Indian newspapers were inclined to view the order as directly attributable to American provision of the Sabres to Pakistan<sup>64</sup> or as 'largely' reflecting official anxieties regarding Pakistan's intentions<sup>65</sup>.

The actual motivations leading to the expansion of the bomber and fighter formations would seem to have been several. It is understood that the initiative for the

Hunter order came from Defence Minister Menon and was not even referred to the Chiefs of Staff Committee. The Army and Navy were of the view that Pakistan's receipt of the Sabres did not warrant a further and unplanned allocation of scarce foreign exchange for the IAF, and the Finance Minister argued against the purchase on financial grounds. In the circumstances, Menon's motives was apparently related to the political advantages to be gained by countering Pakistan's increased capabilities in a sphere where information about developments was readily available to the general public. Nehru's reasons for sanctioning a further drain on foreign exchange reserves depleted by other aircraft and tank purchases are less clear. He was certainly not insensitive to the public mood which was easily alarmed by any strengthening of the power of the 'historical ghost' - Moslem Pakistan - and he may have viewed the Hunters as necessary reassurance to the Indian people of the Government's determination to protect the country. He may also, however, have had an eye to the deteriorating regional situation (trouble in Laos, instability in Burma, strife in Viet Nam and Chinese policies in Tibet) and felt it prudent to strengthen the ultimate sanction behind Indian diplomacy - her armed forces. Public emphasis upon this factor may have raised doubts internally and externally as to the Government's sincerity about panch

sheel and its persistent criticism of power diplomacy and the arms race. It was expedient, therefore, for Nehru to leave the Indian public to arrive at its own conclusions - i.e. Pakistan.

The subsequent orders for more Ouragans and Canberras would also seem to be explainable on these more general grounds with the added aspect regarding the Ouragans that they were probably obtained at extremely favourable prices due to their virtual obsolescence in the more sophisticated European operational theatres. It was reported at the time that the IAF felt that an even larger bomber force was required if India was to possess 'secure superiority' over Pakistan<sup>66</sup> and the possibility of Pakistan acquiring American B-57 (Canberra) bombers<sup>67</sup> undoubtedly strengthened the Service's argument with Cabinet. The factor of national prestige, however, must not be overlooked and New Delhi placed far greater reliance upon at least the image of strong military forces than it was prepared to publicly concede.

The inter-play of prestige and prudence, particularly in view of Chinese policies in the Himalayan region and South-East Asia, is also apparent with regard to the order for Canberras placed in 1961 and the almost frantic search for supersonic fighter aircraft in the spring of 1962. The 'sudden' interest in several squadrons of supersonic fighters

in the spring of 1962 followed upon Pakistan's receipt of twelve F-104 supersonic fighters and was generally regarded at the time as a direct reaction to that issue and was publicly explained as such by official spokesmen.

For political considerations, upon which the Air Force must have played, the Government may have been disinclined to concede superiority to Pakistan in such a prestigious weapons system<sup>68</sup>. However, at the same time it must also have recognized that 'the preponderant strength of India, industrially as well as militarily, would outweigh Pakistani superiority in any single weapon if it came to the issue'<sup>69</sup>. More important motivation for the MIG agreement would seem to lie with the continued delays in the proposed re-equipment of the fighter arm with the HF-24 and the rapidly worsening situation along the long frontier with China. Continued reliance upon the HF-24 to re-equip the Air Force would have entailed the maintenance of an increasingly obsolescent fighter arm for at least two years, with serious doubts as to whether the Hf-24 project would come to fruition at all and whether the model would be world-class if it did reach the production stage. New Delhi was well aware of the numerous intrusions into Indian air space in the Himalayas by Chinese aircraft<sup>70</sup> and, viewed against this background, the desired purchase of some operational world-class fighters



and their ultimate production in India suggests a desire to maintain an efficient and effective fighter arm against any contingency that might arise. While China did not at that time possess operational aircraft faster than the MIG-19 (maximum speed 900 mph), Indian officials were probably concerned that only marked superior aircraft would suffice to offset the quantitative superiority of the Chinese People's Armed Forces Air Forces (CPAFAF).

The purchases of transport aircraft and helicopters from 1960 onwards was directly related to the commitment of the IAF to supply Army troops deployed in Ladakh and NEFA - a contingency for which the IAF was not prepared<sup>71</sup>. As the C-47s were not suitable for operations at Himalayan altitudes, the Indian Government was forced to procure such an additional capacity as was deemed necessary. Even then, however, no provision had been made for possible large-scale operational commitments in NEFA; the C-119s, An-12s and various helicopters - particularly the Mi-4s - were acquired for, and primarily committed to, supply operations in Ladakh.

The IAF as of October 1962 possessed an extraordinary complexity of aircraft - some 30 types of British, French, Russian, American, Canadian and indigenous manufacture. It is hard to see the reasons for such a policy in a country seriously short of technically-qualified personnel. British

aircraft were generally preferred and were acquired despite the availability of comparable types from other sources. The Ouragan purchase in 1954 only followed an inability to obtain Gloster Meteor F.4 fighters from Britain<sup>72</sup> and apparently Sabre Mk 30s from Australia<sup>73</sup> while Canberras and Mysteres were purchased despite the availability of Soviet MIG-17s and Il-28s at far cheaper prices<sup>74</sup>. The Hunters were acquired despite IAF preference for the Mirage. The Mystere order would seem to have constituted a deliberate decision to ease excessive dependence upon a single source (i.e. Britain) which might not always be able or willing to meet Indian requests for aircraft of a particular type. The disinterest in Soviet aircraft until 1959 probably reflected a technical desire to adhere to Western weapons systems<sup>75</sup> and, perhaps more importantly, to avoid provoking misinterpretations in the West (on whose support India's economic plans were heavily dependent) and particularly the United States (by far the greatest contributor of aid) concerning the political implications of such a deal.

India's purchase of Soviet equipment during the 1959-62 period is partly sustainable on practical grounds: the Mi-4 possessed advantages over the Sikorsky S-62 of capacity, ease of maintenance and price<sup>76</sup> while the An-12 was comparable in performance for Himalayan conditions to any similar

Western aircraft with the probable advantage of price and rupee payment. The decision in favour of the purchase and manufacture under licence of the MIG-21 possessed certain attractions in price, rupee payment and the willingness of the Soviet Union to meet India's request for licence rights and technical aid in establishing the facilities<sup>77</sup> - arrangements which Western manufacturers and governments were apparently not prepared to meet for a variety of financial, political and technical reasons. Technically, however, the MIG possessed no operational advantages over the Lightning, Mirage or F-104; it was essentially a day fighter with a more limited operational radius and less versatility than either of the three Western types and is understood to have provoked little enthusiasm in IAF circles beyond the negative view that, if Western types could not be acquired, the MIG-21 was at least a decided improvement upon the existing aircraft in frontline service with the IAF.

Such factors had been ignored previously, however, with respect to the Il-28s and MIG-17s and MIG-19s and it was no more coincidence that the political interest in Soviet aircraft followed the appearance of a recognizable Chinese threat to India's territorial integrity. In such a context, it must have appeared highly advisable to Indian political leaders to obtain at least symbolic assurance of Russian

friendship with the possibility that such a demonstration would impose a brake upon any hasty action which Peking might otherwise contemplate. Moscow's sale of aircraft and helicopters for obvious employment in the Himalayan region against China thus fulfilled a very useful diplomatic purpose.

The political implications of the MIG deal are less easy to assess as official spokesmen made few references to the need to counter Chinese air power in Tibet<sup>78</sup> and this aspect appears to have gone largely unnoticed by the public and press. Convinced of the need for supersonic aircraft and for indigenous production of such a type under licence, New Delhi appears to have taken up the Soviet offer as the only one that met the desired conditions of price and manufacture<sup>79</sup>. The Government and the Indian public may have felt satisfaction with the conclusion of such a deal as reinforcing non-alignment, exerting an 'independent' line in the face of undisguised Western concern and perhaps indicating resentment at Western support for another United Nations resolution involving the question of a plebiscite in Kashmir.

The general effectiveness of the Indian Air Force in the performance of its assigned responsibilities was compromised in various ways. The multiplicity of aircraft, each with different maintenance schedules, spare requirements and service requirements, necessitated continual retraining of

ground and air crews. Technical and equipment procedures had been largely adopted from other air forces and little effort had been made to devise procedures more in accordance with Indian conditions; little allowance was made for the delays involved in obtaining spares from external sources and in transporting them internally at short notice and in unfavourable weather such as during the monsoon. There was little appreciation of logistics procedures and of the need for detailed and accurate forecasting and records of spares requirements. This Service lethargy was aggravated by Government reluctance to provide funds enabling the stocking of reasonable supplies of spares and was particularly dangerous for an air force equipped with many aircraft (e.g. C-47s, Harvards, Ouragans, Vampires) no longer in service in other countries and for which spares were difficult to obtain. The result was, as one Indian newspaper has observed, that during the border war with China the aircraft base repair depot at Kanpur could not perform its basic function of repair for lack of spare parts; the depot had sufficient foreign exchange for new projects but not for its primary needs of repair<sup>80</sup>.

The operational squadrons were deployed and trained for actions against Pakistan in primarily a tactical role in support of the Indian Army in the Punjab and Kashmir. The

air defence system appears to have been rudimentary in view of the absence of any radar warning system - only the Delhi and Calcutta airports possessed radar of any kind - and reliance would seem to have been placed upon early strikes against the bases of the Pakistan Air Force at Mauripur, Drigh Road, Peshawar, Kohat, Lahore, Risalpur and Sargodha with the aim of delivering a crippling blow to the effectiveness of the PAF<sup>81</sup>. The bulk of the activity of both air forces, however, would probably be closely related to the land battle upon which the outcome of any Indo-Pakistani conflict would depend. The almost 2:1 superiority enjoyed by the IAF over the PAF would have left little doubt as to the outcome of any prolonged clash between the two air forces.

The contingency of war with China on even a limited scale, however, had been almost completely ignored in practice, if not in theory. Defence of the densely populated northern Indian plain and its heavy industries, particularly in the Calcutta area, was non-existent, although China, unlike Pakistan, could not be expected to be deterred from such action for fear of much more destructive reciprocal counter-action<sup>82</sup>. The air squadrons were not deployed to put up any effective defence against an air attack launched from Tibetan bases. The possible employment of the bomber and fighter-bomber units in tactical support of the Army in

NEFA was precluded by the inability of the IAF to deploy and maintain at short notice more than four or five squadrons and by the fact that the Service lacked training in support tactics in the rugged jungle and mountain terrain which characterized the NEFA-Assam theatre. Even transport capacity was fully committed to supply operations in the secondary Ladakh theatre and thus unable to provide appreciable assistance to the forces in NEFA. Against China, the IAF provided no deterrent, had little if any strategic role (in view of the need to avoid any escalation of a military conflict with China from which India could hardly benefit) and was so deployed and trained as to be of marginal value in either a tactical or supply role.

#### Notes

- 1 Pakistan received as her share of the old RIAF Nos 5 and 9 fighter squadrons, No. 6 transport squadron, one air observation post flight, one communication flight, all the pre-war training establishments and permanent stations and the only repair and maintenance workshop - which was located at Drigh Road, Karachi.
- 2 Cited, Flight, 27 January 1949, p. 119.
- 3 Aviation Week (hereinafter referred to as AW), 16 August 1948, p. 36.
- 4 The purchase of surplus British aircraft followed a trip to Britain by the British C-in-C of the Indian Air Force, Air Marshal Sir Roy Elmhirst, in April 1948.

5 AW, 5 April 1948, p. 39. The delivery of 30 Tempests from Pakistan had been delayed by the Pakistan Government in retaliation for India's withholding delivery of Pakistan's allotted share of army stores and equipment. See The Times, 12 January 1948.

6 This purchase resulted from another trip to Britain by Elmhirst in early 1949.

7 See statement by the Minister of Defence Organisation, Mahavir Tyagi, LSD, pt 1, vol. 5-6, 18 November 1953, col. 118. These planes, purchased according to Tyagi at a unit cost of Rs 6.53 lakhs, are understood to have replaced the piston-engined Tempests in three fighter squadrons. Four Ouragans, renamed Toofanis in the IAF, were flown out to India and arrived on 24 October 1953, another lot were being unloaded at the time the Minister spoke and the remainder arrived in 1954.

8 The Indian Government reportedly held Rs 21 crores worth of surplus United States aircraft and equipment left from World War II which it desired to sell because it did not feel India could either afford or utilize such stocks. AW, 26 February 1951, p. 172.

9 The Times, 27 February 1954; 13 March 1954. This order would seem to have followed India's inability to obtain transports from Britain. The Times reported on 30 June 1952, with reference to the order for Sealand amphibians, that other Indian orders were being placed in the United States because British delivery dates were too long. According to Robert Trumbull, India was 'understood' to have followed up the C-119G purchase from Fairchild Engine and Aircraft Corporation with negotiations for purchase of more C-119s through the United States Air Force. New York Times, 5 March 1954. Such negotiations as may have been undertaken were clearly inclusive.

10 Defence Minister Singh, CAD, vol. 2, 4 March 1948, p. 1586.

11 Tyagi, LSD, pt 2, vol. 1, 25 March 1953, col. 2815.

12 See K. Rangaswami in Hindu, 1st April 1962.

13 AW, 4 July 1955, p. 7. Special correspondent Philip Deane had stated in The Scotsman on 16 February 1954, however, that the Ouragans had not given complete satisfaction



to India and that the IAF had 'let it be known' that orders for new types would likely go to Britain if India could get satisfaction on delivery limits and prices. AW also reported (26 July 1954, p. 7) that India had been interested in purchasing 50 Australian-built Sabre Mk 30 fighters but that the Commonwealth Aircraft Corporation had been unable to accept such an order due to its complete commitment to production for the RAAF for 'some years' hence.

14 This order appears to have resulted from the visit to India in February 1954 of the French Air Minister, M. Louis Christians.

15 Aeroplane and Astronautics (5 April 1957, p. 465) refers to 125 units but it is believed that the figure cited is correct.

16 AW, 20 February 1956, p. 23.

17 Aeroplane and Astronautics, 26 October 1961, p. 548a. AW (24 September 1956, p. 31) referred to an order being placed for 25 'whole' Gnats worth \$ 8.4 million. Aeroplane and Astronautics (3 September 1964, p. 74) reported that the scheme involved 25 'whole' units, 15 in component form and parts for a further ten with total production in India to be about 200 units. The purchase made India the first country to place an order for the Gnat and only Finland was subsequently to join her in operational employment of this model. Delivery of the 'whole' units from Britain commenced in April 1957 and was spread over a two-year period.

18 AW (8 April 1957, p. 37) reported that the French aircraft-carrier Dexmunde was then en route to India with 13 Ouragans and the first shipment of 23 Mysteres.

19 Aeroplane and Astronautics (13 September 1957, p. 398) gives the number of units involved as 150 but it is believed that the figures given in the text are correct. Deliveries of the Mk 56 began in October 1957 and of the Mk 66 in 1959.

20 Ibid, 15 February 1957, p. 222.

21 The Times, 2 April 1956.

22 Aeroplane and Astronautics, 13 September 1957, p. 298; ibid, 8 February 1957, p. 190; AW, 18 February 1957, p. 89. The cost of the Canberras was between £ 20-30 million including spares. Deliveries began in the early summer, the aircraft being flown out to India.

- 23 Aeroplane and Astronautics, 13 September 1957, p. 398.
- 24 Information obtained in a confidential interview.
- 25 AW, 11 May 1959, p. 34.
- 26 Ibid, 14 December 1959, p. 23; 15 February 1960, p. 23.
- 27 Stephen Barber, News Chronicle, 3 November 1959; AW, 14 December 1959, p. 23; 15 February 1960, p. 23.
- 28 AW, 23 May 1960, p. 37. Selig Harrison stated in an article published in September 1959 that a visit by General Thimayya to the United States in the fall of 1958 was 'mainly interested in arranging for the design and manufacture of special helicopters for transporting troops to the Himalayan outposts bordering Communist China'. "India, Pakistan and the U.S.", part 3, New Republic, 7 September 1959, p. 14.
- 29 For comments on the C-119 purchase, see New York Times, 11 June 1960. The purchase was made under the provision of the Mutual Security Act which provided that the President of the United States could authorize sales to any country in the interest of peace and security on condition that arms sold in such a manner could be used only for internal security or legitimate self-defence.
- 30 AW, 15 August 1960, p. 23; 26 December 1960, p. 63.
- 31 Ibid, 17 July 1961, p. 23.
- 32 Flight, 30 August 1962, p. 768.
- 33 AW (23 May 1960, p. 37) reported that Russia had proposed an unspecified helicopter to India. The New York Times (11 June 1960) reported that the Indians, while impressed with the S-62, had apparently decided in favour of the Mi-4.
- 34 Aeroplane and Astronautics, 28 October 1960, p. 575; 18 January 1962, p. 57; 15 February 1962, p. 162.
- 35 Ibid, 15 February 1962, p. 162.
- 36 See, for example, AW, 20 February 1961, p. 50; 17 July 1961, p. 23.

- 37 Ministry of Defence, Report, 1961-62, p. 33.
- 38 The enquiries were evidently prompted by the absence in the IAF of a world-class fighter with supersonic capabilities and by expected delays in the availability of the HF-24 from the indigenous project undertaken in 1955; the addition of missiles to the IAF's subsonic fighters would constitute an economic substitute for their lack of supersonic capability.
- 39 See report on the Reddy mission in New York Times, 11 June 1960.
- 40 George Wilson, AW, 5 November 1962, p. 26.
- 41 George Brownlow, AW, 26 November 1962, p. 30. He stated also that the IAF mission sent to London in July 1962 ostensibly to evaluate the Lightning reportedly discussed with British officials the possible purchase of Bloodhound surface-to-air missiles as an interim weapon pending re-equipment of the IAF with supersonic aircraft. It is worth noting that Dawn (6 July 1962) alleged that a number of Indian aircraft and missile engineers and technicians were in training at the missile section of the College of Aeronautics at Cranwell, England.
- 42 Cited, Times of India, 24 September 1961.
- 43 6 May 1962. The MIG had, according to the report, been chosen over the Mirage and Lightning for reason that it was more readily available.
- 44 K. Rangaswami in Hindu, 9 May, 1962.
- 45 For reports of, and comments on, these committee actions see New York Times, 12 May and 23 May 1962.
- 46 See New York Times, 17 May 1962.
- 47 LSD, 3rd Series, vol. 4, 31 May 1962, cols 8104-5.
- 48 Cited, Hindu, 15 June 1962; The Nation, ibid.
- 49 Cited, New York Times, 21 June 1962.
- 50 A.M. Rosenthal, ibid, 13 June 1962.

51 New York Times (city edition), 16 June 1962. Sandys apparently reminded Nehru of a promise made by him to the British Prime Minister 'six or seven years before' to consult London before purchase of aircraft from non-British sources, a promise which Nehru had forgotten. See Nehru's remarks on this promise, cited in

52 New York Times, 20 June 1962.

53 AW, 23 July 1962, p. 24. The British Government would, in effect, supposedly subsidize the purchase. The report also mentioned an American proposal whereby, in return for Indian purchase of Lockheed C-130 transports, the United States would ask Britain (or France) to establish a P.I.B. Lightning (or Mirage III) production line in India and guarantee the chosen producer against financial loss. According to Aeroplane and Astronautics (3 September 1964, p. 74) India was offered ex-RAF Lightning F.1s 'several years ago' at about £ 250,000 per unit but accepted the MIG on more advantageous financial terms. According to K.S. Shelvankar (Hindu, 5 August 1962) India was never offered a squadron of Lightnings; he further charged that the evaluation team sent to Britain in July were told by English General Electric that it was in no position to make an offer and referred the team to the Air Ministry which also made no offer.

54 K. Rangaswami, Hindu, 7 July 1962.

55 New York Times (city edition), 1st July 1962.

56 AW, 23 July 1962, p. 24.

57 Dawn, 6 July 1962. The paper alleged that negotiations were not pressed due to 'India's inability to pay the arrears still outstanding in respect of the Mystere jet fighter acquired by the IAF some years ago and her unwillingness to offer an economic price for the Mirage aircraft'.

58 AW, 6 August 1962, p. 32.

59 The nature of the agreement was not revealed at the time, but it was apparently largely one of principle and required extensive further negotiations. A press release by the Soviet Information Service in Britain in early 1963 stated that the agreement provided for twelve MIG-21st to be shipped to India - six in early 1963 and six in 1964 - and for Soviet

technical assistance in the establishment of production facilities in India. See Flight, 4 April 1963, p. 452. See also statement by the Indian Minister of Economic and Defence Production, T.T. Krishnamachari, to a New York press luncheon on 27 May 1963. Cited, Hindu, 29 May 1963.

60 Aircraft in service with the IAF or available to it comprised roughly 110 Mysteres, 60-75 Gnats, 182 Hunters, 100 Vampires, 104 Ouragans, 100 Canberras, 53 C-119gs, 30 C-47s, 26 Otters, 12 Devons, 16 An-12s, 62 Prentices, 30 Texans, 26 Il-14s, 15-20 Austers, about 60 helicopters and a few B-24s and several Viscounts.

61 The Auxiliary Air Force comprised squadrons Nos 51 (Delhi), 52 (Bombay), 53 (Madras), 54 (Allahabad), 55 (Calcutta), 56 (Bhubandeshwar) and 57 (Chandigarh) - the latter two units being added in 1960. All squadrons were equipped with Texans and HT-2 trainers with jet training being introduced to the Delhi, Madras and Calcutta squadrons in 1959-60.

62 The British C-in-C of the RIAF, Air Marshal Sir Thomas Elmhirst, was reported to have stated at a New Delhi press conference on 19 February 1949 that Britain had given higher priority to India's aircraft needs than it had to any other Commonwealth country, including Pakistan. Cited, Hindu, 20 February 1949.

63 The Hunter order apparently surprised even the usually well-informed British aircraft industry. See Aeroplane and Astronautics, 13 September 1957, p. 398.

64 Hindu Weekly Review leader, 15 December 1958.

65 The Eastern Economist, 13 March 1959.

66 Rawle Knox, The Scotsman, 9 February 1957.

67 Pakistan submitted a request to the United States for 15-20 light bombers in early 1958 and made no attempt to disguise the fact that the aircraft were desired to offset India's recent Canberra purchase. Secret talks ensued in Washington between American Defence Secretary McElroy, American Service leaders and a Pakistani mission headed by Finance Minister Ali Amjad and including the Pakistan Army and Air Force Cs-in-C. The first six of 26 B-57 (Canberra) jet bombers were delivered to Pakistan in 1960 and the remainder subsequently to equip two bomber squadrons and one reconnaissance unit.

68 The Times of India (3 August 1961), for example, had declared that India must obtain an aircraft comparable to the F-104s which Pakistan was acquiring.

69 The Times, 8 August 1961.

70 India charged China with 127 intrusions of her air space between 19 September 1959 and 3 June 1961, and China charged India with 38 intrusions of her air space between 14 July 1959 and 17 July 1961. For Indian charges, see notes dated 5 December 1959, III, p. 101; 4 April 1960, pp. 21-3, IV; 22 August 1960, IV, pp. 29-30; 24 October 1960, IV, p. 39; 13 February 1961, V, p. 40; 29 April 1961, V, p. 42; 5 July 1961, V, p. 47. For Chinese charges, see notes dated 7 September 1959, II, p. 54; 16 September 1959, II, p. 56; 20 December 1959, III, p. 102; 2 July 1960, IV, p. 25; 27 August 1960, IV, p. 30; 2 June 1961, V, p. 44; 12 August 1961, V, pp. 48-9.

71 The proposed Avro project constituted only a normal re-equipment scheme to replace the aging C-47s.

72 Britain was unable to supply these aircraft at the time due to the priority given its own needs and those of its NATO allies. See, for example, the comment in The Times, 15 December 1953.

73 See footnote 13.

74 See, for example, Aeroplane and Astronautics, 15 February 1957, p. 222; 5 April 1957, p. 465; AW, 24 September 1956, p. 31. The decision in favour of the Canberras may have been partly influenced by Britain's willingness to release the 'blue study' radar bomb-sight. See statement by the Minister of Defence Organisation, Mahavir Tyagi, cited in The Times, 9 May 1956. This factor alone, however, would not seem to account entirely or even largely for the rejection of the comparable Il-28 at one third to half the price in the context of a particularly acute shortage of foreign exchange.

75 Despite press speculation in February 1957 that Nehru's conference with the visiting Soviet Defence Minister, Marshal Zhukov, possibly indicated a re-examination of the earlier Soviet offer of Il-28s with the aim of augmenting the Canberra order (see James Cameron in News Chronicle, 22 February 1957), India ordered further Canberras subsequently.

76 The Mi-4 can carry a 3500 lb load, is powered by a piston-engine and was available for the equivalent of \$ 150-200,000 and rupee payment, whereas the S-62 has a capacity of 2950 lbs, is powered by a turbine engine and was available for \$ 260-360,000 and in foreign exchange only. See New York Times, 11 June 1960; AW, 23 May 1960, p. 37. The two S-62s purchased by India in August 1960, for example, reportedly cost India \$ 308,000 per unit excluding spares. See AW, 15 August 1960, p. 23; 23 December 1960, p. 63.

77 In view of India's subsequent difficulties with the Soviet Union over implementation of the project, however, it may well be that Moscow sought to obtain short-term political advantages with no intention of pursuing the matter in more concrete fashion; it may have shared Western doubts as to India's ability to implement such a sophisticated project and relied upon eventual Indian recognition of this fact to halt the project before it began.

78 At Calcutta on 29 July 1962, however, Nehru described the desire for supersonic aircraft as motivated by the Pakistan threat and China's 'grasping' part of India's mountain territory. Cited, The Nation, 31 July 1962.

79 The usually well-informed Prem Bhatia charged in an article published in late 1962, however, that while the IAF mission was in London in July the manufacturers of the Mirage III offered to set up a production line in India to match the Soviet offer but were turned down by Menon on the grounds that he was 'committed' to the Russians. "The Harvest of Menonism", The Reporter, 22 November 1962.

80 Overseas Hindustan Times, 30 April 1964. It is also understood from a confidential source that, at the time of the Chinese invasion, the Harvards and a majority of the Vampires were grounded for lack of spares and that the Hunters escaped a similar fate only by the narrowest of margins.

81 The PAF comprised about 15,000 personnel manning eight squadrons of F-86 F Sabre subsonic fighter-bombers, one squadron of F-104 supersonic strike fighter-interceptors, one-two squadrons of B-57 (Canberra) tactical bombers and reconnaissance, transport and coastal search units.

82 The Chinese Communist Air Force comprised about 90,000 personnel manning about 3,000 aircraft, including 2,000 subsonic MIG 15s, 17s and a few 19s and 500 subsonic Il-28 tactical bombers comparable to the Canberra. Chinese bases in Tibet included Nagchuka, Kampa Dzong, Tingri, Tsonadzong, Rima and Zumutsungrth but the writer has no information on the size and composition of the formations based in Tibet.

## CHAPTER VII

### THE INDIAN NAVAL PROGRAMME

At partition, the Royal Indian Navy was divided between India and Pakistan in the rough proportion of 2:1. India retained four sloops, two frigates, one corvette, twelve fleet minesweepers, four trawlers, four motor minesweepers, four motor launches, one survey vessel, the naval dockyard at Bombay and approximately 1,000 officers and 10,000 ratings<sup>1</sup>. The naval establishment was completely unbalanced in almost every respect and the development of a modern navy had necessarily to be a long-term process that would require the full co-operation of an advanced naval power like the United Kingdom.

Differences concerning India's naval requirements appear to have arisen at the very outset between the Indian Government and British naval planners assigned by the Indian Government to the task of developing the Indian Navy. According to one writer, who preferred to use a pseudonym, the Admiralty wanted the Navy to conform to some Commonwealth pattern. They visualized a force of escort vessels and local



flotillas of minesweepers, the extension of base facilities at Bombay and possibly Calcutta so as to afford repair facilities for large units from the Commonwealth navies, and the development of considerable assembly and supply arrangements for escort forces at Cochin<sup>2</sup>.

The leadership of the Indian Government, however, purportedly made it clear that they wanted a navy which in the event of a war would not provide merely the 'missing bits' of a larger naval scheme. They felt that India, by virtue of its location, potential wealth and vast population must inevitably be of immense strategic significance in world problems and could be centrally influential in local ones. India accordingly desired

a preponderance of naval power vis-a-vis her Asiatic neighbours to ensure that (though she herself firmly and truly disclaimed any aggressive policy) where they were concerned she would have a reasonable assurance of freedom of the seas through the Arabian Sea, Indian Ocean and Bay of Bengal for her own shipping.<sup>3</sup>

The Nehru administration would therefore appear to have subscribed to the view expressed by a leading Indian daily in late 1955 that 'it is only commonsense to see to it that our Navy is never overtaken in strength by the navies of neighbouring nations'<sup>4</sup>. Such a strategic role necessitated a navy possessing the nucleus of a striking force, including cruisers and an air component, escort vessels and local

flotillas to safeguard base areas. With direct reference to the threat that would be posed to communications and shipping in the Indian Ocean by the Soviet-bloc submarine arm, the Indian Navy was to be developed with primary emphasis on anti-submarine warfare.

In accordance with an official directive, Indian Naval Headquarters under the direction of Vice-Admiral W.E. Parry drew up a ten-year plan of naval expansion in late 1947. The proposed programme involved the Indianization of the Navy as soon as was practicable and its gradual development into a carrier task force comprising two light fleet aircraft carriers, three light cruisers, eight to nine destroyers and the necessary support vessels<sup>5</sup>. The force was to be capable of expansion when the necessity arose and, though designed primarily for a strictly defensive role, it was to possess the capability for offensive action against an enemy in the Indian Ocean<sup>6</sup>. Its specific wartime roles were defined in March 1949 as the protection of merchant convoys, assistance to the Army in amphibious operations and offensive operations against enemy ports and installations<sup>7</sup>.

The naval programme was accepted by the Indian Government in 1948 and implementation of its initial stages was undertaken. A few samples of landing ships and craft - one LST and six LCTs - were retained 'ready for the day when we

can prepare for any landing operations needed in the future'<sup>8</sup>. The light cruiser Delhi (ex-Achilles) and the 'R' class destroyers Rana (ex-Raider), Rajput (ex-Rotherham) and Ranjit (ex-Redoubt) were purchased from Britain in 1948, the Delhi arriving at Bombay in September of the same year and the destroyers in January 1950 following refit<sup>9</sup>. The oilers Chilka and Sambhar were acquired in 1948 and the four trawlers and six of the twelve fleet minesweepers retained at partition were discarded by 1950. A directorate of Naval Aviation was established in 1948 and, as the Royal Navy was unable at that time to meet an Indian request for suitable fleet aircraft, it was decided to form a nucleus for the future. Provision for the establishment of a fleet air arm was accordingly made in the defence budget for 1949-50. As of late March 1949, it was expected that the first aircraft carrier would 'probably' be purchased from Britain in 1955 and the second in 1957 - by which time it was hoped that the fleet air arm would comprise 300 modern naval fighters, fighter-bombers and anti-submarine aircraft with a frontline strength of 54 units in two carrier groups. The first 40 naval aircraft were expected to arrive in India before the end of 1950<sup>10</sup>.

The deterioration in the international situation during the 1948-51 period, as manifested in the Berlin blockade, the formation of NATO, the Korean War, etc., introduced

uncertainties regarding the availability of the required naval vessels. During a visit to Britain in the summer of 1949, Vice-Admiral Parry was unable to make definite arrangements for further ships due to the inability of the Admiralty to specify the types of ships that would be available for sale<sup>11</sup>. The shipping position became even tighter in 1950-51<sup>12</sup>, presumably as a result of the Korean War, but a pause was in any case required for the recruitment and training of further personnel needed to man future acquisitions<sup>13</sup>.

In the meantime, the Government had reconsidered the naval programme from a financial standpoint and had reached the conclusion that it was beyond the country's immediate needs and resources. Details of the revised programme were revealed by Vice-Admiral Parry at a Bombay press conference on 21 January 1950. He stated that the Navy envisaged the development of a small carrier task force of the 'hunter-killer' (i.e. anti-submarine) type that would comprise one light fleet carrier, three light cruisers, eight to nine destroyers and the necessary support vessels<sup>14</sup>.

The slightly revised scheme was proceeded with in 1953 with the purchase of the fleet replenishment vessel, Shakti, from Italy and the loan from Britain of three ex-escort destroyers of the 'Hunt' type 2 class - the Ganga (ex-Chiddingfold), Godavari (ex-Bedale) and Gomati (ex-Lamerton)<sup>15</sup>. A

second light cruiser, the Mysore (ex-Nigeria), was purchased in April 1954 for £ 300,000 and underwent extensive refit before joining the Indian fleet in 1957. The inshore minesweepers Bassein (ex-Littleham) and Bimlipitan (ex-Hildersham) were transferred from the Royal Navy in 1955.

The details of a six-year building programme for the Navy in British shipyards were revealed by the Chief of the Indian Naval Staff, Admiral Sir Mark Pizey, in Delhi on 11 July 1955. He stated that, during the 1955-61 period, the Navy envisaged the receipt of twelve anti-submarine and anti-aircraft frigates as replacements for the 'R' class destroyers and older frigates, eight coastal minesweepers to replace the obsolete types then in service and an unspecified number of inshore minesweepers<sup>16</sup>. The delivery of ships from this programme proceeded as the individual units were completed. The 'Ton' class coastal minesweepers Karwar (ex-Overton), Cannamore (ex-Whitton), Cuddalore (ex-Wennington) and Kakinada (ex-Durweston) were transferred from the Royal Navy in 1956. The 'Whitby' class anti-submarine frigates Talwar and Trishul were received in May and August 1960 respectively and the 'Blackwood' class anti-submarine frigates Khukri, Kirpan and Kuthar arrived in Bombay in 1958, 1959 and 1960 respectively. The 'Leopard' class anti-aircraft frigates Brahmaputra, Beas and Betwa were received in 1959, 1960 and 1961 respectively.

No further ships were acquired for the ambitious modernization and expansion scheme which thus fell considerably short of the initial proposals: four coastal minesweepers, one 'Leopard' class anti-aircraft frigate, two 'Whitby' class and one 'Blackwood' class anti-submarine frigates and an unknown number of inshore minesweepers had been cut from the scheme<sup>17</sup>. The third cruiser envisaged from an early date also failed to materialize. The reasons for not purchasing these vessels would seem to be financial stringency and the acute foreign exchange problem, which involved a deficit of \$ 650 millions in 1957-58 and threatened to ruin any prospects that the Second Five-Year Plan would be fulfilled. The Indian naval programme underway in British shipyards was clearly an early casualty of Indian efforts to reduce external procurement of what were regarded at the time as 'non-essential' items.

The Indian Government subsequently purchased the three 'R' class destroyers hitherto on loan from the Royal Navy and envisaged ultimately constructing minesweepers, frigates and destroyers in Indian shipyards<sup>18</sup>, which were already building minor craft for the Navy. The mooring vessel Dhruvak and the survey vessel Darshak were commissioned from Hindustan Shipyard Limited (Calcutta) in November and December 1959<sup>19</sup>. The repair ship Dharini was commissioned in May 1960 and the

seaward patrol craft Ajay, Abhey and Akshay were commissioned in September 1960, November 1961 and January 1962 respectively. The diesel tugs Bhim and Bali were handed over to the Navy by their builders, Alcock and Ashdown and Company Limited (Bombay) in February 1962. Miscellaneous water-boats, ferry craft, ammunition barges and pontoons were also acquired from local sources.

The development of the fleet air arm progressed slowly for reasons that seem to have been both financial and due to a lack of suitably trained personnel. The first naval air station, INS Garuda, was commissioned on 13 May 1953 at Venderuthy, Cochin. A Fleet Requirements Unit was formed in the same year upon the receipt of ten Short Sealand light amphibians which had been ordered in 1952; the first units were handed over to Indian officials at Rochester, Northern Ireland, on 13 January 1953<sup>20</sup>. Five Fairey Firefly T.T.1 and five T.T.4 target-tug aircraft were acquired for the Unit in 1955<sup>21</sup>. The formation was augmented several years later by a flight of Vampire jet trainers taken over from the Indian Air Force and by a number of locally-produced Hindustan HT-2 jet trainers.

The Government was for some time apparently undecided as to whether to proceed with the acquisition of an aircraft carrier. Defence Minister Gopalaswami Ayyangar stated in

1952 that no specific date could be given. He argued that, in any case, the Navy did not then possess the trained personnel required to man such a complex unit<sup>22</sup>. Defence Minister N.N. Katju informed the Lok Sabha on 5 April 1955 that, while a beginning had been made on the establishment of a fleet air arm, no proposal had yet been made regarding the purchase of a carrier; he claimed that he could not forecast future developments<sup>23</sup>. Further evidence of Government indecision on the matter was revealed by a statement made by Admiral Pizey at INS Hamla in June 1955 in which he declared that perhaps his last big job with the Indian Navy would be to convince the Government of the need for carriers and fast modern aircraft<sup>24</sup>.

The matter was subsequently taken under consideration and the hulk of the light fleet carrier Hercules was purchased in January 1957. The unit was modernized and completed at Belfast and was commissioned on 4 March 1961. The purchase of jet aircraft for the carrier was under consideration by August 1958<sup>25</sup> and 24 Sea Hawk FGA Mk 6 jet fighter-bombers were ordered in late 1959<sup>26</sup>. British-built Gannet anti-submarine/reconnaissance aircraft and Westland Wessex anti-submarine helicopters were initially favoured but the decision was ultimately taken to obtain roughly comparable French types; 15 Breguet 1050 Alizé turbo-prop



anti-submarine/reconnaissance aircraft were ordered early in 1960 and four Alouette 3 helicopters in 1962. Naval air squadrons 300 (equipped with Sea Hawks) and 310 (equipped with Alizés) were commissioned on 6 July 1960 and 9 January 1961 respectively and joined the Vikrant (ex-Hercules) in August 1961.

The establishment of a submarine arm was envisaged in the original naval plan, but with a lower priority than aircraft carriers<sup>27</sup>. Official spokesmen persistently refused to clarify policy concerning submarines on the grounds that it was not in the national interest to do so<sup>28</sup>. It seems clear, however, that financial priorities precluded the acquisition of any submarines during the period under discussion and forced the Indian Navy to rely upon periodic visits by British submarines for training in anti-submarine operations. In a statement at Bombay on 9 May 1962, the retiring Chief of Naval Staff, Vice-Admiral R.D. Katari, indicated the Navy's dissatisfaction with such a reliance upon the Royal Navy's submarines by publicly advocating the establishment of an Indian submarine 'fleet'<sup>29</sup>.

Simultaneously with the acquisition of new ships and aircraft, the Navy developed training establishments to replace those of the old Royal Indian Navy retained by Pakistan at partition and as required by a modern naval

establishment. Until 1952, all naval officers were sent to Britain for training<sup>30</sup> but, by 1955, India possessed ten training centres which were adequate to meet most of the Navy's general needs. Personnel were subsequently sent abroad only for specialist training in communications, gunnery, torpedo and anti-submarine, navigation, direction, survey, ordnance, naval construction and road conversion. The numbers of personnel sent to British naval training centres accordingly declined from 108 (1954-55) to 76 (1955-56), 52 (1958-59) and 42 (1959-60)<sup>31</sup>.

The replacement of British with Indian personnel in the Service proceeded within the limitations imposed by the availability of qualified Indian officers and technicians. By January 1948, all naval ships were commanded by Indians and there were only nine non-Indian officers at Naval Headquarters. The acute shortage of officers - 40 executive, 44 engineering, 18 electrical, two shipwright and seven instructor as of March 1948<sup>32</sup> - necessitated, however, the retention of former British officers of the Royal Indian Navy and the loan of officers from the Royal Navy<sup>33</sup>.

The 120 British naval officers and Admiralty civilians employed as of July 1949 were progressively replaced by Indian personnel as the latter attained the necessary standards, and by March 1953 only 46 naval officers and ten

civilians of British nationality remained. During 1953 the posts of Naval Secretary at Naval Headquarters and Commodore-in-Charge (Cochin) were assumed by Captain A. Pereira and Commodore B.S. Soman respectively. Nineteen further posts were Indianized during the course of 1954, including the position of Deputy Chief of Naval Staff to which Captain R.D. Katari was appointed on 18 March, and the post of Commodore-in-Charge (Bombay) which was taken over by Captain A. Chakravarti on 28 March. By early 1955, Indians had assumed the senior posts of Chief of Material, Director of Armament Supply and Director of Naval Engineering. During 1955-56, the posts of Chief Inspector (Navy) at the Defence Services Staff College at Wellington, Chief Hydrographer (Navy) and Director of Stores at Naval Headquarters were taken over by Indian personnel. The posts of Director of Naval Education, Director of the Naval Signals Division, Flag Officer (Indian Fleet) and Dockyard Apprentice School were Indianized during the period March 1956-December 1957 and Vice-Admiral Katari became the first Indian Naval Chief of Staff in April 1958. Two Admiralty civilians holding the posts of Senior Technical Assistants reverted to the Admiralty in early 1959 and the post of Director of Naval Armament Inspection was taken over by an Indian naval officer in May 1961. With the appointment

of an Indian as Chief of Naval Aviation in April 1962, the Indian Navy became an entirely Indian-staffed Service.

The commissioning of the Vikrant in the latter half of 1961 completed the existing re-equipment and expansion programme of the Navy and the Chief of Naval Staff, Vice-Admiral B.S. Soman, informed a press conference at Coimbatore on 17 August 1962 that there were no existing plans to add new ships to the Fleet<sup>34</sup>. At the moment he spoke, the Indian Navy constituted the most effective naval force possessed by any country located within the Indian Ocean region - some 50 warships of all typed manned by about 1,450 officers and 14,550 ratings<sup>35</sup>. The vessels comprised:

- 1 'Majestic' class light fleet aircraft carrier (Vikrant) with an air complement consisting of one squadron each of Sea Hawk FGA Mk 6 fighter-bombers and Alize anti-submarine reconnaissance aircraft and four Se-3160 Alouette 3 helicopters.
- 1 'Leander' class light cruiser (Delhi)
- 1 'Mauritius' class light cruiser (Mysore)
- 3 'R' class fleet destroyers (Rana, Rajput, Ranjit)
- 3 'Hunt' class type 2 frigates (Ganga, Godavari, Gomati)
- 2 'Whitby' class anti-submarine frigates (Talwar, Trishul)
- 3 'Blackwood' class anti-submarine frigates (Khukri, Kirpan, Kuthar)

- 3 'Leopard' class anti-aircraft frigates (Brahmaputra,  
Beas, Betwa)
- 2 'Kistna' class frigates (Cauvery, Kistna)
- 2 'River' class frigates (Tir, Investigator) employed as  
a training vessel and a survey vessel respectively.
- 2 'Sutlej' class frigates (Jumna, Sutlej) employed as  
survey vessels
- 1 survey vessel (Darshak)
- 1 'Bangor' class fleet minesweeper (Konkan)
- 4 'Ton' class coastal minesweepers (Cannamore, Cuddalore,  
Kakinada, Karwar)
- 2 'Ham' class inshore minesweepers (Bassein, Bimlipiyan)
- 5 Seaward Patrol Craft (3110, 3112, 3117, 3118, 6420)
- 9 Seaward Defence Boats (Ajay, Abhay, Akshay, Savriti,  
Sharayu, Sharda, Subhadra, Sukanya, Suvarna)
- 1 LCT (4294)
- 1 LST (Magar)
- 1 repair ship (Dharini)
- 1 fleet replenishment ship (Shakti)
- 1 ocean-going tug (Hathi)
- 2 oilers, 5 motor minesweepers and 1 LCT employed as yard  
craft.

In addition to the Vikrant's shipboard complement, the fleet  
air arm included a Fleet Requirements Unit designated as

Squadron 550 and based at INS Garuda (Cochin); the Unit consisted of ten Short Sealand light amphibians, five Fairey Firefly T.T.1 and five T.T.4 target-tug aircraft and several Hindustan HT-2 jet trainers. There was also a Vampire jet flight designated INS Hansa at Sulur (near Coimbatore), which shared the airfield with the Indian Air Force. The Naval Reserve and Naval Volunteer Reserve, both of which were formed after 1955, were of unknown size but the regulations governing recruitment to both reserves had been revised in 1960-61.

The Service functioned under four operational and administrative commands - one afloat (Flag Officer Commanding the Indian Fleet) and three ashore (Flag Officer, Bombay; Commodore-in-Charge, Cochin; and Commodore East Coast, Vizagapatnam). The fleet was based at Bombay and Cochin on India's west coast.

The vessels were entirely of British construction with the exception of various minor craft - the fleet replenishment ship, Shakti, was acquired from Italy; the 'Savriti' class seaward defence boats (Savriti, Sharayu, Sharda, Subhadra, Sukanya and Suvarna) were of mixed Italian, Yugoslav and Dutch origin; the Portuguese frigate Afonso De Albuquerque had been seized during the Goa operation; and miscellaneous craft had been built in Indian shipyards. The

reliance upon Britain for vessels, equipment and training facilities was attributable to the origin of the Service and the co-operation of the Royal Navy in its development. The Sea Hawk fighter had been chosen not least for the reason that at the time of purchase it was the cheapest proven carrier-borne jet fighter in existence. The choice of French-built Alizé and Alouette units had only followed initial consideration of comparable British types and would seem to have been based primarily upon technical considerations.

The Service was responsible for the defence of India's coasts and coastal trade in co-operation with the Air Force and the Army and for the protection of India's maritime trade and communications.

Its basic rationale was seemingly as an implicit part of a Commonwealth-United States naval defence of the lines of communications passing across the Indian Ocean. Although the Indian Government had every desire to avoid involvement in any East-West conflict, it clearly appreciated that neutrality in such an eventuality would be almost impossible due to India's heavy dependence on maritime-borne commerce largely carried in ships of the Western bloc maritime countries to and from Western ports. Thus the Indian Navy had been conceived and developed as an anti-submarine force

aimed at countering the submarine arm of the Soviet Navy in at least implicit co-operation with Western and regional Commonwealth non-aligned states. While India entered into no contingency planning with prospective allies and probably declined even 'understandings' for political and diplomatic reasons, the annual naval exercises with other Commonwealth navies in the Indian Ocean facilitated co-operation in defence of communications in the region lying between Aden and Singapore in the event of an East-West conflict.

The Indian Navy's operational planning during the period 1947-62, however, seems to have contemplated operations if at all only against Pakistan; the contingency of conflict with Communist China or Indonesia involving naval actions appears to have been ignored in practice although it is not unlikely that either or both countries may have figured in staff exercises. The naval threat posed by Pakistan was marginal<sup>36</sup> and could have amounted to little more than one foray by the fleet from Karachi against Indian coastal shipping and perhaps involving a short bombardment of Bombay. Following this the Pakistani vessels would have had to concede India's superior naval might and retire to Karachi and be 'bottled up' pending the outcome of the land campaigns, which would be decisive, or continue on to face the same fate in Chittagong under constant attack from Indian carrier and



land-based planes or perhaps internment in a neutral port. Any serious challenge to India's maritime shipping interests would be effectively precluded by the above course of events and by the difficulty in making attacks on short notice and under pressure against shipping lanes in which Indian-registered vessels would be inter-mingled with a variety of foreign-owned ships. Uninterrupted Indian access to Middle Eastern oil would be further assured by the fact that India's oil imports are carried almost exclusively in foreign bottoms - only two Indian oil tankers being in existence in 1962.

The very complacency with which the contingency of naval operations against Pakistan were viewed, however, had led to financial considerations becoming of paramount importance in determining budgetary allocations for the Navy. The Government failed to provide the necessary ships and facilities without which the responsibilities of the Navy were considerably in excess of its actual operational capabilities. There was no continuous refit of units of the fleet and a rapid deterioration in either the regional or global situation culminating in an outbreak of hostilities would have found few ships of the Indian Navy able to quickly take up stations or to maintain them for any useful period of time. The absence of adequate docking or repair facilities aside

from Bombay and Cochin - both on the west coast - virtually precluded any sustained action in the Bay of Bengal against isolated or concerted actions by Indonesian, Soviet or Communist Chinese surface or undersea craft. Government refusal to provide funds for the maintenance of adequate stocks of spare parts<sup>37</sup> faced the fleet with progressive immobilization in a crisis in which external sources of supply were interfered with or cut off. India had absolutely no answer to the powerful Irian, Indonesia's Sverdlov cruiser.

In operations conducted against submarines or surface ships, many of the Indian ships would have been liabilities rather than assets to the more modern units of the Fleet and allied navies. The cruiser Delhi, though refitted in 1955, possessed little operational value and rarely left harbour even in its training capacity. The three 'R' class destroyers and the three 'Hunt' class frigates were obsolete and quite incapable of detecting or destroying modern conventional submarines - much less nuclear-powered ones. The cruiser Mysore would have been exceedingly vulnerable to submarine attack and incapable of undertaking action against a Sverdlov cruiser. As true in 1962 as in 1953 - when it was made - was the observation of one Indian commentator that 'the most comforting thing about our navy...stout-hearted

though...officers and...ratings are, is that the British and American fleets guard the Western and Eastern entrances to the Indian Ocean,<sup>38</sup>.

### Notes

1 Pakistan received two sloops, two frigates, four fleet minesweepers, two motor minesweepers, four motor launches, two trawlers, one training ship, the gunnery, radar and tactical navigation schools, the Boys' Training Establishment and about 180 officers and 3,400 ratings.

2 "Tughlak", "The Birth of the Indian Navy", Naval Review, 44:2 (April 1956), pp. 173-4.

3 Ibid, p. 175. Lord Mountbatten would seem to have supported the Indian view. In an address to officers and ratings of the Navy at Castle Barracks, Bombay, on 17 December 1947, he expressed the view that India's new international position required a 'great and powerful navy'. Cited, The Times, 18 December 1947. The report notes that at a recent meeting of the Defence Committee at which the future of the Indian Navy was discussed, Lord Mountbatten strongly pressed for at least one cruiser for the Indian Navy.

4 Hindu Weekly Review, leader entitled "Navy Day", 26 December 1955. Indian officials would seem to have hoped for a navy which would replace the East Indies Squadron of the Royal Navy which had hitherto provided India with her naval defence. British naval officials evidently viewed Indian intentions in the same manner; see, for example, statement by Captain H.N.S. Brown, Commodore-in-Charge of a RIN squadron, at Dar es Salaam, cited in The Times, 15 June 1949; Lt. Commander P.K. Kemp, "Commonwealth Co-operation in the Services" in Rear Admiral H.G. Thursfield (ed.), Brassey's Annual 1950 (London, William Clowes & Co.).

5 Vice-Admiral W.E. Parry at a New Delhi press conference, 8 October 1948. Cited, New York Times, 9 October 1948. This appears to have been the first public revelation of the plan.

6 Parry, "India and Sea Power", USI Journal, 79:334,335 (January-April 1949), p. 27.

7 See report of an interview with Captain H.C. Ranald by a correspondent in Hindu, 26 March 1949. Ranald was a Royal Navy fleet air arm expert deputed to organize such an arm for the Indian Navy.

8 Parry, loc. cit.

9 For presumably accurate reports concerning the composition of the Indian Navy, see Raymond V.B. Blackman (ed.), Jane's Fighting Ships (London, Sampson Low, Marston & Co.).

10 See report of Ranald interview in Hindu, loc. cit.

11 See remarks by Parry cited in Hindu, 8 April and 15 August 1949.

12 See report by Press Trust of India of a statement by Parry cited in ibid, 4 June 1951.

13 See Parry, "India and Sea Power", loc. cit.

14 Cited, Hindu, 22 January 1950. See also Jane's Fighting Ships, 1949-50, p. 95; 1950-51, p. 104. It is not known when the decision to obtain only one carrier was taken but it was clearly subsequent to the interview given by Ranald in March 1949 and prior to the public release of the general outline of the naval plan by Vice-Admiral Parry in January 1950.

15 The vessels were loaned for an initial period of three years subject to extension by agreement, but were ultimately purchased outright in 1958.

16 Cited, The Times, 11 July 1955. According to Jane's (1956-57, p. 95; 1957-58, p. 95) specific orders had been placed with British shipyards for four 'Whitby' class and four 'Blackwood' class anti-submarine frigates and four 'Leopard' class anti-aircraft frigates.

17 It would, therefore, appear that the Indian Government had either to accept liability for financial compensation of the firms involved or to persuade the British Government to assume liability for the vessels under actual construction and reduce its own building programme accordingly.

18 See Chapter VIII.

19 For some unknown reason, the Darshak was not formally handed over to the Navy until mid-1964.

20 The Times, 14 January 1953.

21 The purchase followed a demonstration of naval anti-aircraft fire in which resort had to be made to the last ship in line firing a rocket down the line of ships to compensate for the lack of proper target drones. The inadequacy of such a procedure provoked an on-the-spot resolution by a visiting parliamentary delegation that the Navy must be provided with proper target-drones. See Admiral Sir Mark Pizey, "The Indian Navy Today", Asian Review, 52:189 (January 1946), p. 48.

22 LSD, pt 1, vols 1-2, 29 May 1952, p. 326.

23 Ibid, pt 1, vol. 2, cols 1856-7.

24 Cited, Hindu Weekly Review, 6 June 1955.

25 See statement by Defence Minister Menon, LSD, vol. 19, 30 August 1958, col. 3648.

26 Additional Sea Hawks were 'being acquired' in 1961. Ministry of Defence, Report, 1960-61, p. 13.

27 See Commodore N. Krishnan, "Strategic Concepts of Indian Naval Expansion", USI Journal, 88:327 (July-September 1958), p. 217.

28 See, for example, Deputy Defence Minister S.S. Majithia, LSD, pt 1, vol. 5, 28 July 1956, cols 506-7; Menon, ibid, vol. 3, 23 May 1962, col. 6068.

29 Cited, Hindu, 10 May 1962.

30 See statement by the Minister for Defence Organisation, Mahavir Tyagi, LSD, pt 1, vol. 1, 23 February 1956, cols 248-9.

31 See statements by Majithia, ibid, pt 1, vol. 2, 9 April 1956, col. 1985; Menon, ibid, vol. 45, 20 August 1960, col. 3678.

32 See statement by Defence Minister Singh, CAD, vol. 2, 4 March 1948, p. 1585.

33 See statement by Tyagi, LSD, pt 2, vol. 1, 25 March 1953, col. 2815.

34 Cited, Hindu, 18 August 1962.

35 Jane's Fighting Ships, 1962-63.

36 The Pakistan Navy was actually an anti-submarine force and, like the Indian Navy, it had been conceived and developed with primary reference to combatting Soviet submarines in a general war. It comprised one light training cruiser, seven escorts, six minesweepers and miscellaneous smaller craft.

37 An example of the subordination of efficiency to financial considerations was the frigate Brahmaputra. Acquired in 1958 even as the Royal Navy was obtaining ships of this type, the Brahmaputra like its sister ships developed clutch problems. The Government was reluctant to release the foreign exchange with which to effect the necessary repairs and this vessel remained, to all intents and purposes, unoperational.

38 "Odysseus", The Eastern Economist, 6 February 1953, p. 210.

## CHAPTER VIII

### DEFENCE PRODUCTION 1947-1962

The ordnance establishment remained unaffected by partition as all functioning plants happened to be located within the political boundaries of the Indian Union<sup>1</sup>. The factories came under the direct control of the Defence Ministry on 1st December 1947. The Government was conscious of the fact that the country's industrial base was narrow and its manpower deficient in many of the specialized skills required in modern armaments production. While striving to rectify these inadequacies as an integral part of economic development<sup>2</sup>, official policy was: firstly, to ensure the indigenous production of basic items of military equipment that were likely to be required in sufficient quantity to make their production economically feasible; and secondly, to produce items of which the overall requirement, though small, was essential. It was considered to be wiser to continue to purchase those items of military equipment which were extremely costly and in which new developments were taking place rapidly and unceasingly, such as fighter and

bomber aircraft, gunsights and guided missiles<sup>3</sup>. Planning envisaged the use of spare peactime capacity in the ordnance factories for the manufacture of civil items but it was intended to maintain close contact with the development of civilian industry to enable future planning for defence production to proceed on a realistic basis<sup>4</sup>.

The Government proceeded to prepare a scientific organization upon which to base its proposed modern ordnance establishment. Following discussions with British scientists experienced in operational research, the Government established a Science Research and Development Organisation in 1948 under a Scientific Adviser<sup>5</sup>. The organization was initially comprised of a body of 50 scientists and was designed to undertake research on such aspects of defence science as operational research, ballistics, communications, explosives, food, training methods and military physiology. A Board of Scientists was set up to advise the Defence Ministry on all scientific matters and, in 1952, a Defence Science Service was created to attract young scientists who were interested in undertaking scientific research of value to defence as a career<sup>6</sup>.

Also established in 1952 was the Institute of Armament Studies at Kirki which was designed to provide selected officers of the armed forces with an 18-month basic training



course in science and technology as applied to armaments, to maintain contacts with universities and other civilian research institutions, and to promote, in all possible ways, the dissemination of basic knowledge on defence<sup>7</sup>. A factory was set up at Ambrarnath in 1954 to serve as the foundation of an armaments plant aimed at enabling establishments to design and adapt existing types of equipment in small quantities. It was also designed to produce, as required, highly specialized machine tools and to provide a training ground for promising workers; in accordance with the latter aspect, a training school was established with the capacity to train 300 first-class tool makers and designers at any one time for the ordnance factories and industry. Training schemes were also initiated in a number of other ordnance plants and supplementary schemes provided for numbers of technically-qualified personnel to be sent abroad for further training in specific types of work.

A reorganization was effected in January 1958 in which the technical development establishments of the three Defence Services and the Defence Science Organisation were replaced by the Defence Research and Development Organisation. In 1959-60, to step up the tempo of research and development work, the Government constituted the Defence Minister's (Research and Development) Committee to consider

all policy matters affecting the DRDO. A Research and Development Advisory Committee was also created to replace the Defence Research Policy Board and the Defence Science Advisory Committee. During the 1959-62 period, existing establishments and laboratories were expanded and a number of new establishments and laboratories were set up to extend research activity to further fields of defence interest not hitherto attempted.

In 1959, the Government further increased defence research and development activity by approving three schemes aimed at attracting young persons to carry out research in defence science problems. The schemes comprised: a defence research fellowship scheme; grants to universities, colleges, etc. imparting scientific/engineering/technological training for undertaking specific research projects of defence interest; and stipends to research students and others working on defence subjects in universities, technical institutions and defence establishments<sup>8</sup>.

During the period ending in 1954, the existing ordnance factories were apparently balanced and brought up to a satisfactory state of efficiency, 'one or two' were expanded and several new factories were planned and approved by the Defence Committee of the Cabinet but were not proceeded with at the time 'for one reason or another'<sup>9</sup>. In 1952, however,

the Government approved the establishment of a factory to manufacture electronic equipment, vacuum tubes, components and radar. A ten-year agreement was signed in December of the same year with the Compagnie Generale de Telegraphie sans Fils of France for technical assistance in the project. The company, Bharat Electronics, was registered in April 1954 as a limited company in the public sector under the control of the Defence Ministry<sup>10</sup>.

During this early period, 60 new items were developed in the ordnance sphere and a further 40 items were undergoing development as of 1953. Production by value increased five-fold from Rs 5 crores (1947) to Rs 8.3 crores (1948) and Rs 27.5 crores in 1953<sup>11</sup>. The increases were primarily due to deficiencies in supplies resulting from the division of stores with Pakistan<sup>12</sup> and the demands arising from the military operations in Kashmir.

By 1953, the requirements of the armed forces obtainable from local sources were such that the Government was considering the retrenchment of semi-skilled and unskilled workers. The aim continued to be 'to expand civil production in directions which will be helpful also to meet the defence requirements of the country in an emergency'<sup>13</sup> but the Government had started a drive to use the surplus capacity to produce goods for other Government departments and

for civil industry - provoked partially by progress 'sometimes' being held up by the inability of civil production to provide sufficiently advanced basic materials, components and semi-manufactured parts<sup>14</sup>.

In mid-1954, the Government reportedly considered an offer from Daimler-Benz of Stuttgart which involved a joint enterprise with the Tata Iron and Steel company. The proposed project was to have commenced with the production of light ( $3\frac{1}{2}$  ton) armoured vehicles and to be augmented in phases with other branches of assembly and production with the ultimate manufacture or assembly of a range of items including passenger vehicles and light tanks<sup>15</sup>. Serious consideration of this proposal was kept in abeyance due to the reorganization of the ordnance factories which followed the submission of the report by the Ordnance Factories Re-organisation Committee headed by Baldev Singh.

The Committee was appointed in early 1954 to examine the existing organization, procedure and methods of ordnance production with a view to expanding activities and ensuring economic administration. The report of the Committee was submitted to the Government in 1955 and, while not a secret document<sup>16</sup>, has for some unexplained reason never been made public. According to informed sources, however, the report included recommendations for the establishment of a Defence

Production Board, modernization of equipment, civil trading and retrenchment of semi-skilled and unskilled workers.

With the exception of equipment modernization, which appears to have been deferred for financial reasons, the Committee's proposals seem to have been implemented subsequently.

About 5,000 workers were retrenched by September 1956<sup>17</sup> and the production of civil items was extended to include such things as coffee percolators, pressure cookers and meccano sets. It was announced in August 1955 that a Defence Production Board had been created to assume management of all ordnance factories, co-ordinate research and development in the three Armed Services and secure effective liaison with civil industry to meet defence requirements<sup>18</sup>.

Tenders were invited for tractors, a clause inserted in the contracts making collaboration for the manufacture of such units in Ordnance an essential pre-requisite to the conclusion of any agreement. Replies were received from two firms - Messrs Marshalls of Britain and Messrs Komatsu of Japan. The British firm did not make the heavier-type tractor which was a necessary stepping-stone towards heavier fighting vehicles and the Japanese company was therefore selected. The reputation of Komatsu was attested by the fact that it provided the Japanese defence forces with 70 per

cent of their vehicular needs<sup>19</sup>. The scheme was sanctioned in March 1959.

A scheme for the production of three-ton 'Shaktiman' trucks was signed with Messrs Maschinenfabrik Augsburg-Nuremberg AG (M.A.N.) of West Germany in September 1958. The agreement resulted from Government dissatisfaction with the performance of private Indian suppliers. Since 1949, the Defence Ministry had placed substantial orders with Premier Automobiles and Hindustan Motors with hopes of ultimately obtaining military vehicles with a 100 per cent indigenous content. This hope was not realized, after eight years Premier being able to achieve not more than a 30 per cent local content in their military vehicles. The firm which manufactured Studebaker trucks (largely through assembly) had supplied 4,000 old units to the Army and then, in 1957, had abandoned their manufacture, leaving the Army with a large number of trucks for which they were not assured of spares. The Army had then sought to place an order for 1,000 three-ton trucks with TELCO, which raised the unit price by Rs 8,000 apparently to fall in line with the other manufacturers; despite protracted negotiations, the firm would reduce their demand price by only Rs 650 per truck. The question of manufacture of trucks by Ordnance, which had been considered several times previously but had not been pursued

so as to enable private firms to stabilize themselves, was taken up following the 1957-58 experience with the private suppliers in which it had become clear that Defence could not rely upon the private firms to supply Army trucks at a reasonable price. Following extensive tests conducted by the Army, the agreement was signed with M.A.N.<sup>20</sup>.

The first Shaktiman truck rolled off the assembly line at the Gun Carriage Factory (Jubbulpore) on 21 June 1959 with a 39 per cent indigenous component. The Machine Tool Prototype Factory at Ambrarnath produced the transfer cases, and the ordnance factory at Kanpur supplied the road springs from a special quality of steel which it produces. Main assembly was subsequently undertaken at Jubbulpore with proposals to establish the engine assembly line at Kanpur and castings from the ordnance factory at Muradnagar.

Expenditure on the manufacturing and research establishment remained fairly constant for the period ending in 1959<sup>21</sup> but the output of the ordnance factories by value, which totalled Rs 27.5 crores in 1953, fell to Rs 14.57 crores (1956-57) before recovering to Rs 18.38 crores (1957-58) and Rs 19.57 crores (1958-59)<sup>22</sup>. The gradual increase in production was accompanied by a decrease in idle capacity from Rs 63 lakhs (1956-57) to Rs 11 lakhs (1957-58) and Rs 9 lakhs (1958-59)<sup>23</sup>.

The nature of production eased India's dependence on foreign (primarily British) sources which accounted for no less than 90 per cent of her military equipment and stores in 1950<sup>24</sup>. By March 1953, India was reportedly self-sufficient 'generally' in non-lethal stores and equipment, less so with respect to non-technical stores and equipment and self-sufficient to only a small degree as regards lethal stores and specialized military equipment and weapons<sup>25</sup>. The Commander-in-Chief of the Army, General M. Rajendrasinjhi, declared in Calcutta on 22 June 1953 that 80 per cent of the Army's light equipment was then being produced in India and that the Government proposed to make the Service self-sufficient in stages<sup>26</sup>. By the end of 1959, it was claimed that about 95 per cent of the Services' general stores - clothing, textiles, mechanical and chemical stores, steel and other ferrous and non-ferrous materials, petrol, etc. - was being produced indigenously<sup>27</sup>.

The deteriorating border situation with Communist China, however, prompted the Government in late 1959 to undertake an ambitious modernization and expansion programme in its ordnance establishment<sup>28</sup>. The Prime Minister stated in the Lok Sabha on 18 December 1959 that, while self-sufficiency was a big word and never completely obtainable, 'broadly speaking, that is our wish, that is our attempt'<sup>29</sup>. At a



New Delhi meeting of the Congress Parliamentary Party on 8 February 1960, Nehru claimed that 'We are becoming more and more self-reliant in the manufacture of defence requirements. We are advancing in the field of atomic energy and we have made rapid progress in the manufacture of defence equipment'<sup>30</sup>.

About Rs 20 crores were sanctioned for the modernization and expansion of the defence factories in the 1960-61 fiscal year as 'part of a phased programme of raising defence production'<sup>31</sup>. The plan envisaged the production of new items, renovation of old plant and equipment to raise the capacity and efficiency of the factories, establishment of a new explosives factory at Bhandara, and development of steel and special alloy-making capacity in the ordnance factories<sup>32</sup>. These plans provoked one Indian daily to comment that 'the year 1960 has all the portents of coming off as a significant landmark in the history of the Defence industries'<sup>33</sup>.

In February 1960, the production of one-ton trucks was undertaken in collaboration with the Nissan Motor Company of Japan. Projects sanctioned during fiscal 1961 included a clothing factory at Avadi and an alloy and special steels plant<sup>34</sup>. In an agreement made public on 16 December 1961, Nissan agreed to collaborate with the Defence Ministry in the assembly in India of small (8 cwt) patrol jeeps, and the first of these jeeps, which were given the name 'Jonga', was

pressed into service on 24 January 1962. On 1st February 1962, the foundation stones of a cable factory and base repair depot were laid at Chandigarh; the cable factory, which was to be established with the assistance of a Japanese firm, was to manufacture a special variety of cables, special motor and electrical equipment and fire-control equipment, while the repair depot was to manufacture helicopters in addition to its normal repair and maintenance of aircraft.

Renewed interest was shown in the indigenous production of tanks. On 2 October 1960, the Defence Ministry issued a statement to the effect that the manufacture of tanks would be undertaken in the ordnance factories during the Third Five-Year Plan<sup>35</sup>. A team of defence experts headed by the Chief of the Army General Staff, Lt. General L.P. Sen, visited Britain and West Germany in January 1961 to assess several possible types<sup>36</sup>. The West German firm involved, a subsidiary of Daimler-Benz, was prepared to design a panzer tank suited to Indian conditions. However, as has been noted earlier in this paper, the offer by Vickers-Armstrong of Britain to modify the design of the Chieftain medium tank - which had been adopted by the British Army - to meet Indian specifications proved the more attractive<sup>37</sup>. The conclusion of an agreement between the Government and the British firm was revealed in a London announcement on

21 August 1961 which stated that 1,000 37-ton medium tanks were to be manufactured and a heavy vehicles factory was to be established for this purpose at Avadi, near Madras. The first 40 units would be built in Britain, the components of subsequent units would be shipped to India for assembly and, ultimately, there would be complete fabrication and manufacture at Avadi with the minimum of imported components considered feasible<sup>38</sup>. According to a statement by the Minister of Defence Production, A.M. Thomas, at Wellington (Nilgiris) on 7 November 1964, the Avadi plant would have the capacity to manufacture 100 units per annum<sup>39</sup>.

Even before independence, the nationalist political leadership indicated a desire for the country to attain self-sufficiency in the manufacture of aircraft for the Indian Air Force and civil aviation within 20 years, i.e. by about 1967<sup>40</sup>. In 1946, the Interim Government invited a British technical mission to India to advise it concerning the establishment of an aircraft industry. The Committee duly recommended the utilization of the repair and overhaul plant of Hindustan Aircraft Limited (HAL) at Bangalore as the nucleus for the industry and its advice was considered and accepted by the Government.

While a modern design and development department was being established, HAL undertook the assembly of various

aircraft required by the IAF. Fifty Percival Prentice basic trainers were assembled for the Air Force during the 1947-50 period<sup>41</sup> and twelve were produced for the Indian Navy between 1951 and 1953. Some 150 de Havilland D.H.82 Tiger Moth two-seat primary trainers were turned out up to 1951. A licensing agreement was concluded with de Havilland Aircraft of Canada in 1950 and a scheme for the assembly of Vampire F.B.9 single-seat fighter-bombers and T.55 conversion trainers was initiated. The assembly of the fighter-bomber began in 1953 and of the two-seat advanced trainer in 1956 and, when production ceased during the 1959-60 year, a total of 230 fighter-bombers and 50 trainers had been produced.

Negotiations were undertaken in 1955 with Folland Aircraft and Bristol Siddeley Aero-Engines of Britain for a licence to produce the Folland Gnat lightweight fighter and its powerplant, the Orpheus 701 turbojet. The licences were acquired in September 1956<sup>42</sup>, new factory buildings for the project were completed in 1959 and production of the airframe commenced in 1961 from imported components. The first Orpheus 701 came off the production line on 21 November 1960 and type approval was granted by the Defence Ministry nine months later<sup>43</sup>. Following the conclusion of a licence agreement with Hawker Siddeley Aviation in Delhi on 7 July 1959, the Indian Government initiated a project for the manufacture

of a military version of the Avro 748 Series 2 short- and medium-range transport at an Aircraft Maintenance Depot established for this purpose at Kanpur as a unit of Maintenance Command of the IAF<sup>44</sup>. In an agreement signed in London on 30 December 1959, India also acquired a licence for indigenous production of the Rolls Royce Dart RDa7 turboprop, the proposed powerplant for the Avro series to be produced. In the spring of 1962, the Indian Government obtained a licence for indigenous production of Sud-Aviation's SE-3160 Alouette III general-purpose helicopter<sup>45</sup>.

Simultaneous with the assembly and production of foreign aircraft under licence, HAL developed its own design section under the appointed chief designer, Dr V.M. Ghatage. In September 1948, the Government decided that HAL should proceed with the development of three aircraft types designated the HT-2 primary trainer, the HT-10 three-seat advanced trainer and the HT-11 advanced trainer<sup>46</sup>.

The first prototype of the HT-2 all-metal two-seat trainer flew on 13 August 1951 with a 145 h.p. Gipsy Major 10 powerplant. The flight of the second prototype followed on 19 February 1952 with a 155 h.p. Cirrus Major 3 engine. A total of 160 units were subsequently produced for the IAF, Indian Navy and civil aviation training centres until lack of orders caused the production line to be virtually closed

down in early 1962<sup>47</sup>. Development of the HT-10 and HT-11 trainers was not proceeded with for some unknown reasons while the proposed development for the Navy of an amphibian, which was to have been similar in design and power to the Short Sealand<sup>48</sup>, was also not pursued<sup>49</sup>.

Several light monoplanes were developed for civil and military purposes - the two-seat Pushpak for flying clubs and private owners<sup>50</sup> and the more powerful four-seat Krishak for artillery observation and spotting<sup>51</sup>. A light communication aircraft, the Kanpur, was designed by Air Vice-Marshall Harjinder Singh and the first prototype underwent flight trials in September 1960. The first demonstration flight took place on 4 February 1961.

Under the Second Five-Year Plan (1956-61) HAL undertook the design and manufacture of a jet trainer, an advanced jet fighter, and aero-engines. The trainer was envisaged as a single replacement for the HT-2, Harvard and Vampire, while the fighter was to be produced in two series to meet the Air Force's requirements for a transonic ground attack fighter-bomber and a Mach 2 interceptor<sup>52</sup>.

Official approval for the development of the HJT-16 two-seat basic/intermediate jet trainer was given in December 1959 - the first jet design to be undertaken in India without the help of non-Indian consultants. Detailed design work

began in April 1961 when Dr V.M. Ghatage, HAL's chief designer, assembled a group of 15 designers headed by Mr Raj Mahindra. The team was increased to 35 personnel the following year, mainly through the recruitment of graduates from the Indian Institute of Science and other technical colleges<sup>53</sup>.

Development also commenced on the HJE-2500 turbojet engine for the trainer, on a six-cylinder piston engine for the Krishak, and on the PE90H four-cylinder piston engine for the Pushpak. The latter engine was developed in four and one-half months and the first production model was started up by Defence Minister Menon on 11 March 1959.

The development of the HF-24 fighter commenced in 1956 under the direction of Dr Kurt Tank, the former technical director of the famous Focke-Wulf organization and designer of the Kondor maritime bomber and F.W. 190 fighter. The team was initially comprised of 18 German engineers, three Indian senior design engineers and about 22 other Indian engineers with design experience. Initial plans envisaged the use of two Orpheus 703 turbojets for the transonic Mk 1 version and of a single Orpheus 12 turbojet, with dry and simplified reheat ratings of 6,740 lbs and 8,170 lbs respectively, for the supersonic Mk 2. The latter engine was undergoing development by Bristol for the NATO competition

and its completion by the company was conditional on its acceptance for this market.

Within 22 months of the project's commencement, glider trials were begun to test, in free flight, the full-scale wings and fuselage of the design, which had previously been model-tested in wind tunnels and been tested for low-speed behaviour in the tunnel of the Indian Institute of Science at Bangalore. By this time the staff had increased to 80 Indians, the German complement remaining static. Assembly of the first prototype began in April 1960 and was completed in eleven months. In March 1961, the prototype (serial number BR 462) was completed and ground trials commenced. The maiden flight of the aircraft followed on 24 June 1961, powered by two Orpheus 703 turbojets<sup>54</sup>. The second Mk 1 prototype flew in October 1962.

Indian technicians had reportedly built some 25 Orpheus 12s virtually by hand<sup>55</sup> when it became clear that NATO no longer had any interest in the engine. Bristol Siddeley was thereby faced with a further expenditure of about \$ 10 million to complete development of an engine<sup>56</sup> for which India alone offered a market, and a limited one at that. Although under no obligation, contract or otherwise, to India to complete development of the model, Bristol Siddeley - which had already spent some \$ 7 million on the engine - was prepared



to expend up to \$ 1 million further on development<sup>57</sup> but advanced the perfectly reasonable suggestion that the Indian Government either accept further financial liability or request a subsidy from the British Government<sup>58</sup>. For reasons that can only be ascribed to pique, New Delhi not only refused to assume the costs of further development but, according to a well-informed aviation magazine, 'An effort by Britain to compromise by offering India a loan for the general purpose of aviation development and not specifying the Orpheus project as beneficiary was rejected by India's Defence Minister, Krishna Menon'<sup>59</sup>. India reportedly showed no interest in Snecma's offer of the Atar 9 turbojet (which powers the Mirage III and IV)<sup>60</sup> but turned to the Soviet Union for a suitable power-plant.

Several Klimov VK-7 turbojets, which develop a thrust comparable to the Orpheus 12, were obtained and subjected to evaluation tests at Bangalore. The centrifugal flow VK-7 could not, however, be readily fitted to the existing HF-24 airframe without major design changes and India shifted its attention to the RD9-F axial flow engine; six of this type were imported in late 1961 and bench-tested. This power-plant had a small frontal area but its use was still dependent on a modification of either the engine or airframe. Reasons of prestige and the problems of time and finance

involved in a redesign of the airframe strongly inclined the Indian Government against undertaking such a measure except as a last resort. In an apparent volte-face, however, Moscow finally agreed to modify the engine to fit the existing HF-24 airframe<sup>61</sup> and an agreement was concluded in the Russian capital in July 1962 which provided for the licensed manufacture of the Mach 1.4 engine in India<sup>62</sup>. The Soviet authorities agreed to supply a few models by the end of 1963 and production was envisaged in 1963 - subsequently deferred to 1964<sup>63</sup>.

Indian enquiries concerning the feasibility of acquiring a Soviet powerplant for the HF-24 indirectly led to interest in the MIG-21 - Russia reportedly proposing that it provide the whole airframe and engine of a supersonic fighter<sup>64</sup>.

The indigenous construction of naval craft and warships was evidently allocated a lower priority than aircraft and little serious consideration was publicly evidenced in such projects until 1955. In that year, an order was placed with Hindustan Shipyard Limited (at Vizagapatnam) for a survey vessel, and consideration was given to proposals for the local construction of a mooring vessel, seaward patrol craft and some inshore minesweepers<sup>65</sup>.

The Government gave renewed and serious consideration to the construction of naval vessels in India in early 1960<sup>66</sup> and, in pursuance of this objective, purchased in April the entire assets of Garden Reach Workshops Limited (Calcutta) and Mazagon Dock Limited (Bombay)<sup>67</sup>. It was envisaged that these newly-acquired yards, hitherto concerned with civil projects only, would initially build small naval vessels like minesweepers and, later, destroyers<sup>68</sup>. Orders were subsequently placed with these yards for various yard craft like water-boats, ferry craft, ammunition barges, fast motorboats and other items like pontoons<sup>69</sup>. Three seaward patrol craft were acquired in 1960-61 and approval for the construction of three more such craft was given in 1960-61 with a firm order being placed with Garden Reach in 1961-62<sup>70</sup>. Firm orders for two inshore minesweepers were placed with Mazagon Dock in 1960-61 and it was reported as 'likely' that an order would be placed with the same yard in the near future for a destroyer that was expected to cost about Rs 6.4 crores<sup>71</sup>. The managing director of Mazagon accordingly announced on 2 February 1962 that his company was 'soon' to commence the construction of two minesweepers for the Navy and would build the first destroyer before long<sup>72</sup>. Negotiations were also undertaken with Britain for technical and financial assistance in the proposed construction of three

'Leander' class frigates at Mazagon Dock<sup>73</sup>, but discussions were still in progress at the time of the border war.

On the eve of the border war, India's defence industries were occupied with diverse and ambitious production schemes.

The aircraft industry comprised Hindustan Aircraft Limited at Bangalore and the Aircraft Manufacturing Depot operated by the IAF's Maintenance Command at Kanpur. Underway or in the planning stage were the production of Pushpak and Krishak light monoplanes, the Kanpur Logistics Air Support type, Gnat transonic fighters, HF-24 transonic fighter-bombers and supersonic fighters, MIG-21 supersonic fighters, the HJT-16 advanced jet trainer, Avro-748 medium-range transport, Alouette III helicopter, Orpheus 701 and 703, Dart RDa7 and PE90H aero-engines.

The State-owned Mazagon Docks and Garden Reach shipyards were engaged in the construction of yardcraft and patrol vessels and contemplated the construction of minesweepers and destroyers in the near future.

The ordnance establishment comprised 22 factories - seven general engineering, five metallurgical, five clothing and leather, two chemical, two chemical-cum-engineering and one cable<sup>74</sup>. These factories were engaged in the production of small arms and ammunition, artillery, sea mines, depth charges, bombs, one-ton and three-ton general service

vehicles, eight cwt patrol jeeps, tractors and a variety of items for other Government Departments and civil trade including pressure cookers, meccano sets and hair clippers.

The research organization had undergone a considerable expansion and consisted of 25 research laboratories and technical establishments, two training establishments and three field research stations. Its efforts were reflected in such projects as the development of a mountain gun, the semi-automatic Ishapore rifle, anti-tank grenades and mines, mine-clearing equipment, universal gun and mortar-sights, collapsible assault boats, L.74 anti-aircraft guns, etc.

India had made substantial progress in developing local sources of defence equipment, particularly after 1959, but on a foundation built up in less spectacular fashion between 1947 and 1958. Production projects sanctioned had risen from Rs. .34 crores to Rs. .93 crores (1957-58), Rs 1.49 crores (1958-59), Rs 19.32 crores (1959-60), Rs 24.5 crores (1961-62) and totalled Rs 7 crores (1962-63)<sup>75</sup>. The value of production, which had fluctuated during the first decade, rose to Rs 25.14 crores (1959-60), Rs 30.36 crores (1960-61) and Rs 41.5 crores (1961-62)<sup>76</sup>. The value of production for civil trade varied from Rs 3.2 crores (1958-59), Rs 3.45 crores (1959-60), Rs 2.03 crores (April-November 1960) and Rs 7.21 crores (1960-61)<sup>77</sup>, and covered ferrous and non-ferrous

materials, metal products, leather and textile stores and chemical and general engineering articles<sup>78</sup>. The savings in foreign exchange resulting from projects undertaken was estimated at Rs 16 crores (1957-58 to 1958-59), Rs 14.22 crores (1959-60), Rs 11.6 crores (April-November 1960) and Rs 4.07 crores (1960-61)<sup>79</sup>.

HAL's Aero-Engine Division had achieved the distinction of being the first organization in non-communist Asia to manufacture a gas turbine aero-engine. The HJT-16 represented the first time an Afro-Asian country had designed a jet aircraft without help from either of the two power blocs. The HF-24 project gave India the 'distinction' of being one of only four or five countries to proceed with the development of a supersonic fighter aircraft.

India was still far from achieving self-sufficiency to even a general degree, however, and officially-inspired claims to the contrary<sup>80</sup> were grossly misleading. India remained dependent upon external sources of supply for designs, vital armaments components, all sophisticated equipment and many of the basic chemicals and intermediates required for the manufacture of ammunition and explosives.

The production schemes for trucks and jeeps were considerably behind schedule. By December 1962, only 459 Komatsu tractors had been produced for a foreign exchange saving of

Rs 112.50 lakhs as against a targeted output of 750 units and a saving of Rs 3.2 crores in foreign exchange. Despite a reduction in the target for 1962, production had fallen from the 1961 level of 16 per month to about nine<sup>81</sup>. The production of Shaktiman trucks against targets totalled 739/1200 (1959-60), 1201/1200 (1960-61) and 803/2000 (1961-62)<sup>82</sup>. Only 1192 Nissan trucks were produced against an expected 2400<sup>83</sup> and the scheme for Nissan patrol jeeps, which had initially envisaged 5000 per annum, had completed only 1847 up to the end of 1963<sup>84</sup>.

These schemes were also heavily dependent upon foreign components. The indigenous components of the Komatsu tractor was only 34.35 per cent as of December 1962; of the patrol jeep, only 28 per cent as of March 1964. As of March 1962, 46 per cent of the Shaktiman truck was of indigenous origin as against an expected 70 per cent. By March 1964, the indigenous content of the Nissan truck was 28.15 per cent as opposed to an initial target of 80 per cent and a revised target of 50 per cent<sup>85</sup>.

Bharat Electronics was geared almost solely to the production of ground units such as single-band receivers and transmitters, transistorized megaphones and 'walkie-talkies', and its output by value in 1964 was comprised of imported components and specialized raw materials to the extent of 30-35 per cent<sup>86</sup>.

The situation in the aircraft industry was even more misleading as, in reality, the industry largely functioned as an organization geared to the assembly of imported components<sup>87</sup>. Neither special quality steel nor aluminium - both vital to aircraft production - was manufactured in India, and all instrumentation, undercarriage, braking systems, communications and electronic equipment had to be imported. The superficiality of the industry was perhaps best illustrated by the fact that HAL had been able to undertake the repair and overhaul of jet engines only in 1960 while the first major overhaul and inspection of a Canberra bomber was only completed in 1961. The HF-24 project was proceeding in a halting fashion; the first prototype of the Mk 1 had been flight-tested with great fanfare in June 1961 but had been unable to attain a supersonic speed in level flight while the second prototype had only been flight-tested in October 1962. The future of the Mk 2 remained indefinite as no decision had yet been taken on a powerplant and it was at least four years removed from the stage of full production. The Avro scheme was virtually chaotic. The test flight of the first unit on 26 November 1961 had been hailed by Government and project authorities with the claim that three or four units would be produced each month by 1962 - but the second unit was not in fact to



be flight-tested until March 1963<sup>88</sup>. Furthermore, most of HAL's equipment was of pre-1945 origin and AMD's tools and jigs had been fabricated from World War II equipment. The fabricating machines at AMD were largely salvage from stores left behind by the United States Army Air Force in 1945 with some additions from the Punjab and Hindustan Machine Tools plants.

India's defence production organization was also afflicted with a series of other ills which inhibited efficiency and the establishment of soundly-based defence industries consistent with the country's resources and immediate needs. India remained badly deficient in technical capabilities and very short of first-rate design engineers and scientific workers despite the considerable efforts of the Defence Science Organisation. The modernization of the ordnance establishment undertaken in 1960 was making only slow progress and efficient operations were being seriously compromised by the absence of proper cost accounting and depreciation which concealed the heavy costs being absorbed for moderate gains. Low pay scales and slow promotions were continuing to be reflected in the flight of sorely-needed personnel to the greater attractions afforded by civil and private industry. Bharat Electronics was involved in such diverse production as to preclude either economic production

or concentrated development research. A country which remained dependent on gifts of American grain to meet persistent shortages and on massive foreign aid to underpin its economic development plans was committed to two supersonic plane projects - for an air force which was of relatively modest size and at a time when nations possessed of greatly superior financial, technological and industrial resources were engaged in limiting the types of fighter aircraft in service.

Planning for defence production must always be related to existing and potential capabilities, to a careful evaluation of likely military requirements and their projection over a period of time. Its ramifications are so extensive as to call for the most careful and integrated planning. The available evidence suggests that New Delhi, in the latter half of the 1947-62 period, generally ignored these truisms.

Maximum self-sufficiency in military needs was desirable to enable the country to pursue its foreign policy objectives free of the limitations imposed by the applications of virtual arms embargoes by external powers as during the Kashmir conflict<sup>89</sup>. Desired armaments could not always be acquired when needed or at a price which was deemed to be reasonable<sup>90</sup>. Acutely conscious of India's size, convinced of its importance and great potential, and sensitive to the

country's economic weakness and dependence upon the goodwill (or to put it more bluntly - charity) of the more prosperous and committed countries of both the Soviet and Western blocs, India's political leadership developed what amounted to an obsession to achieve the maximum possible self-sufficiency in defence equipment and thereby provide substance to the policy of non-alignment<sup>91</sup>.

The approach to broadening indigenous defence production facilities during the first decade would appear to have been a considered one and in accordance with India's needs and capabilities. From about 1955, however, planning embarked on ambitious schemes which were not warranted either by India's immediate military requirements or by the capacities of local technology and industry. The HF-24 project and the decision to initiate a MIG-21 scheme were quite premature and involved the actual or proposed diversion of scarce funds and technical skills to projects which have been described as 'nothing short of a huge fraud on the gullible public'<sup>92</sup>. Professed official beliefs notwithstanding, there is really little difference between dependence upon external weapons systems and dependence on them for blueprints and vital parts, as both require the co-operation of a foreign company and the at least tacit approval of the particular foreign government. From the standpoint of time, external purchase

from a substantial production programme enables faster acquisition of items undergoing progressive and revolutionary development. Such external purchase is also far less expensive than the establishment of a limited local production line at great cost for a very limited domestic market. The popular argument that indigenous production enables appreciable savings of scarce foreign exchange is not particularly relevant in the Indian case in view of the massive foreign aid which India was receiving from the very countries from which she obtained military stores and equipment.

It is apparent that politics emerged as a primary determinant in defence production during the period which coincided with Krishna Menon's tenure at the Defence Ministry. The vigour with which he approached the issue of defence production, and the constant stress he placed upon the supposed progress being made, suggests that he perceived that only in this sphere could political capital be made from a portfolio which was, from the viewpoint of domestic politics, hardly a stepping-stone to higher political office. The Avro project affords an example of his approach. According to one political commentator, Menon wanted the first Indian-assembled Avro to fly even before it was thought fit for the first prototype to do so in Britain<sup>93</sup>. The result was that project officials set out to manufacture a full production model to

certification standards instead of via the normal stage of a pre-production development prototype. Work began in January 1960 but sanctions for the buildings were not given until 30 months later with the result that equipment arrived but could not be installed. As late as January 1964, production and construction were going on simultaneously in some hangars<sup>94</sup>.

There would also appear to be sufficient evidence to support the widely-held view that Menon deliberately sought to create a private industrial empire within his ministerial control. Although the production of various items for civil trade was undertaken by the Defence Ministry prior to Menon's tenure, the items involved at this early stage appear to have complemented existing civil government and private facilities - road rollers, rail carriages, etc. Following Menon's appointment, however, production was undertaken of such items as film projectors, brief cases, mail bags, microscopes, meccano sets and coffee machines<sup>95</sup>. The production of such items in Ordnance could scarcely be considered to be warranted by the absence of such capacities in the private sector and the expense involved in a limited production of such items could not possibly have been competitive with the larger capacities of the private sector if proper cost accounting and depreciation methods were followed<sup>96</sup>. The

argument that such production was required to preserve spare capacity against the contingency of war would also appear to have been 'over-worked'; the private sector could employ the same argument even more effectively. Ordnance would have undoubtedly been more effective in its essential task - the development and production of military items - if it had not diverted its attentions to petty items of civil trade in competition to established private facilities.

The production schemes for one-ton and three-ton trucks allegedly resulted from the unsatisfactory performance of private suppliers as regards deliveries and price. Defending these projects during the defence debate on 9 April 1960, Menon claimed that two of the three manufacturers of trucks in India had delivered 'almost nothing' of the orders placed with them by the Defence Ministry while the third, although his deliveries were more regular, had increased his prices 'very considerably'. He claimed that the types of trucks under production in Ordnance were better than those supplied by the private sector (50 per cent more carrying capacity and 35 per cent more cruising speed) and that a three-ton truck produced by Ordnance cost only Rs 36,000 or about Rs 7500 below the price quoted by the cheapest manufacturer; the savings resulting from the placement of an order for 4500 three-ton trucks and 1200 one-ton vehicles with Ordnance,

rather than with private Indian manufacturers, totalled Rs 5 crores<sup>97</sup>.

It would have been cheaper, however, to have resolved the issue through penalty-clause contracts with the private manufacturers than to have established such facilities independently in the Ordnance sector. As the annual requirements of the Army at the time amounted only to about 2000 trucks, it seems highly doubtful if an ordnance scheme of say 2000 vehicles per annum could be operated as efficiently or as economically as private production lines serving a market of 40,000 civilian vehicles per annum. This is particularly so when one takes into account the profit motive underlying the efforts of private manufacturers - an incentive not likely to be so compelling in a miniature 'ordnance empire' where the input-output efficiency scale method of computation is much more difficult to ascertain and where production schemes were undertaken on various items in the 'national interest' even if it was not economical to do so. Menon's well-known bias against the private sector was not absent from defence production policy and, it can be argued, it did not facilitate the formulation and execution of policy calculated to achieve maximum results for the human, financial and material resources expended. Insofar as policy was reflected by the HF-24 and MIG-21 projects, efforts were directed seemingly

towards the projection of an image of industrial power and technical skill which in fact did not exist - and which contributed very little, if at all, towards alleviating India's pressing social and economic problems. The contradiction between a supersonic aircraft from an Ordnance factory and emergency grain shipments from the West (over and above the massive PL 480 shipments which the United States has been providing since 1951) needs no elucidation.

#### Notes

1 Sir Gerald Butler, administrative head of the Indian ordnance factories for the period 1938-43, stated in a letter published in The Daily Telegraph on 17 November 1962 that India retained 16 ordnance factories and one clothing factory. Defence Minister Singh stated in early 1948 that there were then 16 ordnance factories in operation with a work force of 38,345. LAD, vol. 1, 3 February 1948, p. 165. The Union Government agreed to provide Pakistan with financial compensation but subsequently declined to honour their obligations completely in the context of strained Indo-Pakistan relations.

2 The Industrial Resolution Policy of the Indian Government issued in 1948 and re-issued in revised form at the start of the Second Plan in April 1956 designates munitions, aircraft and shipbuilding as 'industries whose future development would be exclusive responsibility of the state'.

3 H.M. Patel, The Defence of India, R.R. Kale Memorial Lecture 1963 (Gorkhale Institute of Politics and Economics, Asia Publishing House, 1963), p. 15.

4 Ibid, pp. 15-16.

5 In his capacity as chairman of the Organisation, the Scientific Adviser acted as an adviser to the Defence



Minister and sat on the Defence Minister's (Inter-Services) Committee with equal rank to the Chiefs of Staff and the Defence Secretary.

6 The scheme included a fellowship programme for 50 persons to be trained each year and a studentship scheme aimed at encouraging university scholars to carry out post-graduate research in defence laboratories and establishments on a part-time basis. The Service comprised civilian scientists employed in the Defence Ministry and the three Armed Services.

7 The first regular course began in October 1953.

8 For further details, see Ministry of Defence, Report, 1959-60, pp. 36-7.

9 Patel, op. cit., p. 15. He also stated that the proposals were revived some years later.

10 Production commenced in January 1956.

11 See the statement by the Minister of Defence Organisation, Mahavir Tyagi, LSD, pt 2, vol. 2, 25 March 1953, col. 2821.

12 The Indian Government refused to deliver most of the share legally allocated to Pakistan because of the Kashmir conflict and strained Indo-Pakistan relations.

13 Tyagi, op. cit., p. 2822. See also the statement by Nehru, ibid, pt 2, vol. 2, 26 March 1953, cols 2925-6.

14 Tyagi, loc. cit.

15 See report by the Bonn correspondent in The Times, 21 June 1954.

16 See the statement by Defence Minister Menon, LSD, 2nd Sess., vol. 3, 25 July 1957, col. 5212.

17 Ibid.

18 The Minister of Defence Organisation, Mahavir Tyagi, was appointed chairman of the Board and N.N. Wanchoo, Joint Secretary in the Defence Ministry, became administrative head with the title of Controller-General of Defence Production.

19 See Menon's statement in Parliament on 5 December 1958, LSD, 2nd Sess., vol. 23, col. 3408.

- 20 See ibid, cols 3403-14.
- 21 See appendix II.
- 22 Ministry of Defence, Report, 1960-61, p. 24.
- 23 Times of India, 19 January 1960.
- 24 Hindustan Times, 25 April 1950.
- 25 See statement by Deputy Defence Minister Satish Chandra, LSD, pt 1, vol. 1, 5 March 1953, cols 754-5. He also stated that 80 per cent of Service purchases of equipment in 1951-52 were obtained in India with the majority of imports coming from Britain.
- 26 Cited, Overseas Hindustan Times, 2 July 1953.
- 27 Hindu, 26 January 1960.
- 28 A Defence Production Planning Committee had been established in 1957 to carry out a detailed study of the whole field of defence production, repair, maintenance and research activities with a view to attaining self-sufficiency. The Committee submitted its report in 1959. Speaking at a New Delhi meeting of the Congress Parliamentary Party on 8 February 1960, Nehru explained that the Government had sought to economise in the past few years by postponing the manufacture of certain items but that, because of the border situation with China, top priority was to be given to defence and the defence industries in the 1960-61 budget and in the Third Plan. Cited, Times of India, 9 February 1960.
- 29 Cited, Hindu, 19 December 1959.
- 30 Cited, Times of India, 9 February 1960.
- 31 Ibid, 19 January 1960.
- 32 Ibid.
- 33 Hindu, 26 January 1960.
- 34 Ministry of Defence, Report, 1961-62, p. 36.
- 35 No information was given regarding type or quantity.

36 Commenting on the Mission, the Indian Express stated on 6 January 1961 that the Defence Ministry, in their examination of the Mission's report, would take due note of the suitability of the proposed models for Indian terrain and climatic conditions and 'keeping in view potential enemies against whom they may have to be used'.

37 An important consideration in decisions on equipment purchases from abroad, however, was noted by Nehru at a Delhi press conference in April 1956 when he admitted that 'Indian forces had in the past been developed largely on the basis of British equipment and for practical reasons it was convenient, other things being equal, to continue on this basis'. Cited, The Times, 3 April 1956.

38 For reports of the agreement, see The Times, 23 August and 13 September 1961; Times of India, 11 and 22 August 1961. According to B.G. Verghese (Times of India, 22 May 1964), the hull and turret, engine and transmission system and gear-box are ultimately to be manufactured at Avadi, the gun in one of the ordnance factories and the fire-control system by Bharat Electronics; the vital armour-plating would be imported.

39 Cited, Hindu, 9 November 1964.

40 See Leonard Bridgman (ed.), Jane's All The World's Aircraft, 1947, p. 103c.

41 The first 15 were assembled from imported components, the next five from imported detailed parts with increased local assembly and the remaining 30 of this order from Indian materials and imported engines and instruments.

42 The agreement with Bristol provided for Indian production of the full range of Orpheus turbo-jet engines including the Orpheus B versions.

43 Flight, 2 July 1964, p. 17. The hundredth Orpheus 701 was accepted by the Defence Ministry on 30 September 1963.

44 The manufacture of a medium transport had been envisaged in 1955. See statement by J.M. Srinagash, general manager of HAL, 3 November 1955. Cited, Asian Recorder, 29 October-4 November 1955, p. 489K.

45 See AW, 30 April 1962, p. 35. The Indian Express (8 May 1962) reported that the plant would probably be built at Chandigarh.

- 46 Jane's All The World's Aircraft, 1949-50, p. 102e.
- 47 One example was presented to Singapore under the Colombo Plan, one example was given to the Indonesian Air Force and twelve were sold to the Ghanaian Air Force - which Service the IAF helped establish.
- 48 Jane's All The World's Aircraft, 1950-51, pp. 107-8c.
- 49 A number of Short Sealands were purchased instead.
- 50 The Pushpak was flown for the first time on 28 September 1958 with a Continental C90-12F engine imported from the United States. The initial production series is powered by this engine with later machines to receive the PE-90H engine undergoing development by HAL. By 30 November 1962, 70 units had been ordered of which 48 had been produced. Ministry of Defence, Report, 1962-63, p. 25.
- 51 Work on this model began in 1958, the first prototype flew in November 1959 and the second in November 1960. The model is powered by a 160 h.p. Continental six-cylinder engine.
- 52 In early 1961, a study was also in progress regarding development of a naval version of the HF-24 as a replacement for the Sea Hawk. Ministry of Defence, Report, 1960-61, p. 13.
- 53 Flight, 1st October 1964, p. 579.
- 54 Ibid, 2 July 1964, p. 16.
- 55 AW, 18 December 1961, p. 23.
- 56 Ibid, 23 July 1962, p. 24.
- 57 Ibid. According to the report, development of the engine had been started with U.S. Mutual Aid funds - which aid had been terminated by America when India purchased Soviet transports and helicopters.
- 58 Discussions between Bristol Siddeley and the Indian Government were reportedly held in 1960 and 1961 with a view to completing development of the OR 12 or of continuing development of the much later BS.75 turbofan. Flight, 2 July 1964, p. 17.

- 59 AW, 23 July 1962, p. 24.
- 60 Ibid, 18 December 1961, p. 23.
- 61 The Statesman, 14 July 1962.
- 62 K. Rangaswami, Hindu, 13 July 1962.
- 63 See statement by Menon in Parliament on 17 August 1962. Cited in Hindu, 18 August 1962; see also the remarks of the Minister of Defence Production, K. Raghuramaiah, LSD, 3rd Series, vol. 14, 4 March 1963, col. 1901.
- 64 AW, 23 July 1962, p. 24.
- 65 See statement by Deputy Defence Minister Satish Chandra, LSD, pt 1, vol. 1, 1st March 1955, col. 360.
- 66 See statement by Deputy Defence Minister, K. Raghuramaiah, ibid, vol. 39, 3 March 1960, cols 3919-20.
- 67 At the time of the purchase, the owners of the Dock were apparently eager to sell due to the fact that the Dock was then operating at a loss.
- 68 See statement by Menon in Parliament on 9 April 1960, LSD, 2nd Sess., vol. 42, col. 10,824.
- 69 See Ministry of Defence, Report, 1960-61, pp. 11-12; 1961-62, p. 28.
- 70 Ibid, 1960-61, p. 11; 1961-62, p. 21.
- 71 Ibid, 1960-61, p. 37.
- 72 Cited, Times of India, 20 February 1962.
- 73 The 'Leander' type is equipped to carry a 'Wasp' ASW helicopter and is fitted in the Royal Navy with two Seacat ship-to-air missile launchers for short-range air defence.
- 74 Ministry of Defence, Report, 1963-64, p. 13.
- 75 Ibid, 1959-60, p. 26; 1961-62, p. 36, 1962-63, p. 24.
- 76 Ibid, 1961-62, p. 37; 1962-63, p. 24.
- 77 Ibid, 1959-60, p. 28; 1960-61, p. 25; 1961-62, p. 38.

78 For examples of such items, see ibid, 1959-60, pp. 26-8; 1960-61, pp. 26-7; 1961-62, p. 38.

79 Ibid, 1959-60, p. 28; 1960-61, p. 27; 1961-62, p. 38. It must be noted that the figure for 1959-60 does not include new projects like trucks and tractors while the figure for 1961-62 does not include tractors, which were wholly imported.

80 Such mis-statement was not restricted to the politician; Air Vice-Marshal Harjinder Singh, AOC-in-C of Maintenance Command was reported as informing airmen of the IAF at Avadi in early 1962 that India would be self-sufficient in the manufacture of aircraft within five years and would even be able to export. Cited, Hindu, 21 February 1962.

81 Ministry of Defence, Report, 1960-61, p. 25; 1961-62, p. 37; The Economic Weekly, vol. 40, No. 12, 29 March 1963, p. 628.

82 The Economic Weekly, loc. cit. Menon claimed in the Lok Sabha on 9 April 1960 that the schedule could not be maintained because of lack of steel. Cited, Hindu, 11 April 1960.

83 The Economic Weekly, ibid. See also Ministry of Defence, Report, 1961-62, p. 37.

84 Ministry of Defence, Report, 1963-64, p. 58.

85 Ibid, 1960-61, p. 25; 1961-62, p. 37; 1963-64, p. 58; The Economic Weekly, ibid.

86 B.G. Verghese, Times of India, 22 May 1964.

87 The indigenous content of the first Avro Series 2, for example, was only 37.5 per cent. See statement by the Minister of Defence Production, K. Raghuramaiah, in Parliament, 9 March 1964. Cited, Indian Information 7:6, 15 April 1964, p. 183.

88 Even at this date, plans called for the production of only four more units during the year. Times of India, 12 March 1963.

89 The embargo does not seem to have affected India nearly as much as it did Pakistan, but it obviously led to a belief in the need to avoid a recurrence which could have far-reaching effects.

90 This factor has been noted in the chapters dealing with the three Armed Services.

91 Although there is no evidence to show that India was ever subjected to pressures from the West to adjust her foreign policy on penalty of having arms withheld (Kashmir being a rather different case), such dependence had potential dangers and current inhibitions. As L.K. Rosinger has written:

Generally, speaking, an effort by a weaker government to obtain military aid from a great power suggests at the very least that the aid is not to be used contrary to the overall strategic outlook of the great power. Once such a tie is formed both parties know that a sharp political or economic dispute between them might end their co-operation. Since the withdrawal of foreign advisers, the cessation or diminution of the flow of supplies, etc., might threaten the efficiency or stability of the dependent armed forces and regime, the weaker government in particular acquires a military motive for maintaining close political relations.

India and the United States (New York, Macmillan 1950), pp. 131-2.

92 Madhu Limaye, "National Apathy", Seminar (July 1962), p. 34.

93 G.K. Reddy, Times of India, 11 August 1961.

94 B.G. Verghese, ibid, 22 May 1964.

95 For details of important items of civil trade stores, bulk manufacture of which was undertaken in the ordnance factories between 1959 and 1962, see Ministry of Defence, Report, 1959-60, pp. 27-8; 1960-61, pp. 26-7; 1961-62, p. 38. Listed also are prototypes.

96 Such charges were a persistent feature of the annual reports of the Audit and Public Accounts committees.

97 See Menon's statement as reported in Hindu, 11 April 1960. He also explained that the agreement with a Japanese firm for collaboration in the scheme for one-ton trucks was due to the German company (M.A.N.) involved in the three-ton scheme not having such a model.

## CHAPTER IX

### CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS

The pattern of civil-military relations in India during the period 15 August 1947-20 October 1962 closely approximated the accepted norm in the English-speaking countries of the West. There was a stable subordination of the military establishment to the civil power in which the channels of advice from the military to the civil authority were institutionalized in a manner compatible with a democratic policy-making process. In this achievement, India provided a rare exception among the newly-emergent states<sup>1</sup> and a useful comparison with neighbouring Burma and with Pakistan, where the inheritance of a similar military tradition did not preclude an army coup d'etat after just over a decade of civilian government<sup>2</sup>.

Under the Raj, the armed forces had constituted a professional body which, though regarded by Indian nationalists as an instrument of sectionalism in internal politics<sup>3</sup>, and as a mercenary force loyal to an alien rather than to a popular indigenous authority, evoked genuine national pride by



its exploits in two world wars and countless minor ones. Its contribution to Indian independence from British rule, though generally ignored by publicists, was an important one and perhaps of greater significance than the frequently irresponsible actions and attitudes which characterized the nationalist movement.

The contribution of the armed forces to an independent and bifurcated India has also been extensive. Amid the chaos of partition the Army - though it failed to remain as impartial to communal strife as was hoped - nonetheless constituted the only sanction for official authority<sup>4</sup>. It was the symbol of national purpose in the Hyderabad, Junagadh, Kashmir and Goa operations. In Korea, Gaza, Indo-China and the Congo, Indian military personnel have given expression to their country's support for peace-keeping activities and symbolized her international role. The image of military power projected by the British Indian Army prior to 1947 and inherited by the Indian Army at independence has been a major (if frequently overlooked) contributor to the status which has been accorded to the country and its representatives in a power-conscious world. The Army, and to a lesser extent the Navy and Air Force, have continued to be the ultimate sanction of civil authority in a country that has remained at least as prone to civil disturbances as during the era of

British rule. The armed forces have provided a model of discipline, efficiency and resource for a civil Indian deficient in these very respects.

The Government indicated its appreciation of the need for an efficient and non-political military (and civil) establishment following independence when it rejected proposals from less responsible sections of opinion to prosecute members of the civil and military hierarchies for their loyalty to the Raj during the period of nationalist activity aimed at securing the removal of that alien authority. It readily accepted the vital need to retain the existing civil and military bureaucracies, rejected proposals to replace the professional Army with a more politically-conscious force along the lines of the wartime Indian National Army<sup>5</sup> and made no attempt to interfere with the traditional recruitment patterns.

Congress leaders paid tribute to the patriotism which they felt (genuinely, it seems) had motivated the men and officers of the Indian National Army<sup>6</sup> - but these personnel were barred from re-employment in the armed forces. Explaining the official policy towards these men in Parliament on 29 March 1948, Nehru stated that ex-INA personnel would receive pensions wherever due, that orders of dismissal issued by the former government would be superceded by discharges

designed to remove the stigma which accompanied the former orders, and that Rs 3,000,000 would be set aside for distribution to widows of ex-INA personnel and to disabled persons. Ex-INA personnel would be permitted to join the police, the State Forces and the civil service subject to merit and suitability - but not the Army because of the long break in their service and the 'psychological effect' that such a move would have on an Army already subjected to considerable strain<sup>7</sup>.

The status of the armed forces nevertheless declined after independence, both in society and state.

The traditional aversion of Hindu society to regard the military as superior either to royalty or the priestly order was strengthened by the post-independence context. The absence of any apparent real threat to Indian security during at least the first decade of independence reinforced the illusion that Gandhi had shown the superiority of moral over physical force and that such an approach was applicable even in the post-1947 era to a significant degree; there was thus a philosophic barrier to attaching undue glamour or importance to the military uniform. This attitude was reinforced by the Government's moralistic postures, anti-militarist attitudes, non-aligned stance and stress on economic development as the ultimate source of a nation's strength. In the sociological sense, India's inheritance of able political

leadership, a well-trained bureaucracy and a capable middle class with increasing competence in administration, medicine, engineering, law and business served to lessen the value of the military as a vehicle of modernity and progress. The relatively modest stature of the military in Indian society was partly reflected in the marriage market (a useful barometer of career status in a society where marriages are still arranged) which rated young men in the armed forces in third place behind those in foreign firms and in the Indian foreign and administrative services. In the view of one Indian political commentator, 'nowadays, young men give first preference to commercial and engineering services and then to the civil service, while the Defence Service is given the last place'<sup>8</sup>.

The relative status of the military officer in society was confirmed by the Government's various measures directed at reducing the position of the armed forces in the state and the privileges and benefits given to military personnel. The Commanders-in-Chief of the three Services were re-designated as Chiefs of Staff (a much less prestigious title) with effect from 1st April 1955 and the comparative position of military officers in the Warrant of Precedence was sharply lowered<sup>9</sup>. Lieutenant-Generals lost their former entitlement to gun salutes. Military officers' leave and travel concessions,

family and other allowances and accommodation scales were terminated or reduced. A new Pay Code, introduced in 1948, reduced the pay scales of Indian Commissioned Officers or ICOs (who comprised the vast bulk of the officer corps) to the levels prevailing in 1939, although the pay scales of the small but senior group of King's Commissioned Officers (KCOs) remained untouched<sup>10</sup>. Some military observers evidenced a strong conviction that the Government was indifferent to the welfare of ex-servicemen<sup>11</sup>. There appears to have been a deliberate effort by Government to keep military officers out of the public spotlight<sup>12</sup>.

The position of the armed forces in the state apparatus underwent a sharp reduction from 1946. With the formation of the Interim Government in September of that year, the Commander-in-Chief of an integrated Service command ceased to function as Vice-President of the Executive Council, being replaced in the Interim Cabinet by a civilian Defence Minister, Sardar Baldev Singh. On 15 August 1947, the integrated Service command was broken up with each Service passing under a separate and independent head designated Commander-in-Chief, Indian Army; Flag Officer Commanding Royal Indian Navy; and Air Marshal Commanding the Royal Indian Air Force<sup>13</sup>. In 1950, under Article 53(2) of the new Constitution, the President of India became the Supreme Commander of the armed

forces in a ceremonial supercession which symbolized civilian control.

From a position of direct access to the highest level of the British Indian Government, the military were reduced to a position in the executive machinery in which they constituted the base of a hierarchical structure of committees arranged in a pyramid pattern with the Defence Committee of the Cabinet as the apex<sup>14</sup>.

The system afforded, in theory, a co-ordinated approach with a measure of consistency being ensured by all branches being served by the Military Wing of the Cabinet Secretariat. Proposals relating to the annual defence grants are initiated by the respective Services who assess their needs in terms of personnel, money, supplies and equipment. These estimates are scrutinized by the appropriate apparatus of the individual Service branch under the scrutiny of Deputy Financial Advisers. The revised estimates are then discussed in the Defence Minister's Army, Navy and Air Force Committees and in the Defence Minister's (Inter-Services) Committee, following which they are subjected to the scrutiny of the Defence Ministry. The resulting estimates are then sent to the Defence Committee of the Cabinet for consideration, and the conclusions of this body are forwarded to the full Cabinet for approval. The assessment of military needs which emerges

from this process is presented in the form of the Defence Estimates<sup>15</sup> to Parliament for discussion and approval. The funds are thereupon expended under the constant observation of the Deputy Financial Advisers who are responsible for checking the progress of expenditure against budgetary grants and allotments and examining irregularities<sup>16</sup>.

As revealed by the preceding paragraph, financial controls are pervasive, inside of the defence organization yet independent of it. The annual and supplementary estimates cannot be submitted to Parliament without the prior approval of the Ministry of Finance and audit supervision of expenditure is exercised through the Comptroller and Auditor-General and the Public Accounts Committee.

The Financial Adviser to the Defence Services<sup>17</sup> has a triple responsibility. He must scrutinize all proposals involving defence expenditure and advise whether they should be accepted, possessing direct access to the Finance Minister for this purpose. As Financial Adviser to the Defence Services, he has direct access to the Defence Minister and may, at his discretion require that any case in which he thinks a decision contravenes financial principles be submitted to the Finance Minister direct or via the Defence Minister. He is also a member of various committees on defence matters and the Chief Accountant officer for defence expenditure,

responsible to internal audit and accounting for all monies voted by Parliament for defence purposes<sup>18</sup>. Lastly, in his capacity as Chief Accounts Officer to the Defence Services, the Financial Adviser prepares the annual appropriation accounts.

In the opinion of a former Defence Secretary, 'The policy-making organisation of the Defence Ministry is thus made sufficiently flexible to ensure that every relevant point of view has a chance of being presented at appropriate level and to have it considered at the highest level if necessary'<sup>19</sup>. The theory is rarely if ever translated into practice, however, and this has been true of the formulation and implementation of Indian military policy to the detriment of the nation's defence preparedness.

The system of financial control met with the satisfaction of financial officials. Speaking in 1955, one of the Financial Adviser's staff declared that 'the coat is a little more stylishly cut and stitched if a friendly and well-informed critic helps the tailor at various stages before the finishing touch is given to it'. He admitted that occasional differences of opinion had existed but claimed that the system worked well in practice<sup>20</sup>. His claim would seem to require some qualification, however, in light of the conclusions arrived at in an officially-sponsored investigation of



Indian public administration published in 1953<sup>21</sup> and the annual reports of the Public Accounts Committee<sup>22</sup>. Noting that the Financial Adviser has a virtual right of veto over military expenditure, H.M. Patel has himself implicitly criticized the system of financial controls with the admission that 'many difficulties ensue from this [Financial Adviser's] position...'<sup>23</sup>

The military contribution to policy was further vitiated by the fact, noted in the 1958 report of the Estimates Committee, of the 'considerable duplicate effort involved in the Service Headquarters and the Ministry of Defence, and the possibility of proposals emanating from a senior level at Services Headquarters being examined by officials in the Ministry who are either junior or lack the necessary expert knowledge'<sup>24</sup>. The report also drew attention to 'an imbalance in the distribution of responsibilities between the Ministry and the Services Headquarters and also a lack of sufficient delegation of authority and powers to the Services Headquarters which are presided over by officers of the status of the Chiefs of Staff'<sup>25</sup>. The reception accorded to Service views in the Ministry was further compromised by the tendency of senior bureaucrats to regard the outlook of the Indian military leadership as being excessively coloured by prevailing thought in British military circles. As H.M. Patel once

cautioned: 'Unconsciously we tend to think along those lines and do not allow sufficiently for the differences in our resources, nor also, and this is most important, for the differences in our respective objects. We shall have to guard against this very real danger'<sup>26</sup>.

It is perhaps not surprising, then, that it has been charged by an Indian military writer that the civilian officials in the Defence Ministry have sometimes put a new complexion to a position as appreciated by the Chiefs of Staff<sup>27</sup>. Confirmation of this is suggested by H.M. Patel who claimed in 1953 that the Air Force and Navy obtained 'fair play' on several occasions only as a result of their being able to present their respective cases 'fully and frankly'<sup>28</sup> - i.e. to the appropriate civilian officials like himself who clearly made the decisions. The ability of the average civilian official to take such decisions, however, must be judged against Patel's own admission that the ignorance of civilian officials (to which may properly be added that of the politicians) about military matters is so complete as to be regarded as a self-evident and incontrovertible fact<sup>29</sup>. Efforts to correct this deficiency bore fruition very belatedly for reasons, it would appear, of general apathy. Patel claims to have proposed the establishment of an Indian counterpart of the Imperial Defence College in 1949 only to have

the Chiefs of Staff reply that they could not spare sufficient officers and instructors of the right calibre<sup>30</sup>. In 1955, a modest beginning was made with the introduction of an experimental scheme in Southern Command involving mutual liaison visits by civil and military officers aimed at encouraging closer understanding of each other's organizational and administrative problems; the scheme was subsequently extended to Western and Eastern Commands<sup>31</sup>. The Estimates Committee proposed the establishment of an institution modelled on the Imperial Defence College in its 26th report (1958) and the support given the proposal by the incumbent Defence Minister, V.K. Krishna Menon, is understood to have greatly facilitated the ultimate establishment of the National Defence College in New Delhi in 1960<sup>32</sup>. The scope and/or timing of these schemes, however, was such as to contribute little to the relationships between the civil and military bureaucracies during the 1947-62 period under review.

The advisory function of the military leadership was further compromised by the absence of a unified Service command, which virtually precluded a reasonable consensus permitting forceful professional arguments regarding budgetary allocations. Instead of a single Commander-in-Chief as in the British period, there were three autonomous Services,

each formulating its own policy, competing with each other for budgetary allocations from an economy-minded and markedly apathetic political executive, and maintaining parallel bodies with the most scrupulous canons of parity. Instead of common instruments for joint action, there were various inter-Services committees which tended to swell into even further committees with the result noted by the military correspondent of the Indian Express in early 1963: 'What is particularly marked, as in the case of the committees and boards of the Defence Ministry, often the same men rotate from one meeting to another in an endless swirl, and they are overworked and exhausted, unless they become bored and infertile'<sup>33</sup>.

Such a system placed a heavy responsibility upon the Defence Ministry to effect compromises within the budgetary ceilings laid down by the Cabinet. As the Defence Secretary and the Financial Adviser are primarily concerned with matters of administration and financial procedures within the budgetary allocation, the key figure in the Defence machinery should be the Minister. It is he, and he alone, who is responsible for balancing the Services in a manner consistent with their respective operational roles through the apportionment of available resources. This person must face the demands of each Service separately in his Army,

Navy and Air Force Committees and resolve conflicting Service interests and force compromises in his Inter-Services Committee. He thereby inevitably constitutes the focus of Service resentments over budgetary allocations and this is bound to be particularly true with respect to a poor country desirous of possessing effective armed forces relative to its size but reluctant to expend the sums required to achieve the desired level of military power. In such a context, the maintenance of a satisfactory working relationship requires that the Minister be possessed of a congenial but business-like manner, willing to recognize the experience of subordinates, capable of making reasonable assessments of conflicting Service representations, and able to subordinate personal ambitions, pre-delictions and prejudices to the larger responsibilities of his office. The situation also requires that the Minister be prepared and able to present convincing arguments to the Defence Committee of the Cabinet and to the full Cabinet as and when he is convinced of the need for adjustments in military policy. The available evidence strongly suggests that not a single holder of the Defence post during the 1947-62 period managed to combine the desired assets.

The Defence portfolio seemingly carried little weight in Cabinet, perhaps for reasons advanced by a former officer in

an article published in 1960. The officer, Major-General Y.S. Paranjpe, expressed the view that the appointment in Defence was not politically attractive because the appointee

has to get into something that he knows nothing about; secondly, everything done in the Ministry is of a secretive nature and he cannot advertise himself, except occasionally by showing a rise in the production on the Defence Factories and, thirdly, he always faces criticism if anything goes wrong with nothing to compensate for it.<sup>34</sup>

He thus felt that it was not surprising that such a Ministry should always get persons who possessed neither the necessary qualities nor aptitudes, and charged:

It remains a neglected ministry, run mainly by the civilian secretariat staff. The minister in such cases remains a nonentity influenced by party politics and guided by his secretaries with whose intimate assistance he must function. His decisions are due more to political and financial considerations than to a mature understanding of military problems. He cannot therefore be convincing enough or force an issue amongst his colleagues.<sup>35</sup>

In the complacent atmosphere towards defence which characterized India at least up to 1959, the post was certainly not one in which an individual could appreciably enhance his political stature. On the contrary, the post was subject to persistent criticism for the heavy expenditure it incurred at a time when, by official admission, India was secure against attack. Nevertheless, the individuals who occupied the portfolio during the period were persons of considerable political stature. Sardar Baldev Singh (1946-52) occupied

it by virtue of his political standing in the Punjab and the heavy Sikh representation in the armed forces and was not re-appointed to it following the 1952 general elections for reasons that probably reflected both a relative decline in his political stature and a desire by Nehru to shift the post away from a representative of an important military class and from the volatile Punjab. Gopaldaswami Ayyangar was an important political figure and Nehru's assumption of the post consequent on Ayyangar's death on 10 February 1953 placed Defence for two years under the nominal control of the most important political figure in the country. Dr Nailus Nath Katju came to the post in 1955 with the experience acquired in the portfolios of Home and Law (1950-51) and Home and States (1952-55) and his appointment appeared to suggest Nehru's belated recognition that Defence was a major post<sup>36</sup>. The 'impression created was that the department would enjoy a fairly stable and continuing guidance'<sup>37</sup>.

For various reasons, however, none of these individuals appears to have been a forceful Ministerial representative in the Cabinet. Singh was widely regarded as amiable but lacking both in initiative and administrative skill, with the result that the able Defence Secretary, H.M. Patel, virtually ran the Ministry to the point even of submitting briefs to Cabinet. Ayyangar was regarded as a good

administrator but his tenure was very brief - from May 1952 to 1st February 1953. Katju's capabilities varied with each person whose views were solicited by the writer but, in any case, his tenure was also relatively brief and it is doubtful if it enabled him to acquire other than a superficial understanding of the Ministry's functions. Nehru's assumption of the portfolio from 1953 to 1955 should have augured well for a sympathetic hearing for military requirements but, while he retained overall Cabinet responsibility for the Ministry, the actual running of the Defence was assigned from 15 March 1953 to Mahavir Tyagi, the (junior) Minister for Revenue and Expenditure from Uttar Pradesh. In view of the latter's minor status, it is probable that, during this period, the Ministry was largely run by the Secretary, M.K. Vellodi.

Consequent on Dr Katju's departure for the more attractive post of Chief Minister of Madhya Pradesh in February 1957, there was speculation that Morarji Desai might assume the Defence portfolio. Commenting on this possibility, one journal admitted that it would bring the office high political prestige, but that 'it appears the department is still not being looked upon as a very important one...what is even more depressing is that Mr Nehru and his colleagues seem to apply no strict test of qualification to such as appointment'<sup>38</sup>. The journal regarded S.S. Majithia as an eminent



Sikh second to none in popularity and felt that he had acquitted himself well as Katju's deputy and was the best choice: 'As a Defence Minister he can prove an effective rebuttal to the suspicion, unjustifiably entertained in some quarters, of minority representatives being deliberately kept from important portfolios'<sup>39</sup>. It concluded that 'it is time the portfolio of Defence was recognised as of major importance, undeserving of whimsical improvisations'<sup>40</sup>.

What then was the significance of Krishna Menon's appointment to the post in April 1957? One English observer described the post as 'India's key portfolio'<sup>41</sup>, thereby implying that the appointment was significant, while the Delhi correspondent of the Daily Telegraph referred to the 'surprise announcement' of Menon's appointment<sup>42</sup>. Other observers were inclined to view it as in the form of a 'gentle kick upstairs'. The Daily Express viewed the appointment as a demotion from foreign affairs to 'what Indians pretend to regard as a junior post'<sup>43</sup>. An American press source interpreted the appointments of Menon and S.K. Palit - the latter to Irrigation/Power - as a balancing act between Right and Left in the Cabinet: 'Mr Krishna Menon, as Minister of Defence, will continue to deal with the scene of India's main military preparedness, the Kashmir land...It will doubtless make him available as an even closer advisor

to the Prime Minister than he has been in the past...'. The source concluded, however, that it was felt thereby that Menon was likely to circulate less in international circles, where many Indians felt he had not advanced India's relations<sup>44</sup>. Expressing a similar view, the Montreal Gazette stated that the appointment 'might have been labelled a gentle kick upstairs' for the reason that, in his relationships with the West as Foreign Affairs Adviser, Menon was often too extreme even for Nehru<sup>45</sup>.

The Defence post, however, did not cause any apparent decrease in Nehru's employment of his confidant in international diplomacy - nor was it, in all likelihood, ever intended to do so. At the same time, the appointment was clearly not in response to any crisis or impending crisis in defence as official complacency about the nation's security had probably reached its zenith by this time. Quite to the contrary, the appointment appears to have been a device whereby Nehru could utilize Menon's experience in foreign affairs while providing him an office of greater prestige than was attached to the position of Minister without Portfolio to which he had been appointed on 3 February 1956. Politically ambitious, Menon must have long desired a portfolio in which he could acquire national exposure and the fillup to his political stature thereby which escaped him as

a consultant and roving ambassador. In view of the hostility which Menon generated in Congress, Nehru had from the outset of independence proceeded to ease his confidant into official office, first as High Commissioner in London, and then to head India's delegation to the United Nations General Assembly in 1953. The domestic acclaim which greeted Menon's presentation of the Indian case on Kashmir in early 1957 was clearly regarded by Nehru as offering the atmosphere in which to elevate Menon to a senior portfolio - despite the fact that he did not have the normal credentials for one - i.e. a political base of sufficient importance in India<sup>46</sup>.

The range of senior posts open to Menon was, however, limited by the need for a position that would both permit him sufficient freedom to remain an adviser and special envoy of the Prime Minister in the field of foreign affairs and which would not involve matters requiring extensive administrative experience. This ruled out every post of importance aside from Defence which, at that time, appeared to be one that could easily be left to the civil secretariat. It was subsequently rumoured that Menon would revert to his former portfolio so as to permit of more freedom to move on the international scene<sup>47</sup> but this, and a later rumour to the effect that he had agreed to become High Commissioner in

London on condition that the jeep scandal was buried<sup>48</sup>, were evidently without foundation.

In the context of national complacency about defence, financial stringency and civilian 'pin-pricks' regarding pay, benefits, etc., there was understandable resentment on the part of military officers. One officer wrote in 1953 that the armed forces 'were to be tolerated only so long as conditions made it advisable to do so. Some even thought of them as parasites who lived on the people and, as such, something to be done away with as soon as possible'<sup>49</sup>. Another officer charged that the 'combatant...is treated not as a symbol of the security of the country but as a drain on the country's resources'<sup>50</sup>. In such circumstances, there was a strong desire among officers to seek better-paying and more personally-satisfying civilian employment whenever the opportunity presented itself<sup>51</sup>. Even the Minister for Defence Organisation, Mahavir Tyagi, admitted in the Lok Sabha on 25 March 1953 that 'a feeling is growing among our men that they are not paid the same attention which they had under their alien employers. It may be an unfortunate impression, but the impression is there'<sup>52</sup>.

Less apparent was the reaction of the officer corps to issues of policy. By October 1962, the officer corps comprised perhaps 13,000 in the Army and 6-8000 in the other

two Services combined. The officer cadre of the Army consisted of a small hierarchy of Sandhurst-trained KCOs of pre-1939 origin, a middle echelon dating from a crash recruitment scheme from the universities during World War II, and a junior element which had entered the Service after 1947 following completion of the training programmes at the military academies. The KCOs were generally of well-to-do family backgrounds, drawn from all parts of the country and strongly non-political; the middle echelon was less grounded in tradition and perhaps inclined towards a mild radicalism in outlook; and the junior officers were largely from poorer, more urban, politically-minded and bourgeois origins - but steeped in military tradition by virtue of their training in the military academies. While there were undoubtedly some differences of outlook among the various class, caste, regional and generational groups, the corps appears to have been fairly cohesive, disciplined and professional. The officer cadres of the Navy and Air Force were probably better educated than their Army counter-parts by virtue of the more technical orientation of their Services, of middle-class and largely urban backgrounds and with closer social and working relationships with the urban middle classes who comprised articulate public opinion.

Although reliable generalizations concerning the attitudes of the officer corps are difficult, certain conclusions

seem permissible from the nature of the corps and from interviews with various members of it<sup>53</sup>.

The Services are the most westernized element in a society with strong conservative tendencies and embody modernity in organization, operational planning, general efficiency and technical knowledge. They are not rooted in an indigenous military tradition and do not appear to have either sympathy for Gandhian precepts or for ideologies of the extreme Left or Right. They have a vested interest in stability and order, in national unity, development and technological progress.

The comradeship of the old Indian Army survived partition and the clash in Kashmir<sup>54</sup>, resulting in a less emotional view of Pakistan than held by many civilians - although this is less so of the post-partition recruits and of the Sikhs, who cannot be expected to forget the events surrounding partition easily or quickly. The 'old Commonwealth' is well-regarded and the British tie remains strong with the aid of training courses in Britain, attendance of senior officers at the Imperial Defence College and British staff colleges, the annual conference convened by the Chief of the Imperial General Staff, service literature, weapons systems and regimental and unit links developed over a period of association spanning two centuries for the Army - albeit several decades

with regards to the Navy and Air Force. There is no real anti-Americanism and the various bitter exchanges between the two governments from time to time do not appear to have left any lasting impression; there is even a desire to turn to American military experience and methods in a moderate way. There is also an acute awareness that close relations with the United States is essential in view of India's ultimate reliance upon American military aid in any major conflict with China. Russia has never been viewed as a reliable friend, much less an ally, but there is no desire to unnecessarily stimulate hostility on the premise that good relations are prudent. China was from the outset viewed with a mixture of contempt and disinterest and there was little sympathy for the political view that intimate ties between India and China was a natural goal. Non-alignment was regarded as not detrimental to national security per se on the assumption that Western military aid in a crisis was axiomatic. Its manner of implementation was regarded with some concern, however, in the belief that it strained relations with India's sincere friends in the West for only short-term advantage among the non-aligned and communist states, made the Kashmir issue even more intractable, sapped the will to maintain defence preparedness, enhanced the attraction of the 'naive' Gandhian legacy, led to the policy

of refusing military aid as incompatible with non-alignment (although such aid was viewed in military circles as basically indistinguishable from the economic assistance which the Government eagerly solicited) and afforded no credible deterrent to a communist attack nor to communist policies designed to extend Soviet, and particularly Chinese, power and influence at the expense of India and her implicit Western allies.

During the decade following independence, however, civilian complacency about defence would seem to have been shared by the military to a considerable degree. This view, coupled with the recognition of the need for rapid economic development and the apparent belief that larger appropriations would eventually be made for defence, clearly inhibited the military leadership from arguing too forcefully for sharply increased grants. Also, in the absence of a clearly identifiable threat from China until the later 'fifties, Pakistan provided an expedient strategic rationale without which, given the pronounced non-aligned posture of the Government, sound and efficient military policies would have been difficult to formulate and implement. The civilian fear and distrust of Pakistan thus appeared as a 'blessing in disguise' in preventing further economies in defence outlay than actually occurred<sup>55</sup>, and was used to good effect<sup>56</sup>.



While the military were not unduly concerned with a threat from China arising immediately following the re-absorption of Tibet in 1950-51 - for reasons of logistics - they were professional enough not to allow their opinions to be coloured by wishful thinking based on predelictions as to the intentions of other states - which are, in any case, political in nature, hard to assess and unpredictable<sup>57</sup>. Thus, while acutely aware of the severe difficulties in preparing a cautious response to the extension of Chinese power into Tibet - the Indian military professional had necessarily to conceive of the possibility of eventual military conflict with China in the Himalayan region and to support measures aimed at making adequate preparations against just such a contingency, however remote it was believed to be. Concern with Chinese intentions slowly increased from 1954 and the Aksai Chin road project confirmed the suspicions of at least the senior officers informed of events that India's territorial integrity was being threatened at the very least and that a situation was developing in which an Indian military presence would be required as a deterrent to further Chinese intrusions in the short-term and to defend against at least minor overt attacks over a longer and indefinite period. Dissatisfaction with the continuing passive response of the Government was a major contributing factor to the controversy

revealed by banner headlines in leading Indian dailies on the morning of 1st September 1959 which announced the resignation of the COAS and the impending resignation of the other two Service heads. According to the political correspondent of one paper<sup>58</sup>, there was discord between the COAS and the Defence Minister over recent promotions in which considerations other than merit may have prevailed and also other areas of disagreement; the 'resignations' were attributed to the 'result of prolonged and evidently unsuccessful efforts to keep politics out of the army, navy and air force'.

Nehru's pre-occupation in meeting Ayub Khan at Palam airport and a discreet silence by the three Chiefs of Staff stimulated intense press speculation and New Delhi was rife with rumours. The Defence Minister, Krishna Menon, declined to comment on the issue in Parliament and a Press Trust of India (PTI) release in the afternoon announced Menon's resignation - only to be withdrawn late that evening. At 4 p.m. a report from London revealed that the Chief of Air Staff, Air Marshal Subroto Mukerjee had denied knowledge of, and involvement in, the affair.

In Parliament the next day, the Prime Minister offered an explanation which characteristically left the matter clouded. He admitted that the COAS, General K.S. Thimayya, had tendered his resignation but declared that he had

withdrawn it when requested by himself (Nehru) to do so. Nehru claimed that the issues involved were 'rather trivial and of no consequence', arose from temperamental differences and did not include promotions<sup>59</sup>. He implied otherwise when he conceded that, while the civil authority is and must remain supreme, it should pay due heed to the expert advice it receives and this statement, coupled with his refusal to table a copy of Thimayya's letter of resignation - which specified the contentious issues - added to the speculation.

Press comment revealed a common reaction. Swarajya argued that 'There can be no doubt that General Thimayya acted from a sense of personal dignity in resigning and of unselfish impersonal duty in withdrawing his resignation'<sup>60</sup>. The Times (London) commented: 'He is not the kind of soldier who can easily be imagined trying to relinquish his post for reasons that could be described as "trivial and of no consequence".'<sup>61</sup>. The New York Herald Tribune expressed the view that 'with all due respect to Mr Nehru, it is difficult to believe that a gallant and experienced officer (Nehru's own description of Thimayya) would at a time when war threatened India, try to resign over a trivial issue'<sup>62</sup>. Available evidence suggests that, Nehru's claim notwithstanding, more basic issues were involved which centred around the conduct of the controversial Defence Minister and close confidant of Nehru, Krishna Menon.

Given Menon's intelligence and energy, his administrative drive and his intimate relationship with Nehru, his appointment to the Defence portfolio in early 1957 should have augured well. Chinese actions on the northern frontiers and with regards to South-East Asia required a fresh perspective on defence, and Menon's influence with the Prime Minister should have facilitated achievement of such a goal. His tenure was indeed to coincide with increased budgetary allocations for the Services, increases in Service pay and benefits, some new equipment and an accelerated programme for the expansion of ordnance plant and production - achievements which, though not primarily due to his personal initiative (save the acquisition of Hunter fighter-bombers), apparently received his full support<sup>63</sup>. Unfortunately, Menon's strong predilections in foreign policy, his vested interest in maintaining a posture in which reliance upon the West for military support was not required, his political ambitions and his universally-acknowledged arrogance were to exert a negative influence on defence during the very period when clear-thinking and close co-operation between the political, military and civil arms of government were required as never before. The military circles who viewed his appointment with coolness and misgivings because of his Leftist views and difficult temperament were quickly to have their suspicions confirmed.

Almost from the moment he took up the Defence portfolio, Menon revealed an attraction to the public spotlight not apparent in his predecessors. He began to hustle around the country inspecting Defence installations, accompanied by considerable photographic and press coverage. He consistently drew attention to the achievements being effected by Ordnance and advanced questionable claims regarding the actual significance of the progress being made in this sphere. He proceeded to show an unusual interest in cultivating contacts in the officer corps to the point, it appears clear, of advancing the careers of those individuals to whom he took a liking through the manipulation of appointments. As all appointments, promotions and postings of and above the rank of Colonel (or its equivalent in the Navy and Air Force) require the prior approval of the Defence Minister, the opportunities for 'ministerial mischief' are almost unlimited - particularly if the Minister enjoys the complete confidence of the ultimate authority - the Prime Minister - as Menon did.

The main figure in the 'promotional storm' which was to be a recurring feature of Menon's tenure in Defence was Brij Mohan Kaul, a Kashmiri Brahmin, scion of a wealthy family and a relation of Nehru by blood and marriage<sup>64</sup>.

Self-confident, well-educated, charming yet ruthless, Kaul shared in common with the 'old guard' in the Army hierarchy a Sandhurst training, a good family background, an appreciation of the class and caste infantry organization as the basis of its esprit de corps, and a strong view of the Army as a disciplined force in an otherwise undisciplined country. In other respects, however, he was distinctive among the Sandhurst cadre. He regarded a popular mandate as unreal in an underdeveloped and largely illiterate nation, viewed the military take-overs in Burma and Pakistan with no misgivings and was believed to have no inhibitions about an Army seizure of power in India in the event that civil authority proved unable to function effectively or a communist bid for power appeared imminent or possible. An early participant in student demonstrations against the British and widely suspected in later life of harbouring political ambitions, he retained a strong affection for the British developed as a cadet at Sandhurst.

He served on the North-West Frontier and in the Burma theatre during World War II, but first attracted public notice in 1946 when Nehru appointed him as military adviser in Washington and he concurrently served as military adviser to the Indian delegation during the Kashmir debate in the Security Council. Returning to India later in the year, Kaul

organized and led irregulars in Kashmir until he had differences with Sheikh Abdullah - whom he was to arrest in a midnight episode five years later on Nehru's orders. His activities as Chief of Staff to Thimayya on the United Nations' Repatriation Commission in Korea (in which he allegedly was less than impartial to the communist viewpoints)<sup>65</sup> appears to have led to differences with his superior culminating in his re-posting to India as commander of the 4th division in the Punjab, a post he was to hold for three years.

It is quite conceivable that Kaul may not have risen much further in rank and responsibility thenceforth had not Menon assumed the Defence portfolio. When his efforts to cultivate the 'old guard' at Army Headquarters proved unavailing, the Defence Minister proceeded to try to play off one Service against another by playing upon the inferiority complex of the Navy and Air Force vis-a-vis the Army and making arbitrary decisions regarding military priorities aimed, primarily it would seem, at promoting his popularity in the Air Force<sup>66</sup>. At the same time, Menon cultivated contacts with more junior officers who were susceptible to his influence or prepared to 'play along' in the hopes of faster promotion; one of these was Major-General Kaul. The two men do not appear to have met prior to 1957, but their friendship clearly blossomed after their first meeting. Desirous of

making the armed forces as 'productive' as possible to answer his political critics, Menon was attracted by Operation Amar I, an Army housing project undertaken at Ambala by Kaul's command with the enthusiastic support of the Defence Minister and the somewhat reluctant permission of the COAS<sup>67</sup>.

The first step in the promotional 'storm' occurred in early 1959 when the COAS, after consultation with the Army Commanders as per the usual practice, presented to the Ministry for advancement to the rank of Lieutenant-General the names of Major-Generals P.S. Gyani, P.S. Kumaramangalam and B.M. Kaul - in that order, Kaul incidentally being the junior of the three. The Cabinet, however, clearly acting upon the recommendation of the Defence Minister elevated Kumaramangalam and Kaul only - in June - the latter having in the meantime been appointed Quarter-Master General at Army Headquarters, replacing Lieutenant-General Daulat Singh who proceeded to a Corps command. Kaul's appointment to QMG was consistent with his seniority, but the supersession of Gyani naturally provoked comment both in and without Parliament and in the Service. At issue was not the fact that Gyani's seniority had been ignored, as such must inevitably be the fate of many officers in the course of a military career. In this case, however, an outstanding artillery officer with extensive experience and senior commands in



that branch and of the UNEF in Gaza had been superceded by an officer of very limited experience<sup>68</sup>. The politicians had clearly interfered in a promotional issue for reasons that have strong political overtones and it is perhaps significant that, shortly thereafter, Gyani was promoted Lieutenant-General commanding an infantry division.

The June promotions affair provoked considerable comment in the Army at all levels with open discussion of Menon's 'interference' in promotional matters and speculation as to why Thimayya was permitting it to continue without protest. An immediate and natural result of the issue was to damage Army morale and the discipline and respect for superior rank which are the foundations of an efficient Service. It was evident to senior officers that further political interference of this type could not but have serious effect on the Army.

The promotions issue was aggravated by Menon's persistent misrepresentations of Service views on military policy to Nehru. The Akasi Chin road discovery required, in the eyes of the military authorities, immediate counter-actions so as to avoid a further deterioration and the inevitable dangers that must accompany a 'last-minute' panic action to compensate for years of neglect. The Tibetan revolt and its outcome were foreseen by Army Headquarters in an appreciation

prepared in early 1959 in which they proposed specific counter-preparations<sup>69</sup>. Nehru and Menon remained convinced, however, that Peking must under no circumstances be provoked and India's response was thus limited to stepped-up policing by the border police and Assam Rifles and fresh consultations with the hill-states. Such a response added to the frustrations of the armed forces (particularly the Army) who felt that the politicians were refusing to accept the fact that even minimal military precautions in the Himalayan region could not be effected at a 'moment's notice'. There was concern that, while India talked, the Chinese were developing such a powerful position along the Himalayan front as to be able to act in the area with virtual impunity<sup>70</sup>.

The three Service Chiefs had often discussed general policy in accordance with their professional responsibilities and also the matter of Menon's conduct. In July 1959, they decided to bring the whole question to the attention of the Prime Minister who, they believed, was not being properly briefed by Menon. To avoid the image of a tri-Service ultimatum, it was agreed that Thimayya - as the party whose Service was most concerned - should make the approach and call upon support only if such a step was necessary to convince Nehru of the seriousness of the matter. Vice-Admiral Katari and Air Marshal Mukerjee were prepared at that time,

however, to support their Army colleague even to the point of submitting their resignations - if such an admittedly drastic step was required. Various Cabinet Ministers, who were aware of the situation and had few reasons to like Menon in any case, advised the COAS to discuss the issue directly with Nehru and promised such support as they personally might be able to give.

The opportunity for a meeting between the Prime Minister and the COAS apparently occurred through a chance meeting at a garden party in late August. It was the first meeting between the two men for some time and Nehru invited Thimayya to his house the following day. During the course of the conversation on this occasion, Thimayya informed the Prime Minister of his concern with Menon's interference in Army matters, the effects of this interference on Service morale and the fact that it was an 'impossible situation' which could not continue. Nehru was apprised of the fact that the other two Service Chiefs were available by telephone to confirm Thimayya's contention, but he professed no need to contact the two men and promised that he would speak to Menon about the issue the next day.

What transpired in the Nehru-Menon talk must remain speculative but that the Defence Minister heard of Thimayya's complaints was attested two days later (i.e. three days after

the Nehru-Thimayya conversation) when he sent for the COAS. In a highly-excited state of mind frequently exhibited on the world stage, Menon criticized Thimayya for taking such a matter to Nehru while referring to the possible political repercussions of the issue if it became public; he argued the need for such differences to be resolved privately and on a bilateral basis. Thimayya replied by making his views 'abundantly clear' to the Minister and regular meetings with Menon at 2.30 p.m. on subsequent days revealed that he had no intention of amending his conduct. Faced with this situation and the apparent indifference of Nehru, Thimayya decided to tender his resignation on the assumption that it would be accepted but with the hope that it might focus the Prime Minister's and general attention on the seriousness with which Menon's conduct was viewed.

The letter of resignation, which specified the complaints about Menon's interference in internal Army affairs, was drawn up on the morning of 31 August 1959 and typed in Thimayya's residence by his Personal Assistant. The letter was shown to Katari and Mukerjee, who now unsuccessfully sought to dissuade the COAS from pursuing the matter, and then delivered by one of Thimayya's military assistants to Nehru's residence where it was left with a member of the Prime Minister's staff. During the course of the 2.30 p.m.

meeting with Menon that afternoon, Thimayya informed him of the letter and refused Menon's 'urgent request' to withdraw it before it came to Nehru's attention. The Prime Minister appears to have read the letter at about this time (2.30) and summoned the COAS at 7 p.m. that evening. He stated that such an action must add to his already heavy burdens of office - with Ayub's visit scheduled for the next day - and that he wanted no issue of this magnitude to become public. He requested Thimayya to withdraw his resignation on the grounds that Menon was scheduled to leave for the United Nations several days hence (and would thus be out of the way for a time) and promised that he would look into every one of Thimayya's complaints after the meeting with Ayub. Convinced that Nehru sincerely meant to investigate the matter and take action to confine Menon's conduct to the proper scope of a Minister, Thimayya withdrew his resignation - a serious error as quickly became apparent.

What might have transpired had the issue remained from public knowledge must remain conjectural. Nehru was certainly aware of Menon's arrogance and inability to work well with subordinates and his almost obsessive ambition to dominate those with whom he came into contact. He would know that a first-class professional and non-political soldier like Thimayya could not be provoked to such drastic action at a

time when China was threatening the northern frontiers for other than the most serious reasons. He could conceivably have cautioned Menon to avoid contentious actions - although Menon may have regarded even a mild caution as a rebuke and resigned. Extraneous factors entered into the entire matter, however, and probably affected Nehru's ultimate response. The existence of Thimayya's letter of resignation had been leaked by a member of Nehru's staff to a source at The Statesman who secured confirmation from Thimayya himself in an accidental fashion. The reporter accosted the COAS outside his home with the query 'Have they accepted?' and Thimayya replied 'No' before realising that the 'cat had been let out of the bag'. The matter was the subject of banner headlines the following morning - 1st September.

Menon's suitability for the Defence portfolio provoked extensive press comment. The Manchester Guardian declared that, for all his talents, Menon's resignation 'can only strengthen the Indian Government'<sup>71</sup>. The Statesman carried a PTI report that 84 Calcutta High Court barristers had issued a joint declaration that 'we are firmly of the opinion that in the interest of our national defence the Prime Minister should himself assume charge of the Defence Ministry'<sup>72</sup>. Referring to Menon, the News Chronicle stated: 'However great his efficiency and his services to India when she was

struggling for her independence, his reputation and record are a grave handicap to the Indian Government at this time<sup>73</sup>.

The actual extent to which Menon's position was threatened by the public disclosure cannot be readily ascertained. A release by the semi-official PTI (which generally accurately reflects official views) on the afternoon of 1st September announced Menon's resignation, but the report was withdrawn for unexplained reasons that same evening<sup>74</sup>. It is also understood that a PTI representative called at Thimayya's residence at 5 p.m. the same day with the information that the Cabinet was against Menon, who was going to be sacked; only Pandit Pant, according to this source, was believed to be in a position to save Menon and he was not regarded as so inclined. Late in the afternoon, reports began to circulate that Menon had resigned and lobby opinion tended to accept the view that his resignation would be accepted<sup>75</sup>.

Press sources also speculated that Menon was to be removed from the Ministry. The Manchester Guardian felt that he might be sent off to the United Nations as Minister without Portfolio, with Nehru taking over Defence<sup>76</sup>. The Hindustan Times expressed the view that Nehru would 'undoubtedly' relieve Menon of the Defence portfolio following the latter's return from the United Nations<sup>77</sup>. An Associated Press despatch from New Delhi stated that 'sources close to

the official residence of President Rajendra Prasad' had revealed that Nehru might announce a Cabinet shake-up that would oust Menon or give him another ministerial post<sup>78</sup>. With the advantage even of several weeks' hindsight, one Indian weekly stated that Nehru's handling of the issue (as against Menon's silence), and Menon's impending departure for New York at a time when border events required the closest attention of the Defence Ministry, 'seems to point to a kind of disengagement being pursued between the armed forces and the personality of Shri Menon. The process should lead to his ultimate departure from the Defence Ministry'<sup>79</sup>.

What passed between Nehru and Menon or between Cabinet Ministers concerning this issue is unclear, but it is improbable that Menon was ever in danger of losing his position - even if Nehru privately doubted the wisdom of some of his colleague's actions, his admiration for, and reliance upon, Menon were too strong. Also, Nehru had fiercely defended lesser colleagues on previous occasions even in the face of damning public evidence. The issue of civil authority had to be upheld and a shift of Menon from Defence at this time would undoubtedly have been widely interpreted as a concession to military pressure. Even a public rebuke of Menon's activities would have provoked such general delight among the Minister's legions of enemies, and a blow to his stature,



that Menon may well have warned the Prime Minister that he would have to resign if he was not strongly supported. It is most unlikely that, Pant excepted, any Cabinet Minister or collection of Ministers possessed sufficient influence with Nehru to have swayed his opinion on such an issue. The role of Pant in the matter is not known, but it would appear from the outcome either that he did not feel disposed to exert his influence in favour of Menon's removal or that he intervened at Menon's request on his behalf - as one person interviewed by the writer alleged.

Nehru's public rebuke to Thimayya caused the latter to consider submitting his resignation again - and finally - but there appeared to be no sense in taking such a step at this stage, particularly as the matter had been publicly aired in a fashion and the issue had revealed strong public, press and Service support for the highly-regarded and popular COAS. But as the Daily Telegraph noted, Nehru's attitude 'does credit to Mr Nehru's personal loyalty and it may cover up - for the present - the departmental row, but it perpetuates a dangerous state of affairs for India'<sup>80</sup>.

The assignment to the Army, in August-November, of responsibility for securing the Himalayan frontier against Chinese intrusions appears to have removed that aspect of policy from being a source of strain between the military

and political arms of government, both sectors agreeing - albeit for somewhat different reasons - on the need for prudence while gradually developing communications in the region. The Government remained unresponsive to Army requests for equipment and special mountain formations, however, with the result that Army circles continued to regard the politicians with some distaste. Nor did Menon show any signs of having been inhibited by the September furore as he continued to cultivate contacts with ambitious officers and strengthen his relationship with Kaul. He even attempted to have Thimayya take the eight months' leave due him preparatory to retirement and, while the COAS resisted such efforts and stayed on until two months short of retirement, the intervening period was characterized by minimal contact with Menon. The September affair also resulted in cool relations between Thimayya on the one hand and Katari and Mukerjee on the other due to the manner in which the Navy and Air Force Chiefs of Staff had sought to dissuade Thimayya from an action with which they had earlier pledged support, and the manner in which they had dissociated themselves from it - Mukerjee at a London press gathering and Katari in a radio message to the Fleet.

Thimayya's retirement in early 1961 was followed almost immediately by more controversial appointments with Kaul

again a central figure. About one week before Thimayya's departure from the top post, Menon informed him of his desire to assign Kaul the post of Chief of General Staff - the third ranking post behind the COAS and Deputy COAS. Thimayya refused to make such a recommendation on the grounds that Kaul, who was not considered to possess the requisite qualifications, would thereby become a virtual 'laughing stock' in the Service and thereby lower the prestige of the post. Furthermore, Thimayya recommended that his own successor be Lieutenant-General S.P.P. Thorat, then GOC of Eastern Command and a former commander of the Korean Custodian Force. Thorat would thereby supercede Lieutenant-General P.N. Thapar, then GOC-Western Command and three months junior to Thimayya and two months senior to Thorat. Thorat was considered to be the more qualified and experienced of the two. Menon proceeded to completely disregard Thimayya's recommendation and professional opinions, however, and arranged for Thapar's elevation to COAS and Kaul's appointment as CGS, thereby forcing the able Thorat - who had just completed his four-year term as Lieutenant-General - into retirement.

The elevation of Thapar and the retirement of Thorat left vacant the Western and Eastern Commands, the aspirants for which in order of seniority were Lieutenant-General

S.D. Verma (commander of the Jammu and Kashmir theatre), Lieutenant-General Daulat Singh, Lieutenant-General Lionel Protip Sen, Lieutenant-General Kumaramangalam and Lieutenant-General Kaul. Singh (two and one-half years junior to Verma) was assigned Western Command, Sen was posted to Eastern Command and the superceded Verma applied for premature retirement. The supercession of such an experienced officer<sup>81</sup> renewed suspicions that Menon aimed to clear the way for Kaul's appointment to COAS and the suspicions were aired in a sensational letter, clearly written by a group of high-ranking Army officers, which appeared on the front-page of the Bombay English-language weekly, Current, on 6 April 1961. The letter accused Menon of using promotions to create cliques in the Army loyal to him personally and aimed at an eventual coup d'etat. The view was expressed that Menon proposed to have Kaul succeed, as COAS, either Thapar or Thapar's senior subordinate, Lieutenant-General J.N. Chaudhuri, after the latter served in the top post for a brief period; as Chaudhuri was due for retirement in May 1963 if not elevated in rank, the possibility of his supercession was very strong. Kaul would also have to supercede Kumaramangalam and Daulat Singh while Sen would be forced to either accept the post of Deputy COAS (actually a demotion from Eastern Command in terms of prestige) when the

incumbent, Lieutenant-General Mohinder Singh, retired in January 1963 or be retired.

The promotional issue once again became the subject of some heated debate in Parliament. Menon advanced statistics in defence of his argument that there was nothing unusual about supercessions<sup>82</sup>, and noted that superceded officers had the right of appeal<sup>83</sup>. He claimed the right to overrule recommendations of the COAS on promotions but stated that he had exercised this right only once and 'that one instance was an instance in which I had no other option'<sup>84</sup>. Also, he declared that no officers had resigned over promotions and that there had been only one application for premature retirement<sup>85</sup>.

Having apparently cleared the way for Kaul's eventual elevation to COAS, Menon facilitated the placing of officers close to Kaul into the key posts of Director of Military Operations and Director of Military Intelligence. Menon and Kaul are also understood to have increased their long-standing effort to force from the Service Major-General S.H.F.J. Manekshaw, the highly regarded and outspoken Parsee Commandant of the Defence Services Staff College (Wellington). Their previous efforts to have Manekshaw disciplined for making statements critical of themselves had been rebuffed by Thimayya<sup>86</sup>, but his successor, though undoubtedly a

conscientious officer, was content to remain a somewhat passive bystander to the activities of his civilian superior and Service subordinate.

The attention focused on Manekshaw would appear to have been attributable to various factors resented by Kaul and Menon either individually or in concert. Manekshaw made no effort to conceal his dislike of both men, of promotions policy in particular or of military policy in general. He is believed to have been critical of the politically-inspired external troop commitments as in the Congo at a time when the northern frontiers were so weakly manned. He apparently also regarded the official eschewment of atomic weapons under all circumstances as unrealistic and, under his direction, the implications of nuclear warfare were studied on the premise that future Staff Officers must be familiar with the subject regardless of any moral objections.

His actions and statements were closely observed by officers close to Kaul and Menon and several 'stooge' officers were persuaded to bring trumped-up accusations against him at a time when his third star had been announced but not yet awarded. The general charge was that he was impugning constituted authority, and the 'evidence' presented in support of this charge is understood to have included his resurrection of a picture of Clive from the College basement

and its display in a prominent position on his office wall. Manekshaw was prepared to resign in disgust but was persuaded by some of his colleagues (including Thimayya) to call his accusers' bluff. He was completely vindicated by a three-man Service board of enquiry in New Delhi in December 1961 which recommended, furthermore, that his accusers be made to answer for their own conduct. The enquiry's verdict did not relieve the pressure brought to bear by Menon and Kaul, however, who sought to provoke Manekshaw into conduct which would warrant disciplinary action. Manekshaw refused to be goaded into such action but it was generally believed that he would have been denied further promotion normally due in late 1962 - at which time he would be retired.

The efforts of Menon and Kaul to manipulate Army promotions raises the question of motivation.

Menon was politically ambitious but lacked popular support in the Congress Party and his intimate relationship with Nehru only served to increase the dislike which he provoked among other aspirants for power and influence. His leftist outlook also alienated him from the more conservative sector of Indian politics. It was thus widely felt that, through the Defence portfolio, Menon sought to acquire a favourable domestic image and a basis of support in the Services against the possible scramble for power in Congress

upon Nehru's passing from the scene. Indian publicists tended to dismiss the possibility of a military or military-backed coup almost out-of-hand<sup>87</sup>, but more impartial foreign observers did not share this view<sup>88</sup>.

Menon's cultivation of Kaul was completely consistent with any political ambition he may have aspired to advance with military support, whether implicit or explicit. In the event that chaos followed any sudden passing of Nehru, the Army would certainly be called upon to restore order in many parts of the country and perhaps impose martial law. In such an event, were it accompanied by a serious threat from Pakistan or China and ineffectual political leadership at the Union level, the Army in particular would inevitably be drawn into the political arena and its support would undoubtedly be crucial for any prospective head of government. The combination of two ambitious men - Menon and Kaul - heading the Defence Ministry and the Army respectively at such a crucial juncture could probably exercise decisive influence on developments. It would seem doubtful, however, if any such 'alliance of convenience' between two such men of sharply different backgrounds and political leanings could have long endured, particularly as Menon would have needed Kaul more than Kaul would have needed him. Whatever his political ambitions and susceptibilities Kaul was a Brahman



and by no means shared Menon's political orientation or passively acceded to Menon's will on policy issues. He favoured a strong line against China to the point of being dangerously provocative, opposed the purchase of Soviet An-12 transports, favoured serious consideration being given to Western aircraft before any decision was taken on the MIGs, generally preferred Western to Soviet arms and may have dissuaded Menon from such further purchases of Soviet equipment as the latter may have contemplated<sup>89</sup>. As COAS, Kaul may well have proven to be far more independent of Menon's influence than was commonly supposed and the relationship between them subject to considerable strain.

The conduct of the two men, however, had served to erode the professionalism of at least a segment of the Army officer cadre even as the country was moving almost inexorably towards a crisis in the defence sphere. Summing up the situation in May 1962, the well-informed Frank Moraes wrote:

there is no denying that a great deal of simmering discontent and frustration exists among the officers of our Armed Forces at various echelons...Individual ambition, prejudice and predeliction apart, the main grouse among the officers seems to be that promotions, particularly in the higher grades, often ignore merit and are not seldom dictated by personal or political likes and dislikes. Moreover, the present Defence Minister's habit of bypassing or ignoring senior commanders, of consorting with and counselling their juniors more susceptible to his influence and with a tendency to 'jee-hazoor' him makes for indiscipline and dissatisfaction.

He concluded that 'All is far from well with and within the Services and it is time the people of India knew it'<sup>90</sup>.

Whether the professionalism and the non-political tradition of the Indian armed forces could have escaped severe and even irreparable erosion given several more years of general apathy in the defence sphere and Menon's apparent efforts to encourage political conformism and personal loyalties to his person among senior military officers must remain speculative. Developments in the Himalayas were, in the meantime, leading to a crisis which was to have far-reaching consequences for the civil-military relationship in India.

#### Notes

1 For a useful study of military-political developments in selected emergent states of the Middle East, South East Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa, see John J. Johnson (ed.), The Role of the Military in Underdeveloped Countries (Princeton, University Press, 1962). One observer has commented that -

With the exception, of course, of Pakistan and the Sudan, no newly independent state has so far rivalled India in military preparedness, in terms of officers, for complete autonomy. For this reason, perhaps, India ought to be taken consciously as the point of reference when considering the role and place of the military leadership in Afro-Asian societies.

William Gutteridge, "The Indianisation of the Indian Army 1918-45", Race, 4 (May 1963), p. 39.

2 It must be noted, however, that Pakistan lacked the substantial educated middle class and able civil service which India acquired at partition and faced economic problems even more severe than India's.

3 K.M. Panikkar, Problems of Indian Defence (New York, Asia Publishing House, 1960), p. 28. Sir Fredrick Whyte claimed in 1944, however, that 'the Indian Army of today is just as much an expression of national purpose as any political organ'. India: A Bird's Eye View (London, RIIA, 1944), p. 61.

4 A former British officer of the Indian Army, General Sir Francis Taker, has written:

Never, I believe, has the loyalty and soldierly spirit of any army been subjected to such a strain and to such determined pressure to subvert it and to destroy its pride in itself. And never has any country in history depended more on its army to see it through its darkest and most confused days than has India depended on the Indian Army.

Cited by 'Hariz', "The Indian Mutiny and After", RUSI Journal (November 1957), p. 563.

5 This force was organized by some Indian nationalists in Malaya in September 1942 to co-operate with the Japanese in the 'liberation' of India from British rule. It consisted largely of former personnel of the British Indian Army captured by the Japanese during their lightning advance through Malaya and Burma in early 1942 and, at its height, totalled over 20,000 men. Many of those involved, however, would appear to have joined the INA as a means of escaping from the harsh treatment meted out by the Japanese to all prisoners of war and with little intention of fighting the army to which they formerly belonged. In any case, the INA proved very ineffective in the field.

6 Congress leaders based their defence of the accused at the Red Fort Trial held in early 1946 on these grounds, choosing to ignore in the prevailing political atmosphere the very factors which were ultimately to determine the policy of the government of an independent India towards INA personnel.

7 Several former INA personnel subsequently received senior appointments with the Government. Shah Nawaz Khan, one of the principal accused in the celebrated Red Fort Trial of INA leaders in 1946, became Deputy Minister of Railways in 1957. J.K. Bhonsle advanced from the post of Director of Rehabilitation in Bombay (1948-51) to that of member of Parliament in 1952, Deputy Minister for Rehabilitation with the Union Government (1952-57) and Adviser in the Ministry of Education from 1957. Naranjan Singh Gill, a Sandhurst graduate and one of the chief organizers of the INA, was appointed Ambassador to Ethiopia in 1955.

8. K. Rangaswami in Hindu, 1st April 1962.

9 For example, the Chief of Army Staff, the most senior military officer, occupied 25th place as of 1962 and 31st place as of 1st January 1963.

10 Defence Minister Singh informed the Constituent Assembly in 1949 that the pay discrepancy between KCOs and ICOs dated to pre-war days, that the parity given to ICOs during the war had been valid only for the duration of the conflict, and that the reductions were necessary as the Government was unable to maintain the wartime pay scales. CAD, pt 2, vol. 2, 7 March 1949, p. 1220. It appears, however, that JCOs made representations to the Government and obtained certain unspecified concessions. See statement by Singh in ibid, vol. 5, 8 April 1948, p. 3448. When the KCOs relinquished their Land Forces Commissions on 26 January 1950 and accepted fresh ones from the President of India, it was on the assurance that their pay scales would not be changed. See statement by Deputy Defence Minister S.S. Majithia in LSD, pt 1, vol. 4, 16 December 1952, col. 1633. Subsequent upward revisions in pay scales did not remove the discrepancy and, as of early 1964, the pay scale for Lieutenant-Generals was Rs 2700 per month for ICOs and Rs 4000 per month for the few remaining KCOs.

11 See, for example, Brigadier B.S. Bhagat, "Officer Recruitment in the Armed Forces of India", USI Journal, 83:350, 351 (January-April 1953), pp. 2-20; Major J. Nazareth, "Fighting Spirit in the Armed Forces", ibid, 85:358 (January 1955), pp. 11-12; Colonel M.N. Batra, "Recruitment in the Armed Forces of India", ibid, 83:352,353 (July-October 1953), pp. 164-75.

12 It is interesting to note, for instance, that Thimayya had become a nationally-known figure as a result of the brilliant operations conducted by troops under his command in Kashmir in 1948 and his skilful handling of the prisoner of war issue as head of the United Nations Commission for Repatriation (Korea) in 1953. According to one report, Thimayya was canvassed upon his return from Korea by certain business leaders - mostly Indian but a few foreigners based in India - as a 'safe' alternative to the socialist Nehru. Nehru allegedly dealt with the 'challenge' discreetly but firmly, deflating Thimayya's image by cold-shouldering him, letting it be known that he would not become Commander-in-Chief of the Army as expected and refusing to appoint him to represent India in any further 'international negotiations'.

Foreign Report, 18 December 1958, p. 1. Although the writer has been unable to find any evidence regarding this matter, it is not improbable that Nehru, with his ingrained distaste for things military, would see to it that no single military officer would become too prominent a popular figure. At the same time, however, it should be noted Nehru approved the appointment of General Cariappa as High Commissioner to Australia and New Zealand consequent on his retirement as Commander-in-Chief of the Army in 1953; sanctioned the appointment of Major-General Mohinder Singh Chopra as Minister (and later Ambassador) to the Philippines in 1956 (at which time he was commanding an infantry division) and utilized the services of Major-General Himmatsinghji as Deputy Minister for Defence in the immediate post-partition period up to about 1952.

13 In February 1948, each Commander-in-Chief was given the additional designation of Chief of Staff and, from 1st April 1955, the Service heads were divested of the title of Commander-in-Chief.

14 See appendix XXIII.

15 This paper is a declaration of intent, not a detailed consideration of strategy, with the demands shown under as few main headings as during the period of British rule when the demands were non-votable. The breakdown of the Indian defence demands bears useful comparison to the British demands In 1951-52, for instance, the Indian demands were shown under six headings (Effective Army, Navy and Air Force, Non-Effective Charges, Defence Capital Outlay and Ministry of Defence) with no indication of personnel ceilings for the armed forces. In the same year, the British demands comprised 38 headings (11 Army, 11 Air Force, 15 Navy and 1 Ministry of Defence) with Vote A under each of the Army, Navy and Air Force giving the numbers of officers and men to be maintained for each Service.

16 They keep the Financial Adviser informed through the Deputy Financial Adviser (Budget) of any savings likely to be effected or of any excess which may arise due to periodical review of expenditure sheets sent to them by the Comptroller-General of Defence Accounts. They deal also with appeals against internal decisions in consultation with the CGDA and, on matters in which they do not feel competent to decide, they refer issues for decision to their superiors up to and inclusive of the Finance Minister.

17 The origins of the office can be traced to a resolution inspired by Lord Kitchener in 1906. Despite subsequent changes in nomenclature, the basic functions of the office have remained unchanged. For an informed discussion of the relationship of the Financial Adviser to the defence organization, see the lecture given by Batuk Singh (Additional Financial Adviser) at the Defence Services Staff College on 5 April 1955, reprinted as "Finance and the AFHQ" in USI Journal, 86:363 (April-June 1956), pp. 127-42. As of April 1958, the Financial Adviser's staff numbered 43 persons ranging from Additional to Assistant Financial Advisers. See statement by Defence Minister Menon in LSD, 2nd Sess., vol. 5, 16 April 1958, col. 10,266.

18 He discharges this responsibility through the office of the CGDA which he controls and administers.

19 H.M. Patel, The Defence of India, op. cit., p. 3.

20 Batuk Singh, op. cit., p. 134.

21 Paul H. Appleby, Report on Public Administration in India 1953.

22 As the Committee charged in its Nineteenth Report (1956): Savings ranging from 8 to 10 per cent in the sanctioned grants have become a recurring feature of the Defence Estimates...The savings on Defence Capital Outlay, as in previous years continued to be abnormally high, being more than two-fifths of the total vote. One of the causes of the savings in the grants for work expenditure was that substantial provision was made for items which had not a reasonable expectation of being executed in the course of the year. Audit Report 1956, p. 1. The percentage of savings over total grants ranged as high as 9.8 for the Army (1954-54), 22.8 for the Navy (1952-53), 35.8 for the Air Force (1951-52), 41.3 for Defence Capital Outlay (1954-55) and 12.47 for all outlay (1955-56).

23 "Balance of Hopes and Fears: A Review of the Past Five Years", op. cit., p. 140.

24 Cited, Brigadier B.S. Bhagat, "Reorganisation of Defence Services", USI Journal, 89:375 (April-June 1959), p. 168. See also Lieutenant Colonel V.P. Naib, "Higher Defence Organisation", ibid, 90:381 (October-December 1960), pp. 317-28.

25 Cited in Bhagat, loc. cit. The Chiefs of Staff Committee, for example, constitutes the only purely professional body but serves in only an advisory capacity with no powers of decision. Furthermore, it lacks a precise definition of its responsibilities, powers, rights and limitations and has no authority vis-a-vis Defence Research.

26 "Balance of Hopes and Fears: A Review of the Past Five Years", loc. cit. Nehru expressed a similar view in the Rajya Sabha on 9 November 1962. See Hindu, 11 November 1962.

27 Brigadier B.D. Kapur, "National Preparedness", USI Journal, 87:367 (April-June 1957), p. 82.

28 "Balance of Hopes and Fears: A Review of the Past Five Years", op. cit., pp. 140-1.

29 "An IDC for India", USI Journal, 84:355 (April 1954), p. 249. The first Indian civil servant was only appointed to the Defence Department in 1939. The shortage of experienced officers required the retention of some British officials for some time after independence but the shortage remained such that the Government was unable to implement a reorganization of the Defence Department pursuant to the recommendations, in 1947, of G.H. Shreeve, an officer of the British Civil Service appointed to investigate the matter. The Shreeve report envisaged a Defence Department with 18 Deputy Secretaries along the lines of a Service Department of State in Britain but, at the time the report was submitted in 1947, the Indian Department contained only three Deputy Secretaries. See statement by Defence Secretary G.S. Bhalja in LAD, vol. 2, 4 March 1947, p. 1499.

30 "An IDC for India", op. cit., p. 254.

31 Under the scheme, a military officer spends seven to ten days with his civil counterpart studying the organization and working of the civil set-up while a civilian officer spends a few days in a military unit and studies the military organization and administration and observes the training imparted to the Army. Not more than two officers from each side per quarter are sent on these liaison visits. See Ministry of Defence, Report, 1959-60, p. 7.

32 The course extends for one year and is attended by officers of the rank of brigadier or its equivalent and by senior civil servants. The College functions in a manner very similar to its British counter-part.

33 30 March 1963.

34 "Military Awakening in India is Very Fitful", Organisor (Delhi), 29 August 1960, p. 3.

35 Ibid, p. 4.

36 Commenting on Dr Mahmud's appointment to succeed G.S. Bajpai as Secretary-General of the External Affairs Ministry, The Times (6 December 1954) expressed the view that the appointment -

shows that Mr Nehru had failed to persuade his colleagues in the Cabinet to accept Mr Krishna Menon. Dr Katju will probably go to the Defence. If he does Mr Nehru will relinquish the Defence portfolio which he took over in the first place, it is said, to defend the armed forces from the Congress Party prejudice.

37 Thought, "The Changing Defence Portfolio", 12 January 1957, p. 2.

38 Ibid.

39 Ibid.

40 Ibid.

41 Elisabeth Partridge, NewsChronicle, 18 April 1957.

42 17 April 1957.

43 18 April 1957.

44 The Christian Science Monitor, 20 April 1957.

45 2 September 1959.

46 The one exception to the rule is the Finance portfolio, the most important post in Indian Government (External Affairs carrying the stature of the Prime Minister, without which it can claim second ranking at best) and one which is assigned on the basis of competence rather than political stature - although the two characteristics have been features of several holders of the portfolio.

47 Thought, 15 February 1958, p. 19. A likely replacement, according to this report, was C.L. Trivedi, the former



Governor of Andhra Pradesh (and first Indian civil servant to be appointed to the Defence Department, serving as Secretary during World War II), who had the reputation of being a 'trouble-shooter'.

48 "Beachcomber's Diary", in ibid, 2 April 1960, p. 19.

49 Brigadier B.S. Bhagat, "Officer Recruitment in the Armed Forces of India", op. cit., p. 13.

50 Major J. Nazareth, "Fighting Spirit in the Armed Forces", op. cit., p. 12. Major-General Paranjpe expressed the view in 1960 that 'The Defence Services were taken for granted [at independence] rather like a large inheritance suddenly falling into the hands of a prodigal son, not quite knowing what to do with it all other than to use it according to their whims'. "Military Awakening in India is Very Fitful", op. cit., p. 14.

51 Nazareth, loc. cit.

52 LSD, pt 2, vol. 1, col. 2813.

53 The following remarks regarding the general outlook of the officer corps refer, of course, to the 1947-62 period only and are undoubtedly subject to many qualifications.

54 According to Lord Birdwood, on one occasion during the fighting when two companies of the Guides Infantry found themselves in opposition, they arrived at a friendly arrangement about jamming each other's wireless messages. Birdwood also stated that 'It is on record that in informal conversation officers in Delhi did not conceal their dislike of fighting those with whom they had such ties of sentiment and tradition. If it had been left to them they would stop the fighting immediately'. Two Nations and Kashmir (London, Robert Hale, 1956), pp. 69 and 77 respectively.

55 Major-General Paranjpe even argued that, had Pakistan not refused India's offer of a non-aggression pact, 'our armed forces would have been reduced to skeleton bodies and even those would have functioned as 'Lok sahayak senas... [and] we would be busy today reconverting our Army farmers, Navy fishermen and Air Force locusts fighters into soldiers, sailors and airmen'. "Military Awakening in India is Very Fitful", loc. cit. While this is probably an extremely pessimistic view, there can be little doubt that the allocations for defence would have been much smaller without the existence of public fears of Pakistan.

56 The three Services used the politician's sensitivity to Pakistan to defend requests for new appropriations. The Army managed thereby to successfully oppose further reductions in its strength in 1952-53 and to acquire new tanks, the Air Force to acquire fighters and bombers comparable or superior to those obtained by Pakistan and the Navy to obtain ships and aircraft - the acquisition of which may otherwise have been deferred or quantitatively reduced for financial reasons despite the Government's desire to develop a strong military establishment as a matter of general policy. Even in the context of strained Indo-Pak relations, however, it has been noted that the Army was generally unable to acquire new equipment and the naval programme was sharply reduced - on financial grounds.

57 As General Sir Richard Gale has written, the military man must deal 'with military fact, hard figures, grim realities of time and space and resources'. "The Impact of Political Factors on Military Judgement", RUSI Journal, 99 (February 1954), p. 27.

58 The Statesman, 1st September 1959.

59 LSD, vol. 34, 2 September 1959, col. 5853.

60 12 September 1959, p. 4.

61 Delhi correspondent, 3 September 1959.

62 5 September 1959. For other comments see Noel Barber in Daily Mail, 2 September 1959; New Statesman, 26 September 1959; Indian Express, 4 September 1959; Taya Zinkin in Manchester Guardian, 2 and 4 September 1959.

63 Even he was generally complacent about defence, however, and declined to support increased appropriations (such as for Army weapons and equipment) in circumstances where it seemed more personally rewarding to appear as an economy-minded Minister striving to reduce overall expenditure in defence. See, for example, his claim to have initiated the reduction in the defence demands proposed for fiscal '59 as against the expenditure during fiscal '58. LSD, 2nd Sess., vol. 29, 9 April 1959, col. 10,866. He added that the savings were being effected through better efficiency and use of equipment. This is not borne out by the Finance Minister's claim, in presenting the budget, that the reduction in the demands for defence was largely due to adjustments in the manner of book-keeping. See statement by Morarji Desai in ibid, vol. 26, cols 3600-1.

64 The information concerning Kaul's background and outlook has been obtained largely from Welles Hagen, After Nehru, Who? (London, Rupert Hart-Davis, 1963), pp. 242-72.

65 Kaul was invited to pay a visit to China during his Korean engagement and claims that he did so because Nehru felt that it would be impolitic to refuse and that his answers to reporters' questions on his return were misinterpreted. See ibid, p. 254.

66 Menon ordered the Hunter aircraft for the IAF, for example, shortly after assuming the Defence portfolio without prior consultation with either the Air Force or the Chiefs of Staff Committee. Furthermore, the Army and Navy considered the purchase as unwarranted by the strategic situation and the Finance Minister opposed the further heavy drain on foreign exchange reserves already sadly depleted.

67 The reluctance of Army HQ was due to a belief that employment of frontline troops in such tasks was scarcely cheaper than civilian labour and detrimental to morale.

68 Gyani had not commanded a division which was normally a desired pre-requisite for promotion to Lieutenant-General but Army Headquarters clearly did not regard this factor as an obstacle to Gyani's promotion.

69 Information obtained from an informed Indian military source. The measures envisaged are believed to be very similar to those implemented from late 1959 and included recruitment of special units from the Khampa refugees expected to seek asylum in India against future contingencies.

70 The head of the Army at this time, General Thimayya, was by no means an advocate of seeking conflict with China; as he wrote in mid-1962:

I cannot even as a soldier envisage India taking on China in an open conflict on its own. China's present strength in manpower, equipment and aircraft exceeds our own resources a hundred-fold with the full support of the USSR and we can never hope to match China in the foreseeable future. It must be left to the politicians and diplomats to ensure our security.

"Adequate insurance", Seminar, No. 35 (July 1962), p. 14. It was felt, however, that it was necessary to show the Chinese that India meant to preserve its territorial integrity.

and thereby provide some sanction for the Indian diplomat to talk to China from a position of at least modicum strength. General Cariappa would appear to have expressed a popular Service view in November 1959, when he called for a realignment of India's defence strategy away from Pakistan and towards China.

71 2 September 1959.

72 4 September 1959.

73 3 September 1959.

74 According to the report, Menon had submitted his resignation to Nehru that morning, but the amended version issued that evening stated only that persistent lobby reports of Menon's resignation could not be confirmed from ministerial sources. Cited in The Times, 2 September 1959.

75 The Statesman, 1st September 1959.

76 2 September 1959.

77 3 September 1959.

78 Cited, New York Times, 3 September 1959.

79 Vigil, 26 September 1959, p. 562.

80 3 September 1959.

81 According to one observer, Menon's dislike for Thorat had not stopped at the latter's retirement. Menon allegedly persuaded Nehru to cancel Thorat's post-retirement appointment as manager of the Rourkela Steel Factory although the appointment had been earlier approved by the Prime Minister, by Home Minister Pant and by Steel Minister Swaram Singh; Y.B. Chavan, Chief Minister of Maharashtra at the time, thereupon purportedly invited Thorat to head the Maharashtra Public Service Commission. See report by Prabhakar Padhye in the Times of Viet Nam, 10 December 1962.

82 Verma had commanded the 1st and 2nd armoured brigades, 20th infantry division and a Corps, had held the posts of Master-General of Ordnance and CGS and, at the time of the supercession, was responsible for the most active operational theatre - in Jammu and Kashmir.

83 He claimed that, during 1960-61, 266 Majors were promoted to Lieutenant-Colonel with 485 being superceded, 70 Colonels were promoted with 82 being superceded, 39 Brigadiers were promoted and 57 superceded, seven Major-Generals were promoted and 17 superceded, and four Lieutenant-General were promoted and five superceded. He stated that 64 Majors had appealed against their supercessions to Army HQ only to be rejected while, of the two appeals thereupon made to the Government (i.e. Defence Ministry) one had been accepted and the other was under consideration; three officers had appealed to Army HQ for elevation to Major but their appeals were rejected with the one subsequent appeal to the Government being under consideration; and one appeal involving a desired promotion to acting Brigadier had been made to Army HQ and had been rejected. See LSD, 2nd Sess., vol. 54, 26 April 1961, p. 10,540.

84 Ibid, col. 10,540.

85 Ibid, col. 10,542.

86 Manekshaw apparently declared to some audience of Service personnel in early 1960 to the effect that he wouldn't permit Kaul or Menon to obtain publicity by opening installations in any area he commanded; news of his remarks had reached either Menon or Kaul. Thimayya also refused to act on a later report that Manekshaw had been overheard in a Mess to have referred to him (Thimayya) as a 'bloody fool' as he was well aware of Manekshaw's bluntness and did not view the remark, if indeed it was made, as anything personal. Indeed, it is understood from various informed sources, that the two men had a high regard for each other.

87 Writing in March 1959, Taya Zinkin expressed the view that the idea of an army coup, either by its own initiative or in support of Menon, was absurd. The reasons she advanced in support of this contention were: the army was not a caste itself, with a separate outlook and interests; it had no heroes as even Thimayya, though respected and loved, was far from being lionized; and the middle class - which provides the military officers, technicians, administrators and professional men running India - was predominantly Hindu, a religion which is 'much too vague and too individualistic to make it possible for one man to impose himself on others, except as a saint'. "India and Military Dictatorship", Pacific Affairs, 32:1 (March 1959), pp. 89-90.

88 Robert Trumbull commented in 1957 that: 'The possibility is perhaps very remote, but there are some observers, both Indian and foreign, who believe that if prevailing political influences in India become so unwholesome as to threaten complete destruction of the country's welfare, an army coup is not out of the question'. As I See India (London, Cassell, 1957), p. 172. Hugh Tinker wrote in 1962 that, while the Indian Army was non-political, so was the Pakistan Army down to 1958:

The possibility of military intervention could not be ruled out, if public order ever seriously degenerated, or if India was confronted by a grave external threat which was pusillanimously met by the politicians. Military governments in Hyderabad and Goa were of short duration; but in Kashmir the Army remains the real power behind the State administration. The cry of Indian publicists "It cant happen here" has a shrill note: they know it could and might happen.

India and Pakistan (London, Pall Mall Press, 1962), p. 157. For similar views, see The Times, 3 November 1958; the New York Herald Tribune, 10 December 1958.

89 See Welles Hangen, op. cit., pp. 257-60.

90 Indian Express, 7 May 1962.

## CHAPTER X

### HIMALAYAN CONFLICT

The cautious and limited deployment of Indian troops in Ladakh proved inadequate as either a deterrent to or a bulwark against further Chinese advances. In the autumn of 1960 China pushed a patrol to within ten miles of Daulet Beg Oldi, to the south of Karakoram Pass, and in May of the following year the Chinese were again pushing forward towards Chushul. Shortly thereafter Chinese troops occupied Dehra Compass and their establishment of a post on the Chip Chap River 17 miles south-east of Daulet Beg Oldi in the late summer brought them to their 1960 claim line in this quarter. Other Chinese posts were established at Niagzu and Dambu Guru and the Chinese occupied Hot Springs<sup>1</sup>.

In response to these further indications of Peking's intention to continue its advances in Ladakh, the Indian Government took the momentous decision to challenge the Chinese actions by establishing small and generally isolated outposts in the disputed areas. The objectives of this 'forward policy' were apparently several: to block potential

lines of Chinese advance; to undermine Chinese control of the disputed areas through the interposition of Indian posts and patrol activities between Chinese posts; and, thereby, to threaten and disrupt Chinese lines of communication and supply.

It is still unclear as to whom this policy can be attributed. It was attractive from a political viewpoint and, from the military viewpoint, it was practicable although imposing a disproportionate additional burden upon the existing system of supply and communication. It was apparently based, however, on the premise that the Chinese had been moving only where there was a vacuum and that they would not challenge Indian posts by force of arms. New Delhi may have hoped that such a modest display of its determination not to concede the area by default would make Peking amenable to some sort of negotiated settlement.

By April 1961, Indian patrols were probing forward around the long-established Chinese post on the Chip Chap River and perhaps six posts were set up in Ladakh by the end of the year. Several all-year barracks and supply posts were also established in forward areas to permit an Indian presence to be maintained in the inhospitable area throughout the winter. The developments were viewed with optimism by the Indian Prime Minister. Speaking in the Lok Sabha on



28 November 1961, Nehru declared that 'progressively the situation had been changing from the military point of view and we shall continue to take steps to build up these things so that ultimately we may be in a position to take action to recover such territory as is in their possession'. He explained that the Government regarded Ladakh as presently of greater importance than NEFA and that Longju would be reoccupied when the time was appropriate.

We cannot take adventurist actions which may land us in greater military or other difficulties. It is not an easy matter to conduct warfare in these regions. But it may have to be done and therefore we have to prepare for it if necessary.<sup>2</sup>

The despatch of an infantry brigade group to the Congo in March-April 1961 and the operation against Goa in December of the same year, however, suggest that no sharp deterioration of the situation in the Himalayan region was contemplated at that time.

In the spring of 1962, Nehru sanctioned a more provocative phase of the forward policy in Ladakh which involved direct attempts to cut Chinese lines of communications to their forward posts. According to one report, Menon ordered the spring advances to answer election criticism that he was 'soft' towards China, while letting it be discreetly known that he was more realistic and tougher towards China than was Nehru - being neither optimistic about successful negotiations

with China nor under any illusion of Soviet support in the event of a Sino-Indian clash<sup>3</sup>. In the view of another writer, it was Kaul who took the initiative to argue the need for such action with Nehru on the grounds that the Army had to have self-respect.

Menon was hamstrung. He could not openly oppose a policy aimed at reclaiming lost Indian territory. Menon's long-standing orders that Indian patrols should not engage the Chinese under any circumstances were revoked. Indian troops were told to hold their ground and open fire if the Chinese sought to dislodge them from any position on Indian soil.<sup>4</sup>

The latter version would seem to have been the more accurate; Kaul is known to have favoured a tough line against the Chinese whereas Menon's career and excessively apologetic stand on the issue of Chinese actions in the Himalayas would have rendered problematical his political survival or diplomatic usefulness in the event that China was provoked too far and large-scale conflict ensued.

Several further Indian battalions were shifted into Ladakh to provide the means with which to implement the new phase of the 'forward policy' and a number of new posts were established, including ones at Spanggur Lake and on both the north and south banks of Pangyong Lake<sup>5</sup>. With a confidence that betrayed an increasingly firm attitude on the border question, Nehru claimed in the Lok Sabha on 29 June that

India now had the military initiative and that new Indian posts were outflanking and endangering Chinese posts<sup>6</sup>.

In furtherance of her previous policy and in response to the increasingly forceful Indian policy, Peking established further posts in the disputed area<sup>7</sup> while the Chinese press warned New Delhi of the possible consequences of its 'aggressive' actions. An editorial in Jenmin Jihpao in April hinted at a plot between Nehru, the Dalai Lama, Chiang Kai-shek and the United States to re-initiate 'interference' in Tibet<sup>8</sup> - presumably by supplying arms to the rebels. India was also warned to withdraw its 'aggressive posts' and discontinue its provocations against Chinese posts on penalty of Chinese frontier guards being 'compelled to defend themselves'<sup>9</sup>. Peking announced that it was resuming 'patrols' in the area between the Karakoram and Kongka passes and would commence patrolling the entire Sino-Indian frontier if India continued to invade and occupy Chinese territory<sup>10</sup>. A Chinese note dated 2 June 1962 warned that the country's frontier guards would not acquiesce in continuing Indian provocations<sup>11</sup> and an editorial in Renmin Ribao on 9 July warned the Indian Government to 'rein in on the brink of the precipice'<sup>12</sup>.

In a show of strength on 10 July, some 400 Chinese troops encircled an Indian post which had been established a few days before astride the supply line to a forward Chinese

post in the Galwan River valley<sup>13</sup>. After hurried discussions in New Delhi, the Indian troops were ordered to stand firm and to meet force with force. After several tense days, the Chinese detachment withdrew but Indian and Chinese troops exchanged fire on 16, 19 and 21 July.

In retrospect, this incident in the Galwan River valley appears to have been of great significance. To Peking, it must have indicated that the Indian Government was now prepared to risk an armed clash to maintain its positions and that Chinese posts would either have to be abandoned, as the supply lines to the individual forward posts were cut, or be secured through offensive action against the opposing Indian forces. From the standpoint of New Delhi, the Chinese withdrawal was seemingly interpreted as confirming the view (hitherto held with less conviction) that China would not risk an open clash but would respect demonstrations of India's determination to maintain its territorial integrity by force of arms, if that was required. Thus emboldened, the Indian authorities decided on an even bolder course of action in NEFA, where Chinese occupation of Longju remained an open challenge. The scope of the challenge was considerably broadened when Chinese forces seized the Dhola post and Thag La ridge in the Kameng Frontier Division on 8 September. As a former Chief of the Indian Army Staff,

General K.S. Thimayya, aptly commented in retrospect: 'these actions in overrunning our post in Dhola Ridge and in occupying Thag La Ridge must have been with the specific aim of forcing us to react so as to give them a good excuse for launching an attack on us'<sup>14</sup>.

New Delhi's response could hardly have been more to Peking's satisfaction as it could later be argued that it was the 'aggressive' actions of India which necessitated the 'defensive' actions by the so-called Chinese frontier guards. Thus, Nehru stated in London on 10 September that the border dispute could 'develop suddenly into a conflict'<sup>15</sup>. In response to the establishment of another Chinese post ten miles inside the MacMahon Line near Tawang on 12 September, troops from the 7th brigade of India's 4th infantry division began to move from Tawang towards the Thag La-Dhola area and there were sporadic clashes between Indian and Chinese forces near Dhola on the night of 20-21 September and at the Che Jao bridge on 29 September. According to one press source, the decision to resort to direct action against the Chinese forces encamped on territory claimed by India was taken on 17 September<sup>16</sup>.

Nehru returned from his overseas trip on 1st October but made no immediate comment on the NEFA situation. On 5 October, however, the Defence Ministry announced that the

Chief of the General Staff, Lt. General B.M. Kaul, had been transferred to command of a new Corps in NEFA and that he had already left for Tezpur<sup>17</sup>. Despite official efforts to represent the new Command as merely a re-organization having no wider significance<sup>18</sup>, its implications were correctly noted by sections of the press. The Economist expressed the view that the move reflected a Government decision 'to put Chinese intentions to the test especially in the MacMahon Line Region'<sup>19</sup>. The Times of India declared that the Army was poised for an 'all-out effort to expel the Chinese intruders from the Thag La area'<sup>20</sup>.

The drift to war quickened as Indian troops delivered a small probing attack north-west of Dhola on 10 October and it became fairly clear that Indian forces were preparing to eject the Chinese from the area. Official and unnecessarily dramatic confirmation of such an intention was given by Nehru in New Delhi on 12 October when, just prior to his departure for Madras and thence Ceylon, he declared to the press that the Army had been ordered to eject the Chinese from NEFA<sup>21</sup>. On 15 October, Defence Minister Menon stated at Bangalore that the Chinese would be thrown from Indian soil<sup>22</sup>.

A temporary lull in the NEFA skirmishing was broken by an Indian claim on 16 October that their Dhola post had been fired upon. In reply, Peking charged that Indian troops had

attacked on 17 October all along the Kechilang River, advancing northwards between Hatung Pass and Pangkangting and towards Sechang Lake<sup>23</sup>. The stage was appropriately set for the 'defensive actions' by Chinese 'frontier guards', and a leading Indian daily reported on 19 October that there were elaborate Chinese preparations for an offensive along the borders of Sikkim, Bhutan and NEFA<sup>24</sup>.

The conflict erupted early on the morning of 20 October at both extremities of the Sino-Indian frontier. Indian and Chinese reports differ as to the manner of the actual commencement of hostilities but the preparedness of the Chinese forces was unmistakable. The so-called 'defensive actions' by their 'frontier guards' were delivered in brilliant fashion by large numbers of infantry supported by artillery, mountain guns, mortars and, on at least one occasion in Ladakh, by tanks<sup>25</sup>.

In Ladakh, Chinese infantry attacked south of the Karakoram Pass at the north-west extremity of the Aksai Chin plateau and in the Pangyong Lake area 100 miles to the south-east. Indian forces were speedily ejected from perhaps eleven posts in the vicinity of Karakoram Pass and from several in the Pangyong Lake district but held firm at the vital posts of Daulet Beg Oldi (near the entrance to the Pass) and Chushul (immediately south of Pangyong Lake and at

the head of the vital supply road to Leh). On 27 October, other Chinese forces attacked in the vicinity of Demchok (100 miles south-east of Chushul) and quickly overran the Demchok and Jara La posts but were otherwise contained. In one instance, they conceded some ground to a counter-attack by elements of the Jammu and Kashmir Militia.

In NEFA, the Chinese forces advanced almost at will despite Indian resistance at several key points. The Tsang Le post on the northern side of the Namka Chu River, the Khinzemane post and the Indian brigade near Dhola were overrun on the first day and the Chinese proceeded with a general offensive at both ends of the MacMahon Line. In the western sector, Tsang Dar fell on 22 October, Bum La on the 23rd and Tawang - headquarters of the 7th infantry brigade under Brigadier-General J.P. Dalvi - was lost to a three-pronged Chinese divisional assault on the 24th. In the centre, Chinese troops re-occupied the undefended frontier post at Longju (which they had evacuated during the summer due to the outbreak of an epidemic) and captured the Asafila border post 25 miles to the south-west. In the Lohit Frontier Division, a strong Chinese force captured the frontier post at Kibithoo (located only 20 miles from the Indo-Burmese border) on 22 October and advanced 15 miles down the Lohit Valley to Walong, reaching the vicinity of the town on 25 October. A



Chinese offer of negotiations was advanced on 24 October and was rejected by the Indian Government - as it was undoubtedly expected to be<sup>26</sup> - and a lull set in on the battlefield as both sides prepared for the resumption of the next phase of hostilities.

The Indian Army made desperate efforts to strengthen its defensive positions in NEFA and Ladakh and to prepare against possible Chinese attacks through Sikkim and Bhutan. The measures were in general accordance with the contingency planning prepared in 1961 but their effectiveness had been largely destroyed by the time of implementation by the rapidity of events. Two brigades were withdrawn from Nagaland and sited at Rangiya (south of Bhutan) and a brigade of four battalions was rushed up to defend Walong. The 5th division from Jullundur-Ferezpore was shifted piecemeal to Misamari (near Tezpur) and three brigades drawn from the 4th and 5th divisions were hastily deployed into positions astride the Se La-Dirrang Dzong-Bomdila axis, supported by light Stuart tanks from Calcutta and paratroop artillery from Agra. The 17th division was shifted from Ambala to Goyerkata (in northern Bengal between Bhutan and East Pakistan), two brigades were rushed to Siliguri from Amritsar and Khasali and the Natu La-Gangtok-Siliguri-Kalimpong axis was further reinforced by two brigades drawn from Calcutta and Ranchi. A divisional organization was formed at Dibrugarh.

In Ladakh, the military response to the initial Chinese attacks involved the creation of a divisional organization at Leh and the reinforcement of Chushul by air with several battalions, a battery of 25-pounders and two troops (normally 32 units) of AMX light tanks which had been detached from the 5th and 17th divisions. In early November, the Daulet Beg Oldi post was abandoned as untenable and its defenders withdrawn over the 17,500 feet high Sasar Brangsa Pass to more defensible positions.

The armoured division at Jhansi and the independent armoured brigade at Patiala were not disturbed and events appear to have developed too rapidly for other formations in south and south-west India to be disturbed. The Punjab was thus left almost denuded of combatant formations, suggesting that Army headquarters proceeded on the assumption that Pakistan would not take advantage of India's predicament. The Reserve was activated<sup>27</sup> and 100 units of the Territorial Army were embodied; most of the TA personnel were assigned to their previously designated anti-aircraft and coastal defence duties but some were absorbed into technical units of the regular Army<sup>28</sup>.

The adjustments in Ladakh proved adequate to enable the Chushul perimeter to be successfully defended against repeated shelling and assault, but the outlying posts at Rezang La

and Gurung Hill and four posts in the Spanggur Lake area were overwhelmed by Chinese troops.

The situation in NEFA, however, quickly assumed the proportions of a debacle.

Indian troops counter-attacked in the Walong area on 13 November and captured a hill feature on a ridge north-west of the town, but were unable to hold it against determined Chinese attacks. With the loss of the vital Otter airstrip, the defending garrison had no choice but to commence on 16 November a general retirement down the Lohit Valley to a new defensive position about twelve miles distant. The retirement was effected under heavy Chinese pressure.

In the Kameng Frontier Division, a force of about six Chinese brigades thrust across the Tawang Chu River near Jang and advanced ten miles to the south-east to attack forward Indian positions at Nurang, eight miles below Se La, on the evening of 17 November. At nightfall, the Indian force withdrew to the main defensive position at Se La which, although a strong physical position, was held by only about five battalions. The defences were frontally assaulted that same night by perhaps four Chinese brigades while simultaneous attacks were made against Dirrang and Bomdila<sup>29</sup> by a Chinese force which, under cover of a heavy snowfall, had executed an undetected outflanking movement on 16-17 November

over a mountain range 20 to 30 miles east of Se La. Both towns fell after some hard fighting in which upwards of a dozen Stuart tanks were destroyed. The force at Se La abandoned its positions on 18 November in an attempt to break out to the south but was dispersed before a strong Chinese roadblock north of Bomdila. Effective Indian resistance in the Kameng Division thereupon virtually ceased to exist and Chinese troops swept south a further 30 to 40 miles to the vicinity of Foothills, a small town on the edge of the Assam plains.

At this point, the Chinese were in possession of all the territory which they claimed in Ladakh<sup>30</sup> and, in NEFA, they had advanced to within 40 miles of Tezpur and to within 100 miles of the important Digboi oil fields. Private civilians and government officials were fleeing Tezpur, preparations were being made by British officials to evacuate their nationals from the areas north of the Brahmaputra River, and New Delhi seemed almost paralysed by the collapse of the NEFA defences and the fear that the Chinese meant to overrun all of Assam. Lt. General Kaul had been replaced by a 'fighting general', Lt. General Manekshaw, and posted to the Punjab (then virtually denuded of troops) while the Chief of Army Staff, General P.N. Thapar, had gone on indefinite sick leave and the former GOC, Southern Command, J.N. Chaudhuri, had

assumed the onerous responsibility of directing the Army through the crisis<sup>31</sup>. The 4th division had ceased to exist as a fighting formation and the badly-mauled 5th division had been withdrawn from the line for re-organization under a new commander. Over 10,000 troops were cut off in the Kameng Frontier Division and the 2500 troops in the Lohit Frontier Division were facing a desperate supply situation nearly 100 miles from the nearest roadhead. In Ladakh, the former 'political' deployment in small posts was being readjusted to a more realistic military posture astride the highly defensible approaches to Leh. In the Kameng Division, Indian forces were hastily constructing new defensive positions to the north of Foothills, while a fairly strong Indian force remained deployed against possible attacks in the Sikkim-Bhutan sector.

India's unpreparedness in the military sphere was even more pronounced in the non-military sphere, the confused response of the Prime Minister reflecting his bewilderment at the totally unexpected turn of events<sup>32</sup>. Apparently not alarmed by the initial attacks, Nehru soon swung to the opposite extreme of acclaiming the Chinese actions as a 'major invasion' in which the fate of Asia and the world was at stake<sup>33</sup>. In an address to a conference of State Information Minister on 25 October, he drew an unreal parallel with

Dunkirk, declaring that the Indian people must respond with the same determination as had the British people in the aftermath of that famous evacuation<sup>34</sup>.

In the absence of any production mobilization scheme, the sales of new cars, new jeeps, station-wagons, trucks, steel products and stocks were frozen with a consequent serious and quite unnecessary disorganization of the civilian economy. The sudden increased demand for blood plasma could not be met from the only two existing plants in the country for freeze-drying of this vital requirement<sup>35</sup>.

A state of emergency was signed into force by the President on 25 October and proclaimed the following day under Article 352 of the Indian Constitution. The Defence of India Ordinance 1962 was promulgated, conferring emergency powers on the Government for the duration of the Emergency<sup>36</sup>. Press censorship was invoked<sup>37</sup> and a veil of secrecy was clamped upon developments with the result that both civilian and soldier alike were forced to rely upon Radio Peking for news of developments of the fighting<sup>38</sup>. Chinese nationals and pro-Peking members of the Indian Communist Party were hustled into internment camps and jails. A National Defence Fund was established to which the public were requested to donate cash and valuables. Public appeals were also made for warm clothing to correct a shocking shortage of this

essential item for which the Army was being forced to endure unnecessary hardships and to suffer considerable losses through exposure and frostbite.

The Chinese attacks provoked immediate demands from broad sections of Indian opinion for the removal from the Government of the controversial Defence Minister, V.K. Krishna Menon<sup>39</sup>. A strong move developed within the Congress Party itself which crystallized around important persons<sup>40</sup>. Senior members of the Party, including the deputy leader, Dr Harekrushna Mahatab, U.N. Dhebar, Mahavir Tyagi, B.K.P. Singh and the general-secretary of the Party, Raghunath Singh, met privately a fortnight before the scheduled session of Parliament and agreed upon the need for Nehru to dismiss Menon and assume the Defence portfolio himself. Dr Mahatab conveyed the views of the group to the Prime Minister and was virtually snubbed, but the group maintained its pressure. At a meeting of the Executive Committee several days later, Nehru was made completely aware of the strong feeling within the Party over Menon's failure as Defence Minister. The Prime Minister's effort to assume personal blame for the Himalayan situation failed to provoke the usual passive acquiescence. Faced with the mounting public clamour and Party pressure, Nehru had little choice but to take over the Defence post on 31 October. In an obvious attempt to lessen the significance

of the demotion of his intimate friend, Nehru retained Menon in the Cabinet in the newly-created post of Minister for Defence Production - but with limited responsibilities<sup>41</sup>.

The demotion, which undoubtedly dealt a deep personal blow to Menon, only appeared to increase his arrogance, however, as he proceeded to declare at Tezpur that really nothing had changed<sup>42</sup>. Although he probably recognized the fallacy of such a claim, which constituted more of a defensive stratagem than a statement of fact, the remark enhanced his unpopularity both within and without the Congress Party<sup>43</sup>. The second meeting of the Executive Committee, held on the morning of 7th November, was stormy. Members had resorted to the novel (by Indian standards) procedure of collecting signatures to a demand for Menon's complete dismissal from the Government and some of the members even made direct charges.

Nehru made an unsuccessful attempt to convince the members of Menon's sincerity by reading the latter's letter of resignation dated 30 October<sup>44</sup>, and the meeting ended without any indication from the Prime Minister concerning his subsequent course of action. His attitude towards the whole issue was undoubtedly based to some extent on the recognition that he himself was indirectly being attacked<sup>45</sup>. He could not ignore the plain fact, however, that his views could no longer command unquestioning support and that continued



refusal on his part to meet the widespread demand (from all but the extreme political Left) for Menon's removal from the Government must inevitably weaken his own position and culminate in even more concerted actions leading to direct attacks upon himself. It is believed that he approached the President, Dr Radhakrishnan, on the matter and that the latter, although personally friendly to Menon, advised that he would have to be dismissed for the good of the country<sup>46</sup>. Shortly before the evening general meeting of the Congress Party on 7 November, Nehru announced in Parliament that he had accepted Menon's resignation: 'I feel that Mr Krishna Menon has done good work but the controversy will not rest until he quits and controversy is bad for the war effort'<sup>47</sup>.

The crisis had also provoked the establishment of an Emergency Committee of Cabinet and of a variety of other emergency committees within the Defence Ministry. On 6 November, a 30-member National Defence Council was set up to 'advise' the Government on matters directly or indirectly affecting the defence of India<sup>48</sup>. As the crisis deepened, the Cabinet was re-organized in a manner designed to illustrate the Government's determination to meet the challenge to the country's territorial integrity and prestige. The youthful and vigorous Chief Minister of Maharashtra, Y.B. Chavan, was appointed to the Defence portfolio on 14

November<sup>49</sup> and, on the same day, it was also announced that K. Raghuramaiah had been shifted from Minister of State in the Defence Ministry to the post of Minister of Defence Production, T.T. Krishnamachari had been transferred from Minister without Portfolio to the newly-created portfolio of Minister for Economic and Defence Co-ordination, and V.R.P. Rao had replaced O. Pulla Reddy as Defence Secretary<sup>50</sup>. On 15 November Major-General Sardanand Singh (retd) was appointed to the newly-created post of Director-General of Civil Defence.

The situation had, in the meantime, also forced the Government to appeal for immediate military support from Britain and the United States cloaked in a general appeal for support to all governments excepting Portugal and South Africa. New Delhi sent an urgent request to London and Washington on 26 October and received an immediate response from both of these governments; the first consignment of British aid arrived in two Royal Air Force Britannias on 29 October and the first American aid arrived from depots in Western Europe on 1st November. As the NEFA debacle grew in extent, the Indian Government submitted, on 19 November, an urgent and specific request for American fighting air support<sup>51</sup>. Washington had not replied to the request when the Chinese announced their unilateral ceasefire<sup>52</sup>.

The surprise Chinese announcement was broadcast over the New China News Agency on 20 November. It declared that China would terminate the conflict at midnight of the following day and, from 1st December would commence a withdrawal of her forces to 20 kilometres ( $12\frac{1}{2}$  miles) north of the MacMahon Line and to a similar distance behind the 'line of actual control' in existence in Ladakh as of 7 November 1959. The broadcast stated China's intention to proceed with her withdrawal regardless of the Indian reaction but warned that China reserved the right to strike back in the event that India attempted to re-occupy any of the territory occupied by Chinese troops during their advance<sup>53</sup>. The withdrawal appears to have proceeded as planned and was completed in both sectors by about 15 January 1963<sup>54</sup>.

The official Indian reaction to the announcement was to declare that it was a unilateral action and that a pre-condition to Indian agreement to enter into discussions with the Chinese Government regarding the border dispute was restoration of the status quo as of 8 September 1962. New Delhi had little choice but to respect the Chinese warning against attempts to re-occupy with troops the areas lost to the advancing Chinese. Immediate attention had necessarily to be given to preparations against renewed fighting in the following spring with the aid of emergency shipments of

military equipment and stores offered, ironically enough, only by the countries of the Western bloc whose approach to the 'Chinese problem' had been subject to such heavy criticisms by the Indian Government up to this point. The Soviet bloc, whose friendship India had so assiduously cultivated, remained studiously non-committal<sup>55</sup> and India's non-aligned colleagues chose to treat the issue in accordance with the well-known 'Indian approach' - i.e. on its merits with priority to realpolitik and 'reducing tension' rather than to legal or moral niceties<sup>56</sup>.

The brief and limited conflict had exposed many deficiencies in India's defence posture.

The performance of senior Army officers charged with NEFA defences left much to be desired, with confusion, uncertainty and lack of initiative being widespread. Kaul had attempted to direct operations from the front instead of his headquarters with the result that he exercised little control over operations which proceeded without coordination; the removal and subsequent return of Corps headquarters from Tezpur to Gauhati merely aggravated an already confused situation. Officers were generally left to their own devices - a situation for which more than a few were not equipped. The commander of the Indian force at Se La made only a half-hearted attempt to break through a Chinese roadblock

north of Dirrang Dzong but chose to abandon his roadbound equipment and bypass the roadblock; the result was that the approximately two brigades comprising his force lost cohesion and any effectiveness as a fighting formation. The attempt to hold both principal Chinese thrusts as far forward as Se La and Walong in the face of poor logistics disregarded the prudent contingency planning prepared for meeting a Chinese attack as early as 1961 and enabled the Chinese to destroy two divisions in almost piecemeal fashion. A nervous brigade commander is understood to have contributed to the Bomdila debacle when he effected a disorderly withdrawal of his command (believed to be the 48th Brigade of 4 Div.), thereby exposing two other brigades who proceeded to adjust their own dispositions with general confusion ensuing.

Tactics were too conventional, forces tending to be roadbound both in tactical and logistical movement and unable to cope with the unorthodox procedures so skilfully employed by the Chinese. Officers, many of whom had obviously shown little interest in unorthodox warfare right up to the outbreak of the war, were unable to provide the necessary leadership at company and platoon level and were, furthermore, totally unfamiliar with Chinese tactics, equipment and capabilities. The troops under their command were deficient in battle training and in training required for operations in

the jungles and mountains in which they found themselves, and were also not acclimatized to fight at the heights to which many of them were exposed<sup>57</sup>. Patrolling was poor, enabling the Chinese to retain the initiative throughout.

There was an overall shortage of equipment, while much of what was in existence was obsolete. Although the bolt-action .303 rifle remained an effective weapon in the hands of a trained soldier, it was incapable of off-setting Chinese automatics, superior artillery support and a longer-range mortar. The almost total absence of mines and wire in the forward positions precluded any chance of Indian troops holding positions against 'human sea' tactics. Stocks of supplies in forward areas were inadequate for operational requirements by augmented forces and the absence of a well-thought-out logistics plan for Himalayan operations prevented the rapid despatch of stores and equipment from depots to frontline areas<sup>58</sup>. The communications equipment proved almost completely useless under the conditions to which it was subjected, with a general failure of certain key components. There was an extensive shortage of high-altitude clothing for which the Army suffered hundreds of cases of exposure.

The inability of the Army to cope with limited attacks attest to the complacency which affected Indian military

preparations in the Himalayan region. Committed to secure the Himalayan frontiers and the Himalayan kingdoms against Chinese attacks, the Army had not been allocated the additional resources with which to perform its new commitments nor had the Government felt the need to seek some sort of understanding with Pakistan for co-operative action to meet the challenge posed by China. The contingency was clearly regarded as so remote that New Delhi continued to base its military strategy against her weaker neighbour and restricted her measures on the northern frontier to counter little more than local intrusions - notwithstanding contingency planning against possible divisional attacks which amounted to little more than staff exercises.

The decision to challenge the Chinese in the forward areas of Ladakh in the spring of 1962 and the extension of this policy to NEFA in September 1962 was clearly based on the political assumption that the Chinese would not risk a major conflict with a country of India's size and international stature just for the sake of a few square miles of frontier territory. It tended to ignore the fact that Chinese, as well as Indian prestige, was at stake and that actions such as Nehru's public announcement that he had ordered the Army to clear the Chinese from Indian territory merely ensured that, if only for sake of prestige, Peking could not

passively retire under increasing Indian pressure. Nehru's determination may well have been 'the accumulated result of affronted pride, reflected in the clamour to do something, and real concern about the possible effect of failure to maintain Indian sovereignty in the north-east frontier'<sup>59</sup>, but his determination revealed itself too late to have the desired effect but in a fashion that ensured the very occurrence which Indian diplomacy had counselled other nations against, placing China in a situation where she had no credible recourse but force of arms.

The extent to which the military (essentially Army) leadership must share blame for the debacle is difficult to ascertain. Nehru claimed that decisions relating to Himalayan defence 'were taken by Government in full consultation with the Chiefs of Staff and other senior Army officers concerned and in the light of their expert advice. This applies particularly to the decision that the Army should not withdraw in October-November 1962 from its forward position in NEFA'<sup>60</sup>. He also claimed that his public statement that the Army had been ordered to eject the Chinese was 'not my decision alone; it was the viewpoint of the military people too. They wanted to do it. Otherwise I would not have dared to say anything like that'<sup>61</sup>. Although some senior officers are known to have viewed the 'forward policy'



with some concern, in view of the Army's inability to counter any substantial military reaction by China in these forward areas, other high-ranking officers and perhaps even a majority shared the mood noted by A.M. Rosenthal:

Everyone knew it could not happen. Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru knew it, his recently dismissed Defence Minister, V.K. Krishna Menon knew it, and even Indian generals knew it. "We thought it was a sort of game", said one officer of high rank recently, "They would stick up a post and we would stick up a post and we did not think it would come to much more".<sup>62</sup>

This smugness did not extend, however, to the proposal apparently advanced by the somewhat impetuous Kaul that the Army eject the Chinese from the Thag La-Dhola area. The proposal was regarded with dismay by more responsible officers, including Lieutenant-General Sen (GOC-Eastern Command) and the luckless Brigadier assigned to effect the dislodgement with a brigade of poorly-acclimatized and ill-equipped troops at the end of long and primitive communications with nothing in reserve to provide support. Even Kaul began to doubt the feasibility of the operation following the 10 Octob clash, which revealed without any doubt that the Chinese were in the area in far greater strength than was hitherto believed to be the case<sup>63</sup>. According to an informed Indian military source, Kaul thereupon returned to New Delhi to stress the need for a far stronger force if the plan was to be carried out. Thapar called Sen (Kaul's superior in theory

although not in practice)<sup>64</sup> in for consultations and the three Generals discussed the matter with the Defence Minister. The decision as to the course of action to be followed in the Thag La-Dhola area in the light of the altered situation was referred to Nehru who declined to interfere in what he clearly felt to be a 'military' problem. The decision was then taken in Nehru's presence and with his concurrence, to 'sit tight' until spring as far as further military activities in the Himalayas were concerned - at which time the entire situation could be reviewed. For some unexplained reason, however, probing actions continued and the public remained of the belief that the Government was proceeding with its preparations to force the Chinese out of NEFA<sup>65</sup>. It was, in any case, undoubtedly too late to revert to a more prudent policy.

The conflict removed lingering illusions in official Indian circles regarding Chinese inhibitions about employing force on a requisite scale to achieve desired objectives at the expense of India. It brought into focus a grave threat in a quarter where geography had been regarded as an almost insurmountable barrier to serious attack by land. It confirmed the availability of Western military aid in a crisis, but also evidenced that the balance of power thesis did not preclude a limited conflict in which an aggressor could

initiate hostilities and terminate action after achieving the desired objectives - and then resume his pre-war military posture without interference. The Chinese advance in NEFA revealed the absence of the necessary strategic depth in the 'corridor' between Bhutan/Sikkim and East Pakistan without which any defence of the area against a sustained assault from the north would be most problematical. There had been an unreal obsession with the 'historical ghost' of Moslem Pakistan to the detriment of suitable adjustments in defence strategy to accord with the changing geo-political context in the Himalayan region. The result was traumatic for India - militarily, politically and diplomatically.

In the aftermath of the Chinese ceasefire and unilateral withdrawal, a reassessment of India's defence requirements was required. The problems facing India were momentous. Along a 2800-mile border broken only by several powerless kingdoms, India is faced with a powerful China which remains in 'illegal' occupation of Aksai Chin and has claims to 32,000 square miles of NEFA, further areas in Ladakh, minor claims in the 'middle sector' and an 'on again, off again' claim to about 400 square miles of Bhutan comprising the entire Tashigang area in the eastern part of the state and a portion in the north-western sector facing the Chumbi valley. Peking also continues to advance such proposals as a

Confederation of Himalayan States that would include Nepal, Bhutan, Sikkim, Nagaland and an 'Eastern Hills State' in what is now NEFA; 'regional autonomy' for a 'Darjeeling-Duars district'; a Federation of Bhutan and Sikkim; and a Gurkhistan which would include all Nepalis in North Bengal and Assam<sup>66</sup>.

Indian technicians continue to help man some border checkpoints on the Nepal-Tibet border<sup>67</sup>, Kathmandu has resisted Chinese pressure to end the recruitment of Gurkhas by India and has even permitted increased recruitment since the Sino-Indian border war. But Indian influence in the state is being progressively eroded. China has warned that she would regard any Indian intervention in Nepal as a casus belli<sup>68</sup>, is rushing construction of the strategic Kathmandu-Koderi road<sup>69</sup> and is aiding the construction of another road to link Bhadrapur and Olangchung in eastern Nepal which, though conceived by Nepalis for commercial purposes, will also afford the Chinese with a strategic road which outflanks Sikkim to the west. Nepal is improving her relations with Pakistan as a deliberate policy aimed at loosening the ties with India<sup>70</sup> and, under a tripartite agreement signed with Britain and the United States in March 1964, Nepal is acquiring military equipment and stores from these countries - as against her former complete dependence upon India for such material<sup>71</sup>.

Sikkim appears content to remain firmly within the Indian orbit and has taken various measures to increase its contribution to its own security. The Sikkimese Government has imposed a complete ban on any movement across the Sikkim-Tibet border, has strengthened its system of border checkpoints - which will henceforth be manned the year round - and has established a checkpoint at Uttarey to check possible Chinese infiltration from Nepal. It is raising Home Guards equipped with modern weapons, has approached India to train Sikkimese in mountain warfare and has agreed that half of the Palace Guards will serve in rotation with Indian forces within the state<sup>72</sup>. India cannot, however, take its position in the state for granted and must be in a position to afford Sikkim a reasonable degree of security against Chinese attack - either alone or with the backing of the Western powers<sup>73</sup>.

Bhutan poses a major headache for Indian defence planners. The integrity of the state is vital for any successful defence of NEFA/Assam and Sikkim. A Chinese thrust into the state would threaten Indian forces deployed in NEFA and Sikkim with being cut off from succour by India's main field army and, if Nepal remained neutral in such a conflict (as is reasonable to presume) could lead to those Indian forces covering Darjeeling and Kalimpong being pinned against Nepal's eastern frontier. The result could well be the

destruction of a number of divisions and Chinese control of Assam, Bhutan and Sikkim which India could not contest without massive Western aid and a probable general war. As China would regard any Indian military move into Bhutan as a casus belli, India must devote its efforts to deterring any unprovoked Chinese attack on the state by establishing a credible military deterrent in the area and preparing to rapidly despatch troops into the state over the strategic roads under construction.

#### Notes

1 See P.M. Jones, "Passes and Impasses", Far Eastern Economic Review, 28 February 1963, p. 455.

2 LSD, Series 2, cols 1851-8.

3 Foreign Report, 20 September 1962, p. 6.

4 Welles Hangen, After Nehru, Who? (London, Rupert-Hart Davis, 1963), p. 258.

5 A map published in the Peking Review on 20 July 1962 (No. 29, p. 15) showed 15 Indian 'strongpoints' which had purportedly been set up since the spring - seven in the Chip Chap River area, two along the Galwan River, two west of Spanggur Lake, two on the shores of Pangyong Lake, one east of Phobrang and one east of Murgg. See map D. It was reported in the same journal on 17 August 1962 (No. 33, p. 5) that India had established 22 new military 'strongpoints' in Ladakh since the spring. Chang Chi, "The Sino-Indian Boundary Question". It was subsequently charged that India had set up 43 'aggressive strongpoints' in Ladakh between May 1961 and October 1962 - 38 since the spring of 1962. Peking Review, 2 November 1962, No. 44, p. 23. See map D.

- 6 LSD,
- 7 Mrs Lakshmi Menon, Minister of State for External Affairs, claimed in the Lok Sabha on 3 September 1962 that China had established 34 new posts in Ladakh since May 1962. LSD, 3rd Sess., vol. 8, col. 5531.
- 8 Cited, Peking Review, No. 17, 27 April 1962, pp. 8-9.
- 9 Peking Review, No. 18, 4 May 1962, p. 17.
- 10 Ibid.
- 11 Cited, Peking Review, No. 24, 15 June 1962, p. 9.
- 12 Cited, ibid., No. 28, 13 July 1962, p. 11.
- 13 In accordance with Maoist tactics, a line of retreat was left open to the Indian personnel at the post.
- 14 "Chinese Aggression and After, International Studies, 5: 1,2 (July-October 1963), p. 51.
- 15 Cited, The Times, 11 September 1962.
- 16 Times of India, 27 September 1962.
- 17 Hindu, 7 October 1962. Kaul's new command embraced the area of Uttar Pradesh, Sikkim, Bhutan and NEFA and reduced Maj-General Umrao Singh's Eastern Command to the area south of the Brahmaputra River covering Nagaland and the border with East Pakistan. Both Kaul and Singh were under the authority of Lt. General L.P. Sen, GOC-Eastern Command, but it is understood that Kaul functioned virtually independent of Sen and dealt directly with Army headquarters and the Defence Ministry.
- 18 See ibid.
- 19 13 October 1962, p. 125.
- 20 10 October 1962.
- 21 Cited, Hindu, 13 October 1962.

- 22 Cited, The Daily Telegraph, 15 October 1962.
- 23 See Survey of the Chinese Mainland Press (SCMP), No. 2839, 16 October 1962, p. 27; No. 2840, 17 October 1962, p. 19; 23 October 1962, p. 23.
- 24 Hindu, 19 October 1962.
- 25 The review of developments in the war has been collated from the daily reports of events in the Indian and foreign press and from informed individuals whom the writer interviewed in India.
- 26 China proposed a mutual withdrawal 20 kilometres behind the line of actual control as of 7 November 1959. For text see Peking Review, No. 43, 26 October 1962, pp. 5-6. The Indian Government refused to enter into discussions unless Chinese forces withdrew behind the line of actual control as of 8 September 1962.
- 27 26,144 JCOs and ORs and 110 officers were recalled and 8989 JCOs and ORs remained with the Colours as of 31 December 1962. Ministry of Defence, Report, 1963-64, pp. 29-30.
- 28 16 units were embodied prior to the declaration of the Emergency (i.e. 26 October) and a further 84 units thereafter - a total of 100 of the 177 units then in existence.
- 29 Dirrang was 19 miles south of Se La in a straight line and Bomdila 31 miles, but the distance between Bomdila and Se La by road was 80 miles.
- 30 Chushul was outside the Chinese claim line.
- 31 Both Kaul and Thapar resigned shortly thereafter. According to an authoritative Indian military informant, Nehru had approached President Radhakrishnan with the suggestion that Kaul be appointed to succeed Thapar as COAS but that the President regarded the proposal as 'absurd' in the circumstances. Referring to Kaul's departure from the Army at a New Delhi press conference on 31 December 1962, Nehru stated:  
He was not removed. He resigned. He resigned very rightly as the Chief of Staff resigned because of constructive responsibility. He felt he should resign in the circumstances. You see in these matters it is a little difficult to say where the responsibility lies or whether it lies on anyone at all.  
Cited, Hindu, 1st January 1963.



32 He confessed in the Lok Sabha on 8 November 1962 that the Government (i.e. himself) had felt that 'this type of aggression was almost a thing of the past'. Cited, ibid, 10 November 1962.

33 See, for example, his statement in Parliament on 8 November 1962, LSD, 3rd Sess., vol. 9, cols 108-52.

34 Cited, Hindu, 26 October 1962. Foreign Report (8 November 1962, pp. 7-8) expressed the view that Nehru's broadcast to the nation on 22 October reflected his fear of alarming the country, while his subsequent swing to the other extreme evidenced his recognition of the need to meet the public mood and the prevailing attitude of the armed forces or be faced with an erosion of his own position.

35 India News, 4/2, 4 February 1965. The Trombay establishment subsequently designed and fabricated a plant for this purpose, capable of freeze-drying 600 bottles or 180 litres per month - the first unit of this type to be built in India.

36 Text of the Ordinance in Times of India, 28 October 1962. This Ordinance was superceded by the Defence of India Bill which was presented to the Lok Sabha on 21 November 1963, passed without opposition by both Houses, and signed into effect by the President in December 1963. This 48-clause measure incorporates and extends the Defence of India Ordinance and confers upon the Government emergency powers to maintain public order and ensure the efficient conduct of military operations. The Preventive Detention Act, first initiated in 1950 for one year but continually renewed thereafter, was again renewed in December 1963 for a three-year period.

37 A Central Advisory Committee of editors was set up to check the publication of material which could be considered to jeopardize the security of the country. The Committee appears to have interpreted its terms of reference broadly and to have included within the area of sensitive material expressions of doubt regarding Nehru's qualities of leadership. For details of some of the newspapers and journals who received warnings concerning such 'violations', see Prem Bhatia in the Manchester Guardian Weekly, 10 October 1963; statement by the Minister of State in the Home Ministry, Shri Datas, LSD, 3rd Series, vol. 12, 23 January 1963, col. 5969.

38 Throughout the crisis, the task of briefing the press was entrusted to the External Affairs Ministry through which

oddly enough, all information pertaining to border defence was released. The immediate consequence of the ineptness of the Government's information policy was aptly summed up by one Western observer: 'The people...sense this [national humiliation] from the Government's own evasions and hesitations, lacking direct guidance. If India is confused, those in authority have much to answer for'. John Mander, "Indian Autumn", Encounter (February 1963), p. 19.

39 Menon's activities and comments during the first period of the war were viewed by the Times of India in an editorial on 25 October 1962 as 'a source of bewilderment and dismay'. The paper criticized Menon for taking time off at such a crucial stage to address a Bombay mass rally at which he gave a detailed and rambling explanation or 'justification' of his policy, and considered 'astonishing' his casual admission that defence arrangements of the NEFA frontier were 'found to be inadequate by later events' - a confession of failure which the paper felt Menon 'assumes is mitigated by the act of frank confession'.

40 Details of the developments within the Congress Party pertaining to the ouster of Menon are taken from an article in Thought, 17 November 1962, p. 6. See also K. Rangaswami in Hindu, 9 November 1962; ibid, 8 November 1962; The Times, 8 November 1962.

41 Responsibility for the procurement of foreign supplies was kept by Nehru, Menon being confined to duties relating to inspection and organization, various factories and workshops and the research and development organization. In a despatch from New Delhi dated 31 October, A.M. Rosenthal described Menon's appointment to Defence Production as a 'face-saving gesture' by Nehru but as 'bound to have important international significance' as Menon was regarded as the chief architect of the theory that if India got into trouble with China, Russia would come to her aid; his removal was thus a defeat for Russia and a victory for the West. In an editorial on 1st November 1962, the Times of India expressed the view that Nehru had perhaps 'unnecessarily halted his journey at a half-way house'. In an editorial of the same date, the New York Times declared that Menon was still too highly placed and that his removal from the top list of officials "would have been welcome evidence...that the Indian Government had completely turned away from the attitude of unrealistic trustfulness toward the Communist world that contributed to the present crisis on India's northern frontier'.

42 The Hindu (5 November 1962) reported that 'quarters close to Menon' had denied that he made any such statement. In view of Menon's well-known personality traits, however, it is very likely that he did make such a statement.

43 Commenting on Menon's Tezpur statement, the Times of India (3 November 1962) stated:

Perhaps too much importance should not be attached to this characteristic piece of egoism...Yet it needs to be said that a Union Minister capable of audaciously dismissing as "nothing" changes in a key portfolio which he formerly held invites the severest strictures. It also provokes the question whether the absence of his attitude of anything resembling regretful admission of past errors does not disqualify him completely from holding a post of any consequence.

44 For text of the letter's contents, see Hindu, 8 November 1962.

45 As the Nation commented on 1st December 1962:

Menon was a scapegoat in one sense. He represented the era of vacillation, of half-heartedness, of uncertainty and confusion and bewilderment...He stood not for Nehru's policies and leadership, but for the lack of them. The politician's revolt was not against what Nehru had decided, but against what he had not decided - then, and for so many years before.

46 Foreign Report, 29 November 1962, p. 4.

47 Cited, The Times, 8 November 1962. The Times of India (8 November 1962) felt that the removal of Menon was 'unquestionably the right one in a democracy' due to his loss of public confidence.

Whenever a Minister, for whatever reason, forfeits the confidence of a substantial part of public opinion that is more than sufficient ground for a resignation and appropriate reshuffle of personnel. The principle of collective cabinet responsibility does not in any way negate the equally valid principle of individual responsibility and it is in relation to this that Mr Krishna Menon's earlier letter of resignation was most inadequate. Its failure to refer to the military setbacks in NEFA with which Mr Menon and his Ministry were directly concerned at that time is an astonishing and inexplicable omission.

48 It comprised the Emergency Committee of the Cabinet (the Prime Minister and the Ministers for Defence, Defence Production, Home Affairs and Finance), the Chief Ministers of the major states, the three Chiefs of Staff, leading politicians, senior civil servants, retired generals Thimayya, Thorat and Rajendrasinghi and retired Chief of Naval Staff, R.D. Katari.

49 The correspondent of the Daily Telegraph reported on 21 November 1962 that Chavan was being canvassed as a potential head of government by military and political circles disillusioned with Nehru and who regarded him as an 'unrealistic dreamer' unfit to lead the country at war.

50 Reddy was widely regarded as a Menon protege but, while this may have contributed to his replacement at such a crucial juncture, it must be noted that his term was completed and that the situation favoured a 'new look' in a discredited Ministry.

51 According to an informed British observer on India affairs, Nehru made a desperate appeal to Britain and the United States on 19 November for 15 bomber squadrons to attack the advancing Chinese troops. Michael Edwardes, "Illusion and Reality in India's Foreign Policy", International Affairs (January 1965), p. 52. An Indian correspondent reported in July 1963 that, during the conflict, the United States had moved one squadron of supersonic fighters from Europe to Turkey for despatch in the event that India needed help, Britain had offered a squadron from Singapore, and an American aircraft carrier had been sent to cruise in the Indian Ocean. See report by H.R. Vohra of a State Department briefing given to correspondents in Times of India, 13 July 1963.

52 According to reports, the Indian Ministry of External Affairs repeated the request on 1st December and Nehru repeated it in reply to a query from President Kennedy in early January 1963. See Thomas Brady in New York Times, 25 January and 21 February 1963; Times of India leader, 29 January 1963.

53 Text of announcement in Peking Review, vols 47 & 48, 30 November 1962, pp. 5-7.

54 For timetable of Chinese withdrawal, see ibid, No. 49, 7 December 1962, p. 7; No. 50, 14 December 1962, p. 15; No. 1, 4 January 1963, p. 26.

55 For a discussion of the Russian reaction, and that of the other communist states, see R. Vaidyanath, "The Reaction of the Soviet Union and Other Communist States" in International Studies, 5:1,2 (July-October 1963), pp. 70-4.

56 See M.S. Anwani, "The Reactions of West Asia and the UAR" in ibid, pp. 75-9; Vishal Singh, "The Reactions of South-East Asian Countries" in ibid, pp. 80-4; Parimal Kumar Das, "The Reaction of the Commonwealth of Nations" in ibid, pp. 64-9, with reference to Ghana, Ceylon and Tanganyika. The activities of the Colombo Conference of six non-aligned nations - Ceylon, Burma, Cambodia, Indonesia, Ghana and the U.A.R. - illustrates the tendency among the non-aligned to ignore the 'merits' of the respective parties while promoting Sino-Indian discussions aimed at reducing tension.

57 Evidence of the lack of detailed planning against the contingency of conflict on a substantial scale was revealed by the fact that many of the initial reinforcements for NEFA were Madrassis from the warm tropical south of India.

58 For example, rifles urgently required in NEFA were flown to Calcutta from depots elsewhere in India in a matter of hours but then took six days to reach their destinations in the forward areas. See Times of India, 30 January 1965.

59 The Daily Telegraph, 15 October 1962.

60 LSD, 3rd Sess., vol. 13, col. 1331.

61 Ibid, 5th Sess., vol. 19, col. 2213.

62 New York Times, 11 November 1962.

63 Nehru claimed in the Lok Sabha on 8 November 1962 that the movement of Chinese troops behind the 'huge mountains' from the western to the eastern sector had not been noticed 'at all'. LSD,

64 It is understood that Kaul tended to bypass Sen and deal directly with Thapar and Menon, Thapar himself being a passive bystander to direct dealings between Kaul and Menon and primarily desirous of finishing out his term with the minimum of fuss.

65 Such probing actions may well have been decided upon by Menon and Kaul to maintain the public belief that the Army

was preparing to eject the Chinese - and therefore escape the probable hostile reaction to any cessation of all activity by a public which had been led to expect dramatic results. The onset of winter would have thereby enabled both men to ease out of the predicament into which their actions and/or public statements had placed them.

66 See, for example, G.F. Hudson, "What Does China Want in the Himalayas", The Financial Times, 18 February 1963.

67 Times of India, 28 July 1964. According to the Nepal Review, cited in Dawn (14 August 1963), Indian personnel manned 14 checkposts. Dawn (29 July 1964) reported that Dr Tulsi Guri, Chairman of the Council of Ministers, had assured members of the National Panchayat that foreign (i.e. Indian) technicians working at northern checkposts would be replaced as soon as qualified Nepalese became available. Dawn added that Indian technicians and wireless operators at these posts totalled 100.

68 Speaking on the first anniversary of the Sino-Nepalese boundary treaty, the Chinese Foreign Minister, Marshal Chen Yi, warned that 'should any foreign power dare to attack Nepal, the Chinese Government and people...will forever stand by Nepal'. Cited in SCMP, No. 2836 dated 10 October 1962, p. 32. As India declared a similar policy as early as 1949, both powers have declared Nepal's integrity to be a basic goal of policy.

69 The protocol for the road was signed on 13 January 1963 and the Chinese completed the first phase of the project on schedule, the section being opened for single-file three-ton traffic on 25 December 1964.

70 President Ayub returned Mahendra's 1961 visit in May 1963, on which occasion he was accorded the rank of Field Marshal in the Royal Nepalese Army. A Pakistan-Nepal trade agreement was signed in October 1962, a transit agreement in January 1963 and an air agreement in the same year. Pakistan is training aircraft engineers, mechanics and pilots for the Royal Nepal Air Line.

71 The first consignment of American military aid arrived in Kathmandu aboard two Hercules transports on 17 October 1964 and two U.S. Army teams arrived on 20 June 1965 to instruct Nepalese soldiers in the use, repair and maintenance of the transport and communications equipment being

provided. See Hindu, 19 October 1964; The Times, 21 January 1965.

72 See statements by Maharajah Namgyal at Gangtok, 23 June 1963, cited in Hindu, 24 June 1963; at Gangtok, 24 July 1963, cited in ibid, 26 July 1963; at Calcutta, 29 July 1963, cited in ibid, 31 July 1963.

73 The Maharajah indicated in Gangtok on 23 June 1963 that he was confident in India's ability to defend Sikkim because Britain and the United States would come to India's aid. Cited in The Nation, 25 June 1963.

## CHAPTER XI

### THE NEW INDIAN DEFENCE PROGRAMME

The Indian Government has concluded that 'Military weakness has been a temptation, and [that] a little military strength may be a deterrent'<sup>1</sup>. As the Union Minister for Planning, Gulzaril Nanda, declared in a broadcast over All-India Radio on 6 February 1963:

We can safeguard peace only when we have the strength to make aggression a costly and profitless adventure. The greater our economic and defence potential, the less will be the danger from across our borders. The bare truth is that our faith in our neighbour in the north has been shattered and it cannot soon be restored. India has henceforward to remain on a constant vigil and in a state of complete readiness for every eventuality...From now on, defence and development must be regarded as integral and related parts of the national economic plan.<sup>2</sup>

Although defence planning has been re-oriented to provide for operational contingencies involving China, there remains some concern with Pakistani intentions due to the latter's attitude during the border war and its subsequent relationship with Peking. The concern appears to have progressively increased since early 1963 when the Indian Minister for Economic and Defence Co-ordination, T.T. Krishnamachari,



declared at a Washington press conference that, while India was 'concerned' with Pakistan's intentions, 'I do not think we have to defend ourselves against Pakistan'<sup>3</sup>. Thus, Defence Minister Chavan stated at Ahmednagar on 25 October 1964:

While these host of new problems have to be faced in organising the defences of the northern frontier, one cannot overlook the threat from across the other land frontier. Though politically we do not envisage any aggression across these frontiers in the foreseeable future, I would like to inform you that our defence planning is based on the presumption that such a threat may materialise anytime.<sup>4</sup>

In accordance with its assessment of the altered strategic situation, the Indian Government has undertaken the expansion of the armed forces, production base and operational infra-structure on a considerable scale. The blueprint for this expansion is a five-year plan sanctioned in early 1964<sup>5</sup>. The plan envisages the attainment of six major objectives during the period April 1964-March 1969:

- 1) creation of a 825,000-man Army and the modernisation of its weapons and equipment,
- 2) stabilisation of the Air Force at forty-five squadrons, its re-equipment with modern aircraft and the provision of suitable ancillary facilities,
- 3) maintenance of the Navy at approximately its present strength with replacement of overage vessels by fresh procurement from external sources and indigenous construction,
- 4) establishment of production facilities so as to materially reduce dependence on external sources of supply,

- 5) construction and improvement of communications in the border areas aimed at creation of an operational infrastructure in the form of roads, tracks, airfields, camps, bridges and other facilities,
- 6) expansion of the research organisation.<sup>6</sup>

According to one press source, the Army is expected to constitute the main 'bastion' of defence for five to ten years - by which time it is expected that the Air Force will have developed its own production base and be capable of assuming some of the Army's present (i.e. deterrent) functions<sup>7</sup>.

The financial burden of this defence plan is expected to total Rs 5000 crores, including a foreign exchange component valued at about Rs 680 crores<sup>8</sup>. Projected expenditure on defence for the Fourth Plan period (1966-71) has been placed by the Planning Commission at Rs 5500 crores, involving an outlay that is expected to rise from Rs 920 crores (1966-67) to Rs 1110 crores (1971-72)<sup>9</sup>. Although economies will no doubt be effected wherever practicable<sup>10</sup>, it is understood from a high-ranking Indian military informant that the Indian Cabinet agreed in early March 1964 to make available for defence a minimum of Rs 800 crores per annum over the subsequent decade irrespective of the level of foreign economic and military aid or of the domestic or external situations.

In view of India's chronic shortage of foreign exchange even for non-military purposes, the Government has been

forced to do a complete volte-face on the issue of military aid<sup>11</sup>. It is relying upon 'friendly' countries to make available the desired foreign exchange component in the form of outright grant aid and/or long-term credits on easy terms<sup>12</sup>. Aid-seeking missions have been despatched to various countries but reliance is clearly being placed upon the United States, Britain and the 'old Commonwealth' (Canada, Australia and New Zealand) and the Soviet Union<sup>13</sup>.

The Army is being expanded to a well-equipped force of 21 divisions<sup>14</sup>, including ten mountain divisions specially organized, trained and equipped for operations in the Himalayan region<sup>15</sup>.

Two-thirds of the proposed increase was to be achieved by March 1964 and the remainder thereafter, and a number of measures were implemented to facilitate attainment of the desired goals. A new Recruiting Directorate was established in the Adjutant General's Branch and the recruiting organization was expanded. The minimum age for recruitment to the ranks remained at 17 years but the prescribed physical standards in respect of height, weight and chest measurements were relaxed up to August 1963. Recruitment was thrown open to all classes into all Arms 'without upsetting the traditional organisational structure'<sup>16</sup>. In an effort to reduce wastage of recruits from the pre-Emergency level of

ten per cent, psychological tests were introduced and will form the basis of future recruitment of both technical and non-technical personnel to the Army (and Air Force)<sup>17</sup>.

Terms of colour and reserve liabilities for new recruits were introduced effective 25 January 1965 which involve ten years with the Colours and five years with the Reserve<sup>18</sup>.

Emergency Commissions were offered and a large number of officers were granted extensions beyond the normal age of retirement. The percentage of annual vacancies for Permanent Regular Commissions reserved for qualified JCOs and NCOs was increased from ten to 24 per cent and the strength of the Special List Cadre was increased to 1500<sup>19</sup>.

Existing facilities for the training of officers and other ranks were expanded and new ones created. The capacity of the Indian Military Academy at Dehra Dun was increased from 1485 to 1800 on 1st January 1963, 2400 on 1st April 1963 and 3200 on 1st July 1963 with relevant modifications in the duration of the training period. In January 1963, two Officer Training Schools were established - one in each of Poona and Madras - with an initial capacity of 900 each but increased to 1500 by July 1963. New training centres were set up for other ranks and the capacity of the regimental training centres was increased from 5670 to 39,804 (Infantry), 5500 to 17,861 (Artillery), 3600 to 29,917 (Engineers) and 2300 to 11,949 (Signals)<sup>20</sup>.

Training has been re-oriented for warfare in jungle-cum-mountain terrain. The capacity of the High Altitude Warfare School has been greatly increased and a mobile Army Headquarters Training Team is imparting instruction in jungle warfare to units at their particular stations, thereby avoiding the costly and time-consuming procedure of moving units to the Jungle Warfare School at Dehra Dun - albeit at some cost in effectiveness. The first course in a programme aimed at toughening young officers mentally and physically for patrol activity over long periods in the Himalayan terrain began in March 1964 at the Infantry School (Mhow). The organisational structure of infantry, artillery and service corps units is being revised with the aim of improving operational capacity in mountainous areas.

A new Directorate of Combat Development has been set up in the General Staff Branch to evolve and develop new weapons and tactical concepts and a series of decisions have been taken concerning re-equipment of the Army with modern weapons, equipment and stores adequate for the next seven to ten years. The .303 Lee Enfield is being replaced by the semi-automatic Ishapore rifle of indigenous design<sup>21</sup> and all .303s are being converted to the new 7.62 bore, which has been adopted as the new standard small arms bore. The Sten machine carbine is being replaced by the more modern

Sterling. The 4.2 inch mortar is to be replaced by a lighter type of local design with a longer range and the French-built Brandt heavy mortar has been acquired in quantity and is being produced under licence. A mountain howitzer is being developed in Ordnance and new types of communications equipment are to be acquired both from local production schemes and by foreign purchase. The armoured formations will begin receiving medium tanks from the Avadi Heavy Vehicles factory in late 1965 or early 1966, some 70 light tanks have been purchased from the Soviet Union<sup>22</sup> and light tanks of British design may be produced at Avadi.

A long-deferred provisioning programme to replace the Army's worn vehicle fleet is in progress. As the production schemes underway in the ordnance factories for three-ton Shaktiman trucks, one-ton Nissan trucks and eight cwt Nissan patrol jeeps are unable to meet the increased needs of the Army, large orders have been placed on local automobile manufacturers for Mercedes-Benz three-ton trucks, Dodge one-ton power wagons and Willy's jeeps. Henceforth, trucks will be discarded after 35,000 miles or seven years service - whichever is later - and before the required first major overhaul, and jeeps will be discarded after 30,000 miles or five years service - whichever is later<sup>23</sup>.

The unwieldy Eastern Command was split in two effective 1st May 1963. The new Eastern Command is responsible for Assam, NEFA, Tripura, Manipur and West Bengal and has its headquarters at Barrackpore. The newly-created Central Command is based at Lucknow with responsibility for Bihar, Orissa, Madhya Pradesh and Himachal Pradesh. Liaison between the two Commands has been maintained by a nucleus of the old Eastern Command left at Gauhati while the NEFA Corps remains separate<sup>24</sup>. A new organization has been set up under the Master-General of Ordnance for the procurement of equipment and stores from foreign countries. To ensure better collation, evaluation and assessment of intelligence, the number of officers in the Military Intelligence Directorate has been increased by about 50 per cent<sup>25</sup>.

The 7th and 14th battalions of the Jammu and Kashmir Militia have been merged into the Army and the remainder of the Militia passed under the administrative and operational control of the regular Service in an agreement signed in early 1964 between the Kashmir State Government and the Defence Ministry<sup>26</sup>. One Scout battalion has been raised for service on the Uttar Pradesh-Tibet border and another for service on the borders with Tibet of Punjab and Himachal Pradesh; these units will function in a manner similar to the Assam Rifles in NEFA. The Kashmir State Government is

streamlining the state police and is raising two new battalions of armed police<sup>27</sup>, the Assam Government is preparing a Rs 2 crores border protection scheme for the border with East Pakistan<sup>28</sup> and the Union Government has decided to increase the Central Police Reserve by up to 25 per cent<sup>29</sup>. On instructions from the Centre, Madras is raising a battalion of special armed police for employment on the NEFA border; the entire costs of the force will be borne by the Central authority<sup>30</sup>.

The general expansion appears to be proceeding in general accordance to plan. By March 1964, 300,000 men and 10,000 new officers had been inducted, four mountain and two regular infantry divisions were in training and one existing infantry division was being re-organized as a mountain formation<sup>31</sup>. There continued to be a shortage of doctors and engineers, however; as of 31 December 1963, there were 2721 officers in the Army Medical Corps against an authorized strength of 3357<sup>32</sup> and the shortage of graduate engineers was expected to total 1649 by the end of March 1964<sup>33</sup>. The particularly poor response of engineers has forced the Army to recruit a large number of non-engineering graduate officers for the Corps of Engineers, Signals and EME<sup>34</sup> and military service has been made a pre-requisite for employment of engineers and doctors in the civil sector.



The Air Force is being developed into a force of 45 squadrons with assistance being sought from the United States, Britain and the 'old Commonwealth' and the Soviet Union. This establishment has been conceived to meet the requirements of air defence, ground attack, communications, maritime and strategic reconnaissance and logistics support to the Army, the BRDO, the NEFA and Nagaland administrations and engineers constructing airfields in border areas<sup>35</sup>.

The recruiting organization of the IAF has been sharply increased, pilot training has been stepped up with reductions in the duration of the course where practicable and a ground training school for radar operators and mechanics has been set up. Two new flying establishments have been established and an Air Defence Academy is to be set up in the Hyderabad district. Selected personnel are undergoing specialized training in Britain<sup>36</sup>, the United States<sup>37</sup> and the Soviet Union<sup>38</sup>.

The air defence organization has been strengthened by the creation in June 1963 of a new Eastern Command with headquarters at Shillong (Assam)<sup>39</sup>. Ground-to-air guided missiles are to be employed for the protection of certain vital areas and an early warning radar system is under construction across northern India with American aid<sup>40</sup>. The border war spurred the long-proposed shift of Maintenance

Command from Kanpur to the more centrally-located Nagpur and the foundation stone for the new base was laid on 2 February 1964. Works projects have been implemented for the fresh construction, extension or improvement of facilities at 23 airfields and work on eleven of these sites had been completed by March 1964<sup>41</sup>. The congestion evidenced at Palam during the war is to be relieved by the construction of a new airfield at Hindan (near Ghaziabad) for the exclusive use of the IAF; consequent on its completion, the Air Force will use Palam only for its Communication Squadron (including the VIP flight) and some transport aircraft. Policy and procedures for the provisioning and procurement of stores has been streamlined.

The transport capacity of the Service has been progressively strengthened. Following the first Chinese attacks, the Indian Government contracted with Steward-Davis Inc. of Long Beach, California, for the augmentation of the standard two Wright R-3350 piston-engines on 27 of their fleet of 53 C-119s<sup>42</sup>. The United States provided 24 C-119 Packets and two Caribou Is under their programme of emergency military aid and Indian officials appear to have renewed a former interest in the Lockheed C-130 transport<sup>43</sup>. Canada gave eight C-47s and five Otters as emergency grant aid and India purchased 16 Caribou Is under a loan agreement concluded in

Ottawa in July 1963<sup>44</sup>. A further 30 An-12s were acquired from the Soviet Union under a loan agreement signed in July 1963<sup>45</sup> and the decision has been taken to employ this type as the standard heavy transport. After some discussion within the Government concerning the relative merits of the Avro-748<sup>46</sup> an order was placed for 29 units but, by December 1964, no decision had yet been made regarding the suitability of this type as the future standard medium transport in the IAF<sup>47</sup>.

Orders were placed for an undisclosed number of Mi-4s early in 1963<sup>48</sup> and over 20 units had reportedly arrived by May 1964<sup>49</sup>. A further 20 Mi-4s were ordered in September 1964 under the provisions of an Indo-Soviet loan agreement concluded at that time<sup>50</sup>. A Soviet offer to establish a plant in India for the production of this type under licence from Avaiexport<sup>51</sup> was, however, declined by New Delhi for the stated reason that 'The number of Mi-4 helicopters required by the IAF do not justify the establishment of manufacture in India'<sup>52</sup>. Although French credit terms were not very attractive<sup>53</sup>, a number of Alouette IIIs were purchased in 1963 and India proposed to meet its future Service requirements of helicopters through indigenous manufacture of this model<sup>54</sup>. India is also reported to have shown an interest in obtaining about 50 Boeing Vertold-107 units and a

group of Boeing officials were, as of mid-1964, scheduled to visit India in this connection<sup>55</sup>.

The Krishak Mk II has been accepted for the role of air observation post duties presently performed by the Auster; 30 units have been ordered with deliveries expected to commence in late 1965<sup>56</sup>. The sharply increased requirements for training aircraft has been partially alleviated by 36 Harvards provided by Canada as emergency grant aid and a small number of Vampires purchased from Indonesia in November 1962<sup>57</sup>. Efforts are being made to acquire further Harvards from other countries, but ultimate reliance is placed upon the HJT-16 jet trainer 'Kiran', a model of which will possess a ground attack capability. The war caused most of the project's design team to be transferred to priority work on the HF-24 with the result that little progress was made up to mid-1963, at which time major attention was again given to the trainer. The design staff was increased to 60 personnel, major assembly of the prototype began in November 1963 and final installation of the systems and powerplant was completed just before the first flight on 4 September 1964, which was powered by a Bristol Orpheus Viper II engine<sup>58</sup>. The first 24 pre-production models are to be produced by the end of 1966<sup>59</sup>.

The Vampires, Ouragans and Mysteres are to be phased out of frontline service as the HF-24 Mk I 'Marut' becomes available. The first four Mk Is were handed over to the IAF at Bangalore on 10 May 1964 and a three-squadron 'batch' (normally 48 aircraft) is being produced of the supersonic Mk IA version, which is powered by the HAL-made Bristol Orpheus 703 Reheat engine<sup>60</sup>. As an apparent interim measure pending the availability of the Mk IAs in quantity, India is negotiating with Britain for perhaps 40 more Hunters<sup>61</sup>.

Further Canberra light bombers and reconnaissance aircraft are being obtained from Britain to augment the existing units. No apparent decision seems to have been made to date, however, regarding the future of this arm.

The manner in which the fighter arm was to be re-equipped was for some time the subject of apparent indecision by Indian officials and speculation by foreign observers. During the border war, IAF officers reportedly sounded out United States authorities as to the possibility of obtaining aircraft with a performance roughly comparable to the F-104G<sup>62</sup>. Feelers were put out to Britain also<sup>63</sup> and a desire to purchase a 'lot' of Mirages was apparently not pursued because the price demanded by France was 'obviously' too much<sup>64</sup>. Indian officials were also reported to be looking for an

aircraft suitable for close support work like the McDonnell F-101 'Voodoo'<sup>65</sup>.

India's major interest was in the F-104s, however, and the Government persisted in its efforts to acquire such aircraft despite Western convictions that India had no immediate need for this high-performance weapons system. From 'an early date' the IAF and Indian Defence Ministry reportedly regarded the joint Indian-Commonwealth-United States air exercises held in India in November 1963<sup>66</sup> 'as an opportunity to show that without supersonic fighters the problems of Indian defence against air attack are insoluble'<sup>67</sup>. Speculation as to the progress of their efforts continued into mid-1964. In February 1964, it was reported that India would receive all-weather Convair Delta Dagger F-102 interceptors armed with air-to-air missiles and fin rockets simultaneous with American re-equipment of the Pakistan Air Force with these same aircraft - and in equal number<sup>68</sup>. Other reports later in the year mentioned an American willingness to make available three to five squadrons of F-51 Skyray or F-5B Freedom Fighters equipped with Sidewinder missiles<sup>69</sup>.

Possible Indian purchase of some F-104s on a commercial basis or the alternative establishment of a F-104 assembly or production plant in India was also reported. With the apparent concurrence of the State Department, Lockheed

representatives reportedly took the initiative to hold talks with senior officials of the Indian Ministries of Defence, Finance and Defence Production in New Delhi in late February 1964. Lockheed, according to the report, proposed the establishment of a production unit in India for the F-104 or a comparable aircraft; if that were not acceptable to the Indian Government, an alternative was the sale to India of a certain number of F-104s on a commercial basis<sup>70</sup>. In May 1964, it was reported that India had proposed a \$ 200 million American-built plant to manufacture F-104s in India - the project allegedly being favoured by 'some' Indian Ministers to the MIG project. While the report stated that Washington was unlikely to extend grants for such a project, American authorities ostensibly had under consideration an assembly plant to be financed with a 20-year credit from the Export-Import Bank in the event the MIG project failed<sup>71</sup>.

That particular project had made little real headway by 1964 and there were sufficient grounds for pessimism concerning its future. The first four units had arrived at Bombay on 11 February 1963 under a cloak of secrecy requested by Moscow in an obvious attempt not to exacerbate relations with Peking, and two more arrived later in the spring<sup>72</sup>. The MIG-21s were of little operational use, however, as they lacked

such essential equipment as fire-control radar, had meagre armament and a severely limited combat radius<sup>73</sup>.

In an effort to play down the significance of the Soviet attitude, Nehru claimed that 'The main thing is the building up of the plant. The rest was really some for training purposes and samples'<sup>74</sup>. But the production scheme was making scarcely any progress. By mid-April 1963, plans envisaged the establishment of the airframe plant at Nasik (Maharashtra) and the aero-engine plant at Koraput (Orissa). In October, Hyderabad was selected as the site of a plant that would manufacture electronics equipment and missiles for the MIG-21. Final assembly of the aircraft was scheduled for Bombay and production was expected to begin in 1965 with deliveries to begin in 1966.

Russian technical experts assigned to the project, however, apparently showed indifference to Indian pressure for speed<sup>75</sup> and New Delhi was unsuccessful in its efforts to persuade the Soviet Government to agree to certain modifications in the design<sup>76</sup>. An American correspondent reported from New Delhi on 17 December 1963 'the impending abandonment' of the project for the reason that cost estimates had jumped from the initial estimate of \$ 143 million to a 'current working figure of \$ 336 million' and that Moscow had to date proved unwilling to make the MIG-21 an all-weather aircraft with an



expanded radius of action<sup>77</sup>. The Indian Defence Ministry issued an immediate denial, claiming that 'The project is proceeding according to plan'<sup>78</sup>, but it is very doubtful if this revealed other than unwarranted optimism at that stage. By 5 February 1964, the Minister for Defence Production could only state that two project reports were under consideration and a third was under preparation with civil works underway at Nasik, Koraput and Hyderabad<sup>79</sup>.

It was reported in a leading Indian daily on 26 January 1964 that India was not going to acquire MIGs for the reason that the cost of establishing the complex of factories was prohibitive and American aircraft were preferred by the IAF<sup>80</sup>. The same paper reported in early March, however, that Anglo-American reluctance to give India high performance aircraft had caused even the Air Force to veer around to the view that the MIG project, despite its obvious shortcomings, was the only political and military solution<sup>81</sup>. Defence Minister Chavan included three squadrons of F-104s in the list of defence requirements which he submitted to the United States Government in May 1964<sup>82</sup> while India made what would seem to have been final efforts to obtain a favourable arrangement with Moscow which would enable the MIG project to proceed.

At this point, for reasons known only to senior Soviet leaders but probably related to the virtual irrevocable split

with Peking, Moscow indicated its willingness to be much more co-operative on the MIG project. Shortly after Chavan left for Washington with his 'shopping list', information 'leaked' out in Delhi that Indo-Soviet talks were proceeding and included the possibility that Russia would provide the components for about 60 MIG-21s to be assembled in India in a project to begin about two years later, and perhaps credits - as distinct from the purely technical assistance agreed to earlier - for the complex of MIG plants to be set up in India<sup>83</sup>. An Indian defence mission visited Moscow in September to finalize arrangements and an agreement was signed several hours before President Radhakrishnan arrived to begin his state visit. Russia agreed to provide technical aid and plant to facilitate the establishment of the MIG factories by the end of 1965; 38 more MIG-21s (in addition to the six promised in 1962 but as yet undelivered) incorporating the modifications requested by India; and components for the initial assembly scheme in India which would presumably include some of the 44 units promised. The Soviet authorities also agreed to keep India informed of subsequent improvements in the design and equipment of the MIG-21<sup>84</sup>.

The production scheme was initially planned in four stages - from major assemblies, from sub-assemblies, from detailed parts and from raw materials. To speed up the

project, however, the first three squadrons are now to be imported in fully assembled condition by the end of 1965 and will be constructed and tested by Soviet technicians in India before they are handed over to the IAF. The second stage will begin in 1966, when Indian technicians - with Soviet assistance - will assemble the engines and airframes from imported components and the Hyderabad plant will commence the assembly and part manufacture of instruments and other equipment. It is hoped that manufacture of basic components from raw materials will begin towards the end of 1969. The missile project, however, is not expected to commence until the early 1970s. According to one report, 450 MIG-21s are involved in the entire scheme<sup>85</sup>.

As of mid-1965, therefore, the MIG-21 is conceived as the standard interceptor for the IAF through the 1970s, although the economical Gnat will continue to be produced for operational squadrons. The future of the HF-24 Mk II remains uncertain.

Prime Minister Nehru emphasized the need for a strong navy in March 1963<sup>86</sup> but financial stringency and priorities virtually precluded any immediate expansion. Thus the Chief of Naval Staff, Vice Admiral B.S. Soman stated in Bombay in April 1964 that there was no immediate programme of expansion of the Fleet and that no 'big' warships were on order<sup>87</sup>. The

Government is aware of the need to replace the overage vessels, however, and the matter has been engaging its attention<sup>88</sup>.

Following the border war, the Indian Government initiated discussions with Britain, Sweden and Japan regarding their possible collaboration in the construction of frigates at Mazagon Docks<sup>89</sup>. The 'interest' in possible Swedish or Japanese collaboration, however, would appear to have been little more than a bargaining counter designed to stimulate the British Government into responding to Indian requests for long-term credits to cover the external costs of the desired scheme to construct three 'Leander' frigates at Mazagon Docks. India reportedly made a formal request for such aid to Whitehall at the beginning of 1963 and repeated it on three different subsequent occasions through the medium of Indian officials visiting Britain for various purposes<sup>90</sup>. Speaking in the Commons on 28 July 1964 in reply to Labour criticisms that his Government was not responsive to India's defence needs, Prime Minister Sir Alec Douglas Home claimed that, while he had not received a request from Prime Minister Shastri for frigates, India was negotiating with a British firm and had asked the Government for financial aid. He stated that the matter would be discussed during the forthcoming visit to Britain of Defence Minister Chavan, a visit

which had been postponed because of Nehru's death<sup>91</sup>. On 20 September 1964, the Commonwealth Relations Office announced in London that the Government had offered to provide India with a special defence credit totalling £ 4,700,000 to cover the external costs over the next four years of the construction of three 'Leander' class frigates at Mazagon Docks and 'would be ready to consider further help for the project in the light of circumstances at the time'<sup>92</sup>. Chavan signed the agreement during his November visit and it is expected that the keel of the first frigate will be laid down by mid-1966 and that the vessel will be completed by 1971<sup>93</sup>.

During the course of his visit, Chavan requested that three 'Daring' class destroyers be loaned to India from the Royal Navy's operational reserve on the undertaking that they would be returned in any emergency affecting Britain. He also expressed the hope that at least two frigates could be made available immediately. As Britain only had seven 'Daring' class types in service - all fully operational - it made a counter-offer of three 'Weapon' class destroyers of World War II vintage from its mothball fleet. Chavan declined the offer, however, and the Indian Government remains hopeful that Britain will eventually agree to sell more than one 'Daring' class type on credit<sup>94</sup>. There appears to be little interest in a Soviet offer of frigates for technical

reasons, and the United States reportedly did not respond to a request for three destroyer replacements<sup>95</sup>.

The Indian Government accepted the 'necessity' for submarines and Defence Minister Chavan informed the Lok Sabha on 29 April 1963 that Naval Headquarters had been asked to submit its proposals<sup>96</sup>. The Government subsequently revealed that it was seeking 'a' submarine primarily for training purposes<sup>97</sup> and that it proposed to place orders for submarines which can be spared by other navies wherever possible<sup>98</sup>. Sweden was apparently approached but the issue of foreign exchange seems to have proved an obstacle to further consideration<sup>99</sup>. The United States' offer of a World War II vintage submarine<sup>100</sup> has provoked no interest in India, the Soviet Union has offered a submarine and the Indian defence mission which visited Russia in September 1964 made relevant enquiries<sup>101</sup>, but India clearly prefers to acquire its under-sea craft from Western, and preferably British, sources. Although the British Government was initially cautious in defining its attitude towards the possible provision of a submarine to India<sup>102</sup>, it later agreed in principle to provide a submarine for training purposes<sup>103</sup> and the matter was discussed during Chavan's visit in November 1964. Britain offered a World War II model - the only one it had available for immediate transfer - but Chavan declined the offer on

the grounds that a unit of that vintage was not suitable for training purposes either as regards personnel who would eventually man modern submarines or for anti-submarine exercises. The Indian Defence Minister accepted an alternative offer whereby a Royal Navy submarine would be loaned to India for several months each year and New Delhi has taken under consideration a British offer of facilities for the construction of an 'Oberon' class type<sup>104</sup>. Chavan informed the Indian Parliament on 5 April 1965, however, the the Government was [still] awaiting a decision from Britain regarding the terms on which India could obtain a submarine and he declared that the Government would have to look elsewhere (presumably Russia) if a British unit was not made available<sup>105</sup>.

Three seaward patrol boats are under construction in local shipyards and are expected to be completed in 1966. Two minesweepers are also under construction locally, and a modern fleet replenishment tanker is to be obtained - seemingly by external purchase. The shipboard air complement of the carrier Vikrant has been augmented by ten more Seahawk jet fighter-bombers<sup>106</sup> and by several additional Alouette III helicopters.

Further base facilities are being developed to extend the operational capabilities of the Fleet. Naval base INS Gomantak was commissioned at Marmagoa on 7 March 1964 and

includes the airfield at Dabolim, which is being developed as a full-fledged naval air station adequate for modern jet aircraft<sup>107</sup>. On 4 February 1964, Vice Admiral Soman laid the foundation stone of a naval jetty at Vizagapatnam for what eventually will be a major new naval base and dockyard. A new naval establishment, INS Jarawa, was commissioned on 15 February 1964 at Port Blair in the Andaman Islands<sup>108</sup> and a British military correspondent has been cited as stating that additional naval facilities may also be developed in the Nicobar Islands, another Indian-owned group about 250 miles south of the Andamans on which there is already an all-weather airstrip<sup>109</sup>. The Navy has also taken over control of the coastal batteries from the Army, although the batteries will continue to be manned by Territorial Army personnel.

Adjustments have been made in the scope and nature of the various para-military organizations. Long regarded by the Army leadership as having no military value relative to the investment<sup>110</sup>, the various schemes are henceforth being regarded largely as a means of inculcating a sense of discipline and defence-consciousness among a civilian body in which both characteristics are sadly lacking; the military aspects of the schemes are being deleted or severely restricted.



The Territorial Army is being reorganized to correct the deficiencies in its structure, training and fitness revealed following the embodiment of many of its units during the border war, and in accordance with the different weapons and tactics dictated by Himalayan operational contingencies. The authorized strength of the force has been increased to 591,580 and its actual strength totalled 490,480 as of early 1964 - 78 per cent of establishment<sup>111</sup>. It is probable, however, that the TA will henceforth not be viewed as a second line of defence liable for frontline service but rather as an auxiliary police-cum-civil defence organization with perhaps a reduction in its size.

A million-strong Home Guards organization is being set up to serve as an auxiliary to the police, assist in the maintenance of internal security generally, aid the community in emergencies and provide essential services in such eventualities. The basis of organization is one company of 110 men for each community development organization in rural areas and one company for every 25,000 of population in urban areas<sup>112</sup>.

The Lok Sahayak Sena (viz. National Volunteer Rifles) scheme was suspended upon the declaration of the Emergency to enable its instructors and equipment to be utilized by the Army. Later, 17 of the 27 LSS training teams were re-activated

and despatched to the border states, but it was decided in early 1965 that the scheme had been rendered superfluous by the establishment of the Home Guards and other State schemes; the organization was thereupon dissolved.

The National Cadet Corps has been considerably expanded. The recruitment of a further 400,000 boys and girls to the Senior Division and the Rifles was sanctioned shortly after the declaration of the Emergency, and 198,750 boys had been enrolled as of 19 January 1963<sup>113</sup>. NCC training was introduced as a compulsory subject in the curriculum for male college students from the academic session beginning July-October 1963, and nearly 925,000 were enrolled by January 1964<sup>114</sup>. The Auxiliary Cadet Corps was abolished in April 1965.

The border war provoked a marked upsurge in the output of the ordnance factories<sup>115</sup>. The production of civil items was sharply curtailed or suspended outright as the situation warranted, and the value of production, which totalled Rs 41.88 crores in 1961-62, rose to Rs 63.9 crores in 1962-63, Rs 120 crores in 1963-64 and is expected to exceed Rs 150 crores in 1964-65<sup>116</sup>. The initial increased output was achieved without additional investment by means of longer shifts, the introduction of three shifts in some factories and a 30 per cent increase in the labour force<sup>117</sup>. For the

first time, contracts for the manufacture of certain component parts for munitions, radar and electronic equipment, trucks and tractors and the fabrication of clothing were allocated to the civil sector wherever possible<sup>118</sup>. By July 1963, ten items of defence stores had been earmarked for production in the private sector<sup>119</sup> and, up to the end of 1963, 57 contracts worth Rs 5.32 crores had been placed with the civil sector for the supply of armament components<sup>120</sup>.

The production of various new items has been undertaken<sup>121</sup>. The Ishapore semi-automatic rifles began coming off the production lines following the unilateral Chinese ceasefire at a rate which had increased to several thousand per month by February 1963<sup>122</sup> and to 2500 per month by January 1965<sup>123</sup>. In February 1964, the Defence Ministry was reportedly testing a three-inch pack howitzer of local design<sup>124</sup> and the production of this item was subsequently undertaken. Production of the Brandt heavy mortar under licence began after the border war and other lines of production include 7.62 mm. ammunition, ammunition for the Brandt mortar and the three-inch pack howitzer, 75 mm. light tank shell and light tank high explosive shell, 3.5 inch anti-tank rockets, anti-aircraft guns and improved Sterling carbines. Bulk manufacture of electrically-fired ammunition commenced in India for the first time in 1964-65 and Ordnance is modifying .303 rifles

and light machine-guns to the new rimless 7.62 mm. ammunition.

A new plant was set up at Khamaria (near Jabalpure) in March 1964 at a cost of Rs 2 lakhs and with British technical assistance for the manufacture of 30 mm. aircraft ammunition for the IAF. Construction commenced in January 1964 of a Rs 50 lakh plant at Chandigarh which will produce air-rifles in collaboration with the Daisy Manufacturing Company of Missouri<sup>125</sup>. A new clothing factory, first conceived in 1961, was established at Avadi and began the production of parachutes in October 1963. The manufacture of field cables commenced at the Chandigarh cable plant on 8 September 1963 and mass production began in February 1964. The Cordite Factory (Aruvankadu) was augmented by a new plant commissioned in March 1964 which will produce semi-solvent propellants for rockets. The capacity of Praga Tolls (Secunderabad) to manufacture certain small arms is to be increased<sup>126</sup>.

The production of Shaktiman three-ton trucks reached 3994 units by 31 December 1963 and it was expected that output would total 4300 by March 1964 with an indigenous content of about 61 per cent<sup>127</sup>. By 31 December 1963, 4420 Nissan one-ton trucks and 1847 patrol jeeps had been manufactured with an indigenous content of about 35 and 28 per cent respectively<sup>128</sup>. In February 1964, the Government was

considering the establishment of a separate factory in the public sector for the manufacture of one-ton and three-ton trucks for the Army<sup>129</sup> and it was subsequently decided to establish a new vehicle factory for this purpose<sup>130</sup>.

Efforts to speed up the Avadi tank project to permit production of the first medium tank by mid-1965<sup>131</sup> have not borne fruition and the original target date of late 1965 remains the goal<sup>132</sup>. The production of light tanks at Avadi is also being considered<sup>133</sup>. A French team visited India in November 1963 and a French technical mission visited India in January 1964 and carried out an industrial survey pertaining to this proposed scheme<sup>134</sup>. There appears to be no substance to a press report that appeared in July 1964 to the effect that, to conserve foreign exchange, India might seek Soviet collaboration in a light tank production scheme in India<sup>135</sup>. The Minister for Defence Production, A.M. Thomas, informed the Lok Sabha on 14 September 1964 that no Soviet aid had been sought in this regard<sup>136</sup>. Vickers-Armstrong has offered to design a light tank to Indian specifications and negotiations were in progress as of December 1964 with the expectation that the project might be taken up towards the end of 1965<sup>137</sup>.

India's aircraft production facilities were subjected to the scrutiny of a special committee appointed in March

1963 under the chairmanship of J.R.D. Tata, head of Air India International and a prominent industrialist<sup>138</sup>. The committee surveyed the requirements of aircraft and ancillary electronic equipment required by the armed forces and submitted its recommendations to the Government in April 1963. Details of the report have not been made public, but it is believed to have included a proposal to scrap the MIG project and purchase Western supersonic fighters, and to terminate the Avro project and replace it with a production line for the de Havilland DHC-2 Caribou turboprop utility transport<sup>139</sup>. The Government reportedly considered replacing the Avro project with a Caribou scheme in recognition that the latter possessed a 'better high-altitude capability for operations in mountain areas'<sup>140</sup> but apparently concluded that it was too committed to the Avro project; it thereupon announced that production facilities for the Avro were to be expanded<sup>141</sup>. The Government likewise appears to have regarded itself as too deeply committed to the MIG project, both financially and politically, to terminate it on purely practical grounds and proceeded with it. In apparent accordance with the committee's recommendation, however, the Government has amalgamated all the aircraft manufacturing units in a single State-owned undertaking called Hindustan Aeronautics India

Limited and designed to streamline production and effect economy in the utilization of men and material.

There is no indication that the Government at any time seriously considered terminating the HF-24 Mk II project, but little progress is being made in the absence of any decision regarding a powerplant. Efforts are continuing to produce a suitable engine in India<sup>142</sup> and, after much speculation, a collaboration agreement was signed with the United Arab Republic in Cairo on 2 November 1964 whereby Egypt will provide the engine and India the airframe of a Mach 2 fighter<sup>143</sup>. The issue is confused, however, by a reported Indian proposal that the United States and Britain provide aid for the HF-24 project<sup>144</sup>. Experts from the USAF research and development centre at Dayton, Ohio, and representatives of Rolls Royce visited India in July 1964 to investigate ways and means of improving the performance and rate of production of the HF-24<sup>145</sup> but apparently concluded that the project would require some years and considerable Western aid in design, tooling and finance to mature into a supersonic weapons system<sup>146</sup>. Powerplants under consideration as of July 1964 included the Rolls Royce RB.153, a Bristol Siddeley proposal, Pratt and Whitney's J52 (JT-8), General Electric's J-1 and Egypt's Brandner project<sup>147</sup>. With the firm conclusion of the MIG project in September 1964, however, it was reported

that the likelihood of American aid for the HF-24 was in 'cold storage' for the reasons that two supersonic aircraft projects were greatly beyond India's needs and resources and there would be political repercussions inherent in Russian and Western subsidies of parallel schemes<sup>148</sup>.

The Directorate of Planning and Co-ordination has carried out an assessment in respect of India's requirements of ammunition, explosives, propellants, small arms and armament and proposals based on this assessment have been finalized to expand the production base. The Defence Ministry has also engaged an American consultant firm, Messrs D. Little Inc., to examine and report on existing capacity in the ordnance factories and the civil sector and the manner in which such capacity can be developed in a coordinated way for the manufacture of armaments, ammunition, vehicles and electronic equipment. The firm will also investigate and report on a means whereby production and material control can be introduced into the ordnance establishment.

The existing ordnance factories will be modernized during the 1964-69 period at an estimated cost of Rs 30 crores, which includes a foreign exchange component of Rs 15 crores<sup>149</sup>.

Phase One of the expansion scheme initially envisaged the establishment of six new factories - a Filling Factory at Bhandara, near Nagpur; an Engineering Factory at Ambajahari



for heavy artillery shells; an Explosives Factory at Burla; a Propellants Factory at Panvel; a small arms ammunition factory at Varangaon, near Bhusaval; and a small arms factory at Tiruchirapalli, which will concentrate on semi-automatic rifles. Four of these proposed sites are in Maharashtra, with Burla and Tiruchirapalli being in Orissa and Madras respectively.

Implementation of the expansion plan was heavily dependent upon foreign assistance which has been offered up to the date of writing (June 1965) for only three of the factories. The United States provided a complete ammunition plant that was formally opened at Varangaon on 15 October 1964<sup>150</sup>, and is assisting in the establishment of the Ambajahari factory. Britain provided aid for the Bhandara unit which was set up at a cost of Rs 16 crores, including a foreign exchange component of Rs 4 crores. Inaugurated on 19 December 1964, the factory incorporates plant and ancillary equipment from Britain, Sweden, West Germany, Belgium and France and is the first project of its size and complexity ever attempted by the Directorate-General of Ordnance Factories. It began production in January 1965, will ultimately employ about 4000 workers and is expected to save about Rs 4 crores of foreign exchange per annum<sup>151</sup>.

India has to date received no offers of aid for the Panvel, Burla and Tiruchirapalli factories. The Panvel and Burla projects would have cost Rs 60 crores (including Rs 21 crores in foreign exchange) to set up, and American experts advised against their establishment on the grounds that their 'investment-output' ratio was high and their civil use in times of general peace was very limited. The Indian Government has accepted this expert advice and will stockpile the necessary explosives and propellants through the importation of Rs 8 crores worth of these items and the augmentation of production at the Bhandara plant<sup>152</sup>. New Delhi has decided, however, to go ahead with the Tiruchirapalli project, using the country's weak foreign exchange reserves.

No details of Stage Two of the expansion scheme have yet come to the writer's attention, but it is understood to aim at self-sufficiency for the Army in its requirements.

The defence research organization is being further expanded. New laboratories of Instruments Research and Development Establishment were inaugurated at Dehra Dun on 30 October 1964. An Armament Research Laboratory for work relating to the design and development of armament stores is expected to start functioning by mid-1965.

Border communications are being substantially extended. In mid-1963, the BRDO approved a programme which involves

the construction of 3000 miles of new roads and the improvement of 3000 miles of existing roads<sup>153</sup>. A long-deferred Rs 25 crores project to supplement the 221-mile Leh-Srinagar road (itself being improved with American aid) with another link connecting Manali to Upshi and Kulu in eastern Ladakh was sanctioned in late 1963 or early 1964 with survey and trace-cutting expected to begin in May 1964<sup>154</sup>. The Minister for Transport, Raj Bahadur, informed the Lok Sabha on 24 March 1964 of a Government decision to build a Rs 100 crores 700-mile road from Bareilly in western Uttar Pradesh to Amingaon in Assam along the Himalayan foothills<sup>155</sup>. The main road connecting Manali to Keylong across the 13,400-foot Rohtang Pass is being widened for use by trucks<sup>156</sup>. A new motorable road is being built to link Leh and Chushul and sited some distance back from the old lateral road between the two points which, though still in use, is very vulnerable in the event of renewed hostilities. Nine new airfields had been constructed in the border areas by November 1963<sup>157</sup> and the United States is assisting in the construction of a military airfield at Leh. The Tezpur-North Lakhimpur road is being improved for heavy traffic and the Hindustan-Tibet road is nearing completion. By January 1965, the first phase of the North Sikkim highway, a 47-mile road linking Gangtok and Sinhik, had been completed by the CPWD at a cost of about

Rs 2.5 crores and opened to traffic<sup>158</sup>. An intensive development programme has been launched in the far-flung and sparsely populated areas of Uttar Pradesh, Himachal Pradesh, Punjab, Assam and NEFA<sup>159</sup>. A network of mostly jeepable roads has been laid and all villages save 17 in the Lahaul-Spiti district of Uttar Pradesh bordering Tibet have been inter-connected by bridle paths<sup>160</sup>. India is also meeting the entire estimated Rs 9 crores cost of the 128-mile Sounauli-Pokhra road project in Nepal which is expected to be completed in late 1968<sup>161</sup>.

#### Notes

1 Statement by the President of India, Dr S.S. Radhakrishnan, in a Washington television interview, 9 June 1963. Cited in Dawn, 10 June 1963.

2 Cited, Hindu, 8 February 1963.

3 Cited by Easwar Sagar in ibid, 23 May 1963.

4 Cited in ibid, 27 October 1964. He claimed on an earlier occasion that the five-year defence plan is based upon the premise that both the Sino-Indian and Indo-Pakistani borders are considered 'live' and that collusion between Pakistan and China against India was regarded as 'conceivable'. Statement in the Lok Sabha on 23 March 1964, cited in Overseas Hindustan Times, 2 April 1964.

5 This plan appears to be a revision of a three-year scheme hastily drawn up after the border conflict which envisaged the expansion of the Army to 21-22 divisions, a 60-70 per cent increase in all branches of the IAF, creation of a defence production base adequate for the enlarged Army, development of airfields, radar communications and related facilities - but included no provision for any expansion of the

Navy. See remarks by T.T. Krishnamachari at a Washington press conference on 23 May 1963, cited in Hindu, 24 May 1963; Easwar Sagar in ibid, 24 March, 23 May and 30 May 1963; K. Rangaswami in ibid, 12 May 1963.

6 See Times of India, 2 June 1964; The Times, 24 March 1964; statement by Chavan in the Lok Sabha on 27 April 1964, cited in Times of India, 28 April 1964; statement by Chavan in Bombay on 20 April 1964, cited in ibid, 21 April 1964; statement by Chavan in Poona on 9 May 1964, cited in ibid, 10 May 1964.

7 H.R. Vohra, Times of India, 29 May 1964.

8 See statement by Chavan in London on 19 November 1964, cited in ibid, 20 November 1964. Electronics equipment for the armed forces has been estimated to involve an outlay of Rs 730 crores during the 1963-73 period. Times of India, 10 December 1964.

9 Hindu, 19 June 1964. The Perspective Planning Division of the Commission initially suggested an outlay of Rs 4750 crores on defence during the Fourth Plan, but the Working Committee on Resources, after examining the estimates, increased the figure to Rs 5500 crores. The significance of this projected outlay is evidenced by the tentative estimate of a total outlay of Rs 24,000 crores for the Plan. See India News, 128/9, 28 September 1964.

10 An economy cut of about Rs 20 crores in allocations for defence was proposed for fiscal 1965 and involved the postponement or phasing of a construction scheme which included family quarters for officers. See Times of India, 17 August 1964; statement by Chavan to a meeting of Congress MPs in New Delhi on 10 August 1964, cited in India News, 100/8, 4 August 1964.

11 Nehru shifted to the view that receipt of military aid was compatible with non-alignment so long as no formal alliance is involved. See his statement cited in The Times, 12 November 1962.

12 At the same time, New Delhi is requesting increased economic aid on better terms than hitherto and concessions regarding repayment.

13 H.R. Vohra reported in the Times of India (8 June 1964) that the Indian Government envisaged about \$ 550 million

military aid from the United States and \$ 150 million from Britain and the Commonwealth for the five-year defence plan. He reported in the same paper on 23 May 1964 that, during Chavan's visit to Washington in that month, the Indian Defence Minister had submitted a list of defence needs totalling \$ 550 million over a five-year period which involved a desired \$ 60 million in grants and \$ 50 million in credits per annum for five years.

14 Four or five of these divisions, however, will be lower establishment formations capable of expansion in an emergency. The 'teeth to tail' ratio is being simultaneously reduced through reductions in the logistics branch wherever possible, such as pooling certain facilities with the Air Force and Navy, and discontinuance of the enrolled non-combatant category.

15 These divisions will comprise ten infantry battalions and about 300 vehicles (14,000 personnel) as against nine battalions and 1200 vehicles for the standard infantry division. A concerted effort is being made to recruit the hill peoples, Nagas and other frontier tribals to these formations.

16 Ministry of Defence, Report, 1963-64, p. 23.

17 Times of India, 11 March 1964. The tests were developed and adapted by the Directorate of Psychological Research at the Ministry of Defence and are designed to assess the agility, mental make-up and mechanical aptitude of a recruit to determine his suitability.

18 The adjustment was partly made to reduce the heavy turnover under the previous system of eight years Colour service and partly to constitute a Reserve of men sufficiently capable of acting as replacements for battle casualties in an emergency pending raising of fresh recruits.

19 There were, for example, 841 Special List officers on strength as of 15 January 1964. Ministry of Defence, Report, 1963-64, p. 27.

20 Details of these measures in ibid, pp. 24-34.

21 It is understood that a considerable body of Army opinion favoured discarding the Ishapore model for the FN or AR-15 but that it was concluded that the resulting delay was undesirable.

22 These units were purchased under a loan agreement concluded in Moscow in September 1964. The Russian models were apparently chosen over a French type primarily for financial reasons - purchase from France would have involved foreign exchange whereas Russia would accept rupee payment on deferred terms.

23 Ministry of Defence, Report, 1963-64, p. 38. According to H.R. Vohra (Times of India, 8 June 1964), India may purchase some one-ton trucks from the United States on credit. Such purchases were provided for in the Indo-American aid agreement concluded in May 1964.

24 Ministry of Defence, Report, 1963-64, p. 23. See also Hindu, 17 March 1963.

25 A Central Bureau of Investigation has also been established to investigate cases of espionage, corruption and fraud with probable emphasis on espionage.

26 Overseas Hindustan Times, 9 April 1964.

27 Hindustan Times (Delhi), 12 February 1964.

28 Overseas Hindustan Times, 9 July 1964. The scheme involves an increase in the number of posts on the Assam-East Pakistan border and the raising of more security forces to guard the border.

29 Times of India leader, 14 May 1964.

30 Hindu, 20 September 1964.

31 Ministry of Defence, Report, 1963-64, p. 28; statement by Chavan in the Lok Sabha, 23 March 1964, cited in Overseas Hindustan Times, 2 April 1964. Chavan stated that 17 per cent of the recruits to the mountain divisions were from the hill regions and that the total cost of the six new divisions was Rs 200 crores - each formation costing Rs 25 crores to equip and about Rs 7.5 crores for ammunition and other supplies sufficient for a three-month operation. According to a military informant, Gurkha strength has been increased to 34 battalions with further recruitment envisaged - as against about 23,000 at the time of the border war.

32 Ministry of Defence, Report, 1963-64, pp. 28-9.

33 Ibid, p. 28.

34 See statement by Deputy Defence Minister D.R. Chavan at Dehra Dun, 6 March 1964, cited in Times of India, 28 April 1964.

35 H.R. Vohra reported in Times of India (3 May 1964) that India envisages 30-35 squadrons of supersonic fighter aircraft. This figure would presumably include fighter-bomber units, not all of which would have a supersonic capability.

36 In early 1963, IAF personnel were taking basic helicopter training courses with Bristow Helicopters at Redhill and British Executive Air Services at Oxford. Flight, 31 January 1963, p. 144.

37 IAF officers commenced training in the United States from December 1963 in air-to-air and air-to-ground gunnery. H.R. Vohra, Times of India, 8 March 1964.

38 The Minister for Defence Production, K. Raghuramaiah, stated in September 1963 that the Soviet Union was to train twelve Indian pilots and 84 other IAF personnel. Cited, Hindu Weekly Review, 9 September 1963.

39 The present set-up thus comprises three operational commands - Western (Palam), Central (Calcutta) and Eastern (Shillong). No information is available regarding re-deployment of squadrons but it is understood that four fighter squadrons were shifted to the Calcutta area in November-December 1962.

40 Mobile radar units were provided by the United States in 1963 and sited at Amritsar and to the north of Calcutta. These units are being replaced by fixed installations in a scheme which may cost as much as £ 20 million. The ultimate radar system will probably comprise small advance radar posts sited as far forward in the Himalayas as possible and backed by perhaps 15 larger radar centres located on the edge of the plains.

41 Ministry of Defence, Report, 1963-64, p. 54.

42 George Wilson in AW, 5 November 1962, p. 27. A single Westinghouse J34 turbojet was mounted atop the centre-wing section to provide an additional 3400 lbs of thrust. The first six aircraft fitted in this manner were in service by mid-November and the remainder by February 1963.



- 43 The C-130 was demonstrated to Indian officials at Andrews Air Force base in Maryland in early November 1962.
- 44 Hindu, 16 May 1963; Flight, 23 May 1963, p. 773; AW, 20 May 1963. The cost of the order, including spares, amounted to about \$ 12.5 million.
- 45 Thomas Brady, New York Times, 15 May 1964; The Times, 15 May 1964; H.R. Vohra, Times of India, 10 May 1964.
- 46 See page 16.
- 47 See statement by Chavan in the Lok Sabha on 7 December 1964, cited in Times of India, 8 December 1964. India may be awaiting the outcome of the 748 military freighter flight trials before commencing production. See Flight, 6 August 1964, p. 235.
- 48 See statement by Deputy Defence Minister D.R. Chavan in LSD, 3rd Series, vol. 14, 14 March 1963, col. 4085.
- 49 Thomas Brady, New York Times, 13 May 1964.
- 50 Brady, ibid, 22 September 1964.
- 51 Flight, 27 December 1962, p. 998. According to the report, the offer was disclosed in New Delhi by the Soviet Trade Counsellor, G.P. Velexy.
- 52 K. Raguramaiah, LSD, 3rd Series, vol. 12, 21 January 1963, col. 5427.
- 53 See statement by Defence Minister Chavan in the Lok Sabha, 9 September 1963, cited in Overseas Hindustan Times, 19 September 1963.
- 54 India had acquired the licence for the Alouette frame in early 1962 and the licence for the Artouste 3B turboshaft engine in February 1963. It is understood that 150 units are to be produced under the licensing agreement.
- 55 Hindu Weekly Review, 27 April 1964.
- 56 See statement by Defence Minister Chavan in the Lok Sabha, on 7 December 1964, cited in Times of India, 8 December 1962.

- 57 Hindu, 11 November 1962.
- 58 See Flight, 1st October 1964, p. 579.
- 59 Times of India, 30 November 1964.
- 60 Flight, 6 August 1964, p. 235.
- 61 H.R. Vohra, citing "U.S. sources in Washington", Times of India, 20 March 1965.
- 62 Cecil Brownlow, AW, 19 November 1962, p. 38.
- 63 K.C. Khanna, Times of India, 1st August 1964.
- 64 See statement by T.T. Krishnamachari at a Washington press conference, 23 May 1964, cited in The Nation, 24 May 1963.
- 65 AW, 26 November 1962, p. 31.
- 66 The exercises took place in the eastern sector on 9, 13-14 November and, in the western sector, on 14 and 17 November. The participants comprised 6½ squadrons of IAF Canberra bombers, Gnat and Hunter fighters; one squadron of RAF Javelin fighters; one squadron of USAF F-100 fighters; and two RAAF Canberra bombers. See report in Hindu Weekly Review, 4 November 1963.
- 67 Delhi correspondent in The Times, 20 November 1963. India argues that supersonic fighters are needed as an early warning system cannot be completely effective due to the interference from the Himalayan mountains. The United States and Britain are of the view that several squadrons would be of little value, that an effective force is prohibitively expensive and that, in any event, India would ultimately depend upon Western air support.
- 68 H.R. Vohra, Times of India, 2 February 1964.
- 69 See Jack Raymond in New York Times, 12 May 1964; Easwar Sagar in Hindu, 20 May 1964; PTI report in Times of India, 22 May 1964; H.R. Vohra in ibid, 8 June 1964. India also apparently made enquiries, but no specific requests, about Britain's Firestreak missile and America's Sidewinder.
- 70 Political correspondent in Hindustan Times, 4 March 1964. Lockheed had reportedly made similar approaches in 1961 and

1962; see K. Rangaswami in Hindu, 7 July 1962 and George Wilson in AW, 5 November 1962, p. 26.

71 Washington Post, 19 May 1964.

72 Three of these aircraft were subsequently lost through mishaps.

73 Flight, 6 June 1963, p. 805.

74 LSD, 3rd Sess., vol. 10, 4 December 1962, col. 4225.

75 AW, 16 September 1963, p. 39; ibid, 7 October 1963, p. 23.

76 Selig Harrison in Washington Post, 18 December 1963.

77 Ibid.

78 Cited, Hindu Weekly Review, 23 December 1963.

79 Cited, Times of India, 6 February 1964.

80 H.R. Vohra, ibid, 26 January 1964.

81 Times of India, 5 March 1964.

82 The Times, 15 May 1964.

83 See H.R. Vohra, Times of India, 10 May 1964; Thomas Brady, New York Times, 13 May 1964.

84 See statement by Defence Minister Chavan in the Lok Sabha, 21 September 1964, cited by Thomas Brady in New York Times, 22 September 1965. See also Hindu, 29 August and 22 September 1964; Times of India, 12 and 13 September 1964.

85 The Sunday Telegraph (London), cited in The Australian, 28 September 1964.

86 See his statement at Colaba, 20 March 1963, cited in Overseas Hindustan Times, 28 March 1963.

87 Cited, Times of India, 21 April 1964. See also the statement by Chavan in the Lok Sabha, 1st June 1964, cited in ibid, 2 June 1964.

88 See statement by Chavan in Bombay, 20 April 1964, cited in ibid, 21 April 1964.

89 Nehru stated in the Lok Sabha on 18 March 1963 that the Government was negotiating with 'two or three countries' but declined to identify them as 'not in the public interest'. Cited, Hindu, 19 March 1963. The Minister of Defence Production, K. Raghuramaiah, stated in the Lok Sabha on 16 March 1963 that 'exploratory discussions' had been held with some Japanese firms. LSD, 3rd Series, vol. 14, col. 4143.

90 Delhi correspondent in The Times, 1st August 1964.

91 Cited, The Times, 29 July 1964.

92 The Times, 22 September 1964. The total foreign exchange component of the project, which may take ten years to complete and includes the reconstruction of Mazagon Docks, is estimated at £ 13,660,000. British consultants for the scheme are Sir Bruce White, Wolfe Barry and Partners for the dockyard project and Vickers Limited and Yarrow and Company for the frigate project.

93 See Navy Day message, 15 December 1964, by Vice-Admiral B.S. Soman, cited in Times of India, 15 November 1964.

94 See statement by Chavan in the Lok Sabha, 26 November 1964, cited in Hindu, 27 November 1964; statement by Chavan in the Lok Sabha, 30 November 1964, cited in ibid, 1st December 1964; K.C. Khanna in Times of India, 15 and 21 November 1964; Times of India, 15 November 1964. K.S. Shelvankar reported in Hindu (23 November 1964) that he 'understood' that India would obtain three destroyers of which one would be older than the other two and would have to be re-equipped and re-fitted to be rendered serviceable.

95 H.R. Vohra, Times of India, 29 May 1964.

96 LSD, Foreign Report  
(21 March 1963, p. 8) states that the Indian Navy renewed its demands for submarines on the grounds that Indonesia has 20 Soviet-built submarines, China has 30 and Pakistan was shortly to acquire one. (Pakistan received the small, conventional inshore submarines Diablo from the United States in mid-1964 on loan, with the United States retaining the right to recall it at any time. The loan was approved by the U.S. Congress in late 1963 as part of the 1963-64 military aid programme.) The unit will be used for anti-submarine training and possesses little offensive value. According to an informed source, Indian Naval HQ proposed that a fleet of at least five submarines be acquired.

- 97 See statement by Chavan in Bombay, 20 April 1964, cited in Times of India, 21 April 1964.
- 98 The Times, 2 August 1963.
- 99 Overseas Hindustan Times, 16 July 1964.
- 100 H.R. Vohra, Times of India, 29 May 1964.
- 101 See statement by Chavan in the Lok Sabha, 21 September 1964, cited by Thomas F. Brady in New York Times, 22 September. See also The Times, 31 August 1964; Hindu, 29 August 1964; Times of India, 13 September 1964. The naval members of the mission, Rear Admiral S.M. Nanda and Captain B.K. Dang, inspected Soviet frigates and submarines - the first time any Indian naval officer had been on board a Soviet naval craft.
- 102 K.C. Khanna, Times of India, 1st August 1964.
- 103 See UNI report in Times of India, 26 September 1964; statement by Chavan at Varangaon, 15 October 1964, cited in ibid, 16 October 1964.
- 104 See statement by Chavan in the Lok Sabha, 26 November 1964, cited in Hindu, 27 November 1964, and his statement in the Lok Sabha, 30 November 1964, cited in ibid, 1st December 1964. There appears to be no substance to the report by K.C. Khanna (Times of India, 21 November 1964) that Britain had agreed in principle to provide the required foreign exchange loans and technical aid for the construction of an 'Oberon' class submarine in India at an estimated cost of Rs 4.5 crores over a three-year period.
- 105 Cited, The Times, 6 April 1965.
- 106 Hindustan Times, 14 March 1964; statement by Vice Admiral Soman at Coimbatore, 24 September 1964, cited in Hindu, 25 September 1964.
- 107 Naval air station INS Hansa, which includes 551 Squadron, was moved from Sulur to Dabolim in June 1964. Near the coast and close to Marmagoa anchorage, Dabolim is ideally suited for maritime reconnaissance and for providing facilities for naval aircraft during fleet exercises.
- 108 INS Jarawa consists of a Resident Naval Officers Organisation backed by the necessary transport and communication

facilities. A naval garrison with facilities for moving to various islands on patrol has been stationed in the islands and consideration is being given to the development of fuelling facilities and to the construction of a jetty for naval ships at Port Blair.

109 Anthony Mann in The Daily Telegraph, cited in Dawn, 22 March 1964.

110 The COAS, General Chaudhuri, reiterated this view in April 1963 when he reportedly declared to the press that the Army did not favour dispersion of arms and effort on volunteer forces as the regulars could make much better use of the equipment. Cited, Times of India, 11 April 1963.

111 Ministry of Defence, Report, 1963-64, p. 40.

112 For further details, see Overseas Hindustan Times, 30 May 1963.

113 See statement by Deputy Defence Minister D.R. Chavan in LSD, 3rd Series, vol. 12, 21 January 1963, col. 5428. He also stated that the strength of the Senior Division and the Rifles totalled 592,880 boys and 29,870 girls as of 19 January 1963.

114 Overseas Hindustan Times, 2 January 1964. The Senior Division and the Rifles were merged and reorganized and the compulsory scheme involves a uniform course of military training of three years duration for all able-bodied male college students.

115 Indian Information (7:11, 1st July 1964, p. 329) refers to 'about' 24 ordnance factories, while the Minister for Defence Organisation, K. Raghuramaiah, stated in the Lok Sabha in August 1963 that there were then 20 ordnance factories. LSD, 5th Sess., vol. 19, 19 August 1963, col. 1139. His successor, A.M. Thomas, stated in a written reply tabled in the Lok Sabha on 14 September 1964 that there were then 31 ordnance factories and other production establishments employing 172,000 personnel. Cited, Indian Information, 17:7 1st October 1964, p. 520.

116 Overseas Hindustan Times, 16 July 1964. By December 1964, the quantum of general stores being produced represented a twelve-fold increase over the pre-Emergency period. See statement by Thomas in the Lok Sabha, 17 December 1964,

cited in Times of India, 18 December 1964. The output of the Shahjahanpur clothing factory rose from 9,100,000 pieces (1961-62) to 31,800,000 (1963-64) and, by value, from Rs 9.8 crores to Rs 22.56 crores over the same period. See statement by Thomas at Shahjahanpur on 20 February 1965, cited in Overseas Hindustan Times, 25 February 1965.

117 Although figures for the various plants are not available, the labour force at Shahjahanpur had increased to 13,000 by early 1965. See statement by Thomas at Shahjahanpur, ibid.

118 Times of India, 12 January 1963. On 2 January 1963, the paper contrasted the new policy to the former one of dependence on a 'secret defence sector' attached to the Defence Ministry and distinct from the public sector - a policy which it described as 'an absurdity that had more to do with empire-building than any valid reasoning'.

119 Overseas Hindustan Times, 11 July 1963.

120 See Times of India leader entitled "Defence Planning", 25 March 1964.

121 The production of 26 new items was undertaken subsequent to the border conflict in the period ending March 1964. See statement by Chavan in the Lok Sabha, 23 March 1964, cited in Times of India, 25 March 1964.

122 Times of India, 12 January 1963.

123 See statement by Chavan at Ishapore, 11 January 1965, cited in Times of India, 12 January 1965.

124 Times of India, 26 February 1964.

125 Hindustan Times, 15 January 1964. The air rifles will be used for instruction of para-military formations.

126 See statement by Thomas at Wellington, 7 November 1964, cited in Hindu, 9 November 1964.

127 Ministry of Defence, Report, 1963-64, p. 58.

128 Ibid.

129 See statement by Raghuramaiah at a Madras press conference, 5 February 1964, cited in Times of India, 6 February 1964.

- 130 See statement by Thomas at Wellington, 7 November 1964, cited in Hindu, 9 November 1964. The project will involve Shaktiman and Nissan vehicles and spares.
- 131 Times of India, 6 February 1964.
- 132 See statement by Raghuramaiah at Avadi, 11 May 1964, cited in Hindu, 12 May 1964. The prototype of the tank was completed in early 1963 and was subsequently subjected to extensive tests in northern India.
- 133 See statement by Thomas at Wellington, 7 November 1964, cited in Hindu, 9 November 1964.
- 134 The French scheme would presumably involve the AMX unit.
- 135 Link (17 December 1961, p. 7) had stated that Moscow had reportedly offered to collaborate in the establishment of a tank-manufacturing unit in India and that a specimen Russian tank was under examination in one of the Indian ordnance factories. Hindu (15 July 1964) expressed the view that Russian collaboration was attractive from the financial standpoint.
- 136 Cited, Hindu, 15 September 1964.
- 137 See statement by Thomas in Madras on 13 December 1964, cited in Hindu, 15 December 1964.
- 138 The committee, which included senior representatives of the Army, IAF and Defence Science Establishment, was reportedly set up by the Ministry of Economic and Defence Co-ordination without prior consultation with the Defence Ministry and to the latter's consternation. See Prem Chopra in the Statesman, 7 and 21 July 1963.
- 139 AW, 17 June 1963, p. 39.
- 140 Ibid, 17 June 1963, p. 39.
- 141 Ibid, 5 August 1963, p. 26. Clearly contradicting official claims of an expanded scheme, however, is the fact that whereas the original scheme envisaged 130 units the IAF has ordered only 29 to date.
- 142 See statement by Raghuramaiah at a Madras press conference on 5 February 1964, cited in Times of India, 6 February



1964. It is understood that Bristol Siddeley is co-operating with the Indian Government in modifying the 703 powerplant by adding boosters from the VK-7 to achieve a substantial increase in thrust and a barely supersonic version of the HF-24 designated the HF-24 Mk IB.

143 Hindu Weekly Review, 5 October 1964. The development of the Egyptian engine commenced in October 1960 under the direction of Professor Ferdinand Brandtner, a West German hitherto engaged in aero-engine design for the Spanish Government. The engine is conceived as the powerplant for the HA-300 jet delta-wing fighter designed by another West German, Willy Messerschmitt. Flight (26 March 1964) records doubts regarding the ability of the engine to ever achieve Mach 2.5 due to the prototype's decidedly subsonic-looking intakes and other physical aspects. In view of the large sums Cairo has expended on the airframe project and the prestige factor, it seems unlikely that the project would be terminated in favour of a foreign airframe without considerable efforts being made to improve the HA-300. New Delhi would, therefore, seem to be preparing for such an eventuality by seeking other powerplants.

144 See H.R. Vohra, Times of India, 3 May 1964; Reuter report in ibid, 7 May 1964; AP report in Hindu, 18 May 1964; Easwar Sagar in ibid, 20 May 1964.

145 Times of India, 16 July 1964.

146 Ibid, 17 August 1964.

147 Flight, 2 July 1964, p. 17.

148 Easwar Sagar in Hindu, 21 September 1964.

149 See statement by Thomas in the Lok Sabha, 17 December 1964, cited in Times of India, 18 December 1964.

150 The plant, which is valued at about Rs 20 crores, was the St. Louis Ammunition Factory and was surplus to American requirements. Although the plant will be used primarily for the production of 7.62 mm. ammunition, its machinery can be adapted for the production of ammunition ranging from 7.62 mm. up to 20 mm. anti-aircraft ammunition.

151 See Times of India, 17 December 1964; ibid, 20 December 1964, Hindu, 21 December 1964.

152 See statement by Thomas in the Lok Sabha, 20 November 1964, cited in Indian Information, 15 December 1964, p. 667; statement by Thomas at Wellington, 7 November 1964, cited in Hindu, 9 November 1964; statement by Thomas at Bhandara, 19 December 1964, cited in Times of India, 20 December 1964; statement by Chavan at Varangaon, 15 October 1964, cited in ibid, 16 October 1964.

153 See statement by Chavan in the Lok Sabha, 9 September 1963, cited in Overseas Hindustan Times, 19 September 1963.

154 Overseas Hindustan Times, 16 January 1964. This will connect Leh to Chandigarh via Manali, Bilaspur and Nangal.

155 Cited, ibid, 2 April 1964.

156 Ibid, 13 August 1964.

157 See statement by Chavan in LSD, 3rd Sess., vol. 12, 26 November 1963, col. 1371.

158 Indian Information, 1st January 1965, p. 691.

159 Overseas Hindustan Times, 25 June 1964. The Third Plan (1961-66) allocates Rs 35 crores for a development programme for the border districts of Pithoragarh, Chamoli and Uttarakashi in Uttar Pradesh, Lahaul in Punjab, Ladakh in Jammu and Kashmir and Kinnaur in Himachal Pradesh.

160 Overseas Hindustan Times, 13 August 1964.

161 Indian aid for this project was promised by Nehru during King Mahendra's visit to New Delhi in 1963.

## CONCLUSIONS

There would appear to be no basis for the view that the policies of a sovereign India during the 1947-62 period constituted a unique approach to national security distinct from the traditional one of power politics. Given India's geographical contiguity to the Soviet Union and China and the need to maximise the sources from which economic aid might be obtained India's leaders opted for a policy of non-alignment vis-a-vis the two power blocs. Such a posture was designed to avoid giving provocation to the communist powers and to preclude India's automatic involvement in any East-West conflict. It was also regarded as the best contribution which a weak, but potentially powerful, India could make towards the maintenance of the balance of power between the Soviet and Western blocs. Panch sheel and the 'peace area' were natural corollaries to this stance - all of which were designed to buffer India against the rivalries of the major powers.

In accordance with the financial limitations imposed by the country's economic and social backwardness, India's military liabilities were confined to what may be called the domestic military requirement of defence of the frontiers against a minor power with added provision for aid to the civil power in the

maintenance of law and order. In the event of an attack by a major power, the Indian Government proceeded on the premise that external aid would be well-nigh axiomatic by the desire of either of the power blocs to prevent India's vast resources from falling under the control of the opposing bloc. The only serious military problem appeared to present itself in the North-West in the form of Pakistan and the subordinate authorities in Azad Kashmir. The assessment of this threat and the operational plan conceived to meet it were basically similar to the "Plan of Operations (India 1938" which had been prepared with regards to a possible Afghan threat. As the contingency of a serious Chinese attack in the Himalayan region was virtually dismissed even after 1959, the orientation of strategy against Pakistan remained largely unchanged up to the eve of the Sino-Indian border conflict in October 1962.

(TEXT AMENDED AT REQUEST OF EXAMINERS)

in 1950

India's response to the Chinese occupation of Tibet in 1950-51 bore some resemblance to the policy adopted by Britain towards China's attempt to re-assert her control in Tibet in 1906-11. The legality of the Chinese action was recognized and, though asylum was granted to the Dalai Lama and other Tibetan refugees, these persons were not permitted to carry on political activities while resident in India. While good relations were desired with China, prudence dictated that India would have to strengthen its position in the Himalayan kingdoms and along the Indo-Tibetan frontier against possible Chinese aggrandisement. Nepal, Bhutan and Sikkim were accordingly brought into intimate treaty relationship with India and measures were undertaken to promote social, economic and political progress in these kingdoms. The policing and administration of the border areas contiguous to Tibet were also made more comprehensive.

he similarities between the Himalayan policies of Britain and a sovereign India  
ld not, however, be over-drawn. Britain's modest and economical response to the  
ese re-entry into Tibet was sufficient to preserve her position in the area, but  
an power and influence in the Himalayan region suffered progressive erosion. The  
ons are several. Britain faced a militarily impotent and decadent Manchu China  
h collapsed due to internal stresses, while the Nehru Government had to contend  
a resurgent Chinese state of some permanency and possessed of a large, if ill-  
pped, military machine. In the prevailing state of military technology, the Britis  
rs of India were able to draw comfort from the Himalayan mountain mass; by 1950,  
nological developments had rendered the Himalayas of doubtful value as a barrier  
nst an attack from the north or north-east. The military capability of imperial  
ain had posed a deterrent to Chinese aggressive acts, while the armed forces of  
pendent India were relatively much less significant and were, moreover, deployed  
nst Pakistan in the north-west.

In formulating his country's policies towards China's Himalayan postures, Nehru  
ed to fully appreciate the fact that the policies of the former British Government  
d no longer suffice in the radically altered geo-political context. This failure  
compounded by other errors of judgment. Nehru mistakenly persisted in the view  
; China valued Indian goodwill too much to risk losing it for the sake of possessin  
w square miles of Himalayan territory; <sup>and</sup> Chinese inroads in the Himalayan region  
went without serious challenge until the point had been reached where neither  
ernment could make real concessions on either a unilateral or bilateral basis with-  
loss of prestige and, in India's case at least, serious internal repercussions.  
ru relinquished India's inherited treaty rights in Tibet without even seeking to  
uire some sort of quid pro quo. He hesitated to take firm counter-measures in the  
alayas for fear of provoking Peking, even though the latter appeared to act without  
similar inhibition. Nehru's actual measures, once undertaken, were so cloaked in  
recy as to be of minimal deterrent value and his generally passive response to  
na would appear to have had the effect of encouraging, rather than deterring, China

inducement of the Government to pay Pakistan a large sum owing  
to it after partition: "The years that have followed have been  
utterly barren of any act of Gandhian compromise and reconcil-  
iation on the part of the Government of India".<sup>1</sup> On India's

attitude towards Kashmir, Goa and the border dispute with China, a leading Irish newspaper commented with <sup>perceptive</sup> ~~perspective~~ insight in mid-1962:

On the subject of Kashmir, to which Pakistan has an arguable claim, Mr Nehru refuses both a plebiscite and a conference. On Goa, where India has a good case if not a watertight one, he chose the unilateral decision of military occupation. On the Chinese border dispute, where India is one hundred per cent in the right, he is ready to grasp at any straw to bring the aggressor to the negotiating table. It is difficult to avoid the conclusion that what Mr Nehru has he holds, what he can obtain without trouble he takes and what he has taken from him by superior force he considers negotiable even when it is his in all justice. <sup>2</sup>

The ambivalence underlying India's entire approach to disputes is further evidenced by the statement offered by an official Indian publication in defence of the Goa action: "A nation has the ultimate right to use force in situations where methods of peace and persuasion have failed and where justice and one's own rights demanded positive action".<sup>3</sup> Peking could use the Indian military policy reflected continual and usually unsatisfactory compromises between what was politically desirable, financially possible and militarily prudent.

The Indian Navy represented a compromise between self-reliance and explicit dependence upon friendly powers. The development of a navy powerful enough to dominate the Indian Ocean against a major power was beyond India's financial

capacities, while continued explicit reliance upon the Royal Navy for naval defence was neither politically possible nor wise - as India and Australia had both learned to their regret on the fall of Singapore in 1942. India thus developed a small task force large enough to give her local superiority against any neighbouring country in the strategic arc from Suez to Singapore and so constituted as to facilitate cooperation with Western navies in defence of mutual interests in the Indian Ocean against Soviet-bloc submarines in any general war. To some extent, the Indian Navy assumed the functions of the former East Indies squadron of the Royal Navy. The development programme was affected considerably by financial stringency, but to no apparent extent by Pakistani or Chinese postures.

The Indian Air Force was developed as a balanced tactical air force possessing local superiority against any neighbouring country, save China. The prestige attached to modern aircraft clearly placed the Service in a very favourable position as regards budgetary allocations. The Hunter acquisition and the MIG deal attest to the primacy of this factor over objections by the Finance Ministry and the budget-starved Army and Navy.

The Army's role during the 1947-62 period was consistent with its pre-war responsibilities of internal security, watch and ward on the frontiers (primarily in Kashmir but also in Nagaland from 1955 and NEFA and Ladakh from 1959) and defence against a minor power. The regular professional standing Army

was retained, together with conventional armaments, and contrary to sound military policy but consistent with financial stringency effectiveness tended to be subordinated to size.

In view of the complacency with which India's political leaders viewed their country's security during most of the 1947-62 period and in the context of acute poverty, the military programme would seem to reflect a belief that a sizable military establishment was required for reasons of prestige and general prudence in a power-conscious world. A Round Table commentator charged in 1957 that "India is doing what all others do, nothing worse and nothing better. Only persistent claims to be doing better make the affair look worse. And the fact that India is so poor makes it much more painful too".<sup>4</sup> The Eastern Economist expressed the view in 1958 that "India is suffering from the same fears, complexes and neuroses she suspects and condemns elsewhere". The Times wrote in 1961:

Whatever dissension there may be about the assessment of the threat, India is apparently growing increasingly aware of the need to supplement political neutrality with effective national defence. Non-alignment is an attractive ideal, but for a population of 438 million something more obviously dynamic may be needed as an outward mark of progress. Mr Menon's dictum that militarism is different from preparations to defend one's country is a fair point, but India's growing military strength may be as much a symbol of desire for international status as a reaction to any specific threat." 0



Also, as John Maddox and Leonard Beaton have observed with reference to the Nehru Government's stern anti-nuclear line:

The skeptic about Indian sincerity in these protestations may point to two tendencies of Indian policy; the high priority given to the atomic energy programme based on complete self-sufficiency in all the related technologies, and the consistent opposition of the Indian Government in the International Atomic Energy Agency to safeguards in peaceful nuclear sharing. These certainly suggest an anxiety to have the option on producing a bomb.<sup>7</sup>

Noting further that the Indian atomic energy programme has proceeded at heavy cost in scarce money and scientific and technical personnel, Beaton and Maddox have concluded that "the most reasonable inference is that Mr Nehru, advised by Dr Bhabha, has decided to give the country the option to produce a nuclear device in 1963 in case this should become politically or militarily necessary".<sup>8</sup>

In the aftermath of the border conflict, defence has become an obsession in India. The Defence portfolio has been catapulted from relative obscurity to become perhaps the most attractive post in government next to that of Prime Minister. The position of the armed forces has changed dramatically and the Indian peoples' awareness of the feelings and needs of the military will make them and their elected representatives more solicitous of military (particularly Army) views. The Army has thus become a more positive political force. The prominence now being

accorded to military views is apparent in the manner in which India has responded to date to the altered strategic situation. A useful comparison can be made of current Indian policy and the course adopted by Pakistan in 1947.

In 1947, Pakistani military planners were faced with an uneasy ceasefire in Kashmir, a fairly long and exposed frontier in the Punjab and Rajasthan (not to speak of East Bengal) and an historical problem on the North-West Frontier involving restless tribals and an Afghan neighbour with stated claims to territories beyond the Durand Line. In the Pakistani view, their larger Indian neighbour had seized territory that rightfully belonged to Pakistan and such a seizure could not be accorded legitimacy. Considerations of relative national strength and acute strategic vulnerabilities precluded any attempt to eject Indian forces from those portions of Kashmir under their occupation, but military preparations had to be undertaken both to deter further "aggression" and to permit Pakistan to negotiate outstanding disputes with India from a position of at least reasonable strength. Pakistan accordingly redeployed its army and air force to face India, taking the risk of leaving light semi-military forces to police the North-West Frontier and relying upon diplomacy and a stronger military posture to deter overt aggression from that quarter.<sup>9</sup> To reduce the military imbalance with India while proceeding with economic development, Pakistan looked to external aid and, in the prevailing context, secured American military and

economic aid and formally aligned herself with the West in the cold war.

Following the border war with China, Indian military planners faced a similar predicament - an uneasy ceasefire in Ladakh and NEFA, a long and vulnerable frontier with a more powerful neighbour with stated designs on Indian territory, and the 'historical' problem posed by Pakistan. India could not contend with a simultaneous threat from both these states and certain risks had to be taken. Notwithstanding professed political fears of possible Sino-Pakistani collusion against India, it is understood from a reliable Indian military source that, while border incidents with Pakistan are expected to continue pending a political settlement, neither an isolated attack from Pakistan nor Pakistani cooperation with China in a concerted attack against India is envisaged. The prudence of Pakistan's military leaders, Western pressures (backed, if necessary, by economic and military sanctions) and India's vastly superior military power are considered a credible deterrent to serious aggression from Pakistan.

To enable the country to continue with its ambitious economic plans simultaneous with the creation of a military deterrent to Chinese aggressive designs in the Himalayan region, India has reversed its previous attitude towards military aid. Military aid is being assiduously sought from all possible

sources, including the Soviet bloc, but major reliance is clearly being placed upon the United States, Britain and the 'old Commonwealth' (Canada, Australia and New Zealand).

India's new defence planning is not merely a limited reaction to specific Himalayan needs, however, but represents a deliberate intention to "have strong defence not only specifically to meet the Chinese menace but also as a national policy".<sup>10</sup> There appears to be a desire to project India's military strength beyond the confines of the sub-continent itself. The long-term defence plan has been described as having "little or nothing to do with the border dispute as such and will be primarily concerned with India's larger role in South-East Asia in relation particularly with Communist China".<sup>11</sup> One Indian daily commented in May 1963 that "New Delhi is also coming around to the view that India's defence against Chinese expansion cannot be organised solely on a national basis and that she has to look upon the problem in relation to South-East Asia as a whole".<sup>12</sup> The decision to expand the Army has been described by the Indian High Commissioner in Britain, N.C. Chagla, as "not only in our interests but in the interests of the whole of South-East Asia and, ultimately, of democracy and peace".<sup>13</sup> The decision to construct air and naval facilities in the Andaman and Nicobar Islands provoked a press comment that "a decision has been taken to play a bigger role in the defence of South-East Asia".<sup>14</sup> The same decision was defended by Rear

Admiral S.G. Karmakar (Flag Officer, Bombay) as due to the need to guard the Indian Ocean and its approaches against all eventualities in view of China's ability to cripple Indian trade in a surprise submarine attack from a single base in South-East Asia."<sup>15</sup>

The Indian Government's intention to proceed with its military build-up of developments in Sino-Indian relations - and in the context of a faltering economy and ever-increasing dependence upon the West even for food - suggests a serious distortion of the country's military requirements. The army programme would appear to represent a reasonable response to the possible contingencies involving China, although several divisions remain deployed in Kashmir against Pakistan for primarily political reasons related to the stability of the local government. The development schemes for two supersonic aircraft, however, is neither warranted by the strategic situation nor related to India's financial capacities. There is also no reason for immediate procurement of additional naval vessels, particularly submarines, as the possibilities of attack by Chinese submarines must be regarded as distant. The defence production expansion plan would also seem to be excessive to basic needs as attested by the deferment of two of the six new plants originally envisaged - the lack of which will be compensated for by increased production from an established plan

and stockpiling of imported materials at a fraction of the cost of setting up the two factories for which there would be little civil use.

The explosion by China of a nuclear device on 15 October 1964 has introduced a new factor into Indian defence policy which will inevitably have far-reaching consequences for the country's future defence and foreign policies.

The blast, and a subsequent second detonation, have provoked a heated debate in India regarding the relative merits of an Indian nuclear arsenal. Some Congressmen and Socialists argued during the debate in Parliament on 23-27 November 1964 that India required an independent nuclear deterrent. The Right-wing Opposition and independents generally recognised that India could not afford such a programme but felt that there was a need for India to secure guarantees against Chinese nuclear blackmail from the established nuclear powers - America, Britain and France. A third school of thought, which includes ex-Defence Minister Krishna Menon- argued that the situation required neither Indian possession of the 'bomb' nor attempts to secure guarantees from other nuclear powers, but that India must direct its efforts to mobilise international opinion against nuclear proliferation and for disarmament.

The Government has declared itself against any nuclear weapons programme for the present. At the Cairo conference of non-

aligned nations, Shastri proposed that a deputation be sent to Peking to dissuade China from proceeding with its development of a nuclear capability. He has also suggested a Western-Soviet shield for all non-nuclear powers - an ill-disguised attempt to associate Russia with what would otherwise be total reliance upon the West. At the same time, however, he has reserved the right for the Government to take up the option.

India's professed sense of morality will have little to do with any decision as it has never determined policy decisions in India and cannot be expected to do so in future. Nor will New Delhi be likely to assume that self-denial on its part will bring it useful sympathy or prestige in the world; its claim to moral superiority has not been substantiated by its past conduct.

Prestige will be an important consideration. If it is concluded that the development of a nuclear capability is a necessary 'union card' for admission to great power deliberations, then it can be assumed that the decision will ultimately be taken. Indian policy-makers, however, can not be unmindful that an Indian explosion would have anything near the same impact which accompanied the Chinese 'bomb'. Nor would it necessarily enhance India prestige among the increasingly more sophisticated nations of Afro Asia - several of which could probably develop a similar capability at less strain on their economies. The reaction among the countries of the Western and Soviet blocs would probably be unsympathetic

and even hostile, with possible reductions in economic aid or refusals to increase the present of aid to cover the diversion of India's scarce resources to a nuclear weapons project. Such a decision would require India to renounce her adherence to the test-ban treaty with consequent doubts in many areas as to India's bona fides on any matter.

At the present stage, India's commencement of a nuclear weapons programme would require either Canadian permission to utilise the Trombay reactor or use of the reactor without such permission, either on a clandestine or open basis. Canada could not consent to such use of the reactor without destroying her policy towards such installations and a unilateral decision would seriously strain not only Indo-Canadian relations but also Indo-West relations and would not be likely to please Moscow. The adamant and self-righteous stand which has hitherto characterised Indian policy on disarmament and nuclear weapons poses an obstacle to any Indian nuclear decision in the positive which New Delhi could not take lightly.

A nuclear capability is, however, within India's scientific and financial resources although it would impose a further burden on an economy already functioning only with large-scale western and Soviet aid. Russia and the West cannot reasonably be expected to offer increased economic aid to cover the major cost of an Indian nuclear programme in the military sphere. India



cannot possibly acquire a strategic nuclear capability and would have to be satisfied with a tactical capability like that of France and the United Kingdom. Even the cost of this would be heavy as Britain's V-bomber force of 150-200 planes cost £500 million. The Canberra Mk 8 could carry a small atomic bomb but it would be very vulnerable to a modern air defence system. For a credible deterrent, India would require an aircraft with at least limited supersonic capability like the B-58, Mirage IV, several Russian types or civil aircraft like the Boeing 707, DC-8, Comet IV, Caravelle, TU-104 (a direct development of the Badger) and TU-114 (a direct development of the Bear). The F-10 would provide a good supersonic strike aircraft over short-medium ranges and the Mk 2 version of the HF-24 might also be adaptable. India could seek either to develop the HF-24 or buy a Mach 2 platform - but both would be very costly and the expense of the latter might be prohibitive even if countries possessing such aircraft were prepared to make sales.

The usefulness of an independent Indian nuclear force is debateable. The Chinese heartland is virtually out of reach of Indian aircraft while India's major cities and industrial centres are acutely vulnerable to air power based in Tibet. The usefulness of strikes against Chinese communications in Tibet would scarcely compensate for the devastation which would result from the Chinese nuclear response. In any case it seems unlikely that Chinese leaders would employ nuclear weapons against a

neighbour over which its conventional superiority is so marked. China's main strength for the foreseeable future will be in her reserves of disciplined manpower and Indian military planners must formulate their policy accordingly. Like many nations before her, India must henceforth live with insecurity.

#### Footnotes

1

'Magnificent Failure? The Gandhian Ideal in India After Sixteen Years', International Affairs, April 1964, p. 274.

2

The Irish Independent (Dublin), 9 August 1962.

3

Goa Regains Freedom (Sydney, Information Service of India, December 1961.

4

Vol. 47, 1956-57, p. 393.

5

21 March, 1958, p. 607.

6

29 August, 1961.

7

The Spread of Nuclear Weapons (London, Chatto & Windus for the Institute for Strategic Studies, 1962), p. 136.

8

Ibid., p. 141.

9

The decision to withdraw regular troops from the North-West Frontier posts had actually been taken by the Commander-in-Chief, Field Marshal Auchinleck, prior to partition and in consultation with the Viceroy and the Political Department. Following partition the Chief of Staff of the Pakistan Army, General Gracey, proceeded to plan for the withdrawal to be completed by the end of March 1948 but the rapid Indian advance in Kashmir forced the withdrawal to be completed by the end of December 1947. See Lord Birdwood, A Continent Decides, p. 89.

- 10 Statement by Defence Minister Chavan in New Delhi, 6 January 19  
11 Times of India, 29 April 1964.  
12 Hindu, 25 May 1963.  
13 Statement at a Bombay press conference, 2 January 1963.  
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14 Hindu, 6 April 1963.  
15 Cited, Times of India, 1 April 1964.

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## APPENDIX I

CENTRAL GOVERNMENT REVENUE AND EXPENDITURE  
(1,000 million rupees)

	1950	1951	1952	1953	1954	1955	1956	1957	1958	1959	1960
1. Income from property and entrepreneurship	0.68	0.78	0.59	0.50	0.63	0.66	0.86	0.86	0.88	1.00	1.00
2. Less direct interest on the public debt	0.37	0.37	0.37	0.40	0.39	0.46	0.46	0.58	0.69	1.00	1.15
3. Indirect taxes	4.28	5.31	4.61	4.73	5.23	5.58	6.46	7.89	8.17	8.99	9.79
4. Direct taxes on corporations	0.39	0.41	0.44	0.41	0.37	0.37	0.51	0.56	0.54	0.78	1.38
5. Direct taxes on households and private non-profit institutions	1.92	2.02	2.04	1.99	2.00	2.18	2.42	2.67	2.82	2.70	2.39
6. Other current transfers from households and private non-profit institutions	1.11	1.00	1.02	1.09	1.09	1.43	1.50	1.48	1.83	1.81	2.00
7. Current transfers from the rest of the world	0.22	0.02	0.11	0.19	0.16	0.45	0.45	0.34	0.35	0.36	0.37
Current revenue	8.03	9.17	8.44	8.51	9.09	10.21	11.74	13.22	13.90	14.64	15.78
8. Consumption expenditure	5.59	5.85	6.04	6.44	6.72	7.15	7.87	9.20	9.91	10.75	11.69
a) Civil	3.71	3.88	4.06	4.35	4.62	5.12	5.61	6.27	6.99	7.79	8.52
b) Defence	1.88	1.97	1.98	2.09	2.10	2.03	2.26	2.93	2.92	2.96	3.17
9. Subsidies	0.41	0.45	0.36	0.15	0.13	0.17	0.29	0.50	0.49	0.51	0.67

10. Current transfers to households and private non-profit institutions	0.59	0.59	0.71	0.76	0.91	1.26	1.42	1.50	1.60	1.90	2.16
11. Current transfers to the rest of the world	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Current expenditure	6.59	6.89	7.11	7.35	7.76	8.58	9.58	11.20	12.00	13.16	14.52
Saving	1.44	2.28	1.33	1.16	1.33	1.63	2.16	2.02	1.90	1.48	1.26

Source: United Nations: Year Book of National Accounts Statistics 1959, 1960, 1961, 1962.

## APPENDIX II

ACTUAL GROSS EXPENDITURE OF EFFECTIVE ARMY AND NON-EFFECTIVE ARMY DURING THE YEARS 1949-50 TO 1962-63  
(in lakhs of Rs)

Details	1949-50	1950-51	1951-52	1952-53	1953-54	1954-55	1955-56	1956-57	1957-58
<u>Effective Army</u>									
1 Main Head 1 - Pay & allowances of the Army	32,56	37,71	42,15	44,75	44,89	45,46	44,73	45,11	49,07
2 Main Head 2 - Pay & allowances and Miscellaneous expenses of Territorial Army, National Cadet Corps, State Forces, etc.	2,78	8,71	1,28	40	45	64	1,24	1,44	1,54
3 Main Head 3 - Pay and allowances of Civilians	23,05	21,74	22,36	22,48	22,96	22,53	22,75	23,04	24,64
4 Main Head 4 - Transportation and Miscellaneous	13,76	11,07	12,59	11,93	11,40	12,23	11,67	12,31	14,03
5 Main Head 5 - Expenditure on Manufacturing and Research Establishment	15,27	17,20	20,14	20,43	17,55	16,99	16,74	16,46	17,78
6 Main Head 6 - Purchase and sale of Stores	30,06	28,14	33,15	35,65	31,41	29,39	19,95	25,22	37,97
7 Main Head 7 - Expenditure on Works	11,42	11,02	15,66	14,94	14,13	13,53	12,90	12,75	11,54
8 Main Head 8 - Charges in England	4,81	11,72	6,30	7,06	5,34	9,71	7,31	16,52	22,88
9 Main Head 9 - Loss or gain by Exchange	-	2	1	1	1	2	1	3	4
<u>Total - Effective Army</u>	1,33,71	1,47,33	1,53,64	1,57,65	1,48,14	1,50,50	1,37,30	1,52,88	1,79,49
<u>Non-Effective - Rewards &amp; Pensions</u>									
Army (including State Forces)	7,72	9,06	9,43	9,44	9,62	10,16	13,64	13,76	13,82
<u>Grand Total - Effective and Non-Effective</u>	1,41,43	1,56,39	1,63,07	1,67,09	1,57,76	1,60,66	1,50,94	1,66,64	1,93,31



## APPENDIX II (cont.)

ACTUAL GROSS EXPENDITURE OF EFFECTIVE ARMY AND NON-EFFECTIVE ARMY DURING THE YEARS 1949-50 TO 1962-63  
(in lakhs of Rs)

Details	1958-59	1959-60	1960-61	1961-62	1962-63	Revised Estimates 1963-64	Budget Estimates 1964-65
<u>Effective Army</u>							
1 Main Head 1 - Pay & allowances of the Army	52,61	53,50	65,75	69,42	84,84	1,21,32	1,35,99
2 Main Head 2 - Pay & allowances and Miscellaneous expenses of Territorial Army, National Cadet Corps, State Forces, etc.	1,84	2,16	3,57	3,84	4,53	9,26	6,15
3 Main Head 3 - Pay and allowances of Civilians	25,40	25,92	29,41	25,77	30,59	37,20	40,00
4 Main Head 4 - Transportation and Miscellaneous	16,43	15,49	17,76	20,75	30,13	36,03	35,20
5 Main Head 5 - Expenditure on Manufacturing and Research Establishment	19,09	25,56	28,79	43,73	80,65	1,42,50	1,54,40
6 Main Head 6 - Purchase and sale of Stores	36,00	29,92	29,51	39,57	83,70	1,71,49	1,77,94
7 Main Head 7 - Expenditure on Works	11,65	12,48	13,73	11,96	17,44	26,18	22,76
8 Main Head 8 - Charges in England	4,65	2,22	1,91	2,92	6,59	6,78	10,45
9 Main Head 9 - Loss or gain by Exchange	1	-	-	1	1	1	-
<u>Total - Effective Army</u>	1,67,68	1,67,25	1,90,43	2,17,97	3,38,48	5,50,77	5,82,89
<u>Non-Effective - Rewards &amp; Pensions</u>							
Army (including State Forces)	13,84	14,69	14,84	18,67	17,94	18,40	21,36
<u>Grand Total - Effective and Non-Effective</u>	1,81,52	1,81,94	2,05,27	2,36,64	3,56,42	5,69,17	6,04,25

Source: Indian Ministry of Defence.

## APPENDIX III

EXPENDITURE OF THE NAVY AND AIR FORCE  
(lakhs of rupees: Rs 1 lakh = £stg. 7500)

Year	<u>NAVY</u>			<u>AIR FORCE</u>		
	Revenue	Capital	Total	Revenue	Capital	Total
1951-52	766.18	127.21	893.39	1602.50	111.91	1714.41
1952-53	868.69	177.27	1045.96	1562.74	187.82	1750.56
1953-54	1042.62	216.18	1258.80	2856.61	164.26	3020.87
1954-55	1108.24	394.77	1503.01	2973.78	202.99	3176.77
1955-56	1204.67	733.52	1938.19	3005.63	271.23	3276.86
1956-57	1246.61	810.87	2057.48	3858.50	368.14	4226.64
1957-58	1416.80	1331.85	2748.65	7274.68	432.26	7706.94
1958-59	1637.66	1550.41	3188.07	7735.04	334.80	8069.84
1959-60	1511.12	1925.50	3436.62	6091.20	334.47	6425.67
1960-61	1766.96	1524.01	3290.97	5319.17	387.51	5706.68
1961-62	2066.45	441.34	2507.79	5407.97	453.61	5861.58
1962-63	1658.16	501.95	2160.11	7788.10	1665.09	9453.19
<b>Total</b>	<b>16294.16</b>	<b>9734.88</b>	<b>26029.04</b>	<b>55475.92</b>	<b>4914.09</b>	<b>60390.01</b>

## APPENDIX IV

OFFICIAL MILITARY EXPENDITURE STATISTICS

Country	Military budget expenditure	Gross domestic product	Military budget expenditure as % of GDP
United States (\$)	44,613.0	455,628.0	9.8
Yugoslavia (dinars)	177,500	1,977,300	9.0
Burma (kyats)	393.1	5,407.0	7.3
Russia (roubles)	94,100	1,360,333	6.9
Britain (£)	1,467.1	22,694.0	6.5
France (NF)	14,713.0	236,200.0	6.2
Sweden (kröner)	2,620.0	55,256.0	4.7
Canada (\$)	1,533.1	33,548.0	4.6
Indonesia (rupiah)	8,642.0	187,100.0 <sup>a</sup>	4.6
Communist China (yuan)	5,437	123,800	4.4
West Germany (DM)	8,591.0	230,077.0	3.7
Norway (kroner)	1,004.4	29,255.0	3.4
Thailand (baht)	1,465.1	46,379.0	3.2
Belgium (francs)	17,039.0	554,467.0	3.1
Switzerland (franks)	973.9	32,067.0	3.0
Australia (£)	179.1	5,943.0	3.0
Malaya (\$) <sup>b</sup>	160.6	5,310.0	3.0
Pakistan			3.0 <sup>c</sup>
Turkey (liras)	1,020.5	38,653.0	2.6
INDIA (rupees)	2,808.0	119,450.0 <sup>d</sup>	2.4 <sup>d</sup>
New Zealand (£)	25.7	1,166.0	2.2
Finland (million markkaa)	20.5	1,186.0	1.7
Japan (million yen)	181.0	11,037.3	1.6
Philippines (pesos)	173.9	10,649.0	1.6
Ceylon (rupees)	58.8	5,692.5	1.0

Note: All figures represent the average for the period 1957-59 and units of currency are one million, unless otherwise stated.

a Gross domestic product at factor cost.

b The figure is for 1957.

c Ratio to net national product.

d Net domestic product at factor cost.

Source: Economic and Social Consequences of Disarmament: Report of the Secretary-General Transmitting the study of his consultative group (Department of Economic and Social Affairs, United Nations, New York, 1962), E/3593/Rev. 1, annex 2, tables 2-1, 2-2 and 2-3.

## APPENDIX V(a)

DEFENCE EXPENDITURE OF BRITISH INDIA<sup>a</sup>: SELECTED YEARS  
(crores of rupees)

Year	Defence	Year	Defence	Defence % of Total Expenditure
1891	24.1	1937	47.4	54.5
1911	29.3	1938	46.18	54.3
1914	30.7	1939	49.54	52.4
1915	33.4	1940	73.61	64.5
1916	37.5	1941	103.93	70.6
1917	43.6	1942	214.62	74.3
1918	66.7	1943	358.40	81.5
1919	87.0	1944	395.49	79.7
1920	87.4	1945	360.23	74.3
1921	69.8	1946	207.37	60.4
1923	56.2	1947 <sup>b</sup>	86.63	46.8
1931	51.8	1948	146.05	45.5
1932	46.7	1949	148.86	46.9
1936	45.5	1950	164.13	46.7

Sources: P.J. Thomas, The Growth of Federal Finance in India (Madras, Oxford University Press, 1939), p. 502 for period 1891-1936; R.N. Poduval, Finance of the Government of India Since 1935 (Delhi, Premier Publishing, 1951), pp. 36-7 for period 1937-50. See also R.N. Bhargava, The Theory and Working of Union Finance in India (London, Allen & Unwin), pp. 279-88.

a Refers to GOI up to 1921 and to Central Government thereafter. Because of the changes in financial policy from 1921 comparisons between periods before and after are misleading.

b Figures from 1947 inclusive refer to Indian Union.

## APPENDIX V(b)

NET EXPENDITURE OF BRITISH INDIA ON SELECTED ITEMS  
(crores of rupees)

Item	1857-58	1901-2	1913-4	1921-2	1930-1	Percentage increase 1901-2 to 1930-1
Defence	16.7 (47.7%) <sup>a</sup>	24.7	29.8	69.8 (32.0%)	54.3 (23.5%)	119.8
Police	2.6 (7.5%)	4.4	7.3	12.8 (11.33%)	13.6 (12.2%)	209.1
Law & Justice	(included in Police)	4.4	6.1	7.8 (inclu in Police)	9.0 (inclu in Police)	104.5
General Administration <sup>b</sup>	3.0	2.0	3.0	10.3	14.1	605.0
Education	0.2 (0.6%)	1.7	4.8	9.0 (4.94%)	13.8 (6.91%)	711.8
Public Health <sup>c</sup>	0.1 (0.4%)	2.6	3.5	6.1 (3.33%)	6.7 (3.56%)	153.8
Agriculture	-	-	-	2.0 (1.08%)	3.1 (1.66%)	-
Civil Works <sup>d</sup>	3.1	4.2	10.1	12.6	12.9	207.1

Note: a Percentage of total expenditure.

b Does not include the charges of land revenue collection.

c Includes medical aid and famine relief.

d Chargeable to revenue.

Source: P.J. Thomas, The Growth of Federal Finance in India (Madras, Oxford University Press, 1939), pp. 9-10.

## APPENDIX VI

COMPARISON OF EXPENDITURE OF SELECTED COUNTRIES

Country	Year	Total Expenditure	Defence charges	Defence as % of expenditure
U.K. (£ million)	1928-29	818.0	113.5	13.87
	1935-36	824.3	124.2	15.06
France (million francs)	1930-31	50,398.2	12,948.9	25.69
	1936	40,306.8	8,523.7	21.14
Germany (million RM)	1928-29	8,516.9	757.9	8.94
	1934-35	8,232.3	1,104.5	13.41
Italy (million lira)	1928-29	19,646.0	4,289.0	21.8
	1934-35	20,847.0	5,161.0	24.76
Sweden (million kroner)	1928-29	701.2	133.4	19.02
	1935-36	867.3	120.9	13.94
U.S.A. (\$ million)	1928-29	3,722.5	1,168.6	31.39
	1936-37	8,480.8	1,593.1	18.78
Canada (\$ million)	1928-29	356.9	19.7	5.52
	1936-37	535.2	37.7	7.04
Australia (£ million)	1928-29	81.3	34.6	42.56
	1936-37	110.7	25.0	22.58
Japan (million yen)	1928-29	1,814.9	517.2	28.5
	1936-37	2,311.5	1,060.1	41.58
Russia (million roubles)	1928-29	6,339.9	793.7	12.5
	1936-37	78,715.0	14,815.5	18.95
INDIA (Rs million)	1928-29	1,293.0	584.9	45.23
	1936-37	1,227.0	503.8	41.06

Source: P.J. Thomas, The Growth of Federal Finance in India (Madras, Oxford University Press, 1939), p. 494.  
The percentage calculations are the writer's and are based on the figures.

## APPENDIX VII

### NOTES ON BRITISH HIMALAYAN POLICY

British policy in the Himalayan region was directed towards the assertion of such forms of control as were deemed necessary to maintain tranquility on the frontiers of the areas over which the Crown exercised paramountcy, and to deny influence in, or control of, these strategic areas to any other Power.

The expanding Gurkha kingdom in Nepal was defeated in 1814-16. The question of annexation arose but was rejected<sup>1</sup>, and the Treaty of Sagauli signed on 2 December 1815 provided only for Gurkha withdrawal from Sikkim, Kumaon, Garhwal and the Terai to the west of the Gandak River, acceptance of a British Resident and agreement to British recruitment of Gurkhas for the army in India<sup>2</sup>. Britain's subsequent strict adherence to a policy of non-interference in Nepali affairs

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Britain clearly concluded that, as one official declared at about that time: 'a frontier of seven or eight hundred miles between two powerful nations [British India and Chinese Tibet] holding each other in mutual contempt seems to point at anything but peace'. Cited in Alistair Lamb, Britain and Chinese Central Asia (London, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1960), p. 40.

2

For brief comments on the origins of the Gurkha Rifles, see Lt. General Sir Francis Taker, Gorkha: The Story of the Gurkhas of Nepal (London, Constable & Co., 1957), pp. 297-9.

and acceptance of the kingdom's policy of almost total exclusion of Europeans facilitated the maintenance of a friendly relationship to the mutual advantage of both Governments. Nepalese aid during the Mutiny in 1857 was rewarded by the restoration to Nepal of a large part of the Terai annexed in 1816; Nepal's support to the Younghusband expedition to Lhasa in 1904 was at least balanced by the support received by Kathmandu in countering Chinese demands during the period 1906-11; generous Nepalese aid during the Great War provoked a token annual grant of Rs 1 million in perpetuity<sup>1</sup>. Nepal's complete independence was formally recognised by a Treaty of Peace and Friendship signed in 1925 which provided, in part, for mutual consultation on problems involving a third party<sup>2</sup>. The subsequent relationship up to the British withdrawal from the Indian sub-continent in 1947 was close and friendly, attested to by the generous aid which Nepal provided to Britain during the Second World War.

British political contact with Sikkim commenced in the spring of 1815, when a British force entered Morung during actions against the Gurkhas. The Treaty of Sagauli restored

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<sup>1</sup>

This was capitalised in 1947 with a gift of £1.75 million.

<sup>2</sup>

In accordance with this relationship, the British Resident was re-designated an Envoy in 1920 and subsequently became a Minister Plenipotentiary.



to the Sikkimese ruler the territories previously wrested from him by the Gurkhas and, under the terms of the Treaty of Titalia signed in February 1817, the East India Company guaranteed Sikkim against renewed Gurkha aggression in return for which Sikkim placed her foreign relations under a measure of Company control. In 1835, the Sikkimese ruler was induced to cede the Darjeeling tract under a deed of grant in return for an annual allowance<sup>1</sup>.

Friction persisted over the issue of slaves and the mistreatment of several British officials by Sikkimese authorities in 1849 provoked Lord Dalhousie to annex the Terai district and the hill tracts of Darjeeling west of the Tista River. The kidnapping of British subjects culminated in a British military action against the kingdom in 1860-61. A treaty was concluded on 28 March 1861 which provided for an annual subsidy to Sikkim on condition that its ruling authorities maintained the peace.

The entry of a Tibetan force into the state in 1886 provoked British demands to both the Chinese and Tibetan

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An allowance of Rs 3,000 was granted in 1841, increased to Rs 6,000 in 1846, suspended in 1849, resumed, forfeited in 1860, restored in 1861, increased to Rs 9,000 in 1868 and to Rs 12,000 in 1873, suspended in 1889 and ultimately restored in 1918.

authorities that it be withdrawn. When the warning went unheeded, a force was despatched to eject the Tibetans in March 1888. Subsequent Anglo-Chinese negotiations led to a convention being concluded in March 1890 in which the water-parting of the Tista was stipulated as the boundary between Sikkim and Tibet, and Sikkim was recognised as a British protectorate with Britain having direct and exclusive control over the internal administration and foreign relations of the state. A supplementary agreement was concluded between the same two Governments in December 1893, the chief provision of which established a trade outlet at Yatung, eight miles inside the Tibetan border. Non-recognition of the treaties by the Tibetans contributed to the Younghusband expedition in 1904, and the Lhasa Convention concluded between Tibet and Britain provided for Tibetan acceptance of the 1890 and 1893 treaties.

In 1888, Mr J.C. White of the Public Works Department was appointed Political Agent to assist the Maharaja in the kingdom's administration, the authority of the latter person being progressively reduced. A revenue system was established, a basis was laid for taxation, Nepalese immigration was encouraged so as to bring unused land under cultivation, and the development of roads was undertaken<sup>1</sup>. Foreigners were

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<sup>1</sup>

By 1900, it was possible to travel from one end of Sikkim

allowed into Sikkim only by special permission of the British authorities.

British relations with Sikkim after 1890, which were described by a former Political Officer in the state as being characterised by 'too little tact and sympathy, too much of the hobnailed boot'<sup>1</sup>, were adjusted in 1918. In April of that year, Maharaja Tashi Namgyal was invested with full administrative powers. The subsequent period up to the British withdrawal from India in 1947 was one of tranquility within Sikkim and of close and cordial Anglo-Sikkimese relations. In both world wars, the Sikkimese gave loyal support to British efforts and Tashi's eldest son died in service with the Royal Air Force in 1941.

British contact with Bhutan began with the British ejection of a Bhutanese force from Cooch Behar in 1792 pursuant to a request from the principality's ruler. Following its occupation of Assam in 1826, the East India Company confirmed and renewed an agreement whereby Bhutan occupied the Assam Duars for payment of an annual tribute. Subsequent misunderstandings, missed payments and persistent Bhutanese

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to the other by a mule track, and, in 1906, Sikkim was linked to India by a road suitable for wheeled traffic.

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Sir Charles Bell, Tibet Past and Present (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1924), p. 170.

depredations caused the Company to annex the Assam Duars in 1841 for a compensatory payment of Rs 10,000 per annum. Further Bhutanese raids against British territory and the maltreatment of a British envoy provoked the annexation, in November 1864, of the Assam Duars, the Ambari Falakata (a Bhutanese enclave virtually surrounded by British territory), the Bengal Duars and such hill territory as was considered essential for the control of the 18 duars (passes) which passed through the Himalayan foothills into central Bhutan. The ensuing brief Anglo-Bhutanese war ended with the conclusion of the Treaty of Sinchula on 11 November 1865 whereby Bhutan agreed to refer all disputes with Sikkim and Cooch Behar to the British Government for arbitration, maintain free trade and return fugitives from British justice. In return, the British Government agreed to pay compensation for the Duars in the amount of Rs 25,000 for the first year, Rs 35,000 for the second, Rs 45,000 for the third and Rs 50,000 for each year thereafter - on condition that Bhutan maintained the peace.

The subsidy afforded a considerable source of income which the Bhutanese clearly wished to maintain and good Anglo-Bhutanese relations ensued which were not appreciably affected by minor disputes in 1868 and 1880. Bhutan refused aid to Tibet in the Anglo-Tibetan conflict in 1888 and, in

reply to a request for an open demonstration of support for British policy in 1904, Bhutan despatched a Mission to accompany General Macdonald in his march to Lhasa<sup>1</sup>. In 1907, British support enabled the penlop (governor) of the Tongsa District to establish himself as the hereditary king and thereby promoted a measure of political stability in the previously strife-torn state.

Tibetan developments provoked British initiatives leading to the amendment of the Treaty of Sinchula in 1910. Bhutan agreed to accept the guidance of the British Government in its external relations, and Britain increased the annual subsidy to Rs 100,000 and undertook not to interfere in the kingdom's internal administration. A political crisis in the state in 1929, however, caused the creation of the post of dewan or chief minister in an effort to streamline the Bhutanese administration and maintain law and order. In 1942, for reasons clearly related to the Japanese threat to Assam, the British increased the subsidy to Rs 200,000.

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Up to 1904, political relations between Bhutan and the British Indian Government were carried on through the medium of the Bengal Government. Tibetan developments in that year caused these relations to be transferred to Colonel Younghusband, who communicated directly with the Indian Government. Upon the termination of the Mission, conduct of these political relations was transferred to the Political Officer in Sikkim.

British contact with the tribals in the north-east followed upon the occupation of Assam in 1826. The policy subsequently pursued towards these peoples has been described as one of 'acquiring loose political control over these areas, with the minimum of interference compatible with the protection of these tribesmen and restraining them from raiding either Indian or Chinese territory'<sup>1</sup>. Varying degrees of British 'authority' was asserted in treaties and agreements with the Akas in 1842, 1844 and 1888; with the Daflas in 1835, 1837 and 1852; with the Miris and Abhors in 1862-63 and 1866, and with the Monbas in 1844 and 1853. No written agreements were concluded with the Mishmis. The Naga Hills District of about 4,000 square miles was administered by the Government of India through its agent, the Governor of Assam, as an 'Excluded Area' and its inhabitants were extensively evangelised, especially by American Baptists. The Naga areas lying to the east of this administered district were collectively classed as an 'Unadministered Area'<sup>2</sup>.

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White Paper, II, appendix I entitled "Historical Background of the Himalayan Frontier of India", p. 130.

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For useful discussions of the Naga areas, see Sir Robert Reid, "The Excluded Areas of Assam", Geographical Journal, vol. 103 (1944), pp. 18-28; J.P. Mills, "The Assam-Burma Frontier", ibid, vol. 67 (1926), pp. 289-99.

To check tribal depredations, British authority largely continued the policy of earlier Assamese rulers - suspension of the subsidy, blockade (thereby denying the particular tribe access to the goods and markets of Assam, which they required) and, in the last resort, punitive expeditions<sup>1</sup>. This last alternative was disliked both on the grounds of expense and because of the morally-based opposition by British and Indian politicians. To lessen the chances of friction with the tribes, the Bengal Frontier Regulation of 1873 created an 'inner line' beyond which certain classes of people could not pass without special permits. Where it existed, this line served as an administrative boundary beyond which no taxes were collected. Though the tribal areas of Assam Himalaya were not directly administered, they were nonetheless regarded as falling within the British sphere of influence.

By the beginning of the twentieth century, there were persons who argued the need for a forward policy into the areas beyond the foothills in Assam. Champion of such an approach was Noel Williamson who, in 1905, was appointed to

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Such expeditions were sent against the Akas in 1883, the Daflas in 1874-75, the Miris and Abhors in 1859, the Abhors in 1860, 1894 and 1911 and the Mishmis in 1899. A revolt in the Naga Hills was put down in 1877-80.

the post of Assistant Political Officer, Sadiya. He argued the need to make the tribals aware of the benefits of British rule but, though supported by the Viceroy, Lord Minto, a forward policy was rejected by the Secretary of State for India, Lord Morley, as likely to lead to progressive annexation which it might be difficult to limit. Nonetheless, Williamson ventured up the Lohit in the winter of 1907-08 and on three further occasions, meeting his death at the hands of Abhor tribesmen in early 1911.

A case for the policy favoured by Williamson had, in the meantime, been building up as a result of the interest which the Chinese were showing in the regions adjoining Assam Himalaya consequent on their forceful re-entry into Tibet in 1909-10. The death of Williamson provided the excuse and immediate occasion for a forward move - despite the reluctance of the Viceroy and the British Cabinet for fear of thereby provoking reprisals from China in the trade sphere and from Russia in Central Asia. The resulting plan of action had, as its ultimate objective, 'to define a border more or less along the mountain crests and main watersheds, to exercise British control "of a loose political nature" up to that boundary, and, if the circumstances seemed propitious, to inform China of the new limits of British



sovereignty'<sup>1</sup>. A military expedition punished the Abhors, missions were sent to the Miris and Mishmis, and a host of surveys were undertaken which greatly improved the state of British knowledge about Assam Himalaya. The hills were divided into Western, Central and Eastern Sections (subsequently modified and given new names) under the supervision of Political Officers. The construction of a road up the Lohit commenced in 1912 but made slow progress and came to a halt in 1914 long before it had even reached the boundary area. A recommendation by T.P.M. O'Callaghan (Assistant Political Officer, Eastern Section) in early 1914 that work should continue on the road and that construction of a military post near Walong be undertaken was ignored.

Little attention was paid to the tribal aread during the period between the two world wars. No attention was given to a warning from one Political Officer in 1928 that the Tibetan frontier would become of great political importance once normalcy returned to the Chinese internal scene. In 1936, the Tibetans were still administering and taxing the Tawang Tract. The publication of Chinese maps, which showed all of Assam Himalaya as part of Tibet (i.e. China), caused

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Cited, Alistair Lamb, The India-China Border (London, Oxford University Press, 1964), p. 139.

the Governor of Assam to despatch a Political Officer in 1938 to demonstrate British sovereignty in Tawang by means of collecting a tax. Upon his return, the officer proposed that the Tibetans be removed over the McMahon Line and that British officials be permanently stationed in Tawang and Dirrang Dzong - but the Indian Government was unwilling to accept additional administrative responsibility and the associated expense. In response to Tibetan efforts to collect taxes and labour in the Dihang Valley as far as Karko, however, British Political Officers began to tour up the Dihang deep into Abhor country.

The Japanese threat and the appearance of further Chinese maps prompted the establishment of armed posts at Karko and Riga in the Dihang Valley in 1940-41, the extension of armed posts up the Lohit to the McMahon Line in 1943, the preparation of plans for a motor road from Sadiya to Rima, and concerted efforts to cultivate tribal loyalties. Tribals were employed as porters during the military operations against the Japanese and the Nagas were armed and conducted skillful guerilla operations. In 1942 the Tirap Frontier Tract was created from the Sadiya Frontier Tract and, in 1946, the Balipara Frontier Tract was bifurcated into two divisions - the Abhor Hills and the Mishmi Hills.

## APPENDIX VIII

THE ARMIES OF THE HONOURABLE EAST INDIA COMPANY  
(establishment on the eve of the Mutiny, 1857)

	<u>British*</u>				<u>Native</u>				
	Cavalry	Artillery	Infantry	Total	Cavalry <sup>+</sup>	Artillery	Sappers & Miners	Infantry	Total
Bengal	1,366	3,063	17,003	21,432	19,288	4,734	1,497	112,052	137,571
Madras	639	2,128	5,941	8,708	3,202	2,407	1,270	42,373	49,252
Bombay	681	1,578	7,101	9,360	8,433	1,997	637	33,861	44,928
Local Forces & Contingents	-	-	-	-	6,796	2,118	-	23,640 unclass.	32,554 7,756
Military Police	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	38,977
	2,686	6,769	30,045	39,500	37,719	11,256	3,404	211,926	311,038

\* Including the Company's European troops.

+ Including irregulars and local forces not designated in "forces" and "contingents".

Source: Military Handbook of General Information on India, compiled in the Division of the Chief of the Staff, Intelligence Branch (Simla, Government Press, 1908), p. 325.

## APPENDIX IX

STRENGTH AND DISTRIBUTION OF THE ARMY IN INDIA  
1887

	<u>British</u>					<u>Indian</u>				
	Cavalry	Artillery	Royal Engineer Officers	Infantry	Total	Cavalry	Artillery	Sappers & Miners	Infantry	Total
Bengal	3,786	7,084	203	34,442	45,515	15,202	1,508	1,438	58,944	77,092
Madras	2,524	1,658	35	11,143	15,360	2,146	271	1,495	28,737	32,649
Bombay	631	2,947	45	8,104	11,727	4,667	452	935	22,490	28,544
Hyderabad Contingent	-	-	-	-	-	2,000	536	-	5,004	7,540
Other local corps	-	-	-	-	-	1,598	-	-	5,669	7,267
<b>Total</b>	<b>6,941</b>	<b>11,689</b>	<b>283</b>	<b>53,689</b>	<b>72,602</b>	<b>25,613</b>	<b>2,767</b>	<b>3,868</b>	<b>120,844</b>	<b>153,092</b>

Grand Total, Army in India: 225,694

Source: The Army in India and its Evolution (Calcutta, Superintendent Government Printing, India, 1924), p. 197.

## APPENDIX X(a)

REGIONAL COMPOSITION OF THE INDIAN ARMY  
(percentage of total)

Years	Punjab, North-West Frontier & Kashmir	Nepal, Garhwal & Kumaon	North-East India, United Provinces & Bihar	South India	Burma
1856	less than 10	negligible	not less than 90	-	nil
1858	47	6	47	-	-
1883	48	17	35	-	-
1893	53	24	23	-	-
1905	47	15	22	16	-
1919	46	14.8	25.5	12	1.7
1930	58.5	22	11	5.5	3

Source: Dr B.R. Ambedkar, Pakistan or Partition of India (Bombay, Thacker & Co., Ltd., 3rd edition, 1946), p. 60.

## APPENDIX X(b)

COMMUNAL COMPOSITION OF THE INDIAN ARMY  
(percentage of total)

Area & Major Communities	1914	1918	1919	1930
1. Punjab, NWFP & Kashmir	47.0	46.5	46.0	58.5
a. Sikhs	19.2	17.4	15.4	13.58
b. Punjabi Moslems	11.1	11.3	12.4	22.6
c. Pathans	6.2	5.42	4.54	6.35
2. Nepal, Kumaon				
a. Garhwalis	15.0	16.6	12.2	16.4
b. Gurkhas	13.1	16.6	12.2	16.4
3. Upper India	22.0	22.7	25.5	11.0
a. UP Rajputs	6.4	6.8	7.7	2.55
b. Hindustani Mussalmans	4.1	3.42	4.45	nil
c. Brahmins	1.8	1.86	2.5	nil
4. South India	16.0	11.9	12.0	5.5
a. Marathas	4.9	3.85	3.7	5.33
b. Madrassi Mussalmans	3.5	2.71	2.13	nil
c. Tamils	2.5	2.0	1.67	nil
5. Burmans	nil	negligible	1.7	3.0

Source: Dr B.R. Ambedkar, Pakistan or Partition of India (Bombay, Thacker & Co., Ltd., 3rd edition, 1946), p. 65.

## APPENDIX X(c)

RECRUITMENT TO THE INDIAN ARMY IN WORLD WAR I

Province	Combatant Recruits Enlisted	Non-Combatant Recruits Enlisted	Total
Madras	51,223	41,117	92,340
Bombay	41,272	30,211	71,483
Bengal	7,117	51,935	59,052
United Provinces	163,578	117,565	281,143
Punjab	349,688	97,288	446,976
North-West Frontier	32,181	13,050	45,231
Baluchistan	1,761	327	2,088
Burma	14,094	4,579	18,673
Bihar & Orissa	8,576	32,976	41,552
Central Provinces	5,376	9,631	15,007
Assam	942	14,182	15,124
Ajmer-Merwara	7,341	1,632	8,973
Nepal	58,904	-	58,904
<b>Total</b>	<b>742,053</b>	<b>414,493</b>	<b>1,156,546</b>

Source: Dr B.R. Ambedkar, Pakistan or Partition of India  
(Bombay, Thacker & Co., Ltd., 3rd edition, 1946)  
p. 56.

Province	Population (millions)	Combatant Recruits Enlisted
Punjab	20	326,000
United Provinces	47	142,000
Madras	40	46,000
Bombay	20	36,000
North-West Frontier & Baluchistan	3	33,000
Burma	12	13,000
Bihar & Orissa	33	8,000
Bengal	45	7,000
Central Provinces	13	5,000
Assam	6	1,000
Ajmer	1/2	7,000
<b>Total</b>	<b>240</b>	<b>624,000</b>

Source: Report of the Army in India Committee 1919-1920,  
Part VI, p. 71.

## APPENDIX XI(a)

THE ARMED FORCES IN INDIA  
(31 October 1907)

		Northern Army	Southern Army	Bodyguards & Nepal Escorts	Total Actual Strengths
Regular Forces	British	41,243	32,616	-	78,859
	Indian	85,841	67,566	353	153,760
	Indian Army Reserves	18,346	12,644	-	30,990
	Volunteer Forces	17,269	17,721	-	34,990
	Volunteer Force Reserves	954	853	-	1,807
	Imperial Service Troops	8,579	11,899	-	20,478
	Military Police, Militia, Levies	13,967	17,181	-	31,148

Note: The Volunteers were organised in 81 different units. The military police consisted of the Military Police of the North-West Frontier Province, the Dera Ghazi Khan Military Police, the Burma Military Police (11 battalions in Upper Burma and 3 in Lower Burma), and 5 battalions of military police in Eastern Bengal and Assam. The militia/levies comprised 2 battalions of Khyber Rifles, 2 battalions of Kurram Militia, the North and South Waziristan Militia, the Zhob Levy Corps, Chitrali Scouts, Mehran Levy Corps and Samana Rifles.

Source: Military Handbook of General Information on India, compiled in the Division of the Chief of the Staff, Intelligence Branch (Simla, Government Press, 1908), pp. 347-8.



## APPENDIX XI(b)

DEPLOYMENT OF THE ARMED FORCES IN INDIA  
(1907)Northern Army

- 1st (Peshawar) Division - infantry brigades at Peshawar and Nowshera; cavalry brigade at Nowshera.
- 2nd (Rawalpindi) Division - mixed brigades at Rawalpindi, Jhelum, Abbottabad and Siakhot.
- 3rd (Lahore) Division - mixed brigades at Jullundur, Sirhind and Ferezpore; cavalry brigade at Ambala.
- 7th (Meerut) Division - mixed brigades at Garhwal and Bareilly; cavalry brigade at Meerut.
- 8th (Lucknow) Division - mixed brigades at Fyzabad and Allahabad; infantry brigade at Lucknow; the Assam brigade and the Presidency brigade.
- Independent frontier brigades at Kohat, Bannu and Derajat.

Southern Army

- 4th (Quetta) Division - infantry brigade at Quetta; mixed brigade at Karachi.
- 5th (Mhow) Division - mixed brigades at Jhansi, Nasirabad and Jubbulpore.
- 6th (Poona) Division - 1st and 2nd infantry brigades at Secunderabad; mixed brigade at Madras; infantry brigade and cavalry brigade at Bangalore; a Southern brigade.
- Burma - mixed brigades at Rangoon and Mandalay comprising a total of 2 companies of Royal Garrison Artillery, 2 batteries of Indian mountain artillery, 4 British and 7 Indian infantry battalions.
- Aden - a brigade comprised of 1/8 regiment of Indian cavalry, 3 companies of Royal Garrison Artillery, 1 company of sappers and miners, 1 British and 2 Indian infantry battalions.

Source: Military Handbook of General Information on India, compiled in the Division of the Chief of the Staff, Intelligence Branch (Simla, Government Press, 1908), pp. 337-8, 348.

## APPENDIX XII

ARMY IN INDIA 1914  
(exclusive of native artificers & followers)

	Northern		Southern		Total	
<u>British Army</u>						
Royal Artillery	7,973		7,796		15,769	
Cavalry	3,756		1,878		5,634	
Royal Engineers	213		111		324	
Infantry	28,948		24,798		53,746	
Indian Army, & c.	72		30		102	
<b>Total</b>	<b>40,962</b>		<b>34,613</b>		<b>75,575</b>	
<u>Indian Army</u>						
	<u>British</u>	<u>Indian</u>	<u>British</u>	<u>Indian</u>	<u>British</u>	<u>Indian</u>
Artillery	57	6,440	11	3,603	68	10,043
Cavalry	372	15,440	211	8,810	583	24,250
Infantry	1,095	65,688	930	54,304	2,025	119,992
Sappers, Miners, & c.	167	2,251	269	3,325	436	5,576
<b>Total</b>	<b>1,691</b>	<b>89,819</b>	<b>1,421</b>	<b>70,042</b>	<b>3,112</b>	<b>159,861</b>

Imperial Service Troops - 9,077 (Northern) and 11,992 (Southern)  
 Indian Reservists - 13,381 (Southern) and 22,743 (Northern)  
 Volunteer Force - 18,617 (Northern) and 20,853 (Southern)

Source: Whitaker's Almanac, 1915, p. 585.

## APPENDIX XIII

ACTUAL STRENGTH OF COMBATANT TROOPS OF THE ARMY IN INDIA, 1 SEPTEMBER 1923

	<u>British Army</u>			<u>Indian Army</u>			<u>Total</u>		<u>Grand Total</u>
	British	Indian	Total	British	Indian	Total	British	Indian	
Cavalry	4,811	-	4,811	288	10,879	11,167	5,099	10,879	15,978
Artillery	11,382	12,386	23,768	Inclu in figures for Br Army			11,382	12,386	23,768
Tank Corps	1,004	-	1,004	-	-	-	1,004	-	1,004
Sappers & Miners	-	-	-	297	7,586	7,883	297	7,586	7,883
Indian Signal Corps	-	-	-	2,221	3,152	5,373	2,221	3,152	5,373
Infantry	44,155	1,826	46,341	1,588	102,890	104,478	46,103	104,716	150,819
<b>Total</b>	<b>61,712</b>	<b>14,212</b>	<b>75,924</b>	<b>4,394</b>	<b>124,507</b>	<b>128,901</b>	<b>66,106</b>	<b>138,719</b>	<b>204,825</b>

Source: The Army in India and its Evolution (Calcutta, Superintendent Government Printing, India, 1924), p. 220.

## APPENDIX XIV

LIABILITY OF INDIA TO SUPPLY REINFORCEMENTS OUTSIDE INDIA

India Office, Whitehall, S.W. 1. 23 March 1937.

1. I am directed by the Secretary of State for India to invite attention to the fact that the Government of India have from time to time been asked by H.M. Government to prepare schemes for the reinforcement of certain places outside India and the potential commitments which they may be asked to discharge may be summarised as follows:-

Iranian oil-fields	..	1 Infantry Brigade
Singapore	..	1 Infantry Brigade
Hong Kong	..	2 Infantry Battalions
Egypt	..	2 Infantry Brigades
Burma	..	1 Infantry Brigade.

2. The Government of India have now suggested that the situation in regard to these schemes should be reviewed and that an indication should be given on the following points:-

(a) the schemes which it will now be necessary to maintain,

(b) the extent to which the schemes must be capable of being put into operation simultaneously.

3. It is suggested for the concurrence of the Army Council that the schemes should be classified into two main divisions as given below, and that the classification should be subject to periodical review by the Army Council.

(a) Plans to be maintained at such a degree of readiness that they could be put into effect at short notice.

It is suggested that under this heading the following might be included subject to confirmation and periodical review by the Army Council:-

Reinforcement of Singapore (Scheme M).

Defence of Anglo-Iranian Oilfields.

Scheme M (Emergency) for reinforcement of Singapore (Burma only).

(b) Plans for which reasonable warning can be anticipated.

Reinforcement of Hong Kong.

Reinforcement of Egypt.

Reinforcement of Burma.

A situation in any theatre in this category may deteriorate necessitating the desirability of the plan for reinforcement being transferred temporarily to category (a). Should such an eventuality appear imminent it is requested that early information should be afforded.

4. Finally, I am to invite attention to C.I.D. Paper No. 130-D, paragraph 44, governing the Government of India's commitments regarding the supply of reinforcements from India and the conclusion reached by H.M. Government (namely that the principle should be generally accepted that, except in the gravest emergency, the Army in India should be

employed outside the Indian Empire only after consultation with the Governor-General in Council), and to the understanding attached to India's acceptance of any commitments that troops can only be supplied by India provided the situation in India at the time permits.

R.C. Wilson

Source: Bisheshwar Prasad, Defence of India: Policy and Plans, Combined Inter-Services Historical Section, India and Pakistan (Orient Longmans, 1963), appendix I, pp. 241-2.

## APPENDIX XV

THE CHATFIELD COMMITTEE REPORT, 1938-39

## (A Summary)

The Committee proceeded on the assumption that 'a settled defence policy can and will be laid down, in accordance with the principle that responsibility for the defence of India rests...with the British Government and with no one else' and was of the view that there should be no 'whittling away of the responsibility of the British Government for the defence of India'.

The Committee advanced the view that the 'Major' and 'Minor' divisions of responsibility for Indian defence had been rendered obsolete by international developments. It declared that 'The arena of India's defence against external aggressions should therefore now be regarded as covering not only primarily her North-Western land frontier but also to an increasing extent her sea communications in Eastern waters and the strategic points which are vital to their security'. The Committee noted that this principle had been embodied in the naval agreement concluded in January 1938 and it recommended that India should acknowledge her external defence responsibilities and should bear the ordinary maintenance

costs of units designated for external employment in an emergency affecting her external security. The suggestions of the Pownall Sub-Committee that an Imperial division be set aside solely for Imperial use was negated by the Committee in favour of a policy whereby units designated for external employment would form an integral part of the forces in India as a whole, but would be equipped on a higher scale.

The Committee defined the basis of distribution of the Army in India as comprising frontier defence, internal security, coast defence, general reserve and external defence troops. It made specific proposals regarding the modernization of the army and it expressed the belief that the increased efficiency and mobility afforded thereby would permit of an approximate 25 per cent of the British troops in India to be shifted to the Home Establishment (while remaining in India) and a proportionately less, but absolute, reduction in the Indian component.

The Committee proposed that the re-equipment of the four bomber squadrons then in progress should be aided by a grant of about £1,700,000, and that the remaining RAF squadrons in India be re-equipped with Blenheims, Lysanders and Valentias. Measures were also to be effected to bring the stocks of stores for war requirements up to the requisite scale.



The Committee accepted the Nine Year Plan prepared by the Flag Officer Commanding, Royal Indian Navy<sup>1</sup>, except as regards the proposed loan of four minesweepers from the Royal Navy. It endorsed the proposal of the Auchinleck (Modernisation) Committee that two bomber squadrons be equipped for the dual role of frontier and coast defence, confirmed the proposals of the General Staff regarding the requirements of coast defence and anti-aircraft artillery<sup>2</sup>,

1

This plan proposed the construction of four 'Bittern' class escort vessels and four 'Mastiff' class trawlers, the loan from the Royal Navy of four 'Halycon' class minesweepers, and the re-arming of the sloops Indus and Hindustan - thus providing six sloops towards the protection of maritime communications and four minesweepers for keeping India's ports open. The plan also envisaged the taking up in wartime of 48 merchant vessels - 25 to be fitted out as auxiliary minesweepers and 23 to be fitted out as anti-submarine craft and distributed over all the major ports. Bisheshwar Prasad, Defence of India: Policy And Plans, Combined Inter-Services Historical Section, India and Pakistan (Orient Longmans, 1963), pp. 46-7.

2

The proposed installations (which were apparently set up in the early part of the war) comprised:

Bombay	- 2 7.5-inch guns, 2 6-inch (45°) guns, 3 6-inch (15°) guns, 4 H.D.C. lights and 8 3-inch AA guns.
Calcutta	- 2 6-inch (15°) guns, 2 H.D.C. lights and 6 3-inch AA guns.
Karachi	- 2 6-inch (45°) guns, 3 H.D.C. lights and 4 3-inch AA guns.
Cochin	- 2 6-inch (45°) guns, 3 H.D.C. lights and 4 3-inch AA guns.
Madras	- 2 6-inch (45°) guns, 3 H.D.C. lights, 4 3-inch AA guns.
Vizagapatam	- nil.

Ibid, p. 45.

and suggested the raising of five flights of aircraft on a voluntary basis to assist in the defence of the major ports.

The Committee proposed that India should be made self-sufficient in munitions required for war to the maximum possible extent. The existing factories were to be expanded and a new factory was to be constructed for the manufacture of TNT. The resources of private enterprise were to be drawn upon, but it was recognized that the existing state of industrial development in India necessitated that initial reliance for defence items be placed upon government factories.

It was estimated that the net capital cost of the measures proposed would total £34,33 millions. As such funds were not available in India, the Committee noted that the British Government was prepared to obtain parliamentary sanction for the provision of this sum from the Home Exchequer over a five-year period - the estimated time required to implement the non-naval aspects of the plan. Three-quarters of this sum would be provided as a free grant and the remaining one-quarter as a loan.

## APPENDIX XVI

THE SIZE AND COMPOSITION OF THE INDIAN ARMED FORCES  
IN AUGUST 19391. Army<sup>1</sup>

22 cavalry and armoured regiments including 4 Bodyguard units

4 batteries of field artillery

28 sapper and miner companies including field troops and divisional Headquarter companies

113 infantry battalions including 17 training battalions and Gurkha battalions but excluding 20 trainer companies of Gurkha Rifles

Personnel: 194,373 in India and overseas excluding Indian State Forces, auxiliary and reserve forces, all British other ranks and British officers in British service.

2. Navy<sup>2</sup>

5 sloops (2 of pre-1922 commission)

1 survey vessel

1 patrol vessel

1 steam trawler

Personnel: 19 Indian and 95 British commissioned officers, 25 Indian and 30 British warrant officers and 1,677 Indian ratings.

3. Air Force<sup>3</sup>

1 (incomplete) army co-operation squadron equipped with Wapiti aircraft

Personnel: 16 commissioned officers, 1 warrant officer, 268 other ranks and 1,343 persons in other categories.

Sources: 1 Nandan Prasad, Expansion of the Armed Forces and Defence Organisation 1939-45, Combined Inter-Services Historical Section, India and Pakistan (London, Orient Longmans, 1956), appendix I, p. 393.

2 Ibid, pp. 399 and 408-9.

3 Ibid, pp. 398-9 and 408-9.

## APPENDIX XVII

THE SIZE AND COMPOSITION OF THE INDIAN ARMED FORCES 19451. Army (August 1945)<sup>1</sup>

- 19 cavalry and armoured regiments including 2 Indian States Forces Regiments serving under the Crown.
- 207 batteries of artillery of all types
- 107 companies of Indian Engineers including field companies, field park companies and field squadrons but excluding all laundry, pipeline companies, etc.
- 268 battalions of infantry including 32 Indian States Forces and 8 Gurkha battalions serving under the Crown but excluding independent and garrison companies, etc.

Personnel: 2,065,554 including 16,351 of Indian State Forces serving overseas but excluding all British units as of 1 July 1945.

2. Navy (1 July 1945)<sup>2</sup> - includes ships in service and those about to be commissioned.

- 6 modern sloops
- 3 frigates
- 4 corvettes
- 4 'Bathurst' class minesweepers
- 13 'Bangor' class minesweepers
- 18 trawlers
- 4 motor minesweepers
- 1 landing ship infantry (large)
- 1 coastal force depot ship
- 4 old sloops
- 2 store ships
- 1 salvage vessel
- 4 old gunboats
- 1 mobile wiping and deperming unit
- 11 vessels of coastal forces organised in 3 flotillas
- 2 detached boats for anti-submarine and torpedo training
- 41 craft in the landing craft wing
- 4 LCA flotillas
- 3 LCW formations

Personnel: 30,478 excluding civilians and non-combatants.

3. Air Force (1 July 1945)<sup>3</sup>

- 3 fighter reconnaissance squadrons
- 2 ground attack squadrons
- 2 light bomber squadrons
- 2 fighter squadrons

Personnel: 29,201 officers, airmen and enrolled followers excluding civilians and temporary followers.

Sources: 1. Nandan Prasad, Expansion of the Armed Forces and Defence Organisation 1939-45, Combined Inter-Services Historical Section, India and Pakistan (London, Orient Longmans 1956), appendix 1, p. 399.

2. Ibid.

3. Ibid., pp. 398-9.

## APPENDIX XVIII(a)

INDIAN ARMY

Recruit Intake by Classes, 3 September 1939 - 31 August 1945

<u>Hindus</u>		<u>Mussalmans</u>	
Ahirs	38,150	Pathan	65,103
Assamese	2,772	Afridi	3,710
Bengalis	19,239	Bangach	2,685
Bhils	255	Khattahs	5,252
Brahmans	66,608	Orakzais	736
Chamars	7,453	Yusufzais	10,906
Dogras	29,944	Others	41,814
Garhwalis	18,932	Assamese	3,122
Gherts	358	Baluchis	1,195
Gujars	15,865	Bengalis	61,615
Gurkhas	109,702	Dekhani	19,354
Jats	71,339	Hazarwals	23,884
Kabirpanthis	454	Hindustani	27,638
Kolis	927	Madrassis	28,799
Kumaonis	20,110	Meos	2,757
Kumhars	1,129	Merats (Khatalis)	1,052
Lodhis (UP & CP)	1,366	Punjabi	314,356
Madrassis	302,732	Raj & C.I.	9,852
Mahars	10,059	Ranghars	7,581
Mahrattas	58,421	Others	51,045
Meghs	310	<u>Total</u>	<u>617,353</u>
Mers (Rawats)	2,309	<u>Christians</u>	
Minas	1,608	Assamese	1,073
Oriyas	1,920	Madrassis	59,946
Rajputs	73,121	Others	39,216
Shilpkars	1,469	<u>Total</u>	<u>100,235</u>
Others	208,284	<u>Miscellaneous</u>	
<u>Total</u>	<u>1,064,836</u>	Hos	1,009
<u>Sikhs</u>		Mundas	479
Jats	44,751	Oraons	372
M & R	33,244	Santhals	288
Others	34,383	Others	141,031
<u>Total</u>	<u>112,378</u>	<u>Total</u>	<u>143,199</u>

Source: Nandan Prasad, Expansion of the Armed Forces and Defence Organisation 1939-45, Combined Inter-Services Historical Section, India and Pakistan (London, Orient Longmans 1956), appendix 13, p. 460.

## APPENDIX XVIII(b)

ROYAL INDIAN AIR FORCE

## Recruit Intake by Province and State of Origin World War II

Province

Assam	772
Baluchistan	50
Bihar & Orissa	1895
Bengal	5888
Bombay	4473
Central Provinces & Berar	1761
Delhi	340
Madras	10711
North-West Frontier Province	479
Punjab	7159
Sind	173
United Provinces	22946

State

Cochin	679
Gwalior	71
Hyderabad	671
Indore	41
Jammu & Kashmir	249
Mysore	778
Travancore	2885
Other Indian States	826

Burma	8
Ceylon	9
Goa	8
South Africa	2

Grand Total	42874
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Source: Nandan Prasad, Expansion of the Armed Forces and Defence Organisation, Combined Inter-Services Historical Section, India and Pakistan (London, Orient Longmans 1956), appendix 14, p. 461.

## APPENDIX XVIII(c)

ROYAL INDIAN NAVY

Provincial and Communal Origin of Ratings as of 15 August 1945

<u>Provincial Origin</u>		<u>Communal Origin</u>	
Punjab	4990	Hindus	9448
Bombay	1890	Moslems	7843
Madras	5888	Christians	4548
Goa & Portuguese India	178	Pathans	475
North-West Frontier Province	693	Rajputs	347
United Provinces	1687	Sikhs	342
Travancore	2152	Anglo-Indians	307
Central Provinces & Berar	295	Mahrattas	202
Bengal	2668	Parsees	26
Kashmir	292	Buddhists	17
Rajputana	208	Jews	7
Sind	75	Gurkhas	5
Assam	282		
Delhi	150		
Bihar & Orissa	430		
Cochin	493		
Hyderabad	340		
Mysore	187		
Others	669		
<b>Total</b>	<b>23567</b>	<b>Total</b>	<b>23567</b>

Source: Nandan Prasad, Expansion of the Armed Forces and Defence Organisation, Combined Inter-Services Historical Section, India and Pakistan (London, Orient Longmans 1956), appendix 9, p. 456.

## APPENDIX XIX(a)

BRITISH PLANNING FOR INDIA'S POSTWAR DEFENCE FORCES

Demobilisation planning began in August 1942. At the request of the Adjutant-General, a meeting was held on 7 August 1942 which was attended by the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Department of Defence. It was concluded that India would require an army of about 250,000 men for interim postwar defence, with a further 150,000 needed for overseas garrisons.

The first major step in fixing demobilisation targets was taken in January 1944, at which time the Commander-in-Chief directed the Chiefs of Staff Committee to prepare a paper defining the size and composition of the defence forces required for India after the cessation of the war with the Axis powers. The appreciation was to be based upon the following assumptions:

- a) no constitutional change had occurred in India which affected the status or composition of the defence forces.
- b) Burma would remain independent of India and was unlikely to have forces beyond her needs of internal security for many years to come.
- c) The problems of internal security and of the North-West Frontier had undergone no radical change.
- d) India would be responsible for maintaining land and air forces adequate to defend itself against a minor power and against a major power until such time as Imperial reinforcements could arrive. Naval forces would be limited to those needed for local naval



defence and to assist in the protection of trade in the Indian Ocean.

- e) India was responsible for maintaining an external defence force based on the principles proposed by the Chatfield Committee and accepted by His Majesty's Government and the Government of India in 1939.
- f) Japan would present no threat to India.
- g) Russia would remain in friendly relations with Britain and the United States, preoccupied with internal reconstruction and unlikely to threaten India except by subversive means for some years. It would, however, retain a considerable measure of control in northern Iran.
- h) China would have acquired sufficient military equipment from the United States to maintain a considerable regular force.

The Chiefs of Staff Committee submitted its report on the size and composition of the postwar forces in India in March 1944. It based its recommendations on the following appreciation of the postwar situation:

- a) A threat from Afghanistan was unlikely if India maintained adequate forces, but the border tribals would create trouble if conditions in India were unsettled.
- b) Relations with the Soviet Union and China were likely to be generally friendly. However, after a few years when their shattered economies were rehabilitated, aggression from them could not be ruled out.
- c) India would remain responsible for internal security, for defence against a minor power, and for defence against a major power until Imperial reinforcements could arrive.
- d) India would provide the greater part of the garrisons for South-East Asia Command areas (i.e. Burma, Malaya and Siam) and Indian forces might be needed

for some time in Persia and Iraq Command and in the Middle East area.

e) Internal security would be a difficult problem.

The Committee concluded that, in the immediate postwar period, army requirements would total nine infantry divisions, five infantry brigade groups, 113 infantry battalions and 22 garrison companies. The forces needed for internal security were estimated as 63 infantry battalions, 22 garrison companies and 6 battalions of special armed constabulary. The permanent North-West Frontier garrison was estimated at 50 infantry battalions organised in brigade groups in accordance with tactical needs, plus a divisional HQ equivalent to 5 infantry brigades with supporting arms, ancillary troops and an armoured element. These forces included immediate reserves for the North-West Frontier garrison. The garrisons for occupied countries, which would later be available for meeting a major threat, were estimated at 7 infantry divisions - 3 in Burma, 1 in Malaya, 1 in Siam and 2 in PAIC/Middle East. Two infantry divisions were allotted as general reserve.

The role of the Indian Navy was defined as to ensure the defence of bases and the security of coastal shipping against submarine, mining and air attack and to assist in the protection of ocean shipping. The establishment envisaged by the Committee to fulfill this role comprised one

cruiser squadron of three ships; one flotilla of nine destroyers; one flotilla of eight miscellaneous ships (motor minesweepers, 'Bangor/Bathurst' minesweepers for training reservists and frigates for miscellaneous duties); three flotillas of coastal craft; two surveying vessels, auxiliaries and trawlers; a nucleus of assault ships and craft; and one repair ship.

The role of the Indian Air Force was defined as tribal control on the North-West Frontier, air transport primarily for internal security, defence of the North-West and North-East frontiers, seaward reconnaissance, shipping protection and cooperation with the navy. The establishment envisaged to fulfill this role was estimated by the Committee as: 7 squadrons for tribal control; 5 squadrons for internal security; 3 squadrons for the North-East Frontier; and 21 squadrons to form a nucleus for expansion in case of a major threat of war.

The report of the Committee was accepted by the Indian Government as a useful foundation for further detailed study of the question.

In a further report submitted in April 1945, the Chiefs of Staff proposed force levels for the immediate postwar period (designated as the 'upper limit'), and for the ultimate postwar military establishment in India (the 'lower

limit'). The cost of the 'lower limit' was estimated by the Financial Adviser at Rs 130 crores for 'effective charges' (navy, Rs 6-10 crores; army, Rs 80 crores; air force, Rs 42 crores) and Rs 15 crores for 'non-effective charges'. A rough estimate of India's stabilised postwar budget prepared by the Financial Adviser, the Finance Member and the Finance Department, however, had allotted only Rs 70-75 crores for defence and the Financial Adviser accordingly recommended a drastic cut in the 'lower limit'. Acting on this proposal, the Commander-in-Chief issued a directive to the Chiefs of Staff on 24 April 1945 to ascertain the minimum needs required by India for local defence; i.e., to maintain law and order in India, to maintain order among the tribes and peoples of the North-West and North-East frontiers, to conduct war with Afghanistan (neither side having allies), and to protect India's coasts, coastal merchant shipping and fisheries.

The Chiefs of Staff effected further reductions by omitting all landing craft and reducing the number of sloops and frigates for the navy; by reducing the army establishment by three infantry divisions and an armoured brigade; and by omitting the nucleus aircraft previously allotted to the air force for meeting a major threat. The proposals of the Chiefs of Staff for the 'lowest limit' were accepted by the

Commander-in Chief's War Committee on 12 June 1945, but it was generally realised that this 'lowest limit' was based largely upon financial considerations and represented, in no sense, a military recommendation. The cost estimates of the three levels ('effective expenditure') were (crores of rupees):

	<u>Royal Indian Navy</u>	<u>Army</u>	<u>RIAF</u>	<u>Total</u>
upper limit	10	120	54	184
lower limit	6	80	42	128
lowest limit	5	62	23	98

Source: S.V. Desika Char, "Planning for the Post-War Defence Forces" in Nandan Prasad, Expansion of the Armed Forces and Defence Organisation 1939-45, Combined Services Historical Section, India and Pakistan (London, Orient Longmans, 1956), pp. 196-206.

270

APPENDIX XIX(b)  
POSTWAR PLANNING  
(as of 12 June 1945)

	Upper Limit	Lower Limit	Lowest Limit
<b>1. Navy</b>			
cruisers	-	3	3
sloops	7	8	6
frigates	9+	8(4)	8(5)
corvettes	3	-	-
minesweepers	16	16(8)	16(8)
trawlers	20	11(6)	11(6)
motor minesweepers	10	8(4)	8(8)
hulks for reserve training	2	2	-
HDMLs	27	8	8
MLs	27	-	-
depot ship	1	-	-
sea-going training ships	6	1	1
landing ships (all types)	194	71	-
landing ships	3	2	-
<p>Note: Figures in brackets show the number of vessels included in totals but to be held in reserve:  + includes survey ships.</p>			
<b>2. Air Force</b>			
transport	15	7	7
tac recc, fighter recc or g/a	13	8	6
fighter	12	12	2
photo/recc flight	2	1	-
light or fighter/bomber	3	3	2
heavy bomber	4	4	-
long range general recc	2	2	2
Total squadrons and flights	51	37	19 (later 19½)

3. Army

frontier defence	50 bns in bde gps	11 bns in 4 bde gps	11 bns in 4 bde gps
frontier defence reserve	5 bde gps & armoured element	++	++
internal security	63 bns	++	++
Corps HQ corps troops	2	2	2
infantry divisions	10	9 & 12 bns	6 & 12 bns
armoured divisions	1	1	1
armoured brigades	1	2	1
airborne divisions	1	-	-
parachute brigade groups	-	1	1

Note: ++ denotes frontier defence reserve and internal security troops included in formations.

Source: S.V. Desika Char, "Planning For The Post-War Defence Forces" in Nandan Prasad, Expansion of the Armed Forces and Defence Organisation 1939-45, Combined Inter-Services Historical Section, India and Pakistan (London, Orient Longmans 1956), appendix 17, p. 464 (navy); p. 465 (air force); p. 464 (army).

## APPENDIX XX

Excerpts from "The Defence of India" by Jawaharlal Nehru, published in Young India, September 24 and October 1, 1931.

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'The strength of a country in defence is always relative to the strength of other countries and to the world situation. No country in the world, with the possible exception of the United States of America, can withstand a combination of powers. Apart from half a dozen great powers every other country is weak as compared to them. Many countries, like Czechoslovakia, Poland, Austria and the Balkan states, can be crushed easily by any one great power. But they retain their independence because of the rivalry of others. India's position is far stronger. Geographically she is as safe as almost any country, and politically the world situation favours her and makes an invasion of her extremely unlikely.

'If the domination of England over India ceases and India becomes free, what will be the reaction of other powers? It may be that some will covet her, but the master desire will be to prevent any other nation from possessing India. No country will tolerate the idea of another gaining dominion over India and thus acquiring the commanding position which England occupied for so long. If any power was covetous enough to make the attempt, all the others would



combine to prevent this and to trounce the intruder. This mutual rivalry would in itself be the surest guarantee against an attack on India.

'But let us examine this question further. What country would threaten us? The countries of Western Europe are too much involved in their mutual hates and jealousies to trouble us much. The United States of America is too far away for effective action. Japan has her hands full with the new developments in China and the latest, and sometimes apparent, hostility of the United States. In any event, the Western European powers will not permit her to embark on any such adventure. China will have to face her own great difficulties for a long time to come and, besides, it is difficult to imagine that our relations with her will be anything but friendly. Thus no danger threatens us from any of these countries. There remain for consideration two countries, the little state of Afghanistan and Russia.

'Afghanistan in the past has had the closest bonds with India and it should be our endeavour to revive them. Even if we do not succeed in doing so, we have little to fear from her. The strength of her people lies in defence in their mountain fortresses and not in serious attack. Her people are brave fighters, but their resources are very limited. She is having her own troubles and wants peace to

develop her resources and consolidate her position. But at the worst, if war came, it is quite possible that she may carry a number of successful raids before we can defeat and hold her in check. It is not conceivable that Afghanistan can succeed ultimately against us.

Russia then remains the sole country that may threaten our freedom. She is grown and is in a favourable position to attack us. But it is a well-known fact that although she is strong and almost invulnerable in defence, she is weak in attack. The Soviet Government has made good against a host of external enemies and an abundance of difficulty and misfortune at home. These difficulties and enmities continue and it is exceedingly unlikely that it will embark on an aggressive campaign with so many dangers to face at home and abroad. Such a venture would inevitably expose Russia's flanks to a host of enemies who have long been waiting for a chance to swoop down on her. In spite of her growing strength and self-confidence Russia is haunted by the fear of combinations against her in Western Europe and she dare not imperil her existence by attacking India and having her long frontiers exposed.

It is notorious that Russia is full today of her Five Year Plan. She can think of nothing else, except the building up of her industries and utilising her resources to the

full. Probably the Five Year Plan may be followed by another, requiring a similar expenditure of energy.

'There is also no economic urge for Russia to covet India. Both countries are still mainly agricultural and are being industrialised. Both have enough raw materials and need capital and machinery and experts. They are too similar to be of much help to each other. India has been and is useful to England because the latter is highly industrialised and has a great deal of surplus capital. Russia has no such capital and will not have it for a long time.

'There has been traditional rivalry between England and Russia for generations past and, under English influence, we have been made to fear the bogey of a Russian invasion. Why should we inherit this hate and fear of Russia from England? It does not concern us. Russia will have nothing to fear from a free India and we need have no fear of her. The danger from Russia, such as there is, is caused solely by this rivalry between her and England. It ceases for us as soon as British domination is removed and we are free. Our position thus, in a military sense, is better and stronger as an independent country than it would be if we continued to be involved in British imperial policy.

'We are inevitably led to the conclusion that the position of Free India in the world would be a favourable

one and the chances of external attack on her are remote. But none the less we have to prepare for all contingencies and devote ourselves to the speedy reconstruction of our defence forces.'

Source: Bimla Prasad, The Origins of Indian Foreign Policy (Calcutta, Bookland Private Limited), appendix II, pp. 281-3.

## APPENDIX XXI

ACTUAL STRENGTH OF THE ARMED FORCES  
July 1945 - July 1947

	Indian Army	British Army	RIN	Air Forces in India & ALFSEA (RAF & RIAF)	Indian States Forces Units in India Command, ALFSEA & Overseas
1 July 1945	2,049,203 100%	226,130 100%	37,863 100%	207,632 100%	41,463 100%
1 October 1945	2,015,763 98.3%	249,632 110.4%	37,109 98%	211,955 102%	41,304 99.6%
1 January 1946	1,835,812 89.5%	239,472 106%	31,261 82.5%	214,902 103.5%	32,013 77.2%
1 April 1946	1,682,773 82.1%	197,897 87.5%	23,960 63%	188,463 90.7%	17,313 4.17%
1 July 1946	1,363,486 66.5%	149,322 66.0%	19,882 52.5%	137,076 66.0%	7,788 18.7%
1 October 1946	1,128,588 55.0%	118,176 52.3%	18,109 47.8%	58,324 28.0%	4,582 11.0%
1 January 1947	883,692 43.1%	48,485 21.5%	16,821 44.4%	49,666 23.9%	2,101 5.0%
1 April 1947	624,013 30.4%	37,983 16.7%	15,838 41.0%	39,063 18.8%	-
1 July 1947	507,422 24.2%	29,972 13.2%	15,001 39.6%	33,463 16.1%	-

Note: These figures include all ranks and categories, including enrolled and unenrolled non-combatants.

Source: Nandan Prasad, Expansion of the Armed Forces and Defence Organisation 1939-45, Combined Inter-Services Historical Section, India and Pakistan (London, Orient Longmans 1956), p. 215.

## APPENDIX XXII

### THE TEXT OF THE INDIA-SIKKIM PEACE TREATY ISSUED IN GANGTOK ON DECEMBER 5, 1950

The President of India and His Highness the Maharaja of Sikkim, being desirous of further strengthening the good relations already existing between India and Sikkim, have resolved to enter into a new Treaty with each other, and the President of India has, for the purpose, appointed as his plenipotentiary Shri Harishwar Dayal, Political Officer in Sikkim, and His Highness the Maharaja having examined Shri Harishwar Dayal's credentials and found them good and in due form, the two have agreed as follows:-

#### Article I

All previous treaties between the British Government and Sikkim which are at present in force as between India and Sikkim are hereby formally cancelled.

#### Article II

Sikkim shall continue to be a Protectorate of India and, subject to the provisions of this Treaty, shall enjoy autonomy in regard to its internal affairs.

#### Article III

(1) The Government of India will be responsible for the defence and territorial integrity of Sikkim. It shall have the right to take such measures as it considers necessary for the defence of Sikkim or the security of India, whether

preparatory or otherwise, and whether within or outside Sikkim. In particular, the Government of India shall have the right to station troops anywhere within Sikkim.

(2) The measures referred to in paragraph (1) will as far as possible be taken by the Government in consultation with the Government of Sikkim.

(3) The Government of Sikkim shall not import any arms, ammunition, military stores or other warlike material of any description for any purpose whatsoever without the previous consent of the Government of India.

#### Article IV

(1) The external relations of Sikkim, whether political, economic or financial, shall be conducted and regulated solely by the Government of India; and the Government of Sikkim shall have no dealings with any foreign power.

(2) Subjects of Sikkim travelling to foreign countries shall be treated as Indian protected persons for the purpose of passports, and shall receive from Indian representatives abroad the same protection and facilities as Indian nationals.

#### Article V

The Government of Sikkim agrees not to levy any import duty, transit duty or other impost on goods brought into, or in transit through, Sikkim; and the Government of India

agrees not to levy any import or other duty on goods of Sikkimese origin brought into India from Sikkim.

Article VI

(1) The Government of India shall have the exclusive right of constructing, maintaining and regulating the use of railways, aerodromes and landing grounds and air navigation facilities, posts, telegraphs, telephones and wireless installations in Sikkim; and the Government of Sikkim shall render the Government of India every assistance in their construction, maintenance and protection.

(2) The Government of Sikkim may, however, construct, maintain, and regulate the use of, railways and aerodromes and landing grounds and air navigation facilities to such extent as may be agreed to by the Government of India.

(3) The Government of India shall have the right to construct and maintain in Sikkim roads for strategic purposes and for the purpose of improving communications with India and other adjoining countries and the Government of Sikkim shall render the Government of India every assistance in the construction, maintenance and protection of such roads.

Article VII

(1) Subjects of Sikkim shall have the right of entry into, and free movement within, India, and Indian nationals shall have the right of entry into, and free movement within, Sikkim.



(2) Subject to such regulations as the Government of Sikkim may prescribe in consultation with the Government of India, Indian nationals shall have:-

(a) the right to carry on trade and commerce in Sikkim; and

(b) when established in any trade in Sikkim, the right to acquire, hold and dispose of any property, movable or immovable, for the purposes of their trade or residence in Sikkim.

(3) Subjects of Sikkim shall have the same right -

(a) to carry on trade and commerce in India, and to employment therein; and

(b) of acquiring, holding and disposing of property, movable and immovable, as Indian nationals.

#### Article VIII

(1) Indian nationals within Sikkim shall be subject to the laws of Sikkim and subjects of Sikkim within India shall be subject to the laws of India.

(2) Whenever any criminal proceedings are initiated in Sikkim against any Indian national or any person in the service of the Government of India or any foreigner, the Government of Sikkim shall furnish the Representative of the Government of India in Sikkim (hereinafter referred to as the Indian Representative) with particulars of charges against such person.

If in the case of any person in the service of the Government of India or any foreigner it is so demanded by the Indian Representative, such person shall be handed over to him for trial before such court as may be established for the purpose by the Government of India either in Sikkim or outside.

#### Article IX

(1) The Government of Sikkim agrees to seize and deliver up any fugitive offender from outside Sikkim who has taken refuge therein on demand being made by the Indian Representative. Should any delay occur in complying with such demand, the Indian police may follow the person whose surrender has been demanded into any part of Sikkim, and shall, on showing a warrant signed by the Indian Representative, receive every assistance and protection in the prosecution of their object from the Sikkim officers.

(2) The Government of India similarly agrees, on demand being made by the Government of Sikkim, to take extradition proceedings against, and surrender, any fugitive offender from Sikkim who has taken refuge in the territory of India.

(3) In this Article, "fugitive offender" means a person who is accused of having committed an extradition offence as defined in the First Schedule to the Indian Extradition Act, 1903, or any other offence which may hereafter be agreed

upon between the Government of India and the Government of Sikkim as being an extradition offence.

#### Article X

The Government of India, having in mind the friendly relations already existing between India and Sikkim and now further strengthened by this Treaty, and being desirous of assisting in the development and good administration of Sikkim, agrees to pay the Government of Sikkim a sum of rupees three lakhs every year so long as the terms of this Treaty are duly observed by the Government of Sikkim.

The first payment under this Article will be made before the end of the year 1950, and subsequent payments will be made in the month of August every year.

#### Article XI

The Government of India shall have the right to appoint a Representative to reside in Sikkim; and the Government of Sikkim shall provide him and his staff with all reasonable facilities in regard to their residential and office accommodation and generally in regard to their carrying out their duties in Sikkim.

#### Article XII

If any dispute arises in the interpretation of the provisions of this Treaty which cannot be resolved by mutual consultation, the dispute shall be referred to the Chief

Justice of India whose decision thereon shall be final.

Article XIII

This Treaty shall come into force without ratification from the date of signature by both the parties.

Source: Foreign Policy of India: Texts of Documents 1947-59  
(G.O.I. Lok Sabha Secretariat, New Delhi, 2nd edition, December 1959), pp. 37-40.

APPENDIX XXIII

THE TEXT OF THE INDO-BHUTAN TREATY SIGNED AT  
DARJEELING ON AUGUST 8, 1949.

The Government of India on the one part, and His Highness the Druk Gyalpo's Government on the other part, equally animated by the desire to regulate in a friendly manner and upon a solid and durable basis the state of affairs caused by the termination of the British Government's authority in India, and to promote and foster the relations of friendship and neighbourliness so necessary for the well-being of their peoples, have resolved to conclude the following treaty, and have, for this purpose named their representatives, that is to say Sri Harishwar Dayal representing the Government of India, who has full powers to agree to the said treaty on behalf of the Government of India, and Deb Zimpon Sonam, Tobgye Dorji, Yang-Lop Sonam, Chho-Zim Thondup, Rin-Zim Tandin and Ha Drung Jigmie Palden Dorji, representing the Government of His Highness the Druk Gyalpo, Maharaja of Bhutan, who have full powers to agree to the same on behalf of the Government of Bhutan.

Article I

There shall be perpetual peace and friendship between the Government of India and the Government of Bhutan.

Article II

The Government of India undertakes to exercise no

interference in the internal administration of Bhutan. On its part the Government of Bhutan agrees to be guided by the advice of the Government of India in regard to its external relations.

### Article III

In place of the compensation granted to the Government of Bhutan under Article 4 of the Treaty of Sinchula and enhanced by the treaty of the eighth day of January 1910 and the temporary subsidy of Rupees one lakh per annum granted in 1942, the Government of India agrees to make an annual payment of Rupees five lakhs to the Government of Bhutan. And it is further hereby agreed that the said annual payment shall be made on the tenth day of January every year, the first payment being made on the tenth day of January 1950. This payment shall continue so long as this treaty remains in force and its terms are duly observed.

### Article IV

Further to mark the friendship existing and continuing between the said Governments, the Government of India shall, within one year from the date of signature of this treaty, return to the Government of Bhutan about thirty-two square miles of territory in the area known as Dewangiri. The Government of India shall appoint a competent officer or officers to mark out the area so returned to the Government of Bhutan.

Article V

There shall, as heretofore, be free trade and commerce between the territories of the Government of India and of the Government of Bhutan; and the Government of India agrees to grant the Government of Bhutan every facility for the carriage, by land and water, of its produce throughout the territory of the Government of India, including the right to use such forest roads as may be specified by mutual agreement from time to time.

Article VI

The Government of India agrees that the Government of Bhutan shall be free to import with the assistance and approval of the Government of India, from or through India into Bhutan, whatever arms, ammunition, machinery, warlike material or stores may be required or desired for the strength and welfare of Bhutan, and that this arrangement shall hold good for all time as long as the Government of India is satisfied that the intentions of the Government of Bhutan are friendly and that there is no danger to India from such importations. The Government of Bhutan, on the other hand, agrees that there shall be no export of such arms, ammunition, etc., across the frontier of Bhutan either by the Government of Bhutan or by private individuals.

Article VII

The Government of India and the Government of Bhutan agree that Bhutanese subjects residing in Indian territories shall have equal justice with Indian subjects, and that Indian subjects residing in Bhutan shall have equal justice with the subjects of the Government of Bhutan.

Article VIII

(1) The Government of India shall, on demand being duly made in writing by the Government of Bhutan, take proceedings in accordance with the provisions of the Indian Extradition Act, 1903 (of which a copy shall be furnished to the Government of Bhutan), for the surrender of all Bhutanese subjects accused of any of the crimes specified in the first schedule of the said Act who may take refuge in Indian territory.

(2) The Government of Bhutan shall, on requisition being duly made by the Government of India, or by any officer authorised by the Government of India in this behalf, surrender any Indian subjects, or subjects of a foreign power, whose extradition may be required in pursuance of any agreement or arrangements made by the Government of India with the said power, accused of any of the crimes, specified in the first schedule of Act XV of 1903, who may take refuge in the territory under the jurisdiction of the Government of Bhutan, and also any Bhutanese subjects who, after committing



any of the crimes referred to in Indian territory, shall flee into Bhutan, on such evidence of their guilt being produced as shall satisfy the local court of the district in which the offence may have been committed.

#### Article IX

Any differences and disputes arising in the application or interpretation of this treaty shall in the first instance be settled by negotiation. If within three months of the start of negotiations no settlement is arrived at, then the matter shall be referred to the Arbitration of three arbitrators, who shall be nationals of either India or Bhutan, chosen in the following manner:-

- (1) One person nominated by the Government of India;
- (2) One person nominated by the Government of Bhutan;
- (3) A Judge of the Federal Court, or of a High Court in India, to be chosen by the Government of Bhutan, who shall be Chairman.

The judgment of this Tribunal shall be final and executed without delay by either party.

#### Article X

This treaty shall continue in force in perpetuity unless terminated or modified by mutual consent.

Done in duplicate at Darjeeling this eighth day of August, one thousand nine hundred and fortynine, corresponding

with the Bhutanese date the fifteenth day of the sixth month of the Earth-Bull year.

**Source:** Foreign Policy of India: Texts of Documents 1947-59  
(G.O.I. Lok Sabha Secretariat, New Delhi, 2nd edition, December 1959), pp. 17-19.

APPENDIX XXIV

THE TEXT OF THE INDO-NEPALESE TREATY OF PEACE AND  
FRIENDSHIP ISSUED IN KHATMANDU ON JULY 31, 1950

The Government of India and the Government of Nepal,  
recognising the ancient ties which have happily existed between the two countries for centuries;

Desiring still further to strengthen and develop these ties and to perpetuate peace between the two countries;

Have resolved therefore to enter into a treaty of Peace and Friendship with each other, and have, for this purpose, appointed as their plenipotentiaries the following persons, namely,

THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA:

HIS EXCELLENCY SHRI CHANDRESHWAR PRASAD NARAIN SINGH,  
Ambassador of India in Nepal.

THE GOVERNMENT OF NEPAL:

MOHUN SHAMSHER JANG BAHADUR RANA, Maharaja, Prime Minister and Supreme Commander-in-Chief of Nepal,  
who, having examined each other's credentials and found them good and in due form have agreed as follows:

Article I

There shall be everlasting peace and friendship between the Government of India and the Government of Nepal. The two Governments agree mutually to acknowledge and respect the complete sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence of each other.

## Article II

The two Governments hereby undertake to inform each other of any serious friction or misunderstanding with any neighbouring state likely to cause any breach in the friendly relations subsisting between the two Governments.

## Article III

In order to establish and maintain the relations referred to in Article I the two governments agree to continue diplomatic relations with each other by means of representatives with such staff as is necessary for the due performance of their functions.

The representatives and such of their staff as may be agreed upon shall enjoy such diplomatic privileges and immunities as are customarily granted by international law on a reciprocal basis:

Provided that in no case shall these be less than those granted to persons of a similar status of any other State having diplomatic relations with either Government.

## Article IV

The two Governments agree to appoint Consuls-General, Consuls, Vice-Consuls and other consular agents, who shall reside in towns, ports and other places in each other's territory as may be agreed to.

Consuls-General, Consuls, Vice-Consuls and consular agents shall be provided with exequaturs or other valid

authorization of their appointment. Such exequator or authorization is liable to be withdrawn by the country which issued it, if considered necessary. The reasons for the withdrawal shall be indicated wherever possible.

The persons mentioned above shall enjoy on a reciprocal basis all the rights, privileges, exemptions and immunities that are accorded to persons of corresponding status of any other State.

#### Article V

The Government of Nepal shall be free to import, from or through the territory of India, arms, ammunition or war-like material and equipment necessary for the security of Nepal. The procedure for giving effect to this arrangement shall be worked out by the two Governments acting in consultation.

#### Article VI

Each Government undertakes, in token of the neighbourly friendship between India and Nepal, to give to the nationals of the other, in its territory, national treatment with regard to participation in industrial and economic development of such territory and to the grant of concessions and contracts relating to such development.

#### Article VII

The Governments of India and Nepal agree to grant, on a

reciprocal basis, to the nationals of one country in the territories of the other the same privileges in the matter of residence, ownership of property, participation in trade and commerce, movement and other privileges of a similar nature.

Article VIII

So far as matters dealt with herein are concerned, this Treaty cancels all previous treaties, agreements and arrangements entered into on behalf of India between the British Government and the Government of Nepal.

Article IX

This Treaty shall come into force from the date of signature by both Governments.

Article X

This Treaty shall remain in force until it is terminated by either party by giving one year's notice.

Source: Foreign Policy of India: Texts of Documents 1947-59  
(G.O.I. Lok Sabha Secretariat, New Delhi, 2nd edition, December 1959), pp. 31-3.

## APPENDIX XXV

### HIGHER DEFENCE ORGANIZATION

The executive management of Indian defence is characterized by a hierarchical structure of committees arranged in the classic pyramid based on the three Services with Cabinet constituting the apex. A superimposed conciliar structure provides a formal means for lateral communication among officials at similar levels in different hierarchies, but the vertical 'superior-subordinate' relationship constitutes the 'skeleton'. It is within this system that the three Services struggle concurrently against each other and against budgetary pressures from Finance and an economy-minded Administration.

This committee system of policy management evolved largely ad hoc after independence. The 14 high-powered defence committees in existence in 1948-49 had, by 1958, increased to 48 but the core continued to be constituted by six committees. The composition and responsibilities of these six committees may be briefly noted.

The Chiefs of Staff committee is comprised of the three Service Chiefs. It is the only purely professional body but its functions are merely advisory with no powers of decision.

The Defence Minister's Army, Navy and Air Force Committees are comprised of the Defence Minister as Chairman and the two Deputy Defence Ministers, the concerned Service Chief, the Defence Secretary and the Financial Adviser (Defence) as members. These three committees deal with matters peculiar to each Service but having no direct bearing on the other Services.


The Defence Minister's (Inter-Services) Committee is comprised of the Defence Minister as Chairman and the two Deputy Defence Ministers, the three Service Chiefs, Defence Secretary, Financial Adviser (Defence) and the Scientific Adviser as members. This committee deals with all important matters of joint concern to any two or all three Services and its decisions are final and binding on all concerned. Where particular policy issues are involved, the committee submits its records to the DCC for consideration.

The Defence Committee of Cabinet consists of the Prime Minister as Chairman, the Ministers of Defence, Finance, Home Affairs and Transport as members with the three Service Chiefs, Defence Secretary and Financial Adviser in attendance. It is the highest policy-making body for all practical purposes but, as a committee off Cabinet, it may refer certain issues to the full Cabinet for confirmation.



Map A

The Himalayan Region





Map B - The North-Eastern Frontier Agency

92°

94°

96°

2

KEY TO MAP

- International Boundary (Chinese Version).
- The McMahon Line.
- ..... McMahon Line (Chinese Version).
- Frontier Divisions.
- Frontier Division Headquarters.
- Town or Village.

T I B E T

YALU TSANGPO RIVER

Kangri Karpo Pass

Bruni  
MISHMI  
HILLS

Tamaden

Migyitun

(SIANG F D)

(LOHIT F D)

Longju

Roi Village

ABOR  
HILLS

Amili

Tsayul

Dong

Diphu Pass

MIRI  
HILLS

Along

Dening

Walong

Teju

Tsona Dzong

(SUBANSIRI F D)

Sadiya

(TIRAP F D)

Thag La

Khinzemane

Chedong

Taksang Gompa

Chemo Karpo La

Tawang (KAMENG F D)

Ziro

Dibrugarh

BHUTAN

Bomdila

Dirang Tsong

Khela

BURMA

Tezpur

Balipara

BRAHMAPUTRA R.

NAGA  
HILLS

I N D I A

92°

94°


96°

28°

28




Map C(a)  
The Eastern Sector






Map C(b)  
The Middle and Western Sectors





# MAP D

Location of Certain Indian Military Posts in Ladakh (July 1962)



1. Strong point set up by Indian troops on 6 July 1962.
2. Additional strong point set up on 11 July.