

Copyright is owned by the Author of the thesis. Permission is given for a copy to be downloaded by an individual for the purpose of research and private study only. The thesis may not be reproduced elsewhere without the permission of the Author.

Strategies for Resolving Security and Interference Issues in 802.11 Wireless Computer Networking

A thesis presented in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of

Masters of Engineering
in
Computer Systems Engineering

At Massey University, Palmerston North,
New Zealand.

Gladwin Mendez
2006

Supervisors:
G.A.Punchihewa
Dr Liyanage De Silva

ABSTRACT

This thesis presents the outcomes of the research and development of strategies to improve 802.11 wireless networking security, reduce interference, and investigation into the trends of home users in the city limits of Palmerston North, New Zealand. The main contributions of the research are several types of improvement strategies that reduce interference, add additional layers of security to 802.11, and reports on wireless trends.

The thesis begins with an overview of the current 802.11 security protocols and related issues. The current state of the 802.11 security is presented along with an assessment of efficacy of 802.11. Lastly, the motivations for improving security and reducing interference are explained.

The main improvement presented within the thesis is that of client filtering. The operation of filtering is explained. Using methods from other filtering protocols its shown that how an additional layer of security can be added to 802.11.

Following this, more improvements are shown that can be used with or without client filtering. The use of smart aerials, wizards and frequency selective materials is discussed and the advantages and disadvantages of each are highlighted, as well as the aspects and issues of implementing the strategies on a home personal computer based platform are presented.

This is followed by a description of the experiments conducted into attenuation and direction sensing. The results of the experiments are presented along with the discussion.

Finally, conclusions about the improvements are detailed and the results shown, in addition to research conducted on the trends of 802.11 users to further highlight the need for this research.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Firstly, I would like to thank my supervisor and co-supervisors - Amal Punchihewa and Liyanage De Silva.

Secondly I would like to thank Stan Swan from Massey University at Wellington, who has given me his guidance throughout, his insights and comments have been invaluable. Without him this thesis and the research that it concludes would have been impossible.

In addition I would like my family and my friends. Without their support and their vigilance I would not have made it through the year. Thank you for everything.

ABSTRACT	2
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS.....	3
LIST OF FIGURES	7
LIST OF TABLES	11
1 INTRODUCTION	12
1.1 Background	12
1.2 ContentS of THE Thesis.....	13
2 ISSUES RELATED TO THE RESEARCH.....	14
2.1 Interference	14
2.1.1 Microwave Technology	15
2.1.2 Bluetooth Technology.....	16
2.1.3 802.11 devices.....	17
2.1.4 Digital cordless phones.....	18
2.2 SIGNAL Attenuation	19
2.2.1 Theory of attenuation.....	19
2.2.2 Research and experimentation.....	20
2.2.3 Setup	22
2.2.4 Results	24
2.2.4.1 Polarisation Readings.....	26
2.2.4.2 Interference Readings.....	27
2.2.4.3 Base Readings	29
2.2.4.4.1 Brick 1 metre	30
2.2.4.4.2 Brick 2.5 meters	32
2.2.4.4.3 Brick 5 meters	34
2.2.4.4.4 Distance attenuation comparison	36
2.2.4.5 Wood.....	37
2.2.4.5.1 Wood 1 metre	37
2.2.4.5.2 Wood 2.5 meters	39
2.2.4.5.3 Wood 5 meters	41
2.2.4.5.4 Distance attenuation comparison	43

2.2.4.6	Old weatherboard.....	44
2.2.4.6.1	Weatherboard 1 metre	44
2.2.4.6.2	Weatherboard 2.5 meters	46
2.2.4.6.3	Weatherboard 5 meters	48
2.2.4.6.4	Distance attenuation comparison	50
2.2.4.7	Modern weatherboard.....	51
2.2.4.7.1	Weatherboard at 1 metre	51
2.2.4.7.2	Weatherboard at 2.5 meters	53
2.2.4.7.2	Weatherboard at 5 meters	55
2.2.4.7.4	Distance attenuation comparison	57
2.2.4.8	Findings	58
2.3	Security Protocols and Issues.....	59
2.3.1	Wireless Equivalent Privacy.....	60
2.3.1.1	Issues	61
2.3.1.2	Improvements	63
2.3.2	Wi-Fi Protected Access	64
2.3.2.1	Issues	64
2.3.2.2	Improvements	65
2.3.3	Service Set Identifier Broadcast.....	66
2.3.3.1	Common Issues	66
2.3.4	MAC address filtering.....	67
2.3.4.1	Issues	67
2.3.5	SecureEasySetup(TM).....	68
2.3.5.1	Issues	69
2.3.6	802.11i	70
2.3.6.1	Wi-Fi Protected Access 2	70
2.3.6.2	Robust Security Network	70
2.3.7	Supplemental Methods.....	71
3	TYPES OF ATTACKS	75
3.1	Passive	75
3.2	Active	76
3.2.1	RPC Active Attack.....	77
3.3	Man-in-the-middle.....	79
4	SECURITY AND INTERFERENCE RESEARCH.....	81

4.1	Research of wireless user trends in 2004	81
4.1.1	Methods and resources	81
4.1.2	Findings of 2004 Research of wireless user trends	84
4.1.3	GIS Imagery	89
4.2	Research of wireless user trends in 2005	95
4.2.1	Methods and resources	95
4.2.2	Findings of 2005 research of wireless user trends.....	98
4.2.3	GIS Imagery	99
5	PROBLEM RESOLUTION.....	133
5.1	Smart aerials.....	133
5.1.1	Issues.....	134
5.2	Power stepping	134
5.2.1	Issues.....	135
5.3	Frequency Selective Surfaces	135
5.3.1	Issues.....	135
5.4	Time Usage.....	136
5.4.1	Issues.....	136
5.5	Detection of Attackers	137
5.5.1	Issues.....	137
5.6	Filtering	137
5.6.1	Issues.....	139
5.6	Setup Wizards.....	139
5.6.2	Issues.....	141
5.7	Solution	141
5.7.1	Experimentation	143
6	CONCLUSIONS.....	147
7	PUBLICATIONS BY THE AUTHOR.....	151
8	REFERENCES	152

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 2.1: Location of centre burst frequency in relation to 802.11 channels	15
Figure 2.2: Effect of microwave interference on an 802.11 signal.....	15
Figure 2.3: Frequency usage of 802.11 and Bluetooth	16
Figure 2.4: Dimensions of rudimentary cage	20
Figure 2.5: Experimental layout	21
Figure 2.6: Free Space Loss over distance for 2.4 GHz signals	21
Figure 2.7: Anritsu Portable Spectrum Analyser used.....	22
Figure 2.8: Frequency allocation of 2.4 GHz channels.....	23
Figure 2.9: Experimental setup	24
Figure 2.10: Initial measurement taken looking for anomalous readings	25
Figure 2.11: Base reading.....	25
Figure 2.12: Vertical Polarization Readings	26
Figure 2.13: 5m vertical polarization interference.....	27
Figure 2.14: 5m interference with weatherboard.....	28
Figure 2.15: Averaged and smoothed graphs of signal measurements at 1, 2.5 and 5 meters....	29
Figure 2.16: Measurements taken for brick at 1 metre	30
Figure 2.17: Averaged and smoothed signal through Brick at 1 metre	31
Figure 2.18: Calculated attenuation/signal drop through brick at 1 metre	31
Figure 2.19: Measurements taken for brick at 2.5 meters	32
Figure 2.20: Averaged and smoothed signal through Brick at 2.5 meters.....	32
Figure 2.21: Calculated attenuation/signal drop through brick at 2.5 meters.....	33
Figure 2.22: Measurements taken for brick at 5 meters	34
Figure 2.23: Averaged and smoothed signal through Brick at 5 meters.....	35
Figure 2.24: Calculated attenuation/signal drop through brick at 5 meters.....	35
Figure 2.25: Measured signal at different distances	36
Figure 2.26: Measurements taken for wood at 1 metre.....	37
Figure 2.27: Averaged and smoothed signal through Wood at 1 metre.....	38
Figure 2.28: Calculated attenuation/signal drop through Wood at 1 metre.....	38
Figure 2.29: Measurements taken for wood at 2.5 meters	39
Figure 2.30: Averaged and smoothed signal through Wood at 2.5 meters	40
Figure 2.31: Calculated attenuation/signal drop through Wood at 2.5 meters	40
Figure 2.32: Measurements taken for wood at 5 meters	41
Figure 2.33: Averaged and smoothed signal through Wood at 5 meters	42
Figure 2.34: Calculated attenuation/signal drop through wood at 5 meters.....	42
Figure 2.35: Measured signal at different distances	43
Figure 2.36: Measurements taken for weatherboard at 1 metre	44

Figure 2.37: Averaged and smoothed signal through weatherboard at 1 meters	45
Figure 2.38: Calculated attenuation/signal drop through weatherboard at 1 metre	45
Figure 2.39: Measurements taken for weatherboard at 2.5 meters.....	46
Figure 2.40: Averaged and smoothed signal through weatherboard at 2.5 meters.....	46
Figure 2.41: Calculated attenuation/signal drop through weatherboard at 2.5 metre	47
Figure 2.42: Measurements taken for weatherboard at 5 meters.....	48
Figure 2.43: Averaged and smoothed signal through weatherboard at 5 meters	48
Figure 2.44: Calculated attenuation/signal drop through weatherboard at 5 metre	49
Figure 2.45: Measured signal at different distances	50
Figure 2.46: Measurements taken for weatherboard at 1 metre	51
Figure 2.47: Averaged and smoothed signal through weatherboard at 1 metre	52
Figure 2.48: Calculated attenuation/signal drop through weatherboard at 1 metre	52
Figure 2.49: Measurements taken for weatherboard at 2.5 meters.....	53
Figure 2.50: Averaged and smoothed signal through weatherboard at 2.5 meters.....	53
Figure 2.51: Calculated attenuation/signal drop through weatherboard at 2.5 metre	54
Figure 2.52: Measurements taken for weatherboard at 5 meters.....	55
Figure 2.53: Averaged and smoothed signal through weatherboard at 5 meters	56
Figure 2.54: Calculated attenuation/signal drop through weatherboard at 5 meters	56
Figure 2.55: Measured signal at different distances	57
Figure 2.56: Drop in dB of materials over distance	58
Figure 2.57: Maximising Security for 802.11 home users	59
Figure 2.58: Encryption of data with WEP	60
Figure 2.59: Decryption of data with WEP	61
Figure 2.60: Outlining the table WEP system	63
Figure 2.61: Illustrating spoofing of a MAC address.....	67
Figure 2.62: MAC address spoofed	68
Figure 2.63: Illustration of SecureEasySetup process.....	69
Figure 2.64: How RSN works	70
Figure 3.1: Illustration of a passive attack	75
Figure 3.2: Illustration of an Active Attack	76
Figure 3.3: Illustrating a blended attack utilising the wireless medium.....	77
Figure 3.4: Illustrating a Man-in-the-Middle Attack	79
Figure 4.1: High Level data flow of the system	82
Figure 4.2: Interface and data gathered by Net Stumbler	83
Figure 4.3: World Wide Reported WEP Usage Over Time as of August 2004	84
Figure 4.4: Reported World Wireless Networks as of August 2004.....	84
Figure 4.5: Unsecured WLAN 'Dlink' with average signal strength detected.....	85
Figure 4.6: One minute has passed since first detecting the unsecured AP and already associated with network due to DHCP.....	85

Figure 4.7: Home users with unsecured WLAN and internet sharing	86
Figure 4.8: Bad networking practice of sharing C:\	86
Figure 4.9: Large sized company with an unsecured wireless network	87
Figure 4.10: Found and recognized a default SSID, inputting default administrator password	87
Figure 4.11: Continuing from previous Figure, default administrator password has obviously not been changed	88
Figure 4.12: Distribution of secure and unsecure WLAN's	89
Figure 4.13: 2.5m resolution satellite imagery of the Palmerston North CBD	90
Figure 4.14: Topographical map illustrating SNR of WLAN's and created using GPSVisualizer	91
Figure 4.15: Aerial Photograph of CBD	92
Figure 4.16: 3D Representation of WLAN's in and around Massey University Using ArcScene	93
Figure 4.17: 3D Representation of WLAN's in and around Massey University Using ArcScene	94
Figure 4.18: Low Level data flow of information	96
Figure 4.19: World Wide Reported WEP Usage Over Time as of April 2005	99
Figure 4.20: Reported World Wireless Networks as of April 2005	99
Figure 4.21: 2.5 meter resolution satellite imagery of the city of Palmerston North and its districts	101
Figure 4.22: Channel distribution of WLAN's in Palmerston North	102
Figure 4.23: Channel distribution of WLAN's in Palmerston North	103
Figure 4.24: Security trends evaluated	104
Figure 4.25: Distribution of WLAN's and their security levels	105
Figure 4.26: Wireless security trends	106
Figure 4.27: Distribution of WLAN's and the encryption type used	107
Figure 4.28: Distribution of WLAN's detected per district	109
Figure 4.29: Distribution of commercial units per district	112
Figure 4.30: One meter aerial imagery of Palmerston Norths CBD	113
Figure 4.31: Higher schooling percentage according to district	116
Figure 4.32: No education percentage according to district	117
Figure 4.33: Encryption usage per district	119
Figure 4.34: Co-channel interference	120
Figure 4.35: Clashes per channel	121
Figure 4.36: Use of ArcScene to investigate LOS	121
Figure 4.37: Extrapolation of profile between two points	122
Figure 4.38: Distribution of channel 1 Co-channel interference	123
Figure 4.39: Channel 1 wireless density	124
Figure 4.40: Channel 1 conflict potentials	125
Figure 4.41: Distribution of channel 6 Co-channel interference	126
Figure 4.42: Channel 6 wireless density	127
Figure 4.43: Channel 6 conflict potentials	128

Figure 4.44: Distribution of channel 11 Co-channel interference.....	129
Figure 4.45: Channel 11 wireless density.....	130
Figure 4.46: Channel 11 conflict potentials	131
Figure 5.1: Power stepping option in a modified Linksys WRT54g	135
Figure 5.2: Time usage access restrictions.....	136
Figure 5.3: SNR measurements taken in a home environment over 40 mins	138
Figure 5.4: Authentication process	138
Figure 5.5: Illustrating the scenario in practice.....	139
Figure 5.6: An example of a possible signal adjusting wizard	140
Figure 5.7: Factors involved in calculation SOM.....	140
Figure 5.8: Illustrating the scenario in practice.....	142
Figure 5.9: Authentication process for directional and signal filtering.....	142
Figure 5.10: Physical dimension of the pentenna	143
Figure 5.11: Setup in parking lot.....	144
Figure 5.12: View from above pentenna	144
Figure 5.13: Measurement setup.....	145
Figure 5.14: The near radiation pattern of the pentenna enclosure	145
Figure 5.15: The far radiation pattern of the pentenna enclosure	146
Figure 5.16: Measurement of directional and SNR information	147
Figure 6.1: Wireless security and interference strategies	149

LIST OF TABLES

Table 2.1: Illustrating the different 802.11 standards	17
Table 2.2: Attenuation through different materials	19
Table 2.3: Country 802.11b/g Channel use	23
Table 2.4: Comparing Theoretical and Measured Actual Attenuation.....	29
Table 2.5: Comparison of Attenuation values	58
Table 2.6: Illustrating negligible performance drop using WEP.....	62
Table 4.1: Channel distribution of WLAN's in Palmerston North.....	102
Table 4.2: WLAN's detected per district	108
Table 4.3: Commercial units, residential and income values per district	110
Table 4.4: Education effect on WLAN numbers	114
Table 4.5: Encryption usage according to district	118
Table 5.1: Additional authentication fields added to increase security.....	138
Table 5.2: Additional authentication fields added to increase security.....	141

1 INTRODUCTION

The introduction to this thesis covers both the literature survey, and the background information, beginning with the general background and scope of the research. Then the remaining introduction is divided into three separate and distinct chapters following the overall introduction that provide a more detailed look at the facts of wireless networks.

The first of these covers current security protocols and interference sources that affect 802.11 wireless networks or Wireless Local Area Networks (WLAN), descriptions and their flaws and issues. Secondly, 802.11 security and interference issues are analysed to find where and why it needs attention, and thirdly a summary of the types of wireless attacks that can be used against 802.11 networks.

1.1 BACKGROUND

The initial intention for this research was nurtured in the last year of my undergraduate course. Having just successfully having completed a 4th year project on extending wireless computer networks, the security issues that were found during the research sparked my interest.

The most interesting part of the research was the fact that due to the ease of use and plummeting price of wireless hardware there was now a large take up of wireless by home users. The biggest issue that was found was the small percentage of people who had enabled some sort of security measures on their network.

There are millions of wireless networks have been created across the globe, and the number are increasing drastically everyday. While originally wireless was only obtainable for companies who could afford the hardware, wireless is now standard with most home consumer laptops. They exist to improve free up users from wires and truly mobilise users and make setup of home networks easier, cheaper and less obtrusive.

However, while it is easy to setup a wireless network, the setup and wizards to setup wireless security easily are still lacking. In addition the ramifications of not setting up any security are not properly stated by hardware manufacturers. Most home security protocols are vulnerable and can be cracked given the time. The uptake of wireless devices is also causing issues with co-channel interference. This research was initially started to come up with several strategies that could be used in wireless communications to improve security and reduce interference. Once the strategies were formulated, it was hoped that improvements could be found that would improve the situation and provide a better and more secure service to the users of WLANs. All the

improvements are part of an ongoing push for better quality service, better security and greater efficiency.

1.2 CONTENTS OF THE THESIS

Firstly, an overview of the current state of 802.11 home wireless security protocols and sources of interference, as well as descriptions of the various issues associated with each type. This will encompass the 802.11a, 802.11b and 802.11g standards.

After this, the types of attacks are discussed and then the need for reducing interference and improving security is outlined. This includes research done on wireless interference and security trends within the city limits of Palmerston North. Wireless usage trends according to districts, income, education and commercial numbers. The security results are compared with worldwide values to ascertain whether the city follows international trends.

Then the improvements targeted in this research are introduced as mechanisms to significantly reduce ability of attackers from infiltrating a network, and thus improve security and reducing interference. Three chapters are dedicated to filtering, with the first detailing the two types of aggregation and their respective operation, as well as how filtering will improve security and reduce interference. This is followed by a chapter dealing with another development to deal with security and interference. The third chapter outlines additional steps and education of end users.

The design and details of testing environment for the assessment of the proof of concept is described. This is followed discussion of the results of the experiments.

The conclusions are made against the objectives of the research presented by the thesis, and about the outcome.