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THE ISOLATIONISM OF SENATOR CHARLES W. TOBEY

**A
THESIS**

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University of Alaska in Partial Fulfillment
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THE ISOLATIONISM OF SENATOR CHARLES W. TOBEY

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THE ISOLATIONISM OF SENATOR CHARLES W. TOBEY

Charles Tobey, Republican of New Hampshire, was convinced that mobilization for World War II would destroy representative government and laissez-faire capitalism in the United States. Because of his own Alger-like rise to success within the framework of small-town Republican politics, Tobey idealized competition with commonly understood rules: he rejected the class conflict and economic management of the New Deal. As the threat of war increased in 1939, Tobey entered the United States Senate, where his suspicion of President Roosevelt was heightened by contact with outspoken isolationists. He supported the war effort only after Pearl Harbor, but his main interest remained domestic affairs. His parochial outlook made it possible for Tobey to support international cooperation during the post-war period, because he decided that was the best way to create domestic conditions to encourage democracy and capitalism.

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INTRODUCTION

Would a German victory in Europe be a vital threat to the United States? That question divided Americans into rival groups before Pearl Harbor brought the United States into World War II. The answer was particularly critical for members of the American government because they had to make decisions about offering aid to opponents of Germany and Japan. William L. Langer and S. Everett Gleason describe the foreign policy debate of the late thirties as one between the isolationists and the interventionists, "...between those determined to stand aloof from foreign wars at all costs and those convinced that the United States could not escape the effects of foreign quarrels and that therefore the country should take a hand in them if only to protect itself and its national interests."¹

President Roosevelt and his administration took an interventionist position, while leading members of the U.S. Senate continued to hold traditional isolationist views. Until he gained their support, the President was hampered in his attempts to supply defense materials to England. German victories in 1940 and 1941 caused increasing numbers of Senators to favor more interventionist policies, until a majority sided with the President on the lend lease program and repeal of the American neutrality laws. However, a core of outspoken isolationists remained until the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor outmoded their position.

¹William L. Langer and S. Everett Gleason, The Challenge to Isolationism, 1937-1940 (New York: Harper and Bros, 1952), ix.

Why did some Senators believe that the prospective German victory in Europe would not be vital to America, while a majority came to the opposite conclusion? Biographers of the leading Senate isolationists point to several important factors: Gerald P. Nye's "agrarian radicalism," William E. Borah's "belligerent nationalism," Arthur H. Vandenberg's faith in the natural protection of two oceans and Robert A. Taft's preference for domestic affairs.² There were other isolationists who were not so well-known, but whose vote against interventionist proposals counted equally in the Senate. Even more important, the isolationists represented constituents whom President Roosevelt had to enlist before embarking on an interventionist foreign policy.

Senator Charles W. Tobey, Republican of New Hampshire, was one of the isolationists who stubbornly opposed the idea that American security was linked to European affairs. During debates on revision of the neutrality laws, Tobey wrote to a constituent:

It is not necessary for us to get into the war. We are not a nation such as the small nations of Europe that have been overrun by Hitler. We of America are 132 million strong, able to out-produce all of Europe, and able to take care of ourselves in this world should any nation or nations attempt to come our way.³

Tobey's evident faith in America was coupled with his fear of the effects

²Wayne S. Cole, Senator Gerald P. Nye and American Foreign Relations Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1962, 6-13; Manfred Jonas, Isolationism in America (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1966, 50; Arthur H. Vandenberg, Jr., ed., The Private Papers of Senator Vandenberg Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1952), xix; William S. White, The Taft Story (New York: Harper and Bros., 1954), 108-109.

³To Mrs. William Lord, November 14, 1941, The Papers of Charles W. Tobey, Dartmouth College Library, Hanover, New Hampshire, Box 81. Hereinafter cited as Tobey Papers.

which war might have on American political traditions. To an America First rally in Madison Square Garden on September 17, 1941, Tobey said:

...the greatest menace to this country and to our form of government does not come from any enemy abroad, but rather exists right here in our own country, and more particularly and specifically, under the Capitol Dome in Washington, where the people's representatives in Congress have apparently lost their sense of responsibility under the Constitution to act as a separate but coordinate branch of the federal government and have yielded to pressure and blandishments of another branch, the Executive. Therein is the great threat to the American way of life and the American form of government.⁴

He blamed Congress for following the lead of President Roosevelt, rather than maintaining an independent check on the Administration. Tobey feared the rise of totalitarianism in this country as a result of Roosevelt's strong leadership and he saw American participation in the European conflict as the means by which this would occur.

In both his faith in America and his fear of war, Tobey was like other prominent isolationists described by Manfred Jonas in his Isolationism in America, 1935-1941.⁵ The particular content of Senator Tobey's faith in America, his background for isolationism, is described in the first chapter of this study. His reaction to President Roosevelt's leadership, particularly in foreign policy matters before the question of intervention became so imminent, is contained in the second chapter. Tobey's fear that war would destroy democracy in this country marks the peak of isolationism in this country and for Tobey himself, as he entered the U.S. Senate in 1939. That period is covered in chapter three.

⁴Charles W. Tobey, "Wake Up America! The Hour is Late," Vital Speeches of the Day, VII (October 1, 1941), 749.

⁵Jonas, 23.

The political career of Charles Tobey is made more interesting by the fact that he became an internationalist after the war. That is, he encouraged American membership in such international organizations as the International Monetary Fund, the United Nations, and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. He underwent a foreign policy "conversion" similar to that of his more famous colleague, Senator Arthur Vandenberg of Michigan. Tobey joined a small group of liberal Republicans, including Senators George Aiken of Vermont and Wayne Morse of Oregon, in support of President Harry Truman's programs during the critical period of conservative Republican control of Congress from 1947 to 1949. Tobey remained a spokesman for international cooperation until his death in 1953, at the age of 73. His post-war views are discussed in the final chapter.

Tobey's long political career reached a critical juncture when Pearl Harbor outmoded his isolationism. Did Tobey decide that his pre-war isolationism had been a mistake? Did he believe that time had changed national priorities? Or was the basic rationale for Tobey's isolationism the same as his later internationalism? These questions must be answered to grasp the full import of Tobey's foreign policy position during the late thirties.

On the surface, reasons for Charles Tobey's faith in America are not hard to find. Although he was born poor and lacked extensive education, Tobey worked hard and eventually became a farm owner, a successful banker, Governor of New Hampshire and a United States Senator. His own experience proved that America offered opportunities for a man to succeed on the basis of his abilities, rather than on being born to a particular social or economic class. In a real sense, Tobey lived out the Horatio Alger myth which was so popular in America until the Depression. The

stock market collapse of 1929 wiped out Tobey's investments, but he still owned his farm and his faith in the American economic system was not destroyed. He entered the House of Representatives in 1933 to support recovery of pre-Depression prosperity.

By 1934, Tobey began to recognize that Roosevelt was interested in something more than recovery. From his relatively insignificant position as a Congressman in the minority party, Tobey spoke out against the President and his supporters as being an internal threat to the American way of life. Samuel Lubell, in The Future of American Politics, describes this period as the "Roosevelt Revolution" and he identifies it as the time in which a generation of urban workers became the majority over the traditional, geographically-based Republican coalition.⁶ Tobey's allegiance to the New England area, with its traditions of "laissez faire" capitalism embedded in the Republican Party, made it nearly impossible for him to see that Roosevelt was not destroying the political system itself. As a result, Tobey's fear of wartime mobilization grew out of his suspicion that Roosevelt might become a dictator.

Although Tobey supported the war effort after Pearl Harbor, he did not abandon isolationism as an ideal until 1944. Then, in the space of three months, he shifted his position dramatically in favor of closer cooperation with other countries. Behind this change was the fact that he faced election in 1944. His own constituency in New Hampshire included many first-generation Americans who were critical of Tobey's

⁶Samuel Lubell, The Future of American Politics (New York: Doubleday Anchor Books, 1956), 10-11.

pre-war isolationism. Furthermore, Tobey's fears for the survival of representative government had been allayed when Roosevelt limited his wartime prerogatives. Finally there was the possibility of Republican victory in 1944 and Tobey valued the possibility that he might initiate American policy, rather than functioning as a minority party critic. Those factors all influenced Tobey's conversion to internationalism.

Although Tobey was not a great leader in the Senate, he represented a constituency that was isolationist before the war and internationalist after the war. Without the conversion of foreign policy attitudes among American voters, which was reflected in Tobey's own shift, this nation would not have been able to undertake the programs which allowed other nations to rebuild their societies after the war. The purpose of this paper is to provide an explanation for the foreign policy attitudes of Senator Charles Tobey. Its scope is limited to the life of one man, although historical perspective demands some treatment of the state and national environment in which Tobey worked. This is not a history of isolationism, nor is it an analysis of the literature pertaining to the general phenomenon of isolationism in America. It is a monograph on the political contribution made by Senator Tobey to the formation of American foreign policy, with particular emphasis on the period from 1938 to 1941.

I. FAITH IN AMERICA: THE EARLY YEARS

Charles Tobey grew up in Boston at the turn of the century. Born in 1880, he lived in several lower-middle-class neighborhoods as his parents moved to avoid the encroachment of Irish immigrants.¹ Tobey's childhood was affected by the constant struggle which his parents had for a secure place in the emerging middle-class. While this environment provided many opportunities for a poor man to become rich, it was also risky and uncertain. If Tobey later appeared to be something of an opportunist, it came from early necessity. According to his eldest son, Russell, Tobey often acted impulsively or intuitively without thinking about the consequences. That characteristic was balanced by a deep longing for stability and serenity, symbolized by Tobey's farm in rural New Hampshire.

Tobey's father, William H. Tobey, left his rural home for the opportunities of urban society. William came from an English family which settled in Maine during the 17th century.² Born in Calais, Maine, about 1850, Tobey's father grew up in the coastal city of Bath where his family made a living by farming and fishing. Like many other young men of his generation, he left home after the Civil War to seek his fortune in the city. He found work as an accountant with the Parker-Wilder Company, a

¹Interview with Russell Tobey, son of Charles Tobey and Director of State Parks, Concord, New Hampshire, January 16, 1969. Hereinafter cited as Tobey Interview.

²Anna Rothe, ed., Current Biography, 1951 (New York: H.W. Wilson, 1951), 628.

Boston firm dealing in textiles throughout New England, and spent the rest of his life there. He died in 1929, leaving his wife and four children, Charles, the oldest, and three married daughters, Doris Brown, Mildred Rowe and Marion Jerauld. Russell Tobey recalled that his grandfather William was not interested in politics and that "his work was his life and he did little else."³

Tobey's mother grew up in a solid middle-class family associated with banking and finance in Boston. Ellen Hall Parker was the eldest daughter of Benjamin Parker and her marriage to William Tobey was not approved by her family. Tobey wrote in his autobiography, "My mother was a very strict, religious person of the Baptist faith."⁴ Russell recalled that his grandmother was a very domineering woman, who tried to provide a better life for her children. She taught Charles to play the piano, tutored him in grammar and history, and later her brother was instrumental in finding Charles a job in banking.

Charles William Tobey was born on July 22, 1880, at the home of his Parker grandparents. It was a year before his parents could afford to rent an apartment of their own in Roxbury. At the age of six, Charles started his public education at the Quincy Street School. More than six decades later, Tobey recorded that his mother had dressed him in a "white waist, and bow tie, and clean clothes all carefully pressed to go to school," for which he was bullied and forced to eat rabbit manure by a group of neighborhood ruffians.⁵ Samuel Lubell, in The Future of

³Tobey Interview

⁴Tobey Papers, Box 118, recorded on tape in 1947, transcription date unknown, 8. Hereinafter cited as Autobiography.

⁵Ibid., 1.

American Politics, tells the story of Governor, and later Senator, John Pastore of Rhode Island and his mother's emphasis on dress as a mark of middle-class respectability. Lubell says that it was a key to why some immigrants rose out of the slums and others did not: "To set them apart from the tough boys, their parents overdressed them to the point where many were considered sissies."⁶ Like John Pastore, Charles Tobey grew up with a sense of being different from his immediate neighbors. Tobey's mother instilled in him a sense of unique promise that was important to his later entry into politics.

Tobey's effort to break out of the stifling world of borderline poverty began in 1891. When he was eleven, Charles took the entrance exams for Roxbury Latin School, a private school where many boys prepared for Harvard. He passed, he says, "with the help of grammar studied at the bedside of my mother, who was frequently ill."⁷ Again the key figure was his mother, as she prepared him to strive for a different way of life from ~~hers~~.

Tobey spent four years at Roxbury Latin, until he was forced to leave because the family could not afford this education any longer. Indicating the value which he put on traditional disciplines, Tobey wrote, "I have been profoundly grateful for the touch of the classics I had there."⁸ Although he never graduated from any school, Tobey remained in contact with his classmates and he was the main speaker when Roxbury

⁶Lubell, 81-82.

⁷Autobiography, 5

⁸Ibid., 3.

Latin celebrated its 200th birthday in 1945. He was proud enough of that symbol of his success in life to include it in his reminiscences.

Tobey's account of his last formal class day at Roxbury Latin in June, 1895, reveals his own spirit of self-improvement. The speaker was Edward Everett Hale, author of A Man Without a Country. According to Tobey, Hale said that day, "Some of you won't go to college. To you I give a formula that will provide the best possible education without a dollar of cost. Talk every day with someone who knows more than you do."⁹ That theme was strong enough throughout Tobey's life that it was included by the New York Times in Tobey's obituary with this addition, "Senator Tobey said that he had obtained a good share of his education by talking to taximen, fellow Senators, elevator operators, clergymen, scrubwomen and professors."¹⁰ This philosophy was also reflected in the voluminous correspondence which Tobey carried on with his constituents, many of whom he did not know personally. He rarely used form letters, and he often treated criticism with more complete replies than he gave to approving comments. This characteristic was valuable for a politician, particularly in the days before radio and television were so available.

Between 1895 and 1910, Tobey sought a secure place in the urban middle-class of Boston's financial circles. With no particular skills to offer, Tobey began working as a messenger and office boy. Then, in the fall of 1896, he was hired by William Wood, brother-in-law of the man who managed Boston's famous S.S. Pierce grocery line. Wood himself

⁹Jean L. Block, "Scrappy Tobey Blends Evangelist and Comedian," The Washington Post, April 15, 1951, 3B.

¹⁰The New York Times, July 25, 1953.

was an insurance agent who wrote short-term policies on grocery shipments. In his autobiography, Tobey recounts the story of his "big break" there, when he had to make a decision involving thousands of dollars while Mr. Wood was away.¹¹ Tobey's independence and his willingness to take such a risk attracted the attention of his uncle, George Parker, who then recommended him for a position with Jacob C. Rogers, an attorney for J.S. Morgan and Company, "a London international banking house."¹² Unfortunately, Rogers died suddenly and, at the age of twenty, Tobey was jobless. Again his uncle helped with references to Kidder-Peabody, an important Boston investment firm. He began work there on the same day as Chandler Hovey, who much later became an important influence on Tobey in connection with air defense.

Meanwhile, Tobey's nonconformist spirit asserted itself in romance with Francelia M. Lovett. Charles played the piano for Christian Endeavor meetings at the Roxbury Baptist Church. There he met Francelia, who attended with her cousin, in whose home she lived as a domestic. Her father had committed suicide when "Franc" was a child, and her mother placed the three children in foster homes because there was no other way of caring for them. As a teenager, Francelia came to live in her aunt's home in Dorchester. In an effort to introduce Franc to some "nice" people, she was allowed to attend church meetings and there Charles began to court her.¹³

¹¹Autobiography, 8.

¹²Ibid., 9.

¹³Tobey Interview

As Tobey described it, a chain of events led from his job in Boston to his move to New Hampshire. J.P. Morgan, New York representative of the J.S. Morgan Company, formed U.S. Steel in 1901, which created more work at Kidder-Peabody where money was borrowed for the venture. Employees at Kidder subsequently received raises, and with that Tobey decided to marry Francelia. Because Franc had little education and no social background, Tobey's mother opposed the marriage. However, Charles pursued his decision and they were married in June, 1902.¹⁴

A year later, the young couple spent a week with a cousin of his mother in New Ipswich, New Hampshire. The visit was a relief from the heat and humidity of Boston after Russell was born in June, 1903. The Tobey's found a large, but dilapidated farmhouse near Temple, a town of about 300 people. They offered to buy the farm, even though Charles had no financial resources at the time. That fall, the owner consented to sell 100 acres and the farmhouse to Tobey.¹⁵ The reason for Tobey's purchase was conveyed by an article in the Concord, New Hampshire newspaper some years later, when Tobey was quoted as saying:

It has always seemed to me that there was something very refined and cultivated about the old New England farm way of life. People in the older generations combined thrift and good husbandry with culture and beauty and were enabled to live lives that had richness and value in them without going into debt or spending all their incomes. There is something about this form of New England life that I wish were more deeply inculcated in our agriculture today.¹⁶

¹⁴Autobiography, 12.

¹⁵Tobey Interview.

¹⁶"The New England Way," Concord Monitor, January 15, 1938.

Charles borrowed a down payment and made plans to move north when spring came. Russell recalled, "The move was rejected by my grandparents and dad was hardly prepared for it, but he had big dreams and followed through with them, often without forethought as to the consequences."¹⁷

Tobey was not just seeking an escape from the city, he was also searching for new opportunities to gain the wealth and status enjoyed by some of the older families who had summer homes near Temple. In May, 1904, the Tobey family moved to Temple for the summer and Charles commuted every day to his job in Boston. Franc drove him six miles to Greenfield with a horse and wagon, then he spent about two hours on the train travelling sixty miles into Boston. During this period, Tobey became acquainted with a group of young, liberal Republicans who summered nearby in Peterborough and Dublin. They were becoming identifiable as reformers in the state, led by Robert P. Bass who was to become Governor in 1910. Since most of these young men were associated with Boston financial circles, it is possible that the long train rides afforded Tobey with his first acquaintances among New Hampshire progressives.¹⁸

Between 1904 and 1910, the Tobey family spent every summer in Temple, repairing the large two-story Georgian house. It still stands in excellent repair about three miles southeast of Temple, overlooking a broad river valley.¹⁹ During the first summer on the farm, Tobey sold enough grass as fodder to pay operating expenses, and his apple orchard brought in some profit that fall.²⁰ They sold increasing amounts of pine

¹⁷Tobey Interview.

¹⁸Ibid.

¹⁹Visit to the farm in Temple, New Hampshire, January 16, 1969.

²⁰Autobiography, 39.

from the wooded sections and by 1908 Tobey was able to pay off his mortgage with profits from the farm itself. Obviously pleased with himself, Tobey wrote, "Our judgments and venturesome spirit in daring to buy the farm and go into debt for the whole amount proved to be sound, despite the cries that we were crazy by our parents and friends."²¹

The story of his political awakening was told by Tobey to a writer for The Washington Post in 1951:

In the year 1910, a young New Hampshire poultry farmer wistfully followed a governor's carriage down the streets of Boston. The Governor was Charles Evans Hughes of New York, later Chief Justice of the United States Supreme Court. Before a local meeting, Governor Hughes had just made a ringing attack on evils in government. He had told of banishing gamblers from his state and breaking an ugly insurance scandal.

So inspired by the speaker's zeal and oratory was one listener, Charles William Tobey, that on the spot Tobey made Hughes his idol and determined to follow his path.

Several years later, when in the House of Representatives, Charles Tobey stopped Hughes on the street and said, "Mr. Hughes, you have changed my life. Because of you I am going to serve the people."²²

This story reveals Tobey's admiration for Hughes' method of exorcizing evil, as well as Tobey's reverence for the legal system which Hughes symbolized. The New York Governor had become famous for these investigations and his public disclosure method of exposing evil was the way that Tobey operated throughout his political career.

Richard Hofstadter discusses Hughes and the insurance exposures as a facet of the progressive movement. He says that without a conservative

²¹Ibid.

²²Block, 3B.

tradition to explain the evils of a society caught in the throes of industrialization, public exposures served to externalize guilt.²³ With the background of evangelical Protestantism that was already a strong part of Tobey's background, Hughes was a natural object of admiration for a young man who was just leaving the "evils" of Boston. Tobey later saw himself as an individual crusader like Hughes, as well as a "servant of the people."

Debate over the character and meaning of the progressive movement is beyond the scope of this paper, but because Tobey entered state politics as a registered Progressive, a brief description of the party's origins in New Hampshire is necessary. Formally, the Progressive Party existed in the state from 1906 through the election of 1916. A group of young Republicans formed late in 1905 to back the repeal of a law to allow breeding of horses for racing, which they believed had been encouraged by the Boston and Maine Railroad. These "Lincoln Club" Republicans backed the popular novelist, Winston Churchill, for governor in 1906. L. B. Richardson, Dartmouth historian of this period, notes that "practically no Republican leader of any weight was a supporter of the movement."²⁴ Although Churchill lost the election, the Lincoln Club Republicans split the party vote and the contest was finally decided by the legislature.

According to Duane Squires, author of the most comprehensive history of New Hampshire, the Lincoln Club group was inspired by the Hughes

²³Richard Hofstadter, The Age of Reform From Bryan to F.D.R. (New York: Vintage Books, 1960), 205.

²⁴L.B. Richardson, William E. Chandler, Republican (New York: Dodd, Mead and Co., 1940), 681.

insurance investigations in New York. They began a similar inquiry into campaign expenditures by the "Old Guard." These investigations revealed that candidates were given free railroad passes and other contributions by the Boston and Maine Railroad. On that issue, the progressive faction gained enough adherents to win a majority in the General Court, New Hampshire's House of Representatives, in 1908. Then the legislators established laws for a direct primary in New Hampshire, prohibited free passes for representatives and began studies toward reforming the tax system.²⁵ These reforms were typical of those being pursued by progressives in other states.

In 1910, the Lincoln Club faction backed a nationally known progressive, Robert Bass, and he succeeded in capturing the Republican nomination for governor under the new direct primary law. Elected with ease in this predominantly Republican state, Bass organized the Public Service Commission for continuing investigation of the railroads, urged child labor laws and workmen's compensation, and began publicizing the need for conservation in the state.²⁶ Bass gathered around him young professional men of the type described as the emerging urban middle-class by Robert Wiebe in The Search for Order, 1877-1920.²⁷ However, they were also drawn together by similar genteel background that usually included a Harvard degree and inherited wealth.

²⁵Duane Squires, The Granite State of the United States: A History of New Hampshire from 1623 to the Present, II (New York: The American Historical Company, Inc., 1956), 599.

²⁶Ibid., 604.

²⁷Robert H. Wiebe, The Search for Order, 1877 -1920 (New York: Hill and Wang, 1967), 110-111.

In New Hampshire, the central issue for the progressives was not simply reform of existing evils, but it was a challenge to the established leadership of the state political system. Railroad and lumbering interests had dominated the Republican Party since the Civil War. The Lincoln Club group wanted access to political power in the state without destroying the system itself. However, political control by traditional leaders was well-protected by laws and custom in New Hampshire. There was and still is, an election for all state offices every two years, which meant that there was a high turnover of personnel. There was a tradition against gubernatorial succession, so an outstanding governor had to rely on party organization to gain General Court approval in a single session. The large size of the legislature, 435 members, and low pay for representatives meant that farm people and retired men tended to run for the House. Their lack of experience made the legislators dependent upon a few key political leaders.²⁸ All of these factors hampered progressive reforms in New Hampshire.

In 1912, Robert Bass led the Progressive Party in support of Theodore Roosevelt's Presidential candidacy. That split the Republican vote to such an extent that a Democratic governor was elected for the first time since 1853.²⁹ Although New Hampshire is known as a Republican state, there is a consistent Democratic vote of nearly 40% in each general election. When the Republicans split, as they did in 1912, both factions may lose. According to Duane Lockard, even today the

²⁸Duane Lockard, New England State Politics (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1959), 78.

²⁹Squires, 609.

specter of 1912 serves to force a Republican coalition in all but the most critical times.³⁰ Although the "Bull Moose" party ceased to exist after 1912, the progressives continued as a liberal faction within the Republican Party.

In New Hampshire, both factions of the party were committed not only to the election process, but to the GOP standard. Their differences were not a matter of ideological disagreement, but of technique. According to Duane Lockard, the "bifactionalism" was due more to personalities and differences over questions of national policy than to local issues.³¹ In fact, the commitment of both factions to support business enterprise in the state is the most striking characteristic of the years which Charles Tobey spent in state politics.

Tobey's faith in America, particularly his image of political opportunities for the ordinary man, was set by his own experience. After moving to Temple in the spring of 1911, Tobey joined the local Grange. A year later, some of the Grange friends asked Tobey to run for the local school board in order to represent the farmer's needs. Tobey's son later recalled that his father was delighted at this sign of acceptance by his neighbors who had been reticent, in the typical New England way, about treating him as a member of the community.³² Although Temple had a population of 300 people, there were five independent schools in the district and Tobey commented, "I might say here that if anyone wants to know human nature and experience many vicissitudes and much trouble

³⁰Lockard, 58

³¹Ibid., 49.

³²Tobey Interview.

just get on the school board committee of a small town!"³³

The following year, in 1913, Tobey was elected chairman of the local selectmen, with responsibility for assessing tax value of property in Temple. As chairman, Tobey appeared before the Governor and his Council to urge state construction of a road over Temple Mountain, from Peterborough to Wilton. Tobey records with some pride that one of the Councilmen said after his presentation, "If I'd known they were going to send a lawyer, I would have prepared more information." Flattered at being mistaken for a trained lawyer, Tobey was also pleased when the Council adopted the proposal which he presented. He concluded the account of this event by stating, "That was really the beginning of my public life in New Hampshire."³⁴

In spite of their national defeat in 1912, the progressives still had a complete state organization for the election of 1914. The state Manual for the General Court described the criticism which progressives had for the Old Guard Republicans as "prating of progress in their platform and repudiating it in performance by the type of candidate nominated."³⁵ In the off-year election, progressives affirmed the national Bull Moose platform which included support for initiative, referendum and recall in every state, direct primaries, prohibition, a legislative reference service, wage and hour laws, suffrage for women and an increase in gubernatorial jurisdiction. Charles Tobey registered as a Progressive

³³Autobiography, 28.

³⁴Ibid., 32.

³⁵New Hampshire, Manual for the General Court, 1915 (Concord: Department of State, 1915), 127

candidate for the General Court. He won with 35 votes against 18 cast for the local Democrat and 2 for the Republican candidate.³⁶ When the 1915 session of the legislature opened, the Granite State Monthly characterized each of the new members. Tobey was called "the leading Progressive member of the House of Representatives, a young man whose pleasing personality, comprehensive power of reasoning and forceful arguments have gained for him many friends."³⁷

In New Hampshire, the legislature usually meets for one three-month session in the winter following the November election. Preparation for this brief session is made by party leaders in caucus sessions before the General Court convenes. Coupled with the tradition against gubernatorial succession, the unwieldy size of the House and the type of people who could afford to live in Concord for three months, influence within the Republican Party becomes crucial for the passage of any necessary legislation. Having left the party in 1912, the progressives were not in a good position to affect legislation, except on an individual basis. Tobey did have one advantage however. He was not identified with the men who officially left the Republican Party in 1912, because he had not been in state office at the time. Nevertheless, he chose to run on the Progressive Party ticket and he thereby entered politics as a member of the Bass faction.

The major issue before the legislature in 1915 was whether to approve reorganization of the Boston and Maine Railroad after its brief

³⁶Ibid., 134-136; 251.

³⁷Granite State Monthly XLVII (1915), 6.

union with the New York, New Haven and Hartford Railroad was dissolved. The question was whether to allow the overcapitalized and inefficient company to raise rates or let it pass into receivership until a plan of reorganization could be worked out. The railroad was known to have great influence with Republican leaders and progressives were determined to expose corrupt activities by railroad lobbyists.

Tobey made his reputation as a progressive by exposing such a situation. He wrote, "A printer from Concord called my attention to an expense item for stimulating legislative opinion on the New Haven Railroad's books."³⁸ Hearings were being held by the Judiciary Committee and its chairman was the man who signed pay vouchers of lobbyists working for the railroad. Tobey reported that he was offered passage of his workmen's compensation bill in return for silence. When he spurned the offer, the chairman left town and never returned. Then Tobey said, "I took this story to my friend, Robert Bass, former governor, and he suggested that it be taken to Louis Brandeis, later Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States."³⁹ Upon the advice of Brandeis, Tobey did not press charges, but the affair did solidify Tobey's relationship to Bass. The former governor had campaigned in 1910 on a platform of exposing railroad influence on the legislature.

The progressives relied on public indignation, rather than organized law enforcement to prosecute infractions of political law and custom. In New Hampshire, such public disclosures were difficult to make because

³⁸Autobiography, 35.

³⁹Ibid., 38.

the two major newspapers were run by established leaders of the Republican Party. As local historian Hobart Pillsbury explains, "the topography of the State and the distribution of its population are such that a few newspapers serve large sections."⁴⁰ The dominant papers were the Concord Monitor, offering political news from the state capital, and the Manchester Union, serving the southern and coastal region from the state's largest and most industrial city. The Monitor was owned by New Hampshire Senator William E. Chandler and edited by George H. Moses, the major political rival of Robert Bass. The progressives found a voice briefly when Frank Knox, later Secretary of the Navy under Franklin Roosevelt, founded the Manchester Leader in 1912. However, after nine months and the Bull Moose defeat, Union merged with the Leader to make profits for the owner and not to cover activities of the progressives.⁴¹

The only newspaper which remained an outlet for the Bass group was owned by one of its members, Frank Musgrove. That paper, the Granite State Gazette, was published in Hanover, home of Dartmouth College. After the railroad investigation of 1915, the Gazette called Tobey "the last remaining live wier /sic/ in the Progressive Party of the state."⁴² At that time, Tobey's relations with the Monitor and the Union-Leader were strained by the railroad investigation. When he complained to Robert Bass that a smear campaign had been launched against the inquiry in these newspapers, Tobey received this classic liberal reply: "The

⁴⁰Hobart Pillsbury, New Hampshire: A History (New York: The Lewis Historical Publishing Co., Inc., 1927), 1203.

⁴¹Ibid., 1206, 1210.

⁴²H.C. Pearson, Granite State Gazette, August 26, 1915.

only thing to do is to tell the truth and tell it all."⁴³ This indicates one difference between Bass and Tobey. Bass was so dedicated to principles that he would not compromise for political advantage and, partly as a result, he never won an important election after 1910. Tobey knew that the truth did not always prevail without pressure from influential sources and he learned how to compromise with established leaders enough so that he never lost an election. However, the problem of gaining news coverage in the two major papers plagued Tobey throughout his public career.

While serving in the 1915 Legislature, the price of grain rose because of the war in Europe and Tobey could not afford to keep raising chickens. He wrote, "The poultry business was all shot to pieces and Franc suggested that I try to get into the banking or bond business over in Manchester."⁴⁴ With his previous experience, it was a logical suggestion, except that he had made enemies among business leaders connected with the railroad. He also had no personal capital with which to buy into an investment firm. A critical period followed, in which politics mingled with Tobey's need for funds.

The progressives faced a dilemma in 1916: should the members back a separate candidate against Woodrow Wilson, or try to influence the Old Guard Republicans to nominate a progressive candidate. Robert Bass favored a third party candidate, preferably Theodore Roosevelt again. Tobey felt otherwise and wrote to Bass:

⁴³Bass to Tobey, Oct. 29, 1915, The Papers of Robert P. Bass, Dartmouth College Library, Hanover, New Hampshire, Box 13. Hereinafter cited as Bass Papers.

⁴⁴Autobiography, 39.

Those of us who stuck are men of conviction, who are interested in politics, not so much for personal ambition, as from a desire for service....I believe that our strength is over, in so far as our ever being of sufficient voting strength to be a real factor in state affairs....I believe that many of the rank and file are Progressives, but will not leave the Party to vote in the (Progressive) Primary.⁴⁵

In this sense, Tobey was a political realist. He was concerned about the practical question of winning office. That characteristic made it possible for Tobey to change his foreign policy attitude in 1944, when the question of re-election made it necessary for him to counter his then-unpopular isolationist stance in favor of American cooperation abroad.

Tobey did not, however, refuse to join Bass and the Progressive Party effort to draft Theodore Roosevelt as their candidate in 1916. At a party caucus in February, delegates were selected to the national convention, which was to meet in Chicago as the Republicans gathered there. Robert Bass, Winston Churchill, Frank Musgrove and Fred Shontell, who was later a partner of Tobey's, were selected to attend. Tobey was named the first alternate.⁴⁶ This indicates Tobey's relative position to the progressive leaders in New Hampshire. They had been active in state politics since Winston Churchill ran for governor in 1906, while Tobey had entered his first campaign in 1914. His selection as an alternate to the national convention suggests that the group willing to separate from the Republican Party was small and that Tobey had achieved a measure of success among the state's progressives.

⁴⁵Tobey to Bass, Feb. 21, 1916, Bass Papers, Box 21.

⁴⁶Granite State Gazette, February 17, 1916.

Tobey still hoped that the Republicans would resolve the dilemma by nominating a progressive candidate. In April, 1916, he wrote to Bass that there was increasing Republican support for Theodore Roosevelt since Senator Warren G. Harding of Ohio had put the tariff before "national honor" in his Boston speech. In the same letter, he asked Bass' advice about running for the state Senate, since Temple did not qualify for a seat in the House for the 1917 Session. Almost incidentally, Tobey mentioned that he was going to see Charles Sumner Byrd, Bass' father-in-law who was a Boston shipping magnate and well-known progressive.⁴⁷ That visit was evidently a result of advice, and probably an introduction, from Bass. Byrd subsequently loaned him money to buy into an investment firm in Manchester. Thus Tobey used his political contact with Bass to leave farming and enter the business world in Manchester.

Even though Tobey favored cooperation with the Republicans, he attended the Progressive Party National Convention during June, 1916. George Moses, Old Guard leader in New Hampshire, spurned offers by Bass to combine efforts to make Roosevelt the Republican nominee, so both factions travelled to Chicago.⁴⁸ The importance of that convention lay not only with the friendship that continued to develop between Bass and Tobey, but also in contacts which Tobey made there. Senator William E. Borah of Idaho came over from the Republican Convention to speak. Tobey was impressed by Borah, and added to his account of the visit, "I little

⁴⁷Tobey to Bass, April 17, 1916, Bass Papers, Box 21.

⁴⁸Tobey to Bass, Nov. 27, 1916, Ibid. Papers, Box 21.

thought that some day, namely in 1939 and 1940, I would be sitting in the Senate with him."⁴⁹ At this time, Borah illustrated the kind of cooperation between progressives and the Republican Party which Tobey had urged to Bass.

Tobey's loyalty to the Republican Party was solidified when the convention nominated his hero, Charles Evans Hughes, for the Presidency. In a thesis on New Hampshire progressivism, John Meck wrote, "Of all the third party members who had recently returned under the supposed amalgamation, there is evidence that only one, Charles Tobey, was enlisted to support Republican candidates at public rallies."⁵⁰ The other progressives publically supported the Democratic candidate, Woodrow Wilson. The Democrats won in New Hampshire for the second time and James Squires concluded, "Without a doubt, the dying thrust of the one-time Progressive party was responsible for Wilson's success in the state, and to that extent the Progressives greatly influenced the outcome."⁵¹ However, since the party polled less than 3% of the vote, Squires added,

It disappeared from the list of regular parties in the state, and has not been revived since. It represented a passing movement in New Hampshire, as in the nation, and it revolved largely around its hero, Theodore Roosevelt. When he made his peace with his old party in 1916, the mainspring of organized Progressivism in New Hampshire as well as in the country at large disappeared.⁵²

In fact, the progressives remained an identifiable faction within the Republican Party of New Hampshire, although they were separated less

⁴⁹Autobiography, 40.

⁵⁰John Meck, "New Hampshire: The Effect of Progressivism on State and National Politics From 1912-1916." (unpublished senior thesis, Dartmouth College, 1967), 43.

⁵¹Squires, 620.

⁵²Ibid., 618.

over issues than over the question of who would control the party leadership. This political situation in New Hampshire emphasized personality of factional leaders rather than issues. For Tobey, who was a gregarious man, the split provided an opportunity for leadership of the progressive faction, and it did not encourage him toward issue orientation.

Because Temple had such a small population, it was authorized a seat in the state legislature every other election. Therefore, after the 1916 election, Tobey was finished with his duties as a state representative. He concentrated on arrangements for entering a brokerage partnership with Fred Shontell, who had also attended the Progressive Convention. Tobey wrote to Bass, "As we talked over, I shall of course refrain from all political activities from now on."⁵³ While the reasons for this were not stated, Tobey probably needed to concentrate on strengthening his contacts with business leaders in Manchester who tended to be critical of progressives.

On December 15, 1916, the Tobey family moved to Manchester although they did not sell the Temple farm. In the city, the family enjoyed electric lights, a new Ford car and a live-in maid: all on a salary of \$200 a month. Tobey recalled that in March, 1917, "it seemed certain that our country was going to get into the war."⁵⁴ He recounted that the President of the Manchester Savings Bank called to say that the Government had asked the banks to take charge of a bond issue to finance the war. An initial issue of tax-free bonds, offering 3% interest, would

⁵³Tobey to Bass, Nov. 27, 1916, Bass Papers, Box 21.

⁵⁴Autobiography, 42.

be made if the country went to war. Tobey was asked to take charge of the bond drive in New Hampshire.

In April, 1917, the United States declared war on Germany and Tobey became state director of the Liberty Loan campaign. With a \$500 bonus from the bankers in Manchester and a salary of \$250 a month, Tobey began travelling all over the state. He reported, "countless meetings were held and rallies, most of which I addressed personally."⁵⁵ He built his organization carefully, seeking community leaders in every city and town throughout the state. Many women, who had been active in the Progressive Party before they achieved suffrage, volunteered to lead local campaigns.⁵⁶ Five campaigns were held between 1917 and 1919 and Tobey raised a total of \$72,008,240. That was an average of \$164 per person, compared to the national per capita amount of \$153.⁵⁷ In practical terms, Tobey mounted a most successful campaign and he created a solid political organization in doing so.

Tobey was given another assignment during 1917, which influenced him later. A progressive friend headed the New Hampshire Food Administration, which was a division of the national organization under Herbert Hoover. Tobey was asked to investigate the possibility of dehydrating potatoes. For this purpose, he made his first trip to Washington, D.C. and met with Hoover. Tobey's son later said that his father was most impressed by Hoover's business acumen and his humanitarian concerns. After this visit, Tobey kept in touch with Hoover as he did with other

⁵⁵Ibid., 43.

⁵⁶Tobey Interview.

⁵⁷Pillsbury, 863.

influential men that he met. Russell pointed out that this characteristic often made it possible for his father to substitute these contacts for more formal relations which arose through Republican activities.⁵⁸

Tobey preferred the kind of personal relations which were common in rural communities, to the professional links associated with the urban middle-class. This emphasis on individual relationships left Tobey unprepared for the economic groupings which later emerged during the New Deal.

While acting as Liberty Loan director, Tobey filed as a candidate to represent Temple in the General Court again since a seat was authorized in 1918. Although he was living in Manchester, he kept the farm as his official residence throughout his life. He won the Republican nomination by five votes over his cousin Will Coburn's 21.⁵⁹ That same year, 1918, Tobey became the President of Manchester's Rotary Club: "This was a great experience for me, and gave me an influence and an acquaintance over the city."⁶⁰ Tobey decided to challenge party control over the House and submit his name for the Speaker's position. Tobey wrote, "This did not set well with the Republican Old Guard and machine. I went round the state considerably, wrote many letters, and enlisted the help of friends whom I had known in the Liberty Loan Campaign."⁶¹ In opposition to Tobey, the Concord Monitor backed the "machine" nominee, and Tobey criticized the author of this effort as one Warren K. Billings,

⁵⁸Tobey Interview.

⁵⁹Manual for the General Court, 1919, 169.

⁶⁰Autobiography, 45.

⁶¹Ibid., 45.

who had "an unsavory reputation in the investigation of railroad payments which I instituted four years ago."⁶² Tobey's popularity among Manchester businessmen, as well as his contacts in the Liberty Loan campaign, were enough to gain him the Republican nomination in a caucus vote of 130 to 94.⁶³ That nomination guaranteed his election as Speaker in the 400-member House.

By winning this contest, Tobey succeeded in challenging the Old Guard for party leadership. He wrote to Bass, "I want to have farm representatives on business committees to break down the old conception that country representatives had that there was something mysterious about workings of the House."⁶⁴ In his autobiography, Tobey clearly outlined the power struggle as he saw it:

I realized that powerful interests get hold of Republican leaders and used their influence to put key men on committees, on key committees where they would be safe men from their standpoint or viewpoint. But there was nobody who represented the common people of the state, who was working and intriguing to have men who could faithfully represent impartially the plain people of the state on those committees. I assumed that prerogative and privilege myself.⁶⁵

It was not a matter of changing the political system, but of using it "properly." That was the key to Tobey's progressivism and it defined Tobey's later role in Congress.

As Speaker, the critical assignment to be made was that of chairman of the Finance Committee, since the major issue in each session of the

⁶²Tobey to Bass, Jan. 3, 1919, Bass Papers, Box 15.

⁶³Ibid.

⁶⁴Ibid.

⁶⁵Autobiography, 47.

legislature was the state budget. Tobey agreed to give the chairmanship to a member of the Old Guard, on the condition that the budget would come out in separate bills for vote and veto. In the end, the chairman presented a single budget and Tobey failed to achieve his goal of allowing members of the House to vote their will on separate items.⁶⁶ Duane Lockard says of New Hampshire politics that "the powers-that-be tend to convert all policy questions to economy in government, for the obvious purpose of keeping taxes down and keeping a tight check-rein on the service and regulatory functions of government."⁶⁷ Tobey was not trying to get away from this preoccupation with money, he was simply trying to broaden the base for deciding how that resource should be used.

Although Tobey failed in his challenge to the "plutocracy," he established himself as a successful candidate in spite of Old Guard opposition. That was a major achievement in New Hampshire, where Republican Party control of the legislature was accepted. It was the first example of Tobey's remarkable ability to assert his independence of party control without antagonizing members of the organization enough to suffer defeat.

The legislature adjourned in 1919 after its shortest session in history. Tobey presided over the State Constitutional Convention which ratified amendments for equal suffrage and prohibition.⁶⁸ The former was a particular advantage for Tobey, because he had depended upon many

⁶⁶Autobiography, 49.

⁶⁷Lockard, 47.

⁶⁸Squires, 50.

capable women during the Liberty Loan campaigns. The organization which he built during those years remained the nucleus of his political support, separate from the Republican Party and loyal to himself.⁶⁹ Of special significance in Tobey's correspondence during his isolationist period were two Liberty Loan friends, Mrs. Harriet Newell of Derry and Mrs. Bertha Page, wife of Elwin Page, lawyer in Concord and later a judge on the New Hampshire Supreme Court.

National affairs dominated politics in 1919, with the fight over ratification of the Versailles Treaty and American membership in the League of Nations. No concrete evidence is available for Tobey's reaction to the Treaty at the time, but his son remembered that Tobey admired Woodrow Wilson's idealism and probably did approve of the Fourteen Points.⁷⁰ This assumption is supported by Tobey's later belief that the Treaty failed to bring peace because Wilson was tricked by the Allies. During Tobey's isolationist period in the U.S. Senate, his assumption that the European Allies were responsible for the failure of Wilson's proposals was important in sustaining his position against intervention. Since his position in 1919 and 1920 did not demand that Tobey take a stand on international cooperation, he did not make his reaction to the Treaty a matter of public record.

In 1920, Tobey withdrew \$8700 from Fred Shontell's firm and went into investments by himself. He opened an office in the Amoskeag Building, the business center of Manchester, and began working as an agent

⁶⁹Tobey Interview.

⁷⁰Ibid.

for the Kidder-Peabody Company. According to his own estimation, he made a "good income" and thoroughly enjoyed a two year term as President of the Manchester Chamber of Commerce. He recalled, "I was in demand for speaking engagements on different occasions in the state, and accepted many of these."⁷¹

Tobey's political activities were minor as he concentrated on his investment business. Since Temple was eligible for representation in the 1922 election, Tobey ran again and was elected. This time he did not seek the Speaker's position, since the Democrats had a rare majority. Tobey reported, "I didn't accomplish much, but I enjoyed the experience, as always."⁷² By then, he was making enough money to buy a house in Manchester, hire a cook who remained with the family until Franc died in 1947, and enjoy the leisure of gardening. His older children, Russell and the two girls, were in high school by then and Tobey had time to enjoy young Charles, who was born in 1910. As Tobey entered his forties, he had achieved success economically and socially.

About this time, Robert Bass began speaking at public gatherings in favor of international efforts to avoid war. In so doing, Bass opposed the position taken by New Hampshire Senator George Moses. Of particular importance to the formation of Tobey's isolationist position was a speech which Bass gave to the Portsmouth Women's Club, titled "What War Means to Human Progress." In it, he stressed the appalling destruction of national wealth and human life in war, noting that this country was still spending 93% of its budget on war or its results. He

⁷¹Autobiography, 54.

⁷²Ibid., 55

criticized the declining relations with Europe since the armistice and added, "Our diminished export trade, the hard times now confronting our farmers and the depressed condition of some of our financial markets all bring convincing testimony to the economic interdependence of America and Europe."⁷³ Finally, he outlined a program for achieving better international cooperation:

- 1) political leaders should develop a desire for closer cooperation,
- 2) the people should gain closer control over international relations,
- 3) all diplomatic negotiations should be open,
- 4) there should be unceasing effort for disarmament,
- 5) differences should be arbitrated, rather than being fought out.⁷⁴

While there is no record of Tobey's specific reaction to this speech, it is likely that it represented Tobey's attitudes accurately in 1923.

Tobey approved of such international aid as Hoover's food program and he blamed governmental leaders for undermining Wilson's peace plan. The emphasis which Tobey later put on the reduction of armaments suggests that he accepted both peaceful cooperation and disarmament.

The progressives took advantage of labor unrest to challenge the upper-class pretensions of the Old Guard, but they were prevented by their own commitment to business from seeing the battle as a class struggle. Reforms like wage and hour legislation were treated as aid to free enterprise rather than solidifying the laboring class. The Democrats had won in 1922 by pledging support for union demands after strikes wracked the state's textile mills. In 1924, progressives backed John G. Winant, an attractive, young A.E.F. Captain and former teacher at

⁷³Bass to Tobey, Speech dated Dec. 12, 1923, Bass Papers, Box 22.

⁷⁴Bernard Bellush, He Walked Alone: A Biography of John Gilbert Winant (The Hague: Mouton, 1968), 65.

St. Paul's School, for governor. Winant favored a reduction in working hours, new child labor laws and more generous workman's compensation provisions. The Old Guard backed Frank Knox, owner of the Manchester paper and former progressive. Hobart Pillsbury commented, "The contest in its final stages became an unusually bitter one," but Winant was successful by 2,535 votes out of a total Republican turnout of 40,431.⁷⁵ The vote indicates a majority of the registered Republicans believed that Winant could beat the popular Democratic Governor, Fred Brown, not that they were in favor of welfare legislation.

The forty-eight-hour law for women and children was the topic of much debate during the campaign of 1924. Bass, as a member of the House in 1923, had championed a fact-finding commission to study the effects of this measure on agricultural and manufacturing interests in the state. A proposal to this effect was passed by the House with its Democratic majority, but it was defeated in the small Republican Senate, 10-12.⁷⁶ The progressives were determined to capture the governorship and a majority in the Senate in order to achieve passage of Bass' bill. As part of the drive for this measure, Charles Tobey entered the 1924 contest as a candidate for the state Senate. When elected, he challenged the Old Guard nominee for Speaker of the Senate, won the caucus nomination and assumed the role which doubles as Lieutenant Governor in New Hampshire.⁷⁷ At the same time, Winant became Governor.

⁷⁵Pillsbury, 948.

⁷⁶Ibid.

⁷⁷Autobiography, 56.

Although the progressives had achieved the top elective offices, party leadership remained in the hands of the Old Guard. As a result, Winant failed to get legislative approval for the welfare measures he specifically favored: a forty-eight-hour week, the child labor amendment to the U.S. Constitution, and more liberal unemployment compensation. Like Bass, Winant refused to cooperate with the Old Guard and his program suffered as a result.

During this period, while presiding over the Senate in 1925, Tobey made no pronouncements on foreign affairs. Even though the Locarno Pacts were being signed and debate flourished in the nation's capital over American participation in the World Court, Tobey was more concerned about state financial matters and formation of a regional development organization called the New England Council. Alarmed by the shift of textile mills to the South and disturbed by rumors that New England was "slipping," public-minded men in the six states (Maine, Vermont, New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Connecticut, Rhode Island) conceived of a regional organization to develop the economy.⁷⁸ Areas of specific concern were power and public utilities, agriculture, commerce, industry and transportation.⁷⁹ Robert Bass was put on the utilities committee, probably the most important one because it would be planning for a regional network of hydroelectric power. Tobey was assigned to the least active committee, one on resolutions.⁸⁰ However, it gave Tobey

⁷⁸Squires, 667.

⁷⁹Agenda, First New England Conference, Nov. 12-13, 1925, Bass Papers, Box 25.

⁸⁰New England Council, "Record of the First Meeting," Dec. 14, 1925, Ibid., Box 26.

an opportunity to use his political experience. That position gave him an overall knowledge of, and interest in, the whole range of special committee work. The Council later became Tobey's image of an alternative to expansion of the federal bureaucracy under the New Deal.

The factional split in New Hampshire's Republican Party opened once again in 1926, when Robert Bass opposed George Moses for his U.S. Senate seat. Bass campaigned on the record of his administration (1910-1911) and sought to inject criticism of Moses' position on questions of national policy. Moses was at the peak of his influence as President pro tem of the U.S. Senate and outspoken opponent of the World Court. Bass distributed copies of a signed editorial by William Allen White, whom Bass later supported in his drive to extend aid to the Allies in 1941, with this sketch of Moses:

Moses is a wool-dyed irreconcilable isolationist. He has isolated himself from President Coolidge, from the Republican platform and from the Republican leadership in the U.S. Senate. He has cast more minority votes against Republican administrations in the last five years than any other senator from New England....And in voting those minorities he has been on the wrong side. He has failed to support the Coolidge policy on foreign relations; he stood squarely against the Coolidge plans in the coal investigations and on the railway labor bill he openly fought the Republican Administration which was trying to carry out the pledges made in the Republican Platform. Yet he claims to be a wool-dyed regular Republican.⁸¹

On the other hand, Bass was characterized by White this way: "He has a record for good administration, for economy and for a conservative constructive labor program."⁸² That this material was used by Bass is an indication of the level at which the campaign was fought. The question

⁸¹Bass Papers, Box 26.

⁸²Ibid.

was whether being a good Republican outweighed policy differences. New Hampshire voters made a devastatingly clear choice in this election and Bass lost the primary, 17,654 to 37,655.⁸³ In that same election, Winant who later became Roosevelt's ambassador to England, ran for an unprecedented second term as governor and lost the primary by only 5,000 votes, compared to Bass' shattering setback.⁸⁴ Tobey did not run for office in 1926, although, Temple was again eligible to have a representative.

Caught up in the economic expansion of the twenties, Tobey concentrated on his investments during 1927. He became president of a shoe manufacturing company and a more active member of the New England Council. That year, the Fred M. Hoyt Shoe Company was the second largest in the state, employing some 1,252 men in Manchester.⁸⁵ Although Hoyt continued to run the firm, Tobey was elected president on the basis of his investment in the company. Representing business as well as government, Tobey enjoyed hearing Herbert Hoover, then Secretary of Commerce under Coolidge, speak to the New England Council. He reported to Bass:

Hoover talked over the economic situation and in a large sense was optimistic. He said we would never see the old time panics, that the Federal Reserve System, plus the research work carried on by different industries whereby we knew today the amount of goods on the shelves and ordered ahead, were all factors in making wide fluctuations more difficult.⁸⁶

Since Tobey handled some of Robert Bass' investments as well as backing local businesses himself, the news from Hoover was reassuring.

⁸³Manual for the General Court, 1927, 223.

⁸⁴Ibid.

⁸⁵Pillsbury, 1229.

⁸⁶Tobey to Bass, Jan. 3, 1927, Bass Papers, Box 34

When the 1927 session of the General Court adjourned at the end of March, both factions of the Republican Party met to decide on a slate of candidates for the 1928 primary. At this time, Bass was living in North Carolina for his wife's health. Tobey reported to him that the progressives, including Winant, J.P. Richardson of Dartmouth, and Elwin Page agreed to back Tobey for governor. He also remarked that Frank Knox met with George Moses to line up candidates against the Bass group.⁸⁷ By December, the two factions were unable to agree and Tobey wrote to Bass, "George is overdoing this being dictator in New Hampshire political matters."⁸⁸ Moses was not willing to back Tobey for governor.

Tobey announced his candidacy in the fall of 1927, nearly a year before the primary. His campaign was run by Styles Bridges, secretary to Bass and later U.S. Senator, and by Mrs. Harriet Newell, widow of a Tobey investment client and an organizer in the Liberty Loan drive. The Old Guard agreed to back Ora A. Brown, an influential party man. Tobey commented, "I was opposed as always by a reactionary group, sometimes called the Old Guard, or the machine...headed by Senator George Moses of Concord."⁸⁹ Tobey had a coterie of loyal workers in each city left from the Liberty Loan campaign ten years earlier, as well as the support of some regular party members.⁹⁰

⁸⁷Tobey to Bass, April 6, 1927, Ibid., Box 34.

⁸⁸Tobey to Bass, Dec. 29, 1927, Ibid., Box 34.

⁸⁹Autobiography, 57.

⁹⁰Styles Bridges, "Charles William Tobey," Granite State Monthly (1928) LX, 389.

In his campaign, Tobey stressed that he was not controlled by party bosses and also that he had been a loyal Republican.⁹¹ Tobey enjoyed the opposition of the Old Guard, because it dramatized his role as a spokesman of the "rank and file." He wrote of the campaign,

...the people want to be fair and want things above board. I found that so every time in my public life and usually they stand with you against the machinations of any political machine if they believe you are honest and sincere and get /sic/a fair degree of ability.⁹²

Experience had taught Tobey that New Hampshire voters were not influenced very much by issues and he campaigned on his personal appeal.

Aside from his anti-machine stance, Tobey's platform called for continuing enforcement of prohibition and a state road-building program that would rival Vermont's.⁹³ Tobey favored a "pay-as-you-go" program of bond issues for specific roads, rather than using general tax funds. He also advocated state assumption of responsibility for trunk roads into small towns, protection from cessation of rail facilities in rural areas and opposition to either gasoline taxes or automobile registration fees. It was a frugal program, designed to please economic conservatives.

Tobey's campaign was directed at small-town businessmen and farmers. Laborers in Manchester and Nashua generally belonged to the Democratic Party, and traditional leaders in railroads, lumbering and textiles backed the Old Guard candidate. George Moses acted directly to stop Tobey by sending the following telegram to all party leaders including Bass:

⁹¹"Campaign Material," Bass Papers, Box 34.

⁹²Autobiography, 62-63.

⁹³"Boilerplate for Weeklies," Aug. 21, 1928, Bass Papers, Box 34.

Am much exercised for result of our Primary Tuesday STOP In view of positive tariff revision upward by next Congress I am desirous that New Hampshire should show itself unmistakably in favor of my opinion for revision upward STOP Therefore I urge you to do what you can to help Brown in his fight for Governorship.⁹⁴

As Lockard suggests, the party was divided over national issues and personalities, rather than the immediate issues facing the state level of government. Moses regarded a vote for Brown as a vote for his tariff position, while a vote for Tobey would indicate that Moses could not speak for New Hampshire Republicans.

In spite of opposition from Moses, Charles Tobey won the primary by nearly 3,000 votes. The bulk of his support came from the southern counties around Manchester. The sketch-map on page 42 indicates the percentage vote for Tobey in the Republican primary of 1928, with the counties granting him more than 50% of the vote shaded. Hillsboro County, the state's most populous, was the home of both candidates.⁹⁵ The five largest cities are also included on the map to indicate the business centers in the state.


Analysis of the voting patterns by Hobart Pillsbury and Frank Musgrove indicate that Tobey's campaign strategy reached the voters he wanted to influence. Pillsbury said that Tobey won because "the progressive element of the Party was better organized and because voters refused dictation from party leaders."⁹⁶ Musgrove, Hanover Gazette editor,

⁹⁴ Undated telegram, Ibid.

⁹⁵ Data from Manual for the General Court, 1929, 285.

⁹⁶ Hanover Gazette, Sept. 20, 1928.

Map of New Hampshire
 Divided into Counties
 With the Percentage Vote for Charles Tobey
 in the Republican Primary of 1928



and a friend of Tobey's wrote:

Aside from ability, Tobey received the vote of many who refused to be told what to do. He got a solid liberal vote, but exceeded the Winant-Bass vote of 1926/ by several thousand. These votes came from Party Regulars who recognized Tobey's own record.⁹⁷

It was clear to Musgrove that Bass and Winant did not appeal to regular party members, but that Tobey worked for the party while speaking out as an independent.

Once the primary was over, Republicans combined to back Tobey. The main issue in the general election was enforcement of prohibition, which served to link the state election of 1928 with the presidential contest between Herbert Hoover and Alfred Smith. The Republicans won that election: Hoover received 115,404 in the state, compared to Smith's 80,715; Tobey trailed slightly with 108,431 to his Democratic opponent's 79,798.⁹⁸ However, in Tobey's home county, Smith beat Hoover by 5,000 votes and Tobey lost by the same margin.⁹⁹ While Tobey's primary vote was strong in Hillsboro County, a majority of the voters were actually registered Democrats. More than a third of the county's population had immigrant parents. Most of these were French-Canadians working in the textile mills of Manchester and Nashua.¹⁰⁰

⁹⁷ Ibid., Sept. 13, 1928.

⁹⁸ Manual for the General Court, 1929, 363.

⁹⁹ Ibid., 367.

¹⁰⁰ In 1930, total population of Hillsborough County was 140,165. 55,306 were foreign-born or had mixed parentage; of that 27,106 were French-Canadian. U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Fifteenth Census of the United States: 1930 (Washington: U.S. G.P.O., 1932), 166, 168.

Samuel Lubell cites the 1928 election as the turning point away from Republican ascendancy, as the "coming of age" for thousands of first-generation Americans who would support the Roosevelt Revolution.¹⁰¹ As the population figures indicate, Tobey lived in just such an area. As long as the Republicans outnumbered the Democrats as they do in the rural sections of New Hampshire, strong party identification would be an advantage to Tobey because the party would bring him votes even where he was not well-known. However, Lockard says that there is no consistent geographical alignment to one faction or the other within the Republican Party, so Tobey still had to project his own personality as a "yankee independent" to gain a primary victory. These political pressures on Tobey later encouraged his isolationism. In 1928, the Democratic vote indicated that Lubell's analysis was relevant to Hillsboro County. Lockard supports that thesis in his analysis of voting patterns and he says that the large size and low income of French-Canadian workers "suggest an explanation of why Roosevelt carried the state three times."¹⁰²

Of the 1928 election, James Squires wrote,

Hoover and Tobey, of course were victors not alone because of their attitude on the "dry" issue, but also because they were beneficiaries of many other factors, including the widespread prosperity which was characteristic of the American scene in the autumn of 1928. Unfortunately, as Governor Tobey was to discover, this happy condition was not to endure for long.¹⁰³

When the stock market dropped in October and November, 1929, the winter session of the legislature was over and Tobey was trying to decide

¹⁰¹Lubell, 43-68.

¹⁰²Lockard, 67.

¹⁰³Squires, 666.

whether he should attempt a second term as governor. He wrote, "I became financially very much involved because of loans I had, the collateral of which had shrunk to almost nothing and I felt myself in a precarious position."¹⁰⁴

Publically, Governor Tobey echoed the hopeful statements of President Hoover. This description was rendered by a member of the opposing Republican faction a decade later:

President Hoover and his Party seemed to reason that this boom was, in fact, sound prosperity, and that it could go on indefinitely.... Governor Tobey, himself a stock and bond broker, naturally followed President Hoover's ideas, and hence he took no heroic steps to restrain the mounting evils of exploiters. Even after the crash Governor Tobey echoed President Hoover's slogan that "prosperity was just around the corner," etc. Consequently, he took no positive action, and raised no cry to Washington looking toward "relief," or toward checking the financial inundation....The previous Republican platform, in fact, had solemnly resolved that "Federal relief" was not "the American way."¹⁰⁵

The hindsight writing of this account reveals the extent to which even conservative Republicans accepted the necessity of federal aid after the New Deal.

Like other governors in New Hampshire, Tobey spent only two years in office. He was spared the worst of the Depression. As he left, his exaugural address outlined the situation in optimistic terms:

The world-wide financial and industrial depression which all of us have felt directly or indirectly during the past year has given rise to many problems, perhaps the most distressing being that of unemployment. I am pleased to report that based upon careful surveys made from many sources, the situation in New Hampshire is not as

¹⁰⁴Autobiography, 74.

¹⁰⁵John Bartlett, A Synoptic History of the Granite State (New York: M.S. Donohue and Co., 1939), 121.

bad, probably, as in many of our sister states. From the most recent summaries made, about 80% of normal employment obtains in New Hampshire at the present time.¹⁰⁶

Tobey had expanded the number of jobs available by going ahead with the road-building program which was already funded. Otherwise he did not request large-scale federal aid, even though New Hampshire contained industrial areas on the verge of bankruptcy.

Tobey's personal distress was revealed in his autobiography. "I felt I must get back and try to save what I could in my business," he wrote, even after his wife Franc urged him to seek a second term as governor, "so I did not run, but we had to live hand-to-mouth the next two years."¹⁰⁷ Of the years between his governorship and his entry into the U.S. House of Representatives, Tobey wrote, "pessimism was triumphant, relief rolls were staggering. No one who did not live through that era and who did not have financial obligations can comprehend the extent of the disaster and apprehension which gripped the hearts of men."¹⁰⁸ It was the tone of a man in doubt as to the future. That was a new position for Tobey, whose faith in America and its system of democratic capitalism seemed justified by his own experience until 1929.

At this time however, Tobey's fears for America were probably no greater than those of many other men. He made public speeches based on optimistic predictions, not on examining the causes for depression. He did not talk about unpaid war loans, nor was his later isolationism in

¹⁰⁶Charles W. Tobey, Exaugural Address: January 7, 1931 (New York: M.S. Donohue and Co., 1939) 3.

¹⁰⁷Autobiography, 74.

¹⁰⁸Ibid., 75.

evidence.¹⁰⁹ As governor of a state where little was produced for the export market, where textile manufacturers supported higher tariffs and less foreign competition, Tobey's attention had been focused on local problems. He indicated no real interest in American foreign policy during or immediately following his gubernatorial term.

His own financial difficulties consumed Tobey's attention during 1932. He decided to leave business and run for the U.S. House of Representatives. The decision may have been financial in good part, for soon after he won the primary in September, 1932, he wrote, "I could hardly wait for the time to come when I would receive my salary as a Congressman, but that would not begin until March of 1933."¹¹⁰ The main issue in the campaign was also financial: whether the government should pay a bonus to veterans of the World War. Tobey campaigned against the bonus while urging "liberal treatment" of disabled veterans, and his Republican opponent avoided committing himself either way.¹¹¹ Both candidates agreed that the Congress should reduce expenditures and should not cancel war debts owed to the United States. Tobey also opposed repeal of the prohibition amendment and was pledged to aid the Republican nominee, Herbert Hoover, saying, "It would be folly to supplant him with a man less familiar with the trying experience of the last few years."¹¹²

¹⁰⁹"Tobey Scrapbook, 1929-1930," Tobey Papers, Box 118.

¹¹⁰Autobiography, 76.

¹¹¹Concord Monitor, Sept. 9, 1932.

¹¹²Ibid., Aug. 10, 1932.

The November election of 1932 replaced Republicans with Democrats in New Hampshire as it did throughout the nation. George Moses was defeated by former Democratic Governor Fred H. Brown in his bid for re-election to the U.S. Senate. A Democrat won the other Congressional seat. Both Republicans elected on New Hampshire's short ballot belonged to the progressive faction: Tobey to the House of Representatives and John Winant to the governorship.¹¹³

Tobey took his wife and two sons to Washington D.C. for Franklin D. Roosevelt's inauguration. Russell was then thirty years old and an employee of the New Hampshire Department of Forestry. Charles Junior, then twenty-two, wanted to go to law school and he would soon become his father's office manager in Washington. Russell recalled that his father was deeply disappointed that Hoover was defeated so thoroughly in the election, and he took the family to meet the former President when they arrived in the capital. However, Tobey was also excited by the changes which Roosevelt promised to bring. Russell remembered that his father was particularly impressed by Roosevelt's swift action in declaring a Bank Holiday.¹¹⁴ Tobey entered Congress ready to support drastic relief measures in order to prevent total collapse of America's economic system.

In summary, Tobey's pre-Congressional career did not make him an isolationist but the probability of his becoming one was there. Of primary importance was Tobey's domestic orientation, which grew out of

¹¹³Squires, 695.

¹¹⁴Tobey Interview.

his parochial background. His political experience was limited to state politics which, in New Hampshire, was dominated by the Republican party. Although voting patterns were shifting in favor of the Democrats, the Old Guard had both the money and the organization to affect legislative decisions. In this environment, Tobey supported the conservative economic policies of the Republican Party while asserting his independence on issues that were considered more peripheral. For instance, the accomplishment during this governorship of which he was most proud was the exposure of inhumane conditions at the state children's home.¹¹⁵ That was a personally rewarding crusade for Tobey and one which the party would not criticize.

Tobey's only contact with war led him to the position that American intervention in 1917 had been a result of Allied propaganda. During the war, he directed the Liberty Loan campaign, in which idealism and support of the war effort became selling slogans. There was to tempering reality to his hopes for "making the world safe for democracy" until Wilson's proposals foundered with the help of George Moses in the Senate. Robert Bass also contributed to Tobey's rejection of war by speaking and writing against it as a waste of human and material resources. Finally, while he was governor, Tobey visited Bedford Hospital, a state institution filled with the pitiful human wrecks of World War I.¹¹⁶ That, coupled with the stock market crash, aroused Tobey to fear war and it later developed into conscious isolationism.

¹¹⁵Autobiography, 73.

¹¹⁶U.S. Congressional Record, 73rd Cong., 1st Sess., 1761.

II. CONCERN FOR AMERICA: CONGRESS, 1933-38

Although the economic crisis in America dominated Congressional attention in 1933, growing unrest in Europe and Asia excited some attention to the question of American arms shipments. During Hoover's Administration, there was a Senate inquiry into the possibility that naval interests had sabotaged disarmament negotiations in London, but the committee made no official report.¹ At Geneva in February, 1932, President Hoover urged the abolition of offensive weapons by international agreement, both to preserve peace and cut down the heavy defense expenditure that was preventing repayment of war debts to America. When President Roosevelt took office in March, 1933, Germany and Japan had embarked on aggressive policies that would eventually lead to World War II. While the prospect of disarmament was dim, Roosevelt favored the limitation of American arms shipments to aggressor nations. A bill to give the President such discretionary powers was introduced in April by the Chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, Sol Bloom of New York.

Opposition to this discretionary embargo, which Tobey joined, was led by Republican Representative Hamilton Fish of New York. He claimed that the act would provide for entrance into the League of Nations, that it would destroy the policy of traditional American neutrality and that an embargo would undoubtedly involve this nation in a war with Japan.² Fish wanted to retain unilateral control of American policy,

¹John T. Wiltz, In Search of Peace: The Senate Munitions Inquiry, 1934-1936 (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1963), 8-13.

²Congressional Record, 73rd Cong., 1st Sess., 1696-98.

rather than cooperating with the League of Nations in an embargo, and he favored retention of neutral trading rights over the possibility that such trade might involve this nation in a war. This position is labelled "belligerent isolationism" by Manfred Jonas in his study of Isolationism in America, 1935-41.³ He says that the belligerent isolationists were ready to defend American freedom of the seas with war if necessary. This was the position taken by the Old Guard faction in New Hampshire, and it made their support for arming American merchant ships in 1941 a logical step from isolationism to belligerency.

Charles Tobey did not believe that protection of American trading rights was worth the risk of war. Although he joined Fish in denouncing the President's request for discretionary embargo powers, Tobey's opposition was directed toward avoiding the possibility of war altogether. In the only speech of his first session in Congress, Tobey cautioned:

...the United States should not have as its aim the mere handicapping or punishing of the aggressor nation, which obviously would accrue to the advantage of the opponent in the conflict. Our objective should be more worthwhile. It is, or should be, the peace of the world. I hold that any traffic in arms and munitions thwarts this high purpose and therefore, in my judgment, should be barred.⁴

Not only would he stop the sale of arms to any belligerent, but Tobey proposed a unilateral embargo on raw materials. He justified this restriction as a way of avoiding the situation which drew this nation into World War I. Without peace, Tobey said, the struggle to balance the budget and lower taxes would be doomed.⁵ That domestic problem

³Jonas, 54.

⁴Cong. Record, 73rd Cong., 1st Sess., 1761.

⁵Ibid.

was more important to Tobey than the question of arms limitation itself.

Citing Republican efforts to curb the shipment of arms, Tobey stated in the same Congressional Speech that the Geneva Disarmament Conference of 1925 was undermined by "the contemptible machinations of the armament and shipping concerns," and he charged these interests with encouraging war for their own profits.

Now, the most powerful and at the same time the most subtle enemy of disarmament, and therefore of peace, is the armament ring, so called, a group of munition and armament makers in almost every nation, ours included. They have been active in fomenting war scares and in encouraging their own countries to increase armaments. They have attempted to bribe government officials both at home and abroad. They have disseminated false reports as to the military programs of foreign countries. They have sought to influence public newspapers in their own and foreign countries.

All these statements have been substantiated by investigations, and yet this subtle influence persists....I am sorry for those whose anger does not rise at the devilishness of such work.

This outcry in the House of Representatives came nearly a year before publication of "Arms and the Men" in Fortune, Merchants of Death by H.C. Engelbrecht and F.C. Hanighen, or Iron, Blood and Profits by George Seldes, all credited with stirring public interest in the activities of armament makers.⁶ Evidently Tobey was informed of the Senate investigations concerning the Geneva Conference and he agreed with the popular opinion that naval interests had undermined agreements there.

In addition to his suspicion of the arms "ring" Tobey had reservations about giving too much discretion to President Roosevelt. In a letter which Tobey wrote to the Rochester (N.H.) Courier about the embargo measure, he said:

⁶Warren I. Cohen, The American Revisionists: The Lessons of Intervention in World War I (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1967), 144; Wiltz, 19-21; Jonas, 141.

What I objected to is giving the President, or anyone, the power to choose which nation is the aggressor nation, feeling that such action, if taken, might well be more a cause of war than conducting toward peace. More than that, he could only place the embargo on shipments after the nations were in conflict. I hold that this is not an aid to peace, and that the only honest-to-goodness embargo is one which stops all shipments of arms to all nations. If we believe in peace, we should go that far.⁷

Tobey supported the position which President Hoover had taken in Geneva to ban offensive weapons. He opposed Roosevelt's request for discretionary embargo powers because it did not go far enough.

At this time, Tobey did not assume that the President would misuse powers that were delegated to him by Congress. On domestic matters, he was willing to grant temporary authority to the Executive. In fact, Tobey was criticized by the American Legion in New Hampshire for granting too much discretion to the President by voting with the Democrats for the President's economy bill. He wrote to the Manchester Leader, evening paper of the Union-Leader Company,

I have the privilege of supporting President Roosevelt one-hundred per cent and voted for HR 2820 entitled "A bill to maintain the credit of the United States Government." You say the American Legion objects to giving the President this power. I believe if this is the attitude of the legion it is a mistake. The nation is facing the greatest emergency in a century today. It is the duty of every member of Congress, in my judgment, to give the President the authority he asks to meet the emergency. The whole is greater than the part. I believe we can and should trust the President in this great national crisis.⁸

He did not favor a permanent change in the balance of powers between Congress and the President, but the depression demanded unusual procedures.

⁷Rochester Courier, May 12, 1933.

⁸Manchester Leader, March 13, 1933.

In addition, the Economy Bill in question was not a radical departure from economic tradition. Basil Rauch characterized the bill as "pleasing to the conservatives" who favored a balanced budget.⁹ William Leuchtenburg calls it "an exceptionally conservative document."¹⁰ Tobey was able to stretch his ideas to include the President's limited request for extra powers, but he recognized no such need in foreign affairs.

During the famous Hundred Days period when the Roosevelt Administration presented so many proposals to get the national economy moving again, Tobey was willing to experiment with corporate answers. Even though the American Legion tried to point out Roosevelt's "un-American" proposals, the effort failed to elicit debate over ideology. Economic necessity made people ready to accept new answers, although many like Tobey regarded these as temporary departures.

Commenting on Representative Tobey's record during the Hundred Days, the Manchester Union publicized his support of Roosevelt:

Representative Tobey of New Hampshire, Republican of the rock-ribbed variety in normal times, has his own ideas of members of his party who resort to partisan tactics in what he terms "these times of emergency."

Tobey has voted for most of the administration measures presented thus far and characterizes as "pinheaded politicians" those members of his party who have attempted to delay legislation which from the outset was certain of passage.¹¹

Tobey's retort to those who questioned his support of the Democratic

⁹Basil Rauch, The History of the New Deal (New York: Creative Age Press, 1944), 62.

¹⁰William Leuchtenburg, Franklin D. Roosevelt and the New Deal (New York: Harper and Row, 1963), 43.

¹¹Manchester Union, April 8, 1933.

Administration was based partially on the fact that the legislation would pass anyway. However, when his isolationism became a minority position in 1941, he did not join the majority just to pass laws that would be approved anyway. He favored Roosevelt's early proposals and needed some way to justify his position to the conservative Republicans in New Hampshire.

Tobey did not continue his support for the New Deal when the Administration shifted its emphasis from relief to reform in 1934. Arthur Schlesinger Jr. discusses the change in terms of economic ideas, from self-regulated industry toward collectivism as it was manifested in the management of agriculture.¹² When Roosevelt began to move toward reorganizing the economy, the New Hampshire Yankee in Tobey began to rebel.

Tobey's opposition to the Administration was first asserted in the realm of defense expenditures. From the funds allocated for public works under provisions of the National Recovery Act, \$238 million went for naval construction, "a move which helped touch off a new naval armaments race in the Pacific."¹³ The Portsmouth Navy Yard, a government construction facility in New Hampshire's only seaport, would benefit directly from the expenditure. Tobey was therefore affected by the measure. In January, 1934, most Democrats backed the Vinson Navy Bill to bring the American Navy up to treaty strength, as set by the Washington Conference in 1922 and the London Conference of 1930. Republicans generally opposed the measure because they were concerned about expenditures, as well as

¹²Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., The Coming of the New Deal (Boston: Houghton-Mifflin Co., 1959), 212-215.

¹³Leuchtenburg, 215.

the possibility that such construction would undermine disarmament efforts which they associated with the former Republican Administration.¹⁴ The minority party used this issue to criticize the President, who was known as a "big Navy" man willing to combine the need for jobs with defense preparations.

During House debates on the Vinson Bill, Charles Tobey made his most significant contribution to legislation in 1934. Citing President Roosevelt's earlier request that profits be removed from war, Tobey offered an amendment limiting profits on naval construction to 10%.¹⁵ His proposal was more lenient than one suggested in 1931 by Hoover's War Policies Commission, in which profits would be limited to 5% during wartime.¹⁶ In Tobey's own words, he got the idea for this amendment from Ted Lewis, son of the University of New Hampshire's president, who spoke to Tobey about "the high cost of armaments and exorbitant profits in ship construction."¹⁷ It is worth noting that, as a government facility, the Portsmouth Navy Yard would not be affected by Tobey's amendment.

The House voted to accept Tobey's amendment, recommending to the conference committee that all profits be taxed under the 10% rule.¹⁸

¹⁴Cong. Record, 73rd Cong., 2nd Sess., 1597.

¹⁵Ibid.

¹⁶Wiltz, 15

¹⁷Autobiography, 77.

¹⁸Cong. Record, 73rd Cong., 2nd Sess., 1630.

When the measure was returned for final approval, only profits over \$50,000 would be taxed because, as Vinson reminded Tobey, the cost of auditing these accounts would be more than the savings.¹⁹ However, Tobey was sustained on a point of order and the measure was returned to the conference committee on March 21, 1934. The next day, the Vinson Bill was back for approval with profits over \$10,000 to be taxed and Tobey later remarked with satisfaction, "It returned some \$10 million to the Treasury in excess profits taxes."²⁰ It is evident in this transaction that Tobey was more concerned about saving money than he was about stopping defense construction. While his proposal spotlighted Tobey in apparent opposition to the Administration, which was politically useful in his economy-minded state, it did not hinder defense spending. Its purpose, he explained to his son Russell, was to "keep the fat cats from raping the rank and file."²¹

The debate over Tobey's 10% provision took place before Senator Gerald P. Nye of North Dakota began his committee's famous investigation of the munitions industry. However, it occurred in the same "revisionist" atmosphere. As described by Manfred Jonas,

It was not difficult for a nation in the throes of a severe economic crisis to accept the idea that all calamities, war included, have economic causes. Nor was it hard for a people disabused of their faith in business leadership to believe that American commercial and financial interests were largely responsible for this country's involvement in the First World War.²²

¹⁹Ibid., 5027.

²⁰Autobiography, 78.

²¹Tobey Interview.

²²Jonas, 140.

An intellectual group described by Warren I. Cohen in The American Revisionists had begun questioning American participation in the war early in the twenties. However, the movement did not become widespread until the depression focused attention on why the economic structure collapsed so suddenly and so completely. Cohen says that ordinary people were then ready to hear that commercial interests had led this country into the war.²³

In 1931, Hoover's War Policies Commission had experienced little congressional interest in its findings although there was a flurry of newspaper headlines decrying the "subversive" influence of lobbyists.²⁴ However, the threat of war was greater in 1934 and peace societies found more support for their ideas in the new Congress. Manfred Jonas notes, "From the outset (of the revisionist mood), the most obvious candidates for the role of the modern devil were the munitions makers."²⁵ While Tobey was not attacking manufacturers directly with his 10% clause, he was responsive to the isolationist mood of the American public.

Tobey's addition to the Vinson Navy Bill occurred just before Tobey faced re-election in 1934. New Hampshire was torn by textile strikes during the primary campaign. As William Leuchtenburg explained, "the walkout, aimed as much at the NRA's Cotton Code Authority as at the operators, ended in failure when the union found itself outmanned by the industrialists and the state governors...."²⁶ The codes were

²³Cohen, 120, 130.

²⁴Wiltz, 15.

²⁵Jonas, 141-43.

²⁶Leuchtenburg, 113.

criticized by former President Hoover in an article for the Saturday Evening Post entitled "The Challenge to Liberty." The article decried economic regimentation and declared that the American people were faced with a dangerous threat to their human liberty.²⁷ The implication was that a Republican Congress, if elected in November, would protect the public from this Democratic threat.

The Manchester newspapers hailed Hoover's article and backed the more conservative Republican candidate, Styles Bridges, for governor against the incumbent, John Winant. Governor Winant was considered to be "soft on labor" because he had not used troops to break the textile strikes.²⁸ Robert Blood, editor of the Union, commented, on the day before the primary, "Fundamentally the issue before the country today is whether we can solve our problems and still preserve our American system and constitutional rights which we enjoy; or whether we are to launch forth on a vast Socialist experiment."²⁹ Because of his early support for the New Deal, Tobey received little coverage during the primary election even though he represented the Second District in which Manchester is located.

Although he received little help from the Union, he was not opposed by an Old Guard candidate. Tobey won the primary with 12,789 votes, 7500 more than his nearest rival.³⁰ In November the Democrats put up

²⁷Manchester Union, Sept. 4, 1934.

²⁸Ibid., Sept. 11, 1934.

²⁹Ibid.

³⁰Ibid., Sept. 12, 1934.

a strong slate of candidates, but Tobey won over Harry Metcalf of Newport, 42,706 to 37,122.³¹ In the same election, Styles Bridges won election as governor with a much smaller margin over his opponent John Sullivan, 89,481 to 87,019.³² These figures suggest that many New Hampshire voters favored the relief measures offered by the New Deal, which Tobey supported and Bridges was critical of, but that the Republican Party still had a majority of disciplined voters.

As Congress convened in 1935 and Tobey began his second term, the Nye Committee continued its investigation of the munitions industry. The question of war profits was also studied by a presidential committee. Both groups submitted legislation to curb profits with taxes similar to the Tobey 10% clause. In May, debate and amendment of both measures stirred public interest in the whole question of munitions. John Wiltz writes,

At this point the drive to enact war profit industrial mobilization legislation lost momentum. Americans were becoming troubled over mounting tension in East Africa, and as events moved toward conflict they cast to the background the question of how to mobilize for war. The new problem was how to stay out of war. A result was legislation of the following August, the Neutrality Act of 1935.³³

Although Wiltz assumes that the 10% clause was part of a mobilization effort, that was not Tobey's intent. He regarded it primarily from the economic standpoint of returning money to the Treasury to pay for the defense program. As Wiltz indicates however, public interest shifted away from curbing profits to staying out of war.

³¹U.S. Congressional Directory, 74th Cong., 1st Sess., 1935, 67.

³²Wiltz, 132.

³³Ibid., 143.

Charles Tobey did not recognize that events had superceded his attack on war profits. When the Vinson Navy Bill came up for reconsideration in June, Tobey tried to tighten the tax regulation. Contractors had succeeded in getting committee approval for balancing the profits of one contract against the losses of another. Tobey wanted to eliminate this provision. He was quoted in the Manchester paper as saying, "I believe the law is sound and just, let each contract stand on its own feet. These contractors will look after themselves. There is no need for the government to become a nursemaid to them."³⁴ To bolster his argument, Tobey cited evidence presented before the Nye Committee that companies were jacking-up costs instead of reporting their profits.

During this debate, Tobey revealed a position that did not endear him to conservative Republicans. When questioned by a Democrat as to whether the government should take over the manufacture of all war supplies, Tobey answered, "In my opinion, that is the only way to get rid of these people."³⁵ In the end, Tobey failed in his effort to have the Vinson Bill recommitted in order to remove the balancing clause by a vote of 130 to 208.³⁶ He had antagonized Republicans who favored unfettered manufacture of goods for trade and he was opposed by Democrats who backed the President's request for a larger navy.

In disappointment over his defeat, Tobey charged that the House was being manipulated by munitions makers:

³⁴Manchester Union, June 13, 1935.

³⁵Ibid.

³⁶Cong. Record, 74th Cong., 1st Sess., 9202-03.

For many years I have known of the great amount of money that has been expended by certain shipbuilding, aircraft and other large interests in this country to influence legislation, to corrupt men in public life, to send men overseas to disrupt a Geneva Conference, to bring about not peace but rather to foment war through their sales of munitions, ships and aircraft to foreign governments.³⁷

An interesting footnote on the issue was the announcement by the Union one week later, that the first submarine built with NRA funds had been completed at the Portsmouth Navy Yard, which, of course, was not subject to the excess-profits tax levied on private shipbuilders.³⁸

While Tobey worked to retain his excess-profits tax, he recorded no early reaction to President Roosevelt's differences with the Supreme Court. He probably regarded its pronouncements as infallible and its membership inviolable. Late in May, the Court invalidated the NRA with its decision on interstate transport of live chickens. William Leuchtenburg writes, "not only had the Court destroyed Roosevelt's industrial recovery program, but, by its narrow interpretation of the commerce clause, it threatened the remainder of the New Deal."³⁹ Then the President announced that Congress would not adjourn until it had passed the following "must" legislation: the social security bill, the Wagner labor proposal, a banking bill, a public utility holding company measure and later, a "seek the rich" tax scheme. The Union reacted immediately as Robert Blood wrote,

The danger of the situation is obvious. Instead of a government by laws determined by the representatives of the people, which is the essence of our democracy, our laws become the dictates of an

³⁷Ibid., 9203.

³⁸Manchester Union, June 21, 1935.

³⁹Leuchtenburg, 145.

individual---the very thing which the framers of the Constitution sought to avoid. If the laws are unconstitutional, we have resort to the Supreme Court; but if the essential framework of our government is demolished, there is no court of appeal but the people themselves.⁴⁰

Blood invited public response through the 1936 elections.

Every one of these "little NRA" measures won Congressional approval before adjournment in August, and Arthur Schlesinger Jr. adds this sober note in his analysis of that summer: "In the end, the basic change in 1935 was in atmosphere---a certain lowering of ideals, waning of hopes, narrowing of possibilities, a sense that things were not opening out, but closing in."⁴¹ Tobey made no speeches, issued no statements, nor did he correspond much that summer. Based on his later speeches, this period seems to be the one in which his fears for America began to rise.

Otis Graham in Encore for Reform described the reactions of well-known progressives to this period. In a sample that included Tobey's mentor, Robert Bass, Graham concluded, "Theirs had been an effort to free the individual, and when it came time to choose between individualism and social reforms that could only be reached through unprecedented legal coercion, their choice merely reminds us of the original priorities."⁴² While Tobey came late to the progressive group in New Hampshire, he shared the goals and values of those men. Tobey's faith in America placed more emphasis on individualism than on corporate action. The legislation passed in 1935 legalized an elaborate governmental

⁴⁰Manchester Union, June 15, 1935.

⁴¹Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., The Politics of Upheaval (Boston: Houghton-Mifflin Co., 1960), 397.

⁴²Graham, 67.

bureaucracy which conflicted with Tobey's deepest values and he shared the alienation which Graham found among the "old progressives."

The "lowering of ideals" and "narrowing of possibilities" also occurred in foreign affairs. As Hitler announced German rearmament and Italy threatened Ethiopia, events preceding World War I seemed to be repeating themselves and revisionist thinking focused sharply on specific plans for keeping America out of another war. Throughout July, Congress argued over making the arms embargo mandatory in case of any war or discretionary, as the President requested. Fears of presidential dictatorship, arising with Roosevelt's demand for his "must" legislation, influenced debate.⁴³ With the threat of a filibuster against adjournment, Congress approved the mandatory embargo 79 to 2 in the Senate and without a roll call in the House.⁴⁴ It was a strong statement by the legislative branch against President Roosevelt, based partly on the desire to preserve constitutional prerogatives in foreign relations and partly on the rising fear of war.

Robert Osgood terms the period between 1935 and 1941 "the new neutrality." Having outlined isolationism as a major idea behind American foreign policy from the beginning, he says that "this isolationism of the thirties was distinguished from the isolationism of other periods not by the number of its adherents but by the number of its opponents."⁴⁵

⁴³Leuchtenburg, 219.

⁴⁴Cong. Record, 74th Cong., 1st Sess., 14434.

⁴⁵Robert Osgood, Ideals and Self-Interest in America's Foreign Relations: The Great Transformation of the Twentieth Century (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1953), 364.

The key to this change lay in the realities of European and Asian politics, as it became apparent to more Americans that no unilateral decision to avoid war might be enough to protect the life which Americans valued. A growing number of Americans began to recognize that this country would not stand by while Britain was defeated by a totalitarian power. That tie was one which isolationists like Charles Tobey refused to recognize.

Manfred Jonas identifies the Neutrality Act of 1935 as the first real question which divided the isolationists. There was a break between the "belligerent isolationists," who were willing to fight over American rights to trade with nations of war, and "timid isolationists," who were willing to forego trade in order to avoid war.⁴⁶ Tobey belonged to the latter group, on the basis of his 1933 foreign policy speech. When the Neutrality Act came up for renewal in 1936 he said, "The price [of peace] is the foregoing of opportunities for profit that have heretofore accrued from trade and commerce with belligerents."⁴⁷ He called for elimination of loans or credits to belligerents and continuation of the travel ban on belligerent ships.

Tobey was also critical of increasing defense expenditures for this country. Speaking of President Roosevelt, he said, "I cannot refrain from pointing out that while he called for peace and received neutrality legislation, his faith in such agencies does not seem well grounded, for in his Budget Message he has called for a tremendous increase in the

⁴⁶Jonas, 175.

⁴⁷Cong. Record, 74th Cong., 2nd Sess., 163-64.

appropriations for Army and Navy."⁴⁸ The President belonged to that group which Osgood identifies as becoming more realistic about the ties which America had with other countries. Tobey had not been very critical of defense expenditures until this time, concentrating on his profits tax rather than lower military construction. But after his quiet summer of 1935, there was a definite hardening of Tobey's isolationism as well as a growing distrust of President Roosevelt's motives.

Tobey thought about the expense of war in other contexts than debate on the neutrality measure. Relative to an appropriation for the eradication of Dutch Elm disease, Tobey charged that "the amount asked in this amendment is less than the price of one torpedo boat or one destroyer, if you please; and if we can stop this thing before it spreads to wider areas it will be worth all its cost."⁴⁹ Arguing for another amendment to the agricultural appropriations bill which would provide money for statistical services to poultrymen, Tobey begged, "the amount requested is small, being less than the price of one airplane, but it would aid and encourage the poultry growers the Nation over."⁵⁰ Both statements indicate Tobey's preoccupation with money, gained partially from his long experience in New Hampshire politics.

Not only did cost consciousness determine Tobey's foreign policy approach, but his parochialism made it difficult for him to see why foreign trade should not be sacrificed to avoid entanglements. In defense of import quotas he said,

⁴⁸Ibid., 365.

⁴⁹Ibid., 2961.

⁵⁰Ibid., 2992.

China, that far away country in the old world, is flooding this country with eggs and egg powder, the result of production from farmers using cheap labor and living far below our American standards. They are competing and injuring our American poultry farmers.⁵¹

That was practically the extent of Tobey's thinking about Asia. In all of his statements about American foreign policy, he concentrated on the threat to American independence of action from European politics.

Like many other Republicans in 1936, Tobey was caught between his belief in limited government spending and the need for aid to his constituents. Lower defense appropriations offered a convenient answer as long as there was no major threat to America. Tobey blamed partisan politics when money could be spent for a bigger navy and not for eradicating Dutch Elm disease. As he explained to a constituent who inquired about the Agricultural appropriation measure, "I urged the [Ways and Means] Committee to take some action on this legislation, but I am a Republican and this is still a Democratic Administration. We oftentimes strive in vain to be helpful and our efforts are made impotent by the intense degree of partisanship which prevails here."⁵² Belonging to the minority party was a new experience for Tobey. It was, of course, an election year and he hoped that the Republicans would gain a majority in Congress.

In New Hampshire, the textile strikes of 1934 had finally closed the Amoskeag Mill, largest in the state. Commented the Manchester Union, still owned by Frank Knox who was now the Republican vice-presidential

⁵¹Ibid., 2993.

⁵²Tobey to E.F. Arnold, June 18, 1936, Tobey Papers, Box 78.

candidate, "The unemployed [workers] can be returned to their jobs only by removing the restraints to the ability, industry and ingenuity of the American people. The government has already proved its inability to do more than administer relief."⁵³ Regarding the split taking place between the non-partisan, craft-oriented American Federation of Labor (AFL) and the newly organized, more militant Congress of Industrial Organization (CIO), the Union concluded, "on the whole, class consciousness in labor will be intensified and the unity and independence of political domination that have been one of the chief sources of strength of the American labor movement will have been destroyed."⁵⁴ This statement recalls Samuel Lubell's interpretation of the Roosevelt Revolution. City workers without jobs were not drawn to Republican images of Hoover's "rugged individualism" and self-sufficiency. The Union correctly identified the CIO movement as a threat to traditional politics, without realizing that a permanent change had already taken place because there had been a shift in voting population.⁵⁵

Again Tobey received very little newspaper coverage as he sought a third term in the House of Representatives. A more important battle was going on between Governor Styles Bridges and former-Senator George Moses over the Republican nomination to the U.S. Senate. The contest did not focus on policy differences between the two men, but on their relative ages and the possibility of effective Republican influence in

⁵³Manchester Union, Sept. 7, 1936.

⁵⁴Ibid., Sept. 9, 1936.

⁵⁵Lubell, 46.

the Senate.⁵⁶ When the votes were counted, Bridges won his party's nomination to the Senate by 13,000 votes out of some 75,000 cast.⁵⁷ That election marked the end of Moses' control over the Old Guard in New Hampshire, and the beginning of Bridges' leadership in the party.⁵⁸ In the same primary, Tobey received 23,208 to his nearest rival's 4,084.⁵⁹ The vote for Tobey had nearly doubled since 1934, while the total vote for his three competitors remained about the same. In November, both Bridges and Tobey won seats in Congress although New Hampshire joined forty-five other states in casting her electoral votes for Franklin Roosevelt as he was returned to the White House.

Politics influenced Tobey to speak out on political issues more frequently during his third term in Congress. Sometime before June, 1937, Tobey had decided to run for the Senate in 1938. On June 3, he wrote to James P. Richardson concerning the announcement made by Old Guard candidate Eliot Carter, "I am amazed that Carter has decided to run for the U.S. Senate, he knows I plan to run."⁶⁰ He revived his correspondence with Robert Bass, then residing in Tucson, Arizona, for his wife's health, and suggested that the time was right for progressive leadership in the Republican Party.⁶¹ Tobey wrote to another friend

⁵⁶Manchester Union, Sept. 15, 1936.

⁵⁷Ibid., Sept. 17, 1936.

⁵⁸Lockard, 50.

⁵⁹Manchester Union, Sept. 17, 1936.

⁶⁰June 3, 1937, Tobey Papers, Box 78.

⁶¹March 23, 1937, Ibid., Box 78.

saying, "I am delighted if I had some liberal leadership and whatever I had still exists because I have not change /sic/in any way, but I have lost confidence in the sincerity of purpose of the man in the White House."⁶²

For Tobey, the two issues which dominated the political scene during 1937 were the sit-down strikes plaguing major industries and Roosevelt's effort to change the Supreme Court. Linking these events with state politics, Tobey wrote to Judge Elwin Page in Concord, "This John L. Lewis is a thug....I imagine John Winant esteems his friendship. It angers me to have our old friend, John, cuddle up so close to the Administration and swallow all these things."⁶³ Winant, who had been elected governor of New Hampshire in 1924, 1930 and 1932, had joined the Administration as a member of the Social Security Board. Of the court-packing plan, Tobey lamented to Page that "all three branches will have been absorbed into the Executive," and he concluded,

Well, we are bound to reap the whirlwind from all that has been going on the last five years. God save America! It is apparent that Congress cannot do it. What are your and my children going to face the next thirty to fifty years? I hate to try to forecast.⁶⁴

While Tobey was critical of President Roosevelt for the policies he was pursuing, he was even more concerned about the willingness of Congress to approve Administration programs. In this letter, he related Roosevelt's activities to the domestic situation in Germany and concluded

⁶²Tobey to W.T. Whittle, March 26, 1937, Ibid. Box 78.

⁶³Feb. 8, 1937, Ibid. Box 78.

⁶⁴Ibid.

that "if he should succeed in forcing the passing of this legislation in this country we may well adopt the cry of the Nazis, 'Hail /sic/ Hitler,' for a dictatorship will have been established."⁶⁵

In response to the court-packing plan, Tobey made an impassioned radio speech calling upon the people to rise up against the President. He said,

Wake up, America! Cast off the apathy and indifference that have been our Nation's weakness, and through the spoken and printed word, through mass meetings, and from the public forum, let there go out over this country a rising tide of protest which will rebuke the Executive and this attempt to wreck constitutional government.⁶⁶

Public apathy and Congressional control by the Executive frightened Toby most, but this speech indicates that Tobey still believed that the masses of people would respond with the same indignation that he himself felt.

Tobey's conclusion that anarchy threatened America was shared by many middle-class Americans who depended upon common ideas to hold their society together. William Leuchtenburg wrote,

foes of the sit-down strikes believed that Roosevelt, in refusing to employ force, was condoning an assault on property rights by lower-class rebels at the very moment he was attacking the sacred institution of the Supreme Court....Joined together, the President's policies on the Court and the sit-downs threatened to destroy the middle-class basis of the Roosevelt coalition.⁶⁷

The effect which sit-down strikes and the proposed court changes had on former progressives was studied in detail by Otis Graham, who concluded that "the spring of 1937 must be accepted as the moment when /Roosevelt/ held the support of fewer old reformers than at any other time."⁶⁸

⁶⁵ Ibid.

⁶⁶ Cong. Record, 75th Cong. 1st Sess., A 250.

⁶⁷ Leuchtenburg, 243.

⁶⁸ Graham, 32.

Tobey's faith in the middle-class that he knew, the Yankee farmers and small businessmen of New Hampshire, was expressed by his support of the Ludlow Referendum. This stand also represented his lack of faith in Roosevelt's good judgment and Tobey's fear that the President controlled a Congress like a dictator. In March, 1937, Tobey joined a minority in the House by signing a petition to get the Ludlow bill, which required a national referendum before the nation could declare war, out of the House Judiciary Committee.⁶⁹ That measure was an extreme answer to the question of possible American involvement in war, for it went beyond the Constitutional guarantees of proper deliberation by Congress. It would abrogate the President's powers as commander-in-chief, as well as the Congressional power to declare war. At the time, there was no particular criticism of Tobey's support of the Ludlow Referendum but the issue came up a year later in the 1938 election campaign.

More important to Tobey's political campaign was the debate over renewal of the neutrality laws. The 1936 law was due to expire at the end of April. The mandatory arms embargo was not seriously challenged. Debate centered on the cash-and-carry provision which clearly benefitted the maritime powers, England, France and Japan. The "belligerent isolationists," among them Borah and Hiram Johnson of California in the Senate and Hamilton Fish in the House, argued against that provision because it surrendered American freedom of the seas.⁷⁰ An important difference between Senator Styles Bridges and Congressman Tobey became apparent

⁶⁹Tobey to Rev. Gertrude Burke, March 16, 1937, Tobey Papers, Box 78.

⁷⁰Cong. Record, 75th Cong., 1st Sess., 1677-38, 1798-1801, 2377-2406.

during these debates in March. Bridges objected to the cash-and-carry provision because it undercut American merchant shipping and he ultimately voted against the Neutrality Act of 1937 on that basis.⁷¹

Bridges thus sided with the Manchester Union and the Old Guard in favor of building stronger navy should it be necessary to defend American "rights." Tobey continued to believe that the United States could avoid war if she was willing to curtail all trade that might bring reprisal and thus stir the American public to support combat. As Tobey explained to Robert Bass, "I voted for (the bill) because I think it is a sign post to the world of our increased determination to keep out of foreign entanglements."⁷² While Bridges was not an interventionist in 1937, it was easy for him to shift toward that viewpoint when he felt American freedom of action was being circumscribed by German submarines.

Early in February, the Manchester Union carried a series of articles about the possibility of work stoppage at the Portsmouth Naval Yard if Congress did not approve the pending naval appropriations bill. The editor questioned Tobey who was known to oppose the large amount requested by President Roosevelt for naval construction. Reported the Union in a front-page article,

Representative Charles Tobey of New Hampshire threw the responsibility for any interruption of work at the Portsmouth Navy Yard on government shoulders, declaring, "it is up to the federal government to see that work at the Portsmouth Navy Yard is completed without interruption.

The New Hampshire Congressman said that to date the administration has made no decision as to steps it will take to insure the

⁷¹Ibid., 3937, 3962.

⁷²March 23, 1937, Tobey Papers, Box 78.

continuation of submarine construction, but promised his cooperation with other members of the New Hampshire congressional delegation in an effort to keep Portsmouth up to its production schedule.⁷³

Tobey was in an ambiguous situation. While submarines could be justified for coastal defense, they were not useful for commercial purposes and could only be considered as preparation for war. On the other hand, unemployment was a serious problem in his state and Tobey could not afford to be held responsible for eliminating jobs. Publically he supported building at Portsmouth, but privately he considered such construction as a contribution to the threat of war. Explaining his efforts to recommit the naval appropriations bill to the committee, he wrote, "Frankly, I do not think any neutrality bill will keep us out of war, and in view of the emphasis placed on the manufacture of armaments, I feel that it is not many years away, but we will do our best."⁷⁴

Tobey's hatred for war was tied to his reverence for constitutional government as the structure for American Life. He saw America threatened from within by labor unions and their Jacobin tendencies, by the President and his attack on the Supreme Court, and by the indifference of the American people. In an article titled "An Honest Report Made by a Hired Man to his Employers," Tobey was described by a small paper in Milford, New Hampshire:

Mr. Tobey was bittery critical of the methods used by President Roosevelt and his associates in dictating to Congress, and of their apparent desire to control the legislative and judicial branches of the government as well as the administration. Solemn pledges and promises have been disregarded, and merciless pressure put on senators and congressmen to vote for administrative measures when their own

⁷³Manchester Union, Feb. 5, 1937.

⁷⁴Tobey to Rev. Thomas A. Goodwin, April 13, 1937, Tobey Papers, Box 78.

constituencies and the interests of their constituents were opposed.

Mr. Tobey expressed his grave fears for the future of the democratic form of government that has existed for 150 years in America. The tendency is all creating in effect a dictatorship. This ^{is} likely to happen if the people are not alert to prevent this.⁷⁵

Although he cautioned the public against apathy, he still believed he could stir them when necessary. He did not feel that way about the Administration.

In December, after Congress adjourned, speculation in New Hampshire turned to the 1938 election. The Manchester Union indicated support for Governor Frances P. Murphy to fill the Senate seat. Editor Robert Blood speculated about Tobey:

Many observers also doubt whether Congressman Tobey, almost certain of retaining his seat in the House, will relinquish it to enter the senate race where he would risk defeat. Both honors, it is pointed out, pay the same amount of money---\$10,000 a year.

The Senate, it is true, carries with it more prestige and the term is for six years instead of two, requiring less time and expense for campaigning, but Mr. Tobey is already so well known and ---as frequently demonstrated---well liked by the voters of his district, that only a minimum of campaigning has been necessary for him to win reelection.⁷⁶

This may have been written to discourage Tobey from seeking the Senate seat.

The question of income was important to Tobey. He had no private resources. While he retained a few old customers, notably Harriet Newell, from the twenties, he really had no business to fall back on should he lose. He valued the steady security of government pay:

as I said some time ago to you, in these times of chaos in the world at large, it is a great thing to be on the salary roll of

⁷⁵Milford Courier, October 28, 1937.

⁷⁶Manchester Union, Dec. 17, 1937.

the State or Government as against private industry. This still holds true.⁷⁷

To Robert Bass, he wrote as though he had not decided to run for the Senate:

I cannot afford to be defeated. It would be very difficult for me and embarrassing at my time of life /age 58/, albeit one must take a change /sic/ in all political undertakings.⁷⁸ This matter troubles me greatly. I hope to see more clearly soon.

Tobey's concern was heightened by the downturn which the economy took in the fall of 1937. To know that he could be fairly sure of retaining his \$10,000 a year Congressional seat, or risk defeat by an Old Guard candidate with party backing, put Tobey under tremendous pressure.

The issue which the Old Guard tried to use against Tobey was his support of the Ludlow Referendum. He sensed that this would be the case, for he seized the initiative and wrote a letter to Alfred S. Baker, the editor of the Concord Monitor. That newspaper had a smaller circulation than the Manchester Union, but it was located in the state capital and was read by most of the political leaders there. To Baker, Tobey carefully explained that he had signed a petition "2½ or 3 years ago" to get the Ludlow bill out of committee and onto the floor of the House, not because he favored it particularly, but because he wanted to allow free and open debate on the measure. He added, "I realize of course with you that this proposed referendum would be foreign to our representative government."⁷⁹ He thus justified his efforts in terms of

⁷⁷Tobey to Mrs. Harriet Newell, Feb. 23, 1938, Tobey Papers, Box 78.

⁷⁸March 1, 1938, Ibid., Box 78.

⁷⁹Dec. 30, 1937, Ibid., Box 78.

supporting the exercise of representative government, a popular theme in New Hampshire Republican circles because of the charges against Roosevelt for destroying constitutional methods.

The Union carried an article one week later entitled "Claims Sentiment in New Hampshire Strong for Ludlow Bill," and gave this version of Tobey's position:

Tobey laid emphasis on what he called an increasing disposition of New Hampshire residents to demand that the people have the prerogative of stating whether they shall go to war. 'The situation cannot be overemphasized,' he said, 'The cry for a war referendum is much more widespread than people think.'⁸⁰

Without committing himself to specific numbers, Tobey was sounding-out his constituency with regard to the Ludlow Referendum and taking pains not to commit himself personally on one side or the other.

Next to the article on the Ludlow Referendum, the Union carried an article on Tobey's candidacy, titled "Tobey for Senator?"

Mr. Tobey's ability as a vote getter is securely established and most observers agree that he would be a dangerous opponent in any political race in New Hampshire. His own district has done handsomely by him time and again and there is no reason to believe that his popularity has diminished since the last election.⁸¹

Since the Union had already endorsed Governor Murphy, and Tobey normally had a difficult time getting coverage in the paper, the Union was apparently trying to draw attention to Tobey's position on the Ludlow measure by pairing these articles.

The Union continued its campaign to link Tobey with the Ludlow Referendum after it was defeated in the House. Robert Blood wrote,

⁸⁰Manchester Union, Jan. 8, 1938.

⁸¹Ibid., Jan. 8, 1938.

"seldom before has a more dangerous and untimely measure been presented to Congress," and he pointed out that both liberals associated with President Roosevelt and conservatives allied with the American Legion had opposed it. He continued, "Why the two Congressmen from New Hampshire supported a proposal so obviously dangerous to the national safety is for them to explain. But this is surely not an issue on which our legislators should yield to sentiment or politics."⁸²

Editor Albert Baker of the Monitor was even more explicit about the political implications of the Ludlow issue:

Commander John L. Sullivan of the American Legion told Reserve Officers here Saturday night that the American people are "suckers for propaganda" and singled out for particular condemnation the so-called Ludlow Amendment, which almost was approved by the national house of representatives a few weeks ago. Congressman Tobey, who supported the Amendment, attended the meeting. Should Tobey and Sullivan square off in a senatorial fight next fall, one of the issues has therefore /sic/ been cast.⁸³

Tobey had been opposed by the American Legion earlier, for his position against the veterans bonus, but he evidently felt that isolationist sentiment in New Hampshire was strong enough to take the risk of being associated with the Ludlow bill. Angry at charges that the Ludlow proposal would undermine representative government, Tobey wrote to Harriet Newell,

The President has refused to acknowledge that war is going on and refused to recognize the Neutrality Act, and has thrown it out on the scrap heap. If that is not a blow to representative government then I don't know what is.⁸⁴

⁸²Ibid., Jan. 12, 1938.

⁸³Concord Monitor, Feb. 28, 1938.

⁸⁴Jan. 11, 1938, Tobey Papers, Box 79.

However Tobey made no public statement about defeat of the Ludlow bill and apparently wanted to let the issue die before primary election time.

Tobey also received criticism by belligerent isolationists over naval appropriations. On January 20, 1938, President Roosevelt recommended a 20% increase in the size of the Navy, as well as immediate construction of more ships.⁸⁵ Debate on this request was acrimonious. Isolationists read into the President's "quarantine speech," made the preceding October, a secret plan to join the League of Nations. Others charged that the buildup was designed to involve this country with British war plans.⁸⁶ The Monitor summarized these debates and Editor Baker concluded, "Congressman Tobey, who supported the Ludlow Amendment is also against the Naval Expansion Bill. One begins to wonder whether Mr. Tobey believes in national defense."⁸⁷

Tobey rejected the charge that he opposed defense. He wrote to a constituent:

Unless there is clear evidence that this country needs a larger navy for adequate defense, and not that I say defense, not aggression, I expect to vote against the bill. I am bitterly opposed to sending our ships and our men overseas to pull some other nation's chestnuts out of the fire and becoming involved in a foreign war.⁸⁸

He regarded naval operations as an invitation to repeat events which led to American participation in World War I. However, Tobey also recognized how critical this particular issue was in New Hampshire, where naval

⁸⁵Samuel I. Rosenman, ed. The Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt, Vol. 1938 (New York: MacMillan, 1938), 70.

⁸⁶Cong. Record, 75th Cong., 3rd Sess., see especially 5825-34.

⁸⁷Concord Monitor, March 22, 1938

⁸⁸Tobey to Mrs Adeline Bowles, March 9, 1938, Tobey Papers, Box 78.

construction was becoming more important. He finally did vote in favor of the Naval Expansion Bill because, as he explained to Judge Elwin Page, Section 9 (to protect commerce and citizens abroad) was deleted and another section, which called for a naval disarmament conference, was added.⁸⁹ Those changes made it easier for Tobey to vote in favor of a larger navy with good conscience.

Tobey continued to seek support from the Bass faction in New Hampshire, since it was clear that the Old Guard would oppose him from a belligerent isolationist standpoint. Tobey wrote his clearest statement of political philosophy to date in a long letter to Robert Bass. Some of the most salient sections are included below:

It may be that our party will have to forego victory in 1938 and 1940, but above all we must hold to the principles which we hold to be sound in finance and economics. We cannot sell our souls to catch votes. We must preach the truth as we see it. You and I realize that the Nation needs to learn one great lesson, namely, INTERDEPENDENCE, and from that to learn that we are all tied in together, and that we all rise and fall together, and that those who array class against class and appeal to the passions and prejudices of men to gain political influence are guilty of rank heresy.⁹⁰

The "principles" which Tobey emphasized were economic, not political or social. This standard by which he judged the New Deal was laissez-faire capitalism as practiced by many Republican businessmen during the twenties. Continuing this theme, he admitted the need for government aid to agriculture:

⁸⁹March 21, 1938, Ibid., Box 78.

⁹⁰Feb. 8, 1938, Ibid., Box 78.

I have always been in favor of the principle of reciprocity and believe it sound, but I think it has been more of a detriment than a help to our agricultural interests. I think we have come to a time when international tariffs should be reduced. I am in favor of a sliding scale to cause a minimum of disruption....Over and against the foregoing, it will not be easy for our party to form an agricultural program based upon a laissez-faire attitude. The farmers have been educated to expect this largesse from the wet nurse here in Washington, and if we try to take it away and go back to the old order it will be most difficult if it even should be considered.⁹¹

Tobey struggled to accept the changes made during the New Deal period.

The adjustment was particularly difficult in his conception of the New England farmer, who had been Tobey's symbol of the true American.

He ended this letter to Bass by saying:

I have come to a conclusion that I think you will share, that the era that we were in prior to 1930 is gone forever, that we are in a new era, in which more emphasis will be laid on social philosophy, and it is accepted policy now that the Government will participate increasingly in our economic and financial matters. I seriously doubt if we will see less of it than we are seeing now. I rather expect to see more. This constitutes a challenge to you and me and to all who are trying to be helpful. The immensity of the problem is staggering.⁹²

Tobey had retained the ideal of returning to pre-Depression conditions, but as he began his campaign for the U.S. Senate, he needed the support of men with a broader perspective. Bass had been more interested in welfare legislation than Tobey, and political necessity forced the latter beyond his parochial preferences.

In a letter to Harriet Newell, Tobey wrote that he intended to avoid political argument over the Ludlow Referendum, tariffs and the farm question. Instead, he wanted to concentrate on a safe issue of

⁹¹Ibid.

⁹²Ibid.

local interest, the Flood Control Compact which was before Congress. Two years before, during the 1936 election, Tobey had presented a plan for regional control of flood-dams in order to get federal funding. The bill was designed to avoid federal regulation and control of the dams and surrounding land, yet meet the economic needs of the region. He informed Mrs. Newell that the Administration had stopped passage of his flood control bill for its own version, in which the government would pay the costs of dams and reservoirs, "but would own the reservoirs thereafter and would control any power resources at these reservoir sites."⁹³ Since the issue of federal control of power had been widely publicized by the Tennessee Valley Authority project, Tobey had a safe position in opposing federal control for Republican voters.

Between April and July, 1938, Tobey gained publicity with a "witch-hunt" against Republican Sol Bloom, chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee. It was a technique that worked well in New Hampshire politics and recalled Tobey's moralistic crusade against railroad influence in the state legislature in 1915. The issue was petty: Tobey thought Bloom was making profits from a congressional program. He was chairman of the sesquicentennial celebration of the signing of the Constitution, which would continue throughout the year in each of the thirteen signatory states. Congress appropriated \$200,000 which had been used for the publication of a booklet explaining the Constitution. Bloom had the copyright to this booklet, but it did not promise to bring any profit, since it cost about eleven cents to produce and was being sold for ten

⁹³Jan. 21, 1938, Ibid., Box 78.

cents apiece. When Bloom requested \$150,000 more for this effort, Tobey launched his attack on the floor of the House.⁹⁴

Bloom symbolized urban coalition behind President Roosevelt. Tobey revealed his own prejudice in a letter to Judge Page, who was the New Hampshire chairman for the sesquicentennial. He wrote to Page asking that Bloom not be asked to participate in the state and he added, "Bloom is a Jew with all it implies; very able and always makes everything play for his own aggrandizement."⁹⁵ Tobey's ethnic bias was strong enough so that Representative John O'Connor of New York, chairman of the powerful House Rules Committee, criticized Tobey by interrupting him sharply with "someone has suggested the attack represents the gentleman's attitude toward the racial background of the distinguished gentleman from New York...the attack is startling."⁹⁶

Tobey gained considerable coverage in state newspapers including the Union, the Monitor and the Nashua Telegram, as well as Time and Newsweek magazines.⁹⁷ The way he filed these clippings, in his 1938 campaign scrapbook, indicates that Tobey recognized that his attack on Bloom was a publicity stunt. This is supported by his closing comment to Mrs. Newell concerning "my run-in with...Bloom, a Tammany leader, a Jew. It was good fun, but I have probably incurred his everlasting hatred."⁹⁸ Tobey's reference to Tammany suggests that he was attacking

⁹⁴Cong. Record, 75th Cong., 3rd Sess., 1471.

⁹⁵April 29, 1938, Tobey Papers, Box 78.

⁹⁶Cong. Record, 75th Cong., 3rd Sess., 1472.

⁹⁷"Scrapbook, 1938 Campaign," Tobey Papers, Box 118.

⁹⁸July 9, 1938, Ibid., Box 78.

Roosevelt's "machine" in his own mind with this moralistic tirade.

Having completed this publicity campaign, Tobey announced his official candidacy for the Republican nomination to the Senate in July. He named Arthur Moreau, a prominent Manchester businessman and one of the outstanding France-American residents of New Hampshire as his campaign manager.⁹⁹ The Manchester Leader, the evening paper edited and published by the same staff as the morning Union, noted that Moreau had recently been chosen a member of the Republican national program committee. Tobey also announced that John R. McLane, prominent member of the Bass faction and a Dartmouth trustee, would be his campaign treasurer and Mrs Robert Crosby, past president of the state P.T.A. and regent of the D.A.R. was to be chairman of the women's division.¹⁰⁰ The slate indicated Tobey's effort to combine the state's most influential groups outside of the Republican Party.

Old Guard leaders had decided to back Eliot Carter of the prominent textile manufacturing family against Tobey. As usual, Tobey campaigned on his public image as an independent spokesman for the common people. He wrote to one supporter,

I am up against a great money-spending campaign which my opponent is waging, but my support has always been, and I hope always will be, from the plain people in the county towns, who know me and the things I stand for. I promise to keep faith with your and my ideals.¹⁰¹


Once again he took the popular position of an "anti-machine candidate."

⁹⁹Manchester Leader, July 9, 1938.

¹⁰⁰Ibid.

¹⁰¹Tobey to W.W. Burnham, Sept. 2, 1938, Tobey Papers, Box 78.

Tobey won the primary election against Carter by 18,000 votes, 45,816 to 27,357.¹⁰² By county his percentage of the total vote is shown below. Counties in which Tobey gained more than 50% of the vote are shaded.¹⁰³



<u>County</u>	<u>1928</u>	<u>1938</u>	<u>% Change</u>
Rockingham	52	44	-4
Strafford	44	47	+3
Belknap	43.5	55	+11.5
Carroll	28.3	49	+20.7
Merrimack	67	56	-11
Hillsboro	62	51	-11
Cheshire	57.5	75	+17.5
Sullivan	51	59	+ 8
Grafton	28	61	+33
Coos	43	54	+11

Compared to his previous state-wide campaign for the governorship in 1928 (see page 42), Tobey had a remarkable gain in Carroll, Cheshire and Grafton counties. The latter two have liberal or progressive constituencies, which indicate the effectiveness of Tobey's efforts to enlist the followers of Bass. All three counties have rather small populations compared to Hillsboro and Merrimack, so that a shift in voting by relatively

¹⁰²Manual for the General Court, 1939, 165.

¹⁰³Percentage data compiled from Ibid.

few numbers would cause a large percentage change. The figures do indicate that Tobey gained support during his years in Congress as representative of the Second District, which covers the eastern half of the state including Hillsboro. He had been able to gain more publicity on national affairs than he had enjoyed as a member of the progressive faction prior to 1928. With no trouble, Tobey won the general election for a seat in the Senate.

III. FEAR OF WAR: SENATE ISOLATIONISM, 1939-1941

As Tobey entered the U.S. Senate in 1939, President Roosevelt began to take a more active position in favor of intervention to aid the allies. In his inaugural address, the President said, "We have learned that when we deliberately try to legislate neutrality, our neutrality law may operate unevenly and unfairly---may actually give aid to the aggressor and deny it to the victim," and he called for repeal of the isolationist measure.¹ Debate over repeal of the embargo on arms to belligerents continued throughout the spring and summer of 1939, but the specific legislation failed to reach the floor when a majority on the Foreign Relations Committee refused to support the President.²

Tobey's committee assignments did not place him in a position to influence foreign policy questions before they reached the floor. New Hampshire's other senator, Styles Bridges, outranked Tobey by just two years and he probably would not have used his influence to gain favorable committee assignments for Tobey had he been senior enough to do so, because of their political animosity. As a member of the minority party with no special contacts among Senate Republicans, Tobey was assigned to Banking and Currency, of which he became chairman in 1947, Interstate Commerce and Rules.³ While these assignments reflected his

¹January 4, 1939, Rosenman, F.D.R. Papers, Vol. 1939, 3.

²Donald F. Drummond, The Passing of American Neutrality 1937-1941 (Ann Arbor: Univ. of Michigan Press, 1955), 87-89.

³Congressional Directory, 76th Cong., 1st Sess., 1939, 94.

own interests, none placed him in contact with prominent isolationists.

In line with his decision to aid the allies materially, and in recognition of the place which airpower was gaining in the European War, Roosevelt requested larger defense appropriations with funds earmarked for military aircraft.⁴ When the measure was reported to the Senate, Tobey made his maiden speech on behalf of limiting profits on such construction to 10%. He did not deny the need for airplanes nor did he criticize the efficiency of government construction facilities. He repeated most of the points made in 1934, when he first presented this proposal to Congress: certain manufacturers reaped profits from war, the Legislative Branch was remiss in not controlling such profits and the public seemed ready to follow the President into war. To a larger audience than the Senators listening to this speech, Tobey concluded, "The cardinal sin in this country is not immortality in any of its forms. It is apathy and indifference. It is an amazing thing to me that the American people have not risen up and cried, "Unclean! Unclean!"⁵

The Manchester Union gave Tobey front-page coverage for this speech. Through the two-column story titled "Tobey in Ringing Maiden Speech," the junior Senator reached most of his constituents.⁶ The coverage was due to the son of Judge Elwin Page, Bob, who had just been hired by the Union to cover the Washington "scene." Tobey's stance was familiar to New Hampshire voters. Here was a Victorian Baptist calling

⁴Rosenman, F.D.R. Papers, Vol. 1939, 71.

⁵Cong. Record, 76th Cong., 1st Sess., 3221.

⁶Manchester Union, March 7, 1939.

out against the "sin" of apathy and indifference. It was not the speech of a public prosecutor calling for application of the law, it was the cry of a prophet calling for conversion or at least repentance.

As a Senator, Tobey gained more attention outside of his own state. He was asked to be the Lincoln Day speaker for the Maine Republican Party and Elizabeth May Craig, syndicated Washington columnist, did a feature story on him for the occasion. She noted that Tobey had been opposed in every election by George Moses and the Old Guard Republicans and, unlike Styles Bridges, he did not oppose the New Deal entirely. She added that Tobey criticized the Republican Party for overlooking the needs of common people. On foreign policy, Miss Craig wrote that "he thinks we should stay out of European wars, but thinks we cannot. He is somewhat of a pacifist, is inclined to think that we might carry out the neutrality policy to the point of stopping all sales to belligerents."⁷ The picture of Tobey as a moral fighter was a familiar one, except for the small note that "he thinks we cannot" stay out of the European wars. As a member of the minority party, Tobey realized that Roosevelt's leadership would eventually triumph over isolationist attempts to avoid contact with belligerents. He may also have sensed that America could not tolerate totalitarian control of Europe if England fell.

In his speech to the Maine Republicans, Tobey contrasted Lincoln to President Roosevelt, saying that "he never resorted to passion, prejudice or arousing class feeling" with the implication that Roosevelt

⁷Elizabeth May Craig, "On the Inside in Washington," Portland (Maine) Courier, Feb. 11, 1939.

did.⁸ He charged Roosevelt with contravening the Constitution, citing lobbying in Congress, "must pass" legislation, gag rules and demands for extraordinary powers as proof. Thus the question of Roosevelt's political influence became a moral issue in Tobey's mind, while he concentrated on the President's desire for power and appeals to class identification as being foreign to American traditions.

In letters to his constituents, Tobey drew attention to the authority that Roosevelt had over application of the neutrality law. When one voter wrote to him complaining of continued munition and scrap-iron sales to Japan, Tobey answered simply that "I have contacted the Munitions Control Board regarding this situation and have registered my protest to any continuation of acts which are violations of the Neutrality Act."⁹ In a form letter which he sent to more than twenty constituents who complained about trade with Japan, Tobey said that he was powerless to affect the situation, "It is now in the hands of the President."¹⁰

As Tobey's fears for the traditional patterns of government grew, along with his personal influence as a Senator, Tobey broadened his attacks on American programs which he thought would lead this country into war. Prior to his entry into the Senate, Tobey confined his efforts to limiting war profits and supporting a total trade embargo on belligerents. After he became a Senator, Tobey read revisionist literature which had been available since the mid-twenties. In a folder

⁸"Abraham Lincoln," Speech given Feb. 11, 1939, Tobey Papers, Box 8.

⁹Tobey to Miss Mattie Orford, Feb. 1, 1939, Tobey Papers, Box 79.

¹⁰"Japanese Embargo," form letter, Ibid., Box 6.

titled "Speech Data, 1939," there were six pages of quotations taken from Harry Elmer Barnes' The Genesis of World War.¹¹ Published in 1926, this book was a study of the war guilt question which had preoccupied revisionist historians during that decade.¹²

It is significant that Tobey chose Barnes rather than Charles Beard, who was also examining American participation in the war. According to Warren Cohen, Barnes was an idealist who objected to the war on legalistic and moralistic grounds. In a passage which might also be used to characterize Tobey, Cohen writes, "Barnes himself sought salvation through revisionism, a process of exorcizing his own guilt by shining a spotlight on those who had played a more significant role in the steps leading to war and to American intervention."¹³ On the other hand, Charles Beard's conclusions were "in the realm of 'Realpolitick,'" and Cohen says that Beard called for "a policy based on national interest rather than on sympathies."¹⁴ Although Tobey justified his opposition to involvement in war on the grounds that it was better for the country to avoid such conflict, he did not evaluate American policy on the basis of the international balance of power. While Tobey's attitudes did not derive from Barnes' work, he found some intellectual support for and articulation of his own position there.

Echoes of Barnes' interpretation were obvious in a letter which Tobey wrote to Arthur Woods, a friend and faculty member at the University of Michigan. After Hitler disregarded his Munich pledge and annexed

¹¹"Speech Data, 1939," Ibid., Box 9.

¹²Cohen, 28.

¹³Ibid., 88.

¹⁴Ibid.

the rest of Czechoslovakia in mid-March, 1939, President Roosevelt had asked Hitler and Mussolini to refrain from invading a long list of countries for ten years.¹⁵ Hitler's response was a derisive attack on the American President. Tobey wrote to Wood, "I felt he had some elements of justice in his attack on the President, for requesting an international conference when the United States refused to join the League."¹⁶ Tobey also thought there was "some justice" in Hitler's charge that Britain took colonies by force and therefore should not judge Germany on that account.¹⁷ This letter is the first evidence of Tobey's conviction that Britain was to blame for American intervention in the war. Until 1939, Tobey had blamed the machinations of munitions makers in every country but, after reading Barnes' book which concentrated on absolving Germany for sole responsibility for the war, Tobey began to identify Britain as the "devil" behind a conspiracy to involve this nation once again.

Meanwhile, as the Senate Foreign Relations Committee debated Roosevelt's proposal to lift the arms embargo at his discretion, Sol Bloom introduced a measure in the House for outright repeal of the embargo. The Manchester Union carried a brief article on the Bloom bill, noting that Tobey would oppose the measure when it reached the Senate: "He said the only real neutrality consists of a mandatory severence

¹⁵MS. dated April 14, 1939, Rosenman, F.D.R. Papers, Vol. 1939, 201-5.

¹⁶April 29, 1939, Tobey Papers, Box 79.

¹⁷Ibid.

of all relations with nations at war."¹⁸ On June 30, the Bloom bill was passed by a small margin, 200-188, but the purpose was nullified by an amendment which provided an embargo on "arms and ammunition" but not on "implements of war."¹⁹ Of this vote, Manfred Jonas said, "although this result clearly indicates the continuing strength of isolationist sentiment, it is of greater significance that 123 Congressmen who had supported an arms embargo two years earlier now voted against it."²⁰

Even though an opinion poll disclosed that 57% of those responding favored a change in the neutrality law to permit munition sales to Britain and France, the Foreign Relations Committee voted 12 to 11 not to consider further changes in the Neutrality Law until January, 1940.²¹ The noted diplomatic historian Robert A Divine suggests that some of the opposition came because the Senators wanted to chastise President Roosevelt for his attempted purge of conservative Democrats in the 1938 election, not because they opposed repeal of the embargo.²² Although Tobey did not have a chance to vote on the Neutrality Act at that time because he was not on the Foreign Relations Committee, it is clear that Hitler's actions had not changed his mind. On June 28 Tobey wrote to his wife who was at home in New Hampshire, "The foreign

¹⁸Manchester Union, June 24, 1939.

¹⁹Cong. Record, 76th Cong., 1st Sess., 8151, 8173.

²⁰Jonas, 215.

²¹New York Times, July 9 and July 12, 1939.

²²Robert A Divine, The Illusion of Neutrality (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962:), 277-78.

situation does not look good, and if all one hears is true, Germany is planning another drastic move, probably about the last of August as soon as the crops are in, and this time they are going ahead with their plans."²³ There was no mention of help from America if that was the case.

Tobey refused to consider Hitler as any more of a menace than the other belligerents. When the question of raising quotas for Jewish immigration to this country came up, based on Hitler's announced intention of eradicating the Jewish race, Tobey wrote to Harriet Newell, "I do not feel I can vote for this legislation and do not feel we should take them any more than Spanish refugee or Chinese refugee children."²⁴ However, Tobey was willing to criticize Britain for her hesitation in making Palestine a Jewish refuge and he wrote to the editor of New York's Jewish Journal and Daily News, "I...am glad to stand behind a petition which you are sending to the President, submitting that Palestine is a natural haven for Jewish refugees, and urging that it be utilized to the fullest extent of its economic absorptive capacities."²⁵ In sum, Tobey was somewhat anti-Jewish like many other middle-class Americans of his Yankee Protestant background and he did not believe that America had a moral obligation to defend the Jews against annihilation, although he was willing for Britain to do so. There is no evidence that he was pro-German in this sentiment. Rather his position appears to derive from

²³Tobey Papers, Box 9.

²⁴June 26, 1939, Ibid., Box 79.

²⁵Aug. 17, 1939, Ibid., Box 8.

the same American nationalism which prompted his isolationism.

After the historic White House meeting on July 18, 1939, at which Senator Borah stated his belief that there would be no war that year, and President Roosevelt accepted the fact that the Senate would not reconsider the neutrality bill during the current session, the two sides were polarized by Hitler's invasion of Poland on September 1. The President immediately called a special session of Congress for the purpose of repealing the arms embargo so America could aid the Allies without becoming a belligerent herself.²⁶

The special session opened on September 21, 1939. That morning Charles Tobey had breakfast with Senator Gerald P. Nye and three popular news commentators, H.V. Kaltenborn, John T. Flynn, and Boake Carter. Tobey wrote to Judge Elwin Page that they agreed with Senator Borah that "this is a phony war and will not be carried farther than it has been, namely, the taking of Poland, but it may well be that the lifting of the embargo will be the signal to go ahead."²⁷ This was Tobey's defense against Page's suggestion that the Senator support repeal of the embargo law. Tobey added, "I will say one more thing to you: I can conceive of no conditions which would allow me to vote for war, with only one exception, and that is invasion of this country."²⁸ This was the first indication of a break between Tobey and his progressive

²⁶Sept. 13, 1939, Rosenman, F.D.R. Papers, Vol. 1939, 510; Sept. 21, 1939, Ibid., 512-22.

²⁷Sept. 21, 1939, Tobey Papers, Box 79.

²⁸Ibid.

friends over Tobey's foreign policy position. Like those Congressmen who changed their votes on a mandatory arms embargo between 1937 and 1939, the Bass faction began to leave the isolationist camp because of Hitler's actions.

Possibly to head off criticism from his old friend, Harriet Newell, Tobey elaborated his position against repeal of the arms embargo:

Frankly, I am afraid of the President. I think he is moving toward war and our involvement therein. I seriously fear he has made secret commitments to France and England. I am, of course, bitterly opposed to this and want to keep this country out of war. It is going to take a lot of wisdom and courage to keep us out. I think this is the greatest crisis members of Congress have had to face for twenty-five years and I deeply appreciate this privilege of being here and having a small part in it. ²⁹I am very much moved by the sense of responsibility which is mine.

The interesting thing about this letter is not his position on the embargo or his suspicion of the President, it is the attention which he gives to his own position in the Senate. He was flattered and a little awed by the effect which he might have on national policy. ³⁰ His own sense of security was exhibited most clearly in the active role which he took in the fight against repeal of the neutrality laws, even at the cost of his friendship with Bass and the other progressives in New Hampshire.

Riviving his relationship with Herbert Hoover, Tobey wrote to him asking for advice on Roosevelt's call for an "adjournment of partisanship."³¹

²⁹Sept. 25, 1939, Ibid., Box 79.

³⁰June 19, 1939, Ibid., Box 79.

³¹As noted in Tobey to Frank Knox, Sept. 20, 1939, Ibid., Box 79.

In a reply that was not released for publication until the following May, Hoover cautioned against any suspension of party politics on the ground that debate "keeps alive questions and alternatives" while bipartisan government "would be the start of a totalitarian government."³² Added to Roosevelt's other suspicious actions, such as the proposed expansion of the Supreme Court and exclusion of labor unions from anti-trust regulation, the suggestion of bipartisan government seemed like one more step away from the American tradition of checks and balances. Because Tobey's response to the President was based on these domestic factors rather than on a reaction to events in Europe, it was very difficult for Tobey to contemplate any change in his foreign policy position.

Tobey did not deny that public opinion favored relaxation of the neutrality laws to supply aid to Britain. To James Richardson, a government professor at Dartmouth and active member of the Bass faction, Tobey described his position:

I frankly admit that 95% or more of the people are on the side of Great Britain and France, but that is not justification for /repeal/. Where is the justification for our changing the rules after the war has broken out. In my judgment, there are as many minds here which believe that the repealing of the embargo on arms would constitute a distinctly unneutral act of intervention. All these conclusions, however, are based on the premise that I do not consider this war in Europe, our war.³³

Until he could be convinced that America's physical security was threatened, Tobey continued to believe that the war was not "our war." "The whole miserable mess is the result of the Versailles Treaty," he wrote to Richardson, repeating the revisionist ideas of H.E. Barnes,

³²Sept. 27, 1939, Ibid., Box 23.

³³Sept. 28, 1939, Ibid., Box 79.

"a treaty conceived in inequity and hate, as you well know, and which made Hitler possible."³⁴ Although few people considered the invasion of Poland in the same light as gaining territory by treaty, Tobey still wrote, "I do not think there is much to choose from in the colony grabbing policies of Great Britain and France on the one hand and Germany on the other."³⁵

Why did Tobey remain an isolationist when other progressives, like Page and Richardson, began to favor more interventionist policies? It seems clear that Tobey's conviction that Europe's war was not "our war" continued because of his domestic orientation and his active involvement in the process of government. He saw the war solely in terms of its effect on the American economy and on the political structure, while his progressive friends in New Hampshire had the perspective of educated men who were not caught up in the actual decision-making process of government.

Tobey's economic orientation is stated in this letter to Arthur Wood, professor at the University of Michigan:

I personally am willing to have a lower standard of living in this country and a lesser income and suffer many handicaps rather than do anything that would involve us.

I also feel that the President is moving toward war and I have confidential information that the 'inner circle' of the New Deal, his advisers, rather hope we will get into the war. It is a sad picture. May God help us.³⁶

³⁴Ibid.

³⁵Ibid.

³⁶Sept. 28, 1939, Ibid., Box 79.

He elaborated on this theme in a speech to the Rotary International. Saying that he approved of Roosevelt's own words in 1936, "we are nationalists, not internationalists...not isolationists, but insulationists," Tobey used the terms "nationalist" and "insulationist" to identify his own position.³⁷ In fact these terms do describe the essential elements of his isolationism: the belief that America could remain aloof from battle and safe from invasion, and his fear for the American way of life, economically and politically, should the country mobilize for war.

The emphasis which Tobey placed on individualism was an important part of his nationalism. William Leuchtenburg writes that "in the thirties, 19th century individualism gave ground to a new emphasis on social security and collective action." As an example, Leuchtenburg notes a shift from Charles Lindbergh's fame as "the Lone Eagle," to the New Republic's account of Amelia Earhart's disappearance as a "useless exploit."³⁸ It is not surprising that Lindbergh became a prominent spokesman for the isolationists, because he symbolized the style of life which men like Tobey believed was being threatened by President Roosevelt.

Because of his admiration for Lindbergh, Tobey had his first contact with an isolationist organization, the National Council for Prevention of War. In September, 1939, Lindbergh gave a radio speech that was widely criticized as being pro-German and anti-Jewish. Tobey

³⁷As quoted in the Manchester Union, Sept. 29, 1939.

³⁸Leuchtenburg, 380.

fought with the Senate Democratic leadership to have the speech printed in the Congressional Record and he finally succeeded.³⁹ He cooperated with the Council for Prevention of War, which had campaigned vigorously for passage of the Ludlow Referendum, by having 56,000 copies of Lindbergh's speech printed and sent on his franking privilege. Tobey mailed 7,500 to the regional Council headquarters, 42,500 to the national headquarters, 5,000 to Senator Rush D. Holt of West Virginia and he kept 1,000 copies for mailing to his own constituents.⁴⁰ This was Tobey's first association with a well-known isolationist group and it was a prelude to his later activity in the America First organization, in which Lindbergh was very active.

The Senate argued bitterly over repeal of the arms embargo during the early days of October, 1939. The President had suggested amendment of the neutrality legislation rather than outright repeal, although authorization of cash-and-carry shipments to the Allies, in effect did just that.⁴¹ Tobey was reacting to both the sinking of the Athenia on September 4, and the sinking of the Lusitania two decades earlier, when he proposed an amendment to the Administration's embargo repeal measure. On October 4, Tobey asked the Senate to vote on the cash-and-carry provision immediately, so that American ships would be kept out of the war zone.⁴² This would separate cash-and-carry from the mandatory

³⁹Cong. Record, 76th Cong., 2nd Sess., 6.

⁴⁰Tobey to the National Council for Prevention of War, Sept. 28, Sept. 29 and Oct. 5, 1939, Tobey Papers, Box 7.

⁴¹Sept. 21, 1939, Rosenman, F.D.R. Papers, Vol. 1939, 516.

⁴²Cong. Record, 76th Cong., 2nd Sess., 112.

embargo. In his effort to generate support, Tobey addressed a radio audience that night and called for an outpouring of public response to his proposal.⁴³

Secretary of State Cordell Hull was quoted in the New York Times the next day requesting that American ships avoid war zones to prevent incidents which might draw the nation into war.⁴⁴ However, Tobey seized that request as an opportunity to call for support of Hull by legislation.⁴⁵ The Administration apparently feared that separation of that popular provision from the rest of the bill would result in a vote for cash-and-carry and against repeal of the arms embargo. When Tobey's amendment came to a vote on October 10, 1939, the isolationists lost, 65 to 25.⁴⁶ Among those who voted with the minority were the prominent isolationists from both parties: Borah, Capper, Johnson of California, Holt, LaFollette, Jr., Lundeen, Lodge, McNary, Nye, Tobey, Townsend, Vandenberg, Walsh, and Wheeler. In his analysis of this vote, Robert Divine concludes, "The decisive rejection of Tobey's motion was a clear sign that the administration had more than enough votes to carry through its program in the Senate."⁴⁷

Tobey justified his amendment in a long letter to Judge Elwin Page, who was critical of this indirect attempt to retain the arms embargo.

⁴³Text read over C.B.S., Oct. 4, 1939, Tobey Papers, Box 8.

⁴⁴New York Times, Oct. 5, 1939.

⁴⁵"Radio Speech, Oct. 8, 1939," Tobey Papers, Box 8.

⁴⁶Cong. Record, 76th Cong., 2nd Sess., 237.

⁴⁷Divine, 319.

Tobey wrote:

I was defeated by a large majority, but you can't lick a steam roller. As the weeks and months go by, ...and if our ships are sunk, which sinking, according to the test of Chairman Key Pittman of Nevada of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, was the direct cause of our going into the last war, those who voted against this today for second⁴⁸ or third-rate reasons are going to have a tremendous responsibility.

He based his conclusion on the Nye thesis that American participation in World War I had been caused by a shift in public opinion created by the sinking of American ships. Therefore if ships could be kept out of danger spots, American public opinion would continue to oppose participation in the war and the President would not be able to accomplish his "plan" to aid the British at the risk of war.

In support of the isolationists, the Saturday Evening Post published an article called "Fantasy of the Bloodless Sword," which Tobey clipped for reference.⁴⁹ Commending this article to the chairman of New Hampshire's Republican Party, Tobey wrote, "Realizing the way that this country was deceived at the time of the so-called peace treaty following the World War, and knowing the loss of lives during the last war, I feel a grave responsibility in my position in the Senate."⁵⁰ Tobey apparently felt that party leaders in New Hampshire were ready to support a war effort if American interests were jeopardized. That was the position of Bridges and the Union. To counter that position, the article pointed out that

⁴⁸ Oct. 11, 1939, Tobey Papers, Box 79.

⁴⁹ Saturday Evening Post, Oct. 14, 1939, 20, filed in Ibid., Box 118.

⁵⁰ Tobey to Dudley Orr, Oct. 27, 1939. Ibid., Box 79.

aiding the Allies would bring reprisals against the United States and then Americans would fight to protect their ships and men.

Tobey also sent Boake Carter's book, Why Meddle in Europe?, to several people. The book appeared in 1939, outlining the isolationists' arguments to prove that America was safe from attack regardless of foreign events.⁵¹ He commented to his uncle, George Parker of Boston, "I found both in your letter and in Mr. Carter's book very constructive thoughts and much data that is enlightening on this neutrality question."⁵² According to Manfred Jonas, this book was one of three being widely circulated at that time in support of the position that America was invulnerable.⁵³ In this sense, Tobey was already preparing his defense against the President's plea that American security was being endangered by Hitler.

Tobey was convinced that he had been right about divorcing the cash-and-carry provision from the question of selling arms to the Allies by the German capture, on October 9, of an American ship carrying contraband materials. News of its cargo and its fate did not break into headlines until the last week in October.⁵⁴ Referring to this ship, the City of Flint, Tobey wrote:

⁵¹Boake Carter, Why Meddle in Europe? (New York: Dodge Publishing Co., 1939).

⁵²Oct. 26, 1939, Tobey Papers, Box 79.

⁵³Jonas, 164.

⁵⁴New York Times, Oct. 24 and Nov. 1, 1939.

I hope and pray that between now and the date of the final passage of the so-called neutrality bill, there will not be incidents in the war zones such as the sinking of American vessels which may tend to draw us into the European conflict. Our great responsibility is to stay out of the European war, to preserve and maintain democracy here at home and to make our defense position impregnable against the world, and never to embark on a foreign campaign by sending our boys to foreign soil to fight for the power politics of Europe.⁵⁵

The last sentence is important, for it contains Tobey's picture of the situation: America should remain an example of democracy, defended by walls of her own making, while Europe falls prey to internal wars brought about by traditional rivalries.

At the end of October, the Senate finally voted on the Administration version of the Neutrality Act. There were two questions at stake: would the United States repeal the arms embargo and supply munitions to belligerents designated by the President and should all shipments to belligerents be sent on American flag ships or be transported in foreign bottoms. The Senate voted 63 to 30 in favor of supplying munitions on foreign ships.⁵⁶ Tobey poured out his dismay in the following letter:

I feel that if we are drawn into the European War, the people of the country can look back at the passage of the recent resolution as the first step towards intervention, and they should know where to place the responsibility. Mindfull of the suffering and death to American boys that would result from participation in the European War, I could not do anything but vote as I did.

To my mind, our greatest task is to guard against the subtle propaganda that is increasingly flowing into our country designed to get us into the war. These are troublesome times, and I am deeply conscious of the responsibility which I have in the Senate. It is my determination to test every bill or amendment on the ground of whether it would tend to draw us into the European conflict. If it does, I will oppose it. If on the other hand, its effect

⁵⁵Tobey to Signora Gazella Plannos, Oct. 30, 1939, Tobey Papers, Box 79.

⁵⁶Cong. Record, 76th Cong., 2nd Sess., 1024.

will be to keep us neutral, I will support it.

There have been more than fifty wars in Europe since the United States became a nation. Our duty is to preserve democracy here and to maintain our defenses so as to keep our position impregnable.⁵⁷

Tobey treated entry into war as an academic question, a repetition of history. He fully expected survivors to evaluate and blame people for causing America to enter this war as revisionist historians had done after World War I. He also singled out "subtle propaganda" from a foreign source as the means by which the peace-loving public could be influenced to support intervention. Tobey was still convinced that this was not "our war, but he was giving new emphasis to defense for the preservation of democracy. That domestic concern was still the focus of his position.

Tobey's suspicion of "subtle propaganda" took on an anti-British tone as England pressed for more material aid. Yale history professor Erwin R. Goodenough wrote to Tobey, "There is no danger of our becoming a dependency of Germany, but we are just on the brink of returning to dependence upon England. You are in a strategic position...to fight this new war of independence."⁵⁸ In a folder titled "Speech Data, 1939," Tobey consolidated his ideas about the British:

Now I do not find in the preamble of our Constitution that this nation was founded to save England or, more to the point, to preserve England's grip on the entire world, since her navy guarantees her own safety. Nor do I find it plausible to believe that Germany would ever be able to hold all of Europe down while she crossed the Atlantic to conquer us.

It seems to me apparent that our task is to show the world that a democracy of our type can work successfully. A task that we have

⁵⁷Tobey to John F. O'Leary, Oct. 31, 1939, Tobey Papers, Box 79.

⁵⁸Nov. 1, 1939, Ibid., Box 7.

fallen down on_of_late. According to the present trend, we are going Facist /sic/ very fast in the very methods we are using to combat Facism /sic/.⁵⁹

Tobey still believed that England's navy would protect her, as he believed the oceans protected the United States. That belief was the key to Senator Vandenberg's isolationism, according to his son, and it was certainly very important in Tobey's thinking.⁶⁰ The positive side of Tobey's isolationism was his faith in American democracy, although he felt that President Roosevelt was moving toward too much central authority because Congress seemed unable to withstand Administration pressure on issues such as the neutrality revision. Roosevelt's desire to help Britain did not allay Tobey's fears.

On November 4, 1939, the Administration version of the Neutrality Act was signed into law. Passed by votes of 63 to 30 in the Senate, and 237 to 177 in the House, the new version repealed the arms embargo.⁶¹ Although the Administration won repeal of the arms embargo, the 1939 law still precluded credit sales and it required transport of munitions on foreign ships. Those two issues came up for discussion when Congress convened again.

After the special session of Congress adjourned in November, Tobey left Washington for a month of rest and speechmaking in New Hampshire. As he wrote to a friend, "I am at home after the most strenuous session

⁵⁹ Ibid., Box 9.

⁶⁰ Vandenberg, Private Papers, xix.

⁶¹ Cong. Record, 76th Cong., 2nd Sess., 1356, 1389.

in seven years," and to another he added, "I have been under great strain...as you know, I am of very nervous temperament."⁶² But Tobey did not rest much that December. His speaking schedule was busy; it included the New England Society, the Young People's Religious Union, the New Hampshire Poultry Breeder's Association, the Union League Club in New York City and the Rotary Club in Nashua.⁶³ Not forgetting that 1940 would be another presidential election year, Tobey's speeches were aimed at the groups which traditionally supported the Republican Party. He did not help the party reach urban immigrant groups, which existed even in New Hampshire. Samuel Lubell notes, "G.O.P. leaders persisted in regarding Roosevelt's popularity as a form of hero worship, abetted by the radio," and they believed that when Roosevelt left office, "the coalition would fall apart."⁶⁴

While Tobey was at home, his 28 year-old son Charles Junior was preparing material for the next session of Congress. Charles had finished college and was acting as his father's private secretary while attending law school at night. On November 10, Charles wrote that "Secretary Hull says transfer of American flag ships would contravene the spirit of the Neutrality Act" and he suggested preparation of an amendment specifically prohibiting American shippers from so doing.⁶⁵

⁶²To Elisha Wattles, Nov. 16, 1939, Tobey Papers, Box 79; to Daniel Weeks, Nov. 2, 1939, Ibid., Box 79.

⁶³"Speaking Engagements," Ibid., Box 9.

⁶⁴Lubell, 47.

⁶⁵Tobey Papers, Box 79.

Then Charles wrote an article bearing on the so-called Flag Amendment, which he sent to his father. Senator Tobey submitted it to the New York Times Magazine, but it was not used.⁶⁶

Charles also sought to use his father's connection with the 10% profit clause on defense construction to gain exposure in the Senate. On December 1, the young man wrote that he had been working on a resolution for the first day of the next session, suggesting to the President of the Senate a committee of five to investigate profits under the 10% profit limitation because "if this is successful, you will be on the committee. If the rival Vandenberg proposal goes through, you won't."⁶⁷ Charles also suggested that his father insert a provision requiring that all defense contracts for American purchase be filled before any foreign contracts would be honored.⁶⁸ Charles was not only aware the influence in the Senate would give his father a more powerful voice in party politics in New Hampshire during this election year, but that defense building was a unifying issue which could side-track criticism of Tobey by more belligerent isolationists.

While in New Hampshire, Tobey read two articles which were to shape his political rhetoric during the following year. One came unsolicited from a small publisher in Boston, and it charged that the President had gained votes for repeal of the arms embargo by making "hundreds of patronage appointments for key positions in the 1940

⁶⁶Tobey to the Editor, New York Times Magazine, Nov. 18, 1939, Ibid., Box 79.

⁶⁷Dec. 1, 1939, Ibid., Box 79.

⁶⁸Ibid.

census."⁶⁹ Tobey replied cautiously, "I would like you to send me these bulletins as they come out from time to time."⁷⁰

The second article was published in Collier's magazine, entitled "The Problem of Propaganda." Tobey clipped it for reference and marked the passages which he considered most important. The article pointed out the increased availability of propaganda on the radio, as well as the use of emotionalism in newspaper articles regarding European affairs. The author proposed the following safeguards against being swayed by such subtle influences: "ask yourself whose interests are being served; why is this person or power interested and what could he hope to gain by reporting in a misleading way?" The article concluded with the admonition, "It is wise to keep our emotions under control as the propaganda barrages rain down on us from overseas."⁷¹ Tobey referred to both articles during the next few months as the President sought ways to bolster the Allies against Hitler's sweep of the continent.

The question of propaganda came up first with regard to Finland. After Russia invaded Finland on November 30, news reports generated much sympathy for the defenders. Tobey received many letters requesting American aid to the Finns, who fought against the inevitable takeover for more than three months.⁷² Herbert Hoover charted the direction for Republican isolationists when he became director of the Finnish Relief

⁶⁹From Potter Sargeant, Nov. 24, 1939, Ibid., Box 7.

⁷⁰Tobey to Sargeant, Jan. 5, 1940, Ibid., Box 7.

⁷¹Dec. 23, 1939, 62, filed under "Speech Data, 1940," Ibid., Box 9.

⁷²Ibid., Box 79.

Fund. Tobey wrote to a constituent, "Government aid is contrary to American neutrality, but there is nothing to prevent private donations through the Finnish Relief Fund and I have so contributed."⁷³

In his reaction to the question of aiding Finland, Tobey still represented a sizable proportion of the American public. Diplomatic historian Thomas A. Bailey reports that while American sympathies were with the Finns, public determination to avoid potential involvement in the conflict prevented any move to send military aid. His account suggests that President Roosevelt was not willing to act any more positively to help Finland than Congress.⁷⁴ Tobey did support the Administration bill to increase capitalization of the Export-Import Bank by \$100 million and authorize a loan to Finland of \$20 million. However, he opposed the use of that money for munitions as did a majority of the legislators.⁷⁵ In answer to Robert Bass, who apparently thought that the United States should act to protect the rights of neutral nations like Finland, Tobey wrote, "All neutrals may be wiped out. I don't propose that we should be 'suckers' again."⁷⁶

As Bass moved toward a position of support for greater intervention, Tobey became more firmly committed to the idea that the United States had been duped into entering the first war and that the pattern was the same in 1940. He recorded his position on a dictaphone for his folder

⁷³Tobey to John O. Ammaun, Jan. 29, 1940, Ibid., Box 79.

⁷⁴Thomas A. Bailey, A Diplomatic History of the American People (7th ed.; New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1964), 713.

⁷⁵Tobey to Bass, Feb. 8, 1940, Tobey Papers, Box 79.

⁷⁶Ibid.

titled "Speech Data, 1940:"

The World War of 1917 is the only war in which the United States has fought Germany. We entered this war because propaganda demanding protection of democracy had arouse the nation to a fever pitch. England has since admitted that this was propaganda, propaganda that was paid for and sent out by her for the express purpose of getting the United States into the war.⁷⁷

If he applied the guidelines of the Collier's article to stories of British need for American aid, it was clearly in the interest of England to gain public sympathy. Tobey labelled a majority of such news as propaganda and did not look farther to separate fact from fiction.

Tobey was apparently uncomfortable with his isolationism however, because he began to develop another justification for his position. In a second dictaphone entry Tobey said,

Looking at the situation from another point of view, that of the humanitarian, it will perhaps be better for all the belligerent nations if one people, namely the United States, stays free from the dreadful melee. At least one people, free from bloodshed and enmity, will be needed to bind the wounds and feed the starving on both sides. In this, the most terrible war of all ages, neither faction will be victorious. Famine, death, and disease will attack everyone long after the battle cries have again subsided. It is then that the United States must show her friendship and good will by lending care and assistance to the needy.⁷⁸

His humanitarian outlook explained Tobey's isolationism in broader terms, but it also provided the philosophical basis for his post-war conversion to internationalism. Even in 1940, Tobey was willing to offer post-war aid to the belligerents. However there was an implied reservation in this position and that was American neutrality and non-intervention in the war. Only if that were the case, and America was

⁷⁷Ibid., Box 9.

⁷⁸"Speech Data, 1940," Ibid., Box 9.

strong and whole at the war's end, would Tobey feel that this country was able to aid both sides.

Except for the brief diversion offered by the Finnish resistance, the Presidential election was paramount in Senator Tobey's life during the spring of 1940. The first stirrings came in January, when Tobey met with Styles Bridges to discuss a slate for the Republican National Convention. Tobey discovered that Bridges hoped to be nominated as a favorite son candidate for the Presidency. Tobey wrote to Dudley Orr, state chairman of the party, "I would not pledge myself to vote for him on the first or any other subsequent ballot."⁷⁹ To another friend he added, "If I had the power to make him President through my vote, I should vote against him."⁸⁰

Colonel Frank Knox, owner of the Union and the Republican vice-presidential candidate in 1936, wrote to each of the New England Senators asking for unpledged delegations in agreement that Styles Bridges would be their nominee on the first ballot.⁸¹ At the same time, Union editor Robert Blood wrote to Tobey discontinuing the Washington news service which had been supplied by Elwin Page's son, Robert.⁸² Tobey commented to a Republican friend, "I am amazed at Knox's lack of comprehension in even suggesting Bridges," and he added, complaining of the cancellation of Bob Page's service, "Knox is going to see that

⁷⁹Tobey to Dudley Orr, Jan. 3, 1940, Ibid., Box 80.

⁸⁰Tobey to Ernest Converse, Jan. 22, 1940, Ibid., Box 79.

⁸¹Ibid.

⁸²Blood to Tobey, Jan. 15, 1940, Ibid., Box 2.

Bridges gets better publicity in the future from Washington."⁸³ These activities clarified the position of New Hampshire's party leaders, who supported Knox and Bridges, and once again Tobey was excluded by choosing an independent course.

At this critical time for the Senate isolationists, Senator Borah died. Tobey wrote to his son, "We suffered a great loss in Senator Borah's passing; no man could less be spared than he. He was always captain of his soul and was always very kind to me."⁸⁴ It is revealing that Tobey remarked on those two things about Borah: that he was an independent and purposeful man, who was not swayed by the pressures of political expediency, and that he was kind to Tobey. The individualism so prominent in Tobey's thought was reinforced by men like Borah.

Tobey's fears for America heightened after Borah's leadership was gone and he engaged in an intricate maneuver to gain a vote at the Republican National Convention. In February, Tobey seized upon the 1940 census as a personal crusade against the "spying" and "prying" of Roosevelt's Administration. The idea for this had come the preceding December, in a pamphlet from Potter Sargeant of Boston. Tobey tested the political response on this question in a speech to the Harvard Club of Boston, February 3. He called the proposed expansion of governmental bureaucracy "a loss of a sense of individual responsibility which bodes ill for the nation," noted Borah's criticism of the proposed reorganization of the executive branch, and went on to charge that the census

⁸³Tobey to Arthur L. Franks, Jan. 18, 1940, Ibid., Box 80.

⁸⁴Tobey to Charles, Jr., undated, Ibid., Box 80.

questionnaire was to be the instrument of increasing control by the Administration of the entire populace.⁸⁵ The census issue struck at the New Deal, while coverage of it might gain him enough votes to challenge the Old Guard slate for the Republican Convention.

On February 9, 1940, Tobey introduced Senate Resolution 231, a bill to eliminate new income and job description questions on the upcoming April census form.⁸⁶ Two days later, Tobey moved to oppose the convention slate supported by the state Republican caucus: "I did not want to go to the Convention," he wrote, "but I do not propose to let this other crowd sit in together and make up a slate. I filed today, and expect others to do that also, so it will be a contest."⁸⁷ In his efforts to gain publicity for the delegate's election, he made a speech against the census questionnaire:

This army of locally appointed enumerators, one-half as large as the standing army of the United States, is being appointed, not primarily on the basis of merit or trustworthiness, but under the spoils system of political patronage, to reward party politicians for the work they have done in the past campaigns, or are expected to perform this year.⁸⁸

His main objection was that the census created thousands of temporary jobs which would be given to supporters of the Democratic Administration. Tobey's position would be popular with Republicans while it provided the Senator with another method of attacking the Administration.

⁸⁵"Speeches, 1940," Ibid., Box 9.

⁸⁶Cong. Record, 76th Cong., 2nd Sess., 1148, 1151.

⁸⁷Tobey to John H. Finley, Feb. 9, 1940, Tobey Papers, Box 80.

⁸⁸Radio Speech, Feb. 19, 1940, Ibid., Box 9.

Tobey's office in Washington issued a press release stating that S.R. 231 was designed to strike out the income questions as a violation of the Constitutional right to privacy.⁸⁹ Immediately after his radio speech, which was given front-page coverage in the New York Times and the Herald-Tribune, Tobey wrote to the Union complaining that "my own newspaper" printed only a back-page Associated Press release of the entire affair. He suggested that the Union's new correspondent was at fault.⁹⁰ The publisher replied innocently, "I am convinced that Page was playing the New Deal game. Let's give McKee the new man a fair chance."⁹¹ Tobey was piqued that his deliberate effort to gain newspaper coverage in New Hampshire had been ignored.

Although Tobey failed to impress the Manchester Union with his campaign against the census, he gained transitory national fame. He was the featured speaker on America's Forum of the Air, a popular Sunday radio program. In that speech, he combined his favorite topics in opposition to the New Deal: government spending would soon lead to national bankruptcy; buying gold from Russia and Japan was financing aggression instead of leading to world peace; the major characteristic of the New Deal was "a lust for power;" Roosevelt's success as President consisted of continued unemployment, a Treasury debt and increasing class prejudices.

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Press Release, Feb. 19, 1940, Ibid., Box 7.

⁹⁰Tobey to Edmund Jewell, Union-Leader Publishing Co., March 1, 1940, Ibid., Box 80.

⁹¹Jewell to Tobey, March 4, 1940, Ibid., Box 7.

Tobey ended the address with a dramatic call for a popular outpouring of letters from the listening public against these abuses.⁹² The speech was a plea for Republican unity against the Democrats as well as an attempt to gain publicity for himself.

Tobey made an unusual appeal for massive disobedience to the government in a newsreel statement which was shown in theaters all over the country. He requested a public refusal to answer the new questions, since they were not authorized by the 1929 law which set up the census. He claimed that since the questions were not authorized by Congress, refusal to answer them would not be a violation of law. He closed by saying, "We could not all be put in jail for not answering. They may play that way in Germany or Russia, but never in free America."⁹³

In his most complete description of the "census snooping" crusade, Tobey delivered a sweeping, though hardly original, indictment over the Columbia Broadcasting System. He suspected that the Administration was looking for new tax sources to meet the national debt; the questions about physical work were not for re-employment purposes, but for national mobilization in time of war; there were communists on the census teams in California, and there would be more governmental pressure through the Works Progress Administration using such information. Again he counselled refusal to answer as a violation of Constitutional rights.⁹⁴

Tobey received some criticism for his crusade, on the grounds that

⁹²Speech, March 3, 1940, Ibid., Box 9.

⁹³Press release, March 6, 1940, Ibid., Box 7.

⁹⁴Speech, March 9, 1940, Ibid., Box 8.

it was insignificant compared to the momentous issues facing the nation.

He wrote in his defense to one constituent:

You speak of census snooping as a trivial issue compared to other issues. This may be so, but I think that in light of the loss of liberty in European countries and the methods by which such was lost by increasing degrees, that it is of vital importance for us to zealously guard against any encroachment upon our constitutional liberties. The people are rapidly recognizing this in this census fight and it is a healthy sign for America.⁹⁵

Tobey convinced himself that the response which he received was a sign that the Democratic Administration had over-stepped the boundaries of authority which public opinion would tolerate. In his self-appointed role as the "zealous guardian" of Constitutional rights, Tobey gained considerable for himself and the Republican Party. It was a safe issue, since one could hardly be criticized for protecting the Constitution as Europe's wars loomed ever closer.

In New Hampshire, Tobey's efforts were finally successful: he was elected to the Republican National Convention as a Delegate-at-large. Styles Bridges drew the most votes with 34,616, followed by Tobey with 32,755, George Moses, 26,453 and Huntley Spaulding, 25,414.⁹⁶ Bridges and Moses belonged to the original slate proposed by the Old Guard. Tobey and Spaulding belonged to the progressive faction and they favored Herbert Hoover as the presidential nominee, rather than Frank Knox or Styles Bridges.⁹⁷

⁹⁵Tobey to Mrs. Elizabeth Marsh, March 11, 1940, Ibid., Box 10.

⁹⁶Mimeograph from the Office of the Secretary of State, Concord, N.H., March 18, 1940, Ibid., Box 8.

⁹⁷Tobey to Arthur Franks, Jan. 17, 1940, Ibid., Box 80.

After the Republican delegation was chosen, there were still two weeks until the census actually began. During that time, Tobey shifted his emphasis from the invasion of privacy to criticizing the use which would be made of census information. In other words, he shifted from a personal issue which he needed to win within the Republican Party to a stance of attacking the Democrats for the party. On March 31, 1940, he spoke on the Forum of the Air again, this time as part of a debate. His primary opponent was Senator Claude Pepper of Florida, an ardent New Dealer and former assistant director of the census. Tobey summarized his position, reiterating that the Administration had no right to ask questions of personal income and employment because Congress had not authorized them. Pepper claimed that the 1929 census law was a general authorization for information, not a specific question-by-question measure.⁹⁸

The Republicans continued to criticize Tobey in New Hampshire. The Concord Monitor carried a headline proclaiming "Bridges and Governor Francis P. Murphy Break with Tobey on Census Issue." The story was accompanied by a picture of Senator Bridges happily filling out his census questionnaire.⁹⁹ After this story was published, Tobey wrote to an old friend, "Sometimes one gets discouraged and wonders how long our form of government can continue in the face of the infiltration of un-American ideas and ideals made manifest in so many individuals, but we cannot quit."¹⁰⁰ To a Republican Women's Club in Concord, Tobey admitted

⁹⁸Speech, March 31, 1940, Ibid., Box 8.

⁹⁹Concord Monitor, April 5, 1940.

¹⁰⁰Tobey to Alan D. Kinsley, Ap. 23, 1940, Tobey Papers, Box 80.

that "the average man is more concerned about war than taxes, monetary policy or the Reciprocal Trade Agreements," but he cautioned against this emphasis, "The United States on its home territory is invincible. Meanwhile, the New Deal is dishonest, full of corruption and undeniably a menace to the American way of life."¹⁰¹ Internal problems remained Tobey's primary interest, even though public attention was focused on the war.

In April, Hitler moved into the Scandinavian countries. In May, the Low Countries fell back before Hitler's forces and suddenly Americans were aware that France too might fall. Authors Langer and Gleason describe two themes which dominated public debate through the national conventions in July: how to construct an adequate defense system, and how to save France and Britain from destruction or cushion the shock of their collapse.¹⁰²

Even isolationists were prepared to support American defense, but the question remained, where to draw the battle-line; at the shoreline, around the Western Hemisphere, or at the English Channel? Leading Republicans supported the Administration's position that aiding England was the best way to avoid American involvement in the fighting. A new committee was formed under the chairmanship of the popular progressive Republican editor William Allen White. Members of the so-called White Committee began to speak out for allocating supplies to the Allies in Europe as America's best defense.¹⁰³ Many former progressives including members of the Bass

¹⁰¹Speech, May 7, 1940, Ibid., Box 9.

¹⁰²Langer and Gleason, Vol. II, 472.

¹⁰³Walter Johnson, The Battle Against Isolation (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1944), 66-67.

faction in New Hampshire followed White's lead in supporting the Administration.

The president also sought an alliance with more conservative Republicans by appointing Frank Knox as Secretary of the Navy and Henry Stimson as Secretary of War. Both of these men advocated conscription, build-up of the navy and air force, and greater material aid to Britain. These appointments were contrary to the advice which Herbert Hoover had sent to Tobey concerning bipartisanship in government and they prompted the Senator to make Hoover's letter public.¹⁰⁴ The President's appointments were clearly aimed at removing the issue of aid to the Allies from the presidential race if possible. This heightened Tobey's fears that popular debate would be stifled and the "American system" of checks and balances was being destroyed.

At this time Tobey received advice on strengthening American continental defenses from Chandler Hovey. The two men had come to work for Kidder-Peabody forty years earlier and Hovey remained with the company to become one of its vice-presidents. In addition, Hovey was chairman of the Massachusetts Aeronautics Commission. Tobey's correspondence with Hovey became the most important outlet which the Senator had during his isolationist period in 1940 and 1941. In May Hovey sent a long list of policy suggestions to Tobey. In abbreviated form, they included:

- 1) the United States must not depend on the Navy as the Panama Canal makes that too vulnerable;
- 2) innumerable small submarines would be more useful than large battleships for protecting the Western Hemisphere;
- 3) captured materials should be transported to the United States for minute study, to take advantage of Germany's air development;

¹⁰⁴ Hoover to Tobey, Sept. 28, 1939, Tobey Papers, Box 79.

- 4) large battleships cost too much and take three or four years to build;
- 5) private corporations would still cooperate with the Administration in carrying out defense plans in spite of the fact that for the last seven years large business has been continually heckled by the administration.¹⁰⁵

Hovey's own response to the New Deal was revealed in the last item, while it also indicated his desire for business partnership with the government. The suggestions fit with Hovey's interest in the developing airplane industry, and they also provided a way for Tobey to support submarine construction at the Portsmouth Navy Yard. Tobey wrote back to his friend that "your suggestions seemed to have so much sound sense in them that I not only transmitted them to the Secretary of War Stimson, but used them in several addresses I made to different audiences and also spoke of them to my fellow Senators."¹⁰⁶

After Hitler's forces moved through the Low Countries and threatened France during the spring of 1940, Tobey realized that the war issue could not be avoided in favor of a balanced budget or taxes. He used Hovey's suggestions as the basis for his own position, which was to concentrate on American continental defense. He wrote, "I am strongly in favor of building up our defenses promptly and materially, so that aggressive nations will recognize the futility of attempt at invasion."¹⁰⁷ To a fellow isolationist and Dartmouth professor, Louis Benezet, Tobey outlined the policy which he supported:

Our Navy, if adequate, supplied by a highly efficient Army and air force, will be so effective that few nations, not excluding

¹⁰⁵ Telegram from Hovey to Tobey, May 20, 1940, Ibid., Box 23.

¹⁰⁶ Tobey to Hovey, Sept. 17, 1940, Ibid., Box 23.

¹⁰⁷ Tobey to Russell Bartlett, June 3, 1940, Ibid., Box 79.

victorious totalitarian nations, will challenge its power, and if any does we shall be the deliverer and not the recipient of the terrible hammer strokes of war.¹⁰⁸

He expected a victory by Hitler on the continent, but still refused to consider the effect which Britain's defeat might have on the United States. In this same letter to Benezet, Tobey opposed selling arms to Britain on credit, although he favored using foreign assets in this hemisphere to pay for purchases under the cash-and-carry provision. However, he still felt American defenses were not strong enough to spare munitions for England.¹⁰⁹

When France fell to the Germans in June, Tobey was criticized by New Hampshire constituents for his isolationism and his unwillingness to go along with Knox in favor of aiding the Allies. Tobey replied,

As to the report that I claim it makes no difference to America who wins the war, that is too silly to be worthy of a reply. Of course it would make a difference. But...I am not in favor of sending any of our defense mechanisms, whether it be guns, planes, ships, or munitions, to even the Allies if it will endanger our defense. America comes first!¹¹⁰

Since his position did not include supplying the Allies in order to protect America, Tobey apparently had much higher requirements for defense needs in this country than the interventionists. When Robert Bass wrote to Tobey, "I believe that we shall either have to fight to keep the Germans out of South America or fact prolonged warfare after they have become established in our hemisphere," Tobey did not answer.¹¹¹

¹⁰⁸May 27, 1940, Ibid., Box 79.

¹⁰⁹Ibid.

¹¹⁰Tobey to Jacob M. Sulins, June 12, 1940, Ibid., Box 80.

¹¹¹Bass to Tobey, June 20, 1940, Ibid., Box 2.

He was not ready to agree with Bass on that.

Tobey was concerned about national defense, but he did not believe that war in Europe was a sufficient threat to warrant extraordinary measures. Although he joined the rest of the Senate in voting for an unlimited Army Air Corps, he opposed the build-up of land forces because that implied a capability of fighting on foreign soil.¹¹² He blamed Roosevelt and the Democratic Party for using the threat of war to frighten people into voting for the Democrats in the coming election. Tobey showed some awareness of the position which his isolationism was carrying him when he wrote

Some of us who try to lift up the covers and see what is motivating many of the actions in the present day, are going to be crucified by public opinion, which has been developed through hysteria and the power of suggestion from the White House and other high sources, but that cannot be avoided.¹¹³

When Chandler Hovey wrote to ask Tobey for his opinion of the White Committee which was being supported by Ernest M. Hopkins, President of Dartmouth, Tobey replied, "They think all we have to consider is the foreign situation, but domestic problems cannot be entirely forgotten."¹¹⁴

As the Republican Party gathered to nominate a presidential candidate, there was a split which William S. White characterized as the Taft party and the Dewey party.¹¹⁵ Senator Robert A. Taft of Ohio represented the Old Guard, separated from the new urban sources of Democratic support

¹¹²Cong. Record, 76th Cong., 3rd Sess., A 5929.

¹¹³Tobey to W.J. Abbott, June 13, 1940, Tobey Papers, Box 79.

¹¹⁴Tobey to Hovey, June 17, 1940, Ibid., Box 80.

¹¹⁵White, Taft Story, 106.

and concerned more with the domestic economy than with foreign affairs. Governor Thomas E. Dewey of New York stood for a "forward-looking, dominantly internationalist" party which accepted and approved many New Deal policies.¹¹⁶ Before the Republican Convention opened in June, 1940, Charles Tobey favored neither Taft nor Dewey. He wrote that he still thought Herbert Hoover was the best candidate, "I consider him a strong personal friend and I would be pleased to see him as President." He added that Hoover's ability to manage defense production was proven by his business experience and he concluded by saying, "I think production should be taken out of the hands of Harold Ickes, Harry Hopkins and Roosevelt and placed in the hands of men who have the ability to turn out the goods in quick time."¹¹⁷

Tobey's faith in Hoover's version of Americanism, as well as his fears connected with a policy of intervention, was illustrated by his action at the convention. As William White described the convention, on the first ballot, a majority of the delegates voted for Dewey, while Taft, Willkie and Vandenberg trailed by a margin of 200 votes. By the fifth ballot, Willkie, who belonged to the Dewey faction of the party, was ahead with 429 votes and Taft reached his peak of 377 votes, while the other two received less than a 100 total. Willkie then won on the sixth ballot with 659 votes.¹¹⁸ Tobey did not vote for Willkie, even on the final ballot. He reported to a friend that he had cast a complimentary first ballot for Styles Bridges, contrary to what he had said

¹¹⁶ Ibid., 106-107.

¹¹⁷ Tobey to Frank E. Kittredge, June 18, 1940, Tobey Papers, Box 80.

¹¹⁸ White, 111.

earlier. On the next three ballots, he voted for Herbert Hoover, "a man whom I admire greatly and would like to see President again." On the last two ballots, Tobey voted for Taft, "a colleague of mine, a man whom I admire for his forthrightness and intellectual ability and all-around honesty."¹¹⁹ Tobey thus cast his vote for the older, more conservative group within the Republican Party and he refused to join the other five New Hampshire delegates in approving Willkie's internationalism.¹²⁰

In effect, the nomination of Willkie took the foreign policy issue out of the 1940 presidential race, but it did not remove the question from politics. Richard W. Leopold cites the Charlottesville pledge of aid to Britain as "the commitment, though not a military one, which would take the United States from neutrality to nonbelligerency."¹²¹ The immediate issue was Churchill's request for fifty destroyers and several hundred new planes. Tobey feared that Roosevelt would simply send twenty or thirty ships to England if Congress adjourned: "I have no confidence in Roosevelt's veracity or commitment to peace," he wrote.¹²² Congress remained in session throughout the summer to prevent the President from by-passing the legislative demand that American military leaders certify that any supplies sent to England under the cash-and-carry provision were not needed for defense.

¹¹⁹ Tobey to Joseph L. Smith, July 12, 1940, Tobey Papers, Box 80.

¹²⁰ Ibid.

¹²¹ Richard W. Leopold, The Growth of American Foreign Policy (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1962) 565.

¹²² Tobey to B.F. W. Russell, July 12, 1940, Tobey Papers, Box 80.

That summer, the White Committee publicized President Roosevelt's pledge to aid Britain. Walter Johnson in The Battle Against Isolation describes four objectives of the committee: to support moral and material aid for Britain, including food shipments for civilians; to stimulate the expansion of American industry for the war effort; to defend the Bill of Rights and other civil liberties of all Americans; to educate the public to the idea of sacrificing for liberty.¹²³ Some members of the White Committee urged the President to exchange American destroyers for British possessions in the Western Hemisphere as a way of diverting criticism from those who would balk at making the ships a gift.

Tobey believed that aid to England would be an act of war, because it invited reprisal from Germany against this country. Judge John E. Allen, chairman of the New Hampshire White Committee, published a letter which said that Senator Bridges and Representative [Foster] Stearns had not been "duped by the false promises of Hitler" as had Senator Tobey and Representative [Arthur] Jenks.¹²⁴ Stearns belonged to the Bass faction, while Jenks consistently sided with Tobey. All four men were Republicans. In his reply to Allen, Tobey wrote that he did not assume the United States was immune from attack by Hitler, that he had voted for every defense measure and that his criticism of peacetime conscription was based on his knowledge that it was "a radical departure from the American way."¹²⁵

¹²³Johnson, 92-93.

¹²⁴Quoted in Tobey to John E. Allen, Aug. 14, 1940, Tobey Papers, Box 79

¹²⁵Ibid.

Tobey rejected the White Committee's contention that he supported continental defense only because he believed Hitler's promise that America was not in danger of attack. To one of his own supporters, Tobey explained his position more fully:

Personally, I do not see the danger of Nazi invasion as at all acute, but think it is greatly exaggerated and is being used by the naval and military forces of this country seeking to put this country on a different footing than heretofore, and there is much to contribute to this conviction.¹²⁶

Although he did not believe Hitler's pledge, he did not think the threat of attack was imminent.

The charge that he had been duped by Hitler nettled Tobey for personal and political reasons. No man likes to be accused of blindness or stupidity, but criticism from the White Committee was especially irritating because that group was largely made of his old progressive friends. Furthermore, he resented the implication that he was being unpatriotic. His position was based on his own conception of the American way and that did not include alliance with England for defense. Although Tobey did not face an election for four more years, he had been criticized by fellow Republicans for not joining them in support of Willkie. With Secretary Knox as the owner of New Hampshire's largest and most influential paper, Tobey could foresee trouble. There were hints of this awareness in his June letters predicting "crucifixion" for his stand against the Administration.¹²⁷

¹²⁶Tobey to Paul B. Brown, Aug. 14, 1940, Ibid., Box 79.

¹²⁷To W.J. Abbott, June 13, 1940, Ibid., Box 79.

As a result, Tobey sought a political role which would redeem him in public eyes. On August 22, he introduced Senate Resolution 300, to investigate radio in the United States because of its propaganda uses.¹²⁸ It was turned down because the Federal Communications Commission was already looking into the matter. The background of Tobey's request lay in New Hampshire politics, as well as in his suspicion of foreign propaganda and the Collier's article on that. The Democratic opponent defeated by Tobey in 1938 was Fred H. Brown, who had been New Hampshire's Democratic governor in 1922 and then Senator in 1932. Brown had been appointed to a seven-year term on the FCC after his defeat by Tobey. The Republican Senator linked Brown's appointment with a trade between George Moses of the Old Guard and the White House. Tobey regarded the defeat of S.R. 300 as a conspiracy to protect Moses from being exposed for dealing with the Democrats.¹²⁹

On September 3, 1940, President Roosevelt announced that fifty destroyers and some other weapons would be sent to Britain in return for a long-term, no-cost lease of Caribbean sites for naval and air stations.¹³⁰ Senator Tobey wrote that "the destroyer exchange is an act of war and shortly we will send submarines, then cruisers, then battleships until the whole Navy is in."¹³¹ Tobey acted on his assumption that the destroyer exchange was an act of war by voting for peacetime conscription, even though he had opposed it as being dangerous to American civil

¹²⁸ Cong. Record, 76th Cong., 3rd Sess., 10732.

¹²⁹ "Speech Data, 1940," Tobey Papers, Box 9.

¹³⁰ Rosenman, F.D.R. Papers, Vol. 1940, 391.

¹³¹ To Rev. J. Mace Crandall, Sept. 17, 1940, Tobey Papers, Box 79.

liberties. To one constituent he explained,

What this nation needs, in my judgment, is not a tremendous army, but a tremendous navy, which we voted for, and a tremendous air force, which we also voted for, and a relatively small but efficient army, fully equipped, able to handle the highly mechanized instruments of war under which modern warfare is waged.¹³²

Tobey added, "Let me point out that if I were playing politics, I should vote for the Burke-Wadsworth bill because of the many friends of mine who demand I vote for it." That statement evidently referred to both belligerent isolationists in the Republican Party and his progressive friends in the White Committee, for both groups were supporting greater mobilization for possible war. In the end, Tobey voted for an amendment to the bill which limited duty to twelve months and forbade deployment outside of the Western Hemisphere, then he voted for peacetime conscription "because the reality of the situation demanded such a step."¹³³

During the fall presidential campaign, Tobey did not lend much support to the Republican Party. When asked by the state party treasurer for a donation of \$1,000 he sent a token contribution of \$40.¹³⁴ Then Tobey made his attempt to investigate radio propaganda. When that was thwarted, he undertook an investigation of the Hague political machine in New Jersey for the Senate Special Committee on Campaign Expenses. Late in September he reported that the Democrats assigned to this committee refused to attend hearings and that Administration pressure had been used to obstruct proceedings.¹³⁵ When asked to speak on behalf

¹³²To Harry P. Greeley, Aug. 27, 1940, Tobey Papers, Box 80.

¹³³To Ray W. Howard, Dec. 9, 1940, Ibid., Box 80.

¹³⁴To Frank Sulloway, July 30, 1940, Ibid., Box 80.

¹³⁵Cong. Record, 76th Cong., 3rd Sess., 1257-60.

of Republican candidates, Tobey wrote directly to Willkie to explain that he was deeply engaged in an investigation of machine politics in Newark and he justified his activities as part of the general exposure of special privileges granted through the huge New Deal bureaucracy.¹³⁶

Exposure of the Hague machine in Newark was ready-made for Charles Tobey. It was like his first political foray as investigator of rail influences on the legislature in 1915. The role of crusading muckraker was used by Tobey to gain newspaper coverage as late as the preceding spring, when he undertook his census campaign. Tobey welcomed the interpretation of his efforts by Bob Page, former correspondent for the Manchester Union, who wrote, "It isn't just New Jersey alone you are exposing. It is the whole story of machine politics, and your revelations should create votes in Illinois, New York, Missouri and in every place where the vicious system is practiced."¹³⁷ Consistent with his political image of the American people, Tobey wrote that his own contribution was to expose "boss-ruled elections" while "it is up to the American people to restore our country to the tried and true American concepts of government."¹³⁸

Just before the election in November, Tobey did make one radio broadcast on behalf of the Republican slate of candidates. After charging that the Democrats had been guilty of having a closed convention,

¹³⁶To Wendell Willkie, Oct. 1, 1940, Tobey Papers, Box 80.

¹³⁷From Robertson Page, Oct 23, 1940, Ibid., Box 7.

¹³⁸To Walter Allerton, Oct. 21, 1940., Ibid., Box 79.

"controlled and manipulated by the occupant of the White House," he criticized Roosevelt's connections with machine bosses like Kelly in Chicago, Flynn in New York, and Hague in New Jersey. He ended his radio speech by saying, "My appeal tonight is not only to Republicans, but equally to the great body of Democrats who have seen their party and its traditions tossed aside by the New Deal."¹³⁹ Even though Tobey did not campaign for Willkie, he believed that the Republicans were generally more concerned with traditional patterns of politics and he hoped that the American public valued that more than the economic benefits brought to them by the Democrats.

Roosevelt increased the margin of his victory in New Hampshire from 3,500 in 1936 to 16,000 in 1940.¹⁴⁰ Tobey attributed the increase to "people on relief drawing benefits from him and citizens of British ancestry."¹⁴¹ Justifying his own efforts outside of the state, Tobey asserted that his investigations had undermined Boss Hague's control of New Jersey, where "Hague failed by 50,000 votes in delivering a Democratic majority to the state and the nation."¹⁴² Tobey did receive criticism from party members in the state for having avoided Willkie's campaign. He denied the charge, of course, citing the Hague investigation as part of the campaign and his one radio speech as evidence of support.¹⁴³ His self-defense was perfunctory, but true, and people

¹³⁹Radio address, Nov. 3, 1940, Ibid., Box 8.

¹⁴⁰Manual for the General Court, 1941, 361.

¹⁴¹To Albert S. Baker, Nov. 19, 1940, Tobey Papers, Box 79.

¹⁴²To Frank S. Dodge, Nov. 20, 1940, Ibid., Box 80.

¹⁴³To Roy Sullivan, Keen (N.H.) Evening Sentinel, Dec. 6, 1940, Ibid., Box 80.

could hardly blame a 16,000 vote margin on Tobey.

After the election, Tobey turned his attention to hemispheric defense. Back in August, he recognized that Hitler already had air bases in the Cape Verde Islands and was doing "spade work" for similar establishments in South America.¹⁴⁴ In a special delivery letter sent to Robert Bass, who was supporting the White Committee's position for aid to Britain, Tobey stated his own preferences: "If the Axis gets bases near or on the South American coast, we should stop them."¹⁴⁵ He approved Secretary Hull's plan to lend money to South American countries for their own defense, but would not agree with Bass that the same should be done for England.¹⁴⁶ Tobey's admission that the United States should fight to protect South America was a new position for him. Although it was a traditional attitude which could be traced back to the Monroe Doctrine, Tobey had previously said only that he would support fighting if this country were invaded. His new position indicated that Tobey had begun to shift his viewpoint from a strictly domestic and primarily economic one to a broader understanding of American security.

On December 17, President Roosevelt promised to loan materials to England for fighting Hitler with his story of a man with a garden hose loaning it to his neighbor in order to put out a fire.¹⁴⁷ Expanding on this idea, Roosevelt denied that America might be attacked so long as

¹⁴⁴To Chandler Hovey, Aug. 30, 1940, Ibid., Box 80.

¹⁴⁵To Robert P. Bass, Nov. 22, 1940, Ibid., Box 79.

¹⁴⁶Ibid.

¹⁴⁷Rosenman, F.D.R. Papers, Vol. 1940, 607.

the British navy survived and he urged that the United States become "the great arsenal of democracy."¹⁴⁸ On January 6, 1941, the President asked Congress for "authority and for funds sufficient to manufacture additional munitions and war supplies of many kinds, to be turned over to those nations which are now in actual war with aggressor nations."¹⁴⁹ This was the President's request for lend-lease authority, and it obviated the need to rescind the Johnson Act of 1934 which forbade loans to nations which had not repaid World War I loans. Lend-lease would almost make the cash-and-carry provision of the 1939 Neutrality Act obsolete. Isolationists like Senator Tobey recognized that this policy would make the United States a nonbelligerent participant in the war and the battle over legislative approval for the President's request was the next contest which the isolationists lost.

Outside of Congress, the debate over lend-lease was carried on between the White Committee, which supported aid to Britain as a means of keeping out of the war, and America First, an organization formed the preceding fall to support non-intervention and continental defense only.¹⁵⁰ Tobey opposed the lend-lease proposal on constitutional grounds that it granted too much power to the President. He did not join America First when the organization began, but during the lend-lease debates he made contact, and he did become a member late in the spring of 1941.

¹⁴⁸ Fireside Chat, Dec. 29, 1940, Ibid., 643.

¹⁴⁹ Fireside Chat, Ibid., 668.

¹⁵⁰ Wayne S. Cole, America First: The Battle Against Intervention, 1940-1941 (Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press, 1953), 10.

Tobey's faith in American democracy, with its Constitutional balance of powers, was challenged by conservatives and liberals too. When Albert Baker, former editor of the Concord Monitor and National Guard captain, demanded more executive authority in order to streamline the defense effort, Tobey answered,

The workings of a democracy are slow and oftentimes cumbersome in contrast to the ways of dictator nations, but I am quite certain that every day we are making progress toward greater efficiency, and once things get rolling we will get the military camps and units well and carefully equipped.¹⁵¹

On the Progressive side, there was pressure to approve the lend-lease proposal. Tobey wrote to his son about their response, saying "The Lend-Lease bill of the President is tremendously far reaching and calls for granting of powers never conceived of by Congress before. I do not believe it should pass in its present form."¹⁵²

Personal attacks on Tobey by the New Hampshire White Committee only strengthened his belief that individualism was threatened by the very progressives who had championed those values against the Old Guard. "Tolerance and the democratic process are largely out the window," he wrote to Louis Benezet at Dartmouth,

I feel very bitter about the way they have operated and the pressure they have used. This is the third instance where they have used my name and where persons outside New Hampshire have come in and decried me in public gatherings and, worse than that, put a letter over the name of a Justice of the State Supreme Court, stating that Bridges and Stearns were all right and not guilty of appeasement and being fooled by Hitler, but that Tobey and Jenks were. This is manifestly unfair and untrue.¹⁵³

¹⁵¹Tobey to Baker, Jan. 6, 1941, Tobey Papers, Box 79.

¹⁵²To Russell Tobey, Jan. 13, 1941, Ibid., Box 80.

¹⁵³Jan. 14, 1941, Ibid., Box 80.

Not only did Tobey defend himself, but he rejoiced when William Allen White resigned from the national White Committee over a dispute with other leaders on the question of direct military aid and convoy protection. Tobey applied his interpretation of the "devils" leading this nation into war when he wrote to a fellow Republican of his relief that White had resigned saying, "The national organization of the William A. White Committee is so vulnerable with respect to its origin and activities."¹⁵⁴ To another friend Tobey commented "The genesis of the White Committee lies in the International banking circles of New York City."¹⁵⁵ This was an extension of the Nye thesis that bankers and munitions manufacturers were responsible for American participation in wars, as well as his attempt to defend himself against attacks by the White Committee.

Tobey made his first contact with the America First organization through his dispute with the White Committee. In January, the progressive group met without Tobey, and at that meeting Ernest Hopkins of Dartmouth suggested that it might be necessary to prohibit Charles Lindbergh from voicing his opinions over radio and in the press.¹⁵⁶ Tobey wrote to Judge Elwin Page asking for some rejoinder to Hopkins' suggestion on the basis that free speech must be protected.¹⁵⁷ For his part, Tobey praised Lindbergh saying, "That man is absolutely sincere and honest and is unusually able. I honor him very much for his great qualities as I do any

¹⁵⁴To John P. Carleton, Jan. 21, 1941, Ibid., Box 80.

¹⁵⁵To Dudley Orr, Jan. 25, 1941, Ibid., Box 81.

¹⁵⁶To John P. Carleton, Jan. 21, 1941, Ibid., Box 80.

¹⁵⁷To Judge Elwin Page, Jan. 27, 1941, Ibid., Box 80.

man who possess them and has the guts to stand up for his convictions."¹⁵⁸
 A week later, Tobey was invited to attend a dinner meeting of Republicans who might be interested in a more active role in America First, in which Lindbergh was already a leading spokesman.¹⁵⁹

Meanwhile, the debate over lend-lease brought out a change in Tobey's thinking about aid to Britain. He wrote to a critical friend, "I want England to win this war and am willing to give whatever we can spare from our defense resources, and am in favor of giving or loaning vast sums of money."¹⁶⁰ Although he still did not want to deplete American supplies, this position was a change from his earlier stance against granting credit to England. He was probably reacting to appeasement charges by the White Committee, since he blamed the poor response to a radio broadcast which he made against lend-lease on "the influence of Dartmouth College, Phillips-Exeter, the University of New Hampshire and St. Paul's School, all of which is [sic] so pro-British that they put Britain ahead of the United States."¹⁶¹

Tobey's criticism of lend-lease was mainly Constitutional. He wrote, "Why should Congress abdicate its power to make treaties and to declare war?" and to another friend he added, "I am against this bill, first, because I think we are being moved deliberately into the war and

¹⁵⁸To Arthur Franks, Feb. 7, 1941, Ibid., Box 81.

¹⁵⁹Tobey addressed his thanks to Ray Bliss, National Republican Party Headquarters, Feb. 18, 1941, Ibid., Box 80.

¹⁶⁰To Dr. Henry Amsden, Feb. 3, 1941, Ibid., Box 80.

¹⁶¹Ray Howard, March 8, 1941, Ibid., Box 81.

second, I am against the tremendous powers this bill gives to the President."¹⁶² In addition, Tobey was concerned about the aid which Russia might get under lend-lease: "I often feel that the nations of the world are playing into the hands of Russia and, after this war is over, we may look back upon the events of today with more recognition of this fact."¹⁶³

The Lend-Lease Act of March 11, 1941, gave congressional approval to military aid for Britain. The law circumvented the Neutrality Act of 1939, which banned loans to belligerents. However, the Act specifically forbade convoying in war zones as they were defined by the President. In New Hampshire, reaction to the new law was mixed. The Concord Monitor proclaimed, "With passage of H.R. 1776, the foreign policy of this country becomes the capriciousness of one man's mind."¹⁶⁴ The Monitor added the next day, "...for every ship which he gives away will postpone by just that much the time when this country will have a first class fleet."¹⁶⁵ Tobey noted in a letter to Robert Bass' son, Perkins, that the Manchester Union refused to print the Senator's news releases against lend-lease, supporting instead Frank Knox's position in favor of convoying.¹⁶⁶ The Union publicized the American Legion's request for convoys, while nearly all of the former progressives supported Ambassador to Britain John G. Winant's request for protection of these essential

¹⁶²To Judge Edgar Bowker, March 6, 1941, Ibid., Box 80; to Frank Kittredge, Feb. 28, 1941, Ibid., Box 81.

¹⁶³To Prof. Gordon Bill, Dean of the Faculty, Dartmouth College, March 14, 1941, Ibid., Box 80.

¹⁶⁴Concord Monitor, March 11, 1941.

¹⁶⁵Ibid., March 12, 1941.

¹⁶⁶To Perkins Bass, March 10, 1941, Tobey Papers, Box 80.

materials.¹⁶⁷

Tobey's position on lend-lease became politically important in the spring of 1941. George Moses, still active in conservative Republican circles, decided to support Union editor Robert Blood against Tobey in 1944 primary elections. Tobey wrote to Harriet Newell about this development, "I had hoped that in view of my service I could have the nomination given me without opposition and find therein public approval from my people of New Hampshire, which may be so yet but it looks doubtful."¹⁶⁸ Tobey believed that most of the people backed his position, even though both factions of the party favored interventionist policies. In the same letter to Mrs. Newell, Tobey again expressed his faith in individualism:

I have often felt lonesome in my public life and have tried to discover the reason for it. I suppose it is because I have not gone along with the "machine" and played the game with the other fellows. I have not been a "good fellow" so to speak--- drinking and attending convivial gatherings. In other words I am a peculiar fellow. But, when the time came, people have always been good to me, under the leadership of such rare friends as you and my efforts have been successful.¹⁶⁹

On March 31, 1941, Tobey introduced a resolution to forbid convoying, which he described in Secretary Knox's words as "an act of war." Said Tobey, "This joint resolution provides a means of affording Senators a vehicle to vindicate their public statements into specific legislation to keep the country from taking this fatal step into war."¹⁷⁰ In his

¹⁶⁷Concord Monitor, March 15, 1941.

¹⁶⁸ To Harriet Newell, March 29, 1941, Tobey Papers, Box 80.

¹⁶⁹Ibid.

¹⁷⁰Cong. Record, 77th Cong., 1st Sess., 2765, 2767.

syndicated column carried by the Concord Monitor Ray Tucker claimed that the decision to convoy was already made within the Administration and it would soon be announced.¹⁷¹ The Administration opposed the Tobey resolution through Senator Key Pittman, Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, who refused to report the bill out of the committee.¹⁷² The Washington Post presented the Administration's position in an editorial which said, "We must relieve the British of some of the immense burdens of transport while they are standing off the greatest challenge to our sheltered security in our national history."¹⁷³

Tobey gained some publicity when Tucker wrote in his "National Whirligig" column,

If there are two members of Congress who certain key men of the Administration would like to place in a concentration camp, they are Senator Tobey of New Hampshire and Congressman Albert Engel of Northern Michigan. They insist on asking too many pertinent and embarrassing questions about the national defense program.¹⁷⁴

Later, Tobey responded to this picture of himself with delight, writing to Harriet Newell, "The Administration hates me more than any other member of the Senate and if they could get me in a concentration camp they would do it with glee."¹⁷⁵ Tobey asserted his interpretation of the convoying issue in a long letter to Congressman Sol Bloom, whose Foreign Affairs Committee would examine Tobey's bill in the House:

¹⁷¹Concord Monitor, April 2, 1941.

¹⁷²Cong. Record, 77th Cong., 1st Sess., 2906.

¹⁷³Washington Post, April 4, 1941.

¹⁷⁴Concord Monitor, April 7, 1941.

¹⁷⁵To Harriet Newell, May 15, 1941, Tobey Papers, Box 81.

In your statement you say, "Only the President can determine how and where convoys are needed, if they are needed. That isn't our department."

Isn't our department? I recognize that the Congress, which is supposed to be a body representative of the people, has reduced itself to a sorrowful position by virtue of its "Yes-man" attitude, and I equally recognize that the Congress has turned over many of its powers to the President, but I cannot for a moment concede that we have reduced our status to that of a department, subservient to the whim and rule of the President. God forbid that the time will ever come when the people entirely lose the benefit of a Congress which has the determination in a crisis to exercise its Constitutional prerogatives.¹⁷⁶

He believed that Congress was cooperating with the President in destroying the principle of debate and consensus. That was a danger which Tobey feared more than an invasion by Germany.

Tobey emphasized his domestic concerns as he urged the Senate to consider his anti-convoy resolution, which was being held up in the committee:

We will have joined the game of European power politics. We will be left holding the bag for the political masterminds of Europe. We will have forced on every citizen of these United States a burden of debt which staggers the imagination. In the train of that war will come the dead, the maimed, the insane, saddened homes, the heartache of fathers and mothers, and the probable loss of democracy on the home front and a depression that will make that of 1930 look like a summer sunset in comparison.¹⁷⁷

In spite of his pleas, the Foreign Relations Committee refused to submit Tobey's resolution for a floor vote. Reported the Washington Post, "Tobey, a fire and brimstone orator, convinced of an Administration conspiracy to throttle free debate on convoys, was the author of an anti-convoy resolution rejected... by a 13 to 10 vote on April 10."¹⁷⁸

¹⁷⁶Tobey to Bloom, April 14, 1941, Ibid., Box 46.

¹⁷⁷Cong. Record, 77th Con., 1st Sess., 3177.

¹⁷⁸May 11, 1941.

During the anti-convoy debate, Tobey received his first check from the national headquarters of America First. The money was to reimburse the Senator when Dartmouth College withdrew an offer to pay him after he spoke to a student rally there. Tobey characterized the incident this way:

Attempts were made to boycott me, and in the middle of the speech someone shouted "Liar," and several of the professors went around with a pencil and paper and tried to get signatures forbidding me to speak. ~~They~~ they even refused to pay me. And we have always looked upon Dartmouth as a liberal collect /sic/!¹⁷⁹

Tobey was chagrined by his rejection at Dartmouth, because it was associated with the progressive Republicans through its president, Ernest Hopkins. We wanted the college to uphold liberal ideas such as toleration of individual differences, but he reported sadly, "for speaking out I earned the enmity of the White Committee, Dartmouth, St. Paul's and other anglophiles."¹⁸⁰ To another supporter he wrote, "I have lost friends of 25 or 30 years because I am acting under deep conviction according to what I believe to be the right course for our beloved country and have dared to stand firmly against our participation in the war."¹⁸¹ In response to Dartmouth's refusal to pay Tobey, America First sent him a check for \$58.95.¹⁸²

Between the lend-lease debates and Tobey's anti-convoy resolution, Tobey had been contacted by America First to see whether he would serve

¹⁷⁹To Arthur Evans, July 30, 1941, Tobey Papers, Box 81.

¹⁸⁰To Romeo Barbin, Sept. 3, 1941, Ibid., Box 80.

¹⁸¹To Mrs. J.G. Glessner, Sept. 9, 1941, Ibid., Box 81.

¹⁸²Tobey sent his thanks to Robert L. Bliss, Director of Organization, America First Committee, Chicago, Ill., May 6, 1941, Ibid., Box 80.

as chairman for a state chapter. He declined, saying,

If I were honorary chairman it would very likely be looked upon as a political organization and my association with the chapter might be regarded as a political instrument to further my political career and I feel the chapter would suffer to some extent because of this. In other words, it would be mutually disadvantageous.¹⁸³

Following the Dartmouth speech in May, Tobey sent the names of two men whom he thought would be good chairmen: William J. Neal, the State Grange Master, or Lawrence W. Wathoun of the Society for the Protection of Forests. He also sent a list of the most prominent backers of America First in the state: Professor Louis Benezet of Dartmouth, Professor Thorsten Kalijarvi of the University of New Hampshire, Attorney and leading Republican Robert Upton, and Lester Smith, Headmaster of Appleton Academy.¹⁸⁴ All of these men were in positions comparable to those held by leading White Committee members.

Tobey was sensitive to charges of appeasement. He requested the U.S. Attorney General to conduct an investigation of the German-American Bund in New Hampshire after he received a telephone invitation to join them. The charge of being pro-Nazi or anti-Jewish was levelled at members of America First, particularly at its most famous speaker, Colonel Charles Lindbergh.¹⁸⁶ Tobey also suffered this charge and he took pains to answer the suggestion: "Between Stalin and Hitler you can take your

¹⁸³Ibid.

¹⁸⁴Ibid.

¹⁸⁵To Robert H. Jackson, Attorney General Washington D.C., June 4, 1941, Ibid., Box 81.

¹⁸⁶Cole, America First, 145-153.

choice. I have none. Both are Godless, terrorists and enemies of liberty."¹⁸⁷ Pursuing the anti-Russian theme, he tried to turn the charge of appeasement against the Administration saying, "I think that the real appeaser is the Administration which sends Russia these goods and yet does not dare to ask Russia to treat the Polish people as human beings."¹⁸⁸

Increasing reports of German submarines in the Atlantic, where American ships were escorting shipments toward England without orders to fire on enemy ships, brought up the question of convoying again. This time Tobey chose another method of attacking the Administration after his legislative defeat the previous spring. He described his new role to his oldest son:

Yesterday I was appointed by Burt Wheeler, Chairman of the Senate Interstate Commerce Committee /and an isolationist/, to act on a new committee of five to investigate the movie industry and radio industry on propaganda on our entrance in the war. We have before us leading movie owners of the country and I think it will promise some excitement.¹⁸⁹

A month later, syndicated columnist Dorothy Thompson wrote in the Concord Monitor, "the America First Committee, working through members of the U.S. Senate, has set out to frame the entire motion picture industry of this country." Charging that the investigation was "an American Dreyfus case," she continued,

the object of the whole business is to bring about a reversal of the foreign policy of the United States in the most critical moment of our history, defeat the President's pro-British policy, and

¹⁸⁷To Henry Phillips, July 15, 1941, Tobey Papers, Box 81.

¹⁸⁸To Walter Bobusia, Polish Relief Fund, Manchester, June 6, 1941 Ibid., Box 80.

¹⁸⁹To Russell Tobey, Aug 6, 1941, Ibid., Box 18.

change the American policy into one of collaboration with Hitler on the model of Vichy.¹⁹⁰

Since Tobey read the Monitor regularly, he undoubtedly knew of these charges. He would have agreed that the object was to bring about a reversal of Roosevelt's pro-British policy, though not to the charge of collaboration.

The strongest statement of Tobey's isolationism came on September 17, 1941, when he was the featured speaker at an America First rally at Carnegie Hall. One week earlier, President Roosevelt ordered American Navy ships to "shoot on sight" any German attackers. In his speech, Tobey first emphasized the dangers of autocracy, "rule by one man, which can only mean tyranny and despotism." He charged that propaganda was being circulated by the movie industry: "American movies has millions of dollars owed to it by British motion picture interests. It is obvious that they have a reason for wanting us to get into the war."¹⁹¹

In this speech, he again blamed Congress for allowing the President to change traditional patterns:

...in my opinion the greatest menace to this country and to our form of government, does not come from any enemy abroad, but rather exists right here in our own country, and more particularly and specifically, under the Capitol Dome in Washington, where the people's representatives in the Congress have apparently lost their sense of responsibility under the Constitution to act as a separate but coordinated branch of the federal government and have yielded to pressure and blandishments of another branch, the Executive. Therein is the great threat to the American way of life and the American form of government.¹⁹²

¹⁹⁰Concord Monitor, Sept. 12, 1941.

¹⁹¹"Wake Up America! The Hour is Late," Vital Speeches of the Day, VII (October 1, 1941), 749.

¹⁹²Ibid., 751.

He placed his confidence in American defenses saying, "The bomber has made the American coast impregnable." He concluded the speech with a ringing cry, "Wake up! Demand no war by Executive decree, but only by the considered actions of the one branch of our government empower to declare war by the Constitution."¹⁹³ He believed that America could ward off attack if it came, and that the real danger lay in the destruction of commonly held values as represented in the Constitution.

When President Roosevelt ordered American ships to "shoot on sight," in effect he authorized convoying. Since that was specifically forbidden by the 1939 Neutrality Act, the President requested amendment of the law. Debate over that revision was the last battle fought in Congress against American participation in the war. Tobey denied that his opposition to change in the law was motivated by a partisan consideration.¹⁹⁴ In fact Tobey was convinced that a majority of Republicans were ready to follow Secretary Frank Knox who said in a Navy Day speech, "We must make the law conform to our actions," to which Tobey commented, "That is totalitarianism. Instead of making the law conform to our actions, we should make our actions conform to the law."¹⁹⁵ When chided for his position by the chairman of the Hanover (N.H.) Republicans, Tobey responded,

I am not so concerned with the Party, as I am with the plain people of this country. There is one trouble with the Republican Party and that is it is too far removed from the human needs and aspirations of the rank and file of the people in this country. If you could see as clearly as I do what is happening and what the program

¹⁹³ Ibid., 751.

¹⁹⁴ To Rev. Winston L. King, Oct. 30, 1941, Tobey Papers, Box 81.

¹⁹⁵ To Mrs. Robert P. Hayward, Nov. 7, 1941, Ibid., Box 81.

of the Administration is for this country, for American business and life, you would shudder.¹⁹⁶

Tobey was aware that his isolationism would jeopardize his political future. Nevertheless he continued to oppose actions that he thought would lead directly to war. To his sister, Doris, Tobey wrote,

I have received many bitter communications from people in New Hampshire, who are bitter in their attitude, and they make all kinds of threats, but that doesn't matter. I shall go right along and do what I think is right. If they succeed in defeating me three years from now, I will find some way to live, although I confess it won't be easy at my time of life.¹⁹⁷

On November 17, 1941, the isolationists lost the battle against convoying when both Houses approved the end to that restriction.

When war did come to America with the Japanese bombing of Pearl Harbor, Tobey reported to a friend in New Hampshire, "I voted for the Declaration of War. It was a hard thing to do because of my deep convictions but it was the only thing to do, and when the time came I did my duty as I saw it."¹⁹⁸ The condition which Tobey had long before identified as the one event which would cause him to vote for war had occurred when American territory was actually attacked.

Immediately after the declaration of war however, Tobey called for investigation of American preparedness at Pearl Harbor.¹⁹⁹ Tobey was censured for his request by Robert P. Burroughs, New Hampshire Republican

¹⁹⁶To W.A. Robinson, Nov. 5, 1941, Ibid., Box 81.

¹⁹⁷To Mrs. Harold H. Brown, Nov. 6, 1941, Ibid., Box 80.

¹⁹⁸To Basil H. Johnson, Dec. 18, 1941, Ibid., Box 81.

¹⁹⁹Cong. Record, 77th Cong., 1st Sess., 9542.

Chairman, who charged that Tobey had backed a program of "unpreparedness" and then Burroughs called for Tobey's recall from the Senate.²⁰⁰ In his own account of Burroughs' statement, Tobey replied that even Navy Secretary Knox had said that "the Navy was not on the alert and was caught off guard."²⁰¹ Tobey wrote to Harriet Newell, "I am going through quite a gethsemane [sic] at the present time, but the fact remains that everything I charged on the Senate floor has come true and has been confirmed by no less an authority than Secretary Knox himself."²⁰² The move for Tobey's recall did not attract wide support and it died quietly as Tobey began to support vigorous prosecution of the war.

²⁰⁰Manchester Union, Dec. 12, 1941.

²⁰¹To Rev. Robert G. Armstrong, Dec. 18, 1941, Tobey Papers, Box 80.

²⁰²To Harriet Newell, Dec. 19, 1941, Ibid., Box 81.

IV. CONVERSION TO INTERNATIONALISM: BRETTON WOODS and its AFTERMATH

When Congress reconvened in January, 1942, President Roosevelt called for national unity in support of the war effort.¹ Reporting to his son Charles, who was setting up his law office in Manchester, Tobey described his answer to reporter's queries: "I said it was a good speech and I endorsed it, especially the appeal for national unity, and would give my heartiest support."² On the question of Pearl Harbor, Tobey felt vindicated when reports of unreadiness filtered back after investigation was begun. He also noted to his son that Democratic Senator Millard Tydings of Maryland told him that Congress would continue the investigation "to bring out that Roosevelt wants to fight Hitler and let Japan alone and leave Singapore and MacArthur to their fate," but he added that he refused to associate himself with Tydings on this. Tobey concluded, "I am following your suggestion of lying low and keeping very quiet."³

While Tobey was staying in the background, he sought advice on post-war planning from former President Herbert Hoover.⁴ Although they were not close personal friends, Tobey admired Hoover's interpretation

¹Annual Budget Message, Jan. 5, 1942, Rosenman, F.D.R. Papers, Vol. 1942, 7.

²Jan. 6, 1942, Tobey Papers, Box 18.

³Jan. 27, 1942, Ibid., Box 18.

⁴Tobey to Herbert Hoover, Jan. 6, 1942, Ibid., Box 23.

of Americanism and, as late as 1940, had supported Hoover for President. Hoover responded by sending copies of two pamphlets, America's First Crusade and Postwar Planning in the United States.⁵ Hoover requested Tobey's reactions to the second publication, which later became the basis for the Senator's post-war economic proposals.

Meanwhile young Charles was planning his father's course for the next two years with the 1944 election in mind. In March he wrote,

I think that the time has pretty near come when you might make a short speech on the floor of the Senate, mimeographed first and handed to the press in the morning for the afternoon papers, going after industry for exorbitant profits and making reference to your profit-limiting legislation which the Administration threw out the window when, ...it was most needed, and also making reference to strike situations existing at a time when many of those striker's brothers and fellow-men are going to die on the battlefield because of lack of sufficient amount of planes and equipment, making it more an appeal to labor than a castigation. You could point out that the government should not crack down on labor while it allows these exorbitant profits by industries and vice versa and say that it is time for Congress to take back power from the President if he doesn't at once demonstrate a determination to use it effectively and the Congress should use the power itself by direct legislation. I suggest the above because the people are very impatient on both of the above scores and I think it would be a very timely action.⁶

Making this an appeal to labor was new, but the other issues were not: defense of the 10% profit tax, excessive Presidential power, Congressional responsibility to initiate legislation, and the continuing problem for every politician---finding an issue that people are already aware of. Tobey did not make such a speech immediately, but he was aware that he should.

⁵Hoover to Tobey, Feb. 18, 1942, Ibid., Box 23.

⁶Charles, Jr., to Tobey, March 28, 1942, Ibid., Box 18.

The unpopularity of his pre-war isolationism was clear to Tobey. The other non-interventionist from New Hampshire, Representative Arthur Jenks, faced election in 1942. Tobey wrote, "He has to run this year and I don't have to run for two years, but we are in the trough of the sea being tossed about. We must have something to bring us back on solid ground. If not we will make something, ourselves!"⁷ The last statement became the key to Tobey's foreign policy conversion.

Tobey's concern was heightened by the activities of Styles Bridges, senior Senator from New Hampshire, who faced election in 1942. Tobey reported that his French contact in Manchester knew that the French Canadian people there would vote for Bridges, rather than his Democratic rival, and that the Republican leaders "intend to give Bridges a tremendous vote this time to put him in a premium position in New Hampshire politics."⁸ Tobey continued with a report from Bob Ransdell, husband of his trusted secretary Helen, "Bob says Bridges will come out after the election and break with me on my war views and votes and join with Withrop Carter [of the Carter textile firm] or somebody else against me."⁹

There seemed to be no issue in 1942 that Tobey could use to build popular support. He wrote that he was lunching regularly with ten or twelve ranking Republicans, including Senators Vandenberg, Nye and Norris, but he did not single out particular issues discussed among them.¹⁰

⁷Tobey to Charles, Jr., April 28, 1942, Ibid., Box 18.

⁸To Charles, Jr., July 16, 1942, Ibid., Box 18.

⁹Ibid.

¹⁰To Charles, Jr., July 16, 1942, Ibid., Box 18.

Although he no longer corresponded regularly with the progressives, he sent a note of condolence to Mrs. Robert Bass at the death of her mother. Commenting on the November election, in which Bridges was re-elected and Jenks was defeated, Tobey said to Mrs. Bass, "I think the election of last month should not be taken as a tribute to the Republican Party so much as a protest against bureaucracy and some of the things being attempted in our country."¹¹

Tobey's search for an election victory led him to a more active interest in naval affairs, since the Portsmouth Navy Yard had become more important in the state's economy. He talked with Senator Nye, one of the senior Republicans who was sympathetic toward Tobey, about getting on the Senate Naval Affairs Committee. He reported to his son, "It is still in the balance whether or not I get on the...Committee."¹² His son responded, "It is of great importance that you get on that Committee."¹³ Charles also advised him to write one Don Matson, chairman of the Merrimack County Legislative delegation to the state legislature, "and tell him that he was largely responsible for your taking steps to get on the Naval Affairs Committee and tell him how much it means to have such a friend."¹⁴ In return Matson, who represented the district in which the navy yard was located, became a source of information for Tobey in the state legislature.

¹¹To Mrs. Robert P. Bass, Dec. 3, 1942, Ibid., Box 81.

¹²To Charles, Jr., Jan 6, 1943, Ibid., Box 18.

¹³From Charles, Jr., Jan. 9, 1943, Ibid., Box 23.

¹⁴From Charles, Jr., Jan. 11, 1943, Ibid., Box 28.

When Tobey received an invitation to address a joint session of the legislature in New Hampshire, Charles wrote, "Matson advised that there were two Representatives from Portsmouth and others who were ready to take the floor and attack you on the ground of isolationism for purposes of injuring your position in the state."¹⁵ Since Portsmouth had grown so rapidly with defense construction there, Tobey was vulnerable to attack from followers of Secretary Knox and other state party leaders.

When he received the assignment to Naval Affairs, Tobey reported on Secretary Knox's appearance before the committee. He said,

In the Naval Affairs Committee this morning, Frank Knox was before us for two and a half hours to report on his 20,000 mile trip to the Pacific which he made in the company with Admiral Mimitz. I greeted him cordially and called him "Frank" and he called me "Charlie." I asked him a few questions.¹⁶

Of interest to Tobey was not Knox's testimony, but the friendliness between himself and this powerful figure in New Hampshire politics. As for his assignment to the committee, it gave Tobey contact with wartime politics and construction programs, but it did not lead Tobey to think beyond American defense. The Naval Affairs Committee thus did not contribute anything directly toward developing a more international outlook in Tobey. However, that committee and his relations with the New Hampshire legislature emphasized his precarious position for the 1944 election and that put pressure on Tobey to become less parochial.

Not only did Knox and the Old Guard under Bridges' leadership threaten Tobey, but his former progressive friends chose to back a rival

¹⁵From Charles, Jr., Jan 18, 1943, Ibid., Box 28.

¹⁶To Charles, Jr., Feb 3, 1943, Ibid., Box 28.

for his Senate seat. At first it was not clear who that candidate would be. The Bass faction seemed to be considering Ernest Hopkins, President of Dartmouth, or Foster Stearns, who was serving his second term in Congress. Tobey resented the publicity which Hopkins was already getting through the Boston Herald, from a columnist named Bill Cunningham: "He is a Dartmouth man and it wouldn't surprise me at all to see him come out praising 'Hoppy' and endorsing him for the Senate."¹⁷ The next day Tobey added, "Whether we like it or not, the...Hopkins, Dartmouth College, pro-British group in New Hampshire is pretty powerful in the state."¹⁸ Tobey had not shifted his attitude toward the British nor had he clarified his ideas about an issue for himself.

Meanwhile, events in the Senate were bringing discussion to a head over some kind of peace-keeping organization. Senate Resolution 114, sponsored by Republicans Joseph Ball of Minnesota and Harold Burton of Ohio, and Democrats Carl Hatch of New Mexico and Lister Hill of Alabama, was introduced March 16, 1943. According to Tobey, the measure "fell flat" As he interpreted it, "The Administration was luke-warm towards it and the opinion on it is that Wendell Willkie inspired the action."¹⁹ In his account of the Senate discussion of the so-called Ball Resolution, Tobey wrote,

Pressed for an opinion on it by the press, who asked me if I thought that world organization might be necessary to secure peace, I said it might be and then they wanted to know if I would approve the

¹⁷To Charles, Jr., March 17, 1943, Ibid., Box 28.

¹⁸To Charles, Jr., March 18, 1943, Ibid., Box 28.

¹⁹To Charles, Jr., March 17, 1943, Ibid., Box 28.

Senate having a part in the matter and advising the President. I told them that as I read the Constitution, one of the functions of the Senate was to advise and consult with the President and therefore, the answer was "Yes."²⁰

Tobey was very cautious about committing himself on the Ball Resolution and he was not ready to accept Willkie's leadership in planning for a post-war international organization.

Combined with Tobey's political situation in New Hampshire, the Ball Resolution forced Tobey to consider foreign policy as an issue which might reinstate him with the voters. On March 18, he wrote to Charles,

I must take a position about the post-war era, either refusing to take a position saying the matter is in a state of flux, or make some statement of general principles which will show our approval of a broader international viewpoint than we have had heretofore and which will be flexible enough to allow us to take a firmer viewpoint as the thing develops.

Because you have a better head on your shoulders than I have, I am turning the matter over to you to determine how I should answer these inquiries and others that will come along from now on.²¹

The letter indicates Tobey's indecisiveness, as well as his dependence on his 32-year-old son. Tobey wanted to know what "the people" in New Hampshire wanted, so that he could take a position based on those calculations for electoral victory. He took his role as a representative seriously and his values were close enough to those of his constituents that he could be sure they would demand no extreme change from him.

Tobey's cautious movement toward a broader international viewpoint is illustrated by this letter written to a friend and political supporter:

²⁰Ibid.

²¹March 18, 1943, Ibid., Box 28.

I strongly favor our cooperation in international affairs--- the Good Samaritan and Good Neighbor---and doubt not that you share my feelings that it is imperative that this nation be on guard to see to it that it is not duped in this international game, by other great powers, some of whom certainly double-crossed us at the time of the Versailles Treaty in withholding from Woodrow Wilson and his group the fact that secret treaties existed which guaranteed certain territorial integrities without our knowledge. In other words, we have a prime duty to see to it that our own nation and the interests of our people are safeguarded conscientiously in matters of far-reaching extent which will be involved in post-war plans.²²

Willing to consider international cooperation, Tobey was still heavily influenced by his pre-war attitudes toward Europe. Like Senator Vandenberg, who was also moving toward a broader viewpoint at this time, Tobey was very concerned that America protect herself first.²³ He ignored Asia entirely in his thinking. His Americanism was still the focal point of his international outlook.

By the end of March, 1943, President Hopkins was recognized as a strong political threat to Tobey. He wrote to Charles, "Bob Ramsdell was just in and I am terribly concerned. He has been up home and tells about the Hopkins movement that is very real and many of my friends have joined it."²⁴ In reply, Charles advised his father to seek advice from Herbert Hoover as well as from friends who remained on his side. He added,

I am coming to the point of view that you can go a bit further than some of your friends have recommended in urging cooperation among nations toward a lasting peace...Why don't you write a letter to Herbert Hoover, asking him to give you as many thoughts to back up this view as he can and then you might come out for such a proposal

²²To W.T. Whittle, March 25, 1943, Ibid., Box 26.

²³Vandenberg, Papers of Senator Vandenberg, 40.

²⁴March 30, 1943, Tobey Papers, Box 28.

which, of course, would be popular, but you should come out with this only after conferring with some of our good friends in New Hampshire, who have felt as you have in the past.²⁵

Both father and son were frankly looking for an issue that would be popular in New Hampshire.

While seeking an issue to gain votes, Tobey was trying to divert criticism from the Old Guard over his early lack of support for a large navy. From his secretary Helen Ramsdell, Tobey received this advice concerning a drafted letter which he wanted to send to his constituents:

Where you state that you were a non-interventionist, it might have been well to state that you felt we were not prepared to precipitate ourselves into war, and that your position was that we should have concentrated our efforts into building up our war strengths. This to offset any charges that isolationists are to blame for the position of unpreparedness that we were in at the time of Pearl Harbor.²⁶

Responding to her suggestion, with the knowledge that Senator Bridges might be ready to make a public break with Tobey over his isolationism, he wrote to Charles, "Please have Bob Ramsdell get from the Library of Congress the Manchester Union and the New York Times of the few days before Pearl Harbor which reports the speech of Bridges in which Bridges predicted that there was no immediate danger of invasion by Japan."²⁷

Tobey did write to Hoover, who sent a copy of his latest book, New Approaches to Lasting Peace. Tobey was flattered at Hoover's invitation to pencil comments in the margin and he wrote back, "I confine myself through necessity and wisdom by merely saying well done and that I approve

²⁵April 1, 1943, Ibid., Box 28.

²⁶April 3, 1943, Ibid., Box 28.

²⁷April 27, 1943, Ibid., Box 28.

and am delighted to go along with you on this as I have on every major policy since I came to know you in 1917."²⁸ The ideas which Tobey noted in Hoover's book were these: to avoid the "Versailles tragedy," the victors should agree on the machinery of a peace-keeping organization separate from a treaty ending the war; economic relations as well as political relations should be included; long-range goals should emphasize private enterprise rather than government trading.²⁹ While Tobey did not use these ideas immediately, there were the basis of the position which he made public in July, 1943.

On June 15, Democratic Senator William Fulbright of Arkansas introduced a measure that was similar to the Ball Resolution. It proposed that the United States take the initiative in forming a United Nations organization to settle disputes after the war.³⁰ Tobey received a letter from John McLane of the New Hampshire progressives and a former governor, urging him to support the Fulbright Resolution. Tobey replied that he would vote for it "with pleasure," but he saw the whole issue in light of gaining support from the Bass group. His reply to McLane was primarily concerned with the 1944 election:

Perhaps I valued these associations more than others did, but to me, it is a distinct loss that this group was allowed to disintegrate. Frankly, I have wondered why the group was not revived and brought together for an intimate and frank discussion of men and issues in anticipation of the coming campaign. I read in the Saturday Union of a "Beat Tobey Conference" and attempts to reach agreement on Hopkins or Stearns for the Senate.

²⁸Tobey to Hoover, April 21, 1943, Ibid., Box 23.

²⁹Located in file, Ibid., Box 23.

³⁰Cong. Record, 78th Cong., 1st Sess., 5594.

Your letter and the inquiry embodied therein is the first request which I have had from any member of the group in past years on my attitude towards an effective move to bring about a just and enduring peace, and therefore, it was received with pleasure.³¹

With this letter, Tobey made his bid for progressive support. It came to nothing however. Several years later when he recorded his autobiography, Tobey referred to the meeting which the Union described:

Robert Bass met in John McLane's home and Bass, Huntley Spaulding, Foster Stearns, Sherman Adams and others decided to back Dartmouth President, Ernest M. Hopkins or Foster Stearns for the Senate. I was amazed that my friends had so turned against me.³²

What he disliked the most was that the progressives refused to explore the possibility that Tobey would take a broader view after the war than his earlier isolationism suggested.

By July, 1943, it was clear that Tobey would be opposed by the conservative Republicans under Knox and Bridges, and also by the liberals associated with Bass. Tobey wrote to Harriet Newell that he did not think President Hopkins had "any appeal at all to the common people... he is an associate of the big boys financially and...I think he is as far removed from the understanding of the common people proper as any man could be." He added, "Bridges' close intimates will do all they can for any one of these candidates against me. I am very clear on that point."³³ Justifying his own desire for re-election, he ended the letter to Mrs. Newell with this:

If the Republicans are elected in 1944, I would be Chairman of the great Banking and Currency Committee, which would play a tremendously important part in the post-war era.

³¹To John McLane, June 21, 1943, Ibid., Box 26.

³²Autobiography, 84.

³³To Harriet Newell, July 1, 1943, Tobey Papers, Box 24.

I shall have had twelve years experience in Congress in both branches and all that would be thrown aside by my political enemies in favor of a new man for whom it would take years to attain the position I have through my service here and all because I lived up to my convictions and my campaign promises to do all I could to keep us out of war!³⁴

With this goal in mind, Tobey proceeded in his effort to reach New Hampshire voters without the help of the progressive group, with its prestige in educational circles, or the regular party organization.

As his son advised, Tobey drew up a statement on post-war planning and sent it to every daily or weekly newspaper in New Hampshire. This followed by three weeks a foreign policy message by Senator Vandenberg which set forth guidelines which he thought the Republicans would accept.³⁵ Tobey noted that he had been a charter member of the New Hampshire League of Nations organization, and had supported international economic cooperation at the time of the London Economic Conference. He pledged to support the following:

- 1) a decisive military defeat of the Axis Nations;
- 2) a conference now among the United Nations on the broad and basic terms of a peace settlement;
- 3) establishment of a Council of Nations to prevent the rise of new forms of aggression;
- 4) preparations now to meet the tremendous problems with which we shall be confronted when hostilities cease.³⁶

The statement agreed with Vandenberg's message and reflected the views of Herbert Hoover. While it was not a reversal of Tobey's nationalistic orientation, it did publicize a more internationalist outlook than had been presented before.

³⁴Ibid.

³⁵Vandenberg Papers, 54

³⁶Press Release, July 22, 1943, Tobey Papers, Box 26.

A week after this press release, Tobey elaborated on his ideas in a speech to the Portsmouth Chamber of Commerce:

I wish to point out here that as we plan for meeting post-war conditions, we must not approach the problem in an effort to merely get back to pre-war conditions, to what some call normalcy. That is not our goal....Let us hope and plan so that we may have more of private initiative and free enterprise, those factors which were so largely responsible for the great growth and prosperity of our country down through the decades. Give encouragement to these factors, and let there be a minimum of governmental participation and control. However, governmental regulation to prevent monopoly and unfair competition will always be needed.³⁷

This was a conservative statement oriented toward Hoover's "rugged individualism," but it did convey a willingness to seek new solutions. With the assurance that competition had not been destroyed by mobilization for war, Tobey was not under the pressure to be as negative as he had been just prior to Pearl Harbor. His faith in the survival of American traditions was largely restored and Tobey himself was secure enough to trust other nations in some kind of international cooperation.

President Roosevelt also moved carefully toward international commitments after the war. The President was wary of repeating Woodrow Wilson's mistakes and he was aided by Senator Vandenberg, ranking Republican on the Foreign Relations Committee, who sought to keep partisan politics out of foreign policy even though he wanted to return the Republicans to office in 1944.³⁸ After the Administration issued a cautious statement in favor of international cooperation following the Moscow Conference, Tobey commented to his son, "The Moscow agreement has complicated the

³⁷Speech, July 30, 1943, Ibid., Box 28.

³⁸Aug. 24, 1943 entry to Vandenberg's diary, Vandenberg Papers, 56-57.

Post-war Resolution, and the Foreign Affairs Committee is meeting there today to bring out a new compromise. Now members of the committee are damning themselves for having taken up the matter at all."³⁹ Tobey sounded a bit smug for not having pushed harder in favor of either the Ball or Fulbright Resolutions. On November 5, 1943, the Senate adopted its version of the Fulbright Resolution, which embodied key clauses of the Moscow declaration and Tobey voted with the majority in approval, 85 to 6.⁴⁰

Although Tobey favored an organization of sovereign states, he rejected Willkie's internationalism. He was cool to the idea of a single international government and commented to one constituent,

I have read Willkie's "One World," which you have just finished. It is a most interesting travel-log and sets forth the spirit of interdependence of nations which I believe in sincerely, and which I hope will be a factor in keeping the world on an even keel.⁴¹

He was careful to point out that it was "interdependence" and not mutual dependence that he believed in. However, his comments were tactful and designed to placate incipient criticism.

1944 was a crucial year for Tobey. He was 64 years old, had spent the past 12 years in Congress and had given up his brokerage business during the Depression. From Secretary Knox, Senator Bridges, Republican State Chairman Robert Burroughs, and the Manchester Union, Tobey faced continuing charges that he had slowed the pre-war defense buildup. From Robert Bass, John McLane, President Hopkins and the "one-worlders" in New Hampshire, Tobey was criticized for his nationalism, although they

³⁹To Charles, Jr., Nov 3, 1943, Tobey Papers, Box 83.

⁴⁰Cong. Record, 78th Cong., 1st Sess., 9221-22.

⁴¹To Mrs Clara Ridgway, Dec. 10, 1941, Tobey Papers, Box 83.

called it his isolationism. Tobey tried to meet both charges by stressing his support for defense expenditures and moving toward a position on international cooperation based on mutual benefits. Tobey wrote to a critical constituent,

I have never known an isolationist. An isolationist believes we can live to ourselves alone. I voted for the Reciprocal Trade Agreement and was a non-interventionist and a sincere one. I believed we could keep out of war and, at the same time, aid our friends abroad who are fighting the Axis powers by grants, of money and material.⁴²

His letter suggested a more positive approach to aiding the Allies than he had in fact taken, but it was literally true.

Application of Tobey's wartime support came in February, when the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA) bill came up in the Senate. Tobey's secretary, Helen Ramsdell, kept him informed of the political climate in Washington while the Senator was at home with his dying mother. Tobey indicated the depth of his continuing distrust of Roosevelt when he cabled his office: "I favor the bill but would be inclined to vote for amendment to leave administration of same with the state department rather than the executive."⁴³

Tobey's comments in 1944 indicate a degree of partisanship that would be popular with traditional Republicans in his home state. Concerning a new tax bill presented by the President, Tobey wrote,

I shall vote to override the veto [of the new tax bill] to rebuke a dictator. The net results of the whole thing will be helpful to the country, I think. I hope the people's eyes are opened somewhat more acutely to the dangers of Roosevelt and the continuation of

⁴²To W.T. Whittle, Jan. 21, 1944, Ibid., Box 23.

⁴³To Helen Ramsdell, Feb. 14, 1944, Ibid., Box 29.

him in powers, and the issue serves to divide our enemy, the New Deal Party.⁴⁴

Tobey also tried to mend his differences with Senator Bridges and Secretary Knox. In March, 1944, Tobey and Bridges presented a resolution to the Senate which would take Army and Navy intelligence services from the FCC and give it to the respective services. Tobey said, in introducing the bill, that the transfer had been requested by [Republican] Secretary Knox and Stimson, although it was turned down by the President the preceding fall.⁴⁵ On the same day, Tobey introduced his own bill to provide a 50% pay increase for combat ground soldiers.⁴⁶ At his request, Tobey's radio address and a Gallup Poll showing public approval of the pay increase were included in the Congressional Record.⁴⁷ Both were frankly designed to gain publicity and votes, and they were successful. The Manchester Union carried a front-page article entitled "Bridges-Tobey Join in Presenting Vets Bill."⁴⁸ Later for the election, Tobey had his secretary compile a record of his support for military measures.⁴⁹ The record was not large, but he was eager to use every bit to gain the vote of newly enfranchised service-men.

His position as ranking minority leader on the Banking and Currency Committee provided Tobey with an important break in May, 1944. While he

⁴⁴To Charles O. Richardson, Feb. 25, 1944, Ibid., Box 27.

⁴⁵Cong. Record, 78th Cong., 2nd Sess., 2665-66.

⁴⁶Ibid., 2649.

⁴⁷Ibid., 3616, printed in Appendix, 1922.

⁴⁸Manchester Union, March 14, 1944.

⁴⁹Harriet Ramsdell to Charles Tobey, Oct. 10, 1944, Tobey Papers, Box 29.

was in New Hampshire campaigning for the Republican primary, Helen Ramsdell wrote to him:

Secretary Morgenthau's secretary [from the Treasury Department] has again called regarding luncheon Wednesday May 17 for Commissioner of Finance, Mendesfrance [sic] of the French Committee of National Liberation. She says Secretary Morgenthau does not give luncheons as a rule but this is a special occasion which he wishes you could attend. The State Department will be represented....Senator Wagner [Democratic chairman of the Banking Committee]⁵⁰ will be there and they would like very much to have you attend.

He did attend the luncheon, where the guests talked generally about the post-war economic needs of Europe. This was evidently an attempt by Secretary Morgenthau to elicit Tobey's attitudes on post-war cooperation, for Senator Vandenberg recorded "the logical Republican choice from the Senate was Senator Charles W. Tobey....but the Administration does not want Tobey (for obvious reasons)."⁵¹

The luncheon alerted Tobey to a possible issue that would counter his isolationist image with the voters. He cabled Helen Ramsdell when he returned to New Hampshire:

Radio just reported President Roosevelt has called international monetary conference for July 1st at Brettonwoods [sic] N.H. expected to last several weeks when Morgenthau appeared before our committee on this matter 4 weeks ago he stated that the President would appoint members of Congress to this conference and confident that I as ranking Republican member will be included please call Miss Avery and later on Senator Wagner and ascertain if the membership of this conference as far as the congressional aims go has been approved and advise me.

I am very anxious to be on this commission especially as it is being held in my home state ⁵² tell him my aspirations and the reasons for it and advise me by wire.

⁵⁰Telegram, May 10, 1944, Ibid., Box 29.

⁵¹Vandenberg Papers, 109.

⁵²Telegram, May 26, 1944, Tobey Papers, Box 29.

With time running short for this appointment and the primary scheduled for mid-July, Tobey was very anxious to attend the Bretton Woods Conference.

Senator Vandenberg turned down appointment to the conference because "I cannot possibly put myself in a position where my advance assent is thus presumed; nor can I conscientiously accept an assignment which might subsequently embarrass the Administration if I found it impossible...to 'go along'"⁵³ In his notes, Vandenberg added that the Republican Steering Committee decided that "if any Senate Republican was to 'go along' it would have to be Tobey." Vandenberg's question about the Administration's position arose because none of the legislators had been consulted during formation of Secretary Morgenthau's so-called "American Plan." The Michigan Senator knew that massive economic aid was part of the plan and he also recognized that it was a matter of great controversy in America, since many people particularly Republicans, felt that this nation had already been drained of resources by the war.⁵⁴

Tobey was anxious to attend the conference however, because of the political implications which it would have in New Hampshire. Mrs. Ramsdell cabled Tobey, who was in Concord campaigning:

Several newspaper reporters called this morning to confirm rumors that you are to be named to Monetary Conference someone from American Banker Daily said just now rumor at Treasury is that Walcott of House was to be named and it was between Senator Taft and Senator Tobey for Senate but that Taft being named Chairman of Resolutions Committee for Convention it now looks as if Senator

⁵³Vandenberg Papers, 110.

⁵⁴Ibid.

Tobey was to be the one named⁵⁵ on inquiries I received I said I have no official information.

Evidently concerned that Taft might be named instead of himself, Tobey answered:

Look up all speeches etc. on monetary conference since it was announced April 21. Copy Senator Taft's recent statement his position hostile to some of the aspects of this plan and mail me Concord office.⁵⁶

Helen Ramsdell pencilled on this telegram, "Senator Taft made no written statement--whatever was said was extemporaneous and they have no copy of his remarks in office."

On June 21, Tobey sent the following telegram to reassure the Administration of his support for what he knew of the Morgenthau plan:

This association of nations is the first definite step for permanent world cooperation. It can result in marked progress to promote world trade. The stabilization of currency and elimination of exchange by special interests would go far to promote community among the nations. It would remove the basic evils of the past which have fomented international prejudices and which have been factors contributing to war. Because of the importance of this objective, I look forward to participation as one of the American Delegates to the historic conference.⁵⁷

Tobey recorded his version of the final appointment this way:

On June 23, 1944, Franklin Roosevelt appointed me as a delegate to the Bretton Woods Conference. It is the first definite step for world cooperation with a view to a permanent world peace. I was chosen by Secretary Morgenthau, with State Department approval, to make the keynote address.⁵⁸

⁵⁵Telegram, June 15, 1944, Tobey Papers, Box 29.

⁵⁶Tobey to Helen Ramsdell, Telegram, June 16, 1944, Ibid., Box 29.

⁵⁷Telegram to Miss Kathleen Hanson, June 21, 1944, Ibid., Box 29.

⁵⁸To Mrs. Anita Gray Little, Oct. 31, 1944, Ibid., Box 26.

Delighted at the opportunity to speak before these distinguished foreigners, as well as the newspaper audience which he anticipated for the occasion, Tobey and his son wrote and rewrote his speech the night before its delivery.⁵⁹

Delegates from 44 countries met on July 1, 1944, to draw up plans for a world bank to loan money for economic development and an international monetary fund to ease currency exchange. Tobey welcomed the foreign representatives to his home state with these words:

Today, men and women of different races and creeds are here assembled together, determined to work out, by mutual cooperation, a plan for a permanent contribution for the benefit of the people of the world.

He described the crucifixion of Christ, then continued:

There are nations represented here today who, too, have had their sides pierced and a crown of thorns pressed upon them by the sufferings of war. They fight with and for us and we with and for them.... There are some men who lift the level of the age they inhabit, until all men stand on higher ground in that lifetime. Fellow members of the Conference, may that be said in truth of us when we have concluded our labors. To that end, I call upon each of you to place your hand with mine upon the lever of the spirit and aspirations that called this Conference into being, and by your united cooperation to lift the level of our age, that its blessings may be passed on to generations yet unborn.⁶⁰

This speech made Tobey feel like he was part of the actual group which would define the post-war economic relationships among nations. He was caught up in a sense of great purpose which had not been his before. This assignment was the key to Tobey's post-war foreign policy but even he was not yet aware that it marked his own conversion from isolationism to internationalism. The role which he assumed at the conference

⁵⁹As noted in Tobey to Charles, Jr., July 23, 1944, Ibid., Box 28.

⁶⁰"Bretton Woods Opening Speech," July 3, 1944, Ibid., Box 39.

automatically made him a defender of post-war international cooperation against Taft Republicans who sought a policy of domestic orientation.

Immediately however, Tobey faced the Republican primary election. After the first day of the conference, both major newspapers in New Hampshire used Associated Press articles which were minimal because of the heavy security precautions at Bretton Woods. Tobey's speech was not even mentioned. The Senator was distressed about the news blackout and he wrote to Charles,


It makes me very sore to have this continuation of the restrictive policy of the Union and I am wondering if it wouldn't be wise for me to write them an earnest letter, pointing out the manifest unfairness of the whole thing...or else have some individual like Harriet Newell, sign such a letter, which you could compose.⁶¹

There was little time for this maneuvering because the primary had been moved from its customary September date to July 11.

Tobey had a major advantage in the primary, because the progressives finally chose to back Representative Foster Stearns instead of President Hopkins against Tobey. The conservative party leaders did not select a candidate. Stearns and Tobey appealed to regular party workers on the basis of their traditional Republicanism, in which Tobey had the advantage of his long association with the organization. When the votes were tallied, Tobey won by 6,776 votes out of a 50,884 total.

⁶¹ July 6, 1944, Ibid., Box 40.

On the sketch map below, Tobey's percentage of the total vote is shown in each county. Counties where he had more than 50% of the vote are shaded. The percentage change from his 1938 victory (see page 85) is listed at the right:⁶²



<u>County</u>	<u>1938</u>	<u>1944</u>	<u>% Change</u>
Rockingham	44	58	+14
Strafford	44	55	+11
Belknap	55	44	-11
Carroll	49	60	+11
Merrimack	56	55	- 1
Hillsboro	51	55	+ 4
Cheshire	75	48	-27
Sullivan	59	46	-13
Grafton	61	47	-14
Coos	54	44	-10

In percentages, Tobey's drop occurred in the southwestern counties, where the liberals connected with Dartmouth and the Boston area were located. He gained support in conservative districts where Stearns' association with the progressives was suspected. The Union editorialized, "Stearns defeat by Senator Tobey was more disappointment than surprise."⁶³

⁶²Data compiled from Manual for the General Court, 1945, 417.

⁶³Manchester Union, July 13, 1944.

The Monitor added,

Stearns thought the Republicans were disgusted with Tobey's alleged isolationism and would vote for anyone else. But in this contest there was no anti-multiple term prejudice to help throw Tobey out and Stearns was too colorless to make positive votes in addition to the negative ones he felt he would inherit. A stronger candidate than Stearns might still have defeated Tobey without much trouble. Tobey was fortunate in his opponent.⁶⁴

The primary did not end opposition to Tobey from other Republicans. The national party was still split between followers of Taft and Dewey, as well as a more extreme group of internationalists identified with Willkie. Tobey had disassociated himself from the nationalists of Taft's persuasion. In late August, he wrote to his son,

I understand that Bob Taft and Congressman Charles Dewey of Illinois, formerly Assistant Secretary of the Treasury, are both bitterly opposed to the Monetary Fund. Taft is talking of going on the air, the American Forum, September 19, and I am beginning to think I would like to take the other side of this forum against him. Between now and then I could prepare a good offensive and get better acquainted with the details and study into it and would like to make myself one of the spearheads of the proponents of the organization. I would be interested in your reaction.⁶⁵

Tobey's request for Charles' reaction indicates that, to a considerable degree, Tobey's decision to lead the fight for Senate approval of the Bretton Woods proposals would depend upon the political climate of New Hampshire.

Criticism of Tobey from the more dedicated internationalist side of the party came from Minnesota Senator Ball, who was quoted as saying election of the "Dewey crowd" would undermine post-war peace plans. Ball singled out the following "dangerous" people who would be in

⁶⁴Concord Monitor, July 13, 1944.

⁶⁵Aug. 22, 1944, Tobey Papers, Box 28.

positions of leadership if the Republicans won a majority in the Senate: Hiram Johnson, chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee; Robert Taft, Republican Whip; Arthur Vandenberg, senior member of the Foreign Relations, Rules, Commerce and Finance committees; Charles Tobey, chairman of Banking and Currency. The article which was carried by the Boston Traveler, further quoted Ball as saying, "Senator Tobey of New Hampshire, who like Nye, voted against preparedness measures, is the number one Republican and future Chairman of the Banking and Currency Committee, vital to our international relations---if the GOP wins."⁶⁶

Tobey clipped the Traveler article and sent it to Helen Ramsdell with this comment:

He has always been a mouthpiece for the Stassen-Willkie crowd. I believe he wants Dewey defeated, knowing that if he gets in, it will probably be for eight years, and if Roosevelt is re-elected, that would give his man, Stassen /Governor of Minnesota/, a better opportunity four years from now to get the Republican nomination and win the election. You will remember Stassen appointed him to the U.S. Senate. It isn't Ball's patriotism that is forcing him to turn against his party!⁶⁷

Tobey did not object to identification with "the Dewey crowd." Using Wallace White's characterization of the Republican Party in 1940, Tobey had moved from the Taft faction to the Dewey faction while Willkie and the "one-worlders" moved further to the left.

Although Tobey won the election in November, his margin of victory dropped from 6,700 votes in the primary to 2,900 in the general election. He attributed the difference to "progressive Republicans who voted

⁶⁶Boston Traveler, Oct. 6, 1944, as found with Tobey to Helen Ramsdell, Oct. 9, 1944, Ibid., Box 29.

⁶⁷Ibid.

Democratic."⁶⁸ He recognized that the group behind Stearns generally favored Willkie's "one world" concept, while his own views were clearly based on the mutual benefit derived from the cooperation of sovereign nations. Because the 1944 election selected Roosevelt and a Democratic majority once again, Tobey did not become chairman of the Banking and Currency Committee.

Evidence that Tobey was becoming more interested in foreign affairs was his request concerning committee assignments for the new Congress.

He wrote to the Senate Minority Leader Wallace H. White of Maine:

I would like to retain my present committee positions but with one change, when and if possible, and that is, when my seniority position would permit my being placed on Foreign Relations, there being a vacancy thereon, I have a great desire to serve on that committee.⁶⁹

Although Tobey did not receive that assignment until 1952, his request indicates a change from domestic affairs which had been his primary interest before the war. Since he recognized that seniority was necessary to get a place on the Foreign Relations Committee, his desire also reflected a sense of his own status among Senate Republicans. Furthermore, there was Tobey's opposition to New Hampshire's other Senator, Styles Bridges, who was senior by two years. Bridges got the vacant seat on Foreign Relations in 1944.

Tobey's interest in the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (the World Bank) was crucial to the reformation of his political role. Tobey wrote to

⁶⁸Autobiography, 84.

⁶⁹To Wallace H. White, Nov. 29, 1944, Tobey Papers, Box 29.

his son, "I realize more and more how big a job I have on my hands with the Bretton Woods Conference, because the banking associations and the Republican leaders are against it. I will have to go all out."⁷⁰

Economy-minded Republicans like Senator Taft, who were already critical of the Roosevelt Administration for excessive spending, were not ready to support international currency exchange with dollars. Remembering both inflation and protective tariffs which virtually halted international trade after World War I, these economic conservatives had to be persuaded that the United States could afford to appropriate government funds for this purpose. While the details were being worked out by the Administration, Tobey undertook the task of publicizing the necessity for the Bretton Woods proposals. It was the very role which Senator Vandenberg had foreseen when he turned down appointment to the conference.

As Congress convened in 1945, Tobey began a series of speeches to gain public support for the IMF and the World Bank. In a speech on the Town Meeting of the Air, Tobey echoed both the words and the sentiment of Bass' paper on foreign policy, written just after World War I.⁷¹ Tobey said, "We need to learn the great lesson of interdependence. Each of the allied nations must be willing to surrender some of its prerogatives for the common good, or else we shall fail."⁷² He was obviously thinking about those days when Bass wrote his paper as he continued,

⁷⁰Jan. 12, 1945, Ibid., Box 40.

⁷¹By Robert P. Bass, Dec. 12, 1923, Bass Papers, Box 22.

⁷²Speech, Jan. 18, 1945, Tobey Papers, Box 40.

As one who supported and worked for the League of Nations 25 years ago, I strongly favor our participation in an association of nations, with power to put down aggression when it shows its head. I favor a world court, an international bill of rights and a code of fundamental principles of law.⁷³

Tobey was disturbed by the possibility that a peace-keeping organization would be undermined by secret treaties among the Allies. Following the Yalta communique and its suggestion of trading pieces of land among the great powers, Tobey spoke to the Senate saying,

One of the two tragic features of the communique was that it reaffirmed the principles of the "Atlantic Charter" by a definite formula set forth therein, and a few lines later it set forth, on a very definite point, action entirely contrary to the principles of the Atlantic Charter.⁷⁴

Although things like Yalta reinforced Tobey's suspicion of Roosevelt, his opposition as the war drew to a close was not nearly so strong as it once was. Commenting on his vote to approve Henry A. Wallace as Secretary of Commerce, Tobey said, "The President is entitled to have whom he wants in his cabinet," and then he added, "a respectable number of Republicans voted for him as they did because it showed we are not always against everything the Administration proposes."⁷⁵

Opposition from the conservative Republicans led by Taft actually aided Tobey in defining his foreign policy role. In state politics, he had campaigned for governor on the platform of opposing the Old Guard "machine." His position as advocate for the Bank and the IMF created the same kind of situation: "Opposition does not minimize my feeling

⁷³Ibid.

⁷⁴Cong. Record, 79th Cong., 1st Sess., 1425.

⁷⁵To E.D. Toland, March 9, 1945, Tobey Papers, Box 38.

of a little bit of natural aversion to the Republican crowd, who have ignored me entirely, although I was a member of the Monetary Conference and knew about it first hand."⁷⁶ As the draft proposal was being discussed by party leaders prior to its legislative presentation, Tobey commented, "The bitterness and reactionary attitude of Taft and Vandenberg and [Albert W.] Hawkes [Republican of New Jersey] and some others was noticable."⁷⁷ However, Tobey realized that without their cooperation, he could not count on Senate approval: "Any such cause as this has little chance without such elements in the Republican Party. The longer I am with this thing, the more I believe in it."⁷⁸

Tobey was having trouble convincing others of the sincerity of his interest. He was criticized for his amendment to a local ballot on the Dumbarton Oaks resolution, which many of the towns in New Hampshire voted on following the Yalta Conference. Reporting on this, the Manchester Union indicated that Tobey wished to undermine the proposed international organization:

Only one town---Temple---took it upon itself to change the wording of the question, at the suggestion of its fellow townsman, Senator Tobey. The senator is a "former" isolationist, who claims now to be a supporter of international cooperation to maintain peace. His purpose in inducing his fellow townsmen to change the question, in the words of one town official, was because it was too aggressive. It is clear that the wording substituted by the Senator, "with power to prevent aggression," to take the place of that adopted by the Legislature---"having police power to maintain the peace of the world"---introduces a generality that would take the teeth out of any peace organization and make it innocuous.⁷⁹

⁷⁶To Charles, Jr., Feb. 27, 1945, Ibid., Box 40.

⁷⁷To Charles, Jr., March 2, 1945, Ibid., Box 40.

⁷⁸Ibid.

⁷⁹Manchester Union, March 15, 1945.

Tobey answered this charge by saying, "You will notice that I qualified my remarks by saying that if the wording of the Resolution connoted setting up an international police force, I was opposed to such."⁸⁰

The correction which Tobey made in the Dumbarton Oaks resolution indicated Tobey's conception of inter-governmental relations. He favored as much national independence as possible without open aggression. He was still not willing to forego national sovereignty unless the necessity of war demanded military action. His limited internationalism was consistent with his pre-war views on domestic government. Like his political mentor, Herbert Hoover, Tobey sought governmental guarantees of peace and economic stability so that individuals could pursue their particular goals. During the New Deal, Tobey was cautious and critical about the expansion of governmental power into what he considered private economic areas like agricultural marketing. Similarly, he was careful not to encourage the idea of a single world government or a single international police force. Instead, institutions like the World Bank fit his conception of a proper and necessary governmental function, for the Bank was supposed to loan money for development which would then be repaid. It would not plan or direct projects.

Tobey's tendency to project his economic orientations on the world was apparent in his defense of the IMF. In a speech entitled, "Are Britain and America Headed for a Trade War After Victory?" which Tobey delivered over the Town Meeting of the Air, he said,

⁸⁰To Alexander Laing, Chairman, Dartmouth Group, University Committee on Post-War International Problems, March 19, 1945, Tobey Papers, Box 40.

It seems perfectly obvious to me that unless foreign exchange can be stabilized and international investment made more secure than it use to be, there is not going to be any large volume of international trade for anybody.

If we want peace, we had better start with economics, and one of the best places to start is in our relations with Great Britain and Canada and the other countries of the British Commonwealth.⁸¹

Tobey valued world trade and he had decided that Britain was no longer a threat to American independence. Both of these attitudes were different from his pre-war isolationism. Then he had been willing to sacrifice trade to avoid contact which might lead to war and he had been suspicious of British influence. Since neither change was apparent before he attended Bretton Woods, it is safe to conclude that his new outlook was encouraged by his position there.

Some Republicans wanted to postpone consideration of America's post-war commitment to Britain. As part of this delaying maneuver, Tobey apparently received some criticism that the Bank and the Fund proposals were too complex for the public to understand. He countered this suggestion in a speech to the Economic Club of New York, saying,

In a democracy, the people must pass upon principles. Once they have determined that the principles are right, they can reasonably expect that technical imperfections will be corrected on the basis of experience.

Can we afford it? The real question is whether we can afford not to join the Bank and the Fund. War costs total \$260 billion. It is costing \$8 billion a month now. The total American costs for the Bank and the Fund are \$6 billion, or 23 days of war!

If we fail to provide this means of dealing with international economic problems, we face the real danger of social and economic disorder in a large part of the world, and a resumption of the economic warfare of the 1930s, which was a prelude to this war.⁸²

⁸¹Speech, April 5, 1945, Ibid., Box 40.

⁸²Speech, April 16, Ibid., Box 40.

This speech indicates the continuity in Tobey's outlook before and after the war. Cost-considerations largely determine his conclusions. War must be avoided if possible and public opinion should be trusted to provide the outlines of government policy. However, the speech also reveals Tobey's view had broadened greatly.

In addition to currency stabilization by the IMF, and long-term development loans from the World Bank, Tobey favored expansion of the governmental machinery for tariff adjustment. In 1934, Tobey had opposed extension of the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act (RTA) because it granted too much power over tariffs to the President.⁸³ That was the position being taken by Senator Taft when the bill came up again in 1945. Tobey defended an expansion of the powers under RTA saying,

What he [Taft] fails to recognize is the great principle---we do not like to consider it, but we have to---that the world is today in a state of chaos, and the alternative to doing something is doing nothing. We must do something now. We must wake up, wipe the dust from our eyes, and see that the world is dying, and do something relieve the strain. I will not be a party to inaction.⁸⁴

There was a new note of statesmanship in Tobey's speech, as well as the old strain of humanitarian concern which he had voiced before the war. Further, President Roosevelt died in April, 1945, and Tobey was talking about granting more executive authority over tariffs to President Harry S. Truman, formerly a fellow Senator and a man with common roots like Tobey. Although the general situation had changed as well, the bitterness with which Tobey spoke of Roosevelt's "lust for power" was missing from his references to the new President. Although it cannot be proved except

⁸³ Cong. Record, 73rd Cong., 2nd Sess., 5430.

⁸⁴ Ibid., 79th Cong., 1st Sess., 6022.

by the omission of critical remarks, it seems clear that Truman made Tobey's foreign policy conversion easier.

The specific content of Tobey's enthusiasm for the Bretton Woods proposals was basically economic, although it was closely tied to his political liberalism. He even put aside his pre-war antipathy toward Russia in a grand vision of nations trading peacefully despite political differences. In a speech to the Russian War Relief Association, Tobey explained his position:

Russia's eagerness for economic recovery and rehabilitation of her devastated land means trade, jobs, and profits for the American people and American business. The United States can supply practically an unlimited amount of finished goods and technical equipment for export, which Russia will need during the decades to come. Russia is important to us; we are important to her.⁸⁵

Tobey just expanded the scope of his market conceptions, but his vision of a free-enterprise system had not changed much through the New Deal or the war.

The Bretton Woods Agreement was reported out of the Banking and Currency Committee for debate on July 16, 1945, by a vote of 14 to 4. Tobey described the situation which he expected on the Senate floor in a letter to his son:

I understand Vandenberg is against it. If so and he makes a speech to that effect, I am laying for him. He made a masterful talk when he got back from San Francisco, which has been made into a Senate Document. I have taken that speech and underlined six or seven paragraphs, where he made a plea, saying that the Charter was not perfect but it ought to be tried. At the close of my talk, I will pay tribute to his speech, and the faith he expressed in the San Francisco Charter, and that we ought to accept Bretton Woods and let it work, not just overnight.⁸⁶

⁸⁵July 11, 1945, Tobey Papers, Box 40.

⁸⁶To Charles, Jr., July 16, 1945, Ibid., Box 20.

Tobey apparently had reason to suspect Vandenberg's opposition. Previously Vandenberg had opposed Senate approval of Administration proposals which were not clearly detailed. That was, in fact, one reason why he refused assignment to Bretton Woods. However, Tobey was also aware that Vandenberg's support for the United Nations Charter was based on the hope of cooperation with other nations, particularly Russia, and he was prepared to use the same argument in favor of the Bretton Woods proposals.

When Tobey introduced the Executive Agreement which embodied the IMF and World Bank proposals, he did draw attention to Vandenberg's defense of the United Nations structure:

I venture to say that most countries of the world and particularly in the smaller countries, their great hope for peace is based on the Economic and Social Council no less than on the Security Council. These countries are aware of the fundamental truth, there can be no peace except in a prosperous world.

By giving her aid at such times, Russia, like other countries, is enabled to maintain fair export prices and to avoid sudden contractions on imports. I say it is just as important to have Russia follow these politics as any other country.

...the need of the United States is a need to help the world, and that is the heart of the whole thing. We are going into this plan because the world needs help. Political isolationism and economic isolationism cannot hold sway in the world today. The world is prostrate. It is for our interests to help in the work of reconstructing and rehabilitating a war-torn world.⁸⁷

The essence of Tobey's post-war internationalism lies in two statements from this speech, "The world is prostrate," and "There can be no peace except in a prosperous world." He no longer feared the domination of American policy by any other nation, particularly Britain, and he had a deep faith that economic relations were the key to social and political freedom. After much debate and the cautious approval of Vandenberg,

⁸⁷Cong. Record, 79th Cong., 1st Sess., 7601.

American participation in the IMF and World Bank was approved in the Senate, July 19, 1945, by a 61 to 16 vote (D 41-2; R 19-14; Ind. 1-0). Republicans following Taft's lead opposed it, but those behind Vandenberg's position in foreign policy approved the bill.⁸⁸

Tobey was beginning to be recognized as a "new man!" In August, Tobey reported to his son that he had been invited to meet with Bass, Hopkins, McLane, and others of the progressive faction in New Hampshire. They had decided to include Tobey once again, following his foreign policy shift. His own confidence, gained in 1944 when the progressives opposed Tobey for election, was shown when he decided against attending their informal caucus. As he said to Charles, they might decide to "dump" him again later on.⁸⁹

Although the atomic bomb altered Tobey's conception of the dangers of war by deepening his fear of ultimate destruction, it did not cause Tobey's internationalism. It did set Tobey's nationalism in a new world context, because the consequences of failure to achieve international cooperation appeared so grave. Speaking to an American Legion group in Park Ridge, Illinois, he said,

Surely we can be united together in great efforts to maintain peace, to bind up the wounds of the stricken nations, to put them on their feet and to make a recurrence of the hell of war as remote as possible. If we shall fail to measure up to our high calling in these respects, we must consider the alternative which, in the light of atomic energy, may be tragically chaos.⁹⁰

⁸⁸Ibid., 7780.

⁸⁹To Charles, Jr., Aug. 23, 1945, Tobey Papers, Box 20.

⁹⁰Speech, Nov. 11, 1945, Ibid., Box 40.

To Tobey, his advocacy of international cooperation appeared to be no reversal. It was an extension of his hatred for war, his concern about preserving the American way as he understood it, and his newly influential role in Congress.

Like many other Americans, Tobey watched his hopes for closer cooperation for peace and prosperity dissipate during 1946. Russia refused to treat Germany as a single economic unit for relief purposes, withdrawing goods and machinery instead of aiding reconstruction. In January, 1946, Tobey spoke to the Russian Relief Organization urging their advocacy for a reversal of Russian policy.⁹¹ As relations grew more strained, Tobey ceased making statements on foreign policy. By June, he wrote to his son that requests for help from returning servicemen and hearings on the Office of Price Administration took up most of his time.⁹²

The off-year elections of 1946 brought a Republican majority in Congress for the first time in fourteen years. Senator Taft, Chairman of the Republican Policy Committee, was recognized as head of the party in the Senate although Wallace H. White was the titular majority leader.⁹³ In domestic affairs, Taft's orthodox Republicanism and his potential alliance with conservative Southern Democrats threatened repeal of many New Deal programs still in effect. In foreign affairs, Senator Arthur Vandenberg who was chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, was

⁹¹Speech, Jan. 25, 1946, Ibid., Box 40.

⁹²To Charles, Jr., June 11, 1946, Ibid., Box 20.

⁹³Taft Story, 57-58.

recognized as the Republican spokesman. By this time, Vandenberg was firmly committed to a bipartisan foreign policy.

Tobey no longer fit in the "Taft party" as he had in 1940. U.S. News and World Report carried an analysis of the incoming Congress in an article titled, "Three Republicans Who Are Challenging the Senate Leadership." The three cited were Senators Wayne Morse of Oregon, George Aiken of Vermont, and Tobey. Morse wanted membership on Foreign Relations on the grounds that the committee had no West Coast representative, but he was refused. Aiken wanted chairmanship of Agriculture, but Arthur Capper of Kansas chose that instead of Foreign Relations which his seniority entitled him to. Tobey requested chairmanship of the Commerce Committee, but White received that and Tobey got Banking and Currency. The article noted that these three could tie a Senate vote by voting with the Democrats rather than the Republicans, "Economic views and background separate these men, but antagonism to Party leadership has driven them together and they could be the swing vote."⁹⁴

Opposing the party organization which Taft led was a role which Tobey enjoyed. He pictured himself that way frequently in New Hampshire politics. By May, 1947, U.S. News reported that William Langer of North Dakota had joined the "rebels" and concluded, "This puts a strong tool in Truman's hands for veto fights."⁹⁵ The article included a tabulation of votes since January. Tobey voted against the Republican majority six times out of twelve. All of these were domestic, not foreign issues.

⁹⁴U.S. News and World Report, XXII (Jan. 31, 1947), 52-53.

⁹⁵"G.O.P. Rebels' Key Position," Ibid., XXII (May 16, 1947), 20-21.

His independence of party control revealed his faith in his own judgment rather than party regularity. That characteristic was important in Tobey's foreign policy shift, because it was his separation from the party which had made Bretton Woods so necessary for Tobey and that, in turn, had made him an advocate of American aid to the post-war world. Later, when Tobey did become a member of the Foreign Relations Committee, his independence caused one Republican to remark that Tobey was "as bad as a Democrat."⁹⁶

On February 21, 1947, Britain announced that she would have to end all economic and military aid to Greece, then engaged in a Communist-spurred civil war. Before President Truman called for American aid to Greece in the wake of British withdrawal, Tobey described his reactions in a letter to Chandler Hovey:

Britain's withdrawal from Greece puts the matter squarely up to us, and we shall have to form a policy which will be very far-reaching in its scope. The other day I made a plea that General Marshall /the new Secretary of State/ come down and talk to Congress in joint session, giving us the full facts, without which Congress cannot act intelligently. The American people should learn the situation from their representatives.⁹⁷

Tobey's request to Secretary of State Marshall was consistent with his conception of the American political process. He added, "I called on Herbert Hoover, who has just returned from Europe, and we got from him a firsthand picture of conditions there. I have faith in Hoover and great admiration for him and count him a good friend."⁹⁸ Tobey was still

⁹⁶Quoted in Vandenberg Papers, 334.

⁹⁷March 6, 1947, Tobey Papers, Box 46.

⁹⁸Ibid.

careful to check with people whose opinion he valued, but he sounded more sure of his own part in the process of making a decision on aid to Greece than he ever had as a newcomer to the Senate in 1939.

On March 12, 1947, President Truman addressed Congress, described the turmoil in Greece and Turkey as it affected both the Middle East and Europe, and outlined what later became known as the Truman Doctrine:

I believe that it must be the policy of the United States to support free people who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures. I believe that we must assist free peoples to work out their own destinies in their own way.⁹⁹

Truman asked for an appropriation of \$400 million for immediate needs and for permission to send civil or military personnel there if requested.

Tobey wrote to Chandler Hovey,

The matter of European cooperation is far-reaching and the initial step therein will come in the bill which will be on the floor for consideration on Wednesday, giving \$400 million to Greece and Turkey. I am inclined to go along on this and my thinking largely squares with yours on this.

I think in a way the die has been cast and we are opening the door on horizons which cannot be evaluated fully yet.¹⁰⁰

Tobey joined the defenders of President Truman's request because he believed that it was the only way to avoid a third world war.¹⁰¹ After considerable debate, the entire amount requested was authorized on May 22, 1947, by a vote of 67 to 23 in the Senate (R 35-16, D 32-7).¹⁰² It was a tribute to Vandenberg's bipartisan leadership which Tobey supported.

⁹⁹Cong. Record, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., 1981.

¹⁰⁰April 7, 1947, Tobey Papers, Box 46.

¹⁰¹Cong. Record, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., 3770.

¹⁰²Ibid., 3793.

Senator Tobey did not record his reaction when Secretary Marshall called for a joint effort to revive Europe in June, 1947 although his earlier letters to Chandler Hovey indicated his approval. He spent that summer in Temple with his dying wife. In what became known as the Marshall Plan, the European nations would draw up coordinated plans for their recovery needs. Tobey's later correspondence about the Economic Cooperation Administration, the legislative program embodying the Marshall Plan, explain his support: "When I consider that it costs 15 billion dollars over 4 or 5 years of operation, while the cost of prosecuting World War Two at its peak was \$12 billion every 30 days... I find it cheap at the price."¹⁰³ The assumption that Tobey approved was borne out by his vote in favor of ECA when the Marshall Plan came up for debate in 1948.¹⁰⁴

Instead of participating in the initial debates on ECA Tobey nursed his wife until she died of heart failure, August 30, 1947. At Francelia's death, Tobey was 67 years old and they had been married 45 years. While he recovered from the strain of Franc's death, the Senator began recording his autobiography on a dictaphone. Either he did not complete that effort or reels have been lost, but his years in the Senate are not presently included. He returned to Washington for the second session of the Eightieth Congress when it convened in January, 1948.

On March 1, Senator Vandenberg delivered his address to the Senate in support of the Marshall Plan. In a speech that contained

¹⁰³Tobey to Norman Littell, Dec. 19, 1949, Tobey Papers, Box 54.

¹⁰⁴Cong. Record, 80th Cong., 2nd Sess., 2793.

the same justification as Senator Tobey offered in 1945 for Bretton Woods, Vandenberg asserted,

It strives to help stop World War III before it starts. It fights the economic chaos which would precipitate far-flung disintegration. It sustains western civilization. It means to take western Europe completely off the American dole at the end of the adventure. It recognizes the grim truth---whether we like it or not---that American self-interest, national economy and national security are inseverably linked with these objectives.¹⁰⁵

Tobey approved of the emphasis which the Marshall Plan gave to self-help and mutual assistance, and use of private channels of trade.¹⁰⁶

When the ECA was authorized by the Senate March 13, 1948, Tobey voted with the majority in favor, 69-17 (R 31-13; D 38-4).¹⁰⁷

Although Tobey did not face election again for two more years, there was a Presidential election in 1948 and Tobey began to speak out on behalf of making the Republican Party more responsive to "the people." Addressing his fellow Republicans after their pronounced criticism of the Reciprocal Trade Agreements in June, he said,

If you want to deserve the acclaim of the people and win the election, there are some things you can do about it....condemn the killing of the Taft-Ellender-Wagner Housing Act,.. the burying of the education bill which passed the Senate,.. adopt measures against the railroad lobbyists who infest the Capitol.... Having done such things in all sincerity, my Republican colleagues at Philadelphia, you may then come before the American people asking their support, with high hopes of success.¹⁰⁸

¹⁰⁵Ibid., 1986.

¹⁰⁶Speech covered by Nashua (N.H.) Telegraph, Aur. 3, 1948, Tobey Papers, Box 118.

¹⁰⁷Cong. Record, 80th Cong., 2nd Sess., 2793

¹⁰⁸Ibid., June 16, 1948, 8432.

Tobey had not only joined the bipartisan internationalists in the Senate, but he had also liberalized his views on domestic economic legislation. Tobey enjoyed his role as a "Yankee gadfly" in the Senate, as he had relished the anti-Old Guard stance in New Hampshire.

In his last years, Tobey rehearsed his favorite themes with regularity. His tone was mellower, his faith in America strengthened, and his fears for the destruction of democracy from within almost gone. During 1949, he continued his support for an internationalist foreign policy. He voted to approve Dean Acheson as Secretary of State, supported foreign aid appropriations, agreed to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and favored another extension of the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act.¹⁰⁹ He accepted the victory of Harry Truman and the Democratic Party in the Eighty-first Congress. He supported the reorganization of the Executive suggested by his old friend, Herbert Hoover, saying to his conservative colleagues,

Whether we like it or not, big government is with us to stay, but it behooves the people's elected representatives to grant the necessary authority, to allow the President and his executives to make it run efficiently, with an absolute minimum of overlapping jurisdictions, duplications of function, and unaccountable waste.¹¹⁰

That was a change which he would probably have resisted during the New Deal, but Tobey no longer regarded the President such a threat to the way of life which he cherished.

As always, Tobey emphasized the effects of governmental policies on ordinary people. When economy-minded Republicans sought to cut expenses

¹⁰⁹ Ibid., 81st Cong., 1st Sess., 468; 10985; 9916; 2936.

¹¹⁰ Ibid., 858-59

by closing military installations and releasing men from the service as quickly as possible, Tobey pleaded,

I have been in my early years, a member of a family with little income, not knowing where the money was coming from to buy the necessities. I understand the situation. Let my party and let the Democratic Party translate that understanding into legislation and prevent such things from occurring so that people may look up and say, "Thank God for America."¹¹¹

Tobey's criticism of the Republican Party nearly cost him the election in 1950. Senator Bridges, who was a leading member of the "China lobby" and was taking a hard line against communism as the Korean Conflict broke out, backed his young administrative assistant, Wesley Powell, against Tobey. The 35-year-old Powell charged Tobey with absenteeism and appeasement. Full-page ads in the Manchester Union claimed, "Before the war he voted isolationism, now he votes world federalism. Tobey is blind to the threat of communism."¹¹² An editorial in the Concord Monitor concluded, "Tobey represents what he likes to call the liberal element, the element which would accept more and more state socialism in the American effort to defeat Communism."¹¹³ The Union editor was more blunt: he called Tobey part of the "soft underbelly of the Republican Party."¹¹⁴ Since the Korean War heightened anxiety about communism and the post-war "red scare" led by Senator Joseph McCarthy of Wisconsin was just beginning,

¹¹¹Ibid., 81st Cong., 1st Sess., 12201.

¹¹²Manchester Union, Sept. 11, 1950.

¹¹³Concord Monitor, Sept. 11, 1950.

¹¹⁴Manchester Union, July 24, 1950.

the charges represented an attempt to smear Tobey for his support of international cooperation.

Even Time magazine noted the New Hampshire primary for its extreme bitterness. In a state where primaries were rarely complicated by strong views on issues, the contest was reduced to name-calling. On one side, Powell charged that Tobey was "a Truman Republican" and "a darling of the CIO," while on the other side, Tobey tried to establish his credibility as a "good Republican" by citing Herbert Hoover's concern for labor. During the campaign, Tobey also had the courage to criticize the techniques being used by Republican Senator Joseph McCarthy in his search of communists in the State Department.¹¹⁵

Tobey apparently did not believe that communism was a serious internal threat. His greatest fear for America was voter apathy and indifference, not foreign dogmas. His faith in America and her political institutions had been strengthened during the war. The same concentration on American institutions which lay behind Tobey's pre-war isolationism freed him from the paranoid suspicions of communists in the government which led a segment of the Republican Party, including Senator Bridges, into McCarthyism.

¹¹⁵"Scourge of the Rascals," Time. LVI (Sept. 11, 1950), 25.

When the votes were counted, Tobey won by the lowest margin he had ever received, 1,420 out of a total 79,002 cast. He had only 51.76% of the primary vote. Tabulating the changes in each county (see page 169) the percentages are listed below:

<u>County</u>	<u>1944</u>	<u>1950</u>	<u>% Change</u>
Rockingham	58	44	-14
Strafford	55	52	-3
Belknap	44	45	+1
Carroll	60	26	-34
Merrimack	55	48	-7
Hillsboro	55	63	+8
Cheshire	48	23	-25
Sullivan	46	52	+6
Grafton	47	45	-2
Coos	44	41	-3

Hillsboro County, the most populous and Tobey's home area, gave him critical support. Rockingham and Carroll counties are Old Guard areas which supported Tobey in 1944 because his opponent was considered more liberal than he was. With a more orthodox Republican candidate in opposition, they swung away from Tobey.

After the primary, the Manchester Union analyzed the election:

Tobey reversed the usual order and drew heavily from almost all of the city wards /in Manchester and Nashua/. Powell showed amazing strength in the towns...but was woefully weak in the big cities, including Portsmouth, his native city.

One explanation of the powerful backing given to Tobey in the cities was the report that many undesignated labor voters went to the polls in yesterday's Republican primary and declared themselves as Republican voters for the first time.¹¹⁷

Tobey had evidently appealed to the urban groups brought into the political spectrum by Roosevelt during the thirties. City voters with

¹¹⁶Data compiled from Manual for the General Court, 1951, 336.

¹¹⁷Manchester Union, Sept. 13, 1950.

no declared party affiliation would tend to be second-generation Americans who were more affluent than their parents and therefore might be drawn by Tobey's kind of Republicanism. Samuel Lubell noted that inflation turned many Democratic voters toward the Republican Party in 1950.¹¹⁸ Since inflation would cut into the relative prosperity which wage-earners had experienced during the war, it may also explain part of the city vote for Tobey. The nationally-known liberal magazine, New Republic, mentioned Tobey's victory as a good sign for other liberals faced with similar "dirty tactics" in November and interpreted this as a defeat for Bridges and the China lobby.¹¹⁹ A combination of economic and social factors did return Tobey for his third term in the Senate, following the general election in November.

While Senator Bridges concentrated on "chasing communists" in 1951 and 1952, Tobey gained national fame as a member of the Kefauver Committee which was investigating gangsterism in the United States. The Kefauver hearings provided a good forum for Tobey's moralistic liberalism. He believed that one had only to expose evil and the public would rise up against it. At the age of seventy, Tobey enjoyed the television coverage which the Kefauver investigations had during the early days of this new medium. In an article describing his "TV personality," Jean Block wrote in the Washington Post,

By drawing on an inexhaustible fund of righteous indignation, bolstered by Biblical quotations, his own pulpit style, Latin epigrams and excerpts from Shakespeare, Whittier and Emerson,

¹¹⁸Lubell, American Politics, 206-7.

¹¹⁹The New Republic, CXXIII (Sept. 25, 1950), 9.

Senator Tobey time and again stole the spotlight. With forthright tongue-lashings instead of hairsplitting phrases of jurisprudence, he often satisfied the public's long latent urge to cut surly gangsters and lawbreakers down to size.¹²⁰

As though returning to the roots of his being in his last years, Tobey stepped back from his post-war concern with foreign policy and concentrated on the values which guided life in America.

Tobey's final public statement of his philosophy was an article written for the magazine read most by ordinary Americans, the Reader's Digest. In an article titled "This is Our Greatest Danger," Tobey called for a moral and spiritual renewal in the life of each individual, motivated by the question "What can I do for America?"¹²¹ That question embodied Tobey's faith in individuals, as well as his nationalism. He believed that recognition of personal interdependence made American institutions work with the least amount of centralized control. To him, moral and spiritual renewal was a better defense against communism than any organized effort.

Senator Tobey's outlook had not changed basically since he entered New Hampshire politics forty years before. Unlike Senator Bridges, Tobey did not fear subversive influences as much as he did personal selfishness. The greatest danger to America, Tobey often said, lay in apathy toward each other. In this regard, Tobey was consistent throughout his career. It lay behind his fears for America in 1939 and 1940, and it also made Tobey's post-war internationalism possible. He

¹²⁰Jean Block, "Scrappy Tobey Blends Evangelist and Comedian," Washington Post, Ap. 15, 1951, 3B.

¹²¹Reader's Digest, LX (Jan., 1952), 139-42.

believed that peace was the product of economic stability and that regulated capitalism created the conditions for political freedom. That domestic orientation encouraged Tobey to seek ways of working with other people and other nations, including totalitarian regimes, in a way that orthodox Republicans like Senator Bridges could not.

Tobey backed General Dwight D. Eisenhower rather than Taft for the Republican nomination in 1952. When Eisenhower won the party's nomination, there was some question about Taft's support from his powerful position among Senate Republicans.¹²² Eisenhower did much to reconcile the two factions of the Republican Party during his campaign and that indirectly benefitted Tobey. When Republicans won, Tobey received the chairmanship of the Commerce Committee, which he requested in 1947. He retained his seat on the Foreign Relations committee, which Taft himself joined in order to provide a conservative voice there.¹²³ Tobey's leadership was barely felt however, for he died of a heart attack on July 24, 1953.

Tobey never achieved the Senate influence or notoriety of his senior colleague, Styles Bridges. His conversion to internationalism and bipartisan support for American foreign policy was not as famous, nor as critical, as that of Arthur Vandenberg. Although he served in the House and the Senate for twenty years, he remained a minor influence on national policy. Yet, as a Senator during the critical post-war years, Tobey encouraged a more active role for America in international

¹²²White, Taft Story, 185.

¹²³Ibid., 212.

affairs. His conversion from parochial domestic interests to the broader concerns of international cooperation was probably critical to the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund.

Senator Tobey was an isolationist because he accepted the traditional theory that America should avoid all entangling alliances. As Hitler's activities raised fears that Western Europe would fall to totalitarian rule, Tobey remained an isolationist because he feared the effects of mobilization on the American way of life, particularly on representative government and laissez-faire capitalism. After Pearl Harbor, Tobey supported the war effort but he still feared for the survival of American political and economic institutions because he did not trust President Roosevelt. It was primarily his search for a popular position in 1944 to counter his isolationist image that led Tobey to his internationalist position. Pressures within the Republican Party, as well as his own desire to maintain peace and prosperity through international trade encouraged Tobey's internationalism until his death in 1953.

The nationalism and the individualism expressed in his final question, "What can I do for America," embody the core of Tobey's political philosophy. During the thirties, it led him to support isolationism long after others decided that American values should be defended at the English Channel. In the forties, the threat of British domination was gone and Tobey's faith in America was expressed through his support for more international trade. His love of America came from the economic and social opportunities which he had experienced in his own life. His rejection of war was a fear of the centralization necessary to conduct a war, rather than fear of physical defeat for America. Tobey was an isolationist

because he saw no other way to preserve the kind of life which he valued most.

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