

**CONSTRUCTION AND RECONSTRUCTION OF THE NEW TURKEY  
DISCOURSE: CRITICAL DISCOURSE ANALYSIS OF NEWSPAPER  
COLUMNS (2010-2016)**

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## ABSTRACT

Construction and Reconstruction of the New Turkey Discourse: Critical Discourse  
Analysis of Newspaper Columns  
(2010-2016)

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The purpose of this study is to conduct critical discourse analysis of the uses and transformation of the “New Turkey” discourse between 2010 and 2016 based on mainstream newspaper columns and to make sense of this discursive practice through the Bourdieu’s concept of the Symbolic Power. It was first uttered after Justice and Development Party (AKP) won the 2007 general elections and manifested as a new political vision after 2010 Constitution Referendum. Concerning the research objective, 182 newspaper columns were scanned and divided into categories, and discursive strategies under those categories were coded qualitatively via ATLAS TI program. The codified texts were analyzed contextually and diachronically by using Critical Discourse Analysis method. In accordance with the premises of the Adaptive Theory, methodological framework of the thesis was constructed through the epistemological integration of Critical Discourse Analysis and sociology of Bourdieu. According to the findings, it was identified that the political crises in 2013 caused a rapture in the use of the new Turkey discourse, and therefore radically changed the delineative feature of that discourse. It was also revealed that the new Turkey, which had functioned as sort of ‘normalization’ discourse before 2013, has represented a discourse of powerful state and civilization consisting of global claims, in company with a securitization discourse after 2013. Moreover, it was observed that the journalistic field, the academic field and the

think-tank space played a significant role in the reproduction of the new Turkey discourse by adapting it to the contradictory contexts.

Keywords: New Turkey, Discourse, Pierre Bourdieu, Columnists

## ÖZ

### Yeni Türkiye Söyleminin İnşası ve Yeniden İnşası: Köşe Yazılarının Eleştirel Söylem Analizi (2010-2016)

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Bu çalışmanın amacı, ilk olarak 2007 yılındaki genel seçimlerin Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi (AKP) lehine sonuçlanmasının ardından dolaşıma sokulan ve 2010 Anayasa Referandumu sonrasında AKP tarafından yeni bir politik tahayyül ve vizyon olarak ortaya konulan “Yeni Türkiye” söyleminin 2010 ve 2016 yılları arasındaki kullanımlarının ve dönüşümünün, ana akım gazetelerde yazılan köşe yazılarından yola çıkarak, eleştirel söylem analizini yapmak ve bu söylemsel pratiği Bourdieu’nün Simgesel Güç kavramıyla anlamlandırmaya çalışmaktır. Bu amaç doğrultusunda, toplam 182 köşe yazısı taranarak tematik kategorilere ayrılmış, bu kategoriler altındaki söylemsel stratejiler ATLAS TI programı aracılığıyla niteliksel olarak kodlanmıştır. Kodlanan yazılar Eleştirel Söylem Analizi metodu kullanılarak bağlamsal ve diyakronik olarak analiz edilmiştir. Tezin ana omurgasını oluşturan metodolojik çerçeve, Uyarlayıcı Teori’nin sunduğu imkanlar doğrultusunda Eleştirel Söylem Analizi ve Bourdieu sosyolojisinin epistemolojik entegrasyonu ile oluşturulmuştur. Elde edilen bulgulara göre, 2013 yılındaki politik krizlerin yeni Türkiye söylemi açısından bir kırılma yarattığı ve bu söylemin tanımlayıcı niteliğini radikal bir biçimde değiştirdiği saptanmıştır. 2013 yılı öncesinde bir tür ‘normalleşme’ söylemi olarak işlev gören yeni Türkiye’nin, 2013 yılından sonra güvenleştireme söylemi eşliğinde küresel bir iddia içeren medeniyet ve güçlü devlet söylemini temsil ettiği tespit edilmiştir. Ayrıca, bu söylemin birbirinden çelişkili

bağlamlara uyarlanarak yeniden üretilmesinde gazetecilik alanı, akademik alan ve think-tank uzamının önemli bir rolü olduğu gözlenmiştir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Yeni Türkiye, Söylem, Pierre Bourdieu, Köşe Yazarları

To the ones that are ever after deterritorialized, decentered and uncanny thoughts.



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## TABLE OF CONTENTS

Abstract .....	iv
Öz.....	vi
Acknowledgements.....	ix
Table of Contents .....	x
CHAPTERS	
1. INTRODUCTION .....	1
2. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK .....	9
2.1. Critical Discourse Analysis .....	9
2.1.1. Relational/Dialectical Construction of Discourse .....	9
2.1.2. Contextuality of Discourse .....	14
2.1.3. Discourse as Legitimate Language and Linguistic Capital .....	19
2.2. Pierre Bourdieu .....	22
2.2.1. Habitus .....	22
2.2.2. Fields .....	27
2.2.3. Capital-Symbolic Power-Doxa .....	33
3. METHOD.....	38
3.1. Sampling.....	40
3.2. Coding and Analysis.....	42
4. CRITICAL DISCOURSE ANALYSIS OF THE COLUMNS.....	44
4.1. Period between 2010 and 2014.....	44
4.1.1. Democratization and Normalization.....	44
4.1.2. Demilitarization of Politics: Liquidation of Military Tutelage .....	55
4.1.3. Discourse of Peace-building: Kurdish Question .....	66
4.2. Period between 2014 and 2016.....	80
4.2.1. Change of the New Turkey’s Constitutive Other .....	83
4.2.2. Imperial Claims: Discourse of Restoration of the Republic or Symbolic Re-foundation of the Ottoman Empire.....	97

4.2.3. Discourse of the Leadership and the Presidential System.....	107
5. INTERPRETATION and CONCLUSION.....	114
5.1. Contextual Adaptation .....	115
5.2. Categories of Perception, Discursive Construction of the Constitutive Other and Self-Representation.....	118
5.3. Relations in the Journalistic Field .....	124
5.4. Epilogue.....	128
6. References.....	130

## ABBREVIATIONS

- AKP:** Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi (Justice and Development Party)
- BDP:** Barış ve Demokrasi Partisi (Peace and Democracy Party)
- CDA:** Critical Discourse Analysis
- CHP:** Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi (Republican People's Party)
- FETÖ-PDY:** Fethullahçı Terör Örgütü-Paralel Devlet Yapılanması (Pro-Fethullah Terrorist Organization-Parallel State Organization)
- HDP:** Halkların Demokratik Partisi (Peoples' Democratic Party)
- HEP:** Halkın Emek Partisi (People's Labor Party)
- ISIS:** Islamic State of Iraq and Syria
- MGK:** Milli Güvenlik Kurulu (National Security Council)
- MHP:** Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi Nationalist Movement Party
- MİT:** Milli İstihbarat Teşkilatı (National Intelligence Organization)
- PKK:** Partiya Karkeren Kurdistan (Kurdistan Workers' Party)
- SETA:** Siyaset, Ekonomi ve Toplum Araştırmaları Vakfı (Foundation for Political, Economic and Social Research)
- TSK:** Türk Silahlı Kuvvetleri (Turkish Armed Forces)

## CHAPTER 1

### INTRODUCTION

*In the new Ireland children would be taught a distinctively Irish way of walking, sprightly, limber and affirmative as against the British slouch or swagger. The Irish style of defecation would be regular and efficient, brief in duration to avoid anal eroticism; children would be taught to regulate their bowels like Gaels, not shit as Sassenachs (Eagleton, 1990, p. 51)*

Understanding the reproduction of the political and social order was a very basic motivation of the emergence of sociology as a discipline. Whereas classical thinkers were stuck between the influence of structures and individual actions in the comprehension of stability and change, discursive construction of the social has not been at stake. Firstly Ferdinand de Saussure, then the linguistic turn in social sciences which was promoted in especially the later works of Wittgenstein (Wittgenstein, 1958) brought language into the analysis of the social as a constitutive and reproductive part of social reality. As a result of the increasing interest on linguistic structures in the social sciences, discourse studies which also encompasses language, emerged as a field. Discourse, as Purvis and Hunt define it, “refers to the individual social networks of communication through the medium of language or non-verbal sign-systems” (Purvis and Hunt, 1993, p. 485). However, discourse functions beyond communication and turns out to be one of the influential instruments of power relations, since it necessitates an established consensus on written, verbal and non-verbal systems. Everyday life, the political system, the economic order, and all other structures which need to be sustained must have their own discourse which enables them to be perceived in an intended way. In this sense, although discourse provides one with the opportunity to comprehend material conditions, it may also lead different people to comprehend those conditions in a totally different way. Discourses cannot be constructed without an agency intervention. In modern society, as the instruments and modes of power have changed, intellectuals

have taken the role of imposing the dominant ideas. In other words, coercion, which is an old, ruthless strategy of rulers, has been transferred into the realm of words. This is not to argue that coercion as an instrument of domination has disappeared. Rather, as a modern discovery of power, intellectual intervention has become an accomplice in violent actions.

In this context, non-material practices of power for the maintenance of the social and political order have been discussed among thinkers in an accumulative way. Almost until Foucault, the concept of discourse was not in the foreground. The classical Marxist tradition mostly used the notion of ideology to identify dominant ideas and the established “false reality” in the society. Yet whether the notion itself has a negative or a positive meaning is controversial. According to Jorge Larraín (1983), it is ambiguous in Marx’s writings, since ideology is both negative, because it implies the distortion of the truth, and also positive, because it implies the “totality of forms of social consciousness” (p. 4). Within the same tradition, while Lukács, borrowing the negative conception of ideology, regards it as false consciousness, which is the reason for the objectification of the working class (Lukács, 1971), Althusser considers ideology in both a negative way, as the ideological state apparatus (ISA), and a positive way, as the interpellation of the subject (Althusser, 1971). Gramsci, as a neo-Marxist thinker, has recourse to the notion of hegemony to illuminate the consent-production of the ruling class and the role of intellectuals in the construction of hegemony (Gramsci, 1971). On the other hand, Michel Foucault, who distanced himself from Marxism, operationalized the notion of discourse instead of ideology to make sense of the conditions which make social order possible. For Foucault, it is important to scrutinize what makes a discourse possible rather than what is behind that discourse; therefore, he applied the method of archaeology and genealogy to trace different kinds of institutionalized discourses (Foucault, 1972;1977;1980;1981). The post-structuralist tradition removed the distinction between discursive and non-discursive realms and came to accept that social reality is discursive and that there is nothing outside the text (Derrida, 1976&Laclau and Mouffe, 1985).

Bourdieu, on the other hand, employs neither the concept of discourse, nor that of ideology. Furthermore, he intentionally rejects the use of the latter because of its vagueness (Bourdieu, 1994, p. 266), and therefore sets up his own theoretical tools such as symbolic power and *doxa*, through which he has tried to understand the tacit acceptance of the social world by means of categories of perception and principles of vision and division. He locates those practices and strategies within a well-designed field theory in which agents struggle against each other to impose a legitimate vision and to get recognized capital in return. Finally, after the 1980s, linguistic studies paved the way for critical discourse analysis. Thinkers in this tradition investigate the role of discourse in the reproduction and challenge of dominance (Fairclough, 1992; Van Dijk, 1993; Wodak and Meyer, 2001). Critical discourse analysis is envisaged as an eclectic methodology, since grasping the complexity of social reality necessitates the articulation of different perspectives. Among all these paradigms, I find Bourdieu's framework best suited to my field of study, and in an eclectic way, I make use of critical discourse analysis as a combination of method and methodology in the construction of my object of research. Before mentioning why these two veins are eligible, I would like to clarify my focus at this juncture.

In Turkey, power holders have always used the means of communication functionally to reinforce their power and to impose their world-views. Compared to before, factors like increasing number of media companies, opportunities on the internet, and the emergence of think-tank organizations which link the academic and the political fields have multiplied the channels for governments to legitimize their coercive regimes. The Justice and Development Party (AKP), the most long-lasting party of Turkey, has used all such resources possible to embark on the construction of political hegemony after 2010, and therefore came up with a new political claim which was named as the "new Turkey". Although the new Turkey discourse of AKP government was first uttered after the 2007 general elections, it boomed essentially during the referendum campaign in 2010.

However, it should be noted that there is a historical continuity in claiming new order for almost 300 years in Turkish political history. Both in the Ottoman period and modern Turkey, several reformist movements came up with a self-identification based on being new. According to Niyazi Berkes, the military reforms carried out by the Ottoman Sultan Selim was identified as *Nizam-ı Cedid* (The New Order) by İbrahim Müteferrika (Berkes, 2012, p. 50). Moreover, claims of newness can be traced in the Young Ottomans (New Ottomans) which was a reformist society established in 1865 by Ottoman intellectuals. As Şerif Mardin points out, “the European belief that the Ottoman Empire was in its death throes gave an additional reason to the founders to proclaim, by the inclusion of the word “Young” in the name of the society, the vitality of the empire” (Mardin, 2000, p. 22). In the beginning of 20<sup>th</sup> century, inspired from the Young Ottomans, another reformist group called themselves as the Young (*Jeunes*) Turks. Even Mustafa Kemal, the founder of the Republic of Turkey, used the word “New Turkey” in his “The Speech” [Nutuk] to distinguish the modern Turkey from the old Ottoman rule.

In a similar vein with its historical uses, by tracking its circulation retrospectively in the public opinion, one can reach the conclusion that the earlier use of the new Turkey was standing for the claims of democratization and demilitarization of politics together with the strengthening of the AKP government, whereas the old Turkey was representing the military tutelage in association with Kemalist ideology. Yet, as if it were a *floating signifier* (Levi-Strauss, 1987, p.63), in the following years what the new Turkey stands for has periodically changed in parallel with political breaks. Interestingly enough, the executives, members, and media-engaged actors of the AKP have continued to consecrate and name the changed and completely dissimilar conditions as also the new Turkey. Thus, what characterizes the old Turkey has at the same time changed in time. What we ultimately have is a politically functional but ambiguous naming of the political order.

That ambiguity was the departure point of this study. Aside from AKP members, most intellectuals, academics, journalists and think-tank researchers have contributed to the



circulation of the new Turkey discourse on media platforms by writing newspaper columns, posting on the internet, and “preaching” on TV channels. To put it more explicitly, those actors have made great efforts to legitimize contradictory situations with discursive power of the new Turkey at the expense of even contradicting themselves. In that way, political order has long been discursively produced and reproduced in favor of the AKP government. In this context, my research specifically focuses on the construction and reconstruction of the new Turkey discourse as a practice of symbolic power between 2010 and 2016. As I expressed earlier, my intention is to operationalize a Bourdieusian framework to capture the “taken for granted” circulation of the new Turkey and to understand how it is imposed upon recipients. I chose newspaper columns as the unit of analysis, since such journalistic practice has been used as influentially as TV programs to spread the imposition of the new Turkey. Tracing those columns, I want to explore the following: a) How is the new Turkey discourse constructed in different contexts and adapted to changing political settings? Correspondingly, b) What are the strategies (conceptions, categories, dichotomies, naming, representations, perceptions, etc.) of actors in the construction of the discourse? Having recourse to a Bourdieusian framework, c) Can this construction, reconstruction, and imposition of the new Turkey be comprehended with the concepts of symbolic power/violence and doxa? d) What are the (journalistic) field dynamics and what does the participation of the actors from different fields have to do with the construction and reproduction of the new Turkey discourse? In the light of these questions, I aim to carry out a critical discourse analysis of the columns written by pro-new Turkey actors and to associate that analysis with a Bourdieusian framework. Accordingly, I collected and categorized the columns both periodically and topically and read them critically in line with Bourdieu’s theory. Furthermore, I tried to comprehend the columns as a sort of discursive field of the journalistic field in general in which actors from different fields go in and out. In the method chapter, I am going to explain in detail what the methodic parameters of my research are.

Employing a Bourdieusian perspective in discourse studies is not a frequent trend in Turkish academia. Also, the journalistic field does not draw considerable attention in the social sciences. Among the limited number of master theses; Bahadır Türk's thesis, titled "Pierre Bourdieu's Contribution to the Debates Concerning Ideology and Discourse", which also gave an inspiration for my research, aims to make Bourdieu's concepts useful in ideology and discourse studies. Türk's theoretical study locates Bourdieu in the history of discussions of ideology and discourse and proposes to operationalize his concepts of symbolic violence/power/capital and doxa together with the notions of ideology and discourse (Türk, 2004). In another article, Türk employs these concepts to understand the anatomy of Kemalism as the official ideology of Turkey (Türk, 2004a). On the other hand, Erman Yüce's PhD thesis in a journalism department focuses on the columnists of the *Hürriyet* newspaper through a Bourdieusian framework. Yüce investigates symbolic capital, symbolic power, and symbolic violence practices in the columns by applying a content analysis method (Yüce, 2007). İsmet Parlak and Nigar Değirmenci's article also examines the discursive change of the columnists of *Zaman* newspaper between 2011 and 2014 based on Bourdieu's conceptual tools (Parlak and Değirmenci, 2015). Ali Esgin, on the other hand, tries to understand social scientific practices in Turkey by operationalizing the concepts of doxa and doxosopher, which are developed by Bourdieu (Esgin, 2015).

Concerning the new Turkey, there are some politically biased publications which identify with and affirm the premises which new Turkey discourse stands for. In this sense, they do not treat the new Turkey objectively, but they take it for granted as the new reality of Turkey. On the other side, there are non-academic or semi-academic studies which look into the new Turkey critically. Whereas Bahadır Türk (2014), in a chapter in his book titled *Muktedir* [The Competent], briefly analyzes new Turkey discourse especially focusing on Rasim Ozan Kütahyalı's columns, Doğan Gürpınar (2016) tries to understand the meaning and change of the new Turkey discourse in his book titled *Kültür Savaşları* [Cultural Struggles]. Undoubtedly, all these studies occupy a significant place in the

literature. Each of them provided me an insight that helped me to build my research object around a well-constructed theoretical perspective. In return, my research, I strongly believe, will have offer some humble contributions of its own. There is a remarkable gap in the literature about perhaps the most contradictive discourse of Turkish politics. That discourse, in the circulation of which a considerable number of actors from different fields have participated, deserves to be scientifically treated. By providing a great amount of data and a broad contextual time period, my study first of all seeks to fulfil this aim and therefore to lead up following academic studies. Also, as Bahadır Türk did, I want to exhibit how the sociology of Bourdieu can functionally be employed in the understanding of symbolic reproductions of the political order. Furthermore, to read Bourdieu with a critical discourse analysis provides a chance to locate Bourdieu within the framework of discourse studies, which is something missing in the literature. In this sense, the Bourdieusian perspective allows me to problematize the function both of the discourse itself and of actors for power relations. Also, the eclectic implementation of the critical discourse analysis provides a relational and contextual point of view for my research.

After this introductory chapter, in Chapter 2, I will discuss possibilities of critical discourse analysis in the construction of the research object and in the analysis of the texts by referring to Normal Fairclough and Teun Van Dijk's views. Then I will move to the Bourdieusian framework, which is composed of critical notions such as habitus, field, symbolic power, and doxa. While doing so, I will try to show the applicability of Pierre Bourdieu's sociology to discourse studies by stating the links with the critical discourse analysis tradition. In Chapter 3, I will mention how I constructed my object of research and how I collected, categorized, and analyzed the newspaper columns in accordance with the research objectives by referring to the critical discourse analysis method. Chapter 4 consists of the analysis of the refined data. In this chapter, I will first divide the newspaper columns as before 2014 and after 2014, and then I will analyze them under

the contextual titles in these two periods. Finally, in Chapter 5, by revisiting the theory, I will interpret the data analyzed in the previous chapter and will summarize the findings.

## **CHAPTER 2**

### **THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK**

In this part, I will first discuss the possibilities of critical discourse analysis in order to provide insight into how discourse is constructed in texts. Critical discourse analysis gives clues about the relational construction of discourse, its context-dependent nature, and its functional use as a legitimate language. All these premises asserted by critical discourse analysis provide a framework for the construction of the object of research. In other words, critical discourse analysis indicates the paths of how a discourse should be perceived in a text and how it should be analyzed as an object of research. Secondly, I will mention Bourdieusian framework, consisting of habitus, field, and symbolic power. By means of similarities with critical discourse analysis, I will discuss the possible use of the notion of discourse by associating it with Bourdieu's broad theoretical instruments. Since Bourdieu already addresses the symbolic production of the social world, interpreting discursive constructions by situating them into his theoretical configuration can be productive.

#### **2.1. Critical Discourse Analysis**

##### **2.1.1. Relational/Dialectical Construction of Discourse**

One of the main contributions of critical discourse analysis is its relational and dialectical account in the examination of the social. Just as their contemporaries, scholars which are positioned in the framework of critical discourse analysis have endeavored to deal with the archaic dualism of early modernity. In the social sciences, there is an ongoing debate between a structuralist tradition which prioritizes structures over the agency, and an interpretivist tradition which focuses on individual motivations. The former has influentially manifested itself with the emergence of linguistic studies. Especially Saussure's contribution has intensified structuralist tendencies in social science; therefore, socio-linguistic studies have developed in accordance with this axis.

Critical discourse analysis, as a recent tradition, has emerged in this condition and its prominent scholars have developed a relational view without neglecting the functions of the structures. As representatives, Fairclough and Chouliaraki define Critical Discourse Analysis' (CDA) aim as to overcome the tension of modernity between structure and agency, as "a way of seeing and researching social life as both constrained by social structures, and an active process of production which transforms social structures" (Chouliaraki and Fairclough, 1999, p. 1). In this sense, they stand similar to Pierre Bourdieu's position, which can be called constructivist structuralism or structuralist constructivism, and which is also an attempt to transcend the contradiction between agency and structure.

The relation between language and society is not external (Fairclough, 2001, p. 19), but dialogical; therefore, this enables one to regard discourse as a form of language which is already a social practice. Not only does it constitute social reality but also is constructed and shaped by surrounding social structures. While discourse is capable of constituting identities, relations, and belief systems, it is also constructed and affected by "class and other social relations at a societal level, by the relations specific to particular institutions such as law or education, by systems of classification, by various norms and conventions of both a discursive and a non-discursive nature, and so forth" (Fairclough, 1992, p. 64). Such a dialectical position emancipates analysis from falling into reductionist approaches—either methodological individualism or structuralism. Too much emphasis on subjective motivation in the production of discourse neglects its socially conditioned character, and likewise, too much emphasis on structural determination underestimates the impact of individual labor (or choices) on the production, reproduction, and transformation of discourse. As a solution to this impasse, similar to Bourdieu, Fairclough notes that "the discursive constitution of society does not emanate from a free play of ideas in people's heads but from a social practice which is firmly rooted in and oriented to real, material social structures" (Fairclough, 1992, p. 66).

#### **2.1.1.1. Discourse as Practice**

So, if discourse is a social practice, then we need to portray what practice is and how it works. Practice is basically temporal and spatial investments of material and non-material resources (Chouliaraki and Fairclough, 1999, p. 21). Whether the motivation of the practice comes from mental dispositions or not, practice follows a particular interest in each situation. The mode of practice may change conditionally and also it can be reproduced through cognitive or structural factors. Language here is a crucial arbiter in the reproduction of practices, but one must notice that practice and its reproduction should not be reduced to mere linguistic patterns. In addition, we need to accept there are also non-discursive fields of the social. Discursive practice, says Fairclough, "does not contrast with social practice: the former is a particular form of the latter. In some cases, the social practice may be wholly constituted by the discursive practice, while in others it may involve a mixture of discursive and non-discursive practice" (Fairclough, 1992, p.71). Accordingly, the function and mode of discourse change depending on the position of its performer and the context in which it is performed. This reveals the "reflexivity" of discursive practice, which means that "representations of a practice are generated as part of the practice" and those representations have ideological projections; therefore, they contribute to the maintenance of relations of domination (Chouliaraki and Fairclough, 1999, p. 37).

Discursive practice itself functions as a mediator of ideological and political practices. In fact, they are indistinguishable; nevertheless, the formation of political/ideological meaning in a text can be traced through discursive practices. Text production is an effort, since writing as a process means including preferable messages and excluding undesirable contents. As Fairclough remarks, "Analysis of a particular discourse as a piece of discursive practice focuses upon processes of text production, distribution, and consumption. All of these processes are social and require reference to the particular economic, political and institutional setting within which discourse is generated" (Fairclough, 1992, p. 71). The dialectical and reciprocal generation of discourse may

create various different layers of meaning. To put it another way, a discourse which is not produced with political concerns may be circulated and consumed in such contexts that it comes off as an indisputably political discourse.

The particular discourse which appears in a text is an output of political, social and economic forces and also has the power to impinge on them. Discourse intervenes, transforms, and reproduces socially constituted structures, and this happens by means of strategies of actors who are not independent of those structures. According to Fairclough, "One can neither reconstruct the production process nor account for the interpretation process purely by reference to texts: they are respectively traces of and cues to these processes, and can be neither produced nor interpreted without members' resources" (Fairclough, 1992, p. 72). While actors produce discourses, each involvement positions them across the structures and other agencies, since they set profit-seeking instruments to work.

#### **2.1.1.2. Cognition**

Up to this point, by discussing critical discourse analysis, I have argued that individuals in a society are not totally free in their discursive practical choices, yet I have not explained how it is possible. This kind of "dependency" naturally affects the quality of discursive practices. In his book *Discourse and Social Change*, Fairclough mentions the socio-cognitive dimensions of text production and interpretation (Fairclough, 1992, p. 80), arguing that structures are embodied by individuals who reflect those structures in their discursive strategies. Likewise, embodied structures or "members' resources" shape the interpretation process and the reception of meaning. Members' resources are cognitive products which people already have, but their existence arises from social relations, and they are "socially transmitted and unequally distributed" (Fairclough, 2001, p. 20).

The social determination of cognitive resources also affects the way they are used. Different cognitive strategies, says Fairclough, "are conventionally expected when



someone is reading a poem on the one hand, and a magazine advertisement on the other" (Fairclough, 2001, p. 20). To put it simply, cognition creates socially motivated strategies. However, it is not only limited to the interpretation of a text; rather, cognition comes into play in the process of writing, and it is reflected as a style which can be word preferences, the structure of sentences, or the effective use of the language. These cognitive choices are essentially ideological because they imply the unconscious internalization of particular value systems. Both the production and the interpretation of texts depend on resources which actors gain in their interactions, either intentionally or unintentionally. According to Fairclough, production and interpretation are constrained in a double sense:

Firstly, they are constrained by the available members' resources, which are effectively internalized social structures, norms, and conventions, including orders of discourse, and conventions for the production, distribution, and consumption of texts of the sort just referred to, and which have been constituted through past social practice and struggle. Secondly, they are constrained by the specific nature of the social practice of which they are parts, which determines what elements of members' resources are drawn upon, and how (in normative or creative, acquiescent or oppositional ways) they are drawn upon (Fairclough, 1992, p. 80).

Similar to Fairclough, Van Dijk also addresses the relational bond between structures and discursive production. He takes social cognition into consideration to provide grounded analysis of the question of how using particular discourse ends up with the production or reproduction of dominance (Van Dijk, 1993, p. 251). The emphasis on "cognition" is much more dominant in Van Dijk's analysis. His theoretical concern to unveil the exercise of power presupposes a "missing link" (Van Dijk, 1993, p. 251) between discourse and dominance; therefore, social cognition would help to account for the production, interpretation, and effects of discourse (Van Dijk, 1993, p. 257). In order to make sense of a particular event, one resorts to cognitive schemata which consists of past experiences. They are structured as common sense, and dialectically they structure what we perceive of a particular event. Van Dijk gives the examples of the civil wars in Bosnia

and Kosovo in his book *Ideology and Discourse*, arguing that "reading the newspaper about the civil wars in Bosnia or Kosovo, we not only form mental models of the events but probably also associate these with negative opinions about the war crimes and 'ethnic cleansing' being perpetrated in these wars" (Van Dijk, 2000, p. 21). One should note that reading about the civil war in Bosnia and Kosovo is an act both of cognitive production and of consumption. The text or process of writing is as ideological as the way we interpret the text itself. In newspapers, for instance, authors appeal to general categorizations and common-sense knowledge to manipulate the minds of the masses. This ends up with the constitution of representations, and

those social representations are 'particularized' in mental models, and it is often through mental models that they are expressed in text and talk. And conversely, it is through mental models of everyday discourse such as conversations, news reports and textbooks that we acquire our knowledge of the world, our socially shared attitudes and finally our ideologies and fundamental norms and values (Van Dijk, 2001, p. 114).

Similarly, Van Leeuwen argues that "as discourses are social cognitions, socially specific ways of knowing social practice, they can be, and are, used as resources for representing social practices in the text" (Van Leeuwen, 2008, p. 6). Therefore, as Van Dijk points out in another text, critical discourse analysis concerns "a detailed description, explanation and critique of the ways dominant discourses (indirectly) influence such socially shared knowledge, attitudes and ideologies, namely through their role in the manufacture of concrete models" (Van Dijk, 1993, Pp. 258-259).

### **2.1.2. Contextuality of Discourse**

Being relational also implies being conjectural and contextual, therefore critical discourse analysts focus on conditions of actions or practices and their spatio-temporal dependency. Here, what should be mentioned is the necessity of approaching discourse as an action or practice. It is that practice which cannot be frozen at a particular time and particular place. Rather, discursive practice is so fluid that it is shaped depending on

different settings. Fairclough defines three processes of the analysis of discourse: production, distribution, and consumption. These stages can be read by reference to the particular contexts such as a discourse's political, economic and institutional settings (Fairclough, 1992, p. 71).

Either in the production process or in the consumption process (the reception of the discourse), the meaning of the discourse circulates between structural and cognitive dispositions. Here, the setting is considered as a transformative and determinant factor for the discourse. The construction of a coded meaning necessitates paying attention to the settings, since meaning may change from one particular context to another. Discourses have no intrinsically political or ideological significations, yet different discourses in different contexts may be politically and ideologically invested (Fairclough, 1992, p. 67). In another book, Norman Fairclough and Isabela Fairclough support this argument by referring to Van Dijk's focus on *the context* in political discourse analysis, saying that "outside political contexts, the discourse of politicians or any other 'political actors' is not 'political'" (Fairclough and Fairclough, 2012, p. 18). Here, contexts can be understood as both macro domains like politics, economics, etc. and also as media like newspapers, television programs, particular conversations, etc.

In each condition, context is the limit of discourse and functions as the boundary between different discourses. Just as in Bourdieu's "fields", actors have to fit different settings or contexts to construct "legitimate" discourse. As Fairclough claims, "it is feasible that boundaries between settings and practices should be so naturalized that these subject positions are lived as complementary. Under different social circumstances, the same boundaries might become a focus of contestation and struggle, and the subject positions and the discursive practices associated with them might be experienced as contradictory" (Fairclough, 1992, p. 69). This also corresponds to the Gramscian concept of "hegemony", which Chouliaraki and Fairclough call "struggles for closure" (Chouliaraki and Fairclough, 1999, p. 38). Such a struggle is a never-ending process and cannot be

achieved completely. Discursive practices contest to dominate each other and to draw borders between different contexts. Struggles take place in between macro and micro levels (or in conjunctures) and through these struggles structures are mediated. In other words, "power is not simply exercised, it is also fought over, and fought over in discourse" (Chouliaraki and Fairclough, 1999, p. 62).

Emphasis on "struggles for closure" is a very functional departure point to grasp political discursive investments. The former statement implies what Laclau and Mouffe call the "discursiveness of the social", and the "impossibility of fixing the social" is a precondition of hegemonic articulation (Laclau and Mouffe, 1985). Fairclough and Chouliaraki combine Laclau and Mouffe's discursive practices and Gramsci's hegemonic struggles to make sense of discursive strategies contesting each other. The struggle for closure or identifying what is legitimate is a fight for signification under socially constructed spaces. According to Fairclough, "this may be a matter of vocabulary - 'terrorist' and 'freedom fighter' are contrasting combinations of signifier and signified, and the contrast between them is a socially motivated one- or a matter of grammar, or other dimensions of language organization" (Fairclough, 1992, p. 75). Interestingly enough, such contradictory discourses may be produced, circulated and defended by the same person (or group) in different temporal contexts, which is the very first concern of my study here. As Fairclough clarifies, "Analysis of context of condition involves an interplay between cues and members' resources, but the members' resources, in this case, is in effect a mental map of the social order. Such a mental map is necessarily just one interpretation of social realities which are amenable to many interpretations, politically and ideologically invested in particular ways" (Fairclough, 1992, p. 82).

Van Dijk addresses the discursive context at the basis of power relations. Different from Fairclough, contexts for him are not only stable situations which define the mode of discursive activity but also things that are controlled by power elites. Accordingly, "participants may have more or less control over the variable properties of the (course

of) discourse and its conditions and consequences, such as their planning, setting, the presence of other participants, modes of participation, overall organization, turn-taking, agenda, topics or style” (Van Dijk, 1993, p. 256). Needless to say, the degree of control depends upon the positions of the actors. The more politically and economically powerful one group is, the greater their ability to change situations on behalf of their interests. Yet in each condition, the relationship between discursive practices and contextual structures is dialectical. As Van Dijk writes,

[...] discourse and its users have a ‘dialectic’ relation with their context: besides being subject to the social constraints of the context, they also contribute to, construe or change that context. Flexible negotiations may be engaged in as a function of the demands of the present context and the more general constraints of culture and society. Group power may be obeyed in discourse, but also challenged. Social norms and rules may be creatively changed or broken and such violations may give rise to new social arrangements (Van Dijk, 1997 p. 20).

This does not mean that individuals do not have to be aware of every single dynamic of a particular context to act accordingly, yet “speakers must have beliefs about the beliefs of recipients” (Van Dijk, 2000, p. 26). Socially shared values allow individuals to think in terms of categories and infer what is common with the others. Therefore, ideas, beliefs, and values are structured and particularized in the minds of the people. Then we come to the point that context in Van Dijk’s approach is also a cognitive notion. Above all, our mental structure delimits and defines the situation as context before actualizing discursive practice. In other words, contexts or settings consist not only of physical space but also of the “occupants” of these spaces and their interactional planes (Van Dijk, 2009, p. 50). Occupants located in a defined field constitute the boundaries for the discursive play, and this mediation between discourse and cognition is called “context models” by Van Dijk (Van Dijk, 2000, p. 26).

These context models are communicative and dialogical and appear in confrontations among individuals. They enable us to determine how to construct or use a discourse

depending on social settings. “We may be more or less formal, more or less polite, and may choose one word rather than another, as a function of where, when and with whom we speak, and with what intentions” (Van Dijk, 2000, p. 28). This is inevitably ideological and subordinate to power relations. For those who are able to control contexts, it is a kind of legitimacy, since context presents them the authority to speak more than others. The ideological backgrounds of participants influences what they say or produce. Van Dijk gives the example of journalists, saying that the “media ideologies of journalists similarly control their ways of writing or editing news, background stories or editorials” (Van Dijk, 2000, p. 28). Such ideological embeddedness of different contexts is crystallized in the concept of “orders of discourse”, which is adopted from Michel Foucault.

#### **2.1.2.1. Orders of Discourse**

Although discursive investments, or, with a more structuralist definition, configurations, are contextual, this should not mean that every discourse belongs to a particular setting. Rather, discourse is referential, and it is explained by French discourse analysts with the concept of interdiscourse, as "the complex interdependent configuration of discursive formations" (Fairclough, 1992, p. 68). As the concept itself implies, discourses flow among other discourses and constitute referential formations. These combinations may consist of different modes and forms of discourse coming together. However, Fairclough prefers the Foucauldian term, “order of discourse”, since it signals configurations explicitly. The word “order” indicates that discourse has its articulatory parts, which may be complementary or contradictory (Fairclough, 1992, p. 68). As I discussed before, these dialogical parts constitute or displace boundaries between different settings. According to Fairclough, "what applies for boundaries between subject positions and associated discursive conventions applies generally for elements of orders of discourse” (Fairclough, 1992, p.68). These boundaries might be the dividing line between the dominating and the dominated one, and the former needs to take

control of orders of discourse to perpetuate unequal relations with the latter (Fairclough, 2001, p. 31).

Sets of discourse may not compromise with their social settings and this results in the articulation and rearticulation of orders of discourse. For this study, newspaper articles can serve as an example. Several types of discourses are used to support, to legitimize, and to defend a particular situation. In this sense, one can apply legal discourse combining with literary discourse and also economic discourse relatedly. Chouliaraki and Fairclough define orders of discourse in another book, titled *Discourse in Late Modernity*, as “the socially ordered set of genres and discourses associated with a particular social field, characterized in terms of the shifting boundaries and flows between them” (Chouliaraki and Fairclough, 1999 p. 58). This definition seems very similar to Bourdieu's “fields” and to the types of capital implicit in those fields, which I am going to discuss in the course of the text. Now I move to the last point for critical discourse analysis, before discussing the possibilities of Bourdieu's contribution to discourse and power relations.

### **2.1.3. Discourse as Legitimate Language and Linguistic Capital**

Discursive formations or configurations called order of discourse are practically a kind of investment which intends also to position its producer or performer. I have already stated that these discourses are outcomes of struggles of the individuals who have internalized the structures. In this part, I need to elaborate what I mentioned about members' resources and their use of those resources as a legitimate language and linguistic capital. In effect, one can say that the whole story is about the struggle for signification. Fairclough defines the situation briefly, saying that “people make choices about the design and structure of their clauses which amount to choices about how to signify (and construct) social identities, social relationships, and knowledge and belief” (Fairclough, 1992, p. 76). Signification is one of the most penetrative strategies of power holders since it enables the proliferation of dominant value systems. Therefore, language,

where we host common sense and taken for granted knowledge, should be analyzed as a reflection of ideological dispositions.

Signification—as a practice—has the power to distort and reconstruct reality through words. The selection of words, or what Fairclough calls “wording”, could be changed depending on conflicts in a given setting and “reworded” as the reflection of political and ideological strategies (Fairclough, 1992, p. 77). This is what happens in the columns of daily newspapers: The parties propound ideologically loaded contradictory words in a discussion around a specific topic. In Turkey, for instance, one may call “carrion” what the opposite side calls “martyr” or vice versa. Each one is a discursive practice aiming at degrading the other and legitimizing its own position. Similarly, there is no agreed-upon definitions of words like democracy, liberation, terrorism, etc., and their use changes accordingly (Fairclough, 2001, p. 19). Of course, there is nothing more natural than the fact that wording is political. In a given context, every single noun, adjective, and verb sounds ideologically to produce judgments about interlocutors, and each judgment may end up with a double potentiality: On the one hand, wording seems to produce and reproduce negativity about the image of the other; on the other hand, while doing so, it aims to consolidate one’s position and to make one’s discourse dominant in that setting. The ideologies embedded in discursive practices, says Fairclough,

are most effective when they become naturalized, and achieve the status of ‘common sense’; but this stable and established property of ideologies should not be overstated, because my reference to ‘transformation’ points to ideological struggle as a dimension of discursive practice, a struggle to reshape discursive practices and the ideologies built into them in the contexts of the restructuring or transformation of relations of domination (Fairclough, 1992, pp. 87-88).

Construction of common sense through naturalization will become more crystallized when discussing Bourdieu’s concepts of symbolic power and doxa. Yet Fairclough’s approach derives from the Gramsci and Laclau and Mouffe line. Ideological positioning in discursive practice is a hegemonic struggle and is quite open to articulation,



rearticulation, and even disarticulation of orders of discourse. Here, Fairclough distinguishes political and ideological practices among different modes of discourses. Throughout this thesis, the focus is going to be political discourse, which has already ideological resonances. If what makes a practice political is its capacity to intervene on the state of nature, this also makes it relevant for discursive practices:

Discourse as a political practice establishes, sustains and changes power relations, and the collective entities (classes, blocs, communities, groups) between which power relations obtain. Discourse as an ideological practice constitutes, naturalizes, sustains and changes significations of the world from diverse positions in power relations (Fairclough, 1992, p. 67).

These are interwoven categories, and discourse as ideological practice provides a reference point for discourse as political practice. For instance, hegemonic political discourse needs to naturalize the existing order of unequal relations by resorting to stationary ideological discourses. Established practices which we perform without questioning function no doubt for the sake of justification of power relations (Fairclough, 2001, p. 27). In other words, by means of ordinary linguistic practices, we tend to contribute to the construction of consent for domination in society unintentionally.

#### **2.1.3.1. Members' Resources**

Members' resources, which sounds like *capital* in Bourdieu, is as Fairclough defines it, what "people have in their heads and draw upon when they produce or interpret texts-including their knowledge of language, representations of the natural and social worlds they inhabit, values, beliefs, assumptions, and so on" (Fairclough, 2001, p. 20). This definition also seems similar to Van Dijk's socio-cognitive approach, since both of them are based on the internalization of relationships and structures, and eventually these inputs are applied in the production and consumption of the social world.

Furthermore, the reproduction of relations, which seem self-evident, takes place based upon this notion of members' resources. However, Fairclough opposes the notion that

members' resources are seen as "background knowledge" which is a narrow definition in one sense because resources mostly consist of common sense assumptions, and "knowledge" thus might not be the correct conceptualization (Fairclough, 2001, p. 118). Indeed, people rarely have true knowledge about the events and contexts they act in; instead, they accumulate assumptions, values, and ideas from interactions and dissolve them in the form of categorizations to invest them as capital. On that account, Fairclough sheds light on the interrelation between language, power, and ideology in his book titled *Language and Power*. He claims, "Routine and unselfconscious resort to members' resources (MR) in the ordinary business of discourse is, I shall suggest, a powerful mechanism for sustaining the relations of power which ultimately underlie them" (Fairclough, 2001 p. 9). As it is in the concept of *habitus* envisaged by Bourdieu, members' resources also function as mediator between the social order and members themselves; that is, "social structures shape members' resources, which in turn shape discourses; and discourses sustain or change members' resources, which in turn sustain or change structures" (Fairclough, 2001, p. 135). Fairclough's critiques and propositions about legitimate language and capital become clearer when he is compared with Bourdieu in the following sections.

## **2.2. Pierre Bourdieu**

### **2.2.1. Habitus**

To undertake a reading of critical discourse analysis with Bourdieu's approach, one needs to have recourse to the concepts -habitus, fields and (symbolic) capital and power- which constitute the skeleton of his theory. As I discussed in the critical discourse analysis section, discourses are perceived as practices, and those discursive practices are products of cognitive structures. Cognition is programmed to internalize structures and to establish its own schemes, which corresponds with the notion of habitus in Bourdieu. Those internalizations create sets of dispositions and regulate action not by obeying but harmonizing with structures. To account for such regulations of action, Bourdieu, with

inspiration from the Aristotelian concept of *hexis*, “the incorporated and quasi-postural disposition” (Swartz, 1997, p. 108), developed *habitus* as

a system of durable, transposable dispositions, structured structures predisposed to function as structuring structures, that is, as principles which generate and organize practices and representations that can be objectively adapted to their outcomes without presupposing a conscious aiming at ends or an express mastery of the operations necessary in order to attain them (Bourdieu, 1990, p. 53).

Bourdieu clarifies his intention to constitute a theory of practice in *An Invitation to Reflexive Sociology* as to break with some essential traditions. Practice follows a certain logic which can be apprehended neither by positivism nor by idealism. As Bourdieu claims, habitus functions as follows:

[...] against the positivistic materialism, the theory of practice as practice posits that objects of knowledge are *constructed*, and not passively recorded; against intellectualist idealism, it reminds us that the principle of this construction is found in the socially constructed system of structured and structuring dispositions acquired in practice and constantly aimed at practical functions (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992, p. 121).

#### **2.2.1.1. Internalization**

Habitus is “structuring structures” which are both the cognitive and the embodied form of practices. That is, habitus results from early socialization experiences in which external structures are learned and internalized. As a result, says Swartz, “internalized dispositions of broad parameters and boundaries of what is possible or unlikely for a particular group in a stratified social world develop through socialization” (Swartz, 1997, p. 103). In this sense, habitus is not a given but an ongoing process which is constructed in time and space. Although habitus in Bourdieu seems to be used as an economical term -since it implies “class habitus”- the concept functions as “generative schemes” that are generalizable for all areas of the social world (Bourdieu, 1990, p. 94). On that account, it is also convenient for discourse studies where we need to examine the relation between

individuals' positions and what they produce as discourse accordingly. According to Di Maggio, habitus is "a kind of theoretical *deus ex machina* by means of which Bourdieu relates objective structure and individual activity" (Di Maggio, 1979, p. 1464). Critical discourse analysts share the same concerns as Bourdieu to construct a relational perspective.

#### **2.2.1.2. Relationality**

Furthermore, we can argue that the effect of mediation of discourse between agency and structure is generated by habitus. Like Fairclough and Chouliaraki, who argue that "representations of a practice are generated as part of the practice" (Chouliaraki and Fairclough, 1999, p. 37), Jenkins also interprets habitus as "not just manifest in behavior, it is integral part of it" (Jenkins, 1992, p. 46). Bourdieu tries to overcome classical dualism and also to distance himself from French structuralism by inserting "strategy" into his theoretical instruments. If all actions follow particular interests, then agents necessarily act in a strategic way. To apply a strategy is to mind time and space conditions for an action. Choices, says Swartz, "do not derive directly from the objective situations in which they occur or from transcending rules, norms, patterns, and constraints that govern social life; rather, they stem from practical dispositions that incorporate ambiguities and uncertainties that emerge from acting through time and space" (Swartz, 1997, p. 100). Those choices or strategies are generated by habitus which functions as structuring structures. According to Swartz, actors are practical strategists who are linked to social structures through the concept of habitus. In other words, they differentiate themselves from others by employing different strategies according to the logic of the field.

#### **2.2.1.3. Cognition**

We already know that critical discourse analysis utilizes the cognitive approach to make sense of the dialectical relationship between discourse and society. Similarly, Bourdieu's theory of action, according to Swartz, "is practical rather than discursive, pre-reflective

rather than conscious, embodied as well as cognitive, durable though adaptive, reproductive though generative and inventive, and the product of particular social conditions though transposable to others" (Swartz, 1997, p. 101). Here one point needs to be mentioned. Swartz does not distinguish discursive and non-discursive actions, he rather sees Bourdieu's theory of action in terms of practice which also encapsulates discursive practice. This corresponds with the critical discourse analysis tradition which approaches discourse as practice.

As we can remember from both Fairclough and Van Dijk, the social determination of cognitive resources which bear upon the production and interpretation of discursive practice is the reflection of the internalization of social structures and carries the traces of past practices and struggles (Fairclough, 1992 and Van Dijk, 2001). Likewise, Bourdieu portrays the practices produced by habitus as

always tending to reproduce the objective structures of which they are the product, they are determined by the past conditions which have produced the principle of their production, that is, by the actual outcome of identical or interchangeable past practices, which coincides with their own outcome to the extent (and only to the extent) that the objective structures of which they are the product are prolonged in the structures within which they function (Bourdieu, 1977, pp. 72-73).

I argue that habitus, which produces dispositions to fit objective structures, might stand for the "missing link" between discourse and domination, as problematized by Van Dijk. He designates it as *social cognition*, whose operationalization already sounds like the function of habitus. According to Van Dijk, "ignoring cognitive properties of ideologies causes theoretical deficiencies, since ideologies are socially shared mental representations; that is, they are socially acquired, shared, used, changed and even reproduced through members' practices" (Van Dijk, 1998, p.134). Here, Van Dijk tries to find out the cognitive ground of the reproduction of dominance. Similarly, "to explain why inegalitarian social arrangements make sense to both the dominant and the dominated", says Swartz, "Bourdieu employs the concept (habitus) to emphasize the

class-based character of socialization” (Swartz, 1997, p. 104). In *Outline of a Theory of Practice*, Bourdieu describes habitus as the source of regularities and talks about cognitive structures. Accordingly,

the habitus, the durably installed generative principle of regulated improvisations, produces practices which tend to reproduce the regularities immanent in the objective conditions of the production of their generative principle, while adjusting to the demands inscribed as objective potentialities in the situation, as defined by the cognitive and motivating structures making up the habitus (Bourdieu, 1977, p.78).

Both in Bourdieu and in van Dijk, the notion of cognition stands out as the generating principle. Habitus provides schemes of perception through principles of vision and division and contributes to the production of classifications. By means of these principles, the social world seems “taken for granted” and habitus is responsible for the sustainability of social relations. Bourdieu calls this the “commonsense world”, in which agents create common meaning, and emphasizes the effects of habitus on the basis of this creation:

One of the fundamental effects of the orchestration of habitus is the production of a commonsense world endowed with the objectivity secured by consensus on the meaning (sens) of practices and the world, in other words the harmonization of agents’ experiences and the continuous reinforcement that each of them receives from the expression, individual or collective (in festivals, for example), improvised or programmed (commonplaces, sayings), of similar or identical experiences (Bourdieu, 1977, p. 80).

The influence of habitus on the reproduction of social order can be best understood in the logic of the field where habitus is produced and reproduced. Now I am going to zoom in field theory by referring to how habitus is included into the “game”.

### 2.2.2. Fields

There should be a ground of existence for the manifestation of the interplay between agency and structure. This base functions both as the boundary and as the rule of the game. Bourdieu identifies such an invisible but determining structure as the field. In fact, the field is a spatial metaphor (Swartz, 1997, p. 118) which refers to the structure of the social setting in which agents, equipped with different forms of capital, enter into a relationship of position-taking. Bourdieu clarifies the field as

a network, or configuration, of objective relations between positions. These positions are objectively defined, in their existence and in the determinations they impose upon their occupants, agents or institutions, by their potential and present situation in the structure of the distribution of species of power (or capital) whose possession commands access to the specific profits that are at stake in the field, as well as by their objective relation to other positions (domination, subordination, homology etc.) (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992, p. 97).

For Bourdieu, the concept of field is an analytical instrument which he employed in his studies to make sense of relations in the intellectual, artistic, and economic fields. All these fields share homologously the same logic and they are relatively autonomous social microcosms (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992, p. 97). However, their autonomy is measured in proportion to their distance from the field of power.

To track changes in a social space, thinking in terms of field prevails teleological and free will-based explanations, and this, instead, focuses on the reciprocal relationship between habitus groups and structures. As an analytical method, as Swartz points out, the concept of field reflects the meta-theoretical dimension of Bourdieu's thought (Swartz, 1997, p. 118). Fields are conceptual constructions that enable one to think in terms of relationality. As Bourdieu stresses, "to think in terms of field is to think relationally" (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992, p. 96).

Bourdieu's theoretical framework moves beyond substantialism and all his notions are in relationship with each other in a configuration. This is called field theory. According to Bourdieu, his concepts like habitus, field, and capital are not meaningful in isolation, but they make sense in a system (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992, p. 96). Indeed, in field theory, each of these concepts functions in harmony to portray the existing social order. Bourdieu appeals to a game analogy in *The Logic of Practice* to account for social relations in Algeria. The game in a field is a learning process where agents internalize the rules over time. As Bourdieu defines it, "in the social fields, which are the products of a long, slow process of autonomization, and are therefore, so to speak, games 'in themselves' and not 'for themselves', one does not embark on the game by a conscious act, one is born into the game, with the game; and the relation of investment, *illusio*, investment, is made more total and unconditional by the fact that it is unaware of what it is" (Bourdieu, 1990, p. 67).

Although agents are born into the game unconsciously, field dynamics produce dispositions which enable them to think that it is worthwhile to play. So if it is worth playing, then one can invest in the field by using the proper type of capital. Bourdieu calls this investment in the field as *illusio*, i.e., "players are taken in by the game, they oppose one another, sometimes with ferocity, only to the extent that they concur in their belief (doxa) in the game and its stakes; they grant these a recognition that escapes questioning" (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992, p. 98). Individuals' interests are practically adapted to the logic of the field and those interests struggle against each other to get the reward of legitimate capital in the field. Positions in the field are distributed according to the intensity of capitals. Each investment ends up with the positioning of the investor in the field. In other words, those investments are a struggle of position-taking. In *Distinction (1984)*, Bourdieu investigates how the personal tastes of individuals constitute their class position and how their class positions produce distinctive dispositions, while they also position themselves with strategic choices of taste among others in the same field. In this sense, fields draw the borders of agent practices and



reversely, those practices shape and reshape the boundaries of the field. Habitus and field are in a dialectical relationship and they are complementary parts of practice. According to Bourdieu, "These practices can be accounted for only by relating the objective structure defining the social conditions of the production of the habitus which engendered them to the conditions in which this habitus is operating, that is, to the *conjuncture* which, short of a radical transformation, represents a particular state of this structure" (Bourdieu, 1977, p. 78).

Since boundaries between different fields are unstable, fields are not static configurations. Struggle over valued and restricted resources causes fields to be open to transformations. Subfields may expand or shrink according to their autonomy from the primary field, which is the field of power. The field of power, in Bourdieu, is conceptualized as a meta-field which functions as a regulatory principle, and on the other hand, the field of power signifies the dominant class. It consists of a conflict between economic and cultural capital and subfields are shaped as a result of this conflictual relation (Swartz, 1997, p. 136). Bourdieu's studies on the literary field, artistic field, and academic field are a product of his intention to search for how cultural fields are positioned across the field of power. Let me briefly mention some of those subfields, since they matter for this study to account for the transitivity of the journalistic field in which representatives of other fields are positioned.

Bourdieu's interest in media is seen in his studies on television (He has a book also, *On Television*, 1999). Departing from the analysis of television as a medium, Bourdieu problematizes the journalistic field in general. In TV programs, Bourdieu observes the participation of people from different fields such as the political, academic, etc., and their discussion around actual political issues. Furthermore, all these fields are represented through individual agencies, and interaction between individuals, therefore, signifies the relationship between different fields. Bourdieu makes clear his point in an article in

*Bourdieu and the Journalistic Field*, which is edited by Rodney Benson and Eric Neveu, stating that,

What I am proposing is quite different: I postulate as a hypothesis that when the historian addresses the journalist it is not a historian who speaks to a journalist- which is already a start in the construction of the object- it is a historian occupying a determinate position in the field of the social sciences who speaks to a journalist occupying a determinate position in the journalistic field, and ultimately it is the social science field talking to the journalistic field (Bourdieu, 2005, p. 31).

Those agents are distributed in the overall space and they struggle for the right to determine the legitimate discourse. Although Bourdieu's findings seem to point out mostly television's effects on different fields, he investigates the whole journalistic field, including the making of news, production of ideas and commenting on particular issues. Bourdieu draws attention to the motivation behind the media visibility of those fields. Accordingly, he claims, "Those who deal professionally in making things explicit and producing discourses -sociologists, historians, politicians, journalists, etc.- have two things in common. On the one hand, they strive to set out explicitly practical principles of vision and division. On the other hand, they struggle, each in their own universe, to impose these principles of vision and division, and to have them recognized as legitimate categories of construction of the social world" (Bourdieu, 2005, p. 37).

The journalistic field provides a suitable ground for those who want to impose their vision since it enables them to reach the masses. Therefore, that field is always manipulated by the economic and political fields. In other words, the journalistic field becomes an instrument of hegemony and loses its autonomy against the field of power. According to Bourdieu, this loss of autonomy creates a paradoxical condition: while the journalistic field is limited by the field of power, it also imposes its own limitations on other cultural fields like the political field, the field of social sciences or the field of philosophy (Bourdieu, 2005, p. 41). How is this possible? Both the economic and the cultural advantages of the journalistic field attract those people who are professionally

engaged in “intellectual interest”. As Bourdieu asserts, referring to journalistic field, "in the philosophical field, it strengthens the ‘new philosophers’, the media philosophers. By valorizing what has the most value in external markets, it affects the internal relations within the field" (Bourdieu, 2005, p. 44). In this way, the logic of all fields, which are in interaction with each other, changes, and the fields themselves lose their specificity. New entrants into the journalistic field leave their fields' logic behind and adapt to the conditions of the journalistic field. This is valid both for the academic field and for the political field.

#### **2.2.2.1. Critiques of Critical Discourse Analysis of Field Theory**

What I tried to elucidate about Bourdieu's field theory so far has a lot in common with critical discourse theory. The importance of context and conjunctures in the production and reception of a discourse is one of these common points. Moreover, critical discourse theory provides the insight that the production of discourse is influenced by settings so that discourses gain their meanings by referring to those settings. Reciprocally, produced discourses can shape the structure of the settings. Even in Van Dijk, we already read that some elite and dominant groups have a right to control the settings (or contexts) in which discourses are constructed. In this sense, it seems very similar to the notion of field envisaged by Bourdieu. In fields also, (discursive) practices are the products of a relational relationship between habitus and field structure. Just like the control of settings by elites in van Dijk, in fields of cultural production, hierarchically dominant habitus groups, or in other words, those who have a great amount of prevalent capital, also have the right to determine legitimate discourse in the field.

What is more, according to Fairclough, the order of discourse and field are complementary. Even critical discourse analysis can make use of the notion of the field by articulating it to the notion of order of discourse. One gain for CDA, as Fairclough argues,

in internalizing the concept of field would be in elaborating the category of order of discourse in the light of Bourdieu's theoretical articulation of relationships between different levels of field –between individual fields, but also between fields and the 'field of power' (a meta-field in which agents with power in the various fields contest the relative value of their different capitals), and the 'field of class struggle' (Chouliaraki and Fairclough, 1999, p. 114).

Both order of discourse and field focus on relations and struggles in their spaces. Those struggles are determinant struggles which cause changes in the boundaries of spaces. However, a major criticism of Fairclough and Chouliaraki in the name of critical discourse analysis is that interaction is sacrificed for the sake of structural relations. Bourdieu, in his analysis of TV debate programs, argues that space is preconstructed in those programs since who is invited and who is excluded is already predetermined. Fairclough criticizes this understanding of preconstruction, saying that it ignores the theory of mediation. According to Fairclough, the "journalistic field is a site of mediation between (in Habermas's terms) systems and lifeworld (or the public and the private) which transforms the boundaries and nature of publicness. One feature of this transformation is manifest in the tension between the languages of the political, academic, etc. systems and the language of ordinary life (more informal and personal), which emerges as a pervasive 'conversationalisation' of media discourse" (Chouliaraki and Fairclough, 1999, p. 103). It is safe to say that Fairclough is right since Bourdieu considers the fields as changing boundaries and losing or gaining autonomy rather than articulation. As in the example of media philosophers, Bourdieu understands this emergence on the basis of marketization. On the other hand, Fairclough argues that critical discourse analysis strives to comprehend, for example, the mediatization of politics as an articulation of the political field and journalistic field. This articulation also transforms the political language and creates conversationalized discourse. As Fairclough states, "CDA can trace the emergence of journalistic order of discourse (and field) from the articulation of orders of discourse (fields)" (Chouliaraki and Fairclough, 1999, p. 115). Still, Bourdieu's contributions to the discussions on media discourse will be more crystallized in the following chapter on his variables of capital, symbolic power, and doxa.

### **2.2.3. Capital-Symbolic Power-Doxa**

In order to have an idea about the discursive and symbolic relations in the journalistic field, we are now at the last step: the discussion of capital and symbolic power. In Bourdieu's field theory, the relation between habitus and the field is mediated through investment in and accumulation of different types of capital. This notion of capital is different from its classical usage; rather, Bourdieu tears off the economism of the classical notion and expands it to other cultural fields. Furthermore, Bourdieu locates the notion of capital as an exchange value into his analogy of game. In the fields, agents enter into the relation of position-taking by investing specific resources and Bourdieu calls those resources capital (Swartz, 1997, p. 73). Bourdieu argues that relations and struggles in fields of cultural production, such as the fields of literature, education, art, cannot be explained adequately by referring to economic capital. Instead, Bourdieu proposes to focus on the notion of cultural capital, which can be internalized in the family, objectified in cultural products, and institutionalized in the education system (Swartz, 1997, p. 76). Cultural capital is transferable and convertible into the other types of capital. Especially in market relations, cultural capital, such as academic credentials, is instrumentalized for economic mobilization. In cultural fields, cultural capital is directly related to the hierarchization of agents.

Symbolic capital, on the other hand, functions in Bourdieu's studies to account for symbolic systems which represent the objective reality. Departing from his study on the Kabyle people, Bourdieu discovers the importance of symbolic relations in the maintenance of social order. Symbolic capital necessitates the recognition of those who share common worldviews. According to Bourdieu, "in the symbolic struggle for the production of common sense or, more precisely, for a monopoly over legitimate naming, agents put into action the symbolic capital that they have acquired in previous struggles and which can be juridically guaranteed. In this way, titles of nobility, like educational qualifications, represent real titles of symbolic property which give one a right to the profits of recognition" (Bourdieu, 1990a, p. 135). In other words, symbolic capital is an

instrument of symbolic power which enables agents to elevate themselves both discursively and materially in a particular field.

What is symbolic power then? Symbolic power is the ability to produce and reproduce the symbolic representation of social reality in symbolic systems. For this study, symbolic power is a very functional conceptual tool to make sense of the symbolic/discursive construction of the old and new Turkey. Of course, just as is true with other practices in different fields, the application of symbolic power is not independent of habitus and field dynamics. As Bourdieu claims, for symbolic power to be realized, one needs to have symbolic capital. Also, an imposition of vision and division on others requires a certain authority which has already been gained through struggles (Bourdieu, 1990a, pp. 137-138). Both conditions are dialectical, since the accumulation of symbolic capital brings the authority to make legitimate classifications, while being authority in a field enables one to invest more and more symbolic capital in those impositions. For instance, in the political field, the more symbolic capital one has, the more powerful the implication of one's symbolic power which aims to impose a particular world-view. To change the world, as Bourdieu states, "one has to change the ways of making the world, that is, the vision of the world and the practical operations by which groups are produced and reproduced" (Bourdieu, 1990a, p. 137).

In this sense, symbolic power is also responsible for the reproduction of dominance through principles of vision and division and classifications. When the social world is reduced to these categories, it becomes harder to make sense of and reveal what is going on behind closed doors. These categories mediate the meaning; or, if you like, people make sense of the world through consensual categories. Furthermore, since the dominated sections of the society appeal to the same categories of perception, they see the reality outside with the eyes of the dominant groups. That is why, according to Bourdieu, "Sociology has to include a sociology of the perception of the social world, that

is, a sociology of the construction of the world-views which themselves contribute to the construction of this world” (Bourdieu, 1990a, p. 130).

The making of perceptions does not happen by itself; rather, specialists, intellectuals, or politicians contribute to both the creation and adoption of classifications. It is an intellectual labor that produces all kind of dominations at a symbolic level. In some texts, Bourdieu, just like Gramsci, associates specialists and intellectuals with classes and argues that these groups work for class interests. Each dominant class imposes generalized classifications which conceal the unequal class relations. This is a sort of discursive struggle based on the discursive formation of social reality, and as Bourdieu argues, "this discourse is a structured and structuring medium tending to impose an apprehension of the established order as natural (orthodoxy) through the disguised (and thus misrecognized) imposition of systems of classification and of mental structures that are objectively adjusted to social structures" (Bourdieu, 1991, p. 169). Here, adjusting mental structures to social structures is a significant issue for the success of symbolic power and the effectiveness of discourse, since symbolic power does not create social reality out of nothing. For construction and reconstruction, mental and social structures should overlap. As can be seen in Fairclough, discursive practices become effective when they are naturalized (Fairclough, 1992, pp. 87-88). Similarly, Bourdieu gives the example of class as an analytic classification:

The class (or the people, or the nation, or any other social reality ungraspable in any other way) exists if there exist people who can say that they are the class, by the mere fact of speaking publicly, officially, in its place, and of being recognized as justified in so doing by people who thereby recognize themselves as members of the class, people or nation, or of any other social reality which a realist construction of the world can invent and impose (Bourdieu, 1990a, p. 139).

Arbitrary categories such as class come into existence when they are recognized or misrecognized by different sections of society. This turns out to be symbolic violence over dominated people since they accept these categories as if they were real and they

themselves were part of this reality. Journalists, politicians, academics, bureaucrats, media specialists, etc., all these habitus groups from different fields strive to impose their own visions via televisions, newspapers, or internet sites by constructing classifications which also classify those producers. Bourdieu says symbolic power is a way of making the world with words and “in this sense, symbolic power is a power of consecration or revelation, a power to conceal or reveal things which are already there” (Bourdieu, 1990a, p. 138). Depending on who uses that power, the influences and consequences of discursive constructions may change. For instance, the systematic use of nationalist discourses by politicians may cause harassments against ethnic groups in a society. Even some discourses which seem “neutral” can have significant implications, since they address established categories and prompt the unconscious embodiment of those categories. Bourdieu exemplifies through the case of a bishop's speech in an interview:

When a bishop declares, in a newspaper interview, that it will take twenty years for French people of Algerian origin to be regarded as French Muslims, he is making a prediction that is charged with social consequences. It is a good example of the claim to legitimate handling of the categories of perception, of symbolic violence based on a tacit, surreptitious imposition of categories of perception endowed with authority and designed to become legitimate categories of perception, which is of exactly the same type as the symbolic violence performed by those whose labels slip imperceptibly from ‘Islamic’ to ‘Islamicist’ and from ‘Islamicist’ to ‘terrorist’ (Bourdieu, 2005, p. 37).

This example takes us to the concept of *doxa*, which Bourdieu uses mostly instead of ideology. Normally, the bishop's speech can be seen as ideological, since he appeals to the over-generalization of categories such as French and Muslim. Yet, since Bourdieu finds ideology an ambiguous and distorted concept, *doxa* can be more effective to understand the tacit acceptance of established categories. As in the case of ideology, people accept things without knowing and questioning (Bourdieu, 1994, p. 268). Furthermore, Bourdieu explains doxic modality in *In Other Words*:



And one may even explain in sociological terms what appears as a universal property of human experience, that is, the fact that the familiar world tends to be 'taken for granted', perceived as natural. If the world tends to be perceived as evident and to be grasped, to use Husserl's terms, with a doxic modality, this is because the dispositions of agents, their habitus, that is, the mental structures through which they apprehend the social world, are essentially the product of an internalization of the structures of the social world (Bourdieu, 1990a, pp. 130-131).

This shows once more the relationality of both the production of symbolic or discursive reality and the experience of social reality. Bourdieu defines this as the complicity of agency and structure. Although symbolic systems enable people to communicate, they imply power relations more than communication. Just as in Foucault, power is decentralized and emerges in daily confrontations through different mediums. According to Bourdieu, constituting or appealing to the schemes of perception, such as race, nation, gender, people, etc., refers to the relations of domination. Bourdieu gives the example of the words "soft" and "hard" and claims that the association of "soft" with femininity and of "hard" with masculinity shows the embeddedness of doxic acceptances in the body. He clarifies that "these practical schemes –implicit, tacit, very hard to make explicit- are constitutive of the *doxa*, as the philosophers call it; in other words, the universe of the tacit presuppositions that we accept as the natives of a certain society" (Bourdieu, 2005, p. 37). While discussing the findings of this study, how tacit acceptances, categories of thoughts, and principles of perception operate and how they are performed by professional agents are going to be made clear.

## CHAPTER 3

### METHOD

Concerning my research objectives in this thesis, what is significant is to investigate the construction of a hegemonic political perception through the use of the new Turkey discourse. In this sense, words themselves become the immaterial bricks of this construction and therefore need to be examined in order to uncover how they build up a totality. To this end, I utilize a qualitative research model which deals with the properties of the object rather than the quantity.

Since my unit of analysis is newspaper columns, naturally I will adopt a textual analysis method in general. According to Charmaz (2006), "Texts draw on particular discourses and provide accounts that record, explore, explain, justify, or foretell actions, whether the specific texts are elicited or extant" (p. 35). Each text has its own writer and also a context which that text is a part of. To scrutinize the discursive strategies embedded in those texts, I will apply critical discourse analysis. Among the different tendencies in critical discourse analysis, Fairclough's model is the most appropriate, since he seeks to uncover the relational and contextual construction of the discourse. As he clarifies,

by critical discourse analysis I mean which aims to systematically explore often opaque relationships of causality and determination between (a) discursive practices, events and texts, and (b) wider social and cultural structures, relations and processes; to investigate how such practices, events and texts arise out of and are ideologically shaped by relations of power and struggles over power; and to explore how the opacity of these relationships between discourse and society is itself a factor securing power and hegemony (Fairclough, 1995, Pp. 132-133).

Critical discourse analysis is not only a way of analyzing the data, but also a framework in which the object of research is constructed. Its relationality and contextuality enable me to locate the new Turkey discourse in meaningful contexts which influence the

construction, reconstruction, and also transformation of the discourse. Thus, it can be used together with the Bourdieusian framework in a communicative way because critical discourse analysis has already been developed as an eclectic and interdisciplinary tradition.

This is also consistent with what Derek Layder calls as adaptive theory. Basically, as identified by Layder, adaptive theory aims to integrate the empirical part of one's research into the pre-existing theories, and to reveal emergent theory which can be derived from the data (Layder, 1998). Furthermore, focus of adaptive theory is practices and the social relations and organizations in which those practices take place. Therefore, social research's focus becomes how and why particular cases are intertwined with the forms of power and relations which encompass them (Layder, 2015, p. 244). In adaptive theory, the relationship between data collection, data analysis, and existing theory is crucial and helps to eliminate the gap between theory and data. For this purpose, I use in an adaptive way critical discourse analysis, which is related to data collection and analysis part of the research, and a Bourdieusian perspective, which is an already existing theory. The epistemological compatibility of these standpoints helps me to integrate method with theory. As Layder claims, the main objective is to reconcile the fruitful parts of the different positions and perspectives (Layder, 2015, p. 290). I already discussed how discourse is constructed in a way that is relational and context-dependent (critical discourse analysis) and how constructed discourses function in the reproduction of power relations (Bourdieu) in the theory chapter of this study. For my objectives, what matters is not only the new Turkey discourse itself, but also the social relations in which the discourse is produced. Therefore, as part of the analysis, it is vital to adaptively utilize critical discourse analysis to reveal conditions which are embedded within the new Turkey discourse.

### 3.1. Sampling

Selecting a research sample for this study was difficult. First of all, I need to elaborate why I chose 2010 and 2016 as a range of analysis: 2010 was the year in which new Turkey claims became visible. The 12 September 2010 referendum, which included a constitutional amendment package, was regarded as a threshold between the old and new Turkey. From that day on, the new Turkey discourse has experienced certain turning points. Every election, referendum, political case and political initiative has brought along a different depiction of this new Turkey. Therefore, at the end of the 1 November 2015 election, what the new Turkey meant was totally different from what it had meant in 2010. In order to scrutinize such ambiguous “newness” claims, I limited my object of research to that six-year period.

My purpose is to understand the operation of the journalistic field through newspaper columns; therefore, I tried to establish a sample which encompasses the whole field. For that reason, I applied purposive sampling. Based on my background knowledge on the topic, I conducted an extensive scan of the archives of the internet sites of pro-government mainstream newspapers. Because I searched for “Yeni Türkiye” (The New Turkey) and “Eski Türkiye” (The Old Turkey) on the internet sites of the newspapers, I was able to reach to articles whose title and content included the words Eski Türkiye or Yeni Türkiye. Instead of conducting a case study, my purpose was to scrutinize all kind of uses of the new Turkey discourse in newspapers to capture the discursive change in a particular period.

Accordingly, I collected columns and op-eds from newspapers which are known as close to the AKP government such as *Sabah* (including *Sabah Perspektif*), *Akşam*, *Yeni Şafak*, *Star* (including *Star Açık Görüş*), *Türkiye* and *Takvim*. I was able to reach only two articles each from the newspapers *Zaman* and *Taraf* as their internet sites were closed and their archives deleted because of their relationship with the Gulenist organization which has recently been accepted as a terrorist organization by the state, supposedly the one

behind the 15 July 2016 coup. On the other hand, as a result of purposive sampling, I scanned the actors who positioned themselves as pro-new Turkey and I found 4 articles from the *Hürriyet* and 2 articles from the *Vatan* newspapers. Both newspapers are exceptions among the others, since they are not directly wedded to the government; rather, they are known to follow a more nationalistic perspective. While 5 of the articles belong to Hüseyin Yayman, who had been an academic and became an AKP deputy, 1 of them belongs to Taha Akyol, who is known as a right-wing journalist who mostly supports AKP policies. Ultimately, I found 185 columns and op-eds, but 3 of them were not available on the internet. Consequently, I collected 182 articles written between 2010 and 2016. They are listed in Excel by date, as shown in figure 1. Finally, I personally translated into English quotations from the newspaper columns to be used in the analysis chapter, while other parts of the columns were left in Turkish, since I analyzed not the whole texts but only the parts in which new Turkey discourse is mentioned.

NAME	TITLE OF THE COLUMN	LINK	DATE	YEAR	NEWSPAPER
İBRAHİM KARAGÜL	YENİ BAŞKENT, YENİ TÜRKİYE, YENİ	<a href="http://www.yenisafak.com">http://www.yenisafak.com</a>	04/03/2009	2009	YENİ ŞAFAK
ALİ BAYRAMOĞLU	YENİ DENGELER, YENİ TÜRKİYE	<a href="http://www.yenisafak.com">http://www.yenisafak.com</a>	07/10/2009	2009	YENİ ŞAFAK
RASİM OZAN KÜTAHYALI	ORDUEVİ BAHÇESİNDE FETHULLAH G	<a href="http://arsiv.taraf.com.tr/">http://arsiv.taraf.com.tr/</a>	24/02/2010	2010	TARAF
HÜSEYİN YAYMAN	YENİ TÜRKİYE'NİN AYAK SESLERİ	<a href="http://arsiv.setav.org/pub/">http://arsiv.setav.org/pub/</a>	15/09/2010	2010	ZAMAN
HATEM ETE	REFERANDUMUN MESAJI: YENİ SİYAS	<a href="http://arsiv.setav.org/pub/">http://arsiv.setav.org/pub/</a>	19/09/2010	2010	STAR AÇIK GÖRÜŞ
HATEM ETE	YENİ TÜRKİYE'YE 'HAYIR'	<a href="http://arsiv.setav.org/pub/">http://arsiv.setav.org/pub/</a>	30/10/2010	2010	SABAH
İHSAN DAĞI	YENİ TÜRKİYE, KİMİN TÜRKİYESİ?	<a href="http://arsiv.setav.org/pub/">http://arsiv.setav.org/pub/</a>	07/12/2010	2010	ZAMAN
HATEM ETE	TÜRKİYE'NİN DÜZEN ARAYIŞI	<a href="http://www.sabah.com.tr/">http://www.sabah.com.tr/</a>	15/01/2011	2011	SABAH
HATEM ETE	AK PARTİ'NİN YENİ TÜRKİYE'Yİ İNŞA S	<a href="http://www.sabah.com.tr/">http://www.sabah.com.tr/</a>	02/04/2011	2011	SABAH PERSPEKTİF
NUH YILMAZ	YENİ TÜRKİYE HANGİ DİLİ KONUŞACA	<a href="http://arsiv.setav.org/pub/">http://arsiv.setav.org/pub/</a>	03/04/2011	2011	STAR AÇIK GÖRÜŞ
TAHA ÖZHAN	KÜRT SORUNU MU BDP SORUNU MU?	<a href="http://arsiv.setav.org/pub/">http://arsiv.setav.org/pub/</a>	03/04/2011	2011	STAR AÇIK GÖRÜŞ
TAHA ÖZHAN	19 EYLÜL'DEN 12 MART'A KADAR NE	<a href="http://www.sabah.com.tr/">http://www.sabah.com.tr/</a>	07/05/2011	2011	SABAH PERSPEKTİF

Figure 3.1. Sample list of the articles

### **3.2. Coding and Analysis**

To code the articles in accordance with the aim of this study, I utilized the Atlas TI computer program. I turned the newspaper columns which I retrieved from the internet sites into the PDF format and transferred all of them into Atlas TI. I followed a pattern in which general codes were descending to the specific codes. First, I coded and categorized the articles depending on their general political themes, then appointed sub-codes which indicate discursive strategies in those topics. For example, whereas “Kurdish question” can be a general thematic code, “peace-building discourse” is a sub-code under the category of that Kurdish question. Similarly, “discourse of pluralization” is a sub-code of the claims of democratization. What the new Turkey represents in different contexts was explained in those categories. In other words, I identified thematic changes in the use of the new Turkey discourse; in the first period, what shows up are democratization and normalization, liquidation of tutelage, and the Kurdish question; on the other hand, in the second period, the new Turkey is defined through the new constitutive others, imperial claims, and a cult of leadership. Of course, not all the articles corresponded to the major categories which were included in the analysis. The reason for this is that I did not impose pre-established categories on the texts; rather, categories emerged from the texts themselves, which is a more proper way to understand what is going on in the discursive field. In this sense, thematic categories are not external but immanent to the research material. Therefore, to capture the general tendency and changes, I had to neglect the articles in the analysis which did not fit the general categories. To give an example, only a few columns were about the economic character of the new Turkey claims. Since the majority of the articles were about democratization, liquidation of the tutelage, etc., these limited number of articles about the economy were neglected and not taken into the analysis. Those articles are also part of the discursive field but do not represent the “general tendency”.

I conducted the analysis of newspaper columns under the guidance of Bourdieu’s symbolic power and doxa concepts. Through the operation of these concepts, I traced

how categories, perspectives, and political divisions are imposed in the texts. Furthermore, I utilized the critical discourse analysis tradition to locate different discourses in different contexts and also to scrutinize the role of wording in the construction of meaning. One point worth mentioning is that I paid regard to the diachronic approach in the analysis to catch the temporal changes in political contexts. Accordingly, under each category, newspaper columns were placed and analyzed diachronically, which allowed me to pursue the evolutive transformation of the discourse. Basically, I focused on how new Turkey is portrayed with and through words and changing meanings in the journalistic field. Yet I have to make clear that I am not arguing that newspaper columns in themselves represent the operation of the journalistic field, since the whole field is composed of broadcasting, publishing, marketing, and the relations of media owners with the field of power. Yet I consider writing columns as a crucial practice of the journalist field because actors from different fields can get in or out depending on their pursuing an interest.

## **CHAPTER 4**

### **CRITICAL DISCOURSE ANALYSIS OF THE COLUMNS**

In this chapter, without applying to theoretical concepts, I will present the analysis of the newspaper columns by referring to the political contexts which influence the meaning of the new Turkey discourse. By dividing the columns into two periods, I will seek for the change in the imposition of wording, themes, categories of political perception, oppositions, representations of the self and the other, etc. Furthermore, while doing so, I will provide basic narratives of the contexts to establish the relationality and contextuality of the new Turkey claims. Then in the next chapter, I will link the findings in this chapter to the theoretical instruments.

#### **4.1. Period between 2010 and 2014**

##### **4.1.1. Democratization and Normalization**

After the 2007 general elections, the AKP strengthened its power and initiated a political liberalization process aimed at solving the chronic problems of Turkey. This process was a product of an agenda which was formulated by liberal intellectuals beginning from the 1990s to the middle of the 2000s. Therefore, some journalists, academics, and intellectuals supported liberalization politics and contributed to the propagation of ideas put forward by the AKP. The year 2009 was a critical year when Turkey had significant attempts in the political field. Kurdish question, which stems from the equal citizenship demands of the Kurdish people, was causing reciprocal deaths because of the warfare policies. To bring this war to an end, the AKP initiated a peace-making policy called the 'democratic initiative'. In this process, the Turkish state negotiated with the PKK (Kurdistan Workers' Party), which is accepted by Turkey and many states as a terrorist organization. However, the process ultimately failed. At least in the beginning, this effort was positively welcomed by many sections of the society, since it offered hope of peace. Similarly, to solve the tension between Turkey and Armenia around the Armenian question, the AKP announced that diplomatic relations between the two countries



started again, which was called the 'Armenian Opening'. In the same period, the 'Alevi Opening', the implementation of other democratic rights, and abolishing military tutelage were also on the government's agenda.

There was an expectancy oriented to the institutionalization of those political developments after 2010 referendum. When the referendum was concluded in favor of the AKP, the discourse of liquidating tutelage and, correspondingly, the discourse of democratization became the basic reference point in defending AKP policies. Prime Minister Erdoğan and most AKP-engaged actors, including journalists and academics in the media, put 'new Turkey' discourse into circulation to define current political conditions as shaped by AKP politics. In this sense, politics is placed in the antagonism between the old and the new; the former is attributed an anti-democratic meaning.

#### **4.1.1.1. The 'Old Turkey' as the Constitutive Other**

The new Turkey, like the differential relation in the Saussurian signification chain, is identified only in relation with its opposite version. In other words, what makes Turkey new is its 'non-old' character. This categorical contradiction has been produced and reproduced by media actors over and over. In this sense, producing negative opinions about the old Turkey is as politically functional as new Turkey discourse itself. This is an apparent strategy to discredit what is old in order to make the new seem self-evidently favorable. At the same time, categorical oppositions limit the field of politics and force one to choose one of two sides. For a hegemonic power, construction of the perception of politics through contradictory categories makes it easier to control dynamics of the political struggle. In this sense, we observe the manufacture of the old Turkey discourse and systematical critiques towards the old Turkey in different contexts. In most of the columns, old Turkey is notably mentioned and characterized as wicked. As Rasim Ozan Kütahyalı claims, the masters of the old Turkey,

*considered an important part of the society as slaves. It (the old Turkey) treated or tried to behave viciously those who were seen as slaves. It aimed*

*to plant the guns into the houses of Gülen community members, it killed non-Muslims and wanted to present this massacre as if committed by the religious people. It did its best to overthrow AK Party government. It created a fake sheikh and a fake headscarfed woman; and established a fake religious sect. First it created the conditions and later oppressed all the religious people. It blacklisted the people. It created a montage of Fethullah Gülen tapes and planted a fake map behind Ahmet Kaya. It compelled both Gülen and Kaya to leave this country. Kaya died of grief, while Fethullah Gülen has been living outside for 11 years with homesickness. This mindset did all this mentioned, but we, who long for a real democracy, should never and can never do the same things. We have to be very sensitive concerning the justice in the new period (Kütahyalı, 24.02.2010, Taraf).*

Kütahyalı accuses the old regime of being brutal to both religious and Kurdish people. In this sense, here in Kütahyalı's text, Fethullah Gülen, who is the cult leader of a religious-social organization which organized parallel to the state (and in the state), and the late Ahmet Kaya, who was a famous Kurdish singer, symbolically represent the religious and ethnic victims of the old Turkey. For sure, both figures are seen in the articles of Kütahyalı as primary components of the new Turkey. In this way, perception of the new Turkey is built upon the old Turkey's anti-democratic exercises. As Kütahyalı did, it is possible to refer to the new Turkey by overemphasizing the old one without directly mentioning characteristics of the new one.

#### **4.1.1.2. Kemalism as the Old Turkey**

In the quotation above, referring to the brutal deeds of the old Turkey, Kütahyalı condemns the nationalist and secular paradigm. In the columns quoted in this study, Kemalist ideology is held as responsible for all trespasses of the state; therefore, when columnists use the phrase 'old Turkey', it means nothing other than Kemalism in that period. Kemalism is seen as a regime of the state which has a secular, nationalist and militarist structure. During the referendum process, in order to demonstrate the advantage of legal regulations aiming at the liquidation of military tutelage, columnists often applied to a strategy which emphasized the organic relation between Kemalism and tutelage to criticize the side of 'No'. From a different viewpoint, the process of the

referendum revealed a necessity for the AKP side to glorify the democratic standards Turkey had reached after the AKP came to power and strengthened its power. To maintain this aim, Kemalism has often been kept on the agenda to curse former conditions. As can be seen below, in a similar manner but in different years, İhsan Dağı and Rasim Ozan Kütahyalı in their columns portrayed the old Turkey as a tyranny of the state consisting of the domination of Kemalist military elites and the subordination of the people at their hands:

*We know the old Turkey; it was a country which was governed by the ones who assumed that the people existed for the state and that owners of the state was Kemalist civic-militarist bureaucracy. It was a country in which people's identities were repressed and the energy of the country was wasted for the purpose of standardization of the society and subjugation of the people to the official ideology and the whims of state elites. Privileged classes of the old period, in which people were controlled through artificial fears and an authoritarian governance was legitimized, used to take ruling the country for granted and stage a coup whenever they lost control. In those days, 'letting the tanks out' was so easy. Commanders used to seek for ruling not only the military but also the country. They hanged the prime minister who opposed them, closed the political parties, and made millions of people's lives miserable. They also made a constitution which enabled them to keep ruling the country and the people which were already under the tutelage. In the old Turkey, the state which was a Kemalist civic-military bureaucracy was in charge of the economy as well as everything else. They used to waste the resources of the country since they were irresponsible and felt unrivalled (Dağı, 07.12.2010, Zaman).*

*People of Turkey lived under the black propaganda carried out by the state for 90 years. Ideological state apparatus imposed onto the people a constant fear and paranoia. Whereas in other countries state functions as a mediator of differences in the society, Turkish state did its best to set social elements, which constituted the state itself, against one another. According to the calculations of the state, Kemalist ideology and Kemalist regime could have survived only in that way (Kütahyalı, 05.10.2013, Sabah).*

Although the concept of the state seems neutral, in almost all columns, the state is used with negative connotations while pointing to the old Turkey. As a discursive strategy, mentioning the tension between the state and the people serves to degrade the old Turkey, in which the state was the enemy of the people, and to promote the new Turkey, where the state and the people are peacefully integrated thanks to the AKP's power of governance. Hatem Ete, a think-tank researcher and academic, differentiates the role of the state and governments in the history of Turkish politics beginning from the 1960s until the AKP period. According to him, instead of the government, the state -involving military and other power coalitions- functioned as a crisis-solver in the society and such interventions of non-political actors perpetuated the tutelage regime. Yet, as Ete argues, this situation was reversed, with Erdoğan's power and his persona replacing the old state:

*In 1990s, the fact that this (state) reason was stuck, lost its reflex and was taken hostage by the particular gangs, started a depressed period in Turkey politics. From 27 April the e-memorandum until now, in the public eye, Erdoğan himself has become the representative of the hopes attributed to the state reason (Ete, 02.07.2011, Sabah Perspektif).*

What is meant by the 'old regime' or the 'old Turkey' is not always clear in terms of its beginning and ending. The old Turkey discourse is usually defined by referring to the foundation of the republic and 'one-man period', but sometimes it may begin from the 1960s so that the Democrat Party, which is esteemed as the ancestor of the tradition that AKP follows, is not counted as part of the 'old' Turkey. A similar effort is seen in the identification of the Turgut Özal period as a break from the old Turkey, because Adnan Menderes (the leader of Democrat Party), Turgut Özal (the leader of Motherland Party) and Recep Tayyip Erdoğan were considered as links in the chain of the same political tradition. According to Doğan Gürpınar, what is meant by being 'old Turkey' is the period of the 1990s, symbolized in the politics of Mesut Yılmaz and Tansu Çiller (Gürpınar, 2016, p. 344). Eventually, the old Turkey discourse was constructed in such a manner that all the cruel incidents were now attributed to this ambiguous discursive subject. According

to Ete, the new Turkey, which represents an increase of democratic standards and the normalization of state-society relationships, can only be achieved by facing the sins of the past:

*Political memory of Turkey is disabled because of the pains which were inflicted on purpose by the state in line with a particular policy. The state, which has ever come to see social differences and dynamism as dangerous for the total sovereignty of the state and the sections dominating the state, suppressed different social segments in almost all periods ever since the establishment of the republic. Within this scope, construction of the new Turkey, which represents an increase in democratic standards and normalization of the state-society relations, is not possible without facing the past. The fact that coup attempts in AK Party period has started to be judged, and that facing and judgement has become possible, also strengthened this process. These efforts continued with the unveiling of the mystery about 28 February, Susurluk, perpetrators-unknown murders in the 1990s, Çorum-Maraş incidents, and violation of rights and massacres (Dersim, policies against non-Muslims, Independence Courts) in the one-party period. The fact that the prime minister apologized for Dersim massacre in the name of the state has functioned to trigger the efforts of bringing all dark cases to light. In this way, 2011 became a year in which all sins of the history of the republic have been raked up and they were cleared (Ete, 31.12.2011, Sabah Perspektif).*

Hatem Ete, in his article quoted above titled “2011’de İç Politika” [Domestic Policy in 2011], in which he reviewed the year 2011 in terms of domestic politics, comes to conclude that AKP the managed to reveal all inhuman practices both carried out and concealed by the old Turkey. Ete’s text in this sense includes a certainty that 2011 was the year of facing the past incidents. That facing, at the same time, implies the beginning of the new Turkey, which ‘apologizes’ in the name of the old.

#### **4.1.1.3. Claim of Pluralism**

##### **4.1.1.3.1. Pluralization of the Military and State**

The new Turkey, in contrast with the old Turkey’s uniformity and standardization, had to have democratization and pluralization claims. According to Tanıl Bora, AKP founders took lessons from the 28 February period to reinforce their power and embarked to

constitute a counter-hegemony with the discourse of democracy (Bora, 2016, p. 478). Accordingly, the new Turkey would be a free place for all identities which had been despised by the old regime. Furthermore, at that period, the discourse of democracy was carried one step further and called 'advanced democracy'. Both important normalization attempts like the Kurdish opening and the influence of the 12 September referendum in 2010 enabled pro-AKP actors to identify a 'brand new' democratic political atmosphere. The fates of all ethnic and religious groups were equated with that of the AKP and Erdoğan, once a victim of the old Turkey. Especially Kurdish people's rights were mentioned and pronounced much more emphatically while describing the plural and equal character of the new Turkey. As Kütahyalı claims,

*We will reconstruct the State of the Republic of Turkey. We will create a Turkey in which religious people, Kurds, Alevis and non-Muslims become all equal citizens and we will do this with the virtue alliance of all conscientious people. A young person who performs five time prayer and whose mother wearing a head scarf will be able to become military officer if he wants. A Kurdish or Alevi youth will also be able to enter into any institution without denying his/her identity. An officer of Turkish military will be able to read Fethullah Gülen's pieces in the garden of the officers' club and will be able to turn the pages of Zaman newspaper without feeling the 'fear of dismissal'. And another military officer will also be able to read Cumhuriyet newspaper with the same self-confidence and ruminate on the books of İlhan Selçuk or Ümit Zileli in the garden of the same officers' club in a Sunday afternoon. A Kurdish officer of the military of Turkey will be able to sing Kurdish songs with his touching voice in his friend's wedding in the officers' club. Turkish military officers and sergeants will be able to sing all together Ahmet Kaya's song Kum Gibi in a military mess by the sea. An Alevi military officer will play saz and sing the folk songs from Pir Sultan (Kütahyalı, 24.02.2010, Taraf).*

Kütahyalı appeals to settled symbolisms of Turkish politics: A military officer whose mother wears the headscarf as a religious other of the old Turkey; İlhan Selçuk, Ümit Zileli and *Cumhuriyet* newspaper as representatives of the old Turkey; Ahmet Kaya and a Kurdish and Alevi military officer as an ethnic other of the old Turkey. In that way, Kütahyalı addresses almost all the vital problems of the republic by caricaturing them

through symbols. All these symbolic actors are supposedly going to coexist in the new Turkey without having to hide their identities and identity practices. Kütahyalı romanticizes the prospective political setting and draws positive images like singing Ahmet Kaya songs and playing Pir Sultan folk songs in the military zones. What is striking here is the fact that Kütahyalı establishes the discourse of pluralization in reference to militaristic concepts. This makes sense within the context of the demilitarization initiatives in politics after the 2007 elections. The military was seen as the most crucial obstacle to the democratization of state institutions. Therefore, there was a belief that democratization of the military and its structure would definitely generate a democratic culture in politics.

In 2012, Kütahyalı wrote another column titled “*İşte Yeni Türkiye...*” [Here is the New Turkey...] right after the General Assembly of the AKP on 02.10.2012. This time, Kütahyalı treats pluralization on the basis of politics as an institution. In the direction of the objectives determined by the AKP, Kütahyalı appeals to another symbolism, 2023, the 100<sup>th</sup> year of the Turkish Republic. He claims that the new Turkey is a destination which is going to be reached by the 100<sup>th</sup> year of the republic and that this republic is going to belong to the entire nation when it has been achieved. Like other texts of Kütahyalı, this text also has positive future projections about the new Turkey:

*2023... The centenary of our republic...*

*The New Turkey Republic will not be any more a republic based on the dictatorship of a minority which perceives the values of the majority of the society as threat.*

*This republic will belong to the whole nation when we arrive 2023.*

*The New Turkey Republic will be civic and democratic republic in which the ruler is the majority of the nation but rights of the minorities are also protected.*

*The New Turkey Republic will be a republic in which the closure of political parties are totally removed.*

*In the New Turkey, prohibitive and restrictive rules in the establishment of the political parties will be removed.*

*In the New Turkey, standardizing rules in the political parties will be removed.*

*In the New Turkey, not political parties but real persons will be punished.  
In the New Turkey, all the obstacles in front of the participation in the  
politics will be removed.  
In the New Turkey, regulations about the elections will be reconsidered.  
In the New Turkey, measures will be taken to ensure justice in the  
representation (Kütahyalı, 02.10.2012, Takvim).*

In Kütahyalı's column, we see strong claims that the new Turkey is going to ensure pluralism in participation in politics and governance. As we are going to see also in the following chapters, journalists (or columnists) tend to employ a sense of 'certainty' when speaking about future projections, compared to academics and think-tank researchers. Kütahyalı's columns are full of examples of this kind of certainty, which cause the circulation of new Turkey claims without questioning.

#### **4.1.1.3.2. Pluralization of the New Social**

Besides the pluralization of the state and politics, there is also an emphasis on pluralization at the societal level, which is often mentioned by Ali Bayramoğlu. The claim of new Turkey contains not only structural changes in the state organization but also social changes which influence the forms of relationships among different sections of the society. That is, pro-AKP intellectuals display an effort to make people think as if political regulations which have been made in favor of democratization have had a sudden influence on the society so that micro relations among individuals have become more democratic and tolerant. Without a 'magic wand' the transformative effects of even the most democratic regulations take decades. Yet, according to Bayramoğlu, 'the new social', composed of pluralist re-individualization, shapes 'the political' in the new Turkey, and also confrontations and conflicts of social identities end up with democratic outputs:

*Confrontation of the religious and the secular has become the most important generator for different value systems to start to exist in one body. A structure in which secular, religious, traditional and modern value systems are consumed by the same citizen is both new and significant. Confrontation of identity and history functions as rereading of the republican period, and as democratization and becoming transparent of*



*ascribed identities through discovery of the non-Muslims. Society opens the path for the politics by preceding it and functions as to nurture different value systems. Tension between military and civic, for the first time, has moved beyond the image of conflict between political understanding and the army due to the developments in recent years and the country has reached the point at which political and militarist functions of the army are discussed with social perspectives by the society. If Turkey is to solve its chronic problems, patriarchal residuals and Kurdish question, it will happen in this framework in which the societal encompasses the political more and more. Turkey will experience its conflicts again in this framework. Whoever does not understand and touch upon this societal, from right to the left, will keep staying out of date. This is what the new Turkey's circumstances are about... (Bayramoğlu, 23.09.2011, Yeni Şafak).*

The new condition which Bayramoğlu defines as the encompassing of the social is considered as one which is capable of solving the vital problems of Turkey. Accordingly, the confrontation of categorical dichotomies, such as religious and secular, identity and history, and military and civil, functions to contribute to the democratic and pluralist maturation of the society. In another column in 2012, Bayramoğlu defends the same argument with a single example about abortion:

*An acquaintance I came across was saying during the conversation: "Our family is pious and conservative, with our daughters wearing headscarfs, you know. The abortion issue was spoken last night. There occurred a disagreement between my wife and my daughters. My wife was supporting the opinions on the side of the prime minister about the abortion, whereas my daughters were opposing". A heterogeneous Islamic section as an inevitable result of the change, open society and democratization, but more importantly... becoming heterogeneous of Islamic perception...The fact that the relation between Islamic identity and religious people turns into a relation of interaction...Issues of new religious 'standing' which is produced through everyday life, ethical problems and its answers which are internal to the religion but individual-centered and which highlight historical ones. All of this defines the New Turkey, and maybe I should say even dominantly. From the prime minister to the commentators and the politicians, those who maintain this discussion should not forget that we are living in such a country (Bayramoğlu, 05.06.2012, Yeni Şafak).*

Bayramoğlu, on the basis of this example, portrays the new Turkey as an open and democratic society with heterogeneous religious views. This new Turkey discourse is supported by a piece of ‘evidence’ which consists of his friend's statements concerning his family's differing views about abortion. Strikingly, Bayramoğlu presents such diversity among religious people as if it were something that never happened in the old Turkey. Of course, Bayramoğlu wrote this column after Prime Minister Erdoğan had condemned abortion as “murder”. Therefore, at the same time, Bayramoğlu implicitly criticizes Erdoğan’s opinions on abortion by reminding his readers of the democratic and plural dynamics of the new Turkey.

However, although Bayramoğlu argues that conflicts between different identities lead to democratic and tolerant conditions in the society and that democratic culture shapes the new politics (23.09.2011, Yeni Şafak), he nevertheless warns that without a new constitution, the chaos of the institutionalization of politics and change will continue. We can see the same tendency in the other columnists’ articles. The common expectation was that the democratic conditions established by the AKP would ultimately conclude with a social contract that guaranteed democratic rights for all. Bayramoğlu later on discusses the possible conditions for the new constitution in his column titled “Yeni Türkiye’nin Doğum Belgesi” [The Birth Certificate of the New Turkey]:

*Before the election, the most significant expectation of the country was a new and civic constitution. This expectation is in progress. It is in progress since the new constitution corresponds to a social contract which will unite religious people, seculars, Turks and Kurds around new social and political common grounds which Turkey has been in need for years. As it is known, ‘constitutional process’ did not proceed in an intended way and pace. The fact that the relation of Kurdish question and violence surrounded the country, that idea of security prevailed the politics in almost all cases, Syria problem, MİT (National Intelligence Organization) crisis, and problems of seizure of law and rights caused constitution topic to go back. A new social consensus firstly requires discussion, conversation and reconciliation. In Turkey, issue of constitution tries to proceed unfortunately in a condition of ‘absence or even gap of discussion and politics’. Therefore, ‘Commission*

*of Reconciliation', which was established as inter-parties in the parliament, did not become influential [...]*

*[...] Ömer Çelik, who is one of the Vice Presidents of AK Party, in the interview we had yesterday, was speaking hopefully, highlighting what should be done. "What is important is to make choice. What is it going to be: the last constitution of the Old Turkey or the first constitution of the New Turkey? Our choice must definitely be the second one. The new constitution should be the birth certificate of the new Turkey. In this perspective, what is important is not to write a constitution text but to discuss and to reconcile. The text should be the result of this reconciliation". It is not possible to disagree with Çelik.. (Bayramoğlu, 03.05.2012, Yeni Şafak).*

Referring to Ömer Çelik, Bayramoğlu hopes that the new constitution will be the birth certificate of the new Turkey, though he had declared many times in the other columns I discussed above that we were already living in the new Turkey. In effect, such discrepancy is not surprising, since the power of the new Turkey discourse comes from that ambiguity and contradiction. As is seen in the first quotation, when the context changed, Bayramoğlu talked about "the absence of discussion and politics in Turkey", though he argued before that new democratic and pluralist politics come from the demand of the people in new Turkey. We are going to see clearly that this contradiction is intrinsic to the new Turkey discourse while discussing the other topics.

#### **4.1.2. Demilitarization of Politics: Liquidation of Military Tutelage**

Debates on tutelage constitute the main part of the new Turkey discourse in this period. Construction of the discourse is based on a vision which imagines a country without any kind of tutelage. Indeed, as a representative of religious people who were repressed under the Kemalist secular status quo, the AKP had to deal with the military dynamics which shaped politics for decades to sustain its hegemonic power. Besides military coups and interventions in 1960, 1971 and 1980, the AKP and its proponents kept 28 February 1997 post-modern coup always on their agenda, because it targeted directly the religious patterns in the political field. According to Tanıl Bora, to rescue politics from tutelage,

the AKP constituted its strategy on the basis of the opposition between nation (people) and elites. This strategy led the AKP to overcome another military intervention, called the 'e-memorandum', on 27 April 2007. The AKP never stepped back, and it strengthened its power after the 2007 general elections through the party's ability to polarize politics on the axis of democracy against military tutelage (Bora, 2017, p. 479). Such polarization would find an expression in the discursive segregation of the old and the new Turkey. As Gürpınar claims, military tutelage was equated with the old Turkey, whereas the AKP mediated liberal principles through its emphasis on demilitarization and the right to sovereignty (Gürpınar, 2016, p. 336).

Indeed, by virtue of the discourse of supposed demilitarization, the AKP was welcomed by different segments of the society in that period. According to H. Bahadır Türk, technicians of opinion used demilitarization as a milestone in the advocacy of the AKP and in this way stigmatized critics as if they wanted to return to the days of military tutelage (Türk, 2014, p.392). In effect, the discourse of demilitarization or liquidation of military tutelage includes significant inconsistencies and ambivalences. Paradoxically, after each election result (including referendums), columnists declared that tutelage had been liquidated; however, before each upcoming election they also remind of us that tutelage was on guard. Correspondingly, in their columns, the constitution and reconstitution of the new Turkey always differs and shows up in different contexts. The liquidation of tutelage, as is true with the new Turkey discourse more broadly, is used without any essence, and this flexibility allows pro-government actors to operationalize it as a tool for symbolic power against the opposition.

#### **4.1.2.1. Perceiving the 2010 Referendum as a Battle between Military Tutelage and Democracy**

2010 was the year in which discussions around military tutelage reached their peak due to the constitution referendum. The AKP undertook to make changes in the constitution in favor of the demilitarization of jurisdiction. It proposed the removal of the article that

prevented the trial of generals who had participated in the coups in the past. Also, new changes were going to pave the way for the trial of military officers in civil courts. Such promises were regarded as signs of the liquidation of the military tutelage; therefore, pro-AKP actors in the media attributed crucial meaning to the referendum and succeeded in portraying it as a conflict between democracy and tutelage. Of course, these conflictual categories of perception were established first by Prime Minister Erdoğan and AKP members, then they were reproduced through variable mediums. According to Yayman, who was an academic and later became AKP deputy in 2015, this referendum would accelerate the construction of the new Turkey:

*Although it was not mentioned more in the propaganda period, 12 September referendum will have a significant multiplier effect and change Turkey's ill fate. This influence, though not in the short term, will pave the way for the constitution of a new Turkey in the medium and long term. At the end of the past 30 years, facing of society with the coup and calling pro-coup actors to account though delayed, first of all enabled Turkey to transcend a psychological threshold. While the fact that 'yes' votes had won the referendum enabled Turkey to rediscover its ability of problem-solving, these results may lead many structural problems to be addressed more pertinaciously. When the story of making 1961 and 1982 constitutions is considered, putting popular will in pledge and the established tutelage system, the significance of what has been achieved will be seen more clearly. Referendum results may provide the possibility of changing the 100-year-old fate of Turkey. Turkey can become 'great' and an 'order-making' country both inside and outside by overcoming its acquired helplessness and frustration (Yayman, 15.09.2010, Zaman).*

He expects that facing the system of tutelage after the referendum can lead Turkey to change its destiny and in the long run it may make it an important international leader. In this sense, the established order before the referendum is discredited as an obstacle to Turkey's development. What is usually done to consecrate the 'new' conditions of the period after the AKP came to power, as Yayman also did, is to compare it with the former periods under military rule. Yayman indicates the 1961 and 1980 constitutions as examples of tutelage in order to show the importance of the 2010 referendum. Although new regulations can bring only partial changes, they are presented as if they are a means

of total liberation for Turkey. Opposition groups who do not support those changes for various reasons are easily cast as if they are against democracy and national independence. Hatem Ete, in his column titled “Referandumun Mesajı: Yeni Siyaset, Yeni Türkiye” [Message of the Referendum: New Politics, New Turkey], locates the AKP and the opposition parties, which are the Republican People’s Party (CHP, hereafter), Nationalist Movement Party (MHP, hereafter), and Peace and Democracy Party (BDP, hereafter) on an axis of democracy and tutelage. According to him, supporters of ‘Yes’ are standing on the side of democracy, whereas supporters of ‘No’ are standing on the side of tutelage. As he argues,

*Existing politics experienced an axial shift. Referendum results registered the center of gravity of prevailing politics as ‘tutelage-democracy’ axis. Such axis, in the referendum period, caused many unforeseen alliances and dissolutions, and downgraded the ethnic, denominational, ideological and political dichotomies which make of old political dispositions. Nationalism, seen as survivor among the old political values, was taken into the referendum process as a political dynamic by neglecting this political transformation, but could not be influential. Therefore, it can be said that the attempt which aimed to turn the referendum campaign into a vote of confidence towards to the government by taking it out of context has failed and the opposite sides in the referendum process positioned themselves on the tutelage-democracy axis as constitutional amendment package had foreseen (Ete, 19.09.2010, Sabah).*

As Hatem Ete comes to conclude, considering the results of the referendum (58% Yes, 42% No), even nationalism lost against the demand of democracy. Of course, the results can be interpreted in various ways, yet the problematical issue here how different oppositional tendencies, which met in the side of No, are all described as the ‘tutelage front’. Such generalization and totalization of political positions functions and functioned as the criminalization and otherization of political opponents. This can be seen as a ‘success’ of those columnists and other AKP apologists coming from different fields. All those visible actors in the media impose their generalizations and produce categorized opinions towards the opposition. In another column in 2011, Ete uses the same strategy

and marks political attempts of the AKP as being 'on behalf of the national will', while he stigmatizes the objections to those politics as pro-status quo and pro-tutelage:

*AK Party, in its every attempt of change in favor of the national will, confronted with the resistance of pro-tutelage actors and institutions which supported the maintenance of status-quo. The resistance against AK Party, which has been wanted to be rendered impotent through implicit-explicit, legal-illegal pressures since 2002, turns out to be a visible conflict due to the approaching Presidential election and 22 July 2007 general election. The period between 22 July 2007 and 12 September 2010 finalized the conflict between status quo and change in favor of the latter. After 12 September referendum showed to the pro-status quo actors that conflict is not a true strategy, especially CHP and actors such as media, army, and judiciary were exposed to the developments oriented to replace conflict politics with negotiation politics (Ete, 02.04.2011, Sabah Perspektif).*

#### **4.1.2.2. Perceiving the 2011 General Election as the Introduction to the New Turkey**

If the new Turkey discourse, in reference with the liquidation of military tutelage, was uttered strongly in the period of the 2010 referendum, the period of the general elections in 2011 'registered' the fall of tutelage and declared once again the birth of the new Turkey. As was the case in the referendum, the AKP's win was taken as the defeat of tutelage, which at the same time implied that the political rivals of the AKP are naturally on the pro-tutelage side. Before the election, the common belief among columnists was that Turkey had dealt with the tutelage, and therefore that the constitution of the new Turkey began with the referendum. Taha Özhan and Hatem Ete, both of whom are think-tank researchers (Taha Özhan is also a deputy of the AKP) in SETA (Foundation for Political, Economic and Social Research), argue almost the same thing: that the general election will be the most important step in the inception of the new Turkey:

*The general election, which is going to be held on 12 July 2011, will be one of the crucial destinations of the will to change which has increasingly*

*gained momentum in favor of the status quo since early 2000s. For the last 10 years, within the most decisive and radical change process of the history of the Republic which has proceeded with the leadership of AK Party; all institutions, actors and mindsets which sustain the tutelage system has been forced to change and they have lost their influence in the system. At this point today, the agendum is which parameters the new Turkey is going to be reconstructed on. One of the most powerful signals towards the coordinates of the construction period will be started with the July election (Ete, 02.04.2011, Sabah Perspektif).*

*What is the most basic property of 12 June 2011 election? It stands for a genuine beginning for Turkey to face with its political and collective memory since '12 September'. Here, '12 September' corresponds to both the rupture after referendum and also the deep destruction which began with 1980 coup. All the experiences in the long 30 years between the coup and the referendum will have to get into the path of the 'New Turkey' after 13 June. Together with 12 June referendum, the struggle upon the construction of a new political system proceeded to a different stage and the construction process of the New Turkey started in an unpreventable way. For this very reason, 2011 election already turned out to be the election which was purchased by the market and society, because 12 June means only station on the way, as a result of 12 September. It was not as easy as was claimed, to take position by politically realizing that the New Turkey was established. For many political currents, it was not easy to notice that the wreck of the 1990s had been removed after 2002 or that bureaucratic and military tutelage had become out of date after 2007 (Özhan, 07.05.2011, Sabah Perspektif).*

According to Ete, the election results will determine the parameters of the new Turkey, whereas Özhan argues that the process of the constitution of the new Turkey had started 'inescapably' through the referendum and that the general election would deepen the distance between tutelage and the new Turkey. After the elections, Rasim Ozan Kütahyalı, in his column titled "Eyyamcı Takımının Son Günleri" [The Last Days of the Favouritist Rabble], interprets the results of the election with a new born baby analogy. According to him, the period between 2007 and 2011 was a transition period -even though he wrote many columns implying the existence of the new Turkey even before 2011- and the new Turkey finally was born subsequent to the general election on 12 June 2011:



*The last 4 years has been an exact transition period for Turkey...We have seen no Old Turkey in classical meaning and this obsolete order has been gradually dissolving. Yet, there hasn't been, either, a New Turkey which has left behind this obsolete order. In the last 4 years we have experienced the birth pains of the New Turkey; however, now, the New Turkey was born as a cherub after 12 June process...The New Turkey is not even in the level of crawling, but fortunately it was born already... And democrats of the New Turkey have no tolerance to such newborn baby's slightest possibility of being damaged. Therefore, conscientious people of this country are very sensitive about the clearance of the Old Turkey's mess in every field. Not only in political issues, but also in the field of economy, sports and media... (Kütahyalı, 24.07.2011, Sabah).*

Kütahyalı declares the birth of the new Turkey; however, paradoxically, he at the same time awakes everyone to the wrecks of the old Turkey. In another column titled "Yeni Türkiye'nin Şampiyonluk Mücadelesi" [The Struggle of the New Turkey for Championship] which he wrote at the end of 2011, Kütahyalı expresses the process of the new Turkey with a football match analogy. He sees 12 June as the final match for the declaration of the new Turkey. However, this does not mean that the old Turkey and military tutelage have been totally eliminated:

*Has military tutelage ceased to exist totally? Of course not. Have we totally eliminated the Old Turkey? Of course not. We are at the very beginnings of being a civic and democratic country in the real sense. Old Turkey habits are still continuing. But as Çetin Altan says, there is no need to fall in despair. The day the New Turkey was declared completely is the evening of 12 June. The New Turkey did not start when AK Party came to power. We were living in the Old Turkey also in the 2003-2011 AK Party period. However, that 9-year period was that of a close struggle and even warfare. I compare the last 9 years with the story of an Anatolian team which was qualified for the final and succeeded to become the champion despite any kind of sneaky and wicked ruse and which was always despised until the final match (Kütahyalı, 25.12.2011, Sabah).*

The old Turkey or tutelage system, as an everlasting enemy, is always kept in the political agenda so that the AKP can maintain its political struggle by showing itself as victimized.

What is at stake here is the sacredness of political will in the face of military power. As usual, pro-AKP actors develop an argumentation line which claims that the AKP must be defended against the risk of the usurpation of that will. Therefore, those actors associate whatever happens to the political or legal detriment of the AKP with tutelage and the old Turkey by means of discursive strategies. Here are two examples of 'bureaucratic tutelage' and 'judicial tutelage' in different periods:

*Despite the manipulations, exposed is more and more evidence that the prosecution included the old and new MIT executives in the investigation because of Oslo or Imralı meetings which was conducted within the scope of knowledge, approval and directive of the political power. This reason means that the prosecution questioned the political power's policy to fight against terrorism, and thus, developed a policy by acting like a political actor. Such attitude, which means seizing the government's political will based on collective support by resorting to the bureaucratic privileges, is one that we call and condemn 'tutelage system' in the old Turkey. Since 27 May 1960, the effort of intervening with the government's right to policy-determination through legal-bureaucratic privileges is called in this country as Kemalism. In this framework, it is possible to denominate as neo-Kemalists those actors that included MIT executives in the investigation because of their actions which they carried out to apply directives of the political power, and the community which supported them. In our opposite side, there are neo-Kemalists of the new Turkey who became privileged as a result of their struggle against Kemalist privileges of the old Turkey, and these people show tendency to sustain pro-tutelage dispositions which they took over (Ete, 18.02.2012, Sabah Perspektif).*

*Even in the new Turkey, the biggest opponent of the existing civic and elected government is inside the state itself. When one spoke of the state in the old regime, what it brought to mind was TSK (Turkish Armed Forces). The state meant TSK. In the current amorphous regime in which we overcame the military tutelage, things got more complicated. It seems that civic government rules over a part of the state as it should be in a democracy; on the other hand, there are also quite powerful bureaucratic and juridical tutelage elements who want to take the place of TSK in the state. Bureaucrats and members of the judiciary who want to place the civic government under tutelage act coordinately as if they were instructed by the same center. Now, struggle for political power is between the government which came to power through democratic means and this pro neo-tutelage, neo-Unionist state power. The mindset which suffocated the*

*spirit of 23 July 1908 is now trying to turn the passive revolution which we have experienced in last 5 years into its own tutelage regime in a new disguise. This is the political reality that we are experiencing, and the rest is nothing but empty talk and a pack of lies. Don't believe it (Kütahyalı, 25.07.2013, Sabah).*

In the first quotation from the column titled 'Vesayet, Siyaset, Cemaat' [Tutelage, Politics, the Community], Ete criticizes the prosecutors who held an inquiry about the MİT bureaucrats accused of maintaining the negotiation process with Abdullah Öcalan and other PKK leaders through the Oslo meetings. Ete uses particular wording such as 'usurpation of political will of the government which based on social support', 'bureaucratic privilege', and 'tutelage system' and 'tutelage front'. Furthermore, he describes this tutelage front as 'neo-Kemalists of the new Turkey' who have acquired privileges as a result of their struggle against 'Kemalist privileges of the old Turkey'. As can be also inferred from the title of the column, Ete, by defining neo-Kemalists of the new Turkey, refers to the complex relations in the jurisdiction led by Gülen. This case reveals the in-state organization for the first time and identifies it as a new tutelage group.

In the second quotation, Kütahyalı claims that the civic government still has control over only certain parts of the state; on the other hand, there are also bureaucratic and jurisdictional tutelage groups who want to be substituted alongside the TSK in the state. Kütahyalı, in the period following the Gezi Park protests and before the adjudication of the Ergenekon case, keeps his readers awake against a new tutelage front. While Ete uses the concept of neo-Kemalists, Kütahyalı prefers to use 'neo-Unionist' (neo-İttihatçı), yet it is not clear whom Kütahyalı is referring here. Without having to point to any signified subject, he contributes to the production of 'vigilance politics' on behalf of the AKP.

#### 4.1.2.3. Perceiving the 2014 Local Election as the Last Round for the Old Turkey Claims

It is clear, then, from what has been said up to this point that the discourse of the liquidation of the tutelage or establishment of the new Turkey is something indefinite which was 'registered' so many times and that conversely, the old Turkey and tutelage are deemed as if they are going to rise from the dead in the times of elections. This time, at the end of 2013, Rasim Ozan Kütahyalı and Markar Esayan, a Turkish-Armenian columnist and later a deputy of the AKP in 2015, applied the same strategy to produce opinions in favor of the AKP for the upcoming local election. The strategy is ever there to be employed: To construct categorical oppositions in which the AKP is positioned as pure good who represents democracy and justice, while the others are positioned as pure evil always waiting in ambush to vandalize the country. As Kütahyalı claims in his column titled "Eski Türkiye'ye Dönüş Planı ve Sarıgül" [A Plan to Return to the Old Turkey and Sarıgül];

*Old Turkey front is planning to render the 2014 İstanbul election as the beginning of the comeback. Therefore, they attach great importance to the İstanbul election. The scheme is exactly like that: Mustafa Sarıgül will win İstanbul for CHP; as a result of this, the spell of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan will be broken and later on he will lose the presidency and the whole Turkey. It is also part of their plan to, subsequent to success in 2014 operation, empty out Silivri. Then all murderers and coup plotters in the jail will be let out with heroic anthems. Peace and solution process will be ended, and a civil war will start. This war, it will be claimed, will continue until the last PKK militant is killed. After, great operations will be conducted to restore the regime to the old secularist and nationalist factory settings. As a continuation of this plan, there is a desire to lock somehow Recep Tayyip Erdoğan down.*

*[...] In this operation which targets first Erdoğan and then AK Party and thereby actors such as Abdullah Gül and Bülent Arınç, it is understood that Fethullah Gülen Movement will be the next target. The first target of this plan which can be called the operation of returning to the Old Turkey is Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and its last, Fethullah Gülen. That is to say, we eventually encounter with a plan of exterminating AK Party and Hizmet [Service] Movement again. But this time it is a more subtle, longer-*

*reaching, more professional, and more powerful plan in terms of external support. The tension between AK Party and Hizmet Movement makes the ones who've organized this plan happy. Old Turkey actors, in 2005, were telling the USA Ambassador about Mustafa Sarıgöl as follows: He is a man who broke the record in corruption and who is shallow, a liar, an imposter and a thief. You can read these in detail in Wikileaks documents. What I explained above underlies the reasons of the fact that those who called Sarıgöl as a thief and an imposter now regard him as hope. Thus, to support Kadir Topbaş in 2014 İstanbul election is not only a local choice, but also a slap against the ones who want to turn back to the Old Turkey (Kütahyalı, 14.11.2013, Sabah).*

Kütahyalı calls the local elections an 'operation' and this wording follows a nightmare scenario for Turkey. According to Kütahyalı, Mustafa Sarıgöl, the candidate of the CHP for Metropolitan Municipality of Istanbul, represents the old Turkey coalition and if he is to win, Turkey will be driven into chaos on behalf of the tutelage front. Furthermore, it is reminded that the AKP, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, Fethullah Gülen and the 'Hizmet Movement' (now called a terrorist organization) are under threat by the old Turkey with foreign support. Here, the AKP and 'Hizmet Movement' are treated again as the primary components of the new Turkey. Yet in the period after 2013, the state identified the 'Hizmet Movement' as 'FETÖ-PDY' (Pro-Fethullah Terrorist Organization-Parallel State Organization) as a result of its parallel organization in the state itself. As the state's discourse and approach had changed, engaged intellectuals have adopted this new conceptualization.

Kütahyalı interestingly talks about the importance of supporting Kadir Topbaş for the sake of the new Turkey against Mustafa Sarıgöl. As in the other elections, the victory of the AKP and Kadir Topbaş would be a 'slap' against the groups who wanted to turn back to the old Turkey. In that way, even a local election, which was just expected to choose who would govern the municipal interests was, by means of discursive constructions, turned into a milestone that divided the old and the new Turkey. We observe the same strategy in Markar Esayan's column titled "*Eski Türkiye'deki Son Kapişma ve Erdoğan*" [The Last Tussle in the Old Turkey and Erdoğan]. As Kütahyalı did, Esayan also uses

different wording and describes the period of local elections as a form of 'guerilla warfare'. Furthermore, according to him, this local election in 2014 will be the last fight between the old and the new Turkey:

*Of course, we cannot know what the moves in this 'guerilla warfare' are, whose first round will last until 30 March, and how influential they will be. I think, this is the last and the biggest fight of the old Turkey. Reanimating the old Turkey will not be possible if civic politics becomes successful in this election. Whoever convinces the people about carrying the new Turkey will win the election. I hope all weaknesses of the old state will probably be addressed based on the lessons taken from this serious experience. At this point, Erdoğan has no rival in the eyes of the political base (Esayan, 26.12.2013, Yeni Şafak).*

Accordingly, if civil politics (actually Erdoğan) were to win the election, then there would be no chance to 'resuscitate' the old Turkey anymore. In a similar manner to Kütahyalı, Esayan goes beyond the actual meaning of the local election and attributes it an importance as if it would decide Turkey's fate. Indeed, this is a primary strategy followed by intellectuals in each election. Word choice matters in this kind of totalizing argumentation. That is why Esayan perceives the elections as a form of warfare and the biggest fight. Such preferences aim to indicate the intentions of the old Turkey and in that way, contradictions are maintained in favor of the new Turkey.

#### **4.1.3. Discourse of Peace-building: Kurdish Question**

For some, the Kurdish question can be traced back to the foundation of the republic, while for others it emerged after the 1970s, especially with the foundation of the PKK, which is accepted as a terrorist organization. However, regardless of the beginning of the problem, the Kurdish question remains unsolved.

In short, the Kurdish question arises from the establishment of the nation-state and as part of a modernization process intended to homogenize the nation on the basis of Turkishness and secularization. This modernization project was confronted with the

resistance of Kurdish people whose majority was also non-secular, and in response the state initiated an ongoing oppression against Kurdish culture which resulted in massacres in the early republican era. With the formation of the PKK in 1978, Kurdish resistance turned to an armed struggle targeting the Turkish armed forces. Thousands of people on both sides have died in the subsequent conflict. In each period, the state defined and redefined the problem and constructed its solution policies accordingly. According to Mesut Yeğen, who studied the Kurdish question from Foucauldian framework, the Turkish state, by neglecting the Kurdish identity, has not intentionally distorted the Kurdish problem as a matter of reactionism, resistance of the tribes and banditry but has already perceived it through such concepts (Yeğen, 2015, p. 24). He focuses on the historical and institutional processes behind this perception. As the state paradigm changes, political concepts which make possible to approach the Kurdish question also differs. In the 'normalization' context, AKP supposedly perceived the problem in accordance with the democratic values and laid emphasis on the Kurdish identity. Such political stance was considered as one of the significant markers of the new Turkey project.

As I mentioned before, one of the main democratization policies of the AKP was its Kurdish Opening also called the Democratic Initiative. The process began with negotiations between MİT and the PKK in 2009, which were later called the 'Oslo Meeting' and continued with ups and downs. In 2010, some partial democratic liberations about Kurdish language and culture were realized; however, clashes started again in 2011. In 2013, negotiations began once more between MİT bureaucrats and Abdullah Öcalan, the leader of PKK who is serving a sentence of life imprisonment, and also he was allowed to meet with BDP deputies. In this period, the democratic initiative was replaced with the name of 'the Solution Process'.

Considering this context, columnists wrote many articles supporting the Kurdish opening in relation to the new Turkey discourse. In effect, the Kurdish question is not

independent of the other issues that I have covered so far. It was treated both in the discourse of democratization and liquidation of tutelage parts because the Kurdish question is a multi-dimensional problem and also an encompassing one. Here, in this section, as in the previous ones, I am going to focus on how the new Turkey discourse was established around discussions of peace-building and how the discourse of the old Turkey was taken into the picture.

#### **4.1.3.1. Associating the Emergence of the Problem with the Old Turkey**

In accordance with the AKP's settlement policies towards the Kurdish question, there emerged prudent articles which point out the significance of understanding the history of the problem and empathize with the conditions of the PKK's emergence. Such an attempt of understanding the PKK as 'a product of historical conditions' intends to establish a dialogue with Kurdish people, in order to show the authenticity and sincerity of peace process. On the other hand, this empathy functions in another way, i.e., since the AKP, arguably though, removed the conditions which generated the PKK with the new Turkey envisagement and democratization attempts, there is no need any more to maintain the armed struggle. Instead, the PKK should enter into a process of disarmament and become a political actor. In other words, the PKK is perceived as a consequence of the old Turkey conditions and the new Turkey intrinsically delegitimizes it. Taha Özhan, who often writes about the Kurdish question, talks about the 'vicious circle' of violence, by not only criticizing the PKK, but also referring to the tragic sociological and political conditions which created it:

*Another actor, who strives to survive in heavier conditions, of the political history which I express so far is Kurdish political movement. Unfortunately, this political tradition, whose political parties have been closed until today, became more radicalized in its every new party compared to the former one and targeted the old Turkey. It performed almost perfectly what it was expected from PKK and Kurdish political movement in order to sustain status quo. One has always been taken for the other the fact that human right violations are demands which require to be expressed timelessly and the discourse which is necessary to be (political) subject. We are facing*



*with a tragic condition which unifies the political discourse level of the wisest actors and of stone-throwing children; that of PKK militant in the mountain and of deputy in the parliament; the reactions of an activist in diaspora who was completely alienated to Turkey for 25-30 years and of the mayor of the city whose population is almost 2 million. This literally corresponds to a level on which the political and the sociological, the old and the new, the status quo and the change became meaningless. Under these circumstances, speaking, discussion and negotiation lose their meaning and we are always forced to stay within a bloody vicious circle (Özhan, 03.04.2011, Star Açık Görüş).*

According to Özhan, the Kurdish political movement turned its face towards the old Turkey; however, this was a result of radicalization that transpired after many Kurdish parties were closed. Here Özhan establishes a causation to locate the Kurdish political movement -including the PKK- in a particular context, because as I said earlier, there was a necessity to produce commonsensical discourses due to the vulnerability of the peace process. In a similar way in different years, Taha Özhan and Mücahit Küçükylmaz, who is a former think-tank researcher and still a presidential advisor, historicize the problem and establish causation:

*It is possible to divide Turkey's examination about Kurdish problem into roughly three periods: 1) Problems emerged as a result of primitive nation-building practices which had been implemented throughout the early years of the republic and one-party period. 2) The period which stuck between the backwardness parentheses from the establishment of 27 May order until 1980 coup. 3) From the armed struggle period which began during coup and continued its existence to the period until the end of the 1990s in which the state reason collapsed. We passed to the new phase after 1999 under the pressure of heavy costs which were produced by these three periods. After Öcalan was brought to Turkey, we entered into a different and complicated phase of Kurdish problem. We witnessed together that provocations of the old Turkey worked hardly after normalization of politics and country in the new period; that attempts of the defeated left fantasy of 1970s to there ensued its existence in an amorphous political plane through Kurdish question; and that structural breaks and occupations in our region. At this point, the actors of the new Turkey and the new Middle East appeared to be those distanced from violence or undemocratic ways, whereas actors of the old Turkey turned*

*out to be those who cannot abandon pulling the trigger to fire their last bullets (Özhan, 20.08.2011, Sabah Perspektif).*

*[...] On the other side, Kurdish people, who went back into their shell after Sheikh Said rebellion which includes also religious concerns, experienced the long years that passed until 1980s as a trauma which deepened the feeling of being excluded. During this period, they neither produced influential leader figures nor acquired a social and political framework in which they can express themselves. What turned trauma into a breaking point was the unpleasant experiences subsequent to 12 September 1980 coup, such as Diyarbakır Prison. Some parts of the Kurds broke harshly their long term silence as a result of the fact that PKK started to organize terror attacks. However, PKK, as a Marxist movement which stand against Kemalist center as an ideologically secular movement as Kemalism itself, never came through its basic claims because of this characteristic (Küçükylmaz, 06.04.2013, Sabah Perspektif).*

The aforementioned periods in Özhan's article are almost the same ones which are identified to characterize the old Turkey: the one-party period, the 1960s, and the 1980s. Accordingly, in an implicit way, the old Turkey was regarded as responsible for the terror issues, whereas in a 'normalized' new Turkey, terror issues are nothing other than the residuals of the old Turkey. With the normalization process, what is expected from the PKK is to disarm and to join the political field; otherwise, the PKK would be regarded as an old Turkey actor and would never find legitimacy, instead being marginalized and excluded from democratic processes. However, as Küçükylmaz argues, since the PKK is both Marxist and also as secular as the Kemalist regime, it failed to reach the Kurdish base and to achieve its basic claims. Here, by pointing out the PKK's secular character, Küçükylmaz shows a tendency towards a point at which the Kurdish question can only be solved on the basis of the Islamic commonalities among Kurdish and Turkish people. This was also one of the main strategies for the AKP in the peace process, to meet on common ground with Kurds on the basis of Islamic civilization, which is assumed as the trademark of the new Turkey.

#### 4.1.3.2. Perceiving the Opposition Parties as Old Turkey Actors

Here, similar to the attitudes in the referendum in 2010, opposition parties objected to the peace process for various reasons. While the CHP criticized the process on the grounds that it was not being maintained transparently, for the MHP, to negotiate with a terrorist organization was not acceptable. Even the BDP had doubts about whether the process would be guaranteed and legalized or not. In this context, the AKP presented itself as a founding actor of the new Turkey and representative of the will for peace in the society. Pro-AKP writers and commenters in the media always supported this position by arguing that the AKP took upon itself a very significant mission in attempting to solve the Kurdish question, whereas the opposition parties (and PKK) stood with the old Turkey and did not support the possibility of peace. Opposition parties were also blamed for resisting the liquidation of tutelage, which was discussed in the previous section. In this sense, the old Turkey discourse was used as a functional instrument to criticize the opposition parties in the context of the peace process. In two different columns, Taha Özhan appeals to this strategy by focusing on the BDP and MHP and argues that the AKP is

*the most powerful actor of normalization and solution in the Kurdish problem. 14 years ago, those who claimed that tension between secularism and Islam would be removed by AKP tradition used to be accused of dreaminess. Today what is done in the sphere of the problem through democratic initiative confronts a similar accusation. BDP, as long as it is only the party of Kurdish problem, moves away from being a constitutive part of the New Turkey. However, it should be realized that there is no place for Kurdish problem in the New Turkey, which is the only way to contribute to the normalization (Özhan, 03.04.2011, Star Açık Görüş).*

*BDP and MHP, which are directly and indirectly the two parties of the Kurdish question respectively, either watch the 'New Turkey' dynamics without changing the position or take the wrong position. MHP seems to deeply believe that problems of the last 20 years, which coincide with an ordinary and short moment in the history of this country, will exist as the main axis of Turkey politics. Similarly, BDP also seems to be convinced that by freezing the political time period, it has to stay a political actor under*

*'constant state of emergency' in the old Turkey. Both BDP and MHP are sorely scared of 'disarmament or politization of PKK'. MHP seems to believe that the country will be separated, while BDP deeply believes that it cannot speak without guns. However, if a New Turkey is to exist, there will not be a place for the Kurdish question in it or vice versa (Özhan, 07.05.2011, Sabah Perspektif).*

In both columns, Özhan states that the BDP and MHP cannot be part of the new Turkey as long as they stick to their own political agenda. Furthermore, he assertively claims that the Kurdish question is not going to exist anymore in the new Turkey. In 2013, in the period of the Solution Process, Hüseyin Yayman also criticizes the PKK and BDP, but treats Öcalan in a positive way:

*[...] There is a PKK which calls for revolutionary people's war and supports the solution unwillingly by 'approaching it with caution', and a BDP which cannot produce a policy and cannot be freed from the control of the mountain. Opposite to these, there is a portrait of Öcalan who utters 'millennial brotherhood' and talks about the National Pact (Misakı Milli), common future, sharing a common fate and notion of 'US' ... (Yayman, 22.03.2013, Hürriyet).*

The BDP is considered as under the charge of the PKK, which is already a sort of tutelage. Interestingly enough, even though the BDP is the only legal interlocutor of this process, Öcalan is much more respected by some intellectuals. Of course, the BDP is at the same time a strong political rival of AKP in the East and South East regions. In this sense, a possible success of the peace process could have increased the potential support of the BDP as well as that of the AKP government. Therefore, discourse towards the BDP is always established through its relation with the PKK and the armed struggle. Now, in what follows, the question of why Öcalan was considered as a peace-maker despite his 'bad reputation' is going to be dwelt upon.

#### **4.1.3.3. Peace-Building with Kurds in the Context of Foreign Politics**

As was discussed before, the politics of the AKP on the Kurdish question are based on the discourse of democratization and normalization. Accordingly, some normalization

steps like the removal of the state of emergency, the replacement of ‘Turkified’ names of places with Kurdish ones, the liberty to establish Kurdish institutions in universities, the liberty to broadcast in the Kurdish language, etc. increased the belief that a solution of the problem was possible. While the AKP tried to convince society about the sustainability of the peace process, there were important developments in the Syria crisis which also influenced domestic politics in Turkey. With the effect of the Arab Spring, uprisings against Bashar Assad began in 2011 then turned into a civil war in Syria. Syria was divided into different sections and the PYD (Democratic Union Party), an armed organization which is also accepted by Turkey as terrorist organization, advocating the self-governance of Kurdish people in Syria, conquered the city of Kobane and declared de facto self-government in 2012.

These events raised hopes for the Kurdish population in Syria since they were living free of the Assad regime. The declaration of self-government in the name of the PYD also caused excitement among some parts of the Kurdish population in Turkey. In that context, the AKP was cautious and thus maintained a balanced politics for the sake of the peace process, even though Turkey saw the PYD as a terrorist organization connected with PKK. The declaration of self-government in Syria triggered nationalist tendencies in Turkey and increased the fears of separation because of border security risks. Therefore, the AKP and its intellectuals in the media had to keep positive relations with Kurdish people for the sake of the peace process, without also offending the Turkish side. In order to overcome nationalist reactions about Kurdish separatism, columnists often set the discourse of ‘fear of separation’ to work. That is, to overcome doubts about the separation of Kurds among the Turkish population, columnists perceived those doubts as ‘fear’, and traced the roots of that fear back to the indoctrination of the old Turkey. As Cemal Haşimi, who became a bureaucrat in the prime ministry in 2014, argues,

*The New Turkey is being constructed by exposition to great pains. In the construction period, making policies based on the fears of the old Turkey provides a functional shelter for the defenders of the old Turkey. Whatever*

*the reason, there is an explicit Kurdish-phobia which crosses various political positions, and this phobia, downgraded thanks to the political success of AKP, is activated in every crisis situation [...]*

*[...] It is necessary to add that this manner did not and will not find an interlocutor among Kurds, who are an inseparable part of the New Turkey and the New Middle East. That is why, the fight is not in between Kurds who support Turkey and who are against Turkey, and neither in between Turkey, Turks and Kurds, but in between those who support the new Turkey and the last residuals of the old Turkey. For, there is no contradiction between the achievements of the New Turkey and those of Kurds in the Middle East order which is about to be established (Haşimi, 04.08.2012, Sabah Perspektif).*

According to Haşimi, the AKP made this 'fear of Kurd' diminish despite the old Turkey's attempts in crisis periods. By equalizing the achievements of the new Turkey with the achievements of Kurds in the Middle East, Haşimi points to an inclusive characteristic of the new Turkey which is assumed as built by the AKP. Haşimi argues that there is no conflict between Kurds and Turks; rather, the conflict exists between residuals of the old Turkey and the new Turkey. In other words, the old and the new Turkey are placed onto the war and peace axis.

Moreover, Hatem Ete questions the underlying reasons for nationalist reactions in the context of the achievements of Kurdish community in Syria. Similar with Haşimi's arguments, Ete points to the secularism and nationalism policies of the early republic:

*The republic constituted its official ideology on two principles which would determine the basic parameters of the domestic and foreign policy throughout the following years: secularism and nationalism. The political regime, which aimed to carry out a new nation-building project based on these two principles by ignoring the existing social fabric, also defined the perception of threat on the basis of the possibility of disapproval of these two principles by the society. Resistance against secularism policies was codified as 'reactionism' or pro-'sharia' standing, whereas resistance against nationalism/Turkism was codified as 'separatism'. It defined religious people and/or non-Turk components, who got organized on the basis of religious and/or ethnic demands, as potential domestic enemies.*

*The regime was organized on the basis of vigilance against the possible threats of these domestic enemies (Ete, 06.08.2012, Star Açık Görüş).*

What Ete meant by the republic is of course the old Turkey itself. Residuals of the old Turkey still constitute an impediment in front of the solution of the Kurdish question. According to Ete, the AKP succeeded in overcoming the perception of 'reactionism' of the republic; however, it cannot yet transform the discourse of separation which haunts the nationalist tendencies. Moreover, his discourse towards the achievements of Kurds in Middle East can be considered as pragmatist:

*However, Turkey, as long as it was able to get rid of the paranoia of separatism, could have made peace with Kurds in the neighboring countries just as she had made peace with Islamic entities in the Middle East because it eradicated the paranoia of reactionism emanating from the state reason. Turkey could have utilized the existence of Kurds in the neighboring countries as a step of intervening with the Middle East by leaving the threat of separatism behind just as she had increased its influence in the Middle East on the basis of Islamic movements' rise to power by leaving the threat of reactionism behind. But, today, while Turkey at a point at which she feels apprehension about the fact that Islamic movements came to power, it feels apprehension about the political achievements of Kurds in the neighboring countries, because it still cannot get rid of paranoia of separatism. It is clear then: Change in the Middle East will deeply affect all ethnic and denominational structures living in this geography. Kurds also will receive a share because they are also in the same geography. In this new distribution of roles, political position of all entities which do not bond their fates to the existing authoritarian regimes will be better than today (Ete, 06.08.2012 Star Açık Görüş).*

Accordingly, if Turkey succeeds in maintaining peace with Kurds, this can be instrumental in giving it a voice in the Middle East. Ete also uses the word 'paranoia', like 'fear', to describe doubts on the separation of Kurds. Such wording aims to differentiate AKP politics from the old Turkey approach to the Kurdish question. Yet despite all its peaceful initiatives to deal with the paranoia of separation, Hatem Ete claims that the AKP could not achieve total normalization on this issue due to the threat of the PKK, the armed terrorist organization, and due to the strong influence of the old Turkey policies about

nationalism. However, two months later, Hatem Ete would write oppositely, after the ordinary Congress of the AKP on 30 September 2012:

*When perceptions of threat, defined for the sake of a dream of monist nation-building construction, were removed, there emerged a legitimate political space for the excluded political and social sections of the society. Demilitarized politics enabled the democratization of the state reason. Removal of the threats of reactionism and separatism from the state reason changed the way of perceiving the developments outside as well as providing political legitimacy of domestic social sections which were associated with those threats. The fact that religious social-political sections ceased to be a threat enabled Islamic actors leading Arab revival to be perceived as legitimate representatives of the people. Moreover, the fact that Kurds inside were ceased to be a threat enabled Kurdish actors and organizations, who participated in democratic processes outside, to be considered as legitimate political partners (Ete, 07.10.2012, Star Açık Görüş).*

Ete, in his column titled 'Yeni Türkiye Kongresi' [The New Turkey Congress], reviewed the history of AKP politics until 2012, which displayed political normalization through the struggle with the tutelage front. Contrary to what he said two months before, Ete claimed later that the demilitarization of politics led to the democratization of the state mentality and to a change in the way of perceiving foreign politics in terms of Islamic and Kurdish actors. As often mentioned, peaceful involvement in foreign politics is considered as a trademark of the new Turkey.

#### **4.1.3.4. Perceiving the New Turkey as a Problem-Solver: The Solution Process**

In 2013, when the democratic initiative was begun under the banner, 'the solution process', the perception of 'AKP as a peace-maker despite the old Turkey' increased in all media. In this sense, we can assume a linearity in the discourse on the Kurdish question until the end of 2015. The peace process, which was often interrupted with political maneuvers, entered a new period after the Nowruz festival on 21 March 2013. That Nowruz was so significant that Abdullah Öcalan's letter was read to the crowd for the first time and it was broadcast by many mainstream TV channels. Öcalan's letter,



which consisted of the emphasis on brotherhood based on common history, common future, and common civilization, was especially welcomed by the AKP and BDP, as they were the interlocutors of the process. The process continued with partial withdrawals of the PKK to outside of Turkey's borders and peaceful approaches of the AKP government. In this context, hopes for peace corresponded to the envisagement of the new Turkey, and pro-AKP columnists portrayed the normalization and democratization of the new political atmosphere by comparing it with the old Turkey. Hüseyin Yayman, writing after 2013 Nowruz, points to the transformation of Nowruz conditions beginning from 1990s until 2013:

*I have to say, as an experienced Nevruz/Nevroz/Newroz follower, that we are confronted with a positive situation...First of all, reaching to the point where Öcalan's letter was read today from a Turkey in which Nevroz was banned in 2012 and death penalty was spoken 3 months ago, is a significant change... It is necessary to recall past celebrations in order to understand 2013 Nevroz. Derivative parties of HEP (People's Labor Party) celebrated the Nevroz for the first time in 1991. Nevroz was seen as a 'political challenge against the state' for PKK in 1990s, and it was seen as a way of massification for HEP/DEP/HADEP/DEHAP/DTP. 1992 Nevroz was written in history as 'bloody Nevroz', and more than 100 people died. It is an unnamed revolution to come to these days passing from 1990s...I think, 2013 Nevroz will be the 'last political Nevroz', if normalization continues... (Yayman, 22.03.2013, Hürriyet).*

Yayman starts the article with a particular wording: To define Nowruz, he chooses to use Nevruz, Nevroz and Newroz all together. Such wording functions as an intermediary which addresses both Turkish and Kurdish sides. Yayman describes the normalization which reached up to the legalization of Nowruz (in which even Öcalan's letter can be read) as a 'revolution'. Indeed, even if it did not take long, the recognition of Öcalan as a de facto legitimate actor signifies a radical turn for Turkish politics. Interestingly enough, Öcalan was regarded as a new partner of the new Turkey. While Hüseyin Yayman refers to the new Turkey by citing the Öcalan's words, Mücahit Küçükylmaz interprets Öcalan's 'new' arguments as indicative of a will to partake in the legitimate center of the new Turkey politics:

*Analysis of the Middle East has always had an important place in Öcalan's readings at all times... The main motivation of İmralı Solution Process also consists of the developments in the Middle East... While the letter signals the existence of 'a new Middle East', 'a new Turkey' and a new PKK, it emphasizes democratic struggle (Yayman, 22.03.2013, Hürriyet).*

*So the messages coming from İmralı in the solution process reflects an effort to produce a new conceptual framework in order to get a position in the legitimate center. Öcalan, in his letter which is not even close to Marxist-Leninist paradigm, by arguing that modernist paradigm was destroyed and saying that it is time to forgive each other, referred to the spirit of Malazgirt and Çanakkale, to the law of brotherhood, to the 1920 parliament, to the truths in the messages of Moses, Jesus and Muhammad. So to what extent is this discursive change trustworthy? The fact that İmralı, at least, is obliged to this discursive change and even have imposed actions which this change requires to the armed Kurdish forces is a sufficiently important step. Above all, the fact that old, unacceptable and sharp separatist thesis and negotiation discourses have never been raised should be interpreted as a manifestation of the will to position itself in the legitimate center (Küçükylmaz, 06.04.2013, Sabah Perspektif).*

Since Öcalan's power of influence on the some sections of the Kurdish population is very strong, the de facto legitimacy given by the government to Öcalan enabled the AKP to establish a peace-making relationship with Kurdish people. Also, this showed the state of affairs of the peace process and increased the possibility of a successful solution. In this context, Küçükylmaz was able to point out to a sort of legitimacy of Öcalan and Yayman could positively mention Öcalan's political insight.

According to Küçükylmaz, what led to the destruction of political taboos was the goal of the 'Great and Democratic Turkey', which is a big umbrella that will unite the nation and be dominant in the Balkans, Middle East and North Africa. In this sense, Küçükylmaz, contrary to the old regime, talks about peace between society and state in the new Turkey:

*The biggest difference between the new Turkey and the old one is that extremisms and marginalities are now gathered in a balance center and the society, whose common ground expanded, has produced a will to construct a powerful future together with the state. While the secular way of governing which is discriminative, patronizing and dominating vanished together with problems it had generated, the New Turkey order, in which all sections of the society have found a place, is being established on the basis of democracy. All sections who want to exist legitimately can find a place in this reconstructed democratic social center (Küçükylmaz, 06.04.2013, Sabah Perspektif).*

New Turkey discourse here is grounded with the discourses of democratization and pluralization, and Küçükylmaz criticizes the old regime as being secular, dominating and segregating. In fact, as can be inferred from the other columns about the Kurdish question, there is a dialectical relationship between the new Turkey and peace-building. Different from the discourse of tutelage, there is no consensus on whether the new Turkey is an outcome of peace-building or whether the peace itself is an outcome of the new Turkey. Rather, the usual approach is that the new Turkey is taken for granted and that peace in the Kurdish question should be its intrinsic condition. Yet, according to Rasim Ozan Kütahyalı, who already mentioned the ‘declaration of the new Turkey’ several times in different contexts, AKP’s Diyarbakır meeting was this time the ‘official’ declaration of the new Turkey:

*The point to which Ahmet Kaya case reach today is one of the indicators of the transformation of Turkey in 5 years. The persistent struggle of Gülten Kaya herself for justice played an important role in this current situation of Kaya case. Therefore, official declaration of the New Turkey in Diyarbakır in 13<sup>th</sup> anniversary of murder of Ahmet Kaya is very meaningful. That historical date which the Prime Minister intentionally chose, 16 November, is a turning point (Kütahyalı, 23.11.2013, Sabah).*

Referring to Erdoğan’s speech in the meeting, Kütahyalı points out to the connection between Ahmet Kaya and the new Turkey. That Ahmet Kaya was chosen to be mentioned as a symbolic actor in the peace process is not by chance. Ahmet Kaya was exposed to systematic nationalist offenses at the end of the 1990s and had to leave Turkey. He died

in 2000 when he was living in France. Therefore, considering both the period, the 1990s, and the actors who had participated in those offenses, Erdoğan and AKP-engaged intellectuals associated his death with the old Turkey. This approach is reflected in the media and many columnists like Kütahyalı often mention the Ahmet Kaya case as something which should never happen in the new Turkey.

#### **4.2. Period between 2014 and 2016**

Considering the significant changes in the political field it is safe to say that the pledges of the new Turkey have collapsed. Even so, new Turkey discourse has been maintained in different forms. Making a periodical division is inevitable for an analytical treatment, as the second half of 2013 witnessed significant incidents which reshaped the political tendencies. They were the Gezi Park protests and the 17-25 December case, which were considered by the AKP government as coup d'état attempts.

Briefly, the Gezi Park protests began on 28 May 2013 as a reaction to the government's declaration about the construction of an artillery barracks in the area of Gezi Park. With the arrival of heavy machines at the park to cut down trees, a group of people gathered in the park with ecological concerns to protest the government's action. According to Cihan Tuğal, "when police brutality cracked down on several dozen protestors who wanted to protect the last green area (Gezi Parkı) near Taksim, popular determination to save this park initiated the biggest spontaneous revolt in Turkish history" (Tuğal, 2016, p. 204). In a short while, protests spread to the whole country and clashes ensued. Increasing police violence caused the deaths of seven people during the protests. The incidents lasted for over a month before the government withdrew their plan on Gezi Park.

Towards the end of the year, the AKP government was challenged once more, this time with the claims of corruption known in the media as 'the case of 17-25 December'. As Tuğal identified, "Gülen-connected prosecutors rained down thousands of pages of

corruption accusations on Erdoğan and his coterie” (Tuğal, 2016, p. 216). In the end, the government identified this initiative as a ‘jurisdictional coup’ and associated this ‘operation’ with the Gülenist organization, a secret organization in the state; therefore, some prosecutors and police officers were then displaced. During that period, the National Security Council (MGK) took a decision to approach this organization as the ‘parallel state’ or ‘parallel structure’.

My intention is not to go into details of these cases; rather, I want to show the political conditions and contexts in which the gradual transformation of the new Turkey discourse began. The Gezi Park protests initially were supported even by people aligned with the AKP; however, both the emphasis in the media on the violent acts of the protestors and the securitization of discourse towards protests which was produced by the government led to a new perception. Also, after the 17-25 December case, these separate cases were packed as ‘actions aimed at overthrowing the government’. Tuğal points out that “the Islamic press interpreted Gezi and Gülenis assault as a combined neocon-Israeli conspiracy planned in advance. This interpretation consoled the AKP’s base” (Tuğal, 2016, p. 217). The latter case was the ultimate point of conflict between the AKP and the Gülenist organization. The abstaining manner in AKP from this organization since 2012 (the case of MIT crisis) has crystallized henceforth. It started to be defined as the parallel state because of its positioning in the Turkish state and thus was counted as an old Turkey actor.

The perception of the Gezi protests and the case of 17-25 December signalled a new agenda for the AKP. Claims of pluralism and democratization gave way to securitization policies. AKP members and AKP-engaged intellectuals in the media declared so many times that the new Turkey, as a conjugate of the AKP, was under the threat. As ‘the old Turkey coalition’ expanded, the government’s perception of threat also broadened correspondingly. Therefore, to re-consolidate his power, Erdoğan initiated a new strategy aiming at escalating polarization in the political field. Tuğal identifies Gezi and

17-25 December case, which have changed the course of politics, as respectively “the dagger in the front” and “the dagger from within”, and he argues that “the AKP regime is now much more based on coercion than it was during its first eleven years in power. In that sense, it is less hegemonic. It has further consolidated its base and power bloc, but it has done so at the expense of the ongoing purges of secular and Islamic liberals” (Tuğal, 2016, p. 217). It is safe to say that dispersion of the hegemonic bloc influenced the modalities of the political discourse.

For this study, it can be observed that this change of strategy reflected upon new Turkey discourse in the newspaper columns in three ways: first, in the replacement of the old Turkey with new constitutive others, especially with the discourse of ‘global forces’; second, in the emergence of imperial discourse composed of conspiracy-like arguments; and third, in the adaptation of new Turkey discourse to the presidential system. Of course, the argument of this paper is not that discourses on democratization, pluralization or peace-building suddenly melted away. Some columnists continued to mention these topics in this period: Bayramoğlu (12.07.2014, *Erdoğan’ın Yeni Türkiye Planı* [Erdogan’s New Turkey Plan], *Yeni Şafak*), Mağcupyan (31.03.2015, *Yeni Türkiye (1)* [The New Turkey (1)], *Akşam* & 09.04.2015, *Yeni Türkiye (4): Toplum* [The New Turkey (4): Society], *Akşam*) and Kütahyalı (20.11.2014, *Yeni Türkiye’nin İstanbul Tasavvuru* [The New Turkey’s Envision of Istanbul], *Sabah*) emphasize plural character of the new Turkey; Esayan (16.02.2015, *Ankara Palas’ta Başbakan’la Bir Yeni Türkiye Buluşması* [A New Turkey Meeting in Ankara Palace with the Prime Minister], *Yeni Şafak*), Altınok (26.10.2014, *Etyen Mağcupyan Yeni Türkiye’ye İyi Gelecek* [Etyen Mağcupyan will be Good for the New Turkey], *Türkiye*) and Kütahyalı (29.08.2014, *Yeni Çankaya Yeni Türkiye’yi Kuracak* [The New Çankaya will Establish the New Turkey], *Sabah* & 28.10.2014, *Yeni Türkiye Alevileri Kazanmak Zorunda* [The New Turkey Has to Involve Alevis], *Sabah*) talks about conditions of the minorities; and Esayan (22.03.2015, *Barış ve Yeni Türkiye En Kritik Safhasında* [Peace and The New Turkey are in the Most Critical Phase], *Yeni Şafak* & 23.03.2015, *Yeni Türkiye’nin Formülü ve Kandilin Tercihi* [Formula of The New

Turkey and Qandil's Choice], Yeni Şafak), Bayramoğlu (12.07.2014, *Erdoğan'ın Yeni Türkiye Planı* [Erdogan's New Turkey Plan], Yeni Şafak& 16.05.2014, *Yeni Türkiye'ye Doğru (1)* [Towards The New Turkey (1)], Yeni Şafak& 17.05.2014, *Yeni Türkiye'ye Doğru (2)* [Towards The New Turkey (2)], Yeni Şafak) , Özhan (21.03.2015, *Nevruz, Eski Mesaj ve Yeni Türkiye* [Nowruz, Old Message and The New Turkey], Star& 10.06.2014, *PKK, Silahsızlanma ve Yanlış Sorular* [PKK, Disarmament and Wrong Questions], Star), Dalay (05.07.2014, *Temsil Krizinden Temsil Gücüne Yeni Türkiye'nin Cumhurbaşkanı* [From the Representation Crisis to the Representation Power The President of the Republic of The New Turkey] , Star Açık Görüş) and Selvi (20.10.2014, *Yeni Türkiye, Eski Kandil* [The New Turkey, The Old Qandil], Yeni Şafak) write about their expectations on the peace process.

Yet all these expectations were overshadowed by the discourse of vigilance and grand narratives on imperial claims. In other words, democratization was subordinated to the securitization of the state and to the desire of being a 'world' state. In this last section, I am going to portray how new Turkey discourse and its constitutive others have transformed and how such discourse has shifted from positive politics to anti-politics. In this part, new Turkey discourse is placed on and constructed through new categories of perception which enable the discourse to fit the new political conjuncture.

#### **4.2.1. Change of the New Turkey's Constitutive Other**

##### **4.2.1.1. New Tutelage Front against the Popular Will**

In this period, what we observe is the replacement of Kemalism with the 'parallel state' in terms of the tutelage connections of the old Turkey. However, the parallel state is not perceived as the generator of tutelage as it was in Kemalism discourse. Instead, it is regarded as a part of a much more sophisticated tutelage center. To put it another way, what is at stake in this period is the fact that discourse of tutelage becomes a signified whose signifier is not definite or overdetermined. It was easy to identify the source of the tutelage before 2014 since Kemalism and militarism were functioning as a 'master key'. After Gezi and the 17-25 December case, writers and commenters in the media

started to mention bureaucratic and jurisdictional tutelage instead of military tutelage. Furthermore, they refer usually to the unidentified notion of ‘tutelage centers’ which can only make sense when it is thought of in terms of the discourse of ‘global forces’ on which I am going to shed light in the following part.

In the previous part, I went into how the discourse of tutelage works in the election periods. Similarly, between 2014 and 2016, columnists applied the same strategy in four elections and also in the change of the president of the republic. The presidential election on 10 August 2014 marked a new period in Turkish politics, since for the first time the president of the republic was chosen by the people as a consequence of the 2007 referendum. In the elections, the AKP nominated Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, the CHP and MHP nominated the joint candidate Ekmeleddin İhsanoğlu, and the HDP nominated Selahattin Demirtaş. The AKP side constructed their electioneering based on identifying Erdoğan with the people and associating the opposition candidates with pro-tutelage actors. Yasin Aktay, who was an academic and think-tank researcher and also who is still AKP deputy, reflects on his party’s strategy on his column before the election:

*The fact that the presidency of the republic were opened to the people, in other words, to the politics and discussion disturbs some people from the beginning is about the mindset and reflexes of the old Turkey. The fact that this mindset is carried by the current opposition parties is the great paradox of Turkey politics. It is their own problem that the opposition parties do not feel hopeful about the ballot box. But, this is also a problem which they meet a lot of difficulties to make the people pay the price for. The opposition parties, who desire that the people come to them without they change their position, eventually tried creatively all formulas of the democracy without people. The tutelage, which was established and maintained with the army and institutions of tutelage, became gradually dysfunctional in the assertive conditions of the New Turkey. Sociological conditions of AK Party and organic leadership of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan invalidated all the attempts of tutelage recently. The attempt of joint candidate is a flutter of pro-tutelage mindset which is intrinsic the old Turkey (Aktay, 14.07.2014, Yeni Şafak).*



According to him, the opposition parties with the old Turkey mindset are located against 'the people'. If I leave aside the general discussion on who is 'the people', it is clearly seen that AKP views that it alone represents 'the people'. Random use of the notion of 'the people' enables Aktay to produce a binary opposition on the axis of the people and pro-tutelage mindset. Interestingly enough, based on such categorical imposition, the strategic coalition between the CHP and MHP (joint candidate) is described as part of the old Turkey tutelage, although these two parties were merely entering into a fair democratic competition, just like the others.

To emphasize the popular will in presidential elections amounts to another discursive strategy. Although military tutelage was supposedly overcome, it is accepted that the presidency of the republic as an institution still has the residue of the tutelage. Then, the election rather than the appointment of the president would mean a precursor of the new Turkey. In other words, the triumph of popular will would register the birth of the new Turkey. In this sense, a new categorical dichotomy is set to work: the elected and the appointed. I argued before that the new Turkey discourse draws its strength from its comparison with the past. Galip Dalay, who is a think-tank researcher, and Taha Özhan talk about the pro-tutelage character of the old Turkey's presidency:

*In the former system, which was designed as the guard of the tutelage regime and as the equilibrant against the elected ones, the basic quality, which is looked for in the presidential bid, used to consist of his/her relationship with this pro-tutelage ideology and his/her passion towards defending the system based on this ideology (Dalay, 05.07.2014, Star Açık Görüş).*

*Moreover, presidency of the republic, which was codified as the ultimate position of the tutelage regime, has been neither impartial nor symbolic in a negative or positive way. For years, harsh representation of the constitutive ideology has been called as 'symbolic', whereas protection of the tutelage regime at the expense of crises has been called as 'impartiality' (Özhan, 28.08.2014, Star).*

The new 'tutelage free' structure of the presidency would combine with Erdoğan's popular support, and this 'perfect match' corresponds to the sacredness of being elected. This implies the reduction of democracy to only being elected by the people. Also perceiving every oppositional action by relating it with the pro-tutelage mindset strategically delimits the field of politics. Therefore, Erdoğan's presidency would basically mean a victory against tutelage. This strategy also has the power to categorize critiques directed to AKP and Erdoğan on the basis of elections. Yiğit Bulut, who is the key advisor of Prime Minister Erdoğan, defends the AKP and Erdoğan by emphasizing the virtue of being elected:

*Recently, those, who attacked immodestly to 'Turkish State and Government, to the elected leader, and to the popular will' in the newspapers they manage, in the columns they write and in the TV programs they make by cooperating in any case, are resigning voluntarily one by one. Word, lie, slander, blackmail and montage; to put it simply, apparatus is over for them! (Bulut, 03.08.2014, Star).*

The discourses of the 'elected leader' and 'popular will' act as a shield against critiques. Bulut talks about the 'attacks' in the media against the AKP and Erdoğan before the presidential elections and points out the 'parallel state' as an agent that applies aspersion, blackmail, etc. Given that those offenses exist in some cases; nevertheless, on the one hand, discursive choices such as popular will and being elected, on the other hand, wording like parallel state and 'attacks' may serve to fixation of the political positions. In this sense, this discourse can only belong to the criminal field, not to politics. Therefore, it restrains the field of political movement of the oppositional parties.

Use of the notions like 'the nation', 'the people', and 'popular will' on behalf of the AKP and Erdoğan became increasingly visible after the presidential elections. Also, all these concepts which fetishize 'being elected' were accepted as the kernel of the new Turkey. Reconstruction of the new Turkey once more is located upon the principles of anti-tutelage. As Taha Özhan argues, Erdoğan's presidency would mean the closure of the old

Turkey (28.08.2014, Star), which has already been claimed many times subsequent to each election. Moreover, both Özhan and Kütahyalı claim that the election strengthened the power of the nation and popular will in the new Turkey:

*With take-over today, Erdoğan, whose identity and past was registered through the choices of the nation, is becoming the president of the republic. If he wants to participate again in the election after 5 years, he has to appeal again to the nation to get their favor. Erdoğan is receiving the presidency of the republic from the state in the name of the nation. After 10 August, the nation strengthened its place in the center of the new Turkey. The address and the method was shown for all who want to do constitutive politics (Özhan, 28.08.2014, Star).*

*28 August 2014 is the first day when Çankaya was shaped through the will of the majority of the nation and this will was manifested in Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. The New Turkey Republic was also officially declared with Erdoğan moved to Çankaya (Kütahyalı, 29.08.2014, Sabah).*

While Özhan says that Erdoğan receives the presidency in the name of the nation, Kütahyalı goes one step further and claims that Erdoğan's presidency is the declaration of the foundation of the New Turkey Republic. The common opinion among columnists is that the AKP had been challenged by pro-tutelage actors until the presidential election. It is not a coincidence that the columnists picture every election as a battle between the AKP and illegitimate/illegal groups. The characterization of the opposition as the old Turkey actors who operationalize the tutelage system naturalizes the perception that the AKP succeeds in reflecting popular sovereignty despite all illegal interferences. Gezi protests and 17-25 December case were conceptualized in this way to indicate new constitutive others of the new Turkey. Esayan mentions these cases by comparing them with the 28 February period in his column titled "Yeni Türkiye'ye Hoşgeldiniz" [Welcome to the New Turkey] in which he talks about the role of the people and Erdoğan in the abolition of the 'new tutelage':

*In fact, we are experiencing a miracle which cannot be underestimated. In Gezi crisis and 17-25 coup, I looked at the situation, I saw how new*

*tutelage is powerful, how it spread everywhere and how it cultivated in each field, and I said “Erdoğan has gone!” Because, normally it has to be like this. I knew also this going will take a short time just as 28 February which was said that it would last millennium...But, in this interregnum, we would pay great prices as it was in 1990s after Özal [...] It did not like this... 30 March and the election yesterday also announced the victory of that (Esayan, 11.08.2014, Yeni Şafak).*

After the presidential election the same strategy continued among columnists. Etyen Mahçupyan alluded to Gülen’s parallel organization by referring to the non-politic attempts based on claims of corruption to hurt the AKP (07.10.2014, *AKP Döneminin Basit Gerçekleri, Akşam*) [Simple Facts of AKP Period], Burhanettin Duran claimed that pro-tutelage groups instrumentalized the Gezi protests, 17 December case, and Kobani demonstrations to overthrow government (17.10.2014, *Yeni Türkiye İmkanının Tehlikeleri, Sabah*) [Dangers of the Possibility of the New Turkey], and Erdal Tanas Karagöl alerted before the general election in 2015, against those who organized Gezi protests and 17-25 December ‘coup’ (02.04.2015, *Hedef Türkiye’nin Siyasi ve Ekonomik İstikrarı, Yeni Şafak*) [Political and Economic Stability of Turkey Become the Target]. At the same time, these attempts are located in a global context, and in that way the subject of the discourse of ‘the enemy’ becomes gradually ambiguous.

#### **4.2.1.2. Discourse of the ‘Global Forces’**

What dominates post-2013 Turkish politics is the discourse of internal and external forces which relocate the new Turkey approaches from domestic politics to the international realm. Instruments of the discursive struggle against Kemalism were definite: the AKP and Erdoğan utilized the discourse of liquidation of military tutelage and demilitarization of politics to fortify their power over state. Yet the Gezi protests and 17-25 December were not cases which the AKP was able to approach with the instruments of demilitarization or democratization. Rather, the AKP perceived those as coups and extended the list of actors behind them up to the international connections. Both discourse of tutelage and discourse of global forces were operationalized together as a political strategy. The discourse of tutelage, on the one hand, functions against

oppositional parties mostly in the election periods; on the other hand, the discourse of global forces was uttered whenever the AKP encountered a challenging condition. In this sense, the discourse of global forces is the more encompassing and also includes the discourse of tutelage. Before the presidential elections, Yiğit Bulut talks about the ‘internal and external coconspirators’:

*A reminder for those who try to test our right to life and those who will want to test it again; as long as this state and nation keep taking a step with the determination to shape a centuries old future, domestic and external coconspirators will be pale in comparison with this standing... Note: Post-10 August period will be more difficult for “the certain ones, parallels, coconspirators, domestic proxies and their Masters”... (Bulut, 03.08.2014, Star).*

As can be seen in the quotation, Bulut refers to a concept of the enemy which is intentionally left indefinite. By using the discourse of ‘parallels’, he certainly means the Gülenist in-state/parallel organization but as only a part of a bigger coalition which is guided by the ‘Masters’ outside. One day later in another column, Bulut similarly mentions those forces who want to prevent Turkey’s development (04.08.2014, Star). Bulut’s discursive strategy is more inclined to conspiracy-like argumentation than other columnists. Yet, regardless of habitus and fields, there emerged a tendency to apply conspiracy among the columnists when security concerns started to haunt the political field. İbrahim Karagül also, in a very similar manner with Bulut, declared the new Turkey’s power against global forces and ‘international projects’:

*So, is the New Turkey a hollow slogan? Is it a language for mass communication in accordance with the daily accounts of a political party? If so, this nation and all of us will be disappointed. But it is not like that. It should not be like that and it will not. Because, the history forces us. The geography forces us. Our selves and identities force us. In the presence of this comprehension, we will not let any world power and international project make us step back and lower our head (Karagül, 30.08.2014, Yeni Şafak).*

A more ambiguous image of the enemy opens a path to reconstruct public opposition in terms of the 'we' and 'they' dualism. When a columnist talks about an indefinite 'third person plural', he does not need to specify who consists of that 'they'. Such wording, like a package, enables columnists to freely codify the opposition or social movements as enemies of the new Turkey and in that way, they are criminalized before the public opinion. This strategy is apparent in Markar Esayan's articles both after the presidential election in 2014 and before the general election on 7 June 2015:

*Because, in Gezi crisis and the process of 17-25 December Coup, the main purpose was to break Erdoğan's connection with his party and to split the party. They relied on deputies of (Gülen) community in the party, dissatisfaction of the deputies who completed three periods, and feeling of horror which was produced in these two crisis. Dominant crisis would have stupefied the party and dropped Erdoğan's guard, and the separation would have taken place. Any kind of madness including picking a civil war was ventured (Esayan, 28.08.2014, Yeni Şafak).*

*[...] Now this grassroots movement based on less Westernized disadvantaged religious section reached to the limit. The limits of us and the West... The limit of the West necessitated them to start a war against this movement and its leader with the slogan of "Enough! The people should not have a say anymore!" In fact, Cain wants to annihilate Abel again. Either we will pass this threshold or will be dispersed towards an uncertain process. But, the history will never repeat itself. [...] That the whole world took position against this grassroots movement is because of the the fact that the world will re-find the change where it already experienced the change in 1914. Ottoman was a reality and shaped the world. Our collective memory is calling us to the place where the incident happened. The murderer is also there. We encountered and we cannot turn back anymore (Esayan, 07.06.2015, Yeni Şafak).*

Here, Esayan utilizes the passive voice to emphasize intention of the enemy but not the enemy itself. He perceives the 'Gezi crisis' and '17-25 December coup' as a part of a bigger plan which could cause even a civil war. In the latter quotation, Esayan points to 'the West' and the whole world as if they all are against this 'grassroots movement'. Apart from the 'whole world', even 'the West' is not a clear-cut concept. The discursive

construction of the whole world and the West as an enemy and comparison with 1914 reveals Esayan's strategy, which is to reconceptualize the general election as if it were a real war. This strategy has everything to do with the changing perception of the new Turkey after the vital political crisis in 2013. As I mentioned earlier, new Turkey discourse has been transformed from claims of democratization and peace-building to total struggle against internal and external challengers of the state (or the new Turkey). This situation of paranoia strengthens the polarization politics of the AKP and constrains politics once more on the axis of national power and global forces. To put it another way, this cannot be called politics anymore, since it imposes a permanent situation of vigilance. As İbrahim Karagül claims, even power struggle in Turkey does not have local motivations, but rather should be seen as a part of global operation against rising of Erdoğan and the new Turkey:

*[...] There will emerge also an extraordinary resistance. Did this resistance already drag Turkey into crisis to crisis? In fact, the fight, which we saw as the domestic power struggle, is happening right here. Gezi uprising, encouraging Alevis to the riot, and de facto involvement of the 'ally' Western intelligences in this organization was the struggle of stopping the transformation in Turkey and its march to the future. While doing so, the masses were provoked with a great anger towards Erdoğan on the basis of terror in streets and dignity of Erdoğan was targeted. Erdoğan would be fallen out of favor with the people of Turkey, the pioneers of this great march would be eliminated together with Erdoğan, and the country would be squeezed in a nation-state pattern which is intrinsic to 20<sup>th</sup> century by being caged again in the borders of Anatolia [...] In other words, both Turkey and the geography would be kept away from this new political rising and power accumulation, and tutelage and hegemony would maintain (Karagül, 20.01.2015, Yeni Şafak).*

Where Karagül targets Western Intelligence services, Özhan emphasizes Western-oriented oppositional discourse and resorts to the analogy of war, as the others did:

*On the other hand, the second axis, on the ground of mostly a secular political theology, is the oppositional discourse which was constructed through translation from the West. This approach which 'shoots over the*

*shoulders of other capital cities to the government of its own country' was much more uncontrolled (Özhan, 14.03.2015, Star).*

Considering the opposition as on the side of the global forces creates, one way or another, a perception of treachery. As is already clear, one can see the discourse of global forces in any case in which the AKP government faced challenges. Same strategy can be traced in particular cases. After the Soma disaster in which 301 mineworkers died because of a fire in a coal mine, Markar Esayan talked about those who wanted to start a civil war by abusing the disaster:

*There is a serious psychological warfare in the social and certain media. They went as far as even to write about their wishes to pick a civil war. The aim is to oppress the people under the feeling of anger, violence, fear and horror, and to unbalance the politics. If this is achieved, we surrender to chaos and this chaos always avails to the unfavorable side. Difficulty of those periods, while fighting for the workers' rights or the injustice, is not to be wasted by those who want to abuse this situation (Esayan, 18.05.2014, Yeni Şafak).*

Esayan evades the critiques which claim that disaster happened as a consequence of AKP's neglect by generalizing abusive examples in the media and having recourse to conspiracy. Interestingly enough, Esayan continues his article by claiming that this is a war of sovereignty and that the AKP must take this 'century-long oligarchy' seriously. To define post-2013 new Turkey discourse, nothing can be a better example than this state of mind which can link the critiques directed to the AKP about the Soma disaster to the century-long oligarchy. In a similar way, after rescuing 49 hostages from ISIS (Islamic State of Iraq and Syria) in the Mosul Consulate, while İbrahim Karagül refers to those who watch for an opportunity to make an uproar and who want to stop the rise of the new Turkey as a part of a bigger international project, according to Murat Çemrek, who is an academic and think-tank researcher, ISIS itself is a challenge against the new Turkey:

*What do you think those who busted MIT trucks and impose the idea of that 'Turkey supports terror' think about now? What do they feel? Which*



*project were they part of? Was there a relationship between hostage case and this raid? What kind of a relationship was there between making a fuss of that "Turkey supports ISIS" for months in the Western press and these raids? (Karagül, 21.09.2014, Yeni Şafak).*

*Because, the existence of ISIS in itself is a challenge against the New Turkey which was produced in consequence of reshaping Turkish foreign policy by AK Party governments. In fact, what does this happenings mean other than the questioning of the New Turkey with ISIS? (Çemrek, 27.09.2014, Star Açık Görüş).*

There is no single sphere in which the discourse of global forces did not spread. Before 2013, the obstacle before the peace process was Kemalism and the old Turkey. Yet Esayan talks about internal and external tutelage structures (22.03.2015, *Barış ve Yeni Türkiye En Kritik Safhasında* [Peace and The New Turkey are in the Most Critical Phase], Yeni Şafak) and several intelligence services directed by a 'superior mind' who want to sabotage the peace process and the new Turkey (23.03.2015, *Yeni Türkiye'nin Formülü ve Kandil'in Tercih* [Formula of The New Turkey and Qandil's Choice], Yeni Şafak). Especially after 2015, from the bottom to the top of the government, many columnists and commenters in the media, regardless of their status, adopted the discourse of the 'superior mind'. Cases which cannot be explained with established conceptual tools are associated with this concept of the 'enemy without a marker'. Likewise, the discourse of 'superior mind' signifies a hypervigilant mode of thinking and a continuous state of emergency for the political field. As the name implies, 'superior mind' is the acceptance of the idea that a certain subject -it may be a country, a group, or an organization- is superior to all others, and therefore that it is capable of designing the whole world system. Moreover, this subject is never identified, because its power comes from this unidentifiability. To use the discourse of superior mind functions both to abdicate responsibility in any inefficacy of the AKP and also to make people gather around Erdoğan and the AKP against the attacks of that superior mind.

Yiğit Bulut is one of the pioneers of that strategy. Different from the other columnists, Bulut has usually talked about the financial forces arrayed against the new Turkey since

he was promoted to president Erdoğan's chief advisor responsible for the economy in 2014. To portray the threats against Erdoğan and the new Turkey, he uses different descriptions. Besides the rhetoric of 'superior mind', 'external forces' and 'global operations', Bulut talked about the 'interest rate lobby' many times in TV programs, columns, and interviews after Erdoğan brought forward the manipulative influence of this lobby and its relation with the Gezi Park protests. The interest rate lobby, like the superior mind, is an enemy of Turkey which cannot be defined by referring to particular subjects. In his article after the general election on 1 October 2015, Bulut signals the defeat of the 'dark order' which feeds on financial manipulations:

*My dear friends, don't be scared! Take it easy but don't be relax! Those dark days and the equations in which political outcomes were obtained through economic-financial manipulations will not come back once more... The DARK ORDER, which they established, was destroyed irrecoverably and the new EQUATION and ORDER, in which the real owners of this country produce and get fair share from their production, is establishing... [...] The 'spoiled children' of Turkey assume that THIS ORDER goes like that and they pocket again trillion dollars under the name of trivial interest, commission etc. by RAISING POLITICAL UNREST... (Bulut, 23.11.2015, Star).*

Also, in different columns, Bulut 'reveals' different economic forces that are operating against local production. According to Bulut, the new great Turkey's power will be based on the development of 'local and national' producers. He appeals to the very common-sensical argument: "we can produce local products but it is blocked". This strategy can be traced in two different columns:

*The truths, which I tried to write above but told only one percent of, become notorious among our all producers whom we call "Anatolian (economic) capital" which is "out of the borders of Byzantium" and they proceed on their way by choosing a strategy like "let it be small, let them not intervene with us, let us feel comfortable". Those, who stay in the borders of Byzantium, furnish the money through AB treaties and keep TÜSİAD and TOBB, do not give the life chance to these men (Bulut, 25.07.2014, Star).*

*Turkish firms can produce “from mobile phone to a lot of products which we bought with a price of billions of dollars for the defense industry”, but they do not want to get involve into the way of “branding, emerging, growing and competing” as a result of fears, pressures, and direct-indirect sanctions. As I also wrote above, they are BEWARING OF. Dear friends, let’s ask at this point: Where, whom and how does the pressure come from? The pressures are domestic and foreign! (Bulut, 27.03.2015, Star).*

Bulut imposes a vision based on categories of a Byzantine and an Anatolian capital, and in that way, he indicates the internal and external structures which work against the new Turkey economy. Using of the concept of Byzantium is not a coincidence: It implies both what is called ‘Istanbul capital’ (Istanbul sermayesi) and its international connections. In other words, the conflict between the Anatolian capital and the Byzantine (Istanbul) capital represents the competition in the market between local firms whose owners are mostly conservative and religious people and Istanbul-centered companies whose owners are usually seen as secular and as engaged with the old Turkey. Accordingly, local producers cannot compete with foreign economic powers because of pressures and sanctions which aim to stop Turkey’s economic growth.

Bulut also speaks of a bigger system which has the ability to control the media, military, and economy. According to him, all these interventions were made to design Turkey since the beginning of the republic until Erdoğan came to power. Interestingly, Bulut blames this foreign coalition for military tutelage in Turkey:

*In 1980, the same system worked again and the ORDER, which trapped Turkey again through the “soldier’s bayonet” in 1960, this time used the same means. We witnessed that the method in the period between 1980 and 2003 was simplified, but the structure worked exactly the same including 28 February and attempts of electronic coup. The core of the system was always the same: the elements such as “the order outside-the derivative proxies inside, created media-virtual public opinion” shaped Turkey in a way as they want by also using the army as the LAST IRONER (son ütücü) (Bulut, 31.08.2014, Star).*

Indeed, in many of the columns after 2013, the emphasis on Kemalism as ‘responsible for the sins of the past’ evaporated. Bulut talks about the military tutelage as a kind of ‘proxy’ of the external powers. The notion of ‘the order’, which Bulut writes in capital letters, substitutes for all the images of the enemy which I have discussed so far. In another column, his choices of the word to define the enemy become differentiated:

*6- Today also SOME MEMBERSHIP AND ALLIANCE processes, which are pumped by the “placed thinkers-speakers-writers” in the Turkish public opinion, is the continuation of the same “trick” as long as THEY ARE NOT GROUNDED. The greatest success of Mr. Erdoğan is ‘his realization of this trick’ and his decisive actions to make Turkey ORGANIC by taking the INORGANIC one out of the pot. 7- Ergenekon and similar organizations mean to stop ESTABLISHED MECHANISMS, which was constructed by the English and recently the Germans, by saying that “let this system not deteriorate, let it stay in the pot, let us use it whatever we want and, let it not plant by returning to the soil” and mean to take the hands of the ESTABLISHMENT “suffocating us”, off our throat... (Bulut, 09.11.2014, Star).*

This text includes the historical ‘German and English plot’ against Turkey and Erdoğan’s success in ruining their plans. It is worth recalling that both texts were written after the presidential election in which Erdoğan won. Here, what Bulut calls inorganic Turkey substitutes for the old Turkey and signifies a break with its essence and a sort of dependency on foreign countries. Conversely, organic Turkey is a reflection of the new Turkey and marks its independent and essential character. Finally, this reveals another categorical antagonism, which is between organic and inorganic. As a continuation of the concept of the order, Bulut conceptualizes ‘the establishment’, again in capital letters, to show what made Turkey inorganic in the past. Of course, what is to be done to point out changing enemies by both Yiğit Bulut and all the other columnists which are mentioned in this section is a herald of one last strategy, which is a discourse of imperial claims consisting of grand narratives, as I am going to show in the next section.

#### **4.2.2. Imperial Claims: Discourse of Restoration of the Republic or Symbolic Re-foundation of the Ottoman Empire**

*Turkey, led by the ELECTED PRESIDENCY OF THE REPUBLIC-CHIEF COMMANDER, departed to define “a new concept of national defense which is worthy of the world state” and is elaborating it technically! Frankly, Turkey now “came into play” in every field. Since this departure will discomfort those who want to push in the one, which “broke the shell of itself”; a new “NATIONAL STRATEGY”, which suits the departure, should be developed and is being developed very meticulously and faster.. (Bulut, 01.09.2014, Star).*

This quotation from Bulut’s column is a good way of summarizing what I am going to discuss in this section. It covers almost all elements of the thematic changes of the new Turkey discourse. The expansion of the constitutive others of the new Turkey from domestic actors to international actors had an influence on the claims of the new Turkey. While the new Turkey had been a name of a democratization project based on demilitarization, it shifted to the discursive instrument of bigger claims after the end of 2013. The globalization of Turkey’s enemies means the globalization of the new Turkey itself. Therefore, the content of new Turkey discourse becomes fantasized as it becomes globalized. Furthermore, the new Turkey started to represent a desire to turn back to the ‘old’ times when the Ottoman Empire was powerful. More clearly, the period after 2013 is a period of will to have a voice in world politics again, just as it was in the Ottoman case. In this period, the concern is not to re-establish the Ottoman Empire in a real sense; instead, the Ottoman Empire is used allegorically to portray claims of the new Turkey in the direction of 2023.

In the light of this background narrative, I am going to show different strategies and perceptions which shape new Turkey discourse: On the one hand, the claims of the new Turkey turn out to be grand narratives such as the discourse of civilization, discourse of the ideal (dava söylemi), restoration of the republic, becoming a world state and global power, etc. On the other hand, there is the discourse of cult of leadership accompanied by presidential elections.

#### 4.2.2.1. Analogy of the First World War

The candidacy of Erdoğan in presidential elections is presented as the beginning of a new era for Turkey. This is the period which is mostly compared with the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire in respect to the First World War. One hundred years after the beginning of the war, Erdoğan's presidency is seen as a chance to recover from a 100-year old break in Turkish history. In this sense, new Turkey discourse is produced as a continuation of the Ottoman period, and interestingly enough, 2014 is regarded as the end of an era which began with the war in 1914. Both Kütahyalı and Karagül appeal to the same comparison before the election:

*In this confusion, nobody paid attention to the young with black hair who were moving around there. 19-years old Gavrilo Princip was one of 6 organization members who is determined to kill Arşidük. Princip quickly drew his pistol, walked and approached to back of the car stopping and fired two shots. The first bullet hit Arşidük by the neck and pierced his neck vein. The other bullet hit the stomach of the duchess. It was exactly 10:50. This incident, which happened 100 years ago today, was the last straw. The biggest war, which history of humankind witnessed, started that day. We declared that we take place in this war at 29 October 1914. 29 October 1914 was sort of the date of death of the Ottoman. 9 years later, a brand-new Turkey state would be born in again a day of 29 October. Now, also 100 years after 1914, we are experiencing the birth pains of the Republic of the New Turkey (Kütahyalı, 28.06.2014, Sabah).*

*Prime Minister Erdoğan, in the presentation of the Document of Vision which was prepared for his Presidential candidacy, was especially emphasizing the fact that the republic had been founded after Ottoman and Seljuk Empire and he was being strongly applauded. The First World War. A century passed over it. Within this time period, 100 years after the incident, which had started the war that Anatolian people and near abroad fought over, the slogans of the "New Turkey", the "Vanguard Turkey", the "Great Turkey"... (Karagül, 12.07.2014, Yeni Şafak).*

According to Kütahyalı, just like the foundation of the republic, we are experiencing the birth pain of the new Turkey state. Again, he uses the discourse of the new Turkey as if a new state is being established. İbrahim Karagül, on the other side, emphasizes the same

war but does so by referring to the Erdoğan's speech from the 'document of vision'. The presidential election campaign of Erdoğan started with this 'document of vision', which includes the objectives of the new Turkey. As Karagül mentions, it designates a vision of a new and great Turkey as a world leader for the election. Furthermore, the document of vision indicates symbolic years such as 2023, 2053 and 2071, which imply respectively the centenary of the foundation of the republic, the anniversary of the conquest of İstanbul, and that of the battle of Manzikert after which Turks settled in Anatolia. Of course, this document of vision also influenced the way new Turkey discourse is uttered. Departing from democratization and demilitarization, the AKP and Erdoğan re-conceptualized the new Turkey in an imperial manner. After 2013, as I discussed in the previous sections, the AKP's recourse to the discourse of nationalization against 'non-national' opponents brought about a discourse of returning back to 'our essence', which eventually resulted in Ottoman references in politics. Hatice Karahan, who is an academic and think-tank researcher, points out the rise of the new Turkey by referring to statements of the second sultan of the Ottoman Empire:

*"Each state has two wings as material and spiritual. If these two wings are strong, victory never ceases. But, if one of the wings is broken, apart from the victory, the state cannot escape from falling". This advice, which had been a lesson to Orhan Bey, later on has been spread to numerous generations for centuries. It has become a magical formula behind a great nation's making a magnificent history. The advice, for that nation, rushes to help not only when the nation rises but also when its wing is broken. It becomes a sacred formula and provides to stand up and to fly. And that nation reaches today's Turkey by crossing very long years and roads. The year is 2014... Ankara, the capital of the Republic of Turkey, is witnessing the hopeful and fresh efforts for modern conquest under the name of the "New Turkey" (Karahan, 23.08.2014, Yeni Şafak).*

What Karahan described as 'the modern conquest' is a reflection of the changing parameters of the new Turkey discourse. The notion of conquest draws a direct analogy with the Ottoman period and indicates the imperial vision of the new Turkey. Very similarly, one can observe the unification of the new Turkey discourse among columnists

on the basis of Ottoman references. Rahim Er, who is a journalist, also compares the current condition with 1914 and considers the new Turkey as an opportunity of reckoning with that period when the Ottoman Empire was defeated:

*One century ago, 1914 is the year when we lost the State of Osman's Ancestry (Devleti âli Osman) which the West named as 'empire' as a mumpsimus. Everything was finished in the First World War. The following ones, Lozan and etc. is nothing other than the registration of the loss on the table. Today we are talking about what we were at 1914. It is a big accounting of the collective conscience [...] The issue of the New Turkey is deep. Both everyone and also the state elites should never overlook that the "New Turkey" is never the aim or the Red Apple (Kızıl Elma). The New Turkey is the entrance gate, gateway and security gate of 2023 the Great Turkey. 2023 the Great Turkey is also entrance gate of 26 August 2071 Turkey the World State. Yes, it must be understood. Here we are saying the sentence which we assumed that it is anticipated: we happen to turn back to 30 March 1909, which is a date one day before 31 March. The Great state is a state which has the great dreams, targets, aims and long plans (Er, 05.09.2014, Türkiye).*

His column is full of symbolic dates which reflects the perception of the new Turkey as a continuation of the Ottoman period. Moreover, Rahim Er makes an analogy with a riot known as the 31 March Incident which was suppressed by the Committee of Union and Progress and resulted in the dethronement of Sultan Abdülhamit. He displays the historical imperative that the seeds of the new Turkey are rooted in the Ottoman spirit. The new Turkey is now perceived as a recovery of the First World War period. In this sense, being new is redefined with reference to the distant past and even instrumentalized on the way of becoming a world state. Therefore, when the Ottoman period is referred to in the context of the new Turkey, what is actually implied is not a political, social and cultural newness but a sort of resurrection of the Empire's values.

#### **4.2.2.2. Restoration of the Republic**

Besides the perception of historical continuity with the Ottoman period, the new Turkey was operationalized as a restoration of the republic. Of course, this is not to argue that



the discourse of restoration is not independent from the Ottoman influence. With a small difference, restoration implies that the republic has been deviated from and should be re-established on the basis of local and national values. The republic as a nation-state is no longer seen as an adequate system to have an influence in global politics, especially in the Middle East. Instead, new Turkey discourse announces the reconceptualization of the republic as a world state. Yiğit Bulut compares the opportunity which the new Turkey is confronted after 100 years with the early republican period in terms of nation-building:

*[...] The Republic of Turkey has “identified a new living space” in the beginning of 1900s and has continued in this path for almost 100 years. Now we are in the beginning of 2000s, it has been 100 years and the identified space is too small for us now. Is there any solution other than identifying a new space? Or, instead of defining the NEW LIVING SPACE, is your choice to continue to stay in the “constructed barriers of fear” with an understanding of “be it small, be it belongs to some people”? Dear friends, those, who tried to create ‘a new state’ out of a legacy of the empire in the beginning of 1900, had to “identify a state and a nation” in conditions of war dynamics. In their attempts, they made “identification” out of the residuals of a 700-year-old enormous empire and after they started to the endeavor of “nation-building”. The attempts were lacking but it was not possible to do better in those days. After 100 years, pendulum of the history fell on us again and “change of identifications” and expansion of their scope was unavoidable while the new world order is established. What is done today is JUST THAT. Turkey is DESTROYING THE WALLS in every field and is identifying a new living space for its “NEW CENTURY” (Bulut, 04.07.2014, Star).*

According to Bulut, this vision of the republic cannot comply with the ‘new world order’; therefore, there is a necessity of redefining a new life space for the new Turkey. In this period, what can be traced in the columns is an expansion of Turkey not in terms of homeland but in terms of claims and zone of influence. That is to say, since the notion of greatness is not countable and measurable, it symbolically functions to constitute a new understanding concerning the new Turkey claims as Turkey turned its direction to former Ottoman territories. The new Turkey then means to transcend the mental barriers of the

republic. Similar to Bulut's manner, Markar Esayan considers Turkey as the Ottoman legacy and talks about historical necessity:

*Turkey is not an ordinary country. It is a residual of the empire which was multicultural and had multi vassals. And the world peace is still being threatened in the lands where The Ottoman had dominated once upon a time. We have an experience based on heavy costs we have paid. For this reason, one should not fall into the mistake of assuming that the independence process, which has taken place for the last 12 years, is only composed of Turkey. Turkey cannot escape from its role and responsibilities in its region even if it wants to do. In this sense, changing mentality of foreign politics is important. Turkey definitely will have an important role. It is about the fact that who will decide this role and in which mentality this role will be instrumentalized. We are not going to resurrect the Ottoman. It is not even possible. We are just making peace with our history and rehabilitating the 100 year-old amnesia period. We are also recalling ourselves, overcoming the alienation and complexes of 100 years, and recalling our potential arising from our multiculturalism and adapting them to today (Esayan, 16.07.2014, Yeni Şafak).*

Esayan perceives the 12 years of the AKP power as an independence process. In this sense, the new Turkey means the rehabilitation of a 100-year-old alienation process. Esayan's strategy is very common: The republican period is a break with the religious values of the Ottoman period and the AKP government brings back those values by reconciling the country with its history. In a very similar manner, Burhanettin Duran, who is an academic and think-tank researcher, defines the new Turkey as a desire to live the year of 1920 in today's conditions:

*Definitely AK Party is the most successful party of our political history. Because, AK Party had a chance to both transform and also to periodize the Turkey politics. It showed a will to lead the country to a new position inside and outside with the discourse of the New Turkey. This discourse was turned into a framework vision to make the masses embrace the transformation after 2009 Davos and 2010 referendum. It refers to the constitutive agency of Erdoğan the President of the Republic. This is a desire to live 1920 again in today's conditions... In other words, it is an objective of re-founding the Republic... Each constitutive mission has to convey a new language to the masses and elites... Nowadays, the New*

*Turkey discourse, which Prime Minister Davutoğlu contributed by saying “restoration”, is in the way of becoming the language of a hegemonic politics (Duran, 02.09.2014, Sabah).*

According to Duran, the new Turkey’s aim is to re-establish the republic, which is called ‘restoration’ by Ahmet Davutoğlu. Of course, the fact that Ahmet Davutoğlu, who was a former minister of foreign affairs, became prime minister, affected the discursive change of the new Turkey. Davutoğlu put forward a claim of ‘becoming a regional power’ when he was the minister of foreign affairs and this ideal shaped the foreign policy of Turkey. As prime minister, he set the discourse of restoration and civilization to work in order to hold regional claims. According to Hüseyin Yayman, the new Turkey is a goal of reaching the level of contemporary civilization (02.09.2014, Vatan); in another column, Burhanettin Duran claims that Erdoğan’s presidency and Davutoğlu’s prime ministry correspond to the power of civilization discourse (22.08.2014, Sabah). According to Tanıl Bora, Davutoğlu considers that Turkey has an imperial responsibility in regions once under Ottoman rule (Bora, 2017, p. 482). This is consistent with what I quoted from Markar Esayan above, stating that Turkey has inevitable responsibilities in the region as a consequence of being the Ottomans’ legacy.

Also, İbrahim Karagül, with his specific enthusiastic tone, interprets Erdoğan’s presidency as a part of the historical path of the Turkish nation by referring to the Ottoman, Seljuk and early republican periods:

*Think about today’s developments as not for one day but together with the historical progress and fate of a nation. Only then you can make out how the assessments of what happened today will become after 10 years and 50 years. Only then you will understand that after the Ottoman, the republic project has entered the new period, that this has been a new constitution, and that this historical period has raised its own historical figures and pioneers. You will understand that in Turkey politics, the valid references are now historical figures like Sait Halim Paşa, Nizamülmülk and Alparslan and that those, who cannot go beyond tribe politics, will not be able to be the political character in the today’s and tomorrow’s Turkey. You will understand that the coalescence of the Ottoman accumulation*

*and Seljukian will be influential and that this magnificent wealth has started the magnificent rising period after the First World War as it was after the Crusades and Mongolian invasion. Brave people make the history. People, who are not scared and who do not trill, lead the nations. Both the new political language and also social expectation of Turkey reached to this highness. We saw this also in the handover ceremony of the presidency of the republic. The interest of the world, self-confidence of the country, and tears of the people who watch the ceremony in their homes and streets in fact was an image of a deep missing and a dream which has been raised for years. Turkey carried out handover ceremony as worthy of a world state. I am sure that the messages of this transformation was noted carefully in many capital cities (Karagül, 30.08.2014, Yeni Şafak).*

In this long quotation, one can see the presentation of Erdoğan's presidency as a 100-year-old dream, as a new establishment of the republic, and as a reflection of the world state. Karagül refers to the historical figures of the Ottoman Empire and Seljuk Empire, which signifies the new conceptualization of the new Turkey discourse. Contrary to the period before 2014, the new Turkey shifted from a democratization policy to the ideal of becoming a world state. In this period, 'new' is accompanied by the word 'great'. Thereby, unlike the old one, it is seen that the new and great Turkey has responsibilities which reach beyond the borders by force of being a world state.

#### **4.2.2.3. Claims of Being a Regional Power**

The perception of the new Turkey as a world power has some implications for foreign policy. As I discussed briefly, Turkey's historical necessity in the Ottoman territory is reflected in the Syria crisis. As a consequence of Turkey's being a world state; the AKP and Erdoğan claim to represent the oppressed people all over the world. After 2014, the AKP government actively supported oppositional jihadist groups in Syria against the regime, which increased Turkey's intervention in Middle East politics. Furthermore, hosting over 3 million Syrian migrants enabled Erdoğan to discursively represent the claim of justice at an international level. In this sense, the new Turkey started to represent global justice towards oppressed people. This is exemplified in the column of Erdal Tanas Karagöl who is an academic and think-tank researcher:

*For example, regarding the Iraq and Syria chaos in its border, Turkey both became a model country and also gained an important prestige in the eyes of the oppressed people and the weak countries with its justice and right-based approach. As a secure country, Turkey, in which almost 2 million Syrian citizens found asylum thanks to the open door policy for Syrian civil war which many countries stayed silent and insensitive, has relieved around 4.5 billion dollars from the budget until today. Erdoğan, who utters in every platform the human tragedy in Syria, took important actions to secure the global justice and peace. Criticizing the decision mechanism of BM with the statement of “the world is bigger than 5”, he advocated that other countries and people, notably Islamic countries must have a voice in the global economy and politics (Karagöl, 08.01.2015, Yeni Şafak).*

Karagöl emphasizes both the amount of assistance for Syrian asylum-seekers and Erdoğan's objection against the United Nations, implying that Turkey has the power to influence global issues. Moreover, what is more significant is that Turkey is now capable of representing other weak Islamic countries in global politics. In this sense, it is accepted that the new Turkey's role is being a spokesman for the oppressed people of the world. This was also declared in the election manifesto of the AKP before the general election on 7 June 2015. That manifesto can trace the effects of the prime ministry of Ahmet Davutoğlu, since it includes political strategies which reach beyond Turkey. According to Ufuk Ulutaş, who is an academic and think-tank researcher in SETA, the election manifesto reflects Davutoğlu's vision about the new Turkey:

*The fact that a declaration of a political party, which concerns its voters, includes the statements which also concerns the Balkans, the Middle Asia, the Middle East and Latin America, briefly the whole world is important in terms of indicating both the depth mentioned above and also the central role of Turkey attributed by Davutoğlu. It is possible to read the text not only as a contract which is made with the citizens of the New Turkey, but also as a pact which is made with the people in the geographies in which Turkish foreign policy is influential (Ulutaş, 17.04.2015, Akşam).*

It can be observed that the new Turkey's promises transcend the people of Turkey and address the whole world. Ulutaş argues that the new Turkey's realist goal is to be a global

force which is capable of having an influence on foreign politics. In this period, political strategies are determined according to regional and global dynamics. This also applies to Turkey's domestic politics. Similarly, before the election, Etyen Mahçupyan analyzes the meaning of the new Turkey in terms of global relations:

*The second leg in terms the country envisagement reflects for Turkey the dream of not only being integrated to the world but also playing an ever-increasing international role. Whereas the integration makes individuals and institutions the world citizen, the objective in the interstate platform is to transform Turkey into a country which cannot be excluded in almost every global problem. This does not imply that Turkey must directly intervene and play a role in the conflicts necessarily. But it reflects to 'be in the loop' and to be considered as far as possible in the reconstruction of global balances. The third dimension concerning the territorial role and position of the 'New Turkey' reflects the qualitative leap of what is mentioned above. It is possible to call this briefly as 'global prestige'. Turkey, which is envisaged by AKP, will seek for being a part of the 'big game' with both its power and also what it stands for (Mahçupyan, 14.04.2015, Akşam).*

According to Mahçupyan, the new Turkey envisions an international role for Turkey and its citizens. Turkey would function as the intervening party in the construction of world politics. Mahçupyan defines the objective of the new Turkey as to reach global esteem. According to İbrahim Karagül, Turkey is no longer just an Anatolian state, but a country which 'lends a hand' to countries from Asia to Africa (20.01.2015, Yeni Şafak). With reference to the Ottoman ideal, the aim is to produce a well-esteemed image of Turkey in the global arena. What Mahçupyan defines as being part of 'the big game' accounts to such concern. For the first time since the Ottoman period, desire of being influential country was materialized in the new Turkey claims after 2014. Karagül expressed this the desire in a sentimental way after Erdoğan became the president of the republic:

*When you know that our concern is not a piece of land but is honor and dignity, you will understand then what this ideal is. Only then you will know what the pain and aches, which we buried in our hearts, is. Only then you will understand our concern. You do not need to go back to the far dates.*

*It has not been even a hundred year since all of these. These experiences are considered to be happen 'today' in the wide date range. For this reason, we are talking about not the past but today (Karagül, 30.08.2014, Yeni Şafak).*

Karagül locates the new Turkey in a rhetoric of ideal (dava). The ideal is one of the early rhetorics of the Turkish political right. Mostly nationalists use it in the meaning of the ideal of pan-Turkism. Karagül, on the other hand, uses the notion of the ideal by referring to becoming a pioneer in all spheres in the world and calls for mobilization for this new Turkey ideal. In fact, his inspiration is Erdoğan's speech at the extraordinary congress of the AKP after the presidential election. Erdoğan defines the AKP's political existence as a 'blessed ideal' and what matters is the ideal itself, not the actors who carry it. Both Abdülkadir Selvi (28.08.2014, Yeni Şafak) and Markar Esayan (28.08.2014, Yeni Şafak) directly cite Erdoğan's words in the congress.

#### **4.2.3. Discourse of the Leadership and the Presidential System**

The period beginning from the presidential election, Erdoğan's presidency, and later the AKP congress in which Davutoğlu was appointed to the prime ministry was the forerunner of new political norms. As I discussed in the new tutelage section, Erdoğan's candidacy was presented as the representation of the popular will. This had another implication: the AKP staff and its organic actors in the media started to equate Erdoğan with the people and the state itself more than ever before. Hence, Erdoğan's fortune was identified with the 'continuity of the state'. Erdoğan's presidential candidacy is one reason for this shift of emphasis towards Erdoğan in the public opinion. Additionally, the Gezi protests and 17-25 December case were perceived by the AKP side as if both cases targeted Erdoğan. In this sense, there emerged an invitation in the pro-government media to unite around Erdoğan in order to protect the privileges which they had gained through Erdoğan's policies. Everyone on the AKP side came to agree that Erdoğan by himself represents the claims of the new Turkey. The new Turkey, as a practical discursive strategy, this time started to refer to Erdoğan's powerful presidency. Before

the presidential election, Markar Esayan and İbrahim Karagül conceived the new Turkey based on Erdoğan's power as follows:

*Isn't it everything is clear? Erdoğan's presidential discourse in fact is like a proclamation of a new state. It is like an announcement of the re-foundation of the Republic after a hundred year. A collective conscience is being built. A construction of future, which is welcomed by Turkey society effusively, is being undertaken. This long road is being walked with the brave steps of the brave people and the masses is following them. This is not only about Erdoğan. This is Turkey. It is the truths which this nation has had to gulp it back and never could have told throughout the history of the Republic (Karagül, 12.07.2014, Yeni Şafak).*

*If Turkey solves its domestic problems and makes its state right and people-centered, it has a potential to become a hope and model for the Middle East. Vision of the New Turkey and the fact that Erdoğan is able to stay in power imply this. Çankaya, 2015 election and consolidation of AK Party around Erdoğan in this ideal is something more than domestic politics of Turkey, three-period limitation and who will be the prime minister. Therefore, the whole world is also in this process (Esayan, 16.07.2014, Yeni Şafak).*

According to Karagül, Erdoğan's presidency discourse sounds like a foundation for a new state or the re-establishment of the republic after 100 years. Moreover, he equates Erdoğan with Turkey and with a truth which has been repressed throughout the history of the republic. Associating Erdoğan with the whole country tacitly externalizes the opponents, since the enthusiasm of the masses is materialized in Erdoğan's power. In this sense, Karagül applies to the overgeneralization of the notion of the masses in favor of Erdoğan, which is often done in election periods. On the other side, Esayan presents Erdoğan as a meta-politic actor whose fate is vital for the new Turkey's future. This strategy implies that a possible defeat of Erdoğan in the election would ruin the Turkish state. In a similar vein, according to Erdal Tanas Karagöl, the people did not demand anybody other than Erdoğan to establish equal citizenship in Turkey:



*Improvements in all these fields have increased the quality of life of families in socio-economically low and middle level and also increased their expectations evenly. In Presidential election in 2007, the fact that the people wanted Erdoğan to continue his duty as the Prime Minister was derived from the belief that reforms and applications, which are required for the realization of equal citizenship, can only be achieved under the leadership of Erdoğan. This section of the society, which became more visible with the achievements, sees these achievements they gained in 12 years as milestones of the process which move towards equal citizenship in terms of social, political and economic rights. In this process, the meaning attributed to Erdoğan, who plays the most active role, is not only that he is a political leader but also that he represents the equality. Because, the process of finishing the privileges of a particular section has started with Erdoğan and the continuation of this process is associated with Erdoğan's becoming the President of the Republic in 2014 (Karagöl, 31.07.2014, Yeni Şafak).*

Karagöl implicitly talks about the conflict between secular and religious sections of the society and Erdoğan's role in ending the privileges of secular people. For that matter, the achievements of religious and conservative people after the AKP came to power are associated with Erdoğan's policies. Therefore, as Karagöl claims, Erdoğan's presidency would become the continuation of those egalitarian politics. With reference to the people's opinion, Karagöl emphasizes Erdoğan rather than the AKP as a pioneer of socio-economic and cultural achievements. The title of his column, *Yeni Türkiye'de Orta Sınıf ve Erdoğan* [Middle Class in the New Turkey and Erdoğan], confirms this strategy.

Along with the fact that Erdoğan won the election, the discourse of leadership became dominant in the political field. His new role as president of the republic was seen as above all decision-making mechanisms. Even though Erdoğan had to resign from his duty of AKP chairperson, he declared that he would continue to engage actively in politics as de facto AKP leader, contrary to the principle of impartiality in the constitution. Such an active role was already legitimized through tutelage discussions in the media, as discussed above. The fact that Erdoğan consolidated his power trivialized other AKP actors in terms of their political influence, and this produced a cult of leadership. Markar Esayan gives a clue about that leadership in two different columns:

*It is clear that each influential field including media includes hybridity in terms of the old and the new Turkey. Erdoğan is continuing to swim ably in an olympic pool with a pioneer group. We will see that honest and pro-New Turkey people will have started to join him with a fast adaptation. Erdoğan is founding the New AK Party of the New Turkey on the basis of a mentality dissidence. His party really shows prudence. History will write those who passes this phase without betraying Erdoğan and those who contributes. Because, this transition implies a something more than AK Party and the people are aware of everything, and they are waiting with the red card. We must be careful against those who want to muddy the water of the pool (Esayan, 18.08.2014, Yeni Şafak).*

*Erdoğan the President of the Republic is one of the politicians who understand the necessity of change. Therefore, the congress of yesterday implies in fact a symbolic farewell. AK Party is passing from being the New Party of the Old Turkey to the level of becoming the New Party of the New Turkey thanks to the courage and foresight of its leader and actually is taking required action not to experience once more the dramatic end of ANAP. Furthermore, contrary to expected, the process, with Yalçın Akdoğan's terms, is being carried out trouble-free as easy as falling of a log. This is a result of self-confidence a leader and of his principle to value his ideal above everything. Erdoğan did not reconcile with the new type of tutelage offers and did not make public's will, which is resigned to him, a matter of negotiation behind closed doors. He undertook a risky business and achieved the struggle. The most meaningful day of a political leader was happened yesterday because of this will. Consequently, Erdoğan is not going anywhere, rather he is coming back more powerfully. As of today, center of the politics has shifted to Çankaya. Don't be confused. This is the essence of the issue (Esayan, 28.08.2014, Yeni Şafak).*

In the first one, Esayan portrays Erdoğan's leadership by making an analogy of an olympic pool race. Esayan attributes a constitutive role to Erdoğan in terms of both the new Turkey and also the new AKP. His wording implies the characteristics of leadership which also could be seen as the one-man system. Accordingly, Esayan claims that the people will adapt and join Erdoğan's march on the way of the new Turkey and that those who do not betray Erdoğan will be marked in history. Indeed, what Esayan did is to portray a political field which cannot operate without referring to Erdoğan. In the second one, he points out similar depictions of Erdoğan's leadership. Claiming that popular sovereignty

was consigned to Erdoğan, he believes that Erdoğan has a monopoly on the representation of the popular sovereignty. Moreover, according to Esayan, the center of politics has shifted to Çankaya the presidential palace, which actually implies that the parliament is no longer influential than the decisions of Erdoğan. Also, Yiğit Bulut talks about leadership as the founder of a new system in Turkey:

*It happened also in Turkey just like this. The LEADERSHIP established the SYSTEM with the real owners of the territory and confidence, stability and production came up...Now there is a new Turkey and the LEADER, who is behind the actions taken in 12 years, is also the guarantee and driving force of actions which will be taken until 2023... (Bulut, 23.11.2015, Star).*

#### **4.2.3.1. Presidential System**

Bulut indicates the leadership (actually Erdoğan) as the driving force of the new Turkey. In effect, discussions on the leadership and the system are based on the discussion of the presidential regime. The presidential election in 2014 was seen the first step of the presidential regime and the election campaign was maintained together with the discourse of presidential regime. The presidential regime was emphasized as a vital system to reach the new and great Turkey. According to Bulut, the presidential regime will solve the problems which arise from the system of 'weak governments':

*Even though the "Presidential election" is discussed today in Turkey, before questioning the system to recall the main detail and opening up the issue of PRESIDENCY in detail, I want to make a clear detection: There is only reality underlying all problems of Turkey between 1938-2003: "weak governments, impotent Prime Ministers and most importantly A POWERFUL ESTABLISHED ORDER against them"! Dear friends, when it is looked at the topic of PRESIDENCY in accompany with this detection, the first answer, which we will give to those who ask "What will the Presidency bring" and who try to trivialize the topic, is very clear: Whoever is elected will come to power over %50 and will be accountable only to the Turkish people... Let me write clearer: The model of "weak governments" which the "ESTABLISHED ORDER" was accustomed to encounter especially until 2003 will be completely collapsed! Let me write down: Today the system is "far away from being perfect" but Prime Minister Erdoğan bridges the*

*gap of the system through his personality and the vote which he received... (Bulut, 04.08.2014, Star).*

Bulut claims that Erdoğan's power fills the deficiency of the former system, yet that for a more perfect system, a presidential regime is necessary. Both the presidential elections in 2014 and the general election in 2015 were seen as de facto election of the presidential regime. In this period, what the AKP side argued was that the new Turkey demands the presidential regime, since it was perceived as a desire to compete with global forces. Bulut defines the presidential regime as a part of the 'main doctrine':

*It actually appeared "what Turkish citizens will decide for" while Turkey is going to the polls. NEW GREAT POWERFUL TURKEY, PRESIDENTIAL system which will govern this TURKEY and NEW CONSTITUTION... Do we want or not! At this point, let me ask once more: What should the main doctrine, which will carry TURKEY to 2023 the centenary of our Republic, include? Let us get to the point and question together: 1- Turkey is on the verge of historical opportunities as a result of great change and interaction in all across the world! We need a new "thesis" a new "paradigm" which embraces the change in such a chaos-looking reality. I call this as "the main doctrine for transition to 2023 great Turkey". THIS DOCTRINE cannot be separated from the concepts of PRESIDENCY AND NEW CONSTITUTION and they must be questioned together! (Bulut, 18.02.2015, Star).*

Insistence on the presidential regime is consistent with the globalization of the enemy concept and thus the globalization of the claims. At the same time, it becomes apparent that new Turkey claims are transferred to the 2023 symbolism. At this point, whether is presidential regime an instrument to reach 2023 the great Turkey, or whether it is a final objective is not clear. Yet what is explicit is that the new Turkey is now representing the leadership, the presidential regime, and dreams of being a great state by 2023. In another column, Bulut goes one step further and offers 'plenipotentiary' leadership for greater goals:

*Our Mr. President of the Republic made very important emphasis in one of his last speech: The parliamentary system was taken to the waiting room when the President of the Republic was elected by the people...Dear my*

*friends, there is an only idea on which the people from each rank, place, and position UNITED and CONSOLIDATED: STABILITY IS REQUIRED IN THIS COUNTRY. THE LEADERSHIP AND THE SYSTEMIC REVISION, WHICH ENABLES THE LEADER TO RULE THE COUNTRY AS PLENIPOTENTIARY, ARE ALSO REQUIRED FOR THE CONTINUATION OF THIS STABILITY... It is not realistic to expect a performance for the GREAT-POWERFUL 2023 Turkey, from a system which was taken to the waiting room by the people. In fact, as I already shared before, the main motive which will take us to the ballot box is this! It actually appeared "what Turkish citizens will decide for" WHILE THE NATIONAL WILL IS ON THE WAY OF BEING REFLECTED IN THE ELECTION: NEW GREAT POWERFUL TURKEY, PRESIDENTIAL system which will govern this TURKEY and NEW CONSTITUTION... (Bulut, 25.03.2015, Star).*

Bulut takes the national will as a reference for the imposition of the presidential regime and powerful leadership. According to this reading, the people decided to hand over their will to the plenipotentiary leadership, like in Hobbes' *Leviathan*, and this popular will eliminated the parliamentary system. Clearly, such an assumption means a sort of declaration of deviation from the democratization discourse which was operative until 2014. Concerns of democratization were replaced in this period with concerns of stability based on the securitization of the state.

## **CHAPTER 5**

### **INTERPRETATION and CONCLUSION**

In the previous chapter, I tried to picture discursive transformation of the new Turkey in the journalistic field by focusing on newspaper columns. I aimed to distance myself from the field and to scrutinize it from a bird's eye view. This broad perspective aided me in capturing what happened to the new Turkey discourse in the six long years between 2010 and 2016. While fulfilling this objective, I avoided referring to the theoretical concepts because for the theory to be functional we first need to observe how the discourse itself traversed the whole field in a particular time period. To put it another way, it is unlikely to reach a conclusion without first coming to understand the difference between early and later uses of the new Turkey discourse. In accordance with this purpose, I constructed a narrative of the contexts in which the new Turkey discourse was born and also the ruptures it experienced. Locating the discourse in those settings is crucial to if one wants to make sense of the change that discourse underwent in different settings.

As a result of the discourse analysis of the newspaper columns, first of all, what is explicit is that the new Turkey discourse was pragmatically adapted to changing political (also economic and social) conditions. Strikingly, even though one particular political context, overtly named the new Turkey gave way to a contradictory and totally opposite one, this new context was also called the new Turkey as part of a political strategy. Secondly, in each different context, the new Turkey discourse was constructed based on categories of perception that were imposed upon the recipients. All these categories were established according to the dynamics of the settings. It should be noted that the new Turkey itself is also a categorical opposition of the old Turkey. Finally, in the production and reproduction of new Turkey discourse, the journalistic field played a mediator role in cooperation with the academic and think-tank fields. Representatives of these fields

gathered as columnists in the journalistic field and employed certain strategies to get potential recognition in the field. Now I am going to interpret and conclude these findings by revisiting the theory.

### **5.1. Contextual Adaptation**

The new Turkey emerged in an atmosphere of claims of facing down the Kemalist status-quo, accompanied by this claims of fostering democratization and normalization. The 2010 referendum was the climax of this political liberalization and therefore the period after the referendum was called the new Turkey. Yet my analysis here shows that context is quite significant for the use of discourse, because it was no longer the claim of democratization which makes Turkey new after 2013. Instead, it was the dream of being an imperial power, being a world state, restoring the republic and recapturing the glory of the Ottoman Empire. Those were the “new” properties of the new Turkey. In other words, what characterized the new Turkey radically changed. Of course, the new Turkey discourse did not evolve into its new form automatically. Rather, intellectual actors (journalists, academics, and researchers) adapted it to the changing settings by employing several strategies and justification methods.

Referring to my analysis, I can explicitly assert that late 2013 was a turning point for the claims of the new Turkey. Before the serious political crises in 2013 –the Gezi Park protests and 17-25 December case- the new Turkey stood for the democratization of society, demilitarization of politics, and normalization of conflicts, including Kurdish question. Yet the undetermined nature of the discourse means that it was not always internally consistent in that period. What had been viewed as “new” before 2013 suddenly became “old” in the conditions after 2013.

Based on this, one possible consequence of the analysis is that new Turkey discourse is the imposition of a temporality on the social reality and of a categorical way of thinking. As first envisaged by Erdoğan and AKP executives, the new Turkey meant to overcome

the failures, limitations, and oppressions of the “past” regimes. In this sense, the “new Turkey” divides Turkey symbolically into two time periods. These temporal divisions are internalized and imposed in different ways by intellectuals writing in newspapers. What determines the context in terms of circulation of the new Turkey discourse is usually elections and referendums. The temporal ambiguity of the new Turkey discourse enables intellectuals to re-conceptualize elections or referendums as a milestone which would function as a dividing line between the old Turkey and the new one. For instance, as can be seen in the liquidation of tutelage chapter, the construction of the new Turkey in relation to demilitarization was declared by columnists such as Rasim Ozan Kütahyalı, Ali Bayramoğlu, Hatem Ete, Taha Özhan, and Markar Esayan several times after the 2010 referendum, 2011 general election, and 2014 local election as if it was happening for the first time. In this sense, as Fairclough argues, “the analysis of the discursive event as social practice may refer to different levels of social organization –the context of situation, the institutional context, and the wider societal context or ‘context of culture’. Questions of power and ideology may arise at each of the three levels” (Fairclough, 1995, p. 134). As the political situation differs and the new one loses its newness, the new Turkey is redefined once more according to the position of the actors towards the field of power.

Furthermore, Van Dijk’s “context models” can function here to understand discursive adaptation. Accordingly, depending on the property of the context, discursive adaptation has to do with one’s ability to adapt different type of discourses to the changing settings. More specifically, Van Dijk argues that “context models are not only about relevance, but also about people’s ability to adapt themselves to current situations on the basis of a combination of old information and the capacity to analyze current situations” (Van Dijk, 2000, Pp. 27-28). As I identified in the analysis chapter, 2013 is the point the when political context radically changed. Actors in the journalistic field, in addition to newcomers, produced the modes of justification to adapt new Turkey discourse to the post-2013 conditions. In fact, it is worth recalling once more that while the claim of the



new Turkey was mentioned by Erdoğan and AKP members even in changing conditions, it was justified, reproduced, and circulated in the public sphere by means of engaged intellectuals; for my study, those agents are columnists. If pre-2013 had been a normalization period, post-2013 can be regarded as a vigilance period. So, how come is it possible to describe both periods using the same concept of the new Turkey? According to Van Dijk, “ideologies not only control what we speak or write about, but also how we do so” (Van Dijk, 2000, p. 28). What happened between 2010 and 2016 can be considered as an ideological shift. Especially in 2013, one can observe the peace-making discourse, as part of which even Abdullah Öcalan was included in the idea of the new Turkey; however, towards 2015, claims of the new Turkey became more and more nationalized and localized. The discourse of national will, which excluded non-nationals, is the explicit indicator of this shift.

Of course, contextual change also impinge on the structure of the journalistic field. As the new Turkey moved from democratization towards the presidential system, the journalistic field grew closer to the field of power, which meant losing its autonomy. Therefore, the journalistic habitus had to rearrange itself according to the changing dynamics of the field. Recalling that Bourdieu talks about the particular instance of relating practices to objective structures, which is conjuncture (Bourdieu, 1977, p. 78), I can claim that each political context is a moment for intellectuals in the field to organize and reorganize practical strategies for the sake of justifying the new Turkey while positioning themselves. Also, which type of symbolic capital is dominating the journalistic field changes in time. In the first period, democratization, demilitarization and normalization required a sort of legal discourse, since these political values would be expected to be realized as a result of some legal regulations. Yet, together with the crisis in the political field, legal discourse was replaced with conspiracy discourse and grand narratives dating back to the Seljuk and Ottoman periods. The latter period does not necessitate a form of symbolic capital based on even a limited amount of legal information. Instead, it draws upon the symbolic capital of narratives which romanticize

and fetishize the issues. To make sense of the contextual change in the journalistic field, we need to understand the change in the construction of the discourse which is embedded in the articles.

## **5.2. Categories of Perception, Discursive Construction of the Constitutive Other and Self-Representation**

As the new Turkey discourse has been exposed to contextual changes, it was adapted to the changing conditions and been redefined. This is theoretically meaningful when it is perceived as a practice which operates in the journalistic field. Basically, it can be argued that changes or breaks in the field of power impinge upon the subfields one way or another. Yet, I need to tidy up how changes in the field, and therefore changes in the discourse, are maintained through intellectual strategies by referring to the Bourdieusian concept of symbolic power.

What drove me to approach the new Turkey discourse with a Bourdieusian framework was the construction of the discourse in accordance with the categories of political perception and, as a result of this, the circulation of the new Turkey as taken for granted even in contradictory settings. Indeed, this was uncovered as I penetrated into the analysis of the newspaper columns. In different contexts, new Turkey discourse is located in the prevalent conflict in the political field and positioned according to the strategies of the AKP. This finding is one of the primary outcomes of this study. To integrate this finding with theoretical instruments, it would be helpful to recall the possibilities of Bourdieu's concepts briefly.

As Bourdieu defined it, "the symbolic power of agents, understood as the power to make things seen -*theorein*- and to make things believed, to produce and impose the legitimate or legal classification, in fact depends, as the case of the rex reminds us, on the position occupied in the space (and in the classifications potentially inscribed in it)" (Bourdieu, 1985, p. 735). This definition of Bourdieu points to a relational mechanism which locates

discursive practices in between structured social space and intellectual ability. It also indicates the constructed character of the social world which implies the influence of power relations. We already know that the symbolic construction of the social world is carried out through the principles of vision and division and through socially accepted categories. I argue that the way new Turkey discourse is constructed and circulated in the media can be comprehended by means of the concept of symbolic power. What is manifested in the analysis is the fact that columnist-intellectuals in the journalistic field recourse a) to the categories of perception based on conflictual dualities, b) to the production of the image of the constitutive other and c) to the production of a self-representation based on this constitutive other. Just focusing on the change in those categorical oppositions and classifications, one can grasp the change in the meaning of the new Turkey depending on the context.

In terms of categories of political perception, it is seen that before late 2013, in the matter of democratization and normalization, the distinction of the old and the new Turkey was established through the conflict between the state (elites) and the people (Dağı, 2010;Kütahyalı, 2010, 2013b;Ete, 2011c); whereas in the matter of demilitarization and the liquidation of the tutelage system, dichotomies such as tutelage vs. democracy and status quo vs. change were employed (Ete, 2010, 2011a, 2012a;Özhan, 2011b;Kütahyalı, 2013a). Furthermore, respecting the Kurdish question, new Turkey discourse is placed into the contradiction between peace and violence (Özhan, 2011b, 2011c).

On the other hand, when the context radically changed after 2013, the new Turkey was this time adjusted to the presidential elections through the categorical opposition between being elected and being appointed (Dalay, 2014;Özhan, 2014b;Bulut, 2014c) and the opposition between the people-the nation-popular will-national will and the tutelage side (Aktay, 2014;Özhan, 2014b;Bulut, 2014c). Furthermore, as the claims become globalized and imperialized, new Turkey discourse was constituted in reference

to the conflict between organic state and inorganic state (Bulut, 2014g), national power and global forces (Karagül, 2015), Anatolian and Byzantine capital (Bulut, 2015c), and independence and dependence (Esayan, 2014b).

I will not go into the details of what these oppositions mean in their political contexts, since they all were already discussed in the analysis chapter. Instead, I am going to treat the operation of them as symbolic power which functions in favor of the dissemination of AKP power. Alongside the significant change in the categories or classifications in six years, all of them together amount to the functional intellectual performance in the field of journalism. As Bourdieu says, “the categories of perception, the systems of classifications, that is, essentially, the words, the names which construct social reality as much as they express it, are the crucial stakes of political struggle, which is a struggle to impose the legitimate principle of vision and division” (Bourdieu, 1990a, p. 134). This is a political struggle because intellectuals draw the boundary of the new Turkey by referring to its morally negative version. As I have repeated very often, new Turkey discourse has no essence or descriptive meaning; rather, it gets meaning and it is named by means of intellectual intervention in the contradictory conditions. Remembering that Bourdieu says symbolic power is the making the world with words (Bourdieu, 1990a, p. 138), I can argue that the new Turkey is a product of the symbolic power practice of AKP politicians and its engaged intellectuals in the media.

Aware of their positions in the field, columnist-intellectuals use their power to make people believe the political existence of the new Turkey not at a symbolic level but as if it were real. The way of realizing this purpose is to classify the social reality or, in Bourdieu’s words, to impose principles of vision and division and to refer to established categories of perception. Therefore, whereas they utilize the democracy-tutelage dichotomy in the liberalization atmosphere, with the same purpose, they also draw upon the national-non-national dichotomy in the atmosphere of authoritarianization. Normally, the word “national” does not sound democratic, since it essentially favors a

particular (Turkish) nation. Similarly, distinction between the Byzantine and Anatolian capital (even if it is in the economic sense) does not comply with democratic and pluralist claims because it, in a way, produces an ethnocentric and xenophobic perception. Yet by means of their authority to give a legitimate name to the conditions as the old and the new, those intellectuals do not hesitate to call both democratic claims and nationalistic claims as the new Turkey, in a contradictory way. As Bahadır Türk argued, “to think ideology and discourse on the axis of power is a compulsory” because they have to do with the legitimation of dominant power (Türk, 2004, p. 77). In this sense, applying to every categorical opposition aims to impose the categories of perception on the recipients. As the people are exposed to those impositions, they start to perceive the political reality only through those categories.

On the other hand, the same logic can be traced in the production of self-representation and of the representation of the other, since both judgments are also based on impositions of classifications. Those classifications must be recognized by the people for an effective constitution of hegemonic perspective. States or governments endeavor to construct common sense in the society, since common sense consists of presuppositions which can be easily established through generalizations. “Through the structuring it imposes on practices,” says Bourdieu, “the State institutes and inculcates common symbolic forms of thought, social frames of perception, understanding or memory, State forms of classification or, more precisely, practical schemes of perception, appreciation and action” (Bourdieu, 2000, p. 175). In the new Turkey case, the state, or rather AKP power, produces the representations of the “other”, of its political rivals, and of enemies. In fact, change in the representations in time shows a path beginning from the perception of political rivalry towards the perception of the enemy. Either against political opponents or against global enemies, in each situation, new Turkey discourse is constructed in relation with a constitutive other. In other words, the form of the old Turkey discourse always changes, as does that of the new Turkey.

Before 2013, what defined the old Turkey was the Kemalist civic-militaristic bureaucracy (Dağı, 2010;Ete, 2012a;Kütahyalı, 2013b) which oppressed the people and minorities (Kütahyalı, 2010, 2012, 2013b;Ete, 2011c, 2012b;Yayman, 2013;Küçükylmaz, 2013). It is also military tutelage (Dağı, 2010;Yayman, 2010;Ete, 2010, 2011a, 2011b, 2012a;Özhan, 2011b). Depending on the context, it could be also a system of bureaucratic and jurisdictional tutelage (Kütahyalı, 2013a). On the other hand, while talking about the Kurdish question, the old Turkey was associated with the military coups (Özhan, 2011c;Küçükylmaz, 2013). I do not discuss the facticity of these definitions, even they all can be truly named because Turkey's political history is composed of militaristic domination. Yet, since these systems of classifications function as a political weapon which stigmatizes its interlocutor, actors who are authorized to make identifications employ them as a reflection of symbolic power.

When the state officially recognized the Gülenist organization as a “parallel state” after 2013, representations of the old Turkey were also reconceptualized. This organization, which had been considered as a victim of the old Turkey, was re-identified as a component of the old Turkey after the 17-25 December case by means of the concept of tutelage, since their parallel or in-state organization was uncovered (Esayan, 2014e;Mahçupyan, 2014;Duran, 2014c;Karagöl, 2015b). Similarly, the concept of tutelage was applied to the presidential election in 2014; other candidates and also the institution of the presidency of the republic were associated with the pro-tutelage mindset (Aktay, 2014;Dalay, 2014;Özhan, 2014b;Esayan, 2014c). In the same period, with the claims of restoring the republic, the 100-year-long republican period was perceived as the old Turkey that needed to be faced (Bulut, 2014a;Esayan, 2014b;Duran, 2014b;Karagöl, 2014a). Furthermore, in this process, and also towards the general election in 2015, the old Turkey was re-designated as under the control of global forces and specifically the West (Bulut, 2014b, 2014c, 2014d, 2014e, 2014g, 2015c, 2015d;Karagöl, 2014b, 2014c, 2015;Özhan, 2015a;Esayan, 2015d).

On the AKP side, this change of the definitions reveals a way of perceiving political opponents. Since they are the ones in power and therefore control the mechanisms of imposition, their discursive choices have a strong influence over the subordinated ones. As Bourdieu claims, “the self-evidence of the injunctions of the State imposes itself so powerfully because the State has imposed the cognitive structures through which it is perceived” (Bourdieu, 2000, p. 176). In other words, the state produces schemes of perception which prevent thinking out of those frontiers which is already designed by the state itself.

This is also valid in the construction of the self-representation of the new Turkey. The state and intellectuals produce and reproduce the concepts which lead one to think only in favor of the power itself. After 2014, new definitions were added to the “new Turkey” approaches. This does not mean that the AKP stepped back from the claims of the new Turkey; on the contrary, representation of the new Turkey simply became differentiated. With the influence of the presidential election, in 2014, the concept of the new Turkey shifted to that of the organic Turkey (Bulut, 2014g), to the leader and pioneer Turkey (Karagül, 2014a), to the modern conquest (Karahana, 2014), to the world state (Er, 2014; Karagül, 2014b), and to the restoration (Duran, 2014b); whereas in 2015, under the influence of general elections, the new Turkey was redefined as leadership (Bulut, 2015b, 2015d) and as the new great powerful Turkey (Bulut, 2015a, 2015b).

The shift in the symbolic redefinition of the state from the “new Turkey Republic” to the “great world state” implies the change of instruments of thought regarding the AKP’s perception of the state. This can make sense by referring to what Bourdieu argues about the thinking on the state itself in his lectures at the Collège de France: “I noted that we risked applying to the state a ‘state thinking’, and I insisted on the fact that our thinking, the very structures of consciousness by which we construct the social world and the particular object that is the state, are very likely the product of the state itself” (Bourdieu, 2014, p. 3). In this case, of course, I am talking about forms of political perception rather

than the constructed perception of social reality. In effect, former is an instance of the latter. The shift from the new to the “great” is not just a matter of wording. Instead, it goes parallel with the change of political perception towards imperial claims. Whereas democratization discourse was established based on the perception of newness, the presidential system was justified through “greatness”. Bourdieu gives an example from Kafka’s “The Trial” which perfectly fit in this case of greatness. He claims that “the state, which produces the official classifications, is in a sense the supreme tribunal to which Kafka refers in The Trial when he has Block say of the advocate and his claim to be one of the ‘great advocates’”: ‘Any man can call himself “great”, of course, if he pleases, but in this matter the Court tradition must decide’ (Bourdieu, 1985, p.732). Similarly, in the case of the “great Turkey”, anyone may call himself great but who produces such representation is nothing other than the state itself through its agents in the fields. Here, one can oppose by claiming that particularly AKP government cannot be replaced by the state itself. Yet the state and AKP government can be perceived as interchangeable, since AKP leaders have declared many times that they blamed and removed the conflictual distinction between the state and governments in Turkish political history, which can be traced also in the newspaper columns I analyzed.

### **5.3. Relations in the Journalistic Field**

In this research, what shows up in terms of the field dynamics is the fact that journalistic field hosts actors coming from different fields such as the academic, think-tank, and bureaucratic/political field. Furthermore, even though it is not quite common, there can be seen a transition between these fields, more specifically a transition towards the political field.

Printed media occupies an important place in the journalistic field, since it reaches to the mass people as well as television does. Interestingly, those who participate in TV programs also write in newspapers as columnists, which multiplies their visibility in the media. Journalists can be considered the dominant actors in the media, for they are



already equipped with the pertinent logic of the journalistic field. Moreover, since the journalistic field is placed in the field of cultural production, actors such as writers, artists, scientists, and musicians also participate in symbolic production (Benson, 1999, p. 465). In this sense, it is very likely for cultural producers to pass between different fields. As Bourdieu points out, “culture producers hold a specific power, the properly symbolic power of showing things and making people believe in them, of revealing, in an explicit, objectified way the more or less confused, vague, unformulated, even unformulable experiences of the natural world and the social world, and of thereby bringing them into existence” (Bourdieu, 1990a, p. 146). For this reason, they tend to engage in power relations in order to utilize their symbolic power to intervene in the social world. While doing so, they also position themselves, which provides recognized capital in the field of cultural production.

In the case of the new Turkey, my study reveals an intensive participation of the academic and think-tank fields in the journalistic field. In fact, among 40 different columnists, all 24 academic columnists are at the same time think-tank researchers. Also, interestingly enough, all of them are engaged in SETA (Foundation for Political, Economic and Social Research) which is a think-tank founded in 2006 and known as very close to the AKP government. Either writing in the op-ed pages or in the columns regularly, it seems that they are very active producers and reproducers of the new Turkey discourse. Also, compared with the regular columnists who can be called journalists, think-tank researchers have a chance to write in several newspapers, which enables them to reach different kinds of recipients. Hatem Ete, for instance, found a chance to write in *Star Açık Görüş*, *Sabah*, *Sabah Perspektif*, and *Akşam* between 2010 and 2016. This sort of flexibility increases the mobilization of the think-tank field towards the journalistic field. In fact, even though the think-tank field shows characteristics of the concept of field in the Bourdieusian sense, its diverse actors, such as academics, researchers, and specialists deserve a more hybrid definition. Therefore, Thomas Medvetz portrays the think-tanks as a “boundary organization” (Medvetz, 2015, p.230) and “field-like social

universe” (Medvetz, 2007, p. 9) by referring to Gil Eyal’s conceptualization of “space between fields” (Eyal, 2013). Medvetz argues that think-tank space is the boundary itself between different fields, which indeed can be fruitful for my analysis here. Since they are located in the frontier, their strategic struggles take place in those spaces where they do not belong to any field. Whereas those think-tank actors such as researchers, academics, and specialists perform as columnist in newspapers engaged to the AKP government, they also can get into parliament through being deputies of the AKP or they have possibility to become state bureaucrats. In another text, Medvetz indicates that policy experts in think-tanks may function as the academic scholar, the policymaker, the business entrepreneur, and the journalist, depending on the institutional domains in which they are engaged (Medvetz, 2007, p. 3).

Of course, such preferences are shaped by the individual strategies and demands of the field of power. Among the ones who write about the new Turkey in their columns, while Hüseyin Yayman, Taha Özhan, Talip Küçükcan and Yasin Aktay became deputies from the AKP in 2015, Nuh Yılmaz, Cemal Haşimi, Mücahit Küçükyılmaz and Erdal Tanas Karagöl became bureaucrats and consultants. These cases are the proper examples of upward mobilization in the field depending on the recognized political capitals of the agents, which are primarily based on discursive strategies. As Medvetz asserts, “it is also possible to consider think-tanks as organizations that span multiple fields in the context of a strategy for mediating the relations among holders of different forms of power. In this case, their power rests on their ability to accumulate multiple forms of capital and thereby play a crucial mediating or brokering role in the social structure” (Medvetz, 2015, p. 234). Their transition to the political field and bureaucratic field has to do with their intellectual performance, or which type of capital they employ in the critical instances. This is also what Bourdieu calls *illusio*. Actors find themselves in a game and if they realize the game is worth playing, they invest their capitals in the struggles which take place in the field (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992, p. 98). In this sense, new Turkey discourse turns out to be a sort of game itself, since columnists, with a doxic acceptance, tend to produce

and reproduce the discourse even in contradictory political settings. As can be traced in the analysis chapter, efforts to adapt the new Turkey discourse to the contradictory conditions, wordings, identifications, categories of perceptions, classifications, self-representation, and representation of the constitutive other are a kind of symbolic investment which can be rewarded according to the recognizability of their impositions.

On the other hand, the struggle in the journalistic field also results in the positioning of the regular columnists who are not actively engaged in academia or think-tank space. Among 16 columnists, whereas Markar Esayan became an AKP deputy in 2015, Etyen Mahçupyan and Yiğit Bulut became the consultants. Also, Rasim Ozan Kütahyalı, who wrote the most articles about the new Turkey (35 articles), occupies a relatively autonomous space in the field like think-tank researchers, since he also found a chance to write in 3 different newspapers: *Taraf*, *Sabah*, and *Akşam*. In this sense, the specific weight of particular actors may have a stronger influence than others. Yiğit Bulut, for instance, contributed to the transformation of the definition of the new and the old Turkey by employing discursive strategies based on conspiratorial thought. His phrases such as “interest rate lobby” dominated the perception of politics and also circulated in the media for a long time. In this sense, his “success” comes from what Bourdieu points out as the harmony between subjective dispositions and objective structures. To put it differently, as the dominant political perception became nationalized, Bulut’s conspiratorial way of thinking also became legitimate in the journalistic field, since he usually appeals in his articles to the dichotomy between national power and global threats.

Even though the journalistic field seems as if it is losing its autonomy as it approaches the field of power through the transitions of its actors, it at the same time strengthens its field structure. As Bourdieu detected, the journalistic field becomes dominant over other fields of cultural production because it inculcates its logic of the field to the other fields (Bourdieu, 2005, p. 41). For actors from other fields, for instance the academic field,

the journalistic field plays a role of mediation. The variety of mediums in the media provides significant visibility for those who want to impose their vision and categories of perception. Whereas Bourdieu identifies those intellectuals as doxosophists who are political journalists, media intellectuals and other essayists (Poupeu and Discepolo, 2008, p. XV), Fairclough perceives the emergent journalistic order of discourse as an articulation of different discourses which can also be called the “conversationalization” of the discourse (Chouliaraki and Fairclough, 1999, p. 115). Although both approaches seem similar, while Bourdieu employs a normative perspective and thereby criticizes the mediatization of the academic field, on the other hand, Fairclough treats this phenomenon as a new formation derived from the articulation. One way or the other, what we confront is the fact that actors from different fields leave aside the logic of fields they essentially belong to and adapt to the dynamics of the journalistic field. Think-tanks function here as a facilitator for those who pass from the academic field, since, as I discussed earlier, think-tanks operate in the boundaries, which prevents them from having a distinct field logic.

#### **5.4. Epilogue**

In conclusion, what this research reveals is the fact that Bourdieusian framework, which is rarely adapted to discourse studies, can function to grasp discursive strategies in the journalistic field. By means of critical discourse analysis as both method and methodology, I tried to scrutinize how new Turkey discourse is constructed in different political settings. In a more general manner, I reached the conclusion that in the case of the new Turkey, contextual changes are reflected in newspaper columns; those reflections are carried out through principles of vision and division and categories of perception; and finally, intellectual strategies have impinged on the dynamics of the journalistic field and the field of power, which also reversely positions those actors in the field according to their relevant capitals. My research is an attempt at comprehending recent Turkish political history through the construction and reconstruction process of new Turkey discourse. Therefore, it has limitations in capturing particularities in the

circulation of the discourse in the media. As one of the most influential discourses of Turkish history, the new Turkey seems likely to be studied from different perspectives, which will eventually enrich the field of discursive studies.

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