

**AN AFROCENTRIC CRITIQUE OF THE DISCOURSE OF GOOD GOVERNANCE  
AND ITS LIMITATIONS AS A MEANS OF ADDRESSING DEVELOPMENT  
CHALLENGES IN NIGERIA**

By

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## **DECLARATION**

I **Oluwakemi Damola Adejumo-Ayibiowu** (Student No: 48013501), declare that “**An Afrocentric Critique of the Discourse of Good Governance and its Limitations as a Means of Addressing Development Challenges in Nigeria**” is my own work and has never been submitted either in part or in totality for examination at any institution for any other qualification. I further declare that all the sources that I have consulted have been duly acknowledged throughout the text and by means of complete list of references

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**Oluwakemi Damola Adejumo-Ayibiowu**

## **DEDICATION**

I dedicate this thesis to God who empowers me to do all things. This thesis is also dedicated to everyone who dares to think beyond colonial limitations, and dares be different so as to make a positive difference! You are my motivators, and we are winners together!

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## ABSTRACT

The current study is an African-centred critique of the idea of ‘good governance’; which since the 1990s, has been a prescription of the international development institutions for all development challenges facing developing countries. Despite almost two decades of implementation of good governance reforms in Nigeria, poverty, corruption and underdevelopment persist. The analysis showed that the limited involvement of local people in the design of donor-sponsored good governance reforms mainly produced a universal, donor-conceptualized good governance agenda, which did not fully capture local issues.

Given this, the main objective of the current study was to develop a cultural, context-specific governance model that shares local citizens’ understanding of governance, as well as, addresses challenges of governance at local levels in Nigeria. However, given the diversity of cultures in Nigeria and the uniqueness of each of them, this study only focused on Southwest Nigeria.

Afrocentricity is the theoretical framework for this study. Mainstream development theories have mainly guided the development efforts of African countries but these theories are based on the experience of the European countries and primarily seek their interests. Given the failure of Eurocentric development theories in Nigeria, this study deemed it fit to adopt a theoretical framework that is based on African experience and that seeks African interests. Afrocentricity is the only theory in which the centrality of African interests, principles, and perceptions predominate (Pellebon 2007: 174).

In terms of methodology, this study adopted the case study design. The study also used both the qualitative and quantitative methods of data collection. But the study was largely qualitative because it relied on participants’ interpretations. The inclusion of quantitative data was for purposes of expanding and complementing the interpretive information.

The study is significant because the findings provide agency to indigenous people in Nigeria by the voicing their perception of governance. The study also identified context-specific issues affecting governance in Nigeria, which were not captured in the donor’s universal good governance agenda. The study proposed how the principles that have enabled the effectiveness of traditional governance systems could be incorporated into formal governance to achieve better government performance. Most

importantly, this study offers context-specific and people-centred recommendations to address Nigeria's governance and development challenges. This study's Afrocentric approach to the understanding of good governance is an epistemological rupture against the Eurocentric idea of good governance.

### **Key Words**

Afrocentricity, eurocentrism, good governance, development, poverty, decoloniality, political institutions, colonialism, culture, indigenous knowledge, ethnicity, tribalism,

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## **CHAPTER ONE**

### **1.0 RESEARCH OVERVIEW**

#### **1.1 Introduction**

This first chapter gives an overview of this thesis. The chapter gives the background to the study and the research problem. The chapter also presents the research questions derived from the research problem, as well as, the research objectives formulated in order to answer the research questions. The chapter also presents the motivation for embarking on the study. This chapter also briefly describes the theoretical framework that guided the study, the research design, and the limitation of the study. In addition, the research context is provided in this chapter, as well as, the organization of the whole report.

Good governance has gained significant importance in recent times and has continued to top developmental agendas across the world. Despite lack of satisfactory evidence of its effectiveness, the idea of good governance is celebrated and has become the prescription of international development partners for all developmental challenges facing poor countries. The challenges include stagnated growth, poverty, conflict, and insecurity, to name some. The current emphasis on good governance, particularly the increased role of the government in economic management and poverty reduction is as a consequence of the failure of earlier policies of the Bretton Woods institutions, namely the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in developing countries.

Currently, several African countries are adopting good governance as a strategy for growth and development. Specifically, since the return to a democratic government in 1999, Nigeria has been making a significant investment towards instituting good governance. This effort seems reasonable, given the country's long years of military rule, also characterized by abuse of power, poor service delivery, dilapidated health and social infrastructure, abuse of human rights of the citizens, political instability and high level of corruption (Onwuka 2011: 30). However, in spite of almost two decades of democratic governance and various donor-supported governance reforms, poverty, unemployment, inequality, insecurity and other challenges continue in Nigeria.

As this study reveals, the discourse of good governance is an agenda set by donors. The World Bank's position, in particular, largely provides the basis, political framework, economic context and principles of the current good governance agenda. This study also argues and shows that the characteristics of the good governance agenda share many similarities with earlier economic development models and strategies provided by international agencies, especially the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Despite following these Western development orthodoxies and reforms, many African countries remain poor. One of the limitations of these approaches is that their development was based on the experiences of industrialized countries whose culture and history of growth differ largely from those of African countries.

This study argues that for the good governance agenda to be of relevance to Nigeria's development challenges, it needs to be rooted in the country's systems, structures, values and culture. The perception and institutional understanding of local people, in particular, matter and the indicators of governance need to be redefined to reflect the expectations of local stakeholders, as well as, their culture and norms. This study particularly argues that, to design an institutional framework which will promote the welfare of local citizens in Nigeria, rather than imitate any foreign institutional structure, there is much to learn from the country's valuable cultures and indigenous institutions, which have continued to effectively support the welfare of local people even in the face of the failure of modern government to improve the lives of citizens (Olowu and Erero 1995:1, Okunmadewa et al 2005:4). The next section gives the background to the study.

## **1.2 Background**

Nigeria is the most populous country in Africa with an estimated population of 185.99 million in 2016 (World Bank). With a Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of \$US 568.5 billion (2014), Nigeria is the largest economy in Africa followed by South Africa. In terms of its political framework, Nigeria is a federal system comprising the federal government at the centre, 36 state governments and 774 local government Councils (LGCs). Although Nigeria has an abundance of natural resources, especially crude petroleum, the proceeds of which are shared among all the tiers of government for economic management, the country remains underdeveloped and poverty is widespread. Dimensions of poverty and underdevelopment in Nigeria include lack of

food, lack of income, inequality in incomes, poor health, poor education, high unemployment, low life expectancy, high mortality, insecurity, poor access to public services and infrastructure, unsanitary environment, illiteracy, poor growth, low productivity, and corruption.

Nigeria is one of the colonial territories artificially created at the Berlin Conference of 1884–85 when the European imperialists scrambled for Africa (Ocheni and Nwankwo 2012: 47). Nigeria thus inherited arbitrary state boundaries that amalgamated diverse ethnics, cultures, religion and language without any consideration to the cultural boundaries, which existed among the people. This was the foundation of the several challenges, such as, tribalism, civil war and religious and communal conflicts in Nigeria today (Olanrewaju 2015:6). However, the pre-colonial Nigerian territory was also made up of several sovereign kingdoms, empires and states with sound socio-political institutions, founded on strong ethical values and vibrant economic activities (Ehinmore 2012). The issue of good governance is particularly important in many pre-colonial Nigerian societies, especially among the Yoruba in South West Nigeria, which has various traditional checks and balances in its monarchical governance.

However, European colonialism brought many changes to Nigerian political and socio-economic structures through its direct and indirect rule, as well as, the refutation of indigenous ethical value, traditional laws and beliefs structures. Colonialism also distorted the diversified structure of the economy of the territory to mainly produce raw materials for European industries and provide markets for European manufactured goods (Adeyeri and Adejuwon 2012:3). To maintain its hegemony in areas of industrial development, the British discouraged manufacturing and industrialization in Nigeria (Faleye 2013: 58). The result was an economy dominated mainly by the exports of raw materials and agricultural products needed in Britain; to the neglect of other productive sectors of the Nigerian economy not needed by the British. For example, food crops which contributed to the problem of food insecurity in the country (Shokpeka and Odigwe 2009:57).

The nationalists who took over the administration of the country at independence thus inherited a lopsided economy, which contributed largely to post-colonial increase in poverty, unemployment, food insecurity and rural-urban migration. The current monoculture structure of the Nigerian economy in which the economy depends mainly on oil production to the neglect of other productive sectors is also a colonial legacy.



Post-colonial Nigeria also continued to pursue Western development ideologies such as, Modernisation theories, whose resultant effect is the continued dependence of the local economy on the West, unequal terms of trade, and cheap siphoning of local raw materials to enhance the European economy to the detriment of Nigerian masses (Jean-Pierre 2011:201). Specifically in the 1960s and 1970s, Nigeria embarked on state-led industrialization policies including the Import Substitution Industrialization Strategy (ISI) and export promotion strategies (Agboti and Agha 2013:7). However, these policies resulted in inflation, economic stagnation, balance of payment crisis and debt crisis especially because of the lack of foreign exchange to finance the massive importation of machinery required by industrialization (Chachage 1987:5, Agboti and Agha 2013:7).

These undesirable outcomes of industrialization have been attributed to several reasons such as, the high demand for foreign exchange, neglect of agriculture, and lack of local capacity especially, manpower and technological know-how in the domestic industries (Ibbih and Gaiya 2013:152). The study argues that in addition to these identified problems, another major reason for the failure of industrialization strategies is that the industrialization investments and efforts were not focused on expanding, revolutionizing and advancing indigenous production which is based on traditional knowledge, of which there is local expertise, local raw materials and ready markets. As shown by Ibbih and Gaiya (2013:151) industrialization investments were spent on imitating and producing formerly imported products, which require imported skilled manpower and imported raw materials. By choosing an industrialization strategy that does not revolutionize indigenous industries, and by adopting a strategy that largely depends on imports, arguably ISI is not too different from colonial policies which underdeveloped Africa through discouragement of local manufacture.

In the 1980s, the Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) was recommended to developing countries by the World Bank and IMF. The SAP was a growth orthodoxy based on market liberalization and deregulation. Consequently, industrialization was replaced by trade liberalization and financial deregulation, subsidies on public utilities were eliminated, and social services were to be properly priced through the introduction of user fees or private delivery systems. Nigeria adopted SAP in 1986, but evidence revealed that like in many underdeveloped countries, SAP failed to produce the much desired economic development in Nigeria, and the poverty situation

worsened (Agboti and Agha 2013:2; Babatunde and Busari 2009:11). Official statistics show that Nigerian incidence of poverty, which stood at 27.2 per cent in 1980, rose to 46.3 per cent in 1985 and by 1996, poverty incidence had risen to 65.6 per cent (NBS 2010:7).

However, failure of SAP was attributed largely to poor governance in implementing countries and a new consensus emerged in the international development community that governance indeed matters for the achievement of growth and development. All of a sudden, politics and governance, which used to be considered unimportant in policy decisions especially by international donors and bilateral institutions, became the cornerstone of development cooperation, as well as, an objective and a precondition for development (Singh, 2003:1). 'Good governance' suddenly became the buzzword since the 1990s. According to the former UN Secretary-General, Kofi Annan, "good governance is perhaps the single most important factor in eradicating poverty and promoting development" (UN 1998). Subsequently, donors increasingly link economic aid to political reforms, including demand for the improvement of the quality of public sector management, rule of law, elimination of corruption, democracy, together with compliance with other donor policies in recipient countries, all in pursuit of good governance.

In furtherance to good governance pursuit in developing countries, in 1999, the international financial institutions introduced the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) as a precondition for countries to become eligible for debt relief under the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) initiative. PRSPs require that countries develop a more poverty-focus government and the implementation requires governance reforms including public sector reforms, privatization and liberalization, transparency and anti-corruption, service delivery, budget and expenditure reforms (IMF 2012). In 2000, the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) were also adopted by member countries of the United Nations. The eight MDGs include eradicating poverty, achieving universal primary education, promoting gender equality, reducing child mortality, improving maternal health, combating HIV/AIDS, malaria and other diseases, ensuring environmental sustainability and developing a global partnership for development, all by the target date of 2015. According to IMF (2012:1), PRSPs would provide the crucial link between national public actions, donor support, and the development outcomes needed to meet the MDGs.

For Nigeria and other African states under a heavy debt burden, stagnated growth and persistent poverty, the implementation of the PRSP and the required governance reforms were not an option, but an obligation (Adejumo-Ayibiowu 2015:6). In 1999, Nigeria returned to civil democracy after long years of military rule and this led to some resurgence of aid (especially support for democratic reforms) to the country from international donors. (Adetula, Kew and Kwaja, 2010; Rakner, Menocal, and Fritz, 2007). Consequently, the government began to implement a wide range of institutional reforms aimed at curbing corruption, instituting good governance and achieving desired growth and development. The government's governance agenda is elaborated in its PRSP also called the National Economic Empowerment and Development Strategy (NEEDS), Vision 2020 National Development Plan and government manifestos (National Planning Commission, NPC 2004, 2010). The accountability, deregulation and privatization as parts of the main pillars of the NEEDS identifies improvements in governance, as well as, transparency, authorities' economic reform strategy (NPC 2004).

Nigeria has also adopted the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI). Other governance reforms undertaken by the country include Public Financial Management, Tax reform, banking sector reform, public procurement, transparency and anti-corruption, e-government; ports and customs reforms, judicial reforms, pension reforms, civil service reforms, national health insurance scheme and service delivery (SERVICOM) (Chijioke 2007; OHCSF nd). The government also established anti-corruption agencies particularly the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) and Independent Corruption Practices and Other Related Offences Commission (ICPC) (NPC 2004). Nigeria is also committed to the achievement of the eight ambitious Millennium Development Goals.

### **1.3 Problem Statement**

Economic hardship continues in Nigeria despite progress in economic and governance reforms (Azeez 2009:224). The incidence of poverty which stood at 54.4 per cent in 2004, increased to 69 per cent in 2010 (NBS 2010:11). Although growth performance measured by the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) shows some improvement in the 2000s compared to the 1990s, (World Bank 2013: np). Improved growth performance did not result in an appreciable decline in unemployment and poverty prevalence

(Aigbokhan 2008:25, World Bank 2009:1). Other development indicators show comparatively low primary school enrolment (61 per cent), high infant mortality rate (75 deaths per 1,000 live births), poor access to water (48 per cent of the population), low life expectancy (44 years) and high income inequality (0.4474) (NBS 2010:18). Neither has good governance considerably improved corruption perception of the country. Transparency International's 2015 Corruption Perception Index ranks Nigeria 136th position out of the 175 countries surveyed making Nigeria the 40th most corrupt country in the world.

However, in the face of the failure of formal governance institutions to guarantee the welfare of the poor in Nigeria, indigenous institutions which are based on African culture and indigenous knowledge have been the main respite of the poor and have proven to be resilient and dependable in provision of goods and services needed for welfare improvement (Olowu and Erero 1995:2). Local studies also confirm that traditional institutions rooted in culture and history are comparatively more transparent, equitable, responsive and accountable (Ayittey 1992; Ake, 1987; Olowu and Erero 1995; Mengisteab 2009). Given this background of a donor-conceptualized universal governance strategy and the effectiveness and resilience of many traditional institutions in supporting the local people, the problem is the endemic corruption in Nigeria and the persistent poverty and inequality in spite of almost two decades of efforts to improve governance. The problem under investigation therefore is the extent to which governance practices in Nigeria have influenced developmental challenges in the country.

To better understand these issues, there is a need to have insight into the local people's conceptualization of good governance and their perception of governance. It is also important to understand the strategies that have ensured effective indigenous governance. Such insights offer a possible cultural and context-specific approach to achieving good governance in Nigeria. Consequent to the findings, the study aims to develop a cultural context-specific governance model that shares local citizens' understanding of governance, as well as, addresses challenges of governance at local levels in Nigeria. However, given the diversity of cultures in Nigeria and the uniqueness of each of them, this study only focuses on the traditional governance system in Southwest Nigeria.

Given the stated problem above, the main research question is:

- What are the main issues at the local level and the strategies of good traditional governance that a context-specific governance model should consider so as to promote development in Southwest Nigeria?

The question is broken down as follows:

- How do citizens conceptualize good governance in Southwest Nigeria?
- What are the priorities and expectations of local citizens of the governance system in Southwest Nigeria?
- To what extent do citizens think the governance system meets these expectations?
- What are the main issues to address in order to make governance system effective in promoting development and poverty reduction in Southwest Nigeria?
- What are the strategies of good indigenous governance that guarantee responsiveness, accountability, participation, and transparency as well as, ensure welfare improvement in Southwestern Nigeria?

#### **1.4 Research Objectives**

The following are the objectives of the study, namely to:

- Critique and evaluate the discourse of good governance and its limitations as a means of addressing development challenges in the African context and in Nigeria.
- Establish local citizens' conceptualization of the term 'good governance'
- Identify key issues at the local level which are important for better performance of governance and achievement of development in Southwest Nigeria
- Assess people's perception of the new democratic governance in Southwest Nigeria.
- Understand the principles of good indigenous governance that guarantee responsiveness, accountability, participation, and transparency as well as, ensure welfare improvement in Southwestern Nigeria.
- Develop a context-specific good governance model that reflects the tradition and aspirations of local people in Southwestern Nigeria.

## 1.5 Theoretical framework

Every academic research is based on some underlying theoretical assumptions about what is understandable and how it can be understood. Maxwell (2013:39) defines the theoretical framework as the “the systems of concepts, assumptions, expectations, beliefs and theories that support and inform the research”. Theoretical framework is derived from the discipline orientation that the researcher brings to the study (Merriam 2009:66). The theoretical framework underlies the research and it is the perspective from which the researcher views the research phenomenon. According to Mertens (2005:2), the researcher’s theoretical framework will determine the precise nature of any research activity. The main theoretical framework for this study is Afrocentricity theory. The main thrust of the theory is the supremacy and centrality of African culture and knowledge for solving African problems (Asante 2005). Afrocentricity is a scientific effort towards African development which is based on African history, the pattern of behaviours, culture, and beliefs and not an imitation of the Western methods of development. Afrocentricity, is an African centred research of indigenous African societies for valuable principles, behaviour, practices, theories, patterns, ideas, representations, institutions, rituals and ceremonies which can be adapted for contemporary usage (Hotep 2010:13).

The history of Afrocentricity can be traced to the work and struggles of many authors, scholars, and activists such as W. E. B. Du Bois, Marcus Garvey, Cheikh Anta Diop, Harold Cruse, Malcolm X, Ida B. Wells Barnett, George James, Maulana Karenga and many others (Monteiro-Ferreira 2014:6). These all tried to understand the world from an African-centered perspective. However, Afrocentricity as a theoretical approach to social science research has been attributed to the publication of Molefi Asante (1980) titled *Afrocentricity: The Theory of Social Change*. According to Asante (1991:171), Afrocentricity is a framework of reference where a given phenomenon in or about Africa is viewed and understood through the lens of the African people. Afrocentricity reinforces that just like the European, Asian and other cultures of the World, African people also have their unique ideas, traditions, norms, values and culture which shape their worldview. Afrocentrists argue that when discussing issues relating to African people, whether political, social or economic, Afrocentricity remains the most appropriate paradigm, theory or methodology because it places Africa at the centre of any analysis (Keto 1989:1).

Afrocentricity is a response to Eurocentrism which is a cultural phenomenon that places European cultural values as superior to other cultures and universalizes European experiences for other people of the world. According to Pokhrel (2011:321), Eurocentrism views the realities of non-Western societies from a Western perspective and “advocates for the imitation of a Western model based on “Western values” – individuality, human rights, equality, democracy, free markets, secularism, and social justice – as a cure to all kinds of problems, no matter how different various societies are socially, culturally, and historically”. European colonization of Africa does not only involve the exploitation of the continent, but also the superimposition of European culture and ways of knowing on Africa to the displacement of African knowledge and culture (Asante 2007:16, Rabaka 2009: 4). Consequently, even after their independence from European colonization, African countries have mainly adopted western development theories such as modernization theories and neoliberalism which all failed to achieve the desired development (Agboti and Agha 2013:7; Babatunde and Busari 2009:1). Afrocentricity argues that Western development theories are based on European culture and experience. Given the fact that African culture and history greatly differ from those of Europe, Afrocentricity argues that the application of European theories and approaches to explain the ethos of African people is inappropriate (Asante 2005, Imani 2014: 178, Mazama 2003:5).

The theoretical assumptions of Afrocentricity are rooted in the core cultural characteristics of African societies. According to Afrocentricity, culture matters in the orientation to centeredness (Asante 2005). Culture is also very important in providing the lenses or perspectives with which one looks at societal reality (ibid). In order to understand African reality, the Afrocentricity theory proposes four major theoretical assumptions about human beings, namely, collective conceptualization of human beings; the spiritual nature of human beings, the affective approach to knowledge and the interconnection of all beings in the universe (Asante, 1988; Myers, 1988; Schiele, 1996, Imafidion 2012). Afrocentric paradigm conceives individual identity as a collective identity and a person is considered as an integral part of a society. This philosophy is captured by Mbiti (1970: 141) in an African adage "*I am because we are and because we are, therefore, I am*". Ensuing from this assumption of collective identity are two interrelated principles, namely communalism and humanness.

Communalism is a social theory that encourages a collective way of life and discourages the pursuit of individual goals at the expense of the community (Oyedola and Oyedola 2015:87). Politically, communalism promotes public access to societal resources so that every member has a share of the benefit of such resources (Kaunda 69:5). Humanness or personhood, on the other hand, describes the attainment of an ethical or moral status as expected by the community (Mphahlele 1971). The idea of African humanness is presented by Afrocentrist as Maat. Maat means morals, conduct, the rule of law and custom (Karenga 2006: 9). Maat has been classified as a natural law because it has correspondences in all African countries. In Southern Africa, Maat is called Ubuntu while it is called Omoluwabi in Southwest Nigeria. Moral principle of Maat are fundamental to African culture and they form the bedrock of the society in regulating social-political behaviour for the attainment of good governance and development. The prevailing moral standards of individuals in the society will determine the quality of governance because the government is run by individuals (Dei 2012: 106; Asante 1991, 2003).

Afrocentricity theory also proposes that the spiritual component of African life is as real as the material aspect (Schiele 1996:287; Mazama 2001:399). The idea of spirituality also explains why religion plays an important role in African life, especially Nigeria. In relation to governance, religion is a cultural phenomenon in Nigeria and was a source of political legitimacy in the pre-colonial time (Ekeh 1975:111). Spirituality also relates to the African belief in the affective approach which involves the use of intuition and emotions in addition to reason. According to Kamalu (1990:13), the use of affective emotions in addition to logical reason helps in immediate attainment of the truth rather than through a step by step logic. Moreover, intuition plays a vital role in ancient Egyptian science (Schiele 1998). Afrocentricity also perceived individuals as part of an interconnected web of people in his or community, both living and deceased as the ancestors are also considered to be connected to the community (Lateef 2015: 27, Schiele 1996: 287).

Analyzing the issues of governance and development with Afrocentric assumptions may be unusual; nevertheless, it is the most appropriate theory that can achieve the study's objectives. Given that Eurocentric theories are based on European experience and seek European interests, this study requires a theoretical framework that is based on African interests and one which seeks African interests. Afrocentricity is the only



theory in which the centrality of African interests, principles, and perceptions predominate (Pellebon 2007:174). Afrocentricity enables the researcher to place the historical experience, culture and the voice of local citizens as central to understanding the challenges of governance and development in Nigeria. The Afrocentric non-rational assumptions about human behaviour challenge orthodox Eurocentric assumptions such as materialism, individualism, competition, rationality which form the bases of many western theories including liberal trade and liberal democracy (Karenga, 1995; Schiele 1994; Sheared 1996). The failure of Western theories to achieve development in Africa calls for the development of homegrown theories which are based on African reality and not on Eurocentric assumptions. Afrocentricity is relevant to this study because its assumptions are based on Africa's everyday reality. The fourth chapter of this study discusses Afrocentricity in detail.

### **1.6 Rationale for the Study**

The rationale for the study presents the researcher's argument to show that conducting the study could suitably address some gaps in literature and that the research outcomes could contribute to literature, policy and effective practices (Maree 2016:29; Rossman and Rallis 2012:131). The first rationale for embarking on this study is the lack of satisfactory evidence in literature about the link between the 'good governance agenda' and development which put to question the need to adopt the agenda as a strategy for development. Even though donors insist that good governance is perhaps the single most important factor in eradicating poverty and promoting development in Africa (UN 1998), nevertheless, unending arguments surround the validity of the good governance agenda as a development strategy both from within the conventional and unorthodox economic approaches. Punyaratabandhu (2004:3) and Jütting (2003:1) show that the evidence of a connection between implementation of good governance reforms and development outcomes are tenuous while the causality of the purported links and channels of influence are unclear. Given that Nigeria has been implementing good governance reforms for almost two decades, a study which looks at the impact of reforms on citizen's welfare in Nigeria will contribute to the debate on the link between good governance and poverty reduction. Creswell (2014:117) notes that the discovery of paucity of knowledge in a particular aspect by a researcher can be a motivation to launch an investigation so as to address the gap in knowledge. In my case, during my search for literature on good governance,

I found that there is deficiency of literature and studies that seek to understand the issue of good governance from the perspective of local citizens and from the African context. Good governance has been presented as a universal phenomenon. The definition and the indicators of governance given by international development institutions like the World Bank and IMF pervade literature while local citizens' conceptualization of the idea is almost absent. Arndt and Oman (2008:20) also identified 400 separate governance indicators that point to critical issues on governance. However, most of these works are Eurocentric because they are based on Western governance realities which are then institutionalized as standard (Pokhrel 2011:321).

The dearth of research and literature on good governance from an Afrocentric perspective is another major motivation to embark on this research. This paucity results in the lack of understanding of good governance from local citizens' perspective and from the context of the African culture. The universalization of donors' idea of good governance also means little cognizance is given to the peculiarities of each country. As pointed out by Rodrik (2008:1), different societies have diverse historical and cultural heritage that make the implementation of a one-size-fit-all approach counterproductive. Arguably, no institutional model can be valid everywhere. Hence, this researcher takes an African-centred approach to understand context-specific issues important for better performance of governance and improvement of welfare in Nigeria. The study also looks at citizens' conceptualization of good governance so as to provide a context-specific definition of the concept as against a universal definition.

Although there is a consensus among scholars that good governance matters, this researcher also found in literature that there is no clarity about what specifically in the good governance agenda matters to the welfare of poor people (Gisselquist 2012:2; Grindle 2004:526). This is so because the World Bank institutions have specified what should be the priorities of the government in order to improve citizen's welfare. This motivates me to critically examine the extent to which donors' specified priorities are in the interest of local citizens in Nigeria. Given the high cost of implementing donors' good governance agenda, scholars such as Grindle (2004) and Kerandi 2008 have pointed out the need to find cheaper and optimal governance strategies to achieve poverty reduction. My literature search shows that many African indigenous institutions have been effectively supporting the welfare of the poor and that these indigenous

institutions are comparatively more transparent, equitable, responsive and accountable (Olowu and Erero 1995:1, Okunmadewa et al 2005:4, Ayittey 1992; Ake, 1987; Mengisteab 2009). However, there is dearth of scholarly works on the principles or strategies that make these cultural institutions effective. This forms another rationale for the study.

### **1.7 Research Design**

A research design is a framework for conducting the research project (Kothari 2004:14, Asika 2004). This study finds the case study design as being the most appropriate. According to Yin (1984:23), case study research “is an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context; when the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident; and in which multiple sources of evidence are used.” This study is conducted to understand the issue of good governance in Nigeria from the perspectives and culture of local citizens. For this research, Southwest Nigeria is the case study. A case study research can also adopt exploratory research design or descriptive research design while both approaches can be combined in the same case study (Yin 1984:15). This study applied both exploratory and descriptive research designs.

Exploratory case studies are used to gain insight into a situation that is not very clear and that has not attracted serious investigation and research in the past (Asika 2004, Ugoani 2016:84). It uses qualitative research approaches such as phenomenology, case study, ethnography, grounded theory, and historical research (Creswell 2003:14, Nieswiadomy 2011:171). This study is largely exploratory as it mainly aims to gain insight into good governance from the local people’s perspective and according to the culture of the indigenous people of Southwestern Nigeria. Descriptive research helps to ascertain and describe the characteristics of the pertinent issues and can be used to draw inferences which can provoke action (Marsh 1982:125; Asika 2004). Descriptive research design is applied in this study through the use of quantitative techniques and the aim is to accurately describe the issue of good governance in Southwestern Nigeria.

Most importantly, this study is an Afrocentric research and it largely uses qualitative methods of data collection because it relies on participants’ interpretations. The inclusion of quantitative data is for purposes of expanding and complementing the

interpretive information. Consequently, the researcher used the interview method and focus group interview method to get information about issues relating to good governance as well as information on strategies that ensure effective performance of the pre-colonial Yoruba governance system. The criterion for inclusion in the qualitative phase of the study includes the Obas (kings) of the selected towns, the palace chiefs (King's Cabinet) of the selected towns, leaders of trade associations and community associations, educated elites, political office holders and public servants. In the quantitative phase, the researcher used the questionnaire survey method. A total of 150 questionnaires were administered. Specifically, 50 questionnaires were randomly administered in each location. In terms of sequence, the researcher collected the qualitative data first, followed immediately by the quantitative data. Moreover, the participants in the qualitative phase were different from those in the quantitative phase.

#### **1.6.1 Contribution/Significance of the Study**

This study, using an Afrocentric lens, made important findings that give a better understanding of the issues of governance in Nigeria. The study also identified and highlighted context-specific issues affecting governance in Nigeria; which were not captured in the donor's universal good governance agenda. This study was also able to understand good governance from the local people's perspectives, which is a first necessary step towards developing people-centred good governance and development policies. Another contribution of this study is that it identified and established the principles and strategies that have enabled the effectiveness of traditional governance systems. Most importantly, it proposed how these indigenous good governance qualities could be incorporated into formal governance to achieve better government performance.

The researcher anticipates that the findings of this study about local citizens' conceptualization of good governance, specific local issues affecting governance in Nigeria and the strategies that have ensured effective performance of traditional governance institutions will make original contributions to African-centred knowledge about governance in Nigeria. The study is also significant because it offers context-specific and people-centred recommendations to address Nigeria's governance and development challenges. The reports of this study will benefit development practitioners, institutional reformers and policy makers and would further give them

information to develop home-grown African-centred governance and development strategies. This study is also very important because it is an epistemological rupture against the Eurocentric idea of good governance. The findings provide agency to indigenous people in Nigeria by the voicing their perception of governance.

### **1.8 Limitations of the Study**

One limitation of this study is its limited transferability. Although this study advocates for the home-grown development and governance strategies, the researcher did not attempt to study all the indigenous governance systems in Nigeria or all the cultures in the country. The outcome of this study was based mainly on the institutional understanding of citizens of Southwest Nigeria. Moreover, the African-centred good governance model it developed was based on the Yoruba culture of Southwest Nigeria and the governance issues identified by citizens in Southwest Nigeria. Only the indigenous governance system of the Yoruba people, Southwestern Nigeria was studied. Consequently, the extent to which the findings and the recommendations of this study can be generalized or transferred to other contexts is limited. To mitigate this limitation, the researcher in various chapters of this report, thoroughly described in rich detail the context and assumptions under which this study was done. It is hoped that the background information given about the research context will assist other researchers to make the judgment on the suitability of applicability of the findings of this research to other settings.

It is noteworthy that the research was limited to three locations in Osun State, Southwest Nigeria, due to funds and time constraints. Although the three selected locations embrace the diversity of socioeconomic and political conditions of Yoruba people of Nigeria, they still constitute a relatively small sample.

Another limitation of the study is lack of up-to-date data. This is because current socioeconomic statistics about the study locations are not readily available in libraries or in government offices. The most recent official population statistics of Osun State, including the towns selected for this study, is dated 2006.

### **1.9 Research Context**

This section gives a rich context of the Yoruba people in Southwest Nigeria. It also gives information about Osun State where the study was conducted.

## **Southwest Nigeria**

Southwest Nigeria is regarded as the homeland of the Yoruba people. Yoruba is the second largest tribe and language in Nigeria, after the Hausa. Presently, in recognition of other minority cultures and tribes, Nigeria is divided into six geopolitical zones which comprise the following: North West, North East, North Central, South West, South East and South-South. The South West zone comprises of Lagos, Oyo, Ogun, Osun, Ondo and Ekiti States. The Yoruba has a population of over 40 million people which is about 25 per cent of the total Nigerian population (The World Fact book 2017). This population is also larger than Portugal and Romania combined; or Ghana, Cameroon and many other African countries (Olutuyi 2016). However, the Yoruba people and culture extend beyond the Southwest. For example, a very large population of Kwara and Kogi States in the North Central Zone of Nigeria are Yoruba speakers. The Yoruba are also found in Republic of Benin, Ghana, Togo, Sierra Leone and Benin (Olarinmoye 2007: 21). The Southwest region has an important and vast economy with an estimated GDP of about \$180 billion, contributing about 35 per cent of the national GDP (NBS 2015, Famakinwa 2015). This GDP is also larger than the economies of many countries in Africa, except Egypt, Angola, Algeria, South Africa, and Morocco (Olutuyi 2016). The leading sectors are farming, trading, manufacturing and commercial services including financial, transport, and telecoms (Odunlami 2014). Arguably, it is not right to confine the territory of the Yoruba people to mainly Southwestern Nigeria as recorded in some literature. According to Akinjogbin (2008), most authors writing West African histories have done so within the geographical and political limits established by the colonial powers, even when the cultural group involved actually extends beyond set colonial boundaries. Due to the colonial delineation of countries and people, it can be observed that sometimes the same cultural group which had been divided into different administrative units is treated as constituting different cultural groups (ibid). This is the same case with the Yoruba people who even though they extend to several West African countries, have been treated as being mainly in Southwestern Nigeria.

However, there are two main indigenous criteria to identify the Yoruba. First is the language, while the second is the ancestral origin of Ile-Ife. Thus, the Yoruba are a single cultural group based on the use of a common language and a sense of common history (Adediran 1994). This classification is distinguished from the Western or

European model of citizenship where nationality is defined by law. Language is an important consideration in Africa citizenship because there are usually some cultural and historical connections wherever the same language is spoken. Many Yoruba speaking communities claim to have migrated from Ile-Ife. The city of Ile-Ife is regarded as the spiritual homeland of the Yoruba.

The Yoruba have had advanced urban kingdoms with towns having walls and gates for over 1500 years (Mullen 2004:9, Ojo 2013:150). It is to be noted that Yoruba political culture and tradition religion are interwoven. According to Oladumiye and Adiji (2014:2), the Yoruba governmental system is actually rooted in sacred customs while traditional leadership is synonymous with the performance of rites. Consequently, the authority, integrity, and honour of the traditional process are because of the inseparability of divinity and royalty of monarchical institutions in Yoruba Kingship (ibid). Of all Yoruba kingdoms, the Oyo Empire under its Oba, the Alaafin of Oyo emerged as the dominant Yoruba military and political power in the 17th century and had about 6,600 towns and villages under its control by the end of the 18th century. During the Berlin Conference of 1884–85 when the European imperialist scrambled for Africa, the British were granted the right to colonize many parts of West Africa and in 1893, most parts of Yoruba land became part of a larger colony known officially as Nigeria (Mullen 2004:13).

### **Osun state, Southwest Nigeria**

This study was particularly conducted in Osun state, Southwest Nigeria. Conducting the study in Osun is deemed appropriate because Ile-Ife , which is regarded as the spiritual homeland of the Yoruba is in Osun State. Yoruba communities also share the idea that Ile-Ife is the cradle of Yoruba culture and where Yoruba civilization spread to all parts of Yoruba land. There are several oral histories of the origination of Ile-Ife. The best known in tradition is the migration of Oduduwa and his followers from the North East, around Mecca and Arabia due to Islamic persecution (Osoba 2014, 44). At Ile-Ife, they formed a kingdom and established their traditional religion with its 401 gods (Biobaku 1958: 65). Oduduwa is the first king of Ife noted for his “Ade” or beaded crown. Oduduwa’s sons later dispersed to various parts the region to form the original 16 Yoruba kingdoms (Mullen 2004:11). Specially, one of the case studies for this

research is Ipetumodu; which is a neighbouring town to Ile-Ife and also shares a lot of history with it.

Osun State was created out of Oyo State on August 27<sup>th</sup> 1991 by the federal military government of General Ibrahim Babangida. The state is situated in the tropical rain forest zone, covering an area of approximately 14,875sq km that lies between latitude 7°30'0"N and longitude 4°30'0"E. According to the 2006 National Population Census, the population of the state is about 3.4 Million people, of which 1,734,149 are males and 1,682,810 females. Politically, Osun State is divided into three Senatorial Districts and thirty Local Government Areas. Osun State has been described as a rural state given that 60 per cent of the state's population is in rural areas (Sanni 2010:67). The main occupations of the population include cash crop and food crop farming, cottage industries, transportation, art and crafts, trading and public works or civil servants. However, agriculture predominates and it is largely practised on commercial and subsistence scales.

According to official data from the National Bureau of Statistics (2010) and the World Bank (2011), the absolute poverty level in Osun State is 37.9 per cent, which is lower than the national average of 60.1 per cent. The South West actually has the lowest poverty rate in Nigeria with a poverty rate of 49.8 per cent. The Northwest zone has the highest poverty rate at 71.4 per cent. Net primary education enrolment in Osun State is 70.7 per cent of which males are 69.2 per cent and females are 72.3 per cent. The South West has the highest net primary education enrolment of 70.6 per cent while the North West has the lowest, 37.2 per cent. Net secondary school enrolment in Osun state and in the South West is also the highest in the country which stands at 64.4 per cent and 63.5 per cent respectively while the North East is 25.7 per cent. The adult literacy rate is 67.5 per cent and 75.8 percent for Osun State and South West zone respectively. The unemployment rate is 10.1 per cent in Osun State while it is 26.6 per cent for the Southwest zone. Osun State, like many parts of Nigeria, suffers from a lack of basic amenities and infrastructure especially, constant electricity, good roads, quality public health, quality education, employment among others which contribute to almost 50 per cent of the level of poverty.

The current Governor of Osun State is Governor Rauf Aregbesola and his administration began in 2010. The government has since launched several laudable projects. Osun Youth Empowerment Scheme (OYES) is a 2-year revolving volunteers



scheme introduced to empower 20,000 youths. Osun School Infrastructure Revamp (O-SCHOOLS) is a programme to build modern public school infrastructures across the Local Government Areas in the State. O-MEALS is a programme that provides feeding for primary school children. Opon Imo (Tablet of Knowledge) is a programme to provide senior secondary school students with free tablet computers preloaded with learning materials to prepare for school leaving exams. These programmes, nonetheless, the administration of Governor Rauf Aregbesola has been criticized especially for reasons such as the school merger policies, lack of local government elections since 2010, delay in the formation of State executive cabinet members, delay in payment of state workers' salaries (ibid, Adegoke 2016).

Specifically, this study was carried out in three selected locations in Osun State namely Ikire town, Iwo town, and Ile-Ife North town. A brief background of each of the selected towns is provided below.

### **Ikire Town**

Ikire is an ancient town and the headquarters of Irewole Local Government Council. The town lies on latitude 07°30' North and longitude 04°20' East. According to the 2006 population census, the population of Ikire town is about 143,599 people, which is about 5 per cent of the entire Osun state population. The land mass of Ikire town is about 978.67 square meters with several villages and hamlets. The main occupations of the population include farming of cash crops such as cocoa and food crops like yam, cocoa, cassava and plantain. The traditional ruler or King is known as the Akire of Ikireland. The people of Ikire practice Islam, Christianity, as well as, traditional religion.

### **Iwo Town**

Iwo town is the headquarters of Iwo Local Government. According to 2006 Nigeria National Population Census, Iwo town has a population of about 191,348 people who are mainly farmers and traders of agricultural products such as cocoa, kola nuts, yam, meat, and timber. The Oluwo of Iwo land is the traditional ruler of Iwo. The people in Iwo practice Islam, Christianity and traditional religion.

### **Ipetumodu Town**

Ipetumodu is the headquarters of Ife North Local Government. The town covers about 985 square kilometres and lies latitude at 7°31'00"N and longitude 4°27'00"E.

According to 2006 National Population Census, the population of Ipetumodu is 153,694 people. The traditional head of Ipetumodu is called the Apetu of Ipetumodu. In terms of commerce, the people of Ipetumodu are known for their various pottery works. They are also farmers of agricultural products such as cocoa, palm produce, timber, plantain, yam and cassava.

### **1.10 Organization of the Dissertation/ Summary of Chapters**

This thesis is organized into eight chapters.

Chapter 1 is the introduction of the study which presents the research problems, research questions and the research objectives. Chapter 2 critically examines the idea of development and good governance from an Afrocentric and from a historical perspective. This chapter particularly addresses the first objective of this study, which is to critically examine the discourse of good governance and its limitation as a means of addressing poverty and underdevelopment. Chapter 3 contextualizes the issues of good governance in Nigeria, and it traces the root of governance and development challenges in Nigeria to specific historical factors that are not captured by the World Bank's good governance agenda. Chapter 4 presents Afrocentricity theory which is the theoretical framework adopted by the study. Afrocentricity is a paradigm in which the centrality of African interests, principles, and perceptions predominate. Afrocentricity is the proposition of African-centred solutions to African problems.

Chapter 5 presents the methodology adopted to conduct the field research. The study uses a case study design and applied both the qualitative and quantitative methods of data collection. Chapter 6 presents both the qualitative and quantitative findings. The findings focus on participants' conceptualization of good governance, their assessment of the performance of the new democratic governance, as well as, the principles which ensure the effective performance of indigenous governance systems in Southwestern Nigeria. Chapter 7 presents the context-specific good governance model that is based on the people's conceptualization of good governance, the local issues identified by local people and the culture in Southwestern Nigeria. Chapter 8 is the last chapter. It presents a comment on how each of the objectives set at the outset of the study has been achieved. The chapter also presents the conclusion of the study.

## **CHAPTER TWO**

### **2.0 DEVELOPMENT AND GOOD GOVERNANCE: A HISTORICAL AND AFROCENTRIC PERSPECTIVE**

#### **2.1 Introduction**

This chapter critically reviews literature on the idea of development and good governance from a historical and Afrocentric perspective. Specifically, the chapter addresses the first objective of this study, which is to critically critique and evaluate the discourse of good governance and its limitations as a means of addressing development challenges in the African countries. Consequently, the review of literature centres on the origination of the idea development and the mainstream development strategies, from modernization theories until the emergence of the idea of good governance. The chapter also reviews literature on the impact of European influence and Eurocentric theories on Africa's development and governance institutions. The literature review is also unique because the discourse of good governance and development are examined from the Afrocentric perspective locating the issues from the African intellectual viewpoint while African culture and experiences are the centre of the study as recommended by Mkabela (2005:180).

This evaluation of good governance as a development strategy will begin with a discussion on the concept development. It is widely accepted that development is a multi-dimensional phenomenon with contested definitions. Whatever definition given to the concept is a function of the writer's perspective and school of thought (DSA, 2006: 1). Consequently, we shall briefly examine literature on the three main development perspectives, namely: development as a long-term process of structural change; development as short- to medium-term goals; and development as a dominant 'discourse' of Western modernity (Sumner and Tribe 2008:10). These development perspectives are discussed in the next section.

#### **2.2 Development Perspectives**

##### **2.2.1 Development as a long-term process of structural Change**

This perspective is broad but it majorly regards development as a long-term change in the structure of the economy, that is, from agricultural sector dominance of the

economy to industrial dominance after the order of Europe (Sumner and Tribe 2008:10). Thus, this approach promotes and places changes in the societal structure above societal welfare. Moreover, by this approach Africa's colonization would be regarded as development because it produced major structural changes even though these changes forcefully and prematurely integrated the region into the international capitalist market. According to Kingston-Mann (2003:95), many 19<sup>th</sup> European scholars defend colonial imperialism as a compulsory civilizing action to place Africa and other regions in the global South on the development path of Europe. This development perspective thus overlooks the subjugating, exploitative and dehumanizing impact of colonization.

If colonization and imposed modernization are development, then this approach redefines development as a subjugating, enslaving and crushing process. Viewing the idea of development from the Afrocentric perspectives of scholars such as Asante (2005) and Mazama (2001), the subjugation of other people can never be the essence of development, especially if the interest of Africa is placed at the centre. Within the same grand theory, but from a non-Eurocentric perspective, Rodney (1972:9) relates development to change which advances human capabilities to better control the environment to get satisfaction and to achieve the desired goal. This advancement may relate to increasing knowledge, skill or technology to devise tools to survive against hazards or to exploit the resources within the environment (ibid). Following, Rodney's (1972:9) definition, every society, including Africa, has experienced various forms of development at one point or the other; else, such community would have been made extinct.

Development defined as structural change also universalizes European development experience for all cultures. Eurocentric scholars such as John Stuart Mill (1848) argues that all human societies are governed by the same universal economic rules and follow the same historical path, like the experience of Western Europe. According to Mill, "...whoever knows the political economy of England, or even of Yorkshire, knows that of all nations, actual or possible" (ibid). Even Karl Marx (1867) in his classic writings maintains, "England shows to the less developed nations of the world the image of their future". Brohman (1995:121) argues that all mainstream development theories, from modernization to neoliberalism and even to the newer good governance

framework follow this perspective, specifying that African countries must follow European historical pattern and standard of development.

This notion of development therefore makes irrelevant and development experience different from Europe's. As it shall be shown in Chapter Four, scholars like Asante (2005) have criticized how European development learning was placed at the pinnacle of human civilization hierarchy while African civilizations are subdued. For example, David Hume (1748) intentionally subdued Africa's distinct civilizations in development learning history. In his essay "Of National Characters", David Hume (1748) declared "*I am apt to suspect the Negroes and in general all other species of men to be naturally inferior to the whites. There never was a civilized nation of any other complexion than white, nor even any individual eminent either in action or speculation. No ingenious manufactures amongst them, no arts, no sciences.*" Nevertheless, Hume's assertion and other racist claims of white superiority and European origination of civilization have been refuted.

Using scientific methodology Gould (1981) debunks the assumption of black inferiority and inborn higher intellectual capacity of the whites by showing various damaging errors and miscalculations committed by earlier scientists testing intelligence. Gould (1978:503) particularly shows that there are biases and finagling in Morton's (1849) study of brain size and intelligence in which results placed whites above Indians and blacks at the bottom. Gould's (1978:503) proper reinterpretation of Morton's raw data shows that all races have approximately equal capacities. Similarly, James (1954) in his book, *'the Stolen Legacy*, challenges the orthodox claim of European or Greek origination of civilization. James (1954) asserts that most of the European intellectualism was plagiarized from Egyptian sources and according to him, the earliest Egyptians were not white but black.

Scholars such as Rodney (1973), Mazrui (2005) and Goldstone (2009) also show that until the 16<sup>th</sup> century, Europe was a backward and barbaric region of the world with no civilization especially when compared to Africa (Egypt), Asia and the Middle East. These other regions have developed several sophisticated technology and civilization such as bronze and iron casting, paper and woodblock printing, use of paper money, writing, gunpowder, oceangoing ships, textile manufacturing, architecture, religion, Geometry, Mathematics, Medicine and the building of great empires and political institutions. Himmelstrand (1994:27) and Goldstone (2009:8) also show that Europe

advanced its technology only in the 15<sup>th</sup> century after its interaction with these other advanced regions and by borrowing their technologies, Europeans were able to build ships to join in ocean trading. They also developed weapons of destruction with which they conquered, enslaved and colonized Africa and many other regions of the world, exploiting these territories for their material wealth (ibid). As it shall be discussed in Chapter 4, European racial superiority is an idea achieved through forceful political, economic and epistemological domination of other regions.

The essence of highlighting these arguments is to show that African worldview is as valid as any other view and that effective development theories can emanate from African culture just as this study aims to develop a good governance model based on African culture. These arguments also form the background of the problem statement. Finally, Chukwuokolo (2009:26) and Berg (2007:543) note that the notion of development as structural change and as an imitation of European development experience failed to achieve growth and improve welfare in developing countries, which led to its criticism and the emergence of alternative development approaches and theories.

### **2.2.2 Development as short- to medium-term goals**

This is an alternative perspective of development and it evaluates the process of change and has short- to medium-term time horizons. The Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and the subsequent Sustainable Development Goals are popular in this regard. This approach is technocratic because it is concerned with setting development goals and measuring performance against set targets (Sumner and Tribe 2008:13). The MDGs were a set of eight goals aimed at addressing the problem of poverty and underdevelopment in Africa and other developing regions. The eight goals are: to eradicate extreme poverty and hunger; achieve universal primary education; promote gender equality and empower women; reduce child mortality; improve maternal health; combat HIV/AIDS, malaria, and other diseases.

Before the declaration of MDGs in 2000, extreme poverty and underdevelopment had reached alarming heights in Third World countries with over 1.2 billion people living below the one-dollar-a-day poverty line while another 18 million people of the Third World's population were dying annually because of poverty-related causes (IFAD/FAO 2002). By the end of 2015, which is the timeframe for MDG, UNECA MDG progress

report (2015) shows that globally, the total number of people living in extreme poverty had fallen, nevertheless, progress varies across regions. MDGs' progress in Africa is particularly limited as poverty persists. According to the report, Africa's economic growth has not been rapid or inclusive enough to create adequate decent employment opportunities. UNECA (2014:28) shows that the number of people living below the \$1.25 per day poverty line in Africa rose from 290 million in 1990 to 376 million in 1999 and to 414 million in 2010. About 22 per cent of children in Africa are out school while more than 2 million children continue to die every year largely due to poverty-related causes (ibid).

While MDGs target setting approach to development is different from the earlier long-term historical approach, nevertheless it suffers similar weaknesses with the first approach. Specifically, it is an externally imposed development and universal in its approach. The MDG design process was largely driven by the hegemonic triad of United States, European Union, and Japan and co-sponsored by the IMF, World Bank and OECD with very little involvement of African countries (Amin 2006; Fukuda-Parr 2012: 11). Put differently, Africa has been given no voice in the definition of its development. By defining African development targets from a Western perspective, the MDGs are subjugating rather than emancipatory to the African people.

Scholars such as Amin (2006), Berg (2007), and Soederberg (2004) agreed that the MDG agenda particularly has an underlying political agenda, which superimposes the neoliberal interest of its promoters on Africa and the rest of the world. For example, the Millennium Challenge Account (MCA) established by the United States to support the MDGs strongly hinges Africa's development on its implementation of the Washington Consensus and will not release funds to poor countries until neoliberal conditions by the donor country are met (Soederberg 2004:279). Thus, despite the claim of the international community that MDG is a global commitment to reduce poverty in Africa, studies such as Tujan (2004), Ajei (2009: 2), Bertucci and Alberti (2003: 2) and Berg (2007:543) show that in actual sense, it further curtails Africa's chance to improve the welfare of its citizens due to its imposition of neoliberal policies. Specifically, these scholars show neoliberal policies mainly benefit the developed countries, granting them unlimited access to further exploit African markets.

### 2.2.3 Development as a dominant 'discourse' of Western modernity

This school of thought is also referred to as post-modern or post-development approach to development. It is based on the assessment that the application of mainstream development strategy in the Third World only led to worsening living conditions and underdevelopment. Most importantly, the idea of development as a discourse is rooted in the work of Michel Foucault (1979) on the dynamics of discourses, power, and knowledge in western countries. Foucault (1979) argues that European enlightenment led to the transformation of existing knowledge structures (e.g. medicine), which is based on the true nature of the world to produce new knowledge (like anatomy, psychology) which merely constitutes discourses through which power is exercised over target groups such as, the sick or insane. Put differently, knowledge discourses use the influence of power to create target groups, which never existed before in order to exercise control over them.

Based on the same argument, Post-Modernists maintained that development is best understood as a discourse because it is a language and mechanism used by the West, through its hegemony, to construct inferior target groups (such as Third World, backward economies, underdeveloped or poor countries) while also normalizing the Western domination and subjugation of these target groups (Escobar 1984:377). Thus, development project is a deliberate effort of the West to develop 'others', and it began in 1949 when American President Harry Truman articulated a new direction for American foreign policy called the Truman Doctrine. The fourth point is that the United States will "*embark on a new bold programme for making available the benefits of the country's technical and scientific knowledge for the development of the undeveloped areas ... Their economic life is primitive and stagnant. Their poverty is a handicap and a threat both to them and more prosperous areas*" (Truman in Knutsson 2009:9).

Thus, the Truman doctrine dichotomized the world as developed and underdeveloped, poor and rich, modern and backward. Development is thus the problematisation of the condition of other people even if these people are not aware of such problems. For example, Zubeiru (2010:5) points out that African people have no word for underdevelopment and did not identify themselves as 'underdeveloped' until Europeans used their power to define them as so. Put differently, underdevelopment is not defining the unpleasant reality of any people per se but a way of defining any worldview or manner of lives that do not align with the West. The Truman doctrine



also shows the western ingredients of development. “[...] *what we envisage is a program of development based on the concepts of democratic fair dealing. Greater production is the key to prosperity and peace. And the key to greater production is a wider and more vigorous application of modern scientific and technical knowledge*” (Truman in Escobar 1995:3). From this speech, the key elements of development include democratic governance, increased use of technology or industrialization, increased growth, adoption of western education and cultures (Escobar 1995:4). As noted by Pieterse (2000:182) development involves telling other people what to do.

Kingston-Mann (2003:96) particularly notes that the convictions of European intellectuals are mainly “*rooted in anecdote and culture-bound assumptions rather than a systematic empirical investigation of any non-elite population*”. That is, the European construct of backwardness and underdevelopment of ‘others’ is never based on any evidence but can only be linked to the European idea and power of “white supremacy”. Knutsson (2009:8) also shows that development was a weapon used during the Cold War, which was an ideological warfare between Western and Eastern Europe. The arguments of Kingston-Mann (2003:96) and Knutsson (2009:8) depict that development originates as an unfair and subjective project. In the African context, the clear contrast between European assumptions of development and African realities, as noted by Zubeiru (2010:5), makes development irrelevant and ineffective. Given the fact that many of the expectations of development have failed to materialize in developing nations, Post-development theorists call for the rejection and dismantling of development (Berg 2007:542; Islam 2009:25). According to Escobar (1984:378), development has continued to create more of the problems it aims to solve. Subsequently, Africa and other Third World countries need to find and follow their independent development paths (ibid).

Critics have complained that post-development theorists like Escobar are pessimistic and that they overlook the diversities of development interventions of the World Bank and other donor institutions as well as the positive impact of these interventions such as longevity and increased literacy (Pieterse 2000: 180). In response to such arguments, post-modernists argue that despite diversities of the development interventions of the World Bank in Africa, the approach remains the same: ethnocentric technocratic and universal methods that reduce local people to mere figures (Ramsamy 2006:12). According to Escobar (1995:167), the impact of the World Bank

should not be viewed only in the economic aspect because the institution is an agent of economic and cultural imperialism of Western developed countries. Audu et al (2013:6) also note that the neoliberal policies of the World Bank, the IMF and WTO are fundamentally unfair to the welfare of the poor. Similarly, Adedeji (2002:3) shows that these institutions have been using their financial power and hegemonic position to prevent and incapacitate home-grown development initiatives, especially if it does not align with the interests of the West. This study follows the post-development line of thought because it acknowledges the ineffectiveness of externally imposed development theories in Africa and advocate for home-grown, context-specific approach to development.

### **2.3 Good Governance as a Discourse**

Based on post-modern arguments such as Escobar (1995), the proposition that the good governance agenda is the singular strategy to achieve development in Africa can be understood as a discourse. As this chapter will show in section 2.10, the idea of good governance does not evolve from the poor themselves (Guttal 2001, Shah 2013). Good governance became a concern of development when the idea emanated from the hegemonic institutions of the World Bank and their ally institutions. Consequently, the former United Nations Secretary-General, Kofi Annan asserted that “Good governance is perhaps the single most important factor in eradicating poverty and promoting development” (UN 1998). As Kingston-Mann (2003:96) noted about opinions of European scholars, Kofi Annan’s statement is not based on any valid empirical evidence but on UN’s position of power. According to Escobar (1995:41), institutions such as the United Nations are saddled with the moral, professional, and legal authority to name subjects, and define strategies.

Punyaratabandhu (2004:3) and Jütting (2003:1) also show that the evidence of a connection between good governance and development outcomes remains tenuous and unclear. Consequently, declaration and imposition of good governance as a development strategy is a display of Western economic and epistemological hegemony on Africa as noted by Escobar (1995). The good governance agenda, like the development discourse, can at best be regarded as a “BE LIKE US” global mission, which further displaces the indigenous institutions of other societies; no matter how effectively or responsively these institutions might have served their societies. This

argument provides a basis for a thorough examination of the discourse, the underlying premises, and motives of the development strategy. According to Sachs (1992:3), it is not the failure of development, which has to be feared, but its success. Sach's argument is that since the development discourse has only successfully displaced African culture without improving the welfare of African people, the discourse of good governance may likewise end up as counterproductive.

## **2.4 Defining Development, Governance and Democracy**

### ***Development Defined***

Although various perspectives of development have been discussed, for the purpose of this study, development refers to the progressive transformation or evolution of the social, economic, and institutional systems, which guarantee a better quality of life, self-worth, and freedom for the society and its members (Agbakoba 2009:553, Goulet 1971, Lewis 1963:420). The idea of using European modernity measured by the annual increase in Gross National Product (GNP) ignores welfare matters such as, access to better health care, education and housing for the poor (Chukwuokolo 2009:26; Dang and Sui Pheng 2015:2). Put differently, by their continuous analyses of countries, development by GNP, and by emphasizing capital accumulation and industrial growth above human improvement, the World Bank, and other international development experts continuously omit in their development efforts, real welfare matters such as feeding, healthcare and housing, which are of concern to local people (Chukwuokolo 2009: 26)

Put differently, conventional development strategies, which are based on conventional growth equations omit Africa's development and welfare concerns are not only inappropriate but unfair and a robbery of African freedom. Freedom in this sense particularly refers to self-determination rather than assuming an identity given to one by another. Amartya Sen's (1999) definition of development as "freedom" is relevant in this regard. According to Sen (1999:4), development should be seen as an expansion of human freedom to live a life that is valued. Accordingly, development requires the removal of major sources of unfreedom such as under-nourishment, morbidity, illiteracy, and the lack of political freedom and freedom of expression (Sen 1999:11). Sen classified instrumental freedoms into five categories namely political freedom, economic, social opportunities, transparency guarantees and protective

security. Considering African countries as entities in a globalised world, it is observable that apart from internal factors which contribute to the problem, the epistemological, political and economic hegemony of some advanced countries rob African countries their 'freedoms' and create unavoidable 'unfreedoms' such as inequality, vulnerability, and poverty in many African countries (Chimni 2004:2-3, Adejumo-Ayibiowu 2015:17-18).

### ***Governance Defined***

Given that this study is critically analysing the discourse of good governance as a development strategy, governance will be defined as the manner in which a society is being managed for the achievement of societal goals and the good welfare of its members (Adejumo-Ayibiowu 2015, Kooiman 2003:4, Rhodes 1996:652, Hill 2013:17, Grote and Gbikpi 2002:20). It is important to mention that since their heightened interest in good governance, international development institutions have projected governance in terms of public sector administration capacity (Frey 2008:46; Mauro 1997). The key assumptions of these institutions include the generalizability of governing and that efficient government institutions are very necessary for the creation of a conducive economic environment (Frey 2008:46; Mauro 1997). However, Booth (2011) and Rodrick (2008:1) assert that there is nothing generalizable about the approach to governing. Rather every society has ordered itself as agreed by its members, of which the culture, history, and norms play important roles. Moreover, because culture evolves, as society advances in knowledge and interacts with other societies, the manner of governing are also bound to evolve (Mapadimeng 2009:10, Idang 2015).

### ***Good Governance defined***

Based on the argument of Booth (2011) and Rodrick (2008:1) about governance, the position of this study is that good governance could be best defined by citizens based on their experience vis-à-vis their expectation and need. However, donor institutions like the World Bank and IMF have conceptualized good governance and its principles both for scholarship and to fit their policy frameworks (Gisselquist 2012). Gisselquist (2012) states that despite varieties in definitions adopted by various donor institutions, there is a consensus about the key components of good governance. These include legitimacy, accountability, transparency, the rule of law, equity, competence,

consensus oriented, and effectiveness (ibid). Based on the donor's perspective of good governance, Santiso (2001:2) asserts that good governance requires democratic participation, the prevalence of the rule of law and an independent judiciary, institutional checks and balances through horizontal and vertical separation of powers, as well as, effective oversight agencies. Donors also present good governance components as necessary for development and this is their justification for imposing governance reforms on indebted African countries (Punyaratabandhu 2004:2).

Scholars such as Grayand Khan (2010:3) as well as Court, Hyden and Mease (2003: 26) argue that if good governance requires the components of such western style democracy, transparency and rule of law, then it automatically means that China and the Asian economies are operate a bad governance. Nevertheless, these countries have achieved poverty reduction without having Western indicators of good governance (Rodrick 2002:1). Given this Asian experience of poverty reduction without Western style democracy, one can infer that its either that good governance may not be a prerequisite for poverty reduction or that the concept of good governance has been mis-defined to include some non-essential factors for poverty reduction while omitting the most important factors for achieving development. Several evidence in literature support the possibility of mis-definition of good governance.

The study of Khan (2006:2-5) particularly shows that that governance capacities that have promoted growth and poverty reduction in Asian countries are quite different from those identified in the good governance model. Chang (2001:36) also argues that the West and their institutions have no historical experience to appropriately recommend the good governance principles - most essential for development and poverty reduction. This is because the Western developed countries acquired most of their good governance institutions (such as democracy, modern bureaucracy, limited liability, bankruptcy law, the central bank, securities regulation, and so on) after, and not before, their economic development.

Thus for the purpose of this study, good governance will be defined as any governance system that well steers the society towards the achievement of the societal goals and improves the welfare of its citizens.

## ***Democracy Defined***

Based on this donor's specification of good governance, some scholars such as Ogundiya (2010:204) and Kassahun (2011:204) particularly equate good governance with western style democracy. In its simplest form, democracy is the government of the people by the people (Ajei 2001). It is also agreeable that a society should be led by a representative and responsive government or leadership. However, Gyekye (1997:133) construed "government by the people" to mean that the people are able to choose their rulers and also able to make them conform to the wishes of the people while the governing rules, laws, and procedures also emanate from all citizens. Based on Gyekye's (1997) argument, any government system that is representative and responsive is democratic. Put differently, representativeness and responsiveness do not make western style democracy a universal principle. Whatever institution to achieve representativeness and responsiveness is subject to research and it will be based on each society's experience, culture, and history.

This study adopts Gyekye's (1997) idea of democracy and defines the term as, the ability of the people to determine who rules them, by which law they are ruled and also make the ruler conform to the will of the people. Following this definition of democracy, many African traditional governance systems are democratic yet with distinct features different from Western style democracy. Several scholars such as Ajei (2001); Salami (2006) and Fayemi (2009) assert that the Yoruba (West Africa) traditional governance system and traditional governance of Akan Ghana (West Africa) are democracies because even though monarchical, they are representative, participatory, decentralized and have adequate checks and balances (Ajei 2001; Salami 2006 and Fayemi 2009). Unlike Western-style democracies which were patriarchal for a very long time, the Yoruba democracy since time immemorial allowed active participation of women in the decision-making during the pre-colonial era, unlike Western democracy (Bradley 2011: 457). The danger of a borrowed democracy or any ideology at that, is that it may in addition to its good qualities; contain other non-cultural elements, which may be harmful to the society (ibid).

Wiredu (1996) particularly argues that majority rule of western democracy is a 'winner takes all' system, which may be repressive in communities with minority groups leading to agitations. However, in African democracies, decision-making is mostly based on consensus rather than on majority rule (Bradley 2011:459, Wiredu 1996).

According to Wiredu (1996) consensus has the advantage of ensuring that every interest is represented and protected, thereby reducing disputes. However, this does not mean that consensus is always reached in African democracies. Wiredu (1996) points out that the decision-making process does sometimes lead to conflicts between lineages, clans, and ethnic groups. However, mechanisms for dispute resolution also exist; in which case, the resolution is also a type of consensus (ibid).

Ake (1991:34) also shows that in African democracies, especially in the pre-colonial period, the accountability of rulers particularly goes beyond the management of economic resources. Rather, African rulers are accountable for their own actions and natural catastrophes such as famine, epidemics, floods, and drought (ibid). Thus, the expectation on governors on maintenance of a good moral standard, as well as, social development is high and must be met. It is noteworthy to mention that this also does not mean good rulers always emerge in African democracies. However, Ajei (2001) and Salami (2006) show that in the Yoruba and Ashanti traditions of West Africa there is mechanism to make rulers conform to the will of the people or face deposition.

Moreover , while African democracies are founded on African philosophy of communalism and morality, Western style democracy is founded on liberalism, a self-interest seeking free market principles whose implementation have hurt the welfare of the poor in Africa (Adejumo-Ayibiowu 2015:10, Neher and Marlay 1995 in Springer 2010, 935). Based on these various arguments in literature, this study concludes that good governance can be best achieved if every society is given the responsibility to find what best works for it in order to achieve representative and responsive governance. This is especially important in those places where implementation of western style democracy has caused distortions rather than progress.

## **2.5 African Development and Governance history**

The subsequent sections discuss main theories and strategies that have framed Africa's development efforts since independence. These include modernization theories, dependency theories, neo-liberalism and the current good governance agenda. Two common facts about these strategies are that they are all externally formulated theories and that they have not generated development and poverty reduction in Africa. However, a discussion on Africa's development history cannot

ignore the major pre-independence events such as the Trans-Atlantic slave trade and colonization, which contributed to the region's present predicaments.

## **2.6. Africa's Development and Governance in the Pre-colonial era**

It has been scientifically proven that Africa is the cradle of civilization while human beings also originated from the continent (Owen 2007, Conner 1996). Many African societies had comparatively advanced institutions even before European contact with the continent in 15<sup>th</sup> century (Rodney, 1972). Africa possesses established empires such as Nubia and Kush, Zimbabwe, Ghana Empire, Mali, Songhai, Kanem-Bornu, Benin and Oyo Empires (ibid). Ancient European visitors and travellers were amazed by the civilization and advanced political structures of these societies. For example, the British explorers, Captain Clapperton and Richard Lander who visited Badagry Coast in West Africa in the 19<sup>th</sup> century commended the safety, law, and order of Oyo Empire under the Alaafin (Biobaku 1958:67). Ibn Battuta, a renowned Islamic scholar, who visited Mali Empire in 1352 AD acknowledged the Empire's good administration, lack of oppression, security, and justice (wa Muiu and Martin 2009:36). Similarly, a Dutchman who visited the Benin Kingdom around 1600 described the capital far more civilized than many European cities (ibid).

In the area of commerce, African civilization includes mining, farming, cloth making, metal fabrication, gold and silversmith, food processing and production (Rodney 1972). Rodney (1972) also shows that local manufacturers in pre-colonial Africa were creating products of comparable and in many instances even of higher quality than those from pre-industrial Europe. Benin Bronze works were actually found to be of high quality and beauty compared to those produced in other parts of the world (Ehinmore 2012). According to Bortolot (2000), many African kingdoms had established trade links with other regions like the Mediterranean Sea, Asia, and the Indian Ocean region. Thus, European merchants who started trading along the Atlantic coast met a well-established trading population whose trade system was regulated by knowledgeable and experienced rulers (ibid).

Apart from agriculture and commerce, evidence shows pre-colonial Africa also had advanced knowledge of medicine. For example, Felkin, a European medical student who visited Uganda in 1879, witnessed a well-developed traditional caesarean section in the country (Davies 1959:49-51). Moreover, the smallpox inoculation in the West



was learned from an African slave who had undergone a similar procedure in West Africa (Koo 2007:144). In architecture, the Egyptian Pyramids and the Great Zimbabwe were examples of African advanced architecture (Conner 1996, Mazrui 2005) Therefore, it is evident that pre-colonial African economic development and political system though different from those of Europe, were quite advanced and were able to support the welfare of African people (Agbese 2004). This study particularly argues that Africa's governance in the pre-colonial system was not worse than the governance of other regions.

Some Eurocentric scholars such as Sir Alan Burns, Margery Perham, Lewis H. Gann and Peter Duignan criticized African pre-colonial way of life as poorly governed and underdeveloped (see Boahen 1985:10). Issues raised by these critics include intertribal wars, lack of advanced technological knowledge like the railroad, human sacrifice and lack of education (ibid). It may be necessary to respond to such critics that given that Africa's development or civilization is distinct (not inferior) from the European civilization, definitely there will be dissimilarities in their achievements as well as gaps. According to Idang (2015:98) and Falola (2003), no civilization can be condemned to be inferior or backward because every culture is unique and designed for different purposes according to the beliefs, technology, and social values of those who produce them. In every area of African needs, including governance, and health, each African community had its innovations to solve societal needs (Rodney 1972).

Himmelstrand (1994:25) argues that in the medieval times, Europeans may claim superior knowledge only in three areas namely: shipbuilding, in the military technology of violent destruction, and in the use of written language. These innovations were however borrowed from Arab civilization which was very close to Europe but geographically far from the African mainland (ibid) Moreover, as the saying goes, necessity is the mother of invention, arguably, these innovations by Europeans were developed as survival strategies against harsh climatic conditions, as well as, the high magnitude and violence of war among Europeans which surpassed any African civil war (ibid). Even though Africa did not invent ocean-going ships but, using indigenous science, they were able to build boats and canoes to meet local water transportation needs. Moreover, written literature exists in several parts of Africa such as Egypt and Ethiopia. But in many places, African traditional knowledge systems relied largely on

oral traditions, which in the African, context is not less valid than written records (Vansina 1985; Williams 1987:166; Kasowe and Katanha 2013:456).

Moreover, while critics discuss African human killings as barbaric, they were silent about the cruel killings and brutal torture by the Roman Catholic church doctrines in the early modern times (see *Dark Side of Christian History*, Helen Ellerbe 1996); or the brutality given to those who act against the European monarchs including the cutting of the hands, the burning and pulling apart of people's bodies (see McGlynn 2008). Meanwhile, in Africa, especially among the Yoruba, human ritual killings had been stopped before the 19<sup>th</sup> century (Biobaku 1958:67). Arguably societies evolve and advance as they gain new knowledge which may be as a result of research or peaceful interaction with other cultures. However, Africa's opportunity to improve its economic, social and political development was halted by European interest to dominate the region.

Similarly Chaves et al (2014:326) show that the Europeans, due to their colonial interests in Africa purposely blocked any independent efforts by African rulers to acquire and adopt modern technology for rapid development while existing indigenous knowledge and sciences were destroyed. For example, when Asante, Ghana attempted to contract British engineers in London to build a railway in 1895 as part of a larger programme of modernization of the society, these efforts were blocked by the British colonial secretary Joseph Chamberlain (ibid). Koutonin (2014) also shows that Timbuktu libraries in Mali, which as at 14<sup>th</sup> century housed hundreds of thousands of volumes of books on Mathematics, Medicine, Poetry, Law, and Astronomy, were destroyed by the Arab-European army in 1591. These evidences confirm that Europeans, through trans-Atlantic slavery and colonization, purposely robbed Africa of the opportunity to develop.

## **2.7 Impact of the Trans-Atlantic Slave trade on Africa's Development and Governance**

Europe's interference into African lives began in the 15<sup>th</sup> century when the whites started their voyages. A major development in these adventures was Christopher Columbus' discovery of America for Spain in 1492 where Europeans took over the territory and decimated the American natives through Afro-Eurasian diseases (Goldstone 2009, 4; Nunn 2014: 356). The Europeans' initial trading with Africa began

with purchasing East African ivory and West African gold (Rodney1972). Europe, with its gun power, eventually created an international exchange system and assumed the power to make decisions on what other regions offered to the world trade depending on its own needs and production (ibid). So, even though Africa had useful goods such as ivory and textiles to offer, Europe determined to only deal in slave merchandise with Africans (ibid). Thus, able bodied men and women were forcefully taken, or rather stolen, from their native lands and transported to the Americas and other European colonies to work in the European plantations.

European slavery has several destructive impacts on the African economic and socio-political development. Slavery depopulated Africa depriving the continent of manpower and young talent needed for development. According to Angeles (2011:2), about 12.5 million skilled and productive African men and women were stolen and shipped away to develop European nations. This number excludes other millions who died during slave capturing, slave wars and those who died during the voyage in the middle passage (Rodney 1972). In 1850, Africa's population was only half of what it would have been had the slave trade not occurred (Ojo 2015:112). Stealing away Africa's labour and talent, Trans-Atlantic slave trade practically destroyed Africa's trading and production systems. The Europeans often instigated tribal wars in African societies, setting one community against another. The pervasive warfare and insecurity caused many African groups to splinter and seek hiding in isolated places away from slave raiders (William 1987:41). The fragmentation and forced movement definitely stalled African civilization endeavours and weakened its political institutions (Nun 2014:362).

Development and governance systems of those regions, which participated most in the slave raid and trade, are mostly affected (Nun 2014: 362). For example, the societies, which form present day Nigeria, contributed over 22 per cent of the total slaves captured from Africa (Smith 2009). Whatley and Gillezeau (2011) show that for those living in West Africa between 1701 and 1850, the probability of being captured and sold as a slave during one's lifetime was 9.3 per cent. Slave trade in the Nigerian territory was particularly facilitated by local merchants, local chiefs and war chiefs who became fascinated by European consumer goods and the profitability of trading in slaves rather than commodities. Consequently, a new class of elites arose who had prospered from going to the interiors to wage war and capturing their brethren. An

example includes Madam Tinubu of Egba land who became powerful by organizing and trading in slaves (Ehinmore 2012). The point is that through trans-Atlantic trading, the African culture of humanness and communalism which had held the African societies together became subverted, the ruling class became corrupt and selfish selling their subjects as slaves for the slightest offence.

The increased wealth of slave traders also changed political and social structures of many communities towards materialism (Okechukwu 1978, Isichei 1978). Since exporters of slaves were among the wealthiest, rather than those engaged in legitimate production, this made non-productive business enticing. For example, Igbo land who were known for their *village democracy and experienced-based leadership, began to place increasing prominence to wealth so that leadership titles can be purchased* (Okechukwu 1978:71). Isichei (1978) accounts how some men would sell their children as slaves to acquire these chieftaincy titles. The impact is not far-fetched. Nunn (2014: 360) shows that those parts of Africa that were heavily involved in the trade, today are poorer, have worse domestic institutions, and exhibit lower levels of trust. Nunn and Wantchekon (2011) also show that people from ethnic groups that suffered higher slave export intensity express less trust in their neighbours and local governments today.

In other words, trans-Atlantic slave trade contributed to Africa's current poverty and poor governance institutions. The next section shows that by the time Europeans stopped trans-Atlantic slave trading in 1885, Africa was not given a chance to recoup its many losses; rather the continent was shared among European imperialists further plundering and underdeveloping it.

## **2.8 Impact of Colonization on Africa's Development and Governance**

Arguably, the abolition of the slave trade was not an act of European benevolence to Africa. According to Ocheni and Nwankwo (2012: 47), slave trade lost its attractiveness due to the emergence of the industrial revolution in Europe in the 19<sup>th</sup> century which drastically reduced the need for slave labour in Europe. The new concern of European industrialists was finding additional raw materials, more markets for manufactured goods and new areas to invest accumulated profits (ibid). It is not a coincidence that, as the slave trade was being abolished in 1885, the European powers also divided Africa among themselves for unobstructed exploitation at the

Berlin Conference of 1884/1885, in what is referred to as the scramble for Africa (1972). After the completion of the partitioning, European military troops were deployed to Africa to conquer the kings and kingdoms and use African men and resources for European advancement (ibid).

Like the trans-Atlantic slave trade, colonization has lasting devastating impact on Africa's economic and political development. Foremost, the partitioning of Africa at the Berlin Conference was done out of greed and ignorance leading to indiscriminate creation of national boundaries that ignored pre-existing ethnic boundaries and other social cohesion which had kept African societies together. In many instances, a large ethnic group found itself divided among two or more countries (Boahen 1985:43). Examples include the Lozi ethnic group which was split between four countries namely Angola, Namibia, Botswana, and Zambia just because of German's interest in having River Zambezi (ibid). The Yoruba, Ibo, and Hausa are also people of distinct cultures, separate historical foundations and different religious orientations which Berlin partitioning married together as one with several other minority ethnicities to become present day Nigeria (Jameson 2008). Europe's arbitrary border is a colonial liability which Africa has not stopped to bear its negative impact, such as, political instability, incessant civil wars, ethnic fractionalization, poor quality of government and economic underdevelopment (Michalopoulos and Pappaioannou 2011 in Nun 2014; Nunn 2008, 165).

Significantly, through colonization, Europeans seized Africa's mineral and agricultural resources for European factories. African economies were also restructured so that only raw materials needed by industries in Europe were produced while Africa was made a consumer nation for European manufactured goods. Industrialization was particularly restricted and discouraged while African economies were turned to a single crop and dependent economies (Pieterse 2010:5). Africa was also prematurely forced to the international capitalist market where its raw materials were bought at a very low price while European manufactured products were sold at costly rates to Africa. All these resulted in the poverty and impoverishment of African people, especially because many people were forced out of their livelihood to work in colonial exploitative companies for extremely low wages (Ocheni and Nwankwo 2012:48).

While Eurocentric historians had claimed that colonization was European civilization mission to Africa because it introduced modern administration systems and modern

infrastructure such as, railways, motorable roads, and telegraph into the country, it is evident that in many regions, especially in Nigeria, the colonial administration did not embark on any development programme for the country (William 1980). Infrastructural investments were made to facilitate extraction of materials from the interiors to coastlands (ibid). Moreover, the encouragement of the production of cash crops such as cotton and rubber investment were not stimulated by the need to develop the country but by the requirements of specific metropolitan industries (Shokpeka and Nwaokocha 2009:59). Abdulai (2001:65) shows that the railway debt was charged to the colonial revenue. In some countries like Guinea, Mozambique, and Guinea-Bissau, when the colonialists were forced to leave at independence, the limited infrastructure was destroyed in anger by the colonialists themselves (ibid).

In terms of governance, colonization gave Africa the taste of military and other forms of illegitimate autocratic rule (Ranger 1983). The colonial Governors were generally military appointments rather than civil ones (ibid). The colonialists adopted two types of policies, namely direct rule, and indirect rule. The French and Portuguese adopted the direct rule which harshly aimed to create from the natives, culturally assimilated elites that would represent French interests in the colonies (De Blij et al 2004). The British, however, adopted the indirect rule, making use of existing traditional political systems to work as agencies to the Crown (ibid). But in either style, all existing traditional governance systems and their traditional checks and balances were destroyed by the colonial government (Sesay 2014). Traditional rulers who were the development planners of their societies were stripped of their powers to begin to work in the interest of the colonial governments, just like civil servants (ibid). Those chiefs who resisted colonial rules were removed by the colonialists (ibid, Abdulai 2001). Hence, neither the European colonial officers nor the new African colonial chiefs and rulers were accountable to the people. Moreover, they were often repressive and extortive.

Appointments to the public positions by colonialists were not based on the traditional standards of moral values but on the acquisition of western education or assurance of loyalty to the British, as the case in Northern Nigeria. According to Ezeanyza (2012), there were instances where those not culturally qualified to compete for an elective position in the community were promoted as Warrant Chiefs by British authorities. In Kenya, the colonial chiefs, appointed by the British as a result of their better education

and Christianity, were found to be drunkards and corrupt (Tignor 1993:179). Illicit activities such as office-selling and influence-peddling, illegal labour, monetary exactions and other corrupt practices were all tolerated by British officials (ibid). Even though the colonial administrations often implemented rudimentary systems of law modelled on the institutions obtainable in the mother countries, they provided none of what are now considered core elements of good governance (Ganahl 2012:6). Zuberi (2010:9) and Boahen (1985:337) show that colonial strategies largely include torture, maiming, and mass murder. For example, 10 million Congolese were killed by King Leopold of Belgium, while the Herero tribe of Namibia were nearly completely destroyed by the Germans (Boahen 1985:337). Arguably, this brutality of the colonizers led to the forced submission and participation of Africans in the colonial project, while the colonial culture of citizen oppression and extortion was embraced by African leaders.

Apart from its devastating impact on African economy and governance, colonialism also had a shattering impact on African culture. According to Skinner (1997:174), European colonizers recognized the need to change the culture of the colonized for the success of the colonial project. For example, according to Governor of the French Sudan in 1897, African population must not only be defeated militarily but also intellectually and morally (ibid). Thus in the French cultural policy of assimilation, Africans were forced to adopt European names, language, clothing, mannerism, and values while African pupils were taught to memorize statements such as “My new country today is France, I am French” (Ibid). Africans were therefore reoriented not to believe in their indigenous capabilities but to see themselves as the inferior subject of the whites. Ranger (1983:215) notes that colonialism introduced into African societies, a new tradition that defined the colonialists and their allies as undisputed masters who ruled by command and control. In response to the domination, the local people also invented a new culture so as to survive the brutality of colonial oppression or to benefit from its exploitative process (ibid). By making Africans lose their self-esteem, they became ordinary objects of the Europeans (Asante 1990, 2005).

Some authors such as Ojo (2015:117), (William 1980:25) and Boahen (1987) mention the positive impact of colonialism. These include the elimination slave trade, development of legitimate commerce, the formation of nation-states, the introduction of judicial and bureaucratic institutions, building of infrastructural facilities, the

introduction of cash crop production and influx of missionaries who established schools. Nevertheless, other evidences in literature indicate that many of the positive influences could possibly be achieved without the subjugation of the African people through imperialism. Societies can learn from other cultures through peaceful interaction. For example, Afolayan (1993) shows that as at mid-19<sup>th</sup> century, Samuel Johnson, a C.M.S. minister and a nationalist was already mobilizing the diverse Yoruba kingdoms in West Africa towards having a united government and a nation state. Such efforts, which were stalled by colonization, could have created a nation with less ethnic friction like the current Nigeria. African traditional governance could have possibly advanced to meet modern complex demands without following the European model. Besides, Europe did not invent bureaucracy. Organized administrative systems and bureaucracy had existed in Ancient Egypt since 3000 BC and prospered in China since AD 850, all under monarchical governments (Adegroye 2015:5). Thus, if Europe can borrow China's bureaucracy without becoming Chinese, Africa can improve its public sector, without the Europeanization of its institutions.

These discussions and review of literature on Africa's development and governance in the pre-independence era are important to understand the origination of bad governance and poverty in Africa. The review also provides a context for the need of an African-centred approach to development.

## **2.9 Africa's Post-Independent Development Theories**

This section provides the context for the emergence of good governance as a development strategy. Erstwhile, good governance was not a development orthodoxy. Modernization theories, dependency theories and the Structural Adjustment Programme were the popularized strategies.

### **2.9.1 Modernization Theories**

Since the colonial governments had no deliberate development plan for the African countries, the main aim of the newly independent African nations' leaders was to quickly lift the colonially plundered economies from underdevelopment and place them on the path of advancement. However, many national governments, including Nigeria, followed the development strategies popularized by the Western capitalist imperialists. It is noteworthy that independence occurred during the era of the Cold War and there was active worldwide competition for political influence between the United States and



the Soviet Union which had emerged as the two world superpowers after World War II (Knutsson 2009:8; Campbell 2013:119). More so, development itself was a Cold War strategy by the United States to ensure that it maintained a global imperial position through the spreading of its capitalist ideology (Knutsson 2009:8).

Arguably, the United States was not only contesting against communism but it definitely opposed any indigenous development ideology that threatened capitalism. Development was thus presented to the newly independent African countries as only achievable by following European/American capitalist industrial development path; while the modernization theory was popularised as the main guide for development (Knutsson 2009:8; Campbell 2013:119).

Rostow's linear stages of growth were particularly influential in this regard. In his book entitled "*The Stages of Economic Growth: A Non-Communist Manifesto*," Rostow presented modernization theory as an alternative development strategy to the Soviet communist model. The title particularly confirms that 'development' is an ideological tool rather than a scientific one. Rostow (1960) analysed that the transition from underdevelopment to development would pass through five linear stages. African economies were expected to leap from the "traditional stage" to "pre-conditions for 'take-off', 'take-off', 'drive to maturity' and then the 'age of high mass-consumption' and finally catch-up with the West.

Modernization theory possesses economic, social and political dimensions. The economic dimension includes the important role given to investment, savings, free trade and exportation based on the comparative advantage (So 1990:36). The measure of development is thus economic growth or increase in the GDP per capita, achievable mainly through industrialization (Tipps 1973:202; Agadin 2013:2). The social dimension is the replacement of traditional ways of thinking with modern Western values (Campbell 2013:119). To achieve a reorientation from the traditional mentality, modernization theorists recommend urbanization, western education, and modern factory employment (ibid). The political dimension is based on the idea of liberal democracy, which is also closely linked with economic liberalism (Schraeder 2000:26, Campbell 2013:119).

Many African governments followed this orthodoxy through public sector investment in industrialization projects at the expense of agriculture. Similarly, based on the

assumption of comparative advantage, African economies continued with the colonial legacy of production of export crops at the expense of agricultural foods (Charlton and Andras 2003:5). Foreign values, western education, and urbanization were magnified while indigenous values and indigenous entrepreneurial work were relegated and received no institutional support. However, the outcomes of modernization were disappointing: debt crisis, food insecurity, rural-urban migration, poverty and poor growth (Charlton and Andras 2003:5; Ocheni et al 2012: 48). This problem worsened because very large shares of African economies are owned by Western interests, leading to repatriation of a large percentage of national income of many African economies (Charlton and Andras 2003:5; Ajei 2009:35; Nyikal 2005:2).

The failure of modernization to lead to Africa's growth brought about widespread criticism. Arguably from the Afrocentric perspective, the theory achieved the aim of its creation, to entrench capitalism and expand US economic hegemony (Ekwe-Ekwe 2013:825). The United States and other industrialized nations were able to gain Africa's market both for the sale of their manufacture goods, as African countries used borrowed funds to import large machinery and other capital goods (Ocheni et al 2012:48). As African countries compete against one another in the exportation of agricultural materials, which is the only product they seem to have a comparative advantage (according to the theory), it results in a glut in the international market forcing down the price of agricultural products to the advantage of its Western buyers (Babu 1981:43). As well noted by the Ecologist (1992:131), the intent of modernization of countries is mainly to transform territories and their citizens into consumable resources for exploitation.

In terms of governance, modernization theory assumes that by following its linear principles, countries will automatically develop into stable liberal democracies patterned after Western powers (Matunhu 2011:67). Moreover, being a free trade orthodoxy, modernization theory restricted the main function of government in the development process to the encouragement of investment while the market should determine the resource allocation of the economy. More on the African post-independence development and governance experience during the Cold War will be discussed after an examination of Dependency theory, which is also popular in the post-independence era.

### **2.9.2 The Dependency theory**

Dependency theory views capitalism as a system of exploitation and oppression, just like the Marxist (Boateng et al., 2008:571). It was developed in the late 1950s among Latin American scholars due to the failure of the modernization prescriptions in the region. It is good to mention that the dependency theory addresses development and not good governance. Proponents of the dependency theory include Raul Prebisch, Theotonio Dos Santos, and Andrew Gunder Frank. The dependency theorists argue that the Third World countries are underdeveloped because of the exploitative relationship of the advanced western countries with poor nations in an unequal international system (ibid). Dependency theory divided the international capitalist system into two players namely, a powerful and exploitative core (referring to the economically developed world) and a periphery (that is, the developing countries of the Third World), which depend largely on the core (ibid).

The capitalist system created an international division of labour in which the poor countries mainly export agriculture products while the developed countries are the main exporters of manufactured and technologically advanced products (Dos Santos 1970, 235; Furtado 1972; Singer 1975). The monopolistic control of technology by the developed countries and the persistent low and inconsistent prices of primary products in the international market system make it difficult for peripheral countries to earn enough to finance expensive capital needed for development (Dos Santos 1970, 235; Furtado 1972; Singer 1975). Therefore, contrary to the modernization proposition that underdevelopment is caused by isolation and lack of integration to the world capitalist system, dependency theory held that international capitalist integration is the main cause of underdevelopment in poor countries.

Frank (1969:4) recognizes colonialism as a major historical impediment to the development of Latin Third World countries. He argues that the Third World cannot follow the European development path because the now developed countries were never made “underdeveloped” through colonial exploitation though they might have been “undeveloped” sometime in the past (ibid). Frank called the regressive impact of colonization the “development of underdevelopment” which works in a “metropolis-Satellite” mechanism (Frank 1969:4-9; So, 2010).

To overcome dependency and to develop, dependency theory recommends that developing countries should adopt import substitution industrialization strategies and protection of local industries from foreign competition through tariffs and other support measures till they are self-reliant (So, 2010). These strategies will help dependent countries to conserve foreign exchange as they would not need to import manufactured goods from developed countries (ibid). The production and export of raw materials would continue, though, and the income arising therefrom would be used to finance the importation of capital goods. In relation to governance, the theory proposes increased government involvement as coordinator of industrialization and economic development. However, the implementation of these policies did not put an end to development problems in Latin America as proposed. These countries experienced economic stagnation in the 1960s (So 2010).

Although critics argue that this development theory practically endorses autarky, nevertheless, the theory is far more relevant to the African societies than the modernization theory (Boateng et al., 2008:571). Scholars such as Ajei (2009:2), Bertucci and Alberti (2003:2) and Rena (2012) indicate that the forceful and premature opening of Africa's economies to the international market system led to their exploitation by the West and crumbled the region's development potential. This study posits that developing countries will fare better if they engage in the international market selectively approving only transactions that promise to improve the welfare of their citizens

### **2.9.3 Dependency Theory and Africa's Economic and Political Development**

In the late 1960s and 1970s, dependency school of thought influenced development planning in African countries, especially those who went with the left wing of the Cold War. Many African countries such as Ghana, Senegal, Zambia, and Tanzania opted for socialism and one-party democracy (Ayittey 2008). Even in non-socialist states, the public sector controls a lot of sectors in post-independence African economies. Common features include legislative regulations and controls, marketing boards, tightened export regulations and import restrictions, price and wage controls (ibid). Nevertheless, these countries were highly dependent on the West for industrial capital, raw materials, machinery, and human resources (Chachage 1987:10). With the fall in the international commodity prices in the 1970s which affected returns on the export

of primary goods, many countries could not finance their huge imports leading to inflation, balance of payment problems, large external debt, economic stagnation (Agboti and Agha 2013:7; Chachage 1987:10). Many state-led economies also suffered due to problems of poor planning and coordination, which resulted in the wrong location of industries, lack of discipline and accountability in public corporations, nepotism, a disincentive to produce and chronic shortages of goods and services (Ayittey 2005).

In addition to the identified problems, Andrae and Beckman (1987:13) show that industrialization investments and efforts were towards the production of goods erstwhile imported and the imitation of western products. For example, Guinness Ghana Breweries Limited (GGBL), and Guinness Nigeria began their operations in these countries in the 1960s to produce formerly imported British beers such as, Guinness Stout (ibid). It also meant that these products required imported skilled manpower and imported raw materials (ibid). Arguably if industrialization efforts were towards revolutionizing and modernizing indigenous products, like bottling of indigenous alcohol and beverages such as palm wine or zobo which would have had 100 per cent local content, definitely the outcome of industrialization would have been positively different.

However, critics will also raise the issue of poor governance. For example, Ayittey (1990, 2008) insists that the failure of state-led economies and socialism in Africa were inevitable because, unlike free market economies, these economic systems lead to inefficiency and autocracy. Put differently, it means scholars like Ayittey are claiming that the free market or capitalism and liberal multi-party democracy ensure good governance. However, such an argument ignores the fact that whether in the African countries, which went right wing, or those who followed the left wing, issues of inefficiency and autocracy were common emerging issues in the 1970s. Arguably, the Western powers and their donor institutions largely contributed to the problems through the Cold War.

#### **2.9.4 The Cold War and Post-Independent Governance in Africa**

It is noteworthy that in the years following independence, the colonial governance style and administrative structures of autocracy and limited accountability were mostly preserved by African leaders (Adedeji 2002). As shown by Duke (2010:68) the

colonialists never invested in institutional building, consequently, African public institutions lacked financial, human and organizational capacity. Thus, Africa's weak governance and economic public institutions are colonial legacy. Studies such as, Shah (2013) and Ganahl (2012), show that the autocratic behaviour of African leadership and its lack of accountability were worsened by the Cold War. According to the authors, during the Cold War, the United States and its allies, as well as, the Soviet Union and its allies, were contending to win the allegiance of newly independent African states. Consequently, financial aid was pumped into African governments with no regard for the soundness of their institutions. Often time, this aid was squandered or even diverted to non-developmental uses such as pursuit of conflicts or arms deals, with the knowledge and support of the superpowers (Shah 2013). Similarly, donor agencies have been accused of sponsoring white elephant projects such as, idle cement plants, near-empty convention centres, and abandoned roads (ibid). The saturation of development assistance bred administrative inefficiency, corruption and shifted government accountability from citizens to donors. This also explains why development aid has not made Africa better off in terms of growth, development and poverty reduction (Moyo 2009).

It does mean that the Western imperialist countries placed no importance on democracy and other principles of good governance in their relationship with Africa since they were only keen to gain the loyalty of African states against the Soviet Union. There arose many repressive and autocratic regimes such as Siad Barre of Somalia, Gnassingbé Eyadéma in Togo, Samuel Doe of Liberia, Mobutu Sese Seko of Zaire, Hissène Habré of Chad, Daniel Arap Moi of Kenya, and they were all supported by the West (Sessay 2014). Despite the evidence of corruption and brutality of these regimes, the West intentionally continued to provide them with financial and military resources (Ganahl 2012: 26). In return for these supports, African governments would protect and serve the interests of Western donors against the Soviet Union while also opening their economies to serve as sources of raw materials and market to donor countries (ibid). Arguably, in this context, therefore, good governance to the Western imperialists during the Cold War has nothing to do with democracy or rule of law. Rather good governance is the friendliness to Western interests and anti-communism. However, with the end of the Cold War and with no more threat of communism, Western

countries drastically reduced aid to African countries and also forced the highly indebted African countries to adopt strict open market policies (ibid).

### **2.9.5 Neo-liberalism or Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP)**

By the end of the 1970s, many Third World countries had become highly indebted to various entities including foreign commercial banks and the World banks (Schraeder 2000:171). The need for countries in crises to request new loans from the World Bank gave the Bretton Wood institutions, the opportunity to direct African economic development affairs (ibid). In order to obtain access to desperately needed international financial capital, African countries must adopt the free market principles of Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) (ibid). SAP is a free market, no government intervention orthodoxy involving deregulation, free trade, privatization of state-owned enterprises and export expansion. The World Bank (1981) in its *Accelerated Development in Sub-Saharan Africa* attributed Africa's stunted growth to domestic policy inadequacies such as, overvalued exchange rates, and industrial protectionism, the overextended public sector, as well as, inappropriate agricultural prices. And the SAP solution to these problems included devaluation of local currencies, deregulation of local markets, removal of trade restrictions such as import bans and quotas, export expansion, privatization and commercialization of public enterprises, subsidy removals on basic foods and other local commodities, reduction in public spending, government downsizing and roll back wages, and even tax reduction for the local elites to encourage their entrepreneurialism (World Bank 1981: 4-5). And without adhering to this conditionality, African economies would not be able to get assistance from the World Bank (ibid).

Brohman (1995:133) shows that the neo-liberal agenda is similar to the modernization theory, which mainly aims at expanding capitalism and Western interest in Africa. Like modernization, it insisted that poor development in Africa and other Third World countries is due to their domestic factors, specifically the overbearing state involvement in the economy (ibid). Arguably, by advocating for the removal of states regulations, neo-liberalism is removing all the African protective barriers preventing the seamless expansion of transnational capital or Western business expansion to the region without considering the impact of such Western invasion on indigenous businesses. Semion (2011) explains that neo-liberalism is based on the assumptions

of a perfect market having a perfect flow of information, homogeneous goods, rationality of market actors to decide base optimal price, free entry and exit (Semion 2011). Although neo-classical economists have demonstrated with complex equations, the universal applicability of the theory, Rodríguez (2011:22) shows free market theory is not practicable in Africa due to imperfections such as market externalities and asymmetries of information. Moreover, in Africa, rationality is not only based on price but also on other factors such as tradition, culture, and beliefs (Schiele 1998). Consequently, it can be argued that in the African context, the neo-liberal models are surely irrelevant. By enforcing African countries to adopt a theory, which contradicts the region's reality, the World Bank has practically shown that the intent of the neo-liberal agenda does not really prioritize Africa's development as much as it aims at protecting Western capitalists' interest.

Although free market policies come with a promise by the developed countries to also open their market to African meagre trade, these countries which just ended an era of failed industrialization, and a long period of neglected agriculture, do not have what it takes to compete in an open market (Sundaram 2011:6). Thus, the industrialized countries, with competitive manufacturing and agricultural products, are the beneficiaries of free trade, exploiting the weakness and underdevelopment of African economies (ibid). Clarke (2013) and George (1999), argue that free market does not make available the greatest social good but mainly provides the greatest good to those who have the means to exploit the weaknesses of the free system. That is to say that, by subscribing to SAP, African economies allowed the developed countries to exploit the weakness and imperfections of African markets, which also explains the increasing inequality between the two regions.

SAP policies of privatization, retrenchment, and removal of subsidy on social goods and agriculture culminated in unprecedented poverty, hunger and social unrest in many African countries (Shah 2013). Even the World Bank accepted that SAP is a failure. According to the former World Bank Chief Economist, Stiglitz, *"If there is a consensus today about what strategies are most likely to promote the development of the poorest countries in the world, it is this: there is no consensus except that the Washington consensus did not provide the answer"* (Stiglitz 2004:2). Unfortunately, the failure of SAP was not attributed to the inappropriateness of the policy for Africa. Instead, it was attributed to poor governance and illegitimate regimes (World Bank



1981:3). While it is true that African leaders have been corrupt and African public institutions are afflicted with bureaucratic decadence, nevertheless, the West through their inappropriate interventions, contributed to the pervasiveness of these problems. Despite World Bank's claim, Rodríguez (2011:22) demonstrated SAP assumptions are too unrealistic, too universal, and too insensitive to the welfare of the poor. Therefore, it cannot achieve growth or improve welfare in Africa. The next section discusses how SAP undermined the quality of the governance process in Africa

#### 2.9.6 Structural Adjustment Programme and Africa's Governance

SAP encouraged bad governance in Africa through many ways. According to Mkandawire (1999:128), the SAP process did not allow any public scrutiny or the participation of recipients' parliaments, civil societies or other social groups. Loan recipients are obliged to adopt the policies without the opportunity to raise objections even where the Washington consensus conflicts with national interests or citizens' welfare (ibid). Put differently, SAP has no participatory or democratic feature of good governance in its formulation and implementation. Troye (1992:113, cited in Gibbon, 1992) shows the World Bank considers that authoritarian regimes, that do not give freedom to press and personal expression, are better adjusters than those countries which grant freedom to the press and conduct elections. These institutions maintained that the success of the adjustment would depend upon the protection of the African government against any opposing view whether from within the government or from the population (ibid).

According to Callaghy (1993: 472), the SAP is to be insulated from the public sector implementing it and from the country leadership itself. In that instance, SAP can be viewed as a foreign policy imposed to take over the steering of the state from the legitimate rulers and to make the system function unchallengeably, in accordance with Western interests. And by being insulated from any form of interference from within the country of implementation, SAP becomes a Western instrument of deprivation, which incapacitates every element in the country even as their resources are being plundered. Mkandawire (1999:127) shows that to the IFIs, it is not bad governance to rule by decree or to suppress opposition groups as much as these unpopular political behaviours will enhance the adoption of SAP (ibid). In countries where democratic regimes were already in place, the challenge for the World Bank was "how to

circumvent the democratic process by strengthening the ‘autonomy’ of the bureaucracy” or by creating ‘authoritarian enclaves’ within the economy” (ibid).

In this regard, Ghana under the military dictatorship of Jerry Rawlings, was applauded as the best performer in Africa (Ibid). It thus means that the World Bank considered what is now labelled as bad governance as necessary for the success of SAP. Similarly, studies such as Haggard and Kaufman (1989:214) confirm that in several cases, the implementation of the Structural Adjustment Programme is associated with the emergence of authoritarian or repressive rules. Based on these studies, arguably if SAP turns a non-repressive government to authoritarian, it can be interpreted that the strategy breeds bad governance.

Considering the issue of governance in Africa and the influence of Western advanced countries on the matter, one thing is observable from the critical review of literature so far. That is, whether during the colonial time, the postcolonial Cold War period, or the SAP period, the concern of the latter to the former on governance is based on whatever political and socio-economic arrangement that guarantees the interests of the imperial capitalist countries, especially their open access to African resources and markets. The scramble for Africa has thus always been a continuous process in the European world. Thus, relating this to the problem statement and the objectives of this study, the analysis further confirms that the intents of Eurocentric approaches to development are not always in the best interest of Africans and their applications contribute to bad governance in the region.

## **2.10 Emergence of Good Governance, A Post-Washington Consensus**

After the failure of SAP, the Bretton Wood Institutions replaced the Washington Consensus with a Post-Washington Consensus, a broader agenda based on neo-liberalism, but which also incorporates the role of the state in economic management (Rodríguez 2011:28, Rodrick et al 2002:1). Thus, good governance is World Bank’s way of saying that the neo-liberal adjustment is right, only that African countries lack the right institutions for the policy to work. For example, the World Bank (1988:3) reported in its evaluation of structural adjustment that entrenched institutional and managerial weaknesses in the public and private sectors of low-income countries especially in Sub-Saharan Africa contributed to the failure of the programme.

The idea that institution matters for development is also reinforced by the New Institutions Economics (NIE), which attempts to integrate a theory of institutions into the neo-classical theory of liberalism. According to North (2005), NIE modifies neo-classical theory by adding institutions and political process as a critical constraint in the performance of economies and the explanation for inefficient markets. And with the consensus that institution matters among development partners, donors policies shifted towards good governance, both as an objective and precondition for aid and development cooperation (Singh 2003:1). For African countries under heavy debt burdens, stagnated growth, and persistent poverty, the implementation of the good governance agenda of its creditors was not an option, rather, it was an obligation (Shah 2013, Ganahl 2012)

On face value, good governance can be assumed to mean improved governance, a responsive government and the absence of corruption, which are all desirable political features in any society. There are also strong arguments for such better governance in Africa, especially Nigeria, where corruption, lack of government accountability, administrative inefficiency and poor public service delivery have become endemic. Nevertheless, the origin and intent of the idea of good governance are very significant. With regard to the intent, Ganahl (2012:29) argues that every foreign policy is inherently driven by economic and strategic interests and this argument holds true for good governance. As it shall be shown, this study particularly observes that despite the donors' rhetoric on good governance of legitimacy, accountability, transparency, and the rule of law, the formulation and implementation of good governance agenda mainly constitute the principles of neo-liberalism and Western liberal democracy. This calls for concern on the appropriateness of the policy for poverty reduction and development.

### **2.11 Analysing Donor's Good Governance as a Development Strategy – Is this the Governance Improvement Africans Yearn For?**

It is important to critically analyse the good governance agenda vis-a-vis the governance and development expectation of African people. Given the devastating impact of SAP or the Washington consensus on African countries, which are well known and documented in the literature, any new intervention, which has a genuine intention to reduce poverty in Africa should at least be a departure from SAP neo-

liberal policies. However, Rodríguez (2011:28) shows that the post-Washington consensus completely retains every neo-liberal policy of SAP and merely added few new political ingredients, which were earlier underplayed. The good governance agenda leaves no room for the indigenous solution to local issues. The World Bank does reaffirm the decision of the West not to go back on structural adjustment regardless of its negative impact; just like Prime Minister Margret Thatcher justified neo-liberal revolution with the single word TINA, short for “There Is No Alternative” (Presbey 2002:286).

Good governance is basically reform packages for the public sector reform and neoliberal economic reforms. These reforms include fiscal management, contract enforcement, budget reforms, anti-corruption, government downsizing, privatization, single digit inflation, exchange rate deregulation, export-led growth, financial and trade liberalization, tax reforms, legal reforms to secure property rights, use of private agents to provide public goods, and a general reduction of state involvement in the economy (Khalil-Babatunde 2014:9; Stewart and Wang 2004:22). Good governance also promotes Western liberal democracy and projects it as the machinery to achieve transparency, accountability, participation and ownership and to legitimize the actions of the government in ensuring a free market economy (Demmers et al. 2004:9).

The observations about these policies are that first, they are not different from the structural adjustment policies (Rodríguez 2011:28). Secondly, it is very unclear how these policies can translate to poverty reduction or participatory and responsive government, especially because empirical evidence points to the contrary (Adejumo-Ayibiowu 2015:13). Thirdly, all indebted countries must adopt all these reforms whether or not they are relevant to a particular country’s development challenges (Stewart and Wang 2004:21). Fourthly, despite donors’ rhetoric on legitimacy, accountability, transparency, and the rule of law, the imposition of the agenda is a clear departure from these principles and even contradict the goal of poverty reduction (Shah 2013). The plethora of reforms can only be interpreted to aim at the restructuring of African institutions so that they reflect institutions obtainable in the West (Grindle 2004, Chang 2011). Since the World Bank’s promotion of democracy does not change their own autocratic relation with poor African countries, democracy in good governance can be interpreted as an element included as the “human face” of a

stringent adjustment. That is to provide a sense of cushioning to the poor masses for the prickles of reforms and adjustment.

An examination of the political associations and democratic movements that arose across Africa in the early 1990s shows that many of them were close allies of the West and they depended on the West for financial support (Ihonvbere 1996:129). Subsequently, the manifestoes of many of these political associations merely adopt the neo-liberal prescriptions of the World Bank and IMF and these movements would rather secure the support and approval of the West in their agendas than the support of their local constituencies (Ibid:132). Thus, the West has strategically positioned African democracies to work in its interest, at the expense of the elected accountability to the poor masses of voters. It is no surprise that many democratic leaders that emerged after the Cold War are autocratic and corrupt since they are less accountable to citizens and would continue to have donors support in as much as they comply with donors' prescriptions (Enwere 2013:63).

Studies of Demmers et al. (2004:9) indicate that democracy in the good governance agenda has no aim to aid citizens' participation in governance beyond providing legitimacy for public office holders who can then be made to work in the interest of the World Bank through impositions of stringent conditionality. This erodes government's accountability to citizens. Demmers et al. (2004:9) show that the World Bank's good governance and democratization mainly task elected regimes to generate attractive and open markets for capital. And despite the adverse impact of financial globalization, democratic governments in the good governance framework are restricted from regulating capital flow or taking any policy initiative to save their economies except those fitting within neoliberal parameters (ibid). It can thus be argued that good governance, rather than empowering the state actually weakens the power of national governments to control their economic policies. If anything, good governance mainly works to ensure state effectiveness to better adhere to World Bank's strict conditions, and to provide an enabling environment for the private sector especially foreign investments, even if such an environment is not conducive for the indigenous enterprises.

An example is the IMF/World Bank Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) introduced in 1999 as a good governance template, which countries must adopt to become eligible for debt relief and loans (IMF 2012:1). Easterly (2005:20) shows that

to get funds, the government must first prepare its PRSP according to World Bank specification. It must then wait for the World Bank to approve the “poverty reduction support credit” (PRSC) while the Bank staff would have to prepare the Country Assistance Strategy (CAS). If the PRSP and support credit is approved, then government must allocate the fund in accordance with the Medium Term Expenditure Framework (MTEF) (Ibid). Evidently, this long process of getting funds under the PRSP good governance agenda further delayed service delivery to the poor. The good governance and state’s effectiveness is really about a country’s compliance with World Bank’s bureaucracy of PRSC, PRSP, CAS, and MTEF.

Easterly (2005) also showed that the bureaucracies of good governance further make governance more complex, donor-oriented, non-participatory and irresponsible to citizens. The Tanzanian case in which roads remained bad despite \$2 billion of donor funds for roads, shows that institutional complexity does not guarantee improved welfare or better government (Easterly 2005:20). Since donors place priority on government’s compliance with institutional reporting, instead of fixing the roads, the Tanzanian government keeps producing over 2,400 reports annually for over a thousand donor missions visiting the country in the name of good governance (ibid). The complexity of bureaucracy also makes it impossible for the poor masses to hold anyone responsible for the bad roads (ibid). Thus, by focusing on meeting the donors’ demands at the expense of the citizens’ welfare, African public sector becomes more corrupt and unchallengeable too.

Similarly, PRSPs never follow the democratic principles it aims to promote. Although the agenda requires the development of a more poverty-focused government strategy, with the participation of local stakeholders so that the PRSP can be country-owned and country-driven, many PRSPs involve no participation than some so-called national dialogue (Shah 2013). Evidence from Senegal, Mali, Malawi, Kenya, shows several groups such as parliamentarians, the trade unions, women groups and marginalized groups were not involved in PRSP consultation (Stewart and Wang 2004:10). Moreover, the IMF rarely allows sufficient time for government broad consensus and widespread consultations. As in the case of Mozambique and Ethiopia, the strict deadlines given by the World Bank for the completion of the PRSP inhibit comprehensive consultation thereby compromising the quality of participation

(ibid:12). Given the desperation of countries to obtain debt relief, complying with donor's requirements outweighs the need for wide consultation (ibid; Ishah 2013).

Despite the claim that PRSPs are developed by nationals and country-owned, in practice, the PRSP is drafted in Washington and imposed on poor countries. It is the World Bank that sets the mandatory policy matrices, which include liberalization, privatization, fiscal and administrative reform and the free market (Guttal 2001). Given that these policies are known to erode welfare rather than promote it, creating national ownership of the PRSP involves government persuasion of the public to accept reforms so as to minimize opposition (ibid). Even if various national actors participated in the PRSP, their contribution cannot go beyond the poverty mapping because the final document must only reflect the World Bank/IMF neo-liberal free market framework (ibid). The IMF particularly confirms that the Washington consensus policies have not been removed in the new good governance /PRSP agenda. The PRSP funding, namely the Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility (PRGF), actually replaced the IMF's Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility (ESAF) with the terms and conditions of this loan unchanged, that is, demanding the rapid privatization process and faster pace of trade liberalization in all countries (Shah 2013).

Many good governance reforms directly hurt the poor, for example, in relation to tax reform, the World Bank (2001:110) suggests a reduction of taxes on large companies and multinationals (and of course multinationals largely represent Western interests). The Bank, however, recommends a higher rate of consumption taxes and higher payments for public goods. Such policies discourage small and medium enterprises, local industries, and reduce citizens' welfare while favouring large multinational companies whose business gains are repatriated abroad. Similarly, in 2002 the IMF recommendations forced Malawi to sell its strategic grain reserves to enable commercial loan repayment and debt service, a policy that later exposed about 3 million poor people when the country suffered serious drought shortly after and there were no reserves to cushion the impact (Gwaambuka 2016). This is not a surprise because neo-liberalism condemns welfare service to the poor. Neo-liberal philosophers like Ayn Rand and Garrett Hardin "*suggested that the poor must rather starve and die than become perennial charity cases for those who have riches*" (Presbey 2002:286).

While liberal democracy and institutional reforms make one side of the good governance agenda, the other side is trade liberalism. Unfortunately as mentioned earlier, the global market is structured to serve the interest of the Western developed countries (Ajei, 2009:2; Bertucci and Alberti, 2003:2, Sundaram et al 2011:4). Africa faces an unfair global trade system in which the World Bank insists on full trade liberalization in poor African countries while developed countries continue to protect different sectors of their market from competition (Clarck 2015). The Western agriculture and textile sectors, in particular, have consistently enjoyed subsidies and other protections (Demmers 2004:293). The huge bailout packages that were given to the private sector in the US by the government in 2009 in order to cope with the 2008 financial crisis (ibid) also contradicts the free market ideology promoted by Western countries.

The African region helplessly continues to be the marketplace and dumping ground for goods produced in the highly industrialized countries. A good example is the case of South Africa that tried to protect its poultry industry from the US's dumping of chicken at below cost price. However, in response, the US threatened to cease providing trade benefits to South Africa, especially the country's access to American markets granted under the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) (Tshabalala 2015). As a result, South Africa was forced to open its market to American chicken even though such market flooding could lead to over 6,500 job losses and also threaten the development of domestic chicken production (ibid). Thus, the industrialized countries will continue to have a lot to gain from good governance and liberalization while Africa has little or no hope of appropriating the gains of trade, due to various setbacks being faced by the region.

The sad part of the so-called donors' support for good governance and development in African countries is that they are largely credits which must be repaid whether they lead to poverty reduction and development or not. And due to donors' insistence on the restricted role of the state in economic activities, a larger percentage of these loans are never allocated directly to productive sectors that are capable of generating growth and poverty reduction such as agriculture and infrastructures (UNDP 2011: 170). Evidence from various donors' good governance projects in Africa shows that good governance credits are largely used to repay existing debt or for financing institutional strengthening so that government would have the capacity to create an enabling



environment for the free market (Dembele 2004). The implication of this is that donors' credits do not reach the poor but end up in the pockets of consultants and civil servants that may not even have the political power to effect changes which will lead to national poverty reduction. For example in 2005, it was found that £700,000 of a £3 million British Aid to Malawi was wasted paying American consultancies, their hotel bills and meals while pens and notebooks were flown from Washington, instead of buying them locally (The Guardian 2005).

Since donors' credits are not always put to productive uses, countries' ability to repay becomes difficult and their indebtedness keeps them under the control of the World Bank perpetually. With the plethora of external interventions as well as the structure of the external debts, it will be very difficult for African countries to be debt-free or liberated from Western impositions, which come with indebtedness. Analysis of the structure of Africa's external debt to the World Bank shows that the principal is very small compared with the accumulated arrears and interest; so much so, that even though Africa has paid the West over four times of its original loans as debt service, the outstanding debt remains overwhelming (Dembele 2004). For example, Nigeria's debt in 1978 was \$5 billion. Even though it had repaid \$16 billion as at 2000, the country was still having \$31 billion as outstanding (ibid). The structure and terms of Western aid or credits are thus fraudulent, unfair, enslaving, have no evidence of good governance, no development intent and keep African countries perpetually under the whims of the West and the IFIs.

This study agrees that the theoretical principles of good governance such as legitimacy, accountability, transparency and the rule of law are beneficial to any society, even though it is not clear if they lead to poverty reduction or not. The validity of empirical and econometric studies supporting the primacy of good governance for development had been contested on conceptual and methodological grounds and the possibility of causality and measurement problems. (See Avellaneda 2006; Gisselquist 2012; Sarkar 2015; Chong and Calderon 2000; Chang 2011; Landman and Hauserman 2003). Despite the contentious link, the reviews above have shown that the good governance promoted by the donors has little to do with these principles. The good governance agenda is disempowering, and it reduces public accountability to criticize and brings more hopelessness to the poor.

Most importantly, the good governance agenda has no local content and gives no chance for indigenous solutions to Africa's development and governance issues. These are parts of the problems, which inform the objective of this study. This is why the main objective of this study is to develop a context-specific good governance model for Nigeria. A good governance model that does not follow donors' neo-liberal and western democratic agenda, but which takes an indigenous approach to incorporate local issues, culture and history of local citizens in Nigeria. Therefore, this study is people-oriented rather than donors-oriented. The next section will examine some examples of peoples' priorities in relation to development and good governance.

### **2.12 People's Perspective of Development and Good Governance- Lessons from other studies**

There is no doubt that the call for good governance may be echoing the voice of African masses that bear the burden of poor and corrupt leadership and poor public service delivery. But what do ordinary citizens mean in their quest for good governance? The clamour of ordinary citizens for democracy and better governance does not necessarily mean a demand for westernization of their way of life. However, because of Western domination, people's agitation for responsive and participatory governance is merely perverted and appropriated to support the World Bank position (Mafeje 1998:4). Consequently, African people's objection to one-party autocracy was interpreted as a demand for western-style multi-party liberal democracy which is also associated with "development", without clarifying what type of development (ibid). Moreover, priority actions towards achieving good governance and development are set by IFIs and donors based on their Western interpretation of these issues. However, some opinion surveys indicate that for many citizens, good governance, transparency, and accountability are nothing more than welfare improvement and the ability of the state to deliver that.

A good example of citizens' voice is the United Nations' (UN) My World survey, which seeks to identify what is most important to ordinary people in different countries around the world. The anonymous survey identifies 16 development issues and asks respondents to identify six out of 16 possible issues they believe can improve their state of well-being. Out of the 16 issues, four are related to governance namely, honest and responsive government; political freedom, freedom from discrimination;

and equality between men and women. However, emerging data as at 2016 indicate that respondents rated non-governance issues such as good education, better health care, and good employment more important than governance issues (<http://data.myworld2015.org/>). Of all the four governance related issues that are identified in the survey, only “honest and responsive government” emerges as one of the 6 priorities for survey respondents. In fact, the choice of ‘an honest and responsive government’ came largely from respondents in high-income countries.

Another example is South African Social Attitudes Survey (SASAS), which is conducted annually by the Human Sciences Research Council (HRSC). The 2012 SASAS shows that the four top-ranked development priorities of South Africans are unemployment, poverty, crime, safety, and HIV/AIDS (Roberts, Struwig and Gordon 2013). The issue of governance, especially corruption, was rated only 5<sup>th</sup> and it came ahead of service provision, education, and affordable housing. At face value, one will assume that South Africans prioritize governance or corruption issues above social service provision and education. However, it should be noted that South Africa is an emerging economy that has more robust social welfare schemes compared to most other African countries. In fact, the survey shows that 70 per cent of the respondents are satisfied with the public provision of healthcare, education, social grants, and housing. Thus, in actuality, governance only becomes a concern to the citizens only after they are contented with the level of social service.

However, there are not many national or local studies of people’s development priorities like the above, especially in poor African countries. Nevertheless, it can be inferred from the above surveys that people are more concerned with the effectiveness of the state to perform functions relating to citizens’ welfare rather than the forms of governance. In addition, people’s priorities and expectations of governance appear not to align with donors’ governance priorities stated in their excessive governance reforms aimed at restructuring forms of governance in Africa so that they look like Europe’s. For example, between 1997 and 2002 required reforms for good governance rose from 45 to 116 (Grindle 2004:526). And the emphasis on attending to these reforms (including electoral reforms, anti-corruption, deregulation and privatization) has shifted development focus, efforts, and resources away from the most important question of whether and how governments can improve their

performance and deliver service to improve welfare (Rocha Menocal, 2013 in Bergh et al 2014).

The surveys also confirm the argument in the literature that wealthier populations would have high expectations of governance whereas in poorer countries, basic necessities would be the priority and governance may even be considered as luxurious. Chang (2011:476) and Sachs et al. (2004:121) argue that given that good governance requires real resources, the desire for it and achieving it will depend on the level of economic development. Veenhoven (2000) also found that economic freedom and welfare improvement are more important for poor countries than for rich nations, while political freedom has more effect in richer countries than in poorer countries. In other words, if poverty reduction and welfare is the goal of public policy, there is need to know the aspects of government reforms essential for that purpose as there may be other faster, cheaper and optimal short-term to medium-term strategies to achieve poverty reduction than the plethora of institutional reforms.

Moreover, recognizing that European institutions develop through long and painful historical processes, the expectations that poor countries meet European standards quickly using some World Bank governance templates are unrealistic (Chang 2001:33). Identifying and addressing those development issues considered by citizens as priorities as against donor's priorities is one of the faster and effective approaches to reducing poverty without fulfilling all the good governance criteria. The dearth of national or local studies of people's development priorities in poor African countries is another gap in literature that motivates this study. Consequently, this study is conducted to contribute to literature on citizens' development priorities in Nigeria. Specifically, the study identifies seven (7) issues, which citizens believe if attended to by government, would most improve their standard of living over the next 4 years.

Having reviewed various externally formulated development approaches adopted by Africa to achieve development and good governance, it is also important to mention that Africa has some home-grown regional initiatives to achieve these objectives. The next section reviews these initiatives.

### **2.13 How Africa Has Responded to Development and Good Governance**

Even though Africa's socio-political sphere has been externally dominated, this is not to say that African intellectuals are not concerned about the problem of corruption, bad

governance, poverty and development in Africa. Several independent initiatives have been taken towards addressing these problems. Some of them include the Bandung Conference of 1955, Lagos Action Plan, EPA, OAU, AU, and NEPAD. While many of these initiatives have increased Africa's potential to develop, review of literature shows that the impact has been dampened by the Africa's lack of economic independence and the super-imposition of Western policies by the imperialist nations through the World Bank/IMF.

### 2.13.1 Bandung Conference

One of the first indigenous responses to European domination and the challenge of governance and underdevelopment of the continent, is the 1955 Bandung Conference which brought together delegates from 29 newly independent countries of Asia and Africa in the midst of the Cold War. The main aim of the conference was to propose alternatives to the world order, which had been dominated by the European superpowers. The conference showed that Africa recognized the devastating impact of European colonization, neo-colonization and exploitation on the welfare of other people of colour (Khudori 2014:1). The main aim of the cooperation of these former colonies was to resist further exploitation of their countries by European imperialists so that developing countries can also achieve development (ibid).

While the United States and the Soviet Union were each keenly competing for the loyalty of these new nations, the Bandung Conference agreed not to take sides with any one of the Cold War blocs. This also led to the Non-Aligned Movement. The conference also led to the Bandung Spirit, framed as ten principles unanimously declared to guide the new cooperation. These include mutual respect of human rights; respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity; peaceful coexistence and promotion of mutual interests; equality of all races and country; the liberation of the world from any form of imperialism; building solidarity towards the colonized, the exploited, and those being undermined by the world order of the day, and for their emancipation (Khudori 2014:1).

The Bandung Conference era (1955-1970) generated several developments, including the recognition of the voice of colonized peoples in the world order. It also made possible the representation of African and Asian countries at the United Nations. It allowed the formerly colonized countries to lead development based on their

national, popular and sovereign interests. The Bandung Conference also contributed to the fast decolonization and independence of other Asian and African states (ibid). Despite these achievements, the Bandung Conference era ended around 1970 with the overthrow of the leaders inspired by the Bandung Spirit, the abortion of their development projects and the entry of their countries into the Western Bloc circle (Khudori 2014:1). However, one thing, which is significant, is that the Bandung spirit is a proof that an African country can develop its strategies independent of the European superpowers. Thus, Africa can achieve development and good governance with less imperial influence.

### **2.13.2 Pan-Africanism and Organization of African Unity**

The Organization of African Unity is one important creation of African nationalists to promote a unified front against colonialism in Africa, and every other form oppression of and exploitation of the European imperialists. This movement against the oppression of Africans and white supremacy is referred to as Pan-Africanism. Pan-Africanism acknowledges the uniqueness of African civilization and the importance of African cultures and values in ensuring development, good governance and an orderly society (Esedebe 1982:3). The Pan-African Congress of 1945 held in Manchester, United Kingdom, adopted a declaration that all colonial people must be free from foreign imperialist control and free to elect their governments (Ajala 1988:36 in Schraeder 2007).

In 1958, Independent African countries held the first Pan-African Conference on African soil, in Ghana. African leaders led by President Nkrumah of Ghana at the conference also agreed to adopt a non-alignment policy regarding the Cold War, to be committed to attainment of independence from colonial powers, the unity of African states, as well as, the economic reconstruction of Africa (Ajala 1988:30 in Schraeder 2007, Ta'a 2014:73).

Arguably, there is a consensus among Pan-Africanists that the road to Africa's development is its emancipation from Western imperialists. But this does not only refer to political independence, as was attained by African countries from the 1950s, but importantly Africa has to be free from a world economic order which has made Africa economically dependent on the West and has annexed African economies to developed countries as suppliers of raw materials (Babu 1981). More so, Africa

requires mental or intellectual emancipation, especially from European ideologies and perspectives that have subjugated the traditional knowledge systems and cultural heritage of the African people (Asante 2005, Nkrumah 1970).

The OAU Charter includes promotion of unity, protection of sovereignty, and elimination of colonialism while also improving the standard of living in Africa. Although the OAU Charter did not specify issues such as corruption or autocratic leadership, the Charter did mention the promotion of human rights. Apart from facilitating decolonization, the achievements of OAU also include gathering of African intellectuals and scholars to develop home-grown strategies for Africa's development. These indigenous strategies include the Monrovia Declaration (1979), the Lagos Plan of Action (LPA), Africa's Priority Programme for Economic Recovery 1986-1990 (APPER) and the African Alternative Framework to Structural Adjustment Programme (AAF-SAP) (1989). However, the implementation of many these strategies suffered neglect due to lack of financing.

Another challenge of OAU was the poor performance of its member countries; especially in terms of economic development and governance (Schraeder 2007: 167; Shinkaiye 2006:5). Observable in member countries were increased poverty, high foreign debt, increased military dictatorship, corruption, and repression of human rights and civil conflicts. But OAU only watched these ills helplessly largely due to its principle of non-interference (Schraeder 2007:167; Shinkaiye 2006:5). The OAU was also criticized because military leaders who had illegally deposed their civilian counterparts were allowed to maintain their OAU seats (ibid). Arguably, the failure of OAU was not in the inappropriateness of the organization, but the weakness of its structure, which prevented the organization from interfering in economic and political matters of its members.

Mkapa (2005) attributes the autocratic behaviour of many of the African leaders to colonialism. According to the former Tanzanian President, Benjamin Mkapa, "Colonialists did not prepare Africans for self-democratic rule." Consequently, many African leaders imbibed the behaviour of oppression and exploitation of their colonial masters (Adedeji 2002). However, from the 1990s issues of good governance and popular participation begin to emanate in OAU decisions. Some of these resolutions include the 1990 African Charter for Popular Participation in Development, the 1999 Algiers Declaration on Unconstitutional Changes of Government, the 2000 Lomé

Declaration for an OAU Response to Unconstitutional Changes of Government, the 2002 OAU/AU Declaration on Principles Governing Democratic Elections in Africa, (AU 2007:2; Shinkaiye 2006:5).

### 2.13.3 The Monrovia Declaration (1979)

By end of the 1970s, African intellectuals had realized that the adoption of Western development strategies in Africa did not improve the economic situation of African people. The Monrovia Declaration is the commitment of African Leaders to strategies for national and collective self-reliance in social and economic development so as to establish a new international economic order that will emancipate African economies from being economically dependent on the West. The aim was to ensure that each African country restructured their economic and social strategies to achieve a solid domestic and intra-African base for a self-sustaining, self-reliant development and economic growth (OAU 1979). The document also underscores the importance of democratic political regime, which protects basic human rights and democratic freedom, human resource development, Science and Technology, and culture among other issues.

Thus, African intellectuals and representatives consider self-sufficiency, good governance, the diversification of Africa's economies from the exportation of primary products and external dependence, as well as, the development of indigenous knowledge and the protection of Africa's cultural heritage as key to the region's development. It is hoped that commitment to the Monrovia Declaration will lead to the creation of a dynamic inter-dependent African economy and the establishment of an African Common and Economic Community (OAU 1979). The objectives itemized in the Monrovia Declaration require clear strategies and policy actions, expatiated in the Lagos Plan of Action

### 2.13.4 The Lagos Plan of Action (1980)

The Lagos Plan of Action (LPA) provides the concrete strategies for the implementation of the Monrovia Declaration. African experts at the extraordinary session held in Lagos, Nigeria, affirmed that Africa's underdevelopment is not inevitable and can be reversed by adopting alternative forms of development approaches that counter the neo-liberal prescriptions of the World Bank. The basic guidelines of the LPA include pursuing a people-focused development, economic



diversification, use of indigenous or domestically developed strategies, spirit of self-reliance, importance of culture and regional economic integration and cooperation.

Using these guidelines, the LPA strategy for African development includes agricultural development to meet domestic food requirements and afterwards export; industrialization aimed at meeting people's basic needs, natural resource development through country exercise of permanent sovereignty over their natural resources and development of manpower and technology, promotion of science and technology and its integration in for rural development without neglecting indigenous technologies; the development of transport and communication infrastructures and their regional integration, attention to trade and trade financing (OAU 1980)

To assist African countries to achieve these objectives, and to develop necessary capabilities and infrastructures for economic and social development, important institutions were established. These include the African Development Bank (ADB), the Association of African Central Banks and the African Institute for Economic Development and Planning (IDEP) (OAU 1980).

Other alternative development initiatives developed by African intellectuals towards achieving development and good governance in Africa include the Final Act of Lagos (1980), Africa's Priority Programme for Economic Recovery 1986-1990 (APPER) , the African Alternative Framework to Structural Adjustment Programme for Socio-Economic Recovery and Transformation (AAF-SAP) (1989), the African Charter for Popular Participation for Development (1990) and the United Nations New Agenda for the Development of Africa in the 1990s (UN-NADAF. 1991). In APPER, Africans emphasized the need to apply home-grown solutions. APPER was later infused into the United Nations Programme of Action for Africa's Economic Recovery and Development (UN-PAAERD) in 1986 under which developed countries promised to give more aid and greater debt relief into African countries.

The African Alternative Framework to Structural Adjustment Programme for Socio-Economic Recovery and Transformation (AAF-SAP) (1989) calls on donor agencies to be sensitive to the vulnerabilities of African economies before imposing stringent conditionality on them. The AAF-SAP rejects many of the principles and conditionality of SAP such as, currency devaluation and privatization. It then provides policies, which direct countries towards balanced development and improvement in the welfare of

Africans. AAF–SAP recommendations include greater limits on debt service payments, selective subsidies, and price control, differential export subsidies, a decrease in defence expenditures, improved governance and increase in productive and infrastructural investments.

However, none of these programmes has made much impact on Africa's development (DeLancey 2007:146 cited in Gordon and Gordon 2007). Often times, some of these home-grown initiatives only exist as documents, which were never translated into practice (Adedeji 2002:3). One major problem is finance. For all their initiatives, African countries still depend on developed countries and their IFIs for funding (ibid). Unfortunately, the World Bank and the donor community have always refused to accede to African's own initiatives, making such strategies end as dormant documents (DeLancey 2007:146). And due to their lack of financial resources to implement their own strategies or even pay their debts, African governments are always compelled to abandon home-grown initiatives and accept whatever policy reforms designed by foreign donors (Adedeji 2002:4).

### **2.13.5 New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) and the African Union (AU)**

The New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) was established in 2001 as a strategic socio-economic development framework for Africa. Shortly after the establishment of NEPAD, the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) was replaced by a more focused African Union (AU) in July 2002. Like the OAU, the new continental organization has a vision of promoting unity, and sovereignty. Issues such as democracy, good governance, and human rights are also important elements of the AU's agenda. Specifically, the Constitutive Act of the African Union, particularly Articles 3 and 4, underscore the significance of good governance, popular participation, the rule of law and human rights (AU 2007:1). Most importantly, the AU Act acknowledges the right of the Union to intervene in a member state in respect of grave circumstances such as war crimes, genocide, and crimes against humanity (Article 4 h) while the Member States also have the right to request for intervention from the Union in order to ensure peace and security (Shinkaiye 2006:6).

NEPAD is acclaimed to be Africa's own development strategy (NEPAD 2002:1). However, it is observable that NEPAD is very similar to World Bank/IMF neo-liberal

good governance framework. The document has been criticized by scholars such as Adesina (2004) and Adedeji (2002) for having little involvement of the African people in its formulation and design. These scholars also show that NEPAD discounts external issues such as Western hegemony, unequal terms of trade and overbearing influence of the World Bank and IMF on African economies, which have been undermining Africa's efforts towards achieving development. The NEPAD does not include the principles of earlier African indigenous initiatives, such as self-reliance, equality and the important role for the public sector. Moreover, both the AU and NEPAD largely depend on Western countries and their ally institutions for funding; explaining why NEPAD has to align with the Washington Consensus (Adedeji 2002: 4). The World Bank and IMF usually resisted, weakened and jettisoned any African initiative that does not align with their own policies or if it put the interests of the West at risk (ibid). The situation is worsened by the corrupt attitude of African leaders who only pay lip service to African initiatives. For example, it is estimated that African states lose as much as \$148 billion annually to corruption (Brun et al 2011).

## **Conclusion**

In conclusion, this chapter has shown that the pervasiveness of poverty, underdevelopment and poor governance in Africa cannot be explained without discussing the contribution of the imperialist Western countries to the problem. The chapter has shown how the West has contributed to the distortion of African economies and governance through colonization, its Cold War development theories, a plethora of anti-welfare neo-liberal and good governance policies. The chapter critically analyses the discourse of good governance, and its origin and the weakness of the agenda to solve the development problems of African countries. Particularly, it has been shown that the current good governance is an agenda set by international donor institutions and the principles and standard of governance are formulated based on Europeans' experience. Similarly, surveys of people's development priorities show that citizens are more concerned with the ability of the state to improve welfare rather than the forms of governance, which are the concerns of donors.

Therefore, this chapter address the first objective of this study. This chapter also provides an argument for an African-centred approach to understanding good

governance and development in Africa. According to Doornbos (2003:8), it will be unfair and awkward to force the adoption of Western-derived standards or donor-conceptualized principles of good governance on non-western, political-cultural contexts of developing countries. The culture, history, and values of the local setting are important in any development and governance framework. The understanding and expectation of governance by local stakeholders are particularly important. The responsibility of defining good governance and its indicators, in particular, lies with citizens and stakeholders. Especially because citizens have the right to decide what is important to them and how they can best achieve their objectives based on their culture and indigenous knowledge.

The next chapter contextualizes the issues of good governance in Nigeria and it presents the limitation of the good governance agenda as a means of addressing poverty and underdevelopment in Nigeria. The chapter also traces the roots of Nigeria's problematic political structure to colonial legacy of tribal politics and fractionalization in Nigeria.

## CHAPTER THREE

### 3. NIGERIA'S DISTORTED ECONOMY AND PATRONAGE STATE: A HISTORICAL ENQUIRY

#### 3.1 Background

The previous chapter provided an Afrocentric critique of the discourse of development and the good governance, as well as, the limitation of the World Bank's good governance agenda as a means of addressing poverty and underdevelopment in poor African countries. However, this chapter specifically contextualizes the issue in Nigeria, which is the first objective of this study. This chapter also address the third objective of this study, which is to identify key issues at the local level which are important for better performance of governance and achievement of development in Nigeria. The chapter is divided into six sections. The first section gives the background to the chapter, the second section examines the impact of good governance reforms on Nigeria's socio-economic and political environment, the third section traces the roots of bad governance to history, the fourth section gives a brief overview of the political philosophy of Nigerian nationalists. The fifth section discusses the identified underlying causes of poor governance in Nigeria; based on history and culture while the sixth section gives some recommended solutions.

Nigeria is currently the most populous country in Africa with an estimated population of 173.6 million (World Bank 2014). Geographically, the country lies between latitudes 4°N and 14°N. It is bound in the North by the Niger Republic, in the East by Cameroon, in the West by the Benin Republic, and in the South by the Gulf of Guinea. Nigeria spans a geographical area of 923,768 square kilometres. Nigeria is a multi-cultural and multi-ethnic nation having over 200 ethnic groups and more than 500 indigenous languages and dialects. Nigeria is an underdeveloped country with 63 per cent of the population living below the poverty line of \$1 a day (National Bureau Statistics 2010, World Bank 2011).

Poverty in Nigeria is a paradox, given that the country is the leading producer of crude oil in Africa and the sixth largest oil exporter in the world (Obi 2010:449). Nigeria is persistently plagued with many socio-economic problems such as poverty, inequality, malnutrition, unemployment, low life expectancy, illiteracy, insecurity, conflicts, and lack of social infrastructures (NBS 2010: 18). Scholars such as Ucha (2010),

Aidelunuoghene (2014) and Awojobi (2014) have attributed Nigeria's poverty and underdevelopment to poor governance, especially corruption. Since 1999, the country has embarked on the good governance reform recommendations of the World Bank. This chapter shows that these good governance reforms neither improve governance nor reduce poverty in Nigeria.

Indisputably, every society has bad and good elements. However, arguably what determines those elements that get to positions of leadership is the political structure existing in that country, as well as, external influence. According to Heslop (2017), a political structure includes the Constitution, the political culture, and how government functions. As this chapter shows that for Nigeria, the political structure left and maintained by colonial interests is characterized by tribalism, political godfathers, patronage, corruption and external alliance. Impositions of some good governance templates on a faulty political structure may only create further distortions. Meanwhile in the face of the failure of colonial/modern government to improve the lives of citizens, indigenous and traditional institutions in Nigeria continue to guarantee the welfare of the people, especially those in the rural areas (Olowu and Erero 1995:1, Okunmadewa et al 2005:4). This study argues that solving Nigeria's governance challenges requires dealing with the underlying causes. Integrating the good qualities of indigenous governance institutions into Nigeria's modern political structure also holds a lot of benefits in improving governance and development.

The next section examines the impact of good governance reforms on the Nigerian socio-economic and political environment.

### **3.2 Nigeria in the Era of Good Governance (1999 -2016)**

Nigeria has had long years of military (mis)rule, characterized by flagrant abuse of office, massive looting of state assets, weakened judiciary, and disrespect for human rights, with no accountability and probity (Ejovi 2013:21). Thus, Nigeria's return to democracy in 1999 brought high hopes for achieving better governance in the country. Following the international community's demand for good governance as a precondition for development assistance coupled with citizens' cry for government's responsiveness, the new administration embarked on various governance reforms as recommended by the World Bank, IMF and other donors. In 2004 Nigeria adopted the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) introduced by the IMF/World Bank as a

good governance template, which countries must adopt to become eligible for debt relief and loans (IMF 2012:1). Nigeria's PRSP was branded as National Economic Empowerment and Development Strategy (NEEDS). It has been shown in the previous chapter how the PRSPs are donor-imposed neo-liberal policies that complicate government democracies at the expense of citizens' welfare.

Other good governance efforts in Nigeria include the enactment of various anti-corruption laws and establishment of agencies such as the Independent Corrupt Practices and Other Related Offences Commission (ICPC) Act (2000), the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) Act (2002), the Fiscal Responsibility Law (2007) and the Procurement Reform Law (2008). The ICPC Act established the ICPC which has the mandate to prohibit and prescribe punishments for corrupt practices and other related offences in Nigeria. The EFCC Act established the EFCC as the legal institution to investigate economic and financial crimes like Advance Fee Fraud (419) and money laundering in Nigeria. The Fiscal Responsibility Act establishes that Nigeria strictly follows the World Bank Medium-Term Fiscal Policy Framework in national planning, budgeting, and economic management.

The MTEF is a document showing how the government will spend and generate money for a period of 3years. It also sets a limit on government spending and borrowing. The Fiscal Responsibility Act aims to achieve greater accountability, transparency, prudence and financial discipline in Nigeria's Fiscal operations. The Procurement Law of 2008 was the ratification into law of the "Due Process procurement system" introduced in 2001, following the World Bank "Country Procurement Assessment Report" of Nigeria which recommended that Nigeria should have a procurement law based on the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) (Bayero 2016:123). The aim is that government purchases are transparent and deliver value for money in public finance.

The government also embarked on civil service reforms, which aim at improving the competency of the public sector workforce and tax reforms aimed at increasing non-oil revenue and improving the efficiency of tax administration (Omesì and Nzor 2015:279). Pension reform establishes a contributory pension scheme in a bid to curb sharp practices and improve pension funds management (ibid). It can be observed that none of these governance reforms directly target welfare and poverty reduction. Rather, they are targeted at changing government bureaucracies and it is presumed

that these restructurings will automatically create a better and corruption-free government, which will also translate to improved welfare (Adejumobi 2006:7). Nigeria is nearing two decades of return to democratic governance and implementation of donor's good governance reforms. This section examines the impact of these reforms on Nigeria's economic and political performance.

### 3.2.1 Reforms and Nigeria Socio- Economic Performance (1999-2016)

Despite reforms, inequality remains very high causing differing and unequal access of the population to job opportunities, security, social infrastructures, as well as, control over public resources (Okunmadewa 2005:4, Ucha 2010:53; Aidelunuoghene 2014:120). At an estimated GDP of \$US 568.5 billion in 2014, Nigeria has the largest economy in Africa and has experienced an average growth rate of about 7 per cent since the early 2000s (World Bank 2015). This growth is largely driven by soaring oil and gas prices in the international market and has nothing to do with reforms (Bertelsmann Stiftung, BTI 2016 2016:2). However, due to inequality, a few privileged Nigerians are stupendously rich, while the majority live in abject poverty. Thus, by not paying attention to the distributional effect of economic growth, the good governance strategy fails in addressing the problem of poverty rooted in inequality in Nigeria.

Regardless of economic growth and implementation of reforms, the standard of living remains low while unemployment is very high. Nigeria's per capita GDP, which stood at US\$2,970 in 2014 is one of the lowest in the world (World Bank 2015); while the unemployment rate is as high as 40 per cent (UNDP 2015). Nigeria's economic growth is thus a non-inclusive growth not reducing poverty, welfare and unemployment. The incidence of poverty is higher in rural areas where the population depends on subsistence, rain-fed agriculture, and infrastructure such as health care, education facilities, good roads and water supply are limited (Iwala 2014:14, NBS 2010). The rural population in Nigeria is also vulnerable to sicknesses such as malaria, HIV/AIDS and tuberculosis, which hinder productivity and worsen poverty (Aidelunuoghene 2014:116).

Improving livelihood through self-help, self-employment, and entrepreneurship is difficult in Nigeria due to the bad state of infrastructure despite reforms. According to a study by Foster and Pushak, (2011) power supply remains unreliable, coverage of pipe-borne water is low and declining; irrigation development is also low and Nigeria



has an undeveloped transport system (Ibid: 14). The rail network is practically neglected, and the air transport classified unsafe (Ibid). Similarly, over 70 per cent of Nigeria's road networks are in poor condition; even though road transport accounts for about 90 percent of all freight and passenger movements in the country (NPC 2015). From personal experience, this researcher can tell that road accidents are a major contributor to high mortality in Nigeria. The poor state of roads contributes to road accidents in Nigeria. Nigeria is ranked second-highest in the rate of road accidents among 193 countries of the world while one out of four accident deaths in Africa occurs in Nigeria (Agbonkhese et al 2013, WHO 2013). High mortality caused by the poor state of infrastructure definitely worsens poverty. In addition, private provisioning of power, water, and sanitation also increases the cost of production and makes Nigerian entrepreneurs uncompetitive, forcing many to shut down.

Even where public institutions have been established to address poverty, the impact has been minimal. An example is the National Poverty Eradication Programme (NAPEP), which was established in 2001 to address youth unemployment through training and micro credit schemes. An assessment of the programme shows that the beneficiaries are not the unemployed and the poor (Aidelunuoghene 2014:119). NAPEP is thus diverted to serve some private interests rather than the poor. Unemployment particularly makes available an army of youths for potential recruitment into the armed militia and religious terrorist groups rising in different parts of the country. Examples include Boko Haram, O'dua People's Congress (OPC), and the Bakassi Boys (Osaghae et al. 2007:2, IRIN 2008). According Salawu (2010:345) over 40 per cent of ethnic conflicts and violence caused by militant groups in Nigeria occurred during the democratic or good governance era. As at 2014, about 650,000 people have been displaced and hundreds killed by Boko Haram (Guardian 2014).

Salawu (2010:348) concludes that poverty and unemployment in Nigeria are caused by the failure of the Nigerian leaders to establish good governments, promote national integration and implement good policies. Put differently, Salawu (2010) like other scholars, is still requesting for good governance after several years of good governance reforms. This shows that the good governance frameworks and reforms have failed to lead to a feasible good government that Nigerians yearn for, even though it might have been fulfilling the World Bank requirements. It does seem that almost two decades of pursuing good governance in Nigeria has been a journey on

the wrong route. Having shown that reforms have not improved Nigeria's socio-economic situation, the next subsection examines the impact of the good governance reforms on political governance in Nigeria.

### **3.2.2. Democratic Reforms and Nigerian Political Governance Since 1999**

Nigeria's democracy has been patterned after the United States by adopting political structures such as federalism, constitutional checks and balances, a multiparty political system and elections. Moreover, these also form the superstructures on which other numerous good governance reforms are based. The implications of these borrowed western political frameworks are examined below.

#### **(a) Federalism and Good Governance in Nigeria**

Nigeria is a federal system of government where power is devolved among three levels of government namely: the federal, state and local government. Chijioke et al. (2012:58) define federalism by the historical experience of United States in which many different regions voluntarily transfer part of their power to a central government. Arguably, in the US case, federalism is an evolution and the structure adopted was designed by a consensus of all the components in a way that the interest and welfare of their populations would be better protected (Petersson 2004; Tocqueville 1997). However, in the case of Nigeria, the current form of federalism practised did not evolve through people's consultation. As shown by Utuk (1975:28), the processes which led to federalism in Nigeria were initiatives of the colonial government starting from Benard Bourdillon's deliberate action to divide Southern Nigeria into Eastern and Western provinces for better and effective administration. Similarly, the current federal system adopted since 1999 was inherited from the military (Musa and Hassan 2014:316)

Federalism in Nigeria has taken different structures. Towards independence, most of the nationalists supported federalism but advocated for a confederal arrangement due to divergence in levels of development of the regions (Musa and Hassan 2014:321). Consequently, at independence, each of the three federating unit was largely autonomous and self-sufficient while the federal government was comparatively weaker. However, during the long years of military rule, this arrangement was largely altered with many more states and local government councils created while power largely resides in the federal government. Although there is a good argument for adopting federalism, given the country's multi-ethnicities and large population and

geographical size, nevertheless, Nigeria's federalism faces many challenges as this study shows.

At the return to democracy in 1999, the country maintained a three-tier federal system of government comprising the federal government at the centre, a federal capital territory administration, 36 state governments and 774 local government councils (LGCs). The 1999 Constitution which was drafted by the outgoing military government guides the Nigerian federation (Okeke and Ugwu (2013: 99, 106). The Constitution assigns powers, resources, and responsibilities to each of the government tier spelt out in part 1, section 4 of the Second Schedule of the 1999 Constitution. However, more power resides with the federal government, even though the Constitution assigns to state and local governments, the provision of several social services that impact on poverty directly such as primary and secondary education, health care services, community services, rural roads, and infrastructure. The federal government collects the most important taxes and oil revenues, which are shared periodically under a revenue sharing formula that allocates 54.68 per cent, 24.72 per cent and 20.60 per cent to the federal, state and local governments respectively. This constitutional arrangement has implications on development; especially the fact that the central government controls the largest resources while the local government, which is the closest to the people shares the least.

The concentration of revenue and power led to problems such as aggressive desire to control the federal power by various ethnic groups, as well as, contentions over the arrangement for revenue allocation among the tiers of government (Elaigwu 2007:14). Thus, federalism under the new democratic era has not been able to unify Nigeria's diversity. Rather, it has increased agitations by minority and majority groups alike, especially for fear of marginalization by other powerful groups (Okpalike 2015:148, Elaigwu 2007:14). Many even demand rotation of the position of the presidency among the various ethnicities and regions of the country (Elaigwu 2007:14). In the history of Nigeria, the fear of domination by dominant ethnic groups has caused several bloody coups, cessation threats, civil war (Biafra war), sectional political parties and continuous demand for creation of more states and local government councils. Arguably, with the current federal arrangement not being able to adequately take care of the ethnic divide in the country and its subsequent problems, the new democratic era is built on a foundation too vague to address the country's political challenges,

especially those fuelled by the ethnic divide.

The problem of ethnic divide and the fear of domination led to the establishment of the “federal character” principle in 1979. The principle upholds that appointments to any position in government institutions in Nigeria should reflect the religion, ethnic and language diversity of the country (Adamolekun et al 1991:75). The aim is to achieve national integration by granting every ethnic group access to the ‘national cake’. However, the application of the federal character principle, especially in public sector recruitment and appointments, has actually amounted to the relegation of merit for this quota system and ethnic representation principle. Adamolekun et al. (1991:75) and Aondoakaa and Orluchukwu (2015:54) argue that the pervasiveness of incompetence, laziness, and mediocrity in Nigeria’s public service and among political leaders can be attributed to this principle. This is because it often hedges out morally upright and visionary candidates while candidates that are less intelligent and without requisite qualifications can be given positions of power on the claim that his or her tribe is underrepresented.

With this situation in which ethnicity seems stronger than competence in public sector recruitment, initiating and implementing sound development policies will remain impossible in Nigeria’s public service regardless of new claims of good governance. This researcher argues that if ethnic sentiment is more important than factors such as experience, character and competence, when choosing public office-holders and political leaders in Nigeria, it then means that the foundations of good or bad governance and poverty reduction, are also rooted in historical factors that make Nigeria an ethnic-biased country. These are part of the specific local problems that a universalized western liberal democracy and neo-liberal good governance agenda overlook. This also forms a stronger argument for a context-specific good governance model which is the objective of this study.

### **(b) Checks and Balances and Good Governance in Nigeria**

Like the United States, the Nigerian political structure follows a presidential system of government having three arms namely the legislature, the executive, and the judiciary. This tripartite governance arrangement is also replicated at the regional or state levels. The 1999 Constitution thus follows the doctrine of separation of powers of the three organs of the state which allows for institutional checks and balances. The Constitution

also provides for accountability to the citizens through a multiparty, free and fair election system. These institutional provisions, however, did not stop the abuse of power for personal gain in the executive, legislative and judicial arms of government in Nigeria. There is evidence of cases of the Executive bribing members of the National Assembly so that the budget submitted to the legislature will not be reduced but even increased without justification. The studies of Orbunde and Ogoh (2016:40) as well as Iheanacho (2015:4) report cases of bribery, inflation of the budget and other corrupt practices among the executives and the Nigerian legislative arm.

The budget process particularly remains problematic and an avenue for corruption, despite various reforms. There are no processes for adequate participation to understand citizens' need and priorities (Ndan 2013:84). A study by Policy and Legal Advocacy Centre (PLAC) (2016:29) also shows that the Executive arm usually delays in presenting the Appropriation Bill to the National Assembly while the Legislature also delays in their consideration and passage of the Appropriation Bill. Even after the budget is approved, the Executive arm often delays the disbursement of funds to ministries and agencies implementing the approved development projects (ibid). The poor masses suffer from these delays because any postponement in the implementation of proposed development projects also means the postponement of the alleviation of the sufferings of the poor. Moreover, the legislature in collaboration with the executive has created corruption opportunities in the annual budget through unconstitutional provisions such as budget padding and constituency projects (Gaskiya 2016). Budget padding involves intentional inflation of the project estimates in the Appropriation Bill so that after its approval, projects receive funding higher than the actual cost, which then goes to private pockets (Theophilus and Perpetu 2016:42). Similarly, the country is also littered with many abandoned projects, largely signifying wastage and diversion of public funds from their proposed uses. An investigation by the Senate in 2012 indicated that between 1999 and 2012, there were up to 8000 infrastructure projects abandoned by the Federal Government of which over 2.2 trillion Naira mobilization deposits paid to the contractors had been lost (Gaskiya 2016). Amidst this waste of resources, which contributes to poverty and underdevelopment, the legislatures in Nigeria are outrageously remunerated, earning as much as 166 times of the GDP per capita (Odemwingie 2015) and a comparison of lawmakers' pay around the world by the Economist (2013) shows that Nigeria has the highest paid

lawmakers in the world. Democratic governance in Nigeria is thus unreasonably expensive. The high cost of maintaining the American-style good governance in Nigeria contradicts the country's lack of resources to promote development and poverty reduction. Despite receiving large remuneration, legislatures are regularly led to the removal of several principal officers in the legislative houses (Ojo and Adebayo 2009:12, Yagboyaju 2011:100).

Although the Nigerian judicial arm of government is supposed to be autonomous, so that they will be fair, this arm is dependent on the Executive, both for the appointment of judges and the financing of the judicial system (Ojo and Adebayo 2009:20). The consequence of this is divided loyalty of the judges and their submission and support of the corrupt practices of the executives. For example in Oyo State, as soon as Chief Alao Akala became the Governor in 2007, he used his power to change the state's Acting Chief Judge, who earlier was investigating several corruption allegations against him (Anaba et al 2008, Human Right Watch 2007). This replacement, of course, put an end to the investigation (ibid). Governor Akala's action is also an example of the Executive's intimidation of the Judiciary, which perverts the rule of law in Nigeria. In 2006, 31 of the 36 state governors were accused of grand scale corruption by the EFCC (Obuah 2010:43; HRW 2011). Unfortunately, due to the compromise of the rule of law, these corruption allegations were repressed and the corrupt governors were never brought to justice (ibid). Arrangements for checks and balances for good governance only exist theoretically in Nigeria but are non-operational and ineffective to make the government transparent or accountable. The next subsection examines the impact of a multiparty system and elections.

### **(c) Political Parties and Elections for Good Governance in Nigeria**

The numerous cases of corruption among elected representative in Nigeria raise a question about the electoral process. Could it be that it is the choice of the Nigerian populace to have unaccountable leadership or that the political party systems and the election process are defective to easily allow bad elements to emerge as winners both at the party primary elections and in the general elections? The second scenario is very true in Nigeria. Despite the adoption of a multi-party election system, as recommended by the Western partners, it is very hard for credible and competent candidates to emerge in Nigeria's leading political parties. This is because political parties in Nigeria are dominated by godfathers, patrons, money bags and ex-military leaders (Olu-Aderemi 2012, Idada and Uhunmwangho 2012). Arguably, the participation of corrupt, retired army generals such as General I.B. Babangida and Lt. General T.Y. Danjuma in party politics (especially as sponsors and financiers) is never aimed at promoting good governance and poverty reduction in Nigeria.

As rightly noted by Amundsen (2010:15), the power of the wealthy ruling elites to control Nigeria's party politics and every arm of government renders ineffective all constitutional checks and balances and good governance accountability mechanisms in the country. Thus, no good governance strategy can be effective without first breaking the dominance of these powerful elements in Nigeria's political arena. Unfortunately, the universal western style, multiparty democracy and the good governance framework have no mechanism to hedge out corrupt elites from controlling party ideologies. Worse still, leading political parties that emerge in the new democracy have no distinct philosophy towards good governance, poverty reduction or Nigeria's development (Yagboyaju 2011:97). Rather, political parties in Nigeria seem to be business investment projects of some corrupt wealthy men who sponsor political candidates to power in expectation for rewards (Olu-Aderemi 2012, Idada and Uhunmwangho 2012). Thus, parties do not present competent candidates that will implement party manifestoes. Instead, they present candidates who will humbly obey party godfathers and sponsors. It is, therefore, no surprise that party primary elections are mostly selective, non-participatory and undemocratic, producing mainly corrupt ex-military men as democratic candidates (Adejumo-Ayibiowu 2015:16). This also

explains why elected candidates are corrupt and indifferent to the electorate because their accountability primarily goes to party patrons and financiers (ibid).

Elections which stand as the main source of power for the masses to choose and remove political leaders are hardly free and fair in Nigeria. Since 1999, Nigeria has had five general elections all of which are characterized by violence, destruction of lives and property, political threats, stealing of ballot boxes, manipulation of the Electoral Commission, multiple voting, and vote-buying (ibid). And given the high level of poverty in Nigeria, politicians find it easy to buy the votes of many people; especially in areas where religion and ethnicity of candidates pose no serious threats. Thus, during elections, it is not uncommon to see political parties and electoral candidates sharing money, bags of rice and motorcycles (Adibe 2016:6). The illicit practice of vote buying and peddling does not prevent other election malpractices such as, election rigging and casting of multiple votes. It is, therefore, evident that politics in Nigeria has been turned into a “do or die” affair, which also points to the selfish motives of the political elites.

Ethnicity and religion are also important factors influencing elections and governance in Nigeria; even much more than the competence of political candidates. These factors often go together because different religions dominate in different ethnic groups. Consequently, political parties in Nigeria often capitalize on the ethnic and religious divides existing in the country to base their campaign on these factors instead of the capability of candidates and the innovativeness of the party’s development agenda. Ethnic and religious cleavages are found to be so strong in Nigeria that electorates believe voting for a tribesman or close tribal allies is the key to preventing dominance by another ethnic group and to gaining access to national resources (Adibe 2015:4; Ibrahim et al 2015:8). Various analyses of voting behaviour since independence also confirm that the choices of the electorate are largely influenced by ethnicity and the religion of candidates (Ibrahim et al 2015:8). Theoretically, the good governance agenda is based on the law of rationality and social contract, which predict that voters will vote the most responsive and accountable political parties and candidates. However, Nigeria’s democracy has proven different because voters’ choice or voting patterns reflect a preference for irrational factors such as, religion and ethnicity.

Although Ibrahim et al. (2015:11) argue that in the 2015 election, Nigeria’s voting pattern changed from the usual ethnic-religious sentiments to reflect a new priority for



credible and competent candidates, this researcher argues that the tribal cleavage voting pattern remains unchanged. It should be noted that during the 2015 elections, President Muhammad Buhari, a Northern Nigerian emerged as the winner under the All People's Congress (APC) party while the incumbent president, Dr Goodluck Jonathan a Southerner and a member of People's Democratic Party (PDP) lost the election. However, a breakdown of the presidential election results by the six geopolitical zones shows that voters' choices are still largely ethnic biased. According to the election results released by the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC), Buhari received 89.66 per cent of the total votes in North Western Nigeria (his hometown/ethnic zone) while the incumbent Goodluck Jonathan got 89.66 per cent of the votes in the South-South zone (his ethnic zone) (INEC 2015). Thus, Jonathan continues to have his region's loyalty and support despite the widespread corruption of his administration. The bordering zones to the ethnic homes of the contestants also follow the same pattern so that Buhari had 75.28 per cent of the votes in the North East while Goodluck Jonathan had the 87.55 votes in the South East (INEC: 2015).

The election results also indicate that Nigerian voters may vote rationally, prioritizing factors such as competence when there is no need for ethnic biases towards the candidates. For example, in the South West and North Central zones which had no major candidates in the presidential election the voting pattern was not ethnically aligned and the two candidates shared the votes almost equally (INEC: 2015; Ofili 2015). And due to the deepness of ethnic divide in Nigeria, the 2015 elections took place amidst tension between the North and the South. There was tension by the fact that the North felt they lost their turn to rule the country when President Umaru Yaradua, a Muslim from the North, died in office in 2010 and his Vice-President, Dr Goodluck Jonathan (a southerner) succeeded him. And when Goodluck Jonathan completed Yaradua's tenure and contested and won the 2011 presidential elections, it sparked a lot of bloody violence in the North, where over 800 southerners were killed (Human Rights Watch 2011).

The problems enumerated above are not limited to the federal elections, but are also replicated in the state and local government elections. A study by the Nigeria Peace and Security Working Group (2015) shows that state-level elections are characterized by violence, political thuggery, kidnappings, intimidation of political aspirants, vote buying and selling and ethnic tensions. Moreover, incumbent governors are found to

use state security to intimidate opposition candidates (ibid). Most importantly, the state apparatus is controlled by the local political godfathers, who position their loyalists in key positions of government from Executive to Legislature (ibid). In Oyo State, for example, Chief Adedibu was a political patron who claimed to have sponsored every politician in the state (HRW 2007). In early 2006, Governor Rashidi Ladoja had a feud with the political godfather, who had been demanding for over 25 per cent of the government's security vote amounting to roughly \$115,000 per month. The Governor was impeached by the allies of the godfather in the state house of assembly. Although the impeachment was later declared illegal and reversed in December 2006 by Nigeria's Supreme Court, the situation led to serious tension and destructive violence in Oyo State. Moreover, during the 2007 elections, the godfather used his rigging power to ensure that Governor Ladoja was not re-elected.

In Anambra State in South Eastern Nigeria, Chris Uba was the PDP godfather who sponsored candidates to political posts across the state by rigging. Prior to the 2003 elections, the PDP governorship candidate, Chris Ngige signed a written contract which spelt out his subordination to Chris Uba and pledged the sum of 3 billion Naira (\$23 million) on being elected as the Governor (Popoola 2014:3; HRW 2007). In addition, Ngige took an oath of loyalty to Uba at a satanic shrine and also signed undated letters of resignation. Although Mr. Peter Obi of the All Progressives Grand Alliance, (APGA) legitimately won the election, the election was rigged in favour of Ngige (Popoola 2014:3). Upon assumption of duties, the relationship between the governor and the godfather went sour. In 2004, Uba forced the governor to resign at gunpoint. Although the resignation was later reversed by the Federal High Court, violence pervaded in Anambra State till Ngige was ousted in March 2006 when Mr. Peter Obi regained his mandate through the court (Ibid).

The implication of these crises is that elections are no longer a useful tool of accountability as re-election is not based on the excellent performance of an incumbent or on the people's mandates. The high rate of electoral fraud makes citizens' vote of no meaning in the new democratic governance. According to Adams (2016), the responsiveness of a state government in Nigeria depends only on the character and intentions of the governor which rarely work to the people's advantage. Most state governors have no strategic development plan for their State, rather they invest in expensive misconceived projects such as airports and other white elephant

projects (ibid). Given that the state administers elections of the local government, the rate of election malpractices is even higher at this level. Although the local government is the closest government to the people and should be indeed representative, in Nigeria local government elections are either rigged for the allies of the Governor to win, or they are not held at all (ibid). The emerging Chairmen of the local government councils are thus, unrepresentative and corrupt. Studies show many of the Chairmen often inflate projects or claimed implementation of fictitious projects in order to enrich themselves (Fatile and Okewale 2013:149-151)

Democracy in Nigeria is reduced to mere multi-party elections, which offer the people rights they cannot exercise and allows people to vote but someone else determines who wins (Ake 1996:5). Given Nigeria's money bag and godfather politics, corrupt election systems, as well as, electorates who are more ethnic-religious money biased, it is very difficult for the Western style democracy and the new good governance framework to produce quality leadership that will achieve national integration, welfare improvement and development. These challenges are never prominent in the European cultures and environments in which the good governance scripts are written. Thus, due to its lack of coherence with Nigerian political history and governance reality, the western style liberal democracy could not achieve any responsive, accountable and representative government. These analyses also answer several of the research questions and objectives of this study.

#### **(d) Anti-Corruption reforms and Good Governance in Nigeria**

Despite anti-corruption reforms, the Human Rights Watch (2007:31-32) reports that an average of US\$ 4 billion to US\$ 8 billion is lost to corruption per annum in Nigeria between 1999 to 2006). A local report given by Nigeria's information minister, estimates that between 2006 and 2013, a total of 1.34 trillion Naira or \$6.8 billion has been stolen by government ministers and bankers from public funds (Gaffey 2016). The 1999 Constitution also contains provisions (such as the Immunity Clause of Section 308), which protect some public officials from any civil proceedings or criminal prosecution relating to acts or practice of corruption. Consequently, many corrupt political office holders could not be prosecuted during their administration and many of them eventually get away with corruption offences. An analysis of the performance of the Commission by Albin-Lackey and Guttschuss (2011) indicates that the Economic and Financial Crime Commission (EFCC) has been ineffective. The authors

attributed the limited success of EFCC to the incompetence of its leaderships. Lawal et al (2013:166) attributed the failure of EFCC to lack of institutional capacity. However, this study argues that the failure of EFCC in curbing anti-corruption in Nigeria is inevitable, due to lack of political support.

Definitely, no anti-corruption agency can work effectively without the strong backing of the country's leadership. However, in the case of Nigeria, elected leadership is actually a product of corrupt party politics and therefore have no genuine motivation to fight corruption (Amundsen 2010). The EFCC actually becomes a political instrument in the hands of the ruling party to haunt political rivals (Albin-Lackey and Guttschuss 2011). The EFCC also lacks the support of the judiciary. For example, EFCC criminal counts against former Delta State governor, James Ibori, a member of the ruling party, were thrown out by the Nigerian court (Ibid). Ibori was later arrested, convicted and jailed in the United Kingdom in 2012 for some of the same crimes the Nigeria judiciary acquitted him of; money laundering and corruption specifically (Easton 2016). The UK jailing of Ibori does not mean the Western countries are dedicated to good governance in Nigeria per se, because these western countries have always provided safe havens for money looted by Nigerian politicians (Ekwe-Ekwe 2013:824). However, Ibori's example shows how the Nigerian political class can control the judiciary to protect their corrupt practices and frustrate the anti-corruption efforts of the EFCC.

The regime of President Goodluck Jonathan who sponsored many good governance reforms is also littered with a large number of corruption crimes (BBC 2014, and Vanguard 2015). Therefore, the existence of an anti-corruption institution or modelling Nigeria's public sector like the West cannot guarantee transparency or improve welfare and development. The next section historically traces the roots of poor governance in Nigeria.

### **3. 3 Tracing the Root of the Problem of Poor Governance**

The assessment and analyses above have shown that good governance reforms have not improved the welfare or achieved a responsive and representative government in Nigeria. Rather, various challenges, which existed before the democratic era such as, inequality, poverty, ethnic agitation, tribalism, poverty, and corruption, persist and even worsened. Western approaches to development have often ignored the impact of colonialism and the structural problems it created in Nigeria. By pushing for

development without first correcting the distortion created by colonialism, Western solutions are built on faulty foundations and have become defective, irrelevant and definitely ineffective. It is now clear that the solution to these problems is beyond instituting good governance agencies and complex bureaucracies or advising leadership to be good or the populace to vote wisely. Understanding the genesis of Nigeria's socio-economic and governance crisis is a necessary step towards finding an effective solution to the problem. This study argues that the formation and administration of the Nigerian state by the British colonialists is based on the patrimonial system, the creation of classes, ethnic suspicions, tribalism, clientism and exploitation which culminated into a culture of patronage and corruption in public service in the post-independence Nigeria. The next section shall examine these foundational issues.

### **3.3.1 Colonial Merger of Irreconcilable Cultures**

Nigeria as a nation is an artificial creation of British colonial governments in 1914. However, archaeological evidence from various parts of the country suggests that many parts of the country have been settled by man since at least 9000 B.C. (*The World Fact book* 2017). In the pre-colonial era, the people in the territory now called Nigeria existed as over 200 independent kingdoms and self-governing communities. Examples include Oyo Empire in the South West, the Igbo acephalous societies in the East, Niger Delta Kingdoms in the Southern Nigeria, the Igala Kingdom in the Middle Belt, as well as the Sokoto Caliphate in the Northern Nigeria. These kingdoms possessed and operated different cultures and languages, but all had sophisticated systems of government that have contributed to building their societies (Lavers 1980:190). However, three cultural groups are dominant given their large population namely, the Hausas in the North, the Ibos in the Southeast, while the Yoruba are mainly in the Southwest.

When one considers the large population, sovereignty and organized political structures of some of the societies in Nigeria, it can be argued that they are actually nations in their own right. In fact, some of the kingdoms and empires are larger in geography and population than some European nations. For example, the Yoruba and Igbo population is put at approximately 40 million and 32 million people respectively (*The World Fact book*, 2017). Each of these groups is larger than Portugal and

Romania combined or Ghana, Togo, Cameroon and many other African countries (Olutuyi, 2016). Thus a major harm done by colonization is to reduce the autonomous status of societies from their statehood to mere components called tribe or ethnic group within a European artificially created nation. Arguably the forceful relegation of nationhood to ethnicity causes a feeling of dissatisfaction that leads to violent agitation against dominance by other groups.

The diversities of political cultures of each of these groups also cause differences in the political attitudes of the people and their response to colonialism. According to Akanle (2012:19), culture determines attitude, perspective, and approach to development. An imposition of a new colonial political governance style in the multi ethnic country cannot but lead to distortions. Considering the major cultures, Yoruba, Igbo, and Hausa, it is glaring that the dissimilarities of the political structures are distinct and irreconcilable.

The Yoruba operates homogeneous monarchical but decentralized systems of government which was organized in cities, towns, and villages. The system is also democratic and consultative. The King or Oba rules from the capital city while smaller towns and villages are ruled by chiefs. The village is also made up of extended families or clans, each headed by a family head. The king must consult all stakeholders and the council of chiefs for the decision, and the power to appoint and depose a king lies in the people (Fayemi 2009:110, Akanle 2011:19). The Benin Kingdom of the Edo people in mid-Western Nigeria is also monarchical, operating like the Yoruba kingdoms. The political culture of the Ibos or Igbos is a sort of direct democracy where decisions are taken in a manner that accommodates all members of the society. They particularly operated an age-grade system of governance whereby popular discussions occurred in the councils of elders and similar institutions (Akanle 2011:19). But in other non-Igbo tribes of the Southern Nigeria such as Calabar, Opobo and Bonny, a kingship system of governance such as in the Yoruba state was common (ibid).

The Hausas in the Northern Nigeria, however, have a unique history because since around the 11<sup>th</sup> century they had suffered various Islamic conquests which had subjugated their traditional or indigenous culture (Jameson 2008). Islam is a religion, which controls the totality of the societal life including socio-economic and political systems (Crowder 1968). Consequently, by the sixteenth century, the Hausa

communities all had highly structured Islamic theocracies with the organized fiscal system and established judiciary. Before the European colonization, the region was again conquered by the Fulani in a religious war or Jihad led by Usman dan Fodio in the early 19<sup>th</sup> century (Johnston 2010: 6-8). The war was waged to reinforce the Islamic law and political system in the North. Although the Fulani are a minority group of Arab descent, their victory gave them the whole apparatus of power in the North, displacing the ruling Hausa aristocracy (ibid). The Fulani Empire had its capital in Sokoto and the leadership structures were hierarchical with each community governed by Emirs while the Sultan of Sokoto is the chief of Emirs (ibid). The British were particularly fascinated by the autocracy and organization of the Sokoto Caliphate, which later provided the model for the British colonial policy of indirect rule.

Thus, the political culture of the Hausa in the North is autocratic; the Yoruba political culture is democratic and monarchical while the Igbo have a culture of direct democracies. Forcing these cultures together under a single government inevitably creates tensions. Many scholars agree that Europe's arbitrary and illogical partitioning that merged diverse ethnic groups into territories made internal strife inevitable (Boahen 1985). Although due to force, each of the ethnic groups submitted its sovereignty to British domination and colonialism, none of these societies will ever be ready to submit to the domination of another group within the Nigerian state. Thus, the nature of the relationship between the tribes has been that of suspicion and fear of domination.

### **3.3.2 Colonial Rule of Patronage and Ethnic Division**

#### **Indirect rule**

Before 1914, the colonial government administered the Southern and Northern Nigeria as a separate administrative unit (Utuk 1975:13). In 1914, the Northern colony which had been run at a loss was amalgamated with the lucrative southern colony to be governed together as a single entity despite the cultural differences and the historical divide among these societies. The British imposed a patrimonial system of administration on Nigeria in the name of indirect rule, which actually enlists the dominant or ruling class in the service of colonial rule. Ideally, all relations within a patrimonial system are vertical ties of domination and dependence, with subordinate

clients pushing for the favour of their patrons, and in this case, with the British Resident as the Great white Patron at the Apex of the system.

The indirect rule was very successful in the North because of the existence of a structured Islamic autocracy, which is a system of patrimonialism in itself. According to Turaki (2010), the British colonialism of the North only added an overlay on an already existing Fulani Muslim hegemony in Northern Nigeria. Crowder (1968) also argues that Islam has been used as a conservative force to domesticate the Northern population, a situation that favours the British colonial government, which does not want any resistance or agitation from any liberation. Turaki (2010) argues that the Hausa-Fulani chiefs actually became junior partners of colonialism in Nigeria. Lord Frederick Lugard, Nigeria's first colonial Governor also confirmed that colonialists considered the Fulani as an invaluable medium of subjugation while their lighter skin and Arabian looks made them appear more intelligent than the larger black population (Lugard 1926).

Thus, the British introduced racism and tribalism into the Nigerian communities while also creating a status group of political subjugation and economic exploitation in the country. However, in the Southwest, where democratic monarchical governance predominates, the indirect rule was resisted. Among the Ibos of the Southeast, which run a direct system of democracy, governance, the indirect rule actually led to chaos. For example, direct taxation, which succeeded very well in the North sparked riots when it was introduced to the Southern Nigeria in 1929 (Ejiogu 2007:105). Thus in these communities, with no existing indigenous patrimonialism, the colonialists transformed the indigenous political structures to serve the purpose of indirect rule, creating chieftaincy positions and turning titled offices into a system of patronage. The colonial indirect rule, therefore, created larger political distortions in Southern Nigeria.

Traditional rulers were made to derive their authority from the colonial Governor and no longer from the people and culture while the customary laws were also subjugated and replaced by the British colonial laws. The British introduced its court system while the traditional rules of dealing with criminals and ensuring rectitude were all suspended (Lugard 1926). Thus, the traditional system, which had guaranteed representative and responsive governance was replaced by repressive, non-transparent and unaccountable governance while the traditional law which had ensured orderly and crime-free societies were replaced by ineffective foreign laws.



## **Colonial Exploitation and Cultural Re-orientation**

The colonial mis-governance of Nigerian economic resources cannot be overlooked as colonial policies in Nigeria only exploited and monopolized Nigerian cash crops and other resources for the benefit the United Kingdom (Njoku 1987). The British agricultural policies in Nigeria diverted labour and farm lands from non-exportable crops to cash crops (Shokpeka and Nwaokocha 2009:59). The colonial forestry policy also indiscriminately converted available land to forest reserves to produce timber and rubber (Ibid). The British marketing boards robbed farmers of their profits which were then used to subsidize British consumers, shore up British reserves and line up the pockets of colonialists and their collaborators (William 1980). While these selfish economic policies caused Nigerians food shortages, hunger and poverty, the beneficiaries were the European exporting firms such as the United Africa Company, John Holt, and Paterson and Zochonis (PZ), as well as, their African intermediaries (Njoku 1987). These also created a new tradition of materialism and wealth associated with collaborating in the colonial modern system

Colonialism also led to the subjugation of culture in Nigeria through the imposition of British law, as well as, Western education and Christianity, which spread in the South. The Christian missionaries particularly made their converts question and disbelieve the traditional beliefs previously held in high esteem by the indigenous societies (Decker 2012). Western colonial education also produced elites who were Europeanized in their mentality. Consequently, indigenous culture and traditional religion, upon which the societies in Southern Nigeria, were based became demonized and inferiorized by the educated elite. It is important to note that Nigerian pre-colonial societies had comprehensive, progressive and functional indigenous education that not only taught intellectualism and vocations but also moral and physical development (Joseph 2007, and Garba 2012). Moreover, the education was tailored to the needs of the society; consequently, the problem of unemployment could not arise.

Garba (2012:55) notes that children mostly learnt morals, societal values, culture, leadership skills, vocational skills and home keeping skills by staying close to their parents, watching them perform technical tasks, listening to them deliberately at societal meetings, and through proverbs and wise sayings. However, to destroy local culture, colonial formal education detached children from their parents and their communities by keeping them in boarding schools where they were tutored in western

knowledge and orientated to embrace western culture and ideologies (Garba, 2012:57). Some aspects of the European philosophy inculcated in the students included materialism and individualism, which created new self-seeking and greedy wealth accumulation behaviour in the populace (Omotosho 1998; Nduka 1975). These foreign values conflicted with the local culture of collectivism, humanness and contentment. Arguably, education was used by the colonial masters as a tool for the superimposition of European culture and ways of knowing on the indigenous people to the displacement of traditional knowledge, customs, and intellectualism.

However, the impact of these changes includes outbreaks in crimes and other social vices. According to Lugard (1926), crime increased wherever the British criminal laws were adopted and the traditional methods of punishment were subjugated. Thus confirming the ineffectiveness of adapting foreign rules without giving due consideration to the local context. Formal education which is associated with high paying modern and colonial jobs also instigates migration from the rural area to urban centres and the abandonment of traditional economic activities, such as farming and local manufacture (Orji 2012). However, the restriction of formal education in the North caused a lasting educational gap between the North and South.

## **Colonial- Northern Alliance and Tribalism**

The most lasting negative impact of colonialism is the legacy of patronage governance and its divide and rule tactics, which led to ethnic cleavages of Nigerians. It is believed that the British favoured Northern Nigeria which raised discontent and fear of domination by other groups (Turaki 2010, Smith 2005). The British colonial outlook can be seen in the memoir "*But Always as Friends*" by Sir Bryan Sharwood-Smith (1969), who was the last British governor of the Northern region. The memoir shows how the British identified with the Fulani aristocrats and would ensure that Nigerian political structure is ordered in their interest. According to the Governor, "*Sadauna and his ministers have been helpful. Obviously, the new structure had to accord with their wishes, and its main features were the result of a joint operation*" (Sharwood Smith 1969 in Johnston, 2010:241).

Studies have confirmed that the British prohibited the activities of Christian missionaries and the spread of formal education in the North so as not to interfere with the Muslim tradition, which had given the Fulani Emirs full grip over their Hausa subjects (Sharwood-Smith 1969, Utuk 1975:16, Turaki 2010). While the larger Northern population was kept in ignorance, the children from the ruling lineages were exposed to formal Western-style education to incubate them for future national leadership (International Crisis Group (ICG) 2006:4). Moreover, by allowing the Christian missionaries in the South and disallowing them in the North, the British presented Islam as a more sophisticated religion; while making inferior the indigenous beliefs held in the South. Lord Lugard particularly showed his disdain to Southern cultures by describing them as "primitive and barbaric and held in thrall by fetish worship and the hideous ordeals of witchcraft, human sacrifice, and twin murder" (Lugard 1922:198). Arguably, the British gave the Islamic North some sense of superiority over the other ethnics groups. Worse still, the colonialists instituted a segregation policy that housed internal immigrants to the North in separate living areas called Sabon Gari (strangers' quarters) (Adamu 2016:8, ICG 2006:5).

It is also observed that the jurisdiction of the Fulani emirs became expanded by the British as they were placed to rule the Middle Belt and non-Muslim areas in the North, which erstwhile were not conquered by the Fulani Jihadists (Turaki 2010; ICG 2006:5, Utuk 1975:16). As a result, these non-Muslim areas became subjected to Muslim laws and the use of the Hausa language, thus consolidating all the various ethnic groups in

the upper part of the Niger to form a large, politically unified Hausa speaking northern Nigeria. The large size of the Fulani-controlled north posed a large threat of domination to the other Southern ethnic groups whose heterogeneities in terms of culture, language, religion, and political structures did not allow such unification.

Similarly, in its recruitment especially to the military, which was a colonial machinery for maintaining dominance, the British were rather selective and ethnically biased. According to Ejiogu (2007:104), the military was largely made up of northerners and the Hausa language was institutionalized. The southerners were precluded because their exposure to western education and civilization was considered by the British as threatening factors that could cause insubordination and resistance to colonialism (ibid). Although the need for skilled workers with educational qualifications later allowed some educated southerners to join the officer cadre of the army, scholars confirm that tribalism and social cleavages were the norm of the military, as well as, other colonial public institutions (Ejiogu 2007:108; Ademoyega 1981:24). It does seem that the British had used its public sector employment to satisfy its clients, which caused further division and discontentment among the various ethnic groups.

The perceived alliance of the British colonialists with the Fulani aristocrats raised serious fear and suspicion by the other tribal groups in the South. Nevertheless, it cannot be generalized that all the Fulani aristocrats were allies of the colonialists. According to Sule (2016), many northern rulers whose loyalty to the British colonialists could not be assured and those who seemed not to be working for the interest of the British were actually deposed and even sent into forced exile. Some of the rulers who were deposed and taken to Lokoja included the Emir of Zazzau Aliyu Dan Sidi, the Emir of Kano Aliyu Mai Sango, the Emir of Gwandu Muhammadu Aliyu and the Emir of Bida Abubakar (ibid).

### **3.3.3 Pre-Independence Federalism and Ethnic Politics**

In 1939, the country was divided into three regions namely the Northern, Eastern, and Western Nigeria, mainly for British ease of operations. From 1914 to independence in 1960, Nigeria had four major constitutions namely the Clifford Constitution (1922), Richards Constitution (1946), Macpherson Constitution (1951), and Lyttleton Constitution (1954). But the first two constitutions were imposed on the country and were not aimed at the development of the country but to protect the interests of British

citizens doing business in Nigeria (Utuk 1975:27). With more agitations from nationalists, the Macpherson Constitution of 1951 involved more consultations and it introduced true federalism to Nigeria for the first time. The 1951 Constitution also introduced political parties and the first elected legislature and government in Nigeria. As nationalists continued to clamour for self-governance, the Lyttleton Constitution of 1954, provided for gradual regional autonomy and self-governance. The Eastern and Western regions became autonomous in 1956 and the Northern region in 1959.

Due to the British divide and rule policies, ethnic consciousness dominated Nigeria's politics. The first main sets of political parties were formed along the three major ethnic groups (Nnabuihe 2014:160, Dunmoye 1990:90). The Northern People's Congress (NPC) led by Alhaji Ahmadu Bello dominated the North, it originated from a Hausa-Fulani social group, Jamiyyar Arewa. The Action Group (AG) led by Chief Obafemi Awolowo was the Western Region party and it emanated from a Yoruba cultural group, Egbe Omo Oduduwa, while the National Council of Nigerian Citizens (NCNC) led by Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe was the Eastern region party and it was associated with the Igbo Union. Although there were a few other non-popular political parties formed by minority tribes to agitate their demands, these three dominated and ruled their respective regions at independence (ibid). Arguably, the Nationalists and their political parties were rather contesting for position to represent their tribe rather than seek national interest. This tribalistic nature of Nigerian politics was also caused by the consciousness that the British were taking sides with the North and the suspicion that the Hausa-Fulani would be made to dominate the other tribes at independence.

The tribal politics became intense with the suspicion that the British colonial government manipulated the 1952 national census to favour its northern regional clients (Smith 2005:11, Ekwe-Ekwe 2013: 810-811). With the North declared to have 53 per cent of Nigeria's population, the region became entitled to the largest electoral seats in the National Assembly. The North particularly demanded the allocation of 50 per cent of all the seats in the Federal legislature to its region, which was granted by the British (Smith 2005:11). The northern elites thus had a grip on the political centre that it could preserve through selective alliances to the exclusion of rival southern parties (ICG 2006: 5). Moreover some British ex-colonial officers in Nigeria, such as Harold Smith, Robin Luckham, as well as, some British official documents, point to the fact that the colonialists preferred that the post-independent Nigerian government

was controlled by conservative Northern politicians who would pursue policies favourable to British interests (Luckham 1971:208; Smith 2005:10). According to the official document, “so far as the United Kingdom is concerned it would appear that in the last resort we must make sure that the Government of Nigeria is strong, even if possibly undemocratic or unjust.” (CO 1032/241 in Hyam and Louis 2000: 146, 351). All these are confirmation that the British deliberately manipulated the democratization process.

The type of democracy introduced to Nigeria by the British was particularly dysfunctional, unrepresentative and non-participatory. For example, women were not allowed to vote in the elections that led to independence (Azinge 1994:173). In fact, democracy in Nigeria in this period practically treated the right to vote as income and property rights rather than a political right (ibid). Nigeria adopted universal suffrage only in 1979, before then, women in the Islamic North were not allowed to vote during the elections (ibid). Moreover, it was a sectionalized democracy because the British divide and rule policies weakened and prevented coalition of opposition against any colonial interest (Sessay 2014). Arguably, the British introduced into Nigeria a faulty democratic governance of patronage, election rigging, manipulation, hate, tribalism, conflict and Western dependency.

### **3.3.4 Post-Independence Governance of Ethnic Patronage, Violence, and Corruption**

The fear of ethnic domination was entrenched in the Nigerian political system at independence and each of the political parties fought to control the nation so as to escape ethnic domination by another group (Nnabuihe 2014:160). This keen contest for power actually led to many acts of violence and destruction. The sectionalisation of the political parties in the pre-independence period made it impossible for any of them to win the national election of 1959 even though each of them had landslide victories in their regions. Since the population of the two southern regions combined was less than the Northern region, the coalition of the two Southern political parties, AG and NCNC, stood no chance of winning national elections. Hence, the NPC (Hausa) made a coalition with the NCNC (Ibo) to form a government that took over from the British at independence in 1960 (Dunmoye 1990:90). Abubakar Balewa, a northerner, became the Prime Minister, while Nnamdi Azikiwe, an Easterner, was the

Governor-General. However, the nationalists merely continued with the mode of administration inherited from the colonial government, mainly patron-client system, poor economic management, ethnic battles of the three major groups and a regionalism that left the minority tribes feeling oppressed (Udogu 1994:164, Okpalike 2015:145; Nnabuihe 2014:160). Moreover, there existed wide disparities in the social, economic and educational development between the North and the two Southern regions owing largely to the colonial protection of the Muslim Emirate from Western influence (ICG 2006).

But soon after independence, many crises began. The NPC began to use the federal government executive power to favour the Northern region to compensate for the region's social and educational drawbacks. For example, the educational requirements for senior positions in public institutions were lowered to accommodate the less educated Northerners (Ejiogu 2007:108). In the military, where the officer cadre level had more Southerners due to the higher educational requirements for entry, the government introduced a quota system that pegged officer cadet enlistment at 50 per cent, 25 per cent, and 25 per cent in favour of the North, East, and West respectively (ibid). There were also political crises in the Western region in 1962 and the federal government took over the administration of the region. In 1963, the Midwestern region was created from the Western region. There were also controversies over the 1963 population census, which was believed to have overestimated the number of Hausa-Fulani people in order to give the Northern region more representation in the federal parliament (ICG 2006: 5).

All these heightened the fear of Northern domination and magnified ethnic tensions in the country. Consequently, the earlier coalition between the NPC and the NCNC was dismantled. Moreover, the Action Group in the Western region splintered into two factions. A new coalition was formed with the NCNC joining with the splinter of the Action Group led by Obafemi Awolowo to form the United Progressive Grand Alliance (UPGA) while the NPC led a coalition with Chief Akintola's faction of the old Action Group to form the Nigerian National Democratic Party (NNDP). The political scenes in the years following independence (especially during the general elections of 1964 and 1965) were characterized by violence, intimidation and election rigging. The federal government supported its ally in the West, the Nigerian National Democratic Party, to win the Western Region elections through blatant vote rigging and suppression of the

opposition. This led to serious violence and anarchy in the region with lives and properties of political opponents being set ablaze. In no time, political instability set in, thereby paving the way for military intervention in politics.

Between 1979 and 1983, the country had a brief period of democracy. But the democracy was also characterized by corruption, treasury looting, ethnic cleavages, patronage and regionalized political politics. This failure of government contributed to the fall in living standards in the early 1980s (Ojameruaye, 2011:3; Adesote and Abimbola, 2012:85). The 1983 general elections were characterized by rigging, falsified election results, and violence, which gave way for another military takeover (ibid).

### **3.3.5 Military Rule in Nigeria: A Period of Violence, the Biafra War, Ethnicity and Corruption**

Nigeria has had a total of 29 years of military rule since independence. The self-declared objective of the military coup plotters has been the removal of tribalism, nepotism, and regionalism plaguing Nigeria's democracy (Onwuka 2011:31). However, military regimes were characterized by these same problems. The first military coup, in January 1966, was staged by some Igbo army officials who were discontent with the Northern leaders who were using federal positions to favour the Northern Region (Ejiogu 2007: 108). The coup plotters killed several Hausa and Yoruba political elites and top military officers including the Prime Minister Tafawa Balewa but spared the Igbo elites. Johnson Aguiyi-Ironsi became the first military Head of State. He imposed a unitary system, which abolished the regions and unified the public services while also appointing Igbos to sensitive government positions (Musa and Hassan 2014:317; Adesote and Abimbola 2012:84). Thus Aguiyi-Ironsi reversed the Northerners' domination of the public sector in favour of the Igbos; making it a tribalistic regime.

However, the dissatisfied Northern elites and Northern military officers in no time staged a bloody counter-coup in July 1966 where many highly ranked Igbo officers, including the Head of State, were killed and General Yakubu Gowon (a Northerner) become the Head of State. This revenge coup was coupled with serious violence in the North, which led to massive killings of the Ibos (Heerten and Moses 2014:173). In response to the Igbo genocide in the North, the Eastern Region threatened to secede



from the federation (ibid). As a measure against the secession threat, the Gowon regime restored federalism and divided the country into twelve states from the initial four regions in May 1967 (ibid). The further decentralization was therefore not aimed at bringing government closer to the people but to disunite and fragment the Eastern Region by obliging the agitation for states made by the non-Igbo minority groups within the region. Nevertheless, the Eastern Region declared itself an independent state called "Biafra", an act the Federal Government regarded as illegal. This was the genesis of the Biafra War, which began on 6<sup>th</sup> July, 1967 till 15<sup>th</sup> January, 1970 (ibid). During the civil war, the military government reverted to a centralized government where all fiscal and administrative authorities resided in the national government (Ikpe, 2000). The civil war lasted for thirty months and ended in January 1970. Apart from the civil war, the military administration of Gowon was characterized with wastages, and economic mismanagement, especially because the country had an oil boom which led to high level of rent-seeking and corruption (ibid). The leadership was also not able to transform the oil boom into infrastructural development. At a time when the country lacked socio-economic infrastructure like roads, electricity, and water, the Gowon government regime made the popular statement "that money is not Nigeria's problem but how to spend it" (Onyekakeyah, 2013:305). The Gowon regime was overthrown in July 1975 through a coup (Ikpe, 2000).

Subsequent military regimes are: General Muritala Mohammed (July 1975 – Feb. 1976); General Olusegun Obasanjo (Feb. 1976 – Oct. 1979); General Mohammed Buhari (Dec. 1983 – August 1985); General Ibrahim B. Babangida (August 1985 – August 1993); General Sanni Abacha (1993 – June 1998); and General Abdulsalam Abubakar (June 1998 – May 1999 (ibid). Military rule in Nigeria was characterized by rent-seeking, patronage, massive corruption, incompetence, repression of human rights and underdevelopment of Nigeria (Onwuka 2011:35). Babangida's regime particularly institutionalized bribery and corruption (Ayittey2006:3). Notably, General Babangida promised to relinquish power to a civilian government in 1993 but, when Chief M. K. O. Fabiola, a Southerner, emerged as the winner, the president, because of tribalism and greed, annulled the June 12 presidential elections. The annulment led to violent protests especially in the South, worsened ethnic tension in the country and led to civil unrest and violence (ibid). General Sani Abacha, was found to be the most corrupt and repressive of all the Heads of State. It was reported that Sani Abacha and

his family looted over \$4.3 billion from the treasury and saved the loot in foreign banks (Adelekan 2012:315). It is also notable that Northerners have mostly ruled Nigeria.

Agreeably, the military rulers have been bad governors in Nigeria. However, what paved way for them into Nigerian politics is rooted in the ethnic cleavages, ethnic conflicts and fear of domination that permeates the Nigeria politics.

### **3.4 Political Ideologies of the Nigerian Nationalists**

It is important to highlight some of the political ideologies of prominent Nigerian nationalists who are also regarded as the founding fathers of politics in Nigeria. This is because their political standpoint had a lot of influence on the political behaviour of citizens in Nigeria, as well as, the post-independence governance experience of the country. Moreover, the Afrocentric perspective of this study actually follows the African-cantered viewpoints of some of the Nigerian founding fathers, especially the Afrocentric political ideologies of Chief Obafemi Awolowo and Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe, who are both from the Southern part of Nigeria. Although all the nationalists seek a Nigeria independent of British rule, higher on their agenda is the welfare and development of their ethnic groups. The nationalists are mostly leaders of the foremost political parties all of which operate on the basis of ethnicity and regionalism (Metz, 1991). Put differently the nationalists were more ethnically conscious even in the national struggle for independence. Metz (1991) also notes that the cooperation among the nationalists was the result of expediency rather than a sense of national identity.

#### **Sir Ahmadu Bello**

Sir Ahmadu Bello was a nationalist from the Northern part of the country and he was the national leader of the Northern People's Congress (NPC), which was launched in 1951. However, scholars such as, Aluko (1976), Metz (1991) and Ojo (2014) acknowledge that he held a political ideology which mainly sought to pursue and defend northern interests. Sir Ahmadu Bello's political exploits and campaigns were mainly restricted to Northern Nigeria (Ojo, 2014:38). To further show that Sir Ahmadu Bello placed the Northern region agenda above that of the nation, on the eve of independence, he stated that the consolidation of the North was what was uppermost in his mind (Schwarz Jr 1965:115, Ojo 2014:38). In one other public statement, he declared that "*the new nation called Nigeria should be an estate of our great*

*grandfather Othman Dan Fodio. We must ruthlessly prevent a change of power.....”*  
(Nwobu, 2014:2).

It is important to note that all the Nigerian nationalists were guilty of ethnic cleavage and the promotion of regional agenda above the nation (Ojo 2014:38). Like the other nationalists, Sir Ahmadu Bello supported a federalism that allows regional autonomy or self-rule. In his autobiography published in 1962, he showed his happiness for the granting of what he called “our long-sought self-government”; referring to the regional autonomy granted to the north by the colonial government in 1959. He also believed in promoting fast development of the northern region through education, agricultural and industrial development, as well as, development of infrastructure. He was particularly concerned with issues of water and the introduction of new technology into grassroots-level farming (Odidi and Adamu, nd)

### **Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe**

Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe was from Southeast Nigeria. He was national leader of the Igbo-dominated National Council of Nigerian Citizens (NCNC). Azikiwe was Nigeria’s first indigenous Governor General and Nigeria’s first President (Metz, 1991). Azikiwe was pan-African in his political ideology, advocating for a common African struggle against European colonialism (Metz 1991). Azikiwe’s book *Renascent Africa* (1937), presents his philosophy of a new emancipated Africa and it focuses on five principles: spiritual balance; social regeneration; economic determinism; mental emancipation; and resurgence (Azikiwe, 1968:120-140, Igwe 2015:19). The principle of spiritual balance reinforces African belief in the spiritual and affective, which need not be jettisoned. The principle also called for the respect for other people’s opinions. The principle of social regeneration called for the abandoning of all forms of prejudice, whether racial or tribal. The principle of economic determinism emphasised that economic self-sufficiency is indispensable to achieve a truly emancipated Africa. In this wise Azikiwe advocated for an educational system that was well structured to offer practical solutions to societal challenges and also to provide means of livelihood for Africans (ibid).

The principle of mental emancipation emphasized the decolonization and liberation of African minds from the crisis of inferiority caused by trans-Atlantic slave trade and European colonization. Azikiwe particularly criticized the curriculum of colonial

education, which projects European superiority and undermines African identity. Azikiwe argued that education had been a colonial tool to impress the European denigrating view of Africans (Igwe, 2015:19). Consequently Africans need to reclaim their self-confidence and this is important to break the barrier to development and innovation. Lastly, Azikiwe argued that political resurgence could only occur when there is spiritual balance, social regeneration, economic self-sufficiency and mental emancipation. Moreover, the essence of governance is to improve the welfare of citizens (Kanu 2010:185). With regard to democracy, Azikiwe advocated that every type of democracy should be determined by the cultural parameters of the people (Sule 1997:25). Arguably, the political philosophy of Azikiwe is largely Afrocentric, which is the theoretical perspective of this study.

Nevertheless, Azikiwe, like other Nigerian nationalists, prioritized a regional agenda above the national. For example, Azikiwe said “*It would appear the God of Africa has created the Ibo nation to lead the children of Africa from the bondage of ages...The martial prowess of the Ibo nation at all stages of human history has enabled them not only to conquer others but also to adapt themselves to the role of preserver*” (Azikiwe cited in Ojo, 2014:38). Similarly, at the onset of Nigerian crises in 1966, Azikiwe supported Igbo ethnic nationality and when the crisis broke into the Biafra war in 1967, Azikiwe acted as Biafran roving Ambassador; convincing other African leaders to recognize Biafra. However he later resigned from his position as Biafran roving ambassador in February 1969 and supported a peaceful resolution of the war (Igwe 2015:22).

Azikiwe admitted that tribalism is a major threat to national unity in Nigeria. His proposition to address the problem included, having a federal structure that grants every linguistic or ethnic group local autonomy to ensure everyone’s culture and traditions are respected to a satisfactory level (Azikiwe 1978:277; Kanu 2010:185). Moreover, the Nigerian government must protect the right of all citizens and meet the material needs of the people because when government fails in its responsibilities, it increases loyalty to tribe and disloyalty to the nation (Azikiwe 1978:277).

### **Chief Obafemi Awolowo**

Chief Obafemi Awolowo was from Southwest Nigeria, and the national leader of the Action Group, a political party formed in 1951 as a vehicle for Yoruba regionalism

(Metz 1991). Awolowo, like other nationalists, prioritized the development of the Yoruba (South West Nigeria). His ideology was that one had to be tribalistic before becoming a nationalist (Ojo 2014:3). His book *Path to Nigerian Freedom*, reveals his political stance about a unified Nigeria. He states, "*Nigeria is not a nation. It is a mere geographical expression. There are no 'Nigerians' in the same sense as there are 'English', 'Welsh,' or 'French'. The word 'Nigerian' is merely a distinctive appellation to distinguish those who live within the boundaries of Nigeria from those who do not*" (Awolowo 1947:47).

Awolowo was thus, an ethnic conscious nationalist who believed that the only way Nigeria could stay in unity was to operate a federal system with regional autonomy. According Awolowo (1947:53), "the political structure of any particular national group is primarily their own domestic concern. Consequently, each national group or region could have its own Regional House of Assembly so that we can have what can be called "United States of Nigeria" (ibid). In other words, the only way to address the problem of diverse ethnicities coexisting in one country is local self-government of each ethnic group carefully integrated into a federal structure (ibid, Boele 1998:77)

In relation to democracy, Awolowo agrees with having democratic institutions and democratic liberties similar to those that exist in Western countries. The argument is that democracy is not alien to African culture and it is even a right which "automatically springs from the rights which a man enjoys in any given family" (Awolowo 1968 cited in Boele 1998:78). Awolowo, however noted that European influence perverted and destroyed the democratic features of the African traditional governance system by turning the native authorities into authoritarians. The autocratic behaviour of chiefs under the colonial regimes was one reason Awolowo advocated for the democratization of every Native authority so that all political leaders could be democratically elected and removed (Awolowo 1947:81). And in Awolowo's view, good governance is that political structure that ensures the welfare of various groups in the society, as well as, ensures social justice (Aboluwodi 2012:60). Good governance also concerns the existence of high moral attributes such as love, fairness and equity (ibid). Consequently achieving good governance is dependent on having a leadership with high moral values; especially self-discipline, which Awolowo regarded as a very important attribute of a good leader (ibid61).

In Awolowo's view, ignorance of the masses and incompetent leadership are major impediments to good governance (ibid). According to him, illiterate and ignorant electorate contribute to bad governance because they may not vote wisely and would even assist corrupt politicians to rig elections. Incompetent leadership would similarly support corruption. Awolowo believes that corruption is an evidence of ignorance on the part of leadership. Put differently, corruption and bad governance are evidence of ignorance of the masses and depraved mind of leaders. Consequently, one main strategy of Awolowo towards achieving good governance is social transformation through mass education of both the ignorant masses and the leaders. In Awolowo's view, Nigerian satisfactory democracy is not achievable without an educated citizenry (ibid). Awolowo also advocates a holistic education which not only teaches skills but also develops the mind for good moral behaviour.

Awolowo was also an avowed socialist who believed that capitalism encourages greed, selfishness and corruption. Nevertheless, he did not believe that government should control every aspect of economic production. Instead, Awolowo preferred to preserve the exceptional production associated with capitalism while using the power of the state, such as taxes, to achieve equitable distribution of the wealth (Taiwo 2010).

Given the political influence of these nationalists on the political behaviour of the country, the examination of the political ideologies of Nigerian nationalists further gives insight into how to understand Nigerian governance challenges. As it has been revealed, all the leaders had ethnic cleavages and promoted regional agenda above national agenda. Similarly, all the nationalists subscribed to federalism with regional or ethnic self-governance. The Afrocentric ideologies of Obafemi Awolowo and Nnamdi Azikiwe are also useful tools of analysis adopted in this study.

### **3.5. The Real Issues: Ethnicity, Oil Rent seeking and Western dependence**

Bad modern governance is thus a colonial legacy and entangling which needs to be untangled through decolonization of the Nigerian political system. The implication of British divide and rule policies, tribal alliance and biases, patron-client governance style and manipulated democracy created a political structure of tribal politics, fractionalization, and allegiances of public officials to tribal patrons in Nigeria. The country has since maintained patronage governance based on ethnic clientele. Patronage or patron-clientelism refers to a political system in which the dominant

individuals provide livelihood or political protection to some less privileged groups in exchange for their loyalty, allegiance, and votes (Beekers and Gool 2012:4). Poverty and ethnic-religious cleavages have made clientelism prosper in Nigeria. It encourages corruption and bad governance because rather than make the government responsible to the general citizen, it makes the authority responsive to some ethnic patrons and clientele.

Since colonial masters have successfully set the various groups against one another, there was never a sense of nationhood in Nigeria; not even among the nationalists that fought for Nigeria's independence (Okpalike 2015:148). According to Nnabuihe et al. (2014), the nationalists' struggle for independence was united only to get rid of the British colonialists who stood as the common enemy. But as soon as independence was achieved, they all reverted to ethnic nationalism. For example, Tafawa Balewa, the first Prime Minister, referred to Nigeria as 'the mistake of 1914' while Chief Awolowo, the great Yoruba leader called Nigeria 'a mere geographical expression' (Ijere 2014:48). The lack of the spirit of nationhood in the Nigerian political environment is thus a major impetus to selfish and corrupt behaviour among government agents. The majority of the Nigerian population are more culturally, ethnically and religiously inclined and defensive in their political outlook (Udogu 1994:164, Okpalike 2015:145; Nnabuihe 2014:160). The ethnic cleavages of the population have been used by the political elites for ethnic mobilization of votes and political contestation against perceived majority oppressors so that leadership became more of an ethnic-religious symbol rather than competence and accountability (Umezina 2012:216).

The pervasiveness of poverty across Nigeria is evidence that political elites do not contribute to the development of the ethnic group they are affiliated to (ibid). After getting their mandate on the platform of the tribe, most of them only enrich themselves and their few ethnic clients and patrons. Moreover, the public service, which is the main machinery of government, is affected by these problems where ethnic alliance and federal character is substituted for competence (Lawal 2013:164). Therefore, public institutions are corrupt and public service delivery very poor (ibid). Unfortunately, the ethnic problem in Nigeria also makes it difficult to discipline or question corrupt or erring public officials because such actions will be regarded as tribal antagonism and oppression and could spark serious ethnic violence (Umezina 2012:225).

Nigeria's political challenges have also been compounded by the country's dependence on oil resources. Nigeria's huge crude oil resources provide easy income or rent for the successive government to loot and waste without taxing citizens and without any conscious effort to develop economic sectors (Amundsen 2010). Arguably, because the government makes its wealth independent of the citizens, there is less incentive to be responsive to their needs. The concentration of huge free rent at the government sector in the face of the failure of other sectors is also a great motivation for ambitious individuals to strive for positions within the state apparatus (Ogbeidi 2012:5). The same reason explains violent agitation for state control by various ethnic groups; especially the minority groups and the oil producing communities (Umezina 2012:216). Oil wealth rather than reduce poverty in Nigeria has only led to the centralization of power, authoritarianism, poor taxation, non-diversification of the economy, corruption, patronage and rent-seeking cultures (Amundsen 2010:5). Over \$450 billion of petroleum rent accruing to the government between 1970 and 2004 disappeared into private pockets of military and other political rulers and their allies (Ayittey 2006:3). Unfortunately, the same corrupt elites now function as ethnic and political patrons who use their wealth to maintain extensive tribal clientele as an electoral force to manipulate the machinery of government for private benefit.

Despite their failures and corrupt behaviours, Nigeria's political leaders including the military, remain close allies of Western developed countries, which provide safe havens for their loot. In fact, the country has been steered in such a manner that no matter the internal crisis, its functioning to the interest of the Western developed countries has been uninterrupted, especially in the exportation of cheap primary raw materials, as well as, to provide a ready market for manufactured products from developed countries. As noted by Ekwe-Ekwe (2013:825), even though Nigeria's political systems have denied its citizens the rights to participate and to live a valued life, nevertheless, the country with the rest of Africa has performed well in fulfilling the exploitation purpose of their creation by the Europeans at the Berlin Conference of 1884. So, despite the ethnic problems, civil conflicts, terrorism, poverty, military dictatorship, and corruption, Nigeria continuously exports crude oil and agricultural materials to developed countries. Since Europe did not create African countries to manufacture, Nigeria continues to depend on of the developed countries for its



manufactured goods despite huge incomes made from crude oil exports. This lopsided economy is a creation of colonialism.

In addition to these problems is Nigeria's dependence on Western strategies for its development. Arguably, Nigerian educated elites are mainly products of colonial education and are thus Western in their perspectives (Decker 2012, Garba 2012:55). Therefore, development policy recommendations emanating from this class only attempt to indiscriminately align the country with the West. More so, the lasting impact of colonization on Nigeria is the colonized mind set of Nigerians that Western education is better. The high preference for Western ideas, language, education, and other Western products, underdeveloped and relegated Nigerian indigenous knowledge systems. English language in Nigeria is associated with intelligence, prestige, and modernization while local languages which embody the culture, moral and local knowledge are relegated and no longer spoken among some elites (Alebiosu 2016:24, Isola 2016:5)..

From an Afrocentric view, Westernization and colonial education have only succeeded in many ways to deculture and disorientate Nigerians to discard their indigenous culture and to unconsciously pursue Western interests. For example, foreign foods such as, wheat flour and rice, have increasingly taken over traditional foods like tuwo, amala and gari. Nigeria currently imports about four million tons of wheat annually amounting to \$4 billion due to increasing demand for non-traditional foods like pasta, noodles, and bread (The International Centre for Agricultural Research in the Dry Areas (ICARDA) 2014). Consequently, foreign exchange earnings that are supposed to be used to develop indigenous productions are used to finance avoidable imports which have a negative implication on food prices, unemployment, and poverty.

This Western dependence is worsened by the neoliberal economic policies prescriptions of the World Bank and IMF which continue to impose trade openness, deregulation and liberalization on Nigeria (Adejumo-Ayibiowu 2015). Consequently, there has been unrestricted influx of Western products into the country, which forces many local manufacturers out of the market. Despite the fact that the neo-liberal structural Adjustment Programme caused untold suffering and poverty on Nigerians, the same economic policies were also prescribed in the new good governance agenda (Ibid).

The World Bank development theories give no prominence to factors such as, cultural diversities and ethnic cleavages in the simulations for the country even though these factors affect economic and political behaviour more than any other factors. And despite evidence of large embezzlement of public funds, the World Bank and IMF have been giving credit to the country, thereby increasing corruption and Nigeria's indebtedness. The Western countries have actually been collaborators of corruption in Nigeria with European banks always providing a safe haven for money stolen by the Nigerian political class (Ekwe-Ekwe 2013:824, Ayittey 2006:4).

So far this chapter, through review of literature, has been able to highlight several issues affecting good governance in Nigeria, which is one of the objectives of the study. The issues identified are context-specific and have not been considered in scope of the universal good governance agenda. This limitation therefore provides an argument for the development of a context-specific good governance.

### **3.6 Indigenous Approach to Solving the Problem of Bad Governance**

From the problems identified above, dealing with the challenge of poor governance and poverty in Nigeria is beyond the good governance template from Washington. Rather, it requires dealing with the problems of ethnicity that subverted good quality and competent leadership in government. It also requires dealing with the problem of concentration of power and resources at the national level, as well as, the problem of western dependency or neo-colonialism. The issue of ethnicity is an indication of people's awareness of their cultural distinctiveness, as well as, demand for cultural autonomy. Although some authors like Adeleke (2015:213) argue that globalization has eroded all clinging to particular cultures, the situation of Nigeria confirms that cultures cannot be easily harmonized and homogenized. According to Akanle (2012:20), culture is enduring and gives people their unique identities, memories of being, and relevance.

Even though Western development ignores ethnicity and assumes cultural neutrality in their governance and development templates, in the Nigerian situation, the differences in culture of the various groups and their impact should be the starting point for discussion on good governance and development (Dei 2012:106). Thus, institutional reforms that will make any impact would not be imported from Bretton Wood; rather, they must be based on a critical inquiry of the indigenous culture, and

the historical context so as to identify what works. In fact, Okpalike (2015:148) argues that since the blood of ethnicity is thicker than the bond of nationalism in Nigeria, ethnicity should be a recognized framework of the Nigerian political system. However, the author did not explain how the framework will operate.

Arguably, dealing with ethnic issues to achieve good governance in Nigeria requires undoing what the British did at the onset of colonization when it removed the autonomy or sovereignty of independent states or kingdoms to make them sub-units of an artificial whole. Although Nigeria need not disintegrate, the federal arrangement should accommodate various cultures as largely autonomous fiscal and administrative units (Umezina 2012:227, Okpalike 2015:148). Thus, more regions, states, and local government may need to be created so that every group finds political expression. But most importantly, power which erstwhile has been concentrated in the centre should be devolved to the sub-national governments so that the country really becomes the confederation of fairly independent states (Umezina 2012:227). Thus, each region or state would manage its economy, its natural resources and generate its own resources and then pay some tax to the national government (ibid). The next concern is about ethnic groups too small and economically unviable to stand as autonomous states. This researcher proposes that such small groups will align with closer groups but, the merger must be a matter of consent rather than imposition.

This will not bastardize or disintegrate the country in any way. In fact, this recommendation is the position of Nigerian nationalists who fought for independence (Awolowo 1947:53, Azikiwe 1978:277). This recommendation is also similar to the federal arrangement at independence, which would have succeeded but for the use of central power by some ethnic groups to subjugate other groups, as well as, the marginalization of minority groups (Udogu 1994:164, Okpalike 2015:145, Nnabuihe 2014:160). The reduction of central power and increasing self-governance of states is, therefore, key to achieving peaceful coexistence and unity necessary for good governance and development. Arguably, Nigeria is currently a bastardized country with so much corruption, poverty, cessation threat, violent killings, insecurity, terrorism and underdevelopment which have defied conventional solutions. More so, there is no justification for defending the current political arrangement because it was never formed by the people's consent. In fact, the way early political leaders have defended colonial boundary is actually evidence of their colonized minds. According to Musa

and Hassan (2014:317) the formation and unification of Nigerian political systems did not represent the interests of the natives nor were they consulted to determine the suitable political arrangement, federal or unitary. If all were done to serve the colonial interest, defending a colonial creation, even if not convenient or beneficial, is evidence of mental colonization and enslavement.

In relation to a better political arrangement, Umezina (2012:216) argues that authority at the federal level should be economically less attractive. And arguably, the lucrativeness of political positions in Nigeria to amass wealth has made it attractive to corrupt individuals and political patrons. Thus, huge salaries and allowances of public officials should be discouraged at all levels of government. The suggested political arrangement above holds many benefits for good governance because it guarantees ethnic autonomy and removes the fear of domination, which has made the electorate disregard the competence of their electoral candidate. Ethnic autonomy will also give the citizens and all voters the sense of ownership of government so that public institutions will no longer be seen as amoral (Ekeh 1975). Moreover, with less emphasis on tribal representation, political appointments can truly be based on merit rather than on unprofessional criteria like the federal character principle (Umezina 2012:216). And in as much as political offices are no longer economically lucrative, more patriotic candidates will likely be emerging (Ogbeidi's 2012:5). Similarly, since the states will not be receiving allocations from the federal government, they will be forced to develop their regional economic base and seek internal sources of funds.

However, these alone cannot guarantee good governance, poverty reduction and development because Nigeria will continue to exist within an international environment that subjugates indigenous knowledge and subtly imposes Western economic and political interests over poor countries in the name of neo-liberalism, globalization, and good governance. As argued several times in this study, these are the policies that made many African countries poor and Western-dependent. Consequently, indigenous development theories should be explored in Nigeria after failure of several foreign policies. Likewise, given the devastating impact of Western style democracy in Nigeria, it is important to seek indigenous means of improving democracy in Nigeria to make it relevant to Nigeria's political reality; since in the face of the failure of the modern government to improve the lives of citizens, indigenous and traditional institutions in Nigeria continue to guarantee citizens' welfare, especially those in the

rural areas (Olowu and Erero 1995:1, Okunmadewa et al 2005:4). Local studies confirm that traditional institutions rooted in culture and history are comparatively more transparent, equitable, responsive and accountable (Ayittey 1992; Ake, 1987; Olowu and Erero 1995; Mengisteab 2009).

### **3.6.1 Incorporating the Principles of Good Traditional Governance into Modern Governance**

It is notable that during the colonial period, traditional rulers had constitutional roles, especially because of the British indirect rule made them the heads of the Native Authorities which was the lowest form of British administration (Ota and Ecoma 2016:71; Reed 1982). All the Nigerian constitutions before 1999 also recognized and involved the traditional rulers in modern government (ibid). The Richards Constitution (1944-1951) established Houses of Assembly in each of the three regions in which unofficial members were traditional rulers. The Northern region also had a House of Chiefs. The Macpherson Constitution of 1951, in addition to the existing structure, established a House of Chiefs in the West (ibid). The traditional rulers were thus empowered to contribute to legislations and the passing of bills, as well as, the selection of the members of the national House of Representatives and the regional Houses of Assembly.

But with the increased involvement of nationalists and the educated elites in the colonial project, through political parties, especially towards independence, the constitutional roles of traditional rulers became reduced. The Lyttelton Constitution of 1954 (later revised in 1957) gave minimal participation to traditional rulers at the federal level. The Governor appointed the Senate members while the House of Representatives were directly elected; with the chiefs having no influence in the process. At the regional level, there existed the Houses of Chiefs and Houses of Assembly but neither house required the approval of the other House. At independence, the positions of traditional rulers in the federal and regional legislature were eroded in favour of appointed chiefs. However, the Northern traditional rulers maintained their importance in government through the creation of the Council of Chiefs whose decisions were binding on the Northern government. The Eastern and Western regions only created minority councils which reduced the roles of traditional rulers to merely advisory.

Similarly, the 1979 Constitution gave no roles to traditional institutions at the federal level but provided for the establishment of the National Council of State and the Council of Chiefs at State levels, the membership of which depended on appointment by the governor of the state, likewise the remuneration of the traditional rulers (Chukwu and Alazor 2014:71). Moreover, the function of the council was mainly advisory. During long years of military rule, the role of traditional institutions remained largely advisory. The creation of Local Government councils transferred many of the functions of indigenous rulers to the local government (ibid: 65). The 1999 Constitution of the new democratic era gave no roles to the traditional rulers. The argument against the re-inclusion included issues of duplication of duties, funding and the fact that many of the traditional rulers frequently abused their constitutional powers in the colonial and early post-independence period and did not truly defend the traditions of which they were custodians (Nwora 2007, Crowder 1968:168, ibid: 61).

This study posits that the re-inclusion of the traditional chiefs into modern governance cannot guarantee better governance in Nigeria. As shown by scholars such as Okurounmu (2010:80) and Aka (2012:353), corruption has permeated every aspect of the Nigerian society so much that many traditional rulers are also found receiving gifts associated with corruption, getting involved in unscrupulous politicking, lobbying for government contracts and chieftaincy peddling. Arguably, Nigerian monarchs are political agents who can easily be corrupted by Nigeria's corrupt, money bag political structures. Consequently, this researcher suggests that modern government in Nigeria, which is an imitation of Western liberal democracy can be improved by incorporating those principles which have ensured good traditional governance into modern day governance. Fortunately, many indigenous institutions are performing well; even in the failure of modern governance. Finding out the key features that ensure responsiveness, accountability, participation, competence and transparency in each cultural group and inculcating those principles into the modern governing of the same will give the Nigerian public sector the traditional legitimacy it never had since colonial times and will ensure that good governance is achieved.

## **Conclusion**

It is recognized that Nigeria has different traditional cultures. This study recommends that the good traditional governance principles of each ethnic group or state should guide their bureaucracies. Understanding the features of indigenous governance in

every cultural group in Nigeria is wider than the scope of this study. The study also does not aim to find the similarities in every cultural group in Nigeria so as to develop nationally applicable governance and development strategies. The position of Afrocentricity is that there can be social unity among people sharing a particular time and space but that cultural uniformity is not a must (Schiele, 1996: 285). This is the reason why this study focuses the empirical part of the research on the culture of governance in Southwestern Nigeria, which can serve as a model for good governance in the region. This is one of the objectives of the study.

The next chapter will be devoted to a discussion on Afrocentricity, which is considered the most appropriate theoretical framework for this study.

## **CHAPTER FOUR**

### **4.0 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK: AFROCENTRICITY**

#### **4.1 Introduction**

In the previous chapters, this study has shown that mainstream development theories have guided the development efforts of African countries, especially Nigeria. The analysis has shown that these conventional theories, from Modernization Theory to Structural Adjustment and to good governance agenda, are all based on the economic and institutional development experience of European countries. These theories universalize European experience for African countries and therefore omit the culture, history and local realities of African societies in their simulation. Moreover, it has been shown that the neo-liberal components of all these Western development approaches hurt the welfare of the African poor and are not in the best interest of African people. The neo-liberal agenda of all Eurocentric development theories mainly aims at expanding Western capitalist interests in African countries (Brohman 1995:133). As a recapitulation, the problems, which generated the research questions that this study aims to answer, include the persistent corruption, poverty and underdevelopment in Nigeria; despite almost two decades of implementation of the donors' Eurocentric good governance agenda.

Given the failure of Eurocentric theories in achieving development or improving governance in Nigeria, this study aims to understand governance and development issues in Nigeria from the perspective of local citizens and from a cultural and contextual perspective and the aim is to develop a context-specific good governance model for the country. Subsequent to this research problem, and the research objectives, this researcher in accord with her supervisor, found Afrocentricity as the most appropriate theoretical framework that can achieve the study objectives. Given that Eurocentric theories are based on European experience and seek European interests, this study requires a theory that is based on African interests and one which seeks African interests. Afrocentricity is the only theory in which the centrality of African interests, principles, and perceptions predominate (Pellebon 2007: 174). Afrocentricity enables the researcher to place the historical experience, culture and the voice of local citizens as central to understanding the challenges of governance and development in Nigeria.



This chapter generally describes the meaning and history of Afrocentricity, it also shows the characteristics of Afrocentricity by discussing its philosophy, the epistemology and ontology. This chapter has nine sections. The first section gives the introduction. The second gives the history and definition of Afrocentricity. The third presents Afrocentricity as a scientific paradigm. The fourth section discusses the characteristics and assumptions of Afrocentricity. The fifth discusses African culture, traditions, norms and values. The sixth section analyses the relevance of African traditions to the development of modern African societies. The seventh section presents some Afrocentric principles of governance. The Eighth section presents arguments for the inclusion of cultural principles of governance in modern governance while, the ninth section examines the criticisms of Afrocentricity.

## **4.2 History and Definition of Afrocentricity**

The history of Afrocentricity could be traced to the work and struggles of many authors, scholars, and activists such as, W. E. B. Du Bois, Marcus Garvey, Cheikh Anta Diop, Harold Cruse, Malcolm X, Ida B. Wells Barnett, George James, Maulana Karenga and many others (Monteiro-Ferreira2014: 6). However, Afrocentricity as a theoretical and methodological approach to social science research has been attributed to the publication of Molefi Asante (1980) titled *Afrocentricity: The Theory of Social Change*. Afrocentricity can be regarded as a paradigm, theory, and ideology of thought and action in which the centrality of African interests, principles, and perceptions predominate (Pellebon 2007:174). ). According to Asante (1991: 171), Afrocentricity is a framework of reference where a given phenomenon in or about Africa is viewed and understood through the lens of the African people. Afrocentricity creates and raises black people's consciousness against all forms of oppression and racial domination. It reinforces that, just like European, Asian and other cultures of the World, African people also have their unique ideas, traditions, norms, values and culture which shape their worldview. Afrocentricity involves a conscious research of indigenous African societies for valuable principles, behaviour, practices, theories, patterns, ideas, representations, institutions, rituals and ceremonies, which can be adapted for contemporary usage (Hotep 2010:13).

When discussing issues relating to African people, whether political social or economic, Afrocentricity remains the most appropriate paradigm, theory or

methodology because it places Africa at the centre of any analysis. It is an Africa-centred perspective, which makes Africa the geographical and cultural starting point in the study of peoples of African descent (Keto 1989: 1). It can be observed that European colonization of Africa not only involved the exploitation of the continent, but also the superimposition of European culture, language, ethics and ways of knowing on the African people to the displacement of African knowledge, customs, and norms. Many years after colonization ended, Africans remain mentally subjugated to the European perspective of modernization and civilization because civilization, like any other term, is a victim of Western particularistic expansiveness (Asante 2007:16). According to Afrocentrists, European modernity is nothing but the African holocaust, racial enslavement, and colonialism, as well as, the destruction of the sovereignty, cultures, and civilizations of various peoples of colour (Rabaka 2009:4). This perversion and subversion of indigenous culture, also accounts for the suppression of Africa's political arena (Mazama 2003:4).

Due to Europe's international imperialism, the West for many years, has succeeded in placing itself superior to other peoples of colour. European cultures have been made the centre of all social structures, and the reference point, by which every other culture is defined. Eurocentric paradigm has also assumed a hegemonic and universal position in the world's problem solving so much that most modern intellectual activities follow Eurocentric paradigms of intellectualism. According to Imani (2014:178), Eurocentrism institutionalizes the European and Anglo-American political, economic, social, and cultural formations as 'standard', 'norm' and 'natural' while any differing functional perspective from other cultures are regarded as 'dysfunctional', 'abnormal', 'deviant', or 'corrupt'. This is why European cultural philosophy and ideas such as, development and democracy are regarded as the best forms of political and social institution without questioning (Mazama 2003:5). African traditional forms of governance and indigenous perspectives of development have thus been marginalized which has also made it difficult to orient African lives in a positive and constructive manner.

Just as Schiele (1996:285), states that Social Science theories are derived from and influenced by the specific experiences and cultural perspectives of the theorists, it can also be argued that every mode of knowledge-production is based and centred on a particular history and culture. Eurocentric theories mainly reflect the culture and

experience of countries in Europe and the United States. And given the fact that African culture and history greatly differ from those of Europe, the application of European Anglo-American theories and approaches to explain the ethos of African people will be highly inappropriate and probably, unethical. Unfortunately, due to the Western inclination of many scholars, (including African scholars, who are also products of the colonial education), many intellectual analyses have actually misrepresented Africa. Eurocentric knowledge production about African people is particularly distorted, biased and subjective; which due to the universalization of European thoughts, led to a sweeping generalization about the continent and ineffective policy recommendation and interventions (Obeng-Odoom 2013: 170).

Afrocentricity aims at correcting the disparaging distortions of African people's histories, achievements, and contributions to World's civilization perpetuated through centuries of racist, Eurocentric scholarship. In this regard, Afrocentricity argues that the reason why poverty and underdevelopment persist in Africa is the imposition of the Western worldview and their attendant conceptual frameworks. In relation to African development challenges, Asante (2013) argues that Africa's problem is not a question of the absence of capability or technical know-how, rather development challenges faced by the continent can be traced to economic exploitation and cultural degradation by the Europeans. For about half a million years, the African continent was subjugated and exploited by the Europeans through the slave trade and colonialism (Rodney 1973). Through the capitalist international trading system, the imperialist West's exploitation of the African continent continues in the post-colonial years. Examples include the United States and the European Union's subsidization of their Agricultural sector to the tune of \$20 billion per year in the United States and €48 billion per annum in Europe. Meanwhile, poor African countries are forced to remove all subsidies and trade restrictions due to the World Trade agreement. Subsequently, farmers in Africa and other developing countries who are not receiving such subsidies have not been able to produce competitively and as a result, many have been driven out of the market (Ajei, 2009:93; Rena 2012).

Given this condition, Asante (2013) argues that the challenge to solving Africa's problem is mainly the lack of organizational and political power to see that the continent's economic interests are protected. Following Asante's argument, the challenge of governance in Africa in general and Nigeria, in particular, is due to lack

of political leaders who are culturally centred on pursuing and defending African interests in the face of Western hegemony. Just as Gibson (2000:15) postulated that any inquiry or intervention concerning Africa, should be guided by the fundamental question, 'is this in the best interest of Africans?' this same question should guide any governance or economic reform to be adopted in Africa in general and Nigeria in particular. Moreover, the determination of what is good for Nigeria can rightly be made and should only be made by Nigerians themselves.

Unlike Eurocentric ideologies such as, liberal democracies and modernization theories, which are presented as valid for all cultures, Afrocentricity does not claim to be a universal theory. Instead, Afrocentricity is an African-centred perspective that advocates the supremacy of the African experience for African people (Mazama 2003:5). Afrocentricity argues that all societies have a perspective, which stems from their centres and every society has the right to practice their own culture. Thus, Afrocentricity views traditional Eurocentric theories and methodologies as one out of the various perspectives available and as a perspective valid and most appropriate for the European environment (Mazama 2001:388). The world can then rightly be viewed and understood from different centres rather than making European culture and experience the centre of a diversified and multicultural universe (Asante 2007:42). Therefore, Afrocentricity rejects the idea of social science universalism arguing that no one theory or paradigm can be used to explain social phenomena among all people and in all cultures. And although there may be similarities among various peoples of the world, differences exist. Cultural differences, in particular, are important and are factors that cannot be minimized in social analysis. The Afrocentric perspective fosters the belief that there can be social unity among people sharing a particular time and space but that cultural uniformity is not essential (Schiele 1996: 285).

Afrocentricity seeks to find the African subject place in all phenomenon while also ensuring that African values and thoughts are protected and clear of interpretations that are un-African (Asante, 2007:42). According to Asante (2009), Afrocentricity is a new form of self-determination and self-reclamation for African people. Afrocentricity validates African knowledge, culture, history and experience as unique and not inferior (Asante 2009, Schiele 1996:285). Afrocentricity is, therefore, the liberation of Africa from Western epistemological hegemony. Afrocentricity resuscitates the African knowledge systems as the appropriate means of understanding African phenomenon

and as an African approach to problem-solving whether, social, economic or political (Asante 2003, Mkabela 2005, Owusu-Ansah and Mji 2003). An Afrocentric perspective to good governance and development in Nigeria, therefore, mean an inquiry into the African culture and indigenous knowledge to understand the African perspective to the understanding of governance and development and to find that the cultural qualities in political leadership and citizenries that will achieve goals. The next section examine the characteristics of Afrocentricity paradigm.

### **4.3 Afrocentricity as a Paradigm based on Kuhnian Principles**

The word paradigm has contested meaning but it was first presented as a model of scientific research by Kuhn in 1962. Although, Kuhn was a Science philosopher and his model was primarily intended for the natural sciences, the model has been widely applied to Social Sciences and Humanities (Mazama 2001:390). Kuhn (1962) defined scientific paradigms as *"accepted examples of actual scientific practice, examples which include law, theory, application, and instrumentation together--[that] provide models from which spring particular coherent traditions of scientific research...Men whose research is based on shared paradigms are committed to the same rules and standards for scientific practice"* (p. 10).

Kuhn further defined a paradigm as a research culture with a set of beliefs, values, and assumptions that a community of researchers has in common regarding the nature and conduct of research (Kuhn 1977). Kuhn identified two central aspects of a paradigm namely, the cognitive aspect and the structural aspect. The cognitive aspect consists of three different levels -the metaphysical, the sociological and the exemplars (Kuhn 1970: 182; Eckberg and Hill 1980:117-118; Masterman 1970; Kuhn 1962:102). These three cognitive aspects of a paradigm are embedded within one another with the metaphysical paradigm acting as an encapsulating unit or frame- work, within which the other structures develop.

Based on Kuhn's premises, Mazama (2001) argues that Afrocentricity is a scientific paradigm applying the concept of the cognitive and structural elements of paradigm to Afrocentricity. However, these two aspects are incomplete from the Afrocentricity point of view even though they may look rather comprehensive from a Eurocentric standpoint (Mazama 2001:392). Consequently, Mazama (2001) adds a third aspect namely, a functional aspect. This is because, from an Afrocentric perspective,

knowledge is not only produced for the sake of it but for the sake of the liberation and activation of consciousness.

According to Kuhn (1962), the metaphysical is the organizing principle defining the perception of a reality. For Afrocentricity, the main principle, and the subject matter is the centrality of the African experience, customs, and values for the African people (Oyebade 1990, Asante 1990). Afrocentricity espouses the cosmology, aesthetics, axiology, and epistemology that characterize African culture (Asante 1988: 45; Mazama, 2001:393). Despite diversities of culture, the common core cultural African characteristics that shape the perception of reality of including the importance of the community as against individualism, high level of spirituality and ethical concern, harmony with nature, belief and n veneration of ancestors, and the unity of being. These characteristics and how they shape African governance and development arena shall be discussed further in the study.

The Kuhnian sociological dimension of Afrocentricity (that is, the disciplinary matrix) can be apprehended in the context of Africology. As a discipline, Africology centres on studying African phenomena in the particular cultural voice of the composite African people (Asante, 1990:12). This is unlike earlier studies of African people which use Eurocentric approaches. And within the Afrocentric paradigm or framework, Afrocentric theories could be created including governance theories, development theories, gender theories (Asante 2007:102)

According to Kuhn (1962:102), the exemplars are the concrete problem solutions that students encounter. It can also be illustrated that Afrocentricity complies with this aspect of paradigm through the many dissertations produced by students on the subject matter, as well as, several Afrocentric textbooks that have been published. All these scholarly works can serve as exemplars for others to use as models.

The structural aspect refers to the community of scholars and practitioners of the cognitive dimension of the paradigm (Eckberg and Hill 1980:121). Over the years, a community of Afrocentric scholars has emerged all over the world who have been consistently challenging universal dominant theories and have been reawakening self-consciousness among Black people (Mazama 2001:402).

The purpose of Afrocentricity is not only to generate knowledge but that such knowledge must be able to activate our consciousness to take African-centred actions

(Mazama 2001:403). The functional paradigm represents a need for policy and action (ibid). The aim of the Afrocentric paradigm is to liberate the African people, culturally and politically (2003). This study can serve as a liberating mechanism for re-centring African political leadership and governance system. And by liberation, Afrocentrists mean the emancipation of local people from European dominance of knowledge that has prevented them from defining and asserting their culture, identity, and representations of history. Since independence, many African countries have hardly been able to utilize development models that are built on their own experience; largely due to European hegemony of policy space.

#### **4.4 Characteristics/Assumptions of Afrocentricity**

The theoretical assumptions of Afrocentricity are rooted in the core cultural characteristics of African societies. According to Afrocentricity, culture matters in the orientation to centeredness (Asante 2005). Afrocentricity theory proposes four major theoretical assumptions to understand African reality, namely, collective conceptualization of human beings, the spiritual nature of human beings, the affective approach to knowledge and the interconnection of all beings in the universe (Asante, 1988; Myers, 1988; Schiele, 1996, Imafidion 2012). Ensuing from the assumption of collective identity of human beings are two interrelated principles, namely communalism and humanness. The characteristics and the theoretical assumptions of Afrocentricity can best be understood through the discussion of the philosophical, ontological, epistemological and methodological aspect of the paradigm. All these are discussed in detail in the subsequent sub-sections.

##### **4.4.1 Afrocentric Philosophy versus Eurocentric Philosophy**

Afrocentric philosophy is founded on the tradition, culture, and values of Africa before the advent of European and Arab influences (Schiele 1996:285). It cannot be denied that years of European slave trade and colonization have badly impacted Africa, suppressing and making inferior its philosophy so much that African lives are defined by European standards. This is what is referred to as Eurocentric philosophical hegemony. According to King (1990:165), power is the ability to shape reality. In the words of Lowy (1995: 714) *“Eurocentrism is the single global term that encompasses the totality of oppressive experiences that racial and ethnic groups share collectively because of a history that fell outside of the European definitions of civilization, culture,*

*and humanity*". Nevertheless, Afrocentrists maintain that philosophical integrity of traditional Africa has survived all the episodes of oppression (Mazrui, 1986; Mbiti, 1970; Zahan, 1979). The presentation of Afrocentric philosophy is contrasted with Eurocentric philosophy for better understanding of how Western development theories contrast African cultural realities.

Eurocentric philosophy includes the idea of materialism, individualism, competition, rationality, power, superiority, rationality, and linearity (Karenga, 1995; Schiele 1994; Sheared, 1996; Warfield-Coppock 1995 in Hunt 2004:68). Individualism advocates for the right and interest of individuals rather than the common good of the society. Feudalism, slavery, colonialism, capitalism and liberalism or free markets are all entrenched in the European philosophy of individualism, materialism, and competition. According to Adam Smith (1776), allowing an individual to pursue his or her self-interest in a free market allows efficient allocation of resources and the greatest maximization of social wealth. Even though, there is no doubt free market and capitalism generate inequality and increased poverty, especially in the absence of adequate social welfare, individualists believe that, in the long run, wealth will trickle down to the poor (George, 1999, Presbey 2002: 286). For example, Prime Minister Margret Thatcher once said in a speech that, *"It is our job to glory in inequality and see that talents and abilities are given vent and expression for the benefit of us all."* (Presbey 2002:286). In other words, Thatcher is saying the society should not bother about those who are weak, uneducated and without the necessary capacity to compete in the capitalist market. Society should care less about those who are worsened by the competitive struggle. The profits and other benefits acquired by the toughest, the most talented and the educated have a way of benefiting others in the long run (George, 1999). Thus, issues of selfishness and inequality are not of utmost concern in an individualist society.

Afrocentric philosophy, however, differs distinctly from Eurocentrism in perspective beliefs and values. Afrocentric philosophy includes the notion of interdependence, interconnectedness, spirituality, human-centeredness, holism, and harmony (Warfield-Coppock, 1995, Hunt 2004, 68). Humanism as against European individualism is one distinctive feature of African philosophy and African societies. According to Kaunda (1969:5), the heart of the African traditional culture is that "Man keeps enjoying the fellowship of Man simply because he is Man". According to Kaunda



(1969:5), the African traditional community was a mutual aid society. It was organized to satisfy the basic human needs of all its members and therefore individualism was discouraged. Subsequently, a hungry man can without penalty enter a village garden or his neighbour's farm to take some food to satisfy his hunger (ibid). His action would only become a theft if he takes beyond what is necessary to satisfy his hunger. Moreover every member of the society, whether weak or strong, talented or unskilled and regardless of their contribution to the material welfare, is equally valued (Kaunda 1969:6). It is the responsibility of the strong to help those that are weak (ibid. 5).

Afrocentricity argues that the African approach to society building is never inferior to that of the European. Kaunda (1966) argues that when it relates to the building and development of African nations, Africans should have the freedom to approach the task using their own philosophy rather than being forced to apply Western approaches (Crane 1966:554). Mphahlele (1971) particularly shows that African philosophy of humanness or Ubuntu is one way Africa can reclaim its identity, which has been battered by European misrepresentation and cultural subjugation. Afrocentrists argue that the use of indigenous languages, myths, folksongs, cultural dance and traditional dress codes is important to revive African philosophy (ibid). Location or centeredness is specifically important in Afrocentric philosophy so that Africa and its interests, history and culture are placed at the centre of all analysis. According to Asante (1998:8), *"it is only by regaining our own platforms, standing in our own cultural spaces and believing that our way of viewing the universe is just as valid as any, that we can achieve the kind of transformation that we need to"*.

In other words, Afrocentrists are saying we are still lost and enslaved if we continue to view and understand ourselves from other people's perspectives. True liberation needed for African transformation, therefore, starts when we believe in our own culture and philosophy and apply the same to advance our societies. Afrocentric philosophy aims to emancipate African people from the racial mis-education and philosophy of ignorance employed by Eurocentrism. And the term "mis-education" is used to refer to the form of training designed to make European perspective more dominant and to make the heritage, history, and self-worth of other cultures of less importance (Hunn 2004:68).

#### **4.4.1.1 Some Criticisms against the African Philosophy**

African philosophy, however, has been criticized by several scholars. For example, Hountondji (1996:170) argues that African philosophy is uncritical and unambitious especially when compared to Western philosophy. He argues that African philosophers have been contented with the documentation of traditional belief systems and the demonstration that Africans are also rational thinkers, instead of asking hard questions about existing social and political conditions. Ferguson (2011: 44) also criticizes Afrocentric philosophers for romancing and concentrating exclusively on the narrative of idealized past civilization of African people. Such narratives, he argues, are incapable for matters of political struggles because they fail to see the value of a concrete investigation of real conditions in Africa.

This researcher agrees that a genuine African philosophy should involve critical thinking and should be geared towards the construction of modern African-centred philosophy that promotes self-determination and consciousness. Africa also needs a philosophy that will lead to actions which promote development and poverty reduction just as proposed by Keita (1991) and Ciaffa (2008:130). Nevertheless, the impact of European denigration of African history, which has also subjugated and inferiorized African knowledge systems and their promotion of Eurocentric philosophy as the only way of knowing cannot be overlooked. In the opinion of this researcher, the starting point for African philosophers is to correct this misrepresentation and resuscitate African Epistemology through the reconstruction of Africa's deformed history and the documentation of African culture and tradition. Only after the deconstruction of the colonial defamatory construct of African knowledge can African philosophers be liberated and centred to carry out critical intellectual inquiry based on African holism and in response to the condition of the African people.

The position of this researcher is in line with Oruka (1991) who asserts that African philosophy consists of two orders of activities namely, culture philosophy and the philosophic sagacity. Culture philosophy consists of the communal beliefs, practices and myths, taboos and values and is usually expressed in the oral vocabulary of the people and their traditions. Philosophic sagacity, on the other hand, is the product of a reflective re-evaluation of the cultural philosophy. It involves the critical assessment of culture and its underlying beliefs and offers insightful solutions to societal issues. (Oruka ed. 1991:178-179). Thus, Oruka recognizes the importance of documentation

of culture and tradition as the first order of African philosophical efforts and a first order activity in African critical thinking. Afrocentric philosophy actually begins with the first order of inquiry of African ideals and values. Getting the answer to this first order of inquiry leads to the second order, which is the critical Afrocentric debate.

#### **4.4.2 Afrocentric ontology**

Ontology is the nature of knowledge and the perception of reality. Afrocentricity argues that reality cannot be universal. In Afrocentricity, the main principle that determines the perception of all reality is the centrality of the African culture and experiences of African people. There are major theoretical assumptions about human beings underlying the Afrocentric paradigm namely, collective conceptualization of human beings; the spiritual nature of human beings, the affective approach to knowledge and the interconnection of all beings in the universe (Asante, 1988; Myers, 1988; Schiele, 1996, Imafidion 2012). These assumptions are explained below.

Afrocentric paradigm conceives individual identity as a collective identity even though the paradigm does not reject individual uniqueness. However, the paradigm asserts that individuals cannot be understood separately from others in their community. This philosophy is captured by Mbiti (1970: 141) in an African adage "*I am because we are and because we are, therefore, I am*", to capture the essence of this value. Every individual is perceived as part of an interconnected web of people in his or her community, both living and deceased as the ancestors are also considered connected to the community. (Lateef 2015:27, Schiele 1996:287). This emphasis on collectivism in the Afrocentric paradigm promotes love, sharing, selflessness cooperation, solidarity and social responsibility among members of African societies. Imbibing the quality of collectivism into any governance system will ensure that the interest of the people is sought in any public policy. More on African principle of collectivism shall be discussed afterwards.

Another assumption to understanding African reality is the belief in the spirituality or non-material components of human beings. This proposition argues that the spiritual component of life is as real as the material aspect and that the essence of life is spiritual. (Schiele 1996:287; Mazama 2001:399). This also relates to the African's belief in the affective approach, which involves the use of intuition and emotions, in addition to reason. Afrocentricity does not reject rationality or scientific knowledge but

asserts that understanding African reality is not limited to these modes of thought. While Eurocentrism mainly alludes to rational, empirical and scientific knowledge and totally disregards the emotional, irrational, spiritual and supernatural aspect of knowing, Afrocentrism accepts all these modes of thought, whether cognitive or affective, as equally valid. This researcher argues then that these African cultural means of knowing should be encouraged and brought to the mainstream of economic analysis and theories, which erstwhile have been based on human rational behaviour. Moreover, in this study, the spiritual explanation of participants, concerning governance and development in Nigeria, were all accepted as valid by the researcher.

The Afrocentric idea of irrationality particularly challenges the orthodox Eurocentric social science approach of positivism which is the belief in a logically ordered, objective reality that we can come to know better through Science. The idea of positivism was introduced by French philosopher, Auguste Comte (1798-1857) in 1822. Comte separated his inquiry from the idea of God, religion and natural laws or metaphysics. He proposed that society could be observed and then explained logically and rationally so that Sociology could be as scientific as Biology or Physics (Babbie 2010:45). Afrocentricity, however, argues that logic and the intellect are insufficient to provide full knowledge of phenomena. Intuition particularly plays a vital role in ancient Egyptian Science. According to Kamalu (1990:13), the use of affective emotions in addition to logical reason, helps in immediate attainment of the truth rather than through a step-by-step logic. Schiele (1998:81-8) also argues that it is easy to deliberately distort reality through rationality because it involves active purposeful reasoning, however, emotions give direct experience with the reality. Moreover, most of human behaviour is non-rational (Schiele 1998:81-8). The challenge for African scholarship is how to develop theories and recommend policy actions that are based not only on the rationality and logical reason, but also on non-rational human behaviour. In as much as African intellectuals refuse to accept the fact that African reality includes both the rational, non-rational and spiritual elements, knowledge production will be dislocated and ineffective to solve African problems, socioeconomic or political.

This study pays attention to the non-rational factors that influence governance in Nigeria. Issues such as ethnicity, culture and religion play important roles in Nigeria's political arena. The idea of spirituality also explains why religion plays an important

role in African life. In relation to governance, religion is a cultural phenomenon in Nigeria and was a source of political legitimacy in the pre-colonial time (Ekeh 1975:111). Despite the fact that the Nigerian Constitution separates the State and its institutions from religious doctrines, it is observable that the State –religion relationship remains blurred (Namche 2008:571). Religion (specifically the two dominant ones, Christianity and Islam) is entrenched in the public arena (Omilusi 2015:4, Sampson 2014: 332); such that Muslim and Christian holidays are observed, Christian and Muslim prayers are made at every state function; while politicians want the power to rotate between Christians and Muslims (Sampson 2014:332). However, traditional religion is less politically active compared to the other two (Omilusi 2015:4, Hackett 2013:2).

Achieving good governance in Nigeria requires paying attention to the ways colonial religions have been used by politicians to gain political advantage for themselves and exploit poor masses; a situation which has contributed to sectarianism, discriminatory public resource allocation, religious crises and corruption (Sampson 2014:313). This study does not argue for the abolition of religion or belief in God which is cultural and African-centred. After all, the United States, which Nigeria tries to imitate economically, socially and politically, still holds onto the notion of God and even inscribes “in God, we trust” on its currency. In the pre-colonial period, African belief in God also promoted accountability of public office holders, a principle important for good governance (Ekeh 1975). It can even be argued that the current disregard for the spiritual (especially in the traditional sense of it) contributes to the fearless manner in which public office holders embezzle public funds and oppress fellow citizens. However, religion and the fear of God are totally different. In the case of Nigeria, politicians mainly exploit religion for selfish gain, a situation that has compromised national security (Sampson 2014:313).

#### **4.4.3 Afrocentric Epistemology**

Epistemology refers to the method of acquiring knowledge (Crotty 1998:3). Afrocentricity epistemology is the pursuit of knowledge from a historically and culturally located perspective of the subject. Culture, education, language, and religion are important means of knowledge acquisition in the traditional African society. However, Arab and European invasion, slavery and colonization destroyed, distorted and

perverted these modes of knowledge production (Asante 1980). Afrocentrists argue that the Europeans, after stealing some important aspects of ancient African knowledge such as, writings, Mathematics, and Astrology, destroyed African forms of learning institutions and libraries, and then imposed Western education as the formal mode of learning (William 1987, Conner 1996, Asante 2005). These can be called the genocide of African epistemology. The episodes of encounters with Arab and Europe actually led to the reinvention and external conceptualization of Africa as barbaric, uncivilized and a 'Dark Continent' (Mazrui 2005:70).

Afrocentricity actually broke the European epistemic constraints placed on African peoples. Afrocentrists' historical works like those of Anta Diop (1974) have confirmed that African people are not without history, intelligence and civilization as claimed by racist European scientists and philosophers such as, Hegel, Georges Cuvier, Charles Lyell and Charles Darwin (Conner 1996). Scholars and authors like Martin Bernal (1987) and Chancellor Williams (1987) have exposed how modern Europe had changed and distorted classical history to deny the contribution of ancient Egyptians and Africa to World's civilization. Asante (2005) also shows that Africa taught Europe Geometry, Medicine, Astronomy, Philosophy, and Literature. Relating to governance and development, there is evidence that basic cultural and political institutions such as, family and democracy began in Africa. Likewise, other complex achievements such as, the Pyramids of Egypt, the towering structures of Aksum and majestic kingdoms of Great Zimbabwe and Timbuktu (Rodney 1973, Conner 1996, Mazrui 2005, Tidy 2012). Solving African governance problems, therefore, requires the liberation of African governance systems from colonizing governance and development theories through critical research based on African experience, culture, and values.

#### **4.5 African Culture, Tradition, Norms and Values**

African norms, traditions, and cultural experience are the ultimate references of Afrocentricity. It embraces the epistemology, value theory, metaphysical study that characterize African culture. Culture can be defined as shared perceptions, attitudes and predisposition that allow people to organize experience in a certain way (Asante 1990:9). Closely related to culture are societal norms, values and traditions. A norm can be seen as the society's customary behaviour (Gibson 2000:26); while a value can be defined as those behaviours which are deemed acceptable in the society and

it is synonymous to morality (Obasola 2015:2). In this same manner, tradition can be defined as a set of beliefs and practices accepted and preserved by successive generations (Gyekye, 1997: 221, 219). Tradition, norms, values and culture are, however, interrelated terms that are used interchangeably by Afrocentrists (Asante 1992: 6).

Individual moral development has been found to be the accumulation of cultural tools and which allows the individual to take part in the community (Dei 2012: 106). Thus, if governance is about participation, then culture will greatly determine the type and extent of citizens' involvement in political affairs. Even though Eurocentric theories, especially modernization, see African culture as a barrier to development, Afrocentrically, culture is the starting point for any discussion, relating to development, identity, and knowledge production (Dei 2012, 106). No discussion on governance and development in Nigeria can be made outside indigenous culture because, in Africa, culture is key to understanding human conditions (Asante, 1991: 2003).

Arguably, societal institutions are also highly influenced by cultures. Institutional reforms that will make any impact among local people in Nigeria would not be imported from Bretton Woods. Rather, they must be based on a critical inquiry of the indigenous culture to know what works. According to Karenga (1978), components of culture include history, mythology, ethos, social organization, political organization and economic organization (Asante 1980: 23-24). Therefore, it can be argued that every institutional framework required for achieving African development is embedded in its culture. Development theories that aim to first uproot the local African culture before achievement of growth success are misleading and may even be counter-productive. Two interrelated cultures common to African societies are considered next.

#### **4.5.1 Communalism and Humanness in African Culture**

Among several ethical codes found in the African societies, it can be argued that the African indigenous cultures, traditions and norms of ethics are firmly rooted in two interrelated principles namely communitarianism and Humanness. Communalism or communitarianism is a social theory that encourages a shared and collective way of life. Communalism discourages the pursuit of individual goals at the expense of the community (Oyedola and Oyedola 2015:87). Communalism emphasizes the importance of being part of a society, the significance of unification to pursue a

common goal and self-actualization achieved through community goal actualization. Viewed politically, communalism promotes public access to societal resources so that every member has a share of the benefit of such resources (Kaunda 1969:5). Communitarianism promotes family bonds, kinship connection and societal interconnectedness as relationships in which allegiance and solidarity override individual rights and privileges. In Yoruba culture, for example, every member of the extended family lives together in the family compound (“agbo-ilé”) and each member is identified by that family compound or clan.

Humanness or personhood, on the other hand, describes the attainment of an ethical or moral status, as expected by the community (Mphahlele 1971). An individual is not born with the qualities of humanness, but it is acquired through a commitment to the societal values (Imafidon 2012:7). Humanness is also embedded in communalism because it is attained by an individual in terms of his relations with other members of the community according to acceptable societal behaviour. Consequently, the only way to develop one’s humanness or personhood is to have a positive relationship with and deep moral obligation to others in the community (Kaunda 1969:5; Metz and Gaie 2010:276). The idea of African humanness is presented by Afrocentrists as ‘Maat’. Maat is a moral order concept. As a verb, it can mean “to live together, to look after, or to put in order”. As a noun, Maat means morals, conduct, the rule of law and custom (Karenga 2006:9). According to Diop (1974:111-112), black Egyptians had the greatest of human social attributes, distinguishing themselves from the aggressiveness of Eurasians in their "gentle, idealistic, peaceful nature, endowed with a spirit of justice and gaiety". Maat has been classified as a natural law because it has correspondences in all African countries.

In Southern Africa for example, African humanness can be better understood by the philosophy of Ubuntu. If an individual lacks good morals, it is usually said that such a person lacks Ubuntu. The person possessing Ubuntu will have characteristics such as, being caring, humble, thoughtful, considerate, understanding, wise, generous, hospitable, socially mature, socially sensitive, virtuous and blessed (Mphahlele 1971; Le Roux 2000: 43). Although Ramose (2007:94) asserts that Ubuntu is a standalone African philosophy, which does not necessarily acknowledge community, it can be argued that since the community is made up of persons, Ubuntu is about harmonious living with the community. Among the Yoruba people of West Africa, Maat or Ubuntu



connotes “Omoluwabi” a word which literally means “a child of an exemplary character”. Omoluwabi is a person of honour who believes in honesty, hard work, respects the rights of others, and gives to the community in deeds and in action (Adeniji-Neil 2011:1). According to Akinpelu (1987) Omoluwabi is a sociable and spiritually well-balanced individual who has good economic skills, sound character, wisdom in judgment, proficient in the legends and genealogies of his ancestors, has right standing with the ancestral spirits of the family, as well as, a known problem solver in the family and in the society, and also able to perform his or her social and political duties effectively. A child is not born with these good moral traits, but must be trained in the societal ethics of behaviour. In the African sense, this training is the duty of every member of the society. Kaunda (1969:7) also explains that parenting is a mutual responsibility of all members of African traditional society. No child is likely to be orphaned because, should his parents die, others will automatically assume the responsibility of his upbringing (Kaunda 1969:7).

One distinguishing feature of African humanness is the idea of spirituality. According to Mphahlele (2002:135), this is what differentiates African humanism from Western form of humanism. The black African experiences include both physical and spiritual and a dichotomy between the realms of the intellect and spiritual experience is actually unimaginable (ibid). For example, the spiritual element of humanness in Yoruba culture helped in regulating social and political behaviour, and in achieving good governance and development (Akinpelu 1987). Political leaders are required to make a covenant, taken in front of deities or religious emblems, that they will be humane. A newly installed king or public office holder who swears by the gods to abide by the Omoluwabi values such as, justice and fairness, must keep such an oath. The Yoruba strongly believe that swearing falsely or breaking an oath made before the deities is a great crime with instantaneous, terrible repercussions like death (Ogunleye, 2013:83). Uzorka and Deekor (2013:29) also assert that in the Nigerian cultural societies, especially among the Yoruba, good moral behaviour has been induced by the fear of punishment from the ancestors.

The public oath was also introduced to Nigeria’s formal governance system whereby public office holders swear an oath of allegiance to ensure they serve the public diligently. However, Nigerian politicians would rather take oaths using the Bible or Quran rather than swear in the indigenous way; as it is feared that indigenous gods

are capable and known to mete instant justice on oath breakers (Ogunleye 2013:83). However, public oaths with the use of the Bible and Quran have been turned to oatmeal for Nigerian politicians with their flagrant abuse of power and corruption, breaking and disrespecting oaths taken at the assumption of duties. To reverse this problem of false swearing and to ensure faithfulness of public office holders to public welfare, Ogunleye (2013:85) proposes the traditional virtues of covenant keeping. Similarly Eletu (in Ibiwoye 2016) argues, *“For Nigeria to progress and reduce corruption to the barest minimum, politicians should swear with the traditional gods like Ogun and Oya. When about ten of them die, they will know the implication of what they are swearing with and they will be cautious about stealing public fund”*. This study supports the proposition of Ogunleye (2013) and Eletu which ensures the unwavering commitment of public officials to the citizens’ welfare. Corruption is a crime that deserves death because corruption is a homicide causing poverty which accounts for the death of at least 2 million children annually in Africa (UNECA 2014: 28).

#### **4.5.2 “I am Because We Are”**

In Africa, a person is considered an integral part of a society and the actual realization of personhood is attained through one’s relations with others in his respective community. According to Teffo (1996:103), “every person, every individual, forms a link in a chain of vital forces, a living link, active and passive, joined from above to the ascending line of his ancestry and sustaining below him the line of his descendants”. It follows from Teffo’s argument then that the individual is not only connected to his community but also to God or the Supreme Being, his ancestors, as well as, the future generations. The implication of this is that decisions taken by an individual must take cognizance of God as the unseen Judge of all behaviours, good or bad. An individual must also act to please his ancestors. In the Yoruba society, they use the proverbs such as “remember the son of whom you are”. That is, an individual must not do anything that will put the ancestral name to shame. The community’s interest must also be considered as the Yoruba will say “a tree cannot make a forest”, meaning that an individual cannot actualize his potential in isolation. Finally, every individual must ensure that his decision will not affect future generations negatively, because, for anyone “who sows evil seeds today, the children will reap and eat therein in the future”. Harmonious living with the members of the community, dead or living, is therefore, important.

Mbiti (1969) argues that individuals cannot exist outside their communities. According to him, *"Whatever happens to the individual happens to the whole group, and whatever happens to the whole group happens to the individual. The individual can only say: 'I am, because we are; and since we are, therefore I am.'* This is a cardinal point in the understanding of the African view of man" (1969:109). The argument, therefore, is that the community produces the individual and gives the individual an identity. This is expressed in the Yoruba adage that "only one person gives birth to a child but it is the whole community that raises him up". As Wiredu (2008: 333) also argues that the resulting scope of obligations of the individual to the community can be large, but so can the scope of the corresponding rights because it is a system of reciprocities. Communalism guaranteed that the society provides the necessary knowledge, empowerment, and protection needed for the individual to actualize his potential. While the individual, in turn, is obligated to seek the common good of the society and live according to the accepted norms and customs.

African communalism and solidarity incorporate a similar sense of collectivism described in Rousseau's Theory of Social Contract, which describes the evolution of the state and citizenship. According to Rousseau (1762), the invention of private property in primordial societies (which erstwhile had been characterized with happiness, freedom and equality), led to new challenges such as envy, greed, competition, inequality, and contempt. For this purpose, people surrendered their rights not to a single individual but to the community as a whole, which Rousseau (1762) called the general will. Through Social Contract, the state was formed out of the general will of the people to guarantee people's rights, freedom and equality. While the individual, with his natural rights, in return gets civil liberties such as freedom of speech, equality and assembly. But despite the similarity between Rousseau's theory of individual obligation to community and African communalism, Sahlins (2008) argues that the usefulness of the Western conceptualization of individual and community may be limited if not distorted in analysing non-Western situations. Deepen (2014:4) also argues that Rousseau's idea of community and the individual is highly influenced by communalistic Swiss politics, which does not fit well into the African indigenous belief of the individual who is at the very least a representative of a large basal social unit. This study also agrees with these critiques especially because in the Africa, individuals

and the community operate within an organic universe, which also includes spiritual elements.

Nevertheless, the African construct of communalism whereby individuals totally sacrifice their rights and interests for the common goal has been criticized for being too radical and overstated. Gyekye (1997:37) argues that radical communalism tends to erode the moral autonomy of the individual by making him totally dependent on the activities, values, and ends of the community. Gyekye suggests a moderate arrangement of communalism which manifests features of both communality and individualism. This is because although the individual emanates from the bond of his community, nevertheless he possesses a clear concept of himself as a distinct person of volition. Thus, an individual has two identities, his self-identity, and the community identity. It is in the combination of these two identities that individuals should take self-improving and socially responsible decisions and actions. Gyekye's argument is indeed a critical reflection of the concept of African communalism. One question that truly comes to mind is that "does because we are, also mean I cannot?" Does African community disallow self-acquisition of assets and pursuit of self-goals?

Looking at the Yoruba tradition, which greatly supports the idea of extended family social bonds and communal living; it could be found that the community is by no means an obstacle to individual goals. For example, there is a Yoruba proverb that says "*Oko kii je ti baba-tomo ko ma ni ala*" meaning a farmland cannot belong to a father and his child without a demarcation and boundary". The implication is that despite the belief in collective ownership, individual rights are protected. In fact, assets such as land are not collectively owned although there may be family lands, which hold the grave of the ancestors; this does not prevent private ownership of land and other factors of production such as, labour and capital. The African society also promotes free individual enterprise, free village markets, and entrepreneurial spirit (Ayittey 2008).

This individual-community relationship also relates to and guides governance in African societies. For example, in the pre-colonial tradition of the Igbo society in West Africa, the culture provides the relationship between individuals and the community in such a way that both the individual and the community have an interrelation of dependency and freedom concerning decisions regarding public services. While the Igbo traditional political system creates conditions for the community to support and control individuals holding public office or leadership post, the system also allows each

public office holders to exercise their own judgment without the community's interference, in as much as such decisions are within the scope of the society's procedures regarding ethics, morality and good governance (Nwosu 2002)

The distinctiveness of individual interest, decision and judgment are therefore acknowledged and respected in African culture. However, the dominant social order of the African society is the community. This can be for two reasons. The first is the protection of the individual's interest. For example, a Yoruba proverb says "*Airinpo omo ejo lo nko iya je won*" meaning that "Snakes suffer because they always travel alone". Individual decisions and actions that receive the support of the society also have better potential to succeed than when they are self-serving goals. The second reason is to ensure harmonious cohabitation, maintenance of law and order and the enforcement of moral values in the society. African communalism is thus, a win-win system in which neither the community nor the individual loses. In this wise, Wiredu (2008:334) also asserts that communalism need not lead to the subjugation of the interests of the individual to the community. Rather, it is a symmetrical relationship in which the interests of the community can as well be adjusted to the individual.

The implications of these values are enormous for achieving development and good governance in Nigeria. The Igbo and Yoruba communities of Nigeria support entrepreneurship and the accumulation of assets or capital, which are important for economic production, expansion, employment and growth. The duty of the community is to support and make the environment favourable for businesses to thrive. Moreover, public office holders must see themselves as the servants of the community, seeking only the best interest of the community. In the Yoruba society, the laws, rules, and interest of the community prevail in the choice of leaders and governance. However, another question that comes to mind is that if the principles of communality and humanness were truly functional in ancient African societies, why were inhumane actions such as slavery prevalent? For example, Alofun (2014:72) questions African communality that, "if the bond of brotherhood and unity was that strong, why did Africans sell their fellow African brothers into slavery in exchange for the goods of the white man?".

In answer to that, it is noteworthy that since earlier times, slavery was a common feature of most cultures, including African cultures (Perbi 2001:2). However, domestic slaves in Africa were usually made up of people from different ethnic groups (Lovejoy

1983:2). Slaves were usually “outsiders” and because in Africa, community identity is usually based on kinship, the term “outsiders” means those outside the kinship bond (ibid). Arguably, the kinship bond or communality ensures that an individual cannot be enslaved by a kinsman. Bezemer et al (2012:7) show that the perception of slaves in Africa was not so much the institutionalization of human beings as property was. Rather, African slaves (usually, captives of war or criminals) can be understood as those “without kin” and “natal alienation”, which also allowed them to attract benevolent treatment (Bezemer et al 2012:7). Perbi (2001:9) shows that in the pre-colonial Africa, indigenous slaves (as against export slaves), received humane treatment and enjoyed some rights and privileges. Slaves had the right to be fed, clothed, housed, to marry free people and have children. Slaves could also own farmland and enjoy the proceeds. Moreover, the slave owners did not have absolute power to take the life of their slaves (ibid).

Perbi (2001:9) also shows that many societies such as the Wolof and Serer in Senegal and the Gambia respectively, the Makara and Bambara in Niger, and the Sena of Mozambique, slaves were actually integrated. However, the European trans-Atlantic slave trading forced Africa to be exporters of slaves. The Europeans took advantage of Africa’s multi-ethnicity and lack of national unification (Rodney 1973). They would set communities against one another so that they could benefit from whoever won the conflicts (Rodney 1973). Even in this contemporary time, the imperialist Western countries have continued to use their *comprador bourgeois*, and other local elites to influence and manipulate local politics to the favour of the economic and political agenda of the imperialists, at the expense of the masses.

#### **4.5.3 Individualism, Communalism and African Socialism**

The African culture of communalism is totally divergent to the dominant Western ideology of individualism imposed on African countries during the years of colonialism, which has also become entrenched, especially after the triumph of capitalism (Oyedola and Oyedola (2015:87; Teffo 1996:103; Kaunda 69:5). The entrenchment of the idea of self-centeredness, greed and shrewd capitalism among new African leaders has destroyed the ancient tradition of communalism and promoted corruption, embezzlement of public resources for private gains by political office holders (Nyang'oro 1983:339, Nduka 1975, Omotosho 1998; Uzorka and Deekor 2013:25). All these are the root of poverty and underdevelopment in Nigeria. Conversely, early

national leaders such as Obafemi Awolowo of Nigeria, Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana, Julius Nyerere of Tanzania, Senghor of Senegal, and Sekou Toure of Guinea all embraced the African culture of communalism after independence, and their goals were to reinstitute this virtue, which was scorned by colonialism (Mohan 1966:220). It was within this atmosphere that African socialism emerged as a political ideology in reaction to European capitalist exploitative hegemony. All these leaders believed that the characteristics of socialism are similar to the tradition of African communalism (Nyerere 1968: 12; Nkrumah 1970: 73).

African Socialism affirms Africa's originality and Africa's political, ideological and independence (ibid: 228). Unfortunately, the implementation of socialism led to a huge debt, stagnated growth, underdevelopment, and poverty. Babu (1981) gave several reasons why the idea of African socialism could not adequately address African development challenges. According to Babu (1981:43), many of the nationalists who took over the leadership of African countries at independence were actually unprepared to deal with the problems of governing a new state because they were not able to adopt policies. There was no structural change in the African internal economies or their relationship to imperialism (ibid). Moreover, development was actually conceptualized as becoming more Westernized; while development efforts mainly focussed on achieving increased export, with no concern about the how people ate, dressed and lived (ibid:39).

Unfortunately, export promotion policies yielded little benefits because the international market is biased to favour the imperialists (ibid). Babu (1981) also argues that although the international market is saturated with primary products, the World Bank and the IMF continuously advise African countries to specialize in these unwanted products and to get more loans to finance their production (ibid: 43). These 'criminal policies', which made African countries become highly indebted to imperial financial institutions, were all implemented in the name of African socialism (ibid). The result is a reactionary philosophy that idealizes past backwardness (Nyang'oro 1983:340). Alofun (2014:69) attributed the failure of African socialism, especially in Nigeria, to the unrealistic assumption of African traditional communalism. To her, the existence of a conflict-free society and the bond of brotherhood and unity were no longer practicable in post-colonial Africa due to the larger size of the population.

Alofun's criticism of African communalism and her explanation for the failure of African socialism is not valid.

Certainly, the characteristics of African communalism are not the same as the principles of socialism; nevertheless, it can be argued from the Afrocentric perspective that socialism is alien to Africa and is not rooted in traditional communalism. The African collective spirit of support and solidarity does not correspond to socialism's state control of all economic assets. According to Wiredu (2008:335), the national leaders seemed to have approximated African communalism to socialism too precipitously. Moreover, the foundation of Marxian socialism is rooted in European societies which were individualistic and not communitarian in their ethos (Gyekye 1997:149). But it is important to mention other factors which led to the collapse of African socialism. These include the colonial legacy of a distorted economy, destruction of African values, and the lack of humanness, Maat, Ubuntu or Omoluwabi, on the part of some members of leadership, which led to anti-social behaviours such as corruption, waste, diversion of public funds to Swiss Banks, lack of checks and balances and tyrannical regimes.

#### **4.6 Relevance of African Traditions to the Development of Modern African Societies**

From the African perspective, discussions on the relevance of indigenous African traditions to the development of modern African societies have a conflict between two broad schools of thoughts; the cultural revivalist and the anti-revivalist (Gyekye 1997). The first school of thought, the Cultural Revivalist, supports the revival of African cultural heritage as a developmental tool. The early nationalist leaders such as Nkrumah (1974) and Nyerere (1968), could be regarded as cultural revivalists given their vision and efforts to develop Africa using strategies believed to be rooted in African culture and traditions. According to the Cultural Revivalists, the only way Africa can solve its socio-economic challenges such as, poverty, underdevelopment, inequality and conflicts, is to revive its indigenous traditions that have been suppressed and subjugated by Western imperialism. The imposition, of European forms of thought and knowledge systems on the African subjects, makes it imperative that post-colonial Africa embarks on self-determination, decolonizing and deconstruction projects, so as to revive its pre-colonial cultural values under which



African societies have prospered before the European imperialism (Gyekye 1997: 233). An example is Nyerere's Ujamaa programme of collectivization declared in 1967. Based on the idea of African communalism, Ujamaa aimed at building a socialist state based on the poor rural population through village cooperatives.

The second school of thought is anti-Revivalist and proponents adopt a more critical approach to the relevance of African culture in achieving development. According to this perspective, returning to the cultural past is naïve and dangerous because African traditional values are too archaic to meet the demands of a contemporary scientific world (Oke, 2006:337). In the same way, Hountondji (1996:48) proposed that achieving modernization in Africa requires a mental reorientation and a total break away from its pre-colonial traditions. Another argument says that the highly religious and spiritual nature of African tradition hinders the spirit of rational inquiry and scientific approach (Gyekye 1997:36). Moreover, African knowledge is too secretive and "closed"; which prevents experimentation, criticism and public and scrutiny (Horton 1997). Thus, the Revivalists are actually comparing African traditional thought system with modern Western science.

The problem with such a comparison is that they fail to consider the destructive and inhibitive impact of over half a millennium of subjugation of African cultural thought systems by the West; a situation that did not allow African philosophy to evolve and develop beyond its pre-colonial levels (Asante 2005, Nun 2014: 362); though, it is true that some African values that were acceptable and progressive in ancient time may be considered otherwise in today's westernized world (Precious 2010:5). However, cultural indigenous knowledge is not supposed to be static but dynamic and evolutionary, reflecting internal creativity, experimentation, and societal transformation (Mapadimeng 2009:10, Idang 2015, Precious 2010:6, and Kwame 2006). But critics have failed to acknowledge that the hegemony of European epistemology has prevented African knowledge to adequately evolve and advance in its own unique way to match today's complex African contemporary lives. Until the 19<sup>th</sup> century, religious paradigms dominated the European societies in explanation of social phenomena, just like in Africa. In fact, the state of social affairs in Europe was often perceived as a reflection of the will of God (Babbie 2010:44). However, the European thought system, which suffered no enslavement or colonization later evolved, and in 1822, the French

philosopher Auguste Comte launched Positivism, a scientific approach that separated inquiry from religion (ibid).

Given that all knowledge, whether Western or African, is a cultural phenomenon (Ogungbure 2013:14), it can be argued that African modes of knowing are not different from other cultural modes of knowing. Just as Conner (1996) asserted that African history is not significantly different from the general course of human social development everywhere else, it can be argued that African cultural epistemological development is not significantly different from everywhere else. The study of Moatlaping (2009:27) also affirms that African traditional indigenous knowledge is indeed dynamic and evolutionary. A thousand years ago, African cultural knowledge was able to build civilized kingdoms and thriving commercial cities such as, Kumbi Saleh, Timbuktu, and Great Zimbabwe, that had a population of about 20 thousand people (Conner 1996). Neither London nor Paris was anywhere near that size until hundreds of years later (ibid). Consequently, if African traditional knowledge systems were not disrupted, suppressed and destroyed by European imperialism, its civilizations would have evolved even to accommodate more critical inquiries comparable with those found in presently advanced regions of the world. Hence, what is required is not to discard our cultural knowledge but rather appreciate it and determine to begin scholarly research on the subject, with a rational spirit of inquiry.

Away from the perception of development in terms of technological advancement which requires scientific reasoning and experimentation, development can also be viewed in terms of political advancement or what Ciaffa (2008:122) refers to as “modernity of democratization”. Development in terms of political advancement can be described as, the development of political institutions that move away from authoritarian rule, toward forms of government that enhance the liberty and welfare of all citizens, rather than a selected few (Ciaffa 2008). In this respect, many African democratic traditions can serve as resources that promote democratic governance. Tiky (2012) argues that democracy has been in practice in Africa (Egypt) before the Athenians. A critical look at African culture shows that universal democratic principles are not alien to African traditional systems (Fayemi 2009:110).). However, the third wave of democracy, which blew across Africa in the 1990s, showed radical outcomes that disappointed democracy, optimism and the expectations of good governance and economic development (Omeiza 2008:13). In this crisis of democratic governance, the

African traditional governance system, which has been well institutionalized, can provide insight into having a better democratic experience in Africa. This study aims to understand the principles of effective traditional governance of the Yoruba culture as a remedy to governance challenges in Southwest Nigeria.

#### **4.7 Some Afrocentric Principles of Governance**

Afrocentric theory of political system, constructed by Okafor (2006), provides a fine example of African-centred principles of good governance. The Afrocentric theory of governance is appropriate for an Africa-centred good governance study of Nigeria. The Afrocentricity theory of governance requires that the African interest and specifically, the Nigerian interest, must guide governance decisions. The philosophical outlook, policies and actions of political leadership and policymakers should primarily seek, pursue and advance the interest of the country. African interest in Afrocentricity implies the welfare, progress, and peace of African people. Political interest should also generate and promote victorious consciousness in the people. According to Asante (1989:53), victorious consciousness is the overwhelming power of a group of people uniting to achieve a single purpose and it is a full, spiritual and intellectual commitment to a vision. Accordingly, achieving a societal vision is beyond the commitment of the leaders but it requires the unity of the followers, that is, the members of the community. However, the responsibility to mobilize popular participation in policy decisions also rests with the leaders because any social, economic or political change that is not based on popular participation cannot be long lasting (Okafor 2006: 131)

Afrocentric theory of political systems articulates that, an effective political system which will guarantee good governance will have the following seven characteristics: (1) The system is purposeful, (2) the system is benevolent; (3) the system is communicative; (4) the system is concordant; (5) the system is populist, (6) the political culture is Maatic (7) the political elite are historical-conscious (Okafor 2006:132). It can be observed that rather than advocate for the reinstatement of traditional governance systems for the political administration of contemporary African society, this theory inculcates the good governance qualities of the African traditional societies and modifies them to reflect contemporary African situations so that it can be well adapted for governance. The characteristics above are also not alien to African culture because

they are manifested in traditional political systems. The seven characteristics are examined below:

### **Purposeful**

A purposeful African political system is a legitimately instituted, cross-sectionally representative government. It must have a clear sense of mission in the national interest, as well as, possess the capacity to actualize this mission. However, the capacity to implement programs and policies also depends on several factors including, the regard which citizens have for the government; the economic resources available for the government; the information available for the government; the right which the constitution confers on the government; the African-centred philosophical outlook and the nationalistic vision of the government. The public service, the mass media, the armed forces, the police force and the intelligence service are all necessary instruments of government to exercise its capacity (Okafor 2006: 132).

### **Benevolent**

A benevolent political system is one whose political elite are both willing to lead and also dedicated to pursuing the general welfare of the nation. Accordingly, political elites are defined as the coalition of the leaders of major social, religious, professional and ethnic groups. It is the responsibility of these political elites to redirect the rest of the population along the new mission and goals of the government (Okafor 2006:132). It, therefore, means that governance is not only about elected representatives, but all stakeholders steering one organization or the other. This is to revive the African communal spirit that makes a populace seek a common goal. For multi-ethnic societies like Nigeria, the concern is that a call for collective identity may be threatened by the diversities of ethnicity. However, studies have shown that just as in any multi-ethnic and multi-language African society, structural commonalities exist; which can be built upon to develop a collective identity (Daniels 2001:303).

### **Communicative**

A communicative political system is the one in which there is a free and adequate flow of information between the political leaders and the governed. It is a system that keeps citizens adequately informed about government plans and policies. A communicative political system is able to assure the populace that actions taken by political leaders are in the best interest of the people. To be able to achieve a communicative political

system the political system must employ a language understandable to the masses. The political system must also adopt a philosophical orientation (including the morals, the principles, and constitutions) accepted and embraced by the masses (Okafor 2006:35).

### **Concordant**

This aspect deals with the ability of the political elites to advance a consensus politics. According to the theory, three factors are necessary to achieve concordance. One, the ability of the governing elite to forge a consensus for policy formulation and implementation. Two, the existence of an effective apparatus for resolving conflicts and enforcing discipline within the ranks of the political elite. Three, the elite's consciousness of the collective nature of its civic responsibilities. Even though consensus may not be possible on every issue, it is important that the governing elites command the support of the majority of its members over policy issues to ensure success Okafor (2006:135).

### **Populist**

The popular participation of the citizenry must always be ensured in the policy formulation and implementation process. In the African-centred political system, decision making should be democratized in a manner that would involve the national, local and grassroots levels. Thus, policy formulation and implementation should be through cross-sectional representative organs of government and grassroots involvement. Most important for popular participation in government is the place of equal rights for women in the African society. Female involvement in government should be encouraged and all barriers to their participation, rooted in tradition or religion, should be eliminated (Okafor, 2006: 1322).

### **Maatic**

Maat is Kemet's code of conduct for humanistic society. A Maatic African government is that which manifests an effective level of accountability and one which runs a clean government, free of corruption. Like Ubuntu, Maat stands for truth, justice, harmony, balance, propriety and order. The loss of the Maat philosophy among the political elite is the foundation of the selfish and corrupt practices found among African leaders. Given the entrenchment of inhumane and corrupt behaviour in African society, Okafor (2006:139) asserted that the infusion of Maatic values into the training and education

of Africans from childhood will be highly beneficial and would lay the foundation for good governance and a transformed African society.

### **Historically-conscious**

African political elites must manifest a consciousness of African history, which has been subjugated by long years of European imperialism and colonial education of anti-Africanism. African political elites must be versatile in national and continental history, as well as, the role of Africa in world history. The political elites should also have the consciousness of the place of Africa in the contemporary global scheme. According to Okafor (2006:139), a political elite who lacks such consciousness will repeat the same mistakes in history. Due to the hegemony of western epistemology, which has entrenched the idea that nothing worthwhile can come from Africa, African development approaches have always been based on externally formulated policies. Consequently, Africa remains dependent on the developed countries of the West and has been a perpetual liability to human history. To reverse this trend, the consciousness of African history is important, so as to believe in self and to begin to look inward towards the adoption of indigenous cultural knowledge for Africa's development.

One may ask if there are differences in the above Afrocentricity principles of political system and the mainstream/donor principles of good governance, such as, transparency, accountability, legitimacy, predictability, and participation. However, even though theoretically, mainstream principles of good governance are desirable and seem appropriate for universal applicability, the practical implementation of these good governance principles is instituted in the implementation of imperialist models such as Western liberal democracy and neo-liberalism which have both had a devastating impact on the African continent. These shall be discussed in detail in the subsequent chapters.

Okafor (2006) emphasizes that these seven characteristics are essential but not exhaustible in order to achieve an effective political system in Africa. Consequently, this research examines the Yoruba Governance system to have further insights into cultural principles that ensure good governance.

#### **4.8. Argument for the Inclusion of Cultural Principles of Governance in Modern Governance**

According to Afrocentricity, the transmission of cultural knowledge and ideas is the strongest way to bring the ancestors' vision of an ideal society into the contemporary world (Asante 2005:69). The African people, in particular, live in societies many of which were formed before the arrival of the Europeans (Conner 1996, Mazrui 2005). These communities possess their cultural and traditional ways of knowing and solving their personal and societal problems. African societies have their traditional governance systems. According to Moatlhaping (2007:10), indigenous governance is the set of traditional, cultural and local mechanisms, through which communities organize, manage, and coordinate their activities and consumption of resources. Unlike formal governance systems which are based on colonial structures, the African indigenous governance system is culture-based having constitutions and laws which, although may be unwritten, are well-understood and accepted by every member of the community (Mathias 1995; Larson, 1998). At the advent of colonialism, African indigenous institutions became relegated to the sphere of informality at local levels. Consequently, the development of these indigenous institutions was blocked and their relevance and authenticity sometimes questioned (Mengisteab 2009: 183).

Zack-Williams (2002 in Mengisteab 2008) does not support the inclusion of traditional governance in modern governance. The author argues that traditional governance institutions have been corrupted by the colonial government, as well as, the clientelism of the post-colonial state (ibid). In the same manner, Mazibuko (2014:2455) argues for the elimination of the indigenous governance systems, which according to him have become a mechanism of oppression of the poor. According to Mazibuko (2014:2457), traditional governance systems are not unique to Africa. They are prevalent in other parts of the world but they have also been discarded as the societies developed. Moreover, since the current roles of traditional institutions, especially in South Africa, are not too different from that of a police officer or any non-governmental organization (NGO), there is no need of duplicating institutions or wasting public funds to maintain "useless and out-dated" traditional and customary roles (ibid). In line with this discourse, some countries namely, Uganda, Guinea, Tanzania, Burkina Faso, Zambia, and Zimbabwe, attempted to eliminate the authority of indigenous

governance institutions but such efforts were mostly unsuccessful and have since been reversed (Mengisteab 2008).

Arguably, several roles of the traditional institutions can be performed by formal institutions like the police, but the question to ask is: Which of the governance institutions (formal or indigenous) do the larger number of African citizens depend on and why? Specifically, studies show that indigenous governance has proven to be resilient and even more preferred by most of the rural population. Mengisteab, Hagg and Logan (2011) found that in Ethiopia, Somaliland, Kenya and South Africa, over 70 per cent of the rural population continue to primarily adhere to traditional institutions of governance especially in aspects such as, decision-making, allocation of resources, conflict management and direction of economic activities, even when there are formal governance institutions available. The study also shows that over 70 per cent of the rural population considers their indigenous institutions very effective. The point, therefore, is not that the colonial or formal institutions like the police and NGO are incapable of taking over the responsibility of the indigenous governance systems, but can these institutions perform their functions in a manner that is compatible with African socio-economic realities and traditional cultural values?

Mengisteab (2009:182) shows that one reason why African rural populations continue to adhere to the indigenous governance systems is that these institutions provide services in a manner that their communities identify with. (This is in line with my earlier argument that the set of institutions that functions in a society is a product of its culture). The cultural conflicts embedded in formal institutions explain why the indigenous institutions have remained resilient and have continued to command the allegiance of the rural population. However, this researcher agrees with Zack-Williams (2002) and Mazibuko (2014) that the traditional governance systems have their weaknesses and limitations. The colonial government, through indirect rule, transformed the traditional governance systems from their pre-colonial forms to fit its administration requirements and to subdue the African people to colonial rules. This trend of using the traditional sector as exploitable resources also continued in the post-colonial African states, like in the case of South Africa, where the poor, rural masses are permanently deprived of individual ownership of land because the Constitution binds the rural people to a land tenure system which subjects them to traditional monarchs (Mazibuko 2014:2457). There is also evidence in Africa's history, of



traditional leadership that was oppressive and autocratic. Rodney (1973) specifically shows how some African rulers, due to their greed for European goods, became tyrannical, exploiting their own subjects and captured them for sale as slaves to the Europeans.

Despite these limitations, the adherence of rural people to their indigenous governance system shows the importance of rooting institutions in history, tradition and customs, for effectiveness. For example, the African culture of collectivism ensures that indigenous governance focuses on societal collective good or welfare, which also provides a strong philosophical basis for establishing accountable governance. Moreover, it has been argued that good governance can materialize only through the articulation of indigenous political values and practices and their harmonization with modern democratic practices (Ajittey 1992; Ake 1987 in Mengisteab 2008). The World Bank or Eurocentric good governance principles only aim at reforming modern formal institutions with no consideration for the importance of integrating traditional governance institutions or their principles into formal governance institutions (Rodrick 2008). And by failing to acknowledge and engage the institutions adhered to by large segments of the population, the formal governance institutions have failed in the promotion of participatory and democratic governance. This also explains why formal governance institutions have been ineffective, especially in coordinating policies and resources with broad social interests, in preventing conflicts, and promoting synergy in state-society relations (Mengisteab, 2009:179).

The main argument of this study is not to totally revert to the use of indigenous governance institutions and customary laws; which due to the long years of suppression have not been able to adequately evolve and develop to effectively address today's complex African life. Neither does the researcher advocate the disposal of the current modern constitution. Nonetheless, it is a fact that even in this contemporary age, traditional institutions continue to be important in the development and governance of rural areas where, as in the case of Nigeria, the larger part of the nation's population lives and the presence or impact of formal governments is limited (IFAD 2012: 2).

Adopting a good governance strategy that will be effective in addressing Nigeria's daunting socio-economic and political challenges will necessarily involve integrating some good qualities and principles of indigenous governance adhered to by the

population. Just as proposed by Mengisteab et al. (2011), the fact that the rural population constitutes the largest part of the population in Africa and, in Nigeria in particular, important goals such as poverty alleviation and inclusive democratization cannot be achieved using a good governance agenda that is incompatible with the economic and institutional systems of the overwhelming majority of the population. Moreover, pursuing a good governance agenda that is not rooted in Nigeria's culture will lead to the flourishing of incoherent fragmented institutions in the country, a situation associated with conflicts, discrimination, exclusion, corruption, patronage and the delinking of the state from the society (Mengisteab et al 2009:8).

Africa has a lot to learn from its traditional institutions. In this regard, Ajei (2001:1) proposes that African scholars should sample the plethora of African cultural perspectives and expressions in their effort to capture the meaning, function, and structure of good governance. An indigenous good governance research will challenge European political imperialism, and produce knowledge and governance practices rooted in cultural contexts, histories and heritages thereby reclaiming the African people and contributing to the search for local solutions (Dei 2012:105). Ramose (2009:414) also asserts that tradition and culture should function as a source from which to extract elements that will help in the construction of an authentic and emancipative paradigm relevant to the conditions of Africa. This means that the way out of the African menace, in terms of governance, is to begin to build its governance structures, not on borrowed culture and ideology, but on a solid foundation of good governance attributes in its own culture. This study argues that African knowledge of governance can function as a source from which to draw elements to achieve good governance and development in Nigeria.

#### **4.9 Criticisms of Afrocentricity**

Afrocentricity has received several criticisms especially from mainstream scholars who have refuted Afrocentric claims, especially of the African origin of European intellectual achievements. Afrocentric scholars like G.G.M. James (1954), in his book *The Stolen Legacy*, Cheikh Anta Diop (1955), in his book, *The African Origin of Civilization* and Martin Bernal, in his book, *Black Athena* (1987–1991) all argue that civilization and philosophy started from ancient Egypt; as against the notion of the Greek's origination of civilization held by Eurocentric scholars. Afrocentric scholars maintained that Egypt

was the educational capital of the Ancient World and that many Greek philosophers had ventured to Egypt to study from Ancient Egyptian wise men (Asante 2004). Thus, European intellectual accomplishments were stolen from the ancient Egyptians. One lead opponent to this Afrocentric claim, is Lefkowitz (1996) through her book *Not Out of Africa*. However, Lefkowitz's work has also been criticized as not being thoroughly based on evidence and having a political agenda (Conner 1996). Conner (1996) shows that the idea that Egypt was the cradle of world civilization is not an Afrocentric idea but a universally accepted conclusion until the nineteenth century when some German racial scientists began the promotion of the idea "Greek miracle". Racial science debunks the ability of Egypt to contribute to Greek civilization or produce any worthwhile civilization because according to the theory, Blacks are intellectually inferior, while Whites are the superior race (ibid). However, the scientific work of Gould (1981) has shown that the basis for the assumption of black inferiority such as, the brain size, race and intelligence are actually worthless.

Ferguson (2011:45) specifically criticises Afrocentricity for focusing exclusively on ancient Kemet traditions and culture, thereby ignoring the complex or diverse socio-historical development of Africa and of various peoples of African descent. Given this criticism, it will be worth mentioning that Afrocentricity acknowledges the diversities of ethnicities even though some cultural commonalities can be observed. However, the position of Kemet or Egypt is important as the source of the renaissance of African culture because history shows that Kemet was the foundation of common African ideas and it also shaped the civilization of other Africans with its discovery (Asante 2005:70). Most specifically, the Egyptians are the creators of the cultural concept of Maat, a moral ideal that has led to a legacy of achievement in all aspects of life including, Economics, Architecture, Politics, Mathematics and Religion (Asante 2005:70). Maatic or a high moral standard of behaviour, the nature of ancient black Egyptians, actually distinguished them from the aggressiveness of Eurasians (Diop 1974:111)

Another main criticism of Afrocentricity is that the Afrocentric paradigm has refused to recognize that Africa has undergone a process of cultural change over the years and has actually lost its cultural heritage. For example, Adeleke (2015:213) argues that that impact of colonization and Westernization on Africa is so profound that an African today is also partly European. Moreover, the identities of modern Africa have become

so complex that seeking a pure African based theory may be restrictive and may not truly and fully reflect today's Africa or meet the needs of its citizens (ibid). Similarly, the impact of globalization and technology on all cultures cannot be overemphasized; breaking cultural barriers and eroding all forms of pre-historic constriction of identity. Lalonde (1991:3) also maintains this argument. The implication of such an argument is that Africa has lost its culture and an African-centred research is no longer feasible or necessary. However, in response to such critics, one should note that Afrocentricity also recognizes the non-static nature of culture. According to Asante (2005:68) Africa has suffered greatly in the last five hundred years and it has resulted in the loss of its traditions and values. However, this loss also makes it more necessary for Africans to pursue, in the most determined manner, the renaissance of its culture, values and philosophy (ibid). Without conscious efforts to rebirth African culture and philosophy, the black nations will continue to live beggarly lives depending on European interpretation of African phenomenon and European solution to their situations.

Another weakness of Afrocentricity is its limited achievement of transforming the paradigm into policy actions, which can lead to the growth and development of African countries (Ferguson 2011:44, Keita 1991; Ciaffa 2008:130). The Afrocentricity theory has established that Africa actually has a prestigious history, thus providing a corrective account to Eurocentric denigrating histories of Africa which disregard the great intellectual accomplishments of the continent's pre-colonial era (Asante 2005, Diop 1974, Mazrui 2005). Afrocentricity also offers insights into some of the reasons why Africa is underdeveloped by exposing the impact of over half a million years of European and Arab subjugation, colonialism and neo-colonialism which have led to the dislocation and disorientation of the African people (Asante 2005). Nevertheless, one thing that remains pertinent is that Africa is still the poorest region in the world and requires urgent practical and effective solutions. If Western ideologies and models are inappropriate and have been ineffective in placing Africa on the development path, it is important therefore that Afrocentricity engages in critical debates and research to develop African-centred development theories, based on Africa's historical experience, which can be applied to address African development challenges.

Similarly, it may not be right to blame Africa's underdevelopment on European hegemony alone. Since the end of colonialism, many African states have been mired in corruption, overthrown governments, civil war, autocratic leaders, the repression of

fundamental human rights, undemocratic elections, unaccountable governments, disrespect of the rule of law, inadequate service delivery and widespread exploitation by the elites (Mills 2010, Owoye and Bissessar, 2012). These endemic anti-social practices in the governance arena of many African countries, have contributed to the underdevelopment of these countries, as a result of which they remain under the neo-colonial prescriptions of imperialist institutions such as, the World Bank and IMF. It is high time Afrocentricity looks into these internal problems and develops strategies to surmount the challenge of poverty so that African people can truly be liberated from perpetual European economic and political domination.

## **Conclusion**

In conclusion, despite these criticisms of Afrocentricity, this study considers Afrocentricity as the most appropriate theoretical framework for this research, which aims to understand good governance as a development strategy in Nigeria, based on the indigenous and cultural perspective. To be able to achieve the set objectives of this study, only an approach, which is African-centred, can be applied. The next chapter presents the detailed research methodology.

## CHAPTER FIVE

### 5.0 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

#### 5.1 Introduction

This chapter lays out the processes taken and the methods by which this research was conducted to achieve the stated objectives. The study undertook an empirical examination of the challenges of good governance in Southwestern Nigeria and also analysed the principles of traditional governance of the Yoruba in the region. This research can serve as a model for good governance in the region. The study was conducted in three rural towns, namely Ikire, Ipetumodu and Iwo all in Osun State, Southwest Nigeria. The overview of Southwest, Nigeria and the Yoruba culture has been presented in the first chapter (Section 1.9). The overview showed that the Yoruba people have a homogenous culture. The background of Osun State, as well as, that of each of the study locations, was also provided in the first chapter (Section 1.9).

The main objectives set at the beginning of the field study were:

- Critique and evaluate the discourse of good governance and its limitations as a means of addressing development challenges in the African context and in Nigeria.
- Establish local citizens' conceptualization of the term 'good governance'
- Identify key issues at the local level, important for better performance of governance and achievement of development in Southwest Nigeria
- Assess people's perception of the new democratic governance in Southwest Nigeria.
- Understand the principles of good indigenous governance that guarantee responsiveness, accountability, participation, and transparency, as well as, ensure welfare improvement in Southwestern Nigeria.
- Develop a context-specific good governance model that reflects the traditions and aspirations of local people in Southwestern Nigeria.

Research has been defined as, a systematic inquiry taken to understand a phenomenon so as to provide new knowledge or to add to existing knowledge about the phenomenon (Burns, 1997; Mackenzie and Knipe, 2006). A research process involves data collection, analysis, and interpretation. However, every research is

based on some underlying philosophical assumptions about what is understandable and how it can be understood. Afrocentricity is the theoretical framework applied in this study. Afrocentricity is an alternative indigenous approach. In subsequent sections, the concepts of paradigms, research design, and research methods shall be explained, in addition to explaining the way they are applied for data collection and data analysis in this study.

## **5.2 Research Paradigms**

Denzin and Lincoln (2005) describe paradigms as the set of assumptions and beliefs that guide the researcher throughout the process of the research. Consequently, a paradigm influences the way a researcher will study, understand, analyze and even interpret a research problem. A paradigm is a researcher's theoretical perspective and the philosophical assumption that provides the context and grounding for the process of research (Crotty 1998:8). A research paradigm has four parts namely ontology, epistemology, methodology and method (Denzin and Lincoln 2005).

Ontology refers to the nature of reality (Cameron 2015). It is the researcher's perception or worldview of what constitutes a reality (Denzin and Lincoln 2005, Blaikie 2000). Epistemology can be described as the philosophy of the nature and scope of knowledge. It involves how knowledge of reality is acquired, how it can be understood, the extent of its validity; the method used and its limits (Blaikie, 2000, Cameron 2015). Moreover, the epistemological and ontological assumptions are the real foundations upon which research is built. The methodology is the strategy, plan of action, process or design underlying the choice and use of particular methods (Crotty 1998:3). The methods are the instruments used for data collection and analysis (ibid). A brief explanation of the common paradigms and their applicability to this study is given below.

### **5.2.1 The Positivism (and Post-positivism) Paradigm**

The positivism paradigm is also known as a scientific research method or empirical science research. The positivist paradigm in social research is rooted in the philosophical work of the French philosopher, Auguste Comte who proposed that human behaviour can be studied scientifically through observation and logical reasoning (Babbie 2011:35). The positivist argument is that there is a universal truth of any reality and that the world is governed by some constant laws and rules of

causation. Positivism portrays human behaviours as passive, predictable, controllable and subjectable to cause and effect experiments (Mertens 2005:8). The positivists also assume that the world is external, constant and can be studied from an objective perspective, which is independent of the researcher (Carson et al. 1988).

Positivists also believe that the researcher and the subjects are autonomous and do not impact each other (Hudson and Ozanne 1988). Positivist researchers create distance between themselves and participants so that the researcher does not influence the research in any way (Carson et al. 2001; Hudson and Ozanne 1988). The aim is to produce knowledge, which is measurable, unbiased, value-free and generalizable (Schunk, 2008; Alghamdi 2015:79). Positivists thus adopt a controlled and structural approach to research involving stating of hypotheses to be tested with appropriate methodology (Carson et al., 2001). Methodologically, the positivist paradigm is associated with the use of quantitative research methods such as, statistical and mathematical methods, experiments, laboratory experiments and deduction (Mackenzie and Knipe 2006, Aliyu et al 2014:82). Positivism was particularly replaced by post-positivism after the World War II (Mertens 2005). However many scholars (such as Creswell 2014, Mackenzie and Knipe 2006) do not consider post-positivism as a distinct paradigm but an extension of positivism because they are both objectivist and they adopt quantitative methods.

This study considers post-positivism as a paradigm which has many similarities with positivism and its alignment with objectivity actually makes it an imperfect paradigm for this study. Afrocentric scholars have argued that the positivist criteria of objectivity and universality can be misleading in the social research process. For example, Reviere (2001:710) argues that the objective evaluation criteria of positivism which require the researcher to distance himself as well as remove all subjectivities and social influence are misleading. Accordingly, a research that is African-centred and aimed at improving the lives of the African people requires the familiarity of the researcher with the history, language, philosophy, and myths of the people under study. This is necessary to avoid a situation in which the researcher misrepresents local traditions and cultural practices and thus, produces false knowledge or information about the culture of the African people (Mkabela 2005:180). It does mean that the Afrocentric researcher cannot distance himself from the research elements and he cannot be value-free in his data collection.



### 5.2.2 Interpretivist Paradigm

Interpretivism, also referred to as constructivism, is rooted in the work of some German humanistic philosophers including Max Weber (1864–1920), and Wilhelm Dilthey (1833–1911) (Mertens 2005:12). Dilthey (1883) argues that the natural laws and abstract theories applied in natural sciences are not applicable or appropriate for Social Science research because the subject matter being studied by the natural sciences is not the same with the elements being studied in the Social Sciences. While the natural sciences study inanimate objects, Social Sciences deal with human beings who can also analyze and interpret the environment themselves (Onwuegbuzie 2000). Therefore, interpretivism argues that social research requires distinct methodologies and research designs that will enable the researcher to have the interpretive understanding and the subjective meaning of social phenomenon. The interpretivist paradigm thus supports an Afrocentric study.

Ontologically, interpretivism postulates that there are multiple realities to a particular phenomenon because, reality is socially constructed and differs from person to person (Guba and Lincoln 1994, Crotty 1998). Epistemologically, interpretivism holds a subjectivist view of reality so that every phenomenon is believed to have subjective meanings and subjective interpretations. Subjectivity also means that there will be many interpretations of reality and different definitions of truth. Moreover, the relationship between the researcher and the subject is that of involvement and not detachment. According to Crotty (1998:79), the researcher cannot be detached from the subject matter being studied because “the object cannot be adequately described apart from the subject, nor can the subject be adequately described apart from the object” (ibid). Specifically, both the participants and the researcher bring their own particular interpretations or perceptions of reality to the research. Methodologically, the interpretivist perspective uses qualitative methods of data collection and analysis so as to fully understand people’s interpretation of reality (Creswell 2014, Cohen et al 2003:19).

The assumptions of interpretivism support Afrocentric studies. Afrocentricity argues that the social world should be observed through the meanings people give to it and the interpretation of reality should be from people’s viewpoint (Mkabela 2005:180). The universalization of Western perspectives and meanings has often subsumed the viewpoint of the African people. For example, many good governance studies (like

Kaufman, Kraay, and Mastruzzi 2004) have usually measured the institutional performance of African governments against some western institutional benchmarks. In this study, the researcher mainly set out to capture the views of the local citizens on good governance in Nigeria. The interpretivist paradigm is found highly applicable to this study.

### **5.2.3 Critical/Transformative Paradigm**

A critical paradigm is also known as a transformative paradigm (Elshafie 2013:8, Mertens (2010:21). The paradigm is rooted in critical theory, which drew from the work of scholars like Georg Hegel and Karl Marx. Specifically, critical theory aims to deal with the problem of prejudice in societies (Mackenzie and Knipe 2006). Accordingly, critical paradigm aims to conduct research which will generate knowledge that will cause societal transformation and eliminate all forms of inequality in the society (ibid). The paradigm acknowledges the discrimination and oppression existing in societies that often give one version of reality privilege and power over the some others (Mertens 2012:5). The critical paradigm, therefore, argues that knowledge can only be gained through critical discourse and debate (Fossey et al 2002:170). This paradigm includes the work of transformative researchers, deconstructivists, participatory action researchers, feminists; physically challenged or disabled individuals; indigenous and postcolonial societies, as well as, racial and ethnic minorities (Creswell 2014, Merten 2012:5.)

Epistemologically, the critical paradigm contends that the researcher should have an interactive relationship with the participants in order to understand the various interpretations of reality and how these meanings are related to power issues (Mertens 2012:6). Thus, critical paradigm does not believe in objectivity. The assumption of absolute truth and objectivity may also lead to producing erroneous information about the social phenomenon and about indigenous people and can also lead to the production of research outcomes not relevant to the people (Reason 1994:4). To produce the desired change, a critical research needs to maintain a close relationship with the participants, especially to understand the culture and history, as well as, build the trust necessary for effecting change. Asante (2009, Lum (2010:296) and Romm's (2015) all indicate that transformative paradigm is also highly applicable to Afrocentric studies. Consequently, the methodology adopted in this research follows the critical paradigm.

A critical research uses methods that provide insight into various interpretations of reality, the powers and privileges related to those interpretations, as well as, techniques which offer an opportunity for social change (Mertens 2012:8). Participatory methods such as, interviews and focus group discussions are commonly used in a non-discriminatory manner (Mackenzie and Knipe 2006). Romm (2015:414) and Mertens (1999:5, 2007:216) propose that a transformative paradigm research can make use of quantitative, qualitative, or mixed methods, in as much as methods are chosen and applied with the full involvement of the participants. Mertens (2012:9) suggests that the mixed methods can be most useful in transformative research because the qualitative phase would enable the researcher to establish an interactive rapport with the participants, as well as, to understand the cultural, historical and other contextual factors. The quantitative phase provides additional data to better understand the research issues. Consequently, this study adopts mixed methods of data collection.

#### **5.2.4 Principles for Conducting Afrocentric Research**

In addition to the use of conventional research methodology, Mkabela (2005:180) suggests that the Afrocentric researcher must first be submerged in the culture, history, ideology, language and the beliefs of the indigenous people being researched. In other words, the familiarity of the researcher to the cultural context and the historical situation are very necessary to produce research outcomes that meet the needs of the people. The participants are also main actors in the Afrocentric study, they must be fully involved, as senior partners, whose viewpoints, interests, and concerns matter (Cunningham and Durie 1998; Khupe and Keane 2017:27; and Mkabela 2005:181). In the present study, the researcher followed the following Afrocentric research principles, as stated in Mkabela (2005) and Reviere (2001):

- The research is mainly rooted in the governance experiences and explanations of the people of Osun State. Their definition, interpretation, and experience validate the research and determine what is true about good governance.
- The researcher acknowledges that knowledge construction cannot be value-free and that her personal values also influence the process.

- The researcher has immersed herself in the Yoruba culture. Given that she is also Yoruba and from Osun State, Nigeria, it can be said that the researcher is culturally immersed.
- The researcher understands the African belief in the interconnectedness, especially the Yorubas' belief in the spiritual explanation of the phenomenon. The researcher accepts some immaterial and spiritual principles given by participants as conditions for achieving good governance.
- The data collection methods include participatory methods such as, interviews and focus group discussions, which were conducted in the Yoruba language. The survey instruments were also interpreted in Yoruba. These were done to reinforce the centrality of Yoruba intellect and culture.
- Besides observing due protocol, the researcher also ensured that the traditional rulers of the three study locations namely, Ipetumodu, Ikire, and Iwo, were fully involved in the study. The Obas or Kings authorized the conduct of the research in their communities and they also formed part of the interview respondents. Other members of the research included elders, social council members, cultural committees, political leaders and elites.

#### **5.2.4.1 Observance of protocol**

All of the three study locations are ancient Yoruba towns with crowned Kings or Oba. The traditional ruler or Oba of Ikire town is known as the Akire of Ikire land and he is the Chairman, Akire-in-Council. The Oba of Iwo is called the Oluwo of Iwo land and he is Chairman of the Council of Obas in Iwo Zone. The traditional head of Ipetumodu is called the Apetu of Ipetumodu. Before conducting the study, the researcher first visited the palaces of these traditional rulers to get their permission to conduct the study in their territories. The researcher had earlier received a letter of introduction from the Department of Development Studies, University of South Africa, which was presented to the traditional leadership on arrival at the Kings' palaces. A prior appointment had been made and the researcher met the traditional rulers on the agreed dates and time.

In each of the Oba's palaces visited, the researcher was welcomed by the Oba and several of his chiefs. The Obas explained that the chiefs were invited because the administration of the towns was always carried out by the King in conjunction with his

chiefs. Thus, the chiefs were also qualified to provide information relating to Yoruba traditional governance and other questions the researcher might have relating to governance in Nigeria. Mr A. A., a famous radio and television presenter in Osun State greatly assisted in booking appointments with the traditional rulers and in providing some important information about the research locations. However, on arrival at the study locations, the researcher also used the opportunity to learn more about the historical background of the towns. She also visited the local government offices to obtain available data on the socio-economic situation of the towns.

### **5.3 Research Design**

A research design is a framework for conducting the research project (Kothari 2004:14, Asika 2004). It is the master plan, which outlines the sequence of actions the researcher will take to obtain information that will validly answer the research questions. The research design specifies the necessary data to be collected, the methods to be used in collecting the data, and how the data would be analysed. Doubtless, the strength of the findings of any research depends largely on how it is conducted. Thus, an appropriate research design allows the researcher to collect relevant and reliable data in the most efficient manner and also enable the researcher to draw valid conclusions. Moreover, the research design is also exploratory and descriptive. A case study design was adopted.

According to Yin (1984:23), a case study research design “is an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context; when the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident; and in which multiple sources of evidence are used.” In other words, case study designs allow the researcher to thoroughly explore a research problem or a research phenomenon through detailed contextual analysis. Usually in a case study, the researcher selects a small geographical location or a number of research participants so as to be able to conduct a thorough examination of the phenomenon (Zainal 2007:1). The comprehensive investigation associated with case study design also allows the researcher to gain insight into the behavioural conditions of the research participants through the participants’ perspectives (Tellis 1997). Specifically, the case study design has been found useful when conducting research to ascertain the efficiency and effectiveness of government programmes (Zainal 2007:1).

Consequently, this study finds the case study design most appropriate. This study is conducted to understand the issue of good governance in Nigeria from the perspectives and culture of local citizens. Southwest Nigeria is the case study. Yin (1994) shows that case study designs can either be a single-case or multiple-case study design. In the single case study, only one event or one source of evidence is studied. The limitation of a single-case design is that the conclusion thereby may not be generalizable (ibid). In a multiple-case design, however, more than one case is studied to have several sources of evidence. The replication of the cases makes the method more robust and increases the validity of the conclusion (Zainal 2007:2). This study examines the issue of good governance in (Southwest) Nigeria using three case study locations namely, Ikire, Iwo and Ipetumodu. The multiple sources of data allow for triangulation and increase the robustness of the research.

A case study research can also adopt an exploratory research design or a descriptive research design while both approaches can be combined in the same case study (Yin 1984:15). Exploratory case studies are used to gain insight into a situation that is not very clear and that has not attracted serious investigation and research in the past (Asika 2004, Ugoani 2016:84). It uses qualitative research approaches such as, phenomenology, ethnography, grounded theory, and historical research (Creswell 2003:14, Nieswiadomy 2011:171). This study is largely exploratory as it mainly aims to gain insight into good governance from the local people's perspective and the culture of the indigenous people of Southwestern Nigeria. The study applies phenomenology and narrative qualitative research. Phenomenology is a research to understand the phenomenon through the 'lived experience' or description given by those involved (Creswell 2003:15). Historical research studies past events in order to relate them to the present (2011:176). A descriptive research design is also included in the research design through the use of quantitative techniques and the aim is to accurately describe the issue of good governance in Southwestern Nigeria. A descriptive research is able to ascertain and describe the characteristics of the pertinent issues and it can be used to draw inferences which can provoke action (Marsh 1982:125; Asika 2004).

But most importantly, this study is an Afrocentric research and it largely uses qualitative methods of data collection because it relies on participants' interpretations. The inclusion of quantitative data in this research is for the main purpose of expanding

and complementing the interpretive information. Consequently, the researcher adopted what Johnson, Onwuegbuzie, and Turner (2007:124) describe as 'qualitative dominant' mixed methods research symbolized as QUAL+quan research. According to the authors, a qualitative dominant mixed methods research is a type of mixed methods research in which the qualitative or transformative perspective guide the overall research process, while also allowing the research to benefit from additional quantitative data concurrently (Johnson et al (2007:124). In terms of the sequence, the researcher collected the qualitative data first, followed immediately by the quantitative data. Moreover, the participants in the qualitative phase were different from those in the quantitative phase.

The fieldwork spanned about three weeks starting from 9 January, 2017 to 31 January, 2017.

#### **5.4 Rationale for Adopting Mixed Methods**

A mixed methods approach was adopted in this study because the combination of qualitative and quantitative approaches allows for the collection of comprehensive information which is grounded in the participant's experience and the Yoruba culture, traditions and norms. There is no doubt this study produced more complete knowledge than it would have achieved by using only one method. Combining qualitative and quantitative methods minimized the limitations of using only one method and gives a much richer understanding. For example, the quantitative design by itself has limited explanatory power, while qualitative designs give rich information which, however, is more subjective and cannot be generalized (Condelli and Wrigley 2004:2). The researcher uses triangulation of approaches to take advantage of the strengths of both quantitative and qualitative research approaches, as well as, increase the confidence and interpretative potential of the research.

The researcher also believes that some of the research questions are best addressed by quantitative methods while some are better addressed using qualitative approaches. For example, a larger sample and questionnaire survey method can best establish citizens' development and governance priorities among so many conflicting societal needs. In-depth interviews with elders, on the other hand, helped to give insight into principles of traditional governance. Moreover, during the analysis, the use of mixed methods enabled the researcher to be able to explain some of the quantitative

results with the qualitative findings and vice-versa. The experiences shared by participants in governance during the in-depth interview better explain, in detail, the citizens' perception of governance captured in the questionnaire survey. The convergence and corroboration of quantitative and qualitative findings further strengthened the evidence for the conclusion. Most importantly, the use of the mixed methods in this study further ensured that the knowledge produced is not just abstract (as common with some quantitative studies) but the knowledge will be very relevant to the people who participated in the study (due to the qualitative content).

## **5.5 Population**

According to Kothari (2004:14), population refers to all the items under consideration in any field of inquiry. The target population is the population of interest on which the study is being carried out while the elements of the population are the individuals that make up the target population and which also possess the information sought by the researcher. Three rural towns were selected in Osun State, Southwestern Nigeria for the study. These are Ikire, Iwo, and Ipetumodu towns. As explained in Chapter One, Southwestern Nigeria is mainly inhabited by the Yoruba with a homogenous culture. So, the researcher believes the study locations are sufficient to give insights to the research problem. The socio-economic data of the study locations have been presented in Chapter One. There is no official record of the current size of the towns' population. The most current official population statistics of Osun State is 2006. For the purpose of the study, the elements of the population include all the adult citizens in the three study locations. This also includes the traditional rulers, political office holders, and political/educated elites.

## **5.6 Sample**

For the administration of the questionnaire survey (quantitative data), the researcher adopted cluster sampling. The information from the local government offices showed that in all the locations, people settle in clusters. Consequently, each of the selected towns was divided into clusters, as identified by the local government officials; out of which 3 clusters were randomly selected in each town. A total of 50 questionnaires were randomly administered in each location, which means that 16 or 17 respondents were covered in each cluster. However, for the qualitative data collection (interviews and focus group interviews), a purposive sampling technique was adopted.



The participants in the qualitative phase were selected purposefully (and on the recommendation of the community members and the leadership) based on their knowledge of governance in Nigeria and their involvement in the indigenous governance system. Indigenous governance in this study includes, the traditional monarchs, as well as, the governance systems in trade and community associations. According to Marshall (1996), some elements of the population have richer information than others and they are more likely to provide insight and understanding for the researcher. Consequently, the people included to participate in the interviews were:

1. The Kings (Oba) of the selected towns
2. The traditional leaders or palace chiefs of the selected towns.
3. Leaders of trade associations and community associations
4. Educated elites
5. Political office holders/ public servants
6. Elders

One Oba (King), eight traditional chiefs, three educated elites, two political office holders, two senior local government staff and eight members of trade associations participated in the in-depth interviews and focus group interviews. Consequently, there were 24 participants in total. These participants were considered sufficient and appropriate because the inquiry reached the point of saturation where new explanations stopped emerging from the data.

## **5.7 Literature review**

Literature review is a critical and useful examination of published works on a particular area of interest so as to find out what is already known, knowledge gaps and debates in the subject area (Bolderston 2008). The literature review helps in providing context for the research. According to Kitchenham (2004), a literature review identifies, analyses and synthesizes existing studies relevant to the research question or topic. At the onset of this study, the researcher did an extensive review of literature relating to good governance and development in Africa. The synthesis of the literature reviewed gives the researcher a comprehensive overview of current knowledge on good governance which enabled her to approach the study from an informed perspective. The literature review also enabled the researcher to understand that although there are abundant Eurocentric scholarly works on good governance,

African-centred scholarly works are limited. The literature review also establishes the need for context-specific studies on good governance and development.

The literature reviewed by the researcher include books, journal articles, scholarly studies, published and unpublished reports, websites, mass media, government published documents and official statistical data. The information provided a good background for the research as it contextualizes the issue of good governance in Nigeria and also provided a theoretical framework for the study.

## **5.8 Qualitative Data**

The qualitative data was obtained using in-depth interviews, focus group interviews and observation.

### **5.8.1 Interview**

An interview is a way of gathering information that addresses the research objectives through a conversation. According to Kvale (1996), an interview is an exchange of views between two or more people on a topic of interest. Kumar (2011) opined that the interview method (whether face to face or telephone interview) gives the researcher the freedom to choose the pattern, the order, and content of the questions posed to participants. Similarly, the interview method gives the researcher or interviewer the opportunity to probe initial participants' responses or to ask follow up questions, thereby generating a richer set of data. Probing also gives participants the opportunity to respond in their own words, rather than forcing them to choose from fixed responses, as in quantitative methods (Mack et al 2005). In this study, the researcher employed the face-to-face, in-depth interview method to collect information from traditional leaders, the educated elites and the local government staff; while the telephone interview method was used to collect information from the political office holders who participated in this study. During the interview session, the researcher sometimes asked the participants probing questions, which contributed to the rich data collected in this study.

However, interviews vary in their degree of flexibility. An interview can be unstructured, structured, or semi-structured. Unstructured interviews are flexible interviews that allow the interviewer to ask any question around the research problem, and they also allow the interviewee to answer freely. The researcher is not restricted in terms of the

structure or content and questions can be raised at any moment within the discussion (Kumar 2011). This type of interview can generate a rich set of data. The challenge of this approach is that it cannot be standardized. Analyzing data from unstructured interviews can also be time-consuming. However, in structured interviews, the interviewer asks different participants the same questions in the same sequence. This may involve the use of an interview schedule. An interview schedule is a written list of questions, which the interviewer will ask the respondents during the interview (Kumar 2011). The benefit of structured interviews is that it can be standardized across all the participants and thus easier to apply and analyze, when compared to the unstructured questionnaire.

Semi-structured interviews have the characteristics of both structured and unstructured interviews. They are more flexible than the structured interview and more planned than the unstructured interview. A semi-structured interview will not use a predetermined plan or standardized questions like an interview schedule but there can be a list of themes and questions to be addressed. The flexibility of this interview type allows the interviewer to probe for opinions from the interviewees during the discussion, which could also give insight to new paths which were not initially considered (Gray 2004).

In this study, the researcher used the semi-structured interview method, with the use of an interview guide. The use of interview guide helped the interviewer to remain focused on the objective and to maintain consistency across interviews with different respondents (Guion 2011). In this study, three different interview guides were used to get information from the three different categories of respondents - the traditional leaders, educated elites, and political office holders/public servants. In all the study locations, the interviews with the traditional leaders were conducted at the Oba's palace. Only in one of the study locations was the Oba present to answer the interview questions. In the remaining two towns, after welcoming the researcher, the Oba left the council of chiefs to meet in the council meeting hall to give the researcher answers to the research inquiries. Interviews were also held with three educated elites, one in each study location. The educated elites were chosen based on the local people's recommendations. In Ikire and Ipetumodu, the educated elites interviewed were head teachers of secondary schools and the interviews were held in their offices. In Iwo

town, the educated elite interviewed was a retired school principal and the interview was held in his home.

Two senior local government workers from two different local government councils were also interviewed and the interviews were conducted in their offices. Similarly, two political office holders were interviewed. However, the researcher adopted an in-depth telephone interview for the political office holders because they both travelled to the state capital for official assignments at the time of the field work. Before the commencement of each of the interview sessions, the purpose of the interview and the criteria for inclusion in the participation were explained to all the participants. They were also informed about the use of a tape recorder and the confidentiality of all responses. The ethics of the study and the behaviour of the researcher were defined as suggested by Mkabela (2005:184). The researcher ensured that the traditional rulers and elders were addressed in accordance with manners acceptable to Yoruba culture and the centrality of the Yoruba culture was the starting point of all discussions. The researcher also avoided biases that could disturb the harmony and balance existing in the communities.

### **5.8.2 Focus Group Interview**

In focus groups, the opinions or perceptions of participants concerning the research problem are explored through an open discussion and free interaction between members of a group and the researcher (Creswell 2014). In this method, the researcher selects a group of people having knowledge and experience to discuss the problem insightfully. The researcher then raises questions that motivate discussion among members of the group. It is important that the researcher directs the group so that they do not totally digress from the issue being studied. Kumar (2011) suggests that the appropriate size of a focus group should be 8 to 10 members. Moreover, there must be a procedure for the discussion so that every member is given the opportunity to express his or her opinions. The researcher should also agree with the group about recording the discussions. The recordings provide the data, which would be analysed for drawing a conclusion about the research issue. The advantage of focus group interviews is that it is easy to apply and less time consuming and they provide a source of rich information. The disadvantage, however, is that if not well managed, the outcomes may reflect the opinions of those who have a tendency to dominate a group.

In this study, focus group interviews were held at the Palace of Oluwo in Iwo town and at the Palace of Akire of Ikire town. The researcher opted for the focus group interview in these towns because the palace authorities had available a number of elderly chiefs to participate in the study. In Ikire, the focus group was made up of 4 elderly traditional chiefs while, in Iwo, the focus group was made up of 3 elderly traditional chiefs. The participants freely discussed attributes of traditional governance and also compared it to modern governance. Another focus group interview made up of 8 members was held in Iwo town. The members comprised leaders and members of trade associations such as, carpenters, tailors, canopy rental people and auto parts traders. During the interview, the researcher asked questions about the governing processes of these associations and the principles ensuring the welfare of members. Focus group members were also asked about their perceptions of modern governance. Mr A.A., the famous radio and television presenter who assisted in booking appointments with the traditional rulers, also assisted in putting the focus groups together. The focus group interviews were all recorded on tape with the permission of the group members. The role of the researcher was to moderate the responses and to record the discussions.

### **5.8.3 Observation**

Observation method involves the researcher purposefully and selectively watching and listening to events surrounding the phenomenon of interest as it is taking place (Kumar 2011). During this study, the researcher purposefully watched and took note of the behaviour of the participants when the question about governance performance was posed to them. For example, at the local government offices, the researcher observed that some of the local government officials were reluctant to participate in the study because they felt discussing governance issues, as government workers, was too sensitive. To mitigate this fear, the researcher reassured them of the confidentiality of all responses. However, many public citizens were excited to participate. The researcher also made notable observations of the reception and events occurring at the king's palaces that were visited. The researcher observed several civil matters and disputes were brought to the palace for resolution during her visit. This also provided the opportunity to ask the traditional leaders why some citizens chose the palace for their conflict resolution instead of going to the police station. The socio-economic conditions of the locations were also noted and documented.

#### **5.8.4 Preparation for Data Collection**

In preparation for the interview, the researcher developed interview guides and the informed consent form for each group of the participants. The interview guide listed the issues to be explored during the interviews. It also helped the interviewer to remain focused on the on the objective and maintain consistency across interviews with different respondents (Guion 2011). Given that cultural immersion is a criterion for an Afrocentric study, the researcher had spent time in learning more about the cultural and historical setting of the case studies; even though the researcher was very familiar with the Yoruba culture. It also needs to be mentioned that the researcher is Yoruba and from Osun State, South Western Nigeria. Being born and bred from the same part of the country, it can be said that the researcher is immersed in the culture. The researcher also contacted the participants to inform them about the proposed study and to let them know they were senior partners in the research as suggested by Mkabela (2005).

The purpose of the interview, the criteria for inclusion in the participation and the expected duration of the study were explained to them. They were also informed about the use of a recording device and the confidentiality of all responses. According to Holloway and Wheeler (2010:95), tape-recording is the best form of recording an interview because tapes would contain the exact responses of the respondents, as well as, the questions asked during the interview, therefore researchers cannot lose any vital information. Finally, the researcher sought informed consent from the participants ~~and for those that consented~~. An appointment was scheduled for the actual research interview.

#### **5.8.5 Role of the Researcher and Interviewing skills**

During the study, the researcher followed Mkabela's (2005:184) suggestions on using Afrocentric methods, as well as, interview skills laid out in Guion et al (2011). All the ethics of the study and the behaviour of the researcher were culturally defined. The researcher ensured that traditional rulers and elders were addressed in manners acceptable in the Yoruba culture and the centrality of Yoruba culture was the starting point of all discussions. During the interview, the researcher's role was to ask questions that motivated the respondents to give precise responses. The researcher maintained openness during each interview and the respondents were allowed to

speak freely and at their own pace. The researcher also avoided bias or culturally unethical behaviour that could disturb the harmony and balance existing in the communities.

#### **5.8.6 Profile of Interview Participants**

One Oba (king), eight traditional leaders/chiefs, three educated elites, two political office holders, two senior local government staff and 8 members of indigenous trade associations participated in the in-depth interview and focus group interview phase of the study. Although the researcher planned a one-on-one interview with the traditional leaders, she opted for the focus group interview method given the increase in the number of traditional leaders available for the study. There were a total of nine traditional leaders which included the chiefs and the Oba. The study also had another focus group interview comprising of eight leaders of indigenous trade associations. Individual in-depth interviews were held with the rest of the participants, namely three educated elites, two political office holders and two senior local government staff.

All the participants (100 per cent) have formal education. 75 per cent of the respondents have tertiary education qualifications, while 21 per cent have secondary school education. The high educational qualifications of most of the participants, including the elders, confirm Southwestern Nigeria's early exposure to and embrace of western education. According to Olajutemu (2013:4), the explosion of Christian missionary activities in Southern Nigeria led to the fast educational development in the region; compared to the North. As at 1914, the South had 37,500 primary schools and 11 secondary schools; while only 1,100 primary schools existed in the North (Csapo 1981). During this study, the male participants were 79 per cent of the total participants while the females were 21 per cent. The reason for the higher number of males was because many of the participants are traditional leaders and in Yoruba land, there are generally more men in traditional leadership positions than women. This does not mean that the Yoruba are biased against women. According to Odeyemi (2013:4), although among the Yoruba, many men are at the top of the societal ladder, Yoruba culture does not regard women as inferior to men and does not discriminate against their participation in public decision-making. Among the Yoruba, many women have been known to hold some of the highest traditional political positions, including being the King (Awofeso and Odeyemi 2014:1045). The researcher also confirms that there

were many women traditional leaders in the study locations. However, only a few were available to participate in the study. In terms of age, all the participants were adults and all the traditional leaders in the study were above 70 years.

The profiles of the study participants are presented in Table 5.1, 5.2, 5.3, 5.4 and 5.5. For confidentiality, the names of the participants will not be mentioned. Instead, TL will be used to represent the traditional leaders, TAL represents Trade Association leaders, EE represents Educated Elites, POH represents the political office holders, and LGS represents the Local Government Staff



**Table 5.1 Traditional Leaders' Profile**

<b>Name of Participant</b>	<b>Age range of Participant</b>	<b>Educational Qualification</b>	<b>Gender</b>	<b>Town</b>
TL1	70-75	Tertiary	Male	Ipetumodu
TL2	110-115	Primary	Female	Ipetumodu
TL3	75-80	Tertiary	Male	Ikire
TL4	70-75	Tertiary	Female	Ikire
TL5	80-85	Tertiary	Male	Ikire
TL6	80-85	Tertiary	Male	Ikire
TL7	85-90	Tertiary	Male	Iwo
TL8	70-75	Tertiary	Male	Iwo
TL9	75-80	Tertiary	Male	Iwo

**Table 5.2 Trade Association Leaders' Profile**

<b>Name of Participant</b>	<b>Age range of Participant</b>	<b>Educational qualification</b>	<b>Gender</b>	<b>Town</b>
TAL1	40-45	Tertiary	Male	Ikire
TAL2	55-60	Secondary	Male	Ikire
TAL3	45-50	Secondary	Female	Ikire
TAL4	55-60	Tertiary	Female	Ikire
TAL5	40-45	Tertiary	Male	Ikire
TAL6	60-65	Secondary	Male	Ikire
TAL7	60-65	Secondary	Male	Ikire
TAL8	50-55	Secondary	Female	Ikire

**Table 5.3 Educated Elites' Profile**

<b>Name of Participant</b>	<b>Age range of Participant</b>	<b>Educational Qualification</b>	<b>Gender</b>	<b>Town</b>
EE1	55-60	Tertiary	MALE	Ikire
EE2	55-60	Tertiary	MALE	Ipetumodu
EE3	70-75	Tertiary	MALE	Iwo

**Table 5.4 Political Office holders' profile**

<b>Name of Participant</b>	<b>Age range of Participant</b>	<b>Educational qualification</b>	<b>Gender</b>	<b>Town</b>
POH1	35-40	Tertiary	MALE	Oshogbo, Osun State Capital
POH2	45-50	Tertiary	MALE	Oshogbo, Osun state Capital

## 5.5 Local Government Staff's Profile

Name of Participant	Age range of Participant	Educational Qualification	Gender	Town
LG1	45-50	Tertiary	MALE	Ipetumodu
LG2	45-50	Tertiary	MALE	Iwo

## 5.9 Quantitative Data

### 5.9.1 Questionnaire Method

A questionnaire is a set of specific questions that are constructed and used by the researcher in obtaining information from the respondents (Asika 2004). It is a convenient and cost-effective way of gathering information especially when the sample size is large. The questionnaire also enables vital information, which cannot be obtained from written records to be at the disposal of the researcher. This is because, in a questionnaire, the respondent's anonymity is assured (Goel 1988). There are usually three types of questionnaires namely: closed-ended questionnaires, open-ended questionnaires and a mixture of closed-ended and open-ended questionnaires. The closed-ended questionnaires mainly give numerical data and can be easily analysed. The open-ended questionnaires, however, give text information. They can give deeper insight but it is difficult to compare responses. Combining both closed-ended and open-ended questions in the same questionnaire is better, as it maximizes the strength in both (Zohrabi 2013:255)

The questionnaire employed in this study was a combination of closed-ended and open-ended questions. The open-ended questions were included to allow the respondents to give their own interpretation of the problem without prompting. It also allowed respondents to explain the reasons for their choice of answers in the closed-ended questions. For the administration of the questionnaire, the researcher was assisted by four field workers who were undergraduates at one of the higher institutions of learning in Osun State. The field workers are also Yoruba speakers and

natives of Osun State. The field workers were trained on how to administer the questionnaire over a period of three days. The questionnaires were also interpreted in the Yoruba language so that respondents could participate freely in their local language.

The overall objective of the questionnaire was to collect information on the views of local people on key socio-economic development issues that form their expectation of governance, as well as, their perception of governance performance. Each of the questionnaires was accompanied by a cover letter, introducing the theme and objectives of the study. The cover letter also assured respondents of confidentiality. The questionnaire has four sections namely:

### **Section 1: General Information (1.1-1.8)**

This was meant to capture the background information of the respondents, such as age, sex, occupation, level of education and level others

### **Section 2: Problem Analysis (2.1-2.5)**

This section aimed to find the most pertinent development problems the citizens were facing and which institutions (whether modern or indigenous) have been solving them. It also aimed to find out the qualities of good governance from the perspective of the citizens. These were open-ended questions, which allowed the respondents to give their own interpretation of the problem without prompting. For example, respondents were asked to state (in no order of priority), four (4) most important problems in their areas, who they believed should solve these problems and how residents have been solving them? In the same section, respondents were asked to select, in order of priority, seven out of twenty-four (24) issues, which would most improve their standard of living. This was to find out the issues the citizens considered most important, if prioritized as a development agenda, would translate into better lives. The section also asked respondents if the standard of living had improved or worsened in the era of good governance. This was a closed-ended question with multiple choice answers.

### **Section 3: Perception on Institutional Performance (3.1-3.7)**

This section aimed to find out the perception of citizens about the performance of the government, the control of corruption, the availability and quality of public services and the effectiveness of governance reforms. These were closed-ended questions with multiple choice answers.

## **Section 4: Citizens' participation (4.1-4.6)**

This aimed to find out if there are channels available to citizens to draw the attention of the government to their problems. It also found out the participation of citizens in government through voting. This was a closed-ended set of questions with 'Yes' or 'No' answers.

### **5.9.2 Pilot Study**

During the training of the field workers, a pilot study was conducted with 10 respondents in Ikire. The respondents were a convenience sample and not representative of the population. The aim of the pilot study was mainly to assess how clear the questionnaire was to the respondents and also to allow the field workers to gain experience. From the pilot study, the researcher discovered that a few questions appeared confusing to the respondents. This feedback was used to improve the format of the questions. Specifically, all the confusing questions were removed to arrive at the final questionnaire. The responses from the pilot survey were not included in the findings or, in the analyses of the data.

### **5.10 Data Analysis**

In this study, the researcher analysed the qualitative data first. The data was analysed using the coding process where themes and categories were generated from transcribed interview information, as suggested by Creswell (2002:22, 2014). Specifically, the information from the interviews and focus group discussions were transcribed from tape and translated to the English language. After reading through and making a general sense of what the participants said, the researcher categorized the written data according to similarity and labelled each category with a term. This is called coding. The coding process was used to generate themes and also show the connection between them. The analysis of the responses of the participants to the interview questions resulted in five major themes, seven sub themes, twenty categories and twenty sub categories. Most importantly, the researcher used written texts and rich narratives to describe the findings, utilizing the participants' illustrative and multiple perspectives. The findings were then interpreted and discussed from the Afrocentric perspective. In the discussion, the findings were compared with earlier arguments made in this study, as well as, findings and arguments made by other

scholars in similar studies. The findings were also compared, expanded and triangulated with the findings from quantitative data analysis.

For the quantitative data analysis, the Microsoft Excel programme was used to analyse the information collected from the questionnaire survey. The researcher created codes for each of the questions. Some of the written data was also quantified for easy capturing and analysis. Microsoft Excel was then used to capture and analyse the data. The researcher chose the Microsoft Excel programme because she is versatile in its use. The results were summarized using descriptive statistical techniques such as, total score, ratio, and simple percentage. Charts and tables were used to describe the finding. Most importantly, the findings of the survey were expanded and triangulated with the qualitative data findings to draw the study conclusion.

### **5.11 Reliability and Validity**

Throughout the study, the researcher was very conscious of the quality of the research and therefore took important steps to ensure the validity of the study. Reliability and validity are actually tests used mainly in quantitative research. Applying reliability and validity tests to qualitative research the same way it is applied to quantitative research will be problematic and possibly counter-intuitive. Lincoln and Guba (1985) suggest that the 'trustworthiness' of a qualitative research is more appropriate to evaluate its worth. Trustworthiness involves establishing the credibility, confirmability, dependability, and transferability of the research (Lincoln and Guba 1985:300). Although by using mixed methods of data collection, this study is largely qualitative. Therefore, it applies the trustworthiness criteria to establish the validity of the research.

The credibility criteria can be described as the extent to which qualitative research outcomes are believable, from the perspective of the participants. Lincoln and Guba (1985:314) suggested that member checking of the research findings is an important tool for establishing credibility. This study adopted an Afrocentric collective approach which made the indigenous people senior partners of the research. To enhance the validity of this research, the participants were given feedback on the research findings. The researcher is also conscious that the participants will have access to the final research report which shall be made public and has taken efforts to ensure that the report only reflects the viewpoints of the participants.

Transferability is defined as the extent to which the outcome of a qualitative research can be generalized or applied in other contexts. Transferability in qualitative studies can be challenging, given that interpretive studies are context-specific and reality is always interpreted with subjectivity. Lincoln and Guba (1985) suggest that the use of detailed descriptions of the research context can enhance the transferability of qualitative research. To ensure the transferability of this study, the researcher provided a full description of Nigeria's socio-political setting, as well as, the description of the study locations, namely Iwo, Ikire and Ipetumodu towns in Chapter One (Section 1.9). Moreover, the details of the paradigm, the research design, and data collection methods have been fully described in this chapter. With the context of this study fully declared, one can judge the applicability of the findings of this study in other settings.

Dependability is an effort to establish the consistency and repeatability of a research so that if another researcher were to analyse the same data, the same results and conclusions would be drawn. However, achieving such consistency is challenging in qualitative studies because the interpretation people give to phenomenon changes with circumstances. Merriam (1998) and Creswell (2003) propose that qualitative researchers can establish dependability of their studies through methods such as, triangulation, member checks, and peer examination.

To establish dependability the researcher used triangulation by examining evidence from various sources, including in-depth interviews, surveys, focus groups, and observation. She also adopted member-checking in which participants' comments on the findings were incorporated in the conclusion. She also adopted peer debriefing in which other experienced researchers reviewed and commented on the study.

Confirmability can be defined as the extent to which research outcomes can be confirmed or corroborated by others. One method of establishing confirmability is through data audit in which another researcher examines the procedures of data collection and data analysis to assess possible bias or distortion. The researcher ensured that all collected materials were well-organized and archived so that they could be made available for audit whenever the research is challenged.

The researcher also took steps to enhance the quality of the quantitative elements of the study. Although the purpose of including the quantitative research design is not to generalize but to complement the qualitative findings, nevertheless, the use of



probability sampling method in this study reduces biases and enhances the quality of the study. Moreover, before drafting the questionnaire, the researcher carried out extensive research on governance, development and poverty reduction, as well as, their dimensions and assessment especially in relation to Nigeria. Furthermore, the questionnaire was also circulated to experts in the areas of governance and international development for their input, useful criticism and correction.

### **5.12 Ethical Consideration**

Ethical issues such as informed consent, confidentiality, and consequences for the participants were taken into account. For example, the purpose of the research was articulated to all the participants both verbally and in writing. The researcher ensured that participation in the study was also voluntary and only adult citizens were included. The researcher also sought and got written informed consent from the participants by using an informed consent form. Permission was obtained from the participants to record interviews and focus group discussions. Confidentiality was also assured as none of their names would be made public. The researcher ensured that no aspect of the report poses any harm to the participants, the study community and various institutions studied.

### **Conclusion**

This chapter describes the methodology adopted in this research. The application of mixed methods approach allows for the collection of comprehensive information. The researcher also followed suggested Afrocentric research principles, as stated in Mkabela (2005). The researcher immersed herself in the Yoruba culture and ensured that the definition, interpretation, and experience of the participants predominated. The researcher was very conscious of the quality of the research and therefore took important steps to ensure the validity of the study. The presentation and the discussion of the findings are laid out in the next chapter.

## CHAPTER SIX

### 6.0 PRESENTATION AND ANALYSIS OF FINDINGS

#### 6.1 Introduction

This chapter presents the findings which emerged from this study. As stated in the previous chapter, the study adopted both the qualitative and quantitative methods of data collection and analysis. The findings of the in-depth interviews and focus group interviews are presented and discussed first, followed by the findings and discussion of the questionnaire survey data. The findings relate to the research questions and the objectives of the study. This study used an Afrocentric perspective to understand the issue of good governance as a strategy for poverty reduction and development in Nigeria, especially in South Western Nigeria, using three communities in Osun State as study locations. The argument of this study is that good governance could be best defined by the citizens based on their experience, priorities and culture. Specifically, understanding the citizens' conceptualization of good governance should be the starting point to developing a context-specific good governance framework; as against the universal good governance agenda sponsored in developing countries by international donors. Moreover, the strategies of an indigenous good governance system offer a possible cultural and context-specific approach to achieving good governance in Nigeria. This is because of the effectiveness and resilience of the traditional governance institutions in supporting the welfare of rural communities in the face of the failure of modern governance.

These arguments informed the study objectives and the type of questions asked by the researcher while on the field. The main research question of the study was:

- What are the main issues at the local level and the strategies of good traditional governance that a context-specific governance model should consider so as to promote development in Southwest Nigeria?

Based on this research question, the research objectives were:

- Critique and evaluate the discourse of good governance and its limitations as a means of addressing development challenges in the African context and in Nigeria.
- Establish local citizens' conceptualization of the term 'good governance'.

- Identify key issues at the local level important for a better performance of governance and the achievement of development in Southwest Nigeria,
- Assess people's perception of the new democratic governance in Southwest Nigeria.
- Understand the principles of good indigenous governance that guarantee responsiveness, accountability, participation, and transparency, as well as ensure welfare improvement in Southwest Nigeria.
- Develop a context-specific good governance model that reflects the traditions and aspirations of local people in Southwest Nigeria.

## **6.2 Presentation of the Qualitative findings**

The questions focused on the participants' conceptualization of good governance, their assessment of the performance of the new democratic governance, factors preventing good governance in Nigeria and the principles, which ensure the effective performance of indigenous governance systems in Southwest Nigeria. Several themes, sub-themes and categories emerged which have been used to produce a structure highlighting converging ideas. The findings are presented under the following five themes.

1. Conceptualization of good and bad governance
2. Perception of governance performance since 2010
3. Issues affecting good governance in Nigeria
4. Perception of the effectiveness of indigenous governance systems
5. The strategies for achieving good traditional governance in Southwest Nigeria.

For confidentiality, the names of the participants will not be mentioned. Instead, TL will be used to represent the traditional leaders, TAL represents Trade Association leaders, EE represents Educated Elites, POH represents the political office holders, and LGS represents the Local Government Staff.

The Table 6.1 below shows the themes, sub-themes, categories and sub-categories emerging from the process of data analysis. The analysis of the responses of the participants to the various interview questions resulted in five major themes, seven themes, 20 categories and 20 sub categories which are shown in table 6.6 below. Each of these divisions is discussed in comparison with the literature.



**Table 6.1 Emerging Themes, Subthemes, Categories and sub-categories from Data Analysis**

THEMES AND SUBTHEMES	CATEGORIES	SUB CATEGORIES
<p><b>1. Conceptualization of Good and Bad Governance</b></p> <p>1.1 Good Governance meaning</p> <p>1.2 Bad Governance meaning</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Welfare improvement</li> <li>• Meeting Western Standard of Governance</li> <li>• Welfare Deterioration, Economic hardship and Poor Infrastructure</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ Availability of basic needs and infrastructure</li> <li>○ Empathy for citizens' pain is primary, anti-corruption is not good governance</li> </ul>
<p><b>2. Assessments of Democratic Governance since 2010</b></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Welfare decline due to lack of income and the poor state of infrastructure</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ Militaristic democracy</li> <li>○ Patronage politics and imposition of Candidate that Knows Little About the Locality</li> <li>○ Persistent corruption</li> </ul>

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Political Corruption</li>   <li>• Non-targeted projects due to poor consultation</li>   <li>• Moderate socioeconomic improvement constrained by resources</li> </ul>	
<p><b>3. Issues Affecting Good Governance in Nigeria</b></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Problematic political structure</li>   <li>• Loss of cultural sense of values</li>   <li>• Limited public resources compared to the increasing Nigerian population and wide development gap</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ Excessive Monetization of political positions</li>   <li>○ Poor federal structure</li>   <li>○ Loss of Omoluwabi</li>   <li>○ The removal of culture (especially traditional oath taking) from modern governance</li> </ul>

<p><b>4. Perceptions of Effectiveness of indigenous governance systems</b></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Indigenous governance systems have attributes that enable its effectiveness</li> <li>• The Yoruba Traditional Socio-Political System is founded on traditional religion and culture</li> <li>• Responses to the Criticisms against Yoruba Culture</li> </ul>	
<p><b>5. Strategies for Achieving Good traditional Governance in Yoruba land</b></p> <p>5.1 Participation and Responsiveness</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Cultural Democracy</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ Decentralization and representativeness to family level</li> <li>○ Cultural legitimacy</li> <li>○ Regular consultation meetings</li> <li>○ No monetary Incentives for representatives</li> <li>○ Local People have power over representatives</li> <li>○ Selection Based on good character</li> </ul>

<p>5.2 Accountability and Prevention of Abuse of Power</p> <p>5.3 Dispute settlement</p> <p>5.4 Infrastructure Development</p> <p>5.5 Poverty reduction</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Traditional Checks and balances</li> <li>• Multilevel process and deep inquiry</li> <li>• Truth and obedience compelled by culture</li> <li>• Communal work mobilized by Leadership</li> <li>• Equitable access to resources</li> <li>• No encouragement of Laziness</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ No concentration of power</li> <li>○ Leadership training</li> <li>○ Corrective measures</li> <li>○ Cultural Provision for deposition</li> </ul>
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## **6.2.1 Theme one: Participants' Conceptualization of Good and Bad Governance**

In this study, participants' definition of good and bad governance gave rise to three categories and five sub-categories which are discussed below:

### **6.2.1.1 Sub theme one: Good Governance meaning**

Two categories of meaning actually emerged from the responses. The first is good governance as welfare improvement, while the second definition followed the standard definitions of the international agencies.

#### **6.2.1.1.1 Good Governance is Welfare Improvement**

##### **(a) Availability of Means to Satisfy the Basic Needs And Provision of Social Infrastructure**

All (100 per cent) the participants defined good governance in terms of welfare improvement and emphasis was laid on the availability of the means to satisfy basic needs such as, food, shelter, security and the provision of basic infrastructure. According to the participants, if food is available at affordable prices and there are basic infrastructure such as good roads, good health facilities, water, electricity, and good educational systems, then it is a good governance system. Awolowo's rule of the old Western Region (1952-1959) was regarded as a yardstick of good governance.

For example, one of the traditional leaders, TL6 said *"good governance is when there is easy food access, and there is peace. A good governance address (sic) societal needs such as roads, water, and health care. Awolowo's governance is an example. Before, it was the missionaries like Catholic and Anglican churches that provided education. But when Awolowo came, he established free education in all villages. Modern roads were constructed and we were able to move agricultural produce like cocoa, palm oil and kolanut to the market and turn them into money instead of those things spoiling in the farm"*.

EE2 also stated *"good governance is the government that takes care of the welfare of the people, provide social amenities that are useful for the people. For example, a community like Ipetimodu here, no good road, no pipe borne water, no post office, for 3 months there may not be electricity. If the government can provide these basic amenities, then it is good"*.

According to EE3, *“good governance should provide food, shelter and security for the people. Good governance is about social amenities such as, roads, water and electricity. When these are well provided, there will be peace in the country. Food is particularly important; I went to the university because of food. That time food is almost free and they will give you lots of meats. But how many people can afford a good meal in Nigeria again?”*

**(b) Empathy for Citizens’ Pain is Primary, Anticorruption Rhetoric does not translate to development or Good Governance**

It is interesting to note that, about 60 per cent of the participants particularly mentioned that the anti-corruption campaigns of the Nigerian government are mere rhetoric that contributes nothing to development. They said good governance should prioritize listening to and showing empathy for the citizens’ pain and welfare needs. However, the impact of the anti-corruption rhetoric is never felt and should be made secondary.

TL4 said: *“Good governance is about having listening ears and showing empathy for the citizens’ pain and welfare needs. ‘Kapemini’ meaning, “if I were in their position”. Only then can the government make welfare improvement a priority and a thing of urgency. Loud anti-corruption talks are mere distractions”.*

For example, EE1 stated that *“Government’s propaganda about corruption, for example, does not have any benefits for the masses; it is a game for those at the top. How many have been prosecuted so far for corruption? Even when government claims they recover some looted funds, they are never accountable for it”. The valuable resources spent on anti-corruption rhetoric should be used to provide food and infrastructure for the masses, that is good governance”*

**6.2.1.1.2 Good Governance is meeting Western Standards of Governance**

Only one participant, or 4 per cent of the respondents, defined good governance by international standards. The respondent, POH2 is a lawyer and a Political Scientist by profession and he defined good governance as having the following characteristics: accountable, transparent, rule of law, responsive, equitable, inclusive, consensus, participatory, vision and efficiency.

According to POH2: *“I am a Political Scientist and I will answer with the knowledge of Political Science. Good governance is accountable to the people, and one of the*

*reasons why we have periodic elections is for the people we have the elected to give account. Secondly, good governance must be transparent. That means people should be able to look at what government is doing... good governance must follow the rule of law, that means the government must not flout court orders or tamper with the civil rights. Good governance must be responsive whenever the people make a demand. Good governance must be equitable and inclusive. If for example in Nigeria, the president is appointing ministers, and out of 40, 33 of them are Hausa Fulani, that is not equitable, that is not inclusive. Good governance must be participatory. The people should be able to have an input into the day-to-day administration. Then there is what we call consensus. Where there is a disagreement; it must be resolved in a way that will benefit the public. Good governance must have a vision, what do I intend to achieve in the next four years that vote me into power. Good governance must be efficient, it must be effective..."*

POH2, however, said that his definition above is the standard; far from reality in Nigeria. But he also agreed with other participants that at the minimum, the government should guarantee welfare. According to POH2 *"I have given you what is standard, now what is the reality? The reality on the ground is that the Nigerian government lacks most of these standard attributes of good governance... but no matter what, every government must ensure the security of property and the welfare of the people. A government that cannot guarantee the welfare of its people has failed"*.

### **6.2.1.2 Sub Theme Two: Bad Governance Meaning**

The only category that emerges under this sub-theme conceptualizes bad governance as, welfare deterioration and economic hardship.

#### **6.2.1.2.1 Bad Governance is Welfare Deterioration, Economic hardship and Poor Infrastructure**

When the participants were asked to define bad governance, the general response was that it is mainly evident in welfare deterioration, economic hardship and poor infrastructure.

According to EE1 *"A government that is bad is just the opposite of a good one. In the last 5 years, a gallon of palm oil is now sold for N22,000 from N5,000, what kind of*

*thing is that? If a government cannot provide food, shelter and security, then the government is too bad to reckon with”.*

According to EE3, *“Bad governance is the one that refuses to provide roads, health care, water and other infrastructure necessary for good welfare, or those cajoling people that they are doing it for politics’ sake and are not doing it. No production of rice in Nigeria yet the government banned rice; making food items very expensive now. That is bad!”*

TL4 particularly stated, *“Bad governance is when people can no longer feed themselves. When there is increased death, sickness, armed robbers and those in power are doing nothing about it. That is bad governance”.*

### **6.2.1.3 Discussion of Theme One**

The study clearly shows that the local people in South West Nigeria mainly defined good governance as welfare improvement. That is, the Government’s ability to provide the means to satisfy basic needs such as, food and shelter, as well as, the ability to provide welfare enhancing infrastructure such as, good roads, healthcare, quality education and electricity. The study shows that 96 per cent of the participants did not classify issues, such as, regular elections, checks and balances, anti-corruption campaigns or even the rule of law as primary attributes of good governance; even though they were not against these governance features. Given the high level of education of the participants, it will be incorrect to conclude that they do not understand the impact of elections, transparency, accountability and anti-corruption in ensuring that public resources are used for the benefit of the citizens. However, from the related findings of this study, it can be seen that citizens have actually lost faith in the processes of democratic governance such as, elections, public reforms and the anti-corruption campaigns. These processes are perceived as corrupt and functioning to serve the interests of the political class and of no benefit to the poor masses.

These findings mean participants would rather define good governance by what the government does, rather than how it does it. The responses also emphasized the high level of hardship and poverty in Nigeria, where the immediate desire to have poverty reduced has made citizens disregard how these problems are solved, they just want the basic needs met as a matter of urgency. Put differently, the hardship of poverty in Nigeria has reached a state of emergency, demanding urgent attention of the

international community to provide relief. Only after the basic need for survival of the citizens is met, will the technical issues of governance will matter. The study shows that citizens are primarily concerned about the capacity of the government to improve their welfare, while the methods used to achieve this are perceived as secondary. Given the current level of the economic hardship of the people, if a government can ensure that basic needs can easily be met and basic infrastructure are provided, that government is good enough.

This simple definition of good governance by local people contradicts the broad definitions of governance found in literature on the topic. It should be noted that although everyone agrees that good governance matters, the concept suffers a definitional problem (Hyden and Court 2002; Punyaratabandhu 2004; and Gisselquist 2012). The meaning attached to good governance may largely be a function of the intents and purposes the analysts or the course donors wish to promote. Scholarly literature has however been pervaded by donors' definition of the concept. The key components of the definition of good governance by donors include legitimacy, accountability, transparency, the rule of law, equity, competence, consensus-oriented, effectiveness and control of corruption (Gisselquist 2012, Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi, 2010). For example, good governance is defined by the World Bank as, a system "epitomized by predictable, open and enlightened policy making; a bureaucracy imbued with a professional ethos; an executive arm of government accountable for its actions; a strong civil society participating in public affairs; and all behaving under the rule of law" (World Bank 1994: vii).

While people's narrow or simple definition of good governance is based on their experience, current hardships and political reality, arguably donors' elaborate definition of good governance is based on western institutional experience, economic advancement and political reality. Scholars like Hyden and Court (2002:12), Avellaneda (2006:7) and Grindle (2010) have also argued that the donors' conceptualization of good governance is too broad and fails to make distinctions that are important for the assessment of governance and for the achievement of poverty reduction. It means these scholars agree that not all the acclaimed principles of good governance are important for poverty reduction and development. Enormous resources are required to achieve all the donors' specifications for good governance. If the motive for promoting good governance in poor countries, like Nigeria, is to

achieve development, then what should be paramount is the minimum characteristics of good governance sufficient to achieve that purpose. This is what Fritz (2007) and Grindle (2004, 2010) call 'Good Enough Governance'; even though these authors do not itemize the minimum characteristics of the 'good enough governance'.

Despite these criticisms, the donors' broad and complex specification of good governance is taken as universal and has continued to dictate the complex good governance packages promoted and imposed on poor countries, including Nigeria (Punyaratabandhu 2004:2). The challenge of adopting a very broad or inappropriate conceptualization of good governance is that it will also lead to a very broad or unsuitable operationalization of good governance interventions, which may never lead to the achievement of poverty reduction and development in poor countries. For example, Grindle (2004:526) found that the World Bank good governance agenda is beyond the capacities of most countries and it gives no attention to the priorities, sequences or historical experience of the countries. In other words, the current good governance definition and operationalization lack context-specificity and does not include the development priorities of the local people it aims to benefit. By excluding the voice and perspectives of local people in the conceptualization of good governance, the donors' good governance agenda particularly leaves no room for indigenous solutions, which may as well provide fast and optimal alternative strategies to achieve development.

As argued by Brohman (1995:121), a Western epistemological hegemony which universalizes European interpretation and experiences on others, has continuously led to the distortion of actual development experiences of other people. This study has also argued that in order to achieve development or good governance, there can never be a universal theory or definition valid across all cultures and for all types of people. The theoretical stand of this study (Afrocentricity), is to liberate African countries from Western epistemological hegemony and to resuscitate the African experiences as the appropriate means of understanding African phenomena, whether economic or political. Putting the interest, welfare and development of local people at the centre of any development intervention necessarily requires that their perspectives on the matter predominate. Excluding the voices of the people in the conceptualization of good governance may as well explain why over two decades of good governance reforms have not led to welfare improvement. Nigeria met many of the donors' good

governance specifications because the country now has the donors' recommended framework for participation, rule of law, accountability and transparency such as, periodic elections, Constitution, and an anti-corruption agency. But in reality, poverty continues while corruption is unabated in Nigeria. This study shows that local people will consider government as bad if economic hardship and poor infrastructure persist regardless of the adoption of western institutional standards.

In contrast to popular definitions of good governance in literature, for example, meeting up with some Western institutional standards, this study earlier defined good governance as a governance system which steers the society towards the achievement of societal goals and one which improves the welfare of its citizens (section 2.5.1). This proposed definition of good governance is in line with the findings of the study which show that the local citizens in our case studies define good governance simply as, governance that guarantees welfare improvement. Analysing the good governance agenda vis-a-vis the expectations of the local people, it is evident that the local people's conceptualization of good governance contradicts the donor's conceptualization of good governance and this contradiction has implication on the ability of the donors/Western governance intervention to be able to lead to results that positively impact on the lives of local people.

The simple or narrow conceptualization of good governance by local people in Southwest Nigeria also confirms that good governance is relative and highly dependent on the level of income of individuals and societal development. In environments where poverty predominates, citizens' governance priorities will be on survival issues like getting an income, employment and basic amenities and they will be less concerned with issues such as rule of law, human rights, gender equality or elections. These findings also confirm the argument of Chang (2011:476) that it is the increased wealth and comfort of citizens that create demands for higher quality institutions such as, demands for political institutions with greater transparency and accountability. Veenhoven (2000) also found that economic freedom, through employment provision and increased income, and welfare improvement are more important development interventions for poor countries, than governance interventions are to them, political freedom has more effect in richer countries than in poorer countries. Unfortunately, by not using peoples' definition of good governance, development efforts mainly focus on the donors' good governance reforms (including

electoral reforms, anti-corruption, deregulation and privatization policies), shifting focus, efforts, and resources away from providing public services which have direct and immediate impact on citizens' welfare (Rocha Menocal 2013 in Bergh et al 2014).

These findings also show that when public investment in elections and anti-corruption campaigns yield no visible results, citizens lose faith and hope in it altogether. For example, 71 per cent of the interview participants mentioned that they do not appreciate government anti-corruption efforts since such efforts have not alleviated their current economic hardships. These findings are also corroborated by the quantitative findings where participants' selection of 'most important issues that must be attended to by the government to improve their welfare' included issues such as employment, electricity, good roads, healthcare, education and water as citizens' priorities. The donors' good governance imperative like, corruption control, transparency, as well as, free and fair elections never came up among the first seven development priorities of the participants. However, this result does not mean that citizens do not consider accountability and elections important for governance. It only shows that the participants no longer believe in the approach or governance reforms adopted to achieve it. Given their inability to effect change in a western controlled governance strategy, poor citizens can only cry for the provision of basic amenities necessary for their survival.

In conclusion, good governance cannot have a universal definition. The conceptualization of good governance and the institutional arrangement or governance framework that will work to the benefit of citizens needs to be based on the understanding of the local people, their level of development, their history, culture and experience. This study has been able to understand good governance from the local people's perspectives, which is a first necessary step towards developing a context-specific good governance model

## **6.2.2 Theme two: Participants Assessment of Democratic Governance since 2010**

Participants were asked to assess the performance of the democratic governance since 2010. The date 2010 was chosen because in the first decade of democracy, many of the governance reforms were just being inaugurated and it should be expected that there would be some gaps in their impact. Besides, in Osun State where



the study was conducted, the current administration took over the government in 2010. Participants' assessment is divided into four categories and three sub-categories. The first three categories of responses assessed Nigerian democracy to be pervaded with welfare decline, political corruption and investment in development projects that are not targeted to meet the priority needs of the citizens. The last category of responses showed that democracy has yielded some moderate dividends; just that progress has been curtailed by a lack of resources. The responses are presented below.

#### **6.2.2.1 Welfare Decline Due to Lack of Income and Poor State of Infrastructures**

Almost all the participants (92 per cent) assessed Nigeria's democratic governance in terms of its contribution to their welfare. Most of them complained that democratic governance has not improved their well-being because life is harder now than it was ten years ago. Participants complained of the high cost of goods especially food, lack of income and the poor state of social infrastructure.

According to TL5 *"During the administration of Governor Oyinlola, everything was good and we can feed ourselves. But now they claim they are giving us free education, yet everything is scattered. Those earning N20 then cannot earn N5. It shows that governance then is better than now"*.

EE2 also stated *"The difference is clear because things were better 2010 than now. Many civil servants could build houses and buy cars then. Things are so expensive and unaffordable now, there is unemployment and poverty and government doesn't care. In Nigeria, government doesn't believe in welfare improving projects or creating industries."*

Similarly EE1 *"there is no development in Nigeria. In this town, for example, the roads are very bad; the electricity comes once in a while and there is no pipe-borne water. Government provides free health services yet there is no single Panadol in the clinic. We are operating free education with no provision for instructional materials and there are no teachers for many of the subjects. We cannot call that good governance. Democratic governance in Nigeria is good governance in theory and not in practice"*.

### **6.2.2.2 Political Corruption**

The issues raised in relation to this category are classified into three subcategories, namely, militarized democracy, patronage politics and impositions of political candidates, as well as, persistent corruption. The details are below:

#### **(a) Militaristic Democracy**

A total of 15 participants (62 per cent) complained that the approach to governing by many of the elected leaders is not too different from the military rulers because they distance themselves from the electorate. Moreover, many of the political leaders and political patrons are ex-military men. The change to democracy has not been able to change the individuals ruling Nigeria or their ruling style.

According to EE1, *“the military has been in power since 1966 up till today and that is why there is no serious development despite the change in the system of government. Obasanjo, Buhari, Babangida, they have been in power since the military rule and they are still in power in the democratic government. Obasanjo is still alive and he is the king maker whatever he says stays. One problem in Nigeria is these old folks, they will keep oppressing us. Nigeria cannot change with them remaining in power.”*

POH2 said *“You can’t find true democracy in Nigeria. Instead of leaders to see themselves as our servants, they see themselves as our master with full right to rule over us. They rule like the military. That is why there is no accountability, no checks and balances, no transparency.”*

TAL2 also complained *“Many of them in the political class, immediately they win the elections, are no longer approachable and they no longer care about the people that voted them in. I learnt that the elected councillors were told in one of their meetings in Osogbo that they needed to have about 10 sim cards so that if people are disturbing them with calls on one number they can easily switch to another. They were told they had just 4 years to gather their fortune from politics”.*

#### **(b) Patronage Politics and Imposition of Candidates that Know Little about the Locality**

80 per cent of the participants also complained that politics at local and regional levels are often controlled by some political godfathers who sponsor and rig elections for their candidates. Consequently, candidates presented by political parties are often

outsiders who were not familiar with the challenges suffered by community members. They complained that most of the political candidates presented by the political parties were from outside the locality, either from Lagos or abroad.

According to EE2, *“even at the local level, some rich and highly connected individuals have formed some sort of political kingdom and they act as the political godfather who controls the entire politics of the locality. Consequently, governance works to please them and not the people.”*

In the words of TAL7 *“in Nigeria, the masses cannot present the contestant from each party. The political class and the political godfathers do the primary elections among themselves and choose whoever will satisfy them. They can just present someone from somewhere like Lagos and tell us he is a native of Ikire and that we should vote for him”*

TL9 also had a similar comment, *“many of the political candidates given to us have never lived in our town before, some are from overseas. They make him an honourable member of the State House of Assembly, someone who doesn’t know what we are going through or suffering”.*

The researcher asked POH2 who is a lawyer and a Political Scientist if the Nigerian Constitution allows one to contest for elections outside his or her residential area. POH2 responded thus: *“There is a law which stipulates that before you can contest for elections, you must have resided in that place in the last 12 months. But the politicians don’t comply. Some of them, when they know they want to contest, will be visiting their hometown every weekend. Is that the definition of residence? Sometimes, it is the father that resides in the locality or even the political godfathers who help candidates rig or buy their way into power. And the accountability goes to the political godfather. What we have in Nigeria is neo-democracy. It is not truly representative”.*

### **(c) Persistent corruption**

A total of 23 participants (95 per cent) stated that they did not believe that democratic governance had reduced corrupt practices in the Nigerian government institutions despite implementation of several anti-corruption reforms.

EE2 says: *“the corruption situation is getting out of hand. If you are coming from Ibadan around 7 pm or very early in the morning, you’ll discover the police checkpoints on the road, don’t think that they are there for security, they are just collecting money from*

*motorists. Instead of being a watchdog, discouraging corruption, they are the ones getting corrupted...If you look at the budget, a large chunk of money is set aside for tenancy fee at Aso Rock, whom are they paying this fee to and who is collecting it? That is corruption. ...in state governments when projects are awarded, the cost is always triple or double the actual cost. They will inflate it because of selfish interests... The corruption is with us and will continue to be with us"*

TL6 also complained, *"They will promise to lend money to farmers, but it is the civil servants that will collect it. And instead of the beneficiaries to invest the loan in farming, they will use the money to buy a car. There are no infrastructure because the politicians who promised they will do it have embezzled the allocated money."*

### **6.2.2.3 Non-targeted projects Due to Lack of Consultation**

All (100 per cent) the participants agreed that the practice of consultation with the people had been lacking in the democratic governance era. And about 95 per cent of the participants complained that in many cases, government investments were not targeted towards citizens' pressing needs; rather, projects were implemented to please the ruling elites. In other words, there is no consultation and no participation of citizens when initiating and implementing projects.

According to LGS2: *"The problem of this country is that by the time the budget is being proposed, the government does not carry the masses, for whom we are providing, along. It is supposed to be a participatory budget, but government officials do what seems right to them"*.

TAL3 also said *"We see them on television commissioning projects that do not alleviate the suffering of the masses. No consultation whatsoever and they are unapproachable. How do you approach a political leader that is guarded by six security men?"*

How LGS2 who works in the Local Government Council says his office has a structure to identify local people's needs. Only that government at the state level always chooses not to work by the identified needs. He says *"I am a Community Development Officer. In this local government, we meet with community development associations every month. They bring their issues to the meeting, and we discuss the solutions, but the local government has no capability to resolve any of these problems; we must relate the problems to the state government. The state government controls the*

*resources both for the State and the local government and the politicians controlling government affairs at the state spend the money according to their own wishes and preferences and not according to the wishes of the people.”*

The political office holders who participated in the study also agreed that there has not been adequate consultation.

POH1 responded “...no consultation because the need gap in our time is pretty obvious...”

POH2 also said “... for some of the policies, especially the education policies of Osun state, it is agreeable that the government did not consult the stakeholders.” The result is...

#### **6.2.2.4 Socioeconomic Improvements Constrained by Resources**

However, only 2 participants (8 per cent) of the respondents believed that democratic governance in Nigeria, and in Osun state, has yielded some positive dividends; even though it may not be as much as the people desire. These participants explained that the main constraint to enjoying the dividends of democracy is lack of resources.

According to POH1 “*the return to democracy has not taken us to where we want to be but it has not left us where we used to be. There is an improvement but it will take time for things to fall in place. We know the dark days of this country, especially the havoc wrecked by the military. The current administration of Osun State inherited infrastructure that are in a terrible state, due to many years of neglect. Yet, the budget of Osun State for last year was about 115 billion naira which is less than 500 million dollars. If we look at our resources, compared to the large need gap, someone should not expect too much*”.

LGS2 also believed government performance has been dampened by the economic recession. “*The problem of economic recession is affecting government, because the government may have good intentions, but with no means to carry it out. The Federal government allocation to states in the South West is very low compared to oil producing states like Bayelsa State. Whenever Osun State collects allocation, and the salaries of civil servants are paid, nothing is left. So, there can't be development with lack of resources*”.

### **6.2.2.5 Discussion on Theme Two:**

The findings show that democratic governance has not been able to improve the local citizen's well-being because life is harder now than it was ten years ago due the high cost of goods especially food, lack of income and the poor state of social infrastructure. Moreover, instead of democracy bringing the government closer to the people and promoting participation and political freedom, the study shows that democracy only recycles the old military juntas in Nigeria. Consequently, the approaches of governing in the good governance era are militaristic and non-participatory. The study also shows that the Western style democracy is highly susceptible to *the* elites capturing and hijacking the system so that politics and governance are controlled by some political patrons who sponsor and rig elections for their candidates. This renders the power of the citizens' votes or elections to determine those that rule or represent them, useless. This also leads to the imposition of political candidates on citizens, transfer of elected leaders' accountability from the people to political patrons and poor consultation when initiating and implementing projects. In this kind of political setting, corruption will be inevitable while not much development can be achieved, especially with dwindling public revenue.

The findings mean that democratic reform, as a precondition for good governance, has not yielded its acclaimed theoretical benefits in Nigeria. These findings also mean that Nigeria's experience of Western style democracy contradicts the acclaimed benefits of democracy as stated in literature. Democratic governance is considered in literature a necessary component of good governance and is even synonymous with it (Ogundiya 2010:204). According to Frey and Al Roumi (1999), democracy can improve the quality of life through competitive elections and political participation. They argue that competitive elections make politicians accountable to citizens; while political participation helps in the identification of basic needs and improves the distribution of basic goods and services (ibid). Thus, democracy is expected to be a major antidote to poverty (UNDP 1998).

In contrast, the findings show that democracy and its good governance reforms have not been able to improve welfare or reduce poverty. The findings can be interpreted to mean that rather than emancipating and empowering, the implementation of democracy and its subsequent governance reforms in Nigeria have been disempowering and sabotaging the freedom of the poor. With poverty increasing with

governance reforms in Nigeria, the claim that 'good governance', as defined by Western style democracy and the donors' recommended institutional reforms, is the missing link of development in Nigeria can be contested. Interpreting these findings from an Afrocentric perspective, the application of Western democracy in Nigeria cannot yield the same outcomes given the fact that Nigeria has a history, culture and social-political realities different from those of the West.

The findings of the study about the unsatisfactory performance of democratic governance are in line with the argument of scholars such as, Okunmadewa (2005:4), Ucha (2010:53) and Aidelunuoghene (2014:120). These authors agree that despite democratic governance, inequality and poverty in Nigeria remain very high. In line with the findings of this study, Foster and Pushak, (2011:14) also state that Nigeria's infrastructure, such as electricity, piped water supply and transport facilities, are all in a bad state. These research findings further question the acclaimed positive relationship between democracy and development. For example, the study of Przeworski (2004:12) shows that political regimes have no impact on the growth of total income. Similarly, Doucouliagos and Ulubaşoğlu (2008) also concluded that democracy does not have a direct impact on economic growth. Giving that the findings show that adopting western democratic reforms did not lead to development in Nigeria, arguably, if development is the goal of pursuing good governance, then every society must find its governance strategy and contextual democracy that will lead to that goal.

The findings which show that Nigeria's democracy is militaristic, can also be interpreted to mean that imported political strategies such as, western liberal democracy, cannot lead to the same outcomes as in the originating Western societies because of the contextual differences. These findings can also be interpreted to mean that the change in the form of government from military rule to democracy did not change the experience of governance significantly. In other words, change in structures may not lead to change in outcomes in as much as the kind of people operating the structures is the same. The findings show that ex-military men and their allies dominate Nigeria's political superstructures. These findings are in line with the analyses in Chapter 3 (Section 2.2) that the powerful elites produced during the military rule also captured every government institution in Nigeria in the new democratic era. These research findings are in line with Okeke and Ugwu (2013: 99, 106) and Yagboyaju (2011:101) who argue that the current democratic governance,

characterised by abuse of human rights, continues and pervasion of the rule of law flourishes because ex-military officers continue to occupy top political positions in Nigeria.

Arguably, the democratic governance framework in Nigeria ignores the effects of almost three decades of military rule in the country. It has been pointed out in Chapter 3 (Section 2.2) that the multiparty democracy framework may not be of benefit to the citizens if there are no mechanisms to prevent the capture of Nigeria's political institutions by corrupt retired military officials and their allies. Martin (2006:30) affirms that whenever powerful groups are able to take control of institutions in order to benefit from the policies, to the detriment of the masses, democratic institutions will not lead to development. Similarly the findings show that the citizens perceived that corruption is unabated in Nigeria. This finding means that anti-corruption reforms have been ineffective. Most of the participants in this study stated that corruption is unabated despite good governance reforms. This study has also argued in section 3.2.2 (d) that anti-corruption reforms do not fit into Nigeria's political history and institutional reality can never be effective.

The findings reveal that some citizens believe that, compared to the military era, democracy has brought a number of improvements, especially political freedom. This finding means that the impact of democracy is not totally negative. However, when this finding is compared with the quantitative findings, the study shows that the benefits of the new democracy, such as, election-related freedom is not at the top of the citizens' priorities compared to welfare improvement (Section 6.3.2). These findings can be interpreted to mean that, in Nigeria, political freedom and voting power of the masses do not lead to a responsive government. The findings confirm Ake's (1996:5) description of African democracy that "it offers the people rights they cannot exercise and voting that never amounts to choosing". The poor state of social infrastructure, economic hardship, and poor consultation characterizing Nigeria's democratic governance negate whichever improvements democracy and other good governance reforms have brought.

One interesting finding of this study is that, in comparing the current administration of Osun State with the preceding administration, the participants stated that they preferred the state's administration before 2010. This is despite the fact that it was established that Prince Olagunsoye Oyinlola won the 2007 gubernatorial elections



through rigging (Onapajo and Uzodike 2014:156). According to the participants, they preferred Oyinlola's administration because during his tenure, they had a steady income to meet basic needs, like food and housing. These findings point to the fact that citizens are not very concerned about forms of governance, such as western style political systems and elections. Rather, they are more concerned about the functioning and responsiveness of governance to meet their welfare needs. Unfortunately, the concern and focus of good governance reforms supported by donors have been the forms of political systems while the functions of government, such as, the promotion of economic development and the provision of goods and services for the welfare of citizens are actually treated as secondary (Bergh et al 2014:7).

### **6.2.3 Theme three: Issues Affecting Good Governance in Nigeria**

When the participants were asked about issues that need to be considered in order to achieve good governance in Nigeria and in South Western Nigeria specifically, several issues were raised. The emerging issues have been grouped into three categories namely, the problematic political system, loss of the sense of cultural values and the lack of resources. These three categories are also subdivided into six sub-categories as detailed below.

#### **6.2.3.1 The Problematic Political Structure**

A total of 22 participants (92 per cent) believe that Nigeria's political system needs to be restructured. The emerging issues that relate to the political structure are grouped into two. The first is excessive monetization of political position and the second is the perceived inappropriateness of the current federal structure.

##### **(a) Excessive Monetization of Political Position**

Twenty-two respondents (92 per cent) stated that the monetary income or benefits attached to political positions are very excessive. They said that the unwarranted financial benefits attached to political positions in Nigeria are what attract the greedy and bad elements into the country's politics. It also contributes to other political challenges like patronage, election rigging, election violence and the emergence of incompetent, repressive and unresponsive leadership.

According to TAL1 *"governance is too monetized now. In those days, when my uncle was a councillor, the allowance was 5 shillings and we don't hear of corruption then.*

*But now winning a political post is a money bag has become a 'do or die' affair. Those we are voting in now only pretend when campaigning and when they win, they become our father and are uncontrollable. If for example, a councillor post requires only three sittings in a year and attracts only N1000 per sitting or a senator earns 10000 naira sitting allowance, will they be killing themselves for it? If we remove the issue of money only patriotic citizens will be contesting for political posts".*

TAL8 also added that the excessive money attached to politics makes it a dangerous system that repels peaceful people of purpose. According to TAL8: *"The allowances they are being paid is too much, their monthly pay is even more than 40 years' civil servant salaries. If their allowances can be reduced to something like N20,000 for councillors and N50,000 for the chairman it will discourage the greedy people from politics. For now, it is only a stubborn person that can participate in Nigerian politics. There are many good and knowledgeable people who refuse to participate in politics because they don't want to waste their lives".*

POH2 similarly adds, *"We should reduce the monetization of political offices. For example, the highest a professor in the university earns is N1 million per month, yet a local government chairman earns up to N3 million per month and he may have primary school education. A member of House of Reps earns nothing less than N10 million per month and even more. With so much poverty around, if I have the opportunity through a godfather to get to the House of Rep I will bulldoze anything in my way to achieve it. ...."*

### **(b) Inappropriate Federal Structure**

Participants raised several issues relating to the need to reorganize the current federal structure. Seventeen respondents (71 per cent) believed that there is a need to make the sub-national governance more autonomous and the centre weaker. Twelve respondents (50 per cent) raised the issue of Yoruba subjugation by the North and cultural diversity. They prefer that each ethnic group becomes more autonomous so that they can adopt a governance style that is based on their culture.

#### ***Ethical subjugation by the North:***

TL3 complained that the current political structure allows the subjugation of the South West by the Northerners. He said *"Previously, the northerners were uneducated and uncivilized. The Hausas worked for us as cheap labourers for production of building*

materials. It was Awolowo who took clothes to northern cities like Maiduguri and Kafanchan, telling them it was not good to be naked. That was where our problem started. We enlightened them, now the political system is such that the Hausa are using us, ruling us and oppressing us”.

### ***Need for an autonomous group with a governance style compatible with each group’s culture***

EE3 opined that true federalism is when each group has a self-rule and governance style compatible with its people’s culture. He said “*That is why we are clamouring for true federalism in which each zone is autonomous. We currently have 6 geopolitical zones. We, in the Southwest, have a very good traditional political culture that can achieve good governance for us. If we try our cultural governance and others see results, everyone will adopt it. We should remember that Islamic enter (sic) through the Sahara and the religion affected the North. So our political culture is not the same*”.

### ***Need for a weaker centre and stronger sub-national governments***

LGS1 said that a federal system in which the central government holds the largest amount of resources while the local government lacked financial capacity is problematic. According to him “*We are supposed to have a pyramid system of governance. That is a very light head and a very big base. Our own government structure is very big at the top and very light at the bottom. The federal government is the top and it is too big and the local government too weak. We need a restructuring. If we have a pyramid political structure that gives adequate power to the sub national government, especially the local government, then at the grassroots level, we can solve our problems. When the head is bigger than the body it is called kwashiorkor. And that is the case of Nigeria*”.

### **6.2.3.2 Loss of Sense of Cultural of Values**

A total of 22 participants (92 per cent of the respondents) complained that, in Nigeria, the cultural sense of value which ensured good governance had been largely eroded. Two main issues relating to this category emerged.

#### **(a) Loss of Omoluwabi**

Many of the participants pointed out that the moral virtue of Omoluwabi had virtually disappeared from Nigerian societies and insisted that without a cultural reorientation

to restore these valuable cultural values and behaviour, the country cannot achieve good governance. The loss of these cultural values was said to have led to the pervasiveness of materialism, the consequent corruption and institutional decay.

According to POH1 *“our cultural values are the building blocks of society. These are the necessary ingredients for achieving good governance and development. They include integrity, patriotism, and sense of productivity. We have been wrongly made to believe that we can make money with or without productivity. When there is no integrity and productivity, corruption becomes a norm. There is no architecture in place anywhere anymore; we’ve lost the cultural value to make things work. Reviving cultural sense of value is extremely foundational. In Osun state, we are reviving our culture. The state’s slogan is “Omoluwabi” to reinstitute our Yoruba core values...”*

EE1 said *“There is this thing called Omoluwabi. It says I should wish my neighbour well all the time. That is the bedrock of a good society. But this valuable culture of contentment and love has been replaced by the “get rich quick” syndrome. It is an evil that came when the colonial masters eroded our culture; it worsened when the military took over the country.*

“POH2 similarly said *“Our problem is materialism which has also caused institutional decay. Nothing works because our mind is corrosive and rotten. So, we need resocialization from materialism”.*

### **(b) The removal of culture (especially traditional oath taking) from modern governance**

Twenty-one respondents (87 per cent) believed that the removal of culture, especially traditional oath taking, from governance contributed to Nigeria’s political menace. Most of the respondents lamented that the use of the Bible and Quran for public oath had not been able to guarantee their patriotism, loyalty and commitment. They said traditional oath taking would instil fear in the minds of political leaders and constrain them from acting corruptly and against the wishes of the people. The study also found that even though citizens are clamouring for the inclusion of traditional public oath, this suggestion has been rejected by the political class.

According to TL1, *“Fear, respect and truth is only with the traditional gods. The Bible says God is slow to anger and that is why people don’t obey him, the same with Quran. But if you do something wrong and you falsely swear to Ogun, the judgement is within*

*seven days. There is fear and respect. I am the vice chairman of the council of Obas in Osun State. And 11 of us were selected to come up with advice to the government on several issues because the kings serve in advisory capacity. We prescribed that the politicians should stop swearing with the Bible and Quran, but should use Ogun and other gods. They declined”.*

*EE3 also stated that “in those days, people were honest and there were no corrupt practices. It was because of the fear and respect for the gods. Let us stop using Bible or Quran for public oath taking. Let them start using culture, Ogun and other gods to swear and honesty and truth will be restored in the Nigeria political system. Our culture instils fear because it does not tolerate falsehood and there are immediate consequences for defaulters. If something is stolen now and it is reported to Sango, Sango will fish out the thief even amid 1000 people. The Quran and the Bible were never ours, we borrowed them. That is why it has not been effective”*

### **6.2.3.2 Limited public resources compared to Nigerian increasing population and wide development gap**

Three respondents (12 per cent), who also hold positions in the public sector, explained that the issue of resources must not be overlooked in achieving good governance in Nigeria. They said that the government revenue is currently low compared to the amount of resources necessary to finance needed development in Nigeria. Most states in the South West have very little internally generated revenue and mostly depend on federal allocation which has dwindled with the fall in crude oil prices and economic recession.

*According to LGS 1, “The problem of economic recession is affecting government. The current underdevelopment is not caused by the misbehaviour of some people. Rather, it is caused by the lack of funds. When the resources available for development are insufficient to meet the demand, you will always get underdevelopment. Most of the states in the South West do not generate any significant internally generated revenue. None of the states is currently sustainable without allocation from the federal government, except few ones like Lagos. And federal allocation to states has fallen significantly with fall in crude oil”.*

*POH1 also stated: “The main problem is that we don’t have sufficient resources. Embezzlement, corruption yes, put together the figure of corruption, still, we don’t have*

*enough resources to pull us out of underdevelopment. There have been many years of leadership failure and neglect of socio economic development. To address infrastructural problems in Nigeria, we need over \$100 billion. Yet the most ambitious budget is less than \$20billion. And we have not been able to generate that as a people. Our population is a major challenge, we are growing astronomically and we are not productive as a people”.*

### **6.2.3.3 Discussion of Theme Three**

The study established that the issues affecting governance in Nigeria include a problematic political and federal structure characterized by excessive monetization of political offices, too much concentration of power at the centre of the federal system, tribal consciousness and ethnic cleavages. The study also established that governance has been affected by the loss of the cultural sense of value and the exclusion of culture (especially traditional oath taking) from modern governance. The study also confirmed that inadequate public funds are a major impediment to the ability of the government to develop the country. The issues raised by participants under this theme were governance challenges peculiar to Nigeria which may not be obtainable in other socio-political settings. It is therefore very important that these issues are considered in order to develop a context and culturally specific governance framework.

The meaning of these findings is that Nigeria faces distinctive governance challenges which may not be solvable using a general approach. Put differently, the findings confirm the incompatibility of the good governance agenda with the Nigeria's institutional reality because the agenda does not integrate any of these local issues. The findings of the study have shown that Nigeria's problematic political and federal structures do not encourage good governance. Despite the fact that it imitates the American political system, it makes it impossible for political parties to produce effective leaders to promote good governance and development. These findings also confirm the earlier argument of the researcher in Chapter 3 (Section 1) that there are bad and good elements in every society, but the political structure determines which type of element gets to positions of leadership. The political structure has been defined to include the Constitution, the political culture, and how government functions (Heslop 2017).

The findings presented that excessive remuneration given to political office holders is a barrier to good governance in Nigeria because it attracts greedy and violent individuals into politics. The study has shown in Chapter 3 (Section 2.2) that Nigeria has one of the most expensive political systems and the highest paid lawmakers in the world (Odemwingie 2015). In line with the findings, Yagboyaju (2011:102) argues that the excessive remuneration collected by the political class leads to bad governance because these political elites are too rich to sympathize with the poor masses. Ogbeyi (2012:5) reveals that due to the lucrativeness of political positions, Nigerian politicians will do anything, including killing opponents, to have access to public funds. The findings also confirm the earlier arguments that in Nigeria, politics has become an opportunity for politicians to invest in business projects for some corrupt wealthy men who sponsor political candidates to power in expectation of rewards (several examples were given in section 3.2.2 (c)). This finding also explains why elections in Nigeria are characterised by rigging and violence. Thus, elections in Nigeria cannot really be used as a tool of accountability as they may not reflect people's mandates.

The findings also establish that to achieve good governance, the federal system must be restructured to grant ethnic autonomy and also devolve the power concentrated at the national government to autonomous sub-units. These issues have also been discussed fully in Chapter 3 where it was shown that the problem of ethnicity was created by the colonialists. Through its divide and rule tactics, the British introduced tribalism and ethnic cleavages into the Nigerian communities (Smith 2005, Turaki 2010). Due to the ethnic consciousness of the population since the colonial period, the nationalists actually fought for ethnic self-rule, so that at independence in 1960, the federal arrangement was such that each of the three federating units was autonomous and self-sufficient while the federal government was comparatively weaker (Adamu 2016:8; Ijere 2014:48).

But the problem of concentration of power and resources at the centre was created by the military, which further compounded the problem of the ethnic cleavages that have affected the political behaviour of Nigerians. These problems have caused an aggressive desire to control the federal power by various ethnic groups, bloody coup plots, cessation threats, civil war, sectional political parties, election rigging and contentions about the arrangement for revenue allocation. Unfortunately, the 1999 Federal Constitution, which forms the foundation for good governance in Nigeria was

written by the military, and it continues to legalize the concentration of power at the federal level (Okeke and Ugwu 2013:106).

Some of the participants of this study particularly showed their ethnic cleavage by complaining about the domination of the Yoruba by the Hausa in the North. In line with this finding, both Adibe (2015:4) and Ibrahim et al. (2015:8) argue that ethnic cleavages control political behaviour of electorates. Umezina (2012:216) also explained that at each election, the emphasis is on ethnic sentiments rather than the appropriateness of candidates. These findings further confirm that Nigeria runs an ethnically biased political system and that the current federal arrangement has not been able to adequately take care of the ethnic divide in Nigeria. In line with the findings, the study in Chapter 3 (Section 6) has argued that reducing central power and increasing self-governance of sub-national government or states is important for achieving peaceful coexistence and unity which are necessary for good governance and development. According to Okpalike (2015:148), ethnicity should be a recognized framework of the Nigerian political system since, in Nigeria, the bond of ethnicity is thicker than the bond of nationalism.

The findings can also be interpreted that the loss of cultural values impedes good governance and development in Nigeria. Values can be defined as those behaviours that are acceptable in the society and they are synonymous with morality (Obasola 2015:2). Values are also an intrinsic part of culture (Dei 2012: 106). Cultural values determine how individuals will behave in the society and when participating in political affairs (ibid). This study has shown in Chapter 4 (Section 4.1) that African cultural values are rooted in communalism and humanness (section 4.3). Afrocentrists call this high moral standard of behaviour, Maat (Asante 2005:70; Karenga 2006: 9). The prevailing moral standard of individuals in the society will determine the quality of governance because the government is run by individuals.

In line with the findings on the erosion of cultural values, many authors such as, Patrick (1998), Uzorka and Deekor (2013) and Obasola (2015) agree that Nigerian cultural values, moral ethos and public discipline have all broken down due to the external influence of globalization and civilization. These authors also agree that the influence of Western civilization has replaced the culture of humanness and communalism with the alien culture of materialism and individualism. Consequently, the country is plagued with moral problems such as greed, crime, violence, ritual killing, drug



trafficking, injustice, robbery, advanced fee fraud and corruption (Obasola 2015:3). Materialism which is a desire for instant wealth has made every sector of the Nigerian society corrupt (ibid). The findings can be interpreted that the restoration of cultural values would aid the achievement of good governance in Nigeria

This study also shows that 85 per cent of the participants prefer that traditional oath taking should be included in Nigeria's political structure. The finding means that many citizens desire that cultural principles of governance should be integrated into formal governance. Beyond any anti-corruption policy, participants believe that swearing by the gods on assumption of duties, is one effective way of compelling political leaders to act morally. Although currently, public officers take public oaths by swearing on either a Bible or Quran, corruption has not been curtailed in any way. Participants of this study argue that Yoruba culture goes with respect and fear because the Yoruba gods are known to mete out instant judgement for oath breakers. This finding is also in line with Ogunleye (2013:85) and Ibiwoye (2016) who argue for the inclusion of traditional covenant making in modern governance. This study has also shown that the suggestion to bring cultural oath taking into governance has been rejected by the political class. The rejection of such a popular demand is a confirmation that, in Nigeria, democratic power does not lie with the people.

The last issue raised by some of the participants relating to this theme was the problem of inadequate public resources. The current economic recession, caused by the fall in the price of crude oil internationally, has been pointed out as a contributory factor to the problem. This finding implies that good governance cannot be achieved without adequate government resources. The finding also confirms the negative impact of Nigeria's over-reliance on oil revenue and the failure of successive governments to diversify the economy. Therefore, any good governance arrangement that will be effective must provide resources to finance development. The funding options in the good governance agenda include loans like the IMF's Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility (ESAF) with its stringent anti-welfare conditions that include rapid privatization and a fast pace of trade liberalization (Shah 2013). The good governance agenda also proposes some tax reform the nature of which also hurt the poor (World Bank 2001:110) (Chapter 2, Section 2.11). The incompatibility of the donors' funding options with welfare is also a pointer to the need for a people-centred approach to fundraising.

The lack of adequate resources to finance development in Nigeria also puts to question the appropriateness of the expensive Western style good governance agenda the country is implementing. The high number of political offices, the excessive remuneration of public office holders, the many institutions established in fulfilment of donors' good governance recommendations, all contradict the country's poor purse. The findings mean that Western style governance is actually siphoning resources that could as well have been spent on welfare improving projects; certainly, this foreign political framework is not improving people's welfare. A political framework based on local culture, holds a better promise of providing cheaper and optimal alternative strategy to achieve development. For example, why should we invest scarce resources in instituting and financing an anti-corruption agency that stops no corruption when corruption can be reduced to the minimum if political officials are made to take public oaths the traditional way, a process that costs absolute nothing?

#### **6.2.4 Theme Four: Perceptions on Effectiveness of Indigenous Governance Systems**

When participants were asked about their perception of the effectiveness of indigenous governance systems, all agreed that the Yoruba indigenous governance system was very effective in the pre-colonial times and such a system has continued to be effective in rural areas and among small indigenous groups and trade associations. The participants' responses are in three categories. First, the indigenous governance system is considered very effective because it possesses some good attributes that make it effective. Second, the Yoruba traditional socio-political system is founded on traditional religion and culture. Third, the participants' response to common criticisms against Yoruba indigenous governance and culture.

##### ***6.2.4.1 Indigenous Governance System Has Attributes That Enable Its Effectiveness***

All the participants agreed that the indigenous governance system performs effectively among the rural indigenous people and small indigenous associations. Indigenous governance systems had been found to be participatory, representative and accountable. There is equality, cooperation, and sanctions; while welfare improvement was the main goal of leadership. The indigenous system was also based on the principle of communality, Omoluwabi, and the supremacy of culture.

According to EE1 *“We have our traditional governance in Yoruba land and it is working well. In my village at Lasole, if you put your thing in a place, it will be there forever, no one will steal it. Lasole is an agrarian society, whatever you have, I also have, I don’t need to steal from you. And there is the Omoluwabi philosophy, that is, whatever I will not take; I should not do it to you. Governance is participatory because the masses are taking part in it. No one is downtrodden. There are equal opportunities to excel, whether you choose to be a professor or a drummer.”*

TAL 2 said: *“In our indigenous trade associations there are rules guiding members who are drafted by members themselves. Members do abide by the rules and whoever does not abide is sanctioned appropriately without partiality. Moreover, “ofin wa, asa wa’ (there is law, there this culture). We follow culture and it ensures compliance of members with rules. There is cooperation because our livelihood is linked to our trade association. And when it comes to electing the leaders, we don’t consider their money or wealth, but their good morals, wisdom and their contributions to the development of the association”.*

TAL 4 said *“A leader or representative in indigenous society must be someone from the grassroots who understands what members are actually passing through. They are accountable for all their expenditure. Most importantly, our goal is to help members since government hardly helps anyone. We help ourselves with the little contributions we make regularly and our association is experiencing development”.*

#### **6.2.4.2 Yoruba Traditional Socio-Political System is founded on Traditional Religion and Culture**

All (100 per cent) participants confirmed that the whole structure of Yoruba indigenous governance was based on the Yoruba traditional religion and culture. The consciousness that disrespecting and acting contrary to Yoruba culture could lead to serious, immediate consequences ensured the compliance of all citizens to societal norms. The participants believed that breaking traditional laws or swearing falsely to the gods would attract serious consequences. Peace, cooperation, truth, good morals and participatory political culture in the Yoruba indigenous system, were all ensured by the reverence and fear of culture. Low morals were also considered to be taboo, with grave repercussions. All the respondents confirmed that in pre-colonial Yoruba

societies, goods for sale would be displayed at a road junction, the seller need not stay with them, and buyers will buy and drop the money. Stealing was rare.

TL 1 explained that *“Our socio political lives revolve around our culture. We fear God and we fear the gods we worship. There is no religion so trustworthy like ‘Isese’ (traditional religion), Ifa and Ogun. In ‘Isese’, we don’t fight, cheat, swear falsely or commit adultery. It is a taboo for an Ogun worshiper to sit beside a married woman because it is believed that such can destroy all his spiritual protections. So adultery is unimaginable. It is in the church and mosque you hear cases of adultery. You can only find the truth at the ‘Orisa’ (gods). If there is any confusion we go to swear before Ogun and anyone who lies will be in serious trouble within 7 days. Our political system is also based on this culture of truth. We have democracy embedded in us that cannot be uprooted; the democracy now is mere politics and lies”*.

TL 6: *“Ofin wa, asa wa” (there is law and there is culture). Our fathers followed culture, the Whites introduced the law. Our culture goes with the fear of the gods and because of that, if one is selected as a leader it is believed that he will not cheat others, and they don’t cheat. And there is absolute compliance of societal members with norms and precepts of the community. In fact, goods for sale are usually placed by the road junction, the seller only needs to indicate the selling price, and people will buy and drop the money. No one will steal it. There was fear in those days, and truth, ‘ewe n je, ogun nje’ (that is, the power of local herbs and the magical/spiritual powers of the gods are effective)”*.

EE3 also explained: *“the Yoruba have a culture of teaching morals with taboos. Although with civilization, these taboos are now called superstitions but they actually created the fear that aided compliance to good morals from childhood. For example if rain is falling, they will say it is a taboo to put your hands in the rain but really, it is to stop children from catching a cold. It is also a taboo to sit at the door when you are eating; though really, it is because those passing will be disturbing you. There are many of such taboos that created the Omoluwabi in us”*

#### **6.2.4.3 Participants’ response to common criticisms against Yoruba indigenous governance and culture**

In response to common criticisms against Yoruba indigenous governance and culture such as, human sacrifice, spiritualism and intertribal wars, many of the participants

explained that Yoruba culture has evolved and there were no more human sacrifices. They also supported spirituality of the culture because they believed it to be real; it had protected the people, and had been able to promote good governance, good morals and societal development.

According to TL8, *“No more human sacrifice in our culture. The secret societies and cults were all founded to protect the societies. For example, no war has ever invaded Iwo town. We don’t use soldiers. The spiritual belief and context of our religion give us confidence and influence our behaviour and governance, and they also aid our development and progress. More so, the spiritual power of Yoruba culture lies in pureness of the mind. In fact, just a lustful thought is a sin that can destroy spiritual protection. Our belief gives us a pure heart unlike in churches and mosques where adultery is rampant. Those two foreign religions we exalt today collapsed our moral system”*.

EE2 also explained *“in Yoruba land, we have one important culture, that no kingdom, small or meagre, should attack other Yoruba kingdoms. But sometimes this culture is broken by some leaders with instinct for rebellion. And they are all over the world. For example, how did we get Hitler? But Yoruba also have strategies for dealing with such tyrannical leaders. For example, there was a combined battle of all the empires against a very tyrannical leader at Owuwo, a locally made bomb was used against the city and till today the archaeologist cannot find the original site of Owuwo town. War was also instigated by trans-Atlantic slave trade in which the White used rum to induce people to fight against themselves”*.

EE3 also said *“to disrespect the spirituality of our culture is an evidence of a colonized mentality. During the slave trade, the Whites will quote from the Bible such as, ‘servants obey your masters’. That Bible is the spiritual basis of their action. It is only that they have conquered our mentality. We are saying we have got freedom, no, our brain has been colonized. I am not ashamed of the spirituality of my culture”*.

#### **6.2.4.4 Discussion on Theme Four**

These findings have established that the Yoruba Indigenous governance system was very effective in the pre-colonial times and such a governance system has continued to be effective in rural areas and among small indigenous groups and trade association. This finding is in line with the studies of Olowu and Erero (1995) and

Okunmadewa et al (2005:4) that, even in the face of the failure of colonial/modern government to improve the lives of citizens, indigenous and traditional institutions in Nigeria continue to guarantee the welfare of the people, especially those in the rural areas. This finding can also be interpreted to mean that traditional institutions possess valuable qualities which can serve as resources to promote good governance and development.

The findings established that Yoruba indigenous governance possesses many good institutional qualities such as, participation, representativeness, accountability, equality, cooperation, and sanctions while welfare improvement of societal members is the main goal. This finding means that the principles of good governance highlighted by governance scholars and donor institutions (see Gisselquist 2012) cannot only be found in Western democracy but also exist in other forms of governance systems. The finding can also be interpreted that since these good governance principles have existed in the Yoruba indigenous governance system since the pre-colonial times, definitely the Yoruba societies possess advanced and adequate indigenous knowledge to achieve good governance and never needed to borrow or switch totally to a Western style political system to achieve a well-governed society.

It is noteworthy that the idea of good governance emerged in the international development community only in the 1990s. Before then, Nigeria had experimented with various governance systems such as, colonial autocratic and exploitative rule, ethnic-biased liberal democracy, as well as, military rule. None of these governance structures exhibits or operationalizes the good qualities found in the Yoruba indigenous governance system. Similarly, until the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, the Western imperialists and their institutions placed no importance on democracy and other principles of good governance in their relationship with Africa, rather they were interested in gaining Africa's loyalty and markets (Ganahl 2012: 26). Likewise, development theories during the Cold War cared less about good governance and even supported repressive regimes (Mkandawire 1999: 127). Consequently, one can argue that it is the international development community that metamorphosed from bad governance into good governance. Among many indigenous African people, especially the Yoruba, in Southwest Nigeria, good governance has always been an intrinsic part of the culture. Just like one of the participants stated: "*We have democracy inside us, embedded in us, and cannot be uprooted*".

In relation to the development potential of governance, the finding confirms that the Yoruba indigenous governance system effectively supports the welfare of the people and this is achieved in a participatory manner. However, analysis of donors' good governance in Chapter 2 (Section 2.11) shows that the agenda is not truly participatory and the neo-liberal components hurt the welfare of the poor. The findings also show that the Yoruba socio-political structures are built on principles of communality, Omoluwabi and the supremacy of culture. This is in contrast with Western socio-political structures, which are based on individuality, rationality and social contract (Dueppen 2014). The findings can be interpreted to mean that what guarantees good governance in each culture varies and achieving good governance requires adopting a political system which has assumptions realistic in the local context. No system of government, including Western style democracy, should be universalized. Rather, governance should be structured on each society's peculiarity, norms and culture.

This study found that adherence to culture (which is inclusive of religion and spiritual beliefs) contributes to good governance in the Yoruba system. The cooperation, truth, good morals and participation in Yoruba indigenous governance were achieved because of the reverence to the culture. Morality and absolute compliance to the rule of law were also achieved because of the fear and consciousness that disrespecting and acting contrary to Yoruba cultural norms led to serious, immediate consequences; especially when the ancestors are involved. This cultural belief was so strong that stealing and corrupt behaviours were rare in pre-colonial Yoruba societies to the point that goods for sale would be displayed at a road junction without the seller staying with them, and buyers would serve themselves and drop the money.

This finding means that culture (especially the aspect of culture that promises grave consequences to any leader that acts contrary to the wishes of the people) is the pillar that holds the effectiveness of governance among the Yoruba. Without the fear or consciousness of quick judgement from the traditional gods, there is a tendency for many people, including leadership, to act contrary to societal norms. The interpretation of this finding is that the adoption of any governance system in Southwest Nigeria (including Western democracy) that excludes culture and spirituality will suffer challenges, such as, non-adherence to the rule of law. This is also in line with Ekeh's (1975:111) argument that while many Nigerians respect traditional public institutions due to its spiritual component, Nigerians treat the public service as alien and amoral,

where the individual only seeks to gain without any obligation to the citizens. Participants of this study also recommended the inclusion of spirituality (especially traditional oath taking) into modern governance. This recommendation is one of the cultural solutions to bad governance which contradicts Eurocentric positivism ideology. From the Afrocentric perspective, however, we can only achieve good governance and development in Nigeria when the people's interest, history and culture are placed at the centre of intervention (Asante 1998:8).

Of course, critics are quick to point to the aspects of African society they consider bad and incompatible with modern thinking such as, human sacrifice, spiritualism and intertribal wars (Boahen 1985:10). Ugbam et al (2014:66) ask if going back to culture means the worship of gods long after identifying with one God. In response, it is noteworthy that culture is the way of life of a people (Asante 1990:9). Consequently, issues such as human sacrifice and wars were never part of the Yoruba way of life and consequently were not part of the culture. Moreover, every society has good and bad traditions. Likewise, every religion (including the foreign religions) has its myths and aspects that would be considered bad (Isola 2016:9). The Roman Catholic Church in the early modern times was known for cruel killings and brutal torture of those who challenged the authority of the Church (Ellerbe 1996) (section 3.6). Nevertheless, neither culture nor religion is static (Moatlaping 2009: 27). Both evolve as societies gain new knowledge through research or by interacting with other cultures. This study shows that Yoruba culture has evolved and the practice of human sacrifice has been stopped and is even condemned.

The findings established that the reason citizens support the spiritual aspect of the Yoruba culture is because they found it to be real; it has protected the people and it has been able to promote good governance, good morals and societal development. This finding is in line with the assumptions of Afrocentricity that the spiritual component of life is as real as the material aspect and that understanding African reality is not limited to rationality or scientific knowledge (Schiele 1996: 287; Mazama (2001:399). The researcher has earlier argued that the Eurocentric assumption of rationality, on which most development theories are based, does not adequately capture Nigeria's reality because here, agents' decisions often reflect preferences for irrational and spiritual factors in culture. Given that spirituality is part of the local citizens' reality in Nigeria, the challenge for African scholars is to develop theories that truly reflect that



fact. Unless this is done, knowledge production will be based on incompatible foreign assumptions and consequently be ineffective to solve African problems. There is no doubt, however, that not every aspect of culture is good for development. This is why African scholars must engage in a reflective re-evaluation of culture and a critical assessment of its underlying beliefs so as to be able to offer insightful solutions to societal issues (Oruka 1991:178-179).

## **6.2.5 Theme Five: Strategies for Achieving Good Traditional Governance in Yoruba land**

This theme is further divided into five subthemes namely participation and responsiveness; accountability and prevention of abuse of power; dispute settlement; security and infrastructure development; and poverty reduction.

### **6.2.5.1 Subtheme One: Strategies for Achieving Participation and Responsiveness**

The participants' responses can be described as a form of cultural democracy because it is functional and different from Western liberal democracy.

#### **6.2.5.1.1 Cultural Democracy**

The Yoruba traditional governance system is a unique form of cultural democracy, with several attributes that ensure the participation of citizens and the responsiveness of leaders to the yearnings of the citizens. These attributes are presented in six subcategories.

##### **(a) Decentralization and Representativeness to Family Level**

The Yoruba traditional system is highly decentralized. The family compound (Agbo-ile) is the lowest political unit and it is headed by 'baale' (family head). This is followed by the village unit, headed by the 'Baale' (village head). There are also palace chiefs, who are the cabinet members overseeing various sectors of the kingdom. The head representatives of the family compounds and village meet with the king regularly to advise the cabinet and to present family/village needs and priorities.

TL3 said "*We have the baale, who is the head of the Agbo-ile (family compound). We also have the Baale, directing the small villages before it comes to the king. The decentralization and multilevel governance system are what makes things work*

*smoothly. As a father settles disagreements among his own children, is the same way the baale settle disputes within the family compound. Or if there is advice towards the progress of the family, such will go to the baale. The baale will also invite the other heads of households for meetings and they will discuss the issue together. The responsibility of the Baale (village head) is similar to the baale (family head). Each member of the village will meet with the Baale to discuss the progress of the community, how to build development projects like roads or even plan how their community can get the favour and attention of the king, concerning some matters”.*

TL1 said *“When the king is installed, he will select his chiefs as executives; most families and clans have a chief representing them in the palace to take words from and to the king. We also have “Balogun baale” representing each family house and they meet in the palace. When they meet they tell us what happens in the city and they advise us on how the city will move forward and take information back home.”*

Given that the family, which is the smallest unit of any society, is represented in Yoruba governance, this system guarantees majority participation and the representation of their interest. A family compound (Agbo-ile) is occupied by an extended family; made up of several nuclear families or households.

### **(b) Cultural legitimacy**

Participants explained that the final decision about who would become a king was not by voting, although there might some contest at the family level. The king is culturally selected through the Ifa oracle. The voice of the oracle is the voice of the people. The decision of the Ifa oracle is usually accepted with no contention. That is why the people respected and obeyed the king and the traditional institutions because they were considered to be divine.

TL6 said: *“We follow ‘asa’ (culture) we don’t vote. Our belief is our culture, which is ‘Ifa’. There will be a contest within the eligible royal family after which each royal family presents to the kingmakers their best candidates that they believe would be acceptable to the people. Then the ‘Ifa’ (oracle) will be consulted. ‘Ifa’ chooses the best candidate. The oracle will reject anyone whose tenure will not be beneficial. The oracle has never chosen a bad candidate. Ifa has the final say. We all accept the oracle's choice and that is why we believe in the divinity of our traditional institutions”.*

POH2 also explained “*no individual can just make you an Oba (king), there is what we call the ‘Afobaje’ (kingmakers). These kingmakers will consult an oracle, there may be up to seven people because each family would have brought their representatives. They will ask the oracle, and once the oracle has spoken, the people have spoken*”.

### **(c) Regular Consultation**

In Yoruba indigenous governance, the leadership must consult with the representatives of the people before decisions are made. The representatives must also live in the community and consult with their community and family members.

TL3 said: “*We chiefs serve as the ears of the king, like the slogan goes, “Eti oba n’ile, eti oba l’oko”, (meaning, the ears of the king is both in the city and in the suburbs). In the council meeting, we the chiefs, as well as, family heads and village heads, discuss issues. We keep close contact with the people at the grassroots to know their problems. We would always brainstorm before arriving at any meaningful decision*”.

TL1 also explained: “*The Yoruba cannot do anything without their king, neither can the king do anything without the people. We don’t command unilaterally. For example in this town, there are 25 chiefs representing each house and street. Anytime there is an issue, we discuss together. We don’t argue with one another, we advise ourselves*”.

### **(d) No Monetary Gain for the Representative**

Another strategy that ensures the commitment of a representative is that there are no monetary gains attached to traditional political positions. Instead, representatives are volunteers. However, the people reciprocate the dedication and hard work of their leaders through gifts and assistance with their farm work.

According to TL1, “*In the olden time, political leadership positions, such as a king or chief, have no monetary gain. It was a thing of love and dedication. But the Yoruba people loved their king and will gladly take care of him. The king cannot be hungry. “Somi kale ni nbe laafin” (that is, diverse gifts comes to the palace). In those days, my late father would send me and my mother to carry part of our harvests to the king. Even when we killed game, we shared with the king. There was nothing like money, everyone including chiefs and leaders farmed and there was contentment*”.

TL8 similarly said “*there is no money given to the king. But the citizens happily provide everything the king needs in return for his dedication. They give him food items, they*

*give him wives, and they would help him with his farm work and also harvest his produce for him”.*

#### **(d) Local People’s Power over Representatives**

The participants also explained that the local citizens have power over their representatives to make them accountable or have them removed. If the people believed any baale (family head) or Baale (village head) was no longer representing their interests, they have the power to report him to a higher authority and they also possessed the power to remove him. The systems of deposition of leadership are further discussed under accountability.

TL5 explained that, *“If any baale starts misbehaving or oppressing his family compound, members of that family compound can always say they don’t want him again. In that case, the Baale (who is higher to the baale in the governance hierarchy) will tell the family to choose another leader”.*

T9 also said: *“In the traditional system, if a family or village is not pleased with their heads, they have the power to report him in the palace. If a chief misbehaves and those he is overseeing are complaining, the rest of the council and the king can order him never to come to the palace again. This will embarrass him”.*

#### **(e) Selection Based on Good Character and Long Stay in the Locality**

Participants explained that before anyone would be considered for a leadership position in the traditional governance system, he must be an ‘Omoluwabi’; that is, a person of good character. He must be a member of that family or village and must be resident there so that he is conversant with the needs of his people. It is a shame for a leader to engage in corrupt practices.

According to LGS1, *“In Yoruba land “won kii fi olokunrun j’oye” (meaning we don’t make someone who is morally sick a chief). He must be a person of good character. That is why you can only contest for leadership in your own family compound and within your community”.*

TL4 also said: *“only Omoluwabi (a person of good moral behaviour) is considered for a chieftaincy position. He must be a community member whose character is known and who also knows what the people are going through or suffering. That is why the kingmakers at times reject candidates nominated by eligible royal families; if they know*

*the candidate would not please the people. The kingmaker will ask them to bring another candidate and they will give sufficient reasons for the rejection”.*

TL5: *“There is serious contentment during that time. It is a virtue of Omoluwabi. It is a thing of shame that a Baale and baale embezzles money contributed by community members or spoils the commerce of his community. Because it is a thing of glory to such leader that during his tenure better things are seen”.*

### **6.2.5.2 Subtheme Two: Strategies for Achieving Accountability and Prevention of Abuse of Power**

In the traditional governance system, the accountability of leadership was ensured and the abuse of power was prevented through some traditional checks and balances explained below.

#### **6.2.7.2.1 Traditional Checks and Balances**

The traditional checks and balances are presented in three sub-categories.

##### **(a) No Concentration of Power and Provision for Deposition.**

According to the participants, the decentralized power and hierarchical political structure of Yoruba traditional governance checked abuse of power and made leaders accountable. Power did not reside in only one person. There was always a higher authority to which the people could report a stubborn leader. The higher authority could discipline or remove such an erring leader. In the case of an oppressive king, the people had the power to tell him to “open the calabash”. The opening of a calabash was a demand for the king’s death by his own hands.

According to TL3, *“The Yoruba culture of selection makes it difficult for any king to misbehave and you can rarely hear a bad story of Yoruba kings being a tout Because power does not reside in the only one person, those below are afraid of the higher authority. When a particular leader misbehaves or is oppressive, the people under him will report to the higher person in the hierarchy. If it is the baale (family head), they will report him to Baale (village Chief), and the Baale will call him to order. If it is the Baale or chief, they will report to the king. The king will summon such a chief to the palace and caution him. If a leader is not heeding to correction, the Baale has the power to tell a family to choose another person as their family head. The king can also remove a tyrannical chief or Baale, and ask the people to choose another Chief”.*

T6 also explained: *“The king also belongs to a council of other kings, some of them even more powerful than him. They advise themselves. Even the family of the king has authority to caution him. They will authorize him to reverse any of his orders that is not convenient for the people. But if a king becomes too stubborn and oppressive, the people will mandate him to “open the calabash”. That Calabash opening is the last punishment for the king, from his own hand. That is because the entire city has turned against him; he has to commit suicide”.*

### **(b) Leadership training**

Participants explained that the Yorubas have a system of preparing citizens for leadership positions, through long years of learning from the elders. When a person is chosen as a king he must also go through some months of training in traditional religion, administration, behaviour of Obas and the traditional constitution.

EE3 explain: *“the traditional leaders usually have acquired experience. They move closer to older people. And the training begins from childhood. In those days when the mother is grinding pepper, the daughter is there; when the father is working, the son is there. So they are learning, accumulating experience. Before you can be a leader, you must have accumulated so much experience and be immersed in the culture”.*

POH2 also explained: *“before installation, the Oba will undergo a training called ‘Ipebi’, which can be called leadership training in today’s language. Ipebi is a secret place of training in traditional religion, administration and the behaviour of an Oba for at least three months. For example, an Oba must not marry sisters of the same parents. He must not take another man’s wife. He must not use his position to take land or property. He must be free and fair while sitting in judgment. These were parts of the traditional constitution he must learn and agree to, with an oath”.*

### **(c) Oath to culture**

The participants explained that the King and other leaders must swear to the oracle or culture that appointed them. Leaders must take oaths and covenant to be accountable, truthful and transparent. They cannot do otherwise because Yoruba culture goes with fear. Any leader who contravenes the oath to the culture will die.

POH 2 said: *“the king will only be installed after he has sworn that he will abide by the traditional constitution which, includes transparency and accountability, and he must*

*not oppress with his position. And if he goes contrary, the 'Orisa' (gods) he swore to, will kill him".*

TL3: *"Because we follow culture, there is fear and there is truth. The king is transparent to all the chiefs because in our culture, falsehood is not tolerated. Even now, whatever allocation we receive is known to all the executives and is openly shared".*

### **6.2.5.3 Subtheme Three: Strategies for Achieving Security and Infrastructure Development**

Responses under this sub theme are grouped under one category as explained below.

#### **6.2.5.3.1 Cooperation and communal work mobilized by Leadership**

The participants explained that in the traditional governance system, public goods like security and social infrastructure such as roads and water were jointly provided by all community members through communal efforts and joint contribution of money. The responsibility of leadership is to mobilize this cooperation.

TL2 said: *"In traditional governance, the King usually asks each community what they need through the baale and the Baale. And community projects were executed through communal efforts. Whether to make roads or build halls, everyone contributed his or her effort to get it accomplished. Money may also be allocated to each household to contribute and they trusted themselves".*

TL1 explained: *"In those days there was cooperation for community development, like roads and water. That time they went to the river, if there was no river in a village, they dug for water through communal efforts. If the roads to the market were getting bushy, every member of that community will cooperate to clear the road. The Yoruba respect and fear the king and as soon as the king calls for any assignment everyone answers. For security, if they know there are good security men elsewhere, they hired them and they jointly paid for the service".*

#### **6.2.5.4. Subtheme Four: Strategies for Dispute settlement**

##### **6.2.5.4.1 Multilevel process and deep inquiry**

Participants explained that dispute settlement was handled by each of the leaders in the hierarchy of traditional governance and the king was the last resort of all

adjudication. Traditional leaders were thorough in their investigation and they would not collect any money from the parties involved.

TL1 said: *“In Yoruba land, we have agbo-ile (compound). Like in this community, we have 77 compounds and there are Baale and chiefs for each compound. If there are disputes within the compound, it is the baale that handles it, calling each family involved. If it’s a farmland dispute they will go to the farm and divide or reset the boundary. There are existing customs for sharing inheritance amicably. It doesn’t turn to a fight. If the parties involved are not satisfied, they will come to the king. The king will call the chiefs and invite the chief in charge of that compound. They will all go to the farm again. Even today, the high court often accepts our judgement because they don’t have time to go the farm”.*

TL8 explained: *“dispute settlement starts from the agbo-ile (family compound) level before it comes to the palace. Here, we take time to listen to witnesses and to find out the truth. For example, in modern high courts, they don’t go to the farmland. But here, we go to the farmland, go to the village and interview people to establish the truth. For the cases we settle here, we don’t collect money from them and we must not cheat anyone. They know the palace is for truth”.*

#### **6.2.5.4.2 Truth and obedience compelled by culture**

The participants explained that the fear of culture made every party tell the truth and ensured they complied with the final decision of the judges. The consciousness and fear of culture also made the judges unbiased.

TL1 said: *“The palace decision on a case stands. People agree and obey whatever way the dispute is settled. Our culture goes with fear. There is no one the king will ask to do something that he will not do it. That the king calls for you brings fear and whatever he asks you to do you do it. Besides, it is the duty of the family head to ensure that whoever the king asks to do something in his family compound does it. Whatever the king says stands. There is a slogan that “Enifoju doba, awowo awo”, meaning, “he who dares the king will see the wrath of the gods”.*

TL9: *“That time, baale and Baale, are people with right standing so much so that people don’t have complaints with the leaders’ decision over a matter. People trusted the traditional system of dispute settlement because our culture goes with truth and fear. You don’t come to the palace to tell a lie or swear falsely because it is the house*



*of culture. Nobody wants to sin against culture. When we tell them that whoever lies, this is what will happen to them. Whatever we say to the disobedient, so shall it be, because we don't have two minds, and we are not collecting any money".*

#### **6.2.7.5 Subtheme Five: Strategies for Achieving Poverty reduction**

Responses under this sub-theme are put together under one category below.

##### **6.2.5.5.1 Equitable Access to Resources and a Culture of Hard Work**

All the participants said that in the olden days, there was no reason for one to be poor or, hungry because there was equitable access to resources, especially farmland and there was also a culture of hard work.

TL7: *"There was no reason to be poor that time. Everyone had equal access to societal infrastructure including land. There was abundant land for farming. We farmed yams and other crops. Everyone ate fresh farm foods and they were healthy. No hardworking person was poor. And soon as we found a lazy man, we got such arrested".*

TL9 contributed: *"That time only the lazy people had a problem with eating and drinking; unlike now that people go to school with no work to use the certificate for. We are farmers; people sell their harvest and make money. But those that were lazy, were the thieves and when we caught them and we took them to the Baale. The leaders had farmlands they controlled. These farmlands were given to people, so it's only the lazy that will be hungry. The hardworking lacks nothing throughout the year. There were challenges with building and buying roofing sheets. But buildings could be constructed with Owe (communal efforts) and those who had worked hard would have raised money to roof their house, so that they can live in good houses".*

#### **6.2.5.6 Discussion on Theme Five: Strategies for Achieving Good Traditional Governance in Yoruba land**

##### **A Cultural Democracy**

This study has investigated the Yoruba traditional governance system so as to understand the strategies and arrangements that ensure its continuous effective performance, especially the strategies that ensure participation, responsiveness, accountability, prevention of abuse of power, dispute settlement; provision of

infrastructure development and poverty reduction. The findings reveal that the Yoruba traditional governance was able to achieve participatory and responsive governance because the political structure is democratic (Section 6.2.7.1.1). For the sake of distinguishing this democracy from western style democracy, the Yoruba governance can be called a cultural democracy. Democracy has been defined in this study as any government in which the people have the power to determine their ruler, by which laws they are ruled and how they also make the ruler conform to the will of the people (Gyekye 1997:133) (section 2.5.1). By this definition, therefore the Yoruba traditional political culture is a perfect democracy; even though it is at variance with Western democracy in many aspects as it shall be discussed below.

The democratic nature of Yoruba governance, which prevailed long before their interaction with the Europeans, questions the general claim that democracy originated from the Greeks. Afrocentrists such as Tiky (2012) and Asante (2005) have also argued that democracy had been practised in Africa (Egypt) before the Athenians. In line with Afrocentrist arguments, this researcher also argues that in relation to the origination of democracy, it is possible that Western democracy originated from the Greeks. However, if democracy is defined as any representative and responsive government, then such governance systems have existed in many cultures older than that of Athens and in societies, which never interacted with Europeans. African societies, especially in South West Nigeria, thus have many democratic principles to learn from.

### **Decentralization and Participation**

Examining the attributes of Yoruba cultural democracy, the findings established that the governance structure was highly decentralized and in multilevel (Section 6.2.7.1.1 a). The hierarchical arrangement included a capital city, headed by the king or Oba, followed by smaller towns and villages headed by chiefs or Baalẹ. The smallest political unit is the family compound (Agbo-ile), headed by the baale or family head (usually the oldest man in the family). Every leader was empowered to coordinate the development of his jurisdiction, in association with the members. Only unresolvable issues were forwarded to the next authority in the hierarchy. There were also Palace chiefs, who were the cabinet members of the King, overseeing various sectors of the kingdom and advising the king or Oba. These findings were in line with Fadipe (1970:200) which shows that the Yoruba state is hieratically organized into 'ilu' (town),

then subordinate towns or villages called 'abule' and the villages which also oversee smaller villages or hamlets called 'ileto'. Moreover, each of the political units is largely autonomous, except in extra-state relations which fall under the jurisdiction of the capital (ibid).

This finding means that the Yoruba decentralized structure guarantees majority participation and the representation of their interests given that the family, which is the smallest unit of any society, is represented. A family compound (Agbo-ile) houses an extended family made up of a few nuclear families. The family compound's representation in governance is also one local way governors get adequate information about the governed, thus enabling adequate planning for growth and development.

### **Consultation**

The findings confirmed that in the Yoruba political arrangement, the King or any other leadership must consult the representatives of the people before decisions were made (Section 6.2.7.1.1 c). Similarly, representatives of the family compounds and villages must regularly meet with the king to advise the cabinet and to present their family/village needs and priorities. The representatives must live among their people and consult with their community and family members to be conversant with their needs. This finding is in contrast with the findings about the current democratic governance in which public decisions are made without consultation with the people and the political representatives may choose not to live within their constituency after winning an election (Section 6.2.4.2). These findings are also in line with the argument of Emecheta and Onyemekara (2016:83), as well as, Omeiza (2008:13) that in Nigeria's democracy, the consent of the governed never matters to those governing them.

### **Integrity and High Moral Standard**

The findings established that responsiveness was guaranteed in the Yoruba governance system because only people of integrity and high moral standards were selected for leadership positions (Section 6.2.7.1.1 c). Political candidates in the traditional governance system must have been culturally immersed in 'Omoluwabi' (Maat/Ubuntu) attributes. These attributes were easily verifiable because candidates must have long dwelled among the people.

More so, there were no monetary gains attached to traditional political positions. Instead, representatives were volunteers (Section 6.2.7.1.1 e). This measure thus ensured that only committed and patriotic personalities aspired to political positions. These findings contradict Nigeria's democratic governance, which is excessively monetized and which places little emphasis on morality. According to Okurounmu (2010:61) and Uzorma (2014), in Nigeria, it is possible for corrupt people, ex-convicts and criminals to emerge as political office holders. One notable case of the insignificance of morality in the current Western-style democracy is the case of Diepreye Alamieyeseigha, former Governor of Bayelsa state. Although an ex-convict of various corruption crimes, Alamieyeseigha was accepted as a leader into the ruling party and he became the political godfather of President Goodluck Jonathan (HRW 2011). In 2013, President Goodluck Jonathan granted Alamieyeseigha a State pardon along with some other ex-political convicts (Mayah 2016,). In 2014, Alamieyeseigha was selected as a national delegate despite his record of moral decadence.

The findings established that the main foundation in the Yoruba governance was the culture and constitution. Corrupt behaviours were disgraceful. In line with this finding, Waliggo (2005:2) shows that public morality in Africa is based on a strong sense of shame for the individual who behaves contrary to the common good of the community and its values and such an individual could face a stringent punishment such as, exclusion and banishment. However, the constitution that guides Western democracy in Nigeria is sometimes at variance with cultural values and morality. Waliggo (2005:4) argues that the reason for this variance is because most constitutions in Africa are modifications of colonial laws and thus, are Eurocentric and do not fit perfectly with the local culture and moral values of indigenous people. According to Mathebula (2014:9342), this divergence created a modern culture which shamelessly supports corruption in the public sector and immorality in the societies because the law fails to impose stringent, punitive measures

Nigeria's immoral political system is an evidence of the weakness of the democratic constitution. There are actions, which can be morally wrong and yet constitutionally right in Nigeria. For example, although constitutional, the presidential pardon granted to Diepreye Alamieyeseigha was regarded by many as against good conscience and a blow on anti-corruption (Suraju 2013). Another example is the case of John Yusufu, a public officer who was convicted of three counts of theft of N32.8 billion

pension funds. Surprisingly, the judge gave Yusufu the option to pay a fine of N250,000 for each of the three counts or spend two years in jail. The accused paid the total fine of N750,000 (2.3 per cent of the amount stolen) and was freed (Ogundele 2013). The judgement was widely criticised as it violated the spirit of morality (Suraju 2013). Learning from the Yoruba culture, achieving good governance requires that the law is in conformity with morality.

### **People's Power**

The findings show that another strategy that ensured good governance in the Yoruba culture was that local citizens had power over their representatives. If the people believed that a political leader was no longer representing their interests, they had the power to report him to higher authorities and subsequently remove him (Section 6.2.7.1.1 d). This finding means that in the Yoruba governance system, power really belonged to the people, which is the true essence of democracy. The consciousness of the people's power also ensures that leadership consult the people regularly and serve their interests. This is in contrast to the new democratic governance in which people's power is only limited to voting in general elections. Even when the citizens are not satisfied with the performance of an elected representative, they are forced to wait until such complete their tenure because the constitutional deposition process in the new democracy is cumbersome (Atuba 2017).

### **Supremacy of the Culture**

The findings confirm that in Yoruba traditional governance, the oracle has the final say in the determination of who rules as king, even though there may be a contest at the family level. According to the findings of this study, the voice of the oracle is the voice of the people (Section 6.2.7.1.1 b). This culture demonstrates the African belief in the spiritual and in the interconnectedness of all things, both the living and the ancestors. The inclusion of the spiritual in the election process is what gives it cultural legitimacy and that is one reason the Yoruba people respect their traditional institutions. According to Oladumiye and Adiji (2014:2), the authority, integrity, and honour of the traditional process are because of the inseparableness of divinity and the royalty of monarchical institutions in Yoruba Kingship. Even in present day, many Yoruba believe in the spiritual and the affective.

### **Accountability through Training, Oath Taking and Deposition**

In relation to accountability of leadership, the findings established that the Yoruba traditional governance had traditional checks and balance to prevent abuse of power (Section 6.2.7.1.1 a, b, c). First, there was no concentration of power in any particular position or personality. There was always a higher authority to which the people could report an obstinate leader and the higher authority could advise, warn, discipline or remove the erring leader. The king must not make decisions alone, without the council or cabinet chiefs, as well as, the representatives of the people. Moreover, there was also a cultural process for the deposition of an oppressive king, in such a situation, the people had the power to tell him to “open the calabash” which was a demand for the king’s death by his own hands. Other strategies to ensure accountability included leadership training and oath swearing. Before assuming his duties, a king had to undergo several months of training in traditional religion, administration, behaviour of Obas and the traditional constitution. The King and other leaders were made to swear an oath to the oracle that they would be accountable, truthful and transparent to the people. It is believed that any leader who contravenes the oath to the culture will die. This belief is one reason the Yoruba people trust the leadership in the traditional system

### **Communal Effort**

In relation to provision of social infrastructure, the findings established that in the traditional governance system, all community members through communal effort, jointly provided public goods such as security, roads and water. The responsibility of leadership was to mobilize this cooperation (Section 6.2.7.3.1). Thus, people did not depend solely on the government. Definitely, no government has the resources to provide all the needs of its citizens and it has been shown that Nigeria’s oil resources are not enough to meet the country’s infrastructural needs; even if there has been no corruption. Arguably, resource mobilization from within the society holds more benefit than obtaining external loans with stringent conditionality. This was one of the success secrets of the Awolowo’s tenure (1952-1959), which is regarded as a good government. For example, in August 1954, about 400,000 children turned up to register for free education, as against the projected 170,000. Instead of turning the children back for lack of infrastructure or taking foreign loans to build schools, the Awolowo government resulted to the indigenous culture of communal effort to solve

the school infrastructural problems (Awolowo, 1981). Consequently, the government solicited the support of communities in building additional classrooms while government provided the roofing. Instead of employing expatriates as teachers to fill the manpower gap in the education sector, the government solicited the services of all retired teachers until more local teachers could be trained. This cooperative and communal approach to governance increased participation, citizens' patriotism and collective ownership (Mabogunje 2016).

### **Truthful Adjudication: Combined judicial, legislative and executive functions**

The findings established that in Yoruba governance, settlement of disputes and other judicial matters were decentralised and the adjudication duties were handled by the same representatives or leaders of the people, for example, family heads, village heads and kings (Section 6.2.7.4.).

Unresolvable issues were transferred to the next authority in the hierarchy while the king was last resort of all arbitration. These findings can be interpreted to mean that the judicial, legislative and executive functions were combined together in the same leadership in Yoruba traditional governance. It is believed that the traditional leaders were always unbiased because they had sworn an oath to be truthful. The findings show that the success of the system in terms of dispute settlement or the judicial responsibilities of the leaders were achieved because of the citizens and leaders' respect for the culture. The combination of the judicial, legislative and executive functions in the same leadership, as practised in the Yoruba governance system, is in contrast to the current democratic governance in which these functions are separated. The advantages of a government with combined functions include, low cost of government administration and prevention of friction among the machineries of governance (Onyishi and Eme, 2013).

Many scholars (such as Mabogunje 2016, Osieke 2006, Onyishi and Eme, 2013) have particularly criticised the American style presidential system of government being practised in Nigeria because it requires a separate executive, judiciary and legislature. In terms of cost, the presidential system of government is particularly much more expensive than the parliamentary system of government, which was adopted at independence in 1960. The Nigerian presidential system is characterized by a large legislative and a large executive cabinet with several senior and junior special advisers

and numerous personal assistants, all of whom are entitled to high salaries and bogus allowances (Osieke 2006). The legislators are also powerful and their position lucrative so that the government is bedevilled by regular friction between the executive and the legislative arms of government (Onyishi and Eme, 2013). These problems are not in the Yoruba traditional governance model.

### **Poverty Eradication through Hard Work and Equal Access to Resources**

The findings show that under the indigenous system, poverty was a rare phenomenon. This study shows that communal culture and hard work were values which ensured equality and productivity among the indigenous people. Every individual was required to engage in farming and there was access to land (Section 6.2.7.5.1). The Yoruba have a culture of hard work and they are not averse to any job. The Yoruba have a proverb, "*ise l'oogun ise*" meaning, "the antidote for poverty is work". Another Yoruba saying is, "*ise ni ise nje*", which literally means, "*Work is work, no matter the profession*". This finding is in line with the argument of Zubeiru (2010:5) that African people did not know underdevelopment until the Europeans defined them as underdeveloped and made them so. However, Western civilization, formal education and high paying colonial jobs led to a reorientation from traditional economic activities such as, farming (Orji 2012). Nevertheless, Nigeria does not have the technical knowledge to industrialize and create sufficient modern jobs. Arguably, the reason for high unemployment and poverty is the limited number of firms compared to the large number of Nigerian educated graduates looking for work. Unfortunately, most of these graduates are unwilling to go back to agriculture, which due to years of government neglect, is highly subsistent and non-mechanized.

The findings also established that the equal access to farmland and other social resources was one key factor that helped eradicate poverty among the pre-colonial Yoruba. This is in contrast with neo-liberal policies, which mainly drive economic growth with no consideration for equitable distribution (Presbey 2002). Neo-liberalism creates opportunities for a select number of privileged Nigerians to be stupendously rich, while the majority live in abject poverty (section 3.2.1). Even if the teeming number of Nigerian unemployed individuals chooses to go into agriculture, access to land will be a major problem apart from several other challenges. The findings, however, show that in the pre-colonial Yoruba governance system, land was communally owned and available to anyone willing to farm.



Udoekanem et al (2014:183) explained that the traditional land system was destroyed during colonial rule. The colonial masters seized all lands through colonial laws. Subsequent land policies in the post-colonial Nigeria also remain oppressive and do not grant citizens easy access to land (ibid). Poverty reduction strategies must therefore pay attention to equality and access to resources by the poor.

### **6. 3. Analysis of Quantitative findings**

The data obtained using the questionnaire was analysed using Microsoft Excel and the results are presented in tables and graphical forms, such as, pie charts and bar charts. Out of the 150 questionnaires administered, 148, representing 98.6 per cent of the participants were found useful for analysis while 2 (representing 1.3 per cent) of the participants, were poorly filled and thus disregarded.

The overall objective of the questionnaire was to collect information on the views of the local people on key socio-economic development issues that form their expectation of governance and their perception of governance performance. The data was analysed according to the four sections of the questionnaire namely: participants' demography, problem analysis, the perception of institutional performance and citizens' participation.


#### **6.3.1 Participants' Demography**

The age, gender, occupation, level of education and the level of income of the participants are presented below, using narratives, percentages, pie charts and bar charts.

##### **(a) Age**

The chart 6.1 below shows the age distribution of the participants. All the participants were adults. 31.8 per cent were between 18 and 40 years, 23.6 per cent were 31-40 years, 22.3 per cent were 41-50 years, 16.9 per cent were 51-60 years, while only 5.4 per cent of the respondents were 61 and above. The large number of the participants below 40 years is in line with official statistics and reports, which state that the Nigerian population is largely youthful (NBS 2011).


**Chart 6.1 Age Distribution of Participants**



**(b) Gender**

Although the participants were randomly selected, there were slightly more males than female. Specifically, 56.1 per cent of the respondents were males while 43.9 were females as shown in Chart 6.2 below. Given that the difference was very small, the sample can still be referred to as fairly gender balanced.

**Chart 6.2 Genders of the Participants**




**(c) Occupations of the Respondents**

In terms of the occupations of respondents, 47 per cent of them were civil servants, 20 per cent were students, 18 per cent were self-employed, and 12 per cent were traders, while only 3 per cent were farmers. Chart 7.3 below shows the occupations of

the participants. The large number of civil servants in the sample is also in line with reports that the Nigerian government is the largest employer of labour (Ayoade and Akinsanya 2011:314). This also implies that the government is very important to the lives of the people. The small size (3 per cent) of the respondents engaging in farming (even though farming is the traditional activity of Southwest, Nigeria) is in line with the qualitative findings that Western civilization and formal education have created a lack of interest, by the citizens, to engage in traditional activities especially agriculture (section 6.2.6.).


**Chart 6.3 Occupations of the Participants**



**(d) Educational Qualifications of the Participants**

In terms of education, most of the participants (70.9 per cent) have tertiary education. 20.3 per cent have secondary school education while only 3.4 per cent of the participants had no formal education (Chart 6.4). These findings are also similar to the qualitative findings in which 75 per cent of the participants have tertiary education. As explained in section 6.2.1, the Southwestern Nigeria had early exposure to Western education and embraced it. This also explains why many of them have neglected traditional activities, especially farming, because colonial education is associated with a desire for modern office jobs (Orji 2012).


**Chart 6.4 Educational Qualifications of Participants**



**(e) Participants' Income**

The analysis of participants' income shows that 60.1 per cent of the respondents earn less than N50,000 (that is less than \$120) a month., 26.4 per cent earn between N50,000 and N100000 while only 13.5 per cent of the participants earn above N100,000 (\$240) per month as shown in Chart 6.5 below. The large percentage of low-income earners in the study is in line with official reports that poverty level is very high in Nigeria (NBS 2010).

**Chart 6.5: Monthly Income of Participants**




### 6.3.2 Problem Analysis

This section of the questionnaire aimed to find the four (4) most pertinent development problems the citizens were facing and the institutions (whether modern or indigenous) which have been assisting them to solve the problems. It also aimed to find in order of preference, seven out of 23 issues which would improve participants' standard of living the most. This was to find out which issues were most important to the citizens if prioritized as a development agenda and which would translate to a better life for them. The section also aimed to find out if the standard of living had improved or worsened with the implementation of democracy and good governance in Nigeria in general and in Osun State in particular.

#### (a) Important Development Challenges to Respondents

**Chart 6.6: Problem Analysis: Emerging Issues**



Participants were asked to list the four (4) most important problems that were identified in their community. They were also asked to mention who they believe was responsible to solve the problems, which institutions they approached to solve the problems and why they preferred those institutions. These were purely qualitative or open ended questions; as participants were not given any options as answers. Consequently, nine issues emerged from the responses namely: electricity, roads, water, unemployment, security, low income, education health and corruption. Although these issues were not mentioned in any order of priority, the analysis shows that 56.1 per cent and 50.0 per cent of the participants mentioned poor electricity and

bad roads respectively as their major challenges. The water and unemployment were also regarded as important problems by 39.2 per cent and 30.4 per cent of respondents respectively. Only 16.9 per cent of the participants identified corruption as part of the four important problems in the community (Chart 6.6).

### **(b) Participants' Means of Addressing Emerging Issues**

Similarly, participants were asked to mention who or which institution was responsible for providing a solution to each of the problems they identified and which institution or persons they actually approached in order to solve the problem. For all the cases identified, most of the respondents believe the government was responsible to solve all the problems identified (see table 6.2). Nevertheless, many of the respondents did not approach any government institution in order to alleviate most of the problems. Rather, they sought alternative and indigenous solutions such as, the community and trade associations, the village chiefs, their relatives and friends, their religious associations or they made their own private provision (see table 6.2).

**Table 6.2: Problem Analysis: Participants' Means of Addressing Emerging Issues**

Problems	Agency Perceived to be Responsible for Solving Problem		Where Participants go in order to alleviate problem	
	% of Participants that say Government Responsible	% of Participants that say others are Responsible	Government Institutions	Others/ Indigenous Solutions
Water	94.8	5.2	21.1	78.9
Roads	87.8	12.2	23.1	76.9
Electricity	92.8	7.2	66.7	33.3
Security	71.8	28.2	54.5	45.5
Education	82.1	17.9	51.4	48.6
Health	100.0	0.0	46.2	53.8
Corruption	86.7	13.3	77.8	22.2
Unemployment	87.1	12.9	18.2	81.8
Low income	100.0	0.0	27.8	72.2
Others	96.9	3.1	40.6	59.4


The participants were also asked the reason for choosing the institutions they approached to solve their problems. Many of the respondents who chose to visit government institutions said that only the government has the capacity to address those problems. Participants who choose to use indigenous institutions and alternative provisions explained that these other institutions were closer to the people, they were reliable, responsive and operated by collective participation. These findings further show that the indigenous institutions are still found to be very useful even in modern times and they are effective. These findings are in line with the qualitative findings of this study which show that the indigenous governance system has continued to be

effective in the rural areas and among small indigenous groups and trade associations. These findings are in line with the studies of Olowu and Erero (1995) and Okunmadewa et al (2005:4) that traditional institutions in Nigeria have continued to support the welfare of the local citizens, especially in the rural areas. In line with the findings of these studies, Mengisteab (2009:182) also shows that African rural populations continue to adhere to the indigenous institutions because these institutions provide services in a manner that their communities identify with.

**(a) Seven Development Priorities of Participants in Order of Preference.**

To further investigate what the development priorities of citizens are, participants were given a list of 23 development goals/issues and they were asked to select 7 issues which they believed, if attended to by the government, would most improve their standard of living over the next four years. They were to make their choice in order of preference by attaching weights to the choices, in which case the first choice would have a weight of 7 while the lowest would have a weight of 1. The analyses of the responses are presented in Chart 6.7 and Chart 6.8.

**Chart 6.7: Seven Development Priorities in Order of Preference**




Analysing the participants' choices according to the weight attached to each item on the list, employment came first, followed by a reduction in the cost of goods, and electricity came third, followed by good roads, health care and education, while water was the seventh. These responses also corroborate the findings in the qualitative



phase where participants defined good governance in terms of welfare improvement; especially the availability of the means to meet basic needs and the provision of infrastructure such as, good roads, electricity, health and good quality education.

**Chart 6.8: Participants' Development Needs by Priority**



It is important to mention that three governance-related development goals were included in the list namely: (i) curtail bribery and corruption (ii) transparent and accountable government and (iii) more free and fair elections. However, none of these issues came up among the first seven development priorities of the participants. Instead, 'more free and fair elections' was rated 8<sup>th</sup>, the transparent and accountable government was rated 9<sup>th</sup>, while 'curtail bribery and corruption' was rated 14<sup>th</sup>. These

findings also corroborate the qualitative findings, which show that issues relating to elections and anti-corruption are rated below infrastructure. But these findings should not be interpreted to mean that citizens do not consider 'transparent and accountable government' important because it is an issue rated above 12 important development issues such as 'access to credit', 'control of crime' and 'provision of housing'. However, the findings confirm that many governance issues become a concern to citizens only after their basic needs of survival have been met.


These findings on development priorities of citizens in South West Nigeria are particularly unique because few of such studies exist in developing countries, especially Nigeria. Remarkably, citizens' development priorities in our case studies are in line with the findings of the United Nations' (UN) MY World survey and the South African Social Attitudes Survey (SASAS) conducted by the Human Sciences Research Council (HRSC) both of which seek to find development priorities of citizens. The data emerging from the UN's MY World Survey in 2016, show that respondents around the world rate non-governance issues, such as, good education, better health care, and good employment more important than governance issues (<http://data.myworld2015.org/>). The choice of 'an honest and responsive government' however emerged as one of the top six priorities but it came largely from respondents in high-income countries. The 2012 SASAS shows that the four top-ranked development priorities of South Africans are unemployment, poverty, crime and safety and HIV/AIDS. The issue of governance, especially corruption, was rated fifth and it only came ahead of service provision, education, and affordable housing. Moreover, the Survey showed that 70 per cent of the respondents were satisfied with the public provision of healthcare, education, social grants, and housing. Thus, governance only becomes a concern to the citizens after they are somewhat content with the level of social service.

In the case of Nigeria, it can be inferred from the qualitative findings that the reason why popular governance issues are rated below issues relating to welfare and infrastructure is that citizens have totally lost faith in the processes of democratic governance such as, elections and anti-corruption campaigns, which are perceived to be also corrupt and anti-welfare. Given their inability to effect change in a Western/elite controlled democratic system, poor citizens can only cry for the provision of basic amenities necessary for their survival. This indicates that it is high time that the

international community recognizes that the hardship of poverty in Nigeria is a major crisis that demands urgent intervention which would have an immediate impact on the welfare of the poor. Nigeria urgently needs investments in education, health, and infrastructure to deliver the masses from poverty and uncountable deaths; only after this is done will the poor stop selling their votes. Instead, governance reforms by the World Bank and IMF require a reduction in public spending for the support of social and economic sectors (Welch 2000). As shown in Section 2.11 donors' support for good governance and poverty reduction has focused on granting loans which cannot be invested in productive sectors that are capable of generating growth and poverty reduction, sectors such as agriculture and infrastructure (UNDP 2011:170). These loans are actually for repaying existing debts or for financing government capacity building or liberalization policies (Dembele 2004). It does mean that the donors' credit facilities do not reach the poor but end up in the pockets of consultants and civil servants who have no political power to effect changes that will improve the welfare of the poor masses.

### (c) Standard of Living Now, Compared to Before 2010

**Chart 6.9: Participant's Standard of Living Now Compared to 2010**



Only 22 per cent of the respondents said that their standard of living in 2017 is better than in 2010. Majority of the respondents (62 per cent) said that their standard of living now in 2017, is worse than as it was in 2010. The main reason given was poor income

and the high cost of goods. However, 16 per cent of the participants stated that there had not been any change in their standard of living (see chart 6.9). In other words, 78 per cent of the participants stated that there had not been any improvement in their welfare despite the country's advancement in economic and governance reforms. These findings corroborate the qualitative findings which showed that 92 per cent of the participants complained that democratic governance had not been able to improve their well-being because life was harder in 2017 than it was ten years before (section 6.2.4.1).


### **6.3.3. Perception of institutional Performance**

This section aimed to establish the perception of the citizens about the performance of the state and local governments in the era of democracy and good governance, including the perception of the control of corruption and the quality of public services.

#### **(a) Satisfaction with State and Local Government Performance**

Most of the respondents were not satisfied with the performance of the state and local governments (Chart 6.10). Specifically, 89.3 per cent and 86.1 per cent of the respondents said they were not satisfied with the performance of the state government and the local government respectively. These findings corroborate the qualitative findings of the participants' assessment of democratic governance, which showed that 92 per cent of the interview participants were disappointed in the democratic governance, which was said to be pervaded with a decline in welfare and political corruption (section 6.2.4).


**Chart 6.10: Perception of State and Local Government Performance**



**(b) Perception of Corruption in 2017 Compared to 2010**

The majority (63.9 per cent) of the respondents were of the opinion that the level of corruption in the state had not reduced. While 41.8 per cent believed the level of corruption had actually increased. 22.1 per cent felt that the level of corruption had remained the same. However, 36.1 per cent opined that the level of corruption had reduced (see chart 6.11). This also corroborates the qualitative findings in which 95 per cent of the participants stated that they did not believe that democratic governance had reduced corrupt practices in Nigerian government institutions, despite the implementation of several anti-corruption reforms (6.2.4.2 (c)). It can be interpreted that anti-corruption campaigns have not been able to abate corruption considerably.


**Chart 6.11: Perception of Corruption in 2017 Compared to 2010**



**(c) Perception of the Quality of Public Services in 2017 Compared to 2010**

Some of the participants (31.1 per cent) believed there had been an improvement in the quality of public services and facilities, such as hospitals, public schools, water services, electricity, road infrastructure, and security in Osun State. However, 68.9 per cent of the participants said that the quality of public services in Osun State had not improved compared to 2010. While 23 per cent felt that the quality of public service had remained unchanged, 45.9 per cent believed the quality of public services has deteriorated (Chart 6.12). These percentages corroborate the findings in the qualitative phase in which participants stated that public services especially, healthcare, education and infrastructure, were in a poor state (section 6.2.4.1). Thus, the perception of the participants in this study is that there has not been significant improvement in Osun State's public services despite democratic governance reforms.


**Chart 6.12: Perception of the Quality of Public Services in 2017 Compared to 2010**



**(d) Unofficial Payments to Access Public Services**

In order to access public services, 62.1 per cent of the participants have had to make unofficial payments. 14 per cent of the participants said they always make unofficial payments to get access to public services, 48.1 per cent said they had made unofficial payments occasionally. However, 37.9 per cent said they had never made any unofficial payment to get public services (Chart 6.13). This finding further substantiates earlier findings on the unabated corruption among public servants and poor service delivery in the study location.

**Chart 6.13 Unofficial Payments for Public Service**




#### **6.3.4. Citizens' Participation**

This section aimed to understand if there were channels available to citizens to draw the attention of the government to their problems. It also aimed to find out the participation of citizens in government through voting.

##### **(a) Means of Drawing Government's Attention to Local Needs**

**Chart 6.14: Means of Drawing Government's Attention to Local Needs**






Participants were asked if there are structures or means of drawing government attention to community needs. 74 per cent of the participants said no such means of drawing government attention existed, 26 per cent of the participants said they had means of communicating their needs to the government (Chart 6.14). However, further enquiries showed that the participants that said they had means of drawing the attention of the government mainly depended on the social media and not on any official channel. This finding corroborates the findings in the qualitative phase in which all (100 per cent) of the participants agreed that the practice of consultation with the people is lacking in the democratic governance era (section 6.2.4.3). The implication is that the government is distant from the people and public investment may not address the citizens' main concerns. This study concluded that there is a lack of consultation between the government and the citizens and there is a low involvement of the citizens in Nigeria's democratic governance.

#### **(b) Active Participation in Public Forum**

Participants were asked if they had participated in any public forum where they expressed their views on any issue within the last two years. Only 14 per cent of the participants said they had spoken in any public forum, mainly community associations. 86 per cent of the respondents had never spoken in any public forum (Chart 6.15). This finding echoes earlier findings that the formal structures for the participation of citizens and consultation in Nigeria's democratic governance are inadequate.


**Chart 6.15: Active Participation in Public Forum**



In line with these findings, Yahaya (2011:102) in his assessment of governance in Nigeria, also noted that although the legislators have the opportunity to interact with local stakeholders on policy issues, they hardly visit their constituencies let alone interact with those in their constituencies on pressing national constituency issues (ibid). In addition, the provision of constituency offices and allowances for legislators which should be used to facilitate public deliberation of issues are often diverted for personal use by the legislators (ibid).

**(c) Voting in Elections**

**Chart 6.16: Participants that Voted During the Last Elections**



The study found that there has been no local government election in Osun State since the new administration took over in 2010. The researcher learnt that the last set of elected Local Government chairmen had all been removed unconstitutionally by the Governor and the situation became a court case. However, as at the time of the study, the local governments were headed by government appointees and not by elected representatives. However, for the last state government elections, 55.6 per cent of the respondents said they voted, while 44.4 per cent said they did not vote. 62.7 per cent of the respondents voted in the last Federal government elections, while 37.3 per cent did not vote (Chart 6.16). The reasons for not voting included lack of voters' cards, non-accreditation by The Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) and total loss of trust in the Nigerian democracy.

The findings are in line with the argument of this study in Section 3.2.2 (c) about the weakness of elections as a tool of accountability due to the high rate of electoral fraud, which makes the citizens' votes of no relevance in the new democratic governance. Adams (2016) also shows that given that the state administers the elections of the local government, the rate of election malpractices is even higher at this level because local government elections are either rigged for the allies of the Governor to win, or they are not held at all (ibid). The emerging Chairmen of the local government are thus, unrepresentative.

## **Conclusion**

This chapter has presented and discussed the findings of the current study, which was conducted in three towns in Osun State, South West Nigeria. Major findings include local citizens' conceptualization of good governance, their assessments of the democratic governance and their development priorities. The findings also established local issues affecting governance in Nigeria and the strategies that ensure good governance in the Yoruba culture. Following the findings and the interpretation of the collected data, this study proposes a good governance framework for South West Nigeria which fully captures the issues raised by the participants, as well as, incorporates the strategies of indigenous governance in Yoruba culture. This will be the focus of the next chapter.

## CHAPTER SEVEN

### 7.0 Presentation of the Context-Specific Good Governance Model

#### 7.1 Introduction

In the previous chapter, the empirical findings of this study were presented, interpreted and discussed. As stated in Chapter One (Section 1.4), the last objective of this research is to develop a context-specific good governance model for South West Nigeria, which adequately reflects the local issues, culture and aspirations of local people in the region. Many of the contextual issues considered when developing this model are highlighted in the previous chapters of this study and in the study findings. This chapter presents the context-specific model and its limitations.

#### 7.2 A Context-Specific Good Governance Recommendation

As an Afrocentric study, recommendations for solutions must emanate from the viewpoints, interests, and concerns of the local citizens; based on their identification and interpretation of the problems (Mkabela 2005:180). Following the findings of this study, two governance models have been proposed. The first model shall be for the government at the federal/national level while the second shall be a regional good governance strategy. These models are typified in figure 7.1 and Figure 7.2.

##### 7.2.1 A Context-Specific Good Governance Model at the Federal Level

This study recommends four main rearrangements at the federal level that can promote good governance in Nigeria and address the country's socio-political realities such as ethnic problems, corrupt socio-political behaviour, poverty and Western dependency. This good governance model is depicted in figure 7.1.

##### **1. A federal structure that reflects Nigeria's Ethnic diversities and historical and political reality**

This study argues that in Nigeria, since the ethnic bond is stronger than the bond of nationalism, the reduction of central power and the increase of self-governance by the sub-national governments are critical to achieving peaceful coexistence and the unity necessary for good governance and development (section 3.6). Two main recommendations are specifically proposed:

- a) Sub-national governments are autonomous and fairly ethnically homogenous regions;
- b) Fiscal and administrative power formerly concentrated at the federal level to be devolved to the regions.

The study has shown in Chapter Three (Section 3.6) that Nigeria runs an ethnically biased political system, which makes it difficult for it to produce competent and accountable leadership. Political parties in Nigeria are often formed along the major ethnic groups (Uwaifo 2016:2, Nnabuihe 2014:160,). Similarly, political parties in Nigeria also often capitalize on the ethnic divides existing in the country to base their campaign on these factors instead of the capability of candidates and the innovativeness of the party's development agenda (Adibe 2015:4; Uwaifo 2016:2). Ethnic and religious cleavages are found to be so strong in Nigeria that electorates believe voting for a tribesman or close tribal allies is the key to preventing dominance by another ethnic group and gaining access to national resources (Adibe 2015:4; Ibrahim et al 2015:8). Various analyses of voting behaviour since independence also confirm that the choices of the electorate are largely influenced by ethnicity and the religion of the candidates (Ibrahim et al 2015:8). Consequently, during each election, the emphasis is on ethnic sentiments rather than the appropriateness of the candidates (Umezina 2012:216). The concentration of revenue and power at the federal level also fuels various ethnic problems such as, bloody coup plots, cessation threats, civil war, sectional political parties and agitation over the revenue sharing formula (Elaigwu 2007:14). Arguably, the current federal arrangement is unable to adequately take care of the ethnic divide in the country and its subsequent problems.

Based on the earlier findings, this study proposes a federal arrangement where the sub-national governments are ethnically homogenous regions. Moreover, the sub-national governments should be largely autonomous; that is, power will no longer be concentrated at the centre but devolved to the sub-national government level. In this proposed arrangement, each region will manage its economy, its natural resources, generate its own income, and then pay a percentage as tax to the federal/central government. The country will then become the confederation of fairly independent states. This arrangement is similar to the federal structure as at 1960. In fact, the early nationalists actually fought for self-governance of the regional units, which was a sort

of ethnic self-rule (Musa and Hassan 2014:317, Nnabuihe 2014:160, Dunmoye 1990:90). Consequently, at independence in 1960, the federal arrangement was such that each of the three federating units was autonomous and self-sufficient; while the federal government was comparatively weaker. But during the long years of military rule, Nigeria's federalism became highly centralized.

The proposed federal model does not mean the disintegration of the country Nigeria, but it accommodates various cultures as largely autonomous, fiscal and administrative units so that every group finds political expression. Ethnic autonomy will also give the citizens and all voters the sense of ownership of government and with a weaker national/federal government, there will be fewer struggles for tribal representation. More so, political appointments can truly be based on merit rather than unprofessional criteria like, ethnicity. Similarly, since the regions will not be receiving allocations from the federal government, they will be forced to develop their regional economic base and seek internal sources of funding. Umezina (2012:216) summarized the advantages of granting power to the sub-national government. These include the removal of the negative effects of the federal character clause in Nigerian politics, the removal of the problems associated with the federal allocation formula, the removal of mediocrity in government, the discouragement of jumbo pay packages and the encouragement of hard work.

## **2. Restoration of cultural sense of value and morality**

This study has shown that due to colonial influence and Westernization, many cultural values, which ensured good moral behaviour, have been eroded in Nigerian societies. Value can be defined as those behaviours that are acceptable in the society and it is synonymous with morality (Obasola 2015:2). From an Afrocentric perspective, culture is the starting point for any discussion relating to morals (Dei 2012:106; Asante 1991:2003). Cultural values determine how individuals will behave in the society, as well as, when participating in political affairs. Moreover, African ethics and cultural values are rooted in communalism and humanness (Section 4.3). Communalism encourages a collective way of life and discourages the pursuit of individual goals at the expense of the community (Oyedola and Oyedola 2015:87). Viewed politically, communalism promotes public access to societal resources so that every member has a share in the benefits of such resources. Humanness describes the attainment of high moral status.

This study shows that the cultural values of communalism and humanness have been overridden by the Eurocentric culture of materialism and individualism, which also created new self-seeking and greedy wealth-accumulating behaviour among Nigerians (Omotosho 1998; Nduka 1975). Eurocentric ideologies particularly consider African culture as a barrier to development. Consequently, at the introduction of formal or colonial education, students were kept in boarding schools to detach them from the local culture and re-orientate them to embrace Western culture and ideologies (Garba, 2012:57). Colonial education created curricula which made students unconsciously assimilate European cultures, languages and ideologies and inferiorized local culture (Skinner 1997:174). Many schools in Nigeria today are proud to use American and British curricula while vernacular and indigenous knowledge are prohibited (Alebiosu 2016:24). Through the influence of westernization and the colonial education system, the cultural values of Nigerian society became eroded (Isola 2016:1). Definitely, education was one colonial tool for the superimposition of European culture and ways of learning on the indigenous people; to the displacement of local culture and indigenous intellectualism.

Two main recommendations are proposed here in order to restore the lost sense of values:

**a) Decolonized education to inculcate cultural values in citizens from childhood**

The same way education was used to erode our culture, the school systems can be a major tool of cultural revitalization and moral education. This requires the decolonization of Nigeria's educational system by incorporating curricula that re-teach students to understand and appreciate cultural values such as, honesty, hard work, contentment, patriotism and appreciation of indigenous culture, language, food and ways of life. Education can be defined as the institutions for imparting knowledge and skills and for the transmission or advancement of the cultural values of a particular society (Pious 2005:82, Kneller 1971:38). Consequently, education should be structured to teach and inculcate the students with the cultural values of Nigerian societies and not alien values from foreign cultures. Indigenous education in the pre-colonial societies was comprehensive and functional. It was indigenous because it did not only teach intellectualism and vocations but it also taught moral development (Garba, 2012:55, Pious 2005:84). Likewise, the formal educational system should be made comprehensive to teach cultural values.

Currently, the Nigerian formal educational system does not adequately focus on teaching and imparting moral values in students (Avwersuoghene 2013:35). An analysis of the curriculum of secondary schools in Nigerian, as contained in the National Policy on Education (2004), shows that moral education is not part of the core subjects taught in schools (Avwersuoghene 2013:37); whereas the curriculum provides that subjects such as English language, French, Mathematics, Integrated Science, Social Studies, Biology, Chemistry, Physics Geography and Religious Studies are core subjects in which students will be critically assessed (ibid). Although a subject like Social Studies has some moral values in its contents, the benefits of such a limited inclusion cannot be as much as if moral instructions formed a core subject. Moreover, given the high level of moral decadence in Nigeria, making cultural values and moral instructions, core subjects has become highly necessary.

#### **b) Amendment of the laws from complex Eurocentrism to reflect public morality**

To complement the revitalization of cultural values through the educational system, the Nigerian Constitution and the laws guiding the Nigerian society must reflect cultural values and public morality. The Constitution should not necessarily be based on what is legal in the Western sense but what is right in the Nigerian cultural setting, as well as, what is fair and of good conscience. The Constitution and the laws must reward good moral behaviour and punish immoral behaviour. A law which has instant, grievous punishment for petty thieves but makes complex provisions that can be interpreted in such ways that they protect those who embezzle large amounts of public funds is an amoral constitution by any standard.

When there is no grievous penalty for corrupt behaviour, definitely immoral behaviour will continue to pervade the country. In Nigeria, the punishment for grand corruption can be very small and negligible as shown in John Yusufu's case. Yusufu was convicted N32.8 billion pension funds fraud but given an option to pay a total fine of N750,000 (2.3 percent of the amount stolen) and was freed (Ogundele 2013; Suraju 2013). Such a judgement was widely criticised as violating the spirit of morality (Suraju 2013). Similarly, alleged corruption cases committed by the political elite are often suppressed by the courts. For example, in 2006, 31 of the 36 state governors were accused of grand scale corruption by the EFCC but none of those governors was brought to justice (HRW 2011). Moreover, the granting of presidential pardons to ex-political convicts has permitted corrupt politicians to continue to hold high-level



positions (Mayah 2016, Suraju 2013, and HRW 2011). The message being sent is that when men who are morally decadent are celebrated and held in high esteem, then it pays to be corrupt and so, there is no motivation for the younger generation to practise high moral standards. To be able to revive the Nigerian sense of value, the Nigerian laws must not allow citizens with record of corrupt behaviour, even with a presidential pardon, and ill-gotten wealth to participate in politics.

### **3. Implementation of African-centred policies that seek only the interest of the Nigerian masses**

The third recommendation is the need to prioritize citizens' needs and interests in policy formulation and implementation. That is African-centeredness. This study has shown how the main development strategies adopted by many African countries, including Nigeria, have been rooted in the Western world's development experience and these policies sometimes seek to protect Western/foreign interests, to the detriment of the local citizens. One main feature of mainstream development theories such as, modernization, Structural Adjustment Program (SAP), MDGs, and good governance is trade liberalization. With the poor state of Nigeria's infrastructure and the limited productive capacity to compete in the international market, trade liberalization only opens up the Nigerian economy to the dumping of Western products, killing the country's infant industries and also worsening poverty (Sundaram et al 2011:4). Meanwhile, even though the World Bank insists that African countries open up their economies, Western developed countries, based on WTO agreements, have strategic means of instituting trade restrictions, which prevent African countries from penetrating their markets (Clark 2015).

While the World Bank and other International Financial Institutions (IFIs) have positioned themselves as Nigeria's and Africa's development partners, it is important to note that these institutions also represent the West and often ensure that local socioeconomic conditions are conducive for Western interests (Gary and Karl 2001:15). For example, in the Nigerian oil sector, the IFIs cannot be exonerated from how the oil revenue has bred corruption and increased environmental degradation and poverty. As shown by Gary and Karl (2001:15), the World Bank usually provides direct finance for oil projects and grants political risk insurance for foreign investors in the oil sector. Consequently, the World Bank ensures that the oil producing country's political environment and policies continue to favour these foreign investors even if such

policies hurt the masses. Moreover, some IFIs especially, ECAs (Export Credit Agencies), operated by the governments of most industrialized countries particularly finance oil projects without requiring the project to meet minimum developmental, environmental or social standards (ibid). This also explains the level of degradation of the host communities and the poverty experienced in the Niger Delta communities in Nigeria.

For the reasons above, this researcher argues that nobody can seek and protect Africa's interests better than Africans; while no international governance and development policies can take care of the needs and interests of Nigerians better than citizen-centred, home-grown policies. Two main recommendations are therefore proposed in this model to achieve people-centred policies:

**a) Decolonised policy makers to formulate home-grown policies that incorporate local knowledge and focus on citizen's need**

To be able to develop people-centred policies, Nigeria needs policy makers who have been sufficiently mentally decolonized and have become African-centred in their orientation. Colonial mentality destroys the search for indigenous solutions and encourages western dependency. Unfortunately, due to the fact that many Nigerian intellectuals and policy makers are products of the colonial education, they are Western inclined in their policy simulations and usually assume that Western strategies and solutions are better, without thorough investigations into their suitability to local contexts (Obeng-Odoom 2013:170). Many universities are still running with colonial curricula, which have little relevance to Nigeria's developmental needs (Akpochofo 2006). Thus, these schools are equipping students with skills for which there are no job opportunities in Nigeria and graduates are forced to seek employment abroad. Thus, the school system continuously produces intellectuals with European perspectives and when they emerge as leaders, they adopt Western theories which promote European interests in Nigeria without question. Even when Nigerian political elites steal public funds, they usually invest their loot in Western developed countries (Ekwe-Ekwe 2013:824, Ayittey 2006:4).

Unfortunately, unless African policy makers stand in their own cultural space believe that their contextual perspective is just as valid as any other and it is the most suitable to address their challenges, African countries may never be able to achieve the

desired economic and political transformation we desire (Asante 1998:8). This does not mean Nigeria cannot not borrow or adopt development theories from other environments, however, they must suit the local context and they must be in the best interest of Nigerians. There must be a consciousness that Nigeria exists within an international environment that subjugates indigenous knowledge and subtly imposes Western economic and political interests over poor countries in the name of neo-liberalism, globalization, and good governance. As argued several times in this study, these policies have made many African countries poor and perpetually dependent on the West. Those who make foreign negotiations for Nigeria must consider the impact of such negotiations on the welfare of the citizens and the negotiators must be held responsible for any negative consequences. It is being proposed here that indigenous development theories should be explored in Nigeria while borrowed policies should be modified to suit local context.

**b) Priority given to the provision of welfare enhancing infrastructure and diversification of the economy**

Most importantly, any governance and development strategy to be adopted must prioritize the provision of infrastructure and income, as well as, the diversifying of the economy from a dependence on crude oil. This study has shown that the primary interest of the local citizens is to have their basic needs met and social infrastructure provided as a matter of urgency. Glaringly, the hardship of poverty in Nigeria has reached a state of emergency, demanding urgent attention. The need to attend to these issues outweighs any recommendation to make the government conform to any Western standards. Attention should be focused on making the government perform these basic functions. That is, the government has to be people-centred. Similarly, the overdependence of the government on oil revenue has made the country vulnerable to fluctuations in the price of crude oil. The diversification of the Nigerian economy is important for the government to be able to raise sustainable revenues to finance development.

#### **4. Low cost system of government administration**

This study has shown through the review of literature and empirical findings, that Nigeria's governance system is very expensive compared to the country's limited resources. The model proposed two main recommendations to achieve low cost governance.

##### **a) Reduction of the excessive remuneration attached to political positions**

Reducing outrageous incomes attached to elected positions is a necessity to achieving good governance in Nigeria. This study shows that political positions in Nigeria are excessively monetized. For example, Nigerian legislators earn as much as 166 times the amount of Nigeria's GDP per capita and they are the highest paid lawmakers in the world (Odemwingie 2015). The lucrativeness of political positions in Nigeria and the ease of amassing wealth from public funds has made the country's political terrain attractive to corrupt individuals and it has also contributed to other political challenges such as patronage, rigging, violence, as well as, the emergence of incompetent, repressive and unresponsive government officials (Yagboyaju 2011:102).

Reducing the excessive remuneration attached to political positions will create free funds for development purposes. It will also make political positions less attractive to greedy and bad individuals whose only intention for entering politics is to amass wealth for themselves. It will also reduce the violent struggles for political positions. If political processes can become peaceful and transparent, more citizens with good intentions and track records will participate in it.

##### **b) A change from the expensive American style presidential system**

To achieve a low cost government structure, Nigeria will need to change from the expensive American style presidential system to a cheaper model that serves the country's needs at minimum cost. The current presidential system requires a large number of legislators and huge executive cabinets with several senior and junior special advisers and numerous personal assistants, all of whom are entitled to high salaries and bogus allowances. Similarly, in Nigeria, the implementation of the checks and balances in the presidential system is bedevilled with many challenges, such as, regular friction between the executives and the legislators, as well as, the judiciary's

lack of independence (Section 3.2.2). The expensive American style governance is certainly not the right one to achieve good governance in Nigeria.

Apart from the presidential system, several other cheaper alternative government arrangements exist. In terms of cost, the parliamentary system of government adopted at independence is far cheaper than the presidential system of government. For example, in the parliamentary system, the ministers are usually selected from among the legislators. Mabogunje (2016) also proposes that Nigeria stands to gain from adopting a semi-presidential system, which is a government that combines the best features of both the parliamentary and the presidential systems. The semi-presidential system has the post of Executive President elected by all voters nationwide but it does not have the position of a Vice President. There are also elected legislators out of which a Prime Minister and Ministers are chosen. Given that the ministers are also part of the legislature, the semi-presidential system is cheaper than the American presidential system.


Even though this study is not recommending a reversal to a monarchical government system, it is worthy of note that it is not a forbidden option because there are several countries with monarchical government such as the Vatican City, Qatar, Brunei, and Saudi Arab and these countries are doing better than Nigeria, in terms of development. Nigeria would therefore need to reach a consensus among stakeholders to choose the administrative structure, which works in the best interest of the Nigerian people and which is also compatible with the country's limited resources.

The propositions above are only minimal political rearrangements that can support good governance at the federal level and aid the adoption of culturally specific good governance models at the sub-national or regional levels. Designing a good governance model for the whole country is beyond the scope of this study. The main objective of the study is to design a context-specific good governance model for Southwest Nigeria. However, the model can be extrapolated to other regions that share cultural and other contextual similarities with the case study. Below is the context-specific model that is proposed.

**Figure 7.1: A Context-Specific Good Governance Proposition for the Federal Level**

[Below]

**A Context-Specific Good Governance Proposition for the Federal Level**



### **7.2.2 A context-specific good governance model for Southwestern Nigeria**

The good governance model recommended below is an Afrocentric model because it was developed to reflect the definition of good governance given by the local citizens in Southwestern Nigeria and to address the governance issues also identified by them. It also incorporates the strategies that ensure responsiveness, accountability, participation, transparency and welfare improvement in the Yoruba indigenous governance system. Consequently, this model is compatible with culture and reflects the local institutional reality. These were the qualities that made the recommendations a context-specific good governance model. Citizens in Southwest Nigeria defined good governance as any government that is able to make available the means to satisfy basic needs, such as food and shelter, as well as, provide welfare-enhancing infrastructure like good roads, healthcare, good quality education and electricity. Similarly, citizens also identified issues affecting governance to include ethnic subjugation, overconcentration of power in one authority, excessive monetization of public offices, poor consultation, militarized democracy, corruption, imposition of unfamiliar political candidates and removal of culture from governance.

The model recommends five main rearrangements at the Southwestern regional level to promote better performance of the government in addressing poverty, poor infrastructural development, corruption and other socio-political challenges affecting the welfare of the citizens in this region. This good governance model is depicted in figure 7.2.

#### **1. Revitalization of Cultural Value of Omoluwabi**

Achieving good governance in Southwest Nigeria and salvaging the Yoruba societies from corrupt behaviour will largely depend on the reinstatement and revitalization of the cultural value of Omoluwabi, which embodies the Yoruba culture of humanness, communality and morality. According to Akinpelu (1987) Omoluwabi is a socially and spiritually well-balanced individual who has good economic skills, sound character, wisdom in judgment, who is proficient in the legends and genealogies of his ancestors and one who is in right standing with the ancestral spirits. Other attributes of Omoluwabi include hard work, integrity, contentment, love, generosity, fairness, diplomacy, respect for the rights of others and justice. These moral principles are fundamental to Yoruba culture and they form the bedrock of the society in regulating

socio-political behaviour for the attainment of good governance and development. Only the restoration of the sense of cultural values can make Southwest Nigeria produce citizens of a high moral standard to lead the governance institutions transparently and accountably.

Individuals run the government. If most of the individuals in the societies are corrupt, definitely, corruption and immorality will be bred in every sector of the society, whether private or government. This study shows that largely due to the influence of colonization, globalization and westernization, many of the cultural values of the Nigerian societies have been largely eroded. Ranger (1983:215) argues that colonialism invented a new tradition into African societies. This is particularly true of Nigerian societies. One of such new, unhealthy culture is the practice of admiring, praising and honouring wealthy people, regardless of how the wealth was acquired (Udama 2013: 61, Ajidahun 2013:119). Some armed robbers and corrupt politicians have been known to be given honorary chieftaincy titles, honorary PhD awards and they have even been nominated for political positions just because they are wealthy (Ewokor 2007, Ajidahun 2013:119). This new culture, which sees nothing wrong in acquiring wealth through unethical means, is totally contrary to the pre-colonial Yoruba culture of Omoluwabi which says "*Kaka ki n ja'le makuku s'eru*" meaning "I will rather work as a slave than to steal to become rich".

Also, Western education has led to the inferiorization and the abandonment of Yoruba cultural values, the Yoruba language, and the Yoruba traditional businesses especially among the educated elites. They have stopped speaking Yoruba and will only teach their children to speak the English language (Alebiosu 2016:24, Isola 2016:5). Given that language is the main medium through which the values in a culture are transmitted, the subjugation of a language is the defeat of the culture and its values. Isola (2016:5) also states that language is the soul of any culture, and when a language dies, the culture dies.

Using culture as a tool to achieve development requires a conscious effort to restore cultural dignity. There must be political actions to make Yoruba people proud of their culture, especially the language, food, dressing, music and the cultural values of Omoluwabi. For example, there was a time that natural black hair and dreadlocks were stigmatised and black women applied all sorts of chemicals and treatments to their hair to make the hair straightened to resemble the hair of white people. Even though



many Nigerians still take pride in wearing wigs, today, many black women are proud of leaving their hair in its natural state, while dreadlocks are now fashionable. This change of idea about black hair was achieved through political actions of activists like Steve Biko and Angela Davis who rallied against self-hate, while spreading a message of African pride so that natural hair became associated with freedom and justice (Hall 2016). In the same way, the Yoruba people can be reoriented to take pride in their cultural values through conscious political actions.

The context-specific model further proposed two main recommendations to restore cultural values:

**a) Decolonised Educational system that teaches Omoluwabi as well as Science and technology to industrialize indigenous Knowledge and products**

As stated in an earlier section, the educational system (from primary to university) is a veritable tool to reviving culture; especially among the younger generation. In order to achieve that, the school system in the Southwest must be decolonised so as not to continue to transmit British colonial policies which exalt English language and western ideas to the detriment of indigenous knowledge and local languages. Several studies such as Fafunwa (1989), UNESCO (2005), Olagbaju and Akinsowon (2014) have established that the mother tongue is the best way to teach the younger ones because it is the language the students best understand and the language with which the student can best articulate his or her ideas. It is therefore necessary that Yoruba language becomes the main medium of instruction of education from the pre-primary to the university level. But this also means that the Yoruba language must be developed to cope with new developments especially in Science and technology (Isola 1992:24).

Most importantly, renaissance of Omoluwabi requires dedicated teaching of moral values till students are culturally immersed to appreciate cultural norms such as, hard work, integrity, contentment and patriotism. The use of Yoruba language as a medium of instruction in schools in the Southwest will promote universal education, aid better understanding of students, preserve Yoruba cultural heritage, restore Yoruba cultural dignity, inculcate the Omoluwabi values, promote research into Yoruba indigenous knowledge which will also lead to innovativeness and development. China is a country that uses its local languages as the language of instruction from pre-primary to

University and the country has greatly advanced in Science and technology, as well as, in economic growth and poverty reduction (Isola 2016:7).

Following China's example, the educational system in the Southwest must be dedicated to Science and technology, especially because colonial education did not teach adequate Science and technology needed for industrial development (Duke 2010:68). There must be intellectual efforts to industrialize indigenous knowledge and products through modern science so as to make indigenous innovations competitive globally. It was argued in section 2.9.1 that the Eurocentric assumption that African countries, especially Nigeria, have comparative advantage in agricultural and other primary products is debateable. Nigeria has got several exportable indigenous innovations in the area of Medicine, processed foods, and rich culture; most of which are discounted due to the colonial philosophy of education. Improving local innovations through advanced scientific research and technological transformation of indigenous products would give Nigeria comparative advantage to offer varieties of new, manufactured products in the international market.

This study does not propose that the current education curriculum should be totally discarded but it should be improved and expanded so that it promotes local culture, moral values and African interests. When education is tailored to meet local needs, it will spur economic growth and solve unemployment problems (Ekpenyong 1988:59). A decolonised education system is also one way to raise new generations of citizens whose consciousness is awakened to take African-centred actions.

#### **b) African-centred Constitution reflecting cultural values, debarring ex-military men and corrupt people from politics**

To complement the restoration of cultural values through the school system, there must be political action to stop the society from the culture of admiring and celebrating corrupt politicians and people who amass wealth through unethical means. Thus, the Constitution in the Southwest must be written with the participation of the citizens and culturally conscious intellectuals so that the law reflects public morality and Yoruba cultural values. This study has shown several examples of how the loopholes of the Nigerian Constitution have been exploited by corrupt political elites to escape justice. The Southwest laws should be clear, simple and must reflect public conscience (May 2016:13, Waliggo 2005:4); the law must immediately punish and shame immoral

behaviour and must never have provisions with some complex interpretations to indulge corruption. Moreover, as this study has shown, the current democracy mainly reconstituted many of the ruling military juntas and their wealthy allies. The consequence is that even in the new democracy, the approach of governing party is militaristic, corrupt and non-participatory. Based on these findings, the context-specific model proposes that the local constitution of the Southwest must forbid ex-military leaders from participating in politics.

Moreover, the study shows some politicians (for example Chief Bode George and Chief Diepreye Alamiyeseigha) who are known to be corrupt and ex-convicts continue to proudly participate in public affairs; especially because of some constitutional provisions such as a presidential pardon (Suraju 2013). This is totally against the Yoruba culture. In Yoruba land *“won kii fi olokunrun j’oye”* (meaning we do not make an individual who is morally sick a chief). This context-specific model thus recommends that the constitution must debar anyone with a history of corruption from participating in party politics or from holding public elective positions; whether such a criminal has been granted a presidential pardon or not.

## **2. People-centred Poverty reduction and Development policies**

The next recommendation is that the government must promote citizen-centred poverty reduction and development policies. This means that all the government policies must be made in the interest of the people in Southwest Nigeria. The study has shown that in the current democratic government, consultations with the local citizens were almost non-existent when initiating and implementing public projects. As a result, government investments are not targeted towards the citizens’ pressing needs. This model therefore proposes that the people’s priorities must always be the priority of the government. To achieve this, three more recommendations are proposed.

### **a) Priority given to provision of welfare-enhancing infrastructure e.g. roads and electricity**

Another original contribution of this study is its identification of the development priorities of the citizens in Southwest Nigeria. Participants were given a list of 23 development goals/issues and they were asked to select 7 issues which they believe if attended to by the government, would most improve their standard of living over the

next four years. Emerging issues listed were: employment, electricity, good roads, water, good quality education, health care and reduction in cost of goods. In fact, governance issues such as, curtailing bribery and corruption; transparent and accountable government and more free and fair elections did not appear among the first seven development priorities of the participants; even though this does not mean that the local citizens were unconcerned about the government's accountability and transparency. Rather, it affirms that many governance issues will become a concern to citizens only after their basic needs of survival have been met.

Consequently, this model recommends that public investments should be geared towards the provision of welfare-enhancing infrastructure, as well as, an improvement in the government's ability to provide them. The provision of the infrastructure should be prioritised above donor-specified good governance reforms, which only try to change the government to meet western institutional standards and do not necessarily have an impact on poverty reduction (Bergh et al 2014:7). Examples of the donors' governance reform in Nigeria include the Medium Term Expenditure Framework (MTEF) (2005) and Fiscal Responsibility Act (FRA) (2007). However, studies by Ben-Caleb et al. (2012), Onyiah et al. (2016) and Ben-Caleb et al (2016) show that these expensive reforms did not improve the quality of budget management in Nigeria; instead, they worsened it. The studies also show that the donor's reforms did not induce significant differences in poverty. According to Easterly (2005:20), these reforms were mainly bureaucratic which made governance more complex, donor-oriented, non-participatory and irresponsible to the citizens.

### **b) Agricultural development and Afrocentric Industrialization strategies**

Addressing poverty requires the creation of employment so that those who are willing and able to work find jobs and are able to earn an income. The poor state of infrastructure in Nigeria contributes to the high cost of production and has forced many businesses to shut down (Chete et al 2014:14). This has consequently worsened the unemployment situation in Nigeria. A cultural and context-specific approach to poverty reduction therefore requires the reorientation of the citizens from office jobs to the appreciation of small businesses, especially those in the indigenous sector, such as agriculture. Yoruba people particularly have a culture of hard work and they are not prejudiced against any job. A Yoruba adage says "*ise ni ise nje*" meaning, "no matter the type of profession, work is work". Unfortunately, westernization has re-orientated

the educated citizens against non-white collar jobs (Orji 2012). The Yoruba are predominantly farmers and the government should focus on developing the agricultural sector of Southwest Nigeria in partnership with local stakeholders. There should also be reforms in the land policy so that everyone willing and able to go into farming has access to land.

Industrialization is also important for achieving development, expanding job opportunities and improving welfare. In section 2.9.3, this study gave one of the reasons why industrialization in Nigeria did not lead to the expected growth and development. This was because earlier industrialization policies are Eurocentric, aiming to produce goods previously imported from overseas and the imitation of these western products, required imported skilled manpower and imported raw materials. For example, the country has to raise foreign currency to finance the importation of barley and hops in order to produce beers, such as Guinness stout, locally (Andrae and Beckman 1987:14). Meanwhile, there are no significant efforts to towards bottling indigenous alcohol and beverages such as, palm wine, burukutu or zobo, which would have 100 per cent local content. Consequently, industrialization drains the country's foreign exchange reserves and indirectly prospers Western economies through its external dependence. Therefore, this good governance model recommends that the government in the southwest Nigeria should focus on Afrocentric industrialization policies. These are efforts to expand, revolutionize and modernize indigenous products, which use traditional knowledge, local expertise, local raw materials, and the Nigerian population is a large, ready market. Government policies should promote industries with backward and forward linkages to the economy.

### **c) Decolonised policy makers to develop African-centred Policies**

For government to be able to consistently formulate and implement people-centred, poverty reduction and development policies, it must work with policymakers who have been liberated from Eurocentrism. It has been argued earlier that due to the Western inclination of many African scholars and policy makers, western economic development strategies and theories have been continuously adopted as readymade universal solutions without thorough investigation into the deep causes of each African country's underdevelopment. The World Bank, in particular, influences many of the development theories adopted in Nigeria (Chete et al 2014:15). Scholars such as Amin (2006), Berg (2007), and Soederberg (2004) have shown that many of the World Bank

programmes also have underlying political agenda of expanding Western imperialism. Besides, some of the underlying assumptions of foreign theories contradict Nigeria's socio-economic and political reality (Adejumobi 2000:4, Semion 2011).

The challenge for Nigerian scholars and policy makers, therefore, is how to develop theories and recommend policy actions that are based on Nigeria's social-political realities, as well as, the culture and even the spirituality of the Nigerian people. The educational system will continue to be relevant in raising the cultural consciousness of scholars so that intellectuals and policy makers will be reawakened to look inward and develop home-grown strategies targeted at improving the citizens' welfare. This model does not propose that the government of the Southwest should not learn from other cultures or borrow foreign theories; rather, the model proposes that, even if the government of Southwestern Nigeria will adopt any borrowed theory or external strategies, these must all be redefined to fit the local context and to serve the interests of the local people.

### **3. Mobilization of Adequate resources for development**

The next main recommendation of the context-specific model involves the mobilization of resources. The issue of resources cannot be overlooked in achieving good governance. Resources are needed for government administration and for building the infrastructure needed for development. The study has shown that government revenue is currently low compared to the amount of resources necessary to finance the needed development in Nigeria and in Southwest Nigeria, in particular. The government of Nigeria depends largely on crude oil revenue, which is shared periodically under a revenue sharing formula that allocates 54.68 per cent, 24.72 per cent and 20.60 per cent to the federal, state and local government respectively. However, since the fall in the price of crude oil in the international market, government revenue has reduced, likewise the monthly allocation that is shared to the states and local government (Olarinoye, 2015). Apart from Lagos State, the states in the Southwest generate very little revenue internally and mainly depend on federal allocations (ibid). Since the fall in the amount of revenue received from the federal government, many of these states have not been able to pay their workers' salaries promptly and have had no resources to embark on development projects (Alade 2015: 1347, Olarinoye 2015).

This context-specific governance model has recommended that the sub-national government should have a high degree of fiscal and administrative autonomy. This means that the Southwest as a political entity in the federation, will not be receiving allocations from the federal government. The regional government of Southwest Nigeria must therefore develop its regional economic base and seek internal sources of funds. This model proposes some recommendations that will help Southwestern Nigeria mobilize funds for development. The recommendations are based on Yoruba culture and the country's political experience.

#### **a) Taxation and use of Cooperative /communal efforts to sponsor development projects**

Another original contribution of this study and this context-specific model is that it exposes several cultural, citizen-centred and people-friendly income sources for the government. These include communal effort, donations and community share capital. Eurocentric approaches identify mainly four sources by which government can raise money; these are taxes, borrowing, printing of money and non-tax revenue sources such as income from natural resources (Studebaker, 2015, Alade 2015; Edogbanya and Ja'afaru, 2013). In the case of Nigeria, 80 per cent of government revenue comes from petroleum (Alade 2015: 1347). Other sources of government income in Nigeria are taxes, rent from the use of government properties, profit from state enterprises, fees, grants and loans (Edogbanya and Ja'afaru, 2013:18). However, these other sources constitute only a small proportion of government income. The fall in oil revenue has made government at all levels in Nigeria to aggressively seek means of increasing non-oil income and internally generated revenue (Alade, 2015:16). Unfortunately, it has been observed that the focus has been on how to increase tax income (ibid).

This study supports tax expansion and deepening to generate more funds for the government to perform its functions. However, solely focusing on taxation is Eurocentric. While taxation is almost the cultural way of raising public funds in the Western developed countries (Edogbanya and Ja'afaru, 2013:18), tax is not native to many Nigerian societies. For example when the British colonial government introduced direct taxation in southern Nigeria in 1929, it was resisted and sparked off riots (Ejiogu, 2007:105). Collecting taxes as the only appropriate method of raising revenue for the government is a colonial approach which blocks people's views from appreciating

other non-tax revenue sources by which development projects can be adequately financed in non-European settings. While Eurocentrism seals off and even prohibits African possibilities, Afrocentricity creates awareness about African possibilities.

This study has shown that in Yoruba culture, the citizens do not depend solely on the government for the provision of amenities, such as roads and water. Rather all community members, through communal efforts and joint contribution of resources (not taxes), jointly provide for development projects. The responsibility of leadership is to mobilize this cooperation. Communal efforts are a cultural means of resource mobilization that the government can harness to achieve great progress, especially in the provision of social infrastructure. This Afrocentric resource mobilization method was used during Awolowo's government in the old Western region (1952-1959). For example in 1954, instead of turning the children back from school registration for lack of school infrastructure or taking foreign loans to build schools, the Awolowo government solicited for the support of communities in building additional classrooms; while government provided the roofing. Also instead of employing expatriates as teachers to fill the manpower gap in the education sector, the government solicited the help of all former teachers until more local teachers could be trained (Awolowo 1981).

Similarly, religious organizations in Nigeria practically depend on these communal and cooperative efforts to achieve incredible goals such as aesthetic cathedrals and universities (Babajide, 2013:315, Omonijo et al. 2014:365). The estimated cost of some private projects (such as universities, private jets, hotels, hospitals, cathedrals) owned by religious organizations in Nigeria are higher than the amount needed to solve some of the development challenges facing many Nigerian communities. Interestingly, projects by religious groups are mostly sponsored through the donations of the members of these religious groups (Asaju and Dapo-Asaju, 2013:192; Edukugho and Balogun 2012). Given that the members of religious organizations in Nigeria are also members of the Nigerian society, the government should institutionalize this approach of mobilizing people's cooperation, as used by religious organizations, when tackling societal challenges. Religious leaders should also be made agents of change in the societies to mobilize cooperation.



## **b) Donations towards Development Projects**

Similarly, this study proposes the institutionalization of donations by wealthy citizens towards the development of public projects. It is a fact that some individuals in Nigeria are richer than the government (Suleiman, 2013, Mtila, 2016, Ogbonna, 2017). Formally requesting for gifts and donations to finance development projects is one way to make such people give back to the society. Giving of gifts is an acceptable behaviour in the African culture. According to Sylla (2014:15), gift-giving is a form of social solidarity essential for the maintenance of societal peace and harmony; while social solidarity is also an important part of many cultures in Africa. Conversely, in the European sense, gift-giving and donations to public institutions may be regarded as corruption and would not be an institutionalised source of funds for the government (ibid). However, in many pre-colonial African settings, donations and gifts do not connote bribery and will never lead to corruption (ibid). In Yoruba culture for example, this study has shown that the governance system largely depends on donations and gifts from citizens. A Yoruba proverb says, “*So mi kale ni n be l’aafin*”, meaning that the “the king’s palace is always jam-packed with people bringing gifts”. The receipt of donations by Yoruba political leaders can hardly lead to corruption or injustice because Yoruba leaders often swear oaths to the gods to remain truthful. It is believed that breaking the oath sworn according to Yoruba culture attracts grievous repercussions (Ogunleye 2013:83).

From personal experience, this researcher can say that Nigerian wealthy men will gladly prefer to make huge public donations for which their names will be recognized than to pay tax. Consequently donations from wealthy citizens as a source of financing public development projects should be institutionalized. Former President Obasanjo explored this approach in 2005 when he personally gathered prominent Nigerians and his rich political associates to launch the building of his privately owned Presidential Library in his hometown. The library which was patterned after the United States’ Presidential Library System and Culture was projected to cost N7 billion (\$US50 million) and on the day of the launching, an extra N6 billion was raised (Aghwotu 2006:32). Arguably, the same way Obasanjo’s multi-billion naira library project was financed through appeal funds, development projects, such as, rural electrification, rail networks, and ultramodern health care facilities in the Southwest can be financed through gifts and donations. What is required is leadership to mobilize such

cooperation among rich Nigerians along with a system of accountability to monitor the use of funds raised.

### **c) Community Shares**

Another source of funds to finance development projects recommended in this model is the sale or offering of share capital, but not as company shares but community shares, which are offered as community benefit societies. Community benefit organizations are similar to cooperatives societies. But while cooperative societies are for the mutual benefit of their members, community benefit societies are for the benefit of the whole community (Development Trusts Association, DSA: nd). Like cooperative societies, community benefit societies can offer shares to the public so as to raise funds to finance a venture or public infrastructure that will be for the benefit of all (DSA :nd). This study recommends that instead of focusing on external loans with anti-welfare conditionality or foreign direct investments which are susceptible to high capital flight, citizens should be encouraged to invest in welfare promoting enterprises (with an expectation of returns). This arrangement also shares some similarities with the Public Private Partnership (PPP), an arrangement in which the private sector has a contractual agreement to partner with the government to invest in the financing and the operation of public services and infrastructure (Oluwasanmi and Ogidi 2014:134). The challenge of PPP in Nigeria is that it has mainly involved multinationals, which are primarily driven by profit (ibid). Consequently, the requirement to finance the profits of these private firms makes PPP a more expensive method of funding public goods and make such public goods unaffordable for citizens (ibid, Oyedele 2013).

Offering community shares holds better benefits than PPP because it raises capital from many ordinary citizens and also makes them co-owners in the public venture (DSA :nd). Many ordinary citizens will have a say in how the venture is run and they can get some returns on their investment. Projects financed through community shares will face less community resistance compared to PPP because citizens are aware that profits realized through the public venture would be shared by all community members who have invested in it. Since the motive for the investments in community shares is social benefit rather than private gain (as in company shares), public goods financed through community shares will be more affordable than those financed through PPP.

Moreover, the amount of capital that could be raised through community share capital should not be underestimated. Nigeria is particularly blessed with a large population. If the individual share offer for a development project is set as low as \$2 (N500) so that many citizens can become shareholders and feel involved, up to \$100 million non-interest capital can be raised locally if 10 million people are motivated to buy 5 units each. The 2005 bank recapitalization is a good example of the huge capital that can be raised from the Nigerian population. Specifically, when the Central Bank of Nigeria raised the minimum capital requirement for banks from N2 billion to N25 billion in 2005, most of the banks raised the required capital through initial public offerings of shares in the capital market and over N406.4 billion was raised from the market (Al Faki 2006). Thus, shares are financing tools the government should explore.

#### **d) Low-Cost Governance Style**

The lack of adequate resources to finance development and poverty reduction is one major reason why the government in the Southwest should adopt a low-cost administration style. Presently, the presidential system of government adopted at the national level is also adopted by the states. Thus, three arms of government also exist at this sub-national level, namely the executive, legislature and the judiciary. Section 4 of the 1999 Constitution vests the legislative powers at the state level in the State's House of Assembly, while Section 5 of the Constitution vests the executive powers of a State in the Governor of the State. Section 6 of the 1999 Constitution, however, vests the judicial powers in the courts. As earlier mentioned, the presidential system of government is expensive because it requires a high number of cabinet members who have various junior and senior special assistants. Moreover, in Nigeria the relationship between the legislature and the executive at the state level has not always been cordial (Oni 2014:147). Instead, it has been characterised by mutual suspicion, bitterness, impeachment threats and political rivalry (ibid).

This study has shown that in the pre-colonial Yoruba governance model, the judicial, legislative and executive functions were combined by the leadership. Consequently, the traditional governance arrangement has the advantage of low cost of administration and prevention of friction between the machineries of government. Southwest Nigeria needs to learn from this effective and efficient traditional governance approach. The need for a large executive cabinet, especially at the state level, is particularly debatable if one considers the case of Osun State where the

Governor, due to a fall in state revenue, refused to appoint a state executive council for 33 months (Guardian, 2017). Instead, the permanent secretaries in the government ministries, assisted by some coordinating directors, run the state (ibid). Even though opposition elements criticized the governor's action, it is a fact that paying the salaries of state workers in Osun State has been tough since the fall in federal allocation to the state (Olarinoye, 2015). Thus, the decision of the governor not to appoint an expensive-to-maintain cabinet is prudent. But most importantly, it shows that the government in the Southwest can still be functional and effective using a concise and low cost governance structure. In the first model presented above, this study has suggested two cheaper alternatives to the presidential system of government, namely: the parliamentary system and the semi-presidential system. Lower cost of government will free up resources for development purposes.

**e) Elected representatives should work as volunteers with no salary**

This Model further proposes that salaries or excessive financial benefits, should not be attached to elective positions in Southwestern Nigeria. All the local citizens who participated in this study complained that the financial remuneration attached to elective positions is excessive, and that is why the greedy politicians struggle to win elections by any means, including rigging and violence. Apart from the fact that excessive monetization of elective positions attracts bad elements of the society into politics, it actually drains the public purse and reduces funds available for poverty reduction projects. Citizens who were part of this study strongly advocated that elected officers should only be given sitting allowances, which should also not be excessive. This study also showed that in the pre-colonial Yoruba governance, there were no monetary benefits attached to political positions. Instead, political leaders and representatives worked as volunteers. This measure thus ensured that only committed and patriotic individuals aspire for political positions. Based on these findings, the Model specifies that those who want to participate in governance in Southwest Nigeria must be willing to do so as volunteers with no entitlement to salaries or pension; although they may be given a small allowance. Hence, only self-sufficient individuals should be involved in rebuilding the society.

#### **4. Ensuring Responsiveness and representativeness**

The Model also suggests some context-specific strategies to ensure responsiveness and representativeness of governance. This is necessary because the study shows that currently, the democratic government is distant from the people and government responsiveness is poor. The problem is partly because in Nigeria, some political godfathers control party politics. They sponsor and rig elections for their candidates so that the votes of the people rarely matter in determining who wins the elections. The study has also shown that candidates presented by political parties are often from outside the locality, mostly from overseas or other big cities in the country. Subsequently, many elected representatives are not conversant with the local challenges suffered by community members. After winning elections, many of them often would not live within their constituents. The study further shows that there is no structure for consultation of citizens when initiating and implementing projects in the new democratic governance system. Consequently, government investments are not well-targeted towards citizens' priority needs. In order to overcome these challenges and so as to ensure the responsiveness and representativeness of the government of Southwest Nigeria, four recommendations are proposed.

##### **a) Decentralization with small and autonomous units with clear roles**

Decentralization is simply the transfer of decision-making powers and implementation capacities to lower levels. According to Bardan and Mookhejee (2006:3) decentralization is an important element of participatory governance which allows citizens to have an opportunity to communicate their preferences and views to elected officers who are subsequently held accountable for their performance by the citizens. This study has shown that decentralization is an intrinsic part of the Yoruba governance system; which has a hierarchical arrangement in which the family compound (Agbo-ile) is the smallest political unit. Moreover, each of the political units is largely autonomous except in extra-state relations, which fall under the jurisdiction of the capital (Fadipe 1970:200). Moreover, every leader of a political unit is empowered to coordinate the development of his jurisdiction in association with the members. Only unresolvable issues are forwarded to the next authority in the hierarchy. Given that the family, which is the smallest unit of any society, is represented in Yoruba governance, this system guarantees majority participation and the representation of their interests.

Learning from the Yoruba decentralised governance system, this model proposes that the Southwest Nigerian regional governance should be further decentralized to smaller units of administration. This recommendation is different from the current federal arrangements in which the sub-national governments have weak administrative and fiscal power and are rarely accountable to the people (Amundsen 2010:5, Adams 2016). Under this proposed structure, each government sub-unit must have clear, measurable roles and responsibilities, which must be performed in conjunction with community members. The roles must also be commensurate with the amount of local resources that can be mobilized locally. The smaller units will ensure the participation of more citizens and interests of many more people can be represented in governance. Moreover citizens can also monitor the performance of their local governments.

#### **b) Structure for regular consultation with citizens**

It is important that the government creates an institutionalised structure for consultation with citizens before initiating and implementing projects that will affect them. This model recommends that the government should regularly conduct surveys, similar to the one conducted in this study, to understand its citizens' most pressing needs and development priorities. The findings from such surveys should also inform the government's priority development efforts. Similarly, there must be institutionalised channels available to citizens to draw the attention of the government to their problems. The current study shows that local citizens mainly depend on the social media, not any official channel, to express their governance concerns. Regular town hall meetings are essential to get closer to the people. Similarly, this study shows that the community development officers at the local government offices serve as important links between the government and the people because they regularly interact with the local citizens and community development associations. These officers should be empowered for better performance of their duties and their reports should be taken seriously because they possess insights to the citizens' needs.

#### **c) Political leaders must reside within their constituents**

This model proposes that only candidates who have lived sufficiently in a particular community should be allowed to contest for elective positions in the community. The 1999 Constitution specifies the minimum age, education, party membership and citizenship requirements to contest for elective positions in Nigeria (section 65, 66,

106, 107, 131, 177 and 182). However, the issue of the residence of candidates is not mentioned in any of these sections. This study particularly argues that communities need some years to know the character of any individual who wants to contest in an election. In the Yoruba governance system, only individuals who have been culturally immersed in the 'Omoluwabi' attributes should be considered for political positions. And these attributes are easily verifiable by community members because candidates must have dwelled among the people for a long time. This study proposes a minimum of three years of permanent residence in a place before a person can be qualified to contest in an election in that location. Most importantly, after winning the elections, the elected representatives must continue to reside in their constituencies throughout their tenure in office.

#### **d) Very easy constitutional provisions to remove non-responsive leaders**

Thus, this model proposes that there should be easy constitutional provisions for citizens to remove political officers perceived to be unresponsive to the needs of the electorate. This study showed that the perception of local citizens is that political representatives are unapproachable and unchallengeable. Even when the citizens are not satisfied with the performance of an elected representative, they are forced to wait until such politician completes his or her tenure. There are provisions in the 1999 Constitution (section 66 and 110) which empower the electorate to recall any representative from government. However, the cumbersomeness of the process makes the provisions difficult to exercise (Atuba, 2017). In other words, the people's power is only limited to voting during elections; after which the people have no authority over their representatives. This is in contrast with the Yoruba governance system in which whenever the people believe that a political leader is no longer representing their interests, they have the authority to report him to higher authorities and subsequently remove him, if the need arose. The process of deposition is thus clear and easy. This consciousness of the people's power also motivated political leadership to consult the people regularly and serve their interests.

This study argues that if elected officers in the new democracy are conscious that the people can depose them at any time, they will represent the people's interests better. Most elected officers in Nigeria have a four-year tenure. However, four years is too long a period for citizens to continue to suffer under non-performing political leaders. That is why the model proposes that there should be easy provisions in the constitution

for citizens to depose political officers perceived to be irresponsive to the needs of the electorate.

## **5. Accountability and Checks against Abuse of power**

This model rates that accountability and checks against abuse of power are important for achieving good governance. This study shows that a leader's accountability to the citizens faces many challenges in Nigeria. First, is the issue of godfather-controlled politics in which some corrupt, wealthy men sponsor political candidates into power in expectation of rewards. Consequently, the allegiance of many elected political leaders goes to their sponsor instead of the people. Another challenge to achieving accountability is the influence of external donors on domestic governance. Donors' supports often hinges on some stringent anti-welfare reforms such as neo-liberalism (Enwere 2013: 63). By focusing on meeting the demands of external donors at the expense of their people's welfare, the accountability of elected leaders to the people is also eroded. This study also shows that political office grants the office holders a lot of financial power and some constitutional protection (such as the immunity clause in section 308 of the 1999 Constitution which protects some public officials from any civil proceedings or criminal prosecution). This study shows that many politicians misuse their high financial status and constitutional protection to act arrogantly towards the electorate rather than serve them and then get away with corruption offenses. That is why Emecheta and Onyemekara (2016:83) argue that in Nigeria's democracy, the people have no power because power has been totally usurped by politicians who use it for self-interest.

Given the failure of several anti-corruption reform agencies such as the EFCC and ICPC to improve public sector accountability, this model proposed four recommendations that are largely based on Yoruba culture and governance experience.

### **a) No concentration of power and provision for easy deposition of unaccountable leaders**

This model had earlier proposed a decentralised political structure for Southwest Nigeria in 4 (a) above. However, beyond administrative decentralization, power must also be decentralised with adequate constitutional provision for the people to check, question and even challenge governing political authorities. The study has shown that



the decentralized power and hierarchical political structure of Yoruba traditional governance checked abuse of power and made leaders accountable. In contrast, Nigeria's decentralised political structure is actually characterised by a high concentration of power in some authorities, which fosters abuse of power. Adams (2016) shows that at the sub-national level in Nigeria, especially at the state level, power is concentrated in the Governor so much so, that government responsiveness depends only on the character and intentions of the governor, and these rarely work to the people's advantage. The concentration of power in the state and in the state governor also weakens the local government. For example, the governors also administer the elections of the local government and the consequence is that local government elections are either rigged for the allies of the Governor to win, or they are not held at all level (Adams 2016).

To further check against their arrogant behaviour to the electorate, this model proposes that the excessive financial remuneration given to political officers should be reduced. Many participants of this study also advocated for the removal of Section 308 of the 1999 Constitution, which protects some public officials from any civil proceedings or criminal prosecution. However, most importantly, this model emphasises the need to have easy constitutional provisions for the deposition of unaccountable leaders. When citizens do not have to wait until the expiration of the tenure of political office holders before they can hold them accountable or responsible for their actions, that is when power truly belongs to the people.

#### **b) Leadership training for cultural immersion**

This model also proposes that leaders should be trained in cultural norms, people-centeredness, leadership skills and other necessary training that will make them responsive and accountable. The Yoruba traditional governance system does not underestimate the need for leaders to undergo leadership training before resuming duties. This study showed that before his installation, the king or Oba will undergo a training called 'Ipebi'. Ipebi is a secret place of training in traditional religion, administration, traditional constitution cultural values and expected behaviour of Obas; which lasts for at least three months. For example, an Oba must not take another man's wife; he must not use his position to acquire properties and he must be free and fair while sitting in judgement. He must learn all these to the point of cultural immersion because he must also agree to them by swearing an oath.

Nigerian Nationalist Chief Obafemi Awolowo also argued that the education of political leaders is important in order to have good leadership in Nigeria (Awolowo 1968). Good leadership requires self-discipline, because only men who are masters of themselves can be masters of others (Awolowo, 1985). Awolowo (1968) argued that corruption is an outcome of the political leaders' undeveloped mind and their lack of self-discipline. An undeveloped mind lacks the ability to reason critically, it is ruled by selfish interests and it lacks self-discipline (ibid). Awolowo (1968) further suggested that the depravity of the mind of leaders is caused by ignorance and lack of education; especially in critical thinking. Education of the leadership is therefore pertinent to producing selfless, disciplined and morally upright leaders who will seek the common good of all citizenry in Nigeria. By the education of the leadership, Awolowo (1968) was referring to holistic training of the body, the brain and the mind in self-discipline, unselfishness and critical reasoning (ibid). Only when the minds of leaders are developed will they have empathy for the people they are leading and that is when the welfare of the people will be the central concern of the government (ibid).

Arguably the current, ridiculous desire for materialism by Nigerian political elites, their ruthless looting, and their scandalous waste of public funds confirm Awolowo's proposition that their minds are depraved and ignorant. For example, the amount of public funds stolen by Nigeria's former military head of state, General Sanni Abacha has been regularly reviewed as more discoveries are made. Ingwe (2014:79) reports that Abacha's stolen funds kept in Switzerland, United Kingdom, United States, Liechtenstein and Luxembourg could be as much as US\$210 billion. Similarly, Nigeria's former petroleum minister, Diezani Alison-Madueke and her allies have been found to have stolen about US\$90 billion of public funds all of which were wasted in purchasing luxurious homes across the United Kingdom and United States of America, as well as, buying a yacht, private jets and numerous exotic cars (Kareem 2017). Abacha and Diezani's high kleptocracy and frivolous spending have been regarded by the public as madness (Franklyn 2017). Arguably, it is depravity of the mind and lack of critical reasoning that would make anyone transfer the wealth of his or her nation to foreign banks and make investments where they will be used for the advancement of those nations. Sadly, this attitude is common among Nigerian politicians.

Therefore, this model proposes thorough leadership training for political leaders in Southwest Nigeria. The aim of the education is to develop their minds in critical

reasoning, people-centred policies, humanness, self-discipline and cultural values. Beyond moral lessons, this model also proposes trainings that will build the administrative skills of leaders so that they can competently formulate and implement welfare-enhancing policies and devise strategies for societal transformation and advancement. Aboluwodi (2012:64) argues that leaders need more than moral lessons because a morally disciplined leader may still lack administrative competence. That is why this model proposes administrative skills training in addition to moral training.

### **c) Swearing of Oaths in the Traditional Way**

This model proposes that political office holders in Southwest Nigeria must take oaths according to the Yoruba culture. 85 per cent of the participants in this study particularly believe that the inclusion of traditional oath taking in governance is necessary for the achievement of public sector accountability. This study has shown that in the Yoruba governance system, the King and other political leaders had to swear an oath to the oracle that they would be accountable, truthful and transparent to the people. And everyone was conscious that any leader who contravenes the oath taken will suffer instant, terrible consequences (Ogunleye, 2013: 83). This study actually shows that oath taking and the promise of grave consequence to any leader who acts contrary to the wishes of the people were the pillars of good governance in the Yoruba culture because they compelled both citizens and leaders to comply with societal values. The findings of this study suggest that without the fear and consciousness of quick judgement from the ancestors, there was a tendency that many Yoruba people including leadership to act contrary to societal norms. Therefore, morality, humanness, patriotism and adherence to the rule of law in the pre-colonial Yoruba societies were not only entrenched through education and persuasion but also by the inclusion of spirituality in governance (Akinpelu, 1987).

In present day Nigeria, public oath taking is part of government modalities but instead of swearing in the traditional way, public officers in Nigeria currently take public oaths using the Bible or Quran. However, this modified oath has not been effective to produce accountability because many of the politicians go into corrupt practices as soon as they are sworn into the office (Ogunleye 2013:83). The restoration of traditional oaths recommended by this study is a simple process mainly requiring the substitution of the Bible and the Quran currently used in the swearing process with cultural elements such as water or an iron rod. When public office-holders swear in

accordance with the wishes of the people they are ruling, it further confirms their responsiveness to the people and their allegiance to the culture of the land. From the Afrocentric perspective, good governance and development can only be achieved when the people's interests, history and culture are placed at the centre of intervention. Moreover, the inclusion of spirituality to governance will restore the cultural legitimacy to the public sector (Ekeh 1975:111).


#### **e) Automation and electronic monitoring of all public activities**

The last recommendation of this model is the automation and computerization of all public sector activities. The need for automation is based on the same argument for the inclusion of spirituality and culture in governance. This study has shown that inclusion of spirituality in the pre-colonial Yoruba governance system ensured the spiritual monitoring of all political actions. This prevented political corruption because the Yoruba gods and ancestors were quick to judge corrupt leaders. Afrocentricity acknowledges and respects the spiritual elements of African culture and does not treat it as superstitious (Mazama, 2001:399). Thus, spirituality is an important aspect of African reality (ibid). However, with the advancement of technology, automation and electronic monitoring of many public activities is now possible so that sharp practices can easily be detected and perpetrators of corruption can quickly be prosecuted. The automation of public sector activities provides some of the benefits of the inclusion of spiritual elements in governance. Electronic government or e-government is increasingly becoming the focus of government efforts for the achievement of good governance (Alshehri and Drew, 2010:79).

E-government can be defined as the use of Information and Communications Technologies (ICT) in the performance of government functions so that better quality services can be delivered to citizens (Alshehri and Drew, 2010:79). E-government increases public sector transparency because it allows more public sector information such as government rules and performance data to be disseminated to a wider audience (Patel, 2013:59). The use of ICT in government can also help reduce corruption because it allows the online and real time monitoring of public sector financial transactions (ibid). E-government also curbs corruption by eliminating the role of intermediaries and civil servants who stand as gatekeepers (ibid). Finally, the automation of government functions will increase efficiency and improve public service delivery.

The culturally and context-specific good governance model for South Western Nigeria explained above is depicted in Figure 7.2 below.

**Figure 7.2: A culturally and context-specific good governance model for South Western Nigeria**



### **7.3 Limitation of the Model**

One limitation of this model is its limited transferability. Given that the good governance model above was developed mainly on the institutional understanding of citizens of Southwest Nigeria and the Yoruba culture, the extent to which the findings and the recommendations of this study can be generalized or transferred to other contexts is limited. To mitigate this limitation, the researcher had earlier described in rich detail the research context and assumptions under which this study was carried out. The background information given about the research context will assist other researchers to make the judgment on the suitability or applicability of the model to other cultural settings. Nevertheless, it is hoped that the model can be extrapolated to other regions that share cultural and other contextual similarities with the case study.

### **Conclusion**

This chapter has achieved the last objective of the study, which is to develop a context-specific good governance model that reflects the traditions and aspirations of the local people in Southwest Nigeria. Unlike the donors' good governance reforms which are based on Western institutional realities, the model reflects recommendations based on the issues raised by participants in the current study, Nigeria's political history, Yoruba culture and the principles that ensure responsiveness, accountability, participation, and welfare improvement in Yoruba traditional governance. The application of this model holds many benefits for Nigeria because it is tailored to address local governance and development challenges. The next chapter concludes the study.

## CHAPTER EIGHT

### 8.0 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

#### 8.1 Introduction

The previous chapter presented the context-specific good governance model for Southwest Nigeria. The model adequately reflects local governance issues, the Yoruba culture and the aspirations of local people in Southwest Nigeria. The model also stands as the main recommendations of this study towards promoting good governance in Nigeria. This chapter presents the conclusion of the study. It contains only two sections. The first section presents a brief summary of how the objectives spelt out in Chapter One have been achieved. The second section presents the conclusion of the study.

#### 8.2 Comments on the Achievement of the Objectives of the Study

The main objective of this study was to find the main issues at the local level and the strategies of good traditional governance that a context-specific governance model should consider so as to promote development in Nigeria. This main objective was further broken into six objectives and all of them have been achieved. The summaries are given below.

##### 8.2.1 Objective 1: To critically examine the discourse of good governance and its limitation as a means of addressing poverty and underdevelopment

This objective was achieved through the critical examination of the origination, formulation and implementations of the good governance agenda. In chapter Two and Three, this study showed that the idea of good governance did not evolve from the poor themselves. Even if the poor have concerns about the quality of their government institutions, institutions were never a concern of development until the idea of good governance emanated from the hegemonic institutions of the World Bank, IMF, and their ally institutions (section 2.4). The analysis also shows that since the beginning of development history till date, the concern of Western institutions about Africa's governance has been based on whatever political and socioeconomic arrangement guarantees the interests of the imperial capitalist countries, especially their open access to African resources and markets.



The formulation of the World Bank good governance agenda lacks the participation of the poor and their governments. The main components of the agenda are Western liberal democracy and neo-liberalism. The analysis shows that free trade policies hurt the poor because its assumptions are too unrealistic, too universal, too insensitive to the welfare of the poor and too stringent to achieve growth or improve welfare in Africa (Chimni 2004:2-3, Adejumo-Ayibiowu 2015:17-18). Similarly, Nigeria's experience shows that Western liberal democracy does not guarantee the achievement of a responsive and representative government. The high rate of electoral fraud makes the citizens' vote meaningless and thus becomes a non-effective tool of accountability in the new democratic governance.

Most importantly, good governance being an externally imposed agenda, omits the institutional reality of African countries. In the case of Nigeria, the empirical findings show contextual issues such as, an inappropriate federal system, ethnic cleavages, military controlled politics, over-monetization of political positions, loss of cultural values and morality, very poor state of infrastructure and pervasive poverty are all omitted in the agenda; even though these issues are important to improving governance and development in Nigeria (section 6.2.5). From the Afrocentric perspective, and by putting the interests of the Nigerian masses first, this study concludes that the current good governance reforms of the World Bank are not capable of addressing the governance and development challenges in Nigeria. This study argues that if development and governance strategies were based on the Nigeria's history, culture and institutional reality, more effective strategies of good governance and development would have been worked out.

### **8.2.2 Objective 2: To understand citizens' conceptualization of good governance**

This study clearly shows that the local people in Southwest Nigeria mainly defined good governance as welfare improvement (section 6.2.3 and 6.3.2). That is, the government's ability to provide the means to satisfy basic needs such as food and shelter, as well as, its ability to provide welfare-enhancing infrastructure such as good roads, healthcare, good quality education and electricity. The study shows that participants rated issues such as regular elections, checks and balances, anti-corruption campaigns and even the rule of law below employment, reduction in the cost of goods, electricity, good roads, health care, education and water. This means

that citizens define good governance by what government does rather than how it does it. Given the current level of the economic hardship of the people, if a government can ensure that basic needs are easily met and basic infrastructure are provided, that government is good enough. Only after the basic need for the citizens' survival is met will technical issues of governance matter to the poor masses.

Moreover, the local people's conceptualization of good governance contradicts the donors' conceptualization of good governance, which is broader and requires meeting some western institutional standards. While the people's narrow or simple definition of good governance in this study is based on their experience, current hardship and Nigeria's political reality, the donors' elaborate definition of good governance is based on Western institutional experience and the economic prosperity of Western developed countries. The findings certainly confirm that good governance is relative and highly dependent on the level of income of individuals.

### **8.2.3 Objective 3: To identify key issues at local level important for better performance of governance and achievement of development**

The study found that specific issues affecting governance in Nigeria include the current problematic political and federal structure characterized by the excessive monetization of political offices, too much concentration of power at the centre of the federal system, tribal consciousness and ethnic cleavages. Other issues include the loss of the sense of cultural values, the exclusion of culture (especially morality and traditional oath taking) from governance, and inadequate public funds to finance development. These issues are governance challenges peculiar to Nigeria and may not be obtainable in other socio-political settings. It is therefore very important that these issues are considered in order to develop a context and culturally specific governance framework.

### **8.2.4 Objective 4: To assess people's perception of the new democratic governance in Nigeria.**

The study shows that democratic governance has not been able to improve the local citizens' well-being because life is harder now than it was ten years ago due the high cost of goods, especially food, lack of income and the poor state of social infrastructure. The study showed that democracy usually recycles the old military juntas in Nigeria. Consequently, the approaches of governing in the good governance era are militaristic and non-participatory. The study also shows that politics is

controlled by some political patrons who sponsor and rig elections for their candidates. This renders the power of the citizens' vote or elections to determine those that rule or represent them useless. This also leads to the imposition of political candidates on citizens, transfer of elected leaders' accountability from the people to political patrons. Many citizens also believe corruption is unabated, the quality of public services has not improved and the government officials are unreachable.

A few of the study participants, however, believe that compared to the military era, democracy has brought some improvements, especially political freedom. However, as the quantitative findings show, election-related freedom is not the citizens' priority as much as welfare improvement (section 6.3.2). The poor state of social infrastructure, economic hardship, and poor consultation characterizing Nigeria's democratic governance negate whatever improvements democracy and other good governance reforms have brought.

#### **8.2.5 Objective 5: To understand the principles of indigenous governance that guarantee responsiveness, accountability, participation, and transparency as well as ensures welfare improvement in South Western Nigeria.**

This study shows that the Yoruba traditional governance is able to achieve participatory and responsive governance because the political structure is democratic. For the sake of distinguishing this democracy from western style democracy, the Yoruba governance can be called a cultural democracy. Some of the strategies that ensure good governance include decentralization with autonomous subunits, the people's involvement, family representation, consultations, high moral standard of leadership, non-monetization of political positions, supremacy of the culture, leadership training, tradition oath taking, easy provision for the deposition of unresponsive leadership, communal effort to achieve development, low cost administrative structure, hard work and equal access to resources.

#### **8.2.6 To develop a context-specific good governance model that reflects the tradition and aspirations of local people in Southwest Nigeria**

This objective was achieved in Chapter Seven. The Model reflects recommendations based on the issues raised by the participants in this study, Nigeria's political history, Yoruba culture and the principles that ensure responsiveness, accountability, participation, and welfare improvement in Yoruba traditional governance. Two

governance models were developed. The first model proposes some institutional rearrangement to promote good governance at the national level while the second model focuses on Southwest Nigeria. These models are typified in figure 7.2 and figure 7.3.

### **8.3. Concluding Summary**

This study has shown the limitations of the good governance agenda as an externally imposed strategy to achieve development in Africa, in general, and in Nigeria, in particular. It shows with empirical evidence that Western theories are based on European experience and their basic assumptions do not hold in African countries due to cultural and contextual differences. Moreover, since the beginning of the development project in 1949, the West has always used its hegemony to continuously define the term and how it must be achieved in poorer countries, without consulting the citizens. The idea of development has thus been used by the West to entrench its political, economic and epistemological hegemony over the rest of the world, especially Africa. The inclusion of free trade or neo-liberalism in all Western development interventions, including the good governance agenda is one reason which confirms that the intent of these strategies is not to develop Africa but to restructure Africa economies to suit the capitalist interests of the West, especially their open access to African resources and markets. The uncritical acceptance and adoption of Western neo-colonial theories by African policymakers in the post-colonial period is a form of self-crucifixion of African economies.

It is undeniable that governments in Africa, especially Nigeria, are very corrupt even while the region harbours the highest number of poor people in the world. However, Eurocentric approaches are not the only way to solving these problems. The approaches have consistently denied the African people the chance to be the agency of their own problems. Eurocentricity subjugates and inferiorizes the African way of knowing to the extent that many Africans have been oriented not to believe in their indigenous capabilities. Given that Eurocentric approaches, including the good governance agenda, have not been able to achieve better governance and development in Nigeria, it is time African scholars reclaim themselves from European epistemological subjugation and look inwards to solving Nigeria's political challenges, using indigenous knowledge and home-grown strategies that will wholly seek and

defend the interests of its people. European intellectuals are not more knowledgeable than African philosophers because wisdom does not reside in the colour of the skin. Likewise, home grown strategies are not inferior to Western strategies.

This study, using an Afrocentric lens, has made important findings to give a better understanding of the issues of governance in Nigeria and it has offered several recommendations for improving governance and development in Nigeria. For example, in contrast to the popular definitions of good governance in literature, as meeting up with some western institutional standards, this study defines good governance as the governance system that well steers the society towards the achievement of the societal goals and improves the welfare of its citizens (section 2.5.1). This proposed definition of good governance is in line with the findings of the study which show that local citizens in our case studies define good governance simply as governance that guarantees welfare improvement. By analysing the good governance agenda vis-a-vis the expectations of local people, it is evident that the local people's conceptualization of good governance contradicts the donors' conceptualization of good governance and this contradiction has implications on the ability of the donors'/western governance intervention to be able to lead to results that positively impact the lives of the citizens.

The study has also identified and highlighted context-specific issues affecting governance in Nigeria; which are not captured in the donors' universal good governance agenda. Issues such as ethnicity, tribal cleavage, excessive monetization, godfather politics, sense of cultural value, problematic federal structures and Nigeria's cultural diversities are not included in the donors' good governance reform frameworks like, Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP), Country Assistance Strategy (CAS) and the Medium Term Expenditure Framework (MTEF). That is why this study concludes that good governance cannot have a universal definition or approach. The conceptualization of good governance and the institutional arrangement that will work to the benefit of the citizens needs to be based on the understanding of the local people, their level of development and their history, culture and experience.

The findings of this study about the unsatisfactory performance of democratic governance further question the acclaimed positive relationship between democracy and development. Studies such as Przeworski (2004) and Doucouliagos and Ulubaşoğlu (2008) have shown that democracy has no direct impact on growth.

Consequently, this researcher argues that if development is the goal of pursuing good governance, and Western liberal democracy is not achieving it for the Nigerian people, then every society must find its governance strategy and contextual democracy that will lead to that goal.

This study has been able to understand good governance from the local people's perspectives, which is a first necessary step towards developing people-centred good governance and development policies. Another contribution of this study is that it identified and established the principles and strategies that have enabled the effectiveness of traditional governance systems. Most importantly, it proposed how these indigenous good governance qualities could be incorporated into formal governance to achieve better government performance.

### ***Pointer for Further Research***

Nevertheless, this study offers many opportunities for further studies. For example, this study only focuses on South West Nigeria. Scholars are encouraged to conduct research towards achieving good governance and development based on the interpretation and culture of people from other ethnic groups and geopolitical zones in Nigeria. More so, studies to understand the similarities in the socio-political culture of the various ethnicities in Nigeria will give insights into how to design a culturally specific governance model, useful for improving governance in Nigeria and building platforms for national unity.

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## **APPENDICES**

### **Appendix 1: Interview Guide: Educated Elites**

**Location:**

Date:

Name of interviewer:

#### **Respondents Background**

Age:

Education:

Ethnicity:

Gender:

Profession:

We would like to talk to you about the issues of governance in Nigeria, especially how it affects life at local level.

1. In your own view, how do you define good governance?
2. What do you regard as the key features of a government that is good?
3. How will you define bad governance?
4. What in your opinion are the characteristics of a government that is bad?
5. How will you assess the performance of the democratic governance in (south West) Nigeria since 2010?
6. What issues do you think are affecting the achievement of good governance and poverty reduction in (Southwest) Nigeria?
7. Do you think indigenous governance systems in the Southwest, Nigeria have been effective in contributing to people's welfare especially those in rural areas?
8. What are the qualities of traditional governance system that have enabled the effectiveness?

## **APPENDIX 2 Interview Guide: Public Office-Holders/ Public Servants**

Location:

Date:

Name of interviewer:

### **Respondents Background:**

Age:

Education:

Ethnicity:

Gender:

Position:

We would like to talk to you some more about the issues of governance in Nigeria, especially how it affects lives at local level.

1. In your own view, how will you define good governance?
2. What will you regard as the key features of a government that is good?
3. How will you define bad governance?
4. What in your opinion are the characteristics of a government that is bad?
5. How will you assess the performance of the democratic governance in (south West) Nigeria since 2010?
6. Do the Local and/or State government has measures to identify the development priorities of local citizens?
7. What issues do you think are affecting the achievement of good governance and poverty reduction in (Southwest) Nigeria?
8. Do you think indigenous governance systems in the Southwest, Nigeria have been effective in contributing to people's welfare especially those in rural areas?
9. What are the qualities of traditional governance system that have enabled the effectiveness?

### **APPENDIX 3 Interview guide: Traditional Leaders**

Location:

Date:

Name of interviewer:

#### **Respondents Background:**

Age:

Education:

Ethnicity:

Gender:

Position

We would like to talk to you some more about the issues of governance in Nigeria, especially how it affects lives at local level.

1. In your own view, how will you define good governance?
2. What will you regard as the key features of a government that is good?
3. How will you define bad governance?
4. What in your opinion are the characteristics of a government that is bad?
5. How will you assess the performance of the democratic governance in (south West) Nigeria since 2010?
6. What issues do you think are affecting the achievement of good governance and poverty reduction in (Southwest) Nigeria?
7. Do you think indigenous governance systems in the Southwest, Nigeria have been effective in contributing to people's welfare especially those in rural areas?
8. What are the strategies in the precolonial Yoruba governance system in place to ensure participation, responsiveness, accountability, prevention of abuse of power; dispute settlement; security and infrastructure development; and poverty reduction?

## APPENDIX 4: Household Survey/ Questionnaire

This questionnaire is to identify the priorities and expectations of local citizens of governance system in Nigeria

**The information provided by the respondents will be considered strictly confidential.**

To be filled by the interviewer. Please tick the appropriate boxes and provide answers clearly on the space given.

### 1. General:

1.1. Local government area: .....

1.2. Name of village/town:.....

1.3. Name of respondent (optional):.....

1.4. Age (1) age 18-30 (2) 31-40 (3) 41-50 (4) 51-60 (5) 61 and above

1.5. Sex Male (1) Female (2)

1.6. Occupation: (1) Trading (2) Civil service (3) farming (4) Artisan/self-employed (5) student (6) Others specify.....

1.7. Education Level attained: (1) no formal education (2) primary (3) secondary (4) tertiary

1.8 Monthly income: (1) less than N50,000 (2) N50,000- 100,000 (3) 101,000 -150,000 (4) 151,000-200,000 (5) above 200,000

### 2. Problem Analysis

2.1 What do you see as the four (4) most important problems in your area and who do you think is responsible?

s/n	Most Important Problems	Causes	Who is responsible
1			
2			
3			
4			

2.2. Consider the problem 1, problem 2, problem 3 and problem 4 you mentioned, to which person will you or people go to first in order to solve these problems?

**Main Problems**

**Where would you go being going to solve them when it affects you**

Polic e	State /Local Governme nt Officials or institutions (health centre, LG chairman, Councillor	Kings or Villag e Chiefs	Com m- unity Assoc iation	Trade union	Relativ es	Friend s	Region associ ation	Other s
------------	-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------	--------------------------------------	---------------------------------------	----------------	---------------	-------------	---------------------------	------------

- 1)
- 2)
- 3)
- 4)

2.3. Why do you prefer to first choose to go the institutions you selected above?

**Priority institutions      What good qualities made you prefer to choose this institutions**

- 1)
- 2)

3)

4)

2.4 In your opinion, what 7 issues (from the list below) should the State government focus that will most improve your standard of living over the next 4 years? Arrange your selection in order of priority by assigning 7 to the most important and 1 to the least important.

- a. Provide Employment
- b. Reduce cost of goods
- c. Provide access to credit
- d. Improve taxes collection
- e. Provide good roads
- f. Provide consistent electricity,
- g. Improve access to water
- h. Improve health care
- i. Support for orphans, street children, and the elderly
- j. Provide affordable Housing
- k. Improve education access and quality
- l. Control Crime and security (robbers, kidnappers and suicide attackers)
- m. Control Domestic violence
- n. Reduce discrimination by tribe or sex
- o. Curtail Bribes/corruption
- p. Transparent and accountable government
- q. More free and fair elections
- r. Ability to get justice through courts
- s. Reduce impact of droughts,
- t. Solve Food shortages
- u. Land ownership,



- v. Deforestation,
- w. Reduce Pollution
- x. Others please specify

**2.5** How will you consider the standard of living of your household now as compared to before 2010?

1. Better                      2. Difference                      3. Worse

**2.6** What do you think is the major contributory factor to the current state of your household welfare?

.....  
 .....

**3. Perception on institutional Performance**

**3.1.** Are you satisfied with the performance of your state government?

- (1) Yes                      (2) No.

a. If yes, mention the good qualities.

.....  
 .....

b. If no, mention what disappointments you.

.....

**3.2** Are you satisfied with the performance of your local government?

- (1) Yes                      (2) No.

a. If yes, mention the good qualities.

.....  
 .....

b. If no, mention what disappoints you.

.....

**3.3.** What is your perception of corruption in this state now compared to before 2010?

1. Corruption reduced 2. Corruption the same 3. Corruption higher

3.4 Compared to seven (7) years ago, what do you think about the availability and quality of public services hospitals, public schools, water services, Electricity, road infrastructure, security?

1. Better 2. No difference 3. Worse

3.5 Do you have to make unofficial payment to access public services?

1. Always 2. Sometimes 3. Never

#### 4.0 Citizen's participation

4.1 Is there any way that you could draw the attention of the State government to your problems?

- (1) Yes (2) No.

a. If yes please specify?

.....  
.....  
.....

4.2 Please tell us, within the last two years was there any public forum in this community where you express your views on any issue?

- (1) Yes (2) No.

a. If yes please specify the forum?

.....  
.....

4.3. Did you vote at the last Local government elections?

- a. (1) Yes (2) No

b. If No, please state why?

.....

4.4. Did you vote at the last State government elections?

a. (1) Yes (2) No

b. If No, please state why?

.....

4.5. Did you vote at the last Federal government elections?

a. (1) Yes (2) No

b. If No, please state why?

.....

**14. Interviewer's remarks and observations:**

.....

## **APPENDIX 5 Consent Form**

### **Research Title: An Afrocentric Critique of the Discourse of Good Governance and Its Limitations as a Means of Addressing Development Challenges in Nigeria**

I ..... hereby agree to participate in the above mentioned doctoral research project conducted by Adejumo-Ayibiowu O.D. (Mrs) from the University of South Africa.

I understand that the purpose of the research is academic and has the following objectives:

- To critically examine the discourse of good governance and its limitations as a means of addressing development challenges.
- To understand local citizens' conceptualization of the term 'good governance'
- To identify key issues at local level important for better performance of governance and achievement of development in Southwest Nigeria
- To assess people's perception of the new democratic governance in in Southwest Nigeria.
- To understand the principles of good indigenous governance that guarantee responsiveness, accountability, participation, and transparency as well that ensures welfare improvement in South Western Nigeria.
- To develop a context-specific good governance model that reflects the tradition and aspirations of local people in South Western Nigeria.

Data collected is for academic purpose and will to be used to towards DPhil Development Studies thesis project at UNISA with the aims and objectives stated above.

I acknowledge

1. That the aims and objectives of the study, have been explained to me.
2. That my participation in the study is voluntary and will not be paid.
3. That I may withdraw and discontinue participation at any time without penalty.
4. That my participation involves being interviewed for about 30 minutes. There will audio tape recording of the interview while notes will also be taken by the interviewer.
5. That if I feel uncomfortable about any interview question, I have the right not to answer or to end the interview.

6. That my confidentiality as a participant in the research study is assured. Individual results will not be released to any person except at my request and on my authorization.

Signature: ..... Date: .....