View metadata, citation and similar papers at core.ac.uk
brought to you by CORE
provided by YorkSpace

A NARRATIVE ACCOUNT OF ARGUMENTATION

KHAMAIEL AL TAMIMI

A DISSERTATION SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY
OF GRADUATE STUDIES
IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE
REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF
PHILOSOPHY

GRADUATE PROGRAM IN PHILOSOPHY
YORK UNIVERSITY
TORONTO, ONTARIO

DECEMBER 2017

© Khamaiel Al Tamimi, 2017

ABSTRACT

In this dissertation I attempt to accomplish three goals. The first goal is to develop a narrative account of argumentation. I show that storytelling serves as a legitimate mode of argumentation. Further, I develop an account of narrative argument based on generalized features of narrative and a conception of argument that is rhetorical and in line with Charles Willard's notion of argument as an interaction (1989). I identify features of narrative argument that enable narrative to function as an argument and thus to provide reasons for a claim in the context of disagreement. As a result, I synthesize literatures on narrative and argumentation to provide a definition of narrative argument.

The second goal of the dissertation is to argue for maintaining the narrative as a process without reconstructing the narrative into the dominant model of argument, the Critical-Logical Model. In this part of the dissertation, I further elaborate on the definition of narrative argument and argue that narrative argument must be understood as a process, and not as a product of argument. While the product view focuses on the form and structure of an argument as being linear, explicit, and containing premises and a conclusion, and thus treats arguments as things, the process view focuses on the whole act of arguing, thus highlighting the importance of the context of argumentation and the people involved. In support of this thesis, I show that reducing the narrative into premises and a conclusion is problematic because it deprives it of some of its persuasive force. As such, I argue against the reductionist approach to narrative argument that seeks to extract premises and a conclusion from a narrative, because I contend that the whole act of storytelling is an argument. Reducing the narrative into a product removes the real argument—part of which is implicit—from its context, its unique situation, and its complex social setting.

The third goal of this dissertation is to develop an account of argument evaluation that is suitable for narrative argument understood as a process. I offer an account of how to evaluate narratives using 'the virtuous audience,' a novel evaluative method that combines theories of virtue argumentation and rhetorical audiences.

In sum, this dissertation provides a definition of narrative argument, stipulates the conditions of narrative arguments that make them successful, and offers ways of evaluating the narrative while maintaining its form as a process.

DEDICATION

This is dedicated to my loving parents, Najiah Altamimi and Aoda Wahib Altamimi for all the opportunities you have given me, and most of all for having faith in me.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to express my deepest gratitude to my supervisor Michael Gilbert, without whom this project would not have been possible. I came across Professor Michael Gilbert's works while completing my master's degree, and ever since then his work and philosophy have had a huge impact not only on my research, but also on me as a person. Michael's work on coalescent argumentation and multimodal theories influenced my interest in narrative arguments. Reading his influential book, *Coalescent Argumentation*, has forever changed the way I perceive argument and I am grateful for that. His extensive knowledge and expertise in this area has enriched my understanding and development of my dissertation. I am forever indebted to his extensive guidance, support, and encouragement.

My sincere thanks to my other dissertation committee members, Professors Idil Boran and David Jopling, for their guidance and feedback on this dissertation. I am especially grateful to Idil for her valuable advice.

I would like to thank my dissertation examining committee, Professor Moira Howes and Professor Liette Gilbert for taking the time out of their busy schedule to read and provide helpful comments on my dissertation. And thank you to Professor Duff Waring for agreeing to serve as the Dean's Representative for this project.

A special thank you goes out to York's Philosophy department for the financial assistance they have provided me. I am also grateful to the Province of Ontario for the Ontario Graduate Scholarship funding throughout the years. And thank you to the Philosophy department staff especially Emma Posca for her kindness and help.

I would also like to thank the philosophy department at the University of Windsor for their support and guidance and special thanks goes to professor Cate Hundleby for her mentorship and to professor Robert Pinto for igniting in me the love of philosophy.

Thank you to everyone who has taken part in editing and revising this dissertation including Zeinab McHeimech, Michelle Ciurria and Jason Horn. I am deeply grateful for Michelle and Zeinab for being great friends and for always pushing and encouraging me. Thank you for taking the time to edit endless drafts of my work and for providing valuable and helpful feedback. Your comments and edits have made this possible. Thank you to all my friends, including Daniel, Olivia, Nizar, Amir, Chen and Dina for their friendship and support throughout the years. Special thank you goes to Christalina for always supporting and caring for me.

Thank you to Mohammed for his continuous patience, love, support and encouragement through the years.

I wish to extend a special thanks to Evelyn Ciurria. It is really impossible to thank you enough for what you have done for me and for the kindness and generosity you have shown me.

I am forever indebted to my family for supporting, encouraging and believing in me. Thank you to my father, Aoda, and mother, Najiah, for giving me the opportunity to study in Canada and for their unfaltering support and belief in me. Your resilience and fortitude has given me the strength, persistence and motivation to never give up. Thank you to my brothers, Abeer, Afaq, Sinan, Fahad, Alaa and to my sisters: Luma, Ashtar, Jadial and especially Rawa whose strength and bravery inspires me every day. Thank you to my nephews especially Laith and Ali for your love and humor and thank you to Shehed, Faith and Meriam for your unconditional love.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Abstract	ii
Dedication	iii
Acknowledgements	iv
Table of Contents	v
General Introduction	
Introduction	1
Preliminary definitions	2
Chapter breakdown	4
Chapter One: Chapter One: History Of Argumentation Theory	
Introduction	7
History Of Argumentation Theory	7
Stephen Toulmin	8
Chaim Perelman	9
Informal Logic	12
Pragma Dialectics	15
Rhetoric and Communication studies	18
Narrative Argumentation	23
Recent Development Of Narrative Arguments	25
Rejecting Narrative As Arguments	29
Issues With Narrative Arguments	30
Walter Fisher And Narrative Rationality	32
Conclusion	33
Chapter Two: Feminist Critiques Of Traditional Argumentation	
Introduction	35
Adversariality Of Argumentation	35
Gendered Reasoning	44
Language, Credibility And Power	46
Feminism And Fallacies	51
Feminists Critiques Of Rationality And The Maleness Of Reason	52
Oppressive Frameworks	58
Narrow Conceptions Of Argument	60
Michael Gilbert: Coalescent Argumentation	61
Narrative Argument And Feminism	63
Chapter Three: Defining Narrative Argumentation	
Introduction	66
Definition Of Narrative	69

Action/Event 70
Time And Space 71
Teller (Narrator) And Audience 72
The Act Of Narrative And The Product Of Narrative 73
Context 74
Definition Of Argument 74
Definition Of Narrative Argument 79
Story 82
Mutual Attribution Of Intention 82
Dissensus, Disagreement Or Opposition 83
Context 83
Reasons 85
Arguer 85
Narrative argument as process not product 85
Audience 86
Examples Of Narrative Arguments 87
Example One 87
Example Two 89
Example Three 91
Example Four 92
Objections and Response 93

Chapter Four: Narrative Argument, A Process Account
Introduction 95
Why Narrative Should Remain A Process 98
Nature Of Narrative Argument 99
Narrative Arguments: Multimodal And Contextual Elements 100
Narrative Arguments: A Co-Creation Of The Arguer And The Audience 103
Cognitive And Psychological Aspects And Process Of Persuasion 105
Narrative Argument As Complex Message Design And Reception 108
Translation And A Single, Limited Perspective 109
Distortion And Misinterpretation 110
Objections And Response 112
Objection One: Clarity And Meaningfulness 112
Objection Two: Evaluation Of Arguments 116

Chapter Five: The Evaluation of Narrative Arguments and the Virtuous Audience
Introduction 121
Preliminaries 121
Dominant Account Of Argument Evaluation 123
The Virtuous Audience 127
Argumentation Adapted To The Virtuous Audience 127
Virtuous Audience As Interactive 131
Virtuous Audience As The Measure Of Argument 132
Virtue Argumentation 138

Virtues Of Argumentation 141
Objections And Response To The Virtuous Audience 145
Objection One 145
Objection Two 146
Objection Three 150
Virtuous Consensus 154
Believability And Good Stories 161
Conclusion 169

Conclusion 170

References 173

General Introduction

Introduction

This dissertation defends narratives and storytelling as a legitimate mode of argumentation by showing how narrative can function as an argument and provide reasons for a claim. This account is by no means complete, but it provides the starting point for thinking about narrative arguments. Although narrative arguments are an integral component of argumentation theory, they have not received serious attention. As it stands, standard accounts of argumentation reject narrative reasoning. That is, the traditional and standard model of argumentation only accepts claims, premises and conclusions set out in an explicit and linear fashion as an argument. Adding to Michael Gilbert's view that there is a dominant accepted mode of speaking (the logical mode) which is exclusive of the different modes people use when arguing, such as the emotional, visceral, and kisceral, I argue that in addition to these modes of reasoning there is a fifth excluded mode of argumentation: narrative.

An exploration of narrative argumentation contributes to the current debates in argumentation theory over the exclusionary practices of dominant argumentation, the boundaries and limitation of the definition of argument and the importance of the role of narrative in argumentation.

This project is motivated in part by feminist concerns with the dominant model of argumentation. Feminist critiques of argumentation are generally concerned with three main problems: 1. The hostile and adversarial practice of argumentation, 2. The exclusionary concept of arguing which only accepts modes of arguing that are linear, explicit and devoid of emotions and contextual information, and 3. Whether there exist gender differences in reasoning and arguing that hinder women and minority groups from full participation in the argumentation

arena. Many argumentation scholars, including Michael Gilbert, Phyllis Rooney, Andrea Nye, and Maryann Ayim, have rejected the traditional (critical-logical) model of argumentation, as it ignores the social and personal aspects of argumentation and fails to address the ethical concerns that come with arguing. Because this model of argumentation excludes non-standard modes of reasoning, such as emotional and narrative reasoning, women and other disenfranchised groups are denied access to power due to their linguistic practices. Women's voices often are not heard or taken seriously, resulting in false denials of their authority. This problem is also likely to affect other minorities whose linguistic habits differ from the logico-deductive model, such as Native Canadians, thus reducing the likelihood of genuinely effective cross-cultural communication.

This dissertation is consistent with feminist critiques of argumentation, as it challenges exclusionary conceptions of argumentation. By broadening the conception of argument, we make the practice of argumentation more inclusive and less hostile to those silenced by the traditional model of argumentation.

Preliminary Definitions

I will briefly define several terms that I will be using in the thesis.

Narrative. A narrative contains a sequence of events which are chronologically connected and happen over a period of time; it usually includes a beginning and an end. A chronological story, however, does not mean that it is necessarily linear; it can be both fragmented and disjunctive, and still be chronological. All narratives have some sort of order and are placed within temporal and spatial patterns. All definitions of narrative emphasize the temporally ordered sequence of events.

Broadly speaking, a narrative generally contains these five features: (1) One or more events presented in a logical sequence, (2) movement through time and space, (3) plot, (4) Characters, and (5) a teller and an audience. All these features of narrative will be explained in more details later in the dissertation.

Product. Throughout the thesis I will use the word product. In the field of argumentation, product is the idea that an argument is an artifact, which is not necessarily located in time and space. Hence, the same argument as product can be used in different places but still mean the same thing. Furthermore, argument as product focuses on the form and structure of an argument as being linear, explicit and containing premises and a conclusion, where arguments are treated as things.

Virtue. I use the term virtue to refer to the general idea of character traits. I rely on a basic definition of virtue as an excellent trait of character. And so, virtues are qualities that make a person excellent (Battaly, 2010, p.3). Linda Zagzebski (1996) defines virtue as an excellence and a deep trait of a person (p. 89). Further, virtue of character generally refers to a well-entrenched disposition, that is deeply embedded in a person. As such, possessing a virtuous character is essentially having a certain type of personality and mindset that is cultivated over time. In this dissertation, I focus on virtue argumentation and what it means to argue virtuously with a good character, namely a character that respects others and is open to criticism and having a willingness to change one's beliefs.

Character. A narrative typically has one or more characters, who are the people or persons referred to in the story. Characters can play major roles such as protagonists or antagonists. The meaning and significance of the concept of character in stories is contested in narrative theory. However, for my account of narrative argumentation, I rely on a general

concept of character in storytelling. That is, all stories have characters (people), whether real, fictional or hypothetical. And, as such, characters can also be understood as participants in the story world. Further, the character types in the story must map onto our shared understanding of human nature. To understand characters, the audience resorts to their knowledge of real people (Jannidis, 2009, p.16). The ethos of the characters (i.e. their credibility) is what makes the story plausible and believable. The ethos of these characters, their nature and role can vary from narrative to narrative.

Chapter Break Down

Chapter one of this dissertation introduces argumentation theory and provides a history of the different strands of argumentation theory, focusing on the three main approaches: informal logic, pragma dialectic and rhetoric and communication theory.

Chapter two discusses feminist critiques of argumentation and situates narrative argument within this feminist debate. Feminist critiques highlight the importance of broadening the concept of arguments, of acknowledging the different ways of arguing, and of changing existing argumentation practices that are adversarial and harmful to women and minority groups.

In chapter three, I proceed to develop an account of narrative argument based on generalized features of narrative and a conception of argument that is rhetorical and in line with Willard's notion of argument as an interaction. In this chapter, I provide a detailed description of how narrative functions in an argument setting, presenting conditions for when narrative can function as argument. Chapter three will establish the conditions that enable narrative to function as arguments. I begin this chapter by explaining the basic conditions for a comprehensible story: namely that the story must be 1.) coherent (things fit together) 2.) follows

a sequence of events, and 3. have a beginning and an end. Further, using Charles Arthur Willard's rhetorical theory of argumentation (1989), I propose that some of the conditions for narrative to count as argument are as follows:

(1) The speaker's intention is relevant.

(2) The context and the background information that are shared amongst speakers (a point also made by Gilbert).

On my view, it is the context of the situation, specifically, the shared background knowledge between speakers and the intention of speakers that enables narratives to function as arguments. The purpose and meaning of argument cannot be abstracted away from the perspective of arguers; that is, an argument is (its goal and purpose) whatever the arguer intends it to be.

In the following chapter, I further elaborate on the definition of narrative argument and argue that narrative argument must be understood as a process, and not as a product of argument. While argument as product focuses on the form and structure of an argument as being linear, explicit and containing premises and a conclusion, where arguments are treated as things, argument as a process focuses on the whole act of arguing thus highlighting the importance of the context of argumentation and argument as involving people.

In chapter five, I develop an account of the virtuous audience as a method for evaluating narrative arguments. Borrowing from rhetorical and virtue accounts of argumentation, I show that narrative arguments can be evaluated using a process account. Traditionally, argument evaluation focuses on the product of argument while ignoring that the process of arguing must also be accounted for in order to produce good argumentation. This chapter demonstrates that the practices of argumentation are just as important as the product of argumentation and that the practices of argumentation must also be virtuous for the argument to be acceptable.

Traditional theories of argument evaluation are thus inadequate for narrative argument because they focus on the content and product of arguments. In focusing on the product, traditional argumentation theorists distort and reduce narratives in their analysis of them. A complete theory of argument evaluation, I contend, must consider the process of arguing and not just the product.

Chapter One: History Of Argumentation Theory

Introduction

In this chapter I will first give a brief history of argumentation theory and offer an explanation of the different theories of argumentation. Second, I will give an overview of the recent interest in narrative argumentation.

History Of Argumentation Theory

The study of argumentation was originally part of the art of rhetoric in ancient Greece (Athens) and the Island of Sicily which is the birthplace of the Western tradition of persuasion. While the study of argumentation has been part of the field of philosophy ever since Aristotle where argumentation was studied in terms of formal and deductive logic, argumentation theory is nevertheless a new field that developed in the 1950s (Gilbert, 1997, p. 3). Argumentation theory is an interdisciplinary field which draws attention from a wide range of disciplines and scholars such as philosophers, logicians, computer scientists, linguists, legal scholars and speech communication theorists. As Joseph Wenzel notes in "Perspectives on Argument," there is no single answer to the question of what is an argument, and the answer varies depending on the unique approach taken by the diverse scholars on argumentation (Wenzel, 1992, p. 121).

Two of the main scholars who pioneered the study of argumentation are Chaim Perelman and Stephen Toulmin. Until the late seventies, argumentation theory was still dominated by the work of Toulmin (1958) and Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca (1958). Both Toulmin and Perelman attack formal logic for being artificial and irrelevant to the natural and everyday language of argumentation. Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca's *The New Rhetoric* and Toulmin's

The Uses of Argument are an attempt to offer an alternative to formal logic that is more suitable and useful for analyzing and dealing with everyday interactive argumentation in ordinary language. And both theorists argue that there is a difference between the artificial language of logic and the natural language of argument, and that logic by itself is not sufficient for analyzing natural arguments. This rejection of logic for analyzing and understanding everyday language became the mainstream perspective during the 1970's (L. Benoit, J. Benoit and Hample, 1992, p. 7).

Stephen Toulmin. The two main significant contributions that Toulmin made to the study of argumentation are the idea of field-dependence and the layouts of arguments. In the *Uses of Argument* (1958), Toulmin presents a model of the various components that constitute an argument (such as the claim, data, warrant, backing, etc.). He created a model that's interactive, and mapped the natural process of argument that was not based on formal logic. He created a model that, he argued, mirrored how people really argue in everyday life.

Another important and influential aspect of Toulmin's theory of argumentation is the notion of argument fields. Toulmin argues that some aspects of an argument will be the same across all fields of knowledge, and are the same everywhere, which he calls *field-invariant* because they do not change from field to field, while others are different from setting to setting and are *field-dependent;* i.e., their acceptability will vary from field to field (such as law, medicine, politics, etc.) (William L. Benoit, 1992, p. 61). Each field of knowledge and argument will appeal to unique standards of assessments where the use of warrants, data and backing will vary from field to field. The problem that Toulmin found with formal logic in relation to argumentation is that the criteria used by formal logic are field-invariant and cannot deal with the

differences that exist from field to field (Tindale, 1999, p. 25). For example, the field of business relies on a cost benefit analysis whereas religious arguments require different evaluations and justifications. Another example would be the field of physics and mathematics that rely on mathematical theorems and formulas that is different than the legal idea of proof.

Chaim Perelman. Like Toulmin, Perelman became dissatisfied with formal logic as a method for evaluating everyday language. Perelman believed that the standards of necessity and certainty play no role in argumentation or deliberation because according to Perelman no one argues or deliberates about that which is known or self-evident. The goal of argumentation for Perelman is not the deduction of conclusions from premises (as is the case with demonstration) or simply the resolution of disputes, but rather the creation and or strengthening of the adherence of the minds of the audience (particular and universal) to the claims put forward (Tindale, 1999, p. 17). The domain of argumentation for Perelman, thus, concerns that which is probable and plausible, as opposed to that which is necessary or self-evident as is the case with formal logic (Perelman, 1963, p. 134). Perelman's rhetorical model of argumentation is based on adherence and not self-evident truths. As noted by Caroll C. Arnold , Perleman's independent study of what people actually do when they argue confirmed the ancients' belief that when one's premises are disputable, the best method is to refer back to accepted opinions (Arnold, 1982, Viii). In his attempt to find common ground for agreement, Perelman developed the universal audience, which can be described as the premises and arguments adhered and agreed upon by rational people. And so, for Perelman, argumentation is a social undertaking characterized by the nature of audience. The development of argumentation is essentially the function of the audience who

validate and accept the arguments, and it is precisely for this reason that the speaker is obliged to adapt himself to the audience (Perelman, 1982, p. 13).

This adaptation means that the speaker must begin his starting point of arguments with theses accepted by the audience. The speaker should aim for the transfer of adherence from the premises to the conclusion. And if the premises happen to be rejected then the speaker should first try to reinforce them before he delves into his argument/conclusion. The audience will not accept the conclusion of an argument whose premises they reject or doubt (Perelman, 1982, p.21). As such, adapting to the audience requires the speaker to choose premises that the speaker holds (Perelman, 1982, p.23). This adherence, writes Perelman, never comes out of thin air for it supposes a meeting of minds between the speaker and his/her audience whom all agree on the starting points of argument (Perelman, 1982, p. 9). Perelman's rhetorical model of argumentation relies primarily on the audience for the acceptance and rejection of arguments. The speaker can only develop his argument by linking it to these accepted by his audience, and as such the development of argumentation depends on what is accepted, acknowledged as true, normal, probable and valid (Perelman, 1963, p. 156). Hence, the standard of argumentation for Perelman is the audience. Perelman argues that there are two types of audiences that exist in the domain of argumentation, the particular (or specific) audience that exists in the actual situation, and the universal audience that is composed or extracted out of the particular audience. Perelman developed these two audiences as a way to address the demand for a specific criteria of evaluation as well as to overcome the threat of relativism. The particular audience offers a specific criterion relevant to the situation whereas the universal audience offers an objective criterion that avoids relativism (Tindale, 1999, p. 17).

A major contribution of *The New Rhetoric* is that the majority of the claims we make in

arguing are not self-evident, cannot be proved completely, and are only judged to be reasonable by the audience that validates them (Arnold, 1982, p. xi). According to Perelman, there is no criterion of objective or absolute truth that "shines forth from true statements and is lacking in false ones" (Gilbert, 1997, p. 6). Argumentation is the only method we have for reaching consensus, and we cannot appeal to universal truth, for it is only through arguing that we can come to agreement. Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca (1958) reject the view that convincing an audience means that the view adopted is the right one, for they do not believe in truth, rather, the goal of argumentation is the adherence of the minds of the audience through reason and argument (Gilbert, 1997, p. 6). And because Perelman rejected self-evident truths, adherence became central to his rhetorical model of argumentation. That is, since our arguments cannot be proved completely, we must submit them to the judgment of those for whom it is directed, namely the audience (Tindale, 1999, p. 40). Perelman argues firmly that argumentation can only settle matters when the audience it addresses reaches a consensus on the issue discussed (Perelman, 1982, p. xvi). My project will rely on Perelman's notion of audience and adherence for the assessment and acceptance of narrative arguments. That is, we would assess stories the way we would assess arguments through the adherence and agreement of the audience or those engaged in storytelling.

Further, it must be noted that not all argumentation theorists rejected formal logic or denied its merits; for example, the Pragma Dialecticians do not reject validity or deductive logic, but rather what was being questioned is, 1. The usefulness of formal logic for everyday argumentation, and 2. The conflation of logic with rationalism. This essentially means that there are other ways to be rational (without being logical or valid) and that an argument can be good

without being formally valid. Hence, what was being challenged by many argumentation scholars is the idea that to be rational is to be logical.

Since the early 1990s, new approaches to argumentation emerged that tried to build on the work of Perelman's and Toulmin's models of argumentation. These new approaches include the Rhetoric, Formal Dialectics, Pragma Dialectics, Informal Logic and Formal Analysis of Fallacies. Although this list is not exhaustive, these six approaches roughly represent the current state of argumentation theory. Starting in the late seventies, argumentation has become a focus of interest from scholars in different fields including communication theorists and philosophers. For the sake of brevity, I will explain the three major approaches, Informal logic, pragma dialectic and communication and rhetorical approaches as these approaches map into the three perspectives noted by Brockriede, the product, procedure and process of arguing.

Informal Logic. Informal logic developed in the 1970's as an education reform movement that stemmed from students' dissatisfaction with and criticism of the way argument/logic was taught, as it did not reflect the way students used reason in their daily lives. At that time, textbooks on logic did not provide students with a method to assess or analyze everyday arguments; hence, informal logic emerged out of a movement that sought to revolutionize the way logic was taught (using Howard Kahane's book *Logic and Contemporary Rhetoric* (1971)) and recreate the logic course, a course that would be relevant to everyday reasoning. Thus, informal logic presents an alternative to the limitation of formal logic. Informal logic emerged out of the student revolt of the late 1960s, where students demanded that everything in their education be relevant to their everyday lives.

Notable scholars who pioneered the informal logic movement include Michael Scriven, Michael Gilbert, Trudy Govier, David Hitchcock, Perry Weddle, John Woods, Ralph H. Johnson, J. Anthony Blair, Robert C. Pinto, and Douglas Walton. Unlike other theoretical approaches to argumentation, such as pragma-dialectics, informal logic was not created by speech communication theorists, debate theorists, rhetoricians, or linguists but rather by philosophers trained in the analytic tradition (Blair, 2011, p. 1). It should also be noted that the term informal logic does not refer to one specific approach; rather, the term encompasses a collection of attempts to develop a method of analyzing and evaluating natural language arguments that are not based on formal logic (Van Eemeren, Garssen, Krabbe, Henkemans, Verheij & Wagemans, 2014, p. 374); that is, the disenchantment with formal logic to provide a theory of reasoning applicable to everyday argumentation has resulted in many initiatives to develop a theory of identifying, analyzing, and evaluating arguments that do not rely on formal logic (p.13). Some of these approaches include the pioneering work of Chaim Perelman and Stephen Toulmin, as well as other approaches, such as informal logic and pragma-dialectics.

Formal logic, although valuable, does not prove useful to everyday argumentation. The major critique of formal logic is that it is unable to provide standards of good reasoning in relation to everyday argumentation. Also, an additional problem with formal logic is that neither the notion of valid form, sound argument, or the criteria for inductive strength captures the form of arguments found in the natural language of everyday arguments (Govier, 2014, p. 6). Thus, the requirement that arguments must be valid and have true premises is problematic for the evaluation of real life arguments, because the truth of premises is often either not known or not a clear-cut matter (Van Eemeren, 2014, p. 377); in light of this, informal logic seeks to free argument from the notion that it is a proof (p. 377). Informal logic, as noted by Perelman, is "the

end of deductivism—the idea that all implications are either deductive or defective" (Van Eemeren, 2014, p. 377). The pedagogical goal that led to the development of informal logic later transformed into a theoretical matter of interest as to how to teach students to assess and analyze everyday arguments. Also, the other goal of informal logic is to "provide a complete theory of reasoning that goes beyond formal deductive and inductive logic" (Johnson, 2014, p. 11). The main focus of informal logic is arguments in natural language as opposed to the artificial language of formal logic (Govier, 2014, p. 6).

Proponents of informal logic, particularly Johnson and Blair, do not adopt an oral paradigm and do not focus on oral arguing. According to Johnson, the primary object for argument analysis is written text, because a written argument is more stable and fixed than an oral one (Govier, 2014, p. 3). Further, according to informal logicians, in order to evaluate the argument, the premises and conclusion must be identified and missing premises and/or conclusions must be formulated (Johnson, 2014, p. 25). In terms of narrative argument, informal logicians do not necessarily reject that a narrative can function as an argument, as they claim that it has to be reformulated to fit into the structure of a premise and a conclusion.

In terms of argument evaluation, arguments are tested by their strength using the RSA criteria of Relevance, Sufficiency, and Acceptability (Johnson & Blair, 1977, p. 55). The relevance criterion examines whether the contents of the premises have a strong relation to the conclusion, sufficiency relates to whether the premises, taken together, are sufficient to support and give enough evidence to the conclusion, and acceptability requires that the premises are acceptable ((Johnson & Blair, 1977, p. 55). Accordingly, the acceptability requirement demands that an argument must be acceptable to the arguer, the audience presented with the argument and to the larger and critical community where argumentation is taking place (Van Eemeren,

Grootendorst, & Henkemans, 1996, p. 179). An argument must satisfy these three criteria, and when it fails to satisfy one or more of these requirements, it is then considered fallacious. The term fallacy refers to patterns of argumentation that are frequently committed (Johnson & Blair, 1994, p. 54).

According to Johnson, argument evaluation has two aspects: 1) the illative core of an argument which relates to the structure and relationship between the premise and conclusion (RSA); and 2) the dialectical tier which deals with the extent to which an argument deals adequately with alternative views and objections (Johnson, 2000, p. 166). In relation to the dialectical tier, Blair and Johnson believe that an argument is incomplete if common and known objections to the premises or conclusion are not considered. It is the interlocutors who decide what needs considering (Govier, 2014, p. 7).

Blair and Johnson reject the claim of traditional logicians that premises must be true because arguments in natural language often fall into a gray area, and their acceptability depends on a host of factors; accordingly, there can be good reasons for and good arguments against a given thesis (Johnson, 2000, p. 141). Further, as noted by Blair (2011) the informal logic approach abandoned the "assumption that the only criterion of logical merit in arguments is deductive validity" (p. 9). Thus, informal logicians focus on identifying premises and conclusions in order to assess whether an argument satisfies the RSA standards, in turn, premise identification and argument reformulation comprise integral parts of what informal logicians do.

Pragma Dialectics. Pragma-Dialectics was initiated at the University of Amsterdam by Frans van Eemeren and Rob Grootendorst in the 1970's and continued to develop over the years. Pragma dialectics has its roots in linguistics and discourse analysis, particularly the speech act

theory of J. L. Austin and John Searle (Johnson, 2000, p. 309). This argumentation approach focuses on the actual practices and assertions of arguers and concerns two or more people arguing as opposed to the product of arguing. The meaning of the name pragma-dialectics refers to the practical role of arguing as suggested by the word (pragmatic) and it is dialectical because it is concerned with the dialogical act of arguing, that is with argument as a social activity taking place between two or more people. Some of the characteristics of the pragma-dialectic approach include an emphasis on the *verbal* activity of argumentation (Eemeren, Grootendorst, & Henkemans, 1996, p. 2). Second, argumentation is seen as a social activity where two or more individuals who have a difference of opinion try to arrive at an agreement (Eemeren et al., 1996, p. 277). Third, argumentation is an activity of reason where arguers give rational accounts of their positions (Eemeren et al., 1996, p. 2). And fourth, argumentation is an activity in which arguers intend to justify their standpoints and resolve disagreements (Eemeren et al., 1996, p. 4).

Hence, the pragma-dialectical approach is indeed a process account of arguing because it is dialogical, oral and social. The critical discussion developed by the pragma-dialectical approach is a constrained and bounded style of arguing because it has very well delineated parameters of how arguing should take place. And so while the pragma-dialectical approach is a process account of argument since a critical discussion is procedural, it still retains a formalism as it focuses on formalized rules and structure (as with a critical discussion) which can be rigid and exclusive of alternative models of arguing. The pragma-dialectical approach treats argumentation as a rational means of resolving a difference of opinion through a critical discussion. A critical discussion aimed at resolving difference of opinion goes through four stages. In the *confrontation stage*, the arguers establish that they have a difference of opinion and verbalize their disagreement; the second stage *the opening stage* is where participants decide

to resolve their difference of opinion and begin assigning roles of protagonist and antagonist and agree on the starting points and on the rules of discussion (Eemeren, Grootendorst, Henkemans, 2002, p. 25). In the third stage, the *argumentation stage,* arguers put forward their arguments and defend their positions, answer objections and criticize the interlocutor. In the final stage, the concluding stage, the participants assess whether and how the difference of opinion has been resolved and in whose favor (Eemeren et al., 2002, p. 25). There are ten rules that discussants must follow for a critical discussion to be successful. When the rules are violated, this results in a fallacy. The pragma dialectics define fallacy as violation of the rules of the critical discussion that hinder the resolution of a difference of opinion (Eemeren et al., 2002, p. 109).

Both the pragma dialectic and informal logic approaches see argumentation as serving the goal of rationality, hence ignoring the multiplicity and richness of argument goals that do not focus on truth or rationality. Further, both approaches retain the traditional idea that an argument has to have the premise-conclusion structure, and both approaches discuss the role of fallacies in the evaluation of arguments (Johnson, 2000, p. 319). The problem with both the informal logic and Pragma-dialectic approach is that argument is being forced into a rigid and formulated understanding, either into a critical discussion or products; neither of these two accounts are comprehensive nor do they allow room for alternative modes of arguing that are neither verbal or discursive. For example, pragma dialectics' commitment to the verbalization of arguments states that only arguments that are verbally and explicitly stated count as arguments, while visual or emotional arguments are discredited. As stated by the pragma-dialectic philosophers commitment to externalization, "the study of argumentation should not concentrate on the psychological dispositions of the people involved in an argumentation, but on their externalized- or externalizable-commitments" (Van Eemeren, Grootendorst, Henkemans, 1996, p. 277).

Further, traditional argumentation such as informal logic and pragma-dialectics both ignore contextual features of argument that cannot be reconstructed. In this frame, contextual, relational, personal and social factors are ignored. As pragma-dialectic philosophers put it: “That is not to say that emotions cannot play a part in adopting a position, but that these internal motives, which have been assimilated in the discourse, are not directly relevant as such” (Van Eemeren, Grootendorst, Henkemans, 1996, p. 2).

Rhetoric And Communication Studies. Rhetoric and communication studies of argumentation also offered critiques of formal logic. Communication and rhetoric theorists also criticized the rigidity and limits of formal logic in studying and analyzing everyday arguments. Rhetoric and communication studies developed in the early twentieth century as a result of a growing interest in the practical skills of debating and public speaking. Much like the informal logic movement, communication studies and rhetoric was also first developed with a pedagogical concern for finding better ways to teach practical skills in debating and public speaking (Van Eemeren, Grootendorst, Henkemans, 2014, p. 426). The American tradition of communication studies and rhetoric encompasses different types of approaches to the study of argumentation, including rhetorical theorists, conversational analysts, negotiation facilitators, debaters, and interpersonal communication theorists (Van Eemeren, Grootendorst, Henkemans, 1996, p. 190).

Communication theory of argumentation can be characterized by an emphasis on the descriptive rather than on the normative aspect of argumentation (Van Eemeren, Grootendorst, Henkemans, 1996, p. 197). Charles Willard’s (1989) work pursues a focus on the descriptive side of argumentation. Instead of focusing on an ideal of argumentation, he argues, communication theorists sought to study argumentation as it is. Communication and rhetoric

theorists also focus on everyday interaction among ordinary people (p. 197). That is, a sub area of communication theory, discourse analysis looks at actual conversations and analyzes the rules and procedures followed by participants (Jackson and Jacobs) (Gilbert, 1997, p. 23). Further, there was an emphasis on studying argumentation empirically. For instance, Jacobs and Jackson analyze naturally occurring arguments using data analysis by examining "concrete instances of argument as they occur in everyday conversation" (Jacobs & Jackson, 1981, p. 118).

Willard, along with other communication and rhetorical theorists, provide a much broader conception of argument than informal logic. There are two features of argument that are important for Willard: argument as a type of communication/interaction and argument as emergent. Much like an interaction, arguments are emergent because they are not static and they develop and evolve over time. Willard developed a constructivist/interactionist approach to argumentation which is the view that argument and meaning is constructed through the process, relationship and interaction of arguers. Further, a constructivist/interactionist account of argumentation is the view that argumentation is best understood in terms of a communication theory that combines "cognitive processes (interpretation and inference), social processes (interactions and communal practices), and the similarities, differences, and relationships among communication practices (messages production and audience adaptation)" (Willard, 1989, p. 15). According to Willard, communication theory, rather than logic, provides the best foundation for a theory of argumentation (Willard, 1989, p. 12). It must be noted that Willard's position is considered on the radical side because most argumentation theorists have a more rigid and less flexible view of argument.

This view of argument as interactive and emergent (Willard's view) challenged the overt reasons view of argument (Johnson, 2000, p. 322). Willard's theory of argumentation is a

rejection of the priority of both discursiveness and formal structures of argumentation. In rejecting these formal structures, Willard rejects a product account of argument because arguments are not found only in "implicatures among statements" (Willard, 1989, p. 8) but in encounters between people. He therefore has a broader conception of arguing which includes verbal, non-verbal, implicit, explicit, discursive and non-discursive modes of arguing. Accordingly, anything can become an argument if it is used as such in the context of dissensus (Willard, 1989, p. 8).

Brockriede's (1972) work also falls into the rhetoric and communication approach. Brockriede argues that the nature and relationship of people who argue is an essential variable in understanding and evaluating the processes and outcomes of an argument (1972, p.1). This is different than the logical position (and also the product account) because the arguer is recognized as having an important role in the argument. And so,

> the coarguer response may be influenced by who he is, who the arguer is, and what their relationship is. Perhaps as good a way as any to distinguish the study of logic from the study of argument is to understand that logicians can safely ignore the influence of people on the transaction; arguers cannot. (1972, p.1)

This detached position still resonates today where for the most part argumentation scholars ignore the arguer (except for Willard's and Gilbert's account) and the argument is understood and assessed without considering who the arguer is and how they relate to one another. The role of arguers and their relationships to each other still does not receive the attention it deserves.

Brockriede distinguishes between types of relationships arguers enter, one of which is unilateral and is characterized as rape where arguers coerce each other into assent and treat each other as objects and inferior human beings. This relationship is also adversarial in nature.

Another type of relationship is that of the seducer where an arguer may coerce someone by charm and deceit (p. 4). And the third type of relationship is characterized by love and it is the one that Brockriede endorses. Lovers are distinguished from the rapists and seducers (in argument) in three important ways:

1. Arguers as lovers see the relationship of arguing as equal and as such, “Lovers also differ radically from rapists and seducers in their intentions. Whereas the rapist and seducer seek to establish a position of superior power, the lover wants power parity” (p.5).
2. Arguers as lovers do not rely on the adversary method and do not argue against an opponent, instead, they argue with their peers.
3. The arguer as lover “is willing to risk his very self in his attempt to establish a bilateral relationship...the lover-arguer cares enough about what he is arguing about to feel the tensions of risking himself, but he cares enough about his co arguers to avoid the fanaticism that might induce him to commit rape or seduction” (p.5).
4. While the rapist and seducer treats other arguers as an object or as a victim, “the lover looks at the other person as a person” (p.5).

Arguing as lovers, Brockriede asserts, fulfills an important “function as important as any intellectual creation of the "truth" of a situation, and that is the personal function of influencing the fulfillment and growth of the selves of the people in the transaction” (Brockriede, 1972, p. 9). Brockriede’s work is important because it puts emphasis on the fluidity and process of arguing. In “Where is argument” Brockriede (1992) highlights some of the important features of argumentation: 1. Arguments are not in statements, but are to be found in the vicinity of people (1992, p. 72), 2. An argument is not an argument until someone “perceives what is happening as

an argument" (1992, p. 72), 3. Since arguing is a human activity imbued with complexity and richness, the concept of argument, as such, is an open concept.

Further, Tindale and Gilbert also adhere to the communication/rhetoric approach. Gilbert's *Coalescent Argumentation* provides one of the earliest accounts of multimodal argumentation, and he is one of the few argumentation scholars who develops an inclusive account of argumentation (as will be explained below). Gilbert's work is important because it respects and defends the legitimacy of the different types of arguers (modes of arguing) and acknowledges and incorporates the multiplicity of goals in arguing.

The definitions of argument and the methodology and procedure of argumentation varies from one approach to another. The traditional methodology of argumentation sees that an argument is based on deductive logic. The common understanding of argument among scholars is that an argument has to be explicit, linear, with premises and a conclusion. Recently the boundaries of what constitutes an argument have been broadened, and more attention has been paid to the role of interpersonal argumentation and context as evident by Michael A. Gilbert's work in Coalescent Argumentation. As noted by Wayne Brockriede in 1992 there was no concept of an argument viewed as an interpersonal interactive process (Brockriede, 1992, p. 37). This has changed and the definition and the recent amalgamation of argumentation scholars have broadened this conception of argument. The domain of argumentation is continually being pushed, remodeled, and hopefully improved.

As such, there are four major developments in the study of argumentation since the 1950's: 1. A widening interest in the study of argumentation across a wide range of disciplines; 2. A growing acceptance of diverse methods for studying and analyzing argument; 3. An expansion of the concept of argument beyond the public sphere and an acceptance of

interpersonal argumentation and of the interpersonal and contextual elements in argumentation; 4. Dissatisfaction with formal logic for studying argument and a search for alternative ways of examining arguments. In my dissertation, I will continue this line of criticism of what constitutes an argument by broadening the conception of argument to include narrative. My critique of the traditional and predominate style of argumentation will rely on the existing feminist critique of argumentation which will be discussed in the next chapter. Below I will explain the recent interest in narrative argumentation.

Narrative Argumentation

In the 1970s more and more scholars started using narratological methods in their research. By the end of the 1980s narratology became integrated and studied everywhere (Czarniawska, 2013, p.58). Narrative theory is an interdisciplinary field and has been studied from the perspective of literary theory, cultural theory, education and psychology. "Within these domains, narratives are discussed as a way of making sense of life, a phenomenon, a method and a result (product) of this method (e.g. Carr 1991, Carter 1993, Ricoeur 1984, Taylor 2000)." (Kverndokk, 2003, p.1). The narrative turn in the humanities and social science was legitimated by the recognition that narrative is a legitimate form of knowledge (Czarniawska, 2013, p. 58). The attention to narrative by researchers and scholars in the social sciences was prompted by four turns in the social sciences that include "attention to relationships among participants, the move to words as data, the focus on the particular, and the recognition of blurred genres of knowing" (Pinnegar and Daynes, 2007, p.3).

As the result of this narrative turn, narrative was investigated as a mode of knowledge, i.e., 'narrative knowing' as defended by Polkinghorne (1988) and Bruner (1987), who argue for

the two ways of knowing in the human sciences, the narrative type of knowing and the traditional positivistic, scientific-logical mode (or ‘paradigmatic knowing’) (Pinnegar and Daynes, p. 6). The realist perspective of knowledge in the social sciences treats social facts as things. Prior to the narrative turn, the object of study in the social sciences, such as human relationships, interactions, dispositions and culture, were treated as though they were physical things (Pinnegar and Daynes, p. 9). That is, the researcher/social scientist stood apart from the subjects and it was assumed that research was a neutral activity. The realist conception of knowledge is founded on the assumption that what we study has an “independent, object like experience with no intrinsic meaning” (Pinnegar and Daynes, p. 29). The logical scientific mode focuses on how to find the truth (attainment of truth) and searches for universal truth conditions, whereas the narrative mode seeks particular conditions and focuses on the broader question of the meaning of experience (Lyons, 2007, p. 614). And so, the fundamental difference between the narrative turn and scientific objectivity is that the narrative turn is characterized by an understanding that knowing other people and their interactions is a relational process (Pinnegar and Daynes, 2007, p. 29).

Narrative inquiry is the celebration and recognition of the interactive and contextual quality of knowing. The narrative turn in the human sciences is characterized by a change from the general and universal to the particular, specific, local and personal (Lyons, 2007, p. 7). With regards to epistemological concerns, the narrative turn in research is a move away from the objective, realist and positivist accounts of knowledge towards knowledge grounded in interpretation and understanding of meaning (Lyons, p. 9).

Recent Development Of Narrative Arguments

Narrative arguments is a largely unexplored area that in recent years has received more attention from argumentation scholars. The idea of narrative argument is controversial and has only recently garnered interest. Some of the issues being explored in recent years include the characteristics, structure and assessment of narrative arguments (Olmos, 2017, p. 1). The literature on narrative arguments is a diverse and focuses on types of narrative arguments, particularly novels and parables. Currently, there is no general theory of narrative arguments, only an exploration of types of narrative arguments. Some scholars focus on narrative arguments as presented in parables, while others explore the argumentative merit of novels. My focus will be on neither of those types of narrative arguments, but rather on how narrative is used in oral, interpersonal settings, and as such, mine is more of a general account of narrative as a mode of arguing. It does not fixate on particular types of narrative argument but instead treats all narrative arguments as story-telling processes with more or less persuasive force.

Argumentation scholars who have extensively researched the topic of narrative and arguments include Paula Olmos (2014, 2015, 2016) and Gilbert Plumer (2015, 2017). Olmos has researched the characteristics and assessment of types of narratives such as fables as well as the importance of narratives in or as practical arguments in the realm of public discourse. Olmos has also discussed the similarity and relationship between thought experiments (in both philosophy and science) and classical fables. On the other hand, Plumer focuses on novels as arguments and looks at how we can analyze the argumentative character of novels. Plumer argues that novels exhibit the structure of transcendental arguments as opposed to analogical arguments. An analogical argument, usually an inductive argument, uses accepted similarities between two things to draw a conclusion that some further similarity exists. As explained by Plumer (2015),

the structure of an analogical argument is usually as follows: "X and Y have certain properties in common, X has some further property, so Y has the further property as well" (p. 494). Further, Plumer's argument includes the clarification that the arguments of a novel cannot be overt arguments (argument explicitly stated and having the form of premises and conclusion). This is also true of my account of narrative arguments in interpersonal interactions. That is, narrative arguments on my view do not follow the traditional logical model of premises followed by a conclusion, and the arguments they exhibit are indirect. As noted by Plumer, there is unanimity about the indirectness of narrative in exhibiting the argument (2017, p. 66).

In recent years more scholars have started to pay attention to the important role of narrative in argumentation, including Christopher Tindale, Trudy Govier, Tone Kvernbekk. Ayer (2010) identifies two distinct senses that a narrative argument might have, (1) a story that offers an argument and (2) a distinctive argument form or structure. In regards to the second distinction, it is rare for scholars to identify a distinctive narrative form. This is because most scholars interested in narrative arguments, such as Olmos (2014), Govier and Ayer (2012), Walton (2012) and Lester H. Hunt (2009), hold that narrative arguments have the structure of analogical arguments, in which similarities are used to infer a certain conclusion. Others such as Plumer argue that narrative arguments (particularly novels) exhibit the structure of a kind of a transcendental argument. Transcendental arguments, as explained by Mark Sacks (2005), start from

> … premisses that are so rudimentary and indisputable that the interlocutor, and specifically the sceptic, cannot fail to accept them, then by a series of valid moves they yield a conclusion that is precisely of the sort that the sceptic did question. Thus the

sceptic must concede that the sceptical possibility turns out to be incompatible with other commitments that the sceptic cannot but hold. (pp.439-440)

As for my dissertation, because I argue that narrative arguments are not based on the traditional model and are not linear, direct or explicit, and as such do exhibit a unique argumentative form (which is that of story), I reject the claim that narratives can be collapsed into existing modes of argumentation. Rather, I hold that narrative argument is a unique and irreducible form of argument, which is inherently different from other modes of argument (e.g., analogical, transcendental). Govier and Ayer (2012) argue that if a narrative is to function as argument, of course after being reduced to premise and conclusion, then it would function as an argument from analogy. That is, they argue that parables exhibit the structure of argument from analogy which is the view also taken by Hunt (2009) and Douglas Walton (2012). Olmos notes that some of the widely acknowledged argument types where narrative is involved include "arguments from example", "argument from analogy" and "practical reasoning from analogy" as shown by Douglas Walton 2008 (2017, p. 189). And so most of the literature on narrative arguments has focused on the similarities between narrative reasoning and analogical arguments, although not always using the same concept of analogy (Olmos, 2014, 190). For example, Floris Bex and Tevor Bench Capon's (2017 and 2014) rely on previous work by Walton (2012) and Govier and Ayers (2012) to show that stories function as arguments based on relations of similarity and analogical reasoning. In their work, Bex and Bench Capon (2017 and 2014) also attempt to computationally model the connection between stories and argumentation in analogical reasoning. And so Bex and Bench Capon present a formal, computational framework for modelling stories that is based on analogical reasoning (2017, p. 40). And so narrative arguments have been explored in both informal and formal models of argumentation and reasoning.

While scholars have noted that the analogical view is helpful in understanding how narratives may be argumentative, other approaches see narratives as exhibiting the structure of suppositional argument, and understanding them as exhibiting the structure of a kind of transcendental argument (an account that Plumer develops 2015 and 2016). Plumer offers a model of "transcendental argument" as a way of making sense of how novels as arguments can yield epistemic results (Olmos, p.3). Other scholars interested in narrative argumentation address the epistemological role of narrative fiction (Mitchell Green, 2017), and the cognitive processing of parabolic stories (Eduardo De Bustos, 2017). That is, Green in "Narrative Fiction as a source of Knowledge" (2017) gives an epistemological analysis of literary fiction that relies on literary cognitivism.

As such, there has been some exploration of narrative-based argument schemes as well as an examination of narrative itself as argument, which is the more controversial claim and one that I take up in my dissertation. There are two main approaches taken in relation to narrative arguments. One approach argues that the definition of argument should be broadened to include narrative, as argued by argumentation scholar Christopher Tindale (2017). Tindale argues for the broadening of the concept of argument to accommodate different ways of arguing and giving reasons. Another approach argues that narrative argument should be modified, and reduced into argumentative parts, to fit the traditional account of argument which fits narratives into analogical based argument schemes. Fitting narrative into an argument scheme requires that the narrative be reconstructed. This approach suggests that current argumentation theory can accommodate narrative arguments without modifying or broadening the concept of argument as defended by Tindale, and myself in my dissertation. While this approach is a valuable tool and an important exploration, it is not an approach I favor for my account of narrative arguments

because it requires the reconstruction of narrative. My dissertation argues, with Tindale, that the concept of argument should be redefined to include narrative along with other different ways of giving reasons. I show that narrative arguments are distinct, and challenge the classic, linear, and reductive mode of argumentation.

Rejecting Narrative As Arguments. Other scholars who have explored the possibility of narrative arguments either reject narrative arguments altogether or propose strict requirements for narratives to function as arguments. For example, Tone Kvernbekk (2003) argues that a narrative cannot function as an argument because a narrative does not have the required premise-conclusion relation, which, according to Kvernbekk is the core issue for deciding whether a narrative can be considered an argument or not (2003, p.1). Kvernbekk also rejects narratives as arguments because she argues that in a narrative the conclusion is known beforehand whereas the role of an argument is to take an audience to a conclusion that is not yet known (Tindale, 2017, p. 13). According to Kvernbekk, since the role of arguments is to justify the conclusion, narratives cannot function as arguments because no justification takes place, as the narrator already knows the conclusion. Kvernbekk argues that when a narrator tells a story, he/she already knows the end result, conclusion and/or the event which the story is supposed to lead up to (Tindale, p.6). However, as Tindale points out, even if the narrator knows the end and the conclusion, the audience does not. And “even if the outcome is available to the audience, present in their cognitive environment, it may not have been activated for them” (Tindale, 2017, p.13). And so the narrative would prompt and encourage the activation of the outcome of the story or the argument that is intended. The conclusion makes the information given in the story present or

intelligible in a way that the audience did not recognize before, and allows them to understand differently what they already know.

Issues With Narrative Arguments. Further, Trudy Govier and Lowell Ayer (2012) also problematize the argumentative role of parables as arguments. They do not dismiss that parables can function as arguments but they are concerned with whether parables can provide good reasons for what they argue. And so the approach taken by Govier and Ayer is one where, from the narrative, the premises and conclusion are extracted and made to fit into a traditional form of argument (p.3). After the argument is broken down into premises and conclusion, it is then analyzed for cogency. Govier and Ayer conclude that:

> Our work here shows that for many parables it does make sense to extract a message and reasons for it. With some twisting and bending, we can construct an argument in standardized form. When we have an argument in that form, we can evaluate it. (2012, p.25).

According to Govier and Ayer, the logical core of an argument is comprised of its "premises (explicit and implicit), indicators of its line of reasoning, and its conclusion or conclusions" (p. 6). Other important features of an argument such as emotional indicators, counter considerations, jokes or illustrative anecdotes are not considered as part of the core of an argument. The problem, as I show in later chapters, is that the whole argumentative context is part of the point and message of the story. The point of the story and its argumentative import is grounded in the context in which it arises. Deconstructing, bending and twisting the narrative into standardized argument form risks misrepresenting the argumentative import and meaning of the story. Tindale makes a similar point in response to Govier's and Ayer's approach. Tindale points out that

Govier's and Ayer's approach, and the forceful conversion of narratives to premises and conclusion, imposes strict requirements on narrative arguments. As Tindale writes:

> what this illustrates is the problem familiar to proponents of visual arguments: the tendency, insistence even, to require that if something is to count as an argument it must be possible to frame it in, or "reduce' it to, propositions. And those propositions can then be tested for logical cogency in terms of their internal relations. If we are to resist this tendency, we need to widen our understanding of argument, claiming for narratives what has been claimed for visuals. (2017, p.14)

Other concerns that Govier and Ayer have with the idea of narrative argument include the question of how can narratives can be epistemic when they, sometimes, are fictive. Specifically, they are concerned that narrative arguments cannot be checked or evaluated for truth, or with criteria of rational acceptability. With traditional arguments, the arguments are evaluated by analyzing whether the premises are true or rationally acceptable, but since some narratives are fictive, this criterion does not seem appropriate. In my dissertation, I argue that the traditional and dominant models of argument evaluation are not favourable or useful for narrative arguments as I understand them, because they rely on an exclusionary and rigid type of evaluation that embodies a one-size-fits-all approach, namely, an approach that evaluates arguments by criteria of truth and rationality. The account of narrative assessment that I develop is rhetorical and does not rely on truth or rationality, but rather, on exchanging arguments through a virtuous process. This account respects the fluidity and context-sensitivity of real-life arguments.

Further, Govier and Ayer conclude that narratives rarely present arguments, which is

problematic as it relies on a limited perception of good reasons, based on cogency. However, as I show in my dissertation, the quality of an argument is not just about cogency; there are many accounts of argument goodness that do not necessarily rely on cogency. Govier and Ayer focus on and subject narrative arguments to a narrow conception of good reasons, that of validity and traditional rationality. This excludes too many persuasive narratives from the scope of good arguments.

However, it is worth noting that the rationality of narrative arguments is more compatible with what Walter Fisher calls a narrative rationality, a distinctive type of rationality that is different from traditional logical rationality. Fisher's *Human Communication as Narration* (1987) provides a pioneering work on the topic of narrative and communication. Fisher offers an account of good reasons that is based on narrative perspective, i.e., the narrative rationality.

Walter Fisher And Narrative Rationality. In his article "Narration As A Human Communication Paradigm: The Case Of Public Moral Argument," Fisher (1984) argues for the benefits of the narrative paradigm in contrast to the rational paradigm. By narration, Fisher means a theory of symbolic actions; words and actions that have consequences and meaning for those who live, create and interpret those narratives (p. 2). Fisher argues that the meaning and significance of life in all of its dimensions requires the recognition of its narrative structure (p. 3). Fisher further claims that any ethical question, whether social, political or legal, requires narrative (p. 3). The narrative paradigm espouses the idea that human beings are storytellers and that their essential and most basic mode of communication takes the form of stories, and that "one's life is, as suggested by Burke, a story that participates in the stories of those who have lived, who live now, and who will live in the future" (Fisher, p. 6).

The narrative paradigm challenges the idea that for communication to be rhetorical it has to be in an argumentative form of inference/premise and conclusion and that the mode of evaluating rhetorical communication has to be that provided by a rational standard of informal or formal logic (Fisher, p.2). According to the rational paradigm the primary mode of human communication is arguments with clear-cut inferential structures. However, the narrative paradigm does not reject the rational point of view; it just makes it more amenable to other forms of human communication and modes of reasoning. And so Fisher's narrative paradigm "affirms that narration as individuated form and as genre--like other individuated forms (such as argument) and genre (such as argumentation)--are expressive of good reasons, if viewed rhetorically" (1989, p.56). Fisher's narrative paradigm focuses on good reasons, which he argues can be expressed in variety of forms, whether in stories, visuals, or what have you, which Govier and Ayer delegate as non-core features of an argument. Akin to Willard, Fisher similarly argues that reasoning is to be found in all sorts of symbolic action, in both nondiscursive as well discursive (1984, p.1).

Conclusion

Argumentation theory is already on the path to accepting that arguments do not happen in a vacuum, and that arguing is not based just on abstract, linear and structured thought, rather that argumentation can include emotion, intuition and physicality, and that those are a crucial aspect of our human endeavor and the way that we communicate and interact with one another (Gilbert, 1997, p. 26). And more importantly, those human and contextual elements are not in opposition to reason or rationality; i.e., we can reason emotionally and narratively (Gilbert, 1997, p. 26). However, more work is needed in argumentation theory to not only broaden the conception of an

argument, to include narrative but also to challenge the whole notion of rational argumentation. That is, narrative arguments challenge the idea of rationality as that which is exclusively abstract, linear and devoid of emotions or context. As such, in this project I will build on the already existing critique of traditional argumentation by adding narrative as a further excluded mode of arguing.

Chapter Two: Feminist Critiques Of Traditional Argumentation

Introduction

There are many ways that feminists have reacted against the existing styles or practices of argumentation. Feminist critiques of argumentation range from critiques about the method of arguing (i.e., the adversarial model), the conceptualization of reason, and the exclusionary definitions of arguments, to questions about gender differences. In this part of my dissertation I will elaborate on feminist critiques of argumentation and contextualize the importance of narrative argument in this literature.

Adversariality Of Argumentation

Many feminist theorists of argumentation criticize the adversariality that is embedded in classical approaches to argumentation. This feminist critique focuses on the surrounding context and the practice of argument, which is often infused with aggression and hostility that puts women at a disadvantage, who, due to socialization, tend to use politer forms of argumentation. Feminists such as Janice Moulton (1983) argue that traditional argumentative styles are rooted in the "adversary method" which accepts aggressive behaviour as a model of philosophical reasoning. Moulton critiques this adversary method because, according to this philosophical methodology, aggression takes on positive connotations when it is connected to males or professional workers. Aggression is then connected to more positive concepts such as power, authority, competence, etc. The conflation of aggression with positive concepts has made it hard to see that polite and non-abrupt speech can be just as effective and persuasive (p. 150). Under this paradigm, arguers find themselves disagreeing with everything, rather than agreeing on common assumptions and

working from there (p. 154). Further, Moulton criticizes the adversarial paradigm of philosophy in which the aim of all philosophical research is to find counterexamples (p.153). The aim of the adversary method is to show that people are wrong rather than focusing on persuading others to shake their cherished beliefs, which was the aim of the Socratic method. The adversarial method restricts philosophical issues because it affects the kinds of questions asked and determines the answers thought to be acceptable (p. 157). This paradigm allows for the development of rude and hostile styles of argumentation where the focus of an argument is on winning rather than encouraging the development of good ideas. A major drawback to the adversary method, Moulton asserts, is that it

> accepts only the kind of reasoning whose goal is to convince an opponent, and ignores reasoning that might be used in other circumstances: To figure something out for oneself, to discuss something with likeminded thinkers, to convince the indifferent or the uncommitted. (p. 159)

That is, the adversary method ignores the multiplicity of goals that argument and arguing has for people. Further, the adversary method limits and misrepresents what philosophical reasoning is (p. 153). Non-adversarial modes of reasoning then become dismissed as non-legitimate modes of arguing.

The adversariality embedded in argumentation has led some, such as Sally Gearhart (1979), to argue that all acts of persuasion are an act of violation and that argumentation is an unjust, patriarchal attempt to dominate others. While this is a radical position not endorsed by many scholars, nonetheless, many assert that adversariality is indeed present in argumentation that functions to silence and dismiss those uncomfortable with this method.

This problem of adversariality and the culture of philosophy is related to the question of

the underrepresentation of women in philosophy. It is a well-recognized problem that women are underrepresented in philosophy and that women either do not continue to graduate studies or that they do not rise to the upper echelons of the profession. Since women in other fields similar to philosophy such as history and sociology, who had similar starting points as philosophers, have dramatically improved their gender profile over the last 30 years, it is crucial to consider the ways in which philosophy's methodology contributes to the under-representation and mistreatment of women (Jenkins &Hutchison, p. 7). In fact, some feminists claim that it is the adversary method that is the cause of the misrepresentation of women in philosophy. Marilyn Friedman (2013), for example, argues that it is the culture and practice of philosophy, rooted in adversariality, that is the real cause of the underrepresentation of women in philosophy. Friedman argues that there are features of philosophy that devalue women and make it difficult for women to engage in philosophy. She writes,

> The likeliest aspects of philosophy that might deter or alienate women are (1) the contents of philosophy, its distinctive questions, issues, and ideas; (2) the methods, broadly construed, that are used in philosophy to deal with that content; and (3) the way in which philosophy is taught and communicated. (Friedman, p. 25)

Such features include the conception of reason and the characterization of females in relation to the faculty of reason and rationality (a point made also made by Llyod and Rooney). Other features include the way philosophy is taught and communicated, namely the culture of philosophy as adversarial. That is, the practice of argumentation is marginalizing women.

In their introduction to *Women In Philosophy: What needs to Change?* editors Fiona Jenkins and Katrina Hutchison note that it is only recently that women have appeared as equal in a field whose main attribute, the activity of reason, has been conceived in opposition to women (2013, p. 2). This is a point

famously made by Genevieve Lloyd (1984). The emergence of women in the field of philosophy, for many, is not long lived. And often women speak negatively of their experience with philosophy as a discipline and as a system which has always consigned women to the realm of unreasonable/irrational.

Further, some scholars, such as Jennifer Saul and Helen Beebe, looked to psychology for an explanation of the underrepresentation of women in philosophy. Jennifer Saul argues that women's progress in philosophy is impeded by the presence of two well-documented psychological phenomena, implicit bias and stereotype threat (Saul, 2013, p. 39). Implicit bias refers to unconscious attitudes and assumptions one has that impact how we act and perceive and evaluate others. Stereotype threat refers to the phenomena whereby individuals from negatively stereotyped groups underperform in a task when they encounter reminders of their stereotyped attributes. So as a result of being anxious about confirming the stereotype, they underperform, and hence it is much like a self-fulfilling prophecy where the reminders of the stereotype and fear of conforming to it leads them to actually underperform. The notion of stereotype threat was first introduced by Steele and Aronson (1995), who conducted several experiments which showed that black college freshmen under
performed poorly on standardized tests when their race was emphasized. Steele and Aronson explain this in their own words as such:

> the existence of a negative stereotype about a group to which one belongs, we have argued, means that in situations where the stereotype is applicable, one is at risk of confirming it as a self-characterization, both to one's self and to others who know the stereotype. (Steele and Aronson,1995, p. 808)

As Saul explains stereotype threat, "is a very different sort of phenomenon. Rather than affecting the way that members of a stigmatised group are perceived or evaluated, stereotype threat affects

the way that members of that group actually perform" (Saul, 2013, p. 41). For example, the stereotype that girls are bad at math leads girls to underperform in math whenever they encounter reminders of the stereotype (Jenkins & Hutchison, 2013, p. 12).

Saul (2013) argues that philosophers are not immune to biases and that research shows that even those who explicitly express and sincerely hold egalitarian views still display implicit bias. Hence, this implicit bias leads to more negative evaluations of women's abilities, which is especially heightened in a field such as philosophy, which is stereotyped as male only (p. 44). As pointed out by Saul,

> We really should not be surprised that women continue to be underrepresented in philosophy. Until very recently, women had very little real chance to engage in philosophy. That legacy of exclusion—combined with a cultural view of women as creatures of emotion rather than reason—helped to generate stereotypes that make it far more difficult for women to succeed in philosophy. (2013, p. 56)

This legacy of exclusion continues in argumentation, where women are silenced in many ways, including through stereotype threat and implicit bias.

Helen Beebe (2013) argues that since aggressive behavior is culturally deemed masculine, the adversariality of argumentation results in stereotype threat for women (p. 64). That is, Beebe argues, "Add in a dose of aggressive—and thus stereotypically male—behavior (remember, it doesn't matter whether or not the stereotype is true), and you make the situation worse for the women in the room by drawing attention to their gender, thereby increasing the threat" (Beebee, 2013, p. 73). The reason why a combative style of argumentation alienates women, regardless of whether there are gender differences or not, is due to the cultural understanding of males and females and the association of aggressive behavior with masculinity

and politeness with femininity. An aggressive environment triggers stereotype threat for women due to the fear of not being good at argumentation and the stereotype that argumentation is a masculine endeavor, which results in underperformance and the silencing of women. The adversariality of argumentation poses a stereotype threat for women because in the context of argumentation, women belong to a negatively stereotyped group which is perceived as being poor at arguing, less rational, and too emotional. Adversariality also triggers stereotype threat because women experience anxiety and fear of having to conform to stereotypes about women being irrational, emotional and unreasonable in their style of argumentation. Adversariality of argumentation is a stereotype threat-provoking situation for women. Further, encouraging aggression in argumentation promotes masculine values while denigrating women, and the acceptance of this model for argumentation in philosophy triggers stereotype threat. That is, aggression silences women through discouraging politer forms of argumentation and promoting values associated with maleness.

As pointed out by Jenkins and Hutchison, "issues of gender representation are not unrelated to the frequently narrow and conservative conceptions of the discipline that are dominant in many departments of philosophy, as well as the wider society" (2013, p. 14). This narrow conception of philosophy also coincides with a narrow conception argumentation, reasoning and rationality (as will be shown later in this chapter). Hence, it is important to consider what kinds of modes of reasoning are legitimated and fostered by philosophy as a discipline and how these impact and shape the dominant discourses of exclusion and dismissal. This is precisely the point that feminist critiques of argumentation engage with and make, i.e., that there is indeed something problematic with the way argumentation and philosophy at large conceptualizes reasoning, what it means to argue and be a rational person. Feminist critiques of

argumentation have overwhelmingly argued that philosophy's model of argumentation has negatively impacted women. That is, our conception of knowledge and reason contains implicit biases that favor masculine modes of reasoning and stereotypical images and metaphors of what a philosopher is.

This adversarial method has led philosophers to ignore ways in which one may argue without being hostile. As such, arguments that are passive and indirect are not considered arguments due to the dominance of the adversarial method. The problem with this method is that those who are not comfortable with it are shunned from argumentation. Other forms of argumentation that are less assertive are also not deemed credible or legitimate forms of arguments. And so, the problem is with how argumentation is defined and conceptualized as adversarial, assertive, explicit and linear. The adversariality of argumentation limits what is and is not credible and stipulates that only the stereotypical masculine mode can be credible and legitimate.

As Daniel Cohen (1995) explains, the idea of argument as war permeates all our discourse about argumentation and characterizes how we think of argument (p. 178). Cohen, on the other hand, argues that a more pragmatic goal for philosophy and education should be the "furtherance of inquiry" (p. 179). Therefore, we need to modify our metaphors and look for metaphors of argument that can accommodate both cooperation and competition (1995, p. 179). And although argument is often misunderstood, there is still a legitimate place for argumentation in class, in the development of clear and careful thinking. Cohen proposes three aims of argumentation which are: arguing for but not against, argument as an explanation, and argument as justification, which he thinks will be more inclusive of all types of students as well as less hostile in nature (1995, p. 182).

Other feminist scholars, such as Trudy Govier (1999) argue that adversariality, if kept to a minimum, is necessary for controversy. She suggests that persuasion can be a polite and respectful enterprise when the means are rational. Govier further states that arguments are not necessarily confrontational and that either way, adversariality can be kept to a polite minimum. Govier claims that minimal adversariality is an inevitable part of argumentation, but it is not entirely negative. However, Hundleby (2013) argues against Govier's claim that politeness can help and ease the adversariality of argumentation. She suggests that politeness reinforces gendered social dominance. That is, norms of politeness are different from men to women and tend to "be more severe and restrictive for women, requiring greater passivity and conformity" (p.239). As Hundleby notes, it is not as simple as being polite because the idea of politeness is gendered and hierarchical and unequally distributed. In relation to politeness, women face a double bind where being polite can make them seem less credible, but being less polite makes them seem aggressive, arrogant, and inappropriate. As such, women are perceived as aggressive and impolite for behaving in ways that are considered acceptable for men; consequently, norms of politeness work to deny women and other subordinates the opportunity to engage in polite adversarial roles (Hundleby, 2013, p. 245). Likewise, Hundleby (2013) demonstrates that Govier's position ignores the ways that oppression pervades social institutions, shapes the people in those institutions, and influences the practices and the reception of their arguments (p. 257). As a result, being polite while arguing is not a viable solution to the adversariality of argumentation for women. In addition, Hundleby (2013) argues that "Adversarial modes of reasoning have neither foundational nor over-riding value as means for rational persuasion. Other forms of social engagement and shared reasoning practices deserve recognition as forms of argumentation" (p. 258).

Burrow (2010) reinforces this argument, stating that neither the ideals of cooperation or adversariality in argumentation are equally attainable for women. That is, both endorsing and transgressing norms of politeness diminishes the possibility of women succeeding in argumentation. Burrow (2010) posits that women in philosophy are limited in their possibility for argumentative success due to oppressive discourse norms and the dominance of both the adversarial method and masculine discourse. Burrow also demonstrates that an ideal of cooperation is not a better alternative to the dominant practice of adversariality because "feminine norms of cooperation in discourse demand deference and subordination, both of which undermine authority" (p. 237). Transgressing these gendered norm of politeness is not helpful either because it opens women to criticisms that also undermines their authority. Burrow's (2010) essentially argues that "what counts as cooperative discourse differs according to gendered stereotypes of politeness in ways that affirm power and status for men, but not women" (p. 246).

This gendered discourse is the result of men and women being socialized to communicate differently as evidenced in social norms and values. For example, men's politeness strategies favour status, independence, and competition, whereas women's politeness aims at cooperation through connection and involvement. As such, women's politeness focuses on the values of intimacy, connection, inclusion, and problem sharing (Burrow, p. 247 2010). Women's politeness results in deference and subordination. Hence, Burrow (2010) postulates that it is neither reasonable nor rational for women to further cooperation in argumentation contexts because cooperation furthers their own subordination.

Gendered Reasoning

Other feminist critiques of argumentation focus on the question of whether there exist gender differences in argumentation, i.e., whether females are socialized to think and interact differently than males, and whether one sex is socialized to be more comfortable arguing. Many feminist scholars have noted gender differences in styles of communication and reasoning. Most notably is Carol Gilligan (1982) who argues that men and women reason differently about ethical problems, specifying that women reason using an ethics of care. In terms of argumentation, Deborah Orr (1991) argues that there are gender differences and that those gender differences may hinder women from succeeding in argumentation when argumentation values the masculine mode over the feminine. Further, Orr argues that due to socialization women operate within different logic systems than men and therefore have a uniquely feminine style of thinking (p. 5). However, many have argued that even if such a difference does exist, it is due to gender stereotyping and social regulation, i.e., socialization. That is, most of these scholars who observe gender differences in communication reject biological essentialism, and believe that these gendered differences are a result of social construction, culture, education and socio-economic factors.

The idea of gendered communication has been studied empirically, especially in linguistics. One notable scholar is Deborah Tannen, who conducted many empirical studies observing how styles of speaking learned in childhood are carried over to the workplace, relationships, politics and post-secondary education. According to Tannen, “in every community known to linguists, the patterns that constitute linguistic styles are different for men and women” (1995, p. 140). Women use language to negotiate how close they are, to establish and maintain rapport, whereas boys use language to negotiate their status in the group by showcasing their

abilities and knowledge (1995, p. 140). Women's language is a language of connection and intimacy whereas men's language is a language of status and independence. (1995, p. 140). Females learn to focus on the rapport aspect of relationships whereas boys focus on the status dimension (1995, p. 140). Men engage in the world as individuals in a hierarchical social order as either one-up or one-down and must maintain their independence in order to keep their status in this hierarchal order. Because men see themselves as either one-up or one down, entering a conversation is like entering a contest where they must display knowledge and power and achieve the upper hand (Tannen, 1990, p. 9). Hence conversations for men are struggles to preserve independence, to win, and to avoid failure. Women, on the other hand, see themselves as individuals in a "network of connections," and when they enter conversation they seek to give each other support and confirmation, as well as reach closeness and consensus (Tannen, 1990, p. 19). While both genders desire intimacy and independence, Tannen asserts that women focus on intimacy while men focus on independence. These differences in perceiving and navigating the world for males and females result in disagreement and misunderstanding between the sexes.

The main problem with these socially constructed gender differences in styles of communicating is that society favors and values the masculine mode more. Tannen argues that those socially constructed ways of speaking learned in childhood affect how confident we are perceived and how much credit we receive. A person's speaking style, which Tannen defines as a linguistic style, refers to "directness or indirectness, pacing and pausing, word choice, and the use of such elements as jokes, figures of speech, stories, questions, and apologies" (1995, p. 139). The problem is that women are taught to speak in ways that discredit and limit them in the eyes of society.

Language, Credibility And Power

A further feminist critique of argumentation that is related to the question of gender differences comes from scholars who observe that these socially constructed ways of communicating disadvantage and silence women. For example, in her seminal book 'Language and Women's Place,' Robin Tolmach Lakoff looks at the ways that gender inequality is played out in language, particularly the ways women use language. Although this book was written in 1973, it still resonates with contemporary issues relating to the ways that women can be silenced through linguistic norms. Lakoff argues that women can be silenced in two ways: one, by being prohibited from saying the same words that men use (that is, adopting a masculine mode can be harmful to women, as will be shown with the example of Hillary Clinton); and, second, by the lack of uptake their words receive, i.e., women's words aren't given the same weight as men's (p. 210). Women are systematically denied access to power and are deemed incapable of holding it because of their linguistic behavior. And in turn, they are made to believe that they deserve such treatment because of inadequacies in their intelligence and/or education (p. 42). Part of the problem, as Lakoff perceives it, is that women's speech sounds politer than men's. Aspects of politeness that Lakoff refers to are leaving a decision open, and not imposing your views or claims on others, as indicated by the use of tag questions that do not force agreement or belief on the addresser. She uses the example of "John is here, isn't he?" leaving the addressee more leeway to answer, in contrast to the question: "Is John here?" which leaves room for only a yes/no answer (Lakoff, p. 48). Society often listens and pays more attention to speakers who express their opinions strongly and forcefully. And those who are unable to forcefully state their opinions, which is often the case with women, are less likely to be taken seriously or listened to (p. 45).

Lakoff is not suggesting that these indirect and polite means of expression are innate to women; in fact, she argues they may be adopted by any gender or group of people. As noted by Keri Hall, many researchers have wrongly claimed that Lakoff characterizes "women's language" as exclusively used by female speakers, but Lakoff's "women's language" is not fundamentally about gender, but rather about displayed lack of power (Hall, p. 6). Anyone may choose to use these linguistic practices that are associated with women. Women are perceived as unsure of themselves, unable to make up their minds, and not to be trusted with any real responsibility. Lakoff points out that:

> People form judgments about other people on the basis of superficial linguistic behavior that may have nothing to do with inner character, but has been imposed upon the speaker, on the pain of worse punishment than not being taken seriously. (p. 50)

Lakoff's central point is that language use changes depending on the position of the speaker in society. The acceptability of a sentence is not a yes-or-no decision. Rather, it is

> determined through the combination of many factors: not only the phonology, the syntax, and the semantics, but also the social context in which the utterance is expressed, and the assumptions about the world made by all the participants in the discourse. (p. 73)

A sentence may be acceptable if uttered by women, yet unacceptable if uttered by a man, or vice versa. Women's styles of communication, their displays of emotion, their politeness, and their hesitancy when speaking all contribute to the undermining of their words and their perceived lack of credibility.

Another feminist scholar who has criticized how language usage can silence women is Marianne Janack. Janack (1997) notes that assumptions about a perceived class, race, or gender are crucial factors in the construction of epistemic authority. She explains that this lack of

epistemic authority occurs not only in the realm of public policy but also with respect to "the interpretation of social conditions and personal experience" (p. 132). When women give their stories and speak about their experiences, their interpretations of events are given less credibility than men. She cites cases of her female students who complain that their anger, indignation and emotions are dismissed as "ragging out," i.e., they are menstruating. (ibid.). Janack further draws on examples from her own life experiences where her epistemic authority was questioned, especially during pregnancy. She explains that her complaints and anxiety about unequal household distribution were dismissed by her husband as "pregnancy hormones" (ibid.). Epistemic authority, notes Janack, is conferred in social contexts as a result of the judgments people make about our sincerity, reliability, and trustworthiness. We often do not have firsthand knowledge about the reliability, sincerity and trustworthiness of the speaker, and instead we rely on outward signs, which is where women fall prey to judgments of lack of epistemic authority, because of gender stereotypes and sexism. And so in relation to argumentation, women speakers are often judged by their gender, and their intelligence and credibility are underestimated as a result. Further, women's use of emotion is often dismissed as illegitimate.

As Sue Campbell (1994) points out, emotions have been attributed to women as the ground on which to dismiss women as irrational. Dismissal, according to Campbell, happens

> when what we do or say, as assessed by what we would have described as our intuitions in the situation, is either not taken seriously or not regarded at all in the context in which it is meant to have its effect. (p. 49)

Here, Campbell refers to a situation where women's display of emotion, such as anger, is not taken seriously: women are thus misrepresented as being upset and oversensitive. Women's emotions are characterized as unhealthy, which limits women's engagement in the world (ibid.)

Further, Campbell analyzes how bitterness gets inadequate social uptake which results in expressive failures and the silencing of individuals. Calling people bitter is an attempt at blocking their anger and shifting the attention from the blameworthy behavior that caused bitterness to the speaker's mode of expression. Critiquing people as bitter is a way of silencing them and, as a result, "The expresser cannot account for or defend her intended anger… because her interpreters are no longer listening. 'You're so bitter' is meant to be not challenging but silencing" (p. 51). Campbell argues that people whose bitterness is criticized usually are not in a position to influence politicians, bring lawsuits, or make threats. Criticizing people for being bitter, argues Campbell, aims to perpetuate the impoverishment of resources; for once people are dismissed as bitter, others feel no obligation to empower them. Another consequence of this lack of uptake for ones' emotions is confusion, as it becomes unclear to the accused what he/she is feeling (p. 51).

This silencing and dismissal of women's emotion is very applicable to women participating in politics. For example, during the presidential election of 2008, when Hilary Clinton cried, this became a controversial topic and a major moment in the campaign. Many people questioned Clinton's display of emotion and criticized it as calculated, not genuine, and said that it was an attempt to "cry her way to the nomination." Prior to crying, Clinton was perceived as cold, remote, and too focused on policy, but when she displayed emotion she was criticized as being either weak or cunning. As such, Clinton's emotions were certainly not taken seriously, i.e., her display of emotion was perceived negatively, and this shattered her public image.

Campbell explains that "many people's emotional lives are, in fact, dominated by a confusion that is an inevitable consequence of persistent lack of uptake" (p. 55). This negative

uptake of one's emotional expression, and being called bitter or sentimental, encourages a gendered and unequal distribution of expressive resources, and limits the range of expressive acts available to women (p. 55). Thus, Campbell demonstrates that women can be dismissed by being denied the right uptake to their emotional expression. When women's emotional acts are denied legitimacy, then their voices are also silenced. Further, this dismissal of emotion does not just affect women, but anyone who uses emotion as a form of argument. That is because the dominant model of argumentation does not credit emotion as a legitimate mode of arguing.

There is also evidence that women's words in the courtroom are disregarded and ignored. Kathy Mack (1993), looks at the barriers to women's credibility in the courtroom as a result of gender bias and stereotypes. She focuses particularly on women who testify about rape (p. 328). Mack argues that the first element in the lack of belief in women's words has a lot to do with the social expectations of how a credible speaker is supposed to sound, which is like a man. Mack also refers to some studies which show that certain features of language are associated with powerlessness, such as using superlatives, intensifiers ("so" or "such"), fillers ("uhm" or "you know") tag questions, hedges ("sort of") and politeness markers, all of which make the speaker sound hesitant and unsure of herself. Mack argues, as many have, that these features are used mostly by women. Women speakers, she argues, are high pitched, smile frequently, and are hesitant, all of which are signs associated with powerlessness, and convey lack of credibility (p. 330). Confidence and assertiveness plays a central role with regard to credibility; the more confident you sound, the more credible you will appear. As such, women convey hesitancy even when they are more certain. Bringing this back to the courtroom, Mack points out that despite law reforms introduced to increase trust in women's testimony, women continued to be mistrusted and their words discounted. Despite law reforms, people continue to hold prejudices,

myths, and stereotypes about women (p. 346). And although the law might not support the subordination of women, sexism still occurs in more subtle and hidden ways due to entrenched gender inequality.

Feminism And Fallacies

Other Critiques of argumentation focus on analyzing fallacies and how fallacy theories can be enriched from a feminist perspective. For example, Catherine Hundleby (2011) argues that the existence of a deeply rooted androcentrism in scientific argumentation demands recognition as a form of fallacy. Hundleby (2009) defines fallacies as “common forms of argumentative reasoning that appear correct but are not,[1] which emphasizes both their frequency and deceptive nature” (p.1)

Hundleby (2011) demonstrates that androcentrism is a fallacy through the presence of regular errors that violate Grice’s conversational maxims (, p.3). Grice’s cooperative principle of conversation gives rise to four maxims demanding: (1) an appropriate quantity of information, (2) adherence to norms of truth, (3) relevance, and (4) efficient manner (p.3). Hundleby (2011) demonstrates that each maxim is violated by androcentrism by analyzing Lloyd’s study of the case of the female orgasm. All accounts of the female orgasm fail to address the quantity of available evidence about female sexuality. Moreover, androcentrism neglects the norms of truth. That is, these scientists ignore the overwhelming evidence against their theories, which is contrary to accepted norms of research that these scientists themselves employ. Further, they use the evidence selectively when they draw on the sex research. Hundleby (2011) establishes that because of its broad social influence, androcentrism mishandles many different inference schemes. Hundleby’s work on fallacies points to the importance of updating fallacy theory to

make it reflexive and progressive rather than static and archaic. Further, Hundleby argues for the recognition of androcentric fallacy because "identifying the problem as a fallacy may help to eliminate it historically" (2009, p.9).

Feminists Critiques Of Rationality And The Maleness Of Reason

Other feminist critiques focus on how reasoning has been constructed as a masculine activity since the time of Aristotle. Feminists such as Genevieve Lloyd and Phyllis Rooney argue that there is a problem with the way reason has been constructed as exclusive and devaluing of women. That is, there is a metaphorical and literal exclusion of women from the perspective of reason. In *The Man of Reason* (1984), Lloyd offers an historical account of the way reason has been conceived. In doing this, she surveys major philosophers who have theorized reason, and argues that reason has been developed with male ideals of reason, which exclude women and devalue femaleness and ways of knowing associated with women. Rather, what Lloyd refers to as the maleness of reason is rooted in a deep philosophical tradition which delegates women to the body, to the part of the person deemed as irrational, which in turn puts women in opposition to reason (1984, xviii). From the beginnings of philosophical thought, femaleness was associated with what reason leaves behind, i.e., the dark forces of earth (Lloyd, 1984, p. 2). Since the Greeks, femaleness was associated with a vague and indeterminate mode of thought, whereas maleness represented a clear and determinate mode of thinking. Similarly, Phyllis Rooney (1991) demonstrates that the pervasive thematic dichotomy in Greek thought aligns reason and form with maleness and matter and formlessness with the female (p. 79). In Greek thought, femaleness was symbolically associated with the non-rational, the disorderly, and the unknowable, which must be set aside to attain knowledge (Lloyd, 1984, p. 11). For example, in

the *Phaedo*, Plato presents the intellectual life as purging the rational soul from the follies of the body. Reason must flee from the body and deal only with what is pure, and unchangeable (Lloyd, 1984, p. 6).

With Aristotle, the same picture of knowledge continued along with the distinction between form and matter, which Aristotle revised but nevertheless maintained. With Aristotle`s system, a dualism remained between what is sensed and what is grasped by reason. Lloyd notes that despite Aristotle's criticism of the division of the soul, he nevertheless represented reason as the controlling or subduing of the emotional part of human beings (1984, p. 51). This paradigm of knowledge continued to portray the rational mind as free of matter (Lloyd, 1984, p. 9). Later on, Bacon united matter and form, that is, he depicted nature as both the female and the knowable, but only to say that the task of science is to exercise the right type of male domination over knowable nature (female). As such, Bacon described scientific knowledge in terms of male-female distinctions where the latter must dominate the former (Lloyd, 1984, p. 11). As Lloyd writes, "knowledge is itself a domination of Nature" (p. 13). That is, nature is represented as female and needs to be dominated. Lloyd, further, surveys Aquinas' ideas on reason and shows how he, like Augustine, is committed to the idea that reason resides in man; woman is, then, subjugated and guided by man because the discretion of reason predominates in man (p. 36). Aquinas agrees with Aristotle that women are easily led by their passions, describing them as "unstable of reason" and as having a "defect in reason" (Lloyd, p.36).

Lloyd then moves on to Descartes, with whom reason gained a special association with the realm of pure thought. With Descartes the requirement of truth seeking became separated from everyday life, thus reinforcing already existing distinctions between male and female roles which perpetuated the idea of a separate male and female consciousness (Lloyd, 1984, p. 50).

Descartes' theory of mind supports the sexual division of mental labour, where women have been assigned the realm of the sensuous that the Cartesian man of reason must transcend to attain knowledge (Lloyd, p. 50). For Descartes, right reasoning is a struggle away from the sensuous, the body, and a detachment from the particularities of everyday living (Lloyd, p. 75).

Lloyd's point is that our ideals of reason have excluded the feminine, and that femininity has been historically understood on the basis of this exclusion (xix). Lloyd argues that this male bias in reasoning is more than just misogynist attitudes in philosophical thought (p. 37), it is in fact the way reason has been understood and developed, in opposition to and exclusive of the female.

The absence of women from the philosophical tradition meant that the conceptualization of reason is done exclusively by men and for men, for as Lloyd points out, "There has been no input of femaleness into the formation of ideals of Reason" (1984, p. 108). These misogynist views of reason form the foundation for the way reason has been historically, and is still currently, understood. Rationality has been conceived as the transcendence of the feminine, emotions, and body, and a move towards clarity, abstract thought, and purity.

As Phyllis Rooney (1991) explains, this path of reason, knowledge, and truth as involving a transcendence of the "feminine" is a well-established theme that informs the imagination of most philosophers conceptualizing reason (p. 80). And even when we do not get an explicit division of male and female, we still get some sort of exclusion of the private from the public, of the particular and the immanent, of the sensuous, emotional, and imaginary, and "it is clear that the female is at least symbolically, if not literally, associated with these excluded dimensions" (Rooney, 1991, p. 83). This historical gendering of reason, notes Rooney, does not disappear with later philosophers (1991, p. 83).

The result of the masculinization of reason is that our understanding of maleness and femaleness has been formed within structures of male dominance over women (Lloyd, 1984, p. 103). This equation of the maleness with superiority dates back as far as the Pythagoreans. Characteristics attributed to males have always been valued more and seen as superior to supposed female characteristics (Lloyd, 1984, p. 104). Such male attributes include aggressiveness and the ability to reason, as opposed to female nurturing skills and being easily swayed by emotions.

Unfortunately, there is no simple solution to this problem, for as Lloyd shows, it is not enough to affirm that both sexes are equal in their possession of reason, and that women should have equal participation in the acquisition of knowledge. It is not as simple as allowing women to be “accommodated into a cultural ideal which has defined itself in opposition to the feminine” (Lloyd, 1984, p. 104). Affirming the value and importance of the feminine cannot eradicate the underlying normative structures, because even when it tries, “it will occur in a space already prepared for it by the intellectual tradition it seeks to reject” (Lloyd, 1984, p. 105). Lloyd concludes that our ideal of reason is a male one, and that if there is reason that knows no sex and is common to all, then it is something that we can aspire to in the future, but not in the current account of reason that is carried from the traditional conceptualization of a male reason (1984, p. 107).

In line with this criticism of the masculinity of reason, Orr (1989) critiques informal logic for the narrow and often inappropriate conceptions of rationality that do not include everyone. She argues that informal logic ought to recognize other models of rationality used by people (Orr, p. 2). Orr claims that there is empirical evidence for a feminist style of thinking. Citing the work of Carol Gilligan, Orr argues that the ethics of care (based on the premise of non-violence

and that no one should be hurt) is empirically associated with women, while the ethics of justice (based on the premise that everyone should be treated equally) is associated with men (p. 3). The ethics of justice is characterized by formality and abstraction and is based on the logic of fairness, while the ethics of care is characterized by a style that is contextual and narrative and based on the logic of relationships (Orr, p. 3). Orr argues that Gilligan's work provides two contrasting conceptions of rationality. She does not believe these differences in thinking between men and women are innate, but are rather due to "the psychological process of gender acquisition," and Nancy Chodrow similarly claims that these differences are due to the sexed division of labour within the home, family and workplace (Orr, p. 6). That is, the difference is social. Nonetheless, it is these gendered differences that ground the differences in rationality observed by Gilligan's work (Orr, p. 6). As such, Orr draws on

> research from a variety of different sources to show first that the feminine mode or style of rationality is, in fact, practiced and can be found quite readily in environments as different as elite colleges and social agencies, in fields as disparate as genetic research and moral practice. (Orr, p. 8)

The very epistemic foundations of the feminine and masculine mode of rationality are different because they rely on different assumptions and have different goals (Orr, p. 8). Because the feminine form does not fit comfortably into the standard categories of induction or deduction, Gilligan has referred to its form as "'narrative', utilizing the 'psychological logic of relationships'" (Orr, p. 8). Others such as Farrell, Orr explains, refer to the feminine form as, 'indirect' while Chodorow and Keller refer to it as 'empathic' due to the blurring of boundaries between thinker and subject of inquiry (Orr, p. 8). Orr's central point is that the feminine mode ought to be

> recognized and taught as a part of what humans do when they reason (p. 5);…as the large

> and growing body of studies of the feminine mode of rationality show, it is time for informal logic to take the next step, to expand its understanding of what rationality and argumentation are when they are understood as human, not masculine, practice. To dismiss the feminine mode of rationality with the stock charge of 'mere psychologism' would be at best question begging, at worst prejudice. (p. 7)

As pointed out by Gilbert (1994),

> the assumptions inherent in the Critical logical approach [the dominant model of arguing] are, at core, 'masculine'. They derive from a long tradition and history during most of which female input was neither desired or permitted. (1994, p. 103)

The problem with the masculine mode is that it excludes the emotional and subjective, which are favoured by and associated with women (Orr, p. 5).

Regardless of whether there is something essential about the feminine mode, it is certainly a form of arguing that is ignored by the dominant model, as well as something that narrative theory of argumentation embraces. Indeed, narrative argument, as I show in chapter 1 and 2, is a co-creation between the arguer and audience, and hence the boundaries between thinker and the subject of inquiry are blurred. And since narrative argument is a co-creation between the arguer and the audience, the relationship between them is of paramount importance. It is through the relationship between the storyteller (arguer) and the audience that the narrative acquires meaning and significance, and as such it relies on a logic of relationships. Hence, without essentializing, the feminine mode is included in the narrative model of arguing. The feminine mode emphasizes concern for others and respect for the relationship between arguers, which is consistent with the narrative model as I conceive of it.

While the idea of a feminine style of thinking is controversial and has been strongly

criticized and debated, Orr's insights still shed light on the exclusionary practices of informal logic. That is, regardless of whether it is true that there is a feminine thinking style and regardless of whether it is innate or not, Orr is right to point out that informal logic is exclusionary in its definition of argument and rationality. Regardless of whether alternative models of rationality are feminine or not, there do indeed exist alternative models of rationality and reasoning that are employed by a range of people from different socio-economic backgrounds that are not recognized by informal logic. There are also alternative understandings of rationality such as rhetorical rationality that are often ignored by the traditional philosophical understanding. Further, the result of the masculinity of reason is that women and other minority groups are silenced by the dominant model of argumentation. Our conception of reason, rationality and argumentation is one-sided and tends to favor men over women and as a result disenfranchise and silence women and minority groups.

The traditional model of argumentation relies on one form of rationality that not only does not represent everyone, it is in fact dismissive of emotions, context, and situated knowledge. In our conceptualization of reason and knowledge we have privileged a male framework that hinders women from advancing in philosophy due to the adversariality of argumentation, the masculinity of reason, the linearity of reasoning, and the exclusion of different modes of arguing associated with women.

Oppressive Frameworks

This gendered reasoning and the valuing of masculine modes of reasoning grows out of an oppressive conceptual framework. Karen J. Warren (1988) argues that the conceptual framework in which philosophical argumentation is based is imbued with bias which is patriarchal and limits

women. According to Warren, “insofar as a given framework is biased, the critical thinking which grows out of and reflects it will inherit this bias.” (p. 31) That is, the conceptual framework in which philosophical argumentation is based is imbued with bias which is patriarchal and limits women. Warren explains that each of us operates out of a historically and socially constructed frame of reference which she calls a “conceptual framework” (p. 31). A conceptual framework is a “set of basic beliefs, values, attitudes, and assumptions which, shape, and reflect our view and our world” (p. 32). Hence, critical thinking and argumentation do not occur in a vacuum but always within a conceptual framework which can limit what one sees (p. 33). The problem is that some conceptual frameworks are oppressive.

Warren explains three features of oppressive conceptual frameworks: First, an oppressive conceptual framework is shaped by value hierarchal thinking which, for example, “puts men ‘up’ and women ‘down’…reason or intellect ‘up’ and emotion ‘down’” (p. 32) Second, conceptual frameworks tend to support either/or thinking (p. 32). An example is: either an argument follows the traditional form or it is not an argument. Third, oppressive conceptual frameworks lead to a logic of domination, which Warren defines as “a structure of argumentation which explains, justifies, and maintains the subordination of an ‘inferior’ group by a ‘superior’ group on the grounds of the (alleged) superiority and inferiority of the respective groups” (p. 32). Oppressive conceptual frameworks are used by those who are deemed as superior, as a means of oppressing those deemed as inferior. Patriarchal conceptual frameworks have historically assigned greater value to that which is associated with maleness and lesser value to that which has been traditionally identified as female (p. 32). As such, a patriarchal conceptual framework subordinates women. According to Warren, there is no neutral conceptual framework. Warren’s central point is that argumentation takes place within a conceptual framework that is oppressive

and patriarchal. This framework values some forms of discourse as legitimate argumentation while rejecting others that are just as valuable as illegitimate.

In relation to my dissertation project, the ways in which oppressive conceptual frameworks operate in argumentation is that they limit what counts as a legitimate mode of argument and what is seen as rational. Oppressive conceptual frameworks also limit how argumentation is conducted. Aggressive argumentation is seen as acceptable and polite modes of expression are not always taken seriously. Connecting this with Tannen, it is the hierarchical model of thinking, associated with maleness, that is often favored in argumentation and communication. Women who attempt to adopt the masculine mode face the dilemma of what is referred to in the literature as the “double bind.” The point of Warren’s work is that traditional arguments operate within an oppressive framework that is intolerant of alternative modes of reasoning, because it conceives of an argument as only that which is linear, explicit, and emotionless.

Narrow Conceptions Of Argument

Another prominent feminist critique is concerned with the narrow conception of argument in philosophy, i.e., that way argumentation is set up in terms of the rational paradigm, where an argument is only that which is linear and follows a set of premise to a conclusion. This linearity, rigidity and formality of argumentation is problematic because it excludes other forms of argumentation that are not linear, such as stories, visual representations, emotional appeals, etc. Hence, the traditional and dominant mode of argumentation is presumed to be the rational and linear. Further, our traditional conception of argument carries with it oppressive frameworks and understandings of rationality, as shown above by Lloyd and Orr. Many feminists (e.g., Andrea

Nye, Moulton, and Tannen) critique argumentation for being too focused on linearity and formalism, i.e., the favouring of linear, abstract thought disadvantages those who, due to education, social, or psychological reasons, are not comfortable using this mode of arguing.

Michael Gilbert: Coalescent Argumentation. In his book *Coalescent Argumentation*, Michael Gilbert critiques what he calls the *Critical-Logical Model* (CL) of argumentation, which excludes different modes of reasoning (emotional, visceral, kisceral), and rejects the emotional and personal in argumentation. According to the CL mode of reasoning, emotional reactions are excluded from business and legal decisions. Facts are what matter, while feelings and intuitions are discredited. As such, the CL model of reasoning is dominant, while others are subordinate to it (p. 51). Gilbert disagrees with the major premise and goal of contemporary reasoning paradigms, which state that one should argue, defend, and justify their claim without any recourse to situational, contextual, or personal information (p. 40). This approach to argumentation, explains Gilbert, breeds the attitude that the best position is the one that survives rational competitive inquiry and scrutiny (Gilbert, 1997, p. 48). Gilbert critiques this approach to argumentation because it rejects the alternative modes of arguing, especially the emotional mode. Gilbert writes that arguments are connected to their surroundings in a very complex way, for there are aspects of language, usage, and style that make it hard for anyone to comprehend an argument based on its mere structure, if they are not familiar with the particular history of the arguers involved. This means that to fully understand an argument, one needs to look more in depth into the context from which an argument springs forth, which may very well include emotions.

Gilbert argues that the categories of evaluating arguments must extend to include “errors, forms, and categories that go beyond the logico-rational and include, systematically, all the modalities of human communication” (p. 41). Further, Gilbert criticizes the dominant model of argumentation, the CL model, for its forced decontextualization of argument (p. 107), for analyzing argument in a vacuum. Hence, Gilbert contends that philosophers should not exclude emotive reasoning, physical actions, and intuitional communication from argumentation. The problem with the critical logical model is the exclusionary assumption of what counts as proper reasoning, which excludes non-CL modes of reasoning that do not abide by the rules of the CL model. Hence, alternative modes of reasoning are not seen as proper forms of reasoning. This definition of reasoning not only excludes other modes of reasoning, but also silences people who use them: “because reasoning has a total grip on power and by excluding non-C L modes, those who rely upon them are left powerless” (Gilbert, 1997, p. 111).

Michael Gilbert is one of the few argumentation scholars to develop an inclusive model of argumentation. Gilbert proposes coalescent argumentation as a solution to the exclusionary model. Coalescent argumentation is a normative ideal, which involves the joining together of two distinct claims via recognition and exploration of opposing positions. As Gilbert states,

> The coalescent approach can be expressed in the very simplest of terms. First, by exposing the positions of the dispute partners, second, by finding the points of commonality, and finally by beginning from those points, attempt to explore means of maximizing the satisfaction of goals that are apparently in conflict. (1997, p. 119)

This coalescent approach tries to find commonality between arguers so that agreement can be reached more easily and disagreement and hostility is reduced to a minimum. Coalescent argumentation, as explained by Gilbert, relies on one important assumption: (1) That all

arguments are situated and contextual, and one ideal: (2) that arguments begin with an emphasis on agreement. First, arguments are situated because,

> No position or belief is held in isolation, and therefore the larger picture of beliefs, needs, wants and feelings surrounding the issue must be considered in order to properly understand and, eventually, assess it. (p. 108)

As such, arguments must be understood in relation to the person who holds them. And so part of understanding the argument requires knowing the person and their motivation behind arguing, which requires looking beyond just the argument and into the whole process. Second, arguments begin in agreement because the goal of coalescent argumentation is not to criticize or defeat the alternative view, but rather to find common ground with it, i.e., "to understand, incorporate, respect and move toward consensus" (1994, p. 109). This is different than the NLT assumption inherent in the critical logical model that the best argument, which is best reasoned and the most cogent, will withstand all assault, because the focus of coalescent argumentation is not on "what can be attacked, but on how two apparently divergent positions can be reconciled" (p. 109).

Narrative Argument and Feminism

Feminist critiques of argumentation problematize and question the kinds of work and culture philosophy encourages. They do this by looking at the kinds of biases, culture, and environment that traditional models of argumentation promote. Feminist scholarship points to the need for argumentation theory to foster pluralism and inclusivity. One way that we can promote a conception of philosophy that includes women and marginalized groups is by changing our conceptions of what argumentation and reasoning are: that is, by broadening our definitions to include more people and more styles of reasoning. Hence, broadening our conception of

argument to include narratives, emotions, and visuals allows us to improve our conception of what reason and rationality are, because including more modes calls for different conceptions of rationality that are not just logical, linear, and detached from emotions and context. Including narrative argument and broadening the conception of argumentation leads to a broadening of what it means to be successful in argumentation, which in turn will positively impact the underrepresentation of women and perhaps help eradicate or mitigate current biases about what it means to reason well. That is, expansion in our conception of what argumentation is leads to a more flourishing culture in the discipline of philosophy: that is, a culture of acceptance, empathy, and understanding.

In my defense of narrative arguments, I align myself with the feminist critique of reason, rationality, and the dismissal and silencing of women and minority groups in argumentation. My account of narrative argumentation is consistent with a feminist stance, in that it rejects old and exclusionary conceptions of argument. Further, my account dismantles the assumption that an argument has to be verbalized and explicit to be legitimate. Narrative argumentation utilizes feminist insights because it also rejects masculine and traditional ideals of rationality that understand rationality only in terms of the logical. Hence, accepting narrative argumentation is consistent with feminist insights because it is inclusive and impartial. As pointed out by Warren, "from a feminist point of view, *impartiality requires inclusiveness*" (p. 39).

What is crucial about feminist critiques of argumentation is that they emphasize the personal aspect of arguing. As such, narrative argument respects the personal in arguing. And regardless of whether there are gender differences or not, the personal has been associated with the feminine and it is something that dominant argumentation ignores. Aggression and the masculinity of reason and argumentation is problematic from the feminist perspective because

the feminist perspective focuses on the people arguing and the relationships between them. That is, the personal aspect of argumentation is very important for feminists. Gilbert explains that the CL model is different than a feminist approach to argumentation because the critical logical model is rule-based and focuses on the content (product) of what is argued, not the persons doing the arguing (as is the case with the feminist approach to argument, and a process account of argument). As noted by Gilbert, the feminist model denies the separability of words, arguments and persons (1994, p. 101). Similarly, my narrative account adopts a feminist stance because it sees argument as a relationship, not a contest where arguers compete to win; and it sees argument as a process embedded in a context, not as a decontextualized product.

The acceptance of narrative as a legitimate mode of arguing does not rely on the idea that only women use narrative; it does not need to accept gender essentialism to capture the main critiques and insights of feminist theory. Further, regardless of whether there are differences in thinking between the sexes, what is important about Gilligan's, Tannen's, Gilbert's and other feminists' critiques of argumentation, is the insight that persons, feelings and context should be included in the argument, and are not peripheral to the argument, but are rather an essential part of it. While some of these features, such as attention to detail, to persons, and to connection as opposed to independence, have been attributed to women, they are reason-giving features of argument whether they essentially belong to women or not. That is, we can highlight the importance of these modes of argumentation without committing to the claim that they are essential to women. Recognizing the value of these modes helps us move toward an inclusive and consensus-facilitating model of argumentation.

Chapter Three: Defining Narrative Argumentation

Introduction

In this chapter I will provide a detailed description of how narrative functions in an argumentative setting. This chapter will begin by providing a definition of narrative that is based on consensus in the narratology literature. Then I will provide a definition of argument which I will be using for my account of narrative argument. That is, I will briefly explain the argumentation literature and show where narrative argument fits in—namely, the rhetorical camp, and I will build my case for narrative argument by drawing on that notion of argumentation. As a result, I will synthesize the two literatures on narrative and argumentation to provide a definition of narrative argument. This will include an outline of features of narrative argument. In the last part of the chapter I will provide examples of narrative argument and anticipate and respond to objections.

What I will provide in this chapter will, I hope, add to the scholarship in the field of narrative argumentation. I will provide a definition that will capture the essential characteristics of narrative arguments, i.e., arguing via the mode of storytelling. Disagreement on what counts as a narrative argument may arise, for no definition will be exhaustive. My definition of argument will provide tentative features because even when these features are all present, an audience or interlocutor in an argumentative setting may still disagree on whether what they have heard is a narrative, let alone an argument. Misinterpretations are an inevitable part of argumentation, as of all discursive acts. For it is possible that someone hearing a story may dismiss it as merely an explanation, or contest the idea that the narrative presented is in fact an argument.

Further, narrative argumentation is a continuation of the debate on multi-modal argumentation. The concept of multi-modal argumentation was first introduced by Michael Gilbert (1994), and later developed into coalescent argumentation (1997) (Kjeldsen, 2015, p. 115)). Multi-modal (with hyphen) as used by Gilbert designates four separate and distinct modes that do not necessarily work together. Gilbert argues that in most situations one is able to identify some aspect of a distinct mode. However, multimodal (without hyphen) refers to an argument that uses channels of more than one mode of argumentation. In general, the idea of multimodal (with or without the hyphen) refers to the recognition of different modes of arguing that may or may not work together in an argument. In 1996 more publications on this topic emerged. Multi-modal argumentation emphasizes that there are different modes of arguing which may or may not require different standards or norms of analyzing and evaluating arguments. Such modes include the four pointed out by Gilbert (1997): the logical, emotional, visceral (which relates to the physical mode of arguing that can include a touch or any nonverbal communication such as body language (Gilbert, p. 84)), kisceral (which is the "mode of communication that relies on the intuitive, the imaginative, the religious, the spiritual, and the mystical" (Gilbert, 1997, p. 86); but can also include visual argumentation (Groarke 2009), and the musical mode (Groarke and Dewey). Taste, smell, actio (as in *action),* which is a mode found in facial expression, gestures, posture and tone of voice and other non-verbal modes of argumentation have all been identified as arguments by some argumentation scholars such as Gilbert, Leo Groarke, Sharon Dewey, Marie Gelang and Jens Kjeldsen (Groarke, 2015, p. 134). A multi-modal theory of argument significantly expands the boundaries and definition of argument, and perhaps also the appraisal and evaluation of argument[1].

---

[1] Argumentation scholars defending multimodality do not agree on how the different

Further, narrative argumentation may also be considered a multi-modal theory of argumentation. As Groarke points out, “A theory that recognizes these different modes (and the ways they combine and mix in many real life arguments) is a multimodal theory” (2015, p. 140). The concept of narrative argument is a multimodal theory because narrative is a mode of arguing that has been traditionally excluded and because narrative argumentation acknowledges the legitimacy of such a mode, it is a multimodal theory. Narrative arguments may be said to be another mode of arguing along with visual, emotional, visceral and kisceral modes of arguing. According to Groarke, a mode of arguing is,

> the ingredients (the ‘material’, the ‘stuff’) an arguer uses and arranges when they engage in an act of arguing. In the case of arguing, this way of defining modes suggests that an arguer who uses words employs a verbal mode of arguing; that an arguer who uses taste as a component of their argument uses a mode of arguing by taste; and so on and so forth. (2015, p. 140)

Thus an arguer who uses stories to make an argument and to provide support for their claim is using narrative as a mode of arguing. Some may say that narrative is not its own separate mode because when we use stories to argue we are also using body language, tone and emotions. While it is true that arguing through storytelling has elements of the visceral, kisceral and emotional mode, it is still its own separate mode because it has its own distinctive features which are not found in other modes. There are of course overlaps between the modes as, for example, an

modes of arguments are to be evaluated. Some (such as Groarke for example) would like to maintain the traditional way of assessing and evaluating arguments by reducing them and standardizing them through identifying the premises and conclusion. Others such as Gilbert argue that other modes including non-verbal ones need to have different standards of assessment. In this dissertation I will agree with Gilbert and offer an alternative way of evaluating narrative arguments.

emotional response is often evoked through different modes. Visual argumentation such as a picture often elicits an emotional response but the visual is still it is own unique mode of arguing. And similarly storytelling evokes an emotional response in the audience which speaks to the power and persuasiveness of such a mode. But narrative is its own separate mode because it has distinctive features—namely, plot and an event. Further, as noted by Gilbert, arguers rarely utilize one mode alone, for often argumentation is a combination of many modes (1994, p. 166).

In defending narrative argumentation, I aim to expand the realm of argumentation, as have other scholars in their defense of other modes of arguing. However, my particular focus will be on the essential role that the mode of narrative plays in argumentation.

Definition Of Narrative

For the purpose of this dissertation, a narrative will be understood as an act of storytelling which could be oral or written. I will not focus on narrative as it is used in novels, but rather on the act of dialogical and interactive storytelling, which is essentially communal, social and interpersonal. The common elements or features of narratives discussed by narrative scholars are event (some prefer the term *action*), plot, audience, time and space. While most of these features are adapted and borrowed from literature on narrative and the novel, they are still essential for an understanding of oral storytelling. While these features are literary in nature and were coined and discussed by literary narratologists, they are applicable to my account of narrative argument as they help illuminate what a narrative in general is.

The most common understanding of narrative by narrative scholars is: a representation of a sequence of events (Gerard Genette, Robert Scholes, Gerald Prince, Susana Onega and José Ángel, García Landa, H.Porter Abott, Mieke Bal). Defining narrative in terms of representation

is widely used by narrative scholars and is one of the few methodological constants of narrative theory (Rudrum, 2005, p. 196). However, because a representation of events can also be a list, an illustration or an instruction manual rather than a story, many of these scholars add a further component to clarify what they mean by narrative. To rule out such cases, Gerald Prince adds logical relations. Others such as Mieke Bal (2009) introduce the idea of change, causality and an experiencing subject. Ryan (2007) further notes that in narrative, “the sequence of events must form a unified causal chain and lead to closure” (p. 29). Stories usually contain a beginning and an end with events and actions logically connected. Although scholars may not agree that stories must have a beginning and end, there is little dispute that a story is composed of action (an event or events), characters, and always proceeds forward in time (Abbott, 2007, p. 41).

Action/Event. Although most definitions of narrative include the term *action*, some theorists prefer the term *event* (Altman, 2008, p. 11). Action can be defined as the unfolding of events in the story (Abbott, 2007, p. 125). There is a strong consensus among narratologists that a narrative must consist of an ordered sequence of events. In every story there is a chronological sequence and order of events, which is missing in non-narrative texts such as an essay where there is no order of events (Abbott, p. 14). While Genette suggests that narrative needs only one event, most narratologists insist that more than one event is needed for a story, i.e., a story needs to have a series of events linked by causality (Rudrum, 2005, p. 196). Narrative requires action; otherwise we are left with just a description or a statement.

Another way of understanding event and action is through plot. Abbott notes that plot is a slippery and polyvalent term that is at best approximate in its meaning, and is so vague in ordinary usage that most narratologists avoid it altogether in their definitions of narrative (Abbott, 2007, p. 43). Some scholars who omit plot from their definition of narrative instead

discuss event and action. Plot as explained by Abbott is “the combination of economy and sequencing of events that make a story a story and not just raw material” (2007, p. 43). Generally, plot is understood as a chronological sequence of events linked by causal connection. Brian Richardson summarizes plot as a “teleological sequence of events linked by some principle of causation; that is, the events are bound together in a trajectory that typically leads to some form of resolution or convergence” (cited by Abbott, 2007, p. 43).

Time And Space. Narratives entail movement through time; that is, there is a duration or sequence of events which constitutes the plot (Seymour Chatman, as cited by Abbott, p. 14). When we read or hear a story we are, on the one hand, aware of the time of hearing or reading the story and the order in which things are read/heard, and on the other hand we are aware of the time the events in the story take place and the order in which they occur (Abbott, p. 14). As Abbott notes,

> The story can take a day, a minute, a life time, or eons. It can be true or false, historical or fictional. But insofar as it is a story, it has its own length of time and an order of events that proceed chronologically from the earliest to the latest. (p. 15)

As listeners, we are able to figure out the sequence of events because the story is placed within temporal relation. Hence, all narratives take place in space and time. Time and space refer to the when and where of the story. As explained by Teresa Bridgeman (2007), time has always played an important role in narrative theory because we tend to think of stories as a sequence of events and as such the time and space of the story helps us place the story in its proper sequence of events (2007, p. 53). Time and space are more than just background elements in narrative; rather they are part of its fabric and affect the way we understand the narrative as well as the way we mentally imagine and visualize the story we are told (Bridgeman, 2007, p. 52). Hence, time and

space are basic elements in the way we construct the narrative world, and are needed for any construction of story. Further, the construction of plot and the reader's understanding of plot requires time and space. Bridgeman argues that our interpretation of narratives is also influenced by the temporal and spatial information given in the story (2007, p. 64). Our understanding of the plot and what happens in the story is constructed on spatio-temporal patterns.

Teller (Narrator) And Audience. All stories have a teller, or in other words, a narrator; and this person is either an original author of the story or someone telling the story. In general, all stories are told or narrated by someone who is the teller but not necessarily the author of the story, for the teller can also be someone repeating a story they heard or retelling a story in different words.

The listener is the audience, hearing/reading the story. In terms of oral and interpersonal storytelling, the audience members are never passive, but rather are active participants in the narrative process. The audience actively interrupt the story, ask questions, make corrections and comments; hence one may say the audience are also co-narrators, in that they have an active role in the telling of the story. This idea of the audience playing an active role in the story has been discussed in the conversational narrative literature. Conversational narrative is always interactive telling negotiated among participants. No matter how the storyteller designs the story to fit the local audience and context, the audience will always impose its own designing of the story by interrupting, correcting and co-narrating (Norrick, 2007, p. 136). In conversational storytelling, the audience become co-authors of the story by assisting the storyteller in determining the trajectory, structure and point of the narrative through questions and comments. This makes sense since in oral and conversational storytelling, stories are told in response to comments or questions that arise in the conversation, which is the same for conversational narrative argument

where stories are given as a response to dissensus or difference of opinion between the storyteller and the listener.

While misinterpretation is an inevitable part of narrative reception, especially literary narratives due to the presence of gaps in narratives, it is my contention that this happens less often with oral and interpersonal accounts of storytelling where the audience plays an active role in the construction of the story. This is heavily discussed in the literature on conversational storytelling. Oral and written narratives are riddled with gaps and multiple interpretations, meaning that the story is rarely completely clear to the reader, for there is always room for misinterpretation, multiple interpretations, and questions - which is an inevitable aspect of all human communication. No matter how clear or well-constructed the story is, we still have to fill things in to make sense of the narrative we read or hear. But this is less the case with oral narratives because the recipient or audience can interrupt and interject and ask clarificatory questions, and in that way not only help shape the direction and construction of the story but also avoid misreading. Hence, while misinterpretation is an inevitable part of narrative and all human communication, this problem can be mitigated with oral and interpersonal storytelling. However, it may still be true that a single narrative holds different interpretations, and this is not necessarily a bad thing, for that is the beauty of narratives: that they can convey multiple arguments and points of view through a single story. One story is potentially susceptible to different interpretations and no one reading can exhaust the full potential that stories have; and each person will fill in the gaps differently, thus excluding other possibilities (Wolfgang Iser as cited by Abbott, 2002, p. 85).

The Act Of Narrative And The Product Of Narrative. Narratives, like traditional arguments, have both an act and product component. The product of the narrative is the story that

comes out of the act of telling the story, i.e., the act is storytelling; the product is the story narrated. (More on this in chapter 4)

Context. The importance of context to the construction and interpretation of narrative has been discussed by the narrative psychologist Jerome Bruner (1991) in his article "The Narrative Construction of Reality," where he offers ten features of narrative. Two of these features are *context sensitivity* and *negotiability*. When considering context in relation to narrative, the issue of narrative intention and background knowledge becomes important. More precisely, when reading or hearing a story we take into account the teller's intention in light of our background knowledge as well as our supposition about the teller's background knowledge. Our interpretation of the story is influenced by the context of storytelling as well as the background knowledge that tellers and audience have and share together.

Definition of Argument

This dissertation will expand the notion of an argument to include narrative since existing definitions of arguments typically do not include narrative. That is, many argumentation scholars define arguments narrowly. There are three major strands in argumentation theory viz., the Logical, Dialectical, and Rhetorical perspectives. Roughly, the Logical approach subjects arguments to the standards of deductive logic whereby a good argument is one that is sound and valid; the Dialectical concerns itself with the procedures of arguing; and the Rhetorical concerns itself with the process of persuading. These three perspectives are not exhaustive, for, as Joseph Wenzel notes (1992), there is no single answer to the question of what constitutes an argument, and the answer varies depending on the unique approach taken by the diverse scholars on argumentation (Wenzel, 1992, p. 121).

The logical perspective claims that an argument is a set of statements consisting of premises and conclusions, and is a product that is abstracted from the communicative context, the purpose of which is to establish standards for sound argument.

The dialectical perspective claims that an argument must be presented in a clear and linear fashion and if it is not, then it should be refined and restructured to fit this model, such that the emotional, psychological and contextual factors are excluded (Gilbert, 1997, p. 29). The Dialectic (Informal Logic) views arguing as a rational activity, a process characterized by reason and explicitly verbal. And so unstructured exchanges are rejected by the Dialecticians because explicitness is an important feature of how they define an argument (Gilbert, 1997, p. 34). Some of the proponents of this view come from the Informal Logic movement including Ralph Johnson, J. Anthony Blair, and Trudy Govier. The dialectical view narrows argument to a procedure that is precise, ordered and contained. For example, Douglas Walton says that natural argument must be stripped, made explicit and refined such that the underlying argument is exposed (Gilbert, 1997, p. 29). The logico-rational essence of the dialectical view narrows down the complexity and contextual aspects of everyday arguments into mere sets of premises, conclusions, moves and counter moves (Gilbert, 1997, p. 29). The premises and conclusion must be identifiable, and as such an argument that is missing these essential parts is eschewed by the Dialecticians. Hence, narrative arguments, because they lack linearity of form, are also rejected. Narrative as a mode of arguing is unwelcomed because arguing narratively is not always linear, and it is not always clear what the premise and conclusion is. Hence, narrative is not likely to be accepted in the Dialectic camp.

The rhetorical view, defended by Wayne Brockriede, Charles Arthur Willard, Christopher Tindale and Michael A. Gilbert, is more inclusive and does not see an argument as

necessarily logically well-structured. Arguers do not enter a rule-governed discussion, but instead use the full range of communicative acts available to them, as opposed to only some sort of abstract syllogism or formal logical language (as with the logical perspective). The rhetorical view, according to Gilbert, puts no limits on argumentative moves and the notion of an argument is unrestricted, and allows anything that happens in an argumentative exchange to count as an argument (1997, p. 40). As Brockriede argues, "Arguments are not in statements but in people. Hence, a first clue on the whereabouts of arguments: people will find arguments in the vicinity of people" (1992, p. 73). According to the rhetorical view, arguments can potentially be found everywhere and are what people see them to be; as such, anything can become an argument under the right circumstances where the intention to argue is present. Hence, rhetorical theorists are interested in the arguments that happen in natural language, not in an ideal formal and logical language (p. 127).

The rhetorical camp does not say anything about narratives but is more inclusive and amenable to narrative arguments because the rhetorical view does not limit argumentative moves and allows anything that can happen in an argument to be considered part of it (Gilbert, 1997, p. 39). There is no limit to what counts as an argument as long as it is part of human interaction and activity. Since stories are part of human interaction and are used as a method of persuasion since the earliest record of humankind, they are most likely to be accepted in the rhetorical camp. This is because the rhetorical view is mostly concerned with how actual arguers argue and what methods and techniques they use to argue. While there is still a normative dimension to rhetorical argumentation, rhetorical theories of argument are still interested in how actual arguers argue. Narrative argumentation fits with the rhetorical camp, although it has so far not been

explicitly defended as a mode of rhetorical argumentation. A narrative argument is rhetorical because it is a process of arguing couched in the communicative context where it takes place.

Another way to understand narrative argument is in terms of the three P's" (product, procedure and process) of argument which correspond with the three strands of argumentation discussed above: logical, dialectical and rhetorical. Logic is concerned with the product of argument. Dialectic is concerned with the procedures and rules required for argumentation so that it can be performed correctly and achieve the goal of resolving disagreement and promoting critical discussion (Tindale, 1999, p. 3). And rhetoric concentrates on the communication process and on the means by which arguers attain adherence/persuasion of an audience (Tindale, 1999, p. 4). Rhetorical theorists of argumentation view argument as a process and are interested

> in the full communicative act (as opposed to an abstracted syllogism or whatever), in the expression in natural language (as opposed to some formal logical language), and in the relation of the communicative act to actual speakers and listeners (as opposed to some idealized rational being). (Wenzel, 1992, p. 127)

My definition of argument in my account of narrative arguments will draw on the rhetorical account of argumentation, particularly that of Charles Arthur Willard. Willard defines argument as a kind of interaction where participants maintain incompatible or different points of view (Willard, 1983, p. 28). The context of argumentation for Willard is dissensus or difference of opinion; that is, argumentation arises as a response to dissensus between participants. Willard takes a communication perspective toward argumentation. Thus, argument is a type of interaction and like any other type of interaction; arguments employ the full array of communicative modalities which include the kinesic, paralinguistic and proxemics cues (Willard, 1983, p. 48). As Willard writes, "the working logics of ordinary argument thus partake of the

same materials, discursive and nondiscursive, that all conversation does" (1983, p. 48). Hence, Willard's definition of argument is less restrictive than traditional definitions.

Willard offers the following five conditions for defining argument:

1. "its enabling condition is dissensus, the arguers' belief that their positions are incompatible;
2. "It is a coorientation based upon mutual attributions of argumentative intent, 'we are having an argument';
3. "It is a social comparison process regardless of the motives of the arguers, that is, an argument need not be a disinterested dialogue in order to serve epistemic functions"
4. "Its purposes and meanings cannot for descriptive purposes be abstracted from the perspectives of the arguers"
5. "Definitions of the situation inform the procedures and outcomes of the interaction and endow utterances with meaning." (1983, p. 34)

The first condition establishes argumentation in the context of disagreement. According to Willard, argumentation must have as its starting point disagreement, a point that has also been argued by Chaim Perelman and Stephen Toulmin. The second condition suggests an open-ended and flexible conception of argument where an argument can be anything that an audience intends it to be. For as long as I am using something for the purpose of arguing and the interlocutor understands my act as an argument, then that given act succeeds in being an argument; whether it is a good or bad one is another matter. However, the intention has to be mutual, for it is not enough that I intend my facial expression to be an argument if it is not taken to be so by the interlocutor.

The third condition suggests that argumentation always produces knowledge regardless of the motives of the arguers. When we argue we put our beliefs and arguments in the open for scrutiny and as a result of our beliefs being questioned or criticized, we may revise and/or change our position (Willard, 1989, p. 112). The act of arguing produces knowledge because it is through arguing that we test, examine and modify our beliefs. Fourth, the purpose and meaning of argument depends on the perspective of and background knowledge of the arguers. Suppose we have an audience who totally reject the use of stories in arguments; when they tell stories, they will surely be using them in the descriptive sense. What we do with arguments depends on our perspective and overall belief system. Fifth, the context in which an argument takes place affects the procedure, style and outcome of the argument.

Definition of Narrative Argument

My definition of narrative argument includes interactive, dialogical (between at least two people), written (for example, those occurring in blogs or chartrooms), oral and interpersonal storytelling (although I focus on interactive arguing). Narrative arguments are not what we traditionally think of as arguments, i.e., linear arguments with premises and a conclusion (also called claim-reason complexes), nor do they fit into deductive arguments. Narrative arguments do not fit into the logical model because in using stories to argue we do not use linear arguments with premises and conclusions, and the language of storytelling is not always direct and explicit in terms of premises and conclusion; but nonetheless the argument presented in the story can be just as clearly conveyed and understood by the audience.

There are two main approaches taken when considering narrative arguments. *One* is to say that from a narrative we can extract reasons that support a conclusion. In other words, by

"extraction," it is meant that stories are reduced to standard arguments. To do this, we first must identify the premise and conclusion in the argument then standardize them and evaluate them. The first approach, which I will call the deductive model of narrative argument, denies that narrative as a whole is argument. Trudy Govier and Lowell Ayers follow this deductive approach. They argue that some parables contain arguments but deny that the whole narrative is an argument. That is, they extract from parables the arguments by standardizing the parable into premises and conclusion and by supplementing premises that are supposedly implicitly stated in the story.

This deductive approach is common among argumentation scholars and even among some multimodal argumentation scholars. While the idea of multimodal argumentation was slowly accepted over the years, and proponents of the logocentric view of argument (Ralph H. Johnson, Anthony Blair, Daniel J. O'Keefe, Brant Burleson, among others) acknowledge that there are non-discursive elements and premises in arguments that can be included in the analysis and evaluation of argument, they nonetheless insist that those premises and arguments must be made linguistically explicable. And in order to make linguistically explicable a mode of arguing that is non-verbal or discursive in nature, one has to reduce that mode into premises and conclusion. Even some proponents of multimodal argumentation such as Groarke agree that a visual mode of arguing such a picture needs to be reduced to premises and conclusion in order to be analyzed. This approach assumes that the only way to understand an argument is in terms of a product of premises and conclusion.

Other scholars of the multimodal theses disagree with reduction. Gilbert and Willard defend the second approach to multimodal argumentation which resists the move to reduce and insists that the whole process of arguing is to be analyzed and understood. Hence, the *second*

approach to understanding narrative arguments is to say that the whole narrative is the argument, that there is no separation between narrative and argument; and that is perhaps the radical view that is often rejected by argumentation scholars. My account of narrative embraces the second approach because reducing stories implies that there is some objective argument out there that can be captured; and it misses the complexity of arguing that cannot be reduced to a simple statement. It is difficult to reduce a story to an argument because doing so will ultimately miss not only the point of the story but also the powerful persuasiveness of it. That is because the whole story as process is what makes it persuasive and reducing it to a premise and conclusion will not adequately show how and why the story is persuasive. However, reduction raises a number of problems, which I discuss in chapter 4.

Features of Narrative Argument. In this section I offer features of narrative argument that combine both the features of narrativity (what counts as narrative) as well as features of argument.

Narrative:

1. One or more events presented in a logical sequence
2. Movement through time and space
3. Plot
4. A teller and an audience

Narrative argument:

1. There is a story with the features listed above: a. One or more event presented in a chronological sequence, b. Movement through time and space, c. Plot, d. A teller and an audience

2. Mutual attributions of argumentative intent, ‘we are having an argument’
3. Disagreement
4. Context
5. Reasons
6. Arguer
7. Narrative argument as process not product
8. Audience

1. **Story.** A story will have a sequence of events which are chronologically connected and happen over a period of time and there is usually a beginning and an end. Note that a chronological story does not mean that it is necessarily linear, it can be both fragmented, disjunctive and still be chronological. All narratives have some sort of order and are placed within temporal and spatial patterns. All definitions of narrative emphasize the temporally ordered sequence of events. Narrative arguments must be stories that are presented in a chronological fashion where the audience is able to tell the temporal and causal connection between events or actions.

2. **Mutual Attribution of Intention.** Narrative arguments require mutual attribution of intention which can be understood in two senses. The first intention is the intention to have an argument. There must first be the intention of arguing which defines the context of dissensus. Both the speaker and the interlocutor must agree, whether implicitly or explicitly, through mutual intention that they are having an argument. Otherwise the second sense of intention fails, i.e., the story will not be received as an argument. The second intention is the intention for the story to be used as an argument and understood to be so. The arguer must have

the intention of using stories as an argument and the interlocutor must understand that the story is told as an argument otherwise the recipient misses the point of the story.[2]

3. Dissensus, Disagreement or Opposition. An argument always occurs in the context of assumed disagreement, opposition or difference of opinion. Similarly, for narrative arguments to function as argument as opposed to just a story or an explanation, they require dissensus. The story functions as argument in the context of dissensus. Disagreement is important for narrative argument because dissensus or opposition is what sets apart narrative argument from mere stories. Without dissensus the story does not function as an argument and may have other purposes. While dissensus is the context of argument it is not the goal. In fact, the goal of narrative argument is often the opposite of dissensus. Rather, the aim is to achieve agreement, or to advance knowledge or understanding. It should be noted that dissensus does not mean adversarial argumentation or a hostile attitude of winning or losing.

4. Context. There are two senses of context operating in narrative arguments: The first sense of context is the immediate situation (what Willard calls the definition of the situation) where the argument is taking place. The second sense is context as background information. Background information refers to the shared background and common knowledge

---

[2] Willard argues that speech and communication in general is ambiguous and depends on the speaker's intention (Willard, 1983, 34). For example, the statement such as "teacher's assistants are underpaid" may or may not be an invitation to an argument depending on how the speaker is using it, for it is possible that the speaker assumes the truth of this statement and is not using it to engage in an argument. Willard's point is that any statements can be viewed from an alternative point of view depending on how we interpret the speaker and what the actual intention of the speaker is. Whether an utterance is an argument or not, according to Willard, depends on our attribution of intention to the speaker (Willard, 1983, 34).

between speakers that enable successful communication and provide for meaningful interaction. Without background knowledge the story cannot make sense or function as a narrative argument.

Context is both important for the correct interpretation of the story and for the reception of the story as an argument. Without context it is difficult to know not only the meaning of the story but also the use of it as an argument. Further, what differentiates a narrative argument from a mere story is the context in which the story is told.

Context endows the story with meaning since the story makes sense in the appropriate context. Context is an integral feature of all stories; not just stories that function in arguments.

Narrative arguments cannot be abstracted from the speaker and the situation because both inform the meaning of the story. Here is an example of a story that without its context and background information would not function as argument nor be fully comprehensible.

Nancy says to Mary: “I woke up today and had cereal for breakfast and then went to yoga class.”

This is surely a narrative, and on the face of it, without any background knowledge or contextual information, it may seem to be a narrative without an argument. It seems to operate like a descriptive/explanatory vehicle. However, when given background information, this narrative can be seen to constitute an argument. Suppose that just before Nancy’s statement, Nancy’s roommate Mary was wondering out loud where her eggs went. In this scenario, Nancy’s story of what she had for breakfast is an argument, conveying that it is not she who ate Mary’s eggs. What this narrative implies is that Nancy did not steal the eggs. The reason why this is a narrative argument is by virtue of the shared background knowledge/context and history between speakers. Without this shared knowledge, this narrative becomes mere explanation. However, the context shows how this narrative claim functions as an argumentative rejoinder to Mary’s accusation.

5. Reasons. Narrative arguments contain reasons which are unstated and conveyed through the story. There is a reason given that is embedded in the story. With narrative arguments, like traditional arguments, there is an assertion made that something has to be done, changed or believed (Okeefe's argument$_1$).

6. Arguer. There is an arguer who is making an argument through the telling of a story.

7. Narrative argument as process not product. My account of narrative argument refers to a process of storytelling (more on this in chapter 4). To help clarify the distinction between the process of arguing and the product of arguing, I will refer to Daniel J. O'Keefe's (1982) distinction between argument-1 and argument-2. While argument 1 refers to the content and product of argument, i.e., of what is being argued in that particular exchange/argument, argument 2 refers to the process, mode, act of arguing (O'Keefe, p. 4). Another way to understand argument 1 and argument 2 is in terms of the distinction between the process of arguing, and the product of arguing, where argument 1 is the product and argument 2 is the process. Further, argument-1 also refers to the uses of the verb "arguing that" and argument 2 relates to the use of the verb "arguing about." The examples O'Keefe cites are:
Argument 1 (Arguing that): "John argued that they should see Citizen Kane" (p.5).
Argument 2 (Arguing about): "John and Jane argued about which movie to see" (p. 4).

Argument 2 refers to the activity of arguing as when two people go back and forth in arguing which happens in the context of disagreement or as O'Keefe puts it they, "are simply interactions in which extended overt disagreements between interactants occurs" (1982, p. 9). According to O'Keefe, overt disagreement is a minimal case of Argument 2, for it has to be extended overt disagreement where interactants go back and forth for a while.

The paradigm case of argument 1 (argument as product), according to O'Keefe, requires overtly expressed reason(s) which must both be linguistically explicable and linguistically explicit. As O'Keefe writes "a paradigm case of making argument1 involves the communication of both (1) a linguistically explicable claim and (1982, p. 2) one or more overtly expressed reasons which are linguistically explicit" (1982, p. 14). O'Keefe explains that a paradigm case of argument 1 concerns a person making a claim and overtly expressing reason(s) for that claim. O'Keefe also explains that "in a paradigm case of argument-making the overtly expressed reason must be not merely linguistically explicable but indeed linguistically explicit" (O'Keefe, p. 14). My contention is that narrative arguments do not relate to the argument 1 type as products because of the problem of reducing narratives to products. Viewing argument as a product requires that we reconstruct the story into a traditional form of argument as product, i.e., into a premise and conclusion. This requires that we extract and identify the premises and conclusions which not only misses the point of the whole argumentative story but also is difficult since in a story the arguer, audience, context and background information are all connected and work together as a whole to create the meaning and persuade. Reducing an argument to a product will not give an adequate picture of what went on in the whole argument as a complex activity. Hence, narrative argumentation should be viewed as an argumentative process not product. Narrative arguments are transactional phenomena where the persuasiveness of narratives cannot be reduced to just products because their meaning is not isolated units but rather couched in interrelations of arguers and audiences and the context and background of the situation.

8. Audience. There is an audience/interlocutor to whom the story is directed as way to change their belief, come to an understanding, advance knowledge, or whatever the goal of argument in that particular case may be. Since this account of narrative argument is a

rhetorical, process oriented account of argumentation, much emphasis will be placed on the role of audience. The audience plays an important role in the construction and reception of argument. Further, the audience also plays a crucial role in the evaluation of argument. The acceptability and goodness of narrative argument is measured by the audience. This will be discussed thoroughly in chapter five.

Examples Of Narrative Arguments

In this part I will offer examples of narrative arguments and show how they fit the requirements of both narrativity as well as arguments, thus making them *narrative arguments.*

Example One. Mona and Sarah were discussing the homeless situation in Toronto, and Sarah suggested that any homeless person who has schizophrenia should be involuntarily hospitalized or at least put on medications so that they are able to function better or stay out of the harsh cold winter.

Sarah: I really feel bad for homeless people suffering from schizophrenia, who are running around in the cold talking to themselves. They should be hospitalized or forced to take medication.

Mona responds: That's not always the case…I had a friend whom I met at university. He was involuntarily hospitalized for over a year, and during that time he tried to commit suicide four times. Because he was a mental patient, he was cut off from the community, couldn't make friends, and couldn't get a job. But when he was finally discharged into the community, he functioned much better, made friends, and even went on to do a Bachelor's degree. And worked in three science labs.

Sarah: Hmmm…Maybe we shouldn't hospitalize everyone but the ones in the streets are clearly dysfunctional and should be hospitalized.

Mona: You would have to live in the hospital and maybe those homeless people still enjoy being outside rather than imprisoned indoors. I have another friend with schizophrenia who got outpatient treatment and only had to go to the hospital once a week and after a few weeks he became much more functional. He started working out and applied for jobs.

Sarah: Well my friend's cousin was also schizophrenic and was left in the streets and one day they found him dead from sleeping in the cold. But I see your point maybe outpatient treatment is sufficient.

In this conversation, the argument used was narrative, but there were also parts of the story where they used direct serial arguments (traditional arguments). But the bulk of argument was in narrative mode. It is not always the case that narrative as a mode of arguing is used alone; that is, stories are used in conjunction with other argument modalities including serial (traditional) arguments. In interpersonal, interactive argumentation, arguers go back and forth, using different modalities of arguments to make a point. Narrative arguments take place alongside other argumentative modes such as the Claim-Reason Complex [CRC]. It is possible to find narrative arguments along with explicit, direct and linear arguments. However, it is also possible to find narrative arguments used alone in an argumentative context. My point is to accept these stories alongside other forms of arguments and recognize them as legitimate forms

of argument. We should not expect people to argue in only the serial, linear, direct and explicit form as the dominant argumentation accounts would have us do.

Further, applying Willard's requirements of argument, the narrative told by both participants does count as an argument because both participants have the *intention* of making an argument through storytelling and both understand the story as an argument. Hence there is coorientation and mutual attributions of argumentative intent because both know that they are having an argument by telling stories. And both interpret the stories to be functioning as arguments.

Example Two. Dina is having a conversation with John about the importance of being close to your family whereas john is arguing that a biological bond is not enough to establish a relationship. This is a complex argument and has sub arguments such as that family bond is not about blood, it is about the treatment one receives from their parents.

Dina says: It is important to make effort and be close to your father. I don't understand why you don't talk to your father.

To fully respond to Dina's argument John needs to tell a story of his life, his childhood and what happened between him and his father. But only a story can make Dina understand the argument John wishes to make, and only a story can fully change Dina's mind about familial ties. To respond, John does not give a direct answer, rather he pauses and starts by narrating his story and one story leads to another (However, I will only include parts of it here).

John: My mother married my father because she was desperate to be with someone and to have children. After they had children, the family moved in with my father's mother because my father didn't have enough money to have his own home…. My grandmother disliked my mom and turned my dad against my mom. [sigh] My father who was very close to his mother always sided with his mom which really upsets me because they were both unfair to my poor mother. I always sided with my mother because I saw how unfair things were for her…and [long pause] he didn't care for us either and….[another long pause] the family became polarized… there was resentment on both sides…[of course the story goes on and on]…

One must note that this written narrative argument does not capture all of the content of the narrative argument that was told in a one to one personal interaction between friends/familiars who share a background knowledge and context. Rather this written narrative argument is but an approximation of what took place in that specific context, time and place and hence it does not capture the tone, gesture, physical, visceral, kisceral and emotional (Gilbert) elements that were conveyed in the narrative as it was told in that interaction.

Another point to be made is that the story does not start with a direct response to the argument made by Dina which is often the case when people sit together and argue through stories. The arguments are not made explicit from the get go; rather they unfold as the story unfolds. John's story does not merely illustrate a point or an argument; it *is*

the argument. No parts of it alone can be taken to be adequate on their own. It is only in the full story, in the way it is conveyed with the tone and body language and so on that it can function and be understood as that argument that John wishes to tell (that biological bond is not enough to establish a relationship). And that story surely cannot be reduced to just the product, (i.e., the argument told in the story) because the act of storytelling is just as important as the product of the storytelling. What narrative arguments show is that sometimes it is difficult to separate the *product* (what is being argued) from the *process* (the whole communicative and social act of arguing).

Example Three. Two friends are having an argument about Saddam Hussein and whether Iraq was better with or without Saddam (this is a typical argument Iraqis have about politics).

Ahmed: Iraq has been destroyed since the overthrow of Saddam. Saddam was better for Iraq, we benefited greatly under his rule.

Zeina: Well, when I was 15 years old, I remember dad leaving at 5 am in the morning because he was terrified that Saddam's men would come after him. He left to see my other relatives in another city and we didn't hear from him for two months. My uncle came the next day and told us we had to leave because my brothers were also on the wanted list for Saddam. We had to leave without my dad and my whole neighborhood was in the same situation. Many families fled fearful for their lives.

Ahmed: Ya hmm. Well you know my brother Ali. I remember during that time in the '90s my family was battling with my brother's health issue and we didn't have the money to pay for his surgery. My dad wrote a letter to Saddam asking for help and he responded with

generosity and offered to pay for all the expenses. There are so many stories like this about families being helped by Saddam. He was loved by many.

This debate is usually based on stories. People usually share stories about their experience with Saddam and that is how the argument proceeds with competing stories, each side demonstrating their point of view with a story and the better the story is the more convincing one's point of view is seen to be.

Example Four. A husband and wife are arguing about their families. The wife (Sandra) feels that her husband (John) does not respect or care about her family. And so they are arguing about whether that's true or not, that the husband doesn't care for the wife's family. When Sandra tells John that she wishes that he would spend more time with her family and that he loved them more, he responds with this story:

John: Your mom was sick for two years and I was the only one taking care of her. Even her family didn't show as much affection as me. The day your family called to tell you about her situation, I was the one that offered to pick her up. And I went at 2 in the morning to get her. When she came to stay with us, I took time off of work to spend time with her. I let you keep your job because they didn't give you time off, so I stayed with her.

Sandra: Yes, but we haven't had a real family gathering for over two years, and whenever I had asked you to come with me, you refused.

John: No, you forgot about Nancy's birthday when I bought her that bracelet from the mall and met you there.

Sandra: But that's still once in two years.

John: yes…when is your mother's dinner?

At the end, the disagreement is resolved and they come to an agreement that John will go to his mother-in-law's dinner with Sandra.

Objections and Response

One of the objections to narrative is that there are no narrative arguments, only arguments/points embedded in narratives. That is, one may object that there is no need to accept narrative arguments wholesale, but rather it is better to deconstruct narratives into arguments, i.e., extract arguments from stories. My response is that the deconstruction of narratives into a traditional linear explicit argument with premises and conclusions misses the point of narrative arguments. Forcing a narrative into a traditional form would distort the argument told in the story and would not fully reflect what the speaker meant. Further, the point is that narrative arguments serve a different function than traditional modes. Some arguments or points are hard to convey in an explicit linear way, and doing so misses the ultimate point behind the story: that is, the story as the whole process is the point. When people argue they do not always give direct arguments or respond directly to an argument that the interlocutor puts forward; rather in the context of narrative argumentation, speakers go on telling stories. Nonetheless, speakers seem to get the

point that these stories are more than just explanations; speakers understand the argument and idea behind the narrative. Sometimes it is the case that you simply cannot give a direct answer nor respond directly to an argument without giving a story, i.e., only a story about what happened will capture what the speaker wishes to argue.

Another objection that may be raised concerns the indirectness of narrative arguments and how they lack linearity or form, which, as the objection goes, creates more ambiguity in meaning. According to this objection, narrative arguments may potentially be ambiguous or indeterminate. My response is to point out that all forms of communication are indeterminate. This objection is not particular to narrative arguments. For all communication is ambiguous and indeterminate. Even explicit, serial and linear arguments exhibit ambiguity in meaning. We are often unsure (and at times confused) about the meaning of a philosophical work or a philosopher’s points of view or a system of thought. Even arguments displayed in the traditional model of premise and conclusion are endowed with indeterminateness. That is the fact of all communication. All you have to do is look at the philosophical debates about a certain philosopher’s meaning and you will see that even a clear and well thought out body of work is ambiguous (an example given by Gilbert). More on this objection in chapter four.

Chapter Four: Narrative Argument, A Process Account

Introduction

I argue that narrative must be seen as a process. To do so, I will briefly explain the three different accounts of argument: product, rhetorical, and dialectical. A product account of argument is interested in both written and oral arguments, but in either case, it depicts the argument as a linear, explicit, and discursive form of argumentation that includes premises and a conclusion, often called a CRC, claim- reason complex. The rhetorical account, by contrast, treats argumentation as a process and is interested in the "means by which arguers make their cases for the adherence of audience to claims advanced" (Tindale, 1999, p. 34). This model denies that arguments can be reduced to a rigid formula. Proponents of the rhetorical model include Gilbert (2007) and Willard (1982, 1989). The dialectical approach attempts to reconcile the product and rhetorical accounts of argument (Tindale, 1999, p. 6). In some sense, it follows a process account; however, it differs from the rhetorical because the rhetorical is interested in all the means that arguers use to persuade an audience, and, unlike the dialectical, does not focus on the rules/procedures for resolving disputes and promoting a critical discussion. Therefore, the dialectical approach still retains the idea that an argument has to have a linear structure.

My focus will be only on the two senses: product and process because, since the dialectical marries the two approaches, product and rhetorical, it inevitably retains some problematic aspects of the product account that I am steering away from. I will argue that the product account is inferior to the rhetorical model because arguments—and particularly narrative arguments—lose some of their persuasive force if reduced to standardized arguments. Thus, while narratives can be reduced to products in principle, this transformation cannot be done

without diluting the argument's warrant, and thus misrepresenting the argument as less persuasive than it is in practice. Hence, in this chapter I will further elaborate on the definition of narrative argument and demonstrate how it ought to be understood as a process rather than a product. First, I will offer seven reasons as to why narratives cannot be reduced to a product. Finally, I will respond to objections as to why narrative resists translation into premises and a conclusion.

During the 1970s significant attention was given to the different ways of defining an argument, in particular the difference between the sense of argument as product and as process (Zarefsky, 2014, p. 61). Since then, it has been hotly debated whether the product account (also referred to as argument1) or the process account (argument2) should be the primary definition of argument informing research (Zarefsky, p. 62). David Zarefsky explains that viewing argumentation as a product favors the view that arguments are necessarily discursive, whether in written or oral form. In addition, the argument as product must have premises and a conclusion, must be linear in form, and must implicitly or explicitly have a propositional structure (Zarefsky, p. 64). In contrast, viewing argument as process favors the view that argument does not have to be discursive, or may be non-discursive by its very nature. A major difference between the two senses of argument is that argument as product is devoid of context because products are considered timeless, whereas the process notion of argument relies on context (time and place) for its meaning and argumentative import. There is no consensus as to which perspective of argumentation should take precedence; however, the definition that most scholars seem to favor frames argumentation as linear and explicitly taking the form of premises and a conclusion.

Joseph Wenzel (1980) argues that all arguments have all three perspectives, and each perspective depends on the arguer's priorities. As Wenzel points out, while these three

perspectives observe the same phenomenon of argumentation, they focus on and highlight different aspects of argument. Nonetheless, their boundaries are obscured and the three perspectives inevitably overlap with one another. Wenzel argues for a synthesis of the three perspectives, while others insist that the product (or for others the rhetorical) must be the starting point or foundation of a theory of argumentation. Tindale, for example, argues that the rhetorical account is better suited for the synthesis of the three perspectives (1999, p. 7). He asserts that the rhetorical approach avoids the limitations and problems of the logical and the dialectical. That is, Tindale states that the rhetorical account, with its focus on the context where argumentation takes place and the personalities of those engaged in argumentation, offers the most complete account of what arguing is and what it is like to argue and engage in argumentation (1999, p. 7).

Tindale's view is compelling, especially with regards to narrative arguments, which, as I define them, are interactive and interpersonal, and thus resist reduction to closed, linear products. This is because narratives are rooted in social interactions between people, and written narratives, such as narratives as product, are derivative upon and secondary to these real-time social exchanges. In this dissertation, I am committed to the specific claim that narrative is a process, but whether all argumentation is a process is a question I will have no need to pursue further because it falls outside the scope of the project. I offer seven reasons for what makes narrative a process, and although the features I discuss are not specific to narrative and apply to other arguments, especially other non-traditional and multimodal arguments as shown by Willard and Gilbert, I am still only focusing and arguing for the specific claim that narrative arguments should be seen as a process. Argumentation scholars disagree as to whether all argumentation is a process, but in this chapter I do not want to enter this debate. Rather, I am using scholarship on

argumentation to make a specific point about narrative, and to make broader claims about argumentation in general is beyond the scope of this dissertation.

Narrative arguments should not be seen from the product perspective; rather, reducing narratives to products artificially depletes the argumentative force that they have in the procedural mode. Moreover, the process view of argumentation is best suited to interpret narrative argument because narratives are interactive and interpersonal in their original and natural format. Product reductions are secondary, weak replications of narratives-in-practice. That is, the process of narrative arguments is situated in the interaction between arguers, and this interaction includes the audience as rhetorically understood, the relationship that forms between them, the background, and the context of the argumentation. My account of narrative argument is thus defined in terms of the process-oriented perspective of the rhetorical argumentation, where an argument is seen as a process and not a product. In support of this thesis, I will show how reducing narrative into premises and conclusion is problematic.

Why Narrative Should Remain a Process

There are seven claims in support of the position that narrative should be seen as a process.

First, the form of narrative argument is naturally a process and does not follow the traditional model.

Second, narratives involve contextual features that are not reducible to products, as well as multi-modal contents, such as emotional or physical.

Third, narratives are first and foremost dynamic and fluid interactions between arguers and are a co-creation of the arguer and the audiences.

Fourth, even with the most sophisticated diagramming tools, we cannot capture the cognitive processes through which arguments exert persuasive force on audience members, and these processes are arguably a component part of the argument (viz., Willard 1976).

Fifth, arguments contain paralinguistic contents and complex 'messages' that cannot be reduced to linguistic formulae (as argued by Willard and Gilbert).

Sixth, translations of arguments (i.e., the product account) randomly privilege a single 'analyst's' perspective thereby cutting off other relevant interpretations of the argumentative exchange (Willard, 1976).

Seventh, when translating an argument, under-representation and misinterpretation are inevitable (Willard, 1976).

1. Nature of Narrative Argument. Narrative, as found in natural argument, is not a product, but rather a process. This means that reasons are not stated explicitly in narrative, nor does narrative have an argumentative linear form. Willard claims that during argumentation, reasons slowly emerge in the argumentative utterance, and the reasons are not linked to the claims from the outset. The same is true of narrative arguments; the reasons are not explicitly stated, nor are they made explicit in the exchange, rather they are implied. In order for one to approach narrative as a product, one has to translate it, which means taking it out of context and picking out certain features as components of the argument. Thus, in order to read narrative as product, one would have to reduce it and remove it from its natural habitat. Narratives pose a unique problem to product accounts of argument because narratives are especially messy. The contents of narrative arguments are more likely to be implicit than in other forms of

argumentation, because narratives convey messages through metaphors, similes, and other indirect expressive modalities compared to classic argumentation forms.

Reducing narrative into a product removes the real argument—part of which is implicit—from its context, its unique situation, and its complex social setting. The dominant account of argument, which includes the logico-deductive model, states that an utterance is an argument if and only if the claims and the reasons are explicitly stated. This dominant account is restrictive because it requires that at least one reason be given explicitly, and it assumes that an utterance is not an argument if no reason is explicitly given. If this is the case, then many utterances that convey reasons are not arguments because arguers do not always explicitly state reasons.

Furthermore, reducing narrative reasoning, as Willard (1978) points out, encourages the analysis of argument in a vacuum (p. 123). Hence, traditional accounts of argument do not model real argumentation, such as narrative reasoning. So one of the main reasons why we should favor a process-oriented approach to narrative reasoning is that it is more faithful to everyday interactions.

2. Narrative Arguments: Multimodal and Contextual Elements. Since a narrative argument is contextual, the different elements of its context contribute to its meaning, i.e., meaning is elicited through a variety of contextual elements. Hence, narrative meaning is contextual. As such, extracting an argument from narrative will result in the loss of embedded contextual meaning. Contextual elements would be lost or seriously modified if they are reduced to a CRC. Thus, the meaning would be seriously compromised.

Narrative arguments exist among and employ a range of argument modalities such as emotion, tone, gesture, and body language and are couched in contextual factors.

We cannot look at the narrative alone as a way of understanding its meaning or argumentative import because, in the first place, narrative as an argument does not exist alone without other argument modalities being used to convey its message. This account of how narrative argument works is consistent with Willard's definition of argument. Willard suggests an argument is a type of interaction, and that like any other type of interaction, they employ the full array of communication modalities (1983, p. 48). As Willard writes, "the working logics of ordinary argument thus partake of the same materials, discursive and non-discursive, that all conversation does" (1983, p. 48).

Second, because narrative arguments do not arise in isolation and are always part of a larger argumentative exchange, the *context* of the narrative becomes a central element of the persuasiveness of the narrative. So it is misleading to reduce the persuasiveness and argumentative import of the narrative into a statement of premise and conclusion without acknowledging that narrative becomes argumentative through context and in conjunction with other multimodal arguments (such as emotional arguments). For example, a narrative told without emotion, which is also a type of argument mode, will have a different point than a story told with a strong display of emotions. Also, the type of emotions displayed will affect the meaning and argumentative aspect of the narrative. Furthermore, a narrative told without emotional display, depending on the context and participants, is often not as persuasive as a narrative told with strong emotions, and the same is true with the tone of the story when it is told. That is, the tone of the speaker changes the meaning of the story as well as where emphasis is placed in the story. When the story is told, the tone of the speaker plays an important role in not only the meaning, where emphasis is placed, but also the trust and credibility of the story. The tone and character of the speaker can positively or negatively impact the reception of the story

and the type of relationship that forms between the argumentative partners, which can in turn establish character and establish trust. Looking at the example of Donald Trump in the American 2016 presidency campaign, it is reasonable to think that, in light of his bad character and track record of lies and deception, an otherwise persuasive story coming from him would not be received well by many listeners. While the opposite may also be true: a bad story and perhaps a lie may be believed by an audience that blindly trusts the speaker. Speaker credibility is nuanced and context-sensitive, and cannot be translated into a linear argument product—at least, not in the way envisioned by proponents of the logico-deductive model.

A story is not the same without embedded modes of arguing and contextual factors. All these other contextual factors enrich and impact the whole argumentative exchange. Hence, the meaning of the narrative is not just found in the explicit content of the story, but also in the emotional display and body language of the speaker. Meaning cannot just be found in the verbal and expressive. Rather, meaning is to be found in the context, audience reception and the intricate and subtle relationship between those engaged in argumentation. Narrative argument derives its meaning from the background and context in which it arises and the argument modes that it employs. As such, narrative arguments are contextual. The story functions and has different meanings depending on the context and background information surrounding it. As a consequence, the arguments offered in the process of argumentation are embedded in the process and inseparable from that context because they are intertwined. Specifically, the context, background information, and relationship between the arguer and the audience are all part of the argument.

Moreover, the meaning of an argument is contextual and fluid. As Willard (1983) points out, reducing or diagramming arguments does not capture the process of arguing where arguers

constantly shift and invent different argumentative strategies (p.49). Willard's point is that ordinary talk is contextual and implicit, and it is those implicit assumptions that endow an utterance with meaning (1983, p. 49). Arguers often leave reasons unstated in the background of their overt claims.

That is, looking at the discursive and spoken narrative alone will not tell us the true meaning of the narrative nor the argumentative import of the narrative because there is more to the argument than its discursive parts. Narrative arguments cannot be abstracted from the situation and the process of communication in which they occur, and hence one should not think of them as products, but rather as a process. Reducing narratives into premises and conclusions will not give an adequate picture of what went on in the whole argumentative exchange. The main persuasive features of the argument, such as the emotional and physical modes, as well as the context, cannot be conveyed through a set of premises and a conclusion.

3. Narrative Arguments: A Co-Creation of The Arguer And The Audience. Narrative is not isolated: story-making involves an arguer and an audience. This is because narrative argument is a co-creation between arguer and audience. Narrative arguments are rhetorical-oriented processes because rhetorical accounts view argumentation as a cooperative act where both the arguer and the audience are involved in its development and outcome (Tindale,1999, p. 69). That is, narrative arguments are transactional phenomena whose meaning cannot be reduced to products without remainder as their meaning is not a set of isolated units, but rather couched in interrelations between (i) arguers, (ii) audiences, and (iii) the context and background of the situation. To reduce narrative to product is to remove it from the process. This would decontextualize it and frame it as an abstract entity devoid of contextual background and

relationships in which it is embedded. According to the logical perspective, the meaning of a statement and the relationship between the premise and conclusion is

> conducted without reference to the background—the circumstances in which it arises, including the occasion and consequences; the arguer and her or his intentions in arguing; and the audience, with its background of beliefs and expectations. (Tindale, 1999, p. 29)

From the logical perspective, arguments are seen as things or products that may be abstracted from the communicative context, and to view narrative arguments as products is to also subject them to an abstraction and reduction that fails to capture the full communicative process of arguing via narrative. Since narrative is a co-creation between arguer and audience, it is misleading to attempt to find the meaning and argumentative import of it solely in the content of the story without looking at the relationship between the interactants as a central part of the persuasion that takes place in the argumentative exchange. Reducing narrative to the content misses the point of the narrative argument, which is first and foremost a relationship that people enter, where stories are told, and where trust is (ideally) built and maintained. To reduce a story to just premises and conclusions is to misconstrue its purpose and meaning—the dynamic meaning built between arguers.

Willard's concept of co-orientation helps to explain why the relationship between the audience and the arguers adds to the complexity of narrative, in a way that poses a difficulty for faithful and accurate translation. 'Co-orientation' is a concept that Willard uses to explain how arguments take their coherence from speakers' plans and goals (1989, p. 49). What becomes argumentative depends on the intention, understanding, and the uptake of those involved in the argument. The relationship between arguers 'co-orients' them in such a way that they know whether they agree or disagree, and whether this disagreement is worth entering an argument for

(Willard, 1989, p. 54) Hence, an example of co-orientation in argumentation would look like the following assumption:

> I assume that we disagree; I assume that you assume we disagree; I assume that I am arguing and that you agree that I am arguing; you assume that you are arguing and that I would agree that you are arguing. (Willard, 1989, p. 53)

Co-orientation is a concept Willard uses to explain that people come to argue when they have a disagreement, know that they disagree, have an intention to argue, know that they are arguing, and understand that the modalities used within that exchange, such as a sigh, are used to argue. This co-orientation inherent in argumentation adds to the complexity of argumentation in that it is a unique kind of relationship between the arguer and the audience that cannot always be understood from an outsider's perspective—such as that of someone attempting to translate the argument. It might not be apparent to an outsider or a translator what gesture counts as an argument, though participants might have a better idea what they are trying to convey. That is, what a critic decides is an argumentative gesture or mode may in fact not be one from the "inside perspective," and what a critic excludes as an argumentative mode may in fact be one. We should not assume that outsiders have privileged critical status.

4. Cognitive and Psychological Aspects and Process of Persuasion. Narrative argument is permeated with complex psychological and cognitive processes that cannot be adequately translated into the dominant model of argumentation. Reducing narrative would require various kinds of translations and simplifications. This point was thoroughly argued by Willard in 1976 specifically in relation to translating arguments into the Toulmin model. According to Willard, an accurate translation of an argument would have (at a minimum) three

parts: (1) the process occurring in the mind of the source (arguer) that results in the verbalized claim, (2) the symbolic cues sent out by the arguer, and (3) the cognitive processes of the receiver as they hear the argument (1976, p. 310). These parts would require elaborate diagrams—diagrams that we can't chart in practice because we don't have access to the relevant information. As such, it is impossible for one diagram to capture all the required translational content. As argued by Willard, argument diagrams cannot represent the complex and to some extent mysterious cognitive process that allow persuasion and communication to take place. Argument diagrams cannot give us a structural representation of the cognitive processes that have produced an argument (Willard, p. 312). Further, Willard writes, "the Toulmin diagram cannot serve as a structural representation of human cognitive processes given the complexity of those processes and the state of human knowledge about them" (1976, p. 311). Hence, according to Willard the most important factors that guide and shape an individual's inferential processes, such as one's attitudes, beliefs values, and emotions, cannot be represented in a diagram (1976, p. 315). And without this complex inferential process an argument diagram is inadequate because it does not show us how the argument is cognitively represented, nor how it becomes persuasive to the audience. One can only use the Toulmin diagram to represent a speech text, not the cognitive process of representing and processing the argument (1976, p. 312). That is, argument diagrams do not adequately represent cognitive paradigms. The same is true of attempts to deconstruct narratives into premises and conclusion: the reconstructed argument does not tell anything about the psychological force of the narrative on the hearer, its persuasiveness, or the inferential processes as experienced by the hearer. Thus, diagrams are psychologically inadequate.

Further, Willard argues,

> the difficulty with this approach [diagramming and translating arguments] is that many of the forces that impel speakers to certain modes of persuasive behavior (and auditors to certain kinds of behavior) are not expressible in language. Indeed, many fundamental propositions about which people "argue" are not linguistically expressible. (1976, p. 315).

The motives behind making arguments such as the arguer's attitudes, beliefs and values that underlie the inferential leap from data to claim are not included in the product of argument. Hence, it is difficult to reduce the argument motives which include an arguer's beliefs, attitudes and values. Willard cites Susanne Langer, who argues that many aspects of our sensuous, mental and emotional life cannot be captured in words (1976, p. 315). Langer, as cited by Willard, argues that this subjective reality is not only beyond the reach of language, but is impossible in the essential frame of language (p. 315). As such, art, music, dance, sculpture, and painting are symbolic and express modes of human feelings that cannot be expressed linguistically (Willard, 1976, p. 315). Even the arts such as poetry express feelings only indirectly (Willard, 1976, p. 315). Hence, just as we cannot reduce into words our aesthetic experience, we similarly cannot reduce our argumentative exchanges as conveyed in interactive narratives into a linguistic product.

And so the problem with reducing narratives is that a group of propositions and the diagram they are placed in do not fully capture the actual interactions amongst people. The resulting translation of the narrative does not tell us the psychological process of how the argument is produced, how it is received by the recipient, or convey the extra-linguistic contents of the exchange. This is because the psychological and persuasive aspects of argumentation are

too complex to represent in either a diagram or a traditional, explicit, discursive, and linear argument.

5. Narrative Argument as Complex Message Design And Reception. Narrative argument, like any other type of argumentation, is a type of communication, which means that the complexity of message design and reception plays a role. The translation of narrative into premises and a conclusion does not take into account the complexity of how a message is produced and received. As Willard (1976) point out, a diagram with a set of propositions does not represent the dynamic and complex interaction that takes place when one person formulates a set of propositions and transmits certain symbolic cues to another person, who then interprets and constructs these cues (p. 310). The arguers' perception of the situation, of symbol meanings, and of the other person's motives all come together to determine the choice of one proposition over another. Willard argues that paralinguistic, kinetic, and proxemic cues all have an important role in how the audience receives and understands the message/proposition (1976, p. 313). So, Willard's point is that when person A sends person B a message, a myriad of complex variables take place and must be accounted for in order to describe what happens; but these variables cannot be captured through the deconstruction and diagramming of arguments. Narrative arguments, like other arguments, employ complex messages that are not captured in the reduced product.

This attempt to re-interpret all argumentative modes into the logical is what Gilbert calls "prejudiced reductionism" (1997, p. 79), which is a prejudiced assumption that the only way to understand, assess, and analyze an argument is through the logical mode. This assumption misses a crucial point about argumentation. Argumentation is a form of communication that uses

messages, and messages “contain more than words, they contain information, nuance, flavor, tone of voice, body language…” (Gilbert, 2014, pp. 2-3). Gilbert argues that people do not communicate in sentences or propositions, but rather in messages. And because arguments contain messages, we cannot translate their parts into the familiar symbols of deductive logic.

6. Translation and A Single, Limited Perspective. Translating narrative into premises and a conclusion runs into the problem of a single and biased perspective. When translating, it is not clear whose perspective to adopt. Those analyzing the narrative ‘from the outside’ may have a different interpretation of the argument’s content, meaning, and import, compared to those actively engaged in the argument. A similar point is raised by Willard in relation to the translation of arguments into diagrams. Willard argues that the deconstructing and diagramming of arguments runs into “the problem of perspective.” Willard asks whose perspective will define the argument, and concludes that there are many different perspectives that can be taken, however none of which may be faithful to the actual interaction. That is, it is impossible to capture all of these perspectives in one diagram—especially given that it is impossible to translate *even one* perspective, including the relevant cognitive and paralinguistic elements, into a single diagram. As Willard (1976) asserts,

> the critic is encouraged (and, in a sense, forced) to impose the form of a diagram on that which s/he seeks to describe. The diagram greatly limits the critic’s ability to construe the various perspectives of the people who are ‘arguing’ in a social context. (1976, p. 315).

This is especially the case because, as pointed out by Willard, argumentation and communication in general are enthymematic, and so the analyst must make educated guesses about missing data, warrant, and backing that the arguer did not verbalize. And hence the analyst

must distinguish between the "perspective of the source and the receiver as they 'fill in the blanks'" (Willard, 1976, p. 311). As such, we cannot know for sure what the arguer draws on in terms of data, warrant and backing. While we could give priority to one person's perspective, this would artificially limit the content of the argumentative exchange, which included multiple interactive perspectives.

Similarly, as pointed out by Gilbert (2014) (in his correspondence with David Botting), in attempting to translate a message into a product, the communication becomes that of the analyst, not the speaker, because it is the analyst who will decide what is and is not important, and what is and is not to be included (p. 3). If instead, Gilbert argues, we look at communication and argument as a whole without deciding what to include and what to exclude (as premise and conclusion), we then see the whole process as important, rather than excluding potentially crucial elements. This is why Gilbert insists that the whole argumentative communicative act must be considered and analyzed holistically, not reduced to parts (p. 3).

7. Distortion and Misinterpretation. The reduction and translation of narratives inevitably leads to misinterpretation. This is because, as shown above, (1) there are many perspectives on an argumentative exchange, and (2) translating a narrative into a deductive form requires an enormous amount of interpretation on the part of analyst, and no matter how careful the analyst is, there will always be something excluded from the narrative that is important to the argument. (This is because arguments are eminently complex and analysts have finite knowledge—indeed, sufficient cognitive models to represent the cognitive encoding of arguments is entirely lacking). Misinterpretation is a problem for all argument translations, even arguments that follow a linear, explicit style, but the problem is compounded by complex,

contextual argumentative exchanges. As pointed out by Gilbert, (2002) all communication requires clarification, and as such, misunderstandings happen as a matter of course, even in linear arguments (p. 25). And because narrative arguments rely on different argument modalities, are audience-oriented, rely on co-orientation and complex cognitive and message design, they are too rich to translate into premises and a conclusion.

Willard (1976) also points to the problem of distortion and misinterpretation that results from deconstructing/diagramming arguments (p. 309). Willard argues that fitting a persuasive argument into a diagram requires that we reduce and translate the argument, which requires that we reformulate symbolic cues into analytically explicable premises, and this is ultimately an act of distortion. It is likely that those making the argument diagram will misinterpret the actual argument, and fill in different data, warrant, and backings for the argument (assuming they are using the Toulmin model) than those used by the arguers. That is, arguers may rely on different data and backing than may be apparent to the analyst. Hence, it is inevitably arbitrary what the critic decides to extract as a reason. As a result, when we reduce a narrative argument, we are making a lot of assumptions, many of which may be inaccurate and different from those of the arguers. And since there are many processes, both cognitive and communicative, embedded in argumentation, it is inevitable that lapses and misinterpretations will occur. Misinterpretation is bound to occur when translating a complex, multi-perspectival, and obscure process such as narrative.

Translation always misses parts of the narrative, and oversimplifies the complexity and richness of the narrative. Narrative arguments, as shown above, are multimodal, contextual, audience-oriented, and utilize complex messages designs and cognitive processes, and hence

they are bound to be under-represented or misinterpreted by a translator with limited, context-bound knowledge.

Objections and Response

Objection One: Clarity And Meaningfulness. Some argumentation scholars might insist that in order to make sense of the argumentative act, the narrative must be reduced to a product. The first objection to maintaining narrative argument as a process relates to the clarity and meaningfulness of narrative as an argumentative form. One objection against maintaining the narrative form claims that narrative is not meaningful unless it is made into premise and conclusion. Narrative form, some argue, is difficult to understand argumentatively and in order to understand the argument embedded in the narrative, we need to extract the reasons from the narrative. As a result, some argue that the narrative form is less clear than linear, logical arguments because it is hard to know what the argument is in the form of stories because reasons are not stated clearly. This assumed problem of clarity leads to the demand for reducing multimodal arguments into a product. What this assumes is that logical arguments are more clear then multimodal arguments. In response to this objection, I will discuss three features of narrative that will explain how narratives are argumentatively clear. 1. They arise within a dissensual exchange where disagreement is present, and 2. Narrative arguments are contextual, processual and interactive, 3. Narrative arguments operate within a rhetorical audience that is already interactive, engaged and co-creating the narrative.

First, the distinctive defining characteristic of narrative arguments is that they occur within a disagreement, otherwise they do not function as an argument. Narrative argument requires the appropriate context to be taken up and understood as an argument and that context is

disagreement. Stories arises in response to claims made or to disagreement. So, when the story is told, it is already clear by then what is the issue being disputed. My account of narrative argument stipulates and requires that they function within dissensus. The requirement of disagreement allows the story to make sense within that exchange.

Second, another defining characteristic of narrative is that it is processual. As such, the narrative form is contextual and embedded in the situation. The story told is part of the whole interaction. And so, when a story is told it is a response to an issue discussed and the teller is telling the story to demonstrate the reasons for his/her claim that may be told before the story is given or as part of the story. Stories are not solitary occurrences and are interactive, which means that the story as an argumentative act is never solitary or static but is formed within the interaction and is shared between those engaged in argumentation. Since narrative is a communicative process, it attains its meaning from that process. As such, it is the context that endows narrative with meaning and makes it argumentative. The answer to how narrative becomes argumentative is in the context, process and relationship between arguer and audience. Because narrative relies on the whole communicative interaction for it is meaning, the argument will be found in that process. Hence, the audience understands the argument through the whole process of arguing, i.e., the narrative argument is understood through the way the story is told, the tone, intonation, context and the mutual attribution of intention which cannot be articulated in the discursive form of the premise or conclusion. This brings us to the third feature of narrative, that it takes place within a rhetorical and interactive audience where the meaning and argumentative import of narrative is clear and understood.

Since narrative argument is audience oriented, this means that the audiences engaged in narrative argumentation are rhetorical audiences which involve both the arguer and the

respondent. That is, the concept of rhetorical audience means that the audience is actually involved in the construction of argument: the concept of rhetorical audience includes both the arguer and respondent. Also, the literature in narratology also shows that stories are shaped by the listener and that stories are often not passively told but rather the listener is an active participant. And since the listener is involved in the construction of story then surely they must understand the meaning and argumentative force of the narrative. Since narrative arguments are rhetorical, contextual and processual, they are indeed meaningful and their meaning is fairly easy to determine.

Hence, given that narrative arises in an argumentative context with an interactive audience, it seems wrong to assume that they would not be clear, or less clear than logical and traditional arguments. In fact, narrative arguments are just as clear as any other form of arguing. Unless we are assuming that people are not as equipped and competent to understand or decode messages in communication, then it is inaccurate to assume that narrative arguments are less clear. Further, if we observe communication in general, we will recognize that people are very good at decoding and understanding messages, even ambiguous messages.

Hence, there are two ways to respond to this objection, 1. to point to the nature (features) of narrative arguments as rhetorical and contextual whose meaning is embedded in the process between arguers and the audience. And 2. point out the nature of communication and messages as defended by Gilbert. Gilbert (2002) gives a compelling response to this demand for clarity in his article, “Effing the Ineffable,” by pointing out that all of communication, including written and verbal, is often unclear and that when we communicate with one another we often require further clarification. This is even more so when communication is more complex and when there is disagreement (p. 25). Written language is not any clearer or precise than verbal language. And

in fact, we also disagree about the interpretation and meaning of a written text. Gilbert's point is that if the written and verbal is more clear, then we wouldn't have miscommunication and disagreement in interpretation. Hence, Gilbert argues most communication requires clarification and that is not only the case with multimodal argumentation.

Gilbert argues that the demand to reduce narrative into the logical mode to make it more clear commits the logocentric fallacy. This fallacy is committed when we assume that only in the logical mode can arguments be meaningful, clear and argumentative. Gilbert's overall criticism relates to the assumption that only in the logical mode can arguments or communication make sense (2002, p. 30). Although Gilbert discusses multimodal arguments that are not verbal or discursive, his discussion also fits with the narrative form (which is oral and verbal) because Gilbert's discussion of the logocentric fallacy deals with non-discursive as well as non-logical based arguments. That is, Gilbert's general point relates to the assumption that an argument or message is only argumentative or meaningful when it is broken down to linear and explicit arguments of premise and conclusion. As Gilbert writes, the "logocentric fallacy is committed when language, especially in its most logical guise, is seen to be the only logical form of rational communication" (2002, p. 32). Gilbert's point is that "tonality, body movement and facial expression are an integral part to understanding a position and an argument" (2002, p. 32). Gilbert's criticism relates to not only the exclusion of non-discursive forms of argument but also non-logical based argument, which may or may not be discursive.

Even if we assume that the narrative form is not clear, reducing narrative will not make it more clear what the argument is because there will be the issue of misinterpretation as discussed above.

Objection Two: Evaluation of Arguments. The requirement that narrative be reduced comes from the demand that in order to evaluate an argument we need to reduce it. And so the other main objection against maintaining the narrative form of argument centers around the idea that we cannot evaluate narrative argument in its original form and that it needs to be reduced to be appraised. David Botting (2014), for example, in his article "Why Modal Pluralism Does Not Require Normative Pluralism" provides two reasons for why narrative argument ought to be reduced to be analyzed. According to Botting, a theory of analysis needs assertives as inputs, meaning we need to extract from non-logical moves the assertive they make and analyze what is not an assertive into an assertive (p. 172). Botting's point is that in order to analyze an argument you need to analyze the premises and conclusions of that argument. He argues that since a theory of appraisal concerns whether an argument is rationally persuasive, it is reasonable to reduce all argument modalities including narrative to a single mode, that is the logical. Hence, Botting argues, that in evaluating the rational goodness of multimodal arguments, that is their power to rationally persuade, then it is perfectly reasonable to reduce them to the logical mode (p. 173). So, the objection is that if you want to know whether an argument is rationally persuasive or not, one has to reduce it to the logical mode of premises and a conclusion in order to look at the relationship between the premises and conclusion. In other words, the objection speaks to the claim that we need to reduce it to appraise it. But that is only necessary if the type of appraisal we were interested in was rational persuasion because, of course, we can appraise an argument without reducing it. And so the issue is whether rational persuasion should be the only or primary goal of persuasion.

According to Botting's argument, appraisal should focus on the goal of rational persuasion, and while he admits that other goals of argument may be important to argumentation,

they are not, he argues, the focus of argument appraisal. Gilbert, on the contrary argues that since there are a plurality of modes that arguers use to argue (including emotional, physical, intuitive), argument evaluation should account for the multiplicity of modes and the goals that accompany them (Gilbert, 1997, pp. 142-3). For example, the mode of emotional argument has a different goal than say the logical mode. Botting "concedes that an argument in one mode will have different properties bearing on its satisfaction of these multiple goals from the 'equivalent' argument in another mode" (p. 173). However, Botting argues that a multiplicity of norms would work

> if what we are trying to [do is] evaluate an arguer's performance, his selection of best strategies and rhetorical devices for his purposes. But I aver that this kind of evaluation is not what a theory of appraisal is trying to capture. (p. 173)

Botting argues that other goals of arguments are not normative and relate to an arguer's performance and not the actual goodness of argument. In other words, Botting believes that any other goal of argument, aside from rational persuasion, is not the proper object of argument appraisal (p. 174). He argues that the proper task of argument appraisal should be rational persuasion. Botting asserts, "when we sometimes make judgements that seem to appeal to other goals we are (a) evaluating the performance and not the argument, and (b) not making a normative judgment in the relevant sense" (Botting, p. 182). However, this is where Botting gets it wrong in his claim that argument goodness, should not include arguer's performance: arguers are real people who are affected, moved and changed by the practice of arguments and so argument goodness should indeed include argument practices. And in fact, normative standards of argument goodness should not just relate to the arguments as isolated from the practice of

arguers, but rather should emphasize that the practice of argumentation is part of the goodness of argument.

Indeed, Botting is wrong in his claim because other goals of arguments such as the performance of arguers is both normative and crucial to good argumentation. Botting's point is that other goals of argument are not normative in the relevant sense, and that rational persuasion is the only relevant sense of normativity. However, any normative standard can become relevant depending on what we are doing when we are attempting to evaluate an argument. There is not a particular norm that trumps all other norms, which is what Botting is assuming with rational persuasion. If arguers enter the argument with the goal of achieving understanding and empathy, then why should rational persuasion take precedence over the goals of real arguers. Rational persuasion is one among many goals of arguments. Botting seems to reserve argument appraisal only to rational persuasion. However, argument appraisal should indeed relate to an arguer's performance. Why should we privilege and prioritize rational persuasion over other argument evaluation? Why should argument goodness be only about rational standards when arguments serve many functions and have many goals?

Botting assumes that the only way to evaluate an argument is to see whether it is rationally persuasive. The problem with Botting's objection is precisely the type of analyses he is interested in, i.e., rational persuasion, which excludes any other types of appraisal. The problem with this type of analysis that requires reduction is that it favors a specific type of argument and goals of and motives of arguments. Botting is wrong to assume that we can only talk about good and bad arguments in terms of rational persuasion and not any other standard. The function of argument is not always to rationally persuade, a point also made by Gilbert (2014) in his correspondence with Botting published in *Argumentation and Advocacy.* An argument can be

bad in that even though it upheld rational standards it was not ethically conducted/performed. Argument goodness should speak to the process of argument evaluation not just the product. Further, an argument could be very rational and not serve the emotional needs of its arguers. Rational arguments, as rationality is understood traditionally, do not serve all of arguers needs, for sometimes our emotional or intuitive life cannot be explained by traditional rationality alone.

Gilbert argues that we can appraise arguments in ways other than being rationally persuasive; we can assess and appraise arguments for being fair, reasonable, justified, considerate and even compassionate (2014, p. 186). Arguments can have functions other than rational persuasion and hence can be assessed and appraised in a myriad of ways. Gilbert further responds to Botting by stating that,

> My point as an argumentative descriptivist is that understanding arguments and, yes, assessing and appraising them needs to go beyond deductive correctness and include both actual argument standards applied by real people and argument assessment related to the forms of argument used. (Gilbert, 2014, p. 2)

There are two main issues with Botting's objection: argument appraisal is not just about rationality; it should include other goals (a point made by Gilbert). Second, even if we were to assume that rationality is the standard, because of course sometimes it is, there is still the question of why we should favor traditional rationality, when there is also rhetorical rationality. Hence, the two problems with Botting's claims are: 1. the goal of argument is not always rational persuasion, and neither should that be the only goal of analysis, 2. An argument can be rationally persuasive without being reduced to the logical mode. That is, rational persuasion does not have to be understood only in the logical Mode. Rational persuasiveness can relate to rhetorical rationality. Rationality understood traditionally sees an argument as being rational

when the premise and the conclusion have a certain type of relationship. However, rhetorical rationality is consensual. What is rationally persuasive from the rhetorical perspective is different from what is rationally persuasive from the traditional logical models. However, Botting assumes that other types of persuasion such as emotional persuasion are not rational. And that's where Botting gets it wrong because other goals of arguments are not only normative but also rational. For example, rhetorical persuasion is indeed both normative and rational.

Further, it is unnecessary to reduce alternate modes into a single logical mode to either understand or analyze the narrative, for example. That is, narrative arguments along with the other modalities can give reasons and function as reason giving arguments without being reduced into a standard argument form. Alternative modes of argument do provide reasons and they give it in a unique way that is different from the logical mode, and they do not need to be reduced to be understood. The problem with Botting's objection is that it assumes that the only way an argument can give reason is in the traditional logical mode, and that it is only in the logical mode that reasons can be assessed.

Hence it is unnecessary to 1. Reduce the narrative into the logical mode to understand it because the narrative is understood by the audience as an argument; and 2. It is unnecessary to reduce the narrative to be analyzed because narrative arguments require an alternative method of analysis that does not see narrative as only serving the purpose of rational persuasion understood in the traditional sense. Rather, narrative arguments ought to be analyzed from a process-oriented perspective that takes account of narrative as a process without being translated. In the next chapter, I will argue that narrative arguments can be analyzed through a virtue rhetorical approach, which I call the virtuous audience.

Chapter Five: The Evaluation of Narrative Arguments and the Virtuous Audience

Introduction

This chapter addresses the question of how to evaluate narrative arguments. I will be discussing how to evaluate narrative arguments as process as opposed to arguments as product, the latter of which is assumed by dominant accounts of argument appraisal such as informal logic. The first part of this chapter will show that dominant accounts of argument evaluation are not suitable for the evaluation of narrative arguments because they focus on the product of argument. The second part of the chapter will develop a method for evaluating arguments as process, which combines the rhetorical understanding of audience with virtue argumentation. I call this model the virtuous audience. More specifically, I will focus on the evaluative principles that help us cultivate virtues that avoid the acceptance of dangerous stories such as racist or misogynistic narratives. In the latter part of the chapter I will respond to some of the criticism against virtue argumentation and the virtuous audience. I will conclude by discussing the notion of 'virtuous consensus' that comes out of the virtuous audience. Virtuous consensus is the result of a rhetorical process informed by the cultivation of virtues.

Preliminaries

Before proceeding, some preliminary clarifications are in order. I define a narrative argument as a story told in the context of dissensus or disagreement. The type of narrative I will be discussing is a form of oral and interpersonal storytelling, which takes place in conversations between at least two people, and hence is dialogical. I will not discuss narrative as it is used in novels, but

will restrict my attention to narrative as the act of dialogical and interactive storytelling, which is essentially communal and interpersonal. Since my account of narrative argument focuses on interactive personal narrative, rather than written and/or novel argument, my focus will be on argument as process, not argument as product. By “narrative process”, I refer to the whole interaction in which the story is used as an argument, including such components as body language, tone, context, audience, background and shared history. Narrative arguments do not arise in solitary monologues, but are usually part of a larger interaction. Narrative argumentation is a dynamic and interactive process that happens between the arguer and the audience. Narratives arise in conversations in response to something said or an argument made, and so they are integrated into the whole interaction. Narrative is often used alongside other modes of arguing such as the visceral (physical), kisceral (intuitive) and emotional mode discussed and developed by Michael Gilbert (1997, p. 75).

By product and process of argument, I am referring to the old and contested distinction in argumentation literature which was first introduced by Daniel J. O’Keefe in 1982. O’Keefe distinguishes between the concept of arguing (which is the process) and the argument that results from the process of arguers engaged in arguing (which is the product of arguing). O’Keefe calls these two features, i.e., the product and process of argument, ‘argument 1’ and ‘argument 2.’ Argument 1 is what one person makes, gives or presents, while argument 2 is something that two or more people engage in (as in two or more people are having an argument, the content of which is argument 1) (O’Keefe, 1992, p. 79). As such, argument 1 refers to the content, what is being said in the argument, which is the product of arguing, and argument 2 refers to the process, mode, or act of arguing (O’Keefe, 1982, p. 4). The product of argument is also sometimes referred to as a thing or an object, whereas the process of argument is referred to as an

interaction. This distinction has been both popular and controversial among argumentation scholars, but it is an intuitive and helpful distinction, and I will assume it in what follows. This distinction is helpful in explaining how argument evaluation has been divided in terms of evaluating the product of the argument or the process of arguing as in the rhetorical tradition. I will be discussing only narrative arguments as process—a dissensual and dialogical exchange between two or more people, with multiple integrated but conceptually distinguishable modes built into the argumentative context. I will argue that narrative as process cannot be evaluated using traditional methods—it calls for a distinct evaluative framework, i.e., the virtuous audience.

Dominant Account of Argument Evaluation

In this part of the chapter, I will explain dominant accounts of argument appraisal and show how they are not useful for assessing narrative arguments.

Traditionally, argument evaluation was taken to refer to normatively evaluating whether a conclusion is acceptable or whether the reasons provided are sufficient to warrant the acceptance of the conclusion. There are several such theories of argument evaluation, two of the main ones being the informal logical perspective and the pragma dialectical perspective. The informal logical perspective focuses on evaluating the product, i.e., the argument as consisting of premises and a conclusion. Informal logicians evaluate arguments based on three requirements that an argument must satisfy to be good, namely relevance, sufficiency, and acceptability (RSA) (Johnson, 2000, p. 191). However, because most of the criteria for the RSA model focus on premises and their relationship to the conclusion, which requires that we extract premises and conclusion from the narrative, it cannot be applied to narrative arguments. This is problematic

because once you reduce the narrative to premises and conclusion, it loses some of its persuasive power. This is partly because when reduced to a product narrative arguments lose important evidential content, such as emotional and physical content. This affects the perceived legitimacy of the argument. Also, the narrative argument becomes a different type of argument once it is taken out of its original form and structure. Once the argument is translated into the form of premises and conclusion, it does not tell us anything about the process of arguing, and often omits important features of the argument in an effort to reduce and capture the ordinary argument into a rigid form of premise and conclusion.

Another prominent approach to argument evaluation comes from the dialectical approach, an example of which is the pragma-dialectical theory of Frans Van Eemeren, Rob Grootendorst and the Amsterdam school. The pragma dialectical approach investigates the procedures that are involved in the argumentative exchange and looks at whether the argumentative rules have been followed. The pragma dialecticians are interested in testing theses through critical discussion. Hence, according to pragma dialectics, a good argument is a well-regulated critical discussion, which involves four stages: the confrontation stage, opening stage, argumentation stage and the concluding stage. The discussion is governed by a code of conduct in the form of argumentative rules. This approach stipulates that if arguers ignore or violate argumentative rules, the argumentative exchange can result in fallacies (Van Eemeren, Grootendorst, and Henkemans, 2002, p. 182). Some of the rules for critical discussion include the following:

> Freedom rule: Parties must not prevent each other from putting forward standpoints or casting doubt on standpoints.

> Unexpressed premise rule: A party may not falsely present something as a premise that has been left unexpressed by the other party or deny a premise that he himself has left implicit.
> Argument scheme rule: A standpoint may not be regarded as conclusively defended if the defense does not take place by means of an appropriate argumentation scheme that is correctly applied.
> Validity rule: The reasoning in the argumentation must be logically valid or capable of being validated by making explicit one or more unexpressed premises (Van Eemeren, Grootendorst, and Henkemans, 2002, pp. 182-183).

Most of the rules are difficult to apply to narrative arguments because the pragma dialectical rules relate to argumentation that is structured and rigid in form, whereas narrative argument is not. Further, the narrative argument would have to be turned into a critical discussion in order to apply the rules of critical discussion to it. However, narrative argument is a complex activity that cannot be narrowed down into the four stages of a critical discussion without losing its persuasive and powerful force embedded in its narrative form. Narrative arguments are not structured and therefore cannot follow the four stages of critical discussion. Further, changing narrative into a critical discussion runs into the same problem of reduction that the informal logic approach poses.

It must be acknowledged that both informal logic and pragma dialectics provide worthy accounts of argument appraisal and are surely useful for evaluating many kinds of arguments, especially traditional types of arguments, however these approaches are not applicable or suitable to narrative arguments as process because they require dissecting the narrative into argumentative parts. My approach to narrative arguments avoids compartmentalizing narrative

argument because 1. the whole narrative is an argumentative act, and 2. narrative parts are all interlocked and cannot be broken down into separate parts. And as mentioned earlier, this division risks changing the argument and reducing its persuasive power.

While there is a tendency among argumentation scholars to ignore the process of arguing when assessing arguments, rhetorical approaches and the recent developments of virtue argumentation do attempt to evaluate an argument in terms of the process and practices of argument; yet they also have their setbacks. For example, while virtue argumentation theories do look at the process--though in a very limited way, as I will later show--they ignore the audience. However, it is both the arguer and the audience that form the full dynamic of argumentation. The dynamic of narrative argument requires an interactive approach. This is because narrative arguments cannot be reduced to traditional forms of arguments without losing important evidential and contextual information. The deconstruction of narratives into a traditional argument form of premise and conclusion misses the point behind narrative arguments[3]. Forcing a narrative into a traditional form would overlook the message in the narrated story. Traditional arguments consisting of explicit premise and conclusion would not reflect what the speaker argues through the story. Some arguments or points are hard to convey in an explicit linear way, and doing so misses the ultimate point behind the story; that is, the story as a whole is the point. When people argue they do not always give direct arguments or respond directly to an argument that the interlocutor puts forward; rather, in the context of narrative argumentation, speakers go on telling stories. Nonetheless, speakers seem to get the point that these stories are more than just explanations; speakers understand the argument and idea behind the narrative. Sometimes it is

[3] By the term deconstruction, I am not referring to the form of philosophical and literary analysis developed by Jacques Derrida.

the case that you simply cannot give a direct answer nor respond directly to an argument without giving a story, i.e., only a story about what happened will capture what the speaker wishes to argue. Also narrative arguments follow a rhetorical process that include the arguer and the audience and such a process cannot be reduced to just a premise and conclusion. Hence to evaluate narrative we must retain and maintain its natural form as a rhetorical process. Because narrative argument evaluation focuses on the process of arguing and the cultivation of virtues, it will combine insights from both the rhetorical and virtue theories of argumentation.

Moreover, the account of virtuous audience that I offer can apply to other argument forms, and is not exclusive to narrative. In fact, it is useful for all types of arguments. However, my primary point is that while other arguments with the traditional argument form are susceptible to other analysis modes (such as informal logic or pragma dialectics), narrative argument is not. That is, I argue that the only useful way to analyze narrative is through a rhetorical (combined with virtues) analysis. Hence, the virtuous audience is a rhetorical audience that has cultivated argumentative virtues.

The Virtuous Audience

To define the rhetorical features of the virtuous audience, I borrow from the rhetorical understanding of audiences, most notably Chaim Perelman's account, which is the most thorough and renowned account of audience in rhetorical argumentation. The virtuous audience is rhetorical in three important ways:

1. Argumentation Adapted to The Virtuous Audience. The virtuous audience is rhetorical because the audience of the story must be taken into account. That is, stories are often adapted to the audience. What this means is that the arguer (storyteller) often tries to begin a

narrative argument in agreement, i.e., with a point shared with the audience. And so the virtuous audience assessing the narrative argument has been presented with a story where they agree with the starting point of that narrative. When we tell stories, if we want them to serve as arguments, we do so by ensuring that our stories are going to be accepted by the audience. Of course it is true that not all narratives are adapted to the audience. But in order for a narrative to serve an argumentative function, it needs to be adapted to the audience. In an argumentative setting where disagreement has arisen, stories are usually introduced in response to a point made or question asked and are thus integrated with ongoing talk and debate. Since stories are very much integrated and woven into the whole interaction between arguers, they often are adapted and rely on background knowledge shared by the disputant in the interaction. To do this, we must begin an argument with an agreed and shared starting point. To explain how stories are adapted to the audience, I will refer to the concept of cognitive environment. That is, adapting one's argument to the audience requires an understanding of the beliefs and tolerances of the audience, which, in turn, requires an understanding of the audiences' 'cognitive environment.' The cognitive environment is a concept that Christopher Tindale borrows from the cognitive psychologists Dan Sperber and Deirdre Wilson and applies it to argumentation. Tindale draws six helpful points from the work of Sperber and Wilson on cognitive environments that relate to argumentation, some of which I will also apply to narrative arguments:

1. "A cognitive environment is a set of facts manifest to us":

   One way to explain the cognitive environment is to think of the visible environment manifest to us, like a room full of people. The cognitive environment, then, is the set of facts that are manifest to us and that we can infer and perceive. That is, something may be cognitively manifest to us and we are still not necessarily explicitly aware of it.

Further, individuals share a cognitive environment when they share the same facts. And so stories assume a shared cognitive environment and allow participants in the argumentation context to begin in agreement and to understand the stories' background.

2. "Our cognitive environments differ":

   Although we share the same physical environment, this does not mean that each individual's cognitive environment is identical to the other's. While we share a physical environment our cognitive abilities differ, much like our visible abilities. This is important because our ability to infer other facts from those we directly perceive varies from person to person. Also our personal history and memories affects how we come to interpret manifest phenomena. That is, "knowledge previously acquired affects our ability to work with a present set of facts" (Tindale, 1992, 179). Although we share the same physical world, we still construct different mental representations out of it. As such, our mental representations are different due to differences in our perceptual and cognitive abilities, as well as our unique history and memories.

   This feature of the cognitive environment helps us understand how and what a virtuous audience might come to accept, that is, what facts or points of the story the arguer and the audience share or differ about. What this shows is that even though, when telling a story, an arguer and audience may share a cognitive environment, this does not mean that they will see everything the same or agree about everything. They will still have different interpretations and understandings of events.

3. "Cognitive environments include assumptions which may be false":

   Just as cognitive environment includes manifest facts which are true or probable, it also includes manifest assumptions which are false (Tindale, p.179). This means that what is

manifest to us includes not only facts which are true but also assumptions which are false and hence the cognitive environment refers to all that is manifest to us whether it is true or not.

4. "Overlapping cognitive environments give rise to a shared cognitive environment with mutual manifestedness".

   Although individuals have similar cognitive abilities, but differences in memories, they never share a total cognitive environment. However, when the same facts and assumptions are manifest to individuals, they are said to share a cognitive environment.

5. When we share a cognitive environment with others we know what assumptions or facts are manifest to us both. Hence, a cognitive environment of an individual is a set of facts that are manifest to them. A fact is manifest to an individual at that given time if and only if she is capable at that time of representing it mentally and accepting its representation as true or probably true. Further, Sperber and Wilson expand on manifestedness in two ways. First, they extend manifestedness by including assumptions not just facts. What is manifest includes our personal assumptions whether true or false. Second, manifestedness comes in degrees. Sperber and Wilson state, "to be manifest, then, is to be perceptible or inferable" (Sperber and Wilson, 1986, 39). Manifestedness refers to not only what is available to inference but also what an individual at that time is capable of understanding and representing. It consists of not only the facts that an individual is aware of but also all the facts that she is capable of becoming aware of. Of course, what is manifest to us varies in that what we are aware of and can become aware of is influenced not only by our personal history but also our perceptual and cognitive abilities. What Sperber and

Wilson refer to as the cognitive environment is the intersection of what is manifest to a group.

Since narrative argument evaluation is audience oriented, it becomes important to consider the beliefs and tolerances of audiences, which leads us to consider the cognitive environments of such audiences (Tindale, 1992, p. 178). Understanding the cognitive environment of audiences helps us begin in agreement with the audience. That is, sharing the same cognitive environment is one way in which the audience begins in agreement.

The concept of the cognitive environment sheds some light on how audiences come to believe and accept certain stories and reject others. One of the reasons that some stories (or part of stories) are rejected is that they are too far-fetched and fall outside of one's cognitive environment, what is deemed reasonable. Further, when a story is not part of the audience's cognitive environment, they cannot understand or assess it. And similarly, certain stories or part of the stories are immediately accepted without doubt because they are part of the audience's cognitive environment that they share with the arguer. The storyteller knows that if a story is far-fetched and does not rely on a shared conception of reasonableness, it risks being rejected by the audience. When we tell stories we do so within a shared conception of reasonableness. This shared conception of reasonableness is related to one's cognitive environment. What is rhetorically acceptable and relevant is within one's cognitive environment.

2.Virtuous Audience as Interactive. Similar to Perelman's rhetorical account of audiences, the virtuous audience is interactive and is very much involved in the construction and outcome of the argument. The virtuous audience essentially includes both the arguer and

interlocutor. What this means is that the notion of audience in fact includes the arguer. This means that the person who is an arguer at one time can also become an interlocutor (audience) at a different time, because these roles are dynamic. In other words, the arguer will also be positioned as audience in a dialogical exchange. The virtuous audience is involved with the arguer and is not this remote, distanced and detached entity that only listens to or receives the argument. Rather, the virtuous audience is an active participant in argumentation and is never passive or merely a recipient of the argument. Narrative arguments are co-created between the arguer and the audience. That is why the storyteller also needs to adapt her story to the audience and the context and situation as he /she sees fit. And because arguers begin with agreement that is shared with the audience, and the audience plays a role in how the argument begins and ends, this makes the virtuous audience interactive.

3. Virtuous Audience as The Measure Of Argument. Another aspect of the rhetorical account of audience that I apply to a virtuous audience is that the audience is the measure of argument, and are the ones evaluating the argument, much like Perelman's understanding of audience. Narrative arguments are assessed by the listener, that is, the audience. Depending on the audience, different stories may be accepted or rejected. From the rhetorical perspective, a good argument is one that is effective and persuasive to an audience. This is why the rhetorical approach is interested in adapting arguments to audiences in order to gain their agreement and adherence. According to Perelman, an argument is as worthy as its audience. Since not all audiences are the same, Perelman draws a distinction between two types of audience: the particular and the universal. While the particular audience addresses segments of society, small or particular groups, the universal audience addresses all of humanity, more importantly all

rational human beings. As such, Perelman makes clear that a discourse that appeals to reason is one that appeals to the universal audience because such an audience is a reasonable and rational one (1982, p. 17). The difference in these audiences is actually a difference in the goals of argumentation. Discourse addressed to small groups (specific audiences) aims to persuade; whereas discourse aimed at larger groups, i.e., the universal audience, aims to convince (Perelman, 1982, p. 18). The appeal to a particular audience is an appeal to particular characteristics and situations occupying a particular space and time whereas the universal audience relates to argumentation that transcends all those particularities and makes a broader appeal (Crosswhite, 1989, p. 158).

Perelman argues that the construction of the universal audience requires certain argumentative moves, including the following four features:

1. Arguers must start with the particular audience and move to the universal by performing "certain imaginative operations on [the particular audience] in order to give it a universal character" (Crosswhite, 1989, p.163), for it is always the universal of the particular (Crosswhite, 1989, 167). Perlman argues that the universal audience can be understood as an imaginative tool that we can use to move away from our particularities to achieve more universal argumentation. To do this, one must set aside all the particular and local features of the audience and instead consider its universal features.
2. Arguers must exclude from the particular audience those members who are prejudiced, lack sympathy and imagination, and who are irrational and incompetent at following argumentation. This means that the universal audience includes "only those who are unprejudiced and have the proper competence" (Crosswhite, 1989, p. 163). To have the proper competence means to be "disposed to hear" the argument, "submit to the data of experience,"

and have the proper information and training and to ultimately be “duly reflected’ (Crosswhite, 1989, p. 163). Hence, this move from the particular to the universal, which is a change in understanding and perspective, requires rational and competent individuals. What really seems to allow for the possibility of moving from the particular to the universal is that rational human beings are compelled to do so by the force of better reason. Perelman seems to acknowledge that the construction of the universal audience is not an easy task and that it requires a particular attitude towards knowledge acquisition.

3. Arguers must add particular audiences together, and make sure that their argumentation appeals to not only one particular audience but to many more or all particular audiences.
4. Finally, arguers must imagine their argumentation addressed to other similar audiences at other times, with different histories and situations. As such, arguments appealing to the universal audience appeal to history and ask their audiences to imagine themselves in their historical roles, or outside of their current situation and time.

The instructions Perelman gives on how to construct the universal audience sheds important light on what type of arguments are more inclusive. For example, it helps demonstrate that racist stories cannot be universalized because they cannot apply to more than one audience, which is the audience that accepts racist beliefs. The universal audience shows that arguments that cannot be universalized and applied to more than one audience are not the best type of arguments and, in fact, are exclusive and too narrow. Hence the universalizing technique allows us to see that if the story cannot apply to other audiences with different histories and situations then it must be limited. Stories rely on shared histories and background assumptions of what is reasonable, and this standard of reasonableness varies from the particular to the universal audience. We can draw the comparison between particular and universal audiences to evaluating

narrative in that some narratives have a more universal appeal as they speak to a common human experience, such as narratives of loss or grief. But other narratives may be particular in nature, such as narratives that appeal only to a narrow and dangerous ideology and may be said to be particular in that they only appeal to a small segment of humanity, perhaps the segment of humanity that is misogynistic or racist. Hence, adding particular audiences together and imagining whether one's argument can have universal appeal is no doubt helpful for not only inclusivity, but also for avoiding dangerous narratives. As such, I do not deny the merit of Perelman's techniques of moving from particular audiences to the universal one in that they allow us to achieve universality, inclusivity and the avoidance of narrow and limited point of views. While it may be true that Perelman's claim that the universal audience is preferable to the particular audience, I do not think that this model of evaluation fits all argument types, particularly narrative arguments. This is because Perelman's model allows us to rule out radically objectionable arguments, but doesn't let us evaluate the relative strengths of arguments that don't fall below this threshold; and it doesn't adequately explain how we can become better arguers.

On further scrutiny, there are three main difficulties with applying Perelman's account of the universal audience to narrative arguments. First, most stories are particular in nature and so the distinction Perelman draws between particular and universal does not apply to most narratives. Once universalized, narrative arguments lose their significance and value. Most narrative arguments cannot be universalized because they deal with subjective individuals with unique experiences and particular situations and contexts. Stories are often about localities and are couched in one's history and specific context. We need an evaluative framework that can apply to most narratives and not just dangerous ones. And even though the goal of assessment is

to avoid dangerous narratives, the techniques Perelman offers cannot apply to narrative arguments because stories are particular and contextual and unless we have a virtuous audience they will not be able to discern between good and bad particular stories. Perelman does not demarcate between the different ways that an argument can be particular: on the one hand, it can be narrow and limited, and on the other, it can be subjective, personal or local. Additionally, the universal audience does not distinguish between a merely particular narrative and other harmful narratives. The notion of the particular as used by Perelman to demarcate between types of audiences is vague and does not distinguish between types of particularities. For example, some narratives are particular in being racist; however, all narratives are particular in that they deal with particularities of a situation. Perelman's account does not discuss this distinction. The virtuous audience, on the contrary, will exclude racist arguments, but it won't necessarily exclude all particular arguments.

The second difficulty with applying Perelman's distinction between the particular and universal is that it does not deal with everyday argumentation and personal storytelling. That is, Perelman suggests that to avoid dangerous arguments, one needs to conduct techniques that achieve the universal audience, the highest form of argumentation. Arguments do not need to be the best to be good. Everyday argumentation and narrative arguments are not always interested in achieving the highest standard of argumentation. In fact, narrative arguments do not need to meet this high aspiration of universalism to be good. Perelman's universal audience is limited because it deals only with an ideal audience that cannot apply to everyday arguments that are particular in nature. However, a virtue approach to argument appraisal applies to all types of arguments because the cultivation of virtues will be useful for all contexts, and not just to ideal arguments and to the assessment of dangerous arguments.

The third difficulty in applying Perelman's universal audience to narrative arguments is that it does not really help us cultivate practices where the audience can be more critical in their judgments of stories. While Perelman's account of the particular and the universal may help us understand that dangerous stories are accepted by some people because they appeal to limited and narrow audiences, it does not give us a compelling story about how we come to adopt the universal stance. Perelman offers the universal audience as a heuristic, but says nothing about how to apply and internalize it. More must be said about what allows an audience to move from the particularities of the situation to a more universal stance. Moreover, the distinction between the particular and the universal audience is too general and does not discriminate amongst arguments that aren't 'dangerous,' but may or may not be convincing. We need a more nuanced approach to achieve this level of discrimination. I think that the virtuous audience does this. If audiences cultivate argumentative virtues, they become more discriminating and more critical of their judgments.

There are similarities between the virtuous audience and the universal audience, but the virtuous audience is more robust than the former. Perelman says that the universal audience must be 'reasonable,' and reasonableness is a matter of having "judgment and conduct [that is] influenced by common sense" (Fisher, 1986, p. 89). He also claims that the universal audience has proper competence, which means being "disposed to hear" the argument, "submit to the data of experience", and have the proper information and training to ultimately be "duly reflected" (Crosswhite, 1989, p. 163). Reasonableness is an argumentative virtue, but it's only one amongst many. And further, it's not clear what proper competence entails. I argue that the 'proper competence' Perelman suggests ought to be understood in terms of the argumentative virtues. This will give us guidance on how to become better arguers and better audiences, and it will

provide a more fine-grained evaluative framework for assessing the convincingness of arguments. Hence, while Perelman's account of the universal audience has the merit of attempting to attain more inclusivity, it does not tell us how one can come to develop the skills or competence to achieve more universality in arguing. I argue that it is through virtues developed by the audience that one can become more discerning and reject dangerous narratives. Having good argumentative practices allows us to argue well, which reduces the probability of accepting bad narratives.

Hence, the instructions Perelman gives for constructing the universal audience are for the most part useful but must be supplemented by virtues. Virtues are more applicable to narrative arguments because virtues address the situatedness of narrative arguments. Although the concept of the universal audience has the merit of seeking greater inclusiveness, it does not have enough practicality. What is needed is not just theoretical inclusivity but also applicability. Without rejecting Perelman's overall goal in argumentation, I aim to add to Perelman's understanding of audiences by constructing an account of the virtuous audience.

Next I will explain the virtues that an audience needs to cultivate in order to be able to reject dangerous narratives. The virtuous audience evaluating narratives (and other process arguments) are not passive recipients, but are, in fact, critical participants, and have virtues that aid them in differentiating between acceptable and unacceptable arguments. To discuss the virtues that must be cultivated by the audience, I now turn to virtue argumentation.

Virtue Argumentation. Virtue ethics is a new, burgeoning approach to argumentation that concerns itself with the ethical character of arguers. A virtue approach to argumentation was proposed by Daniel Cohen and Andrew Aberdein in 2007, and has since expanded. Virtue

argumentation is concerned with the relationship between a good argument and the virtuous arguer, i.e., what virtues are needed in order to produce good arguments (Gascon, 2015, p. 467). A virtue theoretic approach to argument focuses on agents rather than actions (arguments), and so it places more focus on the arguers rather than the arguments. One way to understand this distinction is to see that in act-based theories of argumentation, such as informal logic, a good arguer is explained in terms of their argument so that a bad arguer is an arguer who consistently puts forward bad arguments. However, from an agent-based perspective, the quality of an argument is influenced and is the result of the agent's (arguer's) virtues or vices (Gascon, 2015, p. 468). And so the distinction between an act-based argument appraisal and an agent-based argument appraisal is in terms of whether a good arguer is someone who puts forward good arguments (product/action) or someone who has a virtuous character. Virtue argumentation scholars, then, define a good argument in terms of the virtuous arguer. That is, virtue theorists think that what makes an argument good is that the person presenting it has argued well (virtuously). Further, this idea that a good argument is defined in terms of the agent's mode of argumentation is consistent with virtue ethics, which similarly defines a right action in terms of the virtuous agent. That is according to Hursthouse, "an action is right if it is what a virtuous agent would characteristically (i.e., acting in character) do in the circumstances" (1999, p. 23). As to the question of what is a virtuous agent, Hursthouse responds that, "A virtuous agent is one who has, and exercises, certain character traits, namely, the virtues" (p. 24). And so this virtuous agent is defined as an individual who embodies and acts based on virtues. So in order to know what is the virtuous action one must think of what an exemplary virtuous person would do and act based on that knowledge. Since virtue argumentation is linked to virtue ethics, it gains from whatever independent plausibility the latter has.

What I will do is propose an amendment to current accounts of virtue argumentation. These accounts have, for the most part, focused on the arguer cultivating virtues, while ignoring the crucial role of the *audience*, which is also needed for, not only the production, but also the evaluation, of good arguments. That is, the virtues developed by Aberdein and Cohen relate only to the virtuous arguer. Aberdein's list can of course be applied to the audience, as for example, willingness to listen to others is clearly a virtue that belongs to the listener, not the arguer, however, Aberdein does not say that this is a virtue of the audience but rather discusses virtues only in relation to the arguer. Further, Aberdein does not specifically mention that the audience is also required to cultivate virtues. Nonetheless, it's fair to say that virtue argumentation theory has at least begun to take the virtues of the audience into account, although not explicitly. Daniel Cohen (2013) for instance in his article, "Virtue, In Context," argues that in order to understand what a fully satisfying argument is we have to expand on the notion of arguer to include everyone who is relevant to the judgment of an argument, which includes the audience. After expanding the notion of arguer to include the audience, Cohen says that these varieties of arguer roles require their own skill sets and accompanying virtues, however Cohen does not say anything more about the role of audience in the cultivation of virtues. While it is true that Cohen expands the notion of virtuous arguer to include the audience, which in some way automatically includes the audience in the cultivation of virtue, he does not explicitly discuss the audience. Indeed, Cohen hints at the importance of an audience cultivating virtues, by default of including the audience in the concept of arguer, but what is needed is a more elaborate account of the virtuous audience.

As such, I build on the current development of virtue argumentation by introducing and emphasizing the role of the virtuous audience. I argue that argumentative virtues need to also be

developed by the audience because it is the audience that is judging the argument, and therefore needs to have a certain set of virtues in order to reject bad narratives in the case of storytelling. That is because focusing solely on the virtues of the arguer to the exclusion of the audience will not help us in evaluating the argument. Further, the emphasis on virtuous audience highlights the importance of argumentation as a dynamic process and a shared responsibility between the speaker and the audience.

Virtues of Argumentation. The list of Argumentation virtues is not exhaustive and it is still being developed simply because virtue argumentation is a new component of argumentation theory. Most of the virtues developed by Cohen and Aberdein can also be applied to the virtuous audience such as:

Willingness to engage in argumentation

- Being communicative
- Faith in reason
- Intellectual courage
  - Sense of duty

Willingness to listen to others

- Intellectual empathy
  - Insight into persons
  - Insight into problems
  - Insight into theories
- Fair-mindedness
  - Justice

Fairness in evaluating others' arguments

Open-mindedness in collecting and appraising evidence

Recognition of reliable authority

Recognition of salient facts

Sensitivity to detail

Willingness to question the obvious

Appropriate respect for public opinion

Autonomy

Intellectual perseverance

Diligence

Care

Thoroughness (Aberdein, 2010, p. 175).

Other virtues that I will add to this list relate to the audience in particular as for example having a *fair intention* which is the intention to take the other person seriously and not to think of them as idiotic or insane. In other words, it means having the intention to view one another as intelligent and capable by giving them a fair chance and not dismissing them immediately. Fairness in intention is similar to an already existing virtue developed by Aberdein and Cohen which is fairness in evaluating others' arguments. What is different between those virtues is that one focuses on the evaluation of another's argument, while the other, i.e., the virtue of fair intention focuses on having a good intention when entering arguments, which includes both evaluating the argument but also how one perceives another as either intelligent or incompetent. But this virtue

also needs to be balanced with another virtue which is *critical trust*.[4] This virtue requires that one look for cues of coherence and intelligibility in the story and credibility in the teller. Hence, the two virtues I would add to the list include fair intention and critical trust.

In his book *Arguing with People*, Michael Gilbert (2014) describes some of the main characteristics of the ideal arguer. And although Gilbert does not describe them as virtues, they nonetheless fit nicely with a virtue account of argument evaluation. Some of the characteristics and corresponding rules of Michael Gilbert's ideal arguer include the following:

- Reasonable: This is a person who understands that evidence is important and that arguments matter and who values truth and does not just believe things to be true just because he/she wants them to be true. Hence this is a reasonable person because he/she weighs the evidence fairly and is not biased toward one belief or another. (Gilbert, 2014, p. 94).
- Non-Dogmatic: a non-dogmatic person is someone who is open to changing their minds when the circumstances permit and is open to new ideas and challenging beliefs (p. 94).
- Good Listener: A good listener is someone who is interested in hearing the other person's position and is engaged and wants to understand another's position (p. 94).
- Empathetic: an empathetic arguer as defined by Gilbert is one who recognizes that arguing involves emotions that must be taken into account when arguing (p. 95). Empathy is required in seeing that people argue for reasons that are important to them and it enables one to see things from the point of view another arguer.

[4] A similar virtue relating to trust is discussed by Jose Angel Gascon (2015) which he calls willingness to trust in his article "Willingness to trust as a virtue in argumentative discussions".

And these four characteristics, Gilbert argues, should also be present in the audience. That is every arguer "wants to be listened to carefully by reasonable, open minded, and sympathetic people" (p. 95). As such, Gilbert provides a golden rule of argumentation: "Argue with someone as you would want to be argued with" (p. 95). According to Gilbert, then, an arguer should imagine an ideal audience and from there judge an argument by whether or not it would meet the standards of this ideal audience. And so when judging an argument one should ask themselves whether this is the kind of argument they want to be presented with.

The cultivation of virtues by the audience is inherently valuable because virtues help audiences reach critical consensus. Trust, for example, is required not only by the speaker, but also by fellow audience members. If individual audience members don't trust each other, they might not be able to reach a consensus about the acceptability of the speaker's argument, creating an impasse. Hence, the virtue of trust should be applied to audience members to facilitate agreement.

Assessing the narrative through the virtuous audience allows us to maintain the form of the narrative as narrative without having to reduce it to premise and conclusion as with act based argument appraisal that focuses on the product of arguing. It is only through assessing a narrative as process that we can avoid the reduction problem associated with act based argument appraisal. Act based argument appraisals such as informal logic fits more with the notion of arguments as a product. That is because in order for one to assess whether an argument is cogent, one needs to reduce it into premise and conclusion. And assessing cogency also requires looking at the relationship between the premises and the conclusion.

The contribution of virtue argumentation is not limited to just evaluating and assessing good arguments from bad arguments. Virtue argumentation also contributes to the ethical

environment of argumentation and has many other benefits such as creating a more cooperative and congenial environment for arguers and easing the hostility extant in traditional argumentation.

Objections and Response to The Virtuous Audience

In this section, I will anticipate, explain, and respond to potential objections against virtue argumentation. Many of these responses will help clarify my account of the virtuous audience and so in answering the objections, I will elaborate on the concept of the virtuous audience.

Objection One. Critics of virtue argumentation (such as Tracy Bowell and Justine Kingsbury) argue that what makes it the case that the arguer has argued well should not be about the arguer but rather that they have presented good arguments. A good argument according to them is one whose premises provide sufficient justification for believing its conclusion to be true or highly probable. (Bowell and Kingsbury, p. 23). And so the distinction between virtue theorist and its contender is that arguing well is defined by the former in terms of the person arguing and the latter by the arguments presented.

Aberdein (2014) responds to this objection by noting that Bowell's and Kingsbuy's criticism focuses on a conception of argument evaluation that evaluates argument as a product rather than as a process or activity. This conception of argument evaluation, he argues, is not representative of all argumentation scholars or approaches to argumentation evaluation, such as the rhetorical or dialectical, which are in fact the most congenial to a virtue theoretical approach (p. 78). Further, the account of the virtuous audience that I develop avoids this problem of whether arguing well should be about the argument itself or the person presenting the argument. That is because the concept of the virtuous audience does not totally commit to the claim that

argument goodness depends on the virtues of its arguer, because narrative arguments are accepted and rejected by audiences and so argument goodness also depends on the audience. Hence, argument goodness is not just about the arguer but also the audience. That is, an argument is as worthy as both its arguer and its audience (those judging the argument), and, as such, the whole interaction needs to be virtuous for an argument to be good. Both the arguer and the audience need to be virtuous for successful argumentation. That is, good arguments are not just the result of good arguers but also good audiences and virtuous rhetorical processes. Arguing well in the account that I develop includes both the arguer and the audience. Hence good argumentation is not just about good arguers but also good audiences. And so the audience also needs to exercise virtue to ensure good and successful argumentation. This helps to mitigate the force of Bowell's and Kingsbuy's objection by strengthening the reliability of the argumentative process: an audience is better placed to evaluate the acceptability of a speaker's argument than a single person, since they can correct each other's errors. This doesn't ensure 100% reliability, but it ensures a greater degree of reliability.

Objection Two. Another objection against virtue argumentation is that virtues do not prescribe rules for how one should argue. So the criticism centers around a seeming gap between good arguers and good argumentation (Thorson, 2016, p. 1). It is claimed that while we can concede that being a charitable arguer is virtuous, this virtue still does not tell us how to argue successfully (Thorson, 2016, p. 1). Hence it is assumed that virtues do not give us specific guidance in sticky situations (Thorson, 2016, p. 29). Virtue ethics, like virtue argumentation, faces the same criticism. Virtue ethics has been criticized for not providing action guiding rules that enable one to determine what is the right action to follow (Hursthouse, 1999, p. 29). This objection is still a commonly voiced criticism against virtue ethics. It is argued that virtues

express character traits and that it is concerned with being rather than doing, i.e., virtues tell us how to be but not what is the right action to follow in each case (Hursthouse, 1999, p. 29). Further it is argued that the rules should be stated clearly so that any non-virtuous person could understand and apply them. Similar to virtue argumentation, it is claimed that there is a gap between being virtuous and doing the right action.

To this objection (that virtues lack rules) it was Rosalind Hursthouse (1999) who first argued that virtues are thick concepts and that every virtue in fact does generate a moral rule which she calls V-rules. (cf. Julia Annas). Virtues do indeed generate action guidance because they have corresponding rules for us to follow and these rules guide one's action. In terms of argumentation, there are also V-rules that can guide one in arguing successfully, and that can help both the arguer and the audience to utilize virtues and to ensure that the virtues have the correct application. These rules function as guiding principles for how the argumentation and assessment unfolds in the process of arguing. These rules correspond to the virtues so that each virtue has a corresponding rule. For example, honesty as a virtue points to the v-rule that one should "do what is honest and do not do what is dishonest" (Hursthouse, 1999, p. 29). This means that not only does each virtue have a corresponding rule, but similarly has a corresponding prohibition (Hursthouse, 1999, p. 29). It must also be pointed out that while it is true that these V-rules correspond to virtues, it is also the case that some of these V-rules overlap between virtues. As for example the V-rule of "interpret with charity" can fall under the virtue of critical trust, fair intention, and fairmindedness. All the virtues and their corresponding rules interconnect. These argumentation V-rules that I develop are based of Cohen's and Aberdein's list of argumentative virtues. Some of these rules are also borrowed from J. K. Thorson (2016),

who uses Brockriede's concept of arguing lovingly to develop V-rules for argumentation. These V-rules apply to both the arguer and the audience.

And so in terms of argumentation virtues the following rules correspond:

Intellectual courage:

- Be willing to be criticized and challenged
- Willingness to concede to a point.
- The courage to concede to point when you might be wrong or to admit that you are wrong.
- Be willing to change your beliefs especially beliefs that we have strong aversion towards and ones which we have not given a serious hearing.
- Be willing to address beliefs fairly.
- Be motivated by an open exchange of ideas (Thorson, 2016, p. 6)

Good listener:

- Listening with compassion and empathy (also listed in Thorson's list)
- Listening without bias and prejudice.
- Listening with an intention to understand and see another's perspective.
- Listen carefully (borrowed from Cohen, 2009, p. 54).

Intellectual Empathy:

- Be empathetic in your reading and interpretation of another's point of view.
- See things from another perspective by trying to reason from their point of view.

Fair-mindedness

- Be Fair in evaluating others' arguments
- Be open-minded and fair in collecting and appraising evidence

- Be willing to question the obvious
- Interpret with charity (Cohen, 2009, p. 54)

Intellectual perseverance

- Be diligent in your effort to gather evident and assess another's argument
- Be thorough in your effort to understand another's perspective and search for information to help you understand their point of view.
- Exercise care in trying to understand and interpret another's perspective

Critical Trust

- Be trusting enough not to doubt based on prejudice or bias but not naïve to accept anything.
- Be mindful and critical of what you trust.
- Be trusting enough to give another a fair and charitable hearing but critical so that you are not naïve and too trusting.

Fair Intention

- Enter an argument with the intention to listen, respect and understand another's perspective.
- Don't assume from the get-go that the interlocutor is wrong or presenting fallacious arguments
- Give the interlocutor a fair hearing
- Have the intention to take the other person seriously and not to think of them as idiotic or insane

Respect:

- Respect the opinions and arguments of interlocutor
- Be respectful of your co-arguer's humanity (Thorson, 2016, p. 6).

- Present your argument in a way that respectfully responds to your co-arguers background (Thorson, 2016, p. 6)

These V-argumentation-rules also have a prohibition rules, such as the V-rules that correspond to intellectual courage may have a prohibition of “do not be dogmatic” or “do not be afraid of ideas that do not correspond to your beliefs.” And for example the virtue of good listening may have the prohibition of “do not be hasty in your judgment” and “do not listen with preconceived notions of the arguer.” Hursthouse argues that much invaluable action guidance comes from courses of action that one must avoid such as “actions that are irresponsible, feckless, lazy, inconsiderate, uncooperative, harsh, intolerant, indiscreet, incautious…and etc.” (Hursthouse, 1999, p. 33). As such, virtues not only have V-rules but also prohibitions, and both of these guide arguers and the audience in becoming better in argumentation. Hence, virtues of argumentation do provide rules and, as will be shown later, the cultivation of virtues coupled with experience and practical wisdom does provide arguers with action guidance.

Objection Three. The third objection that I anticipate may come up is similar to an objection given to virtue ethics. The objection is that different virtuous audiences can come to different and at times even opposing conclusions. I agree that the exercise of virtues does not guarantee agreement by the audience nor is it always the desired outcome. That is, the point is not that the virtuous audience must come to a single conclusion, but rather that they come to their conclusions with the exercise of virtues and with proper and good argumentative practices. The concept of the virtuous audience admits that different and at times opposing conclusions may be reached because the goal of the virtuous audience is not to reach objective truth but rather to have a virtuous process of arguing.

A similar criticism is made against virtue ethics, which states that the cultivation of different virtues can lead to a conflict in the application of virtues, and to moral dilemmas, and that sometimes different virtues point in opposite directions. For example, the virtue of honesty prompts one to tell a hurtful truth to a friend but compassion prompts one to remain silent. As such, different virtues can offer us conflicting paths (Hursthouse, 1999, p. 35). To this objection, virtue ethicists say that a real understanding of virtue does not actually lead to conflict because a virtuous person will have practical wisdom and know what is the best virtue to apply in sticky situations, and this knowledge comes with experience. Further, virtue ethicists such as Rosalind Hursthouse (1999) claim that the cultivation of virtues coupled with experience results in practical wisdom which then guides individuals in prioritizing and choosing the right virtue.

Further, Hursthouse's response to the alleged vagueness of what a virtuous agent is or would do, is that just as we seemed to have a clear idea of what is the best consequence is with regarded to utilitarianism, we similarly possess acknowledge of what is the best moral conduct that a virtuous agent embodies (1999, p. 25). And as such we do know what the correct moral rules or principles are that a virtuous agent acts based on. Further, we all have some idea of what a virtuous agent would do because we are all brought up in a society where such virtuous people have been honored or praised and her point is that we all have that knowledge accessible to us. And supposing that at times we may not know what the correct action is or are unsure of what a virtuous agent would do, then as Hursthouse points out one the best thing to do is to go and ask those we deem virtuous. Hursthouse adds that

> This is far from being a trivial point, for it gives a straightforward explanation of an important aspect of our moral life, namely the fact that we do not always act as

> 'autonomous', utterly self-determining agents, but quite often seek moral guidance from people we think are morally better than ourselves. (p. 28)

And so when one is unsure of what the right moral conduct is, one should go to people they respect and admire for moral guidance, those one considers kinder, more honest, just and wiser than oneself and ask them what in that situation they would do (p. 29). That is when confronted with a situation where one is unsure of what the right moral conduct is, what a virtuous agent would do, one should seek advice from virtuous people. And so her point is that although one may be confused or not sure, it is not totally true that some people have no idea of what a virtuous agent would do, for most of us, if not all, have some idea of how a virtuous agent would act in such and such situations. Similarly, while it may be true that there is never really a single right choice to make, or single virtue to utilize, V-rules of argumentation along with practical wisdom enable the arguer to make a decision informed by the application of virtues.

Hence, neither virtue ethics or virtue argumentation prescribes an absolute moral principle to appeal to, for it is always a judgment exercised by virtuous individuals facing moral dilemmas. What virtue ethics says is that this exercise of judgment should be a virtuous exercise of judgment, and it is the same with argumentation. The concept of the virtuous audience cannot tell us in advance what is a good narrative argument, for that is a choice made by the virtuous audiences who decide virtuously and rhetorically on a case by case basis. And it is true that the cultivation of virtues does not give us clear answers of what the virtuous audience will accept because that is a choice that emerges out of a process and can never be known in advance. The virtuous audience has to exercise good judgment, and if they have these argumentative virtues then they are more likely to be a better audience. And while it may be true that practical wisdom and experience along with the V-rules can give an arguer a reasonably good idea of what virtue

to apply, it is nevertheless possible that we can come to a situation where no agreement is possible. In Perelman's rhetorical model of argumentation, he likewise acknowledges that mutual agreement is not easily attainable and that the universal audience can be difficult to achieve. Such may be the case when audiences measure argumentation differently, for as Crosswhite explains,

> …one writer may appeal more to the 'competence, training, and knowledge' criteria, and make them very strong criteria, while another may appeal to the criterion of adding audiences together, or letting 'everyone' decide. (Crosswhite, 1989, p. 164)

In such situations, Perelman recommends that argumentation be postponed until we can come to agreement and mutual understanding through dialogue or explanatory discourse of question and answer.

A similar point regarding the virtuous audience is made by Paula Olmos in her commentary on my paper presented at the Ontario Society for the Study of Argumentation (OSSA) conference, 2016, where she argues that it is unrealistic to assume that the cultivation of virtues can control or be the deciding factor for what the audience will accept. She writes, "I'm not sure we can control that [judgments of the audience], somehow beforehand, by identifying a small set of virtues allegedly required of any agent taking part in any argumentative practice" (2016, p. 3). Olmos' objection deals with the idea that the cultivation of virtue by the audience cannot ensure that the audience will accept only good arguments and reject bad ones. I agree with Olmos' point in that the cultivation of virtues alone cannot ensure good argumentation, what is required is also a rhetorical process of knowledge production that is informed by virtues (this rhetorical process will be discussed in the next section of the chapter: virtuous consensus). While misogynistic or racist stories provide clear cases of what the virtuous audience would

reject, it is by no means suggested that these verdicts are easily achieved. Rather, they are the product of long argumentative processes. Hence, the concept of the virtuous audience admits that, with regard to controversial issues, it is possible that the issue remains unresolvable, and results in disagreement. And it may remain unclear what the outcome is because the outcome of argumentation depends on those engaged in and listening to the argument. The virtuous audience as a concept admits disagreement, because the goal is not agreement *at any cost;* while virtuous arguers have agreement in mind, the agreement must arrive through a virtuous dialogical process. This differs from non-virtue-ethical accounts in which agreement is the goal, without procedural constraints; by contrast, the aim of virtuous argumentation is *virtuous* agreement (if possible), as well as the cultivation of the argumentative virtues, and other ancillary goals. Agreement should be abandoned if arguers cannot reach this goal without slighting or harming other arguers; in that case, peaceful dissent may be the correct path. So while agreement is important on the virtuous audience approach, it's not more important than the process. As a result, it is possible that different virtuous audiences can come to different conclusions because what the concept of virtuous audience ensures is not unanimous agreement but rather a virtuous process of argumentation. This is in fact consistent with rhetorical understanding of knowledge production as not being static and consensually based. The virtuous audience ensures virtuous consensus, which is discussed in the next section of the chapter.

Virtuous Consensus

Theories of virtue and rhetorical argumentation offer us a better process of argumentation, but they are not absolute or bullet proof methods for achieving the best arguments. This is because such arguments are the result of good processes and arguers who take seriously the cultivation of

virtues. What the account of virtuous audience offers is an ideal audience that after cultivating virtues can exercise good judgment. But the conclusions they draw are not born in a vacuum and are formed with a rhetorical method of consensus. To explain this rhetorical process of consensus I will first use Perelman's distinction between fact and values to explain how narrative acceptance is negotiated by the audience and is bounded by the standard of what is communally accepted and, second, borrow Richard Burke's concept of rhetorical rationality to explain how the consensus arrived by the audience is rational and reasonable. Further, virtuous consensus also relates to what the audience deems as believable. Stories must also be believable to be good. However, the way I define believability is not in terms of truth.

The boundaries of narrative acceptability are audience oriented. That is, once the frame of narrative is set and the audience accepts the starting point of narrative then the parameters can be renegotiated and are often renegotiated in the process of arguing. Once the audience accepts the narrative, if the story goes too far then the arguer may begin to lose the trust and credibility of his/her audience and that is where negotiation happens in the form of question or objection from the audience. A similar process is discussed by Perelman when he makes a distinction between facts and values. Fact and values are always negotiated by the audience that decides what a fact is and what is a value. Facts become facts through the agreement of that audience. Perelman's perspective on rhetoric is that the facts do not speak for themselves and that facts become facts when an audience consents to them. However, it is important to point out that once facts become fact we don't usually argue about them because we agree that they are facts. But there may come a time when we question certain facts and decide on different types of facts. As noted by Dan Gross, "facts have a privileged status in argumentation that easily can be lost; if justification is called for, the data loses its status as a fact" (Dan Gross, p. 110). Once we

question a statement it loses its status as a fact and will no longer have universal agreement. In other words, facts lose their privileged position as fact when they become the conclusion rather than the starting point of an argument. Perelman does not give fact or truth the status of objectivity (Perelman, 1982, p. 23). As noted by Perelman as soon as the fact or truth is contested by a member of the audience the speaker cannot take advantage of it as a starting point of argumentation (p. 23). According to Perelman, "from the standpoint of argumentation, we are confronted with a fact only if we can postulate uncontroverted, universal agreement with respect to it" (p. 67). This means no statement can enjoy the status of a fact definitively. There are two ways in which an event can lose the status of fact, either the audience raises doubt to the argument presented or new members are introduced who may question the status of a fact (p. 67).

Perelman does not believe in any absolute criterion which can guarantee its own absolute infallibility, rather he believes in intuitions and convictions in which we place confidence until there is reason to doubt and reject them (Perelman, 1963, p. 117). Reason, writes Perelman, is not an eternally invariable or fully developed faculty whose results are self-evident and universal. Rather, the rationality of our opinions cannot be guaranteed once and for all, for they are ever changing. Perelman asserts,

> It is in the ever-renewed effort to get them accepted by what in each field we regard as the universality of reasonable means that truths are worked out, made specific and refined—and these truths constitute no more than the surest and best tested of our opinions. (1963, p. 133)

In this rhetorical model of argumentation, the tested opinions and conclusions adopted are not obvious; rather they represent what, in a given milieu, is considered the best and soundest

opinion. Hence, argumentation becomes a dialectical exchange between the speaker and his/her interlocutor, where the interlocutor is not merely expounding their point of view, but also expressing the opinions of their society and what is accepted. And once these opinions are challenged and a controversy arises concerning these opinions, then this disagreement bring about a modification in the field of the reasonable. This rhetorical model of argumentation is the best method for revealing the imperfect and incomplete aspect of any philosophical knowledge, and doing so without relying on the so called irrefragability of intuitions and self-evident truths (Perelman, 1963, p. 167). Accordingly, there is no criterion for judging arguments, save in the philosophical vision of the interlocutor (Perelman, 1963, p. 167). Narrative arguments similarly rely on facts and values to negotiate what is agreed upon and what can be assumed to be a fact by the audience. Narrative arguments must always begin in agreement and then boundaries of what is acceptable can be renegotiated. And so what is assumed to be accepted by the audience can always be negotiated once the audience questions it. That is because the status of the fact and truth in narrative arguments are also not guaranteed unless we assume the existence of an infallible authority that could guarantee facts and truth for us. But since we do not have absolute guarantee or self -evident truths then facts and truth are always open to question. But this does not mean that an audience can question everything without sufficient reason. Since there is agreement about the purpose and meaning of fact that is sufficiently widespread which means no one can reject them without appearing foolish unless he or she can give adequate reason to justify his skepticism regarding the accepted facts.

In line with the rhetorical tradition, the reasonableness of stories and arguments is constantly being renegotiated in the process of telling stories. This means that what the virtuous audience accepts is arrived at through a rhetorical process. The type of rationality and

reasonableness that narrative rely on is a rhetorical rationality. To fully understand how a virtuous audience comes to agree and accept certain stories and reject others, one has to understand the way knowledge and rationality is formed rhetorically. That is what is considered reasonable and rational from a rhetorical perspective. Understanding how narrative reasonableness is formed rhetorically helps us understand what the virtuous audience accepts.

Reasonableness of narrative is couched in terms of rhetorical reasonableness, which is based on rhetorical rationality. This type of rationality "is not associated with the probability of correctness but rather with plausibility in the circumstances" (Burke, 1984, p. 17). As Richard Burke explains,

> This criterion of plausibility is what a rational person would accept in the circumstances: from this speaker, with these kinds of available evidence, this amount of time in which to decide, this degree of importance, etc. (p. 21)

And hence what the virtuous audience accepts after cultivating virtues is a story that embodies the best reason available. The stories that get accepted are the stories that are socially accepted and one where the hearer has no reason to doubt after exercising critical trust and diligence in understanding, interpreting and assessing the story. What the virtuous audience accepts is what a rational person would accept given the limited resources and capacity one has in doing further research or investigating of the story. Burke distinguished between rhetorical rationality and traditional rationality. Traditional rationality is defined in terms of logic and scientific method. This distinction between these two types of rationality is essentially a distinction between reasons for belief (rhetorical rationality) and evidence for truth (traditional rationality). While traditional rationality often demands evidence for truth, rhetorical rationality is a rationality couched in the consensus of communities and where decisions and beliefs are formed on the

basis of appeals to authority and experts. Hence, rhetorical rationality refers to the best reason available (Burke,1984, p.18).

Hence, according to rhetorical rationality, it is perfectly rational to accept what people generally believe about a controversial issue. However, the more important the decision is and the easier it is to get information, the less rational it is to just act on the basis of common belief. Burke's point is that common belief and the reliance on expert opinion is perfectly rational because it is all that one can do given the limited time and resource one has (p. 18). And similarly the virtuous audience, while critical, also relies on expert opinion and accepts and/or rejects stories that its fellow citizens generally believe in or reject. The virtuous audience also relies on rhetorical rationality and accepts arguments that fall within its community's standard of reasonableness and common belief.

Burke's notion of rhetorical rationality is consistent with feminist work in science and objectivity (Sandra Harding, 2015 and Helen E. Longino, 2002) and Thomas Kuhn's work in *The structure of scientific revolution* (1962). Kuhn similarly concludes that consensus of the community of scientists is important for the practice of science (Burke, p. 22). For there is no higher standard than the assent of the relevant community (Kuhn qtd. by Burke, p. 22). Hence, Burke along with others argue that science also has a rhetorical dimension in that the choice between paradigms is not based on logic or scientific experiments but is rather chosen through the consensus of community for a variety of reasons (p. 22).

And similarly, the acceptance of narrative arguments by a virtuous audience is based on the consensus of community. The same story may be accepted by one community and rejected by another. What distinguishes one community form another is the virtuous process of that community because there is no one single truth that all communities will accept. And my account

of the virtuous audience does not pose such absolute truth. Hence in rejecting that there is one absolute good story that one can appeal to, we leave it in the hands of the community to accept and reject stories they deem good or bad. But what ensures that stories that violate human rights, for example, get rejected is at the end the virtuous and rhetorical process of negotiating and renegotiating what is acceptable in that community which always changes. What ensures that dangerous stories don't get accepted is not the inherent truth of the story but the practices of that community. Drawing on Perelman's distinction between fact and values is helpful in showing how stories are accepted and negotiated in communities. What is today a fact (or an acceptable story) maybe tomorrow an unacceptable or contested story if society questions it. However, it is only through a virtuous and critical audience that we can ensure such processes do not end up being corrupt and too volatile.

The acceptance of narrative arguments by a virtuous audience is both a rhetorical and virtuous assent to the theses presented in the story. By that I mean the story is never static and automatically accepted. The arguer is in the relationship with the audience and this relationship consists of negotiation and renegotiation of what is acceptable. The decision that the virtuous audience comes up with is also guided by rhetorical knowledge producing mechanism. This knowledge producing mechanism is explained by Burke in his discussion of rhetorical rationality and Perelman's distinction between fact and values. That is, the virtuous audience's acceptance of stories is bounded by the exercise of virtues and also what is communally and consensually agreed upon. Not all stories are accepted because the virtuous audience is unable to accept anything as they are bounded by their community's standard of what is acceptable. The cultivation of virtues alone of course does not guarantee that the audience will only accept good arguments, what is needed, rather, is a virtuous rhetorical process. What the virtuous audience

accepts and understand is arrived at through a rhetorical process but it is a rhetorically process that is virtuously formed. Hence, the conclusions reached by the virtuous audience are the result of the cultivation of virtues and good rhetorical process which includes the rhetorical negotiation of the boundaries of what is reasonable. The rhetorical method results in consensus through the negotiation of fact and values.

Believability and Good Stories

The virtuous audience requires stories to be believable and probable. Walter Fisher's (1987) narrative paradigm (as discussed in chapter one) emphasizes the importance of narrative probability and narrative fidelity. According to Fisher's narrative paradigm, human communication is seen as stories competing with other stories constituted by good reasons, and such stories are deemed rational when they fit the demands of narrative probability and narrative fidelity. The rationality of stories is determined by the nature of persons as narrative beings who are: (1) aware of narrative probability, which is what constitutes a coherent story (whether a story hangs together), and (2) constantly checking for narrative fidelity, that is, whether the stories being told ring true with the stories they know to be true. Narrative probability relates to the consistency of characters and actions, and in epistemological terms this would refer to whether a story satisfied the demands of a coherence theory of truth (however, this is not a position that I endorse). Rationality in Fisher's narrative paradigm involves narrative probability (coherence) and narrative fidelity (truthfulness and reliability) (p. 8). Stories are governed by the rules and limits of what is accepted, believed, questioned and criticized to be false or fabricated. I agree that stories must be believable but not in terms of a coherence theory of truth (as I will

show below). Further, according to Fisher the coherence of stories also depends on character consistency:

> central to all stories is character. Whether a story is believable depends on the reliability of characters, both as narrators and as actors. Determination of one's character is made by interpretations of the person's decisions and actions that reflect values. (1987, p. 47)

Character consistency, as Fisher explains it, "is an organized set of actional tendencies" (p. 47), and when these character tendencies contradict one another or change significantly, or in other words, when one behaves out of character, this results in the questioning of the character. Fisher writes that, "coherence in life and in literature requires that characters behave characteristically" (p. 47). And so,

> to view communication through the perspective of narrativity is to focus on messages, on the individuated forms that constitute it, and on the reliability, trustworthiness, and desirability of what is said—evaluated by using the tests of narrative rationality. (Fisher, 1987, p. 143)

Fisher does not negate traditional rationality for he believes that it has a special role to play in specialized fields, but even in those arenas, he believes that narrative can still be useful and relevant (p. 10). According to the narrative paradigm, good reasons are embedded and woven into the stories we tell each other, and the production and practice of good reason is determined by history, biography, and culture, and hence our rationality is defined in terms of these stories as well (p. 7). This means that our rationality and knowledge is situation-specific, historical, contextual and, unlike the rational paradigm, does not aim for objective, ahistorical knowledge that is disembodied. Unlike the traditional rationality that is defined in terms of argumentative competence, knowledge of issues, appropriate modes of reasoning, deliberation

and a high degree of self-consciousness, narrative rationality is a capacity we all share (p. 9). The important point that Fisher's work raises is that our conception of good reasons and rationality needs to be expanded if we want to understand how narrative and other alternative modes of arguments offer reasons. Further, Fisher's account shows that there are alternative conceptions of rationality that are more inclusive and better suited for understanding many types of arguments. Traditional rationality espouses a hierarchal system in which some people are qualified to judge and lead those who are positioned as followers in this unequal community of knowledge production; whereas narrative rationality is inimical to elitist politics because everyone can tell stories and thus no one is excluded from this system of knowledge sharing. Everyone has the capacity and opportunity to be rational in the narrative paradigm (p. 10). I agree with Fisher that argumentation should be less elitist and more inclusive, and in chapter two, I showed why we should take seriously feminist critiques of the classic argumentation paradigm, an elitist and rigid model.

However, because we all share the capacity to tell stories, it does not mean that all stories are equally good. One cannot deny that some stories are better than others for it is true that some stories are more coherent and believable. And this is why Fisher introduces the notion of narrative fidelity and narrative rationality. Fisher's requirement of narrative probability ensures that not any story is acceptable, which means that that the audience will stop listening (reject the story) when the story ceases to be coherent and consistent. According to Fisher, narrative consistency and fidelity is what makes a narrative good and also believable. While I agree that believability requires probability, I reject that a narrative is required to be true (narrative fidelity). In terms of narrative believability, I endorse Plumer's account of believability because his account drops fidelity out of the picture. Plumer (2016, 2017) argues that the believability of

stories depends on the internal and external coherence of stories. Citing Robert A. Schultz (1979), Plumer borrows the idea that internal coherence is a matter of when,

> the events [are] motivated in terms of one another. In most, if not all, cases, motivation amounts to this; either one event is a causal (or otherwise probable) consequence of another; or some events happening provides a character with a reason or motive for making another event happen. (Schultz, p. 233)

As explained by Plumer, the story is not believable if things keep happening for no reason and where events are inadequately connected (2017, p. 73). But that is not all that is required for the believability of stories, because even when events cohere together and are fully connected, the narrative may still not be believable because the connections do not cohere together with our widely shared basic intuitions of how human psychology and society works. And so what is needed is external coherence, where the believability of stories depends on how the story in general with its plot and characters conform to our shared intuitions about human nature (Plumer, 2017, p.73). However external coherence is not about truth or what Fisher terms narrative fidelity.

In terms of fictional narratives, Plumer argues that believability is not about the truth of the stories. A story, can be far-fetched and unrealistic and still be believable. As for example, the events depicted in science fiction and allegorical narratives are not real but believable (Plumer, p. 73). And believability here refers to how the events are reasonably well-connected and how the story respects and maintains our shared assumptions about human and physical nature. Even when the story has substantial alterations in physical reality, but if the author does it in such a way that the development of these alterations is internally consistent, coherent, and the characters are depicted as believing what is going in the story as normal, then this can make the

story seem believable. That is, if the characters in the story are depicted as believing what is going in the story as normal then the audience are more likely to believe the story as well. As Plumer notes, this is a kind of transference of the suspension of disbelief from the characters in the story to the audience listening to the story (p. 74). The characters in the story act like a reality check for the audience, and the believability of the story then is based also on the trust of the characters. So Plumer's point is that although sometimes narratives can be slightly far fetched from our shared conception of reality, we still believe the story because we trust the characters in it. This is also true of my account of narrative arguments in that sometimes a story that is slightly far-fetched, but well-structured, is received as credible due to the trust and credibility of the characters and narrator.

And so Plumer explains that believability is experienced by the auditor as simple, unanalyzed datum, or as the measure of the narrative. Plumer believes that although we may disagree on what is believable, in general,

> there is no fundamental relativity of believability because there is such a thing as human nature, which we all share and to which we have significant introspective or 'privileged' access, or at least psychological attunement. (p. 75)

And so a believable stories taps into these facts about human nature (p. 75). Stories resonate as believable when they are true of human nature. While I agree that there is a general sense of believability that taps into a shared human psychology, however, I also believe that believability is context and audience sensitive. Believability is related to narrative acceptability and that is audience and rhetorically oriented (as I show above).

Plumer's account of believability is similar to Fisher's narrative probability and

narrative fidelity. The only difference, as noted by Plumer (2011) himself, is that believability (as opposed to fidelity and truth) works better for novels because while Fisher's notion of fidelity requires that the story ring true with what one knows to be true in one's life (p. 1555), believability does not require truth. And so while fidelity requires truthfulness, believability does not, but only requires that a story maps onto our shared assumption of human nature and psychology. Stories presented in novels must be believable but not necessarily truthful or real, and so, according to Plumer, believability works better for novels. That is, for a novel to be believable it need only cohere with our shared assumptions of the world, not to have actually happened.

From Fisher's account of narrative fidelity and narrative probability, I borrow the general idea that good narratives are required to be coherent, probable and have character consistency. Since my account of narrative argument does not talk explicitly about truth, but rather virtuous and good argument process, and so similarly my account of good narratives will also not include narrative fidelity. Like Plumer, I also avoid discussion of narrative fidelity because the notion of believability is more faithful to what actually happens in argumentation. When we argue using stories we do not check with whether the story actually happened but rather we check how believable the story is. So Plumer's account of believability is more compatible with my account of narrative arguments. But I disagree with Plumer that believability only works for fictional stories. That is, an important distinction that Plumer makes in his account of believability is that believability is a useful measure for the goodness of fictional narratives but not for non-fictional narratives such as biographical or historical narratives, where he argues the veracity and truth of the narrative is what is important. However, I disagree with Plumer's account because I think believability in terms of argumentation also applies to both fictional and

nonfictional narratives. However, the difference lies in how one conceives of truth. The truth that Plumer thinks is important for biographical and historical narratives is a correspondence notion of truth where the events of the story have to be checked for whether they have actually happened. Further, Plumer sees that the point of non-fictional argument is veracity, i.e., sticking to the facts and telling what happened. But non-fictional stories may be used in an argumentation setting without needing to be checked for whether they actually happened or not. That is, in argumentative exchange one may tell a story about events that happened but for other purposes other than veracity.

Along with Plumer's account of believability, I also rely on the virtues of the speaker for my account of narrative arguments. That is, the narrator, exhibiting virtues, is also the measure of believability. The experience of the narrative believability does not only depend on the narrative internal and external coherence, but, I argue, is also based on the narrator's believability. Plumer does not focus on the narrator's believability but rather on the characters being believable because his account of narrative arguments is based on novels whereas my account is about the use of oral storytelling in interpersonal argumentative exchanges where the credibility and believability of the person telling the story (narrator/arguer) is crucial to how the narrative is received by the audience. Furthermore, the believability of narrative arguments also depend on how good the argumentative exchange is, i.e., the process of arguing and how the narrative argument is to be conducted. And so since I focus on a process and rhetorical account of argumentation, I have shown (in this chapter) that narrative arguments are to be assessed by the virtuous audience and that having a virtuous process ensures good narratives as well good arguments. Good narratives are required to be not only believable, in terms of Plumer's sense, but also need to have believable narrators and a good argumentative process. My account of the

virtuous audience demonstrates that the goodness of narrative arguments depends on the goodness of the process of arguing as rhetorically understood.

My account of truth is rhetorical and is not based on correspondence account of truth. Truth can be accommodated into believability but not in the way Plumer discusses, where the truth of a non-fictional story is based on sticking to the facts and checking for whether the event did happen, but rather in an argumentative exchange the truth of the narrative is taken into account in terms of the believability of and trust for the narrator/arguer. In an argumentative exchange when the narrative is told, arguers do not often check the truth of the narrative by seeing whether the events actually happened. The truth of a narrative in an argumentative exchange, at least from the rhetorical and process account of argumentation, is measured by the credibility and trust for the narrator and the goodness of the argumentative exchange. From the perspective of rhetorical argumentation, believability is both context sensitive and audience based, where the audience is an interactive one involved in the construction of argumentation. And in such terms believability, is then, both the responsibility of the narrator and the audience receiving the story and that is where the exercise of argumentative virtues becomes integral to ensuring good argumentation. Both the narrator (arguer) and the audience are responsible for the construction of a good story. And both are required to cultivate and exercise argumentative virtues. What is believable depends on what the virtuous audience, after exercising virtues, deems as a good story. The virtuous audience is the measure of what is believable and credible. But of course the virtuous audience, is also checking for whether the narrator is also virtuous (and by that I mean credible, honest and trustworthy), and so the virtuous audience trusts only stories that are believable. Believability is a virtue that the virtuous audience is sensitive to and

checks for. A story that is conducted with virtuous process and virtues speaker is one that is believable and a good story.

Conclusion

The virtuous audience is a rhetorical audience who has cultivated virtues. The rhetorical audience includes both the arguer and the audience because narrative is a co-creation between those engaged in the argument. My concept of the virtuous audience combines insights from Perelman’s account of audience and from virtue theories of argumentation. While bad narratives do get accepted by people, it is only through the virtuous audience that we can hope such stories get rejected. The virtuous audience being critical is less likely to accept bad narratives. Bad narratives are more persuasive and powerful than one would like to imagine and that ultimately depends on the type of audience that accepts them. Hence, good narrative arguments are those that are accepted by a virtuous audience. Ultimately, though, for good argumentation to take place and to avoid the production and acceptance of bad narratives, virtues must be cultivated by both the arguer and the audience.

Conclusion

This dissertation developed a narrative account of argumentation which defends narrative as a legitimate mode of arguing. This view combines insights from feminist philosophy and argumentation theory, specifically feminist critiques of argumentation that centre on the adversariality and hostility embedded in argumentation, and the exclusion of alternative modes of reasoning. Dominant models of argumentation view an argument as containing premises and a conclusion, and as either discursively or linguistically explicable. Therefore, the dominant model rejects non-traditional models of reasoning that are non-linear and/or non-discursive. Narrative arguments diverge from this traditional understanding of argument in two important ways: they do not follow the traditional model of an argument as consisting of premises and a conclusion, and they are not reducible to explicit or linear argument form. Hence, my dissertation builds on the already-existing critique of traditional argumentation lodged by feminist philosophers and argumentation theorists, by showing that narrative is a further excluded mode of arguing. The main goal of this dissertation has been to defend the legitimacy of narrative argumentation and to provide an account of how narratives function in arguments.

My dissertation also contributes to argumentation theory, which lacks an analysis of the place of narrative in argumentation. Throughout this dissertation, I maintain that narrative arguments must be seen as a process and not as a product of arguing. That is, I argue the whole act of storytelling is an argument and that we should not attempt to reduce the narrative and extract from it premises and a conclusion. Accordingly, I argue that narrative argument should be evaluated using a process account of evaluation using the concept of the virtuous audience that I developed, which maintains the form of the narrative as a narrative without requiring it to be

reduced. Hence, in this dissertation, I reject the reduction and extraction of premises and conclusion from the narrative and argue that the whole act of storytelling can be a powerful persuasive argument.

Recognizing narrative arguments requires flexibility and open-mindedness as well as the ability to contextualize. That is, acknowledging narratives as arguments requires further recognition that narrative arguments are pervasive, complex and various in kind.

In narratives, arguments are not direct, so they do not jump out at you in the way traditional arguments do, but this does not mean that they do not give reasons. It is important to consider that though not every narrative or act of storytelling has an argument or can be considered as an argument, some narratives do function as arguments, and more importantly, certain cultures and ethnic groups incorporate narrative as both a form of argumentation and a transference of knowledge. However, the idea that telling stories can have persuasive power tends to be met with resistance, for we often demand that arguers be direct and succinct, and to get to the point. As such, narrative argumentation is a challenge to dominant models of argumentation that exclude alternative modes of arguing.

The acceptance of narrative argumentation is ultimately a rejection of exclusionary practices of argumentation. Further, broadening our conception of arguments by accepting narrative as a legitimate mode of arguing makes argumentation more inclusive. Hence, this dissertation dismantles the assumption that an argument has to be verbalized and explicit to be a legitimate mode of arguing.

Acknowledging narrative not only opens up the space for other modes of arguing but also broadens our conception of reason and rationality, because alternative modes rely on an alternative conception of rationality. This doctoral project rejects masculine and traditional ideals

of rationality that exclude narratives as reason-giving. So a celebration of narrative is also a celebration and acceptance of alternative conceptions of reason and rationality.

This broadening of our conception of arguing and rationality ultimately results in better representation of minority groups and others who may be uncomfortable with traditional and standard models of arguing. Acknowledging narrative in turn recognizes the equal status of minority groups and women, that are associated with alternative modes of reasoning. By including narrative, we give representation to marginalized groups including women and cultures where storytelling is an integral part of their heritage and mode of reasoning. This dissertation has important implications for feminist concerns, particularly the interest in making argumentation more inclusive and acknowledging the legitimacy of alternative ways of arguing. Further, this dissertation promotes feminist ideals in the profession, as it encourages a culture of philosophy that is based on inclusivity and acceptance. This improvement in the representation of minority groups results in a flourishing culture in the discipline of philosophy.

Further, narrative as a mode of arguing is less hostile than the traditional model because narrative arguments are indirect. The style of storytelling is generally not hostile, because the act of telling stories often elicits empathy, compassion and understanding. The telling of stories is often associated with empathy, compassion and understanding. There is also empirical research that suggests listening to stories makes us more empathetic (as shown by Raymond A. Mar, Keith Oatley, Jacob Hirsh, Jennifer dela Paz, and Jordan B. Peterson, 2006). Emotions play a large role in storytelling. It is hard to listen to a story, especially to a story well told, without having one's emotions invoked. And so a further area of investigation would be how narrative arguments may engender more empathy and understanding.

References

Aberdein, A. (2007). Virtue argumentation. In *Proceedings of the Sixth Conference of the International Society for the Study of Argumentation* (Vol. 1, pp. 15-19).

Aberdein, Andrew. "Virtue in argument." *Argumentation* 24.2 (2010): 165-179.

Aberdein, A. (2014). In defence of virtue: the legitimacy of agent-based argument appraisal. *Informal Logic*, *34*(1), 77-93.

Abbott, H. P. (2007). Story, plot, and narration. In D. Herman (Ed.), *The Cambridge companion to narrative* (pp. 39-51). Cambridge; Newyork: Cambridge University Press.

Altman, R. (2008). *A Theory of Narrative*. New York: Columbia University Press.

Bal, M. (2009). *Narratology: Introduction to the Theory of Narrative*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press

Benoit, W. L., Hample, D., & Benoit, P. J. (1992). *Readings in argumentation*. Berlin; New York: Foris Publications.

Blair, J. A. (2011). Informal logic and its early historical development. *Studies in Logic*, *4*(1), 1-16.

Bridgeman, T. (2007). Time and space. *The Cambridge companion to narrative*. (pp.52-65). Cambridge; Newyork: Cambridge University Press.

Botting, D. (2014). Why modal pluralism does not require normative pluralism. *Argumentation and Advocacy*, *50*(3), 168-182.

Bowell, T., & Kingsbury, J. (2013). Virtue and argument: Taking character into account. *Informal Logic*, *33*(1), 22-32.

Burke, R. J. (1984). A Rhetorical Conception of Rationality. *Informal Logic*, *6*(3).

Burrow, S. (2010). Verbal sparring and apologetic points: Politeness in gendered argumentation contexts. *Informal Logic*, *30*(3).

Campbell, S. (1994). Being dismissed: The politics of emotional expression. *Hypatia*, *9*(3), 46-65.

Brockriede, W. (1992). Where is argument. *Readings in argumentation*, (pp.73-78). Berlin; New York: Foris Publications.

Bruner, J. (1991). The narrative construction of reality. *Critical inquiry*, *18*(1), 1-21.

Cohen, D. H. (1995). Argument is War... and War is Hell: Philosophy, Education, and Metaphors for Argumentation. *Informal logic*, *17*(2).

Cohen, D. H. (2009). Keeping an open mind and having a sense of proportion as virtues in argumentation. *Cogency*, *1*(2), 49-64.

Cohen, D. H. (2013). Virtue, in context. *Informal Logic*, *33*(4), 471-485.

Crosswhite, J. (1989). Universality in rhetoric: Perelman's universal audience. *Philosophy & rhetoric*, 157-173.

Czarniawska, B. (2004). Narratives in social science research. London; Thousand Oaks, Calif.: Sage Publications.

Fisher, W. R. (1986). Judging the quality of audiences and narrative rationality. In *Practical Reasoning in Human Affairs* (pp.85-103). Springer Netherlands.

Gilbert, M. A. (1994). Feminism, argumentation and coalescence. *Informal Logic*, 16(2).

Gilbert, M. A (1997). *Coalescent Argumentation*. Mahwah, N. J: Lawrence Erlbaum.

Gilbert, M. A. (2002). Effing the ineffable: The logocentric fallacy in argumentation. *Argumentation*, 16(1), 21-32.

Gilbert, M. A. (2007). Natural normativity: Argumentation theory as an engaged discipline.

Informal Logic, 27(2), 149-161.

Gilbert, M. A. (2014). *Arguing with people*. Peterborough, Ont.; Tonawanda, N.Y.: Broadview Press.

Govier, T., Blair, A. J., & Hoaglund, J. (1999). *The philosophy of argument*. Newport News, VA: Vale Press.

Groarke, L. (2009). Five theses on Toulmin and visual argument. In *Pondering on problems of argumentation* (pp. 229-239). Springer Netherlands.

Hundleby, C. (2013). Aggression, politeness, and abstract adversaries. *Informal Logic*, *33*(2), 238-262.

Hundleby, C., & Duran, C. (2011). Androcentrism as a fallacy of argumentation. In Zenker, F. (ed.), *Proceedings of the 9th OSSA Conference, 2011. Argumentation: Cognition & Community*, Windsor, On, University of Windsor.

Hundleby, C. E. (2009). Fallacy Forward: Situating fallacy theory. In: J. Ritola (Ed.), *Proceedings of the 8th OSSA Conference, 2009. Argument Cultures*, Windsor, On, University of Windsor.

Hursthouse, R. (1999). *On virtue ethics*. Oxford ; New York: Oxford University Press.

Lakoff, R. (1973). Language and woman's place. *Language in society*, *2*(1), 45-79.

Janack, M. (1997). Standpoint epistemology without the “standpoint”?: An examination of epistemic privilege and epistemic authority. *Hypatia*, *12*(2), 125-139.

Jannidis. (2009). Character. In Hühn, P., Pier, J., Schmid, W., & Schönert, J. (Eds.), *Handbook of narratology* (14-29). Berlin, New york: De Gruyter.

Johnson, R. H. (2000). *Manifest* Rationality. Mahweh, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.

Johnson, R. H. (2014). *The rise of informal logic: Essays on argumentation, critical thinking, reasoning and politics* (Vol. 2). University of Windsor.

Kjeldsen, J. E. (2015). The study of visual and multimodal argumentation. *Argumentation*, *29*(2), 115-132.

Lyons, N. (2007). Narrative inquiry: What possible future influence on policy or practice. (pp.600-631). *Handbook of narrative inquiry: Mapping a methodology*. Thousand Oaks, Calif.; London: SAGE.

Mack, K. (1993, June). Continuing barriers to women's credibility: A feminist perspective on the proof process. In *Criminal Law Forum* (Vol. 4, No. 2, pp. 327-353). Springer Netherlands.

Moulton, J. (1983). A paradigm of philosophy: The adversary method. In *Discovering reality* (pp. 149-164). Springer Netherlands.

Norrick, N. R. (2007). Conversational storytelling. *The Cambridge companion to narrative*. (pp.127-141). Cambridge; Newyork: Cambridge University Press.

O'Keefe, D. J. (1982). The concepts of argument and arguing. *Advances in argumentation theory and research*, 3-23.

O'Keefe, D. J. (1992). Two concepts of argument. (pp. 79-90). *Readings in argumentation.* Berlin; New York: Foris Publications.

Olmos, P. (2016). Commentary on Khameiel Al Tamimi's" Evaluating Narrative Arguments".

Orr, D. (1989). Just the facts Ma'am: Informal logic, gender and pedagogy. *Informal Logic*, *11*(1).

Orr, D. (1995). On logic and moral voice. *Informal Logic*, 17(3).

Perelman, C. (1963). The social contexts of argumentation. *trans. John Petrie, in Perelman's The*

Idea of Justice and the Problem of Argument (NY: Humanities Press, 1963), 155

Perelman, C. (1982). *The Realm of Rhetoric*. Notre Dame, IN: University Of Notre Dame *Press*.

Pinnegar, S., & Daynes, G. J. (2007). Locating Narrative Inquire Historically. *Handbook of Narrative Inquire. Mapping a methodology.* California: Sage Publications.

Porter, A. H. (2002). The Cambridge Introduction to Narrative. Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press.

Ryan, M. L. (2007). Toward a definition of narrative. *The Cambridge Companion to Narrative*.

(pp.22-35). Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press.

Rooney, P. (1991). Gendered reason: Sex metaphor and conceptions of reason. *Hypatia*, *6*(2), 77-103

Rudrum, D. (2005). From narrative representation to narrative use: Towards the limits of definition. *Narrative*, 13(2), 195-204.

Sperber, D., & Wilson, D. (1995). *Relevance: Communication and cognition*. Cambridge, MA: Blackwell Publishers.

Tannen, D. (1991). *You just don't understand: Women and men in conversation* (pp. 1990-1990). London: Virago.

Tannen, D. (1995). The power of talk: Who gets heard and why. *Harvard Business Review*, 73(5), 138-148.

Tindale, C. W. (1999). *Acts of arguing: A rhetorical model of argument*. Albany, N.Y.: State University of New York Press.

Tindale, C. W. (1992). Audiences, relevance, and cognitive environments. *Argumentation*, *6*(2),

177-188.

Tindale, C. W. (2004). *Rhetorical argumentation: Principles of theory and practice*. Thousand Oaks, California: Sage Publications.

Thorson, J. K. (2016). Thick, thin, and becoming a virtuous arguer. *Topoi*, *35*(2), 359-366.

Toulmin, S. (1958). *The uses of argument.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Warren, K. J. (1988). Critical thinking and feminism. *Informal Logic*, *10*(1).

Willard, C. A. (1989). *A theory of argumentation*. Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press.

Willard, C. A. (1983). *Argumentation and the social grounds of knowledge*. University, Alabama.: University of Alabama Press.

Willard, C. A. (1976). On the utility of descriptive diagrams for the analysis and criticism of arguments. *Communications Monographs*, *43*(4), 308-319.

Wenzel, J. W. (1987). The rhetorical perspective on argument. In *Argumentation: Across the Lines of Discipline, Proceedings of the 1986 Conference on Argumentation, Foris Publications, Dordrecht, Holland* (pp. 101-109).

Zagzebski, L. T. (1996). *Virtues of the mind: An inquiry into the nature of virtue and the ethical foundations of knowledge*. New York, NY, USA: Cambridge University Press.

Zarefsky, D. (2014). Strategic maneuvering in political argumentation. In *Rhetorical Perspectives on Argumentation* (pp. 87-101). Springer International Publishing.