Multimodal Translation Analysis: Arab Spring Speeches in Arabic and English

by

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Abstract

In the contemporary globalized world, translation plays a key role in sharing news across the globe, in particular in the age of multimedia, where meaning is transferred through various modes and genres. This study focuses on two Arab Spring speeches of Mummar Algaddafi's and Hosni Mubarak's and their translations in different media. The thesis initially conducts a comparative study of the source texts (STs), including a textual/contextual analysis drawing on Norman Fairclough's Critical Discourse Analysis, and on Gunther Kress' multimodal analysis. This is followed by examining the target texts (TTs) to investigate the inventible changes that occur during the translation process, particularly if the translation involves not only a transfer of meaning from Arabic to English but also from mode to mode (such as, speaking to writing) and genre to genre (a political speech to a newspaper article). The thesis introduces the Multimodal Translation Analysis model to investigate the following aspects of the TTs: linguistic aspects of the TTs, the TT's multimodal qualities, and, drawing on Mona Baker's narrative theory, the role of dominant narratives in the shaping of the TT.

Dedication

To my awesome mom and dad, thank you for everything. I love you!

Acknowledgements

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Abbreviations

CA: Classical Arabic

CDA: Critical Discourse Analysis

CT: Collaborative Translation

FDCH: The Federal Document Clearing House

Interp.1: The First interpreter:

Interp.2: The Second interpreter

LCA: Libyan Colloquial Arabic

MSA: Modern Standard Arabic

MTA: Multimodal Translation Analysis

SI: Simultaneous Interpreting

ST: Source Text

ST1A: Source Text of Algaddafi's Speech

ST2M: Source Text of Mubarak's Speech

TT: Target Text

TT1A: Target Text 1 of Algaddafi's speech

TT1M: Target Text 1 of Mubarak's speech

TT2A: Target Text 2 of Algaddafi's speech

TT2M: Target Text 2 of Mubarak's speech

TT3A: Target Text 3 of Algaddafi's speech

TT3M: Target Text 3 of Mubarak's speech

Note on Transliteration, Glossing and Translation

This thesis follows the Arabic transcription style used by *The International Journal of Middle East Studies*. Here are the symbols used to transcribe Arabic sounds into English letters:

Letter	Transliteration	Letter	Transliteration	Letter	Transliteration
ء	ʾ	س	s	ل	l
ب	b	ش	sh	م	m
ت	t	ص	ṣ	ن	n
ث	th	ض	ḍ	ه	h
ج	j	ط	ṭ	و	w
ح	ḥ	ظ	ẓ	ى	y
خ	kh	ع	ʿ	ال	al-
د	d	غ	gh	ة	-a
ذ	dh	ف	f	ا	ā
ر	r	ق	q	ِي	ī
ز	z	ك	k	و	ū
َ◌	a	◌ِ	i	◌ُ	u

All translations of Arabic materials quoted in the thesis are mine unless otherwise indicate.

Chapter One

Introduction

1.1 Scope of the Study

> Political language is a language of power. It influences government policy and actions, identifies the dominant values of the moment, and wins votes. Likewise, it is a language that is capable of making war, establishing needs of its users at a particular time. It has a reputation for being flexible and ambiguous or, worse, evasive. (Goshgarian, 2011:426)

"Any political action is prepared, accompanied, controlled and influenced by language" (Schäffner, 1997). As many linguists believe (e.g. Fairclough, 1989; van Dijk, 2002a and 2002b) the manipulation of language is one of the most important techniques politicians use to impose power and ideologies on the public. This is because politicians tend to use rhetorical language in an attempt to persuade the public of what they want. This is clearly evident in the use of a particular terminology, metaphors, analogies and pronominal choices in their political speeches. In this regard, Beard (2000) highlights that political speeches are composed by a group of highly skilled linguists who are aware of persuasive language techniques.

In recent years, the Arab region has been at the core of a number of transformative political events, commonly known as the Arab Spring. Many countries in the Middle East witnessed events that sparked a wave of revolutions. Public protests began in Tunisia in 2010, followed by Egypt, Libya, Yemen and Syria, and, consequently, the region has found itself in the spotlight of the media all over the world. Many news agencies clearly attempted to report on a wide range of different aspects of these revolutions by publishing stories about protesters, the demonstrations, the regimes' responses and the presidential speeches. It is here that

translation has played an important role in conveying the news to the international community in multiple languages and in different genres across a variety of media.

This thesis focuses on a multimodal linguistic analysis of two political speeches and their translations into English. The first speech was given by Mummar Algaddafi, the president of Libya on 22 February 2011; the second one was delivered by Hosni Mubarak, the president of Egypt on 10 February 2011. Both speeches took place during the Arab Spring. The thesis also examines the English-language translations of the speeches into three different genres: an interpreting 'voice-over', a newspaper article, and a transcript. It will firstly analyse the Arabic text of each speech to highlight the strategies used by each president to manipulate and persuade the public to take the president's side in the conflict. Furthermore, the thesis will analyse the translation, and what shifts occurred in the ST in the process of translation. The aim of this analysis is to highlight the role that media plays in shaping and framing the public's attitude, and its ability to manipulate the narrative according to their own ideological beliefs. By exploring the strategies used by both presidents to compose their speeches, the thesis aims to contribute to a broader understanding of linguistic strategies and rhetorical tools used in Arabic political speeches and their effect on the public. It will also explore to what extent the use of Colloquial Arabic versus Modern Standard Arabic may affect the understanding and the translation of a political speech. In addition, examining the translations of the speeches published by the media aims to underline the way in which the media portrayed the source text according to the media's ideological beliefs, their political agenda, or according to a dominant political narrative that was widely disseminated during the time. This analysis will emphasise the role the media plays in reframing a narrative, and in creating an impact on the public and their beliefs.

1.2 Orientation to Previous Research

In the early years of translation studies research, in the 1960s and 1980s, scholars often primarily concerned themselves with the concept of equivalence (e.g Catford, 1965; Nida and Taber 1969; Newmark, 1981). With the constant development of the field, however, research into all aspects of discourse, beyond its linguistic features, increased. In this regard, Hatim highlights that "after many decades of formal linguistics, translation studies turned to discourse analysis and text linguistics which became major sources of influence on translation research in the 1980s and subsequently" (2001:31). Some scholars then began to approach translation through the framework of discourse analysis in order to pay closer attention to the textual and intertextual factors. The study of discourse can also reveal the way in which politicians exert power through their words and employ tools of rhetorical persuasion, as this thesis suggests. Among the scholars who have developed theories related to discourse and translation are House (1977/1997), Baker (1992), and Hatim and Mason (1990; 1997).

The scholars who studied news translation, discovered that 'the dominant strategy is domestication', according to Bassnett and Bielsa "in news translation, the dominant strategy is absolute domestication, as material is shaped in order to be consumed by the target audience, so has to be tailored to suit their needs and expectations" (2009:10). As a result, news agencies have universally applied the domesticating approach to reach their domestic audiences. Most news agencies allow bilingual journalists to translate and then edit the text for the target text audience. Karen Stetting proposes the term 'transediting' to define the process of translating and editing,

> A certain amount of editing has always been part of the work of the translator,
> who needs to incorporate cultural and situational variations and who in many
> cases has to 'clean up' poor manuscripts... transediting is widely practiced in
> certain types of translation to better suit the needs of the receivers. (Cited in
> Bassnett & Bielsa, 2009: 63)

Nowadays, this is practiced by most news agencies, where pieces of news are edited and then made available to the audience by journalists and editors, and not by translators, thus creating a form of translation that is integrated in news production in the field of journalism (ibid:64).

This thesis will explore how two prominent political speeches delivered in Arabic by two Arab presidents have been translated into the items of news in English aimed at western audiences. There are a number of articles that briefly discuss specific features and aspects of other Arab Spring presidential speeches (e.g. Lahlali, 2011), and the majority of these articles have adopted a CDA (Critical Discourse Analysis) framework for the analysis of the speeches and their structure (e.g. Hasan, 2011; Maalej, 2012; Al-Majali, 2015; Farhan, 2017). In regard to studying the translation of Arabic political discourse in general, Bassnett and Bielsa (2009) refer to an important recent case, which concerned reports on Saddam Hussein's trail and how it was rendered in various newspapers and TV channels. Multiple differences were found across the different translations; for example, the style of speech was notably different between the English and the Italian translations, "in Italian the judge is courteous throughout the exchange using phrases like 'per cortesia', while in English he is abrupt to the point of rudeness" (Bassnett & Bielsa, 2009: 130). This example indicates different strategies translators use to make the target text more comprehensible and easier to read. Bassnett and Bielsa state:

> Translators play a huge variety of roles to ensure that global news is accessible to an international readership, from providing the key quote in a breaking story to adding local flavor for investors, from informing government bodies to giving a voice to the often ignored regions of the world and helping companies gain market share and increase market awareness (Bassnett & Bielsa, 2009:138).

1.3 The Aim of the Study

This thesis offers a multimodal and qualitative study of Algaddafi's and Mubarak's speeches and their translations into English, presented in three different genres. The originality of this

research is in the adaptation of a multidisciplinary approach to present an analytical framework, which aims to tackle various aspects of the STs and the TTs. For instance, to understand the linguistic choices, to recognise the shifts that occurred to the TTs and the conventions and strategies used in each genre, and finally to reveal whether the TT was influenced by the dominant narrative at that time. This also illustrates the importance of choosing different genres to examine the way in which translators adopted different strategies according to the genre that they are translating or interpreting to.

The analysis will draw on a body of literature from the fields of Linguistics, Media Studies and Translation Studies. Additionally, attention will also be given to some common features - lexical, syntactic and textual - of political discourse in Arabic and English. The findings of the study will not only advance the field of Translation Studies but will also have the potential to inform future translators and interpreters of political speeches. Furthermore, this research aims to address the role of the media in portraying a speech within existing ideological narratives, and in influencing viewers' opinions by carefully selecting and editing the material for translation. Finally, this thesis will investigate to what extent specific news agencies (e.g Aljazeera, Fox News, *Daily Mail* and *The Guardian*) have attempted to create an impact on its audience, by compromising the meaning of political speeches in order to serve their political agendas.

1.4 Research Questions

This study will address the following research questions:

- What are the difficulties when translating/interpreting political discourse? What strategies do interpreters/translators/news agencies use to address and solve challenges in the translation process?

- What are the shifts that occur as a result of changing the ST's genre/mode?

- To what extent does the media's bias manifest itself in the news? And to what degree does the ideological and political background of translators or news agencies influence the target text or reframe the message of the source text and re-narrate it differently?

- How would a combination of analytical tools developed in multimodal analysis and linguistic analysis help create a model for analysing media texts containing the translations of political speeches?

- To what extent do the political speeches in Arabic share common features used by both presidents, regardless of their use of Standard versus Colloquial Arabic?

- What are the similarities and differences between the political discourse features in Arabic and English?

1.5 Thesis Structure

This thesis consists of ten chapters. These chapters are organised in a way to firstly provide a background of the environment in which the STs are delivered, followed by an account of political discourse features that should help us to understand the way the STs are structured. After establishing the basic knowledge, I will present the theories that I will combine to create a model, which will be used for the analysis of the TTs.

Chapter One presents an outline of the thesis, orientation to previous studies, the aims and research questions, and a summary of the chapters.

Chapter Two gives a brief account of the Arab Spring, its causes, the role that social media played in it and its aftermath. In addition, it presents some essential background information on both presidents in order to familiarise the reader with the presidents' characters and the dominant narratives about them. Moreover, the chapter will outline the structure, themes, content, and type of language used in the speeches by Algaddafi and Mubarak in the Arabic source text. The information on the political and social background is valuable as it will

help evaluate to what extent the media treated these speeches as isolated incidents or framed them within existing political discourses about each president. The chapter will also include an overview of Algaddafi's and Mubarak's other speeches delivered throughout their presidencies. This will help contextualise the speeches analysed in this thesis in a chain of speeches given by the presidents during their careers and see how both presidents present themselves across various public engagements.

Chapter Three will focus on the concept of political discourse, specifically on prominent features of political discourse in English and in Arabic. It aims to establish similarities and differences between the features of political discourse in these languages, and thus to identify problems translators of political speeches may potentially encounter. It will also provide an account of differences between MSA and colloquial Arabic, which aims to highlight the significance of their use.

Chapter Four will draw firstly on the theoretical framework of CDA as described by Fairclough, introduced as a tool to help analyse the ST and its broader context before translating it. Secondly, it will introduce Kress' multimodal framework as a mean to analyse how the meaning of the STs have been conveyed into English in a variety of media and genres. By introducing a framework for multimodal analysis to the field of Translation Studies, this thesis aims to contribute a new model of analysis, specifically applicable to multi-media texts that are increasingly characterising the age of social media in the 21st century. In order to address why translators or news agencies chose to frame/present the STs in the way they did, and to examine the role of ideology in the translation process, the third section of this chapter will draw on Narrative Theory as developed by Baker, and will specifically focus on the selective appropriation approach. Baker's understanding of the role political narratives play in the context of translated discourse will help reveal some common narratives of the Arab Spring in Arabic and English.

Chapter Five will describe the collection of data and the different stages of analysis. It also provides some contextual information on the STs different sources, and on the methods used to transcribe and translate the speeches. Lastly, the chapter sets out how the MTA model will be applied to analyse the STs and the TTs.

Chapter Six presents the analysis of the STs on the linguistic and on the multimodal level, which aims to stress a fundamental point of the importance of conducting a linguistic and multimodal analysis of the ST, and of the context in which the ST appeared during the translation process. The chapter will highlight the way in which rhetorical language was integrated into the speeches as part of the political discourse and how each president used language to serve a specific purpose and their own agenda. In regard to the multimodal analysis, the chapter will discuss the significance of image, body language and other extra-textual features – providing images to contextualise the reader with the ST-, and will consider their relevance for the translation and for the TT audience. The chapter will conclude with a brief comparative discussion of the similarities and differences of these aspects between Algaddafi's and Mubarak's speeches.

Chapter Seven is concerned with a detailed analysis of TT1s, which are live interpretations of the speeches. I will give a brief overview of how interpreting is usually carried out and what strategies can be used by interpreters to address issues that may affect the interpreting process. The chapter will also provide some background information of Aljazeera and Fox News, the news channels on which the simultaneous interpretations of both speeches were broadcasted. This information will give some indication as to why each channel presented the speeches in a specific way. This should be followed by TT1s analysis, which will be enhanced with images of both TTs to contextualise the reader with it.

Chapter Eight is dedicated to the analysis of the speeches' translations published alongside articles in the *Daily Mail* and *The Guardian*. Here, the speeches are presented in another genre that serves a different purpose to that of the source text. Common journalistic conventions for working with translated news will be discussed. The ongoing analysis will then uncover how both speeches were translated by the news agencies and how they were narrated to shape the viewers' opinions. It will be assessed to what extent the translations were conducted according to the news agencies' ideologies. The chapter will conclude with a comparative discussion of the findings of how each news agency approached the speeches and how they chose to represent them.

Chapter Nine will provide an analysis of a written translation of the speeches published on the blog *Warden's Online*, which provides a platform for readers to contribute to a collaborative translation of the speech, and in *The Washington Post* newspaper respectively. Thus, the chapter will discuss the process of collaborative translation and transcription strategies, followed by a detailed analysis of both target texts. Lastly, the chapter will include a discussion of the findings, and address to what extent collaborative translation work was in fact more accurate than the written translations which were published within hours following the speech.

Finally, Chapter Ten will summarise and conclude the findings of the research. Furthermore, it will indicate the potential contribution of this thesis to the field of Translation Studies and to other disciplines. Some areas for future research will also be discussed.

Chapter Two

The Journey of the Arab Spring

2.1 Introduction

Over the past few years, the Arab world has witnessed remarkable changes: in 2010, for example, thousands of people in various Arab countries took to the streets with demands for political reform. Among the names given to this movement, for instance, the 'Youth Revolution' and the 'Facebook Revolution' - a particular one stands out as the most popular and commonly used: the 'Arab Spring'. In order to address Hosni Mubarak's and Mummar Algaddafi's speeches in this thesis comprehensively, it is important to shed light on the context in which these speeches were given and the circumstances that led to them. This chapter will provide a concise history of the political events at the time and the shared ideology in the Arab region, in an attempt to unearth some of the reasons behind these uprisings and investigate the aftermath of the Arab Spring, It will also provide a brief timeline of the main events of the uprisings and give an indication of the significant role of social media during that time. This chapter also includes a background history of Presidents Algaddafi and Mubarak, and provides information on the Egyptian revolution and the Libyan uprising. Collectively, this will allow the reader to gain some understanding of the linguistic and extra-linguistic choices the presidents made while delivering their speeches, and indicate whether their history or cultural background had an impact on the choices they made. Finally, the chapter will provide an overview of the speeches Algaddafi and Mubarak gave throughout their respective presidencies and will consequently be beneficial for the analysis of the speeches they gave during the time of the Arab Spring.

2.2 Timeline of the Arab Spring

The Middle East witnessed significant political changes in 2011, which impacted greatly on the region and sent shockwaves across the world. For days, men, women, and even children took to the streets to revolt against the regime's decades of injustice and to demand political reform. Contrary to previous attempts, these demonstrations were recognised for their defiant attitude and the protesters' determination to seek change. Additionally, the narrative of '*we can do it too*' reverberated across the Arab region at that time. This might be due to the cultural, historical and political background these countries share, as well as to the similarities between the ruling regimes.

The Arab Spring reached its peak by the end of 2010. It was then followed by a sequence of events, starting in Tunisia with an incident concerning a young man that caused public outrage against the government. Tarek el-Tayyib Mohamed Ben Bouazizi was born to a poor family in the town of Sidi Bouzid in 1984 (Stokel-Walker, 2011). Unable to complete his studies, Bouazizi started working in his mid-teens, and eventually settled as a fruit-seller in his town's marketplace (Khatib & Lust, 2014). On 17 December 2010, Bouazizi was harassed by council inspector Faida Hamdy, who demanded he pays her to allow him to keep his business. According to Stokel-Walker, Bouazizi refused to pay her 'hush money', and began arguing with Hamdy to protect his only livelihood (2011:27); "Hamdy ended up slapping Bouazizi in the face. A cultural earthquake occurred" (ibid.:27). To Bouazizi, it was not just about his livelihood but also about his dignity; thus he went to the council building and then to the governor's office to officially complain about the incident, but unfortunately he was not able to meet the officials (ibid.). He was devastated, angry and shocked of how unfair his country had become, and went to the governor's building with the intention of setting himself on fire. Bouazizi died on 4 January 2011 (Filiu, 2011), and his self-immolation can be seen as the ignition the region was waiting for (Brownlee, Masoud & Reynolds, 2014; Dabashi, 2012).

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Demonstrations started shortly after Bouaziz's death, as Tunisian men and women of all ages began to sweep into the streets in solidarity with him and against the way he was treated. Mass mobilisation started in late December 2010, when clashes between protesters and the police grew. These demonstrations later turned into protests against marginalisation, high rate of unemployment and the regime's corruption, and protesters demanded the resignation of Ben Ali (Al-Saleh, 2015). On 14 January, Ben Ali fled the country to Saudi Arabia, marking this day as the day of an unprecedented event in the Arab world, when the will of the people toppled a dictator (ibid.:20). The Tunisian revolution - known by many as the 'Jasmine revolution' – revolutionised the entire Middle East and spread hope that it was possible to regain the people's dignity and freedom in the region (Maalej, 2012:680). The success of the Tunisian revolution in fact triggered region-wide demonstrations throughout the Middle East, starting with Egypt, Libya, Yemen, Syria, Jordan, Bahrain and other countries; all of them sharing one goal, to topple the regime. People in these countries shared the same array of motives, and had been similarly oppressed by their governments (Whitehead, 2014:17). Due to the significance of the Egyptian and Libyan uprising for this research, Section 5.2 offers a detailed description of these two events.

In Yemen, protests and demonstrations in the streets date back to 2007 when thousands of people were killed, injured or imprisoned (Aryani in Haddad, Bsheer & Abu-Rish, 2012). Despite President Ali Abdullah Saleh's attempts to regain control by calling for emergency sessions with the parliament and by hiring people to injure and kill protesters, the protesters were defiant and refused to negotiate or engage in a dialogue with him. Several protests started in February in front of the Ministry of Justice, Sanaa University and elsewhere, reaching thousands of Yemenis, all demanding Saleh's resignation (Rosen, 2011). It was, however, not until 3 June 2011 that Saleh was attacked at his presidential palace and severely injured, forcing him to leave for Saudi Arabia to seek medical help. After his treatment he travelled back to

Yemen but agreed to relinquish his powers in November 2011 (Sadiki, 2014). Unfortunately, the situation in Syria was very different, where peaceful demonstrations turned into a vicious war that continues to this day. When demonstrations started in Syria on 18 March 2011, they rapidly spread across the country demanding the regime's surrender of power. These demonstrations were met with brutal attempts by the regime to suppress them, killing thousands and forcing millions to flee the country (Droz-Vincent, 2014:187). According to Tarnawski (2015:13), a total of 160,000 people were killed in Syria between 2011 and 2014. The fate of the country and its people remains unknown.

2.3 What Triggered the Arab Spring?

The Arab Spring was not a sudden Arab awakening, but a result of years of tyranny, suffering, and unheard demands for social, economic and political reform. Thus 2011 was a defining year for the entire Arab region, as it brought change and gave hope of a better future for the people. The world witnessed a sudden wave of demonstrations that swept the region, its people once again demanding change. The domino effect potentially played a significant role in initiating the uprisings; especially as the causes for dissatisfaction, such as oppression, corruption, the decline of standards of living and the government's failure to cope with challenges of population growth leading to unemployment and poverty, were shared by the people of these countries, although each country's population also had locally grounded reasons to call for change. In the last decades, there were a number of protests and political movements in the region, but none of them succeeded in overthrowing the oppressive regimes, nor did they create fundamental change. According to Lynch (2013), protests in the Arab region date back to the 1950s, and have never really disappeared despite the region's continuous political tension. "The popular movements of the 1950s and the late 1980s each brought huge numbers of people into the streets and into the political realm… they forced dramatic political change…" (Lynch, 2013:30). As Lynch indicates, protests, such as the ones in Algeria, Egypt and Palestine, were brutally suppressed by

these regimes, and led to the use of violence and complete control of the media (2013:43). He adds that some activists believe that the year 2000 was a point of political awakening, when mass mobilisation began to support the second '*Palestinian Intifada*', and followed in 2000-2003 by demonstrations across the Arab countries in protest against the US invasion of Iraq (ibid.). So, since the turn of the century, many more political parties and associations called for change and demanded political and economic reforms in the region, among them the *National Movement for Change* (known as *Kifaya* [enough]), *The April 6 Youth Movement*, the *We Are All Khaled Said* Facebook group in Egypt, and the *Enahda* party in Tunisia (Laremont, 2013:57-60- 160). These parties played an important role in organising the uprisings during the Arab Spring. In the following section I will discuss the broader context of some of the social conditions - freedom and oppression, famine, unemployment, social justice and corruption - that drove much of the events unfolding during the Arab Spring.

2.3.1 Oppression and the Hunger for Freedom

Most people in the Arab region have been deprived of democracy, rendering freedom, equality and social justice, and leaving people to suffer under the regimes' injustices, repression and tyranny. According to Bamyeh (2012:50), the idea of a 'president for life' was the common rule in the Arab region, as can be seen, for example, in Tunisia where Bin Ali ruled for 20 years, in Egypt where Mubarak ruled for 30 years, and in Libya where Algaddafi ruled for 40 years (Howard & Hussain, 2013:1). Owen suggests that many Arab leaders gain power by being part of the military and then developing coup-proof regimes that would allow them to remain in power their entire lives (2014:1).

One can argue that Arab nationalism and the love for freedom is one of the most potent ideological forces in the region. According to Browers (2009:1), Arab countries are 'starving' for freedom, but their expression would cost them their lives. Regardless of the existing political parties in the region, such as Islamists, Nationalists and Leftists, they were often

silenced by the regime, and protesters were treated worse than criminals (Al-Jaber, 2015:361). Although freedom of expression in politics and religious beliefs are guaranteed by international human rights treaties (Al-Jaber, 2015:341), this was not the norm in Arab countries, as Arafa explains:

> Most Arab countries scored poorly on indices of freedom of expression, including press and academic freedoms; freedom of assembly, demonstration, and open public discussion; freedom of association and civil society organisation; the rule of law, including an independent judiciary, fair trials and freedom from exile and/or torture; and personal social freedoms, including gender and minority equalities (2013:170).

Arafa further argues that there has been an absence of media freedom and political freedom in the region (2013:170). Arab regimes redefined the meaning of freedom, whereby freedom of speech is usually associated with political detention, and arbitrarily dictated the way in which people should engage in politics (Al-Jaber, 2015). This is especially true in countries where the oppressing regime strengthened its grip through political detention, constantly monitoring people, and nurturing the regime's supporters (Danahar, 2013:5). According to Lynch (2013:12), authorities in the Arab world attempt to maintain absolute control, especially after 2000, whereby many regimes became more dominant, even though the people grew more impatient and were capable of expressing dissent.

2.3.2   Famine, Unemployment and Social Justice

According to Salih, "there is a consensus among political analysts regarding the cocktail of major factors that, when combined, created the social explosion known as the 2011 Arab uprisings" (2013:186). Among the different reasons, some stand out, such as economic deterioration, the food crisis and the lack of justice in communities. Salih explains how these 'structural factors' sparked the uprisings, as poverty and unemployment spread among the

population, and economic resources where dominated and held by certain individuals (2013:188).

1. Famine

According to Gelvin (2015:21), although the region of the Middle East is known for its agricultural resources, many of its countries, such as Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, Algeria, Lebanon, Morocco, and Sudan, are considered vulnerable to a food crisis. In this regard, Gelvin argues that in the past this might have been due to economic policies and the government's intervention in the market, which eventually led to a rise in food prices. In 2007, for instance, the region witnessed a sudden spike in food prices that led to what was known as the 'bread riot' in countries like Morocco, Syria, Jordan, Yemen, Egypt and Lebanon (Gelvin, 2015.:22). In fact, the food crisis was not only about price increases, but also about the shortage of food in countries such as in Egypt and Libya. Noueihed and Warren describe that "Egyptians fought each other in bread queues, and soldiers were drafted in to bake loaves" (2012:24), and Bush argues that more than half of the Egyptian population live below the poverty line and highly dependent on subsidies, so that when in 2007 the price of wheat tripled and the government cut subsidies, in particular the bread subsidy, Egypt's poor experienced even more deprivation and hunger (2010:124). "It was no coincidence that demonstrators on the streets of Tunis, Amman or Cairo would brandish baguettes or flatbreads as a symbol of their rage in 2011" (Noueihed & Warren, 2012:24).

This was, however, not the case in Libya, considered a rich country with a small population of six million people and with significant potential and resources, but which was hampered with instability during Algaddafi's era (Ayub, Ahmad, Da Wan, Ismail, & Lai, 2016:124). According to Sillman, after 1970, when the UN imposed its sanctions on Libya, the country suffered a shortage of food (2016:67): "In June of 1992 the Libyan Minister of Children's Welfare claimed that UN sanctions endangered the lives of children by denying

them vital medicine and food services" (ibid.:75). Similarly, Rajabany and Shitrit describe how severe economic deterioration resulted from the sanctions, ultimately affecting the availability of different types of food (2014:81). They further claim that during the difficult years between 1982 and 1985, there were many graffiti drawings of bananas, chocolate and apples with sentences like "*lest we forget*" in Tripoli (ibid.). As for recent years, Shalgam (2012:26) highlights the need of addressing the food and water resources crisis, because it is estimated that within less than two decades, water resources will be depleted in Libya (ibid.).

2. Unemployment

Another main cause for the uprising was the high number of unemployed youth in the Middle East. The economic reforms protesters were calling for did not only concern the shortage of food but also the unemployment that would eventually lead to poverty and leave people unable to provide for their families. According to a World Bank report from 2008, youth unemployment was estimated at 30 percent and about 45 percent for university graduates in many Arab nations (Zemni, 2014). Noueihed and Warren describe the growing problem of unemployment as one of the 'main roots of discontent' in many Arab countries, claiming that the unemployment rate varies from 10 percent to 20 percent across the region (2012:36). In this regard, Idris stresses how unemployment increased corruption in the region and, in fact, widened the gap between the rich and the poor, further empowering the ruling elite who are benefitting financially from corruption (2016:6).

In Egypt, the level of unemployment was estimated at 24 percent among youths from the age of 15 to 24, making up 60 percent of the total number of unemployed (Feiler, 2013). Abouellil (2011: 5251) suggests two reasons for the high unemployment rates in Egypt between 2004 and 2010: firstly, the increasing number of young people searching for their first job (92.1 percent of jobseekers in 2007); and secondly, the global financial crisis which affected the performance of the Egyptian labour market as well as the capital market in Egypt negatively

(ibid.). In Libya, the unemployment rate was similarly high, and ranged from 20 percent to 30 percent (House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee, 2012:17). According to Khan and Mezran, the reason for the increasing rate of unemployment was due to the state's dominating presence in the economy, with the public sector employing about 85 percent of people, thus depriving private businesses from hiring Libyans (2013:4). Abuhadra and Ajaali suggest that there are four main reasons for the rapid increase in the unemployment rate in Libya (2014:10): First, the rise in population growth at a rate of approximately 2.9 percent along with an increase in the number of new jobseekers; second, the education system's failure to respond to market needs, or to provide the competence and training to compete with foreign workers; third, the declining role of the state as an employer to provide jobs in public and private sectors; and fourth, Libyan state regulations marginalising the private sector (Abuhadra & Ajaali, 2014:11).

3. Social Justice and Corruption

The Arab region was marked by an absence of social justice, equal opportunities and equality among citizens, which caused Arabs to strive for social reforms, and human and political rights. Jamal and Robbins explain how social justice was among the key demands of protesters, for example, in Egypt people were chanting عيش، حرية، كرامة إنسانية/*'aish, huriyya, karma insaniyya,* which is translated as "bread, freedom and human dignity" (2015:5). Social injustices can be attributed to widely spread corruption in the region, where people close to the authorities take advantage of different resources and are treated as superior to others; as Lesch asserts "many ministers appointed in the mid-2000s promoted corruption on an unprecedented scale (2013:45)". He further illustrates that those ministers monopolized the public sector by selling large portions of it for their own benefits. Additionally, it was only wealthy people who were able to pay for the election campaign to run for parliament, thus businessmen who were close to Mubarak or to the cabinet ministers became MPs (Lesch, 2013). Jamal and Robbins also stress that "lack of social justice requires equal treatment by state institutions. Corruption

undermines this equality by giving those with greater financial means to pay bribes or those with more influential networks preferable treatment compared to those who lack such resources" (2015:13). This was also the situation in Libya, as Nkrumah (2017) notes, where Algaddafi's regime provided a sense of social justice, but fell short in terms of human rights. Lack of social justice in Libya is attributed to the high rate of corruption, giving people closer to the regime better lives and better opportunities (Shalqam, 2012). FeftaWijaya and Shariha remark, "the crisis of corruption in Libya has become the major cause accounting for why the ruling regime in Libya was unable to achieve its socio-economic and development objectives" (2016:19). Gelvin (2015:73) describes Libya as a kleptocracy, whereby the regime has shares in anything worth buying, selling or even owning. In addition, the regime donates money to influential tribes in Libya simply to gain their loyalty and support (ibid.).

2.4 The Power of Social Media

The Arab Spring was often presented as the 'social media revolution'. This is due to the essential role social media played during the uprising, and the way it was effectively employed to organize demonstrations and urge the people to participate. According to Bossio, "almost immediately, the Arab Spring protests garnered worldwide attention for the sheer volume of social media 'noise' the protests created" (2014:22). One cannot argue against the tremendous role social media plays in our globalized world today, when Twitter, Facebook, Blogosphere, etc. are not only used as tools to mobilise the public, but also as ways to broadcast news continuously and update the world with images, videos, stories, and live-feeds. According to Frangonikolopoulos and Chapsos, social media played a significant and protagonist role in changing governments and overthrowing regimes (2012:10). This came as a great surprise to people who had argued that social media is unlikely to "induce wide political change in the Middle East" (Lynch, 2015). And yet, according to Howard and Hussain, using social media facilitated the drastic political change in the region. Digital media provided an accessible tool

that allowed political parties to establish their goals (2013:18). For that reason, Adi (2014:27) believes that it indeed empowered people to freely state their opinions, and generate an enormous change; whereas Hirst (2012) argues that it is not feasible to link the success of the uprisings to technology and social media. He further claims that doing so stems from the lack of knowledge of the historical background of the region and familiarity with it; and that it marginalises the significant role and the actions of many participants (2012:3). In agreement with the latter, El-Mahdi (2014:52) argues that conceptualising the revolution as a 'sudden awakening' of the youth, who used social media to promote these protests, simply ignores the decades of attempts that paved the way for the success of this uprising. Likewise, Baker writes:

> Social media is an important space of protest that is permeated by various forms of translation, but its role in the Egyptian revolution has been seriously exaggerated in shallow analyses that claim the uprising was elite driven, planned and executed by a Twitter and Facebook generation (Baker & Guthrie, 2014 - cited in Baker, 2015:13).

In an attempt to study the way social media has been recognised as an independent media during the Arab Spring, Bebawi (2014:134) illustrates how using various social media platforms were beneficial to communicate and inform the world and the international community of events in their countries, which the mainstream news organisation neglected to highlight. She further states that social media is an 'amplified' tool that was used not only to mobilise protesters but also to spread news about real events and show them live with the help of mobile phones (ibid.).

In the specific case of the Egyptian revolution, Sanders (2012) points out that Egyptian people found Facebook, Twitter and the blogosphere as an alternative and new method of communication and mobilisation. Surprisingly perhaps, social media created a platform for political satire, where jokes were circulated on Facebook, Twitter and YouTube (Salem &

Taira, 2012). For Egyptians, uploading these jokes online gave them a sense of solidarity with the people, and enabled them to some extent to face the oppression they were experiencing (ibid.). Howard and Hussain highlight that Libya and Egypt tried to ban social media platforms such as Facebook and Twitter; and according to Laremont, Mubarak's regime shut down the Internet and mobile phone service in Egypt on 27 January 2011 which lasted for a few days (2013:69). The aim was to disrupt the main tool for communication between demonstrators and to stop them from organising any further protests (Williams, 2011). Libya, on the other hand, had always suffered media blackouts during Algaddafi's regime, but the news of the uprisings in its neighbouring countries were highly prominent on social media. Shalqam also emphasises the role of social media in conveying the news of atrocities and oppression committed by the regime to the outside world, and its role in organising demonstrations in Libya on 17 February 2011 (2012:576). On 18 February, the Libyan government cut off the Internet service in Libya to hinder any coordination or attempts to urge the youth to protest (Badoura, 2013:4). According to Gire (2014), the situation in Libya was different, as social media was first used to begin the revolution, and later, due to the severe Internet service disruption, it became a way of supplying the world with graphic images of the regime's violent treatment of the protesters. In the same context, Beaumont (2011) argues that social media rallied demonstrators, broadcasted messages from hospitals, provided international dial-up numbers for Libyans whose Internet was blocked, and also enabled activists to ask Egyptians to provide them with SIM cards allowing them to communicate away from the regime's surveillance.

2.5 The Aftermath of the Arab Spring

The 'unattainable' success of the Arab Spring revolutions and how they were 'hijacked' by Islamists or governments similar to the very ones they aimed to overthrow, has been much discussed (Al-Jaber, 2015:257). In fact, many political activists categorise the uprisings as failures; Bradley (2012:3) for example, believes that they were anything but democratic, and

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argues that some of them were merely Islamic movements that aimed to impose Islamic laws. On the other hand, some attribute the failure of the Arab Spring to the absence of democratic institutions that would facilitate a transition of power and monitor an election process (Brown, 2013). A different point of view is expressed by Dabashi, who states that the Arab Spring revolutions succeeded as they resulted in the ousting of the presidents in Tunisia and Egypt. Yet they left the ruling regime intact and created a catastrophe in Libya, where the UN and NATO military had to intervene to stop the bloodshed and to defeat Algaddafi (2012:5). Furthermore, Dabashi suggests that the brutality with which the Syrian uprising was met exposed the illegitimacy of the country's regime, its lethal nature and its forcefulness (ibid.:22).

Many politicians and analysts claim that the drastic changes in the Middle East have consequences that are yet to be seen. Haddad, Bsheer and Abu-Rish (2012) indicate some of these consequences as they draw attention to four concerns in the aftermath of the Arab Spring: firstly, the sudden and unprecedented protests that erupted in different Arab countries, which have different backgrounds and ruling histories; secondly, the different circumstances and outcomes in each of the countries that participated in the uprisings; thirdly, the role foreign powers played in interfering with these countries' internal affairs, and fourthly, the anticipation of further protests in other countries in the region (Haddad, Bsheer & Abu-Rish 2012:281). Regardless of the different outcomes each country witnessed, 2011 was an exceptional year for Arabs across the region, not only because they proved that they were willing to pay the price of freedom, but also because they proved to the world their ability to unite and fight for their beliefs, and their desire to change their reality.

2.6 The Rise and Fall of Two Arab Tyrants

> From before I was born, we Arabs have been caught between two forces that,
> seemingly, cannot be defeated: our ruthless dictators, who oppress and humiliate
> us, and the cynical western powers, who would rather see us ruled by criminals

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loyal to them than have democratically elected leaders accountable to us (Matar, 2011).

The Arab uprisings were an unstoppable wave to end tyranny in the region. Amongst the two Arab tyrants overthrown by the Arab Spring are Mummar Algaddafi in Libya, and Hosni Mubarak in Egypt. In the following I will provide accounts of both leaders and the uprisings against them.

2.6.1 Libya

This section aims to present a historical background about Algaddafi's life. It will also provide a detailed account of the Libyan uprising in 2011. This will be followed by an overview of Algaddafi's speeches throughout his presidency, which aims to give the reader a general sense as to how his speeches are structured and to identify any differences to the specific speech that forms the core point of analysis for this thesis.

2.6.1.1 The Enigma that is Algaddafi

Algaddafi was an internationally well-known leader, whose public perception varied due to his rather unusual persona. "The world came to know the Colonel in labels. 'The Mad Dog of the Middle East' was a popular one" (Jawad, 201:38). Mummar Mohammad Algaddafi was born in a tent in a rural area near the town of Sirte. His parents were nomadic Bedouins[1], who were not educated and did not keep birth records for him or his three older sisters. His date of birth is therefore unknown, but experts date it to 1942 or the spring of 1943 (Blundy & Lycett, 1987). He came from a weak and small tribe called Qaddadfa, which literally translates into 'spitters of blood' (Kawczynski, 2011). His upbringing in the desert in a Bedouin culture influenced his life choices. According to John, he was "a son of the desert, his childhood deeply affected his habits and personal life as an adult as well as the policies of his administration" (2012:135).

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[1] Bedouins are an Arab ethnocultural group who live in deserts; they are usually divided into tribes (Malcolm and Losleben, 2004).

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Algaddafi enrolled in the Royal Military Academy in Benghazi in 1963 and graduated in 1965 (ibid.). The 1 September 1969 was a defining day in Algaddafi's life: together with seventy officers who were later named the *Free Officers*, he led a successful revolution. The movement overthrew the monarchy, and Libya was declared a sovereign state, the *Libyan Arab Republic* (Blundy & Lycett 1987; Harris, 1986). In 1975, Algaddafi published *The Green Book*, which he considered the Libyan's constitution and he later changed Libya's name to *Great Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya*. Ham highlights, "jamahiriya has no direct translation but is generally taken to mean 'a state of the masses'" (2007:40).

During the four decades of Algaddafi's presidency, Libya endured economic sanctions, international isolation and constant dispute from many countries all over the world. In 1981, Ronald Reagan accused Libya of being involved in international terrorist activities, which eventually led to the suspension of diplomatic relations between the two countries. After the terrorist bombing in Berlin in 1986, the United States blamed Libya for orchestrating the bombing (Blundy & Lycett, 1987). Based on these accusations, the United States Air Force launched several air raids on different sites in Tripoli and Benghazi, bombing Algaddafi's presidential palace. In 1988, Libya was accused of involvement in the Lockerbie bombing in the United Kingdom, forcing the United Nations to impose international sanctions against Libya in 1992. The sanctions were only lifted in 2003, after Libya agreed to compensate the families of the victims of the Lockerbie bombing (Kawczynski, 2011; Conley, 2009). In 2007, Libya took presidency of the United Nations Security Council. In this regard, Levinson remarks "while Qaddafi keeps pressing for Libya's acceptance in the global community, Libya continues to operate outside international norms by jailing political prisoners, torturing detainees, and ignoring the rule of law" (2009:73). Among all Arab leaders, Algaddafi attempted to stand out as the patriot, a supporter of Arab nationalism and anti-Zionism. He also maintained good relations with other African countries, establishing the African Union, and

was later called the *King of the Kings* (John, 2012). Throughout all this, his controversial character was reflected in his erratic behaviour during world summits and his public appearances, specifically in his long speeches. Furthermore, his desire to stand out and look particularly different affected his wardrobe choices. He was famous for his unusual choice of outfits: naval uniforms, Arabian headdress and silky shirts and jumpsuits. There are images of Algaddafi wearing traditional African clothing, military regalia and uniforms, shirts he designed himself with African continent map motifs, or even a costume with a picture of the Libyan national hero Omar al-Mukhtar. Khatib remarks, "Qaddafi's fashion eccentricity and excess served to cement his reputation as 'that mad guy in Libya'" (2012: 186). Despite his bizarre taste in clothing, he was mainly dressed in traditional Libyan clothing during the Libyan uprising in 2011.

2.6.1.2 Libya: The Beginning of Algaddafi's Fall

The deteriorating situation and the violent oppression by the regime made Libya ripe for a revolution. The protests in Libya were sparked by years of corruption, international isolation and poverty. It is rather significant to emphasise that during Algaddafi's rule, all political parties were banned, thus there were no political activities or demonstrations, and any political activists were dealt with harshly, as Sullivan (2009:54) highlights:

> Qaddafi uses the death penalty as a weapon against those who engage in political activities that do not support his regime. This includes those who try to form political parties and even those who have left the country to speak openly about life in Libya.

Regardless of this fierce oppression, there was one famous protest, which took place in front of the Italian embassy on 17 February 2006. Paoletti claims that hundreds of Libyans gathered in Benghazi protesting against the drawings of Prophet Mohammad, whereby many were wounded and eleven people were killed (2010:130). Thus, choosing 17 February to mark the

beginning of the Libyan uprising was not coincidental, but based on the anniversary of the protest that had taken place in 2006 (Davis, 2016).The protests rapidly spread across the country, from Tripoli to Bani Walid to Al-Bayda, demanding a change of the regime. In contrast to the situation in other countries, the uprising in Libya started with armed citizens and the regimes' mercenaries ruling the streets. Algaddafi employed different tactics to silence the protests; he first arrested political activists, then released 110 Islamist political prisoners, and randomly distributed about 150,000 laptops to the youth as a way of bribing them to support him (John, 2012). On 17 February 2011, riots and demonstrations erupted in Benghazi, leading the day to be called the "Day of Rage" (ibid.). Despite speculations of Algaddafi fleeing to Venezuela - especially after witnessing the results of the uprisings in the neighbouring countries of Tunisia and Egypt - he instead chose to destroy the country and use the army to forcefully cease the uprising (Campbell, 2013). Government forces responded with live ammunition to the first demonstration that took place in Benghazi, killing approximately 100 civilians (Haddad, Bsheer & Abu-Rish, 2012:139; Hehir & Murray, 2013). On 18 February, Algaddafi made his first public appearance in a speech that lasted less than a minute. According to Pargeter (2012), Algaddafi's bizarre look in this first public appearance was proof of his shock, as he looked 'utterly stupefied' (2012:223). On 20 February, Algaddafi's son Saif Al-Islam, addressed the nation on a televised speech on behalf of his father, threatening Libyans with civil war, deprivation of oil, and bloodshed. Laremont describes the speech saying, "the noxious televised speech that Saif al-Islam made on the evening of 20 February 2011, did nothing to assuage the volatile situation but rather proved to be the straw that broke the camel's back" (2013: 81). Two days later, Algaddafi made his second appearance delivering one of the longest speeches, urging Libyan tribes to help him purify Libya. Commenting on the speech, Kawczynski highlights, "he claimed that many of the young people fighting his forces were

doing so as they had been given hallucinogenic drugs in their Nescafe and were being influenced by Al-Qaida" (2011: 242).

The regime began to gradually collapse due to the defection of many soldiers and important government personnel. On 20 February, Abdul Fatah Yunis, the Minister of Interior and one of Algaddafi's close assistants, defected from the regime. This was later followed by the defection of many of the regime's senior members, Libyan diplomats and ministers (Khatib & Lust, 2014). The violence increased, leading to more civilian killings, more oppression and constant clashes between the protesters and pro-Algaddafi forces. By the end of February, several cities started to announce their liberation from the regime, starting with Misurata, Benghazi, Tobruk and Al-Bayda. Nevertheless, Algaddafi's attitude towards the uprising was not one of defeat; he was meeting with tribes regularly, delivering countless speeches, even celebrating the national holidays. He was clearly not willing to step down, or to stop the bloodshed. Algaddafi's denial only deepened over time, as he started to publicly deny the existence of any demonstrations in the country. In an interview with Jeremy Bowen and Christiane Amanpour for the BBC (2011a), Algaddafi appeared, smiling and mocking them when they asked him about leaving the country. He blamed the protests on Al-Qaeda, and argued that he could not step down as he was not the president and the authority was with the people. When asked about the demonstrations, he strongly denied them and said: "They love me, all my people with me … they love me all, they will die to protect me, my people"[2].

However, the clashes between protesters and the regime increased and the killing of civilians and the destruction of the country had caught the world's attention. It was due to the dreadful situation in Libya that the UN authorized military intervention on 17 March 2011. The intervention was established in two steps; firstly, NATO initiated a no-fly zone over Libya, and

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[2] Algaddafi's interview on BBC dated 1 March 2011.

secondly, on 19 March, it started aerial attacks on government forces and Algaddafi's headquarters. This helped the rebel forces to liberate many Libyan cities and take charge of the government (Campbell, 2013; Hehir & Murray, 2013). During this time, Algaddafi was hiding in an unknown location in Tripoli, broadcasting recorded videos and phone calls that strongly condemned NATO's intervention, labelling it as an invasion. Trapped in Tripoli, Algaddafi and his forces started to lose control by early summer and were not able to sustain any attacks. At the end of June, the International Criminal Court (ICC) issued an arrest warrant for Algaddafi, his son Saif Al-Islam, and the military intelligence chief, on the grounds of killing innocent civilians and crimes against humanity (John, 2012:286). By mid-August, the rebels finally had full control over Tripoli and the country.

On 20 October, Algaddafi was travelling in his convoy to escape, when he was seen by NATO soldiers who launched two strikes, injuring his legs. Still resistant, he found his way through the desert and hid in a concrete sewage pipe, but was immediately found by the rebels, captured and killed on 20 October 2011 (Al-Saleh, 2015:114). With blood spattered all over his face, Algaddafi was completely shocked as to what was happening and asked the rebels "what did I do to you?", "For all the self-imagined glories of his forty-year reign, this was the most ignominious and ignoble of deaths" (Pargeter, 2012:244-245).

2.6.1.3 Mummar Algaddafi's Speeches

Throughout the years, Algaddafi's speeches became known to be incoherent, bold, sarcastic, and very lengthy (Leonard, 2009). The duration of his speeches was usually too long for political speeches; they would last for almost an hour and sometimes exceed that. Algaddafi's speeches were always improvised, and are characterised as highly rhetorical due to his tendency to constantly use manipulative language (El Samie, 2016:7). He regularly used irony, humour, metaphors and quotations. During his speech to the Arab League summit in Algeria in 2005, for example, he starts laughing and accusing both Palestinians and Israelis of being 'stupid'

(AlArabiya, Feb 2011). He was also known to interfere with the interpreter's role, pausing the speech to listen to the way the interpreter dealt with certain terminology, and for his significant body language, for instance, when he threw a book while addressing the UN Council in 2009, and then started waving at the crowds and pointing his fingers in their direction (Pargeter, 2012; Qadhadhfa, 2012).

During the Arab Spring, a few days before demonstrations started in Libya, Algaddafi addressed the protesters in the neighbouring uprising countries, in an attempt to put an end to the protests and work with the country's government to find appropriate solutions. Algaddafi also addressed the Tunisian people and warned that they will suffer because of their childish actions. Once the demonstrations erupted in Libya, Algaddafi made countless appearances, delivering many speeches and conducting many interviews, for instance with the BBC and France 24 (BBC, 2011a and France 24, 2011).

Algaddafi gave a long and uncountable series of rambling speeches and continued to speak publicly until he was captured and killed. In all of his speeches, which can perhaps be characterised as dramatic and fiery, he spoke Libyan Colloquial Arabic (LCA). He always addressed different tribes, various events, and sometimes even told stories. He delivered more than 20 speeches during the eight months of ongoing demonstrations against him. His speeches varied in their importance as well as their goal. While some were televised and aired live, others were previously recorded, and some were audio messages to the people broadcasted live on state television. It could be argued that the purpose of Algaddafi's continuous appearances was to prove to the Western and Arab media that he was still in power and present in Libya. His speeches revolved around different aspects, addressing the situation in Libya, drug abuse in Libya and sometimes just to celebrate a national Libyan holiday. He deliberately targeted specific tribes and addressed them in an entire speech, simply to gain their support and to help him stop the revolution. At other times, he addressed the world, the European nations, the

United States and the Arab countries. He started by saluting the Libyan youth, encouraging them to fight for their country and defeat colonisation. He cheered and chanted along with the crowd, and even blew kisses to them (BBC, Feb 2011b). Sarcasm was always one of the main elements that characterised Algaddafi's speeches; he would mock a particular issue or an individual or simply laugh at their outrageous accusations. Moreover, his speeches were full of foul and inappropriate language. The absurdity and shallowness of Algaddafi's speeches increased with his constant attempts to cover up the revolution in Libya. It reached a point at which the media began to regard them as meaningless. Nevertheless, the non-stop succession of Algaddafi's bizarre speeches during the uprising was closely followed by many Western media outlets.

2.6.2 Egypt

This section will discuss some of Hosni Mubarak's history and provide some detail of his life as a president. It will also provide an outline of the Egyptian revolution, its beginnings and how it unfolded following Mubarak's resignation. It will lastly discuss Mubarak's previous speeches during his presidency and the uprising.

2.6.2.1 Mubarak: Egypt's 'Pharaoh'

Mohammad Hosni Mubarak was born on 4 May 1928 in Kafr El-Meselha, in Northern Egypt (Perkins, 2010). Born to a humble family with no privileges, Mubarak decided that the best way to a successful career was to join the military (Darraj & Cox, 2009:36). He joined the Egyptian Military Academy in November 1947, and graduated with a Bachelor degree in Military Science in 1949 (ibid.). He later joined the Air Force Academy where he was awarded a degree in Aviation Sciences and became a certified pilot in the Egyptian Air Force (Solecki, 1990). By 1972, Mubarak was appointed the Commander of the Egyptian Air Force and Deputy Minister of Defence (Perkins, 2010). During the war in October 1973, Mubarak designed and

executed a military operation that was regarded as the only successful one against Israeli forces conducted by an Arab military (Perkins, 2010). Mubarak was seen as a national hero due to the successful air attack the Air Force launched, and the successful negotiation, which resulted in the return of the Sinai Peninsula – which was occupied by Israel at the time – to Egyptian control (Darraj & Cox, 2009; Arafat, 2011). Mubarak continued to be successful when Sadat[3] appointed him as the Vice President of Egypt in April 1957. In this position, he gained a lot of experience in dealing with political disputes and developed good relations with important figures, both in the Arab region and internationally. After the assassination of President Sadat in October 1981, Mubarak was quickly elected to be the fourth president of Egypt. According to Ranko, unlike Nasser and Sadat, Mubarak was not a good speaker, had no charisma, and seemed dull (2014:76). He further suggests that although Mubarak wanted to create a new image of the presidency, he eventually continued to use the same oppressing tools used by the previous presidents (ibid.). In this regard, Cook (2007:74) argues, the dominance of Mubarak's regime highly depended on the unquestioned loyalty of the military to the president. Mubarak strengthened this loyalty by maintaining a system of privilege for the military leadership, whereby the country is ruled by 'one of their own' (Cook, 2007:77).

Throughout his thirty years of presidency, Mubarak had achievements on different levels - in telecommunication, education, industry, economy, and internationally. He succeeded in having Egypt readmitted to the Arab League in 1989 after its suspension[4] (Osman, 2010). Additionally, he played an important role in the region, and was widely known as a wise and powerful Arab leader with great personal authority. In fact, his tribute to the Gulf War in 1991 helped him reduce Egypt's debt by $14 billion (Smith, 1999). And yet, after years of ruling the country, Mubarak failed to find solutions to increasing corruption, severe poverty and socio-

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[3] Anwar Sadat, the third president of Egypt.
[4] Egypt was suspended from the Arab League in 1979 when Sadat signed a peace treaty with Israel.

economic problems. According to Al Aswany, "the level of corruption in government circle was unprecedented in the history of Egypt. A small group of businessmen, mostly friends of Gamal Mubarak, had complete control of the Egyptian economy and were running it in their own interests" (2011:vii). It was estimated that forty million Egyptians - almost half of the population - were living below the poverty line (Al Aswany, 2011:vii). Whilst Mubarak and his regime monopolised the power and the country's wealth, Egypt was in decline on many levels, from health and education, to economy and foreign policy (ibid.). In 2000, rumours spread about Mubarak's preparation of his son Gamal to inherit Egypt's presidency. Gamal's preparation had started when he was appointed by his father as the General Secretariat of the ruling National Democratic Party in 2002, making him the second most powerful man in the country (Sadiki, 2009). The succession campaign was highly rejected by Egyptians, as they had never thought of Egypt as a monarchical republic in which the throne is inherited, and so they started an opposition movement to stop any transition of power within the Mubarak family (Sharp, 2011:17; Al Aswany, 2011).

2.6.2.2 Egypt's New Era: January 25th Revolution

Throughout the years, there were many demonstrations and political movements in Egypt that were unable to create the desired change. Osman (2010) states that suppression was evidently the main response to any demonstration or protest, and sometimes people were subjected to torture, or they simply disappeared. One of the most prominent movements was *Kefaya* / كفاية (translates to Enough) movement, which was established in 2004/2005, uniting several political parties in Egypt, and demanding the rotation of power (Oweidat, Benard, Stahl, Kildani & O'Connell, 2008: viii). In addition, *Kefaya* demanded political reform and an end to the emergency law and any other laws that constrain the public's freedom (Jones, 2007:16). According to Gelvin, *Kefaya* was the first group that demanded Mubarak's resignation (2015). Oweidat et al. (2008) observe that the emergence of *Kefaya* was initially successful for the

following reasons: first, its simplicity in delivering the message; second, the way it united Egyptians regardless of their political differences; and third, the way it spread its messages by using new technology, such as text messages, using blogs, Facebook and Twitter (ibid.). One of *Kefaya's* great achievements was the change in public attitude towards confronting the regime and directly opposing the government (Oweidat et al., 2008).

Unlike *Kefaya*, there were other organisations and campaigns that did not necessarily identify themselves as political, or as anti-Mubarak such as the '*April 6 Youth Movement*', or the Facebook Page '*We are all Khaled Said*' (El-Mahdi, 2014:64). According to El-Mahdi, on the surface the 'We are all Khaled Said' group stressed that they were apolitical and not anti-regime, "but in reality they were striking at the very heart of the regime" (2014:66). It was in June 2010, when a horrifying image of Khaled Said's deformed face and tortured body was widely spread across the Internet (El-Mahdi, 2014:64); as a response, Wael Ghonim – Egyptian activist and Google Executive - created a Facebook page entitled 'كلنا خالد سعيد' (*We are all Khaled Said*), to document Said's murder (Wolfson & Funke, 2015:61). Ghonim (2012) points out that the brutal death of Khaled Said went viral in Egypt because two police officers tortured and killed him. Ghonim further claims that Said's death was mainly attributed to a video he took of two police officers, who were dealing with seized marijuana and dividing the money between themselves (ibid.:65). El-Mahdi (2014) explains how the brutality against Said - who was neither an activist nor a criminal - caused many young people who were able to relate to his story, to join this page, criticise his death and demand a fair trial. Taha and Combs (2012:84) suggest that Ghonim effectively employed his Facebook page during the uprising, and was regarded as one of the masterminds behind the protests on 25 January 2011.

Similarly, حركة شباب 6 أبريل/ *The April 6 Youth Movement* was regarded as Egypt's first cyber-protest movement[5] and was founded in 2008 (Shahin, 2012). The movement was associated with the youth who were highly dependent on the Internet for mobilisation (El-Mahdi, 2014:57). It was named after its first protest on 6 April 2008 in al-Mahalla Al-Kubra, an industrial city in the Nile Delta (Shahin, 2012:61). The protest aimed to support worker's right, and to strike against work conditions and low salaries (Jamal & Khatib, 2013: 246). El-Nawawy and Khamis indicate that it was estimated that more than seventy-thousand people were striking on 6 April, demanding better work conditions and better salaries (2013:83). The webpage was similarly used during the uprising on 25 January, to promote the protests (Zhuo, Wellman & Yu, 2011).

After witnessing the revolution in Tunisia, and under consideration of the poor social conditions Egypt was experiencing - poverty, corruption, diseases, oppression, lack of healthcare, unemployment and deteriorating education - many Egyptian activists called for a protest against the current regime (Al Aswany, 2011). According to Gelvin "there were several groups calling for protests on 25 January. One included activists from the youth wings of political parties and the Muslim Brotherhood, along with labour organisers" (2015:44). Regardless of their different political views, they all had one main goal and one slogan '*the regime must go*' (ibid.). These organisations used social media as the main platform to facilitate the mobilisation process. For Martens-Edwards (2014:187), social media platforms indeed expedite the mass mobilisation that benefited the revolution, as they have been widely used to spread the message about the protests and have been used to urge people to join in the demonstration. Frangonikolopoulos and Chapsos stress that protesters used the Internet in

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[5] The movement used Facebook, blogging and Twitter to plan the protest and cover its events (Radsch, 2008).

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Cairo to gain support for a petition calling for political reforms, as well as organising non-violent demonstrations against the regime (2011:12).

A wave of demonstrations erupted on 25 January 2011, the National Police Day in Egypt, to express people's outrage over police brutality (Cook, 2011). Protesters went to Tahrir Square in Cairo, and other protests broke out in the cities of Mansura, Alexandria, Aswan and Tanta (Davis, 2016). Deillon describes the revolution as 'extraordinary', simply because it was the first time that protesters were not just political activists, but thousands of ordinary Egyptians (2011:3). Protesters camped in Tahrir Square causing a number of clashes between them and the police, which the police later blamed on the Muslim Brotherhood claiming that they had provoked the events (Bal, 2014). According to Bal, as Egyptians were getting prepared for the 'Day of Rage' on Friday 28 January, the government blocked Facebook, (2014:148), and the communication services were deliberately disrupted to dismantle the protesters' mobilisation (Gerbaudo, 2013). On 28 January, after Friday prayers, a huge mass of people took to the streets; in Cairo alone, for instance, which involved more than 200,000 people (Gerbaudo, 2013:27). There were reports of arrests, clashes between protesters and the police, and reports of deaths and wounded people (Bal, 2014). El-Ghobashy states that the preliminary estimate of casualties was about 365 killed citizens, and around 5,000 injured (2012:38). The protests continued, but the police retreated from the streets (Bakr, 2012).

As a response to the protests and in an attempt to contain the situation, Mubarak addressed the nation in his first speech on 29 January. In the meantime, clashes increased between protesters, the police as well as what was referred to as البلطجية/ *baltagiya*[6]. Regardless of the curfew imposed by the military, protesters remained in Tahrir Square and camped there refusing to leave. Two days later, another march with two million protestors took place in

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[6] Baltajia is a common word used in Egypt to refer to thugs and gangs (Sharp, 2011:7).

Tahrir Square (Bal, 2014). On 1 February, Mubarak addressed the nation for the second time, only to disappoint the protesters by refusing to step down, as a result of which clashes arose again between protesters and pro-Mubarak demonstrators, causing more casualties. The situation deteriorated as protesters were frustrated, angry and refused to leave Tahrir Square. The following day, the *Battle of Camel* occurred: Pro-Mubarak supporters charged into the Square, riding camels and horses, killing and injuring many civilians. Taha and Combs describe the scene as follows, "when thugs hired by the aged president's partisans enter Tahrir on their camels and horses wielding swords and injuring demonstrators in as scene reminiscent of medieval battles" (2012:84). On 4 February, the so called "Day of Departure", protesters organised another demonstration in Tahrir Square with an estimated 15,000 – 25,000 participants (Cook, 2011:284). Several days later, Mubarak addressed the nation yet again, repeating his promises and leaving the nation in shock as protesters believed that he was going to step down. As frustration increased among protesters, they decided to march to the Presidential Palace the following morning (Taha & Combs, 2012). However, Mubarak finally decided to step down on 11 February, when Omar Suleiman[7] announced that the President had just resigned (Al-Saleh, 2015). Lindsey (2012:53) describes the revolution and Mubarak's resignation, saying:

> It took eighteen days of mass mobilization, the deaths of hundreds and the wounding of thousands, the crippling of Egypt's tourism industry, and the crash of its stock market, to bring an end to a thirty –year presidency of Husni Mubarak. And almost every minute of the revolution was televised.

2.6.2.3 Hosni Mubarak's Speeches

Unlike Algaddafi, Mubarak was not a controversial figure. He always dressed in an official suit during all of his speeches, and delivered them in the presidential office in Heliopolis in Cairo,

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[7] Omar Suleiman was the vice president of Egypt and chief of intelligence.

standing beside the Egyptian flag and speaking in front of a podium. The speeches were often broadcast live to the nation on the official Egyptian State television. During all of his speeches, he spoke in very eloquent Standard Arabic, speaking in a steady voice, sometimes with a higher pitch or tone, yet without any screaming or shouting. The duration of the speeches was approximately between 15 to 20 minutes. It is relatively important to refer to Mubarak's body language during his speeches, in particular his hand gestures, which was understood as threatening at times, and directive at others, especially in his last speech (Abdulrazq, 2015). Mubarak's speeches were all reported in Arab and Western media. According to Dunne (2003:49), Mubarak always played an active role in preparing his speeches by sketching the main themes he intended to discuss, so that he rarely had to improvise. Mubarak had many writers who helped him write his speeches, among them Anis Mansour, Samer Rajb, Mkram Mohammad Ahmed and Dr Ahmed Omar (Albawabh News, 2014). Each writer was assigned to specific subjects with which they were familiar. During an interview with Mkram Mohammad Ahmed, he claimed that he did not write Mubarak's emotional speech on 10 February, and insisted that the speech was written by Mubarak's son Jamal and the Minister of Information Anas Al-Fiqqi (AlHayah Network, Nov 2013).

The speeches always began with the *Basmala* and ended with a prayer for Egypt. *Basmala* is a famous religious phrase that is said by all Muslims before reciting the Qur'an. It is also used in a different context, as in to praise Allah before doing something, for example, as it is believed to bless the person and to keep Satan away (Rafiabadi:2003:179), it reads as follow:

<div align="center">

بسم الله الرحمن الرحيم

In the name of god, the most gracious, and the most merciful.

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Mubarak's speeches were creatively structured to address current issues that the demonstrators particularly concerned (Abdu-Latif, 2012). According to Abdu-Latif, Mubarak's three

speeches during the uprising can be considered his best, as he channelled all his rhetoric and performative talents into them (2012). On the other hand, El-Bendary believes that Mubarak's speeches were "old wine in a new glass" (2013:41).

In an attempt to stop the horrendous situation of constant killing and sabotaging, and to cease the demonstrations in Egypt, Mubarak gave several speeches and interviews trying to maintain stability in the country. Throughout the 18 days of the revolution, Mubarak delivered three speeches, and each speech carried a particular message and had its own recognisable features. In his first speech, Mubarak stated his acceptance of the freedom to protest peacefully, however, he also accused some of the protesters of their bad intentions to ruin Egypt; and announced that he dismissed the current government and was willing to seek political reforms (Bal, 2014). On 1 February 2011, Mubarak delivered his second speech in an attempt to calm down the demonstrations, desperately urging people to stop the destruction and to protect Egypt. In his second speech, Mubarak blamed foreign dictations and certain political parties for aiming to sabotage the country. He announced that he was willing to engage in a dialogue with the people of the country to find solutions to their problems, and that he would not run for the upcoming election. Lindsey states, "Mubarak's speech on 1 February, in which he emphasised his years of service to the country in the air force and political office and spoke of his desire to end his life in Egypt genuinely moved many Egyptians" (2012:56). It was later followed by his last speech, which was aired on 10 February 2011. Similar to the other speeches, his third speech was not as promising as the people camping in Tahrir Square had hoped for, since they were anticipating the president's resignation. Lindsey remarks, "his third TV appearance, in which he pointedly did not resign, infuriated protesters with its utter tone-deafness" (2012:61). In fact, Egyptians considered this speech incoherent and poorly structured (ibid.).

It is important to mention that Mubarak's speeches were characterised by different levels of power and authority. His first two speeches were structured with a threatening technique, as the speeches were affirmative, intimidating and demanding. However, when the political situation escalated after his first speech, Mubarak decided to be more persuasive to win the Egyptian people over again. While the first speech was mainly informative as Mubarak promised the protesters changes, the second speech was the most emotional speech and impacted on many Egyptians' emotions. According to Taha and Combs (2012:83), Mubarak's second speech was considered an emotional appeal, and created a sense of sympathy for Egypt's ageing leader. In his last speech, however, Mubarak tried to appeal to the public to remain in power. Following the *Basmala*, Mubarak started his last speech with a different greeting which demonstrated a sense of national belonging, solidarity and affection.[8] In addition, he repeated the phrase من القلب */from my heart*, a number of times during his last speech, possibly to demonstrate his sincerity.

2.7 Conclusion

This chapter attempted to draw a picture of the Arab Spring and indicate some of the reasons behind the events, such as poverty and social justice. It has briefly covered five Arab revolutions and they are: Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, Syria and Yemen. The chapter highlighted the role of social media during these uprising and how it helped to mobilize the masses, followed by a brief discussion of the Arab Spring aftermath. The chapter also provides essential knowledge about both presidents, which will help the reader to gain a better understanding of their linguistic choices, of the way they chose to present themselves during the speeches, and

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[8] 1. In the first speech dated 28 January 2011, he started his speech with the *Basmala* and then said الاخوة المواطنون ، اتحدث اليكم في ظرف دقيق/ *Dear fellow citizens I address you today during a very critical time.*
2. In the second speech dated February 1, [2011], after *Basmala,* he then said الاخوة المواطنون، اتحدث اليكم في أوقات صعبة/ *Dear fellow citizens I address you today during these difficult times.*
3. In the third speech on February 10, 2011, he said الاخوة المواطنون، الأبناء شباب مصر و شاباتها ... اتحدث اليكم جمعيا بحديث من القلب/ *Dear fellow citizens, my sons, the youth of Egypt boys and girls, I am addressing my speech today to the youth of Egypt in Tahrir Square and all over the land. I am addressing you all from my heart.*

of their ideologies. The next chapter will discuss the notion of political discourse and its features in English and Arabic.

Chapter Three

Political Discourse

3.1 Introduction

During the Arab Spring, political language - presidential speeches in particular - varied in their importance, style, and in the linguistic tools that were employed when writing them. It is, thus, essential to highlight the vital role that language plays in the political sphere and to assess how it can be employed to change the public's opinion. This chapter is divided into two sections. In the first section, I will define political discourse in general, and differentiate between discourse and political discourse, focusing on political speeches. I will also present various strategies used by politicians to empower themselves by using linguistic features to persuade and manipulate the public. It is essential to distinguish between features and strategies of political speeches, whereby features are mainly the linguistic tools used by the speaker, whereas strategies are the way in which these tools are applied by the speaker. The second section will highlight common features used in political speeches in English and Arabic, as understanding the specificity of Arabic political discourse will shed light on how Algaddafi and Mubarak used specific linguistic tools in their speeches.

The aim of this chapter is to examine the ways in which Arabic features of political speeches were translated into English political discourse. By conducting a comparative analysis of the STs, i.e. the speeches given by Algaddafi and Mubarak, and their TTs in English, I will identify linguistic and cultural issues that translators are likely to face when doing similar translations in the future. Furthermore, this analysis will help us to understand the reception of the speeches in the first instance, and it will indicate potential misinterpretations of the speeches. This will contribute to the existing knowledge in the field of Translation Studies in

the following ways: (1) the thesis will expand our understanding of the ways in which political speeches are translated and the extent to which translations could be affected by homogenic political discourses in translating languages; (2) it will contribute to the existing knowledge of translating different dialects and styles of Arabic into English; (3) it will enhance our knowledge of translating one ST into a variety of media and genres and how it evidently changes its purpose.

3.2 Political Discourse

> Political language is a language of power. It influences government policy and actions, identifies the dominant values of the moment, and wins votes. Likewise, it is a language that is capable of making war, establishing needs of its users at a particular time. Thus, it has a reputation for being flexible and ambiguous or, worse (Goshgarian, 2011:426).

The urge to study political language dates back to ancient Greek and Roman times, where it was referred to as the study of 'political sciences' (Perloff, 2013:100). Throughout the years, the field has developed continuously. In the late seventeenth century, Hobbes introduced modern political philosophy, which is now considered to be the foundation of the discipline of political sciences (Claeys, 2013:776). In the following years, the notion of politics was linked to language and introduced by many pioneers as the study of 'political language' (ibid.). Scholars such as Lasswell (1949), argued that political language is seen as a language of influence since it aims to make an impact on people. Therefore, van Dijk claims, the language of politics is indeed the language of power (2006b:362). According to Schäffner and Chilton (1999), in order to develop the field of political discourse, it is fundamental to study political discourse in depth since it is regarded as a complex human activity. Scholars further emphasise the importance of studying political language in association with other important elements that may affect it, such as culture and audience. Even though some scholars believe that it is

notoriously difficult to define the concept of political discourse as it has a broad range of meanings, others argue that it concerns anything said in public in relation to the political sphere.

Feldman and Landtsheer (1998) state that the most common term referring to communication carried out in the political field is the term 'political discourse'. They define it as a way of using language in public communication, be it in newspapers, television, radio stations, parliamentary debates and election speeches, etc. (ibid.:5). The language used in political discourse usually conveys power, as it aims to evoke a reaction by the public (ibid.). In this light, Chilton maintains that political discourse is perceived in two different ways: firstly, as a constant struggle between people who fight to obtain and assert power and those who stand up to it; and secondly, "as a cooperation, as the practices and institutions that a society has for resolving clashes of interest over money influence liberty and the like" (2004: 3).

3.2.1 Political Speeches

Political speeches, as asserted by Schäffner, share the same genre and characteristics as any political discourse, but may fall into a sub-genre. She further claims that political speeches might share similar ideologies, and similar purpose (e.g. to persuade the public), but they often have different settings, for example, when politicians address their nation in a televised recording (1996). Moreover, Schäffner emphasises that it is essential to create an analysis involving the following criteria: pragmatics, semantics, syntax and phonetics to examine political speeches, due to their communicative nature (ibid.:3). The significance of this sort of analysis is attributed to the rhetorical nature of political speeches.

Language in political speeches is commonly characterised as a sophisticated, powerful and ambiguous type of language because it is rich in cultural and ideological elements. Similarly, to other disciplines, political language consists of terms, jargons and slogans that may vary in meaning from one country to another, and are used to achieve specific political

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aims. In addition, a crucial feature of political speeches is the speaker's tendency to use rhetorical language. It is described by Woodward and Denton Jr (2009) as the type of language that defends the attitudes, beliefs and values of politicians, whereas Beard (2000:35) defines it as the art of persuasion through language in a written or a spoken form. According to David (2014), rhetorical language is conceived by many scholars as an approach of linguistic manipulation using persuasive language techniques that drive people to take certain political actions, and be persuaded by what politicians say. Thus, it is common among politicians and the writers of political speeches to utilise a range of powerful techniques such as allusion, metaphor and repetition in their speeches (Atkinson, 2005). It has, in fact, become commonplace for politicians to use speechwriters' assistance to help them in structuring their speeches and in choosing the most appropriate and effective terminology. Bonner (2012) asserts that several speechwriters are usually employed to assist presidents and prime ministers in writing their speeches, as was previously discussed in section 2.7.2.3 in reference to Mubarak's speeches.

3.2.2 English Political Discourse

Many linguists (e.g. Edelman, 1977; Bolinger, 1980; Fairclough, 1989; Arnold, 1993; Thomans & Wareing, 1999; van Dijk 1997b, 1998, etc.) have examined various techniques and types of languages politicians use to express and reinforce their ideologies to the public and to attain certain objectives (David, 2014:165). In political discourses, van Dijk notes, there are crucial elements that help to draw and hold the attention of the audience, and persuade them of certain views (1997b). Charteris-Black (2005) emphasises that successful politicians combine these elements effectively to create a better impact and achieve their intended goals. In the following I will provide an account of some prominent features of political discourse in English, namely metaphors, metonymy, pronouns, intertextuality, repetition and style.

1. Metaphor

One of the most common linguistic tools found in English political rhetoric is the use of metaphors. According to Kulo, metaphors are linguistic symbols that give concrete labels to abstract ideas (2009:3). Metaphors are defined as the "figure of speech in which a word or phrase literally denoting one kind of object or idea is used in place of another to suggest a likeness or analogy between them" (Merriam-Webster 2014). According to Stepanyan, linguists consider metaphors as the most persuasive device in political discourse, and the easiest way to reach peoples' consciousness (2015:371). In a similar context, Mio notes, "metaphors allow the general public to grasp the meanings of political events and feel part of the process" (1997:117-118). This is especially true since using metaphors can make a speech more memorable, and can evoke an emotional response (Penninck, 2014:28). Lakoff (1991) argues that the importance of metaphor in politics is not just about what it represents, but also what it conceals. For instance, during the first Gulf War, countries were referred to as a person, each of which has hidden economic, religious and class divergences, they can be peaceful or aggressive (ibid.:3). Metaphors in English political discourse may project particular ideological and political beliefs in an indirect way (Beard, 2000). Beard also suggests that there are two main sources of metaphors in politics: war and sport (ibid). He further explains that the usage of war or sport terminology to refer to a political event may reflect the idea of a fight in which there is a winning party. An example of that is the announcement of the 1997 election results in the UK, which was referred to in newspapers as 'The Gloves Are Off", clearly suggesting that some sort of boxing match had taken place (Beard, 2000:21).

2. Metonymy

Metonymy is another feature that is often used in political speeches. According to Beard (2000), metonymy is the act of replacing a word with a particular term or expression that may be related to it. Lakoff and Johnson (2003:35) illustrate that metonymy is produced when people understand one conceptual entity from another. The representation of a concept using a particular word is referred to as metonymy, whereby the word stands for the concept it expresses, thus metonymy can structure our language, thoughts, attitudes and actions (ibid.:39). In political discourse, Wilson suggests, metonymy helps "in arousing emotions and reinforcing particular perspectives, and results in eliciting absurd images which can then be employed for the purposes of ridiculing one's opponent" (1990:104). Stepanyan also remarks that metonymy is closely linked to the speaker's image, since it is a unique rhetorical device that either increases or decreases the speaker's responsibility (2015:378). It helps to perceive political images and simplify their meaning in a focused manner (ibid.). Beard asserts that metonymy is widely used by politicians to simplify their utterances and make them more readable in newspapers (2000). An example of metonymy, which is used by both politicians and newspapers, is the use of the term 'The White House' to refer to the President of the United States, his government and advisors (Beard, 2000:19).

3. Pronouns

Speakers of English tend to use pronouns to emphasise specific points by replacing relevant nouns. Håkansson defines pronouns as "groups of words that are able to appear in the place of other words, most often nouns, other pronouns or noun phrase", and often used to avoid repetition (2012:5). According to Collins, there are several types of pronouns: personal, reflexive, possessive, indefinite, demonstrative, reciprocal, relative and interrogative (1990:28). Using pronouns - whether in utterances or in writing - aims to replace nouns to avoid monotony and boredom when constantly repeated (Sharndama, 2015:21). Bramley, however,

argues that the importance of pronouns goes beyond their linguistic function, and must be analysed in terms of their context, interaction and identity (2001:13). Likewise, Sharndama (2015:21) claims that using personal pronoun can be a way of reflecting ideological references. In political speeches, the use of pronouns can at times be manipulative, since it generates political stances such as solidarity (Chilton & Schäffner, 2002:30). Bello describes pronouns as linguistic tools used to relate to identities, foster group solidarity and, most importantly, to indirectly promote and sustain power (2013:85). Gocheco similarly suggests that using the pronoun *we* is a strategy to express solidarity, whereas using the pronoun *I* is used to refer to the speaker's power (2012:7). Irimiea believes that using pronouns in political speeches is a significant part of the message (2010:4). She argues that politicians use pronouns in their speeches to "foreground or to obscure responsibility and agency" (ibid.:50), since they usually represent political groups or parties. In a similar context, Al-Faki relates personal pronouns to power and solidarity (2014:191). According to Fairclough, leaders usually use the personal pronoun *we* to convey their humbleness (1989:12), whilst Bramley suggests that the pronoun *I* aims to present politicians as individuals and to highlight their accomplishments, whereas using the pronoun *we* is used to invoke a group membership or a collective identity (2001:260-266). Winston Churchill's speech during the Second World War can serve as an example for the use of pronouns in political speeches; he repeatedly uses the pronoun '*we*' to refer to the entire country, saying "We shall fight on the beach, we shall fight on the landing grounds" (Wilson, 1990:47).

4. Intertextuality

Intertextuality is another common feature of English political discourse, often associated with the speaker's knowledge (Beard, 2000). "Intertextuality is one of the important political communicative strategies ... which involves borrowing from previous texts or text-types in creating a new one" (Obeng, 2002:9). It is recognised through the use of different linguistic

strategies such as allusion, quotation, and reference within the text to serve precise pragmatic functions (Genette, 1983). An allusion, as described by Hebel (in Plett 1991:139), is an implicit, hidden or indirect reference or quotation, borrowed from another text but not literally expressed. An allusion is an effective linguistic tool that can be used to avoid direct, threatening acts (David, 2014:166). To illustrate the use of allusions in English political discourse, David (ibid.) highlights how Ronald Reagan's speechwriter[9] borrowed an image from a poem by John Gillespie Magee to refer to the space shuttle explosion disaster in 1986, saying:

> We will never forget them (the crew), nor the last time we saw them this morning, as they prepared for their journey and waved goodbye, and slipped the surely bonds of earth, to touch the face of God.

A quotation, on the other hand, is the reproduction of an utterance made by another person (Hebel in Plett, 1991:139). And the use of references clarifies a point by referring to a certain entity (ibid.), for instance, when the speaker refers to well-known historical or social events without quoting them directly (Guerra, 2013:60). In this regard, van Dijk notes (1997c), using references to information or knowledge, personal experience or observation has variable implications for the speaker's credibility.

It can be suggested that there has been an increase in the use of intertextuality in multimodal media texts in the past decade. For example, the texts published online often include hyperlinks to a multitude of other visual and written texts in different genres and media. Dresang (2008) writes that multimodal texts are a combination of their digital design and intertextual elements. This is also the case in political discourse, according to Busch, as political discourse is now influenced by the new media and started incorporating new modes such as social media and emails (2009:582).

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[9] Peggy Noonan was Reagan's speechwriter (David, 2014:166).

5. Repetition

Repetition is an effective tool often used by politicians. McArthur and McArthur (1992:861) suggest that repetition is understood as doing, saying or writing the same thing more than once. In respect to the use of repetition in the political sphere, Obeng and Hartford rightly observe (2002: 85), the art of persuasion involves integrating many rhetorical features into the political discourse such as repetition, to enhance the perception of the discourse and attract the addressee. Charteris-Black writes that although repetition is a simple technique, it is indeed very effective and conveys determination and strength of purpose (2014:68). Similarly, David (2014:167) stresses that repetition is one of the most effective rhetorical tools that manipulate the public to create an 'ideology' and persuade them to willingly accept it. While Jones and Wareing stress that repeating particular phrases may "contribute towards making the ideas contained in them seem 'common sense'" (1999:39), Beard argues that repetition of words, nouns, or even prepositions holds long speeches together, regardless of its simplicity (2000:39). He further highlights a specific type of repetition - namely three-part lists - which occurs when new ideas or pieces of information are presented in threes (2000:38), such as, for instance, Churchill's '*blood, sweat, and tears*' (Kulo, 2009:7).

6. Style

Charteris-Black draws attention to another feature in political discourse, distinguishing each speaker according to their 'style'. This can differ from the mere analysis of 'delivery' as speakers always distinguish themselves with their unique style and can be seen in the way they structure their speech, the way they use the settings to their advantage and the language they used. For instance, Martin Luther King's style is identified as 'African American liturgical', which involves the blending of cultural and historical experience (2013:30). In his studies of political speeches, Charteris-Black introduces the 'conviction rhetoric', which he defines as the way speakers portray their strong sense of purpose and self-belief by their choice of words,

figure of speech, fluency and intensity of expression (ibid.:108). Charteris-Black (2011:223) refers to Tony Blair's speech about Saddam Hussain and the Iraqi regime as a prominent example.

3.3 Arabic Political Discourse

The Arabic language has been characterised by its "phonetic beauty, rich synonyms, rhythmic cadence" and its complexity (Gannon & Pillai, 2013:71). Sharabi (1966) argues that Arabic is a powerful language that can be a very effective tool in a politician's hand, but that it may lose its effect when translated into another language as translation can convey meaning but it can be difficult to deliver other important elements, such as psychological associations and allusions. This section is divided into two subsections, each of which examines a distinctive linguistic aspect of the Arabic language. While the first section aims to differentiate between Classic and Modern Standard Arabic, the second section will highlight the most common features of political discourse in Arabic.

3.3.1 Arabic Language: Standard Versus Colloquial

> The terms 'classical' and 'modern' refer to two diachronic stages in the development of the Arabic standard or literary language. This variety of Arabic developed and flourished in the period between the VII-th and the XII-th centuries. These two stages conform to the same basic grammatical rules, yet differ from each other in various ways, the differences being predominantly connected with the functional, not the formal aspect of language (Leder, 2002:379).

Throughout history, the Arabic language has developed from Classical Arabic (henceforth CA) to Modern Standard Arabic (henceforth MSA). The emergence of CA is attributed to the start of the literary era, when Arabic literature and poetry flourished (Ryding, 2005:2). Van Mol defines CA as "the Arabic language variety that was codified and normalized centuries ago"

(2003:23). In the seventh century, when the Prophet Muhammad recited the Qur'an in Arabic, CA became a language of poetic power, and was given much scholarly attention (Ryding, ibid.). Bateson (2003:xiii) states that "the classical language, which was the vehicle of Islam and of the literature and is the primary written form today, is relatively uniform throughout the Arab world and across the Islamic centuries, but has never been the ordinary spoken language of the Arabs". Similarly, Mazraani (1997) defines it as the holy language, which can only be used for religious or intellectual purposes.

Linguists and Arabists have investigated the reasons behind the change of CA into its modern form and have suggested three reasons (Bateson, 2003): First, to simplify the original classical archaic form of the language; second, to assign new terminology to the vast shift in lexicon due to the constant development of technology in different fields; third, to cope with the stylistic changes that occurred because of the numerous translations from European languages (ibid.). In this regard, Versteegh states, "both vocabulary creation and regional variation are factors that have contributed to the gradual modification of the Classical language…" (2014:233). The Modern form of CA is perhaps seen as a simplification of the language to adequately suit the current time and culture (Versteegh, 2014). According to Ryding (2005:7), the period in which MSA was widely used dates to approximately the end of the eighteenth century, when MSA was the written norm and major medium of communication for all Arab countries. He elaborates, "differences between CA and MSA are primarily in style and vocabulary, since they represent the written traditions of very different historical and cultural eras…" (2005:4). Currently MSA is used in various media platforms such as in newspapers, news broadcasts, and other formal communication (ibid.:5), whereas Colloquial Arabic is the language spoken in informal daily conversations in societies, to discuss everyday topics (Ryding, 2005:5). Bateson (2003) argues that Colloquial Arabic can be traced back to the first existence of the Arabic language, when each region had its own dialect which was

influenced by pronunciation and other factors. The variation of Colloquial Arabic is relatively evident in different regions and may also differ from one city to another. According to Abi-Hashem, "each region, community, or country has its own colloquial form, style, or accent of the daily spoken language. It is called the conversational style of Arabic…people from neighbouring regions or countries understand each other much better than people from distant regions" (2008:118). Abi-Hashem further asserts that there is a significant difference between the colloquial Arabic spoken in North Africa, such as in Morocco and Tunisia, compared to the Arabic spoken in the Arab Gulf region, such as in Kuwait and United Arab Emirates (2008:118).

On a political level, choosing MSA or Colloquial Arabic to deliver a speech is in itself a strategy that influences the audience, and understanding this strategy has particular significance for this thesis. This is primarily because it will provide us with an explanation as to why Algaddafi and Mubarak chose that particular style of language. According to Holes (1993:13-45), a speaker always has specific intentions and strategies that eventually influence language choices, among them is the conscious choice of using different styles of language, such as, for instance, using Standard Arabic or a dialect. Similarly, Mazraani states that politicians generally use a standard formal form of language when they intend to inform the public, articulate and announce policy, or simply to present themselves in a powerful image (1997:213). She justifies the use of MSA in the region with the way societies perceive it as a signal of authority and seniority, whereas the use of dialects can be more effective due to the sense of solidarity it evokes and the way in which it portrays the speaker in a friendly manner (ibid.). It can therefore be argued that switching the style of language from MSA to Colloquial Arabic is a strategy politicians use to enhance communication. A number of scholars, such as Bentahila (1983), Holes (1993, 2004), Mazaraani (1997) and Bassiouney (2006-2009), have studied this strategy and focused on understanding the motivations that drive it. Holes

(2004:361), for example, examined President Gamal Abdul Nasser's political speeches - who often switched from MSA into a dialect - and refers to the phenomenon of switching as 'levelling'. He demonstrates that Nasser's tendency to switch is dependent on the role he wishes to play, and the power he wishes to convey (ibid.). Versteegh also detects the manipulation of linguistic variation of switching from MSA to dialects, which is found in political speeches in Arabic, such as President Nasser's speeches (2014:250). He describes how Nasser would start his speeches slowly and formally, using Standard Arabic, and would then gradually change to faster colloquial speech towards end of his speeches (ibid.). This strategy is known as 'code-switching', a prominent feature of political speeches in the Arab region (Dickins, Hervey & Higgins, 2013:170). The features of Arabic political discourse will be discussed in the following section.

3.3.2 Features of Arabic Political Speeches

Political language - and political speeches in particular - share similar features in different languages. As for Arabic, Mazraani (1997:203) suggests that politicians use specific strategies to make their speeches appealing and poetic, in order to gain the audience's approval and attention. These strategies are often shared in political speeches in English and Arabic (ibid.). The subsequent section will highlight the most common features of Arabic political discourse: repetition, the reference to religion and ideology, code-switching and cultural references, for example through the use of poetry.

1. **Pronouns**

Pronouns are considered one of the most manipulative features of political discourse in Arabic. Pronoun categories include personal pronouns, demonstrative pronouns, and relative pronouns (Ryding, 2005:50). "Personal pronouns refer to persons or entities and stand on their own as substitutes for nouns or noun phrases" (ibid.:298), and they take on many different roles in

Arabic, such as indicating differences in gender, number, and person. There are twelve personal pronouns in Arabic, whereas there are eight pronouns in English (Ryding, 2005:298). For example, the pronoun 'you' has five translations in Arabic, and they are (أنتِ، أنتَ، أنتما، أنتم، أنتُن), which is either a singular, dual or plural form of a pronoun (Shareef, 2016:115).

Myers-Scotton, Jake and Okasha argue that Arabic pronouns are different from pronouns in any other language, saying that they "have unique form" (1996:30). This is mainly because of the different forms they can occur in, as singular words or as morphemes. Holes explains that pronouns can be suffixed to verbs, nouns, and prepositions, and that they can also be the grammatical direct object (2004:177). He explains this as follows:

> There are two sets of pronominal forms: a set of free morphemes that are written as separate words and that generally occur only in the position of grammatical subject, and a set of bound pronominal clitics that can be suffixed to verbs, nouns, prepositions, and particles of various types and that may function as the grammatical object, indirect object, or possessor of the word to which they are suffixed (Holes, 2004:177).

According to El Samie (2016), a speaker's choice of pronouns may be part of the message they are giving, since pronouns can be used as a linguistic tool to enhance solidarity or power. She further claims that many leaders as well as politicians tend to use the plural personal pronoun as a way of convincing protesters or angry citizens of their intentional meanings, while at other times, it is used to emphasise solidarity with the protesters (ibid.). In a study about the use of pronouns in the presidential speeches during the Arabic Spring, El Samie concludes that the first personal plural pronoun is the one most regularly used among the presidents, with a percentage of 62.27 percent, which indicates their intention of including themselves with the protesters (ibid.:120-121). On the other hand, the first personal pronoun *I* was used when the presidents intended to praise themselves. Hence, using the first and third person pronouns (I/we) in presidential speeches carries a positive connotation, unlike using (him/they), which

has a negative connotation (ibid.:139). In this regard, Jarraya discusses the use of the first personal pronoun in the Tunisian president Zine El Abidine Ben Ali's last speech during the Arab Spring: "Inclusive pronouns are employed where Ben Ali stresses the idea of belonging to the group, and that actions are therefore required from everyone to ease tension" (2013:39). During his last speech, Ben Ali used the inclusive first person plural pronouns 25 times and the more excluding form of pronoun only nine times (ibid.), which is considered a strategy that serves persuasive goals (Wilson, 1990). Here are some examples of Ben Ali's use of the inclusive personal pronoun (Jarraya, 2013:37-38):

- Reform requires calm, and the events <u>we</u> witnessed

- <u>We</u> love Tunisia.

- <u>We</u> do not mind if one political party …

2. Repetition

One of the most common features in Arabic is the tendency to use repetition. Reynolds defines it as "multiple instances of an idea or word, and the greater the number of repetition the more we notice it" (1995:185). He further asserts that the more the word occurs in a text, the more attention it gets. Repetition in languages dates back to the pre-Islamic era, where it was seen as a "stylistic creativity in both speaking and writing" (Holes 1995), and it is indeed regarded positively in the Arabic language, as it indicates how eloquent and creative the speaker is. In this regard, scholars such as Gass and New (1995) state that Arabic speakers use this feature to express how valuable something is to them; however, Israeli (1998) argues that non-native speakers of the language are struck by it, and see it as unnecessarily dwelling on one point, and redundant. Al-Khafaji highlights that repetition in Arabic "can have didactic, playful, emotional, artistic, ritualistic, textual and rhetorical functions" (2005:6). In a similar context, Koch maintains that repetition is key to linguistic cohesion and rhythmic and rhetorical

effectiveness in the Arabic language (1983:48). Koch also notes that repetition exists on phonological, morphological, lexical, syntactic and semantic levels; it can be a repetition of form or a repetition of content (ibid.:52). Beeston (1970) believes that Arabic speakers usually avoid repetition by using both synonyms and near-synonyms, which would reflect the knowledge of the speaker. Similarly, Sharabi illustrates how Arabs are fond of using more than one term to emphasise one particular idea, which can evoke an emotional response (1966). Thus, "synonymous pairs are considered a form of repetition, which is a broadly used stylistic device in MSA" (El-Farahaty, 2015:43).

Repetition is thus an effective linguistic tool and often used in political speeches. The Arabic language and political discourse in general have been known for their use of repetition. According to Johnstone (1994), repetition is a purposeful device that can be used to persuade people and create an emotional impact. Johnstone (1991) further claims that an Arab audience is persuaded by repetition and the display of strong emotions during arguments. To Hoey (1991), repetition in Arabic political discourse should not be considered repetition but rather a replacement of new terms for the same information meant simply to allure the audience. Mazraani (1997:206) justifies using repetition in political speeches as follows:

> Repetition of an item highlights it, helps its comprehension by providing greater textual redundancy and less dense discourse. Rhythmically, repetition provides a musical aspect to language and may create a rhetorical crescendo and captures audience attention. Patented repetition is a technique of persuasion.

Shunnaq lists three types of repetition in political speeches: repetition embedded in language and used normally by the user, functional and communicative repetition that serves a purpose, and unnecessary repetition such as 'tautologies' or 'pleonasms', which is known in Arabic as 'إطناب' (1992:32). In an attempt to investigate this phenomenon, Shunnaq conducted a study to analyse the features of Arabic political discourse in Gamal Abdul Nasser's political speeches

(2000). He reveals that the amount of repetition used in the speech had a parallel structure and served the purpose of emphasis. For example, the parallelism and constant use of the phrase 'الأخوة المواطنون' / *Dear fellow citizens* aimed to reinforce the meaning and arouse emotions (Shunnaq, 2000: 215). This has also been observed in Mubarak's speeches during the uprising in 2011, where he repeated this particular phrase a number of times.

Lahlali (2012:1) wrote an article on repetition and ideology in political speeches in Arabic, stating that repetition in English is mainly used to emphasise meaning, whereas in Arabic it is considered as part of the language structure. Lahlali also notes, "repetition plays a salient role in persuading the Arab audience of one's argument" (ibid.:2). He demonstrates the use of repetition in political speeches by analysing Nasrallah's speeches (Hizbollah leader) during the 2006 conflict, and explains with the example below:

<div dir="rtl">

إلا بنصر من الله وعون من الله وتأييد من الله سبحانه وتعالى

</div>

> A victory could not have been achieve without God's help, without God's aid, without God's support (ibid.:4).

According to Lahlali (2012), in the example illustrated above, Nasrallah intended to use the word *Allah* (God) in a repetitive manner to emphasise the religious aspect of their battle and the support they will get from God.

3. Religious and Ideological References

Another element that distinguishes Arabic political speeches is the reflection of religious and ideological beliefs in political discourse. According to Welch, Cullbert and Cull (2003:342), many scholars believe that it is by far the most important feature most politicians use to manipulate the public, that religion was always used as propaganda to achieve hidden political purposes, and that many political speeches use religious references or quotations (ibid.). They add:

> Religion is often used in propaganda because, once established, it rules out all other arguments, such as human rights, vested interests, political privileges, or property rights. It is the ultimate instrument of political power (2003:342).

According to Wodak, "the power of persuasion can be displayed by different traits. Part of these traits is the display of belief, which can be considered as a necessary ingredient for the staging of politics" (2009:8). Barakat (1993) also notes, when politicians use religion to enforce their point of view or to emphasise its importance, they are fully aware of the effect that religion has on the audience. It is a significant device, which targets the audience's moral approval and raises the desire to obey religion (ibid.). Religion has always been intertwined with the political platform in the Arab world. Abdul-Latif writes in this regard, "religion and politics have a complicated relationship in the Arab world" (2011:50). In this context, Kammoun stresses that politics and religion have a complex relationship in the Arab world (2015:130). She suggests that religious expressions are part of the Arabic discourse due to the fact that Arabic is the language of the Qur'an (ibid.). In Arabic political discourse it is in fact very common, if not even a norm, to start political speeches, debates, and parliamentary sessions with a Qur'anic verse or religious terminology. Roy remarks, "a political speech will begin with a Qur'anic hook, a few verses meant not to explain, but to anchor the speech in transcendency…" (1994:103). This phenomenon was analysed by Dähne (2001:11), who asserts that political speeches generally adopt Qur'anic vocabulary for aesthetic reasons and to sacralise the speech; furthermore, it helps strengthen the speaker's position, protect them against disapproval and increase an emotional effect. Dähne explains how Qur'anic equivalences are always intertwined within speeches due to the widespread knowledge of Qur'anic language across Arabic speaking countries (ibid.). Similarly, Abdul-Latif justifies the use of religious expressions as a persuasive tool in political speeches, because religious discourse is 'immune' to any dissent or resistance (2011:57). He maintains that Qur'anic phrases often lead to a fast

consensus because of the infallibility of the sources, and integrating religious discourse results in creating a more powerful political discourse (2016:180).

Religious and ideological references are, however, not only reflected by using Qur'anic phrases, but also by using words that stem from a particular ideology. According to Israeli (1998), words like '*Zionism, jihad, Baath,* and *martyr*' carry an Islamic connotation and may reflect the speaker's attitude and beliefs. Israeli (1998) illustrates this further with an example of Sadat's speeches, claiming that Sadat's deliberate usage of the word *Allah* /God in almost all of his speeches created a link between him and people. One of his famous phrases is "You are, after *Allah*, my source of encouragement, stamina, and inspiration" (Israeli, 1985:26). Sadat's clever attempt to link people to *Allah* /God was mainly an attempt to highlight their importance to him and express his utmost belief in them as a source of inspiration and power (ibid.). This can thus play a major role in persuading the audience and acquiring their approval. Abdul-Latif conducted a similar study concerning Sadat (2011:58), saying that Sadat integrated religion as an important argumentative device in his speeches. He was known to use phrases and terminologies with religious references such as the phrase بمشيئة الرب /God's choice, and إن شاء الله /God's will (ibid.: 58). Sadat often conveyed his speeches from a religious perspective by drawing on a religious sermon genre, as he often quoted verses from the Qur'an (ibid.: 64), For example, in his speech from 5 February 1977, he said:

<div dir="rtl">

وبأقول لشعبنا زي ربنا سبحانه وتعالي ما خاطبنا وقال: لا تحزنوا وأنتم الأعلون.

</div>

And I say to our people as our Lord the exalted and high spoke to us and "Do not be sad, ye are the superiors (ibid.: 60).

In a recent study, Abu-Ain examines the religious references in King Hussein's political speeches, emphasising how his speeches are intertextually linked to the Qur'an and the Hadith[10]

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[10] Hadith is a report of words and deeds of Muhammad and other early Muslims (Esposito, 2004:101).

(2014:262). Abu-Ain claims, "the intertextual bond with Qur'an, Hadith and Islamic history is not restricted to King Hussein's political speeches…but it is a distinguishing trait of Arabic political discourse…" (ibid.: 263). Here an example of King Hussein's use of religious references in his speech from 7 February 1999:

الحياة والموت بيد الله سبحانه وإذا جاء أجلهم لا يستأخرون ساعةً ولا يستقدمون[11]

Life and death are in the hand of God, and when the time comes, none shall delay
it nor advance it even by an hour (Abu-Ain, 2014:196).

Abu-Ain explains that the King delivered this speech when he knew he was ill and dying, so that it was not surprising that he used this Qur'anic verse (ibid.). This is due to the significance of the verse as it refers to the fact that death cannot be postponed.

4. Code-switching

Code-switching is a linguistic phenomenon that occurs when the speaker alternates between different languages, or within language varieties (Gumperz, 1982). According to Gumperz, code-switching is "the juxtaposition within the same speech exchange of passages of speech belonging to two different grammatical systems of subsystems" (1982:59). Spolsky (1998) explains that code-switching occurs when speakers use utterances, words or even parts of words from another language in the middle of a conversation. Myers-Scotton (2005, 2006) defines it as using different styles of register, and it can be seen in choosing certain lexical items, the choice of which changes from one language into another, or sometimes the change of dialects within the same language.

According to Gumperz, there are many benefits of code-switching, and it is in fact considered a discourse strategy used by many to serve certain purposes (1982). Gumerz (1982:75) writes,

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[11] Yunus: 49

it can serve many functions such as quoting, specifying the addressee, interjecting, reiterating qualifying the message, while the subjective is to show solidary with the interlocutor or establishing some kind of distance, or implying the speaker's involvement with his discourse and the audience.

Bassiouney (2009) asserts that code-switching is common in Arabic when speakers switch between MSA and different Arabic dialects. The process and the relation between changing codes is rather complicated and not simply a lexical choice. She (ibid.) further illustrates that there is a tendency to use this strategy in political speeches for persuasive purposes. Therefore, it is not surprising to see Arab leaders and politicians deliberately switching to colloquial Arabic when addressing the nation. Algaddafi, for instance, chose to deliver his speech in a Libyan dialect for similar purposes. In this regard, Mazraani (1997:105) states that code-switching is a common strategy that is used to gain emotional support from the audience, create a sense of solidarity and intimacy, and signal unity. Using code-switching in political speeches, politicians start their communication by appealing to the emotions of the audience in the local dialect and then establish authority by reverting to Standard Arabic. This mechanism of switching between a formal language and the public's dialect increases attention and understanding and allows the audience to feel a connection with the speaker (ibid). A very recent example of code-switching is Ben Ali's creative linguistic manipulation in his last speech during the Arab Spring (Lahlali, 2011b). Lahlali remarks that regardless of the fact that Ben Ali started his speech by announcing that he would talk to the nation and the world in his Tunisian dialect, there were certain occasions where he switched from the Tunisian dialect to MSA, for instance (2011:3-11):

العنف ما هوش متاعنا ولا هو من سلوكنا

Violence has never been part of our custom or part of our behaviour.

<div dir="rtl">

حتى نفرق بين هذه العصابات والمجموعات من المنحرفين

</div>

Until we isolate these gangs and groups of delinquents...

As discussed above, Ben Ali's switch in discourse was his attempt to appear more patriotic, conveying that he belongs to the nation and that there are no social differences between him and the public (ibid.). Lahlali adds that Ben Ali was "trying to appeal to a wider section of the Tunisian society, especially those less educated people who couldn't easily follow his speech in MSA" (2011:11).

5. Cultural References: The Use of Poetry

In order to reflect unity and a sense of belonging to the public, politicians often employ culture-specific expressions or cultural tools in their speeches. According to Abu Hatab (2005), Arabic political speeches incorporate cultural items that are related to religion, folklore, and other Arabic cultural features. Among the most popular cultural tools in Arabic is poetry. It plays an important role in the Arabic language; and, in fact, it has always been associated with politics: "Arabs have always prided themselves on their poetry, which they regard as their greatest and most congenial mode of literary expression" (Badawī, 1975:56).

In this context, Alshaer (2014) writes that there is a fundamental connection between poetry and politics, which reflects the holistic character of Arabic culture and the ancient embodiment of poetry in the socio-political life of the Arabs. He (ibid.) further explains that poetry has always been a medium of expressing tension and aspirations, and of mobilisation in the region: "Poetry has always been a privileged means of expression in Arabic… and politics is no exception" (ibid). This has also been highlighted by Moreh (1976:217), who states that poetry is like an instrument of expression for the nationalist, socialist, and communist movement in the Arab world. Another well-known example of the embeddedness of poetry in politics is a poem written by the Egyptian Muhammad Al-Asmar (1900-1956), entitled مظاهرة/

Demonstration[12], written after a bloody political demonstration (Somekh, 1992:61). According to Somekh, the poet approached the masses by drawing on the tragic events and bloodshed of innocent people, and on the critical times in 1951 (ibid.). Al-Asmar explains in his book that he realised the importance of integrating policies into his poetry after witnessing the horrific events in the region (1951).

During the Arab Spring in 2011, poetry was considered one of the tools used by protesters to establish their stance. Colla (2011) explains how famous poets and activists composed clever-couplet-slogans, creating a unique style of poetry in Egypt. He writes that hundreds of poems were composed in colloquial Arabic and were memorable and easy to sing, and were aimed to chronicle the situation in Egypt. Sanders and Visona write (2012:214):

> During the eighteen days leading to Mubarak's resignation, the poet rose to the foreground of the social landscape. This became evident in the multitude of chants, songs, and poems erupting in Tahrir Square as well as throughout Egypt.

Ahmed Mekky was among the poets who wrote about the Egyptian uprising in 2011. Mekky, an actor, director, author and rapper, wrote a poem and made it into a song during the uprising

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[12] The poem was published in Al-Asmar book entitled Diwan Al-Asmar in 1951.

(Sanders & Visona, 2012:234). The poem is called **25 يناير** /"*January 25*" and showcases the revolution and the youth achievements, as demonstrated below (ibid):

The dignity of the Egyptian is worth much to him... He wants it back, and for corruption to fly away (again)… January 25... Anniversary for the greatest Egyptian revolution of all time … No wearing a collar, the youth held Egypt's head high..	كرامة المصري تسوا عنده كتير... نفسه يرجع كرامته والفساد يطير شفت يا نادر يوم 25 أعظم تاريخ ثوره مصرية على مر السنين شباب رفع راس مصر لفوق مش لابس طوق

There are other cultural elements that form a significant part of the discourse to demonstrate the speaker's knowledge and eloquence. Another example is the use of humour to simplify complicated issues, attract attention, and avoid conflicts, or engage with the public by talking about daily life. Those elements function as a tool to influence the audience, regardless of the different ways in which they are being used in different languages and cultures.

3.4 Conclusion

To facilitate a more comprehensive understanding of Algaddafi's and Mubarak's speeches, it was essential to examine the nature of political discourse as well as its features in English and Arabic, which is what this chapter set out to do. The aim was to highlight how the features of political discourse are often universal and shared between languages, and to examine in which ways they differ. The brief overview of these features in English and Arabic, shows that they have some things in common, such as intertextuality, repetition and the use of pronouns. However, in each language these features are employed differently, depending on linguistic

and cultural conventions. Intertextuality is applied in English in the form of quotations, allusions and references to other texts. In Arabic, intertextuality is often used to bring cultural, religious and poetic references into a political speech. The use of religious references is more common in contemporary Arabic than in contemporary English, as Western democracies are multicultural and largely secular (Hurd, 2009)[13]. It is worth noting that poetic and religious references cause more potential difficulties in translation due to the lack of equivalences. In regard to the use of pronouns, it has been suggested widely that particular pronouns can define solidarity, while others can indicate arrogance and self-praise; both varieties are used equally in both languages. Repetition, on the other hand, is mainly used as simple repetition or as repetitive order in Arabic, whereas in English, it contains a certain technique, the three-list repetition, as discussed earlier. Another difference between both languages is the existence of two styles of Arabic MSA and Colloquial Arabic which can convey a significant message; whereas in English, it is the style and register through which speakers express themselves. Donald Trump's use of language, for example, is hugely different from that of other politicians; he uses lower colloquial registers and even demotic language in his speeches.

Both languages share the use of metaphor and metonymy, but they are considered especially common in Arabic as I will discuss in the analysis in Chapter Six. In their entirety, the linguistic tools discussed here have always been used by politicians to enhance their speeches. The purpose of discussing features of political discourse in Arabic is to establish a better understanding of the way each president structured his speech, and of the purpose of choosing any particular strategy. The aim of emphasising the similarities and differences between English and Arabic is then to provide a comparative overview of the features of political discourse, as studied by other researchers, as well as to highlight the features that have

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[13] According to Crossley (2014), the use of religious reference in particular from the bible in English political discourse decreased by the end of the nineteenth century, when the bible was no longer considered as an authoritative document.

the potential to influence the translation process. In my own analysis of the TTs, I will discuss the difficulties that these features create for interpreters and translators, and the consequences of potential failures in understanding the ST. The next chapter will examine the relationship between political discourse analysis and political discourse and translation.

Chapter Four

Theoretical Framework

4.1 Introduction

In order to analyse and understand the speeches given by Algaddafi and Mubarak, and their interpretation and distribution in different languages in the media, I have developed a theoretical framework that draws on three theories: Fairclough's Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA), Kress's multimodality, and Baker's Narrative Theory. In this chapter, I will introduce each theory and outline its importance to the analysis.

4.2 Political Language and Critical Discourse Analysis

4.2.1 Political Discourse Analysis

For the larger part of the last two decades, a fundamental amount of work has been carried out on discourse analysis. It was shown that the study of discourse is not limited to grammatical features, but can be extended to the study of context and communicative events of the text. In this regard, McCarthy remarks, "discourse analysis has grown into a wide-ranging and heterogeneous discipline, which finds its unity in the description of language above the sentence and an interest in the contexts and cultural influences which affect language in use" (1991:7).

The study of political language as a separate discipline in discourse analysis was controversial for a long time, as many scholars argued that anything can be "thought of as political in nature" (Schäffner & Chilton, 1997). For this reason, a definition of what can be constituted as political is rather obscure, as it is above all a matter of interpretation. In this light, Schäffner and Chilton (1997) assert that the use of terms like *political text* and *political*

discourse are somewhat ambiguous, and further explain that regardless of the shared purpose most political speeches have, they do not necessarily belong to the same genre. What political speeches have in common, however, is the way politicians use language to deliver their message and convince their audience (Lakoff, 1990). Other scholars, such as Foucault (1980), Fairclough (1989) and van Dijk (1997a) have highlighted the importance of studying not only the language, but also what constructs the discourse of ideological factors and the discourse relation to emphasise power. Rogers (2004:6) explains this further:

> Critical discourse analysis explores the connection between the use of language and the social and political context in which it occurs. It explores issues such as gender, ethnicity, cultural differences, ideology and identity and how these are both constructed and reflected in texts.

Clark adds that Critical Discourse Analysis studies different aspects related to discourse, such as the structure of power within speech, for example, and is therefore concerned with the politics of language (2007:137). CDA asks the reader to fully investigate what lies behind the written or the spoken discourse, and to explore its social and ideological aspects. It is thus essential that a critical analysis of discourse contains a full analysis of discourse beyond its textual boundaries. The following section will introduce Fairclough's approach to CDA, and will introduce tools to analyse political discourse.

4.2.2 Fairclough: Language and Power

Fairclough is an eminent name in the field of discourse analysis, who advocates the importance of analysing discourse beyond its word level. He (1989:24) argues that the word 'text' refers to a product and not a 'process', and so the term 'discourse' refers to an entire process of social interaction of which a text is just one part. Fairclough (1989:26) defines discourse as:

Language use, seen as a type of social practice and not merely bound to text but may also involve analysing the relationship between texts, processes, and social conditions, both the immediate conditions of the situational context and the more remote conditions of institutions and social structures.

Fairclough developed a critical approach to analyse texts, the process, and the factors that affect its production. He was inspired by Foucault's work (1972, 1980), who urged linguists to develop different approaches to discourse analysis, and to link it to various fields such as sociology, philosophy, and ideology. According to Fairclough (2003:123), Foucault's role in the field of discourse analysis was a "decisive influence". In fact, Foucault's framework influenced almost all of the analytical approaches in CDA, where a substantial amount of work has been carried out to continue where he left off (Fairclough & Wodak, 1997:261). Thus, by drawing on the work of Foucault (Fairclough, 1989:12), Fairclough introduced the term 'critical discourse analysis' to the study of discourse, and identified it as the study of the relationship between language, power and social relations (1995:97). He interrelates the theory of discourse analysis with social theories of late modernity and the theory of social practice to thoroughly analyse discourse (Chouliaraki & Fairclough 1999). Fairclough's contribution to this field is greatly recognised, as he was the first linguist to create a theoretical framework and guidelines for further research in the field. CDA explores the predominant connection between language and power in different aspects, whether within or behind discourse, and is a tool that helps to uncover hidden aspects in discourses, such as the relationship between language, power, and ideology. Fairclough summarises the importance of CDA as follows (1995:79):

It sets out to make visible through analysis, and to criticise, connections between properties of texts and social process and relations (ideological, power relations) which are generally not obvious to people who produce and interpret those texts, and whose effectiveness depends upon this opacity.

Fairclough (1989, 1995) proposes a three-dimensional model for CDA, in which he differentiates between three inter-related processes of analysis, as seen in Figure 1. This model is orientated on three inseparable elements (Fairclough, 1992, 73):

1. Analysis of text: the combination of clauses, grammar, and vocabulary organized in one document.

2. Analysis of discursive practice: the way the text is produced, distributed, interpreted, and appropriated.

3. Examining the social practice: the context (situational, institutional, or societal level)

Figure 1 - Fairclough's Three-Dimensional Model

Fairclough (1989, 1992) states that the analysis of discourse consists of the study of language production in a discursive event, while the analysis of discursive practice draws upon the study of the production and consumption of discourse. The latter is related to the study of a specific social and cultural framework in which the discourse occurs, be it the media, culture, or political

power and ideology (1992). Beyond that, the model explores aspects of discourse that are closely related to the subject of this thesis and are therefore beneficial to this research. This is especially true for the analysis of Algaddafi's and Mubarak's speeches and their translations, where grammatical and word choices in fact serve a certain ideology, for example, when Algaddafi uses words like الثورة /*revolution*, or when Mubarak uses words such as الإملاءات أجنبية/ *foreign dictations* (see Section 6.3.3). In addition, it is important to analyse the discursive practice that highlights the role the media plays in distributing the message, and to understand the context of the social event in which the speeches were made. I have therefore incorporated Fairclough's three procedures of analysis - mainly related to the way speakers maintain and achieve power through ideology, by repeating certain words or by using particular words that reflect their power over the addressees - in order to understand how the presidents' power and ideology were reflected in their speeches, and whether they were also evident in the translations of the speeches.

Before elaborating on these procedures, it is necessary to highlight Fairclough's understanding of power and ideology. The scholar argues (1989:33) that power can be attained through discourse and language, and it is important to distinguish between the exercise of power by coercion and the exertion of power through consent. He also asserts that acquiring power greatly depends on the relationship between the speaker and the addressee. It could be argued that using an ideological approach towards the addressee can change the type of power from coercive power to consenting power (ibid.:34). In regard to ideology and its significance for processing and maintaining power, Fairclough (1989, 1995) argues that to be able to fully analyse discourse and its relationship to power, it is important to shed light on the study of ideology. As discourse is socially shaped and contributes to social situations, objects of knowledge and relationships between people or a group of people, ideology may significantly influence discursive practices by producing or reproducing power exerted on certain groups in

society. In most modern societies, power is thus exercised and attained through ideology, and it is linked to discourse since language is the most common form of social behaviour (Fairclough and Wodak (1997:271). Additionally, Fairclough's (1989:74) approach to language and power examines power in discourse, how power is hidden in discourse, and how discourse is an effective mechanism to sustain that power. For instance, power in an exchange or an encounter between two parties can become visible when a powerful participant controls and constrains the non-powerful participant through discourse (ibid.). This type of power is clearly evident in the presidential speeches during the Arab Spring, and in particular in the terminology used by Algaddafi and Mubarak. Unlike this type, there is one-sided mass media discourse such as in newspapers, television and radio, in which the nature of power is hidden in the discourse. Producers of mass media establish power when they implicitly exert power over consumers through their discourse (Fairclough, 1989:49).

In order to carry out a critical analysis of discourse within the parameters of Fairclough's model, three procedures ('stages') are required to analyse not only discourse, but also the dialectic relationship between discourse and discursive practice (1989). Those procedures are *description, interpretation*, and *explanation*, as seen in Figure 2. As noted earlier, I have adopted these procedures for the model I propose, to help me analyse Algaddafi's and Mubarak's speeches by focusing on the analysis of the texts and their discursive and social practices.

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                    │                                 │
                    │   ┌──────────────────────────┐  │
                    │   │   ┌──────────────┐        │  │ ──── Description
                    │   │   │ Text         │◄───────┼──┼───────
                    │   │   │              │        │  │
                    │   │   └──────────────┘        │  │ ──── Interpretation
                    │   │ Discourse Practice        │  │
                    │   │ ◄─────────────────────────┼──┼───────
                    │   │ (Production, distribution,│  │
                    │   │  and consumption)         │  │ ──── Explanation
                    │   └──────────────────────────┘  │
                    │ Social Practice                 │
                    │ ◄───────────────────────────────┼───────
                    │ (Of society, institution, and   │
                    │  specific situation)            │
                    └─────────────────────────────────┘
```

Figure 2 - Fairclough: Procedures of Analysis

Description is the first procedure in the analysis of discourse and is concerned with the analysis of the linguistic characteristics of the text. However, it is important to establish that the text cannot be analysed in isolation from its other elements (Fairclough, 1995: 198). According to Fairclough (1989:112) during the analysis, one must analyse various features of the texts:

1. Experiential: the content of the discourse, i.e. the vocabulary choices that reflect the knowledge and beliefs of the person. It can also be the tool to constrain what can be said or done.

2. Relations: "is a trace of and a cue to the social relationships which are enacted via the text in the discourse… Relational value is (transparently) to do with relations and social relationships" (ibid.: 112). It sometimes sets the boundaries between the speaker and the addressee, where politeness or a certain type of formal discourse is required.

3. Expressive: the relation between subjects and social identities, in which power positions people as subjects.

The second procedure is *interpretation*; Fairclough (1989:141) notes that this stage focuses on the participants' processes of text production and its interpretation. It is divided into two domains: interpretation of the situation's context, which is the relationship between the speaker and the addressee, the people involved in the conversation, and the role of language. Conversely, the second domain is concerned with the audience's history and their common sense, which Fairclough refers to as "member resources" (1989:24). Hence, it is based on a mixture of beliefs, background knowledge, and presuppositions that the audience uses to interpret the discourse. Lastly, the procedure of *explanation*, which is concerned with the relationship between the interaction and social context, in which the social aspect determines the process of production, interpretation, and social impact (Fairclough,1989: 26). Fairclough remarks that through a process called *reproduction* the stage of explanation is closely linked to the stage of interpretation. Reproduction is the process in which the participant's resources require changing certain aspects of the discourse and reproducing it according to these criteria (ibid.). He further explains that the audience's resources – their knowledge- are particularly linked to their culture, social relationships, and social identities that are considered ideologies and determined by specific power and relations in society or institutions, and influence the discourse and its production (1989).

In summary, Fairclough highlights that each procedure in his three-dimensional model aims to examine a particular issue in discourse (1989:141-147). In regard to the topic of this thesis, the first stage, for instance, aims to examine linguistic features of the speeches under analysis, revealing factors such as choice of words, lexical cohesion, the use of politeness techniques and formality, and how they are employed in the speeches to reflect the presidents'

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power and ideology. On the other hand, the second and third stages aim to investigate whether common knowledge and existing discourse about the presidents, will influence how these speeches are interpreted and reproduced by the media, whether in the same language or in their translation. The following section will discuss the incorporation of CDA into translation.

4.3 Incorporating Political Discourse Analysis into Translation

As highlighted in the previous section, discourses are socially shaped, and the analysis of discourse is not limited to its textual aspects. CDA emphasises that language cannot be studied in isolation from the communicative intentions of language users and the context within which they use the language (Stern, 1983:133). Hence, it is of similar significance to understand the way CDA helps understand STs, and more importantly the way it helps in the translation process, and how it influences the TTs. This has been observed by Valdeon who suggests that CDA has a vital role during the translation process as it can help to choose an appropriate strategy to convey the TT according to the target culture and to social differences (2007).

Translation Studies is a fairly new multidisciplinary field that with the help of different disciplines, has made considerable progress in finding a faithful and transparent approach to translation. The development of translation theory eventually led to a new approach of studying all aspects of a text. In the 1980s, a framework that linked discourse analysis with Translation Studies came to light, as highlighted by Hatim: "After many decades of formal linguistics, discourse analysis, and text, linguistics become major sources of influence on translation research" (2001:31). Text analysis is examining the way a text is organised, sentence structure, cohesion, etc., whereas discourse analysis examines the way the language was used and the social factors that influenced it (Munday, 2012). According to Trosborg (2000), many scholars have highlighted the importance of being fully aware of the cultural background of a text, its situational context, and to regard language as a means of communication rather than a set of

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structures and linguistics items. Among them are House (1977, 1997), Baker (1992), and Hatim and Mason (1990, 1997). Their work constituted essential contributions to the field of Translation due to the link they drew between the text linguistics, discourse analysis, and pragmatics.

In regard to the integration of political discourse analysis in processes of translation, a number of studies have been conducted with the aim to highlight the connection between both fields. As discussed in Chapter Three, the complexity of political discourse is not only limited to the rhetorical nature of the discourse and the language used, but also to the cultural aspect and the hidden messages it carries. Consequently, Bánhegyi, (2014) remarks, many translators dedicated their research to studying the way in which CDA can facilitate the understanding of the ST and thereafter its translation. Mahdiyan, Rahbar and Hosseini-Maasoum suggest that CDA influenced Translation Studies by revealing the implicit ideology and power relations hidden in discourse (2013:36). They further suggest that CDA should be applied to both ST and TT to enable the translator to be aware of social, cultural and political factors of the ST, and be able to reconstruct that into the TT by choosing the best translation strategy (ibid.). Schäffner's approach to CDA and political discourse from a Translation Studies perspective will be discussed in the following section.

4.3.1 Schäffner: Political Discourse Analysis from a Translation Studies Perspective

Schäffner is one of the prominent translation scholars advocating the importance of integrating CDA into Translation Studies. Schäffner and Bassnett argue against the absences of translation in the field of politics, and assert that it is in fact part of political activity (2010). Schäffner further stresses the importance of CDA by claiming that reactions to news across the world are not reactions to the news themselves but rather to the information provided in translation

(2004:118). Translation is perceived by CDA as a social, cultural, and political act, and to translate is to carry out the action of reproducing a text within a target text language that fits into its culture. Schäffner highlights two other relevant aspects: the purpose of the translation, and the text's target audience. She claims that most research conducted within a CDA framework in Translation Studies focuses on the translation outcome as a social action, answering questions such as who is the text translated for, when, and the effects it has on the TT culture (Schäffner & Chilton 2002:60). For that reason, it is important to incorporate this approach to the TTs this research analyses, taking into consideration the way CDA will reshape the TTs according to the audience for which they are translated.

Schäffner's approach (1997, 2002, 2004) aims to explore the relationship between linguistic behaviour and politics on different levels, such as pragmatics, syntax and semantic, and the way they are formatted to enhance political persuasion. Schäffner's research focuses on the choice of lexical items in ST in comparison to the TT, the practice of selecting information to translate, and the creation of political identity by framing and influencing readers with a given ideology (Bánhegyi, 2014:152). Taking into account Schäffner's findings, she determines four political strategies that influences the translation process: coercion, resistance, dissimulation and legitimisation/ delegitimisation (Chilton & Schäffner, 1997:226). Schäffner argues that *coercion* is the practice of controlling information that is to be translated (2004). Hence, this feature indicates that translators play a major role in choosing which information to convey to the public by selecting what to translate. Schäffner's coercion strategy helps to reveal whether certain media outlets control the information they wish to convey to the public or not. This leads to the strategy of *resistance*, through which the translator's voice is heard over the officials' voices (Schäffner, 2004). Consequently, I would argue that this can allow translators, or those commissioning somebody with a translation, to manipulate the news by choosing certain texts for translation and deliberately disregarding other information, or by

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intentionally publishing an inaccurate piece of information, a strategy which is known as *dissimulation*. These practices will ultimately affect the translation outcome, and provide the public with a biased translation. Finally, Schäffner refers to the function of *legitimisation* and *delegitimisation*, the negative or positive self-presentation of others, whether explicitly or implicitly, achieved by using particular translation strategies to abuse the text for ideological reasons (2004:145).

In summary, it is imperative to recognise the essential role CDA will play in the analysis of both speeches as well as their translations. Fairclough's framework will emphasise the importance of understanding the text within the context and the culture in which it was produced. In addition, it highlights how speakers employ their power and reflect their ideology within discourse through the linguistic strategies they chose. With the help of Schäffner's strategies in particular I will examine the role of translators as text producers, and thus attempt to bridge the gap between CDA and Translation Studies. I will also investigate how the media reshape texts by controlling the translation process, and further control the information they wish to render according to their own ideology. With that in mind, and in a world of technology where information is published in different formats, media and genres, it is crucial to understand the shifts and changes that occurred to the speeches when transformed into different genres and media, and with a different purpose and audience. In the following section, I will discuss multimodality theory in order to examine how these issues affect the text and consequently affect the translation process.

4.4 Multimodality: A Social Semiotic Approach to Meaning

4.4.1 What is Multimodality?

In the world of contemporary media, it is impossible to understand meaning and its transformation without understanding multimodality. This is due to the way messages are transformed as they are transferred from medium to medium, from genre to genre, and from language to language. Moreover, through new technology, it is now common to use various media such as images and hyperlinks within composed texts. This communication process involves different aspects that are evidently significant and convey a particular message to the audience. Hence, I will draw on Kress' (2010) multimodality theory to assist me in examining and analysing the multimodal texts I am discussing in Chapters Six, Seven, Eight and Nine.

The study of social semiotics emerged in the 1970s, and stems originally from the field of Linguistics. The notion of social semiotics is connected to the study of pragmatics and CDA, as an approach of studying meaning in context. One must differentiate between studying meaning from a linguistic perspective and from one of social semiotics. Linguistic models aim to study grammatical, lexical signs, and any other features such as rhythm, tone, and intonation, defined as 'paralinguistic' features, whereas social semiotics dedicates its analysis to studying meaning- making by using these paralinguistic features (Bezemer & Jewit, 2009). According to Wodak (2006:5), CDA is concerned with studying how ideology and power influence the communication process, while social semiotics is concerned with the impact of using other modes to implement one's power or ideology within a speech. In this regard, Kress and Hodge remark that it is important to examine the social implications of writings accompanied by images in 'print' media, and the embedded power and ideology perceived from implementing these modes (1979, 1988). The significance of social semiotic and the urge to develop a multimodal analysis has arguably grown significantly. According to Bezemer and Jewitt

(2009), the idea of modes or multiple modes, advanced in the 1990s, became inevitable when the idea of studying various modes within one framework was introduced in the context of the concept 'multimodality'. In an attempt to build on Halliday's (1978) approach of describing language as a system of producing meaning by using signs and images, Hodge and Kress (1988) developed an approach of examining language as a system. They define meaning as the resources that people use to communicate, which is not fixed in the text itself (ibid.:12). Similarly, Page (2009:4) investigates multimodality and emphasises how it highlights the wide range of semiotic resources used in communication, and more importantly the connection between them. She further defines the use of the word 'mode' - within a multimodal framework - as the system of choices made in the process of communication that produce meaning. According to Page, modes are not limited to language, and may include voices, numbers, gestures, dresses, colour, image, etc., and they can be combined, for instance in web pages (2009: 6).

Within the multimodal field, there have been numerous efforts to establish an analytical framework that would provide a better understanding of the way in which modes are used in the process of meaning-making in comparison to the genre in which they exist. Bateman defines 'genre' as a widely used term to label broad classes of communication, and it is extended to more recently developed multimodal phenomena, such as advertisement, sitcoms, online newspaper and the Internet (2008:183). He (2008) further asserts that genre is a 'multi-stratal' phenomenon, which requires 'semiotic work' for deploying a genre that involves making choices on several strata. Bateman suggests that any text can constitute a medium in which several semiotic modes are deployed, but the way these mediums are organized and their layout essentially contribute to a given genre (Bateman, 2008). He justifies his motivation to create a connection between genre and multimodality, by providing three purposes: to compare texts and events and describe their properties, to describe the expectation that genres create for the

reader, and to describe the social function of a genre (Cited in Hiippala, 2014:112). Linguist Kress (2010) also proposes a multimodal framework for the analysis not only of modes, but also of genres and their relation to the text. His work will be examined in the following section.

4.4.2 Kress: Multimodality and Contemporary Communication

Kress proposes a framework of multimodality and its relation to meaning, communication and media, in which he asserts that the significance of multimodality lies in the different disciplines it relates to, and the connections it can make. One of the reasons why multimodality is a powerful tool of analysis is the vast change in communication the world has witnessed in recent years, especially in relation to social, cultural and technological changes (2010:5). In this, Kress and Van Leeuwen emphasise the importance of social semiotic and suggest, "new social, cultural and political needs lead to new ways of communicating and to new communication technologies – as well as to new communication theories" (2001: 113). Social semiotic theory thus helps to explain how meaning and communication can exist in various types of resources, across different social occasions, and in all cultures (2010:2). For some types of communication, incorporating a combination of writing, signs or images is important, Kress states (2010), which is why multimodality is the key to illustrate what resources are used in any type of communication in an effort to produce meaning. Accordingly, communication is a complex interaction embedded in the social environment, and it is shaped by its culture, making it vital for some types of communication to combine writing and signs or images (2010:54). Kress further elaborates that the process of creating meaning is often linked to social and economic factors, "communication always has been and will remain subject to social, cultural, economic and political givens" (2010: 19). In general, Kress' approach to multimodality examines the way in which people communicate through different modes, media, in different genres and forms. He defines modes as follows:

> Modes are resources that transfer meaning such as speech, writing, images…
> etc. … and are socially shaped and culturally given semiotic resource for making
> meaning… Image, writing, layout, music, gesture, speech, moving image,
> soundtrack and 3D objects are examples of modes used in representation and
> communication (Kress, 2010:79).

Each mode contains a variety of tools to make meaning, for instance, writing in English - or any other language - has graphic resources such as words, clauses, frames, colours, spacing and fonts. It also has syntactic, textual and social-semiotic resources such as sentence, paragraph, textual block and genre. Similarly, the mode of speech differs with its resources, as they become visible through the speaker's accent, loudness or softness, pitch variations, length and silences and intonation (ibid.). Kress highlights in this regard, "what counts as a mode is a matter for a community and its social representational needs" (2010:87), for instance, if a community decides on a certain colour or font to represent something, it will be a mode to that community and anyone who is in communication with that community (ibid.). Kress emphasises how the layout of the mode organises the materials to create a coherent mode, and each mode has different elements to its layout, in addition to the way the classification of information may have different social and ontological effects. The layout highlights certain information and disposes of other, and guides the viewers as to how to classify knowledge and categorise information. For example, the way certain objects are organized and the way they are coloured may represent meaning and help elaborate it further. Kress (2010:93) stresses how meaning and modes are connected in three ways:

1. Rhetorical issue: the most affordable mode that fits to be selected to achieve the meaning.

2. Orientations of mode: the way each mode is represented differently within its 'takes' on the world.

3. Multimodal ensembles: the organization of modes if there was more than one mode used to represent the meaning.

According to Kress and Van Leeuwen (2001), communication can be achieved through all modes separately or when combined together, because each mode entails its own function. The dissemination of meaning by combining several modes sometimes helps to clarify meaning, especially when the affordances of each mode is used to create meaning, and as a result create new genres (Kress, 2010:21). Kress writes "the used of modes in combination offers a fuller means for conveying meaning, richer than the comparatively sparse capacities of the linguistic modes of speech and writing…" (2015:57). Speeches, for example, can constitute more than one mode, oral speech, gestures, body movements and even a gaze; all of these elements carry meaning and may reflect the power the speaker has over the audience or vice versa. In this regard, Salway (2009:56) writes that combining modes can ultimately produce a particular meaning, even by the way these features/images are organised, for example, within a web page. With increasing advances and developments in contemporary media landscapes and emerging new technologies, new ways of communication and meaning-creation are being found all the time; for example, in blogs, YouTube videos and websites, where modes are combined on a single platform. Kress highlights the importance of newer modes, such as hyperlinks, webs, MySpace and wikis, which empower the author and might be a way of redistributing power and demonstrating acts of resistance (2010:21). This was clearly evident in 2011 during the Arab Spring, when blogs and YouTube channels were an effective tool to demonstrate resistance, in addition to the way in which social media was used to highlight the uprisings by using blogs and Facebook pages as a tool of mass mobilisation and broadcasting news (see Section 2.5).

Kress' approach to multimodality and modes is relevant for this research as it allows me to explore how different modes were employed to compose a certain message and reflect meaning in the ST's of Algaddafi's and Mubarak's speeches; and furthermore, how these modes changed and transferred into different modes and genres during the translation process. For example, Kress states that body language and gestures are an important mode that actually differs from one society to another (2010). Accordingly, changing the mode of the STs may evidently change its genre, and the ST's purpose. Kress describes a genre as the type of communication that exists within each mode whether spoken or written (1988:107). The genre thus provides the tools for contextualisation/locating/situating the meaning in social spaces and provides it with social characterisation; the mode carries ontological/historical and social orientations of the society and its culture into signs (Kress, 2010: 114). Genres further offer to provide the materialisation and realisation of meaning according to the intentions of the speaker and the designer (ibid.:116). Applying Kress' multimodality theory to the translations of the STs serves, therefore, mainly to examine how these modes were transferred from one into another and also into a different language, format and genre. Kress (2010:124) argues that the translation process carries the meaning from one language into another, from one culture into another, thus, it may eventually change the mode of the meaning, its genre and its ideological/discursive complexity. He describes two ways to transform meaning: 1. *Transduction* which is the action of changing the meaning mode and its entities; and 2. *transformation* which means staying within the same mode and culture but reordering the entities. Kress explains that both processes are necessary because a translation needs to address each group and culture in terms of their own meanings and understandings of entities (2010:124). Transduction is seen as a subordinate to translation; it is the transfer of meaning from one mode to another - from a speech to an image, for instance - whereas transformation of 'translation' is to maintain the same mode from writing to writing, or from a speech to a

speech, using different languages across different cultures (Kress, 2010:124-129). The way these modes are transformed and reorganized during translation can also manipulate the ST message and change its purpose, creating a new text with new media and sometimes a new genre. In this regard, Kress and Van Leeuwen suggest that narratives can be reshaped when using another mode to represent it (2001:128).

As discussed above, communication can be carried out using various modes in different genres; those modes can be altered and transferred during the translation process. The multimodality approach allows us to examine modes that are used during a communication process, and the way in which they are transferred into other modes, media and different genres; and it provides us with means to analyse to what extent these changes affect the production of the TTs.

4.5 Translation from a Narrative Perspective

The concept of narrativity first emerged in the field of psychology, where it was used to describe stories that constitute the world and shape our behaviour towards other people and different events (Baker, 2007:155). According to Somers (1992), different attempts were made to develop and apply the narrative approach to different disciplines in the 1960s and 1970s; most of these approaches define narrative as a concept of social epistemology and social ontology. In other words, it is through narrative and narrativity that we know, realize and understand the social reality around us, and it further helps to constitute our social identities (Somers & Gibson, 1994:62). Somers and Gibson were in fact among the first scholars to discuss narrative and to propose a socio-narrative framework, based on four typologies within narrative theory. This has been developed and incorporated into Translation Studies by Baker (2006), as will be introduced in the following section.

4.5.1 Baker's Narrativity

Baker's model of typology which distinguishes four types of narrative according to their political and social effect, that is, ontological, public, conceptual, and meta-narratives, will be discussed below. Additionally, I will focus on four features of narrativity - temporality, relationality, causal employment, and selective appropriation - and on the way in which they operate and shape a given narrative.

In an attempt to link narrative theory within the discipline of Translation Studies, Baker (2006) adopted and built upon Somers' and Gibson's (1994) socio-narrative approach. She defines narrative as "the everyday stories we live by" (Baker 2006:3). Unlike in the fields of literary studies and Linguistics, where narrative is considered a single genre, narrative in the context of a socio-narrative approach has no genre. Narratives are seen as dynamic entities that change in subtle or radical ways, depending on what people experience and how they become exposed to new stories. Baker suggests that paralinguistic devices, such as intonation, typography, visual resources such as colour, image, and layout, can indeed form narratives (2006:158). A narrative is usually affected by the stories a person listens to and believes, rather than their race, gender or any other factors. Since narratives are dynamic, they cannot be seen as one set of stories from which a person can choose.

4.5.1.1 Typology of Narrative

Baker suggests that a socio-narrative approach to translation can primarily be applied to translation and interpreting activities taking place in war zones and conflict zones (2006:35). The following image provides a visual overview of the narrative categories the scholar describes:

Figure 3 - Baker's Types of Narrative

Baker (2006:28) defines *ontological* narratives as the stories a person tells about themselves and about their own history, which shapes their life and gives it meaning. To this she adds *collective* narratives and *shared* narratives. She identifies collective narratives as 'cultural macronarratives', which structure, shape and constrain our personal stories to define their meaning and their outcome, and which are conveyed in different ways, such as through television, literature and educational institutions. Ontological narratives are highly dependent on collective narratives - linguistics forms, symbols, structures and vocabulary - to be fully rendered and translated into another language. Thus, Baker highlights that it is a complex process to retell a story told in one language into another, saying "the retelling is inevitably constrained by the shared linguistic and narrative resources available in the new setting" (Baker, 2006: 29). *Shared* narratives, on the other hand, are those stories that have become accepted and normalised over a long period of time. People's acceptance of personal narratives being told within collective narratives, helps sustain their power and legitimacy. These personal narratives can be used to maintain the social order and avoid alternative, dominating narratives. Baker states, "Many feminists attempt to do by giving voice to neglected or suppressed accounts of the female experience of life, such accounts often being meditated through

translation" (2006:30). The scholar emphasises the importance of ontological narratives to society and the individual, since these narratives are vital to define who we are, and she suggests that the way we tell stories affects the way we act, the way we think, and may have an impact on people around us (2006:28-30). During the Arab Spring, we can see examples of how personal narratives can contribute to collective narratives, when personal narratives about people's experiences during the uprisings created a collective narrative about the atrocities committed by the regimes, which were later reported by different media outlets across the world.

The second type of narrative is the *public* narrative, which has similarities with collective/shared narratives, since both are circulated within the society in which they are shared. Public narratives are the stories produced and communicated by social institutions, for example families, religious and educational institutions, political groups, media, or the government. According to Baker, public narratives dominating a given society can rapidly evolve and change (2006:33). The public narrative about Nelson Mandela, for instance, is a personal narrative that has changed over time. Baker remarks, "[P]ublic narratives are also adapted domestically within the same culture in response to the evolving reconfiguration of the political and social space" (2006:35). Translators and interpreters play a major role in disseminating public narratives in their own communities and for all members of the society. In some cases, translators help circulate the public narrative beyond their national boundaries. However, the translation process is sometimes exposed to different ideological or cultural issues that contribute to changing it. Thus, the existence of public narratives and their survival is highly dependent on circulating them in different dialects, languages and outside their communities (Baker, 2006:36).

Conceptual narratives are the third type of narratives. Baker (2006:39) asserts that this type of narrative can also include stories and explanations scholars use in any discipline to explain to themselves and others the issue of inquiry. There are specific sets of conceptual narratives that exist in each field of study, including the field of translation, some of which may be widely known even beyond their field. As in the case of public narratives, it is the translator's job to decide whether to simply accept and normalise the public narrative into their communities, or to challenge it and find its equivalent within their public narrative (Baker, 2006:43).

The *meta-narrative* is the last type of narratives, and it is defined as "narratives which are embedded as contemporary actors in history … progress, decadence, industrialization, enlightenment ... etc." (Somers & Gibson, 1994:61). Baker illustrates that meta-narratives can exist in different versions and are subjected to disputation just like any other type of narratives, and are able to cross different boundaries and become internationally known. The factors that help sustain certain meta-narratives are usually economic or political factors. Translators have an undeniable role in allowing public narratives to cross the linguistic boundaries and develop into widespread meta-narratives (Baker, 2006:45-48). A representative example for a meta-narrative from the Arab Spring is the public narrative of NATO's intervention in Libya, which would not have been possible if it had not been preceded by the circulation of a meta-narrative on the horrifying massacres and the brutal killings of civilians by Algaddafi's regime.

4.5.1.2 Features of Narrativity

We use the types of narratives described above to construct our world and mediate our experience of it. In the following, I will describe their four features: temporality, relationality, causal emplotment and selective appropriation.

Temporality is the sequence that constitutes a story rather than a single part of it. It means that narratives should always be placed in a certain sequence, and should be in chronological order. In regard to the translation process, temporality means that the set of events organised in the ontological, public or conceptual narratives, have to be organised similarly in temporal and spatial aspects, producing an understandable narrative. Baker further illustrates that the way in which we organise the elements of a narrative, such as temporal or spatial, will create a connection between the set of events, transforming them into a coherent story (2006:50-51). The second feature Baker discusses is *relationality*, which is defined as the difficulty the human mind faces in trying to understand events when they have been taken out of their context and are not logically connected. Thus, in order for texts to be perceived as narratives, they should present a degree of coherence, and should be structured in a suitable sequence to represent reality. In regard to translation, Baker argues that translators avoid the use of direct semantic equivalents when they are connected to negative narratives in the target culture. In other words, translators avoid importing cultural or religious elements that are not consistent with the TT culture, and thus maintain relationality by avoiding alien narratives (2006:61). On the other hand, *casual emplotment* enables us to understand events without necessarily listing them in their chronological order. It allows us to make moral sense of the events that have happened, and evaluate them without having to name them. Baker advises that translators can employ this in the translation process by linking translated events differently, thus creating new meanings through the choice of equivalents in translation. The final feature is *selective appropriation*, which is known as the ability to construct narratives based on evaluative criteria, "that enables and guides selective appropriation of a set of events or elements from the vast array of open-ended and overlapping events that constitute experience" (Baker, 2006:71). Baker suggests that creating a coherent narrative is important and that some events may be excluded from the experience (2006:67-71). She also states, "selecting, and in

some cases 'inventing' texts that help elaborate a particular narrative of an 'enemy culture, then, is a well-documented practice that often relies heavily on the services of translators and interpreters" (2006:75). The narratives translators or interpreters produce have undergone a process of selective appropriation, as sponsoring media often select particular news for translation. The process of selecting particular news, on the other hand, is arguably more often than not governed by media outlets' ideology and agendas. An example of this feature during the Arab Spring is the tendency of many news agencies to highlight the regimes' barbaric acts against the protesters and the massacres committed by the regimes, which in turn emphasised the importance of the presidents' ousting.

For this research, drawing on Baker's narrative theory will allow me to examine to what extent the media changes certain narratives or bases them on existing ones. This should be achieved by considering the shared narrative and how it affects the way people perceive the world. Moreover, the feature of selective appropriation will enhance the discussion as it will allow me to examine how media selectively chooses what parts of a text to translate while deliberately dismissing other parts. This is either for ideological purposes, or due to the widespread narrative and the willingness to emphasise it to the reader.

4.6 Conclusion

This chapter introduced the three main theories that I will integrate into my analysis: Fairclough's CDA, Kress' multimodality theory, and Baker's Social Narrative Theory. The significance of integrating these theories together is in creating an interdisciplinary model that aims to highlight various features of the text. By bringing these theories together, I propose a new model of analysis for political speeches, which I will discuss in more detail in the following chapter.

Chapter Five

Methodology

5.1 Introduction

The methodology used to analyse Algaddafi's and Mubarak's speeches is informed by the theoretical framework discussed in the previous chapter. In this chapter, I will propose a MTA model as I employed it for the analysis of the shifts that occur when Arabic political speeches are translated not only into another language, English, but into other genres, such as newspaper articles. The model draws on CDA theory as advanced by Fairclough's, which will facilitate the analysis of the speeches on the linguistic level. It also draws on Kress' multimodality theory to highlight the significance of the genre and the medium in the process of translation, as well as on Baker's Narrative Theory in order to examine how TTs are presented by the media within dominant political narratives. This chapter will also introduce the stages of the analysis, and how each theory informed the model of analysis employed to examine the texts. In addition, I will indicate at the end of the chapter why I chose Algaddafi's and Mubarak's speeches, and I will present the TTs on which this research is focused.

5.2 The Interdisciplinary Nature of the Study

The field of Translation Studies is interdisciplinary as it utilises theories from other disciplines, such as Linguistics and Political Science. Linguists such as Schäffner (1997; 2002; 2003; 2004) and Hatim and Mason (1990; 1997), for example, have applied CDA theory to the analysis of STs and TTs. As indicated in the previous chapter, I will adopt an interdisciplinary approach to analyse different modes and genres of the translations of Algaddafi's and Mubarak's speeches, the objects of study in this research, and their linguistic and extra-linguistic features.

For this, I will draw on Fairclough's CDA approach (1992), Kress' Multimodality Theory (2010) and Baker's Narrative Theory (2006). By adopting these three theories, this thesis will study how mode, genre and medium can affect the TTs and their qualities. Each theoretical framework also aims to shed light on a particular issue related to the translation and its process. Fairclough's sociolinguistics approach (1992, 1995, and 2001), for instance, will be used to analyse the linguistic features, the way language was employed by both speakers to manipulate the public's opinion, and to understand the way language was used to reflect the president's ideology of the STs - Algaddafi's and Mubarak's speeches - and the TTs. Secondly, Narrative Theory as developed and advanced by Baker, will be applied to understand how these speeches were interpreted through the dominant narratives and whether they were eventually affected by existing narratives. Lastly, Kress' Multimodality Theory is used to emphasise how meaning is dependent on the genre and mode in which texts are presented. Thus, I will apply elements of these three theories to the analysis of the STs and TTs, thereby developing a MTA model that combines these three crucial aspects of translation processes for the context of media: linguistic, multimodal and narrative.

Figure 4 – MTA Model

For the purpose of this study it was deemed necessary to combine Fairclough's CDA, Kress' multimodality, and Baker's Narrative Theory, into a single model in order to approach different aspects of the translation for an overall effective analysis. The importance of each theory lies within the aspect it analyses. For instance, CDA highlights the need of incorporating the analysis of texts beyond the word level, to further understand the linguistic choices, techniques and the message they reflect. Having said that, in a world of multimedia and of information technologies, where texts are affected by the way they are presented to the audience, and

because texts are now being published in different genres, media, format and other qualities that can affect the TT, a theory of multimodality has been incorporated. This will allow assessment of how meaning has been transformed from one medium to another, from one genre to another, and to what extent these shifts have affected the meaning. Baker's narrative approach to the study of translation has been adopted in order to examine whether the TTs have been interpreted within certain existing narratives that have affected the meaning of the STs, and whether some translations could have been used to support dominant ideological narratives. It is essential to identify the changes that occurred to the STs, especially since the TTs are considered the only source of information about the speeches under analysis for non-Arabic speaking people, including the Arab Diaspora.

For the analysis of the texts, I will combine a quantitative and qualitative approach. The quantitative approach will be used to measure and analyse the number of times Algaddafi and Mubarak used specific lexis in their speeches. For example, the number of times each president repeated the pronoun '*I*' in comparison to the number of times they used the pronoun '*we*'. The results will be compared to examine to what extent each president used these linguistic tools to their advantage or disadvantage. In addition, a quantitative approach provides grounds for an indepth linguistic analysis of the speeches, and it highlights certain features that are then discussed in the qualitative analysis. The importance of analysing the number of occurrences of certain words will address the shifts in the texts, and the agents' role and intentions in conveying the meaning of the texts. The agent in the STs is the person delivering the speech, whereas in the TTs this can be the translator or the editor. The qualitative approach, on the other hand, aims to offer a way to analyse beyond the actual meaning of the words used in ST1A (Source Text 1 Algaddafi) and ST2M (Source Text 2 Mubarak) and the motivation behind them. I will analyse the linguistic and the extra-linguistics features of Algaddafi's and Mubarak's speeches and additionally conduct a comparative analysis of these STs. I will then

examine and compare three different translations of each speech that were published and broadcasted in the media. The TTs are divided into two modes, spoken and written. The first group includes the simultaneous interpretations of the speeches, and the second group includes translations in two genres: a newspaper article and a transcript. The first ST (henceforth ST1A) is Mummar Algaddafi's first speech during the Libyan uprising in 2011. I will study three different translations of it: (1) an interpretation of the speech into English that was broadcast live on Aljazeera English on 22 February 2011; (2) an article of a summary of the speech in English, in conjunction with some selected quotations published in the *Daily Mail* newspaper on 23 February 2011; (3) a full transcript of the translation of the speech into English that was published in an online blog on 26 February 2011.

The second speech (henceforth ST2M) is the last speech Hosni Mubarak gave during the Egyptian uprising, delivered on 10 February 2011, and was broadcast on Egyptian State TV. The TTs of ST2M will be divided similarly into simultaneous interpretation and written translations. They are: (1) an interpretation of the speech into English that was broadcast live on Fox News on 10 February 2011; (2) an article in English, which includes several excerpts from the speech published in *The Guardian* on 10 February 2011; and (3), a full transcript of the ST translation published in *The Washington Post* on 10 February 2011. I will address the reasons for choosing these particular texts in Section 5.4. I intend to provide a comprehensive and systematic content analysis of the target texts, and of the shifts that occurred in translation by comparing the TTs with the STs. The analysis of the TTs will reveal how the choice of mode and genre of the translation can in fact create an impact on the TT.

There was significant disparity with regards to the mode and genre used in the reporting of the presidents' speeches. While some media outlets opted to present the entire speech, and integrate images of the presidents, others chose to thoroughly describe the speech including

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descriptions of the presidents. Arab and Western media approached the speeches differently in their choices of how to convey the message. Some channels opted for live simultaneous interpreting, some chose to broadcast the speech in full, with subtitles, others published a transcript of the speech, and some preferred to provide a summary. In this regard, Kress (2010) writes that translators usually opt to change the way the communication is being produced to avoid misunderstanding, and to render the message in a way that the target text audience will perceive as suitable. The process of changing the communication mode, for example from oral into a written text, potentially leads to shifts and changes. It is perhaps inevitable to witness a change of genres as a result of technological advances and the shifts from one language to another, as well as the purpose of the TTs. For instance, ST1A and ST2M were both orally delivered to the public, but when covered by the media, they were mainly a news item with an informative purpose, hence they were either summarised or aired in the form of excerpts of the speech. It is thus the aim of this thesis to examine how these translations were shaped differently to adhere to the purpose and the understanding of the TT audience. I will study the genres and modes in which they were delivered in order to examine the shifts and changes in translation that may be caused by the conventions of these genres and modes. Unlike previous studies that were concerned with presidential Arab Spring speeches - most of which were concerned with the analysis of the speeches themselves in regard to terminology, type of language used, and how the presidents' identities were reflected in their speeches - the methodology proposed here aims to address the qualities of the TTs. The next section will explore the stages of analysis this thesis will follow.

5.3 Stages of the Analysis

The analysis of the STs and TTs will be conducted in two stages. The first stage consists of a comparative analysis of the two speeches and their discursive features within a CDA framework and a multimodal framework. The second stage is an analysis of the mode and genre of the TTs within a combination of CDA, Narrative Theory and a multimodal framework. Figure 5 shows an illustration of the stages of the analysis employed in this research.

A comparative analysis of ST1A & ST2M and their Translations

Critical Discourse Analysis

Analysis of the word choice, structure, ideologies and hidden messages beyond the speech in the STs & TTs.

Multimodal Approach

Analysis of the recourses used to deliver the message: language, setting of the speech, image, the body language, and the mode and genre it was conveyed to as a TT.

Narrative

Analysis of the common narrative and the feature of selectivity

Figure 5 – Stages of Analysis

5.3.1 Stage One – STs Analysis

There are numerous mechanisms that allow us to examine a speech and its features. First, the study of phonetics which helps us to study sounds represented in words produced by the speaker; second, morphology, syntax and semantics, which are the tools that help us to put words to concepts and to understand words as meanings and what they represent; third the study of pragmatics, which is the study of meaning beyond the context and the way it is inferred

from context (Drugman 2011:1-3). The way these mechanisms are employed in a speech can change its effectiveness and goals greatly. As has been highlighted in Chapter Two, political speeches are among the most complex speeches in terms of structure and style.

In recent years, CDA theories have been widely employed to study political speeches, such as speeches by Martin Luther King, Barack Obama, David Cameron, and Erdogan (Sipra & Rashid, 2013; Charteris-Black, 2013; Wang, 2010; Bayram, 2010). CDA highlights the vital role of ideology, and it allows analysts of speeches to establish a connection between discourse, culture, social structure, and the norms and beliefs in a given society (Fairclough, 2000). This is achieved by analysing different levels of discourse, such as grammar, style, rhetoric, organization and pragmatic strategies (Fairclough, 1995:18). CDA has been applied to examine the rhetoric in complex discourses such as political speeches in order to understand the way language is used to create an impression on the audience. Rhetoric in politics dates back to Aristotle, who defines it as an art of discourse which can be used for good and evil purposes (Kenndy, 1994:57). However, to Mccluskey, "the rhetoric is not mere ornament or manipulation or trickery. It is rhetoric in the ancient sense of persuasive discourse" (1987:3). Similarly, Van Eemeren defines rhetoric as the "study of aiming for effectiveness in argumentative discourse" (2010:89). Leith explains it simply as "the art of persuasion, the attempt of one human being to influence another in words" (2011:1). Leith also highlights that rhetoric is a field of knowledge that requires certain skills and techniques to reach a goal and suggests that there is a vast number of effective tools used by linguists to create persuasive speech. Among these tools are humour, repetition, and figure of speech. "Figures of speech (such as metaphor, oxymoron[14], metonymy, hypallage[15] and paronomasia[16]) are widely used in

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[14] Oxymoron: " a combination of contradictory or incongruous words (such as cruel kindness) (*Webster's Online Dictionary*).

[15] Hypallage: "an interchange of two elements in a phrase or sentence from a more logical to a less logical relationship" (*Webster's Online Dictionary*).

[16] Paronomasia: "phrase intentionally used to exploit the confusion between words having similar sounds but different meanings. It is like a word play and is also known as a pun." (literarydevices.com 2017).

both types of rhetoric, and have the function of enlivening discourse. As such, they are used by politicians all over the world" (Tosi, 2001:106f.). The excessive use of rhetorical language might be the reason why political speeches are often perceived to be complex and, at times, convoluted. According to Fairclough and Fairclough, the rhetorical perspective is particularly relevant to political arguments, as it gives the speaker a great advantage to mobilise the support of a larger part of the audience (2012:59). Therefore, rhetorical language is used a lot by politicians in their speeches to persuade the public of their goals and to gain their support. As previously indicated, there is a tendency to use rhetorical tools in political speeches such as metaphors, figures of speech, repetition, and quotations, that can manipulate the audience and influence them. According to Rozina and Karapetjana (2009), political discourse uses a wide range of rhetorical devices at phonological, syntactic, lexical, semantic, pragmatic and textual level, that enables the listener to memorise the content of the discourse which, in turn, makes it easier for the speech to be adopted by the media and the audience. Repetition, for example, as discussed in Section 3.3.2, is a rhetorical device commonly used by politicians.

Taking all this into consideration, the first stage of this thesis will consist of a textual and contextual analysis of the STs within a CDA framework. To be more precise, in this research, the term *discourse* refers to the presidential speeches with their linguistic and extra-linguistic features (ST1A and ST2M). It is because CDA brings attention to the importance of understanding language as a tool that helps to impose power within the language used and to uncover ideological and hidden messages within the discourse, that I intend to apply CDA to uncover some of the hidden features and the ideology each president tried to impose on the audience. Fairclough's three-dimensional model (see Figure 1-2) integrating language and texts into a social context, will thus be drawn on in the analysis of the speeches. The model examines discourse in regard to three factors: the mode of the text (written/speech), the way it was produced and perceived by the audience, and the analysis of sociocultural elements related to

the text. It is also important to examine a text with its 'interpretations', for which Fairclough (1990) provides three elements that shape the discourse: experiential, relations, and expressive, as has been discussed in Section 4.2.2 of Chapter Four. The analysis will therefore be divided into three stages according to the three dimensions (see Figure 1):

1. **Text analysis** '*description*': this is the analysis of the product, i.e. ST1A and ST2M. This includes a detailed linguistic analysis of grammar, vocabulary, semantic, phonology, and cohesion and organization level of the ST (Fairclough, 1992:75). The tools that will be used in this analysis are illustrated in Figure 6 below.

grammar	**modality, pronouns**
vocabulary	**synonyms, euphemisms & foul language, metaphor**
cohesion and organization	**repetition, lexical cohesion and sentence structure**

Figure 6 - Fairclough: Tools of Analysis

The analysis will highlight the features listed above and address to what extent they are key in structuring the speech and producing meaning. It will show the importance of using particular techniques to emphasise the speaker's point or send a message to the audience. It is in fact through these features that speakers propagate their ideologies and effectively manipulate the audience.

2. **Discourse practice** '*interpretation*': "involves processes of text production, distribution, and consumption, and the nature of these processes varies between different types of discourses according to social factors" (Fairclough, 1992:78). It will analyse two aspects, the speech production, and its consumption. In this stage the analysis will be undertaken with the help of the following tools:

A. **Coherence**, which is related to the quality of the speech, and considers whether it was consistent and followed a logical order. Fairclough suggests that coherence is a tool of interpretation rather than part of a linguistic analysis (1992:83).

B. **Intertextuality** which Fairclough calls "the interrelationship of discursive features in a text" (1992:117). He divides it into two types, *manifest intertextually*, and *constitutive intertextuality* or "*interdiscursivity*". Manifest intertextuality refers to the analysis of intertextual elements of the texts such as quotations, irony, presuppositions and allusions. Interdiscursivity, on the other hand, is concerned with the analysis of discursive features in the text, for example the speech tenor and genre (ibid.: 113).

C. **Force of Utterances** or *speech act* is what the speaker intends to achieve with their discourse (1992:75). The analysis of these will highlight the speaker's intentions and the audience's response.

3. **Social Practice** '*explanation'* is the analysis of the socio-cultural aspects that construct discourses. According to Fairclough, discourses are socially shaped, as they convey knowledge and beliefs, social identities and relationship between one group of people and another (1989:43; 1992:19). This stage is concerned with the notion of power and ideology to explore the extent to which the speeches produced hegemonic and social practices. The ideological representations in the speeches will be studied in regard to social power and its influence on society.

The purpose of this analysis is to explore the art of linguistic manipulation in Mubarak's and Algaddafi's speeches based on Fairclough's three-dimensional model, and it should clarify the

importance of specific linguistic choices and structures the speakers opted to use to achieve a particular purpose.

According to Fairclough and Wodak, discourses "are partly realised in ways of using language, but partly in other ways" (1997:261). Hence, the importance of analysing discourse does not necessarily diminish the importance of analysing extra-linguistic features. A semiotic multimodal framework offers a descriptive means to account for the multiple and innovative ways in which semiotic resources are deployed within and across various modes of communication such as speeches, written texts or visual images (Halloran, Tan, Smith & Podlasov, 2010:4). As has been indicated in Section 4.3, the analysis will draw on Kress' framework in an attempt to analyse the combination of multiple aspects of communication, such as language, sound, colour, image and gestures. This thesis will provide a thorough analysis of the following features to explore their importance in regard to the message the presidents wanted to convey:

1. **The image**, which is the way each president appeared during his speech, that is, clothing, surroundings and the place in which the speech took place.

2. **Body language** is an important factor in political speeches as it contributes to demonstrate the speaker's attitude.

3. **Extra interactive resources** are a combination of different elements that Kress describes as "the new technology". This is reflected in the use of new technology such as voice recordings and the visual effects.

5.3.2 Stage Two – Analysis of the Target Texts

Conceptually, speeches are considered a primary response to political events and can be seen as a tool to give meaning to certain events. It is thus through these speeches that politicians

deliver their messages in an attempt to convince the audience of their goals, influence public attitudes, and gain public trust.

Translation has always been seen as the bridge of communication between different cultures and languages. Without translation, people would not be aware of the various events taking place in different parts of the world, such as the Arab Spring. Translation is intrinsic in the process of globalisation, and essential to the movement of discourse and languages. Over the past few decades, the field of Translation Studies has witnessed a rise in the number of attempts to develop a well-formed framework. Among them is Fairclough's CDA, which greatly influenced the translation discipline. It sheds light on different factors that define a text while also considering changes that occur in texts when translators opt to use different techniques to convey the message. It could be argued that the complexity of the translation process forces the translator/interpreter to use different methods to render the message.

The comparative analysis of the TTs aims to explore different techniques and methods used by the media to convey the message according to their own ideology, and their preference of what information to deliver to the audience as explained by Baker's narrative theory. It will highlight the cultural gap between the ST and TT audience, and the way each TT producer attempted to bridge this gap. The extent to which each criterion is important is determined by the source text, the event, and the translation process. On the other hand, the importance of the genre of the target text is realised by the impact it had, the substantial elements it lost, and the reasons for which it was reshaped with different modes to fit into a different genre - for example if the speech was delivered orally and was then translated into an article in a daily newspaper. In regard to the speeches I will examine, and due to the fact that they were delivered orally, it is important to highlight the difference in style and terminology when changing the speech genre from a persuasive speech that is directed at the audience to stop the demonstration, into

an informative piece of news that is shaped within a particular discourse to the target text audience such as the BBC, CNN, and other news agencies that reported on the speeches. As discussed in Section 4.3, Kress' multimodal framework will be used to draw attention to extra-linguistic features and their rendition into the target text. Regardless of the importance of these factors, they are usually not rendered during the translation process, due to the change of mode and genre of the translation. This is when translators have the authority to include extra-linguistic features and attempt to describe them instead of just rendering the speech itself. The British newspaper *Daily Mirror*, for instance, reported on Mummar Algaddafi's speech from the 23 February 2011; the newspaper described the president and his surroundings while delivering his speech as follows:

> Gaddafi, in brown robes, spoke from a podium set up in the entrance of a bombed-out building that appeared to be his Tripoli residence hit by US airstrikes in 1986 and left unrepaired as a monument of defiance (Laurie Hanna for *Daily Mirror*).

Other newspapers, such as the *Washington Post*, chose to not translate these features, and solely translated parts of the speech and summarised the important points. It is therefore important to study the different methods translators use to transfer visual aspects of a speech through different ways of communication, by describing the settings and the body language or by having a picture or video that illustrates these. In the following section, I will introduce the data used for the analysis in this thesis.

5.4 The Data

The data used in this thesis is divided into two speeches and their translations. The first speech (ST1A) is by Mummar Algaddafi; the second one is by Hosni Mubarak (ST2M). Both speeches were delivered orally by the presidents during the Arab Spring in 2011. Thus, it was rather important that I transcribe and translate the speeches personally to use it as a reference during

the analysis and the examination of the TTs. As discussed in Section 5.2, the specific TTs were chosen as they represent different genres. I will investigate the differences and similarities in the translations between these different modes and genres. In addition, I aim to assess the changes to the modes and genres of the source texts, from an oral speech to a written text or summary, and how this changed the purpose of the target texts.

Algaddafi's and Mubarak's speeches share similar characteristics and initially had a similar goal, which was to address the nation during a difficult time, to cease violence, and to stop the revolution. Most importantly though, both presidents intended to remain in power and control the nation. Both speeches thus played a significant role during the Arab Spring. They represent the presidents' last attempts to convince the public to stop the uprising before they were overthrown. Irrespective of the fact that the speeches were perceived as redundant by a large part of the public, they had negative and positive impacts on the people, and were discussed in the news globally. There are several reasons why I chose to compare Algaddafi's speech with Mubarak's: Firstly, because I wish to examine how the different dialects were perceived and considered during the translation process, since Mubarak delivered his speech in MSA, whereas Algaddafi delivered his in LCA. LCA has a different pronunciation style and terminology that are mainly used in Libya, as a result of which other native Arabic speakers find it difficult to understand. Secondly, because of the relevance of the similarity and differences of the themes and issues raised in the speeches, such as civil war, foreign intervention and the chaotic circumstances in which both countries found themselves. Thirdly, because of the impact the speeches had on Libya and Egypt. Algaddafi's speeches managed to change people's minds as they continued to support him so that he remained in power for almost eight months, unlike Mubarak who stepped down one month after his last speech. According to some Libyan bloggers (e.g. Parteibuch Zweitblog), the public indeed reconsidered the uprising and believed Algaddafi's intention of reform, after his first speech from 22 February

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2011, whereas some questioned his sincerity until a few months after the uprising. This is clearly evident in the number of demonstrations and rallies by pro-Gaddafi supporters and in the constant clashes between his supporters and the rebels during the uprising. Fourthly, because of the significance of certain symbols and signs, images beyond the speech, and the body language that contributed to establish a certain image of each president. And finally, because of other important elements that might eventually affect the translation process, such as the tendency to use rhetorical language.

5.4.1 Context Information to Algaddafi's Speech

The thesis will examine the speech delivered by Algaddafi on 22 February 2011. It was aired live on Libyan State television at around 5:53 in the evening and lasted approximately one hour and 15 minutes. I chose this speech firstly as it contains a number of Algaddafi's favourite themes: foreign conspiracy, colonisation, Al-Qaida brainwashing the youth as well as their desire to have access to Libya's oil and resources. Secondly, as the speech is in LCA, this might influence the Libyan people, yet also affect the translation process if the translator is not aware of that dialect. It is important at this point to highlight the tribal nature of Libyan society, where tribes play a major role in the country's affairs. Hence, Algaddafi attempted to reach out to different tribes to gain their support and the support of their followers. Thirdly, due to the combination of several genres within the speech which reflect its complexity.

The speech starts off with encouraging Libyans to defend their lands, then goes on to cite the history of Libya and Algaddafi's glorious efforts to develop the country. It later changes to narrating stories of the tribes and praising them with poetry. Algaddafi calls out about ten names of the most famous tribes in Libya to gain their support, he then asks them to go out on the streets and support him to save Libya. He also narrates a poem about two big tribes in Libya - Zintan and Werfalli - stressing that the poem resembles the current situation in Libya. In addition to reading the rules and regulations and the underlining the importance of following

them, Algaddafi also lists a number of punishments to intimidate the protesters. Regardless of the seriousness of the situation and Algaddafi's fiery attitude, he still manages to be witty and makes some humorous remarks.

Overall, the speech and its translation are rich in linguistic features. At one point, Algaddafi bangs on the podium, yelling 'forward, march forward', he jokes, pausing for a while and then citing poetry. It was one of the most controversial speeches, as it was portrayed differently in media outlets across the world. The BBC described it as a 'rambling speech' (BBC, Feb 2011C), while it was also referred to as 'ranting' by *The Telegraph* and *The Guardian* (Spencer, 2011; Black, 2011). Some parts of the speech were seen as extremely comical so that it was later turned into a music video by Arabic speakers and by non-Arabic speakers. In this regard, Bowen wrote, "Gaddafi's 'Zenga zenga' ['alley by alley'] speech of 22 February 2011, a tirade made internationally and ironically famous by its musical remix as a YouTube viral hit" (2012:109). The Arabic version of the speech ST1A was aired on the Libyan State channel, and different television channels used the airing subsequently. It was also recorded in the archives of many channels and online resources such as YouTube. In order to be able to conduct a comprehensive analysis, I transcribed the speech and translated it myself, and it was later approved by a Libyan translation bureau[17]. The length of the speech was an essential element of its availability in different media. Only a few channels were able to provide interpretations of the entire speech, while others opted to interpret only a few parts of it. The media mostly agreed on the nature of Algaddafi's speech, as it was referred to as *defiant, rambling, and even as incoherent speech* (*Daily Mail*, 2011).

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[17] For details please see Appendix 1.

Mummar Algaddafi – 22 February 2011		
Interpreting – Voice over	Al-Jazeera English - 22 February 2011	Aljazeera website (Aljazeera English, Feb 2011)
Summary and Excerpts	*The Daily Mail* – 23 February 2011	*Daily Mail* website (*Daily Mail*, February 2011)
Transcript of the Translation	Pete Warden online blog – 26 February 2011	Pete Warden blog (Warden, 2011)

Figure 7 - Algaddafi's Data

The data was collected from different online sources: TT1A from Aljazeera's website, TT2A from the *Daily Mail* website, and TT3A from Warden's blog. I attempted to contact the agency of each TT, to inquire about the interpreter/translator and their academic and cultural background. This is due to the importance of the translator's background, knowledge and their ideology, and the way it was reflected in the TT. Nonetheless, both the *Daily Mail* and Aljazeera English failed to respond to any of my emails and attempts to reach the interpreter/translator. Thus, my interpretation of the TT was mainly based on my own understanding and analysis of the TT. On the other hand, Pete Warden - the blog owner of TT3A - was cooperative and responded promptly to all my emails and provided me with all the necessary information I needed (See Chapter Nine).

5.4.2 Context Information to Mubarak's Speech

The reason for which Mubarak's speech was chosen is due to the vast change in the level of discourse each speech contained during the Egyptian revolution in 2011. The president demonstrated different levels of power that gradually decreased until his last speech (see

Section 2.7.2.3). Among the three speeches Mubarak delivered during the revolution, only one was recognised for its unusual style and choice of terminology. The first speech was of a threatening nature, mainly concerned with stopping the demonstrations and to remind the citizens of Mubarak's achievements that helped make a better Egypt. Contrarily, the second speech was emotional and aimed to evoke people's emotion. Similarly, the last speech was mainly concerned with the citizens, their demands, and with Egypt and was also very emotional. Unlike other Arab presidents who have attempted to be closer to their nation by addressing the public in Colloquial Arabic, Mubarak delivered all of his speeches in MSA. His speeches were direct, addressing specific issues, very well articulated, and well prepared.

The speech I will examine is the last speech the president delivered on Thursday 10 February 2011 at 10:45 in the evening. The speech was aired on the main Egyptian State television channel, and lasted for about 18 minutes. The original source of broadcasting was Egyptian state television, which provided constant 'text graphics' to emphasise the important points the president highlighted in his speech. Television channels such as Aljazeera, Press TV, and BBC created the same 'text graphic' but in a translated version, while others, such as CNN, *New York Times*, and CCTV opted not to include it. The main Egyptian State channel preferred to broadcast one side of the story, that is, Mubarak delivering the speech, while other channels like Aljazeera English and CNN chose to show a split-screen live coverage of two different, yet related, events. The first half showed Mubarak delivering his speech, and the other half showed a live coverage of the public protests against him in Tahrir Square. The Arabic source of the speech ST2M is taken from an online source, which provided a recording of the entire speech. The speech was then transcribed and translated by me.

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Hosni Speech –10 February 2011		
Interpreting – Voice over	Fox News – 10 February 2011	Fox News Youtube Channel by Adnane Ettayebi. (Fox News Insider, Feb 2011b and c).
Summary and excerpts	*The Guardian* – 10 February 2011, and Friday 11 February 2011	*The Guardian* website by Chris McGreal and Ian Black. (McGreal, 2011; Black, 2011)
Transcript of the Translation	*The Washington Post* – 10 February 2011	*The Washington Post* website by The Federal Document Clearing (*Washington Post*, Feb 2011)

Figure 8 - Mubarak's Data

The data for ST2M was also collected from a number of well-established online sources: TT1M as reported by Fox News was downloaded from YouTube, TT2M from *The Guardian* website, and TT3M from *The Washington Post* website. Establishing personal communication with interpreters and translators for ST2M was indeed easier than it was for ST1A. In regard to TT1M, Fox News did not provide me with the interpreter's name, or responded to any of my emails. However, I found an interview with Adnane Ettayebi on Fox News discussing the way Fox New's interpreters approached Mubarak's speeches. I emailed him subsequently, and he confirmed that he was the person who had interpreted Mubarak's speech (ST2M). For TT2M, the article published in *The Guardian* carried the author's name, Chris McGreal, and it was relativity easy to investigate the author's background and ideological beliefs and later draw the analysis based on it. For TT3M, the *Washington Post* attributed the transcript of the translation

of ST2M to the *Federal Document Clearing House* in the United States of America. Understanding the translator's background and beliefs was a great asset while analysing the translation and understanding the translator's choices and the strategies they apply to render the message.

5.5 Conclusion

Political speeches have the power to alter an entire nation's belief. However, their importance and impact vary from one nation to another. They can also be interpreted differently throughout the world. The speeches analysed in this thesis had different receptions; while Mubarak's speech was taken seriously initially but ridiculed later, Algaddafi's was defied from the very beginning and disregarded by the media. This thesis aims to explore the reasons why both speeches were treated differently by Arab and Western media. It also attempts to examine the significant gap in cultural and ideological differences between Arab and Western political speeches. In the next chapter I will offer an analysis of Algaddafi's and Mubarak's speeches in order to highlight the similarities and differences in their linguistic approaches.

Chapter Six

The Analysis of the Arabic speeches of Algaddafi and Mubarak

6.1 Introduction

In this chapter, I will analyse the most prominent linguistic and extra-linguistic features of Algaddafi's and Mubarak's speeches drawing on Fairclough's CDA and Kress's multimodal frameworks, as set out in Chapter Five. I will first present the multimodal analysis of the overall image of the presidents, as it provides a context within which the speeches were delivered. I will then apply Fairclough's CDA to emphasise the significance of using certain linguistic and rhetorical tools that initially help the presidents to persuade the public of their views. The analysis will highlight several issues related to grammar, terminology, repetition, allusion, and draw attention to the crucial role ideology and power play in shaping these speeches.

The approach I have used to translate both speeches is a literal one, as I felt the importance of conveying not only the meaning but also the way in which the STs were structured, either through the style of the language or through grammar. Consequently, my translation is a literal translation in conjunction with a thorough interpretation of the meaning, bearing in mind the convention of the English language. The significance of providing my translation in the analysis is to carry an in-depth analysis of the TTs, by providing a literal translation of the ST to the reader. This should help in the illustration and examination of the translation, whether in the existing of errors, accuracy issues or simply if it was misinterpreted intentionally or not.

6.2 The Analysis of Algaddafi's Speech

The speech Algaddafi delivered on 22 February 2011 was perhaps his most significant as it signalled his first official respond to the demonstrations and the uprising in Libya in 2011. The speech was evidently improvised, as Algaddafi, rather rapidly, changed topics multiple times. He talked about the youth and himself, he told stories, and recited poetry, and rules from the Libyan Penal Code book.

As this research requires a full transcript of the speech, I transcribed the speech, taking into account Arabic language punctuation and LCA spelling, which was later approved by a Libyan translation bureau[18]. The difficulty I faced when transcribing the speech was the lack of an original source of the entire transcript in the Libyan dialect, and the lack of LCA literature. Eventually, this created a number of difficulties, for instance, spellings of particular words and exact punctuation, which led to some confusion and incoherent sentences; furthermore, the difficulty of applying MSA style of spelling and punctuation, because of the language of the ST, and its clearly improvised quality. There are a number of instances in which Algaddafi repeats his sentences or part thereof, and other times when he corrects himself. In regard to spelling, there were common ways of spelling particular words that are common to Libyans, such as the spelling of the word زنقة/ *Zanga* = Alley.

6.2.1 Extra-Linguistic Features of ST1A

As highlighted in Section 4.3, Kress' multimodality approach (2010) is concerned with studying communication in a variety of modes, and with the integration of more than one mode to enhance meaning. Politicians often employ several modes, such as their image and body language, as part of the overall message they intend to send. In regard to ST1A, Algaddafi

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[18] Full transcript is available in Appendix 1.

incorporates several modes that contribute to the message he aims to deliver. These modes were either rendered by the media using another mode of communication, mistranslated, or sometimes marginalised. This section intends to shed light on two significant modes: the image and the body.

1. Image

For his speech, Algaddafi chooses to appear in traditional Libyan attire, wearing a long brown robe with a matching shawl, and a matching colour turban, as shown in Figure 9. He ostentatiously exhibits his patriotic side as well his love and belonging to the desert. His light brown coloured attire greatly emphasises his love of the desert, as he always refers to himself as the 'son of the desert'. Algaddafi wears the Libyan traditional robe with shawl and turban in an attempt to convey his true Libyan and tribal identity. Algaddafi appears in the traditional Libyan attire in all his speeches and interviews only during the Libyan uprising in 2011.

Figure 9 - Algaddafi during his Speech on 22 February 2011

In order for Algaddafi to underline his attitude towards the uprising, and to demonstrate his defiance, resistance and dedication, he chooses a very important landmark from which to

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deliver his speech. He appears in front of a podium, in the middle of a destroyed palace in Bab al-Azizia in Tripoli, as illustrated in Figure 10. This palace was Algaddafi's presidential residence until 15 April 1986 when it was bombed by the United States Air Forces. It was deliberately left in ruins as a symbol of Western aggression and unjustified killings of Libyan people. In front of the palace, Algaddafi built a huge golden fist clasping an American air fighter. The sculpture contains parts of the original plane debris that Algaddafi's forces claimed to have shot down during the raids. Not only does it portray Algaddafi's furious reaction toward the raids, but it also sends a message of Libyans' glorious fights. In retrospect, it is clear that Algaddafi was in denial, and that he attempted to build an image of resistance for both himself and the Libyan people, despite the damages the raids and the sanctions caused Libya. As the palace represents a history of resistance and defiance, is was named البيت الصامد '*The House of Resistance*' and later turned into a museum to which international delegations are often taken. The palace carries thus significant meaning, and is regarded as an important landmark to Algaddafi and to the Libyan people, due to the notions of resistance and glory it symbolises (Kawczynski, 2011).

Figure 10 - The House of Resistance

Algaddafi contextualises his speech in a way that resembles previous Western aggression from which Libya suffered, and applies this to the current situation. This is clearly evident in his speech, where he constantly deplores the United States of America for its intervention in Libya and accuses it of manipulating the youth into the revolution. Standing in front of the ruins, a symbolically loaded place, to demonstrate his intention and his will to survive the Western invasion, Algaddafi declares his intention to fight until the day he dies as a martyr. He repeatedly criticises Western countries for plotting against Libya by distributing weapons and hallucinogenic drugs, leading the people to believe that this is indeed another Western conspiracy to take possession of the country and its valuable resources such as oil and gold. In addition, Algaddafi delivers his speech in one of Libya's most recognised landmarks to stop the rumours about him fleeing the country. Not only is it an emphasis on resistance and defiance, but it is also of great importance to the Libyan forces as it proves the president is still in Libya and not willing to step down. It plays an important role in persuading the people of their president's intention to fight for their country and influences their decision of whether to join the rebels or not.

2. Body Language

Algaddafi's exaggerated body language is an effective element of communication that underlines his views as well as his state of mind. His fiery attitude is reflected in his body language, as he constantly bangs his fist on the podium and leaps forward at each time he raises his voice to emphasise a point or to motivate the public. One of the most recognisable moves one can notice in Algaddafi's speech is his fist movement. The fist gesture is used by politicians all over the world as an indication of unity, victory, strength and a demonstration of power (Blum, 1988:5). Algaddafi waves his fist in the air many times, a gesture that is considered as a sign of resistance and defiance in the Arab region (Skabelund, 1999). By using his fist, he

emphasises his anger, resistance, illustrates victory, and encourages people to support him. Ending his speech by urging the Libyans to march with him to purify Libya from intruders, shouting 'revolution', he raises his right fist and waves it as people start to shout out his name. Algaddafi later appears raising both arms in the air as a sign of victory. It is also a sign of engaging with the public, by responding to their chanting and encouraging them to support him.

At other times, Algaddafi's hand gestures are more welcoming and affectionate. It is indeed very rare to see him appealing to the Libyan people for support. For instance, when he appeals to the families and tribes, he waves his hand and places it near his chest. Algaddafi's body language during the speech is clearly an indication of his feelings and his frustration (see Section 2.7.1.3). He is distracted, agitated and nervous, which is reflected in his body language.

6.2.2 Linguistic Features of ST1A

In this section, Fairclough's CDA framework will be applied to Algaddafi's speech. The analysis will follow the model discussed in Chapter Five.

6.2.2.1 Text Analysis – Description

1. **Grammar**

The first category is the analysis of grammar, specifically pronouns. The use of certain pronouns is a linguistic strategy that tends to demonstrate either unity, or to glorify one's self (see Section 3.3.2). This section will investigate the importance of using the pronouns *I* and *we*, and the third person pronoun.

1.1. Third Person

According to Comstock and Scharrer, using the third person is more likely to influence the audience by reflecting the speaker's defensiveness (2005:37). It is also a sign of demonstrating greatness as well as pride in one's name and history (ibid.). During his speech, Algaddafi refers to himself in the third person, stating his name and then clarifying his rank and that he is not a president. Shalqam indicates that Algaddafi mentions his own name in his improvised speech 18 times, sometimes only his surname, other times his full name (2012:83). The president clearly wants to demonstrate his pride in being Mummar Algaddafi and in his identity, and most importantly in being the revolution leader. He refers to himself as a revolution leader to engage the public and appeal to them, as he knows of the appreciation Libyan people have towards the revolution and its history. Consider the example below:

<div dir="rtl">

معمر القذافي ليس رئيس، هو قائد ثورة

</div>

<u>Mummar Algaddafi</u> is not a president, but a revolution leader

This can also be seen when Algaddafi urges people to demonstrate their support and protest for him. In one sentence, Algaddafi refers to himself three times, by repeating his full name as can be seen below:

<div dir="rtl">

اخرجوا من بيوتكم، يا الي تحبون معمر القذافي رجال، نساء، بنات، أطفال، يا إللي مع معمر القذافي الثورة، مع معمر القذافي المجد، العزة لليبيا، للشعب الليبي، في القمة.

</div>

Get out of your houses, you who love <u>Mummar Algaddafi</u>, men, women, girls and children, and you who are with <u>Mummar Algaddafi</u> the revolutionist. With <u>Mummar Algaddafi</u> glory and pride to Libya and to reach the top for the Libyan people.

1.2.Pronoun 'I'

What is striking about Algaddafi's speech is the prevalence of the pronoun أنا / *I* which he uses around 105 times throughout the speech and in various instances to demonstrate his pride and dignity. According to Mirak-Weissbach (2012:35-36), Algaddafi shows signs of megalomania[19], one of which is the constant shift to focus on himself during his speeches. It is worth noting that in Islamic and Arab culture, the excessive use of the pronoun أنا/ 'I' is a sign of arrogance; what is more, some Islamic scholars such as Nasser Al-Qatami describe it as *the Satanic I* (Shaikh Nasser Al-Qatami, Jun 2015). People are usually urged not to use it, especially in political speeches, and would rather use plural pronouns to indicate the person's modest attitude and their willingness to be part of the people and not to isolate themselves from the public.

Shalqam (2012:83) describes Algaddafi as a prisoner in a world of his ego, which later became his only world, leaving him blind to anything else but himself. The example below illustrates this:

أنا أرفع من المناصب التي يتقلدها الرؤساء والأبهات، أنا مقاتل، مجاهد، مناضل، ثائر، من الخيمة، من البادية

<u>I</u> am higher than the positions that presidents and pomps take, <u>I am a fighter, struggler, warrior,</u> and <u>revolutionist,</u> from the tent, from the desert.

The pronoun 'I' is followed by a number of active participles. In the Arabic language, active participles are usually used as an adjective or a descriptive term. The English equivalent of it would usually be a noun ending in /-er/ or /-or/, for example *fighter* (Ryding, 2005:103). In the example above, Algaddafi uses many active participles to talk boastingly about himself. He

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[19] "A condition or mental illness that causes people to think that they have great or unlimited power or importance" (*Webster's Online Dictionary*).

describes his importance to be more valuable than the importance of presidents. He further adds an active participle that Libyans always associated with his name: مقاتل، مجاهد، مناضل، ثائر، من الخيمة / "*the fighter, struggler, warrior, revolutionary, from the desert*". As this was highlighted throughout the speech, many Libyan political analysts, such as Ibrahim Gebril (Bibibehrooz, 2011), criticised him, arguing that he made the speech about himself and his achievements rather than about the Libyan uprising.

At one point, Algaddafi threatens the protesters by reminding them of his power and support. By doing so, he sends a message to the world and to the people of Libya, declaring that not only would millions of people support him and die to defend him, but they were also willing to help him defeat the rebels. In the same sentence, we also see evidence of Algaddafi's constant use of the pronoun 'I' and of his tendency to praise himself as a nationalist leader. This sentence is also another indication of his arrogance and his wish to convey to the world what a powerful leader he was, which would eventually affect the protesters and spread fear among them.

<div dir="rtl">

أنا بعد ذلك سنعلن الزحف، سنعلن الزحف المقدس. أيوه. أنا راه معمر القذافي قائد أممي، أنا تدافع عني الملايين.

</div>

I will then announce the march; I will announce the holy march. Yeah! I am Mummar Algaddafi a nationalist leader, and millions are defending me.

1.3.Using the Pronoun 'We'

At other times, Algaddafi uses the pronoun نحن/ *'we'*, when he appeals to Libyans' support and in a gesture of belonging to them. Clearly, by using the pronoun *we*, Algaddafi attempts to include himself in the fight, with the people and against the rebels, as seen below:

شوهوا صورتكم في إذاعات عربية شقيقة للأسف، يخدمون الشيطان، يريدوا إهانتكم، ونحن نريد أن نرد الآن بالفعل، فوق الأرض، في الميدان

They have destroyed your image, unfortunately in Arab brothers' media, they worship the devil, and they want to insult you. <u>We</u> want to react to this now, with an action, on the land, in the field.

He first blames Arab media for destroying Libya's image in the world, by broadcasting lies about Libyans. Algaddafi phrased the sentence to refer to Libyans only, and saying *your image*; however, when he demands that they act against this, he includes himself to say *we want to react*. It seems that Algaddafi uses the pronoun *we* specifically when he intends to demonstrate his powers and abilities, as demonstrated below:

نحن لم نستخدم القوة بعد

<u>We</u> did not use force yet

He uses the pronoun نحن/ *'we'* to refer to himself, the regime, the army and his followers. This can be seen as Algaddafi's attempt to scare the protesters by indicating the army's alliance with him, especially since he repeats this phrase twice.

2. Vocabulary

The second prominent feature of Algaddafi's speech is its terminological diversity, which finds expression in the use of specific terminology and metaphors.

2.1. Terminology

Algaddafi impressively uses the noun الثورة / *revolution'* 33 times during his speech. He creates a linguistic neologism in Arabic by substituting the word *revolution* as a root for many other words. The word is generally associated with Algaddafi's name due to his rebellious reputation and his revolutionary history so that in Libya, the frequent co-occurrence of the word *revolution* with Algaddafi's name is quite common, as he continuously calls himself the 'revolution leader'. Due to its significance, Algaddafi uses it as a verb, an adjective or a noun, as these examples demonstrate:

My Translation	ST
The morning of the <u>revolution</u>.	صباح <u>الثورة</u>
Libya the <u>revolution</u>	ليبيا <u>الثورة</u>
You who are with Mummar Algaddafi the <u>revolutionist</u>	يا إلي مع معمر القذافي <u>الثورة</u>

Algaddafi begins his speech by saluting the youth with the "*morning of the revolution*", demanding that they revolt against the rebels, questioning their desire of being liberated and revolutionary, and calling to them to support him. It is his attempt to remind Libyans of the support they showed him during the first revolution in Libya in 1969. To Algaddafi, using the

word revolution - and being aware of its positive connotation in Libya - aims to evoke the public's reaction to support him.

Another example is Algaddafi's use of the word الزحف/ *the marching*. In MSA, the word is derived from the verb root زحف /*to march* and it is defined as "a group of people marching strongly towards the enemy and also meeting the enemy at war (Al-Saleh & Al-Ahmed, 1980:224). In addition, the word is mentioned in the Qur'an[20], referring to the movement and the marching of a large army as a singular unit, and the fact that it can be seen from a distance as if it is crawling ahead (Makhlouf, 1997:101). The Qur'anic verse reads as follow:

<div dir="rtl">

يَا أَيُّهَا الَّذِينَ آمَنُوا إِذَا لَقِيتُمُ الَّذِينَ كَفَرُوا زَحْفًا فَلَا تُوَلُّوهُمُ الْأَدْبَارَ

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O you, who believe, when you meet those who disbelieve <u>marching</u> for war, turn not your backs to them (Ali, 2002: 380). [1]

During his speech, Algaddafi uses the word 17 times, to refer to the united march of all his supporters from different parts of the world. The word is used in accordance with his attempts to urge protesters to liberate Libya, as seen below:

Ex#	My Translation	ST
Ex1	The holy <u>march</u> will be announced	سيعلن <u>الزحف</u> المقدس
Ex2	I will call out for the millions from desert to desert, and we will <u>march</u>	سنوجه نداء للملايين من الصحراء إلى الصحراء، وسنزحف أنا والملايين

Algaddafi wants to emphasise the importance of the march to forcefully suppress the uprising by collocating the word الزحف / *march* with the word *Holy*, as the example indicates, thus

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[20] Surah Al-Anfal: the eighth chapter of the Qur'an, verse number 15.

relying on the important connotation of the word *holy*, which is particularly meaningful to religious people in Libya. Calling the march *holy* might also suggest that liberating the country is a call from God, and it is a good cause to fight for. Ex2 then essentially represents Algaddafi's powerful resources as he vows that millions would be marching with him to end this war. It is important to clarify that the reason why Algaddafi calls out for support from millions from the desert and from all over the world is that he was demanding Libyan tribes to support him, as well as neighbouring African countries, to which he was devoted and on which he had always relied for support. A number of African countries provided Algaddafi in fact with well-trained soldiers who supported him and helped in fighting the protesters. This statement also indicates Algaddafi's willingness to march all over Libya, across the entire desert and to fight all the rebels wherever they are situated. It aims to spread fear among protesters of being captured and killed by Algaddafi's supporters.

2.2.Metaphor

In Arabic, metaphors are recognised as a rhetoric device that is widely used in poetry, art, in the press, and it exists to a lesser extent in political discourse (Al Salem, 2014:93). In ST1A, Algaddafi is never reluctant to use a combination of foul language in a metaphorical way to deliver his message and express his contempt of the protesters. Algaddafi uses multiple metaphors, but mostly repeats the following:

<div dir="rtl">

هؤلاء <u>القطط والفئران</u> التي تنقز من شارع إلى شارع، ومن زنقة إلى زنقة، في الظلام

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Those <u>cats and rats</u> who are jumping from one street to another and from one
alley to another, in the darkness.

In this example, we can see how Algaddafi uses the words القطط/الفئران *cats / rats* as a metaphor to describe the rebels and to condemn them. He specifically chooses *rats* and *cats* to indicate

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how cowardly the rebels are since they are hiding in the dark and not fighting him or confronting him. For Libyans, this is a clear accusation of some Islamist groups in Libya who were hiding in the Libyan caves, and were accused of causing the uprising to create chaos in Libya. It is also a sign of undermining their status, as *cats* and *rats* are small, weak and often despised animals. Throughout his speech, he uses the words الفئران /*rats* and its synonym الجرذان / *rats* repeatedly to refer to the rebels and the protesters. For example:

My Translation	ST
catch the <u>rats</u>	شدوا <u>الجرذان</u>
Gangs like <u>rats</u>	عصابات مثل <u>الجرذان</u>

Using the metaphor الجرذان / *rats* is also meant to represent the lack of loyalty of those people as they were accused of conspiring against Libya, and so Algaddafi hopes to evoke people's reaction against the rebels, and despise them as he does since they are cowards, traitors and evil.

3. Cohesion

This section aims to address issues related to the cohesion of the text; expressed, for instance, in the way in which the speaker uses repetition throughout the speech.

3.1.Repetition

As indicated in Section 3.3.2, repetition is commonly used in official speeches to enhance the speaker's statements by employing the strategy of using synonyms and near-synonyms; Arabic is in fact well-known for its passion for synonyms and lexical richness (Marzari, 2006: 19). Repetition - which occurs regularly in ST1A whether through synonyms or through simple repetitions of phrases and sentences - is one of the main factors that led to Algaddafi's speeches being publicly ridiculed. Although repetition might reflect the speaker's intention of strongly emphasising a point, and can indeed have the effect of gaining people's attention, it can also be a sign of the speaker's competence to impose a particular idea over the addressees. In this regard, consider the example below:

شبر شبر، بيت بيت، دار دار، زنقه زنقه، فرد فرد

Span by span, house by house, room by room, alley by alley, person by person

The example shows a phrase that was spread all across the world; in the Arab region it in fact gained fame in the form of a song. Regardless of the importance of this statement, and the threatening nature it carries with it, it was made fun of, turned into a music video called 'Zenga Zenga' and aired on the most important Arabic News networks such as Aljazeera and Al-Arabiya (Kershner, 2011). It was the protesters' way to mock Algaddafi and his speech, proving that they are fearless and committed to the uprising.

Algaddafi's repetitive use of these synonyms in this particular order aims to cunningly threaten to chase the protesters by looking for them all over Libya. He starts off by stating that he would start his search in each *span* in Libya, and then gradually enhances the search to include each *house*, and each *room* in the house, each *alley* in Libya and finally each *person*. By doing so, Algaddafi hopes to scare the protesters into believing that they would be followed and captured; and because his regime was well-known for abducting protesters, torturing and

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jailing them, this statement aims to suppress the uprising as the threat appears quite feasible. In addition, Algaddafi's use of the same lexical item twice intends to enforce his threats and his obligation to follow through with them.

6.2.2.2 Discourse Practice – Interpretation

1. Intertextuality

In this section, I will highlight the importance of intertextuality in constructing the speech to influence the audience. Gadavanij stresses the importance of intertextuality by saying "these references are made to influence that reader and add layers of depth to a text, based on the readers' prior knowledge and understanding" (2002:22).

1.1. Quotation

During his long speech, Algaddafi cites several verses of a Libyan tribal poem and gives numerous different examples of governments crushing their protesters. Each quotation carries an important message that Algaddafi intends to highlight; consider this example[21]:

My Translation	ST
A guy from Zintan insulted a guy <u>from Bani Walid</u>, so he was upset and he wrote this poem. Then the Zintan people responded to him …	واحد زنتاني غلط فيه شاب <u>من بنى وليد</u>، فهو زعل وقال شعر، ردوا عليه الزنتان...

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[21] See Appendix 1 for full texts.

In order to gain the support of one of the biggest tribes in Libya, the *Werfalli* (*Bani Walid*), Algaddafi recites this poem and praises the tribe members. The poem describes how two major tribes were in conflict with each other because of a young boy's action; they later reconciled because of their wisdom. This is intended to draw the listeners' attention to the actions of their youth, and criticise them for not stopping their young people. Algaddafi cites the poem and asserts that the current events are related to this poem. He also appeals to the *Zintan* tribe, to gain their support, and to stop their youths from opposing him. He first claims that those youth do not belong to them, and then argues that they are the young generation who had forgotten all about their tribe's history. This is aimed at the tribes' leaders and can be seen as an attempt to make them control their youth as it is seen as the tribe's responsibility to control their youth. Indeed, Algaddafi's tribal attitude is clearly evident throughout his speech and serves a very specific purpose as the tribes' support would increase his chances to remain in power.

Algaddafi presents examples from all over the world, quoting incidents of what happened in China, Russia, the United States, Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Palestine and Somalia. He chooses these examples in order to support his argument and provide reasons for his actions and for the use of violence against protesters. This is indicated in the example shown below:

My Translation	ST
Students in Beijing, striking in Tiananmen Square…. Deng came and <u>brought the tanks</u> for them. The tanks <u>dragging the</u> students in the Square….He told them "The <u>unity of China</u> is more precious than the people in that Square"	الطلاب في بكين، اعتصموا في ميدان السماء.... جا دينغ جاب لهم الدبابات، الدبابات سحنت الطلبة في الميدان.. قال لهم: وحدة الصين، أغلى من المجموعة اللي في هذا الميدان

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In order for Algaddafi to justify his fierce attitude of crushing demonstrations and intimidating protesters, he mentions examples from different countries whose governments have used violence as a legal action to put an end to public demonstrations. As seen in the example, Algaddafi uses words like *dragging, tanks*, *unity* to show how Deng[22] crushed the protesters for the unity of China, because its unity matters more than the people do. As Algaddafi continuously threatens to use force, he wants to highlight that he is willing to use force and that the army will not hesitate to kill protesters, as it is considered a legal action and the only way to protect Libya. It can be argued that these examples, particularly from China, Russia and the United States, are chosen deliberately, as they are all members of the UN Security Council. By directing his message to these particular countries and to the world, he is justifying his actions for using force against protesters, as members of the UN Security Council had previously taken similar actions and were not attacked or condemned by any country or by the UN.

1.2. Allusion

Allusion is a technique that is widely used by politicians to draw people's attention to specific issues without the need to explicitly mention them. Delahunty and Dignen define allusions as "when we make an allusion we mention the name of a real person, historic event, or literary character, not simply as straightforward reference, but in order to conjure up some extra meaning, embodying some quality or characteristic for which the word has come to stand" (2012:vii). Whereas Hernández-Guerra (2013:60) defines it as "any implicit, indirect or hidden reference and quotation is the exact reproduction of the words said by another person … allusion is not straightforward". She illustrates further that an allusion links texts together, provides attributes and connotations to references, and that it can also improve the semantic enrichment of the alluding text (Hebel in Plett, 1991:139). In regard to allusions in political

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[22] Deng Xiaoping is a Chinese former leader.

speeches, Hernández-Guerra stresses that they are revealing and can describe the speaker's knowledge, intention or illocutionary act and how the audience accepts it, or its perlocutionary effect (2013:60). According to Abdul-Raof (2006), an allusion in Arabic is a "highly effective rhetorical mechanism that employs an implicit signification" (xiv). He further explains that allusions are associated with a given culture and a given language.

Considering Algaddafi's speech, one can notice that throughout his speech, Algaddafi uses multiple different references without naming a particular group of people. Nonetheless, there is one particular reference he uses and wants to emphasise, as seen below:

My Translation	ST
Those people <u>with lice</u>	وحدين <u>مقملين</u>
People with <u>beards</u>	يا بتوع <u>اللحى</u>
You who are living in <u>the dark in Derna's</u> hill?	يا <u>إللى تتشددقون في الظلام</u>، في أحقاف درنة

The examples are all references to the Islamist groups that were active in Libya in the 1980s and which Algaddafi jailed and executed. In Libya, the terms used in these sentences are associated with religious people. Thus, words like تتشددقون في الظلام/ مقملين/اللحى – *people with lice, with beards, who are living in the dark* are all references to Islamists of whom Algaddafi is trying to warn Libyans, as they had wanted to destroy Libya and turn it into an Islamic state in the past.

6.2.2.3 Social Practice – Explanation

In his speech, Algaddafi's ideology and power is manifested in the way in which he addresses the protesters, and in the themes with which he chooses to address them. The following section

will discuss the importance of Algaddafi's ideology - which is reflected in his speech - and his power over the protesters.

1. **Ideology and Power**

According to Maalej (2013:638), political speeches are not only about language, but also about power and ideology, whereby politicians reframe themselves and their opponents in order to achieve their goals. For Algaddafi, his ideology is reflected in the themes he addresses, for example, foreign or Islamist conspiracies and intervention. In particular, the American colonisation - considered to be his favourite topic - since the raids in Tripoli. During his speech, Algaddafi uses several terms to enhance this ideology and attacks the United States by accusing them of ruining Libya. He says, for instance:

My Translation	ST
RPG weapons are in the city of Benghazi! The <u>Americans sneaked</u> it in…	الـ (آر. بي. جي) يا عالم في مدينة بنغازي! <u>خشوها الأمريكان</u>
Do you want America to come here and <u>occupy you?</u>	أنتم تبوا أمريكا <u>تجيكم تحتلكم؟</u>

Algaddafi accuses the United States of conspiring to destroy Libya and invade it, and suggests that the protesters were being paid by the American government. He questions the protesters' motives several times, wondering who they are and claiming they were brought into Libya by foreign secret services.

Algaddafi thrived on power his entire life, and that is reflected in his speech in two ways: (1) he marginalises and mocks the youth and their importance; (2) he uses foul language to diminish the protesters' role and anyone who is against him. I suggest that Algaddafi's

narcissistic attitude drives his urge to demonstrate his bravery by cursing the rebels and Arab and Western countries of whom he thinks as conspirators. Consider theese examples:

My Translation	ST
I would have thrown the resignation to your faces, those <u>germs</u>	لكنت لوحت الاستقالة على وجوهكم، <u>الجراثيم هذه</u>
<u>Rats</u>! Catch them from tonight	<u>جرذان</u>، زروهم من الليلة

Algaddafi describes the protesters as germs and rats, mainly to diminish their importance and existence. To him, he has absolute authority over the protesters and the right to criticise their actions, curse them, and give orders to arrest them. By calling them *rats/germs*, he intends to disparage their role in the protests and portray them as clueless young men seeking an adventure. By doing that, Algaddafi requests their parents and tribe leaders to either hand them in to the authorities to help cure them, or to control them. This request aims to prove Algaddafi's authority, and to make Libyans believe that he is acting in their interest.

At a different point in the speech, he chooses to marginalise and ridicule protesters by using the word البناني / *banani,* as follows:

My Translation	ST
Those who are involved are the young people who are from the <u>banani</u>, who have been taken from their parents	مشتركون فيها الشباب الصغار اللي <u>من البناني</u> هاذوم، اللي يخذوهم من أهلهم
who eats the "<u>Banani</u>"-hehehe-, which means the new generation who eats banana	من اللي <u>ياكلوا في البناني..</u>" ههههه، الجيل الجديد اللي ياكل في الموز

Algaddafi's choice of the word 'البناني *banani*' can be explained in two ways: First, the irony of linking the word '*banana*' to the protesters is due to the fact that in some Arab countries it has been associated with monkeys and their imitating habit; as Herbst (2003:4) writes, using animal comparisons to refer to people intends to dehumanise and degrade people. For Libyans, when Algaddafi uses this term to refer to the young generation and the protesters, it is to indirectly underestimate their abilities to make changes. In addition, he claims that they are not to be taken seriously as they are simply imitating other neighbouring countries that had similar demonstrations and uprisings[23]. It is important to highlight that Algaddafi previously mentions that the protesters are primarily imitating other countries. Mocking the protesters and condemning the real reason for their protests is one of Algaddafi's methods to paint a picture of them as a group of lost young people who are merely seeking an adventure and some fun. The second explanation lies in the fact that Libya was under an international siege in1992, a time when people had no knowledge of some types of food such as fruit or international chocolate brands (see Section 2.7.1). However, when these were introduced to Libya, they were associated with the young generation which was then referred to by the older generation as the '*soft generation*' – the spoilt young people who had not suffered anything and had everything, unlike them. Thus, using this word is Algaddafi's way of marginalising the role of the protesters and their demonstrations, on the one hand, while trying to gain the support of the older generation, on the other hand. The significance in treating the protesters as inferior is to highlight their ignorance, and how they have been brainwashed by a group of people who intend to destroy the country. This is hoped to cause older people and tribal leaders to reconsider the revolution and stop the irresponsible actions of the young generation.

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[23] Tunisia and Egypt.

6.3   The Analysis of Mubarak's Speech

To the Egyptian public, the long-awaited speech and the hope that Mubarak would announce his resignation is ruined by his determination to cling to power. According to Abdu-Latif (2012:286), Egypt State television announced that Mubarak would speak shortly, however, the pre-recorded speech is only aired several hours later, at around 11pm. This causes a state of confusion, fear and anticipation. Abdu-Latif further claims that the reason the speeches are always aired late at night is because the public would be tired and less focused. This political tactic is a way of brainwashing the protesters, draining them and spreading fear among them, and leaving the public waiting, hoping that the president would announce his resignation (2013:104).

The speech lasts for 15 minutes, and Mubarak is improvising as he salutes the Egyptians and directs his speech towards them. Mubarak did not normally improvise during his speeches, as he is known to have his speeches written and prepared for him in advance. Abdu-Latif justifies this by saying that Mubarak lacked communication skills with the public and regularly made common harsh comments (2012:284). Throughout his presidency, Mubarak is known to have several speechwriters; however, the identity of the last speechwriter is quite controversial in Egypt. While some say the speechwriter is the political analyst Ahmed Al-Muslimani, others suggest it might be Makram Mohamed Ahmed[24] (Shaban Abdul Al-Satar, 2011). There are also a number of Egyptian political analysts who believe Jamal Mubarak wrote the speech with the assistance of Anas el-Fiqqi[25] (Al-Qahera Alyoum, 2011). One of the analysts, Nabil Omar, explains that the speech was supposed to be highly emotive and appealing but turned out to be challenging, self-centred and aggressive (Al-Qahera Alyoum, 2011). The speech is recognised

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[24] A former president of the journalists
[25] Anas el-Fiqqi was the Egyptian Information Minister until 12 February 2011.

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as a disastrous speech by many analysts (Levinson, Coker, Bradley, Entous & Weisman, 2011:12).

Mubarak addresses everyone in Egypt: men, women and children in Tahrir Square and the youth of Egypt in particular. Similar to his previous speeches, he begins with the *Basmala* and says a prayer for Egypt, asking God to protect it and its people as his last statement in the speech. Throughout the speech, Egyptians voice their frustration by chanting 'leave, leave', demanding his immediate departure. The noteworthy transformation in Mubarak's image and the linguistic approaches he uses in the last speech illustrate his last desperate attempt to persuade the public to change their attitudes towards the uprising.

6.3.1 Extra-Linguistic Features of ST2M

The significance of studying the image and body language Mubarak lies in the effective role they play in transmitting a part of the message. As Borg claims, body language including gestures, posture and facial expressions convey 55 percent of the message, the vocal tone and pace, 38 percent, and the actual words said by the speaker only 7 percent (2009:17).

1. Image

As for all three of his speeches, Mubarak is dressed in an official black suit with a black tie. Standing in the presidential office in Heliopolis in Cairo, he speaks in front of a podium besides the Egyptian flag, as shown in Figure 11. The speech is broadcast on Egyptian state television. By speaking deliberately in the presidential office in Cairo, Mubarak wants to state to the public that he is still in position of power and that he is indeed still the president of the country. George Ishak describes the speech as follows: "It is a redundant speech, it is annoying and we've heard it a thousand times before" (Shadid & Kirkpatrick, Feb 2011).

Figure 11- Mubarak Delivering his Speech on 10 February 2011.

According to Abdelhamed (Mar 2011), Mubarak's similar image across his three speeches is one of the reasons behind the public's frustration, and the main reason for their failure. Not only is it produced in the same way, but he dresses the same way and says the same things. Moreover, it is seen by some protesters as the image of the same person with three contradicting attitudes. Although each speech has a unique theme and agenda, the resemblance of the image plays an important role in disregarding the speech itself. Watching the three speeches years later, one can easily mistake them for each other, or assume that they were recorded and aired on the same day. It could be argued that the image portrayed by Mubarak during his three public appearances affected him greatly and only agitated the audience further (Abdu-Latif, 2013). To the people in Tahrir Square, his speeches were seen as a mere repetition of unwanted promises.

2. Body Language

Even though Mubarak stands still most of the time, his hand gestures and facial expressions vary during his last speech. In the first and second speech, his hand gestures and body language

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are seen as threatening and disapproving (ElSaeed, 2011). In addition, Mubarak's attitude diverges from his previous speeches as he appears exceedingly nervous, inattentive and fails to look directly at the camera. He is focused on reading the speech from a sheet of paper in front of him, and lifts his head to look at the camera only a few times. In the first few minutes, Mubarak maintains good eye contact with the camera, addressing all the people in Egypt. By the first minute, he scratches his nose; while the majority of the public thought this was completely spontaneous, others, such as Raghda El-Saeed (2011), believe it is a sign of insincerity and incredibility. During the speech, Mubarak appears extremely anxious, his eye contact decreases and his head is bent down, as if he is ashamed or trying to hide something. The most intriguing thing, however, is the constant use of his index fingers throughout the speech. This gesture is highly offensive and can be interpreted as a way of threatening the audience. Fontes (2012:84-85) states that pointing one's finger is considered inappropriate, aggressive and rude in the Arab region. Mubarak points his finger in all three speeches, which is offensive to Egyptians. It appears as if it is aimed to direct them and threaten them at the same time (El-Saeed, 2011). At other times, Mubarak appears to point his fingers to emphasise particular points and their importance. As Csóti (2001) suggests, pointing fingers at the audience may, on the contrary, be intended to emphasise the information and provide confirmation. The president points his finger, then three fingers, to condemn the foreign intervention in Egypt's affairs and to express full rejection of its demands. In addition, Mubarak also points his finger while asserting that political parties have already agreed with him to ensure a peaceful transition of power in September. Clearly, he wants to stress the importance of this agreement, which might also reflect his desperate attitude to end the demonstrations.

Overall, Mubarak's posture and facial expression contributes greatly to his agitated attitude towards the public. He seems upset, disappointed and very nervous. He does not stand still; on the contrary, at times he appears to be swaying from the left to the right. This could

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also illustrate his fatigue from the current situation and his impatience with the protesters. It is, however, highly atypical for Mubarak to deliver his speeches with this amount of nervous behaviour and such infrequent eye contact.

6.3.2 Linguistic Features of ST2M

This section will provide a comprehensive linguistic analysis of ST2M. It will draw attention to the prominent linguistic features of the speech.

6.3.2.1. Text Analysis – Description

1. **Grammar**

1.1. **Pronoun 'I'**

During the entire speech, Mubarak uses the pronoun '*I*' 84 times, much more often than in the previous two speeches. Abdu-Latif (2012:295) elaborates by saying that the president's third speech mainly revolved around himself and his achievements. One can also notice that the numerous times Mubarak refers to himself with the pronoun 'I' are always associated with the country. Hence, Mubarak wants to demonstrate the attitude he wants the public to perceive, which is "I am the country" (ibid). The tendency to use this strategy reveals the speaker's attitude of superiority towards the addressee. He uses it in an integrated form within the verb, which is fairly common in Arabic. Al-Masri (2014:43) explains that the pronoun subjects in Arabic (I, you, he) are included in the verb and only used separately for extra emphasis. Mubarak's strategy is to covertly use the pronoun 'I' in a different form, perhaps to avoid the accusation of self-righteousness and boastfulness (Abdu-Latif, 2012). Instead, he uses the 'agent pronoun', which is the equivalent to 'I' in English. Badwai, Carter & Gully explain that the use of the 'agent pronoun' in Arabic aims to assert the speaker's identity, and not to

emphasise the action they took (2013:348). The examples below illustrate how the use of the pronoun 'I' is employed in Mubarak's speech to achieve different purposes:

My Translation	ST
I confirm that I will not be lenient to punish those who caused it	وأؤكد أنني لن أتهاون في معاقبة المتسببين عنها
I will hold accountable those who made all these crimes to the rights of our youth	وسأحاسب الذين أجرموا في حق شبابنا

Using the pronoun 'I' in these examples can be explained as his attempt to separate himself from the government and the current atrocities committed by them, especially after the public anger towards the government following the Battle of the Camels on 2 February. By maintaining his distance, Mubarak wants to assure the public that he was neither responsible nor aware of these events, and that he will not let them pass without punishing those responsible. He hopes to reflect his helpful and responsible attitude of protecting Egyptians, specifically directed perhaps at the victims' families in an attempt to gain their trust and support by assuring them that they would get justice for what they had lost.

Mubarak also uses the pronoun 'I' similarly to the way in which Algaddafi uses it by praising himself, and his achievements, and by linking it to the third person, as noted in this example:

My Translation	ST
I have worked for the security of Egypt … I worked very hard for its prosperity …; I was never after power or fake popularity. I am confident that the majority of my fellow Egyptian people know who <u>Hosni Mubarak</u> is	عملت من أجل أمن مصر واستقرارها، اجتهدت من أجل نهضتها ...، لم أسع يوماً لسلطةٍ أو شعبيةٍ زائفة. أثق أن الأغلبية الكاسحة من أبناء الشعب يعرفون من هو <u>حسني مبارك</u>،

1.2. Pronoun 'We'

Using the pronoun 'we' to demonstrate solidarity and belonging, Mubarak declares himself one of the people when he demands that they help him keep Egypt safe and to maintain its dignity. He says the following:

وأن <u>نضع</u> مصر أولاً فوق أي اعتبار وكل اعتبار

And <u>that we put</u> Egypt first above any considerations and all other considerations

The example illustrates Mubarak's urging of the protesters, him reaching out to the people in Tahrir Square and across the country, asking them to prioritise their requests and needs, and to think about Egypt and its well-being rather their own demands. This sentence aims to spread doubt over the purpose of the uprising, and positions it as an act that is destroying Egypt and its economy. By claiming that he is more concerned about Egypt than the uprising and youth demands, Mubarak wants to highlight his patriotism and his sincere concern for the country. According to Abdu-Latif, by using the plural pronoun نحن/ *we*, Mubarak creates one untied identity of him and the people of Egypt, fighting against 'them', which can refer to chaos, foreign intervention, or protesters (2012: 298).

Mubarak highlights the Egyptians' ability to protect their country and its spirit by mentioning different social classes in Egypt in his statement, as demonstrated in the example below:

My Translation	ST
This spirit will live with us as long as Egypt and its people exist, this spirit will live with us as long as Egypt exists and its people exists. It shall live in all <u>our farmers, workers, and our intellectuals.</u> It will last in the hearts of <u>our elderlies, and youth and children, Muslims and Copts</u>	ستعيش هذه الروح <u>فينا</u> ما دامت مصر ودام شعبها، ستعيش في كل واحدٍ <u>من فلاحينا وعمالنا ومثقفينا،</u> <u>ستبقى في قلوب شيوخنا وشبابنا وأطفالنا،</u> <u>مسلميهم وأقباطهم</u>

Mubarak identifies himself with all parts of society when he starts addressing the public, and then narrows it down to farmers, workers, educated people, the elderly, the young, children, Muslims and Copts. It is important for Mubarak to involve everyone in the responsibility of protecting Egypt, and it can be seen as his appeal to the youth protesting in the square to stop the uprising and protect Egypt. He sends the message of shared responsibility to all Egyptians, and demands their support, which can be explained as engaging himself with the public.

2. Vocabulary

The tendency to use specific vocabulary plays an important role in political speeches, and reflects the speaker's attitude and ideology, but it also has a political significance that may strengthen the politician's attitude when deployed in certain contexts (Fletcher, 2008). Regarding Mubarak's speech, a number of words demand attention when one listens carefully to the speech. This section aims to address the terminology and metaphors used in Mubarak's speech.

2.1. Terminology

Mubarak uses the word خندق/ *trench* in his speech, and the interpretation of the word goes beyond its linguistic meaning. It is aimed to highlight Mubarak's military background. Using such an equivalent, aims to draw attention to his role in protecting the country from external dangers, which was one of the crucial reasons many Egyptians supported him. See the example below:

<div dir="rtl">

إن المصريين جميعاً في خندق واحد الآن

</div>

       All Egyptians are in one <u>trench</u> now

Moreover, Mubarak intends to refer to the uprising as a war and that Egypt should stay in one bunker to fight it. Indeed, this is his attempt to distance himself and the Egyptians from the protesters or any foreign intervention that aims to destroy Egypt. The implication of war in the term خندق/ *trench* aims to highlight the danger the country is in and implies that the only way to fight it is by staying together. Moreover, Mubarak draws on his military background throughout the speech by using military terminology.

2.2. Metaphors

The Arabic language is rich in rhetorical devices / الوصف البلاغي used to achieve a sublime style of writing (Abdul-Raof, 2000: 138). Abdul-Raof stresses the importance of metaphors, asserting that "it is a form of linguistic allegory and is regarded as the peak of figurative skills in spoken or written discourse. Through metaphor, the communicator can turn the cognitive or abstract into a concrete that can be felt, seen, or smelt" (2006:218). Arabic linguist Abdul-Raof (2006) defines metaphor in Arabic as الإستعارة, which is derived from the Arabic word (borrow – أعار). Therefore, it is regarded as the process of borrowing a feature from someone or something and applying it to someone or something else to which it does not necessarily apply

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in reality. Abdul-Raof explains that a metaphor is comparable to an effective simile, since the link between the feature (*almushaabbah*) and the entity it is being applied to (*almushaabbah bihi*) has been ellipted (2006:218). He further stresses the importance of metaphors in Arabic rhetoric to create an effect that cannot be attained by using similes. One common type of metaphor is personification /التشخيص, which is repeatedly used by Mubarak. Abdul-Raof (2000:147) describes that personification is being employed as a rhetorical tool "when we give the attributes of human beings to non-human, inanimate or abstract nouns", as can been seen in the following example (Abdul-Raof, 2006:255):

إِنَّا عَرَضْنَا الْأَمَانَةَ عَلَى السَّمَاوَاتِ وَالْأَرْضِ وَالْجِبَالِ فَأَبَيْنَ أَن يَحْمِلْنَهَا وَأَشْفَقْنَ مِنْهَا وَحَمَلَهَا الْإِنسَانُ ۖ إِنَّهُ كَانَ ظَلُومًا جَهُولًا[26]

Indeed, <u>we offered the trust to the heavens</u>, the earth, and the mountains, but <u>they declined to bear it and feared it.</u> But man [undertook to] bear it. Indeed, he was unjust and ignorant.

Mubarak refers to Egypt as the family by giving it human features. Many other presidents in Egypt, such as Al-Sadat, have used this technique not only by referring to Egypt as a family, but to themselves as its father (Abdu-Latif, 2015:10). Abdu-Latif further explains that the purpose of using such a metaphor is to portray Egyptians as one family with defined morals, ethics and spirit, and to underline that the president is part of the family and that his actions are to protect them from people's harm (ibid.:34-35). Mubarak explains the horrendous situation Egypt is going through and how he works hard for the future of the country and its sons and daughters. Consider the following examples:

My Translation	**ST**
<u>Egypt</u> is going through difficult times	إن <u>مصر</u> تجتازَ أوقاتاً صعبة
<u>Egypt</u> will pass its current crisis	كي تتجاوز <u>مصر</u> أزمتها الراهنة

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[26] Sūrat al-Aḥzāb 33 – Verse 72

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Mubarak portrays the situation as that of a suffering family. This technique aims to not only simplify the message and make it easier for the audience to understand, but also to strengthen the significance of belonging and conjuring up the Egyptian public's patriotism. Moreover, it is a vital tool to draw attention to the country's worth and significance.

3. Cohesion

3.1. Repetition

Mubarak's speech contains multiple sequences of repetition he uses when addressing specific topics. He uses repetition, for example, when he wants to evoke the Egyptian spirit and address the public's dignity and pride in Egypt's status in the world. His strategy of incorporating repetitions thus differs from Algaddafi, as the latter often employs synonyms, whereas Mubarak combines synonyms with the use of the absolute object المفعول المطلق in Arabic using the word كل/*all*, and then repeating the verb by using an object derived from it. One of the most common approaches to translating the redundancy of using the absolute object from Arabic into English is by adding the word *very* to the noun, instead of repeating it twice and emphasising it by using the word *all*, which is regarded as a literal translation. Nacereddine defines it saying, "it is a verbal noun in the accusative repeated after the same verb in order to give stress, and describe the manner of the action" (2010:209). Hence, Mubarak employs this

technique six times throughout his speech to add force to the verb and its meaning, as seen below:

My Translation	ST
I have felt <u>pain, all of the pain</u>	تألمت كل الألم
I have <u>felt remorse, all of the remorse</u>	أسفت كل الأسف
I am determined, all of the determination	عازم كل العزم
I am <u>keen, all of the keenness</u>	حريص كل الحرص
<u>Shame</u>, <u>all of the shame</u>	الحرج كل الحرج
<u>Embarrassment, all of the embarrassment</u>	العيب كل العيب

Mubarak stresses his emotional pain and the heartache he suffered when he witnessed the horrific massacre that took place some days previously. However, Abdu-Latif suggests that the use of the absolute object and the word كل/*all* is a way of bridging the gap of credibility between the speaker and the addressee (2012:287). Thus, seemingly playing with the public's emotion yet again, his ultimately faulty attempt to gain the support of the victims' family is made by addressing their pain and demonstrating that he shares it. He begins his sentence by directing his speech at them, and then repeatedly insists on the pain he felt; the addition of the word كل/ *all*, then aims to amplify the amount of pain he felt and highlight it. Mubarak clearly wants to stress the importance of what had happened and how deeply it had affected him, similar to the way in which it affected the victims' families, in effect to make him appear more engaged with the public. By demonstrating his great pain and heartache for what had happened, Mubarak also intends to prey on the grieving families' support by supposedly sharing their pain as well as their sympathy and gratitude.

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6.3.3.2. Discourse Practice – Interpretation.

1. **Intertextuality**

1.1.**Allusion**

Allusion can serve as a tool to facilitate the communication process between a politician and the audience, particularly if they are being overwhelmed with information, as allusion helps to simplify (Obeng & Hartford, 2002). Mubarak uses this strategy to refer to different events and to constitutional articles that he did not want to address in detail, as illustrated below:

My Translation	**ST**
I proposed today the amendment of six constitutional articles and those articles are 76,77,88,93, and 189. In addition to the annulment of article number 179 in the constitution	فقد تقدمت اليوم بطلب تعديل ست مواد دستورية هي المواد 76 و77 و88 و93 و189، فضلاً عن إلغاء المادة 179 من الدستور

Using allusion here is Mubarak's method of appeasing the protesters by showing that he is willing to respond to their demands by amending the articles 76, 77, 88, 93, and 189, as they are related to the president's affairs and the election. He also announces his suggestion to cancel article 179, which is concerned with the military court in Egypt, ultimately allowing for more freedom of speech. He is thus proving his sincere efforts to react to the protesters' demands. However, this can be understood as a way of excluding non-Egyptians as well as the majority of poor and uneducated people, who are not aware of these articles. The reason behind this interpretation is Mubarak's constant refusal to permit any foreign intervention into Egypt's internal affairs. In addition, by excluding those who are not familiar with these articles, Mubarak targets a specific audience, that is, the protesters in Tahrir Square who originally

demanded these changes. By addressing them and stating the changes in these articles, he hopes to magnify their importance and show that he is indeed listening to their demands.

Another example for the occurrence of an allusion in Mubarak's speech is concerned with the use of cultural references only Egyptians are acquainted with, as can be seen in the example below:

My Translation	ST
I have witnessed its wars with its defeats as well as its <u>victory</u>. I have lived in the days of <u>occupation and humiliation, and the days of victory in 1973</u> and <u>liberation</u>. The happiest day of my life was the day when I lifted the Egyptian flag over Sinai…	شهدت حروبه بهزائمها وانتصاراتها، عشت أيام <u>الانكسار والاحتلال</u> وأيام <u>العبور والنصر والتحرير</u>. أسعد أيام حياتي يوم رفعت علم مصر فوق سيناء

This reference to the history of Egypt's battles and events can only be appreciated and understood by Egyptians. Mubarak uses words such as أيام الانكسار – العبور/ *days of humiliation –passing*, which are all related to the war in 1973. The significance of using the word العبور/ *passing* lies in its detailed meaning with which all Egyptians are familiar. It represents the days of the October War in 1973, when the Egyptian military passed the Suez Canal and gained victory over the Israeli army. Instead of merely referring to it as October War, which lasted for about four months, Mubarak chooses to refer to it by العبور/ *passing,* which represents victory and glory to Egyptians.

In addition, the connotation Mubarak wants to convey by using specific cultural terminology. For example, instead of saying هزيمة/*defeat*, Mubarak uses the phrase أيام الانكسار/*days of humiliation,* which carries significant meaning to Egyptians. Instead of simply saying they were defeated in the war, Mubarak wants to evoke the public's emotions and

remind them of the humiliation Egyptians and Arabs felt after the war of 1967. Therefore, he uses the common phrase that is used in Egypt to call these days, أيام الانكسار/*days of humiliation,* which may also help in evoking unity among the people, and to gain their trust in and devotion to their president. The importance of using this rhetorical device lies in the message the president shares with the public, which is his appreciation of the country's history and his pride in it. It may also aim to demonstrate his achievements of playing an important role in its main battles and the sacrifices he made for the country.

6.3.3.3. Social Practice – Explanation

1. Ideology and Power

Mubarak's ideological background and his power over the nation clearly shape his speeches to reflect his attitude towards the revolution. In this section, I will discuss to what extent Mubarak's beliefs are reflected in his speech, as well as the sense of power he exercises towards the protesters.

One of Mubarak's prominent beliefs, reflected in his speech, is the fear of foreign conspiracy and intervention. Throughout his speech, Mubarak implies several times that he is not willing to consider any interventions or dictations and that he will protect Egypt until he dies. By reflecting these ideologies, Mubarak maintains firstly his patriotic attitude towards the country, and secondly, his independency as a president and aura of resistance, which he depended on for the support of the youth who were fighting in Egypt's name and the elderly who had always refused any sort of intervention in their free country. Consider the following example:

My Translation	ST
I can and will never accept at all is to listen to the <u>foreign dictations that comes from abroad</u>…	وما لم ولن أقبله أبدًا أن أستمع <u>لإملاءات أجنبية تأتى من الخارج</u>
I have never been <u>subjected to the foreign pressures and dictations</u>	لم أخضع يوما <u>لضغوطٍ أجنبية أو إملاءات</u>

Foreign intervention, specifically military intervention as was witnessed in Iraq, is a common topic for Arab politicians in order to spread fear. Mubarak's beliefs and strong resistance to foreign interference in the country's affairs is clearly evident throughout his speech. He believes it to be shameful and disgraceful to obey other countries and that he would never do so. This draws attention to the conspiracy theory to which Mubarak appears to subscribe, of America's involvement in helping protesters and the Egyptian revolution. He further blames some protesters of betraying Egypt by listening to foreign intruders. It is possible that Mubarak's defiant statement is aimed mainly towards Obama's speech from 1 February 2011, in which the US president addresses the situation in Egypt and guarantees America's support to the protesters if needed. These examples can be considered a cautious response, as Mubarak implicitly demonstrates his utter disapproval of Obama's speech. According to van Dijk, the art of exercising manipulation and influencing the audience through discourse is a form of power and domination (2006:360). Mubarak exercises his power and manipulates the public by choosing different themes throughout his speech. It is evident that his strict appearance changes during the last speech to a more pleading attitude. Although the speech is still referred to by some Egyptian political analysts as a self-praising poem, Mubarak changes his strategy to appeal to the public by evoking their sympathy and emotions. (Abdu-Latif, 2013). According to Maalej, Mubarak's speeches represent power and the reproduction of dominance; the chanting and slogans raised in Tahrir Square, on the other hand, constitute a language of

resisting this power (2013:654). Mubarak chooses a different approach by combining his role as the president and glorifying his achievements, as discussed earlier, but also attempts to gain the youth's acceptance by appealing to them as a father; he says:

My Translation	ST
Like a <u>father to his sons and daughters</u>	حديث <u>الأب لأبنائه وبناته</u>
I am addressing you <u>all from my heart</u>	أتوجه إليكم جميعا بحديثٍ <u>من القلب</u>

Mubarak attempts to appear to the public as a father figure who knows better and who should be obeyed by his sons and daughters. Evoking this father figure image intends to emphasise his role as the president as well as the father, who in Egyptian and Arab culture is regarded as the person responsible for the family as well as for making the important decisions. In this regard, Abdu-Latif (2013:80-90) claims that Mubarak uses a lot of terminologies to bridge the gap between his image as a president and a father, and the Egyptian youth protesting, trying to persuade them of his sincere intention to engage in a national dialogue with them and see to their demands. In a way, it can be seen as emotional blackmail and as an attempt to attract people's attention (Abdu-Latif, 2013:112). It is indeed unlike Mubarak to show his affection and kindness. However, following his second speech, considered highly emotional and influencing, Mubarak hopes that by using similar techniques he would gain the same reaction and evoke the same emotions and with it the people's support. So, he begins by explaining that he is going to talk to the youth from the bottom of his heart, which aims to reflect his sincere love and care for them.

As surprising as these sentences are to the protesters, they only enhance their demands and anger towards the president. They believe that Mubarak is targeting their emotions to

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suppress the uprising; most importantly, by presenting himself as their father. Abdu-Latif (2013) explains this further, asserting that in Egypt, the description of the relationship between the public and the president as a father figure has been quite common over the past four decades. Using words such as أبنائه وبناته/ *sons and daughters* is thus to conjure Egyptians' emotions towards the elderly and their status in the society. What is more, the importance of the father figure in Arab culture implies the responsibility a father carries and the family's obligation to obey him. In this regard, Azimi (2011) suggests that Mubarak's strategy to address protesters in Tahrir Square as a father, aims to highlight the authoritative status of fathers in the Middle East, who have the right to direct their children or even punish them if necessary.

6.4 Conclusion

After conducting a thorough analysis of both STs, it is worth summarising the similarities and differences between the speeches, particularly since they were delivered in similar circumstances and with a similar purpose. Each president, however, chose to approach the public differently, while Mubarak tried to gain Egypt's sympathy and trust by appealing to its youth, Algaddafi chose to appeal to the tribes for their support and threatened the people with violence.

Considering the similarities, there are several features that stand out in both STs. First, the repetitive use of the pronouns '*I*' and '*we*' throughout the speeches. Figure 12 demonstrates the number of times each president uses the pronoun 'I' versus the pronoun 'we'. Mubarak uses the pronoun 'I' twice as many times as he uses the pronoun "we". This indicates to some extent why a number of political analysts refer to the speech as a speech about Mubarak rather than about the uprising. This is contrary to Algaddafi, who uses the pronoun 'we' more often than he uses the pronoun 'I', which can be explained as his desire to engage with main tribes in

Libya to gain their support. And yet, Algaddafi refers to himself in the third person 18 times, which often has a similar connotation of self-praise as the use of the pronoun 'I'.

The Pronoun Used	Mummar Algaddafi	Hosni Mubarak
Pronoun 'I'	105	84
Pronoun 'We'	135	43
Third Person 'President's name'	18	2

Figure 12 - An Illustration of the Number of Times Pronouns are Used in both STs

This evidently leads to another shared feature of both speeches, which is the presidents' continuous preoccupation with their pasts and their achievements. Both speeches are recognised for their self-praising tactic; whereby Algaddafi and Mubarak list their accomplishments, devotion, patriotism and heroism. The speeches include long paragraphs of detailed missions, military backgrounds and their patriotic past. Each president seeks to gain gratitude by illustrating their long history of serving the country, which is arguably perceived by the public as a narcissistic gesture that aims to centre everything on the presidents' life achievements.

The third feature is related to the belief in the danger of foreign intervention and conspiracy, which is well composed in both speeches. Each president blames foreign parties and accuses them of being involved in the demonstrations that aims to destroy the country's stability and cause chaos. This is meant to question the reason behind the demonstrations, and the sincerity of the people leading them. Persistently talking about foreign intervention and the manipulation of the youth is a fundamental element in gradually weakening the demonstrations' value. In addition, the speeches have hidden messages, warning the public that the uprising will ultimately lead to wars, instability and destruction of the country.

Comparing the body language of both presidents with each other, it is noteworthy that they share one important gesture: pointing their finger, which is considered threatening and rude. On the one hand, Algaddafi appears to be angry and agitated, as becomes evident through his constant fist pounding and screaming. On the other hand, Mubarak sounds disorientated but still insists on using this threatening gesture, for which he was already known during his years as president.

Overall, Algaddafi and Mubarak share many characteristics that are reflected in their choices of terminology and use of linguistic strategies. These features contribute to shaping their speeches accordingly, in an attempt to convince the public of their goals. Although Algaddafi's character and attitude differs from Mubarak's, one cannot fail to see the resemblance between their speeches: the combination of their narcissistic attitude and self-glorifying behaviour in conjunction with their pleading statements. What is more, they also share an absolute denial of the sincerity of protesters' demands and their rights, while describing the demonstrations as acts of riots caused by villains. For the presidents, these speeches are a way of communicating their power and beliefs to the public, and they want to remind their citizens of the power they possess and their ability to impact on the country's stability. Both speeches are nonetheless ineffective, to the extent that they have no influence on the protesters, and that they did not succeed in suppressing the uprising as both presidents wished they would. If anything, as a result, Algaddafi and Mubarak are more frequently ridiculed by their citizens for their madness and denial in stepping down (Salem & Taira, 2012; Lynch, 2013).

There are, however, a number of prominent differences that become clear when comparing the two speeches; for example, the length of speech, the language the presidents use, and the image they present of themselves. Firstly, while Algaddafi's speech is long and

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fiery, Mubarak's is eloquent and calm and as long as most of his other speeches. Secondly, Algaddafi uses a pure Libyan dialect; his language is recognised as aggressive at times, sarcastic and threatening to others, whereas Mubarak uses MSA with a less threatening tone. Thirdly, and in regard to the image each president chooses to reflect, Algaddafi's body language is an implication of his anger and disbelief, unlike Mubarak's who stands out for his bland facial expression.

To conclude this chapter, I suggest that both presidents employed various linguistic and extra-linguistic tools to emotionally appeal to the public and gain their support. For instance, Algaddafi chooses to demonstrate his pride in his Libyan identity and his belonging to the tribes, whereas Mubarak demonstrates his achievements of protecting Egypt and appears as a father figure to the youth. However, these tools may have caused misinterpretations or confusion when the speeches were translated into English. The next chapter will address these tools and the way in which they were approached in the translation process.

Chapter Seven

The Interpreting of Algaddafi's and Mubarak's Speeches

7.1. Introduction

The analysis of the target texts will be divided into three chapters, each of which will involve one genre. This chapter will be dedicated to analyse TT1, which are interpretations of Algaddafi's and Mubarak's speeches. I will first provide an insight into the process of interpreting and into strategies used by interpreters. In addition, I will provide an account of the media agencies Aljazeera and Fox News, which provided the interpreted ST1A and ST2M. I will then conduct a comprehensive analysis of both TTs following the model presented in Chapter Five. The chapter will conclude with a comparative analysis of the way each TT was approached and reframed.

7.2. Interpreting

Simultaneous interpreting (henceforth SI) is defined by Russell as "the process of interpreting into the target language at the same time as the source language is being delivered" (2005:136). Russell further states that interpreting is a highly complex process in which language is perceived, comprehended, translated and produced simultaneously and under severe time pressure. Mack highlights that SI is the type of interpreting used in conveying information, for example in internationally broadcast summits, meetings and conferences, political statements, press conferences and parliamentary debates. This type of interpreting is sometimes called live voice-over or *revoicing* (2001:126). The challenging process through which interpreters go during SI may greatly affect their performance. Jones claims that SI is an unnatural activity and has to be cultivated (2014:72). He asserts that simultaneous interpreters face many difficulties they need to overcome using different approaches. On the other hand, Gerver argues that the

difficulty in the process lies within transmitting the speech at a faster rate, rather than in the process of decoding and encoding (1969:54). The demanding nature of the SI process may affect the interpreter's ability, especially when the speech is too long, which causes fatigue and mental strain. In addition, the breaks that the speaker takes, or the speed at which they are speaking may greatly influence the interpreter and drain their concentration abilities leading to exhaustion (Anderson, 1976:210). In 1978, Selekovitch describes SI as a multitasking process that requires a high level of concentration, and similarly Phelan (2001:9) stresses that interpreters today should not interpret for more than fifteen minutes. Pöchhacker draws attention to a survey conducted in 2002, where interpreters showed a high level of work-related fatigue, exhaustion, and mental stress; they also pointed that it is sometimes challenging to cope with the speaker's language and delivering speed (2004:172). Benmaman and Framer (2010) state that no matter how experienced the interpreter is, it is impossible to provide a consistent and accurate interpretation after 30 to 40 minutes of continuous SI. They further assert that scientific studies have proven that mental fatigue sets in after approximately 30 minutes of sustained interpretations, leading to loss of accuracy (2010:148).

It is quite common that interpreters make mistakes due to exhaustion, or simply because they did not hear a word or did not understand it correctly. Jones states that in case a mistake is made, interpreters have two choices, to either correct themselves, or ignore the mistake if it was insignificant (2002:119-120). It is in fact essential that interpreters have certain strategies that help them manage such difficulties. Interpreters should be able to understand the message and skilfully transfer it to the TT, not necessarily by finding linguistic equivalents of the ST in the TT (Seleskovitch, 1978). It is difficult for interpreters to decide how to approach and respond to certain issues while interpreting, for example, the problem of lack of equivalences in the TT, culture specific references, the existence of different dialects, and the issue of what is considered taboo in the TT. As culture and language are intertwined and as they are both

essential for the translation and interpreting process (Faiq, 2008:35), cultural specificities will greatly affect the interpreting process. Dialects pose another challenge, as Tipton and Furmanek (2016:99) point out, as it is important to understand and distinguish different dialects to be able to render the meaning correctly. Al-Salman and Al-Khanji (2002:617) describe eight common strategies that are widely used among interpreters in Arabic-English interpretation when encountering difficulties:

1. **Skipping**: to leave out unnecessary repetition, redundant expressions or any unimportant information

2. **Anticipating**: to expect what will come next and amend the information to put it in the most appropriate way possible in the TT

3. **Summarizing**: to minimise long sentences by maintaining the content and yet delivering the message

4. **Approximating**: to provide the closest equivalent or synonym to have a similar TT expression

5. **Code-switching**: to shift the style from standard to informal or colloquial language that is used when the interpreter is under pressure due to the speaker's fast delivery

6. **Literal interpreting**: to use literal translation

7. **Incomplete sentence strategy:** to utter unfinished sentences due to the occurrence of unfinished sentences by the speaker

8. **Message abandoning**: to resort to silence when the interpreter cannot interpret the message due to difficulties they are facing

7.3 The Analysis of Algaddafi's TT1A

This TT is an interpretation of Algaddafi's speech from the website of Aljazeera. Aljazeera used voice-over interpreting, by having the interpreter simultaneously interpret Algaddafi's

speech, while his voice was turned down. Thus, both voices were audible, as one can hear Algaddafi speaking, followed by the interpreter's voice a few seconds later. This continues for almost the entire speech, more specifically for an hour and nine minutes.[27] The interpreting was carried out live, as Aljazeera broadcasted the speech live from Libyan State Television. There were two different interpreters, however neither of them was identified by the channel and so they remained anonymous (see Section 5.4.1). The first interpreter (henceforth Interp.1) had a strong accent, which led me to believe that he was from an Arab country. The second interpreter (henceforth Interp.2) did not have a strong accent but might also be from an Arab country or was someone who possesses good knowledge of LCA, since he pronounced most of the tribe and city names correctly. While Interp.1 interpreted the first 55 minutes of the speech, Interp.2 joined in the last part of the speech and interpreted the last 18 minutes of it.

In order for Aljazeera to broadcast the speech live, the channel cut short an ongoing programme and made Algaddafi's speech a breaking news item. Before the speech began, an Aljazeera presenter stated that they were "going to Libyan State Television and Mummar Algaddafi". Almost five minutes before the end of the speech, the Aljazeera broadcaster Teymoor Nabili gave a brief description of the speech, using words like '*first substantive speech*, a *long rambling and incomprehensible speech*"; he further summarised some of the important points Algaddafi made (Aljazeera English, Feb 2011). This was later followed by an interview and a detailed analysis of the speech with the exiled Libyan political analyst, Ibrahim Jibreel. It can be argued that the way Aljazeera chose a member of the opposition to analyse the speech can in fact frame the speech within a particular narrative. It would perhaps be important to draw on people from different backgrounds for the analysis of the speech as to ensure some level of objectivity and impartiality. I suggest, however, that the way Aljazeera

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[27] The speech lasted for 1 hour and 15 minutes.

approached the speech was to reshape the viewer's attitude towards the situation in Libya by highlighting the opposition narrative and rarely interviewing people from the Libyan government at that time. Although this greatly helped raise the protesters' voice to the world, it could be argued that by doing so Aljazeera deliberately attacked the Libyan government, and assisted in creating the new narrative of intervention against the Libyan regime.

I chose this particular TT firstly because Aljazeera was constantly attacked by Algaddafi and by Libyans for the media outlet's intervention in Libyan affairs, their false accusation and fake coverage of the situation in Libya. And secondly because of the channel's reputation, its ability to cover important news related to the Arab Spring, and its online availability. These factors played an important role in the analysis and in the way the speech was narrated, even in the interpreting process, to influence the viewer's interpretation of the speech according to the channel's ideological beliefs.

7.3.1 Aljazeera

Arab media has witnessed dramatic changes since the 1990s due to the emergence of private satellite TV channels such as MBC, Aljazeera and Al-Arabiya. According to Elouardaoui, Arab media scholars have agreed that the majority of Arab TV channels - whether state or private ones – are controlled by the governments by applying censorship and developing guidelines to the channels. State officials argue that it is necessary to control all broadcasting as to maintain the common Arab cultural heritage and to secure national unity and political stability (2013: 100).

One of the most prominent TV channels in the region is Aljazeera Satellite Channel (JSC), which is based in Doha in Qatar, and owned by the House of Thani, the ruling family in Qatar (Chiba, 2012:88; Toumi, 2011). It was started in November 1996, and then launched its English Channel under the name Aljazeera English (AJE) on 15 November 2006. Although it is based in Doha, most of its staff and journalists are Western-educated and had previous

experience in Western news organisations such as the BBC. The mission of the channel was to become the 'voice of the voiceless' and to highlight news from all over the world (Usher, 2013:336). Aljazeera came to the world's attention in 1998 during its exclusive coverage of the attack on Iraq from its satellite station in Baghdad: "Operation Desert Fox 'was the birth of Al Jazeera internally, we were the only news organization on the ground', media relations manager Jihad Ballout told Miles" (Maluf, 2005:533). The channel rose to prominence, however, during the war in Afghanistan when it had access to unfolding events, which led channels such as the BBC and CNN to rely on information from Aljazeera. According to Lahlali, Aljazeera's monopoly over the coverage of the war in Afghanistan was a substantial development for Arab media (2011a:9). Maluf states that it was for the first time in modern history that the flow of news was not restricted to the big news broadcasters such as CNN and the BBC (ibid.:533).

During its years of broadcasting, Aljazeera has repeatedly been criticised by the Arab and the Western media, and occasionally had its offices closed and its correspondents expelled from countries such as Kuwait, Jordan, Egypt and Iran (Maluf, 2005:531). Lahlali elaborates on this matter stating that many Arab regimes expressed their discontent with Aljazeera and took strict measures to close its offices (2011a:38). In fact, this was not only the case in the Arab region, but the US government also resorted to repressive measures towards the channel (ibid.). The reason behind this is the fact that the Aljazeera network aims to broadcast, and is willing to air, all sides of an issue, which is sometimes unwelcome by governments. "Aljazeera's 'philosophy' is built on demonstrating how objectivity can be attained only if all subjective views and opinions on any issue are presented and aired" (Maluf, 2005:531-532). To the West, Aljazeera is perhaps regarded as a biased channel due to its constant support of Palestinians in any Palestinian-Israeli issue. Khalil and Kraidy explain further that the terms used by Aljazeera to describe certain events that take place in Palestine are evidence of its subjectivity; while Western channels, for example, use the word 'suicide bomber', Aljazeera

uses the term 'martyr' (2009:97). Aljazeera's Director General, Waddah Khanfar, responds to these accusations, stating, "Aljazeera has accepted the fact that it does report from within the Middle East, and it respects the collective mind of the Arab world, and sees through Arab eyes, therefore, it does offer a perspective that might be different from others" (ibid:23).

It is important to draw attention to the role Aljazeera played during the Arab Spring. According to Abdelmoula, Aljazeera was undoubtedly the leading channel that reported stories and live feeds from the Arab Spring in an unparalleled manner, regardless of the quality of the coverage. He further claims that Aljazeera's coverage of the first event that lead to the Arab Spring, Bouazizi setting himself on fire, was important to keep the revolution going and without it, it might have died instantly (2014:367). The channel repeatedly shaped the narratives of protesters in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, Syria and Yemen, and provided viewers with historical backgrounds, political context and the analytical framework to help them understand the situation (ibid.). According to Howard and Hussain, "AJE played a significant role in amplifying the distributed and diverse voices of the Arab Spring" (2013:99). Aljazeera streamed a twenty-four hour live coverage of the demonstrations in Egypt through Google TV and its Youtube channel, which eventually raised viewings by 2,500 percent (ibid). "During the Arab Spring, Secretary of State Clinton applauded Aljazeera English for out competing with US news media in offering 'real news'" (ibid: 99). Although Aljazeera chose to convey both sides of the story, many people argued that it was anything but impartial. The Russian media, for instance, accused Aljazeera of forgery, falsifying facts and broadcasting fake materials (Sadiki, 2014:618).

It is important to see whether Aljazeera's agenda was reflected in the speech and the interpreters' performance or not. This is because Aljazeera had a strong view of the Libyan uprising and Algaddafi's regime. It stood out as a major source of support for the demonstrations, and hosted outcast Libyan politicians to speak out against Algaddafi's regime.

In addition, Aljazeera's television channel, live newsfeed, and blog were inundated with news about the atrocities committed by Algaddafi, whether during his ruling period or during the uprising. Thus, Aljazeera's attitude was constantly attacked by Algaddafi and his representatives, claiming that they were falsifying evidence and trying to create chaos in Libya and ruin its stability. In fact, Algaddafi ordered his government to shut down Aljazeera's broadcasting offices in Libya by blocking its signal (Aljazeera, Feb 2011).

7.3.2. Extra-Linguistic Features of TT1A

Aljazeera maintained the image of the original broadcast of the speech to help the audience relate to the message and be aware of extra-linguistic features that Algaddafi was employing in his speech. The importance of his clothes, for example, and the place in which he delivered the speech, as fully explained in Chapter Six. The channel added different properties such as a news ticker as shown in Figure 13, which was divided into two main parts. The first part was dedicated to summarising important quotations from Algaddafi's speech, whereas the second part was dedicated to breaking news about the rebels and the demonstrations carried out in Libya. This indicated how contradictory Algaddafi's speech was, as the public was able to read about news of demonstrations and military acts all over Libya while he was speaking. These quotations and the constant news that appeared in the news ticker, can be considered intertextual, as they were employed by Aljazeera to emphasise their motto of representing both sides of the event.

Figure 13 - Algaddafi's Speech on Aljazeera

7.3.3. Linguistic Features of TT1A

This section will examine significant linguistic features of the TT while under the consideration of Fairclough's framework, addressing issues related to grammar, vocabulary and coherence. The analysis will also flag up substantial interpreting issues, such as dialectic issues and the overlap with Arabic.

7.3.3.1. Text Analysis – Description

1. **Grammar**

1.1. **Passive**

Due to the nature of the Arabic language, the word order differs greatly when translating Arabic into English. In fact, in translation, the word order is subject to change according to the TT language and rules, which makes it impossible to maintain the word order of the ST. According to Farghaly (2012:37), translating Arabic can be challenging due to its Verb-Subject-Object (VSO) word order. Among other differences, using the passive in Arabic differs from English, as asserted by Khafaji: "Arabic is known to avoid passive verb forms and not to favour much

use of them in its sentences whereas English is known to make abundant use of the passive verb" (1996:19). Alosh discusses this further, explaining that in Arabic, passive sentences have a noun following the passive verb that corresponds to the direct object of the corresponding active sentence; it is termed 'deputy agent' / نائب فاعل (2005:248). Passive sentences in Arabic are used for a variety of reasons, as Mohammad argues. He claims that in Arabic the agent is sometimes hidden for different reasons including fear, brevity or glorification, similar to the way God is not always mentioned in the Qur'an (2006:40). Wright and Cantarino offer the following reasons for using passive in Arabic (cited in El-Farahaty 2015:74):

1. When God or some higher being is indicated as the author of the act.

2. When the author is unknown or at least not known for certain.

3. When the speaker or writer does not wish to name him.

4. When the attention of the hearer or reader is directed more to the person affected by the act (patients, the patient), than to the doer of it.

These are the main reasons why the passive is used in CA, unlike in MSA, where it is used to place greater emphasis on the action and its object (cited in El-Farahaty 2015:74). For example, in media, it is used as a way of copying the European and English language syntax and style (ibid).

It is quite common for interpreters to change the word order and structure when translating from Arabic into English. This was the case with the Aljazeera interpreter, as he has to form the sentences he is interpreting into a passive form in English, where the subject is not given in the TT. The following example illustrates this further:

Time	ST	TT	My Translation
22:06 **Interp.1**	الـ (آر. بي. جي) يا عالم في مدينة بنغازي! خشوها الأمريكان، خشوها الطليان عشان نقاتلهم!	Young people are <u>given</u> the armed vehicles to go in Benghazi	Dear world, RPG weapons are in the city of Benghazi! <u>The Americans</u> sneaked it in; <u>the Italians</u> did so we can fight them!

As seen above, the emphasis is on the action itself rather than the individual in charge of causing it. While Algaddafi states that the Americans and Italians smuggled these weapons into Libya, the interpreter simply interprets the sentence using the passive strategy without referring to the people behind the operation. The focus, thus, is on obscuring the subject, possibly to avoid any political conflicts.

2. Vocabulary

2.1. Synonyms

The interpreter omits a number of terminologies that were used by Algaddafi as the speech was delivered in the Libyan dialect. This could be due to a number of reasons: Firstly, there is a lack of equivalences for specific terms between LCA and English. Secondly, there is a lack of understanding with regard to the connotation of such terms and the way they should appropriately fit in the speech. And lastly, due to the speed of the speech which causes a problem in itself.

The example below illustrates how the interpreter opts to combine the meaning of the near-synonyms[28] into two words, since they had similar Islamic/religious connotations. As illustrated in the example, the word الدروشة/ *dervish* is not mentioned in the TT. The sequence

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[28] Near-synonyms are defined by Cruse as words sharing similar or close meaning yet provide subtle differences (cited in Alduhaim, 2011:33).

the word appears in is in the context of words that carry a religious connotation. For example, 'turban people' and 'bearded people' are all references to religious people. Nonetheless, the word dervish has a different connotation; it is of Persian origin and usually used to denote members of Sufi institutions (Lewis & Churchill, 2008:69). Regardless of the different connotation, this word is used in relation to the variety of sects and ideologies within Islam as a religion. Algaddafi's use of listing all three words aims to convey one simple message, which is the threat and danger of transforming Libya into an Islamic state. This is repeatedly referred to by many political analysts such as Ibrahim Jibreel in an interview with Aljazeera when he states that Algaddafi is threatening Libyans with Islamist extremism ruling Libya if he stepped down (Aljazeera, Feb 2011).

Time	ST	TT	My Translation
01:38 Interp.1	تريد الدروشة، تريد اللحي، تريد العمايم،	They want the... the /ummm/.. turbans, people of turbans and long beards.	It wants <u>dervishes</u>, it wants <u>bearded people</u>, it wants <u>people with turbans</u>

As seen above, Interp.1 simplifies the sentence in the TT by combining the word "turbans" and "long beards". By doing so, the message Algaddafi wants to convey - that of changing the country into an Islamic state - is still conveyed by the interpreter's translation. It could also be debated that the hesitation /ummm/ Interp. 1 expresses is due to his lack of knowledge of the equivalence for the word in the TT language, or perhaps for reasons of fatigue and exhaustion. However, at a later point when the same word is mentioned in the speech and used as a reference to the same idea, Interp.2, who takes over after Interp.1, interprets the word الدراوشة/ *dervishes* - which is the plural form of the word الدرويش/ *dervish* - into the word "*fundamentalist*". It can be argued that Interp.2 is able to interpret the word for two reasons: (1) it is common to refer to religious ideologies as '*fundamentalist*'; (2) the significance of rendering the information to the TT audience. This is because the first example illustrates different beliefs within the Islamic

religion, while still representing the same meaning; whereas in the second example the word الدراوشة/ *dervishes* was mentioned by itself. It is important to shed some light on the interpreter's lexical choices: Nowadays, the word "*fundamentalist*" is widely used by the media to refer to Islamist extremism. According to the Oxford Dictionary "*fundamentalist*" means "a form of religion, especially Islam or Protestant Christianity, that upholds belief in the strict, literal interpretation of scripture". Therefore, by choosing the word "*fundamentalist*" instead of literally translating the word into *dervishes*, the interpreter correctly portrays the message Algaddafi wants to send to the audience. In addition, this term in particular carries deep meaning for Western media and its audience as it is loaded with violent and radicalised beliefs. This will eventually create an impact on the message the TT is delivering and the ideology it carries.

2.2. Foul Language

As discussed in Section 6.2.2, Algaddafi has a tendency to use foul language in his speeches, which is reflected in this particular speech and dealt with differently by the media. It is, for example, interesting to examine the way Aljazeera's interpreters interpreted words like الفيران/الجرذان/القطط *rats/mice/cats*, which Algaddafi uses 13 times during his speech to refer to the protesters. Consider the example below:

Time	ST	TT	My Translation
06:38 **Interp.1**	الفيران/الجرذان/القطط	Those <u>greasy rats and cats</u>	rats/mice/cats[29]

The interpreter adds the adjective *greasy* to both *rats/cats*. It might be argued that the reason for adding this adjective is to emphasise Algaddafi's disregard for the protesters. In Arabic, the word "rat" has the connotation of insignificance and filthiness, and this might be the reason

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[29] Please refer to Appendix 1 for full details.

why the interpreter opts to add the word *greasy* to clarify the message, or to emphasise the message Algaddafi wanted to convey, that is, marginalising the protesters and their importance by referring to them as dirty and cowards. Interpreters in fact frequently face ethical difficulties in regard to what approach to use when a speaker uses foul language, especially if the speech is being broadcast on live TV. In the example indicated above, the interpreter prefers to interpret the profanity used by Algaddafi and does not ignore it. This is either due to the interpreter's knowledge of the way the TT audience will perceive it, or merely because profanity has always been one of the prominent features of Algaddafi speeches. Otterman and Mackey (2009) argue that Algaddafi often used profanities towards other people, and sometimes even presidents, for instance, when he called Palestinians and Israelis 'stupid people'.

2.3. Metonymy

Algaddafi uses metonymies in his speech, such as the word قبلتها/ *its direction*. As seen in the example below, Algaddafi wants to draw attention to Libya's importance and how, as a role model, it guides African countries and the world in seeking freedom and liberty. The aim of this metonymy is to illustrate Libya's role in the region, to highlight that its actions should be followed, and promote it as a highly regarded place everyone wants to visit.

Time	ST	TT	My Translation
02:42 Interp.1	كل الشعوب الإفريقية تعتبر ليبيا قبلتها	All African nations consider, consider as the <u>Mecca</u>.	All the African nations consider Libya <u>their Mecca</u>.

The Aljazeera interpreter reintroduces Algaddafi's idea using a word that carries the same connotation as the word in the ST. 'Mecca' originally refers to the city of Mecca in Saudi Arabia, the holy city of Islam and the direction to which all Muslims across the world pray

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(King, 1999:48). This metonymy has recently been introduced to the English language and is, according to the Meriam Webster Dictionary, used as a reference for a place that attracts many people. Thus, it could be argued that the interpreter uses the word Mecca to highlight the significance of Libya as a country and a role model for all African nations. By doing so, the interpreter conveys both the message and the stylistic form to the TT audience. To Bernárdez, however, using the metonymy *Mecca* is not a good choice, since the word only carries associations or values in certain societies. He further argues that the word will not be understood by Western cultures, because of its different value in each culture (2013: 316). One can argue that using this term can potentially cause some misunderstanding to the TT audience.

3. Cohesion

3.1. Repetition

Repetition is one of the most common stylistic features in Arabic language, as discussed in Section 3.3.2.2. The translation of repetitions or the use of more than one synonym differs from one translator to another, but there are different mechanisms that translators use to approach this issue. The first method is to render the word or phrase into the TT language, using the linguistic equivalent. The second method is to convey the meaning in the most appropriate way possible but without reliance on linguistic equivalence. The third way is omission, which means to delete all unnecessary meanings and words to avoid repetition. The fourth is by providing an explanation to the TT audience (Hassan, 2015:145).

In regard to Algaddafi's speech, and taking into consideration the mode and the process of the translation, Aljazeera's interpreters either delete synonyms or repetitions, or explain the repetition to the audience. Consider the following example:

Time	ST	TT	My Translation
59:55 **Interp.2**	أنت من اين؟ من عايلة غيث، أنت من عايلة مريم، أنت من ارفاد، أنت من امزين، عارفين بعضنا، ونشوف هذا الولد ولد من، من عائلة امزين، أو من عائلة ارفاد، أو من عائلة مريم، أو من عائلة غيث،	Where are you from? From Mariam? Or any other tribe? Or Arfad? Or Amzin? We know each other. We see everybody, from one tribe or the other.	Where are you from? From Al-Ghaith's family, you are from Mariam's family, you are from Arfad, and you are from Amzin.We know each other; look at this boy, what family he belongs to? From Amzin family, Arfad family, Mariam family or Al Gaith family?

The interpreter chooses to use the summarising strategy (see Section 7.2) by summarising the tribes' name, and by adding his own explanation. Instead of following the sequence in which Algaddafi mentions the tribes' names, the interpreter deletes the second tribe and adds "*any other tribe*". One might argue that the beginning of the TT is ambiguous, and that the repetition of tribes' names might confuse the audience who is perhaps not sure whether these names are cities or tribes. Later on, however, the interpreter chooses to integrate the phrase '*we see everybody, from this tribe or the other,* and thus enhances the meaning Algaddafi was trying to convey, that is, that Libyan people know each other well. I would argue that the interpreter renders the message to the TT audience fully, by explaining the significance behind the statement, and by avoiding repetition that might be confusing to the TT audience. By deleting the names of the tribes, the interpreter does not disregard any important information, yet manages to render the message precisely as in the ST. We can see this is also the case in the following example:

Time	ST	TT	My Translation
00:53 Interp.1	أجهزة الخيانة، والعمالة، والنذالة، والرجعية، والجبن	The <u>agents and cowardice</u>	<u>The agencies of traitors, agents, backwardness and cowardness</u>

As noted above, Algaddafi uses five synonyms and near-synonyms to describe different channels that he believes spread lies about Libya. The interpreter uses the same strategy of summarising these synonyms into two words to avoid redundancy and yet render the message accurately.

7.3.3.2. Discourse Practice – Interpretation

1. **Coherence**

According to Jaaskelainen, "cohesion implies coherence"; hence, there is a common assumption in Translation Studies that cohesion has to be examined by examining coherence (2010: 265). According to Hatim and Mason (2014:195), communication can only be effective if both cohesion and coherence are maintained. They elaborate that coherence can be perceived in logical relations, organisation of events and continuity in human experience. Nørgaard argues for the study of theme-rheme structure - what comes first (theme) and what follows (rheme) - which reveals how the information in a text/sentence is organised and presented together (2014:472). In regard to the way in which the concept of theme-rheme is applied in Translation Studies in general, Dejica-Cartis and Cozma state, "integrating the Theme-Rheme analysis into the translation process so as to facilitate the process of the ST understanding and help translators take consistent and transparent decisions as to the relevance of ST features in the TT" (2013: 892). They elaborate that the process includes: (1) *reception* of the thematic structure of the ST, (2) *transfer*, whereby the interpreter/translator identifies the ST intentions and establishes the translation purpose, (3) *reproduction*, whereby the TT is created (ibid: 893).

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It is arguably more difficult to maintain coherence and an appropriate sequence while interpreting, due to time restrictions and a lack of resources. Lascarides and Stone suggest that, in interpreting, coherence means the interpreter's ability not to present the information in isolation, but to elaborate, explain and narrate it within the best way possible to the TT audience (2009:150).

It can thus be challenging to be able to maintain coherence in a live interpreting session - the difficulty arguably increases even further in improvised, lengthy, and colloquial speech like Algaddafi's. As highlighted in Chapter Six, Algaddafi constantly changes the topic and moves swiftly from one idea to another, leaving the interpreter with the challenging task of trying to render the information in the most comprehensible way possible to the TT audience. Consequently, this affects the interpreter's ability and may eventually lead to a loss in communication. As seen in the following example, Algaddafi urges particular tribes to make their own municipality; however, he then switches to talk about Tripoli and its history. In the ST, the logical order of this sentence is greatly confusing, which further complicates the interpreting process as we can see in the following:

Time	ST	TT	My Translation
20:30 Interp.1	قادرين أن يعملوا شعبية، قادرين أن يسيروا أنفسهم ... دردنيل طرابلس-كما قال الطلياني إن بني وليد أصبحت دردنيل طرابلس-لأنها كانت خط الدفاع المقاوم، لتوجه القوات الإيطالية إلى الجنوب. وأعرف أن ترهونة لا تريد الضم..	They are capable of running their own people's committees in these areas, and not relying on anybody else, but themselves… Libya Tripoli was the Drandnel of Libya, when the Italians were in the south... I know Tarhona does not wants to be joined …	They are capable to make their own decisions,…. Dardanel of Tripoli, just like what the Italian called it, Bani Walid became Dardanel of Tripoli. This is because it was the major defence that resisted the Italian attacks that head to the south. I know that Tarhuna does not want to join…

The way Algaddafi dwells on the topic of the freedom of each tribe and their ability to make their own choices is rather complicated; he does so by embedding the history of *Dardanelle*, which was considered an important spot to fight the Italian invasion and to prevent them from crossing over to Libya (Almarzoqi, 1978). At first, Algaddafi discusses the freedom each tribe had, which was the *theme* of the sentence, whereas the sudden introduction of the history of the city of Dardanelle could perhaps be considered as the *rheme*. Algaddafi refers to Dardanelle as he addresses the Bin Walid tribe, which happens to reside in this area, and by glorifying their history, he is hoping to gain their support. The difficulty in interpreting this sentence lies in two aspects: (1) the problem of illustrating the significance of Dardanelle and its relation to the previous sentence, (2) the difficulty of maintaining a similar sentence structure and conveying the message correctly. Dickins, Hervey and Higgins argue, "in terms of English>Arabic translation the distinction between thematic and rhematic information is most problematic where it proves difficult or impossible to reproduce roughly the same word order in English as in the original Arabic" (2013:119). I suggest that the interpreter chose to address this situation primarily by adhering to the ST and by following a parallel structure, as he simply renders the

same information without any omission or further explanation. This might in fact have confused the TT audience.

7.3.4 Lost in Interpreting

This section will address some of the issues that the interpreters encountered while translating Algaddafi's speech. The focus here will be on dialectic issues and an overlap of the translation with Arabic**.**

7.3.4.1 Dialectic Issues

Although MSA is considered the lingua franca for the Arab region, dialects are often used in daily communication. As underlined in Section 3.3.1, the differences between dialects can create a gap in understanding and in the communication process, which, in turn, can lead to difficulties in interpreting. Das writes in this regard that one word may have different meanings in two different dialects, leaving the interpreter to decide whether to find a regional equivalent or use a standard one (2005:73). The difficulty does not only lie in understanding certain terminology used within that dialect, but also in the way in which to interpret them and their connotations into the TT language.

Interpreting Algaddafi's speech is fraught with difficulty as he uses LCA and terminology that is mainly used among people of specific tribes in Libya. Consequently, this can lead to misinterpretation and loss in meaning, as the interpreter might be forced to resort to strategies such as skipping or abandoning a message as discussed in Section 7.2. This can also be seen in these examples:

Time	ST	TT1A	My Translation
26:44 Interp.1	شالي زرنا؟ سبحان الله	Not interpreted	What forced us to this? Oh god.
27:55 Interp.1	ريت النكسة؟	Not interpreted	Did you see this setback?
34:00 Interp.1	وتبدى ليبيا تطبخ، تبوها هكه تكون؟	Not interpreted	Libya then would start to burn. Do you want this to happen?

These colloquial LCA phrases are used by Algaddafi, but are not interpreted by the interpreter. Algaddafi uses these phrases as a way of communicating with the public, as his speech is of communicative nature. Thus, it can be argued that the interpreter does not interpret these colloquial words for various reasons: firstly, they are insignificant in the ST and thus not relevant to the TT audience; secondly, there is a lack of equivalence between ST and TT language, and a literal translation would be incomprehensible to the TT audience; thirdly, the interpreter chooses to interpret the relevant message due to the length of the speech and time restrictions. In this case, however, the interpreter resorted to the approximating approach (see Section 7.2) to find similar expressions that are common in the TT language. See the example below:

Time	ST	TT	My Translation
19:34 Interp.1	هذه آخرتها؟	Is <u>this the gratitude?</u>	<u>Is that it?</u>

This phrase is common in the Arab region, and is mainly used to demonstrate a person's necessity for gratitude, or puzzlement at someone's actions. The literal translation of it is 'is that the end of it', which would bear no meaning to the TT audience. Therefore, the interpreter chooses to render the meaning of the message without interpreting the original phrase literally

by saying '*is that the gratitude*'. I suggest that the translation of the word does not only render the connotation of the phrase, but also demonstrates Algaddafi's attitude towards the public by questioning their gratitude. Therefore, by using the word 'gratitude' the interpreter does not only convey the meaning appropriately, but also highlights to the TT audience Algaddafi's strong request to the Libyan public to stop the demonstrations and show him and his regime the gratitude they deserve.

7.3.4.2 Overlap between English and Arabic

It is worth noting that during the interpreting of Algaddafi's speech, there are a number of incidences where the interpreter fails to interpret Arabic words into English and simply repeat the Arabic words, which might be attributed to the interpreter's fatigue or simply to his inability to cope with Algaddafi's speed of delivering the speech. For example, the interpreter literally uses the same Arabic word Algaddafi uses; and interprets them into English, or simply disregards it. Consider the examples below:

Time	ST	TT	My Translation
21:10 **Interp.1**	مصراتة حرة، زليتن حرة، الخمس حرة، مسلاتة حرة	Misrata <u>houra</u>, Zliten <u>houra</u>, Khoms <u>houra</u>, Msallata <u>houra</u>, <u>free as well</u>.	Misrata is <u>free</u>, Zliten is <u>free</u>, Khoms is <u>free</u>, and Msallata is <u>free.</u>
1:01:38 **Interp.2**	أنتم قبيلة الزاوية، أم القبائل الزاوية	Zawiya … <u>ām al-qb āl</u> …the <u>mother of all tribes</u>	You are Zawiya tribe - <u>Zawiya the mother of the tribes</u>

In the example, Algaddafi lists names of different tribes and states that they have their own free will. He says the name of each tribe and adds the word حرة/ *free*, which defines what he means. The interpreter here simply repeats the same list, using the same word in Arabic /houra/, leaving

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the TT audience in confusion. He later tries to amend the situation by adding the word 'free as well'. The interpreter's repeated use of the Arabic word, instead of providing the English translation, can be explained with the speed with which Algaddafi listed the cities, thus creating a rhythmic sound, perhaps leading the interpreter to follow the rhythm and mistakenly repeat the word in Arabic. It is also possible that the interpreter simply lost concentration, as this happens after almost 20 minutes of continuous interpreting. This is similar to the second example, when Interp.2 mistakenly repeats Algaddafi's Arabic words, which is followed by a self-correction and an interpretation of the phrase in English at a later point.

7.4. The Analysis of Mubarak's TT1M

This TT is an interpretation of Mubarak's speech (ST2M) which was broadcasted live on Fox News Channel, after the original recording was shown on Egypt State TV, to which the interpreter's voice and the Fox channel logo were added. One interpreter, Adnane Ettayebi, interprets the entire speech as a voice over, although Mubarak's voice is audible at some points. Ettayebi is a member of the AIIC (International Association of Conference Interpreters) who has interpreted for major TV networks such as Fox News and CNN. He is Moroccan, and speaks Arabic, French, Spanish and English. He holds a Master degree in translation and interpreting, and a DESS[30] in conference interpreting. At the end of Mubarak's speech, the live broadcast of the speech is cut and there is a dual screen showing the Fox TV presenter as well as live coverage of the people demonstrating in Tahrir Square, which clearly frames the speech in light of the channel's ideology.

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[30] Specialised high diploma in France.

I chose this TT because of the strong ideology for which Fox News is known. It was considered among the top channels in the world interested in covering the Arab Spring. As Snyder (2013) claims, cable networks, such as CNN and Fox News, played a major role in covering the Arab Spring in the United States. It is important to investigate the speech aired on Fox News from an interpreting perspective in order to analyse the interpreting process, the performance and the outcome, and effectively provide a comparison with the analysis of the interpretation of Algaddafi's speech as discussed above. The importance of this comparative analysis is to underline factors that may influence the interpreting process: using MSA versus using colloquial language, and the validity of the ST, that is, the way the speakers deliver their speeches, the way their ideas are expressed and connect together, the significance of their speeches, and their lengths.

7.4.1 Fox News

Fox News Channel is a twenty-four-hour news broadcasting channel. The network is based in the US, was established in October 1996, and founded by the American/Australian media proprietor Rupert Murdoch (Della Vigna & Kaplan, 2006:1188). It is a conservative network, whose CEO, Roger Ailes, emphasises that the channel reports in favour of the conservative party (Dubofsky, 2013:285). In 2002, the channel surpassed the ratings of CNN, becoming the leading network in the United States. Fox News introduced its online website Foxnews.com in 1995, which includes articles, news coverage and news video clips. Fox News introduced its online live streaming coverage in September 2008 (Hansell, Feb 2009). The channel adopted the slogan *Fair & Balanced* as its trademark in December 1998, to reflect its ideology and professionalism in covering news worldwide (Hirschkorn. 2003). Many people, however, argue against Fox's objectivity, among them Evensen (2007:178), Rogers (2011:184), and Rucker

who argues that the network claims fairness, objectivity, and impartiality yet practices eliminationist rhetoric (2013:93).

In 2011, news about the Arab Spring dominated both Arab and Western media. Due to Aljazeera's 24/7 coverage of the uprisings in the Middle East, many Western news networks - including CNN, NBC and Fox News - made agreements with Aljazeera to purchase their high-quality footage (Powers, 2013:217). Al-Jenaibi writes about the coverage of the Arab Spring on American networks, stating that Fox News and CNN monopolised both foreign and domestic news (2014). According to Snyder (2013:1), a survey showed that viewers perceived Fox News coverage of the Arab Spring as biased, and yet it scored highly in regard to thoroughness and importance of material covered. The way in which Fox framed the narrative of the Egyptian revolution and President Mubarak was according to their own perspective, reflecting the views of the US government. In February 2011, Fox News published an article analysing the political situation in Egypt, in which it referred to Mubarak as the President, whereas Algaddafi was described as a dictator. The article includes quotations from Mubarak and from the political activist Mohamed ElBaradei, who claimed that Egypt was going to explode after Mubarak's speech (Foxnetwork, Feb. 2011). In this article, Fox News also mentions Obama's speech, in which he urges the Egyptian government to accept the people's demand, and offers the support of the American government. According to Snyder, the coverage of the Egyptian uprising on Fox News started with a clip of White House Press Secretary Robert Gibb who stated that it was not necessary for Mubarak to resign, yet it was important that the demonstrations were resolved peacefully (2013: 15).

Glover draws attention to the way in which Fox News framed the Muslim Brotherhood during the Egyptian revolution in 2011, saying "Muslim Brotherhood was mentioned 847 times in 144 Fox News transcripts, creating an average of 5.8 times per transcript" (2011:130). She concludes that the network devoted most of its coverage to the Muslim Brotherhood when

reporting the narrative of the revolution. Furthermore, the narrative that was presented about this movement appeared to imply a dangerous and radical Islam, as Glover states; Fox News perceived the Brotherhood as a 'real, clear present danger' (ibid). Alalawi also discusses this issue, claiming that the events were not represented objectively as expected by the channel but were influenced by the broadcasters' opinions (2015:47). Although Fox News claims to be an unprejudiced network with a conservative audience, the network associates the Brotherhood in Egypt with a language connected to terrorism, extremists and violence, presenting them as a fanatic and radical organisation. Alalawi also discusses a survey conducted by the RNF[31], which reveals that Fox News viewers are more likely to be confused and misinformed about the events of the Arab Spring and even less knowledgeable than people who are not watching news at all (ibid). Accordingly, Fox Network was repeatedly criticised for its coverage of the Egyptian revolution. Newsvine (2013) criticises the network's opposition to any expression of faith that is not Christian, and its particular dislike of Islam, which they portray regularly as a violent religion. Writers for the liberal news website *Salon* argue that Fox News narrated the Egyptian revolution simply as "it's all 'Islamists' and 'Muslim Brotherhood' on Rupert Murdoch's channel" (Salon.com, 2011). *Salon* also mentions how Fox News described the uprising not as a popular democratic one, but rather as actions taken by radical Islamists, and as a threat to the United States (ibid). Criticism of the coverage provided by Fox News also came from within the network itself, when Liz Trotta, a Fox News commentator, claimed that Anderson Cooper's coverage of the Egyptian revolution was shocking and not professional. Trotta also said that Cooper should not have made any editorial comments about Mubarak's speech, describing the speech as incoherent and accusing Mubarak of lies. She also questioned his journalistic ethics and his personal modesty (Huffingtonpost.com, Feb 2011).

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[31] RNF is a website dedicated to reveal the propaganda Fox News is exercising (Alalawi, 2015:47).

7.4.2 Extra-Linguistic Features of TT1M

Using extra-linguistic features helps to reframe the speech, whether in the way the speech was portrayed as a breaking news item, or by hosting political analysts to reframe it in light of the agency's ideology. Mubarak's speech appeared on Fox News as breaking news, with a red news ticker indicating that President Mubarak was delivering a speech. This same news ticker was to highlight and summarise the important messages in Mubarak's speech. It included different themes the president addressed, his new agenda and intentions of reform and change, and the new rules he issued. The news ticker is helpful as it informs the audience of the topics covered in the speech, while it also provides a summary thereof. At the top left of the screen, writing which says, "voice of translator" is visible; this clarifies that the sound is the interpreter's voice and does not come from the original ST.

Figure 14 - Mubarak's Speech on Fox News

The presentation of dual coverage using a split screen (see Figure 14) is an effective tool for framing the speech according to the network's ideology. The network merged scenes of people protesting in Tahrir Square chanting for the president 'to leave', which demonstrated Egyptians' reaction towards Mubarak's speech. Moreover, sometime during the speech, Fox

News chose to turn up the volume of the people's chanting in Tahrir Square, drowning out Mubarak's voice. Thus, the integration of both images, of Mubarak and of the protesters, was a tool to reframe the narrative against Mubarak, highlighting the rejection the president faced whilst delivering his speech.

7.4.3 Linguistic Features of TT1M

Addressing the linguistic features of ST2 aims to highlight the way the interpreter dealt with MSA in comparison to Colloquial Arabic. One must recognise, however, the similar strategies used by both interpreters when interpreting ST1A and ST2M. The following sections will discuss grammar, vocabulary and different interpreting approaches that were significant in the TT.

7.4.3.1 Text Analysis – Description

1. **Grammar**

1.1.The Absolute Object

In Mubarak's speech, the absolute object is used five times as a way of emphasising the message he is delivering. As highlighted in Section 6.3.3, the absolute object can cause redundancy and its use can result in an awkward style in the TT language. To see how the interpreter reacts to this, consider these examples:

Ex	ST	TT	My Translation
1	إنني تألمت كل الألم من أجلهم مثلما تألمتم، وأوجع قلبي ما حدث لهم كما أوجع قلوبكم	I felt a lot of pain for them, as you <u>felt a lot of pain</u> for them... my heart <u>felt a lot of pain</u> for them, as you felt a lot of pain for them.	I felt a <u>lot of pain for</u> them just as much as you felt it. My heart was aching for what happened to them just as much as it ached your hearts.
2	وإنني عازمٌ كل العزم على الوفاء .... وحريصٌ كل الحرص على ...	I am <u>determined to</u> respond... I am <u>adamant and keen</u> ….	I am <u>very determined</u> to sincerely fulfil ….I am <u>very keen to</u> ….

The interpreter uses different strategies to deal with the repetition of the absolute object and yet maintains its emphasis. In the first example, the interpreter uses the word *a lot* to emphasise the greatness of the pain he felt, since the TT lacks an equivalent for the absolute object. One can argue that using intensifier (such as adverbs) for emphasis is a good solution to render the absolute object in English. Unlike the second example, when the interpreter uses the summarising strategy by maintaining the meaning but deleting the repeated words. The interpreter summarises the phrase by using one equivalent, which is the word *determined*, and replaces the absolute object by adding another synonym '*I am adamant and keen*'. By doing so, I would argue, the meaning is emphasised as intended in the ST.

1. **Vocabulary**

Mubarak's speech is rich in synonyms that aim to highlight specific details the president wishes to emphasise in a repetitive manner (see section 6.3.3). Equally to Algaddafi, Mubarak uses synonyms and repetition as seen in the following examples:

Ex	ST	TT	My Translation
1	أقول لكم إن استجابتي لصوتكم ورسالتكم ومطالبكم	I tell them, that my response to your <u>message, to your voice, and to your demands</u>	I am telling you that my response to your <u>voices and your messages and your demands</u>
2	لقد أعلنت بعباراتٍ لا تحتمل الجدل أو التأويل	I <u>learned, and I told and I declared</u>...	I have previously announced in a <u>clear statement that cannot be argued against or fraud</u>

In the first example, the interpreter maintains the same structure as Mubarak, and interprets all of the synonyms in the same way as they occur in the ST. This can be seen as an emphasis of the message Mubarak is delivering to the public. Therefore, the interpreter chooses to interpret the three synonyms Mubarak uses لصوتكم -رسالتكم –مطالبكم/ *your voice-message-demands,* which is rendered as an equivalent for the word demands.

The second example, on the other hand, demonstrates how the interpreter summarises the synonyms inaccurately and changes the structure of the sentence. The interpreter first interprets the verb أعلنت / *declared*, and instead of interpreting the adjectives Mubarak uses to describe his announcement, using the words الجدل- التأويل / *argument- fraud*, the interpreter uses other verbs to emphasise Mubarak's actions. The interpreter uses the words '*learned/ told/declared'*, which carry the same meaning, yet do not express the meaning the ST intends to convey. One can argue that using these synonyms causes misinterpretation of the ST, since Mubarak intends to confirm the sincerity of his declaration, and does not simply want to emphasise that he made a declaration.

7.4.4 Lost in Interpreting

This section aims to address approaches used by the interpreter to approach specific aspects of the speeches that may have consequently influenced the message causing partial or full loss of meaning.

7.4.4.1 Summarising

It is indeed common practice for interpreters to summarise certain sentences or ideas delivered by a speaker to make it easier for the TT audience (see Section 7.2). Mubarak uses numerous synonyms and near-synonyms, perhaps to avoid repetition but still emphasis his message, which requires the interpreter to resort to the summarising strategy, as seen in the example below:

ST	TT	My Translation
ولقد حرصت على أن يأتي تشكيل كلتا اللجنتين من الشخصيات المصرية المشهود لها بالاستقلال والتجرد، ومن فقهاء القانون الدستوري ورجال القضاء	These committees will be made of <u>very important</u> personalities and <u>respectable</u> personalities and legal experts.	I made sure that the forming both of committees would have include Egyptian characters who have been known for <u>their independence and transparency</u>, and from constitutional law experts and judges.

In this example, the meaning is partially conveyed to the TT audience, since the interpreter chooses to summarise the sentence, regardless of the important information it contains. In this sentence, Mubarak discusses the process of choosing members for new committees, and he lists their characteristics. Nonetheless, the interpreter chooses to summarise the list by saying '*important personalities and respectable personalities and legal experts'*. I would suggest that

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the meaning is not conveyed thoroughly here, as an important aspect of describing these characters is missing. The words **الاستقلال – التجرد** / *independence –impartiality,* are an important aspect of the message Mubarak is trying to send to the public; that is, having these committees formed by independent people who are not part of any political party in Egypt or the government. In addition, summarising both **فقهاء الدستور-رجال القضاء** / *constitutional law experts – judges* into one word - the interpreter refers to '*legal expert*' - eliminates the important detail of wanting these legal experts to be judges who can implement laws, and as constitutional experts who are aware of the required amendment of the constitution. Hence, summarising an important aspect of the speech influences the way the information is rendered for the TT audience.

7.4.4.2. Loss of Meaning

During the interpreting process, interpreters are subjected to various circumstances that ultimately affect the interpreting outcome. These circumstances are related to the interpreter's stamina, exhaustion, and stress, as well as the ability to cope with the speaker's language and fast delivery. Thus, sometimes mistakes occur during the interpreting process, as seen in the following example:

Ex	ST	TT	My Translation
1	ـ لقد طرحتُ رؤية محددة للخروج من الأزمة الراهنة،	- I *saw* a specific *vision* to come out of this crisis.	I have <u>proposed a specific vision</u> to get out of this current crisis.
2	فقد تقدمت اليوم بطلب تعديل ست مواد دستورية هي المواد 76 و77 و88 و93 و189، فضلاً عن إلغاء المادة 179 من الدستور	I have asked for the amendment of six articles, 76, 77, 88, 93, *95* and *97*.	I proposed today the amendment of six constitutional articles and those articles are 76,77,88,93, and <u>189</u>. In addition to the annulment of article number 179 in the constitution.

In the first example, Mubarak clearly states that he has proposed a plan by using the verb طرحت/ *proposed*, yet the interpreter mistakenly interprets the word with *'I saw'*. The verb طرحت, was interpreted to 'saw', and then further allocated with interpreting the word رؤية to '*vision'*, which carries a different meaning to the one intended by Mubarak. One can argue that Mubarak makes this statement to highlight his sincere intentions to make changes by proposing plans that should help cease the crisis. However, the interpretation had another connotation, that of Mubarak's visualising or perhaps thinking of plans, but having yet to discuss them. The interpreter could have arguably avoided this problem by interpreting the word رؤية as a *plan*.

In the second example, the interpreter causes confusion when rendering important details into the TT language. This concerns six articles of the Egyptian constitution that were required to be amended and one which was to be cancelled. The loss of meaning occurs twice; firstly, when Mubarak lists the articles he wishes to amend, and the interpreter replaces the article number 189 with 95. Secondly, when the interpreter wrongly alters article number 179 to 97, and adds it to the list of articles Mubarak wants to amend. In the ST, however, Mubarak demands the annulment of article 179. One can argue that the interpreter is not able to cope

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with the speed in which Mubarak lists these articles' numbers and hence the loss of meaning occurs. It is also possible that during the interpreting process, the interpreter suffers memory loss (see Section 7.2), which is understandable due to the many numbers suddenly uttered by Mubarak.

7.5. Conclusion

The analysis of both TTs reveals similarities in the way in which the media and the interpreters dealt with the speeches. This can be seen in the conventions followed by each media outlet, or simply by the way they represented the speech in their live coverage. However, the differences between the two TTs can be traced back to speech style, length and coherence.

In regard to similarities, it is obvious that Aljazeera and Fox News followed a similar format of presenting the presidents' speeches and their opposing public. While Aljazeera primarily aired news about the protests erupting in different parts of Libya, Fox News presented dual live coverage of the president and of the demonstrators in Tahrir Square. Both speeches were later followed by a brief comment from the TV presenter; the Aljazeera presenter criticised Algaddafi and his long and incomprehensible speech, whereas the Fox News presenter appeared confused over Mubarak's stubbornness to remain in power and broadly summarised the speech. Aljazeera and Fox News chose to portray both sides during their coverage by providing news on the protesters as well as the presidents' speeches. Regardless, Aljazeera's ideology of supporting the uprising was clearly reflected in the TT and in the manner it was re-narrated to the public. This can be seen in the way the channel focused on empowering exiled political activists' voices, asking them to analyse the speech and criticise different aspects of it. The Aljazeera channel was unquestionably one of the few Arab channels that provided full coverage of all of the uprisings during the Arab Spring, but one cannot ignore the influence this has on viewers and on the way they formed their political views.

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The evaluation of each interpretation varies for a number of reasons. First, Algaddafi's speech was long, improvised and in LCA, whereas Mubarak's speech was concise, pre-written and in MSA. Second, Algaddafi's speech was loaded with cultural and tribal references that are mainly familiar to Libyans. Third, unlike Fox News, Aljazeera had two different interpreters, and both were anonymous. My findings are therefore based on an assumption about the way most interpreters will deal with texts and are not based on the interpreters' background or their ideological beliefs. At different times during Algaddafi's speech, the interpreter was unable to keep up with the speaker's speed. In addition, the gap between the Arabic language and English greatly influenced the interpreting process. A number of times, the interpreter encountered difficulties, trying to find equivalences to render the message to the TT audience, for example, in regard to the references to Libyan tribes and cities, or the different citations, quotations and poems that Algaddafi used, which were difficult and unnecessary to render into English. Sometimes, the difficulty lies in his use of foul language, leaving interpreters unsure as to whether to interpret this or leave it out. Hence, it is not unheard of to have interpreters complain when Algaddafi is delivering a speech. In 2009, for example, Algaddafi delivered a speech to the UN - it lasted ninety-five minutes, but his interpreter was frustrated and collapsed after seventy-five minutes. He was heard saying in Arabic, '*I just can't take it any more*' (*Daily Mail*, 2009). Even though the average slot of interpreting allocated to interpreters is no more than thirty minutes, Aljazeera's interpreter for Algaddafi's speech went beyond the norm by interpreting more than fifty minutes. This was clearly reflected in the interpreter's voice intonation, stamina and accuracy. The interpreter started pausing by using the omission strategy, whereby he left many things uninterpreted; and there were incidents when he overlapped Arabic words with English ones as highlighted previously. After almost forty-four minutes, the interpreter was heard grumbling, which was perhaps a clear sign of his frustration and exhaustion.

This was not the case with Mubarak's speech, where Fox News interpreter Ettayebi was focused and rendered the speech more adequately. This can be explained by Mubarak's short speech, and his use of MSA. Nonetheless, there were minor mistakes that any interpreter can make during a session, such as the succession of many numbers at one time, making wrong reference to the numbers of the articles in the Egyptian constitution; this would, however, possibly not be known to the TT audience.

To conclude this discussion, I suggest that the circumstances of Mubarak's speech helped the interpreter to produce a better, more reliable TT, whereas in Algaddafi's speech, both interpreters had numerous obstacles to react to, which consequently contributed to the outcome and the quality of the TT.

Chapter Eight

The Translation of Arabic Speeches
for English-Language Newspapers

8.1 Introduction

This chapter will focus on the shifts that occur in the process of transferring the meaning from the genre of a political speech to the genre of a newspaper article. In addition, it will focus on articles for which STs were translated from Arabic into English. The first article concerns ST1A published in the *Daily Mail*, the other two articles relate to ST2M and were published in *The Guardian*. These particular newspapers were chosen for the following reasons: first, in order to conduct an extensive analysis of ST2M, it was deemed necessary to use two articles instead of one due to the shortage of the data and information presented in one article. The first article was mainly to inform the public of Mubarak's speech and of his unwillingness to step down, however, the second article highlighted different aspects of the speech and incorporated a video of the speech. Unlike TT2A, which highlighted many aspects of Algaddafi's speech and was rich with information. The second reason for choosing these particular newspapers lies in my aim to investigate whether each newspaper's ideology had an influence on how it narrated the events of the Arab Spring, and whether it was influenced by the dominant narrative of creating a new era and shaming the presidents, a narrative which was widely spread during the Arab Spring regardless of the outlet's ideology.

To understand the transformation from genre to genre, I will first discuss the process of translating and editing the news before an article is published in a newspaper. Every newspaper has a specific audience and is embedded in the ideology of the society in which it functions. Therefore, it is important to have an insight into the history and ideological underpinnings of

the analysed news sources. I will then proceed to examine the relevant TTs according to the framework presented in Chapter Five. The chapter will conclude with a discussion of the findings.

8.2 Journalism and Translation

The relationship between covering international news and translation has always been complicated, in particular in regard to covering foreign news and foreign news production (Van Doorslaer, 2010:180). "Opinions and ideologies are expressed in the socially and culturally relevant genre of newspaper editorials… opinions and ideologies are being produced by journalists and other writers" (van Dijk, 1995a:9). This is clearly evident in the way news items are carefully selected and edited before being broadcast to the public. News organisations use different translation strategies while covering international news to bring them in line with journalistic convention. Translation is thus subjected to specific requirements that fit the genre and style of journalistic production (Bielsa & Bassnett, 2008: 57). During the process of translating news, journalists rewrite the news for a new context that is more suitable for the medium in which they work. This might create a combination of different genres such as informative and argumentative, as Dickins, Hervey and Higgins suggest when they say that 'hybridization' in genre is common in journalism (2013:181). According to Bielsa and Bassnett (2008) translation is an important part of journalistic work due to the linguistic diversity in news production and the simultaneous circulation of news in different languages around the world; consequently, news agencies regard translation as part of their job, thus, bilingual journalists write and edit the news instead of translators (2008:57). They further explain, "both processes of edition and translation imply the tasks of selection, correction, verification, completion, development or reduction that will give texts the final form in which they appear in the newswire" (ibid.). The process of translation and editing the news is termed by Van

Doorslaer as 'transediting' (2010). Among the common practices used in transediting is selecting what to report; in this regard Harrison asserts that the concept of news selection and production is based upon a modern way of reporting summarised and accurate news (2006:60). Bielsa and Bassnett stress that news agencies working on international news usually use strategies of selecting, editing and prioritising in regard to what news to publish to ensure maximum impact on their readers and based on their own ideological background (2008:83).

Federici (2010:130) maintains that translators and editors reshape the target text to make it more suitable. This approach - especially if used in political contexts - can easily distort the truth and contribute to creating a false image (Bánhegyi, 2015:149). Bánhegyi illustrates how framing an entire narrative by labelling it in a certain context is mainly achieved by using specific lexical items or phrases that aim to identify a particular point of view, belief or political commitment of that narrative (2015:150). Moreover, Whitebrook argues that narratives provide models of explanation and that they structure the text to which they are related. He further argues that any political identity has a basis in conflict and is constructed within a pre-existing narrative that is known in the media (2001:145). In the case of narratives in conflict, and particularly the media's role in this, Bánhegyi (2015:143) argues that Western media is greatly influenced by the role of translators in the Arab region. This is because of their role as a journalist and an interpreter/translator, which might lead interpreters/translators to eventually summarise and edit the stories based on their, potentially, biased social opinion (ibid). Selective appropriation as defined by Baker (see Section 4.4.1.) is one of the tools translators can use to manipulate narratives during the translation process: "Selecting, and in some cases 'inventing' texts that help elaborate a particular narrative of an 'enemy culture, then, is a well-documented practice that often relies heavily on the services of translators and interpreters" (Baker, 2006:75). In this regard, Pormouzeh argues that narratives are thematically driven and usually selected based on specific criteria that have importance for the society (214:611). The

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complexity of translating news is not only related to how narratives influence the translation product, but also to the difficulty of changing the genre. These shifts are complex for various reasons. First, the unavoidable change of medium and genre, for instance from a political speech to a short, summarising article; second, the existence of ideological narratives, which could be used to embed the translation; and third, the inevitable shifts from language to language and from culture to culture, driven by translation.

8.3 The Analysis of Algaddafi's TT2A

The second target text consists of an article published in the *Daily Mail* newspaper on 23 February 2011. It was written anonymously by *Daily Mail* authors, which is common practice for this specific newspaper where some breaking news articles are written by anonymous authors. The article was entitled "*I will die here as a martyr: Defiant Gaddafi blames world leaders for violence in rambling TV address*" (*Daily Mail*, Feb 2011). It was published immediately after Algaddafi delivered his speech on 22 February. Its purpose was to provide the reader with a summary of the speech in English. In addition, it aimed to provide a commentary of the speech, and to contextualise it within the existing broader discourse. Thus, it was inevitable that the speech would be cut and presented in another medium and genre, e.g. there were a number of quotations that were presented in bullet points. Having said that, it is important to highlight that the *Daily Mail* drew on an existing narrative of Algaddafi; on the way he was always mocked and typically described as a dictator (see Section 2.7.1). Algaddafi was much discussed in Western media due to his public threats to the West and his unpredictable behaviour. In 2009, the *Daily Mail,* for instance, wrote an article about the way in which he denounced the King of Saudi Arabia as a 'British product and a liar', and displayed disrespect for the Arab Summit in Doha (*Daily Mail*, March 2009). In another *Daily Mail* article written by Almond, Algaddafi was referred to as 'controversial', 'dictator' and 'monstrous'

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(Almond, 2009). Almond writes, "Gaddafi is one of the maddest dictators on Earth and he doesn't like being upstaged unless it's by this 40-strong troupe of well-equipped, all virgin minders" (ibid).

It is therefore indeed a requisite that this research investigates a variety of Arab and Western media, especially considering that all media are driven by particular agendas. I thus chose the *Daily Mail* with an understanding of its political background and its public perception as an opinionated newspaper in the United Kingdom. It will be informative to see how it portrayed the Arab Spring and specifically Algaddafi's speech to the audience in the UK and beyond. As the *Daily Mail* is one of the most-read English newspapers around the world (Knight & Pattison, 2015:168), the newspaper readership is not only limited to the UK, but includes other countries and regions.

8.3.1 *Daily Mail*

Throughout its history, the *Daily Mail* won various awards for its writers, designers and photographers (Harris 2013:6). The British newspaper was founded by Alfred Harmsworth - Lord Northcliffe - in 1896, and is owned by *Daily Mail* and General Trust (DMGT) news group, which belongs to his family. The largest unit the DMGT owns is the Associated Newspapers Ltd, which publishes The *Daily Mail*, *The Mail on Sunday*, the *Metro*, etc. Lord Northcliffe saw the need to introduce a British newspaper for the "lower-middle class" market. The first issue was published on 4 May 1896, in simple language and with shorter sentences (Harris 2013; Mi 2015; Manning 2001). Harris writes, "the launch of the *Daily Mail* more than a hundred years ago was not just the birth of a great paper – it was also the very foundation of modern journalism" (2013:1). Lord Northcliffe introduced standards and guidelines for his newspapers that are now considered a norm in journalism (Harris, 2013). Three years later, the circulation of the *Daily Mail* had reached 500,000 a day, and by 1902 - the end of the Boer War

- it was over one million, which made the *Daily Mail* one of the most popular newspapers in the world (Griffiths, 2006:131).

The DMGT launched the *Mail Online* (dailymail.co.uk), the online version of the newspaper covering the same stories as the *Daily Mail* and the *Mail on Sunday*, in 2005. Its news coverage features a variety of international news and events, but is mainly relating to events in the UK. Journalists also write about personal finance, travel, celebrity news and lifestyle editorial (Mance, 2014). The *Mail Online* website additionally offers users the possibility to create an account and engage in discussions or to comment on articles and news. In regard to its layout, the website features an unusually long column of stories and images of different stories of trivial events and celebrities' lives (Mi, 2015). According to Rothermere (2004), "the Mail Online delivered a good growth in audiences and revenues and now reached 6.5 million unique users each month, driven by a renewed focus on content and user interactivity". It regularly ranks among the top 15 news websites in the world (Durrani, 2013). Fothergill (2014) asserts that the *Mail Online* continues to be the most visited online UK newspaper in the world, as it has more than 11.3 million browsers daily. With the ever-increasing number of visitors to the Mail Online website, the DMGT decided not to integrate the stories published on the website in the *Daily Mail* paper. This was simply to increase the number of viewings and to maximise the website's ranking in Google search results. People working for the Mail Online started looking for stories that would improve the ratings: "Anything related to climate change, American politics, Muslims – we just chased the numbers very ruthlessly" (cited in Collins, 2012). Robinson argues, "many researchers believe that the celebrity-driven and picture-oriented character of the Mail Online may underestimate the power of the Mail brand (Cited in Mi 2015: 154). Boyce (2007:71) explains that in the UK newspaper market, newspapers have a distinct editorial leaning, to the left or the right wing. He further claims that the *Daily Mail* is more lenient of the Conservative Party and usually aims to put the

other side on the defensive. Throughout the years, the *Daily Mail* has in fact established a solid reputation among the Conservative Party and to voice its right-wing party views (Manning, 2001; Pilger 2010). According to a survey conducted in 2004, 53 percent of *Daily Mail* readers vote for the Conservative Party (Mi, 2015:151). Collins (2012) stresses that *The Mail*, as it is commonly referred to, is similar to Fox News Channel, in the sense that it attracts conservative-voting people, since the newspaper considers itself as the defender of British traditions and values, and as the voice of the majority whose voices are overlooked by the agendas of the metropolitan elites. According to Portugheis, the *Daily Mail* has a reputation of initiating hate campaigns against different ethnic, cultural and social groups, including Muslims (2014:239).

International events are usually reported on anonymously by *Daily Mail* reporters. According to Boyce, the newspaper holds significant power over other media outlets, and is considered a powerful source of 'news' for other newspapers (2007:57-58). During the Arab Spring, there were a number of articles and news updates about the events happening in the region as well as the political speeches by the presidents in these countries. Fathi (2016) highlights, that the newspaper even posted a video of the capture and death of Algaddafi on its website.

8.3.2   Extra-Linguistic Features of TT2A

The *Daily Mail* article reporting on Algaddafi's speech provides the reader with some contextual information: it describes Algaddafi himself and the setting - the palace - where the speech took place; it also provides information about the protesters demonstrating against Algaddafi and about other demonstrations that were taking place across the world at the time. The report also contains a map illustrating the current situation of the Arab Spring. The authors provide several images with captions that help to highlight the significance of the image or the message behind it; this can be explained from two perspectives: first, the *Daily Mail* publishes

images of the president as well as of the setting in which he delivers his speech. The main image in the article shows Algaddafi wearing his traditional clothing and pointing his finger at the camera, which in a way illustrates Algaddafi's anxious attitude. Its caption refers to Algaddafi's speech as 'bizarre' and to his refusal to step down, yet it does not contain an explanation of his attire. With this, the *Daily Mail* fits its article into the existing narrative of mocking Algaddafi's bizarre behaviour - and hence his bizarre choice of outfit - leading TT readers to the assumption that the outfit has no significance and is part of Algaddafi's peculiar attitude. The second image is reflective of Algaddafi's intention to send a defiant message of resistance; the caption, however, does not illustrate that and simply diminishes the place's true significance of resembling defiance and resistance to Libyan, by calling it a "deserted and derelict residence". The reason for Algaddafi to deliver the speech in this particular place was not revealed to the TT audience, and was perhaps ignored due to the well-known narrative of Algaddafi's eccentricity.

The second explanation for using images as a mode of interpreting aspects of the speech is to contextualise the article within the region's dominant discourse. In a caption of one of the images as seen in Figure 15, the *Daily Mail* states that "*Men loyal to colonel Gaddafi are shown on TV to be the only ones left roaming Tripoli after protesters were fired on by security force*" (Daily Mail, Feb 2011). It could be argued here that the incorporation of images that show the atrocities committed by the Libyan regime and the demonstrations shapes the *Daily Mail*'s presentation of Algaddafi's speech, taking the side of the protesters; especially since the article about Algaddafi contained more images of the protesters and the destruction in Libya than of him.

Figure 15 - *Daily Mail's* **Caption of an Image in TT2A**

The article is the first to be published in the *Daily Mail*, directly after Algaddafi's speech. The bold title - *I will die as a martyr: Defiant Gaddafi blaming world leaders for violence in rambling TV address* - is in fact one of the most defiant things Algaddafi said during his speech. The title can perhaps be seen negative by the supporters of the opposition; thus, the negative interpretation of the title emerges from the context in which the newspaper presents the article, not from the quotation itself. This is also, for instance, achieved by describing the speech as a "*rambling TV address*", which diminishes the speaker and his ability to present a coherent speech (*Daily Mail*, Feb 2011). I would suggest that the terminology used in the title aims to send one message. It clearly elaborates on how Algaddafi is perceived in the Western media as an aggressive and bizarre character. The terminology used to describe the speech in the title of the article - such as *defiant, violence, die as a martyr* - has strong connotations of violence and of the desire to fight and shed blood during the uprising. Moreover, highlighting the world's

leaders' violence is yet another way in which the newspaper wants to address Algaddafi's ability to resort to violence to subdue the demonstrations. On the other hand, a tone of sarcasm overshadows the title with the aim to ridicule the speech and diminish its importance. By doing so, the newspaper reframes the speech and represents it to the readers with two main aspects: violence and rambling.

Besides the titles and the images, the article also features an information box containing quotations and statistics. It shows statements from witnesses and protesters narrating their stories or the incidents they have witnessed, in addition to statistics providing actual numbers of causalities and people fleeing the country. It is important to highlight that the box is aligned parallel to the article, which can be seen as a comparison between what Algaddafi and his regime say, and what the protesters and eyewitnesses say to journalists.

8.3.3 Reframing the Speech – CDA and Narrativity

8.3.3.1 Textual Analysis and Discourse Practice

1. Terminology

This section will focus on the importance of CDA for examining the role of specific terminologies in conveying a particular message, and hence shape the article according to an existing narrative. At the beginning of the article, below the title, there are a number of important bullet points that aim to explain briefly the content of the article. The first point states the following:

Gaddafi urges supporters to <u>attack</u> 'drug addict' protesters in TV speech

This is a description of Algaddafi urging Libyans to fight protesters, whom he calls 'drug addicts'. Although it is mentioned multiple times during his speech, Algaddafi also urges

Libyans to stop, help, catch and attack them. Therefore, one can see that the *Daily Mail* chooses to highlight and focus on his intentions of violence, which is part of the discourse and common narrative during that time. By following Baker's selective appropriation feature, and choosing to translate words like ‏نعالجوهم‎ ‏-شدوا/سلموهم‎ /*capture/hand in/ we will cure them* into *attack* them, I suggest that the newspaper wants to convey the message that Algaddafi encourages Libyans to engage in civil war with protesters and maybe even kill them. This is because the word '*attack*' denotes a violent act and does not merely refer to the act of capturing them.

It is worth noting that there is a second box containing a number of bullet points explaining the situation in Libya, stating the number of casualties, providing news about the revolution and of people's reaction. The word '*killed*' is repeated six times; consider the examples below:

Ex1.	Egyptians fleeing over the border from Libya today described a wave of <u>killing</u> that some claimed had seen <u>thousands killed.</u>
Ex 2.	Human Rights Watch says at least 233 <u>people have been killed</u> across Libya so far.

During the Libyan uprising, opinions for or against the military intervention in Libya varied. According to El-Shahir, the dominant discourse was manifested in a joint letter written by the three presidents: Barak Obama, David Cameron and Nicolas Sarkozy, which was published in several newspapers, such as *The Times*, demanding a military intervention in Libya to protect civilians when the situation began to deteriorate (2016:76). Maguire and Vickers conducted research on how the British government created a public narrative as a response to the situation in Libya, which shaped people's understanding of the events and justified the government's response to it (2013:3). They emphasise that the common narrative in the British government

towards the situation in Libya was to intervene and protect civilians, which may ultimately have affected media coverage, and how the situation in Libya was represented as a situation in which young, democracy-seeking rebels were fighting against an evil old dictator (2013:10-18). It can be argued that the way the *Daily Mail* frames the article is mainly due to the dominant narrative of the necessity of an intervention. This is noticed in the way the *Daily Mail* reports on certain criteria of the ST or reframes it according to this narrative, and enhances this by adding news about Algaddafi's mercenaries' victims. I would thus argue that the article is made to suit the shared narrative of an intervention that aims to support the NATO and save civilians.

The article commences by stressing the bloodshed and killings of civilians in Libya, as the following example shows:

> Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi has insisted he will <u>fight</u> to the 'last drop of blood' in a defiant speech that follows days of <u>bloodshed</u> on the streets of his country.

Selecting a combination of terminology like '*fight / bloodshed*' to form an introduction to the article is one way to reframe the speech according to the dominant narrative of Algaddafi's violence. It is in fact worth noting that the *Daily Mail* selects this particular line from Algaddafi's speech, when he announces that he is willing to fight for Libya until the last drop of blood, and to associate this with the current situation in Libya. By describing it as 'days of bloodshed', the language helps to support the negative image the Western media has of Algaddafi. It further emphasises the endless violence that needs to be stopped, as it is clear from Algaddafi's statement that he will not step down. According to Kuperman, the Western media's perception of the Arab Spring revolutions in Tunisia and Egypt, was different to the perception of the situation in Libya, as the events in Libya caused many concerns which

increased further when Algaddafi responded violently to the protesters and the army began to shoot innocent civilians (2013:191).

The *Daily Mail* uses a number of different words to describe Algaddafi according to the narrative within which they constructed the article; among them is the following example:

> The furious <u>tirade</u> also warned…

Choosing the word 'tirade' sends a strong message of Algaddafi's attitude towards the uprising. It demonstrates his anger towards the protesters, his frustration and his abusive nature. This is because Algaddafi was claiming to be the father of Libyans, stating that to demonstrate against him was an act of betrayal and ingratitude. The example is a demonstration of Algaddafi's fierce intentions towards the protesters, as words like *furious* and *warned* carry a significant amount of threat. As mentioned above, the importance of the narrative the *Daily Mail* constructs around the speech lies in the utter violence the newspaper ascribes to it, which is then reinforced through the different stories and statements that are quoted to the *Daily Mail* by Libyans and non-Libyans speaking about the crisis in Libya.

Another noticeable use of terminology relates to the way in which synonyms can be employed in a way to enhance a particular narrative; which, in this case, is the narrative of supporting protesters in Libya against the regime. The following examples show a comparative analysis of two similar terms with different interpretations and the way they were employed in the *Daily Mail* article.

Ex1	Regime = 10	Anti-government = 5
Ex2	Protesters = 28	Rebels = 2

In Ex1, the word *regime* is repeatedly used to refer to Algaddafi and the current Libyan government, unlike the word anti-government which is used five times. It is worth noting that before the Arab Spring, the Libyan government was frequently described by the media and the *Daily Mail* as a 'government' and not as a 'regime' (*Daily Mail*, May 2007). Although one might think that the word *government* is merely a synonym for the word *regime*, the latter is consistently associated with 'dictatorship', especially in the media (Maguire & Vickers, 2013:11). According to Maguire and Vickers, the common use of the word 'regime' in political discourse is strictly supplemented with the use of words like 'dictator' and 'dictatorship' (ibid). They assert that during the Arab Spring, the word 'regime' was regularly used to refer to the Libyan government, unlike the word *government*, which was used to refer to more legitimate countries that witnessed an uprising, such as Bahrain (ibid). The *Daily Mail* thus chooses to translate the word الحكومة الليبية/ *Libyan government* into *regime*, and portrays Algaddafi's government as a dictatorship, possibly to shame the president and to demonstrate its disapproval of the situation in Libya. It may also be the result of the British government's disapproval of the Libyan regime, as the Daily Mail reports the events within the framework of the government's shared narrative of the illegitimacy of Algaddafi's regime. It is important to highlight how the Italian and the British governments were referred to as '*government*' within the same article, which clearly demonstrates how using different terminology can in fact portray a particular message; in this case to highlight the illegitimacy of the Libyan's government.

In the second example provided above, the striking difference between the use of the word *rebels* and the word *protesters* can be easily understood as labelling the uprising as a fair

act against a dictatorship regime. According to Maguire and Vickers, it was quite common to refer to the Libyan protesters as 'rebels' in the media, however, the British government refrained from using the word *rebels*, and instead referred to them as Libyan *civilians* (2013:13). The *Daily Mail* describes them 28 times as '*protesters*', which aims to demonstrate the newspaper's support of the uprising and the people's protest against the regime.

2. Quotation

To analyse the selectivity with which the *Daily Mail* chooses to represent the speech, it is important to draw attention to the specific quotations citied in the article. It is worth noting that there are 10 quotations that are translated directly from Algaddafi's speech, and five summaries of what he said. The issue this analysis will highlight is the importance of selecting these particular phrases, as explained by Baker (2006), and to translate them as part of the article. The examples below illustrate a number of quotations selected by the *Daily Mail* to report the speech:

Ex1	'You men and women who love Gaddafi ... get out of your homes and fill the streets. Leave your homes and <u>attack</u> them in their lairs'
Ex2	'The police cordons will be lifted go out and <u>fight</u> them. Forward, forward, forward'

In Ex1, the quotation stems from different parts of the speech, summarised into one quotation, which is then mistranslated. The word Algaddafi uses is شدوا/ *catch them*; as he intends to express his disapproval of the protesters describing them as drug addicts who need help. However, it is translated by the *Daily Mail* as '*attack*', similarly to Ex2 where the words اقبضوا- طاردوهم/ *catch them-chase them*, are translated to '*fight*', which carries a partially different

connotation and message. This is because Algaddafi wants to emphasise the narrative of helping these protesters; he insists on '*catching*' them rather than '*fighting*' them. In addition, the newspaper's desire to emphasise Algaddafi's urge to use violence is evident when they select separate sentences that have a similar meaning into one sentence and ultimately one quotation. They use the phrase الى الأمام/*forward*, in conjunction with the word *fight*, to demonstrate his insistence on fighting and his constant encouragement to engage in fights.

8.4. The Analysis of Mubarak's TT2M

This section focuses on the analysis of TT2, which consists of two articles published in *The Guardian* newspaper on Thursday, 10 February 2011, and Friday, 11 February 2011. The first article (Article#1) was published on the same day Mubarak delivered his speech, at 22:34pm GMT as a breaking news item to report about the speech. Chris McGreal, who was reporting for the network from Cairo in Egypt, wrote the article entitled '*Egypt's hope turns to fury as Mubarak clings to power*' (McGreal, 2011). He is a senior writer for the Guardian-US, and worked previously for *The Independent* and the BBC (*The Guardian*, 2016c). McGreal worked as a foreign correspondent for *The Guardian* in Jerusalem in 2002, where he later won the Martha Gellhorn Award (London) for reporting on the Israel and Palestinian territories. He later became famous as *The Guardian* '*anti-Zionist, propagandist*', and was repeatedly criticised for his 'anti-Semitic' discourse (Levick, 2013 and Hendrie, 2012). McGreal was also known for his severe criticism of the American media for not being critical enough of Israel; he further questioned their silence towards a banner that reads 'Death to Arabs' at a rally in Israel in 1994 (Levick, 2014). McGreal repeatedly demonstrated his solidarity with the innocent defenceless Palestinian children, criticising the lethal and savage narrative the Jewish are engaged in, which was highly reflected in the article he wrote for *The Guardian* (Levick, 2014).

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The second article (Article#2), however, was published one day after the speech had been delivered; hence it contained more analysis and details of the speech. The article entitled '*Mubarak's defiance could spell disaster*' was written by Ian Black (Black, 2011). Black is *The Guardian's* Middle East editor and correspondent, and has been working for *The Guardian* for almost 25 years (*The Guardian*, 2016b). Black is familiar with covering conflicts in the Middle East, as he reported on many issues such as the Iran-Iraq war, the first Palestinian intifada[32], and the crises in Yemen and Libya (Network, 2015). In 2010, Black was awarded the 'peace through media award' at the International Media Awards (Deans, 2016).

For the past 60 years, the world knew Mubarak as an elegant, wise and eloquent president, who was also known for his good judgment and sensible attitude towards problems he encountered during his presidency (see Section 2.7.2). Mubarak was seen as a legitimate president, with a legitimate government. This can be seen in the way *The Guardian* highlighted Mubarak in their news reporting. In an article written by Ian Black in 2010, for instance, *The Guardian* discusses Mubarak's health issues and describes the situation as a dilemma because of the lack of successor (Black, 2010). Most importantly, *The Guardian* was also interested in the Egyptian election, which was discussed in detail by Hennion who reported on Mubarak's election victory in 2010, which he won with a high percentage of 95 percent and without any competition; the article also argued that no one seemed to doubt the result (Hennion, 2010). This was not the case after the uprising erupted, when demands for Mubarak's resignation came from *The Guardian* as a sign of support for the people of Egypt and their freedom. For example, in an article published by *The Guardian* within the first few days of the Egyptian uprising, Shenker (2011) describes the situation as a public sentiment of ending the 30-year rule of Mubarak, describing him as one of the Middle East's dictators. Another article, published on 2

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[32] It is defined as an armed uprising of Palestinians against the Israeli occupation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip (*Merriam Dictionary*).

February 2011, describes the Egyptian government as '*Mubarak's* regime' which carries a negative connotation as discussed in Section 8.3.1 (Beaumont, Shenker, Sherwood & Tisdall, 2011).

The importance of TT2M lies in the fact that it is also associated with *The Guardian* online news blog, which contains feedback, comments and discussions about the given news. This blog is similar to a live newsfeed that provides the viewers with 24 hours coverage of the uprising in Egypt and of the discussions that take place amongst protesters and political analysts. Having said that, one must realise this translation process changes the ST genre into a combination of two genres of which the TT consists. These articles can be considered an informative piece of news that aims to provide the TT audience with current updates about the situation in Egypt and the uprising.

This thesis aims to analyse these articles for two reasons: first, because of *The Guardian's* reputation as one of the most liberal and high-quality newspapers in Britain (Williams, 2013). Hence, this research aims to analyse the quality of these articles produced by the newspaper, in addition to the way their ideology shaped Mubarak's existing political discourse and how this was re-narrated in the article. The second reason is the fact that the newspaper integrated a new tool of communication in the article, an easily accessible, interactive news blog, open to comment by the public and to journalists. For example, McGreal and Black both write about their coverage of Mubarak's speech and about the people demonstrating in Tahrir Square in the news blog, elaborating on various stories and interviews they conducted with the people there. This news blog is thus an interactive way of communication that indeed effects the readers' perception of the news and allows them to get involved in the discussion.

8.4.1 *The Guardian*

The Guardian is a daily newspaper issued in the United Kingdom that was first founded by John Edward Taylor in 1821. The newspaper is owned by the leading media organisation GMG (Guardian Media Group) (*The Guardian*, 2016d). *The Guardian* headquarters are based in London, but it has numerous branches in different countries and reporters working 24/7 (Gu, 2016:255). The first issue was published on 5 May 1821 under the name '*The Manchester Guardian'*. This might be due to the fact that the newspaper aimed to promote the liberal interest in the outcome of the Peterloo Massacre in Manchester during that period (*The Guardian*, 2016d). National and international recognition of the newspaper was achieved by CP Scott, who was the newspaper editor for 57 years from 1872. According to Mi "he outlined the paper's value in his editorial piece to celebrate the newspaper's centenary as 'honesty, cleanness, courage, fairness, a sense of duty to the reader and the community" (2015:136). Mi argues that *The Guardian* has always given much attention to the way the newspaper is printed and to its style (2015:138). For example, in 1992, it introduced a new feature, creating the tabloid format supplement '*G2'*, which many other British newspapers copied later (ibid; Rusbridger, 2012). In 2004, *The Guardian* pioneered a new format called 'Berliner', the first British newspaper to use it, which was then followed by *The Independent* and *The Times* (Harcup, 2014: 35). According to Harcup, the newspaper was reported to spend about £50 million on a new printing process in 2005 to change to this new format, which was seen as a reader-friendly size (ibid). Mi explains further that this format is recognised for its taller pages compared to traditional broadsheets, which makes it easier to read while on public transport (Mi, 2015:138).

The Guardian's presence on the Internet, "The Guardian's New Media Lab", was officially established in 1995, and was instructed to implement an electronic copy of *The*

Guardian (*The Guardian*, 2016a). In 1999, *The Guardian Unlimited* was launched comprising news, football, and jobs, and later included film, education, books, etc. (ibid; Mi, 2015). According to Mi (2015:139) the webpage guardian.com has grown rapidly, and the site registered over one million users. By March 2001, the network had more than 2.4 million users, making it the most popular newspaper website in the United Kingdom (ibid). The guardian.com has since then gained various press awards, such as best newspaper on the web, the Newspaper Society Award, and online news service of the year (*The Guardian*, 2016a). To increase the website's popularity, guardian.com launched '*Comment is Free'* in 2006**,** to enable readers to engage in discussions, debates and arguments, and to comment on any issue (ibid).

Dating back to 1935, the 'quality' papers in London were all conservative in politics, but *The Guardian* maintained its neutral position and integrated a new category of readers, such as students, teachers, and workers (Ayerst: 1971:489). The political orientation of the newspaper has been emphasised further by Bladh, who suggests that "it has traditionally been known as a left-of-centre liberal publication." (2010:7). In addition, Gu claims that in the past few years, *The Guardian* has increasingly targeted teachers, professionals and the younger generation to increase its readership (2016:244).

During the Arab Spring, *The Guardian* established a 'News Blog' called 'Middle East Live', which aimed to cover news, updates and different stories about the uprisings in 2011 (Douai, Auter & Domangue, 2013:474). Douai, Auter and Domangue believe that the newspaper heavily depended on social media to enrich its live reporting of the 'Arab Spring' (ibid: 482). They further elaborate how many Western media outlets, including *The Guardian,* referred to blogs, tweets and Facebook posts of political activists in their coverage.

8.4.2 Extra-Linguistic Features of TT2M

Demonstrators in Tahrir Square. President Mubarak had seemed on the verge of giving in to demands to resign.
Photograph: Pedro Ugarte/AFP/Getty Images

Figure 16 – *The Guardian's* **Caption of one of the Images in TT2M**

Both articles choose various modes to contextualise the speech, and familiarise the TT audience with different aspects of it. They use images, hyperlinks, videos, and a news blog. In the first article, there is a limited set of modes that are used, for example, the title, a single image, and hyperlinks. Although the purpose of TT2M is to update the audience about Mubarak's speech, it only contains an image of protesters in Tahrir Square raising their shoes up as shown in Figure 16, as a sign of contempt and rejection of Mubarak. This image can indicate the current situation in Egypt and the protesters' response towards the speech. I consider the way in which this image is incorporated in the news as a way to transfer the attention of this breaking news item from the actual event - the speech - to a more important aspect, namely the current situation and the demonstrators' response. The article also includes two main hyperlinks to live feed news about Egypt, and any new or previous articles about Mubarak in *The Guardian*. These links are also introduced at the end of the article to educate the audience about the topic, and, more importantly, to introduce them to the 'news blog'.

The second article is more analytical, as it was published a day after the speech was delivered, the author thus had enough time to integrate different modes in the article and to

provide the audience with more resources. The article includes a one-and-a-half-minute video of different excerpts of Mubarak's speech with English subtitles. Adding the video can in fact help familiarise the audience with the setting of the speech and the way in which the president carried himself during it. This video is important for two reasons: firstly, because of various arguments stating that Mubarak uses his body language to indicate his indifference and agitated attitude towards public demands, and the way he uses his body to threaten them (see Section 6.3.2); the second reason relates to the way in which the newspaper aims to contextualise the speech by providing the ST for the TT audience. Another mode that is embedded in this article is using hyperlinks which open a new page with a live news blog developed by the newspaper to highlight the situation in Egypt. I would suggest that the importance of the blog lies in the numerous modes it provides and in its diversity, since it familiarises readers with a wide range of news from across the globe. It also involves stories, videos, images, and a discussion board between Egyptian analysts, the public and *The Guardian* editors. By linking this blog to the actual article, the newspaper directs the audience to seek more knowledge about the subject, comment on it, or engage in a discussion with others. The news blog is updated hourly and provides a constant analysis of different aspects of the speech or about the rumours of the president's resignation. The blog, for example, incorporates people's comments and discussions about Mubarak's speech from social media; it also includes the response of The April 6 youth movement that was issued on their Facebook page, describing the speech as 'astonishing piece of hypocritical filth' (Siddique & Owen, 2011). It also contains comments from *The Guardian* correspondent who was present in Tahrir Square during the time the speech was delivered. Another feature is the facility to translate the blog, the variety of sources and comments, and, more importantly, the hourly updates of the situation and of different events in Egypt into Arabic. These modes of meaning play a major role in rendering the message to the

TT audience, and most importantly familiarise the audience with various aspects of the speech, as well as the public's interpretations of it.

8.4.3   Reframing the Speech – CDA with Narrativity

8.4.3.1 Textual Analysis and Discourse Practice

1.   Terminology

Not only does the dominant narrative contribute to the way the article is shaped, but by choosing particular terminology it can convey a strong message to the reader. For example, using the word '*bizarre'* as seen below:

Article #2	In a <u>bizarre performance</u> on state TV

The Guardian describes Mubarak's performance using the word '*bizarre'* to reflect on the way he portrays himself, perhaps because he appears nervous yet persistence to stay in power. Their explanation for the use of the word 'bizarre' may differ to the one constantly associated with Algaddafi's, as he has been known for his peculiar character for the past 40 years (see Section 2.71). In this case, however, *The Guardian* possibly chooses the term '*bizarre'* for these reasons: firstly, to refer to the overall perception of the speech, since many Egyptians and analysts considered ST2M as Mubaraks' worst speech; Lynch, for instance, described it as "the worst speech ever" (2011). Secondly, to refer to Mubarak's attitudes and his stuttering at times. Mubarak's attitude was also mentioned in Article#2 as demonstrated below:

Mubarak <u>played father</u> to his people, <u>self-centered, angry</u> and above all <u>determined</u> not to be forced from office before September...

Using contrasting words to describe Mubarak's attitude can be attributed to his changing attitude and how he approaches protesters during the uprising (see Section 2.7.3.3). The newspaper elaborates on his sudden change of attitude by being a '*father*' once, a '*self-centered*', '*angry*' and '*determined*' president at other times. This is because Mubarak intentionally addresses the youth as a father targeting their morals and emotions (see Section 2.7.3.3), and later expresses his determined attitude by recalling his life story as the protector of Egypt, which indeed reflects his arrogant attitude and, in turn, agitates the public. I would argue that this statement has a great impact on the audience because of the way it reflects Mubarak's real character and attitude, and for the fact that he approaches the public as a president in an attempt to cease the uprising. Nonetheless, this phrase attracts the reader as the media labeled most presidents in the uprising countries during the Arab Spring as '*bizarre*'; each, however, for a different reason.

Another example is the use of the word *defiant* and its derivatives. It is used three times in Article#1, and five times in Article#2. One can argue that using this particular word aims to emphasise Mubarak's attitude, words and even actions, as illustrated below:

Ex1 - Article#1	The president's <u>defiant</u> tone angered the crowds
Ex2- Article#2	Ibrahaim Arafat, …. warned that Mubarak's <u>defiant</u> performance would radicalise the situation. "The more stubborn and <u>defiant</u> the president sounded, the more stubborn and <u>defiant</u> the street becomes,"

During the uprising, the word *defiant* was often associated with Mubarak. This might be due to Mubarak's insistence on remaining the president, and on his various attempts to persuade the public of his good intentions. Although Mubarak addressed Egyptians in three different

speeches, the public could not tolerate to listen to what they perceived as '*redundant*' (npr.org, Feb 2011). Consequently, the dominant narrative in Egypt was Mubarak's defiance and stubbornness, and his vain attempts to cease the uprising by repeating himself. Thus, the newspaper uses the word '*defiant*' to enhance the public narrative that is widely spread in Egypt. Regardless of the fact that the word '*defiant*' carries positive connotations, in these articles, and within this context, it is to be understood with negative connotation. In Ex1, the newspaper chooses to demonstrate the people's reactions to Mubarak's defiance by using the word 'angered'. In the second example then the newspaper chooses to stress this further, by (1) repeating the word three times in one sentence, (2) by highlighting the escalation of the situation in Egypt.

1. Quotation

Reporters and translators working on this article were able to select particular parts of Mubarak's speech to re-narrate in their articles, which can eventually shape readers' opinions and the way they perceive the speech. This is not merely based on the newspaper's ideological background, but also on the convention of the TT genre. It is not only by choosing particular terminology that a newspaper reframes a speech, but also by selecting particular parts of the ST2M to render, as argued by Baker (2006). Sometimes, it can be seen by the media's own interpretation of the message sent by the president, consider the example below:

Article#1	Telling them he would not bow <u>to domestic or foreign pressure</u> to quit…
	He rejected foreign pressure, <u>notably from the US,</u> to immediately take major steps …

The newspaper chooses this particular phrase from Mubarak's speech to enhance the narrative of him not stepping down. This is shown in two ways: Firstly, by reframing the phrase of Mubarak's reluctance to listen to pressure from anyone, including the protesters, hence the use of the word '*domestic*'; secondly, by referring to the US, in reference to Mubarak's statement of '*foreign pressure*'. In his speech, Mubarak in fact refuses to listen to any foreign intervention, however, he clearly states and repeats his willingness to engage in a national dialogue with the youth and listen to their demands. It is the addition of the word '*domestic*' that changes the meaning of the ST2M, and conveys a different meaning according to the newspaper's description of Mubarak. As it is given that each newspaper narrates the news within its own ideology and interpretation of the news, *The Guardian* chooses to highlight the United States' role in the Arab region by linking these accusations directly with Mubarak's words, by adding the phrase '*notably from the US*', which was not clearly said by Mubarak.

As mentioned in Section 6.3.3, one of Mubarak's techniques is to remind the people of his role in the development and protection of Egypt. He intends to evoke people's gratitude and emotions. The newspaper heightens this narrative and aims to convey it to the reader as seen in the examples below:

Article#2	<u>Looking grave</u>, he repeated his most <u>memorable line </u>from his last big speech, <u>vowing</u> that he would not leave <u>this soil until I am buried</u> underneath it.
	The <u>embattled </u>president <u>sang his own praises, reminding </u>Egyptians- the silent majority- of his sacrifices as a war <u>hero</u> and his defence of the country's interests in peacetime.

Mubarak targets people's emotions by vowing his devotion to the country and by declaring that he is willing to die for it, however, the newspaper's use of the phrase '*looking grave*' may

underline Mubarak's seriousness and possibly his conviction to not step down, as this was the dominant narrative in which the article was embedded. The word '*grave*' can be defined as describing someone who is looking rather very serious as if something sad, important and worrying just happened (*Oxford Dictionary*). Additionally, using terminology of a religious nature in a context where credibility is needed, such as the word '*vowing*' in the president's speech, may indeed underline Mubarak's attitude of how serious and committed he is to the country.

In the second example, and in a rather cynical way, *The Guardian* ridicules Mubarak glorifying himself and his achievements. This is seen in the way in which the sentence is phrased, and the terminologies used. For example, the adjective *embattled,* that describes Mubarak as a controversial president, can help to shape the reader's opinion of Mubarak, as it carries a negative connotation. Another example is the phrase '*his own praises*' which may eliminate the people's agreement to the way Mubarak is portraying himself and exclude them from praising him, leaving him to be the only person who values his achievements.

2. Intertextuality and the 'News Blog'

As discussed in Section 2.5, the importance of social media helps widen the horizon of a person's knowledge about a particular event or, in this case, about the uprisings in the Middle East. *The Guardian* news blog about Egypt had many significant features as observed in

Section 8.4.2. Noteworthy are the many comments that enhance that dominant narrative against Mubarak. Consider the example below:

Ex1	Mustafa Naggar, activist: The street <u>is fed up</u> with Mubarak.
Ex2	Nabil Abdel-Fattah, political analyst at al-Ahram Centre: I think this speech is going to be a critical point in the development of the crisis; in fact, it has <u>pushed the crisis into a dark area.</u>

The examples illustrate how the speech evokes angry reactions among Egyptians that stem from the narrative of opposing Mubarak and of him holding onto power. Activists, as well as a political analyst, agree that Mubarak's speech made the situation worse, since the people were expecting his resignation, and it had only further escalated the matter. This was the dominant narrative in the media about the Egyptian president's refusal to step down and about the people's reaction towards his speech and stubbornness. *The Guardian* aims to portray people's reaction on its platform, and further urges the public to engage with the article by adding their own interpretation of the speech.

Another prominent issue that is highlighted throughout the blog is the reference to Mubarak's decision of delegating powers to his vice-president Omar Suleiman. This, however, was criticised by Egyptians and political analysts for the absurdity of transferring the president's power and yet not resigning, which consequently meant that he was a president with

no powers. The statement was also misinterpreted by many Western media outlets, as illustrated below:

Ex1	11:36pm GMT: opposition leader Mohammad ElBaradei gives his reaction via Twitter: "How can you be a president without any power?"
Ex2	10:16pm GMT: CNN is saying that it has now got a "precise translation" with Mubarak saying he was 'delegating power' to Suleiman – not "the power" or "all power", but a frustratingly vague use of language.

It can be argued that this statement is oddly phrased, and thus causes an interpretation difficulty for interpreters and translators. Mubarak statement reads as follow:

<div dir="rtl">

فقد رأيتُ <u>تفويض نائب رئيس الجمهورية فى اختصاصات رئيس الجمهورية</u> على النحو الذي يحدده الدستور

</div>

I have decided to <u>delegate the powers of the president</u>s to the vice presidents
in the way that the constitution allows.

This is slightly confusing for the live interpreter - the CNN refers to it as 'vague to translate' - since the use of the word '*power*' can be confused with the president's resignation. The vagueness can also be linked to the way the word '*power*' is often associated with the president, and to take all the powers from him may indirectly state his resignation. This was criticised by ElBaradei as seen in Ex2, when he questions Mubarak's intentions of being a president without any powers. I suggest this might be another reason that contributed to how the speech was perceived as bad and awkward, and not of Mubarak's usual standards.

8.5 Conclusion

As discussed in this chapter, journalists work with a different set of techniques to translators, especially when it concerns reporting live events and breaking news. They are also required to

adhere to journalistic conventions during the process of changing the genre of a particular news item, such as political speeches into a summarising article. Thus, one can argue that editors and reporters in fact play an important role in selecting the news they wish to convey to the public. Due to their work's nature, journalists usually mingle with the public and are involved in their narrative, and sometimes they are greatly influenced by the public narrative and try to implement it into articles.

During the Arab Spring, many media outlets adopted the dominant narrative of supporting the uprisings, and condemning the dictators. Therefore, I chose to analyse articles from two different newspapers - *Daily Mail* and *The Guardian* - that are known for their opposing ideologies, and examine the impact this narrative had on each newspaper. My findings show that despite the differences in the newspapers' ideologies and audiences, both have written the two STs into the dominant discourse of the Arab Spring as it was perceived in the West. Thereafter, TT2A and TT2M reframed their articles to enhance that narrative and reconstruct it to the TT audience. There were, however, some differences in the way in which each newspaper reframed the ST. In regard to TT2A, it can be argued that the newspaper fitted its article into the distinguished dominant narrative of Algaddafi's bizarre attitude and speeches, referring to the speech as '*rambling*'. Surprisingly, TT2M were also fitted into a similar narrative of mocking Mubarak and his speech, regardless of the way he was perceived before the uprising.

The *Daily Mail* and *The Guardian* followed the same format and style of presenting the news within the broader narrative of the 'Arab Spring'. They integrated images, news and facts about the protesters, updates about the situation in each country, and, most importantly, they supported both uprisings. The way each newspaper applied Baker's selective appropriation feature, by choosing particular parts of the speech to summarise or translate, was mainly to

confirm the existing narrative towards each president. Regardless of their different political stances, both newspapers adopted a similar style of reframing the ST and were influence by the dominant narrative. The *Daily Mail* chose to follow the shared narrative of Algaddafi's violence and eccentric attitude, whereas *The Guardian* chose to adhere to the public's narrative of insisting that Mubarak's dictatorship should come to an end.

Transferring the speeches into an informative article was a complex process governed by the new genre's conventions. In this case, the most prominent aspects are the wider dominant narrative and shifts of one language into another and from one culture to another. Hence, both articles presented the speeches as a summary, quoted particular sentences of the ST, and, most importantly, integrated the public's reactions and various news which related to the country with an uprising, in the article. Considering TT2A, The *Daily Mail* coverage chose to enhance the narrative of Algaddafi's violence and cruelty for which he was known in the West, by adding images of the destruction and bloodshed in Libya, by adding statistics of casualties among protesters in Libya, by highlighting the defection of many Libyan military leaders. Similarly, in TT2M, *The Guardian* employed many different modes in its articles by adding hyperlinks to various events, a video of Mubarak's speech, and, most importantly, an online news blog, to underline the dominant narrative of Mubarak's stubbornness and refusal to leave.

Chapter Nine

The Transcripts of Algaddafi's and Mubarak's Speeches in English

9.1 Introduction

In this chapter, I will examine a translated English transcripts of the two speeches; they will be referred to as TT3s. The chapter will provide information on three aspects related to the production of the TTs: (1) transcribing speeches, (2) collaborative translation, and (3) the relationship between blogging and politics. The chapter will also introduce the blog in which Algaddafi's TT was published as a project of collaborative online translation, followed by a detailed analysis of the TT. It will also introduce the newspaper and the agency responsible for transcribing the TT, which will similarly be followed by its analysis. The findings of both analyses will be presented in the conclusion of this chapter.

9.2 Transcribing Speeches

According to the *Oxford Dictionary*, "transcripts are a written or printed version of material originally presented in another medium" (cited in Jenks, 2011:2). Jenks argues that in social sciences, transcripts are defined as the written/printed version of data recordings that includes text and/ visual materials such as pictures (ibid.). As the process is concerned with transferring spoken language into a written medium, many scholars believe it is a complex process. This is especially true if the speech is delivered in a colloquial language, where a fixed Phonetic Alphabet does not exist (Eskenazi, Levow, Meng, Parent & Suendermann: 2013). Another challenging factor is the addition of punctuation to the existing material, since written texts are incoherent without any punctuation. In this regard, Powers writes that the basic function of punctuation is to ease comprehension in reading, and that it works as the writing aid to the pauses the speakers makes (2005:45). One can argue that transcripts are a genre in their own

right. This is seen in the stylistic differences on how the written piece is approached. Bucholtz argues, "transcripts differ from ordinary represented discourse in print media in that they suggest a greater adherence to the prior discourse… because speech is rendered as direct discourse with no reporting clause" (2000:1447). Kress suggests that the importance of transcribing a speech lies in knowing what is important to transcribe and what not; there are, however, vital elements such as intonation, loudness, softness or 'tone of voice' (2009:97). He claims that the existence of digital media facilitates the representation of a speech in different ways. Transcripts, therefore, have different goals depending on the transcriber's attitude and beliefs about the speakers, not to mention the way they choose to portray the speaker.

It is worth noting that transcripts of Hosni Mubarak's speech are available in Arabic and English. A number of newspapers and news agencies, such as BBC and CNN (BBC, 2011a; CNN, Feb 2011), published it in their electronic sources. In addition, Mubarak's speech was used by many political activists and bloggers as a reference; for example, the 25janaer blog (Hosny, 2015), and online newspapers and websites such as revolution25january.com (revolution25january, n.d). This was, however, not the case for Algaddafi's speech, so it was difficult to obtain a copy of either the Arabic transcript or the English one. There was only one version of the Arabic transcript by an anonymous author, published on *Wikipedia* in December 2011 (Wikisource, 2011). Surprisingly, the speech was not transcribed or translated by Libyan activists or famous political bloggers such as Libya S.O.S - War Diary, who solely translated different excerpts of the speech (LibyaSOS, 2012).

9.3 The Art of Collaborative Translation

According to Morita and Ishida, internationalisation[33] and the widespread use of the Internet are associated with the increasing number of multilingual groups online, as a result of which

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[33] Internationalization is the process of integrating an international and intercultural dimension into the teaching, research, and service functions of the institution (Hawawini, 2016:3).

people become more engaged in translation processes (2009b:17). Translation scholars studying the concept of collaborative translation (CT) outline it in various ways: O'Brien describes it as "when two or more agents cooperate in some way to produce a translation"; it could also mean the collaboration of two or more translators working together to produce a translation product (2011:17). Similarly, Singh suggests that it is the process of assigning a team of professional translators - who are using the same translation memory - to translate a ST using Internet -based technology (2011:282). And Pavloviæ proposes certain protocols for CT, whereby translators jointly discuss issues related to the translation outcome; thus, the TT is the outcome of consensus decisions (2007:46). In a study on the workings of CT, Ray and Kelly state that there are two different types of CT: 1. a team of professional translators work and interact together to correct and check the translation of the same content simultaneously; 2. the concept of 'crowdsourcing' as described by Howe (2006-2008), which is an open online translation project in which a group of translators, employees and volunteers participate (2011:2). The process of 'crowdsourcing' is used on various Internet platforms to complete translation tasks by relying on the knowledge of many different volunteers (Jiménez-Crespo, 2013:193). Wikipedia is perhaps one of the most well-known examples of a platform with a collaborative-translation system, with 3.5 million articles in English and 262 language editions that were created through the process of crowdsourced collaborative translations (O'Brien, 2011:19). In this regard, Howe (2008:59) highlights that it is important that these platforms maintain a history of every edit so that people referring back to it can see these changes.

Other scholars, on the other hand, argue that the CT process in general, is solely linked to the use of technology, such as machine translation, crowdtranslation, user-generated translation, and community translation (Jiménez-Crespo, 2015:63). Interestingly, Morita and Ishida suggest that CT is to perform a translation with a machine translation system by two non-bilingual people who use different languages (2009: 361). They further claim that the main

goal of CT is to "translate the documents correctly", which means that the TT translator cannot determine whether the meaning is accurate, but can only determine if the sentence that the machine translated is produced within appropriate language rules (Morita & Ishida, 2009:363). In more general terms, collaborative translation work and its use on different online platforms facilitates the publication and dissemination of news and information in and across numerous languages. In this, there are many advantages in having the translation product available for different people, from different backgrounds, to contribute to the process of translation. Facebook, for example, was translated into Spanish by online users in 2007, followed by a large number of other translations, reaching 97 languages in 2008 (Guarneros Zarandona, 2013:9). Pavloviæ highlights some of the advantages of CT and suggests that having someone to discuss the translation process with, improves the outcome (2007:46). House claims that the engagement in a 'dialogic think-aloud task' helps to create a stress-free working environment and enables translators to present their ideas for suggestions or improvement (2000:159). Barbosa and Neiva also discuss this, arguing that the dialogue protocol, owing to its very interactive nature, compels the subjects to express, comment, and sometimes justify the strategy of translation they are using (2003:152).

It is, however, also essential to highlight the drawbacks of this process. In this regard, DePalma and Kelly (2008) predict that the CT approach to translation will eventually replace the traditional process; they further stress that the boundary between professional translators and non-professionals will no longer exist. In the future, companies may have the public engaged in the process of translation, yet pay professional translators when they require a high level of accuracy (O'Brien, 2011:20). What is more, Guarneros Zarandona highlights the difficulty in combining multiple different writing styles and various translation versions, and producing one solid TT. CT thus raises doubts about the quality of the translation product (2013:10). In an attempt to create a solution where the quality of CT is acceptable and

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recognised as professional, Guarneros Zarandona (2013) suggests that the collaborative approach should not only consist of collaboration in the translation process to convey meaning, but also of collaboration when editing and proofreading the text. Therefore, a quality assessment should highlight the use of terminology, style adjustment and language, rather than meaning (ibid).

9.4 Politics and the Blogosphere

In this globalised era where technology develops rapidly, new means of communication continue to appear. This affects the way news is disseminated across the world, and the way the media respond to developments in current technology, and with the advent of social media. Harvey (2013) claims that the power of social media is solely based on its social perspective, which is its power of contributing and sending a particular message and having it widely spread across the world, and more importantly, creating an impact. In an attempt to define social media, Auvinen writes "new information network and information technology using a form of communication utilising interactive and user-produced content, and interpersonal relations are created and maintained" (2015:7). Some of the most popular social media platforms people use and refer to as a source of news are Twitter, Facebook, YouTube and Blogging or Vlobbing[34]. Auvinen (2015:6) suggests a number of reasons why people are resorting to social media as the main source of information and news: the anonymity of the agents, the richness of data on one platform, the speed of transmitting the information, and most importantly, the near absence of censorship and restriction (ibid). Thus, traditional media such as Aljazeera and other channels are increasingly dependent on new media to provide them with new stories, videos and news. In this regard, Aday, Farrell, Lynch, Sides and Freelon say about Aljazeera's news coverage of

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[34] Vlogging is a term derived from the combination of video and blogging, and refers to sharing videos on a blog as the primary resource (Sindoni, 2014:127).

Egypt, "Aljazeera's own analytics also revealed that the vast majority of referrals to its Egypt coverage came from Facebook and YouTube, not directly from its own website" (2015:9).

Another commonly used social media platform is the Blogosphere, also known as online diaries (Keren, 2006:1). Drezner and Farrell define weblogs as a web page with small numbers of or no occurrences of editing, which provide a forum for online commentaries, and which are organised in a chronological order with the possibility to insert hyperlinks and other online sources. They further explain that these blogs can vary in their purpose from personal, technical, sport and celebrity gossip to political purposes. The blogosphere has become increasingly popular since 2005 when over ten million blogs were created, the majority of which are written in English (2014:5). Storck states in this regard, "there were 35,000 active blogs in the Arab region in 2009…. This number has increased dramatically since the 2011 uprisings, speculated at 600,000 blogs today" (2011:14). The growing significance of weblogs created a new genre: an online source of information, where publishers and readers can contribute and debate over current events (Lievrouw: 2011:25). The emergence of weblogs as a new medium of information has, in fact, led many news agencies to either sponsor or create their own blogs; for example, *The Guardian* newspaper, Fox News, ABC news and Aljazeera (Drezner & Farrell, 2014). It is thus perhaps not surprising that this has encouraged many blogs' authors to divert their attention to the political arena. And it is in this new political arena, according to Keren, is where new political modes, norms and forms of action and inaction are emerging (2006:10).

There has been a significant growth in the number of political blogs, currently estimated to be over one million. According to a recent study, bloggers dedicate their blogs to political issues as it provides them with the opportunity to add their own voices to political debates (Wallsten, 2012:1037). Furthermore, bloggers use their blogs to express their political beliefs, to influence and motivate people, and to attempt to mobilise political actions. Haas suggests

that the influence of political blogs has reached beyond its readership, as it has become a tool used by agencies to change people's views. He further claims that the majority of readers consider these blogs more reliable and trustworthy than mainstream news media such as television and newspapers (2012:12). In an attempt to explain the significant role political blogging currently plays, Pole writes that the political landscape has changed dramatically due to the way blogging has transformed politics and civic engagement; one example of this is the role political bloggers played in assembling 20,000 demonstrators to march for the Jena Six[35] in 2007 (2010:1). Having said this, it is important to highlight that some scholars argue against the effectiveness of political blogging because of issues related to reliability and consistency (Lievrouw, 2011:132). As has been set out in Section 2.5, during the Arab Spring, social media had a dramatic influence on the uprisings and were used as a tool for massive mobilisation that created history and reshaped the nature of politics in the Arab region. People used the Blogosphere to share their ideas, views, and to document events related to the uprisings. Whereas Twitter and Facebook were mainly used by protesters as a means of organising demonstrations and spreading news, YouTube and personal blogs were used to record stories and live events of the ongoing revolutions from insiders' perspectives (Storck, 2011:6). Many governments therefore tried to contain the situation by threatening and arresting bloggers and by forcing them into exile (Aday et al., 2012).

9.5 The Analysis of Algaddafi's TT3A

The third TT is a translation of Algaddafi's speech. Unlike the previous TTs, TT3A is not published on a news website or shown by a broadcasting channel. It is mainly the product of collaborative translation efforts carried out online over a long period of time, and is still online for further corrections. The translation of the speech is not a translation of an existing Arabic

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[34] Jena Six refers to six African-American youth who were arrested in Jena, Louisiana on 4 December 2006 for a crime that later caused racially aggravated attacks on the Black students in Jena High School (Cohen, 2010:263).

transcript of the speech, yet it is a combination of translating and transcribing the speech from different online videos. It was published online on 26 February 2011 in a blog created by Pete Warden, a British/American author and blogger. He saw the importance of having a documented translation of one of the most famous speeches during the Arab Spring. The blog discusses different themes and covers various stories in a number of genres. And yet, Warden's blog is by no means a political one. In 2011, the blog had two posts dedicated to the Egyptian revolution and Algaddafi's speech. TT3A is an online post in Warden's blog, entitled "*Gadhafi's Speech Transcript*". A post appeared on the popular website Reddit on 23 February 2011, requesting a full transcript of Algaddafi's speech; many people - including Warden himself - recommended that they visit Warden's blog (Reddit, Feb 2011). Unfortunately, it is not possible to see the number of times the post was actually viewed or shared on Facebook and Twitter. However, the post had no likes or comments or any discussion to date (21 November 2017).

It was important for me to investigate Warden's interest in publishing Algaddafi's speech, so I sent a number of emails (20 April 2016) with several questions enquiring about his background, his profession, his interest in politics and the reason behind his interest in the speech. Warden stated that he had no personal interest in the Libyan uprising, nor was he familiar with any Libyan issues or the Libyan language. He says that the only reason for him to publish this translation of the speech is "that it was of historical interest, and that he couldn't find a version of it available".[36] In his post, Warden expresses his surprise of not having a translation of the transcript available in the media, especially as it is one of the main ways of understanding what Algaddafi was trying to say and to possibly find a way of dealing with him.

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[36] I conducted an email-based interview with the blogger, where he clarified the process of transcribing and translating the interpreting of the speech that he conducted by watching an online video of the speech, he further added it for the public to edit, retranslate. When inquired about the video he used, Warden stated that he does not have the link to the video anymore, and that he is almost sure it was broadcast on Aljazeera English.

Warden further states that he took the initiative to write down the translation of the transcript himself, regardless of the difficulty he faced of not understanding most of it. Therefore, he decided to have a translation of the transcript available on *Word Cloud*, and urged people to contribute in editing and correcting mistakes he made, specifically people who were familiar with the area and the themes Algaddafi addressed. The translation is in fact still being edited today. The revision history of the document clearly shows the numerous editions and comments made by different users over the years. Most of the corrections of the TT3A were grammatical, stylistic, corrections, explaining certain parts of the ST, or editing important information that was transcribed incorrectly. One significant change throughout the document is an addition of commentary and explanations of names, areas, and sometimes events that may not be familiar for non-Libyans or the TT audience.

It is therefore important to study this translation because it is a text produced by people of different cultural backgrounds who may be part of different ideologies. It is also interesting to note that the text has been edited many times over the years. Unlike other translations, this translation is neither governed by certain criteria or standards, nor driven by a political agenda like other translations commissioned by news agencies. Therefore, the purpose of the text, which is to inform, and for educational purposes, is different as well as the strategies and approaches used by translators; and the place in which the translation is published is neutral, so it does not affect the TT audience.

9.5.1 Extra-Linguistic Features of TT3A

According to Anthony and Thibault, websites are one of the most useful multimodal media that technology has produced, where Internet users are engaged in an active relationship with the virtual screen and have many interactions with the webpage - editing the content or communication with other users, for instance - they are creating virtual participation with the

hypertextual world (2006:106). Therefore, TT3A combines various modes to enhance knowledge for the TT audience such as: (1) it enables a collaborative translation/editing process, which aims to encourage translators all over the world to produce a good TT; (2) it provides a hyperlink of a video of an interpretation of the ST1A, to provide an image of the speech; and (3) it highlights the importance of the '*revision history*'[37] tool that includes usernames and dates of any editions, to enables readers to review the various translations editions and corrections made by different users. Viewers can see the number of times the TT has been edited, and each translator's corrections are highlighted in a particular colour to distinguish it from others. In addition, users can highlight their corrections, which are later reviewed by the blog owner who can accept or reject them. There are some important corrections, specifically clarifications of some details such as names of cities or tribes, and explanations of certain people were highlighted in red and explained in brackets. Thus, TT3A is *per se* a multimodal text that conveys information through multiple modes such as visual, oral and written text.

Anthony and Thibault (2006) write that one important aspect of multimodality is how the text is presented. The layout of the website and how it influences the way the readers perceive the information and interact and comment on the text, is therefore part of multimodality. In regard to TT3A, the post has no comments; however, the number of times the text was edited is more than 20. Since 2011, when the post was first published, it was edited daily by various users until August when it decreased to around twice a month. After 2012, the text has been visited and edited irregularly.

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[37] A tool provided in Word documents that enables registered users to view all the changes since the document was published.

9.5.2 Linguistic Features of TT3A

9.5.2.1 Textual Analysis and Discourse Practice

As discussed in Chapter Four, Fairclough stresses the importance of coherence and cohesion in understanding of a text. Hence, in the following, I will examine punctuation which plays a vital role in producing a logical and comprehensible text. In addition, I will highlight other issues related to cohesion, e.g. the use of grammar.

One of the important characteristics of TT3A is the way in which the ST was transferred from an oral speech into a written translation, and later transcribed and edited by a number of people. Hence, TT3A is recognised as the work of people from different backgrounds combined into one piece of writing that should reflect the ST message. There were a number of significant transformations that structured the speech to fit into the written genre; for example, the use of punctuation, paragraphs, and the explanatory notes. Using these features facilitates the comprehension process for all readers and should ease the way the information is presented. The authors divided the speech into paragraphs, each containing one main idea.

1. Cohesion and Coherence

As examined in Section 6.2.3, the production of the text and the structure of the sentences can evidently affect the way it reads. Throughout TT3A, many sentences are poorly structured; we find evidence for illogical use of words, which creates a difficult style. Consider this examples:

ST	TT3	My Translation
خذوا البترول في يدكم، وتصرفوا فيه. بيش ما فيش حد يقول خذيت حصتي. كل واحد يأخذ حصته، انت بتسكر بيها حر، بتدير فيها شجرة حر، بتتصدقها حر، المهم حصتك خذيتها، وتصرف فيها كيفما تبي.	And those Imams who know about the Koran, the youth, the real Caliphate, tomorrow. **[New paragraph]** I won't take it. His share. Take your share, and you can do whatever you like with it.	Take the oil with your own hands and do what you want with it, so that no one says, you took my share. Everyone takes his share and it is up to whether you want to make a tree of it, it is up to you. You want to donate it; it is up to you.

Algaddafi addresses Libyans in the form of a dialogue, telling them about their share of oil. He explains how each Libyan is entitled to do what they wish with their share of oil, and he uses the metaphor بتدير فيها شجرة/ *plant a tree* to explain their absolute control over their share. This however, creates a problem in the way the sentence is translated in the TT. The transcript author omits this metaphor and simplifies it to the TT audience by being direct. This is indicated by the use of the phrase '*you can do whatever you like with it'*. This technique is commonly used by translators, as one way to translate metaphors, whereby the metaphor is converted into what it means, and the image of the ST is reduced to a written way that suits the TT (Newmark, 1988). Although the way the metaphor is rendered is acceptable, the sentence is nonetheless incomprehensible. This might be due to the part that is deleted from the ST, which is when Algaddafi talks about the oil.

Another element that contributes to the way the text is presented and understood is *punctuation*. In order for coherence to be achieved when transcribing an oral speech into a written form, punctuation plays an important role in defining the beginning and the end of a sentence, as well as in establishing understanding. Ferdows explains the relationship between

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coherence and punctuation, saying that sentence cohesion is established through understanding the unity or the logical grammatical relationship between the different elements in the sentences, including the lexical items and the punctuation (2014). It should also help in portraying the speaker's attitude of an exclamation or anger. According to Kirkman, punctuation has two main tasks: firstly, grammatical, since they draw the boundaries between statements and create an understanding; and secondly, rhetorical, related to creating an emphasis or a tone which is important for particular words (2006:5). For example, in the sentence below, Algaddafi wants to emphasise the fact that Libya is mainly associated with himself, and with its revolution. He utters the following words in a high-pitched voice:

When they say, "Libya Revolution", "Libya Qaddafi"

The authors add *quotation marks* to each phrase, in order to emphasise the importance of these two utterances and to highlight them (Kaufer, Ishizaki, Butler, & Collins 2004:179). By doing so, they indicate the significance of the message Algaddafi wants to portray, i.e. associating Libya with the revolution.

Another punctuation tool that is integrated in the transcript is the use of *square brackets*. Although there is no standardised function for the use of the square brackets, linguists state that it is widely used while transcribing for various functions. For example, Powers claims that using square brackets is recommended when something has been omitted, is unclear, or when there is a broken sentence (2005:113). Correspondingly, Hutchby explains that square brackets are used to indicate a point when an overlapping communication starts (2005:xi). On the other hand, Mills (2001:16) and Hatcher (1996:43) state that any further or explanatory information that the transcriber feels is needed is added in square brackets. In this TT, there are many different reasons for the use of square brackets. Consider the following examples:

Ex1	Umar Al-Mukhtar [**Libyan freedom fighter in 1920s**]	Explanatory
Ex2	But here in the Green Square they want [**unclear**].	Omission

In Ex1 the brackets are used to add an explanation about the person Algaddafi refers to, since TT readers may not be aware of his significant to the Libyan people. By adding this information, the author clarifies why Algaddafi mentions him in his speech. This is similar to an explanation in Ex2, where the author is unsure about what has been said and therefore states that the utterance is unclear. This also gives a chance to other authors who can contribute to the transcript by adding this missing information. There was in fact an update to the transcript and someone added the missing part.

At other times, the brackets are used in conjunction with a question mark, as demonstrated below:

Saddam [**Hussein?**]	Correction/uncertainty

The *question mark* serves primarily to raise issues of uncertainty, because it was referred to by one of the translators mistakenly as Saddam Hussein, when in fact Algaddafi meant a Libyan politician called Bashir Al-Saadawi. The question mark here is to question the validity of the statement. This can be seen through the use of the question mark, which is repeatedly used throughout the documents wherever a point of uncertainty occurs. The question mark is therefore used throughout the TT in cases where the speech is not clear, or where the authors are perhaps not certain of the information; this is demonstrated in the following examples:

Ex1	The program mentioned by the Saif-al-Islam, (**something**) Redat**(?),** who, that he was shot at.
Ex2	We talked about the people's committees in Redat and in Durna **(?).** I know Ben Walid **(?)**Doesn't want to join Redata**(?).**

This sign **(?)** is thus used to indicate obstacles that the transcriber/translator encounters. By having this sign in the first draft of the transcript, the author hopes that these unclear words will be translated and transcribed by other people, who are visiting and editing the documents over the years. Surprisingly, these question marks remain unsolved, regardless of editions dating back to as recently 2016. It is important to highlight that each time this sign is used, it is either to draw the reader's attention to a missing part of the translation/transcript, or it is to address uncertainty of the meaning of Algaddafi's words and message. The use of the question mark is therefore somewhat ambiguous.

In Ex1, the author of the transcript misses part of the ST and replaces it with (something) / **(?)**, and then starts translating and transcribing the rest of the sentence. The problem with this sentence is how an omission of an important part is eventually reflected in the way it can be rendered. Algaddafi mentions the program described by Saif al-Islam and urges people to follow it, and then goes on to addressing the Ubaidat tribe, one of whose members was Abdul Fateh Younis who was shot. The problem here first occurs when the author repeats Saif al-Islam's name and misinterprets the rest of the sentence, which leads to confusion over who has been shot. In addition, there is a mistake when the Ubaidat tribe's name is replaced with '*Redat*'.

In Ex2, Algaddafi purposely lists many tribes' names to indicate their significant, and explains how they are free to join whichever committee they want or to even create their own.

Again, the name of the tribe Ubaidat is incorrect, and a large part of the speech is deleted, which is why the author replaces it with a question mark. The second question mark following "Ben Walid", on the other hand, I suggest is related to the way in which these tribes' names are spelled.

Another important feature related to *punctuation* that the transcript authors, however, did not incorporate in the TT, are explanations, side comments or footnotes, which aim to draw the reader's attention to a significant change in the speaker's attitude, a shift to a different topic or even pauses. In order to transmit the message in the most accurate way possible, it is important to highlight the way the speaker carries himself by drawing the reader's attention to long pauses, to narration of points in form of lists, and to the organisation of ideas and their divisions into paragraphs. This should help the reader to understand the text. In this regard, Sommer and Quinlan argue that the transcript should reflect the narrator's message clearly, and to avoid any confusion, footnotes necessary to clarify meaning should be used (2009:78). In indicated, these features have not been employed in the TT, as the speech lacks timing references, or any comments and explanations as to when Algaddafi addresses a different issue and abruptly deviates from what he is discussing. There are only two cases when we find a reference to time or to pauses. The first case occurs after 15 minutes of the speech, and the author highlights in brackets that the first 15 minutes of the speech are over "*(end of first gadda15 mins)*". The second case sees the author highlight a long silent pause, and he writes "*Long pause*".

2. Intertextuality

As mentioned earlier, brackets can be employed in texts for several reasons. In regard to this TT, it is used, for example, to add further information, to explain what Algaddafi means, or to identify the different names of tribes, cities and presidents that are mentioned during the speech.

Sometimes translators add information or an explanation in an attempt to explain a statement or an utterance that they believe might not be clear to the TT audience. These additions can be considered part of intertextuality, as Hatim and Mason argue that this is a mechanism that enables the reader to recognise and understand intertextual references, and without it, there would only be partial understanding or an incomplete retrieval of the intended meaning of the ST (1997:219). Consider the examples below:

Ex1	Haile Selassie (**Emperor of Ethiopia**), we fought him.
Ex2	I think also Saif-al-Islam (**Qadaffi's Successor & Eldest son**) will meet the embassy

The use of the brackets here is to provide extra information for the TT readers. This technique, however, is not used to explain the various names Algaddafi uses, but it is used where it is important to familiarise the reader with the information Algaddafi is presenting. For example, in the first case, Algaddafi lists a number of presidents that Libya fought against throughout the years, such as Sadat, Habre and Bourguiba. Thus, to highlight the importance of this statement, the authors regard it as important to identify each president in case they are unfamiliar to the reader.

In the last example, I suggest that information is added in order to explain who Saif-al-Islam is. This identifies him for the TT audience - who may not be familiar with him - as Algaddafi's son, but it also refers to the common narrative in Libya about Saif-al-Islam and his potential future as his father's successor.

In summary, intertextuality can be used by either adding information as seen in the examples above, or by deleting a phrase in the ST and replacing it with an explanation, primarily because the TT language lacks an equivalent or due to its insignificance. This is

highlighted by Pedersen who states that *explicitation* is a translation strategy which involves expansion of the texts by adding material, explaining a fact or even providing the original form of an abbreviation or acronym to disambiguate anything that the TT audience may not be familiar with (2005:4-5). This is illustrated in the example below:

> Translator: <u>The Libyan leader is quoting</u> a poetic line about somebody from Zintan, that's not meant to be, Youth of the... Nobody, people, sorry the youth was taken from their families and given these hallucination tablets.

Instead of translating the poem, the author explains the poetic lines Algaddafi quotes to address a Libyan tribe to gain support (see Chapter Six), Nonetheless, the author attempts to explain the meaning behind the poem, but since it is in Libyan dialect and not mentioned in the media, it is replaced by different words that are incoherent.

3. **Grammar**

It is important that translators maintain a level of understanding and correct use of the given language rules and grammar. In regard to how language and grammar are used in transcribing and translating the ST in TT3A, I will highlight the lack of correct sentence order and the failure to use correct grammar. Although the document is continuously edited by different users online, there are grammatical mistakes that eventually affect the meaning of the sentence. The example below demonstrates grammatical errors in the translation:

ST	TT	My Translation
نحن أجدر بليبيا من – أولئك-من تلك الجرذان.	We deserve Libya *from* those rats.	We are more worthy of Libya than those rats.

In this example, the sentence is incomprehensible because of the grammar. The problem occurs when the equivalent for '*deserve*' is used in conjunction with the preposition '*from*'. In the ST, Alagaddafi explains how Libyans, i.e. his supporters, are more worthy of Libya than the

protesters. This, however, is not translated correctly into the TT, since using *from* is grammatically incorrect. In order for this sentence to be comprehensible, it is clear that the grammatical mistake needs to be corrected, and might read as follows: *We are more worthy of Libya than those rats.*

9.5.3 Lost in Translation

There are many cases where a large part of the ST was either deleted or partially omitted in the TT. Although one can argue that this is due to the difficult nature of Algaddafi's speech as elaborated in Chapter Six, the transcript is nonetheless for educational purposes and will perhaps serve as a historical reference in the future, which essentially and ideally requires access to the entire speech. Deleting parts of the texts consequently leads to producing a less accurate TT, and on other occasions to a complete loss of meaning. It also affects the overall understanding of the transcript as many of the sentences are meaningless and many others reflect the wrong meaning. The following sections will address these two issues.

1. **The Accuracy of the Translation**

Translators at times resort to omission as a strategy to avoid causing confusion to the TT audience, to omit redundant or unnecessary information, or for the lack of equivalence in the TT language. In some cases, however, omitting parts of the text might affect the translation's accuracy, and cause a partial loss of meaning; this is illustrated in the following example:

ST	TT3A	My Translation
هالشبان، ليس لهم ذنب ...أحيانا يقلدون <u>ما يجري في تونس وما يجري في مصر</u>، وهذا شي عادي.	They are young people…. They are emulating <u>what is happening in Tunisia.</u> They are imitating what is happening in some cities.	They raided some camps …. Nevertheless, they are not guilty; those youth they are not guilty at all, …. Sometimes they imitate what is going on in Tunisia and what is going on in Egypt, and this is normal.

The example demonstrates a missing part of essential information from the ST, and that is the reference to Egypt. Deleting the word '*Egypt*' and replacing it with '*in some cities*' is unnecessary and causes the loss of a vital piece of information. It is replaced with a general statement, not naming a particular country. Thus, the statement is inaccurate and fails to reflect the precise message of the ST.

Although this TT is a written transcript of the translation of Algaddafi's speech, I suggest that deleting some parts of it, or altering the ST, will ultimately affect the translation's accuracy. This is especially true since the TT is the result of collaborative translation work and translators should be aware of various aspects of the speech and aim to render it as close to the ST as possible.

2. Loss of Meaning

Sometimes deleting parts of a sentence affects the overall meaning and causes a loss of meaning. It might be due to the way in which translators render the ST, causing misunderstanding. This is illustrated in the example below, where part of the text is deleted which causes loss in meaning[38]:

ST	TT	My Translation
الحرب الأهلية: يُعاقب بالإعدام،... لما يديرلي درنة إمارة إسلامية، والبيضاء إمارة إسلامية، وبنغازي ... عقوبته الإعدام. عبث ولعب بوحدة الأوطان، يا سلام! يلتسن، يلتسن، رئيس روسيا، مجلس الدوما مجلس النواب، اعتصم في ‑المجلس‑ مجلس النواب... جابوا الدبابات دكهم بالدبابات حتى طلعوا .... زي الفيران،	Civil war, anybody who is caught and condemned to cause, to undermine the unity of the country. <u>Guilty in the Duma. I ask him to leave, he refused. We are not leaving the building. They brought tanks, and on live TV, Yeltsin</u>, they hit the Duma building and they left like rats.	• Civil war: punishment is execution, … When they make Derna an Islamic state, Al Bayda' an Islamic state, and Benghazi … this is punished with execution. Abusing and playing with the unity of the nations! Oh, Really? Yeltsin, Yeltsin, the Russian President, the State Duma that is the state parliament. There was a strike in the State Duma, just a strike…

The meaning in this example is completely lost due to deleting and summarising some important points, which results in a group of ambiguous sentences. These sentences lose their meaning and Algaddafi's message, which can be seen in the way the sentences are connected within the paragraph, and in the way the sentence structure is shaped. For example, because Algaddafi lists a number of laws and regulations from the Libyan Penal Code, and later gives details about these and how they relate to the current situation in Libya, I would argue that it was necessary that the transcript authors elaborate on this for the TT audience, so to avoid any confusion. This is not the case in this example, however, where the sentence about punishment

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[38] Please refer to Appendix 1 for full details.

relating to the civil war is followed by examples, and is referred to mistakenly as if this had happened in Libya. The second sentence then starts with '*guilty in the Duma*'; hence it is clear that the translator omitted a large part of the ST containing an important message that would have probably helped in terms of the coherence of the TT. And yet, a loss of meaning does not only occur when the TT translators include the example about the *Duma* as part of what was happening in Libya, but also when they overlook or ignore the long example Algaddafi gives about the Russian President Yeltsin. The way in which the TT deals with this example possibly confuses the reader into believing that Algaddafi is talking about an incident that took place in Libya. The different rendition of the ST here is unsuccessful, as it leads to a loss in meaning and potential confusion in the TT audience.

9.6 The Analysis of Mubarak's TT3M

On Thursday 10 February 2011, *The Washington Post* published a written translation of Mubarak's speech as part of its news coverage of the Middle East Uprisings. The transcript is entitled '*Hosni Mubarak's speech to the Egyptian people: 'I will not . . . accept to hear foreign dictations*' (WashingtonPost, 2011). Preceding the transcript, the newspaper provided a commentary stating that the original source of the transcript can be traced back to the Federal Document Clearing House, who published a 'translated version' of the Arabic transcript of the speech. This in fact distinguishes this transcript from many others, as it was issued by an institute in the United States of America, the FDCH. Hence, it is important to see how the newspaper published the transcript from another source and whether it managed to frame it according to its own ideology, or if it maintained degrees of subjectivity. This is especially true since *The Washington Post* is considered one of the leading newspaper in the United States, famous for its political coverage (Mondotimes, n.d) and liberal views (Morton & Williams 2010:59).

9.6. 1 The Washington Post and the FDCH

The Washington Post is an American newspaper that is widely circulated in the United Sates. It is often described as the 'dominant' newspaper in Washington, D.C., and regarded as one of the greatest newspapers in the country (*Encyclopaedia Britannica*, 1996). It was founded by Stilson Hutchins in 1877, and its headquarters are based in Washington (Beaujon, 2015; WashingtonPost, 2011). It launched its website in 1996 as a result of significant growth online. It is estimated that the number of visitors to washingtonpost.com is 9.4 million a month (Kurtz, 2008). The website operated separately from the print product until January 2010, when the two were merged; the website was one of the first American news sites to establish regular live online chats (Wemple, 2008). In 2006, the website won the *Emmy Award* for its online news videos (WashPostPR, 2016). The newspaper specialises in national politics and international politics, and is described as 'one of America's leading political journalism institutions (*Washington Post*, 2014). Over the years, *The Washington Post* has won 47 Pulitzer Prizes; in 2008, it received six awards, which made it the second newspaper to have won this number of prizes in one year (*Washington Post*, 2008). Although *The Washington Post* is widely known for its liberal views, Renström argues that the newspaper seems to have room for more conservative political discourse (2011:13). In 2007, an American political commentator stated that *The Washington Post* was not liberal anymore, and it had been diverted to become a 'neocon[39]' newspaper (NBCNews, 2007). The paper was heavily criticised for its support and promotion of Bush's campaign for the war on Iraq in 2003 (Stone, 2016). More recently, Bernie Sanders criticised the paper for its support in the coverage of the Iraq War (Neidig, 2016).

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[39] According to *Meriam Webster Dictionary*, it is defined as conservatives who advocate the assertive promotion of democracy and US national interest in international affairs including through military means (Merriam-Webster, 2015).

Several studies have investigated American newspaper coverage of the Arab Spring, including *The Washington Post* coverage. A study conducted by Chung and Cho (2013:19) indicates that, in reference to Egypt, the newspaper supported the protesters and opposed Mubarak and his government. They further argue that *The Washington Post* provided more in-depth coverage of the uprisings, professional comments in the articles, thematic frames and editorial pieces, rather than merely reporting the news (ibid:20). According to Youssef (2012: iii), *The Washington Post* included individuals' sources extensively, thus telling their stories, and it appeared to be taking the side of the protesters. On the other hand, the newspaper was criticised for an article it published concerning the significant role America played in the Arab Spring uprisings, and for the way in which it attributed the eruption of these uprisings through social media to technology developed in the United States (Almokhtsar, 2011).

The transcript the newspaper published in its papers was originally translated from Arabic by the Federal Document Clearing House (FDCH). This company is well-known in the United States for its legal and political work, and for its cooperation with the world's leading media agencies such as CNN, Fox News and ABC News. FDCH began producing transcripts of political, financial and general business content in 1993. The company is also known to provide transcripts of US government speeches, Congressional Hearings, Cabinet Briefings, and other newsworthy events; additionally, it provides translation services for on-demand coverage in a variety of languages and formats (ASC / Morningside, 2015).

9.6.2. Extra-Linguistic Features TT3M

It is significant to see how technology and the use of technological modes are used to enrich the TT3M. This is especially true due to the genre change from the ST to the TT. The way *The Washington Post* uses various multimodal tools, for instance, helps attract the reader, and, most importantly, it creates an impact on the way the reader perceives the given news. The

newspaper uses various tools that work as a way of broadening the reader's knowledge about the reported situation; however, it predominantly highlights one particular narrative about the uprising in Egypt. One way is the use of different hyperlinks, most of which lead the reader to news about this particular narrative. The hyperlinks are divided into three categories, each covering a designated aspect. The first hyperlink is placed at the top of the transcript, right underneath the title "*Full coverage of the anti-government protesters in the region*" (*Washington Post*, 2011). This link aims to expand the reader's knowledge about the situation in the Middle East and the various uprisings across the region. It also includes different articles related to the uprisings, such as the reaction of the United States and of other Arab countries, such as Saudi Arabia, towards the uprisings. The second hyperlink, also located at the top of the transcript, allows the reader to explore various events of the Egyptian uprising in the form of bullet points, entitled "*This Story*" (*Washington Post*, 2011). It is worth noting that only two out of 24 points are concerned with news related to Mubarak, while the others refer to the protesters, and the world's reaction to Mubarak's defiant speech. These links are mainly titles of articles written to update the reader about the uprising in Egypt. A similar hyperlink is located to the right of the transcript, and refers to the '*key events from the demonstration*'. This link enables people to see pictures of protesters in Tahrir Square and pictures of events taking place, such as the violence in Tahrir Square and the marching of the army. The third and last hyperlink is mainly of an informative nature to increase the reader's knowledge about the country in crisis. The hyperlink is called '*Egypt*' and directs the reader to a website with information about Egypt's history, population, economy and government. It can be argued that it is potentially the aim of the use of these hyperlinks to reframe the transcript by supporting the protesters; this seems especially feasible since the coverage primarily explores the government's violence towards the protesters.

There is, on the other hand, also the use of images and an embedded video as a way of adding further information for the reader. Although this is a transcript of the speech delivered by Mubarak, the images as well as the video, are of the protesters. I would argue that making some parts of Mubarak's speech available as a video or as an image would have enhanced the news coverage and further contextualise the speech; it could have included some information about the president's attitude and the way he presented himself during the speech. However, *The Washington Post* mainly adds images of protesters in Tahrir Square and a video about the public's response to Mubarak's speech. I suggest that this further affirms Chung's and Cho's argument about the newspaper supporting the protesters and opposing Mubarak's regime (2013). This is in fact, to some degree, evident in the way the newspaper employs various modes, for example through the use of images to reframe the article. This is also highlighted by Baker (2007:158) who asserts that one way to reframe a text is through the use of paralinguistic devices such as visual resources like colour, image and layout.

9.6.3 Linguistic Features of TT3M

9.6.3.1 Textual Analysis and Discourse Practice

Similar to Section 9.5.3.1, the analysis provided here intends to address the changes made in the translation and transcription process in order to explore the comprehensibility of the TT, and the way in which it is presented to the TT audience. It will consider the coherence and cohesion of the TT, including punctuation, and further highlight the importance of choosing particular terminologies that reflect a message or cause confusion.

1. **Cohesion and Coherence**

As discussed in Section 9.5.2, the way a translation is processed into a written transcript either enhances the reader's understanding of the ST or causes confusion. Due to the change of genre,

the way sentences are grouped into different paragraphs, demonstrates a certain logic underlying them. In this regard, Mershon argues that in order to transcribe an oral speech, the transcriber should personally designate the layout of the speech, since the importance of the layout is to highlight each idea the speaker is addressing in one paragraph, and to start a new paragraph once the speaker starts addressing a new idea (2010). Mershon further states "changes in topic should be reflected by separate paragraphs. In general, using more rather than fewer paragraphs will help readers follow the dialogue" (2010:1). This is, however, not the case in TT, as many paragraphs contain the same idea; in fact, some sentences are divided not only into different sentences, but into two or three paragraphs. Consider the examples below:

Ex	ST	TT	My Translation
Ex1	إنني أعتز بكم رمزًا لجيل مصريٍّ جديدٍ... <u>أقول لكم قبل كل شيء</u>: إن دماء شهدائكم	<u>I am telling you</u> that I am very grateful …. **[New Paragraph]** <u>I am telling you before anything,</u> that the blood of the martyrs …	I am telling you that I am proud of you for being a symbol of a new generation of Egypt …. I am telling you before anything else that the blood of your martyrs …
Ex2	وأؤكد أنني لن أتهاون في معاقبة المتسببين عنها ... <u>وأقول لعائلات هؤلاء الضحايا الأبرياء</u>: إنني تألمت...	I will not hesitate to punish those who are responsible …. **[New Paragraph]** <u>I am telling families</u> of the innocent victims that I have been so much in pain…	I will not be lenient to punish those who caused it … I say to the families of those innocent victims: that I felt a lot of pain ….

Almost all of the paragraphs in the first page of TT3M begin with a phrase "*I will*". Surprisingly, many of the sentences are actually separated into a new paragraph, possibly to the effect of emphasising the common public narrative about Mubarak's somewhat insipid speeches. Mubarak uses the verb أقول/*I am saying- I say* multiple times during his speech, probably to emphasise his willingness to engage in a dialogue with the protesters (see Chapter

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Six). The translator then uses the phrase *I'm telling you* or a verb in the present continuous form, as evident in the last example, to start each paragraph, and hence creates a logical transition between each paragraph. By doing so, I would argue, the translator creates a rhetorical device of parallelism.

I suggest that the way TT is formatted potentially intends to emphasise two narratives: firstly, the dominant narrative that spread among Egyptians of Mubarak's repetitive speech, and how the speech was just a replica of his previous speeches; and secondly, the narrative of Mubarak's speech revolving entirely around him, rather than focusing on the current crisis and the assertion that Mubarak knows best for the country, thus clearly dismissing the actions and participations of other parties.

Another important tool that facilitates the way the text is read is *punctuation*. In this TT, the authors opt to use square brackets to indicate a technical error and a missing part of the text; consider the example below:

ST	TT	My Translation
وأن أحداً لا يصنع لنا قراراتنا سوى نبض الشارع ومطالب أبناء الوطن.	No one is making the decision for us except for the **[inaudible]** of the Egyptian **[inaudible].**	No one can make decisions for us, but the plus of the street and the commands of the youth of the nation.

Given the time the transcriber/translator had available before publishing the TT, one might assume that the transcript went through different stages of actual translation and editing, besides the final stage of proofreading the piece before it is published. Yet, this does not seem to be the case for TT3M, since the text has various errors, repetitions and untranslated phrases.

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This might be due to the special circumstances of the speech, such as the priority of its publication as a breaking news item. By way of illustration, the two examples above indicate when the translators use brackets with the word **[inaudible]** to refer to parts of the speech that they could not translate. The word **[inaudible]** is used five times throughout TT3M. Despite the fact that this strategy is not used many times and does not affect the overall coherence of the TT, it does, however, give a sense of publishing a text that is incomplete and might therefore be perceived as unprofessional due to the missing sentences. The examples demonstrate how the word **[inaudible]** is inserted as an indication of the translator's not translating the text which ultimately affects the meaning of these particular sentences. It is important to highlight that the audio of Mubarak's speech is very clear and that the live coverage has no technical errors which could have led to the translator's inability to grasp the meaning or the full sentence.

2. Grammar

From a grammatical perspective, the text shows some issues related to the use of pronouns. Although one can argue that it does not greatly influence the understanding of the sentence, it adds a level of clumsiness to it, as illustrated below:

ST	TT	My Translation
الإخوة المواطنون، الأبناء شباب مصر وشاباتها،	Dear fellow citizens, <u>my sons, the youth of Egypt, and daughters,</u>	Dear fellow citizens, The youth of Egypt boys and girls

The example demonstrates how a simple change of a pronoun can evidently change the meaning and the impact of the sentence. Mubarak begins his speech by addressing the youth in Egypt, men and women, and he presents himself as a father to them. However, at the beginning of his speech, he actually addresses the people present in Tahrir Square, and phrases the

sentence to involve all Egyptians, and so does not use a possessive pronoun to refer to the youth as his own. In the TT, the translator adds the pronoun /*my*/ to the word '*sons*' to emphasise his connection to the youth. Although Mubarak is undeniably using this narrative throughout his speech, this statement helps increase the emphasis of this narrative, but also excludes 'the daughters', and is therefore not as accurate as the sentence in the ST. I would argue that the importance of this statement in this particular speech is that Mubarak wants to use inclusivity as an approach to address the youth because they were believed to play a major role in the uprising. And yet, this translation reduces the significance of the youth, both men and women.

3. Terminology

Using specific terminology can easily manipulate the text and create an impact different to the one intended by the ST. In the transcript appear a number of instances when the meaning is altered in the TT, creating a vague or incoherent sentence. The example below demonstrates how using a certain terminology may influence the meaning in the TT.

ST	TT	My Translation
حتى يتم تسليم السلطة ...، فى انتخاباتٍ حرةٍ ونزيهةٍ توفر لها ضمانات الحرية والنزاهة.	Until power is transferred … free and impartial elections that will be safeguarded by the freedom - the call for freedom.	Until the authority and the power is delivered ….in a free and honest elections that will be provided with the freedom and honesty.

Using the phrase '*the call for freedom*' may cause confusion in the TT reader. In this statement, Mubarak intends to explain his intention of holding a free and honest election in September, and he explicitly uses the words حرةٍ ونزيهةٍ/ *honest and free*. This is clearly rendered in the TT

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but using the phrase *the call for freedom* might cause confusion, which the translator could avoid by simply omitting the phrase or by adding the word '*honest*'.

9.6.4 Lost in Translation

Considering TT3M, it is reasonable to argue that there are no major changes that affect the understanding of the TT, but rather an accumulation of minor ones that affect the overall meaning of the speech. This section will highlight a number of these cases.

1. The Accuracy of the Translation

Sometimes meaning can be altered or inaccurate when important parts of the ST have been omitted or wrongly translated, as seen below:

ST	TT3	My Translation
تعديل ست مواد دستورية هي المواد **76 و77 و88 و93 و189**، فضلاً عن إلغاء المادة **179** من الدستور،	The amendment of six constitutional articles, which is <u>76</u>, <u>77, 88, 93 and 187,</u> in addition to abolishing article number <u>79</u> in the constitution.	The amendment of six constitutional articles and those articles are 76,77,88,93, and 189. In addition to the annulment of article number 179 in the constitution.

As seen above, Mubarak recites a number of articles from the Egyptian constitution which, according to him, require amendments so as to create a better atmosphere for the upcoming elections. Hence, changing the number of the article results in an inaccurate text with multiple mistakes. Both article numbers 189 and 179 are translated wrongly to 187 and 79, leading to inaccuracy and misinterpretation, especially since these numbers refer to articles related to the presidency and elections in Egypt. Although it could be argued that these article numbers are

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only familiar to the Egyptian audience, I suggest that the transcript is important as it will serve as a historical, and perhaps educational reference; a mistake like this would, however, undermine its credibility.

2. Loss of Meaning

While deleting essential parts of the sentence may lead to a misinterpretation or a less accurate rendition of the ST, it may also cause a complete loss of meaning and produce an incoherent sentence. Even though some sentences contain cultural terms that do not necessary exist in the TT language, some translators choose to explain the meaning or simply attempt to translate the meaning rather than the metaphor or the phrase. This is the case in the example below:

ST	TT3	My Translation
ولن تنكسر إرادة شعبها، ستقف على أقدامها من جديد بصدقٍ وإخلاص أبنائها كل أبنائها، وسترد كيد الكائدين وشماتة الشامتين.	The resolve of its people will not be deflected and will [inaudible] again because of the - and will deflect the arrows of the enemies and those who [inaudible] against Egypt.	Will not break the will of its people, will stand on its feet once again with the honesty and loyalty of its sons and daughters all of them, it will deflect the spitefulness upon those who are spiteful, and deflect the gloat upon those who gloats.

In this example, the omission occurs in different parts of the sentence, consequently leading to an incomprehensible sentence. First, the phrase ستقف على أقدامها من جديد بصدقٍ وإخلاص أبنائها كل أبنائها، /will *stand on its feet once again with the honesty and loyalty of its sons and daughters all of them,* is omitted, yet the word '*again*' is translated and followed by an incomplete

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sentence. In addition, some parts of the second sentence are also omitted, for example, when the common Arabic phrase وسترد كيد الكائدين وشماتة الشامتين/ *it will deflect the spitefulness upon those who are spiteful, and deflect the gloat upon those who gloats*, is partially translated but the verb is omitted. The translator replaces the ST phrase with a metaphor that is acceptable in the TT language. Given the tendency to use a repetitive technique in Arabic, the nouns – كيد – شماتة/ *spitefulness – gloat*, are used with their derivatives of an adjective to phrase that sentence. Hence, a literal translation is not preferable and considered redundant and incompressible to the TT audience. This might be the reason why the translator uses the metaphor '*will deflect the arrows of the enemies'* that aims to explain the meaning of the sentence to render the message in an appropriate and comprehensible way. Nonetheless, I would argue that deleting two essential parts of these sentences produces a group of words put together into a meaningless sentence.

9.7 Conclusion

This chapter highlighted the methods used when transcribing the translation of an oral speech. It further demonstrated the importance of using accurate punctuation and separating paragraphs to ensure a readable and coherent text. It has, however, been shown that this is not the case in the two TTs this chapter examined; which is potentially due to the way the authors approached the texts as a written translation, rather than a full transcript of the ST. Concerning the quality of both TTs and the accuracy of the translation, I suggest that both TTs showed some weaknesses concerning accuracy and the coherence of the text. Algaddafi's TT is a product of collaborative online translation that is edited by a large number of people over many years until today, which, one might imagine, should have led to a better-informed and well-written translation. But this is not the case so that the TT in fact shows signs of inaccuracy and loss of meaning, as illustrated by the examples discussed here. Mubarak's transcript is also problematic, its translation perhaps even less effective, and the accumulation of minor errors

influences the overall understanding of the speech. In both transcripts, there is a tendency to use square brackets to highlight uncertainly. In Algaddafi's TT, for example, they are employed in the text to refer to an undefined aspect, to add further information related to the text, or to provide an explanation. However, in Mubarak's TT, it is primarily used to refer to a specific incident of technical error, when Mubarak's voice becomes inaudible. I would argue against this having happened since the speech was broadcast by multiple media outlets online, and it was very clear and audible. Both TTs are produced as written translations of oral speeches by following translation strategies responding to the ST. For example, in many cases, the strategy of omission is used in a way to summarise the ST, or due to lack of equivalences between ST and TT, or indeed lack of understanding of the ST. In fact, large parts of the ST are omitted, as a result of which the text appears to be out of context at some points. There are numerous strategies related to transcribing speeches I believe would have added more value to the TTs, such as adding footnotes for explanation, a timeline to mark long pauses or notable issues, and paragraphing sentences according to a main idea addressed during the speech to create a logical way of understanding the text. Adding these features would have improved the text for the TT audience, arguably making it more fit for purpose for the future. As they stand, both TTs lack accuracy and suffer significant loss of meaning so that the TT audience is required to refer to other reference in order to fully understand the transcripts.

Chapter Ten

Conclusions

10.1 Results and Findings

In this section, I will divide my findings into sub-sections, based on the research question they address:

10.1.1 Features of Arabic and English Political Discourse

This section addresses questions regarding the differences and similarities between political discourse features in Arabic and English, the challenges they bring for translators/interpreters, and the strategies these professionals in turn use to approach these problems. This research presents relevant findings about commonalities and differences between the characteristics of political discourse in Arabic and English.

The shared features between English and Arabic political discourse, which have been identified as a result of the analysis of the two political speeches in this thesis, are the use of *pronouns*, *repetition* and *intertextuality*. In fact, using *pronouns* has proven to be similar in both languages. The pronoun '*we*' is used to demonstrate solidarity, or denote the speaker's self-praise. Other linguistic tools, however, are employed differently in English and Arabic. *Repetition,* for example, is a common rhetorical tool that is used differently in English and Arabic political discourse. In English, repetition is used through the 'three-list' repetition, which aims to evoke emotions and create a slogan that people will remember; whereas in Arabic, it is realised through the use of synonyms and near-synonyms, and sometimes the repetition of ideas, which shows the speaker's fluency and the richness of their speech. This is evident in Algaddafi's speech, for example, when he refers to different Islamic groups to

emphasise the idea of Islamists taking over Libya, by using words like الدروشة، اللحي، العمايم /
dervishes, bearded people, people with turbans, all of which have a religious connotation.

The use of *intertextuality* also differs in the way it is used in Arabic and English. While in Arabic, intertextuality is widely used in relation to religious references, perhaps due to the religious discourses prevalent in Arab societies, in English-speaking societies, the use of intertextuality is employed to make cultural references. The use of cultural references differs in English and in Arabic, since the latter is known for quoting poetry and Qur'anic verses, whereas in English cultural references include quotations by famous politicians such as Winston Churchill, for instance. It is evident from Mubarak's and Algaddafi's speeches that they tend to use religious terminology, as it is common in Arabic culture in order to establish the speaker's credibility. As previously indicated, this thesis aimed to establish how features of political discourse, such as repetition and intertextuality, differ in the way they are employed in each language. However, I suggest that the most noteworthy feature that distinguishes Arabic from English is 'code-switching', or using MSA versus colloquial Arabic, especially since using the latter carries particular significance in the region. This feature is therefore important as it portrays the speaker's attitude and sends a message of unity and belonging to the public. While using MSA can be seen as a way of detaching oneself from the public, and appearing in an official way, using Colloquial Arabic can also influence how the speech is perceived by the public, as seen in Algaddafi's case, where many media outlets made fun of the speech.

I would argue that there are many obstacles translators face while translating and interpreting these features, including those caused by lack of equivalence in the use of linguistic structures, rhetorical tools, general lexis, specific terminology and audience expectations. For instance, translating Qur'anic phrases into English would be problematic, and may lose its significant. In this regard, the analysis showed that most translators and interpreters opt to *omit*, *explain* or *summarise* these problematic features. During Algaddafi's speech, by way of

illustration, the interpreter chooses to explain to the TT1A audience that Algaddafi is reciting a poem, instead of interpreting the poem itself. In another example, in TT2M, the translator chooses to summarise the cultural references of the historical events in Egypt to which Mubarak refers into one phrase of war and victory.

10.1.2 CDA and the Analysis

In order to address the question if the presidents' speeches share common rhetorical and linguistic features regardless of their use of MSA and Colloquial Arabic respectively, I conducted a detailed linguistic analysis of both STs. In addition, the analysis discussed in Chapter Six aimed to highlight the differences between translating/interpreting MSA or Colloquial Arabic, and examined if and to what extent using the latter complicates the process and has thus ultimate consequences for the TT audience. The analysis of the STs shows that both presidents use similar linguistic strategies irrespective of the Arabic dialect in which they delivered their speech. The research concludes that using Colloquial Arabic is a strategy in itself that aims to illustrate the president's closeness to the public. A number of similar approaches were used by each president, such as the use of the pronoun نحن/ 'we' to highlight solidarity and their belonging to the nation. It was evident that both presidents intentionally use this pronoun when they appeal to the public for their support to stop the uprising. On the other hand, both presidents repeatedly use the pronoun أنا /'I' to the effect of self-admiration and to highlight their importance and achievements. Perhaps this strategy was one of the reasons why the public considered both speeches as self-praising as opposed to as an address to the crisis and the uprising. The second approach employed by both presidents is the reiteration of various issues to gain the public's sympathy. Algaddafi, for instance, appeals to the tribes and asks for their support, as well as focusing on his role in aiding Libya's development. With this, he reminds Libyans of his importance in liberating the country as their revolution leader. In a similar attempt, Mubarak addresses Egyptians as a father figure, reminding them of his role as

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Egypt's proctor during wars and victories. Clearly, both presidents depend on evoking the public's emotion to gain their support and gratitude.

The third approach to be considered is the similarity of the themes addressed in the speeches. For instance, both presidents warn of foreign conspiracies and interventions. In his speech, Algaddafi clearly condemns America's and Italy's intervention, and their plan to smuggle weapons that would help the rebels to destroy Libya. Similarly, Mubarak rejects any foreign intervention and clearly states his refusal to listen to any other country's leader. It can be argued that using this particular theme has a prominent significance in the Arab region due to the various conflicts and occupations it has witnessed in the past.

There were, however, noteworthy differences between ST1A and ST2M, and they are seen in a number of features. Firstly, there is a large variety of Arabic political discourse through which politicians address their audiences and construct their speeches. By way of illustration, Mubarak, addresses the public as a father figure, yet maintains his role as Egypt's president by using MSA and by recalling decisions he had made in the past to alleviate problems. Algaddafi, on the other hand, chooses to deliver a more motivational speech, with which he encourages Libyans to fight the rebels, and to liberate Libya, portraying himself as a fighter. Secondly, Algaddafi's individuality makes his speeches, for several reasons, difficult to work with: (1) the length of the speech; (2) multiple cultural references, such as tribal references; and (3) the fact that Algaddafi breaks many speech conventions, which makes part of his speech incoherent. This is contrary to what we can see in Mubarak's speech, which is coherent, well structured, and similar to his previous speeches. I suggest that for these particular reasons, along with the existing dominant narrative about Algaddafi, his speech was approached differently by the media and in effect publicly ridiculed. Mubarak's speech, on the other hand, was described in the news as redundant but it was not made fun of like Algaddafi's speech.

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Employing CDA in analysing the linguistic features of the STs has aided the analysis of a number of linguistic strategies used in the STs, for example, when Algaddafi gives examples of governments that have violently stopped protesters in the past, possibly to warn Libyans of his intention to use violence. However, using CDA in the examination of the TTs revealed how these linguistic strategies were employed to reconstruct these. For instance, the analysis of Chapter Eight indicates that, at times, translators deliberately choose a certain terminology to reframe the speech into a particular narrative, as seen in the way the title of Algaddafi's TT2A '*I will die as a martyr: Defiant Gaddafi blaming world leaders for violence in rambling TV address*' portrays a message of violence and mockery, whereas Mubarak's TT2M '*Egypt's hope turns to fury as Mubarak clings to power*' mainly portrays Egyptians' disappointment. The choice of terminology can also reframe the speech, for instance by referring to the government as a *government* or a *regime* as discussed in detail in Chapter Eight.

10.1.3 Multimodality and Translation Strategies

The analysis of the TTs aims to address questions related to shifts that occur due to changing the genre and mode of the STs. In the process of the analysis it became clear that the conventions used in the transcription process, in translation, in simultaneous interpretation, and in journalistic writing, differ greatly and are driven by opposing values. For example, interpreters attempt to be as faithful as possible to the speeches as they value loyalty to the STs. However, due to time restrictions and pressure, they are likely to make mistakes. When a political speech is translated and published in a shortened form in the genre of an article, translators and editors value transparency more; therefore, the text falls into the conventions of the receiving language. Translators and editors tend to frame the message within the dominant political narrative that is familiar to their readers, and in accordance with the journalistic conventions. In regard to transcription then, it depends greatly on the purpose for transcribing the speech, which consequently controls the process of translating the ST. For example, if a

transcript is used for educational purposes, it will attempt to enhance the reader's understanding by explaining cultural references such as references to famous figures in Libya or the Arab region, as seen in TT3A.

Multimodality is essential to understand the shifts the TT is subjected to due to the strategies and conventions each genre is known for. The analysis carried out in Chapter Seven, Eight and Nine has shown that translators use different strategies depending on and according to genre and purpose. Interpreters usually opt for strategies, such as omission and summary due to the time constrains, while translators transcribing a speech usually aim to explain information of which they think the TT audience is not aware. In newspapers, on the other hand, the main strategy used is selective appropriation, whereby translators select from the ST what they wish to convey and shape the article accordingly.

10.1.4 Narrative and Translation

This research has shown that translators and interpreters are frequently influenced not only by cultural, social and ideological forces that are embedded in society, but also by the existing dominant political narratives. As Hatim & Mason (1997) assert, translation can never be seen as a neutral activity. According to Baker (2006:105), translators and interpreters face an ethical choice of whether they reproduce the existing ideologies encoded in the narratives of the ST, or if they distance themselves from them. Sometimes, they resort to different strategies to enhance that narrative or undermine it (Baker, 2006:105).

In the case of the speeches examined for this research, the analysis has indicated that the translation or the interpretation of the ST is influenced by the dominant narrative, whereby media not only shaped the translation but also reframed it, using different modes and tools of representation, such as images, hyperlinks, titles, or even means of broadcasting. This can be seen, for instance, in the way in which *Aljazeera* frames Algaddafi's speech by inviting an

exiled Libyan political analyst to present the speech, or how *Fox News* uses dual coverage to broadcast Mubarak's speech and the people's reaction to his speech in Tahrir Square simultaneously. Furthermore, this is also visible in the way in which newspapers practice selective appropriation (Baker, 2006), choosing particular parts of the speech to translate and then to compose the article, which consequently reframes the article based on the newspaper's interpretation and ideology. This is evident in the way the *Daily Mail* portrays Algaddafi's speech as a violent, rambling speech.

Based on my analysis of different media outlets with different associations and ideologies, that is, Aljazeera, Fox News, *Daily Mail* and *The Guardian*, I can conclude that the TTs are all influenced by dominant Western narratives of the Arab Spring. They are as follows: (1) supporting the uprisings for democratic reasons, (2) condemning the violence in Egypt and Libya, (3) Algaddafi's eccentricity and thus dissimilarity to Mubarak. Thus, the TTs are shaped according to these narratives, deliberately, consciously, or not.

10.1.5 Multimodal Translation Analysis Model

The MTA Model developed for this study combines Fairclough's CDA (1992), Kress' multimodality framework (2010), and Baker's (2006) Narrative Theory, which in conjunction aim to facilitate an approach and response to different aspects of the speeches. The analysis in Chapters Six, Seven, Eight and Nine validate this model's ability to examine the translations of both STs as set out in Chapter One. The model aimed to highlight that a ST is an amalgamation of a number of different aspects, including extra-linguistic and linguistic features such as the president's image, for instance. A translator thus needs awareness of these multiple layers and ought to compensate for extra-linguistic features in other ways. I suggest that the model developed in this thesis is significant as it integrates multimodality into Translation Studies; this, in turn, is crucial in the era of multimedia and new technologies, when a text is

no longer isolated from other modes that facilitate its understanding. This is clearly evident in the way *Warden's* transcript added a hyperlink of a video of the speech, or the integration of the news blog in *The Guardian*. My findings will in fact help to understand how multimedia are now used to reframe or manipulate the meaning of a ST by adding hyperlinks or images for information other than the translated text. I would argue that this model can be applied to non-political texts, and be further developed to analyse any multimodal text.

10.2 Limitations of the Study

Any researcher inevitably faces a number of limitations. One of the main difficulties I encountered was the attempt to maintain neutrality in my role as a researcher, and thus to view all parties fairly, with the same critical eye. This, however, was difficult for two reasons: (1) the biased resources I worked with, either appraising the presidents or shaming them; and (2) the primarily negative coverage of both regimes in the news. Another difficulty that arose was that, coming from Kuwait, it was difficult for me to fully engage with the Libyan community, their native language and, most importantly, their culture, particularly as during Algaddafi's era, there were complete media blackouts across Libya. I became involved with the Libyan community in the UK, and tried to engage in the culture itself. Egypt, on the other hand, where I have lived before, was a more familiar territory to me. Finally, it was indeed difficult to track down the number of interpreters/translators whose translations I examined. For example, I contacted Aljazeera English, Fox News, and numerous other sources, in order to trace the translators and find out about their backgrounds. This, however, proved to be an impossible task as I had no responses from any of my sources. Hence, my analysis was based on my interpreting and translation experience, and on the available literature, without taking into account the translators' own justifications.

10.3 Contributions to the Field of Knowledge

This study contributes to the fields of Translation Studies, Arabic and English Linguistics, Political Sciences, and Media and Communication Studies. Firstly, it advances the field of Translation Studies by introducing the MTA Model which facilitates the analysis of linguistic and extra-linguistic features of a ST. And secondly, it is the first in-depth comparative analysis of the translations of these particular Arab Spring speeches. The contribution to Translation Studies goes further, as presenting the MTA Model - a combination of three theories from three disciplines - will allow to examine various aspects of a text beyond the linguistic level. This study utilised CDA to help identify vital elements embedded in the STs, such as using particular terminology and cultural references. It draws on multimodality in order to assess how changing the genre and medium of the ST inevitably affects the TT and its purpose, and how new media can in fact shape the TT according to one particular ideology. And it considered Narrative Theory in order to highlight the way in which the existing dominant political narrative can ultimately change the way in which a TT is reframed or produced.

The contribution to Linguistics consists in providing a succinct account of the features of Arabic and English political discourse, in identifying some common strategies used by popular presidents throughout history, and in observing the ways in which they were implemented by Algaddafi and Mubarak in their speeches. Furthermore, the thesis highlights the common features characteristic of both languages, and draws attention to the significance of using MSA or Colloquial Arabic, indicating that common political discourse features are applied similarly in both styles of language.

In regard to the contribution to Political Studies, the thesis presents a comprehensive account of the political circumstances prior to the Arab Spring, its causes, and its aftermath. It also provides a rich record of the proceedings of the Arab Spring. Comprehensive information

about the political background of the region enhances the knowledge of how political discourse is constructed there, bearing in mind it has an impact on the way in which meaning is transferred between different languages, cultures, media and genre.

Finally, this research contributes to Media and Communication Studies by heightening the awareness of the shifts that occur to the texts when they are transferred from genre to genre and language and to language.

10.4 Recommendations for Further Research

This study is limited in scope, thus, the most obvious avenue for future research is the expansion of data through the inclusion of different speeches, perhaps of current presidents such as the Egyptian president Al-Sisi. Another interesting data point would be an analysis of American president Donald Trump's speeches and their translation into Arabic. It would moreover be valuable to assess whether the MTA Model can be developed further and applied to other genres. In the future, it might, for instance, be worthwhile to apply the MTA Model to a different genre, such as UN conference interpreting sessions, where interpreters or bilingual journalists report about the meetings in their language for TV channels or newspapers from all across the world. In this context, it would be interesting to examine the following aspects: first, the importance of CDA in enhancing the knowledge of features used in an international forum such as the UN; second, to examine changes which occur in a TT when the genre and the purpose of a ST differ; third, it would be interesting to examine what modes are incorporated in the TT to enhance its understanding, and whether these modes are subject to the interpreters' understanding of the texts, their ideology and the strategies they apply. This is especially true if the interpreter opts to summarise and hence misses information that might be valuable for others. An examination of live coverage with subtitles, and of the way in which subtitles are employed as a mode of delivering a message while maintaining ST features, is another potentially viable research area for the future.

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Appendices
Appendix 1
Mummar Algaddafi

1. Algaddafi Arabic and English Transcript

The Arabic & English Transcript of Mummar Algaddafi speech

Tuesday 22nd of February 2011

مساء الخير. اليوم أيها الشباب في الساحة الخضراء، وصباح الثورة الغد. أحييكم أيها الشجعان، أحييكم شباب الفاتح، شباب 1
القومية، شباب الفاطمية، شباب التحدي، جيل التحدي، جيل الغضب. أحييكم وأنتم تقدمون للعالم الصورة الحقيقية للشعب الليبي 2
الملتف حول الثورة على بكرة أبيه. أنتم من الساحة الخضراء تقدمون الحقيقة التي تحاول أجهزة الخيانة، والعمالة، والنذالة، 3
والرجعية، والجبن، تحاول أن تغطيها، تشوه صورتكم أمام العالم. أجهزة عربية للأسف شقيقة، تغدركم وتخونكم، وتقدم صورتكم 4
بشكل يسئ لكل ليبي وليبية. يقولون لهم: أنظروا إلى ليبيا، أنظروا إلى ليبيا، لا تريد العز، لا تريد المجد، لا تريد التحرير، لا تريد 5
الثورة. أنظروا إلى ليبيا، تريد الدروشة، تريد اللحى. تريد العمايم، أنظروا إلى ليبيا، تريد الاستعمار، تريد الانتكاسة، تريد الحضيض. 6
وأنتم هنا في الساحة الخضراء، تقولون: ليبيا تريد المجد، تريد القمة، قمة العالم. ليبيا تقود القارات، آسيا، وإفريقيا، وأمريكا 7
اللاتينية، وحتى أوروبا. كل القارات تعقد قممها في ليبيا، هذا مجد لليبيين والليبيات، أصبح الليبي الآن يُشار له بالبنان في جميع 8
أنحاء العالم. بالأمس كان الليبي ليست له هوية، فعندما تقول «ليبي» فأنك تقول عندما تقول ليبي يقولون لك ليبيا؟ ليبيريا؟ لبنان؟ 9
ما يعرفون ليبيا. أما اليوم عندما تقول ليبيا، يقولك: آه ليبيا! القذافي! ليبيا الثورة. كل الشعوب الإفريقية تعتبر ليبيا قبلتها، وشعوب 10
أمريكا اللاتينية. وشعوب اسيا، وحكام العالم كلهم بقواهم الكبرى النووية، يتقاطرون على ليبيا، على بلدكم، على طرابلس، على 11
سرت، على بنغازي. شوهوا صورتكم في إذاعات عربية شقيقة للأسف، يخدمون الشيطان، يريدوا إهانتكم، ونحن نريد أن نرد الآن 12
بالفعل، فوق الأرض، في الميدان. معمر القذافي ما عنده منصب، حتى يزعل ويستقيل منه، كما فعل الرؤساء. معمر القذافي ليس 13
رئيس، هو قائد ثورة، والثورة تعني التضحية دائماً وأبداً حتى نهاية العمر. هذي بلادي، بلاد أجدادي وأجدادكم، غرسناها بيدنا 14
وسقيناها بدم أجدادنا.نحن أجدر بليبيا من أولئك.من تلك الجرذان، وأولئك المأجورين. من هم هؤلاء المأجورين؟ المدفوع لهم 15
الثمن من المخابرات الأجنبية؟ لعنة الله عليهم تركوا العار لأولادهم إذا عندهم أولاد، تركوا العار لعايلاتهم إذا عندهم عايلات، تركوا 16
العار لقبائلهم إذا كان عندهم قبائل. ولكن هؤلاء ماعندهم قبائل، فالقبائل الليبية، قبائل شريفة، ومجاهدة، ومكافحة، تتقاطر علىّ في 17
هذا الشهر، كل القبائل.من البطنان، إلى الجبل الغربي، إلى فزان. كلهم يهتفون هتاف واحد، كلهم يتحدون. تحدينا أمريكا في هذا 18
المكان، بجبروتها وقوتها. تحدينا الدول الكبرى النووية في العالم، وانتصرنا عليها. طأطأوا رؤوسهم هنا، إيطاليا قبّلت يد ابن 19
الشهيد -شيخ الشهداء-عمر المختار، هذا مجد ما بعده مجد ليس لـ المنفه فقط، ولا للبطنان فقط، ولا لبنغازي فقط، بل للبيبين 20
وللعرب وللمسلمين. هذا هو المجد-الذي يريدون له-المجد الذي يريدون أن يشوهود. 21

إيطاليا الإمبراطورية في ذلك الوقت تحطمت فوق الأرض الليبية بجحافلها. أنا أرفع من المناصب التي يتقلدها الرؤساء والأبهات، 22
أنا مقاتل، مجاهد، مناضل، ثائر، من الخيمة، من البادية، والتحمت معي المدن، والقرى، والواحات، في ثورة تاريخية جابت الأمجاد 23
للبيبين، سيتمتعون بها جيلاً بعد جيل، وستبقى ليبيا في القمة، تقود إفريقيا، وتقود أمريكا اللاتينية، وتقود آسيا بل تقود العالم. لا 24
يمكن أن يُعطّل هذه المسيرة التاريخية الظافرة، حفنة من شذاذ الآفاق، الماجورين، من هؤلاء القطط والفنران التي تنقز من شارع 25
إلى شارع، ومن زنقة إلى زنقة، في الظلام. أنا دافع ثمن بقائي هنا، أنا جدي عبد السلام بومنيار، أول شهيد سقط فوق الخمس في 26

1

أول معركة عام 1911. أنا لا يمكن أن أسيء إلى هذه التضحية العظيمة، لا يمكن أن أترك رفاة جدي الطاهرة في المرقب. أنا 27

ســأموت معه شهيد في النهاية. ها هي رفاة والدي في الهاني، مجاهد، بطل من أبطال القرضابية، وتالا. وهاهو ـ جدي- عمي 28

الشيخ الساعدي في مقبرة منيدر. لا أترك هذه الرفات الطاهرة، هؤلاء المجاهدون. قال بشير السعداوي: "الحرية شجرة لا يتفيأ 29

ظلالها، إلا من غرسها بيده وسقاها بدمه". ليبيا شجرة نحن نتفيأ ظلالها، لأننا غرسنا بيدنا وسقينا بدمنا. 30

نخاطبكم من هذا المكان الصامد، هذا البيت في طرابلس، الذي أغارت عليه مية وسبعين طايرة، تقودها الدول النووية الكبرى 31

أمريكا وبريطانيا والحلف الأطلسي. أربعين طائرة بوينج، تزود هذه الحملة بالوقود، تخطت كل القصور، وكل المنازل، وكل بيوتكم، 32

كل بيوتكم تركتها، تبحث عن منزل معمر القذافي. لماذا؟ هل لأن معمر القذافي رئيس جمهورية؟ لو كان رئيس، ـلا ما عملو له- 33

لعاملوه مثل ما عاملو رؤساء الدول الأخرى، ولكن لأن معمر القذافي تاريخ، مقاومة، تحرر، مجد، ثورة، وهذا اعتراف من أكبر 34

قوه في العالم، بأن معمر القذافي هو ليس رئيس، أو ليس بشخص عادي. حتى نقتله بالسم أو نعمل ضده مظاهرة تسقطه. لما كانت 35

القنابل هنا في هذا المكان، تدك بيتي، وأولادي تقتلهم، أين كنتم أنتم يا جرذان؟ أين كنتم أنتم يا اللي بتوع اللحى؟يا اللي تتشدقون في 36

الظلام، في أحقاف درنة، وفي أحقاف الجبل الأخضر. وفي حقبة أخرى. أين كنتم؟ كنتم مع أمريكا، تصفقون لأسيادكم الأمريكان، 37

عندما كان معمر القذافي وعائلته في هذا المكان تقصفهم القنابل. مية وسبعين طائرة، تخطت الملوك، وتخطت الرؤساء، وتخطت 38

القصور في كل الوطن العربي، وجت إلى خيمة معمر القذافي وبيت معمر القذافي. هذا مجد لا تفرط فيه ليبيا، ولا يفرط فيه الشعب 39

الليبي، ولا الأمة العربية، ولا الأمة الإسلامية، ولا إفريقيا ولا أمريكا اللاتينية، ولا كل الشعوب، التي تريد الحرية والكرامة للإنسان 40

وتقاوم الجبروت. نحن قاومنا أمريكا، جبروت بريطانيا، الدول النووية، حلف الأطلسي قاومنا جبروته، لم نستسلم، وكنا 41

نحن صامدون هنا. الآن مجموعة قليلة من الشبان المعطاة لهم الحبوب، يغيرون على مراكز الشرطة هنا وهناك مثل الفيران، 42

يهاجمون ثكنة آمنة غافلة، لأننا نحن لسنا في حالة حرب، حتى نشدد الحراسة على مخازننا وعلى معسكراتنا. نحن بين أهلنا وفي 43

أمان وسلام، وليبيا تنعم بالسلام، استغلوا هذا السلام وهذا الأمان وهذه النعمة التي فيها ليبيا، وأغاروا على بعض المعسكرات 44

وبعض المراكز، وحرقوا الملفات التي فيها جرائمهم، وهاجموا المحاكم التي فيها ملفاتهم ومراكز الشرطة التي فيها التحقيق معهم 45

على جرائمهم. لكن ليس لهم ذنب هالشبان، ليس لهم ذنب أبدا، هم صغار السن16 سنة، 17، 18، أحيانا يقلدون ما يجري في 46

تونس وما يجري في مصر، وهذا شيء عادي، وأحيانا يسمعون أن في مدينة ما في ليبيا شبان سطوا على محكمة، فيقولون 47

حتى حنا نمشو نسطو على المحكمة التي عندنا، تقليد. قالوا: حصلوا على سلاح، حتى نحن ليش ما نحصل على سلاح! لكن هناك 48

مجموعة قليلة، مريضة مندسة في المدن، تعطي الحبوب، وأحيان حتى النقود، لهؤلاء الشبان الصغار اليافعين، وتزج بهم في هذه 49

المعارك الجانبية، الذين قُتلوا هم من الشرطة والجنود ومن هؤلاء الشبان، وليس من الذين يحركونهم، هم قاعدين في بيوتهم أو 50

قاعدين في الخارج، يتمتعون بالأمان وبالراحة والمتعة. ويحركو أولادكم ويعطوهم الحبوب، هم وأولادهم. وعدو جيبوا سلاح، 51

غيروا، احرقوا، يا أبطال، بيش يموت أولادكم، وبيش نبدا نحن نقاتل في بعضنا. عبد الفتاح يونس بطل من أبطال ثورة الفاتح 52

العظيم، كان تحت أمرتي عندما داهمنا إذاعة بنغازي، وأعلنت البيان الأول لتحرير ليبيا ـكانت ليبيا محتلة في تلك اللحظةـخمس قواعد 53

أمريكية في تلك اللحظة، لما دخل عبد الفتاح معي مدينة بنغازي، خمس قواعد أمريكية، عشرين ألف إيطالي يحتلون الأرض الليبية، 54

من مصراته إلى ترهونة إلى صبراته، تحت السيطرة المدنية الطلياتية، إلى جانب كل الدكاكين وكل الورش وكل الخدمات، وعندهم 55

أعضاء في مجلس النواب ليبيين مرتشين. وكانت البطنان محتلة بالكامل بالقوات الأمريكية، طبرق ترزح تحت السيطرة الأمريكية 56

الكاملة، لما احنا قمنا بدخول بنغازي، لتحريرها. لا تعرفون معسكر الفويهات الي اسمه ديغادوستا، وكان إنجليزي مية في المية. 57

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لما كنت أنا وعبد الفتاح نهاجم إذاعة بنغازي، لكي نعلن منها التحرير، ومش لنعلن منها الآن، النكسة والعودة للوراء والخزي والعار. معسكر المستشفى ويفل، هذا كان معسكر ويفل، مكتوب اسم ويفل، ولم يتجرأ أحد على أن يشطب على كلمة ويفل. أين كان آباءكم وأجدادكم؟ عندما كانت قواعد أمريكية فوق الأرض الليبية؟ من منكم فقص وجه بارود؟ فجّر قنبلة واحدة؟نحن ضحينا بأنفسنا، كنا نعد للدخول في معركة، مع أمريكا ومع بريطانيا فوق الأرض الليبية. وأعلنت من ميدان الجلاء في طرابلس، ما لم يتحقق الجلاء، فإن القتال سيكون من شارع إلى شارع، ومن بيت إلى بيت، ضد القوات الأمريكية، مافلتوهاش أنتم أبدا، ولا آباءكم، يا شذاد الآفاق، أين كنتم أنتم؟ تفتكرو أن ليبيا سهلة؟ أين كنتم أنتم؟ ليبيا دفعنا ثمنها غاليا، وبنينا لها مجد عظيم لا يدانى. نحن تركنا السلطة للشعب الليبي من عام 1977، أنا والضباط الأحرار، ولم يعد لنا أي منصب ولا أي صلاحية، ولانصدر أي قانون ولا أي قرار، وتركنا السلطة للشعب الليبي، للمؤتمرات الشعبية واللجان الشعبية، أحسنها ما أحسنها، سقمها ما سقمها، أساء إليها ما أساء إليها. فسد ما فسد، هذه تهم الليبيين جميعا. في المستشفى، وفي المدرسة، وفي الإدارة، وفي المكتب، في السيارة، في الطيارة، في الإسكان، في الزراعة، في الصناعة، هذه كلها تدار بالليبيين اللي تحت اللجان الشعبية المصعدة من المؤتمرات الشعبية، والمؤتمرات الشعبية هي كل الشعب الليبي.انحلت مشكلة الصراع على السلطة في ليبيا نهائياً، استلمها الشعب الليبي بالكامل في 1977. أنا وزملائي لم نعد مسؤولين عن أي شيء، إلا عن القتال عن ليبيا-بس.- ومسكنا السلاح فقط ولما غارت علينا أمريكا قاتلناها، وفرنسا في الجنوب قاتلناها، والسادات قاتلناه، وهبري قاتلناه، وهيلا سيلاسي وقاتلناه، وحتى بورقيبة، والنميري قاتلناه، وسقطت الرجعية وسقطوا عملاء الاستعمار، وسقط الاستعمار. كانت معنا بنادقنا فقط، تركنا لكم كل شيء، حتى فلوس البترول عييت وأنا أقول لكم خوذوها بيدكم، كل شهر خوذوا فلوس البترول وتصرفوا فيها، ما يضحكوش عليكم توا، ويقولو لكم وين فلوس البترول؟ أنتم قلتو لا، خل فلوس البترول عند الدولة، عند اللجان الشعبية، أنتم إللي صعدتم اللجان الشعبية العامة، وصعدتم اللجان الشعبية كلها، أنتم مسؤولين عنها، يضحكوا عليكم! أنتم سذج إلى هذه الدرجة! بكرا،أنا أساند في السلطة الشعبية وأدعو الشعب الليبي إلى تشكيل الشعبيات الجديدة والبلديات الجديدة، حسب البرنامج الذي وضّحه لكم سيف الإسلام.

أنا أعرف أن العبيدات، الذي منهم عبد الفتاح يونس الذي أمس أطلقوا عليه النار في بنغازي ومصيره مجهول، وقالوا له أنت عبيدي شن جابك إلى بنغازي؟ ليلة الثورة كان هو يحرر معي في بنغازي، ليش ما قالوا له أنت عبيدي ماجيت إلى بنغازي! وين كنتم أنتم؟ لما كان عبد الفتاح ببندقيته يعرض نفسه للخطر! ولما كان يقاتل في السادات وإسرائيل على الحدود، لما كانوا بيجتاحونكم لما كان سيجتاحكم السادات هو وأمريكا. كان عبد الفتاح هو بطل المعارك على الحدود، وأمس يضربوه بالرصاص ومصيره مجهول، ويقولون له أنت عبيدي شن جابك إلى بنغازي، هذه آخرتها؟ هذه آخرتها يا أهل بنغازي! من أنتم؟ أبداً! هاذوم ليسوا أهل بنغازي!!

أعود لأتكلم عن الشعبيات، أنا أعرف أن العبيدات في القبة، لا يريدون الانضمام إلى درنه، يديروا شعبية بروحهم. وأنا إلى جانب إرادة الشعب، فلتكن شعبية للعبيدات، شعبية للقبة، ومن غد يمكن أن يعلنوا الشعبية ويعملوا فيها السلطة الشعبية، ويطهروها ويقيمون فيها كل شيء بأنفسهم. وأعرف أن بني وليد، لا تريد الانضمام إلى مصراته، وتعتبر ضمها جبر وعسف، تتحرر بني وليد. بني وليد تريد أن تشكل شعبية، حرة حسب إرادة شعبها، أولاد الرصيفة، أولاد صولة، قادرين أن يعملوا شعبية، قادرين أن يسيروا أنفسهم ولا يريدون على أحد ولا يستعينوا بأحد. دردنيل طرابلس،كما قال الطلياني إن بني وليد أصبحت دردنيل طرابلس-لأنها كانت خط الدفاع المقاوم، نتوجه القوات الإيطالية إلى الجنوب. وأعرف أن ترهونة لا تريد الضم للخمس أو لمسلاتة أو ل.. حرة، أهل

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88. ترهونة أحرار، يقدروا يقيموا شعبية من بكرا، ويعملون فيها سلطة شعبية مصراتة حرة، زليتن حرة، الخمس حرة، مسلاتة حرة.
89. ومتأكد أنه بعد هذا النداء، ستنطلق الجماهير من بكرا، وتشكل شعبيات جديدة، وأنا متوقع أن الشعبيات التي عددها الآن ثلاث
90. وعشرين شعبية، ستصل ممكن إلى ثلاثين شعبية أو أكثر. وأعتقد أن ستشكل بلديات للإدارة المحلية، من خمسين بلدية إلى ميه
91. وخمسين بلدية متوقعها، لأن كل واحد يريد أن تكون له بلدية. هذا الشيء الصحيح، هذا هو الذي يخدم الإنسان، يخدم حياتنا
92. وتاريخنا، وما يحشمناج قدام العالم، مش ياك هاك، احرق اعجله، اسرق بندقية، عيّل في بنغازي، واخذ قنابل، عاطينه قواذف (آر.
93. بي. جي) الي ضد الدبابات، وماشي بهم في بنغازي! الرعب في بنغازي! الـ (آر. بي. جي) يا عالم في مدينة بنغازي! خشوها
94. الأمريكان، خشوها الطليان عشان نقاتلهم! عويلة صغيرين يعطوهم بيهن بشوارع بنغازي، دوخوهم،سكروهم،
95. أعطوهم الحبوب، وعزلوهم عن أهلهم. تبدا العائلات في جمع أولادها من بكرا. اخرجوا من بيوتكم، يا الي تحبون معمر القذافي
96. رجال، نساء، بنات، أطفال، يا إلليمع معمر القذافي الثورة، مع معمر القذافي المجد، العزة لليبيا، للشعب الليبي، في القمة. والذي
97. يريد المجد يتذكر جلاء الطليان، وجلاء الأمريكان، وجلاء الإنجليز، والنهر الصناعي العظيم، والسلطة الشعبية، وعودة النفط الذي
98. كان تسعين منه للشركات الأميريكية وأنتم عندكم عشرة في المية، والآن تسعين في المية ليكم وعشر في المية للشركة
99. الأميريكية فقط. الذي يريد العزة، والكرامة، والمجد، اخرجوا من بيوتكم، أخرجوا للشوارع، أمّنوا الشوارع،
100. شدوا الجردان،ما تخافوا منهم. نحن لم نستخدم القوة بعد، والقوة تساند الشعب الليبي. إذا وصلت الأمور إلى حد استخدام القوة،
101. سنستخدمها، وفقا للقانون الدولي،ووفقا للدستور الليبي والقوانين الليبية. من بكرا تخرجوا ولا من هذه الليلة، كل المدن الليبية،
102. والقرى الليبية، والواحات الليبية، التي هي تحب معمر القذافي. أنا لو عندي منصب، لو أني رئيس،
103. لكنت لوحت الاستقالة على وجوهكم، الجراثيم هذه. لكن أنا ماعنديش منصب،ماعنديش حاجة نستقيل منها، عندي بندقيتي، أنا
104. حنقاتل إلى آخر قطرة من دمي، ومعي الشعب الليبي.

105. أنا كمِلت عمري مانيش خايف من شيء، أنتم تواجهون صخرة صماء، صخرة صلبة تحطمت عليها أساطيل أمريكا، ما تتحطمش
106. عليها شراذمكم أنتم؟ أخرجوا من بيوتكم وداهموهم في أوكارهم. إسحبوا أطفالكم من الشارع، إسحبوا أطفالكم منهم، خذوا منكم
107. أطفالكم، يعبوهم، يسكروهم ويقولو لهم: عدوا للنار بيش يموتوا أولادكم. أودلاكم يموتو لأي سبب؟ لأي غرض؟ لا لشيء، تدمير
108. ليبيا، حرق ليبيا. شرطة ماتوا، أولادكم ماتوا، لكن أولادهم هم ما ماتوش، اولادهم هم ما ماتوا، أولادهم في أمريكا وفي أوروبا !
109. ماذا أصابكم؟ ما هذا الخوف؟ ما هذا الرعب من هذه العصابات؟عصابات مثل الجردان، لا تمثل شيء، لا تمثل واحد من المليون من
110. الشعب الليبي، لا تساوي شينا، حفنة من الشبان الذين يقلدون الذي يجري في تونس وفي مصر، والذين أعطوهم الحبوب، والذين
111. أمروهم من الداخل وقالوا لهم احرقوا، اسلبوا،اعملوا، تقليد، جردان. من بكرا، الأمن بالشرطة وبالجيش، يفرض الأمن، من بكرا
112. تفتح الحواجز، أي حواجز يحب تشال، شيلوها أنتم من مدنكم، اقبضوا عليهم، طاردوهم في كل مكان، اصحوا، اخرجوا من بيوتكم.
113. هكه تبغوا بنغازي تصبح دمار؟ هتقطع عليها الكهرباء، وهتقطع عليها الميه. من بيجيب لكم الكهرباء وميه، خلاص. وهذه الجردان
114. يمكن أن تصل إلى البترول، وتنسف البترول، وتعودوا إلى الظلام، إلى عام 1952. شالي زرنا؟ سبحان الله، بنغازي بنيتها أنا
115. بنفسي طوبة طوبة، وفرحانين بها ونبنوا فيها من جديد، يجيوا ليدمروها بأولادكم؟ من الذي يخطر عليه الرصاص في بنغازي،
116. قنابل في بنغازي، حرايق في بنغازي، دبابات في شوارع بنغازي توا. هي كلها ثلاث دبابات محروقة، روّعت بنغازي. يمشوا إلى
117. المطار، يحاولو يخُربوه، الطائرات خلاص توقفت، الطيران المدني توقف -من الطيار الي -من الطائرة التي مازالت فتنزل في مطار
118. بنينة؟ والسفن قالوا لا يمكن أن نزل في مطار بنغازي، لأن قالوا فيه جردان ولما نصل يهاجمونا وياخذو الذي في السفينة. درنه

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119 أصبحت خراب، وحاكمها توا واحد، عدوا ازحفوا عليه كل العائلات، كل الجماهير في درنه، طهّر درنه. داير لحية ويقول للنسوان

120 ما عاش يطلعن اعتبارا من اليوم، ريت النكسة؟ وقال جيبوا لي التبرعات أنا خليفة، وتبع بن لادن، وتبع الظواهري. والله باهي

121 يحكمكم الظواهري اخرها. أنتم تبوا أمريكا تجيكم تحتلكم؟ وتعمل لكم زي أفغانستان، زي الصومال، زي الباكستان، زي العراق؟

122 هكي بلادنا بتولي بتولي زي أفغانستان، يعجبكم هذا؟ باهي اطلعوا كان ما يعجبكمش. اطلعوا إلى الشوارع، سكروها كلها، وشدوهم

123 كلهم وطاردوهم وفكوا منهم سلاحهم، واعتقلوهم وحاكموهم وسلموهم إلى الأمن. قلة قليلة، في أي مكان سمعتم فيه حركة، هم

124 قلة، إرهابية بتحول ليبيا إلى إمارات تبع الظواهري أو تبع بن لادن، هذه أخرتها، بيش تخش أمريكا، وتقول إنها لن تسمح

125 بأفغانستان جديدة هنا في شمال أفريقيا؟! بيجيبون لنا الاستعمار، وتصبح بلادنا قنابل.

126 لقد تم توزيع الضباط الوحدويين الأحرار، على كل قبايلهم ومناطقهم، بيش يقودوا هذه القبائل وهذه المناطق، ويؤمنوها ويطهروها

127 من هذه الجردان. ويحاولون القبض على الذي غرر بأولادنا الصغار، ويقدموهم للمحكمة. هذي عقوبتهم في القانون. اسمعوا

128 الهتافات في الشوارع بالروح بالدم نفديك ياقايدنا، أنا ما يدورا في حد، هم يدورا في ليبيا. شوفوا جرايمهم في قانون العقوبات

129 الليبي اللي من قبل الثورة:

130 • رفع الليبيين السلاح ضد الدولة: عقوبته الإعدام، يُعاقب بالإعدام كل ليبي رفع السلاح على ليبيا.

131 • دس الدسائس مع الدول الأجنبية لإثارة الحرب ضد ليبيا: يُعاقب بالإعدام كل من فعل ذلك.

132 هذا قانون العقوبات...

133 • المساس بأراضي الدولة وتسهيل الحرب ضدها: يُعاقب بالإعدام، كل من سهّل دخول العدو في البلاد، أو سلمهم مدن، أو حصون،

134 أو منشآت، أو مواقع، أو موانئ. هذا العمل سيؤدي إلى تسليم هذه المواقع إلى أميريكا، لأن أميريكا لا ترضى بأن تصبح درنة ولاية

135 تبع بن لادن، ولا البيضاء، تبع بن لادن، ولا بنغازي تبع بن لادن. مابتسمح أميريكا، أبدا.

136 • التسلل إلى الأماكن العسكرية: إذا استفاد العدو من ذلك الفعل، فتكون العقوبة الإعدام. الذي يتسلل إلى الأماكن العسكرية، هذوم

137 ارتكبوا هذه الجرائم.

138 • يُعاقب بالإعدام، كل من زوّد حكومة أجنبية، أو أحد عمالها، أو أي شخص آخر يعمل لمصلحتها على أي وجه من الوجوه، وبأية

139 وسيلة ما يتعلق بالدفاع عن البلاد، أو أي سر مماثل له. وهاذوم أعطوا كل أسرارنا للعدو. مش ذنب الأطفال، نحكي أنا ذنب اللحى

140 الي ورا الأطفال، الذين يضحكون عليهم، الذين سيكون مصيرهم غدا أمام المحاكم، يبكون ويرفعون أيديهم ويقولون سامحونا، ولن

141 نسامحهم هذه المرة.

142 • الاعتداء على الدستور: يُعاقب بالإعدام كل من شرع بالقوة أو بغيرها من الوسائل التي لا يسمح باستعمالها النظام القانوني

143 والدستوري في تغيير الدستور أو شكل الحكم. هاذوم بيغيّرون سلطة الشعب، عقوبتهم الإعدام بحكم القانون.

144 • استعمال المفرقعات في ارتكاب الجريمة السابقة: يُعاقب بالإعدام كل من استعمل قنابل أو آلات مفرقعة أخرى من أجل ارتكاب

145 الجريمة، زي الذي هجموا على المخازن، عقوبتها الإعدام.

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لا! أرجوكم، توقفوا لتستمعوا فيه، كلكم متحمسين، أرجوكم أن توقفوا الرمي، أرجوكم أن توقفوا الرمي، خل الناس تسمع الكلام 146
الي أنا نقوله، لانه كلام خطير، بيدا من الليلة وبيدا من بكرا، عمل آخر، غير الرصاص هذاي، الرصاص مازال ما أمرتش بيه، لما 147
يصدر الامر باستعمال القوة. عندئذ نكون نحن أهلها، بعدين يحرق كل شيء. 148

- اغتصاب قيادة عسكرية، زي ما حصل في البيضاء، زي ما حصل في بنغازي، اغتصاب قيادة عسكرية أو التمسك بها بدون حق: 149
يعاقب بالاعدام كل من فعل ذلك. 150

- استعمال القوة ضد سلطات الدولة، عقوبته الاعدام، أفعال التخريب والنهب والتقتيل، يُعاقب بالاعدام كل جرايمهم التي عملوها، 151
منذ ذلك اليوم حتى الان، عقوبتها الاعدام في قانون العقوبات الليبي التي معمول به قبل الثورة. 152

- الحرب الأهلية: يُعاقب بالاعدام، كل من يرتكب فعل غايته إثارة حرب أهلية في البلاد. هذا العمل سيؤدي إلى حرب أهلية، ومثلما 153
قال لكم سيف الإسلام أمس، فانكم نحن قبائل كلها مسلحة، وما في قبيلة تحكمها قبيلة، ولا أحد يقدر يحكمنا أبدا، لا من درنة ولا 154
من هوتولونو، نحن مسلحون ولقدر أن نتمرد زي الصومال، وتبدى ليبيا تطيح، تبوها هكه تكون؟ هذا يقود إلى الحرب الأهلية، إذا 155
أنتم ما مسكتوهومش من الان، 156

- الحرب الأهلية: يُعاقب بالاعدام، كل من يرتكب فعل غايته إثارة حرب أهلية في البلاد، أو تفتيت الوحدة الوطنية. لما يدير لي درنة 157
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258 نربوهم، نعلموهم، نقروهم، نشغلوهم يطلعوا أمن، يطلعوا فنيين. لكن زي-كي -ما قال الشاعر في مناسبة بتاعت الزنتان هذه،

259 قال:"واحد زنتاني غلط فيه شاب من بني وليد، فهو زعل وقال شعر، ردوا عليه الزنتان". تنطبق على الحاله -لأني أنا بنقول

260 هالبيت لأنها تنطبق على الوضع الذي فيه اخوتي في الزنتان الآن. قال: " غلطة وغلطها شاب من الإعدادي لا يعرف التاريخ لا هو

261 إنساني". يعني قالوا له يا خونا يا زنتاني ما تؤاخدنا، هذا الذي غلط فيك ماهو ورفلي كبير، هذا الذي غلط فيك هو شاب صغير،

262 "غلطة غلطها شاب من الإعدادي لا يعرف التاريخ ولا هو إنساني"، مزبوط، توا الشباب اللي تواما يعرفوا التاريخ، لا يعرفوا

263 معركة الكردون. أنا أعرفها ونقدر من أجلها الزنتان، لكن هم نسيوا أمجاد آبائهم وأجدادهم. " لا هيش مقصودة ولا غلطتنا، شباب

264 طيش من وكالة البناني"، قالوا له " هذي لا هي غلطتنا إحنا ولاشي، هذا شباب طايش من اللي ياكلوا في البناني.. ههههه"،

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الجيل الجديد اللي ياكل في الموز. بالضبط، الشباب اللي في الزنتان هم من هذا النوع، مش الزنتان، شفتوا واحد بشنابه؟ شفتوا 265
واحد بعايلته، واحد براتبه، واحد بوظيفته، شفتوا واحد عنده دكان، واحد عنده مزرعة، واحد عنده مقهى، عنده مطعم، عنده 266
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18. العقوبة على الذين جندوا الشبان هاذوم، وضحكوا عليهم، هم هذولاللي يجب أن تقبضوا عليهم، وتقدموهم للعدالة، قدموهم 269
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جمعوا لي هالشبان، خلوني نتكلم معاهم، شوفوا كيف يتغيرون. عطوني فرصة، جيبوهم، خلي الزنتان يجيبوا أولادهم، أو أي مكان 274
آخر يجيب أولادهم. 275

أنا نقود ثورة الشباب وأنا طالب، هذه ثورتنا، الثورة الشعبية، أنا أتمنى الثورة الشعبية، أن الشعب يستلم كل شيء. وأنا اللي قلت 276
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إزالة كل معوقات الحياة في الشوارع، الدكاكين تُفتح، الدكاكين يجب تُفتح، الكوشك تُفتح، المطارات تُفتح، الموانئ تُفتح. لا تخربوا 309
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عفوا، بلغوني أن الشعر اللي قلته عن الزنتان، هذاك الوقت في انقطاع فني ما سمعوشي.فسامحوني بنعاوده مرة ثانية إذا كان 313
الإرسال ماشي كويس، قتلكم، قلتكم: واحد ورفلي، عفوا شاب شاب ورفلي غلط في واحد زنتاني، والزنتاني زعل وحسبها على 314
ورفلة كلهم، وقال مش حنجيكم، ومانوش عاد أصحاب، ومش حنجي لبني وليد، وزعل وقالها في قصيدة شعر، ردوا عليه ورفلة 315
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الإعدادية-ما يعرف التاريخ، ولا يعرف معركة الكردون زي ما قلت أنا توا إن الشباب الموجودين توا، ما يعرفون أهلهم وأجدادهم، 317
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على شأنهم. حتى توا الشباب الموجودين في الزنتان، هم من شباب الطيش، لكن جيبوهم لي، ياريت اتجيبونهم لي بس. كل الشباب 322
هاذوم، أنا نبيهم، أنا نبي الشباب الثاير، أنا اللي سميته جيل الغضب. معقولة شباب الفاتح يترك الأمجاد، ويضحي بها ويحرق 323
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325 يمكن، مش ممكن شبابنا يقودهم واحد آخر. هم إذا كان ماتيعوش معمر القذافي،يبتعوا واحد مقمل بلحيته؟ ههههه... مش ممكن
326 الشباب معنا احنا،هذول شبابنا، هذا جيل الغضب اللي أنا ربيته، وهم يهتفوا في كل مكان يقولوا:احنا جيل بناه معمر واللي يعادينا
327 يدمر.

328 أخيرا يا سادة، مالم تتحقق هذه الأشياء :تسليم الأسلحة، تسليم الأسرى، تسليم المشاغبين، القبض على الذين غرروا بأولادنا ،
329 وإزالة كل شيء، وإعادة الحياة الطبيعية للموانئ، والمطارات، والطرق، والمخابز، والميه، والتموين، والمواصلات، والاتصالات،
330 وتعود الحياة هانئة، والعائلات تقعد عايشة في أمان، وأطفالنا عايشين في أمان، ويروحوا للشارع، وللمقهى، وللملاهي، وللمطاعم،
331 مالم يتحقق هذا، ونرى أن وحدة ليبيا تتعرض للخطر، أو إن قوى معادية للديمقراطية، معادية للحرية، بتشوه الإسلام -القاعدة
332 بالذات- نراها، إذا كان سنرى أن هذا سيتحقق ،سنحول دون تحقيقه. عندئذ، نقول لكم، سيعلن الزحف، سيعلن الزحف المقدس،
333 زي مسيرة ألف ميل التي قادها ماو تسي تونغ، وحرر بها الصين إلى عند اليوم، خلاها دولة تملك القنبلة الهيدروجينية. أيوه،سنقود
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335 البيوت، ونطهر كل شيء. اللي بيسلم نفسه نادم ومعترف بذنبه، من الذين حركوا شبابنا، أما شبابنا فسيندمون. الشباب هذول،
336 خلهم يسلمون نفسهم وماعليهومش، حنعالجوهم، حنعالجوهم، نعالجوهم أولا الحبوب، لصحتهم لأن لهم كم يوم يأخذون الحبوب.
337 لكن أمهاتهم يمشوا يجيبهم، ونسمحوا لهم يعدو ايجبنهم. وكان الرجال خايفين من العصابات، النسوان والبنات يعدن يأخذن خوتهن
338 وأولادهن، ويجيبوهن للبيوت، ندربوهم، نعلموهم، احنا أهلهم، نؤهلوهم للعمل الصالح، والخدمة الصالحة، ويجيبوا دخل، ويجيبوا
339 رواتب، ويؤمنوا البلاد. معقولة شبابنا يخربوا البلاد؟ أبداً هذا مش شبابنا! هذولا اللي وراهم، الي يقومون بالعمل هذا عاطينهم
340 حبوب، راه، مش بإرادتهم. الله أكبر! إذا لم يتحقق كل هذا، أنا بعد ذلك سنعلن الزحف، سنعلن الزحف المقدس. أيوه. أنا راه معمر
341 القذافي قائد أممي. أنا تدافع عني الملايين. أنا سنوجه نداء للملايين من الصحراء إلى الصحراء، وسنزحف أنا والملايين، لتطهير
342 ليبيا شبر شبر، بيت بيت، دار دار، زنقه زنقه، فرد فرد، حتى تتطهر البلد من الدنس والأنجاس. لا يمكن أن نسمح لليبيا تضيع بين
343 أيدينا بدون مبرر، في غوط الباطل، من يسمح بهذا؟

344 أنا معي الملايين، ومعي الله، الذي نصرني على القوى العظمى الكبرى. معي الملايين مش من الداخل، معي الملايين من الأمم
345 الأخرى. أنا نوجه نداء إلى كل ملايين الصحراء، من الصحراء إلى الصحراء ستزحف الملايين. الملايين تزحف، وما يقدر حد
346 يوقفها. بسرعة! أنقذوا أنفسكم قبل أن نعطي إشارة الزحف المقدس.

347 الليلة زحف سلمي، الليلة زحف سلمي، من داخل المدن، من داخل القرى، من داخل الواحات، لإنقاذ أطفالنا والقبض على اللي
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349 الزحف من أين يأتي، وبعدها في الزحف الأممي اللي انا نقوده، لأن ليبيا تهم كل الأمم، ليبيا مثابة عالمية.

350 أنا قاعد هنا، ما يكذبوش عليكم؟أنا نمشي إلى فنزويلا؟ والله؟!

351 أنا نخلي جثمان الشهيد عبد السلام بومنيار أول شهيد سقط في الخمس عام 1911، ونعدي إلى فنزويلا، والله يكتبها علي
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353 أتصدقوا؟!ها هو أول حاجة، هذي الكذبة بتاعهم، مش أمس قالوا لكم القذافي في فنزويلا؟ وهاذي أنا قاعد؟ هذه المحطات العربية

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أكبر عدو، متشمة فيكم. تبغيكم أن تدمروا النفط، وتدمروا الحرية، وتدمروا السلطة الشعبية، وتدمروا ليبيا، وما عاش تبقى ليبيا   354
قلعة عالمية. متغاضون منكم، عشان كذا يشوهون فيكم. بارك الله فيكم يا أخوتنا في قطر. بارك الله فيكم يا أخوتنا في قطر. هذه آخرتها؟   355
هذا الماء والملح اللي بيننا وبينكم؟ هذا الدم والأخوة اللي بيننا وبينكم؟ تزوروا في كل شيء علينا؟ بدل ما تكونوا معنا، تكونوا   356
ضدنا؟ لمصلحة من؟ بالله لمصلحة من؟ قد تندمون يوم لا ينفع الندم، الذي بيته من الزجاج لا يرجم الناس بالحجارة. من أنتم؟ دقت   357
ساعة العمل، دقت ساعة الزحف، دقت ساعة الانتصار، لا رجوع. إلى الأمام. إلى الأمام. إلى الأمام. ثورة، ثورة.   358

1 Good evening, today dear youth in the Green Square, and the morning of the revolution for
2 tomorrow. I salute you, you courageous people. I salute you, you the youth of the Fateh, the youth
3 of the nationalism, the youth of the Fatimi, the youth of challenge, the generation of challenge, and
4 the generation of anger. I salute you while you are presenting the true image of the Libyan people
5 to the world, whom are surrounded by the revolution. You- in the Green Square-are presenting the
6 truth that the agencies of traitors, agents, baseness, backwardness and cowardness are trying to
7 cover up, and to destroy your image in front of the world. Unfortunately, it is Arab brothers' media,
8 that are betraying and deceiving you, and present your image in a bad way that harms all Libyans
9 men and women. They are telling them "look at Libya, look at Libya, it does not want dignity, it
10 does not want glory, it does not want liberation, it does not want revolution. Look at Libya, it wants
11 dervishs, it wants bearded people, it wants people with turbans, look at Libya, it wants
12 colonization, it wants deterioration, and wants to reach the lowest point". However, you- here in
13 the Green Square- are saying, "Libya wants glory, Libya wants to be on top, the top of the world".
14 Libya leads the continents Asia, Africa, Latin America, and even Europe. All the continents hold
15 their summits here in Libya. This is a glory for Libyan men and women. Libyan people are now
16 known all over the world, after that time when Libyan people had no identity. When you say
17 Libyan, they ask you "Libya? Liberia? Lebanon?" They do not know Libya. However, today when
18 you say Libya, they say "oh yeah, Libya, Algaddafi, Libya the revolution". All the African nations
19 consider Libya their mecca, all the Latin Americans nations, and all the Asian nations. All the
20 world leaders with their great nuclear powers, they come to Libya, to your country, to Tripoli, to
21 Sirte, to Benghazi. They have destroyed your image, unfortunately in Arab brothers' media, they
22 worship the devil, and they want to insult you. We want to react to this now, with an action, on the
23 land, in the field. Mummar Algaddafi does not have a position, to be sad and resigns from it, just
24 like the other presidents. Mummar Algaddafi is not a president, but a revolution leader. Revolution
25 means sacrifice, always and forever, and until the end of life. This is my country, the country of
26 my grandparents, your grandparents. We planted it with our hands, and we watered it with the
27 blood of our grandparents. We are more worthy of Libya than those rats, and those hired people.
28 Who are those hired people? Who are being paid by the foreign secret services? May god curse
29 them, they have ashamed their children if they have any, they have ashamed their families, if they
30 have any and ashamed their tribes, if they have any. However, those people have do not belong to
31 any tribes; because Libyan tribes are honourable, fighters, and strugglers, they have all came to

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32   me this month. All those tribes from Butnan, to the Nafusa Mountains, to Fezzan, they are all

33   chanting the same slogan, they are all challenging. We have challenged America in this place, with

34   its tyrant and power. We have challenged the great nuclear countries in the world, and we won and

35   they bowed their heads here. Italy kissed the hands of the son of the martyr - Omar Mukhtar the

36   elder martyrs- and this is a glory that there is not any other glory compared to it, and not just to the

37   Manfah tribe, not to the Butnan only, and not for Benghazi only, but for all Libyans, Arabs and

38   Muslims. This is glory, that they want to destroy.

39   Italy the empire back at that time, was destroyed on the Libyan land with all its legions. I am higher

40   than the positions that presidents and pomps take, I am a fighter, struggler, warrior, and revolutionist,

41   from the tent, from the desert. All the cities, villages, and oases has joined me in a historic revolution

42   that brought glory to the Libyan people, that they would enjoy a generation after another. Libya shall

43   remain at the top, leading Africa, Latin America, and leading Asia, but also leading the world. Nothing

44   can stop this historic and victorious journey, not a bunch of mercenaries and hirelings who are hired

45   by those cats and rats who are jumping from one street to another and from one alley to another, in the

46   darkness. I paid the price for staying here, my grandfather Abdul Salam Abu Meniar, the first martyr

47   falling over the Al Khums in the first battle in 1911.I will not insult this great sacrifice; I will not leave

48   the pure remains of my grandfather in Murqub. I will die with him as martyr at the end. Here is the

49   remains of my father in Hani, a fighter, one of the heroes in Ghardabiya and Tala, and here is my

50   grandfather, my uncle Sheikh Al-Saadi in Munaydar cemetery. I do not leave those pure remains.

51   Those are the fighters. Bashir al-Saadawi said, "Freedom is like a tree, no one can stay under its shadow

52   but those who planted it and watered it with their own blood". Libya is a tree, we are under its shadow

53   because we have planted it with our hands and we have watered it with our blood.

54   I am talking to you from this resistance place, this house in Tripoli, which was raided by one hundred

55   and seventy planes, led by great nuclear countries, America, Britain and the NATO. Forty Boeing

56   airplanes, providing fuel for this campaign. They passed over all the palaces, all the houses, and all

57   your homes- all your homes they passed it- looking for Mummar Algaddafi's house. Why? Is it because

58   Mummar Algaddafi is the president of the country? If he were a president of the country, they would

59   have treated him like other countries presidents'. However, because Mummar Algaddafi is history,

60   resistance, liberation, glory, revolution, and this is a confession from the greatest countries in the

61   world, that Mummar Algaddafi is not a president, or a regular person who we can kill by poison

62   or make a demonstration against him to have him fall. When bombs were all over this place,

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63   bombing my house, and killing my children, where have you been you rats? Where have you been
64   you people with beards, you who are living in the dark in Derna's hill? In the Jebel Akhdar hill,
65   and in any other hills? Where have you been? You were with the Americans, clapping your hands
66   to your masters, the Americans. When Mummar Algaddafi with his family were in this place,
67   bombed by bombs. One hundred and seventy plane, passed the kings, the presidents, and the passed
68   all the palaces in the Arab region, and came to Mummar Algaddafi's tent, and Mummar
69   Algaddafi's house. This kind of glory that Libya will not let go, and the Libyan people will not let
70   go, not even the Arab nation, Islamic nation, the African, the Latin American, and not any nation
71   that wants freedom, dignity for humans, and fights the tyrant. We fought America's tyrant, Britain
72   tyrant, and the nuclear countries. We fought the NATO's tyrant, we did not give up, and we were
73   resisting here. Now, a small group of youth -who were given pills-, are raiding the police stations
74   here and there like rats. Attacking a secure and oblivious barrack, because we are not in a war
75   status, we do not need to enforce the security on our warehouses and camps. We are among our
76   families in peace and security, and Libya is in peace. They have used this peace and this security,
77   and the welfare Libya is living in, and they raided some camps and some centres. They burned the
78   files that has their crimes, attacked the courts that has their files, and the police station that has the
79   integrations upon their crimes. Nevertheless, they are not guilty; those youth they are not guilty at
80   all, because they are young about sixteen, seventeen, and eighteen years old. Sometimes they
81   imitate what is going on in Tunisia and what is going on in Egypt, and this is normal. Sometimes
82   when they hear about some youths who robbed courts in a city in Libya, they will say, "Okay, we
83   will go and rob the court in our city too". It is only imitation, "they said they got weapons, we want
84   weapons too!" But there are few sick groups who have sneaked among us in the cities, providing
85   pills, and sometimes even money, to those young youth, and they push them towards those side
86   battles. Those who were killed were police officers, soldiers and those youth, and not those people
87   who are directing them. They are sitting in their houses, or are abroad enjoying the security, safety
88   and the pleasure for them and their children. They are directing your children, giving them pills,
89   and they are telling them "go and bring weapons, rob and burn, you are the heroes." Thus, your
90   children will die, and so we will fight each other. Abdul Fatah Younis is one of the heroes of the
91   Great Fateh revolution heroes. He was under my command when we attacked Benghazi
92   broadcasting channel and I have announced the first announcement to liberate Libya, which was
93   occupied back then. Five American headquarters right at that moment when Abdul Fatah went

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94   right in Benghazi city with me. Five American headquarters, twenty thousand Italians occupying

95   the Libyan land, from Misrata to Tarhuna, to Sabratha, under the control of the Italian civilians.

96   Right next to all the shops, the workshops and all the services. They had members of the parliament

97   in the Libyan Council of Deputies who took bribes. The Butnan was completely occupied by the

98   American forces, and Tobruk was collapsing under the complete American occupation when we

99   went to liberate Benghazi. You do not know the Fwehat Camp that was called   and was

100   one hundred percent English. When Abdul Fatah and I were attacking Benghazi's broadcasting

101   channel, to announce the liberation from it. Not to announce the relapsing that is happening now,

102   going backward, the shame and the humiliation. The "hospital" camp in Benghazi was camp

103   Wavell, there was the name Wavell written on it, and no one dared to erase the word Wavell.

104   Where have you been? Where have your fathers and your grandparents been? You mercenaries!

105   When five American headquarters were on the Libyan's land? Has anyone of you shot at them?

106   Or bombed one single bomb? We sacrificed ourselves; we were preparing ourselves to go into a

107   battle with America and Britain on the Libyan land. I have announced from the Evacuation Square

108   in Tripoli, that if there was no evacuation, we will start fighting from one street to another and

109   from house to another against the American forces. You have never said that, neither your parents,

110   you mercenaries. Where have you been, you? Do you think Libya is easy? We have paid a precious

111   price for Libya, and built a great glory for it that no one can reach. We have left the authority to

112   the Libyan people since 1977, the free officers and me, we no longer have any positions or any

113   authorities, and we do not issue any laws or any resolutions. We have left the authority to the

114   Libyan people, to the People's Congress and the People's committees. Whether it treated well or not,

115   fixed it or not, insulted it or not, and corrupted it or not, all of this concerns all the Libyans. In the

116   hospital, in the school, in the administration, in the office, in the car, in the airplane, in the housing, in

117   the agricultural, and in the industry. All of those fields are run by Libyans, they are running the People's

118   committees that belongs to the People's Congress, and those People's Congress consisted from all the

119   Libyan people. The problem was totally solved in Libya; the fight over the authority was over when

120   the Libyan people took entirely in 1977. My friends and me are no longer responsible for anything,

121   expect for fighting for Libya and we hold on to our weapons only. When America raided us, we fought

122   them, and France at the south we fought them. We fought Sadat, we fought Habre, we fought Haile

123   Selassie, and even Bourguiba and Nimeiry we fought them. Then the backwardness has fallen,

124   colonization agents has fallen and colonization has fallen. We only had our guns; we left everything

125   else to you, even the money from the petroleum I am sick of telling you take it with your own hands.

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126 Each month, take the money of the petroleum and do what you want with it. Do not let them laugh at
127 you now, and ask you where is the money of the petroleum has gone. You said, "No, let the money be
128 for the country, with the committees". You were the ones who voted for them to be People's General
129 committees, and the entire People's committees, you are the one responsible for it. They are laughing
130 at you! Are you that naïve? Tomorrow … I support the people's authority, and I ask the Libyan people
131 to form new districts and municipals, according to the program that Saif al-Islam has explained to you.

132 I know that the Ubaidat that Abdul Fatah Younis is part of, who was shot yesterday in Benghazi -
133 and his fate is still unknown- was told "you are from Ubaidat, what brought you to Benghazi?".
134 During the revolution night, he was liberating Benghazi with me. Why didn't they tell him back
135 then you are from Ubaidat, do not come to Benghazi. Where have you been when Abdul Fatah
136 was jeopardizing his life fighting with his gun? And when he was fighting Sadat, and Israel on the
137 boarders when they were about to invade you? Sadat was about to invade you, him and America.
138 Abdul Fatah was the hero of the battles on the boarders, and yesterday they were shooting him and
139 his fate is still unknown. They told him "you are from Ubaidat? What brought you to Benghazi?"
140 Is that it? Is that it, you people of Benghazi? Who are you? Never! They are not the people of
141 Benghazi at all!

142 I will repeat this, I will talk about the districts; I know that the Ubaidat is in Al-Qubbah, they do
143 not want to join Derna, and they want their own district. I am with what the people wants, so be it,
144 a district to the Ubaidat, and a district to Al-Qubbah. Starting from tomorrow, they can announce
145 the district and start the district authority. To also purify it, and make everything in there with their
146 own hands. I know that Bani Walid does not want to join Misrata, and considers the joining as an
147 act forceful injustice. Then Bani Walid may be liberated, Bani Walid wants to form a district, they
148 are free, it is up to their people. The youth of Al Rusaifa, the youth of Soula, they are capable of
149 making a district, they are capable to make their own decisions, and not to respond to anyone or
150 take help from anyone. Dardanel of Tripoli, just like what the Italian called it, Bani Walid became
151 Dardanel of Tripoli. This is because it was the major defence that resisted the Italian attacks that
152 head to the south. I know that Tarhuna does not want to join the Al Khums or Msallata. They are
153 free, the people of Tarhuna are free, and they can make their own district starting from tomorrow
154 and make their people's authority. Misrata is free, Zliten is free, Khoms is free, and Msallata is
155 free. I am quite sure that after this call, the people will go starting from tomorrow to form new
156 committees. I expect that the districts (shabiyah), which are about twenty-three committee now,

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157 are going to reach about thirty committee or more. I also believe that there will be municipality for
158 the local administration, from fifty municipality to one hundred and fifty municipality I think.
159 Because everyone wants to have their own municipality This is the right thing. This is what helps
160 the human being; it should serve our lives and history, and it will not make us ashamed in front of
161 the world, and not burning wheels, and stealing guns. A boy in Benghazi took bombs, they gave
162 him an RPG, those anti-tank weapons, and he is walking with it in Benghazi! The horror in
163 Benghazi! Dear world, RPG weapons are in the city of Benghazi! The Americans sneaked it in;
164 the Italians did so we can fight them! They provided tanks to those young kids and they are running
165 around with it in Benghazi's streets! They drove those kids crazy, made them drunk, and gave
166 them pills. They isolated them from their families. The families should start gathering their kids,
167 starting from tomorrow. Get out of your houses, you who love Mummar Algaddafi, men, women,
168 girls and children, and you who are with Mummar Algaddafi the revolutionist. With Mummar
169 Algaddafi glory and pride to Libya and to reach the top for the Libyan people. He, who wants
170 glory, should remember the evacuation of the Italians, the evacuation of the Americans, and the
171 evacuation of the English, the Great Man-Made River, People's authority, and the return of the oil.
172 It was ninety percent of it for the American companies, and you only get ten percent. Now, you
173 get ninety percent, and the American companies get only ten percent. Those who wants glory,
174 pride and dignity should come out of their houses, get out of your houses, get out to the streets.
175 Secure the streets, and catch the rats, do not be afraid of them. We did not use force yet; the force
176 supports the Libyan people. If things reached the point where it is necessary to use force, we will
177 use it according to the international law, and to the Libyan constitution and laws. Starting from
178 tomorrow, or tonight, you get out of all the Libyan cities, villages and oases you who love Mummar
179 Algaddafi, because Mummar Algaddafi is glory. If I have a position, if I was the president, I would
180 have thrown the resignation to your faces, those germs. However, I do not have a position; I do
181 not have anything to resign from. I have my gun, I shall fight until the last drop of my blood, and
182 all the Libyan people are with me.

183 I have always lived my life fearless, you are facing a deaf rock, a hard rock, that America's fleets
184 were crashed over it; wouldn't your gangs be destroyed over it too? Get out of your houses, raid
185 them in their dens, take your kids from the streets, and take your kids from them. They took your
186 kids, brainwashing them, making them drunk, and telling them "go to the fire", so that your kids
187 will die. Your kids are dying, for what reason? For what purpose? Nothing, nothing but to destroy

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188 Libya, to burn Libya. Police officers have died, your kids have died, but their kids have not died,
189 their kids have not died, their kids are in America and Europe! What happened to you? Why is this
190 fear? Why is the horror from those gangs? Gangs like rats. They are nothing. They cannot be one
191 in a million of the Libyan people. They are worth nothing, bunch of youth, who are imitating what
192 is happening in Tunisia and Egypt, who were given pills, and was ordered from within to burn,
193 rob, do this, imitate... Rats. Starting from tomorrow, security by police and military are imposing
194 security. Starting from tomorrow, the barriers should be lifted, any barriers should be lifted. You
195 lift it, lift it from your cities, and catch them, chase them everywhere, wake up and get out of your
196 houses. Is this how you want Benghazi? To be destroyed? To cut off the electricity from it? And
197 cut off the water? Who will bring you electricity and water? That is it. Those rats can reach the
198 petroleum, and blast the petroleum, and then you are back to the darkness, to the year 1952. What
199 forced us to this? Oh god, Benghazi, I built it, brick by brick, we are happy with it and still building
200 it now. They brought your kids to destroy it now! Who can think that there would be gunshots in
201 Benghazi? Bombs in Benghazi? Fires in Benghazi? Tanks in the streets of Benghazi now? It is
202 only three tanks that were burnt, and it mortified Benghazi. They are going to the airport, trying to
203 sabotage it. The planes stopped, the civil aviation has stopped. Which plane would still land in
204 Benina airport? Even ships, they said we cannot dock in Benghazi's port, because there are rats
205 there, and when we arrive, they will attack us and take everything in our ships. Derna became a
206 destruction and its leader now, march to him; all the families and the masses in Derna, purify
207 Derna. The leader has a beard and he is telling the women not to go out starting from today. Did
208 you see this setback? He said brought me donations, I am your caliph and I am with Bin Laden
209 and Al-Zawahiri! You will be governed by Al-Zawahiri at the end? Do you want America to come
210 here and occupy you? Does to you like it did to Afghanistan? Like Somalia? Like Pakistan? Like
211 Iraq? By doing so our country will be gone, it will be gone just like Afghanistan! You like that?
212 Listen; get out if you do not like this. Get out to the streets, close it all, catch them, chase them,
213 and take their weapons from the. Arrest them, sue them and hand them to the police. Very few,
214 wherever have you heard that there is a movement, they are few terrorists who wants to turn Libya
215 into states that follows Al-Zawahiri or Bin Laden. Is this it? To allow America to come in, and say
216 that it will not allow another new Afghanistan here in north Africa! They will bring colonization,
217 and our country to become a bomb.

21

218 The free officers are now distributed to all their tribes and their cities, to lead those tribes and those
219 cities, secure it, and purify it from those rats. Try to catch those who manipulated our young youth
220 and to hand them to the courts. Their penalties will be by law. Listen to the chanting in the streets
221 "with the soul, with the blood, we will sacrifice for you our leader". They do not want me; they
222 want Libya. Look at their crimes in the Libyan Penal Code, which was issued before the revolution.

223 • Libyans carrying weapons against the country, the punishment is execution. Punished with
224 execution any Libyan who carries weapons in Libya.

225 • To plot conspiracies with foreign countries to start war against Libya, the punishment is
226 execution for anyone who does so.

227 This is Libyan Penal Code …

228 • To violate the country's properties, and facilitate war against it, the punishment is
229 execution, for anyone who facilitates the access for the enemy into the country, or who
230 hand them cities, forts, facilities, positions, or ports. This action will lead into handing
231 those positions to America. Because America will not allow that Derna becomes a stat that
232 follows Bin Laden, nor Al Bayda' follows Bin Laden or Benghazi follows Bin Laden.
233 America will not never allow this.

234 • Sneaking to military positions, if the enemy benefited from this indeed, the punishment is
235 execution. The person who sneaks to military positions is the person who committed all
236 those crimes.

237 • Punished with execution any person who provided a foreign government, one of its agents,
238 or any person that works for it by any way or by any method with anything related to the
239 defence of the country, or any similar secrets. Those gave all our secrets to our enemies. It
240 is not the kids fault; it is the fault of the bearded people behind those kids. They are
241 laughing at you. Their destinies will be in courts tomorrow, they will cry and raise their
242 hands and ask for forgiveness, but we will not forgive them this time.

243 • Assaulting the constitution, the punishment is execution for anyone who legalized force or
244 any other way the methods that are not allowed to be used by legal law or constitution in
245 change the constitution or the way the governing is. Those people will change the people's
246 authority; they will be punished with execution by law.

22

247 • Using explosives in committing any of the previous crimes, the punishment is execution
248   for anyone who have used bombs or any other bombing machines. We can see that
249   committing a crime like brining the warehouses is punished with execution.

250 No please, stop, listen to me, you are all excited. Please stop shooting. Please stop shooting. Let
251 the people listen to what I have to say because it is a very serious speech, it will start from tonight
252 and tomorrow. Anything else rather than those bullets, I still have not ordered shooting. When I
253 issue the order to use force, by then, the power is within your hands. By that time everything will
254 be burnt.

255 • The violation of a military base -similar to what happened in Al Bayda', and what happened
256   in Benghazi- the violation of a military base or to hold in to it without rights is punished
257   with execution, to anyone who does that.

258 • Using force against the country authorities, the punishment is execution. The acts of
259   vandalism, robbing, and killing are all punished with execution. All of their crimes that
260   they have committed, since that day and until now are all punished with execution in the
261   Libyan law that was applicable before the revolution.

262 • Civil war, the punishment is execution, anyone who commits an action, which aims to
263   provoke a civil war in the country. This action now will lead to a civil war, like what Saif
264   Al-Islam has said yesterday. He told you, we are all armed tribes, and there are not any tribe
265   that governs another one. No one can govern us, not from Derna nor from the Honolulu. We
266   are all armed, and we can rebel like Somalia. Libya then would starts to burn. Do you want this
267   to happen? This will lead to civil war! Unless you hold it together starting from now.

268 • Civil war: punishment is execution, anyone who commits an action, which aims to provoke
269   a civil war in the country or to break the national unity. When they make Derna an Islamic
270   state, Al Bayda' an Islamic state, and Benghazi I do not know, a republic. The national
271   unity will break down, and this is punished with execution. Abusing and playing with the
272   unity of the nations! Oh, Really?

273 Yeltsin, Yeltsin, the Russian President, the State Duma that is the state parliament. There was a
274 strike in the State Duma, just a strike, they have asked them to get out, and they said: "no, we are
275 striking". They have asked them to get out, get out; they did not. One day, two days, three days, in
276 front of the world, they are negotiating with them to get out, and they said we are not getting out.

23

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277 They brought the tanks, it was broadcast in the television, Yeltsin, and they demolished the State
278 Duma while the members of parliaments are still inside. They ran over them with tanks, until they
279 got out like rats. The west did not object to it. On the contrary, they said you are doing a legal
280 action. Strike is considered a rebellious act in the country. It was not armed, members of the
281 parliament with no weapons, just striking.

282 Students in Beijing, striking in Tiananmen Square, they stayed for few days. They have raised the
283 Kitty Cola logo, demanding to be like America. After that, Deng came and brought the tanks for
284 them. The tanks dragging the students in the Square, those who were in front of the tanks have
285 died, until the tanks came from the other side. Those who were alive went away and some were
286 alive but mortified, and whoever died, died. He told them "The unity of China is more precious
287 than the people in that Square".

288 "The unity of the Russian Federation, its dignity, its law ,the respect of its constitution, and solving
289 tits problems in the right methods, he told them, is more important that the bunch of the members
290 of parliament."Hit them with the tanks, and the West told him "Yes, you are right."

291 The Branch Davidians in America -they are children and women and they also have other obsessed
292 people who were called the Branch Davidians- are a radical religious sect who made a strike in a
293 big warehouse inside America. They tried with them, they tried but it was useless. Clinton brought
294 tanks and poison gas, and he destroyed them.

295 The school that made a strike in Russia, they brought poison gas and killed them all.

296 Al-Zarqawi, they said he went with his gang, they consider him with Bin Laden, and he went to
297 Fallujah. America erased Fallujah by aviation totally. They hit mosques, why? They said we are
298 fighting terrorism, and they said this is not a mosque, it is a headquarter for terrorists. We are trying
299 to locate Al-Zarqawi and his gang they are hiding in this city, which is called Fallujah. Therefore,
300 we have to destroy it, they have searched it house by house by bombs, by aviation, and they have
301 destroyed it. America cannot object to anyone like the one in Derna when you destroy it, because
302 the Americans themselves did the same thing. Baghdad was completely destroyed, so many
303 civilians have died, families died. Celebration occasions was hit, and they said we thought it was
304 an enemy gathering. A building they said there is a terrorist inside it they destroy all of it. A shop
305 they destroyed, they said we thought there are terrorists sneaked inside the shop. They killed

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306 everyone who were in the shop. One million, two millions, three millions have died in Baghdad
307 by the American planes, just because they said we want to destroy terrorism. We want to destroy
308 the Baath party as they said, we want to destroy Al-Qaida, and therefore we are free to use whatever
309 force is needed.

310 Gaza, the Israelis took it over and no one condemned them, the Americans are still defending them
311 until now. They have said the Israel's have the right, they have the right, its self-defence, they have
312 to surround it by land and sea and air and have to bomb it, tanks all over the streets of Gaza and
313 kills whoever it wants.

314 You see what is going on in Somalia; do you want your country to be like Somalia? Like Iraq?
315 The same group that sabotaged those countries are now in Libya. They want to make Libya like
316 Afghanistan, Somalia, and Derna becomes like Fallujah, Bayda' becomes like Fallujah, or
317 Benghazi becomes like Fallujah. The same gang because they are the same group. We start from
318 tonight and tomorrow, the youth all the youth, not the rats, the sick ones who are taking the pills,
319 who took them from you. All the youth starting from tomorrow will form people local security
320 committees. Now and from tonight, they start to sew a green logo and has a writing on it that says
321 the people local security committee. We secure all the Libyan cities, until the organization of
322 security is back to order. Because we have told the security officers do not fight them, they said
323 "since we are not fighting we want to go home". We have told them to go home, they said "they
324 have come to attack us with bullets, they will kill us.", so we told them no, no do not fight them.
325 They have said since we are not fighting them, then we want to go home. This is until security
326 officers are back again and they take their weapons and impose security in the streets. Now free
327 officers are distributed to their tribes, thank god each tribe has their own free office in Libya that
328 are securing their tribes. They are not America's agents, Bin Laden's agents or Al-Zarqawi's
329 followers, those people with lice.

330 Your children, starting from tomorrow, the youth and not the youth that we said they bought them
331 and took them. Those, we are over with; we will see what their parents do with them. If they treated
332 it, their parents, and handed them over we will train them, cure them from the pills they took and
333 they might be good youth. However, if they remain like this, every time raiding a place, no! This...
334 hehehe, you will see how this will end! All the women who have boys get out quickly, those who
335 have brothers, get out quickly, and those who have a relative or her lover, get out quickly. The

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336	men, who have boys, get out quickly, mothers, sisters and girls all of you get out to the streets. Get
337	out to the streets quickly and control the streets. I lead the people's revolution. We want the Libyan
338	people to control Libya from its west to its east. I am at the top of the people's revolution, we will
339	show them how people's revolution is, it is the awareness, constructive work, control of security,
340	security, respect, people's authority, people's authority and people congress and committees. Show
341	them how people's authority can be, show them how people's revolution can be, get out of your
342	house starting from now. Starting from tomorrow, the youth should participate also in the
343	revolution defence committees. The revolution that means all the earnings, the finical and spiritual
344	one. It means the glory, the pride, it means Mummar Algaddafi, and it means the history of the
345	grandparents and martyrs. Starting from tomorrow, all the youth should carry a logo of the
346	revolution defence committees in all the Libyan cities, the Libyan village and the Libyan oases.
347	Tomorrow form the committees, and those logos were them all on your arms. The committees that
348	defend your earnings, the earnings mean to defend the oil, to defend the Great-Man Made River, to
349	defend the huge accommodation investment that costs seventy-one billion dollar and would house
350	about three millions Libyan, the airports, the ports, the roads, the bridges and the finical earnings.
351	Starting from tomorrow, committees will be formed from the youth, committees to defend the
352	revolution earnings. Committees to defend the revolution, committees to defend the people local
353	security, committees to defend the social values and ethics. This committee will be formed from
354	people who memorised the Quran and they are about one million individual, people who
355	memorised the Quran in Libya, and the mosques imams the pure ones. They know the Sunnah,
356	they know the principles, they know the true Salafiya, and not just kill and kill. Whoever killed an
357	innocent soul it is as if he killed the entire human race. Tomorrow we will form committees to
358	defend social values and ethics, to protect the streets. The girl is walking, the woman is walking,
359	even if she is not wearing a headscarf, no one bothers her and no one kidnaps her like what is going
360	on now. Kidnapping now, it is all over now. Violating houses in all the cities, those gangs are in.
361	people are living in hell. It is not a military that you can fight them with tanks and aviation;
362	otherwise, we could have used our planes, tanks and artilleries. It is not even people, a battlefront
363	from the battlefronts. No, not at all, rats! Catch them from tonight; start with them until you catch
364	them.

| 365 | I think -starting from tomorrow- there will be a new management in the state of the masses, a new state |
| 366 | of masses, new districts, new municipalities, and a new real people's authority. In regards to the |

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367 constitution, and whatever is related to journalism, civil society organizations, etc., Saif Al-Islam has
368 talked to you about it. These things are related to Saif Al-Islam, everything such as lawyers, judges,
369 bloggers, writers, journalists and the youth, all of these issues are related to Saif Al-Islam and to those
370 groups.They can talk about it with lawyers as well as with the people who are talking about the
371 constitution. I do not mind if Libyans wants a constitution, main law, a reference or any law system.
372 We want the law to prevail, we wish if there is law in Libya. We want the law to prevail. The people's
373 authority makes the law, which is respected by everyone. Because I -Mummar Algaddafi-do not have
374 a palace, money, not even my future. I have spent my life for the revolution and I do not want anything.
375 I want everything for Libya. I want it to live in security, glory and prosperity. Protecting its oil, its
376 Great Man Made River, its great accommodation investment, its ports and the airports, and to be purify
377 it from those who are burning the cities now. Hurry up! Be brave! You are more than they are, you are
378 millions, you are millions and they are just one hundred persons. Catch them in the streets, open the
379 airports, open the ports, bring back the people's authority and bring back the security. Here they are,
380 the free officers, are distributed near you. Securities are distributed and the people armed units are
381 ready. You can decide to distribute the wealth all over again. I still insist that the Libyan petroleum
382 must be for Libyans. You do not trust the people's committees any more, that is it then, take the oil
383 with your own hands and do what you want with it, so that no one says, you took my share. Everyone
384 takes his share and it is up to whether you want to make a tree of it, it is up to you. You want to donate
385 it; it is up to you. The important thing is that you have taken your share, and that you do whatever you
386 want with it. I think that Saif Al-Islam will take care of the ambassadors and journalists, and then they
387 will be able to publish all facts about Libya. Because the world abroad cannot see anything about Libya
388 except through the dirty channels of our dear brothers who betrayed us. Whom have betrayed us instead
389 of covering the truth, they fraud facts and publish pictures that was taken years ago. The great state of
390 masses Libyan radio is the only one, which the whole world should follow, because it will respond to
391 everything. It will listen to what dirty radios are saying and respond back to it. Watch how the Libyan
392 radio will respond to what you see from these dirty radios. Airports have been suspended, ports have
393 been suspended, life has been suspended, fuel has been suspended, phones have been suspended and
394 radios have been suspended. People are scared. Once, a person terrorized Washington, a very
395 dangerous terrorist. They could not catch him but after a while. He was attacking a school burns it, and
396 kills people inside it and disappears He then goes to another school and disappears. Schools are
397 terrified, and students in America did not go to schools. Oh why? They said when we go they say there
398 was assault on a school. He was one person and schools were stopped. He goes to the shops, and shot

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399 a gun, and then he escapes to another shop. They said that all shops are on a terrorist attack. The streets
400 are similar too, this has just happened now. America was so sick from that criminal in Washington.
401 Therefore, they recruited everything they have until they found him. They found one person who have
402 terrified them. And you, bunch of people that we can count on one hand's fingers are terrifying
403 Benghazi? The peaceful demonstrations, which the world is talking about, is a different thing. We go
404 out in a peaceful demonstration for Gazza, a peaceful demonstration for Iraq. However, if there is a
405 Libyan problem, we do not go to the street, but to the people's congress or to the people's committees
406 to solve the problems. It has the money, it has the decisions, it has the signatures and it has the
407 administration. We do not go to the street. The Libyan problem is with the people, with the congress
408 and the committees. We launch a peaceful demonstration for another case. No one will prevent a
409 peaceful demonstration and shoot at it with guns, it is Impossible as long as it is peaceful and it is
410 marching from one street to another.

411 I myself led many peaceful demonstrations in the last destroyed era, but I did not burn anything. I did
412 not break anything, nothing. The police were on my right and on my left when we were walking down
413 the street and in the squares, speaking until we get tired, and post telegraphs then we go back. We
414 supported Gamal Abdel Nasser; we supported the Arab Unity, the Algerian revolution, and against
415 exploding bombs in Algeria. The peaceful demonstrations are one thing, but the armed rebellion and
416 dividing parts of the homeland is another. The world needs to understand that peaceful demonstrations
417 are one thing, which is considered a legal act in countries who needs to. The Libyan people do not need
418 demonstrations, because their problems can be solved by the people's authority. However, even the
419 peaceful demonstrations- if it is in Libya- is one thing, and the armed rebellion that is happening right
420 now and the attempts to separate Derna, to separate Al Bayda' or to separate Benghazi is another thing.
421 Who would allow it? The rebellion that happened in the parliament without any weapons, was hit by
422 Yeltsin, by tanks and the west applaud for him. The Branch Davidians rebelled in America, they
423 demonstrated without weapons; and Clinton hit them by tanks. The armed rebellion in Fallujah, they
424 considered it a rebellion although Fallujah is Iraqi and not American. However, they said no! This
425 rebellion follows Al-Zarqawi, and they bombed it with aviation, they broke it into small pieces.
426 Look at Bagdad, the demolition by cannons and airplanes because there is an armed rebellion. Even
427 the unarmed rebellion such as the Branch Davidians and the Russian State Duma, they were all hit by
428 tanks. When the black people rebelled in California -in America- and attacked stores, Nelson sent the
429 army -by force- and erased them. When the students rebelled in Tiananmen Square in Beijing in China,
430 China has erased the square by tanks. No one would allow his country to be a joke! Or allows an insane

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431 person to separate any of its parts. Now in Derna, he told them "women are not allowed to go out, and
432 bring me the donations because I am the Sultan", and every time they bring him someone to kill similar
433 to Al-Zarqawi way. Peaceful demonstrations is one thing and the armed rebellion and cutting off parts
434 of the country is another. The interior demands is one thing, and the conspiracy with exterior countries
435 abroad is another.

436 We have interior demands and we need a constitution. We need districts, we need municipalities, we
437 need a civil society organizations, it is so very normal. It is peaceful and acceptable. However, the
438 conspiracy with foreign countries in the name of these demands is another thing. We, my brothers
439 know each other. Oh my dear god! How will react to those young people, such as the ones in Zintan?
440 It is shameful to say that the people of Zintan are traitors. Is it possible that Zintan, the grandchildren
441 and sons of the heroes and martyrs of Kardon battle, who stepped on the Italian flag with their barefoot,
442 you are saying that they are traitors? Those are merely rebellious kids from Zintan, like those who
443 rebelled in any another parts in the country. They have rebelled against their families; it is shameful
444 that you distort Zintan. Dear Zintan people, it is shameful that they distort your image, go to your
445 children and catch them one by one. We shall raise them, teach them, educate them, and make them
446 work, to be security guards and technician. However, just like the poet has said about Zintan in a similar
447 situation; he said "a guy from Zintan insulted a guy from Bani Walid, so he was upset and he wrote
448 this poem." Then the Zintan people responded to him, and this is similar to the current situation
449 my brothers in Zintan are in, that is why I am telling you this. He said, "A mistake was made by a
450 guy from a preparatory school, he doesn't know the history, nor he is a humanitarian." This means,
451 my brothers in Zintan, do not mind us, this mistake is by young person and not a wise one from
452 Werfalli. He is the one who made a mistake, a young man, and a mistake by a person from a
453 preparatory school, he does not know the history, nor is he a humanitarian. It is true, youth now
454 do not know their history and they do not know the Kardon battle. I know it and appreciate the
455 Zintan people for it, but they have forgotten the glory of their fathers and their grandfathers. It is
456 not on purpose, it is the mistake of the people who eats the "Banani"-hehehe-, which means the
457 new generation who eats banana. Exactly, the people in Zintan are like this, and not the people
458 from Zintan. Have you ever seen a person with a moustache? Have you seen a person with his
459 family? With his salary? With his job? A person with his shop? With his farm? Whit his café?
460 With his restaurant? With animals? Have you seen them participating in this? Never!No one has
461 joined it from Derna, those who are involved are the young people who are from the banani, who have

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462 been taken from their parents, who took hallucinations pills. The punishment should not be on those
463 youth, because even the law is not applicable to them since they are less than eighteen years old. The
464 punishment is for those who armed those young people, and fooled them. Those people are the ones
465 who should be arrested and handed in to the justice. Bring them to the court.

466 If I go to Zintan, they will chant "The Fateh, The Fateh"! They will say, "We will sacrifice all our
467 heads for yours". I am sure that the youth of Zintan have chanted. I went once to Ajdabiya, and the
468 youth of Ajdabiya are crazy about the revolution, and they were chanting, "We will sacrifice all our
469 heads for yours". Ajdabiya, the sons and grandsons of the heroes and martyrs of the famous AlKaraheb
470 battle. They are the guards of Omar Mukhtar. Omar Mukhtar when he came to Ajdabiya they guarded
471 him. Not because he gave them houses or will give them money, but because he is Omar Mukhtar. I,
472 if I go, Ajdabiya will guard me, and if I go to Zintan, Zintan will guard me. Give me a chance. Bring
473 those youth to me, let me talk to them and you will see how they will change. Give me a chance, bring
474 them! Let the Zintan bring their children, or any another place let them bring their children.

475 I led the revolution of the youth when I was a student. This is our revolution, the people's revolution.
476 I wish that the people's revolution would hand everything to the people. I was the one who said we
477 needed to have radios everywhere, the ones that they have just used now. I was the one who made
478 those broadcastings. Because I want each town to be independent by its own in the state of the masses
479 just like the United States of America and the German states. We know each other by name, my dear
480 god! We know now that Zintan, they are the sons of Abualil, Alhoul, sons of Eissa, Bin Zwaied and
481 Belqassem. If Hajji Mohammed AlSagheer Alayeb -god's mercy is upon him is- still alive now, this
482 thing would have never happened. If Hajji Mohammed AlSagheer Alayeb were still alive, I would
483 have called him now and told him "Uncle Hajji, take those kids.", and he would have taken them. He
484 was the mediator many times, why there is not anyone like him? Surely there is, but they are scared,
485 poor ones! Zintan people are afraid of their own sons. Okay then, let the police and security forces
486 arrest them, teach them and raise them well and then, they bring them back to you. Now, I also know
487 the Ubaidat, they came to me the day before yesterday – the Ubaidat-, and we were reciting poetry
488 and saying me "I wish I was with the two thousands Ubaidat knights on their horses,a mong them
489 there was the fighter Posholate.", and the women were trilling. How would they turn against me?
490 It is impossible that they turn against me. Yesterday, they were with me here, and I told them in
491 the radio " broadcast what did Derna's people have said when they came to me, Benghazi's people,
492 Al Bayda', the Ubaidat, AlQubbah, and the whole region." When they all came the day before

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493   yesterday in around one week ago. What did they say? Where are they? Where did they go? Let
494   them get out and put their words into action, and to respect what they said. Where are you from?
495   From Al-Ghaith's family, you are from Mariam's family, you are from Arfad, and you are from
496   Amzin.We know each other; look at this boy, what family he belongs to? From Amzin family,
497   Arfad family, Mariam family or Al Gaith family? Oh dear god...

498   When we come to the Aldrsah tribe, you are from Mohammad's family, Burgol's family, Abdul
499   Aljawad's family, AlSeriry Abu Aweyna's family, Shalman, and Shoaib; we know each other.
500   Who in the world knows each other like we do? Leadership or else or people, we know each other.
501   You are the son of so, and the son of so and so. We started to kill each others? Misrata, Ramadan
502   AlSuehali and Saadoun Al Suehali, the heroes of Al Mashrak battle. Al Mashrak battle martyr. Oh
503   my god... Goz El-Teek battles, all these glorious battles, how do you insult its history? It is
504   impossible! When we come to Zawiya, you belong to Abu Hameera family? You belong to Abu
505   Zoraiba family? To Salab? To Belazi? You are the son of Saqer? You are the Ashraf? You are
506   Zawiya tribe or the tribes in Zawiya? - Zawiya the mother of the tribes- you are from Al Remah?
507   You are from Alkuarglah? We know each other. If we go to Al Hasah and we tell them, you are
508   Khalabtah, Khlbuto, you are Shabariqah, Belqasim?

509   Now, this is what I have just said, this is what I have just said. Look how your brothers the Arabs
510   have distorted it? One of the Arab channels is saying, "He issued orders to the army and the police
511   to destroy the rebels." Can you imagine this! listen! Would I say such things? I have asked the
512   people to take their kids and to arrest whoever manipulated their kids. However, in the day when
513   Libya is in danger, its national unity in danger, and Al-Qaida starts to centre in Libya, even the
514   Security Council will support me using the force. Now it is just arresting operations, but now you
515   go out of your houses, all of you, men and women who are with me, secure the cities, secure the
516   oases and the villages, show them their lies, and let them watch you. See, now they have confessed
517   that they are rebels. Before, they used to say that they are demonstrators. There are demonstrations
518   in Libya? All of it are supporting demonstrations; well it is okay since they have admitted that they
519   are just rebels.

520   What is required is that they hand in the weapons that terrorized the people. Benghazi is dying,
521   dying, terrified from the weapons that are in the hands of children. It will die; it does not have
522   water, food, electricity, or anything else. Go out Benghazi, save, save, Benghazi save yourselves,

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523 liberate Abdul Fatah who liberated Benghazi with me the night of the revolution. Talk to him to
524 run the country until the security is back to order and the people's authority is back. Starting from
525 tomorrow, start forming the new districts, new municipalities, new congresses, and new people's
526 committees will be formed tomorrow. He will help you, so free him. Shame on you! Are you a
527 gang? Is it possible? You are Benghazi?

528 Hand in the weapons immediately and return it to wherever you took it from. Otherwise, it will
529 terrorize the country and cause massacres. Children are obsessed and drunk and they have weapons
530 and machineguns. Hand in prisoners from both the police and the army. Anyone who they have
531 arrested, hand him in immediately. Arrest the rebels and hand them to the security so they can be
532 educated, bring them back to their senses, and they have to go through a recovering period to be
533 completely healed from the pills that they were taking for few days, because it is very harmful to
534 the heart.

535 To remove all life's obstacles in the streets, the stores must be opened, shops must be opened,
536 airports must be opened, and ports must be opened. Do not destroy your country without a reason,
537 why? What is the reason? What is wrong with you? This is an act of an eye as they say. That is it,
538 I believe in the envious eye, a safe country and an envious eye hits it. We found ourselves in
539 security, prosperity, our petroleum, our water, peace and bliss, and the world is burning around us.
540 Then we go to burn our country? Of course, I am telling you at the end, that there is no one sane
541 person who will allow his country to be ruptured or to be in the hand of maniacs.

542 Excuse me, they have just told me that the poetry I have just recited about Zintan was in the time
543 when there was a technical failure and they did not hear it. Forgive me; I will have to recite it again
544 if the transmission is good. I said to you, I said, "a Werfalli person, -sorry- a Werfalli guy insulted
545 a Zintan guy. The Zintan guy was upset and he was sad at all Werfalli, and told them I will not
546 come to you, and that we are no longer friends, and he will not come to Bni Waleed. He was sad
547 and he said that in a poem." Werfalli answered him back in a poem and said, "A mistake was made
548 by a guy from a preparatory school, he doesn't know the history, nor he is a humanitarian." The
549 meaning is that they told him he is a boy from preparatory school, does not know the history nor
550 the Kardon battle. Just like I said now that the youth now do not know their families and
551 grandparents, they do not know Kardon battle, or the late Mohammad Al Sagir Al Ayeb who used
552 to solve the problems in Zintan, and we were relying on him. They said to him "never mind our

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553 son". Even us we should not mind the Zintan either. I do not mind Al Zintan they are heroes. They
554 told him "it is a mistake by a guy from preparatory school; he doesn't know the history nor is he a
555 humanitarian. It was not on purpose, and it is not our fault. A reckless young guy from banana
556 agency." He said he is a reckless young guy from those who eat banani, which is a banana. The
557 people said to me that people in Zintan did not hear the poem, and we hope that you say it again,
558 and I said it again for them.

559 Even now the youth in Zintan are reckless, but bring them to me, I wish that they just bring them
560 to me. All those youth, I want them and I want the rebellious youth. I have called them the
561 generation of anger. Is it possible that AlFateh youth would leave the glory and sacrifice it and
562 burn the state of masses? The state of the masses! For the sake of people with lice and dirty
563 followers of foreign intelligence agents and dervishes! Who can believe that? Impossible, it is
564 impossible that our youth would be led by someone else. If they did not follow Mummar Algaddafi
565 they will follow one of those people with lice and beards? -Hehehe- It is not possible. Those youth
566 are with us, they are our young people, the generation of anger that I have raised myself, and they
567 chant everywhere and say, "We are the generation that Muammar build, and we shall destroy
568 anyone who becomes our enemy".

569 Finally, gentlemen, if these things were not achieved, handing in weapons, handing in prisoners,
570 handing the rebels, arresting the ones who manipulated our children, removing everything. And
571 restoring the normal life to ports, airports, roads, bakeries, water, supplies, transportations and
572 communications, life goes back to blessing, families live in safety, our children live in safety and
573 they go to the streets, coffee shops, clubs, and restaurants. If this was not achieved, and we see that
574 the unity of Libya is in danger or that force of anti-democratic and against freedom, that deforms
575 Islam-especially Al-Qaida-, if we see that this will be achieved, we will stop it from happening.
576 Then we will tell you, the marching will be announced. The holy march will be announced; similar
577 to the one thousand mile march, which was led by Mao Tse Tung, freed China until today, and
578 made it a state that owns the hydrogen bomb.

579 Oh yea, I will lead the march. Imagine this march and where will it come from, you know it! Then
580 we are have to purify the cities, purify the streets, purify the houses, and purify everything.
581 Whoever surrender himself and acknowledges his guilt, among those who manipulated the youth.
582 As for our youth, they will regret. Those youth, let them surrender themselves and not to worry.

583   We will cure them; first, we will cure them from those pills for their health because they were
584   taking pills every day. However, their mothers should bring them, and allow us to bring them. If
585   the men are afraid from the gangs, women and girls should bring their brothers and children and
586   bring them home. We will train and educate them, we are their family. We rehabilitate them for
587   the good work and the valid services, and they will bring incomes and salaries and secure the
588   country. Is it possible that our youth are destroying the country? Never, those are not our youth. It
589   is those people behind them, the youth who are doing so are given pills, and they are not doing so
590   willingly. Allah Akbar! (Dear God Almighty) If this is not achieved, I will then announce the
591   march; I will announce the holy march. Yeah! I am Mummar Algaddafi a nationalist leader, and
592   millions are defending me. I will call out for the millions from desert to desert, and we will march
593   the millions and I to purify Libya, span by span, house by house, room by room, alley by alley,
594   person by person, until the country is purified from villains and the impure people. We cannot
595   allow Libya to slip away from our hands without justification. In the wrongdoings. Who can allow
596   this? Millions are with me, and God is with me who helped me win over the great powers. Millions
597   are with me -not from the inside- but from other nations. I can appeal to all the millions in the
598   deserts. From desert to desert millions will march, millions march, no one can stop them. Save
599   yourselves, quickly! Before we give the signal for the holy march. Tonight, it is a peaceful march
600   -from inside- inside the cities, inside the villages, and inside the oases. To save our children and
601   to catch those who manipulated our children. This night you do it and tomorrow, you will go out
602   in the streets. After that, if it was not like it, there will be a march from inside; you know where
603   this march will come from. After that, there will be a nationalized march, which will be led by me,
604   because Libya concerns all the nations, Libya is an international refuge. I am staying here; do not
605   let them lie to you! I go to Venezuela? Oh really? Would I leave the body of the martyr Abdulsalam
606   Bu Meniar, the first martyr who died in Al Khums in 1911, and go to Venezuela? Oh really? It
607   will shame me in the history! I leave the fighter Mohammad Abdulsalam Bu Meniar and his grave
608   in AlHani, and the fighter Al Shaik Al Saadi Bu Meniar and his grave in Munedr, oh really! And
609   I go? Do you believe that? This is the first thing; this is their lie. Listen, they have just said to you
610   yesterday that Algaddafi is in Venezuela, and here I am. These Arab media, are the biggest enemy,
611   they are gloating over you. They want you to destroy the oil, to destroy the freedom, to destroy the
612   people's authority, and to destroy Libya. By then Libya will not be a global fort. They are envious
613   of you, which is why they are distorting you. God bless you our brothers in Qatar. God bless you

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614　our brothers in Qatar. Is that it? Is the water and salt between you and us? Is this the blood and the
615　brotherhood between you and us? You falsify everything about us. Instead of supporting us, you
616　are against us! For whose sake? For God sake, for whom? You may regret this in a day when
617　remorse will be useless. Whoever lives in a glasshouse should not stone people, who are you? The
618　work time has started, the march time has started, the victory hour has rang, and there is no going
619　backward, go forward, go forward! Revolution! Revolution!

2. *Daily Mail's* Article

Mail Online

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'I'll die here as a martyr': Defiant Gaddafi blames world leaders for violence in rambling TV address

By Daily Mail Reporter
Updated: 11:08, 23 February 2011

- **Gaddafi urges supporters to attack 'drug addict' protesters in TV speech**
- **Interior minister later defects and encourages 'revolution'**
- **Fleeing residents claim 2,000 killed in Benghazi**
- **Oil and gas supplies cut off as dictator 'orders sabotage'**
- **Hopes Libyan dictator would devolve power dashed**
- **William Hague announces evacuation of Britons**
- **Muslim cleric urges army to shoot Gaddafi to 'rid Libya of him'**

Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi has insisted he will fight to the 'last drop of blood' in a defiant speech that follows days of bloodshed on the streets of his country.

Celebratory gunshots in celebration were heard after Gaddafi's speech, aired on state TV and on a screen to several hundred supporters in Tripoli's central Green Square.

It suggests more bloodshed lies ahead after pro-regime gunmen and mercenaries left bodies littering the streets of the capital, after they went on the rampage, shooting on sight anyone found in the streets and opening fire from speeding vehicles.

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Defiant: Gaddafi declared it was his country and he had no intention of stepping down"

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="Last stand?
The dictator spoke from his deserted and almost derelict former Bab al-Aziziya residence, which was bombed in 1986 by U.S. aircraft"

Last stand? The dictator spoke from his deserted and almost derelict former Bab al-Aziziya residence, which was bombed in 1986 by U.S. aircraft

But the anti-government forces appeared to be gathering momentum - as the Libyan interior minister announced his defection after Gaddafi's speech and encouraged the army to 'join the people'.

Residents fleeing the second city Benghazi claimed 2,000 people had been killed there, and confirmed reports that fighter jets and heavy weapons had been used against protesters.

Oil and gas supplies from the country have also been cut off from two major oil companies, Italy's ENI ENI.MI and Spain's Repsol REP.MC, amid reports that Gaddafi has ordered security forces to sabotage oil production facilities.

The head of state had launched a brutal crackdown as his 41-year reign came under threat as thousands of Libyans took to the streets to call for change.

<Rebelling: Soldiers in the eastern city of Tobruk say they are no longer supporting Gaddafi!

Rebelling: Soldiers in the eastern city of Tobruk say they are no longer supporting Gaddafi

"'Massacre': Egyptians fleeing across the border from Libya claimed 2,000 people had been killed by security forces in second city Benghazi"

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'2,000 PEOPLE KILLED IN BENGHAZI'

Egyptians fleeing over the border from Libya today described a wave of killing that some claimed had seen thousands killed.

A witness who had fled the city of Benghazi said at least 2,000 people had been killed there -- a figure that could not be independently corroborated but which indicated the scale of destruction people believed was wrought by a week of violence.

Human Rights Watch says at least 233 people have been killed across Libya so far.

Egyptians described a treacherous journey out of Libya in which they were shot at by armed bandits taking advantage of the chaos.

Hassan Kamel Mohamed, a 24-year-old steel worker who had fled from Tobruk, said: 'There were thugs everywhere and they would pull weapons on you at any time.'

'We were trying to sleep at night but we couldn't. Thugs would fire in the air every fifteen minutes. They took our money, they took everything.'

Mohamed Bayoumy, 37, said he had been travelling for three days in the western part of the country and that there were armed groups along the road, demanding bribes. Another man, who declined to be named, said: 'The situation is bad for Egyptians right now.'

'They took money from us and shot at us,' he said, declining to give his name.

'Five people died on the street where I live,' said Mohamed Jalaly, 40, on his way to Cairo from Benghazi. 'You leave Benghazi and then you have ... nothing but gangs and youths with weapons,' he added. 'The way from Benghazi is extremely dangerous,' he said.

At the Salum crossing on the Egyptian side of the border with Libya, the Egyptian army had set up dozens of tents to serve as a field hospital to receive those fleeing the turmoil, though they were mostly empty on Tuesday morning.

Jalaly corroborated reports that security forces in Libya used heavy weaponry against anti-Gaddafi protesters in Benghazi, attacking them with military aircraft and heavy machine guns.

Gaddafi tonight spoke from behind a podium in the entrance of his bombed-out Tripoli residence hit by U.S. airstrikes in the 1980s and left unrepaired as a symbol of defiance.

'I am a fighter, a revolutionary from tents ... I will die as a martyr at the end,' he said, vowing to fight 'to my last drop of blood'.

He called on supporters to take to the streets and attack protesters, who he described as misguided youths and 'drug addicts' fomented by Islamic fundamentalists.

He said: 'You men and women who love Gaddafi ... get out of your homes and fill the streets. Leave your homes and attack them in their lairs.

'The police cordons will be lifted, go out and fight them. Forward, forward, forward!'

A day after a bizarre appearance in which he apparently sat in the front of a van and insisted he was in the Libyan capital - despite reports he had fled - Gaddafi addressed a crowd in Green Square.

After widespread international criticism of Gaddafi's violent response to the protests and the resignations of several of the country's ambassadors, the 68-year-old leader delivered a rambling speech.

He claimed his own home had been bombed by 'superpowers' and said 'rats' had been paid to disfigure the reputation of Libya.

He said: 'I am not going to leave this land' and added he would not 'give up' like other leaders, in an apparent reference to the deposed Tunisian and Egyptian presidents.

He added: 'A small group of young people who have taken drugs have attacked police stations like mice... They have taken advantage of this peace and stability.

'However it is not their fault, these young people; they tried to imitate what happened in Tunisia ... However there is a small group of sick people that has infiltrated in cities that are circulating drugs and money.'

Gaddafi's speech made frequent reference to Libya's history, with talk of wars against France, Egypt, the UK and the U.S.

The furious tirade also warned armed demonstrators, those 'who spy for other countries' and 'anyone who undermines the constitution' would face death: 'I am a fighter, a revolutionary from tents ... I will die as a martyr at the end.

'I have not yet ordered the use of force, not yet ordered one bullet to be fired ... when I do, everything will burn.'

It had been reported that he may devolve power but his speech never looked likely to lead to a resignation.

He added he was not a president so could not step down and said he planned to fight 'until the last drop' with the Libyan people behind him.

He referred to those who 'love Muammar Gaddafi' and urged supporters to take to the streets without fear of 'gangs'.

He added: 'If matters require, we will use force, according to international law and the Libyan constitution.'

 <img Mean streets: Men loyal to Colonel Gaddafi are shown on TV to be the only ones left roaming Tripoli after protesters were fired on by security force"

Mean streets: Men loyal to Colonel Gaddafi are shown on TV to be the only ones left roaming Tripoli after protesters were fired on by security force

 "ABC news"

"ABC news" class="

Violence: Violent scenes were captured on film, with an eyewitness describing men 'going crazy'

"Burned out: A government building in Tripoli after it was attacked by protesters last night"

Burned out: Libyans walk past a government building in Tripoli today after it was attacked by protesters

"Solidarity: Libyans demonstrate outside Downing Street in a protest against Gaddafi's brutality"

Solidarity: Libyans demonstrate outside Downing Street in a protest against Gaddafi's brutality

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Time magazine reported that Gaddafi has ordered his forces to blow up oil production facilities, threatening oil supplies to Europe.

Residents and an opposition activist told reporters that people were staying in their homes as Gaddafi's forces sought to crush anti-government demonstrations by shooting anyone outside on sight.

The British Foreign Secretary William Hague, in the wake of the speech and amid continuing uncertainty, announced the Government was working with airlines to lay on flights home and a Navy frigate was being deployed to waters near the troubled country.

'We're working closely with airlines to assist as many British nationals as possible to depart Libya,' Mr Hague told a press conference in London.

Revolutionaries seized control of the second city Benghazi, amid reports that 2,000 had died there. Other communities in eastern Libya were also overtaken yesterday and Tripoli woke this morning to find bodies littering the streets after security forces loyal to Gaddafi opened fire on protesters.

Scores of corpses had not been cleared away because of the warnings to residents to stay in their homes, said Mohammed Ali of the Libyan Salvation Front.

He said eyewitnesses saw forces loyal to Gaddafi shoot at ambulances and some protesters were left bleeding to death.

The colonel had appeared on Libyan TV last night to insist he is still in the country, while Tripoli blazed and his troops were allegedly shooting, bombing and strafing civilian demonstrators.

As Gaddafi spoke today, it emerged a 'Libyan naval asset' had been spotted off the Maltese coast, a day after two fighter jets landed on the island after defecting from the Libyan military.

Gaddafi's appearance in Green Square followed reports that mercenaries from Russia and former Soviet nations were fighting Libyan protesters on his behalf.

Eastern European gunmen have been spotted with black African mercenaries from French-speaking African nations such as Chad and were believed to have received up to £18,000 each to prop up the regime.

The Libyan side of the Egyptian border was controlled on Tuesday by anti-Gaddafi rebels armed with clubs and Kalashnikov rifles who welcomed visitors from Egypt, according to a Reuters correspondent who crossed into Libya.

One held up a picture of the Libyan leader, upside down, and defaced with the words 'the butcher tyrant, murderer of Libyans', the correspondent said when passing through the town of Musaid, just inside the Libyan side of the border. The men were welcoming and waved cars through.

It has been reported that Iran has stopped its oil activities in Libya with the intention of evacuating staff in the next 48 hours while Opec is considering an extraordinary meeting to discuss raising its oil output, according to Italian government sources.

"Brothers in arms: An army soldier and anti-Gaddafi protesters pose in front of a tank in the early hours of this morning in Benghazi" class="

Brothers in arms: An army soldier and anti-Gaddafi protesters pose in front of a tank in the early hours of this morning in Benghazi

"Victory joy: Men give victory signs as they ride on a truck scrawled with graffiti in Arabic reading 'Go, go, go, leave, leave, leave, down with the regime', on their way to clean up streets in Benghazi"

Victory joy: Men give victory signs as they ride on a truck scrawled with graffiti in Arabic reading 'Go, go, go, leave, leave, leave, down with the regime', on their way to clean up streets in Benghazi

"On the move: A truck loaded with household belongings drives past a traffic policeman in Benghazi"

On the move: A truck loaded with household belongings drives past a traffic policeman in Benghazi

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As the fighting intensified, cracks appeared among Gaddafi supporters, with some ambassadors resigning and calling for his removal.

Ali Aujali, the Libyan ambassador to the U.S. today said he was resigning 'from serving the current dictatorship regime'.

'But I will never resign from serving our people until their voices reach the whole world, until their goals are achieved,' he said on ABC television's Good Morning America. 'I am calling for him to go and leave our people alone.'

But amid reports that he had fled to Venezuela, Gaddafi appeared on state TV earlier to insist: 'I am in Tripoli and not in Venezuela. Do not believe the channels belonging to stray dogs.

'I wanted to say something to the youths at the Green Square (in Tripoli) and stay up late with them but it started raining. Thank God, it's a good thing.'

He gave the brief statement in a bizarre 22-second TV interview while holding an umbrella and sitting in the front seat of a van, which appeared to be outside his residence in Tripoli.

Gaddafi spoke out after reports suggested a massacre had taken place in the city's Green Square and left more than 60 dead.

One protester told Al Jazeera: 'What we are witnessing today is unimaginable. Warplanes and helicopters are indiscriminately bombing one area after another. There are many, many dead.

 < 'I'm staying': Colonel Gaddafi was interviewed sitting in the front seat of van. He insisted he was still in Tripoli"

'I'm staying': Colonel Gaddafi was interviewed sitting in the front seat of van. He insisted he was still in Tripoli

EVACUATIONS: THE COUNTRIES PULLING OUT OF LIBYA

GERMANY
Foreign Minister Guido Westerwelle said all Germans remaining in Libya should leave the country. The Foreign Ministry would assist their repatriation where necessary.
GREECE
Greece is watching the developments in Libya and is ready to repatriate Greeks who will officially request it, the Foreign Ministry said in a statement on Monday.
ITALY
Italy plans to send a flight to Tripoli on Tuesday to bring back Italians who want to leave Libya, a

Foreign Ministry source said.

NETHERLANDS

The Netherlands is planning to evacuate its citizens from Libya on Tuesday with a military plane, Dutch Foreign Affairs Minister Uri Rosenthal said on Dutch television.

TURKEY

Nearly 600 Turks were evacuated at the weekend from Benghazi where many Turkish firms are active. Anatolian news agency reported another 250 Turks were being taken by bus from eastern Libya to the Egyptian city of Alexandria.

UNITED STATES

The United States has ordered all non-emergency personnel to leave Libya. The U.S. State Department, also warning embassy family members to leave the country, said protests, violence and looting were possible during the next several days.

YEMEN

Yemeni Television said on Monday President Ali Abdullah Saleh had instructed the national airline to send flights to Libya to bring home Yemenis and Yemeni students.

'Our people are dying. It is the policy of scorched earth,' he said. 'Anyone who moves, even if they are in their car they will hit you.'

Security forces appeared to be preparing a major assault in the capital last night, as state TV said troops had 'stormed the hideouts of the saboteurs'. Snipers took up positions on rooftops and jets swooped low over rooftops, apparently trying to stop more opposition activists joining those who are already overwhelming the city.

Protesters had called for another demonstration in Tripoli's central Green Square and in front of Gaddafi's residence, but witnesses described a scene of intimidation, with helicopters hovering above the main seaside boulevard and pro-Gaddafi gunmen firing from moving cars and even shooting at the facades of homes to terrify the population.

Youths trying to gather in the streets were forced to scatter and run for cover by the gunfire, according to several witnesses who said people wept over bodies of the dead left in the street.

A statement from Libyan state TV claimed reports of widespread bloodshed were 'baseless lies' by foreign media outlets.

'You should know that this is part of the psychological warfare, lies and rumours which you should resist because they are aimed at demolishing your morale, stability and blessings for which they envy you,' it read.

'Rumours are a poison which you should not drink. False news peddled by satellite TVs are arrows which you should deflect towards their throats.'

Runways at Benghazi airport have been destroyed in the violence and passenger planes cannot land there, Egypt's Foreign Minister Ahmed Aboul Gheit said today.

'Regarding east of Libya, the Benghazi airport runways have been destroyed. It is not possible for Egyptair flights or any other flights to land in that airport,' he told a news conference.

Changing face of Libya: Libyan protesters tear down a poster put up by Muammar Gaddafi on a building in Tobruk"

Changing face of Libya: Libyan protesters tear down a poster put up by Muammar Gaddafi on a building in Tobruk

"Flying the flag: Libyan protesters wave the pre-Gaddafi flag above a fire-ravaged building in Tobruk, which has fallen to protesters"

Flying the flag: Libyan protesters wave the pre-Gaddafi flag above a fire-ravaged building in Tobruk, which has fallen to protesters

Unrest spreads: Libyan people take part in a protest in the seaport city of Tobruk" class="

Unrest spreads: Libyan people take part in a protest in the seaport city of Tobruk

="Triumphant: Protesters in Tobruk seem in defiant mood despite the ongoing bloodshed in Libya"

Triumphant: Protesters in Tobruk seem in defiant mood despite the ongoing bloodshed in Libya

Witness statements from the ground have reported foreign mercenaries, many of whom are from Chad and Darfur, patrolling the streets and attacking demonstrators.

A Libyan man who gave his name as Ali and lives in a Tripoli suburb, told 972 magazine: 'Gaddafi obviously does not have any limits. We knew he was crazy, but it's still a terrible shock to see him turning mercenaries on his own people and just mowing down unarmed demonstrators.

SUNNI CLERIC: ARMY SHOULD KILL GADDAFI

Influential Muslim cleric Yusuf al-Qaradawi issued a fatwa on Monday that any Libyan soldier who can shoot dead embattled leader Gaddafi should do so 'to rid Libya of him'.

'Whoever in the Libyan army is able to shoot a bullet at Mr Gaddafi should do so,' Mr Qaradawi told Al-Jazeera television.

He also told Libyan soldiers 'not to obey orders to strike at your own people', and urged Libyan ambassadors around the world to dissociate themselves from Kadhafi's regime.

Famous in the Middle East for his at times controversial fatwas, or religious edicts, the octogenarian Qaradawi has celebrity status in the Arab world thanks to his religious broadcasts on Al-Jazeera.

'So yeah, we knew he was crazy. But maybe we did not realize he was that crazy. It's a scary and devastating feeling to be here now.'

There were reports that the Libyan ambassador to London and his staff had resigned and joined protesters as one activist raised a flag of the pre-Gaddafi Libya at the country's British embassy yesterday.

Libya's former ambassador to the Arab League in Cairo, Abdel-Moneim al-Houni, who resigned his post on Sunday to side with protesters, demanded Gaddafi and his commanders and aides be put on trial for 'the mass killings in Libya'.

'Gaddafi's regime is now in the trash of history because he betrayed his nation and his people,' Mr al-Houni said in a statement.

Libya's ambassador to India, Ali al-Essawi, said he resigned because he could not tolerate the authorities 'killing peaceful people'.

Protesters have been allowed to enter the Libyan Embassy in Stockholm and have raised the flag of the monarchy that was toppled by Gaddafi's military coup in 1969.

About 50 protesters shouting 'Libya, Libya' rallied outside the building on Tuesday and urged embassy staff to join them.

"Libya protests"

A Libyan diplomat in China, Hussein el-Sadek el-Mesrati, told Al-Jazeera television: 'I resigned from representing the government of Mussolini and Hitler.'

'WE'LL MEET YOUR SLAVES WITH GUNS': PROTESTERS DEFIANT IN EASTERN LIBYA

An anti-government protester who crossed into Egypt to escape the media blackout told how demonstrators had taken control of eastern Libya.

Suleiman al-Zugeilil said 'everything is calm' in the east and claimed protesters stood firm in the face of attacks by the Khamis Brigade, a special forces unit named after one of Gaddadfi's sons.

Mr al-Zugeilil provided The Times with video footage of protesters in al-Baida hanging the almost naked body of one of the Khamis Brigade from a bridge and said Tobruk had meet taken with little resistance by anti-regime demonstrators.

'After the massacres in Benghazi, the armoured brigade, which has tanks, joined the protesters in sypathy with the people,' he claimed.

In Tobruk, locals burnt the regime's HQ and chanted: 'Gaddafi you are a coward, send your slaves, we'll meet them with guns', in reference to the dictator's use of foreign mercenaries to quell unrest.

And the Libyan Embassy in Malaysia distanced itself from the regime, issuing a statement strongly condemning 'the barbaric, criminal massacre' of civilians.

However, none of the embassy's diplomats quit.

About 250 protesters stormed into the Libyan Embassy in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, on Tuesday, chanting and calling for Gaddafi to step down, a counsellor at the embassy told CNN. Osama Ahmed said the majority of the protesters were Libyan students studying in Malaysia. The protests were relatively peaceful, and embassy security let the protesters in for two hours.

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And a top Libyan diplomat stationed in China said on Tuesday he had resigned to protest his government's violent crackdown on protesters and called on Gadhafi to step down and leave the country.

Hussein Sadiq al Musrati, who was the second secretary in the Libyan mission to Beijing before he stepped down four days ago, joined about 20 students and protesters in front of the Libyan Embassy in Beijing Tuesday. Demonstrators held signs that read: 'The game is over. Get out ... you're finished'.

Senior clerics within Libya issued a fatwa against the Gaddafi regime. And two Libyan air force jets landed in Malta, where their crew sought political asylum.

Read more: http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-1358972/Libya-protests-Gaddafis-rambling-TV-address-Ill-die-martyr.html#ixzz4z1G3EeTj
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"'Murderer': Palestinian people hold a poster denouncing Libyan leader Moammar Gadhafi during a march in Gaza City"

'Murderer': Palestinian people hold a poster denouncing Libyan leader Moammar Gadhafi during a march in Gaza City.

3. Pete Warden's Transcript
https://docs.google.com/document/d/10dy5oLJY2QL7k2VuwKonUpSgCUX-_9ATQ-134Xka9fs

Transcript of Muammar Qaddafi's Speech on State TV, Tuesday, Feb 22, 2011

I salute you,
The youth of victory,
People of the nationalism,
People of challenge,
Youth of challenge,
They are a generation of anger and challenge,

   core the world. They want to - unfortunately some Arab media and some Arab organizations are tarnishing your image and are betraying you and depicting you as a bad people, and they are saying: "Look at Libyans, look at Libyans! Look what is happening in Libya, the Libyan people are fighting each other, look at Libya, Libyans want imperialism, Libyans don't want victory. They don't want revolution. They want people in turbans and with long beards. Libyans want colonialism."

   But now you, people in the Green Square, are saying: "Libya needs dignity. Libya needs to go to the top of the world and of Asia, Africa, and Europe. All this is pride for Libya. And now everybody is looking at Libyan people as their heroes, those Libyans. When you are saying "Libyan, Liberia....Lebanon" nobody knows any place, but they know Libya, Libya, Qaddafi, because the Libyan people are proof that they are the heroes and they are backing their legitimate government. All African nations consider us as the Mecca, as rulers of the world. All the superpowers, with their nuclear weapons, are concentrating on Tripoli and Benghazi. Unfortunately some Arab stations, radio stations are serving Satan, they insult you in Arabic media, they want to insult you, they want to humiliate you. Now we are holding, we are resisting. We want to regain the square and [regain territory] everywhere.
Muammar Qaddafi has no post that he can resign from, he doesn't hold any position. He is a revolutionary leader only, that revolution, which means always sacrifice until death. This is my country, the country of my great-grandfathers and your grandfather's country. We planted it and watered it with our grandfathers' blood. We deserve Libya from those rats and agents who are being paid by secret governments. We damn them! Curse them. They brought curse to their families and to their tribes, if they have tribes. They don't have tribes, they are mercenaries. They are all shouting one shout only and one slogan, they are challenging the aliens and the foreigners, they don't have identity [originality]. All tribes are here with us. All chanting the same slogans. www.tmzilla.co.uk

Everyone challenges. We challenged America with its mighty power. We challenged the world's superpower and we came out victorious. Here they bow their heads. Your remember Omar Al-Mukhtar's era? This is our glory[ious era]. It was not a victory for a tribe. It was not a victory for the Libyan cities, but a victory for the Libyan people, for Arabs and the Muslims. This is the victory they want to distort, the glory they want to tarnish. Italy, the Empire at the time, could not succeed on our soil, Libyan soil. They broke apart on Libyan soil.

I am much bigger than any rank, for those who are talking about a rank. I am a fighter. I am a fighter with the Libyan people. I am a revolutionary, I am the Bedouin from the oasis that all towns, cities and people know very well. Libya will remain at the top and will lead Africa and South America and it will lead the world as well. Nobody can stop it, mercenaries cannot stop it, they cannot stop Libya. Those greasy and oily rats who are getting paid by foreign powers. I have paid the price. I am paying the price by staying here and by my grandfather, Abdus Salam Bomanyar, "The Martyr", who fought against the Italians. It's not possible. I will not leave the country and I will die here as a martyr, on this soil, in the end. The remains of my father, grandfather and my uncle Sheikh Saadi in the cemetery of Neder is the proof. I will not leave these righteous remains. Saddam [Hussein?] says we cannot enjoy the shadow of trees of freedom unless we planted these trees and we watered it with our blood.

   I am talking to you from the house which was bombarded by a hundred and seventy planes by America and Britain. They left all houses and were aiming for Muammar's houses. Is it because he is president of the country? They could have treated him like other presidents, but Muammar Qaddafi is history, resistance, freedom, victory,

revolution. This is a testimony from the highest authority that Muammar Qaddafi is not the president, he is not a normal person. You cannot poison him or lead demonstrations against him. When bombs were falling on my house and killing my children, where were you, you rats? Where were you, those with big beards? Where were you? You were in America. You were applauding your master, the Americans. One hundred and seventy planes, left all palaces and leaders and kings alone and came to the great house of Muammar Qaddafi. This is a victory that should not be relinquished by anybody, any country or people in Africa or any nation. Fighting back the tyranny of America, we did not give in, we were resilient.

Now a small group, a group of young people, who were given hallucinogenic pills, raided police stations here and there like rats, they raided barracks. They used relative safety and security that Libya had enjoyed, and they raided some barracks and they also annulled their previous criminal records. But I don't blame these youths. They are young people: sixteen, seventeen, eighteen. They are emulating what is happening in Tunisia. They are imitating what is happening in some cities, like they heard something about raid on a courts building and they say: "We shall do it in our city". But there is a sick group that is giving money and pills, these hallucinogenic pills, to these young people, very young people, pushing them towards this side of war. The people who were killed are the members of the police and armed forces but not those who were behind them . They are in their houses outside of the country, enjoying the safety and their families and children. And they are encouraging you and your children, giving them pills and we start slaughtering each other, encouraging to slaughter each other.

During the revolution, Abdul Fatah Yousuf was under my command when we freed Benghazi, Abdul Fatah entered Benghazi under my command, twenty thousand people from Sietal al-Satana(?), under the Italian, al-Buktana was occupied by the American forces, Tobrouk was under complete American control, when we entered Benghazi to create unity because the barracks when I told al-Buktar(?) when I ask him to attack, to overtake the radio in Benghazi. Weifel(?) hospital and nobody dared to change the name, where were you and your grandparents, you mercenaries, when there were five American bases, who of you would dare to do such a thing. We entered a war against America and Britain on Libyan soil. If their forces don't leave, the fight will carry on, will continue. You think it's easy, we paid a price for Libya, it has a victory, it will be reckoned with.
(end of first gadda 15 mins)

We left the Rule to the Libyan people. We don't have any authority, we do not issue any (order/decree), we left it (rule) to the Libyan people. It is the Libyan people who are responsible, all of them. In the hospitals, in the schools, in the departments, in agriculture, in everywhere. The struggle for power has been resolved. When Africa(?) raided us, me and my officials, we fought the French in the south and we fought Sadat (Egyptian President) as well, and Haile Selassie (Emperor of Ethiopia), we fought him. Even Bourguiba (Tunisian President), and we fought him. All agents of the colonial masters, we fought them, and left everything for you. Even the money for oil, I ask you to take every month, we said no. Leave the money, revenue for petrol with the government. You are responsible for the people's committees. I call on the Libyan people to form new municipalities as was mentioned by Saif-al-Islam (Gadhafi's eldest son), the program mentioned by the Saif-al-Islam, (something) Redat(?), who, that he was shot at. They ask him, why did you come to Benghazi? On the day of the revolution, why did you come? Where were you, when Abdul Fatah(?) holding his arm, fighting for the revolution, when he was come the borders fighting Sadat and Israel? Al-Fatah was the leader, the champion of the war on the borders. He was shot by an unidentified person. Is this the gratitude? Who are they? This is not the people of Benghazi. We talked about the people's committees in Redat and in Derna. I know Bani Walid doesn't want to join Redata(?). We can capable of running their own people's committees these areas. Not relying on anybody else but themselves. Tripoli was the front rail(?) of Libya, when the Italians were in the south. I know ? does not want to be joined. With Salat(?) or with the Humus(?). Torna they can establish their own committee. (?) free as well.

And I'm sure after this call, people tomorrow will call for new committees. Will reach the number of thirty. The municipality will be more than fifty and will reach one hundred and fifty, and everyone will have their own municipality. These ones who serve us, and serve our history. These people, it's not those who carry the arms like the RPG (Rocket Propelled Grenade). Young people are given the armored vehicles to go in Benghazi. They were put. Families should to collect their children, get out of their homes. If you love Moummar Qaddafi, children, men, women, with Moummar Gadin(?) something, for victory. To be at the top, who wants victory, must remember when the American, the Italian, and the British left, and when oil came back into the ownership of the people. Now 90% of

it belong to the people, only 10% of it to the American companies. Get out of your homes, to the streets, secure the streets, take the rats, the greasy rats out of the streets. We did not choose(? or shoot?) the youth so far, force is behind the Libyan people. If we have to use the force then we'll use it. According to the international law, and according to the Libyan constitution. Tomorrow, even from tonight, these people who leave Moummar Qaddafi, if I was the president I would have thrown my resignation at your face, but I don't have. I will fight until the last drop of my blood. With the Libyan people behind me. You are a solid rock, that was bitten by the American aggression. Take your children from the streets. They took your children away from you. Your children are dying. For what reason? For what purpose? For nothing, but to burn Libya. Libyan peace died. Your children died. But their children are in America, and in Europe. What is this scare of these gangs? Gangs, like rats, means nothing. One in a million from the Libyan people, it can do nothing. They were given these tablets, like in tea(?), imitating, they were just imitating the people in Tunisia and Egypt. Tomorrow the hope lies with the people and security. All barricades should be lifted. Follow them. Get out of your homes. Chase them. You want Benghazi to be destructed? Cut off from electricity and water? These rats can reach the oil fields and blow it. Benghazi I built it block by block, and we are still building it. And they are come to destroy it, by using your children.

Three tanks were burned, that turned into. Even civilian planes stopped using Benghazi, they have stopped using Benghazi airport. They are worried in case of these rats attack them. Darmah (Libyan City) has became a rebel, a madman. Beware that al-Zawahiri (Bin-Laden's deputy) will come and rule you. Do you want Americans to come and occupy you? Like Afghanistan and Pakistan and Iraq? Our country will become like Afghanistan if that's what you want. Go out to the streets. Chase them. Take away their arms from them. And arrest them, and prosecute them. Hand them to security. Only few of them. It's a bunch of terrorists. Turning into Emirates of +al-Zawahiri (Bin Laden's Deputy). What Afghanistan in North America bring the Americans and dropping bombs on it.

All free officers have been distributed to the tribal areas, try to cleanse these people and arrest those responsible who they will be prosecuted. And that will be their punishment. They don't want me, they don't want Libya. This is the criminal act. Anybody who lifts an arm, any Libyan who lifts an arm shall be punished with death sentence. Those who spy with other countries shall be punished with death sentence. Anybody who undermines the sovereignty of the state shall be punished with death. Who hands ministrations or mutations(?). And they don't blame to bin-Ladin, those who submit shall be punished by death. Those who commit crime against the army. Anybody who shall be handed the death sentence who works for foreign country, that undermines the defense of the country. We are not blame the youth.

and when they are caught and prosecuted they will be begging for mercy, and this time we will not be so merciful, we will not be forgiving. Any
ho undermines the constitution, anyone, by force, or otherwise, to undermine and change by force or any other way, and the punishment is death. Any who use explosives shall be punished with death. Any who use bombs or...
Please, please remain quiet. Be quiet so you can hear. This is a very dangerous... I haven't even started to give orders to use bullets. Any use of force against the authority of the state, anyone causing murder shall be handed the death sentence. All these punishable by death, all these I mentioned. Civil war, anyone cause or act leads to civil war, and these acts, lead to civil war. Nobody can wear out. You want it to be like Somalia? This will lead to civil war, if you do not apprehend them.

should form to defend the community values, and everyone should feel free walking the streets in safety, heads held high, without being teased. People are living in hell. Start from tonight, apprehend them from now. Come tomorrow I think a new administration will be formed, new municipalities, new people's authorities. And the issues were raised by Saif-al-Islam that will be delivered to him, and the judges and lawyers and the relation to constitutional forms, I have no, I want to use any situation, legal authority. We want the law to prevail, the authority of the people. I don't have money, I don't have a palace. I want everything I have for the Libyan people, and preserve its oil reserves, and live with dignity. Be brave. You outnumber them millions. You are millions and they are tens. Open the airports and deport. Bring back security. Now you have the free officers who can help you. And you can decide as well, decide the distribution of wealth. The Libyan oil should be distributed to all people. You can take it and do whatever you want

with it.   Civil war, anybody who is caught and condemned to cause, to undermine the unity of the country. Guilty in the Duma. I ask him to leave, he refused. We are not leaving the building. They brought tanks, and on live TV, Yeltsin, they hit the Duma building and they left like rats. And the west did not raise a voice. These members of parliament, of the Duma, did not have any arms. Children in Peking, in the square, were. Peking brought the tanks, and those who were in front were crushed to death. And whoever died, the unity of China is more important than those people in the square. Tiananmen Square. The unity of the Russian Federation was more important than those in the building. The Davidian sect in America, children and women and other crazed individuals, a religious group in America, called the Davidians, they were also, Clinton sent in tear gas, and also the armored vehicles. The school that was taken over in Russia, they killed the perpetrators, all of them. Al-Zarqawi who is a follower of Bin Laden, when they took over Fallujah. America flattened Fallujah from the air, fighting terrorism, they destroyed mosques, why, they said, we are fighting terrorism. They said, this is not a mosque, this is a gathering of terrorists. We are looking for al-Zarqawi in Fallujah. We must destroy, bombard it from the air. Nobody can be critical of what they did. Baghdad was destroyed, so many civilians died. When wedding ceremonies were shot at, thinking illegal gatherings, two, three million died in Baghdad so we can get rid of terrorism, eliminate the Baath party, get rid of Al-Qaeda. Gaza, it was destroyed by the Israelis, nobody condemned the Israelis. They said we have the right to self-defense. From air, from sea, from sea and from land. Tanks entered the city, killing as they wanted. Do you know what's happening in Somalia? Do you want your country to be like Somalia and like Iraq as well? Same groups who caused the destruction of this country, is doing what they did, they want to be like Fallujah.

It is the same infection, the same group. So starting tonight and continuing tomorrow, the youth, all the youths, not those rats who've taken the tablets, all the youths tomorrow form security committees from tonight, they put green with red writing secure the cities, to bring back security to the cities. They are attacking us. Until the security personnel come back and establish security once again, they will go back to their tribes. It's the people of the tribes will help them, not the agents of the Americans, or of Bin-Ladin, or Zarqawi. Your children from tomorrow, the youth, not those youths... if they were handed to the authorities so we can rehabilitate them and make them more effective, as a community. People, men and women should take over the streets, lead the revolution from one end to another. I am the head of the people's revolution. It's taking security, establishing security, respecting authority, people's authority. Get out of your houses as of now, and the youth should be organized to join the committees. Tomorrow the youth should be, all cities, Libyan cities, should wear these pants on the arms, committees defending the achievements that cost $71, and the committees should be formed to defend the achievement of the revolution, and the security, local security. And those Imams who know about the Koran, the youth, the real Caliphate, tomorrow

I won't take it. His share. Take your share, and you can do whatever you like with it. I think also Saif-al-Islam (Qadaffi's Sucessor & Eldest son) will meet the embassy buildings, and the media, and ever compety(?), our brothers who betrayed us instead of relaying the truth, they giving pictures that so many years old. The Libyan radio media will be said by these dirty stations, and see what the response will be from the Libyan media. Airports are, seaports, are not working, radios are not working. One terrorist who dangerous, they could not apprehend him after a while. It's a person who committed, shooting from one school to another and they couldn't apprehend him. This is only very few who terrorize Benghazi.

Peaceful demonstrations that talked by the Dewal(?), about Gaza, peaceful demonstrations about Iraq. We can resort to the people's committees. They have the committee conference, the people's committee conferences, they have the money, we have to resolve our differences there. I myself led peaceful demonstrations lately. The old regime, but I did not seek destruction. I am against the bombing, causing explosions in Algeria. Peaceful demonstrations is different. And the undermining of the social(?) is a different matter. The world must understand peaceful demonstration is different. Libyan people don't need to resort to demonstrations, they can go to the people's committee. But armed rebellion are to disconnect the airports or Benghazi are a different matter, we will not allow it. Rebellion in the Russian parliament was dealt with by tanks, and the Davidian cults (a Protestant offshoot) in Waco (a town in America) were dealt with by armored vehicles. The uprising in Fallujah (town in Iraq) was dealt with by air bombardment. Because there was an armed uprising. Even those unarmed incidents in Waco and parliament were dealt with by force. When the students in Tianamen Square, again the tanks were sent to deal with them. It's not a joke, they would rather do whatever it takes in order not to allow part of the country be taken away. Peaceful demonstration is different. Peaceful demonstration is something, and talking to foreign country, to conspire against the country is a different matter. But conspiring with foreign government is a totally different issue. We brothers know each other.

We could have traitors in... Those who stepped on the Union Jack flag, calling them traitors... We'll rehabilitate the, teach them, become technicians, teachers...

Translator: The Libyan leader is quoting a poetic line about somebody from Zintan, that's not meant to be, Youth of the... Nobody, people, sorry the youth was taken from their families and given these hallucination tablets. The punishment should be hanging for those who give it to, not the people who use these tablets. And found out they are still shouting the slogans of the revolution, raise up your heads brothers. The sons and grandsons of the battles for liberation. The guardians of our hero *Umar Al-Muktar* (Libyan Freedom fighter in early 1900s), they guard his grave and his principles. Wherever we go I will be guarded by those young men and women, and I'll have a chance, it will give me an opportunity to talk to them and I will find out, and I'll be able to convince them. This young people's revolution is our revolution, it's our people's revolution. These radio and televisions that have been abusing the events inside the Jamhuriyah (Democratic) Libyan lands, like the American states, or German states for that matter. We know each other by name. We know this intent, that area, the sons of Isaiah, Tahoun, Gazim(?) and other tribes, the Had Mohamed, the late. Had he been alive, these things wouldn't have happened I would have called him and told him

If you were with me yesterday, and then the Arabs, and the Belgaza(?), what did they say, what happened to them, they should come out. Were you from Mariam, or Sizaid, or any other tribe, we know each other. We see everybody, from one tribe or another. Honestly. You are Erbawana, or Shaib, we know each other. Who in the world would know each other as well as us? We kill each other. Mushir Shalab, the hero of the Musharak battle, battles of the from Rejidah how can we ignore all this history? It's impossible. Are you from Shafur, the mother of all tribes, are you from Shaliya, we know each other.

If we go to El-Hasa, we say to them, are you Shabarga Everything I've said just now, look at your Arab brothers, they've distorted, one of the satellite channels says I've issued orders to arrest the rebels. Can you imagine? Have I asked anything like that? I've asked the crowds, the children, the people who led them, but when Libya is in danger, and its unity is in danger, and Al-Qaeda. Even the security council, the use of force, but ordinary arrests, now we should come out to men and women, the security of towns, cities and oases, should come out now. Admitted they were rebels, before they were demonstrators. Are there demonstrations in Libya? All the demonstrations are supporting us. What's required is giving up all the weapons that terrorize people. Benghazi is dying, is terrorized. Old and young they are dying, no water, no electricity, nothing. Benghazi you should save yourselves, you should come out, and set up the Fatah Hapri, who set Benghazi free on the eve of the revolution. Agree with him to run the affairs of the city until the police comes back to it, and for the new municipalities, and for the new assemblies, and the new conferences, and the new congresses, tomorrow we'll start. He will help you, set him free, shame on you, are you gangsters? It's impossible! Surrendering, giving up all weapons, to the authorities, from which they have been taken, or we will have massacres. Drugged and young people who have got machine guns, setting the prisoners free. Arresting the troublemakers and giving them over to the security people so that they can be taught a lesson   , give up the drugs they've been taking, because they are very harmful, they are very harmful to the heart. Of all the obstacles of life in the streets, shops should be open, airports should open, and harbors should open, don't destroy your country for no reason. What is the reason for that? What's come over you? Shame on you. We were living in safety, security, prosperity. We're having our oil, our water, in peace and happiness. That we burn our country down.

Long pause

Now I want to tell you, finally, it's impossible for anybody who's sensible to allow, for the country to be torn apart, or to fall into the hands of crazy people. I've just been informed that the poetry I just mentioned, about the dam, apparently for some reason they haven't heard, and forgive me for repeating it. Because there was a technical fault, and they did not hear it.

I said one was more friendly, oh a youth who insulted somebody else, and then got annoyed and blamed it all on the (?) tribe as a whole. These few are no friends to you, and then he wrote a poem about it. The from a tribe replied, say a mistake made by a young man from the preparatory school who doesn't know any history, and then the young man, preparatory school doesn't know anything about history, like the other people do not the people, do not know anything, do not know the Kardom battle, the late Mohamed who faced problems. They said to him forgive us. I don't

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blame this (?) of the heroes. This is a mistake made by a young chap from a preparatory school who doesn't know history, unintended, and it's not our fault. Crazy people from the Benani(?), it's just a misled people, and then they asked me not to repeat this poetry because some people did not hear it. Just an u

thenwise, bring them over to me, I wish you could, all those young people who are revolting. It's really, is it possible for young people to destroy the country, the country of the masses? To follow the agents of the foreign intelligence and those fundamentalists? Who would believe this? Nobody could. It's impossible for our youth to be led by somebody else. If they're not following Qaddafi, who would they follow? Somebody with a beard? Impossible, the people are with us, supporting us, these are our people, I've brought them up. Everywhere they are shouting slogans in support of Moammar Qaddafi.

END:

But their mothers go to come to them, and allow them to go to their come .
If the men were afraid of the gangs , women and girls go they take their brothers and their children , and their come to the houses , train them , teach them , we are their parents , Nahlhm to do good service, good and come and salaried income and believe in the country .

Reasonable youth ravaging the country? ! Never These are not our young people, those who are behind them , but who do this work they gave them pills and not willingly .
If not all of this, - Voice ears Morocco - God is great - I then we will announce crawl Bible.
Yes .. I " Muammar Gaddafi " internationalist commander , I scramble Me millions .
I we will direct appeal to the millions of desert to desert , and I Snzhv to millions, to cleanse Libya Shoubra Shubra , beta beta, Dara Dara , Rue Rue , one by one , until the country purify herself from pollution and الأنجاس .

We can not allow that Libya lost in our hands without justification, in Ghot falsehood , allow this ? ! .
I 'm me millions , and with me God who Nasrna the major superpowers .
Me millions not from the inside, with me millions of other nations.
I can make an appeal to all the millions of the desert, from the desert to the desert Stzhv the millions .. Millions creeps , and no one can stop them .

Save yourselves before quickly to give the signal to crawl Bible.
Tonight a peaceful march from the inside, from inside the cities, the villages , from inside the oases, to save our children and the arrest of who Grroa to our children .

That ye do this tonight and tomorrow , that looked to the streets .
But then - if this is not - there crawled from the inside , you know this creep where it comes from , and then there crawling International Sacodh 's the because Libya concern to all nations , Libya Mathaba universal.
I'm staying here, do not lie to you .

I walked to Venezuela ... and God ? ! ! .
I leave the body of the martyr " Abdul Salam Bomenaar " first martyr fell in five in 1911, and I go to Venezuela , and God written on history? ! ! .

Leave a mujahid " Mohammed Abdul Salam Bomenaar " his grave at Hani , Mujahid Sheikh " Saadi Bomenaar " grave in " Mnedr " , God and walk ? ! ! .
Otsedkon ? ! .

Here's the first need , Kzpthm of these , see the pain tell you yesterday that " Gaddafi" in Venezuela ; Hannah exist.

These Arab stations , the biggest enemy , Chamth you .
Triedkm to destroy oil, and destroy freedom, and destroy the people's power , and destroy Libya , and Libya does not remain a global Castle .
Mgtazawn you, for that Ichohnkm .

God bless you , O our brothers in Qatar .

God bless you , O our brothers in Qatar .
This latter end , this salt water that stands between us and you.
Is that blood and brotherhood between us and you , everything you visit us, instead of that you will be with us , you will be against us .

For the sake of God? ! Benefit? ! .
May Tendmon the Day whereon neither remorse, and that his house of glass not stoned stones.
Who are you? ! .

Sounded the hours of work , the hour crawl, the hour of victory , irreversible .
Forward.
Forward.
Forward .. Revolution , revolution.

Appendix 2
Hosni Mubarak

1. Mubarak's Arabic and English Transcript

<u>The Arabic & English Transcript of Hosni Mubarak speech</u>

<u>Thursday 10th of February 2011</u>

1   بسم الله الرحمن الرحيم.

2   الإخوة المواطنون، الأبناء شباب مصر وشاباتها، أتوجه بحديثي اليوم لشباب مصر بميدان التحرير،وعلى اتساع أرضها،

3   أتوجه إليكم جميعا بحديثٍ من القلب، حديث الأب لأبنانه وبناته.أقول لكم: إنني أعتز بكم رمزًا لجيل مصريَ جديد يدعو إلى

4   التغيير إلى الأفضل، ويتمسك به ويحلم بالمستقبل ويصنعه. أقول لكم قبل كل شيء: إن دماء شهدائكم وجرحاكم لن تضيع هدرًا،

5   وأؤكد أنني لن أتهاون في معاقبة المتسببين عنها بكل الشدةِ والحسم، وسأحاسب الذين أجرموا في حق شبابنا بأقصى ما تقرره

6   أحكام القانون من عقوباتٍ رادعة. وأقول لعائلات هؤلاء الضحايا الأبرياء: إنني تألمت كل الألم من أجلهم مثلما تألمتم، وأوجع

7   قلبي ما حدث لهم كما أوجع قلوبكم. أقول لكم إن استجابتي لصوتكم ورسالتكم ومطالبكم هو التزام لا رجعة فيه، وإنني عازمٌ

8   كل العزم على الوفاء بما تعهدت به بكل الجدية والصدق، وحريصٌ كل الحرص على تنفيذه دون ارتداد أو عودة للوراء. إن هذا

9   الالتزام ينطلق من اقتناع أكيد بصدق ونقاء نواياكم وتحرككم، وبأن مطالبكم هي مطالب عادلة ومشروعة، فالأخطاء واردةٌ في

10   أي نظام سياسي وفي أي دولة، ولكن المهم هو الاعتراف بها وتصحيحها في أسرع وقت ومحاسبة مرتكبيها. وأقول لكم: إنني

11   كرئيس للجمهورية لا أجد حرجًا أو غضاضةً أبدًا في الاستماع لشباب بلادي والتجاوب معه، لكن الحرج كل الحرج، والعيب

12   كل العيب، وما لم ولن أقبله أبدًا أن أستمع لإملاءات أجنبية تأتي من الخارج، أيا كانت مصدرها وأيا كانت ذرائعها أو مبرراتها.

13   الأبناء شباب مصر، الإخوة المواطنون، لقد أعلنت بعباراتٍ لا تحتمل الجدل أو التأويل عدم ترشحي للانتخابات الرئاسية المقبلة،

14   مكتفيًا بما قدمته من عطاءٍ للوطن لأكثر من 60 عاماً في سنواتِ الحرب والسلام. أعلنت تمسكي بذلك، وأعلنت تمسكًا مماثلاً

15   وبذات القدر بالمضي في النهوض بمسؤوليتي في حماية الدستور ومصالح الشعب حتى يتم تسليم السلطة والمسؤولية لمن

16   يختاره الناخبون في شهر سبتمبر المقبل، في انتخاباتٍ حرةٍ ونزيهةٍ توفر لها ضمانات الحرية والنزاهة. ذلك هو القسم الذي

17   أقسمته أمام الله والوطن، وسوف أحافظ عليه حتى نبلغ بمصر وشعبها بر الأمان. لقد طرحتُ رؤية محددةً للخروج من الأزمة

18   الراهنة، ولتحقيق ما دعا إليه الشباب والمواطنون، بما يحترم الشرعية الدستورية ولا يقوضها، وعلى نحوٍ يحقق استقرار

19   مجتمعنا ومطالب أبنانه، ويطرح في ذات الوقت إطارًا متفقًا عليه للانتقال السلمي للسلطة من خلال حوار مسؤول بين كافة

20   قوى المجتمع وبأقصى قدر من الصدق والشفافية. طرحتُ هذه الرؤية ملتزمًا بمسؤوليتي في الخروج بالوطن من هذه الأوقات

21   العصيبة. وأتابع المضي في تحقيقها أولاً بأولٍ، بل ساعةٍ بساعةٍ، متطلعًا لدعم ومساندة كل حريص على مصر وشعبها كي

22   ننجح في تحويلها لواقع ملموس، وفق توافق وطني عريضٍ ومتسع القاعدة، تسهر على ضمان تنفيذه قواتنا المسلحة الباسلة.

23   لقد بدأنا بالفعل حواراً وطنياً بناء يضم شباب مصر الذين قادوا الدعوة إلى التغيير، وكافة القوى السياسية، ولقد أسفر هذا

24   الحوار عن توافق مبدئي في الآراء والمواقف يضع أقدامنا على بداية الطريق الصحيح للخروج من الأزمة، ويتعين مواصلته

25   للانتقال به من الخطوط العريضة لما تم الاتفاق عليه، إلى خريطة طريق واضحة وبجدول زمني محدد. تمضي يوما بعد يوم

26   على طريق الانتقال السلمي للسلطة من الآن وحتى سبتمبر المقبل. إن هذا الحوار الوطني قد تلاقى حول تشكيل لجنة دستورية

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تتولى دراسة التعديلات المطلوبة في الدستور وما تقتضيه من تعديلات تشريعية، كما تلاقى حول تشكيل لجنة للمتابعة تتولى 27

متابعة التنفيذ الأمين لما تعهدت به أمام الشعب، ولقد حرصت على أن يأتي تشكيل كلتا اللجنتين من الشخصيات المصرية 28

المشهود لها بالاستقلال والتجرد، ومن فقهاء القانون الدستوري ورجال القضاء. وفضلاً عن ذلك، فإنني إزاء ما فقدناه من 29

شهداء من أبناء مصر في أحداث مأساوية حزينة أوجعت قلوبنا وهزت ضمير الوطن، أصدرت تعليماتي بسرعة الانتهاء من 30

التحقيقات حول أحداث الأسبوع الماضي، وإحالة نتائجها على الفور إلى النائب العام ليتخذ بشأنها ما يلزم من إجراءات قانونية 31

رادعة. ولقد تلقيت بالأمس التقرير الأول بالتعديلات الدستورية ذات الأولوية المقترحة من اللجنة التي شكلتها من رجال القضاء 32

وفقهاء القانون لدراسة التعديلات الدستورية والتشريعية المطلوبة. وإنني تجاوباً مع ما تضمنه تقرير اللجنة من مقترحات، 33

ومقتضى الصلاحيات المخولة لرئيس الجمهورية وفقاً للمادة 189 من الدستور، فقد تقدمت اليوم بطلب تعديل ست مواد 34

دستورية هي المواد 76 و77 و88 و93 و189، فضلاً عن إلغاء المادة 179 من الدستور، مع تأكيد الاستعداد للتقدم في وقت 35

لاحق بطلب تعديل المواد التي تنتهي إليها هذه اللجنة الدستورية وفق ما تراه من الدواعي والمبررات. وتستهدف هذه التعديلات 36

ذات الأولوية تيسير شروط الترشيح لرئاسة الجمهورية، واعتماد عدد محدد لمدد الرئاسة تحقيقاً لتداول السلطة، وتعزيز 37

ضوابط الإشراف على الانتخابات ضماناً لحريتها ونزاهتها، كما تؤكد اختصاص القضاء وحده بالفصل في صحة وعضوية 38

أعضاء البرلمان، وتعدل شروط وإجراءات طلب تعديل الدستور؛ أما الاقتراح بإلغاء المادة 179 من الدستور فإنه يستهدف 39

تحقيق التوازن المطلوب بين حماية الوطن من مخاطر الإرهاب وضمان احترام الحقوق والحريات المدنية للمواطنين، بما يفتح 40

الباب أمام إيقاف العمل بقانون الطوارئ فور استعادة الهدوء والاستقرار وتوافر الظروف المواتية لرفع حالة الطوارئ. 41

الإخوة المواطنون، إن الأولوية الآن هي استعادة الثقة بين المصريين بعضهم بعضاً، والثقة في اقتصادنا وسمعتنا الدولية، 42

والثقة في أن التغيير والتحول الذي بدأناه لا ارتداد عنه أو رجعة فيه. إن مصر تجتاز أوقاتاً صعبة لا يصح أن نسمح 43

باستمرارها فيزداد ما ألحقته بنا وباقتصادنا من أضرار وخسائر يوماً بعد يوم، وينتهي بمصر إلى أوضاع يصبح معها 44

الشباب الذين دعوا إلى التغيير والإصلاح أول المتضررين منها. إن اللحظة الراهنة ليست متعلقة بشخصي، ليست متعلقة 45

بحسني مبارك، وإنما بات الأمر متعلقاً بمصر في حاضرها ومستقبل أبنائها. إن المصريين جميعاً في خندق واحد الآن، وعلينا 46

أن نواصل الحوار الوطني الذي بدأناه بروح الفريق وليس الفرقاء، وبعيداً عن الخلاف والتناحر، كي نتجاوز مصر أزمتها 47

الراهنة، ولنعيد لاقتصادنا الثقة فيه، ولمواطنينا الاطمئنان والأمان، وللشارع المصري حياته اليومية الطبيعية. لقد كنت شاباً 48

مثل شباب مصر الآن، عندما تعلمت شرف العسكرية المصرية والولاء للوطن والتضحية من أجله. أفنيت عمري دفاعاً عن 49

أرضه وسيادته، شهدت حروبه بهزائمها وانتصاراتها، عشت أيام الانكسار والاحتلال وأيام العبور والنصر والتحرير. أسعد 50

أيام حياتي يوم رفعت علم مصر فوق سيناء، واجهت الموت مرات عديدة، طياراً وفي أديس أبابا وغير ذلك كثير، لم أخضع 51

يوماً لضغوط أجنبية أو إملاءات، حافظت على السلام، عملت من أجل أمن مصر واستقرارها، اجتهدت من أجل نهضتها ومن 52

أجل أبنائها، لم أسع يوماً لسلطة أو شعبية زائفة. أثق أن الأغلبية الكاسحة من أبناء الشعب يعرفون من هو حسني مبارك، 53

ويحز في نفسي ما ألاقيه اليوم من بعض بني وطني. وعلى أية حال، فإنني إذ أعي تماماً خطورة المفترق الصعب الحالي، 54

واقتناعاً بأن مصر تجتاز لحظة فارقة في تاريخها تفرض علينا جميعاً تغليب المصلحة العليا للوطن، وأن نضع مصر 55

أولاً فوق أي اعتبار وكل اعتبار آخر، فقد رأيت تفويض نائب رئيس الجمهورية في اختصاصات رئيس الجمهورية على النحو 56

الذي يحدده الدستور. إنني أعلم علم اليقين أن مصر ستجتاز أزمتها ولن تنكسر إرادة شعبها، ستقف على أقدامها من جديد 57

2

بصدق وإخلاص أبنائها كل أبنائها، وسترد كيد الكائدين وشماتة الشامتين. سنثبت نحن المصريين قدرتنا على تحقيق مطالب 58

الشعب بالحوار المتحضر والواعي، سنثبت أننا لسنا أتباعا لأحد، ولا نأخذ تعليمات من أحد، وأن أحداً لا يصنع لنا قراراتنا 59

سوى نبض الشارع ومطالب أبناء الوطن. سنثبت ذلك بروح وعزم المصريين، وبوحدة وتماسك هذا الشعب، وبتمسكنا بعزة 60

مصر وكرامتها وهويتها الفريدة والخالدة، فهي أساس وجودنا وجوهره لأكثر من سبعة آلاف عام. ستعيش هذه الروح فينا ما 61

دامت مصر وشعبها، ستعيش هذه الروح فينا ما دامت مصر ودام شعبها، ستعيش في كل واحدٍ من فلاحينا وعمالنا ومثقفينا، 62

ستبقى في قلوب شيوخنا وشبابنا وأطفالنا، مسلميهم وأقباطهم، وفي عقول وضمائر من لم يولد بعد من أبنائنا. 63

أقول من جديد: إنني عشت من أجل هذا الوطن حافظاً لمسؤوليته وأمانته. وستظل مصر هي الباقية فوق الأشخاص وفوق 64

الجميع. سنبقى حتى أسلم امانتها ورايتها، هي الهدف والغاية والمسؤولية والواجب، بداية العمر ومشواره ومنتهاه وأرض 65

المحيا والممات، ستضل بلداً عزيزه لا يفارقني أو أفارقه حتى يوارني ترابه وثراه، وستضل شعباً كريماً يبقى أبد الدهر مرفوع 66

الراس والراية موفورة العزة والكرامة. حفظ الله مصر بلداً أمنا وراعى شعبه وسدد على الطريق خطاه. والسلام عليكم ورحمة 67

الله وبركاته. 68

3

370

1   In the name of God, the most gracious, the merciful.

2   Dear citizens,

3   My sons, the youth of Egypt boys and girls, I am addressing my speech today to the youth of Egypt
4   in Tahrir Square and all over the land. I am addressing you all from my heart, like a father to his
5   sons and daughters. I am telling you that I am proud of you for being a symbol of a new generation
6   of Egypt, calling for change to the better, and hold on to it, dreams of its future, and makes it. I am
7   telling you before anything else that the blood of your martyrs and injured will not go in vain, and
8   I confirm that I will not be lenient to punish those who caused it very firmly and very fiercely. I
9   will hold accountable those who made all these crimes to the rights of our youth with the most
10   severe sentences according to the law. I say to the families of those innocent victims: that I felt a
11   lot of pain for them just as much as you felt it. My heart was aching for what happened to them
12   just as much as it ached your hearts. I am telling you that my response to your voices and your
13   messages and your demands is a commitment that I will not go back on. I am very determined to
14   sincerely fulfil what I said with all seriousness and honesty; I am very keen to carry it out without
15   hesitation or going backward. This commitment stems from my absolute and genuine convictions
16   of your pure and honest intentions and movements, and that all your demands are fair and
17   legitimate demands. Mistakes are likely to happen in any political system or country, but what
18   matters is to admit to it and to rectify it as soon as possible and punish the ones who committed it.
19   I am telling you- as the president of the republic- that I do not find it embarrassing or difficult at
20   all to listen to the youth of my country and respond to them. However, the embarrassment, all of
21   it and the shame all of it that I can and will never accept at all is to listen to the foreign dictations
22   that comes from abroad, no matter what was it source or its excuses or is justifications.

23   My sons and daughters, the youth of Egypt, my fellow citizens, I have previously announced in a
24   clear statement that cannot be argued against or fraud; that I will not run for the upcoming
25   presidential elections. I am satisfied of what I gave to my nation for over than sixty years, in the
26   years of both wartime and peacetime. I have announced that I am committed to this. I have also
27   announced that I am similarly committed – with the same degree- to continue with my
28   responsibility of protecting the constitution and the people's interest until the authority and
29   the power is delivered to whomever the electors choose next September in a free and honest
30   elections that will be provided with the freedom and honesty. This is the oath that I have taken
31   before God and the nation, and I will keep it until we take Egypt and its people to the safe land.
32   I have proposed a specific vision to get out of this current crisis, and to achieve what the youth and
33   citizens of Egypt are demanding, within respect to the constitutional legitimacy and without
34   undermining the constitution. In way, that it will achieve stability in our society and the demands
35   of its youth and in the same time propose a framework agreed upon to a peaceful transition of
36   power within a responsible dialogue between all forces of society and with absolute honesty and
37   transparency. I have proposed this vision committed to my responsibilities of taking the nation out
38   of these difficult times, and I am following up with the process of implanting it, step by step, and
39   hour by hour. I look forward for the support and help of each individual who cares about Egypt
40   and its people, to succeed in making it a reality within a broad and widely agreed on national
41   consensus that will guarantee its implantation by our valiant armed forces.

4

42	We have already started a national constructive dialogue that includes the youth of Egypt who
43	have called for a change along with all the political parties. The result of this dialogue was an
44	initial consensus between opinions and views, and thus we can put our feet on the first steps on
45	the right path to get out of this crisis, we should stick to this path to move from the big guidelines
46	into what we agreed upon, which is a clear roadmap with a specific timetable. It should take us
47	day by day into a peaceful transition of power from now and until next September. This national
48	dialogue agreed to form a constitutional committee to study the required amendments upon the
49	constitution and what it is needed of legitimate amendments. It also agreed upon forming a
50	committee to monitor the progress and follow up with the precise implantation of what I
51	have committed to, to the people. I made sure that the forming both of committees would
52	have include Egyptian characters who have been known for their independence and transparency,
53	and from constitutional law experts and judges. In addition, towards what we have lost of our
54	martyrs the son of Egypt in tragic and sad events, that hurt our hearts and shook the nation's
55	conscience, I have issued my orders to instantly finalize the investigations about last week's
56	events, and to refer the results right away to the general prosecutor to take the necessary legal
57	actions. I have received yesterday the first report about the constitutional amendments
58	with the high priority suggested by the committee that was formed from both judges and legal
59	experts to study the required constitutional and legitimate amendments.

60	In my response to what the committee's report suggested, and with the authority vested to me as
61	the president of the republic according to article number 189 in the constitution, I proposed today
62	the amendment of six constitutional articles and those articles are 76,77,88,93, and 189. In addition
63	to the annulment of article number 179 in the constitution. Confirming the willingness to propose
64	later on the request to amend articles that the constitutional committee recommends according to
65	what they see of both justifications and reasons. These top priority amendments aim to simplify
66	the requirements to run for the presidential elections of the republic, and to set a limited time for
67	the presidency to ensure the rotation of power, and to reinforce the discipline of observing the
68	elections to make sure it is conducted in a free manner and with honesty. It also confirms the
69	exclusive authority of the judiciary to rule upon the legitimacy and validity of the members of the
70	parliament, and the ability to amend the requirements and procedures of the request to amend the
71	constitution. In addition, the suggestion to annul article 179 in the constitution, aims to achieve the
72	required balance between protecting the citizens from the danger of terrorism yet guarantee the
73	respect of both the freedom and civil rights of the citizens. This will open the door to lift the
74	emergency law, once quietness and stability is gained as well as the proper circumstance that
75	allows us to lift the emergency law.

| 76 | Dear citizens, |

77	The priority now is to regain the trust among all Egyptians and to regain trust in our economy, our
78	international reputation, and the confidence that the change and transformation that we have started
79	is a one-way road and we cannot go back from it. Egypt is going through difficult times, where we
80	cannot allow it to continue and increase the damage and losses it caused to us and to our economy
81	day by day. Egypt will end up in a situation where the youth who have been calling for change and
82	reformation will be the first ones who are affected by it. This current moment has nothing to do
83	with me personally, it has nothing to do with Hosni Mubarak; however, it is related to Egypt in

5

84 both its present time and the future of its sons and daughters. All Egyptians are in one trench now,
85 and we should continue the national dialogue we have started, with the spirit of one team rather
86 than divided people, to avoid disagreements and conflicts. Accordingly, Egypt will pass its current
87 crisis, and we will regain the confidence to our economy, tranquility and security to our citizens
88 and the normal daily life to Egyptians streets.

89

90 I was young once, just like the youth of Egypt now, when I learnt the honor of the Egyptian
91 military, the loyalty to the nation and how to sacrifice for it. I have spent all my life protecting its
92 land and its sovereignty. I have witnessed its wars with its defeats as well as its victory. I have
93 lived in the days of occupation and humiliation, and the days of victory in 1973 and liberation. The
94 happiest day of my life was the day when I lifted the Egyptian flag over Sinai; I have faced death
95 a number of times as a pilot, and in Addis Ababa and a lot more times other than that. I have never
96 been subjected to the foreign pressures and dictations, I maintained peace and I have worked for
97 the security of Egypt and its stability. I worked very hard for its prosperity and for her generations;
98 I was never after power or fake popularity. I am confident that the majority of my fellow Egyptian
99 people know who Hosni Mubarak is, and it pains me to see the reactions of some of my fellow
100 countrymen. Anyway, because I completely aware of the seriousness of the situation, and
101 because I am confident that Egypt is going through a defining moment in its history that requires
102 all of us to prioritize the sake of the nation above all, and to put Egypt first above any
103 considerations and all other considerations. I have decided to delegate the powers of the
104 presidents to the vice presidents in the way that the constitution allows it. I am fully aware that
105 Egypt will go through its crisis and will not break the will of its people, will stand on its feet once
106 again with the honesty and loyalty of its sons and daughters all of them, it will deflect the
107 spitefulness upon those who are spiteful, and deflect the gloat upon those who gloats. We the
108 Egyptian will prove our ability to achieve people's commands through a civilized dialogue. We
109 will prove that we are not followers to anyone, and we do not take orders from anyone, and that
110 no one can make decisions for us, but the plus of the street and the commands of the youth of the
111 nation. We will prove this with Egyptian spirit and determination, with the unity and stability of
112 the people, and with our adherence to the pride and dignity of Egypt and its unique and eternal
113 identity. It is the foundation and the essence of our existence for over than seven thousand years.
114 This spirit will live with us as long as Egypt and its people exist, this spirit will live with us as long
115 as Egypt exist and its people exists. It shall live in all our farmers, workers, and our intellectuals.
116 It will last in the hearts of our elderlies, and youth and children, Muslims and Copts, and in the
117 minds and conscious of our children who are yet to be born. I am telling you again, that I have
118 lived for this nation, protected its responsibility and its trust, Egypt will remain the lasting one
119 upon all people and above us all. It will remain until I hand over its trust and flag; it is the goal and
120 purpose, and the responsibility and duty. It is the beginning of my life, its path and its end, the land
121 of my life and death, it will remain a dear country that I will not be separated from nor will it be
122 separated from me until I die and be buried underneath its soil. The people will remain with their
123 pride, live with their heads and flag held high, and live with their dignity and pride.

124 May god protect Egypt as a safe county, and protect its people and guide its way to the right path.
125 May peace be upon you all.

6

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Egypt's hope turns to fury as Mubarak clings to power
President hands some powers to vice-president Suleiman but will remain in control until September elections

Demonstrators in Tahrir Square. President Mubarak had seemed on the verge of giving in to demands to resign. Photograph: Pedro Ugarte/AFP/Getty Images

Egypt

Egypt's hope turns to fury as Mubarak clings to power

President hands some powers to vice-president Suleiman but will remain in control until September elections

Chris McGreal in Cairo

Thursday 10 February 2011 22.34 GMT

President Hosni Mubarak dashed the hopes of hundreds of thousands of Egyptians celebrating what they expected would be his resignation speech by defiantly telling them he would not bow to domestic or foreign pressure to quit.

Mubarak said he would hand some powers to his vice-president, Omar Suleiman, but would remain in overall control until September to oversee what he called an orderly transition to an elected government. He repeated a pledge not to seek re-election.

He also said that there would be no going back on a commitment of long-term political reform after the two weeks of growing protests to demand his resignation. However, he ominously referred to the army playing a role in ensuring an orderly transfer of power.

The president's defiant tone angered the crowds packed in to Cairo's Tahrir Square, the centre of protests against Mubarak's 30-year rule, and may have set the stage for an ugly confrontation at the mass demonstrations called for across Egypt. Many of the protesters waved their shoes, a traditional sign of contempt, and chanted: "He must leave", and shouted "Mubarak you are finished".

Egypt's opposition leaders immediately said they would escalate the protests which in recent days have spread to include strikes that have shut down the public transport system, some hospitals and factories.

Mubarak said he would transfer some powers to Suleiman to prove that the demands of protesters for political change will be met but did not specify which ones. But he rejected foreign pressure, notably from the US, to immediately take major steps toward democratic rule.

"I have spent most of my life in defence of our homeland," said Mubarak. "I have never succumbed to any international pressure. I have my dignity intact."

In the hours before Mubarak's speech, thousands of pro-democracy activists poured in to Tahrir Square for an impromptu victory party in expectation that the president was about to quit after 30 years in power.

The prime minister, Ahmed Shafiq, and other senior politicians said they expected him to announce he would step down as the political crisis continued to deepen.

The mood of optimism was reinforced when General Hassan al-Roueini, the military commander for Cairo, told the crowd: "All your demands will be met today".

Hossam Badrawi, the new secretary general of the ruling National Democratic party, was quoted in the state press as saying he had requested Mubarak to transfer his powers to Suleiman, who had appeared to be effectively running the country in recent days.

But behind the scenes, a political struggle appeared to be under way over the terms of Mubarak's departure. The military's role was not immediately clear but the Muslim Brotherhood, a leading political force although banned, said it appeared the army had taken over behind the scenes. "It looks like a military coup," one of the group's leaders, Essam al-Erian, told Reuters. "I feel worry and anxiety. The problem is not with the president, it is with the regime."

The huge crowds served as a warning that the popular pressure for change is not likely to ease.

Besides Mubarak's resignation, opposition activists have been demanding an immediate lifting of the country's 30-year-old state of emergency, which has been used to lock up the government's opponents without trial. They have also pressing for parliament, elected in a tainted ballot last year, to be dissolved.

Some opposition leaders have said that they would accept an interim administration, controlled by civilians with a military presence, for up to a year to make constitutional changes to permit free elections and also to allow for the creation of new political parties and to give them a chance to become rooted.

Despite his defiance, Mubarak's position is increasingly threatened by the spreading strikes and protests. The regime had expected the protests to lose steam this week but the largest crowd to date descended on Tahrir Square on Tuesday as ordinary Egyptians sensed the government's weakness after it made a series of political concessions even if they fell short of the opposition's demands.

Doctors and thousands of other medical workers joined transport workers, Suez canal employees and thousands of other workers across the country in walking out.

On Wednesday, Egypt's foreign minister, Ahmed Aboul Gheit, rejected Washington's demand for a demonstration that major change is underway – specifically the lifting of the oppressive 30-year state of emergency, a particular grievance of pro-democracy campaigners – by saying that Washington should not "impose" its will.

The White House responded by warning that Cairo has not done enough to satisfy what the Obama administration has previously characterised as the legitimate demands of the protesters.

"I think it is clear that what the government has thus far put forward has yet to meet a minimum threshold for the people of Egypt," said Robert Gibbs, the White House spokesman.

Earlier this week, the US vice president, Joe Biden, phoned Suleiman, the former intelligence chief who is now overseeing dealings with the opposition and the promised political transition, to urge him to immediately lift the state of emergency.

Topics

- Egypt Hosni Mubarak Middle East and North Africa news

Egypt

Mubarak's defiance could spell disaster

The stubbornness of the beleaguered Egyptian president has embarrassed the army and endangered the people

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Ian Black

🐦 @ian_black

Friday 11 February 2011 00.40 GMT

Egypt's popular uprising seemed on course for a significant escalation – and possibly for direct military intervention – last night after a defiant Hosni Mubarak handed some powers to his vice-president but again flatly refused to bow to demands that he stand down at once.

Mubarak dashed what turned out to be catastrophically misplaced expectations that he was finally about to go – fuelled by apparent signs that the army was stepping in to ensure stability after more than two weeks of unprecedented unrest.

The president said he was committed to key constitutional amendments – though he gave no timetable – and announced a bigger, though undefined, role for Omar Suleiman, his newly appointed deputy and veteran intelligence chief.

In a bizarre performance on state TV, Mubarak played father to his people, self-centred, angry and above all determined not to be forced from office before September, when new presidential elections are due.

Looking grave, he repeated his most memorable line from his last big speech, vowing that he would "not leave this soil until I am buried underneath it" – a sharp reminder, amid speculation about retirement to Sharm al-Sheikh or medical treatment in Germany, that he will not follow in the footsteps of the deposed Tunisian leader Zine al-Abdine Bin Ali, now living in gilded exile in Saudi Arabia.

Suleiman, reviled by many opposition supporters as being too close to Mubarak, the US and Israel, pledged in a televised statement of his own that he was committed to an orderly transition, but warned that Egyptians would not be dragged into chaos or used as "tools for sabotage".

Mubarak's speech came at the end of an extraordinary day during which all the evidence seemed to indicate decisive intervention by the military, with officers telling protesters in Tahrir Square that their demands would be met.

Even more significantly, state TV broadcast pictures of the higher armed forces council meeting without Mubarak, the commander-in-chief, reinforcing the impression the generals and the defence minister, Field Marshal Hussein Tantawi, were moving against him. Tantawi is said to be close to and in close contact with the US government.

The council's statement – the title "communique number one" redolent of past military interventions in Egypt and across the Arab world – said it would "remain in continuous session to discuss what measures and arrangements could be taken to safeguard the homeland and its achievements, and the aspirations of the great Egyptian people". Omar Ashour, an Egyptian academic at Exeter University, said: "We may be seeing factional fighting inside the regime and in the end the Mubarak faction won. Or maybe we see him attempting to cling to power regardless of the views of the military. This is certainly embarrassing for them."

Mohamed ElBaradei, the nearest the fractured opposition has to a single well-known leader, said Egypt's fate now lay in the hands of the military. "The army must save the country now," he said.

The concessions Mubarak did offer, to amend key provisions of the constitution including hated anti-terrorist laws, are certainly important, but little more than small print in the big picture of thirst for radical change and profound mistrust of the regime's true intentions.

Mubarak portrayed himself as a patriot overseeing a stable and orderly transition until September — the date of an election in which he said last week neither he nor his son and onetime heir apparent Gamal would now stand.

Above all, the embattled president sang his own praises, reminding Egyptians – the silent majority – of his sacrifices as a war hero and his defence of the country's interests in peacetime. "I have lived for this nation," the former air force commander declared, visibly emotional about his own efforts. "I have exhausted my life defending the land and its sovereignty. I have faced death on my occasions. I never bent under foreign pressure. I never sought false power or popularity. I am certain that the majority of people are aware who Hosni Mubarak is." He clearly meant that those who were roaring their anger and disapproval for the world's TV cameras did not.

Ibrahaim Arafat, a political scientist at Qatar University, warned that Mubarak's defiant performance would radicalise the situation. "The more stubborn and defiant the president sounded, the more stubborn and defiant the street becomes," he told al-Jazeera TV, suggesting an attempt to provoke serious trouble to give the army a pretext to declare martial law.

"I think it is strange," political scientist Osama Ghazli Harb told Reuters news agency. "It means the president doesn't understand anything. I think it could be catastrophic. His intention is to continue in power in spite of the will of the people. For two weeks people have said, 'Go.' Now I'm afraid for the future."

Topics

- Egypt Hosni Mubarak Protest Middle East and North Africa Arab and Middle East unrest news

3. *The Washington Post* **Transcript**

Hosni Mubarak's speech to the Egyptian people: 'I will not . . . accept to hear foreign dictations'

VIDEO

Raw Video: Egypt reacts to Mubarak speech
Crowds of Egyptians erupted in chants after President Hosni Mubarak said he is transferring power to his vice president, Omar Suleiman, but will not leave the country. (Feb. 10)
» LAUNCH VIDEO PLAYER

Thursday, February 10, 2011; 4:50 PM

Here is the transcript of Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak's speech to his nation Thursday evening, translated from Arabic by Federal Document Clearing House:

In the name of Allah, the merciful, the compassionate, dear fellow citizens, my sons, the youth of Egypt, and daughters, I am addressing you tonight to the youth of Egypt in Tahrir Square, with all of its diversity.

I am addressing all of you from the heart, a speech from the father to his sons and daughters. I am telling you that I am very grateful and am so proud of you for being a symbolic generation that is calling for change to the better, that is dreaming for a better future, and is making the future.

I am telling you before anything, that the blood of the martyrs and the injured will not go in vain. And I would like to affirm, I will not hesitate to punish those who are responsible fiercely. I will hold those in charge who have violated the rights of our youth with the harshest punishment stipulated in the law.

I am telling families of the innocent victims that I have been so much in pain for their pain, and my heart ached for your heartache.

I am telling you that my response to your demands and your messages and your requests is my commitment that I will never go back on to. I am determined to fulfill what I have promised you in all honesty, and I'm determined to execute and carry out what I have promised without going back to the past.

This commitment is out of my conviction of your honesty and your movement and that your demands are the demands - legitimate and just demands. Any regime could make mistakes in any country, but what is more important is to acknowledge these mistakes and reform and correct them in a timely manner, and to hold those responsible for it accountable.

I am telling you, as a president of the country, I do not find it a mistake to listen to you and to respond to your requests and demands. But it is shameful and I will not, nor will ever accept to hear foreign dictations, whatever the source might be or whatever the context it came in.

My sons and daughters, the youth of Egypt, dear fellow citizens, I have announced, without any doubt, that I will not run for the next presidential elections and have said that I have given the country and served the country for 60 years in public service, during wartime and during peacetime.

I have told you my determination that I will hold steadfast to continue to take on my responsibility to protect the constitution and the rights of people until power is transferred to whomever the people choose during September, the upcoming September, and free and impartial elections that will be safeguarded by the freedom - the call for freedom.

This is the oath that I have taken before God and before you. And I will protect it and keep it until we reach - we take Egypt to the safety and security.

I have given you my vision to get out of this current situation, to accomplish what the youth and the people called for, within the respect for the legitimacy and the constitution in a way that will accomplish security, and security for our future and the demands of our people, and at the same time will guarantee a framework of peaceful transition of power.

Through a responsible dialogue between all factions in the society, with all honesty and transparency, I have given you this vision under commitment to take the country out of this current crisis, and I will continue to accomplish it. And I'm monitoring the situation hour by hour.

I'm looking forward to the support of all those who are careful about the security and want a secure Egypt, within a tangible time, with the harmony of the broad base of all Egyptians that will stay watchful to guard Egypt and under the command of its military forces.

We have started a national dialogue, a constructive one, that included the youth who have called for change and reform, and also with all the factions of opposition and of society. And this dialogue resulted in harmony, and preliminary harmony in opinions that has placed us on the beginning of the road to transfer to a better future that we have agreed on.

We also have agreed on a road map - a road map with a timetable. Day after day, we will continue the transition of power from now until September. This national dialogue has -- has met and was formed under a constitutional committee that have looked into the constitution and what was required - and looked into what is required, and the constitution reforms that is demanded [inaudible].

We will also monitor the execution - the honest execution of what I have promised my people. I was careful that both committees that were formed - to be formed from Egyptians who are honorable and who are independent and impartial, and who are well-versed in law and constitution.

In addition to that, in reference to the loss of many Egyptians during these sad situations that have pained the hearts of all of us and have ached the conscience of all Egyptians. I have also requested to expedite investigations and to refer all investigations to the attorney general to take the necessary measures and steps - decisive steps.

I also received the first reports yesterday about the required constitutional reform - reforms that was suggested by the constitutional and law experts regarding the legislative reforms that were requested. I am also responding to what the committee has suggested. And based on the powers given to me according to the constitution, I have presented today a request asking the amendment of six constitutional articles, which is 76, 77, 88, 93 and 187, in addition to abolishing article number 79 in the constitution, with the affirmation and conviction that later on we can also amend the other articles that would be suggested by that constitutional committee, according to what it sees right.

Our priority now is to facilitate free election - free presidential elections and to stipulate a number of terms in the constitution and to guarantee a supervision of the upcoming elections to make sure it will be conducted in a free manner.

We - I have also looked into the provisions and the steps to look into the parliamentary elections, but those who have suggested to abolish article number 179 in the constitution will guarantee the balance between the constitution and between our security and the threat of terror, which will open the door to stopping the martial law, as soon as we regain stability and security and as soon as these circumstances -- circumstances assure the stability.

Our priority now is to regain confidence between citizens among themselves and to regain confidence in the international arena and to regain confidence about the reforms that we have pledged.

Egypt is going through some difficult times, and it is not right to continue in this discourse because it has affected our economy and we have lost day after day, and it is in danger -- it is putting Egypt through a situation where people who have called for reform will be the first ones to be affected by it.

This time is not about me. It's not about Hosni Mubarak. But the situation now is about Egypt and its present and the future of its citizens.

All Egyptians are in the same spot now, and we have to continue our national dialogue that we have started in the spirit of one team and away from disagreements and fighting so that we can take Egypt to the next step and to regain confidence in our economy and to let people feel secure and to stabilize the Egyptian street so that people can resume their daily life.

I was a young man, a youth just like all these youth, when I have learned the honor of the military system and to sacrifice for the country. I have spent my entire life defending its land and its sovereignty. I have witnessed and attended its wars with all its defeats and victories. I have lived during defeat and victory.

During the victory in 1973, my happiest days were when I lifted the Egyptian flag over Sinai. I have faced death several times when I was a pilot. I also faced it in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia and elsewhere. I did not submit nor yield to foreign dictations or others. I have kept the peace. I worked towards the Egyptian stability and security. I have worked to the revival in Egypt and the prosperity.

I did not seek authority. I trust that the majority -- the vast majority of the Egyptian people know who is Hosni Mubarak, and it pains me to what I have -- what I see today from some of my fellow citizens. And anyway, I am completely aware of the -- what we are facing and I am convinced that Egypt is going through a historical -- a historical moment that necessitates we should look into the higher and superior aspirations of the nation over any other goal or interest.

I have delegated to the vice president some of the power - the powers of the president according to the constitution. I am aware, fully aware, that Egypt will overcome the crisis and the resolve of its people will not be deflected and will [inaudible] again because of the - and will deflect the arrows of the enemies and those who [inaudible] against Egypt.

We will stand as Egyptians and we will prove our power and our resolve to overcome this through national dialogue. We will prove that we are not followers or puppets of anybody, nor we are receiving orders or dictations from anybody -- any entity, and no one is making the decision for us except for the [inaudible] of the Egyptian [inaudible].

We will prove that with the spirit and the resolve of the Egyptian people, and with the unity and steadfastness of its people and with our resolve and to our glory and pride.

These are the main foundations of our civilization that have started over 7,000 years ago. That spirit will live in us as long as the Egyptian people - as long as the Egyptian people remain, that spirit will remain in us.

It will live amongst all of our people, farmers, intellectuals, workers. It will remain in the hearts of our senior citizens, our women, our children, Christians and Muslims alike, and in the hearts and minds of all those who are not born yet.

Let me say again that I have lived for this nation. I have kept my responsibilities. And Egypt will remain, above all, and above any individuals -- Egypt will remain until I deliver and surrender its -- it to others. This will be the land of my living and my death. It will remain a dear land to me. I will not leave it nor depart it until I am buried in the ground. Its people will remain in my heart, and it will remain -- its people will remain upright and lifting up their heads.

May God keep Egypt secure and may God defend its people. And peace be upon you.