


AN EDITION
OF TWO 15TH-CENTURY TREATISES ON UNIVERSALS

Julian George Deahl

A Thesis Submitted for the Degree of MLitt
at the
University of St Andrews




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An Edition
of two 15th-century Treatises on Universals,

by Julian G. Deahl,

presented for the Degree of Master of Letters,

at the University of St. Andrews,

School of Mediaeval Studies

May 1974.



I hereby declare that this dissertation has been composed by myself, and that the work of which it is a record has been done by myself, and that it has not been accepted in any previous application for a higher degree.

The date of my admission as a candidate for the degree of Master of Letters in Arts under the Resolution pertaining to that degree was the 21st. day of June, 1973.

Julian G. Deahl

I hereby state that the conditions of the Resolution and regulations pertaining to the degree of Master of Letters in Arts have been fulfilled by the candidate

P.A. George,
Supervisor.

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WILLIAM MILVERLEY: UNIVERSALIA

JOHN TARTEYS: UNIVERSALIA

INTRODUCTION TO TEXTS

William Milverley

Master William Milverley (Milverlegus, Milverleius, Milverleye, Mirweley, Mirwirley, Mulverlaye, Mylleeveryley, Myverley, Myverlaye) is a personality who has left nothing behind him except his works. He was apparently a master at Oxford, but no record remains of his incumbency and we have no certain dates for his life. Both Leland and Bale place the period of his work in the middle years of the fourteenth century, during the reign of Edward III. (Bale Scriptores I 434, Leland Collectanea iv.65). There is no other confirmation of this and Dr. Emden thinks it more likely that he worked and wrote at the beginning of the fifteenth century, apparently because the manuscript copies of his works that we possess are collected together with those of other philosophers of this period. (Emden, Biographical register, Vol.2, p.1284). It will be difficult to give a chronological context to the philosophical content of his work, until the works of supposed contemporaries have been edited. There is no doubt that his exposition of universals and his terminology have resemblances to the ideas and words contained in John Tarteys' "Universalia". However Milverley's work does have certain ideosyncracies which suggest to me a more extreme Realist position. However the "Universalia" appears to be an elementary introduction to the complexities of universals and it would be perhaps unwise to develop this sort of inference, until his other works have been examined. We may assume that his works, especially the "Universalia", enjoyed a certain vogue in the later fifteenth century: there are eight extant copies of the "Universalia" and record of at least one more. This would probably be due to the relative simplicity of the work. Unlike Tarteys' "Universalia", Milverley's treatise is not unduly cluttered by complex doubts and questions and proceeds in a fairly straight-forward manner, following Porphyry's familiar text, but not as a commentary, and explaining in the introduction in a relatively simple way the concepts that the

reader will need in the body of the text. The doubts and questions set out at the end are not difficult either: they combine logical and metaphysical exercises without attempting any developments which the beginner might find too taxing.

Milverley's works are:

- (i) *Sophismata in determinatione sua et responsiones ad distinctiones (eiusdem?) de Incipit*, Worcester Cathedral MS.F.118, fos.64-78v, which responsiones possibly refer to art.7, fos.13-14 of the same MS: *De Incipit secundum usum Oxon.*
- (ii) *Universalialia "pro superficiali notitia quinque universalium"*
 British Museum Harleian MS.2178, art.2.
 Worcester Cathedral MS.Q.54, fos.3-11v.
 Oriel College MS.35, art.1, fos.1-4.
 New College MS.289, art.6, fos.58-63.
 Magdalene College, Oxford, MS.latin 47, art.2, fos.34-37.
 Magdalene College, Oxford, MS.latin 162, fos.1-4.
 Bodleian Library, Bodleian MS.676 (S.C. 2595), fos. 134r-147v.
 Corpus Christi College, Oxford, MS.103, art.4, fos.32v-40v
- (iii) *Commentary on Gilbert de la Porée, de sex principiis, "intentio auctoris in hoc libello"*.
 Oriel College MS.35, art.6, fos.134-152.
 Magdalene College, Oxford, MS.latin 47, art.5, fos.67-86.
 Worcester Cathedral MS.Q.54, fos.116-167v.
 Lambeth Palace MS.393, fos.143b-184.
 British Museum, Harleian MS.2178, art.6.
 Bodleian Library, Rawlinson MS.677, art.11.

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(iv) de inceptione "quidlibet meum esse".

New College MS.289, art.9, fos.71-81.

"quidlibet incipit esse quod sor"

Corpus Christi College, Oxford MS.116, fol.5.

(v) de differentia "nulla differunt"

New College MS.289. art.10, fos.81-90.

(vi) de scientia "scitum est, non conscitum"

New College MS.289, art.11, fos.90-99.

Tanner (*Bibliotheca Britannico-Hibernica*, p.528) gives the following further manuscripts:

New College MS 289 de propositione "in materia de propositione" (previously mentioned by Bale)

Corpus Christi College Oxford MS 103, de differentia, de scientia, de qualitate.

Of these the Corpus Christi manuscripts de differentia, de scientia, are not given in Coxe's Catalogue, the manuscript "de qualitate" is given, but is ascribed following Bishop Bale, to John Chilmark (Coxe, Vol.II, p.36, Corpus Christi MS.289, art.5, fos.41-60). The New manuscript "de propositione" is not given by Coxe either, but the Worcester Cathedral Library Catalogue mentions an article "de propositione" following Milverley's *Sophismata* (Worcester Cathedral MS.F.118, art.26, fos.79-83). It is neither catalogued as anonymous nor is it explicitly attributed to Milverley. Finally the index to the MS.F118 mentions a text which was never actually included in the manuscript: "Quattuor materiae Milverley".

Record of a further copy of the *Universalia*, "universalia Milverley et Burleius super Porphirum et predicamenta", 2^o fo' "sicut album" appears in an inventory of books of Canterbury College Oxford, made in 1501 by the retiring Warden, Thomas Chaundler, the same man apparently, whose name appears after the explicit of the New College copy of Milverley's "Universalia". (Pantin, *Canterbury College*, Vol.II, p.25,

item 238). The book does not however appear in the inventory made in the same year by the new incumbent Robert Holynborne upon entering office.

TEXTS

The edition of Milverley's "Universalis" was made on the basis of the following manuscripts (the sigla are put in front).

- A. Magdalene College Oxford MS.latin 47, fos.34-37, "universalis abbreviata, compendiose compilata). Parchment "in quarto minori", single column with broad margin left for copious notes and section headings, English hand, clear and regular, according to Coxe a fourteenth century work (Coxe, Vol.II, p.26).
- B. Bodleian Library MS.2595, fos.134.
Parchment, single column with marginal notes, illuminated capitals, diagram of the tree of Porphyry (fol.147v), English hand, often unclear or smudged, written in the 15th century in England by John Buxhale, whose name appears in the explicit as "B".
- C. Corpus Christi College Oxford MS.103, art.4, 32v-40v.
Parchment "in quarto minori", single column, florid English hand, some intricately ornate ascenders, possibly later additions, illuminations of capitals of chapter headings missing, large spaces left, written in 15th century.
- D. Worcester Cathedral Library MS.Q.54, fos.3r-10v.
Parchment, single column, illuminated capitals, marginal notes, English hand, usually clear, but inexpertly blotched or erased in places, written in the 15th century.
- E. New College, MS.289, art.6, fos.58r-62r.
Paper, "in quarto minori", single column, marginal notes, English hand, often irregular and unclear, approximately $\frac{1}{4}$ of fol.58 torn

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away, hole in fol.60, written in 15th century, name Thomas Chawndler appears in different hand after explicit.

The other manuscripts, British Museum Harleian MS.2178, art.2, Magdalene College, Oxford latin MS 162 and Oriel College MS, art I, I was unable to use for lack of time.

The manuscripts fall into two groups, A and B, and C,D and E. Of these two groups A and E are the most reliable manuscripts, representing two slightly different traditions. A recommends itself chiefly because of the clarity of the handwriting. The text is not without mistakes, but these are usually minor. B is almost certainly a copy of A, a copy which is often quite unreliable. The copier was, one would imagine, a student, because he has attempted to give interpretations of readings, of which he is unsure, which betray a philosophical rather than paleographical ineptitude. He has also made two major additions to the text, which we must assume are his own, as they occur in none of the other manuscripts.

E is discovered to be a quite reliable text, once the problem of the handwriting has been overcome. The missing part of fol.58 means that if from Chapter 1:2,1.13 to Chapter 1:4,1.43 E alone receives no mention in the apparatus, it is to be assumed that that part of the text is missing in E.

D is a copy of E or of a precursor of E. It is on the whole reliable and has apparently received later additions by a scribe who had another copy of the MS before him. It is less full than E, but more legible.

C, although quite legible, contains a large number of inaccurate readings and sometimes tends towards the A/B rather than towards the D/E tradition.

So in compiling the edition I have preferred A and E. Where these differ I have chosen the D/E tradition, unless the sense of the passage seems to demand that A be adopted. C has been used to support the D/E tradition, if necessary. B has been used as a source of amusing inaccuracies and interesting interpolations alone.

John Tarteys

Tarteys (Tartaius, Tartas, Tartays, Tartous) is again a character of whom very little is actually known. He was a master at Oxford, who according to Bishop Bale "per plures annos in Balliolensi collegio studuisse dicitur" (Bale part ii, pp.94-95), by Wood's testimony during the reigns of Henry IV and V (Wood, Lib.II, p.75). His *Universalis* is a more complex work than that of Milverley. Rather than set out concepts before tackling the exposition of the five predicables, he sets out and elaborates upon concepts as he goes along. As a result his work contains very many more questions and answers than does Milverley's. There are a number of differences, the most striking being the absence of the notion of communicability which Milverley makes central to his work. Tarteys covers a larger area of logic and metaphysics than does Milverley and the work is less of an introduction to Porphyry than an account of typical problems raised by it.

We possess today very few of Tarteys' works. Bishop Bale ascribes several tracts on logic to him: (i) *Summulae logicales*, (ii) *Questiones naturales*, (iii) *Suppositiones*, (iv) *Obligationes*, (v) *Problemata*, (vi) *Consequentiae*, all without incipits and all formerly in Balliol College Library.

The works we have today are:

- (i) *Problemata correspondens libello Porphirii*, "*Problemata correspondens libello Porphirii est hoc, Utrum universalis*

ad aliquem sensum"

Magdalene College Oxford, MS.latin 47, art.1, fos.2-34

Lambeth Palace MS.393, art.7.

(ii) De figuris "utrum omnes figure artificiales et naturales"

Lambeth Palace MS.393, art.8.

(iii) Universalia "cum universalium cognitio ut dicitur Porphyrius"

British Museum, Harleian MS. 2178, art.7, fos.
100v-107r.

(iv) Materia de modis "...tur enim fere accidentales"

New College MS.289, art.12, fos.99-107.

(v) Sophisma de equivocis "Nulla sunt equivoca. Quod sophisma sic
factum".

New College MS.289, art.21.

TEXT

It was obviously not possible to make anything other than a transcription of the "Universalia". The manuscript is of the 15th century on parchment, in double columns, some 27 columns long, approximately 45 lines per column. The hand is legible, but the manuscript itself is faded in parts. The text is corrupt in some places and some questions appear without answers and some answers without questions. The division of the work into chapters is as a result not as self-evident as is the case with Milverley's work.

INTRODUCTION TO THE TEXT

Man is a rational animal. For the Realist philosophers of the middle ages this definition constituted the starting point of all philosophical enquiry. Man finds himself in a world of particular sensible entities continually coming into existence and passing from existence. These entities are subject to continual change and man's perception of them is also in a state of flux, due to for instance changes in perspective and changes in the intensity of light. How then can man come to possess any certain knowledge of his world? The Realists answered that he could do so because he is rational, that is he is capable of abstractive thought. This process of abstraction is one of composition and division, that is, of formally dividing what is presented to the senses as a material concrete unit, fixing ones thought upon some particular aspect of that entity and ignoring all other aspects, and of constructing from aspects that display similarites formal unitary entities, which unlike the material entities of the world are not liable to flux. Nor is man's recognition or intellection of such formal units liable to change, unless he by an act of free will reconstitutes them. Thus man superimposes upon the labile sensible world a world of entities, which form a stable basis for discursive. This therefore is the basis of human knowledge.

Yet does not the fact that men are consistently able to recognise the same formal units in many things in different situations imply that these entities have some reality themselves? The medieval Realists certainly thought that this was so. The conceptual entities we construct from material things are signs for entities a parte rei, in the real order, and these things are universals, existing in material things, if they are essential to them, and inhering in them, if they are accidental to them. The universality of such things is comprised in the fact they, as formal units, are to be found in many material units. The

universal stands as a higher-order entity (*superius*) in relation to many lower-order entities (*inferiora*). The notion of "higher-order" and "lower-order" may be conceived in two ways. Something may be said to be of a higher order than something else, if it is better known (*notius*) than that other thing, or may be simply prior to that thing in the real order, that is, as its cause. If one asserts that a universal is only better known than its inferiors, that is, that the formal relationship of universality is merely conceptual, then one is adopting a Conceptualist position. If one states that a universal is both prior to and better known than its inferiors, yet dependent upon them in some way (but not as a "*causatum*" to its "*causa*"), then one is close to a moderate Realist position. To assert that universals are prior to and better known than their inferiors and yet are themselves independent of the existence of their inferiors is to move towards an extreme Realist position. In all three cases the psychological question of what is involved in being better known than something is raised. In the latter two cases, the metaphysical question of whether a formal entity is prior to a material unit is raised. So the question of universals can be seen to be relevant both to psychology and to metaphysics.

However to the moderate Realist the universal is in some way real and the most important question regarding universals is how our expression of universal relationships and the corresponding understanding of such relationships matches the reality of such relationships. That such expressions or predications match some reality is the concern of Logic. Predication in this sense may be both a real relation (*a parte rei*) where something is predicated of another thing, that is, exists in it or inheres in it, or it may be a verbal relation of a subject and a predicate (*a parte terminorum*). In both cases universals are of paramount importance, whether in the

metaphysical sense of universalia a parte rei or as universalia a parte terminorum (general terms). The main problem of the moderate Realist position, which I think is also seen in Milverley's Universalia, is that of whether all such general terms signify real universals. The moderate Realist would see no difficulty in asserting that "man" signifies a real universal man or that "white" in some sense signifies a universal whiteness. But terms of what Ockham would call secondary imposition pose problems, for instance, genus species accident, etc. If they are to signify real universals, then either they must do so in some indirect fashion, or the reality of the entities so signified cannot be Categorical or substantial, but in some sense transcendental. If we reject both these answers, then we are forced to assume that some general terms signify conceptual entities and if some, then why do not all general terms do so?

Metaphysics then tells us what sort of entities exist and more especially what the nature of universal entities is. Logic tells us what sorts of relations there may be between entities and more especially the sorts of relations holding between superiors and inferiors. However Logic may be prescriptive as well as descriptive and in this sense it is prior to all sciences. For if sciences bear upon the material world and if we may only know (intelligere) the material world indirectly, by knowing universals, then any science must presuppose the general notion of universality or of the one-to-many relation. Logic is the study of such relations, thus logic is prior to all science. And if Logic is prior to all science, the study of universals is the first concern of Logic: for which reason Porphyry's Isagogue was studied before the Organon, despite the warnings of many wise men of the folly of such an undertaking by the inexperienced.

Milverley divides universals into three classes, the causational universal, the representational universal and the real or predicable universal. This division has correlates in an earlier division made by St. Thomas and a contemporaneous division made by Wyclif. St. Thomas sets out the ways in which an entity may be related to many others, in *causando* (where one thing is the cause of many others), in *cognoscendo* (the intellect, which may be applied to many things), in *repraesentando* (a concept, which may refer to many things), in *significando* (a word, which may signify many things), in *essendo* (an entity, which may exist in many things) and in *praedicando* (the same entity as it may be asserted of many things). 1). These modes are reduced to three, in *causando*, in *repraesentando* and in *essendo*: however St. Thomas considers that Logic is only properly concerned with the last relationship, of metaphysical or logical universality. Wyclif gives a very similar classification of a *universale causatione*, as for instance God or the celestial bodies, a *universale repraesentatione*, a spoken or written term or an intention of the mind which signifies many things in the real order and a *universale communicatione* which is communicated to many *supposita*. 2).

There seems however to be a distinction between what St. Thomas on the one hand and what Wyclif and Milverley on the other consider to be primarily signified by a *universale repraesentatione*. St. Thomas takes the view that the representational universal signifies many different things in the real order, for instance the term "man" primarily signifies an individual man or the sum of all men (that is can be given personal supposition). Wyclif and Milverley stress that such a *universale* term primarily signifies the universal man, a universal *a parte rei* or secondary substance, and the term is to be

1). Plassmann pp.225-227. 2). Wyclif *De Logica* I p.8.

used primarily in simple supposition. 3). However a general term may be accidental, for example "genus". According to Milverley and Wyclif, such a term would signify a real universal, as well as individual genera, which universal would however be neither a primary nor a secondary substance.

Milverley however differs again from St. Thomas and Wyclif in writing of the *universale praedicatione* or *universale communicatione*. Wyclif speaks of such a universal as being predicable of or communicable to many individuals. 4). Milverley states that a *universale praedicatione* is communicable to many essences, "*quia est realiter illa*". In doing so Milverley seems to depart from the usual mediaeval exposition of Aristotelian teaching on the nature of universals. To St. Thomas a universal (*unum versus alia: i.e. respiciens alia*) is a thing which is or can be in many things really. It is also predicable of many things, hence the short definition of universal "*unum in multis et de multis*". As predicable of an individual thing, the universal is said to constitute in whole or in part the essence of the thing so predicated. It would not however make very good sense to an Aristotelian to state that the universal "*homo communis*" is communicated to the essence of man, *humanitas*, as Milverley would have it.

Milverley's equation of "*communicabile*" and "*aptum natum communicari*" is a point made in most mediaeval logical texts. Simply to state that a universal is something "*quod communicatur*" or something "*communicatum*" would be to ignore the possibility that a universal may at any particular time have only one *suppositum* or no *supposita*

3). Milverley *Universalis* C.1,1 ll.5-7: "*tale universale ... significat universale reale*", Wyclif *De Logica* I p.8, l.15ff.: "*et dicuntur universalis representatione, quia principaliter et primarie representant universalis a parte rei*". 4). Wyclif *ibidem* p.8, l.7 "*et sic natura humana communicatur omnibus individuis speciei humanae, quia inest omni homini, quod sit homo*".

at all. The universal relation of one to many would obviously be absent at this period in time, so the definition of universal takes into account the fact that at another instant in time individuals might appear to which the universal could be communicated and thus the one-to-many relationship would be restored. So we must allow the universal the ability to enter into a one-to-many relationship, that is we must allow it communicability. However because the one-to-many relationship is not necessary, in that one term of the relation is many contingent beings, Milverley can state that communicability is much the same as a property (*proprietas*) of universal being.

The explanation given as to why universals are said to be communicated to many essences still does not resolve the earlier difficulty, viz. that Wyclif and others assert that universals are communicable of things. Mediaeval Catholic thought held the soul, like God, to be an indivisible. The Trinity, like the soul, therefore cannot have three essences, but only one essence. In this sense the intellective soul is not a *universale praedicatione*, although both the soul and the Divine are *universalia causatione*, following the Thomistic division of universals given earlier. One suspects that Milverley here has attempted to reconcile his *Metaphysics* with doctrinal strictures, but in doing so denies that *universalia praedicatione* are communicated to material individuals. Universals may indeed be communicated to essences, but if they are not also communicated to the individuals, in which these essences exist, Milverley has formed a *Metaphysics* without a physical basis.

CHAPTER 1:2 Secundo notandum

Here Milverley discusses the ways in which "*universale reale sive praedicatione*" may be used and the problem of the mode of existence of universal accidents again arises! It would be best to first mention Milverley's division of universals into *universale per se* and *universale per accidens*. The distinction seems to correspond to the

Aristotelian differentiation of those universals which are secondary substances and those which are not. *Universalia per se* seem to correspond to the general and species of substance, *universalia per accidens* to the genera and species of accident. *Universalia per accidens*, as is later apparent, seem to have no place allocated to them in the order of Being: they are what Milverley calls composites of a universal *per se* and one of its accidental attributes. It is with the *universale per accidens* in mind that we must approach the first use of "*universale reale*" that is "*ut actualiter concipitur*". This universal, we are told, is mind-dependent, in that as a concept, it is formed by the mind. The individual man "Socrates" is an unintelligible, that is, it is in a state of potency or contingency, and as such is knowable only by experience. The concept "man", formed by the mind, is actualised and necessary, and would seem in Milverley's view to correspond to some real universal *per se*. But there are also concepts which are accidental, for example "*hoc commune album*" (the universal white thing). This is also mind-dependent, which could merely mean that the mind forms the actualisation "white thing", but which could also mean that such a universal has no correspondence to a real entity outside the mind. It is difficult to know whether Milverley holds the latter view. For it to be clear that he did so, one would expect him to give "*hoc commune album*" or something like it as an example of the way in which such a universal is expressed, in the same way that he gives "*humanitas*" and "*homo communis*" as examples of the ways in which we express the latter two meanings of *universale reale*.

Secondly, *universale reale* is used to mean the nature in which something having the property of communicability exists, which is signified by a term like "*homo*" or "*humanitas*". This is apparently what Milverley calls the material essence of a thing. This essence

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is substantial and particular and it is also in this sense that Milverley's notion that universals per se are communicated to essences is perhaps to be understood, although I am not sure where the dividing line between substance and Milverley's material essence falls, if indeed there is one.

Thirdly, by *universale reale* is meant the entity which is itself communicable, either taken simply or together with its communicability, which latter Milverley terms a "*compositum per accidens*". Milverley regards this form of universal as extra-mental and non-substantial. This non-substantiality of the universal could mean that it is a secondary substance and Milverley admits that a universal of this sort can be a universal per se. But it could mean that such a universal is a universal per accidens, that is, is neither a secondary nor a primary substance. Milverley does not go as far as to state this, he merely states that this universal is a *compositum per accidens* and the communicability of the universal is apparently what gives this *compositum* its accidental nature. He has earlier said that communicability is rather like a property (*proprietas*) of the universal, in the way that risibility is a property (*proprium*) of man. But the property "risibility" is, as will be seen, immediately posterior to the universal man, that is, its necessary and sufficient condition for being is the existence of a man. The Aristotelians thought that secondary substances (that is universals per se) were related to primary substances (material entities) by virtue of their communicability. We certainly could have no immediate knowledge of secondary substances, if the individuals to which they are communicated did not exist. So in this sense communicability is essential, not accidental to universals, because it enters into the definition of *universale reale*, viz. a universal is something which is communicable to many others. If however our knowledge of universals is itself contingent

and universals constitute an order of real and necessary beings beyond the material reality we experience, then communicability is something "quod adest et abest praeter subiecti corruptionem", a mere accident. But then universals per se would be in some sense transcendental and might at some time be unknowable, at least as far as we are concerned now (quoad nos).

CHAPTER 1:3 Tertia notanda

The discussion of predication is first taken with respect to the necessary conditions for the meaningful relation of universal and particular. The later discussion of the predicables sets out the sufficient conditions for the same. In practice all meaningful predication will be by universal of particular or by accident of subject, that is, will be formal predication. The examination of essential predication is intended to establish a way of identifying and refuting meaningless predication, as will become clear in the first three of the questions raised at the end of the treatise.

Predication a parte rei relates to relations in the real order. That one thing is predicated a parte rei of another implies that the one is really an essential feature of the other or that the one is really an accident of the other. Predication a parte terminorum relates to the conceptual order of to grammatical copulation, where one term is related by a copula, like "est", to another: this copulation must be taken as designating directly or indirectly a real relation between entities a parte rei, the directness of the signification being determined by the mode of supposition of terms in the predication a parte terminorum.

Predication a parte rei secundum essentiam seems to mark a considerable development upon what St. Thomas calls material predication: "cum praedicatum et subiectum re quidem sunt unum et idem, attamen ratione distinguuntur seseque mutuo excludunt, e.g. animalitas est rationalitas". This is explained as asserting that rationality and animality are both found in the same material individual (man),

but that these two constitute two formally different individuals. Milverley's statement of essential predication is rather different. "Praedicatio secundum essentiam est praedicatio, in qua aliqua essentia, quae adaequate est essentia materialis subiecti vel praedicati, est tam subiectum quam praedicatum, licet non secundum formale subiecti vel praedicati". He defines material essence as a "concretum se habens per modum denominati" and formal character as an "abstractum se habens per modum dominantis". A "concretum" is a term which may express either a thing or its essence. An "abstractum" is a term which expresses the form of a thing alone. The "modum denominati" or "modum denominabilis" is the grammatical mode of a substantive which may be qualified by a denominating adjective. The "modum dominantis" is the grammatical mode of a denominating adjective, which may qualify a substantive. 5). Thus in the predication "Socrates est homo communis", the material essence "humanitas" is adequately the material essence of the subject; a "concretum se habens per modum denominati" is also the predicate. However the dissimilarity lies in the formal characters of the subject and the predicate: these are expressed by the adjectives "incommunicabile" and "communicabile" respectively, which are "abstracta se habentia per modum dominantis", more fully determining "humanitas" as for example "Socrates" and "homo communis".

Milverley stresses the importance of the fact that the material essence should exhaustively constitute the subject or the predicate term, for instance "humanitas" exhaustively constitutes or defines Socrates, but "animalitas", "sensibilitas", "corporalitas" (all of

5). Erfurt (1972): *Grammatica Speculativa* p.99 and Mullaly: p.xciii

which belong to the essence of Socrates) do so to an increasingly smaller extent. In the other example given, "homo est asinus", both "homo" and "asinus" share the essence "animalitas", yet this is not the essence which exhaustively constitutes a man or an ass.

However it is unlikely that we will merely wish to predicate things in this material sense. Firstly we will be interested in essences of individuals, other than the adequate material essence, for example "animality" or "corporality" with respect to Socrates. Secondly we will be interested in the formal relation between the adequate essence and the other essences of individuals, that is, of containment the one within the other, and, which amounts to the same thing, in the formal relation between the predicate and subject terms of a predication, that is of communicable universal to particular. Thirdly we will be interested in predications involving accidental features of individuals, like the whiteness of Socrates. While none of these interests will be served by essential predication, all of them will be served by formal predication.

Milverley, as is clear from Question 4 of the *Universalialia*, believes in an order of being, ranging from Being in general to the material individuals of the world. Being is embraced by all universals and is present in all individuals. Beneath Being are universals, of which the most immediate order constitutes Aristotle's *Categories*, which are themselves contained within other universals and which are communicable to a subset of the individuals, in which Being is present. Thus Being is present in the set comprising all men and all other individuals, corporality is communicated to a subset of Being, which comprises men and some other individuals and humanity is communicated to a subset of this which comprises men alone. A formal essential predication, e.g. "X is a Y", where X and Y are the names of essences

taken in personal supposition (that is as standing for the individuals to which they are communicated, where X and Y are also subsets of Being embracing these individuals) asserts firstly that all individuals contained beneath the subset X are contained beneath the subset Y, secondly that the relation of the subsets X and Y is that of inferior to superior in the hierarchy of being and thirdly that any individual having the essence X will also have the essence Y. That is what I take to be the meaning of Milverley's statement that "formale praedicati dicitur de subiecto".

Accidental formal predication has two modes. Firstly where it expresses a simple relation between entities and secondly where it states that an entity has a certain contingent state of being. An example of the first mode is "homo differt a me". This is what Milverley calls *praedicatio secundum habitudinem* and what Wyclif also calls *praedicatio secundum relacionem*. 6). Here the predicate term "differt a me" signifies one member of a relation and limits the subject term to simple supposition, that is constrains "homo" to stand for the universal man "homo communis" and not for all individual men. The formal character of the predicate is "incommunicable" and this is what restricts the subject to simple supposition.

An example of the second mode is "homo est albus". This is what Wyclif among others calls *praedicatio secundum motum* or *praedicatio accidentalis*. 7). Here the predicate "est albus" limits the subject to personal supposition, that is constrains "homo" to stand for its supposita, all individual men, and not for the universal per se "homo". Here the formal nature of "est albus" must be taken as the accident "communicable" ("albus communis" is "albedo") and this means that what is predicated of the subject a parte terminorum, is taken as the

6). Wyclif De Ente p.34. 7). Wyclif ibidem.

predicate of the individual supposita of the subject a parte rei. In Milverley's words, the subject must be regarded as being mobile.

It is in this light that the two rules of predication given must be understood. Firstly, that predication secundum motum is not valid, where the subject term is a term of second intention, that is, connoting beyond what is signified the formal nature communicability, because the predicate term limits the subject to personal supposition anyway. Secondly, that predication secundum habitudinem is permissible where the subject is a universal so expressed, because the predicate term limits the subject to simple supposition only.

CHAPTER 1:4 Quarto notandum.

Given then a multitude of universals per se and per accidens, we can determine by the strictures of formal predication the manner in which they relate to individuals and to one another. But it is possible to place further restrictions on the type of relationship into which universals can enter and because we can identify certain groups of strictures which apply to certain types of universals, we are in a position to offer a classification of universals according to the manner in which they may meaningfully be predicated. The names we give to our classes of predicational strictures are the names we give to our classes of universals, namely, genus, species, difference, property and accident.

Every universal other than Being itself is predicated in quid or in quale. A predication in quid defines or partially defines what a thing is, what its essence is, that is a universal per se. There are two modes of predication in quid, generic and specific, and two corresponding types of universal, genus and species. Genus is the name given to a universal per se which is communicable to an individual, where one or more lower-order universals per se are also communicable to the universal. Thus it expresses part of what it is for that

individual to be what it is. Species is the name given to a universal per se, that is directly communicable to its particular instances, that is, expresses the whole of what it is for those individuals to be what they are.

Predication in quale is predication by universals per accidens. It describes what sort of thing an individual is. The relation of the universal so predicated may be substantial or accidental. If substantial, the universal so predicated is either simultaneous with the species of which it is predicated, that is, contained in its definition, or immediately posterior to it. If the predication is of the first type, it is called predication in quale per se primo. This occurs when difference is predicated of species. Here is expressed the difference between that species and any other species of the same order, that is, contained immediately beneath a certain genus. If the predication is of the second type, it is called predication in quale per se secundo, as when property is predicated of species. If the predication is in quale accidentally, the predicate is an accident per accidens and contingently follows the existence of the individuals of the species, of which it is predicated, that is, the accident "abest" et adest praeter subiecti corruptionem".

CHAPTER 2 Genus

Milverley defines genus as being a universal predicable in quid of many things differing in species. He proceeds to demonstrate the sufficiency of this definition by showing that it adequately differentiates genus from the other four types of universal. However he then goes on to define an analogical genus which is predicated "secundum maius et minus" of its particulars. Many mediaeval philosophers would have taken issue with this. According to Thomistic doctrine, universals are only communicable in a univocal sense. The

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Thomist definition of universal demonstrates this: "unum in multis et de multis". If however a universal has one relation to one individual and another to another, then the notion of universal becomes untenable, for we clearly have a universal "partim unum, partim diversum". Further, a genus cannot be equivocally predicated, because it is said to be predicated in quid of an individual, that is, given the predication by a universal of an individual, we are in a position to state exactly what it is for this universal to be itself. If we are still not clear as to what it is that this individual is, but have to ask further questions, for instance "How do you mean that?", that is a question relating to the analogy intended in the predication, the predication is not in quid, nor in fact in quale and the entity so predicated is neither a genus nor indeed a universal, as Milverley has hitherto defined them. We are dealing in the case of the analogical genus "accident" with a transcendental, like Being itself, which can be neither predicated in quid nor in quale, and Milverley himself is later to forbid the predication of such entities. Furthermore, when we say that an accident is predicated of something, we are stating that a so-and-so is predicated in the manner of an accident per accidens. If there is more than one manner of predicating an accident, then there is more than one class of universal accident, but according to Milverley there is only one class of predicable accident per accidens.

It could be argued here that Milverley is not speaking of predicable accident but of predicamental or Categorical accident. However he equates the genera generalissima with the Categories. The genus generalissimum, as he states it, is the highest order of entity that may be meaningfully predicated. Aristotle terms the first Category as substance and the last nine as accident, but here again, following Milverley's reasoning, the term "Categorical accident" is a

transcendental and may not be meaningfully predicated of anything else.

CHAPTER 3 Species

Milverley defines species as a universal "sub genere univoce praedicabile in quid de individuis". He demonstrates the sufficiency of the definition and proceeds to define infima and subaltern species. He next poses the question: "If genus and species are each assumed in the definition of the other, then they are each better known than the other!" Porphyry's answer is given that they are correlatives, terms of second intention, and thus each may be assumed in the definition of the other. Indeed, nothing assumed in the definition of something else is better known than that thing, unless the definition be of universals per se and not per accidens. But hoc commune genus and hoc commune species are universals per accidens. Milverley elaborates the point further. Understood in personal supposition, the terms "genus" and "species" refer to particular universals per se and as such cannot be used as terms in a definition, whereas taken in simple supposition, they refer to the universalia per accidens, hoc commune genus and hoc commune species.

However there is one further complication, which again raises the question of whether universalia per accidens are real in the sense that universalia per se are so. Milverley states that hoc commune genus and hoc commune species are "simul in natura". Ockham on the other hand, whilst agreeing that they are correlatives, says that they are "simul in intellectu" 8), "intentiones in anima distinctae" 9).

Further, Milverley himself places a restraint on the predication "The five universals and the universal universal constitute six universals". One should therefore also deny the predication "These three genera and the genus of genus are four genera". As Milverley

8). Ockham Praedicabilia p.33, l.16. 9). Ockham Praedicabilia p.27, l.16.

explains, the only feature common to a number of genera per se is Being in general. The genus of genus is not Being in general, unless it be so in some transcendental sense. Therefore it has no being, as we understand this. Why then does Milverley state that hoc commune genus and hoc commune species are "simul in natura", the real order? If he supposes them to be transcendentals, then the relation in which hoc commune genus stands to particular genera is not one of communicable entity to particular, as in formal predication, but only analogous to this. As in the case of the universal universal it is virtually restricted to essential predication. For, if we can know intellectually no entity beyond the order of being, that is, beyond Being in general, then we cannot know by intellectuation transcendental genus or species, thus we cannot formally predicate them, as Milverley himself states (C. IX, 1.23-27). The only predication possible is essential predication, which does not add to our knowledge of things. Milverley's arguments themselves reject formal predication of transcendentals, therefore the term "hoc commune genus" in simple supposition must designate, as Ockham states, a mental concept or otherwise correspond to the conventional use of a name.

Milverley finally notes that a universal per se which is a subaltern genus can stand in simple supposition specifically or generically, that is, either as taken as a species with respect to another subaltern genus or infima species immediately beneath it, e.g. "Animal est species humana", or as taken as a genus with respect to its individual supposita, e.g. "Animal est genus animalis". Wyclif notes this distinction, giving as an example of specific simple supposition "Animal est species specialissima" and as an example of generic simple supposition "Animal praedicatur", neither of which examples are particularly helpful 10).

10). Wyclif De Logica, p.35.

CHAPTER 4 Difference

Milverley defines difference as a universal predicable per se primo in quale of species and goes on to show the sufficiency, in that it differentiates difference from all other types of universal. Difference is both constitutive and divisive, divisive of genus and constitutive of species, that is, with genus constitutes the definition of a species. In this sense it is prior to species, for as Milverley has already stated (C.3, 11.16-18) "omne positum in definitione alterius est simpliciter notior definito...in definitione proprie dicta data de universalibus per se". Difference is also convertible with species, for to state rationality is to imply humanity. Whether all species per se and per accidens have convertible differences is another matter. Species per accidens (such as rationality) do not: this would lead to an infinite number of accidental features of accidental features. All species per se in the predicamental or Categorical order do have further convertible differences, but we usually fail to notice them or name them.

It is further argued that rationality, the immediate of substantial difference of the species "man", is not convertible with man, because it is also predicable of angels and of the soul, which amounts to a denial of the fact that rationality is the substantial difference of man. Milverley offers two answers to this problem. Firstly that rationality is met in every instance of man in the material order, but that this rationality is not the same sort of rationality found in angels or the intellectual soul. Or secondly that angels are intellectual, not rational, beings, which means that the objects of their thought are always essential rather than material and that because of this they are not capable of rational thought, that is, thought utilising discursive processes of induction and deduction. Further, the rational soul is not rational per se, but only for as long as it exists with the human body: at death, when it is separated

from the material body, its thought is also severed from the material plane and it becomes like the angel, an intellectuale, incapable of discursive rational thought.

Milverley finally considers the question of whether a part of a definition, i.e. genus or difference, has greater extension than or is co-extensive with what is defined. Both parts of the disjunction are admitted, in that "having greater extension than" is taken as meaning "being prior to" and "being co-extensive with" is taken as meaning "being convertible with".

CHAPTER 5 Property

Milverley defines property as a universal predicable in quale per se secundo of species. It is predicated per se secundo rather than per se primo (as is a difference), because a property, unlike a difference, is not prior to or convertible with a species, but posterior to it and to the existence of its supposita. It is then shown that because property and difference are only univocally predicable of substantial species, that is, species per se, they may only be properly predicated of substances. If they are predicated of species per accidens, this must be done analogically, which however distorts the notion of predicability or communicability hitherto given, that is, that what is predicable should be present in all particulars of a species to the same extent. So the problem of the exact nature of the universal per accidens again arises, for, given that we cannot ascribe a substantial existence to them, we are forced to decide whether they are transcendental Ideas or merely conceptual entities.

Finally the question is raised as to whether a property (a universal per accidens) can be asserted of another property. The answer is that it cannot be, as properties are only in a Category of Being by virtue of the fact that they are predicable of substances.

CHAPTER 6 Categorical Accident

Categorical accident in its general sense is an entity inhering in a subject, but not as part of that subject. Such inherence is subjective. However, although accident in this sense might be expected to include difference, that is, substantial or immediate difference, Milverley states that this is not so. The immediate difference of man, i.e. that he is rational, is an objective part of him, in that the universal "rationality", which uniquely defines man, is a substantial part of him. Yet because this difference implies a relation between man and non-man, it would seem that to admit difference as an objective part of the substance of man is to allow an objective or substantial existence to a relation. This is perhaps why St. Thomas prefers to say that difference is predicated essentially and adjectivally "in quale quid", rather than merely "in quale".

Secondly Milverley distinguishes the primary subject in which an accident inheres and upon which it is immediately dependent and the secondary subject in which it mediately inheres by virtue of its inherence in the primary subject. For instance, the quantity of Socrates inheres in the matter of Socrates, which is its primary subject and only by virtue of this primary inherence does it inhere in Socrates himself.

CHAPTER 7 Predicable Accident

Predicable accident is defined as a universal predicable of substance in quale per accidens. According to Milverley, accident may be absolute or relative. However the definition of "predicable" is that it is not only the name given to a class of universals, but also a particular manner in which such universals are predicated, which differentiates this class from any other class of universal. Further any universal in any predicable class must be predicated in quale or in quid, otherwise it would still leave the determination of

what a thing is or what sort of thing it is incomplete. Therefore universals must be predicated univocally.

Milverley, however, tells us that absolute accidents make no reference in predication other than to the subject and that relative accidents do refer to something else other than the subject. In his general account of accidents, Milverley states that accidents inhere in subjects "non tamquam pars" and that universal difference, that is, substantial difference, does not do so. I do not wish to equate specific difference with the difference of material individuals, but it does not seem likely that the difference between Socrates and Plato can be said to inhere in Socrates or Plato or that this difference can be predicated of Socrates without being predicated simultaneously of Plato. Without going any deeper into the problems of relations, it does seem that Milverley's account of accident involves not one but at least two modes of predication and that we have here not one, but at least two classes of universals per accidents. The attempt to include all such accidental predications under the same heading means that the predicable accident per accidens is at one further stage of abstraction at least than any of the other four predicables.

Milverley goes on to discuss separable and inseparable accidents. Inseparable accidents are such as may not be absent from the subject in which they inhere, without that subject ceasing to be what it is. For instance, a snub-nose is such because it has a certain shape. Were it to lose that snubness, it would probably cease to be a nose at all. A separable accident is "quod abest et adest praeter subiecti corruptionem", that is can be absent from or present in an individual without prejudicing that individual's continued existence. Some species of accidents may be said to be both separable and inseparable. For instance there can be black men, white men, red men, yellow men, black cats, white cats, etc. and each of the accidents black, white etc.

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cannot by its absence stop a man or a cat being what it is. However there are black crows but no red, green or pink crows, and if a crow ceased to be black, it is very unlikely that we would consider it to be a crow at all. So blackness is separable *secundum speciem*, but inseparable *secundum individuum*, where the individual is a crow.

CHAPTER 8 Definition

Milverley here gives two modes of definition: one in which the defined term is a term of first intention and here the definition given applies to each and every individual contained under the term, when it is taken in personal supposition, the other in which the term defined is a term of second intention and the definition applies to any universals contained under the term. And it is in this second sense that the definitions given of the five predicables are to be understood.

CHAPTER 9 First Doubt

Milverley here denies the argument that there is an infinite succession of universals. For example, the five universals (predicables) are all universal, therefore a sixth universal is communicable to them; this sixth universal and the five universals are all universal, therefore a seventh universal is communicable to them. Milverley states that there is no class of universal which is more universal than the five classes of predicables, unless it be Being itself, which is the essence common to all existent individuals, but which is never predicated of them. So Milverley admits that the predication "The five universals and the universal universal are six universals" is valid, but only in an essential sense, that is so long as we are talking of material being, not formal being. In this sense the universal universal, Being, is communicated to itself, that is, simply or by identity and to the five predicable classes personally, as a superior to inferiors. However there can be no formal sense, in

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which "the five universals and the universal universal are six universals" is true. They are universals of different orders: the five universals are objects of second intention or of ultimate abstraction, the universal universal is transcendental.

The second case is similar. "Socrates" and "homo communis" are, as we have seen, found to have the same material essence, but there is no formal identity between the two, as the latter connotes a universal nature, whereas the former does not. To state that "Socrates and man in general are two men" is false, because they are neither two material men, nor two formal men. Similarly to predicate "homo" formally of "homo communis" is to assert an identity between the form of "homo" (indeterminate) and the form of "homo communis" (communicable), which is not true.

Three further problems are raised. Firstly that universals are numerically infinite, following Boethius' statement that the species of numbers and figures are infinite. Secondly that the species of animals are infinite, because the offspring of two animals of two different species is of a third different species and the offspring of this animal and of some animal of an other species is of another species yet. Thirdly that the human species is not an infima species, because it has two lower-order species per se contained beneath it, that is, man in general and woman in general. Therefore no infima species in the animal which has male and female members is an infima species.

The reply to the first question is that an infinite number of species per accidens is possible. But to the second question, he replies that species of substances and thus of animals are not infinite. In the case of animals, the offspring of two animals of different species would itself be incapable of further reproduction. Thirdly Milverley replies that men and women are not species per se

in the human species, because a hermaphrodite is both male and female.

CHAPTER 10 Second Doubt

The second question concerns the possibility that the universal is particular and two arguments are put forward in favour of this view. Firstly thus: every man runs, but something which is a man, does not run (namely man in general), therefore it is not true to say that every man runs. This, according to the argument, is supposed to be an expository syllogism. But Milverley denies this. An expository syllogism is one in which the middle term (here "something which is a man") has personal supposition (that is, supposes for an individual man). Man in general is an individual only in a formal sense, thus the minor premiss should read "something which is formally a man does not run", in which case it would not only be false, but the whole syllogism would be invalid, because there would then be no middle term.

And secondly thus: there are no such things as formal characteristics of quantity. Milverley quotes the following rule: given two accidents with opposite denotations, the first of which is formally predicated of some entity taken in its universal sense, and the second of which is formally predicated of the same entity taken in its particular sense, then we allow that we may essentially predicate the second characteristic of the first and the first characteristic of the second. For example, man in general is formally communicable and indivisible. Man in particular is formally singular and an indivisible thing is divisible. Thus because a singular entity may be given the formal characteristics of a universal and a universal may be denied the formal characteristics of a universal, we are forced to deny that there is any difference between universal and particular entities.

Milverley denies this argument. He accepts the rule given, but

denies that a universal entity may be denied its formal characteristics, because he denies that a predication like "res quanta est non quanta" is in any sense a formal predication. He further denies that Socrates is essentially different from man, but concedes that he is so formally, and denies that Socrates is either essentially or formally different from Socrates.

CHAPTER 11 Third Doubt

Milverley next considers whether predications of the form "man in general runs" are permissible. Two arguments are given to show that they are. Firstly that universal accidents like "currere" take common entities as subjects and not singular ones. Thus they primarily denote such common entities. Therefore the predication "homo communis currit" primarily signifies man in general running, because the entity primarily denoted by the predicate is man in general. Secondly it is argued that "homo currit" signifies that the entity man in general is running, because (a) "homo" signifies man in general and (b) "currit" signifies running. And thus the two predications "homo currit" and "homo communis currit" are convertible, because they both signify the same thing.

Milverley answers the first part of the argument by distinguishing between the two sorts of subject that universal accidents may take. They take as subjects "quo ad dependentiam" universal entities and as subjects "quo ad denominationem" singular entities. Thus it is true to state that such universal entities take as their subjects universal entities, but not that they primarily denote such entities, because with respect to denomination their subjects must be singular entities.

Thus Milverley is in a position to answer the argument. "Currit" is the sort of predicate that will primarily denote a singular entity, that is, will imply that the subject of the predication in which it

occurs must be taken in its mobile sense, that is as standing in personal supposition, and only secondarily denotes a universal entity. Thus "homo" must signify primarily individual men and only secondarily man in general. "Homo communis" however primarily signifies man in general and "homo communis currit", if it is to be accepted as a valid predication at all in the light of the rule Milverley gives in the chapter on formal predication, will primarily signify man in general running. Therefore "homo currit" and "homo communis currit" are not convertible, because the objects of their primary signification differ.

CHAPTER 12 Fourth Doubt

Finally Milverley raises the question of whether the number of individuals to which a species is communicated is the measure of its communicability. If this were so, an infima species like the species of points could be said to be more communicable than certain subaltern genera like the genus animal. Milverley denies that this is so and states that the hierarchy of universals in being is constituted according to the distance between any universal being and individual being. All species equidistant from individual being are thus equally communicable. He distinguishes relative communicability, which is determined by the number of individuals to which a universal is communicated at any one time and absolute communicability, which is determined by the distance of a universal entity from individual being. The latter is an immutable relation, the former is contingent upon the number of individuals of a species that happen to exist at any one time.

He allows that all infima species are equally species and equally communicable and thus the species "species" is communicated univocally and equally of species in all categories of being. However the species of species is itself an accidental universal and is apparently itself outside the order of being as we know it. Whether or not its communicability is absolute, and if so, how it can be said to relate to individual being, is not resolved.

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(PROEMIUM)

1.

Pro superficiali notitia quinque universalia est primo notandum, quod triplex est universale, quantum spectat ad propositum. Aliquod enim est universale causatione, quod est res multa causans: et sic est Deus maxime universalis. Aliquod est universale repraesentatione, 5 quod est signum multa signans, ut iste terminus "homo": et tale universale non dicitur universale nisi aequivoce, quia significat universale reale: sicut homo pictus non dicitur homo nisi quia signum veri hominis. Tertium est universale reale sive praedicatione, quod est natura communicabilis pluribus essentiis, ita quod idem sit dicere 10 "communicabile" et "aptum natum communicari", modo quo species humana comunicatur suis suppositis, quia est realiter illa. Et sic, si foret aliqua species, cuius non posset esse nisi unicum individuum, adhuc illa esset communicabilis, licet non posset communicari, sicut in casu: aliquis homo est risibilis, qui non posset ridere, eo quod 15 universalitas vel communicabilitas est quasi proprietas universalis, sicut risibilitas respectu hominis. Et additur in descriptione "pluribus essentiis", quia a probabili, licet anima intellectiva singularis sit communicabilis memoriae, rationi et voluntati, tamen illa non est formaliter universale, cum illa tres non sunt tres 20 essentiae, sed una et eadem essentia animae intellectivae.

Cap.I,1: 1. est primo sciendum C, primo est notandum D, est om.E.
 3. enim om.C, est enim D / causans multa B. 4. Deus est maxime universale BD, est Deus maxime universalis AE, Deus est maximus universalis C / aliquod est (enim) add.CD. 6. dicitur CD / aequivoce (scilicet) add.CDE / quia) quod C. 7. sicut) sic C / quia (est) add.A. 8. sed tertium ECD.
 9. natura (simplex) add.B / idem) tantum C / dicere om.BCE. 10. et) sicut C, id est D / communicare C, communicare esse B / modo quo) sicut D.
 11. illa (id est essentialiter illa) add.D. 12. foret) esset AC / individuum (sicut species Phoenicis) add.D. 13. illa om.C / licet) quamvis C. 14. in casu om.D / aliquis om.D / est) dicitur D / qui) et tamen A, licet D. 15. vel) et C. 16. respectu (istius) add.B

Chapter one.

INTRODUCTION.

1.

In acquiring a preliminary knowledge of the five universals, the first thing to be noted is that the universal is of three types, as far as we are concerned here. There is a universal of causation, which is a thing causing many things. There is a universal by representation, which is a sign signifying many things, for instance the term "man". Such a sign is not said to be a universal except in an equivocal sense, in that it signifies a real universal: for example, a painting of a man cannot be said to be a man except in the sense of being a sign for a real man. The third type is the real or predicated universal, which is an entity, that can be communicated to several essences (in the sense that it means the same to speak of something being common to and of something being naturally fitted to being communicated), in the way that the human species is communicated to its supposita, because in a real sense it is them. And thus if there were a species of which there could only be one member, it would still retain its ability to be common, although it could not be communicated (for example, in the case of a man, capable of laughter, yet unable to laugh), because universality or communicability is as it were a property of the universal, as is an ability to laugh of man. The phrase "to several essences" is added to the description, because it is probable that although a singular intellective soul is common to memory, reason and will, it is not however a universal as we should define it, as these three are not three essences, but one and the same essence of the intellective soul.

(cont.) / descriptione) definitione C. 18. rationi, memoriae B,
 19. illa om.A / formaliter universalis DE, universalis formaliter B,
 formaliter universale C./ tres post illa om.A / tres post sunt om.E.
 20. essentia animae intellectivae) anima intellectiva C, intellectivae
 (et caetera) add.C.

2.

Secundo notandum est quod universale praedicatione aliquando accipitur pro ipsa natura universali, ut illa actualiter concipitur vel est comprehensibilis ab intellectu. Et sic dependet ab anima, quia ille conceptus vel comprehensibilitas dependet ab anima. Et isto modo dicit Commentator Tertio De Anima, quod universale non est complete extra animam et quod intellectus facit universalitatem in rebus: et isto modo intelliguntur quotquot auctoritates sonantes, quod universalis non sunt extra animam.(1) Alio modo sumitur universale pro illa natura, cui inest universalitas et ut sic significatur per terminum concretum primae intentionis vel per terminum abstractum, ut homo, humanitas. Sed tertio modo sumitur universale pro ipsa natura, ut est universalis, sive pro composito per accidens ex natura et universalitate. Et sic significatur per terminum secundae intentionis, ut homo communis, species humana, genus animalis. Et universale sic dictum, sicut et secundo modo, est complete extra animam. Nullum tamen universale isto tertio modo est substantia, sed compositum per accidens ex natura et universalitate, sicut "album" in suppositione simplici componitur ex substantia et albedine. Et de tali universali intelliguntur quotquot textus sonantes, quod universalis non sunt substantiae.(2)

Ex quo patet, quod aliquid est universale per se, scilicet natura simplex, cui inest universalitas, distinguendo simplex contra aggregatum per accidens, quale universale est humanitas. Et aliquid est universale per accidens, scilicet compositum per accidens ex natura universali et una proprietate sibi accidentali, ut hoc commune album, hoc commune universale.

C.I,2: 1. est om.CE / aliquando om.C. 2. accipitur) sumitur C / ipsa om.A / universale C / ipsa BC / concipiatur A. 3. vel) ut illa C. 4. iste B / quia ille -- ab anima om.E. 7. sonantes) quae sonant CDE, (quae ponunt) add.A. 7-8. quod universale non est extra animam A. 8. illa) ipsa CDE. 10. abstractum (primae intentionis) add.A / ut prout CE. 11. est universale BC. 12. ex (illa) add.C / et (illa) add.C. 14. ut secundo D. 15. modo om.CDE / illo C / tertio om.B /

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2.

The second thing to note is that the predicated universal is sometimes understood as the universal entity, which is conceived or is comprehensible actually to the intellect. And thus it is dependent upon the mind. And this is the sense that the Commentator intends when he says in the Third Book of the De Anima, that the universal is not wholly extramental and that the intellect fabricates universality in things. And in this sense are to be understood a number of authorities who state that universals do not exist outside the mind. Secondly the universal is used to mean the entity in which a communicable nature inheres and which is thus signified by a concrete term of first intention or by an abstract term, e.g. by "man" or "humanity". However thirdly the universal is used to mean the entity itself which is universal, or a composite per accidens of the entity and universality. And this is thus signified by a term of second intention, e.g. "man in general", "the species man", "the genus animal". And a universal of this and of the second type is wholly extramental. However no universal of this third type is a substance, but rather a composite of an entity and universality, in the way that "white thing" understood in simple supposition is composed of substance and whiteness. And in respect of this kind of universal are to be understood a number of texts which state that universals are not substances. It is apparent from this that there is a universal per se, namely a simple entity, in which universality exists (contrasting simple to aggregate per accidens) and humanity is such a universal. And there is a universal per accidens, namely a composite per accidens of a universal entity and a property accidental to it, e.g. white thing in general, universal in general.

(cont.) 15-16. tamen universale isto modo non est substantia B. 18. albedine) accidente A / universali) universalitate BC. 22. aggregatum) aggregationem A / accidens (ex natura universali et una proprietate sibi accidentale, ut hoc commune album, hoc commune universale) add.A. 24. ex natura -- hoc commune universale om.A / accidentale D.

Tertio notanda est distinctio praedicationis. Aliqua enim est praedicatio a parte rei, aliqua a parte terminorum. Praedicari a parte rei est realiter esse, sicut universale praedicatur de suo inferiori, vel realiter inesse, sicut accidens praedicatur de suo
 5 subiecto. Praedicatio a parte terminorum non est praedicatio proprie, nisi quia signum praedicationis a parte rei.

Praedicatio a parte rei, quantum pertinet ad propositum, est duplex. Aliqua enim est praedicatio secundum essentiam et aliqua est praedicatio formalis.

10 Praedicatio secundum essentiam est praedicatio, in qua aliqua essentia, quae adaequate est essentia materialis subiecti vel praedicati, est tam subiectum quam praedicatum, licet non secundum formale subiecti vel praedicati: ut hic: "Socrates est homo communis"; ista essentia, quae adaequate est essentia subiecti, scilicet humanitas,
 15 est tam subiectum quam praedicatum, sed non secundum formale praedicati, quod est communicabilitas. Voco autem essentiam materialem subiecti vel praedicati concretum se habens per modum denominati, et formale abstractum se habens per modum denominantis. Exemplum in illa praedicatione: "Socrates est homo communis"; homo est essentia
 20 materialis et communicabilitas est formale praedicati. Ex quo patet, quod non est praedicatio secundum essentiam "homo est asinus", licet eadem essentia sit subiectum et praedicatum, scilicet genus animalis, quia illud genus non est adaequate materiale subiecti nec praedicati. Praedicatio secundum essentiam a parte terminorum est praedicatio
 25 primarie significans talem praedicationem a parte rei.

C.I,3: 1. aliqua est enim A. 2. rei (et aliqua) add.CD. 3. a parte rei om.A / realiter esse vel realiter inesse A. 3-4. inferiori vel realiter BD, inferiori realiter A, singulari et realiter C. 5. proprie praedicatio AC. 6. signum praedicationis ACE, significat praedicationem B, significat praedicationes D. 7. pertinet ABD, spectat C. 8. aliqua enim est AC, aliqua est enim BD, aliqua est om. enim E / est praedicatio om.C / praedicatio enim secundum C. 14. ista BCE, illa AD / est adaequate C / scilicet BCDE, videlicet A,

3.

The third point to note is a distinction in predication. There is on one hand predication a parte rei and on the other predication a parte terminorum. To be predicated a parte rei is to exist really, as when a universal is predicated of its inferiors, or to really inhere, as when an accident is predicated of its subject. Predication a parte terminorum is not strictly predication unless it be a sign standing for a predication a parte rei.

Predication a parte rei is for our purposes twofold. One kind is essential predication and the other formal predication.

Essential predication a parte rei is predication, in which an essence which exhaustively constitutes the material essence of the subject or predicate is both subject and predicate, albeit not as far as the formal nature of the subject or predicate is concerned. For instance in this case "Socrates is man in general", that essence which exhaustively constitutes the essence of the subject, namely humanity, is both subject and predicate, but not with respect to the formal nature of the predicate, which is communicability. Thus I consider the material essence of the subject or the predicate to be a concrete thing constituted in the manner of something denominable and the formal nature to be an abstract thing constituted in the manner of something which denominates. An example of this predication is "Socrates is man in general". Man is the material essence and communicability the formal nature of the predicate. From this it is clear that "man is an ass" is not essential predication, although the same essence is both subject and predicate, i.e. the genus animal, since this genus does not exhaustively constitute the material nature of the subject or the predicate. Essential predication a parte terminorum is predication primarily signifying a corresponding predication a parte rei.

(cont.) Socrates ADE, humanitas B, communicabilitas C. 15. praedicati ABDE, praedicatum C. 16. quod BCD, quae A / autem ABD, enim C. 17. per modum abstractum et formale denominati B / determinati B / et (voco) add.C. 18. determinantis B. 18-19. in illa praedicatione A (over)

(8)

(cont) in isto praedicato BD, in tali praedicatione C. 19. Socrates
ABD, ut homo C. 19-20. essentia materialis subiecti est homo C.
20. est om.C. 21. quod (hoc) add,A. 22. eadem essentia AEDE, idem C.
23. scilicet AEDE, quia C.

3.

Praedicatio formalis est praedicatio, in qua formale praedicati dicitur de subiecto: et illa est duplex. Quia aut formale praedicati formaliter essentialiter dicitur de subiecto, et sic dicitur praedicatio formalis essentialis, ut "homo est animal", ubi animalitas formaliter praedicatur de homine. Et generaliter quaecumque per se superius praedicatur de suo inferiori est praedicatio talis. Aut formale praedicati praedicatur formaliter accidentaliter de suo subiecto et tunc dicitur praedicatio formalis accidentalis, ut "homo est albus". Et talis est duplex. Quia aut est ita, quod illud formale praedicati est accidens implicans suum subiectum primum esse per se mobile, cuiusmodi sunt albedo, nigredo, caliditas et caetera. Et tunc neganda est huiusmodi praedicatio de universalibus in terminis secundae intentionis vel ultimatae abstractionis: ut negandum est, quod homo communis currit vel quod humanitas est alba. Vel est ita, quod formale praedicati est accidens non implicans suum subiectum primum esse per se mobile, cuiusmodi sunt causare, differre et caetera. Et talis dicitur praedicatio secundum habitudinem. Et concedenda est praedicatio de universalibus in terminis secundae intentionis, ut "homo communis causat" et "genus animalis differt a me".

Praedicatio formalis a parte terminorum est praedicatio significans huiusmodi praedicationem a parte rei. Et specialiter contingit praedicatio formalis accidentalis a parte terminorum, quando praedicatur verbum adiectivum vel nomen adiectivum significans accidens adiective tentum, ut homo ridet, homo est risibilis. Et additur iste terminus

26. praedicatio BD, om.C, illa. 27. subiecto (formalis) add.D, formaliter) add. E / illa BCDE, talisA. 28. formaliter (et) add.A / dicitur de subiecto om.B, de subiecto dicitur C / sic ABD, tunc CE / praedicatio om.ABC. 28-29. et sic dicitur praedicatio formalis essentialis om.B. 29. essentialis om.C / ubi ABD, ibi CE. 30. de homine praedicatur A / generaliter ABDE, communiter C / quando C / per se om.AC. 31. talis praedicatio CD / est praedicatio talis om.E. 32. praedicatur ADE, affirmatur B, dicitur C / suo om.CDE. 33. et sic dicitur B, et dicitur tunc A, et tunc dicitur CDE / praedicatio om.B. 34. et om.A / talis (praedicatio) add.C / est duplex ACDE, dicitur dupliciter B / ita est C / praedicati om.ABC. 36. caliditas (frigiditas)

Formal predication is predication, in which the formal nature of the predicate is asserted of the subject. And this is of two types. Either the formal nature of the predicate is formally and essentially asserted of the subject: and this called formal essential predication, as for instance "man is an animal", where animality is formally predicated of man. And such predication generally occurs whenever a superior per se is predicated of one of its inferiors. Or the formal nature of the predicate is predicated formally and accidentally of its subject and this is called formal accidental predication, e.g. "man is white". And this is of two types. For either it is such, where the formal nature of the predicate is an accident implying that its immediate subject is per se mobile: whiteness, blackness, heat etc. are of this kind. Such predication of universals expressed as terms of second intention or of ultimate abstraction should thus be denied: e.g. it should be denied that man in general runs or that humanity is white. Or it is such where the formal nature of the predicate is an accident, which does not imply that its immediate subject is per se mobile and of this kind are verbs of causing, differing etc.. And this is called predication according to habitude. And such predication of universals expressed as terms of second intention may be permitted, e.g. "man in general causes" and "the genus animal differs from me".

Formal predication a parte terminorum is predication signifying a corresponding predication a parte rei. A particular case is formal accidental predication a parte terminorum, when a paronymous verb, adjective or noun signifying a paronymous accident is predicated, e.g. a man laughs, a man is capable of laughter. And the phrase

add.C 37. huiusmodi ABDE, illa C / de om.D. / in om.E. 39. vel quod om.C. 40. est accidens om.C / primum om.A. 41. differre, causare C / et caetera ADE, om.C, et huiusmodi B. 42. praedicatio om.E. 42-43. et concedendum est in universalibus et in terminis secundae intentionis C, et concedenda est in terminis secundae intentionis de universalibus D. 43. in terminis om.B / cum terminis A. 44. causat (me) add.B / et om.B. 46-47. praedicatio formalisaccidentalis a parte terminorum est B, 47. praedicatio om.C 48. nomen om.A / vel ABDE, sive C / significans accidens adiective tentum om.C

50 "adiective tentum" quia tale adiectivum in neutero genere substantivato
 praedicatur de universali in praedicatione secundum essentiam: ut
 concedendum est, quod homo communis est risibile, quia est homo
 singularis risibilis.

4.

Quarto notandum pro sufficientia istorum quinque universalium, quod
 sufficientia eorum capitur penes modos praedicandi universalis. Nam
 si universale citra ens praedicatur, aut praedicatur de individuo
 in quid vel in quale. Si in quid, aut inter ipsum et individuum est
 5 universale per se medium. Et tunc est genus: sicut animal praedicatur
 de Socrate, quia inter genus animalis et Socratem est universale per
 se medium, scilicet species humana. Aut inter ipsum et individuum non
 est universale per se medium. Et tunc est species, quia species humana.

Si in quale, aut in quale substantiale et sic est differentia
 10 substantialis, quae praedicatur per se primo de specie, sicut ratio-
 nalitas dicitur de homine. Aut in quale accidentale: et hoc dupliciter.
 Quia aut illud immediate et convertibiliter consequitur speciem
 secundum gradum speciei, et sic est proprium, quod praedicatur per
 se secundo de specie: sicut risibilitas de homine. Aut praedicatur in
 15 quale accidentale non sic: et sic est accidens per accidens.

Et sic per istos quinque modos patet, quod quinque sunt modi
 universalium, et quod omne universale citra ens communissimum continetur
 sub aliquo illorum, sed ens commune non: ut patet Capitulo De
 Specie, quia nec praedicatur in quid nec in quale. Nec propter illum
 20 sensum est concedendum, quod tantum quinque sunt universalia, quia

49-50. ut homo ridet — "adiective tentum" om.Ac. 51. ut ABDE, sicut C.
 C.I,4:1. notandum (est) add.CD / pro — universalium om.BG. 2. eorum
 AE, istorum quinque universalium B, istorum universalium C, istorum D.
 3. aliquod universale ED / universalis E / citra ens om.B / praedica-
 bitur C / in quid de individuo B. 4. aut B / si (autem) add.E / quid
 (tunc) add.A / et (sum) add.C / (inter) individuum add.E. 5. tunc ABDE,
 sic C / quia ABDE, sicut D. 7. scilicet species humana om.E. 7-8.
 X aut inter ipsum individuum universale per se X add.ag.E, (X et sic
 est species specialissima sicut species humana X) in rasura E.
 8. species quia om.C / quia ACE, sicut BD. 9. substantiale (aut in

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"paronymously" is introduced, because a paronymous adjective expressed as a neuter noun may be predicated of a universal in essential predication: for example it is admitted that man in general is something capable of laughter, because man in particular is capable of laughter.

The fourth thing to note as far as the sufficiency of these five universals is concerned is that their sufficiency is comprised with reference to the ways of predicating universals. For if any universal other than Being be predicated, it is predicated either in quid or in quale of an individual. If it is predicated in quid, then either there is between this universal and the individual an intermediate universal per se. And then the predicated universal is a genus: as for example when animal is predicated of Socrates, since there is an intermediate universal between the genus animal and Socrates, namely the species man. Or there may be no such intermediate universal per se between the universal and the individual: then this is a species, for instance the species man.

If it is predicated in quale, it is either predicated in quale substantially: and it is a substantial difference, which is predicated per se in the first sense, as for example rationality is of man. Or it is predicated in quale accidentally: and this may be done in two ways. For either it is immediately and convertibly posterior to the species, according to the degree of the species: and thus is a property which is predicated of species per se in the second sense, as is an ability to laugh of man. Or the universal may be predicated in quale accidentally, but not in this way: and this is an accident per accidens.

And it is clear from these five methods of predication that there are five classes of universal and that every universal except Being in its most general sense belongs to one of these classes. However Being in general does not, as is clear from the Chapter on Species, as it is predicated neither in quid nor in quale. Neither should one admit following this interpretation that there are only five universals,

(cont.) quale accidentale. Si in quale substantiale) add.A. 11. et om.A. 11. dicitur AD, praedicatur BE, om.C. 12. illud om.D, iste E / convertibiliter ACDE, consequenter B. 13. sic om.C. 15. non sic om.C, (de specie) add.B, (et immediate consequens speciem secundum gradum speciei) add.ng.D. 16. per quinque illos B / modi BCDE, species A / 17. universalium (quidem praedicatur de se secundo de specie) add.C / et ACDE, aut B / communissimum om.ECDE. 18. istorum C / sed ACDE, et B. 19. nec BCDE, non A / istum B. 20. sensum ABDE, secundum C.

sive exponitur gratia pluralitas sive gratia alietatis, patet
 manifesta falsitas illius. Immo, si esset concedendum, quod tantum
 quinque sunt universalis, quia tantum quinque sunt tales modi praedicandi
 secundum genus, per idem esset concedendum, quod tantum duo sunt univ-
 25 ersalia, quia tantum duo sunt modi praedicandi primi universalis,
 scilicet praedicari in quid et in quale. Et si allegetur pro
 auctoritate, quod tantum quinque sunt universalis, dicitur, quod illa
 exemplativa non habentur in textu Porphyrii, Boetii nec Aristotelis.

Praedicatio per se primo est quando per se superius praedicatur
 30 de suo per se inferiori: sicut quando genus vel differentia
 praedicatur de sua specie, ut per se homo est animal et rationalis.
 Praedicatio per se secundo est quando praedicatur proprium de eo,
 cuius est proprium: ut per se secundo homo est risibilis. Ex
 praedictis infertur, quod idem praedicatur in quid et in quale de
 35 diversis: sicut color praedicatur de albedine in quid et in quale de
 homine. Et sic idem est accidens et genus respectu diversorum: ut
 risibilitas est proprium respectu hominis et species respectu
 risibilitatum singularium.

Praedicari in quid est praedicari de aliquo certificando
 40 quaestionem quaerentem "Quid est illud?": sicut animal praedicatur de
 homine, quia quaerendo "Quid est homo?" convenienter respondetur quod
 est animal. Praedicari in quale est praedicari de aliquo certificando
 quaestionem quaerentem "Quale est illud?", sicut qualiter risibilitas
 et albedo praedicantur de homine. His tamen est notandum quod
 45 universale per accidens non praedicatur in quid nisi de entibus per

21. sive ABDE, si C / exponitur AE, exponatur BC, expositioni D /
 alietatis (statim) add.C / patebit BCDE, patet.A. 22. manifeste om.E /
 illius om.CD. 23. modi tales E. 26. praedicari AD, praedicatum B,
 praedicare C / in quid et om.C / et (praedicari) add.DE, (praedicatum)
 add.B / allegetur ABD, allegatur CE. 27. auctoritate ABDE, antecedente C.
 28. exemplativa ACDE, existentia B. 29. primo est om.E. 30. de per se
 suo D / per se om.B / sicut quando ABD. 31. ut) et C. 33. secundo om.D.

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since whether this statement is interpreted in terms of plurality or in terms of diversity, the fact that it is false is still manifestly clear. Indeed, if it were to be admitted that there are only five universals because there are only five such methods of predication with respect to genus, then on this basis it should be granted that there are only two universals, because there are only two ways of predicating the first universal, viz. in quid and in quale. And if one adduces as authoritative the view that there are only five universals, the reply is that this has no precedent in the text of Porphyry, Boethius or Aristotle.

Predication per se in its first sense occurs when a per se superior is predicated of its inferior, as when a genus or a difference is predicated of its species: for example man is per se an animal and rational. Predication per se in its second sense occurs when a property is predicated of that of which it is a property, for example man is per se secundo able to laugh. It is inferred from the foregoing that the same thing can be predicated in quid and in quale of different things, as when colour is predicated of whiteness in quid and of man in quale. And by the same token, as the same thing is an accident and a genus in respect of different things, so the same thing can be both a property and a species in respect of different things. For example the ability to laugh is a property in respect of man and a species in respect of particular abilities to laugh.

To be predicated in quid is to be predicated of something answering the question "What is that thing?", for example animal is predicated of man, because it is correct to reply to the question "What is man?" that he is an animal. To be predicated in quale is to be predicated of something answering the question "What sort of thing is that?", for example in this way an ability to laugh and whiteness are predicated of man. However at this point we must note that a universal per accidens is predicated in quid only of entities per

(cont.) 35. in quid de albedine DE. 36. et sic) tunc C / respectu
diversorum om.CD / ut) sicut D. 37. respectu om.CE / respectu
(diversorum) add.C. 38. risibilitatis singularis B. 39. praedicare C /
de aliquo praedicari B / praedicare C / certificando) certam signi-
ficando C. 40. quaerentem quaestionem A / illud) hoc B. 42. praedicare
C / de aliquo om.ABC. 43. quaerentem) ut C / qualiter) quantitas B.
43-44. sicut de homine) sicut quaerendo "Qualis est homo?" convenienter
respondetur quod est risibilis vel albus D. 44. praedicantur) prae-
dicatur / est om.CD. 45. in quid om.BC.

accidens: sicut coloratum praedicatur in quid de albo. Conformiter
sicut: universale per se non praedicatur in quid nisi de entibus per se.

(Capitulum Secundum)

(DE GENERE)

Genus est universale praedicabile in quid de multis differentibus
in specie. Per primam particulam differt genus ab individuo. Et per
secundam differt genus a specie specialissima, quae non praedicatur
de multis differentibus in specie, et a differentia, proprio et accidente,
5 quae praedicantur in quale et non in quid.

Nam genus dividitur. Aliquod est genus analogum, quod scilicet
praedicatur secundum magis et minus de suis contentis, sicut hoc genus
"accidens" praedicatur secundum magis et minus de accidente absoluto
et accidente respectivo, quia accidens respectivum est magis accidens
10 quam accidens absolutum, quia plus inhaerens.

Et aliquod est genus univocum, quod scilicet est ^{nu}genus univoce
praedicabile de singulis suis inferioribus, ita quod non secundum
magis et minus: sicut animal aequaliter praedicatur de omnibus
animalibus, eo quod omnia animalia sunt aequae animalia, licet non
15 aequalia. Et genus univocum dicitur dupliciter. Nam aliquod est genus
univocum, supra quod non est aliquod genus univocum supraveniens,
qualiter quodlibet praedicamentum est genus univocum. Et tale genus
dicitur genus generalissimum. Et aliquod est genus univocum, supra
quod est aliquod genus univocum supraveniens, sicut hoc genus animal.
20 Et tale genus vocatur genus subalternum. Et omne tale genus est forma-
liter tam genus quam species: genus respectu inferioris et species
respectu superioris, sicut animal est genus respectu hominis et species
respectu corporis.

46. Sicut — albo om.D / albo) albedine C. 47. sicut) sic B / in
quid om.BD / per se (et caetera) add.B / (in quid) add.D.
Cap. II: 1. in quid om.B / multis in rasura, add. eadem manu pluribus D.
2. specie (in eo quod quid) add.B / et om.BC. 3. secundum (particulam)
add.B / specialissima om.E. 3-4. specie specialissima -- in specie)
differentia, proprio et accidente, quae praedicantur in quale et non
in quid C. 4. multis om.B / in.om.E / et) ac etiam E / et a differentia

accidens, for example "coloured thing" is predicated of "white thing" in quid. Similarly a universal per se is only predicated in quid of entities per se.

Chapter Two

Genus

Genus is a universal predicable in quid of many things differing in species. By the first clause genus is distinguished from the individual. And by the second genus is distinguished from the infima species, which is not predicated of many things different in species, and from difference, property and accident, which are predicated in quale and not in quid.

And genus divides itself. There is an analogic genus, namely which is predicated in quid of its supposita in varying degrees. For example the genus "accident" is predicated in varying degrees of absolute and relative accidents, because a relative accident is more an accident than an absolute accident, because it is more inherent in a thing.

And there is also a univocal genus, which is namely a genus, which is univocally predicable of each of its inferiors in such a way that there is no greater or lesser, for example animal is equally predicable of all animals, because they are all equally animals, although they are not equal. Univocal genus has two forms. For there is a univocal genus, which has no other univocal genus supervening upon it and in this sense each of the Categories is a univocal genus. And such a genus is called a supreme genus. And there is a univocal genus which does have another univocal genus supervening upon it, for example the genus animal. And such a genus is called a subaltern genus. And any genus of this sort is as much a genus as a species: a genus in respect of an inferior and a species in respect of a superior, as for instance animal is a genus in respect of man and a species in respect of body.

(cont.) — accidente) Per tertiam particulam differt genus ab accidente, differentia et proprio B / et a differentia — non in quid) Per tertiam differt genus a specie specialissima, quae non praedicatur de multis differentibus in specie, ac etiam a differentia, proprio et accidente, quae praedicantur in quale et non in quid C / Et (per tertiam particulam) add.D. 5. quae) quia B. 6. Nam om.A / scilicet om.A. 7. praedicatur (in quid) add.CDE / de suis contentis om.E / hoc genus om.ABC / absoluto) respectivo B. 9. et (de) add.C / accidente om.E / respectivo) absoluto B. 11. scilicet om.AB / genus om.E. 12. ita quod) et A /. 13. aequaliter om.AB. 14. eo quod) quia A / omnia) singula C. 16. univocum per se A / univocum om.AB, genus univocum om.B / genus om.C / est (quia quodlibet praedicamentum est genus univocum) add.B / est B. 19. generalissimum genus E / et) sed B / univocum om.B. 19. supraveniens om.B / hoc genus om.B / animalis D / dicitur B. 20. subalternum (sicut hoc genus animal) add.B / genus om.B. 21. genus — superioris) respectu speciei inferioris et generis superioris C / respectu (speciei) add.DE. 22. respectu (generis) add.DE.

Ex quibus patet quod ens communissimum non est formaliter genus,
 25 ut dicit Porphyrius Capitulo De Specie, quia non praedicatur in quid,
 quia quaerendo "Quid est hoc?", quodcumque demonstratur, inconueniens
 est responsio dicere, quod est ens.

(Capitulum Tertium)

(DE SPECIE)

Species est universale sub genere univoco praedicabile in quid
 de individuis. Per primam particulam differt species a genere
 generalissimo, et per secundam a differentia, accidente et proprio.
 Et est duplex species. Nam aliqua species est universale praedicabile
 5 in quid de individuis tantum. Et vocatur species specialissima, sicut
 species humana. Et aliqua species praedicatur in quid tam de individuis
 quam de speciebus, sicut animal praedicatur tam de homine quam de
 asino. Et vocatur species subalterna.

Et si obiciatur contra istam descriptionem, quod genus ponitur
 10 in definitione speciei: igitur est simpliciter notius specie. Et
 e contra species ponitur in definitione generis: igitur est simpliciter
 notior specie. Et per consequens eadem sunt simpliciter notiora
 seipsis... Dicitur, quod genus et species, ut hic describuntur, sunt
 res secundae intentionis et sunt duo correlativa, sicut dicit Porphyrius.
 15 Ideo necesse est utrumque istorum poni in definitione alterius. Nec est
 illud generaliter verum, quod omne positum in definitione alterius est
 simpliciter notius definito, nisi in definitione proprie dicta, data
 de universali per se et non per accidens, quales non sunt istae
 duae definitiones assignatae, quae dantur de hoc commune genus et hoc

25. dicit) vult B. 26. hoc) homo B / quodcumque demonstratur BDE,
 quicumque demonstratur C, quocumque demonstrato A. 27. dicendo B /
 ens (et caetera) add. B.

C. III: 1. de suis individuis B. 2. individuis (vel sic species est
 universale univocum non formaliter generalissimum praedicabile in
 quid de individuis) add. D, (vel sic species est universale uni-
 vocum non formaliter generalissimum praedicabile in quid de in-
 dividuis) add. E / per primam partem E, per secundam particulam B /
 a differentia, accidente et proprio CDE, a proprio, differentia et
 accidente B. 4. et) unde A / duplex est species A / species om. B.
 5. sicut) ut B. 6. et aliqua tam praedicatur de speciebus quam
 individuis B / tam de speciebus quam de individuis CDE. 7.

From this it is apparent that Being in its most general sense is not formally a genus (as Porphyry says in the chapter on Species), because it is not predicated in quid, because if the question were asked "What is this?", whatever were indicated, the proper reply would not be to say that it was a being.

Chapter Three

SPECIES

Species is a universal coming under a univocal genus and predicabile in quid of individuals. By the first clause species is distinguished from the supreme genus and by the second clause, it is distinguished from difference, accident and from property. And species has two forms. One form of species is a universal, which is predicabile in quid of individuals alone. And this is called the infima species, for example the species man. And the other form of species is a universal, which is predicated in quid both of individuals and of species, as for example animal is predicated of man as well as ass. And this is called a subaltern species.

And if the objection were to be made against this description, that genus is assumed in the definition of species and is therefore better known than species, and contrariwise that species is assumed in the definition of genus and therefore is better known than genus: and in consequence that each of these is better known than the other ... The reply is that genus and species as they are described here are objects of second intention and are two correlatives, as Porphyry says. And thus it is necessary to assume each one in the definition of the other. Nor is it generally true, that everything assumed in the definition of something else is better known than the thing which is defined, unless in a definition properly speaking, which is given of a universal per se and not of a universal per accidens. However the two definitions given here are not of this type, given as they are of genus

(cont.) 7. sicut) ut B / tam praedicatur B / praedicatur de homine et
de asino CDE. 9. illam B, istam om.C / genus quod B. 11. ponitur) est B /
simpliciter om.B. 12. notius D / eadem) aliqua A / simpliciter om.B.
13. prout E / sunt om.CE. 14. ut B. 15. illorum CD. 16. istud C /
alterius om.CDE. 17. data om.B. 18. illae ED. 19. assignatae DE,
assignantes A, om.BC / quae dantur) datae C / per hoc B.

20 commune species, quae sunt universalia per accidens et non universalia
 per se. Sed in istis sufficit, quod totalis definitio sit aliquantulum
 notior definito, licet non quaelibet eius pars sit notior definito.
 Unde genus est notius et prius sua species in suppositione personali,
 quia hoc est notius et prius sua specie, demonstrando "hoc genus animal"
 25 et "hoc est genus". Sed genus et species in suppositione simplici,
 id est, hoc commune et hoc commune species sunt simul in natura, eo
 quod sunt duo correlativa. Unde personaliter intelligendo, species non
 debet poni in definitione sui generis, sicut homo non ponitur in
 definitione animalis. Sed in suppositione simplici sic, quia hoc
 30 commune species ponitur in definitione generis communis.

Ulterius notandum, quod terminus communis significans genus
 subalternum potest supponere in suppositione simplici speciali vel
 in suppositione simplici generali. Exemplum primi: "Animal est species
 humana" est suppositio simplex specialis. Exemplum secundi: "Animal
 35 est genus animalis" est suppositio simplex generalis.

(Capitulum Quartum)

(DE DIFFERENTIA)

Differentia est universale per se primo praedicabile in quale
 de specie. Per primam particulam differt differentia a proprio et
 accidente, quae non praedicantur per se primo. Et per secundam
 particulam differt ^{differentia} a genere et specie, quae praedicantur in quid.

5 Et aliqua talis differentia est constitutiva speciei, sicut illa,
 quae ponitur in definitione cum genere ad constitutionem speciei:
 sicut rationalitas cum genere animalis constituit hominem. Et

~~20-21. et non per se B / et non sunt universalia E. 21-22. quod
 totalis -- eius pars) quod quaelibet pars principalis definitionis
 sit notior definito, utpote genere et differentia, et non quaelibet
 pars C. 22. notius B / eius quaelibet E. 23. prius et notius C /
 et prius om.B. 23-24 (in suppositione personali, quia hoc est notior
 et prius sua specie) add. mg. D. 25 et "hoc est genus" om. B, (ideo et
 caetera) add. C, (igitur et caetera) add. DE / sed) et tamen BCDE.
 26. id est (cum) add. C. 28. sui om. AB. 29. sic quia om. B. 30. huius
 communis generis BCE, hoc commune genus D. 31. ulterius est notandum
 BC / communis om. B. 32. in om. E / speciali om. B, in suppositione
 speciali D. 33. vel suppositione CE, vel in simplici speciali B.~~

and species in their general forms, which are thus universals per accidens and not per se. As far as these two are concerned, it is sufficient that the whole definition be somehow known better than what is defined, although no part of it can be better known than what is defined. For this reason genus is better known than and prior to its species in personal supposition, because in the examples "this genus animal" and "this is a genus" it is better known than its species. However both genus and species in simple supposition, that is genus and species in their general form have an equal position in the natural order, because they are two correlatives. Thus when understood in personal supposition, species should not be assumed in the definition of its species, just as man is not assumed in the definition of animal. But this is quite correct in simple supposition, as species in its general form is assumed in the definition of genus in general.

A final point to note is that a general term standing for a subaltern genus can suppose in simple special or in simple general supposition. An example of the first case: "Animal is the species of humanity" is simple special supposition. An example in the second case: "Animal is the genus of animal" is simple general supposition.

Chapter Four

DIFFERENCE

Difference is a universal predicable per se in its first sense in quale of species. By the first clause difference is distinguished from property and accident, which are not predicated per se in its first sense. And by the second clause difference is distinguished from genus and species which are predicated in quid. And one sort of difference is constitutive in respect of a species, i.e. that one which is placed in a definition with a genus in order to constitute that species, as for example rationality together with the genus animal constitutes man. And

(cont.) / (ibi) est add.C. 34-35. ut animal est species vel homo est species B / genus animal C / est suppositio simplex generalis B / generalis et caetera C.

C.IV: 1. primo om.B. 1-2. de specie in quale B. 2-3. ab accidente et proprio B. /. per se primo de specie B / secundam) aliam E.

4. differt genus a genere B / differt differentia om.C./ in quid (et non in quale) B. 5. sicut om.B.

aliqua est divisiva, illa scilicet, per quam genus dividitur in speciem et in species inferiores: sicut "rationalitas" et "irrationalitas"

10 dividunt animal in hominem et brutum. Ex quo patet quod eadem est differentia constitutiva et divisiva respectu diversorum: sicut rationalitas est constitutiva hominis et divisiva animalis.

Et si quaeratur numquid quaelibet species habet differentiam convertibilem, dicitur quod non, quia illa species, quae est differentia
15 substantialis, ut rationalitas, non habet ulteriorem differentiam convertibilem, quia tunc esset processus in infinitum in differentiis substantialibus. A probabili tamen, quaelibet species per se in aliquo praedicamento habet differentiam convertibilem: ut communiter tamen non habemus nomina talibus differentiis imposita.

20 Et si obiciatur quod rationalitas, quae est immediata differentia hominis, non convertitur cum homine, eo quod praedicatur tam de anima quam de angelo... Hic dicitur dupliciter. Primo, quod licet rationalitas communis praedicetur de homine, anima intellectiva et de angelo, illa tamen rationalitas, quae est immediata differentia
25 substantialis hominis, convertitur cum homine in concreto et est alterius speciei quam rationalitas animae intellectivae vel angeli: sic est dare tres species rationalitatum, quarum quaelibet convertitur cum sua specie. Vel secundo dicitur secundum Sanctum Thomam, quod angeli non sunt rationales, quia non possunt discurrere: sicut nec
30 animae intellectivae post separationem a materia. Et sic non est aliqua rationalitas differentia substantialis nisi hominis, quae praedicatur per se de homine et per accidens sive concomitanter

9. vel species inferiores A / et species in inferiores C. 10. hoc genus animalis B. 10-11. quod eadem differentia est divisiva et constitutiva CE. 12. est constitutiva est hominis B. 13. utrum quaelibet B. 14. (sibi) convertibilem add. B. 14-15. quia differentia substantialiter est rationalitas non habet ulteriorem differentiam sibi convertibilem B. 15. utpote C / non habet differentiam ulteriorem se C. 16. (sibi) convertibilem add. B. 18. ut) licet B / communiter om. B. 19. nomina imposita talibus differentiis A. 20. differentia immediata B. 21. non (simpliciter) convertitur add. B. 21-22. tam praedicatur de homine quam de angelo B. 22. Hic dicitur dupliciter) Huic dicitur B. 23. communis rationalitas AE / rationalitas communis BC, rationalitas AC / praedicatur B / anima intellectiva, de angelo

Chap. IV Difference

there is a divisive difference, namely that by which a genus is divided into one or more inferior species, as for instance rationality and irrationality divide animal into man and brute. And from this it is clear that the same thing is a constitutive and divisive difference in respect of different things: for example rationality is constitutive in respect of man and divisive in respect of animal.

And if it were to be asked whether there is a species which has a difference that is convertible with it, it is replied that there is not, because that species which is itself a substantial difference, like rationality, does not have a further difference, that is convertible with it, otherwise there would then be an infinite regression of substantial differences. It is however probable that a species per se which is in one of the Categories will have a difference which is convertible with it, but these are of such a kind that we generally do not give them names.

And supposing that the objection were made that rationality, which is the immediate difference of man does not convert with man for this reason that it is predicated both of the soul and of angels ... The answer here is twofold. Firstly that although rationality in its general form may be predicated of man, of the intelligent soul and of angels, nonetheless that rationality which is the immediate substantial difference of man converts with man in the real order and is of a different species from the rationality of the intelligent soul or of an angel. And thus it is possible to posit three species of rationality, of which any one reciprocates with its species. Or a second answer might be given in accordance with St. Thomas that angels are not rational, because they are incapable of discursive thought, as are intelligent souls after their separation from matter. And thus no form of rationality can be a substantial difference, except the rationality of man, which is predicated per se of man and per accidens or by association

(cont.) et homine B. 24. et angelo C / immediata om. CDE. 25. (et)
in concreto add.B / et (sic) est add.E. 26. quam est rationalitas A.
27. (et) sic add.ED. 30. est om.C. 31. communicanter C.

de anima, dummodo materiae unitur, licet non sic praedicatur de eadem
 post separationem. Et sic illa differentia in praedicatione per se
 35 convertitur cum homine, licet ex consequenti praedicatur de anima
 intellectiva. Pro cuius confirmatione potest allegari dictum Aristotelis,
 Primo De Anima, Commento Sexagesimo Sexto, quod melius est dicere
 animam non intelligere, sed hominem per animam: et sic anima non est
 per se rationalis, sed homo per suam animam. Vel melius dicitur,
 40 quod illa rationalitas, quae praedicatur de anima, non est aliqua
 differentia substantialis alicuius hominis, sed una potentia animae,
 quae vocatur ratio: et sic illa rationalitas, quae est differentia
 substantialis hominis, convertitur cum homine.

Et si obiciatur ex Secundo Posteriorum, quod quaelibet pars
 45 definitionis est in plus quam definitum et totum in aequae, dicitur
 secundum Antiquos Expositores, quod hoc intelligitur, quod quaelibet
 pars definitionis est in plus, id est prius, et totum in aequae, id
 est convertibile. Et sic quaelibet differentia est in plus, id est
 prius, quam species. Et in huius confirmatione dicitur Quarto
 50 Topicorum, quod differentia de pluribus aut de aequis quam species
 praedicatur. Et exponunt Expositores, quod quaelibet differentia
 praeter ultimam est in plus et ultima, si cum paribus sit nomen
 impositum, est in aequae.

33. de anima om.B / licet (quod) add.B / praedicabitur CDE / de eadem
 om.B, de eodem C. 35. ex consequente BD / praedicatur B. 36. pro cuius
 responsionis confirmatione BC. 37. Commento Sexagesimo Tertio CE.
 38. non intelligere (etc.) add.CD / sed hominem per animam C, per
 suam animam E (per) animam rasura D, hominem anima AB. 38-39. et tunc
 anima per se non est rationalis B. 39. rationalis per se C / per suam
 animam BC / vel) sed B, et E / dicitur) potest dici C, est dicere D.
 40. ista B / de anima) de homine B / aliqua om.B. 41. hominis om.CDE
 / una om.B. 42. sic om.A, sic) tunc B / illa differentia rationalitas
 B. 43. cum homine (etc.) add.CD. 44. quod om.B. 45. est plus quam C.
 46. quod hoc intelligitur AC, quod hoc intelligitur in rasura D,
 hoc sic intelligitur B, quod hoc sic intelligitur E. 47. est plus/
 est in plus, id est prius om.B. 48-49. et sic quaelibet differentia
 est in plus, id est prius quam species om.E. 49. quam species (etc.)
 add.AC. 49-53. et in huius — est in aequae om.ABC. 52. ultima (non)
 add.E. 53. imposita D / illam et opinionem de differentia convertibili
 ponit Doctor Subtilis in quaestionibus super Porphyrium add.E.

Chap. IV Difference.

of the soul, as long as the latter is still bound to matter, although it is not so predicated after the soul's separation. And so this difference, when predicated per se is convertible with man, although it may as a result be predicated also of the intellectualive soul. In confirmation of this, Aristotle's remark in the sixty-sixth Chapter of the First Book of the De Anima may be adduced, that is that it is better not to say that the soul comprehends, but rather that man does so by virtue of his soul. And thus the soul is not of itself rational, but man is so by virtue of his soul. Or this might be better stated, that the rationality which is predicated of the soul is not a substantial difference, but rather a faculty of the soul, which is called reason. And thus the rationality which is the substantial difference of man converts with man.

And if it were to be objected on the basis of the Second Book of the Posterior Analytics, that any part of a definition has at the same time greater extension than and is completely co-extensive with what is defined, it may be said according to the Ancient Commentators that this may be understood as saying that any part of a definition has greater extension than, i.e. is prior to, and is co-extensive with i.e. converts with what is defined. And thus any difference has greater extension than, i.e. is prior to, its species. And in confirmation of this, the Fourth Book of the Topics states that a difference is predicated with greater extension than of with the same extension as its species. And the Commentators explain that every difference, except the final definitive one, has greater extension than the species it defines and that the final one has the same extension, if its name be given together with similar ones.

Proprium, ut est quartum universale, est universale per se secundo
 praedicabile de specie in quale. Per primam particulam differt
 proprium a differentia et accidente, quae non praedicantur per se
 secundo. Et per secundam particulam differt proprium a genere et
 5 specie, quae praedicantur in quid. Et si petatur quare potius
 differentia substantialis praedicatur per se primo de specie quam
 proprium, dicitur quod causa est, quia talis differentia est prior
 specie constituens eam definitive. Sed proprium est posterius specie
 immediate et convertitur consequens speciem et principia quidditativa
 10 speciei. Et ideo praedicatur per se secundo et non sic accidens prout
 est quintum universale.

Ubi notandum quod proprium de praedicamento substantiae praedicatur
 aequaliter de eo, cuius est proprium, et de singulis contentis sub eo,
 sicut omnes homines sunt aequae risibilis. Sed propria et differentiae
 15 substantiales de praedicamentis accidentium praedicantur secundum magis
 et minus in concreto, sicut illa accidentia in abstracto, ut quia
 unum album est alio magis album, ideo una albedo est alia intentior
 et magis disgregativa visus, et una linea est alia longior. Et ideo
 dicit Aristotelis, Septimo Metaphysicae, quod solum de genere substantiae
 20 sunt proprie differentia et proprium. Ex quo patet, quod quantitas
 corporea non est proprium respectu substantiae corporeae, cum
 quantitas corporea praedicatur de corpore secundum magis et minus,
 cum una substantia sit alia magis quanta, sicut quadrupedale quam
 pedale.

1. est universale om.C. 2. in quale de specie A. 3. ab accidente
 et differentia BC. 4. per secundam A. 5. in quid et non in quale B /
 et si petatur causa E. 6. differentia substantialis potius BC.
 7. dicitur causa est B. 7-8. prior est specie BE. 8. eius definitionem B.
 9. convertibilis, convertibiliter E / sequens A. 10. et non praedicatur C /
 et sic non accidens B. 12. Unde notandum B, ubi notandum est C / quod
 proprium non est de praedicamento C. 12-13. essentialiter dicitur de
 eo B. 14. ut omnes B / aequaliter risibilis / sed proprium C. 16. in
 abstracto om.CDE. 17. reliquo magis album A / reliqua intentior A.
 18. et magis disgregativa visus om.B, disgregativa viso D. 19. aliquo

Chapter Five

PROPERTY

Property, the fourth universal, is a universal predicable per se in its second sense in quale of species. By the first clause, property is distinguished from difference and accident which are not predicated per se in its second sense. And by the second clause, property is distinguished from genus and species which are predicated in quid. And if somebody demanded to know why it is substantial difference, rather than property, which is predicated per se in its first sense of species, the reply is that it is so because such a difference is prior to species and constitutes it definitively, whereas property is posterior to any immediate species and converts with the species and with its essential principles. And thus it is predicated per se in its second sense and not in the same way as accident, which is the fifth universal.

At this point it should be noted that a property of something in the Category of Substance is predicated equally of that of which it is a property and of each individual thing contained beneath it: as for example all men are capable of laughter to an equal extent. However the properties and substantial differences of things in the accidental Categories are predicated in concreto in varying degrees, as the accidents do in abstracto: for example, because one white thing is whiter than another, so one whiteness is more intense or more striking to the eye than another and one line is longer than another. And thus Aristotle states in the Seventh Book of the *Metaphysics* that difference and property may only be strictly ascribed to individuals of the genus substance. From this it is clear that physical quantity is not a property of physical substance, since physical quantity is predicated of a body in varying degrees, for one physical substance can be of a greater quantity than another, for example four-footed things as against footed things.

(cont.) Metaphysicae C. 20. dicuntur propria et differentiae B. 21.
corporeae om.E 22. de corpore om.B. 23. quattuor pedale A, quadrupedale
B, quadripedale CD, quatripedale E. 23-24. quam pedale ACDE, est ad
pedale B.

25 Et si quaeratur numquid proprium habet proprium ulterius, dicitur
 quod non, sicut dictum est de differentia substantiali, quod illa non
 habet differentiam substantialem ulteriorem. Ex quo patet, quod
 nulla differentia substantialis nec aliquod proprium est per se in
 praedicamento, quia si sic, tunc haberet differentias substantiales
 30 et propria, sicut aliae species praedicamentales videntur habere.

(Capitulum Sextum)

(ACCIDENS PRAEDICAMENTALE)

Accidens in sua communitate descriptum est ens inhaerens. Et sic
 est commune tam ad proprium quam ad accidens per accidens. Inhaerere
 enim est inesse alicui subiective, non tamquam pars, scilicet non
 componendo suum subiectum quantitative, quidditative aut qualitative,
 5 sicut albedo inhaeret homini non componendo ipsum, eo quod nullum accidens
 est pars illius, cuius est accidens.

Et si obiciatur, quod rationalitas singularis inhaeret homini, eo quod
 non est pars hominis... Dicitur, quod illa inest homini tamquam pars,
 eo quod est individuum alicuius immediate definientis hominem, scilicet
 10 rationalitas in communi. Et ideo non inhaeret homini.

Et si quaeratur de inhaerentia accidentis, dicitur, quod omne
 accidens inhaeret suo subiecto primo, a quo dependet per se: et non
 per inhaerentiam mediam. Sed accidens inhaeret suo subiecto mediato,
 a quo potest separari per inhaerentiam mediam: tamen omnis inhaerentia
 15 inhaeret per se ipsam, ne sit processus in infinitum. Verbi gratia:
 quantitas Socratis inhaeret materiae Socratis, a qua dependet per se,
 sed Socrati inest per inhaerentiam mediam, quae inhaerentia corrumpitur

27. differentiam ulteriorem convertibilem A, differentiam ulteriorem BC,
 differentiam substantialem ulteriorem DE. 28. quod nullum proprium nec
 differentia substantialis D. 29. in aliquo praedicamento C. 29-30.
 differentiam substantialem et proprium B. 30. aliqua B, aliae ACDE.
 C.VI: ~~ix~~ 1. in sua maxime communitate B, in sui communitate DE, in
 sua communitate A, in sua communicabilitate C / et tunc est B.
 2. est om.C / tam commune ad proprium B. 3. enim om.B / alicui subiecto B /
 non tamquam (quaedam) pars add.D / pars (nec contentum subpositore
 sub parte) add.B, pars (nec suppositore cum partibus) add.A / scilicet
 om.C / non om.B. 4. quidditative, qualitative, nec quantitative B,

And if the question were put whether one property can have a further lower-order property beneath it, the answer is that it cannot, as was stated in the case of the substantial difference, viz. that it has no further lower-order substantial differences beneath it. And from this it is apparent that no substantial difference or property is in any Category of itself, for if it was, it would then have substantial differences and properties itself, as other Categorical species appear to have.

Chapter Six

CATEGORIAL ACCIDENT

Accident in its general sense is described as an inherent being. And thus it is common both to property and to accidens per accidens. For to inhere is to be in something subjectively, not as a part, that is, not by quantitatively, substantially or qualitatively constituting its subject, as for example whiteness inheres in man without constituting man, for the reason that no accident is part of that of which it is an accident.

And if it were to be objected that a particular rationality can be said to inhere in a man, for the reason that it forms no part of him, it is replied that it is in fact in a man as a part of him, because it is a particular instance of something, which immediately defines man (rationality in general) and therefore is not inherent in man.

And if the inherence of accidents were to be questioned, the reply would be that every accident is inherent in its primary subject, i.e. that from which it depends of itself and not by virtue of any intermediate inherence. But an accident also inheres in its intermediate subject, i.e. that from which it may be separated by an intermediate inherence. However any inherence inheres of itself alone, otherwise there would be an infinite succession of inferences. For example: the ^{quantity} quantity of Socrates inheres in the matter of Socrates
(over)

upon which it is dependent per se, but exists in Socrates by virtue of an intermediate inherence, which itself decays in proportion to the decay of Socrates, although the quantity remains afterwards.

(cont.) quantitative, qualitative aut quidditative C, qualitative, quantitative aut quidditative DE. 7. homini om.D. 8. dicatur, quod illa non inhaeret homini, eo quod inest B. 10. in communi om.C / homini om.¹BCDE. 11. dicatur B. 12. ex quo B. 12-14. sed accidens -- inhaerentiam mediam om.BC. 14. a quo potest separari potest E / mediam om.A / cum omnis C / 15. ne esset processus D. 16. quantitas inhaeret om.Socratis A / inhaeret Socrati A. ~~17. exceptionem ex (ex parte) ad dicitur 18. ex parte~~

ad corruptionem Socratis, licet quantitas postea maneat.

(Capitulum Septimum)

(DE ACCIDENTE PRAEDICABILI)

Accidens, prout est quintum universale, sic describitur. Accidens est universale praedicabile de substantia in quale per accidens.

Et capitur "per accidens", ut distinguitur contra "per se". Per ultimam particulam distinguitur accidens a genere et specie, quae

5 praedicantur in quid. Et per istam particulam "per accidens" differt accidens a differentia et proprio, quae praedicantur in quale per se primo et per se secundo et non per accidens ad sensum limitatum.

Et accidens dividitur: nam aliquod est accidens absolutum et aliquod est accidens respectivum. Dicitur autem accidens absolutum

10 accidens, quod in sua prima denominatione absolute denominat suum subiectum, sicut albedo Socratis absolute denominat Socratem, quia in eius prima denominatione, quae est Socratem esse album, non comparat Socratem obiective ad aliquod extrinsecum, quia ibidem expresse non includuntur nisi Socrates et albedo. Sed accidens

15 respectivum est accidens, quod in sua denominatione prima praeter subiectum expresse includit obiectum: sicut differentia, qua Socrates differt a Platone, in sua prima denominatione, quae est Socratem differre a Platone, expresse includit Socratem pro subiecto et Platonem pro obiecto.

17. corruptionem (corporis) add.A. 18. manebit A.

C.VII: 2. per accidens in quale CDE. 3. capiatur E. 3-7. per ultimam — non per accidens) per ultimam particulam "per accidens" differt accidens a differentia et proprio, quae praedicantur per se et non per accidens D. 5. illam CE. 6. quae praedicantur per se et non per accidens CE. 7. limitatum BCDE, allegatum A. 9. et aliquod respectivum ED. 9-10. dicitur quod accidens absolutum est accidens in sua denominatione prima C. 10. accidens om.B / quod om.DE / denominat B, denominans ACDE. 11. Socratis om.E / absolute om.B / (scilicet) quia add.D. 12. in eius denominatione prima C / quod est B / quae est Socratem esse album om.CDE. 13. non comparat illud ad aliquid C, non concluditur expresse nisi Socrates et eius albedo E. / extrinsecum om.BCDE / 13-14. quia in eius prima denominatione, quae est Socratem esse album, non includuntur expresse, nisi Socrates et albedo CDE. 15. in sua prima denominatione DE. 18. excludit B. 19. et per Platone B.

Chapter Seven

Predicable Accident.

Accident, in so far as it is the fifth universal, is described thus. An accident is a universal which is predicable of substance in quale and per accidens. And "per accidens" is to be understood as opposed to "per se". By means of the last clause, accident is distinguished from genus and species, which are predicated in quid. And by the clause "per accidens" accident is distinguished from difference and property, which are predicated in quale per se in its first and second senses respectively and not per accidens in the sense given.

Furthermore accident is divided: for there are such things as absolute and relative accidents. Something is called an absolute accident, which is an accident, which in its primary denotation, absolutely denotes its subject, as foreexample the whiteness of Socrates absolutely denotes Socrates, because in its primary denotation, which is that Socrates is white, it does not relate Socrates objectivel to anything else, because the predication does not expressly include anything but Socrates and whiteness. But a relative accident is an accident, which in its primary reference expressly includes an object apart from the subject, as for example the difference, by which Socrates differs from Plato, in its primary denotation, which is that Socrates differs from Plato, expressly includes Socrates as subject and Plato as object.

20 Et utriusque membri, aliquod est accidens separabile et aliquod
 inseparabile. Dicitur autem accidens separabile, quod secundum se
 vel aliquod accidens eiusdem speciei specialissimae potest de esse
 suo subiecto, cui prius infuit, suo subiecto manente: sicut nigredo
 in pluma corvi, licet sit inseparabilis a pluma. Dicitur tamen accidens
 25 separabile, eo quod accidens eiusdem speciei potest suo subiecto de esse
 quia nigredo in homine eiusdem speciei cum nigredine in pluma corvi
 potest de esse homini, cui prius infuit, homine manente.

Accidens inseparabile opposito modo dicitur, quod nec secundum
 se nec secundum aliquod accidens eiusdem speciei specialissimae
 30 potest de esse subiecto, cui prius infuit, subiecto manente: sicut
 simitas se habet respectu nasi simi, quia nulla simitas potest de esse
 naso, cui prius infuit, naso permanente. Et illa est divisio accidentis
 separabilis et accidentis inseparabilis secundum speciem.

Quodlibet tamen accidens habens subiectum adaequatum, a quo non
 35 potest de esse, subiecto manente, potest dici accidens inseparabile
 secundum individuum: sicut nigredo in pluma corvi. Et idem est
 accidens separabile quantum ad speciem. Et ideo accidens inseparabile
 secundum individuum est separabile secundum speciem: sicut nigredo
 in pluma corvi.

20. pro utriusque membri B, membri (est dupliciter) add. E. 21. quod om. C /
 quia secundum A. 23. subiecto suo stante DE, suo subiecto stante C.
 23-24 sicut nichil pluma corvi B. 24. inseparabile AB / dicitur autem A.
 25. de esse (etc.) D, de esse suo subiecto etc. E. 26. quae est eiusdem B
 / nigredo in homine est AC. 27. subiecto manente A. 28. dicitur
 accidens CDE, dicitur AB, quod BCDE, quia A. 29. aliquod om. B /
 nec aliquod accidens CDE. 30. subiecto, cui prius infuit, subiecto
 stante, potest de esse C / suo subiecto manente, ABC, subiecto stante DE.
 31. sicut simitas respectu nasi simi C, sicut simitas potest de esse
 naso eius, cui prius infuit, naso illo manente B, sicut simitas nasi
 simi D. 32. naso manente AB / et ista BD / est om. B. 33. et inseparabilis
 accidentis D. 35. suo subiecto manente B. 36. sicut nigredo est
 accidens inseparabile quantum ad individuum DE. 37-38. et ideo
 accidens inseparabile secundum individuum est separabile secundum
 speciem om. B. 38. quantum ad individuum C.

Chap.VII Predicable Accident.

And in each of the above two cases there is a separable accident and an inseparable accident. Now a separable accident is the name given to an accident, which in virtue of itself or in virtue of another accident of the same infima species can be absent from the subject in which it was previously present, while this subject remains: as for example blackness in a raven's feather, even though this blackness is inseparable from the feather. It is however called a separable accident for the reason that an accident of the same species can be absent from its subject, since blackness in a man, which is of the same species as the blackness in a raven's feather, can be absent from a man, in which it was previously present and the man remains a man.

On the other hand, inseparable accident is the name given to an accident, which neither in virtue of itself nor in virtue of any other accident of the same infima species, can be absent from a subject in which it was previously present, whilst that subject remains what it is. For example: snubness in respect of a snub-nose, because snubness cannot be absent from a nose, in which it was previously present, if that nose is to continue to exist. And this is the difference between separable and inseparable accidents using the criterion of species.

However any accident having a suitable subject from which it cannot be absent, if the subject is to remain, can be called an inseparable accident in virtue of an individual, as for example blackness in the feather of a raven. But this same accident may be separable as far as its species is concerned. And thus an accident which is inseparable as far as some individual is concerned, is separable as far as its species is concerned: for example the blackness in a raven's feather.

(Capitulum Octavum)

(DE DIVISIONE DEFINITIONIS)

Pro praemissis est notandum, quod descriptio sive definitio potest assignari de aliquo, ut ipsum est res primae intentionis. Et tunc non requiritur definitionem formaliter competere definito in se, nec cuilibet universali sub eo, sed cuilibet eius individuo, sicut
 5 descriptio quantitatis est quod sit accidens absolutum de se divisibile: et tamen quantitas communis non est sic formaliter divisibilis, nec linea communis, sed quaelibet quantitas singularis est sic divisibilis.

Alio modo potest definitio vel descriptio assignari de aliquo, ut ipsum est res secundae intentionis. Et tunc non requiritur
 10 descriptionem formaliter competere definito, nec alicui eius individuo, sed omni universali contento sub nomine illius definiti. Et sic describuntur hic quinque universalis. Verbi gratia: descriptio data de genere non praedicatur formaliter de hoc communi genus, quia illud non praedicatur formaliter in quid, quia quaerendo quid est animal,
 15 vel corpus, non convenienter respondetur quod est genus. Nec competit illa descriptio alicui eius individuo, ut constat, cum nec Socrates nec Plato etc. sic est formaliter genus. Sed haec descriptio competit omnibus generibus contentis sub hoc communi "genus", sicut genere substantiae sive genere quantitatis.

~~C.VIII. 1. pro praemissis tamen notandum CDE. 2. ipse B / non om.B. 3. formaliter definitionem E. 4. alicui universali BC. 5. sicut descriptum est in quantitate C / divisibile (etc.) DE. 6. formaliter sic CDE / divisibile A, sic divisibilis formaliter B. 7. divisibilis sic D. 8. vel) sive D / de alio D. 9. et sic A. 10. descripto CD. 11. definiti contento B / et sic om.B. 13. non formaliter praedicatur B / illud om.D. 14. non formaliter praedicatur B. 16. ista BD. 17. sic om.BE / et caetera sic om.CD. 18. commune B. 18-19. sicut genere substantiae, genere quantitatis et caeteris CDE. 19. generi DE.~~

Chapter Eight

DEFINITIONAL MODES

As far as the foregoing is concerned, it should be noted that a description or definition can be given of something, which is itself an object of first intention. And in this case, there is no need for the definition to apply formally to what is defined or to any universal contained beneath it, but only to one of its individual instances. For example, the description of quantity is that it is an absolute accident divisible per se. However the general entity quantity is not thus formally divisible, nor is the general entity line. However any particular quantity is divisible in this way.

In the second place, a definition or description may be given of something, when the thing is an object is an object of second intention and thus there is no need for the description to formally apply to what is defined, not to any individual contained under it, but rather to apply to every universal contained under the name of what is defined. And it is in this second way that the five universals have been here described. For example, the description given of genus is not formally predicated of the general entity genus, because this is not formally predicated in quid. For if anyone asks What is an animal or a body, it is not correct to reply that it is a genus. Nor does this description apply to any individual contained under genus, as is clear, because neither Socrates nor Plato etc. is thus formally a genus. However this description does apply to all individuals contained under the general entity genus, for example to the genus substance or to the genus quantity.

Cap.VIII De Divisione Definitionis

20 (Sed pro differentia inter terminum primae intentionis et terminum
 secundae intentionis est notandum, quod terminus primae intentionis
 est terminus significans suum significatum non connotando singularitatem,
 universalitatem, ut iste terminus "homo" et iste terminus "animal" etc..
 Et illa res significata ut sic vocatur res primae intentionis. Terminus
 25 secundae intentionis est terminus significans suum significatum
 superconnotando universalitatem vel particularitatem, ut iste terminus
 "homo communis", "homo singularis", "genus", "species", "individuum",
 "singulare", "communicabile", "incommunicabile". Quodlibet illorum
 terminorum significat suum significatum et connotat ultra illud
 30 significatum universalitatem, particularitatem vel singularitatem,
 ut iste terminus "homo communis" significat speciem humanam et
 connotat ultra illam communicabilitatem.)

NON EXTAT IN MSS CDE.

22-23. universalitatem vel particularitatem sive singularitatem B.

23. et om.B. 28. quodlibet enim istorum B. 29. ultra illud) ultimum B.

31-32. et ultra illud connotat communicabilitatem B.

(However with respect to the difference between a term of first intention and a term of second intention it should be noted that a term of first intention is a term standing for its significate without connoting singularity or universality, e.g. the term "man" and the term "animal" etc.. And whatever is so signified is called an object of first intention. A term of second intention is a term standing for its significate, however connoting beyond this universality or particularity, e.g. the terms "man in general", "man in particular", "genus ", "species", "individual", "singular entity", "communicable entity", "incommunicable entity". Each of these terms signifies its significate and beyond this connotes some universal, particular or singular nature. For example, the term "man in general" signifies the human species and beyond it connotes universality.

(Capitulum Nonum)

(DUBIUM PRIMUM)

Circa praedicta dubitatur primo numquid sunt infinita universalia praeter illa quinque, quod sic arguitur. Illa quinque universalia conveniunt in hoc, quod sunt universalia. Igitur praeter illa est dare sextum universale commune istis, in quo conveniunt. Tunc ultima, 5 illa sex universalia conveniunt in hoc, quod sunt universalia. Igitur est dare septimum universale, in quo conveniunt: et sic in infinitum. Confirmatur consequentia, quia sequitur bene "isti homines singulares conveniunt in hoc, quod sunt homines". Igitur praeter illos est dare hominem communem illis. Igitur conformiter 10 sequitur in alio. Et conformiter potest moveri numquid Socrates et homo communis sunt duo homines, sicut hoc commune genus et hoc commune universale sunt duo universalia iuxta probata.

Quantum ad illud dubium, negatur quod praeter illa quinque universale est dare infinita universalia. Immo omne universale per se 15 praeter ens commune est formaliter genus, species, differentia, proprium vel accidens, secundum prius declarata. Et sic concedendum, quod praeter illa est dare sextum universale, scilicet ens in communi, in quo conveniunt in hoc quod sunt entia. Sed non ultima est procedendum, cum illud sit communissimum. Tamen praeter illa non est dare sextimum 20 universale, in quo conveniunt in hoc quod sunt universalia: quod petit dubium. Et sic conceditur, quod est dare universale, in quo illa quinque conveniunt in hoc quod sunt universalia et hoc est hoc commune universale. Non tamen est concedendum, quod illa quinque et hoc commune universale sunt formaliter sex universalia. Unde numquam concedenda est praedicatio

C.IX: 1. primo dubitatur CD / infinita sunt B. 2. ista quinque BC / ista quinque BCD. 4. commune A, commune illis B, commune istis DE, commune istis quinque C / in quo conveniunt om.CDE./ tunc illa AB, et tunc ultima ista C, et tunc ultima illa DE. 6. igitur (praeter ista) add.CD. 7. confirmatur ratio C / quia sequitur A, quia sequitur bene CD, quia bene sequitur E, sequitur bene om.B. 8. isti duo homines B, isti homines singulares sunt homines CD, illi homines singulares sunt homines E. 9. istos CE / communem istis E. 11. et homo in communi C / et hoc om.B. 12. iuxta om.C. 13. istud BC / ista BE. 14. est ponere CDE / universalia om.C / immo om.AE.

Chapter Nine

FIRST DOUBT

Concerning the foregoing, first of all it is doubted whether there might not be an infinite number of universals apart from these five. And the argument runs thus. These five universals have in common the fact that they are universals. Therefore it is possible to posit besides them a sixth universal, which is common to them and in which they agree. And finally these six universals have in common the fact that they are universal. Therefore a seventh universal can be posited, which the previous six have in common. And so on ad infinitum.

The logic of the argument is confirmed, because it is valid to argue that these individual men have in common the fact that they are men: therefore it is possible to posit a man common to them. Thus the argument is similarly valid in the first case. And similarly it is possible to ask whether Socrates and man in general are two men in the same way that genus in general and universal in general are two universals, as has already been established.

And as far as the particular doubt is concerned, it must be denied that an infinite number of universals can be assumed besides the five universals given. On the contrary, every universal per se, apart from Being in general, is formally a genus, a species, a difference, a property or an accident, as has been made clear in the foregoing. And thus it must be admitted, that it is possible to posit a sixth universal besides these, namely Being in general, in which the other five agree in so far as they are beings. But we should not proceed to the end of this argument, because this sixth universal is Being in its most general sense. So it is not possible to posit a sixth universal besides these five, which they all hold in common by virtue of the fact that they are universals, which is the point at doubt. Thus we can allow that it is possible to have a universal in which these five agree in so far as they are universals and this is general universality. But we should not admit that these five and universal in general are formally six universals.

(cont.) 15. citra ens commune B. 16. et est concedendum B, et sic est
concedendum CE. 17. praeter ista quinque universalia B, praeter ista CE /
est ponere CE // sextum om. B / ens commune CDE. 18. sit procedendum B.
19. praeter ista B, praeter ista quinque C / non om. C / est ponere DE /
septimum A. 21. et tunc CDE / concedatur. 23. quinque universalia B.
24. nunquam est concedenda CDE.

25 formalis termini secundae intentionis cum termino numerali de aliquibus, ubi iste terminus secundae intentionis significat primarie unum illorum, licet sit concedenda, ubi non sic.

Exempla primae partis regulae sunt talia: hoc commune animal et hoc commune genus non sunt formaliter duo genera, nec illa quinque et hoc commune universale sunt formaliter sex universalia, quia 30 praedicatum tam in prima praedicatione quam in secunda significat primarie unum comparatorum. Exempla secundae partis regulae sunt talia: homo et asinus sunt formaliter duae species, quia hoc praedicatum "species" non significat primarie hominem nec asinum. Etiam substantia et quantitas sunt formaliter duae praedicamenta, quia hoc praedicatum 35 "praedicamentum" non significat primarie substantiam nec quantitatem. In praedicatione tamen secundum essentiam est concedendum, quod animal commune et hoc commune genus sunt duo genera: immo sunt omnia genera, non tamen formaliter.

40 Et conformiter dicitur ad dubium motum, quod in praedicatione secundum essentiam Socrates et homo communis sunt duo homines, non tamen in praedicatione formali, quia homo communis est omnes homines. In casu tamen, quod Socrates sit omnis homo, negandum est, quod Socrates et homo communis sunt duo homines. Unde terminus numeralis 45 additus termino primae intentionis limitat ad suppositionem personalem. Et sic idem est dicere "Socrates et homo communis sunt duo homines" et "sunt duo singulares homines", quod repugnat casui. Immo in isto casu Socrates et homo communis sunt homines, et tamen nec finiti nec infiniti. Ista tamen conclusio foret impossibilis de talibus, quae

23. quinque universalia B. 24. numquam est concedenda CDE. 25. cum aliquibus E. 26. ille terminus B./ illorum (comparatorum) add. E. 27. non sit C, non sic (etc.) add. BCE. 28. (et sic) exempla add. D. 29. ista BC, illa quinque (universalia) add. E. 30. et hoc) in hoc B / sex om. D. 31. praedicatione) propositione A. 33. talia om. B / et om. D / (nec) hoc add. C. 33-34. hoc commune species AB. 34. non om. BC, non) nec DE / primarie significat D / etiam) et DE. 36. hoc praedicatum om. AB / hoc primarie significat D. 38. hoc commune animal BD. 39. duo genera (quia hoc commune genus est duo genera) add. DE. 40. et conformiter om. B. 41-42 non tamen) sed non D, tamen om. E. 42. homo in communi B /

And so the formal predication of a term of second intention with a numeral is never permissible of any group of things when the term of second intention signifies primarily one of those things, although it is permissible when this is not the case.

Examples of the first part of the rule are such: animal in general and genus in general are not formally two genera, nor are the five predicables and universal in general formally six universals, because the predicate both in the first and in the second predication given above signifies primarily one of the parts of the subject. Examples of the second part of the rule are such: man and ass are formally two species, because the predicate "species" signifies primarily neither a man nor an ass. And substance and quantity are formally two Categories, because the predicate "Category" signifies neither substance nor quantity primarily. However in predication according to essence it must be admitted that animal in general and genus in general are two genera, in fact constitute all genera, but not formally however.

One could reply along the same lines to the doubt put forward that in essential predication Socrates and man in general are two men: however in formal predication this would be impossible, as man in general constitutes all men. However in the case where Socrates constituted all men, it would have to be denied that Socrates and man in general were two men. Hence the conjunction of a numeral and a term of first intention implies a limitation to personal supposition. And thus it is the same to say that Socrates and man in general are two men and that they are two individual men, which is contradictory. For in this case, Socrates and man in general are men and yet they are neither definite men nor indefinite men. It would however be impossible to draw this conclusion with regard to the sort of things,

43. homo om.C. 44. duo homines (etc.) add.C. 46. communis (tamen) add.C.
 47. homines singulares B / casui om.D / isto casu BD, in casu isto C,
 in casu illo E, in illo casu A. 48. homines (et sunt duo homines
 singulares) add.B / tamen om.AE.

50 sunt formaliter homines.

(Si haec praedicatio esset concedenda "homo communis est formaliter homo", tunc sic forma praedicati est humanitas sive communicabilitas, quae humanitas est convertibilis cum praedicato, ita est in facto. Sed secundum praedicationem datam, communicabilitas esset forma, quae
55 includeretur in significatae termini "homo". Et sic homo esset humanitas, quae tunc non esset forma, sed ipsemet homo, et communicabilitas, quae esset eius forma. Et sic iste terminus "homo" significaret humanitatem et communicabilitatem, sicut et isti termini "homo communis", cum dicitur homo communis, communicabilitas est forma hominis.)

60 Unde homo communis non est formaliter homo, sed identitate, quia tunc esset forma sui ipsius, licet sit formaliter homo communis, quia communicabilitas formaliter sibi inest.

Et si quaeratur in quo conveniunt omnia universalia in hoc quod sunt universalia, dicitur quod in hoc communi "universale". Et illud
65 in se ipso convenit cum omnibus aliis universalibus: et communicatur sibi ipsi et omnibus aliis universalibus, quia praedicatur de se identitate et de aliis tanquam superius, sicut species humana et omnes homines conveniunt specialiter in eadem specie, ne sit processus in infinitum in speciebus humanis.

70 Et si obiciatur, quod infinita sunt universalia secundum numerum, eo quod sunt infinitae species numerorum et figurarum iuxta Boetium: imo fortius, infinitae sunt species animalium, quia duo animalia diversarum specierum coeuntia generant animal tertiae speciei iuxta Philosophos, illud igitur commixtum cum animali alterius speciei

51. (unde) si add. B. 51-59. Si haec — forma hominis om. CDE. 55. (istius) termini add. B. 56-57. sed ipsemet — forma om. B. 57-58. humanitas et communicabilitas A. 62. sibi formaliter inest EDE. 65. universalibus aliis A. 65-66. et communicatur — aliis om. B. 66. universalibus aliis A / quae praedicantur AB / se om. B. 68. specialiter AB. 71. secundum Boetium AB. 72. sunt infinitae B / species om. B / eo quod AB. 73. diversarum specierum om. D / specie tertiae D. 74. illud) idem BD / igitur) autem E, igitur (animal) add. B.

which are formally men.

(For if the predication "man in general is formally a man" is admitted, then the form of the predicate is humanity or communicability and this humanity converts with man and thus does so in reality. But according to the predication given, communicability would constitute the form, which would thus be included in what is signified by the term "man". And thus man would be identical with humanity, which itself would not constitute the form of man, but man himself, and with communicability, which would be its form. And thus the term "man" would signify humanity and communicability, just as in the case of the term "man in general", by which man in general is expressed, communicability is the form of man.)

Hence, man in general is not formally a man, but is so by identity, because otherwise he would constitute the form of himself, although he is formally "man in general", because communicability inheres formally in itself.

And if the question were put, as to what all universals have in common, that makes them universals, the answer is that they have the universal universal in common: and that this has all the other universals in common with itself and is common to itself and to all other universals, because it is predicated of itself by virtue of identity and of the others in the manner of a superior. In the same way the human species and all men have in common belonging specifically to the same species, otherwise there would be an infinite regression in the human species.

And suppose the objection were to be made that universals are numerically infinite, because there is an infinite number of species of numbers and figures, as Boethius says, and, to give a more concrete example, because there is an infinite number of species of animals, because two animals of different species copulating produce an animal of a third species, as Aristotle says, and this third animal mating with an animal of another species...

75 generabit animal quartae speciei: et sic in infinitum. Secundo sic:
 nulla est species specialissima in genere animalis, quia non homo,
 eo quod sunt duae per se species sub homine, scilicet vir communis et
 mulier communis.

Ad primum dicitur, quod non est inconueniens infinitas esse
 80 species accidentium, et hoc saltem quantum ad nos. Nec tamen propter
 hoc sunt infinitae species substantiarum nec animalium. Et conceditur,
 iuxta sententiam Porphyrii, quod animal generatum ab animalibus
 differentibus in specie est alterius speciei quam aliquod illorum.
 Nec potest illud animal generare aliquod animal ulterius propter
 85 intrinsecas qualitates latentes ex parte complexionis, sicut nec
 Phoenix. Et licet illud animal habeat potentiam generativam, non
 tamen potest generare, sicut nec homo, cum devenerit ad certam
 aetatem, potest procedere in actum generandi. Ad secundum dicitur
 negando, quod vir et mulier sunt per se species sub homine, cum
 90 contingit idem individuum esse virum et mulierem, ut patet de
 hermaphroditis.

75. generat CDE / sic (quia) add.CDE, sic (quod) add.D. 76. sub genere B /
 eo quod) quia BG. 77. per se species om.C, species per se BD / vir in
 communi B. 78. mulier in communi B. 79. primum (istorum) add.B,
 (illorum) add.A. 80. quantum (pertinet) add.A. 81. conceditur)
 est concedendum B. 83. in.om.A, specialite DE / est om.B. 84.
 aliquod animal ulterius) aliud alterius B. 86. et (sic) add.BCD.
 87. devenerit) pervenerit B. 89. negando om.E. 90. patet) per C.
 91. sicut hermaphrodita B / .

would produce an animal of a fourth species and so on ad infinitum. And secondly suppose it were to be objected that there is no lowest-order species in the genus animal, because even man is not such a one, as there are two species per se of a lower order than man, namely man in general and woman in general.

To the first objection the reply is that it is not implausible, that there should be an infinite number of species of accidents, at least as far as we can know them. However there are not, by virtue of this possibility alone, an infinite number of species of substances or animals and it must be admitted in accordance with the opinion of Porphyry, that an animal generated by animals differing in species is of a different species to either parent, however this animal cannot at a later date generate another animal, because its intrinsic qualities are latent as far as regeneration are concerned, as is the case with the Phoenix. And although such an animal possesses a generative potential, it does not reproduce, as neither does man, for only when he reaches a certain age can he begin to reproduce. To the second objection the answer is to deny that men and women are per se species subordinate to man, for it does happen, that the same individual is both a man and a woman, as is clear in the case of hermaphrodites.

25 arguendi in talibus terminis, sic est arguendum: homo communis non
 currit et homo communis est formaliter aliquid, quod est homo, igitur.. etc..
 Et tunc minor est falsa.

Ad secundam conclusionem dicitur negando illam. Et conceditur
 regula assumpta et ulterius negatur, quod res universalis est formaliter
 30 non quanta, cum illa non sit praedicatio formalis essentialis, cum nulla
 negatio pura sit de formali essentia quidditativa alicuius universalis.
 Nec illa praedicatio est praedicatio formalis accidentalis, cum nulla
 talis negatio pura sit accidens formaliter inhaerens universali.

Ex quibus infertur, quod in praedicationem secundum essentiam sunt
 35 concedendae tales praedicationes: Socrates est aliud ab homine et aliud
 a Socrate, quia est hoc aliud ab homine et hoc est aliud a Socrate,
 demonstrando animal commune. Capiendo illum terminum "aliud" in
 neutro genere substantivato, tamen negatur, quod Socrates est aliud
 a Socrate vel differt a Socrate. Et si arguitur sic: Socrates differt
 40 ab homine in communi, igitur non est homo communis, negatur consequentia
 nec arguitur ab exposito ad eius exponentem. Sed talis propositio
 debet sic probari. Aliqua ratio inest formaliter Socrati, quae non
 inest homini in communi, vel e contra, igitur Socrates differt ab
 homine in communi. Et antecedens patet, quia singularitas inest formaliter
 45 Socrati et non formaliter homini in communi, et e contra universalitas
 inest formaliter homini in communi et non formaliter Socrati, igitur etc..

27. ~~maxix~~ et om.A / est minor C / falsa (etc.) add.C. 28. conclusionem om.C /
 conceditur) concedatur A. 29. assumpta AD, sumpta BC, assignata E /
 negatur ulterius E. 30. illa om.C / praedicatio formalis essentialis)
 formaliter essentialis. 31. pura om.BCDE / universalis) vel B.
 32. praedicatio post est om.ABC / formalis) formaliter A. 33. pura)
 prima C / formaliter accidens C. 35. tales praedicationes concedendae C /
 praedicationes) propositiones B', praedicationes (scilicet) add.E.
 36-39. quia est — a Socrate om.A. 36. Socrate (vel differt a Socrate)
 add.CB, vel quod differt a Socrates add.A / (et) quia add.E / est
 om.B' / hoc post est om.D./ est om.B. 37. animal in communi B' /
 istum D / aliud) animal B'. 38. aliud) alius C. 39. differt a Socrate)
 alius ab homine C / sic om.C / (quod si) Socrates add.C / (si) Socrates
 add.B. 40. homine communi DE. 41. ad (unam) eius add.BC. 42. formaliter
 inest CD. 43. (formaliter) inest CDE / homini communi DE /. 44. homini
 communi DE./ patet) est verum D / formaliter inest CD. 45. formaliter
 om.B' / homini communi DE. 46. formaliter inest C / formaliter inest
 B'DE / igitur) ideo C / igitur etc. om.C.

Chap.X Second Doubt

in respect of the proposition containing the nub of the argument. Man in general does not run and man in general is formally a thing that is man, therefore... and so on. Thus the minor premiss is seen to be false.

To the second argument the reply is to deny it. The rule adopted is admitted. Finally it is denied that a universal thing is not formally quantifiable as such, because the predication here is not formal and essential, since one cannot properly negate the formal quidditative essence of any universal. Nor is this predication a formal and accidental predication, because such a negation cannot be properly an accident, inhering in a universal.

From this it is inferred that predications such as the following are to be admitted in essential predication, e.g. Socrates is something other than man and something other than Socrates, because pointing to animal in general, this is something other than man and something other than Socrates. However taking the phrase "something other than" as a neuter substantive, it is denied that Socrates is something other than Socrates or that he differs from Socrates. And if one argues thus: Socrates differs from man in general and thus is not identical with man in general, one must deny that the argument is valid, nor can one argue from what is explained to what explains it. However a proposition of this type should be demonstrated thus: there is some principle formally inherent in Socrates, which is absent from man in general, or to put it another way, Socrates is different from man in general. The antecedent is clearly true, because singularity formally inheres in Socrates and not in man in general. And on the other hand universality formally inheres in man in general and not in Socrates.

Secundo dubitatur numquid universale sit suum singulare, quod sic patet ex declaratis, quod non arguitur. Quia primo sequitur, quod omnis homo currit et aliquid, quod est homo, non currit: quia ponitur, quod omnis homo currat, tunc patet prima pars: et secunda probatur, quia homo communis non currit et homo communis est aliquid, quod est homo, iuxta concessum: igitur... etc.. Patet consequentia, quia est sillogismus expositivus.

Secundo sequitur, quod quantum est non quantum. Probatur, quia iuxta opinionem, quando sunt duae denominationes oppositae, quarum una praedicatur formaliter de re communi et alia formaliter de singulari, tunc concedenda est praedicatio secundum essentiam unius de reliqua. Ut, quia homo communis est formaliter communicabilis et formaliter indivisibilis, et homo singularis est formaliter singularis et divisibilis, ideo conceditur, quod universale est singulare et indivisibile est divisibile. Igitur, cum res singularis sit formaliter quanta et res communis formaliter non quanta, concedendum est, quod quantum est non quantum.

Ad primum negatur conclusio reducta in oppositum dubium, et admittatur casus, et negatur secunda pars conclusionis, scilicet: aliquid, quod est homo, non currit. Et negatur consequentia ulterius facta pro probatione illius: nec est sillogismus expositivus nisi medius terminus esset supponens pro individuo, et non pro communi, vel aliter terminus inferior ad maiorem extremitatem vel ad minorem, quorum neutrum hic reperitur. Unde ad hoc, quod teneat modus

C.X: 1. suum ACD, apud B, unum E. 2. (et) quod non add.CD / primo) tunc D. 3. quia) quod E. 3-4. quia ponitur) probatur et ponitur C. 4. ponitur) probatur B / (et) tunc add.B / prima (parte) add.B, prima pars patet C. 7. consequentia) consequens B / expositivus (Notandum quod quando aliquid accidens recipit inceptionem, quam attribuit suo subiecto, tunc suscipit seipsam mediante se et non mediante alia, ut Socrates, qui iam primo incipit esse et has (?) mediante alia inceptio, tunc ista inceptio incipit esse mediante seipsa, quia ista est aliquid accidens et $\bar{\bar{}}$ illud accidens recipit inceptionem quam attribuit suo subiecto) add.B. 7. est om.E / non est C. 9. quaecumque A. 10. de re communi formaliter C / alia) aliud A

Chapter Ten

SECOND DOUBT

In the second place it is doubted whether a universal is the same as its particular, which notion is clear from, but not discussed in the foregoing. For the first argument runs thus: every man runs and something, which is a man, does not run. It is assumed, that all can run, thus the first part of the argument is clearly true. And the second part is seen to be proved, since man in general does not run and man in general is something, which is a man, as has been previously admitted, therefore.... etc.. The validity of the argument is clear, because it is an expository syllogism. The second argument runs thus, that a thing of a certain formal character is not of that character. This is seen to be proved, because following generally held views, when one has two accidents with opposite denominations, of which one is formally predicated of a general thing and the other of a singular thing, then one must allow essential predication by one of the other. For example, since man in general is formally universal and formally indivisible and man in particular is formally singular and divisible, one must admit that a universal thing is singular and that an indivisible thing is divisible. Thus, since a singular thing may be formally characterised as universal and a universal thing is seen to be characterised as singular, it is admitted that a thing of a certain formal character is not of that character.

In reply to the first argument, the conclusion drawn from the point at doubt cited is denied. The generalisation adduced is admitted, but the second part of the conclusion, namely "something, which is a man, does not run" is denied. Then the argument put forward finally to prove this is denied. Nor can the syllogism be said to be expository unless the middle term is seen to stand for a particular thing, not for a general thing, or unless it be a term inferior to the extreme term of either the major or the minor premiss. But neither of these

two cases occurs here. Thus one should argue in the following manner ...

(cont.) formaliter om.C / de (re) singulari add.CD. 13. indivisibilis⁰
divisibilis E / est om.B / formaliter (homo) add.C. 14. divisibilis)
indivisibilis E / concedendum A, conceditur CDE, concedatur B /
singulare est universale A, singulare est universale om.B. 15. est om.CDE /
igitur om.B / cum res singularis sit formaliter quanta) res quanta
singularis sit formaliter B / res (quanta) singularis CDE. 16. communis
(sit) formaliter add.B / quod om.B. 19. scilicet (quod) AC. 20-21.
pro probatione illius om.A. 21. (dicere) sillogismus add.mg.D /
expositorus DE. 22. (tunc) esset add.E / (medius) supponens add.B /
pro om.E. 23. ad post vel om.BCDE. 24. neutrum) nullum AD / teneat
(talís) add.B.

(Capitulum Undecimum)

(DUBIUM TERTIUM)

Tertio dubitatur numquid tales praedicationes sunt concedendae de universalibus: scilicet "homo communis currit", "homo communis est albus" etc.. Quod non patet ex praedictis et quod sic arguitur. Accidentia talia universalia primo subiectantur non in individuis, 5 igitur in communibus. Et per consequens primo denominant communia.

Item illa est vera: "homo communis currit", sic primarie significando probatur hominem communem currere est veritas. Et sic illa primarie significat, igitur...etc.. Antecedens probatur sic. Illa est vera: "homo currit", ut supposito, et illa primarie significat 10 hominem communem currere, igitur...etc.. Minor arguitur sic: subiectum illius significat primarie hominem communem et alia pars significat currere. Igitur tota propositio significat primarie hominem communem currere. Et per consequens istae propositiones simpliciter convertuntur: "homo currit" et "homo communis currit". Sed una est vera, igitur et 15 alia.

Pro isto dubio est dicendum, quod tale accidens universale habet duplex subiectum primum, scilicet quo ad dependentiam, et sic universale est eius subiectum primum, vel quo ad denominationem, et sic singulare vel aggregatum ex singularibus est eius subiectum primum. Verbi 20 gratia: risibilitas communis quo ad dependentiam primo subiectatur in specie humana, sed quo ad denominationem aequae pridem subiectatur in quolibet homini singulari vel in aggregato ex omnibus hominibus. Et tunc non valet consequentia facta: "Talia universalia accidentia primo subiectantur in communibus, igitur primo denominat communia",

C.XI: 1. praedicationes) propositiones A. 2. scilicet om.C, scilicet) sicut A / homo communis post currit om.AD. 3. etc om.B / patet) constat C / ex praedictis om.B / quod om.B / subiectantur (et) add.ABC. 4. in universalibus AB, universalia CDE / in ante individuis om.D. 5. communibus) universalibus B. 6. (secundo) Item add.E / illa) ista C / (praecise) primarie add.C, (praecise et) primarie add.B, primarie (praecise) add.D, (praecise vel) primarie add.E. 7. communem om.D. 8. (praecise) primarie add.CE, primarie (praecise) add.D / antecedens sic ABC, antecedens probatur sic DE. 9. illa est) ista est BC / ut supposito om.BE / (praecise et) primarie add.B, (praecise) primarie add.C, primarie (praecise) add.D. 10. etc. om.C / arguitur om.BCDE. 11. illius) istius B / primarie significat E / significat

Chapter Eleven

THIRD DOUBT

In the third place it is doubted whether predications such as the following are to be admitted in respect of universals, namely "man in general runs", "man in general is white" etc.. This is not clear from the foregoing, but is argued as following. Such universal accidents primarily take as their subjects, not particulars, but common entities. And thus as a result, they primarily denote common entities.

Further, it is true that man in general runs, thus in its primary sense, the truth of the proposition "man in general runs" is proved. And the proposition thus has a primary meaning, therefore ...and so on. The antecedent is proved in this way: it is true that man runs, but because it has supposition, it primarily signifies man in general running, therefore...and so on. The minor premiss is argued in this way: its subject primarily stands for man in general and the other part stands for running. So the whole proposition primarily means that man in general runs. And consequently these propositions directly convert: "man runs" and "man in general runs". One is true, so the other is also.

As far as the former doubt is concerned, we must state that a universal accident of the above kind has two types of primary subject, that is, with respect to dependency, where a universal is its primary subject, and with respect to denotation, where a particular or a sum of particulars is its primary subject. For example, in its general sense, the ability to laugh with respect to denotation has as its subject the human species, but with respect to dependency finds its subject equally in any man in particular or in the sum of all men. And thus the argument as set out does not stand, that is that universal accidents of this sort primarily take their subjects from among common entities and that they primarily denote common entities.

(cont.) om.B. 12. (praecise et) primarie add.B, primarie om.E. 13.
istae) illae E, istae (duae) add.B / convertuntur simpliciter BC,
simpliciter om.E. 14. sed una est vera) sed vera est E. 16. dicendum
est D, est om.E. 17. primum) primo B / scilicet om.B. 18. eius om.A.
21. pridem) primo B / subiectatur om.CDE. 22. homini) eius C / in ante
agregato om.E. 23. tunc) sic CDE / valet (talis) add.CE / facta om.C /
talia om.C. 24. primo om.E.

25 quia antecedens est verum, loquendo de subiectione quo ad dependentiam, et consequens falsum. Vel potest dici, quod talia accidentia communia implicat sua subiecta prima esse per se mobilia. Ideo non primo denominant communia, sed primo denominant res singulares. Et sic accidentia remote denominant sua communia, ut in neutero genere: "homo communis est album, risibile" etc..

30 Ad secundum negatur, quod illa est vera: "homo communis currit" sed illa est vera: "homo currit" in casu posito. Et negatur ulterius, quod illa significat primarie hominem communem currere. Et non valet consequentia ulterius facta "subiectum significat primarie hominem communem et alia pars significat currere, igitur...etc.". Antecedens enim est verum in suppositione personali, sed non in suppositione simplici, quia iste terminus "homo" significat primarie naturam humanam, cui inest communicabilitas, sed non significat primarie illam naturam, ut ipsa est communicabilis. Et hoc oportet addere

40 ad hoc, quod argumentum valeret. Unde iste terminus "homo" significat hominem communem, ac etiam iste terminus "homo terminus", sed dispariter. Ideo non convertuntur, quia primus significat primarie naturam, cui inest communicabilitas, et alius significat illam naturam, ut ipsa est communicabilis.

45 Patet etiam quomodo modus arguendi non valet in assimili: capiendo illam propositionem "asinus est hominis", subiectum primarie significat "asinum" et verbum "esse" et praedicatum primarie "hominem", igitur tota propositio significat primarie asinum esse hominem. Dato enim consequente, istae duae propositiones convertuntur: "asinus est homo"

25. (et) quo ad add.B. 26. et consequens falsum om.CDE / vel) unde B / 27. implicancia CDE / ideo om.CDE. 28. communia) sua individua C, om.DE / sed (sua individua) add.DE / sic (illa) add.DE. 29. sua communia) illa singularia CDE / ut in neutero genere) sicut accidentia singularia e contra remote denominant universalis in talibus praedicationibus CDE. 30. risibile etc. om.B. 31. negatur) dicitur negando B / illa) haec C. 32. sed) et C / illa) haec C / in casu posito "homo currit" B / et negatur) sed negatur B. 33. primarie significat E. 34. facta ulterius C / (ibidem) subiectum add.C / subiectum (illius) add.C / primarie om.B. 35. significat om.C / et alia pars significat currere) etc.DE. 36. enim om.D. 37. iste) ille E. 38. humanam om.CDE. 39. oporteret CDE / 40. valerete argumentum B / valeat E / iste) ille E.

so speaking of taking a subject with respect to dependency, the antecedent is true and the consequent is false. Or one could say that general accidents of this sort imply that their primary subjects are per se mobile. Thus they do not primarily denote common entities, but singular things. And therefore accidents secondarily denote their general forms, for example in the neuter gender: "man in general is a white thing, is something capable of laughter" etc..

In reply to the second argument it is denied that "man in general runs" is true. However "a man runs" is true in the example given. And finally it is denied that this latter proposition primarily signifies that man in general runs. And the last argument set out i.e. that "the subject primarily means man in general and the other part means running, therefore...and so on" is not true. For the antecedent is true in personal supposition but not in simple supposition, because the term "man" primarily signifies that human nature, in which universality exists, but does not primarily mean the nature, which is itself universal. And this limitation should be added to the argument for it to hold true.

For this reason the term man signifies man in general and so does the phrase "man in general", but in a different way. Thus these two terms do not convert, as the first primarily signifies the entity, in which universality exists, and the other signifies the entity, which is itself universal.

It is thus clear that any such way of arguing will be false, and for similar reasons: for taking the proposition "an ass is of man", the subject primarily signifies "an ass" and the verb "being" and the predicate primarily signifies "a man". Therefore the whole proposition is supposed to signify primarily that an ass is a man. So given that the consequent is true, these two propositions convert: "an ass is a man" and "an ass is of man", which is not true. But it would be necessary that these two propositions were synonymous
(over)

(cont.) 41. iste) ille E. 42. (illam) naturam add.CDE / naturam
(humanam) add.A. 43. alius (terminus) add.CDE / naturam (communem)
add. AB / ipsa om.B. 45. (quomodo) quod B / modus om.A. 46. illam
istam BE / (ibi) subiectum add.C / significat primarie B. 47. "hominem"
primarie D. 48. primarie om.A, primarie (et praecise) add.E /
(vel e contra) dato add.C. 49. istae) illae A / propositiones om.C /
converterentur CDE.

50 et "asinus est hominis", quod non est verum. Sed oportet, quod illa
duo praedicata sunt sinonima et eodem modo significandi significarent
hominem, quod non est verum.

(Capitulum Duodecesimum)

(DUBIUM QUARTUM)

Quarto dubitatur de communicabilitate universalium. Et videtur,
quod una species specialissima est alia magis communicabilis, quia
quanto una species communicatur, tanto est communicabilis. Sed una
species specialissima pluribus communicatur quam alia, sicut species
5 puncti quam species humana, igitur...etc.. Et per idem deducitur, quod
aliqua species specialissima est communior certo genere subalterno,
quia species puncti pluribus communicatur quam genus animalis,
igitur...etc..

Pro illo dubio est notandum, quod communicabilitas universalis
10 est una passio absoluta, consequens naturam universalem, quae attenditur
penes distantiam universalis ab esse individuali et non penes hoc,
quod tale universale pluribus communicatur. Unde aequae communicabilis
est species humana in casu, quod Socrates sit omnis homo, ac si essent
mille milia hominum, quia tunc tante distat ab esse individuali,
15 sicut unquam alias. Et sic est ordo in communicabilitate universalium,
quia species specialissimas sunt minimae communes, deinde genera
subalterna per ordinem, deinde praedicamenta, et sic usque ad ens, quod
est maxime commune, quia maxime distat ab esse individuali.

Et per hoc negatur maior argumenti, quod quanto species communicatur,
20 tanto est communicabilis, quia illa implicat aequalitatem inter

50. illa) ista B. 51. sunt sinonima) sinonime CDE / et) in B.
52. quod non est verum) quod falsum est B / verum (etc.) add.E.
C.XII: 1. de om.B / (numquid universale sit suum universale, quod
sic patet: Pro dicta) communicabilitate add.B / de om.B / et (sic)
add.B. 2. quia) quod B. 3. (in) quanto C / species ante communicatur
om.C / (pluribus) communicatur add.C / (in) tanto add.C / est (magis)
add.C / una) aliqua C. #6. aliqua) una B / specialissima om.C /
genere certo C. 7. communicatur pluribus E. 9. illo) isto BC / est
om.A, notandum est D. 10. naturam universalis A. 11. ab) ad C. 12.
universale tale CE / communicabilis) praedicabilis A. 13. humana om.B /
quod) qua B / sit) esset C / essent om.E. 14 quia) per B. ~~XXXXXXXX~~
16. communes om.C. 19. quante D, (in) quanto add.E / species (sic)
add.C. 20. tante D, (in) tanto add.C.

Chap.XII Fourth Doubt

and that they signified man in the same way, which they do not.

In the fourth place the communicability of the universal is doubted. And it appears that one infima species is more communicable than another, because to the same extent that a species is common, so it is communicable. But one infima species is common to more things than another, for instance the species of points than the human species, therefore...and so on. And from this argument we deduce that one infima species is more common than some other subaltern genus, since the species of points is common to more things than the genus animal, therefore...and so on.

As far as this doubt is concerned, it should be noted that the communicability of a universal is an absolute affection consequent on the nature of the universal, which is conceived according to the distance of the universal from particular being and not according to the fact that the universal is common to many things. Thus species is equally predicable of the human species, whether Socrates constitutes all men or whether there are a million men, because the human species is as far from individual being in the one case as in the other. And thus there is an order in the communicability of universals, because the infima species are the least general, then come the subaltern genera and the Categories in the order, and so on up to Being, which is the most general of all, because it is the most distant from individual being.

By this the major premiss of the argument is denied, i.e. that a species is communicable to the same extent to which it is communicated, because this implies an equality between...

communicabilitatem respectivam illius universalis et communicabilitatem absolutam, quae comparatio non est admittenda, eo quod talis communicabilitas respectiva suscipit magis et minus secundum diversa tempora, sed non illa communicabilitas absoluta. Et sic negatur secundum deductum et
 25 argumentum pro ipso factum, scilicet species puncti pluribus communicatur quam genus animalis, igitur est magis commune.

Et si deducitur sequi: omnes species specialissimas esse aequales
 et aequales species, eo quod aequaliter distant ab esse individuali,
 et per consequens hoc commune species aequaliter et univoce praedicatur
 30 de rebus diversorum praedicamentorum...dicitur concedendo consequens,
 nec inconueniens aliquod universale per accidens praedicari aequaliter
 et univoce de rebus diversorum praedicamentorum, licet sit impossibilis
 de universale per se. Verbi gratia: esse figuratum praedicatur
 aequaliter et univoce de substantia figurata et quantitate figurata,
 35 esse praedicamentum aequaliter praedicatur de qualitate et quantitate.
 Et sic hoc commune species, quod est universale per accidens aequaliter
 praedicatur de homine, puncto et albedine et sic de aliis singulis speciebus
 specialissimas etc..

21. communicabilitate respectiva C / illius) ipsius DE. 22. talis om.E / communicabilitas) communicatio CDE, comparatio add.mg.E. 24. illa) ista B / secundum om.C / et om.B. 25. argumento C / scilicet om.E, scilicet (quod)add.D / communicatur pluribus D. 26. animal CD. 27. deducatur DE. 29. praedicatur aequaliter et univoce CD. 30. consequens) conclusionem B. 31. inconueniens) universale C / aequaliter praedicari BC. 32. et univoce om.C / licet (hoc) add.D. 32-35. et univoce — aequaliter praedicatur om.B. 33. esse figurata D. 34. univoce et aequaliter praedicatur B. 35. et (esse) add.D. 37. sic om.C. 38. etc. (cf. Cap.X l. 34-46: Ex quibus — formaliter Socrati) add. BC / add.B: Nota, quod non est concedendum, quod homo in communi est unum universale, quae est principium quantitatis discretae, quia tunc sequeretur, quod universale poneret se in numero cum suo singulare, quod est falsum. Nota quod duplex est communicabilitas, scilicet absoluta et respectiva: absoluta est quaedam passio absoluta consequens naturam universalitatis, et respectiva est quaedam passio consequens naturam comparando illam ad suo supposito.

- A. Explicunt universalialia Myllverley compendiose compilata.
- B. Explicunt universalialia Mylverlay utilia, quod B(uxhale), followed by diagram of tree of Porphyry and inscription "ut logicam, noscas, fructus ex arbore poscas".
- C. Explicunt quinque universalialia secundum Mulverley.
- D. Explicunt universalialia Magistri Wilium Mylvyrley. quod (and what looks like an erasure effected by applying the tip of a licked finger vigorously to the page).

the relative communicability of this universal and its absolute communicability. And this comparison should not be admitted, because such relative communicability admits of various degrees at different periods in time, however absolute communicability does not. Thus we must deny the second conclusion drawn and the argument put forward on its behalf, namely that the species of points is communicated to more individuals than the genus animal and that it is thus more common.

And if it is supposed to follow that all infima species are equally common and equally species, because they are equidistant from individual being, and that consequently species in general is predicated equally and univocally of instances of different predicaments, the reply is to admit the consequent, for it is not implausible that a universal per accidens should be predicated equally and univocally of instances of different predicaments, although it would be impossible of a universal per se. For example, figurative being is predicated equally and univocally of figurative substance and figurative quantity, and predicamental being is equally predicated of quality and of quantity. And therefore species in general, which is a universal per accidens, is predicated equally of man, a point, and of whiteness and similarly of each of the infima species.

?

E. Explicit compendium de quinque universalibus secundum Magister W. Mylverley. Thomas Chawndler.

References to other texts in Milverley's Universalia:

- Cap.1:2: 5-6 Averrois Cordubensis: Commentarium Magnum in
Aristotelis De Anima Libros, ed. F.S.Crawford
(Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1953), p.440, Book III,
Section 18, 96-7.
- 7-8 cf. Averroes Metaphysics X, comm.6, Iuntina ed. VIII,
120rb, 4-21.
- 18-19 cf. Aristotle Metaphysics VII 13, Bekker 1038b, 7-8
" " 8-9
Bekker 1053b, 16-17
Averroes Metaphysics X, comm.6, Iuntina VIII
120rb, 4-21.
- Cap.1:4: 18-19 Porphyrii Isagogue, Aristoteles Latinus, 1 6-7,
Categoriarum Supplementa (Leiden, 1966), p.10, 8.
- Cap.2: 24-27 ibidem, p.10, 8.
- Cap.3: 14-15 ibidem, p.9, 1-3.
- Cap.4: 28-29 St. Thomas, Summa Theologica, PP. Quaestio 58, art.3c:
(utrum angelus cognoscat discurrendo), PS. Q.89, art.3c.
- Cap.4: 36-39 Aristotle, De Anima, Book I, Bekker 408b, 13ff.
- Cap.4: 44-45 Aristotle, Posterior Analytics, Book 2, Bekker 96a, 33f.
- Cap.4: 50-51 Aristotle, Topics, Book 4, Bekker 122b, 39 - 123a, 1.
- Cap.5: 19-20 Aristotle, Metaphysics, Book Z (7), Bekker 1031a, 1-14 (?).
- Chap.9 72-74 Aristotle, De generatione Animalium, Bekker 747b, 30ff.
- Cap.9: 82-83 Isagogue Porphyrii (Aristoteles Latinus), p.28, 5-9.

UNIVERSALIA MAGISTRI JOHANNIS TARTEYS

UNIVERSALIA MAGISTRI TARTOUS.

(Capitulum Primum)

Cum universalium cognitio, ut testatur Porphyrius in suo libello, ad logicam caeterisque scientiis praebet instrumentum, ideo restat plus veritatis inter caeteras, ut possidentem persequi penitus in praesenti, supponendo eius causationem huius termini
5 "universale".

Aliquid enim est universale causatione, eo quod plura causat. Et sic merito omnis res, id est universale isto modo, dicitur universale, et quoddam, ut res, dicitur causator. Sic ad istum sensum asseritur universor, ubi constat, quod inter caeteras res
10 est Deus isto modo universalis, quia est maxime causatinans.

Secundo modo dicitur universale exemptione vel ideale, quod idem est, quod est praesuppositum ad esse rei, secundum quod sit res et quod stat esse sine tali re.

Tertio est universale receptione illud, quod potest in se plura
15 ansi vitiosum recipere. Et hoc contingit dupliciter: extrinsice et independenter vel intrinsicice et dependenter. Primo modo dicitur situs universale, cum plura corpora possit vicissim et independenter in se recipere, cum tale locatum ab ipso non dependet. Secundo modo loquendo dicitur materia prima universale, cum plures formas
20 absolutas dependentes recipiat.

Quarto modo dicitur universale cognitione, quod inducit vel habet aptitudinem sive dispositionem ad inducendum aliquid in cognitionem rei. Et hoc contingit dupliciter: vel naturaliter vel artificialiter. Illud dicitur universale cognitione naturali,
25 quod naturalem inducit vel habet aptitudinem ad inducendum aliquid naturaliter in cognitionem rei, accidens respectu substantiae. Substantia enim est inducibilis in cognitionem rei, quamvis non primo et principaliter. Contingit tamen, quod huiusmodi accidentia inducant

2. scienssis. 7. isto modo my reading. 8. causam^r. 9. uni^{or}.
17. scitus. 18. tali. 19. dicitur) de. 23. quadrupliciter.

Cap. II

substantia et accidente. Vel artificialiter et tale universale
 60 praedicatur de omnibus suis inferioribus univoce. Et hoc contingit
 dupliciter: vel quod idem non superveniat alia natura positiva simplex,
 et sic est genus generalissimum, vel quod idem superveniat alia
 natura talis. Et hoc contingit dupliciter: nam vel idem praedicatur
 de rebus diversarum perfectionum essentialium, vel solum de rebus
 65 eiusdem perfectionis essentialis, quod si primo modo, sic dicitur
 genus subalternum, si secundo modo, sic dicitur species specialissima.

(Capitulum Secundum)

Pro distinctione tamen habendo inter dicta universalis, scilicet
 speciem, differentiam, proprium et accidens, est notandum, quod genus
 est natura positiva, simplex et univoca, quiditative praedicabilis
 de rebus diversarum per se perfectionum essentialium. Et hoc contingit
 5 dupliciter: nam vel tale per se continetur vel sub genere generalissimo
 et sic est per se genus, vel est in tali genere per reductionem, et sic
 est per accidens genus. Et quod aliquod sit genus per accidens
 contingit dupliciter, quia vel idem est natura positiva, simplex et
 univoca, quiditative praedicabilis de rebus diversarum per se
 10 perfectionum essentialium, sicut sensibilitas in communi, vel aliter
 idem est aggregatum per accidens, ut animal album.

Species est natura positiva, simplex et univoca, solum quid-
 itative praedicabilis de rebus eiusdem perfectionis essentialis.
 Et hoc contingit dupliciter: nam talis species est per se contenta
 15 sub genere tali, et sic est per se species, vel est in illo genere
 per reductionem, et sic est species per accidens. Et quod aliquod
 sit species per accidens contingit dupliciter: vel quod tale est natura
 positiva, simplex et univoca, solum quiditative praedicabilis de rebus
 C.2: 2. est) et. 7. per accidens om.

aliquid in cognitionem rei artificialiter, quia per discursum
 30 quantum de se est illud, faciunt naturaliter, quia diversis modis.
 Nam vel tale universale praedicatur de sua specie per se primo
 qualitative et substantialiter et sic est differentia substantialis,
 ut "homo est rationalis". Vel praedicatur de sua specie per se secundo
 qualitative et sic est proprium secundo modo dictum, ut "homo est
 35 risibilis". Vel tertio modo praedicatur per accidens de inferiori
 illius speciei et sic dicitur accidens per accidens, ut "iste homo
 est albus". Universale cognitione artificiale dicitur idem, quod
 inducit aliquid in cognitionem rei pure artificialiter, vel ~~habet~~
 aptitudinem ad sic inducendum, modo quo terminus dicitur universale,
 40 cum artificialiter sit in cognitionem rei per ipsum significatae.
 Et tale dicitur universale locatum et aliud universale naturale.

Quinto modo dicitur universale existentia vel praedicatione, cuius
 natura non repugnat esse plura individua separatim. Additur enim
 ista particula "cuius natura non repugnat" propter unicum solem.
 45 Et huiusmodi, quae non sunt, nec possunt esse plura individua
 separatim suis rationibus intrinsecis, non repugnat ipsa formaliter
 esse plura individua separatim. Et additur iste terminus "separatim"
 propter quantitatem discretam, quae est multa coniunctim, cum a
 probabili omnis talis quantitas discreta sit realiter suae partis.
 50 Et contingit dupliciter: vel quod sit plura divisim non divisa, vel
 plura divisim et divisa. Si autem tale universale sit plura divisim
 non divisa, sic dicitur universale supponi totum, ut dicuntur ratio,
 memoria et voluntas. Si vero sit plura divisim et divisa, hoc contingit
 dupliciter: vel quod praedicatur de pluribus secundum prius et
 55 posterius, vel secundum maius et minus. Et sic universale est
 aequivocum vel analogum, dicendo idem praedicari secundum maius et
 minus, quod participatur de duabus. De prioris uno solo participatur
 per inhaerentiam vel comparisonem ad aliud, modo quo ens participatur

33. secundo) de. 34. secundo) quarto. 38. inducit) includit in se/
 incognitum / pure my reading. 39. inducender. 40. artificialis. 43.
 enim) in.44.unicum my reading. 52. ut om.

Cap.III

20 eiusdem perfectionis essentialis, ut risibilitas in communi, vel
aliter est aggregatum per accidens, ut homo masculus.

Et sic differentia est natura positiva, simplex et univoca,
qualitative praedicabilis per se primo de specie.

Proprium est natura positiva, simplex et univoca, ex principiis
quidditativis egrediens, per se secundo praedicabilis de specie.

25 Accidens est natura positiva, simplex et univoca, ex principiis
intrinsicis qualitativis egrediens, per accidens in specie praedicabilis.

Additur enim ista particula "natura positiva" in praedictis
descriptionibus ad differentiam negativarum veritatum affirmatarum
de praesenti, praeterito et de futuro, ut "hominem non esse asinum".

30 Et sic additur iste terminus "simplex" ad differentiam
aggregatorum, quae non sunt per se in genere, iuxta sententiam
Aristotelis dicentis album non esse in genere per se propter suam
duplicem significationem.

35 Et additur iste terminus "univoca" ad differentiam transcendentium,
quae secundum communem modum loquendi de suis inferioribus univoce
non praedicantur.

Et causa positionis caeterarum particularum in praedictis
descriptionibus positarum faciliterque advertitur.

(Capitulum Tertium)

Circum istam praecedentem declarationem tale ponitur dubium
numquid genus et species, quae inter caetera universalia digniora
reputantur, sua sint inferiora, de quibus praedicantur.

20. per) vel / ut) vir / masculus) mastindum. 29. praesenti) posse.
32-33. suam duplicem significationem) suum duplex significare.
38. advertitur) advertenti.

vel res primarie significatae per subiectum potest large dici
praedicatio essentialis.

Et sic praedicatio essentialis est formalis. Possumus tamen
distinguere illas ex opposito, vocando praedicatio secundum essentiam
40 unam, et aliam formalem. Unde tunc ad priorem descriptionem oportet
addere: "dummodo nulla forma, ut forma inclusa in praedicatio vel
existens praedicatum, requiritur denominative inexistere subiecto,
ut sic", vocando praedicationem termini de termino, ubi per praedicatum
denominatur forma forma aliqua, quae est verificationem propositionis
45 vel secundum talem praedicationem requiritur non inesse formaliter
rei significatae per subiectum.

Et praedicatio formalis rei de re est quando ratio praedicati hoc
est forma, ut forma inclusa in praedicato vel existens praedicatum,
ut huiusmodi formaliter inest subiecto, ut "homo est animal", "Socrates
50 est album". Et dividitur talis praedicatio in praedicationem essentialem
et accidentalem. Praedicatio formalis essentialis est duplex, ut de
praecedentibus, viz. termini de termino vel rei de re. Termini de
termino est quando praedicatum denominatur aliqua forma etc., et tale
praedicatum est de quidditate subiecti, ut hoc contingit quando species
55 vel genus praedicatur, et haec praedicatio est in quid, vel quando
differentia substantialis praedicatur et sic est in quale. Et talis
praedicatio per se in quale est duplex: cum alia talis sit in quale
per se primo et alia talis sit in quale per se secundo. Praedicatio
in quale per se primo est quando praedicatur differentia substantialis.
60 Praedicatio in quale per se secundo est quando praedicatur passio vel
proprietas subiecti, quae, licet non sit de esse subiecti, cum sit
ipso posterior, tamen per se inest, cum subiectum non posset componi
ex suis principiis quidditativis, nisi causaret huiusmodi passionem.

43. praedicationem) praedicatum. 44. denotatur / alia / est om..
53. denotatur.

Cap. IV

5

alio modo potest sumi pro vocabuli assertione, et praedicati de subiecto et termini de termino,

10

tertio modo inter caeteros maxime illud propositum sumitur praedicari de particulari de multis, vel de multis dici vel esse in multis. Et ponitur ista particula "esse in multis" propter accidentia communia, quae proprie insunt, cum ista sit proprietas eis communis, ut patet per Aristotelem in praedictis. Et debet ista descriptio intelligeri cum aptitudine.

15

Praedicatio enim secundo modo subdividitur in praedicationem secundum essentiam et praedicationem secundum formam vel formalem.

20

Praedicatio secundum causam est duplex: alia est termini de termino, et alia est rei de re. Praedicatio secundum causam termini de termino, quando per praedicatum significatur primarie causa rei significatae per subiectum, ut "haec dies est latio solis super terram". Aut praedicatio secundum causam rei de re est quando praedicatum a parte rei est causa subiecti. Et debet ista intelligeri principaliter de causis materialibus et efficientibus.

25

Praedicatio secundum essentiam est duplex: alia enim est termini de termino et alia rei de re. Praedicatio secundum essentiam termini de termino est quando res primarie significata per praedicatum est res primarie significata per subiectum, et nulla forma connotata principaliter per praedicatum, ut sic, requiritur inesse re primarie significatae per subiectum formaliter et denominative, ita quod iste terminus, ut sic, dicatur rationem, sub qua propositio verificatur. Praedicatio secundum essentiam rei de re est quando subiectum a parte rei est praedicatum, licet diversa sit ratio praedicati et subiecti, ut "singulare est universale", in quo exemplo patet, quod claudit contradictionem "communicabilitatem multis suppositis esse incommunicabilitatem multis suppositis". Ideo singulare non est universale formaliter vel secundum formam, quamvis essentialiter sit hoc verum, et quamvis quaelibet praedicatio, ubi praedicatum est subiectum

35

Cap. IV

Ad oppositum istius Porphyrium sic dicentem: species specialissima
 5 est illa species, quae nullo modo est genus, et genus generalissimum
 est ita genus, quod nullo modo est species. Ex quo processu plane
 patet, quod non sunt simul: immo vere strictius repugnaret, quod
 genus sit species et e contra.

Item, si sint aliqua duo et aliqua ratio inest uni, quae ab
 10 altere removetur, illa differunt. Sed aliqua ratio inest speciei,
 quae a suo genere formaliter removetur, igitur...etc.. Patet consequentia,
 cum minor et maior patent per Aristotelem sic dicentem: non est melius
 medium inveniendi differentiam inter aliqua, quam invenire unum
 ens, quod uni inest et ab altero removetur, igitur...etc.. Et per
 15 consequens, species non est genus, cum ab illo differat.

Item, de ratione singularis est, quod sit unum et non multa,
 ut de vi vocabuli patet. Sed si singulare esset universale, tunc
 ipsum esset multa. Igitur, singulare non est universale.

Ad istum dubium dicitur concedendo illud et tunc ad rationem
 Porphyrium dicitur quod ipse intelligit speciem non esse formaliter
 genus generalissimum, sed essentialiter est. Est verum, quod species
 specialissima est genus generalissimum, nam eadem essentia est unum
 et relictum. Sed in praedicatione formali est falsum speciem
 specialissimam esse genus et ad istum ~~genus~~ creditur Porphyrium
 habuisse etc..

(Capitulum Quartum)

Pro qua materia est diligenter advertendum, quod "praedicari"
 sumi potest multipliciter:

uno modo sumitur pro exercitatione ad bonum, ut fides Christi
 praedicatur in gentibus,

C.III: 7. sunt) stant. 12. minor et maior) minore et maiore./
 patent) patet.

Cap.V

65 Praedicatio formalis substantialis rei de re est quando ratio prima
 substantialis praedicati inest formaliter subiecto, vel quando
 praedicatum inest forma substantialis subiecti. Praedicatio formalis
 70 accidentalis est quando per praedicatum denominatur aliqua forma
 accidentalis, quae ad verificationem propositionis, ut sic, requiritur
 inesse subiecto formaliter et denominative. Et talis praedicatio
 formalis accidentalis subdividitur: nam alia talis est secundum
 75 habitudinem et alia secundum motum. Praedicatio formalis accidentalis
 secundum habitudinem est quando per praedicatum denominatur forma
 requisita inexistentis subiecto, ad hoc quod propositio capiat veritatem
 sic significando, quae forma, quamvis alicui insit, non tamen propter hoc
 sequitur suum subiectum primum secundum denominationem per se mobile. Et
 80 tales formae sunt, quae inexistunt universalibus et individuis
 indifferenter corporeis et incorporeis et in tali "amari" etc..
 Praedicatio formalis accidentalis secundum motum est e contra quando
 aliqua forma accidentalis denominatur praeter praedicatum, quae
 requiritur inexistere subiecto, et sic propter quam sequitur suum
 85 subiectum primum secundum denominationem esse per se mobile, ut sunt
 albedo, nigredo. Et sic ex quibus patet quod in praedicatione secundum
 essentiam, universale est singulare.

(Capitulum Quintum)

Contra praesuppositum in praemissa declaratione, viz. quod
 universale non est formaliter singulare, est forma respectu cuiuslibet
 sui singularis, igitur quaelibet praedicatio universalis de suo
 subiecto est formalis.

5 Item, haec est praedicatio formalis: "iste homo est homo";
 igitur res primarie significata per praedicatum est formaliter res

79. forma) formalis.

C.V: 1-4. vide C.3:19-25, C.4:33-35.

Cap.V

35 in communi: igitur...etc.. Antecedens sic: ista propositio est vera:
 quilibet homo singularis est, igitur, cuius subiectum supponit
 personaliter et praedicatum simpliciter, sicut in sta "quilibet homo
 est homo". Sequitur, quod est dare rem primarie significatam per
 praedicatum, quae est rationis ad omnem rem significatam per subiectum
 40 et nulla est huiusmodi res nisi singulare, commune: igitur...etc..

Item, est dare singulare in communi et omnis singularis est aliquod
 esse subiectum singulare: igitur est dare subiectum singulare in
 communi. Assumptum sic, est dare plures singulares, igitur, sicut
 respectu hominum singularium est ponere hominem illis communem, sic
 45 respectu huiusmodi singularium est dare singularem omnibus illis
 communem. Confirmatur ratio: sic aequae vere conveniunt omnes illae
 singulares in hoc, quod sunt singulares, sicut omnes homines in hoc,
 quod sunt homines. Igitur, sicut respectu hominum est dare hominem
 communem illis, in quo conveniunt, sicut respectu huiusmodi singularium
 50 est dare singularem illis communem, in quo deberent convenire. Consimile
 argumentum potest fieri de incommuniibus singularibus. Et patet modus
 arguendi specialiter ponere ipsos, sed de ipso plus in responsione.

Item est dare proprietatem communem cuilibet singulari, quae non
 est proprietas alicuius universalis. Et illius proprietatis non est
 55 dare aliquod subiectum commune formaliter, igitur singulare.

Item, ista propositio est vera "homo currit" et non verificatur
 pro aliquo in communi, cum talis praedicatio ab homini in communi
 removetur. Igitur oportet, quod verificetur principaliter pro aliquo
 singulari in communi. Et "est asinus", "amovetatur", "ridet", dicatur
 60 sic de similibus, sed de isto plus in responsione.

Item, est dare virum in communi, ⁸⁸igitur istam naturam
 absolute acceptam, prout deprivatur ab huiusmodi accidente. Et sic
 ista essentia, ut sic concepta, est per se universale, igitur est
 55. dare om. 59. in communi (principaliter) add.

significata per subiectum. Sed res primarie significata per praedicatum est homo in communi et res significata per subiectum est homo singularis. Igitur universale est formaliter singulare. Confirmatur ratio: nam
 10 iuxta istam opinionem, aliquod realiter praedicari de aliquo non est, nisi unum esse aliud: igitur aliquod formaliter praedicari de aliquo est formaliter esse aliquod.

Item sic: homo communis est formaliter homo singularis: igitur universale est formaliter singulare. Antecedens sic: homo singularis
 15 secundum quod homo communis est multi homines singulares, cum ipsum esse communem est ipsum esse multa de vi vocabuli iuxta hanc opinionem, igitur...etc..

Item, quicquid est formaliter unum et non formaliter multa, est formaliter singulare. Sed homo communis est formaliter multa: igitur...etc..
 20 Consequentia patet et maior sic confirmatur: non enim valet dicere "quicquid est unum formaliter et non plura formaliter, singulare tamen", cum e contra quicquid est plura, est universale et per consequens numerus discretus foret formaliter universale. Et hoc est num argumentum militans contra opinionem Burlaii. Et ideo est idem: quicquid est
 25 formaliter unum et nullo modo plura, est singulare formaliter, ut patet de ratione singularis. Sed homo communis est formaliter unum et nullo modo plura: igitur homo communis est formaliter singularis. Et per consequens universale est formaliter singulare, quod ab ipsum est negatum.

30 Item, vocetur essentia hominis in communi absolute concepta. Tunc ista essentia, ut sic concepta absolute, est unum individuum, formaliter igitur, ut ista sic concepta, est singularis.

Item, homo singularis est homo communis: igitur homo communis est formaliter homo singularis. Antecedens sic: est dare hominem singularem

est genus vel species specialissima. Et non nisi species specialissima,
 65 igitur est per se species specialissima et non est per se alia species
 specialissima nisi species humana. Et sic contingit arguere de femina
 in communi et per consequens vir est mulier.

(Capitulum Sextum)

Ad primum respondetur negando maiorem, viz. utrobique, ubi
 praedicatum est forma respectu subiecti, est praedicatio formalis. Nam
 ad hoc, quod sit praedicatio formalis, ut praedicatur, est requisitus,
 quod praedicatum vel idem, quod se habet per modum formae, denominat
 5 personaliter, ut sic: "iste homo currit". Sed, cum sic dicatur "singulare
 est universale", "homo communis est album", illud, quod se habet per
 modum formae, non requiritur, quod insit formaliter subiecto. Nam
 in primo exemplo, illud, quod se habet per modum formae, est communicabilitas
 vel universalitas, et illud, quod se habet per modum materiae, est
 10 homo. Et illa communicabilitas sive universalitas, sic connotata,
 non requiritur sic inesse subiecto. Et sic formaliter et conformaliter
 dicendum est de secundo exemplo.

Ad secundum dicitur concedendo, quod hic est praedicatio formalis:
 "iste homo est homo", sed ex isto non sequitur, quod res primarie
 15 significata per praedicatum sit res primarie significata per subiectum,
 ut manifeste patet. Ex quo sequitur defectus illius consequentiae.
 Sed bene sequitur, quod praedicatum vel res primarie significata
 per praedicatum inest formaliter subiecto vel rei primarie significatae
 per subiectum in suppositione personali. Et sic patet responsio ad
 20 istam objectionem cum sua confirmatione.

Ad tertium argumentum dicitur negando, quod homo communis est
 formaliter homo singularis, quod cum quod est homo, sed secundum quod

Cap.VII

est multi homines singulares, est communis. Sed negatur, quod homo,
 secundum quod est communis, est multi homines singulares, cum stat
 25 ipsum esse communem cum hoc, quod non sint multi homines singulares.
 Et ulterius, cum assumitur, quod hominem esse communem est ipsum esse
 multa, negatur illud, cum hominem esse communem est eius communicabilitas.
 Hominem esse multa est homo et multa et sic hominem esse album est
 homo et suppositum album. Non tamen hominem esse communem est eius
 30 communicabilitas, cum ipsemet sit formaliter commune et non sit album.

Ad quartum argumentum dicitur, quod consequentia non valet. Nam
 in maiori est suppositio personalis et in minori est suppositio simplex.
 Et simpliciter minor est vera, cum "esse unum" potest dici multipliciter,
 ut dicetur posterius, et consequens falsum.

35 Ad quintum argumentum dicitur negando consequentiam. Nam ista
 essentia, absolute concepta, non est universalis nec singularis, cum
 illae, ut sic conceptae, non inest aliquod accidens. Conceditur, quod
 ista essentia, sic concepta, est una transcendentitas, quae universalitas
 erit ipsa essentia, sicut universalitas Dei est ipsemet Deus.

40 Ad sextum argumentum dicitur negando, quod homo communis est
 homo singularis. Et tunc, cum ulterius infertur, quod est dare
 hominem singularem in communi, negatur illud et dicitur, quod illud,
 quod assumitur pro eius probatione, non est propositio, viz. ista:
 "quilibet homo est singularis", sicut nec ista: "quilibet iste homo
 45 est ille homo".

(Capitulum Septimum)

Pro quo notandum, quod ille terminus "homo singularis" est terminus
 discretus, est ex limitatione intellectus. Tripliciter enim dicitur
 terminus discretus. Est enim aliquis terminus discretus a demonstratione

31-34. vide C.V: 17-29, 35-39. vide C.V: 30-32. 40-45. vide C.V: 33-40.
 37. universalitas) uni.

Cap.VII

ut pronomina demonstrativa. Et aliquis est terminus discretus ab
5 impositione, ut nomen proprium, quod uni soli a proprietate imponitur.
Et tertio modo aliquis est terminus discretus ab intellectus limitatione,
ut tales termini "individuum", "singulare" et "substantia prima", et
termini aggregati ex suis partibus et nominis appellativis, ut "aliquis
homo", "quoddam animal" et sic de caeteris. Termini enim particulares
10 ad hoc adduntur nominibus, ut limitent ista nomina ad particulares, quia
aliter superflueret. Et in tertio gradu est iste terminus "homo singularis".
Et tunc dicitur ulterius, quod pronomen sine demonstratione nihil
significat praeter quod significat naturaliter: et tamen sine
demonstratione habet modum vel aptitudinem significandi discrete.
15 Et ex demonstratione habet significatum, quod discrete significat.

Item, iste terminus "homo singularis" sine limitatione intellectus
nihil significat primarie, quamvis sine limitatione intellectus nihil
significat principaliter istum hominem singularem et nunc istum
principaliter. Sed differt a pronomine, cum pronomina ex demonstratione
20 significat sine concitatione rationem essentiae eius in genere, non
dicitur significare substantiam etc.. Isti communiter termini
consignificant rem connotando proprietatem essentiae eius in genere et
ordinalitatis in genere vel in specie. Differt etiam a nomine proprio,
quia nomina fuerunt a proprietate imposita ad significandum iudicia
25 determinate et non quodcumque homo voluerit et quotienscumque per
intellectum limitare, sed haec nomina fuerunt imposita ad significandum
discrete vel in particulari, quando homo voluerit sibi ipsi in tali
genere vel specie limitare: et propter hoc ad differentiam aliorum
discretorum dicuntur termini particulares. Et sic non est dare homines
30 singulares in communi, quam istum hominem in communi. Nomina tamen
propria quandoque possunt sumi appellative, ut loquitur vulgus
communiter. Et ita errando contra naturam terminorum impositionis
concepit vulgus frequenter talia nomina "aliquis homo", "aliquod animal" etc..

35 in contrarietate et ita de aliis. Et sic secundum Corundem talibus
conceptibus modus significandi discretus sine aliquo principaliter
apprehenso vel significant convertibiliter cum talibus nominibus
"homo masculus" et "animal" significando hominem masculum in communi
et animal in communi. Et patet, quod non intelligendo tales terminos
40 in contrarietate non distribiles plus quam propria nomina. Et sic
remanerent omnes tales conclusiones imperfectae, quibus homo singularis
est homo singularis, sicut talis "quodlibet homo est homo". Et ex
hac solutione patet clare apud theologos quomodo non est dare
personalitatem in communi tribus suppositis.

Confirmatio indefiniter et per idem patet quomodo respondendum
45 est ad argumenta communiter facta in ista materia, quorum primum est
hoc. Iste terminus "homo singularis" significat hominem singularem
primarie et nec istum nec istum, cum tunc haec propositio esset
falsa "quilibet homo singularis est homo singularis". Igitur primarie
significat hominem singularem in communi. Confirmatur ratio sic: ex
50 hoc, quod omnes homines singulares conveniunt in hoc, quod sunt singulares,
igitur est dare rationem communem omni homini singulari, per quam sit
huiusmodi. Et illa ratio iuxta opinionem foret homo singularis in
communi, igitur...etc..

Item, ille terminus "homo singularis" est terminus univocus, cum
55 praedicatur univoce. Et per consequens suum significatum primum
est unum commune.

Tertio, est possibile aliquem hominem non esse cum hoc, quod
quilibet homo singularis sit: sed ista sunt contradictoria, igitur...etc..

Ad primum dicitur, quod iste terminus "homo singularis" significat
60 ex limitatione intellectus istum hominem singularem etc.. Et tunc,
cum asseritur istam propositionem esse falsum "quilibet homo singularis
est homo singularis", conceditur, quod idem est dicere cum isto "qui-
libet iste homo est homo". Et ad confirmationem, dicitur, quod sicut
non est ita, quod omnes homines conveniunt in hoc, quod quilibet istorum
34. corud. 57. non (est) esse add. 62. (est homo) est homo add.

Cap. VII

65 est homo, demonstrando seipsum. Nec est concedendum, quod omnes
homines singulares conveniunt in hoc, quod quilibet homo istorum
est homo singularis in numero, cum dispar sit ratio istius individui
et istius individui et istius, quocumque demonstrato.

70 Patet, quod aequivocum est hoc individuum ab illo, et sic tales
termini, ut communiter sunt aequivoci. Et si arguitur sic, tantum
individuum est individuum, igitur omne individuum est individuum,
dicitur, quod idem est, si arguitur, tantum hoc est hoc, igitur omne
hoc est hoc, ubi in utroque consequens est imperfectum.

75 Et per illam responsionem ad primum, et ad secundum, ad tertium
dicitur, quod hoc est possibile aliquem hominem non esse cum hoc, quod
quilibet homo singularis sit, et cum hoc, quod aliquis homo non sit.
Admittatur casus et conceditur, quod aliquis homo non est, negatur
tamen, quod nullus homo est, cuius oppositum est verum: homo masculus.
Nec contradicit ista "aliquis homo non est" isto propositioni "quilibet
80 homo est", sed huic "aliquis homo est", limitando ad eundem datum, et
contrarium istius "quilibet homo est" est homo, non quilibet homo, est,
quae aequipollet huic "homo masculus non est". Ex isto patet, quod
sicut non est verum, quod necessario "iste homo singularis est", quo-
cumque demonstrando, ita nec est dicere, quod necessario "aliquid
85 homo singularis est", nisi abutantur ad significandum convertibiliter
cum illo homine, sicut communiter utitur vulgus isto termino "aliquis
homo" ad significandum convertibiliter cum illo termino "vir" vel
"homo masculus". Sed illud non est ad propositum, cum sic contingit
quocumque termino abuti.

67. individuas. 74. responsionem) responsio, et om. 77. non) nam

(Capitulum Octavum)

Ad septimum dicitur negando maiorem, viz. quod est dare singularitatem in communi. Et tunc ad eius probatione, cum sic arguitur, "est dare plures singulares, igitur...etc.", negatur consequentia, cuius causa est haec: in nullis negationibus praeteritionibus, possibilitatibus vel privationibus semper modum privationum habentibus est dare primarie 5 singulare aliquibus commune, cum praedicatur declaratione prima ad quod aliquid sit universale, prout propositio partium, quae praesupponitur ipsum esse naturam positivam, sed singularitas est privatio, cum idem sit incommunicabilitas. Non enim est dare hominem in communi, nec 10 (singulare?) in communi nec sic de caeteris, quae se habent per modum negationis, quamvis privitatem in communi, quietam in communi, remissionem in communi et sic de caeteris non se per modum negationum habentibus, sicut veraciter ponendum est. Ad confirmationem ulterius factam, satis patet responsio ad praemissis.

15 Ad octavum argumentum dicitur, quod est dare proprietatem communem cuilibet singulari, quae non est proprietas alicuius universalis. Negatur, quod istius proprietatis non est dare aliquod subiectum commune formaliter quo ad dependentiam, quamvis non quo ad denominationem. Negandum est tamen istam proprietatem inesse subiectum, cum tunc idem 20 subiectum susciperet eius formalem denominationem, quamvis tale commune propter huiusmodi proprietatem formaliter subiectum, tamen illam formaliter subiectat, etc..

Ad nonum dicitur concedendo in casu quod ista propositio est vera: "homo currit" et dicitur, quod ista verificatur pro suo 25 primario significato, quod est cursus vel hominem currere in suppositione simplici, quod idem est. Significat enim ista propositio "homo currit" hominem currere, et taem nec hominem singularem nec hominem in communi, sed totum hoc simul in suppositione simplici hominem currere. Haec ~~C.VIII: 1-14. vide C.V:41-52. 19-22. vide C.V: 33-35. 23-⁵⁰. vide C.V:56-60. 4. possi^{bus}. 8. sintal. 10. word illegible.~~

enim praedicatio est formalis "homo currit", cum res primarie
 30 significata per praedicatum insit formaliter rei significatae per
 subjectum vel alicui supposito huius rei. Non enim inest huius
 cursus homini in communi formaliter sed alicui singulari. Ista
 propositio "homo currit" primarie significat aggregatum ex omnibus
 35 hominibus praesentibus, praeteritis et futuris currere. Secundum
 partem: generaliter omnes huiusmodi termini de plurali significant
 primarie huiusmodi aggregata. A probabili enim ponitur, quod est dare
 hominem currentem in communi, sedentem et sic de caeteris. Consequente
 omnia sunt formaliter "homo communis", contradictus quandoque ad
 unum et quandoque ad aliud. Sed "homo communis" est formaliter "homo
 40 albus", sicut "homo in communi" est formaliter "homo in communi", sed
 non formaliter homo. Et enim talis ratio movens ad ponendum
 hominem currentem in communi et huiusmodi contingit accipere multos
 homines currentes distinctos per cursus suos, autem cursibus et
 illorum cursuum particularum est dare unum cursum in communi: igitur
 45 est dare illi cursui et non aliud, nisi hominem currentem in communi.
 Igitur homo enim communis est per accidens homo currens in communi,
 et sicut homo communis est per accidens homo currens et sic tale universale
 non est formaliter generale vel corporale. Causa enim quare dicitur
 homo currens in communi et non homo singularis in communi, quia
 50 est dare cursum in communi et non singulare in communi.

Ad decimum satis patet solutio ex praedictis.

(Capitulum Nonum)

Hic specialiter obicitur persuadendo tales res communes omnium
 accidentium, tam implicantium sua subiecta per se prima esse mobilia
 quam non ~~formales~~, ^{formales} suscipere denominationes. Et arguitur primo sic.

51. vide C.V: 61-67.

47. et) est.

Sicut se habet accidens singulare ad subiectum singulare, sic se
 5 habet accidens universale ad subiectum universale, sed accidens
 singulare formaliter et immediate denominat suum subiectum
 aliquammodo esse formatum. Igitur sic denominat accidens universale
 subiectum universale. Et per consequens universalia recipiunt
 praedicationem formalem tam accidentium implicantium sua subiecta
 10 prima esse per se mobilia, quam non implicantia. Confirmatur ratio
 sic ista tripliciter. Nam aliter sequeretur, quod talia universalia
 ad nihil deservirent. Secundo sequitur, quod non essent proportionata
 subiecta accidentibus. Et tertio sequitur, quod aliqua est comparatio,
 qua nihil comparatur. Ista sunt falsa, igitur...etc..

15 Prima confirmatio sic deducitur: si talia universalia deservirent,
 tunc aliqua facerent, et sicut singulare facit singularem actionem, sic
 universale facit universalem actionem. Secunda sic deducitur: nam
 dato opposito, huiusmodi universales talium accidentium susciperent
 denominationes formales.

20 Item, aliquid universale est formaliter album, igitur...etc..
 Antecedens sic: albedo in communi prius est quam aliqua albedo singularis
 et non prius est albedo quam est aliquid esse album. Et non tunc est
 aliquid singulare esse album, cum tunc non est aliqua singularis:
 igitur...etc. est aliquid universale album. Maior probatur: si pro
 25 illo priori denominat et non si aliquid esse album, igitur pro isto
 priori est ista albedo. Homo est risibile.

Item, prius homo quam homo singularis et non prius est homo quam
 est animal rationale. Igitur, prius est homo rationale quam est aliquis
 homo singularis. Et per consequens, pro isto priori est homo communis
 30 rationalis.

Item, homo in communi est formaliter corpus. Igitur est formaliter
 corporeus. Patet consequentia, cum de quocumque praedicatur definitio,
 de eodem praedicatur definitum. Sed esse substantiam corpoream est
 definitio: igitur; si homo in communi est formaliter corpus, sequeretur

Cap.X

35 quod est formaliter substantia corporea, et per consequens corporeus.
Et quod homo communis sit formaliter corpus, patet, cum idem sit per
se superius respectu hominis in communi, et per consequens corporeum
et incorporeum, quod est contradictio.

(Capitulum Decimum)

Ad primum dicitur concedendo, quod sicut se habet accidens
singulare ad subiectum singulare, ita se habet accidens universale
ad subiectum universale, non tamen sunt modo. Nam accidens singulare
taliter se habet ad suum subiectum, quod denominat formaliter et
5 immediate, nec sic facit accidens universale. Conveniunt tamen in hoc,
quod sicut accidens singulare dependet primo et immediate a subiecto
singulari, ita accidens universale primo et immediate dependet a suo
subiecto universali.

Hic tamen est distinctio accidentium. Specialiter notandum...
10 Aliqua enim sunt accidentia, quae implicant suum subiectum primum et
immediatum esse per se mobile et talia nunquam insunt formaliter
subiectis, cuiusmodi sunt albedo, nigredo, augmentatio, alteratio,
risibilitas. Cum similibus non enim est concedendum, quod homo communis
ridet, augmentat, etc.. Generaliter tamen, species et genera huiusmodi
15 accidentium sunt prius quo ad dependentiam in aliqua substantia in
communi, quamvis non secundum formalem denominationem, ut risibilitas
isto homini in nullo est quo ad formalem denominationem, nisi in
aliquo homini singulari habente aptitudinem ad ridendum. In homini
singulari est dependenter, cum singulare quolibet tali signo singulari
20 stat istam esse. Homo enim communis non est risibilis, sed risibile
in neutero genere substantivato propter hoc, quod est aliquod singulare
risibile.

Alia enim sunt accidentia, quae non implicant suum subiectum
primum et immediatum esse per se mobile, cuiusmodi sunt relationes per
accidens in genere et respectu huiusmodi sunt causare, diligere et
25 C.X: 1ff. vide C.IX: 1-19.

huiusmodi. Et talia possunt inesse formaliter subiectis universalibus.

Ad primam partem confirmationis, dicitur, quod huiusmodi universalia ad multum deserviunt, causant omnia sua supposita, quae et faciunt. Quaecumque faciunt sua singularia extrinsece, cum causant idem efficienter.

30 Dubitatur enim a quibusdam numquid talis universalis, ut puta homo communis, sit simplex vel compositum. Pro cuius materia est notandum, quod aliqua est simplicitas excludens omnem compositionem, scilicet qualitativam sive quantitativam sive quidditativam, aut potentiam cadendi in compositione. Et illa competit soli Deo, cum
 35 Ille non istorum modorum componitur, ut componunt. Aliqua est simplicitas excludens compositionem qualitativam et quantitativam et potentiam cadendi in compositione tali, quae competit intelligentis. Illae enim componuntur ex genere et differentia, cum possint definiri et habent communem quidditatem, vel generalem vel specialem. Tertia est
 40 simplicitas excludens compositionem qualitativam et quantitativam, sed non potentiam cadendi in compositione. Et isto modo anima intellectiva est simplex et formaliter universalis, quae, licet non cadant in compositionem qualitativam nec quantitativam, tamen cadunt in compositionem quidditativam. In quarto gradu est simplicitas
 45 excludens compositionem qualitativam, sed non potentiam cadendi in compositione. Et isto modo materiae primae sunt simplicitates. Quinto modo est simplicitas excludens compositionem ex partibus quantitatis disparum specierum. Et isto modo sunt elementa simplicia. Sed in sexto gradu est simplicitas excludens compositionem ex partibus
 50 sensibilibus diversarum specierum, cuiusmodi sunt iuxta Echromoterna. Quaelibet habeant partes quantitatis diversarum specierum, omnes tamen partes sensibiles sunt eiusdem speciei specialissimae, cuiusmodi sunt cor *****.

~~27-29. vide C. IX: 15-17.~~

30. tales universales. 42. universales. 53. illegible: ob e(?) soltz (?)

Cap.X

Et etiam notandum est, quod aliquod est compositum quidditative,
 55 sicut quodlibet definibile habens rationes essentielles, ex quibus
 integratur existens quidditas. Aliud est compositum qualitative,
 cuiusmodi sunt composita ex materia et forma. Et tertio modo est
 compositum quantitative, ut talia, quae habent partes extra partes.
 Dicitur ergo, quod talis res communis est simplex tertio gradu, et
 60 tamen componitur quodammodo quidditative, cum habet partes quaedam
 essentielles. Non tamen componitur quidditative, sicut nec anima.
 Non enim est imaginandum, quod species humana, quamvis dicitur "homo
 communis", sit formaliter homo grossus, compositus ex materia et forma,
 extensus in situ, damnabilis aut salvabilis, sicut quid grosse
 65 concipientes aestimatur derisorie garulante in hac materia, cum
 eis defecerint argumenta, sed est essentia humana: "humanitas", sive
 natura humana: immateriale, indivisibile et ad omnem punctum cuiuslibet
 hominis, per quam quilibet homo convenit formaliter cum alio. Et
 ita de aliis universalibus est dicendum: est enim dare plures tales
 70 veritates singulares "istum hominem esse" et praeter tales est dare
 talem veritatem "hominem esse", fundatam in illis, quam oportet
 distinguere tanquam priorem a quacumque tali veritate: ista veritas
 esse essentia, natura, vel species humana.

Ad secundum confirmationem dicitur etiam negando illam et illud,
 75 quod ex illo deducitur sequi.

Ad tertiam confirmationem dicitur ipsamet negando, ad quam patet
 responsio ad praemissis.

(Capitulum Undecimum)

Ad secundum argumentum dicitur negando, quod aliquod universale

74-75. vide C.IX: 12-13, 17-19. 76-77. vide C.IX:13-14.

C.XI: 1. vide C.IX: 20-26.

est formaliter album. Et sic argumentum, quando sic arguitur: "albedo
 in communi prius est quam albedo singularis, igitur...etc", negatur
 consequentia propter multiplicem suppositionem minoris. Nam minor
 5 potest sumi in suppositione simplici vel in suppositione personali.
 Si sumatur in suppositione simplici, tunc est verum, cum idem sit
 dicere aliquid esse album et albedo alicuius. Et tamen nec pro
 tunc devenerat formaliter commune nec singulare. Si autem sumatur in
 suppositione personali, tunc minor est falsa, cum tunc significat,
 10 quod prius est albedo aliquid esse album, quam est singulare animal
 esse album, quod est falsum, cum albedo tunc communis non prius foret,
 quam albedo singularis.

Tunc ad aliud argumentum, quando sic arguitur, "pro illo priori,
 ista albedo est accidens, igitur pro isto priori inhaeret formae", negatur
 15 consequentia. Nam ex antecedente non plus sequitur, nisi quod pro isto
 priori idem accidens inexistit alicui, quod quilibet accidenti est
 essenziale. Accidens enim inhaerere subiecto est subiectum accidentis
 formalem suscipere denominationem. Videtur enim, quod talis albedo
 hic non est aliquid esse album, cum tunc esset causa, quare aliquid
 20 esset album. Per consequens causaret aliquid esse album. Et cum idem
 sit "aliquid esse album" et "albedo", ita sequitur, quod causaret seipsam
 et esset prior seipsa. Conforme argumentum potest fieri de quibuscumque
 aliis accidentibus, etc.. Hic communiter dicitur, quod ista albedo
 causat hoc album. Sed contrarie, si causat hoc album, igitur hoc album
 25 est causatum ab hoc. Igitur hoc causatur ab hoc. Et per consequens, accidens
 causat substantiam et sic accidens esset prior substantia.

Item sit per Philosophum, Septimo Topicorum, "quandocumque sunt
 aliqua duo et stat unum esse sine relicto, tunc illa non sunt eadem".
 Sed stat istam albedinem esse cum hoc, quod istum hominem esse album
 30 non sit, igitur istum hominem esse album non est ista albedo.

~~15. there appears to be no exact parallel text to this reply.
 the argument: C.IX:20-26 seems confused towards the end and it may
 be that the scribe has accidentally omitted the conclusion of
 one argument and the beginning of the following argumnet.~~

Cap. XI

Maiores patet ex hoc, quod istam albedinem manere isto homine corrupto.
Ergo sic secundum Aristotelem in praedictis, Capitulo de Oppositis,
caecum esse non est caecitas. Igitur conformiter, esse album non
est albedo.

35 Item videtur quod humanitas est albedo. Nam humanitatem esse est
hominem esse, et hominem esse et est hominem esse album: igitur, cum
hominem esse album est albedo, sequitur consequens. Minor patet ratio,
sicut hominem esse est commune ad istum hominem et ad illum, ita ^{istum}
hominem esse est commune ad istum hominem esse album, sedentem, patrem
40 et ad istum hominem esse in hoc consequenti. Igitur, sicut hominem
esse est istum hominem esse, sic ^{istum} hominem esse est istum
hominem esse album. Et per consequens hominem esse est hominem esse
album.

Item, istum hominem fore est istum hominem fore per hoc tempus
45 et per hoc etc.. Igitur per idem, istum hominem esse est istum esse in
hoc consequenti vel istum hominem esse album et sic de caeteris.
Patet antecedens, tamen istum hominem fore per tempus hoc est
futura illius hominis per hoc tempus et istum hominem fore esse
eius futura. Sed futura illius hominis per hoc tempus est
50 futura simpliciter. Igitur istum hominem fore per hoc tempus est
illum fore, quibus datur, viz. quod istum hominem esse in casu
desinit esse. Et sic Deum esse desinit esse et per consequens Deum
non esse incipit esse. Ex quo sequitur, quod nullus Deus immediate
post hoc erit. Et per idem sequitur, quod qui desinit esse, desinit
55 esse et sic nihil esset.

Item sequitur, quod singulare est formaliter universale, cum
illa non distinguantur penes communicabilitatem et incommunicabilitatem,
cum illum hominem sit universale pluribus communicabile quam hominem
esse.

58. sit) scit / universale) vel.

- 60 Ad istum argumentum dicitur concedendo, quod albedo est aliquod esse album et causa aliquod esse album. Et cum ulterius infertur, quod causaret seipsam, negatur consequentia. Pro quo est notandum, quod illa oratio "aliquod esse album" potest dupliciter sumi, scilicet abstractivae et concretivae. Si abstractivae, tunc "aliquod esse album"
- 65 est idem quod albedo alicuius. Si sumatur concretivae, hoc contingit dupliciter: vel quod supponit pro aggregato ex illa re et albedine ista, et sic est una maneries suppositionis simplicis. Vel quod subiectum supponit personaliter pro ista rei, cui inest albedo. Si illo modo, tunc est verum, quod illa albedo causat hominem album
- 70 et causat hominem aggregatum, ex quo est pars illius aggregati vel ordine causandi. Nec sequitur, quod causat aliquam partem illius aggregati, quamvis causat aggregatum, sicut non sequitur de linea bipunctali, cuius punctus causat totam lineam et nullam eius partem, nec sequitur de binario. Si secundo modo, tunc est falsum, quod illa
- 75 albedo causat hoc, sicut est falsum, quod illa albedo causat istam rem, cui inexistit albedo, vel causat aliam rem cum illa albedine. Secundo modo est verum, quod illa albedo causat aliam rem cum illa albedine, cum sit idem dicere ad illum modum loquendi, sicut causat hominem aggregatum, igitur...etc..
- 80 Ad secundum dicitur negando consequentiam. Pro intellectu tamen Philosophi est notandum, quod aliquod esse alicui, idem dato, contingit dupliciter. Vel secundum accidens, vel secundum substantiam. Secundum accidens, quod est primarie eadem essentia cum eodem, superaddit cum accidentale sibi, sicut in hoc: albus adest alicui, idem dato.
- 85 Secundum substantiam vel ex aequo, id est convertibili, quando est primarie eadem essentiam cum dato, non superaddendo aliquod accidens, ut iste homo et hoc animal. Et de tali identitate intelligit Philosophus.
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- 60-79. vide C. XI: 18-26. 80-87. vide C. XI: 27-31.

Ad tertium argumentum dicitur negando consequentiam. Sed bene
sequitur sic: concluderetur album esse est albedo. Nam caecum esse
90 est res caeca et album esse est res alba, sed esse caecum est
caecitas et esse album est albedo, igitur...etc..

Ad quartum argumentum meretur negando consequentiam: non est
illam humanitatem esse et istum hominem esse. Nam sic non sequitur
istum hominem esse est istum esse album et istum hominem esse est
95 istum hominem esse album, ita nec sequitur modo. Nam plura sunt
illum hominem esse et illam humanitatem esse. Est enim dare talem
veritatem: "illum hominem esse", quae est communis ad esse accidentale
illius hominis et esse substantiale illius hominis, quae veritas
est transcendens. Et illa veritas communis est essentialiter ille
100 homo et illum hominem esse, album esse, patrem esse in hoc exemplo,
quamvis non formaliter.

Et ad illa, quae dicuntur sequi, viz. quod hominem esse, desinit
esse, Deum esse, desinit esse, dicitur concedendo huiusmodi in suppo-
sitione personali. Nec sequitur ex hoc, quod Deum non esse, incipit
105 esse, cum ibi negatur esse pro omni sensu, sicut non sequitur "istum
hominem, album desinit, igitur istum hominem non esse, incipit esse".
Nam in casu, quod aliqua albedo illius hominis desineat esse, est
antecedens verum et consequens falsum et conformiter est dicendum.

Ad quintum argumentum dicitur negando, quod risibilitas communis
110 prius est quam homo singularis, cum in nullo ordine prioritatis, nec
in aliquo alio ordine, est tamen communius quam est aliquis homo
singularis, sed ille modus non debet vocari "prius" proprie. Nec
sequitur, quod sit prius, quamvis principia, a quibus procedit, sint
priora, cum homo singularis ex illis principiis quiditative componitur.
115 Ita tamen risibilitas solum ex eis procedit. Homo singularis prius

88-91. vide C.XI: 32-34. 92-101. vide C.XI: 35-43. 102-108. vide
C.XI: 51-55, the earlier part of the argument 44-51 is not answered;
it may be that here again two questions have been conjoined by the
scribe. 109.ff. This answer has no correlate in C.XI: it may be
the answer to a question following C.IX: 20-26, which itself deals
with priority. The occurrence of "homo est risibile" following that
question is otherwise inexplicable.

Cap.XII

ex talibus partibus quidditative componitur quam ex illis partibus
 talis risibilitas prosedit. Conceditur tamen, quod pro aliquo priori
 ista risibilitas communis est, pro quo non est aliquis homo singularis
 nec singularis risibilitas. Nec repugnat risibilitatem esse hominis
 120 in communi quo ad dependentiam, quamvis non formaliter.

Ad sextum dicitur concedendo, quod prius est homo quam est homo
 singularis. Et negatur minorem, quod non prius est homo quam est animal
 rationale. Nam ista definitio non datur nisi ratione singularium
 hominum. Et sic homini in communi non definitur nisi ratione suorum
 125 singularium.

Ad septimum dicitur, quod omne corporeum potest dupliciter sumi:
 vel accidentaliter vel substantialiter. Si accidentaliter, sic dicitur
 trinam divisionem. Si substantialiter, sic dicitur substantiam
 compositam ex materia et forma. Et sic consequitur, quod homo communis
 130 est uno modo incorporeus et alio modo corporeus, ex hoc quod quodlibet
 suum individuum componitur ex materia et forma. Et enim impossibile,
 quod sit corporeus substantialiter sumendo illum terminum, etc.

(Capitulum Duodecimum)

Ad secundum argumentum in dubio principali primo tactum hoc,
 scilicet omne singulare differt ab universale, et sic aliqua res
 insit uni, quod ab alio removetur, igitur singulare non est universale
 ...dicitur negando consequentiam. Pro cuius declaratione supponitur
 5 primo, quod quaelibet propositio ratione huius verbi differt ab
 exponenti. Primo debet exponi secundum exigentiam terminorum, ut sic,
 dicendo "singulare differt ab universale". Verbum debet resolvi sic:
 isto modo vel ista ratione, singulare differt ab universali, quae

128. tam. 121-125. the reply to problem Cap.IX: 27-30. 126-132.

the reply to position on C.IX: 31-38.

C.XII: 1ff. vide C.IV: 11-15. 5. ab om.

10 pesterius sic exponitur: primo per duas affirmativas affirmantes extreme
 esse et per istam propositionem negativam negantem unum extremum
 dici de reliquo, sub ratione respectu cuius fuit resolutio, saltem
 nisi sit differentia negativa. Patet ille modus exponendi per
 Aristotelem sic dicentem: "non est melius medium inveniendi differentiam
 inter aliqua quam invenire aliquod, quod uni inest et ab alio removetur".
 15 Et sciendum est propter ista posita: nihil differt a seipso, quamvis
 a multis ignorantibus idem conceditur et a multis argumentis eius
 veritas suadetur.

Prima ratio est haec: assignatur homo, tunc arguitur sic: ille
 differt a seipso ex hoc, quod iste homo sub ratione, qua est albus,
 20 cel aliter accidentius est, et sub tali ratione non est homo. Igitur
 sub tali ratione differt ab homine.

Secunda ratio est ista: homo differt a seipso existente in tempore,
 et homo existens in tempore est idem, quod homo, igitur...etc..
 Antecedens: prout isto modo homo est prius sub aliqua ratione quam
 25 est existens in tempore.

Ad ista tamen et omnia similia respondetur tripliciter. Primo
 apud quosdam dicitur, quod semper in negativa exponente debet deter-
 minatum dari, quando ipsum procedit subiectum, quod non sint in
 proposito, quare negatur argumentum et consimilia, sed illa expositio
 30 quibusdam non placet, eo quod eodem modo debent termini capi in exposi-
 tionibus. sicut in proposito. Ideo dicuntur aliqua expositores, quod
 si terminus obliquus regatur ex vi causae in viam exponentem, sicut
 in exposito est consequentia bona et antecedens falsum. Sed quia ista
 via est minus diffusa ratio, dicitur breviter, quod talis propositio
 35 debet probari isto modo: illa ratio inest dicti, quae non inest eidem,
 igitur...etc.. Et antecedens tunc est falsum, ut patet, etc..

(Capitulum Tertium Decimum)

Ad tertium argumentum tactum in dubio principali, scilicet: si singulare esset universale, tunc ipsum esset multa etc., negatur consequentia.

- 40 Pro quo notandum est, quod ultra communem modum sumendi, numerum potest tripliciter sumi. Uno modo sumitur numerus pro qualiumcumque rerum singularium sive universalium multitudine. Et sic homo in communi et asinus sunt multa. Alio modo sumitur numerus pro qualiumcumque rerum singularium multitudine, ut id, homo et punctus sunt multa.
- 45 Tertio strictissime sumitur numerus pro qualiumcumque singularium rerum multitudine per se in genere substantiae, modo quo duo homines et duo asini dicuntur multa.

Et est ulterius notandum, quod tripliciter possunt aliqua ponere se in numero. Uno modo omnia talia ponunt se in numero, ex
50 quibus resultat proprie numerus ad modum loquendi priorem. Secundo modo ponunt se talia in numero, quando de termino significante illa est plures numeri vere et affirmative praedicabilis in recto, ut "isti sunt homines". Tertio modo, quando ex termino significante aliqua est terminus pluris numeri adiunctus termino numerali, sic
55 praedicabilis et affirmative, ut ista sunt duo, vel duo homines, duo animalia, duae substantiae vel duae res. Est suppositio personalis illa, quod sit tantum dicere "haec sunt duae substantiae singulares", quando superrespondetur.

Est notandum, quod numquam est praedicatio concedenda termini
60 substantialis pluralis in recto de termino significante aliqua, nisi significatum primum praedicati sit unum commune utrisque, in quo conveniunt: ut supposito quod Socrates sit homo. Tunc non est concedendum, quod Socrates et homo in communi sunt homines, quia ille terminus "homines" non est superior ad subiectum, sed est

65 concedendum, quod sunt animalia, substantiae corporae, sed non duo animalia nec tria, nec finita nec infinita nec aliqua animalia.

Contra istam probationem arguitur sic. Ponendo quod isti sunt homines et quod sunt duo homines, nam hic sunt duae substantiae, quarum quaeque est homo: igitur hic sunt duo homines.

70 Item sic: homo communis est homo formaliter homo quam iste homo et non est formaliter iste idem homo; igitur sint duo homines distincti.

Item, nego essentiam communem, tunc ista essentia sub se concepta est homo communis, igitur sic concepta est homo singularis et per consequens hic sunt duo homines.

75 Ad primum enim argumentum dicitur idem negando, cum ille terminus "quilibet" limitet ad substantiam singularem. Nam imperfecta quaelibet istarum substantiarum est homo, demonstrando Socratem sedentem. Nec sequitur utrumque istorum est, igitur illa duo sunt, sicut non sequitur hoc est unum et hoc est unum, igitur
80 illa sunt duo, quamvis addatur terminus discretus ad hoc.

Ad secundum dicitur negando, quod homo communis est formaliter homo quam homo singularis, quia homo in communi non est formaliter homo, sicut patet ex dictis.

85 Ad tertium dicitur concedendo, quod ista essentia sic concepta est homo, sed ut sic concepta nec est homo singularis nec communis. Nam ut sic concepta non inest sibi aliquis accidens, igitur...etc..

(Capitulum Quartum Decimum)

Sed circa istam materiam de universalibus non modicum circumstat dubium an sit dare ens commune Deo et omnibus causatis, et quod sic arguitur. Formalis ratio, concludens quod animal est commune homini et asino, est, quia uterque istorum est animal, sed causa Deus quam quodcumque causatum est ens, igitur conformiter foret ens illis.

5 71. idem) eidem.

Confirmatur ratio, nam Deus et iste homo conveniunt in hoc, quod differunt a tertio homine, igitur cum differentia fundetur in entitate, ita a fortiori convenirent in hoc communi ente, ex quo sequitur ens fore commune illis.

10 Item, si non est dare ens huiusmodi in communi Deo et sic omnibus causatis, sequitur, quod nulla propositio de pluri de nihil esset concedenda, sicut talis illa sunt. Et per consequens non esset de illis demonstratio assignanda. Antecedens: si illa est vera, ista sunt. Tunc ista conveniunt recipiendo consimilem praedicationem et
15 non nisi in entitate, igitur...etc..

Item, differentia, qua Deus differt ab illo homine, est subiective in Deo et terminative in illo homine. Igitur, cum sit in utroque, sequitur, quod in hoc conveniunt.

Ad oppositum illius dubii arguitur sic. Nam dato illo, sequuntur
20 tria. Primum est, quod duplex sunt praedicatione, quod est expresse impossibile. Secundum est, quod aliquod est dignius et nobilius Deo. Tertium est, quod Deus incipit esse. Ista sunt impossibilia, igitur
...etc..

Primum sic deducitur. Omne in communi formaliter intellectum
25 causat omnia causata, sed hoc solum competit primae causae, igitur
...etc.. Minor sic: ens in communi causat quicquid causat eius individuum, sed aliquod individuum causat omnia causata, ut patet, igitur...etc..

Item sic, ens in communi formaliter intellectum est causa
30 vel causatum, sed ipsummet formaliter intellectum non est causatum, quia tunc Deus esset causatum. Igitur ens commune formaliter intellectum est prima causa.

Item, omne prius et posterius causato est prima causa, sed ens in communi est huiusmodi, cum omne universale est prius in suo

16. subiectum.

Cap. XIV

35 ordine et posterius in alio ordine, igitur etc..

Secundo sic probatur. Omne universale est prius quocumque suo supposito et si est prius, igitur, cum ens in communi est maxime universale, sequitur ipsum esse quocumque supposito dignius, igitur ...etc..

40 Item sic: omnem perfectionem, quam habet Deus, habet ens in communi, et aliqua ultima igitur est perfectius eo vel ad minus aequè perfectum.

Item, nullum prius intendit universalialia, quam singularialia. Igitur, cum ens in communi sit maxime universale, sequitur quod
45 ipsummet est prius intentum a natura et natura semper intendit nobilius et dignius. Igitur idem ens in communi est communissimum et dignissimum, igitur...etc..

Tertium sequens sic deducitur. Ens in communi prius omni individuali incipit esse, et ad inceptionem cuiuslibet universalis
50 sequitur omnium singularium inceptio eiusdem. Igitur, cum Deus sit aliquod eius singularare, sequitur quod ipsum incipit esse.

Item ens in communi fit post eternitatem, igitur incipit esse. Antecedens sic: si ipsum fuit in eternitate, igitur, cum ipsum formaliter differt a prima causa, sequitur, quod in eternitate
55 fuerunt duae essentiae et hoc absolute. Consequens falsum, cum solum fuit in eternitate una essentia, viz. Deus.

Item sic: in eternitate non sunt plures essentiae, sed una essentia solum, sed Deus est in eternitate. Igitur ens formaliter intellectum non est in eternitate, et per consequens incipit esse.

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Ad istum dubium dicitur concedendo illud et ad primum dictum sequi negatur idem, viz, quod sunt duae primae causae. Conceditur tamen, quod ens in communi est prima causa, non tamen formaliter, sed essentialiter. Nec sequitur: "idem, quod causat omnia causata, est formaliter prima causa, sed ens in communi causat omnia causata,

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igitur ens in communi est formaliter prima causa", cum maior est particularis. Nec valet consequentia: "omne causans omnia causata formaliter est prima causa, sed ens in communi est huiusmodi, igitur est prima causa", propter variationem suppositionis. Non enim est minor istius consequentiae neganda, propter hoc quod ens in communi causat omnia causata, igitur est formaliter prima causa.

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Nam Deus causat omnia effective, aequivoce et independenter, sed ens in communi non sic facit, sed ratione alterius et intrinsece. Et ideo, quia alio modo causat ens tale omnia causata quam Deo, ideo Deus non est ens commune formaliter.

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Ad secundum argumentum dicitur negando, quod ens in communi formaliter intellectum est causa vel causatum. Nam sic intellectum, nec est causatum, nec incausatum: immo ipsum formaliter et independenter conceptum non est ens. Conceditur tamen, quod ipsum intellectum vel conceptum est ens commune, licet non sit hoc nude.

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Ad tertium argumentum dicitur negando consequentiam, saltem intelligendo consequens formaliter, quia est mutatio et variatio in suppositione. Et conceditur viz., quod ens in communi est prius et posterius quocumque eius causato vel supposito. Est enim prius, quia communius posterius, quia causatur ab illo. Ad secundum dictum sequi, quod aliquod est dignius et nobilius Deo, negatur. Tunc ad aliud argumentum: "omne universale est prius quocumque eius supposito" et tunc conceditur, quod ens commune est prius Deo: non sic prius,

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60-74. vide 24-28. 75-79. 29-32 vide. 80-84. vide 33-35.
84.ff vide 21. 85.ff vide 36-39.

quia dignius vel nobilius, sed quia communius. Unde quia animal commune sit prius homine, quia communius, non tamen cum est dignius perfectius.

90 Et enim aliquod prius incipit, vel quia communius et universalius et superius, vel quia dignius et posterius est, quia causa vero multis aliis modis.

Ad secundum argumentum negatur, quod aliquis est dignius vel perfectius Deo. Et tunc ad argumentum "omnem perfectionem, quod habet
95 Deus etc.", negatur, quod habet aliqua ultima. Conceditur tamen, quod idem habet omnem perfectionem, quod habet prima causa, licet alio modo, cum ens commune solum contentive habet omnem perfectionem, quod habet prima causa, et Deus habet formaliter et (multiplice?). Conceditur tamen consequens illius consequentiae, viz. quod ens commune
100 est perfectius vel aequè perfectum cum Deo praedicatione secundum essentiam.

Ad tertium argumentum dicitur concedendo, quod natura prius intendit universalia quam singularia causata. Natura enim non intendit Deum, sed singularia causata. Et de talibus intenditur,
105 quando dicitur, quod natura prius intendit universalia quam singularia. Et sic conceditur, quod ens commune est dignius aliquo singulari causato.

Ad quartum dictum sequi, viz. quod Deus incipit esse, negatur idem pro impossibili. Et tunc ad argumentum: "ens in communi incipit
110 esse etc.", negatur minor et conceditur, quod sit in eternitate. Non tamen sequitur ex isto, quod istae essentiae fuerunt in eternitate, quia Deus et ens commune non fuerunt duae essentiae, ut patet ex praedictis, sed solum una. Ad aliud argumentum conceditur, quod in eternitate non sunt plures essentiae, sed solum una essentia, et tantum ens in
115 communi est in eternitate. AMEN.

93-94. vide 21. 94-101. vide 40-42. 102-107. vide 43-48. 108-109. vide 22, 48-51. 109-113. vide 48-51, 52-56. 113-115. vide 57-59. 98. mnce. 103. intendit) intenditur.