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Roles, trust and skills: a typology of patronage appointments

Article (Accepted version)
(Refereed)

Party Professionals, Programmatic Technocrats, Apparatchiks and Agents:

A typology of modalities of patronage in comparative perspective.

Abstract

This article contributes to the study of the politics of patronage appointments by creating a typology of patronage roles based on the nature of trust between patrons and appointees and on the skills patrons seek in appointees. Our classification brings together the dispersed literature on patronage roles and can be applied to the study of modalities of patronage across and within countries. We offer preliminary evidence from our study of the politics of patronage appointments in Latin America suggesting that variations in patronage roles can be related to variations in party systems institutionalisation and to the nature of the links between political actors and voters. Finally, we explore whether the categories identified in our empirical study can be found in other settings. We conclude that our typology can contribute to the study of the impact of modalities of patronage on the quality of the public administration and on political governability.

Keywords: patronage appointments, modalities, roles, trust, skills.

I. Introduction.

In virtually every country, office holders use their power of patronage to make political appointments to public administration. There are of course, significant variation in

the number of people appointed through patronage -ranging from a few hundred to thousands- and in whether these appointments are made legally or by ignoring or bending civil service rules (Piattoni, 2001). Moreover, variation in patronage are not just a matter of numbers or about how far down in the administrative structure patronage extends. Key to the comparative study of the politics of patronage appointments is understanding the motivations of patrons when they make appointments, the roles appointees play, the skills required to play these roles and what accounts for different modalities of patronage.

In addressing these issues, the literature on patronage uses a mélange of different categories and schemes (or none at all, as patronage is often treated as synonymous with clientelism). This article contributes to the study of the politics of patronage appointments by presenting a new typology of patronage roles. We argue that by creating a typology of roles based on the nature of trust between patrons and appointees and on the skills patrons seek in appointees, our classification: i) brings together the dispersed literature on patronage appointments in developed and developing countries; ii) presents a coherent classification of the roles played by appointees, which can be applied to the systematic study of patronage appointments across and within countries and regions; iii) facilitates better understanding of the relations between appointees, political office-holders and political parties; and iv) constitutes the building block for understanding differences in patronage roles that define modalities of patronage.

It is beyond the scope of this paper to advance a general theory of modalities of patronage. Differences in patronage roles can be attributed to diverse factors reflecting, *inter alia*, priorities of elected office holders, the nature of public administration and characteristics of party systems. To facilitate understanding differences in modalities of patronage, we offer preliminary evidence from our study of the politics of patronage appointments in Latin

America. This research supports the argument that among the drivers of the variation of patronage roles variations party systems institutionalisation as well as the nature of the links between parties and voters can be related to variations in patronage roles

The reminder of this article is structured as follows. First, we define patronage appointments and review how the comparative literature has approached the study of patrons' motivations and the classification of patronage roles. Second, we present, define and justify our typology. Third, we apply our typology to the empirical study of patronage roles in a number of Latin American countries, and explore the variation through our hypothesized drivers. Finally, we explore whether the categories identified in our empirical study can be found in other settings, and whether our typology can facilitate comparisons of patronage roles across world regions for which somewhat different conceptions have been used.

II. Unpacking patronage appointments.

We define patronage appointments as the power of political actors to appoint individuals by discretion to non-elective positions in the public sector, irrespectively of the legality of the decision (Kopecký, Mair and Spirova, 2012). The definition does not make assumptions about the motivations for the appointments, the roles played by appointees, their professional capabilities and the impact of patronage appointments on the quality of public administration.

Our definition covers different modalities of patronage, usually described as clientelism in less-developed and transitional political systems and discussed as the politicization of the public administration in Western European and North American systems (Peters, 2013). While there is a tendency in the literature to use interchangeably the terms

politicization, patronage and clientelism, the three concepts are analytically different. Politicization is a rather broad concept, and includes a range of mechanisms through which political actors attempt to influence public administration (Peters, 2013). It can refer to the selection of appointees for positions in government on political grounds–patronage per se--, but also to other, subtler, ways in which political actors attempt to shape the behaviour of public servants (Bach, Hammerschmid, and Löffler, 2018). Clientelism has been defined as "the direct exchange of a citizen's vote in return for direct payments or continuing access to employment, goods and services" (Kitschelt and Wilkinson 2007, 2). Given that our focus is on the public sector employment dimension of clientelistic exchanges, we define clientelistic appointments as the exchange of public sector *jobs* for electoral support (Roniger, 1994). Given that according to our concept of patronage appointments, patrons make appointments for a range of motives and appointees perform a variety of roles, clientelism is taken here as just one among a number of different modalities of patronage and brokerage as one among the many roles performed by appointees.

Scholars have identified a broad set of motivations other than clientelism for making political appointments. Kopecký, Mair and Spirova (2012) produced an important study of party patronage and party government in European democracies that was subsequently expanded to cover 22 countries from five regions (Kopecký, et al., 2016). These studies consider two motivations of patrons : *Control* over the formulation and implementation of public policies, and *reward* of supporters for political services. They also classify the criteria for selecting personnel on professional, political and personal grounds (Kopecký et al 2016, 417). They found that the control of policy making and implementation is the most common motivation for making political appointments, particularly in the low patronage scope cases of Western Europe. By contrast, in countries with a large scope of patronage, appointments serve both as a control and reward function.

However, these studies fall short of providing a comprehensive analytical tool for comparative studies of patronage appointments. Arguably, their classification of modalities of patronage is too narrow to provide enough information about what the appointees actually *do* when given a position in the public sector. For instance, when appointments are made in order to control the policymaking process, how do appointees perform the task: by giving technical advice to their patrons in the executive, by controlling the public sector bureaucracy or by using their political knowhow to negotiate policy initiatives through the labyrinth of power (Campbell and Peters 1988, 84)? The three roles are significantly different and require different skills. When appointments are made to reward militants, what role are these militants expected to perform: to engage in political activism on behalf of their patrons, to mediate between the ruling party and Congress, or to oversee a bureaucracy often regarded as hostile to the ruling party? Again, different roles require different skills.

The classification of selection criteria in terms of professional, political and personal grounds is also problematic. Professional criteria refer to the skills required from appointees to perform their roles, whereas political and personal criteria describe the relation of trust between appointer and appointee that is of the essence of patronage relations. Thus, an appointee can be selected on technical or political grounds, combined with either political or personal trust.

These lacunae take us back to the importance of unpacking patronage roles by considering the roles played by appointees and the skills required to perform them. Studies of the politicization of public administrations in developed democracies have identified a wide variety of roles played by political appointees and the skills required to perform them. For instance, Connaugthton (2015) distinguishes four roles played by ministerial advisers in the policy making process in Ireland, according to their influence and impact in the policymaking process: expert, partisan, coordinator and minder. Ed Page and his collaborators (LSE GV314

Group and Page 2012) classify the roles of special advisers in the UK's public administration as "commissars" and "fixers". And in a large N study of the Norwegian government, Askim, Karlsen and Kollvieit (2016) found three distinct roles among political appointees: "'stand in", "media adviser" and "political coordinator". Meanwhile, the US literature on public administration tends to focus of the competences sought in the appointees and on the overlap between political and administrative skills at the top of the public administration hierarchy. For instance, Lewis (2011) mentions among the competences loyalty, technical knowledge and campaign support. Campbell and Peters (1988) show that even political systems that emphasise the separation between politics and administration, governments are populated by *amphibious* functionaries playing multiple roles, requiring different combinations of political and technical skills.

Variations in the number of political appointees notwithstanding, studies of patronage appointments in mature Western democracies tend to concentrate on the roles played by a narrow category of political advisers at the top of public administration. In contrast, in the more politicised public administrations of developing nations, clientelism has been traditionally regarded as the main modality of patronage, and in many countries remains an important mechanism for gathering electoral support. However, scholars have been examining motivations beyond electoral gains and at roles other than political brokerage in the study of public administrations in emerging democracies. For example, studies have focused on political office-holders' need for technical advice as the motivation for the appointments of trusted technocrats in administrations with low technical capacity or highly politicised civil services (Teodoro and Pitcher, 2017), particularly in processes of radical policy reform (Dominguez, 2010; Silva, 2009). Others studies have looked at political appointments at the upper levels of the public administration as instruments for coalition management (Bersch, Praça, & Taylor 2017; Garcia Lopez, 2015). Still others have looked at

appointees' roles as political operators responsible for securing political support for policy initiatives, or as agents of their principals for controlling the public bureaucracy and state resources in patterns not entirely dissimilar to those of Western democracies (Scherlis, 2012).

In short, patronage appointments are a common feature of the public administrations of developing and developed democracies alike. Comparisons between countries and regions have centered on differences in scope, often under the assumption of the prevalence of clientelism in developing countries compared to developed nations, where patrons' motivations and the roles of appointees exhibit more nuanced characteristics. In light of the evidence, this assumption is difficult to sustain. By examining the nature of trust between patrons and appointees and the skills required to perform different roles, it becomes possible to elaborate assumptions and test hypothesis about the relation between patronage roles, political office-holders and political parties, and about the impact of different patronage roles on the workings of government, the political system and public administration.

III. A typology of patronage roles

1. Trust and skills.

Our typology captures a variety of roles that cuts across modalities of patronage both in high and low patronage administrations. We utilize two organising dimensions: the nature of trust (partisan or non-partisan), and the type of skills (professional or political) required from the appointees. When combined, the two dimensions permit classifying *patronage* roles across different modalities of patronage.

Trust is the essence of patronage. It cuts across other selection criteria and combines with them in different measures. Politicians will normally and naturally tend to appoint trustworthy persons and given the asymmetrical power relation between patron and appointee, appointments usually terminate when there is a breakdown of trust. The significance of trust in patronage appointments is highlighted in a study of special advisers in the British government that states that as political commissars "advisers serve as the eyes, ears and mouth of the politicians who appoints them" (LSE GV314 Group and Page, 2012, 5). And, in some Latin American countries, political appointments are officially denominated "positions of special trust".[1]

Relations of trust can be based on *partisan* or on other forms of trust outside partisanship, which are here labelled "non-partisan". In the latter we include personal trust between patrons and appointees, appointments made in order to co-opt potential enemies (oppositions parties, bureaucrats, etc.), or because the appointee represents some powerful corporate interests that the patron seeks to bring on board.

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[1] *"Cargos de particular confianza"*.

The predominance of one type of trust over the other gives information about who has appointment power and, indirectly, about the nature of the political system. While legal power of appointment almost always resides in an executive office-holder, in practice the appointer may just be rubberstamping the appointment of a person trusted by the ruling party or by some other significant stakeholder, such as a business association or a trade union that have the real power of appointment. The predominance of partisan trust can be taken as an indicator of a strong party government or governmental coalition. Conversely, the predominance of personal trust may indicate a more personalistic political system, in which executive office holders enjoy significant autonomous power relative to parties.

While different types of trust give indications about the nature of the political system, different skill sets indicate the different roles appointees perform within the administrative machinery and the political system. Some appointees are chosen for their professional expertise within a policy field. While a neutral, professionally qualified civil service is considered important for good governance, democratically elected politicians have a legitimate right to seek advice from politically sympathetic experts. They also can demand that public administration implement government policies in an efficient and timely way.

In other cases, appointees are chosen for their capacity to operate politically, which does not mean that they lack technical expertise but that the skills sought by the patron are predominantly political. Political skills are typically required for brokerage between politicians and voters in clientelistic patronage arrangements, but they are also required for other roles, even in low patronage political systems. For instance, political skills are essential for media advisers, or to monitor the tenured bureaucracy, or to liaise between executive officeholders and the legislature.

We thus produce a typology of modalities of patronage practices combining the two dimensions (nature of trust and skillset), defining four main categories of patronage roles: ***party professionals***, ***programmatic technocrats, political appartchiks*** and ***agents,*** plus a number of sub-categories.

Table 1 about here

2. *Describing patronage roles*

Upper Left Quadrant: *Party Professionals*

Party professionals are appointees combining partisan trust and techno-professional competences. These appointees tend to be found in the upper and medium levels of the public administration. Their main role is policy design and implementation. Campbell and Peters (1988, p. 24) describe party professionals as proactive participants in the policy process that combine a technical grasp of at least one policy sector with a consciously held partisan trust. As they put it, "[these] officials explicitly identify with the fortunes of a specific political party."

Lower Left Quadrant: *Programmatic Technocrats*

Programmatic technocrats combine technical competence with non-partisan trust. We borrow the term from Silva (2009) to describe independent experts who influence their

political bosses through personal trust and specialized knowledge of a policy field. These appointees can, and in many cases do, sympathize with their patrons' political ideas, but their allegiance is to the office holder and not the ruling party. In some cases, they follow their patrons throughout their political careers in different positions in public administration. In others, despite being appointed by discretion, they become quasi-permanent members of the high public administration, rotating among different positions of responsibility. In this capacity, they work for governments of different political affiliations, especially in more technocratic types of governments or when the career civil service lacks professional expertise.

Upper Right Quadrant: *Apparatchiks*

Moving now to the dimension of political skills, in the quadrant that combines it with partisan trust we find the category of *apparatchiks*. With variations, this category appears in both emerging and consolidated democracies. The appointment of party loyalists to public sector jobs is a long-standing feature of Latin America's politicized public administrations (Philip, 2003), in which it is often difficult to separate the ruling party, the government and the public administration. In European party systems, parties have come to compensate for loss of mass membership by becoming increasingly embedded in the state apparatus, drawing on state resources to maintain and reward their political cadres (Katz and Mair, 2009).

Apparatchiks' roles in public administration derive from their political capital as trusted by the party. Within this category there are several subtypes. In their study of European patronage, Kopecký et al. (2012) found that the main role of political appointees was to control the public administration on behalf of the government. We call this subcategory "*commissars*".

We call *party operators* apparatchiks that use their political skills to articulate support

for government policy within the party system, particularly within the ruling party or government coalition. *They* are mainly found at the upper and medium levels of public administration. They understand the politics of the day, acting as intermediaries within the policymaking process by liaising with members of parliament, interest groups and other stakeholders. *Party operators* are particularly relevant when the government lacks a parliamentary majority, and in presidential systems in which the president has low or moderate powers and is forced to negotiate with Congress, as happens in the US system (Halligan, 2003).

Also within the category of *apparatchiks*, but at lower levels of the bureaucracy, we find *electoral brokers* whose role is to mediate the particularistic provision of public goods between governments and voters, typical of clientelism (Stokes et al., 2013). It is likely that this patronage role is more common in service delivery areas and at provincial and municipal levels. Finally, *political activists* at the lower levels of public administration perform no distinct role in public administration; their main role is to campaign for the ruling party or to act as claques for the party in political rallies. This subcategory has been identified in Paraguay by Schuster (2015) and in Argentina by Oliveros (2016).

Lower Right Quadrant: *Political Agents*

In our fourth quadrant, combining non-partisan trust and political skills we identify *political agents.* The personal nature of trust gives agents little autonomy from their bosses, as they are not protected by party membership. At the higher levels of public administration, the typical sub-role is the so-called "*minders*". The category fits the profile of a coterie of assistants that act as gatekeepers to their political bosses and become their "eyes, ears and

mouth" (LSE GV314 Group and Page 2012, 5). In Mexico, this category of appointees has been traditionally called "cliques" (*camarillas)* (Langston, 1997), a term that gives a good idea of the nature of the relationship with their patrons. At the intermediate level we identify the category *fixers.* Similar to *party operators, fixers* liaise their patrons with the political system to mobilize support for his/her policy initiatives but, again, their loyalty is to their patron (normally executive office-holders) rather than to the ruling party. Finally, at the lowest levels of public administration we identify the subcategory of *electoral agents*. They perform the same role as brokers but serve individual politicians as mobilisers and activists in electoral campaigns (Mares & Young 2016).

In summary, the roles described above are not mutually exclusive. But despite the subtle differences among them, they are also real and have implications for both the comparative study of public administration and the study of the relations of patronage appointments and political systems. For each category of patronage roles the question of the scope of appointments and variations within different areas of the public administration remain beyond the scope of this paper. In the following section we apply our typology to varieties of patronage appointments in Latin America.

IV Varieties of patronage appointments in Latin America.

IV.1 Theoretical assumptions

The various structural and agency factors influencing patronage appointments make it difficult to advance a general theory of modalities of patronage without further extensive empirical research. A parsimonious way of understanding these modalities is to relate our

typology to some key variables that have the potential to account for significant variation in patronage roles. We assume that parties are key actors in the politics of patronage appointments and, hence, that the characteristics of parties and party systems (especially party system institutionalisation and the nature of their relations with voters) are important explanatory variables in accounting for differences in patronage roles.

Institutionalization is the process by which organisations and procedures acquire value and stability (Huntington, 1968, 12); it is not a dichotomous but a continuous variable. Party system institutionalization has been defined as a system in which a set of parties interact regularly in stable ways (Mainwaring, 2018, 19). In an institutionalized party system there is considerable stability in who the main parties are and in how they behave (Mainwaring, 1998, 68), even if some parties rise and others decline and the system adapts to new entrants (Mainwaring and Torcal 2006, 205). Processes of institutionalization are neither teleological nor linear: parties and party systems institutionalize, de-institutionalize and re-institutionalize in no pre-determined sequence (Carreras, 2012).

Two characteristics of institutionalized party system are important for shaping patronage roles. The first is the relations between parties and executive office-holders. In countries with strongly institutionalized party systems, executive office holders act mainly as agents for their parties (Elgie, 2005, 117). Acting as principals, parties and party factions influence strongly the politics of patronage by privileging *partisan* over personal *trust*. This locates patronage appointments in institutionalized party systems predominantly in the upper quadrants of our typology and those in less institutionalized systems in the lower ones.

The second characteristic is party organization. In more institutionalized party systems, party organizations are not subordinated to the political career of a leader; they have their own independent status and continuity (Huntington, 1968, 12-24). While institutionalized parties

can, and often do, colonize the state, party organization exists autonomously from the state apparatus, precedes the party's access to government, and survives its demise. However, parties with a strong organizational base may use patronage appointments to reward their cadres and control the public bureaucracy (Kopecký et al., 2012). This typically requires the appointment of a significant number of cadres performing roles located in the top right quadrant of our typology.

Party system institutionalization has also been associated with high levels of programmatic commitments. Programmatic or ideological linkages are important means by which voters become attached to parties and, hence, by which parties build a stable electoral base that promotes party continuity. However, non-programmatic attachments, such as clientelism, can produce the same institutional stability, as exemplified by several traditional parties in Latin America, such as the *Partido Revolucionario Institucional* (PRI) in Mexico and the *Partido Colorado* in Paraguay. Conversely, when party systems collapse policy can change abruptly. Challenger parties and populist political outsiders can have strong ideological beliefs and programmatic preferences, as exemplified by some of the left-wing populist parties in Latin America that disrupted party systems in the first decade of this century (Phillip and Panizza 2011). Hence, whether links with the electorate are programmatic or of a different nature depends on the nature of the political actors (both parties and political leaders) rather than on the party system as a whole.

It is conceivable than in a given political system some parties' link with voters are predominantly programmatic while other prioritize non-programmatic, office- seeking mechanisms (Strøm and Müller1999). What characterizes the latter is the goal of maximizing their control over political office benefits, that is, private goods bestowed on recipients of politically discretionally governmental appointments (1999, 5). Following from this classification, when parties are predominantly programmatic, we expect patronage roles to

concentrate mostly on the left quadrants of our typology and, when they are mainly office-seeking, on the right- side ones. However, programmatic –oriented actors may also need operators and fixers to articulate support for government policies. Whether these roles will be located predominantly in the upper or lower quadrants will, in turn, depend on the institutionalization of the relevant actors. In the case of institutionalized parties with programmatic links with the electorate, we expect to find more party professionals and political operators and more programmatic technocrats and fixers for non-institutionalized programmatic actors . When links are of a non-programmatic nature, we expect to find brokers and activists in institutionalized party systems and electoral agents in weakly institutionalized ones.

Table 2 below summaries how our theoretical assumptions relate to patronage roles. Our classification aims to identify the more frequent patronage roles that could be expected to be found in each cell, and not to account for all possible patronage roles and every possible explanatory variable.

Table 2 about here

IV Varieties of patronage appointments in Latin America.

The stylised presentation of findings in this section draws on our current research on modalities of patronage in the central public administrations of seven Latin American countries. We focus on ministries because patronage in the core of government has not received much attention, insofar as most research has been done at the subnational level, with special interest in brokerage and clientelistic practices.

The project aims at establishing who has the real power of appointment, the motivations for the appointment and the skills patrons seek from appointees. In terms of methodology, it adopted the expert survey originally employed by Meyer-Sahling and Venn (2012) and Kopecký et al. (2016) for the comparative study of patronage in 22 countries from five world regions. Experts were chosen for their direct knowledge of specific areas of the central public administration. They answered a semi-structured questionnaire in which they were asked to provide quantitative estimates and qualitative accounts of patronage for the countries of their expertise. A copy of the questionnaire is attached as an annex to this paper. Information from the experts was checked against official documents and other primary and secondary sources. In determining levels of party system institutionalization (PSI), we used Mainwaring (2018) PSI score. For establishing the programmatic or otherwise nature of political parties, we followed Kitschelt et al. (2010).

In this article we use preliminary results for Argentina, Chile, Ecuador, Peru and Uruguay, and only employ secondary sources for Brazil as results for this country are still not available.

IV.2. Country findings

Chile, Uruguay and Brazil have the highest PSI scores and Peru the lowest one, with Ecuador and Argentina in intermediate positions (Mainwaring, 2018). In the three countries with higher PSI scores, the ruling parties' structure and organization preceded their access to office and was autonomous from the state. In Uruguay, the Frente Amplio (FA) was established in 1972; in Brazil, the Workers Party was created in 1980; and, in Chile, the Concertación de Partidos Por la Democracia (*Concertación*), an alliance of long-established left and left-center parties, was formed in 1988. Our findings on Chile cover the presidencies of the center-left administrations of Michelle Bachelet (2006-2010 and 2014-18) and the center-right government of Sebastián Piñera (2010-14). Findings on Uruguay correspond to the center-left administrations of Tabaré Vázquez (2005-2010) and José Mujica (2010-2015).

Results from the survey show a predominance of *party professionals* in both countries (Moya Díaz and Garrido Estrada, 2018; and Authors 1 and 3, 2018). The survey also found that the governments appointed numerous *party operatives* and, to a lesser extent, *commissars*. There were, however, some differences between the two countries. Parties in Chile have shallower social roots (Luna and Altman, 2011) than in Uruguay, and the party system as whole has become less institutionalized over the past decade or so (Corporación

Latinobarómetro, 2017). In Chile, presidents also have stronger institutional powers than in Uruguay. The combination of factors resulted in a relatively larger number of political appointments that   combined technical skills with personal trust (policy professionals), particularly at upper levels of public administration (Moya Díaz and Garrido Estrada, 2018).

While we still lack full survey results from Brazil, a similar pattern was detected by Lopez and Praça (2015) for Brazil's Federal Public Administration under the Workers' Party governments (2003-2015). The authors found that while patrons required various skills from their appointees, the standard requirement was a combination of political and technical skills with priority assigned to technical skills (Lopez and Praça, 2015, 112)). Appointees were normally connected to the ruling party or coalition parties (party professionals and commissars), although not necessarily to the party of the minister in charge. Suggestions of names for appointments were often made by members of parliament from the governmental coalition (ibid.).

On the opposite side of the PSI continuum, we have weakly institutionalized, personalistic parties. These parties are often established prior to the elections and do not survive after their leaders' leaving office. Further, there is a strong relation between personalistic and weakly institutionalised parties. Peru is the least institutionalized party system of our group of countries (Mainwaring, 2018). According to the experts surveyed in our project, patronage appointments are common in Peru's central public administration. But in contrast to the appointment of party professionals in the more institutionalized party systems of Chile and Uruguay and the administrations of the Workers' party in Brazil, appointments were mainly aimed at recruiting programmatic technocrats(Muñoz and Baraybar, 2018).   Appointees shared a commitment to the neoliberal economic model in force since the 1990s, of which they regarded themselves guardians, above the politicians that appointed them. During the 2000s, technocrats and high-level bureaucrats managed to consolidate their

power vis-à-vis politicians and their almost inexistent political parties (Dargent, 2014). Moreover, they displaced more and more professional politicians from power at the ministerial level, resembling what Grindle (2012) describes but could not fully find in her work: a politicized, weakly institutionalized , programmatic patronage system.

As noted above, party and party system institutionalization is a continuum. Ecuador and Argentina were intermediate cases on this continuum (Mainwaring, 2018). The study of Ecuador covers the three presidencies of Rafael Correa (2007-17). The case of Argentina covers the presidencies of Néstor Kirchner and Cristina Fernández de Kirchner (2003-2015). In both countries, a period of high political instability and crisis of the party system was followed by the emergence of new political forces (Alianza Pais in Ecuador and The Frente Por la Victoria (FPV) in Argentina) that dominated the periods under consideration.

In Ecuador, the decade between 1996 and 2007 was characterized by a highly unstable political system, with three democratically elected presidents unable to finish their constitutional mandates. Since the first electoral victory of Rafael Correa in 2006, the country entered a period of political stability: Correa won two successive re-elections and his chosen presidential candidate, Lenin Moreno, won a fourth in 2017. During this time the ruling party, Alianza Pais, evolved from an ad-hoc personal vessel of Correa's presidential ambitions into the dominant political force in the country. Correa's administrations were characterized as *techno-populist* (De la Torre, 2013). The term describes the government of a strong populist leader who was himself a European and American trained economist. His governments appointed a large number of mostly young professionals at high and intermediate levels of public administration for the design and implementation of an ambitious project of post-neoliberal modernization of the country's state and society. Initially, while appointees shared the president's vision for the country, most were not organically linked to the ruling party, fitting the profile of *programmatic technocrats* and

political agents. However, as Correa won successive elections and Alianza País consolidated its power, the profile of the appointees shifted accordingly, with more partisan rather than personal trust, characteristic of *party professionals and commissars* (Sandoval, 2018).

The case of Argentina deserves special consideration. The ruling FPV, formally a branch of the Peronist party Partido Justicialista but in practice largely autonomous from it, was established in 2003 during a deep political crisis following the collapse of the Argentinean economy. While in office, Kirchner stabilised the economy through a post-neoliberal development model that significantly departed from the neoliberal orthodoxy of the 1990s (Wylde, 2018). The FPV's candidate, Kirchner's wife, Cristina Fernández de Kirchner, won the next two presidential contests in 2007 and 2011 (Nestor Kirchner died in 2010). Together, Nestor and Cristina Kirchner, ruled Argentina for 12 years, a record of continuity for the country under democracy.

During their rule, the FPV remained a highly personalistic political machine at the political service of the presidents. Patronage mainly took the form of a network of appointments directly controlled by the president and his/her closest allies in key agencies, and by ministers in their own domains. Technical skills were valued to implement the government heterodox economic program but it was combined with personal rather than partisan trust, fitting the characterization of programmatic technocrats. The distinction between the personal, the political and the partisan was, however, not always clear. Particularly during the administration of Fernández de Kirchner, appointments shifted from being based on loose networks of personal trust and politico-ideological sympathies to more strictly partisan criteria. The shift was driven by the president's attempt to consolidate her own political grouping (*La Cámpora*) from within the state.   In terms of our classification, changes in appointment pattern were similar to that of Ecuador, in which technically skilled appointees migrated from the lower left quadrant (*programmatic technocrats*) to the upper

left one (*party professionals*) without perhaps fully fitting either category (Authors 1 and 3, forthcoming).

The presence of *commissars* and *political agents* at middle levels in public administration aimed to control and command a bureaucracy that was not trusted by government. In the lower tier of the public administration, the experts surveyed noted that the appointment of *brokers* to mediate between the government and recipients of public goods and services was the principal motivation for appointments (Authors 1 and 3, forthcoming). Other studies showed that the wider category of *political activists* was also relevant at this level (Zarazaga, 2014).

Finally, a significant finding, common to all countries covered by our research, is that the experts did not identify in any central public administration a significant number of appointees that performed electoral-related roles (*activists , brokers and electoral agents*) , in any central public administration in question. Partial exceptions to this finding were Argentina and Ecuador (Authors 1 and 3 2018, Sandoval 2018). The lack of mass clientelism in the central public administrations contrasts sharply with the strongly clientelistic administrations of Paraguay and the Dominican Republic, in which activists and brokers make part of a significant proportion of all public sector workers (Kopecký et al 2016; Schuster 2015).

In Table 3 we show a stylized presentation of the dominant patronage roles for each country.

Table 3 about here

Patronage in other political systems

A fundamental question for any conceptual scheme is whether it can travel. The greater the level of intension of a concept, and the greater the extent to which it is based on the experiences of one country or one region, the less likely it is to useful in understanding similar phenomena in other settings (Sartori, 1970). Given that the conception of patronage and the categories defined through our typology are based heavily on Latin American experiences, can these same categories be identified in other settings, and are they useful for understanding public administration in those settings? Further, can these concepts facilitate comparison of patronage across regions of the world?

Perhaps not surprisingly, we do believe that these categories do "work" in other settings, albeit with some caveats. Indeed, other scholars working in Asia, Africa Europe, and North America have identified patronage styles that are not dissimilar to those identified in Latin America. And, like patronage in Latin America, the motivations for using political appointments include the need to recruit skilled advisers and managers for government, as well as the desire to build political party and personal political followings. There is far from sufficient space to provide a complete description of all the other patterns of patronage, but we can provide some examples of each of the four major types identified in our typology.

1) *Party Professionals* can be found in most countries, including those with generally low levels of patronage. They have been the majority of presidential appointments in the United States (Lewis, 2008), as well as the "SPADs" in the United Kingdom and their equivalents in Commonwealth countries (Eichbaum and Shaw, 2011).   This list could be extended to include almost all countries, as most ministers want and demand committed policy advisors, and may not want to depend on the permanent bureaucracy (Eymeri-Douzans, et al., 2014).

2) *Programmatic Technocrats*.   These appointments occur less frequently in the advanced economies with professional and competent civil services, but certainly do occur outside Latin America. For example, many African countries utilize technocrats because of the relatively low levels of talent within their own civil services (Teodoro and Pitcher, 2016). And the more advanced countries recruit experts into government during times of crisis, or for major policy changes.

3) *Apparatchiks.* Political leaders in many settings want to control the actions of their governments, and often believe that the permanent bureaucracy will not serve them well. This pattern of behavior has been found to be especially strong in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe (Kopecký et al., 2012). In Central Asian republics, these appointments may be made more on the basis of clan ties rather than political party ties, but they still involve attempts of political groupings to control the rest of government (Murtazashvili, 2016).

4) *Political Agents.* Finally, political agents are loyal to an individual politician rather than a political party and attempt to exert some control over the remainder of government on behalf

of that politician. Again, many governments in both more advanced and less advanced systems will have these "courtiers" (Savoie, 2008) for the leaders. They perform a variety of tasks ranging from the mundane to the extremely important for ministers (see Connaughton, 2010), but the primary task is advancing the career of the political leader being served.

We could offer more extensive examples for each of the above categories. The fundamental point, however, is that these concepts and this typology do have empirical referents outside Latin America. Thus, this typology does have the capacity to travel and to be useful for comparing patterns of patronage in many political systems, unlike most that have been developed to match particular circumstances. Further, the categories developed here help to classify and clarify the broad category of patronage in government and demonstrate the various ways in which political appointments can be used by parties and individual leaders.

Analysis, conclusions and further research.

By focussing on the nature of trust between patrons and political appointees and on the skills patrons seek in appointees, our typology bridges the gap between politics and public administration in the study of patronage appointments. The nature of trust (partisan or not partisan)- is aimed at understanding the type of political patrons that have the real power of appointment (parties, individual politicians and other actors) and the political systems (more or less institutionalised) in which they interact. The nature of skills (technical or political) that patrons privilege in appointees, completes the picture by focussing on the other dimension of the relation; on what appointees actually *do* when appointed: advice, control, operate politically, campaign, etc. It also helps to perceive the different ways in which appointees are active in different arenas: public administration, the political system and the

wider social environment. The combination of the two allows for an elegant description of different modalities of patronage.

By looking at party system institutionalisation as a dynamic variable and at the programmatic or clientelistic links between parties and citizens, we were able to account for why certain political roles were more prevalent in certain Latin American political systems than in others, as well as how patronage roles can change through time with changes in institutionalisation and programmatic commitment. Results from our survey and secondary sources support the assumption that, in highly institutionalized party systems, patrons tend to appoint in the upper quadrants of our typology; and, in less institutionalized ones, in the lower ones. But these are relative rather than absolute variations and an important caveat is necessary. Our findings highlight the importance of considering the dynamic, non-teleological and uneven nature of the institutionalization and de-institutionalization continuum in the changing nature of patronage roles. Our survey shows that changes in PSI were reflected in changes in patronage roles in Argentina, Chile and Ecuador. In the case of Brazil, PSI scores are likely to be lower after the impeachment of president Rousseff in 2015 but we lack information about the scope of change and its impact on patronage roles.

Our findings also support the importance of differentiating party system institutionalization from the programmatic nature of political parties. In Chile and Uruguay, party system institutionalization went hand in hand with the programmatic parties. But in Ecuador under Correa, and in Argentina under the Kirchners, radical left populist parties in weakly institutionalized party systems had strong programmatic commitments combined with clientelism. Conversely, Paraguay has a higher PSI score than both Ecuador and Argentina (Mainwaring, 2018) but a more clientelistic patronage system (Schuster, 2015). Meanwhile, Peru is an interesting case combining very low PSI scores with considerable programmatic continuity, enforced by programmatic technocrats that seem to have more policy making

authority than their patrons.

As any model, typologies are a simplification of reality. There are many other variables that contribute to explaining variations in patronage roles. Among these are agency factors, such as whether governments aspire to a radical political break with the politics and policies of previous administrations or, alternatively, if they seek to implement a more gradualist, consensus-seeking, process of change. Results from the survey showed that the hyper-politicized, rupturist Kirchners administrations in Argentina (Panizza, 2016) made political control of the bureaucracy a government priority, hence the appointment of a large number of commissars (Authors 1 and 3, 2018). In contrast, in Uruguay, the Frente Amplio largely maintained the traditional patterns of bargaining and negotiations which characterize the policy making process in the country (Lanzaro, 2014), thus the relatively larger number of political operators (Authors 1 and 3, 2018).

We conclude by returning to the relation between patronage and the politicization of public administrations. The study of patronage is often permeated by normative assumptions about how the colonization of the state by political appointees undermines both the capacity of the public administration and the quality of democracy. The problem with these assumptions is that there is surprisingly little comparative empirical research about modalities of patronage, and about the impact of different modalities on the quality of the public administration and on political governability.

Good governance has been associated with a professional and autonomous bureaucracy; but despite variations in the utilization of political appointments, there is some sense in using more committed political appointees to control the administrative system and public policies. These goals require both political and technical skills. *Commissars* can facilitate policy changes by controlling and commanding unresponsive or incompetent public bureaucracies. *Political operators* can contribute to drive policies through by negotiating political support.

Even *brokers* find justification in recent literature, as substitutes for deficiencies in representative government. Seemingly, despite marked differences in levels of expertise available through the permanent bureaucracy, there is a generalised need for policy advice and direction of the ministries, coming from individuals committed to the party program or the political office holder. Arguably, the predominance of *party professionals* favours responsiveness but raises questions about their relations with the permanent civil service in terms of building state capacity and ensuring neutral service delivery, while the abundance of *programmatic technocrats* raises questions about whether they are truly accountable to their principals and ultimately to the voters. A more systematic exploration of these issues, and its implications for good governance and democratic governability, should be part of a future research agenda.

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| | Type of skill | |
	Professional	Political
Partisan	Party professionals	Apparatchiks: ▪ Party operators ▪ Commissars ▪ Brokers ▪ Activists
Non-partisan	Programmatic technocrats	Political agents: ▪ Minders ▪ Fixers ▪ Electoral agents

Nature of trust is the row heading on the left.

Table 1. Typology of patronage practices

Party system institutionalization

	High	Low
Programmatic	**Party professionals** *(Operators)*	**Programmatic technocrats** *(Fixers)*
Non-programmatic (Office seeking)	**Apparatchiks** (Brokers and activists)	**Political agents** (electoral agents)

Links with the electorate

Table 2. Mapping patronage roles

Type of skill

	Profes.	Political	Profes.	Political	Profes.	Political
Partisan			Party professionals: EC. (2017) AR. (2011)	Apparatchiks. Commissars: EC. (2017) Brokers: AR. (2011)	Party professionals: UR. CH. BR.	Apparatchiks. Commissars, Party operators: UR. CH. BR.
Non-partisan	Programmatic technocrats: PE. EC. (2007) AR. (2003)	Political agents: EC. (2007)				
	Low		**Intermediate**		**High**	

Party institutionalization

Table 3. Typological classification of empirical findings