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WHAT DO WE DO NOW?: EXAMINING CIVILIAN MASCULINITY/IES IN CONTEMPORARY LIBERAL CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS

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Abstract

In contemporary Western, liberal democratic societies, the soldier is frequently regarded as “the best of us”, taking on the unlimited liability for the protection and betterment of the whole. In the context of volunteer militaries and distant conflicts, the construction of men (and the universalized masculine citizen) as “always-already” soldiers (or potential soldiers) poses a substantial obstacle to the identification or performance of “good” civilian masculinity – particularly during wartime. The theorization and articulation of a positive, substantive civilian masculinity, or masculinities, rather than one defined simply by an absence of military service and implication in the collective use of violence, is a central challenge of contemporary politics. As a means of illuminating the complex dynamics of this challenge, this article examines contemporary charitable practices of civilian support for the military, and corresponding constructions of masculinity, in the UK during the “war on terror”. In doing so, the article demonstrates the ways in which gendered “civilian anxiety”, through its connection to citizenship, comes to condition the political possibilities and subjectivities of all those who seek belonging in the liberal political community. The article concludes by arguing for the essentiality of a research programme oriented around “civilianness”, and civilian masculinity/ies.

Keywords: civilian; masculinity; civil-military relations; liberalism; citizenship; United Kingdom; military; charity; anxiety

Introduction

Civilians – as civilians – do not play a prominent role in international relations theorising or analysis. Indeed, civilians appear more often in IR as dead bodies – civilian casualties – than as socially-embedded, politically relevant subjects.² There are exceptions to this generalisation: analyses of the laws of war and human rights reference civilians as objects of regulation;³ the military sociological literature valorises civilians as agents of restraint in the democratic control

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² See PRIO, ‘Armed Conflict Data Set’, available at <https://www.prio.org/Data/Armed-Conflict/>, accessed 15 February 2017.

³ See Jennifer M. Welsh, *Humanitarian Intervention and International Relations* (Oxford University Press, 2004)

of armed force;⁴ and liberal democratic peace theory at least partially envisages civilians (though more as *citizens*) as a potential brake on arbitrary wars.⁵ Feminist and gender analyses have highlighted the ways in which the categories of “civilian” and “soldier”, and the purportedly binary distinction between them, reproduce, and are reproduced, by gendered hierarchies of masculinity/femininity, protector/protected, and agency/passivity.⁶ Associated studies examine the empirical effect and political consequences of this powerful gendered discursive formation for the laws of war⁷ and the differential experiences of civilians in personal and professional contact with the military institution.⁸ While crucially important, much of this work has centred on examining the ways in which the gendered Beautiful Soul/Just Warrior binary serves⁹ to shore up the heroic masculinity of the figurative soldier and the corresponding legitimacy of the (nation)state. As a result, this scholarship tends to reify the enduring empirical association of soldier and masculinity and femininity and civilian.

As such, this inattention to politically-relevant civilians may be at least partially attributed to the power of the common Western construction of men (and the masculine/ised citizen) as “always-already” soldiers (or potential soldiers).¹⁰ The ideal-typical “soldier” is frequently figuratively – though far from universally, empirically – linked to the valorised characteristics of Western masculinity, such as autonomy, bravery, self-sacrifice, rationality, and strength.¹¹ As observed by Basham, though there are important differences across national and cultural contexts, military service and sacrifice are closely connected to understandings of masculinity and normative citizenship.¹² The notion of heroic, masculine military service, however, exists in tension with the contemporary state of a good deal of Western - particularly liberal democratic - civil-military relations.

Of the 88 states qualified as “free” in the 2018 Freedom House report¹³ (an imperfect approximation of liberal democracy, to be sure),¹⁴ 66 lack conscription.¹⁵ The end of the Cold War saw a sharp drop in conscription, particularly within Europe, to the extent that national service remains in only ten European states.¹⁶ We see a trend where, in an era of professional militaries and geographically-distant conflicts, the vast majority of liberal democratic citizens only indirectly

⁴ See Peter D. Feaver, ‘The Civil-Military Problematique: Huntington, Janowitz, and the Question of Civilian Control’, *Armed Forces & Society*, 23.2 (1996), pp. 149-178.

⁵ See John M. Owen, ‘How Liberalism Produces Democratic Peace’, *International Security*, 19.2 (1994), pp. 87-125.

⁶ Jean Bethke Elshtain, *Women and War* (University of Chicago Press, 1987); Cynthia Enloe, *Maneuvers: The International Politics of Militarizing Women's Lives* (University of California Press, 2000).

⁷ See Charli Carpenter, *Innocent Women and Children: Gender, Norms and the Protection of Civilians* (Routledge, 2016); Helen Kinsella, *The Image before the Weapon: A Critical History of the Distinction between Combatant and Civilian*. (Cornell University Press, 2011).

⁸ Cynthia Enloe, *Bananas, Beaches and Bases: Making Feminist Sense of International Politics* (University of California Press, 2014).

⁹ Elshtain, 1987.

¹⁰ Deborah Cowen, *Military Workfare: The Soldier and Social Citizenship in Canada* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2008), p. 17.

¹¹ Frank Barrett, ‘The Organizational Construction of Hegemonic Masculinity: The Case of the US Navy’, *Gender, Work & Organization*, 3:3 (1996), pp. 129-42.

¹² Victoria Basham, *War, Identity and the Liberal State* (Abingdon: Routledge, 2013), p. 40.

¹³ Freedom House, ‘Table of Countries 2018’, available at {<https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world-2018-table-country-scores>} accessed 5 June 2018.

¹⁴ Joe Foweraker and Roman Krznaric, 2000. ‘Measuring Liberal Democratic Performance: An Empirical and Conceptual Critique’, *Political Studies*, 48:4 (2000), pp.759-787.

¹⁵ CIA World Factbook, ‘Military Service Age and Obligation’, available at {<https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/fields/2024.html>} accessed 5 June 2018.

¹⁶ Austria, Cyprus, Denmark, Estonia, Lithuania, Finland, Greece, Norway, Sweden, and Switzerland. Panu Poutvaara and Andreas Wagener, ‘Ending Military Conscription’, CESifo DICE Report 2011, available at {<https://www.cesifo-group.de/DocDL/dicereport211-rr1.pdf>} accessed 5 June 2011.

interact with the military.¹⁷ By sheer numbers, the “civilian” experience of wartime is far more common than that of “soldier”. The situation is, of course, not limited to liberal democratic and/or Western societies; in wars with conscription there have generally been more people outside the armed forces than in.¹⁸ But as this model of limited, distant, professionalised, and predominantly Western war proliferates, the possibilities of and for ‘civilianness’ as a meaningful political subjectivity within liberal democracies seems radically under-examined.

So, should we care? Or rather, how does this matter? The focus on soldiers is, in many ways, entirely logical, considering the normative and political stakes of organised violence. It is also, however, a reflection of the overarching, gendered tendency in international relations to regard the activities and subjectivities conventionally associated with men and/or masculinity as the legitimate (and “obvious”) objects of academic IR inquiry, while relegating purportedly “domestic”, feminised activities and persons to the margins.¹⁹ This article, in contrast, argues that civilians, as socially-embedded and politically relevant subjects, are key to understanding both longstanding assumptions of IR theory and, more importantly, contemporary liberal civil-military relations. It interrogates, informed by Kinsella, the ways in which the “reliance [on] negative definition” of civilian as simply not-a-soldier “prohibits consideration of the significance of the concept of civilian itself”.²⁰

To open this discussion, I examine an illustrative case study – the gendered dynamics of charitable support for the military in the UK – to think through two key lacunae: a) the under-theorisation of “civilian” in its own right; and b) a corresponding inattention to the empirical possibility/ies and performance(s) of explicitly civilian masculinity/ies. Though attentive to the contingent and fluid nature of both gendered/ing norms and the liberal civil-military divide, I foreground the under-examined notion of “civilian masculinity/ies” as a means of teasing out the complexities of enduring Western liberal constructions of violent political agency, and the challenges of identifying and theorising an alternative. In doing so, I draw upon liberal political thought and popular culture to generate a heuristic, conceptual account of military service, citizenship, and gender that exposes broader challenges in untangling normative masculinity and collective violence.

The logic of inquiry is similar to that of studies examining female combatants and their gendered performances within the armed forces. Due to the patriarchal disconnect between feminine/ised bodies and the conduct of violence, analyses of female soldiers are understood to reveal broader dynamics of gender (and sexuality, race, class, etc.), power, and violence within the institution that might otherwise be invisible.²¹ Here, I flip this critical impulse to leverage the seemingly parallel structural and ideological tension²² between masculinity and civilianness to consider the political relationship between civilians and war as a similarly exigent normalised silence. This analytical emphasis on masculine/ised civilian subjects creates space to examine potential

¹⁷ Many of the analytical insights may indeed travel beyond the West – but as the questions and account offered here rely on Western-generated understandings of gender, and the gendered nature of liberal politics, the argument should be bounded appropriately.

¹⁸ See Peter D. Feaver and Christopher Gelpi, *Choosing Your Battles: American Civil-Military Relations and the Use of Force* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2011).

¹⁹ Enloe, 2014.

²⁰ Kinsella, 2011, p. 6.

²¹ Annika Kronsell, ‘Gendered Practices in Institutions of Hegemonic Masculinity: Reflections from Feminist Standpoint Theory’, *International Feminist Journal of Politics*, 7:2 (2005), pp.280-298.

²² This refers to broadly circulating cultural understandings of violence and gendered citizenship – akin to the idealised, figurative citizen-soldier - and is not necessarily reflected empirically in a given individual’s lived experience or self-understanding.

counter-performances of patriarchal, frequently militaristic, masculine/soldier feminine/civilian binaries while simultaneously attending to the ways in which these constructions continue to powerfully inform and constrain the possibilities of, and for, meaningful civilianness.

“Civilian masculinity”, then, refers to the performance of masculinity/ies that are substantively civilian, rather than structurally assigned as such by existing notions about the civil-military divide. It is less a question of the many, many masculinities in a given place and time that are not articulated in military terms²³ than one of the possibilities and ambiguities of masculinities that engage with civilianness *per se* as socially intelligible and politically legitimate. The masculinities performed by football supporters,²⁴ for instance, are structurally civilian in so far as (typically) those involved are not members of the armed forces or the immediate surrounding community. For the purposes of this study, however, they would not be considered substantively civilian masculinities, as they are not (again, typically) made politically and socially meaningful vis-a-vis collective violence and/or normative public personhood.

The open question as to the possibility of this form of masculinity/ies, conceptually and empirically detached from violence and domination, is a central concern of contemporary politics. In addition to the transformation in civil-military relations described above, the plausibility of positive and substantive masculinity/ies underlies discussions of toxic masculinity,²⁵ rape culture,²⁶ and the “appropriate” gender performance and temperament of world leaders.²⁷ In a more “immediately” IR context, similar concerns regarding “good” public masculinity may be observed in the rise of international “gender experts”, and the proliferation of international organisation-sponsored gender “training” and “mainstreaming”.²⁸ The article thus speaks to contemporary scholarship within critical masculinity studies examining “new”, “positive” political masculinities that strive to move away from violence.²⁹ Attending to the political possibilities of civilian masculinities animates these debates within, and highlights their essentiality to, international relations.

The aim of the article, then, is not to provide a straightforward and too-simple “diagnosis”, reconstruction, or universally-applicable reading of civilian masculinity/ies. Instead, the case is used to open and explore a series of theoretical and political questions about the analytical, ideological, and normative relationship(s) between masculinity, violence, and political agency within contemporary, predominantly Western, liberal democratic societies.³⁰ I begin with an analysis of the ambiguous political possibilities of (and for) civilian masculinity through an empirical case study of charitable civilian support for the UK military during the “global war on terror” (2001-2010). I then use this case to construct a conceptual, heuristic account of the intellectual and popular context within which contemporary liberal civilian masculinity/ies

²³ Michael S. Kimmel and Jeff Hearn, *Handbook of Studies on Men and Masculinities* (London: Sage, 2005); Robert William Connell and Raewyn Connell, *Masculinities* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2005).

²⁴ Anthony King, ‘The Lads: Masculinity and the New Consumption of Football’, *Sociology*, 31:2 (1997), pp. 329-346.

²⁵ Kathleen E. Miller, ‘Sport-related identities and the “toxic jock”’, *Journal of Sport Behaviour*, 32.1 (2009), p. 69.

²⁶ Emilie Buchwald, Pamela R. Fletcher, and Martha Roth, eds. *Transforming a Rape Culture*. Minneapolis, MN: Milkweed Editions, 2005.

²⁷ Jacqueline Rose, ‘Donald Trump’s Victory is a Disaster for Modern Masculinity’, *The Guardian*, 15 November 2016, available at {<https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2016/nov/15/trump-disaster-modern-masculinity-sexual-nostalgian-oppressive-men-women>} accessed 15 February 2017.

²⁸ Jacqui True, ‘Mainstreaming Gender in Global Public Policy’, *International Feminist Journal of Politics*, 5.3 (2003), pp. 368-396.

²⁹ Henri Myrntinen, ‘Stabilizing or Challenging Patriarchy?: Sketches of Selected “New” Political Masculinities’, *Men and Masculinities*, (2018), DOI: 10.1177/1097184X18769137.

³⁰ Anne Sisson-Runyan and V. Spike Peterson, *Global Gender Issues in the New Millennium* (Boulder, Co: Westview Press, 2013), pp. 47 and 161.

operate. First, I outline the gendered nature of normative citizenship, as productive of, and produced within, the liberal distinction between public and private. I then demonstrate that this normative (masculinised) citizenship is premised not only upon the conduct of politics in the public sphere, but an underlying, foundational expectation of military service: the liberal military contract. Together, these two analytical moves illuminate the broad ideological and empirical conditions of possibility for – and potential elision of – civilian masculinity/ies within the liberal political imaginary. Subsequently, I develop the concept of “gendered civilian anxiety” to capture the disconnect between gendered myths of heroism, military service, and citizenship and the contemporary reliance on a volunteer military. The article concludes by arguing for the essentiality of a research programme oriented around “civilianness”, and civilian masculinity/ies.

Seeing civilian masculinity/ies

Methodologically, examining potential performances of civilian masculinity/ies poses an interesting challenge. Civilianness, particularly in societies without conscription, is in one sense, everything/where, as it pertains to nearly everyone. At the same time, civilianness is also nothing, in so far as it has little content/meaning absent a negative contrast with soldiering. Civilianness does not fade into the background of politics and war; it is the background. Similarly, as with soldiering (or gender or any other social category), civilianness is presumably not a static identity or status, but rather a subjectivity produced iteratively in context (albeit one that is challenging to empirically observe due to its sheer banality). Contemporary critical military and militarism scholarship have established the contingency and blurring of the civil-military divide, particularly within liberalism,³¹ understanding the two as intertwined and coproductive.³² “Civilianness”, and civilian masculinities, as a result, cannot be assigned or assumed *a priori*. Consequently, though there are surely a proliferation of potential civilian masculinities both globally and within a given society, “seeing” them requires looking for contexts in which these subjectivities have the potential to become politically activated and made relevant to the conduct of collective violence.

As a practical first cut on a potentially enormous research programme, this article examines charitable practices of support for the UK armed forces to raise questions and identify points of tension surrounding the political intelligibility of civilian masculinity/ies. Several factors recommend UK charitable support for the military as an initial point of departure. In Anglo-American societies, the soldier “warrior” is often posited as the apogee of citizenship and figurative embodiment of heroic masculinity.³³ Though this is not a universal model of soldiering citizenship, the material and cultural power of Anglosphere militaries both globally and within recent coalition warfare, as observed by Enloe,³⁴ have led to a transnational diffusion of this “warrior” model across contexts, including Norway and India.³⁵ In smaller, less conventionally bellicose states, such as Denmark and Sweden, citizenship and military participation, though with more emphasis on service than war-fighting, have also come to be articulated in terms of

³¹ Bryan Mabee, ‘From ‘Liberal War’ to ‘Liberal Militarism’: United States Security Policy as the Promotion of Military Modernity’, *Critical Military Studies*, 2:3 (2016), pp. 242-261.

³² Alison Howell, ‘Forget “Militarization”: Race, Disability and the “Martial Politics” of the Police and of the University’, *International Feminist Journal of Politics*, 20:2 (2018), pp. 117-136.

³³ Nine Rones and Kari Fasting, ‘Theorizing Military Masculinities and National Identities: The Norwegian Experience’ in *The Palgrave International Handbook of Gender and the Military*, Duncanson, C. and R. Woodward, eds. (London: Palgrave MacMillan, 2017), p. 146.

³⁴ Enloe, 2000; Clare Duncanson, *Forces for Good? Military Masculinities in Iraq and Afghanistan* (Hampshire: Palgrave MacMillan, 2013).

³⁵ Rones and Fasting, 2017; Swati Parashar, ‘Discursive (In)securities and Postcolonial Anxiety: Enabling Excessive Militarism in India’, *Security Dialogue*, 49:1-2, (2018), pp. 123-35.

gendered (masculine) heroism.³⁶ Even Germany, long regarded as an anti-militarist exception to the valorisation of soldiers, has begun, post-conscription, to reference militarised notions of masculinity in its recruitment campaigns; recruits are framed as strong, tough, “reluctant” warriors.³⁷ The examination of the UK thus hinges the exploration of civilian masculinity/ies around a particularly influential understanding of the masculinity-citizen-soldier nexus within liberal democracies. In doing so, it sidesteps the US-centrism (and exceptionalism) of a good deal of contemporary scholarship on Western civil-military relations.

Similarly, charitable support for the armed forces, as one of the most conventionally-recognisable “civilian” practices in wartime, offers a logical site for assessing the political activation and production of civilianness as a positive, substantive subjectivity. As the supportive discourses and activities associated with charitable care align, superficially, with notions of feminised maternal ethics and stereotypical women’s “homefront” activities,³⁸ and thus the conventional gendered structure of civil-military relations, they constitute a hard test for civilian masculinity/ies. As a result, examining the gendered/ing construction of charitable activities supporting the military enables me to empirically differentiate between masculine/feminine constructions. This avoids reifying conventional understandings of the gendering of the civil-military binary, as well as the binary itself, while remaining alive to its power and social force. This “hard test”, combined with the prominence of the heroic Anglosphere citizen-soldier, makes the UK a strong starting point for thinking through the possibilities, stakes, and meaning of civilianness and masculinity in contemporary liberal democracies.

Concretely, the interpretive interrogation of the case is based on a discourse analysis of publicly-produced texts by five anti-war and five pro-military NGO public textual productions from 2001-2010.³⁹ These texts were sourced from physical archives, individual activists, depository libraries, and the organisations themselves, as well as the Wayback Machine, an online website archive. Specific texts were selected for analysis on the basis of references, directly or indirectly, to the normative relationship between the armed forces and society, initially by keyword search (e.g. “support the troops”, “help for heroes”, etc.) and then by theme. The organizations were selected typologically to balance the inclusion of the most prominent organizations (and thus dominant representations) with capturing variation in the overall discourse (and thus a spectrum of perspectives). The inclusion of anti-war NGOs, such as the Stop the War Coalition, alongside more conventional military charities, such as the Royal British Legion, captures potential dissent, contestation, and variation in the gendered dynamics of charitable support for the armed forces.

These texts are contextualised in broader social discourse via an analysis of the public statements of UK state officials (civilian and military) and the mainstream print media from the same time period. These texts, which include news articles, speeches, press releases, official statements, and legislative records, were, again, identified on the basis of keyword search for “support the troops”

³⁶ See Mads Daugbjerg and Birgitte Refslund Sørensen, ‘Becoming a Warring Nation: The Danish “Military Moment” and its Repercussions’, *Critical Military Studies*, 3:1 (2017), pp. 1-6; Annika Kronsell and Erika Svedberg, ‘The Swedish Military Manpower Policies and their Gender Implications’, *The Changing Face of European Conscription* (2006), pp.137-161.

³⁷ David Shim and Frank Stengel, ‘Die Rekruten: Exploring military recruitment of the German Armed Forces on YouTube’, Working Paper presented at the 59th Annual Convention of the International Studies Association, 4-7 April 2018, San Francisco, CA; David Shim and Frank Stengel, ‘Social media, Gender and the Mediatization Of War: Exploring the German Armed Forces’ Visual Representation of the Afghanistan Operation on Facebook.’, *Global Discourse*, 7:2-3 (2017), pp.330-347.

³⁸ Sara Ruddick, *Maternal Thinking: Toward a Politics of Peace*, (Beacon Press, 1995).

³⁹ Anti-war organisations: Veterans for Peace UK, Stop the War Coalition, Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament, WILPF UK, Peace and Social Witness UK. Military charities: BLESMA, Help for Heroes, Royal British Legion, The Soldier’s Charity (formerly the Army Benevolent Fund), uk4uThanks!

or equivalent phrasing in the context of charitable support for the military. The entire corpus was organised with the use of the software programme NVivo and interpreted with references to themes including: a) the military-society relationship; b) citizenship and/or the state; and c) the gendering of civil and military subjectivities. The quotations presented here, drawn from a corpus of 238 paragraph units, and approximately 550 pages of text, should be understood as particularly illuminating and/or explicit illustrations of common, if frequently implicit, representations of the gendered military-society relationship that, in turn, form the context for the articulation of civilian masculinity/ies.

Interrogatory case study: The gendered dynamics of charitable support for the UK Armed Forces

During military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, despite the contested legitimacy of the wars, calls to “help our heroes” proliferated in the United Kingdom.⁴⁰ The number of charities established to support the military in the UK tripled every year between 2005-2011.⁴¹ This increase in military-related NGOs, charitable giving, and community service was accompanied by a general social practice of displaying or wearing, military-related apparel and symbols, such as bumper stickers, pins, or bracelets. “Support for the troops” has come to form a routinized component of British discussions of Iraq and Afghanistan, with popular pro-military practices, such as an annual Armed Forces Day, military volunteer awards, and recognition at sporting events along the US model now apparent.⁴² “The troops”⁴³ comprise a key locus for the interpretation of war, gender, and the normative relationship between society and the military in the contemporary UK.⁴⁴

Charitable support and moral constructions of civil-military relations

The most immediately striking characteristic of charitable military discourses is a sense that it is “good”, or “appropriate” to support the troops. A 2010 fundraising appeal statement by The UK Soldiers’ Charity is a good example of these constructions:

“...We support soldiers, former soldiers and their families whatever their age, whatever their rank, whenever they need it. We currently support over 6,000 individuals. Last year they ranged in age from 5 months to 107 years old. Here are just a few of their stories...It is thanks to your generosity that you make our work possible”.⁴⁵

⁴⁰ Basham, 2013, pp. 23-7; Paul Dixon, *The British Approach to Counterinsurgency: From Malaya and Northern Ireland to Iraq and Afghanistan*, (Abingdon: Palgrave MacMillan, 2012), p. 91.

⁴¹ *Telegraph*, ‘Sir Richard Dannatt Calls for Military Charities to Work’ (15 January 2011) available at {<http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/defence/8261482/Sir-Richard-Dannatt-callsfor-military-charities-to-work-together.html>}, accessed 15 June 2015.

⁴² Dixon, 2012, pp. 131-2; John Kelly, ‘Popular Culture, Sport and the ‘Hero’-ification of British Militarism’, *Sociology*, 47:4 (2012), p. 728; Katharine Millar, ‘“They Need Our Help”: Non-governmental Organizations and the Subjectifying Dynamics of the Military as Social Cause’, *Media, War & Conflict*, 9:1 (2016), p. 10

⁴³ Joanna Tidy, ‘Forces Sauces and Eggs for Soldiers: Food, Nostalgia and the Rehabilitation of the British Military’, *Critical Military Studies*, 1:3 (2015), pp. 220-32; Basham, 2013.

⁴⁴ Similar practices occur elsewhere, with public commemorations of military sacrifice visible in India and the formation of civil society organisations expressing solidarity with military personnel and their families (often with the yellow ribbon associated with the US armed forces) in Germany.⁴⁴ Though less pervasive than those of the UK (and the US, Canada, and Australia), they are suggestive of a common experience of liberal societies with professional armed forces. Parashar, 2018, p. 129; Initiative Solidarität, ‘Home page’, (2018), available at {<https://solidaritaet-mit-soldaten.de>}, accessed 7 June 2018.

⁴⁵ Army Benevolent Fund, ‘Our Stories’, (approx. 2010), available at: {<http://www.soldierscharity.org/need-our-help/our-stories>}, accessed 16 May 2014.

Though the charity elsewhere makes frequent reference to the military service of the troops, in this passage the primary identity of those being supported is private persons in need of welfare services. This positioning is brought home by the visuals of the webpage, which links individualised stories of hardship with photos of the recipients. Men in uniform – active service members – are presented alongside women, the elderly, and disabled veterans in civilian clothes as equivalent beneficiaries of the charity. While their “militaryness” is the factor qualifying the troops for support, it is constructed as private social relation, rather than a public obligation or practice of warfare. This paternalistic support works in an affective register, using compassion to “draw attention to the social, political and economic needs of military families”⁴⁶ – and with them, military personnel. By virtue of its flat, taken-for-granted presentation, supporting the troops is naturalized as a pro-social, laudable act.⁴⁷

This sense of private, apolitical morality is compounded by the articulation of support in an affective, charitable idiom. A long-time volunteer for the British Legion, for instance, describes her “commitment to the cause” as driven by the recognition that “There will always be ex-servicemen and women who need our help...[W]e can encourage the younger generations to continue to support the ex-service community and carry on the good work of so many who went before them”.⁴⁸ The troops are the subject of “good work”. The charity BLESMA illustrates this framing, as, in describing to potential donors “how you can help”, it notes that while the state makes general policy, the organization “concerns itself with individual cases”. It asks: “Will you make them your concern too?”⁴⁹ This is a moral indictment of the failure to provide support, both by the state and by an implicit audience of private individuals. It (re)produces “the troops” as akin to any other “needy” group, rather than agents of the state/nation.

These brief examples indicate the discourse “produces the military as a notionally apolitical social ‘cause’”.⁵⁰ As causes, though imbued with moral force, have an apparently spontaneous quality,⁵¹ they have a tendency, as observed by Sylvester in relation to development workers, to construct a normative dynamic wherein the benefactors are in, but not of, the communities they help. Donors may be “compassionate and show an admirable sense of urgency – as they hold themselves aloof”.⁵² This articulation of support constitutes it, at least superficially, as “a well-intentioned, altruistic and unconditional interaction, wherein one individual or group acts to benefit another without expecting anything in return”.⁵³ In so doing, they constitute a highly asymmetric power relationship between the two parties.

These aspects of moral support – the sense of a detached, charitable duty to “help”, lack of sense of shared fortune, and affective, interpersonal connection – produce a moral structure of obligation that is not socially recognized as political. In failing to set out a rationale for support,

⁴⁶ Lisa Silvestri, ‘Surprise Homecomings and Vicarious Sacrifices’, *Media, War, & Conflict*, 6:2 (2013), p. 112.

⁴⁷ Millar, 2016.

⁴⁸ Royal British Legion, ‘Who Are Our Volunteers?’, (5 December 2003) available at {http://web.archive.org/web/20031205143556/http://www.britishlegion.org.uk/helpus/volunteers_who.asp}, accessed 5 July 2014.

⁴⁹ BLEMESA (Blind and Limbless Ex-Servicemen’s Association), ‘2007 Annual Report’, (23 April 2008), accessed via WaybackMachine, 14 June 2014, p. 13.

⁵⁰ Tidy, 2015, p.221; Millar, 2016.

⁵¹ Neal Jenkins et al., ‘Wootton Bassett and the Political Spaces of Remembrance and Mourning’, *Area*, 44:3 (2012), p. 361.

⁵² Christine Sylvester, *War as Experience: Contributions from International Relations and Feminist Analysis*, (Abingdon, Routledge, 2013) p. 105, cited in Millar, 2016, p. 13.

⁵³ Gronemeyer cited in Millar, 2016, p. 13. For original, see, Marianne Gronemeyer, ‘Helping’, In *The Development Dictionary: A Guide to Knowledge as Power*, edited by W. Sachs (London: Zed Books), p. 56.

or to construct a sense of shared community, moral support superficially (though often explicitly) relieves supporting the troops of any “public” character, instead relying on the idiom of affective care. This refusal of a political connection between the troops and supporters discursively removes what might, within conventional liberalism, be considered public activities and relationships into an ostensibly “private” realm.⁵⁴ The implications of this apoliticisation of military care for the articulation of substantive, civilian subjectivities, however, are unclear. Examining the gendering of charitable support for the armed forces – and, in particular, the possibilities of and for civilian masculinity/ies – offers an illuminating lever on these dynamics.

Gendered/ing supportive care

Charitable support the troops discourses are typified by the refrain that the troops require “care” when they “get home”. These constructions, in conjunction with the publication of individual veterans’ struggles as a means of generating supportive compassion and charitable awareness, implicitly extrapolates from beleaguered veterans to the “troops” as a whole.⁵⁵ This logic is extended to military personnel in the battlespace. The Stop the War Coalition, for instance, explicitly positions itself as a defender of the troops, arguing, “We want to save lives by bringing them home”.⁵⁶ Moral support is a matter of the troops’ life and death. Similarly, calls to “protect” the troops – from the elements, from the war, from unspecified harm – are ubiquitous. Hansard (UK parliamentary) debates on Iraq and Afghanistan, for instance, frequently involved calls to protect the troops through the provision of appropriate equipment and supplies, most infamously with respect to the implications of a 2009 helicopter shortage for force protection and the evacuation of the wounded.⁵⁷

Within this altruistic discourse, the figure of the masculine, agential combat soldier that we might expect in discussions of civil-military relations seems to recede, as the troops are constructed as imperilled victims of conflict.⁵⁸ They are produced as what Berlant refers to as “citizen-victims – pathological, poignant, heroic, and grotesque”,⁵⁹ marrying suffering with worthiness. The consequences of this figuration for the gendering of the civil-military relationship, and thus the possibilities for civilian masculinity/ies, could be understood in (at least) two ways: as reflecting an empowered feminized civilian sphere caring for a dependent, masculine troops, or as a structural feminization of the troops vis-à-vis agential, masculinised civilian patrons. There is a case to be made for both readings – and the references to “care” and “love” are suggestive of a potential maternal dynamic. It would be an essentialist error, however, to “conflat[e]... feminization with the absence of war”,⁶⁰ or, conversely, the provision of care. Understanding the gendering dynamics of civil-military relations in the context of moral support requires examining the multi-faceted substantive (e.g. characteristic-based, such as loving) and relational (e.g. social positioning) gendering of societal supporters vis-a-vis the troops.

⁵⁴ Millar, 2016, p. 23.

⁵⁵ Katharine Millar, ‘The Plural of Soldier is Not Troops: The Distinctive Politics of Groups in Legitimizing Violence’, working paper.

⁵⁶ Stop the War Coalition, ‘Anti-war Protesters Mark Tragic Milestone for Victims of Conflict’, (28 August 2009), available at: {<http://web.archive.org/web/20090914084240/http://stopwar.org.uk/content/view/1459/27/>}, accessed 10 March 2014.

⁵⁷ BBC, ‘Helicopter Shortage a ‘Scandal’’, (19 July 2009), available at {http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk_politics/8157978.stm}, accessed 13 August 2015.

⁵⁸ Millar 2016, pp. 16-17.

⁵⁹ Lauren Berlant, *The Wueen of America goes to Washington City: Essays on Sex and Citizenship* (Durham: Duke University Press, 1997), p. 1.

⁶⁰ Kimberly Hutchings, ‘Making Sense of Masculinity and War’, *Men and Masculinities*, 10:4 (2008), p. 395.

The above construction of civilian supporters as “protecting” the troops and “saving their lives” is crucial to arbitrating this gender dynamic. Protection positions supporters in a relationship of hierarchical superiority over the dependent troops – a situation more akin to the operation of the patriarchal welfare state, or masculine head of household, than a maternal logic of care. This is evident, for instance, in the 2010 statement of a Conservative MP that:

“...The help that charitable and voluntary organisations and-dare I say it?-the big society have given to people returning from warfare goes back a long way. It is not for the state to do everything, and the state is not necessarily best placed to do that. We all have social responsibilities, and service charities are an excellent example of the big society in action.”⁶¹

This statement, referencing a 2010 Conservative plan to encourage the provision of social services and supports by non-state entities,⁶² explicitly highlights the paternalistic dynamic between the “big society” of private supporters and the dependent servicemembers returning from war. Charitable support is constructed as a community good. It is morally superior, here, to care provided by the state, as it exemplifies a logic of individualistic and agential voluntary contribution. Crucially, the monetary transfers which typically accompany such charitable support have been observed by critical gender and organisational scholars to be “key for accomplishing masculinity”.⁶³ This exemplar of charitable discourse subtly attributes characteristics associated with stereotypical hegemonic Western masculinity, such as rationality, independence, and civic-mindedness,⁶⁴ to supporters, rather than “the troops”.

The clearest demonstration of these constructions is the discourse(s) surrounding the increasingly-common recognition of supporters, either in the press or through formal awards, for their service to military personnel. Though the campaign has subsequently been criticised for producing mixed results,⁶⁵ the portrayal of actor Joanna Lumley during her involvement in the 2009 campaign for UK settlement rights for Nepali Gurkha veterans provides a striking illustration of these masculinist constructions. In a 2009 *Telegraph* opinion piece, Lumley was characterised as having “fought a brilliant campaign” that involved the “conquest” of Westminster through a canny and honourable application of “the patriotic instincts and good manners of middle England”.⁶⁶ The explicit framing of her actions in military terms flips the conventional relationship between a masculine military and feminised society while attaching conventional attributes of hegemonic masculinity – public action on behalf of others, rationality, integrity, and speaking truth to power – to Lumley, the civilian supporter.⁶⁷ Similarly, support for the military – particularly disabled veterans participating in the Invictus Games – is framed as a crucial part of the personal maturation and redemption narrative of Prince Harry, a member of the UK royal family. The CEO of the Invictus Games has commented upon Prince Harry’s “real sense of

⁶¹ Oliver Colville, MP, Hansard remarks, HC Deb, 25 November 2010, c503

⁶² BBC, ‘David Cameron Launches Tory ‘Big Society’ Policy’ (19 July 2010), available at {<http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-10680062>}, accessed 26 October 2017.

⁶³ Dan Lainer-Vos, ‘Masculinities in Interaction: The Coproduction of Israeli and American Jewish Men in Philanthropic Fundraising Events’, *Men and Masculinities*, 17:1 (2014), p. 48; see also Vivianna A. Zelizer, *The Purchase of Intimacy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005).

⁶⁴ See Raewyn Connell, *Masculinities*, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995).

⁶⁵ BBC, ‘Was Lumley Campaign Good for Gurkhas?’ (31 July 2011), available at {<http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-south-asia-13372026>}; Paul Valleley, ‘What Went Wrong for Joanna and the Gurkhas’, *The Independent* (1 August 2011), available at {<http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/home-news/what-went-wrong-for-joanna-and-the-gurkhas-2330107.html>}, accessed 26 October 2017.

⁶⁶ Andrew Gimson, ‘Joanna Lumley is Coming: Traditional Gurkha Battle Cry’, *The Telegraph*, (22 May 2009), available at: {<http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/politics/5363695/Joanna-Lumley-is-coming-the-Gurkhas-traditional-battle-cry.html>}, accessed 26 October 2017.

⁶⁷ Vron Ware, ‘Why Critical Whiteness Studies Needs to Think About Warfare’, *Sociologisk Forskning*, 46:3 (2009), pp. 1-14.

humility”, observing that “his is not somebody who is doing this because he needs attention”.⁶⁸ At the same time, public discourse also frequently references his active involvement in the cause, noting that “He weighs in. He’s got good questions and he’s very thoughtful”, and “detail-oriented” in his efforts to support military families.⁶⁹ Paternalistic, benevolent support, rationally measured and conducted without personal stake, is constituted as a central component of normative, implicitly masculine public virtue.

Support for the troops – particularly that cast in the masculine idiom of contribution to the community – is central to social recognition as not only a good citizen, but also as a good person. The *Sun* tabloid, in conjunction with the UK Ministry of Defence, hosts the “Military Awards”, or “Millies”, which honour not only service people but also single out individuals and organisations for their exceptional “Support to the Forces”.⁷⁰ In 2008, the civilian founders of Help for Heroes were awarded a Millie to recognize their “invaluable help to the Armed Forces”.⁷¹ In 2009, the Millie for best support was awarded to the town of (now Royal) Wootton Bassett, which held spontaneous commemorations and ceremonies as the repatriated bodies of deceased servicemembers were transported through the town centre.⁷² Prince William, in presenting the award, highlighted the town’s sense of honour and stoicism, noting: “One of the most remarkable things is that the people are so modest, they refuse to accept any praise”.⁷³ Perhaps most significantly, the awards themselves have become a high profile formal event, frequently attended by prominent citizens and celebrities. These attendees are photographed distributing awards and in the company of armed forces personnel, further reinforcing both the laudability of charitable support and the hierarchical imbalance of status (and capital) between the supporters and the troops.⁷⁴ This is in line with Boon’s observation that philanthropy is frequently constructed as commensurate with socially-valourised masculinity, “as controlled sacrifice for human well-being, render[s] the man who donates to the public good a heroic figure”.⁷⁵

This connection of support with good public personhood and the generation of social capital is also evident in efforts of both military-related charities to generate corporate sponsorship. Help for Heroes, for instance, frames its sponsorship opportunities as offering “a message resonating with consumers”⁷⁶, driving sales, “building brand engagement”, promoting PR opportunities, staff team-building, “and, of course, rais[ing] funds that will help [H4H] rebuild lives”.⁷⁷ Such charitable opportunities to “demonstrate company values, and your commitment to your customers,

⁶⁸ Janet Davidson, ‘Humility and ‘having a good time’: Prince Harry brings his royal rapport to Toronto’, *CBC*, (1 May 2016), available at {<http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/prince-harry-invictus-games-military-support-toronto-1.3554153>}, accessed 26 October 2017.

⁶⁹ *Ibid.*

⁷⁰ Forces Children’s Trust, ‘Forces Children’s Wins a ‘Millie’ (December 2010), available at: {<http://www.forceschildrenstrust.org/news/37-fct-frontpage-stories/74-forces-childrens-trust-wins-a-qmillieq-.html#.WeC9z0yZPoA>}, accessed 10 October 2017.

⁷¹ Caroline Iggulden and Tom Newton Dunn, ‘It’s Great to Celebrate Britain’s Real Heroes’, *The Sun* (16 September 2008).

⁷² John Harris, ‘A Very British Tribute to the Troops’, *The Guardian* (23 December 2009), available at: {<https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2009/dec/23/british-patriotism-soldiers>}, accessed 10 October 2017.

⁷³ The Bromley Times, ‘The Soldier Who Saved Up to a Thousand Lives’ (23 December 2009), available at: {<http://www.bromleytimes.co.uk/news/the-soldier-who-saved-up-to-a-thousand-lives-1-580314>}, accessed 25 October 2017.

⁷⁴ Katie Earlam, ‘Royalty, Sports Stars and Celebrities Honour British Troops at Millies 2012’, available at: {<https://www.thesun.co.uk/archives/news/318766/royalty-sports-stars-and-celebrities-honour-british-troops-at-millies-2012/>}, accessed 25 October 2017.

⁷⁵ Kevin Alexander Boon, ‘Heroes, Metanarratives, and the Paradox of Masculinity in Contemporary Western Culture’, *The Journal of Men’s Studies*, 13:3 (2005), p. 309

⁷⁶ Help for Heroes, ‘Want to Work With Us?’, (N.D.), available at: {<https://www.helpforheroes.org.uk/give-support/partnership-opportunities/want-to-work-with-us/>}, accessed 25 October 2017.

⁷⁷ *Ibid.*

employees, and local community”⁷⁸ also underscore outreach efforts of the UK state under the Armed Forces Covenant. Businesses are also asked to sign the covenant and “promot[e] the fact that [they] are an armed forces-friendly organisation...by publicising our Armed Forces Covenant on your website and displaying the Armed Forces Covenant logo”.⁷⁹ Reinforcing this message, the Ministry of Defence has also, as of 2014, begun issuing Defence Employer Recognition Scheme awards (at Bronze, Silver, and Gold levels) to recognise private sector businesses that support military personnel.⁸⁰

As a means of demonstrating civic engagement, community mindedness, and moral principles, support for the troops is constituted in the idiom of protective (and, here, conservative capitalist, interestingly) masculinity, in keeping with the public performance of benevolent philanthropy. In this way, the (re)masculinisation of the “private” sphere and supporters operates analogously to a dynamic observed to characterise the fundraising interactions of Israeli and American Jews. In these interactions, philanthropic activities “allowed American Jews not so much to replace their model of masculinity with a (slacker) version of the Israeli model” against which they would fall short, as they did not engage in military fighting themselves, but rather “hold onto theirs while associating themselves more closely” with the nationalistic and militarised masculinity of their Israeli counterparts.⁸¹ In both instances, paternalistic support reflects a need to address, albeit through a denial of its legitimacy, the figure of the combat soldier as an exemplar of normative masculinity.

Ambivalent civilian masculinity/ies

The discourse, as a consequence, appears to proffer ambivalent civilian masculinity/ies. The explicit contrasting of the supporters with the supported troops indicates it’s fair to read these expressions of masculinity as “not military” within the conventional understanding of a liberal civil-military distinction. In that sense, the construction of supporters as benevolent, hegemonically masculine subjects opens the door to the expression of meaningful and socially valorised non-military masculinity. At the same time, however, charitable “support the troops” discourse indicates that hegemonic masculinity continues to derive from associations with the military as a proving ground for good public personhood. To paraphrase Tidy, the normalisation of the troops as a form of social cause subtly reifies an underlying assumption that “military objectives are socially valuable”.⁸² The performance of hegemonic masculinity, though demonstrated (or accrued) through the public performance of protective and beneficent patronage rather than war participation or military service, still refers to “militaryness”.

The discourse thus demonstrates a tension wherein the reading of supporters as non-military relies upon and reproduces the conventional liberal understanding of discrete civil and military spheres, while the performance of hegemonic Western masculinity by supporters blurs this divide through continual implicit association with militaryness. This double movement suggests a severing of any political relationship between the troops and civilian supporters through the idiom

⁷⁸ Ibid.

⁷⁹ UK Ministry of Defence, ‘Armed Forces Covenant – Ideas for Best Practice’, (2012) available at: {https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/504663/20160301_Armed_Forces_Covenant_Guidance_Notes_for_Businesses_2.pdf}, accessed 6 April 2016.

⁸⁰ UK Ministry of Defence, ‘Defence Employer Recognition Scheme’ (24 October 2017), available at: {<https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/defence-employer-recognition-scheme/defence-employer-recognition-scheme>}, accessed 27 October 2017.

⁸¹ Lainer-Vos, 2014, p. 59.

⁸² Tidy, 2015, p. 224; See also Enloe, 2000.

of paternalistic charity. The discourse demonstrates a folding of purportedly-distinct civil and military spheres into the apolitical realm of affect – and simultaneous failure to explicitly construct supporters as civilians. This troubles a straightforward reading of non-military masculinity as simultaneously one of politically-relevant civility. The relationship between patron/beneficiary maps onto the civil-military divide without substantively engaging with its relationship to military service or conflict.

Outside an explicitly political community, the status of supporters as substantively, rather than descriptively, “civilian” appears analytically and discursively ambiguous. This raises a series of interesting questions regarding meaningful civilianness. If support is cast as a matter of charity rather than war support/participation, is it fair to read it as “civilian”? Absent a meaningful engagement with notions of common political membership, can we read these discourses as offering a positive and substantive subjectivity? What, in other words, is the (gendered) relationship between politics, civilianness, and normative citizenship?

Conditioning civilian masculinity/ies: The liberal military contract

To address these questions, this section works through the various binaries the case study suggests are relevant to the possibilities of civilian masculinity/ies: civil/military, masculinity/femininity, and public/private. Existing gender scholarship and critical militarism/military studies have demonstrated these dichotomies are not timeless universals, or objective facts, but rather contingent effects of power.⁸³ As indicated by the ambivalence of charitable UK civilian masculinity/ies, these binaries are often blurred and contradictory, even as they are ideologically and discursively reinforced as structural effects. Here, I draw upon a critical, historically-contextualised reading of liberal political thought to examine the ways in which, despite many critical analyses and empirical performances to the contrary, these associations may yet inform social relations and subjectivities. Consequently, the use of “liberalism” here reflects its contemporary interpretation both popularly and within international relations scholarship, rather than the specific minutiae of any particular theorist.⁸⁴

Masculinised citizenship

As alluded to by the case, the question of politically viable civilian masculinities is largely one of the relationship between gender, violence, and normative public personhood. Liberal political thought, however, has seldom directly engaged with the question of civilianness (or soldiering, for that matter).⁸⁵ Normative public behaviours of the individual vis-à-vis the polity are collapsed into the broader category of citizenship. “Citizenship-as-membership” is typically understood with regard to “status, rights, political engagement, responsibilities, and identity/solidarity”.⁸⁶ It references the total public person beyond the use of collective force highlighted by civilianness. The ambiguous relationship between charitable support, civilianness, and political membership evidenced in the case, however, suggests that “civilian” and “citizen” are not synonyms. Citizen is a political category in a way in which “civilian”, despite its historical genealogy, is not.⁸⁷ Unpacking

⁸³ Annick Wibben, ‘Why We Need to Study (US) Militarism: A Critical Feminist Lens’, *Security Dialogue*, 49:1-2 (2018), pp. 136-148; Sisson Runyan and Peterson, 2014, pp. 46-7.

⁸⁴ Beate Jahn, *Liberal Internationalism: Theory, History, and Practice* (Abingdon: Palgrave MacMillan, 2011).

⁸⁵ April Carter, ‘Liberalism and the Obligation to Military Service’, *Political Studies*, 46:1 (1998), pp. 68-81.

⁸⁶ Linda Bosniak, ‘Citizenship’, in *The Oxford Handbook of Legal Studies*, Mark Tushnet and Peter Cane (eds.) (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), p. 186.

⁸⁷ Kinsella, 2011.

the uneasy co-existence of civility and citizenship thus offers a point of entry for thinking through, and about, the possibilities of civilian masculinity/ies.

Broadly, within liberal thought, the spectre of force - the threat of physical harm and/or the desire to preserve property - spurs the creation of political community.⁸⁸ Citizens give up their sovereignty to the state in return for its protection from internal violence and the anarchic international. They accept the political obligation that accompanies being in community, notably the duty to follow the law.⁸⁹ Importantly, as argued by feminist political theorists, within classical liberal theory, as well as the general trajectory of Western political thought, the nature and purpose of politics were bound to an “ethos of manhood”.⁹⁰ The universal, contracting liberal citizen is constituted in accordance with Western masculinist ideals of autonomy, rationality, agency, and the (latent) potential for violence.⁹¹

The universalism of the liberal citizen, as an abstract ideal that theoretically pertains to all subjects, is thus observed by feminist scholars to obscure its masculinist underpinnings. The implicitly masculine citizen mirrors the reliance of the political and ideological coherence of the liberal state upon the now-familiar division of society into gendered (as well as classed, racialized, and sexualised) public and private spheres.⁹² Pateman argues that the “liberation” of the citizen through the liberal social contract required the subjugation of women (and the feminine) via rigid and essentialist gender roles, and corresponding social relations of exploitation and dependence: the “sexual contract”.⁹³ Though poor women, for instance, have long worked outside the home, the constitution of the individual citizen as masculine furthered an overarching discursive construction of the “public” economic and political sphere as masculine, and the private domestic sphere as feminine.⁹⁴

Correspondingly, Brown observes that while the extension – both empirically and within evolving liberal political thought – of individual rights to women (and minoritised groups) may have decoupled citizenship from a particular male (white, cisgender, heterosexual, property-owning) body, a universalised masculine “public” subjectivity remains the hallmark of normative citizenship.⁹⁵ Liberal political thought produces an ideal-typical polity as pacific, rational, and a “means to individual ends”: a way of ensuring physical safety such that masculine citizens may pursue their own betterment.⁹⁶

As critical scholars observe, however, the rational, coordinated pursuit of individual liberty is not the entire story. Despite the liberal state’s ideological dependence upon claims to pacify the polity,

⁸⁸ Thomas Hobbes, *Leviathan* (Hamondsworth: Penguin, 1985); John, Locke, *Second Treatise of Government* (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1980).

⁸⁹ John Simmons, *Moral Principles and Political Obligations* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1981), p.5.

⁹⁰ Wendy Brown, *Manhood and Politics: A Feminist Reading in Political Theory* (London: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 1998), p. 7

⁹¹ Carole Pateman and Elizabeth Grosz, *Feminist challenges: Social and Political Theory* (Abingdon: Routledge, 2013), p. 64; J. Ann. Tickner, ‘Hans Morgenthau’s Principles of Political Realism: A Feminist Reformulation’, *Millennium*, 17.3 (1988), p. 432.

⁹² Raewyn Connell, ‘The State, Gender, and Sexual Politics’, *Theory and Society*, 19:5 (1990), pp. 507-544.

⁹³ Carole Pateman, *The Sexual Contract* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1988); Elizabeth Frazer and Nicola Lacey, *The Politics of Community: A Feminist Critique of the Liberal-Communitarian Debate* (Hemel Hempstead: Harvester, 1993), p. 70-2.

⁹⁴ Connell, 1990, p. 522.

⁹⁵ Brown, 1998.

⁹⁶ *Ibid*, p. 182

“The formal political power of the liberal state is expressed in its assertion of the ‘national interest’, ... [enabling it to] pursue concerns higher than life. It is for ‘national security’ and ‘national honor’ that the state sacrifices its youth in foreign military interventions”.⁹⁷

The realization of the state’s monopoly on force requires that “citizen soldiers be prepared to kill and die” for the state.⁹⁸ The metaphorical social contract is underwritten by a corollary bargain wherein individuals accept that “to be protected from violence by the nation-state is to be exposed to the violence wielded by the nation-state”.⁹⁹ Membership is also premised upon a mythical “military contract”, which makes potential involvement in collective violence a condition – or political obligation – of belonging. As a result, normative citizenship is “construed as risking life... [wherein] a real man lays his life on the line”.¹⁰⁰ “Good” citizens are constituted as (at least potentially) liable for military service. Though rarely explicitly stated, liberal political thought provides a subtle, yet significant, normative connection between liberal citizenship, masculinity, and military service: a “liberal military contract”.

Historically, this account of the military-masculinity-citizenship nexus reflects and (re)produces a series of interlocking normative structures dating to (at least) the mass “nation in arms” of the French Revolution. Marked by the *Lévee en masse* (“national” conscription), the Revolution saw a devolution of the burdens of warfare from professional long-service armies to society as a whole.¹⁰¹ This societal mobilization was based on nationalistic ideals and membership in the *patrie*;¹⁰² military service was exchanged for democratic citizenship and civil and political rights. The institutional structure of the mass army expanded across Europe throughout the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, bringing with it the ideology of nationalism and concessions of citizenship required to legitimise mass conscription.¹⁰³ By WWII, military service had been firmly entrenched as a normative obligation of democratic citizenship, while the onset of industrial-age “total war” involved all of society, through preparation, supply, or participation in battle.¹⁰⁴ It is this overall Western imaginary, wherein liberal thought, democracy, and mass war participation “grew up together” – the specifics vary from state to state – that facilitates and is captured by the notion of the liberal military contract. My claim is not that the contract represents an actual moment/outcome of democratic decision-making or consolidation, nor that it was/is enacted in ideal-typical form. Instead, for the purposes of examining the politics of civilian masculinity/ies, I understand it as a cultural myth, a powerful socio-cultural narrative that imbues impressionist recollections of history and normative beliefs with affective valence – and projects them forward into the present.¹⁰⁵

⁹⁷ Ibid p. 184.

⁹⁸ Talal Asad, *On Suicide Bombing* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007), pp. 60-1.

⁹⁹ Judith Butler, *Precarious Life: The Power of Mourning and Violence* (London: Verso, 2006), p. 26; Beate Jahn, ‘The tragedy of liberal democracy’, *Statebuilding and Intervention: Policies, Practices and Paradigms* (Abingdon: Routledge, 2009), pp. 210-229.

¹⁰⁰ Brown, 1998, p. 182.

¹⁰¹ William McNeill, *The Pursuit of Power: Technology, Armed Force and Society from 1000 A.D.* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984), p. 192.

¹⁰² Alan Forrest, ‘The Nation in Arms I: The French Wars’, *The Oxford History of Modern War*, Charles Townshend (ed.), 2nd edition (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), pp. 59-61.

¹⁰³ Barry R. Posen, ‘Nationalism, the Mass Army, and Military Power’ *International Security*, 18:2 (1993), pp. 80-124; McNeill, 1984, pp. 253-5.

¹⁰⁴ Richard Overy, ‘Total War II: The Second World War’, in *The Oxford History of Modern War*, Charles Townshend (ed.) (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), pp. 138-157.

¹⁰⁵ Berit Blieseman de Guevara, ‘Myth in International Politics: Ideological Delusion and Necessary Fiction’, In *Myth and Narrative in International Politics: Interpretive Approaches to the Study of IR*, Berit Blieseman de Guevara, ed. (Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan, 2016), pp. 15-47.

Gendered civil-military relations

Importantly, the (ostensibly) universal citizen-soldier does not describe any given member of the polity. Masculine normative citizenship, and the gendered, spatialized binary between public and private upon which it rests, also typifies the structure of civil-military relations. The universalized citizen subject liable for military service was, historically, male, and, in classical and contemporary political thought, is masculine. The development of the mass army ensured that the majority of the male population engaged in state-sanctioned violence (or, in the case of volunteer militaries, as in pre-WWI UK, were potentially liable for military service). The ability and willingness to perpetrate violence became a requirement of masculine citizenship, wherein “the ultimate test of men’s political obligation is his willingness to give up his life in defence of the state”.¹⁰⁶ Women were empirically and ideologically assigned “support” roles, such as caretaking, reproduction of “the nation”, symbolic potential victimhood etc., which constitute a feminine “other” to militarized masculinity.¹⁰⁷

Significantly, through the performance of violence and symbolic association with the state, soldiers are constructed as protecting non-serving civilians. This gendered structure of warfare is writ-large to the relationship, often cast in terms of heterosexual kinship, between a masculinized, protective military and a feminized society (or nation) vulnerable to harm.¹⁰⁸ The best known formulation of this dynamic is Elshtain’s contrast of the masculine “Just Warrior”, charged with defending “home and hearth”, with the feminine (or societal) “Beautiful Soul” whose virtue and innocent domesticity require protection.¹⁰⁹ This gendered association of women (and children) with civilian status is present in the writings of early-modern international legal theorists and,¹¹⁰ as observed by Kinsella, was internationally affirmed with the post-WWII drafting of the Geneva Conventions.¹¹¹ Conceptually, but also to a large degree empirically, a gendered division of “political” space underlies the social facticity of the liberal state. In its ideal-typical form, this spatiality relies upon and reproduces a gendered “civil-military gap”, separating feminised, dependent society from the protective, autonomous military.¹¹² It is this gendered divide, as both normative ideological structure and an historical empirical regularity, that forms the key context for the analysis and articulation of politically viable, socially meaningful civilian masculinity/ies.

Civilian + masculinity/ies = citizen?

The competing normative imperatives, and uneasy associations, of the binaries raised by the case (masculine/feminine, soldier/civilian, military/civil, and public/private) are crystallised in ideals of normative citizenship. The above analysis suggests the figurative, or ideal-typical, universal citizen may be considered doubly masculine. The political aspect of citizenship is conducted in a public

¹⁰⁶ Orna Sasson-Levy, ‘Military, Masculinity, and Citizenship: Tensions and Contradictions in the Experience of Blue-Collar Soldiers’ Identities’, *Global Studies in Culture and Power*, 10: 3 (2003), p.322.

¹⁰⁷ Joshua Goldstein, *War and Gender* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003).

¹⁰⁸ See Saskia Stachowitsch, ‘Military Privatization and the Remasculinization of the State: Making the Link Between the Outsourcing of Military Security and Gendered State Transformations’, *International Relations*, 27:1 (2013), pp. 74-80.

¹⁰⁹ Cited in Helen Kinsella, ‘Securing the Civilian: Sex and Gender in the Laws of War’, *Power in Global Governance*, 98 (2004). Pp. 253-4. For original see, Elshtain, 1987.

¹¹⁰ Best 1993 cited in Carpenter, 2016, p. 47; Richard Hartigan, *The Forgotten Victim: A History of the Civilian* (NY: Transaction Publishers, 1983).

¹¹¹ Carpenter, 2016, p. 29; Helen Kinsella, ‘Gendering Grotius: Sex and sex difference in the laws of war’, *Political Theory*, 34:2 (2006), pp.161-191.

¹¹² Maryam Khalid, ‘Feminist Perspectives on Militarism and War: Critiques, Contradictions, and Collusions’, In *The Oxford Handbook of Transnational Feminist Movements*, Rawwida Baksh and Wendy Harcourt (eds) (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), pp. 637-8

sphere constituted in accordance with stereotypically masculine characteristics – particularly rationality and autonomy. The very possibility of this rational liberal politics relies, in turn, upon the underlying constitution of the citizen as a potential soldier, typified by masculine virtues of protection, sacrifice, and honour. Normative citizenship is defined by the willingness to “die for something”, namely the state, rather than being “willing to live for or through something”.¹¹³

This conceptual schema illuminates the tensions and challenges that conditioned the articulation of intelligible civilian citizenship within the case. Civilian status has been produced within a strongly ideologically delineated (if empirically blurred) gendered civil-military divide as structurally feminine. Citizenship itself is constituted as not only normatively masculine, but dependent upon military service. The ambivalence of civilian masculinity/ies within UK discourse is thus reflective of, and politically conditioned by, an ideological/cultural context wherein femininity and civilianness are readily commensurate, but masculine civilianness¹¹⁴ - though, as seen in the case, not performatively impossible - challenges gendered expectations of normative citizenship. The ambivalent political chances of/for “civilian masculinity/ies” indicate a form of liminality, wherein it remains difficult to be read as, simultaneously, a civilian, a political subject and, bridging the two positions, normatively masculine.

Gendered civilian anxiety

There is a final twist on this heuristic, narrative account of the liberal military contract that is central to understanding the contemporary politics of liberal civilian masculinity/ies. Bluntly, there is nothing particularly liberal, nor necessarily democratic, about the normative structure of the “military contract”. It exists in tension with liberal ideas of civic rights against arbitrary violence, non-violent conflict resolution, and individual autonomy. Though the recourse to volunteer militaries has been posited by contemporary liberal thinkers – perhaps paired with a conscript lottery – as alleviating immediate problem of state coercion of individuals,¹¹⁵ it does not address the underlying normative obligation of service.¹¹⁶ The confluence of gendered cultural affects, narratives, and ethics regarding (at least potential) military service and citizenship suggests that in a time of war, all “good” masculine citizens ought to serve. But, as raised in the introduction, in a context of declining conscription across Western democracies,¹¹⁷ most people are civilians. We may therefore see the differential distribution of risk and obligation (which is gendered, classed, sexualised, and racialized) of volunteer militaries as accentuating the illiberality of the “military contract”. It violates the democratic principle of equality¹¹⁸ without extinguishing the gendered expectation that posits all citizens as liable to defend the whole. It raises the possibility that civilians may be failing to act appropriately.

Consequently, I suggest “gendered civilian anxiety” is an entailment of the military-citizenship-masculinity nexus within liberal thought and politics – and a means of thinking through the ambiguous politics of civilian masculinity/ies. “Anxiety” is understood in the psychoanalytic/existentialist sense of the transgressive potential of choice, or free will,¹¹⁹ rather

¹¹³ Brown, 1998, 182.

¹¹⁴ And empowered explicitly feminine modes of citizenship.

¹¹⁵ Katrina Forrester, ‘Citizenship, War, and the Origins of International Ethics in American Political Philosophy, 1960–1975.’ *The Historical Journal*, 57:3 (2014), pp. 773-801

¹¹⁶ Victoria Basham, ‘Liberal Militarism as Insecurity, Desire and Ambivalence: Gender, Race and the Everyday Geopolitics of War’, *Security Dialogue*, 49:1-2 (2018), pp. 32-43.

¹¹⁷ Martin Shaw, *The New Western Way of War*, (Cambridge: Polity, 2005).

¹¹⁸ Pateman, 1988, p. 9.

¹¹⁹ Angus McDonald, ‘Our Democracy, Our Identity, Our Anxiety’, *Law and Critique*, 28:3 (2017), p. 342.

than an individual psychological or (necessarily) affective experience. As outlined by Kierkegaard, anxiety stems from the relationship between the subject (or individual) and a prohibition – generally understood as law – and the recognition that the subject has the potential to break the law.¹²⁰ It comes less from actual acts of transgression than the realisation of a temptation, or desire, to break the rules, while still abiding by them.¹²¹ This notion of anxiety maps well onto our conventional understanding of the social contract. To live in community, citizens agree to abide by the rule of law – the authority and prohibition – but retain the ability (and desire) to break the law, which results in anxiety. As put by Žižek, “the more rigorously we OBEY the law, the more we bear witness to the fact that...we feel the pressure of the desire to indulge in [transgression]”.¹²²

Gendered civilian anxiety, following this logic, does not arise from the negative prohibition of law, but instead the positive obligation of military service/sacrifice: the liberal military contract. It derives from the possibility of ignoring, or shirking, an unwritten expectation of soldiering – and, further, the recognition of a desire to do so. Substantively, the concept draws upon Managhan’s diagnosis of US civil-military relations as characterised by a “cultural legacy of gendered guilt”.¹²³ Managhan refers to a dual, gendered bind facing (not exclusively, but particularly) women’s anti-war activism. At one level, war opposition is easily constructed as a treacherous undermining of Just Warriors by the ungrateful Beautiful Souls. The impulse of the post-9/11 anti-war movement to “support the troops” may thus be construed as a “redemption” of the gendered betrayal of “our boys” during Vietnam. It is an anxious forestalling of the temptation to do so again in the future.¹²⁴ At another level, we can also see “gendered guilt” in the normative (liberal) division of violent labour wherein, until recently, the burden of military service was not open to women – a potential (if involuntary) shirking of the responsibilities of citizenship. “Gendered civilian anxiety” therefore incorporates the parallel normative expectations of feminine “home front” loyalty and masculine military service – and the unease that stems from the dual possibility of contravening intertwined gender and citizenship norms. It encompasses all those who are/understand themselves to be civilians in wartime, as well as the anxiety pertaining to what it means to be a civilian in wartime, and attempts to account for the complicated, shifting gendering of the subject-position.

In the past, the citizens to whom this expectation pertained were men, and the expectation today remains a component of the implicitly masculine citizen subject-position. Throughout the twentieth century, however, military service became a crucial means for marginalised and minoritised groups to demonstrate belonging in the political community and demand recognition as citizens.¹²⁵ The shifting roles of men and women mean that the sex/gender correspondence of the masculine, protective military and the feminine, protected society common to Western lay and philosophical understandings of civil-military relations no longer holds – if it ever did. Consequently, this anxiety is available and applicable to all those who might seek to self-identify with the performance of “good” liberal citizenship and/or hegemonic masculinity/ies. Accepting, for the moment, the gendered civil-military divide as contingent yet socially meaningful, non-serving civilians are structurally associated with (purportedly feminine) society during wartime. There is a sense in which they are left without “an ontologically secure sense of military masculine

¹²⁰ Ibid, p.342.; Andreja Zevnik, ‘From Fear to Anxiety: An Exploration into a New Socio-Political Temporality’, *Law and Critique*, 28:3 (2017), pp.238

¹²¹ Ibid, p. 238; Soeren Kierkegaard, *Concept of Anxiety*, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980)

¹²² Zevnik, 2017, p.238; Slavoj Žižek, ‘Anxiety: Kierkegaard with Lacan’, *Annual of Psychoanalysis*, 35 (2007), pp.179-189.

¹²³ Tina Managhan, ‘Grieving Dead Soldiers, Disavowing Loss: Cindy Sheehan and the Im/possibility of the American Anti-War Movement’, *Geopolitics*, 16:2 (2011), pp. 451.

¹²⁴ Ibid, p. 451.

¹²⁵ Ronald Krebs, *Fighting for Rights: Military Service and the Politics of Citizenship*, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2006).

identity”,¹²⁶ and, under the liberal military contract, without an ontologically secure citizen identity.

This is not unique to the post-9/11 “global war on terror”, nor, necessarily, liberal societies. Goldstein observes that across cultures, past and present, gender norms connect “bravery and discipline in war to manhood – with shame as enforcement”.¹²⁷ Women pelted soldiers with corn as “chickens” before the 1973 Chilean military coup,¹²⁸ and military service in Russia today is frequently framed as a key characteristic of a desirable (male) partner and prerequisite for marriage.¹²⁹ Particularly pertinent is the now-infamous presentation of white feathers by young women to non-serving men in the UK during WWI. These campaigns, along with state recruitment posters, drew on gendered logics of masculine shame and feminine vulnerability to encourage men to join the military.¹³⁰ Gendered anxiety regarding the collective use of force is a perennial political problem. What this article argues is that the empirical shift away from mass military participation and large-scale existential conflict, paired with the ideologically-required incorporation of women as formally equal citizens into the liberal military contract, represents a qualitative shift in the scope of this disconnect – and is thus particularly helpful for thinking through the ambiguous politics of contemporary civilian masculinity/ies.

Gendered anxiety and charitable support

To come full circle, we can read charitable UK support the troops discourses as exhibiting traces of anxiety. The best example of this uneasiness is the Royal British Legion’s 2009 “Time to Do Your Bit” campaign.¹³¹ It called on MPs, electoral candidates, and the general public to “take the pledge” for the armed forces. Though the Legion suggested that “how you do that is up to you”, the charity lobbied MPs to sign explicit declarations that “I, First Name Surname, pledge to do my bit for the whole armed forces family”.¹³² The framing of this charitable campaign in the idiom of an oath implicitly reproduces the expectation that, again, in times of war, good people and good citizens should contribute. The gendered undertones of this call are clear, as the references to “doing one’s bit” evoke the WWI image of the small child asking their father, “What did you do in the war, Daddy?”,¹³³ as an expectation of both good citizenship and masculinity. The sense of anxiety stems less from the content of the campaign than the process of asking for the pledge itself. The very necessity of soliciting the pledge acknowledges the possibility that civilians might *not* be doing their bit and, without prodding, might be tempted not to help, not to participate.

This tenor of forestalled transgression is similarly apparent in the post-9/11 tendency of UK anti-war NGOs to qualify their opposition to Iraq and, later, Afghanistan, with declarations of support for the troops. A 2003 Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament statement upon the deaths of British military personnel in a helicopter crash illustrates this framing: “All life lost in this conflict, either by

¹²⁶ Paul Higate, ‘Theorizing Continuity: From Military to Civilian Life’, *Armed Forces and Society*, 27:3 (2001), p. 450.

¹²⁷ Goldstein, 2003, pp. 264 and 406.

¹²⁸ Margaret Power, ‘Anti-Allende Women and the 1973 Military Coup in Chile’, *Bicentenario*, 2:2 (2003) pp. 33-58.

¹²⁹ Valeria Sperling, *Sex, Politics, and Putin: Political Legitimacy in Russia* (Oxford, Oxford University Press: 2014).

¹³⁰ Nicole Gullance, ‘White Feathers and Wounded Men: Female Patriotism and the Memory of the Great War’, *Journal of British Studies*, 36:2 (1997), pp. 178-206.

¹³¹ Royal British Legion, ‘Gordon Brown pledges to “do his bit” for British Armed Forces’ (16 March 2010), available at {<http://web.archive.org/web/20100425182258/http://www.britishlegion.org.uk/about-us/media-centre/news/campaigning/gordon-brown-pledges-to-do-his-bit-for-british-armed-forces/>} accessed 14 April 2014.

¹³² Royal British Legion, ‘Previous campaigns, (approx. 2010), available at {<http://www.britishlegion.org.uk/news-events/campaigns/previous-campaigns-2/5>} accessed 4/23/2014

¹³³ See Victoria and Albert Museum, The. Nd. ‘What did YOU do in the Great War, Daddy?’, available at {<http://collections.vam.ac.uk/item/O74621/daddy-what-did-you-do-poster-lumley-savile/>} accessed 16 May 2016.

accident or design, is a tragedy. As some of the placards on the anti-war protests have said, ‘Support our troops, bring them home.’”¹³⁴ As seen previously, the troops are framed as dependent and vulnerable, even feminised, through their connection to foreign civilian casualties – and are used to justify the group’s opposition to war. Protests and materials organised by the umbrella Stop the War Coalition were typified by similar frames. A 2005 protest, for instance, marched under the slogan “Stop the Bombings, Stop the War, Bring the Troops Home, Defend Civil Liberties and Defend the Muslim Community”.¹³⁵ Once again, the troops are framed as a social cause like any other, emphasizing that the vulnerable troops are not betrayed, or undermined, as in Managhan’s account of gendered guilt, but paternalistically protected. This discourse is, at one level, a strategic way to get a fair hearing for war opposition.¹³⁶ The specific idiom selected to do so – the causification of the troops – however, suggests an anxious engagement with the possibility, as with the Legion’s campaign, of not helping – of refusing the liberal military contract.

War opposition may thus be paradoxically read as premised upon the anxious refusal of a desire to avoid the masculinist obligation of war participation and military sacrifice. In this context, the implicit allusions by the Legion to WWI, a time in which citizens might have been tempted to shirk their gendered obligation of military service itself – raises the spectre that charitable support *per se* might not be the appropriate form of normative citizenship at all...but a means of evasion. Gendered civilian anxiety may be read as stemming from both the temptation to transgress the obligations of the military contract (and corresponding expectations of hegemonic masculinity/ies) and the uneasy suspicion that this might already be taking place.

This reading of UK charitable military support as demonstrating gendered civilian anxiety helps us to understand the ambiguous political possibilities of, and for, civilian masculinities. Casting military support as a private matter between individuals avoids (if not entirely successfully) the question of public political obligation. Instead, it “downsize[s]” citizenship to “a mode of voluntarism”.¹³⁷ This enables a shift in the dominant tropes of Western hegemonic masculinity from the heroic (citizen)soldier that undergirds the liberal military contract to the empowered, beneficent charitable patron. This sidestepping of citizenship facilitates a flip in the conventional, liberal gendering of the civil-military divide, addressing the gendered aspect of anxiety by resignifying structurally feminized “society” as itself masculine. At the same time, however, the superficial “resolution” of this anxiety is premised upon military association, and militarised masculinity, through troop support. The elision of citizenship does little to address the underlying, constitutive connection between masculinity, military service, and citizenship. The ambivalence of the masculinity/ies articulated within this discourse – as structurally/descriptively civilian, yet of ambiguous substantive, political civility – remain contextualised by an anxious refusal of a potential desire to shirk the masculinist obligation of political violence.

Conclusion

This article argues for the analytical utility and political essentiality in theorising the conditions of possibility of “civilianness”, and civilian masculinity/ies, as the foundation of a new civil-military

¹³⁴ Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament, ‘CND Sadness over Casualties’, (21 March 2003) available at {<http://web.archive.org/web/20030418155937/http://www.cnduk.org/press2/press133.htm>} accessed 03 March 2013.

¹³⁵ CND, ‘Press Conference: National demonstration Saturday September 24th 2005’, (18 September 2005), available at {<http://www.cnduk.org/cnd-media/press-releases/2005/item/216-press-conference-national-demonstration-saturday-september-24th-2005?qh=YTozOntpOjA7czo2>}, accessed 10 March 2014.

¹³⁶ Lynne Woehrle et al, *Contesting Patriotism: Culture, Power, and Strategy in the Peace Movement* (Plymouth: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, Inc, 2009), pp. 30-39.

¹³⁷ Berlant, 1997, p. 5.

research programme within international politics. The case study of charitable support for the military in the UK reveals a series of contingent yet socially and politically powerful (purported) dichotomies – civil/military, feminine/masculine, public/private, and to some degree, violence/politics – that are bound up in contemporary understandings of normative, particularly Western, liberal citizenship. It demonstrates the ways in which the intertwining of long-standing conceptual associations within liberal political theory and popular Western cultural myths as to war and military service places a conceptual and experiential “squeeze” on the articulation of legitimate, positive, and substantive civilian masculinity/ies during wartime. The ambivalent “civilianness” of the charitable performances of masculinity - as socially valued, non-military, and (at least immediately) non-violent, yet continuing to draw meaning and political legitimacy from implicit military associations – illustrates both the tenuousness and the mutable durability of the normative nexus of citizenship, military service, and masculinity.

What is a fairly specific empirical case points us towards the broader stakes of the political possibilities of, and for, civilian masculinities. The ambiguous “civilianness” of these charitable masculinities reflect and reproduce what Wendy Brown reads as a broader breakdown in Western political discourse, deriving not from “maleness but institutionalised ideals of manhood...not politics, but [the] politics of estranged men”.¹³⁸ By this, she refers to a “crisis” of the modern Western “politics-manhood relation”, wherein the masculinised subject of modern Western societies (who, in an era of formal equality, may be anyone) is no longer able, through the glorious and transcendent collective use of force, to eschew and overcome the indignities and banality of “mere”, feminine, life.¹³⁹ Ambivalent civilian masculinity/ies – and its anxious relationship to unmet (and potentially un/desired) obligations of collective violence – gesture towards this larger politics wherein previously-hegemonic, socially-valourised models of masculinity and political subjectivity (the citizen-soldier) are revealed to be untenable without (yet?) being firmly supplanted by politically meaningful and legitimate alternative(s).

Civilian masculinity/ies, as a concept, analytic, lever on contemporary civil-military relations, and empirical phenomenon thus offers an important and under-theorised point of entry into the gendered/ing dynamics of contemporary conflict. The anxiety pertaining to the liberal military contract, and its potential disconnect from contemporary civil-military relations, does not suggest “that this rupture will necessarily produce social and political chances worthy of celebration”.¹⁴⁰ But the “exhaustion of existing modes and practices” opens the possibility for an alternative politics of civility, citizenship, and new relationship to the use of force – and highlights the urgency in seeking them out.¹⁴¹ The open question as to the possibility of this form of masculinity/ies (as well as empowered citizen-civilian femininities),¹⁴² explicitly detached from socially-valourised violence, haunts a range of pressing, contemporary political questions which, though superficially disparate, may be unified into a coherent research programme.

The ambivalence of “civilian masculinity” – at least with regard to those within the community, rather than in relation to distant others – is indicative of the substantial empirical and theoretical promise of the topic, which ought to be placed alongside existing examinations of, for instance, militant femininity, veteran masculinity, queer martiality, and/or the gendering of conscientious

¹³⁸ Brown, 1998, p. 187.

¹³⁹ Ibid, p. 6.

¹⁴⁰ Ibid, p. 17.

¹⁴¹ Ibid, p. 6.

¹⁴² See Ruth Lister, *Citizenship: Feminist Perspectives* (New York: NYU Press, 2003).

objection.¹⁴³ It highlights the conceptual and political difficulty – but also urgency – in unthinking easy associations between masculinity, political agency, and force. By providing an account of the liberal theoretico-ideological difficulty in accounting for civilian masculinity/ies, its elision in popular Western myths of military service/war, and an example of how such a politics may be assessed empirically, this article has laid the groundwork for cultivating a far better-specified understanding of the ways in which this trinity – masculinity, political agency, and violence – intersects.

¹⁴³ Laura Sjoberg and Caron E. Gentry, *Mothers, Monsters, Whores: Women's Violence in Global Politics* (London: Zed Books, 2007); Jasbir Puar, *Terrorist Assemblages: Homonationalism in Queer Times* (South Carolina: Duke University Press, 2007); Daphne Barak-Erez, 'The Feminist Battle for Citizenship: Between Combat Duties and Conscientious Objection.' *Cardozo JL & Gender* 13, (2006), p. 531.