University of Bath

PHD

An explanation for an individual's educational development through the dialectic of action research

McNiff, Jean Eudora

Award date:
1989

Awarding institution:
University of Bath

Link to publication

General rights
Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the public portal are retained by the authors and/or other copyright owners and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognise and abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.

- Users may download and print one copy of any publication from the public portal for the purpose of private study or research.
- You may not further distribute the material or use it for any profit-making activity or commercial gain
- You may freely distribute the URL identifying the publication in the public portal ?

Take down policy
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact us providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately and investigate your claim.

Download date: 13. May. 2019

AN EXPLANATION FOR AN INDIVIDUAL'S EDUCATIONAL DEVELOPMENT THROUGH THE DIALECTIC OF ACTION RESEARCH

Submitted by

Jean Eudora McNiff

for the degree of Ph.D.

of the University of Bath

1989

Attention is drawn to the fact that copyright of this thesis rests with the author. This copy of the thesis has been supplied on condition that anyone who consults it is understood to recognise that its copyright rests with its author and that no quotation from the thesis and no information derived from it may be published without the prior written consent of the author.

This thesis may be made available for consultation within the University Library and may be photcopied or lent to other libraries for the purposes of consultation with the permission of the author or Mr Jack Whitehead.

UMI Number: U023781

All rights reserved

INFORMATION TO ALL USERS
The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted.

In the unlikely event that the author did not send a complete manuscript
and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if material had to be removed,
a note will indicate the deletion.

UMI U023781
Published by ProQuest LLC 2013. Copyright in the Dissertation held by the Author.
Microform Edition © ProQuest LLC.
All rights reserved. This work is protected against
unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States Code.

ProQuest LLC
789 East Eisenhower Parkway
P.O. Box 1346
Ann Arbor, MI 48106-1346

AN EXPLANATION FOR AN INDIVIDUAL'S EDUCATIONAL DEVELOPMENT THROUGH THE DIALECTIC OF ACTION RESEARCH

JEAN MCNIFF

SCHOOL OF EDUCATION

UNIVERSITY OF BATH

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

My grateful thanks are due to:

Mary Tasker
Cyril Selmes

for their painstaking reading of various drafts of the manuscript, and for their comments which helped move my thinking forward;

Alan Hyde

who never tired of listening, and always knew the right words of encouragement;

and

Jack Whitehead

my best teacher, who opened the door for my own learning.

AN EXPLANATION FOR AN INDIVIDUAL'S EDUCATIONAL DEVELOPMENT THROUGH THE DIALECTIC OF ACTION RESEARCH

ABSTRACT

The purpose of this text is to analyse the educational development of a reflective practitioner. It contains two analytic frameworks. The 'inner' framework considers the origin, constitution, and use of values in education. Within this framework I examine the dominant assumptions of the literature of values education, and that of other related disciplines, and conclude that they are not adequate as a basis for generating an explanation for my own educational development.

The 'outer' framework analyses my own educational development in terms of an educational theory which can account for this development as both a generative and transformatory process.

The presentation is designed to show the origin, constitution and use of a critical educational science in which educational research can be shown to be both intrinsically educational and a proper base for teaching.

AN EXPLANATION FOR AN INDIVIDUAL'S EDUCATIONAL DEVELOPMENT THROUGH THE DIALECTIC OF ACTION RESEARCH

CONTENTS

		PAGE
PART ONE	ACTION	
Introduction		(1)
Chapter 1	The personal and social education project, 1981-1983	1
Chapter 2	The writing project, Chapters 1-3	74
Chapter 3	The personal and social education project, 1984-1986	120
Chapter 4	The writing project, Chapters 4-6	187
PART TWO	REFLECTION	214
Chapter 5	What constitutes knowledge of values?	226
Chapter 6	How is knowledge of values acquired?	363
PART THREE	IMPLICATIONS	476
Chapter 7	How is knowledge of values (acquisition) put to use?	480
Chapter 8	The justification of educational knowledge	519
ENVOI		
Chapter 9	The generative enterprise	556
BIBLIOGRAPHY		560
APPENDICES		

INTRODUCTION

Page

Contents

1 RATIONALE FOR THIS TEXT (i)

2 WRITING THE FIRST VERSION (ii)

3 CRITICISMS OF THE TEXT (vi)

4 CHOICE OF EPISTEMOLOGICAL STRATEGY (viii)

5 THE ORGANIC NATURE OF THIS TEXT (xvi)

6 PRESENTATION OF THIS TEXT (xxv)

INTRODUCTION

1 RATIONALE FOR THIS TEXT

This text arose out of a meeting held in September, 1988, at the University of Bath. The meeting was between myself and Mary Tasker, Cyril Selmes, and Jack Whitehead, all lecturers in education at the University. The audiotaped recording of that meeting (AT46) is in Appendix I.

The meeting was part of the validating procedure for my submission of my PhD thesis. I had presented a working draft to my three colleagues for their critical evaluation. Although it was still a working draft, in that I was prepared to make some changes to the text, I imagined that it would be a final draft, and one which I could submit to my examiners.

My colleagues rejected my work as not of an overall standard for submission for a PhD. The grounds for the rejection are itemised shortly. I am therefore writing this text, the second version, some of which is quite different in form from the first, though substantially similar in substance. Much of this text is original, not to be found in the first version.

In order to understand the reasons for my colleagues' rejection of it, it is necessary for me to give a brief overview of the text I produced and the events which caused me to produce it.

Please note that the contents of this introduction are a gloss of what is expanded in the coming pages of the text. I am concerned here to give only a brief overview of circumstances.

2. WRITING THE FIRST VERSION

The text of the first version exists as part of the data archives of my total project.

My study, which began in 1981, was to do with personal and social education; specifically, to document the progress of the personal and social education courses which I had helped to introduce into the school where I was deputy headmistress. The original title of the study was 'An evaluation of the social, personal and careers education (SPACE) programme in --- School', and I was particularly concerned to evaluate the impact of the work of Leslie Button as I applied it in my classes. The study lasted in school until 1986. Over the years I had altered my views about the nature of personal and social education quite radically. I intended to document this shift in view in the thesis, and to offer explanations for the changes in my practice and my thinking. The text was to be a record of my work in school, 1981-1986.

In 1986 I became ill, and eventually took early retirement from school in 1987. During my convalescence I read extensively, wrote a book, and started to write my thesis. The actual writing of the thesis was not a solid stint of writing, but was composed of episodes of creative writing, reflection on the writing which included further reading, re-writing, and further reflection. This cycle of action-reflection, in which the action of writing was itself the spur to further reflection, led me to shift the focus of my study.

I had originally intended to write a report. At the beginning of the writing exercise, December 1987, I started writing the report in propositional form. I completed Chapters 1, 2 and 3 by February 1988. I now ran into severe difficulties for two main reasons:

(i) The ideas I was working out, through my writing, were much more exciting than the material of the personal and social education project that I was re-telling. I was much more intrigued by the original ideas that I was expressing in my writing, but which I felt were illegitimate in this report. I was frustrated by this state of affairs, and constantly found myself wanting to write a text in which I could express my original ideas, rather than feel continually constrained to write about the past practice of personal and social education in school.

(ii) Because I felt that my thesis was to do with past school practice, I was careful not to include my present self in my report. The only way I felt I was justified in doing so was to critique my practice of 1981-86, but I excluded any further development of ideas, 1986-88. This was doubly frustrating, for the period of exciting mental growth since I had left school had continued some fundamental value shifts that were already taking place in 1984-86, as I shall elaborate in Chapters 3 and 4. Yet I felt I had to put myself back into the frame of mind in 1986, when I left school, in order to document the practice of school.

In February 1988, I completed Chapters 1, 2 and 3, at crisis point. The frustrations I have just identified had become so acute that I felt I had to abandon the project in its current form until I was more confident of where it was leading me. I was given solid support by my supervisor, Jack Whitehead; he suggested avenues for my reading, and spent quantities of time talking through my project with me.

I came to understand issues concerning dialectical forms. I came to see that I was attempting to exclude the 'living I' (Whitehead, 1980) from my work. In attempting to write the report of 1981-1986, I was divorcing the 'I' of now from the 'I' of then. Instead of seeing myself as a complete person, whose personal history leads to the present, I saw myself as existing at discrete intervals, each interval unrelated to the other. In the text, I was attempting to deal with my developing understanding of dialectical issues of interactions and interrelationships, but in propositional form.

There was a clear breakthrough in my work, half way through Chapter 4, when I began positively to think dialectically. I began to build my understandings into the text, consciously using the text both as a medium of expression for my thoughts, and as an instrument of thought. I was recording my cognitive processes, while deliberately using the exercise of those processes to bring about change in the processes - in short, I was becoming critical.

Chapters 4, 5 and 6 show the development of critical awareness. By the time I reached Chapter 6, I could put a name to it, and explain my own development in terms of critical reflection-in-action.

The quality of maturity of thought is far better in Chapters 4-6 than in Chapters 1-3. In AT46, JW, CS and MT agree that Chapters 4-6 are of a standard and presentation appropriate for a PhD.

I was anxious to demonstrate this critical awareness throughout the text. I wondered if I should re-write Chapters 1-3. In correspondence with Jack, I expressed this wish, stating also that if I were to re-write, I would be destroying the evidence contained in Chapters 1-3 to show the muddled state of my thinking that was slowly resolved in Chapters 4-6.

We jointly agreed a strategy that might solve the dilemma. I felt I could build into the text a critique of my own work, using the insights I had gained through the work and that were evident in Chapters 4-6, in order to critique Chapters 1-3.

In the text I had made it clear (Chapter 5) that I had undertaken cycles of action-reflection to move forward the development of my thinking. Now I intended to embark on a further cycle, where I was going to critique my own work, using the understandings that had been generated by that work.

The end result shows a progression, in which (Mary Tasker's comment) unstructured episodes of random creativity are disciplined into organised structures, and inchoate forms (Jack Whitehead) are given coherence by critical reflection.

The text was nevertheless rejected by my colleagues for the following reasons:

3 CRITICISMS OF THE TEXT

(i) I did not communicate easily with my reader in Chapters 1-3. The content was muddled and the presentation difficult to follow. Chapters 4-6 were of an appropriate standard, but the reader would have become disenchanted with the entire project, having had to "wade through" (JW) the text laboriously, long before ever reaching the good stuff, and would probably lose interest and stamina.

(ii) There was frequent repetition throughout the text. I explained at the meeting that this was because ideas were created during the writing, and were often worked out to a more mature form later in the work. Even so, said Mary and Cyril, there was repetition of material, which detracted from the authority of the overall project, and again distorted communication.

(iii) There was lack of systematic planning throughout the project. Although my critics praised some of the original work, it was felt that many episodes appeared as bursts of sporadic activity, which sometimes bore no relation to the context.

(iv) The presentation was confusing. I had tried to build in identifiable cycles of action-reflection, using different strategies (for example, different type faces) to indicate the different categories of thought structures I was using, and the times at which I was using them. This fact was not immediately clear to the reader, who felt (Cyril Selmes) that he had to pick his way carefully through the intricate maze.

(v) I was presenting my study from an epistemological ground that is as yet still regarded as dubious by many in the research community. I proceed from the fundamental premise of the freedom of the individual, the right of every person to claim personal knowledge as the basis for action (Polanyi, 1958); and, in terms of educational research, the right of every individual enquirer to exercise her creativity in making her enquiry personally educative (Walker, 1987; see also Part III of this

text). Because this research tradition is still in its infancy, my colleagues felt that I would be courting disaster to present a technically difficult text that rested on a tentative basis.

Because of these objections, we agreed a re-write. I would re-caste the text in critical terms; that is, using the original version as an expression of my practice, I would reflect upon that practice and attempt to demonstrate in the practice of this present text how I have brought about an improvement in my own understanding of my practice.

In order to clarify this concept, let me explain the root epistemology of my project:

4 CHOICE OF EPISTEMOLOGICAL STRATEGY

After careful investigation of different strategies, and active experimentation to see which best suited the demands of the action of my practice (McNiff, 1984, 1988), I opted for Jack Whitehead's presentation of minimal steps to resolve an unsatisfactory situation in which the enquirer is attempting to turn statements of value into statements of fact:

1 I experience a problem when some of my educational values are denied in my practice;

2 I imagine a solution to the problem;

3 I act in the direction of the solution;

4 I evaluate the outcome of my actions;

5 I modify my ideas and my actions in the light of my evaluation.

(Whitehead, 1977)

I suggested the addition of a generative component (McNiff, 1984) to allow an enquirer to focus on specific issues of concern without losing sight of the overall project, or to accommodate shifts of interest within the overall project (see also Chapter 6 of this text).

I consciously adopted this strategy in the production of the first version, and I endeavoured to make clear the sequence of action-reflection steps I took. Chapters 1-3, the report about my practice in school, described in propositional terms the action-reflection cycles I undertook in school in order to enhance the quality of education for the children in my care. Chapters 4-6, which documented the beginnings of my critical awarenesses, constituted another action-reflection cycle, focusing both on the personal and social education project in school, and the production of the text so far. My project assumed the dialectical characteristics of linking the relationships between the propositions I had been making about past practice to the critical awareness of present practice, which incorporated the propositions (see also Chapter 7 of this text). Because I had developed insights into the structured thought processes I had been using, and consciously decided

to use other, dialectical-transformational thought processes, I embarked on yet another action-reflection cycle, in that I built in the critique to the whole text.

Later in this text, Chapter 6, I shall explain how I believe that a crisis of practice generates sufficient tension in the practitioner to make her want to change that practice. I am at that stage now. My crisis of practice is that my first version does not communicate easily to the reader, for reasons I have identified above. So I must modify my practice. I must attempt to find a form that is easily comprehensible. My search for that literary form prompts me to embark on yet another action-reflection cycle, this text, in which I write (action) my thoughts (reflection) about the action ...

Now, there is a crucial point here, and one that will recur throughout. I take the point from Roderick (1986, p.13) when he identifies a fundamental difference between the perspectives of Gadamer and Habermas. Roderick speaks about "the anti-foundationalism present in current philosophical debate. ... While Gadamer is content to meet this challenge by looking backward to the positive function of tradition, Habermas hopes to meet it by looking forward to the possibility of embodying concrete structures of communicative rationality in a transformed society".

I may apply the same concept to my present task. I may say that Chapters 1-3 of the First Version, which documented the past practice of school, were written from the perspective of a secure 'foundation', in at least two senses: (1) I based my claim to substantive knowledge in the tradition of the literature of personal and social education, that there was an accepted way of 'doing' personal and social education with a normative outcome - a more socially adjusted child; (2) I based my claim to epistemological knowledge in the tradition of academic texts, that there was an 'accepted' way of writing a thesis with a normative outcome - a document structured in linear form which was an expression of the writer's propositions.

My secure foundation was a reflection of my acceptance of the concept of the control of educational knowledge. The crisis generated in the writing of the first version caused me to realise that the cognitive processes I was using, that rested on the secure foundation, were inappropriate, in that they were inadequate to deal with the action of my practice - the attempt to keep past practice separate from present reality. This realisation is traced throughout first version chapters 4-6.

My present task, then, is not only to interpret, but to develop a critical understanding; and, further, to communicate that understanding. In order to do this, I need to focus on the creativity of the enterprise; in my attempt to move my own understandings forward, to explain critically how it is that I have come to know, I need to embark

on action-reflection cycles that rest on the premise of the identification and systematic resolution of problems.

As part of the exercise, I need to suggest ways in which you, the reader, and I, the writer, may agree my basic claim that I understand my own educational development. We need to agree those "structures of communicative rationality" that Roderick suggests will lead to a transformed society; a society in which we do not depend on a secure foundation of reified knowledge, but on personally created foundations of mutually agreed knowledge.

This text, then, is a further action-reflection cycle within the total body of my project. I have skimmed some issues in this introduction, and I shall endeavour to make the issues explicit in the course of the text.

In terms of my current action-reflection plan, then:

1 I experience a problem when some of my educational values are denied in my practice

Problems:

(a) The first version of my thesis did not readily communicate to my readers.

(b) Communication was distorted because of

- inappropriate cognitive structures
- lack of identifiable plan
- lack of critical understanding of substantive propositions of the text, and of appropriate form

The educational values that are being denied, and that I am trying to realise in practice, may be expressed in terms of my identified educational aims:

(a) I wish to present, and have validated, my claim to educational knowledge - that I understand my own educational development;

(b) I wish to enjoy my own intellectual freedom, which until recently has been restricted by my dependence on the secure foundation of my belief in the control of educational knowledge;

(c) I wish to continue critically exploring my own intellectual development through the writing of this text. By turning it into a critical analysis of my previous practice (First Version) I believe I will further enhance my own development.

2 I imagine a solution to the problem

The solution I imagine is the production of this text, conducted again in the strategy of first version chapters 4-6, where I endeavoured to create thought through the action of writing. This text will, I hope, present the distillation (Mary Tasker) of the first version, while at the same time communicate to you, the reader, how and why I have embarked on the values shift as evidenced in the text.

3 I act in the direction of the solution

I am about to start on the body of this text.

4 I evaluate the solution

Time will tell. I like Habermas's view (1976) that the validity of communication is that it stands the test of time. "In the interaction it will be shown in time whether the other side is 'in truth and honesty' participating or is only pretending to engage in communicative action." Is this text an improvement on the first version? Can we identify the criteria that indicate improvement? and can we agree a mutual understanding of the notion 'improvement'?

Most importantly, do we agree that this text does what it sets out to do? Do we agree that it lives up to the intentions that are spelt out in the title? I am claiming to understand my own educational development. In the text I attempt to present my understandings of the terms 'educational', 'development' and 'understand' - and also of the term 'I'. It may seem strange that I feel I need to explain my understanding of the term 'I', yet that is perhaps the most significant discovery to emerge from my project so far. I understand myself better now than I did before. And that, I submit, is what education is all about. But you may disagree; so I will invite you to read the text ahead in the spirit in which it was written: an unfolding of an enterprise, the discovery of the self by the self.

The evaluation will then occur, in its technical sense, when we meet and discuss the project. Then you will perhaps challenge some of the assumptions and claims, and I will defend my work; or I will acknowledge that yours is the better argument, and modify my work. And certainly your fresh insights will inspire new thoughts in my mind, and I will want to hasten home to my writing table and investigate the emergent ideas.

This will then lead us to:-

5 I modify my ideas and actions in the light of the evaluation.

And the beauty is that the process will go on. For I have discovered through my project that now is not the full stop to the past, but the beginning of the future.

5 THE ORGANIC NATURE OF THIS TEXT

At several junctures in this text I point out that, as a thesis, the form of this text is unlike that of other theses that I have read. The difference of form stems, I believe, from its novel character.

Most of the theses I have read adopt the form of proposing specific research questions/hypotheses, and working towards providing answers or corroborations. My thesis does not do that. Instead, my thesis readily admits that it has no final answers, other than an answer that says that I have adopted the form of life that questions. This form of life has been generated by my study.

In Chapters 2 and 4 of this text, I try to show how I originally wanted to write a thesis in a normative fashion, as indicated above, of positing an hypothesis and working systematically towards its corroboration. I explain how and why I found this form of text incompatible with my evolving form of life. I explain how I shifted the focus of my text from a report of the past personal and social education project in school to an account of my own intellectual development, and how the reflection-in-action involved in the production of the first version enhanced this development. Proceeding from this view, I suggest that my study is educative, for it has deepened my understanding of my own practice, and has enabled me to communicate the processes that encouraged that understanding.

In this Introduction, I have already said that I am embarking on another action-reflection cycle by writing this present text. I am continuing my education. I do not regard my present task in the light in which I embarked on the first version, that I would try to prove an hypothesis. I am embarking on this text from the stand that I feel I may present certain hypotheses, my present best thinking, that are pertinent to my project. But - and this sort of proviso has become a factor that has evolved out of my study (for I am beginning to understand how I learn, the very mechanics involved in my ratiocination) - I am learning to "hold my concepts loosely" (Rogers, 1961). This strategy is quite different from that which I used before, when I would often be quite dogmatic in my assertions, and refuse to give up a dearly-held theory. I shall presently say more about the mechanics of my learning.

I believe this willingness to be provisional is a sign of the improved quality of my own education. The strategy of provisionality, however, has arisen out of the writing of this second version. It is a strategy that I have been forced to adopt because people rightly disagreed with some of my definitive but mistaken views. Again, I am led to realise that inflexible theories, in this case, fixed personal theories, have not always enhanced my practice, and I am required to consider the practice of my life in a pluralist society of other thinkers whose argument sometimes is better than mine, and to generate a new theory that will accommodate the diversity of thought.

So my study continues to be organic. If I have an initial hypothesis that I wish to corroborate, the hypothesis is that I have latent answers within me that I wish to discover - that is, I have the potential within me, as, I believe, we all have as human beings, to find a better form of life. My hypothesis so far has been corroborated through the course of my study: life gets better as it goes on, for I understand myself better with the passing days; and, I believe, because I am able to understand myself, I am helped to understand others better as well. This is not the vanity of individualism. Indeed, I believe my vanity has been systematically demolished through my study, for I find that there is little room for vanity within a truly dialogical form of life that is grounded in a willingness to meet others on mutually-agreed territory.

I said above that I am beginning to understand the mechanics of my learning. This is a new and exciting area of discovery.

Through the writing of the first version I discovered that there were different forms of thought, and that these forms, when seen as values-in-action (Chapters 6 and 8 of this text) could be manifested in corresponding forms of life. In this second version I have indicated how I have moved from propositional to dialectical forms of thought, and how my form of life has become free.

Now I am looking at the mechanics of my thought, and studying how it is that I learn.

This area of study is new for me, so what I have to say here is as yet not particularly well-formed. It is crucial to the drift of my present project, however, for I believe I may enhance the quality of my own education by understanding the processes of mind/brain tht are involved in my own educative process. In Chapter 3 I suggest a working definition of the concept of education as being "an improvement in the process of the development of rationality". I feel I am moving nearer towards understanding the nature of my own mental processes that are involved in rationality.

Let me try to be more explicit:

As I see it, there is a significant factor in my ratiocination: I tend to be dogmatic. I was made aware of this by Jack Whitehead: in conversation about the first draft of this second version, specifically about Chapter 5, Jack pointed out that I had made dogmatic assertions that were the products of a train of thought that was not properly carried through. I agreed - I know I do this. Through my reading, I believe I am beginning to understand what happens in my mind:-

When I first encounter a concept C it comes to me as a proposition. It is not yet part of my mental repertoire, being external as yet to my personal knowledge.

Consider, for example, the word 'salsify'. This could be a noun or verb, by analogy with 'dragon fly' and 'qualify'; its pronunciation could be salsifIE or salsifEE. My knowledge of the word 'salsify' has as yet no referrent, other than that it obeys the rules of English morphophonemics, and qualifies to be part of the grammar. I look it up in the dictionary, and find it is a vegetable. I now have an immediate frame of reference, though I still do not know what salsify looks, smells or tastes like. But in the lexicon its significant features are those of vegetable, rather than those of animal or mineral. I then purchase some salsify. I now know about the plant in a propositional sense, and my knowledge has become personal. I experience the real plant.

I believe the same thing happens for me in the wider context of 'knowledge'. When I encounter a new concept C I immediately try to make sense of it. My evolved understandings help me to make sense of the processes I engage in when I am attempting to make sense.

In Chapter 6 of this text I have presented a hypothesis whereby structures are transformed into new structures. I suggest an analytic model to explain the nature of change, that the process of understanding proceeds by the minimal steps (i-v). I have explained the process there with reference to statements of the type:

(i) I experience a problem when some of my educational values are denied in my practice;

(ii) I imagine a solution to the problem;

(iii) I act in the direction of the solution;

(iv) I evaluate the outcomes of my actions;

(v) I modify my ideas and actions in the light of my evaluation.

(Whitehead, 1977)

In such a process of minimal steps, I suggest, (v) is a modification of (i). My introduction of the generative component (see above) allows an enquiry to follow an infinite number of steps (i-v). In Chapter 6 I present the model in its notional terms to account for the process of personal development. Such a process, I suggest, is enhanced by the individual's exercise of critical reflection, in her intention to generate (v) from (i) within the total framework, in an effort to realise her educational values.

I am now reminded of Polanyi's (1958) invitation to thinkers to be dogmatic. "This invitation to dogmatism may appear shocking", he says (p.268), "yet it is but the corollary to the greatly increased critical powers of man". In my scheme, I will suggest that what happens could be this: when I encounter concept C, I try to make sense. I imagine what it could be like (of course, I may be mistaken in my imagining), and I implement my imagined form. Now this is my stage of dogmatism. It is here that I come to rest with a definition. But my critical powers continue with evaluations. I see, because of increased understanding, that the formulation is deficient, and I modify accordingly. As I said

above, I possess the latent answer that there is possibly a better form of life, and my critical awarenesses lead me ever to question and modify. I believe this is the way in which I learn, and I will attempt to show this process in action in Chapter 5 of this text.

In Chapter 5 I present a tentative model of how different forms of knowledge are generated from different ways of thinking; and I describe how the ideas presented in Chapter 5 were directly generated by my curiosity to research the mechanics of my own thought processes. But, for now, I am attempting to give a brief account of the processes of mind/brain that I use that result in a method of learning. My method of learning, I have discovered, lies in the process of

1 identification of C;
2 initial attempt to make sense of C;
3 initial hypothesis;
4 critical evaluation of hypothesis;
5 modification of hypothesis.

It is immediately clear that I am mapping this notional process onto those already identified by Whitehead (op.cit.) and Popper (1972).

In adopting this type of strategy, which I regard now as a strategy of provisionality, I am reminded of the remarks of Jean Rudduck and David Hopkins in 'Research as a basis for teaching' (1979). They say:

"Research underlines the provisionality of knowledge. Teaching, at every level, is vulnerable if it does not acknowledge that error is a realistic intellectual achievement and failure a realistic practical achievement, for a critical appreciation of error and failure is a necessary foundation for improvement. Research, which disciplines curiosity and calls certainty into question, is a proper basis for teaching."

I would also suggest that it is a proper basis for learning. I am learning how it is that I learn. I am aware now of my tendency to be dogmatic. In the processes that I have described in this section I see the dogmatism as a necessary step: I seem to come to a certain level of understanding (my tentative hypothesis, my present best thinking), and I fix that temporarily in my mind as a base for further development. As the understanding of C grows, so the base is dissolved, and the hypothesis undergoes the metamorphosis into a new form of understanding (see also Chapter 6 of this text). Until now, the dogmatism has been a characteristic of my process of learning.

Now I have become aware of what I am doing. Now I see the erstwhile dogmatism for what it is - a platform on which I may rest while I work out the next step. The difference in my strategy now is that, because I understand the nature of my process of learning, I deliberately introduce the notions of temporality and provisionality. I am happy now to hold my concepts loosely. I am fairly sure that they will undergo modification at some stage.

If I had accepted, even a year ago, the claims that I am making now, I would have become very anxious. I could never have let go of my security of fixed hypotheses. I would have linked 'provisonality' with feelings of insecurity. Today my view has changed. I have learnt that the art of provisionality is not a threat to security. It is a promise of re-creation; for if a thing is provisional, it contains the power to be metamorphosed into a better form of itself. Today, I link 'provisionality' with the notion of potential and generative power. The fact that I have come to these understandings is itself, I believe, an affirmation of the generative power of a strategy of provisionality, for I have metamorphosed into a better form of what I was: I have developed; I continue to develop.

So, to return to the title of this section, my thesis continues to be organic. I am still learning, and my learning is enhanced through my critical reflection on the epistemology of my learning.

In order to help in the validation of this claim, I have left Chapter 5 in its 'raw' unedited form. I have used this chapter to demonstrate in action the strategies I employ as I learn. The material of the chapter is relatively new in my repertoire of ideas, and I have used the chapter to show the mental processes involved in working out new ideas. I shall comment in detail in Chapter 5.

6 PRESENTATION OF THIS TEXT

The text is in three parts:

PART 1: ACTION

PART II: REFLECTION

PART III: EVALUATION

Part I is to do largely with the action of the research project, and contains original work, Chapters 1-4. Each chapter presents a specific content, and also a critical reflection on the content.

Chapter 1 The personal and social education project, 1981-83

Chapter 2 The writing project, first version Chapters 1-3

Chapter 3 The personal and social education project, 1984-86

Chapter 4 The writing project, first version Chapter 4-6

By organising the chapters in this way, I have attempted to show how the total project has two separate but interrelated foci - the personal and social education project and the writing project - and to trace the development of thought involved. It could be argued that a better organisation would be:

Chapter 1 The personal and social education project, 1981-83

Chapter 2 The personal and social education project, 1984-86

Chapter 3 The writing project, first version Chapters 1-3

Chapter 4 The writing project, first version Chapter 4-6

I would be pleased for advice from you, the reader.

Part II presents some reflections on Part I. It concerns itself mainly with theories of knowledge and theories of values, and I trace the emergence of my own understandings about the nature of knowledge and values through studying the theories, and seeing if they can account for my practice. In deciding that the theories do not have such explanatory power, I suggest a new set of theories that do meet the demands of my practice.

Part II contains:

Chapter 5 What constitutes knowledge of the nature of values?

Chapter 6 How is knowledge of values acquired?

These two chapters originally appeared as Chapters 4 and 5 of the First Version, the chapters (with Chapter 6) that my colleagues admired. I have modified them considerably to fit in with the overall presentation of this text.

Part III looks at the implications of Part I and Part II, dealing largely with questions of validity and the need for theories that will replace those that I have found inadequate to deal with the issues of my practice. Part III contains:

Chapter 7 How is knowledge of values (acquisition) put to use?

Chapter 8 The justification of educational knowledge

Chapter 9 The generative enterprise

Chapter 7 originally appeared as first version Chapter 6. It is amended to fit into the overall framework of this text.

Chapter 8 considers issues of validity raised by my own enquiry - to see if I can justify my claim to educational knowledge.

Chapter 9 suggests some useful directions for future research that I feel would be worth exploring by the community of researchers, and that I hope to explore personally.

Thank you for sharing in my work.

Jean McNiff

April 1989

PART ONE

ACTION

CHAPTER 1 THE PERSONAL AND SOCIAL EDUCATION PROJECT, 1981-1983

Contents

PAGE

1 BACKGROUND TO THE RESEARCH 2

(i) My involvemeent in Button work 2
(ii) The work of Leslie Button 9

2 PRACTICE IN SCHOOL - FIRST TRIALS: 1981-1983 14

(i) The action 14
(ii) The assumptions 28
(a) the assumptions of the literature 28
(b) my own assumptions 39
(iii) The epistemology 51
(iv) The results 56

3 CONSIDERATIONS 62

(i) How my practice reflected my view of knowledge 63

(ii) How my practice reflected my view of persons 66

(iii) How my practice reflected my view of personal development 70

CHAPTER ONE: THE PERSONAL AND SOCIAL EDUCATION PROJECT, 1981-1983

1 BACKGROUND TO THE RESEARCH

I joined a large secondary school in Bournemouth in 1974, after working for nine years with foreign adult learners of English, both at home and abroad. I was appointed deputy headmistress of the school in 1979. An immediate brief was to help establish and formalise programmes of pastoral care in the school, and to support my colleagues during this innovatory period.

At the time of my appointment there was little formal pastoral provision. The school's social organisation had been re-caste in 1976 from vertical house to horizontal year division, and I was one of two pastoral heads in an emerging pastoral curriculum. The new headmaster, appointed a term before my appointment as deputy head, was concerned about the lack of pastoral provision, and we agreed to work together to research some frameworks.

(i) My involvement in Button work

At the same time (1980), the headmaster was approached by Dorset's adviser for personal, social and religious education to send me and my other pastoral colleague, R.M., on a 9-day course at the Institute of Higher Education in Bath, conducted by Leslie Button of the University

of Swansea, and designed to allow teachers to learn about the principles and techniques of active learning in tutorial work. This was a DES regional course, involving teachers from five counties. Six teachers from three different Dorset schcools were invited to attend, the idea being that those persons would return to their home schools after the course, initially to introduce the principles and practice to their immediate colleagues, but later to set up training sessions county wide.

I was deeply influenced by the course. I had always been personally dissatisfied with my practice in school. I taught mainly disenchanted, underprivileged youngsters, who usually hated the idea of school and learning. I wanted to teach in the empathic style I had used in my work with foreign learners, but the children seemed entrenched in hostile attitudes, and it was difficult to get through. The course at Bath seemed to offer help in the methods and techniques to get across the ideas of care, to help the children help themselves, and to establish a world in school which regarded personal integrity as fundamental.

On my return to school (still 1980) I set about trying out the 'Button schemes' in some of my classes, both for myself and with R.M., and setting up training sessions for other interested colleagues. At the same time I was heavily involved in formalising a general pastoral curriculum, together with the headmaster. There was some confusion in my mind now what was happening. On the one hand I was convinced of the power of the Button approach which concentrated on group dynamics (as I then understood it, but see Chapters 2 and 3) and experiential learning, and at that time I saw this approach as essential to successful pastoral

work; on the other hand I was required to support newly-appointed heads of year within the brand new horizontal division of the school, and to draw up possible curricula for the five years, all dealing with pastoral themes. At that time (1980-81) there was relatively little literature dealing with pastoral inclusions, and the only literature I had knowledge of and access to was Leslie Button's own work, couched in the terms of his experiential approach. At the time I did not perceive the difference between content and process which in part characterised my task: first to provide a contents framework for the five years of the school, and second to 'teach the subject' which was processional in nature. I did not formalise these ideas until 1983 when I wrote my first book (McNiff 1986).

This was a confusing period, but very exciting, for I saw myself on the brink of a new era in which pastoral care was to become part of the formal curriculum. The books of Marland (1970) and Hamblin (1978) had enjoyed huge success in setting the scene; current HMI/DES documents (e.g. 1979, 1980) stressed the need for personal and social education to lie at the heart of the curriculum. 1981 saw the publication of Priestley and McGuire's 'Life after school' (1981), FEU 'Social and Life Skills' (1981), 'Active tutorial work' (1979-82) by Baldwin and Wells, a work based squarely on Leslie Button's ideas and which was to become almost a cult, and Button's own work 'Group tutoring for the form teacher' (1981).

Because of the magnitude of the projects I was involved in I approached the University for assistance. I felt that

(1) I needed to enlist support to help me clarify issues and determine coping strategies for my work;

(2) the projects themselves were so interesting that they deserved documenting;

(3) it was part of my brief to set up training sessions for colleagues, and reference to my own research findings would probably be useful;

(4) I was intensely dissatisifed with my current practice, but I could find no way to improve the situation.

I registered for an M.Phil. at the University of Bath, and took as my main research question the seemingly simple question "How do I improve this process of education here?" (Whitehead, 1980). I shall explain in Part One how I came to realise that this was not such a simple question.

This is an account of the background to the research. The field widened considerably over the years, and I can identify three significant chronological periods:

(a) 1981-1982 My early projects at school

During this time I introduced a 'Button' programme into several of my classes. I worked closely with R.M., my colleague on the Bath course, who acted as a monitor and critical friend (Kemmis, 1983). I was also accompanied, on occasion, by R.C., the adviser for personal, social and religious education in Dorset. The classes responded as I had hoped, with improved behaviour and apparently deeper understandings of how to get on with each other (see below for a clarification of what I mean by 'improved behaviour' and for the validation of my claims). I focused on one class for my research purposes, documenting their progress on audio and videotape, as well as conventional paper and pen methods, and recording conversations with colleagues in our attempt to make my systematic enquiry public (Stenhouse, 1982).

(b) 1982-1986 Exploring the field

1982-1983: I was seconded to the South East Dorset Teachers' Centre and worked closely with teachers in 16 different schools in an attempt to help them set up their own personal and social education programmes. I was now concentrating full time on the issues of personal and social education, reading widely, spending much time with colleagues in

discussing matters of education, and my own understandings matured considerably. I now produced my early work on the generative enterprise (McNiff 1984) and on the principles and practice of personal and social education (McNiff 1986). Researchers often comment on the value of writing as an instrument for shaping thought (see above, and also Rowland, 1982), and I felt that I made considerable headway this year, so much so that I applied for and was awarded transfer from M.Phil. to Ph.D.

1984-85: These were fallow years (see Chapter 3) when my research seemed to lose momentum because of enormous personal and professional difficulties. I tried to keep up my reading, but my heart was not really in my research, and all my mental and physical energies were given over to coping with matters of daily concern.

1985-1986: The extreme turbulence began to settle, and I was able to work with one group of children. This was a particularly challenging group, and I had to dig deep into my own resourcefulness to find ways of coping with them. My own response to the challenge made me think all the more about my own practice. I abandoned all attempts to conduct a modified Button approach, or indeed any systematic Lifeskills training, but switched to a style which I felt would simply encourage some sort of communication (see Chapter 3).

(c) 1986-1988: Synthesis

For much of 1986 I achieved virtually nothing in school, illness forcing me to take extended leave. In early 1986 I attempted to write up the report so far, but quickly realised that I needed to read much more in order to relate my ideas to those of others and to give the whole academic legitimacy. It so happened that I was now at home, and I began to read, seriously and widely, and the maturity of thought was considerable.

In 1987 I felt the need to synthesise much of my then best thinking, and I produced 'Action research: principles and practice' (McNiff 1988). This was a particularly important manuscript for me. It was clear from the reactions of some reviewers of the text that I was in a delicate and controversial field, and I needed to be quite sure of my ground when making claims about epistemology and practice. I read widely, and started communicating with a number of colleagues in schools and institutes of higher education.

In 1987-88 I wrote my thesis (what I call throughout this text the first version: see Introduction above). For reasons that I have itemised in the Introduction, much of that text was unsuitable for submission. I undertook to re-caste the thesis in the form of this present text (second version). The action and reflection involved in the production of the book and the first version helped to develop the critical faculties which I use in this second version to demonstrate my understanding of the process of the development of my own rationality.

These are the chronological periods of the research study, 1981-1988.

I now continue with what is particularly pertinent to this section:

(ii) The work of Leslie Button

My work in personal and social education in school was modelled largely on the work of Leslie Button. I will here give a brief sketch of his philosophy.

In his 'Developmental group work with adolescents' (1974), Button gives a rationale for his work (Chapter 1, p.1):

"To be human is synonymous with being in communication and in relationship with other people, which demands of us a range of social skills. In accommodating ourselves to other people we will also have to accept some of their demands on us, which, together with our natural concern for them, is the source of much of their influence upon us. ... Thus our personal satisfaction, growth and development is achieved mainly through the part that we play in the lives of other people and they in ours. Group work is about helping people in their growth and development, in their social skills, in their personal resource, and in the kind of relationships they establish with other people. Social skills can be learnt only in contact with other people, and it is the purpose of group work to provide the individual with opportunities to

relate to others in a supportive atmosphere, to try new approaches and to experiment in new roles. The health of the wider community also will depend on the individual's social skill, and his empathy with and his concern for others."

This book is the theoretical base for Button's subsequent production of occasional papers (e.g. 1975, 1976) in the philosophy and management of personal and social education, which he then put together in a coherent form (1981, 1982) as a systematic approach to personal and social education in secondary schools. I understand that Button's own efforts were overtaken by his student, Jill Baldwin, who published 'Active tutorial work' (1981), together with Harry Wells, as part of the Lancashire Project. Button's own work, published later in 1981, ironically appeared almost a copy. 'ATW' has since become an established tradition as a foundation of active pastoral work in secondary schools, and such is its popularity that in-service courses have been arranged at local and even national level based on the courses. I will later comment on the danger inherent in such 'package deals' and the denial of some basic assumptions of personal and social education through 'teaching by the book' as some packages would persuade teachers to do (e.g. McConnen, 1989).

Personal and social education goes under a variety of names. In the 16+ sector it tends to be called Lifeskills, and is a much more established part of the educational tradition than in the secondary sector. Lifeskills teaching came into being through social and youth work. Many of its ideas came from a movement in the 1940s and 50s that started in

America with a view to improving relations in industry and social institutions. A main initiator was Kurt Lewin, who was also the 'originator' of the action research movement. It was Lewin's 1946 paper that popularised the name 'action research' and the processes inherent in the approach. Many of Lewin's ideas (e.g. his techniques of sociometry and sociodrama, 1947) appear in Button's work, as well as in that of McGuire and Priestley (1981), Hopson and Scally (1981), and Baldwin and Wells (1981).

Lifeskills work in secondary schools appears variously as personal and social education, personal, social and moral education, tutorial work, and other titles. Its place in the curriculum varies according to the degree of importance, and the philosophical base given to it, for individual schools. Some schools see personal and social education as a foundation for the curriculum (HMI/DES, 1980), as a total educational concept which will colour all the teaching that goes on in the school and contributes to a school ethos. Other schools see personal and social education as a part of the timetable, during which time 'personal and social education' is taught as a subject. David (1983) gives a very good review of the field and comments on the amount of confusion such variation of viewpoint can cause teachers, particularly those new to the profession, who suddenly find themselves 'teaching' personal and social education as well as their ordinary subject. In a conversation I had with a colleague at school, she pointed to this lack of guidance from the literature and senior staff (me), both in terms of lesson content and lack of resources:

BD The staff feel, and I certainly do, that you don't want to spend too much time planning these things. You've got a full teaching day to worry about. The last thing you want to do is sit down on a Wednesday morning and write a lesson plan and think, 'What are we going to do in SPACE time?' That's the main reason that staff are perhaps a little bit anti SPACE time. A lot of staff do see that there's an extra lesson and to have to plan. That's why we need material given to us so that we don't have to rack our brains as if it's an extra lesson to do every day. Then it's a problem.

JM I'm sure it is, as it's a very crowded day.

BD When you've got your own lessons to worry about, your teaching subject, you don't want to worry about how you're going to plan a lesson for SPACE. (AT27b)

As far as Button is concerned, as I understand his work, the way in for pupils and teachers alike is through experiential learning. It is only by doing that we come to understand (Button, 1981). This tradition of learning by doing has a very long history, starting with the notion of the difference between techne and praxis of Aristotle, in which phronesis is the guiding light or telos. Modern commentators point to its importance, writers such as Wilson (1967) who talks of "learning rules and procedures through group work"; Polanyi (1967), who tells us that "it is not by looking at things, but by dwelling in them, that we understand their joint meaning"; and the FEU (1980), that comments on the desirability of a Social and Life Skills "programme being so

arranged as to provide a range of appropriate experiences in it" (p.42), and (1982) "an approach to young people that uses EXPERIENCE as the relevant starting point for structuring learning" (p.6).

The main vehicle for promoting learning of social skills through experience is seen as group work (Button, 1974). This is also a popular theme in much of the social and life skills and personal and social education literature (e.g. Hopson and Scally, 1981; Douglas, 1976; Brandes and Phillips, 1978; Pfeiffer and Jones, 1975). The FEU (1982) gives clear guidelines in the organisation and management of group work, and sees one of the teacher's main functions as "to manage and structure the group's work - for example, by the use of a group exercise - so that the students are able to work through some of the key issues and themes identified".

I will indicate in Part Two that I am dubious about the legitimacy of the term 'social education'. While I agree that personal and social education should be at the heart of the curriculum, I believe that the aim of education is the creation and fulfilment of personal potential, and that education is to do with the development of personal knowledge (McNiff, 1989[b]). Social education, I feel, is a matter of schooling, whereas personal education is encouraged through a process that is itself educational.

****

This has been a brief outline of the background to the research project in personal and social education. We now move on to a consideration of my practice in personal and social education, 1981-1983.

2. PRACTICE IN SCHOOL - FIRST TRIALS: 1981-1983

(i) The action

On our return from Bath, my colleague, R.M., and I set about teaching a 'Button course' to selected groups of children. At the time our main criterion was to make the children more socially aware, so that they would behave better in class, and become more competent citizens. We like to think that we were successful, as attested to by parents and staff. It was to explain this success that I undertook my formal study, - at least that was one of my several reasons - to know, as I stated in AT45, "why the courses worked".

I began my formal study in September, 1981, choosing to work with one group of children, in an attempt to evaluate the Button work I was doing as part of the overall SPACE (social, personal and careers education) programme of the school. I took as my research strategy the model formulated by Jack Whitehead (1977: see above). To ground my claim that I was trying to enhance the quality of education for my children, I took as criteria for my practice the recommendations for the aims of education, and the aims of personal and social education, as exemplified

by the school handbook (1983), Dorset LEA Policy Statement (1983), and HMI/DES aims of education (1981), which I reproduce here:

1 to help pupils to develop lively, inquiring minds, the ability to question and argue rationally and to apply themselves to tasks and physical skills;
2 to help pupils acquire knowledge and skills relevant to adult life and employment in a fast-changing world;
3 to help pupils to use language and number effectively;
4 to instil respect for religious and moral values, and tolerance of other races, religions and ways of life;
5 to help pupils understand the world in which they live, and the interdependence of individuals, groups and nations;
6 to help pupils appreciate human achievements and aspirations.

In order to provide a rational foundation for my attempts to improve my practice, I took as my base line the fact that some of my educational values were being denied in my practice (Whitehead, op.cit.) That they were is evident on VT1. The children in the film are vulgar, rude and aggressive - a far cry from the sensitive, receptive children I had hoped to teach.

I shall here give a brief account of my work with this particular group. I adopt a literary, descriptive style for this account rather than critical, in order to communicate the emotional tone of the action in which I was engaged. A critical discussion about the practice that is described in this section (i) follows in sections (ii)-(iv).

I introduced a Button course to one particular group. The group consisted of 14 14/15-year-olds in the remedial stream. I taught them English, 3 x 1 hour 10 minute lessons per week. Because they were low achievers and very badly behaved, I thought that the introduction of Button work would not interfere too severely with their academic studies on the basis that anything that kept them quiet would be useful, and also on the basis that the Button work would be bound to have some sort of impact with these children with so little personal and social adequacy.

A denial of some of my educational values may be seen in VT1. The children are rude, hostile to each other and to me, and profess no interest in school. The audiotapes that we started making at the same time contain the statements:

"We ain't no good."
"We don't care."
"The teachers treat us like dirt."
"We don't trust the teachers and they don't trust us."

Our lesson procedure often seemed to be that of who shouted the loudest, and the lesson content disappeared in the face of their rampant apathy.

Against this background I introduced my scheme of personal and social skills. My journal of the time, and the progress reports which give detailed progress chart my frequest outbursts of despair - "Why am I doing this? They don't care!" Three or four children were immediately

intrigued by what I was trying to do and were prepared to co-operate, but their conciliatory attitude was often overwhelmed by the forcefulness of some of the more aggressive children, notably Malcolm and Gary. These two boys had formed a partnership in crime, inside and outside the school. They saw themselves as potential strong-arm men. They were both keen on body-building, and a favourite trick they were developing was striking threatening poses towards the lady teachers. The three girls in the class were intimidated, and seldom said a word.

For the first two weeks or so of our time together I tried to introduce a formal Button scheme, attempting to follow his methodologies and first lesson contents to the letter. This just did not work. My attempts to get the children to shake hands was a disaster. I abandoned the scheme for a week to let them settle down. This abandonment was a regular feature of my work. I found it necessary for my own sanity and stamina to return to periods of very formal didactic teaching, when the youngsters read and wrote under my supervision and I caught my breath. Then, after this period of relative calm, it was time to have another go.

Because my introduction had been such a disaster I focused on another aspect, hoping this would find better favour, that of making a contract. Button recommends as a very first step in any course to make an initial contract that the group is going to work together. I had done this, and the children had been happy to make the contract, but had great difficulty in keeping it with respect to some of the exercises I had

asked them to do. They rejected shaking hands, trust exercises, and small group work.

I decided to introduce the idea of a contract as an exercise in class democracy. I asked them their opinion about the idea and invited comment. This did seem to go down well. We established a system of house rules, outlining codes of behaviour for the children and me, that we would adhere to as long as the lesson was in progress. They would attempt to be courteous and to listen, not fool around or swear, and I would be more tolerant, listen to them and not tell them off. My role as deputy head seemed to present some problems to them in the initial stages.

Malcolm	You're a hard lady.
JM	No I'm not.
Malcolm	You've got to be, haven't you.
JM	Why?
Malcolm	Your office is upstairs. (AT6)

The negotiated settlement provided a reasonable basis for our work together, but the initial stages of Button work (personal role exploration, trust exercises) were still seen as 'pathetic'. I abandoned the idea entirely after a disastrous lesson that boded no good for future attempts. Still determined to capitalise on these pockets of peace, I decided to go straight into what I had seen at Bath as a very useful piece of experiential learning which also had immediate transfer potential, the receiving of a visitor.

The children were interested in the idea. They even agreed to practise some skills, such as how to greet a visitor, and how to put him at his ease. Their patience at practising was very quickly exhausted by their demands to receive a visitor immediately.

My supervisor, Jack Whitehead, was due to visit the school, and I asked him to be a visitor. I also persuaded the science department to lend me a video camera to record the visit. At that time (1981) it was very difficult to get much technical equipment, and the VTR that we had was of primitive design. The quality of film is not good, but the action on the film records that the children did respond in terms approaching social conformity and personal ease.

We made two short films that day. It was the first time the children had been on camera, so the first film inevitably was of the 'hello, mum' variety. My attempts to capture the flavour of Button work are overtaken by their attempts to show off. In those days I was terribly naive about people's reactions to cameras (I had had experience myself of video work in the Eurocentres micro-teaching projects, and no longer considered camera work as alien) and I did not appreciate that the children had to get used to the camera in the room and to seeing themselves on film. I was disappointed in the result and expressed my distress to the children. By this time (December) we had established enough rapport for them to want to do the best for me (a considerable step in the project which I will focus on in Chapter 3), and said they would have another go. The first filming session took place in the morning. I spoke to the children about my feelings afterwards, while

Jack was visiting the headmaster. The children suggested that we have another go that afternoon. I was not sure that such an attempt would be worth the organisational bother, but they promised to be good and to make it worthwhile.

I arranged for a lesson change myself so that I could teach the group; their subject teacher took my class. I asked the science department to let us use the VTR again, and the laboratory technician obligingly spent his lunch hour setting up a better arrangement than in the morning. I asked Jack if he would extend his visit and he was glad to do so.

This time the results really were spectacular. The children treated their visitor with great courtesy and engaged him in conversation for about twenty minutes of filming. When the 'official' period of filming finished they continued to talk to him in amiable terms. Mark was particularly struck by Jack (Mark had that week returned to school after temporary suspension for an unsolicited flashing episode during an RE lesson) and made real efforts to contribute to the success of the film. Later, as part of his reactions to the visit, he wrote of his visitor: "I thought he was CID because he wore a suit." Perhaps, after all, he was feathering his own nest.

* * * * *

At about this time I was invited to give talks about my work at various venues as part of the Dorset in-service provision. The introductions came initially from R.C., the adviser who had been my contact for the Button course in Bath, but later from the head of in-service and other colleagues in the advisory department. I was invited to speak to a group of staff at the Dorset Institute for Higher Education, and there met a lecturer in education who was particularly interested in the content of my work (personal and social education) and the mode of enquiry (action research). He was interested to follow up my work as part of his own enquiry into in-service provision and research methodologies. After some discussion we agreed that he would join me in school to monitor my practice, and his reports would add to my own; we should complement each other's research studies. As such, we would both act as part of a validation process for the other. As things worked out, much of my work was recorded and used by him, but he then avoided making it available to me. As we had initially agreed that I would be in the 'action' role and he would be in the 'recording' role, I depended on him to keep all records of videorecordings, tape recordings and other memoranda. This he did, but I cannot include any documentary evidence of his involvement in my work. You, the reader, will have to trust my word that events turned out as I say they did.

Peter (as I shall call him) joined me in January, 1982, and spent the next six weeks in school, following my progress in many of my lessons. He sat in with Malcolm's group on occasion as an interested visitor. They greeted him in the same courteous fashion as they had Jack

Whitehead, but after that he became a spectator-recorder, and the children soon regarded him as part of the furniture. He was interested in monitoring my activity through the Flanders Interaction Analysis Schedule, and I was not then sophisticated or confident enough to require him to be part of my action. Sadly, a potentially very powerful opportunity was missed. Peter's involvement did inspire me to try an 'experiment within an experiment', which I shall recount later in this chapter, and which then prompted me to pay much greater attention to the action research style of enquiry I had been advised about in May, 1981, and which I was now following with Malcolm's group but in a not very committed fashion (see below: (ii)).

The results of my sub-experiment and the insights which I gained through conducting it caused me now to determine to keep a very careful record of what I was doing with Malcolm's group and about my own thoughts about my own practice. It was probably at this stage (early 1982) that I became a committed action researcher rather than a pretend one; in the sense that I actively began exploring my own views about the nature of my practice - I determined to investigate my present form of life - rather than merely acknowledge that there might be an alternative form of life which, at this time, I was not inclined to explore or adopt.

My decision now to keep a detailed record of my action research led me to consider more efficient ways than my previous journal or depending on Peter who seemed determined to stay external to my action. The videofilm we had made (10.12.81) had captured in action a denial of some of my educational values, and also a reversal of that denial (the

negation of the negation as providing a new base and a steady state in order to start from a new metamorphosed point which has absorbed the negation: see Chapters 3 and 6). In order to keep a detailed record, I decided to use an audiotape recorder and to be absolutely honest with the children that I was keeping a record of our time together.

I was amazed at the effect the tape recorder had on them, and the instantaneous nature of this effect. It was as if, as soon as we went into recording mode, they started playing to an audience and were on their best behaviour. Our lessons of January - March, 1982, had the pattern that they would be 'normally' abusive and ill-mannered for the short time before we recorded, they would start acting their part while actually on tape, and then revert to their 'normal' behaviour while listening to the tape. In about April - May, 1982, their 'good' conduct was transferred to non-recording time.

Because I used the tape recorder so extensively, I acquired many hours of tapescripts, which are included in Appendix 1. From these,it will be seen that I explained my project to my children (AT4 and 6) and how I would like them to behave. I still saw personal and social education at this stage as producing a certain kind of person (Pring, 1984: see also (ii) below) in terms of social acceptability, and I still saw my project as a socialising (schooling) activity. The children agreed that they would try. It speaks well of their progress that they reached a state of agreeing to agree - Habermas's (1975) criterion of negotiation, and the foundation of Bernstein's (1983) dialogical communities (see also Chapter 3).

I continued using the tape recorder as a major resource for about three months. The content of our lessons varied. Sometimes we concentrated on formal English studies; sometimes, though not often, I tried some Button exercises, but the children seemed suspicious of such organised activities. Usually they were happy to talk about themselves. They talked and I listened. I think the children began to learn how to listen to each other, as well. As time went on the girls began to open up, and became accepted by the boys. One of the shyer boys became more forceful as his opinions grew to be valued. I taught the children how to listen, and it is clear from the tapes (e.g. AT6) that, for example, Gary became a good listener and encourager instead of wanting to shout other people down. Our conversations were random, seldom planned by me, although I always had something ready if they should not be in a co-operative mood.

I am aware, in making these claims, that clear evidence needs to be available to substantiate them, as well as an identified process of validation to show that (a) my claims have been grounded through an intersubjective process of understanding with other colleagues, and (b) that identified instances of action may be put forward as representative of the criteria that have been agreed as being representative of a realisation of the educational values nominated above. I will return to these themes repeatedly, later in this section and in Chapter 7.

I must confess at this time that much of the children's socially acceptable behaviour was due to a process of bribery. They had been much impressed by Jack Whitehead who I told them was another teacher I worked with at Bath. (They never quite understood me when I said he was my teacher. I was a teacher, so how could I have a teacher of my own?) They appreciated that I had to go to Bath to work with him, and Malcolm had an aunt at Steeple Langford on the A36, so Bath and Jack Whitehead became recognizable signs. I promised the group that, if they co-operated with me, I would take them to Bath at the end of the year in the mini-bus. They thought this was wonderful, and the tapes are full of references to the proposed trip. I did in fact take them to Bath, first to the University, where Jack met us and showed us around. The group was singularly unimpressed except for when they saw the sophisticated space invader machines in the lounge. They then had great fun when I let them go off individually into the town - heart in mouth as I envisaged reports in the Times Ed of an irresponsible teacher allowing her pupils to be unsupervised and the mayhem they caused in the unsuspecting city. They all arrived back at the minibus on time, however, and regaled me all the way back to Bournemouth with their exploits - no criminality as far as I could judge.

Towards the end of our time together (May, 1982) a major incident occurred which seemed to round off our work and drew to a close the first cycle of my action research enquiry. Through my contact with Peter I arranged to spend an hour at the recording studio at the Dorset Institute of Higher Education. I wanted to show in action the increased personal and social awareness and competence of the children as part of

the validation process for my study. As this was a major event, I invited Jack to join us again for the day. The children welcomed him as a friend. Peter and Jack saw the making of the video, and recorded their comments afterwards.

Prior to the day of filming, the group and I had had a deep disagreement. As deputy head I was responsible for promoting young people to the position of prefect. I had been delighted to do so, in consultation with colleagues, for Malcolm. It was not only to his credit that, from an uncouth, abusive youngster, he had now grown in responsibility to fulfil this task, but also, I felt, to mine, that I had helped him on his way. Unfortunately Malcolm sadly abused his privilege by bullying a younger boy, and I had no option but to demote him. The group closed ranks against me, accusing me of unfairness. They were hostile and rude, and rejected all overtures from me to tape record. We had had a week of sullenness and cold shoulders. I had booked the filming session at DIHE well in advance, and could not with good grace cancel, but I was apprehensive of the outcome and doubted if anything of worth to my project would appear on film.

We went ahead with the filming. The video (VT3) shows the children and me being polite to each other, engaging in small talk but not really saying much. Then the row is mentioned. I was at the time amazed at the children's response. We had not referred to the disagreement for some time, and now it was out in the open. Instead of becoming defensive, the children were ready to talk about it. I told them how hurt I had been at their unfair accusations and behaviour, and they

accepted that they had been thoughtless. We discussed the situation rationally and sympathetically. We reached an understanding, and the atmosphere became relaxed and warm. The video catches the changing emotions and the action of people trying to search out each other and heal sadness.

Jack and Peter recorded their comments later about the episode. The transcript of this recording will show that they agreed that I could demonstrate through my work, of which this video was a good example, a realisation of some of my educational values. The HMI criteria of 'to develop lively, enquiring minds ... an ability to listen ... respect for others' points of view ... sensitivity ... an ability to argue rationally' - all these qualities come across. A comparison of VT1 and VT3 will show a clear denial and a clear realisation of those educational values, as specified by me, and as recommended by the school (1981), Dorset LEA (1983) and HMI (1981).

Although I have worked with small groups of children since Malcolm's group in 1981-82, I feel that this was the most coherent episode in school in which I attempt to show a systematic development of practice. In Chapter 3 I shall review my work with colleagues as part of my INSET involvement, 1982-83, and subsequent work with groups of children, 1984-86, which evidences substantial values shifts and perspectives on practice.

****

I wish now to critique some of the aspects of my work with Malcolm's group.

(ii) Assumptions

I shall divide this section into two: (a) the assumptions of the literature; (b) the assumptions of myself

(a) The assumptions of the literature

(a1) Assumption (a1): Persons or types of persons? Personal and social education is concerned with producing a certain kind of person, rather than autonomous persons.

Pring (1984) points out that formal schemes of personal and social education in schools tend to exacerbate the separation of theory and practice. While the curriculum is supposedly geared (HMI/DES 1977, 1979, 1981) towards helping children develop as persons, much of the literature of personal and social education and the practice that its theory generates focuses more on producing a particular kind of person (FEU, 1980; McGuire and Priestley, 1981). Compare, for example, the recommendations of HMI (1981) above, or The Warnock Report (1978):

"First, to enlarge a child's knowledge, experience and imaginative understanding and then his awareness of moral values and capacity for enjoyment; secondly, to enable him to enter the world after formal education is over as an active participant in society and a responsible contributer to it, capable of achieving as much independence as possible"

with

"Attainment targets will be set for all three core subjects of Maths, English and science. ...They will reflect what pupils must achieve to progress in their education and to become thinking and informed people" (DES, 1987)

The different perspectives are noted by Pring (1984) who refers to DES/HMI (1977):

" ... the educational system is charged by society ... with equipping young people to take their place as citizens and workers in adult life. ... Secondly, there is the responsibility for educating the 'autonomous citizen', a person able to think and act for herself or himself, to resist exploitation, to innovate and to be vigilant in the defence of liberty. These two functions do not always fit easily together." (Pring, 1984)

and by the FEU (1980), particularly with regard to the practice of personal and social education (or social and life skills in the 16+ sector) in schools and colleges:

"The sudden popularity of the concept [of SLS] has resulted in considerable diversity of practice. Some tutors provide a lot of factual material in SLS 'courses' - about health, civil rights, obtaining jobs, etc. Others emphasise the acquisition of coping skills, such as form-filling, using the telephone, reading bus maps. Some concentrate on interpersonal relationships, perhaps through role-playing disputes and analysing decision-making. Others emphasise the acquisition of specific attitudes (e.g. towards time-keeping or tidiness), or of more general attributes such as confidence or initiative. Although these approaches interconnect, and many teachers mix them, it is also possible to find examples of practice which do not overlap at all."

I would suggest that the above passage relies on the notion of the production of the certain kind of person as an objective of formal schooling. Even though diversity of practice is noted, the assumption of the text is that a particular product will emerge at the end of controlled inputs.

It would be wrong to say that the literature exclusively emphasises the aspect of the production of the certain kind of person, but I feel that the bias is certainly there. Perhaps it is a question of emphasis. Consider, for example, the following passage from the FEU (1980):

"For a variety of reasons, the provision with which we are concerned is most commonly referred to as 'Social and Life Skills Training'. We think this label is useful in so far as it implies active learning with the aim of being able to perform everyday activities more competitively ...We think it could be misleading in so far as it suggests that being trained in certain skills is all that is required for this.

"Another danger, in having any label at all, is that what we consider may most usefully be regarded as an aspect of personal development may come to be thought of as a 'subject'. This might in turn lead to 'subject teachers', and endless and fruitless debate about what the 'essence' of the subject is, and the young people being offered another 'lesson' at which to succeed or fail - instead of being offered support in achieving their adult aspirations.

"We consider it reasonable to assume that for most 16-19 year olds many of these aspirations are bound up with being a worker." (FEU, 1980)

It seems to me that the FEU attempts to make explicit the need for SLS to be concerned with education geared to the needs of individuals via a non-restrictive curriculum, but then opts for an end product of a 'worker'. The remainder of the text makes it clear that the image of the worker here is not in the Marxist sense of the person whose product is a way of life, but of the worker as part of the means-end machinery of productive forces, a position critiqued by Habermas (1979), among others.

The emphasis in the literature on the production of a certain kind of person is reflected in an associated assumption, that SLS is largely a matter of schooling rather than a matter of education.

(a2) Assumption (a2): Schooling or education? Personal and social education (SLS) is concerned more with the formalities of schooling than with the education of individuals.

This is a theme which I shall take up in Chapter 7. Here I will say that the literature of personal and social education seems to emphasise the socialisation of the individual within prescribed institutionalised frameworks, rather than resolve to encourage the personal development of the individual.

It seems to me that the notion of 'education' in the phrase 'personal and social education' needs to rest on a valid interpretation of what the generic term 'education' means in practice. I would suggest that, in much of the literature, sociology tends to subsume education. In the literature of personal and social education, the main aim seems to be the socialisation of the individual rather than his education, if we regard education to do with the personal development of the individual.

Langford (1985), for example, states categorically that the practice of education is teaching, where teaching is "bringing about education"; and "teaching is best thought of as a social activity which may be organised either as a profession or bureaucratically" (p.68). He later defines the education that is thus brought about as 'personhood': "being educated is to become a person". Similarly, Carr and Kemmis (1986) identify the goal of education as socially oriented:

" ... to intervene critically in all patterns of action which fragment communities and isolate individuals ... "

Personal and social education was institutionalised in the early 1980s, largely through the efforts of Leslie Button and Jill Baldwin (see above). I used both schemes of work extensively during my work as a teacher, and as an INSET provider (1982-83). While I was using them, I could never quite get to grips with the difference between them. I can rationalise that difference today by suggesting that Baldwin's 'Active tutorial work' is geared toward the socialisation of young people, whereas Button's 'Group tutoring for the form teacher' is geared toward their personal development. It is a question of emphasis. Button constantly emphasises the value of action research - personal enquiries by young people into their own lives. "We call this approach 'action research' because through their enquiry the participants begin to affect the situation they are examining. Their discoveries also have a strong impact on them, and stir in them a determination to take some action about the situation they have uncovered." (Button, 1974). As I hope to

show later, much of Button's epistemology is based on the work of Lewin (1946).

Baldwin and Wells, on the other hand, mention this personal orientation in the introduction to their books, yet seem not to carry the concept through into the practices that are outlined in them. Their aims, as spelt out in their introductions, are biased towards the instrumental, couched in terms to do with adaptation and accommodation.

A number of books that appeared in the early 1980s acknowledged the dual nature of personal education and social education. For example, Hopson and Scally (1981) launch a diatribe against the restrictive nature of much 'traditional' schooling:

"We have already seen that schooling and education are not synonymous. Because, in the past, they have sometimes been regarded as such, we have produced myths such as:

- education happens only in school;
- education lasts only until you leave school;
- some people are always teachers, some are always learners;
- being educated means knowing many facts;
- being clever means passing exams;
- 'experts' and those in authority always know best."

They then set about systematically demolishing these myths, finalising their argument (p.45) with:

"Schools, even with the best intentions and out of the highest motives, present to many a depowering, alienating experience, which some would say blocks off the notion and possibility of life-long education. We think it is possible to reverse this. We see that 'switching on' can be achieved by making schooling more 'person-centred'. A process that is about me - my interests, hopes, values, ideas, perceptions, ambitions, relationships, skills, and development - is one that can produce interest, energy, commitment, responses, and responsibility." (Hopson and Scally, 1981).

Yet in the same year, Hamblin (1981) opted for organised programmes of pastoral care, which included specific inputs of an instrumental nature:

"One weakness of pastoral care has been the tendency to overvalue experiential learning as if it were inherently superior. In so-called discovery or informal learning it is possible for the wrong things to be learned or for existing prejudices and stereotypes to be reinforced. What is learned conflicts with our intentions. Pupils may miss crucial points without the planned intervention of the tutor."

And McGuire and Priestley (1981) saw 'Life after school' as resting squarely on the development of interpersonal skills, while overlooking the fact that 'interpersonal' is an extension of 'personal'. They state that, in their book, "an approach to social education is presented which is founded on a particular way of viewing the situation of individuals in the period just before and after leaving school. It defines their situation as a set of problems that have to be solved; and regards

social education as a systematic attempt to help individuals acquire the skills of solving these problems by themselves."

I have attended many courses on personal and social education, and I have usually been led to believe that social education is a priority (I part company with the term 'social education': see Chapter 6). The literature still seems to show this bias - for example, McConnen (1989). My practice of 1981-82 reflected the message that I was receiving.

I have reflected often why the situation should have emerged that HMI documents should recommend above all the need for the personal development of the individual, yet the implementation of those recommendations seem anxious to focus on the socialisation of the individual. Perhaps, as Dunlop suggests (1984), it is easier to rationalise issues to do with social interactions than those to do with personal development.

(a3) Assumption (a3): There is a specific methodology to teach personal and social education

There has been a very clear assumption in the decade of the life of formalised personal and social education that the two main resources are (1) experiential learning and (2) group work. The epistemological factors here seem to be that experiential learning will encourage personal education, and group work will encourage social education. The

FEU (1980), for example, presents a useful analysis of 7 models of SLS development, and draws as one of its conclusions:

"Much SLS work is best organised as a group activity, since alternative perceptions and the discussion of others' experiences can be very valuable."

I would today challenge much of what goes on in personal and social education in the name of experiential learning; and suggest that it is more in the nature of manipulation towards the identified ends of the teacher. I am here reminded of Socrates's questioning of the slave. This was no free discourse, as Socrates would have us believe. He knew all along the answers he wanted the slave to arrive at, and his questions were so directed.

This tendency is rife in the literature. A clear case appears in Hamblin's (1974) 'The teacher and counselling'. Hamblin begins his work by rationalising the objectives of the counsellor:

"He sets out to encourage:

(i) the growth of self acceptance in the pupil;

(ii) the development of controls from inside the pupils, rather than continuing his reliance upon external checks and pressures;

(iii) the learning of relevant and competent coping strategies and of problem-solving techniques which are both realistic and

viable for that pupil."

Drawing on the work of Rogers (1942), Lewis (1970) and Krumboltz (1966), among others, he is keen to stress that counselling is to do with enabling the pupil to find personal values in which to ground his social identity. Yet, on page 216, we read:

"This chapter makes a distinction between group guidance and group counselling, showing the former to be a structured informational process which reinforces the aims of the school. ... Group counselling is concerned with the solution of developmental and personal problems." It appears, after all, that there are norms to which individual pupils need to aspire, and group work is a valuable instrument to correct deviant individuals. Throughout there is this emphasis, which Rogers (1961) identifies as the assumption by the therapist that the client needs to be cured, rather than helped.

Mary Warnock (1978) is dubious about the value of group work (and I agree with her, though I would not have done so in 1981):

"Every move in the direction of working in groups, or team activity, of joint projects and communal discussion, is a move in the wrong direction. ... Corporate activity may be a fine thing from time to time. But independence is perhaps finer." (see also Chapter 5 of this text)

****

I have tried to show how these three assumptions of the literature have turned the HMI recommendations on their head. These recommendations make explicit the responsibility of institutions to foster the personal development of the individual. They do not mention that personal development needs to equate with or conform to institutionalised expectations. The assumptions of the literature that I have indicated above seem to accept the need for institutionalised norms as the foundation of individual growth: i.e. social conformity, which suppresses personal identity, is seen as the basis of social evolution.

I will now outline how, in 1981-82, my own assumptions reflected these views in my practice.

(b) My own assumptions

(b1) Assumption (b1): My belief in the existence of a 'certain kind of person'

It is clear to me today that I misinterpreted the philosophy of Leslie Button. Button's work (1974, 1981) indicates that individuals' understandings of themselves are the foundation for social action, and those understandings are brought about through the action research of personal enquiry (see above). In this belief he is relatively isolated from many of his contemporaries, as I have endeavoured to show above, who seem to believe the reverse, that conformity to reified social norms

is the basis for individual action. Social evolution, in this view, is the movement towards reified goals which are the product of an idealised tradition (see 3 below). Social evolution, in Button's view, is in the growth of individuals who agree mutually compatible norms which are the product of those individuals' rational consciousness.

The early days of my enquiry could be characterised in terms of the clear objective of producing the 'certain kind of person'. I saw the rationale for Button's work as lying in the socialisation of the individual through group activity. The person, in my view, was the product of an institutionalised methodology, which was itself an expression of my view of abstract social norms grounded in a view of a reified Truth.

Many of these views were given expression in my conversation with R.C. (AT1):

My comments about the purpose of Button work and the SPACE programme indicate my view that persons are essentially institution-bound:

"All of the Button work I think is link work. It's involving children in their own destinies, in helping them to create their own lives and being responsible for their own lives and for their own actions, and seeing their own actions within the line of the perspective of society in general."

My view of the certain kind of person did not stop at the children, but extended to colleagues. Talking about a colleague who had expressed an unwillingness to join in the SPACE programme:

"There is one year tutor who is not committed, and what a difference he makes, because we are all aware of the fact that he is not committed. ... He's being brought along now by group pressure, by the year tutors in the group, that he's got to conform. But he is a reluctant member, and it will be interesting to see if he does make the grade. ... If we change him I shall be extremely surprised. I'm really very negative about him."

In many of the tapes I express my wish that children should be tolerant, sensitive, be able to get on with each other; this is a recurring theme. I see their personal progress in terms of better behaviour, again conformity to reified social norms. In conversation with F.D. (AT27: 26.1.83) I make explicit my educational values:

"I would put out such values as being: Hoping that the children will turn out to be more sensitive to the needs of others, will become lively, caring human beings, and in terms like that."

It is interesting to compare this view with the view of 1985, again with F.D. (AT42: 26.4.85) where I say:

"I believe very strongly in the autonomy of the child, in the right of every child to be given the opportunity to develop as a person, in the

necessity of the youngsters having the correct amount of ego value. These children undervalue themselves, don't they? So that's what I'm trying to find for these children. I'm looking for ways to help them increase these aspects, and I'm also looking very critically at my own class practice, what I am doing in class to help them achieve these aims." I had, as evidenced in this statement, shifted my view of the outcomes of personal and social education, from an instrumental, socially-oriented view of the acquisition of values to a person-centred view of the creation of values.

This now brings me to the second major assumption that was the foundation of my 1981-82 practice.

(b2) Assumption (b2): My belief in a 'correct form of teaching'.

This is in fact a cluster of assumptions. In (1) I have indicated my view of an 'output' of personal and social education, which reflected my view of the control of knowledge (see below, 3: Considerations); in (2) I shall attempt to show that I had fixed ideas about the 'input' that would achieve the objective. This input embraced the notions that there was a correct way of 'doing' personal and social education, that I knew that way, and that I could get my children and colleagues to perform in that way as well.

There are a large number of instances in the audiotapes of these views, and indications also that formed the ground for my practice.

For example, M.W. and I (AT45, 13.7.87) recall our days at school in the early 1980s, when she was a newly-appointed teacher and I a newly-appointed deputy head.

M.W. comments: "My memories of you are not having to struggle to maintain discipline but possibly tending to be the other way because your discipline was so established and so neatly compartmentalised ...
My feeling, which may be wrong, was that, consciously or unconsciously, when you became deputy, you did initially try to carry on the Mrs X tradition (former deputy headmistress). And that is where I think you were going against yourself. Because although there is no doubt about it, Mrs X did care very strongly about the children, at the same time it was a very Old Testament type of discipline, wasn't it? I suppose the analogy is quite a good one, actually, because it was a kind of pre-Hosea type of discipline, whereas you and I would want to temper it with a bit more love and forgiveness in a more New Testament tradition. But initially you appeared to be fitting into that mould, which didn't seem natural.

JM I felt very strongly, because that was the only model I had of becoming a deputy head, I felt I had to live up to that; and I felt also that other people's expectations of me fitted that mould.

Later I say:

JM I saw my role very much as a functional role rather than a personal one. ... In my early Button days .. I saw everything in terms of black and white, and I had a specific job and a specific function. It was all externalised. It was all in terms of other people's expectations of me and my expectations of myself, and it gave rise to enormous conflict. It went totally against the grain that I had to treat these horrible children as equals, on a person to person level. I had a - how shall I say it? - snooty attitude towards them that they were children and they had to do what they were told and not what they wanted. And I am very aware of this, in my earlier work. It took a lot of personal - 'sacrifice' is the word that comes to mind, but that's not the word I'm looking for. I've learnt humility."

However, the lack of humility and the conviction of the correctness of my form of life extended to my view of colleagues' responsibilities, and in AT1 (21.6.81) I hold quite a coercive view of the imposition of my will on others:

JM I regard one of my functions a breaking down the hostility (to the new Button work). It's very much a hidden objective in my work ...

RC How many can'ts have we and how many won'ts (in teachers undertaking Button work).

JM How many CANS might be a better [word], and how many WILLS might be a better basis.

RC ... I think the staff dynamics of this are very interesting, and very often missed out of consideration, treated as slightly irrelevant ...

JM Well, I'd be happy without the staff dynamics. If I could have one hundred per cent co-operation, as I have had in the other years ...

I related my practice very decisively to school policy, of which I was a representative. In a conversation with BD (AT27b: 9.2.83) I survey the field with the hope of her confirmation that my views are becoming the norm:

JM "I think what's appearing - the pattern that's becoming clearer in the first year - is that there are very clear notions as to what should be done in SPACE. Staff are very clear that they want to be encouraging among the children positive attitudes, lively, free-thinking people, the ability to relate to each other, the ability to relate to adults and authority, to get on well in society. I think that is fairly well accepted, isn't it? That these are the aims that we have ...

"Another thing that's emerging is that the style of teaching is still fairly centred from teacher to children. There doesn't seem to be a tremendous emphasis on group work, on activities. I wonder perhaps if next half term if we couldn't get together and look at different methodologies - ways of presenting the material."

I carried this view with me into my in-service work at The Oaks, 1982-83. Because of my interest in the field I was invited to work at the Teachers' Centre with a view of promoting personal and social education in local schools. One teacher at The Oaks had heard me speak, and had thought, as I had with Leslie Button, that possibly here was a way for him to overcome the troubles he felt in his practice. The headmaster, PL (AT26) had in fact long wanted 'improved tutoring' to be a feature of the curriculum, but was delighted that the initiative appeared to have been generated by the staff; and he lent his unqualified backing. "We needed a fairly fundamental change in attitude towards tutorial work in its wider sense. Encouraging, I think, different relationships inside the school, in lessons particularly. To get many teachers to see a wider role, a wider educational role than just purveying their academic excellence. I think this can only come from the staff themselves, and so we had to recognise deficiencies, looked for ways to put them right, and came to develop this philosophy themselves."

In the next section I shall discuss the epistemology of my practice, and in PL's last sentence he makes explicit the systematic action-reflection plan of identifying a problem and working towards its solution which is formalised in Whitehead (op.cit.) I shall give an ongoing account of my work at The Oaks in Chapter 3, where I situate the chronological shift away from propositional forms of practice to dialectical forms of practice.

On my entry to The Oaks, October 1982, I carried with me my assumptions about controlled forms of life. I met people who held the same assumptions, and together we reinforced each other's prejudices. It was only through our own practice (e.g. PC's realisation, through his own action-reflection, that his epistemology reflected assumptions that he now realised were alien to his educational values: AT26b) that we came to see our prejudices for what they were, and to allow our 'instincts to blossom' (PL: AT26) - to substitute an alternative set of realisations about the nature of people and the nature of forms of knowledge, that were more closely aligned to the educational values that were emerging out of the liberated forms of consciousness that we were encouraging (see also Chapters 3 and 4).

At the beginning, however, October - December, 1982, we all seemingly believed in controlled forms of life, in which the focus of education, and personal and social education in our specific case, was to turn out the certain kind of person who would be socially adjusted. For example:

PL It was rapidly becoming apparent that the pupils needed to have a good deal more social skill in enabling them to cope with the problems of the outside world than perhaps they had obviously had to do in the past. ... The increasing complexity of the world meant that pupils clearly needed to have a much wider range of social skills than perhaps we traditionally thought they had to.

He identifies current coping strategies:

"Somehow the feeling all the time, they lacked the maturity to handle fifth year courses. And the strategy for that ranged from 'We ought to be caning them harder and drilling them harder' to 'Well, is there something we're not getting across? Are we failing somehow in developing their maturity?'" (AT26: 13.12.82)

MK (Teacher) I feel very strongly at the end of five years that people leaving our school should be better able to cope with life than they do at the moment. I find that a lot of our boys when they leave are socially inadequate and very immature, and one would hope that this type of course would sort out some of the things that obviously mattered. (AT25)

It is interesting that MK refers to personal and social education here as a 'course', a specific input. The headmaster picks up this point (AT26):

PL (identifying how the staff initially had fixed ideas about controlled practices which were gradually modified into ideas about mutable practices): I think they've learnt a lot out of the course. You know, they still talk about it .. it's probably a shorthand .. as a course, just as CSE English or geography may be a course. I'm not sure how many of them see it as .. I would argue that it's nothing to do with a course. It's a philosophy of working.

JM I think that a good half of them have accepted that now, that through the techniques, the strategies, they ...

PL Yes, there are signs that they do that now when they say. 'Oh, we've thrown that piece out. That wasn't working. We can do it in a different way.' They are now much more ready to adapt. I think at one stage some of them wanted to have the textbook in their hand, and this week we .. if it's the third week we must be on whatever. I think they've learnt a lot from that.

Summary of (ii): The Assumptions

The assumptions of the literature of educational theory, and those inherent in my practice, reflect a view of knowledge that I shall investigate further in (3) below (Considerations). This view is grounded in the notion of the control of knowledge by external experts, who in turn ground their epistemologies in the concept of reified Truth.

This concept is vital for many of the arguments of this thesis, and it is important that I make quite clear what I mean by it.

The concept of reified Truth, the notion of a Truth 'out there' that exists as a body of knowledge independent of individuals, is one that is a foundation of many philosophies, among them, for example, Sir Karl Popper's (1972) notion of 'objective knowledge'. In his World 3, knowledge exists as "the objective content of thought, expressed in language as products of the mind" (Haymes, 1988), in sharp contrast to the World 2 of subjective thought processes. Donne (Satyre) noted that

"On a huge hill,

Cragged, and steep, Truth stands, and he that will

Reach her, about must, and about must go",

a view of an unknowable and unattainable Truth. This was also the great question of the Platonists. "Plato said that we could know truth if we could sublimate our minds to their original purity. Arcesilaus said that man's understanding is not capable of knowing what truth is. Carneades maintained that not only our understanding could not comprehend it, but even our senses are wholly inadequate to help us in the investigation." (Brewer's 'Dictionary of Phrase and Fable, 1963).

This view may be contrasted with a view of truth as being the property of an individual thinker. Browning (Paracelsus, part 1) states that "Truth is within ourselves", and Gorgias the Sophist said, "What is right but what we prove to be right? and what is truth but what we believe to be truth?" (cited in Brewer, op.cit.)

I will hope to demonstrate in the coming chapters how my view changed from a belief in reified Truth to a belief in created truths; but this will be explained in due course.

In my early work I adopted a belief in the unassailability of reified Truth through my reading of the literature and through the training I had received during my professional life. I would imagine that my misinterpretation of the philosophy of Button had been an automatic attempt to distort his work to fit the mould of my preconceptions; and this attempt in fact produced misconceptions which I then applied in my

practice. As time went on (Chapter 3) I realised that my practice did not fit the framework of my misconceptions. I changed my views about the nature of teaching; I became dissatisfied with my role as a teacher; I saw how my children struggled to express their own ideas in spite of my attempts to control them; and I was forced to reconsider my practice and change it.

(iii) The epistemology

The epistemology of my early practice was characterised by a belief in positivist frameworks of cause and effect, an inclination towards a behaviourist mode, and a belief in specific end products. My practice was a structured enterprise, the structure emanating from a belief that I and the children upheld the values of obedience and conformity to a reified system. I take these issues further in 3(i) (Considerations), and I investigate how I ground my beliefs in my understanding of the literature of educational theory and research. For this section I will point to episodes in my practice to illustrate the forms of thought I was using at the time.

I began my preliminary enquiries into personal and social education directly I returned from the Button course in 1980. It was always in my mind to conduct an experiment along 'traditional' lines to 'prove that the Button methdologies were successful' - in terms of my then current thinking, to produce children who were more amenable and more socially adjusted. I began my formal study in 1981, and agreed to try out an

action research approach (Whitehead, 1977). At the time I saw little relevance in this approach to my area of enquiry. A research question (Foster, 1982) was: 'How can I show that this methodology works?' My assumptions were that it did work, and that I could demonstrate its success by producing the required end product of improved children. Straughan's question (1981) of 'How can we teach children to be good?' was about to be answered.

I did notionally adopt the agreed strategy, but I never systematically applied it until after I had found an opportunity to conduct the experiment I had always envisaged, and which was then a complete failure. I am here minded of Medawar's (1969) comment that "What shows a theory to be inadequate or mistaken is not, as a rule, the discovery of a mistake in the information that led us to propound it; more often it is the contradictory evidence of a new observation which we were led to make BECAUSE we held that theory."

My experiment and subsequent crisis of practice occurred thus:

In February 1982 I was five months into my Button course with Malcolm's group. At that time Peter had joined me as an observer, with a view to documenting my practice. I told him about my wish to conduct an experiment to compare the results of two teaching styles, one control group in my 'traditional' way (didactic/authoritarian) and the other in an 'experimental' way (experiential/democratic). I set about finding two groups in school that were parallel in age, ability, distribution of sexes, and other variables. I aimed to 'teach a Button course' to the

experimental group, and 'teach English' to the control group. I would administer pre- and post-tests, which I devised and produced, to measure change in behaviour and attitude. The experiment would last one half-term, enough time to allow the experimental group to assimilate the ideologies I would be trying to get across, and to change their behaviour accordingly.

I abandoned my experiment within a week.

The videotapes of that experiment unfortunately disappeared with Peter. When we viewed the action of my teaching with the two groups, we both agreed that it was indistinguishable which group I was teaching. My style varied minimally with the experimental and control group. The resources I used in lessons were different. There was a lack of books in the experimental group, whereas I used books for reading and writing in the English control group. But, I reasoned, what would happen when I extended my initial lifeskills teaching with my experimental group into THEIR English component? That, I reasoned, would be the same as my control group.

The actions of the children in the two groups were different, in that I was asking them to perform differently. My control group were talking, reading and writing as part of their English studies, but they were also laughing, talking and listening to each other, engaging in paired oral work, moving about the classroom - all the skills which I was attempting to convey in an accelerated fashion to my experimental group. My experimental group were doing the same things (not reading or writing)

through the medium of concentrated group work. A viewing of the videos of both groups showed that the seating arrangements were different, and the grouped arrangement of the experimental group facilitated their communicating with each other more than the ranked arrangement of the control group. In both groups, however, the pupils were communicating throughout.

I learned some immediate and very important lessons from my experiment, which may be summarised:

(a) My epistemology was faulty. I could not evaluate my practice by operating within a positivist framework.

(b) My concept of personal and social education in the curriculum was faulty. It was not just a lesson, but a total educational concept, an approach to teaching rather than a content.

(c) My understanding of myself as a teacher was faulty. I am essentially a living person, whose inalienable integrity of personality will communicate itself to people, no matter what the circumstances.

(d) My understanding of the nature of people as individuals was faulty. People in groups do not become the group. They are still individuals, each with his or her own inalienable integrity of personality.

The experience of this experiment now led me to consider seriously the viability of action research as a way of tackling my problems of educational practice. It began to dawn on me what I was doing generally: I was trying to persuade the children, but in a quite coercive fashion, to adopt my values, that is, to behave in the way that I wished them to. As indicated in (ii) above, I had definite ideas about the end products of personal and social education, and I wanted my children to conform to those expectations. I was expecting my children to fit themselves into my imposed frameworks, while at the same time working to fit my whole practice into a self-imposed framework, in accordance with my understanding of the literature of educational research and with my interpretation of the function of schools and schooling.

On a number of occasions, particularly in my work with colleagues, I was questioned about the rightness of persuading our children to adopt our values. I responded cheerily that yes, we were right, because we based our values on HMI recommendations and on the Truth. I now see that I was in error. The journey to this realisation has been sometimes very painful. I understand now that there are different orders of values (Chapters 5 and 6), and different means of arriving at shared forms of life (Chapter 7). In 1982 I was concerned with rules rather than principles, with imposition rather than agreements. I explore these notions further in Part Two, and trace the path by which I came to these understandings and which resulted in value shifts for myself and changes in my actions in the world.

(iv) The results

In 1982, when I was asked what I had achieved with my pupils, I responded that they were more socially adjusted. My assessments were borne out by colleagues, and by the children themselves. For example:

RT What do you think the Button work has achieved?

JM They get on better with each other. They're more sensitive, more aware ...

and later:

Pupil: Miss lets us talk among ourselves. We don't call each other names so much now. (AT4)

and:

JM They seem to know better what's expected of them. Instead of yelling out immediately, they take time to consider. (AT4)

The children are quick to state that their behaviour has improved. In the tapes AT4 - 6, there are numerous instances of the children's acknowledgement that they were not initially prepared to get on with each other, and that they 'improved' to the extent that they were now better adjusted. They freely acknowledge that the improved situation is because of my influence. The clearest evaluation is seen in VT3, the conversation between Jack Whitehead and Peter, where they agree that the criteria of HMI (1981) that I had identified as approximating to my own educational values had indeed been realised in practice. The conversation outlines the unsatisfactory state at the beginning -

JW ... we agreed that Jean's practice showed a denial of her educational values ...

- to a developing resolution:

JW ... that is clear evidence here of a realisation of her educational values. The children are bright, sensitive, articulate. There is evidence of lively, enquiring minds, the ability to argue rationally ...

This view extended also to my in-service work. I hoped to enable the teachers to help their children also to become more socially adjusted. I am not entirely sure what I hoped to achieve with the teachers; I believe it was to become more skilled, more technically efficient, in applying the Button methodologies. There is evidence of this view throughout the documents, most notably perhaps in the videotapes of Bourne Hall School. I was asked by the headmaster of this school to work closely with some members of staff in class, and also to conduct in-service courses for others. As a body, the staff appeared interested, but many could not attend the sessions. The headmaster and I decided on the strategy that I would make training films. From my position today, from my critical vantage point, I may understand better the implications of the notion of 'training films'; for training is precisely what the intention was in the overall strategy. The films I made would present a model, a target of expertise, towards which colleagues, supposedly, would aim.

I speak critically of this venture, but I will maintain that much education did in fact come out of it, for the pupils, for colleagues, and for myself, in the following ways:

For pupils: It is notable that a number of pupils rapidly developed insights as to the merit of what we were doing. On the video I arrange for them to engage in trust exercises, and then I ask them what they have learnt from the experience. Comments abound such as:

"You realise you're in other people's hands."

"You learn about responsibility."

At the time I had a restricted view as to the function of personal and social education, and I saw such comments as indicators of the children's increased sociability. Indeed, they were; but what I failed to see at the time, and did not begin to realise until about 1983, a year later, was the degree of personal commitment, brought about by their own critical reflection on their own practice (their behaviour in class), that occasioned the increased sociability. At the time, I was still conditioned by my own training (and I use the word advisedly) that let me operate in terms of end states and fixed expectations of pre-determined outcomes.

For colleagues: I made a series of video films with one teacher in class. Linda was keen to learn about the Button methodologies, and she watched and joined in as assistant while I demonstrated the techniques. We got the children to use the camera.

Having made three films, we then showed them, one a week, to the rest of the staff as a short course of personal and social education. As part of the whole project, we then used video to practise specific techniques, such as counselling, listening, correcting, encouraging children to talk, and so on. A small group of four was particularly enthusiastic, and agreed to lead sessions at the Teachers' Centre as part of a more comprehensive personal and social education course that I arranged for secondary schools in the area.

I have only one of the films as documentary evidence, the original film in which I present techniques. The other films in which the teachers took part were kept by the Teachers' Centre. I can say that the term during which I was active in the school encouraged amounts of talk about education and willing criticism of personal practice. The headmaster attested to this many times, as did colleagues; and two later registered at universities to document their enquiries into their practice.

For myself: It was involvement with people in this manner that led me seriously to question what I was doing as a teacher, both of children and of colleagues. Over the year 1982-83 I became intensely involved with small groups of teachers and their children in 16 different schools, and I had peripheral contact with many others through the various courses I arranged at the Teachers' Centre. At the beginning of the year I saw my function as a role model. By the end of the year I saw myself not so much even as having a function. My secure foundation in the surety of clear objectives was shaken. My convictions were loosened, and I doubted keenly whether the models I was presenting were appropriate, or indeed if I should be attempting to present models at all.

This uncertainty - the disequilibrium which is part of the nature of change, as I suggest in Chapter 6 - was profoundly disturbing, and led me to question; and it is the questioning itself which I claim to be educational. For the uncertainty created vacuums in my practice, inconsistencies which had to be resolved.

During 1981, when I wished to demonstrate the value of my work, I would claim that my children and colleagues had 'improved'. It never occurred to me to think that I might need to improve. The improvement I pointed to was in terms of greater tolerance, sensitivity and sociability (AT1, 4, VT1, 3, 5)

Malcolm: We get on better than we used to (AT4)

Gary: Let me say that again. I didn't like what I said. (AT6)

The improvement in colleagues was in their acceptance of the Button work and their technical expertise in applying it.

Adviser: The staff's attitudes have improved considerably. (AT19)

Headmaster: His (a teacher's) interest in the pupils which I'm sure was always there, but it's been formalised and brought out. (AT26)

By the end of 1982 I was beginning to question the notion of improvement - not the process of getting better, but the concept of the end product towards which the improvement was directed. I was never aware of this shift at the time. I was aware only of uncertainty where before I had been so sure; and I was aware of irritation that, instead of increased surety through my accelerated involvement in personal and social education during my year at the Teachers' Centre, I had in fact created uncertainty and dissatisfaction with my own practice. By 1983 I was intensely dissatisfied with the role-model role I had assumed, and

proceeded to abandon it. My practice of 1983-86 (Chapter 3) shows the process of this shift.

3. CONSIDERATIONS

This section contains some critical reflections on my early practice in the personal and social education project. I will indicate how my practice reflected the cognitive structures I was using at the time, and also indicate how the inappropriateness of those structures resulted in the dissatisfaction with my practice that prompted me to change both my thinking and my action.

I have identified three broad areas for this section:

(i) How my practice reflected my view of knowledge;
(ii) How my practice reflected my view of persons;
(iii) How my practice reflected my view of personal development.

(i) How my practice reflected my view of knowledge

When my headmaster and I, both new appointees to our respective positions, decided in 1980 to try to rationalise our pastoral programme, I undertook to draw up some kind of blueprint for SPACE time. I searched the literature, including the schemes of other institutions, to see what sort of content there might be. I came up with a recipe for success, as I thought at the time. The recipe was an A4 sheet of paper, divided into a term's schedule indicating weekly contents, for all five years of the school. The weekly contents were then reproduced on A4 sheets, with daily contents written in, for all classes within the same year. I was proud of my efforts. I was also very cross when colleagues refused to use the scheme, on the grounds that it was confusing, too tightly structured, and not appropriate to their needs.

A similar fate befell another senior colleague and good friend at another school. Together we had discussed the contents of our masterschemes. He entered the staff room one day, only to duck a paper aeroplane.

My anecdotes serve to illustrate my view of knowledge, a view that lasted until 1983, then to be radically revised.

I was convinced that knowledge rested with the experts, an abstract, reified entity that bore no relation to present circumstances. This is the view critiqued by McCarthy in his introduction to Habermas's 'Communication and the evolution of society' (1979): Philosophy could

be seen "in its traditional sense as a presuppositionless mode of thought that provided its own foundations".

My reading of the literature of educational research reinforced this view. I accepted that philosophy belongs to the realm of 'pure' knowledge: "Philosophy is ... primarily an analytic pursuit. ... It is a second-order area of knowledge." (Hirst, 1974) I accepted that theory dictated practice: "The advances which have recently been made in our control of the learning process suggest a thorough revision of classroom practices and, fortunately, they tell us how that revision can be brought about." (Skinner, 1968) I accepted that knowledge was the property of experts, that I should regard my practice as an applied science (O'Connor, 1957) which was the property of the experts (Hirst and Peters, 1960).

I saw knowledge in terms of structures rather than transformations. A favourite book in the 1970s was Mager's 'Preparing instructional objectives' (1960), and I organised my teaching along these lines. I saw teaching and learning as separate areas of discourse, each with its own set of expectations and end products: teaching had an ultimate objective of controlling the learner. Learning had an ultimate objective of accepting pre-determined knowledge. I saw my practice as grounded in the concept of pure knowledge, and of imposing that knowledge on others. I operated on two levels of 'knower' and 'known', or 'subject' and 'object'. Carr and Kemmis (1986) identify this view, when applied to issues of education, as a systems approach: "From this perspective, it is natural to think of education as a COMMODITY ... and

to think of educational organizations as DELIVERY SYSTEMS which make the commodity available to the 'clients'. ... Under the 'systems' view, it is compelling to think of curricula as 'programmes' which are designed to make certain knowledge (information, skills) available and to create, monitor and assess student progress." (Carr and Kemmis, 1986: their italics).

I saw my practice as part of an overall system, in which I was the object of other subjects' wills; and I saw my children's practice as part of my system, in which I was the subject-knower and they were the objects of my will. My view of educational systems was hierarchical, with a pecking-order on claims to knowledge. My own place in the order was ambivalent.

By 1983 I was developing insights that allowed me to see myself as an autonomous person, with the possible ability of stepping out of the system altogether. By 1986 I was applying this view to the children, seeing that they had the right to step out of my system altogether. But these realisations were still a long way off .....

In terms expressed by Habermas (1979), I may say that my early practice reflected my desire to reach consensus, rather than agreement. By this I mean that 'consensus' indicates the acknowledgement of the correctness of substantial propositions by a body of knowers, and 'agreement' indicates the common resolve of a body of knowers to find grounds for a shared form of life. My later practice reflected the reversal of these states, in that I no longer regarded consensus as desirable - indeed, I

now believe that much consensus is damaging; I shall elaborate in Chapter 7 - but saw instead my practice as a procedure to bring about the higher order principle of agreement to agree. In this case, what counts as knowledge rests in intersubjective agreement, rather than, as I saw it in my early work, as the attainment of a reified, objective Truth (see (iii) of this section).

(ii) How my practice reflected my view of persons

My thinking here continued to be influenced by the training in the disciplines foundation I had received in my initial teacher training (1963-64). I saw matters of education falling into contributory sectors of history. sociology, psychology and philosophy; and my view of persons was that theirs was a form of life that could be classified according to these sectors. This view of persons was a derivative of the propositional forms of knowledge I applied to my practice which allowed me to hold a concept of 'person' as an abstraction, subject to normative analysis.

Thus I believed that persons could be studied by experts in controlled situations - the 'applied' psychology and sociology of structuralist theories. In his 'Pelican history of psychology' (1968), Thomson traces the massive influence that such theories have had since the beginnings of psychology within philosophy. "Psychology is now regarded as a group of disciplines which are empirical and scientific in their methods." (p.13) When I first read these words in about 1975 I took them at face

value, as a True Recording of the Facts. Today, in 1988, I question the assumptions: 'Psychology is regarded' - by whom? 'A group of disciplines' - which? He does not elaborate. Why a group of disparate elements? ' ... which are empirical and scientific in their methods' - what does he mean by this?

In my early practice as a teacher, however, I did not question inherent assumptions, but believed everything I read in the books. In my 1981-83 practice in personal and social education I attempted to apply my knowledge to producing certain kinds of persons. Like Nietzsche, I envisaged a kind of production line which was the basis of social evolution.

Persons, in this view, could be characterised in terms of their values, but for me, at the time, values appeared more as distinctive features than as personal creations. I agreed with schools of thought that believed that personality could be measured by isolating such distinctive features and applying a scale of normative statistical analysis. It occurred to me only in recent work (McNiff 1988) that such an approach is reflective of the Cartesian mentality that focuses on the reductionism of separation, rather than the creativity of unity (Riegel, 1968).

My view of persons was that they were entitities external to myself, whom I could affect but who could not have a reciprocal effect on me. I saw my children and colleagues in this light. I could teach them, but I never thought that I had anything to learn. I had all the answers. My job was to get them to ask the right questions. Most relationships I had with children and colleagues were of an I-it nature (Buber, 1937), in which I distanced myself from the objects in my life.

MW My early memories of you (1981-82) were not talking down, but very much 'I'm deputy head and you're the pupils and I definitely need to be completely in charge of you.'

JM I always felt distanced when I was in my functional role. ...

MW I think it would be probably fair to say that in your early days at school you would not be able to give that whole-hearted support. You would feel that you had far more to offer them as an English teacher or an authority figure than they could ever give you; whereas now (1987) you would probably ... (AT45: 13.7.87)

I would sum up by saying that my thought and values at that time could be characterised as propositional. The dialectical form of life I lead now, in 1988, enables me to see myself as a changing being in a world of changing beings, who is eager to enter into I-Thou relationships (Buber, op.cit.), in that I am affected by people as intensely as they are by me; I am open to change and welcome it. I see myself as changing, as well as the tree I see in front of me (Basseches, 1984). In 1981 I saw

only the tree as changing, abstracted before my eyes; and in this sense I did not see at all, but only perceived. The messages reached the brain, and were encoded; but they were not decoded. My experience of the world, and the people in it, were not ATTENDED TO, to be acted upon, but seen as objects in my space (Argyle, 1967).

As such, I had no concept of individuality, other than as an abstraction. My view was that critiqued by Langford (1985), in his discussion of the limiting view that role-performance imposes: "Performance in a role thus typically involves relations with other persons, but the persons concerned are required by the role to be seen in a limited, special way" (p.112). In terms of my practice in personal and social education, I saw my children not as children in their own right, but in their role as pupils, vis-a-vis my role as their teacher, and I wanted them to perform in the way I decided. My practice entertained no concept of individual freedom, not even my own.

A colleague told me recently that his earliest memories of me were of Miss Clare, but today's friendship was of Miss Read (Chronicles of Fairacre, 1964). Miss Clare's practices had been of late "looked upon by some visiting inspectors with a slightly pitying eye. They are, they say, too formal; the children should have more activity, and the classroom is unnaturally quiet for children of that age. This may be, but for all that, or perhaps because of that, Miss Clare is a very valuable teacher, for in the first place the children are happy, they are fond of Miss Clare, and she creates for them an atmosphere of serenity and quiet which means that they can work well and cheerfully,

really laying the foundations of elementary knowledge on which I (Miss Read) can build so much more quickly when they come up into my class." Was this the picture I presented - the benign authoritarian who was fond of her children, but at a controlled distance? Evidently so.

(iii) How my practice reflected my view of personal development

I am aware, from my relatively newly acquired position as a critical dialectical thinker, that I have operated for most of my life in terms of an absolute Truth. I still do (Chapter 8) in that I believe profoundly in the presence of God, who, for me, is the Truth; but my concept of the knowledge of God has changed, along with the concept of a knowledge of truth. Whereas I used to envisage the Truth in terms of ultimates, I now operate more in terms of ever-renewable forms of being (Chapter 6), the realisation of presently ultimate forms. I will give detailed accounts of my current thinking in Part Two; here let me stay back in 1981-83 and look at my then views of the process and nature of personal development.

The main characteristic in my mind was that there was an end product to personal development. My view was reinforced by my search of the literature. Yet here I encountered two different perspectives of an end product.

First, there were the general recommendations of HMI/DES documents (e.g. 1979, 1981) that stressed the need for the development of individual potential. Second, there were the findings of the literature of educational research (e.g. the work of Piaget and Kohlberg) that indicated that there was an end product, a sixth stage, that signalled the achievement of full development.

I believe today that my conceptions were faulty because of my misunderstandings, in the first case, and because of misinformation in the second. In the first case I misunderstood the notion of potential; and in the second case, I was misled by what are, in my present opinion, faulty representations of the nature of development.

I understand today that the notion of potential contains the idea of an unlimited number of created forms of being. Potential is the capacity for infinite realisations, unbounded enquiries. I shall explain in Part Two how I see potential as resting in the competence of the individual, as part of personal knowledge. In my early understandings, I regarded potential as a commodity, of which the person had a capital sum which she used up progressively through life. This is of course a reductionist view, whereas the views I hold today, of the unlimited, creative nature of potential, are reconstructive. Then I regarded the development of potential somehow as a journey towards an ultimate peak, a realisation of the lump sum. I see now that I misunderstood the recommendations of this branch of the literature.

The second aspect that encouraged me to think in terms of an end product to development was the work of Piaget and Kohlberg, and their supporters. When I first became interested in the work of Button, I read quite widely in the field of the psychology of development. Piaget seemed to dominate current thought, to the extent that cognitive-structuralist approaches presented a technology of teaching (Samples, 1967: see also Chapter 6); and the work of Kohlberg presented a similar culture, a complete project that covered psychology, sociology and technology (Chapter 6). I have come to my present best thinking that such approaches are inadequate to deal with questions of education; that is, questions which deal with issues of personal enquiries into personal development, the enquiry by the self into the self. I have come to be suspicious of empiric paradigms that seek to impose structures on the individual, and have opted for reconstructive paradigms that seek to allow the individual to create his own structures, such structures being in constant modification through the process of generative transformations (Chapter 6).

My early views of personal development, then, were of an end product, a state in which a person was 'developed'. My aim was to get my children to this state. Yet I had no personal conception of how this development could be characterised (see my BERA paper, 1984), other than of some improvement in social adaptation, in terms of my interpretation of the Button work. I was in an epistemological and conceptual mire, acutely dissastisfied with my practice, even though my colleagues and supervisors all agreed that the children had improved in terms of my ambitions. How and why I tried to resolve the dissatisfaction is part

of the next episode, when I returned to school after my year at the Teachers' Centre. I then reflected deeply on the practice of the years 1981-83, and gathered these reflections into a manuscript that was published in 1986. This, I believe, was the point at which I started to become critical, with the result that my values shifted significantly, prompting a different kind of practice altogether. This is the thread that I shall pick up again in Chapter 3.

CHAPTER TWO THE WRITING PROJECT, CHAPTERS 1-3

Contents

PAGE

1 INTRODUCTION 75

(i) Rationale 75
(ii) The original plan 78

2 PRACTICE 79

(i) The action 79
(ii) The assumptions 84
(iii) The epistemology 96
(iv) The results 99

3 CONSIDERATIONS 103

(i) How my practice reflected my view of knowledge 103

(a) an inclination towards propositional forms 103
(b) an inclination towards abstractions 104
(c) an insistence on ideologies 106

(ii) How my practice reflected a view of self 107

(a) a systematic negation of personal involvement 107
(b) a mechanistic view of self 109
(c) inclination towards techne rather than praxis 109

(iii) How my practice reflected a view of development 112

(a) the notion of absolute truth 113
(b) the notion of reified knowledge 115
(c) the notion of development as structure 117

CHAPTER TWO: THE EARLY WRITING PROJECT: CHAPTERS 1 - 3

1. INTRODUCTION

(i) Rationale

The writing project was my first attempt to write my thesis, and I have called it in this present text the first version. Some parts of it were later rejected by my colleagues (see above: Introduction). Some parts, Chapters 4, 5 and 6, were accepted as of an appropriate standard for submission for a PhD. Chapters 1, 2 and 3 were regarded as muddled. The total structure of the text was felt to be confusing and intimidating. This present text is my second attempt to write my thesis. The first version exists in bound form as part of my data archives.

The first version was written from December 1987 - May 1988. This second version has been written from October 1988 - May 1989.

In this text I am re-writing this Part One as a record and a critique of my work in personal and social education, and of my task as a practitioner who is reflecting on her work. The understandings I have developed that enable me to carry out that critique were largely brought about through the act of writing the first version, an intensely reflective exercise about past and present practice. In this sense, the task of writing became educational, in that it made me question my

previous assumptions, question the very cognitive structures I was using, and replace unsatisfactory aspects of my practice with new aspects which were closer approximations to my educational values. For example, I came to see (first version, Chapter 4) that the propositional forms of expression I was using were inadequate to deal with dialectical forms of thought.

In this present second version I intend to incorporate the better parts of the First Version (Chapters 4, 5 and 6), as being first-order reflections on my practice in personal and social education. Chapters 4 and 5 constitute Part Two of this second version, and appear as Chapters 5 and 6. First version Chapter 6 appears at the beginning of this text Part III, as Chapter 7. The original chapters have been adapted to fit into the overall structure of this second version, but the body of the text is substantially the same as it appeared in the first version. This second version, Part One, is not simply a re-write of a section that is below standard, in terms of style or technical facts. It represents a radical re-appraisal of my position as a thinking practitioner. It is not 'can do better' but 'can do differently'.

I said above that writing the first version was educational. I am thinking here of the work of Schon (1976) who speaks of the need, not only for reflection ON action, but reflection IN action. I believe that this was the syndrome that developed in my writing. I originally intended the first version to be a report about the action of my personal and social education project. It developed from a report about

the technical aspects of practice into a reflection on that practice. As I grew more involved in my text, the writing itself developed into a project, a part of my practice, which was making me think and which was demolishing certain assumptions I had held. So here was an expansion of thought and action, in that I began writing about the facts of previous actions, progressed to writing about reflections about those actions, and progressed further to reflecting on my present action which incorporated the actions and thoughts of the past. I will develop the implications of this epistemology in Part Two of this second version.

In this sense, this second version continues to be educational. I am writing now from the stand of critical reflection. I am bringing to bear on my present second version the understandings about my first version that I developed through the first version. I believe I am meeting the criteria identified by Schon (1983) that qualify me as a thinking practitioner; and that the action and reflection of my thought-in-action, resulting in an improvement in practice, will demonstrate the realisation of those criteria identified by Stronach (1986) that allows a study that is by the self of the self to be termed educational.

(ii) The original plan

My original plan in writing the first version was that it was a writing up, in terms of the phrase that appeared on my University registration card, and in terms of my expectations of the sequence of my formal period of study. I saw the writing-up phase as an end product of a 6-year study which had been largely devoted to my enquiries into the nature of personal and social education. Even in 1988, I did not yet see the major implication of my work, that it had led to substantial personal development and significant value shifts. That insight came through the action of writing up.

My intentions were to produce a report that documented the actions over 1981-86. I had no intention of including the acitivity of 1986-87, much of which had been spent researching and writing 'Action research: principles and practice' (1988). That was the period spent out of school, during my recuperation and subsequent retirement; and which had been for me the most exciting time of my mental life (see below 2(iii)). I thought I had better confine my report only to those episodes which were relevant to personal and social education, which was the field of my research, as I saw it then. I have come to my present stand of believing that I, as a living practitioner, am the field of research (Stronach, 1986) and my practice in personal and social education, 1981-86, has been only one episode of the total field of enquiry of which my understanding of myself is the essence - but more of this later in Chapter 4.

My thesis was to be the report of my enquiry that documented my work in school in personal and social education. I intended to relate my practice to the literature of educational research, and to the literature of personal and social education - to my knowledge there is as yet no book which deals with research into personal and social education (except my own attempt; 1986), and only one (Button, 1964) which deals with the theory; the literature concentrates on the technology of teaching personal and social education, usually in prescriptive forms (see Chapters 5 and 6 of this text). I also intended to recount, with the documentary evidence of video and audiotapes, and my written reports, how my children had attained the 'end product' of personal development that I have discussed in second version Chapter 1.

2. PRACTICE

(i) The action

While I wrote first version Chapters 1-3, I was most unhappy about the project, in terms of its form and substance.

The form I had in mind was that of theses that I have read: usually in linear progression, in report form, with a clear sequencing of ideas. The substance of those theses seemed to be presented in terms of answers arrived at through the enquiry that was being documented.

It is important to bear in mind that I came to write the first version in December 1987. During 1987 I had written 'Action research', and in this text I had been critical of forms of knowledge that assume the existence of final answers. Through writing this text, I had become more acquainted with the contents of traditions of educational research, and I now 'knew the theory', what Reid (1980) terms 'knowledge-that' (see Chapter 5 of this text). I 'knew-that' certain traditions of educational research operate on the basis that a researcher will set out to use his study to prove an hypothesis. I was critical of this approach when it was applied to educational situations, maintaining that an external researcher often used teachers as the 'objects' of his research and seemed to de-humanised them in the process. Teachers were often not seen as individuals, in this role, but the functionaries of the researcher's master-scheme.

From my reading, and from the synthesis of my understandings that writing encourages, I believed I knew the operational principles of propositional knowledge. I knew-that this was a theory of knowledge-that; in other words, I had propositional knowledge about propositional knowledge. And in my book I had been critical of educational researchers who rested their claims on propositional forms.

Yet here I was, in my thesis, doing the same thing.

I viewed my thesis, the first version, as a story unfolding to a final denouement. It would have a beginning, a middle and an end, and the end would be the conclusions I had arrived at, the answers to the questions I had initially asked. This form would be in line with the literary and epistemological form I had experienced in my reading of academic treatises.

I encountered serious problems with this strategy. If this was the theory, my practice did not fit the theory - right in line with the lack of congruence between theory and practice which is manifested when propositional forms of knowledge are seen as the grounding of dialectical forms of life, and which I had recently critiqued in the book. I had to acknowledge to myself that I had no final answers. I was not even sure which questions I ought to present as my research issues, for the emphasis seemed to change throughout the project.

As a result, first version Chapters 1-3 ramble, tumbleweeds with no foundation, no structure.

I realise now that what I was doing was aiming to exclude the living 'I' (Whitehead, 1980). I was alienating the 'I' of the past from the 'I' of the present. My view of myself as a person was similar to that view already discussed in Chapter 1 of this text - a view that sees persons as reified beings who are part of somebody else's schemes. I did not recognise myself as a material living being (Marx 1844) whose personal history has led to the totality of autonomy of present personhood.

My decision to see the present self who was writing a text about a past self indicates the same epistemological error in the work that had caused me to see theory and practice as separate realms of discourse (Chapter 1 of this second version). This error was perpetuated in my conscious alienation of my past and present selves. My present self undertook to write about my past self from a position of alienation.

There is an important philosophical and epistemological point here. In this present text, I, the self, am writing about 'I', the past self who wrote the first version; and critiquing the cognitive structures of the past 'I' who wrote about the 'I' of the personal and social education episode. Yet the perspectives from which history is recorded are different in the two cases.

The self of this second version uses critical and dialectical forms of thought. This enables her to see the present as a new form of being, which has been brought into existence by the past (Hegel, 1817). The present is a continuation of the past, not divorced from it, but grounded in it. Persons are not the material beings of discrete moments, but products of the interplay between creative personal competencies (Chapter 6) and socio-cultural-historical factors (Riegel, 1968).

History in this view is being recorded, but takes on also a creative element. History is changed through its interpretations (Gadamer, 1975). Nor do we stop at the hermeneutics, but we change the perspective again to go on to the dialectics, where we consciously use our understandings of the historical events of the world (including ourselves) to create the future of the world (including ourselves). I shall explore these ideas further in Chapter 4 of this text.

The self of the first version used propositional forms of thought. This led her to see the past practice of personal and social education as a discrete episode of life that had nothing to do with her present practice as a thinking practitioner.

The decision to go ahead on this basis was frustrating. It meant, in theory, that I had to return to the less advanced modes of thought I had been using pre-1987 in order to record the practice that had taken place then. In the first version, when I referenced the formal period of study, I was never sure which year to quote to indicate its end - 1986 when I left school and stopped teaching, but started reflecting, or 1987 when I started using those reflections and accelerated my development as a thinker. To exclude the self of today was deliberately to regress, like Wyndham's Amy (1958) who refused to use her telepathic powers and relied on speech. The result, by the end of First Version Chapter 3 (see (iv) of this section) was that I temporarily abandoned the project in despair.

(ii) The assumptions

I held certain assumptions in my writing of First Version Chapter 1-3. These assumptions (pre-conceived theories) were challenged by the action of writing (my practice), and were replaced by other assumptions (better theories) to fit with the reality of the action of my writing (an improvement in practice). The assumptions included the following:

(a) a thesis was an end product;
(b) a thesis needed to represent answers to research questions;
(c) a thesis was a product;
(d) this product should be in propositional form;
(e) it should exclude personal involvement.

I had gleaned this (mis)information from the tradition of educational researchers who produce documents in this vein, following the empiric-analytic paradigm which rests on various philosophies grounded in the notion of reified knowledge: Kant's 'ding-an-sich', Russell's 'facts only', Hobbes's exclusion of a knowing subject.

My practice of writing immediately began to negate the assumptions:

(a) Assumption (a): my work was an end product

In 1986, the end of my active school life, it would have been correct to say that any thesis I wrote then would have been an end product. However, the year 1986-87, of deep reflection and active writing, moved forward the thinking that had been generated by the practice of school; so the thesis could only be a continuation. So my view of the need for an end product forced me to take an epistemological step backward, to the thinking of 1986 - an impossible act, impossible because thought cannot regress; it can only progress, that is, be creative.

(b) Assumption (b): my work represented answers to research questions

In 1981-82 I was sure I had specific answers to clearly formulated questions. By 1983 that sureness had been shaken. 1984-86 produced deeply disquieting questions about the nature of my practice as a teacher. 1987 strengthened the questioning aspects of my life. In 1988 I adopted a dialectical form of thought in which the only answer I could find was that there ever more questions to be asked. I moved from Hare's notion (cited in Riegel, 1968) that rationality is "a property of thought directed to the answering of questions" to the view expressed by Bob Marley (1965) that "there are more questions than answers".

When I wrote first version Chapters 1-3 I had not clearly formulated this progression in my mind. Still attempting to follow the format of a 'received' thesis, I attempted to outline the research issues I had been considering, and to show how I had arrived at the conclusions to those issues. Of course I was doomed to failure because (a) I had no conclusions and (b) I was trying to pretend that I had.

In Chapter 5 of this text I trace Collingwood's (1939) thesis that a dialectical form of life is a constant interplay of question and answer, where the answer to a question immediately becomes another question. I shall then go on in Chapter 6 to indicate how this situation may become the ground for the epistemological aspects of the nature of educational theory; and in Chapter 7 to consider how it may be seen as the foundation of the communicative competence (Habermas 1879) on which an educational situation may be established.

(c) Assumption (c): My thesis was a product

In her 'Schools of thought' (1975), Mary Warnock investigates the epistemological bases of a view of education as a commodity and a view of education as a process, concluding that "education is something that happens to a child and changes him for the better" (p.32). If, however, education is regarded as a desirable STUFF, "cake or money, to be handed out", the 'results' of education may be viewed also as products.

This is how I regarded my thesis. It was to be a product of my labour; I use the word 'labour' here in one sense identified by Hannah Arendt (1958), that is, in terms of technical production, and not as a form of life brought about through contemplation of appropriate action, which is part of phronesis. The product - the report which would be the form of my thesis - would be the end result of the education, itself a product, that I had brought about in my children. I had succeeded in 'giving them' personal and social education, rather like a dose of medicine, which they in turn had 'acquired'. Further, they had acquired the kind of education I had intended for them, the kind of education that would turn them into the certain kind of person I had envisaged as the end product of the educational package (second version Chapter 1).

My thesis would contain descriptions of the kind of education I had arranged for my children, and the end products of that education - i.e. personally and socially educated children; but in terms of what I then saw as 'educated' (see above). My view of personal development was that

it was a product (Chapter 1: 3(iii)). The thesis would be a structured package that contained descriptions of structured packages.

I have deliberately used here the word 'description', for in this view my work was confined to a description of my practice, rather than an explanation. This is a very important point and one that is tackled in (d) below, and in Chapter 6.

(d) Assumption (d): the product should be in propositional form

I have already indicated that it was frustrating to keep out of my own work; yet I felt that the report form was the correct way to write a thesis. There are two major considerations here: the first is the precedence of theory over practice; the second is a satisfaction with descriptions rather than explanations.

Theory over practice

By presenting my work as a report, in which I, the commentator, divorce past practice from present understandings which are grounded in those past practices, I assumed the dominance of theory over practice. The theory of now was sufficient, I supposed, to account for the practices of then.

I could easily fall into the same error in this present text. I could assume that my present understandings are sufficient to present the report about my report (first version, 1-3). I am constantly aware, however, of the need to be open to new experiences, to learn from what I am doing. Even as I write these words I am engaging in the thought-in-action that Schon recommends (1983) to keep my work educational - that is, to keep up the level of living development through personal enquiry. This text is an organic vehicle for my development. The first version, 1-3, was a static report of a practice that I now saw as dead.

Because I saw my past practice as dead, the report I wrote about it could only be propositional. In this text I have adopted such a form (Chapter 1) in reporting the actions of my work in school; but I now link that work to my present form of life. In doing so, I am incorporating propositional forms within dialectical forms. In Chapter 6 I shall explain my conception of how dialectical forms of life are more mature than, and incorporate (rather than negate), the less mature propositional forms of life (see Chapters 5 and 6 for my understanding of the term 'mature').

By adopting the propositional form as dominant, I was assuming the superiority of reified theory over living practice. This form is evident in first version, Chapters 1-3, where, although I indicate at odd moments that I would like to refer past practice to present forms of understanding, I feel constrained to keep them apart.

Descriptions and explanations

This is a major theme running through my work, and will receive more detailed explication in Chapter 6 of this text. A quick gloss here sets the scene:

I became interested in the work of Chomsky while I was studying linguistics at the University of Essex, 1971-72. Some of his ideas have influenced my own thinking, as will be apparent particularly in Chapters 5 and 6 of this text.

Chomsky's early work was focused on aspects of syntax, but has shifted over the years to investigate the underlying principles of language competence that is a reflection of the mind/brain of the individual. As he makes clear in many recent texts (e.g. 1978, 1981, 1985), his work in linguistics is only one path of enquiry to reach certain understandings about the nature of mind; there are many other paths - I like to think that my chosen field of enquiry is one of those other paths.

I am attracted by his characterisations of the notion of adequacy, in terms of the epistemological grounds of a scientific enquiry.

In 'Aspects of the theory of syntax' (1965), Chosmky identified three increasingly complex levels of adequacy. In terms of linguistic analysis, the level of observational adequacy was attained when a language could be observed and recorded. The next level up was that of

descriptive adequacy, when a language could be described in terms of its component parts. This was the level aimed at by the structuralist school, notably in the work of Bloomfield and Skinner, whose ideas Chomsky critiqued in his 1968 'Skinner's Verbal Behaviour'. In this critique, he indicated that Skinner's work, and that of other people working in the structuralist-behaviourist mode, was confined to descriptions and observations of language behaviour, but did not attempt to explain that behaviour. By 'explain' he suggested that some indication was needed to account for the intuitions that go towards the production of an infinite number of novel uttrances; what Jespersen (1922) terms 'notion of grammar'. Once such intuitions could be accounted for, suggested Chomsky, then this was approaching the level of explanatory adequacy. Chomsky's contribution towards an epistemology of linguistic enquiry was to term as deficient structuralist analyses that aimed only for descriptive adequacy, and to go for reconstructive theories that aimed for explanatory adequacy. By 'reconstructive' I take the meaning spelt out by McCarthy (1978), in his discussion of the work of Habermas who adopts many of Chomsky's notions, that reconstructive theories aim to reconstruct explicitly what is already implicit in the mind of the individual. So, for example, when a speaker-hearer recognises the ambiguity in phrases such as

Time flies

Visiting relatives can be a bore

or recognises the unacceptability of grammatically correct strings such as

> This is the man whose aunt whose brother went to London yesterday I saw get on the train who telephoned later

the way to explain the intuitions in the mind of the speaker-hearer that allows him to 'know' (Chomsky's 'cognize': 1985) the elements of ambiguity or unacceptability is to hypothesise the existence of mental linguistic rules. These rules, when made explicit (1965), form the foundation of a grammar. Any utterances that do not abide by the rules are discounted as not belonging to the language.

This is the scientific basis of Chomsky's notion 'rule of grammar'; and when such rules of grammar may be organised and demonstrated in action (made explicit), the study that aims at this making explicit may be said to have attained explanatory adequacy.

Chomsky extended this notion recently, particularly in 'Knowledge of language' (1985) when he identified two parameters of scientific enquiry. Now shifting his ground significantly from a relatively narrow perspective of the study of language to a wider perspective of the study of mind, Chomsky identifies the areas of E-language and I-language. For him, E-language refers to a study that concentrates on extended language - that is, the language that is used by a body of people. The epistemology of this level of enquiry would usually rest at description, i.e. it would aim to describe and record the utterances of a group, that

served as the basis of adequate communication between members of that group. An I-language refers to a study of an internal language - that is, the intuitions of an individual that give him the capacity to use any and every language that he chooses. An I-language aims for explanatory adequacy; i.e. it makes explicit the linguistic intuitions of the individual that are already in his mind, in the form of the innate capacity for the rules of language.

I use the concepts of levels of adequacy and types of enquiry in my work. I indicate throughout that an enquiry that aims to record and describe the educational practices of other people, external to the enquirer, is limited to the level of description, an E-study. The epistemology here is to 'know about' something, to acquire an amount of propositional and procedural knowledge (Chapter 5 of this text) that allows an enquirer to make pronouncements about other people's practices. On the other hand, an enquiry that aims to explain the educational practices of the self aims at explantory adequacy, an I-study. The epistemology here is to understand, to create the personal knowledge (Polanyi, 1958) that allows an individual to make explicit how she has improved her life, i.e. brought about an improvement in practice. In this way she may claim that her enquiry has been educational - her personal enquiry has caused her to make changes in her own form of life that have led to an improved situation.

In first version, 1-3, my work was in propositional form. I aimed to describe my practice in school, but I saw that practice as finished. In first version, Chapters 4-6, I increasingly adopted a dialectical form (see also Chapter 4 of this text). At the time I was content to stay at the levels of description and propositions. I am now of the opinion that such levels are not educational (not part of an I-enquiry), but are more concerned with the management of educational situations. I wanted to show how I was beginning to understand what constituted my own development, and I wanted to be free of the propositional mode. I wanted to write in terms of current understandings, but I did not know how to change. I grew disenchanted with the restrictive nature of the form I had adopted for first version 1-3, and I abandoned the work.

(e) Assumption (e): the thesis should exclude personal involvement

Some traditions of enquiry tend to omit personal involvement in descriptions and explanations. Attempts to introduce the element of personal involvement, in order to make the enquiry one of personal commitment (in the sense identified in this text), have sometimes met with resistance (e.g Whitehead, 1989).

I adhered to such a tradition in first version 1-3. The resultant practice of adopting a propositional form of life was so alien to my emergent enlightened thinking that a crisis of practice took place that forced me to abandon the project. My emergent thinking was in the form of educational values that focused on the freedom of the thinker to adopt a form in which that freedom could be expressed (Feyerabend, 1970); the need for a form of scientific enquiry that would allow for a systematic abandonment of less satisfactory forms and the adoption of forms that approximated closer to the educational values that were emerging (Popper, 1972); the need for the elements of fun, curiosity and excitement in the discovery of knowledge (Feynmann, BBC, 1987; Popper, The Guardian, 1988) to be an integral part of the enquiry. All these aspects could not be included in the propositional form that I felt constrained to adopt.

When I came to the end of first version Chapter 3 I was greatly saddened. I enjoy writing, and I should have been enjoying writing my thesis. I felt that I was discovering forms of life that were appealing, but those forms were outside the barriers of the propositional descriptions that I felt confined to. Because my personal involvement was not allowed, I left the writing of the thesis, and looked for other paths to enlightenment (see Chapter 4 of this text).

(iii) The epistemology

Throughout, I saw the product that was my thesis as a structure. This structure contained a specific content. The content could be itemised and categorised, analysed in terms of its constituent parts. I deliberately adopted a structuralist approach to the work, in that I attempted to present it as discrete aspects of a practice that was itself a discrete part of my life.

I was throughout aware of the need to provide a scientific basis for my enquiry. I was aware of Stenhouse's (1982) definition of an educational enquiry: "a systematic enquiry made public"; and I wanted to fulfil the criterion of the systematic nature of my enquiry. I realise now that I confused the terms 'systematic' and 'chronological', seeing them then as synonymous. I realise now that chronology is a central aspect of structuralist theories which adopt an essentially linear approach in a concentration on demonstrating cause and effect. In First Version 1-3, I was aware of the need to describe the systematic (chronological) nature of my practice, to point to the causes and the effects in terms of changed behaviour in the children. To a certain extent I have done this in Chapter 1 of this text, but I am incorporating those propositional elements within the conceptually critical framework of the overall work.

I was also confusing the notion of 'scientific' with 'systematic/chronological'. I had previously pointed to the work of Popper (1972) as the definition of 'scientific':

"The process can be described by the following somewhat over-simplified schema ... :

P1 ——— TT ——— EE ——— P2

That is, we start from some problem P1, proceed to a tentative solution or tentative theory TT, which may be (partly or wholly) mistaken; in any case it will be subject to error-elimination, EE, which may consist of critical discussion or experimental tests; at any rate, new problems P2 arise from our own creative activity." (Popper, 1972)

In first version 1-3 I had the mentality that saw the elements incorporated in the discrete formulations 'P1', 'TT' as chronological steps in the total formulation P1 -- P2. In turn, this total formulation was a chronological step in the enquiry, and the next step would be a new, identical formulation of P1 -- P2. My thinking was again directed along linear paths towards end products.

I began to see, dimly at first, that 'systematic' and 'scientific' are not synonymous, and have little to do with chronology. I realised that 'systematic' implies 'disciplined', in line with my previous remarks above of the need to make explicit what is already implicit, part of the personal knowledge (Polanyi, 1958) of the enquirer. It was necessary, I began to see, to make the knowledge I held available in an understandable form that would communicate itself to another enquirer. The conception of 'systematic' was to do with the exercise of

communication of knowledge rather than the compartmentalisation of knowledge.

Similarly, I began to unravel my misunderstandings of the notion of 'scientific' enquiry. I moved away from images of linearity and chronology, and turned towards concepts about total forms of enquiry that are a manifestation in action of a thinker's form of life. I came to see Popper's formulation not as a content but as a procedure - i.e. not specific categories of action, but general principles for action.

These were all important learnings for me, but at the time very confusing. I had no point of reference on which to fix my emergent thinking, other than the act of faith that it would all come out right in the end. My efforts to understand, and the outcomes, are documented in Chaper 4 of this text.

(iv) The results

This section glosses some of what appears in first version, Chapter 4. The material is expanded in Chapter 5 of this Second Version.

So far in this chapter I have given reasons for the dissatisfaction with first version 1-3. In first version, Chapter 4, I came to writing about forms of knowledge and forms of values acquisition. These substantive elements were in fact what were the most important elements in my mental life at the time; without realising it, through the act of analysing forms of knowledge and forms of values acquisition, I was making explicit to myself the forms of knowledge and the forms of values acquisition that were available to me, and the forms that I had elected to use. Through my study of the literature - other people's ideas about these areas - I was being forced to become involved in my own understandings, and in decisions about my actions prompted by those understandings. My propositional knowledge, the 'knowledge-that' that I had gained from my study of the literature, was being transformed into personal knowledge, the understanding of my internalisation of the 'knowledge-that' that was producing new forms of thought.

The crisis occurred when I came to writing about views of personhood. I had categorised views of forms of knowledge into

1. (1) propositional knowledge - know-that
   (2) procedural knowledge - know-how
   (3) personal knowledge - know + direct object

I had further categorised views of forms of values acquisition into

2. (1) values as instrumental

   (2) values as from a sociological perspective

   (3) values as personal forms of life

Within 2. (3) I had categorised views of personhood as

(i) an instrumentalist's view of persons

(ii) a sociologist's view of persons

(iii) a dialectician's view of persons

It was this last that caused the penny to drop. For I saw my work until now resting on the epistemology of other people's ideas about other people; whereas now I came to the realisation of the need for an epistemology of the self's understanding of the self. I had until now tried to give an analysis of my practice in terms of the reified knowledge of the literature; now it became immediately evident that I had to account for my own understandings of my own practice.

I could not rationalise it in these terms at the time. I recall that I was in despair with the project. The form I was using was entirely inappropriate, I realised, but, short of going back and starting again, I could see no way out. I also had no clear idea how I would re-formulate the text.

I abandoned the writing temporarily until I had had time to talk to Jack Whitehead about my difficulties. He counselled that I was evidently moving towards a dialectical form of thought, and recommended certain texts that would be useful (for example, Riegel, 1973).

I must note at this juncture that I had been in close touch with Jack by letter and by phone. For all the years of my study, he had been generous with his time and availability, and particularly so when we worked together on 'Action research'. At this time of the research he was particularly supportive, offering advice and encouragement. But no one person can make a myopic see; I had to put on my own glasses. All Jack's encouragement could not make me change entrenched values; but what it did do was provide the insistent encouragement that perhaps there was another way of life available.

So I visited the library, collected a number of works that appeared useful (for example, Basseches, 1984), and settled down to several weeks of intense reading and reflection.

The results were astounding. I realised the enormous difference between propositional and dialectical forms. I came to understand what this meant when applied to the reality of my own life. I continued writing Chapter 4, but this time from a different perspective, seeing the writing project now as a continuation of my practice, rather than as a platform from which to recount past practice.

I will continue this theme in Chapter 4 of this text. I will here conclude this section by indicating that this was probably the most turbulent but exhilarating episode of my mental life. It opened doors that I had until now not realised existed, and enabled me to develop a mentality that is reflected in the sentence from Roderick (1986) that I have already quoted in Chapter 1. Here, Roderick points to the difference between Gadamer's hermeneutic science and Habermas's critical science. The former, he says, assumes that present practice is constituted by, and grounded in past practice. The present may be interpreted through the past. Habermas, on the other hand, regards the present as the foundation for the future; while he agrees with Gadamar's philosophy, he tries to change the perspective so that present practice will form the ground for future practice.

This was the turning point for my thesis. I abandoned the propositional forms that required me to see past practice as reified and external to myself. I now saw my present practice as shaped and formed by the past, but equally that my present practice was now the ground for future development. I realised that my life was not a linear sequence of discrete episodes, but a whole that was shaped by my understanding of my experience of events, and not by the events themselves.

3. CONSIDERATIONS

I wish now to reflect on what I have written about my practice. There are two levels of reflection here: the writing about my practice is the first-order reflection, and what I am about to write in this section is a second-order reflection on my writing.

I will start from the perspective of how my practice reflected certain views. I have already indicated the crisis that caused these views to emerge, and I will indicate the changes in thinking in Chapter 4 of this text. Here I will consider how my practice reflected

(i) my view of knowledge
(ii) my view of self
(iii) my view of development

(i) How my practice reflected my view of knowledge

(a) An inclination towards propositional forms

I have indicated at length that I was inclined towards propositional forms. I will here only point to some implicational aspects of my discovery of dialectical forms of thought, and these aspects will receive more detailed treatment later.

- I see dialectical forms as a more appropriate ground than propositional forms in values education (Chapter 5 of this text). Current values education is mainly focused on propositional forms of development - e.g. cognitive developmental frameworks (Piaget, Kohlberg); values analysis (Raths et al. (1978), Simon et al. (1972), McPhail et al.(1972). Very few formal schemes are available that focus on the development of the person (Button, 1981) rather than on the development of a certain kind of person (e.g. McConnen, 1989) (see also Chapter 1 of this text).

- I see dialectical forms as a more appropriate ground for in-service education (Chapter 7). My early practice (Chapter 1) was grounded in the phenomenology of experience - i.e. events themselves were seen as the source of experience for teachers. I will indicate that it is not enough for teachers to experience the events, but to experience the experience, to 'dwell in' (Buber, 1937) a phenomenon in order to develop a critical awareness of their own experience of an event or episode.

(b) An inclination towards abstractions

Throughout the First Version, Chapters 1-3, I saw my thesis as an abstraction, a thing to be produced. I did not see it as part of the living 'I', that in turn is part of the socio-economic culture in which I live (Riegel, 1968).

Most importantly for the issues of this text, I did not see it as a contributory factor to my own development. I had the view that I had developed, reached the final stage that is hypothesised by the cognitive developmentalists, and was now creating this object that was the product of my development.

The contents of First Version 1-3 are also presented as abstractions. They are not seen as constituent parts of the ultimate development that I had now reached.

The change in mental perspective led in fact to an abandonment of abstractions. I came to see the notion of abstraction as a useful analytical tool. I could take an idea out of context, and discuss it as an abstraction, but now I see the need always to reinstate it as part of a living context. I have developed this procedure substantially in Chapter 6 of this text, where I discuss the characteristics of dialectical forms as holding within themselves propositional forms. Parallel to this notion is the idea of synthesis existing together with analysis. So, when I come to discuss in Chapter 6, say, the nature of change as part of an educational enquiry, I deliberately abstract elements to form an analytic model, but then reinstate it into the context of reality in order to demonstrate the synthesis of an integrated life form.

(c) An insistence on ideologies

I became interested in the work of Jay and Horkheimer, and point to their efforts (Jay, 1973; Horkheimer, 1972) to demolish the concept of ideologies as the basis of social evolution. Habermas also hypothesises alternative bases for social evolution, notably the concept of dialogical communities (Habermas, 1979) which encourage the generation of mutually agreed normative values.

In Chapter 1 of this text I have indicated how I departed from the concept of ideologies as the basis for my practice as a teacher. I had the view that social evolution rested on an ideological basis that saw the role of teachers as producing the certain kind of person who would adjust to that ideology. In this present chapter, I have indicated how I have parted from the concept of ideology as the basis for my practice as a thinker. I had the view that the production of a thesis rested on an ideological basis that saw the role of the writer as recording practice in a propositional mode.

My practice, both as a reflexive teacher and as a reflexive writer, critically examines the concept of ideology as the basis for the development of that practice. I am critically aware now of what I am doing in all aspects of my life. I see the production of this thesis as the free enterprise of a free thinker. I am not bound by an insistence on a certain form, other than to acknowledge the need to demonstrate in practice that I have improved my practice; to demonstrate the way in

which I have come to understand the need to make explicit the procedure by which I have improved my practice; and to demonstrate the procedure by which I validate my claims through mutually agreed realms of discourse (Chapter 8).

(ii) How my practice reflected a view of self

(a) A systematic negation of personal involvement

In Chapter 1 of this text I have indicated how I saw my children as entities external to myself, whom I could manipulate to meet my identified objectives (the production of a certain kind of person), in line with the requirements of the reified literature. In this present chapter I have indicated how I saw the self who had enacted the personal and social project as external to the self who was writing about the project.

Both these aspects reflect a view of persons that is the main epistemological base in much of the literature of educational research, that of subject and object. Many traditions of educational research (e.g. Husen and Postlethwaite's 1982 book presents a wide selection of articles, most seemingly proceeding from this base) assume the existence of two parties who stand in an ambivalent relationship to each other. On the one hand is the researcher; on the other is the researched. In

empiric approaches (e.g. O'Connor, 1959; Hirst and Peters, 1970) the researcher-subject actively carrries out research on the researchee-object, usually with the aim of consolidating an hypothesis. In interpretive approaches the two parties agree to collaborate (e.g. Hamilton et al, 1967), usually with a view, again, to substantiating the researcher's hypothesis (see my 1988). As such, this approach "prioritises social over educational understandings" (Stronach, 1986). Stronach suggests that the approach to educational isssues that focuses on the research of a second party is not educational - it does not enable the enquirer to understand his own practice - but sociological.

My view of self, as reflected in the early writing project, was as an object. I held a certain fixed hypothesis (I had a certain end product in mind), and set out to prove the hypothesis (to create that end product). So I, the subject, was writing about I, the object, in the sense that I saw the two selves standing apart from each other, rather than as aspects of a self that finds synthesis through reflection and critical appraisal (see Chapter 4 of this text).

(b) A mechanistic view of self

The mechanistic view I held of others applied equally to the self that was under analysis. In Chapter 1 of this text I have endeavoured to show how I viewed my pupils and colleagues as part of the wider sociological machinery of school, which itself is a manifestation of the culture in which we live. My intention throughout my work in personal and social education was to produce the person who would conform to the abstracted norms of the institutionalised aspects of that society.

No less did this view extend to the self I was writing about in first version 1-3. I saw that self as having to conform to institutionalised expectations, in that I imagined the form of my text should adopt a linear, propositional format; and in that I imagined the substance of my text to adopt the same epistemological base as the dominant approach to educational research - that of subject-writer recording the action of the object-actor.

(c) Inclination towards techne rather than phronesis

In the 'Nichomachean Ethics' Aristotle tells us that techne is the knowledge of skills and strategies that allows a craftsman to produce a technically acceptable work. Phronesis is the wisdom that enables the craftsman to apply this knowledge wisely. The application of techne (knowledge-that) and the appropriate action in application (phronesis:

knowledge-how) culminate in praxis, the wise and considered practice of the mature craftsman.

In Chapters 6 and 7 of this text I will suggest that this theory may be reflected in a parallel theory I hypothesise as the basis for educational research. With Habermas (1979) and Bernstein (1983), I agree that the basis for acts of communication is to be found in dialogical communities; and I suggest that the grounding for the contents of communication is to be found in the competence of individuals. To my mind, educational (as distinct from sociological) theory is a matter of I-enquiries, where individuals may account for their own educational development.

In my early practice as a teacher, 1981-82, and the early writing project, December 1987 - January 1988, I seem to have opted for a life characterised by technical excellence (techne). My work as a teacher was skills-oriented (Chapter 1 of this text), reflecting my knowledge-that, as was my writing, First Version 1-3. In both areas I attempted to demonstrate the amount of knowledge that I had amassed.

In my teaching practice my illusions were dislodged by the insistence of my children to continue to be eminently human, rather than obliging automata (Chapter 3 of this text) in becoming the certain kind of person I wanted them to be. My reflection on my practice in working with the children caused me to re-think my position (techne modifed by phronesis) so that I moved nearer to the emerging praxis of a reflexive practitioner (Schon, 1983).

In my writing practice my insistence on neatly structured propositional forms (techne) was dislodged by the insistence of my living self to enter into the action. My reflection on my work caused me also to re-think my position here, and adopt an alternative form which accommodated the phronesis of reflection. The critical-dialectical form of the later work (first version, 4-6) may be characterised as an emerging praxis in that I am able to critique unsatisfactory forms and substances on the grounds of lack of communicative clarity (Searle, 1969), and aim for forms and substances that more adequately fulfil the criteria identified by Habermas (1979) as the basis for understanding (truth, honesty, appropriateness, sincerity).

My early practice as teacher and writer reflected a view of self as skilled technician. The hallmarks of my success were those of organisational and technical excellence. In my work in personal and social education, I realise now that I was aiming at manipulation, rather than education. In my writing of first version 1-3 I was aiming for public acclaim at my amount of knowledge. In first version, 4-6, I aimed at personal wisdom in my pursuit of knowledge.

(iii) How my practice reflected a view of development

This thesis is a record and an explanation of how I came to undertake a shift in values. This shift has involved a re-examination of the very concept of values, for I had thought, before becoming involved in writing up (December 1987) that values could not undergo substantial changes once the human had reached a certain level of maturity. Yet to my initial astonishment, here was I, an intelligent person old enough to know better, re-thinking basic values that I had held dear for most of my adult life.

The area in which this change has been most significant is the one explored in this section, the notion of development. I believe that here is a real demonstration of my reflection-in-action. Through the action of reflecting about the nature of development, I have applied that reflection-in-action to my own development, and I believe that I have developed. The nature of that development itself has helped me to develop insights about the 'meaning' of development, as manifested in my own life rather than in the reified literature.

My views about the nature of development, as manifested in first version, 1-3, may be characterised primarily in terms of

(a) the notion of absolute truth

(b) the notion of reified knowledge

(c) the notion of development as structure

(a) The notion of absolute truth

Along with the vast majority of the literature of educational research (and much scientific literature in general), I assumed that there was an ultimate Truth to which we had to aspire. Rorty, in his essay 'World well lost' (1982) shows how such a belief is counterbalanced by an alternative paradigm that Truths are Many. "In reply to this argument, defenders of coherence and pragmatic theories of truth have argued that our so-called 'intuition' that Truth is One is simply the expectation that, if all perceptual reports were in, there would be one optimal way of selecting among them and all other possible statements so as to have one ideally proportioned system of true beliefs."

I have indicated in Chapter 1 of this text my inclination towards this view, that Truth is One, as demonstrated in my practice in personal and social education. I thought there was a particular, good form of life, and mine was the job to produce the certain kind of person who would lead that good life. In First Version 1-3 I took the view that there was an absolute Truth, to which I had to aspire. The end product of my efforts, the thesis, would be a reflection of this Truth. Once written down, the words could never be questioned. I have changed my ideas considerably (see Chapters 3 and 4 of this text), in that I now see truth as interpersonal creativity. (In Chapter 3: 3 (iii) (a) I shall expand on this idea, that persons sharing the same form of life may agree to 'truths' that are reflections of the philosophies that enable that form of life to develop.) I also attempt to explain the reconciliation between my own beliefs of truths developed by persons

through dialogue and the Truth that is God. This discussion appears in Part Three, and is also part of my further study.

In accepting the notion of absolute Truth, I subscribed to the idea of communities that operate on the basis of rules rather than principles. In Chapters 5 and 6 of this text I explore this notion in depth, bringing it in line with forms of knowledge which I have identified as propositional 'know-that' and procedural 'know-how', and personal knowledge (Polanyi, 1958). I suggest that a community, educational or otherwise, that operates on a system of rules is restrictive of its members. Whether the system is imposed by a benign ruler, such as the Old Testament community who received the Ten Commandments, or by a dictator, such as the interregnum of Hitler's Germany that was dominated by 'Mein Kampf', it still remains that the system is imposed by coercion, and infringement of the rules is corrected by punishment. On the other hand, communities that operate on principles are grounded in the personal integrity of individuals. Acceptance of higher-order principles, such as the two major laws of the New Testament: love God and love thy neighbour, is a matter of personal volition through dialogue, and infringement of principles is not a matter of correction by an external policy-maker, but of being in touch (or not, as the case may be) with the self. Rogers (1961) makes this point with reference to disturbed persons: that many societies based on rules-systems regard any individual aberration as a matter for curing, usually through punishment, whereas communities based on shared principles view abandonment of those principles as an individual choice which may be re-considered through dialogue.

My early practice as a teacher was characterised by my adherence to rules, both for myself and for my children. So was my early practice as a writer. I adopted a set form and a set content. The content aimed at producing an ultimate set of answers - its own truth - while describing a practice that aimed at producing an ultimate set of answers.

I did not initially see my project as educational - that is, generating a disequilibrium that would force a better practice to emerge. I saw it merely as the record of my past practice, the truth as it was. It was the disquiet generated by such inappropriate forms of thought that made me aware of the possibility of other truths, which I shall explain in due course.

(b) The notion of reified knowledge

Until 1988 I fully accepted the doctrine of reified knowledge. By this, I mean a form of life that is guided by a belief in knowledge as an abstraction, 'out there', and which is not the property of an individual knower. I could appreciate the fact that there were debates in the literature (e.g. Lakatos and Musgrave, 1970), but I saw such debates as being of a closed nature, and of not concerning me other than as a reader. My reading was from an interpretive base, where I assimilated and understood as a passive observer, regarding my understanding as a storehouse of information. My understandings were all about this THING called knowledge.

When I wrote 'Action research: principles and practice' I became involved in a good deal of research of the literature, and had to find a form in which I could clearly communicate what was in my mind. This disciplined search led me to organise my accumulated knowledge in new ways, and I became aware at the time that I was using knowledge to interpret and create knowledge - I was creating new forms out of current forms (see also Chapter 5 of this text).

When I came to first version 1-3, I felt that this facility was now denied; it would be illegitimate to create new forms in an academic treatise whose function it was to present the facts. It was frustrating to proceed like this, since 'Action research' had been tremendously stimulating in terms of my mental development, and I felt now straitjacketed by the proposed thesis. It was in something approaching anger that I abandoned the project at Chapter 3 and opted later for the new form of Chapter 4.

This brings me to the most important aspect of this section.

(c) The notion of development as structure

I had always been interested in the idea of development, and had read extensively about it. My knowledge took the same form as that presented in most of the literature, that development was seen as a journey from A to N, in which A represented non-development, and N represented development. In between there were intermediate stages of development, B, C, D, etc., that could be characterised in terms of how far they were from A, the beginning, and how near they were to N, or full development. This was the dominant view presented by the behavioural psychologists, usually from a skills-oriented perspective - at one stage the subject could not do something which at a subsequent stage he could; and by the cognitive developmental psychologists - at one stage the subject was developed to a certain level, and then proceeded to become more developed to another certain level. I accepted these philosophies without question, and attempted to fit my practice to them.

Accordingly, I tried to ground my practice in personal and social education in the recommendations of HMI/DES, that pupils should be encouraged to develop their full potential. I viewed this potential as an ultimate development, and matched it with the ideas of full development as characterised by Piaget's Stage 6 or Kohlberg's Stage 6/7. I have already indicated in Chapter 1 of this text how my interpretation of the concepts of 'potential' and 'development' was at fault. I am aware now, and shall focus on the point here, that I was operating in terms of structural analysis, part of the framework of

propositional forms of thought which was my major form of thinking during the writing of First Version 1-3.

I implemented the view of an ultimate development to the task of writing my thesis. I intended to end up with a text about structured development, both describing the ultimate development of my children as they 'developed' (a tautology that I never could resolve), and demonstrating the development of issues with the text towards a final dénouement of the answers.

In the debate between Chosmky and Piaget (Piattelli-Palmarini, 1980), the two protagonists find many mutual grounds to settle their differences, except the one essential notion regarding the innateness hypothesis. Chomsky maintains that the individual is born with innate potential, limitless creative capacity, which she organises into structures which she then proceeds to use to organise her experience of the world. Piaget argues that the individual is born in a state of readiness to absorb and accommodate structures that are imposed on her experience by the world. I will refer to this argument later (Chapters 5 and 6 of this text), when I adopt the views of Chomsky in the hypothesis I shall present about the nature of the acquisition of values. Here I will say that I was inclined, in my early practice, towards the views of Piaget. I regarded First Version 1-3 as the demonstration of an organisation of my children's development. I was never aware of it as an instrument in my own development, for two good reasons: (1) I saw myself as 'developed'; (2) I saw my thesis as a

product external to myself. My thesis became a structured part of the total structure of my life.

Among the many elements that jolted me out of this arrogant complacency was the tautology mentioned above about the meaning of the word 'development'. Here was a term that embraced both the state of being developed and the action of developing. I found myself in First Version Chapter 2 writing about 'the development of development'; a phrase not only linguistically tautological but conceptually contradictory. For if the ontology of the concept 'development' implied an ultimate state, how oculd that ultimate state go on developing?

So it was that I came to first version Chapter 4, which was when I realised that my mental structures were re-forming, and I revived previous ideas (McNiff, 1984) about transformations. I began to see structures of development as being subject to disequilibrium and transformation. I started working out these ideas at the end of First Version Chapter 3, and it was this articulation within the thesis of the processes that were taking place in my life because of this making explicit that caused me to stop and re-think.

I shall take up the story again in Chapter 4 of this text.

CHAPTER 3 THE PERSONAL AND SOCIAL EDUCATION PROJECT, 1984-1986

Contents

PAGE

1 INTRODUCTION: FIRST TRIALS RE-VISITED 121

What had I achieved with
(a) pupils 121
(b) colleagues 123
(c) self 128

2 PRACTICE 132

Introduction 132
(i) A crisis of practice: reasons for a conscious change in practice 133
(ii) The action: 1984-1986 138
(iii) Epistemology 155
(iv) The results 160

(a) An improvement in schooling 161
(b) An improvement in education 162

3 CONSIDERATIONS 164

(i) A shift in a view of knowledge 164

(a) structures and transformations 164
(b) towards an 'end product' of on-going development 168
(c) involvement of knower with known 169

(ii) A shift in a view of persons 172

(a) the need for personal involvement in practice 172
(b) the need to see persons as material beings in a material world 176

(iii) A shift in a view of development 181

(a) the notion of Truth as interpersonal creativity 181
(b) The notion of personal development as grounded in generative processes 183

CHAPTER 3: THE PERSONAL AND SOCIAL EDUCATION PROJECT, 1983 - 1986

1 INTRODUCTION: FIRST TRIALS RE-VISITED

So what had I achieved? What changes had I initiated through the practices of 1981-83? I will attempt to analyse the effects of my practice on (a) pupils (b) colleagues (c) myself.

(a) Pupils

As far as I could tell, my pupils had changed for the better; that is, I had improved the quality of education for the children in my care. I had set out my criteria that indicated potential improvement (e.g. HMI 1981); I had demonstrated in practice (VT1) how my educational values were being denied in my practice; and I had achieved a state (VT3) where my educational values were nearer to realisation through my practice. I made these claims in the knowledge that I could substantiate them through the validation procedures I had set up (Chapter 1 of this text) with children and colleagues, to show how this particular educational situation had improved.

In terms of the critical analysis of my practice that I have undertaken in this text, my 'success' needs to be seen in a balanced way. I have already indicated that my thinking at that time was not liberated, tuned always to matters of a propositional format, and given direction by the

institutional forces that I represented. I see now that I was engaged not so much in educational research as sociological manipulation, certainly in terms of teaching aims and objectives. Yet, lest I appear too damning of my own practice, education was going on, both for the children and for myself. I became aware, in 1983, of the need to educate, rather than dominate, my children; yet that educative process, I suggest, had been going on implicitly. I shall say more on this presently.

When asked to characterise my practice in 1982, I responded that my children were more socially aware, more tolerant, more sensitive to the needs of others (AT7). Indeed, they were, as the records of my practice in Chapter 1 of this text bear witness. The element that I was not yet aware of, and therefore did not make explicit, was that I was teaching the children to conduct their own personal enquiries, their own action research into their own practice. This understanding emerged over the years 1983-86. The more the understanding matured, the more my role as a teacher modified to accommodate the understanding and the responses of the children. I loosened the reins; I replaced rules with principles (see below); I became a facilitator rather than a dominator; I encouraged the emergence of the fun elements in the children, the excitement of finding out the meaning of their own development. All these aspects will be detailed in this chapter.

So, when asked, in 1988, to characterise my practice of 1982, I may say that I had fixed ideas about the nature of education - primarily that it was sociological in focus - and fixed ideas about my own role as an instructor. My practice was dominated by 'bound' theories (see Chapter 9 of this text) which restricted my practice as a teacher and my development as a person. The way in which I came to develop my understandings of my practice, and to change it in the light of those understandings, forms the content of this Chapter 3 and Chapter 4.

(b) Colleagues

Although I worked with colleagues in my own school, most of my in-service work was conducted in Dorset schools during my year's secondment to the Teachers' Centre, and for two years after that when I conducted courses in personal and social education. I can refer to the year's secondment, 1982-83, as the time when I kept records of my practice; most of these records are on audiotape, some with accompanying tapescripts.

As I have done in the previous section, I can point to fundamental value shifts, brought about through critical reflection on my practice. In the case of my in-service work, this episode had a much more clearly articulated epistemological base than my early work with Malcolm's group. I made explicit on a number of occasions (e.g. AT24) how I was proceeding from the basis that my educational values were being denied

in my practice, and how I was systematically working towards their realisation. I was keen to share this epistemology with colleagues.

I can say that my practice as an in-service provider changed quite radically over the year.

At the beginning, 1982, I held the same underlying assumptions that coloured my attitudes to colleagues as those that I have catalogued in Chapter 1 of this text: assumptions that were centralised on the concept of the control of educational knowledge. The same mechanistic view of my children as servants of the system was evident in my work with colleagues. I saw my role as passing on the knowledge of skills and techniques to colleagues, so that they could become efficient manipulators of children, as I was. Courses which I led at the Teachers' Centre and at individual schools before the actual secondment were very much in this vein. I encouraged teachers to copy what I was doing, and put forward clear agendas for individual and series of lessons which I made clear were set patterns for action. In my 1988 text I have critiqued the blueprints of Kemmis and McTaggart (1982), Elliott (1981) and Ebbutt (1983) on exactly the same grounds as I based my 1981-82 practice: of postulating exact procedures for classroom success. I feel now that my 'licence' to critique has emerged in this ironic way, and that I am justified in critiquing the work of other people because I am prepared to critique my own. I have challenged their work on the grounds that it is not educational but manipulative; and I level that same challenge at my own work.

I systematically documented my work at The Oaks, as part of my formal study; I documented work at other schools in a less rigorous fashion. I joined The Oaks in October, 1982, with the brief of supporting teachers in their endeavours to introduce formal schemes of personal and social education into, intially, two year groups, and eventually all five year groups. Previous to this, a group of eight teachers had attended courses run by myself and other county advisers, and were keen to learn about the Button methodologies. They held a view that 'Active tutorial work' (Baldwin and Wells, 1981: see also Chapter 1 of this text) would provide a ready made pastoral syllabus, and be a handbook of techniques and general guidance.

I concentrated my support at a skills level for the first two or three weeks, leading classes with colleagues observing, sitting in with them and advising on their attempts to implement the same techniques. I attended meetings with them. The level of involvement was intense, and much discussion took place, with immediate implications for practice, both theirs and mine.

Colleagues' practice, individually and collectively, changed rapidly, about three weeks after the beginning of my involvement. The change is observable in the records in the following ways:

(1) There was a move away from the restrictive nature of the 'handbook': Headmaster: "It is interesting to see how they have thrown aspects out that they have found unsatisfactory." (AT26)

(2) There was a move away from a view of teaching as instruction: PC: "Only last week I wrote 'today's lesson'. Yet it's not a lesson." (AT13) Headmaster: "Some of them still see it as a 'course' ... but there is much educational talk going on." (AT26) The children sense this shift: Pupil: "English is the teacher's lesson: tutorial is ours. ... In English she shouts a lot; in tutorial she's a friend." (AT15)

(3) There was a move away from the role of dominator to the role of facilitator: Headmaster: "Take Mr X, who was a hard, humourless little man, and who is now a caring teacher ... I am most impressed by the comments of PL about the insights into his role." (AT26)

(4) There was a move towards an atmosphere of support for personal enquiry: Headmaster: "Since your (JM) involvement there has been more educational talk in the staffroom than there has been for some time ..." (AT26)

My own practice changed in a parallel fashion. I began to concentrate less on technical aspects of teaching and more on rationales: as I see it now, my practice moved from techne towards praxis, the same as was happening with my colleagues. It was at this juncture, November 1982 - February 1983 that I changed my view of the nature of my practice.

Still looking at what I had achieved with colleagues, then, I can say that I initially concentrated on passing on my propositional and procedural knowledge (propositional 'knowledge-that' and procedural 'knowledge-how'), the facts and skills involved in technical teaching skills. These factors focused on the successful management of classrooms, but less with the education of the children. Through intense reflection, in this case primarily of a collective nature in planning and de-briefing sessions, the teachers came to attach less importance to the technical aspects of classroom methodologies, and more importance to the growth of their children. They were unanimous (AT14, 17) about the improvements in education that were being manifested: improvements such as the responsiveness of the children, the willingness of the children to be involved, the excitement at learning, the desire to take part. In this way, our joint practice moved towards an application of our phronesis, to bring about a situation that encouraged the education of our children rather than our manipulation of them. My involvement, I suggest, was that I encouraged teachers' personal knowledge (Polanyi, 1958) to emerge: Headmaster: "They are willing to abandon their prejudices and allow their instincts to blossom." (AT26) Through conducting my own action enquiry into my practice as an in-service supporter, I had encouraged colleagues to conduct their own action enquiry into their practice as teachers; and the knock-on effect was that they had moved away from the roles of instructors to roles of educators, where they had in turn encouraged their children to conduct their action enquiry into their own practice.

I would say that my involvement in The Oaks was eventually to encourage in-service education rather than provide in-service instruction. The shift was subtle but clear. From initially being a role-model I withdrew to lending encouragement to colleagues' experiments with different approaches in class. The headmaster identifies my role thus: "But, you see, the training at first. ... Hopefully they will need you less and less. ... Now you've a more supporting role ..."

(c) Self

I agree with Walker (1985) when he says that "what is changed most by the research is the researcher". I made enormous progress during the years. The best evidence of this progress lies in comparing publications that were a direct result of my reflection on my practice with those earlier ones that were a direct result of my underlying assumptions. In the latter case I am thinking of progress reports (see Appendix 2); in the former case I am thinking of 'Generative action research', written in 1983 and published in 1984, and 'Personal and social education', written in 1983-84 and published in 1986. (see Appendix 3.)

The progress to which I am referring is to do with the abandonment of assumptions about the control of educational knowledge and an adoption of forms of thought concerned with the creation of educational knowledge; to do with the demolition of the barriers between theory and practice; and to do with a view of the nature of persons and personal development. I shall discuss these aspects in detail in this chapter.

An important change that I shall mention here was to begin to see my practice as an integrated whole rather than a series of discrete episodes. I have already indicated in Chapter 1 of this text that my view of my practice was initially of a structured nature, both in diachronic and synchronic terms. By this I mean that I saw the content of my practice, its ontology, as structure: certain inputs would achieve certain outputs. I saw the historical aspects of my practice also as structured: I had undertaken my initial teacher training; then a course in EFL; then a course in applied linguistics; and so on; but each 'box' was self contained, and did not influence the next in line.

Now I began consciously to draw on previous experience to make sense of present experience. I had been quick to apply to my work the structures of my initial training in the disciplines of education. I now re-assessed the theories I was using (though I did not express it in those terms then: see also Elliott, 1983), and gradually came to see the appropriateness to my work of reconstructive theories.

I had been attracted to the work of Chomsky since my studies in linguistics, 1971-72. I suddenly saw the relevance of his epistemologies to the problems I was experiencing in my attempts to characterise the nature of personal and social education (or values education, as I began to re-phrase it: see also Chapter 5 of this text). My reading in this field had been dominated by the literature that stressed the importance of the technical excellence of classroom practice (e.g. Baldwin and Wells, 1981); by the work of John Wilson, whose assumptions about the nature of values education and the control

of educational knowledge had influenced my own (itemised in Chapter 1 of this text); and by the views of Piaget and Kohlberg, which assumed the linear nature of development by accretion.

My major break with the assumptions of this literature was in my adopting Chomsky's notions of competence and performance. I initially hypothesised the existence of levels of mind that could be characterised in terms of different functions. The level of competence, I suggested (McNiff 1984, 1986), was the area of values formation, while the level of performance was of values manifestation. There was often much slippage between the two, however, as manifested in my practice: e.g. The boys in PC's class act in a silly fashion (VT4). They see themselves on video, and ask for it to be erased. "If people saw that," they say, "they would get the wrong impression of us." So I reasoned that performance was not always a direct manifestation of competence, as Chomsky had also suggested in his 1965 'Aspects of the theory of syntax'. Therefore there had to be some intermediate factor that distorted the underlying competence of the individual. I came to the later conclusion (see Chapter 6 of this text) that these factors were transformations of intention.

This major break was not only one to do with the substantial concepts of my study, but attacked the very epistemologies that I was using. It was here that I began moving away from my previous views of knowledge as processes of systems to my current views of knowledge as forms of thought (see Chapters 4 and 5 of this text).

What, then, had I achieved with self? In terms of the personal and social education project, I had dislodged entrenched views of the nature of education, with its embedded assumptions about the nature of persons and personhood, and developed different perspectives. I had dislodged views about my overall project, expanding from the narrow perspective of the nature of personal and social education as a 'subject' to the broader perspective of the nature of education as a form of life; these views incorporating those about the focus of educational research, whether a study of other people or a study of self. And I had established the groundwork that was later (Part Two) to focus on the generative enterprise (Chomsky, 1982), and to suggest that educational theory and research is primarily concerned with a study by the self of the self's thought processes, and, far from being grounded in institutions, is grounded in the individual mind.

Conclusion

These, then, are indicators of changes in my thought and action that began in 1982-83.

In Autumn 1983 I returned to my home school to start teaching again. I was frustrated at having to leave the intense involvement of my in-service work, but in retrospect this was no bad thing. I now had the opportunity to put my newly-created ideas to the test of my own practice with the children, and to reflect on my learnings.

2. PRACTICE

Introduction

This section documents my teaching practice over the years 1983-1986. These years were increasingly problematical. 1983-84 saw many sudden staffing changes, often preventing me from carrrying out my own teaching. I often had to switch classes in mid-stream, as, for example, when I took over the teaching of German for two terms. In 1984 there were such difficult family problems that I took a year's suspension from my formal studies. In 1985 industrial action brought severe disruption to my own teaching and administrative commitments. The difficulties exacerbated a latent heart problem which crescendoed in 1986, causing me to be hospitalised for much of the year, and take subsequent early retirement in 1987.

These years, though traumatic in one sense, were in another sense the most formative of my teaching life. I truly believe that we find the best in ourselves when we are faced with adversity. I felt professionally and personally isolated, but the isolation - certainly from many of my colleagues because of the action - brought me closer to the children; and the personal isolation because of family problems and threatening ill health put me more in touch with my own thoughts. So 1983-86 were years characterised by dissipated actions, but intense reflection; and these years also saw significant value shifts and changes in my practice, as I shall now detail.

(i) A crisis of practice: reasons for a conscious change in practice

I returned to school in Autumn 1983. For the following year I had no opportunity to do any systematic research work in personal and social education, since I took over the teaching of German in the school, and since now was the onset of industrial action.

In Autumn 1984 I had a more stable teaching timetable, but school was by now feeling the effects of the action. I was to teach English to a group of about 15 third year girls and boys (13/14 year olds). The children were difficult, far more so than Malcolm's group. They were disenchanted low achievers, and hostile in the extreme. Three were already on the shortlist for special education, and did in fact leave during the course of the year. Two boys were receiving psychiatric help; one girl was in care because of parental assault; another girl was being encouraged by mother to be sexually adventurous (but in the meantime mother was asking my help to control her daughter). It really was the most difficult group, and I shrank from teaching them. It would have been impossible to split the children up, for we seemed at that time to be inundated with difficult children, and teaching life in a large part of the school was tense.

It took me some weeks into the autumn term to decide to tackle the group as a research issue (this was still my current epistemology). The point uppermost in my mind was that I couldn't hope to try any of the Button methodologies here. Yet I couldn't just leave the situation. The children were terribly unruly, and I simply had to keep a firm authoritarian lid on the whole lot to avoid potential anarchy.

Yet I had no other group available. I was otherwise teaching my usual 'bitty' timetable, and that was disrupted by the action, so it had to be this group or none other - and time, as I saw it then, was running out for me to produce the 'results' for my research project.

Now, this is a most interesting point for the epistemology of my project. Here is a manifestion of my entrenched positivist attitudes of (1) knowledge being an accumulative commodity (2) demonstration of that knowledge by replication of experiment and repetition of result. I intended my project to follow the sequence:

1 The experiment with Malcolm's group, 1981-82 (I still regarded it as an 'experiment WITH' the group, rather than an investigation into my own practice), during which I had held certain hypotheses about the nature of the Button work, and had proved these hypotheses to my satisfaction;

2 My in-service work, 1982-83, which had also for me the nature of an experiment, only this time to see if other people could do as I did with as clearly observable results in terms of more socially adjusted children;

3 My work again in school, 1983 onwards, to implement the Button work more efficiently in school in my own classes; to introduce to my colleagues this work, whose benefits I had demonstrated, particularly at The Oaks which was now held up even at county level as a shining example. This approach should be institutionalised, I felt, as part of the overall pastoral programme. I would see to it that staff received appropriate training and back up.

I believe that this is a clear indication of my views of knowledge at the time: that knowledge is a commodity; that it is accumulated in a linear, accretive fashion; that theory dictates practice; that educational knowledge may be controlled by self-styled experts; and, as such, it becomes reified.

Possibly, had other circumstances of life been stable at the time, I might have gone along this path in all innocence. A crisis of practice occurred, however, that changed things, the crisis being generated by two factors: (a) the lack of harmony is external circumstances, and (b) my own dissatisfaction with my practice.

I have already indicated the lack of harmony in school. Industrial action was rife. No one wanted to listen to my ideas for institutionalised schemes. The move in the staff was away from all imposition, and I found my overtures often rebuffed. I seemed not only to be getting nowhere fast in trying to establish this innovation; my efforts seemed to be counterproductive, generating a certain amount of hostility. I had no one in school to whom to turn for advice. in 1984

I had also experienced profoundly disturbing family difficulties. The whole set of circumstances became overwhelming and I applied for, and received a year's suspension to my studies.

Added to this was an acute dissatisfaction with my practice. The dissatisfaction was centred on my relationship with the children. The group of Autumn 1984 were deeply hostile, totally 'unsuitable', I felt at the time, for any pastoral work.

The epistemology of my project until now was demolished, then, for I could no longer continue a consecutive programme of study with colleagues or children. I came to view the year's suspension not so much a break, as an end to my project.

Hope springs eternal. I have indicated at a number of points that my life is an act of faith. This was truly the testing ground for that faith. I recall a short story I read as a child, in which space travellers were taken captive on an alien planet, and imprisoned in a cage. The earth men were visited by a mouse-like creature, which they entrapped in a make-shift cage for their amusement. The aliens promptly set them free, on the grounds that they must be creatures of intelligence to want to control other forms of life.

This perhaps was my saving grace, though I do not think domination was now my motive. I had been cut down to size by colleagues, children and home circumstances, and there was much more of that in store. But I was still intensely curious. I wanted to know, now perhaps more than ever, why I was not getting through.

I felt I could not approach many of the staff. The senior management team all had to tread very carefully these days. I seemed unable to 'use the children as a research field' because of their hostility and indiscipline. I was thrown back on my own resources, to the extent of becoming quite introspective. This, I believe, was when I started realising that what I was doing was not so much 'experimenting on' the children and colleagues, but challenging the assumptions of my own mind, and investigating my own practice, consciously and deliberately. Although I was officially suspended for a year, I took up my investigations again in January, 1985, but now from an entirely different perspective. I was not then sufficiently aware of the changes, or the reasons for the changes, but I had a sure intuitive knowledge that I had reached a certain turning point in my practice, and that this time I was on the track of something much better.

(ii) The action: 1984-1986

In Chapter 1 of this text I have referred to Malcolm's group, because Malcolm was the individual whose personal practice underwent the most observably significant changes. In this section I shall refer to Vincent's group, on the same basis. From a loud-mouthed rogue, Vincent became a strong, caring young adult.

I started teaching Vincent's group in Autumn, 1984. I have already indicated the difficult nature of this group. The first term was spent largely keeping control. Because, however, they were the only group I had to work with, I decided to carry on regardless, and start a formal 'study' of the group in January, 1985.

I decided that it would be useless trying out formal Button techniques to begin with; so I had no clearly formulated plan to tackle a not clearly formulated problem. I fell back on Jack Whitehead's 1977 formulation, starting with 'I experience a problem when some of my educational values are denied in my practice'.

I captured that denial on videotape (VT4) in January, 1985. On this tape I appeal throughout to the children's rationality, trying to get them to the stage where they will listen to each other and be courteous to each other. There are momentary agreements by individuals, but, by and large, the group appear as uncontrollable louts.

In my mind, I think I had given up on these children even before we started living together, in the sense that I saw no hope that they could ever become socially adjusted; they were already too far gone for that. The most we could ever hope to achieve, I reasoned, was that they would adopt some modicum of personal sensitivity in order to give their peers - and me - a chance to live as autonomous beings - in other words, to recognise the rights of other individuals in establishing a basis for dialogue.

How interesting that, because of the nature of the factors of my practice, I had changed the basis of my practice in order to accommodate the factors; and this change led to the development of my practice. With Malcolm's group I had aimed for the social adjustment of the children, in which the overriding ethic was to produce the certain kind of person whose formation was grounded in my interpretation of the literature. With Vincent's group I aimed at establishing a basis for dialogue, in which the overriding ethic was an appeal to the rationality of each individual to agree to the establishment of a dialogical community. I had veered from the golden rule of Kant to the social ethic of Habermas (see below: 3).

I worked with this group until Spring, 1986; in total, about 18 months. The group changed individuals, but a core of about six remained constant. I found in later months that I could rely on these members to introduce new individuals to the moral code that gradually emerged.

The detail of my practice is to be found in the audio and videotapes of that practice, 1985-86, in all, about 40 hours of recording. I shall not attempt here to record the detail, but give a general description of the actions.

We had 3 x 1 hour 10 minutes lessons per week, designated 'English' on the timetable. Some of the group were almost illiterate; others were bright, but had been demoted to the group because of behavioural problems. I developed a strategy of mixing basic skills of literacy with the reading of literature, while at the same time encouraging the atmosphere of care that would encourage learning. This latter was a higher priority aim for me.

I tried again the techniques that had been successful with Malcolm's group - using video and tape recording. There was not the immediate impact as with Malcolm's group, but certainly the atmosphere seemed less charged when we used the tape recorder than 'live' action.

The first audio recording I made (AT38: 10.1.85) is my initial introduction to the children of the idea of my doing research; of inviting them to join with me; of my appeal to their sensibilities to try to get on with each other. I promise them a trip to Bath if they will co-operate. The children appear interested, and give a guarded assurance that they will agree to work with me and with each other, but the action on this tape often degenerates to name calling. However, throughout, there are clear indications of the children's interest in what must have been a novel form of life.

The work now continued for the next six months. I made frequent tape recordings with the group. It is evident from a survey of the tapes that trends gradually emerged; particularly two major trends: (1) an increase in the children's exercise of rationality; (2) an increase of my own rationality.

The children's rationality

The evidence on tape is characterised by a slow development of utterances grounded in rational thought. In the early stages of our work together, the children's utterances were in the nature of outbursts largely grounded in preconceived assumptions. The assumptions usually referred to a view of other persons as objects external to self who were products of institutionalised mores. For example, there is much abusive name calling, references such as 'He's thick'; 'He doesn't know what he's talking about'. References to teachers are that they are products of the institution, external and hostile to self: 'They don't like us; they treat us like dirt; it's them and us'. References to self were also as products of a system, and reflected the assumptions of controlled forms of life; self-references frequently revealed a low self-esteem and negative self-image: 'We're dinloes; I'm a thicky; everyone says I'm no good;' and so on.

Clearly individuals in the group progressed at different speeds. In retrospect I see that I could have evolved a research strategy where I focused on a small group of individuals, charting the evidence of their development. Indeed, such a detailed investigation would still be possible from the wealth of taped evidence that I have; but at the moment I have not the time for such detailed investigation, preferring rather to approach my enquiry from the broad scope of general trends.

Some individuals seemed to make little progress in exercising their rationality. Marcus and Gary, for example, consistently refuse to stop name calling and associated utterances; but on occasion (e.g. AT40), particularly when challenged by their peers, they insist that they can 'behave' if they want, and do sometimes exhibit very clear sensitivities about other people. Their disruptive influence was quite severe at times, and often led to a breakdown in the communication patterns that were otherwise emerging in the group. DF, a visitor to the group, comments on this (AT39):

"They certainly seem to be trying, but some individuals appear set on wrecking the group."

These children were those designated for special education, and did in fact leave us in Summer 1985. On the other hand, Richard, another candidate for special education, shows a remarkable capacity for sensitivity and personal integrity. In AT39 he makes it clear that his previous efforts to display these qualities had been met with rebuffs from his teachers, and he had felt embarrassed and hesitant to allow

this side of his character to be publicly available. Now, however, given the forums of agreed frameworks of care, he is happy to allow what he sees as his true character to emerge, and to abandon the image of 'tough guy' that he had been forced by peer pressure to adopt. The two faces of Richard may be seen on VT5, where we are visited by another teacher, and on AT39, in public conversation with Richard. Our teacher shows himself to be hesitant in his relationships with the children. Indeed, the children seem generous in their overtures to him, but are met with unease. Richard, on this occasion, shows a witty malignancy towards the teacher, easily out-smarting him in conversation. On AT40, the de-briefing of this interview, I take Richard to task over this, pointing out that he was cleverer and more assured than the teacher, and had been cruel to use his superior confidence. Richard agrees.

As time went on, then, the general trend was away from agreed platforms of indifference and hostile apathy, with clear recourse to established norms of views of persons as objects - and objects of negative attitudes - to negotiated transformative episodes, in which the children agreed to try out new forms of life. The negotiation lay in my direct appeal to their rationality as a basis for their actions: "Why did you say/do that?" is a continual question, to which I demand an answer that is grounded in the individual's analysis of his own mental constructs rather than in reified norms ('I did that because ... ' rather than 'He's a ... so I did it'.)

In this pattern, I suggest that our joint and individual actions took a pro-active form rather than re-active, as identified also in Schutz's (1972) 'in order to' as opposed to 'because' motives: 'in order to' implies a paradigm of intentionality that is grounded in individual critical awareness of values-in-action; 'because of' implies a paradigm of persuasion that is grounded in social phenomena that are outside the control of the individual, in which the values of others shape the intentions of the individual. The transformative episodes, I suggest, reflect the developing awarenesses of the children for the need for change; their entrenched attitudes are challenged by my insistence on personal justification for actions, and the disequilibrium thus generated allows new attitudes/behaviours to emerge (see also Chapter 7 of this text).

There is a nice piece (AT42; 26.4.85) which I think shows the essential qualities that the children were developing, along with the validation of the claims about their developing rationality that I am making. This was in the visit to the class of FD, a teacher who had left school but was back as a supply teacher. She was passing the window, and I asked her if she would join us. During her visit, I was called away from class, and the children held her in courteous conversation throughout. The tape recording of the de-briefing she and I then made captures the flavour of her impressions of the children. Her comments include the following:

FD I don't really think they were talking to me as a teacher, as perhaps one would ask a teacher a question. No, they were talking to me as a person, because since that lesson, if I bumped into any of them in the playground it has been instantly 'Hello, Miss' and there is some kind of rapport. ... I felt that you didn't have to keep reminding the group of why you were there every two minutes. (see also below)

In Autumn 1985 I was timetabled with the group again, only this time the more disruptive members had departed, and we acquired new colleagues. I continued audio and video tape-recording with the group. They were now in their fourth year, still designated a low achievement group, but it was hoped that some members would go on to take CSE English.

This term I concentrated more on formal aspects of study, and kept Friday afternoons as the time set apart for personal and social education. I used video on a number of occasions here (VT7, 8) and I think there is now a distinct emergence of behaviours which are direct reflections of an emerging values system that is grounded in rationality. I may point to the criteria identified by Habermas (1979) as being the hallmarks of this rationality when exercised in the evolution of norms of social intercourse; those criteria of sincerity, truth, honesty and appropriateness. I believe my children had developed an awareness of the need for such norms; and, more importantly, were now aware of the need for a higher-order value of the need for rationality.

I have already referred to the significant development of Vincent. In 1985 he was quietly disruptive, but seemed always to be assessing the situation with his peers before deciding what to do. It was the development of this caution that was most striking. In our early work he went along with the boys; but during the summer term, Vincent's voice of moderation is heard more frequently. He became a stabilising force, often agreeing with me when I challenged the silly behaviour of others. He did not necessarily agree with the content of my questions, but with the fact that I would not accept behaviour which was outside our agreed frame of reference. He often supported me with "You tell them, Miss" or "That's right, Miss, I agree". Vincent's parents started keeping in close touch with me, insisting that I had become a steadying influence and that he had 'learnt sense' instead of following the code of the estate on which they lived. Unfortunately I did not keep a systematic record of these episodes. There is, however, clear evidence of Vincent's exercise of rationality in the videotapes we made in 1985/86.

VT9 is with a small group and a visiting teacher. At this time I was becoming unwell, and had to use strategies in school that would help me keep going in lessons. We had arranged a videorecording episode, but I was feeling quite ill. I usually delegate the responsibility of the technical aspects of filming to the children - they are much better at it that I - but on this occasion I was glad to let the children take over. I had previously set up the equipment, but it did not work. I was in despair how I would keep the group occupied for an hour in my state of health. Fortunately Vincent organised the group to investigate the equipment and to seat themselves, explaining to our visiting teacher

what we were about to do. Some of this organisation is captured on the film which we took as the equipment started working.

The same sensitivity is shown by Vincent, and seemingly adopted by others, in a most touching episode (VT9). Jason, one of the boys in the group, had consistently refused to join in the group discussions for the year that we had worked together. He maintained a sullen silence and his swastika handwriting. No matter how much I complained, he still formed his letters square and put spikes on the letters, as well as decorated his books with Nazi grafitti. On the occasion of the filming, the group started talking about hobbies to our visitor, a good friend of mine called Fred whom I had often recruited as a visitor to groups in my in-service work. Jason suddenly seemed to warm to Fred, who typically encouraged Jason to continue. Jason then recounted his exploits on motor cycles with great gusto. The other five members of the group listened to him with respect. I later commented to the group how impressed I was with what he had to say, but my comments were met with gentle amusement. Evidently Jason had been fabricating it all. Yet the group had not interrupted, nor called his bluff, but had been content to listen to Jason's stories with sympathy and sensitivity.

The final film (VT10) of my teaching is of the group with RS, the English adviser for Dorset, who asks them what they have learnt with me. The children answer that they have learnt to listen to each other, to understand each other and themselves, that they have grown up. He is impressed by the quality of their social ease, as well as the quality of their responses, and congratulates them on their personal and social skills.

When I was hospitalised in March 1986 the children wrote to me, to tell me that they were still helping each other. I think this is the greatest accolade, the best evidence that they had each developed the power to get on with each other without me.

My rationality

It was clear to me from the start that the children were not going to come round to my way of thinking, 'My thinking' could be characterised at two levels of intention at least: the first, higher-order level was at the level of principles in which I believe social intercourse is grounded, the meeting of minds and the agreement by individuals to recognise and respect individual integrity. This was my educational aim and what I wished for the children in my role as educator. The second lower-order level was at the level of rules in which I believe my domination was grounded, the imposition of my expectations on the children. This was my institutionalised aim, and what I wished for myself, in my role as representative of the institution.

They made it clear that they would not obey me. The first term, Autumn 1984, was spent keeping order, using the mechanics of the school's system of reprisals - extra work, staying in, etc. My miserable term was spent punishing myself as much as I was punishing the children; more so, because, as well as having to endure detention with them, my life as a teacher took the form of a systematic suppression of my educational values.

I thought about the problem deeply, and decided to try the strategy of breaking with domination and appealing to reason (see above). As the children's rationality was allowed to develop, so was mine.

In this text I continually return to the theme of reciprocity as the ethic of communication. While it is true that reciprocity is the semantic base, it is not always quite so evident that it is the moral base (Searle, 1969), some schools of thought preferring a view of the domination of one will over another. The result is then 'one-way' communication, that is, instruction.

This latter view was my own in January 1985, a theory of systematically distorted communication (Habermas, 1976). My practice was guided by an erroneous theory, shown in this paragraph to be in error because of the slippage between form and substance; the 'theory' about the form of communication grounded in reciprocity; and the theory about the substance of communication (my practice) grounded in domination.

I focus here upon the reciprocal nature of rationality as the basis for communication. The children exhibited the deliberate development of their rationality as they moved away from wanting to dominate me and their peers (see preceding section) to a situation of negotiated understandings. I equally moved from domination to negotiation.

The action of this move may be traced through the tapes and transcripts. AT38 is when I spelled out to the children what I hoped we could all adopt as a platform for negotiated values. I suggested to them that the substance of our lessons together should be characterised by understandings - we stopped calling names, we made a serious attempt at learning - and that the form of our lessons should be characterised by agreements - we would adopt a view that we listen. So we would agree (form) to agree (substance). The tape shows that the children agreed that it might be worth a try (a step forward in the framework - form), but degenerated still into name calling (stasis in the content - substance).

In Chapter 6 I present a theory of the nature of change, in which form and substance are in constant interchange, as structure dissolves into transformation, which momentarily gells again into structure. I believe this process is manifested here in the development of class practice, on the part of the children and myself. Understanding grew on the part of the children towards each other, characterised on the tapes as a diminution of abuse and intolerance, by an emergent readiness to be sympathetic and to listen to other people's points of view, and a desire

to act on these aspects - AT40: Gary: "We listen to each other now. We don't call each other names any more. We don't muck about so much."

My own understanding towards the children developed. This was part of the conscious strategy I adopted in January 1985. Truth to tell, I did not even like some of the children in the group; but we had to live together, and the lead for making life tolerable (survival!) had to come from me. Yet even as I played at it over the months, it actually happened. As I tried to implement my own hypothesis - how I could improve the quality of life for us all - it actually worked - the quality of life was improved. My theory, which had sprung from a desire to improve an unsatisfactory practice, was implemented as a new form of practice. Through my conscious actions, at a performance level, I developed new attitudes and values at a competence level. Through actively trying to find common grounds for understandings, through trying to root out those elements in the children to which I could appeal, I actually found those elements and grew to like them. And the reverse seemed to happen, that the children found aspects of me that they could share, and grew to like those.

My behaviour changed significantly over the 18 months. The Autumn 1984 self was dominated by theories of knowledge that emphasised the control elements: control by the body of reified knowers over an uncritical public; control by the institution of the functional self; control by the functional self of the personal self; control by teachers of pupils; control by the pupils' peer-cultural selves over personal selves; and so on. The January - September 1985 self underwent a slow, painful process

of liberation of mind. Liberation is painful (Fromm: Fear of Freedom, 1942) in the relinquishing of norms, clear frames of reference that have been established by the reified knowers, and the setting adrift of the self to take responsibility of the self. I believe this is what is referred to in the term 'autonomy' (e.g. HMI, 1981) - this unselfish self-sufficiency, which is the conscious application of understandings of the nature of freedom.

My behavioural changes in the tapes are manifested in utterances that are grounded in I-Thou relationships rather than I-It (Buber, 1937; Maslow, 1968; see also below, 1:3), and are characterised by the ethics articulated by Rogers (1961) that the disturbed person is not in need of cure but in need of a bridge to put himself back in touch with himself. I often read Rogers's work during 1985-86, and I was deeply influenced by these views that were helping me to understand myself and my children.

My speech acts also seem to move towards a questioning approach, rather than an approach that rests on a set fund of answers. When asked for my opinion, or challenged on an opinion, (e.g. AT41), I am ready to share my views, but I make it clear that these are my views and I do not necessarily expect the children to adopt them. What I do expect is for the children to give me a courteous hearing, even if they disagree with me, as I am prepared to listen to them.

I seem to develop questions of a more critical nature. My earlier questions, until 1985, were based on 'closed' heuristics: what? where? who? which? when? I submit that this type of question begs answers of a specific nature: e.g. Q. When did he go? A: He went yesterday. As such, they are manifestations of a mentality that assumes control; the answers appear to exist already in the mind of the questioner, who is exercising an hypothesis about his understanding of the nature of truth. My later questions, January 1985 onwards, adopt the more 'open' nature of the heuristics 'why?' and 'how?', which require answers grounded in the answerer's creativity and rationality, rather than his acquiescence. By adopting this stand, I seem to be requiring explanations from the children, reasons for their acting as they do. In Chapter 7 I present my theory that the action is guided by the intentions, an applied rationality, that is the transformative element between competence and performance. I may say, on this premise, that actions are an externalisation of values when grounded in the critical reflection of the knowing subject (see also Chapter 8). In my practice of 1985, I was working towards creating a community of active knowers, who could agree value-norms through their critical reflection on their practices.

My own acknowledgement of how I put these ideas into practice, and that I had radically changed my own ideas, is presented in two crucial documents: AT42 (26.4.85) and my paper to the BERA conference (1985). The transcript of the audiorecording with FD (see above) is an articulation of this foregoing section. For me, the crucial utterances are:

"I believe very strongly in the autonomy of the child ... I'm hesitant to use the word 'progress' because it sounds as if they've started off from somewhere bad, and it's not. I mean, it's not a disease; it's learned behaviour that I'm trying to help them unlearn, or learn other behaviours. I'm trying to present other options to them ... I'm desperately trying to empathise with that group. By 'empathy' I mean I try to meet them on their own terms ... I don't judge them. I might occasionally say 'I disagree with you', but I don't say that in a judgemental way. ... Until recently my teaching style was based on the premise that I was right ... I [thought], No, I am going about this the wrong way ... I must go in thinking, I am right as far as I'm concerned, but I must look at them as people with every right to think what they think."

It was such calculated reflection-in-action that led to the second essential statement in the BERA paper that I no longer regarded the children as the children I wanted them to be, but as persons in their own right.

Such documents, I submit, are indicators of monumental changes in practice, and in the mental life in which the practice is grounded. I will now turn to the epistemology that I consciously adopted. Here again is evidence of a values shift, for in my early practice (see Chapter 1 of this text: my 'experiment' with the control group) my epistemology dictated practice. Now, I began to view my practice as forming its own epistemology; indeed, the epistemology became the practice.

(iii) Epistemology

I hope it is evident from the text so far that, from 1981, I became restless with epistemologies that are grounded in the notion of control. The restlessness stemmed from the fact that my practice appeared not to be evolving from my interpretations of the dominant literature (the literature on behavioural psychology (e.g. Skinner, 1968), cognitive-developmental psychology (e.g. Kohlberg, 1976), empiric-positivist approaches to educational research (e.g. Egglestone et al, 1976)), but appeared to be evolving from a form of life which was based on the need for principles mutually agreed by rational individuals within dialogical communities. The shift in my practice reflected the move towards such principle-governed action and away from rule-dominated action, and the epistemologies I used as part of my mental processes equally moved towards rational-critical forms, and away from controlled-acceptant forms.

Although the restlessness began in 1981, the clear articulation of the break with dominant forms of epistemologies of educational research took place in my 1984 text. In this article I trace the steps that led me to adopt a form of educational research that epitomised my own enquiry in action; and then how I came to question the assumptions of the dominant presentations of an action research 'methodology' as applicable to my own practice. It was here that I formulated the notion of the importance of the generative component in educational research.

To make this brief resume more explicit:

My early practice was guided by my reliance on what I now see as being controlled forms of educational knowledge, primary sources being the 'disciplines' of education as an overall guide to practice in the classroom, the cognitive-developmental approach (Piaget and Kohlberg) as an overall guide to my practice in personal and social education, and normative-analytical epistemologies as a general methodology for my own research study. I rejected this latter (Chapter 1 of this text) as being too restrictive for my practice, and investigated the literature of action research as an alternative form of educational enquiry.

My practice of 1982-83 as an in-service supporter, and 1983-84 as classroom teacher, was now consciously viewed as problematic - that is, I identified specific concerns with a view to finding possible solutions, rather than stay with the normative-analytic paradigm that is non-problematic, offering teachers answers-by-precedent. At the time I believed in action research as a unified school of thought, with practitioners all following the same lines. I did not yet question the difference in philosophy between the work of Jack Whitehead at Bath, and the work of Stephen Kemmis, John Elliott and Dave Ebbutt, currently or latterly at East Anglia. This difference was in fact investigated and articulated in my 1988 text. In 1983, I did see that the texts of Elliott, Kemmis and Ebbutt were restrictive of my classroom practice, leading me to see that practice as having to fit in with pre-identified modes of conduct. I was far more inclined towards the Whitehead characterisation of action research as an open-ended series of

questions, which did not attempt to provide specific answers other than to encourage practitioners to discover their own answers through critical questions about their own practices.

In my 1984 text I critiqued the work of Elliott, Ebbutt and Kemmis, as I have also done in my 1988 text, and showed how I rejected the linear, closed format on the grounds that such linearity and closedness did not reflect my own practice. Instead, I tried to show how I followed Whitehead's notion of question and answer as the basis of my epistemology. I also suggested the importance of a generative component, as giving the flexibility for the iterative qualities of an enquiry in action.

To explain briefly: One of my central concerns was (and still is) the random nature of a problematic action enquiry. Problems are by definition spontaneous and uncontrollable, because they are caused to the practitioner by outside influences. The whole basis of action research is that it is a collaborative endeavour, in which one practitioner will move forward her own understandings (of herself - McNiff and Whitehead; of other people - Kemmis, Elliott and Ebbutt) through dialogue and mutual agreements with other similarly concerned practitioners. If research is left on an isolationist plane - if I present hypotheses by and for myself - problems do not arise. I am an isolationist individual, and my answers are universally valid, since the universe is limited to one. As soon as I engage in pluralist forms of life, however, my answers are not automatically valid, other people holding other opinions, and their validity needs to be negotiated

(Chapter 7 and 8). Hence I say that problems are caused to the practitioner by the other people involved in the enquiry.

As such, the concept of 'problem' may further be identified as a denial of values in practice (Whitehead, 1977). I was concerned about the randomness of these denials, this concern being overlooked or summarily dismissed (Kemmis and McTaggart, 1982) by the dominant literature. I had experienced the randomness in my own practice; as soon as I thought I had solved one set of problems, another set arose in its place. At times it was difficult to identify which was my main area of concern, since subsidiary problems often became more significant than the primary one.

I felt that an enquiry ought to have an in-built facility to change focus as and when it was necessary. I referred to the notion of generative capacity (Chomsky, 1957, 1965).

Chomsky maintains that enquiries that proceed from a comparative base (as structuralist theories do) depend on epistemologies that do not require the personal commitment of the enquirer. In linguistic enquiries, structuralist theories view the creation of language as a matter of precedent and habit (e.g. Skinner, 1968; Bloomfield, 1933), and approach the task of studying matters of language use and acquistion by recourse to precedent: comparing one language with another by means of normative-analytic strategies (Mackay, 1965).

Chomsky took the view that a persons's capacity for language could not be understood in this fashion. Such strategies could not account for the unlimited production of novel utterances (Chapter 2 and 6 of this text). Instead, Chomsky opted for a reconstructive theory that hypothesised the existence of an innate disposition towards a language capacity, together with a generative component that allowed the unlimited creation of language.

I used this notion in my characterisation of the nature of educational research. I reasoned that the resolution of problems was the incentive for undertaking research; that problems, resulting from a denial of values in practice, were the axis of the enquiry; that problems seemed to spawn new problems; and the way to maintain a balanced focus was to hypothesise the existence of a generative component which allowed the enquirer to ask questions appertaining to the particular problem under consideration.

In Chapter 6 of this text I indicate how I became dissatisfied, like Chomsky, with the dominant paradigm of research into moral education. I critique comparative theories and suggest that, instead of studying descriptions of parallel studies, what we ought to be about is trying to find an explanation for why people do as they do - the study of the foundation of values rather than the study of possible organisations of values systems.

My later practice, 1984-86, was based on the idea of creating answers to problems through questions appertaining to those problems: a critical reflection as a means for the potential transformation of an unsatisfactory situation. I believe that this phenomenon occurred on two tiers: (1) of my critical reflection on my own practice which I (2) then communicated to the children in an effort to encourage them to reflect critically on their practice. By setting up this chain, I hope that I managed to create an atmosphere in which individuals' rationality was encouraged to develop.

(iv) The results

Following on from section (i) 'Action' of this part, I consider now what I can claim were the outcomes of my changed practice. I make the following claims:

a I helped bring about an improvement in schooling

b I helped bring about an improvement in education

(a) An improvement in schooling

I have already pointed out (Chapters 1 and 2) that, as I see it, there is often much mis-naming in the literature. What many people refer to as 'education' would be more aptly termed 'schooling': that is, a concentration on the efficient delivery system in which knowledge is seen as a commodity to be passed on to the consumer by the manufacturer.

If I regard my practice in this way, as I did in 1981-83, I can say that the system came to operate in 1984-86 more efficiently because of my efforts. The manufacturer (myself) was by now more technically skilled in the production of the service/product - I was certainly more skilled/knowledgeable about the underlying philosophies of personal and social education. The delivery system (lessons) was more efficient - I was more skilled in techniques/presentations and management of the clients. The consumers (pupils) were more responsive to the product - I advertised and packaged the product attractively in order to make them more willing to obtain what was on offer. Generally, I can say that there was a great increase in consumer response.

But in 1983/84 I abandoned this view of education. I started seeing education primarily as what goes on in the mind, and secondarily what goes on in the classroom. For me, the action of the classroom became an extension of the action of the individual mind; and this later led to a realisation that free individual action is grounded in the values system of the rational individual, and free community action is grounded in the shared values system of mutually agreed rational individuals.

(b) An improvement in education

I will then reiterate my definition of education as what goes on in the mind. Specifically, I will suggest that education is the process of an improvement in individual rationality. (The fact that I may coin this particular working definition is, I suggest, tangible proof that my own education has improved - I am able to exercise my improved rationality to come to this point of view and abandon my previous views about the consumer base to so-called 'education'). The process of an improvement in individual rationality, I believe, may be traced through the systematic application of that rationality in the detection of specific concerns and processes of working towards a negation (Chapter 6) of the negative aspects of such concerns. Such a process may be seen in a series of action-reflection cycles, in which negative situations (a negation of values in practice) are transformed through individual rationality into positive situations (a realisation of values in practice). In Chapter 6 of this text I present my hypothesis about the 'mechanics' of such structures and transformations (see also 3 below).

I am claiming that my practice 1984-86 brought about an improvement in education. According to the working definitions I am presenting here, I can say that in this chapter so far I have traced the process of my own developing rationality and that of my children's. I have attempted to show how I engaged in systematic action-reflection, this process itself an avenue by which my rationality emerged, and was then absorbed into the action-reflection, to intensify my experience of my own thought-in-

action. I have tried to show how I encouraged the children to explore the same avenues.

Through my critical awareness I have come to the notion that there is no absolute human Truth (see Chapter 1, and (3) below). When I speak of development, I do not attempt to indicate 'developed'. I speak here of an on-going process that begins now, rather than ends now. More of this in the following section.

To conclude: In VT9, my colleague speaks of the fact that the children seem to have developed. At the time I understood her in the sense of (a) above - my children had become better consumers. Now I interpret her claims in a new light. I believe my children had become more rational persons. Certainly I had. As such, I confidently make my claim that I had improved the quality of education for the children in my care, by improving the quality of education for myself. And I claim, as goes the title of this thesis, that I can account for my own personal and professional development, by encouraging my own rationality to emerge, and by exercising it with intent. In Chapter 8 I shall write 'exercising it with universal intent', echoing the claims of Polanyi (1958) about his own practice; but that is to do with the politics of knowledge and will enter the agenda later.

3. CONSIDERATIONS

I will now make some observations on what I have recorded so far in this chapter. I maintain that my view of my 1983-86 practice changed from my view of my 1981-83 practice. This shift in view I will organise as

(i) a shift in a view of knowledge;
(ii) a shift in a view of persons;
(iii) a shift in a view of development.

Many of the ideas expressed here are explicated in greater detail in future chapters. I will indicate references as I go.

(i) A shift in a view of knowledge

(a) Structures and transformations

I have indicated in this chapter that I started moving away from a reliance on structures to an inclination towards transformations. By this I mean that I operated largely in terms of structures pre-1983. I used structured forms of thought, as can be seen, for example, in my belief in clearly prescribed teaching objectives, or in my belief in methodologies that depended on stimulus-response strategies. I not only used structured forms of thought (epistemology) as my modus operandi; I

envisioned structured forms of life (ontology) as the outcome of my practice, in, for example, the certain type of person who would have achieved a certain stage which I anticipated would spell maturity.

My reading of the literature told me that this maturity, or full development, was achieved at a stage that could be identified by certain behavioural characteristics. Piaget's stage 6 of formal operational thought, and Kohlberg's stage 6 of universal ethical principles were identified as the ultimate of cognitive and moral development. Kohlberg makes it clear (1976) that his stage 6 of full moral development is dependent on a parallel full cognitive development.

When I tried to apply these theories to my own practice, I ran into enormous difficulties, of both a pragmatic and a philosophical nature. Some of the difficulties were:

1. I was confused as to the age when ultimate stages were reached. I read conflicting interpretations, particularly of Piaget's findings. Different books put different ages to the stages, some maintaining that formal operational thought could be reached by a 12-year-old; others that this stage did not begin until late adolescence. Did that mean that I and my 12-year-old children were at the same stage of development? In theory, yes; in practice, plainly not. Where, I wondered, did the theory account for the difference? Further, I read that Kohlberg's ultimate moral stage could be achieved by a 16-year-old. Did that mean that the wisdom of maturity counted for nothing? Had I made no further progress since adolescence?

2. If full development were to be realised at a specific stage, did that mean that further development was then denied? Or was it unnecessary? Did that mean that I had no more scope for personal development? In terms of my teaching practice, did that mean that my task was to get my children to a certain stage before they left school, after which they had no more need of education?

3. If stage developmental theory was to be believed, all my children ought to be behaving in a uniform fashion. They were not. In the same group, Sheila was a confident, mature 14-year-old who openly despised the silly antics of her peers. In the same individual, Richard could be a responsible young man who was capable of degenerating into infantile clowning when egged on by the others. How did the theory account for the differences?

These and other difficulties made me uneasy with the concept of cognitive stage development. I still felt I had to adapt my practice to the theory, however, since I had no alternative model available; nor had I yet available the epistemological model of looking for my own personal theory as an outcome of my practice.

This confidence grew, however, through the intense action and reflection of my in-service work, 1982-83, and the application in class, 1983 onwards, of the insights I was developing. I was also particularly helped by the work of Carl Rogers. While I still felt that I had to adhere to a theory, I readily switched to Rogers's theory in preference to Piaget's.

Rogers's work is mainly to do with disturbed individuals, but I saw clear applications of the principles which underpin his ideas to my own work. When I read his (1961) 'On becoming a person', I felt that I was still on the familiar territory of stage development, but this time the theory was presented in a much more flexible fashion. Whereas Piaget concentrates on categories of behaviour, Rogers prefers to identify trends and inclinations. His concepts are held loosely, and have a far-ranging applicability. I saw the relevance of this approach so keenly that I attempted to present my own model with regard to the development of my children. This model appears in detail in Chapter 6 of this text.

In this way I suggest that I was moving form the fixed concepts of Piagetian-type structures to the transformative episodes of Rogerian-type processes.

My own attempt at a stage development model lasted about a month. I recall that I presented the model to Jack Whitehead in a progress report in 1985. Jack was pleased with the way my thinking was going, and encouraged me to present my ideas at the 1985 BERA conference. This I did. My model received pungent criticism from two colleagues who levelled the same objections to it that I have identified above. I still hear the voice ringing in my ears: "Yes, I can identify with the comments of the children that you have written down here, but what's that supposed to prove? Any one of my children in class could be at any one of those stages at any given time. This tells me nothing at all." He was right, of course, and, for me, this was the final nail in the coffin of stage developmental theories.

I was profoundly disturbed by this episode, but it was probably the incentive I needed for solid critical thought. As a direct result I looked for an alternative explanation for my children's development. The outcome of that search appears in Chapter 6 of this text. There I shall present my theory of the nature of change, in which structures and transformations are in constant interplay. I shall also refer again to my practice to show how the theory arose out of that practice.

(b) Towards an 'end product' of on-going development

My pre-1983 concept of personal and social development indicated an end state: 'developed' rather than 'developing'. I reckoned then that my task was to get my children as near to 'developed' as possible by the time they left my tutelage. My problem was that I had no idea how such a 'developed' state could be characterised. In my 1985 BERA paper I pointed out that there was no guidance in the literature to help me understand how to make my children 'developed' and no operational definition of what such 'development' looked like.

I realise now that I, like the literature, was at fault in using inappropriate cognitive structures. The linguistic metaphors that were expressions of my thought appeared as rigid concepts to do with end states: 'The children have reached a level ... '; 'I am aiming for ...'; 'They have developed to the stage where ...'.

My practice 1983-86 indicated that I moved away from a dependency on the hope of end states to the excitement of the immediacy of the present. I began to understand (though I could not then articulate the thought) that 'development' did not imply an achievement of an ultimate end state, but a renewal of forms of being; 'developing' rather than 'developed'.

I was able to articulate this re-emphasis in 1988, when I became involved in the ideas of dialectical forms of thought. The insights generated allowed me to see that the notion 'developed' belongs to propositional forms which focus on descriptions of past practice; whereas the notion 'developing' is part of the dialectical forms which examine present practice as a state of being which prepares the ground for ever-renewable states of being.

In Chapter 6 I examine these ideas much more closely, and try to give a coherent explanation for what I see as a form of life that sees the present as the springboard to the future rather than a full stop to the past.

(c) Involvement of knower with known

As my attitudes towards forms of knowledge relaxed over the years 1983-86, so did my attitudes towards the children. I moved from a position of knower in an instrumental sense to knower in a personal sense, in this way:

Humanistic psychology characterises relationships in terms of the depth of personal involvement of the knowing subject with the object that is known. Thus, Buber (1965) considers relationships in which instrumental knowlege (knowledge-that) allows the knower domination over the known. In this sense, the knower is the subject over an external object, and the relationship established is 'I-It'. However, if the knower makes a personal commitment to the act of knowing, that is, instrumental knowledge (I know that) transforms into personal knowledge (I know), the relationship changes. The knower then abdicates domination over the object, and enters rather into a reciprocal relationship of 'I-Thou'.

When this factor is matched with forms of knowledge, we can say that relationships conducted from a propositional stand adopt the veneer of 'I-It' confrontations. It is possible then for the knower to make pronouncements about his counterparts in a judgemental capacity. The knower sees himself as reified, apart from the objects of his study. He it is who influences and controls the changing scenarios before him, but he does not allow those scenarios to change him. He carefully excludes himself from personal involvement. However, when the relationship is conducted from a dialectical stand, the knower freely acknowledges that he as liable to be influenced as to influence. He sees himself as a changing part of the changing scenario, which is now no longer before him, but is his own stage. In such an I-Thou relationship, the reciprocity allows each subject to become the other's object.

This is the pattern that emerged during my later practice. I have demonstrated in Chapter 1 how I maintained a distance from my children, 1981-83, insisting on an I-It relationship in which they were the objects of my study. My relationships, 1983-86, were characterised by a growing reciprocity. Wilson (1967) identifies certain criteria as the foundations of moral behaviour: they are respect and responsibility, both grounded in individual rationality. For behaviour to become moral, says Wilson, such respect and responsibility must be exercised intentionally. I suggest that I-Thou relationships are founded on this intentionality, what Rogers (1961) calls 'unconditional positive regard' and Newsom (in Vesey, 1976-77) calls 'unreasonable care'. I believe my children and I approached such a relationship. I cannot pretend that it was always like this, but I believe the general trend was certainly there, and I have some golden moments recorded (e.g. VT9) when there was genuine affection around.

I hasten to point out that such a relationship was not confined to me and individual children, but extended among the children. I was the focus, the director. As I learned, so I tried - and often managed - to set up the situation where I withdrew entirely, leaving the children to conduct their own relationships. Thus, on VT4 (1985) we see me interacting with collective individuals; I am centre stage, and I direct the traffic. As I learned and relaxed more into my own I-Thou relationships, so did the children, and so I encouraged them to respond more to each other. Buber (1965) also speaks of the sublimation of the I to the Thou; this I believe is what occasionally happened in class,

where I, the manager, was forgotten in the children's eagerness to discover themselves in each other.

Many of the implications of this philosophy are expanded in Chapter 7, where I consider the intentionality of the individual as the basis of social evolution.

(ii) A shift in a view of persons

(a) The need for personal involvement in practice

Positivist forms of educational research uphold the legitimacy of forms of knowledge that require the knowing subject to remain aloof from the objects of her practice. I have indicated how I accepted this view, and fitted my practice to it. I then came to be uncomfortable with the view, for I found myself increasingly drawn into my own practice. The years 1983-86 were the time when I decided to abandon such a philosophy. My conscious beliefs were denying my intuitive beliefs. I was faced here with a two-fold dilemma: (1) my own resistance and (2) institutionalised resistance.

(1) My own resistance

I wanted to adopt a form of practice in which I felt authorised to allow the children to be free. It was difficult for me over the years to explain the concept of freedom. When I thought such thoughts in, say, 1982, I had visions of my children adopting roles made popular by the media: uncouth revolutionaries and fanatical anarchists. I recoiled from the vision of myself as a woolly-minded liberal who had a 'laissez-faire' attitude and allowed the children to do as they liked. With hindsight I can say that it was not my instincts that were at fault but my interpretations of the concept. I have indicated so far in the text how I came to my present understanding of the concept of freedom; that freedom requires the unselfish self-conscious application of institution-unbound values of care, acting in others' best interests (see Chapter 7). The path to this realistion has been bumpy, as I have tried to show.

I believe that I found the way to such realisations through a personal commitment to practice. Like Fromm (1978), I came to the realisation that in order to live my life as an integrated human being I had to allow my life to be touched by the people around me. I was not like Sartre's outsider; I was involved in my own life. Such a commitment is "profoundly hazardous" (Polanyi, 1958), for I exposed the vulnerability of self to the possible attack of others. Had I sufficient trust in the children to risk it? Had I sufficient trust in my own strength? Like Polanyi, I decided to have faith in my own personal knowledge, and allow the barriers to be broken down.

(2) Institutionalised resistance

The changes I have recorded here occurred over the period of three years. During that time I engaged in the trial and error of action-reflection. My practice seemed to become increasingly problematic, for in abandoning the restrictive form of practice that was controlled by bound theories of educational research, I had no formalised alternative theory available on which to model my practice. My teaching style, 1983-86, became less and less authoritarian, yet still operated within the framework of my own discipline of care. This 'regime of softness' (Reason and Rowan, 1981) was geared towards the dialogical community that I felt intuitively to be the realisation, in social terms, of the values I was encouraging to emerge. I felt that such a community could operate not from the coercive base of rules, but from the humanistic base of mutually agreed principles that are grounded in individual rationality. Yet my groping efforts to find an appropriate delivery method in class often resulted in actions that did not convey such philosophies.

I always insisted on ground rules in class; we all cared for each other, and that meant being courteous, listening, being honest - in retrospect I was applying Habermas's (1979) criteria for communicative competence, though I had never heard of Habermas at the time. My children, however, often strayed from agreed frameworks, and misinterpreted my efforts to allow them a modicum of freedom as licence to abuse. They often took advantage, and then I had to resort to other forms of practice, such as an authoritarian shout.

I clearly remember one afternoon when my headmaster brought a visiting Inspector to see my class. I had told the headmaster something of what I was trying to achieve, but I could not articulate it clearly, either to him or to myself. He disapproved of anything 'radical'. They came to my lesson, presumably with the expection of seeing a well-ordered group, since I was deputy head and expected to present 'model' lessons, to be greeted by seeming chaos. The bitter discussion that later ensued indicated what my headmaster thought of my 'discipline'.

Such incidents, I believe, are what are referred to by J. Nias (1984) when she speaks of "the deeply held values and attitudes of the substantial self and the behaviour expected by significant others of the situational self". It was very difficult for me to balance my own values against those of my senior management colleagues. This situation made even more difficult my decision to continue on my chosen path of committing myself to an unknown form of practice. The conviction that I was 'right' in this decision was grounded in the belief that my previous form of practice would in any case deny the educational values that had now surfaced, and that the 'rightness' of the decision lay in the fact that I was trying to find an appropriate form of practice that would allow those values to become fact. I did not claim that my course was universally 'right', but it appeared to be right for me (see 3 below).

(b) The need to see persons as material beings in a material world

Much of the literature of educational research assumes the control of educational knowledge, and, as such, assumes the dominance of the knowing subject over the passive, unknowing object. In this view, persons-as-objects are not credited with full personhood - as feeling, rational individuals who exist in the world and exert an influence on it, but are seen as abstractions.

This is certainly how I viewed my children until 1983/84. I saw them not as individuals, but as children 'en masse'. It would have seemed obvious that the very nature of personal and social education would have made me aware of the children as individuals, yet I was not. I feel this blinkered view was caused by three factors: (1) the insistence by the literature of personal and social education on group work as the main vehicle; (2) my understandings of the nature of educational research; (3) my view of myself as an abstraction.

(1) The insistence on group work

I have already indicated in Chapter 1 that group work was regarded as a prime methodology by the literature of personal and social education. I went along with current thinking, and advocated its merits (AT9 and 27b). I see now the grave shortcomings of regarding groups as corporate entities. The individuals in those groups become abstractions. I have moved away from the enthusiasm I had, for I see now that the notion of 'group' is grounded in semantics rather than ontology. 'Group' is a

collective noun, denoting a collection of parts. If 'group' is viewed as a proper noun - 'the group' - the sum becomes more than its parts. Individuality is sacrificed to corporate identity, and the lead is taken from the most dominant influences in the group. Golding's 'Lord of the flies' illustrates this concept luridly; the hysteria of losing one's identity to the greater god allows one the licence to abdicate personal responsibility.

I believe that in trends in the literature of personal and social education even today, 'group work' is viewed not so much from the perspective of collections of people each lending each other mutual support, but from the perspective of establishing a corporate identity which then forms the abstraction of 'the certain kind of person' who is the end-product of personal and social education. The 'full development' envisaged by the teacher may be endowed in this abstraction; the group becomes the creation of the teacher, an externalisation of her values, which may themselves be an externalisation of other forces. This was certainly the situation for me, pre-1983. All my talk of personal freedom for the children was so much speechifying (Rogers, 1961); what I was really after was conformity to institutionalised mores.

(2) My understanding of the nature of educational research

Until about 1985 I saw my research study as being into personal and social education. As such, 'research into personal and social education' was part of the wider concept of research into education.

Yet my crisis of practice had left me wondering what 'education' was, and how I could best characterise the research into it. I was systematically de-bunking the myth of reification, in terms of persons, research, education. I was beginning to see all these elements in terms of myself, not as abstractions pivoting around me and subject to my control, but as aspects which affected me deeply and changed me. 'Research INTO education' became itself a meaningless abstraction. It was I who was doing the research; I who was as much a part of the research process as the children I had set out to research on. And if I were an integral part of it all, subject to the influences of the aspects of which I was a part, then the research was as much 'into' me as 'into' my children.

These were the thoughts, dimly articulated, that dominated my changing perspectives about the nature of educational research. At the time, pre-1986, I had not the technical knowledge to cope with such realisations. I felt that I had moved outside the legitimate frameworks of educational research; I felt I was losing touch with anything to research ON. I felt almost honour bound to give up my formal project, since I was not getting any tangible results, nor had I a specific methodology to go about 'recording'.

My reading, in 1985, of 'Human Inquiry' (Reason and Rowan, 1981) was a saving grace. I began to move in new directions in my understandings, which I shall explain in the next section.

(3) My view of myself as an abstraction

It seems silly to say that I viewed myself as an abstraction, yet I believe that is what I did in my school practice until about 1985. I saw myself largely in terms of my functional role. In terms of my understanding of the nature of educational research, my brief was to conduct an experiment on the children. In terms of my interpretation of my role as deputy head, my brief was to implement the institutionalised values of the school, and these were largely externalised values of the headmaster. I simply did not see myself as a free person who had the right to believe in her own educational values and strive to turn them into reality. I insisted on obedience from the children, from colleagues, and from myself, to the reified abstraction called The System.

The taste of freedom in other schools, the turbulence of the years 1983-86, the emergence of a self-sufficiency which overcame the difficulties, all contributed to the perceived need to change my practice and the ability to do so. I began to see myself as a critical person with the same rights as others to live the life I chose; and I extended the same realisations to my children and colleagues, that they also could live the life they chose.

I had to leave school in 1986. I felt at the time that this was a cruel twist, for I was genuinely enjoying my school life in my emergent confidence to use my freedom. However, the time was right (isn't it always) to stop and reflect on what had been happening during the course of my study. I was able now to read intensively and rationalise my own acts in the light of other theoretical perspectives. Further, I was able to formulate my own personal theories out of my practice.

The outcome is that today I regard myself as the unique individual that I am, savouring each moment of life as an intense state of being. I refer again to a favourite quotation of Lorenz (Piattelli-Palmarini, 1980): "Two shovels filled with something or other are never equal to each other; the number one applied to a real object will never find its equal in the whole universe". I rejoice in the thought, for I know that each one of us is the only one who ever was and ever will be created. Such realisations are worth all the turmoil, all the pain. Whether or not this text is accepted as a PhD is almost immaterial, against the enormous educative process that it has led me through.

(iii) A shift in a view of development

I will discuss the aspects of this section in much greater detail in Part Two, and will here give a quick gloss of the aspects that are directly relevant to the content of this chapter - my practice in personal and social education, 1983-86.

(a) The notion of Truth as interpersonal creativity

When I became critical, beginning with the crisis of practice in 1983, I started not believing in reified forms of knowledge. I examined the concept of an ultimate Truth and found it wanting in terms of meeting the needs of my practice. I rationalised that my practice was not leading anywhere specifically, other than to this present moment. This situation, as far as I could see, would last through all of time. No matter how hard I believed in an ultimate truth, or state of the art in which all things would be revealed, that time would never come. No amount of ratiocination will turn today into tomorrow.

I began to see two things: (1) that a reified truth cannot exist, since truth is the property of the people who believe in it; (2) truth is something for the present, able to act as the foundation for the future, but not able to become the future. I began to see truth as a property of mind, an individual's mind - and since I had rights as an individual, no more and no less than other individuals, my truth was more valid for

me than the reified Truth that I was handed by the literature. Because I was a person existing here and now, the truth that had the most immediate impact on me was the reality of here and now. If I did not like the truth as I found it, such as when my educational values were denied in my practice, it was up to me to change it.

I ran into some problems as to how I could validate my claims to knowledge. I felt that if I were to hold up my truth as THE truth, I would be guilty of presenting my views as reified. I read some of the work of Habermas (1976, 1979), Bernstein (1983), Rorty (1982)and Arendt (1958), and began to understand this theory, that the validation of an individual's claim to knowledge is to agree the criteria for truth and look for instances in which such criteria may be perceived in practice.

I shall develop these ideas at some length in Chapter 7. I will here now indicate how these realisations had profound implications for my understanding of the nature of personal development.

(b) The notion of personal development as grounded in generative processes

As ever, the influence of Chomsky was never far away, and I again fell back on the central concept of the generative component.

As I became accustomed to doing without the concept of reified knowledge, and began to see knowledge as a personal creation, I brought into play the idea of human potential. For me, the concepts of potential and generative power are closely allied.

I will detail the theory in Chapters 6 and 7, but a brief outline here gives the flavour of the ideas that were born at about this time:

There are two aspects to the theory. One aspect is to do with the capacity for on-going development. The other is to do with the validation of claims to knowledge.

The capacity for on-going development

I have already indicated in this chapter how I was dissatisfied with structured frameworks of stage developmental models. I reasoned that if such a dominant theory were inappropriate, either I was at fault in not understanding the theory, or the theory was at fault in not understanding me. Armed with my conviction that my truth was appropriate for my needs, I systematically set about forging a new theory.

My later reading brought me into touch with the work of Riegel. He accepts much of Piaget's theory, but maintains that the enterprise is limited in stopping at formal operations. Riegel proposes (1973) a further 'stage' of dialectical thought; that is, an 'end product' of on-going development. I agree with the principle at issue, that the only 'end product' to development is a state of non-end-product. I do not agree with Riegel's interpretation of the nature of human development, however. By sticking with even an amended form of stage theory, he still puts human development into linear categories, and, for me, that is still sticking at the level of descriptive adequacy and avoiding the critical issue of how a theory of human development may attain explanatory adequacy: that is, not only describe what happens during a person's life, but to explain why things happen as they do. I have attempted this; this text is the manifestation of the theory.

Now to the second aspect:

Validation of claims to knowledge

Let us accept that knowledge is the property of the knower. As such, each individual knows what he knows. But, as I shall explain in Chapter 5, there are different kinds of knowledge, the finest and most powerful being, in my opinion, the intuitive personal knowledge that is part of the innate endowment of a human being.

Let us further suppose that knowledge may be shared and validated as a currently accepted truth by a society of knowers, all individuals, each with individual personal knowledge. Such truth is temporary, since it is subject to changes in the individuals who share their knowledge.

Now let me synthesise the two aspects:

I hypothesise that development may be accounted for by acknowledging the existence of innate potentials for unlimited acts of creation (Chapter 6). I also hypothesise that the nature of change may be understood in terms of the constant interplay between structure and transformation, and that the process of the development of the rationality of the individual (my working definition of the concept 'education') may be traced in action-reflection cycles that may be mapped onto the ever-expanding network of structures and transformations (Chapter 6). In making these suggestions, I am offering a theory that seeks to reconstruct inferred innate processes. I am led to offer this theory as a possible explanation for the development of individuals. At first I applied it to the development of my children, in the fashion of knower and known, but now I apply it primarily to myself.

In offering my own theory to account for my own personal and professional development, I am claiming legitimacy for my individual truth. In writing my thoughts down, I am inviting other rational knowers to consider my truth as legitimate to its own context, and, if they choose, to validate it as a shared truth by acknowledging it as a potential form of life. In this fashion, I feel, the communciation

process itself becomes educational, in that individuals may move forward their own understandings, while being able to account for that understanding. (See also Chapter 7 for further elaboration)

Conclusion

I became ill in 1986 and left school. I officially retired in 1987. I felt that my research project had now come to an end. All that was left for me to do was record my practice in personal and social education, how I had helped my children become more sociable.

I saw my future as possibly writing another book. Never did I think that I would now develop my own education. Yet that is what I have done.

The one and a half years since I left school (it is now December 1988) have forced me to think actively about what I had been doing on a largely intuitive, inspirational level. Even so, I never characterised such thought as 'practice'. It was only through the crisis of practice when I came to write up the thesis (Chapter 2 of this text) that I realised that practice never ends. Nor, in my view, does anything else. What we have in life is the ever-present now, and new beginnings.

So now to Chapter 4, an explanation of how I came to the understanding that lets me say these things; and on to a continuation of my thought-in-action that is the form of this text.

CHAPTER 4: THE WRITING PROJECT, CHAPTERS 4-6

Contents

PAGE

1 INTRODUCTION 188

2 PRACTICE 190

(i) the action 190
(ii) epistemology 197
(iii) the results 202

3 CONSIDERATIONS 204

(i) A shift in a view of knowledge 204

(a) an abandonment of abstractions as the grounding of my practice 204
(b) levels of adequacy 206
(c) a view of knowledge as creation 207

(ii) A shift in a view of practice 208

(a) practice as creation 208
(b) practice as an externalisation of a view of self 209

(iii) A shift in a view of self 211

(a) self as knower and known 211
(b) the abolition of ideologies as the basis of development; the creation of critiques 212

CHAPTER FOUR: THE WRITING PROJECT: CHAPTERS 4 - 6

1 INTRODUCTION

To recapitulate briefly: in Chapter 2 of this text I explained why I had found the writing of First Version 1-3 disturbing, and why I came to the situation where I was forced to adopt another form. The writing of First Version 4-6 showed the adoption of a new form of writing which reflected the adoption of a new form of thought.

I have told how I gave up the formal project at the end of Chapter 3. I did not give up writing, however. By now I was very keen to explore some of the ideas that were developing through the writing, even though at the time they did not seem relevant to the project that I saw as focused specifically on my personal and social education work in school. I decided that I would go on to Chapter 4, but write now about subjects that I found interesting and in a way that I wanted to. So it was in an almost defiant mood that I began Chapter 4, exploring the ideas of forms of knowledge, and how different forms influence the way people think about topics. This was the line I took at this stage; when I came to writing I began to see the need to make explicit how I thought about topics, rather than how other people thought. When I came to writing about views of personhood, and attempted the same propositional format - how other people viewed personhood - it was borne home how imperative it was for me to be clear how I understood my own views. I realised then

that persons should not attempt to characterise other persons as abstractions, but needed rather to focus on a characterisation of their own personhood. It was then that I broke entirely with the propositional forms that I was using and started writing about my own views.

I stopped writing entirely while I read for several weeks. I read texts about dialectical knowledge and dialectical forms of life. This was the first time I became critically aware that there are different ways of thinking. I realise that this sounds teribly naive, but it is so. What had happened through my practice of writing was that I had moved into a different way of thinking; but, because I had never come across an explicit statement that humans may engage in quite radically different forms of thought, I really did not understand what was happening. Through my reading I learned about different forms of thought, and through my reflection I was able to analyse what was happening to me. As soon as I could rationalise the situation, I started coping, and working towards a resolution of the problem.

I re-drafted the beginning of First Version Chapter 4 to produce a text that reflected the values I had formed during the writing of Chapter 4. In the validation meeting at Bath between Jack Whitehead, Cyril Selmes, Mary Tasker and myself, we agreed that the content of Chapters 4, 5 and 6 was good, and relevant to what had now emerged as the real focus of my research, that is, an explanation for my own personal and professional development.

2. PRACTICE

(i) The action

The contents of first version Chapters 4, 5 and 6 aimed at providing answers respectively for the three questions:

1. What constitutes knowledge of values?
2. How is knowledge of values acquired?
3. How is knowledge of values acquisition put to use?

In my view, the three questions synthesised the far-ranging nature of my work in personal and social education, and also allowed scope for the expression of my theories about values acquisition, theories that challenged and broke with current theories of cognitive stage development (Piaget, Kohlberg, Rogers), theories of habit formation (behaviourist/stimulus-response schools), and theories of comparative analysis (structuralist/positivist schools) (such theories claiming to explain, but, in my view, offering descriptions rather than explanations). I had anticipated that I could present hypotheses about values formation by reference to my practice in school: show how my theories were grounded in the behavioural outcomes of my children. What I did not anticipate was that I would reconsider my research questions in terms of myself. Nor did I anticipate the shift in focus that made me stop thinking of personal and social education as something that had happened in school to my children, and regard it as something that was happening to me now.

The action of first version 4-6 was that my project became organic, an extension of the living person who was writing it. It was no longer a report about past practice, nor even a progress report about present practice. It was actually a part of the machinery of present practice.

What happened was this: I wrote, in answer to my question 'What constitutes knowledge of values?' that, before we could present any tentative answer, we had to consider what 'values' meant. In order to do this, we had to survey the different ways that the literature presented knowledge of values. And before we could do this, we had to survey the ways in which different people thought about such issues.

I then considered such different approaches. I did not realise it at the time, nor could I put a name to it, but what I was doing was researching the literature of thought structures: ways of thinking about thinking (Basseches, 1984). This was an entirely new field for me, and one which I found incredibly exciting. As yet, however, I still regarded what I was reading as part of 'the literature', intellectually stimulating but personally unrelated.

Then I went on, in Chapter 4, to consider the ways that different forms of thought influenced ways that people regarded values. I organised these approaches as (a) values as instrumental, (b) values as from a sociological perspective and (c) values as personal. I suggested a parallel between different kinds of knowledge and different views on values constitution. I reasoned that views of the constitution of values would inevitably colour the way individuals looked at the notion

of personhood. A propositional thinker would view persons as abstractions; a dialectical thinker would view persons as real, living entities existing in a material world; and as soon as that perspective was adopted, the thinker had of necessity to include himself in his own discussion, since he was the living entity whose property the thoughts were that he was expressing.

At this point I realised what I had done, the enormity of the discoveries I had made. I went around in a kind of euphoric haze. I realised now why my project was the failure that it was. It took me a little while to gather my thoughts sufficiently to consult Jack Whitehead how to tackle the project in the light of my new forms of thought.

My first instinct was to go back and re-write. I remember Jack's words distinctly: "You need to communicate the process that has led you to these insights." If I re-wrote, the evidence would be lost, and history would be distorted. I was in a dilemma. My answer was to continue writing, now a trusted way of disentangling intellectual morasses, like the ant cleaning its antenna, familiar normality as an antidote to panic (Hall, 1963).

As I continued to write my propositions about the nature of values, I started writing interludes, externalisations of my own thoughts, and I became aware that the very thought processes I was using were undergoing a rapid metamorphosis as I applied my newly found knowledge about different ways of thinking. I could identify how I was moving away from

propositional forms to dialectical forms, and I commented in the text that I was producing to show this change. The interludes became increasingly critical. At first I thought to keep a diary, but the interludes became more than that. They began to take the form of conversations with myself, a new form of thought challenging the old.

To make the distinction between the text of the original plan, and the interludes, which were becoming an on-going critique in dialectical form of what I was writing in propositional form, I wrote the text in lower case script and the interludes in upper case. (I have adopted the same strategy in Chapter 5 of this text.) I began to see that the emergent critique was, in fact, the focus of the study, in that I was now continually involved in accounting for my own on-going development, rather than in the 'arrested' development of my children.

I began calling the critique the 'thesis' and the propositional text the 'dissertation'. This naming lasted for perhaps a day, for I rapidly realised that each part of my practice influenced the whole. Granted I could analyse for purposes of easy presentation, but the reality was that I and my text were integrated as surely as my mind and body. The text was me, an externalisation of my mind/brain, an expression of the form of thought that made me adopt a particular form of life.

The experience of writing first version Chapter 4 and 5, particularly, was, for me, spiritual. It put me closer in touch with myself than any other experience of my life. I am reminded of a favourite passsage from Polanyi (1958):

"Having made a discovery, I shall never see the world again as before. My eyes have become different; I have made myself into a person seeing and thinking differently. I have crossed a gap, the heuristic gap which lies between problem and discovery."

and from Hall (1981): Quiller, a secret agent, is in a silent surrounding and thinks he hears something. He is about to dismiss the sound as in his imagination, but he remembers his reliance on his mind:

"So quiet that it could have just been in my mind; but I know my mind; it doesn't play tricks on me; it lets me know things; it lets me know the kind of things I should know."

This is how I felt. I was in touch with my mind, and I trusted it.

I finished the text. My interludes became less frequent as Chapter 5 progressed, and almost disappeared in Chapter 6. I found that the critical awareness was worked into the fabric of the text, and there was no need for an on-going critique.

When I reached the end I was even more dissatisfied with Chapters 1-3. I was pleased with 4-6, though I felt 6 could be stronger. But what to do now with the overall project? I had a hybrid, neither a propositional report nor a dialectical portfolio; a text without a framework, a flowing expression of thought without a stable focus.

I decided to attempt yet another tack; and here I was at fault. For I fell once again into a form of thought that regarded the only form of progress as linear. Let me explain:

I had learnt that I had a critical faculty and I had learnt how to exercise it. I had turned Chapters 4-6 into an expression of thought-in-action. I had demonstrated to my own satisfaction how I had undertaken action-reflection cycles to move forward my own understanding of my own development. By on-going critical reflection on my current practice I was able to demonstrate in action how I was improving that practice. I had presented the theory of the need for reflection-in-action as a means of improving educational practice, and I was actually presenting living proof of the theory in the practice which contained the theory.

Now I wanted to undertake a further action-reflection cycle to show how I could apply my critical faculties to the whole project, Chapters 1-6. I therefore went through the project from the beginning, building in a critique as I went, using my now more powerful thought processes to point out the less mature thinking of Chapters 1-3, and attempting to present coherently the thoughts of the inchoate episodes.

I believe I succeeded, but the result was a text that was now so confusing in its structure as to be incomprehensible. Provided one had the key to the maze it was possible to navigate one's way through. But readers are mortals with limited time and patience, and the three friends who read the text were unanimous in their judgements that their task of reading was definitely laborious.

It was my own suggestion that I re-write, but I was adamant that I should not produce a precis of the first version. I had other intentions which then I could not articulate, but now, after due reflection, I can, tentatively. I said earlier that my fault was in supposing that progress was linear. This was reflected in my desire to undertake the critique. In my mind was not so much a view of the whole as a view of linear episodes; not so much the idea of presenting an understanding of the principles underlying the whole project as an attempt to describe the processes that I had used as I wrote. I had fallen into my own trap: I had again demonstrated the restrictive view that descriptions of progress are sufficient. In writing this present text I have radically changed the form from the first version; in doing so I hope to present explanations for why I am the person that I am today, rather than only descriptions of the paths I have followed. I shall consider this point further in the next section.

(ii) Epistemology

A theme that I draw on throughout is the notion of adequacy. In Chapter 2 of this text I point to Chomsky's theory of levels of adequacy - observational, descriptive and explanatory - and scope of enquiries - E (external) or I (internal) studies. Chomsky draws the parallel between these two aspects, in that E-studies are concerned with accounting for how other people behave, and are therefore descriptive. I would say that they are also propositional. An I-study, says Chomsky, aims to account for the intuitions of the individual, and therefore aims for explanatory adequacy. I would say that such a form of enquiry is grounded in dialectical forms.

I will here state my belief that propositional forms are embedded within dialectical forms, and, by implication, that I-level enquiries contain E-level enquiries. Let me explain, and say also that what I am about to explicate here will be used in Chapter 7 of this text as the basis, in my view, of the nature of communicative competence.

We start from a root premise that thought is the property of a living thinker, and not a reified abstraction. As such, thought may be characterised as form and substance: the thoughts I produce are generated by the process of thought (Chapter 5). As I will attempt to show in Chapter 6, I suggest that form and substance are in constant interplay and fusion; form metamorphoses into substance, which metamorphoses into a new form of form. In this way, ontology and epistemology fuse into each other; the distinction is one of

convenience, a naming of processes that helps the living enquirer understand the processes through analysis. It is like making the light stand still, freezing the action, so as to study a moment in time in order better to understand the concept of time.

The thought-as-substance produced by the thinker may be seen as the substantial values of the thinker. The thought-as-action may be seen as the expression of those values. A value may be characterised as a belief; and the expression of such a belief may take the form of an implicit prefix: 'I believe that ... '. I am here not referring to the distinction made by Habermas (1979: Universal Pragmatics) between the illocutionary component and the propositional component. As I understand him, Habermas is providing here a foundation for speech acts at a performance level. What I am suggesting is a foundation for the individual's claim to knowledge. If I say "It is raining", I am claiming that I know that it is raining. My knowledge takes the form of an expressed value, albeit an implicit one: "I believe that it is raining."

If I use the linguistic notation developed by Chomsky to further clarify the theory: a propositional string may be characterised as NP + V

[NP - it] [V - is raining]

Generative transformational theories of linguistics (for example, Fodor and Katz, 1964) tell us that every surface string at performance level may be mapped onto its semantic counterpart at competence level. Thus, the surface manifestation "it is raining" is an expression in linguistic surface terms - phonemes, intonation and other linguistic elements - of an underlying knowledge of the fact that it is in fact raining.

Now, if the utterance is an expression of the genuine personal knowledge of the speaker (and here I will invoke the criterion of honesty: Habermas, 1979), i.e. if it is part of his personal truth (see Chapter 3 of this text), then his truth will be manifested in the surface string by prefixing it with an intuitive, inferred 'I believe that ...', this phrase indicating that here is a statement of value that is part of his personal value system at competence level. "It is raining" is a manifestation of his belief that it really is raining.

In Chapters 7 and 8 of this text I will carry the discussion further by indicating how interpersonal communication may be grounded in the manifestations at surface level of the underlying competencies of individuals, each aiming at sharing his own personal knowledge. For the time being, I am maintaining that substantial propositions are the property of the speaker, and, provided he means what he says, may be seen as an externalisation of his value system that is characterised by an inferred prefix 'I believe that ... '

I further maintain that such inferred prefixes are part of dialectical mechanisms. Dialectical forms of thought are grounded in the acknowledgement of the thinker that he is a material being in a material world. His thought is organic and in a constant state of development; and is unbound and capable of infinite acts of creation.

So my discussion suggests that propositional forms are embedded within dialectical forms.

Let me return to the notion of levels of adequacy and the scope of human enquiries. I suggested that enquiries that are conducted in propositional terms - for example, a researcher conducts an experiment into other people's practice - may only aspire to descriptive adequacy; that is, the researcher may give an account about somebody else's practice. I further suggest that when an enquiry is conducted in dialectical terms - when the enquirer acknowledges that he includes the living I (Whitehead, 1980) in his enquiry, and views himself as the research field - then the enquiry attains explanatory status, for the researcher may attempt to account for his own understanding of his practice.

So I conclude that dialectical forms of enquiry may contain propositional forms as substantial manifestations of the underlying values of the enquirer. Descriptions of practice may illustrate how the enquirer tackled the root problem of a negation of values; explanations for practice will require the enquirer to demonstrate in practice how she understood what she was doing and why she was doing it.

In my view, it is not sufficient to demonstrate an improvement in practice. It is necessary also to demonstrate the development of understandings that led to that improvement in practice.

****

This was the essential learning of first version Chapters 4-6. I came to know (Stronach, 1986), and I tried to show how it was that I came to know. This, for me, is what made my project educational. I earlier defined 'education' as the process of an improvement in individual rationality. I believe that I have improved my own rationality (for my definition of 'improved' see Chapter 6), and I believe that I have demonstrated the process whereby it came about.

I will now point to some major implications of these aspects.

(iii) The results

Let me examine what I indicated in Chapter 1 of this text as the outcome of my project. I had intended to produce a report about my work in school in personal and social education, 1981-86. In producing this report I had a fixed hypothesis which I wanted to prove; that my teaching of personal and social education had produced children who were socially adequate and personally pleasant.

Now let me examine what the real results are. I have here an organic text that is a record of my own education. More than that, it has been the expression of the thought-in-action that has helped me to understand my own development.

The substantial propositions of the first version showed a general trend away from an interest in knowledge of processes of systems to a desire for knowledge of forms of thought. The crucial root concept of my epistemology became the acknowledgement that I was a living person who was creating this text, and, out of my creation, was experiencing the liberation of innate potential to engage in unbounded forms of being.

The 'results' of this text, then, are not in the form of an end product of proven hypotheses. The results are in the form of life that I have consciously adopted. The concrete results of the substantial propositions were originally intended to present answers. Instead, they present a distillation (Mary Tasker) of my thought-in-action up till now that is a part of the on-going development of my life.

If I have reached an end product, or proven a hypothesis, it is simply that I have an end product of no end product. In my view, there is no end to anything, ever. There are only ever-renewable states of being, including death. Today is the sum total of all my yesterdays, but that total end product of experience acts as the platform for the future. The propositions of my past life are arrayed as the foundation for my future, guided by the intentionality of now.

In Chapter 6 I shall outline how I understand how questions search out answers, which are then transformed, through the generative component, into new questions. This is my state of mind. I do not see anything now as fixed, immutable, but recognise that everything, including myself, is in a state of change and creation; and I am glad that I am part of it.

3. CONSIDERATIONS

Let me here briefly examine some of the issues raised in this chapter. As I indicated in Chapter 3 of this text, the major issues are synthesised in Chapter 6, and I do not intend to labour points here. Inevitably, in a text like this, some repetition will occur, but, while I want to reinforce central themes, I do not want to repeat details. So I will gloss points here that are treated later in a more explicit form.

(i) A shift in a view of knowledge

In Chapter 6, section (2) is entitled 'Towards a characterisation of the transformational generative nature of dialectics'. What I am doing in this present section is to outline some of the principles I regard as assumptions of the theory I shall present there.

(a) An abandonment of abstractions as the grounding of my practice

It is interesting to consider the epistemological issues that underlie my use of the word 'assumptions' with its reference in Chapter 1 of this text. Then I was referring to my acceptance of the reified literature. Now I refer to my consideration of hypotheses that I have created out of my practice.

I have come full circle, I believe, in all aspects of my life where I have abandoned the idea of abstraction as the grounding of my practice. I read now with a critical eye; I actively question the messages of the media, and I accept very little at face value. This does not mean that I have become a social hawk, demolishing the beliefs of others, for my critical reflection reminds me always that I am in a continual state of development. I will always have much to learn, and learning stems from the fact that I am open to the questions of others and of my own mind. Like Rogers (1961), "I hold my concepts loosely".

I regard abstraction as a useful and necessary part of epistemology. For example, theories of cognitive stage development help me to understand that there are perhaps recognisable distinctive features in any process of development; but I do not accept this concept as an explanatory concept. It is helpful for me, in reading the literature of cognitive stage development, to appreciate that other observers have noted general trends, metamorphoses from one set of distinctive features to another. I still maintain, however, that these are tentative descriptions of an overall process; they are not ultimate inductions that here is a specific form of life. I accept the descriptions for what they are, but I see their limitations as hypotheses of abstractions, not to be taken as universal generalisations of an ontology.

(b) Levels of adequacy

I look now always for explanations. In my first book (McNiff 1986) I went along with dominant paradigms in thinking that teachers are required to describe the processes that led to an enhancement of practice. I explained carefully in the book the processes that I felt teachers could undertake in order to bring about that practice. I included a section about my own research project, and aimed to show how my pupils had become more socially adequate through my enhanced management skills. I see now that I was offering descriptions of practice, and my recommendations were couched in a form that identified the distinctive features of good practice and exhorted teachers to adapt their methodologies to my hypotheses. Although the messages of the text are presented in a non-coercive fashion, I feel that I am guilty of aspiring to become part of the reified literature that regards the printed or spoken word as The Truth.

(c) A view of knowledge as creation

In this way, I feel that teachers may become critical. As I did, they may bring their reflective capacities to bear on the grounds of their practices. When I did this (Chapters 1 and 3 of this text) I discovered that my practice was grounded in the assumptions of the reified literature. Critical reflection, brought about through the crises of practice when I resolved to negate the negation of my educational values, enabled me to see these assumptions for what they were, and to develop new assumptions. This process, itself a part of the epistemology of my practice, has led to a different form of epistemology where I view practice as creation rather than adaptation.

Knowledge, for me, is not now something I glean from the thoughts of others. Those thoughts are expressions of their creators' cognitive structures. In my epistemology of creation, they have descriptive status, E-levels. I may accept those expressions, and include them into my own hypotheses, producing the formation that others' expressions may form part of the ground for my own explanations, I-levels.

For further discussion, please see Chapter 6 of this text.

(ii) A shift in a view of practice

(a) Practice as creation

Continuing the theme of the above section, I may say that I see practice as personal creation. For me, the nature of creation is not of something out of nothing, but something out of something. In my previous thinking of the practice of 1981-83, I view Truth as a chronological ultimate, something to be aimed for as an end-state, and Creation as chronological starting point. Creativity was the bringing-into-being of a new form that had little relationship with previous forms. It was not, and suddenly it was.

In my dialectical form of thinking, I may say that each new state of being (Chapter 6) that is a distinctive feature (descriptive level) of an on-going process of structures and transformations (explanatory level) is an act of creation. Viewed in this way, each second of my life is an act of creation.

Viewed in this light, creation becomes something that is grounded in previous forms of life (previous acts of creation). If I apply this concept to the creation of a work of art, I may say, along with Wilhelm von Humboldt, that the substantial work of art was already in the mind of the artist in its form. The process of on-going acts of creation eventually externalise the form (that is in fact, in my hypothesis, part

of the innate endowment of the artist) into the substance that may be perceived as part of the material world.

As such, each moment of practice is grounded in previous moments of practice. Far from the thinking described in Chapter 1 of this text, where practice was the passive adaptation of others' prescriptions, I see practice as the personal creation of the actor. In the living society of which the actor is a part, that practice is subject to the constraints of society (Chapter 7 of this text); but what I am attempting here is a characterisation of the nature of practice, and I maintain that it is the property of the actor's innate capacities as a material being in a material world.

(b) Practice as an externalisation of a view of self

As such, this view of practice reflects the view of the practitioner as a living, material being in a living, material world. Instead of viewing himself as a product of a reified system, he views himself as a thinking being and creator of his own system. His life is not the reflection of an other's thoughts, but the externalisation of his own, an act of creation, a coming-into-being.

Now, creativity must not be regarded as a licence for anarchy. Lest I be misunderstood in my views about the nature of a creative form of life, I stress that, in pluralist societies, such a form of life is

subject to the control of other forms of life - i.e. each individual is subject to the control of other individuals.

By the same token, an individual is subject to the control of his own critical capacity. Here we need the contribution of thinkers such as Foucault, Habermas, Giroux, Bernstein, who tell us that the mutually created truths of individuals prepared to share their individually created truths are the moral foundation for that society. The individual truth is subject to the constraints of the better argument, when 'better' is seen as the validation by rational individuals as the form of life acting in the best interests of those who have agreed the criteria for the common truth.

I shall examine this concept further in Chapter 7. In this section I am focusing on the concept of the nature of practice, and I suggest that the practitioner who views his life as a constant creative act, of coming-into-being, will inevitably view his practice in the same light.

(iii) A shift in a view of self

(a) Self as knower and known

In adopting a dialectical form of thought for the creation of my practice, I suggest that I demolished the barrier in my own life between theory and practice. I no longer viewed myself as the applier of others' theories, but as the creator of my own. I was no longer the object of an other's enquiry, as my children were no longer the object of my enquiry. I became the object of my own enquiry; my practice took the view that I was both knower and known, subject and object.

I have indicated at junctures in this text that this, I believe, is the nature of educational research. In answer to Torbert's (1981) question of 'Why is educational research so uneducational?' I will agree with him that, until recently, forms of educational research have concentrated on proving hypotheses about others' practices - about controlling educational knowledge.

Even forms of thinking that show a more liberated tendency to requiring teachers to account for their own classroom practices (e.g. Eggleston et al, 1976) still accept as fulfilling the criterion of 'educational' the fact that descriptions of practice will suffice. I will take this point further in Chapter 7, where I shall attempt to show that recent submissions to the University of Bath (e.g. Denley, 1987; Jensen, 1987; Gurney, 1988) still rest at the level of descriptive adequacy. They

present descriptions of practice. They do not aspire to explanatory adequacy in showing why and how they came to adopt the form of life that led to that practice. They do not show the process of their view of self that has led to its concomitant view of practice. This, I believe, is what makes a study educational, in the sense of 'education' as being the process of the development of rational thought.

(b) The abolition of ideologies as the basis of development; the creation of critiques

This, I believe, is the strength of my contribution. I have attempted to show in this Part One how I have come to my present form of thought and my present form of being. Whereas in 1981 I was totally at the mercy, through my own restictive forms of thought, of the ideologies that were the outcomes of the thoughts of reified others, in 1988 I am a free thinker, and my practice reflects that freedom. I obey the conventions of the societies of practitioners of whom I am a part, because I share a similar form of life. But I obey out of wisdom and not out of prejudice.

My practice is creation. I do not aim to create new ideologies, for I am constantly modifying and re-formulating my ideas. I rejoice in the process, for with each new question, each new re-formulation, my being as a thinking person is re-affirmed.

I have a new kind of peace in my very restlessness, for I can allow my curiosity free rein without the fear of the spectre of other dominant knowers who will challenge my right so to do. I am happy to demolish the shibboleths, and I replace them with a view of self that is assured of the infinite comfort of her own unbounded potential.

PART TWO

REFLECTION

AN EXPLANATION FOR KNOWLEDGE OF VALUES

Contents | Page

INTRODUCTION 215

1 Rationale for Part Two 215

2. Content of Part Two (Substance of the inner framework) 219

3 Epistemological issues regarding the constitution and acquisition of knowledge of values 220

PART TWO: REFLECTIONS

AN EXPLANATION FOR KNOWLEDGE OF VALUES

INTRODUCTION

1 Rationale for Part Two

Much of what appears in this part is a condensation of what appeared in first version, Chapters 4, 5 and 6. I have attempted to pick out the valuable pieces of writing, and then weave them into the critical form of this present text.

In the first version my intention in writing these chapters was to demonstrate in practice the ideas that had been generated through my practice of writing. The writing had been focused on the report of my work in personal and social education.

So I can say that this present exposition is an outcome of my critical reflection on all past practice, that practice containing my understandings of my development as a teacher and as a writer. The difference between this present exposition and that of first version 4-6 is that then I was reflecting on the experience of events, whereas now I am reflecting on my understanding of that experience. I am presenting this part as from my developing understandings of my own development, as

part of an on-going enquiry. I fully acknowledge that I am still learning.

In the Introduction I said that I would use Chapter 5 as an example of how I was still learning. Chapter 5 has an interesting history. It appeared first as part of the first version, which then became part of my data archives. It stayed substantially the same in the second version, and was then considered by Jack Whitehead and myself as a weaker section of the whole text. I undertook some revision, but the revisions themselves appeared as 'patching up' rather than the fundamental revision of conceptualisation that was needed. So this attempt at producing Chapter 5 is my third, and I have used it to show the development of my learning in action.

I have adopted a strategy similar to that which I used when writing the first version. I have used the text as the field for working out my ideas that are being given voice through the text. I have adopted the same format of writing in lower case letters for the substantial propositions, and using upper case script for the interludes of expressed thought. I have externalised these thought processes to try to show how I learn; how I endeavour to turn random and vaguely understood concepts into a systematic enquiry. I have tried to make clear throughout the whole text the dual nature of my enquiry: the outer framework of my enquiry into my own development, and how it is that I have come to know; the inner framework of my enquiry into my study of moral education. Both frameworks involve and influence the other, for my values of the outer framework were shaped by the activities of the

inner framework. I have indicated throughout that, although by adopting these measures, I might appear to be presenting my study as fragmented, as two separate issues, in fact they are not. I have tried to interweave them, to show how the different capacities of thought and action have led to an integration that is a reflection of the totality of my life.

Having then accepted that the total structure of the text may be seen at these two levels, I will now say that Chapter 5 may be seen as operating at three levels: (1) the thought-in-action (upper case script) that allows me to organise my own reflections on (2) the outer framework of my own development that is grounded in (3) my study of moral education. I hope that I have communicated the difference between these levels, and, at the same time, shown them all to bear directly, as a total practice, on the form of life that I lead.

I will remind you to regard Part II as a crucial part of my story and my claim to educational knowledge. Although Part II has a more theoretical perspective than Part I, the thoughts expressed here are the direct result of the form of life generated by my practices as recounted in Part I. Part II shows how I have 'become critical' (Carr and Kemmis, 1986), and how I turn my critical faculty in on itself in order to understand itself.

I will remind you, also, of the central issue of this text: my claim to knowledge. I am claiming that I understand how it is that I have come to know. The considerations I express in Part II are the structures that have been subjected to the critical analysis of my mind; I now show how the structures change along with the growth of understanding. The changes of mind that occur inevitably generate changes in the substantial propositions. It is the process of change within the inner and outer framework that I wish to make explicit in this section. By doing so, I wish to justify my claim that I know how it is that I have 'come to know'.

2 Content of Part Two (Substance of the inner framework)

In 'Knowledge of language' (1986), Chomsky explains how the focus of linguistic enquiry has shifted.

" ... the shift of focus was from behavior or the products of behavior to states of mind/brain that enter into behavior. If one chooses to focus attention on this latter topic, the central concern becomes knowledge of language: its nature, origins, and use.

"The three basic questions that arise, then, are these:

(i) What constitutes knowledge of language?
(ii) How is knowledge of language acquired?
(iii) How is knowledge of language put to use?"

My work is to do with an enquiry into the nature of values education. I see a parallel shift in my own way of approaching my enquiry as the one that Chomsky formulates above. My practice as a teacher convinced me of the need to seek explanations for human values in forms other than overt behaviour. Most of the literature of values education centres on 'behaviour or the products of behaviour'. In Part One I have attempted to demonstrate how this approach is inadequate to answer the questions of my practice, and I therefore look to 'the state of mind/brain that enters into behaviour' as providing some more appropriate answers. So I have adopted Chomsky's method of attack by posing three basic questions:

(i) What constitutes knowledge of values?

(ii) How is knowledge of values acquired?

(iii) How is knowledge of values put to use?

These three questions will form the focus of the following three chapters respectively; but note: (iii) forms Chapter 7 at the beginning of Part III.

3. Epistemological issues regarding the constitution and acquisition of knowledge of values.

There seems to be little overall agreement in the literature as to a coherent categorisation system of values, and even less about how a system of values might be acquired. Dunlop (1984) suggests that "this is partly because of the inherent difficulty of the task. Emotion and feeling are extremely hard to talk about systematically. There is great imprecision and looseness in the ordinary language used to refer to them, and the approaches of those few writers who have tried to discuss them vary to a surprising extent. One constantly finds oneself wondering whether they are even talking about the same thing at all. It is also because the phenomena are highly obscure and elusive 'in themselves'." Raven (1981) comments that "examples of values are legion". How then, to refer to a concept aired by Chomsky (1986), can we resolve Plato's problem, of how we can know so much, given so little evidence.

Chomsky explains the problem thus:

"The essence of Plato's problem was well expressed by Bertrand Russell when he raised the question: 'How comes it that human beings, whose contacts with the world are brief and personal and limited, are nevertheless able to know as much as they do know?' In certain domains of thought and understanding, our knowledge is vast in scope, highly specific and richly articulated in character, and in large measure shared with others who have similar backgrounds and experience. The same is true of systems of belief and expectation, modes of interpretation and integration of experience, and more generally what we may call 'cognitive systems', only parts of which qualify as actual knowledge. The problem that arises when we consider the matter with a little care is one of 'poverty of stimulus'. Although our cognitive systems surely reflect our experience in some manner, a careful specification of the properties of these systems on the one hand, and the experience that somehow led to their formation on the other, shows that the two are separated by a considerable gap, in fact, a chasm. The problem is to account for the specificity and the richness of the cognitive systems that arise in the individual on the basis of the limited information available. Cognitive systems result from the interaction of experience and the organism's method of constructing and dealing with it, including analytic mechanisms and the intrinsic determinants of maturation and cognitive growth. The problem, then, is to determine the innate endowment that serves to bridge the gap between the experience and knowledge attained - or cognitive systems attained, abstracting from the truce-requirement for knowledge and generalizing to

other systems that involve belief, understanding, interpretation, and perhaps more." (Chomsky, 1986)

Chomsky wonders if these principles of procedure may be generalised to other cases, and "can at least serve as a suggestive model for similar enquiries in other cognitive domains." He adds, "My own belief is that the principles do not generalize, that they are in crucial respects specific to the language faculty, but that the approach may indeed be suggested elsewhere, both in its achievements and their apparent boundaries." It is this approach that I wish to build in to my enquiry into the constitution, acquisition and use of a knowledge of the nature of human values.

In this Part II, I propose to take a close look at some of the current assumptions of the literature, in my attempt to find answers to the questions of the chapters. In response to the questions 'What constitutes knowledge of values?' (Chapter 5) and 'How is knowledge of values acquired?' (Chapter 6), I need to explore (Chapter 5):

(1) the nature of 'knowledge', that I may understand what it is to 'know';

(2) the nature of values, that I may understand what they are that they may be 'known';

I also need to consider (Chapters 5 and 6):

(3) what mechanisms are at work that enable a 'knower' to 'know' 'values'. Here I will try to give a characterisation of the processes at work in considering how it is that we 'acquire' values, and how it is that we 'know' this acquisition to have come about.

In pursuing an understanding of the nature of the questions I have asked, I will suggest that most of the answers presented in the literature are unsuitable for the form that my practice takes. My practice is part of my form of life as a thinking practitioner, in which I experience problems when my educational values are denied in my practice, and I attempt to follow through a systematic enquiry as to how to improve it. To my mind, the dominant paradigm as expressed in the literature offers me answers from a

(1) psychological perspective, when I meet dominant assumptions that take the form of

(a) general learning mechanisms: stimulus-response (e.g.Skinner, 1938); Thorndike, 1947); assimilation of and adaptation to the environment by the individual (e.g. Piaget, 1926);
(b) general learning method: habit formation (e.g. Piaget, 1932)
(c) general cognitive organisation: stage development (e.g. Kohlberg, 1969).

(2) philosophical perspective, when I meet dominant assumptions that take the form of

(d) general epistemological foundations: logical-positivist approaches; propositional forms of knowledge;

(e) general paradigm of enquiry: empiricist, normative-analytic approaches;

(3) sociological perspective, when I meet dominant assumptions that take the form of

(f) general characterisation of values: objects of knowledge;

(g) general characterisation of values systems: aspiration towards institutionalised mores;

(h) general grounding of values systems: foundationalism of reified Truth; a 'correct form of life'.

I shall attempt to show in Chapters 5 and 6 how initially I attempted to fit my practice to these assumptions, and how and why I came to see them as inappropriate to the needs of my practice.

In Chapter 5 I shall present a model of the mental processes I hypothesise to be significant in consideration of the question of that chapter - 'What constitutes knowledge of values?', and in Chapter 6 I shall present a model of the mental processes that I consider to be significant in consideration of the question of that chapter - 'How is knowledge of values acquired?' The first model will evolve from the

questions I consider regarding the mechanics of mental processes - the processes of thinking; the second model will evolve from the questions I consider regarding the organisation of mental processes - the forms of thought. I will initially present the models analytically, but I will indicate throughout my resolve to synthesise the models as an overall explanation for how it is that a knower comes to know. I shall indicate that traditional epistemological forms require us to accept the process-product dichotomy; I propose to synthesise process and product into a whole, by suggesting, in Chapter 5, that knowledge is a form of action. In Chapter 6 I shall develop this notion to say that INTENTIONAL action may be seen as an externalisation of values; and in Chapter 7 I shall suggest that values-in-action may be seen as a form of life.

CHAPTER 5 WHAT CONSTITUTES KNOWLEDGE OF VALUES?

Contents

PAGE

1 INTRODUCTION 227

2 WHAT DO I MEAN WHEN I SAY "I KNOW"? 228

(i) The nature of consciousness 230
(a) Rationale for this section 230
(b) Two modes of thinking 235
(c) Two modes of thought 244
(d) Two forms of knowledge 251
(e) Synthesis 255

3 WHAT DO I MEAN BY 'VALUES'? 258

(i) The creation of values as a kind of knowledge 258

(ii) Forms of enquiry (epistemologies) about knowledge 261

(a) Knowledge as the object of enquiry 263
(b) The knower as object of enquiry 267

4 ASSUMPTIONS OF THE LITERATURE OF VALUES EDUCATION 272

(i) The dominance of propositional knowledge 276

(ii) The dominance of sociological perspectives 278

(iii) Values as personal knowledge 292

(a) Theories of values education as reflections of personal knowledge 302
(b) Approaches in schools 307
(c) Approaches to the development of appropriate skills 308

(iv) Summary 315

5 A THEORY OF THE CONSTITUTION OF KNOWLEDGE OF VALUES 320

(i) Values into practice 323
(ii) What it means to be a person 330

(a) an instrumentalist's view of personhood 337
(b) a sociological perspective of personhood 340
(c) a dialectician's view of personhood 350

6 SUMMARY 361

CHAPTER FIVE: WHAT CONSTITUTES KNOWLEDGE OF VALUES?

1 INTRODUCTION

In this chapter I wish to examine the nature of 'knowledge', that I may be clear in my understanding of what we are doing when we say 'I know'; and the nature of 'values', that I may be clear in my understanding of what values are that they may be known.

I will argue that 'knowledge' may be interpreted in a number of different ways. I will also explore the issue, made explicit by Polanyi (1958, 1969), of how we may know that we know. In my view, I believe there is a relationship between ways of thinking and forms of thought, and, to make this relationship clear, I will try to show how I feel forms of knowing may be linked with modes of consciousness.

I shall then consider possible characterisations of the concept 'values', and I shall state my belief, contrary to the dominant views of the current literature (for example, Hare, 1952; Straughan, 1982; Wilson, 1967) that values do not constitute a reified body of moral tenets, an idealised form of life which an individual should strive to adopt; rather that values are concepts held by a knowing individual, a personal creation which she may share with other knowing individuals.

2 WHAT DO I MEAN WHEN I SAY "I KNOW"?

In the overview to Part II I referred to Plato's problem: the problem of poverty of stimulus and richness of response. I will refer now to Polanyi's problem, as articulated in his text 'Understanding ourselves' (1961; also in Ornstein's 1973):

"Man must try for ever to discover knowledge that will stand up by itself, objectively, but the moment he reflects on his own knowledge he catches himself red-handed in the act of upholding his knowledge. He finds himself asserting it to be true, and this asserting and believing is an action which makes an addition to the world on which his knowledge bears. So every time we acquire knowledge we enlarge the world, the world of man, by something that is not yet incorporated in the object of the knowledge we hold, and in this sense a comprehensive knowledge of man must appear impossible."

Polanyi here seems to be saying that it is not enough to regard 'knowledge' as a capital sum outside ourselves; for the act of knowing that we know is an additional piece to the lump sum. So the sum continues to grow commensurate with the acts of individual knowing.

Polanyi answers his own problem: "The significance which I attribute to this logical oddity will become apparent in the solution suggested for it. Its solution seems to lie in the fact that human knowledge is of two kinds. What is usually described as knowledge, as set out in written words or maps, or mathematical formulae, is only one kind of

knowledge; while unformulated knowledge, such as we have of something we are in the act of doing, is another form of knowledge. If we call the first kind explicit knowledge, and the second, tacit knowledge, we may say that WE ALWAYS KNOW TACITLY THAT WE ARE HOLDING OUR EXPLICIT KNOWLEDGE TO BE TRUE. If, therefore, we are satisfied to hold a part of our knowledge tacitly, the vain pursuit of reflecting ever again on our own reflections no longer arises. The question is whether we CAN be satisfied with this." (Polanyi, his italics, op.cit.).

Now, I wish to conduct my own enquiry into Polanyi's problem and its solution, to see if my understanding of my own practice is enhanced by accepting (a) that there is indeed a 'problem of knowledge' (Ayer, 1956), and if Polanyi's solution solves the problem.

First, I wish to consider what I feel is an appropriate starting point to the problem of knowledge: the nature of consciousness of the person who 'knows'.

(i) The nature of consciousness.

(a) Rationale for this section

I became interested in the question of different ways of thinking through my own practice as a thinker. I have always used imaging as my primary mode of thinking. I have found that my particular way of thinking has served my purposes enormously well, in that I can, for example, remember sentences from books by conjuring up a key word, expanding that word to a phrase, fixing the phrase on the page where I have read it, 'seeing' the whole in my mind, and 'reading off' the sentence. Whenever I am faced with a problem that I find difficult to resolve, I 'accept' the problem into a total mental visual field, and rotate and manoeuvre the problem-as-image in order to resolve it (see also Luria, 1968).

I would say that my primary mode of thinking is metaphor. Instead of focusing upon the immediate object of my reflection, I seem rather to focus upon its representation in my mind. This 'off-tangent' way of thinking has distinct disadvantages in the outer-worldly aspects of my life. To myself, I often seemed inefficient in my professional work-situation, for I often seemed not to be operating in the same mode of consciousness as my colleagues. I would say that we shared the same field of discourse in content areas but not, in Wittgenstein's words, the same language game. I seem to express myself in terms of intuitions, whereas colleagues often seem to express themselves in terms of analytic propositions.

The same syndrome has usually been apparent when I attempt to engage in the analytic discourse of argument. I find flittering thoughts whizzing through my mind, but the thoughts take the form of images and tactile sensations. The shapes fuse and separate into new shapes so rapidly that I am unable to decipher them into speech. Further, I do not want to stop, in order to go through the laborious process of re-forming them into speech. As a result, to the observer, I often appear inarticulate and clumsy. So I tend to retreat from discourse, and find my favourite form of expression in the written word, when I may go through the process of translation in a leisurely fashion.

Yet metaphor, particularly visual metaphor, is an enormously powerful force in my thinking, and I use it consciously. I am doing that now. This is one of the reasons that I am writing this present rationale. As well as wanting to ground the coming discussion as to the nature of knowledge, I wish also to use this chapter as a demonstration in action of the organic nature of this text.

I have already indicated in the Introduction to this chapter that this present writing is the third attempt at this chapter. I wish to use this chapter to demonstrate the growth of understanding, to demonstrate in action how I may come to know. I intend in this chapter to discuss the nature of ways of thinking, and the nature of forms of thought - that is the proposed ontology of the chapter, part of the 'inner framework' that I alluded to in the Introduction. By adopting the form that I am here adopting, I have the opportunity to demonstrate the epistemology of my knowledge; the way in which I am learning about my

own learning (the 'outer framework'). I suggested above that knowledge is something we do; I am 'doing knowledge' here. I am exploring the way I think about ways of thinking. I am using a form of knowledge - that of enquiry-in-action, which I believe is a process of structures and transformations (see below and Chapter 6) - to enquire into forms of knowledge. I am demonstrating in action the process of my own education.

What I will suggest, then, is to invite you, the reader, to regard this chapter as an enquiry. I will invite you to join with me as I try out ideas, as I comment on my observations of my own mental processes.

My situation is that I work alone. I have no contact with others in this chosen field except Jack Whitehead. Perhaps, had I access to other similarly interested minds, I would go through the process of trial-and-error in thought through discussion; but I have not that access. I have to think things out for myself. And I see that here, in the writing of this particular chapter, is a golden opportunity ; for this is a chapter in which I have important things to say, but I am not yet entirely sure of what I want to say. So, instead of engaging in question and answer with colleagues to work out my ideas, I will present the question and answer with myself; and the explicit form of writing will, I hope, enable you to understand me and to see the actual struggle as I try to make sense.

I have already indicated in my initial presentation (see the Overview to Part II) that I am confident about the hypotheses that I hope to present. This is in many ways so much bluff. I am not at all confident, for I have not yet fully worked out the ideas. My notes are not clearly set out, as they were for second version 1-4. Chapters 1-4 were clear in my mind; when I came to writing, it was an easy matter of translating thought into the action of writing. One form of symbolisation (my imaging) became another form of symbolisation (my writing). [HOW INTERESTING THAT I AM AGAIN OPERATING IN METAPHOR: THE 'OBEJCT' OF MY THOUGHT - MY PRACTICE - BECAME AN ABSTRACTION, AN IMAGE OF THOUGHT THAT WAS TURNED INTO AN EXPRESSION OF THOUGHT.] As I embark on this chapter, I have not a clearly formulated plan of campaign. My notes are random words on a page. On the page in front of me I read "values - most of the lit. seen as objects to be known" and "I say - values a property of their subject" and "object-centred epistemology vs. subject-centred epistemology". Yet in this I do feel confident, for here I have clues. These are the clues of my intuitions that, I feel sure, will be woven into the fabric of a coherent text. Perhaps the text will not be quite coherent in the first writing; that is when my skills as my own editor will come into play, to re-work the text into a more elegant form. And my reading of Polanyi (1969) tells me that clues are a form of knowledge, a subsidiary form of consciousness that enables me to focus on the object which I want to gain knowledge about. He says (p.214):

"I am here speaking of ACTIVE consciousness, which excludes incoherent dreams or pathological bursts of temper. Active consciousness achieves coherence by integrating clues and the things on which they bear or integrating parts of the wholes they form. This brings forth THE TWO LEVELS OF AWARENESS; the lower one for the clues, the parts or other subsidiary elements and the higher one for the focally apprehended comprehensive entity to which these elements point. A deliberate act of consciousness has therefore not only an identifiable object as its focal point, but also a set of subsidiary roots which function as clues to its objects or as parts of it." And I am also advised by Polanyi (1958) of the 'fiduciary component': the need to rely on the clues, as being a direct arrow to clear understanding.

So I am putting my faith in my tacit knowledge. I believe that I will work out some answers, but, operating in the strategy of provisionality that I spoke about in the Introduction to the text, I will not opt for definitive conclusions, but use the provisional hypotheses I arrive at as resting-places; rungs on the ladder rather than the top platform.

So, to embark on the journey: I have an idea that there is a relationship between ways of thinking and forms of thought, and I will explore the parts involved in the hypothesis to see if it makes sense.

(b) Two modes of thinking

In this section I am following the advice of William James (The principles of psychology, 1950) that "the only thing which psychology has a right to postulate at the outset is the fact of thinking itself, and that must first be taken up and analyzed."

James's formulation of 'the stream of consciousness' suggests that the mental life of an individual is continuous and unbroken, and that it may be characterised by at least two modes. Similar to Polanyi's position (see above), James says that "thought is always interested more in one part of its object than in another, and welcomes and rejects, or chooses, all the while it thinks" - that is, one part of the mental processes attends to phenomena, while another part is aware of this attention - comparable to Polanyi's formulation of tacit knowledge and explicit knowledge (see above).

Let us for the time being accept these two modes of thinking. I shall provisionally adopt Polanyi's terms of 'tacit knowledge' and 'explicit knowledge', and I shall return to the discussion of their characteristics shortly. It is important here that I fully comprehend Polanyi's use of the terms, however, for I shall shortly hypothesise that, in my view, there is a parameter of thinking that is related to, but separate from, Polanyi's use of the term 'tacit knowledge'.

I refer again to Polanyi's 'The structure of consciousness' in 'Knowing and Being' (1969). On p.212 I read:

"It is a mistake to identify subsidiary awareness with subconscious or preconscious awareness, or with the fringe of consciousness described by William James. The relation of clues to that which they indicate is a LOGICAL RELATION similar to that which a premise has to the inferences drawn from it, but with the important difference that tacit inferences drawn from clues are not explicit. They are informal, tacit."

So, as I understand it, Polanyi is saying here that tacit knowledge is functional (he says "the characteristic feature of subsidiary awareness is to have a FUNCTION, the function of bearing on something at the focus of our attention.") Explicit knowledge is functional, in that it allows us to attend to and gain awareness of the object of our attention (would Polanyi now say 'have personal knowledge of the object of our attention'?); tacit knowledge is functional, in that it allows us to attend to and gain knowledge of our attention itself (to have knowledge of our knowledge).

Now, I wish to explore the nature of the 'logical relation' that Polanyi sees between the concept of functional tacit knowledge, and the concept of 'subconscious or preconscious awareness'.

I came to the work of Robert Ornstein through my readings about the nature of mind (for example, Chosmky, 1965, 1982; Samples, 1978). I was particularly interested in this topic, since it gave fresh insights to my own 'intuitive' way of thinking (see above), and encouraged me to think that, rather than being an 'odd' form, I had here the capacity to tap into an immensely wealthy source of potential knowledge. In the introduction to his book 'The nature of human consciousness' (1973) Ornstein states: "A major thesis of this book is that two modes of consciousness exist in Man, the intellectual and its complement, the intuitive. Contemporary science (and, indeed, much of Western culture) has predominantly emphasized the intellectual mode, and has filtered out rich sources of evidence: meditation, 'mysticism', non-ordinary reality, the influence of the 'body' on the 'mind'. In part, this book is intended to open an inquiry into that inelegant, tacit, 'other' side of ourselves."

From the many excellent papers, I shall choose Bogen's analysis ('The other side of the brain: an appositional mind', originally 1969) as the paper that best guides my thinking at this point.

Bogen presents evidence from a variety of sources that the two sides of the brain (left and right hemisphere) seem to have two specific functions. The left hemisphere is dominant for what he calls 'propositional thought': it is associated with 'symbolic' functions such as speech, seeming "to operate in a more logical, analytic, computerlike fashion" (Levey-Agresti and Sperry, 1968). The right hemisphere is associated with interpretation, synthesis, imaginative capacities.

Bogen suggests the use of the term 'appositional': "This term implies a capacity for apposing or comparing of perceptions, schemas, engrams, etc., but has in addition the virtue that it implies very little else." I shall provisionally adopt the use of the term 'appositional'. So to clarify my understanding of his work, I may say that, for example, left hemisphere functions will enable us to use words, and it is complemented by the right hemisphere function of allowing us to use words in meaningful utterances.

Bogen continues in his exposition that there is now a substantial body of literature to support the idea of split-brain functioning. He summarises: "One of the most obvious and fundamental features of the cerebrum is that it is double. Various kinds of evidence, especially from hemispherectomy, have made it clear that one hemisphere is sufficient to sustain a personality or mind. We may then conclude that the individual with two intact hemispheres has the capacity for two distinct minds. This conclusion finds its experimental proof in the split-brain animal whose two hemispheres may be trained to perceive, consider and act independently. In the human, where PROPOSITIONAL thought is typically lateralized to one hemisphere, the other hemisphere evidently specializes in a different mode of thought, which may be called 'appositional'.

"The rules or methods by which propositional thought is elaborated on 'this' side of the brain (the side which speaks, reads, and writes) have been subjected to analyses of syntax, semantics, mathematical logic, etc.) for many years. The rules by which appositional thought is

elaborated on the other side of the brain will need study for many years to come."

Citing the work of Goldstein (1948, 1960) he says: "Throughout Goldstein's work there seems a division of mental function into two modes of thought: an 'abstract attitude' involving discursive reasoning, and a 'concrete attitude' which is 'un-reflective' and 'more realistic'. His belief that one of these is a 'higher' function that the other and his disaffection for anatomical localization are not necessarily bound up with the essential point, that there are two types of thinking generated in the same cerebrum." He then cites further sources to support this theory that "man is dual", including the work of Levi-Strauss (1965) who says:

"Primitive man is clearly capable of positive thought ... but it is his myth-creating capacity which plays the vital part in his life. ... I believe that these two ways of thinking have always existed in man, and they go on existing, but the importance they are giving is not the same here and there."

I would also suggest that, in the nature of his thinking, modern man is no different from primitive man. I am led to this conclusion by the work of Sir James Frazer ('The golden bough', 1922), Freud (1955), Jung (1953) and Levi-Strauss (op.cit.), who all suggest that the image we have built of ourselves as a sophisticated, logic-oriented species is demolished as soon as we go to sleep, or engage in modes of thinking which are grounded in affective, rather than cognitive, zones.

I will now attempt to relate my exposition with my discussion about the nature of knowledge.

Let us suppose, for the time being, that there are two modes of thinking. I will here refer to 'thinking' rather than 'thought', for it is my intention to use the word 'thought' with reference to forms that thinking generates. In using the term 'thinking' I am referring more to the 'processes' involved in consciousness; in using the term 'thought' I refer more to the 'products' generated by thinking - and I hasten to add that, in the course of my exposition, I will indicate my belief that 'process' and 'product' are but different aspects of the same concept; in the same way that light may be seen as point or wave. (Bertalanffy (1952) summarizes: "What are called structures are slow processes of long duration, functions are quick processes of short duration. If we say that a function, such as the contraction of a muscle, is performed by a structure, it means that a quick and short process wave is superimposed on a long-lasting and slowly running wave". See also my Chapter 6 of this text.)

I will call these two modes of thinking 'appositional' following Bogen (op.cit.) and 'analytic', following Levy-Agresti and Sperry (1968). I am deliberately avoiding the use of the term 'propositional' which Bogen uses as the partner term to 'appositional', for later in this chapter I shall be speaking about 'propositional forms of thought', and I do not want to confuse the issue by awarding two references to one single term. For my discussion, then, I refer to 'analytic thinking' to denote the symbolic, logical processes involved in discursive, verbal or formal-

logical thinking; and 'appositional thinking' to denote the non-discursive, non-verbal, eidetic processes involved in synthetic or analogic thinking. A similar complementary system appears in the work of de Bono ('The mechanisms of mind', 1967; 'The use of lateral thinking', 1967). He suggests that there are four modes of thinking - natural, logical, mathematical and lateral. Because this area of enquiry is new for me, I wish to keep my discussion as specific as possible, so I will stay with the two methods of thinking that I have identified.

[I WILL CONFESS HERE TO SOME UNCERTAINTY. I HAVE NOT FOUND ANYONE IN THE LITERATURE WHO IS PROPOSING A SIMILAR FORMULATION AS I AM HERE, AND I WONDER IF I AM WRITING JUST SO MUCH RUBBISH. BUT I HAVE A STRONG FEELING - MY INTUITIVE THOUGHT HERE - THAT I AM ON THE TRACK OF SOMETHING INTERESTING. I AM DOING THE SAME IN THIS CHAPTER THAT I DID IN THE ORIGINAL CHAPTER 4 - OF WORKING OUT MY THOUGHT THROUGH THE PROCESSES THAT ARE THE OBJECTS OF THAT THOUGHT. I AM TRYING TO EXPLAIN THE PROCESS OF ARRIVING AT A CHARACTERISATION OF KNOWLEDGE THROUGH THE ACTIVE PRACTICE OF EXPLORING THE PROCESSES INVOLVED IN 'KNOWING'.

I HAVE A FORMULATION IN MY MIND THAT:

1 THERE ARE AT LEAST TWO TYPES OF PROCESSES INVOLVED IN THINKING - ANALYTIC AND APPOSITIONAL;
2 THESE PROCESSES GENERATE DIFFERENT MODES OF THOUGHT - LOGICAL AND INTUITIVE;

3 A FORM OF THOUGHT (IF I VIEW THOUGHT AS AN ACTIVE INGREDIENT IN THE LIFE OF A THINKER) WILL GROUND A THINKER'S APPROACH TO KNOWLEDGE: IF 'THOUGHT' IS SEEN AS THE WAY IN WHICH WE 'KNOW', A FORM OF THOUGHT INEVITABLY CONTRIBUTES TO A CHARACTERISATION OF 'KNOWLEDGE'.

I ALSO SEE THIS FORMULATION AS THE GERM TO A COGNITIVE MODEL INVOLVING COMPETENCE AND PERFORMANCE. IN MY MIND, I SEE A VISUAL:-



THE TWO 'BLOCKS' MAY FIX INTO EACH OTHER, LIKE LEGGO, TO FORM A WHOLE. IF I REGARD THE TOP BOX AS COMPETENCE, AND THE BOTTOM BOX AS PERFORMANCE, THE TWO HALVES, JOINED TOGETHER, FORM A SYNTHETIC WHOLE. THE TOTAL MODEL REPRESENTS THE SYNTHETIC, RELATIONAL NATURE OF THE MIND, IN WHICH THE WHOLE IS GREATER THAN THE SUM OF ITS PARTS.

I AM ANTICIPATING THE FORTHCOMING DISCUSSION, IN ORDER TO MAINTAIN THE MOMENTUM OF THE OVERAL ISSUE OF MY PROJECT - THE WAY IN WHICH AN INDIVIDUAL LEARNS. I AM HERE KEEPING A DIARY OF MENTAL EVENTS. I ALREADY SEE DEFICIENCIES IN THE MODEL - AM I TRYING TO SEPARATE INTO TWO PARTS WHAT IS IN FACT A WHOLE, WHEN I USE THE TERMS 'TACIT KNOWLEDGE' AND 'INTUITIVE THOUGHT'?

I THINK NOT (INTUITIVELY); BUT MY CRITICAL FACULTIES ARE MAKING ME AWARE OF FLAWS IN MY ANALYTIC/LOGICAL FORMS. MY THEORY-BUILDING IS MOVING AHEAD IN JERKS, WHICH APPEAR AS CULMINATIONS OF EPISODES OF NEW CREATION BROUGHT ABOUT BY THE RE-FORMULATION OF PREVIOUS THEORIES (SEE CHAPTER 6 FOR MY VIEW OF THE NATURE OF DEVELOPMENT).

I SHALL FOLLOW MY IDEA. I SHALL CONTINUE TO KEEP A DETAILED RECORD OF HOW MY THINKING ALLOWS ME TO CREATE NEW THOUGHT ABOUT THE NATURE OF KNOWLEDGE-GROUNDED-IN-THOUGHT - i.e. THE EPISTEMOLOGY OF KNOWLEDGE.

(c) Two modes of thought

Before I embark on a discussion of what the two modes of thought are, I need to establish that I now have a clear understanding of how I see the difference in nature between 'thinking' and 'thought'.

I said above that I saw 'thinking' as a process, and 'thought' as a product. I also made the point, and I continue in this belief, that process and product are not discrete entitites, but part of the interrelated mechanics of the ongoing interchange of transformations and structures. In Chapter 6 I make my understanding of this issue explicit by the presentation of a model of the nature of development.

I will first draw on the idea put forward by Kosslyn (in Block, 1981) that it is necessary to (1) distinguish between models and theories, and (2) to recognise the distinction between general and specific models. I will also consider Polanyi's notion (1969) of the irreducible structure of life forms, in order to ground the theory regarding the respective natures of theory and model.

Kosslyn says that a model is a component of a theory: it contains "an element of 'as-if' that is not present in a theory proper. That is, a model is assumed to be under a description, or under a certain interpretation, that leads one to draw points of similarity between it and the modeled domain. A theory proper is unambiguous and not in need of such interpretation."

If I apply this conceptualisation to my present strategy of enquiry-in-action, I may say that I am engaged at this point of producing tentative models, and I will endeavour to synthesise the amalgam of my models as a cognitive theory.

Now I draw on Polanyi's notion of 'irreducible structure'. Polanyi says (1969) that higher forms are grounded in lower forms, and are generated by those lower forms. If we can accept a temporary principle that a lower form is characterised in terms of context-specific features, we can suppose that higher forms will no longer be bound by these features, having transcended them, but will still contain the features in its metamorphosed form (see also Chapter 6 of this text). So, says Polanyi, the concept of 'mind' is above the concept of 'brain': "the mind harnesses neurophysiological mechanisms; though it depends on them, it is not determined by them."

I will apply the same concept to my enquiry-in-action. I am proposing models - temporary structures in the business of building theories, and, according to the theory I put forward in Chapter 6 concerning the nature of development, my 'present' theory, in the form of my present best thinking, may be seen as a temporary structure that will be absorbed into the next step in my development, as a better thinking sets in.

Now it is useful here to consider Kosslyn's distinction between "two kinds of models, SPECIFIC and GENERAL. Specific models are designed to account for performance in a particular task, ... whereas general ones embody the entire set of principles (assumptions about functional capacities and their interrelations) that should account for performance in all the tasks in a given domain." (Kosslyn, his italics, op.cit., p.211).

Let me apply this notion to the specific content of this present section: the generation of types of thought from types of thinking. I will suggest that the term 'thinking' suggests functionality, and I will go on to propose that this functionality may be characterised as transformations. (Our everyday linguistic structures seem to imply that 'thinking' is seen as an action, embodied, as it were, in the verb 'I am thinking'. If I talk about a person's thinking, I imply that he is doing something. 'Thought', on the other hand, is normally assumed to be a noun: we speak of 'thought' as a structured entity.) I will also suggest that the term 'thought' denotes 'product' and that this product may be seen as data-structure. I am saying that type of thought is generated by type of thinking, the data-structure is generated by the transformations.

[THIS BIT IS VERY HARD FOR ME. I FEEL I AM GROPING DOWN A DARK TUNNEL, STEP BY STEP. EVERY NOW AND THEN MY PASSAGE IS PUNCTUATED BY LIGHTS THAT SUDDENLY APPEAR ON THE WALL, MY IMMEDIATE SURROUNDS ARE ILLUMINATED, AND I SEE SHADOWS SCURRYING BACK INTO THE DARKNESS BEHIND ME. I AM STILL NOT SURE IF MY JOURNEY WILL END WITH AN EMERGENCE INTO

THE SUNLIGHT. PERHAPS I WILL COME UP AGAINST AN IMPENETRABLE WALL-FACE, AND THE LIGHTS WILL GO OUT.

NO. MY 'FIDUCIARY COMPONENT' IS AS STRONG AS EVER. MY FAITH IN MY OWN INTUITION WILL CARRY ME THROUGH.]

Let me now try to draw some of the threads together by suggesting a characterisation of 'thought'.

There is a vast body of literature embracing numerous disciplines concerning the properties of mind. I will at present agree with Thomson (1959) and Ryle (1946) that the term 'thinking' is a "polymorphous concept", that is often expressed as 'reminiscing', 'opining', 'attending', 'remembering', 'imagining'. Thomson limits his definition of 'thinking' as the reflective process of arriving at an envisaged goal. I believe that this use of the term 'thinking' is in the normative sense of (left hemisphere) analytic processes, and the thought thus generated is in the form of structures whose main characteristic is that they are goal-directed.

Let us then propose the concept that right-hemisphere appositional thinking generates 'intuitive' thought. By this I mean the kind of thought that is diffuse, is non-goal-directed, is relational, is non-sequential. I would suggest that such thought is analogous to the scanning operations of computers. Such thought picks out the models which may contribute to the amalgamation of display presentation, the 'clues' that will contribute to the 'other' kind of thought. Let me

also propose that left-hemisphere analytical thinking generates formal (transactional?) thought. Such thought is basically goal-directed.

Let me present some tentative analogies to clarify my own understandings of these basic conceptualisations.

In the appositional/analytic dichotomy/complementarity I see an analogy between playing the notes on a piano and playing music; or between producing the morphophonemes of words and producing meaningful utterances. An analogy to do with thinking itself would be if I had a vague idea about the key to a code, and explored the idea to produce the code-breaker.

In the intuitive/formal (transactional?) dichotomy/complementarity I see an analogy between using a trial-and-error strategy of solving a problem, and then homing in on the most promising one. There is a passage in Marjorie Grene's 'The knower and the known' (1966) which is relevant to my hypothesis (though I would imagine she did not write it with my hypothesis in mind):

"The character of problem solving may also instruct us, finally, in respect of Hume's third principle, the principle of association. A problem is solved, not by the kind of trial and error which could be interpreted as the product of chance or of an associative mechanism which is the next thing to chance. It is solved, as Koehler says, by a 'series of complete attempts at solution' - only all but the last have gone wrong. Problem-solving, in other words, involves not only insight,

but risk, and if risk, then responsibility ... For there is always, in the solution of a problem, in the establishment of an induction, the abrupt, logically unaccountable, personal transition from puzzlement to insight: the transition which Kierkegaard called a 'leap'."

I have experienced many such 'leaps' in my practice, particularly in writing texts like this, where I puzzle over a problem, seeing it first this way and then that; and, indeed, the sudden insight puts me on the other side of a gulf of not knowing. I have often been bewildered at the dramatic change in view that such an experience produces. I can look back at the difficulties of puzzlement, for I am secure on this side; but what has happened in the intervening space has always been a mystery. I am beginning to think that it is no longer a mystery. I am beginning to think that what happens is because of the scanning facility of intuitive thought. As Marjorie Grene and Koehler indicate, "all but the last have gone wrong". It is not so much that the last trial has been successful that makes the next step so radically different from the last; it is because the scanning mechanism of intuitive thought has transformed into the goal-directed structures of model-presentation. My scanning becomes focused; my structure becomes focal; I am temporarily at rest in a model that I will use in the generation of a theory.

Of course, all this is highly speculative, but I feel that it is at least some attempt to take into account the random, seemingly irrelevant aspects of thought that lead, certainly in my practice, to an insight that will enable my conceptualisations to develop. I find that if I focus intently on a topic, in an active mode, and then relax into a

receptive mode, as when I am gardening or doing mundane activities, my mind will do the rest. When I then return actively to the problem, I usually have the solution. The articles in Part 4 of Ornstein's (1973) explore this phenomenon extensively; and I was delighted to read an explicit account of what I have been doing automatically for years.

The reason that I have undertaken this particular path of enquiry is to explore an hypothesis that there is a relationship between forms of thought and forms of knowledge, and I present here some statements to ground my belief. I will hope to ground these statements in the literature. My statements are these:

1 Most of the literature dealing with the epistemology of knowledge seems to assume the existence of a primary form of thought, what I have here called 'formal' ('transactional'?) thought. Scant attention is paid to intuitive thought.

2 There is a rift in the literature whether thought is seen as an action, or as an abstraction. The first view assumes thought to be a property of a thinker; the second view takes thought to be a product of minds. In my previous formulation, the first view is a specific model; the second view is a general model. The specific model is operating in a person-centred mode, in which the person is the epistemic centre; the second is operating in an object-centred mode, in which the object (reified thought) is the epistemic centre.

3 There is a direct relationship between the concept of thought and the concept of knowledge. Views about thinking/thought inevitably produce a commensurate view about knowing/knowledge.

I will now attempt to expand (3). This exposition will inevitably involve expansion of (1) and (2). So now I turn my attention to the idea of different forms of knowledge.

(d) Two forms of knowledge

First, let me trace the links, as I hypothesise, in the transition from thought to knowledge.

If I say, "I am thinking", I state that I am actively involved, I am doing something.

If I am thinking something, without externalising that thought in speech, writing, gesture, or other symbolic form, I am not making that thought public. It is my personal property without external involvement. If I externalise that thought, however, I imply that I know. As long as my thought is covert, I do not claim validity for it. As soon as it is externalised, I am claiming it as a valid representation of what is going on inside my mind. I am making a knowledge-claim about my thought. (In Chapters 7 and 8 I shall discuss the notion that all statements at surface level are manifestations of

deep level competence, provided the speaker accepts and acts accordingly within normative rules of discourse.)

So, I am suggesting that there is a direct link between modes of thought and forms of knowledge, and I will anticipate future discussion by saying that intuitive thought generates tacit knowledge, and formal (transactional?) thought generates explicit (propositional?) knowledge.

So my schema at the moment is



In a moment I shall indicate that this is a first step in a much more refined model. First I need to show what I mean by 'explicit (propositional?) knowledge' and 'tacit knowledge'.

There is a large body of literature on the knower and the known, and, within the literature, there seem to be two major, polarised positions, The first position (e.g. Ayer, 1956; Popper, 1972) indicate that knowledge is an object to be acquired; that it stands outside the individual as a reified body. The other position (e.g. Polanyi, 1958; Grene, 1966) regards knowledge as a property of the individual. For an entity to be known, there must be a knower as agent (Kant, 1785). In the first school, a knower is required to prioritise the characteristics and properties of knowledge, in order that he may train himself to acquire them. The knower, in this sense, is not focally aware of his own knowledge, but receives it, as it were, from another agency. Regard for one's own ability to know is ignored. Ayer tells us (op.cit. p.214) "To apply the physicalist thesis to one's own experience is, as it were, to pretend to be anaesthetised". I shall continue this discussion in the next section. In the second school, a knower is encouraged to be aware (to know) his ability to know; and Polanyi (1958) has formulated this dual awareness in the terms of 'focal' and 'subsidiary' knowledge: the focal, explicit dimension of knowing an object, and the subsidiary, tacit dimension of knowing one's own knowledge. Grene says (op.cit.), "Whatever I succeed in doing, it is I who achieve knowledge: I in my contingent, personal existence, I-in-situation,"

I shall return to this discussion in the next section of this chapter. For purposes of my present argument - that there are two modes of consciousness which generate, to my mind, two forms of knowledge, it serves here only to introduce the ideas that I have expressed.

I will suggest, then, that explicit knowledge is embedded within and generated by formal (transactional?) thought; and tacit knowledge is embedded within and generated by intuitive thought.

I must ask you here to remember that I am using specific terms to indicate notional properties of mind in the presentation of a model. I have not yet, in my formulation, arrived at a theory. My theory will indicate that the parts that I have identified fuse into each other in the dynamic process of the living person. My model, at this analytic stage, indicates static parts that are, in the coming section, about to assume a modicum of life and become moving parts within interrelationships.

(e) Synthesis

In this section I hope to expand the parts I have identified as notional 'processes' and 'products (outcomes)' in the mind, and to introduce the further elements of levels of mind, in my attempt to understand the workings of the mind/brain.

First, in sections (b), (c) and (d) above I have supposed that there are two separate but related forms of consciousness, which may all contribute towards a characterisation of the conceptualisation of 'knowledge'. In my schema I showed a notional embedding of forms of knowledge within levels of thought. I will now show how I feel these currently linear representations may be linked into relational aspects.

Let us suppose that we may view the workings of the appositional mind to produce the top half of the structure at (1), and the workings of the analytic mind to produce the bottom half.



In my conceptualisation, the two 'blocks' are not discrete, the lower block being a metamorphosis of the higher. I shall return to this aspect in a moment, when I shall also suggest that the metamorphosis is effected through dialectical transformations.

I will now introduce the concepts originated by Chomsky (1957, 1965) of 'competence' and 'performance'. I have applied these concepts extensively in my own work (McNiff 1984, 1986).

Chomsky was concerned to account for the linguistic intuitions of the native speaker-hearer (see also Chapter 3 of this text). In his attempt to characterise the levels of mind that would account for these intuitions, he hypothesised the existence of two levels of mind. Competence was a deep level, which was the location for the intuitive 'knowledge' of linguistic rules that enabled a speaker potentially to use the grammar of any and every language. Performance was a surface level, the externalisation in practice of the application of those rules.

I will apply these levels to my present model. I will suggest that the 'tacit' block is at the level of competence, and that the 'explicit' block is at the level of performance.

I have stressed throughout that the model does not aim to represent discrete entitites, but to suggest an interrelated complementarity; in the same way that a mind is not divisible, but operates efficiently as a whole. What I now need to do, therefore, is to suggest a way in which 'tacit' and 'explicit' elements are fused and metamorphosed.

My provisional answer is that I look now to the approach by a knower to his own knowledge. It is my argument that, if a knower aims at formal forms in which to account for his own knowledge, he tends to deny the tacit dimension. In my formulation, he does not realise his full potential at competence. If he aims for dialectical forms in which to account for his own knowledge, he tends to appreciate the tacit dimension; as a result, he is aware of his own potential, and may exercise his rationality (at performance) to transform the potential (at competence) into a form of life.

I have here introduced the elements of form of enquiry, or approach to knowledge. I have used the terms 'formal' and 'dialectical'. I shall dwell on these elements at length in the next section.

I am now working towards a theory - that of the need for a knower to develop an understanding of his own potential. In my formulation, this means that 'knowing' entails rational decisions in the act of knowing - that is, becoming aware of competence, and desiring to turn it into performance.

I now also wish to home in on the question of this chapter: 'What constitutes knowledge of values?' For "if knowing is essentially a kind of doing, and human doing is always value-bound, then knowledge is so as well" (Grene, 1966). But I am here anticipating the issue of what values are that they may be known; and that is the essence of the next section.

3 WHAT DO I MEAN BY 'VALUES'?

(i) The creation of values as a kind of knowledge

So, to continue the discussion, I may say that the creation of values is a kind of knowledge. By this I mean that values are beliefs that individuals hold, collectively or separately - beliefs that shape their lives. If I say, "I believe that all people are equal" I am expressing a held value. In expressing this belief in explicit, symbolic form - in speech or writing, say - I am making a provisional claim to personal knowledge. In asking people to share my belief, or provisional claim to knowledge, I am testing it against the beliefs of others and seeking for my claim to be validated by the community of which I am a part. (For a detailed discussion of the justification of knowledge claims, see Chapter 8 of this text.) So, in attempting to uphold the values which I

have, I try to adopt a form of life which is in itself a claim to knowledge.

Now, this is where there is a danger, in epistemological terms, of confusing explanations by individuals to account for the knowledge that they possess with prescriptions of the literature that are impositions of knowledge systems that may be alien to the individual. I feel strongly that this is where current literature about values acquisition and values education is misleading. I say this because, initially, I tried to ground my own practice in the prescriptions of the literature, and saw in such an attempt a denial of my own educational values of freedom and the inalienable integrity of the individual. I shall say more about this in due course.

My discussion rests in part on the formulation I have arrived at through the discussion so far.

(1) I have submitted the view that knowledge is grounded in thought, and that higher forms will evolve out of lower forms.

(2) I have suggested that there are two levels of mind; that competence may be seen as containing the tacit component, and performance may be seen as expressing the explicit component.

(3) I have suggested that the creation of values is a form of knowledge: in tacit form values may be seen as underlying beliefs; in explicit form they may be seen as a form of life.

(4) I have said that performance is a metamorphosis of competence, such a metamorphosis being effected through dialectical transformations (see also Chapter 6).

(5) I have briefly referred to forms of thinking about thought - the epistemological bases of knowledge - and I have alluded in passing to formal and dialectical approaches to knowledge. This will receive detailed treatment here, for, in my view, this is the crucial link between knowledge and values. For, if we accept what I have suggested - that creation of values is a kind of knowledge, then 'knowledge of values' becomes 'knowledge of knowledge'. This is no tautology, but a fundamental issue in any discussion of values - and one that is, in my view, not only ignored in the majority of the literature, but not even perceived.

What I am saying is that a view of knowledge will inevitably influence a view of values, and, correspondingly, a view of values acquisition and values education. A characterisation of values has to rest on the characterisation a knower has of his own knowledge. If he believes that knowledge is reified, then values may also be reified. They will be outside himself, and be something at which he aspires. If he believes that knowledge rests within himself, then his values are part of his own creation, and may be something that he may share with other similarly-opinioned knowers.

This is the theme I wish to explore in some detail in the next section. First I will consider approaches to knowledge, as expressed in the literature. Second I will consider approaches to values, as expressed in the literature. I will then specifically look at the literature of values education, and argue that there is an overwhelming tendency for values to be seen as an expression of formal approaches to knowledge. I will indicate my disagreement with this view, and give reasons why I disagree. I will also continue with my model of notional levels and mechanisms of mind, in an attempt to formulate a theory of what constitutes knowledge of values.

(ii) Forms of enquiry (epistemologies?) about knowledge

The literature of traditions of epistemological enquiries indicates that there are two main approaches to types of knowledge that may be characterised as 'the knower and the known' (Grene, 1966). Questions arising out of this formulation would focus on who the knower was in an enquiry, if the 'knowledge' were an 'object' of enquiry, if this object were external to the knower or part of his own property, if the concepts of 'object of knowledge' or 'knowledge as creation' are justified, and how it is that he is aware of his own knowledge. Answers to these questions will determine a knower's characterisation of the nature of values, and this will be the point of Section 4.

Here, I will enquire about the epistemic centre in the two main forms of enquiry: I will suggest that one form is object-centred, and the other form is subject-centred. I will argue in my synthesising discussions that object-centred epistemologies cannot, by their nature, meet the requirements of internal justification (Chapter 4) of explanatory levels, for they may not demonstrate the fusion of the tacit and explicit components involved in a full functioning of the levels of mind. To be biased toward an object-centred epistemology is to prioritise left-hemisphere activity in formulating theories that are grounded in the knower's explicit knowledge, while relegating to lesser importance the right-hemisphere activity that allows the knower to know how it is that he may make a claim to knowledge and seek to justify that claim. A more balanced view that holds right- and left-hemisphere activity as complementary, enables the knower to use the full power of his mind in order to raise the level of enquiry to an explanatory level, when the knower seeks internal justification for his knowledge as an expression of all levels of mind. He adopts a subject-centred epistemology, in which the epistemic centre is the 'I' who is enquiring. The questions are not only "How do I know this?" but also "How do I know that I know this?"

I will now discuss the nature of object-centred enquiries, in which explicit knowledge is the object of the enquiry.

(a) Knowledge as the object of enquiry

A number of philosophers assume the dominance of object-centred paradigms. Within the paradigm itself there is often much discussion about the priorities of forms of knowledge. Perhaps the discussion that has caused the most prolific debate has been the characterisation of propositional knowledge.

Propositional knowledge may be broadly formulated as being 'knowledge about the world' (Russell, 1973) - that is, explicit knowledge - and takes three basic forms:

know-that
know-how
know + a direct object

There is debate whether these three forms constitute an accurate exposition of the field, if the forms are complementary or embedded, if the forms actually exist. For example, Hirst prefers to acknowledge only the two forms of 'know-that' and 'know-how'. In his 'Human movement, knowledge and education' (1979) he states:

"It has frequently been pointed out that the language we use when referring to knowledge is very varied. ... First, there are those expressions in which what is known is a truth or set of truths, e.g. that 2+2=4, or who is President of France. These are normally referred to as expressions of propositional knowledge or know-that. Secondly

there are expressions in which what is known is how to carry out a performance or activity of some kind, e.g. how to drive a car. These are usually referred to as cases of procedural knowledge or know-how. Thirdly there are expressions in which what is known is an object of some kind, e.g. Paris, the Ring, the Prime Minister, the feeling of pain. Here it is customary to speak of knowledge with a direct object. But are there then three quite distinct mutually irreducible kinds of knowledge, or can we show that there are ultimately only two kinds, or perhaps even one? In a strict sense it seems to me there are only two distinct mutually irreducible concepts: 'know-that' and 'know-how' with cases of knowledge with a direct object always being reducible to 'know-that' and 'know-how' plus another non-knowledge element."

Iris Murdoch, on the other hand (1970), claims that the knowledge that shapes our being, that is, pre-cognitive, possibly pre-conceptual knowledge that forms and shapes our values, is a more important kind of knowledge. Consider, she says, the statement: "I know that my Redeemer liveth". There is no amount of empirical evidence that could make this a propositional statement. It is a statement of faith, yet that faith is the essence of the life form of the person who makes the statement. Often, this type of belief cannot be articulated. "The virtuous peasant knows ... although what he knows he might be at a loss to say." His knowing is a more valid life form, for him personally, than much cognitive knowledge.

Reid (1980) also argues for knowledge with a direct object. Drawing his example from music, he says: "Consider one of the 'Master Classes' [on television]. ... The clear and important distinction between knowledge-that and knowledge with the direct object comes clearly if I say, 'The master knows-that it ought to go like this'. His knowledge-that and -how is clearly dispositional ... But only so far. Then come bodily gestures, facial movements ... the passage just has to go 'like this'. ... Real musical intuitive knowledge is direct as the arrow. Many insightful things, in forms of knowledge-that and -how can be said by musicians; but musical knowledge, qua musical, does not reach its musically cognitive consummation finally from -that or -how. Rather, knowledge-that or -about music in itself derives from direct musical gnosis, musical intuition." (cited in Whitehead, 1986)

Ryle (1946) argues forcibly that know-how is the ground for know-that. Knowing-how is logically prior to knowing-that, he maintains. There is no gap between theory and practice, the epistemology that seeks to separate mind and body into separate fragments of intellect and skill. For Ryle, the ability to do something incorporates knowledge about that thing.

The scope of the discussion extends when it comes to justification of knowledge. A.J. Ayer (1956) argues for the acceptance of universal validity claims to justify a knower's knowledge; but the form of knowledge that he references is explicit knowledge only.

Perhaps the most comprehensive documentation of the notion of the priority of explicit knowledge has been that of Popper (1972). Popper hypothesises three worlds: World 1, which is the material world of everyday things; World 2, which is the realm of our own conscious processes whereby we know Worlds 1 and 3: and World 3, in which is stored man's explicit knowledge, the world of ideas, ethics, language, values, and so on. World 3 is 'out there', independent of the agency of individual knowers. It is a world to be accessed for knowledge about the form of man's life and being.

In (4) I shall argue that this view of knowledge is the dominant paradigm for values education; and I shall present a discussion to indicate that, although I took it as the ground for my own enquiry, this approach turned out to be barren. I shall say how and why I came to this conclusion, and I shall hypothesise the alternative model that evolved out of my practice to contribute to my theory of 'knowledge of values'.

(b) The knower as the object of enquiry

This approach to knowledge has a long history, going back at least to Plato. Hintikka (1974) shows that Plato's concept of 'dynamis' incorporated two dimensions of knowledge, and that these dimensions were often not clearly distinguished.

The dimensions were the DOXA that "refers to some particular opinion someone has and EPSITEME [which] refers to that item of information which is needed for someone to be in the STATE of knowledge." Hintikka then confesses confusion about the characterisation of these concepts. "Now episteme and doxa are suddenly identified with faculties of knowledge and opinion. A FACULTY or POWER and its RESULT seem to be confused here."

He goes on to elaborate this seemingly dual nature of knowledge:

"In so far as a modern thinker is at all willing to speak of knowledge and opinion as faculties or powers, he might take the 'products' of these faculties to be the particular items of knowledge or of opinions to which these 'faculties' give rise - in other words, to those COGNITIVE STATES which we mean when we speak of knowing or believing something. Alternatively, he might refuse to speak of products at all and consider instead only the functions performed by our capacities of knowing and of opining. One soon discovers, however, that Plato viewed the situation differently. Those 'functions' or 'ends' of the faculties of knowledge and belief which serve, e.g. to distinguish each faculty

from the others and which are somehow analogous to the products of a craftsman's skill were for Plato not just cognitive states in this or that man but sometimes tended to comprise also THOSE OBJECTS WHICH ONE'S KNOWLEDGE OR OPINION IS ABOUT. In other words, Plato does not always clearly distinguish from each other the OBJECTS of knowledge and the 'functions' or 'products' of the power to know" (Hintikka, his italics, 1974).

To my knowledge of the literature, this seeming dichotomy received explicit formulation in the work of Polanyi (1958, 1967, 1969). In my opinion, he succeeded in making explicit the relationship between the Cartesian 'cogito' and 'sum', and I shall dwell on this point in due course.

The way in which Polanyi expands his philosophy is by (1) suggesting a theory of knowledge that takes account of the personal element of responsibility and commitment in any act of knowing; (2) an acceptance that 'personal knowledge' is a "pervasive substructure of all intelligent behaviour" (Grene, in Polanyi, 1969); and (3) an acceptance of the tacit dimension that enables a knower to know his own knowing. Polanyi refers to the problem as identified by Plato that 'we know more than we can tell' (see the Overview to Part II), when Plato made Meno ask:

"Why, on what lines will you look, Socrates, for a thing of whose nature you know nothing at all? Pray, what sort of thing, amongst those that you know not, will you treat us to as the object of your search? Or even supposing, at the best, that you hit upon it, how will you know it is the thing you did not know?"

Polanyi's answer to Plato's problem and, correspondingly, his own (see above) is to postulate the existence of two kinds of knowing: FOCAL and SUBSIDIARY. "His central thesis is that no knowledge is, or can be, WHOLLY focal. And in the case of a problem, the subsidiary aspect looms large. We do not know, in the focal sense, what we are looking for, and yet we can look for it, because we rely, in looking for it, on clues to its nature, clues through which we somehow anticipate what we have not yet plainly understood. Such clues we hold in SUBSIDIARY rather than FOCAL awareness" (Grene, in Polanyi, his italics, 1969).

It is this tacit dimension that I have built into the model I am presenting in this chapter. I had already come to the point, from my understanding of the work of Chomsky, of hypothesising levels of mind as the grounding for the reconstruction of innate faculties that I could suggest would account for the intuitions of the individual knower. I may now match the idea of a particular level of mind - competence - as the location for the tacit component mooted by Polanyi.

It is here, as I indicated before, that I see a possible relationship between the 'cogito' and the 'sum', for if my full knowledge, at all possible levels of mind, is available to me, I am able to raise the tacit to the explicit. I am able to know how it is that I 'come to know' (Stronach, 1986). My potential for a chosen form of life may be realised, and I may be aware of an intense form of BEING, instead of only existing. 'Knowing and being' is the theme of Polanyi's (1969) papers. In this view, knowing and being are complementary, are part of the other.

From this epistemological perspective, then, the knower is not only the subject of an enquiry, but also the object. The individual is at one and the same time both subject and object. Explicit knowledge is grounded in his own tacit knowledge; tacit knowledge is a potential form of life.

I will now proceed, from this brief exposition of the different approaches to the 'knower-known' issue, and from stating my own position, to the notion of the creation of values as a form of knowledge. I agree with Edith Stein, when she says (1970): "Knowledge as not yet realised is felt as a value. This feeling of values is the source of all cognitive striving. ... An object proffers itself to me as dark, veiled, and unclear. It stands there as something which demands exposure and clarification." (Stein, 1970; cited in Dunlop, 1984). I also return to the hypothesis of Marjorie Grene (op.cit.) that "if all knowing is essentially a kind of doing, and human doing is always value-bound, then knowledge is so as well."

I need now to relate the foregoing to my practice. Initially I will survey the literature of values education, and show how my understanding of the literature led me to adopt a certain form of life. This form of life itself was alien to my deeply held educational values, and I changed it. My decision enabled me to become critical of the literature, for I now needed to ground my practice in something other than the dominant paradigm. How and why I changed my practice has constituted much of Part I, and will continue here and in Chapter 6.

4 ASSUMPTIONS OF THE LITERATURE OF VALUES EDUCATION

It seems to me that there are some overwhelming assumptions in the literature of values education. I have already pointed to some of the philosophical and practical issues involved in Part I. I have indicated what I see as a danger inherent in the assumptions of producing a 'certain kind of person', of the lack of educational commitment in a prioritising of the management of schooling, of the danger of overlooking the integrity of the individual by focusing on group methodologies. In this section I want to look at the epistemological foundations of the assumptions of the dominant paradigm.

I will suggest that there seems to be an all-pervading positivism which assumes the role of a secure foundation. This positivism has generated the view that people will react to certain stimuli in certain conditions with hypothesised end results (e.g. Gagne, 1970; Skinner, 1968; Kohlberg, 1976; Straughan, 1981); that values are objects of knowledge, and may be acquired as such (e.g. Downie and Telfer, 1969, 1980); Wilson, 1967); that there is a pre-determined course of action that will enable the learner to acquire values (e.g. Kohlberg, 1971; Selman, 1976); that this course of action will lead to an end-product of 'full development' (e.g. Piaget, 1932; McPhail, 1982; Ungoed-Thomas, 1978). Further, there is the dominant assumption that values reflect the standards and mores of a given society (Raths et al, 1978), and that it is the task of educators to help their children acquire the necessary skills to attain these values (e.g. Raven, 1981; Hamlin, 1978; Saunders, 1979).

I will examine these assumptions in detail, but first I wish to clarify a point of terminology:

A point of terminology

There is much variation in the literature about the naming of different branches of education in values; and a certain amount of synonymous naming, or using terms as mutually distributive, does not help. In my early work I assumed that personal and social education was a self-contained body of knowledge with its own literature. My reading and discussions with colleagues rapidly introduced new terms into my vocabulary: values education, social education, Lifeskills, tutorial work, moral education, personal development, values clarification, and so on. I then thought that some sort of hierarchy might be acknowledged in the literature; say that values education would incorporate moral education, which would in turn incorporate personal and social education, something along the lines of a tree diagram:



My search of the literature produced no such arrangement. Indeed, I discovered that the values clarification models of Harmin (1973), Kirschenbaum (1977) and Raths (1978) had the same conceptual and procedural basis as McPhail's (1975) consideration model. Similarly, the posing of dilemmas which are a central feature of Kohlberg's cognitive moral developmental model (1972, 1973) features in the dialogical models of Button (1981), Baldwin and Wells (1979-81), and other lifeskills workers. The perspectives and procedures of these and other models which I shall shortly survey vary in detail, but their central issues are comparable, often with an overlap that renders them contiguous. It is pointless to attempt an analysis of ranking or other categorisation for the naming of components of the same concepts. The choice of name is perhaps a matter of personal taste. Wilson (1967) and Hersch (1980) refer to moral education; Metcalf (1971) and Simon (1972) refer to values education; Peters (1966) speaks of ethics in education.

I shall adopt the generic term of 'values', using other titles in specific contexts.

Let me now return to the assumptions of the literature, and examine the epistemological issues that underpin these assumptions.

I will organise this section into three parts to consider the following issues:

(a) The dominance of propositional knowledge

Within this discussion I will suggest that a faith in 'knowledge-that' is the epistemological foundation for an instrumental approach to values education. I will also suggest that a faith in procedural 'knowledge-how' leads to:

(b) The dominance of sociological perspectives

Much of values education is conducted from a sociological persepective, in which 'knowledge-how' reflects a view that values are a skills-oriented phenomenon whose acquisition will enable the learner to perform adequately in a given society.

(c) Values as personal knowledge

Here I will consider an alternative approach, in which the concept of values is regarded as a form of knowledge, and values education is seen as developing the potential for personal knowledge.

To preface here the discussions of (a) and (b), I will refer to my hypothesis, already explicated in this chapter, that a faith in explicit knowledge, here characterised as propositional and procedural knowledge, may be seen as a prioritising of transactional (formal?) thought. Explicit, reified knowledge is here seen as a desirable end; knowledge is a structure to be studied. In my view, the debate about the superiority of know-that and know-how (e.g. Ryle, 1946) may be characterised here as propositional know-that (a) and procedural know-how (b); both approaches, I believe, are embedded in an object-centred epistemology, where know-that (in an instrumental sense) and know-how (in a technical, skills-based sense) demonstrate the desire of the knower to attain knowledge of external values.

Let me then survey the current literature of values education from these perspectives:

(i) The dominance of propositional knowledge

Many writers hold that values are something to be attained in the sense of valued goals. Most writers who adopt this stand see a close connection between the affective and conative, and some do not make any distinction between the two. (The traditional view of psychic experience is that there are three spheres of activity: the cognitive, which accounts for rational perception; the affective, which is to do with emotions and feelings; and the conative, to do with impulse, desire, determination.) For those who equate the affective and the

conative, the will to realise a feeling or an emotion leads to the means-end mentality that serves instrumentality. Arnold and Gasson (1954) talk of emotions that "aim at the possession of suitable objects"; Findlay (1963) suggests that values can be acknowledge only through desire. Raven (1981, chapter 11) writes exclusively in terms of values as goals, and gives detailed coverage of the competencies (skills) that need to be acquired and refined in order to achieve those goals. "Most people already engage in these activities (necessary competencies), to at least some extent, in pursuit of goals they value, and this fact provides one way of assessing their values. We can seek to discover what they tend to think about spontaneously, what they tend to enjoy doing, which goals they monitor their progress toward, and which goals they strive to find better ways of achieving." Magee (1978) cites the work of John Searle (1969) in attempting to solve the problem of intentionality thus: "The mind imposes intentionality on objects that are not intrinsically intentional by intentionally transferring the conditions of satisfaction of the intentional state to the corresponding object." Schaffler (1960) applies the view of instrumentality to teaching: "Teaching suggests ... an attempt to achieve learning by offering to pupils good reasons for believing certain things and for acting in certain ways" (cited in Straughan, 1962), and Sartre (1973) comments: "Man is nothing else but that which he makes himself ... To choose between this and that is at the same time to affirm the value of that which is chosen". Peters (1981) reminds us of Hume's position that moral education depended not so much on rational principles as disinterested passions.

The work of Peters, especially his 'Ethics and education' (1966), 'Psychological and ethical development' (1974) and, together with Hirst, 'The logic of education' (1970) is particularly interesting in this sense. Peters assumes that emotions are states of mind which lead to appraisals. "The central feature of states of mind which we call 'emotions', such as fear, jealousy, remorse, etc., is a type of cognition that can be called an appraisal" (Peters, 1970). These appraisals, essentially linked with passivity, may be then associated with action, in which case they perform as motives. For Peters, one of the tasks of teachers is to help the development of appropriate appraisals.

(ii) The dominance of sociological perspectives

I have already argued extensively that an object-centred epistemology of knowledge leads to a fragmented view of life. In models of education, the adoption of object-centred epistemologies of knowledge have already produced the 'disciplines approach', in which education may be fragmented into separate areas, and in which theory and practice are seen as separate realms of discourse.

[PERHAPS I SHOULD HAVE STARTED THIS DISCUSSION FROM THIS APPROACH? SHOULD I HAVE MADE MORE OF THE THEORY-PRACTICE ISSUE, AND PERHAPS REGARDED KNOW-THAT AS GROUNDED IN THE REIFICATION OF PSYCHOLOGY, AND KNOW-HOW AS GROUNDED IN THE DOMINANCE OF SOCIOLOGY? I WONDER IF I CAN WEAVE THESE IDEAS INTO THE PRESENT TEXT WITHOUT DISTORTING THE FLOW? I MUST GIVE THIS FURTHER THOUGHT, AND, IF I REVISE THE TEXT, PERHAPS START FROM THIS ALTERNATIVE STANDPOINT.]

Most current models of moral education come within this rubric. Values tend to be seen as elements of social intercourse - beauty, love, truth, a desire for the best possible world. Voltaire's 'Candide' was the innocent victim of this approach. He saw 'institutionalised' values as the ultimate of human aspiration, and he aimed to become a part of such social normity. His neglect of his own personal development, including the neglect of the development of his critical faculties, rendered him spiritually impotent. His knowledge of the world was limited by what he perceived; there was no balance introduced by criticism, no growth brought about by reflection. He accepted, and was happy.

A sociological perspective seems to be widely accepted as a basis for values education, in that it stresses the need for understanding between persons in order to improve social situations and make life more peaceful and enjoyable for the majority (see Pring, 1984). The procedure to achieve this improvement is through an increase of the socialisation of individuals. In order for this socialisation to take place, individuals need to be persuaded to adopt certain life styles, but this adoption should be intentional. Thus an improvement of social

situations is brought about through an extra effort on the part of all human beings to get on together.

Examples of this approach are many. Dewey (1959) states: "Ultimate moral motives and forces are nothing more or less than social intelligence - the power of observing and comprehending social situations - and social power - trained capacities of control - at work in the service of social interest and aims. There is no fact which throws light upon the constitution of society. There is no power whose training adds to social resourcefulness that is not moral." Hersch et al (1980) give an excellent appraisal of models of moral education in the 1970s and 1980s, pointing to an increased public awareness of issues of morality and a demand for values (moral) education to become institutionalised as part of the curriculum. As a rationale for their selection of six models, among a host of other contenders, they propose the criteria of caring, judging and acting as a basis for interpersonal understandings. "A 'model' of moral education, in our conception, is a way of thinking about the processes of caring, judging and acting in an educational setting. A model includes a theory, or a point of view, about how people develop morally, and a set of strategies, or principles, for fostering moral development. A model thus helps us both to understand and to practise moral education" (Hersch et al, 1980). They emphasise the notion of skills acquisition and training as an assumption of moral education: "As a whole the models furnish a broad-based pedagogy. Methods are presented to mobilize feeling, to guide thinking, and to sustain action. There are techniques designed to help students clarify personal interests, and these are methods that equip

students to negotiate complex international problems. Considered collectively, we believe the models do justice to the complexity of moral education." The models considered in the book are:

1 The rationale building model: Shaver and Strong (1976)
2 The consideration model: McPhail, Ungoed-Thomas and Chapman (1975)
3 Values clarification : Harmin et al (1973); Kirschenbaum (1977); Raths et al (1978); Simon et al (1972)
4 Values analysis: Evans, Applegate and Tucker (n.d.); Fraenkel (1977); Metcalf (ed), (1971); Meux et al (1974)
5 The cognitive moral developmental model: Hersch et al (1979)
6 The social action model: Newmann (1975); Newmann et al (1977)

In Britain there has been a lively interest in values education, particularly since the 1970s, this interest being sustained by various HMI/DES documents (see also Chapter 1 of this text). For example, the Plowden Report of 1969 recommends: "At the heart of the educational process lies the child. No advances in policy, no acquisition of new equipment have their desired effect unless they are in harmony with the nature of the child, unless they are fundamentally acceptable to him." 'Aspects of secondary education in England' (1965) states that "teachers generally acknowledge ... the need to provide more personal education in the curriculum for all pupils". 'A view of the curriculum' (1981) says that "schools need to secure for all pupils opportunities for learning

particularly likely to contribute to personal and social development". 'Curriculum 11-16' (1977) comments on "the socialisation of the young, their induction into adulthood, and their preparation as citizens, parents, wage earners, and voters of the future."

I have already indicated (Chapter 1) that it is interesting to note that most of such reports stress the need primarily of personal education and secondarily of social education. The take-up in the models, however, has turned the recommendations on their head, with an overwhelming emphasis on social education and little or no attention to personal education. Mary Warnock states (1978), and I agree with her, that the techniques of social education (for example, group work, interaction therapy, and so on) can be inhibiting if not damaging for the personal development of the individual if this is the primary teaching medium. She says: "I believe that perpetual society destroys the imaginative faculty, and that children who fear solitude and are bored immediately they are alone are becoming deprived in this very respect. It is the duty of education, it seems to me, to counteract the very strong pressures of current fashion to make solitude seem a disgrace or a disaster. Every move in the direction of working in groups, or team activity, of joint projects and communal discussion, is a move in the wrong direction. Even the insistence that everyone must participate in everything is damaging. Corporate activity may be a fine thing from time to time. But independence is perhaps finer." (Warnock, 1978) Compare, also, the stand of Hargreaves (1982) who attaches much importance to the expressive arts, especially drama, as a means of encouraging personal autonomy within the comprehensive school.

I have already indicated my critique (Chapter 3) of the overwhelming inclination of the 1960s-1980s literature dealing with institutionalised values towards group activity and the socialisation of the individual through group work. The APU (1981) echoes a number of other authoritative documents (e.g. FEU 'Developing social and life skills', 1980; 'Tutoring', 1982; NFER 'Teaching social and life skills', 1979) in its conclusions that "pupils' personal and social development is given the highest priority by teachers, both in school organisation and curriculum design"; that the main characteristics of personal and social education were "seen as being of a general or of a specific nature, viz:

a) aspects of general development concerned with persons and personal relationships, morality and social awareness;
b) aspects of specific development concerned with occupational, political, legal, environmental, health and community areas."

It seems to me that this sociological approach to values education puts the cart before the horse. The assumption is that people will develop as persons (and the concept of 'person' is ill-defined in the literature) through their contact with other people, rather than an alternative approach that a primary focus on the development of individuals will automatically enhance the social situations in which they find themselves (Habermas, 1979; see also Chapters 3 and 7 of this text).

I would pick out in particular three elements in this approach that seem misleading and deficient:

1 There is no clearly set out theory of personhood to help a teacher decide what it means for her pupils to 'develop as persons';

2 Most texts agree that it is the approach and interpersonal skills of the teacher that will determine how well the schemes are communicated, but there are no procedural guidelines in the literature in general or in specific texts to give teachers operational or procedural criteria on which to base their teaching practice;

3 Nowhere in the literature is the fact emphasised, or even aired except in tangential ways, that in order for teachers to engage in the teaching of personal and social education, they must have experience of personal and social education - that is, to teach children through experiential methods which are aimed at refining pupils' emotions and perceptions, teachers need to have gone through the same process of personal enquiry and self-discovery. In other words, for teachers to engage in 'education', they need to be encouraged to see the need for self-education, first their own, and second, their children's (see Chapter 7 of this text for further discussion).

The discussion so far in this part of values education as from a sociological perspective (which emphasises the need for 'know-how') has looked at values education as a specific component of the curriculum. It is not, however, and should not be, in my view, limited in scope so

as to fit only into a specific curriculum spot. This dual nature of values education can often lead to conflict and malaise among teachers: are they teachers of subjects (e.g. maths) for which there is provision in initial training courses; are they teachers of this 'subject', personal and social education, for which there is currently little or no provision in initial training courses; are they teachers of subjects with pastoral responsibilities (e.g. year tutors, form tutors); or are they tutors with teaching duties? The confusion about the nature of values education and subsequent confusion about personal and professional roles is well voiced in David (1983), as well as in the audiotapes in Appendix 1, especially AT 7 and 21. My personal view, gleaned from my in-service work in other schools as well as my own, is that values education/personal and social education is usually adopted in schools as a specific input at a designated time, following a view that lesson time devoted to personal and social education presents issues in a focused and accelerated form that would otherwise have been presented throught the 'hidden curriculum' in an ad hoc manner. The organisation of personal and social education programmes asks the questions 'What can our learners do without tutors? What can they do better with tutors?' The answers to these questions provide the basis of the programme. A specific lesson input may be regarded as the short-term means to the long-term ends, that of building caring communities made up of reflexive, autonomous individuals.

On this premise, then, the aim of personal and social education as a 'subject' is to help people to develop the necessary personal and interpersonal skills to build caring communities. Hargreaves (1982) points out that schools have to practise what they preach in their claims to be fostering personal and social development: "Our present secondary school system, largely through the hidden curriculum, exerts on many pupils, particularly but by no means exclusively from the working class, a destruction of their dignity which is so massive and pervasive that few subsequently recover from it."

Sadly, my own experience of schools leads me to believe that many teachers will pay lip-service to a caring ethos, and be skilled demonstrators of personal and social education as a lesson, yet seem to be unwilling to carry the ideas over into their general dealings with the children (a development in my own practice which I have traced through Chapters 1 and 3 of this text). In AT18, MR comments on his pride in his own teaching skills: "... extrovert, like to think confident, like to think in command, dominating, hopefully; that's how I like to think it goes." He sees personal and social education as a time when caring skills are appropriate, but such is not necessarily his attitude to the rest of the curriculum. "If somebody gives me a really stupid answer that is really just a ridiculous answer in class I would - no, I think I probably wouldn't say anything. I would probably just ignore them and carry on to something else and say, 'When you've got something intelligent to say, let me know'. That would probably be my comment then, whereas [in tutorial] they can explore little things like that. They know they're not going to be jumped on if they do something

silly. Of course, that means that they might be inhibited because they might be afraid in normal lessons of saying something silly without genuinely meaning to be silly. In tutorial you've withdrawn that problem. If you say something silly without intentionally meaning to do it, it probably won't matter." He points to his dual rule system: "Yes, well, I've got two sets of rules, haven't I? I've got one set of rules to govern anything I do with them and I. And I've got a set of slightly different rules with regard to maths. And tutorial. And they are still perfectly aware that in tutorial they don't break the rules at the top."

Throughout my in-service work I have found this to be an overwhelming view; that there is a set of rules for teachers in tutorial time, and another set of rules for 'normal' curriculum time. Interestingly, the 'rules' of tutorial time seem to apply to non-curriculum time, during rehearsals for plays, musical activites, and so on, when teachers relax from their functional role into their personal role. I am also acutely aware that the transformation in my own practice was brought about, in part, by seeing myself reflected through the eyes of colleagues such as MR above. I have been as guilty as anyone of implementing multiple rules sytems; and I believe that it is the critiquing of my own practice that has led me to opt, where possible, for the dialectical system of higher-order principles aimed at building dialogical communities.

My re-formed practice makes me sympathise with Pring (1984), who argues forcibly against formal 'programmes' of personal and social education: "There is no doubt in many people's minds that personal, social and moral development should be a major concern of the schools. But it is mistaken to conclude that the way of translating this concern into curriculum terms is to put another subject, namely, personal and social education, into the timetable. It MIGHT be important to look at the content of the curriculum ... but the upshot of what I have argued so far is that there are more significant questions to be asked about the conditions of learning, the impact of the curriculum as a whole upon the young person, the methods of teaching and the relationships between teacher and pupil. Indeed, to add yet another subject to the already overcrowded timetable could be seen as a way of escaping from these questions."

I agree with Pring that the atmosphere in schools, as manifested through the hidden curriculum will go much further to encouraging personal and social development than any amount of 'formal' personal and social education. I am reminded of a lady colleague who used to march resolutely off to class, clutching copies of MSC handbooks on personal and social education, and muttering invectives against the children she was about to encounter. It is in personal relationships that personal and social education is most effective, "in a one to one relationship between persons" (Vincent, personal correspondence) and in the agreement of people to meet others on an equal footing in order to build warm, caring atmospheres. Whitehead also comments (1986): "The majority of circumstances in education require warm and caring relationships to

improve them. These qualities are often more important than the use of a systematic form of enquiry." (see also my 1988a). But in order to meet these requirements, it is necessary to concentrate on individuals as persons, not as people in groups, and that means breaking with the current popularity of formal programmes in two ways: first, to relegate to secondary status an approach that sees values as objects to be acquired through a skills-based strategy and from a sociological perspective, and therefore also to relegate the focus on sociological issues (the emphasis on SOCIAL education); and second to relegate the view of persons as existing within a social world in favour of a view of persons as independent beings (the emphasis on PERSONAL education). I am not suggesting that we abandon a sociological approach altogether. That would be silly, since we are all part of the world and form the world in which we live. What I am saying is that education is essentially to do with I-concepts, what goes on in an individual's mind. An E-concept describes the actions of other people. It emphasises the dichotomy between describer and described. Issues of sociology do not give intrinsic explanations for individual development, why people do as they do. They suggest rather what people do (know-that) and how they do it (know-how). Peters asks (1981): "How do children come to care? This seems to me the most important question in moral education; but no clear answer to it can be found ... "

In my opinion, any theory of personal and social education or values education should be based on a clear understanding of what personal and social education or values education means, and here there are two parts to the question. The first part focuses on the 'content' and the second on the 'process'. What does the 'values' or 'personal' or 'social' component mean, and what does the 'education' component mean? To assume that a switch to teaching through experiential techniques or group work is going to ensure personal and social development is naive and potentially dangerous. It is the assumption that habits will form if there are enough examples around, as stated, for example, by Straughan (1982), that there is a need to expose children to a wide range of phenomena, "so enlarging a child's concept of 'a person'". We are back to Plato's problem. Given that the phenomena themselves are legion, and given that a child has never been taught what the concept 'a person' means, how can the child (a) abstract from the phenomena what 'a person' means, and (b) how can his concept 'be enlarged'? An approach to values education that is grounded in an object-centred epistemology is to assume that people will develop in terms of (1) accretion and (2) habit formation. This is an essentially structuralist viewpoint. As I understand his work, it is that adopted by Piaget in his theory of the cognitive and moral development of the child (Piaget, 1932). In Piaget's system, the structures of the world impose themselves on the child, and by a process of assimilation, accommodation and interpretation, the child will abstract from those structures certain rules that will then determine his understandings. We are left holding the questions: (1) which rules will the child adopt, given that the phenomena are so many and so varied; (2) how will the child abstract the

rules from such a mass of conflicting data? Given that each and every response from the child to its environment is a novel response, it is a case of 're-inventing' the rules with every experience. These issues belong to Chapter 6, and will be discussed extensively there.

I will focus on the issue that an approach to an understanding of the nature of human values that is grounded in a sociological perspective is to aim at descriptions of values within social systems, without explaining their relevance to individuals. An understanding of values education that is grounded in sociology is to aim at descriptions of values within schools, as part of the institutionalised system, without explaining how it is that individuals come to think as they do, nor why they do so. This brings us to the third part of this present discussion, the view of values as personal creations.

(iii) Values as personal knowledge

I will now consider the literature of values education that proceeds from a subject-centred epistemology, in which the knower strives to realise his own values - i.e. transform his tacit knowledge into the explicit form of a form of life.

I will begin by dwelling again on the fact that many great thinkers accept as an a priori of their epistemology the fact voiced by Polanyi (1958) that "we know more than we can tell". Modern structuralists have attempted to show that we can tell everything that we know. Chomsky comments (1986): " ... much of modern psychology has decided, for reasons that do not impress me, to limit itself to the study of behaviour and the control of behaviour ... I will merely state my own opinion: that this approach has proven quite barren, and that it is irrational to limit one's objectives in this way. One cannot hope to study learning or perception in any useful way by adhering to methodological strictures that limit the conceptual apparatus so narrowly as to disallow the concept 'what is perceived' and the concept 'what is learned'." Where Chomsky and Polanyi appear to agree is in the assumption that to focus only on explicit, observable data is to limit the human enterprise to observation and description of events (the object-centred epistemologies and sociological approaches of the previous section: E-levels). In order to understand, it is necessary to extend the study to entertain a notion of competence that is beyond the scope of behaviourism, and to seek explanations for the concepts 'what

is learned' (Chomsky) and 'knowledge' (Polanyi) in a pre-conceptual level of the mind. In this sense, a study becomes an enquiry into the workings of an individual mind (I-level). What makes the project explanatory is the focus by the self on the self, an effort by the self to account for its own ability to 'know' (Polanyi, 1958) or 'cognize' (Chomsky, 1986). This sense is closely akin to that of Reid's (op.cit.) 'knowing with a direct object', manifested in Omar Khayyam's "Know thyself" and Shakespeare's "To thine own self be true". Maslow (1962) says that "phenomenology ... uses personal, subjective experience as the foundation upon which abstract knowledge is built". Personal knowledge uses personal, subjective experience as a mirror of its innate faculties. Maslow continues: "No theory of psychology will ever be complete which does not centrally incorporate the concept that man has his future within him, dynamically active at this present moment."

I must now break into my account and introduce aspects of Chapter 6, in order to clarify and anticipate certain hypotheses that I will be putting forward in this Chapter 5. It is my thesis that personal knowledge is related to competence; that the area of competence is the location of 'felt values', essentially at a deep level; that the surface-level expression, or realisation, of the deep-level'felt' values is seen in the behavioural manifestation of values; and that the way in which deep level values are turned into surface level values is through the transformations of will and determination. These elements also use the traditional notions of the areas of psychic activity known as cognitive, affective and conative. My hypothesis will then produce three models: initially a static structure of:

1



This is a static model, descriptive in the sense that it is a hypothetical representation of the levels of knowledge of the individual. First it is necessary to hypothesise an acquisition model where the device receives certain inputs (for example, from the environment/culture) which will then cause it to produce certain outputs (on an observed, performance level). Thus, model 2 looks like this:-

2



It is then necessary to raise Model 1 to explanatory (rather than descriptive) status to turn it into a performance model (I am reminded of Schutz's aphorism (1972) that action is meaningless without intention) by mapping on to it transformational structures that will

allow elements of competence to be transformed into elements of performance:

3



These aspects will be expanded and made explicit in Chapter 6. They are introduced here as a forerunner of a theory which rests on the notions of competence and performance, notions which are essential to the present discussion, and which are addressed now.

Competence and performance

In 'Aspects of the theory of syntax' (1965), Chomsky elaborates on the notional terms 'competence' and 'performance' which had been mooted in his 'Syntactic structures' (1957):

"We thus make a fundamental distinction between competence (the speaker-hearer's knowledge of the language), and performance (the actual use of language in concrete situations)."

Since 1983 I have applied these terms in my writing on the development of the human being's capacity to acquire and demonstrate values. I use the word 'acquire' loosely, since it is my hypothesis that the person has as part of her innate endowment the facility to develop latent values (personal knowledge) that is a part of her inheritance as a human being. 'Acquisition' of values is, in my view, a phenomenon of the interplay of innate structures and external structures, in the confluence of personal knowledge and knowledge of the world. This confluence is enabled through a dialectical approach of transformations of structures brought about through the cancellation of the negation (Chapter 6).

The application of the terms to the field of values shows us that it is possible for a person to become skilled at a superficial level (performance) without internalising what he is doing as a moral code (competence). I gave voice to these ideas in my 1986 text. I did not, at the time, dwell on the problems of teaching for competence. In the

book the point is easily overlooked. In reality, I had not thought the problem through, or arrived at any sort of answer. I wrote:

"Applying the notions of competence and performance to the development of personal adequacy, I feel it is possible for a learner to become skilled at a superficial level (performance) without accepting what he is doing as a moral code (competence). In terms of the aims of education, a performance level is insufficient to produce a morally educated person.

"In similar vein, Stanton et al (1980) point to the development of skills on a hierarchical basis. 'It may be important to distinguish between (a) relatively simple skills, (b) compound (or complex) skills, and (c) the ability to deploy a compound skill. For example,

(a) steering (b) riding a bike (c) riding safely in traffic

"Wilson et al (1967) also point to the cumulative development of increasingly complex skills in driving a car, skills ranging through 'factual information (where the brake and accelerator are), rules of thumb (Don't switch on when in gear), and practice'.

"But skills of a mechanical nature, suggest Stanton et al and Wilson et al are subsidiary elements within the total exercise of being a safe driver. The good road user, they suggest, will have learnt the skills of negotiating traffic, will have accepted the responsibility of being a road user, and will have regard for other road users.

"In their characterisation of the morally educated person, Wilson et al point to those aspects of responsibility and regard, which are themselves dependent on the person's rationality. Responsibility and regard may be taught, but not necessarily learnt, or put into practice. For values to be realised in practice, there must be an initial intentionality. 'We might be tempted to say that we can divide the task of moral education into two parts. First we should educate people so as to give them the skills, abilities and knowledge required for moral decisions ... and then we should 'give them the motivation' to put these into practice.' (Wilson et al, 1967)

"Motivation alone, however, does not of itself lead to competence. A learner could demonstrate his interpersonal skills for all sorts of reasons - personal enrichment, reward, fear of punishment - without actually having accepted the values of what he is doing. 'This would not make them into more reasonable people, and would not count as education,' concludes Wilson. 'We need rather some way of educating ... people so as to improve this deep and subtle form of rationality.'"

This present discussion, then, dwells on the notion of competence as the location of tacit (personal) knowledge. The task of education is to raise that personal knowledge to a cognitive level, not as a focus of attention, but as a recognised facility. There is an important distinction here. A talent that becomes the focus of attention quickly loses its spontaneity. Polanyi (1958) notes this in his analysis of primary and secondary focusing. As soon as a learner concentrates too closely on the skills of riding a bicycle, he says, such as the position

of his feet on the pedals, his total motor co-ordination is affected and he loses touch with the whole manoeuvre. Any typist will acknowledge that too close a fixation on the mechanics of finger-eye co-ordination will produce more mistakes than a focus on the message, where the body is left to get on without interference from the intellect. Treisman (in Haber, 1970) points to the distortion of visual messages brought about by conscious reflection. Einstein (ref. mislaid) comments on the weakening of intuitive thought by the need to translate that thought into spoken or written symbols. Buber (1965) speaks of the dangers of 'over-consciousness' as taking away the spontaneity of life.

In this text, a main theme is that of the self's knowledge of the self, and the need for the self to stand apart from itself and adopt a critical perspective in its claim to understand its own development. This standing aside is an aspect of the analytical procedure necessary for such focusing. The self is integrated, however, in the synthesis of its parts (Ryle, 1946), as a thinking, living person, who has the dialectical capacity to be one and many at the same time, to operate at several levels of consciousness (Hegel, 1910) while being conscious of that consciousness (self-consciousness).

In his paper 'Understanding ourselves' (originally 1961; reproduced in Ornstein's 1979), Polanyi points to this duality of human knowledge, what he calls 'explicit knowledge' and 'tacit knowledge'. Following on from this account of the power of tacit (personal) knowledge to hold within itself explicit (objective) knowledge, I may suggest that 'knowledge of personal knowledge' may be re-phrased as the self's

knowledge of the self. Thus the phrase becomes 'knowledge of personal knowledge', and in operational terms that implies the self's knowledge of the self. When the focus dissolves into the whole, when it becomes diffused within the integrated totality of the person, personal knowledge becomes the foundation for the personality, a basis for a life form that rests on the assurance of its own unity in completeness. When I say, then, that the task of education is to raise personal knowledge to a cognitive level, I mean that as teachers we need to enable our learners to recognise their own unity, to be confident in their intuitions and to have faith in their imagination and creativitiy.

This is the task that some approaches to values education adopt (for example, Button, 1974; Rogers, 1983) (and in my view, not enough of them do). Perhaps they do not approach the task from this theoretical principled basis, and I recognise that these personal hypotheses may not be the best or immediately acceptable; but I feel that a coherent, principled basis of a theory of personhood which incorporates within itself an explanation for personal knowledge would do much to promote the acceptability and viability of formal schemes of values education that operate from the basis of the integrity of the individual.

Let us now consider some models of values education (for example, Button, 1981) that proceed from this basis of the individual. The client of the curriculum of such an approach is the learner (rather than the learner-in-a-group, or a group itself), and the task of education, seen in this light, is not the socialisation of the individual, but a growing in the self-knowledge by the individual of the individual. The

skills of this approach are not so much interpersonal as personal. They are the skills and competencies for the individual to get to know his own mind, and then to use that mind to explore its own knowledge.

This approach is manifested in schools in, to my knowledge of the literature, three ways:

1 Theories of values education as personal knowledge
2 Approaches to those theories in schools
3 Approaches to the development of appropriate skills

These three ways mirror the organisation of the constituent parts of these Parts II and III:

1 What constitutes ...?
2 How is knowledge of ... acquired?
3 How is knowledge of ... put to use? (Part III)

The same questions are now being tackled of (1) what constitutes a theory of values education as personal knowledge? (2) how is such a theory acquired? (3) how is such a theory put to use? There is a fourth component in the present discussion, however, which is the overall theme of my project:

4 How have I come to know that I have come to know? How can I, as a real, living person, explain to myself how I have developed into this person that I am? The answer I hypothesise throughout dwells on the

idea of a dialectical approach of question and answer that will help me to render to myself an acceptable account: to support Cavell's comment (in Rorty, 1982), that I am exploring "the possibility that one among endless true descriptions of me tells me who I am".

(a) THEORIES OF VALUES EDUCATION AS REFLECTIONS OF PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE

To my knowledge of the literature, there are very few systematic theories based on this philosophy. John MacMurrary, working in the 1930s, is perhaps a chief exponent, reacting strongly against the instrumental and sociological aspects of behaviourist/structuralist approaches. MacMurrary took feeling and vitality for human life as his central theme. Dunlop (1984) notes that, in this, "MacMurray's position here is very closely allied to that of Polanyi. He stresses that it is a task of education to bring children to the position where they can TRUST their own powers to grasp the nature of reality. Polanyi emphasises that every action of a living being, including a rational person, involves commitment, or reliance on powers or principles that he cannot fully comprehend. Perception, feeling and thought are all ways of grasping reality, or aspects of reality. We have these powers as the living beings we are, and have to learn to rely on them in spite of the social pressures that tempt the individual towards irrational reliance on others (though Polanyi, unlike MacMurray, gives full weight to the need to rely on TRADITIONS of thought and feeling). Having to rely on

our own powers does make us vulnerable to error, but if we react properly to mistakes we will naturally learn from them. Trust in life is essential." (Dunlop, 1984)

The writings of Maslow (e.g. 1968) and Rogers (e.g. 1961, 1983) are in this vein, much of their writing, strictly speaking, not so much about education in schools as education of the individual in the world, although Rogers's 'Educating for freedom in the '80s' (1983) is written specifically for values education in schools and has massive implications for schooling. Elizabeth Leonie Simpson (in Scharf, 1978) writes about the need for 'creativogenic schools' in which the emphasis is on the discovery of themselves by individuals through their imaginative creativity. " ... the search for the self, for introspective awareness through self-searching, may be the basis for identification with all of humankind. Insight, subjectivity, private experience, and the empathic taking of the perspective of the other carry the individual beyond personal idiosyncrasy, beyond shared communal beliefs, to an autonomy which is separate from the social group but is still a part of it. ... Reality is ... a personal perception, a creation - a product of the development of the self through the interaction of the individual and the social and physical opportunities in the midst of which he or she lives and strives."

In a most interesting paper in the same volume, Robert Samples outlines the schools of thought about values education on an historical basis which has clear parallels with my arrangement in this text. He maintains that "each school of thought begins from a different group of

assumptions. Each then proceeds toward an expanded knowledge based on those original assumptions. These schools of psychological thought are the Freudian, Behaviourist, Cognitive-Developmental, Humanist, and Transpersonal. Abbreviated statements delineating the basic charactersitics of each follow:

Freudian The human psyche is a dynamic world constantly in turmoil wherein the higher human instincts are in combat with baser animalistic forces.

Behaviourist The human psyche is little more than an aggregate of behaviours embedded into the nervous system by the experiences each human has had.

Cognitive-Developmental

The human psyche develops through sequential stages, each of which is characterised by a higher capacity for logical, abstract thought than the stage preceding it.

Humanistic The human psyche is far more expansive than any of the above alone, and it encompasses all of the qualities of a person within a context of goodness and a capacity to be godlike.

Transpersonal The human psyche is only a portion of a cosmic, universal psyche that is inextricably interconnected in a little understood unity." (Samples, 1978)

Samples makes the interesting point that the behaviourist and cognitive perspectives of Skinner and Piaget have dominated Western research traditions to the extent that "their results have begun to affect technology as surely as if they were born of the technology. ... Those

who have moved beyond behaviouristic approaches and entered the areas of humanistic and transpersonal psychology have done so primarily because the technocratic human so well described by behaviourists was simply too limited. All the human capacities of spirituality, emotionality, sexuality, and intellectuality are at the core of these final two holistic psychologies. In no way do the philosophies of humanistic or transpersonal psychology exclude either behaviorism or cognitive psychology. Rather, they are embraced as part of the whole. But alas, the opposite is not true.

"Behaviorism and cognitive psychology only have the capacity to embrace that which is consistent with their premises, PREMISES WHICH ARE AT THE OUTSET REDUCTIVE (Samples's italics).

"What we have in both behaviorism and cognitive development is really a kind of cultural chauvinism. Rationality can clearly be considered a religion if one thinks metaphorically. The logic of our actions then becomes a measure of our faith. Experience becomes the indicator of the morality of my being. My conformity to this context is a measure of my worth." (Samples, op.cit.)

As I understand him, what Samples seems to be saying here is that a dialectical approach that subsumes the less mature behavioural/structuralist research traditions reflects the holistic, flexible approaches inherent in humanistic and transpersonal psychology. This is my thesis, also, that an approach to values education as personal knowledge subsumes within its own structure the approaches of

instrumentality (Samples's 'technocratic dominance') and sociology as part of its own dialectic.

Samples concludes the paper with a description of a 'new individual' whose own self-knowledge acts as the basis for dealings with other selves. "But now a new individual emerges. One that senses a new tribalism, a new unity. One whose laws, religions, schools, and economics are being guided by a simultaneous transformation that is at once a return and a departure. The emergence of this individual is a reinstatement of collectivism BUT THIS TIME BY AFFILIATION. It is a departure in that there is movement toward the future. Both of these directions are grounded in the now. The concepts of inappropriate psychologies and philosophies are as destined to disappear as surely as the inappropiate technologies, with humankind moving toward a synergic survival."

Samples here presents a characterisation of his new individual for whom, it seems, dialectical operations would appear to be the highest form of cognitive activity (Riegel, 1973), and whose philosophy of action is grounded in the now of dialogical communities (Bernstein, 1983). I am similarly interested, and I would now suggest that the I-perspective of the self's investigation of the self results in the establishment of communities of selves who share a common interest of moving towards mutual understandings.

(b) APPROACHES IN SCHOOLS

The writings of Mary Warnock stress the need for an approach to values education by refining cognitive skills through affective areas (in my view, the dialectical interdependence of competence and performance, where competence leads to performance, which in turn shapes and alters competence: see Chapters 6 and 7). She emphasises the need for curricula to be geared toward the individual: "Education is something which is essentially tailored to the recipient" (Warnock, 1977), and for curricula to enhance the education of the imagination and feelings (in Vesey, 1978). Pring (1984) shares the same view. The formal curriculum, he feels, should be so organised and constituted as to "fit in to the overall aims of personal and social education". He indicates several entry points: through humanities, citing in particular the Humanities Curriculum Project 14-16 of Lawrence Stenhouse (begun in 1967), and the 'Man: a course of study' of Bruner (1966). "In particular ... it should be noted how an integral part of the understanding of humanistic studies in their contribution to personal development is the classroom atmosphere, the active mode of learning, the non-authoritarian relationships between teacher and pupil, and the strategies for involving pupils in deliberation and reflective learning." He stresses the enjoyment of literature. Citing the work of

Bantock, 1955, 1963, 1965, 1967, he says: "The place of literature and the arts in the refinement of the emotions and in the moral education of young people has been a constant theme in Bantock's many contributions to education". He also stresses the need for the expressive arts: "The general argument is that an essential feature of personal growth is the development and refinement of a 'feeling response' to oneself, to others, and to the environment." (Pring, 1984)

(c) APPROACHES TO THE DEVELOPMENT OF APPROPRIATE SKILLS

To my knowledge, these approaches fall into two categories, the first being aspects of formal schemes of personal and social education that are primarily sociological in focus; the second through specific schemes of Instrumental Enrichment.

First, then: many schemes of personal and social education see themselves from a sociological perspective, such as Priestley and McGuire (1981), Manpower Services Commission (1980), Hopson and Scally (1981). Others attempt to switch the focus to the individual as operating independently of society while still acknowledging herself as part of that society, much in line with Stenhouse's (1975) thinking that the individual and society are interdependent, one influencing and shaping the other. The schemes I have in mind are those of Button (1981) and Baldwin and Wells (1979-81) (but see my comment in Chapter

1). Button approaches issues of socialisation through group work and interaction techniques such as trust walks and role exchanges. He approaches issues of personal development through his concept of personal enquiry. Personal enquiry is conducted through paper and pen methods and experiential learning with immediate transfer to the real world.

Paper and pen methods take the form of questionnaires, worksheets and personal diaries or logs. The techniques range from straightforward questions: 'What is my best subject at school? Do I consider myself honest?', open-ended statements: 'My best point is ...; I think I could improve ...' to accounts: 'Write a few sentences on what you are going to do about it.' The emphasis is on getting the young person to clarify his thinking about himself, to face up to weaknesses and difficulties, to help him to improve his own self-image, to encourage him to find solutions to his own personal and social problems. Within Button's programmes, the learner is thrust into real experience as soon as possible. One of the first requirements of the programme is to engage someone in conversation, having practised the skills of dialogue in class within the supportive group atmosphere, in order to find out about that person. The person approached may be mother, milkman, neighbour, brother, friend. When this exercise is prepared in class, the teacher stresses that the learner should be prepared for some surprises: Mum sometimes says unusual things when you actually ask her to take time out to sit down and talk to you about herself! The underlying assumption is that the more people are prepared to find out about each other, the more they will learn about themselves; and the main epistemological

assumption is that the more they are prepared to find out about the workings of others' minds, the more they will find out about their own. These thoughts are given voice particularly in the work of Buber, Fromm, Rogers, Maslow, and in the words of the great Prophets. "The world of Thou is not closed. He who goes out to it with concentrated being and risen power to enter into relation becomes aware of freedom. And to be freed from the belief that there is no freedom is indeed to be free" (Buber, 1958). Fromm (1978): "Only in the process of mutual alive relatedness can the other and I overcome the barriers of separateness, inasmuch as we both participate in the dance of life."

For Button, the greatest field of experience is real life (contrasted with, for example, Kohlberg's schemes which stop at the level of vicarious experience in role play and discussion of hypothetical dilemmas). Learners are encouraged to take on and welcome real life experiences, but their first steps are cushioned within the supportive group atmosphere in class. For example, when a visitor is to be received, each person of the group bids for a specific job: welcoming, thanking, introducing the conversation, and so on. In this way the individual is encouraged to see himself as an important part of the whole exercise. As a transfer exercise he is then invited to try out the skills he has learnt in real social settings, and to report back to the group. The aspect of de-briefing is important in Button's methodologies, from a personal point of view. It gives the learner an opportunity to talk over his experiences with a supportive group, and thus affords him the chance to reflect on his actions and plan future modifications. In this respect the principles of action research, to

which Button refers repeatedly, are clearly identifiable, in that pupils undertake cycles of problem identification, planning, acting, observing, reflection, re-formulation of problems, and so on.

My role in class was to help the pupils engage in their own action research and personal enquiry.

For example, in AT6, Malcolcm's group are being rather silly and Gary makes a comment. When we listen to the tape, Gary is uncomfortable and asks me to erase the tape.

JM Why?

Gary It's stupid.

JM Why is it stupid?

Gary It's not me, is it.

JM What are you going to do about it?

Gary Let me do it again. I want to do it again.

This is not behaviour modification, as, for example, Skinner would have us believe. It is the result of an active reflection by a thinking individual into his own values, who has decided to reject certain values (as exhibited in this case by his verbal behaviour) and take on others. In my hypothesis, he has decided to modify his performance through the transformations of selective reasoning and determination, to match more harmoniously the values of his underlying competence. There are a number of examples of this kind of personal re-routing throughout the

conversations in Appendix 1. I have indicated in Part One that my project in personal and social education in school took the form of an action research enquiry into my pupils' action research enquiry; and a personal enquiry into self, the spin-off of which was to encourage my pupils to undertake a parallel personal enquiry. In this way I engaged in EDUCATIONAL research; and in using this term I invoke my working definition of 'education' as a process of the development of individual rationality, and point to Chapter 3 of this text where I have attempted to show the process in action.

To move on to Instrumental Enrichment: the techniques adopt the same principles of action-reflection, but not within the specifically social settings of Button's pedagogy. In a Schools Council production (1983), Weller and Craft give an interesting account of a national project based on the work of Reuven Feuerstein (1979). Instrumental Enrichment is "a curriculum intended to furnish tools for thinking. [It] seeks to break the lock-step between traditional assessments and curriculum planning. It rejects the tautology implicit when tests of pupils' current performance levels are taken as predictors of potential. It criticizes the vicious circle integral to this practice and emphasises the damage that can be done when teachers overtly reduce their expectations and thereby set arbitrarily low ceilings on children's development." (Weller and Craft, op.cit.) Feuerstein believes the teaching involves "a radical shift from the static to a dynamic approach in which the test situation was transferred into a learning experience for the child." (Feuerstein, 1979). "This approach is concerned with changing the course of intellectual development and with 'thinking' as the key to

that change." (Weller and Craft, op.cit.) They comment in passing that the major aim of an improvement in thinking also brings about an improvement in feeling. I regard this aspect as crucial; they regard it as a spin-off. For example, Feuerstein identifies six sub-goals, as explained by Weller and Craft:

"The overarching goal of Instrumental Enrichment is to render individuals more susceptible to change through encounters with their environment. Feuerstein also describes six sub-goals. They are:

* the correction of deficient cognitive functions as a means to improving the social and intellectual competence of culturally deprived individuals.

* the promotion of an array of concepts, vocabulary and skills needed for high-level thinking and problem-solving activities.

* the creation of habits that make higher-level thinking part of an individual's active and spontaneous repertoire.

* the encouragement of a reflective style of problem-solving in which pupils take their time to gain insights and formulate organized and articulate responses.

* the promotion of an approach to learning in which pupils both enjoy the work for its own sake and recognise its wider practical value.

* the arousal of pupils from a passive and regurgitative state to one where they view themselves as active generators of new information.

...But success is equally tied to the style and classroom climate adopted by teachers." (Weller and Craft, op.cit.)

Pupils' responses to the questions of the evaluation of the pilot study include:

"It is brilliant for your brains."
"It helped me do my other lessons."
"It helped me to be more alert."
"It helps you not to be impulsive - before I used to rush into things."
"It helped me from being frightened of new things." (Weller and Craft, op.cit.)

The tone and content of these comments is parallel to that of the comments from my own children on many occasions.

Teaching approaches are taken as an active component of the success of the overall scheme. The elements of care, support and encouragement are emphasised throughout.

****

(iv) Summary

Let me try to summarise and synthesise the discussion so far. In doing so I shall consider the models I have used, and try to integrate the whole into a tentative theory of the grounding of values education - to answer the question of this chapter: 'What constitutes knowledge of values?'

I started from the root premise that people see the world, including themselves, in different ways. I went on to suggest that one particular way has become dominant in much modern western thought, and this way has coloured spin-off disciplines. This bias, I suggest, is representative of an imbalance of integration - first an integration of the person-in-the-world, and second of the working of the individual mind.

To make this view more explicit I will now integrate the hypotheses I have put forward so far. The model for the derivation of knowledge indicates that knowledge is grounded in forms of thought which are grounded in the workings of the brain:



I then went on to suggest that different types of thinking would generate different types of knowledge:



The forms of knowledge thus generated, I proposed, could be identified according to the knower's view of his knowledge. Explicit knowledge may be characterised as 'propositional', which, depending on one's epistemology, could then be further extended or sub-divided into 'know-that' or 'know-how'. Tacit knowledge could be extended to become 'personal knowledge', not only in the sense of knowledge + a direct object as in 'I know John', but also in an extended sense of 'I know'. The model becomes:



I have also indicated that the two columns are symptomatic of the underlying epistemology of the knower; that propositional knowledge is a property of the person who approaches the task of knowing in which knowledge is the epistemic centre, external to the individual knower. Personal knowledge is a property of the knower who approaches the task of knowing in which she is the epistemological centre, and knowledge is her personal creation.



In my discussion about the nature of values education, I have indicated the dominance of the 'knower as subject/knowledge as object' syndrome. I have indicated that I feel this approach is unwise in ignoring the vast potential of forms generated by a subject-centred epistemology. I have also indicated that an object-centred approach focuses on a view of the individual as part of a certain kind of society, and that this view perpetuates the assumption of the existence of reified knowledge.

These views, I have suggested, form the basis of the dominant paradigm of values education today.

I will now refer to the need for integration that I have specified above. I see this fragmented approach as leading to (1) a separation of theory and practice: in values education the dominant paradigm is of a form of life to be attained, and educational practice is centred on teaching learners to attain it; (2) a view of persons as objects: in values education the dominant paradigm is a view of a person living-in-the-world, in which knowledge of the world is to be accessed, rather than created; (3) a view of personality as fragmented: the mind is seen as a separate entity to the body. There is little relationship between the 'cogito' and the 'sum'; forms of thinking and forms of being are seen as separate realms of discourse.

My response to my dissatisfaction with current dominant assumptions of the literature has been to suggest a break with enquiry via the social sciences, and to adopt a reconstructive strategy. I have proposed that it is necessary to view the person as an integrated organism living in a self-perpetutating, self-transforming state of being (see also Chapter 6).

So I will now formalise my tentative theory of what constitutes knowledge of values.

5 A THEORY OF THE CONSTITUTION OF KNOWLEDGE OF VALUES

In the discussion so far I have suggested that the concept of mind is seen often from a separatist view: 'mind' is the piece of a human that is the converse to 'body'. Researchers working from an alternative 'appositional' ground have suggested that the concept of mind itself needs investigating (e.g. Freud, 1950; Jung, 1953; Maslow, 1968; Chomsky, 1985). These researchers have suggested that the concept should not be approached as a rigidified structure, but should be credited with notions of fluidity and metamorphosis. Certain researchers (e.g. Chomsky, 1982; Fodor, 1977) have suggested a view of the concept of mind as that of a 'power house', containing a generative component that is capable of producing an infinite number of creative acts.

I will adopt this view and refer again to the introduction of the concept of levels of mind. By introducing this concept, I said above, it would be possible to transform seemingly separate activities of different forms of thought into an integrated whole, and thereby affect a parallel integration of seemingly disparate approaches to a view of the workings of the mind. Instead of dwelling with a model of two separate columns, I proposed a unit consisting of two interrelated halves:



Through this integration, I will suggest, the notion of the 'concept of mind' may be transformed into the notion of the 'concept of self'. I refer again to Polanyi's idea of irreducible structure: in my formulation, 'selfhood' transcends 'mindhood'; a view of self incorporates ideas of mentalism, for, in my view, the 'self' is grounded in the mind, but is more than the mind (by 'mind' I mean the notional products of the workings of the brain).

The first part of the question 'What constitutes knowledge of values?' may be approached via the question 'What is knowledge?' I have tried to show my understanding of the idea of knowledge: that it is not an external object of enquiry to be accessed by the individual enquirer, but is a creation of the knower that is externalised in the knower's form of life. My understanding of the nature of values, that they may be 'known', is that the creation of values is a form of knowledge that also has a manifestation in an individual's form of life. Values formation, I believe, is associated with competence; values expression is part of performance. By adopting this stand I may say that the individual's form of life may be seen as a realisation of her values.

From this formulation, I need now to go on to say how my practice (form of life) is a manifestation of my values, so that, when I come to substantiate my claim to knowledge (Chapter 8), I may point to how I struggled to adopt the particular form of life that I lead. I need to show how I lived a form of life that was, in fact, a denial of my values, and how I strove, through my reflection-in-action, to overcome that denial, and adopt a form of life that was a realisation of my

values. In other words, I may say that I did (action) in accordance with what I thought (values-as-knowledge). It is the nature of my doing (my practice) that enables me to formulate a theory of the basis of that doing.

So, as part of my theory, I need to consider two further aspects: (1) a summarising commentary on my own 'values into practice', to see how I attempted to integrate two hitherto separate realms of discourse, and (2) to investigate the notion expressed above that 'selfhood' is, as I shall hope to demonstrate, the essence of the steady state (Chapter 6) of our existence.

(i) VALUES INTO PRACTICE

This is a brief recapitulation and synthesis of what I have explicated in detail in Chapters 1-4 of this text. I present this summary here to indicate how my views pre-1984 were left-hemisphere dominated, and how I came gradually to recognise the importance of my own 'appositional' faculties to see (a) myself as an autonomous person; (b) my children as autonomous persons; and (c) the notion of 'person' as a concept that is grounded in a view of a synergic world.

In the last part of this chapter I shall explore the implications of my view of the 'synergic individual', and in Chapter 7 go on to suggest that an agreement to a synergic form of being by self-aware individuals is perhaps the way forward for social evolution.

****

The first tape recording of my study was made on 21.7.81. This was a conversation with RC, the adviser for personal, social and moral education, and in it I seemed to demonstrate an intuitive grasp of what I have presented above, that personal and social education was primarily about the education of the individual which then had secondary repercussions in society. I say that I see the basis of the work as spiritual development ...

RC ... it is sad that in some of the training we were on (in Bath), at least one of the church girls found it difficult to relate beliefs to what she was doing in the developmental work.

JM I see no conflict. ... I see the two areas dovetailing neatly ...

RC ... If a parent asks you, "What is this group developmental work?", what would you say it was all about?

JM We teach the child to be aware of himself, ... to be aware of himself in society, to care for others, we try to teach him ways in which he can be more self-reliant, be more sensitive to the needs of others, to like himself ....

The adviser then made a comment which in subsequent years had encapsulated for me the dilemma of which perspective to adopt in values education. In the conversation, I am speaking about the staff's tentative approach to Button work:

JM ... our staff see its possibly attacking their individuality. I think they are hostile in some cases because they are afraid it might strip them naked of all their defences.

RC Here again we may see part of the curious relationship we have in modern western society. The individual is over against society, keeps himself to himself, and, by doing that, makes himself more himself. In fact, the reverse will be true: the more we get out of people that they

learn to cope in the modern world, the more individual and characteristic we become."

I believe RC is here referring to the alienation of the individual that is recounted in the works of, for example, Marx, Engels, Sartre, Kafka, when the individual is forced into social roles which are incompatible with his personal role; and that RC is suggesting that if the educational system helps people to become more at ease in a given society, the more they will be able to realise their own individuality. These sentiments are expressed more intensely by Feyerabend (1976), who resists the idea of individuals being oppressed by the reified, non-rational rules of a restrictive society. "A society that is based on a set of well-defined and restrictive rules so that being a man becomes synonymous with obeying these rules, forces the dissenter into a no-man's land of no rules at all, and thus robs him of his reason and his humanity. It is the paradox of modern irrationalism that its proponents silently identify reationalism with order and inarticulate speech and thus see themselves forced to promote stammering and absurdity. ... Remove the principles, admit the possibility of many different forms of life, and such phenomena will disappear like a bad dream." (Feyerabend, 1970).

My dilemma in personal and social education was always a question of perspective: whether to embrace the principles of social education and its techniques (group work, role play, and so on) with a view to helping the individual realise his personal potential through this medium; or whether to concentrate on personal education and its techniques

(personal enquiry, expressive arts, and so on) with a view to helping the individual relate more appropriately to others in society. I had thought about the problem sufficiently to be able to rationalise and articulate it. In a 1984 progress report I wrote:

"The Button work I am doing seems to concentrate on the group at the expense of the individual; yet I still feel all the children are making progress as individuals. On the other hand, I feel I ought to pay more attention to them on an individual basis to help them get on with each other."

It is only in recent work (1986 onwards), through my reading of the work of Bernstein (1983), Gadamer (1975), and Habermas (1975, 1970), that I have been able to resolve the two apparently conflicting perspectives into a synthesised view of the nature of universal pragmatics and communicative competence (Habermas, 1979).

I shall dwell on these issues further in Chapters 6 and 7 of this text. Here, let me refer back to the indications I made in Chapters 3 and 4, that I take the view that all individuals are equal; that all individuals have the same inalienable right to develop as individuals. Persons in society, however, are essentially ambiguous, in that they are individuals for themselves and also individuals for each other. The resolution of these two perspectives, I believe, lies in the ability of each and every individual person to recognise other people as individual persons. The way to achieve this resolution may be through an agreement to reach mutual understanding. Rorty, in 'Philosophy and the mirror of

nature' (1979), takes the same line in hypothesising how disagreement may be avoided through the conscious use of strategies designed to reach a common understanding. The theme is abundant in the work of Habermas (e.g. 1972). The principal strategy, suggests Rorty, is to reach a state of 'commensurability'. "By 'commensurable' I mean able to be brought under a set of rules which will tell us how rational agreement can be reached and what would settle the issue on every point where statements seem to conflict. These rules tell us how to construct an ideal situation, in which all residual agreements will be seen to be 'non cognitive' or merely verbal, or else merely temporary - capable of being resolved by doing something further. What matters is that there should be agreement about what would have to be done if a RESOLUTION were to be achieved." (Rorty, 1979).

This base is a significant shift from my previous view that, although I held as a fundamental belief the fact that all people were individuals and all individuals were equal, my approach to those individuals was that of researcher and researched, teacher to taught, reflecting the positivist view at the root of my practice that I still knew what was best for my children. This view is reflected in the crucial statement I made in my 1985 BERA paper (see Chapter 3 of this text) that "Until now I was teaching my children to be a certain kind of person, the kind of person I wanted them to be. Now I see them as the kind of person they are." I can say today that my practice was dominated by this positivist approach and was made explicit in two ways. The first way was in the propositional form of know-that, and characterised by statements such as "(I know that) my children are hostile. (I know that) they should be

sensitive to one another. (I know that) they do not like learning. (I know that) they should like learning."

In essence, my propositions were taking the form of statements of fact and statements of value as separate realms of discourse. Similarly, the second way, my values took the form of propositions in an instrumental sense: "Personal and social education is here to show my pupils the benefits to be gained by adopting these philosophies and procedures. I am here, as a teacher, to help them, and as an in-service provider to help the staff see these obvious truths."

The know-how aspects of my practice took a similar line of: "Personal and social education is here to show my pupils how to get on with each other. I am here to help them to develop appropriate personal and social skills to facilitate their socialisation."

By 1985 (as I have outlined briefly in Chapter 3) I had changed my views considerably, both in regard to the individuality of the children and of myself. I began to see personal and social education as complementary. I saw the way to personal education as through an individual's personal enquiry, and the way to social education as through individuals' joint enquiry. It is important to stress here the difference in view. I no longer viewed 'a group' as an entity but as a collection of individuals, each exercising his or her own personal freedom. The group for me was no longer the unit that I was teaching. What I saw now was the unity of individuals functioning collectively; I could help individuals use the resources of other individuals to asist their personal growth; the

children could learn about themselves from each other. In this way, each person was growing in his own personal knowledge, explaining his own competence through the performance aspects of his conscious actions with other individuals. Personal structures and concepts of self could metamorphose into, and juxtapose onto structures and concepts of 'self-and-others', through the process of dialectical transformations.

I have pointed out that my rôle as teacher underwent a similar metamorphosis. Because I had undertaken my own personal enquiry I had grown in strength as an individual. The strengthening of my 'I' enabled me to enter into a relationship with other 'I's, not from a position of dominance but from a position of respect. I came to see that the 'I and Thou' relationship in turn helped my children to develop their own living 'I's. I was able to explore my own competence, to become aware of my own personal knowledge as an organic notion, to raise that knowledge to consciousness to enable me to enter into an I and Thou relationship with my pupils and colleagues. In taking this stand of commitment, my statements of values, as part of the personal knowledge of my competence, became reflected in my statements of fact, as part of the realisation of my personal knowledge in my performance.

Now, before going on to the crucial question of the process of 'coming to know', it is necessary to investigate the question in which my enquiry is grounded: what it means 'to be a person'.

(ii) WHAT IT MEANS TO BE A PERSON

There are many different approaches to this question in the literature (Radford and Kirby, 1975). For the purposes of this text, I will follow the overall organisation of this chapter in its discussion of approaches to a knowledge about knowledge, and of approaches to a knowledge about values; suggesting that there are three broad approaches to these issues which reflect (a) the investigator's view to thinking about the object of his enquiry and (b) his interpretations about the nature of that object.

I will suggest, then, that the answers to the questions implied by 'what it means to be a person' may be couched in the language of (i) formal-structuralist interpretations, (ii) cognitive-developmental interpretations, and (iii) dialectical interpretations.

In a formal-structuralist approach, an answer to the question will include the assumptions of the investigator that he already has clearly formulated ideas about his approach to knowledge, and will probably interpret 'being a person' as 'being a certain type of person' (Pring, 1984). The type of person will be the stereotype envisioned as the product of empiric investigation; the approach and its object of investigation are controlled by the methodologies of an 'objectivist' approach which is grounded in a normative-analytic epistemology.

The cognitive-developmentalist's answers, too, will include his assumptions that he has clearly formulated ideas about his approach to knowledge, and he will interpret 'being a person' as 'being an individual whose development is shaped by the society in which he is'. The person envisioned here is studied in his role-bound context in relationship with the mores of a given society. His development is plotted along currently sociological dimensions. It is seen as a linear progression which is determined by biological factors interacting with the environment (Levinson, 1978) and which follows a relatively stable trajectory.

The dialectician's answers rest on his acknowledgment that he has no final answers, and, as such, his interpretations of 'being a person' will allow him to suggest frameworks and indications, but prevent him from making definitive propositions about characterisations. His approach to the structure of knowledge entails an acknowledgement that change, disequilibrium and contradiction are important and necessary aspects of life which free that life from the stultification of stasis and encourage it to develop. This view is reflected in his interpretation of what it means to be a person, along two dimensions. First, he will acknowlege that, as a living investigator, he himself is subject to change and therefore his interpretations are temporary. Second, his view of 'personhood' is that it, too, is subject to change, and any definitions that are arrived at must also be temporary and open to re-interpretation.

This characterisation in terms of current trends may be spelt out as:

(1) a formal-structuralist approach sees personhood as the state of an accumulation of the criteria that go towards making a 'certain type of person'. This approach closely parallels the mental structures of the investigator working in a formal-analytic mode who writes in propositional terms. The person under investigation is seen as a technocrat (Samples, 1978), and his RAISON D'ETRE is seen as functional and instrumental. The view of a person here is grounded in the investigator's mental structures.

(2) a congitive-developmentalist approach sees personhood as an expression of the individual life form in its role-bound relationship with the institutions of society. This approach closely parallels the mental structures of the investigator working in a sociological mode. He sees persons as parts of society, as contributing to the formation of a given society in its current state of development. The person under review is seen as contributing to the maintenance of that given society, its mores and its culture. The view of a person here is still grounded in the mental structures of the investigator who sees the person as external to the society in which the person lives; and the investigator sees the person and the society as external to himself. They are objects of a study of which he is the subject and the person is the object.

(3) a dialectical approach sees personhood in terms of temporary notions. Dialectical investigators accept that their own mental structures are constantly in process of transformation, yet the temporarity and transitions of the transformational process itself provides a stable framework of reference (Chapter 6). The person thus is not a feature of the external world 'out there' but is the person-investigator herself. The 'criteria' of dialectical thinking (Basseches [1984] speaks in terms of 'schemata' that characterise dialectical thinking) involve the ability of the individual to see relationships along a multitude of dimensions. He sees himself as a constituent member of a society in its historical, political, economic and cultural senses; he lives in a transactional mode (Riegel, 1968) in which there is a reciprocal influencing and shaping of the individual and of other individuals who make up the society. In this way, the one-dimensional man (Marcuse, 1964) of the approaches summarised at (1) and (2) are incorporated in the multi-dimensionality of the (3) dialectical person.

Similarly, dialectical approaches to the structure of knowledge incorporate those approaches summarised at (1) and (2). Broughton (1987) says that the shift to dialectical from formal thinking means a shift of centres rather than a restructuring; mental operations transform their relationships, like the coloured bits of plastic in a kaleidoscope when it is turned, rather than undergo radical restructuring themselves. What causes this 'shift of centre', he says, is the conscious critical reflection of the investigator, and the reflexive process itself generates the turbulence necessary to occasion the shift. The view of the person here is grounded within himself.

I wish now to apply these thoughts to my chosen area of personal and social education. I will argue that the functionalist view of (1) is a basic assumption of those who believe that education is to do with schooling. In this view, the aim of schools and their curricula is to turn out the 'certain kind of person' who will perpetuate the system (Chapter 1 of this text). The aim of values education (personal and social education) here is to develop that type. The ontology is adaptation of the self to the system; the epistemology is propositional.

I will argue that the sociological view of (2) is a basic assumption of those who believe that education is to do with the socialisation of the individual. In this view which incorporates the functionalism of (1), what we aim for and end up with are descriptions of the behavioural mores of a given society. A study that assumes that there is a 'certain kind of person' (1) who belongs to a 'certain kind of society' (2) aims to investigate the performance of the individual, and judges how closely it approximates to the mores of the society. The development of the person is viewed as an acquisition and an accumulation of acceptable behaviours, and the acquisition of skills required to execute those behaviours is seen as an accumulation of skills and habits. This is the approach widely adopted in structuralist/behavioural psychology and in cognitive-developmental approaches, notably in the work of Piaget and Kohlberg. Their work (and that of others), and the impact of their views on the acquisition of skills and habits that go to form the certain kind of person/certain kind of society will be discussed fully in Chapter 6.

It is my view that such investigations are grounded in the E-approaches of observation and description. These are phenomenological/sociological in orientation, for they are concerned with the events and institutions of which the individual is a part, as perceived by the investigator. To my mind, the cognitive-developmentalist's approach of (2) is more mature (see below) than that of the structural-behaviourist's of (1), in that relational aspects are emphasised. The individual is not seen in an idealised Skinnerian sense as an entity operating in a role-free vacuum, but is seen as a social being. As such, his physical actions and mental structures are subject to the purposeful intentions of his dealings with other people.

I consciously use the word 'mature', for it is my intention to demonstrate that traditions of thought develop towards maturity, in the same way that my own thought processes have developed, and are still developing, to a developing maturity. Maturity, for me, is characterised by an openness to change, an active seeking-out of moments of disequilibrium, and the ability to synthesise conflict, resulting in a situation of equilibrium. I shall explore these notions in detail in Chapter 6. Kuhn (1962) says that paradigm shifts are caused by a sense of crisis in the old, dominant paradigm which results in the emergence of a new one, yet this new one incorporates the old. This, for me, is the way to the ever-changing scenarios of maturity. Epistemological traditions also go through this process, and the historicity involved in the project of tracing epistemological development is part of the dialectical tradition.

I intend to argue that the E-approaches of (1) and (2) are not powerful enough to deal with the notion of 'person as self; self as an individual'. This notion contains the following assumptions: it is an extension of an epistemology that rests on the idea of personal knowledge (knowing + a direct object); further, it metamorphoses the procedural quality of that epistemology into the substance of its life, where the desire to know becomes the quest, and the quest becomes the desire to know. The dialectical tension between epistemology and its object (knowing + direct object) integrates the search by the self for the self, where self becomes both the knower and the known, researcher and researched. This approach is focused on the person as self, and subsumes within itself the notion of the person in society. In this way it resolves the ambiguity of persons in society, in that it first enables the individual to explain to himself and for himself the nature of his own personhood, and second enables him to adapt aspects of that personhood to the expectations of others (see also Chapter 7). The focus has now shifted from a description of the expectations of a given society (E-approaches) to an explanation for the workings of the mind of a particular individual (I-approaches). It then becomes a study of mind; and, specifically, the study of the mind/self by the living mind/self. This now becomes a matter of competence. The methodologies of the epistemology of a cognitive-structuralist approach to the social sciences is inadequate to deal with this, and I submit that it is necessary to adopt the reconstructive sciences that attempt to reconstruct in an explicit manner what is already part of the implicit personal knowledge of the person (McCarthy, 1979).

I shall now attempt to relate these ideas more fully to the literature and to my practice.

(a) An instrumentalist's view of personhood

Pring (1984) gives an excellent account of this first approach when applied to the institutions of schooling. "Teachers exercise control over children. Being IN control, they DO things to them and change them in ways they, the teachers, want. Teachers, therefore, make assumptions about the appropriate ends of children's development and also about the morally acceptable means of achieving those ends. But how teachers treat children and what they judge to be appropriate goals of their development depend upon what sort of 'things' they see young people to be. How you treat people depends upon your concept of 'person'. It is necessary, therefore, to sort out first what it means to be a person and then what the connections are between the 'development of persons' and educating them."

Pring is here talking about schools and schooling, but the same assumptions are apparent in all walks of institutionalised life, from family and friends to professional life. In all areas of Western society we are expected to conform to other people's standards and expectations (Marcuse, 1964).

Traditionally, there is a view that education will somehow bring about personhood. Such a statement immediately begs questions about the concepts 'education' and 'personhood', and the questions remain largely unanswered precisely because there is little current unity in attempting to give a valid theory of what the terms means in practice. Langford (1973) says that "to become educated is to learn to be a person". Langford's view of 'to become educated' is in a sense of 'to accumulate knowledge'. In this view, of course, he is not alone. He has the whole empiricist tradition behind him, in which the 'knowing that' of propositional knowledge is seen as the ultimate cognitive ability (see, for example, Putnam's [1978] stand that ethics is concerned with practical knowledge). Langford seems also to be interpreting the notion of 'to be educated' as part of the social sciences. If being educated leads to personhood, and education is seen as a social commodity, then personhood will probably also be seen in the same light. A view of persons, in this view, follows the circular, self-perpetuating route of: persons in society conform to the expectations of that society, which leads them to become the persons of the society who in turn impose the expectations.

The 'certain kind of person' at (1), then, is a product of the mind of the external commentator who is operating in a normative-analytic mode. His own view of society is restrictive, in that it operates according to the idealised criteria of himself, the commentator, and the view of persons is reductionist, in that individual spontaneity and creativity are disallowed. Such a society, peopled by such persons, is grounded in the imagination of its creator, and is essentially idealised and

therefore fictitious. It is to be found, for example, in the scenarios of 'Brave New World'. In this work, I feel that Huxley was not only parodying a de-humanised society, but also parodying the workings of the mind of the artist who really believes that such events may come to pass. He was portraying the potential product of a certain way of thinking. This way of thinking falls into the trap of Kierkegaard's 'unity of imagination', in which thought is divorced from action, and human potential, like a rogue animal, is no longer bound to its own human subjects. The mind of the creator is the epistemic centre. His view of pesons produces the 'certain kind of person'. It is curious how, and why, generations of empirically-oriented scientists have failed to see this simple fact: that what they are observing in their 'objectively' conducted experiments are not the substantial corroborations of hypotheses, but the externalisations of their own cognitive processes; that is, a form of thought that suggests to them that the world can be neatly classified and predicted. The 'knowing that' of the formal thinker entraps him into the closedness of his own thought processes, and the reductive persons who are the products of those processes mirror the reductionism of the processes themselves.

(b) A sociological perspective of personhood.

As has been noted earlier, current values education seems to be overwhelmingly geared towards a view of persons as the product of their society. In the early twentieth centruty, Dewey built his educational philosophy on the notion of just societies, in which the individual affected society, and society affected the individual. So it was in the public interest to turn out a moral, well-balanced citizenry. Dewey's influence was far-reaching, and is clear in the work of many theorists, including, for example, Kohlberg (1972), Rawls (1971), Raths et al (1978).

Empiric approaches to educational research strongly support the notion of persons as products of a given society; as do interpretive traditions, and some action research approaches. They support the notion by (1) approaching their enquiry via propositional knowledge; (2) assuming the intellectual dependence of individuals. By (1) I mean that empiric traditions test a given hypothesis against the actions of subjects. The methods of the behavioural psychologists (for example, Skinner, 1953) assume clear correlations between the predictions of their hypotheses and the behavioural outcomes of their experiments on subjects. Most standardised tests and schedules operate on this principle (which leads me to question the price put on individuality by the 1987 National Curriculum proposals with their schedules of standardised, commonly applied test procedures). Popper (in Lakatos and Musgrave, 1970) comments that "we approach everything in the light of a

preconceived theory", and refers to his own 'The logic of scientific discovery' that: "A scientist engaged in a piece of research, say in physics, can attack his problem straight away. He can go at once to the heart of the matter: that is, to the heart of the organized structure. For a structure of scientific doctrines is already in exsitence; and with it, a generally accepted problem-situation."

This certainty in 'knowledge that' is reflected in the interpretive approaches of, for example, Parlett and Hamilton (1972). The approaches of the truly empiric traditions were in an etic sense (Pike, 1967); that is, the scrutiny by an observer of his subject without access to or interference from the subject. The approaches of the interpretive traditions were in an emic sense; that is, the observation and interpretation of a social or pedagogic setting in collaboration with the subject. In this view, actors' and observers' opinions did not necessarily coincide, and the mismatch offered rich grounds for the attempt to resolve the situation. The epistemological standpoints in both approaches are the same, in that they take the expertise of the observer as unquestionable. This approach is seen also in the action research models of Kemmis and McTaggart (1982), Elliott (1981) and Ebbutt (1983). These models tend to be static, disallowing spontaneity or creativity on the part of the persons who are following the laid-down guidelines. They fall into the empiric habit of positing hypotheses, mapping the territory, and requiring actors to follow their lines (see also my 1988 for a fuller critique). Schon (1983) pleads for an alternative form of theory. "When someone reflects-in-action, he becomes a researcher in the practice context. He is not dependent on

the categories of established theory and technique, but constructs a new theory of the unique case" (cited in Whitehead, 1987). The uniqueness of each and every individual, however, is not within the focus of an empiric approach with its assumptions of reified knowledge.

In (2) I stated that empiric traditions cultivated the intellectual dependence of individuals. Harre (in Reason and Rowan, 1981) suggests: "If one adopts as a general theory of action, that people are agents acting intentionally in accordance with socially grounded rules and conventions to a realized project, the entities in need of empirical investigation are clearly defined." Feyerabend (in Lakatos and Musgrave, 1970) sees the reification of propositional theories as stultifying. The way forward, for him, is in the freedom of the individual to question and criticise: "Progress has always been achieved by probing well-entrenched and well-grounded forms of life with unpopular and unfounded values. This is how man gradually freed himself from fear and from the tyranny of unexamined systems. Our question therefore is: what values shall we choose to probe the sciences of today?" Elliott (1983) cites the popular, but misleading, "proposition that 'objective' inquiry is the study of what exists externally to all minds". He goes on to reject the dominance of the empiric approaches in favour of approaches of the social sciences that take one-to-one relationships between persons as their axis of gravity, such relationships finding their expression in practical discourse (Habermas, 1979): "A reconstructed interpretative paradigm shows how a MORAL SCIENCE of social procedures is possible" (his italics; Elliott, 1983).

The two aspects of propositional theories and intellectual dependence foster a view of individuals as persons-in-society. This approach then aims to give descriptions of their form of life as it is shaped and determined by society. The theories about the persons and their relationships that emerge tend to be descriptive of events in a prescribed form (for example, McCauley and McCauley, 1977; Masden and Masden, 1974); or descriptive of events in a phenomenological form (for example, Rutter et al, 1979; Hamblin, 1978). Descriptions of societies and their members are descriptions of performance, at an E-level. Theories of personhood that aim for these performance levels will aim to perpetutate the theory by perpetuating a normative view of persons; i.e. of a certain given type of person.

My practice rested squarely on this basis until about 1984. My first recorded indication of a change of view was in my 1985 BERA paper when I wrote: "Until 1984 I had operated in terms of 'How do I use my class practice to bring about a state of personal development?' and in my mind I had unclear notions of a personally developed child. Now I changed my conceptualisation to 'How can I help a child find and develop his own autonomy and become a fully-functioning person in his own right?' A massive implication here is that I determined to explore what it means to 'be a person' rather than 'be the sort of person I wish you to be'."

Until then, my view of personhood had been dictated largely by the literature. I had concentrated on producing a certain kind of person, and this focus had been fostered by the lack of clarity in policy statement documents as to a characterisation in practice of what 'being a person' meant (see Chapter 3 of this text). I had undertaken my enquiry within the framework of personal development as an outcome of social enquiry. If I had then been able to analyse and articulate this concept, I would have seen immediately that the questions I was asking and the answers I was expecting did not, and could not, match.

The mismatch in questions and answers is also a by-product of empiric approaches which rest on propositional logic, in that propositions are not immediately concerned with questions and answers and therefore do not question any variance or inconsistency in their form. Collingwood (1939) also travelled the path of rejecting 'objectivist' interpretations of truth: "I began by observing that you cannot find out what a man means by simply studying his spoken or written statements ... In order to find out his meaning you must also know what the question was (a question in his own mind, and presumed by him to be in yours) to which the thing he has said or written was meant as an answer." Collingwood says that the same principle may be applied to the idea of truth. The truth of a proposition must be relative to the question it answers. "Here I parted company with what I called propositional logic, and its offspring, the generally recognized theories of truth." For him, there are no 'true' answers - only 'right' answers: "By 'right' I do not mean 'true'. The 'right' answer to a question is the answer which enables us to get ahead with the process of

questioning and answering." (Collingwood, op.cit. See also Chapter 3 of this text).

As I reflected on my practice, I came to be aware of the mismatch. My questions to do with social development were being answered by the answers of social development as expressed through the methods of the social sciences. Thus I could ask myself in accordance with Plato's notion of thinking as 'a dialogue of the soul with itself' questions of the sort: "Are my children progressing in the directions I want them to go? Are they becoming more social towards each other?" These questions, to follow Collingwood's exposition, were the answers to my mental propositions, and spoken and written statements (for example, AT4), that I knew the end state that my children should be working towards. My epistemology was one of propositions, and the closed questions and answers displayed my certainty of a given truth that I intended to prove.

I have already commented on the fact that the form of my questions changed over the years, from the normative-analytic notions of 'when?', 'where?', 'who?', 'which?', 'what?' to the hermeneutic heuristics of 'how?' and 'why?'. When the enquiry shifts its focus, as did Collingwood's, to questions characterised by 'how?' and 'why?', the answers anticipated are in the form of explanations rather than propositions. When these questions are asked in social situations, the answers have the focus on the science of the singular (Simons, 1980). If they do not, there is no 'right' answer, in Collingwood's sense, that will enable the enquiry to proceed.

Consider, for example, the questions: 'Why do football hooligans behave as they do?' or 'Why do the children in my class truant so much?' A glib answer might produce a theory of a 'certain kind of person': the 'kind of person' who misbehaves at football matches or truants. Such a theory will at best describe what people of those inclinations do at a performance level. Such answers are not the 'right' answers to the questions; more importantly, the questions were inappropriate in the first place.

In order to move the enquiry forward, it is necessary to ask the 'right' questions. 'Why did Joe behave as he did at the football match? Why does Susie truant?' Only Joe and Susie will be able to tell us the truth, and according to Collingwood, we cannot rely on their immediately spoken or written words as the truth. In order to arrive at the 'right' answer that will move the enquiry forward (in the sense of social action: Schutz, 1972; Habermas, 1979), that Joe and Susie will think again, it is now necessary to engage in a dialogue that will persuade Joe and Susie to do some thinking. In this view, the enquiry shifts its focus to an I-dimension, in which the self accounts for its own self. Perhaps Iris Murdoch (1970) was thinking of the minimal steps of a dialogue of question and answer when she suggested that Jesus's exhortation of "Be ye therefore perfect" should in fact be "Be ye therefore slightly improved".

The questions of my practice that dwell with issues of sociology and socialising were answered by propositions in that vein. The question 'Have my children improved?' was answered by 'Yes, I know that my children have improved.' When I wanted to know why or how they had improved, or the meaning (in Collingwood's sense, the appropriateness of the context-specific answer) of 'improvement', in order to demonstrate publicly that improvement in practice, the questions and answers of formal propositions were inadequate. For that, I had to develop another set of questions altogether, and consequently another questioning strategy. In order to answer the propositions of the recommendations that a child should 'realise his full potential' or 'develop autonomy', I had to formulate questions that would produce answers to carry the enquiry forward; and I had to develop strategies that would leave questions and answers open-ended. The only answers available were of the type 'Because I want to' in response to my question of 'Why are you doing that?' Here I was looking for personal explanations, trying to help my children find out for themselves through their own action enquiry, and my intentional strategy took the form of a dialogue of open-ended question and answer. I maintain that it was in this way that my study began to be educational, in the sense identified in Chapter 3 of this text, for I was encouraging the development of my children's rationality, as well as my own. The process of question and answer encouraged the process of the development of rationality. The identified change in my practice which indicated a movement towards issues of education and away from issues of socialisation may be seen in the types of questions I asked and the types of answers I

anticipated. My search for answers about personal development was guided by questions about personal development, not about socialisation.

Parallel to this change was my revised view about the nature of persons. My early work focused on producing the 'certain kind of person' (Chapter 1 of this text). My more recent work has focused on assisting an individual self to know its own self, in response to the dialectic of question and answer that is a characteristic of the dialogues of my enquiry. The dialogues take the form of JM to other people (see the tapes in Appendix 1), and JM with JM (First Version and this text).

Whitehead (1989), drawing on the work of Ilyenkov (1977), Marcuse (1964), and Polanyi (1958), among others, shows how his own understanding developed of the dialectic of a dialogical form. He cites Wittgenstein's insight that "'I' is not the name of a person, nor 'here' of a place, and 'this' is not a name. But they are connected with names. Names are explained by means of them. It is also true that it is characteristic of physics not to use these words." Whitehead goes on to say: "Now 'I', 'this' and 'here' are contained within questions of the form, 'How do I improve this process of education here?' ... By integrating [the contradiction of the living 'I'] in the presentations of our claims to know our educational practice we can construct descriptions and explanations for the educational development of individuals. Rather than conceive educational theory as a set of propositional relations from which we generate such descriptions and explanations, I am suggesting we produce educational theory in the living form of dialogues which have their focus in the descriptions and

explanations which practitioners are producing for their own value-laden practice."

The application of the concepts expressed here to my practice will focus on the fact that it is my unique practice, and that it involves me crucially as a living, thinking part of that practice. What is vital is not only that I am a person, but that I am the person that I am. Selfhood is a charateristic of self, and may be entered in the lexicon as a distinctive feature. The distinctive features of an individual's selfhood, however, may be answered only by that individual's enquiry into self, both as the subject and object of the enquiry.

Thus, 'I know that' transforms through the stages of minimal steps: 'I know that: I know that' < 'I know how: I know that' < 'I know how: I know how' < 'I know + direct object: I know how' < 'I know + direct object: I know + direct object'. The dialogue is of the self with the self, through the negative dialectic of question and answer, in which previous stages (answers) are cancelled (S20 [zero]) to be replaced by new questions (S03) which will give rise to new states (S3) (this model is explained in Chapter 6 of this text). The structures of the self, in the shape of answers about that self's form of life, are in a constant state of re-structuring through the transformations of its own questions. For me, educational theory is the living form of practitioners' lives as they intentionally engage in this process of question and answer, in which the interplay moves the self's enquiry into the self forward through the dialectic of cancellation and renewal. These questions will be further explored in Chapter 6, when I

shall also introduce the idea of questions and answers as innate capacities of the living self, and suggest ways in which the self may 'come to know' those innate capacities as part of its integration as a living person.

(c) A DIALECTICIAN'S VIEW OF PERSONHOOD

In a dialectical approach to knowledge, there is no division between observer and what is observed, between knower and what is known. The basic schema of interrelatedness demolishes barriers. Thus, if I observe a tree, I see it for what it is: a changing object in a world of change. Yet I, too, am a changing object in a world of change, and as a thinking, living being, I must acknowledge my potential for my dependency on change to make me the thinking organism that I am. Basseches (1984) underscores this acknowledgement as a mark (Buber, 1958) of a dialectical thinker: "For [the formal thinker], whereas the tree we experience is taken as an active construction, the self we experience is reified and taken as given."

In the dialectician's relational world there can be no separate knower and known, subject and object, for the tension between the two causes them to enter into a relationship with each other which is a blend rather than a demarcation. It is like making omelettes. The eggs and milk are separate entities, yet, when they are mixed, they lose their separate form.

The relationships make a new form of existence. Riegel (in Pervin and Lewis, 1978) identifies four dimensions of interaction "between parts of the organism and between the organism and the environment". He argues that reciprocal action-transaction between persons (between organism and the environment) is dependent on the successful integration of the individual (interaction between parts of the organism); in that the individual recognises that she is a complex, changing being whose contradictory nature is an essential component of her own development. Riegel sees this ability to operate at several levels at the same time as a mark of ongoing human development. The person who achieves a state of living as a contradiction, who seeks out the crises of contradiction as watersheds of development, is at a higher level of devlopment than a person who shelters in the lee of the cliffs, who refuses to acknowledge her own variability. In his 1975 'Toward a dialectical theory of development', Riegel sees the determination of psychologists to stay with empiric traditions as a mark of immaturity. He says: "The one-dimensionality of the scientific community does not seem to be able to operate with the multi-dimensionality of the exceptional individual". (I will hope to show in coming pages that, in my view, persons who develop the capacity for dialectical thought are exceptional, in that they are the persons who are attempting to realise their full potential. I would like to see the day when all individuals will be persuaded of their inherent exceptionality, and their capacity to realise it.)

As I see it, a dialectical view of persons is part of the philosophical repertoire of two significant groups of thinkers in the contemporary literature. These two groups are the humanistic psychologists mentioned by Samples (see above) and the philosophers and psychologists exploring critical theories of psychological development. The first group is represented by the work of Maslow, Rogers and Buber; the second by that of Riegel and Broughton. At the basis of these separate schools of thought is the awareness of unrealised human potential. It is accepted that the potential of human development is probably unlimited, certainly far in excess of the realisation of that potential by many individuals, and that the way to uncover, or discover, this potential is through the interpretive approaches of dialectical hermeneutics. "Interpretive approaches of a psychodynamic nature must play a part, given the demonstrably dynamic origin of that undeveloped self that escapes consciousness. ... The unconscious must be understood interpretively wherever and however it is manifest - in terms of social and political history as well as life history. Hermeneutic approaches provide the hope for fostering insight into all that is human in us but is yet to develop, and they suggest collective and interpersonal practices of both liberating and coming to own that yet-to-be." (Broughton, 1987)

The style of the critical psychologists is crisp and incisive; their linguistic structures are rigorously methodological and direct, and the thought structures employed are clear. Maslow, Rogers and Buber tend to adopt more literary, artistic approaches to their field, and write in intuitional rather than critical terms. Such a tendency gives rise to comments such as that recorded by Radford (in Radford and Kirby, 1975)

that "the trouble with this sort of approach (humanistic psychology) is not that there may not be some truth in it. Indeed, the humanistic writers have done Psychology a great service by reasserting the importance of individual experience and human values. The trouble is that so far the approach has failed to lead on anywhere further. 'Hermeneutic' psychology books have sold extremely widely, largely one suspects because they are full of nice comforting uplifting thoughts. But the thoughts remain the personal intuition of the writers. They may be morally and ethically desirable, but are they psychologically sound? If not, they are only a version of what the great religions have offered, more systematically and convincingly."

Such dismissive comments, typical of the reductionist mentality of positivist thinkers, have been counteracted by the ideology critique of the Frankfurt school (Jay, 1973; Horkheimer and Adorno, 1975), and the work of Habermas (1975) and Gadamer (1975). In this approach, "the surface character of the research or theory in question is treated as a literary text, subjected to an active engaged, constructive interpretation. The surface forms are penetrated to reveal underlying relations and structures which are in turn related to aspects and constructs outside the surface text." (Harris, in Broughton, 1987)

Unity may thus be effected through the critical reflection of the dialectical tradition. The literary approaches of the humanistic psychologists may be subjected to the hermeneutic interpretations of the critical theorists. The underlying convictions of the unlimited potential of human development which is a philosophical axis for both

schools of thought are legitimated in the social scientific terms of critical analysis, and in the moral scientific terms of dialectical synthesis.

The dialectician's view of personhood, then, revolves around the notions of self as a living contradiction and life as a coming-to-be. My interpretations of these two aspects needs clarification, so that you and I will understand together, and, according to the criteria of Habermas (1979), will agree an understanding of a characterisation of the personhood of the dialectician.

Ilyenkov says (1977) that "contradiction as the concrete unity of mutually exclusive opposites is the real nucleus of dialectics, its central category" (cited in Whitehead, 1987). This notion may present a problem to someone who is unfamiliar or resistant to the idea of dialectics. It is natural and comfortable to a dialectical thinker. I say this in full acknowledgement that I have undergone an enormous mental struggle to transform my cognitive structures from formal to dialectical forms (First Version, 3-6). In encouraging new forms of thought to emerge, I explicitly acknowledged that I was struggling to bring to my surface consciousness my intuitive thoughts, and demonstrating the contradictions within myself. This contradiction continues to be expressed today in my acknowledgement that I know, yet I do not know. I do not know on a cognitive surface level; I know (in Polanyi's 1958 and Chomsky's 1965 sense) on an intuitive, deep level; and I want to know and be able to demonstrate that knowledge in an explicit form. This wanting to know is my driving force; it provides

the transformations of conation (Chapter 6) that enable me to turn my intuitions into cognitives, my latent values into observable practice.

Ilyenkov goes on to say: "No small difficulty arises as soon as matters touch on 'subjective dialectics' or dialectics as the logic of thinking. If any object is a living contradiction, what must the thought (statement about the object) be that expresses it? Can and should an objective contradiction find reflection in thought? And if so, in what form?" (Ilyenkov, op.cit.)

For dialectical thinkers there is no one 'unity of form' such as exists in other approaches to the organisation of the structure of knowledge. If there were, it would no longer be dialectical thinking. Basseches notes:

"Dialectical thinking is a living, continuously evolving, self-transforming intellectual tradition. To say that dialectical thinking is living and evolving is to say that it has contradictions. Actually, it probably has as many internal contradictions as there are thinkers who partake of the dialectical tradition. For each person who thinks 'dialectically' does so in the context of a somewhat different context of relationships, and it is that to which dialectical thinking BECOMES RELATED that makes it what it is. Dialectical thinking is CONSTITUTED over time by various dialectical thinkers, who are in turn constituted by their various other relationships. The nature of dialectical thinking thus evolves as dialectical thinkers interact with their

respective circumstances and with each other" (his italics, Basseches, 1984).

I will draw out only two of the many implications here. One is that dialectical thinking has its expression, in answer to Ilyenkov's problem, in the 'living, continuously evolving, self-transforming, intellectual tradition'. Thus there is no notional 'unity of form' unless that 'unity' takes its form in the agreement of the whole community of dialectical thinkers that they each think dialectically, and therefore independently and individually. The second implication is that, given this 'unity of agreement', the community critically uses this agreement to ground its constitutent individual members' interrelatedness in dialogue, the form of question and answer, as an expression in action of the 'living, continuously evolving, self-transforming intellectual tradition'. In this way, the action of the community of individuals is part of the thinking; it is the form become substance; and the analytic thought of real people becomes synthetic through the action of real people. Thus, the dialectician finds herself part of an interdependent community of reflexive independents.

The contradiction of my practice is seen, in this light, as a wish to realise in my practice the values that are at present being denied in my practice. The form of my practice has changed over time. From 1981-86 my practice was grounded in my classroom, in my relationships with my children, and in my school and other schools, in my relationships with colleagues. My practice involved me as a reflexive practitioner, both as a teacher and as an in-service supporter. The forum of my practice

extended in 1984 when I started producing texts. Since 1986, the production of texts itself has become that practice. My practice has evolved and developed over time. Its present form, that of producing texts, incorporates its historical form, that of working with other people in pedagogic settings. As a dialectician, I can say that my present developed practice draws on previous experience of practice, which I may now include as part of the analysis of a description of how I came to be where I am, and use this as part of the explanation for my present synthesis. Thus I can travel back, analyse my memories, and bring them together in the present focus in which my memories are constituent parts of my synthesised present.

When I was a teacher in class, some of my educational values were often denied in my practice. Those educational values were that I wanted my children to be caring, to be able to see the finer things in life, to be independent, thoughtful and alert. My practice showed that these values were being denied (Chapter 1 of this text). My practice aimed to reverse the situation, so that my educational values were realised.

In my practice as a colleague and in-service supporter, some of my educational values were often denied in my practice, in that other colleagues viewed the children in a negative light, and were hostile to the ideas of personal and social education, and towards the underlying assumptions of personal and social education of the need for warm, caring, democratic relationships. My recordings of my practice demonstrate that colleagues developed their rationality because of my encouragement and influence, which led to a gradual cancellation of the

unsatisfactory situation to make way for burgeoning development. Because of my critical intervention in their lives, I, too, developed (Chapters 1 and 3 of this text).

In my practice as a thinker, in which the production of texts is the externalised form of my thought, some of my educational values are constantly denied, in that I do not know, yet I want to know. This quest for knowledge, seen in an empirical light as being grounded in epistemology, is the substance of my practice, and shifts its ground to ontology. The dialectical frameworks of my forms of thought and action enable me to see the interrelationships and shift the focus in order to accommodate those relationships. My need to know is both epistemology and ontology. The contradictions inherent in my not knowing and my need to know indicates my status as a dialectician, and my public acknowledgement of that contradiction indicates my development towards a dialectical form of life.

In summary, than, I can suggest that a dialectician's view of personhood is not expressed in terms of other people. The synthesis of human experience requires him to look for the relationships that bring about that synthesis. We are changing individuals in a world of changing individuals. Even before he starts to look for relationships between other people (as if he were standing on the outside looking in) the dialectician has to enter into relationship himself with others. In doing so, he is forced to encounter himself (Maslow's 'self-actualisation) as a structural prerequisite of his relationship with

others (Buber's 'I and Thou'). Maslow says (1962): "Change becomes much less an acquisition of habits and associations, one by one, and much more a total change of the total person, i.e. a new person rather than the same person with some habits added like new external possessions." Habermas says (1979): "In a process of enlightenment there can only be participants." Buber says (1965): "Man is crystallized potentiality of existence. ... The uniqueness of man is to be found in the meeting of I and Thou. ... The I exists only through the relation to the Thou." As I understand it, this suggests to me that a dialectician's approach to personhood refuses to make pronounements about other people as objects existing external to himself. First he requires himself to understand himself as a changing person, but this understanding is part of the process of acceptance that others are forces in that change. He no longer sees himself as an 'I' living independently of other 'I's. He enters into an 'I and Thou' relationship that is not grounded in the sociology of people in societies, but is grounded in the notion of the interdependent community of independents. 'Personhood' is not an end product, but is the development of the individual.

The dialectician's interpretation of a form of personhood, then, rests on the realisation that there is no identifiable, concrete end product, but only a continual process of ever-renewed states of coming-into-being. The conversation between John Radford and Richard Kirby in their 1975 'The person in psychology' nicely presents the view of the dialectical and the formal thinker (pp 50-51):

"RK My argument is ... that man's basic and distinguishing feature is his capacity to be an infinitely diverse set of states and contents of consciousness. For this reason, all knowledge is potentially available to everyone. And 'all knowledge' includes the capacity to modify oneself. Therefore we are all the same in the sense that we are all omnipotent, POTENTIALLY.

JR That seems to me a string of non-sequiturs. Even if states of consciousness are infinite, whatever that means, why should that imply being all-powerful? I'm sure I couldn't run a mile in four minutes, however conscious I was. And a collection of beings, all omnipotent, seems a contradiction in terms, to say nothing of being terribly boring.

RK As usual you completely fail to grasp the nature of human potential."

Later in the book (p.115) RK says:

"You could just as well argue that the human potential movement will produce an irreversible change the other way - a world in which everyone is reaching personal fulfilment, and feels no need to tyrannize over anyone else." (Their italics: Radford and Kirby, 1975)

Broughton (1987) stresses the notion of 'yet-to-be' as a fundamental characteristic of personhood: that is, that personhood itself is not a steady state, but a present embodiment of the individual's ever-renewable potential. The yet-to-be of a moment ago is now, which in turn has to be turned into the present state of the 'yet-to-be' of the next moment. Thus personhood is an on-going state of development, with a historical dimension of what has been till now and a moving towards what will be, all brought about through the dialectical transformations of now.

6 SUMMARY

The question of this chapter is 'What constitutes knowledge of values?' I will summarise my answer here, by suggesting that, in terms of world views which deal with the nature of human values, we may approach the topic from the point of view of the behavioural-structuralist, the cognitive-developmentalist, and the humanist-philosopher. An interpretation of the nature of human values is dependent on the interpreter's approach to the structure of knowledge. We have seen that the structuralist works in terms of the propositional knowledge of knowing-that; the cognitive-developmentalist works in the procedural knowledge of knowing-how; and the humanist-philosopher works in the personal terms of knowing + a direct object. Both dimensions, that of the approach to the structure of knowledge, and an approach to an organisation of human values, will influence the interpreter's view of the nature of what it means to be human. 'Personhood' may be seen in

its instrumental, sociological and dialectical-developmental sense. The grounding of the notion of 'personhood' is radically different for all three viewpoints. In the first approach, the grounding is in the mental structures of the interpreter. In the second approach, the grounding is, at a remove, in the institutions of society, which themselves are grounded in the mental structures of the interpreter. In the third approach, which now takes on the form of a critical theory of current theories, the grounding is in the interpreter himself.

It is further suggested that the last of the triad is a more mature discipline than the previous two. Because it is within the dialectical tradition, it is able to subsume the other two traditions mentioned along the dimension of approaches to knowledge (epistemological considerations) and along the dimension of the history of the development of knowledge (dialectical considerations). The question of maturity is dealt with in the first section of Chapter 6.

What is now needed is a theory of development, to explain what is meant by 'maturity' and to explain the processes by which that maturity is achieved.

CHAPTER 6 HOW IS KNOWLEDGE OF VALUES ACQUIRED?

Contents

PAGE

1 OVERVIEW 364

2 TOWARDS A CHARACTERISATION OF THE TRANSFORMATIONAL GENERATIVE NATURE OF DIALECTICS 373

3 HOW IS KNOWLEDGE OF VALUES ACQUIRED? 400

4 ASSUMPTIONS ABOUT VALUES ACQUISTION (MORAL DEVELOPMENT) 408

(1) Assumptions of the literature of developmental psychology 422

5 GENERATIVE TRANSFORMATIONAL DIALECTICS AS A POSSIBLE EXPLANATION FOR AN ACQUISITION OF KNOWLEDGE OF VALUES 448

(a) The device 455
(b) The process - towards a model of performance 465
(c) Dialectical operations as a form of being 472

CHAPTER SIX: HOW IS KNOWLEDGE OF VALUES ACQUIRED?

1 OVERVIEW

We have seen in Chapter 5 that a characterisation of the nature of human values is determined by at least two factors. The first of these factors is the way in which an interpreter organises his approach to the structure of knowledge; the second is how he organises his approach to the constitution of values. We saw how both aspects - the structure of knowldge and the constitution of values - are in turn determined by the interpreter's view of persons.

Broadly speaking, there are two schools of thought here, those of (1) formal thinkers and (2) dialectical thinkers. The first school comprises interpreters who see the idea of 'personhood' as external to themselves as reified, unchanging observers. This view colours their approach to the other aspects; they see knowledge as their own property, a set of structures which they may impose upon the object of their enquiry, which is the persons in the society they are studying. As a result, they expect the persons to conform to their, the interpreters', expectations. They see the constitution of values as external as well. Values are seen as commodities to be accumulated and added on to the person. So the study, in its keenness to observe the 'objectivist' criteria of empiric traditions, adopts a hierarchical, linear approach to its research field, which may be seen as:

(1)



The interpreter observes and describes the person who in turn acquires values.

I have indicated in various parts of this text that this was my view of my practice in schools until about 1984. I saw myself as the reified interpreter of my children's actions. I saw values as things, somehow reified and unattached themselves, to be acquired by my children and my colleagues. I have also indicated in Chapters 2 and 4 that I had viewed this text in the same light, that it was an object external to myself. Of course it is, in its physical sense, but I viewed the contents (my thoughts and interpretations) also as external to myself. The pattern for my approach was parallel to the one above of

(2)



in that I was an intrepreter of my practice in schools, which in turn embodied my values.

The second school of thought comprises interpreters who see the idea of 'personhood' as resting in the developmental notions of change and renewability. These notions are applicable to themselves, as developing and renewable organisms, and to themselves with others, forming groups which are developing and renewable. These interpreters are aware of the relationships within themselves, and their relationships with other people, leading to an overarching concept of people as changing and developing beings in a world of change and development. The view of personhood here does not see 'personhood' as an end state to be achieved, but sees it as a constant coming-into-being. The focus is in the present, which is shaped by the past, with a view to realising the yet-to-be.

This self-view prevents these interpreters from seeing themselves (or anything) as reified. They are prevented from making generalisations about other people because:

1 they cannot 'know' other people in the sense of entering into their consciousness and saying how they think and feel;

2 any generalisations they may invent are also subject to change and therefore conceptually obsolescent;

3 they themselves are subject to change in their own course of development.

The study, revolving around the axis of the notion of development, may be expressed as

(3)



in which the person is both subject and object of his own study, and in which the raising to consciousness of an intuitive knowledge of self (competence) to a cognitive level (performance) is the aim.

This view sees the nature of persons and their personhood as a continuing state of development rather than a fixed end product; reflecting also the view of the structure of knowledge, that is, too, in a continuing state of development.

The first approach sees structures of knowledge as fixed, and it is the interpreter's privilege to impose these structures of knowledge on his unknowing subjects. The second approach sees the structures of knowledge as developing and therefore subject to change, and it is the interpreter's task to invite other persons to share with her in her explanations of her own life, and join with them in their explanations of theirs.

The way in which these structures of knowledge are acquired will be discussed here more fully than the glosses of Part One, along with the accompanying aspects of an explanation for an acquisition of the term 'what is learnt' (Chomsky, 1965).

In diagram (1) the 'subject' of the enquiry is shown to be the interpreter, the 'object' of the enquiry is the person, and the 'indirect object' for the interpreter is the person's study of his own properties. Starting from the other end, the properties of commodities of personhood, its observable values, are seen in their accumulative

sense as belonging to the person. Traditional approaches to values education have stressed the importance of reified values, along the phenomenological dimensions of the institutions of society. Moral education is seen as presenting a model whereby these values may be acquired. Working upwards through the diagram, the person is seen as exploring the given field of values, and deciding which to accept for herself. (This is the model of Kohlberg, and others, who have organised the anticipated outcomes of their subjects' explorations into categories and classifications which reflect their own mental structures which operate in terms of 'end products'.) At the top of the tree is the interpreter, the puppeteer, watching the scenario before him and fitting it all into his own structures.

In diagram (3) the 'subject' of the enquiry is shown to be the interpreter, the 'object' of the enquiry is the interpreter's self, and the 'indirect object' for the interpreter is the object of the self's enquiry, the self's own self. Starting from the end is the same as starting from the beginning; the focus of the enquiry is the self in whichever one of its manifest forms is the present focus of the enquiry. The pattern is one of Chinese boxes, in which there is constant ebb and



flow, change and re-direction, expansion and contraction. There is no beginning and no end, but simply a constant, ever-renewable process of development.

The approach at (1) accommodates the notion 'what is learnt' in its dependency on the assumptions inherent in traditions of the acquisition of habits. Personal and moral development is seen as an accumulation of the mores of a given society, with a view to turning out a given kind of person. The way to that personal and moral development is through a concentration on the knowledge and skills (know-that reinforced by 'know-how') that will enable the person to live up to the image of the 'certain kind of person'.

The approach at (3) accommodates the notion 'what is learnt' in the exploration by the self of the self.

First, the self acknowledges its own potential for change; this potential for change is a prerequisite for development, i.e. a moving forward to an improved situation from a previously unsatisfactory situation, in which values are denied in practice. (In the coming pages we shall see that the notion of values being denied in practice may be rephrased in an equivalent form by the notion of competence being prevented from emerging into performance. Both linguistic structures carry with them the notion of suppressed development.) The self then conducts its own enquiry into its own self. This enquiry embodies the principles of change leading to development. The whorls and spirals of the action-reflection mode of enquiry (see below) allow a movement which

is itself an expression of the notion 'what is learnt'. Personal and moral development is seen as a movement away from stasis to one of change and disequilibrium, in which formal, imposed structures are transformed into the self-transforming structures of dialectical metamorphosis.

It is to this latter notion that this chapter now addresses itself. It is my intention to review the literature of current theories of values acquisition and the application of those theories in current models of values education. In doing so, I hope to demonstrate that these theories play a part in the educative process, in that they describe possible ways in which knowlege may be organised to meet a specified need. I also hope to demonstrate that such approaches to the concept 'what is learnt' are powerless to provide explanations for individuals' development, in that the concept 'what is learnt' is not accommodated within their conceptual or methodological repertoire. The assumptions of theories of values acquistion which rest on the view of a 'certain kind of person' will draw on the methods of the social sciences to present descriptions of that certain kind of person who belongs to a certain kind of society. The assumptions of theories of values acquisition which rest on the view of 'person as coming-into-being' will draw on the methods of the reconstructive sciences to present explanations for the development (what is learnt) of that person, in which 'what is learnt' is the telos of the individual thinker to explore further 'what is learnt' through the process of learning.

The (for me) essentially reductionist view of the 'certain kind of person' of empiric approaches is counterbalanced in the society of researchers who adopt the generative view of the 'person as coming-to-be' by their discovery, through their own evolving practice, that the reductionist view is a more primitive expression of their own closed thought processes which they are now encouraging towards the maturity of open processes which are a hallmark, in both descriptive and explanatory terms, of their own developmental process of 'coming-to-be'.

In this chapter, I will attempt to explain why I feel that a dialectical form of being is a more mature state than one of formal structuralism. I will attempt to show that such a form of being is brought about through the reconstructive sciences, which are themselves grounded in a dialectical approach to the structure of knowledge. And I will attempt to show that my practice, which was centred on active teaching, and is now centred on active reflection, is a realisation in action of my educational values which are also grounded in a dialectical form of being.

I will aim to make these notions explicit in the coming pages. My first step in this direction is to present, in idealised form, my understanding of the nature of development towards maturity through the process of transformational generative dialectics.

2 TOWARDS A CHARACTERISATION OF THE TRANSFORMATIONAL GENERATIVE NATURE OF DIALECTICS

Let me suggest that many personal enquiries begin with a sense of vision. The origin of the enquiry lies in the vision of the enquirer which embodies her values. Values, in my view, are the latent knowledge of the enquirer which take the form of concepts, expressed in the notional terms of "I believe that ...". The notion "I believe that ..." incorporates a propositional statement ' ... that all people are free' within a dialectical framework 'I believe ... ' in which the concept 'I' tsakes the form of a living, material object and the concept 'believe' is a property of that living 'I' (see also Chapters 3 and 7).

The vision is of a satisfactory state. This satisfactory state is an expression of the realised values of the enquirer, in which statements of fact and statements of value blend in the same form, both linguistic and conceptual, in a homeostatic state. Thus the statement

"I believe that all children should have equal opportunities"

may be seen as an expressed value of the vision of the enquirer. The practice of the enquirer may not be within a location in which all children have equal opportunities, however, nor may it have such an expression; resulting in the statement of fact: "My children do not all have equal opportunities". Statements of value are separated from statements of fact, and therefore form separate realms of discourse.

The vision of the enquirer is of the day when the negation may be negated, and the situation transformed into one of homeostasis.

The separation of statements of value and statements of fact results in a denial of the enquirer's values in practice (Whitehead, 1979). This denial, itself an unsatisfactory state, causes a state of tension to exist in the mind of the enquirer. The sense of crisis occasioned by the lack of homeostasis causes her to want to act in order to restore the balance.

This sense of crisis is akin to that identified by Kuhn (1962) and which, according to his argument, results in a paradigm shift. He says that a sense of crisis in a degenerate paradigm generates sufficient tension within a scientific comunity to cause the shift, in which the new paradigm incorporates the old. This pattern may be applied here, where the sense of crisis in the personal enquirer generates the necessary tension that causes her to look for ways out of the dilemma. The strategies adopted, founded on the insights developed, allow her to change her ground, but her new ways embody the old. The old is not now dismissed; it is incorporated into the new.

In the initial stages of my enquiry I adopted the model put forward by Whitehead (1977) as a schedule to guide the process of my own action and reflection. I applied it to my practice in school, and I could then document my progress in a systematic fashion:

'I experience a problem when some of my educational values are denied in my practice.' My children were hostile and rude, and did not want to learn. My educational values were that I believed they should be sensitive and humane, and should want to learn.

'I imagine a solution to my problem.' I explored the field to find some way whereby I could teach them to become sensitive and humane, and to persuade them to want to learn. I particularly explored the work of Leslie Button.

'I implement the solution.' I tried out a Button course.

'I evaluate the solution.' Within the scientific methods of peer, client and self validation (McNiff, 1988) I concluded and claimed that my children had made progress, in that they demonstrated in action, and I could point to recorded instances of that demonstration in action, that they had moved closer to an embodiment of the educational values that I and others had agreed constituted a living-in-practice of my educational values.

'I modify my ideas and practice in the light of the evaluation.' I reviewed constantly, changing tack as and when I saw the need to move the enquiry forward, in the sense of Collingwood (1939) that a series of 'right' questions will result in a series of answers to prompt further thought and action.

This action-reflection cycle helped me to follow my own development in a systematic way. It also helped me to record my children's development. I could claim that I had improved my own practice, and I could claim that I had helped them to improve theirs. I saw the 'modification' step as being closer to my vision than the initial 'problem' step.

I then experienced a sense of crisis in my applications of the model, which, in the view outlined above, generated sufficient tension in me to cause me to do something about it. I could see, in the Whitehead model, that the mental structures that created the relational form were those of the dialectician. In its present form, however, it seemed not to account for the totality of my whole class practice which was essentially random and spontaneous in nature. In its present form it concentrated on only one aspect of practice, that is, on a general framework for the making explicit of a dialectical procedure of posing problems and suggesting answers. That framework and the action-reflection cycle needed to be applied to my total practice.

My answer to my identified problem lay in my introduction of a generative component (McNiff, 1984) which allowed the model to act as the germ, in both form and content, for a system of re-cycling and re-application. What resulted was a three-dimensional spiral of spirals which allowed me to enter and leave the model at whichever point was appropriate for the issue at present under investigation (see Appendix 3 for the 1984 paper).

As I have moved on in my action and reflection over the years, I have come to understand the significance of the Whitehead model as a dialectical framework. I see this interpretation now as incorporating the notion of the self as 'subject' of the enquiry - 'I experience a problem when some of my educational values are denied in my practice'; as 'object' of the enquiry - 'I evaluate my actions'; and as the grounding of future decisions concerning practice - 'I modify my practice in the light of the evaluation'. It incorporates the notions of contradiction, in that, at one and the same time, the self experiences a denial of its educational values and a wish to reverse the denial, to strive for a realisation in practice of those educational values. It incorporates the notion of this contradiction in the traditional notional terms of thesis (recognition of a problem), antithesis (disequilibrium brought about by the enquirer's sense of crisis), and synthesis (attempt to resolve the problem to the satisfactory state of homeostasis).

I now wish to move my present enquiry forward by focusing on this latter aspect: the dialectical procedure of an action-reflection enquiry, which cancels out an unsatisfactory state to give way to a more satisfactory one.

I now consider the question of traditional forms of dialectics as an epistemological procedure.

First I will refer to the work of Comey (1952), who states: "The movement of both the real world and rational thought follows an evolutionary pattern in which whatever is undeveloped and undifferentiated divides up, assuming opposing or contradictory forms and then becomes a concrete unity. The higher form in this evolutionary process is a realisation of what the lower form is intended to be; each higher stage contains all the preceding stages within it. The lower form is 'negated' in the higher, since it is no longer what it was; nevertheless it has been actively retained in the higher form." This notion formed the basis of Hegel's (1912) theory of contradiction, where "the thing passes from its contradictory state, to a reconciled, unified state".

I will suggest that, in the light of my practice, this traditional notion of negation is not always conceptually valid, and that Adorno's (1973) notion of cancellation is often closer to the reality of life. I will also here attempt to show that my understanding of his work indicates that Riegel (1973) is in error when he maintains that the 'antithesis' stage dismisses the practice of that stage; and that, following Kuhn's notion of new paradigms incorporating the old, the idea of Basseches (1984) that the 'antithesis' rather incorporate the old paradigm as the basis for the new. I will also refer to the work of Chomsky (1968, 1982) and his notion of self-perpetuating, self-transforming states, to explain what I see as a formulation for a transformational generative approach to the dialectics of practice.

I shall now attempt to clarify and make explicit:

In his 1912 'Science of logic', Hegel supposed that the reality of the world was constantly changing, as were the thought processes that reconstructed the subject's perceptions of the world. Change, for Hegel, was accounted for by the law of contradiction. Hegel believed that each concept, as well as each aspect of the perceived world, existed alongside its contradictory form. As I understand his work, the process of development is seen in the movement towards a higher form of being by anything which is undeveloped. That which is at a primitive level divides up, assumes a contradictory form, and synthesises itself in a higher form of being (Comey, op.cit.). Such an iterative process depends on the notion of lower and higher forms for its existence, and the new form then immediately becomes the primitive level. Hegel's model carries within itself the idea of built-in obsolescence, in which the new form becomes immediately obsolescent at its nascence. Movement is always towards an idealised higher form of evolution which in reality may not be realised until its present state of existence is pronounced satisfactory by human judgement.

The way in which movement was effected, in Hegel's view, was in the negation of the negation. As each new form degenerated into its instant obsolescence, so it was subsumed under the new, emergent form that would replace it. This new form was the synthesis of the previous contradictions in the old form. This process of evolution through contradiction has often been referred to as the triad of thesis, antithesis and synthesis.

I will suggest that the idea of cancellation is more appropriate than negation (Adorno, op.cit.), where a thesis has to be cancelled out - i.e. reduced to a nul state - in order to make way for a new one. I will also introduce the expressions used by Chomsky (op.cit.) to express the notion of a developmental mechanism, and apply this system to help me in my understanding of dialectical movement. These combined aspects lead to a formulation that an initial steady state, S0 (or fixed nucleus; see Piattelli-Palmarini, 1980), leads, in a conception of a physically finite world, to an ultimate steady state, SS. I am aware in putting forward this hypothesis that I seem to be suggesting an end state; but I will aim to show that it is an interim state of further development. I will attempt to show how this formal conceptualisation may be integrated into a holistic view of development as non-end-state.

My original formulation (First Version Chapter 3) held that an initial state S1 was cancelled out S10 [zero]. The resultant 'nul' state, which still incorporated the properties of the S1 state, now made way for a new state, S2. I presented this model in the linear form of



$(S1_0)$

I now wish to refine and elaborate the model, in the light of the action and reflection that have taken place since its initial formulation.

The initial formulation had a linear format, S1 - Sn (SS). The linear conceptualisation is contrary to my inclination towards a dialectical form of being, as manifested in (a) my early adoption of the Whitehead model of reciprocal problem-posing and problem-solving as an action-reflection plan for combating unsatisfactory elements of my practice; (b) my expansion of this model into an overall strategy for an improvement in practice, by introducing the generative component to allow for the action-reflection plan to be infinitely re-created; (c) my later adaption of the notion of dialectical processes as an improved, matured form of being. When I synthesise these diverse aspects, I am enabled to plot the developmental steps in the refinement of my initial model thus:

I apply the notion of S0 - Sn to the Whitehead action-reflection model. I see that the initial steady state S0 is reflected in the first phase of the action-reflection plan, which is the making explicit of an educational problem. Thus:

S0(i) 'I experience a problem when some of my educational values are denied in my practice.'

S0(ii) 'I imagine a solution to the problem.'

S0(iii) 'I implement the solution.'

S0(iv) 'I evaluate the solution.'

S0(v) 'I modify my ideas and practice in the light of the evaluation.'

The state itself (S0) is in this way in a change situation, S0(i-v).

In my 1984 text I showed that my original linear representation was inadequate, and opted for a spiral. The linear representation of A -- N, in my present formulation now re-caste as S0 -- Sn, reflects the cognitive structures of formal processes which assume a final end-state Sn. However, I have demonstrated in the practice of these pages that I do not hold with the notion of a final end-state. In my dialectical form of life (which includes my dialectical form of thinking) I believe that the only end state that suits me is one which requires an ever-developing openness of mind to all things new. Within the equilibrium is the notion of constant disequilibrium. Conversely, it is only through the process of self-regulating disequilibrium that equilibrium may be attained.

A more adequate representation than a line was a circle, indicating the notion of a return to a conceptual starting point. In the action-reflection model, Whitehead demonstrates this conceptual return. However, my initial cricle, in turning in on itself, indicated no



progress. The end state 'E' was back at the beginning 'A'. I maintain that the traditional notion of thesis - antithesis - synthesis is often interpreted in this form, indicating a linearity that leads nowhere other than back to its own starting point, as in



or leads to the context-free vacuum of T - A - S - ?. A spiral that has the potential to move beyond a defined end state is a more appropriate representation of what happens in real life.



Thus, the potential for recreation of the action-reflection model is captured in the visual demonstration. The end-state of S(v) 'I modify my ideas and actions in the light of the evaluation' gives the ground for the new action-reflection cycle, and also for a new spiral of the dialectic. S0 becomes S1 thus:



It is important at this stage to consider the difference between the concepts of 'negation' and 'cancellation'. In his theory, Hegel regarded the negation of the negation as leading to synthesis. The negation of a thing was its contradictory form. By passing over into its contradictory form and from there into a higher state of development, the thing overcame its own negation, leading to a negation of the negation. In the Whitehead model, step (1) of 'I experience a problem when some of my educational values are denied in my practice' is overcome when the experience of this negation passes over into its contradictory state of steps (ii) and (iii), when the imagined solution is implemented to bring about movement towards a satisfactory state. This movement is a negation of the negation. The assumption is not that the enquiry has reached an end state in which human judgement maintains that an ultimate satisfactory state has been achieved, in that all problems have now been solved. The reality is that there is gradual movement, in that each new state, S1, S2, S3, ... is nearer to the vision of the enquirer.

This movement is one of cancellation and renewal. S3 is not a negation of S2; it is a cancellation. This means that each state is cancelled into a nul state which leaves the field clear for the creation of a new state. To return to the visual, the cancellation is one of form rather than substance, in that S2 (i, ii, iii, iv, v) is kept in its entirety as part of the history of S3; but the form of S3 is now different from that of S2 (otherwise it would still be S2). Thus the content of S3 has been brought about through the negation of the negation within the

processes of S2; but the form of S3 has been effected by the cancellation of S2. S3 is a different form of BEING.

Now, in order to explain the potential of an organism for ever-renewable forms of being (S4, S5, S6 ...), it is necessary to return to the notion of generative power.

In my 1984 text I was critical of methodological models that they were linear and did not allow for individual spontaneity and creativity. I suggested that it was necessary to build in a generative component that would allow for individual spontaneity and creativity, and, at the same time, afford the individual enquirer a systematic framework to explore this spontaneity and creativity; that is, provide herself with explanations for her own thought and actions. I can apply this notion of the importance of the generative component to the Whitehead model. I can also apply it to my notion of S1 ... Sn. Thus,

(1) Whitehead's model: (v) results from a negation of the negation at (i):



(2) Dialectical states of development: S2 results from the cancellation of S1:



(2) may now be juxtaposed onto (1), resulting in (3):

(3)



(3) is given generative power. Sub-enquiries are accommodated, each following the dialectical approach of action-reflection. In this way, entry and exit are allowed at any stage, depending on the needs of the enquirer. Each action-reflection cycle may be treated as an enquiry in itself, or may be related back to the whole. The strands of the web are all interrelated and interdependent. They may function independently within a context-specific enquiry (in the model, notated as S2(i[i-v])), but, in terms of the total life of the enquirer, S2 is part of S1 and S3. In this way, the horizontal relationships of the present may be explained, as well as the vertical relationships of the past. Past practice (cancelled states) form the present; other aspects of practice (co-existent horizontal states) influence current practice. No aspect is fully separated from the other. The enquirer is an integrated person, and this model of her enquiry reflects the integration.

I have suggested repeatedly that a dialectical form of being is more mature than a formal one. By implication, dialectical structures encourage development, whereas formal structures encourage stasis. Let me explain these claims in the light of my previous thoughts and present practice.

Labouvie-Vief (1980) indicates that the type of reasoning needed by young people to build stable relationships and environments is well characterised by Piaget's conceptualisation of formal operations. Adult development is more to do with the pragmatics of accommodating formal operations to the realities of social pressures. I will suggest that this view is restrictive, for reasons which I shall exemplify shortly.

In her summary, Labouvie-Vief re-focuses the question of the aim of developmental psychologists, in saying: "It appears. therefore, that life-span developmentalists have been misled, in part, by exclusively focusing on the question: 'What is the development of logic?' Instead, they need to return to the contrapuntal question which has provided an original motivation for Piaget: 'What is the logic of development?'"

I will approach this issue from two separate but related standpoints. The first standpoint is from the point of view expressed by Canguilhem (1980) (cited in Broughton, 1987), who says: "'What is psychology?' becomes 'What do psychologists hope to achieve, doing what they do?' In the name of WHAT have they set themselves up as psychologists? ... Psychology is still based upon the duality, not that of factual consciousness and the norms entailed by the idea of man, but that of a mass of 'subjects' and a corporate elite of specialists equipped with a self-appointed mission." The second standpoint is that of Chomsky (1968). Referring to the work of Mehler and Bever (1967), he says: "If [their] analysis is correct, what we are observing is not a series of stages of intellectual development, in Piaget's sense, but rather slow

progress in bringing heuristic techniques into line with general concepts that have always been present."

These thoughts lead me to think that the 'logic of development', advocated by Labouvie-Vief as the proper business of psychologists, is part of the view critiqued by Canguilhem, in which a band of elitists impose their own mental structures on the world. I have already indicated that this view is grounded in the interpreter, who sees himself and his thought as reified. The questions 'What is the logic of development?' (Piaget/Labouvie-Vief), and 'What are the norms entailed by the idea of man?' (Canguilhem) do not share a common focus (Collingwood, 1939). They therefore cannot be answered in terms of responses which share a common focus. The first assumes the reification of the interpreter and the dependence and subordination within the structures of the enquiry of the 'objects' (people whose development is being studied). The second assumes the interdependence of thinking people, and therefore the interdependence of the knower and the known, in which the 'object' of the enquiry is responsible for organising the structures of the enquiry.

Let me now turn to Chomsky's (1972) stand that the notion of stages is reductive and stultifying. He rejects the idea of developmental stages and suggests rather the development of the heuristics of cognitive operations. What is not developing, in Chomsky's view, is the process of conceptualisation. What is developing is the ability to organise. I share this view. Based on my practice as a learner, a teacher, a thinker, what I have observed in myself is not a development of

concepts. The potential for my concepts has always been there. I was born with the potential to refine those concepts through my experience of life. I was also born with the mental capacity for the organisation of those concepts into ways of thinking. I have experienced, and demonstrated, the application of my own heuristics in the tackling of educational problems through my class practice, and in the construction of the first version and of this text. I have moved from formal operations to dialectical operations. This has not been a development of concepts (the concepts were a property of the thinker throughout) but a development of the organisational capacity to refine and make those concepts explicit. This 'making explicit' operates at the level of mental operations (understanding and explaining) and at the level of actual operations (applying in real life).

I suggest that a stage-developmental model is a manifestation of the structures of thought of the interpreter who believes in end states. There is an ultimate, an absolute, in view. All things are aimed towards the end. Human development is seen as aiming at this stage, and progress towards that state is seen in the formal terms of the model-maker, who believes that the persons of his model operate in the same way.

I go on to suggest that this view of human development is immature. It operates in terms of the past. The overcoming of the past is seen as the end-state. Each stage is described and specified. There is no free will, no right to exercise creativity and spontaneity, no right to refuse (see Beton's comment, in Buck-Morss, 1977) of "man's unlimited capacity for refusal'). The individual is not free, but is an extension of the vision of the model-maker who likes to have things in his view of their place. Thus life may be seen as 'getting through' rather than as 'living'.

A view of development, then, that stops at an end state is immature. It builds in the concept of stunted growth. The introduction of the notion of life-span development does not overcome the difficulty, either. Some thinkers in this vein (e.g. Levinson, 1968) demonstrate that, in their view, the cognitive operations manifested in adult life are the same as the final stage of cognitive operations achieved by adolescents - i.e. formal operational thinking. Adolescent cognitive processes simply seem to be extended into adult life. The downfall of the psychologists who think in this vein is that they are offering what appears to them as descriptions of other people's lives, rather than offering explantions for their own. Descriptions, as I have indicated repeatedly, are not explanations. Descriptions are the outcomes of the interpreter's notions about the way in which other people act, and are therefore operating at E-levels. In issues of epistemology, E-levels themselves are less mature than I-levels, and a study that rests at an E-level will inevitably have a restrictive view of its objects. If the format of the study then requires the objects to fit into its structures, the objects

themselves will assume the properties of stunted growth. Any development that takes place in practice will be seen as exceptional, an aberration. Or the model-makers will twist the model to accommodate the reality of practice (Kohlberg's level 4½, for example, was introduced because people did not fit neatly into levels 4 or 5: Kohlberg, 1976).

I feel it is necessary to break with these dominant views of human development on at least two counts. The first is to break with the notion of a description of development which is characterised by stages which are assumed to have been brought into being by certain forms of thought (e.g. Piaget's stage of concrete operations; Kohlberg's stage of 'good boy, good girl'). The second is to break with the notion of a development of cognitive processes per se, and to look towards a theory of the development of heuristic techniques (the notion of 'wanting to know; striving for mental freedom'). I shall explore these ideas later in this chapter.

Let me return to my stand about the immaturity of schemes that are arrested (and therefore arrest the growth of their subjects) at a certain level because that level is an 'end product' of the structures of the formal thought processes of the inventor. I would suggest that a dialectical form of thinking will cancel out this form (and I will attempt to show that the cancellation is part of this development of psychological theories along the lines of the present section which is dealing with the dialectics of development). Let us assume for a moment that there is life after formal operations. Let us further assume that that life is characterised by a dialectical form of being. This might

suggest that we are tacking on yet another 'stage' that is marked 'Stage 7: dialectical operations'. On the contrary. Dialectical thinking is not an end product in itself, but contains within itself the capacity to think freely. Basseches (1984) comments on this point: "While I am reluctant to treat dialectical thinking as an end point of cognitive development (since positing a fixed end point would deny possibilities for further change and therefore be undialectical), I do claim that the capacity for dialectical thinking is an important aspect of cognitive maturity." Riegel (1973) characterises dialectical thinking as the 'final stage of cognitive operations', not in the sense of 'here is another stage into which humans must fit' but in the sense 'here is a way of life and thinking, which is free, and which seems to represent some of the highest values of the human endeavour'. I will suggest that this way of thinking is more mature than the restrictive way of formal structures; for it opens the eyes to new experiences and "allows the instincts to blossom" (PL, AT26).

I will also now dwell on my belief that we are mistaken in looking only for patterns of cognitive development. I feel that this notion is another shibboleth imposed by formal thinkers in their attempts to impose formal structures on the world. Rather, what we ought to be doing is looking for ways to encourage heuristic capacities to develop. I believe that dialectical thinking is not something to be aimed at, in Riegel's sense, but is something that has always been there. I believe that humans are born as dialectical thinkers. What happens on their journey through the institutions of life is that the capacity for dialectical forms of being is slowly crushed by the pressures of the

institutions to conform to institutionalised expectations, and that natural forms of being are systematically distorted into other forms in line with the expectations of the model makers. For me, this is the cause of the alienation of the individual from himself. He loses touch with the reality of his own focus of being. The freedom of the dialectic, with all its seemingly untidy, crisis-laden turbulence of intense evolution; its desire to look for relationships, for disequilibrium, is eroded by a fearful world of people who have themsevles been forced into a defensive mode of life by the political thought-makers of organised institutions.

I am saying, then, that the capacity for dialectical thinking is a natural property of the human being, from birth to death. Theories of development that look for changes in cognitive processes are mistaken in their focus, for, in my view, they are not observing the development of the mental organisation of a world of phenomena, but rather the mental organisation of dealing with a world of phenomena. The two are worlds apart. The first is to do with the calssification of structures. The second is to do with heuristics and permutations of relationships. Approaches to making these interpretations inevitably vary. The approach that sees human development as an increasing sophistication in the classification of structures opts for formal operations, in which mental structures are imposed on the data. These are the E-levels of the formal structuralists and cognitive-developmentalists. The approach that sees human development as dexterity in heuristic techniques opts for a reconstruction (a making explicit) of the implicit, innate tendencies of the human being. This approach is grounded in the belief

for human potential as a living, continuously evolving property of a living, continuously evolving person, which rejects the notion of end states and focuses on concentration of being. This is maturity. This is 'the development of autonomy' (HMI/DES, 1980) and 'developing as a person' (FEU, 1981). And it is the task of educators to help persons to develop, i.e. bring out that maturity, not in the sense of moving towards a higher stage, but in the sense of making explicit their innate, implicit properties of heuristic capacities (see also Chapter 7).

****

So far I have concentrated largely on a description of dialectical forms. I have not explained fully how it is (in my view) that forms emerge, nor why. I have explored the E-levels of the discussion; now it is time to integrate those levels into the I-levels of explanation.

Kuhn says (see above) that a sense of crisis is generated in the thinker when an old paradigm no longer meets the identified needs of that thinker (or community of scientists, in Kuhn's realm of discourse). This crisis causes the thinker to look for new ways of tackling his problem. Over time, through the methods of iterative re-focusing, and adopting what was later to be known as a hypothetic-inductive approach (Medawar, 1969), the thinker comes to new forms of thinking which amount to a new paradigm. The new paradigm replaces the old, while still incorporating the aspects of the old which led to its new form. From a dialectical perspective, we may say that the new paradigm has negated

the negations in the old paradigm that led to the crisis, and that the new state has cancelled out the old, allowing the new one to develop out of the old.

If I apply this to my interpretations so far, I can say that a sense of crisis is generated in my present forms of thought when I experience a denial of my educational values in my practice (Whitehead's action-reflection spiral). The sense of crisis prompts me to attempt to resolve the problem. I have within me the intuitive knowledge that my present practice (S0) has the potential to move toward an ultimate steady state (SS) in which my educational values are all realised in my practice, and all denials are resolved. My vision is realised, in which statements of fact and statements of value are juxtaposed into the same realm of discourse. In the meantime, in the movement towards the Steady State, states move through their notional cycles of thesis, antithesis, synthesis, as demonstrated in Whitehead's action-reflection spiral, leading on to other spirals. The sense of crisis prompts the movement, in that crisis brings with it feelings of disequilibrium. Thus, if my present practice is characterised as S1, and I am aware of an unsatisfactory situation when some of my educational values are denied in my practice, this sense of dissatisfaction involves disequilibrium within S1. The spiral is set in motion, in which the action-reflection cycles moves nearer to a sense of resolution (homeostasis). In graphic form, this may be represented as:

SO state of current practice

S(i) sense of crisis when some of my educational values are not realised in practice. Disequilibrium sets in. Implement action-reflection cycle.

S(ii) I imagine a solution to the problem. Deliberate encouragement of disequilibrium. Vision of possible negation of circumstances at S(i).

S(iii) I action the solution. Total conflict and disequilibrium. Deliberate encouragement of change situation. Negation of the negation at S(i).

S(iv) I evaluate the solution. Move towards synthesis. Move towards stability in the vision of a new state.

S(v) I modify my ideas and actions in the light of my evaluation. New state about to emerge. Negation of the negation at S(i) now complete. Synthesis results in homeostasis. S0 is now cancelled to make way for S1

S1(i) Sense of crisis when some of my .....

In this way I hope to demonstrate the dialectical notion of stability through contradiction. The stable states of S0, S1, S2 ... are unstable in two ways: first, their internal constitutions (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v) are in a volatile state of crisis and movement towards synthesis; second, there is constant movement in the process of S0, S1, S2, S3 ... Sn. The steady state (SS), in my present conceptualisation, has a double character: and here I readily admit that I have to think this issue through carefully in order to resolve the ambiguity in my conceptualisation. In one sense, SS is a vision, a dream, in which absolutes of value and absolutes of practice are realised together. As such, it exists in the idealised sense of a goal for human potential, not in the sense of an end state, but in the sense of a living, constantly evolving sense of mission which is part of the human endeavour. In another sense, SS is now, the present state of being that is better than the previous one, and therefore the best so far. I will refer back to Chapter 2, when I expressed how my view of Truth had altered over time, in that before, I had seen Truth as an absolute, whereas now I see Truth as resting in mutual agreements of material, living persons. In this way, SS is the present realisation of all factors which are focused on resolving the unsatisfactory elements of practice, and therefore the best situation which has been experienced so far.

This explanation for movement towards maturity/self-fulfilment may be seen in the epistemological issues of my project. I have applied Kuhn's theory of the development of new paradigms to the movement documented in my class practice (Chapters 1 and 3). I have pointed to the movement of thought documented in First Version (Chapters 2 and 4). In the rest of this chapter I will attempt to show how I considered formal systems of values education as the basis for my class practice, and how I came to reject them as unsuited to my needs. I experienced a growing gulf between the form of my questions to do with my practice, and the form of the answers that were to be found in the literature. I will also endeavour to show how I was initially dependent on the propositions presented in the literature as a guide to my practice, and how such a form was inapplicable. I will show how I applied my action-reflection scheme to the literature which resulted in my sense of crisis, and how I used this sense of crisis to help me look for other ways of tackling the problem. How I moved my own thought and practice forward now becomes the theme for the next pages.

3 HOW IS KNOWLEDGE OF VALUES ACQUIRED?

I believe that there is a close relationship between the term 'values' and the notion 'what is learnt'(Jespersen, 1922; cited in Chomsky, 1965, 1985), according to the following formulation: values are to do with belief systems; belief systems are grounded in a pre-cognitive level of the mind; the notion 'what is learnt' expresses the interaction between innate potentials for learning and the environment. 'What is learnt' is an explanatory concept to account for the making explicit of the innate capacities for belief, i.e. the potentials of the organism to develop its innate qualities as a genotype to the levels of functional performance.

A normative interpretation of the term 'values' carries with it connotations of 'goodness'. Wakeman (1986) uses the term exclusively to refer to the notion of an improvement in the quality of life. In a more dispassionate sense, 'values' may be applied to negative as well as positive aspects of the human condition. I distinctly remember pulling a worm apart when I was five. I wanted to see how far it would stretch. My values as a curious but cruel child were no less 'values' than those I hold today, as an adult, of the sanctity of all life forms. The values of Pinochet's Chile are values, even though I do not hold with them.

At present, the rightness or wrongness of values is not at issue. That will come later. I shall consider the standpoints of the relativists and pragmatists with regard to the use to which a knowledge of values is put (Chapter 7) and suggest, with Bernstein (1983) that it is time to move beyond relativity and objectivity. I shall also consider the use of the term 'education' as implying an improvement, and thus 'educational values' as the underlying beliefs that will bring about an improvement in the educative situation. What is at issue in this chapter is the notion of what values are, so that we may move the enquiry forward in terms of finding ways in which they may be acquired.

A value, in my view, corresponds to the notion 'what is learnt'. This does not imply that learning is a matter of habit formation, in line with the dominant assumption in the literature that learning mechanisms in general operate on the basis of habit formation. I vigorously reject that idea. The notion 'what is learnt' refers to the mechanisms of the mind/brain, whereby intuitive, innate matters of conceptual substance, interacting with the influences of the environment, are organised into meaningful conceptual experiences by means of heuristic transformations. In graphic form:



'What is learnt' is not the assimilation by the organism of external information. 'What is learnt' is a notion applicable only to the individual's subjective experience. In my sentences describing my practice I may produce such utterances as: "Let me tell you what my pupils learned today" or "I will tell you what I learned today". If I wish to use the phrase 'what is learnt' I must change the focus of my linguistic structures, to produce speech acts such as: "I will try to explain what is learnt by children when they engage in dramatic activities". I am here referring to the mental operations of the children, in their ability to build theories. 'What is learnt' refers to the deep-structure concept of values, organised through the capacity to build theories, or ways of looking at themselves and the world.

There is a gap here, however, in the literature. I agree with Baldwin (1967) when he says: "In psychology, theory building itself is an activity that the theories should explain. ... Theories of human behaviour and development have not been well designed." By implication, the notion 'what is learnt' needs explaining before any descriptions of overt behaviour are attempted.

It is precisely this notion that dominant theories of development vault (see Macbeth's comment on 'O'erweening ambition that o'ervaults itself and lands on the other side'). Dominant theories of development seem concerned to describe the mechanisms of development without accounting for those mechanisms, i.e. explaining why they do as they do. They describe learning in operational terms without accounting for the notion 'what is learnt'.

For me, this is the most interesting issue, and one which has come to be the focus of my present practice. For I originally wanted to find out if my children would do as I wanted them to do, by falling into line with my preconceived notions of 'personal development', as an outcome of personal and social education. Then I wanted to find out why they were prepared to do so. I then wondered what the mental operations were that enabled them to accept certain things and reject others. From there it was a short step to wonder why I wanted to know why they wanted to know. Throughout, there is an increasing emphasis on explanations - not only explanations of ontology ('Why does this thing work as it does?') but also explanations of epistemology ('How do I know why this thing works as it does?')

I believe that ontological explanations contain the substance of dialectics. Explanations that focus on the workings of a thing aim to see its internal workings and justification for those workings. In the question 'Why does this thing work as it does?' answers will be sought that see relationships along horizontal and vertical dimensions, which have come into being through the process of generative transformations thus: "The thing works because A is related to B in its present form, as it was related to A(-1) and B(-1) in its historical form, and the relationships are characterised as the evolving, self-transforming acts of the mind/brain involved in bringing the connections to a surface level. The notion 'How do I know why this thing works as it does?' involves the relationships of the knower, in her present and historical form as a relational being in the question 'How do I know ...' with the object of the enquiry, in its present and historical relationships as

'what is known'. 'What is known' is the realisation as a final state of [S1(v), S2(v)] of the process of action research which characterises the transformations of the process involved in 'what is learnt'.

In this presentation, it is probably clear that I do not accept theories that take as a starting point the assumption that learning is a result of habit formation. This assumption permeates virtually the whole body of literature on the theory of educational psychology. The premises of habit formation rest on principles of absorption and assimilation, both of which, I feel, are not part of the developmental mechanisms of a knowing subject. Habit formation is an accretive act that has nothing to do with the personal knowledge of the knowing subject. The whole notion operates on the 'plaster sticking' principle. If I put plaster on a wall, some will stick and some will fall off. The bits that stick will add up. The plaster skin has nothing to do with the original wall, and does not change its internal character. The change that has come about is in me, the plasterer, in my perceptions of what I believe is now a new wall, but which is, in fact, a thin covering that could eventually fall off.

I believe that the makers of the theories of habit formation do not see the wall for the plaster. The overwhelming assumption that the skin formed (the formation of new habits) alters the internal character of the wall denies the nature of the person who supposedly forms the habits as a thinking, knowing form of life that is in a constant state of evolution. The notion of habit formation is a quick, convenient label used by formal thinkers who see the world in terms of their own mental

structures. 'Habit formation' is a label applied to the mechanisms of personality which, in my view, have nothing to do with assimilation by a knowing subject of aspects of the environment, but attempt, in a crude way, to make some sense out of the ability of the knowing subject to organise and select aspects of her experience of the external world.

It is probably evident from this project that I very much admire the work of Chomsky. I do not accept everything that he says, as in, for example, Piattelli-Palmarini (1980) when Chosmky suggests that the language ability is a separate organ of the body, such as heart, lungs, liver. Even his great supporter Jerry Fodor parted company with Chomsky on that issue; and I wondered as I read the text whether Chomsky were not deliberately provoking the combatants at the convocation, especially Putnam. I also do not join his band of supporters in his adherence to structuralism; but, in all fairness, he has stated on several occasions (1965, 1986) that he is not so much concerned with the pragmatics of communication between persons so much as with accounting for the mental operations that allow the individual to form a universal grammar that will enable him to form an infinite number of grammatically correct novel utterances in any given language.

In the 1950s, Chomsky found himself in an intellectual world bedevilled by structuralist theories of language learning and language acquistion. The die-hard school of Bloomfieldian structuralists, as the dominant paradigm, maintained that language acquisition was a matter of habit formation. Chomsky rejected this notion in his 1957 'Syntactic structures' in which he postulated

his original hypothesis of the innate qualities of mind as accounting for an ability to generate unlimited quantities of well-formed strings. By 1986 his thinking had advanced considerably, but the original premises and models stayed substantially the same. In 'Language and mind' (1968), Chomsky poses what he calls 'Plato's problem' (see beginning of this Part) in which the problem of poverty of stimulus is presented. Given so little data, how is the individual able to generate an infinite quantity of well-formed utterances? The basis can hardly be a matter of habit formation, argues Chomsky, but more a matter of uncovering pre-conceptual rules of language in the mind of the speaker that will enable him to use the language. For every situation which involves the use of language, each new speech act will have to be 're-invented', for no two speech acts are identical in all linguistic forms, nor are any two situations identical which prompt the selection of that particular speech act. The task of the researcher of linguistics, says Chosmky, is to discover more about the rules-system governing the generation of the language. Habermas, taking many of Chosmky's theories on board, expands the field to require researchers to account for the rules governing communication, which involves Chomsky's area of interest. Chomsky's interest in the structures of language which are inherent in the mind of the speaker is incorporated into Habermas's interest in the structures of communication which are an expression of the inherent qualities of people as dialogical beings.

Throughout my own project I have seen Chomsky's ideas as eminently applicable to my own area of interest in the acquisition of values. I have in this section rejected the notion of habit formation on the same several grounds. Given that no two social situations are ever identical (see the quote from Lorenz, Chapter 2 of this text), the fallacy of the inductivist philosophy is exposed. Given the scarcity of data in human systems of communication, the nonsense of imitation as the basis for original acts is exposed. Given the infinite potential of the human mind to generate an unlimited set of individual original responses to any one situation, the unlikelihood of externally imposed rule systems as governing individual behaviour is exposed.

If I apply these generalised notions to my area of interest in the acquisition of values, I run into difficulties with dominant assumptions. I feel isolated, but not intimidated, and while I will not insist that I am right, I will strongly suggest that this contribution throws light on the issues from another angle.

Let me make haste slowly, and consider the assumptions of the dominant paradigms. I will also attempt to show how I originally accepted those assumptions unquestioningly; and how and why I broke away and developed ideas of my own that contained more appropriate questions and answers that were being revealed by my practice.

4 ASSUMPTIONS ABOUT VALUES ACQUISITION (MORAL DEVELOPMENT).

Chapter 5 of this text was concerned with what constitutes a knowledge of human values: that is, what is the subject matter of the field to do with values. In educational matters, we saw that the areas of concern were labelled variously as 'values education', 'personal and social education', 'moral education', and so on. An attempt to deal with descriptions and explanations often results in the literature as definitions of values education. There are chapters named variously 'What is moral education?' (Downie and Kelly, 1978); 'What morality is' (Wilson, 1987; 'Introduction to moral development' (Hersch, Paolitto, Reimer, 1979). There seem to be two assumptions here in the minds of such writers: the first is to do with the need for definitions, and the second is to do with the nature of values education.

The first assumption reflects the need of writers to start off from a firm, specific base, in which clear answers are given about the nature of values/moral education. I have already suggested that such an approach reflects the attitude of the writer who believes in end products. Presumably, if a writer gives a clear definition of what values/moral education IS, his reader will have a good foundation for future thought and action. His practice in school wil be geared towards producing young people who will fulfil the procedural criteria for continuing that acknowledged system of values/moral education; and presumably continue the tradition of proposing definitions for what values/moral education IS.

The second assumption reflects the view that values/moral education is to do with 'right living'. The writer has a certain notion about what characterises a 'moral form of life', and moral education is there to help the person achieve that form of life.

I have on several occasions pointed to the variation of terminology in the literature, and my situation is made even more confusing when I attempt to turn the common nouns of 'values education, moral education, personal and social education, values clarification, etc.' into an adjective that describes the sort of education dealing with values acquisition. For I am left, and so are the vast majority of writers of current literature, with the term 'moral education'. Some books on personal and social education (e.g. Pring, 1984) refer to a child being 'personally and socially educated', which in turn makes them explore the term 'education'. Most conclusions point to the interpretation of 'education' as a means to bring about 'right living', and we are caught up in the recurrent conceptual circle.

When it comes to the question of this chapter - 'How is knowledge of human values acquired?' - the answer to be found in the current literature is couched in terms of moral growth and moral development, and the procedures whereby this development is brought about are found in theories of educational development. It seems that the popular view of writers on the constitution of morality and the acquisition of morality is that for the first we need to consult the philosophers, and for the second we need to consult the psychologists. The first area, of the constitution of morality, seems to rest its case in the knowledge of

the philosophers who can make pronouncements about what morality IS. The second area looks to the educational psychologists to provide answers on ways in which morality develops. A third area focuses on providing teachers with 'the knowledge' to apply the findings of the philosophers and psychologists (e.g. Hirst, 1974; Marland, 1974); and such books are adopted widely as initial and in-service resources to show the skills of teachers to help children 'become moral'.

This procedure is representative of a 'closed shop' mentality that strives to keep its own mores intact by imposing doctrines on its personnel that will make them conform to the expectations of that closed shop, and produce the 'certain kind of person'.

In Chapters 1 and 3 of this text I have tried to show how my practice changed in line with my developing understandings of the nature of personal and social education. In this section I now wish to indicate how the thinking was itself affected by those understandings; that is, how my own values underwent a gradual metamorphosis through my reflection on my practice.

When I first undertook my study in 1981, I thought that behaviour was brought about through habit formation. Habits were formed through the exposure of the subject to the environment which embodied the values which were the mores of the ruling society. I accepted that my job was to uphold the values of the society in which I found myself, both as a citizen of the UK, and as a deputy headmistress; in short, I was to produce the 'certain kind of person'. In this, I went along with the

assumptions of the literature, e.g. Hamblin (1981), Lewis and Mee (1981), Baldwin, (1979). These assumptions were grounded in a philosophical tradition that accepted reified rules as the correct basis for living, and assumed that the task of education was to enforce the rules. This last point needs some clarification:

Much of the literature of moral philosophy shows that there is a distinction between moral dispositions and moral reasoning. Pring (1984) explains: "First, the connecting link bewtween what reason says I should do and what I do in fact do must lie in some feeling or disposition to act according to practical reason. There must be some sense of obligation, of duty. Secondly, however, this approach to moral development - the concentration upon reasoning and obligation - might seem rather one-sided, omitting reference, as it does, to the range of feelings which are part of the moral life.

"At the beginning of 'The Republic', Thrasymachus asks Socrates, why be moral? It is a 'Catch 22' question. If one gives a moral answer for being moral, then the question is begged. If one gives a non-moral answer for being moral (such as moral people generally propser), then the subsequent 'moral' behaviour is no longer moral - it simply has the appearance of morality. The point is that, in the absence of a certain inclination to take moral considerations seriously, moral reasons will not be reasons for ACTION." (Pring, 1984).

This schism between a view of persons who naturally act morally, and those who act morally out of a sense of duty is, in my view, instrumentalist, and one that is a favourite grounding for much of the literature of the social sciences. It points to the duality of knower and known; to a view of persons as divided selves, where one section has a sense of moral obligation which another section does not necessarily want to adopt; to a theory of action that is geared towards end states - all reflections of an approach to knowledge that denies change and adaptability.

The view is synthesised in the literature of moral reasoning in the 'is-ought ' dilemma. Kant's views, for example, tell us that a sense of duty is a significant factor in the morally developed person. It is not so crucial that he is not naturally a moral person: what matters is that he acts upon his sense of duty to act morally - that is, to employ his rationality to cultivate his moral dispositions.

The 'is-ought' dilemma has two foci of attention. The first is that there is a certain standard (end state) to be achieved, that which OUGHT to be. This OUGHT is the embodiment of a philosophical view (a view of individual philosophers who think in a certain way); an embodiment of philosophers' values. A number of these philosophers see the embodiment of their values as a reflection of divine will or of socially desirable higher principles (e.g. Moses's Ten Commandments; Kant's 'Golden Rule'; Plato's 'Orthe doxe'; Rousseau's 'First nature': Aristotle's 'Contemplative life').

The second focus is that there is a human condition which has a form of existence separate from the values adopted by the philosophers. This condition should be brought into line with the expressed values, and the way to do that is through a formation of character by external forces (e.g. teachers). Nowell-Smith (1954: cited in Peters, 1981) sums up the situation: "Pleasure and pain, reward and punishment, are the rudders by means of which moral character is moulded; and 'moral character' is just that set of dispositions that can be moulded by this means." Peters himself, however, points to the difficulties in this view of imposing 'oughts' on present 'is's'. "Moral education is a matter of initiating others into traditions and into procedures for revising and applying them; these come to be taken as habits of mind. It is also a matter of spreading the contagion of sympathy and imagination so that such traditions bite on behaviour. But I think that we have little established knowledge about the crucial conditions which favours the initiation into this distinctive form of life." (Peters, 1981).

The philosophy that see 'oughts' as reified end states of the human condition is well presented by Hare (1952) who formulates the epistemologies involved in the development of moral reasoning in terms of universality and prescriptivism. He surmises that an end state of right living according to agreed higher principles is the ultimate goal of life, and that that goal may be made available to all individuals, through the proper conditions of an educative environment. Straughan (1982) characterises Hare's position thus: (1) the moral educator must show that he is personally trying to live up to his principles; (2) children must be shown that moral judgements are not statements of fact

to be learnt, but choices of principles to be made, leading to a particular way of life; (3) if we agree the principle of universality, children must learn how to put themselves in other people's shoes; (4) if universality means that the individual may not take his own self-interests as primary, he must learn to love his fellow man and treat his interests as of equal weight as his own.

The way to achieve the IS from the OUGHT - that is, to transform statements of value into statements of fact - is through rule following. The prescriptivism and universality of Hare may be seen throughout the rule systems of moral philosophy. The 'knowledge-that' of the content of morality is achieved through the 'knowledge-how' involved in following prescribed rules. Perhaps the clearest formulation of the notion of rules as guiding moral reasoning and action is seen in the work of Kant, who saw rules as "innate moulds into which specific experiences are fitted" (Peters, 1981).

As I have indicated in Chapter 1, my practice was based on the idea of rules as the basis of social evolution, and habit formation as the way to internalise the rules. In Chapter 3 I indicated that, by 1983, I became aware of much slippage between my belief in the respect I should be affording to my children as autonomous, independent thinkers, and a view of them and myself as servants of the system. Yet, even at this time, I still saw personal and social education in an ends-means light. My concept of 'person' was still interpreted as 'a certain kind of person'.

I have indicated that, during my secondment to the Teachers' Centre (1982-83) I saw relevance to my work of Chomsky's notions of competence and performance, and I became interested in the work of John Wilson and the Farmington Trust. Through my study of their work I saw that my blind adherence to the notion of blind adherence to rules was in error; my own capacity for free thought was limited, and my perception of people as persons was prejudiced. I began to become critical of my own thought processes, which enabled me to stand outside myself and account for my own practice.

One of the triggers for the beginning of the shift was in Wilson's characterisation of the morally educated person. He identifies the 'features of morality', and presents these features as desirable end states: "the analysis of the components of moral education in this way provides a useful check-list and might be useful objectives for teaching purposes" (Pring, 1984). Wilson stresses the need for rationality. If we act in a moral fashion, he says, our actions are meaningless unless we really intend them to be moral. For example, I may look after an aged neighbour, and my actions would be termed honourable. If I were doing this only in the hopes that she would leave me her property in her will, my morality is anulled. For Wilson, rationality is the override that qualifies actions as moral.

I applied this idea to the work of Chomsky, and decided to adopt his notions of competence and performance in my attempts to understand my own practice. I saw 'performance' as related to Wilson's idea of rationality. I saw also relationships with Freud's 'super-ego', but I never articulated this aspect. The model I produced (McNiff, 1986) took 'competence' as the area of emotions (Wilson's regard and respect) and applied the faculty of critical appraisal in bringing those emotions to the surface (performance). As time has gone on, I have extended this view (see later in this chapter) to account for the production of moral actions at a surface level by the application of dialectical transformations of the material at competence, deep level. The model helps me also in my understanding of the 'content' of morality, or values acquistion, in that I now have a basis for the reconstruction in practice of the innate faculties, including the emotions, at competence level.

My extended reading uncovered for me traditions of thought which stressed the need for the temperance of rationality to blind rule following. I came to realise that my previous practice had been aimed at training the children rather than educating them, and this in turn expanded my understanding of the nature of morality and moral education. Peters (1986) points this out: "'trained' suggests the development and competence in a limited skill or mode of thought, whereas 'educated' suggests a linkage with a wider system of beliefs." I found myself engaging in processes of education (see Chapter 3). What I was not aware of was the process of self-education that was also taking place. I simply felt a general feeling of malaise; I was aware of a future

opening up, of being on a threshold. I did not see the future clearly, nor could I explain the feeling of intense excitement I felt at the prospect. I rationalise it today by suggesting that what I was seeing was not the future but the present; that I was engaging in now, and that my perspective was changing from now as legacy of the past to now as harbinger of the future.

I have indicated in Chapter 3 how I tried to develop strategies that were aimed at leading out the children's own understandings of themselves. My questions moved towards open endings. When I read Schutz's 'Phenomenology of the social world' (1972), I was struck by Walsh's introductory remarks about Dilthey, and this work became relevant: "By interpreting this outward expression [of the individual's inner life] in terms of what lies behind it, we come to understand (verstehen) others. We do this by reconstituting our own inner experience 'in' the other person by 'reading' him. Understanding is therefore a 'rediscovery of the I in the Thou'. ... This insight into others is, therefore, the paradigm, so to speak, of the knowledge that is proper to the social sciences." (Walsh, in Schutz, 1972).

I grew to understand the difference between techne and praxis. Conversations with colleagues at the University inspired me to read and think about these issues. I deliberately adopted the Whitehead action-reflection spiral as a guide to my own thinking and action. I could see the development of my own practice towards praxis. This manifested itself in the more 'open' style of my classroom and of my dealings with the children in general in school, and of the divergence that was

setting in in my thinking; and, in consequence, my rejection of the political strictures imposed on me by institutionalised expectations. My way of thinking moved away from formal structures of thought to hermeneutic theories, and their implications of rapid shifts in perspective to accommodate the flexibility necessary for an interpretive mode of being. I believe that here I began to move towards a solution of Peters's problem about rational methods of teaching rationality:-

In his 1981 'Moral development and moral education', Peters poses the problem: "Given that it is thought desirable that children should develop an autonomous form of morality, and given that, if Piaget and Kohlberg are right, they cannot, in their early years, learn in a way that presupposes such an autonomous form, how can a basic content for morality be provided that gives them a firm basis for moral behaviour without impeding the development of a rational form of it? What non-rational methods of teaching aid, or at least do not impede, the development of rationality?"

Now, I have much to say about Peters's problem: to say why it is a problem, and not just one, but several problems; to look to the assumptions inherent in the traditions of thought exhibited here; and to suggest ways in which I am moving towards answers to similar problems in my own way.

First, I do not accept that Piaget and Kohlberg are 'right'. I do not accept that anyone is 'right', but that we all have a contribution to make in our own interpretation of the situations within our own context-specific frameworks. This has come to be a moral tenet for me, that I may make propositional statements on the understanding that I do so from the dialectical stand that prefaces my proposition in the notional terms 'I believe ... '; and that I as a dialectical person agree to set up a dialogue with others that will engage in mutually constituted agreements about the appropriateness of the form and substance of our questions and answers (see Chapter 3). Further to Peters's apology (see above) for Piaget and Kohlberg, I do not accept that Piaget and Kohlberg were asking questions that were appropriate to a study which was conducted within a dialectical framework. The questions and answers of Piaget and Kohlberg are grounded in formal, structuralist epistemologies which operate in terms of end states, as seen in their love of definitive, delimited stages, characterised in transitional terms, all heading towards one final stage - a stage to end all stages - which then had to serve the person for the rest of his life.

Second, I do not accept Peters's inclination for a "firm basis for moral behaviour" that is presumably shaped by a "rational form". This view is again symptomatic of a structuralist way of thinking, that sees development in terms of accretion, in line with my 'plaster sticking principle'. It is somehow supposed that rationality will be tacked on somewhere. This is also in line with Wilson's view of an idealised process of moral education: "We might be tempted to say that we can divide the task of moral education into two parts. First we should

educate people so as to give them the skills, abilities and knowledge required for moral decisions: ... and then we should 'give them the motivation' to put these into practice" (Wilson et al, 1967; see also my 1986).

Third, I must consider Peters's question of whether "non-rational methods of teaching" will aid the development of rationality. Is Peters here saying that, in order to develop rationality we must teach in a non-rational manner? Is he implying in a circuitous way that a field of study to do with organising the emotions is taught through the emotions? - or that teachers should develop styles that are grounded in affective zones rather than cognitive? He seems to be falling into the way of thinking critiqued by Stenhouse (1975) that we teach people to jump higher by setting the bar higher.

To continue with the development of my interpretive faculties during my school practice, I actively looked for ways to teach the rationality to go with the emotions, as Wilson said. I later came to understand the formal thought processes that caused me to proceed like this: the assumption that 'rationality' was another brick to be added to the edifice of the human being. My present best thinking (see below) tells me that the notional distinctive features of 'rationality' may be characterised in terms of the relationships operating between surface and deep levels, transformational relationships which enable aspects of competence (emotions, feelings, values) to be realised through the conative aspects of will and determination into aspects of performance (cognitive manifestations). I had been groping towards this thinking

since the original application of Chomsky's 'competence' and 'performance' to my interpretations of personal and social education. Now, with my search for ways to teach rationality, which in turn was encouraging my own critical faculties to emerge (Chapter 3), I was seeing the relevance of these thoughts to my awareness of a new way of thinking and being.

I now became much interested in the different interpretations put on personal development, and the different ways of explaining this development. My areas of enquiry so far had been grounded in the propositions of the literature about moral development. Now I came to be critical of the blanket view that says reified moral values are part of the traditions of a given society, and that they are acquired by the person's being in that society (habit formation). I had grown beyond these descriptions. I now wanted explanations for my children's development and for my own. So I turned to the literature of developmental psychology; and there found equally solid walls of the traditions of formal thinking that provided no answers, but only more questions.

(i) Assumptions of the literature of developmental psychology

First I studied the work of the two giants of cognitive developmental psychology, Piaget and Kohlberg. I was instinctively ill at ease with the assumptions inherent in theories of stage development. Then I turned to the work of the humanist psychologists, Rogers and Maslow. I found myself infintely more in sympathy with their views, but still caught in the trap of stage development. I became familiar with the work of Polanyi, and was much influenced by his ideas. The influence of my hero Chomsky was always in the background, and I saw affinities between his views and those of the critical theories of Broughton. I went on to read the work of Riegel, and many things fell into place in my mind. I need to read the work of Habermas much more closely, for I see many applications of his work to my own.

I will here attempt to show how I moved my ideas from a focus on stage development, which is grounded in the social sciences, to generative transformational dialectics, which is grounded in the reconstructive sciences.

Stage developmental theories

I wish here to investigate some of the main features that are identified in stage developmental theories, and to show how I originally tried to fit my practice to the theory, but then came to abandon such theories as inadequate to offer explanations for my practice.

"If Piaget and Kohlberg are right" (Peters, op.cit.) there is a final stage of human development. This final stage may be characterised by specific criteria. Piaget's Stage 6, Formal Operational Thought, lasts from about age 11 through adulthood. This stage involves the ability of the person to perform operations on operations, and "the construction of all possible combinations of relationships, systematic isolation of variables, and deductive hypothesis testing" (Kohlberg, in Scharf, 1978). All other stages may be similarly characterised by a description of their distinctive features. A successful 'completion' of each stage will move the subject on to a higher one. It is not possible to move to a higher stage without going through the preliminary one. Attainment of a logical stage is necessary for attainment of the parallel moral stage.

In Kohlberg's Stage 6, the Universal Ethical Principle Orientation, "Right is defined by the decision of conscience in accord with self-chosen ETHICAL PRINCIPLES appealing to logical comprehensiveness, universality, and consistency. These principles are abstract and ethical (Golden Rule, the Categorical Imperative); they are not concrete moral rules like the Ten Commandments. At heart, these are universal principles of JUSTICE, of the RECIPROCITY and EQUALITY of

human RIGHTS, of the respect for the dignity of human beings as INDIVIDUAL PERSONS" (Kohlberg, op.cit.; his italics). The same comments apply to Kohlberg as to Piaget about the sequentiality of stages, and the need for the subject to proceed systematically up the ladder in order to achieve success.

Pring (1984) comments on the features of development in such schemas (see also Selman, 1976; Loevinger, 1976: see below; Rogers, 1961: see below).

"The features of development ... are:

(i) it can be broken up into DISTINCT STAGES;

(ii) each stage demonstrates a QUALITATIVELY DIFFERENT MODE OF FUNCTIONING;

(iii) each stage is a STRUCTURAL TRANSFORMATION OF A PREVIOUS STAGE - it re-structures in a more adequate way the previous mode of operating;

(iv) THE STAGE SEQUENCE IS IRREVERSIBLE, the earlier stages necessarily preceding the later one;

(v) the process of development can stop at any stage (thus we talk of stunted growth).

"What are transformed stage by stage in personal development are those characteristics of 'personhood' that I picked out ... namely the ways in which one thinks, feels, and behaves in a meaningful and responsible way. It is the capacity to see things, to reflect upon them, to form judgements, to relate to others, and to behave accordingly which is transformed in a qualitative way. Of course, different children will learn different ideas, habits, beliefs and skills, but the way in which they will learn will be 'structured' according to the stage of development they are at. Whatever the differences in CONTENT of what children learn, there will be similarities in the FORMAL ORGANISATION of this content. These concepts of 'structure' and a 'transformation of structure' and the distinction between 'form' and 'content' are vital for understanding development in the sense we shall be considering" (Pring, 1984).

Now, it seems to me that the idea of stage development as presented so far carries with it several assumptions, assumptions that I have not found realised in my practice both as a teacher and as a thinker. The assumptions are that:

1. Everyone is the same in developmental terms. It is assumed that people will, more or less, proceed at the same pace. If some capacities appear not to be developed, we speak of 'stunted growth'. The term 'stunted growth' itself is a concept applied as a shorthand term by some of the educational psychologist I have met to explain the presence or absence of phenomena for which there appear to be no other explanations. 'Growth' is assumed to be within the normally accepted dimensions of

linearity and sequentiality, and refers to what is observable by an external observer. 'Growth' is the notional movement between notional stages: an abstract concept.

2. The model is reified. There is no in-built laterality to accommodate individual differences.

3. Less powerful stages develop into more powerful stages. Fodor (in Piattelli-Palmarini, 1980) attacks this notion vigorously, pointing out that a notional stage that is presented in descriptive terms only has not the power to produce a more powerful stage. (But see Polanyi, 1969, for the concept of irreducible structure.)

4. There is a final end state. Beyond this, no progress is envisioned.

5. The stages presented are prescriptive and universally applicable. Harris (1982) has pointed out that Piaget's theory is grounded in the socio-economic cultures of the Western world, and, if applied to children of the Third World, reveals that most of those children are retarded according to the norms of his stages.

6. The concept of stage development was invented by persons who have not shown its applicability to their own development as thinking persons. The idea of stages is not an extension of their own explanation for their own development, but an extension of their own thought structures that see themselves as external to others.

Taken all together, these assumptions allow an enquiry that grounds itself in the notion of stage development to have descriptive power (qualify as an E-enquiry) but not to have explanatory power (qualify as an I-enquiry).

When I first seriously studied the work of Piaget and Kohlberg in the hope that they would provide the answers to the questions I was now asking about my pupils' cognitive and moral development, I felt distinct unease because of a clear misfit. The answers were not appropriate. I assumed that I was asking the wrong questions. The answers given in the literature were in the form of 'at such-and-such an age you can expect such-and-such behaviour'.

And, according to Kohlberg (1976), in order to bring about such behaviour (observable at a certain stage), I as a teacher had to undertake specific tasks of asking probing questions that were applicable to a stage higher than the one at which my pupils currently seemed to be. I read (Kohlberg, op.cit.) that there would be a marked improvement in my children's performance as a result of this teacher intervention. I never thought to question the assumptions of Kohlberg's experiments, nor the analysis of the data.

This all seemed wonderful, but left me aghast. My problem was not to go through complex procedures to ascertain at which level my children currently were. Nor was it to go through even more complex procedures of planning a lesson that would focus on my asking types of questions appropriate to the content of another stage. My problem was to

understand why my children were as they were; to understand my own practice; to help my children move forward as free-thinking by whatever educational strategies seemed most appropriate at the time. I seemed to be operating in a different language altogether.

At the same time as reading the literature of Piaget and Kohlberg, I was also researching the principles of action research. 'Human Inquiry' (Reason and Rowan, 1981) featured very strongly in my life. My practice was guided by the principles of action research, but my thinking was still inclined towards Piaget and Kohlberg. I could not initially resolve the two realms of discourse, other than to feel that action research was more in line with what I WAS doing, whereas the literature of Piaget and Kohlberg was what I SHOULD be doing.

In retrospect I can rationalise the dilemma thus: the literature of Piaget and Kohlberg is presented in its propositional sense of knowledge-that supported by knowledge-how (Chapter 5). This approach to knowledge is reinforced by a parallel approach to values that categorises them in terms of their usefulness to society. The approaches to knowledge and to values are presented in these terms by these researchers who regard persons as external to themselves and as 'subjects' of an enquiry.

The literature of action research is presented in its dialectical sense of knowledge + a direct object. This approach abnegates a view of persons as external to the researcher by requiring the researcher to 'know herself' as a subject of her own research. This perspective takes individual practice as the ground for self-knowledge. Dialectical hypotheses are statements of individual belief ('I believe ...') which incorpoate propositional statements (' ... that this is so ...') grounded in personal practice ('... because I experienced it like this') and submitted to public scrutiny ('let me show you ...') for intersubjective criticism (' ... how I think it is so ...') for interpersonal agreement (' ... so that we can agree ...') about dialogical frameworks (' ... a common ground').

At the time I possessed no such formulation. I was unhappy that my practice did not fit the propositions of Piaget and Kohlberg. Then I read 'Personal knowledge' (Polanyi, 1958). This was one of the most influential books of my life. I drew from that the courage to have faith in personal instinct. It provided for me a kind of 'meta-framework', in a belief in self that was above beliefs in propositional forms of knowledge. For me, 'Personal knowledge' is an intensely spiritual book, emphasising the spiritual qualities of persons as demonstrated by an insistence on the need to encourage a reliance on the faith in faith.

I came to see action research in this light. I came to see it as a liberating exercise that encourages freedom of thought and practice. I was by now aware of the changes in the thought processes that were encouraging a critical approach to my practice, and I was now consciously using action research as the guide that would use criticism to bring about improvement. I was rationalising and growing in understanding of my own practice, but I was still not much nearer to an understanding of my children's, seeing explanations for how they were still grounded in models presented by Piaget and Kohlberg, or those of other psychologists whose work I read, such as Bandura and Walters (1965). I still had the view that my children's progress could be described in terms of stages, and that their development was a matter of habit formation.

Through my reading of Pring (1984), I discovered the work of Jane Loevinger (1976). Her ideas of ego development seemed closer in spirit to what I was doing. She sees personal development in terms of growing towards maturity of inclinations and dispositions. She talks of the 'ego' rather than the 'self', and sees the constitution of the ego as "a rather complex 'fabric' of character traits, ways of interrelating with other people, conscious pre-occupations, capacities for controlling impulses, and modes of thinking about different issues" (Pring, 1984). As I browsed through her work I became aware of the similarities in approach to the work of Button. Some things began to fall into place. I went back to the texts of Button. In his 1964 'Group work with adolescents' he talks of the pupils' personal enquiry. Here was a way forward for me, that seemed to be dispelling the ghost of habit

formation, and I began to review the work I had done and was doing in this light.

It became clear to me that Button was advocating an action research policy for children's development. I had long ago accepted that it was the policy for my own development (see Chapters 1 and 3). I had never before considered transferring those notions to the children. Hot on the heels of this revelation came another: that what I was doing as a researcher was conducting my own action research enquiry into my children's action research enquiry.

This was for me a monumental discovery, for these reasons:

In my practice I was critically reflecting on my own process through the action research cycle of observe, reflect, act, evaluate, modify, observe ... I was changing my ideas and my actions continually in an attempt to move closer to a practice that would enable me to help my children develop. The movement in my ideas and actions could be characterised in terms of an openness that had been absent before. In retrospect I can say that I was moving towards dialectical operations of thought and practice. Part of the openness of my thought entailed my view of my children as free, thinking human beings; unlike previous practice that had aimed to turn out a 'certain kind of person'. At the time I had not yet formulated the notion of dialectical operations as being a state that had the generative capacity for unlimited acts of creation.

As indicated above, I was concerned at this time to introduce a critical element into the children's actions, as per the suggestions of Wilson (1967). I felt that if I could make them aware of what they were doing they would (a) reconsider 'negative' aspects of their behaviour in order to replace them with more 'positive' aspects; (b) adopt those more positive aspects as part of their moral code (competence). As already stated, at the time I did not characterise this as 'action research'; but on reflection, I can see that I was encouraging my children to adopt the same principles as I in a consideration of our practice. I was not so much teaching personal and social education in terms of the process of becoming socialised or becoming personally independent, or in terms of the content of knowing how to acquire the skills of these characteristics (see Chapters 1 and 3). What I was now doing was teaching my children how to do action research, presenting to them ways and means whereby they could develop their own skills of reflection in action. Later I came to appreciate that I was also moving myself and them toward dialectical forms of being. Certainly we established dialogical communities as the form of life in which dialectical humans may communicate with each other.

I have indicated in Chapter 3 how I tried to prompt my children to re-think - to reflect in action on their actions. I tried to get them to evaluate their ideas and actions in a critical sense, and to use that critical appraisal in the formation of new ideas and actions. The tapes of 1983-86 are full of such instances. I offer two examples here as a flavour of our lessons together:

(1) Mandy It was stupid.

JM Why do you say that?

Mandy Well, it was. I should have ...

JM Go on, Mandy. What could you have done? (AT40)

(2) Here the whole group is given the task of being a validation group. In VT10 with the English adviser, RS, the group is talking about their own style in our lessons.

Vincent She lets us talk among ourselves.

Colin We all listen, and then we say, 'Yes, but you haven't done such and such, and then we think about it.

The most apposite piece of evidence is unfortunately lost. It was a videotape of PL, headmaster of The Oaks, when he was talking about my work, both with the children and with the staff. He commented that I had brought personal and professional skills to the staff which they were passing on to the children. This tape was stolen during a break-in at school. But if what PL was saying held merit, what was happening was a three-fold chain: (1) I had come to my own position of adopting an action-reflection cycle to move my own practice forward, which (2) enabled me to pass on the skills to colleagues which helped them to move their own practice forward which (3) enabled them to pass on the skills to the children which helped them to move their own practice forward. By my words 'pass on the skills', I do not mean this in its instrumental sense of 'know-how'; but in a dialectical sense, that I was making explicit my form of life and inviting others to understand it, and share

it if they wished. My method was not coercion. Certainly I was always enthusiastic, and may have been guilty of persuasion by keenness; but by 1983 I can honestly say that I was moving toward a form of life that cherished the independence of other individuals and sought to make their thinking free, and that included the freedom to be free of my influence as well if they so wished.

By now, then, I was acutely aware of the 'meaning' of my practice, in terms of ideas being related to action, and the wish to turn statements of fact and statements of value into the same realm of discourse. My action-reflection procedure was approaching nearer to the vision, and the action-reflection procedures of my children were approaching nearer to their vision. Together we were agreeing frameworks that would enable us to negotiate our separate visions into the universal pragmatics of our own situations.

In 1984/85, however, I was still stuck in terms of the question of this chapter: 'How is a knowledge of values acquired?' I could see clearly that my procedures were leading my pupils forward. I still could not explain why. My acquisition model was still grounded in the notion of habit formation, and its expression took the form of stage development.

Then I discovered the work of Carl Rogers, and this proved to be enormously influential in my thinking. As happened on my reading of 'Personal Knowledge', some sort of intellectual leap took place which cleared much mental clutter and shifted the perspective to make way for new ways of thinking.

I found myself in sympathy with Rogers on two main counts. The first was his view of 'personhood' which was grounded in the notion of development. Unlike Piaget and Kohlberg, he saw no 'fixed' end stage of rigid structures. An aim, a final state, for Rogers was described in terms of personal experience, when that experience of self is one in which new experiences are welcomed and sought. Thus Rogers's Seventh Stage (1961) is characterised by the following criteria:

" - New feelings are experienced with immediacy and richness of detail, both in the therapeutic relationship and outside. The experiencing of such feelings is used as a clear referent.

- There is a growing and continuing sense of acceptant ownership of these changing feelings, a basic trust in his (the client's) own process.

- Experiencing has lost almost completely its structure-bound aspects and becomes process-experiencing - that is, the situation is experienced and interpeted in its newness, not as the past.

- The self becomes increasingly simply the subjective and reflexive awareness of experiencing. The self is much less frequently a perceived object, and much more frequently something confidently felt as process.

- Personal constructs are tentatively reformulated, to be validated against further experience, but even then, to be held loosely.

- Internal communication is clear, with feelings and symbols well matched, and fresh terms of new feelings. There is the experiencing of effective choice of new ways of being." (Rogers, 1961)

The second reason why I felt so much in sympathy with Rogers is his view of his own development. He states that his learning is never complete, but part of his on-going development in which he is constantly moving forward in wisdom. His learning and his knowledge of his own development is grounded in his practice, and therefore in himself as a reflexive practitioner.

"I have learned to live in increasingly deep therapeutic relationships with an ever-widening range of clients. This can be and has been extremely rewarding. It can be and has been at times very frightening, when a deeply disturbed person seems to demand that I must be more than I am in order to meet his need. Certainly the carrying on of therapy is something which demands continuing personal growth on the part of the therapist, and this is sometimes painful, even though in the long run rewarding.

"I would also mention the steadily increasing importance which research has come to have for me. Therapy is the experience in which I can let myself go subjectively. Research is the experience in which I can stand off and try to view this rich subjective experience with objectivity, applying all the elegant methods of science to determine whether I have been deceiving myself. The conviction grows in me that we shall discover laws of personality and behaviour which are as significant for

human progress or human understanding as the law of gravity or the laws of thermodynamics."

I was much taken with the views of Rogers about the educative relationships between counsellor and client. It provided new ways for me of thinking about my own role, and that of my pupils. Rogers saw the client not as someone to be healed or cured. He had not 'gone wrong'. He had simply lost touch with himself. It was not the counsellor's job to carry out the healing process as an external agent applying remedies; it was his job to enter into relationship with the client in order to help the client re-establish contact with himself. He documents the way in which he came to this point of view:

"One brief way of describing the change which has taken place in me is to say that in my early professional years I was asking the question, How can I treat, or cure, or change this person? Now I would phrase the question in this way: How can I provide a relationship which this person may use for his personal growth?"

I remember that I was very excited when I read this for the first time. Here was another teacher who had gone through the experience of trying to turn out a 'certain kind of person' as his previous training had taught him to do, had found that situation a denial of his values as a responsive human being, and had opted to find his own way according to his own practice. I felt that I had here a legitimate tradition which would provide support for my own emergent thinking.

Just as I have found through my practice that propositional and procedural knowledge is an inappropriate ground for my work with others, so Rogers found through his experience:

"It has gradually been driven home to me that I cannot be of help to this troubled person by means of any intellectual and training procedures. No approach which relies upon knowledge, upon training, upon acceptance of something that is TAUGHT, is of any use. These approaches seem so tempting and direct that I have, in the past, tried a great many of them. It is possible to explain a person to himself, to prescribe steps which should lead him forward, to train him in knowledge about a more satisfying mode of life. But such methods are, in my experience, futile and inconsequential. The most they can accomplish is some temporary change, which soon disappears, leaving the individual more than ever convinced of his inadequacy."

I saw this view as articulating what I had been intuitively groping towards, in terms of the relationships I was trying to establish with my children. I saw the action-reflection cycle as a means to heighten them; and my own awareness of the need for such relationships, and a way of developing a process to bring these relationships about. And I saw my role as a teacher to enter into the relationships with my pupils so as to foster the basic understandings necessary for the establishment of such relationships. Like Rogers, I felt:

"If I can provide a certain type of relationship, the other peson will discover within himself the capacity to use that relationship for growth, and change and personal development will occur."

But whereas Rogers was here talking about a one-to-one relationship, client and counsellor, I was involved in a one-to-one relationship of me and an individual, and me and many individuals. My problem was how to apply the principles of one-to-one to one-to-many. A step toward solving the problem lay in my adoption of the principle of establishing a dialogical community of reflexive independents (see Chapter 7).

This interest in the work of Rogers had two significant implications for my practice. First, I changed my perceptions of the children, and consequently my teaching style. Second, I formulated my own model, based still on the form of stage development, to account for the personal and social development of my children.

I deliberately adopted a view of my children as caring, thinking people. I attempted to establish an 'I and Thou' relationship that showed Rogers's principles of 'positive regard', the same as Buber's notion of 'affirmation'. I was delighted to read the conversation between Rogers and Buber, recorded in Buber's 'The knowledge of man' (1965), in which they both explain these thoughts referring to individuals' positive acceptance of each other in their struggle to improve the quality of life.

Rogers ... You're saying that perhaps we can help the individual to strengthen. Yes, that's it, to affirm life rather than refuse it.

Buber I differ only in this word; I would not say life. I would not put an object on it.

My changing attitude toward my children could be characterized by what Elizabeth Newson (in Vesey, 1976-77) calls 'unreasonable care'. She says that the task of teachers is to go out of their way to make children feel valued: "Children who have no sense and recognition of their own value are defeated children", and she goes on to say that positive regard offered unstintingly by their teacher will encourage them to extend the same regard to themselves and to others. I had always cared for my children, those that deserved it. Now I determined to care actively for all my children, even the horrible ones.

I have no record of this change, other than this present testimony and the tapescripts which speak for themselves. I feel, also, that the care is reflected in the videotapes of my 1985/86 practice (e.g. VT9 and 10). To my mind, there is a vibrant empathy between the children and myself, and between the children to each other. I have already referred in Chapter 3 to the touching episodes, such in as Jason's stories about his motor bike prowess, when genuine affection was displayed. If I compare these episodes with those showing the same group as uncouth, rowdy louts (VT5; AT38) who fall about with glee when someone in the

group is made to feel small, I wonder at the enormous strides that the children made within a year.

For myself, I am pleased to point to VT10, as validation of my claim that I helped my children to develop, in the sense hypothesised in this text, which is validated through their acknowledgement to RS, the English Adviser:

> Sheila We understand what we're doing now. She's helped us. (VT10)

I was so impressed with the work of Carl Rogers that I adopted his framework in an attempt to explain the development of my children. What I ended up with was a description in terms of stage development. However, I was progressing, as I saw it, to try to capture the essence of my children's development in notional terms of features. Those features, unlike the rigid structures of Piaget and Kohlberg, looked at general inclinations, in the style of Rogers. I recorded this approach in a BERA paper (1986), but, as I have already indicated in Chapter 3 of this text, the model lasted a very short time.

The model appeared as this: all the quotes are from the transcripts:

STAGE ONE: FIXITY

Characteristics include:

- a self-contruct of low esteem: "We are dinloes." "We're thick."
- a rigid view of lack of potential: "We ain't no good."
- little regard for personal actions: "He made me do it."
- little regard is shown for other people: "Miss, she thinks she's great, just because her dad's a taxi driver."
- there is little desire to change: JM "Why do you behave like that?" P. "It's a good laugh. I like it."

STAGE TWO: AN EMERGING CONTINUUM

Characteristics include:

- the self-construct is improved: P. "We're no good." JM: "I don't agree. What's the matter with you?" P: "Nothing, really."
- responsibility is perceived as an object. JM: "Why did you do that?" P: "He hit me so I hit him." (As opposed to "He started it.")
- limited personal regard is extended. P: "I suppose Ann is all right."
- potential is acknowledged but not acted upon: P1: "We're thick." P2: "Speak for yourself."
- there is an acknowledge that perhaps change is necessary:

P: "My mum says I've got to stop mucking around,"

STAGE THREE: A FREEING OF EXPRESSION

Characteristics include:

- an increased willingness to communicate self: P: "No, that's not what I think. You don't understand what I'm saying."
- an increased sensitivity in communication: P: "Miss, why don't you have your ears pierced?" JM: "I'm squeamish. I couldn't bear the thought of it!" P: "If you did it would make you look much younger." JM: "What's having my ears pierced got to do with making me look younger?" P: "Well, you know."
- a growing awareness of other people's feelings: P: "We've stopped calling each other names now." "We agreed with Miss not to muck around."
- a growing awareness of the need to accept responsibility: P: "I hate this school. I hate all teachers." JM: "Because you were caned." P: "Yes. (Pause). My own fault really."
- an acceptance of personal potential: P: "I'm thinking of taking that exam like you said."

STAGE FOUR: INTO FREEDOM

Characteristics include:

- self-constructs are less rigid: P: "They say my folks are hippies because of the way they dress. I'm not a hippy. I think I look like Michael Jackson. I like it."
- there is an awareness and consideration for other people: P: "Shush! Julie's trying to say something."
- there is an emergence of self-reliance: P: "I'm not going to muck around from now on. I want to be a prefect."
- judgements about other people are held much more loosely and rationally: P: "Mr X is not bad, for a teacher." "The police nicked us but they let us off. That was quite fair, really."
- the children are prepared to listen to each other and engage in dialogue: P: "No, I don't agree with you."

STAGE FIVE: TOWARDS AUTONOMY

Characteristics include:

- a developing construct of self as process: Visitor: "What do you do in these lessons?" P: "We learn how to get on with each other. We learn about how to improve ourselves." P: "I'm growing up now. I'm much better in myself."
- as easement of relationships with adults in authority: JM "How do

you see me, then?" P: "You're our teacher. You're a friend." JM: "How do you see other teachers?" P: "Some of them are all right, really."

- an enhanced ability to communicate: P: "It's nice when I can't find the right words and they listen to me." P: "I can talk to the group without feeling stupid."
- a movement towards a state of process: P: "We didn't understand. We've learnt a lot."
- the present is now not so much rooted in the past as a preparation for the future: P:"From now on I intend to make something of my life."

STAGE SIX: AUTONOMY

Characteristics include:

- a development of self-direction: P: "I've decided what's best for me."
- a trust in personal potential: "I'm going to have a go at the exam. I might not pass it, but I'll still have a go."
  P: "Miss, I really fancy Julie. Shall I ask her out?" JM: "Why don't you? I'm sure she'd love to go out with you." P: "Yes, all right, then. Got to watch my spots, though."
- a readiness to trust other people: P: "Marcus is my friend. He won't let me down." P: "Sometimes I see my mum as a real friend rather than my mum."

- the ability to listen sympathetically: P to a visitor: "Go on, Mr X, tell us about it."
- an awareness and acceptance of a sense of process: "I'm growing up now." "We're getting there."

Almost as soon as I had created the model (Chapter 3), I found it deficient. I record my dissatisfaction in a revised version of the BERA paper that I wanted to get published, but never got round to sending it off:

"I have come to the view now that I reject the stages as inadequate to explain the life of an individual. Stages may indicate general trends, but I am still focally concerned to show the PROCESS at work. Objections to my stages will point out, for example, that some individuals are already well advanced to higher stages when they first begin work with a group; some do not go further than intermediate stages; some take a long time to move, while others, in Platonic style, will progress to autonomy by leaps and bounds. Stages are useful indicators in the description of the process; they are not explanations for that process." (McNiff, 1986(b)).

This was now finally movement away from the notion of stage development, itself a casualty of the 'fixity' concept. This was the point at which I made a complete break with stage development in my search for explanations. All that I had achieved had been a more complex description of what was happening. I was still thinking in linear terms. I cannot say when or where I actually moved beyond propositional

thought, which is the ground for the linear notions of stage development, or even exactly why. The 'when' was some time in 1986. The 'why' is probably answered by the sense of crisis caused by my insights into personal development because of the intense action and reflection of the research process so far.

I am still much taken with the ideas of Rogers, and I have later expressed the application of his ideas as an example in practice of the establishment of warm caring relationships (1986(c), 1987(a)).

I will now proceed to the idea of generative transformational dialectics as a possible explanations for an acquisition of a knowledge of values (this chapter) and as a basis in which to ground the use of a knowledge of values (Chapter 7).

5 GENERATIVE TRANSFORMATIONAL DIALECTICS AS A POSSIBLE EXPLANATION FOR AN ACQUISITION OF KNOWLEDGE OF VALUES

In this section I shall attempt to draw a number of different strands together, to present a synthesis of my present best thinking which is an expression of the thought and action of my practice over the years. I shall present what I have found to be a useful device to explain what I see as a way in which humans acquire values; and I shall then use this notional device as a basis for the grounding of communicative competence (Habermas, 1979) within dialogical frameworks (Chapter 7).

In this chapter I have pointed out that the dominant model for values acquistion is currently:

(a) General learning mechanism - stimulus response; assimilation of the environment by the individual;

(b) General learning method - habit formation of responses to stimuli from the environment;

(c) General cognitive organisation - stage development.

I have shown how I initially adapted this model to my own practice, without necessarily agreeing with the underlying assumptions inherent in the model, but have come to reject it as being inappropriate to my needs. My reasons for rejecting it may be summarised as follows:

(1) It does not answer Plato's problem.

(2) It does not answer the questions of my practice.

To make these reasons more explicit:

(1) It does not answer Plato's problem

The questions posed in Plato's problem are to do with poverty of stimulus and richness of response. In the field of values acquistion, we are dealing with issues that have as deep significance for the human condition as any field of enquiry. If the notions of stimulus-response and habit formation are correct, what we are saying is that the child learns to make judgements on which he will act according to the data presented to him, and will build habits on the basis of those data.

To any reflexive observer, this just plainly is not so. In a superficial sense it may be. If my child worries the cat and I tell her to leave the cat alone, she will do so. Her actions are governed by criteria other than concern for the cat, tempered even by Wilson's element of rationality (1967). If my 13-year-old pupil stops misbehaving because I tell him to do so, I cannot automatically assume that he will generalise his assumed 'good' behaviour to any and all future situations. The field of human experience, even for infants, is so vast and complex that it is quite shortsighted to limit the variety of human responses to only those that may be observed. Further, it is imposing an unnecessary limitation on the mind of the thinker to suppose

that stimuli and responses may be classified in terms of events past rather than events to come.

If we assume that each new response by the individual to the environment is new, we must then accept at least two corollaries:

(i) The 'values system' or 'system of acquisition of morality' has to be 'reinvented' with each new act. No two situations are going to be identical, to assume that identical responses will result from identical stimuli. Nor is it possible to invoke the ghost of generalisability, assuming that similar situations will produce similar responses. Real life shows that it clearly is not so. No amount of telling or intellectualising stops an alcoholic from taking the next drink. To stop drinking, you have to want to first. A child who 'learns' to wait for the green man every time he is out with his mother still enjoys himself defying the traffic when he is out by himself.

There is no one 'pat' answer, or formula, to assign to responses, particularly, but not only, in the field of morality. The furore in the literature about Williams's (1967) 'The cost of saving lives' is evidence of that.

(ii) Because there is no standard formula of specific or generalised responses to specific or generalised situations, it must be assumed that each new act is an act of individual creation. The inductivist fallacy is shown to be what it is: a convenient shorthand form used in an attempt to predict human behaviour. Although human behaviour is often predictable (support for inductivism), it is not always so (rejection of inductivism), and humans always have the option for it not to be so. (I speak here of 'normal' humans in 'normal' circumstances, and not, for example, of ill persons, or persons whose personalities have been maimed as in, for example, people who have been subject to mental assault.) In other words, although it may suit the person to build up certain habits, he will not necessarily take them on board as part of his mental life. He always has the option to change. (The problem is that people are often not aware that they have the option to change: see also Chapter 7).

The questions of Plato's problem are not answered by the answers of the dominant paradigm. They do not match. The fields of discourse are separated by a gulf. Plato's paradigm is asking about mechanisms which allow the re-creation of moral responses; the paradigm involving behavioural psychology and cognitive developmental psychology is answering in terms of generalised responses produced by the sorting system of the brain. Plato's paradigm is asking about the novel acts of developing individuals; the dominant paradigm is operating in fixed concepts about a 'certain kind of person' who is, in fact, an abstraction. The questions about generative capabilities cannot be

handled by a way of thinking that has intermediate and final end products as an objective of the human enterprise.

2. The dominant model did not answer the questions of my practice

I wanted to know why my children thought and acted as they did, not as the literature assumed they would. I genuinely tried with many groups to get them settled sufficiently to go through a Button programme, or a Kohlberg programme, or a structured input that would provide the basis for some sort of standardised test. I saw my teaching not in the 'input', the content of a programme when they were settled, but in my getting them to the state where they were settled. It was this pre-set phase that called for the teaching skills. The 'input' stage called for technical skills. In the 'input' stage I simply had to apply the technology, go through the programme and wait for the 'right results'. The 'meta' framework, of establishing the right relationship with the children, put demands on me as an educator. I recorded this difficulty in a progress report as early as 1982, when I wrote: "It is easy to get the children to agree to co-operate in the Button work; but how do I get them to the stage where they are prepared to agree?"

The dominant model does not tackle the problems of naughty children, or the dissatisfaction with practice. It tackles the problems of plotting children's progress in decision making and in social skills along fixed dimensions in which cognitive structures are supposed to change in order to deal with environmental circumstances of increased complexity.

Kohlberg's model requires teachers to be aware of their students' present level of awareness and development in order to lead them on to higher levels.

I see this model as one in which skills may be refined and insights developed. I do not see it as answering the questions of the practice of me as an individual or of my children as individuals. Human practice itself is heavily value-laden. I am not so interested by the responses of the child within the controlled conditions of a specific input, but by the responses in the wider framework of classroom life, and life in general.

It will be argued that an input such as Button's, McPhail's, Kohlberg's will work, will in itself teach the child the necessary moral behaviour to apply to the wider terms of life. He will supposedly gain insights during his formal training that he will transfer to general life situations. I accept this argument, but also complain that it is limited in its scope. It is limited because it again rests on the notions of habit formation. It is also limited because it assumes that children learn to make moral decisions only through formal programmes. Those programmes will certainly intensify and accelerate the acquistion of their own latent knowledge, as I demonstrated to my own satisfaction (Chapter 1). But such programmes still do not demonstrate to me as a teacher how I can account for this development of latent knowledge, my own as well as the children's. It still does not answer the questions of my practice of the form 'How do I improve this process of education here?' (Whitehead, 1980)

The considerations so far suggest that the dominant model for values acquistion seeks answers in the social sciences. The model presents a picture of the individual in society, the individual 'over against others'. This approach has not the power to provide explanations for individual practices. It will produce observations and descriptions; and those descriptions include the observations of the researchers who interpret the world in terms of their own mental structures. Those descriptions operate in terms of prescriptivism and universalisation, so their creators assume that the models they produce are reified and generally applicable. I cannot accept all this as an explanation for my own practice. So, for the reasons specified so far, I am rejecting the dominant model of a stimulus-response orientation, habit formation, cognitive-developmental stages, an approach via the social sciences. I am proposing a new model which suits my practice. I am not presenting it in a reified sense. I started thinking about this way of thinking many years ago, as I hope to have demonstrated in this text. This text is the first time I have drawn my present best thinking together, but already the ideas expressed here are being discussed in the community of researchers (McNiff 1984, 1986, 1988), and later work shows modification of earlier work as a direct result of colleagues' criticisms.

I will continue to make my ideas public in an attempt to engage in dialogue to move the ideas forward. I was pleased to read of Lewin's presentation of theories (in Baldwin, 1967). Lewin had the knack of writing up his best thinking, but then moving beyond it almost immediately. I sense that the same thing happens to me. Certainly I have found that what I had considered to be a satisfactory answer is

rapidly replaced by a better one. The in-built obsolescence I spoke about earlier in this chapter is doing its work, in preventing us from resting on our laurels, but spurring us forward to look, and look again.

I shall now present what I have come up with as a possible answer. No doubt it will change as I continue to reflect in action.

(a) THE DEVICE

Throughout this text I have indicated my belief that what is observed in human behaviour is often a surface level manifestation which is not always congruent with the latent ability of the individual. In the study of language, which is where my interest in this area of enquiry originated, Polanyi's aphorism that 'we know more than we can tell' is immediately relevant.

Chomsky (1957), drawing on the innateness hypothesis of Wilhelm von Humboldt and Leibniz, rejected the currently dominant paradigm of a structuralist approach to the study of linguistics as being inadequate to deal with the latent knowledge of the individual that allows him to recognise deviant sentences, and to produce an unlimited number of well-formed strings in any given language. Thus, a native speaker-hearer would know that the string

* 'sincerity frighten may boy the' is syntactically deviant;

* 'sincerity may frighten the boy' is semantically deviant;

* 'the boy elapsed' is interpretatively deviant;

* 'I'm memorizing the score of the sonata I hope to compose one day' is pragmatically deviant.

(All these examples, and some of those following, are taken from Chomsky's various works.)

The native speaker-hearer will also distinguish between sentences that are acceptable in performance terms and purely grammatical or syntactic terms. The string

'I called up the man who wrote the book that you told me about'

is marginally acceptable, whereas

'The man who the boy who the students recognised pointed out is a friend of mine'

is unacceptable in performance terms, though grammatically correct. Discourse is often guided by acceptability, rather than grammaticality.

The native speaker-hearer will recognise the ambiguity in sentences such as

'Time flies'

'Visiting relatives can be a bore'

'Flying planes can be dangerous';

and will be able to produce unlimited strings, both of the sort

'This is the cat that ate the rat that ... '

and of the sort

''Twas brillig and the slithy toves
Did gyre and gimble in the wabe';

i.e. utterances that are limitless (and therefore novel) by accretion, and utterances that are novel by creation (that no other person has, or is likely to, produce).

I am applying Chomsky's hypotheses concerning the innateness hypothesis, the interplay between competence and performance, and the ability of the human mind to generate an infinite number of novel responses to my own notions concerning the acquisition of values, or moral knowledge.

Let us suppose that observable acts are those of performance. Let us also remember Collingwood's (1939) advice that we should not always accept observable behaviour as the truth of a person's intentions. When we look at VT1, we see children behaving in a socially unacceptable manner. No amount of cajoling on the part of the teacher (JM) persuades them to reform their behaviour. There are momentary lapses by individuals, but, by and large, the group is a mob of loud-mouthed, silly children. It would be an interesting exercise to try to place them within a Piagetian or Kohlbergian structure. What would be the response of Piaget or Kohlberg, or Selman or Loevinger, I wonder, if they were confronted by my children? TM, I remember, cautious about our preliminary taster of Leslie Button's work in 1981, commented wryly: "Put Leslie with 3A2 last thing on Friday afternoon and see how he gets on."

If we do not believe, as I do not, that children are as bad as they would have us believe, we must look for other explanations. These same children, I found out in my practice, could be caring, sensitive and curious, once removed from situations in which they felt they had to show off. Their silly behaviour, I assumed, was a matter of choice. Their 'true' characters were manifested in more thoughtful, self-critical moments.

Let us, then, further suppose the notion of competence, the area within the individual that is the place of his inner beliefs and values, his sense of right and wrong. Competence is at a deep level and performance at a surface level. The way in which competence may be allowed - or prevented - from reaching the surface of performance is through the intention, the choice, of the individual. Now, competence may be deliberately presented in a distorted fashion, such as in my children's abberative behaviour. This choice is the application of Wilson's (1967) element of intentionality that makes the morally aware person.

The three areas of my proposed model draw on the traditional areas of affection, conation and cognition. To explain:

The wrangle in the literature over which of the three aspects of the human mind is dominant is grounded in a view of these three areas being in competition with each other. They are to be found in writings as early as Aristotle, who compared the three areas to the winged steeds of the charioteer, often at a loss to know which should take the lead. Peters (1964) expresses confusion; Russell (1908), commenting on Plato's theory of education, talks of "good behaviour with the wrong emotions". Straughan (1982) comments: "Education aims to produce a certain 'rational' state of mind in the learner by bringing him to acknowledge the validity of reasons, but this state of mind may have a greater or lesser effect upon how the person actually behaves. His reasoning may or may not remain at a theoretical level; his judgements may or may not be translated into action; his beliefs may or may not guide his behaviour."

Let me suggest that the lack of vision throughout the literature is caused by the insistence of thinkers to approach a theory of acquisition of values through the medium of the social sciences, which seek to impose explanations for individual behaviour within the framework of social morality. Even Downie and Kelly (1978), whose message focuses on the need for individuals' interpretations of morality ("Moral education ... must enable people to do their own moral thinking rather than encourage them to conform to an externally imposed moral code"), assume that morality is learnt through exposure to a moral, appropriate form of life.

I am here suggesting that it is necessary to turn to the reconstructive sciences, i.e. an enquiry into how the innate faculties of the human mind may be reconstructed into cognitive structures. So, instead of viewing affective (to do with the emotions), conative (to do with will) and cognitive (to do with ratiocination) areas as being in opposition, or at best in some sort of uneasy acquaintanceship, let us interpret the situation dialectically, and look for relationships, transformations, and movement forward through negations and cancellations. Drawing all these strands together, let us suppose competence to have to do with the affective zone. This will embrace feelings, beliefs, emotions. Let us then suppose performance to do with the cognitive zone, relying on the processes of ratiocination. In order for competence to be reflected in performance, it has to go through a system of transformations. I will call these 'dialectical transformations' for they are to do with conative areas of the will, determination and attitudinal factors. So

competence may be transformed into performance by the application of conscious decisions.

Now, it may be, as in the case of VT1, that individuals will deliberately present their deeply-held beliefs in a distorted fashion at a surface level. I know that I should not lie, but I do. This decision to distort does not in fact distort competence - only the surface presentation (see also Habermas's 1979 notion that intuitions may not be false, but their representations may be). The task of educators is not only to present learners with the correct performance models (for habit formation is a non-sequitur) but with appropriate mechanisms for making choices. If we can put learners in touch with their own dialectical processes, we are using the key to the door, the key to the generative capacity that makes possible the transformations in the first place.

Visually, the model is:



To support this model it is necessary to suppose an acquisition model (AM) which entails the notions 'generative capacity' and 'what is learnt'.



Let us suppose that the AM itself is an aspect of competence. Thus, a specific 'input' from the environment will be processed by the AM to produce a certain output. The AM contains the notion 'what is learnt', i.e. internalised aspects that the individual has accepted as a distinctive feature of his own personality. Let us also suppose that the AM contains the generative capacity that enables the individual to produce an unlimited number of novel actions (i.e. his creative faculty). In performance terms, the output generated by the individual reflects the input, determined by the dialectical transformations.

Return with me for a moment to my naughty children on VT1. I maintain that they are not really like this, not deep down. In the terms of my model I am saying that they have deliberately distorted their performance, as a potential manifestation of their competence. The conscious decision lies in the conative aspects of the transformations.

What my children perhaps were not employing was the criticism that is the steering control of action (performance). 'Criticism' as such is perhaps not a value that may be prefaced by the notional term 'I believe ... '; but the ability to be critical is a value, as in the dialectical sentence 'I believe I should be critical of myself'. The act of criticism is part of performance, as is action and reflection; i.e. consciously employed strategies to strengthen the link with competence. I have seen and demonstrated in my practice as a teacher, and in the preparation of this text, that critical action-reflection will encourage the learner (my children and myself) to observe, criticise, attempt to solve, evaluate and modify aspects of practice that are unsatisfactory,

because the action of that practice at a performance level does not match the values at competence level that the practitioner really wants to action. Critical reflection-in-action at a performance level enables the practitioner to modify practice so that it may reflect competence and make competence accessible - i.e. enable the practitioner to understand her own values - put her in touch with herself - to enable her to bring about an integration of self in the synthesis of competence and performance through action-reflection.

I have mentioned before that the transformations necessary are in the nature of dialectical transformations. These transformations act as a kind of Jacob's ladder, providing a two-way communication link between surface and deep levels of the human mind. Aspects of competence may be raised for cognitive appraisal; access may be gained to competence by the conscious mind. This communication is effected and facilitated by acts of will. Competence and performance are in constant interplay within the open mind of the practitioner. The conscious applications of dialectical strategies allows the practitioner to employ the heuristics of discovery in play (Gadamer, 1975). There is no restrictive notion of 'objective', 'end product' or 'aim'. All these notions are dissolved in interplay and diffusion. An end becomes a starting point; a goal becomes a state of being. The transformations themselves, I suggest, are in the nature of the model already detailed at the beginning of this chapter. In the mind of the practitioner, they are the link between competence and performance, effected and shaped by acts of will. As such, the transformations belong more to performance, and for the time

being I shall include them in the aspect it is now important to discuss - a performance model that will explain the process whereby deeply held values of competence are enabled to be realised in the practice of everyday life.

(b) THE PROCESS - TOWARD A MODEL OF PERFORMANCE

We have already noted that an acquisition model is part of competence, receiving an input (I shall say more about the input shortly) to produce an output that may be characterised in performance terms. The output is now subject to dialectical transformations to give it substance.



It is now also that we apply the generative component to allow the production of an unlimited number of novel acts (i.e. creative faculties).

Let us suppose that the human is born with certain inherited faculties that promote the development and well-being of mind and body: physical organs - heart, lungs, liver; capacities - language, senses; and mental mechanisms - curiosity, restlessness; along with the biological formulae that will enable the physical and mental aspects of growth to come about. All these aspects are part of the natural inheritance of the person. I am aware in suggesting this that I have parted company with a number of philosophers who believe that the mind of the child at birth is a 'tabula rasa', on which experience of the environment writes the script.

I will maintain, for the time being, that the human at birth is not a formless lump but is a creature already in a state of intense BEING, containing the potential for all future acts of life. I am not saying that the potential has as yet been realised - given form or substance - but that the potential is already there, and that this potential is infinite (see also Scheffler, 1980). The capacities of the individual may be specific to that person - i.e. the form and substance of individual mechanisms - but I truly believe that each and every person is born with unlimited potential. I ground my belief in the notion that humans are a reflection in action of the competence (knowledge) of the universe, that which some people call God. God made man in his own image. The universe is without end, untrammelled by any finite

expectations. An atom has within it the capacities of the universe; and the universe is made up of atoms. Each monad is constituted of monads: the ebb and flow, the to-and-fro of life is seen in the interplay between macro and microcosm. The universe is made of the same substance as persons. In death the person becomes the universe; in life she holds the universe within herself. The potential of the universe is boundless, and the potential of all persons, in their state of being a person, is also without end.

I am careful in this text not to rest my case on religious or theological grounds. I hope to demonstrate the validity of my claims through the rigour of scientific procedures. Yet it must be evident that my life and being is founded upon the strong foundation of a concrete belief in a personal God. This belief enables me to produce complex theories about my practice, yet, at the end of the day, to see the complexity synthesised in an elegant simplicity in a simple act of faith. It is like the artist, who views the ever changing scenarios in front of him, and his interpretation of the vastness, in its interplay of unity and diffusion, causes him to paint his expression of the single unity of form in a vibrant red canvas.

So I will stand by my theory that every human, at birth, has the potential for an infinite number of acts of creation. Clearly I cannot 'prove' this theory, any more than Chomsky can 'prove' his theories. When challenged about his innateness hypothesis (Piattelli-Palmarini, 1980) he explained: "You can't demonstrably prove it is innate - that is because we are dealing with science and not mathematics; even if you

looked at genes you couldn't prove that. In science you must have demonstrative inferences; in science you can accumulate evidence that makes certain hypotheses seem reasonable, and that is all you can do - otherwise you are doing mathematics."

Let me consider, then, the nature of this potential. Let me suggest that the person is born as State of Being SB0 [zero], but, according to my hypothesis, has the potential to go on to SB1, SB2, SB3, ... SBn. To a large extent, his choice of which SB to go for will be influenced by the environment into which he is born. However, the shaping of his choice does not cancel out the potential, that he could adapt to the environment of other cultures or conditions if he wished. As the person proceeds through life, the choices presented to him are going to cause him to opt for ever-more complex and refined SBs. Thus, the original SB may be shaped by cultures and sub-cultures: initially the society into which the person is born; then into family cultures, friendship cultures, and so on, which will move the person forward in the directions in which he wants to go.

Now, the structuralist school tells me that the environment imposes its structures on the individual (e.g. Piaget, 1932). I maintain that the individual imposes her structures on the environment. The innate potential never dies, but is always in a state of generative activity, allowing new forms of being to emerge according to the decision-making strategies of the person.

Let me apply this schema to an acquistion of the knowledge of values. I have considered changing the title of this chapter to 'A development of the knowledge of values', for, to my mind, values are already there, in the pool of potential, which is part of the competence of the individual. I would welcome comment on this aspect to help me clarify my own thinking.

Let us suppose that SB0 [zero], the original State of Being, has the potential to take on each and every value of the human condition. The process of selection determines which values are accepted and which are rejected. Now, the process of selection just referred to is embodied in the notion of dialectical transformations outlined at the beginning of this chapter. A sense of crisis causes the organism to seek a new state of being, and this state is brought about by the cancellation of previous states, which then acts as the foundation for the new state. The newly created state still maintains the characteristics of the old degenerate state within itself.

So an application of this notion gives us the formulation, in our discussion about the development of systems of values, that SB0 (competence) has the potential to accept each and every value. SB1, a State of Being that has opted for a certain position, still contains the characteristics of SB0: the potential is still there, undiminished. So it goes through the device: increasingly complex States of Being are selected, according to the criteria of dialectical transformations, in the sense of spirals of spirals containing the steps of negation,

cancellation and renewal; and the aspects of negation, cancellation and renewal put together spell 'recreation'.

Now, we are still left wondering, Where does performance actually come in here? I will answer that performance itself is part of the dialectical process that is subject to negation, cancellation and renewal (recreation). Performance itself is in a state of continual recreation. There is no end state that may be labelled 'performance'. There are only continually evolving SBs. Within the dialectical process (S1[i-v]) we have seen the progression S1(i) sense of crisis < S1(ii) imagining a solution < S1(iii) action of the solution < S1(iv) evaluation of the solution < S1(v) modification of the old paradigm focusing into creation of the new paradigm < S2(i) sense of crisis ... < Sn. Performance may be placed at any S(v) of any cycle (S[i-v]), but this is immediately replace by a new S(i).

So a model of performance is going to contain elements that will not allow it to be static, but require it to be in a self-transforming state of evolution. The potential at SB0 (competence) is the creative capacity that allows and requires this evolution.

The story does not stop there. For we have seen that any S(v) embodies the notion of movement towards the vision of the individual, in which statements of fact and statements of value blend and are one. Put into the wider context of the model, in which S0 may be viewed as the original source of vision, or pool of values, and S(iv) is the movement towards the realisation in any SB of a realisation of those values, then

S0 may be regarded as competence and S(i-v) as performance. But states are not annihilated; they are cancelled. All the characteristics of previous states, including S0, are incorporated within each new state. In this view, any S(i-v), as a characteristic of any SB, holds within itself S0 and SB0 (i.e. competence). The 'input' for the AM at competence, characterised here in terms of S0, comes from the 'output' at the PM. Performance is the input for competence, not in the linear sense of

competence ⟷ performance

in which the two aspects influence each other reciprocally, but in a dialectical sense S1(i → ii ⟶ iii ⟶ iv ⟶ v) (S -1) S2 ... Thus, an overall model of



expresses the central notion of competence and performance as questions of value and questions of fact. Each new sub-spiral is a new SB which in itself is movement towards a fusion of questions of value and questions of fact. The whole model is bounded by the finiteness of human life. Perfection is an ideal of the SB at birth, a vision of the yet-to-be; and, because there is no final IS, there is simply always a

'yet-to-be', which is synthesised in the 'now' of the struggle to turn values into practice.

My belief is that the notion of 'yet-to-be' is realised at death, which is then a continuation, but in a new form, of States of Being. Death for me is no great penalty, but, as for Peter Pan, the promise of great adventure. In the meantime, my present form of being in this life causes me sufficient senses of crisis to look for explanations of my present form. And I need now to consider another aspect of my present discussion of an acquisition of knowledge of values through a consideration of the notion of dialectical operations.

(c) Dialectical operations as a form of being

It is interesting to apply Fromm's (1976) analysis of forms of having and forms of being parallel to the theories of structuralists and the theroies of dialecticians. The structuralists hold that development comes about in terms of accretion: new states are restructured from old ones. The mental operations required for an interpretation of the new states are seen in terms of the restructuring of previous interpretations. Progress is linear, one stage growing out of another towards a final end state.

Fromm equates a form of life that is geared towards acquistion with a form of thought that sees knowledge as an accumulation of facts. This form of knowledge was presented in Chapter 5 as 'know that' and 'know how' Fromm's theory is that forms that exist by accumulation and accretion are forms of 'having'. In his view, a 'having' mode of life is restrictive of the individual, for the situation becomes that he does not own his possessions so much as his possessions own him. In his eagerness to gain, he puts all his energy into having, so that his life is devoted to protecting his assets as he loses his 'being' form of life. "What will it profit a man if he gain the whole world yet lose his soul?" (Matthew, 16:26)

Fromm then goes on to say that a form of life that is grounded in 'being' is one that is free of possessions. I am always delighted at his example of the blue glass that absorbs all colours of the spectrum except the blueness. It is in 'giving away' the essential quality of its being that it maintains its essential quality of being: it is blue because it 'gives away' the blue.

I will relate this idea of being with a theory of dialectical operations. A dialectical form of life does not envision any end or intermediate state as a criterion of development. It sees development as a constant state of 'coming into being': a constant state of renewed states. There is no beginning and no end: "I am the alpha and the omega, said the Lord God, who is, and who was, and who is to come, the Almighty".

Klaus Riegel (1973) indicates that dialectical operations are the final stage of cognitive development. I would agree but go beyond. I have already stated that I do not accept the notion of stage development. What I believe we are observing in studies which focus on discrete phenomena of development is the development of the ability to organise. Riegel accepts part of Piaget's theories but maintains that there is a stage beyond formal operations, that of dialectical operations. I believe that persons always operate dialectically. They are born and die, capable of dialectical operations as part of their innate competence. In my view, small children are tremendous dialectical thinkers, rapidly seeing relationships, happily at ease with contradiction (and, if contradicitions are not immediately observable, inventing one), crossing heuristic gaps between the one and the many by natural leaps and bounds. What I think is perhaps the greatest tragedy of organised education is the insistence by teachers, trained in formal operations themselves, systematically to destroy and belittle the capabilities of children for dialectical ways of being (see also Chapter 7).

To suggest the theories that I have been expounding is to fly in the face of the established literature. I fully appreciate that mine is a minority position, but that does not invalidate the relevance of my theory as a way of explaining my practice to myself. I have discovered that the questions of my practice simply are not catered for in the answers of the current literature. Therefore I have looked to other fields of human enquiry, and I have shifted perspective dramatically.

The answers I have so far come up with have raised new questions in my mind. The more I go on in my practice, the more I realise I do not know. I am seldom certain of anything, and I am always prepared to shift my ground. But some things I am fairly certain about, and some things completely sure about. I am fairly certain that theories of stage development do not mirror the reality of a person's life; and that 'morality' is not learnt through habit formation. I am absolutely certain that the theories of the current literature cannot explain my own practice. Only I can do that through the theory that has developed out of my practice. The theorists who suppose that they are capable of explaining my life are talking abstract nonsense. They hope to describe what I am doing; they do not really KNOW. At best they will present E-schemas that generalise to all people. Only I, as a living person, can undertake my own enquiry into my own mind and being. And the answers I may give, though not yet qualifying as an academically legitimated theory, are appropriate to the truth of my practice. Time will tell, "in truth and honesty" (Habermas, 1979) if you, the reader, agree that what I have said strikes the necessary chord in you that makes us want to talk about it.

PART THREE

IMPLICATIONS

HOW IS KNOWLEDGE OF VALUES (ACQUISITION) PUT TO USE?

Page

OVERVIEW 477

PART THREE

OVERVIEW

In Part Two I have considered some questions inherent in the notion 'knowledge of values'. In Chapter 5 I considered the questions (a) what does 'knowledge of - ' mean, and (b) what is the nature of values that they may be known? In Chapter 6 I considered how such knowledge may be acquired.

In this part I wish to consider some of the hypotheses I have put forward in relation to the notion 'knowledge of values' to suggest some ways in which this knowledge may be put to use.

There are two separate but interrelated issues here. In line with my reasoning of Chapters 5 and 6, I may say that it is necessary to consider the questions

(1) how is knowledge of values put to use?

(2) how is knowledge of values acquisition put to use?

In attempting to formulate theories that answer (1) I shall be dealing with issues of the use of an individual's knowledge of her own competence; the way that that knowledge may be equated with Wittgenstein's notion 'form of life'; and how the exercise of a shared form of life by consenting individuals may provide the basis for social evolution.

In attempting to formulate theories that answer (2) I shall be dealing with issues that focus on the need for individuals' personal responses to the problems inherent in their own practices, in line with Whitehead's (1979) apology for the need for teachers' personal theories of education, in which they attempt to integrate matters of value and matters of fact.

Consideration of these two questions and their implications is the essence of Chapter 7.

Chapter 8 looks at the justification of educational knowledge. In response to the statement 'I know - ', there is the question 'How do you know?' I shall attempt to show that there are different forms of truth conditions for different forms of knowledge claims. I shall also attempt to show how my own claim to educational knowledge - that I have improved the process of education for myself and for the poeple in my care - is justified, by responding that:

(a) "I know this is so because ... " and drawing on extant evidence (my inferential knowledge claim);

(b) "I know this is so because ... " and indicating my form of life (my personal knowledge claim).

In Chapter 9 I shall suggest what I consider are issues of educational research that need urgent attention. These are some of the areas that I shall try to explore in the future, and that I think need taking forward by the wider community of educational researchers.

CHAPTER SEVEN: HOW IS KNOWLEDGE OF VALUES (ACQUISITION) PUT TO USE?

PAGE

1 INTRODUCTION 481

(i) Grounding the theory: How is knowledge of values put to use? 483

(ii) Applying the theory: How is knowledge of values acquisition put to use? 488

(iii) Implications 493

(a) The need to distinguish between theories of schooling and theories of education 494

(b) The need to break with propositional forms of knowledge 497

(c) The need for individual enquiries by teachers 498

(d) The need for individual enquiries by learners 504

(e) The need for educational research to be educational 508

CHAPTER SEVEN: HOW IS KNOWLEDGE OF VALUES (ACQUISTION) PUT TO USE?

INTRODUCTION

In 'The concept of the knowledge of God' (1988), Haymes considers, as I have done in this text, the different interpretations in the literature accorded to the notion 'to know'. He references in particular the work of Ryle (1946, 1949) in drawing the distinction between 'knowing that' and 'knowing how'; the work of Popper (1972) in his classification of the three worlds of knowledge; the work of Malcolm (1967), in his belief of 'knowledge by acquaintance' (parallel to the notion of the 'personal knowledge' of Polanyi [1958], which I have drawn on in this text); and the work of Malcolm's tutor, Wittgenstein (e.g 1970), in his notion of 'fundamental propositions'.

Toward the end of his book Haymes says:

"There is, in the end, a mystery here ... The mystery is that the notion of knowledge ... seems to run out into this question of how 'knowing how' and 'knowing that' are held together, that is, how the fundamental propositions we believe in and the rules we live by relate. The mystery is that in some way the one is the other. But it is impossible to illuminate this further and, indeed, all that Wittgenstein could say about it is 'This is how we live'." (Haymes, 1988)

I would suggest that the resolution to the paradox remains a mystery so long as it is approached via areas of discourse that relate to the social sciences. Haymes throughout maintains that personal knowledge is manifested as a form of life (see below and Chapter 8 of this text), yet seems not to make the necessary intellectual leap away from theories of social science that regard 'knowledge' as 'given' to reconstructive theories of innate potential that regard 'knowledge' as created, this leap, I maintain, being the clue to the answer to the mystery.

I shall consider this question in more detail in (i) below.

Haymes also alludes to the notion that beliefs (values) are worthless unless they are acted upon. Quoting Wittgenstein (On Certainty) that "It is our ACTING which lies at the bottom of the language game", he concludes that "to know these propositions ... is something you do".

I wish now to present my own views on this issue. As I have indicated in the preface to Part III, I see two separate but interrelated aspects. The first is to do with grounding the theory; the second is to do with applying the theory.

(i) Grounding the theory: How is knowledge of values put to use?

Let me go back to Chapter 4 where I suggested that propositional knowledge (know-that) and procedural knowledge (know-how) is grounded in a framework of dialectical knowledge (know + direct object). I explained there that propositions of the form 'It is raining' and 'I know how to play the piano' are emcompassed within the wider belief system of the person who is making the claims to knowledge. Thus uterances of the form 'It is raining' may be characterised syntactically as

[NP - It] + [Predicate - is raining]

The propositional NP + Predicate is embedded within the NP + Predicate in the dialectical form of the belief system of the speaker. This then enters the semantic component, where meaning may be applied to the propositional sentence in its syntactic (surface level) form through the linguistic transformations which link it with its semantic (deep level) form. Graphically:



The notion 'I believe' is an assumption in the mind of the speaker who produces the surface utterance "It is raining". The MEANING of the utterance 'It is raining' is grounded in the relationship between its surface structure and deep structure; between the articulation and mental operations of the speaker.

Chomsky has often been termed a structuralist. Until recently I rejected this label, seeing his work grounded in the notion of the mental structures of the individual and, by implication, to do with dialectics. Yet I see that his approaches are essentially structuralist in character. For Chomsky's work operates at the 'horizontal' level of syntactic structures. In the ideas presented above, a characterisation in Chomskyan terms would be as I have so far represented it:

[NP + Predicate] - I believe: [NP + Predicate] - it is raining.

I am now saying it is necessary to go beyond syntactic structures to dialectical operations, whereby the sense of propositional statements is determined by the belief system of the speaker. I am suggesting that the abstractions of syntactic structures are themselves seen as elements of propositional discourse. Wilder makes the point (in Piattelli-Palmarini, 1980) that Chomsky's work is not to do with communication, but with the formulation of abstract principles to explain the knowledge of language. What governs the use of language in real situations is another area of enquiry altogether, and which is considered in (ii) below.

However, still adopting Chomsky's terminology and notation system, let me propose that the syntactic structures of propositional discourse, characterised above by [NP + Predicate] 'It is raining' enter into a dialectical relationship with the self that is making that proposition. Every utterance at a surface level of phonology and syntax has a deep level semantic interpretation. That semantic interpretation itself is now subject to the belief system of the speaker who holds it. In terms of a theory of universal pragmatics, we can suppose that an outcome of this notion is that propositional discourse is, by its nature, embedded in the individual belief systems of the participants of that discourse. Thus, propositional discourse, conducted with the provisions of the notion 'I believe ... ' becomes dialectical discourse. It all depends on the perspective of the agents in the discourse.

So far I have dealt with the belief system of the individual as an abstraction. I will consider now what might happen if someone wishes to turn his held value (termed as [NP + Predicate: NP + Predicate] 'I believe: I believe it is raining') into a stronger form, in which his value is externalised as a knowledge claim. It seems a common sense notion that claims to knowledge become that through the act of externalisation. So long as they remain the undisclosed property of the thinker, they are not knowledge claims. As soon as he declares them, they are. The corollary is that, in making this knowledge claim, the speaker then declares his intention to defend his knowledge; and defence of knowledge implies action of some sort.

I am saying, then, that propositions of the form [NP + Predicate] 'It is raining' are a suffix to an implicit prefix 'I believe ... ' that indicates that the proposition is an externalised belief of the speaker. So long as the belief is undisclosed it may remain as a tentative hypothesis in the mind of the speaker. If he wishes to turn the hypothesis into a knowledge claim, he uses the strong version 'know' rather than 'believe', to produce a statement characterised as "I know: I know it is raining". It is the nature of the term 'know' that is the nub. If 'know' is part of the declared proposition, as in the notional term

'I -x- : I know it is raining'

where the propositional statement 'It is raining' is the continuation of the implied 'I know', all operating at surface level, the ' -x- ' in the

notion NP + Predicate 'I -x- ' at deep level reflects the competence of the individual and the strength of his commitment. In his values system he will characterise ' -x- ' as 'I believe' or 'I know'. I maintain that when the ' -x- ' takes the form of 'I know' at deep level, this is the time when the individual makes a commitment - accepts this as part of his personal knowledge. And the implication of commitment is that such personal knowledge needs must be acted upon, and turned into an externalised knowledge claim - that is, a form of life.

In terms of the question of this section, then, of 'How is knowledge of values put to use?' I would reply that what we are really dealing with here is the area of the mind/brain that organises commitment. By the term 'organise commitment', I am suggesting that it is possible to envisage levels, or degrees, of commitment, where the notional term 'I believe' indicates hypotheses that are loosely held, and where the notional term 'I know' indicates hypotheses that are held with a good deal of commitment. The theme is evident in the work of Polanyi, that such personal knowledge involves an act of commitment. What I am suggesting is the process at work in the mind of the speaker that enables him to make the commitment.

We cannot leave it there. I have been speculating about the internal activities of the mind of the individual in organising his values sytem. The term 'commitment' implies action: in the lexicon its significant features would include ' + intended action '; and in my present area of discourse, 'intended' transforms the underlying belief/knowledge into its manifested 'action'. I have considered the use of knowledge of

values, and I am surmising that it is a process within the mind/brain of the individual that organises the degree of commitment to a potential form of life. I need now to consider how that commitment is manifested as a form of life. My discussion so far has operated in terms of the competence of the individual. Now I need to consider a paradigm of performance, the shift of perspective that moves beyond the individual-specific structures of mind, to embrace the notion of how individuals may share their knowledge (their degree of personal commitment) in adopting a shared form of life.

(ii) Applying the theory: How is knowledge of values acquisition put to use?

To summarise the foregoing, and to refer back to Chapter 6, I may say that an interpretation of what constitutes a theory for the acquistion of values is to propose a model that starts off with a reconstruction of the innate potentials of a human being (to be found in the area of competence). The way in which the potentials of this deep level may be realised in action is to propose a theory of performance that allows the individual to account for his ability to turn values into practice. The theory of performance proposed entails the use of dialectical transformations that enable the individual practitioner to apply critical correctives to his choice of actions. These dialectical transformations are set into motion by a sense of crisis when present practice (performance) is not congruent with the values that sponsor

that practice (competence). The transformations move the structures of values closer to the structures of practice through the process of minimal steps entailed in an action-reflection cycle.

I now wish to take the discussion beyond a theory of individual performance to embrace the wider community, and suggest that an enquiry that focuses on the self's knowledge of the self may be extended to include other selves who are similarly engaged.

I have indicated in (i) that personal commitment/knowledge involves action. In this sense, the person's values determine his action/form of life. The combination of 'values-into-action' constitutes a personal knowledge claim, and knowledge claims need to be defended, for by implication the individual enters into the pluralist world of other individuals who do not necessarily share his form of life. I have suggested in Chapter 6 that statements (implicit or explicit) which constitute a knowledge claim are answers to latent questions in a companion's mind (Collingwood, 1939). The idea of 'latent questions' is directly parallel, in my interpretation, to the ideas of Polanyi's 'latent knowledge', and, in terms of my formulation, part of competence. Latent questions are grounded in the competence of the speaker, and the form of the question is to probe the competence of the other. The level (competence) at which this probing is conducted suggests that the two participants are entering into an 'I-Thou' relationship in which there is the desire to share levels of commitment.

Collingwood says that we cannot take an immediate verbal or actual response of the companion as a 'true' indication of his intentions or his meaning. In my interpretation, I can apply this to say that we cannot take a person's observed performance as an indicator of his competence. The dialectical transformations that he is using may be deliberately distorting the presentation of his values. Collingwood says that, in order to get at the true meaning in his mind, we must enter into a question and answer relationship (a dialectical relationship) where the ongoing cycle of question and answer will move us ever closer to what constitutes, for that particular situation, the 'right' answer. But we have already seen in this section that questions and answers in the form of propositions are externalisations of the value system of the individual. Questions and answers are embedded within the notion 'I believe ... ' or in the stronger claim, 'I know ...'. What is happening in a dialogical relationship of question and answer, then, is not simply the uncovering of propositional beliefs, as in the syntactic 'I believe: it is raining' ([NP + Predicate: NP + Predicate]); but is also the probing of the belief system of one by another; the attempt to share personal knowledge and enter into and dwell in the mind of the other. The questions that are answered by the syntactic 'I believe ... ' in its propositional form are those of the pragmatic heuristics 'when?', 'who?', 'what?', 'which?', 'where?'. The questions that are answered by the dialectical 'I believe ... ' in its relational form are those of the hermeneutic heuristics 'why?' and 'how?'. The syntactic form is looking for causes in the nature of descriptions; the dialectical form is looking for reasons in the nature of explanations. The first is attended to by the phenomenological

theories of, for example, Schutz (1972), who posits 'in-order-to' and 'because- ' motives as descriptive of human intercourse (see also Chapter 3 of this text). The second is attended to by, for example, the critical theories of Habermas (1976) who takes agreement among thoughtful individuals as the explanatory override for reaching inter-competence understanding - in my terms, sharing personal knowledge.

What I am trying to work toward is an understanding of a theory of communication that is an application of the notions I have arrived at in my enquiries about the constitution of, and acquistion of, knowledge of the nature of values. This theory of communication is grounded in individual competence. I have suggested that material stored at competence level, the values system of the individual, is raised to surface consciousness (performance level) by the intentionality of the individual engaging in dialectical operations, The implication here for a theory of competence is that people engaged with each other will intentionally operate at competence level as well as performance in their shared knowledge claims - i.e. that the utterances they produce will not only be phonologically and syntactically acceptable utterances but will also be reflective of the underlying competence of the individual. The criteria that Habermas suggests (1979) to steer communication, those of authenticity, sincerity, truth, comprehensibility, are instances of this point. The values and truth conditions he puts forward are to do with the validity of dialogue. Dialogue, for Habermas, is valid (meaningful) if parties are authentic in themselves, are sincere in what they say, if they choose an utterance that is appropriate to the situation, and if the utterances may be

demonstrated as true. All these conditions are mutually agreed criteria of dialogue that will produce 'right' answers and questions (Collingwood, op.cit.); they will create mutually agreed truths that are manifestations of the shared knowledge of committed individuals.

I am saying that these criteria are grounded in competence, and may be accepted as criteria by individuals who are aware of them (performance). They may not actually articulate or analyse them, but the individuals concerned are aware, as part of their known values system, that these are the things they want to do. In applying the values of competence in their lives (performance), individuals are forming dialogical communities (Bernstein, 1983) which are founded upon intersubjective agreements to understand. In this way, shared knowledge becomes a shared form of life; and a form of life, in Wittgenstein's philosophy, is the truth condition for a claim to knowledge.

I shall have more to say about the justification of knowledge claims in the next chapter. For now, I wish to consider some of the implications for educational research that may be drawn from my hypotheses so far.

(iii) Implications

In this section, I wish to consider five major implications. They are:

(a) The need to distinguish between theories of schooling and theories of education
(b) The need to break with propositional forms of knowledge
(c) The need for individual enquiries by teachers
(d) The need for individual enquiries by learners
(e) The need for educational research to be educational

In Chapter 8 I shall consider issues involved in the justification of knowledge claims. Bearing in mind that I will hope to justify my claims to knowledge, these are the claims I make:

(1) I have helped to improve the quality of education for the people in my care;
(2) I have improved the quality of education for myself;
(3) I can account for this improvement; that is, I can make explicit my understanding of how this improvement has come about - I have developed my own educational knowledge.

This third claim is to be found in the title of this text. I maintain that my study has of itself been educational. I will enumerate the reasons and substantiations in Chapter 8, but here I will simply say that I am a better person for having undertaken my study than I would have been if I had not done so.

What I now have to say indicates the implications I see for my own life. I have stated above that my understandings, in order to qualify as true for me as an individual, will lead me to a form of life that reflect those understandings. My intention is to make my own knowledge explicit, to invite you, the reader, to share that knowledge with me, and to agree or not as the case may be. If we do reach agreement, we shall agree to share our knowledge, and to adopt a common form of life that reflects our agreement. The implications that I am about to explain are, in fact, my values-in-action; and, if we agree our common knowledge, we shall abide by our shared knowledge in our future intentional actions.

(a) The need to distinguish between theories of schooling and theories of education

Theories of education need to be grounded in a valid explanation of what education is. The dominant assumption in the literature is that education is to do with schooling, and that educational research should be focused on an improvement in the management of schooling. Some recent recommendations (e.g. Wilson, 1989) rest on the assumptions that education is to do with schooling, that educational knowledge may be controlled by external experts, that education is a commodity geared towards the consumer, and that theory, the 'packaging' of educational

knowledge, is reified and external to teachers in classrooms. I cannot accept these assumptions on the grounds that none of them has been applicable to my own study. In trying to adhere to the principles of these assumptions, I was deliberately and systematically distorting my own practice, including my way of thinking. It took extreme turbulence to make me realise the need to shift my ground (Chapters 3 and 4 of this text).

Having shifted my ground, I will suggest that these assumptions need to be overtaken, to make way for new approaches and fresh ways of thinking. I believe that these ways of thinking consider that education is to do with individuals, that educational knowledge is formed by practising teachers through the reality of their own practices, that education is a discovery by the self of its own innate potential, and that educational theory is an organic device that helps researchers to explain the organic nature of their own development.

From my study, I have come to believe that theory may become research. Because it is organic, the theory of now has the potential to change into a new state of being, a new theory. The process by which it changes is research. In the model of S(i-v), research takes the form of the hermeneutic heuristics that lead toward temporary structures (theories) which are themselves volatile and inherently obsolescent. I can claim legitimacy for this concept by pointing to my own practice as a teacher, when my desire to stay within the confines of the specifications of the literature led me nowhere. I have stated earlier,

and my conviction grows, that an adherence to prescriptive forms of practice leads only to stunted growth. In my deliberate attempts to warp the development of myself and my children, I was disallowing the creativity of life, and intentionally attempting to stop progress.

I believe that education is not to do with school. The management of schooling is part of sociological issues. While I accept that efficient management of schools and schooling is necessary for a promotion of an improvement in the quality of education, I do not equate the two. An improvement in schooling does not mean an improvement in education, and research into schooling does not mean research into education. Schooling is, to my mind, to do with the turning out of people who will adopt appropriate standards which will entitle them to a legitimate place in a given society. It is not to do with helping them to think, to be aware of states of being, that will help them rationalise which standards they want to adopt, nor explain why they should.

I believe that a similar mismatch of approaches is evident in the majority of the current literature. Much energy has been expended on arriving at definitions of education and applying those definitions. Although such an exercise has a place in indicating the stands that have been taken - i.e. descriptions of practice - I feel that much of the energy that has been used by many investigators in the name of educational research would have been better employed if those investigators had applied a critical awareness to their own practice. The literature abounds with descriptions and recommendations. It is thin in explanations. Few investigators see the need to account for

their own educational development. They prefer rather to make pronouncements, at a safe distance, on other peoples'. Because those pronouncements are distanced and reified, they cannot qualify as explanations; they qualify simply as descriptions of what other people are, or ought to be, doing. As such, they emerge as pronouncements on schooling. They may not qualify as explanations of personal practice.

(b) The need to break with propositional forms of knowledge

It is not enough to speak about experience. We have to experience the experience for ourselves.

Speaking about experience results in descriptions of practice, either in terms of other people's practice or one's own. The case studies to be found in the most of the literature are from this standpoint (e.g. Nixon, 1981; Hustler et al, 1986). What is needed, I feel, is for researchers to use research as a means to demonstrate in practice how they have come to know - to show how they have moved in time from a less satisfactory state of being in which values were denied in practice to a more satisfactory state of being in which values are in process of being realised in practice. They need to demonstrate publicly how they have come to know - i.e. to justify their claim to understand their own personal development - by making their reports available to a wide audience, and using that public scrutiny as a means of validating their claims to educational knowledge.

I am moving toward this in my own work. 'Action research: principles and practice' was published in November, 1988. In this text I included individuals' accounts of their own practice, and I have expressed the views in general that I am voicing here.

(c) The need for individual enquiries by teachers

There has been a significant shift in the focus of in-service education during the 1970s and 80s. Stenhouse's Humanities Curriculum Project had much to do with the promotion of the view of the teacher as researcher. The shift in focus was towards school-based curriculum reform, when individual schools were encouraged to take stock of what they were doing and suggest ways of improving their practice (e.g. Davies, 1980; Lawton, 1973). I will suggest that this was a move in the right direction, but the emphasis was still on schools and their organisation, rather than on the individual practices of teachers. In-service education is still more to do with schooling than education.

At present, the dominant paradigm for in-service education is still grounded in the notion of the control of educational knowledge. This knowledge is still seen as a reified body of accumulated knowledge, which teachers are required to accept. Educational research is still seen in the light of the application of this body of knowledge, in terms of a clear process (knowledge-how) of the application of a specific content (knowledge-that). In-service provision is grounded in propositional knowledge. So long as this situation obtains, teachers will always be relegated to the service role of technicians.

I broke out of the mould. I was one of the lucky ones. I have rejected the view of controlled knowledge and the control of my practice, and I exercise my right as a "person claiming originality and exercising (her) personal judgement responsibly with universal intent" (Polanyi, 1958). I feel very strongly that teachers should be given the support and encouragement to do the same.

For me, personal enquiry is the only way to improve personal practice. I have attempted to demonstrate this throughout the text. There is an urgent need for teachers to be encouraged to see the control of their practice as resting within themselves, as well as influenced by social structures; the need to give reasoned justification for that practice in making public their claims to knowledge; the need to have ratified in public forum the legitimacy of those forms of knowledge.

These recommendations themselves rest on two assumptions. I have used this text to show how these assumptions have come into being - i.e. to show how and why I think as I do - and I may articulate them here as (1) a belief that personal enquiry will bring about an improvement in an educational situation and (2) the notion 'education' embraces the ideas of improvement and development. I am aware that my interpretation of the terms 'improvement' and 'development' do not coincide with their use in much of the literature, in this way:

I will suggest that published aims of education, and particularly moral education, tend to rest on the assumption of an external, reified Truth that is the guiding light of teachers' practices (e.g. FEU, 1981; DES, 1981). Our current educational theory is couched in propositional tems; our current theories of moral education rest on the assumption of an external, absolute Good towards which we all must strive, and the teacher's task is to help her pupils attain this state of grace.

In a propositional sense, the idea of improvement is that of moving towards the abstract good. I have critiqued the literature for the lack of guidance in a clear characterisation in operational terms of its recommendations (see Chapter 3 of this text): when we read 'to help pupils attain their full potential' what do the terms 'attain' and 'full potential' mean in practice. What is the nature of the abstract good?

I will say that it is time to break with propositional forms of knowledge and think rather in dialectical ways that focus on the realities of now rather than the abstractions of never-never land. Philosophies of moral education that are based on the notion of an abstract good do not add to the everyday, commonsense desire to improve this present situation here. They do not explain why a child is naughty, or how a teacher decides which strategy to employ in moving the child forward in his own understanding.

I find the idea of absolute goodness comforting, and I truly believe in the ultimate perfection of God. At the same time, I also truly believe in the present goodness in man (for me, God working in man) that is to be found in situations of intersubjective agreement. The goodness that we can understand, and agree to bring about, is grounded in the reality of the present when a situation is made beneficial for all parties. Happiness is to be found just as much in dreaming as in achieving; I enjoy the party just as much in anticipation as in the experiencing; for the acts of dreaming and anticipation are themselves rich mental experiences which I dismiss at my peril. The dialogical communities on earth are perhaps an anticipation of a heaven yet to come, but, to my mind, they are in fact heaven on earth. Goodness is here, in each one of us (in our individual competences), and it is up to every one of us to use it (performance; values-in-action) to the best of our ability.

Seen in this sense, 'improvement' does not mean working toward an ultimate good, but proceeding by minimal steps toward a present good. I have characterised (Chapter 6) the 'end product' of a series of minimal steps as a new state. As one structure is cancelled, so another begins; so that there is no end, but always new states of being.

The notion of improvement is in the idea of movement forward toward a state of new being. Goodness is not to be found only in an absolute Truth, but in the notion of ever-evolving states of being.

For me, the idea of Grace is not to be found in an absolute Truth, and therefore unattainable to mortals, but is immediately accessible to each and every one of us. I share the views of Bernstein (1983) that "if we are truly dialogical beings - always in conversation, always in the process of understanding - then the dynamics of the play of understanding underlie and pervade all human activities." Bernstein considers the work of Gadamer: "We can see why for Gadamer, the process of understanding can never (ontologically) achieve finality, why it is always open and anticipatory"; and the work of Habermas: "(His work) can orient our collective praxis in which we seek to approximate the ideal of reciprocal dialogue and discourse, and in which the respect, autonomy, solidarity and opportunity required for the discursive redemption of universal normative validity claims are not mere abstract 'oughts' but are to be embodied in our social practices and institutions." (Bernstein, 1983)

This, then, is the foundation for my first assumption, that personal enquiry will bring about an improvement in an educational situation. What of my second assumption, that the notion 'education' embraces the ideas of improvement and development?

In the terms of this text, 'education' is the process whereby the self comes to know its own self. In the terms of Chapter 6, the knowledge of self comes about through the dialectical transformations that enable competence to be realised in performance, and for performance in turn to shape competence. The action of the transformations is brought about through the action-reflection of the knowing subject. Educational enquiry is to do with individuals' enquiries into their own personal practice, seeking to understand those practices and make those understandings available to public debate.

It is the understanding through critical reflection that enables the process of improvement to come about. Improvement, as we have seen in the recent discussion, is inherent in the notion of an openness to new forms of being. Similarly, development is not characterised in terms of end states, but is the state of openness, the actioning of the generative component that releases the potential for ever-evolving new states of being. Education is movement; education is process - not towards final end states, but towards new beginnings. An understanding of being, for self is being, and self-development is the evolution and metamorphosis into ever-new states of being.

For me, this is where the future lies. The future is not to be found in degenerate theories of education which jealously guard the notion of a control of abstract knowledge. It is to be found in the living reality of teachers' practices, as they try to make sense of what is going on, here and now, in order to improve the the quality of life for themselves and the people in their care.

(d) The need for individual enquiries by learners

I am pleading in these pages for the establishment of a new tradition of educational enquiry that focuses on the integrity of individuals in the living reality of their own locations. I have suggested that teachers need to be encouraged to take on the role of researchers, but that their field of enquiry should not be in the propositional sense, as traditional models suggest, of applying reified theories to their own practices. Rather I am saying that teachers need to take on the responsibility of investigating their own practice through their own action-reflection, in order to produce personal theories of education (Whitehead, 1984) to provide explanations for those practices, and provide publicly agreed substantiation for their claim to knowledge.

In the same way, I have suggested that this is the same method by which learners may come to know themselves - i.e. engage in their own personal process of education. This has enormous implications for traditions of teaching methodologies.

I am drawing a comparison here between the control of knowledge by writers of the literature, and by teachers, consumers of the literature. Throughout this text I have challenged the view that legitimate knowledge rests in the academy or in the literature, and is not generally viewed as a creation of individual teachers. I have said that teachers come to understand their own development through the action of their practice, and through a critical reflection on that action. Such understandings as they do have form more adequate and appropriate theories of education than the reified theories to be found in the literature; and, once shared in public forum, provide the basis for a shared form of life with other practitioners that will help those practitioners move forward THEIR own practice. Such a process, I have said, is educational, on an I-basis, and offers teachers explanations by themselves for their practice rather than descriptions by other people which often prove to be distortions of their practice.

I am now saying that teachers also need to relinquish their vested interest in the control of their clients' knowledge. Some current models of teaching methodologies - didactic/expository, methods aimed at encouraging discovery learning - are not always, to my mind, educational, in that they do not require the learner to think for himself.

To make this concept more explicit: traditional didactic/expository styles are grounded in the notion of reified knowledge. Teachers acquire information and pass it on to their learners, who receive it and accept it. This was true of my practice in personal and social

education, 1981-83, where, although I used the methods aimed at socialisation, such as group work and role play, I always controlled the action so that it would fit in line with my preconceived goals. I can say that this view of teaching is similar to a view of empiric methods of educational research, in which the testing out of a researcher's original hypothesis often results in a confirmation of that hypothesis. (see also Adelman and Young, 1985)

The idea behind discovery/enquiry methods is that learners will discover the truth for themselves. I do not agree that this is always the case. I am reminded, for example, of Socrates's conception of education, where the learner is gradually brought to see things for himself. I have already referenced his account of his encounter with the slave. Socrates was intending to show how he brought the slave to see for himself, but Socrates had the answers all the time, and led the slave to the point of sharing his view. To my mind, this is manipulation rather than education. I can draw a parallel between this style of teaching and the methods of the educational interpretive tradition, in which an investigator tries to agree his interpretations of observed practice with those of the teacher (Parlett and Hamilton, 1972; see also Walker, 1985). The guiding light here is still the validity of externally imposed control on individual practice. This was representative of my practice in personal and social education, roughly 1983/84, when I engaged people in their own learning with a view to bringing them, by their own volition, to my interpretation of the truth. In reality, I was not really engaging them in their own learning so much as engaging

them in my master-plan; and, as such, I was guilty of deception and manipulation, of myself as well as of them.

I believe my later practice of 1985/86 was beginning to qualify as educational. I began to relinquish control, in that I genuinely afforded validity to the children's views, rather than attempted to distort them to fit my own. I did this by encouraging enquiry learning, by encouraging the children to engage in their own systematic action-reflection (Chapter 3 of this text). In so doing, I attempted to move away from the image of the courtroom, in which they were on trial and I was the judge, to the image of a dialogical community, in which we intentionally set up the framework for a foundation of intersubjective agreement that would allow us genuinely to communicate as persons of integrity. This was initially a most difficult task for me, for I felt that I was abdicating responsibility as an efficient teacher. As I saw it, I was not teaching anything. My understandings today tell me that I was moving away from content-based styles to client-based styles; I was educating the children rather than manipulating them.

This is, in my opinion, an area that needs urgent attention by educational researchers. I conducted my own action research into my pupils' action research. I had to leave teaching, unfortunately, at precisely that time when the most fundamental insights were beginning to be made explicit and contribute to my practice. What is needed, I believe, is other enquiries into children's enquiries, to see if such an approach will contribute to teachers' understandings of how to encourage children's understandings; to build dialogical communities of enquiring

practitioners, from the ranks of teachers and learners, who engage in shared forms of life to improve the quality of education for themselves and for others.

(e) The need for educational research to be educational

I have indicated above my belief that much of what goes on in the community of researchers in the name of educational research often does not qualify as educational. I need to clarify this issue, and I will suggest that two areas in particular come into focus in (1) the use of the concept 'educational' and (2) the purpose of educational research.

(1) A clarification of concepts

In (a) above I indicated that the term 'educational' is often used where the term 'sociological' would be more appropriate. There seem to be two tendencies in the literature: the first to use the terms synonymously, and the second to confuse characterisations of the two terms.

'Educational' and 'sociological' tend to be used synonymously when commentators are referencing the activities of schools and schooling, such activities often to be classified under the term 'management'.

For example, if I am planning to evaluate a curriculum change (e.g. House, 1980), the exercise may not always qualify as 'educational'. I am concerned with pragmatics and logistics, the efficient allocation of timing and its effects, and so on. My activities are perhaps within a location where education goes on, i.e. a school or other institution, but my activity is not intrinsically educational - i.e. my own education is not the focus of the exercise. What I am practising and improving, perhaps, is my managerial expertise; I am not immediately concerned with developing my own understanding of myself.

Of course, such an explication as I have outlined immediately begs the use of the term 'education', which may be, and often is, all things to all people - hence such confusion and liberty-taking in the literature. I will return to this point shortly.

The second point I have made is that 'educational' is often confused with 'sociological'. Carr and Kemmis (1986), for example, tend to make this confusion systematically; "A critical educational science must then be a participatory science, its participants or 'subjects' being the teachers, students and others who create, maintain, enjoy and endure educational arrangements".

I agree with Carr and Kemmis in their apology for a 'critical educational science', but I would suggest, before going too far, that the concept of 'education' is characterised and used consistently.

For me, as I have indicated throughout, 'education' is to do with the process of the development of the rationality of the individual. Education is the way in which the self comes to understand its own self. If I apply this concept to my discourse about education, the only way in which it makes sense - is context-semantically valid - is if I apply it to myself.

I may legitimately say, "I am conducting my programme of educational research into my desire to improve my own practice". I may also legitimately say, "I am helping my children to improve their education through my own educational research" for I am attempting to understand the practices in which I am engaged which will in turn help the children to understand the practices in which they are engaged. But I would strongly resist anyone who, as Peter did in my account in Chapter 3, attempted to indicate that he was doing 'educational' research into my practice. Only I, as a reflexive practitioner, may do that. Research ON other people is not, for me, educational. Research into self IS.

For me, research is to do with creativity. I see research as an enterprise, conducted by an individual, or group of individuals working collaboratively, in order to develop understandings about a particular self-specific issue, and to use those understandings to build innovative theories which may explain the issue more adequately. I do not take the view of research as defined, for example, by Wilson (1981) that it is an activity conducted by experts on an unknowing person-object or group of persons-object. In this way, research becomes a content-based exercise of documenting facts and figures, the normative-analytic methods of the

social sciences and of empiric and interpretive paradigms of so-called educational research.

(2) The purpose of educational research

Let me now consider what I see as the purpose of educational research.

Recent moves in directions of research paradigms show certain shifts in emphasis:

In the 1960s there was a move toward school-based curriculum reform (see, for example, Lawton, 1973). In the 1970s the influence of Lawrence Stenhouse was evident in his encouragement of practitioner-centred, rather than institution-centred, research. Eggleston et al (1976) speak in favour of 'lifting the lid off the black box of classroom practices', in their view, aiming to help teachers describe what goes on in their own classrooms. A number of dissertations have been submitted by my contemporaries that follow this line, for example, Denley (1988), Jensen (1987), Larter (1987), Gurney (1989), Eames, 1987).

I maintain that, although such views of practice and resultant texts are to do with education, they do not intrinsically qualify as educational research, in that they do not make explicit the understandings of the researchers involved in improving the quality of their own education.

This, I believe, is the nub. Educational research has to demonstrate the understanding of an individual's enquiry-in-action for that individual to claim legitimate educational status for the enquiry. I believe, with Torbert (1981), Walker (1985), Stronach (1986) and Whitehead (1989), that educational research needs to be educational. The person doing the research needs to be prepared to shift ground, because her intentions, in embarking on her enquiry, are (a) to change her understandings, and (b) to change her form of life in line with her created understandings. Such change constitutes the nature of education; the creation of new forms of being is the implicit notion of 'education'. I have come to this understanding precisely because, when I first embarked on my study, I was not prepared to change; and I was forced to change in view of the new forms of life I had to adopt in order to stay true to the emergence of my own personal knowledge. Polanyi's aphorism (1958) that personal enquiry is a hazardous journey was never so true as what I encountered. But it was worth it.

So I would claim that my enquiry has been, and still is, educational: and I will defend my knowledge claim in the coming chapter. I believe that this text may qualify as part of the emergent tradition that Carr and Kemmis (1986) envisaged, of a critical science of educational research.

Summmary

There are some incisive implications in these views. I am forced to consider central aspects of my own role over the years, and to decide whether that was adrift from my educational values. I am forced to reconsider my educational values, and to wonder if they have changed. I need to consider if and how I will change my form of practice to accommodate my learnings.

Let me first consider what I was doing in my research study. It started life, in 1981, as an evaluation of the social, personal and careers education programme at school. Jack Whitehead and I decided on a strategy that, before I could enquire into other people's practices, I first had to understand my own. I have come to the view today that, before I enquire into other people's practices, I need to make explicit and public my own understandings of my own practice, and ask other people to share my ideas and, if they so desire, my form of life so that we may continue a dialogue that will move forward our individual and joint understandings.

I am aware now that the term 'personal and social education' is a misnomer. I am a great advocate for personal education; that, I am inclined to think, is the field of enquiry where my future lies. I am doubtful about the idea of 'social education'. There can be, and is, a phenomenon called 'social training' or 'social instruction', which is a body of theories about personal conduct in social situations. Such theories stem from normative standards of personal conduct. I cannot

see, however, that social training has anything intrinsically to do with the personal education of the individual. The connection lies in the applications, as outlined in this chapter, that people who conduct their own enquiries into self may join with others who are similarly inclined to form dialogical communities that will encourage the personal growth of the individual members.

I am aware that I must call into question my own role and teaching style. In advocating the setting up of dialogical communities in classrooms, I am not suggesting that I, or others, should opt for a laissez-faire style or abdicate responsibility. On the contrary. I believe that it is even more necessary to set up clear frameworks, and these to be frameworks of care (1987b) that will allow the spontaneous development of individual creativity.

My role as a teacher needs to be that of a strong leader; but mine needs to be the leadership that will insist on the keeping of mutually agreed rules. Straughan (1982) says that "a major factor in achieving the disciplined commitment will be the personal example set by the teacher." He cites the work of Mary Warnock (1975) who says: "The teacher must be a LEADER in argument if he is to teach argument ... the children must not be deprived of the spectacle of a teacher who holds, or clearly expresses, moral views (for) there is nothing but benefit in the contemplation of a [wo]man of principle." Pertaining to the question of teaching style in moral education, Mary Warnock suggests a procedure of "firstly, by teaching (on some occasions at least) what he himself believes to be morally right and wrong, and WHY he so believes, thus

exemplifying what it means to seek to justify a moral viewpoint: and secondly by ENCOURAGING critical questioning and appraisal of that viewpoint, so demonstrating the value that he, as a moral agent, places upon independent judgement and rational discussion. By adopting this approach the moral educator is not debarred from declaring and arguing for his own moral beliefs, but he must also strive to convey that all moral conclusions are PROVISIONAL, in the sense that they must be held open to the reasoned criticism of others, however firmly one believes in their validity" (her italics, Warnock, 1975).

I agree with Mary Warnock's views on teaching style. For me, moral education is not only to do with content areas about whose validity opinions may be expressed, but with the process of bringing children to the state where they WANT to KNOW. The WANTING to KNOW is the spur to their own action enquiry. The teacher's task is then to help the learner through the maze, not by imposing ideas, but by supporting the learner in the personal discovery of his own. In this task, the teacher has two massive methodological resources to hand: the first is to encourage dialectical ways of being; the second is in the building of frameworks of care.

I have already stated my belief that humans are dialectical beings. From the work of Basseches (1984) I can suggest that maturity of thought is reflected in dialectical ways of thinking, with the emphasis on openness to new experience (Buber, 1965); whereas formal structures impose restrictions on thought processes and the ways of being which reflect those thought processes which lead to stunted growth. I will

agree with Iris Murdoch (1970) that "the search for unity is deeply natural", but that unity comes from a synthesis of development rather than a destruction of development.

I would say that the insistence of the policy makers (as, for example, in the current legislation, DES, 1987) on formal structures is geared toward legitimating the notion of institutionalised retardation. It is envisioned that children's development depends on sufficient input from their teachers, who will act according to the propositions of the policy makers themselves. This efficient machine will produce the 'certain kind of person' who will perpetuate the system.

I would suggest that a policy of freedom is in tune with a valid interpretation of the term 'education' as it is used in 'educational research', 'educational theory' and 'educational practice'. Freedom of thought is to be found in dialectical ways of thinking. I have already suggested that it is not enough to surmise that dialectical thinking is a stage beyond Piaget's formal operations. I believe that dialectical thinking is the 'natural' way for people to think, and that formal schemes indicate methods of organisation which reflect the formal structures of their creators' thought processes, rather than provide explanations for the mental life of persons. Organisations of curricula which are analytic - i.e. emphasise the contrasts in a field of study, rather than the relationships - and teaching methodologies which are analytic - i.e. aim to develop the cognitive abilities of the learner without taking note of his affective inclinations - perpetuate the

propositions that education is to do with schooling and personal development is to do with producing a certain kind of person.

I have found in my practice that my strategies of helping my children to dialaogical forms of being - i.e. to encourage their view of themselves as dialectical beings - promotes their well-being as individuals, as outlined in this text. What I now need to do is share this idea in a dialectical form. I am doing that through this present text, and through my future teaching activities. I am anxious that my work should not in itself appear propositional, and my corrective is always the fact that I make explicit that my propositions of the form 'I believe : that ...' are embedded within the dialectical framework of myself as a living person whose articulated values system is an expression of the semantic 'I believe ... ' at the deep level of competence.

This is now where I draw on my second resource of frameworks of care. In my theory of performance and communication, I have indicated that the building of dialogical communities will support the notion of an interdependent community of reflexive independents, whose telos is the need for intersubjective agreement that will enable personal enquiries to go forward, This notion, I have said, applies to communities of enquirers in every location: teachers following taught courses at institutes of education, teachers following their own classroom enquiries, teachers of teachers engaged in in-service work, learners in classroom situations, and so on. I agree with Whitehead (1986) that "the majority of circumstances in education require warm and caring

relationships to improve them. These qualities are often more important than the use of a systematic form of enquiry."

Relationships do not just happen. They are created by caring teachers who are prepared to pay attention to personal practice in which there is a supreme realisation of the value of persons.

This is the point that I came to in my practice as a teacher. I moved from seeing my role in 1981 as an imparter of information to children whom I was determined to turn into persons who fitted my view of the 'certain kind of person' who was the end product of personal and social education; to seeing myself as the person who could create the relationship that would encourage each child to want to explore her own form of being, to grow. In my practice as a thinker, I have moved from seeing myself as a 'certain kind of person' who makes propositional statements in accordance with the tenets of the dominant paradigm; to seeing myself as an independent, who is qualified to interpret the world as I see it (Polanyi, 1958) with a view to improving the quality of education for myself and for the people in my care.

CHAPTER EIGHT: THE JUSTIFICATION OF EDUCATIONAL KNOWLEDGE

PAGE

INTRODUCTION 520

1 THE NATURE OF THE CONCEPT 'CLAIM TO KNOWLEDGE' 521

(i) Forms of 'knowledge that' 522
(ii) Forms of 'knowledge how' 524
(iii) Forms of 'knowledge + a direct object' 526

2 THE NATURE OF THE JUSTIFICATION OF CLAIMS TO KNOWLEDGE 528

(i) Forms of justification 528

(a) Verification conditions and truth conditions 528
(b) Knowledge as a form of life

(A) Performance as a form of life 538
(B) An individual's form of life as justification of a claim to knowledge 541

3 THE JUSTIFICATION OF INDIVIDUALS' CLAIMS TO EDUCATIONAL KNOWLEDGE 542

(i) The need for universal acceptance of personal claims to validity 542

(a) The establishment of universal validity norms 543
(b) Conditions for the establishment of validity norms 545

(ii) The justification of my claim to understand my own educational development 547

(1) I can demonstrate in action an improvement in practice 548
(2) I can demonstrate in action a critical understanding of my own development 549
(3) I can demonstrate in action that I may communicate my educational knowledge to other knowing subjects 551
(4) I can demonstrate in action the form of life I have adopted as my values-in-action 553
(5) I can indicate future directions in which my present understandings will lead 555

CHAPTER EIGHT: THE JUSTIFICATION OF EDUCATIONAL KNOWLEDGE

(NOTE: I am indebted to the work of Brian Haymes [1988], for helping me to clarify many of the concepts about justification that are expressed in sections 1 and 2 of this chapter)

INTRODUCTION

In this text I have imagined that the notion 'knowledge' has its expression in three forms (see Chapter 5):

1 knowledge that
2 knowledge how
3 knowledge + a direct object

I now need to consider what constitutes the nature of claims to knowlege; that is, the sort of knowledge an individual is claiming for using a particular form of expression. I also need to consider how such knowledge claims may be - or if they need to be - justified. When it is a question of claims to educational knowledge, I need to consider if the claim is legitimate - i.e. if the speaker is selecting an appropriate form of expression in which to place his claim; if his claim demonstrates the concept that his own education has been extended in some way; and if his claim is justified.

To begin with, I shall consider the nature of the concept 'claim to knowledge'.

1 THE NATURE OF THE CONCEPT 'CLAIM TO KNOWLEDGE'

I have hypothesised three distinct forms of knowledge (above and Chapter 5), and I have argued that knowledge + a direct object may be linked, in some of its forms, with the notion of personal knowledge, and can contain within itself the formal structures of propositional and procedural knowledge (Chapters 6 and 7).

I now wish to make some further observations on the nature of these forms of knowledge, so that I may consider the methods by which persons claiming to 'know' in such forms may justify their claims.

My observations follow a general hypothesis that, for each form of knowledge so far discussed, there are two levels involved: (a) a level of abstraction, and (b) a level of personal commitment. When I come to speak about justification of knowledge, I shall surmise that the level of abstraction may be justified by inference, and that the level of personal commitment may be justified by a form of life.

(i) Forms of 'knowledge that'

Propositional knowledge may be characterised by the clausal form 'know that'. It is my contention that 'know that' may operate at two levels in the mind of the speaker who claims 'knowledge that' in these ways:

People usually make propositions about the world in terms of know-that: "I know that it is 10 o' clock"; "I know that he lives there".

Bertrand Russell drew the distinction (1919, 1973) between knowledge of propositions and knowledge of objects and persons; he termed them 'knowledge of truths' and 'knowledge of things'. In his terminology, knowlege of truths fits the formula 'know that P': "I know that it is Friday". Knowledge of things moves toward what I have called, following Polanyi, 'personal knowledge': 'I know X'; "I know John". (I draw a distinction between utterances of the form 'I know John' and 'I know myself': I shall follow through this train of thought in (ii) below).

Let us stay for a moment with the easily-recognised form of 'know that P', in order to consider the existence of abstract and personal knowledge within this form.

I propose that 'know that P' is the usual form of utterance in which persons externalise their knowledge about the world. In Chapter 7 I have suggested that 'know that P' is a manifestation at performance level of the underlying values system of the speaker, which entails the tacit form 'I believe/know: know that P'.

Consider, for example, H.H. Price's story (1969; cited in Haymes, 1988) about passengers waiting for a train. Passenger A is worried about the lateness of the train, and demonstrates his anxiety by looking at his watch, shuffling his feet, and so on. Passenger B observes his behaviour, and makes the statement, not abnormal in any sense: "I know that he is worried". It would be quite unusual, however, for Passenger A to say: "I know that I am worried". He would simply say: "I am worried". In answer to the question about the justification of their knowledge claims 'How do you know?', B would draw on his inferential knowledge: "I know that he is worried because A is doing such-and-such", whereas A would draw on his personal knowledge: "I just know".

Yet the phrase 'I just know' in this case is nevertheless an externalisation of an underlying tacit claim 'I know that I am worried'.

I would contend, then, that propositional 'know that P' operates at the level of abstraction in which we organise and express our formal knowledge about the world. We may choose such a form of discourse to explicate our externally-oriented knowledge.

At the same time, however, there is a vast pool of underlying latent knowledge, which may be expressed in terms of personal commitment: 'I know that P', where P is to do with self: 'I know that I am worried'. The difference is significant when it comes to justification (see (ii) below).

The same duality, I believe is apparent in the field of discourse which I have termed in this text 'procedural knowledge', that is, knowledge how.

(ii) Forms of 'knowledge how'

Gilbert Ryle (1949) is critical of the intellectualists' stand that 'knowing that' precedes 'knowing how' - the perpetuation of the theory-practice dichotomy. For him procedural knowledge of necessity incorporates propositional knowledge. "Knowing a rule of inference is not possessing a bit of extra information but being able to perform an intelligent operation. Knowing a rule is knowing how."

I have indicated my agreement in this text - that procedural knowledge can incorporate propositional knowledge within itself. But I will now go on to say that, parallel with (a) above, there is an abstract form and a personal form of procedural knowledge.

The abstract form again focuses on our organisation of our experience of the world: "I know how to play the piano; I know how to speak German". What, however, of the intransitive form of these two sentences: "I know how to play; I know how to speak"?

I believe there would be some debate about the validity of the application of the term 'know how' to such utterances. It would be acceptable for me to say "I know how to swim" or "I know how to climb trees". It would be unusual for me to say "Fish know how to swim" or "Monkeys know how to climb trees". Such organisms do not know how; they just do. So perhaps there is a parallel in the concept of birds singing and humans singing: it is part of their natural endowment that they do.

I may now draw again (see Chapter 6) on the innateness hypothesis. I maintain that persons are born in an intense state of being in which the potential for acts of creation is unlimited. This potential, in one of its externalised forms, may be characterised 'know how'. Knowledge how to do things, in this personal sense, leads to a form of life: if I have the innate knowledge how to speak, my form of life will incorporate that knowledge - I will speak.

I may hypothesise, then, that procedural knowledge operates at the abstract level of, for example, 'know how to drive a car', in which we organise our experience about the world; and at the personal deep level of competence, in which procedural knowledge of 'know how to speak' may be externalised at performance level in a form of life.

Again, the distinction is significant when it comes to justifying claims to knowledge.

(iii) Forms of 'knowledge + a direct object'

In this section I am able now to articulate some concepts that have been glossed in the text so far.

I have characterised (above and in Chapter 5) this third form of knowledge as 'knowledge + a direct object', and I will now attempt to show that this may be considered, as in (i) and (ii), in its abstract and personal form.

Russell (1919) argued for categories of knowledge generally termed 'knowledge by description' and 'knowledge by acquaintance'. Knowledge by description enables us to 'know' things external to ourselves - the conceiving of our awareness of Universals. Knowledge by acquaintance enables us to have immediate, direct knowledge of something or someone - the 'concepts' which are the Universals of which we are aware. By description I may know of the Queen; but I may not know her unless by immediate acquaintance. Knowledge by description enlarges our knowledge ABOUT the world; knowledge by acquaintance enlarges our knowledge IN the world.

I will suggest now that such immediate knowledge about persons may operate at an abstract level. We may see persons as external to us and unrelated to us. "I know John" has no further significance to my life than as an utterance - until I am called upon to justify my knowledge (see below).

There is also a deeper level of knowledge + a direct object, what I have termed throughout as 'personal knowledge', and is the result of a commitment to knowledge. 'I know myself' is the concept aimed at when I make relevant to my life concepts of the order 'I know John'. For if I make a commitment to the idea of 'I know John' - i.e. if I see John not as an abstraction but as a living entity who will have an influence in my life, I have to entertain the notion that I as a living person am capable of making such commitments. Such a mental 'set', a state of readiness to enter a form of life in which knowledge of John is a signficiant feature, involves my acceptance of myself as a person who may make such a claim to knowledge. Knowing John as an abstraction is knowlege by description, and involves my formal structures of thought; knowing John as a person is knowledge by acquaintance, and involves my dialectical forms of thought. The difference is one of direct and indirect knowledge. Indirect knowledge may rightly be termed 'knowledge + a direct object'. Direct knowledge involves the self, and the relationship of the self with that which is claimed to be known. Thus knowledge + a direct object metamorphoses into personal knowledge, where 'knowledge of John' is the catalyst to the self's knowledge of self.

As in (i) and (ii), the difference between the two forms is significant when it is a question of the justification of claims to knowledge, and that is the aspect to which I turn now.

2 THE NATURE OF THE JUSTIFICATION OF CLAIMS TO KNOWLEDGE

I will argue in this section that there are two main forms of justificaiton to knowledge claims: the first is through inference; the second is through a form of life (Scheffler, 1985). I shall also consider the need for justification, and I shall suggest that certain forms of knowledge - for example, the knowledge of personal commitment - does not require justification.

(i) Forms of justification

(a) Verification conditions and truth conditions

I wish to consider here two types of conditions that are applicable to knowledge claims. They are (1) verification conditions and (2) truth conditions. I will argue that they are essentially distinct when applied to different kinds of knowledge claim.

In my view, claims to propositional knowledge ground their truth conditions in verification: the utterance "I know that today is Friday" is true because it can be verified by looking at the calendar. The utterance by the golfer in the conversation: Golfer's wife: "Do you know you look exhausted!" Golfer: "I only know my legs ache." is true because his form of life bears out his personal knowledge in that he is limping; his claim cannot, under any circumstances, be verified by

recourse to an other's knowledge of his state; his truth is not open to verification or question, but it is essentially true to him.

The dominant tradition in the literature is that claims to knowledge may be justified by inference. A.J. Ayer (The problem of knowledge, 1972) equates verification and truth conditions in his definition: "... first that what one is said to know be true, secondly that one can be sure of it, and thirdly that one should have the right to be sure." Now, this arrangement may be appropriate to claims of the form 'I know that P'. As I write, I know that P is true - yes, this is a pen in my hand. I am sure that P is true - this is a pen and not a pencil. I have the right to be sure - I have the evidence to say that this is a pen and not a pencil.

However, as Hick (1967) says (cited in Haymes, 1988), if knowledge is such that it has to fulfil both truth and verification conditions, we may not know that we know. 'I know that P' has no "independent guarantee" (Haymes, op.cit.) other than its own grounds. The distinction highlighted here is that claiming to know and knowing are separate realms of discourse. Knowledge itself cannot be erroneous by definition, as Haymes points out, but claims to knowledge can. What we are talking about is the possibility of certainty.

Haymes continues:

"Nothing is lost or gained by admitting the logical impossibility of absolute certainty in some cases. It is true that one can be absolutely

sure of some knowledge claim. We can know, for example, the truth or falsity of analytic propositions; for example. 'All bachelors are unmarried men'. If true such statements are tautologies; if false they are contradictions. They can only be tautologies or contradictions as a result of the meaning of the words used in them. So this kind of 'certainty' has restricted application. It is about the meaning of symbols or words and not things.

"But in other cases where there is not the possibility of demonstration of this symbolic kind all we can ever have is the right to be sure. From this we infer a conclusion and claim to know it. It is always logically possible that we may be mistaken. What we considered good grounds, or a properly accredited route, may prove to be insufficient or inaccurate. It is an empirical fact that no one can be absolutely certain of what they say.

"This is true of all knowledge claims, except the tautologies we have already mentioned." (Haymes, 1988)

I will return to the question of how I can 'know that I know' later in this section. I wish now to consider some forms of knowledge which are resistant to Ayers's definition that verification and truth are in mutual distribution. I shall make two points in my argument. The first is to do with the internal logic of propositional claims to knowledge: the second is to do with the ontology of personal claims to knowledge.

In the first case I return to Ryle's notion mentioned above that procedural know how incorporates propositional know that. In Ryle's sense, know how/that is voiced in the sense of 'be able to': 'I know how to type' = 'I am able to type'. Now, there is a fundamental area of human knowledge that defies verification, and this is to do with Wittgenstein's notion of 'language game' (a notion that I discuss below), or context-specific semantic-specific utterances. As I understand his work, this is the notion that Habermas (1979) has aimed to characterise in his postulated criteria for the formation by mutually agreeing individuals of dialogical communities. What I am saying is that there is an area of human knowledge that may not be verified unless participants of that form of knowledge share the same realm of discourse.

Consider, for example, the conversation:

A: I saw a UFO last night

B: You couldn't have. It was dark.

or:

A: Waiter, waiter, there's a fly in my soup.

B: Quiet, sir, otherwise everyone will want one.

In both cases, the participants are engaging in different fields of discourse. They do not share the same language game. They cannot achieve intersubjective understandings, for they do not share the ontology of common semantic or pragmatic interpretations, nor the epistemology of the desire to reach agreement.

This is significant when it is a question of establishing truth conditions, if we equate truth with verification. For if A, the visitor to the spiritualist's meeting hears B, the spiritualist, say: "I see you have someone with you", he will say, "No, you're wrong; I have come alone". As Haymes says, for a non-believer to ask a believer to prove the existence of God simply does not make sense. The believer takes the existence of God as given, as a Fundamental Proposition (Wittgenstein, 1974), and his field of discourse pivots on that given belief. Discourse outside that game, for the believer, is of another form that he may engage in in an abstracted sense but not in the sense of personal commitment.

This is significant when it comes to verification of knowledge how. I have said above that a claim of the form 'I know ...' may be answered by 'how do you know?' - in other words, 'Prove it'. A knowledge claim of the form 'I know how to ... ', in the sense of 'am able to' may be verified by ostensible proof: I will play the piano, or type - I will demonstrate the skills that are involved in my claim to procedural knowledge.

Taken a step beyond, I may communicate these skills to an other. I may teach someone how to play the piano, or type. This level of discourse, I suggest, is at the abstracted level identified in (1b) above.

What, though, of a claim to procedural knowledge when the claimant is operating at the level of personal commitment. When the student reads the theory of dialectical thought and professes, "I know how to think dialectically", and is then asked by a colleague, "Teach me how to think dialectically", he cannot. He has no personal knowledge of the process. He has abstract knowledge of the principles, but no personal knowledge of how to apply them in practice.

From my argument, I am saying that it is possible to demonstrate abstracted procedural knowledge as veridical justification for the claim 'I know how to do'. It is not always possible to do so for claims to personal procedural knowledge; nor is it always necessary (see below).

Yet the lack of verification does not nullify the truth value of a claim. "I know how to think" may not be subject to veridical justification (inference), but it is the major truth condition for the thinker's form of life.

This is the point I wish to take up in (b) below: that a form of life is a justification for claims to personal knowledge. Before I do that, I must consider a point raised above - that of the necessity of justification.

The need for justification

I will leave for the time being the question of verification conditions, for I hope to continue to demonstrate that verification is not always necessary in establishing the truth. I will now focus only on truth conditions - that is, on the speaker's certainty of the truth of his claim to knowledge. In making his claim, the speaker is claiming truth for his situation in which his claim is made.

Now, in order for me to justify the concept which I have just expressed, let me consider again the idea of truth. In this text I have indicated on several occasions how I moved away from the notion of an abstracted, reified Truth, to the idea that truth may be expressed in the form of the mutually agreed values-system of consenting individuals.

Incorporated within this principle is the notion of language game. Wittgenstein said that language is the expression of a chosen form of life: " .. to imagine a language is to imagine a form of life" (Investigations, 19) and "Here, the term 'language game' is meant to bring into prominence the fact that the SPEAKING of a lnaguage is part of an activity, or a form of life" (Investigations, 23).

When, as children, my sister and I talked to the fairies in our shed, the exercise was true for us. It was not true to father who thought we were playing in the shed. Nor did he share our field of discourse.

The truth of the shared beliefs of consenting individuals provides, for them, a form of life. We children did not attempt to draw father into our shared truth, but that did not invalidate that particular truth for us. Nor did it need justification. We could not justify it, nor was there any need to. When father finally banned us from the shed we took our shared knowledge to other locations. The locations changed; the knowledge did not. Nor did it change until we agreed to change it - probably by changing our views about the existence of fairies. But what is not forgotten is the fact that we did share the idea of truth - we did share a common basis for a form of life; and that union of childhood, the willingness and ability to share, continued as a form of life throughout.

My understanding of the work of Gadamer helps me to rationalise this issue. Gadamer says (1975) that "understanding is never subjective behaviour toward a given 'object', but towards its effective history - the history of its influence; in other words, understanding belongs to the being of that which is understood." Forms of life based on agreements are not vested in the objects of discourse (our childhood fairies) but in the heritage of mental states that gave rise to such agreements. As I have indicated before, consensus is not the aim of discourse, but an agreement to share understandings that will provide the 'right' answers to move forward individuals' ability to question.

"In an idea of play, the difference between faith and pretence is dissolved," says Gadamer. I believe that an implication is that hypotheses as to what constitutes truth are held loosely; that the thinker is ready to move into new states of being, to generate new truths within that particular dialogical community.

So I would continue to maintain that justification is not always necessary. A knowledge claim that rests on the basis of a form of life as its ground does not need to justify itself to other individuals who share the same area of discourse in which that knowledge claim is embedded, and therefore the same form of life.

I now need to consider more closely the notion 'form of life', and the type of knowledge claim that is contained within it.

(b) Knowledge as a form of life

At the basis of this notion is a very simple formulation. It is that:

I claim to know something;
I am committed to that knowledge - i.e. I believe it is true;
I take this knowledge into my values system;
I am committed to my values system;
I show that commitment in my actions;
My claim to knowledge is apparent through my actions;
My values-in-action result in a particular way of living;
My knowledge is manifested in my form of life;
My claim to knowledge is justified by my form of life.

I am not here speaking about the veritude of knowledge. I am speaking about the justification of an individual's claim to knowledge. 'Knowledge' by definition cannot be in error. The question of whether other individuals subscribe to the particular values of the individual who professes to own that knowledge is another matter, and one to be resolved by dialogue. What I am speaking about is an individual's right to claim justification for his particular knowledge claim through a form of life that reflects the knowledge that is his property.

I have alluded above to Wittgenstein's notion 'form of life'. For him, belief and knowledge are synonymous (On Certainty, 42, 308). The 'aim' of knowledge is to act or participate in a form of life (110).

Let me now relate this idea to the views I have expressed in Chapters 6 and 7 of this text. I have acknowledged my debt to the work of Chomsky, in helping me to understand the ideas inherent in the innateness hypotheses of Leibniz and von Humboldt. I carried this understanding into my formulation of the process of the development of the values system of the individual (Chapter 6), and the application of this knowledge of values to models of communication and pragmatics (Chapter 7). I will now say that I may apply the notion 'form of life' in my hypotheses in two separate but interrelated fashions: (A) the idea that I may imagine 'performance' to be characterised as 'form of life' in an abstract, notional sense; (B) that I may apply the notion 'form of life' to myself, as justification for my own claim to knowledge.

(A) Performance as a form of life

In Chapter 6 I hypothesised a model for the acquistion/development of values. I suggested that the mind of the individual could be imagined as existing at separate but interrelated levels, where the deep level of competence acted as the 'pool' of potential, and the surface level of performance was the manifestation in action of the values held at competence. In Chapter 7 I went on to say that agreements of substance (ontological issues) were reached by individuals at performance level, through the method of probing the competences of each other in an effort to share, or make a commitment together, to certain values (epistemological issues). In (b) above in this section, I have said that the form of an individual's life is sufficient justification for his knowledge claim (that the values he holds are 'true' for him). His

performance is justification for his competence. I can go on to say that a form of life shared by consenting individuals is sufficient justification for their shared claims to knowledge (that the values they hold are 'true' for them). Their joint performances justify their shared competences.

Now, throughout this text I have argued that an enquiry may operate at different levels: observational, descriptive, explanatory. In line with Chomsky's formulation (1965), the meeting of the requirements of internal justification awards explanatory status to a grammar: that is, if a language L may be shown to demonstrate internal validity (it does not deviate from its own rules) it may be said to have explanatory status. If the language is only noted and recorded, such activities will enable the enquirer to claim observational and descriptive status; but if the rules inherent in the mind of the speaker/hearer are reconstructed - i.e. made explicit - and may be shown to adhere to the rules of grammar of L, the enquirer (speaker/hearer) may claim explanatory status for his enquiry. He has justified his knowledge of language by demonstrating in action that the language itself has explanatory adequacy.

What I am getting at here is the relationship between the notions 'justification' and 'explanation', with a view to applying such concepts to the notion 'educational'.

I have also indicated throughout this text the notion of the scope of an enquiry, the concept of E- and I-levels. An E-level, for me, aspires only to descriptive adequacy. In terms of a study in education, the enquirer may describe what is going on in other people's practices; she will attempt to characterise what is external to herself. Such an activity, in my view, does not qualify as 'educational'. If the enquirer approaches the study at an I-level, however, she will be able to account for what is going on in her own practice by delving into her assumptions (or held values), considering them, and modifying them, with a resultant modification of practice. Such an enquiry is an enquiry into mind, and may be applied only to self. This form of enquiry, I submit, is educational, for it has reached explanatory status. The link is that, the fact that the individual is constantly in a state of readiness to adopt a new form of life as justification for an improvement in values-in-action is itself justified as educational. The state of mind that is open and enquiring qualifies as (is justified in claiming knowledge that is) educated, and the study that enables the mind to encourage a dialogue of question and answer in the self may be justified as educational. Such a form of life as is generated by an educated individual who is seeking to continue her education, in the sense of continuing the on-going process of the development of rationality, may qualify as educational, and the individual who is engaged in this form of life may claim educational knowledge: that is, she may explain the process by which she is, and continues to be, educated.

(B) An individual's form of life as justification of a claim to knowledge

This is my basis for the justification of my claim to educational knowledge. I may select from the two forms of justification I have already considered: either recourse to evidence (inferential justification) or demonstration of my known values as a form of life. In my view, the latter is the stronger form. An individual's LIVED values are more significant that her SPOKEN values. Belief-in-action is more powerful than belief-in-abstraction. I believe that my claim to knowledge is doubly strengthened, for I may say that I can point to the form of life I have now, as well as the evidence that that form of life has produced (in records of my practice). I may say, not only that I know (make a knowledge claim), but that I know that I know (understand the evolution of the knowledge claim). I shall analyse the detail of my levels of knowledge claim in (3); and for the time being I shall rest my case and look at the pragmatics of the justification of such claims to educational knowledge.

3 The justification of individuals' claims to educational knowledge

In Chapter 7 I said that I would like to see the establishment and institutionalisation of a tradition of critical educational research. I would further like to see norms agreed by the community of researchers about the validity of this practitioner-centred mode, such validity resting in the forms of justification that I have outlined above. In this section I hope to show (i) the criteria I would suggest as assisting toward the agreement of validity norms and (ii) how my own claim to educational knowledge meets those criteria.

(i) The need for universal acceptance of personal claims to validity

There are two points I wish to bring out here. The first is the need for clear criteria by which a practitioner may demonstrate that she has improved her educational knowledge - i.e. the inferential justification of her knowledge claim by appeal to evidence - those criteria to be used by the community of researchers as universal validity norms. The second point is the need for conditions for the establishment of such validity norms. The first point refers to the justification of personal knowledge claims; the second refers to the justification of individuals' claims to award justification to others' knowledge claims. In 3(ii) below I shall be making explicit my own claim to educational knowledge, in the hope that I may demonstrate that I have fulfilled the criteria below. While I am prepared to submit my claim to public scrutiny, I wish to be assured that my critics are qualified to criticise. I am at

pains to justify my claim. I wish to be accorded the reciprocal courtesy that my critics are prepared to share the same language game, to be prepared to dwell in my mind as I endeavour to show how I have come to know the need for the justifications I am expressing. I will take further the idea of reciprocal justification in (ii) below.

(a) The establishment of universal validity norms

While I was preparing the notes to this text, I produced five criteria for the establishment of universal validity norms, and these I reproduce in (ii) below. Coincidentally, I was in correspondence with Jack Whitehead, who sent me some of his work along the same lines, and I will reference his work here.

In his (1985) he uses a number of standards in judging the validity of a claim to educational knowledge. For example, in judging the validity of a teacher's claim to know her own professional development, he asks questions of the kind:

- Does the evidence show that the teacher has carried out a systematic enquiry into her own practice?

- Are the values used by the teacher to characterise her educational enquiry shown to be emerging in practice?

- Are the assertions made about her practice supported sufficiently by evidence from practice?

- Are the criteria used to judge the quality of pupils' learning clearly defined?

- Is there evidence which shows changes in the quality of the pupils' learning?

- Is there evidence of a relationship between the teacher's intentions and the quality of the pupils' learning?

- Is the explanation for an individual's educational development presented in terms of the practitioner's educational values, and related sufficiently to the wider forms and fields of knowledge?

I believe that it is by specifying criteria for the principles of claims to educational knowledge in this way that common standards of judgement may be agreed to justify individuals' claims to educational knowledge.

(b) Conditions for the establishment of validity norms

I would suggest the need for a common constitution agreed by the community of researchers, that colleagues wishing to participate in the process of justifying an individual's claim to educational knowledge should apply standards of judgement to themselves before embarking on a validation exercise. I would put forward the following criteria to be considered among the establishment of such conditions:

- Does each participant fulfil the criteria of (a) above - i.e. does he demonstrate in practice that he has justified his own claim to educational knowledge?

- Does each participant demonstrate a willingness to establish a critical dialogue with others involved in the justification of the knowledge claim?

- Is each participant willing to use the validation exercise as part of the educative process already in question - that is, to move forward his own understanding as well as that of the researcher's? Is he prepared to learn, as well as to judge?

- Is dialogue grounded in the notion of personal rationality, in which the aim is not consensus of content but consensus of form - we agree to share our understandings of each other, if not to share our opinions about the substance of our conversation.

In democratic jurisprudence, the person on trial has the right to refuse a juror who, he feels, is explicitly or implicitly prejudiced against his case. As yet, the same principle does not apply to researchers who submit their work to an academic board. I feel very strongly that the selection of examiners should not be a matter of logistics - for example, who is the most available person at the moment - but a matter of qualification - who will show himself prepared to fulfil the criteria at (b), to justify his own claim to educational knowledge, in order to participate in another's. At the moment I dare say mine appears as a minority view; but I would hazard a guess that it is a view shared by all those who, like me, have been judged by research committees and examining boards whose members are ignorant of the researcher's areas of enquiry, and who are not prepared to help his emergent thinking nor take the trouble to ask the right questions.

I will now turn to my own claim to educational knowledge, and attempt to justify it in the terms outlined above.

(ii) The justification of my claim to understand my own educational development

I have said above that I may draw on two forms of justification: the evidence which I may use as inferential justification, and the form of life I have, which, as I have pointed out, is a manifestation of my values-in-action. I will draw these two concepts together in this section.

I may justify my claim to educational knowledge by demonstrating in action (in this text and in debate about it) that I fulfil the criteria at (a) above. I will organise these and other criteria of my own into five sections to show that:

(1) I can demonstrate in action an improvement in practice;
(2) I can demonstrate in action a critical understanding of my own development;
(3) I can demonstrate in action that I can communicate my knowledge to other knowing subjects;
(4) I can demonstrate in action the form I life I have adopted as my values-in-action;
(5) I can indicate future directions in which my present understandings will lead.

I will now expand on the above:

(1) I can demonstrate in action an improvement in practice

I may do this by recourse to the personal and social education project and to the writing project (Chapters 1-4 of this text). In the personal and social education project I have outlined the actions I undertook in my attempt to turn an unsatisfactory situation in which some of my educational values were denied in my practice into a satisfactory situation in which those educational values were closer to a realisation in practice. I may point to the validation exercises I conducted (for example, VT3, JW and Peter; AT42; VT10: RS and the children) and the corroboration of the participants in my study that the process of their education had been improved by my involvement. I may use this evidence as proof of my claim that I had engaged in the improvement of my own education to improve my practices which would encourage my children to engage in the improvement of their own education.

I may point to the improvement of my practice by recourse to the writing project. In Chapters 2 and 4 of this text I have tried to show how I conducted my action enquiry into my practice as a writer and a thinker: how I observed, reflected, acted, evaluated and modified, in order to resolve an unsatisfactory situation. I am involving you, the reader, in the validation of my claim to educational knowledge. Let us define the criteria by which we judge improvement to have taken place; and then let us agree instances in this text, and perhaps compare them with the first version, to show that improvement in action. I am certain that my claim is justified when I say that the second version is better than the first. The form of life I have adopted in writing the second version

is, in my mind, justification in itself of the validity of my claim. I would welcome the participation of yourself to corroborate my certainty: to 'validate my validation'.

(2) I can demonstrate in action a critical understanding of my own development

In Chapters 1 and 3 of this text, concerning the personal and social education project, I have attempted to show how I consciously shifted my values to accommodate the emergent notions of creative personal development. I have told how I had fixed ideas about personal development and how, over the years, a critical awareness developed to make me adopt a new form of life that took as its telos the freedom of the individual. My teaching practice, as outlined in Chapters 1 and 3, showed the beginning of an increase in educational knowledge - that is, an awareness of the need to develop my understandings in order to improve my practice. At this time, pre-1987, however, I was not aware of the need to know that I know (see above). At the time I was aware of an increase in knowledge; I was not yet aware of my emerging critical faculties. I was not using my rationality consciously.

Such awarenesses did not emerge to consciousness until I became involved in the writing project, which entailed intense reflection on how past practice affected and shaped present practice. This was when the critical faculties began to take over and caused me consciously to shift my values. I developed from being a practitioner to becoming a reflexive practitioner (Schon, 1983). I became aware of the need to know that I know - that is, not only to be content with my educational knowledge, but to desire to justify that knowledge, such a process of justification itself making my study educational.

I may point to Chapters 2 and 4 of this text as an account of my own understanding of the development of that critical awareness. The text of the first version is in existence to show in action that process of emergence; Chapters 2 and 4 of this text are my present reflection on the action of past reflection. In terms of my form of life, I may say - but I cannot justify my claim other than to point to my form of life - that I think differently than I did, and my values-in-action cause me to act differently than I did.

Today my thinking is free. I interpret the world as I see it, as Polanyi would have me do, as a person claiming originality and exercising (her) personal judgement responsibly with universal intent. The 'universal intent' mentioned is not the form of my early practice, when I sought to impose my will on others in a desperate attempt to prove my hypothesis of an end Truth. The 'universal intent' is to make my findings known through my form of life, which includes this text, so that I may invite others to share the understandings I have created that

shape my form of life, and to share that, too, if they wish. My claim to educational knowledge is justified by my form of life. I declare my universal intent by inviting you, the reader, to share my sense of justification. In so doing, I ask you to exercise your critical faculties to comment on the emergence of my critical faculties.

My universal intent lies in my ability to communicate my form of life, and this is my third point.

(3) I can demonstrate in action that I may communicate my educational knowledge to other knowing subjects.

I believe that I was able to communicate my educational knowledge to others throughout my personal and social education project. Chapters 1 and 3 of this text explain how I involved pupils, colleagues, parents, my supervisors, and other interested parties in the study. I not only kept them informed about what I was doing; I actively sought their advice and acted upon it. Although I was the focus of my own study, in that initially I was subject (1981-83) but later also became the object, I asked others to collaborate closely with me. This was done not only in a logistical sense, but also in an epistemological sense - I did not ask people only to contribute time and equipment, but also their opinions. Nor did I keep other people 'external' to the study, requiring, for example, visiting colleagues to the group to 'act' as visitors; anyone who joined us immediately became part of the study. My view of the children changed over the years (Chapter 3) so that I moved

from informing them about what I was doing to making them and their values part of what I was doing.

I communicated my educational knowledge via the printed word, and via seminars in which I held up my best thinking to public scrutiny. Sometimes I received criticism that was painful, because it meant re-thinking dearly held positions. I always acted on criticism; not necessarily to re-write, although I usually did, but certainly to re-think in order to justify my educational knowledge more coherently. The texts which I have produced over the years are included in Appendix 3.

When I came to my writing project I was aware that I was using the text for several purposes. It was to be an amalgam of my present best thinking; it was to help me clarify concepts by the mechanics of organising thought into symbolic form; and it was to communicate my educational knowledge to other knowing subjects.

In the introduction to this text I have indicate how some parts of the text initially failed to communicate easily, and how I came to see the necessity of producing this text. Time will tell if you and I agree that I have communicated adequately with you.

Throughout the project in all its aspects I have become increasingly interested in the idea of communication. I need to read more widely than I have done so far, but my emergent thinking indicates that I want to know the mechanisms by which people make sense. I ask myself how I made sense out of the chaos of my practice when I seemed to be losing

all stable references (Chapter 3); how I made sense out of my writing project when I had much to say but no identified form in which to say it. My glib answer would be that I undertook action-reflection cycles to move my understanding forward; but there are many questions I want to explore which are outside the scope of my present thinking.

(4) I can demonstrate in action the form of life I have adopted as my values-in-action

First, I may say that this text is a demonstration.

I am unable to demonstrate my form of life, however, in a professional educational setting. I am not actively involved in teaching, so I may not apply my ideas to an active teaching practice. But I may say, in terms of my own educational development, that it moves forward by the minute. The crucial difference for me is that I operate in terms of the future rather than the past. When I was at school I looked always to an end product - the end of the day, the end of the children's life in school, the end of my professional development - everything was geared toward some sort of imminent end. I never stopped to rationalise what the end was, or if there was anything after it. The end was simply there, and my purpose was somehow to get prepared in order to meet it.

My life as a dialectical thinker began in action from about 1984. This new form of life began to take hold over the next years, and was crystallised in form in my mind in 1988 when I made the crucial discoveries about dialectical thinking through writing the first version. I could now rationalise what was happening to me, and it was then that I started looking forward. As I have said in the text, I began to see now not as a full stop to the past, but as the beginning of the future. I realised that there was no end to anything, ever.

This realisation has had a profound influence in my life. I realise the nonsense of looking back to the so-called best years of my life, or looking forward to the best that is yet to come. My life is now. The anticipation of the future is in the now. The nostalgia for the past is in the now. I am now. I remember, when I first read Goethe's work, how astonished I was at his outpouring of joy over the most ordinary phenomena; and I read that he did not start thinking like this until his middle years. I am not astonished now; I am delighted to be following the same path. My life is a life realised fully in the present; and I am aware how lucky I am.

(5) I can indicate future directions in which my present understandings will lead

In Chapter 9 I briefly detail some of the ways for my future thinking, I may precis what appears there to say that I am interested in 'the generative exercise' (Chomsky, 1982). I want to move away from the formal theories that have a stranglehold on the literature toward dialectical theories, within areas of discourse involving theories of learning, theories of personal development, theories of knowledge, and theories of communication. My thinking is still emergent in many areas, so the future looks busy. I have only scratched the surface in this text.

ENVOI

PAGE

CHAPTER NINE: THE GENERATIVE ENTERPRISE 557

1 Theories of learning 557

2 Theories of personal development 558

3 Theories of knowledge 558

4 Theories of communication 559

CHAPTER NINE: THE GENERATIVE ENTERPRISE

This chapter is a brief account of what I see as future directions for educational research. I hope to go in these directions with my own enquiries, but the field is massive and offers fruitful avenues for the general community of educational researchers.

I feel there is need of a 'turn' in educational research that will make it an educational critical science.

I see the need for the turn in these areas; there are probably many more.

1 Theories of learning

There is a need to move beyond theories of habit formation and acquisition devices. There is a need for the development of theories of learning that are grounded in individual rationality, such as generative transformational theories that see learning as creation rather than acquisition.

2 Theories of personal development

There is a need to move beyond structuralist theories such a cognitive-developmental theories; there is a need to move beyond synchronic theories that are static and that aspire only to descriptive adequacy. There is a need to develop diachronic theories such as life-span theories that will attempt to account for the on-going development of mature adults and adolescents. There is a need to develop dialectical theories that see the organism acting with and shaping the environment, instead of the main current assumption that the environment shapes the individual.

3 Theories of knowledge

There is a need to move beyond propositional forms and the assumptions of reified knowledge. Such forms aspire only to descriptive adequacy, and depend on and encourage structured mentalities. This is the way to stunted growth. There is a need to develop critical forms of personal knowledge. Such forms aspire to explanatory adequacy, and depend on and encourage dialectical mentalities.

4 Theories of communication

There is a need to move away from object-centred epistemologies that exclude researchers from their own research. There is a need to develop subject-centred epistemologies that involve the living 'I'. There is a need for researchers to agree to establish dialogical communities that will help to encourage a living form of theory that may be said to be educational.

Jean McNiff

February, 1989

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Adelman, C. (ed) UTTERING, MUTTERING (Grant McIntyre, 1981)
Adelman, C. and M. Young 'The assumptions of educational research: the last twenty years in Great Britain' in M. Shipman (ed) EDUCATIONAL RESEARCH: PRINCIPLES, POLICIES AND PRACTICES (Falmer Press, 1985)
Adorno, T. NEGATIVE DIALECTICS (Trans. E.B. Ashton) (New York, The Seabury Press, 1973)
Assessment of Performance Unit PERSONAL AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT (London: D.E.S., 1981)
Aristotle NICHOMACHEAN ETHICS (Trans. H.G. Greenwood) (N.Y., Arno Press, 1973)
Arendt, H. THE HUMAN CONDITION (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1958)
Argyle, M. THE PSYCHOLOGY OF INTERPERSONAL BEHAVIOUR (Penguin Books, 1967)
Armstrong, M. CLOSELY OBSERVED CHILDREN (Writers and Readers, 1980)
Arnold, M. (ed) THE NATURE OF EMOTIONS (Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1968)
Arnold, M. and J.A. Gasson 'Feelings and emotions as dynamic factors in personal integration', in Arnold, M. (ed) THE NATURE OF EMOTIONS (Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1968)
Ault, R.L. CHILDREN'S COGNITIVE DEVELOPMENT (Oxford University Press, 1977)
Ayer, A.J. THE PROBLEM OF KNOWLEDGE (Penguin Books, 1956)
Baldwin, A.L. THEORIES OF CHILD DEVELOPMENT (John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1967)
Baldwin, J. and H. Wells ACTIVE TUTORIAL WORK: YEARS 1 and 2; YEARS 3, 4 and 5; 6th FORM (Basil Blackwell, 1979-82)
Bantock, G.H. FREEDOM AND AUTHORITY IN EDUCATION (London: Faber and Faber, 1955)
Bantock, G.H. EDUCATION AND VALUES: ESSAYS IN THE THEORY OF EDUCATION (London: Faber and Faber, 1965)
Bantock, G.H. EDUCATION, CULTURE AND THE EMOTIONS (London: Faber and Faber, 1967)
Bantock, G.H. THE PAROCHIALISM OF THE PRESENT (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1981)
Basseches, M. DIALECTICAL THINKING AND ADULT DEVELOPMENT (Ablex Publishing Co., Norwood, N.J., 1984)
Beasley, B. THE REFLECTIVE SPECTATOR IN CLASSROOM RESEARCH (Adelaide, Australia: Association for research in education, 1981)
Boehm, A.E. and R.A. Weinberg THE CLASSROOM OBSERVER: A GUIDE FOR DEVELOPING OBSERVATIONAL SKILLS (New York, Teachers' College Press, 1977)
Bernstein, R.J. BEYOND OBJECTIVISM AND RELATIVISM: SCIENCE, HERMENEUTICS AND PRAXIS Basil Blackwell, 1983
Bertalanffy, L. von PROBLEMS OF LIFE (New York Wiley, 1952)
Bleicher, J. HERMENEUTICS AS METHOD, PHILOSOPHY AND CRITIQUE (London: Routledge Kegan Paul, 1980)
Bloomfield, L. LANGUAGE Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1933
Bogen, W. 'The other side of the brain: an appositional mind', in Ornstein, R. THE NATURE OF HUMAN CONSCIOUSNESS W.H. Freeman and Co.,San Francisco, 1973

Brandes, D. and H. Phillips GAMESTER'S HANDBOOK London: Hutchinson, 1979
Broughton, J. CRITICAL THEORIES OF PSYCHOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENT Plenum Press, 1987
Brown, S., J. Fauvel and R. Finnegan CONCEPTIONS OF INQUIRY The Open University Press, 1981
Bruner, J.S. TOWARDS A THEORY OF INSTRUCTION Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1966
Buber, M. I AND THOU (trans. R.G. Smith) T. and T. Clark, Edinburgh, 1937
Buber, M. DISTANCE AND RELATION 'Psychiatry' 20 (2) (1957)
Buber, M. THE KNOWLEDGE OF MAN (George Allen and Unwin London, 1965)
Buck-Morss, S. THE ORIGIN OF NEGATIVE DIALECTICS (The Harvester Press, 1977)
Burgess, R. (ed) ISSUES IN EDUCATIONAL RESEARCH (Falmer Press, 1985)
Button, L. OCCASIONAL PAPERS IN DEVELOPMENTAL GROUP WORK (Department of Education, University College of Swansea, 1970-75)
Button, L. DEVELOPMENTAL GROUP WORK WITH ADOLESCENTS (Hodder and Stoughton, 1974)
Button, L. GROUP TUTORING FOR THE FORM TEACHER: 1 LOWER SECONDARY SCHOOL, 2 UPPER SECONDARY SCHOOL (London, Hodder and Stoughton, 1981, 1982)
Canguilhem, G. 'What is psychology? Ideology and consciousness' cited in J. Broughton, CRITICAL THEORIES OF PSYCHOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENT (Plenum Press, 1987)
Carr, W. THE GAP BETWEEN THEORY AND PRACTICE Journal of Further and Higher Education, Vol. 14, No. 1 (1980)
Carr, W. and S. Kemmis BECOMING CRITICAL (The Falmer Press, 1986)
Child, D. PSYCHOLOGY AND THE TEACHER (Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1973)
Chomsky, N. ASPECTS OF THE THEORY OF SYNTAX (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1965)
Chomsky, N. CARTESIAN LINGUISTICS (New York, Harper & Row, 1966)
Chosmky, N. KNOWLEDGE OF LANGUAGE (Praeger Publishers, N.Y., 1986)
Chomsky, N. LANGUAGE AND MIND (New York, Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1972)
Chomsky, N. THE GENERATIVE ENTERPRISE (Foris Publications, 1982)
Chosmky, N. THE LOGICAL STRUCTURE OF LINGUISTIC THEORY (New York, Plenum Press, 1975)
Chomsky, N. SYNTACTIC STRUCTURES (The Hague: Mouton, 1957)
Collingwood, R.G. AN AUTOGBIOGRAPHY (Oxford University Press, 1939)
Comey, D.D. 'Logic' in Kernig (ed) MARXISM, COMMUNISM AND WESTERN SOCIETY Vol. 5, (Herder and Herder, N.Y.)
D'Agostino, F. CHOMSKY'S SYSTEM OF IDEAS (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1986)
David, K. PERSONAL AND SOCIAL EDUCATION IN SECONDARY SCHOOLS (Longman, for the Schools Council, 1983)
Davies, W.K.J. ALTERNATIVES TO CLASS TEACHING IN SCHOOLS AND COLLEGES CET, (H.Cave and Co., Ltd., 1980)
De Bono, E. THE MECHANISM OF MIND (Pelican Books, 1967)
Denley, P. THE DEVELOPMENT OF AN APPROACH TO PRACTICAL RESEARCH INITIATED THROUGH CLASSROOM OBSERVATION, AND OF PARTICULAR RELEVANCE TO THE EVALUATION OF SCIENCE TEACHING (Unpublished Ph.D. submission, University of Bath, 1987)

DES EDUCATION IN SCHOOLS: A CONSULTATIVE DOCUMENT (London: HMSO, 1979)
DES A FRAMEWORK FOR THE SCHOOL CURRICULUM (London: HMSO, 1979)
DES THE SCHOOL CURRICULUM (London: HMSO, 1981)
DES THE NATIONAL CURRICULUM 5-16: A CONSULTATION DOCUMENT (HMSO, 1987)
DES/HMI CURRICULUM 11 TO 16 (London: DES, 1977)
DES/HMI ASPECTS OF SECONDARY EDUCATION IN ENGLAND (London: HMSO, 1979)
DES/HMI A VIEW OF THE CURRICULUM (London: HMSO, 1980)
Delamont, S. INTERACTION IN THE CLASSROOM (London: Methuen, 1983)
Dewey, J. DEMOCRACY AND EDUCATION (London: Macmillan, 1916)
Dorset County Local Education Authority POLICY STATEMENT 1983
Downey, M. and A. Kelly MORAL EDUCATION: THEORY AND PRACTICE (Harper and Row, 1978)
Downie, R.S. and Telfer, E. RESPECT FOR PERSONS London: Allen and Unwin, 1969
Downie, R.S. and Telfer, E. CARING AND CURING London: Methuen, 1980
Douglas, J.D. THE RELEVANCE OF SOCIOLOGY N.Y. Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1972
Dunlop, F. THE EDUCATION OF FEELING AND EMOTION George Allen & Unwin, 1984
Ebbutt, D. TEACHERS AS RESAERCHERS: HOW FOUR TEACHERS CO-ORDINATE THE PROCESS OF RESEARCH IN THEIR RESPECTIVE SCHOOLS Working paper No. 10 (Schools Council TIQL Project, 1982)
Ebbutt, D. 'Educational action research: some general concerns and specific quibbles' in R. Burgess (ed) ISSUES IN EDUCATIONAL RESEARCH (Falmer Press, 1985)
Ebbutt, D. and J. Elliott ISSUES IN TEACHING FOR UNDERSTANDING (Longmans for Schools Council, 1985)
Eggleston, J., M. Galton and M. Jones PROCESSES AND PRODUCTS OF SCIENCE TEACHING (London: Macmillan, 1976)
Eggleston, J., M. Galton and M. Jones CHARACTERISTICS OF EDUCATIONAL RESEARCH: MAPPING THE DOMAIN (B.E.R.J. 5, 1, 1979)
Elliott, J. ACTION RESEARCH; FRAMEWORK FOR SELF EVALUATION IN SCHOOLS TIQL working paper No. 1 (Cambridge Institute of Education, 1981)
Elliott, J. ACTION RESEARCH INTO ACTION RESEARCH CARN Bulletin No. 5 (Cambridge Journal of Education, 1982)
Elliott, J. PARADIGMS OF EDUCATIONAL RESEARCH AND THEORIES OF SCHOOLING (mimeo, Cambridge Institute of Education, 1983)
Elliott, J. EDUCATIONAL THEORY, PRACTICAL PHILOSOPHY AND ACTION RESEARCH British Journal of Educational Studies Vol xxxv, No. 2 (June, 1987)
Elliott, J. EDUCATIONAL THEORY AND THE PROFESSIONAL LEARNING OF TEACHERS: AN OVERVIEW Cambridge Journal of Education, Vol 19, No. 1 (1989)
Elliott, J. 'How do parents judge schools?' in Elliott, J., D. Bridges, D, Ebbutt, R. Gibson and J. Nias SCHOOL ACCOUNTABILITY (London: Grant McIntyre, 1981)
Elliott, J. and C. Adelman INNOVATION AT THE CLASSROOM LEVEL: A CASE STUDY OF THE FORD TEACHING PROJECT Unit 28, Open University Course E203: Curriculum Design and Development (Open Universtiy Press, 1976)

Elliott, J. and C. Adelman 'Reflecting where the action is: the design of the Ford Teaching Project', EDUCATION FOR TEACHING, Vol 92 (1973)

Elliott, J. and B. Macdonald (eds) PEOPLE IN CLASSROOMS (Norwich: CARE Occasional Publications No. 2, 1975)

Ellis, R. and D. Whittington A GUIDE TO SOCIAL SKILL TRAINING (London: Croom Helm, 1981)

Fenton, E. and L. Kohlberg TEACHER TRAINING IN VALUES EDUCATION: A WORKSHOP (New York: Guidance Associates, 1976a)

Fenton, E. and L. Kohlberg UNIVERSAL VALUES IN AMERICAN HISTORY (New York: Guidance Associates, 1976b)

Feyerabend, P.K. AGAINST METHOD: OUTLINES OF AN ANARCHIST THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE (London: New Left Books, 1975)

Feyerabend, P.K. 'Consolations for the specialist' in I. Lakatos and A. Musgrave CRITICISM AND THE GROWTH OF KNOWLEDGE (Cambridge University Press, 1970)

Findlay, J.N. VALUES AND INTENTIONS (London: Allen & Unwin, 1961)

Fodor, Janet D. SEMANTICS: THEORIES OF MEANING IN GENERATIVE GRAMMAR (Thomas Y. Cromwell Co., N.Y., 1977)

Fodor, Jerry A. and J.J. Katz THE STRUCTURE OF LANGUAGE (Prentice-Hall, Inc., Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey, 1964)

Foster, D. EXPLANATIONS FOR TEACHERS' ATTEMPTS TO IMPROVE THE PROCESS OF EDUCATION FOR THEIR PUPILS (Unpublished M.Ed. thesis, University of Bath, 1982)

Frazer, Sir James. G. THE GOLDEN BOUGH (Macmillan and Co. 1963)

Freud, S. AN OUTLINE OF PSYCHO-ANALYSIS (Hogarth Press, 1949)

Freud, S. TOTEM AND TABOO (Routledge, Kegan Paul, 1950)

Freud, S. THE INTERPRETATION OF DREAMS (Allen and Unwin, 1955)

Fromm, E. THE FEAR OF FREEDOM (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1942)

Fromm, E. TO HAVE OR TO BE (Jonathan Cape, 1978)

Feuerstein, R. INSTRUMENTAL ENRICHMENT (Baltimore: University Park Press, 1979)

FEU EXPERIENCE, REFLECTION, LEARNING (London: DES, 1978)

FEU A BASIS FOR CHOICE (London: DES, 1979)

FEU DEVELOPING SOCIAL AND LIFE SKILLS (London: DES, 1980a)

FEU BEYOND COPING (London: DES, 1980b)

FEU TUTORING (London: DES, 1982a)

FEU PROFILES (London: DES, 1982b)

FEU COMMON CARE - TEACHING AND LEARNING (London: DES, 1984)

Gadamer, H.G. TRUTH AND METHOD (New York: The Seabury Press, 1975)

Gagne, R. THE CONDITIONS OF LEARNING (Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1965)

Galton, M. BRITISH MIRRORS: A COLLECTION OF CLASSROOM OBSERVATION INSTRUMENTS (Leicester School of Education, University of Leicester, 1978)

Giddens, A. POSITIVISM AND SOCIOLOGY (London: Heinemann, 1974)

Giroux, H.A. IDEOLOGY, CULTURE AND THE PROCESS OF SCHOOLING (Brighton: Falmer Press, 1981)

Goldstein, K. THINKING AND SPEAKING (New York Academy of Science, 1960)

Green, B. PERSONAL DIALECTICS IN EDUCATIONAL THEORY AND EDUCATIONAL RESEARCH METHODOLOGY (Unpublished M.A. dissertation, University of London, 1979)

Grene, M. THE KNOWER AND THE KNOWN (Faber and Faber, 1966)
Grene, M. 'Introduction' in M. Polanyi KNOWING AND BEING (Butler & Tanner, Ltd., 1969)
Gurney, M. THE DEVELOPMENT OF PERSONAL AND SOCIAL EDUCATION THROUGH ACTION RESEARCH (Unpublished Ph.D. thesis, University of Bath, 1988)
Gurney, M. 'Implementer or Innovator? A Teacher's Challenge to the Restrictive Paradigm of Traditional Research' in P. Lomax (ed) BERA DIALOGUES NUMBER 1: THE MANAGEMENT OF CHANGE (Multilingual Matters, Ltd., 1989)
Habermas, J. TOWARDS A RATIONAL SOCIETY (Trans. J.J. Shapiro) (Heinemann, 1971)
Habermas, J. KNOWLEDGE AND HUMAN INTERESTS (Trans J.J. Shapiro) (Heinemann, 1972)
Habermas, J. THEORY AND PRACTICE (trans. J. Viertel) (Heinemann, 1974)
Habermas, J. COMMUNICATION AND THE EVOLUTION OF SOCIETY (trans. J. McCarthy) (Boston, Beacon Press, 1979)
Hall, A. THE QUILLER MEMORANDUM (Fontana Books, 1965)
Hall, A. THE PEKIN PORTFOLIO (Fontana Books, 1981)
Hamblin, D. THE TEACHER AND COUNSELLING (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1974)
Hamblin, D. THE TEACHER AND PASTORAL CARE (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1978)
Hamilton, D. et. al. BEYOND THE NUMBERS GAME (London: Macmillan, 1977)
Hammersley, M. THE ETHNOGRAPHY OF SCHOOLING (Driffield, Nafferton, 1983)
Hare, R.M. THE LANGUAGE OF MORALS (Oxford University Press, 1952)
Hare, R.M. FREEDOM AND REASON (Oxford University Press, 1963)
Hare, R.M. 'Language and moral education' in S.G. Langford and D.J. O'Connor (eds) NEW ESSAYS IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1973)
Hare, R.M. MORAL THINKING: ITS LEVELS, METHOD, AND POINT (Oxford University Press, 1981)
Hargreaves, D. THE CHALLENGE FOR THE COMPREHENSIVE SCHOOL (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1982)
Harre, R. 'The positivist empiricist approach and its alternative' in P. Reason and J. Rowan (eds) HUMAN INQUIRY (Wiley, 1981)
Haymes, B. THE CONCEPT OF THE KNOWLEDGE OF GOD (Macmillan Press, 1988)
Hesse, M. REVOLUTIONS AND RECONSTRUCTIONS IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE (The Harvester Press, 1980)
Hegel, G.W.F. THE PHENOMENOLOGY OF MIND (trans. J.B. Baillie) (The Macmillan Co., 1910)
Hegel, G.W.F. LOGIC (Trans. W.Wallace) (Oxford University Press, 1917)
Hersch, R.H., D.P. Paolitto and J. Reiner PROMOTING MORAL GROWTH: FROM PIAGET TO KOHLBERG (New York: Longman, 1979)
Hersch, R.H., J. Miller, and G. Fielding MODELS OF MORAL EDUCATION (Longman, 1980)
Hick, J. FAITH AND KNOWLEDGE (Cornell University Press, 1966)
Hick, J. GOD AND THE UNIVERSE OF FAITHS (Macmillan, 1973)
Hintikka, J. KNOWLEDGE AND THE KNOWN (D. Reidel Publishing Co., 1974)
Hirst, P.H. KNOWLEDGE AND COMMUNICATION (London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1974)

Hirst, P.H. MORAL EDUCATION IN A SECULAR SOCIETY (London, University of London Press, 1974)
Hirst, P.H. 'Human movement, knowledge and education' in the Journal of the philosophy of education, Vol. 13 (1979)
Hirst, P.H. (ed) EDUCATIONAL THEORY AND ITS FOUNDATION DISCIPLINES (London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1983)
Hirst, P.H. and R.S. Peters THE LOGIC OF EDUCATION (Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1970)
Holly, M.L. 'Reflective Writing and the Spirit of Inquiry' in The Cambridge Journal of Education, Vol. 19, No. 1, 1989
Holly, P. 'Beyond the cult of the individual: putting the partnership into in-service collaboration' in J. Nias (ed) TEACHING ENQUIRY-BASED COURSES (Cambridge Institute of Education)
Hopkins, D. A TEACHER'S GUIDE TO CLASSROOM RESEARCH (Open University Press, 1985)
Hopson, B. and P. Hough EXERCISES IN PERSONAL AND CAREER DEVELOPMENT (Cambridge; CRAC, 1973)
Hopson, B. and M. Scally LIFESKILLS TEACHING PROGRAMMES Numbers 1 and 2. (Leeds: Lifeskills Associates, 1979
Hopson, B. and M. Scally LIFESKILLS TEACHING (Maidenhead: McGraw Hill, 1981)
Horkheimer, M. 'Traditional and critical theory' in Horkheimer, M. CRITICAL THEORY (New York: The Seabury Press, 1972)
House, E.R. EVALUATING WITH VALIDITY (Sage Publications, 1980)
Hustler, D., T. Cassidy and T. Cuff ACTION RESEARCH IN CLASSROOMS AND SCHOOLS (Allen and Unwin, 1986)
Husen, T. and T. Postlethwaite (eds) INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPAEDIA OF EDUCATIONAL RESEARCH AND STUDIES (Pergamon, 1982)
Illich, I. DE-SCHOOLING SOCIETY (Calder and Boyars, Ltd., 1971)
Ilyenkov, E. DIALECTICAL LOGIC (Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1978)
James, W. THE PRINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGY Vols I and II (New York: Dover, 1950)
Jay, M. THE DIALECTICAL IMAGINATION (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1973)
Jensen, M. A CREATIVE APPROACH TO THE TEACHING OF ENGLISH IN THE EXAMINATION YEARS: AN ACTION RESEARCH PROJECT (Unpublished M.Phil. thesis, University of Bath, 1987)
Jespersen, O. LANGUAGE: ITS NATURE, DEVELOPMENT AND ORIGIN (London: Allen and Unwin, 1922)
Jung, C.G. 'The psychology of the unconscious' in COLLECTED WORKS (Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1953)
Kant, I. FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF THE METAPHYSIC OF MORALS (1785) (trans. T.K. Abbott) (London: Longman, 1909)
Kelly, A. 'Action research: some definitions and descriptions' in R. Burgess (ed) ISSUES IN EDUCATIONAL RESEARCH: QUALITATIVE METHODS (Falmer Press)
Kelly, G.A. THE PSYCHOLOGY OF PERSONAL CONSTRUCTS, VOLS I and II (Norton, New York, 1955)
Kemmis, S. 'Action research' in T. Husen and T. Postlethwaite (eds) INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF EDUCATION: RESEARCH AND STUDIES (Pergamon, 1982)
Kemmis, S. and R. McTaggart THE ACTION RESEARCH PLANNER (Geelong, Victoria, Deakin university Press, 1982)

Kohlberg, L. 'Stage and sequence: the cognitive-developmental approach to socialization' in D. Goslin (ed) HANDBOOK OF SOCIALIZATION THEORY AND RESEARCH (Chicago: Rand and McNally, 1969)

Kohlberg, L. 'Stages of moral development as a basis for moral education' in C. Beck, B. Crittendon and E. Sullivan (eds) MORAL EDUCATION INTERDISCIPLINARY APPROACHES (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1971a)

Kohlberg, L. 'From "is" to "ought": how to commit the naturalistic fallacy and get away with it in the study of moral development' in T. Mischel (ed) COGNITIVE DEVELOPMENT AND EPISTEMOLOGY (New York: Academic Press, 1971b)

Kohlberg, L. 'Moral stages and moralization: the cognitive developmental approach' in T. Lickona (ed) MORAL DEVELOPMENT AND BEHAVIOUR: THEORY, RESEARCH AND SOCIAL ISSUES (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1976)

Kohlberg, L. 'The cognitive developmental approach to moral education' and 'The moral atmosphere of the school' in P. Scharf (ed) READINGS IN MORAL EDUCATION (Winston Press, Inc., 1978)

Kohlberg, L. ESSAYS ON MORAL DEVELOPMENT: VOL I THE PHILOSOPHY OF MORAL DEVELOPMENT (San Francisco, Calif: Harper and Row, 1981)

Kohlberg, L. 'Recent work in moral education' in L.O. Ward THE ETHICAL DIMENSION OF THE SCHOOL CURICULUM (Swansea: Pineridge Press, 1982)

Kolakowski, L. POSITIVIST PHILOSOPHY (Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1972)

Kosslyn, S. 'The medium and the message in mental imagery' in N. Block (ed) IMAGERY (The MIT Press, 1981)

Krathhwohl, D., B. Bloom and B. Masia TAXONOMY OF EDUCATIONAL OBJECTIVES VOL 2 AFFECTIVE DOMAIN (London: Longman, 1964)

Kuhn, T. THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS (University of Chicago Press, 1962)

Labovie-Vief, G. BEYOND FORMAL OPERATIONS: USES AND LIMITS OF PURE LOGIC IN LIFE-SPAN DEVELOPMENT (Human Development, 23, (1980)

Lakatos, I. and A. Musgrave (eds) CRITICISM AND THE GROWTH OF KNOWLEDGE (Cambridge University Press, 1970)

Langford, G. 'The concept of education' in G. Langford and D.J. O'Connor (eds) NEW ESSAYS IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1973)

Langford, G. EDUCATION, PERSONS AND SOCIETY - A PHILOSOPHICAL ENQUIRY (Macmillan, 1985)

Larter, A. AN ACTION RESEARCH APPROACH TO CLASSROOM DISCUSSION IN THE EXAMINATION YEARS (Unpublished M.Phil, University of Bath, 1989)

Lawton, D. SOCIAL CHANGE, EDUCATIONAL THEORY AND CURRICULUM PLANNING (Hodder and Stoughton, 1973)

Leonie-Simpson, E. 'The creativogenic school: developing positive human personality' in P. Scharf (ed) READINGS IN MORAL EDUCATION (Winston Press, 1978)

Loevinger, J. EGO DEVELOPMENT (San Francisco, Calif: Jossey-Bass, 1976)

Levi-Strauss, C. STRUCTUAL ANTHROPOLOGY: VOL 2 (Penguin, 1968)

Levi-Strauss, C. 'History and dialectic' in THE SAVAGE MIND (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1973)
Levinson, D.J., C.N. Darros, E.B. Klein, M.H. Levinson and B. McKee THE SEASONS OF A MAN'S LIFE (Alfred Knopf, New York, 1978)
Lewin, K. ACTION RESEARCH AND MINORITY PROBLEMS Journal of social issues, Vol. 2 (1946)
Lewin, K. 'Group decision and social change' in T. Newcomb and E. Hartley (eds) READINGS IN SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY (New York, Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1947)
Lewis, J. THE HISTORY OF PSYCHOLOGY Teach Yourself Books (1970)

Likona, T. MORAL DEVELOPMENT AND BEHAVIOUR: THEORY, RESEARCH AND SOCIAL ISSUES (New York, Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1976)
Lomax, P. EVALUATING FOR COURSE IMPROVEMENT in Assessment and evaluation in higher education, 10 (1985)
Lomax, P. ACTION RESEARCHERS' ACTION RESEARCH: A SYMPOSIUM British Journal of In-Service Education, 13 (1986)
Lomax, P. (ed) THE MANAGEMENT OF CHANGE BERA Dialogues Number 1 (Multilingual Matters, Inc., 1989)
Lovell, K. and K.S. Lawson UNDERSTANDING RESEARCH IN EDUCATION (London: University of London Press, 1970)
Macdonald, B. and R. Walker (eds) INNOVATION, EVALUATION RESEARCH AND THE PROBLEMS OF CONTROL (Norwich School of Education, University of East Anglia Press, 1974)
Mackay, W. F. LANGUAGE TEACHING ANALYSIS (Longmans, 1965)
MacMurray, J. REASON AND EMOTION (London: Faber, 1935)
MacMurray, J. FREEDOM IN THE MODERN WORLD second edition (London: Faber)
Magee, B. MEN OF IDEAS BBC Publications (1978)
Mager, R. PREPARING INSTRUCTIONAL OBJECTIVES (Palo Alto, Ca., Fearon, 1962)
Malcolm, N. 'Knowledge and belief' in A.P. Griffiths (ed) KNOWLEDGE AND BELIEF (Oxford University Press, 1967)
Malcolm, N. WITTGENSTEIN: NOTHING IS HIDDEN (Basil Blackwell, 1986)
Marcuse, H. ONE DIMENSIONAL MAN (Boston: Beacon Press, 1964)
Marland, M. PASTORAL CARE (London: Heinemann, 1970)
Marx, K. 'Paris Manuscripts' in R. Bernstein PRAXIS AND ACTION (Duckworth, 1972)
Marx, K. THE WRITINGS OF THE YOUNG MARX D. Easton and K.H. Guddal (eds) THE WRITINGS OF THE YOUNG MARX (New York, Anchor Books, 1967)
Maslow, A.H. TOWARD A PSYCHOLOGY OF BEING (New York: Van Nostrand Reinhold, 1968)
McCarthy, T. THE CRITICAL THEORY OF JURGEN HABERMAS (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1978)
McGuire, J. and P. Priestley LIFE AFTER SCHOOL: A SOCIAL SKILLS CURRICULUM (Pergamon, 1981)
McNiff, J. ACTION RESEARCH: A GENERATIVE MODEL FOR IN-SERVICE SUPPORT British Journal of In-service Education (Summer, 1984)
McNiff, J. DEFINING THE CRITIERIA FOR PERSONAL AND SOCIAL EDUCATION IN SCHOOLS A paper to the BERA Symposium, 1984
McNiff, J. THE CRITERIA FOR PERSONAL AND SOCIAL EDUCATION IN ACTION A paper to the BERA Symposium, 1985

McNiff, J. PERSONAL AND SOCIAL EDUCATION: A TEACHER'S HANDBOOK Hobson's Press (CRAC), 1986a
McNiff, J. 'Talking Time' in 'Lifeforce', Vol 1 CRAC (1986b)
McNiff, J. 'Creating helping relationships in schools' in 'Lifeforce, Vol 2 CRAC (1987a)
McNiff, J. 'Teachers' professional and personal development through action research' in 'Lifeforce' Vol 3 CRAC (1987b)
McNiff, J. 'Classroom management and the teaching of personal and social education' in 'Lifeforce' Vol 4 CRAC (1988a)
McNiff, J. 'Frameworks of care' in 'Lifeforce' Vol 5 CRAC (1988b)
McNiff, J. ACTION RESEARCH: PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE (Macmillan Education, 1988c)
McNiff, J. 'My claim to understand my own educational development': a paper to the BERA symposium (1989a)
McNiff, J. AN INDIVIDUAL'S CLAIM TO UNDERSTAND HER OWN EDUCATIONAL DEVELOPMENT Paper to the CARN Annual Conference (1989b)
McNiff, J. 'What's it all about?' in 'Lifeforce', Vol 8 (1989c)
McPhail, P., J.R. Ungoed-Thomas and H. Chapman MORAL EDUCATION IN SECONDARY SCHOOLS (Harlow: Longman, 1972)
McPhail, P. SOCIAL AND MORAL EDUCATION (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1982)
Medawar, P. INDUCTION AND INTUITION IN SCIENTIFIC THOUGHT (Methuen, 1969)
Metcalf, L. (ed) VALUES EDUCATION: RATIONALE, STRATEGIES AND PROCEDURES (Washington, D.C. National Council for Social Studies, 1971)
Meux, M. et al. RESOLVING VALUE CONFLICTS in Metcalf (1971)
Mill, J.S. COLLECTED WORKS (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1963)
Mouton, J.S. and R.R. Blake SYNERGOGY (Jossey-Bass Publishers, 1984)
Murdoch, I. THE SOVEREIGNTY OF GOOD (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1970)
MSC INSTRUCTIONAL GUIDE TO SOCIAL AND LIFE SKILLS (London: MSC, 1980)
MSC A NEW TRAINING INITIATIVE: A CONSULTATIVE DOCUMENT (London: MSC, 1981)
MSC A NEW TRAINING INITIATIVE: AN AGENDA FOR ACTION (London: MSC, 1981
MSC/FEU A NEW TRAINING INITIATIVE: A JOINT STATEMENT (London, MSC, (1982)
Musgrave, F. 'Curriculum, culture and ideology' in P.H. Taylor (ed) NEW DIRECTIONS IN CURRICULUM STUDIES (Lewes, Falmer Press, 1979)
NFER TEACHING SOCIAL AND LIFE SKILLS (1979)
Newman, F.W., T. Bertocci and M. Ruttanne SKILLS IN CITIZEN ACTION: AN ENGLISH-SOCIAL STUDIES PROGRAM FOR SECONDARY SCHOOLS (National Textbook, 1977)
Newman, F.W. EDUCATION FOR CITIZEN ACTION: THE CHALLENGE FOR THE SECONDARY CURRICULUM (Berkeley, Calif: McCutchan, 1975)
Newson, E. 'Unreasonable Care: the establishment of selfhood' in G. Vesey HUMAN VALUES (1978)
Nias, J. THE DEFINITION AND MAINTENANCE OF SELF IN PRIMARY TEACHING (Cambridge Institute of Education, 1983)
Nias, J. A MORE DISTANT DRUMMER: TEACHING DEVELOPMENTS AS DEVELOPMENT OF SELF (Cambridge Institute of Education, 1984)

Nisbet, J. and N.J. Entwhistle EDUCATIONAL RESEARCH METHODS (London: University of London Press, 1970)
Nixon, J. A TEACHER'S GUIDE TO ACTION RESEARCH (Grant McIntyre, 1981)
O'Connor, D.J. AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1957)
O'Connor, D.J. 'The nature and scope of educational theory' in Langford, G. and O'Connor (eds) NEW ESSAYS IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1973)
Ornstein, R. (ed) THE NATURE OF HUMAN CONSCIOUSNESS (W.H. Freeman and Co., San Francisco, 1973)
Ornstein, R. MULTIMIND (Boston, Mass., Houghton Mifflin, 1987)
Parlett, M. and Hamilton, D. EVALUATION AS ILLUMINATION Occasional Papers, No. 9. Edinburgh Centre for research in educational sciences (University of Edinburgh, 1972)
Peters, R.S. ETHICS AND EDUCATION (London: Allen and Unwin, 1966)
Peters, R.S. THE PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION (London: Oxford University Press, 1973)
Peters, R.S. PSCYHOLOGY AND ETHICAL DEVELOPMENT (London: Allen and Unwin, 1974)
Peters, R.S. EDUCATION AND THE EDUCATION OF TEACHERS (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1977)
Peters, R.S. 'The place of Kohlberg's theory in moral education' in Journal of Moral Education 7 (3) (1978), reprinted in Peters, R.S. MORAL DEVELOPMENT AND MORAL EDUCATION (London: Allen and Unwin, 1981)
Peters, R.S. MORAL DEVELOPMENT AND MORAL EDUCATION (London: Allen and Unwin, 1981)
Pfeiffer, J.W. and J.E. Jones A HANDBOOK OF STRUCTURED EXPERIENCES FOR HUMAN RELATIONS TRAINING (Iowa: University Associates Press, 1975)
Piaget, J. THE LANGUAGE AND THOUGHT OF THE CHILD (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1926)
Piaget, J. THE MORAL JUDGEMENT OF THE CHILD (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1932)
Piattelli-Palmarini, M. (ed) LANGUAGE AND LEARNING: THE DEBATE BETWEEN JEAN PIAGET AND NOAM CHOMSKY (Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1980)
Polanyi, M. PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE (Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1958)
Polanyi, M. THE TACIT DIMENSION (Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1967)
Polanyi, M. KNOWING AND BEING (Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1969)
Polanyi, M. 'Understanding ourselves' in Ornstein, R. (ed) THE NATURE OF HUMAN CONSCIOUSNESS (1973)
Popkewitz, T. PARADIGM AND IDEOLOGY IN EDUCATIONAL RESEARCH (Lewes: Falmer Press, 1984)
Popper, K. CONJECTURES AND REFUTATIONS (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1963)
Popper, K. THE OPEN SOCIETY AND ITS ENEMIES (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1966)
Popper, K. OBJECTIVE KNOWLEDGE (Oxford University Press, 1972)
Popper, K. 'The allure of the open future' (The Guardian, 29.8.1988)
Price, H.H. BELIEF (London: Allen and Unwin, 1969)
Priestley, P. and McGuire, J. LEARNING TO HELP: BASIC SKILLS EXERCISES (Tavistock Publications, 1981)
Pring, R. PERSONAL AND SOCIAL EDUCATION IN THE CURRICULUM (Hodder and Stoughton, 1984)

Radford, J. and R. Kirby THE PERSON IN PSYCHOLOGY (Methuen and Co., 1975)
Raths, L.E., M. Harmin and S. Simon VALUES AND TEACHING (Columbus, Ohio: Merrill, 1978)
Raven, J. EDUCATION, VALUES AND SOCIETY (London: Lewis and Co., Ltd., 1981
Rawls, J. A THEORY OF JUSTICE (Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1971)
'Miss Read' CHRONICLES OF FAIRACRES (Penguin Books, 1982)
Reason, P. and J. Rowan (eds) HUMAN INQUIRY: A SOURCEBOOK OF NEW PARADIGM RESEARCH (Wiley, 1981)
Reid, L.A. PHILOSOPHY AND EDUCATION (London: Heinemann, 1962)
Reid, L.A. 'Knowledge-that and knowing-this' in The British Journal of Aesthetics, Vol 20, No. 4.
Riegel, K.F. 'Dialectical operations: the final period of cognitive development' in Human Development, 16 (1973)
Riegel, K.F. (ed) THE DEVELOPMENT OF DIALECTICAL OPERATIONS (Basel: Karger, 1975)
Riegel, K.F. and J. Meacham 'Dialectics, transactions and Piaget's theory' in L. Pervin and M. Lewis INTERACTIONAL PSYCHOLOGY (Plenum Press, 1978)
Rogers, C.R. ON BECOMING A PERSON (Constable, London: 1961)
Rogers, C.R. FREEDOM TO LEARN FOR THE '80s (Chalres and Merrill Publishing Co., 1983)
Roderick, R. HABERMAS AND THE FOUNDATIONS OF CRITICAL THEORY (Macmillan: 1986)
Rorty, R. PHILOSOPHY AND THE MIRROR OF NATURE (Princeton, 1979)
Rorty, R. CONSEQUENCES OF PRAGMATISM (The Harvester Press, 1982)
Rowland, S. THE ENQUIRING CLASSROOM (Falmer Press, 1984)
Rudduck, J. 'Teachers in Partnership' from STUDIES OF IN-SERVICE COLLABORATION (Longman for the Schools Council, 1982)
Rudduck, J. and D. Hopkins RESEARCH AS A BASE FOR TEACHING (Heinemann, 1985)
Ryle, G. 'Knowing how and knowing that' in Proceedings of the Aristotelean Society, Vol. xlvi, 1946)
Russell, B. MYSTICISM AND LOGIC (London: Longmans, Green, 1919)
Russell, B. THE PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY (London: Oxford University Press, 1973)
Ryle, G. THE CONCEPT OF MIND (Harmdonsworth: Penguin, 1949)
Rutter, M., B. Maugham, P. Mortimore and J. Ouston FIFTEEN THOUSAND HOURS (London: Open Books, 1979)
Sanders, M. CLASS CONTROL AND BEHAVIOUR PROBLEMS (McGraw-Hill, 1979)
Samples, R. 'Pscyhology, thought and morality: some limitations of Piaget and Kohlberg' in Scharf, P. (1978)
Scharf, P. READINGS IN MORAL EDUCATION (Winston Press, 1978)
Scheffler, I. REASON AND TEACHING (Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1973)
Scheffler, I. OF HUMAN POTENTIAL (Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1985)
Schon, D. THE REFLECTIVE PRACTITIONER (Basic Books, 1983)
Schutz, A. THE PHENOMENOLOGY OF THE SOCIAL WORLD (Evanston: North-Western University Press, 1967)
Schutz, A. ON PHENOMENOLOGY AND SOCIAL RELATIONS (Northwestern University Press, 1970)

Searle, J.SPEECH ACTS: AN ESSAY ON THE PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE (Cambridge University Press, 1969)
Selman, R.L. 'Social cognitive understanding: a guide to educational and clinical practice' in T. Lickona (ed) MORAL DEVELOPMENT AND BEHAVIOUR (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston,1976)
Shaver, J. and W. Strong FACING VALUE DECISIONS: RATIONALE BUILDING FOR TEACHERS (Belmont, Calif: Wadsworth, 1976)
Simon, S., S. Howe and H. Kirschenbaum: VALUES CLARIFICATION (New York, Hart, 1972)
Simons, H. (ed) TOWARDS A SCIENCE OF THE SINGULAR Occasional Papers No. 10, Norwich, CARE, University of East Anglia (1980)
Skilbeck, M. 'Lawrence Stenhouse: research methodology - "Research is systematic enquiry made public" B.E.R.J. 9 (1) (1983)
Skinner, B.F. THE BEHAVIOUR OF ORGANISMS (1958)
Skinner, B.F. THE TECHNOLOGY OF TEACHING (New York: Prentice Hall, 1968)
Sockett, H. 'A moral epistemology of practice?' in Cambridge Journal of Education, Vol. 19, No. 1 (1989)
Stein, E. ON THE PROBLEM OF EMPATHY (trans. W. Stein) (The Hague: Nijhogg, 1970)
Stenhouse, L. AN INTRODUCTION TO CURRICULUM RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT (Heinemann, 1975)
Stenhouse, L. (ed) CURRICULUM RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT IN ACTION (London: Heinemann, 1978)
Stenhouse, L. Site lecture presented at Simon Frase University, Vancouver 8/1980 (cited in Skilbeck, 1983)
Stenhouse, L. AUTHORITY, EDUCATION AND EMANCIPATION (London: Heinemann, 1983)
Straughan, R. I OUGHT TO, BUT ... (NFER, 1982)
Straughan, R. CAN WE TEACH CHILDREN TO BE GOOD? INTRODUCTORY STUDIES IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION (George Allen and Unwin, 1982)
Straughan, R. and J. Wrigley VALUES AND EVALUATION IN EDUCATION (Harper Row, 1980)
Straughan, R. and J. Wilson (eds) PHILOSOPHERS ON EDUCATION (Macmillan, 1987)
Stronach, I. RAISING EDUCATIONAL QUESTIONS Cambridge Institute of Education mimeo (1986)
Sugarman, B. THE SCHOOL AND MORAL DEVLEPMENT (London: Croom Helm, 1973)
Thomson, R. THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THINKING (Penguin Books, 1959)
Thompson, J.B. CRITICAL HERMENEUTICS (Cambridge University Press, 1981)
Thompson, J.B. and D. Held HABERMAS: CRITICAL DEBATES (Macmillan, 1982)
Thorndike, E.L. SELECTED WRITINGS FROM A CONNECTIONIST PSYCHOLOGY (1947)
Torbert, W. 'Why educational research has been so uneducational: the case for a new model of social science based on collaborative inquiry' in P. Reason and J. Rowan HUMAN INQUIRY (Wiley, 1981)
Treisman, A. 'Selective attention in man' in R.N. Haber CONTEMPORARY THEORY AND RESEARCH IN VISUAL PERCEPTION (Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1970)
Ungoed-Thomas, J.R. THE MORAL SITUATION OF CHILDREN (London: Macmillan, 1978)
Vesey, G. HUMAN VALUES The Royal Institute of Philosophy Lectures Vol. 11, 1976-77 (The Harvester Press, 1978)

Wakeman, B. AN ENQUIRY INTO THE DEVELOPMENT OF PERSONAL AND MORAL VALUES (Unpublished M.Phil. thesis, University of East Anglia, School of Education, 1986)
Walker, R. DOING RESEARCH (Methuen, 1985)
Warnock, G. CONTEMPORARY MORAL PHILOSOPHY (London: Macmillan, 1966)
Warnock, M. SCHOOLS OF THOUGHT (Faber and Faber, 1977)
Warnock, M. 'Educating the imagination' in Vesey (1978)
Watson, J.B. BEHAVIOURISM (New York: Norton, 1930)
Weller, K. and A. Craft MAKING UP OUR MINDS: AN EXPLORATORY STUDY OF INSTRUMENTAL ENRICHMENT (Schools Council, 1983)
Whitehead, J. (1977): see Green, B. PERSONAL DIALECTICS IN EDUCATIONAL THEORY AND EDUCATIONAL RESEARCH METHODOLOGY (1979)
Whitehead, J. 'The process of improving education within schools' Paper to the BERA annual conference (1977)
Whitehead, J. 'The observation of a living contradiction' Paper to the BERA annual conference (1980)
Whitehead, J. 'In-Service Education: the Knowledge Base of Educational Theory' in British Journal of In-Service Education 6(2), (1983a)
Whitehead, J. 'The use of personal educational theories in in-service education' British Journal of In-Service Education 9(3) (1983b)
Whitehead, J. 'Action research and professional educational development' Cambridge Action Research Network Bulletin, 6 (1984)
Whitehead, J. 'An analysis of an individual's educational development: the basis for personally oriented action research' in M. Shipman EDUCATIONAL PRACTICE: PRINCIPLES, POLICIES AND PRACTICES (Basingstoke: Falmer Press, 1985)
Whitehead, J. 'In-service education as a collaborative action research' British Journal of In-Service Education, 13 (3) (1987)
Whitehead, J. 'Creating a living educational theory from questions of the kind, "How do I improve my practice?" in Cambridge Journal of Education, Vol 19, No.1 (1989)
Williams, B. MORALITY AND THE EMOTIONS (London: Bedford College, 1965)
Williams, B. 'The cost of saving lives' in Smart, K. and B. Williams UTILITARIANSISM: FOR AND AGAINST (1967)
Wilson, J. REASON AND MORALS (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1961)
Wilson, J. MORAL EDUCATION AND THE CURRICULUM (London: Pergamon Press, 1969
Wilson, J. PRACTICAL METHODS OF MORAL EDUCATION (London: Heinemann, 1972)
Wilson, J. A TEACHER'S GUIDE TO MORAL EDUCATION (London: Chapman, 1973)
Wilson, J. DISCIPLINE AND MORAL EDUCATION NFER (1981)
Wilson, J. A PREFACE TO MORALITY (Macmillan Press, 1987)
Wilson, J. N. Williams and B. Sugarman AN INTRODUCTION TO MORAL EDUCATION (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1967)
Wittgenstein, L. PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1953)
Young, M.F.D. (ed) KNOWLEDGE AND CONTROL: NEW DIRECTIONS FOR THE SOCIOLOGY OF EDUCATION (London: Collier Macmillan, 1971)