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**Power Transition, Peaceful Change and the UN Security
Council: Exploring the Role of Social Structure in
International Political Change**

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Thesis submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for the award
of the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

School of Government and International Affairs

Durham University

2017

Abstract

The present study is an inquiry into power transition and how it relates to international social structure comprised of state practice, norms, international law and international organisations. It examines how the behaviour of rising powers and international political change in the context of power transition are governed and guided by international social structure through exploring the interface between three themes in International Relations scholarship: power transition, the interwar debate on peaceful change and reform of the UN Security Council. Via integration of elements of English School theory and hitherto neglected, but nevertheless valuable insights from the interwar debate on peaceful change, the study sets out the socio-structural conception of power transition—or, to be more accurate, of international political change in the context of power transition—as an institutionally governed process, presents a distinctive way of theorising power transition that radically departs from the materialistic, mechanistic and state-centric conception of power transition prevalent in the existing literature on power transition, and develops a framework for analysing actual cases of power transition from the socio-structural perspective, taking Security Council reform as a case study. The study emphasises the diversity of institutions governing change in international society, highlighting the role of international law and international organisations designed for the maintenance of international peace and security, such as the League of Nations and the UN, in managing international political change in the context of power transition, and showing the role that the Security Council as an agent of international political change plays in entrenching the institution of peaceful change in contemporary international society via exercise of its powers under Chapter VI and potentially Chapter VII of the UN Charter. From this standpoint, the study questions and reframes the existing debate on Security Council reform, specifying key issues to be addressed in future debate thereon.

Table of Contents

Abstract	2
Table of Contents	3
Declaration	6
Statement of Copyright	7
Acknowledgements	8
Introduction	9
Chapter structure.....	19
Chapter 1: Literature Review	23
Introduction	23
Theories of and debates on power transition	24
Organski’s power transition theory.....	25
Modelski’s long cycle theory.....	29
Gilpin’s hegemonic stability theory.....	33
Developments in power transition studies.....	37
Contemporary debates on power transition	39
The ontological assumptions underlying theories and debates on power transition	42
International social structure and English School theory	47
Wendtian constructivism and its applicability to power transition analysis....	48
English School frameworks for analysing international social structure	51
The relationship between primary and secondary institutions	56
Anarchy and hierarchy.....	58
Peaceful change and UN Security Council reform.....	59
Peaceful change	59
UN Security Council reform.....	63
Conclusion	65
Chapter 2: Methodology and Method	67
Introduction	67
How can power transition be studied?.....	67
Methodological pluralism.....	67
Systemic and societal approaches to studying power transition	71
Critical theory and the normativity of power transition studies	74
Interpreting the past: hermeneutics and the lessons of history	76
Why revisit the interwar debate?.....	76
The objectivity of text interpretation	79
The nature of lessons of history.....	85
Conclusion.....	88
Chapter 3: The Problem of Peaceful Change	90
Introduction	90

The development of the international quasi-constitutional structure	92
The Great War, international society and rising tides of solidarism.....	92
The establishment of the League of Nations	95
The Geneva Protocol of 1924 and the Pact of Paris	102
Article 19 of the League Covenant and peaceful change	105
A history of Article 19	105
The rise of interest in Article 19 and peaceful change	111
Some aspects of the problem of peaceful change.....	113
Ways of approaching the problem of peaceful change.....	113
Peaceful change and power transition	114
Peaceful change and revolution.....	115
Peaceful change and collective security	117
Peaceful change and appeasement.....	119
Conclusion	120
Chapter 4: Three Normative Perspectives on Peaceful Change.....	122
Introduction	122
Revisionism and forcible change.....	123
Konoe's criticism of the Anglo-American conception of peace.....	123
Carl Schmitt and the criminalisation of aggressive war	126
Großraum and the radical transformation of the international order.....	131
Revisionist vision of international order	133
International law, secondary institutions and peaceful change.....	134
Lauterpacht's legal theory and the role of international courts and tribunals	134
Peaceful change and world government.....	141
Progressive view of international order.....	143
Pragmatism and peaceful change	144
Carr on peaceful change	144
Negotiation and compromise.....	149
The limitations of the give-and-take approach	152
Pragmatist vision of international order	154
Conclusion.....	155
Chapter 5: Peaceful Change in Contemporary International Society.....	158
Introduction	158
Power transition as an institutionally governed process.....	160
Two modes of theorising power transition	160
Multifariousness of international social structure governing power transition	162
.....	162
The focus on secondary institutions	163
The post-war development of peaceful change in international society	165
Non-use of force in contemporary international society	165
Collective security and peaceful change in contemporary international society	169
.....	169
Methods for peaceful change in contemporary international society.....	172
Negotiation, mediation, inquiry and conciliation	173
Arbitration and judicial settlement	174
Regional organisations and issue-specific secondary institutions	175
The centrality of the UN system.....	179
Peaceful change and the UN Charter.....	181

Article 14 and the General Assembly	181
Chapter VI of the UN Charter and the Security Council.....	188
Conclusion	196
Chapter 6: Reframing Power Transition Theory	199
Introduction	199
Constructing a framework for analysing power transition	200
A brief commentary on the framework.....	219
Conclusion	220
Chapter 7: The UN Security Council as Both Object and Agent of International	
Political Change	223
Introduction	223
The history of and debate on UN Security Council reform.....	225
Power transitions in contemporary international society: 1945–present.....	225
The background to contemporary efforts to reform the Security Council	226
The 1991 Gulf War and early efforts to reform the Security Council	228
Increasing momentum towards Council reform	232
The attitudes of the G4 countries.....	233
(i) Brazil.....	234
(ii) Germany	235
(iii) India	236
(iv) Japan	237
Commitment to the purposes and principles of the UN	238
The debate on Security Council reform from the mid-1990s to the present .	239
Analysis of the process of Council reform	243
Reframing the debate on Council reform	252
Fixation with the issue of size and composition and the duality of the Security	
Council	252
Key issues to be addressed in future debate on Council reform.....	256
Conclusion	258
Conclusion	261
Power transition, peaceful change and UN Security Council reform.....	261
Rising powers and international social structure	267
Significance of the present study.....	268
Future research agendas.....	270
The case of global economic governance reform.....	270
Comparative research on power transition	275
Peaceful change and the role of the UN Security Council	276
The interaction between agency and structure	277
Bibliography.....	279

Declaration

This thesis is the result of my own work. Material from the published or unpublished work of others which is used in the thesis is credited to the author in question in the text.

Takamitsu Hadano

9 October 2017

Statement of Copyright

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Acknowledgements

First of all, I should like to thank my primary supervisor, Professor John Williams, for his guidance, valuable advice and constant encouragement. His constructive and sometimes critical comments on the drafts of the thesis have greatly helped me expand and clarify my thinking on the subject of the thesis. I am much obliged to my secondary supervisor, Dr Peter Stirk, and to all the staff of the School of Government and International Affairs at Durham University for their continual support. I am also grateful to the Japan Student Services Organization (JASSO) for providing a generous scholarship which has enabled me to pursue my PhD study in the United Kingdom. Finally, I thank all members of my family for their unfailing love and support.

Introduction

Power transition has featured prominently in contemporary debates on world politics, both within academia and beyond. In the present study, power transition is defined as shifts in the distribution of material capacities of sovereign states which may well have the effect of significantly altering the existing polarity of the international system. Power is understood here in terms of material capacity rather than in terms of authority. During the last decade or two, the rise of the BRICS, and especially China's 'peaceful rise', has generated a growing literature on how power shifts among states impact on the international system. There is an increasing awareness that it is vitally important to comprehend the behaviour of rising powers and the process of international political change if we are to better analyse and understand new trends in contemporary world politics.

The present study is an inquiry into power transition and how it relates to state practice, norms, international law and international organisations (the term 'international social structure' will hereafter be used as a generic term for these factors). The study explores how the behaviour of rising powers and international political change in the context of power transition are governed and guided by international social structure, presents a framework for analysing actual cases of power transition from such a socio-structural perspective, and discusses how the existing international social structure can be reformed so as to better manage international political change in this age of global power transition. I shall address these tasks by exploring the interface between three themes in

International Relations (hereafter IR)¹ scholarship: power transition, the interwar debate on peaceful change, and reform of the UN Security Council. Although these themes have tended to be studied separately in IR scholarship, being able to explain how they are interconnected is a major step forward in the understanding of the behaviour of rising powers in the context of power transition. It is my intention to demonstrate how they are related to each other.

In this introduction, I shall sketch out the direction of the present study by pointing out the problems of the existing literature on power transition and by explaining how this study intends to address them and why it is necessary to do so. The primary and secondary research questions that are to be addressed in this study will be formulated and set out in chapter 1.

The present study follows much of the existing literature on power transition in seeing the central goal of power transition studies as lying in the better understanding of the behaviour of rising powers and the process of international political change.² However, the study departs from much of the literature in taking a socio-structural approach in seeking to deepen our understanding of these political phenomena. I am sceptical of the approach taken by much of the existing literature for the reason that it pays insufficient attention to whether, how and to what extent international social structure affects the behaviour of rising powers and international political change in the context of power transition. Underlying the prevalent approach in the extant literature is the conception of the norms, rules and institutions in the international system as being

¹ I will use the term ‘International Relations’ with uppercase letters to refer to the academic discipline whose purpose lies in studying international relations, that is, relations among nations.

² See, for example, Robert Gilpin, *War and Change in World Politics*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981; A.F.K. Organski, *World Politics*, 2nd edn, New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1968[1958]; Ronald L. Tammen, Jacek Kugler, Douglas Lemke, Allan C. Stam III, Mark Abdollahian, Carole Alsharabati, Brian Efirid and A.F.K. Organski, *Power Transitions: Strategies for the 21st Century*, New York: Chatham House, 2000.

merely reflective of power relations within that system.³ Under this conception, the behaviour of rising powers is treated as a variable explaining the character of norms, rules and institutions in the international system. States, including rising powers, are treated as if they were rational actors who make decisions and act solely on the basis of cost-benefit calculations, responding to changes in the configuration of material power in the international system. This prevalent approach has led to the neglect of the significance and role of international social structure in international political change, distracting attention from how the behaviour of rising powers is governed and guided by the social structure of a given international system.

This is not to say that the existing literature on power transition has been completely blind to questions concerning the modalities of international political change. On the contrary, one of the central claims made in the existing literature is that international political changes are often brought about by *war*.⁴ The problem with this claim is that it tends to reduce the modalities of international political change to, or understand them in terms of, the war/non-war dichotomy, thereby downplaying the *diversity* of ways in which international political changes in the context of power transition are brought about in the international system in practice.

The diversity of the modalities of international political change can be analysed only by theorising power transition from the socio-structural perspective that emphasises the significance and role of international social structure in the process of international political change. This study seeks to address this theoretical problem by developing an English School (hereafter ES) conception of power transition. As will be discussed in detail in chapter 1, ES theory provides a suite of conceptual tools for capturing the

³ Gilpin, *War and Change*, p. xi; Organski, *World Politics*, p. 364; Tammen et al., *Power Transitions*, p. 9.

⁴ Gilpin, *War and Change*, pp. 15, 197; Robert Gilpin, 'The Theory of Hegemonic War', *The Journal of Interdisciplinary History*, 18/4, 1988, pp. 591–613; Organski, *World Politics*, p. 371; Tammen et al., *Power Transitions*, pp. 21–33.

institutional features of international societies and potentially for analysing the behaviour of rising powers with reference to them, and it is this quality that makes it the most appropriate theoretical underpinning of this study. On the basis of theoretical insights offered by ES theory, I will develop an ES conception of power transition and, on this basis, present a framework for the socio-structural analysis of power transition. The primary benefit of taking this approach is that it enables production of historically and sociologically thick accounts of power transition.⁵

As part of these endeavours, the present study will shed light on peaceful change and the interwar debate thereon. The term ‘peaceful change’ has been used in many different ways, but, in the present study, I shall use the term to refer to the *social practice* aimed at peacefully bringing about changes in the international status quo the continuance of which may give rise to international grievances, thereby leading to the destabilisation of the international order and potentially to war. In other words, peaceful change is to be understood in the present context not in terms of individual and specific changes peacefully made in the international status quo, but in terms of customary manners or habitual ways of effecting such changes in a given international system.

The *international status quo* with which peaceful change is concerned is not any international status quo, but that against which states have grievances. Therefore, *changes* that the practice of peaceful change seeks to bring about are changes that would help

⁵ Stephen Krasner has described ES theory as follows: ‘For students of international relations the English school is the best-known sociological perspective’. Stephen Krasner, *Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999, p. 46. See also Barry Buzan, *From International to World Society?: English School Theory and the Social Structure of Globalisation*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004, p. 1; Andrew Hurrell, ‘Keeping History, Law and Political Philosophy Firmly within the English School’, *Review of International Studies*, 27/3, 2001, pp. 489–494; Andrew Hurrell, *On Global Order: Power, Values, and the Constitution of International Society*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007, pp. 16–17; Laust Schouenborg, ‘A New Institutionalism?: The English School as International Sociological Theory’, *International Relations*, 25/1, 2011, pp. 26–44; John Williams, *Ethics, Diversity, and World Politics: Saving Pluralism from Itself?*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015, p. 2.

assuage and eliminate grievances of states against the international status quo. Such changes can be of various types depending on the state or states that are dissatisfied with the international status quo (e.g. territorial readjustment, the establishment of fair trade rules, structural reform of multilateral organisations, and hegemonic transition, i.e. change of the hegemon in a given international system).

Peaceful change is not a mere recurring pattern of state behaviour, but is best understood as a purposeful, structured and institutionalised practice underpinned by the moral and sometimes even legal conviction that the political changes in the international status quo ought to be effected in a peaceful and orderly manner, i.e. without recourse to the threat or use of force. In this sense, it can be regarded as a fundamental or, in ES terminology, *primary institution* of international society (more on this concept in chapter 1).⁶ As will be discussed later in this study, peaceful change can be practised in a number of ways, such as by means of negotiation, third-party judgement, etc. Given this conception of peaceful change, the *problem* of peaceful change can be defined as one that concerns how to establish a social practice or institution aimed at peacefully bringing about changes in aspects of the international status quo causing international grievances.

The problem of peaceful change takes on particular importance in the context of power transition. For rising powers can be tempted to exercise their growing power *vis-à-vis* other states and to have recourse to the threat and even use of force in order to obtain changes in the international status quo which they deem as unsatisfactory, unfair or unjust. This poses challenges as to how and to what extent a given international social structure can accommodate rising powers' attempts to revise aspects of the international political status quo, and as to how that structure can be reformed so as to increase its ability to guide and govern their behaviour. It is with these challenges that the present study is primarily concerned.

The present study will turn to the interwar debate on peaceful change for a threefold

⁶ See Buzan, *From International to World Society?*, p. 167.

purpose. Firstly, this will enable us to retrieve hitherto neglected and/or misunderstood insights that are nonetheless still relevant to power transition studies. Although IR scholarship during the interwar period has often been depicted as the First Great Debate,⁷ it was in fact characterised by a substantial and sophisticated debate over how international society should respond to power shifts among states that engaged some of the most prominent and influential scholars and practitioners of the day. Among other things, the debate offers valuable insights into the relationship between power transition and international social structure. Indeed, the debate represents the most systematic and rigorous attempt in the history of IR scholarship to theorise this relationship. As mentioned above, the present study seeks to establish that the process of political change in the context of power transition is guided and governed by international social structure, and the insights gained from the analysis of the interwar debate on peaceful change help us to develop a distinctive way of thinking about and theorising the diversity of modalities of international political change in the context of power transition, which is ascribable to the presence of international social structure. In particular, the debate offers valuable insights for thinking about how international law, especially that governing peaceful settlement of disputes, and international organisations designed for the maintenance of international peace and order, such as the League of Nations and the UN, add to the diversity of modalities of international political change, including changes in the context of power transition.

Secondly, the focus on the interwar debate on peaceful change enables us to shed light on the problem of peaceful change in *contemporary* international society. The establishment of a social practice or institution aimed at peacefully bringing about

⁷ See, for example, Brian C. Schmidt (ed.), *International Relations and the First Great Debate*, London: Routledge, 2012. This depiction has been challenged by ‘revisionists’ in IR historiography. See, for example, Lucian M. Ashworth, ‘Did the Realist-Idealist Great Debate Really Happen?: A Revisionist History of International Relations’, *International Relations*, 16/1, 2002, pp. 33–51; Peter Wilson, ‘The Myth of the “First Great Debate”’, *Review of International Studies*, 24/5, 1998, pp. 1–15.

international political changes is one of the most pressing problems that have yet to be fully resolved under contemporary international law and the UN system, as will be discussed later in the present study. And the importance of this unresolved problem is of growing importance as contemporary international society faces mounting challenges posed by rising powers intent upon revising aspects of the international status quo. The insights the interwar debate provides help us not only to better understand how and to what extent international social structure guides and governs the behaviour of rising powers in contemporary international society, but also to consider how it is that the existing international social structure can be reformed so as to further entrench the practice of peaceful change in contemporary international society facing global power transition.

Thirdly, the insights retrieved from the debate will provide the basis on which to rework ES theory. Although ES theory provides conceptual tools for analysing the behaviour of states in connection with international social structure,⁸ the ES has yet to develop its own distinctive analytical framework for power transition analysis that matches its ambition to provide a grand-theoretical perspective on world politics.⁹ By incorporating the insights offered by the debate in ES theory, this study seeks to develop an ES framework for analysing actual cases of power transition in the past, present and future.

The framework will bring in the distinction between issue-specific and general institutions, which enables the analysis of the institutions governing the behaviour of rising powers and international political change not only in general but also in connection

⁸ See, for example, Buzan, *From International to World Society?*; Kilian Spandler, 'The Political International Society: Change in Primary and Secondary Institutions', *Review of International Studies*, 41/3, 2015, pp. 601–622.

⁹ See, for example, Hedley Bull and Adam Watson (eds), *The Expansion of International Society*, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984; Barry Buzan and Richard Little, *International Systems in World History: Remaking the Study of International Relations*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000; Adam Watson, *The Evolution of International Society: A Comparative Historical Analysis*, London: Routledge, 1992.

with specific issue-areas.¹⁰ Taking advantage of this analytical virtue, this study examines the issue of reform of the UN Security Council with a view to understanding how institutions of contemporary international society shape the behaviour of the rising powers pursuing this political goal. What characterises the existing literature on power transition is the scarcity of theoretical analyses of Council reform. The linkage between power transition and the issue of Council reform is evident and requires no explanation. Indeed, many works on power transition touch on this issue, showing an understanding of its significance for, or relevance to, power transition in contemporary world politics.¹¹ However, efforts to establish their connection have not been accompanied by commensurate efforts to put *theories* of power transition to the test by applying them to this issue.

While it is difficult to explain why certain things have not happened, I venture to say that the lack of theoretical analyses of Council reform is primarily due to the simple fact that the existing theories of power transition are ill-suited for such an analysis; they are not fit for purpose in the first place. The primary purpose of much of the existing theoretical literature on power transition has been to identify the correlation between power shifts and the occurrence of wars. In order to improve the explanatory power of their theories, scholars have focused on key variables such as the (dis)satisfaction of states.¹² However, such a theory of power transition is not enough to capture the

¹⁰ The concept of issue-area has been widely used in comparative foreign policy analysis, and the publication of *Power and Interdependence* written by Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye has helped it to take root in IR. See William C. Potter, 'Issue Area and Foreign Policy Analysis', *International Organization*, 34/3, 1980, pp. 405–427; Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, *Power and Interdependence: World Politics in Transition*, Boston: Little, Brown, 1977.

¹¹ See, for example, Miles Kahler, 'Rising Powers and Global Governance: Negotiating Change in a Resilient Status Quo', *International Affairs*, 89/3, 2013, pp. 711–729; Stefan A. Schirm, 'Leaders in Need of Followers: Emerging Powers in Global Governance', *European Journal of International Relations*, 16/2, 2010, pp. 197–221.

¹² See, for example, Woosang Kim, 'Alliance Transitions and Great Power War', *American Journal of Political Science*, 35/4, 1991, pp. 833–850; Woosang Kim and Scott Gates, 'Power Transition Theory and the Rise of China', *International Area Studies*

complexity of the process of Council reform and, for that matter, any process of international political change. In view of this, this study aims at deepening our understanding of the process of Council reform by analysing it through the above-mentioned analytical framework that focuses attention on both general and issue-specific institutions governing international political change. This leads to a better understanding of the behaviour of the rising powers active in this particular issue-area, especially the four countries comprising the Group of 4 (hereafter G4): Brazil, Germany, India and Japan. Analysis of Council reform through the analytical framework will help us consider the impact of institutions upon the behaviour of rising powers in contemporary international society.

The present study takes up the issue of Council reform not only because the Council is of importance as an *object* of international political change in the context of power transition, but also because it is itself an *agent* of international political change, including changes in the context of power transition. Security Council reform is important from the point of view of power transition since it is one of the central agendas that some of the rising powers in contemporary international society have called for, but it is also important from the viewpoint of peaceful change since the Council is part of contemporary international social structure governing international political change, including changes in the context of power transition. This means that the question of Council reform cannot be discussed apart from the problem of peaceful change, which, as discussed above, concerns the establishment of a practice aimed at peacefully bringing about changes in the international status quo. As already mentioned, one thing that the interwar debate on peaceful change demonstrates, and that this study seeks to theorise, is the role of international organisations in managing change in international society.¹³ The

Review, 18/3, 2015, pp. 219–226; Organski, *World Politics*; Tammen et al., *Power Transitions*.

¹³ See H. Lauterpacht, 'The Legal Aspect', in C.A.W. Manning (ed.), *Peaceful Change: An International Problem*, London: Macmillan, 1937, pp. 135–165; Arthur Salter,

behaviour of rising powers is affected by the presence of international organisations, especially those designed for the maintenance of international peace and security such as the League of Nations and the UN. In contemporary international society, this task is being carried out by international and regional organisations of various kinds, but there is no doubt about the centrality of the UN and, more specifically, the Security Council in that regard. Illustrating the need to view the Council as both object and agent of international political change, this study shows that it is vitally important to recognise this *duality* of the Council when examining issues concerning power transition in contemporary international society.

The recognition of this duality gives additional importance to the issue of Council reform since the outcomes of Council reform would have significant repercussions for its capacity to manage international political change, including changes in the context of power transition. If this be the case, it follows that Council reform should be brought about in such a way as to enhance its effectiveness in managing international political change. Despite this, however, the current debate on Council reform is fixated on the issue of its size and composition, as will be shown in chapter 7. While recognising its significance, it will be argued that any Council reform which tackles nothing but the issue of size and composition would almost certainly fail to improve the Council's effectiveness in managing international political change, including in the context of power transition, thereby failing to enhance its practical ability to maintain international peace and security. With that in mind, this study seeks to reframe the debate on Council reform by shifting focus of attention from the issue of size and composition to the issue of the Council's capacity to promote the practice or institution of peaceful change in international society. It is only by addressing the latter issue that the prime goal of Council reform—the enhancement of its ability to maintain international peace and security—can be achieved. While this reframing of the Council reform debate is not necessary for answering the

'Reform of the League', *The Political Quarterly*, 7/4, 1936, pp. 465–480.

primary research question of the present study, which will be set out in chapter 1, the issues at stake here are too important to be dismissed and are best understood in the context of the subject matter discussed in the present study.

If change is inevitable, it is important that efforts be made to bring about change for the better and in a peaceful manner, and such efforts must be underpinned by, above all else, an accurate understanding of the nature of change in a given society. This study provides an innovative way of understanding change in international society by exploring the relationship between power transition and international social structure. While one may, at this point, still have doubts about the interconnectedness of power transition, peaceful change and Security Council reform, it is my hope that this study will clearly demonstrate that it is not only helpful but even necessary to address the interface between them if we are to get a fully integrated understanding of the relationship between power transition and international social structure. As will be discussed in the conclusion, this will not only allow us to correct the defects in the existing literature on power transition, but will also enable us to identify future research agendas on power transition.

Chapter structure

The chapter structure is as follows. Chapter 1 begins by providing an overview of the major theories of power transition, revealing the ontological assumptions underlying them, and explaining why those assumptions are problematic for power transition analysis. It goes on to introduce ES theory as an alternative approach for theorising power transition, setting out the conceptual frameworks that are extensively used in the discussions and analyses in the present study, and setting forth the primary research question of the present study. The chapter then discusses in greater detail than is done here why it is necessary to explore the interface between the three themes identified above in order to understand the relationship between power transition and international social structure, and formulates the secondary research questions to be addressed in the chapters

that follow.

Chapter 2 addresses the methodology and methods underpinning the present study. The first part of the chapter considers different ways of theorising power transition in connection with their methodological principles, and argues for the adoption of methodological pluralism from the standpoint of keeping both the analytical and the normative within power transition studies. The second part of the chapter addresses the methodological and hermeneutical issues concerning the interpretation of the interwar debate on peaceful change and the significance of historical insights.

Chapters 3 and 4 turn to the interwar debate on peaceful change. The historical backgrounds and focus of the debate are explained in chapter 3. The chapter shows the symbiotic relationship between collective security and peaceful change, emphasising its significance for the management of international political change, including changes in the international status quo in the context of power transition. Moreover, it demonstrates that there exists a mutually constitutive relationship between these state practices and international organisations designed for the maintenance of international peace and security such as the League of Nations. Deepening the understanding of these institutional connections is not only necessary for understanding the interwar debate on peaceful change, but also for understanding the basic character of contemporary international social structure governing international political change, including in the context of power transition. Chapter 4 addresses the normative aspects of the debate by exploring three different normative positions on the problem of peaceful change. As discussed in chapter 2, the analytical issue of understanding how international social structure affects the process of international political change in the context of power transition is inseparably linked to the normative issue of how international social structure should be (re-)arranged so as to better manage the process of international political change in the context of power transition. The chapter advances the conception of power transition—or, to be more accurate, of international political change in the context of power transition—as an

institutionally governed process, and shows the inescapable normativity of power transition studies.

Chapter 5 sets out and discusses the socio-structural conception of power transition that underpinned the interwar debate on peaceful change, comparing it with the mechanistic conception of power transition prevalent in much of the existing literature on power transition, and deriving theoretical insights from the former. It then goes on to establish the enduring relevance and significance of this socio-structural conception and these insights for power transition studies today by examining the character of contemporary international social structure governing change with a focus on the role of the Security Council in promoting peaceful change. It will be argued that the institutionalisation of peaceful change and other developments in contemporary international society have rendered the socio-structural conception of power transition even more valuable for power transition studies today.

On the basis of the socio-structural conception of power transition and other findings of the preceding chapters, chapter 6 sets forth an analytical framework for examining actual cases of power transition in connection with international social structure. The framework will be set out in the form of a set of key questions to be addressed in power transition analysis. It helps facilitate analysis by drawing attention to regulative and constitutive effects of institutions of international society on rising powers, by bringing in the distinction between issue-specific and general institutions, and by shedding light on issues concerning the effectiveness and reform of international social structure.

Chapter 7 explores how reform of the Security Council relates to power transition and peaceful change, focusing on the duality of the Council as both object and agent of international political change. First, it gives an overview of the history and current status of Council reform, and then demonstrates how the behaviour of the rising powers active in this issue-area has been governed and guided by the institutions governing the Council

reform process. Moreover, it considers how the Council reform process can be moved forward given the existing institutional constellation. The chapter then questions and reframes the debate on Council reform, which has been fixated on the issue of size and composition, from the standpoint of the role the Council as an agent of international political change plays in entrenching peaceful change in contemporary international society, including in the context of power transition, and specifies a couple of key issues that need to be addressed in future debate on Council reform.

In the conclusion, I shall first summarise the discussions and analyses of the present study, providing answers to the primary and secondary research questions, and then discuss the significance of the present study. This is followed by a discussion about how this study can contribute to further research on power transition.

Chapter 1

Literature Review

Introduction

Power transition has long been the subject of debates in IR. Power transition has been viewed by many IR theorists as the occasion of wars, and on that account a great deal of research on the theme has been produced.¹ However, the existing literature on power transition is not without problems, and it is necessary to bring the problems to the fore and to put them under critical examination. The goal of this chapter is fourfold: (1) to identify gaps in the existing literature on power transition; (2) to elaborate upon alternative ways of theorising power transition that would fill the gaps; (3) to narrow down the focus of the present study by associating power transition with peaceful change and reform of the UN Security Council; and (4) to set forth the research questions that will be addressed in the following chapters.

The plan for this chapter is as follows. The first section examines theories of power transition and reveals the ontological assumptions underlying them. It starts out with an exposition of classical theories of power transition that provide the basic ideas on which contemporary works and debates on power transition build. Among others, I shall focus

¹ Robert Gilpin, *War and Change in World Politics*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981; Robert Gilpin, 'The Theory of Hegemonic War', *The Journal of Interdisciplinary History*, 18/4, 1988, pp. 591–613; A.F.K. Organski, *World Politics*, 2nd edn, New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1968[1958]; Ronald L. Tammen, Jacek Kugler, Douglas Lemke, Allan C. Stam III, Mark Abdollahian, Carole Alsharabati, Brian Efirid and A.F.K. Organski, *Power Transitions: Strategies for the 21st Century*, New York: Chatham House, 2000.

on three classical theories of power transition: A.F.K. Organski's power transition theory, George Modelski's long cycle theory and Robert Gilpin's hegemonic stability theory. These theories have had a tremendous influence upon the way contemporary IR theorists look at power transition, shaping their basic conception of what it is to theorise power transition. The section then offers a brief overview of contemporary debates on power transition. This is followed by an examination of the ontological assumptions upon which theories and debates on power transition are based. Identifying their ontological assumptions enables us to pinpoint an area where further research can be conducted. It will also be discussed why it is necessary to explore this uncharted territory. Outlining how the social structure of international society has been theorised in IR scholarship, the second section introduces the concepts and theoretical frameworks that will be utilised in this study. In particular, I shall focus upon the Wendtian version of constructivism and the Buzanian reformulation of ES theory.² The third section starts by setting out the primary research question of the present study and then narrows down the focus of the study by establishing the connection between power transition, peaceful change and Security Council reform, setting forth three secondary research questions that will be addressed in the following chapters, which is followed by the conclusion.

Theories of and debates on power transition

This section provides an overview of classical theories of power transition, reviews ongoing debates on power transition, and critically examines the ontological assumptions on which the theories and debates rest.

² Barry Buzan, *From International to World Society?: English School Theory and the Social Structure of Globalisation*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004; Alexander Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999.




Figure 1 [Source: Organski, *World Politics*, p. 365.]

Organski's power transition theory

Organski formulated power transition theory (hereafter PTT) in his *World Politics*, the first edition of which was published in 1958.³ This influential theory has been credited with having paved an alternative way of theorising international relations that is distinct from one based upon the traditional realist idea of the balance of power. Organski severely criticised the balance-of-power theory as ‘fuzzy ... logically unsound and contradict[ing] itself’.⁴ Instead, PTT emphasises the hierarchical order of the international system as against the horizontal order wherein sovereign states of comparable strength act and compete with one another. It posits that it is the distribution of power within this hierarchy that shapes the course of events in the international system.⁵

This hierarchy consists of five layers as shown in figure 1. At the summit of the hierarchal structure stands the dominant nation, which holds a preponderance of power and shapes the international order through the exercise of its power and influence over other states, developing rules and institutions favourable to itself.⁶ The great powers lie beneath the dominant nation. Although they gain some advantage from the existing

³ Organski, *World Politics*.

⁴ Ibid., p. 299.

⁵ Jacek Kugler and A.F.K. Organski, ‘The End of Hegemony?’, *International Interactions*, 15/2, 1989, p. 116.

⁶ Organski, *World Politics*, p. 364.

international order, they benefit less as compared with the dominant nation.⁷ Further down the hierarchical ladder are the middle powers, small powers and dependencies. This power-based international hierarchical order is considered to be most stable when there exists a significant power gap between the dominant nation and the others in favour of the former.⁸ Organski further distinguishes states into those who are satisfied with the international order and those dissatisfied with it.⁹ On the basis of these distinctions, he argues that states can be classified into the following four groups or categories:

1. The powerful and satisfied
2. The powerful and dissatisfied
3. The weak and satisfied
4. The weak and dissatisfied¹⁰

It is the dynamics among these groups of states that determine the stability of the international order.

By definition, the dominant nation falls into the first category because it is, according to this theory, the very dominant nation that creates the international order in the first place.¹¹ As is the case with any social order, there are always those (in this case, states) who are dissatisfied with the existing arrangements of things, and states lower in the international hierarchy are more likely to be frustrated and disgruntled about the status quo.¹² However, Organski holds that the number of the discontented does not in itself constitute a real threat to the status quo since the majority of them, even when combined together, lack the power and influence necessary to challenge the dominant nation and the international order it maintains. As he argues, it is '[o]nly in the rare instance when a

⁷ Ibid., p. 365.

⁸ Ibid.

⁹ Ibid., pp. 364–369.

¹⁰ Quoted from *ibid.*, p. 364.

¹¹ Ibid., p. 366.

¹² Ibid., p. 369.

dissatisfied nation is also a great power and manages to overtake the dominant power' that 'the status quo [is] threatened'.¹³

According to Organski, discontented great powers, which fall into the second category, tend to go about challenging the ways in which things are organised on the international plane with their growing power and influence.¹⁴ While the dominant nation can always choose to accommodate changes in power balances and meet the rising powers' demands, it tends to cling to the status quo.¹⁵ This often leads to increased tensions between states in support of the status quo and dissatisfied rising powers, increasing the likelihood of armed conflict. As Organski succinctly states, '[d]esiring change and unable to bring it about peacefully, the challenger all too often turns to war'.¹⁶

In Organski's view, the main dynamic causing power transition is 'industrialization and political modernization'.¹⁷ In particular, he emphasises the role of the former.¹⁸ Industrial Revolution, which originated in Britain in the late eighteenth century, ushered in the era of dynamic shifts in the international distribution of power, increasing the wealth and power of states going through that process. He singles out such factors as 'population size, political efficiency, and economic development' as constituting the sources of national power.¹⁹ As the process of industrialisation proceeds, these resources

¹³ Kugler and Organski, 'The End of Hegemony?', p. 117.

¹⁴ Organski, *World Politics*, pp. 366–367.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 371. This point may be partly explained from the point of view of prospect theory. See Jack S. Levy, 'Prospect Theory and International Relations: Theoretical Applications and Analytical Problems', *Political Psychology*, 13/2, 1992, pp. 283–310; Jack S. Levy, 'Prospect Theory, Rational Choice, and International Relations', *International Studies Quarterly*, 41/1, 1997, pp. 87–112.

¹⁶ Organski, *World Politics*, p. 371.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 339.

¹⁸ While he emphasises the role of industrialisation, he also points out that, in some countries, political modernisation takes place in advance of industrialisation. See *ibid.*, p. 342.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 338. According to his definition, power is 'the capacity of an individual, group, or nation to control the behavior of others in accordance with its own ends'. A.F.K. Organski and Jacek Kugler, 'The Costs of Major Wars: The Phoenix Factor', *The American Political Science Review*, 71/4, 1977, p. 1347.

of power grow hand in hand in a synergetic manner.²⁰

According to Organski, there are three stages of industrialisation which each state proceeds through.²¹ The first is what he calls ‘the stage of potential power’ in which a state has yet to experience industrialisation and the accompanying growth of its national power. Secondly, ‘the stage of transitional growth in power’ refers to the phase in which a state starts to industrialise and increase its power. Finally, there comes a time when a state ceases to develop as robustly as before, which he calls ‘the stage of power maturity’.

Since some states experience industrialisation earlier than others, there emerge power gaps between them; what Organski calls ‘the differential spread of industrialization’ is the occasion of the formation of the international hierarchy described above.²² The first nation that emerged as the dominant nation in history was Britain, for it was in this country that the first ever industrial revolution took place. Subsequently, the United States superseded it as a new dominant nation, reconstructing the international order in its own image.²³

However, as states reach the final stage of industrialisation, the rates of their development start to diminish.²⁴ The dominant nation is no exception in this regard. Meanwhile other states start to industrialise and get onto the path of robust growth, narrowing the power gaps between rising powers and states which began to industrialise before them, including the dominant nation.²⁵ When a rising power or powers catching up with the dominant nation happen to be dissatisfied with the status quo, the likelihood of war increases.²⁶ Organski boldly states as follows: ‘[i]t is the powerful and dissatisfied

²⁰ Organski, *World Politics*, pp. 340–342.

²¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 340–344.

²² *Ibid.*, pp. 344–345. The quoted phrase is from p. 375. The rankings within the hierarchy are affected not only by the difference in the timings of industrialisation, but also by the differing growth potential of states. See *ibid.*, pp. 339–340.

²³ *Ibid.*, pp. 339, 355–356, 361.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 343.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 344–345.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 361, 364.

nations that start world wars'.²⁷

To sum up, Organski's PTT offers an alternative way of theorising international relations to the one based on the idea of the balance of power, marking a first step towards the theorisation of power transition, and setting agendas for further research in this field of study.

Modelski's long cycle theory

Modelski's long cycle theory (hereafter LCT) has had as much influence as Organski's PTT. Compared to PTT, LCT views power transition from a broader historical perspective. The central focus of LCT is upon what he calls the 'global political system' which is defined as 'the institutions and arrangements for the management of global problems or relations, or alternatively as the structure for the management of global interdependence'.²⁸ The global political system is here understood literally as a *political* system as against other types of system such as the world economic system examined by Immanuel Wallerstein.²⁹ It is also distinguished from what he calls 'regional political systems' such as the European political system. LCT concerns patterns, regularities and cycles that can be observed *globally*.³⁰

As is the case with PTT, LCT postulates the existence of 'world powers' which he defines as '[e]ntities uniquely dominant in the global [political] system'.³¹ In this regard, the global political system contrasts with the European political system which had been characterised by the balance of power.³² According to Modelski, a world power is a state with five properties or abilities: 1) insularity; 2) open, pluralistic and coalition-oriented

²⁷ Ibid., p. 367.

²⁸ George Modelski, 'The Long Cycle of Global Politics and the Nation-State', *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, 20/2, 1978, p. 214.

²⁹ Ibid., pp. 215–216.

³⁰ Ibid., pp. 214–215.

³¹ Ibid., p. 216.

³² George Modelski and Patrick M. Morgan, 'Understanding Global War', *The Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 29/3, 1985, p. 395.

society; 3) capacities and resources for ‘global reach’; 4) world’s leading economy; and 5) innovativeness.³³ In particular, he singles out naval power as one of the most important attributes of a world state. As he remarks:

In the modern world system a useful indicator of capacity for global reach, and therefore also of global power status, has been the distribution of naval forces. ... No state could overthrow the prevailing world order without first establishing a command over the oceans. To chart trends in the distribution of sea power is therefore to map the progress of competition for global status.³⁴

In addition, he also stresses the significance of *nation-states* in the creation and maintenance of the global political system. Nation-states have succeeded in constructing efficient and effective political systems which provide themselves with the capacity required to become and act as a world power of the global political system.³⁵

The world power is, by definition, a country with the capacity to operate and engage in military, economic and other activities globally.³⁶ The world power establishes, governs and leads the global political system, acting as the leader of the global order.³⁷ The global political system is therefore characterised by a hierarchical structure and by ‘specialisation’ or ‘functional differentiation’ stemming from the power gaps between the leader and the others.³⁸ There have been four world powers in history: Portugal, the United Provinces of the Netherlands, Great Britain and the United States. These countries

³³ George Modelski, *Long Cycles in World Politics*, Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1987, p. 16.

³⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 9–10. For more on sea power, see George Modelski and William R. Thompson, *Seapower in Global Politics, 1494–1993*, London: Macmillan, 1988.

³⁵ Modelski, ‘The Long Cycle of Global Politics’, pp. 230–232.

³⁶ Modelski and Morgan, ‘Understanding Global War’, p. 395.

³⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 397; Modelski, *Long Cycles*, pp. 12–18. The key functions of the leadership of the global political system involve: ‘(i) agenda formation, (ii) mobilisation, (iii) decision-making, (iv) administration, and (v) innovation’. *Ibid.*, p. 14.

³⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 13.

Cycle phase	Preference for order	Availability of order
(1) Global war	High	Low
(2) World power	High	High
(3) Delegitimation	Low	High
(4) Deconcentration	Low	Low

Table 1 [Source: modified from Modelski, *Long Cycles*, pp. 30–31.]

have taken turns leading and presiding over the global political system.³⁹

As discussed above, the world power leads the global political system, supplying order and stability to it. However, there comes a time, on a cyclical basis, when the capacity of the world power to maintain the global political system declines. Modelski argues that '[w]e may also take it as given that all order deteriorates. In every known system order is continually lost'.⁴⁰ In time, the world power faces challenges from other states who attempt to take over the leadership from it, and a new leader eventually emerges with the capacity necessary to undertake leadership role as a result of what he euphemistically calls a 'selection mechanism', that is, a 'global war'.⁴¹ The assumption of the leadership by a new world power marks the beginning of another long cycle of the global political system.

Modelski argues that each long cycle can be divided into four phases, as shown in table 1. In the first phase, although the demand for order is high, the declined power of the previous leader and severe competition among states make order and stability less available. In the next phase, a new world power, which emerges out of the struggles, responds to the demand for order by exercising its power and influence. In the third phase, the demand for order falls as states devalue it and start to pursue other goals. Finally, the world power reduces efforts to provide order in response to the diminished demand.⁴²

³⁹ Modelski, 'The Long Cycle of Global Politics', pp. 217, 225.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 225.

⁴¹ Modelski and Morgan, 'Understanding Global War', pp. 400–401.

⁴² Modelski and Thompson explain these processes by using the cobweb models developed in economics. See George Modelski and William R. Thompson, 'Testing Cobweb Models of the Long Cycle', in George Modelski (ed.), *Exploring Long Cycles*, Boulder: Rienner, 1987, pp. 85–111.

Modelski points to what he calls ‘monopoly erosion model’ as an important factor accelerating this cycle.⁴³ According to him:

The monopoly erosion model posits some such general proposition as “over time, monopoly tends to transform into a condition of freer competition.”⁴⁴

The last phase, which he calls ‘deconcentration’, is followed by the outbreak of a global war, in the aftermath of which a new world power leading the global political system emerges.

LCT regards the behaviour of the world power as responding to the demand from other states for the provision of order and as contributing to the development of the global political system. However, it should be noted that its behaviour is not solely motivated by altruism since it is the world power that is the chief beneficiary of the global political system.⁴⁵ Indeed, Modelski himself points out that the world power is propelled by ‘the urge to make a global order’ which he defines as ‘an expression of a will to power, the urge to control and to dominate, to imprint a pattern on events’.⁴⁶ Therefore, there is ambiguity in his explanation as to the reason why the world power acts as it does.

At any rate, Modelski maintains that the world power serves to maintain the global political system by providing an element of order to it. Moreover, he argues that the world power brings innovation to the system.⁴⁷ This argument, reflective of his evolutionary conception of world politics, gives a progressivist twist to his cyclical account of the global political system. His conception of world politics can be readily detected in the following passage:

⁴³ George Modelski, ‘Long Cycles of World Leadership’, in William R. Thompson (ed.), *Contending Approaches to World System Analysis*, Beverly Hills: Sage, 1983, p. 127.

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 138.

⁴⁵ Modelski and Thompson, ‘Testing Cobweb Models’, p. 110, n. 5.

⁴⁶ Modelski, ‘The Long Cycle of Global Politics’, p. 224.

⁴⁷ See Modelski, *Long Cycles*, pp. 14–15.

[W]orld politics [can be] seen as groping its way toward greater coherence and higher (more differentiated) forms of social order, with mankind lifting itself by its own bootstraps, so to speak, toward new ways of living.⁴⁸

This ‘Whig interpretation’⁴⁹ of the history of world politics is further accentuated by his depiction of the challengers who had failed to attain global leadership (such as Philip II’s Spain, Louis XIV’s France, and Hitler’s Germany) as *reactionaries* who attempted in vain to impede progress by imposing anachronistic political arrangements upon the course of world history.⁵⁰

Whether or not we accept this progressivist view, there is no denying that Modelski’s LCT has had a significant influence upon the way in which power transition is analysed today. It claims the existence of recurrent patterns and cycles in world politics and tries to explain them by utilising such economic models as cobweb models and Talcott Parsons’ sociological theory.⁵¹ Moreover, as with Organski’s PTT, it views war as the central mechanism by which change is brought about in world politics. However, LCT does not offer a detailed explanation as to why states emerge and decline; he uncritically assumes the validity of the *monopoly erosion model* mentioned earlier. It was this question that Robert Gilpin undertook to address in his works on power transition.

Gilpin’s hegemonic stability theory

In his *War and Change in World Politics*, Gilpin utilises some of the basic ideas of rational-choice theory in his attempt to construct what is commonly called hegemonic stability theory (hereafter HST).⁵² His argument rests upon the rationalist assumption

⁴⁸ Ibid., p. 135.

⁴⁹ Herbert Butterfield, *The Whig Interpretation of History*, London: G. Bell and Sons, 1931.

⁵⁰ George Modelski, ‘A System Model of the Long Cycle’, in George Modelski (ed.), *Exploring Long Cycles*, Boulder: Rienner, 1987, p. 124.

⁵¹ See *ibid.*; Modelski, *Long Cycles*, chap. 5; Modelski and Thompson, ‘Testing Cobweb Models’.

⁵² Gilpin, *War and Change*.

that 'rationality' governs how individuals conduct themselves; he assumes that it is cost-benefit considerations that constitute the most important determinant of human behaviour.⁵³ He applies this *homo economicus* assumption about human behaviour to the study of state behaviour. This application is made possible not because he postulates the presence of the *raison d'État*, but because he regards the state as consisting of individual human beings whom he assumes to be rational agents conducting themselves with a view to maximising benefits and minimising costs.⁵⁴

This assumption enables him to defend the universal applicability of his theory of political change. As he remarks:

In this book we shall assume that rationality is not historically or culturally bound but that individuals in all societies past and present attempt to achieve their interests and goals by the most efficient means possible.⁵⁵

Starting from this assumption, Gilpin maintains that the basic character of international relations has remained the same since the days of Thucydides.⁵⁶ In his view, even the much-vaunted economic interdependency among states and the presence of nuclear weapons do not effectively change the ways states go about their business.⁵⁷ His theory of power transition is meant to be applicable across times and places, and therefore purports to provide the broadest view of power transition. In this regard, HST contrasts with Organski's PTT which confines its own applicability to the post-industrialisation period in world history and with Modelski's LCT which only applies after the emergence

⁵³ Ibid., p. x.

⁵⁴ Ibid., pp. 15–18. To be more accurate, he views coalitions of individuals as constituting the state. See *ibid.*, pp. 18–19.

⁵⁵ Ibid., p. xii.

⁵⁶ Ibid., pp. 7, 211. He also states as follows: 'But, in honesty, one must inquire whether or not twentieth-century students of international relations know anything that Thucydides and his fifth-century compatriots did not know about the behavior of states.' *Ibid.*, p. 227.

⁵⁷ Ibid., chap. 6.

of world economy and nation-states.

On the basis of rational-choice theory, Gilpin assumes that the actors of the system, including sovereign states in the modern international system, set out to mould and remould its rules and institutions to their own advantage. As a result, they tend to be reflective of power relations in the system.⁵⁸ On the flip side of this, shifts in the distribution of power create demands for restructuring rules and institutions which no longer reflect the new power relations in the system.⁵⁹ When there is a disjuncture between the power balances among states and the arrangements of the international system, the international system becomes less stable. In contrast, the international system is most stable when there are no gaps between these factors, i.e. when rules and institutions are completely reflective of the existing power relations in the system.⁶⁰

It is well to note that the international system may remain stable even when many states are not satisfied with it. Since they are assumed to be *rational*, they do not seek to challenge it if the expected costs are so high that they would offset the expected benefits. It is only when there are realistic possibilities for successfully gaining net benefits that states set out to challenge the status quo.⁶¹

Gilpin holds that the incentives for states and their cost-benefit considerations are substantially affected by the material structure of the international system, i.e. by ‘the distribution of capabilities and the ways in which this distribution of capabilities changes over time’.⁶² Moreover, he argues that changes and innovations in technological, military and economic environments alter the costs and benefits accompanying an attempt to challenge the status quo.⁶³ Furthermore, he points out that the character of domestic

⁵⁸ Ibid., p. xi.

⁵⁹ Ibid., pp. 9–10.

⁶⁰ Ibid., pp. 9–15.

⁶¹ Ibid., pp. 11, 50–51.

⁶² Ibid., p. 86.

⁶³ Ibid., pp. 55–84.

political configuration affects how states act in a given situation.⁶⁴ Among other things, however, he emphasises the impacts of the distribution of material power on state behaviour. To quote his words:

In summary, the structure of the international system and shifts in that structure are critically important determinants of state behavior. The structure of the system constrains behavior and imposes a cost on any behavior that seeks to change the international status quo. Similarly, the redistribution of interstate capabilities may decrease or increase the cost of changing the international system.⁶⁵

In order to explain such structural changes, Gilpin focuses upon what he calls ‘the differential or uneven growth of power among states’.⁶⁶ The dominant state *rationaly* extends its hold over the international system until the point when the benefits of further expansions would be offset by the costs of doing so, i.e. up to the point of there being no net benefits. However, the dominant state cannot maintain this state of equilibrium because the costs of holding onto its control of the system increase over time while the benefits it gains from maintaining its imperial or hegemonic rule decrease. Meanwhile, assisted by the ‘diffusion of military and economic technology’,⁶⁷ other states experiencing robust growth catch up with the hegemon, thereby further increasing the costs for the maintenance of the status quo, and decreasing the costs of challenging it.

These secular processes go hand in hand to create a disequilibrium in the international system, increasing pressure for change. Historically, such a discrepancy in the system has been resolved through what Gilpin calls *hegemonic war*, which he defines as ‘a war that determines which state or states will be dominant and will govern the

⁶⁴ Ibid., pp. 96–105.

⁶⁵ Ibid., pp. 95–96.

⁶⁶ Ibid., p. 93. The following discussion in the paragraph is based on his discussions in chapters 3 and 4.

⁶⁷ Ibid., p. 177.

system'.⁶⁸ His conception of hegemonic war is concisely summarised in the following passage.

Hegemonic war historically has been the basic mechanism of systemic change in world politics. Hegemonic conflict, arising from an increasing disequilibrium between the burden of maintaining an empire or hegemonic position and the resources available to the dominant power to carry out this task, leads to the creation of a new international system.⁶⁹

To sum up, by incorporating rational-choice theory and other theories and propositions developed in modern economics, Gilpin's HST purports to offer a universalistic understanding of power transition and continues to shape how IR theorists think about and theorise power transition.

Developments in power transition studies

Using different sets of data and adopting refined methods, subsequent researchers have put the key propositions of these classical theories of power transition to the test in order to confirm them and, if necessary, to modify them.⁷⁰

Jonathan DiCicco and Jack Levy classify subsequent works in power transition studies into two categories, drawing upon Lakatos' concept of research programme.⁷¹ Following Lakatos, they label as 'progressive' the contributions that provide researchers with new sets of empirically testable hypotheses and propositions built upon (and, in some

⁶⁸ Ibid., p. 15. See also *ibid.*, p. 197.

⁶⁹ Ibid., pp. 209–210.

⁷⁰ See, for example, Henk Houweling and Jan G. Siccama, 'Power Transitions as a Cause of War', *The Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 32/1, 1988, pp. 87–102; Indra de Soysa, John R. Oneal and Yong-Hee Park, 'Testing Power-Transition Theory Using Alternative Measures of National Capabilities', *The Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 41/4, 1997, pp. 509–528.

⁷¹ Jonathan M. DiCicco and Jack S. Levy, 'Power Shifts and Problem Shifts: The Evolution of the Power Transition Research Program', *The Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 43/6, 1999, pp. 675–704.

cases, modifying) the ‘set of hard-core (HC) assumptions in power transition theory’.⁷² For example, they argue that Douglas Lemke’s multiple hierarchy model, which applies and extends the findings of power transition theory to regional international systems should be seen as an example of progressive research in power transition studies.⁷³ In addition, the research connecting power transition theory with democratic peace theory can also be regarded as progressive.⁷⁴ Henk Houweling and Jan Siccama argue that power transition leads to war only when one or more states involved in the process of change have undemocratic political systems.⁷⁵ Similarly, Douglas Lemke and William Reed argue that power shifts among democracies are less likely to result in a war because they are more likely to be satisfied with the international order. This is so, they argue, since all the dominant nations in history have been democratic in nature.⁷⁶

DiCicco and Levy also point out that some works in power transition studies have been ‘degenerating’ in that, in their attempt to patch gaps between theory and history, they have inadvertently distracted researchers from focusing on the central concerns of power transition studies.⁷⁷

While some scholars have sought to refine existing theories of power transition, others have applied those theories to a wider range of policy issues. For instance, Tammen et al. have applied Organski’s PTT to issue areas such as regional international relations, security and deterrence, economic policy and trade, and alliance politics.⁷⁸

⁷² Ibid., pp. 677, 684.

⁷³ Ibid., pp. 691–692.

⁷⁴ DiCicco and Levy mention this type of research in their footnote but they do not elaborate on it in detail. See *ibid.*, p. 688, n. 35.

⁷⁵ Henk W. Houweling and Jan G. Siccama, ‘The Neo-Functionalist Explanation of World Wars: A Critique and an Alternative’, *International Interactions*, 18/4, 1993, pp. 387–408.

⁷⁶ Douglas Lemke and William Reed, ‘Regime Types and Status Quo Evaluations: Power Transition Theory and the Democratic Peace’, *International Interactions*, 22/2, 1996, pp. 143–164.

⁷⁷ DiCicco and Levy, ‘Power Shifts and Problem Shifts’, pp. 677, 694–698.

⁷⁸ Tammen et al., *Power Transitions*.

Some scholars, however, claim that power transition theory offers no significant insights into the actuality of world politics. Richard Lebow and Benjamin Valentino claim that the key propositions of power transition theories are lacking any empirical evidence, warning that they can result in a self-fulfilling prophecy by provoking unwanted hostility and unnecessary tensions.⁷⁹ Putting aside the validity of their claim, their warning contains a grain of truth, for many contemporary debates over the future of the world order are being informed by existing theories of power transition.

Contemporary debates on power transition

There is little doubt that the central concern driving today's discussions about power transition is the rise of China. There have been countless attempts to apply the findings and insights of power transition theories to this case.⁸⁰ Meanwhile, some scholars have examined the idea that the West has been declining in terms of power relative to other parts of the world.⁸¹ The idea of the declining West has sparked extensive debates on the prospects of the liberal international order that has been constructed since the end of the Second World War. Since it is impossible to cover and track everything said about power transition today, here I shall focus upon two prominent figures, John J. Mearsheimer and G. John Ikenberry, whose views represent two dominant perspectives on power transition.

Drawing upon neorealism, Mearsheimer makes a pessimistic assessment of the prospects of the American-led international order. He claims that the political and

⁷⁹ Richard Ned Lebow and Benjamin Valentino, 'Lost in Transition: A Critical Analysis of Power Transition Theory', *International Relations*, 23/3, 2009, pp. 389–410.

⁸⁰ See, for example, Steve Chan, *China, the US and Power-Transition Theory: A Critique*, London: Routledge, 2008; Christopher Layne, 'China's Challenge to US Hegemony', *Current History*, 107/705, 2008, pp. 13–18; Ronald L. Tammen and Jacek Kugler, 'Power Transition and China-US Conflicts', *Chinese Journal of International Politics*, 1/1, 2006, pp. 35–55.

⁸¹ Michael Cox has critically examined this idea. See Michael Cox, 'Power Shift and the Death of the West? Not Yet!', *European Political Science*, 10/3, 2011, pp. 416–424; Michael Cox, 'Power Shifts, Economic Change and the Decline of the West?', *International Relations*, 26/4, 2012, pp. 369–388.

strategic confrontation between the United States and China is highly likely because of the latter's rise and the resulting change in the power configuration of the international system.⁸² He starts from the assumption that every great power pursues the same and simple objective in a situation of anarchy. As he remarks:

The ultimate goal of every great power is to maximize its share of world power and eventually dominate the system. ... Their ultimate aim is to be the hegemon—that is, the only great power in the system.⁸³

However, as it is unrealistic for any great power to dominate the entire globe, a more realistic goal would be to establish itself as 'the only regional hegemon in the world'.⁸⁴ He goes on to argue that, once having established its dominance in its own region, the regional hegemon will seek to prevent other powers from achieving preponderance in their respective regions.⁸⁵ In his view, the United States has historically conducted its foreign policy along these lines.

According to Mearsheimer, China—the new emerging power—will also act in accordance with these principles; he predicts that the country will act to establish a regional hegemony of its own. This move will increase diplomatic tensions and a security dilemma will set in since such a move is clearly at odds with the United States' goal of preventing other powers from gaining preponderance in their respective regions.⁸⁶ He adds that the increasing economic interdependence between the two giants does not substantially affect the course of events.⁸⁷ This is so because, in his view, 'there are factors that sometimes override economic considerations and cause great powers to start

⁸² John J. Mearsheimer, 'China's Unpeaceful Rise', *Current History*, 105/690, 2006, pp. 160–162.

⁸³ *Ibid.*, p. 160.

⁸⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 161.

⁸⁵ *Ibid.*

⁸⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 162.

⁸⁷ John J. Mearsheimer, 'The Gathering Storm: China's Challenge to US Power in Asia', *The Chinese Journal of International Politics*, 3/4, 2010, p. 393.

wars'.⁸⁸

In contrast to Mearsheimer, Ikenberry is of the opinion that the hegemonic confrontation between the two nations is avoidable and China can rise peacefully, the main reason being that the nature of the existing international order is such that it is beneficial for China to accommodate itself to it rather than to try to challenge it.⁸⁹ He holds that the American-led international order which has been constructed since the end of the Second World War is intrinsically liberal.⁹⁰ Based upon the principles of liberal democracy and capitalism, the existing international order is 'open, integrated, and rule-based'.⁹¹ Furthermore, it is an equitable, 'neo-Rawlsian' order in which nations and countries of all ranks, including China, can thrive and prosper.⁹²

In addition, the deepening economic interdependence, he argues, increases China's incentives to accept the rules and institutions of the liberal international order, and the advent of nuclear weapons have made the occurrence of hegemonic wars less likely.⁹³ In such a world, 'the costs of not following multilateral rules and not forging cooperative ties go up'.⁹⁴ In particular, he emphasises that China's rapidly growing economy owes much to the international economic arrangements provided by the liberal international order, arguing that China cannot do without those arrangements if it hopes to continue to grow.⁹⁵

⁸⁸ Zbigniew Brzezinski and John J. Mearsheimer, 'Clash of the Titans', *Foreign Policy*, 146/1, 2005, p. 49.

⁸⁹ G. John Ikenberry, 'The Rise of China and the Future of the West: Can the Liberal System Survive?', *Foreign Affairs*, 87/1, 2008, pp. 23–37; G. John Ikenberry, 'The Future of the Liberal World Order: Internationalism After America', *Foreign Affairs*, 90/3, 2011, pp. 56–68.

⁹⁰ Ikenberry, 'The Rise of China', p. 28. See also G. John Ikenberry, 'Liberal Internationalism 3.0: America and the Dilemmas of Liberal World Order', *Perspectives on Politics*, 7/1, 2009, pp. 71–87.

⁹¹ Ikenberry, 'The Rise of China', pp. 24, 28.

⁹² *Ibid.*, pp. 24, 34, 37.

⁹³ *Ibid.*, pp. 30–31.

⁹⁴ Ikenberry, 'The Future of the Liberal World Order', p. 67.

⁹⁵ Ikenberry, 'The Rise of China', pp. 29, 32; Ikenberry, 'The Future of the Liberal World Order', pp. 57–58.

In short, Ikenberry maintains that peaceful rise is possible because there are strong *incentives* for China to uphold the institutional frameworks provided by the liberal international order.⁹⁶ Seen from this point of view, not only can China be a part of the liberal international order, but it can also act as an active defender of that order.

It is beyond the task of this study to address all aspects of contemporary debates surrounding power transition. However, it can be safely said that the focus of those debates converges on the question: will the liberal international order be unstable or even unsustainable in the future as the relative power of the West, especially that of the United States, declines and as the relative power of rising powers, especially that of China, continues to grow? Realists tend towards the view that conflict over hegemony is likely and the liberal international order will be unstable because of the relatively declined power of the hegemon, whereas liberals tend towards the view that it is possible to cooperate within the existing institutional frameworks and, therefore, the liberal international order can be maintained even after the hegemonic power of the dominant nation has waned. In this regard, contemporary debates on power transition are reminiscent of, and can be regarded as an extended version of, the neorealist-neoliberal debate over whether or not international regimes would remain stable ‘after hegemony’.⁹⁷

The ontological assumptions underlying theories and debates on power transition

Having outlined the major theories and debates on power transition, the next task is to examine the ontological assumptions underlying them. In doing so, I will draw upon Alexander Wendt’s map of ‘four sociologies’ (see figure 2 on the next page).⁹⁸ This move not only allows us to locate the existing approaches to power transition within a wider picture, but also enables us to identify an under-explored territory for power transition

⁹⁶ Ibid., pp. 61, 66–67.

⁹⁷ Robert O. Keohane, *After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy*, Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1984.

⁹⁸ Wendt, *Social Theory*, pp. 22–33.




Figure 2 [Source: modified from Wendt, *Social Theory*, pp. 29, 32.]

studies.

Wendt classifies structural theories in IR scholarship on the basis of their underlying ontological assumptions. The first distinction he introduces is between *materialism* and *idealism* which concerns ‘the extent to which structures are material or social’.⁹⁹ Materialism identifies material factors as the primary determinants of the structure of the international system and state behaviour within that system. While materialism recognises the role of non-material factors, it gives secondary importance to them in its understanding of world politics. In contrast, idealism holds that the structure of the international system and state behaviour are, to a large extent, dictated by ideational factors such as social norms, rules and institutions. This position recognises the presence of material factors, but maintains that the ways in which they bear upon the relations among states hinge on how states understand them and on the meaning states attach to them. In short, the idealist argues that, to quote Wendt’s words, ‘the deep structure of society is constituted by ideas rather than material forces’.¹⁰⁰

The second distinction is between *individualism* and *holism*.¹⁰¹ It is about how actors in the international system relate to, and are affected by, structures. Individualists

⁹⁹ Ibid., p. 22. The following discussion in the paragraph is based on *ibid.*, pp. 23–26.

¹⁰⁰ Ibid., p. 25.

¹⁰¹ The following discussion in the paragraph is based on *ibid.*, pp. 26–29.

in IR scholarship are primarily concerned with how structures externally constrain and regulate state behaviour, and take states' identities and interests as given, independent of structures. In other words, they focus upon what Wendt calls 'behavioral effects'.¹⁰² In contrast, holists argue that structures not only constrain states' behaviour, but also internally constitute and construct their identities and interests. In other words, they focus upon 'property effects' as well.¹⁰³

Figure 2 is based upon these two distinctions. Although Wendt drew this map in order to analyse structural theories in IR scholarship, this can also be used for identifying the ontological assumptions on which theories and debates on power transition rest.

To start with, theories and debates based on the materialist-individualist ontology fit into the left lower quadrant. In fact, most of the major theories and debates on power transition can be regarded as belonging to this group. Organski's PTT is clearly rooted in this ontological assumption. It is materialist because it identifies the distribution of power and the economic growth as the most significant factors shaping the process of international political change, and it can be labeled as individualist because of its rationalist conception of state behaviour, which constitutes one of PTT's core assumptions.¹⁰⁴

Grounded in rational-choice theory, Gilpin's HST also lies within this quadrant. As with Organski, Gilpin mainly focuses on material structures and takes states' identities and interests as given independent of structures. Although he recognises the importance of sociological perspectives in studying power transition, his reliance on the Waltzian conception of structure confines his focus to the role of material factors and their behavioural effects.¹⁰⁵ Moreover, he argues that the state's interests are primarily determined by the way in which coalitions are formed *domestically*. In other words, he

¹⁰² Ibid., p. 26.

¹⁰³ Ibid., p. 27.

¹⁰⁴ See DiCicco and Levy, 'Power Shifts and Problem Shifts', p. 684.

¹⁰⁵ Gilpin, *War and Change*, pp. 85–88.

maintains that national interests are a function of domestic political processes.¹⁰⁶

Most of the contemporary debates about power transition can also be seen as based upon the materialist-individualist ontology. Indeed, as discussed above, they greatly resemble the debate between neorealists and neoliberals, whose theoretical arguments were rooted in the materialist-individualist ontology. Mearsheimer's neorealist argument is evidently materialist and individualist. Although Ikenberry stresses the importance of the nature of the international order in his analysis of power transition, his argument can be seen as an extension of neoliberal institutionalism, which is revealed by his frequent usage of such words as 'benefit' and 'incentive'.¹⁰⁷

Modelski's LCT falls into the left upper quadrant. Like PTT and HST, LCT is materialist in that it mainly focuses upon the material structure of the global political system and the distribution of power within that system. Unlike PTT and HST, however, it is holist because the power gaps between the world power and the other states in the system leads to the former forging a distinct identity as the *leader* of the system, resulting in 'functional differentiation'.¹⁰⁸

The above-mentioned research focusing on the role of democratic form of government in shaping the course of power transition can be put into the idealist-individualist group. It is idealist since it focuses upon the relationship between such ideational factors as the principles and values on which domestic political systems are based, on the one hand, and the process of international political change induced by power transition, on the other. It is individualist since those principles and values are assumed to stem from domestic factors.

Compared with research in other quadrants, relatively little research has been conducted within the right upper, idealist-holist quadrant. This is problematic since it

¹⁰⁶ Ibid., pp. 18–25.

¹⁰⁷ Ikenberry, 'The Rise of China', passim; Ikenberry, 'The Future of the Liberal World Order', passim.

¹⁰⁸ Modelski, *Long Cycles*, p. 13.

leads to the neglect of the role of international social structure in international political change. The process of international political change in the context of power transition cannot be analysed deeply enough without reference to such factors as state practice, norms, international law and international organisations, and it is only by adopting the idealist-holist ontology that the relationship between power transition and such international social structures can be fully theorised.

As Wendt points out, ES theory is one of the most well-known IR theories that are rooted in the idealist-holist ontology.¹⁰⁹ Some ES theorists have discussed power transition from this ontological standpoint. Robert Ayson, for example, shows that Hedley Bull emphasised the importance of accommodating rising powers' demands for international political change from the point of view of the maintenance of international order and viewed the investigation into the relationship between power transition and institutions of international society as a scholarly responsibility.¹¹⁰ To quote Ayson:

... if there was to be a semblance of international order, Bull's continual reference point for evaluating the health of the international system, there would need to be evidence that the prevailing powers were coming to terms with these changes [in the distribution of power in the international system]. Without this adjustment, the society of states simply would cease to function properly. ... Power needed to be accommodated consciously and carefully. Moreover, it was the responsibility of scholars in Bull's view to be part of the debate over how this management and adjustment ought to take place: to investigate the institutions through which order could be found and maintained [in the context of power transition].¹¹¹

For another example, Ian Clark offers an analysis of power, legitimacy and responsibility from the ES perspective, discussing how 'the power of norms and the

¹⁰⁹ Wendt, *Social Theory*, pp. 31–32.

¹¹⁰ Robert Ayson, *Hedley Bull and the Accommodation of Power*, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012.

¹¹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 7.

norms of power' interact.¹¹² He has formulated and posed a question of great significance as follows.

[D]o international norms effectively constrain the material power of emerging states, or do shifts in material power create the necessary condition for the reconstruction of those norms?¹¹³

This question redirects our attention from material structure to social structure, foregrounding issues concerning the latter's regulative and constitutive effects.¹¹⁴

Nonetheless, it cannot be denied that the relationship between power transition and international social structure has yet to be fully explored, and there still remains a number of unanswered questions in this regard. This is partly due to the fact that much of the contemporary literature on power transition based on the idealist-holist ontology has confined its attention to the specific case of the rise of China.¹¹⁵ Although this case of power transition is of paramount importance for contemporary world politics, power transition needs to be looked at from a broader perspective if we are to theorise its relationship with international social structure.

International social structure and English School theory

Although the existing literature on power transition is inadequate in this regard, IR theory does offer a set of frameworks that can be utilised for analysing power transition in terms of the social structure of the international system. This section gives an overview of the

¹¹² Ian Clark, 'International Society and China: The Power of Norms and the Norms of Power', *The Chinese Journal of International Politics*, 7/3, 2014, pp. 315–340.

¹¹³ *Ibid.*, p. 317.

¹¹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 320.

¹¹⁵ Barry Buzan, 'China in International Society: Is "Peaceful Rise" Possible?', *The Chinese Journal of International Politics*, 3/1, 2010, pp. 5–36; Qin Yaqing, 'International Society as a Process: Institutions, Identities, and China's Peaceful Rise', *The Chinese Journal of International Politics*, 3/2, 2010, pp. 129–153; Xiaoming Zhang, 'A Rising China and the Normative Changes in International Society', *East Asia*, 28/3, 2011, pp. 235–246.

literature on international social structure, identifying the theoretical frameworks upon which the discussions in the following chapters draw.

Wendtian constructivism and its applicability to power transition analysis

Wendt is credited with shedding light upon the ontological assumptions of IR theories, as discussed above, and with setting out a clear direction for the development of constructivism, which is based on the idealist-holist ontology. His main argument is that the identities and interests of states, as well as their behaviour, are to a great extent constructed and constituted by the social structure of the international system.¹¹⁶ Wendt follows neorealists in focusing on *structure*.¹¹⁷ However, his conception of structure is radically different from that of neorealists; he holds that the structure of the international system consists primarily of such ideational factors as shared ideas, understandings and knowledge.¹¹⁸ As he puts it, international structure can be seen as a ‘distribution of knowledge’.¹¹⁹

More specifically, he focuses on ‘socially *shared* knowledge’ or ‘*culture*’ defined as ‘knowledge that is both common and connected between individuals’.¹²⁰ He describes three different cultures defining the nature of the international system. Hobbesian culture exists when states represent each other as enemies; Lockean culture exists when they view each other as rivals; and Kantian culture exists when they regard each other as friends.¹²¹ States’ identities and interests hinge upon which of these three cultures is widely shared by states in a given international system. And this in turn affects the ways in which they interact with one another. As he remarks:

¹¹⁶ Wendt, *Social Theory*, p. 1.

¹¹⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 10–15.

¹¹⁸ Alexander Wendt, ‘Constructing International Politics’, *International Security*, 20/1, 1995, pp. 73–74.

¹¹⁹ Wendt, *Social Theory*, p. 20.

¹²⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 141.

¹²¹ *Ibid.*, chap. 6.

[T]he character of international life is determined by the beliefs and expectations that states have about each other, and these are constituted largely by social rather than material structures. This does not mean that material power and interests are unimportant, but rather that their meaning and effects depend on the social structure of the system, and specifically on which of three “cultures” of anarchy is dominant—Hobbesian, Lockean, or Kantian.¹²²

Wendt goes on to discuss the ways in which these cultures are maintained by introducing the concept of ‘internalization’.¹²³ According to him, a culture can be maintained either by force, by calculation or by legitimacy, and only when it is upheld because states regard it as legitimate can it exert constitutive effects on states. When a culture is maintained by legitimacy, it is said to be most stable. When it is maintained by calculation or by force, it only has behavioural effects and tends to be less stable. And here it must be noted that there is no necessary connection between the extent to which a culture is internalised and the type of culture prevalent in a given international system.

Drawing on the Wendtian version of constructivism, Barry Buzan challenges the materialist conception of polarity most typically found in neorealism.¹²⁴ He argues that the impacts of polarity on the behaviour of states cannot be understood unless polarity is viewed in the context of the social structure of the international system, understood here, à la Wendt, in terms of the identities of states and whether they see one another as enemies, rivals or friends.¹²⁵ For example, he examines how the ideologies held by major powers shape their relations with one another.¹²⁶ Since polarity is one of the most basic concepts used in power transition analysis, Buzan’s attempt to reform the understanding of it on the basis of the Wendtian version of constructivism is highly informative.

¹²² Ibid., p. 20.

¹²³ The discussion in this paragraph is based on *ibid.*, pp. 250, 254.

¹²⁴ Barry Buzan, *The United States and the Great Powers: World Politics in the Twenty-First Century*, Cambridge: Polity, 2004.

¹²⁵ Ibid., pp. 15–80.

¹²⁶ Ibid., pp. 20–22.

Kupchan et al. attempt to analyse power transition through a similar, constructivist theoretical framework which they call *ideational contestation*.¹²⁷ According to them, the peaceful management of power transition is more likely when (1) the hegemon and the challenger hold a benign image of one another; (2) both parties agree on the fundamental principles and rules that would govern the international order; and (3) they are successful in legitimising the agreed international order.¹²⁸

Although their concept of *ideational contestation* opens up a critical way of analysing power transition from a constructivist perspective, the problem with this framework is that it is likely to divert attention away from how the social structure of the international system affects the ways in which the major powers interact in their relations with one another. Indeed, it gives the reader a false impression that the major powers are free from, or immune from, the behavioural and constitutive effects of social structure as if they were in a position to freely negotiate and legitimise their preferred international order as they like. For example, it is argued that:

Legitimacy emerges when hegemon and contender agree not just on hierarchy and a set of core rules on the conduct of foreign policy, but also on a set of deeper normative principles.¹²⁹

However, the fact is that there already exists ‘a set of deeper normative principles’¹³⁰ that is deemed legitimate in a given international system before the hegemon and the challenger commence negotiations on the future shape of the international order, and such normative principles delimit the socially accepted and appropriate ways of settling disputes. To argue otherwise is to acknowledge the verity of the realist argument that the

¹²⁷ Charles A. Kupchan, Emanuel Adler, Jean-Marc Coicaud and Yuen Foong Khong, *Power in Transition: The Peaceful Change of International Order*, Tokyo: United Nations University Press, 2001.

¹²⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 7–14.

¹²⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 13.

¹³⁰ *Ibid.*

norms and principles of international society are *merely* reflective of the underlying power relations in the international system.

That said, some of the contributors to the book do touch upon this important point. Jean-Marc Coicaud argues that it is important to factor in the social contexts provided by the UN system, although he does not elaborate on this point.¹³¹ Moreover, Emanuel Adler focuses upon the impacts that security communities and social learning have on the course of power transition.¹³² They both suggest a direction for further research into power transition, albeit in a brief and sketchy manner. What is needed is a more robust framework that would enable such analysis.

English School frameworks for analysing international social structure

In this study, I will fully utilise the merits of ES theory since it provides a set of refined conceptual frameworks that can be used for explaining the behaviour of rising powers and the process of international political change in connection with international social structure. In particular, I shall make extensive use of Barry Buzan's socio-structural reformulation of ES theory.¹³³

ES theory assumes the existence of *international society* comprised of sovereign states. As Buzan briefly explains:

The basic idea of international society is quite simple: just as human beings as individuals live in societies which they both shape and are shaped by, so also states live in an international society which they shape and are shaped by.¹³⁴

The concept and reality of international society have been the central focus of ES

¹³¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 68–100.

¹³² *Ibid.*, pp. 138–158.

¹³³ Buzan, *From International to World Society?*.

¹³⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 8.

theory.¹³⁵ Hedley Bull, one of the founding fathers of the ES, defines international society as follows:

A *society of states* (or international society) exists when a group of states, conscious of certain common interests and common values, form a society in the sense that they conceive themselves to be bound by a common set of rules in their relations with one another, and share in the working of common institutions.¹³⁶

One of the foundational elements of international society is international law, and many ES theorists have regarded it as, to quote Martin Wight, '[t]he most essential evidence for the existence of an international society'.¹³⁷ Although the members of modern international society are called 'sovereign states', this only means in practice that states are '*constitutionally insular*', and the membership in international society is accompanied by the duty and obligation to abide by the rules of international law.¹³⁸

However, international law is only one of the *institutions* of international society. ES theorists have pointed to the existence of a series of institutions governing the maintenance of order in international society. By way of example, Bull reflects on the functions of what he views as the five fundamental institutions of international society: diplomacy, the balance of power, international law, war and great power management.¹³⁹ However, it has long remained unclear what exactly the term 'institution' refers to,

¹³⁵ See Andrew Hurrell, *On Global Order: Power, Values, and the Constitution of International Society*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007, pp. 12–13.

¹³⁶ Hedley Bull, *The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics*, 4th edn, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012, p. 13.

¹³⁷ Martin Wight, *Power Politics*, Leicester: Leicester University Press, 1978, p. 107. See also Bull, *Anarchical Society*, p. 124.

¹³⁸ C.A.W. Manning, 'The Legal Framework in a World of Change', in Brian Porter (ed.), *The Aberystwyth Papers: International Politics, 1919–1969*, London: Oxford University Press, 1972, p. 307; C.A.W. Manning, *The Nature of International Society*, London: London School of Economics and Political Science, 1962, pp. 102–103, 106–108.

¹³⁹ Bull, *Anarchical Society*, part 2.

causing difficulty in mapping the constellation of institutions in a given international society.

Picking up on this, Buzan sets out to engage in a comprehensive reworking of the ES frameworks for understanding the institutions of international society. After examining the differences demarcating the ES conception of institution from that of neoliberal institutionalists, Buzan introduces two categories of institutions, i.e. primary institutions and secondary institutions.¹⁴⁰ *Primary institutions*, according to Buzan, are ‘relatively fundamental and durable practices, that are evolved more than designed’ and are ‘constitutive of actors and their patterns of legitimate activity in relation to each other’.¹⁴¹ More concretely, the term ‘primary institution’ refers to some such thing as ‘an established custom, law, or relationship in a society or community’.¹⁴² Primary institutions are not to be understood as norms or principles, but as entrenched practices underpinned by norms and principles. Accurately speaking, therefore, when ES theorists speak of the primary institution of sovereignty, the thing that is being discussed is not the principle of sovereignty, but the entrenched practice of respecting the principle of sovereignty. When ES theorists speak of human rights as being a primary institution, what they are discussing is not so much the idea of human rights as the established international practice of respecting and promoting the idea of human rights. Likewise, in ES theory, such primary institutions as self-determination and democracy are to be understood as internationally established practices, rather than as ideas and principles.

Secondary institutions are defined as arrangements ‘consciously designed by states’ for specific purposes.¹⁴³ Examples of secondary institutions include the WHO, the IMF, the League of Nations, the UN and other international arrangements, regimes and

¹⁴⁰ Buzan, *From International to World Society?*, pp. 161–167.

¹⁴¹ *Ibid.*, p. 167.

¹⁴² Barry Buzan, *An Introduction to the English School of International Relations*, Cambridge: Polity Press, 2014, p. 16.

¹⁴³ Buzan, *From International to World Society?*, p. 166.

Table 2. Buzan's list of contemporary international institutions

Primary Institutions		Secondary Institutions
Master	Derivative	(examples of)
Sovereignty	Non-intervention International law	UN General Assembly Most regimes, ICJ, ICC
Territoriality	Boundaries	Some PKOs
Diplomacy	Bilateralism Multilateralism	Embassies United Nations Conferences Most IGOs, regimes
Great power management	Alliances	NATO
	War	UN Security Council
Equality of people	Balance of power Human rights Humanitarian intervention	UNHCR
Market	Trade liberalisation	GATT/WTO, MFN agreements
	Financial liberalisation Hegemonic stability	IBRD, IMF, BIS
Nationalism	Self-determination Popular sovereignty Democracy	Some PKOs
Environmental stewardship	Species survival Climate stability	CITES, UNFCCC Kyoto Protocol, IPCC, Montreal Protocol, etc.

Source: adopted from Buzan, *From International to World Society?*, p. 187.

organisations.

According to Buzan, primary institutions 'shape and constrain the formation, evolution, and demise of secondary institutions'.¹⁴⁴ In a lately published introductory primer of ES theory, he speaks of secondary institutions as follows:

For the English School, secondary institutions are *reflective and supportive of* primary ones, and their possibilities are *constrained by* the broader framing of primary institutions within which they necessarily operate.¹⁴⁵

Table 2 is Buzan's list of the institutions of contemporary international society. As shown

¹⁴⁴ Barry Buzan, 'International Political Economy and Globalization', in Alex J. Bellamy (ed.), *International Society and its Critics*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004, p. 121.

¹⁴⁵ Buzan, *Introduction to the English School*, p. 30, emphasis added.

in the table, he subdivides primary institutions into *master* institutions and *derivative* institutions, which are derived from the former.¹⁴⁶

Buzan argues that international societies can be categorised into different types according to their institutional features.¹⁴⁷ Here, I shall briefly explain how Buzan classifies international societies, focusing on the role and status of war as an institution in each type of society.

A '*Power Political* interstate society' is characterised by hostility, animosity and war. The relations between states are minimally institutionalised in international societies of this type. In such a society, war may be institutionalised as a socially accepted means for political and territorial aggrandizement.¹⁴⁸

A '*Coexistence* interstate society' is characterised by a higher degree of institutionalisation. This corresponds with Bull's conception of Westphalian international society based on *pluralism*.¹⁴⁹ War is one of the fundamental primary institutions in international societies of this type. Bull argues that, on reflection, war has from time to time performed 'a positive role in the maintenance of international order'.¹⁵⁰ According to him, war has the following three functions in pluralist international societies. Firstly, it serves as an instrument for law enforcement. Secondly, it functions as a means of maintaining the balance of power. Thirdly, it is an avenue for bringing about just change.¹⁵¹ International societies of this type may be characterised by the development of rules regulating the conduct of war, but those rules tend to be confined to *jus in bello* and do not extend to *jus ad bellum*.¹⁵²

¹⁴⁶ See Buzan, *From International to World Society?*, pp. 182–184.

¹⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 190–195.

¹⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 190–191.

¹⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 191–192.

¹⁵⁰ Hedley Bull, 'War and International Order', in Alan James (ed.), *The Bases of International Order: Essays in Honour of C.A.W. Manning*, London: Oxford University Press, 1973, p. 120.

¹⁵¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 120–121.

¹⁵² See Hedley Bull, 'The Grotian Conception of International Society', in Herbert Butterfield and Martin Wight (eds), *Diplomatic Investigations: Essays in the Theory of*

A ‘*Cooperative* interstate society’ is not only marked by an even higher degree of institutionalisation, but also by an increase in the number of secondary institutions.¹⁵³ International societies of this type are *solidarist* in nature and may be characterised by the development of *jus ad bellum*.¹⁵⁴ Although war may still have a place in a Cooperative international society, the legal and/or legitimate use of force is usually restricted to limited cases such as self-defence.¹⁵⁵

A ‘*Convergence* interstate society’ is marked by the breadth of shared values and the convergence of forms of government adopted by states, which make for much greater institutionalisation.¹⁵⁶ With the advance of institutionalisation, war becomes less of an institution and becomes more of a social deviance.

Drawing upon Wendt’s idea of internalisation, Buzan argues that the stability of an international society hinges upon how and to what extent the common values underpinning that society are internalised by states. According to him, international societies are most stable when the values underpinning them are deeply internalised by belief. They are less stable when the values are shallowly internalised by calculation, and are least stable when the values are imposed by coercion.¹⁵⁷

The relationship between primary and secondary institutions

Generally speaking, the principal focus of ES theory has been on primary institutions. This has led to the unwarranted neglect of the role of secondary institutions in international societies. The ES’s disposition to focus on primary institutions in disregard of secondary institutions is most apparent in Bull’s following statement:

International Politics, London: Allen and Unwin, 1966, pp. 51–73.

¹⁵³ Buzan, *From International to World Society?*, pp. 193–194.

¹⁵⁴ See Bull, ‘The Grotian Conception’.

¹⁵⁵ Buzan, *From International to World Society?*, p. 193.

¹⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 194.

¹⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 157–160.

Even the part that is in fact played by the United Nations and other international organisations is best understood not in terms of the official objectives and aspirations of these organisations themselves, or of the hopes commonly placed in them, but in terms of the contribution they make to the working of more basic institutions. It is for this reason that such references as are made to the United Nations and such bodies appear in the chapters dealing with the balance of power, international law, diplomacy, the role of the great powers, and war. It is these latter that are the effective institutions of international society; the League and the United Nations, as Martin Wight once argued, are best seen as pseudo-institutions.¹⁵⁸

This is an unwarranted downgrading of the role of secondary institutions. As Peter Wilson rightly suggests, '[i]t may turn out that secondary institutions loom far larger in the psychomilieu of practitioners' when they are studied empirically.¹⁵⁹ Indeed, Emanuel Adler points out that international organisations not only regulate state practice, but also serve as 'a site of interest and identity formation'.¹⁶⁰ In short, it is theoretically possible that secondary institutions have both regulative and constitutive effects on states, and this is something that needs empirical verification.

Picking up on this point, Kilian Spandler argues that there needs to be a sustained effort to examine how primary and secondary institutions relate to each other.¹⁶¹ While appreciating the primary/secondary distinction made by Buzan, he criticises ES theorists for not treating secondary institutions as 'autonomous objects of analysis'.¹⁶² He goes on to argue that primary and secondary institutions are 'linked by distinctive processes of constitution and institutionalisation', pointing out that the mechanism of social change

¹⁵⁸ Bull, *Anarchical Society*, p. xxxvii.

¹⁵⁹ Peter Wilson, 'The English School Meets the Chicago School: The Case for a Grounded Theory of International Institutions', *International Studies Review*, 14/4, 2012, p. 586.

¹⁶⁰ Emanuel Adler, 'Seizing the Middle Ground: Constructivism in World Politics', *European Journal of International Relations*, 3/3, 1997, p. 345.

¹⁶¹ Kilian Spandler, 'The Political International Society: Change in Primary and Secondary Institutions', *Review of International Studies*, 41/3, 2015, pp. 601–622.

¹⁶² *Ibid.*, p. 602.

can be better understood in terms of how these two types of institutions interplay.¹⁶³ In some cases, primary and secondary institutions are supportive of one another. In other cases, they can be mutually inconsistent.¹⁶⁴ Building on Buzan's argument that the inconsistency and tensions between primary institutions can lead to institutional change in international society, Spandler seeks to theorise how secondary institutions come into the picture.¹⁶⁵ Theorising how primary and secondary institutions interact is crucially important for understanding the development of international social structure governing international political change, including in the context of power transition, and therefore must be an integral part in the development of a socio-structural conception of power transition.

Anarchy and hierarchy

Some readers might wonder if ES theory is an appropriate theoretical choice for the present study on the grounds of its emphasis on the *anarchical* nature of international society, which could seem to contradict power transition studies' focus on the *hierarchical* nature of the international system.¹⁶⁶ However, ES theorists are far from being oblivious to hierarchical aspects of international society. As discussed above, Bull conceptualised great power management as an institution of international society, and Wight wrote of suzerainty in historical international societies.¹⁶⁷ Moreover, Clark sets out to establish hegemony as an institution of international society.¹⁶⁸ The existence of ES writings on hierarchical aspects of international society shows that ES theory is by no means

¹⁶³ Ibid., p. 603.

¹⁶⁴ Ibid., pp. 614–621.

¹⁶⁵ See Buzan, *From International to World Society?*, pp. 250–251.

¹⁶⁶ Bull, *Anarchical Society*.

¹⁶⁷ Ibid., pp. 194–222. Martin Wight, *Systems of States*, Leicester: Leicester University Press, 1977.

¹⁶⁸ Ian Clark, 'Towards an English School Theory of Hegemony', *European Journal of International Relations*, 15/2, 2009, pp. 203–228; Ian Clark, *Hegemony in International Society*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011.

incompatible with power transition studies, and the present study will discuss the impact of institutions reflective of international hierarchy, such as great power management, on the process of international political change in the context of power transition.

Peaceful change and UN Security Council reform

These ES frameworks enable us to understand international social structure in terms of primary and secondary institutions and also help us explain state behaviour with reference to them. On this basis, the primary research question of the present study is: *how do primary and secondary institutions of international society affect the behaviour of rising powers and hence the process of international political change in the context of power transition?* In order to address this question, it is necessary to establish an ES conception of power transition, develop an analytical framework underpinned by such a conception of power transition, and then analyse actual cases of power transition through the lens of such a framework. For these purposes, the present study addresses a couple of secondary research questions that will help guide the present inquiry into the relationship between power transition and institutions of international society.

Peaceful change

While ES frameworks mentioned above are of potential value to power transition studies, they are, as they stand, framed in too general a manner to be used for addressing analytical and normative issues concerning power transition, and therefore in need of reworking. Bearing this in mind, this study seeks to establish a reformed conception of power transition and develop an ES framework designed for power transition analysis, and to this end it integrates the above-mentioned elements of ES theory with the insights retrieved from the interwar debate on peaceful change. I shall here set out the reasons as to why the present study turns to the debate, setting forth the first secondary research question to be addressed in the following chapters.

The interwar debate on peaceful change engaged a number of prominent scholars and practitioners during the interwar period. This study calls for a renewed attention on the debate for two main reasons. Firstly, the debate provides important clues as to how we can go about theorising the relationship between power transition and institutions of international society. Although the debate predates both power transition studies and ES theory, it offers hitherto neglected, but nevertheless valuable insights into the relationship between power transition and institutions of international society, providing a strong support for the socio-structural conception of power transition, which the present study seeks to develop.

Secondly, the debate provides an ideal starting point from which to embark upon a historically-informed investigation into institutions governing international political change in contemporary international society. The interwar period marks a normative and historical turning point in the development of international social structure, and indeed the origins of much of contemporary international social structure can be traced back to the interwar period. Therefore, understanding the features of the interwar international social structure is an essential first step in understanding the institutional contexts within which power transition occurs today. This point will be discussed further in the next chapter on methodology and methods.

It is worth stressing at this early stage that the term ‘peaceful change’ cannot be understood as simply referring to the avoidance of wars. Such a truncated conception of peaceful change would not add much to power transition studies. The significance of the debate lies in that it sheds light on the fact that international political change in the context of power transition is an institutionally governed process. As such, the term ‘peaceful change’ carries an institutional connotation.

Although the interwar debate on peaceful change has little presence in the ongoing debates in power transition studies, there has been a couple of attempts to explore the contemporary relevance of peaceful change. In his 1984 article, Esko Antola offered a

brief overview of the debate, and, in another article published in the same year, he attempted to apply the insights he gleaned from the debate to post-war international relations in Europe.¹⁶⁹ Another notable work was written by Arie M. Kacowicz. In his 1994 article, he attempted to apply E.H. Carr's conception of peaceful change to the analysis of local and regional territorial disputes.¹⁷⁰

In spite of these works, however, the interwar debate on peaceful change either receives little attention or is totally forgotten in the ongoing debates in power transition studies. On that account, it has to be said that the previous works on peaceful change have failed to inform and shape contemporary debates on power transition, despite the significance of the insights that the debate offers for power transition analysis.

Moreover, the previous works on peaceful change have failed to pick up on the insights the debate offers into the relationship between international political change and international social structure. This is primarily due to that they were written against the intellectual backgrounds in the 1980s and early 1990s, and therefore were greatly informed by the neo-neo paradigm in IR theory. In view of this, the debate needs to be revisited from the point of view of ES theory with a view to shedding light on the hitherto neglected aspects of the debate.

In particular, the present study will focus on the legal aspects of the debate. The study of international relations during the interwar period was not fully differentiated from the study of international law, and therefore it is impossible to understand the significance of the debate without understanding the legal issues involved in the problem of peaceful change. Moreover, the focus on the legal aspects of the debate will enable us to tackle the false dichotomisation of IR and international law. This division of labour

¹⁶⁹ Esko Antola, 'Theories of Peaceful Change: An Excursion to the Study of Change in International Relations in the 1930s', *Cooperation and Conflict*, 19/4, 1984, pp. 235–250; Esko Antola, 'Peaceful Change as a Model for Europe', *Current Research on Peace and Violence*, 7/4, 1984, pp. 229–246.

¹⁷⁰ Arie M. Kacowicz, 'The Problem of Peaceful Territorial Change', *International Studies Quarterly*, 38/2, 1994, pp. 219–254.

should be questioned and challenged rather than be taken as a given.¹⁷¹ Furthermore, the legal dimensions of the debate are of particular interest from the standpoint of ES theory. As discussed above, ES theorists have viewed international law as an empirical confirmation of the presence of an international society, with the implication being that the character of international law in a given international society shapes the character of that society. If this be the case, it can be argued that the ways in which the process of political change is managed in a given international society are to a great extent determined by the character of the law governing political change in that society. The interwar debate on peaceful change can provide valuable insights with regard to the relationship between international law and international political change.

In this connection, the present study will also focus on what the debate tells us about the role of international organisations in international political change, including in the context of power transition. The development of international law during the interwar period went in hand-in-hand with that of international organisations such as the League of Nations and the Permanent Court of International Justice. As a matter of historical fact, the interwar debate on peaceful change was inextricably linked to this dual process. A focus on this dimension of the debate will enable us to tackle state-centrism in the previous works on peaceful change as well as in the existing literature on power transition. Moreover, this dimension of the debate is of interest from the standpoint of ES theory since it provides the key to understanding how primary and secondary institutions interact in the management of international political change.

Bearing these points in mind, the first secondary research question of the present study is: *what are the key insights from the interwar debate on 'peaceful change' and how do they, with the help of ES theory, reform the conception of power transition and the way we analyse the behaviour of rising powers?*

¹⁷¹ See Anne-Marie Slaughter, Andrew S. Tulumello and Stepan Wood, 'International Law and International Relations Theory: A New Generation of Interdisciplinary Scholarship', *The American Journal of International Law*, 92/3, 1998, pp. 367–397.

UN Security Council reform

The present study will develop a framework for analysing actual cases of power transition on the basis of the reformed conception of power transition. The framework will enable us to analyse the behaviour of rising powers with reference to the type, character and effectiveness of institutions of international society. In this study, I will use this framework to analyse the behaviour of rising powers and the process of international political change in the issue-area of reform of the UN Security Council.

There is no question that UN reform is one of the most urgent issues facing contemporary international society. Since the UN is responsible for tackling a whole range of global problems including international security, poverty, climate change and human rights, its reform calls for a multifaceted and multidimensional approach. That said, there is no doubt about the centrality of Security Council reform, and the sheer number of publications devoted to this theme attests to the importance attached to it by scholars and practitioners alike.

Moreover, global power transition of today has given additional importance to Council reform. As is often argued, the size and composition of the Council reflect the power relations that existed at the end of the Second World War, and there have been calls for its reform in order to make it in harmony with the current power balances and in tune with other realities of contemporary world politics. In view of this, the Council can be viewed as an *object* of international political change in this age of global power transition. The present study seeks to deepen the understanding of this important issue foregrounded by power transition by explaining the behaviour of the rising powers actively pursuing Council reform in connection with the primary and secondary institutions governing change in this issue-area. Hence the second secondary research question to be addressed is: *how does the reformed conception of power transition enhance the understanding of the behaviour of the rising powers pursuing UN Security Council reform?*

However, that the Council is an important object of international political change

is not the only reason why this study focuses on the issue of Council reform. One thing that the interwar debate reveals is, as mentioned earlier, the role of secondary institutions such as the League of Nations in managing change in international society. Extrapolating from this, it may well be surmised that the UN—the successor to the League—also plays a role in managing change in international society, including international political changes in the context of power transition. Indeed, it will be shown in chapter 5 that the UN, especially the Security Council, is a central part of contemporary international social structure governing international political change, including in the context of power transition. Moreover, secondary institutions such as these may have constitutive as well as regulative effects on states, thereby serving as ‘a site of interest and identity formation’.¹⁷² On this account, it can be argued that the Security Council is not just an object, but also an *agent* of international political change. The interwar debate on peaceful change provides insights into the *agency* of secondary institutions designed for the maintenance of international peace and security, such as the League, the UN and its Security Council, by shedding light on their role in managing change in international society, including changes in the international status quo in the context of power transition, via the promotion of the symbiotic relationship between collective security and peaceful change.

Bearing in mind that the Council is both object and agent of international political change, the present study examines the following secondary research question: *given the duality of the Security Council with regard to power transition, how should the Council be reformed so as to enhance its capacity to manage change in international society, including changes in the international status quo in the context of power transition?* This question may not need to be addressed for the purpose of answering our primary research question, but it is too important a question to be ignored and is best addressed in the context of the present study. Moreover, as will be discussed in the next chapter, the

¹⁷² Adler, ‘Seizing the Middle Ground’, p. 345.

analysis of power transition cannot be separated completely from normative issues surrounding power transition from the point of view of ES theory.

Conclusion

The key points made in this chapter can be summarised as follows. The majority of the literature, theories and debates on power transition rest on the materialist-individualist ontology, while others are based upon the materialist-holist or idealist-individualist ontological assumptions. Although some constructivists and ES theorists have attempted to analyse power transition from the idealist-holist perspective, the results are far from satisfactory due to the lack of efforts to develop a robust framework for power transition analysis that emphasises the role of international social structure. ES theory, especially Buzan's reformulation of it, provides a good starting point for developing such an analytical framework and for analysing the behaviour of rising powers in connection with institutions of international society. Bearing these points in mind, the present study addresses the following primary research question: *how do primary and secondary institutions of international society affect the behaviour of rising powers and hence the process of international political change in the context of power transition?*

The present study also addresses three secondary research questions that will help us answer the primary research question and deepen our understanding of the relationship between power transition and institutions of international society. The secondary research questions that will be addressed in the following chapters are as follows:

1. *what are the key insights from the interwar debate on 'peaceful change' and how do they, with the help of ES theory, reform the conception of power transition and the way we analyse the behaviour of rising powers?;*
2. *how does the reformed conception of power transition enhance the understanding of the behaviour of the rising powers pursuing UN Security Council reform?;* and
3. *given the duality of the Security Council with regard to power transition, how should*

the Council be reformed so as to enhance its capacity to manage change in international society, including changes in the international status quo in the context of power transition?

Chapter 2

Methodology and Method

Introduction

This chapter addresses methodological issues involved in this study, setting out the methodological principles underlying the discussions and analyses in the following chapters. Firstly, drawing upon what ES theorists call methodological pluralism, it discusses how power transition can be studied from three different, yet complementary methodological perspectives: positivism, interpretivism and critical theory. Secondly, it provides, yet again, the rationale for revisiting the interwar debate on peaceful change. Thirdly, it deals with some hermeneutical issues concerning text interpretation, focusing on the issue of objectivity and the nature of lessons of history or historical insights. Finally, I shall discuss how the insights drawn from the interwar debate can be applied in power transition analysis.

How can power transition be studied?

Methodological pluralism

A number of ES theorists adopt a methodological approach known as *methodological pluralism*. The approach originates in Martin Wight's three traditions of international theory. According to Wight, the discourse of international relations has developed as a series of continuous conversations amongst three distinct traditions of thought about world politics. *Realists* view sovereign states as engaging in power struggle in a state of anarchy. *Rationalists* put weight on their sociality and see international relations as more

of a social intercourse and less of a power struggle. *Revolutionists* view individual human beings as the principal moral agents in world politics, and seek to bring into existence a global moral community based upon the solidarity of humanity.¹ This tripartite classificatory scheme was meant to be reflective of the multifaceted nature of world politics, providing IR theorists with different perspectives from which to look at the complex realities of world politics. However, methodological issues were of minor interest to Wight, and he himself did not reflect on the potential of the scheme for the development of a distinctive IR methodology.

It was Andrew Linklater who took the initial steps in exploring its potential. In his 1990 book *Beyond Realism and Marxism: Critical Theory and International Relations*, he proposed associating each of Wight's three traditions with a different methodological approach in sociology: positivism, hermeneutics and critical theory.² Firstly, he points out that there is an affinity between realism and positivist methodology. Positivism in the social sciences seeks to conduct natural-scientific research on social phenomena aimed at explaining recurrent patterns of social behaviour on the basis of the principles, methods and ways of reasoning developed in natural science. According to Linklater, realists in IR scholarship, especially those known as structural or neo-realists, are chiefly concerned to employ such positivist approaches in their study of the international system.³ Secondly, rationalism is based upon hermeneutical methodology since it recognises the importance of diplomatic language and culture in understanding international relations. Rationalists take particular note of human agency and intentionality and are sceptical about the idea that human behaviour can be understood by simply applying the principles and methods

¹ He presented this scheme in a lecture delivered in 1960. See Martin Wight, 'An Anatomy of International Thought', *Review of International Studies*, 13/3, 1987, pp. 221–227. His categorisation has become widely known especially after the publication of one of his posthumous books. See Martin Wight, *International Theory: The Three Traditions*, London: Leicester University Press for the Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1991.

² Andrew Linklater, *Beyond Realism and Marxism: Critical Theory and International Relations*, Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1990.

³ *Ibid.*, pp. 3–4, 9, 10–15.

developed in natural science.⁴ Thirdly, revolutionism has a strong affinity for critical theory since they both are concerned with, and united in their belief in, human progress and emancipation. Revolutionists maintain that human beings are capable not only of explaining and understanding social phenomena, but also of changing them for the better. Therefore, revolutionists are chiefly concerned to challenge the existing arrangements in the international system rather than to explain and understand them. In other words, revolutionism is based on a conception of political *theory* that stresses its inseparability from political *practice*.⁵

According to Linklater, these three approaches ‘form a sequence of progressively more adequate approaches to world politics’.⁶ As he remarks:

One of the main developments of this line of argument suggests that positivism, hermeneutics and critical sociology form a dialectical sequence of approaches to society. ... Critical theory surpasses both perspectives because its inquiry is oriented towards the realisation of truth and freedom.⁷

As is clear from this citation, he treats revolutionism and its critical methodology as a superior mode of theorising world politics, proffering a dialectical or progressive conception of IR methodology.

Richard Little takes issue with such an interpretation of ES theory, arguing instead for the adoption of *methodological pluralism* as the methodological basis of it. Little draws attention to the fact that ES theorists have traditionally explored the multifaceted nature of world politics via focus on international system, international society and world society and how they interplay in world politics.⁸ For example, he shows how Hedley

⁴ Ibid., pp. 3–4, 9, 15–21.

⁵ Ibid., pp. 3–4, 9, 21–32.

⁶ Ibid., p. 10.

⁷ Ibid., p. 9.

⁸ See Richard Little, ‘Neorealism and the English School: A Methodological, Ontological and Theoretical Reassessment’, *European Journal of International Relations*, 1/1, 1995,

Bull had warned against focusing on only one of these ontological elements to the exclusion of the other two in the study of world politics.⁹ He goes on to argue that the study of each of these ontological elements is closely associated with a specific methodological approach, pointing out that international system, international society and world society have been typically studied on the basis of positivist, interpretivist and critical methodology respectively.¹⁰

It is well to note that Little's argument accords with Linklater's argument on this point. The main point of difference lies in the former's rejection of prioritising critical methodology over the other methodologies. Instead, he strongly argues for the adoption of methodological pluralism which regards each of the three methodologies as equally contributing to the advancement in knowledge about world politics. Moreover, Little argues that methodological pluralism has potential for overcoming 'the fragmented nature of the contemporary discipline',¹¹ providing IR theorists with 'ways of linking apparently disparate bodies of knowledge and understanding'.¹² Indeed, one of the strengths of ES theory is its simultaneous focus on the three ontological aspects (international system, international society and world society), and therefore it is essential that those using ES theory take account of all of the three associated methodologies when studying world politics.

pp. 9–34; Richard Little, 'The English School's Contribution to the Study of International Relations', *European Journal of International Relations*, 6/3, 2000, pp. 395–422.

⁹ Little, 'Neorealism and the English School', p. 15; Little, 'English School's Contribution', p. 402. See also Hedley Bull, *The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics*, 4th edn, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012, pp. 23–26, 39, 49–50.

¹⁰ Little, 'English School's Contribution', pp. 404–414.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 415.

¹² *Ibid.*, p. 397. Little demonstrates this point by showing how the balance of power can be studied and understood from different methodological points of view. See *ibid.*, pp. 404–411.

Systemic and societal approaches to studying power transition

Methodological pluralism in the sense discussed in ES theory is instructive for the present study inasmuch as it allows us to consider how power transition can be studied from different methodological perspectives. I shall first discuss how power transition can be investigated from the positivist and interpretivist perspectives, and then discuss the relationship between power transition and the critical perspective.

As we have already seen, positivism in the social sciences aims at constructing a theory that can explain patterns of human behaviour in society. Carl G. Hempel's idea of scientific historiography epitomises such a methodological perspective. With a view to achieving 'the methodological unity of empirical science', he attempted to open up a new line of scientific historical inquiries based on his idea of the covering-law model.¹³ He claimed that a scientific explanation had to be comprised of two kinds of statements: (1) statements identifying 'the *determining conditions* for the event to be explained'; and (2) statements concerning 'the general laws on which the explanation is based'.¹⁴ In other words, he contended that, in order for an explanation to be scientific, it had to include one or more statements about general patterns or regularities. He also asserted that this idea should be applied to scientific *prediction*, arguing that predictions should be inferred from these two kinds of statements.¹⁵ On the basis of this idea, he claimed that the same principle should be applied to the study of history. As he remarked:

In history as anywhere else in empirical science, the explanation of a phenomenon consists in subsuming it under general empirical laws; and the criterion of its soundness is ... exclusively whether it rests on empirically well confirmed assumptions concerning initial conditions and general laws.¹⁶

¹³ See Carl G. Hempel, 'The Function of General Laws in History', *The Journal of Philosophy*, 39/2, 1942, pp. 35–48. The quotation is from *ibid.*, p. 48.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 36.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 38–39.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 45.

Hempel's idea of scientific historiography is of assistance in considering how positivists in IR scholarship would go about studying power transition. They would gather empirical data on diachronic changes in the distribution of material power in the international system and then see if there exist any historical correlations between power shifts and the occurrence of wars. Using such data, they would then set out to construct a theory that would not only help spot correlations, but also help explain the causality behind them. They would then use the theory to *scientifically* predict the behaviour of rising powers in the future. They might, for example, predict that a war between countries A and B is likely in the near future since there exist such and such conditions at present. At the risk of oversimplification, this is, in fact, what much of the existing literature on power transition has done up until today, as represented by Gilpin's HST, Organski's PTT and most of the works inspired by these classical theories of power transition.

From the rationalist perspective, the analyses of this kind are far from satisfactory since they take insufficient account of the role of human agency and intentionality. Rationalists consider that the important factors to be looked at in power transition studies are quite unlike the objects studied in natural science. What rationalists are chiefly concerned with are *social facts* underpinned by human agency and intentionality. More specifically, rationalists focus upon what the philosopher John R. Searle calls *institutional facts*. According to Searle, institutional facts are created when people in society collectively attribute to something, whether it be a physical entity or a pattern of behaviour, a status, meaning or function that are not inherent in its physical nature, and a social fact exists as long as people make decisions and act on the basis of it, whether consciously or not.¹⁷ On this view, the study of society should be focused on understanding the meanings of institutions for actors and on clarifying the socially created semiotic contexts behind those meanings.

In the eyes of rationalists, most of the building blocks of a plausible analysis of

¹⁷ See John R. Searle, *The Construction of Social Reality*, London: Penguin, 1996.

power transition seem to be institutional facts in Searle's sense of the word. At the most fundamental level, sovereign states and their role in the international system exist by virtue of a series of intertwined institutional facts based upon human agency and intentionality. Moreover, wars, the occurrence of which positivists treat as dependent variables in their study of power transition, can hardly be viewed as physical phenomena occurring *naturally*. As Bull argues, war needs be considered as a purposive institutional activity with certain social functions.¹⁸ From this point of view, any attempt at theorising power transition that downplays the institutional aspects of power transition are bound to fail because of its inability to capture the whole picture of power transition. If these points are accepted, then it becomes essential for scholars to make use of such resources and materials as will enable identification of institutions governing power transition and interpretation of their meanings for actors. These include materials such as legal documents, treaties, declarations and political statements.

Having said that, it is well to note that stressing the importance of the rationalist methodology cannot be a legitimate reason for denying the significance of recursive patterns of state behaviour for power transition analysis. Alan James repudiates the distinction between international system and international society on the ground that it is inconceivable that the interaction between states could possibly occur without there being any societal connections among them.¹⁹ However, abandoning the system/society distinction would run counter to methodological pluralism underpinning ES theory.²⁰ From the point of view of methodological pluralism, the positivist and interpretivist perspectives are both important in shedding light on the multifaceted realities of world

¹⁸ Hedley Bull, 'War and International Order', in Alan James (ed.), *The Bases of International Order: Essays in Honour of C.A.W. Manning*, London: Oxford University Press, 1973, p. 120–121.

¹⁹ See Alan James, 'System or Society?', *Review of International Studies*, 19/3, 1993, pp. 269–288.

²⁰ See Richard Little, 'History, Theory and Methodological Pluralism in the English School', in Cornelia Navari (ed.), *Theorising International Society: English School Methods*, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009, pp. 78–103.

politics, and therefore both of them should be taken into account if the whole picture of world political scenery is to be captured.

Critical theory and the normativity of power transition studies

For all the differences that set rationalism apart from positivism, they are similar in that they both aim to explain and understand the realities of world politics. Revolutionism, by contrast, seeks to challenge and change those realities in order to bring into being a just and equitable society wherein individuals are emancipated from oppression. For this purpose, it emphasises the normativity of IR theory. In ES theory, revolutionism has often been discussed in connection with the concept of *world society* which is founded upon the common interests and values uniting humanity.²¹

On the face of it, power transition studies might seem to be incompatible with revolutionism for two reasons. Firstly, because of its state-centrism, the literature on power transition tends to neglect the existence of non-state actors including individual human beings whom revolutionists regard as the fundamental moral agents in world politics. Secondly, the occurrence and recurrence of wars associated with power transition might appear to deny the possibility of creating an ideal world society based on the common interests and values uniting humanity.

In spite of this, however, power transition ought to be of great concern to revolutionists. There is no denying that wars significantly affect human beings' lives by imposing ruinous ravages and suffering on them. Given this fact, there are good reasons for revolutionists to take a keen interest in power transition as a normative issue facing world society and to try to change the reality of the world by critically engaging with the problem of power transition.

At this point, it is well to consider the analytical/normative divide that exists between positivism and rationalism, on the one hand, and revolutionism, on the other. As

²¹ See Little, 'English School's Contribution', pp. 411–414.

discussed above, positivism and rationalism are interested in explaining and understanding how states interact in their relations with one another. Buzan, for example, argues that his main concern is to present a reformulation of ES theory on the basis of the claim that ‘the structural and normative strands within it’ can be distinguished from each other.²² To use his words, he is concerned not so much with ‘normative theory’ as with ‘theory about norms’.²³

However, as John Williams rightly points out, this position is untenable because Buzan’s structural interpretation of ES theory cannot escape its own normativity as long as it concerns itself with questions concerning values in international and world societies.²⁴ As Buzan himself postulates, social structures are changeable and the interests and values underpinning them are historically contingent, although some structures often discussed in connection with the law of nature tend to be more stable and durable. If this be the case, the separation between the analytical and the normative has to be seen as highly questionable, and therefore efforts to explain and understand world politics should be considered as inseparable from efforts to challenge and change it. When things can be changed, the attitude of detachment is not neutral; it is a sign of unwarranted conservatism. Thus, we are well-advised to keep in mind the normativity of IR scholarship, including power transition studies.

To sum up, methodological pluralism offers a distinctive way of looking at power transition from three different methodological viewpoints, enabling us to understand its multi-dimensional features. Although I will make extensive use of Buzan’s social structural reformulation of ES theory in the present study for examining the relationship

²² Barry Buzan, *From International to World Society?: English School Theory and the Social Structure of Globalisation*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004, pp. 14–15.

²³ *Ibid.*, p.14.

²⁴ See John Williams, ‘Structure, Norms and Normative Theory in a Re-defined English School: Accepting Buzan’s Challenge’, *Review of International Studies*, 37/3, 2011, pp. 1235–1253.

between international social structure and power transition, all of the three methodological perspectives should be kept in mind, and we must avoid prioritising one methodology at the expense of the others.

Interpreting the past: hermeneutics and the lessons of history

This section seeks to provide the rationale for revisiting the interwar debate on peaceful change and to discuss how it should be interpreted. In addition, it discusses the nature of historical lessons and considers how the lessons and insights gained from the interwar debate can be applied in power transition analysis.

Why revisit the interwar debate?

Despite the discussion in the previous chapter, some readers might still wonder why it is necessary to revisit the debate and whether it is relevant to the present study. Therefore, it is well at this point to consider these issues in greater detail so that there shall be no doubt as to the significance of the debate for the present study.

As discussed in the previous chapter, the debate offers theoretical insights into the relationship between power transition—or, to be more accurate, international political change in the context of power transition—and international social structure. Indeed, it is the most rigorous and systematic attempt so far in IR scholarship to explore the role of international social structure in accommodating rising powers' demands for international political change, and thus it provides a strong defence of the socio-structural conception of power transition which this study seeks to establish. Moreover, the focus on the *debate* is useful for the present purpose since it highlights the existence of different normative perspectives on power transition. Therefore, by revisiting the debate, it is possible to retrieve both analytical and normative insights on the basis of which to rework ES theory and to develop a framework for power transition analysis that accords with the ES's methodological pluralism.

To be clear, this is not to suggest that the debate provides an intellectually neutral perspective. In fact, as discussed in the previous chapter, the debate took place in an intellectual context where the separation between the study of IR and that of international law had not been fully established. However, this should not be seen as a disadvantage. On the contrary, as we have seen earlier, there have been sustained efforts to bridge the gap between the two disciplines, and on this account alone the debate is worth revisiting.²⁵

Furthermore, the debate is worth revisiting since it reveals the basic character of contemporary international society, thereby providing an appropriate starting point from which to examine the features of contemporary international social structure governing international political change, including in the context of power transition. As Bull points out, the twentieth century witnessed the emergence of solidarism, as opposed to pluralism, or what he calls ‘neo-Grotian ideas’.²⁶ The rise of the neo-Grotianism was a real game changer, with a lasting influence on contemporary international society. In the aftermath of the catastrophe caused by the First World War, the exponents of this doctrine envisioned a series of designs for improving the international conditions with a view to creating a lasting peace, as will be discussed in detail in the next chapter. Their efforts have been embodied in such international treaties as the General Treaty for Renunciation of War as an Instrument of National Policy (which is widely known as the Pact of Paris) and such international organisations as the League of Nations, and some of these embodiments continue to inform and constitute part of contemporary international social structure including the UN system. In other words, some of the most basic features of the contemporary international social structure have their historical origins in the solidarist or neo-Grotian efforts to reform the social structure of the interwar international system.

²⁵ See, for example, Anne-Marie Slaughter, Andrew S. Tulumello and Stepan Wood, ‘International Law and International Relations Theory: A New Generation of Interdisciplinary Scholarship’, *The American Journal of International Law*, 92/3, 1998, pp. 367–397.

²⁶ Bull, *Anarchical Society*, pp. 230–232.

As will be shown in chapters 3 and 4, the interwar debate on peaceful change was inseparably linked to the development of the neo-Grotianism during the interwar period, and therefore revisiting the debate will help deepen the understanding of the character of contemporary international social structure governing international political change, including changes in the international status quo in the context of power transition.

It is true that the League of Nations and the UN are the products of the First and Second World Wars respectively, and, as a consequence, these international organisations have different features that are reflective of the differences between the two world wars. However, the continuity between them cannot be denied. While they have different historical origins, these secondary institutions share common purposes and principles, and are designed to play a role in maintaining international peace and security through the promotion and entrenchment of non-use of force, collective security and, as will be discussed later in the present study, peaceful change. As Leland M. Goodrich, one of the founders of the UN, had revealed in his comparative study of the League and the UN, the differences between the two organisations are often exaggerated.²⁷ As he remarked:

... the point upon which attention needs to be focused for the serious student of international affairs is that the United Nations does not represent a break with the past, but rather the continued application of old ideas and methods with some changes deemed necessary in the light of past experience.²⁸

Surely when the founders of the UN were designing its organisational structures, powers and functions, they had both the First and Second World Wars in mind. This is not to downplay the important differences between the two organisations, but the present study seeks to show that there exist important points of continuity in terms of their role in promoting and entrenching the practice of peaceful change in international society.

²⁷ Leland M. Goodrich, 'From League of Nations to United Nations', *International Organization*, 1/1, 1947, pp. 3–21.

²⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 5.

It is for these reasons that this study turns to the interwar debate on peaceful change. However, this must be done with great caution since there exist some interpretational problems and pitfalls which must be avoided if we are to gain plausible lessons and insights of history. It is to this subject that I shall now move on to.

The objectivity of text interpretation

Although ES theorists often refer to history when trying to understand the development and current status of international societies, William Bain argues that they have done so on too shaky methodological foundations.²⁹ Bain levels his criticism to the ways some founding fathers of ES theory treat history in their works. First, he scrutinises Bull's conception of history, criticising its ambiguity resulting from the tension between the realist and constructivist conceptions of history in his argument.³⁰ Bain then turns his attention to Herbert Butterfield's conception of history, arguing that, while Butterfield rejects the idea that history offers practical lessons, he fails to free himself completely from the very idea he is trying to reject.³¹ In search for a remedy for these historiographical ambiguities, Bain turns to Michael Oakeshott's conception of history as a 'fable'.³²

However, Oakeshott's conception of history as a fable is by no means more straightforward than Bull and Butterfield's conceptions of history. On the one hand, as the term 'fable' implies, Oakeshott takes a constructivist position, arguing that 'we can never look at the past except through the spectacles of the present'.³³ In his view, history is something that the historian *constructs*; the historian's 'business is to read the past

²⁹ William Bain, 'The English School and the Activity of Being a Historian', in Cornelia Navari (ed.), *Theorising International Society: English School Methods*, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009, pp. 148–166.

³⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 149–152.

³¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 152–154.

³² *Ibid.*, pp. 154–159.

³³ Michael Oakeshott, 'History is a Fable', in Michael Oakeshott, *What is History? and Other Essays*, Exeter: Imprint Academic, 2004, p. 37.

through the eyes of the present as accurately as possible'.³⁴ However, despite the fact that he used the term 'fable', he denies that history provides practical lessons as to how we should conduct ourselves in contemporary situations. As he remarks:

The world of history has no data to offer of which practical experience can make use; and to conceive it as offering such data is to misconceive its character.³⁵

As these examples show, there are a number of issues concerning the understanding of history and the interpretation of historical texts, and therefore it is well-advised to attend to them before we go about studying the interwar debate on peaceful change. For this purpose, I shall here address some hermeneutical issues concerning human knowledge and text interpretation.

Etymologically, the origin of the word 'hermeneutics' can be traced back to the Greek word *hermeneuein* which, roughly translated, means 'to interpret'.³⁶ According to Richard Palmer, '[h]ermeneutics is the study of understanding, especially the task of understanding texts'.³⁷ Friedrich Schleiermacher is widely credited with theorising hermeneutics as the general 'art of understanding'.³⁸ He held that understanding is achieved when the interpreter succeeds in reconstructing the creative psychological processes which led to the production of an object being interpreted such as a historical text.³⁹ He argued that literal or grammatical interpretation is not sufficient for understanding texts, for they are not completely reflective of the author's intentions and

³⁴ Ibid., p. 42.

³⁵ Michael Oakeshott, *Experience and its Modes*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1933, p. 158.

³⁶ Stanley E. Porter and Jason C. Robinson (eds), *Hermeneutics: An Introduction to Interpretive Theory*, Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2011, p. 2; Richard E. Palmer, *Hermeneutics: Interpretation Theory in Schleiermacher, Dilthey, Heidegger, and Gadamer*, Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1969, p. 12.

³⁷ Ibid., p. 8.

³⁸ Ibid., p. 84.

³⁹ Ibid., p. 86.

psychological processes. In other word, there always exist gaps between what the author intends to express by writing a text and the literal meaning of the text. In order to understand a given text, the interpreter should be able to reconstruct the inner processes of the author's mind.⁴⁰ For this purpose, Schleiermacher proposed a distinctive way of interpretation that became one of the central concepts in hermeneutics, i.e. the hermeneutical circle. The meaning of the parts constituting the whole can be determined only with reference to the meaning of the whole. However, the meaning of the whole can be understood only by interpreting what the parts constituting the whole mean.⁴¹ On the basis of the hermeneutical circle, Schleiermacher maintains that a text should be viewed in context rather than in a state of alienation from its social, cultural and historical surroundings. To quote Stanley Porter and Jason Robinson, 'he accepts that no matter how unique a person's writing (or spoken expression) might be, it will always reflect a wider cultural spirit (*Geist*) that may be discerned by the interpreter.'⁴²

Hermeneutics developed into an independent discipline thanks to Wilhelm Dilthey's path-breaking attempt to establish the foundational basis for *Geisteswissenschaften*, which means the human sciences or humanities. According to Palmer, Dilthey's goal was 'to develop methods of gaining "objectively valid" interpretations of "expressions of inner life"'.⁴³ As Dilthey pursued the objective validity of interpretation, he became less concerned with the reconstruction of psychological or internal processes and more concerned with interpreting and understanding external "'objectification[s]" of the mind' or 'expressions of lived experience' produced within, and reflective of, its social, cultural and historical environments and conditions.⁴⁴ Schleiermacher's idea of the hermeneutical circle was picked up on by Dilthey in this

⁴⁰ Ibid., pp. 92–93.

⁴¹ Ibid., pp. 87–88.

⁴² Porter and Robinson, *Hermeneutics*, p. 32.

⁴³ Palmer, *Hermeneutics*, p. 98.

⁴⁴ Ibid., pp. 112–114. See also William Outhwaite, *Understanding Social Life: The Method Called Verstehen*, Lewes: Jean Stroud, 1986, p. 26.

context, and provided a methodological principle for the contextual understanding of the objectifications of human life.⁴⁵ However, Dilthey's argument is plagued with inconsistency, for there is an apparent discrepancy between his pursuit of 'objectively valid knowledge' and his idea of the 'historicality' of human beings, including the interpreter.⁴⁶ Faced with this dilemma, he claimed that the way out of this dilemma was to heighten a sense of our own historicality and to overcome our own prejudices that hinder objective interpretation.⁴⁷

The same dilemma and solution can be detected in E.H. Carr's historiography. In his well-read book *What is History*, he argued that if we are to understand a history book, it is essential that we understand who the author is and her/his socio-historical backdrops.⁴⁸ At the same time, he insisted on the importance of being aware of our own historicality. As he remarked:

But I shall venture to believe that the historian who is most conscious of his own situation is also more capable of transcending it, and more capable of appreciating the essential nature of the differences between his own society and outlook and those of other periods and other countries ... Man's capacity to rise above his social and historical situation seems to be conditioned by the sensitivity with which he recognizes the extent of his involvement in it.⁴⁹

The objectivity of historical understanding is one of the most controversial issues in historiography, and this issue has long been debated between realists and constructivists in historiography. However, it is not always easy to put historians into one of these groups. For example, it is particularly difficult to determine whether R.G. Collingwood was a

⁴⁵ Palmer, *Hermeneutics*, pp. 118–121.

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 121–123.

⁴⁷ Porter and Robinson, *Hermeneutics*, p. 44.

⁴⁸ E.H. Carr, *What is History?: The George Macaulay Trevelyan Lectures Delivered in the University of Cambridge, January–March 1961*, 2nd edn, London: Penguin, 1987, p. 44.

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*

realist or a constructivist in his understanding of history.⁵⁰ Collingwood famously stated that '[a]ll history is the history of thought',⁵¹ and, in his autobiography, he went so far as to write that 'there is nothing else except thought that can be the object of historical knowledge'.⁵² As with Schleiermacher, he thought that the task of history should be focused upon the reconstruction of the psychological processes that occurred in the minds of historical figures. To quote his words, '[t]he history of thought, and therefore all history, is the re-enactment of past thought in the historian's own mind.'⁵³

Another distinguishing feature of Collingwood's historiography, which is of great importance for successfully re-enacting past thoughts, is the logic of question and answer. To quote his own words at length:

I began by observing that you cannot find out what a man means by simply studying his spoken or written statements, even though he has spoken or written with perfect command of language and perfectly truthful intention. In order to find out his meaning you must also know what the question was (a question in his own mind, and presumed by him to be in yours) to which the thing he has said or written was meant as an answer.⁵⁴

To put simply, if we are to understand a person's thought we need to understand the question, imagined or real, which she/he is trying to answer. As Kenneth McIntyre points out, these arguments accord with historiographical realism since they assume 'the existence of an external, persistent, and objective past'.⁵⁵

At the same time, however, Collingwood is often credited with offering a severe

⁵⁰ See Kenneth B. McIntyre, 'Historicity as Methodology or Hermeneutics: Collingwood's Influence on Skinner and Gadamer', *Journal of the Philosophy of History*, 2/2, 2008, pp. 138–166.

⁵¹ R.G. Collingwood, *The Idea of History*, revised edition, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993, p. 215.

⁵² R.G. Collingwood, *An Autobiography*, London: Oxford University Press, 1939, p. 110.

⁵³ Collingwood, *Idea of History*, p. 215.

⁵⁴ Collingwood, *Autobiography*, p. 31.

⁵⁵ McIntyre, 'Historicity', p. 144.

criticism of realism, paving the way for constructivism in historiography.⁵⁶ Collingwood held that the meaning of historical evidence or facts is determined only when they are examined by the historian who attends to them with a specific question in mind.⁵⁷ Indeed, he wrote in *Speculum Mentis* that:

... just as we remember not what happened but what we want to remember, as we perceive not what is 'there' but what we attend to, so we reconstruct history not as it was but as we choose to think it was.⁵⁸

The debates surrounding the objectivity of interpretation and historical understanding show no sign of conclusion, and the problem of objectivity in history deserves far more detailed treatment and discussion than can possibly be undertaken in this chapter. However, the difficulty of achieving the objectivity of interpretation does not absolve us from the scholarly responsibility to produce as accurate an analysis and interpretation as possible. Even if it be true that the objective understanding of history is impossible, this should not encourage us to indulge in writing a fake history. As we have already seen above, even Oakeshott, who regarded history as a *fable* created by the historian, remarked that the historian's 'business is to read the past through the eyes of the present *as accurately as possible*'.⁵⁹ Since we do not have direct access to the author's mind and the ideas in it, it is necessary to take the social, intellectual and cultural contexts into account as we go about interpreting historical texts so as to understand the authors' intentions behind those texts and the question or questions she/he was addressing as best we can.

⁵⁶ See, for example, Margit Hurup Nielsen, 'Re-Enactment and Reconstruction in Collingwood's Philosophy of History', *History and Theory*, 20/1, 1981, pp. 1–31.

⁵⁷ See David Boucher, 'The Significance of R. G. Collingwood's "Principles of History"', *Journal of the History of Ideas*, 58/2, 1997, pp. 314–317.

⁵⁸ R.G. Collingwood, *Speculum Mentis, or, The Map of Knowledge*, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1924, p. 237.

⁵⁹ Oakeshott, 'History is a Fable', p. 42, emphasis added.

Contextualisation is vitally important for understanding the interwar debate on peaceful change, for the common understanding of the debate has been strongly informed by the First-Great-Debate narrative which simplistically represents the interwar IR scholarship as debates between realists and idealists.⁶⁰ This simplistic narrative is a product of insufficient contextualisation, and has made it difficult for today's students of IR to understand what it really was that was at stake in the interwar IR scholarship. Aware of the methodological importance of contextualisation, the next two chapters will place and study the interwar debate on peaceful change in its historical context.

In this connection it is well to note that what has been discussed above holds true for the understanding of state behaviour inasmuch as, from the interpretivist methodological perspective discussed above, the social actions of states can be seen as *texts* to be interpreted. When understanding states' actions and the intentions behind them, it is necessary to take their social and historical contexts into account. With this in mind, the analytical framework set out in chapter 6 will be framed in such a way as to enable the analyst to explain the behaviour of rising powers in connection with socially and historically constructed international social structure in a given international society.

The nature of lessons of history

Of greater importance is whether knowledge of the past provides any lessons or insights that are useful for understanding the present and the future. If it does, what are their use and limitations? It is necessary to address this issue since it is sometimes argued that history does not tell us what to do in a given situation, as in Oakeshott's historiography as we have seen above.⁶¹ Furthermore, as Ernest May demonstrates, history has often

⁶⁰ On the First Great Debate in IR, see Brian C. Schmidt (ed.), *International Relations and the First Great Debate*, London: Routledge, 2012.

⁶¹ See also Michael Oakeshott, 'On Arriving at a University', in Michael Oakeshott, *What is History? and Other Essays*, Exeter: Imprint Academic, 2004, p. 339.

been *misused* by decision-makers, resulting in miscalculations and errors in judgement.⁶²

In light of this, it is advisable to discuss the nature of lessons of history at this point.

At least, there are a couple of objections to the idea of drawing lessons from history. First, it is sometimes claimed that, since it is virtually impossible to arrive at a completely objective or neutral understanding of historical events, lessons of history cannot be but arbitrary. However, this argument is untenable because, even if there were some real difficulties in arriving at an objective interpretation of historical events, this would by no means justify the claim that any interpretation is equally plausible. Second, it is often argued that, since historical events are all unique and history does not repeat itself, history cannot offer any reliable guides as to what we should do in a given situation.⁶³ Besides, the above discussion about the methodological importance of contextualisation might, on the face of it, seem to contradict the claim that it is possible to draw lessons and insights from the past that are relevant to the present situation. Even if we concede these points, however, it should still be asked whether there are any other kinds of lessons to be learned from history.

As I see it, the uniqueness of historical events does not necessarily negate the practical relevance of history. The claim that history is of little practical value is based on a narrow conception of *practicality*. If the concept is broadly understood to mean the quality of being related to real situations and conditions of the world, it can well be argued that history is *practically* relevant in some respects.

Collingwood provides valuable insights into the relationship between history and ‘practical life’.⁶⁴ As with Oakeshott, he argues that ‘history never exactly repeats

⁶² Ernest R. May, *“Lessons” of the Past: The Use and Misuse of History in American Foreign Policy*, New York: Oxford University Press, 1973.

⁶³ This is one of the reasons behind Oakeshott’s denial of the practicality of the lessons of history. See Michael Oakeshott, *On History and Other Essays*, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1983, pp. 37–38.

⁶⁴ Collingwood, *Autobiography*, p. 106.

itself'.⁶⁵ Nevertheless, he maintains that history can provide insight that helps in 'diagnosing our moral and political problems'.⁶⁶ As he remarks:

The historian's business is to reveal the less obvious features hidden from a careless eye in the present situation. What history can bring to moral and political life is a trained eye for the situation in which one has to act.⁶⁷

While history does not tell us what exactly we should do in a given situation, it does help us understand the situation by raising our *awareness* of issues to which we have been oblivious, and, for this reason, history is of practical value. And Collingwood's argument is perfectly compatible with the contextualisation approach adopted in the present study since placing and studying a historical debate in context can sometimes raise our awareness of 'the less obvious features hidden from a careless eye in the present situation'.⁶⁸

Moreover, history is of practical relevance since it brings change to our views of the real world by challenging our assumptions and prejudices about it. This point is most robustly enunciated by Hans-Georg Gadamer who argues that understanding is achieved through *fusion of horizons*.⁶⁹ He defines a 'horizon' as 'the range of vision that includes everything that can be seen from a particular vantage point'.⁷⁰ Understanding occurs when the horizon of the interpreter encounters and fuses with that of the text being interpreted. Fusion of horizons is a self-transformative process or experience in which the prejudices and prepossessions held by the interpreter are exposed, questioned and

⁶⁵ Ibid., p. 100.

⁶⁶ Ibid., p. 101.

⁶⁷ Ibid., p. 100.

⁶⁸ Ibid.

⁶⁹ Hans-Georg Gadamer, *Truth and Method*, London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2013. His argument in this book was greatly influenced by Collingwood. On this point, see McIntyre, 'Historicity'.

⁷⁰ Gadamer, *Truth and Method*, p. 313.

challenged.⁷¹ Consequently, the interpreter's horizon is transformed and expanded, enabling her/him to view things from an expanded perspective. As Palmer explains:

So the encounter with the horizon of the transmitted text in reality lights up one's own horizon and leads to self-disclosure and self-understanding; the encounter becomes a moment of ontological disclosure. It is an event in which something emerges from negativity—the negativity of realizing that there is something one did not know, that things were not as one had assumed.⁷²

Fusion of horizons not only changes how we see things, but also brings change to our conceptions of ourselves, thereby affecting our attitudes towards practical life.

Fusion of horizons also occurs when interpreting historical texts, and it is also for this reason that history, and the study of it, is of practical relevance. History does not tell us what exactly is going to happen in the future. Nor does it tell us what to do in a given situation. Yet history is of practical relevance since it expands our way of seeing and doing things. As discussed earlier, the interwar debate on peaceful change provides important insights into hitherto unrevealed aspects of power transition by highlighting the relationship between power transition and international social structure, and those insights will have the effect of challenging and reforming the way we look at, theorise and respond to the problem of power transition.

Conclusion

The discussions in this chapter can be summarised as follows. Drawing on the ES's discussions about methodological pluralism, the chapter first discussed how power transition can be studied from the positivist, interpretivist and critical perspectives, and argued for the adoption of methodological pluralism as the basis of the present study so

⁷¹ See, for example, *ibid.*, p. 317.

⁷² Palmer, *Hermeneutics*, p. 201.

as to be able to address both analytical and normative aspects of power transition. Secondly, it set out the rationale for revisiting the interwar debate on peaceful change, arguing that: (1) it offers insights into the relationship between power transition and international social structure; and (2) it provides the key to understanding the basic features of contemporary social structure governing international political change. Thirdly, it was argued that, while interpretation and understanding are constantly affected by one's own historicity, it is possible to arrive at a more objective interpretation of historical texts by taking into account their social, intellectual and cultural contexts as well as the intentions of authors. It was also suggested that the same principle of interpretation applies to the understanding of state behaviour. Finally, it was pointed out that, although history does not tell us what to do in a given situation, it is of practical relevance inasmuch as it not only provides insights that help us better understand the present situation, but also challenges and reforms our views about and attitudes towards the real world by revealing its hitherto hidden aspects.

Chapter 3

The Problem of Peaceful Change

Introduction

This chapter traces the historical emergence of the problem of peaceful change and explores its nature. The goal of the chapter is threefold. Firstly, it aims at providing an outline of the historical background to the interwar debate on peaceful change. As discussed in chapter 2, contextualisation should be the first step in understanding the meaning and significance of historical events and texts; knowledge about context allows us to identify the question or questions which people were trying to answer. This task is particularly important when exploring interwar IR scholarship, the interpretation of which has been largely guided and informed by the idea of the First Great Debate and the simplistic realist/idealist dichotomy.¹ Whatever merit there is in it, this interpretation does not offer a solid background knowledge required for the historical understanding of the debate on peaceful change. In order to gain such knowledge, it is necessary to look back afresh upon the history of interwar international relations without being dictated to by the narrative of the First Great Debate.

Secondly, by looking at how war came to be regulated and outlawed via changes and developments in international norms and law during the interwar period, this chapter seeks to explore the relationship between war and international social structure. Highlighting how the role and status of war in interwar international society were

¹ On the First Great Debate in IR scholarship, see Brian C. Schmidt (ed.), *International Relations and the First Great Debate*, London: Routledge, 2012.

inextricably intertwined with the development of international law and the League of Nations, the findings of this chapter provide a strong support for the socio-structural conception of power transition and international political change.

Thirdly, this chapter also provides the background knowledge necessary to understand the development of contemporary international society after the Second World War. The UN of today is based on reflection of the lessons and failures of the League of Nations. It is therefore not surprising that these secondary institutions differ from one another in many significant ways. At the same time, however, it cannot be denied that there are numerous similarities between these secondary institutions as well. Despite outward differences, there exists a common thread running through them: the promotion of the symbiotic relationship between collective security and peaceful change as a key to international peace and security. It was during the interwar period that systematic efforts began to be made to promote the principle of non-use of force at the international level, and, as will be shown below, it was commonly believed that this required the entrenchment of both collective security and peaceful change in state practice, and the League was expected to play a central role in firmly establishing these practices as primary institutions of international society. The experiences of the League, both successes and failures, informed the institutional design of the UN and its Security Council, and, as will be discussed in chapter 5, this has had significant impacts on the character of contemporary international social structure governing power transition and international political change. These points have been neglected by much of the existing literature on power transition, which is marked by state-centrism and the materialist-individualist ontology, as pointed out in chapter 1.

The first section provides a historical overview of the development of the international quasi-constitutional structure during the interwar period. This will be done first by looking at the impacts of the First World War on traditional institutions of international society, and then by tracing the emergence of the League system and what I

call the *trinity* of international norms concerning the use of force. The second section gives a detailed look at the origin of Article 19 of the Covenant of the League of Nations, showing both the importance and complexity of the problem of peaceful change. These two sections provide the background knowledge necessary to understand the origins of the problem of peaceful change. The third section then explores some of the features of the problem by looking at how peaceful change relates to power transition, revolution, collective security and appeasement, with a particular focus on its relationship with collective security.

The development of the international quasi-constitutional structure

The Great War, international society and rising tides of solidarity

The First World War had immense and multifaceted impacts on world politics. It was the first all-out war in world history in which states across the world mobilised all kinds of national resources available to continue fighting with each other and to gain a victory. To quote Francis Walters, the author of a magisterial book on the history of the League of Nations, the Great War ‘acted as a powerful stimulus to the political conscience of mankind’.²

From the viewpoint of international society as a whole, one of the most significant repercussions of the war was the delegitimisation of the balance of power, which had been regarded by scholars and practitioners as one of the most basic institutions of classical European international society. The idea that power balances among states should be maintained in such a way as to ensure that no one state held a preponderance of power to overwhelm the other members of international society had been long considered as ‘the unwritten constitution of international society’.³ The First World War revealed the limitations of the balance of power as an institution for the maintenance of international

² F.P. Walters, *A History of the League of Nations*, vol. 1, London: Oxford University Press, 1952, p. 16.

³ Martin Wight, *Power Politics*, Leicester: Leicester University Press, 1978, p. 174.

peace and security.⁴ In his address to the Senate on 22 January 1917, Woodrow Wilson advocated ‘a community of power’ instead of ‘a new balance of power’, and his commitment to a reformed international order was reaffirmed two months later in his second inaugural address in which he declared that ‘peace cannot securely or justly rest upon an armed balance of power’.⁵ In the introduction he contributed to a book published in 1919, Lord Robert Cecil, who also played an important role in the establishment of the League of Nations, expressly rejected the notion that the balance of power would contribute to the preservation of international peace, arguing that ‘[n]o one can seriously believe that any development of the idea of the Balance of Power can give any satisfactory result’.⁶

Underlying much of the criticism against the balance of power was a change in the Clausewitzian conception of war as a means of national policy. Notwithstanding a great deal of attempts to restrain the use of force, as exemplified by the Hague Conferences, the idea that sovereign states were entitled to resort to war was still prevalent before the First World War, and international law had permitted, if not encouraged, states to make recourse to war for the purpose of achieving political goals including the maintenance of the balance of power. The First World War raised fundamental doubts about this traditional conception of war. Firstly, due to the increasing destructiveness of modern warfare, the recourse to war came to be widely considered as too costly a means for achieving any meaningful political objectives.⁷ Secondly, as Michael Howard pointed out, the twentieth century witnessed the undermining of the autonomy of politics by military imperatives and the emergence of directionless, unbridled and uncontrolled

⁴ Alfred Vagts and Detlev F. Vagts, ‘The Balance of Power in International Law: A History of an Idea’, *The American Journal of International Law*, 73/4, 1979, p. 576.

⁵ Albert Bushnell Hart (ed.), *Selected Addresses and Public Papers of Woodrow Wilson*, New York: Boni and Liveright, 1918, pp. 174–175, 186.

⁶ Geoffrey Butler, *A Handbook to the League of Nations*, London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1919, p. vi.

⁷ See, for example, H.G. Wells, *The Idea of a League of Nations*, Boston: The Atlantic Monthly Press, 1919, pp. 8–13.

violence.⁸ For these reasons, it came to be widely held that war should no longer serve as a means of national policy. It is important to note that war was viewed during the interwar period as a *social practice* or, in ES terminology, an *institution* of international society. This is evident, for example, in the following statement made by Lord Cecil at the outset of a commentary on the League of Nations:

DO WE REALLY WANT to get rid of war and *the war system*?⁹

Put shortly, as a result of the First World War, some of the traditional primary institutions of classical European international society lost their credit, and there emerged a need for the reworking of the international order and a set of alternative institutions based on principles conducive to international peace and security.

Towards the end of the First World War, countless proposals were made to establish an international framework within which the use of force could be effectively regulated. Many of them were based on a doctrine which presumed the existence of the social solidarity among sovereign states, which Hedley Bull famously dubbed *solidarism*.¹⁰ Solidarists held that there existed sufficient social solidarity and cohesion among members of international society for 'the enforcement of the law'.¹¹ On this view, the use of force should be permitted only for the purpose of law enforcement and the protection of rights. What solidarists were striving to do was to revive the distinction between just and unjust war. In the seventeenth century, Grotius, to whose ideas Bull ascribed the

⁸ Michael Howard, 'War as an Instrument of Policy', in Herbert Butterfield and Martin Wight (eds), *Diplomatic Investigations: Essays in the Theory of International Politics*, London: Allen and Unwin, 1966, p. 198.

⁹ Viscount Cecil, 'The League as a Road to Peace', in Leonard Woolf (ed.), *The Intelligent Man's War to Prevent War*, London: Victor Gollancz, 1933, p. 256, emphasis added.

¹⁰ Hedley Bull, 'The Grotian Conception of International Society', in Herbert Butterfield and Martin Wight (eds), *Diplomatic Investigations: Essays in the Theory of International Politics*, London: Allen and Unwin, 1966, pp. 51–73.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 52.

solidarist doctrine, argued that wars fought for purposes other than ‘defence, the recovery of property and the infliction of punishment’ were unjust and therefore should not be permitted by international law.¹² One of the principal goals of solidarists was to resuscitate this Grotian *jus-ad-bellum* thinking and to reform the international social structure of the day accordingly.

These were the ideas that underlay efforts to remove such traditional institutions as the balance of power and war in the aftermath of the First World War. As Graham Ross remarked, the international arrangements established after the war were ‘a mixture of old and new’, and they heavily drew upon knowledge and experience derived from the Concert of Europe, the Hague Peace Conferences and other diplomatic practices.¹³ However, there is no denying that the First World War provided a historical turning point for the development of international social structure.

The establishment of the League of Nations

The need to establish an institutional framework for the promotion of peace and security was strongly recognised from the early stages of the war. In 1915, two associations advocating the establishment of such a framework were founded on both sides of the Atlantic. In America, the League to Enforce Peace played a part in the dissemination of the idea of penalty and sanction, on which the League of Nations was based.¹⁴ In Britain, the League of Nations Society was set up, and, three years later, it merged with the League of Free Nations Association—another British group supporting the creation of a League—to establish the League of Nations Union.¹⁵ Similar associations existed in

¹² Ibid., pp. 54–55.

¹³ Graham Ross, *The Great Powers and the Decline of the European States System 1914–1945*, London: Longman, 1983, p. 8.

¹⁴ Alfred Zimmern, *The League of Nations and the Rule of Law, 1918–1935*, London: Macmillan, 1939, pp. 161–164; F.S. Northedge, *The League of Nations: Its Life and Times, 1920–1946*, Leicester: Leicester University Press, 1986, pp. 26–27.

¹⁵ See Henry R. Winkler, ‘The Development of the League of Nations Idea in Great Britain, 1914–1919’, *The Journal of Modern History*, 20/2, 1948, pp. 95–112.

many parts of the world including Germany, France and Italy, and those groups gathered together to form the International Federation of League of Nations Societies in the aftermath of the war, embodying growing internationalism at that moment.¹⁶ The historical fact that these groups of people existed demonstrates that the idea of setting up a League of Nations was receiving widespread support from diverse corners of the world.¹⁷

Significant as these movements were, it was, as Ross rightly points out, statesmen and government officials who had a great influence over the framing of the League of Nations and its Covenant.¹⁸ As is widely known, there were differences between Britain and America in the perception of what the post-war international order should look like. To quote Martin Ceadel, there were ‘two versions of collective security’, which was instrumental in making the Covenant ‘eclectic’.¹⁹ President Wilson emphasised and valued the notions of mutual guarantee and territorial integrity. In his address to the League to Enforce Peace on 27 May 1916, in which he declared his support for the idea of establishing ‘an universal association of the nations’, he expressly defined ‘a virtual guarantee of territorial integrity and political independence’ as one of its primary goals.²⁰ He reaffirmed his commitment to this idea in the Fourteen Points speech delivered to the Congress on 8 January 1918, in which he declared that:

¹⁶ See Thomas R. Davies, ‘Internationalism in a Divided World: The Experience of the International Federation of League of Nations Societies, 1919–1939’, *Peace & Change*, 37/2, 2012, pp. 227–252.

¹⁷ According to Davies, the Federation was comprised of associations in 24 countries at the time of its creation in 1921 (the founding members of the League numbered 42), and, by 1930, the figure had increased to as many as 40 countries. *Ibid.*, p. 230. Moreover, the Congress of the Federation was seen by some as the ‘third chamber’ of the League. See *ibid.*, p. 240.

¹⁸ Ross, *Great Powers*, p. 109.

¹⁹ Martin Ceadel, ‘Enforced Pacific Settlement or Guaranteed Mutual Defence? British and US Approaches to Collective Security in the Eclectic Covenant of the League of Nations’, *The International History Review*, 35/5, 2013, p. 993.

²⁰ Hart, *Selected Addresses*, p. 125.

A general association of nations must be formed under specific covenants for the purpose of affording mutual guarantees of political independence and territorial integrity to great and small states alike.²¹

Significant as Wilson's contribution was, one must not underestimate the role British practitioners played in the drafting of the Covenant. Britain was in favor of improving mechanisms for peaceful settlement of disputes, which had been developing gradually since the nineteenth century. It was Lord Cecil, later Viscount Cecil of Chelwood, who took the lead in promoting the idea of a League of Nations within the British government. As early as the autumn of 1916, he wrote a memorandum titled 'Memorandum on Proposals for Diminishing the Occasion of Future Wars', which was submitted to and circulated in the British Cabinet.²² In the memorandum, he propounded a couple of ideas that were later materialised in the Covenant.²³ Firstly, he argued for the need to develop an international arrangement whereby states would be required to make use of international conference as a method for settling disputes and to refrain from taking any unilateral action before the conference had arrived at a decision. Secondly, he proposed to make such an arrangement effective by making provision for blockade and financial sanctions against states acting in violation of the arrangement.

At Cecil's request, the Phillimore Committee was set up and produced a report on 20 March 1918 that contained plans generally known as the Phillimore Plan.²⁴ Article 1 of the Plan provided for what Alfred Zimmern called the idea of 'Inquiry and Delay',²⁵ the essence of which can be found in Cecil's memorandum discussed above. It provided that the contracting states to the convention should not make recourse to war 'without

²¹ Ibid., p. 249.

²² See Viscount Cecil (Lord Robert Cecil), *A Great Experiment: An Autobiography*, London: Jonathan Cape, 1941, pp. 47–48.

²³ The memorandum is reproduced on *ibid.*, pp. 353–357.

²⁴ George W. Egerton, *Great Britain and the Creation of the League of Nations: Strategy, Politics, and International Organization, 1914–1919*, London: Scolar Press, 1979, pp. 65–66; Zimmern, *League of Nations*, pp. 180–181.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 182.

previously submitting the matter in dispute to arbitration or to a Conference of the Allied States' and 'until there has been an award or a report by the Conference'.²⁶ In addition, it prohibited states from waging war against a state which respected and observed 'the award or ... the recommendation (if any) made by the Conference in its report'.²⁷ Article 2 provided that if a contracting state was found to be acting in violation of these provisions, it would 'become *ipso facto* at war with all the other Allied States', and the article stipulated the measures of sanctions to be taken in such a case.²⁸

Having assumed a position as the leader of the League of Nations section in the Foreign Office in November 1918, Cecil requested an outline of a Foreign Office memorandum which had been written up by Zimmern. In the process, some elements of the Phillimore Plan were added to the outline, the result of which was the production of a document known as the Cecil Draft (or Cecil Plan).²⁹ Cecil continued to rework the Draft, and it was eventually developed into the British Draft Convention.³⁰ Cecil's drafts were characterised by the following ideas.³¹ Firstly, along the lines suggested in the Foreign Office memorandum, they envisaged holding regular meetings or conferences of major powers.³² Secondly, they proposed a system for peaceful settlement of international disputes, the essence of which had been suggested in the Phillimore Plan. Thirdly, they envisaged the establishment of a Permanent Court of International Justice.

Along with Wilson's drafts, the British Draft Convention carefully prepared by Cecil was influential in the process of drawing up the draft covenant submitted to the League of Nations Commission set up at Paris, which is known as the Hurst-Miller Draft.

²⁶ David Hunter Miller, *The Drafting of the Covenant*, vol. 2, New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1928, p. 3.

²⁷ *Ibid.*

²⁸ *Ibid.*

²⁹ See Zimmern, *League of Nations*, pp. 195–196; Egerton, *Great Britain*, pp. 99–101.

³⁰ See Miller, *Drafting of the Covenant*, vol. 1, pp. 51–64. Cecil's Draft Convention can be found in *ibid.*, vol. 2, pp. 106–116.

³¹ See *ibid.*, vol. 1, pp. 38, 51–52.

³² For the explication of the Foreign Office memorandum, see Zimmern, *League of Nations*, pp. 190–196.

It was a product of compromise that came out of a series of negotiations between America and Britain. To give an example, the idea, which was floated by the Phillimore Plan and later adopted by Cecil, that a non-compliant state would be '*ipso facto* at war' with all the other contracting states was diluted by adding the word 'deemed', thus allowing states to reserve the right to declare war.³³

Although the Hurst-Miller Draft served as a draft document at the Commission charged with the task of setting up the League, it must not be forgotten that many other countries were in support of the idea of a League. Léon Bourgeois, who attended the Commission as a representative of the French government, for example, had even more radical and ambitious plans than the American and British ones. He proposed the creation of 'a supranational armed force' that he believed would be necessary for the enforcement of law.³⁴ Although this proposal, which was reflective of his commitment to the notion of *solidarité*, failed to materialise, it can be viewed as evidence showing that the project to set up a secondary institution of some sort for the maintenance of international peace and security was strongly backed up and supported with enthusiasm by a number of non-Anglo-American statesmen. As discussed above, the support from politicians was a critical factor in the formation of the League.

On 28 April 1919, the plenary meeting of the Paris Conference gave its approval to the final draft of the Covenant, which came into effect the following year. It was amended in 1924 so as to reflect the establishment of the Permanent Court of International Justice.³⁵

The Covenant codified the ideas and plans discussed above with a view to offering a legal framework for preventing the occurrence of future wars. In Article 10, member

³³ See Miller, *Drafting of the Covenant*, vol. 1, p. 53. The Hurst-Miller Draft is reproduced on *ibid.*, vol. 2, pp. 231–237.

³⁴ J.E.S. Hayward, 'The Official Social Philosophy of the French Third Republic: Léon Bourgeois and Solidarism', *International Review of Social History*, 6/1, 1961, p. 44.

³⁵ For a detailed account of the adoption, enforcement and amendment of the Covenant, see Manley O. Hudson, 'Amendment of the Covenant of the League of Nations', *Harvard Law Review*, 38/7, 1925, pp. 903–953.

states promised to ‘respect and preserve as against external aggression the territorial integrity and existing political independence’ of the other member states.³⁶ Although this article did not actually contained the term ‘guarantee’, which had the effect of weakening this article, it was clearly reflective of Wilson’s strongly-held doctrine of mutual guarantee.³⁷ Article 11 laid out a basic principle that ‘[a]ny war or threat of war’ would be regarded as a matter of international public concern and provided that ‘the League shall take any action that may be deemed wise and effectual to safeguard the peace of nations’.³⁸ Articles 12, 13 and 15 provided for peaceful settlement of international disputes. Article 12 made it obligatory for members to refer international disputes ‘either to arbitration or judicial settlement or to enquiry by the Council’ and imposed a three-month moratorium on war from the date of pronouncement in the form of either an arbitral award, a judicial ruling or a report released by the Council. By Article 13 member states undertook not to go to war with a state which complied with the award or ruling, and by Article 15 they agreed not to wage war against a state acting in compliance with recommendations contained in the report unanimously agreed to by the members of the Council except those party to the dispute in question.³⁹ Article 16 provided for the economic, financial and, potentially, military sanctions to be applied against a rule-breaking state which ‘resort[ed] to war in disregard of’ these Articles, and Article 17 supplemented these provisions for peaceful settlement of disputes and sanctions by declaring that they were also applicable to disputes between non-member states as well as to those between a member state and a non-member state.⁴⁰

While the League drew on various existing state practices, it was not simply designed as an accessory added to the existing international social structure. In his

³⁶ League of Nations, Covenant of the League of Nations, 28 April 1919, available at: <http://www.refworld.org/docid/3dd8b9854.html> (accessed 2 July 2017), Art. 10.

³⁷ See Zimmern, *League of Nations*, pp. 245–246.

³⁸ League of Nations, Covenant, Art. 11.

³⁹ *Ibid.*, Arts. 12, 13 and 15.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, Arts. 16 and 17.

renowned tract written in 1918, *The League of Nations: A Practical Suggestion*, General Jan Smuts advocated ‘a more fundamental conception of the League’, arguing that the League ought to be something that would bring about ‘an inner transformation of international conditions and institutions’.⁴¹ As he remarked:

The League must be such as to mean much more than new Councils to provide for Arbitration and Conciliation in future troubles. The new institution of peace must not be something additional, something external, superimposed on the pre-existing structure. It must be an organic change; it must be woven into the very texture of our political system. The new *motif* of peace must in future operate internally, constantly, inevitably from the very heart of our political organisation⁴²

On this view, the League was meant to bring a fundamental change to the *modus vivendi* of international society. In ES terminology, the League was expected to assist in bringing about a transformation of the international social structure comprised of such traditional primary institutions as war and the balance of power, the process of which could have constitutive effects of redefining states’ identities and interests. While such theoretical terms were not used at the time to describe the role of the League, the idea that the League would have constitutive as well as regulative effects was commonly shared by the founders of the League.⁴³

However, the Covenant did not completely deny the right of war. As is well known, there were gaps in the Covenant which allowed states to resort to war in certain cases. Firstly, Article 15(7) provided that, when the Council failed to produce a unanimous

⁴¹ J.C. Smuts, *The League of Nations: A Practical Suggestion*, London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1918, p. 47.

⁴² *Ibid.*

⁴³ For example, Lord Cecil remarked that, in the presence of the League Covenant, ‘[p]eace will be *recognised* as the *interest* of all nations in and out of Europe, and the *duty* of preserving it will be *acknowledged* by every one of them’. Butler, *A Handbook to the League of Nations*, p. vi, emphasis added.

report, states were permitted to ‘take such action as they shall consider necessary for the maintenance of right and justice’.⁴⁴ Moreover, even when the Council arrived at a unanimous report, war could still be resorted to if recommendations in the report were not respected and implemented by any of the parties to the dispute, albeit subject to the three-month-moratorium rule. Although the Covenant put a set of restrictions on recourse to war, it did not radically challenge the right of war, and therein lay the weakness of the Covenant.

The Geneva Protocol of 1924 and the Pact of Paris

After the Covenant was adopted, attempts were made to fill in the gaps that allowed states to resort to war under certain circumstances. The Protocol for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes, or the Geneva Protocol of 1924 as it is often called, was one such example.⁴⁵ The Protocol provided for the compulsory jurisdiction of the Permanent Court of International Justice over legal or justiciable disputes, and made it obligatory that non-legal or non-justiciable disputes be submitted to, and settled by, either the League Council or ‘the Committee of Arbitrators’.⁴⁶ The Protocol made arbitral decisions *binding*, whether it be a judicial decision, arbitral award or a Council report, and the Council was to see to it that the parties to the dispute complied with the ruling handed down on them. A signatory state which resorted to war in defiance of the Covenant and the Protocol was to be deemed as an aggressor, whatever the reason for the resort to force might be.⁴⁷ The Protocol was pressed forward with by the Labour government led by

⁴⁴ League of Nations, Covenant, Art. 15(7).

⁴⁵ League of Nations, Protocol for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes [hereafter Geneva Protocol], 2 October 1924, available at: <http://www.refworld.org/docid/40421a204.html> (accessed 3 July 2017). For a detailed exposition of the Protocol, see John F. Williams, ‘The Geneva Protocol of 1924 for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes’, *Journal of the British Institute of International Affairs*, 3/6, 1924, pp. 288–304.

⁴⁶ Geneva Protocol, Art. 4(1)–(4).

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, Arts. 4(6) and 10.

James Ramsay MacDonald, who had been in favour of the idea of optional clause. However, it did not win support from Stanley Baldwin's Conservative government which was formed in November 1924, and in the end the protocol passed by the board.⁴⁸

However, this setback did not stall the increasing international momentum towards the limitation of war. 1928 witnessed a significant turning point in the history of international society: the conclusion of the Pact of Paris.⁴⁹ The need for outlawing war had long been vigorously discussed since the end of the First World War, and, as early as 1921, Salmon Levinson published a pamphlet in which he advocated the need to criminalise and outlaw war.⁵⁰ However, as was the case with the creation of the League of Nations, what mattered was the support from statesmen. The origins of the Pact can be traced back to French Foreign Minister Aristide Briand's open letter to the United States published on 6 April 1927. In the letter, he proposed the conclusion of a bilateral treaty by which the two nations agree to forswear the resort to war in their relations with one another. In response to the French proposal, the Secretary of State Frank Kellogg came up with a counter offer to draw up and sign a multilateral treaty instead of a bilateral one.⁵¹

The Pact, which was signed on 27 August 1928 and is still in effect today, obliges the signatory states to forswear making recourse to war in order to solve international disputes and to 'renounce it [war] as an instrument of national policy'.⁵² By the second

⁴⁸ For a well-documented account of the Protocol's history, see Lorna Lloyd, *Peace through Law: Britain and the International Court in the 1920s*, Woodbridge: Boydell Press, 1997, esp. chap. 3.

⁴⁹ The official name for the treaty is the General Treaty for Renunciation of War as an Instrument of National Policy.

⁵⁰ See Salmon O. Levinson, *Outlawry of War*, Chicago: American Committee for the Outlawry of War, 1921.

⁵¹ See David Hunter Miller, *The Peace Pact of Paris: A Study of the Briand-Kellogg Treaty*, New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1928, chaps. 2–4.

⁵² League of Nations, General Treaty for Renunciation of War as an Instrument of National Policy, League of Nations Treaty Series, vol. 94, no. 2137, available at: <https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/UNTS/LON/Volume%2094/v94.pdf> (accessed 3 July 2017).

article, the signatory states promise to settle international disputes through peaceful means. The Pact was significant in that it placed *legal* obligations (as against mere *moral* obligations) on states and in that it was entered into by most of the states at the time, thus giving it a semi-universal character.⁵³ The Covenant of the League of Nations and the Pact of Paris complemented each other, and '[t]hese twin charters', as Zimmern called them, 'formed a sort of constitutional framework within which the public affairs of the world were henceforward to be conducted'.⁵⁴

In addition, the Covenant and the Pact were instrumental in formulating the principle of non-recognition.⁵⁵ Following the outbreak of Manchurian Incident in September 1931, Secretary of State Henry Stimson dispatched a brief note to the Japanese government in which he stated that the United States would not 'recognize any situation, treaty or agreement which may be brought about by means contrary to the covenants and obligations of the Pact of Paris of August 27, 1928'.⁵⁶ Here, the Pact of Paris is mentioned as a legal ground for the principle of non-recognition. This principle was further confirmed in the Assembly resolution of 11 March 1932 which declared that:

[I]t is incumbent upon the Members of the League of Nations not to recognise any situation, treaty or agreement which may be brought about by means contrary to the Covenant of the League of Nations or to the Pact of Paris.⁵⁷

⁵³ See Quincy Wright, 'The Meaning of the Pact of Paris', *The American Journal of International Law*, 27/1, 1933, pp. 40–50; Ian Brownlie, *International Law and the Use of Force by States*, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1963, pp. 75, 83–84.

⁵⁴ Zimmern, *League of Nations*, p. 405.

⁵⁵ Brownlie, *International Law*, p. 410.

⁵⁶ United States Department of State, *Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, Japan: 1931–1941*, vol. I, Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1931–1941, p. 76, available at: <http://digital.library.wisc.edu/1711.dl/FRUS.FRUS193141v01> (accessed 3 July 2017).

⁵⁷ League of Nations, Records of the Special Session of the Assembly Convened in Virtue of Article 15 of the Covenant at the Request of the Chinese Government, *League of Nations Official Journal, Special Supplement*, no. 101, available at: <http://digital.library.northwestern.edu/league/le00352c.pdf> (accessed 3 July 2017).

The principle of non-recognition, or the Stimson doctrine as it was often called, was of historical importance since it decisively undermined the traditional theory and practice of international law that acknowledged the validity of treaties concluded in the presence of force and duress.⁵⁸

To sum up, the Covenant of the League of Nations, the Pact of Paris and the principle of non-recognition, all of which were developed in the short span of 15 odd years after the end of the First World War, formed a *trinity* of international legal norms that formed the backbone of the quasi-constitutional structure of interwar international society, contributing to the development of the principle of non-use of force.

Article 19 of the League Covenant and peaceful change

A history of Article 19

This trinity was based on the assumption that restrictions or prohibitions on the use of force would discourage states from making recourse to war as a means for settling international disputes. It was widely recognised, however, that legal discouragement was not enough to transform state practice, and that there was a need to provide some machinery whereby states could bring about international political change in a peaceful manner. It was this problem that the controversial Article 19 of the Covenant was expected to address.⁵⁹ Article 19 read as follows:

The Assembly may from time to time advise the reconsideration by Members of the League of treaties which have become inapplicable and the consideration of international conditions whose continuance might endanger the peace of the world.⁶⁰

⁵⁸ See Jeffrey Golden, 'Force and International Law', in F.S. Northedge (ed.), *The Use of Force in International Relations*, London: Faber, 1974, p. 203.

⁵⁹ Quincy Wright, 'Article 19 of the League Covenant and the Doctrine "Rebus Sic Stantibus"', *Proceedings of the American Society of International Law at Its Annual Meeting (1921–1969)*, 30, 1936, p. 65.

⁶⁰ League of Nations, Covenant, Art. 19.

Despite its brevity, Article 19 was a product of complex negotiations and compromise. The need to provide for peaceful change was recognised from the very beginning of the drafting process. At President Wilson's request, Colonel House drew up a draft known as the House Draft which was handed to Wilson on 16 July 1918. Article 20 of the Draft provided for mutual territorial guarantee, which had been one of the principles set out in Wilson's Fourteen Points. What is noteworthy about this article is that it coupled the idea of mutual guarantee with the idea of peaceful territorial change.⁶¹ The article runs as follows:

Article 20. The Contracting Powers unite in several guarantees to each other of their territorial integrity and political independence, subject, however, to such territorial modifications, if any, as may become necessary in the future by reason of changes in present racial conditions and aspirations, pursuant to the principle of self-determination and as shall also be regarded by three fourths of the Delegates as necessary and proper for the welfare of the peoples concerned; recognizing also that all territorial changes involve equitable compensation and that the peace of the world is superior in importance and interest to questions of boundary.⁶²

According to House's account, this article was included in the Draft in order to prevent the League from becoming too inflexible an organisation.⁶³

Wilson adopted this article as the basis for Article 3 of his first draft after some modifications.⁶⁴ From this, it can be inferred that the idea underlying Article 20 of the House Draft was in line with, or at least did not contradict, Wilson's own vision of the League. Indeed, he was of the opinion that mutual territorial guarantee did not preclude revisions or modifications that would help remedy injustice and accommodate changes in

⁶¹ Miller, *Drafting of the Covenant*, vol. 1, pp. 12–14.

⁶² *Ibid.*, vol. 2, p. 10.

⁶³ *Ibid.*, vol. 1, p. 14.

⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, vol. 2, pp. 12–13.

circumstances. He held that such revisions would be feasible once the animosity that arose during the war was soothed, and he envisaged that the newly founded League would be instrumental in balancing ‘elasticity’ and ‘security’ in international society.⁶⁵

Such was Wilson’s conviction that he included the same article in his second draft written on 10 January 1919. However, David Hunter Miller, who was responsible for the Hurst-Miller Draft mentioned above, had a different view on the matter and demurred in his comments on Wilson’s second draft. He claimed that the proposed article, especially its provision for future revision, was such as to perpetuate, provoke and legitimise revanchist movements and campaigns. On that account, he suggested that such a provision be dropped from the article concerning territorial guarantee.⁶⁶ Despite his legal adviser’s suggestion, Wilson did not drop the provision for future alteration of territories in his third draft of 20 January 1919.⁶⁷ This episode shows Wilson’s commitment to the idea that the provision for mutual guarantee must be accompanied by the provision for just change.

The need for the provision for future territorial change was also recognised by Lord Cecil. The British Draft Convention of 20 January 1919, which had been developed from Cecil’s earlier drafts went one step further than Wilson’s drafts with regard to territorial guarantee and change. It contained an article that not only empowered the League to make recommendations as to how territorial arrangements should be modified, but also allowed states to absolve themselves from their legal obligation to guarantee the territorial integrity of a state party to the dispute when the state failed to follow the League’s recommendations with regard to territorial modification.⁶⁸ Miller criticised this article during a discussion with Cecil on 21 January 1919 on the same basis that informed his comments on Wilson’s second draft. In response, Cecil argued that there must be some

⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, vol. 1, p. 42.

⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, vol. 2, pp. 70–72.

⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, vol. 2, p. 99.

⁶⁸ *Ibid.*, vol. 2, p. 107.

provision allowing for treaty revision and suggested the addition of a general provision for revision which did not refer specifically to the problem of territorial revision.⁶⁹ On 27 January, they agreed on a joint draft. The Cecil-Miller Draft, as it was called, contained a lengthy article which was reflective of Wilson and Cecil's ideas about mutual guarantee and future revision.⁷⁰

On 1 February, Miller met with Cecil Hurst, a British legal expert, with a view to finalising an Anglo-American joint draft. At the meeting, Hurst proposed that the second and third paragraphs of Article 3 of the Cecil-Miller Draft be deleted, which was welcomed by Miller. The amended article was adopted as Article 7 of the Hurst-Miller Draft, which was to become Article 10 of the Covenant. At this point, Wilson gave his consent to the omission.⁷¹

As already explained above, the Hurst-Miller Draft was submitted to the Commission responsible for the setting up of the League, and therefore had a tremendous influence on the final shape of the Covenant. Had it not been for Lord Cecil's efforts to amend the Hurst-Miller Draft, the Covenant would have been adopted without any provision specifically designed for addressing the problem of peaceful change. Cecil had been sceptical of the provision for mutual territorial guarantee and wanted to weaken it

⁶⁹ Ibid., vol. 1, pp. 52–53.

⁷⁰ Ibid., pp. 55–56. Article 3 of the Cecil-Miller Draft reads as follows: 'The High Contracting Powers undertake to respect and preserve as against external aggression the territorial integrity and existing political independence of all States members of the League.

If at any time it should appear that *any feature of the settlement made by this covenant and by the present treaties of peace* no longer conforms to the requirements of the situation, the League shall take the matter under consideration and may recommend to the parties *any* modification which it may think necessary. If such recommendation is not accepted by the parties affected, the States, members of the League, shall cease to be under any obligation in respect of the subject matter of such recommendation.

In considering *any* such modification the League shall take into account changes in the present conditions and aspirations of peoples or present social and political relations, pursuant to the principle, which the High Contracting Powers accept without reservation, that Governments derive their just powers from the consent of the governed.' Ibid., vol. 2, p. 134, emphasis added.

⁷¹ Ibid., vol. 1, pp. 67–71.

by leaving room for future revisions of territorial boundaries. In his 1941 autobiography, he remarked as follows:

I, for one, objected to it [Article 10] on the ground that it seemed to crystallize for all time the actual position which then existed. ... It is right that if resort to war is forbidden, other means should be provided for correcting international injustice.⁷²

Such was his belief that the Hurst-Miller Draft did not sit well with him. In the British amendments submitted during the second meeting of the Commission on 4 February, a proposal was submitted to modify the guarantee article by adding a provision regarding treaty revision which ran as follows:

subject, however, to provision being made by the body of delegates for the periodic revision of treaties which have become obsolete and of International conditions, the continuance of which may endanger the Peace of the world.⁷³

At the fourth meeting of the Commission held on 6 February, Cecil expressed his disapproval of the guarantee article. Faced with Wilson's opposition, Cecil proposed inserting the above-quoted provision for treaty revision into the guarantee article.⁷⁴ The next day, Cecil proposed adding an article on treaty revision that was detached from the guarantee article.⁷⁵ At the eighth meeting of the Commission held on 11 February, this proposal was put on the table. It was criticised on the ground that it was not clear as to whether the article was intended to endow the Assembly with the power to revise treaties or to enable it to make recommendations. The point at issue was whether the Assembly was to have legislative power or not. After much discussion, it was agreed that the

⁷² Cecil, *Great Experiment*, p. 77.

⁷³ Miller, *Drafting of the Covenant*, vol. 2, p. 550.

⁷⁴ *Ibid.*, vol. 1, pp. 168–170.

⁷⁵ *Ibid.*, vol. 1, p. 153; vol. 2, p. 556.

Assembly would not be an international legislature and would only be allowed to make recommendations as necessary. Cecil's article was amended accordingly to make this point clearer, and the amended article eventually became Article 19 of the Covenant.⁷⁶

The history of the drafting of Article 19, however, does not come to the end here. On 18 March, Cecil once again proposed amending the article on mutual territorial guarantee by inserting a reference to the article on treaty revision so as to make the connection between them more explicit, but Cecil's proposal was rejected by Wilson on the ground that France would not agree to such an amendment.⁷⁷ As a result of the separation or detachment of Article 19 from Article 10, the generality of the former was accentuated. Article 19 was applicable to all kinds of international issues and problems, including issues concerning territorial boundaries.⁷⁸

As these records show, the drafters of the Covenant had given serious thought to Article 19 and the problem of what later came to be called peaceful change. This had been so not only because they thought that changes in circumstances surrounding world politics were possible or likely in theory, but also because they thought that the settlements concluded in Paris in a rush would not be sustainable for a long time in practice unless they were open to revision. According to Peter Jackson, even Georges Clemenceau held the view that the territorial settlements are subject to revision. To quote Jackson:

All of the major peacemakers in Paris had anticipated that future territorial adjustments were likely, if not inevitable. The purpose of Article 19 of the Covenant, it should be remembered, was to provide for peaceful revision of the peace settlement. The Franco-Polish military alliance, which was intended to protect Poland's frontier with Germany, was not an ineluctable consequence of the Treaty of Versailles. On the contrary, even Clemenceau admitted the

⁷⁶ Ibid., vol. 1, pp. 202–203.

⁷⁷ Egerton, *Great Britain*, pp. 153–154.

⁷⁸ This point was confirmed by Cecil himself later on. See Cecil's letter to Paul de Auer, quoted in Paul de Auer, 'Revision of Treaties', *Transactions of the Grotius Society*, 18, 1932, p. 166.

possibility of future territorial revision. In his defence of the treaty before parliament, he stated explicitly that some territorial revision was to be expected. The virtue of the Covenant, he argued, was that it made it more likely that revision would be peaceful and under terms acceptable to France.⁷⁹

As the British diplomat Harold Nicolson, who attended the Paris Conference, recalled, those who were in charge of drawing up peace treaties were fully cognisant of the difficulty of realising the ideals of Wilson's Fourteen Points due to the public sentiment at that time, and they thought that the final settlements should be reached later 'when the hysteria of the war had subsided'.⁸⁰

The rise of interest in Article 19 and peaceful change

In spite of the importance statesmen and diplomats attached to it during the drafting of the Covenant, Article 19 did not feature prominently in debates within and outside the League of Nations during the 1920s. Indeed, the League Assembly showed its unwillingness to discuss issues under Article 19. For example, due to the objections from France, the League refrained from invoking Article 19 when Bolivia and China appealed for treaty revision.⁸¹ Even the above-mentioned Geneva Protocol of 1924, which was carefully designed to supplement the Covenant by strengthening its provisions for peaceful settlement of disputes and outlawing aggressive war, did not address the problem of peaceful change directly.⁸²

However, the 1930s saw the sudden revival of interest in Article 19. This was mainly due to changes in international situations that were taking place in Europe and the

⁷⁹ Peter Jackson, *Beyond the Balance of Power: France and the Politics of National Security in the Era of the First World War*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013, pp. 512–513.

⁸⁰ Harold Nicolson, *Peacemaking 1919*, London: Constable, 1937, pp. 90–92.

⁸¹ Walters, *History of the League*, vol. 2, p. 718; De Auer, 'Revision of Treaties', pp. 167–168.

⁸² See Williams, 'The Geneva Protocol of 1924', p. 303.

Far East.⁸³ During the 1930s, the status quo in these areas was increasingly challenged by rising powers such as Germany and Japan, which had been vigorously pushing forwards with militarisation and aggressive expansionist policies. In face of the challenges posed by the revisionist countries, there was an increase in the public and academic interest in the League. A series of international incidents such as the Manchurian Incident, Abyssinian Crisis and German remilitarisation generated debates as to what the League could do, and how it could be reformed, so as to deal with revisionist demands in a peaceful manner. It was this historical development which brought issues concerning Article 19 to the fore.

By that time, it was generally believed that Article 19 was ineffective and of no practical use since the Assembly was not authorised to do more than ‘advise the reconsideration ... of treaties which have become inapplicable and the consideration of international conditions whose continuance might endanger the peace of the world’.⁸⁴ In other words, the Assembly was not allowed, under Article 19, to determine terms of settlement, nor did it have the power to enforce them.⁸⁵ The ineffectuality of the article was glaringly obvious. To quote Frederick Dunn, ‘Article 19 has been a dead letter from the beginning’.⁸⁶ While the League Council could help bring about international political change by *recommending* solutions to international disputes under Article 15 of the Covenant, Council recommendations made under this article were not obligatory, regardless of whether a report containing them was agreed unanimously or not. In short, despite the fact that there existed the urgent need to respond to the demands for change made by the rising powers, the League lacked effective machinery for bringing about

⁸³ Parker Thomas Moon, ‘The Need for Peaceful Change in Europe and the Far East’, *Proceedings of the American Society of International Law at Its Annual Meeting (1921–1969)*, 30, 1936, pp. 26–35.

⁸⁴ League of Nations, Covenant, Art. 19.

⁸⁵ Leland M. Goodrich, ‘From League of Nations to United Nations’, *International Organization*, 1/1, 1947, p. 7.

⁸⁶ Frederick Sherwood Dunn, *Peaceful Change: A Study of International Procedures*, New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1937, p. 111.

international political change. It was against this background that the problem of peaceful change, which the Scottish philosopher H.J. Paton described as ‘the greatest of all problems for international justice’,⁸⁷ drew public attention in the 1930s.

Some aspects of the problem of peaceful change

Ways of approaching the problem of peaceful change

Peaceful change was being analysed and discussed from various viewpoints. The problem of peaceful change was discussed in connection with other specific problems facing interwar international society. For instance, it was discussed in relation to problems concerning colonies, migration and raw materials.⁸⁸ In particular, the problem of peaceful change was discussed in connection with the review of the Peace Treaties concluded by the belligerent powers at the end of the First World War, especially the Treaty of Versailles.⁸⁹ Problems such as these were regarded as of vital importance to international peace and security. At the same time, however, the problem of peaceful change was widely studied and discussed in its own right, and was seen as posing general problems concerning international social structure. For example, Hersch Lauterpacht held the view that, to quote Martti Koskenniemi, ‘the problem was much more significant than a mere revision of the Peace Treaties’.⁹⁰

According to Charles Webster, there were three ways of approaching the problem of peaceful change.

1. Peaceful change to avoid war.
2. Peaceful change to produce justice, or perhaps, better expressed, to remedy

⁸⁷ H.J. Paton, ‘Justice among Nations’, *Philosophy*, 17/68, 1942, p. 298.

⁸⁸ See Dunn, *Peaceful Change*, chaps. 2–3; Bryce Wood, *Peaceful Change and the Colonial Problem*, New York: Columbia University Press, 1940.

⁸⁹ Martti Koskenniemi, *The Gentle Civilizer of Nations: The Rise and Fall of International Law 1870–1960*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001, pp. 238, 336–338.

⁹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 382.

justice [sic].

3. Peaceful change to produce a world order better adapted to the changing material and mental processes of to-day.⁹¹

By 'mental' was meant some such thing as the rise of political nationalism.⁹²

These approaches can be seen as reflective of different points of view. The first approach was adopted mostly by those concerned with the maintenance of the status quo, whereas the second approach was taken mainly by revisionists who were trying to bring about a state of affairs which they claimed, rightly or wrongly, to be just and fair. The third approach was chiefly adopted by those who tried to address the problem of peaceful change from an academic or detached point of view. Although they were not mutually exclusive, these different approaches signalled that there existed significant differences in views on peaceful change (more on this in the next chapter).

In the remainder of this chapter, I shall address some aspects of peaceful change by exploring its relationships with the following four concepts: (1) power transition; (2) revolution; (3) collective security; and (4) appeasement. Understanding these aspects will deepen the understanding of the problem of peaceful change and will serve as preliminaries for the next chapter.

Peaceful change and power transition

From the standpoint of the present study, it is important to recognise the close relationship between peaceful change and *power transition*. As we have already seen, the rise in interest in the problem of peaceful change was caused by the rise of the revisionist powers in Europe and the Far East, which had been vigorously pressing forward with military expansion. This was no coincidence since the growth of demands for international

⁹¹ C.K. Webster, 'What is the Problem of Peaceful Change?', in C.A.W. Manning (ed.), *Peaceful Change: An International Problem*, London: Macmillan, 1937, p. 5.

⁹² *Ibid.*, pp. 18–19.

political change and the growth of state power are interconnected in two ways. Firstly, states dissatisfied with, and therefore seeking to challenge, the international status quo can draw attention to their grievances by increasing their power via, for example, military expansion. It is well known that one of the reasons behind the (re-)militarisation of Germany and Italy was their dissatisfaction with the Versailles settlements. Secondly, states, which have successfully emerged as rising powers via economic growth, militarisation, etc., may well start calling for change in the status quo. Appetite grows with eating and avarice increases with wealth. The rising powers may begin to find the status quo increasingly unsatisfactory and to nurse grievances against it as they become more powerful. Ironically, power and dissatisfaction can grow simultaneously in world politics.

This by no means implies that peaceful change has no relevance for small countries with little power to trigger significant power shifts in the international system. In principle, the problem of peaceful change arises whenever a state demands a change in the status quo, and therefore the connection between peaceful change and power transition is not essential. That said, as the history of interwar international society suggests, the need for devising some machinery for peaceful change is felt most strongly when there exists an international dispute involving one or more rising powers dissatisfied with the status quo.

Peaceful change and revolution

Secondly, in the interwar debate on peaceful change, war was frequently likened to *revolution*.⁹³ The following citations show that the analogy between war and revolution

⁹³ Fred Halliday points out that there exists a close connection between wars and revolutions, arguing that '[w]ars *and* revolutions are the defining crises of modernity, the products and punctuation marks of the process of international society'. Fred Halliday, *Revolution and World Politics: The Rise and Fall of the Sixth Great Power*, Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1999, p. 192. Moreover, he suggests that ES theory has failed to systematically study the role of revolution as an institution of international society despite its focus on revolutionism. *Ibid.*, pp. 192–194. The findings and arguments of the present study can contribute to the advancement of knowledge in this hitherto underexplored

was common at that time.

Any world system is doomed if it identifies peace and morality with a mere maintenance of the *status quo*. To do this is to breed, as we have bred, the forces of revolution and revolt.⁹⁴

Where this [a legislature with authority] is lacking we get revolution, which in the state is the counterpart of war in the international sphere.⁹⁵

The international form of revolution is war.⁹⁶

The analogy to war is not private vengeance,—it is revolution.⁹⁷

Revolution in domestic society tends to occur when there are no effective procedures to bring about changes demanded by a rising social class such as the middle class or working class. As history shows, some societies succeeded in averting revolution, while others had to suffer from social dislocation caused by it, and this difference can be largely ascribed to differences in their social structures and political institutions.

That the metaphor of revolution was frequently used to describe war is worth noting since it shows how people of the day understood the problem of peaceful change, which, in turn, significantly determined their responses to the question they were trying to address. As will be examined in the next chapter, some scholars attempted to solve the problem by applying measures and methods which had proved to be successful in

aspect of international society. See also George Lawson, 'Halliday's Revenge: Revolutions and International Relations', *International Affairs*, 87/5, 2011, pp. 1067–1085.

⁹⁴ John Foster Dulles, 'Peaceful Change', *International Conciliation*, 20, 1940, p. 493.

⁹⁵ Paton, 'Justice among Nations', p. 298.

⁹⁶ G.M. Gathorne-Hardy, 'Territorial Revision and Article 19 of the League Covenant', *International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1931–1939)*, 14/6, 1935, p. 833.

⁹⁷ A.H. Feller, 'Machinery for the Preservation of Peace: Retrospect and Reorientation', *Proceedings of the American Society of International Law at Its Annual Meeting (1921–1969)*, 27, 1933, p. 182.

domestic societies, while others opposed to such a domestic analogy. The validity of domestic analogy was one of the most important issues in the debate on peaceful change.⁹⁸ Although there were arguments for and against domestic analogy, the idea of revolution was commonly referred to when discussing the problem of peaceful change during the 1930s, and it is essential to take this into account when we explore different views on peaceful change in the next chapter.

Peaceful change and collective security

Thirdly, it is essential to understand the symbiotic relationship between peaceful change and *collective security*. The symbiosis between peaceful change and collective security was generally recognised during the interwar period, and the knowledge about it formed one of the bases of the debate on peaceful change. For instance, Webster stated that these state practices ‘are two aspects of all efforts to produce a more peaceful and ordered world and it may be said that each is impossible without the other’.⁹⁹ For another example, Arnold Toynbee stated as follows:

We have not only to establish and maintain a system of “collective security” which will safeguard the existing international order against attempts to change it by violence; we have also, *pari passu*, to work out some method of “peaceful change” as an alternative to the violent method of change which, in the international field, has hitherto been provided by war.¹⁰⁰

As we have discussed earlier in the chapter, the significance of this symbiotic relationship was also understood by statesmen and diplomats including such prominent

⁹⁸ For a detailed analysis of the concept of domestic analogy, see Hidemi Suganami, *The Domestic Analogy and World Order Proposals*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989.

⁹⁹ Webster, ‘What is the Problem of Peaceful Change?’, p. 3.

¹⁰⁰ Arnold J. Toynbee, ‘Peaceful Change or War? The Next Stage in International Crisis’, *International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1931–1939)*, 15/1, 1936, p. 26.

figures as President Wilson and Lord Cecil. As the records of the drafting process of the Covenant reveal, collective security was perceived to offer only a partial solution to international conflicts. Indeed, it was even argued that, without some machinery for peaceful change, collective security could even be detrimental to international peace and security. As Martin Wight later summarised:

If collective security was seen as a means of law-enforcement in international society, it was necessary to *balance* it by some means of adapting the law to changing needs. If forcible change was forbidden, peaceful change must not be blocked. When treaties were manifestly obsolete or unjust, they should be subject to revision.¹⁰¹

Collective security and peaceful change were supposed to complement each other in a mutually reinforcing way.¹⁰² Collective security unaccompanied by peaceful change would be like, to borrow Toynbee's phrase, 'a boiler without a safety-valve'.¹⁰³

The need to establish collective security and peaceful change as legitimate state practices of international society derived from the need to firmly entrench the principle of non-use of force as a fundamental state practice in international society. Therefore, in ES terminology, non-use of force can be viewed as a master primary institution, while collective security and peaceful change can be conceptualised as derivative primary institutions derived from the master primary institution of non-use of force, although these emerging primary institutions were still in their embryo stages and in tension with the traditional primary institution of war at that time.

Moreover, it is important to note the mutually constitutive relationship between these derivative primary institutions and the League of Nations. As noted earlier, the League was designed in such a way as to be reflective of the ideas and practices of

¹⁰¹ Wight, *Power Politics*, pp. 205–206, emphasis added.

¹⁰² See Wright, 'Article 19 of the League Covenant', pp. 72–73.

¹⁰³ Toynbee, 'Peaceful Change or War?', p. 27.

collective security and peaceful change, but, at the same time, the effectiveness of these emerging primary institutions were seen as dependent on the workings of the League. In ES terminology, the League was a secondary institution reflecting *and* reinforcing the primary institutions of collective security and peaceful change. During the interwar period, there was a commonly held view that the League could deal with the demands from the revisionist rising powers via the promotion of collective security and peaceful change, and this is why much of the debate on peaceful change centered around issues concerning the workings and reform of the League system, as we shall see in the next chapter.¹⁰⁴

The understanding of the symbiotic relationship between collective security and peaceful change, and of their mutually constitutive relationship with the League, is not only necessary to understand the interwar debate on peaceful change (which is explored in chapter 4), but also vitally important for understanding the basic features of contemporary international social structure governing change, including changes induced by power transition (more on this in chapter 5).

Peaceful change and appeasement

Lastly, it is necessary to look at the relationship between peaceful change and *appeasement*. As will be examined in the next chapter, the term ‘peaceful change’ was from time to time used to describe the policy of appeasement. However, the term does not refer to some specific policy; it refers to a state practice aimed at bringing about international political change in a peaceful manner, and this can be achieved in many different ways. It cannot be denied that appeasement is one such way, but they are by no means identical. If we take appeasement to mean a concession made by the strong at the sacrifice of the weak, in which sense the term has often been used by many, it can even be argued that the policy of appeasement actually goes against the purpose of collective

¹⁰⁴ See, for example, Arthur Salter, ‘Reform of the League’, *The Political Quarterly*, 7/4, 1936, pp. 465–480.

security and hence against peaceful change. For these two practices, as noted above, symbiotically coexist in international society. This is why Toynbee was adamant in distinguishing peaceful change from appeasement, arguing that the policy of appeasement was ‘*not* a practicable alternative to the policy of collective security combined with peaceful change’.¹⁰⁵ Whether we agree with Toynbee or not, it needs to be stressed that peaceful change is not the same as appeasement. Decoupling peaceful change from appeasement is particularly important for saving the former from gratuitous accusation, for the latter has gained an infamous reputation and is considered by many as insupportable as a matter of principle.

Conclusion

This chapter has explained the historical background to the problem of peaceful change, examined the history of Article 19 of the Covenant, and explored some of the features of peaceful change in connection with power transition, revolution, collective security and appeasement. In the conclusion, I shall restate the historical background to the problem of peaceful change in theoretical terms, using the ES frameworks introduced in chapter 1.

In traditional Westphalian international society, which can be classified as a *Coexistence* international society, war was socially recognised as a primary institution.¹⁰⁶ Indeed, war was a legitimate state practice not only regulative of state practice, but also constitutive of the state itself. As Charles Tilly remarked, ‘war made the state, and the state made war’.¹⁰⁷ Moreover, as discussed in chapter 1, war as a primary institution had social functions, one of which being to bring about just change in international society.¹⁰⁸

¹⁰⁵ Toynbee, ‘Peaceful Change or War?’, p. 32.

¹⁰⁶ Barry Buzan, *From International to World Society?: English School Theory and the Social Structure of Globalisation*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004, p. 191.

¹⁰⁷ Charles Tilly, ‘Reflections on the History of European State-Making’, in Charles Tilly (ed.), *The Formation of National States in Western Europe*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975, p. 42.

¹⁰⁸ Hedley Bull, *The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics*, 4th edn, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012, pp. 182–183.

However, the catastrophe of the First World War called this traditional primary institution into question. In the aftermath of the war, a series of efforts were made to entrench non-use of force as a primary institution in international society. The establishment of the League of Nations was the most important attempt in this regard. The League was a secondary institution reflective of two derivative primary institutions derived from the master primary institution of non-use of force: collective security and peaceful change. At the same time, the League was expected to assist in maintaining international peace and security via the promotion of the institutional symbiosis between these derivative primary institutions in international society. In terms of the degree of internalisation, the international social structures introduced in consequence of the Versailles and other peace treaties were only shallowly internalised and were maintained largely by force and coercion.¹⁰⁹ In other words, they were based on the delicate power balances that existed at the end of the First World War. However, as noted above, they were also reflective of emerging primary institutions such as non-use of force, collective security and peaceful change. The establishment of the League was followed by further efforts to place limitations on war, such as the Geneva Protocol, the Pact of Paris and the principle of non-recognition. These developments signaled the emergence of a *Cooperative* international society.¹¹⁰ Despite these developments, however, the League system lacked effective machinery for promoting and entrenching peaceful change as a primary institution in international society, which was widely held to be detrimental to international peace and security. It was this problem that the interwar debate on peaceful change addressed.

¹⁰⁹ For the discussion of the degree of internalisation, see Buzan, *From International to World Society?*, pp. 103–108; Alexander Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999, pp. 247–250.

¹¹⁰ Buzan, *From International to World Society?*, p. 193.

Chapter 4

Three Normative Perspectives on Peaceful Change

Introduction

As shown in the preceding chapter, it was widely held during the interwar period that there existed a symbiotic and mutually reinforcing relationship between collective security and peaceful change and that therein lay the key to managing change in international society, including changes in the international status quo in the context of power transition—an important point that has been neglected in the existing literature on power transition. Moreover, it was commonly understood that there existed a mutually constitutive relationship between these primary institutions and the League of Nations. Furthermore, in the 1930s, it was widely acknowledged that the League system lacked effective machinery for promoting peaceful change. However, the interwar debate on peaceful change brought into sharp relief the existence of different, even conflicting views about what should be done about the problem of peaceful change, which concerns how to establish and entrench the practice of peaceful change in international society. The purpose of this chapter is to explore three different normative positions on this problem.

This chapter advances the conception of international political change in international society, including changes in the context of power transition, as an institutionally governed process, and demonstrates the inescapable *normativity* of debates surrounding power transition by highlighting that international political change can be managed differently by different institutions of international society. This in turn confirms the validity of the ES's methodological pluralism—the methodological position that, as

discussed in chapter 2, seeks to address both analytical and normative issues in world politics—in studying power transition. As was also discussed in chapter 2, the meaning of historical texts and debates can be interpreted only by putting them in context. The findings of the preceding chapter provide the historical knowledge necessary for contextualising the ideas and arguments explored in the present chapter.

The first section excogitates the revisionist views on peaceful change, focusing on the political and legal thoughts of Fumimaro Konoe, who was Prime Minister of Japan from 1937 to 1939 and from 1940 to 1941, and those of Carl Schmitt, a prominent German constitutional theorist. They both had a strong antipathy for the League of Nations and presented arguments in favour of forcible transformation of the international status quo. Although Konoe's essay, which is examined in the next section, was originally published in 1918 and therefore cannot be seen as a direct contribution to the debate, it deserves attention since it prefigured the emergence of the problem of peaceful change. The second section explores Hersch Lauterpacht's contributions to the debate. His legal theory was based on the view that the problem of peaceful change could be solved by developing international legal frameworks, especially the League system.¹ The third section examines E.H. Carr's political thought from the point of view of peaceful change. Critical of the effectiveness of the League, he proposed a pragmatist solution to the problem of peaceful change that emphasised the importance of negotiation and compromise.

Revisionism and forcible change

Konoe's criticism of the Anglo-American conception of peace

In 1918, Konoe published a short essay entitled 'Against a Pacifism Centered on England and America (英米本位の平和主義を排す)', the purpose of which was to warn the Japanese people against uncritically hailing the forthcoming establishment of the League

¹ The term 'League system' refers to the *ensemble* of international organs and arrangements related to the League, such as the Permanent Court of International Justice.

of Nations as a major step forward for the realisation of democracy, justice and humanism.² At the beginning of the article, he stated that the development of democracy and humanism was the trend of the times. These ideas, he argued, were grounded in the basic principle of the equality of all human beings and, in the sphere of international relations, they manifested themselves in the form of the national right to existence and survival. He went on to maintain that these ideas were not necessarily incompatible with the traditional Japanese political system and culture, expressing his hope that they would take root in Japan in the future. At the same time, however, Konoe directed a critical look at Anglo-American arguments made in the name of democracy, humanism and justice and bemoaned the uncritical attitude of those who tended to take such arguments at face value.³

Konoe questioned the assumption consciously or unconsciously made in Anglo-American thinking: the equation of *peace* with justice and humanism. He claimed that, when the word *peace* was used in American and British arguments, it must be understood or interpreted as meaning the maintenance of the status quo favourable to their countries' interests, and asserted that such *peace* could hardly be considered as identical with justice and humanism. He maintained that the maintenance of peace would only serve the cause of justice and humanism when the status quo being maintained was in harmony with the demands of justice and humanism. In his view, when the status quo was in conflict with the demands of justice and humanism, the use of force for challenging it might be justified.⁴ Indeed, he went as far as to argue that '[a]dherence to peace even when one's just right to survival is trampled is the enemy of humanism. *Pacifism and humanism are not always compatible; sometimes we must abandon peace for the sake of humanism.*'⁵

² Fumimaro Konoe, 'Against a Pacifism Centered on England and America', *Japan Echo*, 22, 1995, pp. 12–14.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 12.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 13.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 12.

Having criticised the Anglo-American conception of peace, Konoe turned to the project to establish the League of Nations. He argued that he would support the League as long as it was based upon true justice and humanism. However, he expressed his concern that the League could function as a mere vehicle for the maintenance of the status quo in favour of Anglo-American economic imperialism, thereby compromising Japan and other countries' legitimate right to self-preservation and development. In order to avert this 'truly intolerable state of affairs', he suggested that Japan should strongly resist economic imperialism '*not only for the sake of Japan but for the sake of establishing the equal right to life of all nations of the world on the basis of justice and humanism*'.⁶ Putting aside the validity of his argument and of his conception of justice and humanity, Konoe's argument can be interpreted as a normative justification for war as a primary institution of international society governing change therein.

Although written in 1918, Konoe's essay prefigured what was to come with uncanny accuracy. He foresaw the possibility that the postwar plans to establish peace would stand in the way of the national development of rising powers, and argued that these countries need not have any qualms about having to resort to force in such cases. In a sense, his essay prefigured the emergence of the problem of, and debate on, peaceful change. That said, it is important to remember that he did not only predict the future course of Japan's foreign policy, but also, as Prime Minister of Japan, led the country during the war in East Asia and pursued the creation of the Great East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere.⁷

Revisionist arguments of this kind were influential in other countries which had also been dissatisfied with the status quo. We shall now turn to Carl Schmitt, who provided theoretical grounds for German grievances.

⁶ Ibid., p. 14. See also Thomas W. Burkman, *Japan and the League of Nations: Empire and World Order, 1914–1938*, Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 2008, pp. 56–57.

⁷ On the development of Konoe's views on the League, see *ibid.*, pp. 95–96, 206–209.

Carl Schmitt and the criminalisation of aggressive war

According to Schmitt, international law after the First World War was characterised by what he called ‘contractual positivism’ that emphasised the paramountcy of the doctrine *pacta sunt servanda* (agreements must be kept) and sought to legitimise the status quo as determined at the Paris Conference. However, in the 1930s, the focus shifted from *pacta sunt servanda* to such concepts as ‘revision’, ‘collective security’ and ‘peaceful change’.⁸ On the assumption that ‘the history of international law is a history of the concept of war’, Schmitt set out to critically analyse the transformation of the conception of war underlying developments in international law during the interwar period.⁹

Schmitt described this conceptual change as one from the ‘non-discriminating concept of war’ to the ‘discriminating concept of war’. The former refers to the conception of war which had long been prevalent in European international legal thinking before the First World War. According to him, it was the exclusion of *justa causa* (just cause) from the realm of international law that opened the way for the non-discriminating concept of war. This in turn enabled sovereign states to mutually recognise each other as *justi hostes* (just enemies) since, under the non-discriminating concept of war, it was theoretically impossible to determine which side was fighting for a just cause.¹⁰ As he remarked:

Instead of *justa causa*, international law among states was based on *justus hostis*. Any war between states, between equal sovereigns, was legitimate.¹¹

The non-discriminating concept of war had been conducive to what he called the

⁸ Carl Schmitt, ‘The Turn to the Discriminating Concept of War (1937)’, in Carl Schmitt, *Writings on War*, trans. by Timothy Nunan, Cambridge: Polity, 2011, p. 33.

⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 31.

¹⁰ Carl Schmitt, *The Nomos of the Earth in the International Law of the Jus Publicum Europaeum*, trans. by G.L. Ulmen, New York: Telos Press, 2003[1950], pp. 141, 147, 154, 165, 167. This book was originally published in 1950, but it can be seen as a belated contribution to the interwar debate on peaceful change.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 121.

‘bracketing of war’, which he regarded as ‘[t]he essence of European international law’.¹² In classical European international society, sovereign states, which recognised one another as *justi hostes*, were the only legitimate actors in war.¹³ In his view, that states saw each other as *justi hostes* had the positive effect of preventing wars fought between them from degenerating into wars of annihilation.¹⁴

Another factor which Schmitt considered as having contributed to the bracketing of war was the right of neutrality as a corollary of the non-discriminating concept of war. Since sovereign states were equal peers and there existed no higher authority above them *de jure*, each state could individually determine which belligerent had *justa causa*, and those who preferred not to make a judgement with regard to *justa causa* were allowed to remain neutral on condition that they would treat all the belligerents equally.¹⁵ Under the non-discriminating concept of war, war was understood as a *duel* fought between equal peers. As Koskenniemi points out, ‘[w]ar became a duel, a *Kabinettkrieg*, a regulated procedure for resolving inter-European rivalries’.¹⁶ In ES terminology, Schmitt regarded war as a kind of institution of traditional European international society.

Schmitt pointed out that this traditional conception of war, which provided the conceptual basis of the bracketing of war, underwent a drastic transformation after Woodrow Wilson’s War Message on 2 April 1917, which marked the beginning of a series of attempts to replace the non-discriminating concept of war with the discriminating concept of war with a view to distinguishing just wars from unjust ones.¹⁷ According to him, this turn was so radical that it called into question the *raison d’être* of the concept of *war* itself in international law. As he remarked:

¹² Ibid., p. 187.

¹³ Ibid., pp. 100, 141.

¹⁴ Ibid., p. 142.

¹⁵ Ibid., pp. 142, 157, 167–168.

¹⁶ Martti Koskenniemi, ‘Carl Schmitt and International Law’, in Jens Meierhenrich and Oliver Simons (eds), *The Oxford Handbook of Carl Schmitt*, New York: Oxford University Press, 2016, p. 602.

¹⁷ Schmitt, ‘Discriminating Concept of War’, pp. 31–32.

Justice and injustice cannot be legally bound to the same concept [i.e. war]. A recognized legal act and a recognized illegal act cannot, within the same legal order, constitute one and the same legal concept.¹⁸

He claimed that, under the discriminating concept of war, legally sanctioned use of force turned into the execution of law and justice, while legally unsanctioned exercise of force was equivalent to an international criminal offence.¹⁹ Accordingly, a state illegally resorting to the use of force was to be treated as an offender or a ‘felon’.²⁰ With the introduction of the discriminating concept of war, the traditional notion of *justus hostis* was obliterated.

What he was particularly concerned about was the way in which the line between the just and legal use of force and the unjust and illegal use of force was drawn under the discriminating concept of war. Under the international legal system based on this conception of war, a state which resorted to arms first without complying with the rules of international law was to be deemed *ipso facto* to be an aggressor with no regard for the *justa causa* behind the act of aggression. As he stated:

Whoever fires the first shot or engages in any equivalent action is the “felon” in this new criminal offense. The problem of *justa causa* remains outside the definition of terms.²¹

This passage suggests that he was critical of equating peace, defined as the absence of aggression, with justice, as was the case with Konoe. He was critical of the formalistic prohibition of aggression that failed to take into account the question of *justa causa*.

Indeed, he devoted much space to the analysis of this issue in his *Nomos of the*

¹⁸ Ibid., p. 66.

¹⁹ Ibid., pp. 66–67.

²⁰ Schmitt, *Nomos of the Earth*, pp. 122, 124.

²¹ Ibid., p. 122.

Earth.²² His arguments in the treatise were aimed at politicising interwar attempts to legitimise the international status quo via the criminalisation of forcible change. The following three points support this interpretation. Firstly, one of the themes that run through the treatise is the critical reflection on the nature of the status quo.²³ Secondly, he noted that war had been a legitimate means for bringing about political change in traditional European international law. He even claimed that ‘it is not only possible, but often even necessary to recognize wars, feuds, reprisals, and applications of force of various kinds as a means of effecting changes’.²⁴ Thirdly, he remarked that the Geneva Protocol, which was an attempt to give substance to the discriminating concept of war by outlawing wars of aggression, ‘became caught up in the struggle between revisionism and anti-revisionism’.²⁵ While the professed goal of the treatise was to trace the historical development of international law, it is clear from these points that the treatise was written in response to the debate on peaceful change.

On top of this, the discriminating concept of war was incompatible with Schmitt’s belief, for it amounted to the negation of what he called *the political*. As is well known, he claimed in *The Concept of the Political* that the essence of *the political* consists in the fundamental distinction between friend and enemy.²⁶ According to him, enemy is someone who literally threatens ‘us’, jeopardises ‘our’ way of being, and against whom ‘we’ ought to fight in order to protect ‘ourselves’ at all costs.²⁷ Political enemy is an existential threat in the true sense of the word because it poses ‘the real possibility of physical killing’, namely war.²⁸ The decision as to who the enemy is cannot be made via

²² See, for example, *ibid.*, pp. 275–280.

²³ See *ibid.*, pp. 244–248, 257–258.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 186. See also *ibid.*, p. 100.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, 279. It is worth noting that he made brief mention to Lord Cecil’s efforts to raise the problem of peaceful change in this connection.

²⁶ Carl Schmitt, *The Concept of the Political*, trans. by George Schwab, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996, p. 26.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 27.

²⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 33.

the application of ‘a previously determined general norm’; nor can it be made by ‘the judgment of a disinterested and therefore neutral third party’.²⁹ It can only be made by the subjective and autonomous judgement of a people or the state representing it. He places a particular emphasis on this point because of his conviction that the inability or unwillingness on the part of a people or a nation to autonomously draw a line between friend and enemy signifies the termination of its existence as a political entity.³⁰

In Schmitt’s view, the discriminating concept of war was politically problematic from the viewpoint of the political. For it meant that states could no longer identify enemies against whom to wage war of their own volition, the capacity to do which he considered to be vital for their self-identification and self-preservation as *political* communities. In concrete terms, it meant that the League of Nations, which was essentially ‘a system that monopolized judgment on the just war’, could decide who the common enemy was via the identification of an act of aggression.³¹ His concern can be clearly observed in the following passage.

In praxi [in practice] the real question is whether every state can make the decision, can have the *jus supremae decisionis* [right of supreme decision] of the justice or injustice of a war, or whether another state or group can make the legal decision on the justness or unjustness of a war in such a way that this decision becomes valid for a third party.³²

Furthermore, Schmitt warned about the possibility that the League would exacerbate rather than terminate international conflicts. The fact that the League legalised and endorsed the use of force against ‘a disturber of peace’ or ‘an outlaw of humanity’ opened the way for war in the name of humanity, which would take the form of

²⁹ Ibid., p. 27.

³⁰ Ibid., pp. 29–30, 49.

³¹ Schmitt, ‘Discriminating Concept of War’, pp. 31–32.

³² Ibid., p. 64.

‘executions, sanctions, punitive expeditions, pacifications, protection of treaties, international police, and measures to assure peace’.³³ He denounced this as nothing less than an unwarranted appropriation of the universal authority of humanity for the political purpose of ‘denying the enemy the quality of being human and declaring him to be an outlaw of humanity’, the process of which would lead to the escalation of violence and would result in an unrestricted war of annihilation.³⁴ The scope of such a war would be geographically expanded as a consequence of the change in the conception of neutrality.³⁵ Under the discriminating concept of war, states were not expected to stay neutral in the face of an act of aggression.³⁶ In view of these changes in international law, Schmitt held that, contrary to its goal of maintaining international peace and security, the League system based on the principle of collective security was in fact setting the stage for a total war.³⁷

Großraum and the radical transformation of the international order

Although Schmitt had a clear understanding of the problem of peaceful change, his strong antipathy toward the League system led him to seek a solution outside its framework. However, he also held the view that the return to the old non-discriminating concept of war was impracticable.³⁸ In his view, what was required was ‘the concept of a concrete great spatial order’ as the basis for a new international legal order which would replace the existing League system.³⁹ This is where his famous concept of *Großraum* (greater space) comes into the picture. *Großraum* literally means a large geographical and spatial

³³ Schmitt, *Concept of the Political*, p. 79. See also *ibid.*, p. 56.

³⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 54. See also *ibid.*, p. 36.

³⁵ Schmitt, *Nomos of the Earth*, pp. 246–247.

³⁶ Schmitt, ‘Discriminating Concept of War’, pp. 57, 65.

³⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 31–32, 58, 72.

³⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 74.

³⁹ Carl Schmitt, ‘The *Großraum* Order of International Law with a Ban on Intervention for Spatially Foreign Powers: A Contribution to the Concept of *Reich* in International Law (1939–1941)’, in Carl Schmitt, *Writings on War*, trans. by Timothy Nunan, Cambridge: Polity, 2011, p. 109.

area, but he used this term to refer to a spatial area governed by a *Reich* (empire) on the basis of some political principles.

Reichs ... are the leading and bearing powers whose political ideas radiate into a certain *Großraum* and which fundamentally exclude the interventions of spatially alien powers into this *Großraum*. ... The connection of *Reich*, *Großraum*, and the non-intervention principle is fundamental.⁴⁰

In developing these ideas, Schmitt was inspired by the Monroe Doctrine. He viewed this doctrine as the first attempt in history to establish a *Großraum* in which a dominant power governed according to its political ideas, while staving off foreign interferences in the *internal* affairs of *Großraum*.⁴¹ He envisaged the creation of a German-centred regional order modelled on the Monroe Doctrine that would allegedly promote ‘mutual respect for every nationhood’.⁴² However, there is no doubt that his chief intention was to provide theoretical grounds for German dominance on the European continent. As Peter Stirk points out, his purpose was ‘to justify German hegemony’.⁴³ The following long passage is worth reading since it exhibits a strange blend of self-centeredness and self-proclaimed altruism that was typical of Schmitt and other revisionist thinkers.

The concept of a *Deutsches Reich* belonging to the upholders and designers of a new international law would earlier have been a utopian dream, an international law built upon the *Reich* but an empty legal fantasy. Today, however, a powerful German *Reich* has arisen. From what was only weak and impotent, there has emerged a strong center of Europe that is impossible to attack and ready to provide its great political idea, the respect of every nation as a reality of life

⁴⁰ Ibid., p. 101.

⁴¹ Ibid., pp. 87–88.

⁴² Ibid., pp. 99–100.

⁴³ Peter Stirk, ‘Carl Schmitt’s *Völkerrechtliche Grossraumordnung*’, *History of Political Thought*, 20/2, 1999, p. 372.

determined through species and origin, blood and soil, with its radiation into the Middle and East European space, and to reject the interference of spatially alien and *unvölkisch* powers. The action of the *Führer* has lent the concept of our *Reich* political reality, historical truth, and a great future in international law.⁴⁴

This passage is also of interest since it hints at the connection between power transition and international institutional change.

The concept of *Großraum* had an unignorable influence on scholars and practitioners in Japan, amongst whom the idea of the Asian Monroe Doctrine had been popular.⁴⁵ It was invoked as a theoretical basis for the slogan ‘the Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere’ announced in 1940 under Konoe’s premiership.⁴⁶ As was the case with *Großraum*, this concept was used as a justification for the expansionist policy of the rising power in East Asia.

Revisionist vision of international order

What Konoe and Schmitt had in common was their scepticism towards the League of Nations which they regarded as the greatest impediment to the development of their countries. In ES terminology, they were sceptical about the legitimacy and role of the secondary institution created in the aftermath of the First World War on the basis of the emerging primary institution of collective security.⁴⁷ Instead, they placed their hope in

⁴⁴ Schmitt, ‘*Großraum* Order’, p. 111.

⁴⁵ For an account of the historical development of the idea, see Sven Saaler, ‘The Construction of Regionalism in Modern Japan: Kōdera Kenkichi and His “Treatise on Greater Asianism” (1916)’, *Modern Asian Studies*, 41/6, 2007, pp. 1261–1294.

⁴⁶ See Tetsuya Sakai, ‘The Political Discourse of International Order in Modern Japan: 1868–1945’, *Japanese Journal of Political Science*, 9/2, 2008, pp. 233–249. In fact, it could be plausibly argued that Schmitt derived his idea from the Asian Monroe Doctrine inasmuch as he made reference to the latter in his work on *Großraum*. See Schmitt, ‘*Großraum* Order’, pp. 89–90.

⁴⁷ See Barry Buzan, *From International to World Society?: English School Theory and the Social Structure of Globalisation*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004, pp. 161–204.

the establishment of a regional hegemonic political system in which their respective nations would play a central role. Such a vision of international order was commonly shared by revisionists at that time. However, such a goal could only be accomplished by *forcibly* overthrowing the status quo defined by the Versailles and Washington systems, which amounted to the rejection of the primary institution of peaceful change. The rejection of peaceful change in revisionist countries was accompanied by fascist discourses re-legitimizing war as a means for bringing about international political change.

Such a vision of international order was diametrically opposed to the liberal vision underpinning the international order centered on such primary institutions as non-use of force, collective security and peaceful change. In terms of Buzan's typology of international societies, the international order envisaged by revisionists verged on a *Power Political* international society in which military conquest is viewed as a legitimate means of national policy.⁴⁸ To revisionists, who embraced such a conception of international order, the idea of peaceful change was merely a liberal ideology promulgated in order to consecrate the status quo.

International law, secondary institutions and peaceful change

Lauterpacht's legal theory and the role of international courts and tribunals

Although the possibility of peaceful change was out of question for some people, there were those who believed that the problem could be solved by developing secondary institutions, especially the League system. Hersch Lauterpacht was one such person. He began to address the problem as early as the late 1920s, albeit in the context of the debate over compulsory international arbitration.⁴⁹

⁴⁸ Ibid., pp. 190–191.

⁴⁹ See H. Lauterpacht, 'The Doctrine of Non-Justiciable Disputes in International Law', *Economica*, 24, 1928, pp. 277–317; H. Lauterpacht, 'The Absence of an International Legislature and the Compulsory Jurisdiction of International Tribunals', *The British*

At that time, many states were unwilling to undertake the legal obligation to submit all international disputes to international courts or tribunals for a judicial judgement. Their reluctance found its theoretical justification in, and was based on, the doctrine of non-justiciable disputes. This doctrine classified international disputes into justiciable (or legal) disputes and non-justiciable (or political) disputes, and it was held that only the former was amenable to judicial resolution. Lauterpacht criticised this widely-accepted theoretical distinction as '*formally untenable and legally unsound*'.⁵⁰ To borrow a phrase from Martti Koskenniemi, this doctrine could give rise to 'an unlimited right to opt out of third party settlement'.⁵¹ Aware of such a potential danger to the international legal order, Lauterpacht set out to debunk the rationales behind the doctrine.

According to Lauterpacht, one of the reasons frequently given in support of the doctrine of non-justiciable disputes was the nonexistence of an international legislature endowed with the power to amend and repeal existing rules of international law in response to changing social realities and demands.⁵² This basic feature of world politics generated concern about the possibility that the application of existing rules and treaties would lead to judicial decisions which 'would be so manifestly unjust and so little in accord with the changes continuously taking place in the international society that ... they would have the unavoidable effect of perpetuating injustice and friction'.⁵³ For this reason, supporters of the doctrine claimed that the fundamental distinction between the two categories of disputes should be upheld and that there should be 'alternative methods' for settling non-justiciable disputes, such as conciliation.⁵⁴ On that account, the idea of compulsory arbitration by international tribunals was strongly resisted by the supporters

Yearbook of International Law, 11, 1930, pp. 134–157.

⁵⁰ Lauterpacht, 'Doctrine of Non-Justiciable Disputes', p. 315.

⁵¹ Martti Koskenniemi, 'Lauterpacht: The Victorian Tradition in International Law', *European Journal of International Law*, 8/2, 1997, p. 227.

⁵² Lauterpacht, 'Doctrine of Non-Justiciable Disputes', p. 307; Lauterpacht, 'Absence of an International Legislature', p. 134.

⁵³ *Ibid.*

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 135.

of the doctrine.

Lauterpacht employed a two-step strategy in order to prove the advantage and practicality of compulsory arbitration by international tribunals. Firstly, he questioned the effectiveness of procedures proposed as alternatives to judicial settlement. In his view, alternative avenues for bringing about change in the status quo had their own limitations, which made them less effective than they appeared to be. He pointed out that, whilst the arbitral awards of international tribunals were binding, international conciliation was less effective in that the decisions arrived at through conciliation were of non-binding nature.⁵⁵ He also discussed whether the presence of an international legislature would cut the Gordian knot. Although he saw it as ‘an ideal worthy of pursuance’, he did not think that it could be established in the near future.⁵⁶ Moreover, he pointed to the possibilities that legislative processes of changing the legal rights and obligations of states by majority vote might intensify the tension between the disputants by making ‘the outvoted state dissatisfied, resentful, and clamouring for a change’.⁵⁷ He held that the effectiveness of these alternatives could not be assumed and argued that ‘judicial settlement is the only ultimate means of disposing of disputes’.⁵⁸

Having questioned the effectiveness of alternative methods for dispute settlement, Lauterpacht set out to illustrate that international tribunals had a capacity to adapt international law to changing realities of world politics. He pointed out that international judges and arbitrators could perform law-making role ‘by way of interpreting the existing law and applying its general principles’.⁵⁹ As he remarked:

International tribunals are judicial tribunals administering rules of law. But, like

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 138–141.

⁵⁶ Lauterpacht, ‘Doctrine of Non-Justiciable Disputes’, p. 308.

⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 309. See also Lauterpacht, ‘Absence of an International Legislature’, pp. 141–144.

⁵⁸ Lauterpacht, ‘Doctrine of Non-Justiciable Disputes’, p. 309.

⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 310.

the law applied by municipal courts, the law administered by them is tempered by a spirit of legal equity, common sense and natural justice which, while paying full consideration to acquired rights, finds ways and means to prevent the law from becoming an instrument of oppression, or from giving its sanction to manifest absurdities.⁶⁰

In his view, international tribunals had a broader judicial discretion than do municipal courts in the process of making arbitral decisions due to the fact that they were bound by less 'hard and fast rules' of international law and were 'in a position to exercise their law-creating function in a spirit of progress'.⁶¹ According to Lauterpacht, international tribunals could perform this function through the application of the doctrine of abuse of rights.⁶² In addition, international courts could make use of the doctrine *clausula rebus sic stantibus* (things thus standing) for the same purpose.⁶³

Moreover, he argued that international courts and tribunals could play a more constructive role when states party to the dispute were willing to cooperate.⁶⁴ For example, he pointed out that states could ask and authorise an international court or tribunal to pronounce a ruling *ex aequo et bono* (according to what is equitable and good), which was 'in effect tantamount to endowing it with a legislative function'.⁶⁵ Referring to Article 38 of the Statute of the Permanent Court of International Justice, which provided that 'the Court may "decide a case *ex aequo et bono* if the parties agree thereto"', he maintained that the Court would not be deemed to have acted *ultra vires* in deciding *ex aequo et bono* as long as this action was performed on the basis of the consent of the

⁶⁰ Ibid.

⁶¹ Ibid. See also Lauterpacht, 'Absence of an International Legislature', p. 145.

⁶² This doctrine enabled judges to render the claims made on the basis of existing sovereign rights null and void when they were causing unwarranted harm or injustice. See *ibid.*, pp. 145–147; H. Lauterpacht, *The Function of Law in the International Community*, Hamden, Conn.: Archon Books, 1966[1933], pp. 286–306.

⁶³ Ibid., pp. 270–285; Lauterpacht, 'Absence of an International Legislature', p. 147.

⁶⁴ Ibid., pp. 147ff.

⁶⁵ Ibid., p. 150.

states parties to the dispute.⁶⁶ Although he acknowledged that this option was only feasible when there was ‘a great and determined will to peace on the part of governments’, he held that this was feasible given state practices at that time.⁶⁷ Furthermore, Lauterpacht argued that the states parties to the dispute could draw on the Court’s decisions and advisory opinions as a basis for further diplomatic negotiations.⁶⁸

In short, Lauterpacht held that the nonexistence of an international legislature could not be a good reason for objecting to compulsory arbitration, and that international courts and tribunals could be expected to play a positive role in adjusting international law to changing realities of world politics via their judicial activities and practices.

However, he was well aware of the limits of the above-mentioned remedies. With regard to international judges, he pointed out that ‘the task of explicitly amending the existing law is not within their province’.⁶⁹ Moreover, he did not have complete confidence in states’ willingness to settle disputes by voluntary agreement and was of the opinion that the question at stake was ‘of too great importance ... to be left entirely to the initiative of states’.⁷⁰ It was his belief that the effectiveness of the rule of law in international society must not hinge completely on the will or whim of sovereign states.⁷¹

As he stated:

the task of amending the law and adapting it to changed conditions must, in so far as this function cannot be fulfilled by the normal judicial activity or by agreement of the parties, necessarily fall upon the political organs of the international community.⁷²

⁶⁶ Lauterpacht, ‘Doctrine of Non-Justiciable Disputes’, p. 313.

⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 313–314. See also Lauterpacht, *Function of Law*, pp. 307–329.

⁶⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 332–336.

⁶⁹ Lauterpacht, ‘Absence of an International Legislature’, p. 157.

⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 155.

⁷¹ See H. Lauterpacht, ‘The Nature of International Law and General Jurisprudence’, *Economica*, 37, 1932, pp. 301–320.

⁷² Lauterpacht, *Function of Law*, p. 339.

From this perspective, Lauterpacht proposed giving substance to Article 19 of the Covenant by entrusting the League Council with the task of deliberating on changes in the existing international rules and rights. He suggested that the Statute be so amended as to enable the Permanent Court to call on the Council to give consideration to its judgement pronounced ‘in accordance with the existing legal position ... with a view to a possible modification of its terms in the wider interest of international peace’, the result of which could have an effect of permanently suspending the execution of the Court’s judgement.⁷³ As he remarked:

In fact, the time has come to consider whether the present deadlock of Article 19 cannot, in a restricted sphere, be successfully overcome by making a judicial pronouncement, having no binding effect, the starting-point for putting into operation the political machinery for revising the existing law or at least for rendering inoperative obsolete law.⁷⁴

Lauterpacht’s suggestions could be questioned from different perspectives. First, it was far from certain whether making non-binding judgements of the Court the ‘starting-point’ for negotiations would have proved effective in practice. He insisted that the ascertainment of the exact contents of the law would create ‘an attitude of accommodation’ on the part of disputants.⁷⁵ However, it could also be argued that, once legal rights and obligations pertaining to a dispute had been determined by an international court, the state which would benefit from the continuation of the status quo might well take a tougher line against the other party or parties involved. Secondly, it was not clear as to when and under what circumstances the Court should call on the Council to give consideration to their judgements. Obviously, the act of asking the Council to reconsider the status quo would have had an immense political significance. On this point, Lauterpacht seems to

⁷³ Lauterpacht, ‘Absence of an International Legislature’, pp. 155–156.

⁷⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 156.

⁷⁵ Lauterpacht, *Function of Law*, p 330.

have relied on his tacit assumption that international judges were capable of making decisions from an impartial point of view for the sake of the progress, good and interest of the whole international community. Thirdly, he did not provide a clear and convincing justification as to why it was not the League Assembly but the Council that should play a major role in initiating this quasi-legislative process when Article 19 stipulated the right of the Assembly to make recommendations with regard to peaceful change.⁷⁶

Lauterpacht himself acknowledged that none of his proposed solutions was sufficient by itself. Yet he maintained that ‘however small each of these remedies may be, their cumulative effect is to supply a working alternative to a purely negative attitude’.⁷⁷ He insisted on the importance of compulsory arbitration for a reason. He held that the denial of compulsory arbitration would run counter to the emerging principle or, in ES terminology, primary institution of non-use of force. As he remarked:

the rejection on this account [that there existed no international legislature] of obligatory arbitration amounts in the last resort to a sanction of the reign of force, and the question arises whether force is more likely to prove an instrument of just change.⁷⁸

This passage clearly shows his underlying motivation for arguing for the need for compulsory arbitration. Although his stated objective of his earlier works was to deny the validity of the legal doctrine of non-justiciable disputes, he had been driven by a deeper conviction that it was his duty as an international lawyer to uphold the rule of law, as against ‘the reign of force’, in the international community and to assist in the promotion of non-use of force. He held the view that the acceptance of compulsory arbitration by states was the *sine qua non* of the rule of law and non-use of force in the international community and that this could be realised only with the help of some machinery for

⁷⁶ See *ibid.*, p. 340.

⁷⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 345.

⁷⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 345–346.

peaceful change.

Peaceful change and world government

In his 1937 lecture on ‘the legal aspect’ of peaceful change, he expounded on the significance of peaceful change for international law.⁷⁹ According to him, the authority of international law as law had been questioned by sceptics on the grounds that it had traditionally recognised war as a legitimate and legal means for political change. Therefore, establishing some alternative to war was of vital importance in terms of the maintenance and enhancement of the authority of international law.⁸⁰ He went on to point out that the absence of means of peaceful change would necessarily result in either the inequitable rule of law or recourse to violence.⁸¹ In addition, the presence of the Pact of Paris had made the provision of effective means of peaceful change a matter of great urgency.⁸²

What was most striking about this lecture was that he placed great importance on the setting up of an international legislature. As he remarked:

What is peaceful change as an effective institution of international law or of international society? It is the acceptance by States of a legal duty to acquiesce in changes in the law decreed by a competent international organ. It is the existence of a legislature imposing, if necessary, its fiat upon the dissenting State. This, it is submitted, is the only proper meaning of peaceful change as an effective legal institution of the international society. ... An international legislature of that nature may without impropriety be described as a super-State.⁸³

⁷⁹ H. Lauterpacht, ‘The Legal Aspect’, in C.A.W. Manning (ed.), *Peaceful Change: An International Problem*, London: Macmillan, 1937, p. 136.

⁸⁰ *Ibid.*

⁸¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 137–138.

⁸² *Ibid.*, pp. 139–140.

⁸³ *Ibid.*, pp. 141–142.

In contrast with his championship of world government, his attitude towards the above-mentioned judicial remedies was surprisingly ambiguous in the lecture. Although he mentioned such procedures as the application of the doctrines of *rebus sic stantibus* and abuse of rights, they were described in a less positive tone than previously done.⁸⁴

Another shift in his thinking can be observed in his critical stance towards the League Covenant. As we have seen above, he had previously proposed giving substance to Article 19 of the Covenant.⁸⁵ Yet, in the 1937 lecture, he criticised it for having obfuscated ‘the need for the only true solution, namely, a legally binding and effective machinery for peaceful change through international legislation’.⁸⁶

His belief in the need for an international legislature is clearly expressed in his review article of Lord Cecil’s autobiography published in 1941. In this review, he argued that the ‘resurrection’ of the League after the Second World War would require the curtailment of sovereignty and the establishment of an international legislature which he regarded as ‘the only instrument capable of a true solution of the problem of peaceful change’.⁸⁷ As he remarked:

The problem of peaceful change cannot be solved on any other than legislative basis, i.e. by way of decisions of an international organ endowed with effective authority in law and in fact to impose its decrees upon a dissenting minority.⁸⁸

⁸⁴ For instance, he stated as follows: ‘It would seem, therefore, that international judicial and arbitral organs cannot legitimately play a prominent part in the process of peaceful change. Their principal object is to apply the law and not to change it’. *Ibid.*, p. 149.

⁸⁵ Lauterpacht, ‘Absence of an International Legislature’, pp. 155–156.

⁸⁶ Lauterpacht, ‘Legal Aspect’, p. 158. He went on to argue as follows: ‘Whatever may be the merits or shortcomings of Article 19, it cannot ... be considered as [a] legal institution of effective peaceful change ... Such an institution is tantamount to international legislation, that is to say, to a process of a peaceful alteration of the law for which the consent of the State affected is not required. But international legislation means an International Legislature. And International Legislature is a World State.’ *Ibid.*

⁸⁷ H. Lauterpacht, ‘Resurrection of the League’, *The Political Quarterly*, 12/2, 1941, pp. 130–131.

⁸⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 131.

It is worth noting that he did not elaborate on the role of international judges and other alternative means of peaceful change in this review article. In view of this, it is safe to conclude that his view on the problem of peaceful change had undergone a significant shift over the years. As will be discussed shortly, the idea of international legislature was bitterly criticised by Carr, but its importance for the promotion of peaceful change was recognised by some prominent international legal scholars such as Georges Scelle.⁸⁹

Progressive view of international order

Despite the shift in his thinking about peaceful change, one thing that ran through all his thinking on the subject was the insistence on the need to bring in some dispute settlement system that would make recourse to judgement of a third party, be it an international court, an international tribunal, the League of Nations or a World State. He held that the promotion and entrenchment of peaceful change in international society were possible only by introducing some form of third-party intervention. Such a thinking was not peculiar to him, but was shared by other liberal thinkers at the time. For example, W. Arnold-Forster remarked that:

RENUNCIATION OF WAR is not enough: nations must also renounce the right to be judge in their own cause. They must accept pacific *settlement* in the last resort by a third party's judgment.⁹⁰

Establishing some such system entailed curtailing or modifying the traditional concept and practice of sovereignty in some way. This was what Josef L. Kunz meant when he described the problem of peaceful change as follows:

⁸⁹ Martti Koskenniemi, *The Gentle Civilizer of Nations: The Rise and Fall of International Law 1870–1960*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001, pp. 336–338.

⁹⁰ W. Arnold-Forster, 'Arbitration, Security, Disarmament', in Leonard Woolf (ed.), *The Intelligent Man's War to Prevent War*, London: Victor Gollancz, 1933, p. 314. See also *ibid.*, pp. 350–361.

The problem of revision is, in its deepest meaning, the problem of “national sovereignty.” “Peaceful change” as a fact, not merely as a word, presupposes not an international law *between* the nations, but an international law *above* the nations.⁹¹

In this connection, it is well to recall that Schmitt was opposed to the League on the grounds that it limited the ability of political communities, including sovereign states, to make *autonomous* judgements.

Lauterpacht held the belief that the problem of peaceful change could be solved by, and only by, reinforcing secondary institutions that would make use of some form of third-party judgement in international dispute settlement, such as the League of Nations and the Permanent Court of International Justice. In his view, the primary institution of international law and strengthened secondary institutions would provide a set of means for promoting the primary institution of peaceful change and for eliminating the primary institution of war. Lauterpacht’s thinking about, and treatment of, the problem of peaceful change typified the view that international political change, including changes in the context of power transition, could be managed and controlled via the progressive development of international social structure. Such a development would signal the transformation of a *Coexistence* international society into a *Cooperative* international society.⁹²

Pragmatism and peaceful change

Carr on peaceful change

Lauterpacht’s suggestions met with criticism from pragmatic thinkers of the period. E.H. Carr’s *The Twenty Years’ Crisis, 1919–1939* is the most important text in this regard.⁹³ It

⁹¹ Josef L. Kunz, ‘The Problem of Revision in International Law’, *The American Journal of International Law*, 33/1, 1939, pp. 54–55.

⁹² Buzan, *From International to World Society?*, pp. 191–194.

⁹³ Edward Hallett Carr, *The Twenty Years’ Crisis, 1919–1939: An Introduction to the*

is often said that the treatise provides a realist criticism of utopianism and idealism.⁹⁴ However, the treatise will be cast in a different light in this section, with a focus on Part 4 ‘Law and Change’ and, in particular, Chapter 13 entitled ‘Peaceful Change’. His statement that ‘[t]o establish methods of peaceful change is ... the fundamental problem of international morality and of international politics’ indicates that the problem of peaceful change had been central to his thinking about international relations in general.⁹⁵ Indeed, the following passage from his inaugural lecture as the Woodrow Wilson Professor of International Politics at the University College of Wales, which was delivered on 14 October 1936, confirms this interpretation.

There is a growing realisation in this country that, just as you can have no rule of law unless you have machinery at work for the re-making and unmaking of law, so you can have no sanctity of treaties unless some ready and effective means can be devised for the alteration or unmaking of treaties. There is no more urgent problem, if peace is to be preserved and democracy survive, than what is known as the problem of peaceful change. But that is another vast subject which I cannot approach to-day.⁹⁶

As I see it, *The Twenty Years’ Crisis*, which he published three years afterwards, was meant as a contribution to the debate on peaceful change; in Collingwoodian terminology, it represented his *answer* to the *question* of peaceful change. His arguments in the treatise cannot be fully understood unless they are put in this historical and intellectual context.

According to Carr, the interwar period witnessed efforts to ‘treat the rule *pacta sunt servanda* not merely as a fundamental rule of international law, but as the cornerstone of

Study of International Relations, London: Macmillan, 1939.

⁹⁴ The sheer number of attempts at reconsidering the so-called First Great Debate between realists and idealists attest to the influence this book has had on IR scholarship. See, for example, Peter Wilson, ‘The Myth of the “First Great Debate”’, *Review of International Studies*, 24/5, 1998, pp. 1–15.

⁹⁵ Carr, *Twenty Years’ Crisis*, p. 283.

⁹⁶ E.H. Carr, ‘Public Opinion as a Safeguard of Peace’, *International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1931–1939)*, 15/6, 1936, p. 860.

international society’, and he quoted Lauterpacht as saying that the rule ‘constitute[d] the highest, irreducible, final criterion’ governing state behavior in the society of states.⁹⁷ Such efforts were part of the interwar movement for the rule of law in international society. However, efforts to establish the sanctity of treaties failed to prevent states from breaching international law and treaties. After examining cases in which international legal rules and agreements had been violated during the interwar period, Carr pointed out that in many cases the violation had been justified on the basis of morality rather than of legality.⁹⁸

Being a realist, Carr had no difficulty in recognising that there could be a discrepancy between legality and morality. For example, he argued that treaties concluded under duress or international agreements which contained inequitable contents could be viewed as morally questionable.⁹⁹ Moreover, he examined and even showed some understanding of the radical view that treaties are essentially ‘instruments of power and therefore devoid of moral value’.¹⁰⁰ After mentioning the Marxist conception of law and society, he stated as follows:

In the same way, it can be maintained with considerable show of reason that insistence on the legal validity of international treaties is a weapon used by the ruling nations to maintain their supremacy over weaker nations on whom the treaties have been imposed.¹⁰¹

He argued that this was plausible in light of the arbitrariness with which the principle *pacta sunt servanda* had been invoked by states in practice.¹⁰²

⁹⁷ Carr, *Twenty Years’ Crisis*, pp. 232–233. For the original text, see Lauterpacht, *Function of Law*, p. 418.

⁹⁸ Carr, *Twenty Years’ Crisis*, pp. 237, 239.

⁹⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 239–242.

¹⁰⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 242.

¹⁰¹ *Ibid.*

¹⁰² *Ibid.*

He then contended that the power-political and conservative dimensions of international law had been further strengthened as a result of the outlawing of war as an instrument of national policy. As he remarked:

The rude pre-War system, or lack of system, was logical in recognising as legal the one effective method of changing the *status quo* [namely, war]. The rejection of the traditional method as illegal and the failure to provide any effective alternative have made contemporary international law a bulwark of the existing order to an extent unknown in previous international law or in the municipal law of any civilised country.¹⁰³

Carr pointed out that this one-sidedness had been the ‘most fundamental cause of the recent decline of respect for international law’.¹⁰⁴ In short, the principle of *pacta sunt servanda* eventually failed to secure wide support and obedience because it came to be seen as a symbol of the conservative character or quality of the interwar international legal order, and this perception led to the diminished deference to international law. The one-sidedness of interwar international law had to be overcome, he argued, since ‘[r]espect for law and treaties will be maintained only in so far as the law recognises effective political machinery through which it can itself be modified and superseded’.¹⁰⁵

Although he was critical of the conservatism of the interwar international legal order, Carr never concurred with the idea that recourse to war should be permitted for the purpose of bringing about international political change.¹⁰⁶ Nor did he blame international law for not providing a mechanism for change. For the primary function of law was ‘to promote stability and maintain the existing framework of society’.¹⁰⁷

¹⁰³ Ibid., pp. 244–245.

¹⁰⁴ Ibid., p. 245.

¹⁰⁵ Ibid.

¹⁰⁶ In his inaugural lecture mentioned above, he expressed his ‘strong leaning towards the position of the quasi-pacifist’. Carr, ‘Public Opinion’, p. 850.

¹⁰⁷ Carr, *Twenty Years’ Crisis*, p. 244. See also *ibid.*, p. 230.

In Carr's view, what was lacking was a *political* mechanism for peaceful change. As was common at that time, he made a sharp distinction between legal disputes, in which the interpretation and application of the existing rules and rights were at issue, and political disputes, in which disputants were seeking changes in the existing rules and rights.¹⁰⁸ With this distinction in mind, he unequivocally denied that arbitral tribunals and international courts, including the Permanent Court of International Justice, could be counted on to resolve the problem of peaceful change since their primary function was to 'apply the legal "rule applicable to the dispute"'.¹⁰⁹ Moreover, he explicitly ruled out the possibility that such secondary institutions could effectively carry out legislative functions for the reason that they would not take due account of the political importance of power relations between the states parties to the dispute. To quote his own words, '[c]onflicts of interest can be dealt with only by an organ which takes the power factor into account'.¹¹⁰ He also pointed out that there was a genuine difficulty for international judicial organs to decide the case *ex aequo et bono* since there existed no common framework of values upon which the judges or arbitrators could base their decisions.¹¹¹ For these reasons, Carr concluded that international judicial organs were not fit for purpose as far as the problem of peaceful change was concerned.

Carr was also critical of legislative solutions. He recognised that, in domestic politics, legislative measures provided reliable means of peaceful change. However, he was wary of domestic analogy and was of the opinion that the same solutions could not be applied in the sphere of world politics.¹¹² He criticised Lauterpacht's later argument, which emphasised the need for an international legislature, as a futile attempt to establish a world government with no chance of success. For he could hardly believe that such

¹⁰⁸ Ibid., p. 258.

¹⁰⁹ Ibid.

¹¹⁰ Ibid., p. 261.

¹¹¹ Ibid., pp. 262–263.

¹¹² Ibid., pp. 267–268.

political and social conditions as were necessary for setting up a world state existed at that time.¹¹³ As he trenchantly stated:

The difficulty lies not in the lack of machinery for international legislation, but in the absence of an international political order sufficiently well integrated to make possible the establishment of a legislative authority whose decrees will be recognised as binding on states without their specific assent.¹¹⁴

For these reasons, Carr was critical of approaches that emphasised the role of secondary institutions in general. In particular, he did not lay his hopes on the League since he viewed it as based upon a series of false assumptions, one of which being that there existed infallible world public opinion.¹¹⁵ His sceptical attitude towards secondary institutions led him to explore the role of primary institutions in managing international political change.

Negotiation and compromise

The solution he proposed was remarkably simple: negotiation and compromise. However, never once did he imply that this solution was easy to implement. As is well known, he was highly critical of the notion of the harmony of interests.¹¹⁶ The absence of the harmony of interests meant that negotiations would always be tough and intense, and the only way to reach an agreement was to split the difference and to reach a compromise through diplomatic maneuvering. In his view, it was concessions on the part of the beneficiaries of the existing international order that were crucial for the success of diplomatic negotiations. Peaceful change could not be effected if the status quo powers held fast to their vested interests protected by the existing international arrangements. To

¹¹³ Ibid., p. 268.

¹¹⁴ Ibid.

¹¹⁵ Ibid., pp. 42–51, 176.

¹¹⁶ For his criticism of the harmony of interests, see *ibid.*, chaps. 4 and 5.

quote his words, '[t]he process of give-and-take must apply to challenges to the existing order'.¹¹⁷

Although Carr defined the purpose of peaceful change as the realisation of 'necessary and desirable' revisions of the international order 'without war',¹¹⁸ he denied that moral persuasion alone could bring about such changes. If a compromise settlement was to be reached, powerful pressure must be put on those actors who had benefited from the maintenance of the status quo. As he noted, '[a]n operation of peaceful change, generally recognised as salutary, could not be effected save under a threat of war'.¹¹⁹ For this reason, he repeatedly stressed that the problem of peaceful change needed to be settled on the basis of 'a compromise between morality and power'.¹²⁰

Carr viewed the interplay between power and morality as the essential factor in the dynamics of political change in both domestic and international domains. This conception of the nature of political change allowed him to turn his attention to the conflict between labour and capital in search of insights applicable to the relations among states. The history of the relationship between labour and capital was of particular interest to him not only because he understood the problem of international peaceful change in analogy with domestic class struggle, but also because it provided many real-life examples of political and social changes that had been achieved without actual resort to violence, that is, without revolutionary convulsions. According to Carr, repeated industrial actions fostered willingness on the part of both capital and labour to have the dispute between them settled through conciliation and arbitration, thereby 'creating something like a regular system of "peaceful change"'.¹²¹ This process had been facilitated by the existence of 'a certain measure of common feeling as to what is just and reasonable in their mutual relations'.¹²²

¹¹⁷ Ibid., p. 215.

¹¹⁸ Ibid., p. 265.

¹¹⁹ Ibid., pp. 274–275.

¹²⁰ Ibid., p. 265. See also pp. 279, 283–284.

¹²¹ Ibid., pp. 269–272.

¹²² Ibid., p. 279.

Therefore, the process of negotiation between capital and labour had been guided by considerations of both power and morality, which he viewed as the basis of any political settlement and change.

Although Carr was sceptical of simplistic domestic analogy, he sought to find a clue to the solution to the problem of peaceful change in the insights and lessons offered by the labour-capital relationship in industrialised domestic societies. As he remarked:

If we could apply this analogy to international relations, we might hope that, once the dissatisfied Powers had realised the possibility of remedying grievances by peaceful negotiations (preceded no doubt in the first instance by threats of force), some regular procedure of “peaceful change” might gradually be established and win the confidence of the dissatisfied; and that, once such a system had been recognised, conciliation would come to be regarded as a matter of course, and the threat of force, while never formally abandoned, recede further and further into the background.¹²³

Although he laid his hopes on this approach, he conceded that it remained to be seen whether the insights drawn from domestic experiences were really applicable to the relations among sovereign states.¹²⁴ As elements of power are always present in world politics, the effectiveness of Carr’s solution in establishing some machinery for peaceful change largely depended on whether there existed, at the international level, ‘a certain measure of common feeling as to what is just and reasonable’, which had made peaceful change possible in domestic societies.¹²⁵ As ES theorists point out, the creation and maintenance of rules and institutions among states is accompanied by the forging and cultivation of common interests and values among states.¹²⁶ This holds true for any

¹²³ Ibid., p. 272.

¹²⁴ Ibid.

¹²⁵ Ibid., p. 279.

¹²⁶ See Hedley Bull, *The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics*, 4th edn, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012, p. 13; Hedley Bull and Adam Watson (eds), *The Expansion of International Society*, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984, p. 1.

machinery for peaceful change, including the one proposed by Carr.

This accounts for why Carr's solution to the problem of peaceful change failed to produce positive outcomes in the 1930s. In the first edition of *The Twenty Years' Crisis*, he (in)famously observed that the diplomatic negotiations that led to the Munich Agreement was 'the nearest approach in recent years to the settlement of a major international issue by a procedure of peaceful change' inasmuch as '[t]he change in itself was one which corresponded both to a change in the European equilibrium of forces and to accepted canons of international morality'.¹²⁷ Despite his observations, however, the Munich Agreement failed to provide a springboard for peaceful change since there existed very few common interests and values among states involved in the process. The Schmittian conception of international society prevalent at the time in Germany emphasised struggle between political communities and allowed little room for common interests and values among them.

The meaning and implications of Carr's argument with regard to peaceful change can be understood only by putting it in the historical context. As discussed in chapter 2, contextualisation is a necessary first step for interpreting historical texts. Although much of his argument regarding the Munich Agreement was deleted from the later editions of the treatise, it is necessary to bear in mind that the Munich Agreement was mentioned in the first edition published in 1939 as an empirical case supporting his give-and-take approach.

The limitations of the give-and-take approach

Carr's pragmatic approach may well be welcomed by many as the most *realistic* solution to the problem of peaceful change. However, it was flawed in three respects. Firstly, it is questionable if the Munich Agreement was in accord with his approach. Carr repeatedly claimed that the process of give and take required *self-sacrifice* on the part of the strong

¹²⁷ Carr, *Twenty Years' Crisis*, p. 282.

and wealthy, who benefited most from the continuance of the status quo.¹²⁸ However, it is difficult to regard the Agreement as a product of self-sacrifice on the part of those who had benefited most from the Versailles system. The Agreement was nothing less than a product of political trade-offs at the expense of Czechoslovakia, whose delegates were not even allowed to attend the conference.

Secondly, it is equally questionable if we can really look on his give-and-take approach as a *solution* in the first place. For his approach, which emphasised negotiation and compromise, did not propose anything new or fresh. As discussed earlier, war had long been recognised as a legitimate means of political change. However, this by no means suggests that negotiation and compromise had been seen as unimportant in world politics. Even at the time when war was regarded as a legitimate instrument of national policy, there existed a common understanding that war was an *ultima ratio* (last resort) that should be resorted to when, and only when, all the other methods had been tried in good faith.¹²⁹ In fact, it was precisely because negotiation and compromise had proved to be not enough that a series of attempts were made during the interwar period to develop the machinery for pacific settlement of disputes, including the League system.

Finally, it must be pointed out that Carr's argument fails to distinguish between peaceful change and appeasement. As we have seen above, he maintained that peaceful change had to be grounded in 'a compromise between morality and power'.¹³⁰ However, he could not differentiate moral claims supported by power from those used for concealing ulterior motive, for his argument that morality and ethics were reflective of power and interests led to the denial of the autonomy of moral claims.¹³¹ As Morgenthau trenchantly criticised, Carr possessed 'no transcendent point of view from which to

¹²⁸ Ibid., pp. 214–215, 279.

¹²⁹ See Ian Brownlie, *International Law and the Use of Force by States*, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1963, pp. 49–50.

¹³⁰ Carr, *Twenty Years' Crisis*, p. 265.

¹³¹ See *ibid.*, chap. 5.

survey the political scene and to appraise the phenomenon of power'.¹³² This led to the confusion between peaceful change aimed at bringing about *just* changes and appeasement aimed at avoiding war through *ad hoc* reconciliation of great powers' interests. Although it is not always easy to distinguish the former from the latter, abandoning this distinction would be fatal to the practice of peaceful change.

Pragmatist vision of international order

Carr's treatise typified a pragmatist way of thinking about the problem of peaceful change. Unlike Schmitt, he did not dismiss the problem as being formulated in such a way as to be loaded in favour of liberals. However, unlike Lauterpacht who embodied interwar liberalism, he was critical of the role of secondary institutions and international law in solving the problem. Instead, he took a middle ground or pragmatist stance on the problem, exploring the possibility of bringing about peaceful change through negotiation and compromise. This, he argued, could be obtained by invigorating, in ES terminology, the primary institutions of *diplomacy* and *great power management*.¹³³ Carr's pragmatist vision of international order can be interpreted as based on what Buzan calls the *Coexistence* model of international society.¹³⁴ While he was sceptical of the role of secondary institutions in managing international political change, he did not dismiss the role of third-party settlement, for great power management could take the form of mediation in practice. Indeed, the Munich Conference can be interpreted as an example of great power mediation, although Czechoslovakia was absent from it.

¹³² Hans Morgenthau, 'The Political Science of E.H. Carr', *World Politics*, 1/1, 1948, p. 134.

¹³³ For a list of primary institutions, see Buzan, *From International to World Society?*, p. 187.

¹³⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 191–192.

Conclusion

Unlike political debates in which people fall into disagreement over the nature of the problem, those engaged in the interwar debate on peaceful change shared a common understanding of what the problem was about. However, there were radically different, even conflicting normative perspectives on what ought to be done about it. This chapter focused on four political and legal thinkers whose ideas and arguments set the parameters of the debate.

The essence of the first normative position, as represented by Konoe and Schmitt, boils down to the denial of the relevance of peaceful change. Despite the emergence of the norm of non-use of force, the idea that states retained the prerogative right to resort to war in order to effect political changes was strongly embraced by revisionists. The revisionist vision of international order emphasised the role of war and underplayed the importance of secondary institutions in world politics. The international order envisaged by revisionists was akin to what Buzan calls a *Power Political* international society in which war has a legitimate place as a primary institution.¹³⁵

The second normative position, as represented by Lauterpacht, had its roots in the belief in the importance of the emerging primary institution of non-use of force and sought to promote it by entrenching the primary institution of peaceful change in international society via the invigoration of secondary institutions, such as the League of Nations and the Permanent Court of International Justice, with the help of the primary institution of international law. Although there were different suggestions as to how and to what extent secondary institutions could help entrench peaceful change in international society, most suggestions based on this normative position contained plans to bring in some form of third-party judgement in processes of dispute settlement, which could potentially amount to the curtailment of state sovereignty. The international order envisaged by progressivists was akin to what Buzan calls a *Cooperative* international society, in which war is

¹³⁵ Ibid., pp. 190–191.

delegitimised and secondary institutions flourish.¹³⁶

The third normative stance, as represented by Carr, emphasised pragmatic solutions based on the realities of world politics. Pragmatists were sceptical of the possibilities that the problem of peaceful change could be resolved by following a set of pre-arranged procedures offered by secondary institutions, such as the League Covenant or the Statute of the Permanent Court of International Justice. They held the view that the demands for political change must be dealt with via negotiation and compromise. The pragmatist vision of international order emphasised the role of such primary institutions as diplomacy and great power management. This position was not opposed to third-party judgement *per se* since great power management could take the form of great power mediation. The international order envisaged by pragmatists was similar to what Buzan calls a *Coexistence* international society.¹³⁷

As significant as these normative differences were, there was one thing that united these thinkers (with the exception of Konoe): the recognition of the significance of socio-structural contexts for international political change, including changes in the context of power transition. Lauterpacht's arguments were based on the recognition of the role of the primary institution of international law and secondary institutions reflective of it in managing international political change. While Carr severely criticised Lauterpacht's ideas, his own arguments were also marked by the focus on such primary institutions as diplomacy and great power management and their role in managing international political change. Even Schmitt was concerned with the *status* and *role* of war as stipulated in international law, and this reveals his reliance on the socio-structural conception of world politics. As will be discussed in the next chapter, the debate among these scholars represents a distinctive way of theorising power transition that emphasises the role of international social structure in managing the process of international political change in

¹³⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 193–194.

¹³⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 191–192.

the context of power transition. The task of the next chapter is to clearly set out what this socio-structural perspective is, to establish its enduring importance for power transition analysis, and to examine contemporary international social structure governing international political change from that perspective.

Chapter 5

Peaceful Change in Contemporary International Society

Introduction

The preceding two chapters explored the interwar debate on peaceful change, which is the most rigorous and systematic attempt so far in IR scholarship at exploring the role of international social structure in international political change. The debate exemplifies a distinctive way of looking at, and presents an alternative mode of theorising power transition that emphasises the role of international social structure, thereby providing a strong defence of the socio-structural conception of power transition as an institutionally governed process. Drawing on the theoretical insights from the debate, the present chapter seeks to set out the socio-structural conception of power transition and to establish its enduring significance for power transition analysis. The development of peaceful change as a primary institution since the end of the Second World War, along with that of other primary institutions such as non-use of force and collective security, has made the socio-structural perspective even more valuable for power transition studies. The chapter shows the institutionalisation of peaceful change in postwar international society by examining the structures and practices of the UN and its Security Council—secondary institutions that are expected to play a major role in promoting and entrenching peaceful change in contemporary international society.

This chapter proceeds in four stages. The first section contrasts the mode of theorising power transition that was widely adopted by those engaged in the interwar debate with that which has been prevalent in the existing literature on power transition.

This helps establish the socio-structural conception of power transition—or, to be more accurate, of international political change in the context of power transition—as an institutionally governed process. The following sections aim at showing the enduring significance of the socio-structural conception of power transition. The second section looks into the institutional development of the primary institutions of non-use of force, collective security and peaceful change in postwar international society. The third section overviews methods and techniques that help states *practise* the primary institution of peaceful change in contemporary international society. The final section closely examines the role of the UN in the promotion of peaceful change with a focus on the role of the Security Council. In particular, it focuses on Chapter VI of the UN Charter since it is primarily via exercise of the powers under this Chapter that the Council seeks to promote peaceful change in contemporary international society.

The present chapter examines various cases of peaceful change including cases which may not be seen as instances of power transition. While some of the cases covered in the present chapter and the methods and institutions mentioned in relation to them might not seem to be particularly relevant to power transition, they all serve to illustrate the diversity and multifariousness of the international social structure governing change in contemporary international society, including changes in the context of power transition. The interests and goals pursued by rising powers are, from the perspective of the idealist-holist ontology underpinning the present study, largely, if not entirely, affected and redefined by the social structure of international society, and the range of possible and legitimate means by which rising powers pursue their interests and goals varies depending on the institutions and methods governing international political change in the issue-area or areas at stake in a given instance of power transition. For these reasons, and also for the purpose of developing a framework for the socio-structural analysis of power transition, it is important to become conversant with the multifariousness of the international social structure governing change in contemporary international society and

to be cognizant of the actual and potential diversity of the modalities of change in the context of power transition.

Power transition as an institutionally governed process

Two modes of theorising power transition

As discussed in chapter 2, the benefit of studying history is that it exposes and challenges the assumptions and prejudgments one has about the world in which one resides by revealing hidden aspects of that world, thereby enabling one to conduct oneself with a better understanding and knowledge of the situation. Such being the case, then what does the interwar debate on peaceful change tell us about power transition, and how does it reform the way we look at and theorise power transition? I shall here address these questions by contrasting the theoretical approach that underpinned the debate with that adopted in much of the existing literature on power transition. As with contemporary theories of power transition, the debate was primarily concerned with how the demands of rising powers could be dealt with so as to prevent wars. Back then, however, this problem was being addressed in a distinctive manner, which contrasts markedly with the manner in which power transition is being theorised and addressed in much of the existing literature.

What characterised the interwar debate on peaceful change was the wide acceptance of the socio-structural conception of power transition. It was widely held at that time that the process of international political change in the context of power transition was something governed by such factors as state practice, norms, international law and international organisations. In other words, much of the debate was based on the premise that power transition—or, to be more accurate, international political change in the context of power transition—is an *institutionally governed process*, and that the behaviour of rising powers is subject, in varying degrees, to international social structure. It is to be noted that this conception of power transition and the insights it offers are

compatible with ES theory and the socio-structural conception of world politics underpinning the theory.

Under the socio-structural conception of power transition and international political change, war was seen as a state practice constituting *part* of international social structure and therefore was supposed to be subject to critical reflection and amenable to social control. This accords with the ES conception of war as a primary institution of *international society*.¹ The socio-structural conception of war is markedly different from what may be called the *mechanistic* conception of war which underlies much of the existing literature on power transition. In the contemporary literature, war is very often described as if it were something that *occurs* or *happens* mechanistically in response to power shifts within the *international system* in the ES sense.²

The socio-structural conception of war was shared by statesmen such as Woodrow Wilson, Lord Cecil and Jan Christiaan Smuts, as we have seen in chapter 3. These statesmen held the view that changes in states' understanding of, and their attitudes towards, war would lead to a transformation of international social structure, with impacts on rules and institutions governing state behaviour and potentially on states' identities and interests. In other words, the interwar efforts to eliminate war from international society were premised on the idea of, or even the belief in, the co-constitution of states and international social structure.

As discussed in the conclusion of the preceding chapter, the socio-structural perspective also underlay the ideas and arguments of Schmitt, Lauterpacht and Carr. It should be easy to see that Lauterpacht's view on peaceful change was based on such a perspective. Although Carr was critical of the role of secondary institutions on which

¹ See Hedley Bull, *The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics*, 4th edn, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012, p. 13.

² See Bull, *Anarchical Society*, pp. 9–10; Barry Buzan, *From International to World Society?: English School Theory and the Social Structure of Globalisation*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004, pp. 98–99.

Lauterpacht placed his expectations, his arguments were also based on the premise that war had been a state practice, or a primary institution, of international society, whose role in international political change could be reduced by invigorating other primary institutions such as diplomacy and great power management. Schmitt was highly sceptical about peaceful change, but his jurisprudential analyses of the role and status of war in international law in general, and under the League system in particular, show his reliance on the socio-structural conception of world politics.

Multifariousness of international social structure governing power transition

Understanding war as *part* of international social structure governing power transition entails recognising the following two points. Firstly, the proposition that war is an institution constituting part of international social structure governing power transition suggests the existence of *other* primary and/or secondary institutions governing the process. Much of the existing literature on power transition has been devoted to the examination of the relationship between war and change. However, from the socio-structural perspective, it is necessary to take due account of the role of other primary and secondary institutions in international political change. This partly explains why the focus of the interwar debate on peaceful change, based as it was on the socio-structural conception of power transition and international political change, was on discovering and inventing alternative methods or mechanisms for bringing about international political change.

Secondly, the role that war as a primary institution does play in processes of change in a given international society cannot be understood apart from the development and nature of other primary and secondary institutions of that international society. One of the important insights the interwar debate on peaceful change offers is that the role of war in international political change and its status in international society may change in response to developments in *international law*. International law is ‘the bedrock

institution'³ that sets principles and rules governing state behaviour in international society. In particular, it provides a common framework within which the use of force in a given international society is to be seen and judged. Prior to the First World War, there were no legal rules in general international law proscribing war as a means of international political change, although there did exist debates on what were the *morally* right and acceptable reasons for resorting to it.⁴ However, as shown in chapter 3, international law has tightened its restrictions on the use of force since the end of the First World War by legally establishing *ad bellum* thresholds. This led to the emergence of the primary institution of non-use of force and the twin derivative primary institutions of collective security and peaceful change, as a result of which war lost its status as a legitimate means of international political change. As will be shown in the next section, these institutions have established themselves in contemporary international society, with significant impacts on power transition and international political change.

The focus on secondary institutions

Another characteristic of the interwar debate was its focus on the role of secondary institutions in managing change in international society. As we have seen in chapters 3 and 4, much of the debate on the problem of peaceful change centered around the role of such secondary institutions as the League of Nations and the Permanent Court of International Justice in international political change. In particular, it was shown that there existed a commonly held view that the entrenchment of the institutional symbiosis between collective security and peaceful change required the support of secondary

³ James Mayall, *World Politics: Progress and its Limits*, Cambridge: Polity Press, 2000, p. 94.

⁴ There were even international treaties and agreements providing for the limitation of the use of force amongst the contracting states, such as Bryan Treaties concluded by the US and other countries. However, under the principle *pacta tertiis nec nocent nec prosunt* (agreements can neither harm nor benefit third parties), these treaties and agreements could not have the effect of binding the behaviour of any third party, and therefore did not have the status of general or public international law.

institutions designed for the maintenance of international peace and security such as the League. That the majority of the books and articles on peaceful change published during the interwar period focused on how secondary institutions could, through interaction with primary institutions, manage international political change shows how widely the socio-structural conception of power transition was being shared by practitioners and scholars at that time.

This contrasts markedly with state-centrism prevalent in the existing literature on power transition, in which the role of secondary institutions rarely features. For instance, the role of the existing secondary institutions such as the UN and the International Court of Justice is rarely taken into account in theoretical debates on China's peaceful rise.⁵ While some liberal thinkers, such as G. John Ikenberry, discuss the role of secondary institutions such as the UN, they do not address how primary and secondary institutions interact to manage international political change, nor do they examine constitutive effects that secondary institutions may have on rising powers.⁶ By adopting the socio-structural conception of power transition, state-centrism prevalent in the existing literature can be corrected, and due attention can be given to the role of secondary institutions in the management of power transition and to their constitutive effects on rising powers.

The interwar debate on peaceful change sheds light on these hidden aspects of power transition to which much of the existing literature on power transition has been blind. The theoretical insights the debate offers are in accord with and supportive of the ES's conception of world politics, as set out in chapter 1. The question that rises here is

⁵ See, for example, Yi Feng, 'Global Power Transitions and Their Implications for the 21st Century', *Pacific Focus*, 28/2, 2013, pp. 170–189; Ronald L. Tammen and Jacek Kugler, 'Power Transition and China-US Conflicts', *Chinese Journal of International Politics*, 1/1, 2006, pp. 35–55; Woosang Kim and Scott Gates, 'Power Transition Theory and the Rise of China', *International Area Studies Review*, 18/3, 2015, pp. 219–226.

⁶ See G. John Ikenberry, 'The Rise of China and the Future of the West: Can the Liberal System Survive?', *Foreign Affairs*, 87/1, 2008, pp. 23–37; G. John Ikenberry, 'The Future of the Liberal World Order: Internationalism After America', *Foreign Affairs*, 90/3, 2011, pp. 56–68.

whether those insights are applicable to, and have any significance for, the analysis of power transition in contemporary international society. This question has to be answered in the affirmative since, as the following sections show, the post-war international order is characterised by, among other things, the development of international law regarding non-use of force, the institutionalisation of peaceful change, and the development of the machinery for managing international political change. All these developments make the insights the interwar debate offers valuable for power transition studies.

The post-war development of peaceful change in international society

Non-use of force in contemporary international society

As we have seen in chapter 3, non-use of force emerged as a principle, albeit an inchoate one, of international society in the aftermath of the First World War, and the Second World War brought home to practitioners and scholars alike the necessity of entrenching this principle more firmly in international society as an actual practice or institution. Thus, the UN Charter articulates its significance by enshrining it as one of the basic principles governing the behaviour of the UN member states. Article 2(4) reads as follows:

All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.⁷

The importance of the prohibition of the use of force has been reconfirmed in many international documents and declarations. For example, the Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations (hereafter the Declaration on Friendly

⁷ UN, Charter of the United Nations [hereafter UN Charter], 26 June 1945, Art. 2(4), available at: <http://www.un.org/en/charter-united-nations/index.html> (accessed 26 July 2017).

Relations) reconfirmed the significance of non-use of force and stated that '[s]uch a threat or use of force constitutes a violation of international law and the Charter of the United Nations and shall never be employed as a means of settling international issues'.⁸ It is to be noted that Article 2(4) not only prohibits the actual use of force, but also the *threat* of force. This principle has been confirmed in Article 52 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties which provides that '[a] treaty is void if its conclusion has been procured by the threat or use of force in violation of the principles of international law embodied in the Charter of the United Nations'.⁹ This has been reaffirmed in the Declaration of the Enhancement of the Effectiveness of the Principle of Refraining from the Threat or Use of Force in International Relations adopted in 1987.¹⁰ Moreover, the International Court of Justice (hereafter ICJ) has, in its judgement on the merits of the famous *Nicaragua case*, recognised the principle of non-use of force as a principle of customary international law underpinned by state practice and *opinio juris*.¹¹ There is disagreement as to whether the principle can also be regarded as a peremptory norm or *jus cogens*, even though the ICJ has taken a positive view of its peremptory status in the *Nicaragua case*.¹² Putting aside the question of its peremptory status, it cannot be denied that states no longer sign

⁸ UN General Assembly, Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations [hereafter the Declaration on Friendly Relations], UN Doc A/RES/2625(XXV), 24 October 1970.

⁹ UN, Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 23 May 1969, United Nations Treaty Series, vol. 1155, p. 344.

¹⁰ UN General Assembly, Declaration on the Enhancement of the Effectiveness of the Principle of Refraining from the Threat or Use of Force in International Relations, UN Doc A/RES/42/22, 18 November 1987.

¹¹ International Court of Justice [hereafter ICJ], Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America) [hereafter the *Nicaragua case*], Merits, Judgement of 27 June 1986, ICJ Reports 1986, p. 14, para. 188.

¹² See, for example, James A. Green, 'Questioning the Peremptory Status of the Prohibitions of the Use of Force', *Michigan Journal of International Law*, 32/2, 2011, pp. 215–257. For the ICJ's view on this point, see ICJ, the *Nicaragua case*, para. 190. See also Claus Kreß, 'The International Court of Justice and the "Principle of Non-Use of Force"', in Marc Weller (ed.), *The Oxford Handbook of the Use of Force in International Law*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015, pp. 561–604.

treaties that are incompatible with the principle of non-use of force, although this does not preclude the possibility that states can be actually violating the principle in purportedly *implementing* their treaty obligations. Therefore, the existing treaty-based military alliances in contemporary international society, such as the NATO and CSTO, are all explained to be *defensive* in purpose.

As is well known, the two legal exceptions to the general prohibition on the use of force as set out in Article 2(4) are the use of force in self-defence under Article 51 of the Charter and the use of force as part of enforcement action authorised by the Security Council under Chapter VII of the Charter. However, there have been efforts to loosen the legal restrictions on the use of force. It has been claimed from time to time that the Charter does not prohibit the use of force in pursuit of the purposes of the United Nations such as the promotion of self-determination, democracy and human rights.¹³ Some have even claimed that Article 2(4) is just one of many factors against which the lawfulness of the use of force is to be assessed.¹⁴ However, it is to be noted that these arguments *presuppose* the validity and importance of the principle of non-use of force and are not meant as the denial of it. There are those who claim that Article 2(4) has become a dead letter due to the recurrent non-compliance with it on the part of states.¹⁵ Indeed, it is undeniable that states have from time to time conducted themselves in a manner incompatible with the prohibition set out in the article. However, as Claus Kreß rightly points out, this point has already been worked out by the ICJ in its decision on the *Nicaragua* case.¹⁶ In its ruling, the Court stated that:

¹³ Christine Gray, 'The Use of Force and the International Legal Order', in Malcolm D. Evans (ed.), *International Law*, 4th edn, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014, pp. 622–626.

¹⁴ W. Michael Reisman, 'Article 2(4): The Use of Force in Contemporary International Law', *Proceedings of the Annual Meeting (American Society of International Law)*, 78, 1984, pp. 74–87.

¹⁵ See, for example, Thomas M. Franck, 'Who Killed Article 2(4)? or: Changing Norms Governing the Use of Force by States', *The American Journal of International Law*, 64/5, 1970, pp. 809–837.

¹⁶ Kreß, 'International Court of Justice', p. 570.

It is not to be expected that in the practice of States the application of the rules in question should have been perfect, in the sense that States should have refrained, with complete consistency, from the use of force ... The Court does not consider that, for a rule to be established as customary, the corresponding practice must be in absolutely rigorous conformity with the rule. ... If a State acts in a way *prima facie* incompatible with a recognized rule, but defends its conduct by appealing to exceptions or justifications contained within the rule itself, then whether or not the State's conduct is in fact justifiable on that basis, the significance of that attitude is to confirm rather than to weaken the rule.¹⁷

The Russian annexation of Crimea has been criticised as a clear violation of the principle set out in Article 2(4) of the Charter, which prohibits not only the use of, but also the *threat* of, force. For instance, the G7 leaders stated in the 2016 G7 Summit Declaration that '[w]e reiterate our condemnation of the illegal annexation of the Crimean peninsula by Russia and reaffirm our policy of its non-recognition'.¹⁸ In order to shake off accusations, Russia has tried to vindicate itself by providing a series of justifications based on various reasons such as consent, self-defence, the protection of nationals, etc.¹⁹ While it is often argued that the Russian conduct in Crimea poses a challenge to the principle of non-use of force, the fact that Russia has had to try to justify its actions attests to the validity of, and the importance attached to, the principle.

In view of these, it can be argued that non-use of force—a fundamental and durable state practice underpinned by *opinio juris*, i.e. the belief that it is a legitimate pattern of behaviour in international society—has been firmly entrenched in international society as an entrenched practice or *primary institution* governing international dispute settlement in contemporary international society.²⁰ This marks a significant and historic change in

¹⁷ ICJ, the *Nicaragua* case, para. 186.

¹⁸ G7, G7 Ise-Shima Leaders' Declaration, 26–27 May 2016, available at: <http://www.mofa.go.jp/files/000160266.pdf> (accessed 26 July 2017), p. 22.

¹⁹ See Roy Allison, 'Russian "Deniable" Intervention in Ukraine: How and Why Russia Broke the Rules', *International Affairs*, 90/6, 2014, pp. 1261–1268.

²⁰ For the definition of primary institutions, see Buzan, *From International to World Society?*, p. 167.

international social structure regulating the use of force. This also represents the undermining of the Schmittian position that emphasises the role of the primary institution of war in world politics.²¹ As shown below, the post-war international social structure governing change is founded on the combination of Carrian ideas, which emphasise the role of primary institutions such as diplomacy and great power management, and Lauterpachtian ideas, which emphasise the role of the primary institutions of non-use of force and international law and that of various secondary institutions reflective of these primary institutions. In ES terminology, contemporary international society can be interpreted as being in the process of transition from a *Coexistence* international society to a *Cooperative* international society.²²

Collective security and peaceful change in contemporary international society

This trend has been reinforced by the institutionalisation of collective security and peaceful change, which are, as discussed in chapter 3, derivative primary institutions derived from the master primary institution of non-use of force. The UN Charter reconfirms the importance of these two derivative primary institutions and the symbiotic relationship between them for the maintenance of international peace and security. Article 1(1) of the Charter reads as follows:

[The Purposes of the United Nations are:] 1. To maintain international peace and security, and to that end: to take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace, *and* to bring about by peaceful means, and in

²¹ This is not to imply that war in the sense of the use of force has altogether ceased to be a primary institution of international society. As Buzan points out, the use of force is still being considered as legitimate for certain specific purposes in contemporary international society, and recent debates around responsibility to protect (R2P) can be interpreted as an effort to change the nature and purpose of war as a primary institution of international society. See Barry Buzan, *An Introduction to the English School of International Relations*, Cambridge: Polity Press, 2014, pp. 150–153.

²² Buzan, *From International to World Society?*, pp. 191–194.

conformity with the principles of justice and international law, adjustment or settlement of international disputes or situations which might lead to a breach of the peace²³

As is clearly stated in this article, the Charter emphasises the importance of promoting *both* collective security *and* peaceful change, and this demonstrates that the drafters of the Charter had fully understood the significance of the symbiotic relationship between collective security and peaceful change for safeguarding international peace and security. This also shows that the drafting of the Charter had been informed by the interwar debate on peaceful change.²⁴

It is well known that the UN is given greater powers than the League of Nations in terms of collective security. Chapter VII of the UN Charter confers on the Security Council the power to make binding decisions and take necessary measures to enforce peace, including military ones. This contrasts sharply with the fact that some of the founders of the League, such as Lord Cecil, had relied almost solely on the agency of international public opinion as a mechanism to implement decisions made by the League.²⁵ The UN was founded on the basis of the realisation that international public opinion, if not shored up by some form of material power, is not sufficient to constrain the aggressive behaviour of rising, revisionist powers. The Charter seeks to provide the material underpinning necessary to enforce peace by means of its strengthened mechanisms for promoting collective security.

Informed by the interwar debate on peaceful change, and its founders being aware

²³ UN Charter, Art. 1(1), emphasis added.

²⁴ In ES theory, the UN and its Security Council have often been understood as reflective of the primary institutions of diplomacy and great power management respectively. See Buzan, *From International to World Society?*, p. 187. The present study duly takes account of this, but focuses on the primary institutions of collective security and peaceful change in order to shed light on another, hitherto insufficiently explored aspect of these secondary institutions.

²⁵ See Lord Robert Cecil, *World Opinion and the League of Nations*, London: League of Nations Union, 1918.

of the symbiotic relationship between collective security and peaceful change, the Charter combines the strengthened machinery for collective security with that for peaceful change. Indeed, the Charter puts significant emphasis on peaceful change and seeks to institutionalise it by promoting the principle of pacific settlement of disputes. Article 2(3) which provides that '[a]ll Members shall settle their international disputes by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security, and justice, are not endangered'.²⁶ Peaceful change is vitally important for non-use of force, for collective security cannot in itself eliminate root causes of international disputes and conflicts. As Tomuschat remarks:

... since the use of coercive means is unlawful under the prohibition of intervention and the principle of non-use of force, a different mechanism of conflict resolution is required. Disputes which are left unsettled can lead to eruptive disturbances. Hence, the principle of peaceful settlement of disputes occupies a pivotal position within a world order whose hallmark is the ban on force and coercion.²⁷

As discussed in chapter 3, collective security and peaceful change are mutually dependent and they cannot exist without each other, and the symbiotic relationship between them is the key to giving substance to non-use of force.

States have reaffirmed their commitment to the principle of pacific settlement of disputes in many international documents and instruments. The aforementioned Declaration on Friendly Relations and the Manila Declaration on the Peaceful Settlement of International Disputes (hereafter the Manila Declaration) are among the most often cited international documents.²⁸ Moreover, the principle has been recognised by the ICJ

²⁶ UN Charter, Art. 2(3).

²⁷ Christian Tomuschat, 'Article 2 (3)', in Bruno Simma, Daniel-Erasmus Khan, Georg Nolte and Andreas Paulus (eds), *The Charter of the United Nations: A Commentary*, 3rd edn, vol. I, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012, p. 184.

²⁸ UN General Assembly, the Declaration on Friendly Relations; UN General Assembly,

as a principle of customary international law underpinned by state practice and *opinio juris*.²⁹ In view of these, it can be argued that peaceful change has also been firmly established not merely as an idea or principle, but also as a practice or primary institution governing international political change in contemporary international society. The next section turns to different methods or techniques that help states to *practise* peaceful change in contemporary international society.

Methods for peaceful change in contemporary international society

As discussed above, contemporary international social structure governing political change is based on both Carrian and Lauterpachtian ideas and is comprised of both primary and secondary institutions. Moreover, it combines methods which involve a third party and those which do not. On the basis of the principle of free choice of means, states are free to choose whatever means they consider appropriate for settling their disputes as long as the means employed is compatible with the rules and principles of international law in general and of the UN Charter in particular. There are various methods or techniques that help states to practise peaceful change in contemporary international society. In this section, I will focus on methods and techniques which may be employed by states without the involvement of the UN as a third party. These methods and techniques include negotiation, mediation, inquiry, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement and resort to regional organisations. These methods or techniques are listed in Article 33(1) of the UN Charter and in such documents as the aforementioned declarations,

Manila Declaration on the Peaceful Settlement of International Disputes [hereafter the Manila Declaration], UN Doc A/RES/37/10, 15 November 1982. These documents are cited or referred to in Tomuschat, 'Article 2 (3)', p. 186; Simon O'Connor and Cecilia M. Bailliet, 'The Good Faith Obligation to Maintain International Peace and Security and the Pacific Settlement of Disputes', in Cecilia Marcela Bailliet and Kjetil Mujezinović Larsen (eds), *Promoting Peace Through International Law*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015, pp. 68–69; John Merrills, 'The Means of Dispute Settlement', in Malcolm D. Evans (ed.), *International Law*, 4th edn, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014, p. 564.

²⁹ See ICJ, the *Nicaragua* case, para. 290.

and are premised on different primary and secondary institutions in different ways.

Negotiation, mediation, inquiry and conciliation

I shall start by examining methods and techniques underpinned by the primary institution of diplomacy: negotiation, mediation, inquiry and conciliation. To start with, *negotiation* is used routinely by states as a means for dispute settlement. Indeed, it is the most basic method used for settling international differences and is often employed in combination with other methods and techniques.³⁰ Since the outcomes of diplomatic negotiations tend to reflect power differentials between parties to disputes, this method is, understandably, often preferred by states with a strong bargaining power.³¹ It is therefore one of the methods most likely to be preferred by rising powers in the context of power transition. For example, with regard to the South China Sea dispute, China has shown its preference for negotiation over judicial settlement including arbitration.³² Diplomatic negotiation can be either bilateral or multilateral. When multilateral negotiation among a group of states become an established practice, this can be seen as a sign of the emergence of multilateralism, which is a derivative primary institution derived from the master primary institution of diplomacy.³³ Such groupings of states as the G7 and G20 can be viewed as manifestations of multilateralism. *Mediation* is among the most commonly employed methods for dispute settlement and is also underpinned by the primary institution of diplomacy. It is a method whereby an appointed third party seeks to settle international differences by proposing a non-binding solution based on the claims and information provided by the parties.³⁴ The method has been widely used in practice, and its

³⁰ Merrills, 'Means of Dispute Settlement', pp. 564–565.

³¹ *Ibid.*, p. 565.

³² See Yu Mincai, 'China's Responses to the Compulsory Arbitration on the South China Sea Dispute: Legal Effects and Policy Options', *Ocean Development & International Law*, 45/1, 2014, pp. 1–16.

³³ See Buzan, *From International to World Society?*, pp. 183–184.

³⁴ Merrills, 'Means of Dispute Settlement', p. 566; O'Connor and Bailliet, 'Good Faith Obligation', p. 74.

importance has been reaffirmed in a recent General Assembly resolution.³⁵ When the role of the mediator is assumed by a great power, the method of mediation can be said to be premised on the primary institution of great power management as well as on diplomacy. Such great power mediation can, by virtue of the mediator's power and authority, often facilitate pacific settlement of disputes and mitigate the effect of power imbalances between the parties on terms of settlement. On the other side of the coin, the great power assuming the role of the mediator might use its position to press for a solution which suits its own interest. In short, there is a dilemma between effectiveness and impartiality here. *Inquiry* is a method whereby the parties to a dispute appoint a commission of inquiry which will carry out fact-finding inquiry in order to ascertain the facts relevant to the dispute. *Conciliation* is a method that 'combin[es] inquiry with the power to make recommendations' on terms of settlement.³⁶ Peaceful change can be practised in contemporary international society by encouraging states to utilise these methods and techniques based on diplomacy and great power management.

Arbitration and judicial settlement

Peaceful change can also be practised with the help of the primary institution of international law. *Arbitration* and *judicial settlement* are methods for dispute settlement whose effectiveness depends on international law and secondary institutions reflecting and reinforcing it, such as the ICJ, the Permanent Court of Arbitration and other arbitral tribunals. Significant as they are, these legal methods are not very suitable for settling *political* disputes where one or more of the parties concerned are seeking to challenge and change the status quo, and hence not always the best way to manage changes in the context of power transition. Indeed, as the recent South China Sea Arbitration clearly demonstrated, it is unlikely that rising powers will accept the jurisdiction of international

³⁵ See UN General Assembly, UN General Assembly Resolution 65/283, UN Doc A/RES/65/283, 22 June 2011.

³⁶ Merrills, 'Means of Dispute Settlement', p. 569.

courts or tribunals when they believe they can obtain better diplomatic results through negotiation. However, the ICJ can still contribute to the management of international political change by issuing advisory opinions at the request of the UN General Assembly or the Security Council.

Since arbitration and judicial settlement are established practices of contemporary international society, these methods can be seen as derivative primary institutions derived from the master primary institution of international law. Categorising these methods as institutions is not peculiar to the present study, and it is, in fact, in accord with Martin Wight's conception of institutions. As he remarked:

Arbitration is an institution for the settlement of minor differences between states. War is the institution for the final decision of differences.³⁷

Similarly, since the four methods described above—negotiation, mediation, inquiry and conciliation—are all established practices of contemporary international society, these methods can also be viewed as derivative primary institutions derived from diplomacy (and, in the case of mediation, from great power management). The institutionalisation of these methods and techniques for dispute settlement has added to the diversity and multifariousness of the social structure governing change in contemporary international society.

Regional organisations and issue-specific secondary institutions

In contemporary international society, *regional organisations* have been increasingly and actively engaged in dispute settlement. The importance of regional organisations, which can be seen as secondary institutions at the regional level, has been recognised for a long time. For example, Boutros Boutros-Ghali's *An Agenda for Peace* emphasised the need

³⁷ Martin Wight, *Power Politics*, Leicester: Leicester University Press, 1978, p. 112, emphasis added.

to build a cooperative relationship between the UN and regional organisations, and *the 2005 World Summit Outcome Document* reaffirmed this point.³⁸

For example, the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) and its successor, the African Union (AU), have worked towards achieving peace and security in Africa. Although the Commission of Mediation, Conciliation and Arbitration was set up by the OAU Charter, the OAU had sought to settle disputes and resolve conflicts by employing informal methods such as good offices and mediation and by setting up ad hoc committees for mediation, as was the case with the border dispute between Algeria and Morocco.³⁹ In 2004, the AU member states established the Peace and Security Council (PSC) which is a standing decision-making body tasked with promoting regional peace and security, and this can be seen an effort to strengthen the AU's formal and institutional structure for peaceful change.⁴⁰

The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) is another example of regional organisations which have contributed to the maintenance of regional peace and security. As was the case with the OAU, the member states of ASEAN have placed emphasis on informal approaches to dealing with disputes among its members despite the

³⁸ Boutros Boutros-Ghali, *An Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peace-keeping*, UN Doc A/47/277, 17 June 1992, paras. 60–65; UN General Assembly, UN General Assembly Resolution 60/1, 2005 World Summit Outcome, UN Doc A/RES/60/1, 16 September, 2005, para. 170.

³⁹ See P. Mwet Munya, 'Organization of African Unity and its Role in Regional Conflict Resolution and Dispute Settlement: A Critical Evaluation', *The Boston College Third World Law Journal*, 19/2, 1999, pp. 547–553, 556–558. See also Tiyanjana Maluwa, 'The Peaceful Settlement of Disputes among African States, 1963–1983: Some Conceptual Issues and Practical Trends', *International and Comparative Law Quarterly*, 38/2, 1989, pp. 307–308. While it is true that the OAU has contributed to the settlement of border disputes, it is debatable whether those settlements can be seen as examples of peaceful *change* in view of the fact that most of those settlements were based on the principle of *uti possidetis juris*, that is the recognition of the validity of the territorial status quo.

⁴⁰ Whether this organ will be able to play a meaningful role in future dispute settlement processes remains to be seen. On the PSC and the challenges it faces, see Paul D. Williams, 'The Peace and Security Council of the African Union: Evaluating an Embryonic International Institution', *Journal of Modern African Studies*, 47/4, 2009, pp. 603–626.

fact that ASEAN has formal mechanisms for settling disputes.⁴¹ In this regard, the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) shows a similar trend. While there exists the OSCE Court of Conciliation and Arbitration, it has remained inactive since its inception in 1992.⁴² Instead, the OSCE has focused its efforts on conflict management and resolution through field operations and through ad hoc frameworks such as the Minsk process and the 5+2 talks on the Transnistrian settlement process.⁴³

The EU has not only been successful in managing disputes among its member states, but also has increased its capacity for external actions and, under the Common Security and Defence Policy, engaged with processes of conflict prevention and peace building in extra-regional countries and areas over the years.⁴⁴

These are but some of the examples of regional organisations that have contributed to the maintenance of peace and security. The growth in the number of regional secondary institutions can be interpreted as a regional expression of the primary institution of multilateralism or, to put it another way, a manifestation of multilateralism at the regional level. This ‘regional multilateralism’⁴⁵ is one of the features of contemporary international social structure.

⁴¹ See Mely Caballero-Anthony, ‘Mechanisms of Dispute Settlement: The ASEAN Experience’, *Contemporary Southeast Asia*, 20/1, 1998, pp. 38–66.

⁴² For a general account of the Court, see OSCE, Court of Conciliation and Arbitration, available at: <http://www.osce.org/cca> (accessed 3 February 2017).

⁴³ See OSCE, Conflict Prevention and Resolution, available at: <http://www.osce.org/conflict-prevention-and-resolution> (accessed 3 February 2017).

⁴⁴ See European Union External Action, The Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), available at: https://eeas.europa.eu/topics/common-security-and-defence-policy-csdp_en?page=2 (accessed 3 February 2017). See also Eva Gross and Ana E. Juncos (eds), *EU Conflict Prevention and Crisis Management: Roles, Institutions and Policies*, Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge, 2010.

⁴⁵ This term has been coined and used by Harris Mylonas and Emirhan Yorulmazlar, albeit in a slightly different context. See Harris Mylonas and Emirhan Yorulmazlar, ‘Regional Multilateralism’, Global Public Square, 14 January 2012, available at: <http://globalpublicsquare.blogs.cnn.com/2012/01/14/regional-multilateralism-should-be-the-next-paradigm-in-global-affairs/> (accessed 26 July 2017).

These methods, techniques and organisations can help bring about peaceful change in contemporary international society, albeit in different ways. Which of these methods is the most appropriate way of settling a dispute depends largely on the nature of the dispute and the goals pursued by the parties concerned. In some specific issue-areas, there are issue-specific arrangements or treaties prescribing specific norms, rules and procedures for dispute settlement and international disputes falling within those issue-areas are normally dealt with in accordance with those requirements. Examples of such issue-specific arrangements and treaties include, but are not limited to, the Law of the Sea Convention and the WTO dispute settlement system.

It is noteworthy that there has been an increase in the number of secondary institutions in contemporary international society at the regional level, as in the case of the EU and the ASEAN, and in some specific issue-areas, as in the case of the WTO and the International Tribunal on the Law of the Sea (ITLOS). As James Crawford remarked:

In clear contrast with Grotius' view of international law as [secondary] institution-less, the 20th century saw the development of a large number of [secondary] institutions and the struggle against the 'ad hoc': not a struggle against the existing conception of arbitration, but rather a struggle against *ad hoc* arrangements for dispute settlement. ... So the 20th century has brought [secondary] institutions and it has, especially in the last 15 years, brought a vast increase in the number of disputes being submitted to these institutions.⁴⁶

The growth in the number of secondary institutions at the regional level and in some specific issue-areas can be interpreted as a manifestation of this struggle for *permanence* in the field of international dispute settlement.

Some of the above-mentioned methods or secondary institutions might not seem to be particularly relevant to power transition. However, such a view can only be justified

⁴⁶ James Crawford, 'Continuity and Discontinuity in International Dispute Settlement: An Inaugural Lecture', *Journal of International Dispute Settlement*, 1/1, 2010, pp. 13–14.

on the basis of what may be called the essentialist conception of power transition, which sees changes induced by power transition as confined to limited issue-areas and as brought about by limited means. While such a conception of power transition may be compatible with theories of power transition based on the materialist-individualist ontology, it is insupportable from the point of view of the present study which is based on the idealist-holist ontology.⁴⁷ IR theories based on the latter ontological position, including constructivism and ES theory on which the present study draws on, have argued that states' interests and identities are constituted and redefined by international social structure and that the means by which they pursue their interests and preserve their identities is dependent on the character of international social structure.⁴⁸ If this be the case, there are no *theoretical* reasons to think that some methods of peaceful change are irrelevant to power transition. While it is important to distinguish between changes induced by power transition and those which are not, it is not possible to assume a priori that some issue-areas are essentially connected to the problem of power transition, nor is it possible to identify a priori the means or methods by which changes are invariably brought about in the context of power transition. As will be discussed in greater detail in the following chapter, rising powers can, and indeed they have, pursued widely different goals and they have made use of different methods reflecting different primary and secondary institutions for the purpose of obtaining desired changes.

The centrality of the UN system

As significant as these methods, techniques and organisations are for international dispute settlement, it is the UN and, especially, its Security Council that are expected to play a central role in promoting the primary institution of peaceful change in contemporary

⁴⁷ Alexander Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999, pp. 22–33.

⁴⁸ Buzan, *From International to World Society?*; Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*.

international society. As discussed in chapter 3, if peaceful change is to be promoted and entrenched in international society as a primary institution, it is imperative that it be supported and upheld by secondary institutions designed for this purpose, such as the League of Nations. This is not to imply that every single primary institution requires the support of secondary institutions. However, some primary institutions require the support of secondary institutions because they are in tension with other primary institutions. As Buzan points out, there can be '[t]ensions and contradictions among primary institutions', which could potentially lead to an international socio-structural change.⁴⁹ As can be readily imagined, such a tension is likely to arise when a new primary institution aimed at reforming international social structure is emerging. Such was the case with peaceful change since it was in tension with the classical primary institution of war at the most fundamental level, and it was for this reason that peaceful change needed to be reinforced by the League. Moreover, although peaceful change has been established as a primary institution in contemporary international society, it is still in need of the support of the UN and its Security Council given the fact that states have from time to time resorted to war.

Issue-specific secondary institutions such as the WTO and the ITLOS and regional secondary institutions such as the EU, AU and ASEAN may well prove effective in settling international disputes that fall within their own jurisdiction, but the development of secondary institutions encompassing all issue-areas and regions across the globe is a *sine qua non* in order for peaceful change to be promoted and firmly entrenched in contemporary international society as a *general* primary institution governing international political change. The centrality of the UN system in this respect is reaffirmed in the above-mentioned Manila Declaration.

Member States should make full use of the provisions of the Charter of the

⁴⁹ Buzan, *From International to World Society?*, p. 250.

United Nations, including the procedures and means provided for therein, particularly Chapter VI, concerning the peaceful settlement of disputes.⁵⁰

If the UN is expected to play a central role in promoting peaceful change, then how can it carry out such a function? What are the provisions of the Charter concerning peaceful change and how effective are they? What are the limitations of the current UN system with regard to peaceful change? It is to these questions that we now turn.

Peaceful change and the UN Charter

This section will have a close look at Article 14 and Chapter VI of the UN Charter, which are the Charter's main provisions for peaceful change. I shall compare these provisions with some of the provisions in the League Covenant in order to highlight the distinct features of the Charter with regard to peaceful change. I shall also consider how those provisions of the Charter have been applied in practice and examine how the UN practice with regard to peaceful change has developed since its inception in 1945, for mere textual exegesis of the Charter would not suffice to present a realistic picture of the UN as it exists today.

Article 14 and the General Assembly

Article 14 falls within Chapter IV of the Charter which defines the powers of the General Assembly. The article provides that:

Subject to the provisions of Article 12, the General Assembly may recommend measures for the peaceful adjustment of any situation, regardless of origin, which it deems likely to impair the general welfare or friendly relations among nations, including situations resulting from a violation of the provisions of the present Charter setting forth the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations.⁵¹

⁵⁰ UN General Assembly, the Manila Declaration, part II, para. 1.

⁵¹ UN Charter, Art. 14.

As Markus Zöckler and Donald Riznik explain, Article 14 may appear to confer broader powers on the Assembly than did its counterpart in the League Covenant, Article 19, for the following reasons.⁵² Firstly, while Article 19 of the Covenant gave the League Assembly the right to ‘advise the reconsideration ... of treaties which have become inapplicable and the consideration of international conditions whose continuance might endanger the peace of the world’, Article 14 of the Charter gives the General Assembly the right to ‘recommend measures’ necessary for peaceful adjustment. Secondly, while, pursuant to Article 5(1) of the Covenant, decisions under Article 19 had to be approved by unanimous assent of the member states attending the League Assembly meeting, General Assembly decisions under Article 14 of the Charter can be made by two-thirds majority vote. Thirdly, whereas Article 19 of the Covenant set limits on the subjects and situations which the League Assembly could address, the General Assembly, under Article 14 of the Charter, is given the right to address ‘any situation, regardless of origin, which it deems likely to impair the general welfare or friendly relations among nations’, including matters concerning treaty revision.⁵³

While Article 14 of the Charter can be seen as conferring broader powers on the General Assembly in these respects, it must be noted that the powers given by Article 14 to the General Assembly are the powers to make *recommendations*, which are non-binding *de jure*. This is not to say that General Assembly recommendations are insignificant; they can even be binding *de facto* in some cases. Generally speaking, General Assembly recommendations are viewed as reflecting the weight of international opinion, if not a consensus, among the UN member states, and therefore they carry political and moral weight.⁵⁴

⁵² Markus Zöckler and Donald Riznik, ‘Article 14’, in Bruno Simma, Daniel-Erasmus Khan, Georg Nolte and Andreas Paulus (eds), *The Charter of the United Nations: A Commentary*, 3rd edn, vol. I, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012, p. 557.

⁵³ However, it can be argued that Article 19 of the Covenant was *ambiguous enough* to cover ‘any situation, regardless of origin’.

⁵⁴ Leland M. Goodrich and Edvard Hambro, *Charter of the United Nations: Commentary*

After all is said, however, this basic limitation on the power and authority of the General Assembly puts it in much the same position as the League Assembly so far as peaceful change is concerned. In view of this, Leland Goodrich, who attended the San Francisco Conference as the secretary of the committee in charge of drafting the Charter provisions on pacific settlement of disputes, wrote in 1947 that ‘the power conferred under this Article does not go substantially beyond that of the Assembly under Article 19 of the Covenant and there is the same chance, if not likelihood, that the United Nations will be ineffective as an instrument for treaty revision’.⁵⁵ In a sense, this is not entirely unintentional inasmuch as some delegates to the San Francisco Conference were actually against adding provisions for treaty revision. Indeed, some of them sought to and succeeded in removing the word ‘treaty revision’ from Article 14 ‘on the ground that it would weaken the structure of international contractual obligations which provides the basis for orderly relations among the nations of the world’.⁵⁶ The result of this political wrangling is what is known as the Vandenberg Amendment which introduced the phrase ‘any situation, regardless of origin’.⁵⁷ It is generally understood that treaty revision can be discussed under Article 14, but this episode in the drafting history of the Charter reveals the extent to which some statesmen and diplomats had been reluctant to address or even talk about the issue of treaty revision. When Argentina floated the idea to discuss and review its peace treaty with Italy under Article 14 at the second General Assembly session, the Argentine proposal met with opposition from several states which emphasised the sanctity of treaties. This was the first ever attempt to invoke Article 14 for the purpose of treaty revision in the history of the UN, but the proposal to utilise the article was eventually withdrawn by Argentina itself.⁵⁸

and Documents, 2nd edn, Boston: World Peace Foundation, 1949, p. 178.

⁵⁵ Leland M. Goodrich, ‘From League of Nations to United Nations’, *International Organization*, 1/1, 1947, p. 8.

⁵⁶ Goodrich and Hambro, *Charter of the United Nations*, pp. 178–179.

⁵⁷ Zöckler and Riznik, ‘Article 14’, p. 553.

⁵⁸ Goodrich and Hambro, *Charter of the United Nations*, p. 179.

Despite this inauspicious start, Article 14 has appeared in a number of General Assembly resolutions on various topics and issues.⁵⁹ For example, General Assembly Resolution 721(VIII) regarding race conflict in South Africa asked the United Nations Commission on the Racial Situation in the Union of South Africa to carry on its inquiry into the racial situation in South Africa in ‘relation to the provisions of the Charter and, in particular, to Article 14’.⁶⁰

While Article 14 has been invoked, and the language of the article employed, in a number of General Assembly resolutions, it has seldom been used as an avenue for treaty revision. In fact, the Argentine attempt to invoke it at the second Assembly session is the only example of it being used as a means for treaty revision, as far as I can find. Moreover, although the article has appeared in a number of General Assembly resolutions, the General Assembly usually does not go beyond calling on the parties to a dispute to agree to a cease-fire and to commence negotiations with a view to arriving at an amicable settlement or adjustment, and it often shies away from making recommendations concerning terms of settlement or the principles on which terms of settlement must be based. The most prominent example of this approach taken by the General Assembly can be found in Resolution 2793(XXVI) adopted on 7 December 1971 against the backdrop of the hostilities over the status of East Pakistan (now Bangladesh).⁶¹ Although this resolution, which employed the wording of but did not explicitly refer to Article 14, recognised ‘the need to deal appropriately at a subsequent stage, within the framework of the Charter of the United Nations, with the issues which have given rise to the hostilities’, it did not specify or suggest terms of settlement or the principles on which a settlement between the belligerents must be based, such as the principle of self-determination, and

⁵⁹ Zöckler and Riznik, ‘Article 14’, pp. 563–565.

⁶⁰ UN General Assembly, UN General Assembly Resolution 721(VIII), UN Doc A/RES/721(VIII), 8 December 1953, para. 4.

⁶¹ UN General Assembly, UN General Assembly Resolution 2793(XXVI), UN Doc A/RES/2793(XXVI), 7 December 1971.

instead merely '[c]all[ed] upon the Government of India and Pakistan to take forthwith all measures for an immediate cease-fire and withdrawal of their armed forces on the territory of the other to their own side of the India-Pakistan borders'.⁶²

In view of these, it has to be admitted that the General Assembly's track record for peaceful change has been by no means satisfactory, and it is therefore necessary to explore ways to enhance its capacity to promote and entrench peaceful change in international society. However, it must be noted that, under the present Charter, the role of the General Assembly in promoting and entrenching peaceful change is secondary to the role of the Security Council. Indeed, the Charter explicitly stipulates that the provisions of Article 14 are subject to Article 12, which means that the General Assembly is obliged *not* to 'make any recommendation with regard to' the dispute or situation in question while the Security Council is dealing with it 'unless the Security Council so requests'.⁶³ In short, it is the Security Council that carries the primary responsibility for promoting and entrenching peaceful change in contemporary international society. The Council promotes and entrenches the primary institution of peaceful change by facilitating peaceful settlement of disputes among states, and it is therefore necessary to look at Chapter VI of the Charter which provides for the Council's powers with regard to peaceful settlement of disputes.

Before moving on to discuss the role of the Security Council, it will be well to pay attention to the role that the General Assembly played in entrenching peaceful change without recourse to its powers under Article 14 in the context of the North-South divide. As is well known among ES scholars, Hedley Bull understood the North-South divide in terms of the problem of peaceful change. While Bull held the view that the problem of peaceful change had become less prominent as a result of the advent of nuclear weapons and other developments in contemporary international society, he was of the view that the

⁶² Ibid., para. 1; James Crawford, *The Creation of States in International Law*, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2006, p. 393.

⁶³ UN Charter, Art. 12.

problem concerning the establishment and entrenchment of the international practice of peacefully revising the status quo remained relevant in the context of decolonisation or what he later called ‘the revolt against the West’.⁶⁴ In a famous lecture in which he articulated his understanding of justice in international society, he pointed out that the problems posed by the North-South divide were commonly seen as analogous to those posed by the rise of the fascist powers.⁶⁵ As he remarked:

It is common to view the conflict between the Third World and the West as one between the values of justice and of order in international relations (just as in the interwar period the conflict between the revisionist states, Germany, Italy and Japan, and the *status quo* powers, Great Britain and France, was so regarded).⁶⁶

Although he thought this was too much of a simplification, he did stress the importance of accommodating the demands of the Third World for just changes from the point of view of the maintenance of international order.⁶⁷ Bull took the North-South divide very seriously not primarily because he thought this issue was of great moral or ethical significance; nor can his worries be fully explained with reference to the concern, most clearly expressed by Martin Wight, that decolonisation resulted in the cultural fragmentation of international society.⁶⁸ Bull directed a serious look at the North-South divide because he regarded it as an instance of potential *power transition*. As he remarked:

There is, however, a more disturbing side to these adjustments. The Western

⁶⁴ Hedley Bull, ‘The Twenty Years’ Crisis Thirty Years On’, *International Journal*, 24/4, 1969, p. 633ff. See also Hedley Bull, ‘The Revolt against the West’, in Hedley Bull and Adam Watson (eds), *The Expansion of International Society*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984, pp. 217–228.

⁶⁵ Hedley Bull, ‘Justice in International Relations: The 1983 Hagey Lectures (1984)’, in Kai Alderson and Andrew Hurrell (eds), *Hedley Bull on International Society*, London: Macmillan, 2000, p. 226.

⁶⁶ *Ibid.*

⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 243.

⁶⁸ Martin Wight, *Systems of States*, Leicester: Leicester University Press, 1977, pp. 33–34.

countries are asked to accept not merely the ending of their privileges, but also a reduction of their power. This is what the revolt against Western dominance is chiefly about, more than it is about national self-determination or human rights or closing the gap between rich and poor. As the Third World countries develop their economies, their societies, their polities and their military strength and reduce or eliminate their vulnerability to Western (and Soviet) intervention, they will create an international system, the political structure of which will be vastly different from that to which the Western peoples have long been accustomed.⁶⁹

While the problems surrounding the North-South divide have not been completely solved, some of those problems have been addressed by the emergence of *development* as a primary institution of international society and by the demise of the primary institution of imperialism/colonialism which took place concomitantly.⁷⁰ The UN General Assembly played a role in this process and assisted in the entrenchment of the primary institution of development, for example, by adopting the *Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples* and by establishing the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) which is a secondary institution aimed at redressing the inequalities existing among developed and developing countries. While Article 14 of the Charter has remained ineffectual as we have seen above, this does not mean that the Assembly has been completely irrelevant to the promotion of peaceful change in contemporary international society.⁷¹

⁶⁹ Bull, 'Justice in International Relations', p. 243. Robert Ayson shows that Bull held the view that '[t]he success of the third world's claims for justice, which now extended to issues surrounding the distribution of economic resources, reflected a shift in the international distribution of power'. Robert Ayson, *Hedley Bull and the Accommodation of Power*, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012, p. 179.

⁷⁰ Buzan, *Introduction to the English School*, pp. 153–156.

⁷¹ As Ayson points out, Bull held that one of the factors supporting the third world's demands for just change was 'the expansion of the institution of sovereign statehood to include the third world', and this, in turn, helped the newly created third world countries to push their agendas at the UN General Assembly. See Ayson, *Bull and the Accommodation of Power*, p. 180. In the context of decolonisation, the primary institution of sovereignty was one of the key institutions governing international political change.

Chapter VI of the UN Charter and the Security Council

The Security Council is a secondary institution not only reflective of the primary institution of peaceful change, but is also responsible for promoting and entrenching it in international society; the Council and peaceful change are mutually constitutive in the sense that the Council is an integral part of the entrenched practice of peacefully bringing about changes in international society and, at the same time, the existence of such a practice forms the basis on which the Council carries out its responsibilities with regard to international peace and security. What makes this process of mutual constitution operative is the Council's role as an agent of international political change, and the Council performs this role via exercise of its powers under Chapter VI (and potentially Chapter VII) of the Charter.

The Charter is based on the principle of free choice of means in the sphere of international dispute settlement, and Article 33(1) of Chapter VI obliges the parties to a dispute to seek to settle the dispute by 'peaceful means of their own choice'.⁷² However, the Charter also empowers the Security Council to intervene as a third party and to make procedural and/or substantive recommendations for the peaceful settlement of international disputes. Under Article 34, the Security Council is entitled to look into 'any dispute, or any situation which might lead to international friction or give rise to a dispute, in order to determine whether the continuance of the dispute or situation is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security'.⁷³ When the Security Council determines that a dispute or situation is of such a nature as to be likely to endanger international peace and security, it is authorised, under Article 33(2), to 'call upon the parties to settle their dispute' by means of their own choice.⁷⁴ Alternatively, it is empowered under Article 36(1) to 'recommend appropriate procedures or methods of

⁷² UN Charter, Art. 33(1).

⁷³ *Ibid.*, Art. 34.

⁷⁴ *Ibid.*, Art. 33(2).

adjustment'.⁷⁵ These provisions in the Charter empower the Security Council to make procedural recommendations with a view to peacefully settling disputes.

Furthermore, the Charter authorises the Council to make *substantive* recommendations as well as procedural ones in certain circumstances, and it is this power of the Council that is most relevant to our discussion here. As stipulated in Article 37(1), the parties to a dispute are obliged to refer the dispute to the Council when they fail to settle the dispute by means of their own choice, and, as provided for under Article 37(2), the Council may 'recommend such terms of settlement as it may consider appropriate'.⁷⁶ In suggesting terms of settlement, the Council may take into account existing legal rights and obligations relevant to the dispute, but it is not bound to base its substantive recommendations on them. As Hans Kelsen points out:

... the Security Council is authorised to recommend a settlement which might involve an infringement upon the rights which the one or the other party has under existing international law, if the Security Council considers such settlement as 'just' or, under Article 37, paragraph 2, as 'appropriate'.⁷⁷

There has been a difference of opinion as to the legally binding force of Security Council recommendations made under Article 37. On the one hand, Leland Goodrich and Edvard Hambro emphasise the non-binding nature of Council recommendations and claim that they cannot acquire binding force in any circumstances under the present Charter.⁷⁸ According to their accounts, the delegates to the San Francisco Conference agreed that the power of the Council under Article 39 to make binding decisions was confined to the domain of enforcement measures pursuant to Article 41 and Article 42,

⁷⁵ Ibid., Art. 36(1).

⁷⁶ Ibid., Art. 37(1) and (2).

⁷⁷ Hans Kelsen, 'The Settlement of Disputes by the Security Council', *The International Law Quarterly*, 2/2, 1948, p. 182.

⁷⁸ Goodrich and Hambro, *Charter of the United Nations*, p. 260.

and that the power must be exercised not for the purpose of imposing specific terms of settlement, but for the purpose of bringing hostilities between the parties to a conflict to an end.⁷⁹ According to this interpretation, the Security Council's powers under the Charter are not substantially different from those conferred upon the League Council by the Covenant as far as peaceful change is concerned; as with the League Council, the Security Council can make substantive recommendations, but they are non-obligatory and unenforceable.

This interpretation is also supported by the following episode in the drafting history of the Charter. Since the Dumbarton Oaks draft contained no provisions concerning the Council's power to recommend or determine terms of settlement, the draft was open to different interpretations. At the San Francisco Conference, the following two amendments were made so as to make it clear that the Council did *not* have the right to determine substantive recommendations and impose them on the parties concerned. Firstly, Article 37(2) was added to the draft to make it clear that the Council may only *recommend* terms of settlement after one or more of the parties to a dispute, having failed to settle it by means of their own choice, have referred it to the Council for settlement. Secondly, the delegates to the Conference decided to remove the provisions in the Dumbarton Oaks draft which could be interpreted as suggesting 'the possibility that failure to settle a dispute [by the means and procedures provided for in what later became Chapter VI of the Charter] might be deemed a threat to the peace' by the Council.⁸⁰ In other words, it was agreed that the Council could not regard a failure to settle a dispute as constituting a threat to the peace, which is one of the thresholds for invoking Articles

⁷⁹ Ibid., pp. 264–266; Leland M. Goodrich, 'III. Pacific Settlement of Disputes', *The American Political Science Review*, 39/5, 1945, p. 966; Goodrich, 'From League of Nations to United Nations', p. 8.

⁸⁰ Leland M. Goodrich, Edvard Isak Hambro and Anne Patricia Simons, *Charter of the United Nations: Commentary and Documents*, 3rd edn, New York: Columbia University Press, 1969, p. 258.

41 and 42 for the purpose of implementing enforcement measures.⁸¹ Such a change was necessary in order to give the delegates to the Conference assurances about the non-binding nature of Council recommendations for dispute settlement made under what later became Chapter VI.⁸² Such assurances were necessary for securing support from small and middle powers, many of which had been sceptical of great power management in the wake of the great powers' (mis)handling of the issue over Sudeten and the Munich agreement.⁸³

On the other hand, many scholars have argued that it is legitimate for the Council to take enforcement measures against states when they have declined or rejected a Council recommendation made under Chapter VI, and that the recommendation virtually acquires binding force in such a case. The most famous and prominent scholar supporting this view is Hans Kelsen. Having explained that Council recommendations have no binding force in themselves, he goes on to argue that:

However, under Article 39 the Security Council may consider non-compliance with its recommendation a threat to the peace and resort to enforcement action against the recalcitrant State. If such enforcement action is interpreted to be a sanction, a recommendation of the Security Council may constitute the obligation to comply with the recommendation, that is to say, the so-called 'recommendation' may have the same character as a 'decision' of the Security Council, binding upon the members under Article 25. This is of great importance in case of a recommendation of terms of settlement.⁸⁴

While Kelsen's interpretation of the Charter conflicts with the intentions of some of its

⁸¹ The other two thresholds specified in Article 39 are breach of the peace and act of aggression. Neither of these terms can be plausibly interpreted as covering a failure to settle a dispute.

⁸² Ibid., p. 292.

⁸³ Goodrich and Hambro, *Charter of the United Nations*, pp. 264–265.

⁸⁴ Kelsen, 'The Settlement of Disputes by the Security Council', pp. 212–213. See also Clyde Eagleton, 'The Pacific Settlement of Disputes under the Charter', *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, 246/1, 1946, p. 27.

drafters, the Council has in practice expressed its readiness to take such a step to ensure the effectiveness of its recommendation.⁸⁵

Although it is commonly argued that the Council had been ineffective and dysfunctional during the Cold War period due to the rivalry amongst its permanent members, it is noteworthy that it has more than once adopted resolutions containing substantive recommendations. Security Council Resolution 67 adopted in 1949 endorsed the establishment of ‘a federal, independent and sovereign United States of Indonesia’ and a transfer of sovereignty to this state as the target to be achieved through negotiations between the parties, namely the Republic of Indonesia and the Netherlands. It also specified the principles on the basis of which negotiations should be conducted and set a timetable for achieving this goal.⁸⁶ Security Council Resolution 188 adopted on 13 October 1956—about two weeks before the Israeli attack on Egypt—specified six requirements which any settlement of the dispute must respect.⁸⁷ Security Council Resolution 242 adopted on 22 November 1967 in the wake of the outbreak of the Six-Day War also specified the principles which must form the basis of ‘the establishment of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East’, including ‘[w]ithdrawal of Israel armed forces from territories occupied in the recent conflict’.⁸⁸ Security Council Resolution 457 regarding the Iran hostage crisis emphasised the importance of respecting ‘the inviolability of diplomatic personnel and the premises of their missions’ in its preamble

⁸⁵ Thomas Giegerich, ‘Article 37’, in Bruno Simma, Daniel-Erasmus Khan, Georg Nolte and Andreas Paulus (eds), *The Charter of the United Nations: A Commentary*, 3rd edn, vol. I, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012, p. 1160.

⁸⁶ UN Security Council, UN Security Council Resolution 67, UN Doc S/RES/67(1949), 28 January 1949. The Dutch-Indonesian Round Table Conference was held in the wake of this resolution. The Conference brought about the transfer of sovereignty to the United States of Indonesia, but the new state was eventually transformed into the Republic of Indonesia in 1950 under the leadership of President Sukarno.

⁸⁷ UN Security Council, UN Security Council Resolution 118, UN Doc S/RES/118(1956), 13 October 1956.

⁸⁸ UN Security Council, UN Security Council Resolution 242, UN Doc S/RES/242(1967), 22 November 1967.

and then '[u]rgently call[ed] upon the Government of Iran to release immediately the personnel of the Embassy of the United States of America being held at Teheran, to provide them with protection and to allow them to leave the country'.⁸⁹ These resolutions can all be viewed as adopted under Article 37(2).

However, it has to be asked whether these resolutions were successful in promoting peaceful change. That the Security Council adopted resolutions aimed at peaceful change is one thing, and it is quite another that the Council was *effective* in bringing about peaceful change. According to Steven Ratner, Security Council Resolutions 67 and 242, which have been mentioned above, were put to a vote only when the Council was informed that the terms of settlement recommended in these resolutions would be accepted by the parties concerned.⁹⁰ This implies that it is doubtful whether the resolutions had any significant influence on the parties' behaviour.⁹¹ As for Resolution 118, suffice it to say that the Suez crisis can hardly be seen as an instance of peaceful change. The Iran hostage crisis was settled peacefully in the sense that it did not lead to an armed conflict between the parties, but the role Resolution 457 played in the dispute settlement process should not be overstated.⁹²

During the Cold War period, the Security Council showed the general tendency to refrain from issuing substantive recommendations. Instead of recommending terms of settlement, it placed a stronger emphasis on bringing disputes under control and keeping

⁸⁹ UN Security Council, UN Security Council Resolution 457, UN Doc S/RES/457(1979), 4 December 1979.

⁹⁰ Steven R. Ratner, 'Image and Reality of the UN's Peaceful Settlement of Disputes', *European Journal of International Law*, 6, 1995, p. 433.

⁹¹ Besides, Israel has failed so far to fulfil its obligations specified in Resolution 242. Needless to say, the acquisition of territory by force departs from the primary institution of peaceful change.

⁹² It was due to such factors as the ICJ's judicial decision, UN sanctions on Iran and Algerian mediation that eventually led to the political agreement to settle their dispute by setting up the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal (IUSCT). See Vaughan Lowe, *International Law: A Very Short Introduction*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015, pp. 45–46.

conflicts from escalating by calling for a cease-fire.⁹³ Such a tendency on the part of the Council evolved in tandem with its increasing reliance on mediation by the Secretary-General and his special representatives and on peacekeeping operations.⁹⁴ While these mechanisms have contributed to the maintenance of international peace and security, the Council could, in theory at least, have engaged more actively and proactively with processes of conflict resolution by exercising its power under Article 37(2).

The end of the Cold War ushered in an age characterised by what is often called Security Council activism, and the Council has deepened its engagement in the promotion and entrenchment of peaceful change. What is remarkable is that the Council has shown a greater willingness to engage in the promotion of peaceful change by issuing recommendations containing not only calls for a cease-fire but also specific terms of settlement. According to Ratner, it ‘has regularly either endorsed or proposed principles and terms for settlement of conflicts’, and he cites internal and international conflicts in Cambodia, Central American and Southern African states as examples.⁹⁵ What is even more noteworthy is the fact that some Council resolutions containing substantive recommendations have on occasion been adopted under Chapter VII. Adopted under Chapter VII, Security Council Resolution 824 on the Bosnia and Herzegovina conflict recognised ‘the unique character of the city of Sarajevo, as a multicultural, multi-ethnic and pluri-religious centre’ and Resolution 1031, which was also adopted under Chapter VII, endorsed the Dayton Agreement.⁹⁶ This change is remarkable since it clearly breaks away from the traditional understanding and interpretation of the Charter as prohibiting the Council from determining and enforcing substantive recommendations on the parties

⁹³ Rosalyn Higgins, ‘The Place of International Law in the Settlement of Disputes by the Security Council’, *The American Journal of International Law*, 64/1, 1970, pp. 12–13.

⁹⁴ Ratner, ‘Image and Reality of the UN’s Peaceful Settlement of Disputes’, p. 434.

⁹⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 438.

⁹⁶ UN Security Council, UN Security Council Resolution 824, UN Doc S/RES/824(1993), 6 May 1993; UN Security Council, UN Security Council Resolution 1031, UN Doc S/RES/1031(1995), 15 December 1995.

to a dispute.

While these represent a positive advance in international dispute settlement, it can be questioned if they truly represent an advance in the promotion of *peaceful* change. For, in most of the cases mentioned above, the Security Council's approach was reactive rather than proactive in the sense that it took action only after disputes had turned into armed conflicts. For this reason, they can be seen as representing not so much peaceful change as the failure to bring about peaceful change. In light of this, it is vital that the Security Council improve its capacity to act proactively and to prevent disputes from escalating into armed confrontation in the first place.

Moreover, it remains to be seen whether the Council would show the same willingness to issue substantive recommendations when faced with disputes involving one or more rising or great powers. The preceding discussions suggest that the mere existence of an institution supporting the practice of peaceful change does not guarantee that international political changes, including changes in the context of power transition, are always brought about in a peaceful manner. That an institution exists is one thing, and that it is *effective* is another thing. Under the UN Charter, there exists a normative agreement in contemporary international society that the Council ought to play a role in managing international political change, but the extent to which the Council actually impacts on the process of international political change is debatable and needs to be empirically observed by means of case studies. A series of crises in Ukraine provides an important case study to evaluate the Council's ability and willingness to manage international political change in the context of power transition. Russia's conduct with regard to the crises in Ukraine has posed a fundamental challenge to 'the ideal of a rule-governed international order'.⁹⁷ The long-drawn conflicts in Ukraine may well lead one to ask what the Council can do to help bring about a peaceful settlement between the

⁹⁷ Roy Allison, 'Russia and the Post-2014 International Legal Order: Revisionism and *Realpolitik*', *International Affairs*, 93/3, 2017, p. 519.

parties. In fact, there have been contested political debates about the possibility and desirability of sending peacekeepers to eastern Ukraine, and the Russian government has recently proclaimed its support for the deployment of a peacekeeping mission to eastern Ukraine.⁹⁸ The crisis in Ukraine is putting to the test the Council's ability with regard to the promotion and entrenchment of the practice or primary institution of peaceful change in the context of power transition.

Conclusion

This chapter started out by discussing how the interwar debate on peaceful change reforms our understanding of power transition by underscoring the socio-structural conception of power transition underpinning the debate. The socio-structural conception of power transition as an institutionally governed process sheds light on the multifariousness of institutions governing international political change, highlights the relationship between war and international law, and underlines the importance of the role of secondary institutions in managing change in international society. The issue raised at that stage was whether these insights were applicable to the analysis of power transition in contemporary international society. The goal of the subsequent sections was to show that those insights have enduring significance for power transition studies since the post-war international order has been characterised by the entrenchment of non-use of force, the institutionalisation of peaceful change, and the development of various methods, techniques and institutions that help states practise peaceful change. These developments in international social structure strongly indicate the enduring importance of the socio-

⁹⁸ See Mario Baumann, 'Does Peacekeeping Work in Ukraine', *Russian Analytical Digest*, 214, 2018, pp. 9–12. Ilaria Zavoli has put forward the idea of deploying a peacekeeping mission to eastern Ukraine on the basis of the *General Assembly's* authorisation. This proposal is a reminder that the Assembly can also play a role in the management of international political change in contemporary international society. Ilaria Zavoli, 'Peacekeeping in Eastern Ukraine: The Legitimacy of a Request and the Competence of the United Nations General Assembly', *Journal of Conflict and Security Law*, 22/1, 2017, pp. 147–173.

structural conception of power transition. Indeed, it can even be argued that the increasing elaborateness and diversity of contemporary methods, techniques and institutions for managing international political change not only confirms, but also increases the need for the socio-structural perspective.

Among others, this chapter has emphasised the centrality of the UN Security Council in contemporary international social structure governing peaceful change, examined in some detail its powers under the UN Charter, and explored its practices with regard to peaceful change and how they have changed since the end of the Second World War. The Security Council is flawed in many respects, and this is also true as regards its role in promoting and entrenching peaceful change in international society. As pointed out above, while the Security Council has become relatively more active in the field of international dispute settlement, its response has been reactive rather than proactive, and hence failed in many cases to bring about international political changes peacefully. Despite these limitations on the powers of the Security Council, it nevertheless represents a central secondary institution designed and responsible for promoting and entrenching peaceful change in contemporary international society. As emphasised in the present study, there exists a mutually constitutive relationship between the primary institution of peaceful change and secondary institutions reflecting and supporting it, and it is the Security Council that is expected to play a major role in this regard in contemporary international society. The present chapter has shown that the Security Council carries out this function via exercise of its powers under Chapter VI of the Charter.

Despite this, however, conventional theories of power transition—focused as they are on the role of the primary institution of war—have failed to take into account the role of the Security Council in managing international political change and that of other primary and secondary institutions. On the basis of elements of ES theory, the socio-structural conception of power transition, and the theoretical insights gained from the interwar debate on peaceful change, the next chapter sets out to develop an alternative

analytical framework that will enable us to explain the behaviour of rising powers and international political change with reference to primary and secondary institutions.

Chapter 6

Reframing Power Transition Theory

Introduction

The preceding chapter discussed how the interwar debate on peaceful change challenges and reforms our conception of power transition, and considered the theoretical insights it offers. Moreover, the chapter showed that the postwar international social structure has been characterised by the entrenchment of non-use of force, the institutionalisation of peaceful change, and the role of the UN Security Council in managing international political change, which strongly indicates the need for the reformed, socio-structural conception of power transition if we are to understand the dynamics of power transition and international political change in contemporary international society. What is required at present is an analytical framework that enables us to examine actual cases of power transition from the reformed, socio-structural perspective, i.e. with reference to socially and historically constructed international social structure. As discussed in chapter 2, knowledge of context is vitally important for the understanding of the behaviour of states, including rising powers.

With this in mind, this chapter sets out to develop an analytical framework for examining the relationship between power transition and international social structure via integration of elements of ES theory with the insights gained from the interwar debate on peaceful change. The framework, which is presented in the form of a series of key questions to be addressed in power transition analysis, not only enables us to explain the process of international political change in the context of power transition and the

behaviour of rising powers in connection with the character of international social structure, but also enables us to address normative issues involved in the management of power transition. The differing views on peaceful change, as highlighted in chapter 4, mean that it is not enough to explain the process of international political change in the context of power transition; it is also necessary to address how it should be managed. The framework is framed in such a way as to enable us to address this normative question. This accords with the ES's methodological pluralism which, as discussed in chapter 2, regards the analytical and the normative as having equal importance to the study of world politics. Moreover, as will be discussed in the conclusion of the present study, the framework enables us to conduct diachronic and synchronic comparative studies of power transition and the behaviour of rising powers in connection with the character of, and changes in, international social structure, thereby contributing to the ES's efforts to provide a grand-theoretical perspective on the history of world politics.¹

Constructing a framework for analysing power transition

The following analytical framework, which is presented in the form of six key questions to be addressed in power transition analysis, is a heuristic toolkit for guiding inquiry into actual cases of power transition. It can be used for producing socio-structural accounts of international political change in the context of power transition.

1. What are rising powers' attitudes towards the status quo of a given international society, and how are they affected by primary and secondary institutions?

The first key question to address is how rising powers in a given international society

¹ See Hedley Bull and Adam Watson (eds), *The Expansion of International Society*, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984; Barry Buzan and Richard Little, *International Systems in World History: Remaking the Study of International Relations*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000; Adam Watson, *The Evolution of International Society: A Comparative Historical Analysis*, London: Routledge, 1992.

view the status quo. To understand rising powers' attitudes towards the status quo, it is necessary to examine the meanings they attach to it. As Wendt argues, '[a] key premise of idealist social theory [i.e. idealist-holist theory] is that people act toward objects, including each other, on the basis of the meanings those objects have for them'.² In the present context, it is of particular importance whether the rising power or powers in a given international society consider the status quo to be desirable and satisfactory, for this largely shapes their attitudes towards it.³ As Organski points out, a rising power is satisfied with the status quo when it *feels* that it can benefit from the continued existence of the status quo.⁴ Conversely, a rising power is dissatisfied when it *feels* or *believes* that it cannot receive much benefit from the continuance of the status quo.

While rising powers' attitudes towards the status quo of a given international society are largely determined by their feelings and beliefs about it, the standards with which they evaluate the status quo are not independent of international social structure. ES theory, based as it is on the idealist-holist ontology, views rising powers' preferences and identities as *constituted* at least partly, if not entirely, by international social structure.⁵ Rising powers' satisfaction and dissatisfaction is something that can be explained only with reference to their interests, preferences and identities, and these cannot be understood without reference to the *intersubjective* understanding and knowledge among states in a given international society as to who they are and what constitutes their interests. It is true that how states define their national interests is affected by unit-level factors such as the personality of decision-makers and the character of

² Alexander Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999, p. 140.

³ See Jacek Kugler and A.F.K. Organski, 'The End of Hegemony?', *International Interactions*, 15/2, 1989, p. 117.

⁴ A.F.K. Organski, *World Politics*, 2nd edn, New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1968[1958], p. 366.

⁵ See Barry Buzan, *From International to World Society?: English School Theory and the Social Structure of Globalisation*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004, p. 162; Wendt, *Social Theory*, pp. 22–33.

domestic political systems. However, as Wendt argues, interests are also constituted, at least to a certain extent, by intersubjectively shared ideas and knowledge among states.⁶ In the past, for example, it was commonly held that territorial conquest and expansion would bring benefits to states, but this conception of national interests has been largely replaced today by the idea that international trade is a better means of pursuing national interests.⁷ Moreover, it has come to be widely recognised that participation in international rule-making and agenda-setting is vitally important for the pursuit of national interests.⁸ In short, national interests and preferences are, in varying degrees, socially constructed and historically contingent. The same holds true for state identity which also affects states' attitudes towards the status quo.

The ES's ideas of primary and secondary institutions provide a useful framework for examining rising powers' identities and preferences in a given context and for monitoring their changes over time. Primary institutions of international society not only regulate state behaviour, but are also constitutive of states' identities and preferences.⁹ Primary institutions are not mere recurring patterns of behaviour; they are underpinned by the 'values' shared by states in a given international society and by 'the foundational normative claims inherent in' those values.¹⁰ Therefore, rising powers' preferences and hence their attitudes towards the status quo in a given historical context need to be examined in connection with primary institutions operating in that context.

Moreover, it is also necessary to examine whether and to what extent secondary institutions in a given international society have constitutive effects on rising powers'

⁶ Ibid., pp. 1, 113–135.

⁷ See Richard Rosecrance, *The Rise of the Trading State: Commerce and Conquest in the Modern World*, New York: Basic Books, 1986.

⁸ See, for example, Zhongtao Zhang, 'China's Road to Participate in the International Rule-Making', *Canadian Social Science*, 12/4, 2016, pp. 51–55.

⁹ Buzan, *From International to World Society?*, pp. 162, 167.

¹⁰ John Williams, 'Structure, Norms and Normative Theory in a Re-defined English School: Accepting Buzan's Challenge', *Review of International Studies*, 37/3, 2011, p. 1247.

identities and preferences. As discussed in chapter 1, secondary institutions can serve as ‘a site of interest and identity formation’.¹¹ Moreover, as Kilian Spandler suggests, secondary institutions can, through interaction with primary institutions, bring about a transformation of international social structure, with constitutive impacts on states’ identities and preferences.¹² When ascertaining rising powers’ attitudes towards the status quo, it is therefore vitally important to examine the constitutive impacts that secondary as well as primary institutions in a given international society have on their identities and preferences.

Having said that, it needs to be reiterated that international social structure do not *determine* rising powers’ identities, interests and preferences. States’ interests and identities are also affected by unit level and sub-unit level factors. This means that different rising powers in a given international society may make different evaluations of the status quo, and may be dissatisfied with different aspects of the existing international order for different reasons.

From the socio-structural perspective, it is vitally important to ascertain what exactly rising powers are dissatisfied with on a case-by-case basis. For, as pointed out in the preceding chapter, the ways in which international disputes are settled can be different in different issue areas. For example, the methods and techniques that are considered appropriate for the settlement of territorial disputes can be different from those deemed appropriate for the settlement of trade disputes. This suggests that processes of international political change in one issue area may be very different from those in another. Moreover, the methods, techniques and organisations that are available for dispute settlement are better developed in some issue areas than in others. For example, the issue-area of trade disputes is characterised by the development of sophisticated methods and

¹¹ Emanuel Adler, ‘Seizing the Middle Ground: Constructivism in World Politics’, *European Journal of International Relations*, 3/3, 1997, p. 345.

¹² Kilian Spandler, ‘The Political International Society: Change in Primary and Secondary Institutions’, *Review of International Studies*, 41/3, 2015, pp. 601–622.

procedures for disputes settlement. The WTO's dispute settlement mechanism, for example, provides quasi-judicial procedures that are specifically designed for settling trade disputes. By contrast, territorial disputes, which have a direct bearing on state sovereignty, tend to be settled through more traditional methods such as diplomatic negotiations, and the development of mechanisms specifically designed for resolving territorial disputes has been relatively slow.¹³ To sum up, international disputes are settled differently in different issue areas, and, accordingly, processes of international political change are managed differently in different issue areas. Therefore, ascertaining why the rising power or rising powers in a given international society are dissatisfied is vitally important for understanding the process of international political change in the context of power transition.

The significance of this point has tended to be forgotten or neglected in the existing literature on power transition. On the contrary, efforts have been made in the opposite direction. Woosang Kim, for example, tried to provide an index of states' dissatisfaction with the international order.¹⁴ The quantification of states' dissatisfaction takes priority over detailed examination of the sources of their dissatisfaction in his theory of power transition. The problem with this way of theorising dissatisfaction is that it can obscure the fact that states' attitudes towards the status quo are usually a mix of satisfaction and

¹³ That said, some advanced mechanisms for settling territorial disputes do exist in contemporary international society such as the United Nations Convention of the Law of the Sea, which provides the machinery for settling maritime disputes. Moreover, there has been a gradual development in the capacity of regional organisations to deal with territorial disputes. For instance, the Organisation of African Unity (now African Union) and the EU were instrumental in settling territorial dispute among some of their member states. See P. Mwet Munya, 'The Organization of African Unity and its Role in Regional Conflict Resolution and Dispute Settlement: A Critical Evaluation', *Boston College Third World Law Journal*, 19/2, 1999, pp. 537–592; Michael O. Slobodchikoff, 'How Effective are International Organizations at Resolving Territorial Disputes among Member States: A Look at the European Union', *Studies of Changing Societies: Comparative and Interdisciplinary Focus*, 1/2, 2012, pp. 29–59.

¹⁴ Woosang Kim, 'Alliance Transitions and Great Power War', *American Journal of Political Science*, 35/4, 1991, pp. 833–850.

dissatisfaction and that few states, if any, are willing to reject it in its entirety. Such an index can be misleading, for states are usually dissatisfied with *certain aspects* of the status quo, except in rare circumstances in which they are ‘revolutionary’ in the Kissingerian sense and seek to destroy the whole established social order.¹⁵

2. What are the primary and secondary institutions governing international political change in a given international society?

The next key question is: what are the primary and secondary institutions governing international political change in a given issue-area (or areas)? As discussed above, rising powers can be dissatisfied with the status quo for different reasons, and international disputes are dealt with and settled differently depending on the issue-area. Therefore, it is important, first of all, to identify *issue-specific* institutions governing political change in a given issue-area (or areas).

Having said that, it is equally or even more important to identify the primary and secondary institutions governing international political change in all or nearly all issue-areas. Such institutions may be called *general*, as opposed to *issue-specific*, institutions. In almost all human societies, be they domestic or international, there are institutions governing change that operate across the whole (or nearly whole) range of issue areas. Such general institutions set the normative parameters within which actors seek to bring about political change in a given society, and it is normally within such parameters that issue-specific institutions governing political change are developed. Moreover, general institutions provide guides as to how to bring about political change when issue-specific institutions become dysfunctional or are non-existent.

The existence of some general institution for effecting political change is one of the basic conditions for the maintenance of social order in any society, be it domestic or

¹⁵ Henry Kissinger, *A World Restored: Metternich, Castlereagh and the Problems of Peace, 1812–22*, New York: Grosset and Dunlap, 1964, p. 2.

international. Bull fully appreciated this point, arguing that, in any society, the following function must be fulfilled by some institution.

(vii) The rules must be capable of adaptation to changing needs and circumstances—there must be ways of rescinding or modifying old rules and replacing them with new ones.¹⁶

Any society has some sort of machinery for fulfilling this function, but the manner in which this function is fulfilled is different depending on the society. In modern domestic societies, this function is usually carried out by the government in the broader sense. As Bull remarks:

(vii) The government may also adapt the rules to changing circumstances and demands by having its legislature repeal or amend old laws and enact new ones, and by having its administrators execute the law and its judges interpret it in such a way as to change its content.¹⁷

In international society, however, the same function is carried out not by the world government, but by sovereign states ‘in the absence of a universal legislative authority’.¹⁸ In some cases, states try to change the status quo through non-compliance. In other cases, they seek to change it through violent and forceful actions.¹⁹ As Bull explains, international society ‘is notoriously lacking in mechanisms of peaceful change, notoriously dependent on war as the agent of just change’.²⁰ This is one of the reasons why he counts war as one of the fundamental institutions of international society alongside the balance of power, international law, diplomacy and great power

¹⁶ Hedley Bull, *The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics*, 4th edn, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012, p. 54.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 56.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 69.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 70.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 183.

management.

That said, it is important to take note of the following three points. First of all, the role of the legislature in domestic societies should not be overemphasised. As Henry Maine demonstrated, important social changes had been brought about by the judicature in some domestic societies.²¹ In modern domestic societies, the function of legal adaptation or adjustment is carried out not only by the legislature, but also by the judicial and executive branches of the government, as Bull points out in the passage quoted above. Although international society lacks the world legislature, there do exist international judicial institutions such as the International Court of Justice and the Permanent Court of Arbitration, and, as Lauterpacht asserted, they can, in theory, play a role in political change. Moreover, administrative agreements concluded between governments might have some cumulative effect on the status quo of the international order.

This brings us to the second point: although states have from time to time sought to change rules and arrangements by resorting to war, it is by no means the only institution governing political change in international society. Indeed, it can even be questioned if war can still be regarded as a *primary institution* for settling disputes and for effecting political change in contemporary international society in light of the emergence and entrenchment of the primary institutions of non-use of force and peaceful change, as we have seen in the preceding chapter. In addition, as discussed in the preceding chapter, such primary institutions as international law, diplomacy and great power management also play an important role in promoting peaceful change in contemporary international society, and there also exist derivative primary institutions such as mediation and conciliation. Furthermore, secondary institutions such as international judicial organisations and the UN organs also play a role in this regard. Most important in this respect is the role of the UN Security Council since, as explained in the preceding chapter,

²¹ Henry Sumner Maine, *Ancient Law: Its Connection with the Early History of Society, and its Relation to Modern Ideas*, London: J. Murray, 1861.

it is a secondary institution specifically designed for promoting the primary institution of peaceful change (as well as collective security) in contemporary international society. In short, the point is to discard the war/non-war dichotomy, to recognise the *diversity* or *multifariousness* of institutions governing international political change, and to examine the role of primary and secondary institutions that are operating in a given case.

However, and this is the third point, the existence of the primary institution of peaceful change and other institutions supporting it does not necessarily lead to the elimination of power and violence from international society. As H.L. Nieburg argues, it is often the threat of violence and the fear caused by it that assist political changes in *both* domestic and international societies.²² As he remarks:

The threat of violence, and the occasional outbreak of real violence (which gives the threat credibility), are essential elements in conflict resolution not only in international, but also in national communities. Individuals and groups, no less than nations, exploit the threat as an everyday matter. This fact induces flexibility and stability in democratic institutions and facilitates peaceful social change.²³

Elements of power and violence are always present in any society, whether it be domestic or international. In this point, Carr was on the right. What is important is not how to eliminate such elements, but how to manage and regulate them.

3. To what extent and why do rising powers conduct themselves in accordance with the primary and secondary institutions governing international political change?

When considering the process of political change in connection with international social structure, it is necessary to examine to what extent and why states follow the norms set by the issue-specific institutions governing change in a given issue-area and by the

²² See H.L. Nieburg, 'The Threat of Violence and Social Change', *The American Political Science Review*, 56/4, 1962, pp. 865–873.

²³ H.L. Nieburg, 'Uses of Violence', *The Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 7/1, 1963, p. 43.

general institutions governing change in a given international society. Whether there exist institutions is one thing, how deeply they shape state behaviour is another. As the present study is concerned with international political change in the context of power transition, it is necessary to consider whether rising powers are observing or, at least, willing to observe the norms set by the issue-specific and general institutions governing change in a given international society. Rising powers' attitudes towards the institutions governing change in international society is the third point that need to be examined when analysing power transition in connection with international social structure.

The level of conformity to institutional norms among states other than rising powers also matters. While it may sound tautological, it is a well-known sociological and psychological fact that the power of a social norm is strong when it is actually followed by the majority of actors. Conversely, its power can be weak when it is neglected by a large number of actors. The same point has been made by a number of prominent IR scholars. For example, C.A.W. Manning points out that states follow norms since they have no choice but to act in front of what he calls 'the reference group', i.e. other members of the international society with whom they will have to co-exist and get along with for many years and decades to come.²⁴ For another example, James G. March and Johan P. Olsen argue that states' behaviour can be explained in terms of 'the logic of appropriateness' as well as in terms of 'the logic of consequences'.²⁵ While it is difficult to predict how states will seek political changes in a given situation from their past behaviour, there is no denying that the degree of conformity among states is an important factor determining state behaviour.

In this connection, it is also important to understand *why* states conform to social

²⁴ C.A.W. Manning, 'The Legal Framework in a World of Change', in Brian Porter (ed.), *The Aberystwyth Papers: International Politics, 1919–1969*, London: Oxford University Press, 1972, p. 323.

²⁵ James G. March and Johan P. Olsen, 'The Institutional Dynamics of International Political Orders', *International Organization*, 52/4, 1998, pp. 949–952.

norms. Following Buzan's discussion about the mode of internalisation, it can be argued that there are three reasons why social norms are followed: coercion, calculation and belief.²⁶ The power of a social norm is weak when states are forced to comply with it. Its power is moderate when states act in conformity with it for the reason that it is in their interest to do so. The power of a norm is strong when the conformity with it is based on the belief that doing so is legitimate and appropriate in a given situation. For example, the norms set by what I have called the *trinity* of international legal norms—the League Covenant, the Pact of Paris and the principle of non-recognition—were not respected by the rising powers during the interwar period partly because the values underpinning them were not internalised deeply enough, as discussed in chapter 3. In the next chapter, I shall examine whether and to what extent the norms and standards set by the UN are internalised by the rising powers of today.

The three modes of internalisation are, however, nothing more or less than ideal types. In reality, the three logics can operate concurrently. Moreover, as I shall discuss shortly, states' perception of the legitimacy and appropriateness of a social norm is related to, if not determined by, their perception as to whether acting in conformity with it would generate socially desirable outcomes.

4. Are the existing institutions governing international political change effective?

It is important to note that positive outcomes do not necessarily follow from states' acting in conformity with the existing institutions governing international political change. The next focal point is whether and to what extent such institutions are *effective* in bringing about political change. *Effectiveness* is here defined as the ability of an institution to produce socially desirable outcomes at an acceptable cost. In this context, it refers to the ability of an institution to bring about reasonable political changes without seriously disrupting the international order. Note that the concept of effectiveness can be applied to

²⁶ See Buzan, *From International to World Society?*, p. 103.

both primary and secondary institutions, and that the effectiveness of a primary institution can affect that of a secondary institution reflective and supportive of it, and vice versa.

The effectiveness of an institution impacts upon its legitimacy. An institution, be it primary or secondary, which produces socially desirable outcomes is likely to be considered as legitimate by states, and such an institution is likely to be followed by them. In contrast, an institution which is *ineffective* may come to be considered as illegitimate. When an institution is considered as ineffective and illegitimate, it may lose its power to shape state behaviour, and states may well seek to replace it with some other institution that can be expected to produce desired outcomes more *effectively*. And again, the legitimacy of a primary institution can affect that of a secondary institution reflecting and supporting it, and vice versa.

As discussed in chapter 3, war ceased to be regarded by many states as a legitimate institution for bringing about change in international society after the First World War. This was because it was widely held that war could no longer be resorted to without causing socially unacceptable consequences. In other words, the decline in its *effectiveness* in the sense defined here led to the decline of its legitimacy as an institution of international society. The decline in the effectiveness and legitimacy of war led to the emergence of non-use of force and, subsequently, to the creation of the trinity of the Covenant of the League, the Pact of Paris and the principle of non-recognition. However, the League system based on this trinity proved ineffective in bringing about international political change. Article 19 of the Covenant came to be seen as symbolising the ineffectiveness of the League system. The League's ineffectiveness gave rise to the sense of grievance on the part of revisionist countries against it and to revisionist efforts to re-legitimate war as an institution for bringing about change. It remains to be seen whether the UN system will prove effective in managing international political change. As shown in the preceding chapter, the UN system as it exists is not without problems and in need of reform (more on this in the next chapter). This directly leads to the next key question.

5. *How can international social structure be reformed so as to entrench peaceful change in international society in the context of power transition?*

International social structure is by no means immutable. International social structure remains the same as long as it is reproduced through states' practices and actions. The transformation of international social structure may be caused by gradual changes in human understanding, consciousness, values and morality. Or, alternatively, it may be caused as a result of purposeful attempts. If international social structure is mutable, how can it be changed for the better? In other words, how should it be modified or reformed so as to promote and entrench peaceful change in a given international society in the context of power transition? This normative question needs to be addressed especially when the *effectiveness* of the existing institutions governing international political change is in doubt.

The three thinkers discussed in chapter 4 provide three different normative positions on this question. Firstly, the Schmittian view suggests that the idea 'peaceful change' is just a liberal fantasy and that it is absurd to try to eliminate war from world politics. On this view, states must strive to bring about changes necessary for their own political existence by whatever means necessary, including the use of force. This was the course of action taken by revisionist countries in the 1930s, as exemplified by the German attempt to establish the *Lebensraum* or by the Japanese attempt to establish the Great East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere. This view is based on the assumption that war is an important, or even integral, part of international social structure. In ES terminology, it can be argued that the Schmittian view envisages the creation of a 'Power political' international society.²⁷ In other words, those who take the Schmittian view would aspire to survive in a Hobbesian world 'based largely on enmity and the possibility of war'.²⁸ As discussed in the previous chapter, however, the development of the primary institution of non-use

²⁷ Buzan, *From International to World Society?*, p. 159.

²⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 159–160.

of force and its twin derivative primary institutions, i.e. collective security and peaceful change, in the postwar international order has made this position socially unacceptable and illegitimate. This normative position stands little chance of social acceptance, at least for the time being.

Secondly, the Lauterpachtian view stresses the importance of peaceful change in terms of the rule of law in international society, and would suggest that international social structure should be strengthened via the development of secondary institutions, both general and issue-specific, such as international organisations designed for the maintenance of international peace and security, regional organisations, international courts and tribunals, and other intergovernmental arrangements designed for dealing with specific issues. The effectiveness of a secondary institution can be improved by increasing its operational efficiency or by reforming its organisational and legal structure or both. On this view, secondary institutions can play an important role in reducing and ultimately eliminating the role of war and violence in international political change, thereby reinforcing the rule of law in international society. In ES terminology, those who hold the Lauterpachtian view can be seen as envisaging the creation of a ‘Cooperative’ or ‘Convergence’ international society.²⁹

During the interwar period, there were many people who held views along these lines. Arthur Salter, for example, argued that the League system could manage international crises and prevent wars, if states were willing to live up to their commitment to the principle of collective security under the Covenant.³⁰ Moreover, he suggested that peaceful change could be promoted, if the right to the benefit of mutual guarantee and collective security could be made conditional on the compliance with recommendations approved by the League Assembly and the Council.³¹

²⁹ Ibid., p. 160.

³⁰ Arthur Salter, ‘Reform of the League’, *Political Quarterly*, 7/4, 1936, pp. 467, 478–479.

³¹ Ibid., pp. 475–476. This proposal paralleled the idea floated by Cecil in the drafting

Although many people shared the view that the League had to be resuscitated by strengthening the machinery for collective security and peaceful change, there were different views as to which of the two should take priority. Some argued that peaceful change should take precedence over collective security, arguing for the strengthening of Article 19 of the Covenant. For example, V. Shiva Ram remarked as follows:

What is needed at the moment is developing the operation of Art. XIX and seeking territorial revision in Europe and the colonial world. Without settling these issues, no reform of the League is possible which can establish collective security.³²

However, others held the view that the establishment of an effective collective security system took precedence over peaceful change. For example, G.M. Gathorne-Hardy remarked that ‘I believe that, *without* collective security, so-called “peaceful change” lets in the worst evils and iniquities of war by a side-door’.³³ On this view, collective security is a precondition for peaceful change. According to Clyde Eagleton’s account written in 1937, this was, in fact, the view held by the majority of the member states of the League during the 1930s, although some countries such as Hungary and Australia maintained that the effective operation of Article 19 had to be the precondition for achieving collective security.³⁴ This was reflective of the simple political fact that many countries which remained in the League were concerned about the maintenance of the status quo.

From a theoretical point of view, however, this was a chicken-and-egg problem,

process of the Covenant, which was mentioned in chapter 3.

³² V. Shiva Ram, ‘Reform of the Covenant of the League of Nations’, *The Indian Journal of Political Science*, 1/1, 1939, p. 93.

³³ G.M. Gathorne-Hardy, ‘The League at the Cross-Roads’, *International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1931–1939)*, 15/4, 1936, p. 495.

³⁴ Clyde Eagleton, ‘Reform of the Covenant of the League of Nations’, *The American Political Science Review*, 31/3, 1937, p. 462.

and collective security and peaceful change were in no way opposed to one another. As Quincy Wright pointed out, collective security and peaceful change were mutually supportive, and the one could not operate effectively when the other remained ineffective.³⁵ Moreover, despite the existence of the Schmittian position which rejected both collective security and peaceful change and the Carrian position which claimed that peaceful change could be promoted without, at the same time, promoting collective security, the idea that there existed a symbiotic and mutually reinforcing relationship between collective security and peaceful change was, as was discussed in chapter 3, shared by many scholars and practitioners in the interwar period, and the League was expected to play an important role in promoting and entrenching this institutional symbiosis in international society.

As shown in the preceding chapter, the understanding of the symbiotic relationship between collective security and peaceful change and of their mutually constitutive relationship between secondary institutions reflecting and reinforcing them is vitally important for understanding the role of the UN and, especially, that of the Security Council in managing international political change. When faced with the effectiveness question in the contemporary context, those who hold the Lauterpachtian view would propose reforming the Security Council with a view to enhancing its capacity to bring about peaceful change as well as its capacity to implement collective security. This would entail amending the UN Charter, especially Chapter VI (and potentially Chapter VII as well), since the Council is designed to help states to practise peaceful change via exercise of its powers under Chapter VI of the Charter (more on this in the next chapter).

Thirdly, the Carrian view suggests that peaceful change is both desirable and possible, and that the pragmatic way to facilitate peaceful change is not to set up and strengthen secondary institutions, but to pursue diplomatic negotiations. On this view, it

³⁵ Quincy Wright, 'Article 19 of the League Covenant and the Doctrine "Rebus Sic Stantibus"', *Proceedings of the American Society of International Law at Its Annual Meeting (1921–1969)*, 30, 1936, pp. 72–73.

is primary institutions such as diplomacy and great power management that are the key to peaceful change. Moreover, this view does not rule out the possibility of the presence or development of *issue-specific* primary institutions governing change in specific issue-areas such as the customary law of the sea.³⁶ The Carrian view can be seen as envisaging the creation and maintenance of a *Coexistence* international society.³⁷

It is well to note that developing primary institutions for political change is not the same as falling back on *ad hoc* or one-off reconciliation of differing state interests. What the Carrian view stresses is the importance of establishing ‘a *regular* system of “peaceful change”’ or ‘*regular* procedure of “peaceful change”’.³⁸ The adjectives ‘pragmatic’ and ‘ad hoc’ are not synonyms. In order to establish such a *regular* institution for political change, there needs to be expectations between states that disputes between them can and will be resolved in a certain way, and such expectations grow not out of a single agreement, but out of a *continued* cooperation. This is why Carr, who argued that the Munich agreement was ‘the nearest approach in recent years to the settlement of a major international issue by a procedure of peaceful change’,³⁹ remarked rather tentatively as follows:

Other aspects of it [the Munich agreement] were, however, less reassuring. Herr Hitler himself seemed morbidly eager to emphasise the element of force and to minimise that of peaceful negotiation—a trait psychologically understandable as a product of the methods employed by the Allies at Versailles, but none the less inimical to the establishment of a procedure of peaceful change. ... The agreement was violently attacked by a section of British opinion. Recriminations ensued on the German side; and very soon any prospect that the Munich

³⁶ As discussed in chapter 1, the term ‘primary institution’ refers to some such thing as ‘an established custom, law, or relationship in a society or community’. Barry Buzan, *An Introduction to the English School of International Relations*, Cambridge: Polity Press, 2014, p. 16.

³⁷ See Buzan, *From International to World Society?*, pp. 159–160, 191–192.

³⁸ Edward Hallett Carr, *The Twenty Years’ Crisis, 1919–1939: An Introduction to the Study of International Relations*, London: Macmillan, 1939, p. 272, emphasis added.

³⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 282.

settlement might inaugurate a happier period of international relations in which peaceful change by negotiation would become an effective factor seemed to have disappeared.⁴⁰

Another point to note is that the Carrian position, which stresses the role of primary institutions, and the Lauterpachtian position, which emphasises the role of secondary institutions, are not necessarily mutually exclusive. The development of primary institutions in a given international society may give rise to the momentum towards the development of secondary institutions, and the established secondary institutions in turn serve to support those primary institutions. As shown in the preceding chapter, contemporary international social structure governing international political change combines institutions of both types. The difference between the two positions lies in the assessment of the degree of convergence of interests and values in a given international society. As will be pointed out shortly, the degree of convergence among states largely determines the shape of the social structure of a given international society and its potential for development.

Some readers might intervene at this point, pointing out that one important policy choice is missing from the discussion: the policy of containment. Some might point to the *lesson* of Munich, arguing that rising powers must always be contained, not appeased. As important as it is, the lesson of Munich in itself does not provide a satisfactory answer to the problem of peaceful change. As David Chuter critically points out:

... the Munich myth, especially in its cruder forms, is an argument for always fighting (or threatening to fight) rather than negotiating, and always preferring violent solutions to compromise. The very concept of negotiation can be dismissed as weakness, as was sometimes suggested in the Reagan years.⁴¹

⁴⁰ Ibid., pp. 282–283.

⁴¹ David Chuter, 'Munich, or the Blood of Others', in Cyril Buffet and Beatrice Heuser (eds), *Haunted by History: Myths in International Relations*, Providence: Berghahn Books, 1998, p. 77.

The primary lesson of the myth is that the challenger must be contained and deterred so as to impede its attempt to change the status quo. The problem with this lesson is that it does not distinguish reasonable demands for change from unreasonable ones. Therefore, the policy of containment needs to be coupled or combined with other mechanisms or institutions for bringing about just change.

The tripartite normative distinction formulated above is useful for considering how the existing international social structure can be made more effective in the context of power transition, and I shall apply this distinction as we discuss how to facilitate the process of Security Council reform in the following chapter.

6. To what extent do the status quo powers and the rising powers in a given international society share common interests and values?

The preceding question of how to reform the existing international social structure governing international political change needs to be addressed from both empirical and normative points of view. The last key question concerns the extent to which states, especially the status quo powers and the rising powers in a given international society, share common interests and values, which not only affects the manner in which the dispute or disputes at stake in the context of power transition are settled, but also impacts on the shape of international social structure governing change in international society and its potential for development in the face of power transition. To put it another way, the range and potential development of primary and secondary institutions governing international political change in a given international society facing power transition are affected, if not determined, by the degree of common interests and values amongst the challengers and the challenged. In addition, it is to be noted that, as was discussed earlier in the present chapter, states' interests, values and identities are not shaped independently of the existing primary and secondary institutions.

At the minimum, there needs to be what Bull calls 'a sense of common interests in

the elementary goals of social life' or what Carr calls 'a certain measure of common feeling as to what is just and reasonable' among states, especially among those with the power to shape and re-shape the international social structure, if an institutionalisation of the process of international political change is to happen.⁴² In very rare cases in which this basic condition is totally absent, such an institutionalisation is not to be expected. The process of institutionalisation would be facilitated when states, especially the status quo powers and the rising powers, are willing to cooperate with one another and to take coordinated actions in pursuit of common interests and values which are not limited to co-existence, as in cases in which states form what Mayall calls 'an enterprise association' with a view to realising a set of fundamental values such as human rights, democracy and free market.⁴³ Generally speaking, the development and maintenance of secondary institutions require a greater degree of common interests and values among states, and secondary institutions governing change in the context of power transition are likely to be robust and *effective* when they are underpinned by the cooperation among the status quo powers and the rising powers. The role of secondary institutions in managing international political change in the context of power transition can be significantly undermined in the absence of the cooperation on the part of the rising powers. However, as will be discussed in the next chapter, recent years have witnessed increasing efforts by rising powers to set up and make use of secondary institutions for the purpose of bringing about desired changes in the status quo.

A brief commentary on the framework

The analytical framework set forth above makes frequent use of such words as 'function' and 'effectiveness' which are often been used by functionalist theories in sociology, but the present framework needs to be dissociated from functionalism or structural

⁴² Bull, *Anarchical Society*, p. 64; Carr, *Twenty Years' Crisis*, p. 279.

⁴³ James Mayall, *World Politics: Progress and its Limits*, Cambridge: Polity Press, 2000, p. 21.

functionalism in sociology. Functionalism in sociology or what Bull calls “‘structural-functionalism’ explanation”⁴⁴ is based on ‘[t]he theory that all aspects of a society serve a function and are necessary for the survival of that society’.⁴⁵ Functionalism in this sense is of a conservative nature, for the claim that everything that exists in a society is a necessary element for its survival and self-reproduction leads to the spurious legitimization of the existing social arrangements and institutions. As Bull explains, arguments of this sort are problematic and flawed since the survival of a society, and the maintenance of a social order, is just one of many different values and goals pursued by actors in that society.⁴⁶ Similarly, peaceful change is not the only goal pursued by states, and, indeed, it is possible that some states in an international society may feel obliged to pursue their goals via means incompatible with peaceful change. The present framework allows for this possibility by taking note of the Schmittian position on peaceful change.

Conclusion

Based on the socio-structural conception of power transition as an institutionally governed process, the present chapter has developed a framework for power transition analysis that emphasises the role of international social structure. The framework enables us to explain the attitudes of rising powers towards the status quo and the process of international political change in the context of power transition with reference to both primary and secondary institutions in a given international society. Moreover, the present chapter has brought in the distinction between issue-specific and general institutions so as to increase its analytical leverage. Issue-specific institutions are institutions governing international political change in specific issue-areas. The presence of issue-specific institutions is reflective of the fact that there exist various kinds of issues in world politics

⁴⁴ Bull, *Anarchical Society*, p. 72.

⁴⁵ Oxford Dictionaries, ‘functionalism’, available at: <https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/functionalism> (accessed 16 July 2017).

⁴⁶ Bull, *Anarchical Society*, p. 72.

General	Diplomacy Great power management International law Peaceful change	League of Nations UN and its Security Council International Court of Justice
Issue-specific	Customary law of the sea State practice governing dynastic succession and marriage	WTO PKOs ITLOS
	Primary	Secondary

Figure 3: two-dimensional typology for mapping institutions governing change in international society

and that disputes are settled differently depending on the issue-area. General institutions, on the other hand, govern the process of international political change in a given international society regardless of the issue-area.

Note that the distinction between issue-specific and general institutions cuts across the distinction between primary and secondary institutions. Therefore, the two-dimensional typology, as shown in figure 3, can be derived from the two distinctions. This typology allows us to map and locate the institutions governing international political change in a given international society. The focus on issue-specific institutions means that any analysis of power transition using the present framework must draw up, at least in one's head, its own map when examining the process of international political change in a given actual case of power transition. As institutions change over time, there cannot be such a thing as the definitive map for understanding institutions governing international political change, and so the institutions displayed in figure 3 are samples only.

The framework developed in the present chapter also sheds light on such issues as the influence and effectiveness of institutions governing change in international society, and brings up issues concerning reform of international social structure. As we explore ways to promote and entrench peaceful change in international society, it is important to take note not only of different normative views on peaceful change, but also of the existing conditions of world politics, especially the degree to which rising powers share

common interests and values with other members of international society. By highlighting these key points, the framework facilitates the socio-structural analysis of power transition.

Chapter 7

The UN Security Council as Both Object and Agent of International Political Change

Introduction

Reform of the UN has been greatly debated for years, and, among others, reform of the Security Council has always been the focal point of UN reform, both within academia and beyond.¹ Some of the rising powers in contemporary international society have long sought to reform the Council. This chapter analyses the process of Council reform and the behaviour of the rising powers active in this issue-area through the framework developed in the preceding chapter. The analysis not only explains their behaviour in connection with primary and secondary institutions in contemporary international society, but also shows that their identities and preferences have been shaped and constituted by those institutions. The chapter also addresses how the process of Council reform can be facilitated so as to bring about an international political change in this issue-area.

Moreover, the chapter seeks to question the way in which the debate on Council reform has been framed and to reframe the debate on the basis of the conception of the Council as both object and agent of international political change. The Council can be viewed as an *object* of international political change since, as discussed below, some rising powers have called for reform of the secondary institution; the Council is seen as

¹ Paul Kennedy and Bruce Russett, 'Reforming the United Nations', *Foreign Affairs*, 74/5, 1995, pp. 56–71; Dimitris Bourantonis, *The History and Politics of UN Security Council Reform*, London: Routledge, 2005; Peter Nadin, *UN Security Council Reform*, Abingdon: Routledge, 2016.

something to be *changed* in response to power shifts. At the same time, however, it is an *agent* of international political change inasmuch as, as discussed in chapter 5, it is expected to play an important role in entrenching the practice of peaceful change in contemporary international society. It will be argued that the current debate on Council reform is problematic from the standpoint of this duality. For the current fixation on issues concerning the size and composition of the Council has led to the neglect of the role of the Council as an agent of international political change and, consequently, to the failure to address the issue of how it can be reformed so as to improve its capacity to maintain international peace and security via the promotion of the symbiotic relationship between the primary institutions of collective security and peaceful change. The focus on the duality of the Council will help reframe the debate, thereby enabling us to deliberate on ways to enhance the Council's capacity in this respect.

The first section provides an overview of the history of and debate on Council reform, focusing on the attitudes of the G4 countries (Brazil, Germany, India and Japan) towards Council reform. It focuses on their intentions as well as behaviour with regard to Council reform, and, as discussed in chapter 2, this requires attention on the social and historical contexts surrounding Council reform. The second section analyses the intentions and behaviour of these countries through the framework developed in the preceding chapter, demonstrating how they have been affected by international social structure. The third section criticises the current Council reform debate as excessively focused on the Council's size and composition, calling for shifting the focus of the debate away from them to the Council's role and effectiveness in promoting the institutional symbiosis between collective security and peaceful change in contemporary international society.

The history of and debate on UN Security Council reform

Power transitions in contemporary international society: 1945–present

The title of Paul Kennedy's book, *The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers*, nicely captures one of the truisms of international relations: that great powers come and go.² During the interwar period, there were seven great powers: the United States, Britain, the Soviet Union, France, Italy, Germany and Japan. By the end of the Second World War, the number had decreased to two. The new term 'superpower' was coined to describe the primacy and predominance of the United States and the Soviet Union over other states in the postwar international society. It was this bipolarity that characterised world politics during the Cold War.

However, there have been significant power transitions since the end of the Second World War, which cannot be captured by the concept 'superpower' alone. Germany and Japan have successfully recovered from their defeat in the Second World War by actively engaging in international trade.³ Their rise as regional and global economic engines led to changes in the balance of power within the Western capitalist camp. Although their economic growth became sluggish during the 1990s, they have not disappeared from the international stage and continue to stand as regional and potential global powers.

In the past decade or so, the focus of attention has shifted to the rise of the BRIC. As is well known, the acronym was coined by Jim O'Neill in his 2001 Goldman Sachs report, in which he suggested that these countries be invited to take part in international economic decision-making processes which had been dominated by the G7.⁴ Picking up on the subject broached by the report, Dominic Wilson and Roopa Purushothaman explored long-term implications of the rise of the BRIC for the global economy in another

² Paul M. Kennedy, *The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500 to 2000*, London: Unwin Hyman, 1988.

³ See Richard Rosecrance, *The Rise of the Trading State: Commerce and Conquest in the Modern World*, New York: Basic Books, 1986.

⁴ Jim O'Neill, 'Building Better Global Economic BRICs', Global Economics Paper No: 66, Goldman Sachs, 30 November 2001, available at: <http://www.goldmansachs.com/our-thinking/archive/archive-pdfs/build-better-brics.pdf> (accessed 21 July 2017).

Goldman Sachs report published two years later. In this report, it was predicted that these four emerging economies could surpass the G7 in terms of GDP by 2039.⁵ Later on, South Africa was incorporated in the grouping, and they have come to be called the BRICS.

The emergence of these countries since the end of the Second World War has significantly altered the geopolitical realities of world politics, so much so that it would be absurd to consult geopolitical maps created in 1945 for the purpose of understanding the present situation of the world.

The background to contemporary efforts to reform the Security Council

Council reform is a political agenda that some of these rising powers in contemporary international society have sought to push to the front-burner. The so-called G4 countries (Brazil, Germany, India and Japan) have been especially active and assertive in pushing Council reform onto the agenda. These countries have often been elected as non-permanent members of the Council.⁶ This can be seen as an indication of public recognition of their power and influence in the post-war international society as well as of their contributions to the maintenance of international peace and security, which is one of the criteria for selecting non-permanent members, as provided in Article 23(1) of the UN Charter. Such intermittent and temporary access to seats in the Council has allowed these powers to make themselves heard in processes of international decision- and rule-making. Ironically enough, however, this has brought home to them that there exists a large disparity between permanent and non-permanent members in terms of power and

⁵ Dominic Wilson and Roopa Purushothaman, 'Dreaming with BRICs: The Path to 2050', Global Economics Paper No: 99, Goldman Sachs, 1 October 2003, available at: <http://www.goldmansachs.com/our-thinking/archive/archive-pdfs/brics-dream.pdf> (accessed 21 July 2017).

⁶ By way of example, Japan has been elected to a non-permanent seat eleven times since it joined the UN in 1956, and Brazil, an original member of the UN, has been elected ten times since 1946. See UN, Countries Elected Members of the Security Council, available at: <http://www.un.org/en/sc/members/elected.asp> (accessed 4 April 2017).

influence, which can be corrected or eliminated only by reforming the Council and by becoming permanent members themselves. With this awareness in mind, the four countries have come together to form the G4 with a view to pressing forward with Council reform.

While these countries have been most active in promoting Council reform, the need for Council reform has been widely recognised by the membership of the UN. The UN membership has nearly quadrupled since its inception in 1945, and, as of 2017, the UN boasts a membership of 193 countries. On grounds of this huge increase in membership, many member states have called for reforms designed to enhance the representativeness of the Council.

In the history of the UN, the following three changes or adjustments have been made to the size and composition of the Council in response to changes in world politics. Firstly, a decision was reached in the General Assembly in 1963 to increase the Council membership from eleven to fifteen by adding four non-permanent seats, and the Charter was amended accordingly in 1965.⁷ At the same time, the non-permanent seats were reallocated on the basis of new regional groupings.⁸ The 1965 Council reform was a timely response to the rising tide of decolonisation and the resultant increase in the UN membership.⁹ The second change or adjustment concerns the so-called ‘representation question’ of China. As is well known, the General Assembly adopted a resolution in 1971 that brought Communist China on board, while expelling Nationalist China from the

⁷ UN General Assembly, UN General Assembly Resolution 1991(XVIII), UN Doc A/RES/1991(XVIII), 17 December 1963.

⁸ The resolution stipulated that five non-permanent members be elected from ‘African and Asian States’, one from ‘Eastern European States’, two from ‘Latin American States’, and two from ‘Western European and other States’. This formula provided the basis of today’s UN regional groups. See UN, United Nations Regional Groups of Member States, 9 May 2014, available at: <http://www.un.org/depts/DGACM/RegionalGroups.shtml> (accessed 5 April 2017).

⁹ Yehuda Z. Blum, ‘Proposals for UN Security Council Reform’, *The American Journal of International Law*, 99/3, 2005, p. 636.

UN.¹⁰ The third change concerns Russia's assumption of the permanent Council seat previously occupied by the Soviet Union which took place in the wake of the latter's collapse in 1991.¹¹ These changes and adjustments are by no means insignificant. However, given the magnitude of the changes in world politics that have occurred since 1945, one may well regard them as inadequate. Indeed, no progress has been made as far as the *expansion* of the permanent membership is concerned since 1945, leaving the G4 countries discontented.

Contemporary efforts towards and debates on Council reform, which are discussed below, are best understood in the context of power shifts in international society. In contrast to the focus on the expansion of non-permanent membership in the 1965 Council reform which was brought about in the context of decolonisation, one of the most hotly debated issues in contemporary debates on Council reform is whether to add permanent as well as non-permanent seats to the Council, and the Council reform process and the debates thereon have been led, among others, by the G4 countries which have risen to become major powers in contemporary international society. The current focus on the expansion of permanent membership is reflective of the extent of power shifts that have occurred since the inception of the UN as well as of the shared awareness that some reforms are necessary in order to accommodate the G4 countries' demands for change with regard to the size and composition of the Council.

The 1991 Gulf War and early efforts to reform the Security Council

The 1991 Gulf War was a turning point in the history of the Security Council. The war vividly showed the Council's ability and willingness to act decisively in processes of international dispute settlement, but it also highlighted the Council's exclusiveness in

¹⁰ UN General Assembly, UN General Assembly Resolution 2758(XXVI), UN Doc A/RES/2758(XXVI), 25 October 1971.

¹¹ David L. Bosco, *Five to Rule Them All: The UN Security Council and the Making of the Modern World*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009, pp. 166–167.

terms of decision-making.¹² Edward Luck and Toby Gati explain the issue foregrounded by the Gulf War as follows:

The more active and assertive the council becomes, the more the 150-plus member states not on the council will mutter about decisions it makes in their name but without their input.¹³

Although Germany and Japan are regular attendees of the Council as non-permanent members, neither of them was represented at the Council at the time of the Gulf Crisis. Therefore, neither of them could take meaningful part in the decision-making process at the Council in the run-up to the war despite their substantial financial contributions which largely underwrote the US-led operations against Iraq.¹⁴

The need for Council reform was most strongly felt in Japan, which contributed as much as 13 billion US dollars for the implementation of the UN-authorized and US-led campaign in the Gulf region.¹⁵ The Gulf War left the country frustrated because it had been unable to access information regarding the discussions taking place inside the Security Council chamber.¹⁶ The war also left the country traumatised since its financial contributions, which were by no means insignificant in amount, were not well-received and actually went unappreciated by other governments. In Japan, this event is vividly remembered as the ‘Gulf Shock’.¹⁷ The main cause of the Japanese diplomatic failure was the lack of contributions in personnel and, since then, it has been hotly debated how

¹² Jerzy Ciecianski, ‘Restructuring the UN Security Council’, *International Peacekeeping*, 1/4, 1994, p. 414.

¹³ Edward C. Luck and Toby Trister Gati, ‘Whose Collective Security?’, *The Washington Quarterly*, 15/2, 1992, p. 45.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*; Ciecianski, ‘Restructuring the UN Security Council’, p. 429.

¹⁵ Reinhard Drifte, *Japan’s Quest for a Permanent Security Council Seat: A Matter of Pride or Justice?*, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2000, pp. 65–66.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 66.

¹⁷ Kuniko Ashizawa, ‘Japan’s Approach towards Asian Regional Security: From “Hub-and-Spoke” Bilateralism to “Multi-tiered”’, *The Pacific Review*, 16/3, 2003, p. 372.

the country should make personnel as well as financial contributions to the international community—the subject that still informs debates surrounding the amendment of the Japanese Constitution. This political agenda has increased awareness of the importance of becoming a permanent member of the Security Council. For it would be viewed as politically insupportable to put the lives of members of Self-Defense Forces at risk in military and non-military activities in which the Japanese government has no say. It is no accident that Japan has increased its efforts to become a permanent member of the Council since the end of the Gulf War.

However, the need for Council reform was felt also by small and middle powers which had misgivings about future Council interventionism. The fear on the part of third world countries of great-power management and intervention by means of manipulation of the Council was such that many of these countries expressed concern in the wake of the Gulf War over the future status of the principle of non-intervention as codified in Article 2(7) of the UN Charter.¹⁸

Meanwhile the permanent members of the Council were not willing to support Council reform in fear of opening a Pandora's Box and were reluctant to even discuss the matter in depth. While the Gulf War prompted emerging and developing countries to call for Council reform, the same war was seen by the permanent members as providing a rationale for opposing it. The permanent five based their positions on the issue on what Dimitris Bourantonis calls the “‘efficiency’ argument”, the reasoning underlying which is simple: there is no need to revamp the Council if it is working properly and effectively.¹⁹ The reluctance on the part of the permanent five to broach and address this delicate subject manifested itself in their handling of the question concerning the status of the Soviet seat in the Council in the wake of its collapse at the end of 1991. When the collapse of the Soviet Union raised a question as to what to do with the Soviet seat, the

¹⁸ Ciechanski, ‘Restructuring the UN Security Council’, p. 415; Luck and Gati, ‘Whose Collective Security?’, pp. 45–46.

¹⁹ Bourantonis, *History and Politics*, p. 36.

permanent five collaboratively saw to it that this question was settled before it sparked wider debates over the size and composition of the Council.²⁰ At the initiative of British Prime Minister John Major, the first ever Security Council summit was convened in January 1992. The summit meeting was characterised by what Dimitris Bourantonis and Georgios Kostakos call the ‘dual agenda’.²¹ According to them, while the official item on the agenda for the meeting was *The Responsibility of the Security Council in the Maintenance of International Peace and Security*, the permanent five had an agenda of their own. The true motive for holding the meeting was to establish that Russia would legitimately succeed the Soviet Union as a permanent member, and to present this as a *fait accompli* to the world.²²

The permanent five could pull off this diplomatic manoeuvre rather easily and without serious obstruction partly because the General Assembly was in recess when the summit meeting took place.²³ While other countries had little choice but to acquiesce in the permanent five’s decision, it is often pointed out that the period following the collapse of the Soviet Union was a window of opportunity for Council reform. As David Bosco remarks:

... it is also clear that the moment was a missed opportunity to realign and perhaps expand the council. Just as the end of the Second World War had opened space for the council’s creation, the end of the Cold War might have allowed adjustment to reflect new realities and to refresh the council’s legitimacy with the rest of the world.²⁴

²⁰ Russia’s assumption of the permanent seat was also supported by the eleven Soviet Republics which gathered in Alma-Ata at the end of December 1991 to declare the creation of the CIS. See Yehuda Z. Blum, ‘Russia Takes Over the Soviet Union’s Seat at the United Nations’, *European Journal of International Law*, 3, 1992, pp. 355–356.

²¹ Dimitris Bourantonis and Georgios Kostakos, ‘Diplomacy at the United Nations: The Dual Agenda of the 1992 Security Council Summit’, *Diplomacy and Statecraft*, 11/3, 2000, pp. 212–226.

²² Ibid. See also Bourantonis, *History and Politics*, pp. 41–45.

²³ Bosco, *Five to Rule Them All*, p. 167.

²⁴ Ibid.

While the summit meeting did not address the question of Council reform, it is noteworthy that the discussions at the meeting touched on the need to promote the symbiotic relationship between collective security and peaceful change. In his opening address to the Council, Prime Minister Major stated that ‘we should today reaffirm our attachment to the principle of collective security’ and then went on to declare that ‘we should today consider anew the means by which collective security is upheld through the United Nations and consider how best to update and to develop them’, pointing out that such instruments as preventive action, peacemaking and peacekeeping are available for this purpose.²⁵ As shown below, however, the debate on Council reform has failed to pick up on this issue and has instead focused its attention on the issue of Council’s size and composition.

Increasing momentum towards Council reform

Notwithstanding the permanent five’s attempts to put Council reform on the back-burner, the movement towards Council reform gained momentum from 1992 to 1993. General Assembly debate over ‘equitable representation on and increase in the membership of the Security Council’ has become a yearly event at the UN since 1979.²⁶ However, the General Assembly debate on the question at its 47th session held on 23 November 1992 was filled by a sense of expectation and urgency. For instance, the representative of India argued that most states were convinced that ‘the need for the revitalization and restructuring of the Security Council [had] become more urgent than ever before’.²⁷ Following the debate, the General Assembly adopted Resolution 47/62 requesting the Secretary-General to solicit opinions on Council reform from member states and to

²⁵ UN Security Council, Provisional Verbatim Record of the 3046th Meeting, UN Doc S/PV.3046, 31 January 1992, p. 6.

²⁶ Bardo Fassbender, *U.N. Security Council Reform and the Right of Veto: A Constitutional Perspective*, Hague: Kluwer Law International, 1998, p. 221.

²⁷ UN General Assembly, Provisional Verbatim Record of the 69th Meeting of the 47th Session of the General Assembly, UN Doc A/47/PV.69, 23 November 1992, p. 12.

produce a report containing comments submitted by them.²⁸ The report of the Secretary-General was published in July 1993.²⁹ This document provides an overview of the attitudes of countries towards the question of Council reform, including those of the G4 countries. On 3 December of that year, the General Assembly adopted Resolution 48/26 ‘establish[ing] an Open-ended Working Group [hereafter OEWG] to consider all aspects of the question of increase in the membership of the Security Council, and other matters related to the Security Council’.³⁰ Putting aside the merits of the idea to set up a working group, this decision was both reflective and supportive of the increasing momentum towards Council reform at that time. It was during this period that countries demanding Council reform began to systematically formulate and air their own opinions regarding the question. Here, we will have a close look at the opinions expressed during this period and afterwards by the G4 countries.

The attitudes of the G4 countries

As discussed above, the G4 countries’ call for Council reform is best understood in the context of power transition. As Hosli and Dörfler remark:

Several countries are ambitious to accede to the Council mainly because of their “power” in terms of population size, economic weight or their financial or military contributions to the work of the organization, such as Brazil, Germany, India and Japan.³¹

²⁸ UN General Assembly, UN General Assembly Resolution 47/62, UN Doc A/RES/47/62, 11 December 1992.

²⁹ UN General Assembly, Question of Equitable Representation on and Increase in the Membership of the Security Council: Report of the Secretary-General, UN Doc A/48/264, 20 July 1993. A total of ten addenda and a corrigendum were later published.

³⁰ UN General Assembly, UN General Assembly Resolution 48/26, UN Doc A/RES/48/26, 3 December 1993.

³¹ Madeleine O. Hosli and Thomas Dörfler, ‘The United Nations Security Council: The Challenge of Reform’, in Dries Lesage and Thijs Van de Graaf (eds), *Rising Powers and Multilateral Institutions*, Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan, 2015, p. 136.

However, power shifts are nothing more than a *permissive* condition which merely *allows* them to demand such changes. The G4 countries' behaviour in general, and their attitudes to Council reform in particular, cannot be explained solely in terms of their increased power and influence in contemporary international society. As discussed in chapter 3, the rising powers in the 1930s used their growing military power and political clout not to move forward with reform of the League of Nations, but to challenge it. On this account, it cannot be claimed that the G4 countries have sought Council reform simply because of their growing power, wealth and influence vis-à-vis other countries. Therefore, both material and social factors must be sought to explain the behaviour of the G4 countries in the context of Council reform. Indeed, as we shall see below, it is their commitment to the purposes and principles of the UN that is the key to explaining their behaviour with regard to Council reform.

(i) Brazil

Reflecting its self-identification as a leader of developing countries, Brazil's original stance on the question emphasised the 'correlation' between the representativeness of the Council, on the one hand, and its authority and effectiveness, on the other.³² At the same time, however, it hinted at its ambition of becoming a permanent member, arguing that there existed a substantial support in the international community for increasing permanent seats on the Council so as to 'reflect better ... the changed international situation'.³³ In its written comment submitted to the Secretary-General, the Brazilian government proposed 'the idea of entrusting the responsibility of permanent membership in the Council to perhaps two additional major industrialized States, as well as to one major country from each of the main regions of the developing world'.³⁴ Although it did not nominate itself here as a candidate for permanent membership, it was clear that Brazil

³² UN General Assembly, A/47/PV.69, p. 18.

³³ *Ibid.*, p. 21.

³⁴ UN General Assembly, A/48/264, p. 14.

considered itself as a legitimate candidate to represent the Latin American and Caribbean Group. Indeed, the fact that there are no permanent members from the Latin American and Caribbean group supports Brazil's bid for permanent membership, although a number of rival countries in Latin America deny the claim that Brazil represents the interests of the region.³⁵ Brazil has come to publicly promote its candidacy for permanent membership since the creation of the G4. The current Brazilian government underlines the importance of reforming the Council so as to accommodate 'today's geopolitical realities', and promotes itself as a *natural* candidate for permanent membership capable of 'perform[ing] greater responsibilities in the field of international peace and security'.³⁶

(ii) Germany

In the 1990s, Germany was often called a 'reluctant power' since the controversy over its Basic Law had prevented the country from taking on broader international responsibilities.³⁷ Moreover, there are persistent domestic reservations about the use of force overseas, as with the case of Japan.³⁸ Despite these historical and social backgrounds, it has consistently expressed its willingness to assume greater responsibility in the international community and has promoted itself as a legitimate candidate for permanent membership. In 1992, the representative of Germany remarked in the General Assembly that 'all reform efforts must take into account the new reality of the forces of international politics', and, in its written comments submitted to the Secretary-General, it

³⁵ Sabine Hassler, *Reforming the UN Security Council Membership: The Illusion of Representativeness*, Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge, 2013, p. 138. See also Oliver Stuenkel, 'Leading the Disenfranchised or Joining the Establishment? India, Brazil, and the UN Security Council', *Carta Internacional*, 5/1, 2010, pp. 53–63.

³⁶ Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Brazil, Brazil and UNSC Reform, available at: <http://csnu.itamaraty.gov.br/en/brazil-and-uns-c-reform> (accessed 31 July 2017).

³⁷ See Franz-Josef Meiers, 'Germany: The Reluctant Power', *Survival*, 37/3, 1995, pp. 82–103. See also Jochen Thies, 'Germany: Europe's Reluctant Great Power', *The World Today*, 51/10, 1995, pp. 186–190.

³⁸ Mark Imber, 'The Reform of the UN Security Council', *International Relations*, 20/3, 2006, p. 332.

was declared that ‘[t]he Federal Government is ... prepared to assume the responsibilities which permanent membership of the Security Council entails’.³⁹ As Sabine Hassler points out, there has been a growing acceptance of the view that ‘[p]ermanent membership would not be possible without the Federal Army’s participation in measures authorized by the Council, including combat action’,⁴⁰ but it is equally the case that greater participation and involvement in UN activities give rise to a demand for a bigger say within the UN. While Germany maintains the stance that its ultimate objective is to create a permanent seat for the EU, it has in practice sought permanent membership for itself seeing that Britain and France are unlikely to subscribe to such an idea.⁴¹

(iii) India

India has seen itself as a leader of developing countries, as has Brazil as we have seen earlier. It has consistently advocated a broader representation on the Council on the grounds of the alleged correlation between the Council’s representativeness, on the one hand, and its effectiveness and efficiency, on the other, while denying the validity of the claim that an increase in the number of seats on the Council would inevitably result in its inefficiency.⁴² The representative of India on the Council has recently stated as follows:

The Security Council, which takes decisions on behalf of “we the peoples”, represents an increasingly small minority of the world’s population. If it is to make rules for “the peoples”, it needs to adequately reflect new realities.⁴³

³⁹ UN General Assembly, A/47/PV.69, p. 22; UN General Assembly, A/48/264, p. 44.

⁴⁰ Hassler, *Reforming the UN Security Council Membership*, p. 144.

⁴¹ See Federal Foreign Office of Germany, Reform of the United Nations Security Council—Questions and Answers, 10 January 2017, available at: http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/EN/Aussenpolitik/Friedenspolitik/VereinteNationen/05_Reformen/ReformSR-Fragen.html?nn=481864 (accessed 26 April 2017).

⁴² UN Security Council, S/PV.3046, p. 97; UN General Assembly, A/47/PV.69, p. 16.

⁴³ UN Security Council, Provisional Verbatim Record of the 7857th Meeting, UN Doc S/PV.7857, 10 January 2017, p. 71.

However, India holds that the Council must not only represents ‘the peoples’, but also reflect ‘the present and future dimensions of power’, and that it is a legitimate candidate for permanent membership on the Council in light of its growing economy, population and future potential as well as in view of its large-scale contributions to UN peacekeeping operations.⁴⁴ Indeed, India is not just a supporter, but a pioneer of the present-day UN peacekeeping,⁴⁵ and this also strengthens its bid for permanent membership. This stance on the question has remained basically the same until today.⁴⁶

(iv) Japan

Japan has long been an ardent supporter of UN reform not merely because it wants some reward for its financial contributions and wants to eliminate the former enemy clauses in the UN Charter,⁴⁷ but mainly on grounds of its belief that, if the goals of the UN are to be achieved, the confidence of its member states needs to be sustained by revamping the UN to accommodate changes in world politics, including ‘shifts in global power relations’.⁴⁸ Presumably, of all the written comments submitted to the Secretary-General, Japan’s comments make out the most systematic case for a reformed Council inclusive of countries with the capacity and willingness to assume global responsibilities.⁴⁹ This should not be surprising given its willingness to play a greater role in the international community and its record as a major financial contributor to the UN.

⁴⁴ UN General Assembly, A/48/264, pp. 47–48.

⁴⁵ Yeshe Choedon, ‘India’s Perspective on the UN Security Council Reform’, *India Quarterly: A Journal of International Affairs*, 63/4, 2007, p. 19.

⁴⁶ See Permanent Mission of India to the UN, India and United Nations: UN Reforms, available at: <https://www.pminewyork.org/pages.php?id=1991> (accessed 25 April 2017).

⁴⁷ Hassler, *Reforming the UN Security Council Membership*, pp. 141–142. See also Rajaram Panda, ‘Japan, Germany and the UN Security Council’, *India Quarterly*, 48/4, 1992, pp. 51–70.

⁴⁸ UN General Assembly, Provisional Verbatim Record of the 7th Meeting of the 47th Session of the General Assembly, UN Doc A/47/PV.7, 30 September 1992, p. 67.

⁴⁹ UN General Assembly, A/48/264, p. 54, paras. 6–7.

Commitment to the purposes and principles of the UN

It is pertinent to the present study to note that all the G4 countries seeking Council reform are united in their firm *commitment* to the purposes and principles of the UN. Their stances on the question of Council reform are premised on the shared assumption that the Security Council carries primary responsibility for the achievement of the purposes of the UN, primary among which is the maintenance of international peace and security, and their proposals and plans for Council reform are aimed at enhancing the Council's ability to execute this responsibility. For example, in the 1992 Security Council summit meeting, the then Japanese Prime Minister Kiichi Miyazawa remarked as follows:

First of all, I believe that, in securing a peaceful world order, the ideals and purposes of the United Nations Charter, which represent fundamental and universal values, will be of even greater relevance than ever before. It is incumbent on Member States to strive, constantly, to ensure that each of these values is respected in practice. At the same time, it is also necessary for the United Nations to evolve while adapting to a changing world. ... In addition, since the Security Council is at the centre of the United Nations efforts to maintain international peace and security, it is important to consider thoroughly ways to adjust its functions, compositions and other aspects so as to make it more reflective of the realities of the new era. This is a process in which Japan is prepared to take an active part.⁵⁰

This oft-quoted remark is but one of many similar ones made by the G4 countries. To give another example, the Brazilian government clearly states that its national interest is inseparable from the workings and effectiveness of the UN.

For Brazil, the protection of the Security Council's credibility, to be achieved through a comprehensive reform, can be seen as a national goal. In addition to posing threats to the international stability, the weakening of the UNSC would benefit other arrangements in which the country would have scant influence and

⁵⁰ UN Security Council, S/PV.3046, pp. 104–105.

would be detrimental for the achievements of the last 60 years in terms of consolidation of the international law through the UN. Therefore, aware of the post-Cold War world order, Brazil must engage actively in the discussions on peace and security, notably on the UNSC reform.⁵¹

Likewise, Germany and India have also made clear their commitment to the causes promoted by the UN and its Security Council as well as their willingness to take on greater responsibilities for promoting those causes.⁵² Japan itself has kept a favourable attitude towards the UN. As Peter Nadin argues, ‘Japanese foreign policy is partial to the UN ... [its] constitution is pacifist in nature, which accords with the spirit of the Preamble and Chapter VI of the charter’.⁵³ What does all this mean for the behaviour of these emerging and potential global powers with regard to Council reform? This point needs to be elaborated in detail, and we shall return to this question later on.

The debate on Security Council reform from the mid-1990s to the present

On 20 March 1997, the Malaysian diplomat Razali Ismail, who was then the President of the General Assembly and the Chair of the OEWG, set forth a reform plan which is generally known by the name of ‘Razali Reform Paper’.⁵⁴ The paper, which was presented in the form of a General Assembly draft resolution, proposed the addition of five permanent members without the right of veto and four non-permanent members to the Council. In spite of his initiative, the proposal and, indeed, the whole plan met with a setback in the face of resistance primarily from Italy and the Non-Aligned Movement, which did not concur with the idea of adding more permanent members to the Council.⁵⁵

⁵¹ Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Brazil, *Brazil and UNSC Reform*.

⁵² See UN General Assembly, A/48/264, pp. 43–44; Permanent Mission of India to the UN, *India and United Nations: UN Reform*.

⁵³ Nadin, *UN Security Council Reform*, p. 55.

⁵⁴ Razali Ismail, *Razali Reform Paper*, 20 March 1997, available at: http://csnu.itamaraty.gov.br/images/documentos/15_Razali_Reform_Paper.pdf (accessed 27 April 2017).

⁵⁵ Bosco, *Five to Rule Them All*, pp. 202–206; Dimitris Bourantonis and Konstantinos Magliveras, ‘The Enlargement of the UN Security Council: Reflections from the Current

While the debate on Council reform continued after the failure of the Razali Reform Plan, this setback was followed by a short period of relative stagnation, during which much of the focus of the international community was on issues surrounding 9/11 and war on terror. However, the publication of two important documents gave fresh impetus to the debate. In November 2004, a report entitled *A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility* was published by the High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change which had been appointed by the then UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan.⁵⁶ The report proposed two models for consideration. Model A, on the one hand, provided for the addition of six permanent members without the right of veto and three non-permanent members. Model B, on the other, proposed the addition of eight four-year seats which were renewable and one two-year seat which was non-renewable.⁵⁷ About half a year in advance of the 2005 World Summit to be held in September that year, Annan published his own report titled *In Larger Freedom: Towards Development, Security and Human Rights for All*.⁵⁸ In the report, he referred to the two models suggested by the High-level Panel and called on the UN member states to deliberate on them with the hope of forming a consensus about Council reform preparatory to the summit.⁵⁹

In response to Annan's call for Council reform, the G4 countries, along with other like-minded countries, submitted a draft resolution on Council reform, in which it was proposed along the lines of the above-mentioned Model A that the Council be expanded by adding six permanent and four non-permanent seats.⁶⁰ As for the issue as to whether

Debate', *Politics*, 22/1, 2002, pp. 24–30.

⁵⁶ UN General Assembly, *A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility: Report of the High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change*, UN Doc A/59/565, 2 December 2004.

⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 66–69.

⁵⁸ UN General Assembly, *In Larger Freedom: Towards Development, Security and Human Rights for All: Report of the Secretary-General*, UN Doc A/59/2005, 21 March 2005.

⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 41–43.

⁶⁰ UN General Assembly, *Draft Resolution on Security Council Reform*, UN Doc A/59/L.64, 6 July 2005.

new permanent members would have the right of veto, the draft resolution suggested that ‘the new permanent members shall not *exercise* the right of veto’ and that the issue be reconsidered in fifteen years’ time.⁶¹ By shelving the issue for the time being, the G4 countries attempted to assuage concerns that adding more permanent members would have adverse effects on the effectiveness of the Council. Following the submission of the draft resolution supported by the G4 and other countries, two counterproposals were submitted for consideration. On the basis of the common African Union position on UN reform, which is known as the ‘Ezulwini Consensus’, a group of African states introduced a draft resolution, in which it was proposed that new permanent members enjoy the right of veto on equal terms with the existing permanent five.⁶² The African proposal differs from one supported by the G4 countries in this regard, but both groups were united in their desire to add permanent as well as non-permanent seats. Another counterproposal came from what is widely known as the Uniting for Consensus (hereafter UfC) group, which is a group of states opposed to the idea of adding more permanent seats to the Council. The draft resolution submitted by the UfC proposed that the Council accept ten more non-permanent members with no additional permanent seats.⁶³ These draft resolutions were not put to a vote, and they only served to underscore the deep divisions existing between these groups of states. Indeed, it was difficult to reach any substantive agreement which would be satisfactory to all parties, and the World Summit Outcome Document did nothing more than reaffirm the member states’ support for ‘early reform’ of the Council and their commitment to continue negotiations towards this goal.⁶⁴

⁶¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 3–4, emphasis added.

⁶² UN General Assembly, Draft Resolution on Reform of the Security Council, UN Doc A/59/L.67, 18 July 2005, p. 2; African Union, The Common African Position on the Proposed Reform of the United Nations: “The Ezulwini Consensus”, AU Doc Ext/EX.CL/2(VII), 7–8 March 2005, pp. 9–10.

⁶³ UN General Assembly, Draft Resolution on Reform of the Security Council, UN Doc A/59/L.68, 21 July 2005.

⁶⁴ UN General Assembly, UN General Assembly Resolution 60/1, 2005 World Summit Outcome, UN Doc A/RES/60/1, 16 September 2005, p. 32.

Seeing as there existed a wide division of opinion among UN member states on the question, it was unlikely that the OEWG would ever be able to play the role of a *deus ex machina*, and its report published in September 2007 contained recommendations to the effect that, while the OEWG would continue its work as heretofore, the governments of the UN member states should begin intergovernmental negotiations at the General Assembly with the goal of moving forward with Council reform.⁶⁵ The OEWG report published the following year yet again called for intergovernmental negotiations and specified ‘five key issues’ to be addressed, that is, ‘categories of membership, the question of the veto, regional representation, size of an enlarged Council and working methods of the Security Council, and the relationship between the Council and the General Assembly’ (in the Council reform debate, these issues are sometimes referred to as *five pillars*), and the General Assembly gave its assent to the OEWG’s recommendations in its Decision 62/577.⁶⁶ Since then until today, UN member states have pursued intergovernmental negotiations (frequently abbreviated as IGN) at the General Assembly. Recent intergovernmental negotiations have led to identification of a couple of ‘elements of convergence’ among member states.⁶⁷ However, this progress is far from a breakthrough, and the IGN show no sign of reaching a substantial agreement.

In an attempt to press forward with Council reform, the G4 countries have recently put energy and effort in cooperation with like-minded countries. At the initiative of the

⁶⁵ UN General Assembly, Report of the Open-ended Working Group on the Question of Equitable Representation on and Increase in the Membership of the Security Council and Other Matters Related to the Security Council, UN Doc A/61/47(SUPP), 14 September 2007, pp. 5–6.

⁶⁶ UN General Assembly, Report of the Open-ended Working Group on the Question of Equitable Representation on and Increase in the Membership of the Security Council and Other Matters Related to the Security Council, UN Doc A/62/47(SUPP), 15 September 2008, p. 6; UN General Assembly, Decision 62/557, UN Doc A/62/49 (Vol. III), 15 September 2008, pp. 106–107.

⁶⁷ Mogens Lykketoft, Letter from the President of the General Assembly dated 12 July 2016, available at: <http://www.un.org/pga/70/wp-content/uploads/sites/10/2015/08/Security-Council-Reform-12-July-2016.pdf> (accessed 6 May 2017).

G4 countries, especially India, the Group of Friends on Security Council Reform was created in 2016, consisting of the G4, the Committee of Ten (C10), the L.69 group, Nordic and East European countries, Britain and France, and the G4 countries continue to call on other member states to join this newly formed group committed to the ‘principles of early reform, text-based negotiations and the expansion of the Security Council in both the permanent and non-permanent category of seats’.⁶⁸

Analysis of the process of Council reform

In this section, I will analyse the process of Council reform through the framework developed in the previous chapter, with a view to demonstrating the ability of the framework to produce socio-structural accounts of rising powers’ behaviour as well as to furthering understanding of the process of international political change in this issue-area.

1. What are rising powers’ attitudes towards the status quo of a given international society, and how are they affected by primary and secondary institutions?

As was argued in the preceding chapter, it is vitally important to understand what exactly rising powers are dissatisfied with. As has been established in the previous section, the G4 countries are dissatisfied with the current state of the Security Council and are united in their commitment to its early reform. It is important to draw attention to the simple fact that these countries are primarily dissatisfied with the *size* and *composition* of the Council. They are not dissatisfied with the Council *itself*, nor are they dissatisfied with its roles and mandates. Indeed, as discussed above, the G4’s efforts to move the process of Council reform forward are underpinned by their *commitment* to the purposes and principles of the UN, and they have strongly supported the cause of international peace and security

⁶⁸ See Permanent Mission of Germany to the United Nations, Joint Statement of the G-4 Directors General and Permanent Representatives to the United Nations Meeting, 2 February 2017, available at: http://m.new-york-un.diplo.de/Vertretung/newyorkvn/en/_pr/press-releases/2017/20170202-G4jointstmnt.html (accessed 31 July 2017).

by providing personnel and financial assistance. These countries *feel impelled* to work towards the betterment of the Council. This suggests that their identities and preferences are at least partly constituted by these secondary institutions as well as by the primary institutions underpinning them such as non-use of force, collective security and peaceful change.

This contrasts markedly with the rising powers' attitudes towards the League of Nations during the interwar period. The revisionist states at that time were not only dissatisfied with specific powers, mandates and functions of the League, but were radically opposed to the League itself. This contrast is reflective of the different levels of development of such primary institutions as non-use of force, collective security and peaceful change in the respective periods as well as the different degrees of internalisation of these institutions and the norms and values they represent. Furthermore, these differences account for the difference in the rising powers' behaviour in the respective periods. It is to this point that we turn below.

2. What are the primary and secondary institutions governing international political change in a given international society?

As discussed in the previous chapter, international political change in contemporary international society is governed by the primary institutions of non-use of force and peaceful change. It is these general institutions that are governing the process of Council reform, providing general guides as to how states should pursue their goals with regard to Council reform. The modalities of the movement towards Council reform cannot be understood without reference to these general primary institutions.

Within this normative framework, states, including the G4 countries, have thus far pursued Council reform with the help of the primary institution of diplomacy. In this regard, the movement towards Council reform follows the Carrian model that emphasises the role of diplomacy in international political change. However, the movement departs

from the Carrian model in that the former has not been governed by the primary institution of great power management. Indeed, the permanent five forming the great power club in contemporary international society have often been unwilling to discuss the question of Council reform, and the debate on Council reform has taken place mainly at the General Assembly, not at the Security Council.

Although sustained efforts have been devoted to Council reform since the Cold War period, it is only in the last twenty years or so that the efforts have led to the generation of *issue-specific* institutions governing the process of Council reform. As seen above, the OEWG was established in 1993 in order to consider the question of Council reform from all perspectives. The OEWG can be regarded as an issue-specific secondary institution since it is an intergovernmental arrangement consciously designed to promote discussion in this issue-area. At the suggestion of the OEWG, the IGN commenced in 2009 with a view to forging a convergence of views and opinions of member states regarding the five pillars of Council reform. The IGN are structured negotiations designed to push forward with Council reform and, therefore, can be regarded as another issue-specific secondary institution governing the process of Council reform.⁶⁹ These issue-specific secondary institutions reflect and support the primary institutions of non-use of force, peaceful change and diplomacy.

Furthermore, the G4 countries' behaviour in the process of Council reform has been governed by the primary institution of multilateralism, which is derived from the primary institution of diplomacy.⁷⁰ This is particularly evident in their recent move to create a group of like-minded states, i.e. the Group of Friends. According to the German

⁶⁹ It is to be noted that, in ES terminology, secondary institutions refer not only to intergovernmental organisations, but more generally to 'intergovernmental arrangements' including international conferences. Barry Buzan, *An Introduction to the English School of International Relations*, Cambridge: Polity Press, 2014, p. 17.

⁷⁰ See Barry Buzan, *From International to World Society?: English School Theory and the Social Structure of Globalisation*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004, p. 187.

representative at the General Assembly, the members of the Group share the triple principles of ‘early reform, text-based negotiations and expansion in both categories of seats’.⁷¹ Reflective of the primary institution of multilateralism, the Group serves to reinforce the above-mentioned institutional frameworks governing the process of Council reform, especially the IGN.

3. To what extent and why do rising powers conduct themselves in accordance with the primary and secondary institutions governing international political change?

As seen above, states have different opinions on Council reform, but there is a general agreement that Council reform should be pursued within the institutional frameworks just described. The G4 countries have not only acted within the institutional frameworks, but have also led their creation.

The question here is why this has been the case. In other words, how can we explain the compliance pull of those primary and secondary institutions? March and Olsen’s logic of consequences and logic of appropriateness provide a helpful framework for considering this question.⁷² From the point of view of the logic of consequences, the following three hypothetical answers can be imagined. Firstly, it could be that the governments of the G4 countries, after much deliberation, have reached a conclusion that the two-track approach that combines consultations of the OEWG and the IGN is the most efficient way forward to bring about a Council reform. This answer is implausible considering that the approach has produced very few substantial achievements so far. Secondly, it could be the case that they, again after much deliberation, reached the view that the question of Council reform is not important enough to risk social and/or legal punishment by the international community by pursuing it in a more aggressive manner

⁷¹ UN General Assembly, Verbatim Record of the 42nd Plenary Meeting of the 71st Session of the General Assembly, UN Doc A/71/PV.42, 7 November 2016, p. 7.

⁷² James G. March and Johan P. Olsen, ‘The Institutional Dynamics of International Political Order’, *International Organization*, 52/4, 1998, pp. 943–969.

that could possibly contravene the norms set by the institutional frameworks governing the process of Council reform, including the threat or use of force. This answer is also implausible considering the importance that the G4 countries have attached to the question of Council reform. The third possible answer is that the G4 countries are grudgingly *forced* to bow to the modality of the current Council reform process for the simple reason that they are not powerful enough to make their point through forcible measures. Of the three hypothetical answers, this is the least plausible for the reason given below and, again, this claim contradicts the fact that it is the G4 countries that have led the ongoing Council reform process. This is not to suggest that the behaviour of the G4 countries is not based on, or being affected by, the logic of consequences. Clearly, their behaviour is based on political calculation to a certain extent. However, political calculation is not the only determinant of the G4 countries' policy choices. If we are to fully understand the behaviour of these powers, it is necessary to consider how it is governed by the logic of appropriateness as well.

One thing that the G4 countries have in common is, as we have seen earlier, their firm *commitment* to the UN and its purposes and principles. To give another example, in the G4 joint press statement on 21 September 2016, '[t]he Ministers re-iterated their resolve to continue contributing to the fulfillment of the purposes and principles of the UN Charter'.⁷³ One might think that their professed commitment is perfunctory or tactical at best. However, it is an undeniable fact that these countries have provided continual support to the UN in various forms, such as personnel and financial support. This is something that cannot be done on a continuous basis were it not for domestic public support for the *raison d'être* of the UN.

Given the G4 countries' commitment to the UN and its purposes and principles, one can use a simple syllogistic reasoning to extrapolate why these countries have not

⁷³ G4, G4 Joint Press Statement on United Nations Security Council Reform, 21 September 2016, available at: http://www.mofa.go.jp/fp/unp/page3e_000585.html (accessed 10 May 2017).

resorted to forcible measures and have instead complied with the norms set by the primary and secondary institutions governing this issue-area.

Proposition 1: the G4 countries are committed to the fundamental principles of the UN;

Proposition 2: peaceful settlement of disputes is one of these principles;

Proposition 3: therefore, the G4 countries are committed to the principle of peaceful settlement of disputes.

The G4 countries consider Council reform as a means of enhancing the UN's capacity to achieve its purposes and principles, and this is why they pursue Council reform in conformity with the principle of peaceful settlement of disputes. To pursue Council reform otherwise would be totally self-contradictory and self-defeating.

In short, their commitment to the UN is a significant determinant of the G4 countries' behaviour with regard to Council reform. From the perspective of ES theory, the attitudes of the G4 countries towards Council reform can be interpreted as a sign of the development of a *Cooperative* international society, in which war is no longer recognised as a legitimate primary institution governing international political change.⁷⁴

4. Are the existing institutions governing international political change effective?

The Council reform process has been progressing at a snail's pace, and there is a wide recognition of the need to break this diplomatic logjam. While the current reform process has provided states with opportunities to air different views on the question, it has not been effective in producing tangible outcomes, and it is far from clear whether the continuation of the ongoing reform process will bear any fruit in the future. In short, the existing institutional frameworks governing the process of Council reform are far from *effective* in the sense defined in the preceding chapter.

⁷⁴ Buzan, *From International to World Society?*, pp. 193–194.

Given the commitment on the part of the G4 countries to the purposes and principles of the UN, it is unlikely that the ineffectiveness of the existing institutional frameworks will immediately lead them to abandon the ongoing process of Council reform. In the long term, however, the diplomatic deadlock may lead them to harbour doubts about the legitimacy of some of the primary and secondary institutions governing the Council reform process, and this could potentially result in withdrawal of their support for the UN in the form of reduction in financial and personnel contributions. This would be detrimental not only to the UN, but also to the maintenance of international peace and security.

5. How can international social structure be reformed so as to entrench peaceful change in international society in the context of power transition?

How can the prospect of peaceful change be improved in the issue-area of Council reform? As already discussed, the threat or use of force is a self-defeating way of bringing about Council reform. Besides, such a course of action is not *peaceful*, nor is it *effective*. Therefore, the Schmittian normative position which, as discussed in the preceding chapter, emphasises the role of force in international political change cannot offer any workable solutions to the question of Council reform. Given the efforts made so far to improve the prospect of peaceful change in this issue-area, it is important to explore, first of all, ways to improve the effectiveness of the existing institutional frameworks. Since the Council reform process is governed by the issue-specific secondary institutions of the OEWG and IGN, as well as by the general primary institutions of non-use of force, peaceful change and diplomacy, ways must be found, first of all, to improve the effectiveness of these issue-specific secondary institutions, especially the IGN. This means pursuing the course of action proposed by the Lauterpachtian position on peaceful change that focuses on the role of secondary institutions in international political change.

One possible way to improve the effectiveness of the IGN is to set a deadline for

concluding negotiations and to take a vote after the set negotiation period. However, this idea is unlikely to gain much support considering that the General Assembly has decided that the IGN process should seek ‘a solution that can garner the widest possible political acceptance by Member States’.⁷⁵ Besides, it would be unwise to set a time limit for such an important political decision.

Another, more realistic, way to improve the effectiveness of the IGN is to advance the Council reform process by means of text-based negotiations. In General Assembly Decision 69/560 adopted without vote on 14 September 2015, it was decided that the IGN be pursued on the basis of the documents circulated by Sam Kutesa, the then President of the General Assembly.⁷⁶ The decision was hailed as a landmark development in the history of Council reform.⁷⁷ However, substantial negotiations based on the Kutesa documents are yet to begin, and a large number of states have called for the early commencement of, to borrow a German representative’s phrase, ‘real, text-based negotiations’.⁷⁸ Text-based negotiations are the most practical and realistic way available at this moment to induce convergence of views with regard to the five pillars of Council reform, and this approach currently enjoys broad support from UN member states.

Invigoration of secondary institutions may have the effect of revitalising primary institutions, such as are emphasised by Carr, by inducing states, including great powers, to engage in open or behind-the-scenes negotiations and to make compromises outside the secondary institutional frameworks mentioned above, and such processes may in turn feed into the process of Council reform. As will be discussed below, whether such a development would facilitate the process of Council reform depends on the extent to

⁷⁵ UN General Assembly, Decision 62/557, p. 107.

⁷⁶ UN General Assembly, Decision 69/560, UN Doc A/69/49 (Vol. III), 14 September 2015, p. 265; Sam Kutesa, Letter from the President of the General Assembly dated 31 July 2015, available at: <http://www.un.org/pga/wp-content/uploads/sites/3/2013/11/Security-Council-reform-IGN-31-July-2015.pdf> (accessed 12 May 2017).

⁷⁷ See UN General Assembly, Verbatim Record of the 104th Meeting of the 69th Session of the General Assembly, UN Doc A/69/PV.104, 14 September 2015.

⁷⁸ UN General Assembly, Record of the 42nd Plenary Meeting of the 71st Session, p. 7.

which states involved in the process of Council reform share common interests and values.

6. To what extent do the status quo powers and the rising powers in a given international society share common interests and values?

The success of the IGN and text-based negotiations depends on the potential as well as existing degree of common interests and values among states in contemporary international society. In the IGN process, no state is in a position to force views on other states, although there are differences in their negotiating power and influence. Moreover, as provided by Article 108 of the Charter, amendments to the Charter require the assent of at least two thirds of member states including the permanent five, which can, individually or collectively, veto any amendments to the Charter. This necessitates that states overcome political differences and strive in good faith to reduce gaps in their opinions through the IGN process. Intergovernmental text-based negotiations would not only serve as a test of the existing degree of common interests and values among states, but also provide opportunities for exploring and furthering common interests and values. Finding common ground among the status quo powers and the rising powers pursuing Council reform through the IGN process is not a sufficient condition for the success of Council reform, but, nevertheless, is an important step towards its realisation.

I have thus far examined the process of Council reform through the analytical framework developed in the preceding chapter, and have explained the behaviour of the G4 countries in terms of the preferences and goals they have, the primary and secondary institutions governing the Council reform process, the binding power and influence of those institutions on the behaviour of those countries, and the effectiveness of those institutions in bringing about international political change. I have also discussed how the Council reform process can be moved forward, taking into account the present and potential conditions of contemporary international society.

This line of analysis has been made possible by virtue of the socio-structural

conception of power transition as an institutionally governed process and the analytical framework based on it. This is something that cannot be done by analysing the process of Council reform through traditional theories of power transition that try to explain the behaviour of rising powers in terms of changes in international material structure and the rising powers' evaluative attitudes towards the status quo as a whole. Such a theory cannot capture complex processes of international political change, which cannot be understood in terms of the war/non-war dichotomy. It is only by adopting the socio-structural perspective and the framework underpinned by it that the complexity surrounding international political change in the context of power transition can be accurately analysed.

Reframing the debate on Council reform

Fixation with the issue of size and composition and the duality of the Security Council

As we have seen in the present chapter, many countries, including the G4 countries, have pursued Council reform so as to adapt it to changing realities of world politics. In this sense, the Council can be seen an *object* of international political change. When addressing the question of Council reform, however, the Council cannot be seen merely as an object of change. Council reform is not just about giving a bigger say to rising powers or recognising them as great powers; the goal of Council reform, shared by the G4 countries, is to enhance the effectiveness of the Council in the maintenance of international peace and security, and this cannot be achieved without the enhancement of its ability to promote the symbiotic relationship between the primary institutions of collective security and peaceful change. As discussed in chapter 5, the Council performs this function by acting as an agent of change via exercise of its powers under Chapters VI and VII of the UN Charter. In view of this, the Council cannot be viewed merely as an object of change; it is also an *agent* of change. Any discussion on Council reform should take this duality into account, and, therefore, the debate on Council reform should be addressing issues concerning the ways in which the Council exercises its agency and how

this can be done more effectively, including in the context of power transition. However, the current debate on Council reform has been fixated on issues concerning the Council's *size* and *composition*, and issues concerning the Council's agency with regard to promoting peaceful change have been neglected.

Much of the current debate on Council reform has been fixated on the issues relating to its size and composition. This has been so because of the underlying assumption or dogma that the effectiveness of the Council in the maintenance of international peace and security is a function of its size and composition. This shared assumption is evident in justificatory statements, comments and proposals made by states. The G4 countries focus on the issues concerning the Council's size and composition on the grounds that an expanded Council with new permanent as well as non-permanent members is a *sine qua non* for the maintenance of international peace and security in contemporary international society. This logic is evident in the following statement:

The G-4 leaders stressed that a more representative, legitimate and effective Security Council is needed more than ever to address the global conflicts and crises, which had spiraled in recent years. They shared the view that this can be achieved by reflecting the realities of the international community in the 21st century, where *more Member States have the capacity and willingness to take on major responsibilities with regard to maintenance of international peace and security*. ... The leaders emphasized that the G-4 countries are legitimate candidates for permanent membership in an expanded and reformed Council and supported each other's candidature.⁷⁹

As seen above, some countries have opposed any increase in the permanent membership on grounds of fairness and sovereign equality and, therefore, have refused to accept the G4's proposals. However, these countries share the same assumption that

⁷⁹ G4, Joint Press Statement on United Nations Security Council Reform, 26th September 2015, available at: <http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/files/000101241.pdf> (accessed 16 May 2017), emphasis added.

the effectiveness of the Council is dependent on its size and composition. For example, the Italian diplomat Marcello Spatafora, addressing the General Assembly, commended a proposal submitted by the UfC group as a promising plan that could improve the Council's effectiveness since it was grounded in the principles of fairness and equality.⁸⁰ It is important to note here that, in the UfC proposal, such notions as fairness and equality are understood primarily in terms of the size and composition of the Council.

Furthermore, many of those who are against any expansion of the Council are concerned that an expansion of the Council would seriously undermine its effectiveness, and, in this regard, their views are similarly based on the assumption that the effectiveness of the Council and its size and composition are connected. The following text from Russett et al. nicely summarises such sceptics' reasoning:

The concern for maintaining an effective Security Council remains central. A council hobbled by new veto-wielding or veto-threatening states might not act quickly or decisively in a crisis, or perhaps could not act at all. Much the same effect could be produced if there were a substantial enlargement of even the nonpermanent membership, or a serious increase in the majority threshold.⁸¹

In short, the assumption that the effectiveness of the Council in the maintenance of international peace and security is a function of its size and composition is shared widely across the political spectrum.

Why has this been the case? Here, I would venture to argue that this is attributable to a commonly accepted myth about the failure of the League of Nations. It is often taught and widely believed that the League failed to deal with the international crises during the 1930s for, among others, the following two reasons. Firstly, it is often claimed that the

⁸⁰ UN Press Release, 'Uniting for Consensus' Group of States Introduces Text on Security Council Reform to General Assembly, UN Doc GA/10371, 26 July 2005, available at: <http://www.un.org/press/en/2005/ga10371.doc.htm> (accessed 31 July 2017).

⁸¹ Bruce Russett, Barry O'Neill and James Sutterlin, 'Breaking the Security Council Restructuring Logjam', *Global Governance*, 2/1, 1996, p. 73.

League's failure is due to the absence of certain major powers, including the United States. Secondly, it has been pointed out that the League could not make effective decisions in face of the revisionist challenges due to its unanimity rule. If these are believed to be the main causes of the League's failure, and if the UN is understood by analogy with the League, it is understandable why the focus of Council reform has been put on the issues concerning its size and composition, including the issue of the right of veto. As we have seen in chapter 3, however, it was widely discussed during the 1930s that the ineffectiveness of the League was primarily due to its inability to effectively promote the symbiotic relationship between collective security and peaceful change. Indeed, it was issues concerning the promotion of this institutional symbiosis and the role the League played in this regard that were most debated among scholars and practitioners in the 1930s. The excessive focus on the issues concerning the Council's size and composition that has haunted the current debate on Council reform may be reflective of the failure to appreciate this important lesson of history. Since we have discussed in great detail the significance of the symbiotic relationship between collective security and peaceful change for secondary institutions designed for the maintenance of international peace and security such as the League and the UN, we are in a good position to consider what it is that is truly important for the effectiveness of the Security Council in managing international political change, including in the context of power transition.

To sum it up, the current debate on Council reform is problematic because it has failed to address issues concerning the institutional symbiosis between collective security and peaceful change, its significance for the maintenance of international peace and security, and the role that the Council plays in promoting and entrenching the institutional symbiosis in contemporary international society. The Security Council is not merely an *object* of international political change, but also an *agent* of international political change. Any reform that fails to recognise the duality of the Council and confines itself to tinkering with its size and composition would not bring about a real improvement in its

capacity to maintain international peace and security. Such a reform might improve the Council's capacity with regard to collective security. However, collective security is just one of the two basic pillars of the maintenance of international peace and security, and it cannot be sustained unless it is accompanied by some machinery for peaceful change.

Key issues to be addressed in future debate on Council reform

This brings us back to the discussion of the Council's powers under Chapter VI of the UN Charter, which we have already touched on in chapter 5. Chapter VI of the Charter stipulates the Council's powers with regard to peaceful settlement of disputes, and it is primarily this part of the Charter that provides for peaceful change. As was discussed in Chapter 5, the Council has frequently responded to conflicts and crises only after violence has set in. Therefore, the Council's powers under Chapter VI need to be reviewed, and strengthened as necessary, so that the Council can respond to conflicts more proactively and effectively. At least, the following three interrelated issues need to be addressed in future debate on Council reform.

Firstly, future debate on Council reform needs to address how it is that the Council's capacity to induce states to pursue a peaceful settlement can be improved. As provided for in Article 33(1), states party to a dispute 'likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security' are under obligation to pursue a peaceful settlement by 'means of their own choice'.⁸² However, it is often extremely difficult for states party to a dispute that is genuinely likely to cause major disruption to the international order to agree on the means by which the dispute is going to be settled. Failure to agree on the mode of dispute settlement may well lead to a political stalemate which, in turn, could result in an armed confrontation. In order to forestall such a development, Article 36(1) of the Charter stipulates that the Council may 'recommend appropriate procedures or

⁸² UN, Charter of the United Nations, Art. 33(1), 26 June 1945, available at: <http://www.un.org/en/charter-united-nations/index.html> (accessed 26 July 2017).

methods of adjustment'.⁸³ However, *recommendations* of the Council are, by definition, legally non-binding. Moreover, there is a traditional interpretation of the Charter that stresses the non-enforceability of Council recommendations. According to Goodrich et al., 'the Dumbarton Oaks text was revised to eliminate the provision expressly permitting the Security Council to determine that a failure to settle a dispute under Chapter VI was a threat to international peace and security'.⁸⁴ This means that some of the drafters of the Charter held that Council recommendations made under Article 36(1) could not be enforced by any of the enforcement measures provided for in Chapter VII. This interpretation of the relationship between Chapters VI and VII needs to be critically reviewed if the Council is to be able not only to respond to, but also to proactively prevent the occurrence of, armed conflicts. In view of this, there is room for discussion on what the Council can legitimately do to induce parties to a dispute to pursue a peaceful settlement.

The second issue to be addressed in future debate on Council reform, which is closely connected to the first one, is whether the Council is entitled to make recommendations containing terms of settlement *on its own initiative*. According to the traditional interpretation of Article 37 of the Charter, the Council can recommend terms of settlement only after a dispute has been referred to the Council by one or more states party to a dispute. This means that the Council is prohibited from proactively engaging in dispute settlement by making recommendations containing terms of settlement *on its own initiative*, and that the Council cannot recommend terms of settlement when all of the parties concerned are unwilling to refer the matter to the Council. Despite this traditional interpretation, some states have opined that the Council can, on its own judgement, make

⁸³ Ibid., Art. 36(1).

⁸⁴ Leland M. Goodrich, Edvard Isak Hambro and Anne Patricia Simons, *Charter of the United Nations: Commentary and Documents*, 3rd edn, New York: Columbia University Press, 1969, p. 292.

substantial recommendations under Article 37.⁸⁵ This leaves room for discussion as to whether the Council can legitimately make substantial recommendations before a dispute has been referred to it.

Thirdly, future debate on Council reform should address whether the Council may legitimately determine terms of settlement and enforce them by means of measures provided for in Chapter VII of the Charter. Although some of the drafters of the Charter held the view that the Council may not take enforcement measures against those disregarding its substantive recommendations, Kelsen and others have argued that the Council is permitted to do precisely this, as discussed in chapter 5. The answer to this question significantly affects the capacity of the Council to manage the process of international political change, including in the context of power transition, and on this account this legal ambiguity needs to be addressed in future debate on Council reform.

Future Council reform should explore ways to enhance the Council's ability to bring about peaceful change in contemporary international society, and to this end discussion on these interrelated key issues concerning the Council's powers under Chapters VI and VII of the Charter should be made an important part of the agenda of the IGN by adding the item entitled 'the Council's powers under Chapters VI and VII of the UN Charter' as a sixth pillar to the existing five pillars of Council reform. This move would enable future IGN to address how to improve the Council's capacity as an agent of international political change.

Conclusion

On the basis of the analytical framework presented in the preceding chapter, the present chapter has examined the process of UN Security Council reform and the behaviour of the G4 countries. The analysis has explained the behaviour of the G4 countries in relation

⁸⁵ Ibid., p. 285; Thomas Giegerich, 'Article 37', in Bruno Simma, Daniel-Erasmus Khan, Georg Nolte and Andreas Paulus (eds), *The Charter of the United Nations: A Commentary*, 3rd edn, vol. I, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012, p. 1154.

to the primary and secondary institutions governing political change in this issue-area such as non-use of force, peaceful change, diplomacy, multilateralism, the OEWG and the IGN. Moreover, the chapter has highlighted the G4 countries' commitment to the purposes and principles of the UN, thereby demonstrating the regulative and constitutive effects that the UN and its Security Council as well as the primary institutions underpinning these secondary institutions have had on the behaviour, preferences and identities of the G4 countries. These findings have been made possible by the use and application of the analytical framework that combines elements of ES theory and the theoretical insights obtained from the interwar debate on peaceful change, and this is something that cannot be achieved by the state-centric, materialist theories of power transition which neglect the role of international social structure in power transition and, especially, the role of the primary institution of international law and that of secondary institutions such as the League of Nations, the UN and other international political and judicial organisations.

The present chapter also considered how the process of Council reform can be moved forward, and proposed institutionalising text-based negotiations as a possible and realistic way forward to bringing about a Council reform. Improving the effectiveness of institutions governing the process of Council reform is not only important for the success of Council reform, but also for the long-term effectiveness of the primary and secondary institutions governing change in contemporary international society.

Given the role of the Council in promoting the institutional symbiosis between collective security and peaceful change, which is central to the maintenance of international peace and security including the management of changes induced by power transition, it is also important to consider what *kind* of Council reform is necessary for this purpose. The Council is not only an object of international political change, but also an agent of international political change. The excessive focus on the issues concerning the Council's size and composition has had the counterproductive effect of shifting the

focus of debate away from the role of the Council as an agent responsible for promoting the symbiotic relationship between collective security and peaceful change. With this in mind, the present chapter has proposed that the item entitled ‘the Council’s powers under Chapters VI and VII of the UN Charter’ be added as a sixth pillar to the existing five pillars of Council reform and, by doing so, it should be made an important part of the IGN process. It is only by addressing this issue that the long-term effectiveness of the Council in managing the process of international political change, including in the context of power transition, can be enhanced.

Conclusion

By exploring the interface between power transition, peaceful change and reform of the UN Security Council, the present study has explored the relationship between power transition and international social structure with a view to gaining a better understanding of the behaviour of rising powers and international political change in the context of power transition. The first section of the conclusion provides an answer to each of the secondary research questions set out in chapter 1, and the second section goes on to provide an answer to the primary research question. This will be followed by a discussion about the significance of the present study for power transition studies. The fourth section discusses how the present study can contribute to further research in power transition studies and what needs to be done in future research in order to further deepen the understanding of power transition.

Power transition, peaceful change and UN Security Council reform

The present study started with doubts about the explanatory power of the existing major theories of power transition and their ontological assumptions. Chapter 1 offered an overview of the existing literature on power transition through an examination of the major theories of power transition propounded by A.F.K. Organski, Robert Gilpin and others, revealing their reliance on the ontological assumptions that have led to the conception of rising powers as rational actors acting on the basis of cost-benefit calculations and in response to changes in international material structure. As a result of these assumptions, much of the extant literature has failed to look at how such factors as

state practice, international norms and law, and international organisations (which I have referred to collectively as ‘international social structure’) affect the behaviour of rising powers and hence the process of international political change. In chapter 1, it was argued that such a socio-structural perspective was necessary if we were to fully comprehend the behaviour of rising powers in world politics. The present study turned to ES theory, especially Barry Buzan’s reformulation of it, for just such a theoretical perspective.

However, it was also pointed out in chapter 1 that ES theory itself needed some reworking to perform analysis of the behaviour of rising powers and the process of international political change in the context of power transition since it had not developed its own distinctive framework necessary for such an analysis. It was then argued that the interwar debate on peaceful change would provide hitherto neglected insights into the relationship between international political change and international social structure on the basis of which to generate a socio-structural conception of power transition and to rework ES theory. Thus the first secondary research question was: *what are the key insights from the interwar debate on ‘peaceful change’ and how do they, with the help of ES theory, reform the conception of power transition and the way we analyse the behaviour of rising powers?*

This question was addressed in chapters 2 to 6. Chapter 2 addressed the methodology and methods underlying this study and reflected on how power transition could be analysed, drawing on the ES’s discussions on methodological pluralism. It was argued that power transition needed to be looked at not only from the positivist and interpretivist perspectives, but also from the perspective of critical theory so as to keep normative issues concerning power transition within reach of this inquiry. Drawing on the literature on hermeneutics, the latter part of the chapter addressed how the interwar debate on peaceful change should be interpreted, arguing that it needed to be read and interpreted in context and in such a way as to modify any preconceptions we might have about power transition.

Chapters 3 and 4 turned to the interwar debate on peaceful change for key lessons and insights for power transition analysis. Chapter 3 took a close look at the debate and its historical background, and shed light on the following insights. Firstly, the debate illustrated the need to view war as a social practice and therefore as amenable to social change and control. It was pointed out that this conception of war accords with the ES's conception of it as a primary institution of international society. Secondly, it was shown that the key to eliminating war as an institution of international society is to establish and entrench the symbiotic relationship between the primary institutions of collective security and peaceful change in international society. Thirdly, the debate showed that the entrenchment of this institutional symbiosis requires the support of secondary institutions designed for the maintenance of international peace and security such as the League of Nations. These insights together provide the basis on which to develop a socio-structural conception of power transition as an institutionally governed process. Chapter 4 expanded further on the debate by focusing on three different normative views on peaceful change and on the expected role of international social structure in international political change. The existence of divergent views on this point upholds the claim made in chapter 2 that power transition studies cannot just be about the analytical, but must also concern the normative.

On the basis of the discussions in chapters 3 and 4, chapters 5 and 6 set out to address the first secondary research question by presenting a socio-structural conception of power transition as an institutionally governed process and by developing a framework for analysing actual cases of power transition. Chapter 5 started by formulating the socio-structural conception by recapitulating the insights gained from the interwar debate and by comparing the approach underlying the debate with that adopted by much of the existing literature on power transition. It then went on to establish that the socio-structural conception, based on the insights drawn from the interwar debate, is of enduring importance for attempts to understand power transition in contemporary international

society by showing that the postwar international society has been characterised by the development of international law governing the use of force, the institutionalisation of peaceful change, and the development of the machinery for managing international political change, especially the UN and its Security Council.

Chapter 6 set out an analytical framework on the basis of the socio-structural conception of power transition, combining elements of ES theory and the insights gained from the interwar debate. The framework was presented in the form of six key questions to be addressed in the socio-structural analysis of power transition. The framework drew attention to the importance of identifying the sources of rising powers' dissatisfaction, brought the distinctions between the issue-specific/general and primary/secondary institutions into power transition analysis, and brought up issues concerning the influence, effectiveness and reform of institutions governing change in international society. The analytical framework enables production of sociologically and historically rich accounts of international political change in the context of power transition.

Chapter 7 addressed the second and third secondary research questions through exploring the duality of the Council with regard to power transition. The second secondary research question was: *how does the reformed conception of power transition enhance the understanding of the behaviour of the rising powers pursuing UN Security Council reform?* Council reform is certainly one of the most hotly debated topics in connection with power transition today, and in this respect the Council can be seen as an *object* of international political change. At the same time, however, the Council is an important political actor affecting the process of international political change, and therefore it must also be regarded as an *agent* of international political change. It follows that any outcome of Council reform would have significant repercussions on its ability to manage international political change, including in the context of power transition. Therefore, the third secondary research question was: *given the duality of the Security Council with regard to power transition, how should the Council be reformed so as to*

enhance its capacity to manage change in international society, including changes in the international status quo in the context of power transition?

The first two sections of chapter 7 addressed the second secondary research question. The first section provided an overview of the history of and debate on Council reform, focusing on the goals pursued by the rising and potential global powers active in this issue-area, i.e. the G4 countries, and revealing their attitudes towards the issue. The second section analysed the process of Council reform and the behaviour of the rising powers pursuing this goal through the framework developed in chapter 6, showing that the process and their behaviour are governed not only by the general primary institutions of diplomacy, non-use of force and peaceful change, but also by issue-specific secondary institutions such as the OEWG and the IGN. The analysis demonstrated that the behaviour of the G4 countries, especially their compliance with the norms laid down by these primary and secondary institutions, can only be explained with reference to their commitment to the purposes and principles of the UN and its constitutive as well as regulative effects on those countries. In short, it showed how the process of Council reform and the behaviour of the rising powers active in this issue-area are shaped by international social structure, i.e. institutions of international society. It was also pointed out that the institutions governing the process of Council reform are not effective enough to bring about a reform of the Council, suggesting that text-based negotiations can serve to move forward the Council reform process by providing opportunities for the opinions held by the relevant actors to converge.

The third section then went on to address the third secondary research question by reframing the debate on Council reform. It pointed out that the ongoing debate on Council reform has been fixated on the issue of size and composition and, therefore, has predominantly treated the Council as an object of international political change. In view of this, it was asserted that another dimension of the Council as the agent of international political change must feature in future debate on Council reform and that Council reform

should be carried out in such a way as to improve its capacity to promote and entrench the primary institution of peaceful change in contemporary international society. To this end it was suggested that the item entitled 'the Council's powers under Chapters VI and VII of the UN Charter' be added as the sixth pillar to the existing five pillars of Council reform. It is only by doing so that the duality of the Council with regard to power transition would be duly addressed in the debate on Council reform.

To sum up, the interface explored in this study can be summarised as follows. Power transition in world politics is not so much a physical phenomenon as a social phenomenon since international political change triggered by power transition can only be understood with reference to international social structure or, in ES terminology, institutions of international society. The interwar debate on peaceful change bolsters this conception of power transition as an institutionally governed process and provides both theoretical and empirical insights into the relationship between international political change and international social structure. One thing that the interwar debate underscores, and the analytical framework developed in this study theorises, is the role of secondary institutions such as the UN Security Council as agents of international political change. This means that it is not enough just to analyse Council reform, which is an important issue foregrounded by contemporary power transitions, in connection with the primary and secondary institutions governing change in contemporary international society, but also necessary to consider how the outcome of Council reform would feed back into the Council's ability as a secondary institution responsible for the management of international political change, including in the context of power transition. The three themes are not separate but thus interconnected, so much so that it is impossible to arrive at a better understanding of power transition and its relationship with contemporary international social structure without exploring the interface between them.

Rising powers and international social structure

On the basis of the findings and arguments of the present study, we can now provide conclusions to our primary research question, which is: *how do primary and secondary institutions of international society affect the behaviour of rising powers and hence the process of international political change in the context of power transition?* The conclusions can be stated as follows:

- primary institutions, such as international law and peaceful change, impact on the behaviour of rising powers by providing a general socio-structural context in which power transition occurs, and by constituting their identities and interests;
- secondary institutions provide rising powers with a more specific, structured, open, multilateral and possibly fair way of negotiating and bringing about political changes in the international status quo;
- some secondary institutions, such as the UN and its Security Council, also act as agents of international political change, influencing the behaviour of rising powers in varying degrees depending upon their effectiveness, and constituting rising powers' identities and interests;
- the behaviour of rising powers and the process of international political change in the context of power transition are affected not only by the general socio-structural context of a given international society, but also by the type, character and effectiveness of the primary and secondary institutions governing change in a given issue-area or areas at stake.

These conclusions stress the importance of secondary as well as primary institutions in the context of power transition in contemporary international society. The growing importance of the role of secondary institutions governing international political change is reflective of the development of the primary institution of international law and

the entrenchment of the primary institution of peaceful change in contemporary international society.

These conclusions do not imply that the behaviour of rising powers is always influenced by secondary institutions governing change in international society. Some rising powers are reluctant to make use of secondary institutions in the process of dispute settlement, as in the case of Russia's ambiguous attitudes towards the idea of peacekeeping in Ukraine and in the case of China's refusal to settle maritime disputes by international judicial means. However, in other issue-areas and contexts, rising powers have shown their willing to make active use of secondary institutions in their attempt to effect changes in the international status quo, as in the case the G4's attitudes towards UN Security Council reform and, as will be discussed shortly, in the case of BRICS's attempts to reform the international economic governance structure. These phenomena can be interpreted as a sign of the existence of contested understandings of the international social structure or, alternatively, as a sign of the transition from a *Coexistence* international society to a *Cooperative* or even *Convergence* international society, to borrow Buzan's typology of international societies.¹

Significance of the present study

The present study and its findings contribute to the literature on power transition in the following ways. Firstly, the present study sets out and supports the socio-structural conception of power transition as an institutionally governed process, and presents a distinctive way of theorising power transition that radically differs and departs from the materialistic, mechanistic, and state-centric conception of power transition prevalent in the existing literature on power transition. The present study shows that international social structure, as defined in terms of both primary and secondary institutions, have both

¹ See Barry Buzan, *From International to World Society?: English School Theory and the Social Structure of Globalisation*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999, pp. 159–160, 190–195.

regulative and constitutive effects on states including rising powers. In particular, the present study demonstrates the significance of the primary institution of international law and of secondary institutions designed to maintain international peace and security for international political change, including changes in the context of power transition. As regards the role of international law, the present study illustrates the institutionalisation and codification of the primary institution of peaceful change in contemporary international law, and highlights the development of methods, techniques and organisations that help states practise peaceful change. As regards the role of secondary institutions, the present study reveals the Security Council's role as an agent of international political change, and unravels the mechanism by which it exercises its agency via focus on its powers under Chapters VI and VII of the UN Charter. By underlining these key points that have been almost totally neglected by much of the existing literature on power transition, the socio-structural conception of power transition advances a distinctive way of looking at power transition that emphasises the role of international social structure.

Secondly, the present study sets forth an analytical framework for examining cases of power transition with reference to international social structure, thereby enabling study of power transition from the socio-structural perspective. While the present study has examined the case of Security Council reform through this framework, it can be used for producing historically and sociologically thick accounts of other cases of, or issues related to, power transition and also for conducting comparative analyses of various sorts, as will be discussed in greater detail in the next section.

Thirdly, based on the ES's methodological pluralism, the present study sheds light on the inescapable normativity of power transition studies, and the analytical framework it sets forth is framed in such a way as to enable the theorist to address both analytical and normative issues concerning power transition. The three normative positions on the role of primary and secondary institutions governing international political change as

formulated in chapter 4 provide a useful framework for normative deliberations in power transition studies.

Future research agendas

In this section, I shall indicate directions in which this study can be furthered in future power transition studies.

The case of global economic governance reform

The analytical framework that the present study set out in chapter 6 can be used for the purpose of analysing other specific cases of power transition. For example, it can be used as a framework for analysing processes of reform of global economic governance and for understanding the behaviour of the rising powers active in this issue-area in connection with international social structure. The following is the sketch of what a socio-structural account of global economic governance reform would look like.

The global economic order in the wake of the Second World War was marked by the combination of two primary institutions: hegemony and the market.² Against the backdrop of American hegemony, three secondary institutions, namely the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), were created in order to give an institutional expression to the market as a primary institution of international society. The Bretton Woods system was based on the preponderance of American power and its leadership. In view of this, some scholars of international political economy (IPE) claimed that the stability and effectiveness of the global economic order crucially depended on the maintenance of American hegemony and leadership.³ However, American hegemony underpinning the Bretton Woods system

² As discussed in chapter 1, Ian Clark has argued for conceptualising hegemony as an institution of international society. See Ian Clark, *Hegemony in International Society*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011.

³ See, for example, Robert Gilpin, *The Political Economy of International Relations*,

was taken over by multilateralism as Germany and Japan achieved rapid economic development through international trade. The relative decline of American power created the need to adjust and coordinate the economic policies of the hegemon and those of the rising powers so as to maintain and stabilise the global economic order. A series of multilateral agreements was reached amongst the United States and the emerging economic powers during the 1970s and 1980s, starting with the Smithsonian Agreement of 1971. In 1985, the Plaza Agreement was reached by the United States, Britain, France, Germany and Japan, i.e. the countries comprising the G5, with a view to adjusting foreign exchange rates, and, two years later, these countries and Canada and Italy, i.e. the countries comprising the G7, assented to the Louvre Agreement with the goal of promoting exchange market stability. Strictly speaking, these are not cases of rising powers' *challenging* the status quo and the hegemon since it was the United States that desired changes in the existing global economic order, from which such countries as Germany and Japan had been benefiting greatly. However, as a result of these multilateral negotiations, multilateralism as a primary institution for managing the workings of the market and for bringing about changes in the field of global economic governance has become entrenched in state practice.

The primary institution of multilateralism, derived as it is from the primary institution of diplomacy, continues to operate in the field of global economic governance reform. Policy coordination among the G7 and the BRICS has taken the form of the G20, which can be seen as a secondary institution reflective of multilateralism. The G20 was originally created in response to the East Asian financial crisis of 1997–1999 in recognition of the limitations of the effectiveness of the G7 framework and of the necessity to incorporate emerging economies into decision-making processes in order to deal with the contemporary global economic and financial issues.⁴ Other interconnected

Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1987.

⁴ Mark Beeson and Stephen Bell, 'The G-20 and International Economic Governance: Hegemony, Collectivism, or Both?', *Global Governance*, 15/1, 2009, pp.74–76.

factors also gave impetus to the creation of the G20. For example, the allegation that the IMF mishandled the situation during the Asian financial crisis produced a sense of discontent amongst developing countries towards the existing global economic governance dominated by the G7, and this generated demands for a more representative and legitimate global economic order. The G20 was hailed as an avenue for bringing about such a change. Moreover, the creation of the G20 almost coincided with the recognition of the economic importance of the BRICS. These rising powers were in support of the G20 since they were exploring opportunities to engage with international economic rule- and decision-making processes, and the G20 appeared as providing just what they wanted. The political significance of the G20 was enhanced as a result of the global financial crisis of 2007–2008, which, to borrow Ayse Kaya's phrase, led to the 'revival of multilateralism'.⁵ The crisis was commonly viewed as making manifest the limitations of the Western- and G7-led global economic order. For instance, Wen Jiabao, former Premier of China, remarked in January 2009 that the financial crisis had 'fully exposed the deficiencies in the existing international financial system and its governance structure' and that 'a new world economic order that is just, equitable, sound and stable' must be established.⁶ The G20 has been hosting summit meetings in addition to ministerial meetings since the crisis of 2008. These developments illustrate the growing importance of the primary institution of multilateralism in the field of contemporary global economic governance.

However, it can be questioned whether the G20, which is a secondary institution governing reform of global economic governance, is *effective* enough to deliver on what is expected of it by the BRICS. One of the goals pursued by the leaders of the BRICS and

⁵ Ayse Kaya, 'Revival of Multilateralism and the Challenges Ahead', in *Global Governance Audit*, Global Economy & Development Working Paper 49, Brookings, January 2012, pp. 19–20.

⁶ Quoted in Will Shield, 'The Middle Way: China and Global Economic Governance', *Survival*, 55/6, 2013, p. 147.

other developing countries represented at the G20 summit meetings was to promote infrastructure investment in developing countries, which had declined since the global financial crisis. At the 2010 summit meeting held in Seoul, it was declared that the leaders of the G20 countries were committed to increasing and promoting infrastructure investment in developing countries, but the G20 has overall failed to deliver on the commitment and to bring about demanded changes partly because of the lack of enthusiasm on the part of the G7 and the World Bank.⁷ By 2012, it had become clear that the G20 was not very effective in terms of the implementation of agreed policies. Moreover, the legitimacy of the G20 was questioned since its membership was not based on any objective criteria. Based on the recognition of the G20's ineffectiveness and of the lack of its legitimacy, Jakob Vestergaard and Robert H. Wade propose to establish what they call 'the Global Economic Council' which would oversee the activities of the IMF and the World Bank and make important decisions on global economic issues.⁸ The essence of the idea is to set up a secondary institution which is stronger than the G20 in order to bring about changes in the field of global economic governance.

However, instead of striving to reform the existing global economic governance structures such as the G20 and the Bretton Woods institutions, the BRICS have begun to try a different route; they began to establish secondary institutions of their own design that would better serve their purposes. At the 6th BRICS summit in 2014, the BRICS leaders agreed to establish the New Development Bank, a secondary institution focused on infrastructure investment and sustainable development, and the agreement came into force in 2015.⁹ As Gregory Chin explains:

⁷ Gregory T. Chin, 'The BRICS-led Development Bank: Purpose and Politics beyond the G20', *Global Policy*, 5/3, 2014, pp. 368–370.

⁸ Jakob Vestergaard and Robert H. Wade, 'Establishing a New Global Economic Council: Governance Reform at the G20, the IMF and the World Bank', *Global Policy*, 3/3, 2012, pp. 257–269.

⁹ New Development Bank, 'Essence: History', available at: <http://www.ndb.int/about-us/essence/history/> (accessed 21 July 2017). On the New Development Bank more generally, see Andrew F. Cooper, *The BRICS: A Very Short Introduction*, Oxford: Oxford

Given the obstruction of the infrastructure investment agenda encountered in the G20 process, it should not be surprising that the BRICS governments turned to creating an alternative institutional option to try to mobilize finance for infrastructure in the developing world.¹⁰

Along with the Bank, the BRICS leaders have also established the BRICS Contingency Reserve Arrangement (CRA), the operation of which can compete with that of the IMF in the future.¹¹ In addition to playing a leading role in the establishment of these BRICS-led economic structures, China has also led the establishment of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), which, as its name suggests, is focused on promoting infrastructure investment in Asia.¹²

These sub-multilateral institutions are not only motivated by economic considerations, but also by a sense of political frustration arising from the snail pace of reform of the IMF and the World Bank. It is widely believed that the BRICS's primary motivation for establishing these institutions is to provide a set of economic and financial arrangements that can act as a counterbalance to the Bretton Woods institutions (and to the Asian Development Bank in the case of the AIIB) largely dominated by the G7 and other western countries. This might be understood as a manifestation of the shift from multilateralism to what Julia C. Morse and Robert O. Keohane call 'contested multilateralism', which is a concept invented to capture a situation where states utilise existing or new multilateral institutions in order to challenge or put a limit on the activities and operations of other existing multilateral institutions.¹³ In this connection, two

University Press, 2016, pp. 65–81.

¹⁰ Chin, 'The BRICS-led Development Bank', p. 370.

¹¹ On the relationship between the IMF and the CRA, see Nicolette Cattaneo, Mayamiko Biziwick and David Fryer, 'The BRICS Contingent Reserve Arrangement and its Position in the Emerging Global Financial Architecture', *SAIIA Policy Insights*, 10, 2015, pp. 1–7.

¹² See Xiao Ren, 'China as an Institution-Builder: The Case of the AIIB', *The Pacific Review*, 29/3, 2016, pp. 435–442.

¹³ See Julia C. Morse and Robert O. Keohane, 'Contested Multilateralism', *Review of International Organizations*, 9/4, 2014, pp. 385–412.

potential research questions arise; namely (1) Would the potential or ongoing transition from multilateralism to 'contested multilateralism' give rise to competing conceptions as to how disputes in this issue-area should be managed? (2) Would the development of 'contested multilateralism' extend to other issue-areas, e.g. global security and human rights? Contested multilateralism may potentially have the negative effect of producing different, even competing understandings as to the role of primary and secondary institutions in managing change in international society. If this process extends to other issue-areas such as global security and human rights, then this could lead to the fragmentation of contemporary international society. The analytical framework developed in the present study can help address these key questions facing contemporary international society.

Comparative research on power transition

The framework not only enables the socio-structural analysis of specific instances of power transition, but also enables comparative research of various kinds. For example, the following three kinds of comparative analysis can be conducted using the framework: (1) comparative analysis of how the ways in which international political change in the context of power transition is managed in one international society differ from those in another international society, and historical analysis of diachronic change in international social structure governing the process of international political change; (2) comparative analysis between rising powers in a given international society in terms of their goals, the means employed to achieve the goals, and their conformity with the norms laid down by the institutions of the given international society; and (3) comparative analysis across issue-areas aimed at showing how international political change is managed differently in different issue-areas. These are but few of possible ways to utilise the framework in future research. The framework can be used for such purposes since, although it is based on the insights drawn from the interwar debate and is particularly useful for the purpose

of analysing power transition in contemporary international society, the framework itself is of general applicability and can be used for analysing cases of power transition in the past, present and future without difficulty.

One can also combine the framework with the regional/global distinction so as to conduct a comparison across different regions or a comparison between the institutions governing international political change at the global level and those at the regional level. This would enable further analysis of the role of regional secondary institutions, such as the EU, ASEAN and CSTO, in bringing about international political change in regional international societies in the context of power transition.

Peaceful change and the role of the UN Security Council

On the basis of this study, it is possible to undertake an inquiry into what is the best possible combination of institutions of international society from the standpoint of peaceful change. The effective management of international political change requires much more than resort to makeshift measures. If power transition occurs in the context provided by international social structure, efforts must be made to rearrange the structure so as to render the process of change more peaceful. As shown in the present study, the international social structure governing international political change is comprised of a series of primary and secondary institutions, and this raises the question as to what is the best combination of institutions in terms of the peaceful management of international political change, including in the context of power transition. When addressing this question, it is important that the findings of comparative and historical analyses conducted along the lines suggested above be consulted, although it is always necessary to take context into account. Moreover, the three normative positions on peaceful change discussed in chapter 4 provide different views on this point.

In this connection, it is not only possible but even necessary to discuss further what the UN Security Council can do to help states to practise the primary institution of

peaceful change in contemporary international society, especially in the context of power transition, and how it should be reformed so as to enhance its ability in this regard. In chapter 7, I have set forth ways to improve the Council's capacity with regard to peaceful change, but these proposals need to be scrutinised and considered in greater detail in future research on power transition.

The interaction between agency and structure

While it has been argued that institutions of international society are neither immutable nor unchangeable, the dynamics of institutional change were not examined in depth in the present study. The discussions in chapter 3 regarding the emergence of the primary institution of non-use of force and other relevant institutions provide hints about how institutions in international society come and go. Moreover, the idea of the *effectiveness* of institutions introduced as part of the framework can be referred to when theorising international institutional change. However, these points need to be addressed in a more systematic manner if we are to fully understand the institutional dynamics in international society.

In this connection, it is well to note that this study has not paid enough attention to the agency of states. As far as this study is concerned, this is defensible since the purpose of this study is to show how international social structure affects the behaviour of rising powers and the process of international political change—a question which has been neglected in the existing literature on power transition. However, once the importance of international social structure has been established and its role in international political change clarified, it is necessary to step back and see the whole, and this means examining the interaction between agent and structure and how this interaction produces institutional changes.

This is an old and classic issue in sociology, but it is an issue that is still being hotly debated in the discipline, and students of world politics can learn much from the ongoing

debates on the issue.¹⁴ For ES theorists in particular, this means going back to their original starting point for the ES project, which was clearly set out by C.A.W. Manning in his *The Nature of International Society*.¹⁵ As Manning showed in this enigmatic but seminal book, sociological perspectives can help theorise some of the most important aspects of world politics. Pushing future research on power transition in such a sociological direction would enable us to better theorise both how international social structure affects rising powers and *vice versa*. Moreover, power transition studies can also contribute to the ongoing sociological debates by providing theoretical and empirical insights gained from world politics.

The world is never static, and power transition will continue to be a key issue in world politics. By furthering research along the lines suggested above, we will be able to gain a better understanding of this perennial issue of world politics.

¹⁴ Recent works on this topic include, for example, Elizabeth Shove, Mika Pantzar and Mat Watson, *The Dynamics of Social Practice: Everyday Life and How it Changes*, London: Sage, 2012; James Mahoney and Kathleen Thelen (eds), *Explaining Institutional Change: Ambiguity, Agency, and Power*, New York: Cambridge University Press 2010.

¹⁵ C.A.W. Manning, *The Nature of International Society*, London: London School of Economics and Political Science, 1962.

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