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SOVEREIGNTY
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AN EXAMINATION OF THE UTILITY OF SOVEREIGNTY IN THE CONTEXT OF SYSTEMIC CHANGE FROM AN ENGLISH SCHOOL PERSPECTIVE.

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SUMMARY

This thesis is concerned with assessing the current relevance of the concept of state sovereignty to the study of international relations in the context of contemporary systemic changes, European integration and globalization. It engages with two central questions. First, given that it is said that the above changes significantly undermine sovereignty, to what extent does sovereignty actually continue to constitute an important concept for IR? Second, and more challenging, what is the most appropriate way to conceptualize sovereignty in the context of these changes?

This research engages with the above questions from the vantage point of the English School theoretical approach, exploiting its three traditions spectrum. In doing so, it develops the application of the three traditions by both reflecting on a new subject area and also recognizing fresh perspectives from within its traditional sphere of activity. On the one hand, it considers economics (a subject largely ignored by the School), developments in relation to which are central to the contemporary systemic changes under consideration. On the other, it highlights relevant unidentified perspectives residing in a traditional area of engagement, theology, which is rendered increasingly important in the context of globalization and the so-called *La Revanche de Dieu*.

The thesis argues that, appropriately applied, sovereignty continues to be an important concept for the study of international relations. In making this case, however, it contends that if sovereignty is to clarify rather than obscure, it must be handled in a way that means it can competently engage with change. The thesis contends that the English School carries the latent potential to rise to this challenge and that in a significant sense this makes the three traditions more important today than at the time of their initial formulation, thus endorsing the current renaissance of interest in the ES theoretical approach.

DECLARATION

This work has not previously been accepted in substance for any degree and is not being concurrently submitted in candidature for any degree.

Signed..

Date..........31.\.5.\.05..............

STATEMENT 1

This thesis is the result of my own investigations, except where otherwise stated.

Other sources are acknowledged by footnotes giving explicit references. A Bibliography is appended.

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STATEMENT 2

I hereby give consent for my thesis, if accepted, to be available for photocopying and for inter-library loan, and for the title and summary to be made available to outside organisations.

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

In recent years some of the most engaging debates within the international relations discipline have been on the subject of the meaning and relevance of state sovereignty. Transnational flows, both economic and civic, seem to be transforming the world into a 'global village' in which the notion of a closed, boundaried, sovereignty is no longer tenable. Rather than helping us analyse more effectively, sovereignty is increasingly felt to obscure and confuse.[1] Furthermore, critics point out that those who do hang on to sovereignty appear to do so primarily for emotional reasons of tradition and identity, apparently preferring the certainties of the past to the flux of the future.[2] Having supposedly served as the point of departure for the modern study of international relations and having been a key assumption of this discipline,[3] many scholars now question the role of sovereignty, some suggesting the need for major conceptual adjustment, either downgrading it to practical insignificance or jettisoning it altogether. In this environment, some argue that there is a real need for international relations as a discipline to rise to the challenge of developing new, post-sovereign categories that provide a better conceptual frame through which to come to terms with contemporary world politics.[4]

Hardt and Negri for instance contend that sovereignty must be rejected altogether. Attempts to hang on to it, they maintain, are misguided because 'the decline of the

nation-state is not simply the result of an ideological position that might be reversed by an act of political will: it is a structural and irreversible process. The nation was not only a cultural formulation, a feeling of belonging, and a shared heritage, but also, and perhaps primarily, a juridico-economic structure. The declining effectiveness of this structure can be traced clearly through the evolution of a whole series of global juridico-economic bodies, such as GATT, the World Trade Organization, the World Bank, and the IMF'.[5]

Camilleri and Falk are similarly dismissive of attempts to maintain sovereignty. '[S]uch attempts at conceptual flexibility may be activated by any number of motives, including intellectual habit, practical convenience or the official desire to preserve and justify the coercive and administrative apparatus of the state. Yet they are unlikely to escape for long the mounting tensions inherent in the discourse. It is the cumulative or quantitative impact of these tensions which makes it both feasible and advisable to attempt a qualitative reassessment of that discourse'.[6] This position is further clarified by the final sentence of their text on the subject: 'Though the state will continue to perform important administrative and other functions, the theory of sovereignty will seem strangely out of place in a world characterized by shifting allegiances, new forms of identity and overlapping tiers of jurisdiction'.[7]

Bauman, meanwhile, who defines the sovereign state in terms of a 'tripod' of military, economic and cultural roles,[8] maintains, 'All three legs of the "sovereignty" tripod have been broken beyond repair. The military, economic and cultural self-sufficiency, indeed self-sustainability, of the state - any state − [has] ceased to be a viable

prospect'.[9] Given the power of global financial markets, 'the crushing of the economic leg has been most seminal'.[10]

It is the contention of this thesis, however, that, whilst the developments that are thought to threaten sovereignty such as regional integration and globalization (systemic changes) can be said to have resulted in the curtailment of sovereignty, there nonetheless remains an important conceptual job of work for it to perform.[11] Indeed this thesis suggests that those who are encouraging international relations either to jettison sovereignty altogether or to downgrade it to practical insignificance run the risk of obscuring and confusing every bit as much as those who think that sovereignty can be deployed today in exactly the same way as in years gone by. In light of this, the central challenge is to develop an approach to sovereignty that can successfully engage with 'systemic change' which this thesis defines generically as profound change that results in the redefinition of ontology (intra-ontological change) as opposed to merely change resulting from a different kind of arrangement/interaction within a given ontology (inter-ontological change). Both regional integration and globalization - as the thesis will demonstrate - present a form of intra-ontological change but whilst regional integration results in new sovereign jurisdictions (change by extension), globalization has the general effect of eroding the ontology upon which sovereignty depends (change by erosion). In engaging with these kinds of change the objectives that this thesis seeks to address are two-fold. First, it endeavours to demonstrate the ongoing need for a concept of state sovereignty despite systemic change. Second, it develops a conceptual framework within which to consider sovereignty in the context of these systemic changes, both regional, as in the case of European integration, and universal, as in the case of globalization.[12]

CHAPTER STRUCTURE

This chapter is divided into two parts. Part 1 defines the methodology of this thesis in the light of the challenges that it seeks to address, before Part 2 then considers the argument of the thesis, providing an overview of each chapter.

PART 1: METHODOLOGY

This chapter's consideration of method is divided into three sections. Section 1 defines the logic for examining the fate of state sovereignty in the context of systemic changes by employing a form of spectrum analysis and selects the English School three traditions approach as its preferred spectrum. Section 2 goes on to develop understanding of the three traditions spectrum, and its capacity to engage with international relations in the context of systemic change, by investigating debates regarding the relationships between the three traditions. Finally, Section 3 sets out how this thesis seeks to develop the use of the three traditions in its quest to engage with state sovereignty in the context of contemporary changes.

SECTION 1: SELECTING A SPECTRUM

The successful prosecution of this research depends upon the development of a framework that can effectively consider sovereignty in the context of the two kinds of systemic change that it has in view. In order to construct a conceptual framework with the capacity to deal with the impact of systemic changes like regional integration and globalization, it is the contention of this thesis that one should adopt some form of spectrum analysis. Utilizing a spectrum is beneficial for the following reasons:

First, and most obviously, a spectrum provides one with the possibility of being able to engage with change across a range of positions embracing state sovereignty both before and during regional integration/globalization. This approach has the benefit of not just providing an account of where sovereignty is now but of where it has been, of where it could go, and of how journeying across the spectrum impacts upon its integrity.

Second, the spectrum is also important because the fact that different states have different strengths and resources and respond differently to changes like regional integration and globalization means that they affect different states in different ways. Any conceptual frame, therefore, that rises effectively to globalization's challenge must be able to cope with the fact that at any one time the 192 polities of the world will be differently affected by it and thus best serviced by a flexible model of sovereignty. A spectrum approach rises to this challenge by facilitating a conceptualization of sovereignty which can vary ontologically, within certain parameters, from one place on the spectrum to another.

The third and final rationale for selecting a spectrum approach relates narrowly to the challenge of globalization. Globalization is defined as a 'time-space compression', the term developed to describe the manner in which growing interdependence has altered human experiences of the basic dimensions that are constitutive of reality, namely time and space. Specifically, globalization touches these basic dimensions, giving rise to a spatio-temporal revolution in which it is said that the closure (fixedness) of given space is transcended (as the thesis will demonstrate) by the openness (potentiality) of time, giving rise to a new ontology.[13] This does not result in the demise of the old

ontology but rather in its coexistence with the new. Thus, there is a need to keep in view both the new and the old ontologies at the same time. Once again, therefore, there is a need to cater for a breadth of conceptual space that can only be met by a spectrum.

SPECTRUM PRECEDENTS

In adopting a spectrum approach, this thesis assumes a model with good intellectual credentials. Keohane and Nye's path-breaking work on 'Complex Interdependence' in the mid '70s was based explicitly on the understanding that it was a description of a pole or 'ideal type' which worked in tandem with an opposing pole, realism, thus defining a spectrum.

'We do not argue ...that complex interdependence faithfully reflects world political reality. Quite the contrary: both it and the realist portrait are ideal types. Most situations will fall somewhere between these two extremes. Sometimes realist assumptions will be accurate, or largely accurate, but frequently complex interdependence will provide a better portrayal of reality'. [14]

In a special edition of *Political Studies*, entitled *Sovereignty at the Millennium* (1999), Georg Sørensen, meanwhile, recognising the reality of both continuity and change within sovereignty, suggested the need for a similar approach.

'Is it possible to find ways of synthesising that complex entity which is sovereign statehood in a way which respects both change and continuity[?] ...Instead of looking in vain for one synthesis which will never be empirically accurate, I suggest the use of

Weberian ideal types. The ideal type is not an accurate description of historical reality; it is a construct which elucidates typical features of that reality so as to bring out their essential elements'.[15]

Whilst gaining inspiration for the spectrum approach from Keohane, Nye and Sørensen, however, this research differs from both. In the first instance it contrasts with Keohane and Nye in the sense that it takes the role of ideas very seriously and does not subscribe to a uniformly positivist, social scientific framework. This facilitates the development of an appreciation of the role of construction within the spectrum. In the second instance it contrasts with Sørensen in that, whilst he points to the wisdom of a spectrum through the development of three distinct sovereignty games, this thesis will employ different ideal types and strategically focus on the spectrum that they define as a whole.

THE ENGLISH SCHOOL THREE TRADITIONS SPECTRUM

In rising to the challenge of developing a spectrum approach, this thesis – as noted above – actually draws its primary methodological and ontological inspiration from the English School. Boasting a fine pedigree that stretches back to the likes of Martin Wight and Herbert Butterfield, the English School is defined at its most basic level by a methodological and ontological pluralism.[16] This pluralism is manifest in a simultaneous commitment to three traditions which might seem, *prima facie*, to be conceptually incompatible: Realism, Rationalism and Revolutionism.[17]

The 'three traditions' were primarily developed as a framework through which to understand political thought. Realism expresses a conservative belief in original sin

which, in the absence of a global government, means that the international arena is characterised by anarchy. From this perspective, the international arena as a whole is referred to as the 'international system'.[18] Rationalism, meanwhile, is similarly committed to the notion of original sin but, recognising coexisting progressive tendencies, contends that it would be wrong to characterise humanity simply by reference to human fallenness. In this context, whilst the international arena is still defined by conflict, it is also defined by a measure of sociability which finds expression through commerce and diplomacy. From this perspective, the international arena is referred to as the domain of 'international society'.[19] Finally, revolutionism contends that it has the capacity to "abolish sin" and create an international arena characterised by peace and harmony on the basis of a global federation of states, a one world government/empire or a global, cosmopolitan society of individuals.[20] From this perspective, the international arena as a whole is referred to as the domain of 'world society'.[21]

As an ontological spectrum, the three traditions thus passes from realism, positing a closed, state-centric view of the world, to rationalism which transforms the previously discreet ontology of the states into something altogether more connected through the presence of transnational societal structures. Finally, revolutionism posits a holism in which the enduring closure that sustains the divisive state-centric ontology is ultimately exchanged for some kind of global connectedness. This self-conscious ontological pluralism informs the rationale for the selection of the three traditions since it provides the required capacity to consider the sovereign state in the context of profound changes, even - as this thesis will demonstrate - the spatio-temporal revolution that is globalization.[22]

SECTION 2: THE THREE TRADITIONS AS A SPECTRUM

Having defined the need for a spectrum and having selected the English School three traditions spectrum specifically, it is now methodologically important to develop a detailed understanding of the way in which the three traditions constitute a spectrum. This will be achieved by addressing some key questions pertaining to the relationships between the three traditions (I) and by confronting their critics (II).

I) THREE TRADITIONS RELATIONSHIPS

The fact that the English School is characterised by three traditions prompts questions and debates about how one should understand their inter-relationship. Specifically, it has been suggested that the middle tradition, rationalism, defines a *via media* which might provide grounds for ultimately distancing the English School from realism and revolutionism and thus the reality of the spectrum.

Martin Wight certainly lent some weight to the notion that rationalism is the most important English School tradition. At the conclusion of his Three Traditions lectures he admitted that he was primarily attracted to rationalism and that, in the process of refining his thinking in preparation for the lectures, he had found the appeal of realism eroded. 'You will have guessed that my prejudices are Rationalist, but I find I have become more Rationalist and less Realist through rethinking this question [the question of the relationship between the three traditions] during the course of these lectures'.[23]

Wight's stated preference for rationalism has almost certainly been the inspiration for other suggestions that the purpose of the three traditions approach is to present a rationalist synthesis. Jackson, for instance, asserts: 'His [Wight's] triad ...seems to operate in a dialectic manner, with realism as thesis, revolutionism as antithesis and rationalism seeking some kind of synthesis ...'[24] Linklater, meanwhile, used the three traditions to call into being his own dialectic wherein revolutionism, rather than rationalism, was the point of synthesis.[25]

The notion, however, that Wight's work provides a basis for the assertion that the three traditions constitute a dialectic, positing a synthesis through one tradition, does not stand up to scrutiny. One can appreciate this fact by carefully re-reading Wight's above admission of his rationalist prejudices. Wight does not say that he has ceased to be realist but rather that he has become less realist. Thus Wight clearly was not setting up rationalism as a synthesis but merely as what he judged to be the most useful of the three traditions. As Hedley Bull observes, 'it would be wrong to force Martin Wight into the Grotian pigeon-hole. It is a truer view of him to regard him as standing outside the three traditions, feeling the attraction of each of them, and embodying in his own life and thought the tension among them'.[26] Richard Little submits a similar observation: 'It is an oversimplification to suggest, therefore, that the English School is synonymous with the study of international society. Certainly the English School has acknowledged the importance of rationalist ideas but this is not to the exclusion of realist and revolutionist ideas. From an English School perspective, a comprehensive understanding of international relations must embrace all three traditions'.[27] Sheila Grader, meanwhile, contends; 'To reduce Wight's theorizing to a simple dialectic is seriously to misconstrue the nature of his

contribution to the study of international relations'.[28] Thus, for the purposes of sustaining the spectrum, the English School crucially does not seek ultimate resolution between the three traditions. The whole point is that coming to terms with international politics, in all of its diversity, cannot be achieved through a single, synthesized, neat and conceptually self-sufficient lens – hence the importance of the spectrum. This point can be clarified by the following two perspectives.

First, the notion that the three tradition's role must be regarded as a gradually changing whole (which is a result of the fact that it services a constantly flowing spectrum), rather than as a synthesis, is demonstrated by a number of English School metaphors. Wight's contention that the three traditions are related to each other, not as three discrete railway tracks running in parallel, but rather as three streams joined to each other by tributaries, makes the point very clearly.[29] Bull, meanwhile, eloquently expressed the same idea through a light metaphor. Wight 'saw the three traditions as forming a spectrum, within which at some points one pattern of thought merged with another, as infra-red becomes ultra-violet'.[30] Whichever way one chooses to play it, therefore, discussing the three traditions as a dialectic misses the point because it loses sight of their capacity to define an ontological and methodological spectrum, sustaining an ontological and methodological pluralism rather than a synthesis.

Second, the commitment to seeing the three traditions as a whole is also reflected in the injunction to adopt a tentative approach to the divisions between them. As a result of his commitment to seeing the three traditions in terms of a constantly flowing spectrum, Wight warned against the reification of any of them and even went to great lengths to draw attention away from/soften their boundaries by identifying sub-

emphases within each tradition.[31] If the three traditions constituted three reified positions rather than a constantly flowing spectrum, then, whilst recognising the reality of changes between traditions, the spectrum itself would provide no commentary on those transformations. In approaching the boundaries tentatively, however, the sense of the importance of the three traditions as a whole is greater than that of the three traditions taken individually. From this uninterrupted perspective, one can appreciate that the spectrum accommodates many different spatio-temporal combinations from absolute closure to absolute openness, not just those that lie classically at the centre of each of the three traditions. In this sense the three traditions can be thought of as illuminating the spectrum by providing tentative markers which describe the classic characteristics of the different zones of the spectrum.

Thus, according to the English School, one can only sustain conceptual rigour in approaching international relations - and therein the sovereign state - through the three traditions on the basis of a dynamic assessment that is informed by a certain conceptual messiness and tension. In the words of Buzan, it 'is this explicitly pluralist (or multiple rather than competing paradigms) methodological approach that underpins the distinctiveness of the English School as an approach to the study of IR'.[32] Thus there is no synthesis in one tradition but a spectrum of three tentative, heuristic traditions whose boundaries are strategically blurred.

II) THREE TRADITIONS AND THEIR CRITICS

In suggesting that the English School three traditions approach has an important contribution to make, it is important to engage with critics who have suggested, contrarily, that it has little or nothing to offer. This provides further opportunity, as

this section will now demonstrate, to clarify the relationships between the three traditions and the role of the three traditions as a whole.

One of the bluntest criticisms of the English School regarding its use of the three traditions comes from Roy E. Jones in an article which, although calling for the closure of the School, seems to have been more significant for strengthening its identity by giving it a name. Political theory, Jones claims, 'is not simply classifying and commenting on the actions and dicta of statesmen and others'. Clearly suggesting that classification was the extent of Wight's achievement, he dismisses the Wightian system as an 'historical dictionary' and a 'pedagogical device'.[33] As such, Jones maintains that Wight's frame of reference was 'particularly cold and lifeless'.[34]

A more recent example comes from David Boucher's observations regarding the three traditions. 'They see each of their traditions as mutually exclusive and autonomous categories, without adequately explaining the relations between them, or between the traditions and the thinkers who are said to exemplify them. The traditions are little more than classificatory categories into which thinkers are forced irrespective of the embarrassing elements which appear to be ill at ease in their putative homes'.[35]

There are two central accusations in these observations. First, that the three traditions provide nothing more than a form of classification. Second, that, as such, they are lifeless, not very useful and sometimes even counter-productive. These contentions can be easily dismissed by referring back to Wight's warning (noted above) against reifying the traditions, illustrated both by his claim that they are not three discrete railway tracks, but streams linked by tributaries, and Bull's suggestion that the three

traditions flow into each other as in a spectrum of light.[36] It is useful, however, to reflect in greater detail on the problems with the characterizations provided by Jones and Boucher because this presents the opportunity for developing a fuller understanding of the actual relationship between the three traditions and of the spectrum which they construct.

Perhaps Wight's boldest statement against reification of the three traditions, contradicting both Jones and Boucher, is found in *International Theory*. 'In all political and historical studies the purpose of building pigeon holes is to reassure oneself that the raw material does not fit into them. Classification becomes valuable, in humane studies, only at the point where it breaks down. The greatest political writers in international theory almost all straddle the frontiers dividing two of the traditions, and most of these writers transcend their own systems'.[37] In this fluid context, Porter observes, one can see 'the Wightian categories not simply as co-existing, but in a state of dynamic relationship one to another. And from the clash of categories, from their mutual criticism, their modification and transmutation, important insights can be gained into ...what is going on in the world ...'[38] As a consequence of this process Wight 'was always experimenting with the new ways of assembling ...[his]... material',[39] defining an approach that makes significant demands of the theorist.

In order to fully appreciate the tentative character of the three traditions one must recognize that they were developed in the context of a wide-ranging critique of Enlightenment optimism. They were never supposed to be a scientific device into which data could be fed at one end and analysis extracted automatically at the other.

As Bull observed, 'Theoretical inquiry into International Relations ...does not lead to cumulative knowledge after the manner of natural science. Confronted by a controversy, like the great debate which Wight explores among the three traditions, we may identify the assumptions that are made in each camp, probe them, juxtapose them, relate them to circumstances, but we cannot expect to settle the controversy except provisionally, on the basis of assumptions of our own that are themselves open to debate'.[40]

Grader similarly stressed the tentative nature of the three traditions, reflecting specifically on their relationship to history. 'In the case of Wight, to take the form of his thinking for his view of the development of the history of ideas, is to substitute for experimental and tentative theorizing a dogmatism which he did not possess. Wight did not teach his themes historically but analytically'. Wight's theories were thus 'tentative and embryonic'.[41]

A further account of the fluidity of the spectrum from the perspective of history can be drawn from Roger Epp's observations about how Wight used it to come to terms with past events. 'In keeping with this position [his criticism of modern social science's quest for inexorable laws in/of history], he criticized those who regarded history as a storehouse in which to find examples to buttress laws and maxims'. In Wight's mind history presented the scholar with 'a vast canvas upon which irony, the play of chance, human wills and circumstance were interwoven, and which offered not off-the-shelf maxims but a sense of the unpredictability, the limits and the possibilities of political action'.[42] History in Wight's view, therefore, was anything but cold and lifeless.

To summarise the conclusions of the above sections, before proceeding to Section 3, this examination of the three traditions makes it plain that they form a constantly flowing spectrum of positions. Demonstrated both through their rejection of the notion of a synthesis and also through their tentative, interacting identities, they define the framework within which this thesis will examine sovereignty in the context of systemic change.

SECTION 3: DEVELOPING THE THREE TRADITIONS

One of the consequences of the three traditions being far from static and lifeless is the fact that there is always the possibility, as Porter observed, for revision. 'We might also have further to refine or subdivide the categories. For Wight's "International theory" was never just a response to the problem of ordering thought; it was perpetually a challenge'.[43] Bearing in mind this potential for change and development, this section will now consider how this thesis seeks to develop the spectrum to help it rise to the challenges of conceptualizing sovereignty in the context of the systemic changes that are of interest to this research.

- THE ENGLISH SCHOOL AND ECONOMICS

The specific examples of systemic change that this thesis will examine, regional integration and globalization, both involve economic processes to a very great extent. This is significant developmentally because the English School's preferences for history, law and philosophy have meant that it has, until very recently, only made passing references to economics. As Richard Little observes: 'Despite acknowledging the importance of economics, there has been a reluctance by the English School to

embrace this sector wholeheartedly'.[44] Tony Evans and Peter Wilson, meanwhile, maintain: 'The principal weakness of the English School is its relative disregard of economic and technological factors and the various types of international cooperation that these factors either induce or necessitate. If the characteristic feature of the Grotian conception of international society is continual international intercourse such as trade, as Wight held, then it is quite an omission for the English School to largely ignore the growth of trade and other economic relations in their account of the evolution in of international society'.[45] More importantly, in his call for the reconvening of the English School, Barry Buzan identified economic/globalization challenges as an important gap, requiring future research.[46] Indeed, Buzan has since started the ball rolling with the provision of the first detailed reflection on globalization from the perspective of globalization: *From International to World Society: English School Theory and the Social Structure of Globalisation.*[47]

In considering the impact of economic changes on IR from the English School perspective, this thesis will seek to address the general failure of English School theorists to seriously engage with this increasingly important dimension of IR. This will identify - in a way that differs from Buzan - the very significant latent conceptual potential of the three traditions for the purpose of coming to terms with economic changes, especially globalization. In so doing it will provide a fuller appreciation of the significance of the revolutionist tradition. Although Wight employed the three traditions, there is a sense in which his reflections on revolutionism, whilst carrying an ontological implication, were largely confined to the realm of ideas in that most forms of revolutionism remained merely aspirational. Neither Jacobinism, Calvinism, Lutheranism, nor Communism got anywhere near to taking over the world

ideationally, let alone governmentally. Having said this, however, the ideas of Cobden, which also informed Wight's model of revolutionism, have been - especially in the context of globalization - much more successful.[48] From Wight's perspective, therefore, the point must be made that the development of revolutionist ontology has greatly accelerated since the time when he developed the three traditions approach and indeed even since his death. This makes the three traditions approach far more relevant today - as this thesis will critically demonstrate - than was ever the case at the time of its initial formulation.[49]

- THE ENGLISH SCHOOL AND THEOLOGY

Another key feature of the era of globalization has been the renaissance of religion[50] which plays rather more obviously to the strengths of the English School, given the fact that the likes of Martin Wight, Herbert Butterfield and Donald Mackinnon were very interested in international relations and theology.[51] Indeed, under their influence, theological sources made not insignificant contributions to the definition of the three traditions.[52] It is the contention of this thesis that such sources are actually also useful for renewing the traditions today, helping them come to terms with state sovereignty in the context of contemporary systemic change. Identification of this latent potentiality is significant not just because of the renewed interest in the English School frame of reference but also because IR generally is currently experiencing a renaissance of interest in theology.[53] Demonstrating the significance of the English School theological grid at the very time when scholars are talking about the return of theology to IR after a 'three hundred year exile' makes the contribution of this thesis that much more relevant.[54]

CONCLUSION

Thus, in summary, this thesis seeks to consider the fate of sovereignty - both its endurance and transformation - in the context of contemporary systemic changes, European integration and globalization, whose conceptual challenge is such that they call for the use of a spectrum. In responding to this need, this thesis selects the English School three traditions spectrum, demonstrating its great, and largely untapped, capacity to deal with state sovereignty in the context of regional economic integration and the pressures of globalization. This is significant first because coming to terms with these changes, and the conceptualization of sovereignty therein, is a key challenge for any contemporary assessment of international relations. It is also significant because the English School is currently experiencing something of a renaissance and a fresh demonstration of its capacity to rise to such a challenge further justifies the basis for this renaissance.[55] Having defined the methodology of this thesis, this introduction will now outline its central line of argument.

PART 2: THESIS STRUCTURE:

The argument of this thesis is divided into three main sections, each of which examines sovereignty in the context of systemic change (regional integration/globalization) from the perspective of one of the three traditions. In determining exactly how to approach the three traditions it is important to appreciate that Wight made it plain that there was no set format for doing so. On some occasions he began in the middle with the rationalist tradition and then went out to the realist and rationalist traditions,[56] whilst on other occasions he went across the spectrum from realism to rationalism to revolutionism[57] and at other times from revolutionism to rationalism to realism.[58] The particular approach adopted by this thesis begins by

focusing on the two polar traditions, realism (chapters 3 and 4) and revolutionism (chapters 5 and 6) and then turns to rationalism.[59]

The initial focus on the polar traditions adopted by the selected approach is helpful when working in the context of globalization - which, as noted earlier, has given the breadth of the ontological spectrum new relevance - because it emphasizes the actual ontological parameters within which our study must be located and the challenge presented by those parameters for the definition of sovereignty. Having clarified the polar traditions, the thesis then moves on to consider the middle ground set out by the rationalist tradition (chapters 7, (8) and 9). This thesis considers to what extent, if any, rationalism, as the linking tradition, might provide the basis for a conceptualization of sovereignty that can come to terms with something of this challenge, not only holding the spectrum together but also providing a privileged perspective on it. Consideration of rationalism provides the opportunity for this thesis - benefiting from reflection on some theological sources - to develop a model of what it describes as 'open sovereignty'. Engaging with systemic change, this will provide for a model of sovereignty that effectively engages with both continuity and change.

CHAPTER 2: METHODOLOGY AND ONTOLOGY

Before embarking upon assessment of the two polar traditions, defining either end of the English School three traditions spectrum and then rationalism, it is first important to seek to gain a better understanding of the conceptual services of the three traditions spectrum ontologically and epistemologically, highlighting their capability to engage with change. Given that the most demanding form of systemic change in view will be globalization and that it is in relation to this challenge that the thesis argues that the

three traditions spectrum has a special contribution to make, the chapter will commence with this particular challenge. This will demonstrate that the three traditions can provide a framework for confronting not only an ontological but also an epistemological spectrum. Thus it is possible, the chapter will contend, to draw conclusions about ontology both directly by assessing the ontology in question and also indirectly through the epistemological commitments of the operative methodology. More importantly, though, this relationship between epistemology and ontology puts one in a strong position to translate ontological change conceptually through the lens of epistemology. Demonstration of the importance of this approach, however, will also provide the opportunity for highlighting its limitations and lead into the presentation of an alternative and rather more conventional interpretation of the spectrum which the thesis will apply to European integration. Either way, as an ontological and methodological spectrum, the three traditions provide a framework that can cater for the dynamic conceptualization and reconceptualization of sovereignty over time as it engages with the processes of ontological change that are definitive of systemic change.

OPERATIONAL QUALIFICATION: CHAPTERS 3-6

Having defined the ontological and methodological services of the spectrum in greater detail, the thesis then moves to the actual definition of the spectrum by reference to its traditions. In considering the two polar traditions it is imperative to remember that their perspective, although valid, is only partial. As such it is not their purpose individually to provide a rounded and qualified appreciation of sovereignty in the context of systemic change. Moving away from the English School, specifically, while remaining within the tradition of polar analysis, it is vital to remember Keohane

and Nye at this point; 'We do not argue ...that complex interdependence faithfully reflects world political reality'. [60] Thus in reading chapters 3 and 4 one will find that they are open to criticism for their lack of engagement with the reality of the global flows that characterise globalization. Symmetrically, chapters 5 to 6 are open to the criticism that their single-minded endeavour to make the case for post-sovereignty has caused them to forget something of the enduring territorial 'givenness' of the sovereign state seen in chapters 3-4. This is intentional, for Wight did not provide his basic definition of realism whilst seeking to account for the arguments upholding rationalism and revolutionism or *vice versa*. Each was first defined separately and only later were they brought into 'conversation' with one another. Thus the realist tradition is a lens that must be used alongside the rationalist and revolutionist traditions, just as Keohane and Nye argue that 'complex interdependence' is a lens that must be used alongside 'realism'. Rather than courageously seeking to collapse the bases for realism and revolutionism into an enlightened synthesis, the thesis argues that - in line with the approach of the English School and Keohane and Nye - it is actually more helpful to view the world from a position of conceptual tension, deploying different lenses simultaneously.

REALISM & THE SOVEREIGN STATE POLE (CHAPTERS 3-4)

This thesis commences its exposition and definition of the spectrum by examining the definition of sovereignty through the realist tradition in chapter 3. In providing this definition, the chapter examines the key roles played by territory, the realist group imperative, constitutional independence and spatial commitments in the definition of an ontologically closed account of sovereignty. The chapter then subjects this definition to criticism, however, in an attempt to develop a renewed English School

realist account of sovereignty that can engage with systemic change.[61] Chapter 4 then moves on to apply this model of sovereignty to change in the form of the changing boundaries of economic nationality,[62] manifest in the context of European integration. After deploying a confederal model, drawing on Murray Forsyth's *Unions of States* and Carl Schmitt's theory of the Bund,[63] the chapter suggests that, in the context of European integration at least, the sovereignty sustained by some forms of realism exhibits some ability to adapt by extending its boundaries on a supranational basis.[64]

REVOLUTIONISM AND POST-SOVEREIGNTY (CHAPTERS 5-6)

Chapter 5 then defines the revolutionist tradition and its contemporary application, contending that the most powerful manifestation of revolutionism today is found in the phenomenon of globalization. In developing this argument, the chapter refers to the two agents of revolutionism identified by Wight, 'the commercial spirit' and 'the spirit of enlightenment'.[65] The former is unpacked in terms of economic globalization, whilst the latter relates to a growing willingness on the part of states to intervene in the affairs of other states particularly in the name of global humanitarian values. Given that it has often been observed that, although the English School makes passing reference to economic factors, it fails to fully engage with them[66] and given - as chapter 5 will demonstrate - that economic globalization provides a stronger foundation from which to point to the erosion of state sovereignty than does intervention (which in any event has enjoyed significant English School attention[67]), this chapter will focus the greater part of its energies on examining the role of the 'spirit of commerce'. Specifically, it will argue that the transnational economic flows[68] which are central to contemporary globalization have given rise to a time-space compression which erodes the reality of sovereignty on a very fundamental,

ontological level. The chapter will conclude that economic globalization, buttressed by the impact of the new interventionism, is calling into being a new global connexity that is undermining the boundaried closure upon which sovereignty depends, creating the need for new post-sovereign categories.

Having considered how economic globalization and increasing intervention contribute to contemporary revolutionism in chapter 5, chapter 6 then moves on to examine how this has been further authenticated through the development of global governance in response to these challenges and reflects on the implications of this revolutionism for the actual conceptualization of sovereignty/post-sovereignty. In rising to this challenge, the chapter trades particularly on the relationship - mentioned above in the account of chapter 2 - between ontology and epistemology, examining the development of revolutionist post-sovereignty first from an ontological and then from an epistemological perspective. The former approach focuses on the deconstruction of sovereignty and the development of networked governance,[69] before the latter turns to consider how to accommodate global flows and governance conceptually by developing revolutionist conceptualizations of post sovereignty. It demonstrates that contemporary revolutionism defines the location of an increasing number of scholars who are suggesting that sovereignty is not really compatible with globalization.[70]

RATIONALISM AND OPEN SOVEREIGNTY (CHAPTERS 7 - 9)

Having defined and examined the two polar traditions of the three traditions spectrum, the thesis then turns to the middle tradition, rationalism. Chapter 7 considers the capacity of rationalism to engage with systemic change first in the context of regional integration and then globalization. In the case of the former the chapter argues that,

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providing a significantly (partial) ontologically open model of sovereignty, rationalism has the best credentials of any of the three traditions (including wider realism, see chapter 4) for the purpose of providing an account of sovereignty coming to terms with regional integration understood as a form of 'change by extension'. In the case of the latter, meanwhile, the chapter contends that rationalism again provides the most useful account of sovereignty in the context of globalization and the demands of 'change by erosion', balancing recognition of the partial unbundling of sovereignty with the reality of its endurance.

Inspired by rationalism chapters 8 and 9 then embark upon the task of providing a sharper definition of 'open sovereignty' drawing on what, in the context of globalization, is the increasingly relevant theological perspective within the English School. In the same way that, through the influence of Wight and Butterfield, theology contributed to the original definitions of the three traditions, so too can it contribute to the renewal of these traditions, especially rationalism, as English School scholars consider the challenges of twenty-first century systemic changes.

Chapter 8 begins by examining what has to date been the English School's primary source of theological reflection on state sovereignty, Christian Realism.[71] The thesis will contend that this makes moves in the right direction, accommodating a measure of openness that presents an improvement on neorealist accounts of sovereignty. At the same time, however, it will make it plain that this accommodation is limited and does not really rise to the full extent of the 'open sovereignty' challenge defined by chapter 7.

Chapter 9 contends that there are other theological sources that are more helpful for the purpose of rising to the challenge of open sovereignty that seem to have been eclipsed by the enthusiasm of Wight and Butterfield for the venerated Saint Augustine. Specifically, it points to the Protestant theology that defined Welsh proto-nationalism[72], the aspirant polity of which provides an engaging correlate to open sovereignty. In turning to this theological source, however, it is important to be clear that it is not the purpose of this chapter to suggest that it necessarily has a unique contribution to make to IR. To be sure, there may be other national traditions with similar commitments, but the interrogation of these would demand many more theses.[73] The purpose of referring to theologically disclosed Welsh proto-nationalism is to deploy a cultural/literary lens that further clarifies the model of 'open sovereignty' and does so in a way that taps into, and critically builds on, the new interest in theology and IR - which is partially informing the new interest in the English School[74] - which has always been distinctive because of its interest in theology.[75]

CONCLUSION

Finally, chapter 10 draws together the implications of using open sovereignty in the context of the spectrum serviced by the three traditions. First, it reflects on the fact that as an ontological spectrum, the three traditions posit an excellent framework through which to come to terms with IR in the context of systemic changes like globalization, making it more relevant today than at the time of its development. Second, in assessing sovereignty through this framework, it presents the concept of 'open sovereignty' which, particularly inspired by rationalism, can engage with two kinds of change resulting from the transformations in view in the form of 'change by

extension', associated with regional integration, and 'change by erosion', associated with 'globalization'. Third, it demonstrates how the conceptualization of 'open sovereignty' within the rationalist tradition can benefit from further development by drawing on the repository of theological thought that has always been associated with the English School and which is of special relevance today, not just because of the renewed interest in the English School, but also because of the more general renewal of interest in the role of religion and theology in IR. The result is an approach that neither obscures change by hanging on to a dated understanding of sovereignty nor one that, in its enthusiasm to engage with the reality of change, jettisons, or virtually jettisons, the concept of state sovereignty. It proposes instead a model of sovereignty that can accommodate continuity and change.

In defending the model of open sovereignty in the context of systemic change this thesis provides a critique of those scholars, such as Negri, Hardt, Walker, Camilleri, Falk (J), Falk (R), Guehenno, Ohmae, and Bauman, who seek either to jettison sovereignty or to relegate it to practical insignificance.[76] Their radical unbundling strategy, the thesis argues, provokes a distorted view of the international arena. Sovereignty must be retained as a concept/category if we are to gain a proper perspective of the international arena. In recognising the impact of global flows, however, this thesis critiques those who defend sovereignty without properly recognising the ontological implications of those flows which make the challenges posed by globalization conceptually different from those pertaining to earlier definitions of interdependence. This will include those committed to defining sovereignty as a closed, category such as James, Laughland, Waltz and Meirsheimer.[77] The chapter will highlight the failure of these writers to appreciate the

ontological significance of globalizing power flows with their associated ontological/constitutional diminishment of sovereignty, demonstrating that this appreciation requires a more nuanced 'power – law' distinction than they recognize.

In closing it is interesting to note that in his controversial plea for the closure of the English School, Roy Jones suggested that part of the reason for its failure to engage with economics was the result of the incompatibility of global economic flows with a commitment to the concept of sovereignty. Sheila Grader responded to this with skepticism. 'But surely it is possible to recognize the important influence of outside factors, particularly economic ones, without abandoning the concept of "sovereign state". If the concept of sovereignty is indeed outdated and too entrenched to comprehend the present state of economic reality, then there is an anomaly to be explained – but mere rejection or substitution is not explanation. More case studies are needed to show in what way the idea of sovereignty will no longer do, even as a working hypothesis'.[78] This thesis responds to this challenge from the other perspective of seeking to demonstrate precisely how sovereignty, properly handled, is indeed compatible with global economic flows, even whilst these flows will, on certain occasions, result in its partial erosion.

[1] 'The anchoring of society to a particular place and the relationship of society to other places are undergoing qualitative change. The image of the world where space is appropriated and exclusively controlled by sovereign states is a conceptual tool of doubtful utility'. Joseph Camilleri and Jim Falk, *The End of Sovereignty? The Politics of a Shrinking and Fragmenting World*, Edward Elgar, Aldershot, 1992, p. 250.

'We cannot, therefore, operate with a jaded and worn view of sovereignty in the face of these new realities'. Marc Williams, 'Rethinking Sovereignty', *Globalization: Theory and Practice*, ed. Elenore Kofman Gillian Youngs, London, Pinter, 1996, p. 109.

R. B. J. Walker contends that such are the distorting implications of sovereignty that it has become 'ridiculous'. 'State Sovereignty and the Articulation of Political Space/Time'. *International Studies Quarterly*, 1990, p. 447.

Modern concepts 'define social units in terms of their separateness rather than their connections, and they think in terms of untrammelled powers and sovereignty. So, for example, ideas based on nationalism, national sovereignty or exclusive identities of religion or ethnicity all divide the world between us and them...In this way an idea that suited an age of clear cut territorial boundaries is transposed into an environment in which it no longer makes sense'. Geoff Mulgan, *Connexity: How to Live in a Connected World*, London, Chatto and Windus, 1997, pp. 8-9.

Other texts: Walter Wriston, The *Twilight of Sovereignty*, New York, Charles Scribner's sons, 1992; Matthew Horsman and Andrew Marshall, *After the Nation-State: Citizens, Tribalism and the New World Disorder*, London, Harper Collins, 1994; Jean Marie Guehenno, *The End of the Nation-State*, Minneapolis, University of Minneapolis, 1993.

[2] '[I]n the popular mind, sovereignty is an unquestioned axiom, belonging equally to the world of politics and to the world of culture and identity. In fact sovereignty is the central building block in the wall of national identity. It links people and the state within a well defined authority space, where people's consent to be ruled is conditioned by the fact that they feel the rule and the rulers to be their own, and hence refuse to recognize any important distinction between sovereignty as an attribute of the state and as their property'. Ulf Hedetoft, 'The State of Sovereignty in Europe', *National Cultures and European Integration*, ed. Staffan Zetterholm, Oxford, Berg, 1994. p.17. Also see: J. H. H. Weiler, 'European Neo-constitutionalism: in Search of Foundations for the European Constitutional Order', *Political Studies*, 1996, p 523; Alan James, 'Sovereign Statehood in Contemporary International Society', *Sovereignty At The Millennium*, ed. Robert Jackson, Oxford, Blackwell, p. 48 and Marc Williams, 'Rethinking Sovereignty', p. 111; Ian Clark, *Globalization and International Relations Theory*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1998, p. 71 and Alexander Wendt, 'Anarchy Is What the States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics', *International Organization* 46, 2 (Spring 1992) in *International Relations Theory: Realism, Pluralism, Globalism and Beyond*, ed. Paul R. Viotti and Mark V. Kauppi, Boston, Allyn and Bacon, 1999, pp. 446-8.

Beyond its relationship to notions of identity, sovereignty also obtains a certain emotional investment to the degree that it plays some extremely stabilising/reassuring/comforting roles. 'Power, morality, and humanism cohere without friction in this sovereign universe', Ulf Hedetoft, 'The State of Sovereignty in Europe', p. 15, footnote 3. There is a real sense in which sovereignty provides a framework through which one can make sense of life. Camilleri and Falk elaborate on this theme contending that 'sovereignty ...is aimed at establishing order and clarity in an otherwise turbulent and incoherent world. Its historical function has been to act as a fundamental source of truth and meaning, to distinguish between order and anarchy, security and danger, identity and difference'. Thus construed, it is clear that

the traditional absolute understanding of sovereignty still has an important role to play, at least in the mind of the general public. Camilleri and Falk, *The End of Sovereignty* p. 11.

[3] See for example: Daniel Philpott, *Revolutions in Sovereignty: How Ideas Shaped Modern International Relations*, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 2001, p. 16 and Robert Jackson and Georg Sørensen, *Introduction to International Relations*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1999, p. 2.

[4] Zygmunt Bauman, *Globalization: The Human Consequences*, Oxford, Polity Press in association with Blackwell, 1998, p. 64; Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, *Empire*, London, Harvard University Press, 2000, pp. 325-328; Camilleri and Falk, *The End of Sovereignty*, p. 77; Guehenno, *The End of the Nation State*, p 57; Williams, 'Rethinking sovereignty', p. 113; Sørensen, 'Sovereignty: Change and continuity in a Fundamental Institution', *Sovereignty At the Millennium*, pp. 168-9; David Held, *Political Theory and the Modern State*, Cambridge, Polity Press, 1989, pp. 229-37; Jackson 'Introduction', *Sovereignty at the Millennium*, p. 4; David Held, Anthony McGrew, David Globatt and Jonathan Perraton, *Global Transformations: Politics, Economics and Culture*, Oxford, Polity Press, 1999, p. 5 and Clark, *Globalization and International Relations Theory*, p. 70.

[5] Hardt and Negri, *Empire*, p. 336.

[6] Camilleri and Falk, *The End of Sovereignty*, p. 245.

[7] Ibid., p. 256.

[8] Bauman, *Globalization*, p. 61.

[9] Ibid., p. 64.

[10] Ibid., p. 65. Another good example of this position is provided by Richard Falk, 'Sovereignty', *The Oxford Companion to Politics of the World*, Oxford, ed. J. Krieger, Oxford University Press, 1993, pp. 851-3.

[11] This need not imply that sovereignty will always be a useful concept. Examinations of international relations in the context of the wide sweep of history suggest that its genesis was relatively recent making it clear that there is nothing timeless or inevitable about sovereignty. Martin Wight, *Systems of States*, Leicester, Leicester University Press, 1977; Adam Watson, *The Evolution of International Society*, London, Routledge, 1992, Ole Wæver, 'Europe's Three Empires: A Watsonian Interpretation of Post-Wall European Security', *International Society after the Cold War: Anarchy and Order Reconsidered*, ed. Rick Fawn and Jeremy Larkins, London, Macmillan, 1996 and Barry Buzan and Richard Little, *International Systems in World History: Remaking the Study of International Relations*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1999.

[12] Jackson and Sørensen highlight the importance of developing a framework within which to come to terms with sovereignty in the context of change. 'Changes in the institution of sovereignty should be a high priority on the future research agenda of IR'. Robert Jackson and Georg Sørensen, *Introduction to International Relations*, p. 267. Buzan makes a similar observation. The English School 'must also be interested in the question of sovereignty, not as a static concept but as an evolving institution of modern international society. Any solidarist/progressive view of international society requires sharp moves away from essentialist conceptions of what sovereignty is and how it works. As the case of the EU illustrates thick international societies have to unpack and redistribute elements of sovereignty. English school theory needs to understand all this better than it now does'. Barry Buzan, *From International to World Society: English School Theory and the Social Structure of Globalisation*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2004, p. 95.

[13] The notion that globalization is essentially about a revolution in time and space, a time-space compression, has a very broad basis of support from people coming from a number of different theoretical positions: David Harvey maintains that globalization leads to 'an intense phase of time-space compression that has had a disorienting and disruptive impact upon political-economic practices, the balance of class power, as well as upon cultural and social life'; David Harvey, *The Condition of Postmodernity: An Enquiry into the Origins of Cultural Change*, Oxford, Blackwell, 2000, p. 284. Mittleman claims that '[d]riven by changing modes of competition, globalization compresses the time and space aspects of social relations'. James Mittleman, 'The Dynamics of Globalization', *Globalization: Critical Reflections*, ed. James Mittleman, Lynne Rienner Publishers Boulder Colorado, 1996. Williams claims that 'globalization presents a different articulation of time and space. Authority structures need no longer be fixed to territorial actors'. Marc Williams, 'Rethinking Sovereignty', *Globalization: Theory and Practice*, ed. Elenore Kofman Gillian Youngs, London, Pinter, 1996, pp. 117-18. Also see: Zygmunt Bauman, *Globalization: The Human Consequences*, chapters 1 and 2; David Held, Anthony McGrew, David Globatt and Jonathan Perraton, *Global Transformations: Politics, Economics and Culture*, pp. 14-16; John Gerard Ruggie, 'Territoriality and beyond: problematizing modernity in international relations', pp. 146-7; James Der Derian, 'The Space of International Relations Simulation, Surveillance and Speed', *International Studies Quarterly*, 1990, pp. 295-310;

Anthony Giddens, *Beyond Left and Right: The Future of Radical Politics,* Cambridge, Polity Press, 1994, p. 4 and Anthony Giddens, *The Third Way: The Renewal of Social Democracy,* Oxford, Polity Press, Blackwell, 1998, p. 31 and Jan Aart Scholte, *Globalization: A Critical Introduction,* Basingstoke, Palgrave, 2000, p. 196.

[14] Robert O Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, 'Realism and Complex Interdependence', *Perspectives on World Politics,* ed. Michael Smith, Richard Little and Michael Shackleton, Beckenham, Croom Helm Ltd, 1981, p. 121.

[15] Georg Sørensen, 'Change and Continuity in a Fundamental Institution', pp. 175-6.

[16] Barry Buzan, 'The English School: an underexploited resource in IR', *Review of International Studies,* 2001, p. 476.

[17] Martin Wight initially developed the three traditions framework in the 1950s (Martin Wight, *International Theory: The Three Traditions,* ed. G Wight and B Porter, London, Continuum, 2002). No doubt because of his central importance ('For those identifying themselves with the English School, Wight is something of a godfather'. Tim Dunne, *Inventing International Society: A History of the English School,* Basingstoke, Macmillan, p. 47. 'The figure who occupies centre stage is Martin Wight'. Ibid., p. 61) the three traditions distinction (along with the distinction developed by Bull between pluralism and solidarism) has become a defining feature of English School theory. NB: The methodological approach that the three traditions nurture has given rise to criticism. See Ian Hall, 'Review article: Still the English patient? Closures and inventions in the English School', *International Affairs,* Vol. 77, 3, 2001, p. 942. Interestingly this provoked a sharp response from Barry Buzan and Richard Little 'The English patient strikes back: a response to Hall's mis-diagnosis', *International Affairs,* Vol. 77, 3, 2001, p. 943.

[18] Martin Wight, 'An anatomy of international thought', *Review of International Studies,* 1987, 13, pp. 222-3.

[19] Ibid., p. 223.

[20] Brian Porter, 'Patterns of Thought and Practice: Martin Wight's "International theory"', *The Reason of States,* ed. Michael Donelan, London, George Allen and Unwin, 1978, p. 67.

[21] Martin Wight, 'An anatomy of international thought', pp. 223-226. For a more recent account see: Buzan, *From International to World Society: English School Theory and the Social Structure of Globalisation,* pp. 6-7.

[22] Martin Wight, *International Theory: The Three Traditions,* e.g. chapter 1; Martin Wight, 'An anatomy of international thought' pp. 221-227; Martin Wight, *Systems of States,* Leicester, Leicester University Press, 1977, pp. 38-39; Martin Wight, 'Western Values in International Relations', *Diplomatic Investigations: Essays in the Theory of International Politics,* London, George Allen and Unwin Ltd, 1966, esp: pp. 92-95; Richard Little, 'The English School's Contribution to the Study of International Relations', presented to BISA Annual Conference, 20-22 December 1999, University of Manchester. http://www.leeds.ac.uk/polis/englishschool/; Barry Buzan, 'The English School: an underexploited resource in IR', pp 475-77; Tim Dunne, *Inventing International Society: A History of the English School* p. 8 & 49; Roger Epp, 'Martin Wight; International Relations and the Realm of Persuasion', *Post-Realism: The Rhetorical Turn in IR,* eds. F. A. Beer and Robert Hariman, Michigan, Michigan State University Press, 1996, p. 122; Roger Epp, 'The English School on the frontiers of international society: a hermeneutic recollection', *The Eighty Years Crisis 1919-99,* ed. Tim Dunne, Michael Cox and Ken Booth, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press 1999, p. 53 and Robert Jackson and Georg Sørensen, *Introduction to International Relations,* pp. 146-148. It is important to note that world society does embrace an ambiguity in that there is quite a significant ontological difference between a federation of separate states and the formation of a one world government. More on this later.

[23] Martin Wight, *International Theory: The Three Traditions,* p. 268. In suggesting that Wight was primarily a rationalist, however, it is important to note, as this quotation suggests, that Wight was only primarily a rationalist for part of his life. During the mid to late '40s he is thought, in deference to his work, *Power Politics,* (London, Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1946) to have been primarily a realist see Tim Dunne, *Inventing International Society: A History of the English School,* pp, 52-54.

[24] Robert Jackson, 'Martin Wight, International Theory and the Good Life', *Millennium,* 19, 1990, p. 270.

[25] Andrew Linklater, *Beyond Realism and Marxism: Critical Theory and International Relations,* Basingstoke, Macmillan, 1990, pp. 9-10. There are other examples of suggestions that the English School is basically rationalist, although these do not necessarily invoke the idea of a dialectic. Roger Epp's introduction of rationalism, for instance makes this point very eloquently: 'If anything the theoretical orientation marked variously as the "English" or "classical" or "international society" or

"rationalist" school has been reinvigorated in recent years, ...'. Roger Epp, 'The English School on the frontiers of international society: a hermeneutic recollection', p. 48. Also see *Janine Kissolewski* actually defines the English School by international society (rationalism) defined against realism and world society (revolutionism). See Janine Kissolewski, 'Norms in international society English School meets constructivists', presented to BISA Annual Conference, 18-2 December 2000, Bradford University, p. 2 http://www.leeds.ac.uk/polis/englishschool/. Tim Dunne, meanwhile, calls his history of the English School 'Inventing International Society', suggesting that international system (realism) and world society (revolutionism) are not really what the English School is about.

[26] Hedley Bull, 'Martin Wight and the theory of international relations', *International Theory: The Three Traditions*, p. xiv. This of course reflected Bull's own position. 'It is important, however, to retain a senses of the limitations of the anarchical international society ...because international society is no more than one of the basic elements at work in modern international politics, and is always in competition with the elements of a state of war and of transnational solidarity or conflict, it is always erroneous to interpret international events as if international society were the sole dominant elements' Hedley Bull, *The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics*, London, Macmillan, 1977, p. 51.

[27] Richard Little, 'The English School's Contribution to the Study of International Relations', p. 3. The English School is not about the provision of a via media but rather 'a coherent framework for theoretical and methodological pluralism'. Barry Buzan and Richard Little, 'Why International Relations has Failed as an Intellectual Project and What to do About it', *Millennium*, 2001, p. 36. 'In an ES framework, what is more significant is the assumption that all three elements can always operate simultaneously, in a continuous coexistence and interplay, the question being how strong they are in relation to each other. Theoretical pluralism transcends the standard treatment of the inter-paradigm debate as being a war between incommensurable approaches and aims instead at what Wæver described as an attempt to "combine traditions and theories normally not able to relate to each other"'. Ibid., p. 37.

[28] Sheila Grader, 'The English school of international relations: evidence and evaluation', *Review of International Studies*, 1988, 14, p. 34.

[29] 'Thus the three traditions are not like three railroad tracks running parallel into infinity. They are not philosophically constant and pure like three stately, tranquil and independent streams flowing first from Vitoria and Suarez to J. L. Brierly, secondly from Machiavelli to E. H. Carr, and lastly from Ignatius Loyola to Eric Hobsbawn and Palm Dutt. They are streams, with eddies and cross currents, sometimes interlacing and never long confined to their own river bed. They are to vary the metaphor, threads interwoven in the tapestry of Western civilization'. Martin Wight, *International Theory: The Three Traditions*, p. 260. A similar expressing of the interlinked nature of the three traditions is also seen in the following: 'All I am saying is that I find these traditions of thought in international history dynamically interweaving', Martin Wight, 'An anatomy of international thought', p. 227.

[30] Hedley Bull, 'Martin Wight and the theory of international relations', p. xiii.

[31] Ibid.

[32] Barry Buzan, 'The English School: an underexploited resource in IR', Review of International Studies, 2001, pp 476 and Barry Buzan, *From International to World Society: English School Theory and the Social Structure of Globalisation*, p. 10 and p. 25.

[33] Roy Jones, 'The English school of international relations: a case for closure', *Review of International Studies*, 1981, 7, p. 10.

[34] Ibid., p. 11.

[35] David Boucher, *Political Theories of International Relations*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1998, p. 16. Another expression of this concern is given by Brian Porter, although as the chapter will demonstrate he only sets up the image of atrophied categories to knock it down. 'If Wight constructed a grand design, fitted so much of human thought and behaviour into his threefold structure, may he not have falsified reality, seen pictures in the fire or in the clouds, imposed a bogus order upon the intractable complexities of history, been the artist whose art improves upon nature? And then is not the structure a little too neat, recalling that symmetry beloved of the Latin mind – or in this case the mind steeped in the Latin culture?' 'Patterns of Thought and Practice: Martin Wight's 'International theory', *The Reason of States*, ed. Michael Donelan, London, George Allen and Unwin, 1978, p. 69.

[36] Bull, 'Martin Wight and the theory of international relations', p. xiii.

[37] Martin Wight, *International Theory: The Three Traditions*, p. 256. Another example of the sense of one tradition flowing into another is seen in Wight's use of language. 'The tendency of *rationalism into revolutionism* might also be illustrated by three concrete revolutions ...' Ibid. p. 263. (Italics added).

[38] Ibid.

[39] Porter, 'Patterns of Thought and Practice: Martin Wight's 'International theory', p. 71

[40] Bull, 'Martin Wight and the theory of international relations', p. xxi. Barry Buzan reflects the kind of flexibility required when confronting the three traditions: 'IR needs to shift perspective so that it sees these stories not as alternative, mutually exclusive, interpretation, but as a linked set, each illuminating a different facet of reality. The interesting question is not which of these stories is right, but what kind of configuration the combination of them produces'. Barry Buzan, 'The English School: an underexploited resource', p. 480.

[41] Sheila Grader, 'The English school of international relations: evidence and evaluation', p. 34.

[42] Roger Epp, 'The "Augustinian Moment" in International Politics: Niebuhr, Butterfield, Wight and the Reclaiming of a Tradition', *The Aberystwyth Papers*, 1991, p. 11 and Roger Epp, 'Martin Wight: International Relations as Realm of Persuasion', p. 129.

[43] Porter, 'Patterns of Thought and Practice: Martin Wight's 'International theory', p. 73.

[44] Richard Little, 'The English School's Contribution to the Study of International Relations', p. 18.

[45] Tony Evans and Peter Wilson, 'Regime Theory and the English School of International Relations: A Comparison', *Millennium: Journal of International Studies*, 1992, p. 329. Also see Ian Hall, Review article: Still the English patient? Closures and inventions in the English School, *International Affairs*, Volume 77, 3, 2001, pp. 936.

[46] Barry Buzan, 'The English School: an underexploited resource in IR', pp. 484-485. Another perspective can be seen in the work of Bull: 'it is true that he was not much interested in the economic dimension of subject, and that his failure to deal with the history of thought about economic aspects of international Relations is one of the points at which he is vulnerable to criticism'. Bull, 'Martin Wight and the theory of international relations', p. xx. Sheila Grader also note the reluctance to engage with economic phenomena, 'The English school of international relations: evidence and evaluation', p. 30.

[47] Buzan, *From International to World Society: English School Theory and the Social Structure of Globalisation*.

[48] For Wight's identification of Cobden with revolutionism see: Martin Wight, *International Theory: The Three Traditions*, p. 115. Also see *The Theory of International Relations: Selected Texts from Gentili to Treitschke*, ed. M. G. Forsyth, H. M. A. Keens-Soper and P. Savigear, London, George Allen and Unwin, 1970, pp. 305-324. A good example of a writer who celebrates the progressive implications of the free movement of goods, services and all factors of production in the context of contemporary globalization - a contemporary revolutionist in the Cobden tradition to whom Wight might refer for this purpose were he alive today - would be Kenichi Ohmae, see: Kenichi Ohmae, *The End of the Nation State: The Rise of Regional Economies: How New Engines of Prosperity and Reshaping Global Markets*, London, Harper Collins, 1996, p. 152; Kenichi Ohmae, 'Putting Global Logic First', *The Evolving Global Economy: Making Sense of the New World Order*, ed. K. Ohmae, Harvard, Harvard Business Review, 1995 and Kenichi Ohmae, *The Borderless World*, London, Collins 1990. On the sense of the 'potential' rather than 'actual' status of revolutionism see Bull's observation that Kantianism 'exists potentially, even if it does not exist actually'. *The Anarchical Society*, p. 25. Having reflected on the potentiality of revolutionism/world society, it is interesting to note that Grotius, perhaps the most influential thinker in the formulation of ES categories approached rationalism/international society from a similar perspective. 'In Grotius' time these institutions existed only in embryo; the international society he describes is an ideal or normative one, for which there was as yet little concrete historical evidence'. Hedley Bull, 'The Importance of Grotius in the Study of International Relations, *Hugo Grotius and International Relations*, Oxford, Clarendon, 2002, p. 90.

[49] Again Buzan notes the importance of the world society/revolutionist category when considering globalization but he replaces it with two new categories one pertaining to interactions between individuals across the globe, 'interhuman societies', and the other which pertains to the interaction of transnational actors in the international arena, 'transnational societies'. This thesis, however - for reasons that will become apparent - maintains the traditional category of world society/revolutionism. Barry Buzan, *From International to World Society: English School Theory and the Social Structure of Globalisation*, chapter 4.

[50] See for example: Scott M. Thomas, 'The Global Resurgence of Religion and the Study of World Politics', *Millennium: Journal of International Studies*, 1995, pp. 289-299. Samuel Huntington famously referred to this resurgence as 'La Revanche de Dieu', *The Clash of Civilizations and Remaking of World Order*, London, Touchstone, 1998, p. 95.

[51] Martin Wight, 'Russia, the Church and the West', *Ecumenical Review 1*, 1948, pp. 25-45; Martin Wight, 'What makes a good historian?', *The Listener* 17 Feb 1955, pp. 283-4; Martin Wight, *International Theory: The Three Traditions*, pp. 25-27; Herbert Butterfield, *Christianity in Human History*, New York, Charles Scribner and Sons, 1950; Herbert Butterfield, *International Conflict in the Twentieth Century: A Christian View*, New York, Harper and Brothers, 1960; Herbert Butterfield,

Christianity, Diplomacy and War, London, The Epworth Press, 1962, p. 78; Herbert Butterfield in *Herbert Butterfield: Writings on Christianity and History*, ed. C. T. McIntire, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1979, p. 125. D. M. Mackinnon, 'Natural Law', *Diplomatic Investigations: Essays in the Theory of International Politics*, ed. Herbert Butterfield and Martin Wight, London, George Allen and Unwin, Ltd, 1966, Tim Dunne, *Inventing International Society: A History of the English School*, chapters 3 and 4 and Ian Hall, 'Review article: Still the English patient? Closures and inventions in the English School', *International Affairs,* Vol. 77, 3, 2001, p. 933.

[52] The greatest single theological influence on the English School, as chapter 8 will point out, was Augustine, who inspired what Michael Loriaux describes as 'Christian Realism' (Michael Loriaux, 'The Realists and Saint Augustine: Skepticism, Psychology, and Moral Action in International Relations Thought', *International Studies Quarterly*, 1992, 36, p. 406). The theological influence on rationalism, however, is seen in the work of Victoria, Suarez and Grotius (e.g. Wight, *International Theory*, p. 15.) and in revolutionism through Calvin, Luther and Gentili and again Victoria (e.g. Ibid, pp 8-12 and p. 40).

[53] In terms of a renewed interest specifically in theology within the English School please see: Scott M. Thomas, 'Faith, History and Martin Wight: the role of religion in the historical sociology of the English School of International Relations', *International Affairs*, Vol. 77, No 4, October 2001; Charles Jones, 'Christianity and the English School', paper presented to the annual convention of the International Studies Association at Chicago, 2001; Ian Hall, 'History, Christianity and Diplomacy: Sir Herbert Butterfield and International Relations', *Review of International Studies 28*, 2002, pp. 719-36; Sean Molloy, 'Bridging Realism and Christianity in the International Thought of Martin Wight', European Consortium for Political Research, Fourth Pan-European International Relations Conference, University of Canterbury, 8-10th September 2001, and Roger Epp, 'The "Augustinian moment" in international politics: Niebuhr, Butterfield, Wight and the reclaiming of a tradition'.

In terms of the general renewed interest in theology see: Fabio Petito and Pavlos Hatzopoulos, *Religion in International Relations: The Return from Exile,* New York, Macmillan, 2003; John D. Carlson Erik C. Owens, *The Sacred and the Sovereign: Religion and International Politics*, Washington DC, Georgetown University Press, 2003; Samuel P Huntington, 'The Clash of Civilizations', *Foreign Affairs* 72, (3), pp. 22-169; Samuel P. Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations and Remaking of World Order*, London, Touchstone, 1998; Douglas Johnston and Cynthia Sampson, *Religion, The Missing Element of Statecraft,* Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1994; John L. Esposito and Michael Watson, *Religion and Global Order*, Cardiff, University of Wales Press, 2000; K. R. Dark ed. *Religion and International Relations*, Basingstoke, Macmillan, 2001; Scott M. Thomas, 'The Global Resurgence of Religion and the Study of World Politics', *Millennium: Journal of International Studies*, 1995, pp. 289-299; *Sovereignty at the Crossroads: Morality and International Politics in a Post-Cold War Era*, ed. Prof. Luis Lugo, London, Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 1996; Daniel Philpott, 'The Challenge of September 11 to Secularism in international relations', *World Politics* Vol. 55, October 2002, No 1; Daniel Philpott, 'The Religious Roots of Modern International Relations', *World Politics*, 52, no 2 2000, pp. 217-222; Daniel Philpott, *Revolutions in Sovereignty: How Ideas Shaped Modern International Relations*, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 2001; *Millennium: Journal of International Studies*, 2000, Vol 29, No 3. (Special Edition on Religion and IR) containing essays such as Vendulka Kabulkova, 'Towards an International Political Theology' and Miroslav Volf, 'Forgiveness, Reconciliation, and Justice: A Theological Contribution to a More Peaceful Social Environment'. Also please note new organisational developments, The International Centre for Religion and Diplomacy: www.icrd.org and The Ethelburga Centre: www.ethelburgacentre.org.uk

[54] Fabio Petito and Pavlos Hatzopoulos, *Religion in International Relations: The Return from Exile,* New York, Macmillan, 2003, chapter 1.

[55] Barry Buzan, 'The English School: an underexploited resource in IR', pp. 471-488.

[56] Martin Wight, *International Theory*, chapter 5.

[57] Ibid., chapter 3.

[58] Ibid., chapter 1.

[59] This particular order can be observed in Ibid., chapter 6.

[60] Robert O Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, 'Realism and Complex Interdependence', p. 121.

[61] The Euclidean and Newtonian frame of the modern sovereign state is made very clear by the criticisms of: Camilleri and Falk, *The End of Sovereignty*, p. 238 & p. 240; Walker, 'State Sovereignty and the Articulation of Political Space/Time' p. 456 and pp. 459-460. Championing the open system through the instrumentality of General Systems Theory, Bertalanffy challenged the essential nature of this configuration resulting from a Newtonian, spatial orientation. According to the Newtonian view it is important to see society 'as a whole superordinated to its parts. This implies great problems of

planned economy, of the deification of the state, but also reflects new ways of thinking'. Ludwig von Bertalanffy, *General Systems Theory*, Braziller, New York, 1968, p. 30.

[62] The German 19th century theorist Fredick List defined the idea of 'economic nationality'. An area is said to have economic nationality when all goods and services and factors of production move freely and within the same framework of law. For application of the concept see: Anderson and Hall, 'Absolutism and Other Ancestors', pp. 29 – 30; John Agnew and Stuart Corbridge, *Mastering Space: Hegemony Territory and International Political Economy*, Routledge, London, 1995, pp. 89-90; Bjorn Hettne, 'The International Political Economy of Transformation', *International Political Economy: Understanding Global Disorder*, ed. Hettne, London, Zed Books, 1995, p. 7; James Anderson, 'The Modernity of Modern States', *The Rise of the Modern State*, p. 8; Camilleri and Falk, *The End of Sovereignty*, p. 241 and David Hetherington, *Economic Management of Resources: A Critique of Classical Economics*, Centre for Migration and Development Studies, The University of Western Australia, 1996, p. 13 and p. 60. For a spirited critique of economic nationality see: Justin Rosenberg, *The Empire of Civil Society: A Critique Of the Realist Theory of International Relations*, London, Verso, 1994, pp. 124-9.

[63] Confederalism is deployed by: Murray Forsyth, *Unions of States: The Theory and Practice of Confederation*, Leicester, Leicester University Press, 1981; Daniel Boucher, *The EU Defined: A Confederal Definition of the European Union*, MA Thesis, (unpublished), 1994 and M. Schluter and D. Lee, *The R Factor*, London, Hodder and Stoughton, 1993, p. 244.

[64] The United States of Europe vision and thus the development of supranational sovereignty is adhered to both positively and antagonistically. Supporters of the vision include: Michael Burgess, *Federalism and Federal Union: Political Ideas, Influences and Strategies in the European Community, 1972-1987*, London, Routledge, 1989; John Pinder, *European Community: The Building of a Union*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1991; Ernest Wistrich, *The United States of Europe*, London, Routledge, 1994; There are also political parties with a federal vision. The German CDU's proposals for the 1996 IGC argue that the EU should become 'more democratic and federal'. It must be 'orientated', they state, 'to the model of a federal state'. Cited in Norman Lamont, *Sovereign Britain*, London, Duckworth, 1995, p. 23. Critics of the vision include: John Laughland, *The Tainted Source: The Undemocratic Origins of the European Idea*, London, Warner Books, 1998; Norman Lamont, *Sovereign Britain* and John Redwood, *The Death of Britain*, Basingstoke, Macmillan, 1999.

[65] Martin Wight, 'An anatomy of international thought', p. 224.

[66] Richard Little, 'The English School's Contribution to the Study of International Relations', p. 18; Tony Evans and Peter Wilson, 'Regime Theory and the English School of International Relations: A Comparison, p. 329 and Barry Buzan, 'The English School: an underexploited resource in IR', pp. 484-485.

[67] Examples of studies of non-intervention V intervention carried out within the English School tradition include: R. J. Vincent, *Non-intervention and International Order*, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1974; R. J. Vincent, *Human Rights and International Relations*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1986; James Mayall, *The New Interventionism, 1991-1994*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1996; Nicholas J Wheeler, 'Pluralists or Solidarist Conceptions of International Society: Bull and Vincent on Humanitarian Intervention', *Millennium: Journal of International Studies*, 1992, Vol. 21 No 3 and Nicholas Wheeler, *Saving Strangers: Humanitarian Intervention in International Society*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2000.

[68] - Regarding trade see e.g.: Camilleri and Falk, *The End of Sovereignty*, pp. 70-71; Barrie Axford, *The Global System: Economics, Politics and Culture*, Cambridge, Polity Press, 1995, pp. 103-105; Held, McGrew, Goldbatt and Perraton, *Global Transformations,* p. 164; Paul Hirst and Grahame Thompson, *Globalization In Question, The International Economy and the Possibilities of Governance*, Second Edition, Polity Press, Oxford, 1999, p. 22; Kitsin and Michie, 'Trade and Growth: A Historical Perspective', *Managing the Global Economy*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, p. 10.
- Regarding portfolio finance see e.g.: Saskia Sassen, *Losing Control? Sovereignty in an Age of Globalization*, New York, Columbia University Press, 1995, pp. 42-62; Andrew Walter, *World Power and World Money: The Role of Hegemony and International Monetary Order*, Hemel Hempstead, Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1991; Camilleri and Falk, *The End of Sovereignty*, pp 73-77 and Axford, *The Global System*, pp. 107-109.
- Regarding foreign direct investment see e.g.: Held, McGrew, Globatt and Perraton, *Global Transformations*, pp. 245-251; Axford, *The Global System*, pp. 96-97, pp. 105-106; Camilleri and Falk, *The End of Sovereignty*, p. 71 and Hirst and Thompson, *Globalization in Question,* chapter 3.

[69] Jachtenfuchs, 'Conceptualizing European Governance', *Reflective Approaches to European Governance*, ed. KE Jorgensen, London, Macmillan, 1996. p. 44 and p. 46; Guehenno, *The End of the*

Nation State, p. 49 and pp. 55-56; Sassen, *Out of Control,* p. 31; Camilleri and Falk, *The End of Sovereignty,* p. 249; Axford, *The Global System,* p. 150; Rosenau, 'Governance and Democracy in a Globalizing World', *Re-imagining Political Community: Studies in Cosmopolitan Democracy,* ed Daniele Archibugi, David Held, and Martin Kohler, Polity Press, Cambridge, 1998, in *The Global Transformations Reader,* pp. 182-3 and Hardt and Negri, *Empire,* p. 340.

[70] Williams, 'Rethinking sovereignty', p. 113; Sørensen, 'Sovereignty: Change and continuity in a Fundamental Institution', pp. 168-9; David Held, *Political Theory and the Modern State,* pp. 229-37; Jackson, 'Introduction', *Sovereignty at the Millennium,* p. 4; Hardt and Negri, *Empire,* 325-328; Held, McGrew, Goldbatt and Perraton, *Global Transformations,* p. 5; Bauman, *Globalization,* p. 64; Guehenno, *The End of the Nation State,* p 57; Clark, *Globalization and Theory of International Relations,* p. 70 and Camilleri and Falk, *The End of Sovereignty,* p. 77.

[71] Michael Loriaux, 'The Realists and Saint Augustine: Skepticism, Psychology, and Moral Action in International Relations Thought', *International Studies Quarterly,* 1992, 36, p. 406; Reinhold Niebuhr, 'Augustine and Christian Realism', *Christian Realism and Political Problems,* London, Faber and Faber, p. 114-139; Sean Molloy, 'Bridging Realism and Christianity in the International Thought of Martin Wight', pp. 1-9; Charles Jones, 'Christian Realism and the Foundations of the English School', pp. 9-20, Herbert Butterfield in *Herbert Butterfield: Writings on Christianity and History,* p. 125 and Roger Epp, 'The "Augustinian moment" in international politics: Niebuhr, Butterfield, Wight and the reclaiming of a tradition', *The Aberystwyth Papers,* The University College of Wales, Department of International Politics 1991.

[72] 'Welsh proto-nationalism' refers to the epoch of thought which extends from the advent of modern Welsh nationalist thought and agitation in the latter nineteenth century, into the twentieth century covering the birth and then the development of Plaid Cymru certainly until 1945 and in many ways up until 1970. This epoch of Welsh nationalist thought was – as the thesis will demonstrate - in the main underpinned by distinctively theological norms, assumptions and arguments.

[73] Having said this, however, it is important to be clear that, whilst the characteristics of the aspirant polity in 'Welsh proto-nationalism' cannot be shown to be unique, they can at least be shown to be distinctive in the sense that there are other nationalisms, even nationalisms drawing directly in Christian theology, with wholly different ontological implications, as chapter 8 will demonstrate.

[74] In 'The Global Resurgence of Religion in the Study of World Politics' Scott Thomas reflects on the significant utility of religious thought in developing IR theory citing the importance of Colin Gunton's *The One, the Three and the Many,* which posits, as later chapters will testify, a grid that resonates directly with that of Welsh-proto-nationalism; Scott Thomas, 'The Global Resurgence of Religion and the Study of World Politics', p. 299. In the spirit of its interest in theology, the English School, moreover, is also distinctive for being ready to draw on different disciplines generally to an extent not countenanced by other IR schools. This English School trait informs the decision of this thesis to draw on some texts from political theory, government (in addition to theology of course) as well as international relations/globalization.

[75] R. Tudur Jones, 'Christian Nationalism', *This Land and People,* ed. Paul H. Ballard and D. Huw Jones, Collegiate Centre of Theology, University College, Cardiff, 1979; R. Tudur Jones, *The Desire of Nations,* Ammanford, Christopher Davies, 1975; R. M. Jones, 'Language in God's Economy: A Welsh and International Perspective', *Themelios,* Vol. 21, No 3, April 1996; D. Hywel Davies, *The Welsh Nationalist Party 1925-45,* Cardiff, University of Wales Press, 1983; Gwynfor Evans, *Fighting for Wales,* Talybont, Y Lolfa Cyf, 1991; Dorian Llywelyn, *Sacred Place, Chosen People: Land and National Identity in Welsh Spirituality,* Cardiff, University of Wales Press, 1999; Laura McAllister, *Plaid Cymru: The Emergence of a Political Party,* Bridgend, Seren, 2001, pp. 44-46; Robert Pope, 'Introduction', *Religion and National Identity Wales and Scotland c 1700-2000,* ed. Robert Pope, Cardiff, University of Wales Press, 2001 and Scott M. Thomas, 'Faith, History and Martin Wight: the role of religion in the historical sociology of the English school of International Relations', *International Affairs,* Vol. 77, No 4, October 2001, pp. 905-929.

[76] Camilleri and Falk, *The End of Sovereignty,* pp. 203-205, p. 245 and p. 256; Walker, 'State Sovereignty and the Articulation of Political Space/Time', p. 447; Hardt and Negri, *Empire,* p. 139, pp. 332-333 and p. 336; Guehenno, *The End of the Nation-State,* especially chapters 2 and 4; Ohmae, *The End of the Nation-State,* chapter 4, especially pp.46-57; Ohmae, 'Putting Global Logic First', *The Evolving Global Economy,* pp. 130-132; Peterson, 'Remapping in the Conflict of Globalization', p. 12 and Bauman, *Globalization,* pp. 64-65.

[77] James, 'The Practice of Sovereign Statehood in Contemporary International Society', p. 41; Alan James, 'Sovereignty: Ground Rule or Gibberish', *Review of International Studies,* 10, 1984, p. 11; Hans Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace,* New York, Alfred A.

Knopff, 1948, p. 312; John Laughland, *The Tainted Source: The Undemocratic Origins of the European Idea*, London, Warner Books, 1998, p. 171; Jackson, 'Sovereignty in World Politics: a Glance at the conceptual and Historical Landscape', p. 10 and Sørensen, 'Sovereignty: Change and Continuity in a Fundamental Institution', pp. 170-171.

[78] Sheila Grader, 'The English school of international relations: evidence and evaluation', p. 36.

CHAPTER 2

ONTOLOGY,

EPISTEMOLOGY AND METHODOLOGY

Having introduced the concept of the three traditions spectrum in chapter 1, demonstrating its relevance to the challenge of engaging with the dynamic environment of systemic change, it is the purpose of this chapter to consider in detail precisely how one should use the conceptual services of the spectrum when seeking to come to terms with the sovereign state in the context of contemporary systemic changes. Specifically it will engage with the two forms of systemic change identified by the previous chapter: accounts of European integration which for the purposes of this research affect sovereignty with what the introduction defined as 'change by extension' and accounts of globalization (and indeed some of European integration) which affect sovereignty with what the introduction termed, 'change by erosion'. Although committed to examining both the above changes, given that: a) the most radical form of change under consideration is globalization, b) regional integration takes place in any event in the wider context of globalization and can be understood in terms of it and c) it is in relationship to globalization that there is the greatest need and opportunity for the latent conceptual potentialities of the three traditions with respect to change to be spelled out, this chapter will define its baseline interpretation of the three traditions' capability to engage with systemic transformation in terms of the more extreme demands of globalization. Whilst examination of international

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relations from the perspective of this interpretation of the spectrum will register both 'change by erosion' and 'change by extension', however, demonstration of some limitations of this approach and the desire to obtain a better perspective on 'change by extension' will prompt consideration of the deployment of an alternative interpretation of the three traditions spectrum later in the chapter which will provide a complementary, sideways perspective on the subject matter. Having developed a clear appreciation of the services of the three traditions spectrum, both in terms of the baseline interpretation and the alternative complementary view, it will then be possible for subsequent chapters to embark upon their reconsideration of sovereignty in the context of systemic change from the perspective of these traditions.

CHAPTER STRUCTURE

Part 1 will consider the relationship between ontology and space and time and ontology and epistemology and the implications of these relationships for the three traditions spectrum. This will provide a clear appreciation of the conceptual potential of the three traditions spectrum as a means of engaging with sovereignty primarily in the context of 'change by erosion'. Part 2 will then consider the weaknesses associated with viewing the three traditions as an epistemological spectrum and suggest ways of addressing these concerns through developing the complementary, alternative approach to the spectrum - noted above - which will be particularly useful for the purposes of coming to terms with 'change by extension'.

PART 1: ONTOLOGY, EPISTEMOLOGY AND SPACE & TIME

Part 1 is divided into two main sections: Section 1 will define the relationship between differing ontological profiles (fixed and fluid) and space and time through

consideration of the ontological impact of globalization, applying this perspective to the definition of the three traditions. Section 2 will then examine the means for translating this systemic change and its ontological implication into a conceptual frame through reference to epistemology, applying it to the three traditions spectrum. (Adopting this line of analysis will have the benefit of further clarifying the relationship between the differing ontological profiles and space and time).

SECTION 1: THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ONTOLOGY, SPACE AND TIME AND THE THREE TRADITIONS

In turning to consider the relationship between ontology, space and time and the challenge of relating this to the three traditions spectrum, this chapter will adopt two approaches. The chapter will first consider the relationship between space and time, ontology and the definition of the three traditions from a narrowly IR perspective focusing on the challenge of globalization (Sub-Section I), before it then seeks to confirm its findings by very briefly reflecting on the relationship between space, time and ontology as set out in general terms by evolving philosophies of science (Sub-Section II).

SUB-SECTION I: THE IR PERSPECTIVE

Whilst the notion that globalization should be defined as a revolution in space and time has not emerged from within IR but from other disciplines in the form of the work of Harvey,[1] Jameson[2] and Virilio,[3] to name but a few, International Relations theorists have not been slow to buy into this definition, as seen in the work of e.g. Walker,[4] Der Derian,[5] and Ruggie.[6] In simple terms, the revolution in space and time involves the rise of what is best described as a new 'temporality'. Specifically this is

manifested through the transnational flows that typify globalization, e.g. flows of money, information, services etc, the movement of which has the effect of eroding boundaries such as those of the sovereign state. Characterised by movement, and even speed, rather than stasis, theorists seek to explain these phenomena in terms of their temporal rather than spatial extension.

Walker for instance engages with the new temporality by noting that it was always said that modernity was 'a process of historical acceleration, ...of all things solid melting into air'. Moreover he continued, *'Many have argued that such processes of activist development imply the eventual erasure of old spatial demarcations'*.[7] (Italics added). Later he defines in greater detail the relationship between ontological stability and the hegemony of closed spatial categories, on the one hand, and ontological flux, i.e. boundary erosion and a rising temporality, on the other. 'The clean lines of state sovereignty, it will be said, are less impressive than the startling velocity of contemporary accelerations. Temporality, so much recent analysis seems to suggest, can no longer be contained within spatial coordinates. Given the history of thinking about concepts of space and time since Isaac Newton stopped underwriting the guarantees for modernity, this should not be surprising. But given the extent to which modern political thought has depended on the claim that temporality can indeed be tamed and shaped by the spatial certainties of sovereign states, it is undoubtedly quite perplexing, even threatening'.[8] In this context there is a real sense in which flows are more appropriately characterised by time than by space, 'by processes of temporal acceleration than by spatial extensions ...'[9]

James Der Derian concurs. 'New technologies are elusive because they are more real in time than in space, their power is evidenced through the exchange of signs not goods, and their effects are transparent and pervasive rather than material and discrete. They do not fit and therefore elude the traditional and the reformed delimitations of the international relations field'.[10] To underline the challenge of the new temporality, Der Derain went on to quote Paul Virilio: "Space is no longer in geography – it's in electronics. Unity is in the terminals. It's in the instantaneous time of command posts, multinational headquarters, control towers, etc ...There is a movement from geo- to chrono-politics: the distribution of territory becomes the distribution of time".[11] In this context Der Derian claims that any attempt to come to terms with the new environment must 'elevate chronology over geography, pace over space, in their political effects'.[12]

Finally, for the purposes of this chapter, the challenge of the new temporality is also recognized by John Gerard Ruggie who identifies its relationship with fundamental (see his reference to 'stage' in the quotation below), i.e. ontological, change. 'This [post-1989] world exists on a more extended temporal plane, and its remaking involves a shift not in power politics but of the stage on which that play is performed'.[13]

SPECTRUM ANALYSIS

Thus, in light of the above, it is clear that the spatio-temporal revolution of globalization, which calls into question existing identities, is manifest through a phenomenon referred to variously as 'temporality',[14] 'temporal accelerations',[15] or an 'extended temporal plane'.[16] From the perspective of defining the spatio-temporal

profile of the spectrum, therefore, this suggests an association between globalization and a new temporal orientation that this thesis - drawing on the above expressions - refers to as the 'new temporality'. On this basis, given the above ontological description of the three traditions, there would seem to be a correlation between revolutionism, which champions the erosion of the boundaried sovereign state ontology, and a temporal orientation. In deference to this logic one can also infer a symmetrical relationship between realism, representing enduring boundaries, and a spatial orientation. Indeed, as Walker observes - commenting on the time before globalization - 'modern political thought has depended on the claim that temporality can indeed be tamed and shaped by the spatial certainties of sovereign states ...'.[17] In this sense, then, it would seem that the impact of globalization is to transpose given, fixed ontologies from the domain of the realist tradition, characterised by a spatial orientation, where they are apparently stable, to the domain of the revolutionist tradition, characterised by a temporal orientation, where they become fluid.

SUB-SECTION II: BEYOND IR

The above observations regarding the relationship between space and time and ontology are useful. In an effort to gain more evidence for, and greater clarity about them, however, it is helpful at this point to step back from the confines of IR theory to reflect on some of the more fundamental philosophical and scientific developments that inform the conceptualization of space and time and upon which IR theory implicitly depends. Specifically, it is helpful to turn to figures like Newton, Aquinas and Einstein, to note something of their contributions to fundamental debates about space and time because this helps to further clarify the bases for the associations between the spatial orientation and stasis, and the temporal orientation and change

which were identified above. The chapter now briefly turns to these discussions, therefore, not to make a contribution to fundamental debates about space and time, but rather to further elucidate the spatio-temporal profile of the spectrum wherein the fate of the sovereign state is to be considered.

PRE-MODERN AND MODERN CONCEPTIONS OF SPACE

The chapter will first briefly examine pre-modern conceptions of space through Aquinas and Boethius, and then modern conceptions of space through Newton, to confirm the spatio-temporal commitments of ontological stability cited above:

The medieval system, John Polkinghorne contends, detached God from the experience of time such that, in Aquinas' view, 'God does not foreknow the future, he simply knows it'.[18] Since God stands outside of time, all of history can be seen by him in a single sweep. A vivid expression of this approach is found in the writings of Boethius who stated that God had 'the complete and perfect possession at once of an endless life'. Reflecting upon this statement Polkinghorne maintained that '[i]n talk of this kind time is being assimilated into space, so that the complete history of the universe is thought of as laid out on a four-dimensional space time "map" for instant perusal by God'.[19] The key phrase here is 'time is assimilated into space'. It communicates the idea of space becoming absolute and thus time, and the related potential for real change, being erased. 'Time does not elapse; the world line is not traversed. It is simply there. Space time diagrams are great chunks of frozen history'.[20]

Moving to the seventeenth century one can see that the early modern system had similar consequences. Newton contended that beneath the relative space and time of

our inherently limited experience was a really existing, absolute space and time. To obtain real time within this framework one must go to this underlying layer of absolute time. The absolute character of this time, however, Gunton contends, actually testifies to a loss of its truly temporal nature. Thus, in actuality, one must conclude that, in Newton's view: 'Because absolute time is not temporal, time does not belong to the inner essence of things'. This results in a view of time's relationship to space that is actually very similar to that of Aquinas and Boethius. '[F]or Newtonian science time is spatialised, in the sense that it is considered reversible'.[21] Whenever time becomes absolute it loses its finiteness, and thus its temporal character is 'spatialised' and dies. Time is thus again assimilated into space.

SPECTRUM IMPLICATIONS

Consideration of the relationship between IR theory and space and time, in the first part of Section 1, suggested a relationship between the spatial orientation and stasis. The two conceptualizations of space and time considered above, apart from IR theory (the medieval views of Boethius and Aquinas and the early modern Newtonian perspective), reiterate the notion that ontological closure is secured by a spatial orientation and the denial of time. In defining the three traditions as an ontological spectrum, therefore, this again suggests that the realist tradition, representing the enduring stability of the sovereign state ontology, should be related to the spatial orientation.

POSTMODERN HYPERSPATIALISATIONS

The chapter will now briefly examine the revolution in conceptions of space and time associated with the new physics to confirm the spatio-temporal commitments of ontological flux cited above.

Whilst some eighteenth and nineteenth century thinkers sought to rebel against the closure implied by the Newtonian position, it was not until Einstein's breakthroughs in the early twentieth century that the notion of absolute space was superseded. In the same way that modern conceptions of space were informed by scientific breakthroughs in the seventeenth century, those of postmodernity have been similarly influenced by scientific breakthroughs which occurred in the early twentieth century. The revelation that behaviour within the most fundamental component of reality, the atom, was radically indeterminate constituted a major threat to the conventional mechanical, determinist view of the world. This open image was soon strengthened by developments in quantum mechanics which posited an indeterminate wave-particle duality. Furthermore, the advent of dynamical systems theory (chaos theory) reinforced this new and radically indeterminate view of the nature of reality. This suggested - in total contradiction of the perspectives of scientists of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries - that the world did not reside upon/in an absolute space, generating a closed, determinist order in which the apparent reality of time, sustaining openness (as opposed to spatialised Newtonian time), was an illusion. Instead it posited a radical temporality according to which every ontology, no matter how solid it may appear, was actually a construction. The foundational openness sustained by the temporality of the new era was/is such that there could/can be a number of

potential spatial ontologies at any one time, hence the reason why some scholars have come to refer to such ontologies as hyperspatial.[22]

SPECTRUM IMPLICATIONS

Consideration of the relationship between IR theory and space and time in Sub-Section 1, suggested a relationship between the temporal orientation and change. Specifically, the conceptualizations of space and time considered above, apart from IR theory, reiterate the notion that ontological openness is secured by a temporal orientation/new temporality and the denial of closed, modern space. In approaching the three traditions as an ontological spectrum, therefore, this again suggests that the revolutionist tradition, representing change and a fluid global connexity that is deconstructive of 'given' ontologies such as the sovereign state, should be related to the temporal orientation.

SECTION 2: THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN EPISTEMOLOGY, ONTOLOGY AND THE THREE TRADITIONS

Having clarified the relationship between the spatial orientation and closure/stability and the relationship between the temporal orientation and openness/change and unpacked their implications for sovereignty in terms of the poles of the three traditions spectrum, it is now possible to consider how this ontological frame can be viewed epistemologically, providing further clarity about the conceptualization of sovereignty within the three traditions spectrum. Turning to epistemological reflection also has the benefit of providing yet further clarification - as the chapter will demonstrate - regarding the relationship between spatio-temporal commitments and ontological stability/change defined in Section 1.

Recent years have witnessed the third (some say fourth) great debate of modern international relations theory (the first such debate having been between realism and idealism and the second between traditional and 'scientific' approaches) which has been an epistemological debate taking place between rationalists and reflectivists.[23] It has resulted in IR theory becoming both very much more epistemologically self-conscious and also in its embracing a far greater diversity of epistemological positions. Some scholars have sought to account for these developments in English School terms by demonstrating how the three traditions spectrum accommodates an epistemological spectrum. Andrew Linklater contends that the three traditions are definitive of an epistemological spectrum extending from positivism - the epistemology servicing realism - on the right hand side, to interpretivism - the epistemology associated with rationalism - in the middle, to critical theory - the epistemology associated with revolutionism - on the left hand side.[24] This view is also endorsed by Richard Little. 'A comprehensive assessment of the work of the English school', Little maintains, 'makes it clear that they rely on interpretivist, positivist and critical assumptions'.[25] In order to be sure that the spectrum can deal with the full array of epistemological positions, moreover, Ian Manners has endorsed the above approach and suggested the provision of a fourth tradition called 'Relativism' (whose figurehead he suggests should be Nietzsche) to accommodate a more extreme, postmodernist expression of post-positivism than critical theory.[26]

In considering the epistemological services of the spectrum one must engage with the challenge that, as Little observes, the epistemological services of the spectrum remain very implicit. 'But although members of the English school have been relatively

explicit about their pluralistic orientation, they have certainly not discussed it in any detail or examined all of the consequences of following such a route. By attempting to map out the implications of adopting a pluralistic approach to international relations, it becomes apparent that there are substantial lacunae in the extant work of the English school'.[27] In unpacking those lacunae epistemologically, in relationship to the challenge of globalization, the chapter seeks to contribute to the quest of making the implicit, and not obviously relevant, explicit and very obviously relevant.[28] This will demonstrate how English School theory can introduce the new temporality to conceptualization of state sovereignty through appropriate epistemological adjustment.[29]

UNPACKING THE EPISTEMOLOGIES OF THE THREE TRADITIONS

In the context of the rationalist – reflectivist debate, the previously little used word 'ontology' has become very important in IR theory. The exact nature of the relationship between epistemology and ontology is highly contested and it is in no sense the purpose of this thesis to seek to make any contribution to this particularly contentious theoretical discussion.[30] Having said this, however, whilst the precise nature of the relationship between epistemology and ontology is the subject of much debate, some general points can be made without controversy.

Whilst ontology and epistemology are not exactly two sides of the same coin, they are interrelated. In 'Positivism and Beyond', Steve Smith makes this point unambiguously. 'As to the separation of epistemology, methodology and ontology the three are indeed fundamentally interrelated'.[31] In a quest to identify the central characteristics of this interrelationship the chapter will now consider the ontology

associated with a) positivism, b) strong post-positivism (critical theory/postmodernism) and c) mild post-positivism (the interpretivist/hermeneutic approach). It is by appreciating the relationship between particular epistemologies and ontologies in this way that one can begin to see how to express ontological changes conceptually through appropriate epistemological adjustments:

a) POSITIVISM

Positivism (embracing neorealism within the Linklater – Little framework), exists alongside a certain ontological stability (or, if you prefer, closure) commensurate with that of modern natural science. Secured by the fact that there is a division between the subject and object, the knower and the known, this ontological stability enables positivism to focus on the impact of forces on the ontology in question rather than change within that ontology. It is this that makes positivism ill-equipped to deal with the fundamental developments (systemic changes) that are not about the implications of the movement of forces between the actors of a particular ontology but rather changes within that ontology itself.

This approach, and its historical dominance in IR, is reflected on by Smith. '[I]n international relations positivism has tended to involve a commitment to a natural science methodology, fashioned on an early twentieth century view of physics before the epistemologically revolutionary development of quantum mechanics in the 1920s, which fundamentally altered the prevailing view of the physical world as one that could be accurately observed. Accordingly, positivism in international relations, as in all the social sciences, has essentially been a methodological commitment, tied to an empiricist epistemology: together these result in a very restricted range of permissible

ontological claims'.[32] Referring to this reluctance to engage with change, Cox observes that, from the perspective of positivism, the 'state of the social whole can be taken as *given* ...'[33] (Italics added)

To the extent that the ontology associated with pre-quantum physics is often identified with Newtonian mechanics, it is not uncommon to hear theorists, usually post-positivist critics (of varying degrees, see below), referring to 'Newtonian' ontological assumptions in IR (Euclid and Descartes are also regularly invoked) in order to berate their impact on the capacity of theory to engage with systemic i.e. ontological, change.

Ruggie makes the point in the following terms. 'As for the dominant positivist posture in our field, it is reposed in deep *Newtonian* slumber wherein method rules, epistemology is often confused with method, and the term "ontology" typically draws either blank stares or bemused smiles' (italics added). There is a real need, he argues, to move beyond implicitly Newtonian assumptions if IR is to come to terms with the changes of the post-1989 world.[34]

Similarly, R. B. J. Walker critically draws attention to the ontological closure introduced by positivist Newtonian assumptions and emphasises their inappropriateness, highlighting the fact that other disciplines have moved on from the seventeenth century. As noted earlier, but now in the light of his post-positivist epistemological commitment, Walker observes: 'Temporality, so much recent analysis seems to suggest, can no longer be contained within spatial coordinates. Given the history of thinking about concepts of space and time since *Isaac Newton*

stopped underwriting the guarantees for modernity, this should not be surprising. But given the extent to which modern political thought has depended on the claim that temporality can indeed be tamed and shaped by the spatial certainties of sovereign states, it is undoubtedly quite perplexing, even threatening' (italics added).[35]

Walker also refers to the 'Cartesian coordinates' in positivist international relations theory to describe the same ontological closure that he attributes to the sovereign state. We 'find it exceptionally difficult', he maintains, 'to renounce the security of *Cartesian co-ordinates*, not least because they still provide our most powerful sense of what it means to look over the horizon' (italics added).[36] In the same vein he also refers to Euclid. '[B]ut we are no longer so easily fooled by the objectivity of the ruler, by *Euclidean* theorems and *Cartesian* co-ordinates that have allowed us to situate and naturalise a comfortable home for power and authority' (italics added).[37]

Finally, for our purposes, it is worth noting that Camilleri and Falk also invoke Newtonian and Euclidean (and Galilean) references to describe the ontological assumptions of much of positivist IR theory and its approach to the sovereign state. 'The Hobbesian view of the state, which still colours the modern understanding of sovereignty, owes a great deal to the spatial consciousness implicit in *Euclidean* geometry, *Galilean* mechanics and *Newtonian* physics' (italics added).[38]

ANALYSIS

In light of the above one can be clear that positivist epistemology is useful on two counts. First, it enables one to see again, this time through an epistemic lens, the relationship between a spatial orientation (seen for example in Newtonian ontology)

and a denial of change. Specifically, it demonstrates that ontologically closed categories are serviced epistemologically in ways that deny change. Positivism assumes an absolute subject/object duality, i.e. it provides no room for the object to be changed by the subject. The object, the known, stands as a reified given and there is nothing that the knower can do through his/her knowing that will result in the transformation of the known. Second, by observing the relationship between the spatial orientation and the denial of change through an epistemological lens this section demonstrates positivism's potential to be used to conceptualize ontological continuity. In terms of using an epistemic lens to facilitate the translation of the conceptual demands of ontology, positivism's capacity to service stability clearly associates it with realism. From the perspective of the first one-third of the 'three traditions spectrum', therefore, it is argued that the dominant epistemology, as suggested by Linklater and Little, is indeed positivist.[39]

INTRODUCING POST-POSIVITISM

The chapter now comes to those epistemological positions, united by their rejection of positivism and realism, which can generically be described as post-positivist. This grouping, however, is extremely broad, providing approaches to epistemology that apply to both rationalism and revolutionism. In light of this, the chapter will introduce a distinction between what it will describe as a moderate post-positivism, associated with rationalism, and a strong post-positivism, associated with revolutionism. Given that moderate post-positivism provides a qualified expression of strong post-positivism, and given the structure of the remaining chapters of this thesis (which involves examination of the two poles before rationalism), the chapter will

first examine positivism's (realism's) polar opposite, strong post-positivism, and then moderate post-positivism.

b) STRONG POST-POSITIVISM: POSTMODERNISM *ET AL*

Like positivism, strong post-positivism also makes methodological assumptions that are related to ontological assumptions.[40] In strong post-positivist thought there is no quest to understand the movement of forces through a given ontology, for the ontology is not given. Unlike positivism, wherein the knower and the known confront each other as two closed categories, in the context of strong post-positivism the underlying sense of ontological openness means that the knower's act of knowing has the effect of constructing or reconstructing what is a fluid ontology (the known).[41] The world stands in a state of flux and the knower is able to confront this with his created concepts which help to generate new, and, he hopes, more relevant ontologies. In providing a means for translating the new temporality and its attendant ontological fluidity into a conceptual frame, therefore, post-positivism provides an important, epistemologically disclosed, conceptual function.

In suggesting that revolutionism is associated with strong post-positivism, however, one runs into the difficulty which has prompted Manners to suggest the introduction of a fourth tradition. Since critical theory, associated with revolutionism by Linklater and Little, does not completely give up on Enlightenment aspirations, although it constitutes a strong form of post-positivism, it certainly does not describe the post-modern polar opposite of a confident positivism.[42] There is thus a need, Manners contends, for a fourth tradition of 'Nietzchean Relativism' which gives the English

School spectrum the capacity to define the full breadth of potential epistemological diversity.[43]

This thesis fully recognizes the wisdom of the above point but, rather than sacrifice conventional references to the three traditions, suggests a slightly different solution. Given that whilst it does constitute a strong form of post-positivism, critical theory does not completely give up on Enlightenment aspiration (making it less of a polar representation of post-positivism than Manners' post-modern, Nietzschean position) this thesis would suggest that critical theory should not be used to define the whole of the revolutionist tradition. Instead, exploiting the conventional distinction within revolutionism between its moderate Kantian and strong Dantean expressions, this thesis associates critical theory with the first, Kantian part of the spectrum and the postmodernist, Nietzschean approach with the final Dantean section.[44]

EXAMPLES

The objective of all forms of strong post-positivism - Critical or Relativist - is to critique positivism and its attendant 'essentialist' ontology at the centre of which is the closed, rigidly boundaried, modern, sovereign nation-state that gains its clearest expression in neorealism. Defined largely against ontological stability (completely in the case of the stronger post-modern forms of strong post-positivism, those occupying the Dantean section of revolutionism), it is the contention of this thesis that strong post-positivism provides a key role in rising to the conceptual challenge of the new temporality with its hyperspatial implications. Seeking to make good the problems defined by Jameson when he observed that, we 'do not yet possess the perceptual equipment to match this new hyperspace ...in part because our perceptual habits were

formed in that older kind of space I have called the space of high modernism'[45], these approaches, which we will now consider in detail, have responded by seeking 'a reconfiguration in social space time experiences to a degree not witnessed since the Renaissance'.[46]

Eloquently articulating this reconfiguration project, Robert Cox, a critical theorist, contends that the ontology of the international arena is not a given but is the fruit of construction. This means that when the dominant constructed ontologies no longer seem to work, because the world has moved on, there is a need to create new ones. 'In such periods, certainties about ontology give place to scepticism'. In the context of the demise of 'old Europe', Cox observes, this gave rise to Pyrrhonism. Today it is calling upon strongly post-positivist epistemology.

Cox's epistemological approach contains two steps, both of which depend on an ontological openness within which the ontology can be changed, namely, the deconstruction of the old ontology and construction of the new. First, deconstruction: 'To deconstruct the ontological constructs of the passing present is a first step towards a more pertinent but still relative knowledge'. Second, construction: 'Structures are socially constructed, i.e., they become a part of the objective world by virtue of their existence in the intersubjectivity of relevant groups of people. The objective world of institutions is real because we make it so by sharing a picture of it in our minds quite independently of how we value it, whether we approve or disapprove of it'.[47]

John Gerard Ruggie also seeks to come to terms with radical physical flux by explicitly seeking to engage with post-positivist epistemology.[48] 'Accordingly,

understanding that transformation – and presumably any analogous shift that may be taking place today – requires an epistemological posture that is quite different from the imperious claims of most current bodies of international relations theory'.[49]

James Der Derian's post-structuralist strategies for coming to terms with the radical ontological flux inaugurated by the new temporality, meanwhile, adopt a similar epistemic posture '[C]hronopolitical in the sense that they elevate chronology over geography, pace over space ...' they are post-positivist.[50]

Yosef Lapid also contends that it is essential to embrace post-positivist epistemology if one is to engage with fundamental change. In seeking to rise to this challenge through the lens of the new interest in culture and identity,[51] Lapid suggests that IR is responding to the 'broader perception that "a new, somehow profoundly globalized era is being born"'.[52] In engaging with the world today, he contends (with the assistance of John Shotter), that IR theorists '"have a choice: either to think of it as based in invariances (fixed things) and to treat change as problematic, or, to think of it as in flux (as consisting in activities) and to treat the attainment of stability as a problem". For too long the IR theoretical enterprise has ignored this choice, investing itself almost exclusively in the former possibility'.[53]

The feminist, V Spike Petersen, similarly argues that a post-positivist epistemology will be essential if one is to engage with fundamental change. In the current context it 'is increasingly unlikely', Petersen maintains, 'that a territorial unit can continue to preserve its distinctiveness on the basis ...of delinking, ...there is an increasing probability that distinctive identity may be formed as a unique crossroad in the flow of

people, goods and ideas'. In this context feminist epistemology, with its rejection of positivism's subject/object duality, gives rise to 'multilevel, multidimensional analytic frameworks that are less likely to generate reductionist and/or static accounts'.[54]

Marlene Wind also champions the capacity of reflectivist IR theory to engage with systemic change and highlights the failure of rationalist research programmes to rise to this challenge. They are 'unequipped', Wind contends, 'to conceive of structural transformation in the international system'.[55]

BEYOND EPISTEMOLOGY?

Before providing an overall assessment of the uses of strong post-positivism and the three traditions spectrum, it is at this stage helpful to refer back to the approach of Section 1 to develop a clearer expression of the relationship between the spatio-temporal revolution and strong post-positivism. Specifically, the ontological implications of the annihilation of distance resulting from globalization's time-space compression can be seen as having, in an important sense, the socio-epistemic effect of eroding the distinction between subject and object by collapsing them into each other. The fact that at the same time that post-positivist epistemologies are seeking the abolition of the distinction between subject and object, globalization is physically providing a basis for this same end (or something like it) through the abolition of the distance (and even the matter) between subject and object that secured their distinction, is of great relevance and interest.[56] This annihilation can be seen in the following examples.

Reflecting on military technology, Virilio provides one of the most eloquent expressions of the impact of the time-space compression on the subject/object distinction, demonstrating not just the transcending of space in the sense of distance but also space in the sense of matter through his use of the concept of penetration. 'The instantaneousness of action at a distance corresponds to the defeat of the unprepared adversary, but also, and especially, to the defeat of the world as a field, as distance, as matter. Immediate penetration, or penetration that is approaching immediacy, becomes identified with the instantaneous destruction of environmental conditions'[57]

Economically, meanwhile, the impact of globalization manifest in 'late capitalism' similarly has the effect of abolishing the distinction between subject and object through movement. In his 'Postmodernism, or the Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism', Frederic Jameson characterises postmodernism as a 'waning of effect' wherein the relationship between subject and object, and the related distinction between inside and outside, is extinguished. The depth manifest through this distinction is replaced by a simple surface.[58] This is a function of the logic of late capitalism in which the importance of exchange transcends that of those facilitating the exchange, replacing the centred economic actor with what Guehenno described as the decentred 'fleshless cipher'. It is a society in which 'exchange value has been generalized to the point at which the very memory of use value is effaced'.[59]

ANALYSIS

Strongly post-positivist epistemology is useful on two counts. First, it provides another context within which to see the relationship between the temporal orientation

(manifest in ontological openness, flux) and the celebration of change. Strong post-positivism abandons the absolute distinction between subject and object (as does the effect of the annihilation of distance), and its attendant reifications, clearing the ground for the object to be changed by the subject. Second, in providing an epistemological perspective on the relationship between the temporal orientation and the celebration of change, it demonstrates how epistemology can be used to confirm, engage with, and seek to shape, change, translating its implication into the conceptualization of an appropriate ontology. In terms of using the epistemic lens to facilitate the translation of the conceptual demands of ontology, strong post-positivism's capacity to service radical change clearly associates it with revolutionism. From the perspective of the last one-third of the 'three traditions spectrum', therefore, it is argued (also in Section 3) that the dominant epistemology is strongly post-positivist.[60]

c) MODERATE POST-POSITIVISM: INTERPRETIVISM

Again, like positivism and strong post-positivism, moderate post-positivism makes methodological assumptions that are related to ontological assumptions and is defined very much in the tradition of a *via media* between positivism and strong post-positivism. Moderate post-positivism does not present one with the knower seeking to know a reified reality which his knowing cannot change - as in the case of positivism - nor does it present one with the knower confronting an inessential world which his knowing can make - as in the case of strong post-positivism. Instead it defines a knower whose knowing can inform and construct reality to an extent but without this being predicated on a commitment to a radically inessential world. Although ontologies can be subject to change through inter-subjective construction and

reconstruction (partially open), this does not make them inessential (completely open) and beyond the reach of what might be described in common sense terms as a realistic epistemology.

Moderate post-positivism is best understood as a form of pre or anti-positivism that tends to go by the terms interpretivism, the hermeneutic approach and/or moderate constructivism.[61] In turning to this interpretivism, the chapter addresses the epistemological posture that Linklater and Little have associated with the tradition which, as chapter 1 observed, is often said to be definitive of the true English School position, rationalism. In light of this it will come as no surprise that those who have sought to identify the School with one particular epistemology have tended to select interpretivism. As a consequence of this fact, it is also important to seek to define interpretivism from within the English School as well as from outside.

One of the most detailed investigations of the balance of intrepretivism made from within the English School is presented by Roger Epp, who seeks to define it by referring to the work of Gadamer. 'Employing the elements of language, prejudice and tradition, Gadamer resists in a particular way the sharp subject-object dichotomy that is central to modern epistemology and to classical hermeneutics. His understanding of a text, an event, a practice, or a face-to-face interlocutor, is neither subjective (where meaning is idiosyncratic to the knower) nor objective (where meaning inheres in the known and remains only to be discovered by a detached knower). Instead, understanding is denoted metaphorically as a fusion of horizons that changes both knower and known'.[62] His dialogical to-ing and fro-ing between the knower and the known 'represents his attempt at a theoretical grounding that is

neither foundationalist nor radically subjective. For interpretation is tempered by an accountability to the "thing itself".[63]

Another English School scholar, Tim Dunne, concurs, claiming that the English School is defined by 'a broadly interpretive approach to the subject...'.[64] This he locates in the widespread scepticism about the possibility of international relations being scientific which he claims was present long before Hedley Bull's celebrated 'International Theory: The Case for the Classical Approach'.[65] Given that the subject matter of international relations depends on ideas like the balance of power and diplomacy, it cannot be treated as an arena of reified facts that exist independently of what people think about them. The ontology of the international arena must thus be seen as partially but not wholly constructed.[66]

One can actually obtain a particularly clear appreciation of the ontological and epistemological characteristics of the rationalist tradition by referring to a scholar from outside the English School with whom Dunne, and indeed many other English School scholars draw parallels (Hidemi Suganami, Ole Wæver and Barry Buzan), Alexander Wendt.[67] Wendt eloquently expresses the balanced commitment of a mildly post-positivist constructivism, engaging with both ontological openness and closure. On the one hand, in demonstrating that his approach incorporates sensitivity to the 'given', spatially oriented aspects of the subject matter, Wendt is careful to recognize 'the material substrate of agency, including its intrinsic capabilities'. In the case of human beings this material substrate is the body. In the case of 'states it is an organisational apparatus of governance'. Specifically, he is clear that 'the *raw material* out of which members of the state system are constituted is created by domestic society

before states enter the constitutive process of international society' (italics added) and thus the constructed state is in no sense a malleable, hyperspatial, extra-territorial reality. On the other hand, having been clear about this foundation of givenness, this material substrate, Wendt is also clear about the reality of construction, manifest in the process of inter-state recognition which informs his definition of sovereignty.[68]

Ole Wæver interestingly provides an account of the interpretivist/constructivist English School approach, by reflecting on its similarity to the work of Alexander Wendt and claiming (like Linklater) that it should embrace a stronger form of post-positivism. There are, Wæver contends, two forms of constructivism. In the first instance there is that which pertains merely to structure, 'constructivism part of the way down', of which the work of Alexander Wendt is perhaps the best example. This is symptomatic of the partial openness that is definitive of the rationalist tradition. In the second instance there is the rather more thorough constructivism that pertains to both units and structure, 'constructivism all the way down', typified by the scholarship of Erik Ringmar.[69] This demonstrates a rather more radical constructivism that, for the purposes of this thesis, pertains to an equally radical openness and is best associated with revolutionism. Specifically, Wæver claims that the English School epistemology fits in with the former Wendtian approach 'which operates only on outside-in constructions of meaning, not inside-out. Thus, English School advocates might find points of convergence with the "really existing" American constructivism, but', Wæver is keen to point out, 'this is not the only possible form of constructivism, nor even the most obvious form to give it on the basis of its own critique of mainstream international relations'.[70]

Having demonstrated the distinctions between radical, 'all the way down' constructivism and partial, 'part of the way down constructivism', demonstrating the similarity between the Wendtian and English School positions, the point should be made that Wæver actually entertains the possibility that English School constructivism may be rather more limited than that of Wendt. The latter, Wæver observes, has parallels with critical theory in the sense that, when engaging with structures, it adopts the position that 'this is not given by nature therefore it could be different' which Wæver suggests is not the case with the English School. '[T]he new American constructivism seems to portray the rules of international society as much more malleable and open to reformulation than the English School typically has'.[71] Wæver, however, whilst not rejecting his commitment to radical constructivism, then reflects that there may be some wisdom in this position in the sense that some structures are more malleable than others, suggesting that there is perhaps a need to develop a multi-layered approach to constructivism, drawing on something of the wisdom of the English School approach.[72]

ANALYSIS

Thus interpretivism depends upon a relationship between the subject and object that can neither be described as one of complete division, as in realism, nor as one of no division at all, as in post-modernism. It thus exists alongside both a measure of ontological stability, which means that it never celebrates radical flux, but also a measure of openness which means that the interpretivist ontology does not amount to the reified units accompanying positivism. Rationalist ontology is thus neither wholly essential, as in pure forms of positivism, nor wholly inessential as in pure forms of strong post-positivism. Embracing a hybrid epistemology and a hybrid ontology,

rationalism is post-positivist to the extent of criticising the closure associated with neorealism but not to the extent of the strong post-positivism which this thesis associates with revolutionism. Interpretivism thus provides an epistemological means for translating a measure of change and a measure of continuity into a conceptual frame. In terms of using the epistemic lens to facilitate the translation of the conceptual demands of ontology, interpretivism's capacity to service continuity and change clearly associates it with rationalism. From the perspective of the middle one-third of the 'three traditions spectrum', therefore, it is argued (also in Section 3) that the dominant epistemology is interpretivist.[73]

CONCLUSION

In conclusion, whilst the ontological assumptions made in the context of the deployment of a positivist epistemology suggest an associated ontological closure, those made in the context of a strong post-positivist epistemology suggest an associated ontological openness, and those associated with interpretivism suggest continuity and change. Thus positivism rises to the conceptual challenge of the spatial orientation, strong post-positivism to that of the temporal orientation, and interpretivism to that of a spatio-temporal balance. The theorist must obviously be fully aware of the implication of the above distinctions when seeking to conceptualize ontologies in the context of globalization. In light of the above, Smith's conclusion to his wide ranging critique of positivism is very relevant. **'[E]pistemology has had enormous ontological effects,** and these have affected not only the study but also the practice of international relations. In positivism's place international theory needs to develop strong post-positivist theories based on a variety of epistemologies because **a lot more than epistemology is at stake'.** (Emphasis added)[74]

Having sought to make the epistemological services of the three traditions spectrum, and their relationship to the spatio-temporal revolution that is globalization more explicit, Part 1 will now close with some final refinements and the provision of a fresh perspective. First it will seek to contribute to the development of the three traditions through the provision of further analytical distinctions. Second, it will locate the wisdom of the spectrum in a wider context.

1. DEVELOPING ANALYTICAL DISTINCTIONS

It is important to deploy the three traditions in a manner that highlight the gradually and constantly flowing character of the spectrum from closure to openness, demonstrating that in representing a third of the ontological spectrum, revolutionism, for example, is not an ontologically homogenous unit, bumping into the different but equally homogenous rationalist unit. This thesis consequently seeks to soften the three tradition boundaries by introducing a sub-division within both realism and revolutionism. First, realism is divided between a category at its extremity, representing complete ontological closure, and a category that, whilst primarily closed, does embrace a measure of construction which develops as one moves towards the rationalist tradition. The place of complete ontological closure is defined as the sovereign state pole and relates to neorealism, whilst that which engages with a limited measure of construction is defined by what this thesis terms 'Augustinian realism' (of which more in chapter 8). A similar sub-division is introduced to revolutionism between a category at the extremity of revolutionism, representing complete ontological openness, and a category that, whilst primarily open, engages with a limited measure of closure which develops as one moves towards the

rationalist tradition. The place of complete ontological openness is defined as the post-sovereignty pole and represents the neo-Dantean, 'Nietzschean' section of revolutionism, whilst that which engages with a very limited measure of closure defines the neo-Kantian, 'Coxian' critical theory component of the revolutionist tradition. Having highlighted the tentative nature of the three traditions boundaries it is important to point out that the exact relationship between the sovereign state pole and realism *per se* and the post-sovereignty pole and revolutionism *per se* will become clearer in the following chapters.[75]

2. WIDER PERSPECTIVE

In a context where ontological diversity is giving rise to significant epistemological and methodological fragmentation, the ontological, epistemological and methodological pluralism of the English School has an important contribution to make. Indeed it is interesting to note, in closing, that scholars from beyond the School intimate the wisdom of a methodological pluralism (see below), even whilst - in some cases - apparently failing to recognize/engage with the possibilities offered by the English School in this regard.

After reflecting on the notion of a synthesis between positivism and reflectivism, James Der Derian (who has been very consciously influenced by the English School)[76] rejects this avenue. '[I]t is not a synthesis but by learning to live with irreconcilable differences and multiple identities - in high theory and in everyday practices - that we might find our best hope for international relations'.[77]

Ruggie, meanwhile, infers the need for a methodological tension by first praising a) the capacity of neorealism to deal with 'the endogenous logics of the relations of force', b) the capacity of the microeconomics of institutions to deal with strategic behaviour and c) the ability of reflectivist theories to address the role of spatial imageries, and then making the important point that none of these bodies of theory are 'in any sense additive'.[78] Once again there is no synthesis, just the option of a methodological pluralism.

Cox, meanwhile, also celebrates pluralism, endorsing the role of positivism even whilst embarking upon a post-positivist attempt to re-conceive the world in the context of globalization. Rather than affirming the importance of embracing different methodologies at different levels at the same time, however, he argues that there are epochs of stability during which positivism is most helpful and then epochs of transformation during which post-positivist, reflectivist approaches are most helpful.[79]

PART 2 PROBLEMS WITH EPISTEMOLOGICAL PLURALISM?

Having defined the baseline ontological and epistemological interpretation of the three traditions spectrum that will be used by this thesis as it seeks to come to terms with systemic change, it is now important to pause to reflect on critiques of the suggestion that one should use the three traditions as an epistemological spectrum. This will provide an opportunity for a defence of epistemological pluralism but it will also pave the way for the presentation of an alternative account of the three traditions spectrum that will be rather more appropriate for coming to terms with certain accounts of regional integration. The chapter will engage with this opportunity by way of considering recent contributions made by Barry Buzan and Ian Manners.

Although Buzan has in the past associated himself with the idea that the three traditions can be associated with an epistemological as well as ontological pluralism,[80] he breaks away from this position in his latest major contribution to English School theory.[81] There are a number of rationales for this decision. In the first instance Buzan notes that there are some forms of revolutionism, e.g. Marxism, that cannot be reconciled with post-positivist, critical theory.[82] In the second instance, Buzan argues that all English School theory is, in any event, best approached from a single constructivist epistemological perspective. This epistemological monism can be seen in the fact that Buzan jettisons both the polar traditions of the spectrum. On the one hand he rejects pure closure in the form of the 'international system' on the basis that this provides narrowly mechanical accounts of change that are not true to life.[83] On the other hand he has never entertained the possibility of associating the English School with the pure openness of narrowly socially constructed accounts. Whilst his theory is concerned to cater for a measure of social construction it also seeks to cater for an element of physical givenness.[84] Operating within this framework, Buzan has always demonstrated a clear preference to a 'systems approach' that is committed to the provision of explanatory value through structure whose delivery capacity depends upon a measure of closure. In rejecting both extremes ontologically and epistemologically - even whilst maintaining the language of the three traditions - Buzan moves to the middle ground of rationalism where he draws very extensively on the work of Alexander Wendt.[85] This thesis would respond to the Buzan critique first by defending epistemological pluralism but then by affirming a key component of his argument.

- DEFENDING EPISTEMOLOGICAL PLURALISM

The suggestion that epistemological pluralism should be replaced with a universal constructivism is problematic firstly because the rejection of epistemological pluralism raises questions about the integrity of methodological pluralism. Specifically, given the relationship between epistemology and ontology, it would seem possible that Buzan's rejection of epistemological pluralism might translate into at least an erosion of ontological pluralism and that this might negatively impact the capability of his theory to maintain methodological pluralism.[86] To this one might respond that Buzan's ontological pluralism remains intact in that, although he rejects the international system (realism) he replaces world society with two new traditions thus maintaining three in total: international society, transnational society and interhuman society.[87] Although in Buzan's thought these renewed traditions appear to secure an enduring methodological pluralism, however, the point must be made that, restricted to structural concerns,[88] what these three traditions actually do is to articulate a commitment to three levels of analysis. When bearing in mind the suggestion that all three should be carried out in the context of what might broadly be characterised as a Wendtian, moderately constructivist, systems theory form of analysis, it would seem that, like so many others, Buzan effectively adopts the ontology and epistemology of an international society, rationalist synthesis, albeit across three levels of analysis. Whether this provides the basis for a methodological pluralism in the English School tradition seems less than clear.[89]

The suggestion that epistemological pluralism should be replaced with a universal constructivism is problematic second, and more importantly, however, because it fails to engage with a significant opportunity. The quality of the three traditions spectrum

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that makes it so relevant and so undervalued in relationship to globalization is the fact

its identity as an ontological and epistemological spectrum render it an ideal

framework for coming to terms with the conceptual challenges of globalization as a

spatio-temporal revolution. Its spatio-temporal capability arguably makes the three

traditions spectrum more relevant today than at the time of their development.

- CATEGORY ERROR?

Having rejected the notion that the three traditions should be approached in uniformly

constructivist terms, however, this thesis would endorse the point that Buzan makes

about Marxism, prompting the question: what solutions are available? One scholar

who supports the idea of engaging with the three traditions as an epistemological

spectrum but also recognizes that there is a problem with associating Marxism with

post-positivist revolutionism is Ian Manners. Highlighting this difficulty, however, the

main innovation presented by Manners is the introduction of a fourth tradition. If the

suggestion is that revolutionism can cater for positivist globalism, like Marxism,

whilst relativism (the fourth tradition) caters for post-modernist globalism, one

encounters the difficulty that, in order to maintain the integrity and coherence of the

ontological spectrum, positivism should correlate to the realist tradition and come

before rationalism let alone revolutionism. In response to Manners' approach, the

spectrum would move from positivism and ontological closure, to interpretivism and a

greater measure of openness, back to positivism and ontological closure and then, in

one move, on to its post-positivist opposite and complete ontological openness. Any

sense of moving in a gradual and orderly manner from a strong positivism and

ontological closure at one pole, towards ever increasing openness, culminating in a

radical post-positivism and ontological flux at the other, would be lost.

MULTIPLE SPECTRUMS?

The desire to update the three traditions spectrum in order to make it sensitive to the rationalist – reflectivist debate is very understandable and is the basic approach supported by this thesis. One must recognize, however, that the consequence of developing a sharper understanding of the epistemic lens such that one associates realism with positivism, rationalism with interpretivism and revolutionism with strongly post-positivist theory, is that the positivist versions of revolutionism no longer fit and cannot be made to do so without placing the ontological and epistemological coherence of the spectrum in jeopardy. Far from solving the problem, the introduction of a fourth tradition to enable the spectrum to accommodate Marx, has the effect of destroying its ontological and epistemological coherence. In light of this, it is the contention of this thesis that the solution to the dilemma that Buzan and Manners rightly identify, is not the rejection of epistemological pluralism or the introduction of a fourth tradition, but rather, in true English School style, recognition of the validity of holding alternative accounts of the spectrum in tension.[90]

The application of the traditional approach to the three traditions which is not epistemologically self-conscious, and which does not make revolutionism dependent on strong post-positivism and the breakdown of the traditional relationship between the inside and the outside, provides for detailed engagement with a more limited form of systemic change. Although when viewed narrowly in terms of the epistemologically plural model of the three traditions there is a capacity to engage with the reality of 'change by extension', the perspective provided on this form of change is necessarily truncated. Specifically, whilst European integration presents a

form of change that is consistent with a transformation from realism (several sovereign states creating an international system) to revolutionism (a single supranational sovereignty creating one large domestic arena) on the traditional three traditions spectrum, when viewed from the perspective of an epistemologically plural spectrum this form of transformation is potentially consistent with a constant epistemological posture and thus need not involve a change of traditions. The three traditions spectrum, thus construed, would be able to locate the point of 'change by extension', e.g. six separate states coming together to form a supranational sovereignty in the context of a constant Augustinian realism, but not the process of change. One can, however, compensate for this shortcoming by superimposing the traditional spectrum upon the epistemological spectrum of this thesis, making it is possible to see with greater clarity the impact of that change and thereby obtain a more sophisticated appreciation of sovereignty and systemic change.

Given the opportunity to better accommodate regional integration, this thesis suggests that two accounts of the three traditions spectrum should be related in the manner of Figure 1. The epistemologically variable spectrum is represented by the horizontal axis which proceeds from positivism and the realist tradition on the left hand side, through to the interpretivism of the rationalist tradition, in the middle, and on to strong post-positivism and the revolutionist tradition, on the right hand side. The traditional Wightian spectrum meanwhile cuts vertically through the horizontal axis. The manner of its bifurcation, however, is complicated by the fact that, whilst the traditional Wightian approach is not self-consciously epistemologically variable in the sense of embracing the entire epistemic spectrum, disclosed in a less than technical and rather more common-sense, historically variable manner, it would not be

FIGURE 1

THE TWO THREE TRADITIONS SPECTRUMS

REALISM			RATIONALISM			REVOLUTIONISM	
SOVEREIGN STATE POLE							POST SOVEREIGNTY POLE
NEO-REALISM	AUGUSTINIAN REALISM				CRITICAL THEORY		POST-MODERN THEORY
					NEO-KANTIAN		NEO-DANTEAN

THE EPISTEMOLOGICALLY PLURAL THREE TRADITIONS SPECTRUM AXIS

appropriate to collapse the Wightian account into one point on the Linklater – Little spectrum. To the extent that it would perhaps make most sense to associate the classical English School with a form of pre-positivist interpretivism, this thesis suggests that the centre of this spectrum is located in rationalism. This is communicated diagrammatically by the fact that the central line representing the Wightian approach cuts through the epistemologically variable spectrum via the centre of rationalism. To the extent, however, that it would be wrong to set the classical approach in this one position there is a sense in which the traditional Wightian tradition must be seen as moving vertically but potentially from an array of epistemological (horizontal) postures with the exception of those defined by the sovereign state pole part of the realist tradition and those defined by the post-sovereignty pole, Dantean part of the revolutionist tradition.

CONCLUSION

In attempting to employ the English School three traditions spectrum as a means of considering sovereignty in the context of systemic changes that include globalization and regional integration, this thesis employs two interpretations of the spectrum that service the two kinds of change that these developments embrace, namely 'change by erosion' and 'change by extension'. Given that globalization is defined as a spatio-temporal revolution with profound ontological and (therein) epistemological implications, it is important to examine the fate of the sovereign state in the context of this revolution in terms that are sensitive to both the ontological and epistemological parameters of sovereignty, on the one hand, and globalization, on the other. The Linklater-Little interpretation of the three traditions is consequentially selected and made basic in light of the facts that globalization: a) is the most profound systemic

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change in view and b) can be said to incorporate regional integration. This provides the research with its perspective on 'change by erosion'. Given, however, that, although it is possible to locate the point of 'change by extension' on the Linklater-Little interpretation of the three traditions spectrum, it is not possible to unpack the process of that change on that particular spectrum, the thesis also employs the traditional interpretation of the three traditions in a complementary role. This provides the research with its perspective on 'change by extension'. The relationship between the two accounts is given diagrammatic expression by Figure 1.

INTO THE SPECTRUM!

Having defined the spatio-temporal profile of the spectrum, and having defined how it must be deployed in relationship to sovereignty in the context of globalization, it is now possible for the thesis, armed with the requisite distinctions and definitions that have been developed in this chapter (openness and closure, spatial and temporal orientation, the new temporality, essential and inessential, given and constructed), to move to the detailed definition of sovereignty in the context of the three traditions. The thesis turns first to the realist tradition.

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[1] David Harvey, *The Condition of Postmodernity: An Enquiry into the Origins of Cultural Change*, Oxford, Blackwell, 2000, p. 284.

[2] Fredic Jameson, 'Postmodernism, or the Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism', *The New Left Review*, 1984, pp. 80-81.

[3] Paul Virilio, *Speed and Politics: An Essay on Dromology*, trans Mark Polizzotti, New York, Semiotext(e), 1986.

[4] R. B. J. Walker, 'State Sovereignty and the Articulation of Political Space/Time', *International Studies Quarterly*, 1990, pp. 459-460.

[5] James Der Derian, 'The Space of International Relations Simulation, Surveillance and Speed', *International Studies Quarterly,* 1990, pp. 295-310.

[6] John Gerard Ruggie, 'Territoriality and Beyond: problematizing modernity in international relations', *International Organisation*, 1993, p. 147.

[7] R. B. J. Walker, 'State Sovereignty and the Articulation of Political Space/Time', p. 457.

[8] Ibid., pp. 459-460.

[9] Ibid., p 460.

[10] Der Derian, 'The Space of International Relations Simulation, Surveillance and Speed', p. 297.

[11] Virilio, *Pure War*, Semiotext(e) 1983 p. 115, cited by Der Derian, p. 307.

[12] Der Derian, 'The Space of International Relations Simulation, Surveillance and Speed', p. 297.

[13] Ruggie, 'Territoriality and Beyond', pp. 139-140.

[14] R. B. J. Walker, 'State Sovereignty and the Articulation of Political Space/Time', pp. 459-460.

[15] Ibid., p 460.

[16] Ruggie, 'Territoriality and Beyond', pp. 139-140.

[17] R. B. J. Walker, 'State Sovereignty and the Articulation of Political Space/Time', pp. 459-460.

[18] John Polkinghorne, *Science and Providence*, London, SPCK, 1994, p. 77.

[19] Ibid, citing Boethius, *On the Consolation of Philosophy*, 5.6.

[20] Ibid.

[21] Colin Gunton, *The One, The Three and The Many*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1992, p. 86.

[22] The term hyperspace actually arises from physics wherein it is used to describe all possible consequences emanating from indeterminacy. Fredric Jameson, however, has applied it to culture, philosophy and economics in his, 'Postmodernism, or the Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism', p. 81 and the term has since been employed by others: David Harvey, *The Condition of Postmodernity*, p. 201. Barrie Axford, *The Global System: Economics, Politics and Culture*, Cambridge, Polity Press, 1995, pp. 149-150; John Gerard Ruggie, 'Territoriality and Beyond: problematizing modernity in international relations', *International Organisation*, 1993, p.147 and Manuel Castells, *The Rise of the Network Society: The Information Age: Economy, Society and Culture Volume I,* Oxford, Blackwell, 2001, p. 507.

[23] Steve Smith, 'Positivism and Beyond', *International Theory: Positivism and Beyond*, ed. S Smith, K Booth and M Zalewski, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1996. p.12. In doing so he echoes the renown 1989 observation to this effect made by Yosef Lapid, 'The Third Debate: On the Prospects of International Theory in a Post-Positivist Era', *The International Studies Quarterly*, 33, (3), pp. 235-9. Ole Wæver defines it as the fourth great debate - the third in his view being the inter-paradigm debate - see Ole Wæver, 'Four Meanings of International Society: A Transatlantic Dialogue', *International Society and the Development of International Theory*, ed. B.A. Roberson, London, Continuum, 1998, p. 81.

[24] Andrew Linklater, *Beyond Realism and Marxism: Critical Theory and International Relations*, Basingstoke, Macmillan, 1990, chapter 1. Interestingly, although Linklater helps make an important contribution to the understanding of the ontological and methodological pluralism of the three traditions spectrum, he then jettisons that plurality by suggesting that the three traditions should be seen as a dialectic giving rise to a new synthesis which champions revolutionism. This manoeuvre, as Richard Little observes, is unfortunate, given that it loses the opportunities presented by the English School's commitment to methodological pluralism. Richard Little, 'The English School's Contribution to the Study of International Relations', presented to BISA Annual Conference, 20-22 December 1999, University of Manchester. http://www.leeds.ac.uk/polis/englishschool/ pp. 6-7.

[25] Ibid., pp. 7-8. Buzan and Little, meanwhile, make the following observations. i) Realism 'is broadly parallel to mainstream neorealism and uses structural modes of explanation and a positivist methodology'. ii) Rationalism: 'Although parallels can be drawn between this approach and regime theory, it has constitutive rather than merely instrumental implications, using agency-based modes of explanation, and hermeneutic methodology'. Barry Buzan and Richard Little, 'Why International Relations has Failed as an Intellectual Project and What to do About it', *Millennium*, 2001, p. 36. iii) Revolutionism: 'might appear similar to transnationalism, but carries a much more foundational link to normative political theory and critical theory'. Ibid., p. 37. 'In an ES framework, what is more significant is the assumption that all three elements can always operate simultaneously, in a continuous coexistence and interplay, the question being how strong they are in relation to each other. Theoretical pluralism transcends the standard treatment of the inter-paradigm debate as being a war between incommensurable approaches ...' Ibid. On other references to the association of the three traditions with three epistemologies see Roger Epp, 'The English school on the frontier of international society: a hermeneutic recollection', p. 54.

[26] Ian Manners, 'The Missing Tradition of the ES: Including Nietzschean Relativism and World Imagination in Extra-national Studies', *Millennium,* Vol. 32, 2003, pp. 241-264.
On the one hand this thesis supports the need to be more explicit about the spectrum embracing of the full breadth of epistemological diversity. On the other hand, however, it does not believe that this requires breaking away from the familiar references to the 'three traditions'.
In the first instance, one can avoid the need to introduce a fourth tradition by recognising that critical theory does not need to define the whole revolutionist tradition. Although a strong form of post-positivism, the fact that critical theory does not completely give up on Enlightenment aspiration, makes it less of a polar representation of post-positivism than Manners' post-modern Nietzschean position. This means that critical theory should not be used to define the whole of the revolutionist tradition. Specifically, this thesis exploits the conventional distinction within revolutionism between its moderate Kantian and extreme Dantean expression, associating critical theory with the first, Kantian part of the spectrum and the postmodernist, Nietzschean approach with the final Dantean section.
In the second instance, having incorporated the fourth tradition into the third, it is interesting to note that part of the rationale given for the introduction of a fourth tradition is based on faulty premises. Specifically, Manners proposes extra-national studies as a means of undoing 'the Wightian movement of divorcing international theory from political theory'. (Ibid., pp. 261-2). However, Wight actually introduces this divorce between the domestic and international - giving grounds for scholars to infer the denial of the possibility of a changing relationship between the inside and outside - in the context of his 'Why Is There No International Theory' essay which crucially resided on a two and not a three traditions spectrum. There was no category of revolutionism. ('[I]t is necessary to see the domain of international theory stretching all the way from the noble attempt of Grotius and his successors to establish the laws of war, at one extreme, to de Maistre's "occult and terrible law" of the violent destruction of the human species at the other'. Martin Wight, 'Why Is There No International Theory?' *Diplomatic Investigations: Essays in the Theory of International Politics,* eds. Herbert Butterfield and Martin Wight, London, George Allen and Unwin, 1966, p. 33). When one introduces revolutionism, in deference to the basic Linklater – Little approach, then one can see revolutionism/world society, as a domain that embraces the blurring of the boundaries between the inside and outside and thus one is actually already confronted with theory that 'does not simply reproduce the inside/outside distinctions'. Ian Manners, 'The Missing Tradition of the ES: Including Nietzschean Relativism and World Imagination in Extra-national Studies', p. 263.
For a contrary view that interprets this pluralism as problematic see: Ian Hall, 'Review article: Still the English patient? Closures and inventions in the English School', *International Affairs,* Vol. 77, 3, 2001, p. 942. This gives rise to a sharp response from Buzan and Little 'The English patient strikes back: a response to Hall's mis-diagnosis', *International Affairs,* Vol. 77, 3, 2001, p. 943.
It is important to note at this stage that there are other approaches that seek to apply epistemology to the three traditions in a quite different manner to that of Linklater, Little and Manners. Ole Wæver, for example, presents a framework wherein - in accordance with the traditional Wightian approach - both realism and revolutionism constitute modern accounts of the domestic arena. In the case of realism one sees the traditional modern domestic arena of the nation-state whilst in the case of revolutionism one sees that domestic arena writ large, becoming a supranation. According to Wæver, it is the rationalist tradition that, seeking a half way house between these two modern worlds, confuses the relationship between the inside and the outside, violating the modern epistemic assumptions that these can be kept separate. See Ole Wæver, 'Four Meanings of International Society: A Transatlantic Dialogue', pp. 98-101.

[27] Richard Little, 'The English School's Contribution to the study of International Relations', pp. 7-8.

[28] The point should be made that those who argue that the English School should be defined by the rationalist, international society tradition, inevitably argue that English School epistemology is basically interpretivist. For example see: Roger Epp, 'The English school on the frontiers of international society: a hermeneutic recollection', pp. 47-63.

[29] The point should also be made that post-positivist perspectives, trading on the demise of the reified division between the knower and the known, are actually participating in globalization itself. The 'transformationalist school' makes it clear that globalization is a broad material – ideational development which should not be reduced to economics see: David Held, Anthony McGrew, David Globatt and Jonathan Perraton, *Global Transformations: Politics, Economics and Culture,* Oxford, Polity Press, 1999. pp. 7-9.

[30] Steve Smith, 'Positivism and Beyond', pp. 17-18.

[31] Ibid., p. 17.

[32] Ibid.

[33] Robert Cox, 'Towards a post-hegemonic conceptualization of world order: reflections on the relevancy of Ibn Khaldun', *Governance Without Government: Order and Change in World Politics*, ed. by James N. Rosenau and Ernst-Otto Czempiel, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1992, especially p. 135.

[34] John Gerard Ruggie, 'Territoriality and Beyond', p. 170.

[35] Ibid., pp. 459-460.

[36] Ibid., p.447.

[37] Ibid., p. 459.

[38] Joseph Camilleri and Jim Falk, *The End of Sovereignty? The Politics of a Shrinking and Fragmenting World*, Edward Elgar, Aldershot, 1992, p. 238.

[39] Richard Little, 'The English School's Contribution to the Study of International Relations', p. 6 and p. 8.

[40] Steve Smith, 'Positivism and Beyond', p. 12; Alexander Wendt, 'Anarchy Is What the States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics', *International Organization* 46, 2 (Spring 1992) in *International Relations Theory: Realism, Pluralism, Globalism and Beyond*, ed. Paul R. Viotti and Mark V. Kauppi, Boston, Allyn and Bacon, 1999, p. 434 and Knud Erik Jorgensen, 'Introduction: Approaching European Governance', *Reflective Approaches on European Governance*, p. 4.

[41] As Jameson notes in his foreword to Lyotard's *Postmodern Condition*, the break with the Newtonian view of the world negates the subject-object duality, facilitating a shift from positivism to post-positivism. This inaugurates the 'so-called crisis of representation, in which an essentially realistic epistemology, which conceives of representation as the reproduction, for subjectivity, of an objectivity that lies outside it [and in so doing] projects a mirror theory of knowledge and art, whose fundamental evaluative categories are those of adequacy, accuracy and truth', is destroyed. Fredric Jameson, the foreword to *The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge,* by Jean-Francois Lyotard, trans Geoff Bennington and Brian Massumi, Manchester, Manchester University Press 1994, p. VIII.
This same representational crisis is articulated by Jameson in 'Postmodernism, or the Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism', pp. 88-89. In the context of radical openness there are no givens and is no objectivity to be carried to subjectivity. Henceforth, representation cannot communicate anything objectively into the subjectivity of the knower without the knower becoming involved in a manner that would change that which he/she seeks to know. In an open world one cannot know without one's knowing impacting the definition of the known. Far from being a passive act, knowing thus becomes an active and more importantly a creative act that gives rise to a new ontology whose generation, facilitated by the hegemony of time, is hyperspatial. As V. Spike Petersen observes, one of the key elements of post-positivism is that it rejects the notion that there is a divide between theory and practice. The one can impact the other. V. Spike Petersen, 'Shifting Ground(s): Epistemological and Territorial Remapping in the Context of Globalization', V. Spike Petersen, 'Shifting Ground(s): Epistemological and Territorial Remapping in the context of globalization', *Globalization: Theory and Practices*, Elenore Kofman and Gillian Youngs, London, Pinter, 1996, pp. 11-28.

[42] Critical theory represents a more moderate form of post-positivism than postmodernism because it does not entirely break away from the guidance of the Enlightenment in the direction of its emancipatory agenda. '[C]ritical theory develops a normative vision which is often missing from, although it is not necessarily inconsistent with, elements of post-modernism. Ashley and Walker (1990, pp 391, 394-5) take issue with claims "to stand heroically upon some exclusionary ground" and challenge obstacles to dialogue across the "institutional limitations that separate nations, classes, occupational categories, genders and races."' Andrew Linklater 'The achievements of critical theory', *International Theory: Positivism and Beyond*, ed. Smith, Booth and Zalewski, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1996, p. 293. 'Critical theory maintains its faith in the Enlightenment project and defends universalism in its ideal of open dialogue not only between fellow-citizens but, more radically, between all members of the human race'. Ibid., p. 296. As a function of this there is a willingness to engage with more rationalist research designs during times of ontological stability. Robert Cox, 'Towards a Post-Hegemonic Conceptualization of World Order: Reflections on the relevancy of Ibn Khaldun', p. 135.

[43] 'Little has argued that the concept of world society can be tied to Wight's tradition of revolutionism and Critical Theory in IR. However, there is a tension here in that Wight's revolutionism was clearly intended to include Marxist thinkers such as Immanuel Wallerstein and his world system theory set firmly in the structuralist paradigm of historic materialism. However, Critical Theorists try to distance themselves from the structuralism of Marxist thinking and its focus on historic materialism in order to refocus on the post-positivist approaches of discourse ethics. Thus, placing Critical Theory in the tradition of revolutionism is a move that still needs some choreographing. ' Ian Manners, 'The Missing

Tradition of the ES: Including Nietzschean Relativism and World Imagination in Extra-national Studies', p. 247.

[44] The point should be made that critical theory and postmodernism are used as figureheads to refer to differing strengths of strong post-positivism. The revolutionist tradition should thus be seen in relation to all forms of strong post-positivism regardless of whether they are described as reflectivist, post-modernist, post-structuralist, feminist or critical.

[45] Jameson, 'Postmodernism, or the Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism', p. 81.

[46] Ruggie, 'Territoriality and Beyond', p.147.

[47] Cox, 'Towards a Post-Hegemonic Conceptualization of World Order: Reflections on the relevancy of Ibn Khaldun', p. 138.

[48] Ruggie, 'Territoriality and Beyond', p. 139.

[49] Ibid., p. 169. In citing Ruggie at this stage, the point should be made that, whilst very critical of imperious positivism, his neo-institutionalist scholarship tends to reside in the more cautious interpretivist territory. Ruggie seeks to problematise positivist ontology, demonstrating the weaknesses of reification but he does not seek to apply his post-positivism for the sake of celebrating the victory of radically inessential hyperspatial ontology.

[50] Der Derian, 'The Space of International Relations Simulation, Surveillance and Speed', p. 297. On his relationship to the English School see: Ole Wæver, 'Four Meanings of International Society: A Transatlantic Dialogue', p. 98; Roger Epp, 'The English school on the frontiers of international society', p. 48, footnote 6 and the foreword to International Theory: Critical Investigations, ed. James Der Derian, London, Macmillan, 1995.

[51] These issues were famously 'bracketed', in the words of Alexander Wendt by neorealism see Alexander Wendt, 'Anarchy Is What States Make of it: The Social Construction of Power Politics', p. 435.

[52] Yosef Lapid, 'Culture's Ship: Returns and Departures in International Relations Theory', The Return of Culture and Identity in IR Theory, Boulder, Lynne Rienner Publishers Inc, 1996, p.4.

[53] Ibid., p. 6.

[54] V. Spike Petersen, 'Shifting Ground(s): Epistemological and Territorial Remapping in the context of globalization', pp. 11-28.

[55] Marlene Wind, 'Rediscovering Institutions: A Reflectivist Critique of Rational Institutionalism', Reflective Approaches to European Governance, p. 18.

[56] Again please note endnote 41 on the subject – object divide.

[57] Virilio, Speed and Politics, p. 133.

[58] Frederic Jameson, 'Postmodernism, or the Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism', pp. 61-62.

[59] Ibid., p. 66. In a context dominated by exchange, it is necessary to focus on the relationships between actors rather than the actors themselves. There is in fact a real sense in which actors are deconstructed and decentred by the 'hegemony of joining' which erodes the subject object duality. As Mulgan reflected '[i]t may still look as if it is made up of separate and sovereign individuals, firms, nations or cities, but the deeper reality is one of multiple connections, many of them inexplicable, many invisible'. Geoff Mulgan, Connexity: How to Live in a Connected World, London, Chatto and Windus, 1997, p. 3.

[60] Andrew Linklater, Beyond Realism and Marxism, chapter 1 and Richard Little, 'The English School's Contribution to the study of International Relations', pp. 7-8.

[61] It is important to note that some forms of constructivism such as that defined by Alexander Wendt ('Anarchy Is What the States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics', International Organization 46, 2 (Spring 1992) in International Relations Theory: Realism, Pluralism, Globalism and Beyond, ed. Paul R. Viotti and Mark V. Kauppi, Boston, Allyn and Bacon, 1999, p. 454.) and David Dessler ('Constructivism within a positivist social science', Review of International Studies, 1999, 25) do engage with a rationalist research design and can thus be construed as positivist even whilst their approach is not positivist in the sense that it believes ontology is socially constructed. This ambiguity is of great relevance to the English School in the sense that whilst it is constructivist, it also believes in seeking to identify structural patterns of behaviour. (On patterns see: 'International politics is the realm of recurrence and repetition; it is the field in which political action is most regularly necessitous'. Martin Wight, 'Why Is There No International Theory', p. 26. Bull was like Wight in that he embraced 'the search for patterns in the history of ideas about international relations'. Tim Dunne, Inventing International Society, p. 136. '[T]he problems and paradoxes of nations show such constancies of fundamental pattern throughout the ages, it is the realm where man ought to learn most (though in reality he refuses to learn) from the accumulated experience of the human race'. Herbert

Butterfield, *History and Human Relations*, London, Collins, 1951 p. 31). The chapter will return to the relationship between rationalism, post-positivism and constructivism shortly.

[62] Roger Epp, 'The English school on the frontier of international society: a hermeneutic recollection', p. 51.

[63] Ibid. Roger Epp rightly associates interpretivism with rationalism but he takes it too far for this research in the sense that he argues that Wight's entire approach is interpretivist. Ibid., pp. 47-63.

[64] Tim Dunne, *Inventing International society: a History of the English School*, p. 7. Like Epp, Dunne suggests that the English School per se can be understood in terms of interpretivism and thus he loses sight of non-interpretivist epistemologies in the English School. Some ambiguity also surrounds the question of whether Dunne himself should best be seen as rationalist in the sense that he seems to prefer the other key English School spectrum (developed by Bull) between pluralism and solidarism in relationship to which it is possible to associate, at different times both pluralism and solidarism with rationalism, whilst often also associating solidarism with revolutionism. Regardless of whether Dunne is best understood as a revolutionist or a rationalist, however, his approach to interpretivism resonates with rationalist epistemology.

[65] Hedley Bull, 'International Theory: The Case for the Classical Approach', *World Politics* 3, 1966, pp. 361-377.

[66] Tim Dunne, *Inventing International society: a History of the English School*, chapter 1.

[67] Hidemi Suganami, 'Alexander Wendt and the English School', *Journal of International Development*, December 2001; Ole Wæver, 'Four Meanings of International Society', p. 94; Barry Buzan, *From International to World Society? English School Theory and the Social Structure of Globalisation*, especially chapter 4; Barry Buzan and Richard Little, *International Systems in World History*, pp. 41-43 and Tim Dunne, *Inventing International society: a History of the English School*, p. 187.

[68] Alexander Wendt, 'Anarchy Is What the States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics', p. 446.

[69] Ole Wæver, 'Four Meanings of International Society: A Transatlantic Dialogue', pp. 93-95.

[70] Ibid., p. 95.

[71] Ibid., pp. 95-96.

[72] 'Constructivist theory really has to develop such a layered structure of rule if it is to be able to encompass, and enlarge on, structural realism, but these rules have been difficult to deliver'. Ibid., p. 96. Interestingly, Wæver suggests, contrary to radical constructivism, that the English School can accommodate this multi-layered approach, and therein its capacity to accommodate enduring givenness, in the fact that the English School is committed to the three traditions, including the closure of realism. 'The difference between the ontology of constructivists and the English School probably runs somewhere else: whether everything is "rules" vs. the concept of rules used in a more narrow meaning. English School writers would only talk of rules when the regulation takes the form of "international society logic," whereas the conception of the English School is that there are always three logics at play: the realist logic of the international system, the "rationalist" (Grotian) of international society, and the revolutionist world society one'. Ibid., p. 97.

[73] Andrew Linklater, *Beyond Realism and Marxism*, chapter 1 and Richard Little, 'The English School's Contribution to the study of International Relations', pp. 7-8.

[74] Steve Smith, 'Positivism and Beyond', p. 38.

[75] Accommodating the three traditions as a spectrum in this manner means that there is a need to recognize an interpretivist quality attached to that part of the realist tradition that lies beyond the sovereign state pole and that part of the revolutionist tradition that lies beyond the post-sovereignty pole since the respective parts of the realist and revolutionist traditions are neither entirely closed nor entirely open. To the extent that there is a rationalist quality to the epistemologies attending parts of realism and revolutionism, there is clearly a sense of the importance of interpretivism to the English School. This may account for the tendency of some like Epp and Dunne to associate it primarily with interpretivism. This should never obscure, however, the fact that the three traditions, as an ontological and epistemological spectrum, embraces both complete closure, and a pure form of positivism, and complete openness, and a pure post-positivism.

[76] See his foreword to *International Theory: Critical Investigations*, ed. James Der Derian, London, Macmillan, 1995.

[77] James Der Derian 'The (S)pace of International Relations: Simulation, Surveillance and Speed', p. 296.

[78] Ruggie, 'Territoriality and Beyond', p. 169.

[79] Robert Cox, 'Towards a Post-Hegemonic Conceptualization of World Order: Reflections on the relevancy of Ibn Khaldun', p. 135.

[80] Buzan and Little, 'Why International Relations has Failed as an Intellectual Project and What to do About it', pp. 36-7.

[81] Barry Buzan, *From International to World Society? English School Theory and the Social Structure of Globalisation*, p. 24.

[82] Ibid.

[83] Ibid., pp. 98-108.

[84] Ibid., p. 101.

[85] Ibid., especially chapter 4.

[86] The point could be made here that, given that the traditional Wightian approach did not define epistemological pluralism, it surely could not guarantee ontological and methodological pluralism. In response to this, however, one must understand that the Wightian approach was not *a priori* epistemologically monistic but rather it lacked epistemological self-consciousness. By embracing an epistemological monism *a priori*, Buzan takes the three traditions into new territory with potentially new implications for its aspirant ontological and methodological pluralism.

[87] Barry Buzan, *From International to World Society? English School Theory and the Social Structure of Globalisation.*, pp. 118-128.

[88] Traditionally the English School has, as Buzan observes, embraced both a normative and a structural strand (Ibid., pp. 13-15), giving Wight a rather broader approach to the traditions which means that his commitment to a methodological pluralism amounts to rather more than a commitment to a structure that clearly operates on multiple levels of analysis. 'Wight seems to hang between seeing the three traditions as "component social elements" of reality, and seeing them as "patterns of thought" about international reality. On the one hand, he sees a sovereignty/anarchy social structure, patterns of habitual intercourse (diplomacy, law, commerce) and patterns of moral solidarity. On the other, he sees modes of thought linked to Hobbes, Locke and teleological historicists such as Kant, Toynbee, Hegel, Marx and Spengler, and finds "all these three ways of thought within me" (Wight 87: 227). In the end Wight's approach through traditions puts the focus very much more on the sources of ideas in political theory, and much less on the empirical realities of the international system'. (Ibid., pp. 32-33). Buzan, however, deliberately seeks to abstract the structural from the normative in order to obtain greater clarity. 'Delineating these different approaches to the English School raises the question of how the normative and structural strands within it, and the different goals they represent, interact. As a rule, they have been blended together, a practice most clearly visible in the work of Bull and Vincent, and one that has come at a cost of a lack of clarity and precision in the analytical framework. This is not to blame the normative theorists, for without them precious little analytical development would have taken place at all. But it is to assert the need to develop the social structural strand more in its own right, and less as an annex to human rights concerns'. Ibid., p. 14.

[89] The effective redefinition of the three traditions as three levels of analysis can be seen Ibid., chapter 4.

[90] Interestingly Buzan effectively affirms the wisdom of having more than one account of the three traditions by stating very clearly that his more structural approach to the three traditions is not supposed to replace but rather to complement the traditional approach with an alternative perspective. Barry Buzan, *From International to World Society? English School Theory and the Social Structure of Globalisation*, p. 15 and p. 228.

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CHAPTER 3

THE REALIST TRADITION &

THE SOVEREIGN STATE POLE:

DEFINITIONS

The purpose of this chapter is to define sovereignty narrowly in terms of a critical appraisal of the realist tradition and therein the sovereign state pole. In reading the chapter it is important to remember that it defines a tool that, along with the other two traditions (and therein the other pole) and in deference to the methodology of the English School, will prepare the way for developing a distinctive perspective on the role of state sovereignty in the context of the contemporary systemic changes addressed by this research, European integration and globalization.

The chapter begins with a brief introductory definition of the realist tradition, paving the way for Part 1 which develops (from English School, neorealist and other sources) a realist account of sovereignty defined by reference to ontological closure. Part 2 then goes on to criticise the utility of this narrowly closed understanding of sovereignty, highlighting implicit bases of openness and thereby building up a realist understanding of sovereignty that can accommodate a measure of change. The end result will be a broad-based conservative definition of sovereignty, albeit one that is internally self-critical, explicitly allowing for an element of construction. The model of sovereignty that this chapter defends thus does not actually reside in the sovereign state pole but rather in the broader realist tradition.[1]

INTRODUCING REALISM

In answer to the question 'what is international society?' Martin Wight stated, realists claim that it is: 'Nothing. A fiction. An illusion. Non est'.[2] Perhaps the most celebrated expression of this commitment comes from Hobbes, who likens the international arena to the state of nature, which he characterizes as a domain of anarchy, the war of all against all. Whilst individuals have contracted together to form society within limited territorial areas, giving rise to sovereign states,[3] this has not happened on a global basis between the resulting sovereign states. There is no global Leviathan and thus no global society. 'Thus the international scene is properly described as an anarchy – a multiplicity of powers without a government'.[4]

According to this Hobbesian-realist account of state and society, wherein the Leviathan enforces order and civility, power is necessarily anterior to law, society and indeed morality. As Morgenthau observed; 'There is a profound and neglected truth hidden in Hobbes's extreme dictum that the state creates morality as well as law and that there is neither morality nor law outside the state ...for above the national societies there exists no international society so integrated as to be able to define for them the concrete meaning of justice or equality, as national societies do for their individual members'.[5] Thus construed, there is no effective form of morality residing simply in human conscience, in natural law or any form of international law. In their rather gloomy understanding of the human condition, realists contend that morality must be both constructed and enforced via contract if there is to be any possibility of creating any kind of 'society'. Therefore, where power has not been used to generate society - in the space between societies, the anarchical, international arena - it must be used by the

independent sovereign states to forcibly and selfishly advance their own national interests, articulating the distinctive realist *modus operandi*.[6] Thus construed realism is about sovereign states expressing their national interest through power.[7]

PART 1: SOVEREIGNTY AS ONTOLOGICAL CLOSURE

Having provided a definition of realism, the chapter now turns to consider the ontologically closed nature of realist models of sovereignty. In doing so, whilst having a particular interest in the English School account of sovereignty, and using the approach of one of their foremost scholars to provide the structure of much of Part 1, it will also seek to demonstrate the ontological closure associated with other forms of realism beyond the traditional English School, especially neorealism.

Perhaps the most prolific writer on sovereignty issues associated with the English School has been Alan James.[8] In seeking to define sovereignty James suggests that the most obvious point of departure is that sovereign states consist of three basic elements: territory, people and government but he is eventually forced to turn elsewhere in order to locate sovereignty's central characteristic, constitutional independence.[9] This chapter will examine each of these components in turn considering how they contribute to an ontologically closed model of sovereignty. It will then proceed to consider the further bases for closure manifest through conceptualizations of space about which James, and certainly the pioneers of the English School, were not particularly theoretically self-conscious. The end result will be the presentation of a model of sovereignty characterised by ontological closure. (As noted above, Part 2 will then provide a critique of the positions presented in Part

1 and so the following consideration of those positions by this chapter should not necessarily be interpreted as an endorsement of them).

i. REALISM AND TERRITORY: ONTOLOGICALLY ABSOLUTE

There is, James observes, no sovereign state without territory.[10] The territorial nature of sovereignty is widely recognized by all, from those who are its staunchest supporters to those who are its fiercest critics. Robert Jackson, who contends that sovereignty still has an important role to play, maintains that '[a] sovereign state is a territorial jurisdiction: i.e., the territorial limits within which state authority may be exercised on an exclusive basis'.[11] At the other end of the spectrum, critics Camilleri and Falk claim that the sovereign state is a 'national territorial totality ...'.[12] In order to fully appreciate the territorial ontology of the sovereign state, however, one must return to its apparent point of origin, the Reformation, and the order that it defined itself against, the medieval *Respublica Christiana*.[13]

In medieval Europe political boundaries had a certain fuzziness. Loyalty was not to a boundaried state upheld in the name of a 'the people', of which all its inhabitants were a part, but rather to regional networks of kinship and interpersonal affiliation. In this context space was organized concentrically around affiliation rather than through territorial plates coextensive with the jurisdictional reach of boundaried polities.[14] The sense of boundaries, moreover, was also crucially weakened by the fact that community identity, and its relationship to territory, was qualified by the reality of a transnational identity manifest through the Christian Church and empire. It may have included different communities but Europe crucially constituted the supranational *Respublic Christiania*, embracing a sacramental view of space and territory, which meant that all

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medieval European territories were crucially part of the same territory with a similar sacramental function, incarnating the same numinous. In an important sense, therefore, it was all of a piece.[15]

The coming of the Reformation resulted in the break-up of the *Respublica Christiana*, the development of national churches and the advent of the sovereign state which was from the beginning territorially defined.[16] The centrality of territory to the definition of the sovereign state was facilitated by two developments. First, the Reformation reduced territory to its material components by draining off any sense of sacramental numinous which meant that European territory could be broken into discreet chunks rather than being held together as a whole. (This perspective, moreover, was also greatly enhanced by developments in science that followed the Reformation. Whilst the Aristotelian cosmology of the medieval world placed the earth at the centre of the universe, the discoveries of Copernicus, Kepler and Galileo dethroned the earth, rendering it an insignificant speck in a massive universe. Any sense of specialness, attending to the earth and its crust, not jettisoned by Protestant territoriality's rejection of medieval sacramentalism, was thus finally expelled by these men of science. Once again, therefore, territoriality was increasingly reduced to its material nature). Second, the application of governmental divisions to this newly material understanding of territory meant that European territory could readily be broken up into units representing the jurisdiction of the sovereign states. Thus construed, politically territoriality was first determined by its physical givenness and then by its relationship to a state. It was broken down into the discreet chunks of boundaried *res extensa* which are so central to the definition of the modern sovereign state, endowing it with that very basic sense of being ontologically closed.[17]

Thus in terms of the definition of the ontological spectrum, whose parameters were set out in the previous chapter, the territorial perspective locates sovereignty at the place of ontological closure, the sovereign state pole. However, whilst the modern territorial aspect of sovereignty does constitute an important part of its definition, it certainly is not sufficient given that closed territorial units are not necessarily sovereign, although (with the exception of Antarctica) they will none the less inform at least part of the foundation of a sovereign state at a different territorial level. Having considered sovereignty in relationship to territory, therefore, the chapter now turns to examine the ontological closure of sovereignty via government and the social contract principle.

ii.   REALISM AND GOVERNMENT: ONTOLOGICALLY ABSOLUTE

It was in the context of having been released from the medieval model of government that modern political theory embarked on its quest for an account of political obligation and the legitimacy of the state. Whilst the likes of Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau and Hegel disagreed about a great deal, they were united by the fact that their theory of political obligation was resolutely state-based. Specifically, modern political theory sought to devise a model of political obligation and state legitimacy by deploying the notion of the social contract or some kind of constitutive act.

Realism bought into the state project, as demonstrated earlier, through the Hobbesian frame of reference which asserts an imperative to escape the anarchical implications of the state of nature through the creation of a civic group, a 'civil society' secured through the Leviathan.[18] One can see how this contributes to ontological closure from the way in which it deals with the issue at the heart of the anarchical challenge posed

by the Hobbesian state of nature - the realist belief that humankind is evil - both in terms of the manner of its development and in terms of its character. [19]

First, in terms of the manner of its development one must appreciate that in realism the move from the state of nature into a civil society is the result of a law-like imperative which means that the generation of the civic group (which in the modern/early postmodern era is the state) is a given and is as such the most basic political unit. [20] 'Realism identifies the group as the fundamental unit of political analysis. Once it was the city state, now it is the sovereign state'. [21] It does not matter who you are or where you live, everyone faces the problem of human evil and the need to create islands of civility to make life manageable and thus the state, or some form of polity, becomes a basic foundational unit of human existence. As a result of the basic and foundational role of the state in the provision of order and civility, the state is seen as 'existing prior to and as a container of society. As a consequence, society becomes a national phenomenon'. [22] To the extent that the law-like imperative for the construction of the state or the polity is basic, so too is the development of sovereignty. [23] 'For realists, the state is the main actor and sovereignty is its distinguishing trait'. [24]

Second, and more importantly, in terms of the character of the sovereign state, one must recognize that the successful generation of society through the state depends on shutting out the anarchical outside. In realist theory, therefore, the sovereign state has become completely identified with a civility and progress that was strategically secured by its ontological closure, whilst the spaces between these fixed state territorial jurisdictions became associated with anarchy. R. B. J. Walker clearly demonstrates this imperative for

ontological closure, and its implications for conceptualization of the international arena in the following statement: 'Inside particular states we have learned to aspire to what we like to think of as universal values and standards - claims about the nature of the good society, freedom, democracy, justice, and all the rest'. But the purchase of these norms 'depends on tacit recognition that these values and standards have been achieved only because we have been able to isolate particular communities from those outside'.[25] Modern politics and progress, therefore, was only possible on the basis of creating a closed, boundaried territorial polity that shut out the anarchy of the state of nature beyond.

Thus in terms of the definition of the ontological spectrum, whose parameters were set out in the previous chapter, the realist group imperative perspective on sovereignty locates sovereignty at the place of ontological closure, the sovereign state pole within the realist tradition. However, as in the case of territoriality, whilst the group imperative provides an important ontologically closed perspective on sovereignty it is not, as the next section will make plain, sufficient.

iii. REALISM AND CONSTITUTIONAL INDEPENDENCE: SOVEREIGNTY DEFINED & ONTOLOGICALLY ABSOLUTE

Having considered the way in which territory and the realist group imperative inform the ontological closure of the sovereign state, the chapter now reaches what is certainly, in James' view, the key feature of the English School approach to sovereignty which not only provides perspective on the closure of the sovereign state, but also on its definition. Whilst embracing territory and government and therein a people, James, as noted earlier, thought them less important than constitutional

independence. Considering territory, people and government he claimed that, whilst all are involved in the definition of the sovereign state, none of them is distinctive:

TERRITORY + PEOPLE + GOVERNMENT = SOVEREIGNTY?

Whilst sovereign states are territories wherein the people are subject to a common government whose jurisdiction is defined by those territorial borders, James observes that territory + people + government does not necessarily make for a sovereign state. In the case of Sri Lanka it does, but in the case of California it does not.[26] This is of course particularly interesting given the fact that the wealth of California, and thus one would assume its power, far exceeds that of Sri Lanka. Thus, whilst sovereign states have a territory, a people and a government, it is clear that they must also have something else. Given this difficulty, Alan James suggests that the best way to come to the correct definition of sovereignty is to analyse the passage of a polity from non-sovereign to sovereign status. To unpack this approach he turns to the example of the Solomon Islands, a British Protectorate from 1893 until 1978.[27]

SOVEREIGNTY AND CONSTITUTIONAL INDEPENDENCE

As a Protectorate the Solomon Islands did not enjoy independent statehood or make any pretence at being sovereign, despite having territory, people and government. Once, however, their constitutional ties to Britain were cut they became fully independent and were thus free to seek membership of the international community, becoming the 150th member of the UN, a privilege only available to sovereign states. Sovereignty, James claimed, is thus the result of legal constitutional independence. 'Sovereignty ...consists of being constitutionally apart, of not being contained, however loosely, within a wider constitutional scheme'. It is in short, a matter of

'constitutional separateness',[28] of not being legally subservient to a higher authority.[29] Reflecting back on Sri Lanka and California this certainly makes sense. Whilst Sri Lanka enjoys constitutional independence and thus sovereignty, California, subject to the federal constitution of the United States, does not.

In defining sovereignty as constitutional independence, James was of course reasserting what Hans Morgenthau had already written about sovereignty in his *Politics Among Nations*. 'Independence signifies the particular aspect of the supreme authority of the individual nation which consists in the exclusion of the authority of any other nation. The statement that the nation is the supreme authority - that is sovereign within a certain territory – logically implies that it is independent and that there is no authority above it'.[30]

In this judgement, James and Morgenthau are widely supported. '[S]overeign legislation', claims HWR Wade, 'depends for its authority on an "ultimate legal principle", i.e., a political fact for which no purely legal explanation can be given'.[31] The political fact in question, Laughland claimed, is constitutional independence, state sovereignty. 'Sovereignty, indeed, is constitutional independence'.[32]

In his conclusion to *Sovereignty at the Millennium,* meanwhile, Georg Sørensen asserts: 'the constitutive rule content of sovereignty is constitutional independence... The history of sovereignty from then [the seventeenth century] until now is a history of the victorious expansion of the principle of political organization embodied in sovereignty: constitutional independence'.[33] The implication of this is clear; if there is an imperial constitution behind a polity then that polity is not sovereign.[34]

In developing an understanding of the ontologically absolute/closed character of sovereignty as constitutional independence, it is important to define it against power which is relative (1) and in terms of the foundation of law which is absolute (2).

1) RELATIVE POWER.

The fact that sovereignty is about legal constitutional independence means that a polity actually does not need to join the United Nations or actively engage in international relations to be sovereign. To make this point James referred to another ex-colony, the island of Ellice (subsequently renamed Tuvula), which also gained its independence and thus sovereignty in 1978.[35] Whilst the Solomon Islands used their sovereignty to become part of the international community, joining the United Nations and actively pursuing a foreign policy, Tuvula declined to enter the international arena. Constituting nine islands, spread over some half a million square miles and sustaining a population of merely eight thousand, at that time it simply was not in Tuvula's interest to make active use of its sovereignty on the world stage.[36]

The issue at the heart of state sovereignty, James thus contended, 'is not what it [the sovereign state] will do but what it is eligible to do ...[and]...being sovereign, it is eligible to do much'.[37] Sovereignty is not about having a capability to do x, y and z, it is rather about being free from any legal restraint that says you cannot do x, y and z. It is fundamentally about making a polity legally at liberty to act as it sees fit.[38]

Thus, according to this view, critically, sovereignty has nothing to do with power. 'In point of status there is, in fact, now nothing to choose between Tuvula and Britain or

any other sovereign state'.[39] In other words you may be the United States of America, a weak state that has made use of its sovereign status by entering the realm of international politics (e.g. Solomon Islands), or a state that is so small that it has not even bothered to do this (e.g. Tuvula). It makes no difference; each is sovereign.

Again Morgenthau made this distinction in *Politics Among Nations.* 'The actual inequality of nations and their dependence upon each other have no relevance for the legal status called sovereignty. Panama is as sovereign a nation as the United States, although in the choice of its policies and laws it is much more limited than the United States'.[40]

F.H. Hinsley in his seminal text on the subject, *Sovereignty*, was also anxious to draw a distinction between sovereignty and power and was, in so doing, very clear that any reduction of the state's international freedom of action in no way placed sovereignty in jeopardy. It 'is wrong to conclude that because the state has experienced a decline in its international freedom of action, sovereignty is no longer compatible with the state's international position. To argue in this way is to associate the attribute of sovereignty with the possession by the state of freedom to act as it chooses instead of with the absence over and above the state of a superior authority'.[41]

Laughland made a similar point, referring to two favourite examples regularly quoted by those convinced of the practical irrelevance of sovereignty - France's loss of face in 1983 when it was forced to abandon its reflationary economic policy under pressure from the international financial markets and Britain's subservience, before the introduction of the Euro, to the Bundesbank, confirming that it had no 'monetary

sovereignty'.[42] The notion that these examples point to the death or irrelevance of sovereignty, Laughland claimed, is based upon a failure to distinguish between the polity and the government, i.e. the foundation of law, within which people may seek to pursue their objectives, and the actual power of the executive, which will almost certainly be a function of the power of the economy sustained within that polity.[43] 'Sovereignty ...is a matter of authority, not power. The confusion between these two concepts lies at the very heart of the claim that nation-states, being weak, are no longer "sovereign"'.[44]

Robert Jackson is also clear about the importance of the distinction between economic power and sovereignty, claiming that notions of economic sovereignty are unhelpful because they confuse issues of power with issues of sovereignty. In the current age loss of economic autonomy is widely experienced but this, he argues, is not the same as loss of sovereignty. Considering the case of Canada in relationship to its powerful neighbour, the United States, he maintains, 'while Canada has the right to its own currency, it has limited power or capacity to determine the value of that currency. Canada is a sovereign state but it does not possess very much economic autonomy'.[45] Sørensen, meanwhile, concurs: 'The fact small or weak states were always less powerful actors does not make Denmark or Ghana less sovereign; irrespective of their substantial weakness these countries do have sovereignty in the form of constitutional independence'.[46]

The neorealist Kenneth Waltz also makes the same point. 'To say that states are sovereign is not to say that they can do as they please, that they are free of others' influence, that they are able to get what they want'. States may be and probably are

'hardpressed all around, constrained to act in ways they would like to avoid, and able to do hardly anything just as they would like to'. But they can still remain sovereign. Sovereignty, Waltz claims, is about a state being free, i.e. constitutionally free, to decide what choices it will make in the context of these constraints.[47] In light of the actual distinction between sovereignty and power - according to the above view - it is clear why sovereignty deployed in deference to this understanding should appear to be little more than 'gibberish' to those who presume that it is a word pertaining to state power.[48]

In closing this section it is interesting to note, given the English School focus of this research, that, whilst clearly not all scholars subscribing to the distinction between sovereignty and power express it within the framework of the English School, the notion that sovereignty is defined as 'constitutional independence', and is as such clearly distinguished from power, is particularly associated with this School. This relationship is clearly expressed by Hidemi Suganami in the following. '[H]aving been brought up in the English School tradition, especially under the influence of Manning and James in this particular respect, I was of the view that there was one most basic, internationally relevant, sense of the word "sovereignty". When the word is used in this specific sense, it is interchangeable with "constitutional independence"'.[49]

2) ABSOLUTE SOVEREIGNTY

Having considered relative power, and made it plain that this does not define sovereignty; it is now possible to make contrasting observations about the ontologically absolute nature of sovereignty as constitutional independence. Alan

James defines the absoluteness of sovereignty in the following terms: 'constitutional independence is either possessed or not. The relevant entity is sovereign (and therefore 100% sovereign) or lacks sovereignty – lacks it totally'.[50] Georg Sørensen, meanwhile, echoes the constitutionally absolute status of sovereignty by drawing an analogy with other legal categories, marriage and citizenship. A person is either married or not, there is no legal status of 75% married. A person is either a citizen or not, there is no legal status of 75% a citizen. '[A] state either does have sovereignty in the sense of constitutional independence or it does not have it. There is no half way house, no legal in between'.[51] Hans Morgenthau also unpacks this theme in terms of the logical demands of sovereignty with similar ontological implication. 'We have heard it said time and again that we must "surrender part of our sovereignty" to an international organization for the sake of world peace, that we must "share" our sovereignty with such an organization, that the latter would have a certain "limited sovereignty" while we would keep the substance of it, or vice versa, that there are "quasi-sovereign" and "half sovereign" states'. Morgenthau contends that divided sovereignty, whilst enormously attractive, is conceptual nonsense. 'If sovereignty means supreme authority, it stands to reason that two or more entities - persons, groups of persons, or agencies - cannot be sovereign within the same time and space'.[52]

In conclusion, then, sovereignty, disclosed through realism's 'constitutional independence', is ontologically absolute. Not residing upon the inherently relative concept of power, which many suppose, sovereignty is manifest in constitutional independence which is either present or absent. In relating it to the spectrum whose parameters were defined in chapter 2, therefore, this legal perspective correlates to the

ontological closure of the sovereign state pole within the realist tradition. Having defined the ontologically absolute (closed) character of the realist tradition from the perspective of constitutional independence, the chapter will now pursue the ontological closure of the realist tradition through the grid provided by realist conceptions of space, 'spatialisations'.

iv. REALISM & 'SPATIALISATION': ONTOLOGICALLY ABSOLUTE

As noted earlier, Alan James - like the pioneers of the English School - has not been very theoretically self-conscious about the role of concepts of space, 'spatialisations', in the definition of sovereignty. It can be shown, however, that these do play an important role in developing the ontologically closed character of sovereignty. Specifically, one can see the spatial implications of modernity on the configuration of state sovereignty, and its consequential closed ontology, on two levels: first, through the grid of general modern social epistemological assumptions and then through a rather more clinical deployment of the modern 'spatialisation' which is implicated in the quest for social scientific explanatory capacity. The chapter will begin by examining this ontological closure in terms of realism generally before moving to consider the social scientific basis for ontological closure, focusing particularly on neorealism.

a) GENERAL CLOSURE

John Gerard Ruggie's analysis of the shift from medievalism to early modernity clearly demonstrates the general impact of the modern social episteme on politics and the state from the perspective of IR.[53] During the medieval era there was a great division between Nature and Grace with the focus being very much on Grace which,

although mediated through various sacramental channels, had the general effect of preventing the physical world from coming into focus, giving rise to a multi-perspectival apprehension of reality. The Renaissance and Reformation assertion, contrary to medievalism, that matter was both knowable and good, posited a new epistemic confidence, replacing the subjectivism of the previous era with the belief that one could objectively know the world.[54] This social epistemic revolution gave rise to the single point perspective which had significant implications on politics. 'Within the definite boundary of the new territorial state', Mumford observes, 'unified areas of administration were established ...In politics as well as in painting after the invention of the easel picture, the new life was held together in a rigid frame... the new territorial state... could be seen or at least visualised: it was a visible whole, and each country that was politically unified became, so to say, a self-contained picture. This visualisation of power became possible only when territorial continuity became an attribute of the sovereign state'.[55] The use of this lens had the effect of cutting the world into discrete politico-territorial blocks. Approached in this manner, there is an important sense in which territory became the foundation for the state, upholding government, population and society. This has resulted in international relations being reduced in complexity to the point where it is entirely logical to invoke the image of clashing tectonic plates or the realist billiard ball metaphor.[56] In this context, 'state territories have been reified as set or fixed units of sovereign space. This has served to dehistoricize and decontextualize processes of state formation and disintegration. Classical realism and idealism have both relied heavily upon this assumption. But it can be regarded as the rock bottom geographical assumption that underwrites the others'.[57]

Thus the general impact of the new epistemology clearly had the effect of configuring a new ontology characterized by closure which provides further helpful perspective on the interpretation of territorial closure considered earlier in the chapter. In so doing it demonstrates, once again, the fact that sovereignty is characterized by ontological closure and thus by the sovereign state pole of the realist tradition of the sovereignty spectrum set out in chapter 2.

b) *A PRIORI* CLOSURE

Instead of being impacted by philosophical and scientific developments simply by virtue of being part of modern culture and its new single-perspectivity, some forms of realism have deliberately sought to apply natural science methodological assumptions to the study of IR, calling into being ontological reification for the purpose of licensing a more advanced explanatory capability. The chapter will consider a seventeenth century and then a contemporary application of this endeavour.

i. THE HOBBESIAN PERSPECTIVE

Thomas Hobbes was committed to a new science based on Euclidean geometry and the notion that all phenomena could be explained as matter in motion. Specifically, this catered for the possibility of developing the autonomy of politics from religion.[58] This mechanical presupposition, with its explanatory capability, facilitated his confident, positivist epistemology, securing the absolute division between the subject and object such that the subject could not change the object by reference to its knowing of the object since the object was reified and fixed, ontologically closed. In arguing that the state should be understood by reference to such an epistemology, this form of realism attributes an essential ontology to its subject, the sovereign state *a*

priori.[59] Camilleri and Falk, as noted earlier, are in no doubt about Hobbes' legacy and its positivistic, scientific basis. 'The Hobbesian view of the state, which still colours the modern understanding of sovereignty, owes a great deal to the spatial consciousness implicit in Euclidean geometry, Galilean mechanics and Newtonian physics'.[60]

ii. NE0REALISM, SOVEREIGNTY AND ONTOLOGICAL CLOSURE[61]

Neorealism has had the effect of renewing realist ontology. In order to understand this renewal one must understand that it has been totally tied up with the aspiration to develop a rigorous social scientific approach. This chapter, therefore, approaches ontological renewal, and its implications for sovereignty, from the perspective of the development of this influential positivist, scientific frame of reference. This requires first some consideration of the underlining principles and assumptions of neorealism, paving the way more importantly for a definition of 'structure'.

Waltz was critical of reductionist approaches and thus he rejected the rooted particularity of first and second image theories. This form of IR was, he maintained, of limited value primarily providing a 'descriptive' as opposed to an 'explanatory' service. Waltz's neorealism thus embraced the systemic approach where it focused on the third image level of analysis. His aim in turning to the systems approach was to tease the subject matter out of the realms of process/subjectivity, wherein some misguided theorists suggest social practices can inform the character of international life, and raise analysis to a greater level of objectivity and success through identifying the international 'structure'.[62]

Drawing on examples of structure in other parts of social science, Waltz argued that the structure of international relations should be characterised by a profound instability born of international anarchy. By shifting the motivation from human evil, emanating from particular individuals or groups rooted in specific state contexts, to the structural instability of states, neorealism became the study of abstract, ahistorical international structure. Indeed, whilst the states are constitutive of the structure, it is the structure rather than the specificities of individual states that provide the basis upon which neorealism is able to provide explanatory capability. 'Waltz's argument is at base a determinist theory in which structure dictates policy. This takes the classical realist idea of the importance of international structure in foreign policy to a point beyond classical or neoclassical realism, which always makes provision for the politics and ethics of statecraft'.[63]

THE RESULTING SOVEREIGNTY

This Waltzian structure results in a very particular closed view of sovereignty whose separation from process renders it, like the international structure that the states define, ahistorical and timeless. Set in the context of the structure, (that which facilitates the *ceteris paribus* condition, opening the door to science) the sovereign state assumes a remarkably absolute and uniform ontology. This uniform timelessness is seen in the fact that there is no differentiation of function between states and no facility for countenancing the possibility of structural change resulting from changes within the sovereign states:

First, differentiation of function: in the neorealist frame all sovereign states do everything. They cannot work together to share the burdens of different areas of

responsibility or to extract the benefits of a division of labour. '[A]narchy', Waltz maintains, 'entails relations of coordination among a system's units, and that implies their sameness'.[64] The uniform, timeless state, moreover, expresses its sovereignty when discharging its unshared responsibilities. 'To say that a state is sovereign means that it decides for itself how it will cope with its internal and external problems'.[65] Critically for the purposes of this investigation, in the Waltzian view, the ontological closure and homogeneity of the state is a function of its autonomy and sovereignty. 'To call states "like units" is to say that each state is like all other states in being an autonomous political unit. It is another way of saying that states are sovereign'.[66] This approach, Agnew and Corbridge contends, 'leads Waltz to take the territorial character of the state to an extreme in his claim that international relations should be studied only at a systemic level. This is because it is the anarchy beyond state borders that international relations as a field takes as its subject'.[67]

Second, the possibility of structural change: the ontological closure of neorealist sovereignty is expressed in the timeless permanence of the state and the consequential sense, expressed by Wind, that 'the territorial state lives on forever'.[68] Walker similarly expresses his concern. 'The apparently abstract claim to state sovereignty, much of the recent critical literature has suggested, must be understood as a complex political practice – a practice that has been persistently reified by claims about political reality that simply affirm the eternal presence of the state in human affairs and, therefore, the inevitable absence of any need to treat questions about political identity with any seriousness at all'.[69] In similar vein, Agnew and Corbridge claim that the ontological closure of the sovereign state is profoundly implicated in Waltz's attempt to escape the specificities of history. 'To retain a parsimonious structural model of international

relations Waltz sacrifices historical validity. "The state system" thus has an existence outside of the historical contexts in which it has evolved'.[70]

In conclusion, although in some senses neorealism shifts its focus away from the sovereign state to 'international structure', the role of the sovereign state as 'structure builder' is essential and more importantly is executed through a renewal of the sovereign state's closed ontology. Indeed, to the extent that closure is central to the positivist scientific method which neorealism deploys (providing an absolute division between the subject and the object, which ensures that the knower does not change the known or vice versa, see chapter 2), its ontological closure ultimately is an *a priori*' given. Thus closure in neorealism should not be seen as a pragmatic index of the state's response to the realist group imperative (although that imperative remains and is responded to within neorealism), as seen in many classical forms of realism, but as a social scientific imperative flowing from its epistemology and allied explanatory aspiration.[71]

CONCLUSION

In drawing Part 1 and its characterization of realist sovereignty to a close, it is the contention of this chapter that modern territoriality, the realist group imperative for civility, the legal implications of constitutional separateness and the operative spatialisations within realism and neorealism, all demonstrate the basis for an ontologically closed conception of sovereignty at the sovereign state pole. First, drained of numinous and viewed in narrowly material terms as a territorial entity, the boundaried sovereign state is ontologically closed, i.e. discreet and self-contained. Second, the group imperative can only create civility through the creation of

government that shuts out anarchy into the realm of the outside, the international arena. Third, shut off from other legal foundations, the sovereign state depends on constitutional independence. Finally, configured through the single-perspectival lens associated with modernity and its consequential ontological closure, the sovereign state 'spatialisation' at the very least suggests ontological closure. More importantly, however, where the closure of the modern ontology has been depended upon in the deployment of the scientific method, e.g. neorealism, this perceived closure has become not the mere consequence of being impacted by the prevailing social episteme but the consequence of an explicit theoretical assumption embraced *a priori*. In conclusion, sovereignty appears to have a clear basis for being conceived as an ontologically closed category.

PART 2: SOVEREIGNTY & CHANGE: CONSTRUCTED & GIVEN

At the heart of the absolute, closed definition of sovereignty that has emerged in this chapter is the sense of sovereignty pertaining not to contingent processes but rather to an ontologically closed juridical-territorial unit. This does not mean that there is no capacity to engage with changes that impact sovereignty as a whole at specific moments of time, like the Solomon Islands gaining their independence in October 1978 or the reunification of Germany in October 1990. It does mean, however, that, whilst there is recognition of the reality of gradual change, there is a failure to engage with it.

One can see a good example of the conceptual problems presented by gradual change when considering Alan James' account of European integration. In James' world there seems only to be room for sovereign nation-states or sovereign supranational states.

There is no conceptual space for the 'in between'. James claims that the EU is no where near becoming a sovereign state but the only other model he appears to have is one that addresses international bodies from an essentially intergovernmental perspective. Prior to sovereign federal statehood; organizations 'do not have independent lives of their own; they do not have independent sources of finance; they do not have independent armed forces. All they have comes from or is loaned to them by states. Consequentially, organizations are unable to devour, as it were, their creators, and therefore present no threat at all to states' constitutional independence'. Essentially it therefore seems that, even when one deals with integration projects between states with growing supranational components, these are deemed to be a function of the nation-state sovereignty, as in any conventional intergovernmental arrangement, until some day presumably their extent is such that they become a single new sovereign state.[72]

Mindful of the above, the point should be made that, if one subscribes to an absolute conception of sovereignty (i.e. when an actor is either 100% sovereign or not sovereign at all), it is hardly surprising that it is not really possible to contemplate a gradual transfer of sovereignty bit by bit[73] and that one should be forced into accepting a framework that basically infers that one must move at a specific moment in time from a place where the member states are wholly sovereign (and the EU is not) to a place where the EU is wholly sovereign (and the members states are not).[74] The absolute approach to sovereignty may have worked when considering the advent of new sovereign states, released at specific moments from imperial rule but it is not applicable to regional integration, nor does it help when considering any other conceivable process of the gradual transfer of sovereignty over time.[75]

In light of the above, it is now necessary to criticise some of the implications of the sovereign state pole (Part 1), developing a defence of sovereignty that resides further out in the spectrum in the broader realist tradition (and which – as will become apparent later in the thesis – also has great claims to the rationalist tradition). Set apart from the place of absolute ontological closure, this makes for a realist account of sovereignty that can embrace a measure of openness and change. In a world in which sovereignty endures and yet has to come to terms with a constantly changing environment, developing a model of it that can deal with change constitutes a key theoretical challenge especially for the English School.[76] In the first instance the School is deeply committed to being historically rooted and to avoiding the pitfalls of scientific over-enthusiasm with all its reifications. In the second instance, the three traditions framework has been devised specifically in order to cater for a changing environment. Of all theoretical frameworks, therefore, contemporary accounts of the English School should be particularly well positioned to employ a conception of sovereignty that can deal with twenty-first century change.

STRUCTURE

This chapter will explore the difficulties associated with the closed English School approach to sovereignty in three sections. Section 1 will examine how the centrality of the division between internal and external sovereignty (constitutional independence) to the English School definition of sovereignty has been used to generate an artificially closed model of sovereignty. Section 2 will identify a number of bases of openness manifest in internal sovereignty, which are actually implicit in the definition of sovereignty given in Part 1, but obscured from view as a result of its giving priority

to external sovereignty. Finally, Section 3 will then consider how best to renew the English School realist approach to sovereignty in order to make it capable of engaging with current changes.

SECTION 1: CONSTITUTIONAL INDEPENDENCE: REVISITED

By involving territory, people and government in his definition of sovereignty, and yet distinguishing them from the central characteristic of constitutional independence, James engages with a long standing distinction in English School thought between 'internal' and 'external sovereignty' according to which the former refers to supremacy with respect to internal government (embracing the positive presences of government, territory and people) whilst the latter pertains to constitutional independence, freedom from supranational legal constraint.[77] In the history of English School thought there has been a tendency to invoke both internal and external sovereignty, observing that they are connected, but to then deal almost exclusively with external sovereignty to the extent that one loses sight of its relationship to internal sovereignty.[78] The ontologically closed character of sovereignty is the result of focusing on external sovereignty abstracted from its internal dimension.[79] This generates some real logical problems. The chapter will first consider these in general terms (I) before focusing on the central challenge of change (II):

I. SOVEREIGNTY BY INFERENCE

Addressing the central difficulty with divided sovereignty, quite apart from the problem of change, the point must be made that the assertion that constitutional independence (external sovereignty) can effectively provide the definition of sovereignty in the context of IR suggests that what is liberated will constitute a

naturally cohering unit (internally and externally). There is in this failure to address in any way the nature of that unit, an essential Newtonian assumption that it is a natural self-sustaining, self-cohering, unchanging actor that will endure.[80] Far from constituting an appropriate historically rooted approach, this definition is profoundly ahistorical. James was right to assert that territorial peopled units with forms of government do not by themselves provide a definition of sovereignty, but neither does constitutional independence, by itself, provide such a definition. In truth both constitutional independence and the positive presence of territory, people and government (internal sovereignty) are key ingredients of sovereignty. In response to James specifically, therefore, the point must be made that, whilst you cannot have sovereignty on the basis of a territory + people + government (internal sovereignty) alone, neither can you have sovereignty on the basis of constitutional independence (external sovereignty) alone. Both the positive and negative elements of sovereignty are important and require attention in any rigorous and historically informed definition of sovereignty

II. OBSCURING INSIDE-OUT CHANGE

Another perspective on the artificial nature of the closure attaching itself to sovereignty resulting from the division between internal and external sovereignty can be seen by narrowly considering its inability to engage with change. Specifically, the division effectively separates external from internal sovereignty and in doing so cuts it off from what – certainly in the current environment of economic transformation – is an important low politics/economics process arena of change. Set apart from such sources of change, which if allowed to inform external sovereignty might well result

in variable levels of constitutional independence, sovereignty is a crucially absolute condition.[81]

CONCLUSION

The ironic consequence of subscribing to the negative definition of sovereignty is the fact that one ends up with an ontologically closed account of sovereignty that is more appropriate for neorealism than historically rooted approaches such as the English School.[82] In the context of regional integration and globalization, which have involved huge changes for sovereignty emanating from the world of low politics processes, the decision to deal with sovereignty as 'external sovereignty' abstracted from 'internal sovereignty' has been a major problem for the English School. There is a desperate need for it to embrace a holistic 'negative and positive' model of sovereignty that can be subjected to changes emanating from the inside-out as well as the outside-in. This must provide a capacity to deal with the positive presences of the social contracted territorial people or quasi-state governments, initiating both domestically and internationally, if they are to properly inform any definition of sovereignty.[83]

SECTION 2: BASES FOR OPENNESS

Having considered the way in which external sovereignty can be used to infer ontological closure, it is now important to reflect on some of the bases of openness that inform sovereignty and which would be able to impact external sovereignty if a properly holistic conception of sovereignty is embraced. The chapter will focus primarily on its reconsideration of the realist group imperative which goes right to the heart of the definition of internal sovereignty.

I. THE REALIST GROUP IMPERATIVE REVISITED

The chapter will reconsider the two expressions of the realist group imperative, the social contracted polity and the quasi-state ruled by force. In so doing it will demonstrate that, although developing effective internal sovereignty is about shutting out anarchy (see Part 1), it is not about shutting out openness *per se*. Furthermore, it will also demonstrate that, whilst - in deference to Part 1 - sovereignty should not be defined simply by reference to power; neither should it be defined by relying centrally on constitutional independence apart from power processes. Both provide crucial elements of the definition of sovereignty.

i.   SOCIAL CONTRACTED POLITY

The constitutionally independent unit will probably cohere in the form of a social contracted polity. If so, power and process can be seen both in terms of its constitution (a) and in terms of the need to take action (b).

a.   CONSTITUTION

From the perspective of the social contracted polity, the characterisations of sovereignty via the realist group imperative failed to properly engage with the ontological implications of its construction. It is the suggestion of this thesis that this was in part a consequence of using the notion of a social contract whilst denying the historicity of a contract signing process which has resulted in a tendency for people to invoke it as a closed, ahistorical given. (The utility of the theory did not pertain to the historicity of a contract-signing ceremony but to the provision of an account of political obligation. Whilst there was no specific event at which a contract was

endorsed, there was/is some sort of 'contract effect' manifest through the purchase of effective political obligation, which rendered the employment of the theory appropriate). This must be combated in two ways. First, from the perspective of the broad sweep of history, there is a need to be explicit about the fact that, whilst the socio-politico-legal-cultural configuration that actually sustains the 'contract effect' may not be the result of the signing of a contract on a particular day, it is the result of many events that have manifested themselves across the socio-political history of the polity in question. Second, from the perspective of current practice, it is important to note that in recent years modern democracies have, through the provision of elections, come close to something like a regular contract signing ceremony which has helped to authenticate the political community. Facilitated in the UK by the 1867 and 1884 Reform Acts and finally sealed by the 1918 and 1929 Reform Acts, this quest to increase the franchise provided a levelling process whereby all citizens of the UK could, every four or five years, vote in a General Election and call into being a new government in their name, the name of the people. Indeed, such is the obvious connection between the advent of voting and the expression/renewal of the social contract that it gave rise to the term the 'sovereignty of the people'.[84] In the context of social contract theory one would state that this 'people' has provided sovereignty with the cultural glue that has fostered a framework wherein individuals can shape the use of their surrendered natural rights/sovereignty to influence their polity and thus participate in their state sovereignty in an ongoing meaningful way which sustains a ongoing measure of openness.[85]

b. AN ACTOR THAT ACTS

The relationship between sovereignty and process is also made plain through examination of the fact that it is not a naturally cohering, timeless unit. It needs to be able to act in order to seek to guarantee its own sustenance. At its most basic level sovereignty is about the creation of an actor that 'acts'. From a social contract 'emerges a sovereign understood as a conscious agent located at the centre of the body politic ... Explicitly or implicitly the sovereign is endowed with a distinctive, identifiable will and a capacity for rational decision-making'.[86] Thus the sovereign territorial people is not a political form that can be conceptualized apart from action. The actor forms judgements and acts. Again, this is not to say that sovereignty is not dependent on constitutional independence, in the context of the realist group imperative and modern social epistemic assumptions, nor is it to suggest that sovereignty is actually about being able to guarantee getting one's own way. The point is simply that the prospect of a sovereign polity that is so constrained that it has no power to take action or initiate in any way is as nonsensical as the idea of a sovereign state without constitutional independence. Power and process must thus clearly feature in any credible conceptualization of sovereignty.

ii.   A POLITY RULED BY FORCE

Whilst many sovereign polities constitute cohering social contracted, territorial units of some sort but nonetheless depend on power processes in order to initiate their purposes, the power dependence of other polities is heightened by the fact that power needs to be deployed constantly in order to maintain coherence because of the absence of any meaningful social contract effect. A constitutionally liberated unit that is an ex-colony may not have constituted a coherent political unit and may have only

been sustained in the context of imperial grip. On becoming constitutionally independent, therefore, it might only be held together by the force of a dictator. To the extent that this polity depends very significantly on power for its sustenance, it would be even more inappropriate to claim that its sovereignty has nothing to do with power than to make this assertion with respect to sovereignty relating to a social contracted territorial polity. Thus, whilst 'constitutional independence' is an accurate definition so far as it goes, sovereignty's relationship with power requires more attention.[87] Whilst this form of sovereignty sustains closure in the sense of constitutional independence, territory and modern 'spatialisations', the lack of a social contracted territorial people makes a polity rather less solid and consequently very much more vulnerable and existentially very much more dependent on power.

INTERNATIONAL INITIATION?

Finally, in considering the realist group imperative associated with internal sovereignty, the point should be made that this provides the basis for one of the clearest demonstrations of the problem with divided sovereignty. Specifically, the divide between negative, external sovereignty, defined as constitutional independence, and positive, internal sovereignty, defined as social contracted territorial people or a quasi-state ruled by force, is such that the positive agency sustaining the actor that acts, is identified with internal sovereignty. In reality however, the social contracted people or quasi-state ruled by force, uphold their respective executives that make decisions and initiate with respect to the low politics competencies pertaining to internal sovereignty and with respect to the high politics competencies pertaining to external sovereignty. The high politics foreign and defence policy competencies cannot be accounted for merely by negative

constitutional independence apart from the positive polity any more than the presence of certain policy competencies without constitutional independence can necessarily be interpreted as confirming the presence of sovereignty.

II. TERRITORIALITY

Turning briefly to the notion that territoriality is necessarily an ontologically closed category, the point must be made that, whilst territory is indeed fixed, territoriality, namely the cultural understanding of territory, depends very much on the operative ideational lens through which territory is apprehended. The fact that different lenses, e.g. the medieval and modern, result in different configurations clearly demonstrates that sovereign territoriality must be seen as a partially socially constructed category. Given that territoriality is not entirely given, and thus completely closed, there is a sense in which it must be able to accommodate ontological openness to at least some degree. Any rigorous model of sovereignty must take account of the constructed nature of sovereign territoriality and the attendant measure of openness.

III. 'SPATIALISATION'

Finally, the implication of modern 'spatialisation' in the quest for greater explanatory potential also runs into difficulty as a result of failing to account for a measure of openness. Specifically, Marlene Wind highlights the complete ontological closure of neorealism by noting that the interests of the actors are treated as givens, fixed and beyond question. They have no capacity for change. 'States, like rational individuals in classical economics, are assumed to have 'given' utility preferences as states regardless of other attributes they may possess, or variability they may show'.[88] Over time, however, states and their interests do change as a consequence of changing

experiences and relationships.[89] Any credible realist model of state sovereignty must embrace a measure of ontological openness in order to cater conceptually for changes in priorities and preferences.

RENEWED ENGLISH SCHOOL REALIST CONCEPTION OF SOVEREIGNTY

Having considered the need for a holistic understanding of sovereignty both from the perspective of consideration of the difficulties associated with the divide between internal and external sovereignty (Section 1) and through examination of the bases of openness (Section 2), it is now possible to consider how best to renew the realist concept of sovereignty. In moving to make this assessment, it is in no sense the purpose of this reconsideration of the key components of sovereignty, as defined by Part 1, to suggest that they actually posit a false definition. Each remains important. The point of Part 2 has simply been to make the case that an historically rooted defence of sovereignty should recognize that whilst constitutional independence, the realist group imperative, territoriality and spatialisation inject a significant sense of ontological closure into the notion of sovereignty, there are problems with the contention that sovereignty is an essentially closed category. There has thus been a need to revisit each of these characteristics not to argue that they are not important, or even that they do not contribute to the sense of ontological closure that is definitive of sovereignty but simply to highlight the difficulties of seeking to suggest that they inject into sovereignty an ontology that can be characterized by reference to complete closure. The fruit of this approach is a conservative definition of sovereignty that is entirely consistent with realism, although, as noted at the beginning of this chapter, not the complete ontological closure of the sovereign state pole.

In demonstrating the need for any compelling realist account of sovereignty to be able to engage with change this thesis does not simply present a criticism of English School expressions of sovereignty but of all accounts of sovereignty - especially neorealism - whose ontology is such that they must be located at the sovereign state pole. Given the special English School focus of this research, however, the main purpose must be to unpack the implications of this critique on English School thought. Specifically, the commitment to approach international relations in an historically rooted manner should predispose the English School to see sovereignty as a whole in which openness can be mediated from both its internal and external dimensions rather than being ignored by a closed conception of sovereignty that is actually external sovereignty abstracted from internal sovereignty.[90] It is perfectly proper to talk of sovereignty in terms of its implications for external relationships and it is perfectly proper to talk of sovereignty in relationship to domestic state authority. If one talks of them at length apart from each other, however, this suggests that these two conversations are not necessarily connected in the sense of being part of the same whole, two sides of the same 'sovereignty coin'. Although it is quite impossible to conceive of constitutionally independent, external sovereignty without internal sovereignty, some English School thinkers have allowed their attention to focus on external sovereignty to such an extent that it has both given the impression that a) one can think of it apart from internal sovereignty and that b) it has an absolute ontological standing which, ironically, parallels that of neorealism. It is only when one approaches the sovereign state holistically - engaging with the fact that change can impact either internal or external sovereignty and thereby sovereignty as a whole - that one can see processes/changes and thus account for the actual model of

sovereignty manifest in the states system. As such the dominant English School approach to sovereignty within the realist tradition should not identify with the sovereign state pole but the wider part of the realist tradition which is not entirely closed. This is particularly important if one is to usefully deploy sovereignty in the context of the profound changes of the early twenty-first century like European integration and globalization.[91]

Given the above, it is interesting to note that James – who as noted at the beginning of this chapter – has written extensively about sovereignty from within the English school tradition and in so-doing has been one of the foremost exponents of the internal – external sovereignty divide and the allied emphasis on external sovereignty, has recently reassessed his position. Ironically, however, this would seem to be more the result of a concern to maintain an ontologically absolute vision of sovereignty rather than one that can better accommodate change!

'It [sovereignty] may, and does, have different implications in different contexts, leading some to speak of internal sovereignty and external sovereignty. But that is dangerous terminology, for it can all too easily be taken to mean that sovereignty can, as it were, be split down the middle, enabling one of its halves to exist without the other'.[92]

CONCLUSION

Having provided a definition of sovereignty on the basis of ontological closure in Part 1 of this chapter, and having qualified this in Part 2 through the demonstration of the presence of contingent processes in these apparently closed ontologies, resulting at

least partially from the fact that sovereignty is no longer abstracted from its internal dimension, it is now possible to reflect in greater detail on the implications of the resulting model of sovereignty. Clearly, to the extent that sovereignty is actually constructed, it cannot be treated as ontologically entirely closed, Newtonian *res extensa*, given *a priori*. This does not mean, however, that a polity cannot have firm boundaries. Ontologically one is not confronted with the entirely open, ephemeral, inessential, depthless space associated with post-positivist epistemology, on the one hand, or the entirely closed, solid, essential, Newtonian space of positivist epistemology, on the other. In confronting this fact one must appreciate that the qualification of Part 2 is only partial for, whilst there are elements of construction in sovereignty, territory, the product of the realist group imperative, release from an imperial polity and modern social epistemic configuration, all make for a solid ontology. In this context the construction in question gives rise to solid boundaried entities that draw on givens, such as the physical givenness of the state's extension, its territory. This approach enables one to see the importance of sovereignty but in a context where one can be theoretically self-conscious of the fact that it is not ontologically closed *a priori*. It might change.

Another perspective on the ontology of the sovereign state can be obtained by noting that it is not the purpose of this thesis to conceptualize a frozen but rather a living entity. As a dynamic unit in a dynamic world, it is essential to factor process into the sovereign state as it responds to, and engages with, challenges over time. This basis of process is central to both inter-dependent internal and external dimensions of sovereignty, i.e. in the social contracted territorial people, the recognized sovereign state and in the capacity of the sovereign state to take actions to assert itself. These processes are

actually concerned with maintaining the integrity of the ontology and are articulated in its interest.

In conclusion given that, whilst territorial givenness and the realist group imperative might appear to be indicative of absolute closure, sovereign states embrace contingent processes and change and, given that the integrity of the sovereign state ontology depends on the states' capacity as an actor to engage in processes and act, it is the contention of this thesis first, that a measure of change/construction is consistent with a solid ontology and second, that understanding the openness upon which this depends is central to the provision of an effective account of sovereignty. This conceptual approach confronts one with the fact that between the clinical modern spatialisation of a clinically positivist epistemology (entirely closed, solid, essential, Newtonian and given *a priori*) and post-modern spatialisations of pos-positivist epistemology (entirely open ephemeral, inessential, depthless and hyperspatial) is another spatialisation which is perhaps more the common sense understanding of the classical realist (and indeed, as the thesis will demonstrate, rationalist) space subscribed to by the English School tradition which, denying the temptation of either boldly building a science or of seeking to release IR categories from metanarratives, presents an ontology that is neither wholly closed nor wholly open. It is from this spatialisation that this thesis seeks to develop its model of sovereignty.[93]

Having both defined the closure of the sovereign state pole (Part 1) and subjected it to criticism (Part 2), developing a qualified realism, it is now important to consider the utility of this model of sovereignty in the context of the pressures of change. The next chapter will apply the defence of sovereignty supported by this chapter in the context

of the profound changes of the current era, including the rapidly increasing number of

sovereign states and the process of European integration. It will contend that, in the

context of contemporary pressures, sovereignty is demonstrating a significant capacity

to endure and adapt.

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[1] As will become apparent later in the thesis, the model of sovereignty defended by this chapter also has some claims to the rationalist tradition.

[2] Martin Wight, 'An Anatomy of International Thought', *Review of International Studies*, 1987, 13, p. 222.

[3] Martin Wight, *International Theory: The Three Tradition*, London, Continuum, 2002, p. 31.

[4] Martin Wight, *Power Politics*, ed. Hedley Bull and Carsten Holbrand, Leicester, Leicester University Press 1978, p. 101. Later Wight makes exactly the same point: 'The fundamental cause is the absence of international government; in other words, the anarchy of sovereign states'. Ibid.

[5] Hans J. Morgenthau, *In Defence of the National Interest*, Knopf, 1951, p. 34.

[6] Ibid. As the 'expression of national interest through power', realism can trace its intellectual roots back to the days of ancient Greece and Thucydides' *History of the Peloponnesian Wars*. The advent of modern realism, however, is associated with the demise of the supranational *Respublica Christiana* and emergence of the modern sovereign state from the 17th century. (The doctrine of sovereignty is classically associated with the end of the thirty years war and the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648. In reality the development of sovereignty took place over a number of years stretching back well before 1648 with the earlier development of the Italian City States and stretching forward into the 18th century. See Stephen D. Krasner, 'Westphalia and All That', *Ideas and Foreign Policy*, ed. Goldstein and Keohane, Cornell University Press, 1993, pp. 235-264.) As such it gained expression through the belligerent Hobbesian tradition and the more tempered Grotian tradition. As part of the modern discipline of International Relations, though, which actually began after the First World War, realism only became a major IR theoretical tradition towards the end of the inter-war period (Jack Donnelly, *Realism and International Relations*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2000, pp. 26-7.)
The world had emerged from the First World War confidently asserting 'never again' and seeking to construct, through bodies such as the League of Nations and charters such as the Kellogg Briand Pact, a new world order in which conflict would be replaced by a sophisticated world society of free nations. The complete failure of the League to deliver, however, especially at the time of Italy's invasion of Abyssinia, together with the breakdown of economic co-operation in the context of rising trade barriers and movement towards rearmament, made it apparent during the late '30s, that the post war idealism that informed this agenda provided a very poor characterisation of reality. The seminal text that inaugurated the realist era was E. H. Carr's, *The Twenty Crisis 1919-1939* which, although written before the outbreak of the Second World War, was published with perfect timing such that the preface is dated in the same month as Britain's declaration of war. Realism, perhaps not surprisingly, then came to dominate International Relations through the work of Carr (E. H. Carr, *The Twenty Years' Crisis, 1919-1939: An Introduction to the Study of International Relations*, 2nd edn, New York, St Martins Press, 1946), Reinhold Niebuhr (Reinhold Neibuhr, *Moral Man and Immoral Society: A Study in Ethics and Politics*, New York, Charles Scribners, 1932. Whilst Carr's *The Twenty Years' Crisis*, is seen as the portal into the Realist era, of great interest to this thesis, given the theological component of the English School and the resurgence of the study of religion and IR considered in chapters 8 and 9, is the fact that the theologian Reinhold Neibuhr's, *Moral Man and Immoral Society*, actually predated *The Twenty Years' Crisis*.) *et al.* between the late '30s and early '60s. It then became less popular as the neoliberal approach gained currency but it was not long before realism reasserted itself in the altered form of neorealism – of which more later.

[7] The point should be made that, highlighting implicit bases for openness that facilitate the development of some minimal norms, Part 2 will necessitate the provision of some qualification not only of Part 1 but also of this introduction.

[8] Alan James, 'Sovereignty: Ground Rule or Gibberish?' *Review of International Studies*, 1984; Alan James, *Sovereignty and Statehood: The Basis of International Society*, London, Allen and Unwin, 1986 and Alan James, 'The Practice of Sovereign Statehood in Contemporary International Society', *Sovereignty at the Millennium*, ed. Robert Jackson, Oxford, Blackwell, 1999.

[9] Alan James, 'Sovereignty: Ground Rule or Gibberish?' p. 3 and Alan James, 'The Practice of Sovereign statehood in Contemporary International Society', p. 37.

[10] Ibid.

[11] Robert Jackson, 'Sovereignty in World Politics', p. 10.

[12] Such is the centrality of territory to the definition of sovereignty that it can be seen in the writing of a very wide cross section of scholarship: Robert Jackson, 'Sovereignty in World Politics', *Sovereignty at the Millennium*, ed. Robert Jackson, p. 10; Camilleri and Falk, *The End of Sovereignty: The Politics of a Shrinking and Fragmenting World*, Aldershot, Edward Elgar, p. 239; Alan James, 'Sovereignty: Ground Rule or Gibberish?' p. 3; Alan James, 'The Practice of Sovereign statehood in Contemporary International Society', p. 37; Daniel Philpott, 'Westphalia, Authority and International Society', *Sovereignty at the Millennium*, ed. Robert Jackson, p. 148; Eli Lauterpacht, 'Sovereignty – Myth or Reality', *International Affairs*, 73, 1, 1997, p. 140; Sørensen, 'Change and Continuity in a Fundamental Institution', *Sovereignty at the Millennium*, ed. Robert Jackson, p. 172; Marc Williams, 'Rethinking Sovereignty', *Globalization: Theory and Practice*, ed. Elenore Kofman and Gillian Youngs, London, Pinter, 1996, p. 112; Alexander Wendt, 'Anarchy Is What the States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics', *International Organization* 46, 2 (Spring 1992) in *International Relations Theory: Realism, Pluralism, Globalism and Beyond*, eds. Paul R. Viotti and Mark V. Kauppi, Boston, Allyn and Bacon, 1999, p. 447; Agnew and Corbridge, *Mastering Space: Hegemony, Territory and International Political Economy*, London, Routledge, 1995, chapter 4; Saskia Sassen, *Losing Control? Sovereignty in an Age of Globalization*, New York, Columbia University Press, 1996, pp. 2-3; John Gerard Ruggie, 'Territoriality and beyond: problematizing modernity in international relations', *International Organization*, 1993; Barrie Axford, *The Global System: Economics, Politics and Culture*, Cambridge, Polity Press, 1995, p. 136 and R. B. J. Walker, 'State Sovereignty and the Articulation of political Space/Time', *International Studies Quarterly*, p. 445.

[13] Daniel Philpott, *Revolutions in Sovereignty: How Ideas Shaped Modern International Relations*, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 2001, chapters 5 and 6. This is not to make the claim that the ideational powers of the Reformation alone were responsible for the advent of the modern state system, see Ibid., pp. 102-104. Also see Stephen Krasner, 'Westphalia and All That', pp. 235-264. Wight helpfully demonstrates how, in some important senses, the advent of the state system pre-dated the Reformation with the Council of Constance, see, 'The origins of our states-system: chronological limits', *Systems of States*, p. 131. He is clear, however, that the Reformation serves as the important point of culmination. The conflict between Pope and Emperor between 1076-1268 'destroyed the balance of medieval society, and led to a revolution in politics that culminated in the Reformation'. Wight, *Power Politics*, p. 25.

[14] Agnew & Corbridge, *Mastering Space*, pp. 83-84.

[15] Ibid.

[16] Daniel Philpott, *Revolutions in Sovereignty*, chapters 5 and 6.

[17] This of course is not to suggest that boundaries were set in stone in the sense that they could not be changed as a consequence of conquest. The point is, however, that this constituted a reallocation of the territorial foundation of sovereignty, and thus particular sovereignties, not the abolition of the absolute territorial foundation of sovereignty *per se*.

[18] Wight, 'An anatomy of international thought', p. 222 and Wight, *International Theory: The Three Traditions*, p. 17.

[19] The breadth of the recognition of human evil is demonstrated by the following quotations:
'Realists tend to be pessimistic about human nature, or rather, if "pessimism" suggests a regret about the badness of what is recognized to be bad, the consistent Realist has no regrets; he sees human nature as plain bad'. Martin Wight, *International Theory: The Three Traditions*, p. 25. Also see: Martin Wight, *Power Politics*, p. 104. Kenneth Thompson, meanwhile, contended that human nature is 'at its core egoistic, and thus inalterably inclined towards immorality'. Kenneth Thompson, *Moralism and Morality in Politics and Diplomacy*, Lanham MD, University Press of America, 1985, p. 17. Herbert Butterfield, moreover suggested that, in light of this, it was 'essential not to have faith in human nature. Such faith, he observed, is a recent heresy and a very disastrous one'. *Christianity and History*, London, G Bell and Sons, 1949, p. 47. In Reinhold Neibuhr's view human sinfulness was more of a problem in international relations than in domestic life. 'A perennial weakness of the moral life in individuals is simply raised to the nth degree in national life'. Neibuhr, *Moral Man and Immoral*

Society: A Study in Ethics and Politics, p. 107. Hans Morgenthau meanwhile, contended that 'the drive to dominate was common to all men'. Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations*, p. 30. 'Whatever their other disagreements', Jack Donnelly observes, 'realists are unanimous in holding that human nature contains an ineradicable core of egoistic passions; that these passions define the central problem of politics; and that statesmanship is dominated by the need to control this side of human nature'. Jack Donnelly, *Realism and International Relations*, p. 10. Tim Dunne and Brian C. Schmidt agree, 'The structural realism lineage begins with Thucydides' representation of power politics as a law of human behaviour. The drive for power and the will to dominate are held to be fundamental aspects of human nature. The behaviour of the state as a self-seeking egoist is understood to be merely a reflection of the characteristics of the people that comprise the state'. Dunne and Schmidt, 'Realism', *The Globalization of World Politics*, ed. John Baylis and Steve Smith, Oxford, Oxford University Press 2001, p. 147.

[20] This domestic perspective, the quest for domestic peace, is particularly strong in Hobbes' account of international anarchy, see the characterization given by Jackson and Sørensen, *Introduction to International Relations*, pp. 74-76.

[21] Tim Dunne and Brian C. Schmidt, 'Realism', p. 143. The basis and foundational nature of the group is seen in the assertion that in realism the group is seen as being logically prior to the individual, see Wight, *International Theory: The Three Traditions*, p. 103.

[22] Agnew and Corbridge, *Mastering Space,* p. 84.

[23] 'The question of Realism's resilience touches upon one of its central claims, namely, that it is the embodiment of laws of international politics which remain true across time (history) and space (geopolitics)'. Tim Dunne and Brian C. Schmidt, 'Realism', p. 145.

[24] Ibid., p. 150.

[25] R. B. J. Walker, 'Security, sovereignty, and the challenge of world politics', *Alternatives 15*, pp. 11-12.

[26] Daniel Philpott, 'Westphalia, Authority and International Society', p. 147; Alan James, 'Sovereignty: Ground Rule or Gibberish?' p. 3 and Alan James, 'The Practice of Sovereign statehood in Contemporary International Society', p. 38.

[27] Alan James, 'Sovereignty: Ground Rule or Gibberish?' p. 9.

[28] Ibid., p. 11. James makes the same important point more recently: 'Sovereignty in its most fundamental sense, amounts to constitutional independence'. Sovereignty 'consists of being constitutionally apart, of not being contained, however, loosely within a wider constitutional scheme'. Alan James, 'The Practice of Sovereign statehood in Contemporary International Society', p. 39.

[29] The most recent example of a state demonstrating the same principle as the Solomon Islands was seen at midnight on May 20th 2002 when East Timor became constitutionally independent from Indonesia. Subsequently obtaining a seat at the United Nations, East Timor is the world's 192nd sovereign state. The next most likely nation to gain sovereign independence, according to James Pettifer, will again result from the break-up of a former supranational state rather than decolonisation. The candidate in question is Kosovo which is seeking independence from the former republic of Yugoslavia. James Pettifer, 'Kosovo: Nation in Waiting', *The World Today*, Volume 61, Number 2, February 2005, London, Royal Institute of International Affairs, pp. 18-20.

[30] Hans Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace*, New York, Alfred A Knopf, 1948, p. 290.

[31] H. W. R. Wade, 'The Basis of Legal Sovereignty', *Cambridge Law Journal*, 1955, p. 189.

[32] John Laughland, *The Tainted Source: The Undemocratic Origins of the European Idea*, London, Warner Books, 1998, p. 169.

[33] Sørensen, 'Change and Continuity in a Fundamental Institution', p. 171.

[34] A difficulty which none of the above scholars engage with is the fact that it is possible for a state to obtain membership of the United Nations, and thus be welcomed into the community of sovereign states as a sovereign state, whilst not being entirely constitutionally independent. UN General Assembly Resolution 1541 defines 3 forms of self-government set out in Principle IV. These include 'Free Association', a status chosen by ex colonies who wish to maintain some constitutional ties with their former imperial master. At present only three states have chosen 'Free Association' the Marshall Islands, the Federal States of Micronesia and Palau. Their jurisdiction over foreign affairs, defence, telecommunications, immigration, environmental protection and currency is shared with the United States and thus they cannot be judged to be fully constitutionally independent. This is something of an anomaly. The case can be made, however, that, to the extent that the freely associating states could embrace complete independence but rather use their freedom to freely associate, there is fundamentally an effective independence that has serviced their decisions which in relation to some issues they choose to make with the United States.

[35] James, 'Sovereignty: Ground Rule or Gibberish?' p. 10.

[36] Please note that in 2000 Tuvula reassessed its position and actually did join the United Nations, see www.un.org .

[37] James, 'Sovereignty: Ground Rule or Gibberish?' p. 10.

[38] This does not mean that the polity in question will not restrain itself legally through the imposition of constitutional checks and balances on particular organs of the state. It does mean, however, that there can be no external legal check from a higher polity. A contrasting view that does associate sovereignty with power and which emerges from beyond the English School can be seen in Roy E. Jones, 'The English school of international relations: a case for closure', *Review of International Studies*, 1981, 7, pp. 5-6.

[39] James, 'Sovereignty: Ground Rule or Gibberish', p. 10.

[40] Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations*, p. 293. This was amplified from the perspective of an equal legal sovereign, capacity to act: Sovereignty, Morgenthau maintained, '...signifies that with reference to the legislative function all nations are equal, regardless of their size, population, and power. In any international conference, the vote of Panama counts as much as the vote of the United States, and the votes of both are required to make the new rules of international law binding on both: the rule of unanimity'. Ibid., p. 291.

[41] The quotation continues; 'To do this is to confuse the situation to which states may often have aspired, but have never in fact enjoyed, with the opposite condition from which the concept of sovereignty in its international version historically obtained its relevance and from which it continues to drive it - that condition in which a collection of states, all insisting on their independence, were brought to recognize that they do not exist in isolation but are forced to live with other states'. F. H. Hinsley, *Sovereignty*, New York, Basic Books Inc, 1966, p. 226.

[42] Laughland, *Tainted Source*, p. 177.

[43] Ibid., p. 177-181.

[44] Ibid., p. 171.

[45] Robert Jackson, 'Sovereignty in World Politics', p. 10.

[46] Sørensen, 'Change and Continuity in a Fundamental Institution', p. 173.

[47] K N. Waltz, *Theory of International Relations*, New York, Random House, 1979, p. 96. Others making the same point include Ian Clark who points out that sovereignty 'makes no assumption about the capacity of the "sovereign" to act in an independent or autonomous fashion'. Ian Clark, *Globalization and International Relations Theory*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1998, p. 74. Axford, meanwhile, also stresses the power/law distinction. 'It is important to note that the concept of sovereignty does not carry with it the clear expectation that sovereign actors have the capacities to carry out these functions of rule, but affirms that they are recognized as having the right so to do without undue let or hindrances from other state actors'. Axford, *The Global System*, p. 136-7.

[48] Camilleri and Falk provide an example of the view that James *et al* are anxious to dismiss. 'To the extent that the international system normally comprises a few powerful and many weaker states, there inevitably arises a hierarchy of relations that does not easily correspond to the theoretical equality of all sovereign states'. Camilleri and Falk, *The End of Sovereignty,* p. 33. Furthermore, they also state, 'If all states are deemed equal by virtue of their sovereignty, how is this theoretical equality - itself the legal expression of an abstract spatial relationship - consistent with or related to the actual geopolitical inequalities associated with colonialism,...' Ibid., p. 240.
This is a great example of the functional approach that James *et al* are anxious to dismiss. In the first instance one must point out that colonies are not independent and therefore not sovereign. The notion, therefore that the difference between a powerful and sovereign state needs in some sense to be reconciled with a colony is false. They really are quite different. In the second instance constitutionally independent weak states and constitutionally independent powerful states are equally constitutionally independent and thus equally sovereign.

[49] Hidemi Suganami, 'Sovereign, intervention and the English School', Paper for Pan European IR Conference, Kent, September 2001, p. 2. Furthermore, in the thinking of Suganami, this identity was distinctive. '[O]nce you begin to see 'sovereignty' in the English School way, it is very difficult not to see it in that way. Similarly, those who do not see 'sovereignty' in the English School way seem to find it almost impossible to see it in that way. According to them, it seems, 'sovereignty' is inseparably associated with 'the sovereign' in the despotic sense'. Ibid., p. 3. He then goes on to make the 'power contrast' by comparing this English School approach with that of others who think that '"sovereignty" is inseparably associated with "the sovereign" in the despotic sense'. Ibid.

[50] Alan James, 'The Practice of Sovereign statehood in Contemporary International Society', p. 41.

[51] Sørensen, 'Change and Continuity in a Fundamental Institution', p. 171.

[52] Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations*, pp. 303-308.

[53] John Gerard Ruggie, 'Territoriality and beyond: problematizing modernity in international relations', *International Organisation*, 1993.

[54] Oppenheimer, 'On Science and Culture', *Encounter,* October 1962 and Gunton, *The One The Three and the Many*, p.75. There were, moreover, forces at work within Catholicism itself that were moving away from a low view of matter. Many scholars would trace these developments back to Thomas Aquinas, whose contentions that, whilst man was fallen his intellect was not, opened the door to a humanism that gave matter a greater merit. This was manifest particularly clearly in art where it gave rise to a new realism and interest in nature. On a general level it provided a greater measure of objectivism, encouraging a rather more confident social episteme Francis Schaeffer, *Escape from Reason*, IVP, 1968, chapter 1.

[55] Lewis Mumford, *The Condition of Man*, London, Martin Secker and Warburg Ltd, 1944, p. 169.

[56] At this point one can clearly see once again the point of intersection between the concept of closure considered in association with the mechanical Newtonian metaphor, and the social epistemic category. Both provide means by which one can understand the essential, boundaried, closed, finished nature of the territorial modern nation-state.

[57] Agnew & Corbridge, *Mastering Space*, pp. 83-84.

[58] Iain Hampsher-Monk, *A History of Modern Political Thought: Major Political Thinkers from Hobbes to Marx*, Oxford, Blackwell, 1992, pp. 8-12. Whilst all forms of realism subscribe to what is essentially a single-perspectival, territorial, ontology, it should be understood that they do not all, by any means, share Hobbes' aspiration to treat the study of international relations as a science.

[59] In order to assess the ontological implications of this scientific aspiration on sovereignty the chapter must reconsider the understanding of space and time developed in chapter 2. Both Aquinas and Newton provide absolute conceptions of space, whose ontological closure is testified by the fact that they result in the assimilation of time by space. (John Polkinghorne, *Science and Providence*, p. 77. Gunton, *The One the Three and the Many*, p. 86.) Whilst the pre-modern and modern spatialisations are united in their common assimilation of time by space, however, their implications are different. Although the pre-modern spatialisation posited an absolute conception of space, it was located in a sacramental view of the world. Consequentially, all space was joined together by a common numinous, which meant that there was no sphere for 'different' and 'alienated' chunks of space to clash. Newtonianism, meanwhile, which informed modern realism, posited an entirely different world, with an absolute materialist conception of space, bereft of the unifying reality of a sacramental presence. In this frame, different chunks of unmediated *res extensa* were indeed free to clash, hence the poignancy in international relations of the billiard ball metaphor. It is this absolute, alienated, clashing materialist ontology that informs the ontology of state sovereignty within the realist frame of reference. Thus, regardless of whether modern sovereign state spatialisations are viewed from the perspective of simply secular space (no common sacramental numinous) or the imperative to develop an environment that can service scientific explanation, the end result is the same; the positing of an ontologically absolute model of sovereignty.
It is important to understand that, whilst Hobbes might have required an *a priori* absolute conception of space because of his scientific aspirations, unlike neorealism (see below), this was not generally true of realism. Developed in the context of modern norms and assumptions, realism traded on modern spatialisations but frequently did so without any scientific aspiration and thus without the imperative for pure *a priori* modern spatialisations that could service scientific laws. A good example of this position is seen in classical realism which occupies space within the realist tradition apart from the sovereign state pole. (Realism itself embraces something of a spectrum between those who are ontologically closed in the absolute sense of being impervious to all forms of change - the sovereign state pole - and those that can embrace some forms of change – see the broader realist tradition - whilst not sacrificing their spatial orientation (and thus givenness) to inter-subjective construction. The capacity for some ontologies within the realist tradition to embrace change at the same time that those with purer expressions of ontological closure remain fixed (i.e. those of neorealism) is explored more in chapter 4.

[60] Camilleri and Falk, *The End of Sovereignty*, p. 238.

[61] The consideration of neorealism is important partly to demonstrate that in the new approach to the three traditions spectrum posited by Linklater and Little (Richard Little, 'The English School's Contribution to the Study of International Relations', presented to BISA Annual Conference, 20-22 December 1999, University of Manchester p. 18. http://www.leeds.ac.uk/polis/englishschool/) there is scope to embrace more scientific manifestations of positivism than those normally associated with the English School. An association with neorealism, however, has been present since Bull, who, although

famously criticizing the scientific aspirations of American behaviouralism associated with works such as Kaplan's *System and Process in International Politics*? (Morton A. Kaplan, *System and Process in International Politics,* New York, John Wiley & Sons, 1957), did not have the same problems with Waltz, considering his *Theory of International Politics* to be an important book. Andrew Hurrell, 'Society and Anarchy in the 1990s', BA Robertson ed. International Society and the Development of International Relations Theory, London, Pinter, 1998, p.20. Since then there has been an increasing interest in the relationship between the English School and neorealism see for example Barry Buzan, 'From international system to international society: structural realism and regime theory meet the English School', *International Organization 47* (3), pp. 327-52.

[62] Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, p 80, 82, pp. 97-99.

[63] Robert Jackson and Georg Sørensen, *Introduction to International Relations*, p. 87.

[64] Waltz, *Theory of International Politics,* p. 93.

[65] Ibid., p. 96. Interestingly far from being determinist, this suggestion seems to introduce normative concerns to Waltz's apparently scientific, third image theory.

[66] Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, p. 95. This assertion that the sovereign state must do everything resonates very clearly with the allied notion considered in the previous section that sovereignty is absolute and cannot be split.

[67] Agnew & Corbridge, *Mastering Space*, p. 81.

[68] Marlene Wind, 'Rediscovering Institutions', p. 19.

[69] R. B. J. Walker, 'State Sovereignty and the Articulation of Political Space/Time', p. 446. The ontological closure manifest in the timelessness of the neorealist sovereign state is thrown into sharp relief by contrasting it with Wight's realist text, *Power Politics*, p. 23.

[70] Ibid., p. 82.

[71] At this point some might respond by stating that neorealism has perhaps not surprisingly been the subject of great criticism and it has no future and is thus not worthy of detailed analysis. To respond to this concern it is important to be clear that whilst neorealism has of course no shortage of critics, these have not managed to jettison neorealism, with its support for sovereignty, from a key and enduring role in international relations theory.

1] Global Flows: Some have critiqued neorealism's state centrism pointing out that states are not the only actors in the international arena and that, in the context of transnational flows, their ontological integrity is in doubt. Crucially, however, Waltz does not question the increasing significance of non-state actors and global flows. 'The importance of non-state actors and the extent of transnational activities', he observes, 'are obvious'. (Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, p. 94.)

Whilst not doubting the reality of these flows and actors, however, Waltz is clear that they do not call into question his approach to structure. Indeed, given the fact that critics who refer to the growing roles of global flows and non-state actors are at least partially concerned with economics, Waltz contends that their criticisms are especially misplaced. First, the firm is penetrated by mergers and takeovers and does not control its environment and yet this does not make the social scientific methodology unsustainable in the field of the economics and its study of the role of the firm; why then should it undermine analysis of IR and its exploration of the role of the state? Second, the firm is constantly regulated and checked by non-firm actors and yet again this does not place the social scientific methodology in jeopardy in economics and its study of the firm, again prompting the question why then should it undermine analysis of IR and its examination of the role of the state? To be sure, some states may be vulnerable and short lived but this is certainly not the case for all states. The standing of the healthy states in the international system is such that it is they that still define the international system.

'States set the scene in which they, along with non-state actors, stage their drama or carry on their humdrum affairs. Though they may choose to interfere little in the affairs of non-state actors for long periods of time, states nevertheless set the terms of the intercourse, whether by passively permitting informal rules to develop or by actively intervening to change rules that no longer suit them. When the crunch comes, states remake the rules by which other actors operate. Indeed, one may be struck by the ability of weak states to impede the operation of strong international corporations and by the attention the latter pay to the wishes of the former'. (Ibid., p. 95.) The special status of the state, Waltz continues, is also upheld by the fact that those who study transnational phenomena, 'have developed no distinct theory'. Furthermore, this is, in his judgement, 'quite proper, for a theory that denies the central role of states will be needed only if non-state actors develop to the point of rivalling or surpassing the great powers, not just a few of the minor ones. They show no sign of doing that'. (Ibid.)

2] The End of the Cold War: Neorealism was conceived in the context of the Cold War, making a great deal of the challenge of providing explanation for international developments in the context of a bipolar

world. It is all very well to treat states as closed units with endogenously disclosed fixed national interests, in the context of paradigmatic/dispensational stability, but when the world is turned upside down, there must surely be a need to cater for a transformation that can only be accounted for if one concedes a measure of openness and thus sacrifices a purist Newtonian ontology.

Wind considers this inability to deal with structural change in neorealism more broadly in the context of the new rationalist consensus between neorealism and neoliberalism and the associated triumph of regime theory. 'However, because most modern regime theory explains the set up and persistence of institutions on the basis of rational choice theory, they *a priori* exclude themselves from detecting the evolution of institutions produced through norm based state practices. ...the theories will also be unequipped to conceive of structural transformation in the international system: the territorial state will live for ever'. (Marlene Wind, 'Rediscovering Institutions', p. 18.)

Whilst critics of neorealism have certainly made much of this line of argument in a post-1989 world, however, neorealism itself endures.

Central to the reassertion of the neorealist ontology was the publication of John Mearsheimer's 'Back to the Future: Instability in Europe After the Cold War', in which he reasserted the basic neorealist ontology as a timeless ontology which is a function of the basic imperative for the creation of a polity/sovereign state. (John Mearsheimer, 'Back to the Future: Instability in Europe After the Cold War' in S. Lynn Jones ed., *The Cold War and After: Prospects for Peace*, Cambridge Mass, MIT Press, pp. 141-92.) Reflecting on the timelessness of his position Jackson and Sørensen observe that Mearsheimer believes that 'neorealism has continued relevance for explaining international relations'. It 'can be employed to predict the course of international history beyond the Cold War'. (Robert Jackson and Georg Sørensen, *Introduction to International Relations*, p. 89.)

Although Mearsheimer has concerns about social scientific prediction (p. 9), he clearly follows Waltz in asserting that 'the keys of war and peace lie more in the structure of the international system than in the nature of the individual states'. (p.12) The whole thrust of his argument is based very much on a third image, systemic analysis in the Waltzian tradition, with all of its implications for the ontology of sovereignty. Thus, whilst neorealism is the subject of much criticism, the neorealist ontology and the neorealist model of sovereignty remain alive and well in international relations theory.

In neorealism's support, it is interesting to note that during the height of the Cold War some scholars feared that its danger was precisely that it was doing away with the effective multiplicity of many sovereign states dialoguing within a global states system. In other words, the Cold War was not significant for supporting sovereign states but for effectively negating their presence. (See Herbert Butterfield, *Christianity, Diplomacy and War*, London, The Epworth Press, 1962.)

[72] Alan James, 'Sovereign Statehood in Contemporary International Society', p. 46.

[73] The problem with the 100% definition of sovereignty on the basis of constitutional independence is that constitutional independence is increasingly no more absolute than power. This is obvious in relationship to the EU but also the Andean Community and CARICOM for instance. Daniel Philpott makes the point about partial sovereignty in the following terms: 'Absoluteness is a measure of the scope of affairs over which a sovereign body governs within a particular territory. Is it supreme over all matters or merely some? ...The government of France is supreme in defence policy but not in trade, which it governs jointly with other European Union members as prescribed by EU law'. *Revolutions in Sovereignty: How Ideas Shaped Modern International Relations*, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 2001, p. 19. Indeed one does not just have to look at regional integration to see sovereign states that do not have exclusive, constitutionally separate jurisdiction over all competencies. Those sovereign states that have a Compact of Free Association with their former colonial master, the United States: the Marshal Islands, Palau and the Federal States of Micronesia, are constitutionally tied to varying degrees to the US both with respect to their internal and external sovereignty. Critically, however, whilst these constitutional ties exist, neither state has surrendered either all of its internal or all of its external sovereignty. The three states remain sovereign by upholding partial internal and partial external sovereignty. Similarly a number of former British colonies remain constitutionally tied to Britain which provides their highest court of appeal through the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council: Jamaica, Trinidad and Tobago, Mauritius, Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, St Lucia, Grenada, St Vincents and the Grendines, Dominica, Antigua and Barbuda, St Kitts and Nevis and Kribati. All of these polities, however, are nonetheless sovereign.

[74] The stark inability to deal with change is striking because it is a criticism that is usually directed at neorealists with their particular strand of positivism and associated ontological closure. On its inability to deal with change see e.g. Little, 'The English School's Contribution to the study of International Relations', p. 12.

[75] Given the comments made earlier about the divide between internal and external sovereignty

shadowing a divide between high and low politics, it is interesting to note the passage of a colony to independent statehood, not only happens at a specific moment of time, it is also a thoroughly high political event at which government representatives raise and lower flags amidst much pomp and circumstance. It is, therefore, quite unlike the process of European integration which happens in a rather more gradual, functional and piecemeal manner across many years.

In light of the difficulties with the internal-external sovereignty divide, it is interesting to reflect on some observations made by Ian Clark when reviewing Alan James' *Sovereign Statehood*. Clark observes, 'Theoretically, the matter has customarily been disposed of by positing a dualism, in terms of which sovereignty has an internal and an external aspect, resulting in supremacy within, and independence without, the state. Beyond this, presumably, the student of international relations should not decently enquire'. Ian Clark, 'Making sense of sovereignty', *Review of International Studies*, 1988, p. 303. Later Clark returns to the problems of this division specifically addressing concerns about the relationship between sovereignty as a narrowly legal concept which is, as it happens, not divorced from power. In the course of invoking the distinction between internal and external sovereignty 'James reiterates the distinction between sovereignty as legal standing as contrasted with the notion of sovereignty as physical capability: 'sovereignty is a matter of law and not of stature' (p. 40). This does not mean that physical attributes are unimportant because the argument is qualified to allow that 'sovereignty requires the consonance of legal and physical realities'. (p. 41), although, at the end of the day, the legal condition is not altered by physical realities' (p. 41). This is a less than lucid section of otherwise careful and workmanlike study'. Ibid., p. 305.

[76] Robert Jackson and Georg Sørensen, *Introduction to International Relations*, p. 267.

[77] Martin Wight, *International Theory*, pp. 2-3; Martin Wight, *Systems of States*, pp. 129-130; Hedley Bull, *The Anarchical Society*, pp. 8-9; and Hidemi Suganami, 'Sovereignty, intervention and the English School', presented to 4th Pan-European International Relations Conference, 8-10 September 2001, University of Kent at Canterbury. pp. 2-3. http://www.leeds.ac.uk/polis/englishschool/

[78] The following sets out a list of examples of the internal external divide and reflections by others on its centrality to the English School:

Historians of political thought 'have traced the development of internal sovereignty, of a supreme law-making authority in each community...'We are more concerned with the development of external sovereignty, the claim to be politically and juridically independent of any superior'. 129-30

Martin Wight, *Systems of States*, Leicester, Leicester University Press, 1977. Also see: Martin Wight, *International Theory*, pp. 2-3.

'On the one hand, states assert, in relation to [their] territory and population, what may be called internal sovereignty, which means supremacy over all other authorities within that territory and population. On the other hand, they assert what may be called external sovereignty, by which is meant not supremacy but independence of outside authorities'. Hedley Bull, *The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics*, London, Macmillan, 1977.Pp. 8-9

'States necessarily are janus-faced: they simultaneously look inward at their subjects and outward at other states. Although each facet can of course be distinguished analytically and theorised separately, *neither is ontologically independent of the other*'.

Robert Jackson, Martin Wight, International Theory and the Good Life, *Millennium*, 19, 1990, p. 261.

'Theoretically, the matter has customarily been disposed of by positing a dualism, in terms of which sovereignty has an internal and an external aspect, resulting in supremacy within, and independence without, the state. Beyond this, presumably, the student of international relations should not decently enquire'.

Ian Clark, 'Making sense of sovereignty', *Review of International Studies*, 1988, p. 303.

'But having been brought up in the English school tradition, especially under the influence of Manning and James in this particular respect, I was of the view that there was one most basic, internationally relevant, sense of the word "sovereignty". When the word is used in this specific sense, it is interchangeable with "constitutional independence"; sovereign states are thus constitutionally independent political communities'. Ibid., p. 2.

Hence their talk of sovereignty in its internationally relevant senses as opposed to domestically relevant senses; or external sovereignty as opposed to internal sovereignty. Of the internationally relevant senses, the most basic is said to be the sovereign state's institutional standing as an entity which is constitutionally independent. Ibid., p 2-3.

Suganami, Hidemi, 'Sovereignty, intervention and the English School', presented to 4th Pan-European International Relations Conference, 8-10 September 2001, University of Kent at Canterbury. http://www.leeds.ac.uk/polis/englishschool/

[79] For more information about the division between internal and external sovereignty in the English School and its impact on the School's capability to conceptualize change please see Appendix 1.

[80] The legal thesis that sees sovereignty as an enabling precondition rather than a power 'seems to imply an "essentialist" concept of sovereignty, immune to historical change: the attributes of sovereignty exist in perpetuity and produce a single form of state'. Ian Clark, *Globalization and International Relations Theory*, p. 71.

[81] One of the best examples of fractured sovereignty is manifest in the work of Stephen D. Krasner, which, whilst not traditionally located in the English School, has in recent years become increasingly closely associated with it (See especially *Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy*, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1999 chapter 2.) Krasner claims that there are four views of sovereignty: 'Interdependence sovereignty', 'Domestic sovereignty', 'Vattelian sovereignty' and 'International legal sovereignty' see: Ibid., pp. 9-25 and Stephen D Krasner, 'Rethinking the sovereign state model', *Empires Systems and States: Great Transformations in International Politics*, eds. Michael Cox, Tim Dunne and Ken Booth, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2001, pp 17- 42.

Interdependence sovereignty pertains to the ability of the state to control movement of money and ideas across its borders. Domestic sovereignty refers to the authority structures in states that sustain behaviour regulation. This depends on a) acceptance of authority and b) the level of control the state can actually exercise. Effective states have strong domestic sovereignty, whilst failed states have none. Vattelian sovereignty, meanwhile, refers to the right of non-intervention in the domestic affairs of a polity. Finally, international legal sovereignty pertains to the equality of all sovereign states regardless of their size and power, on the basis of their recognition and consequent membership of the international community. Crucially these different perspectives are potentially independent. 'The rules institutions and practices that are associated with these four meanings of sovereignty are *neither logically nor empirically linked in some organic whole*'. Ibid., p. 21.

Whilst it is important to break aspects of sovereignty down into bit sized chunks, whose fate one can readily follow, Krasner's approach has the effect of abstracting features away from the sovereign state. These features do not exist apart from state sovereignty. To really understand sovereignty, one must understand the phenomenon with respect to which the above provides different perspectives. We are not confronted by four autonomous characteristics. They are all related to the same reality. Thus contrary to Krasner, it is indeed the contention of this thesis that the four sovereignties that he describes are '*linked to some organic whole*' and that failure to recognize this will lead to distorted understanding of sovereignty and thus the international arena, e.g. the 'constitutional independence' definition produces an artificially closed models of sovereignty that cannot deal with change.

[82] The irony of this, given the rooted and historical identity of the English School is clearly demonstrated in the following: 'Unlike neorealism, which largely confines itself to the international system pillar, takes an essentialist view of sovereignty and makes system structure dominant over units, English School theory is much more inside-out, than outside-in. International society is constructed by the units, and particularly by the dominant units, in the system, and consequently reflects their domestic character (Hollis and Smith, 1991: 95) Buzan, *From International to World Society: English School Theory and Social Structure of Globalisation*, p. 95.

[83] Furthermore, it is important to appreciate that there is a sense in which even if one does consider external sovereignty alone, properly apprehended this involves a measure of construction. The constructed nature of sovereignty is also seen very clearly from the 'outside in' by reference to the doctrine of 'recognition'. Recognition does not merely have the negative effect of pledging non-intervention; it also has the positive effect of constructing a particular aspect of state sovereignty. In his work *The Nature of International Society*, C. A. W. Manning expressed the relationship between recognition and the acquisition of sovereignty by developing an analogy between the international community and the idea of a club for Kings. States are like Kings who, prior to their recognition, are seeking membership of the international community, their club. C. A. W. Manning, *The Nature of International Society*, London, G Bell and Sons Ltd, 1962, pp. 101-3. Robert Jackson makes an identical point. 'Having sovereignty amounts to membership of an exclusive club', 'Sovereignty in World Politics' p. 27. On the importance of 'recognition' generally see Wight, *System of States*, p. 23. On gaining that membership, they obtain sovereignty. When seen in this light one obtains appreciation of the fact that, in an important sense, sovereignty is in part a constructed social status, an international personality (C. A. W. Manning, *The Nature of International Society*, pp. 101-3 and Wight, *System of States*, p. 23). State sovereignty is thus, Clarke observes, 'partially created by an international system of social recognition, of which they [sovereign states] are an integral part'. Clark, *Globalization and International Relations Theory*, p. 73. Thus recognition is not just negatively the guarantee of

constitutional independence, it is also positively the impartation of sovereignty and identity through the social process of constructing international personality.

[84] James Mayall, 'Sovereignty, Nationalism and Self-Determination',

[85] Anthony D. Smith, *National Identity*, London, Penguin, 1991, p. 15. & 44; Anthony D. Smith, *Nations and Nationalism in a Global Era*, Cambridge, Polity Press, 1995. p. 36, 113 & 154 and Maurice Keens-Soper, 'The Liberal State and Nationalism in Post-War Europe', *The History of European Ideas*, 1989, vol. 10, No 6, pp. 689-703. This can also be seen perhaps more fundamentally in the use of voting in the form of plebiscites to determine the boundaries of polities. See: Wight, *System of States*, pp. 165-8.

Turning back from engaging narrowly with change in order to address the importance of the positive content of sovereignty generally, the above provides the opportunity for one to see the basis for the association between the felt presence of a social contracted territorial people and the sovereign nation-state. (Please note that the importance of significant minorities and their implication for the notion of the social contracted territorial people will be considered later in the post-sovereignty pole (chapter 6) of this thesis). Specifically, Ulf Hedetoft recognizes the centrality of identity to sovereignty in the following: 'in the popular mind, sovereignty is an unquestioned axiom, belonging equally to the world of politics and to the world of culture and identity. In fact sovereignty is the central building block in the wall of national identity. It links people and the state within a well defined authority space, where people's consent to be ruled is conditioned by the fact that they feel the rule and the rulers to be their own, and hence refuse to recognize any important distinction between sovereignty as an attribute of the state and as their property'. (Ulf Hedetoft, 'The State of Sovereignty in Europe', *National Cultures and European Integration: Exploratory Essays on Cultural Diversity and Common Policies*, ed. Staffan Zetterholm, Oxford, Berg, 1994. p.17).

[86] Camilleri and Falk, *The End of Sovereignty*, p. 238.

[87] It is perhaps important at this point to make the qualifying remark that no one expects any sovereign state to survive without power in the form of police and military. The point here, however, is to highlight a qualitatively more basic power dependence that is a function of marked ontological flux and uncertainty. This state of affairs is often seen in what Robert Jackson has described as Quasi States, see Jackson, *Quasi States, International Relations and the Third World*, pp. 148-151.

[88] Wind, 'Rediscovering Institutions', p. 29. See further exploration of the givenness of preferences in Judith Goldstein and Robert O. Keohane, 'Ideas and foreign Policy: An Analytical Framework', *Ideas and Foreign policy: Beliefs, Institutions and Political Change*, New York, Cornell University Press, 1993, p. 4.

[89] Wind, 'Rediscovering Institutions', p. 29 and Ole Wæver, 'Four Meanings of International Society: a Transatlantic Dialogue', *International Society and the Development of International Relations*, ed. B.A. Roberson, London, Continuum, 2002, p. 93.

[90] C. A. W. Manning, *The Nature of International Society*, p. 102; Bull, *The Anarchical Society*, p. 8 and Alan James, 'Sovereignty: Ground rule or Gibberish'.

[91] The reasons for the English School division between internal and external sovereignty and the rationale for developing a holistic approach are defined in more detail by Appendix 1.

[92] Alan James, 'Sovereign, Statehood in Contemporary International Society' p. 42.

[93] The chapter will return to this particular realist model of sovereignty in chapter 8.

CHAPTER 4

THE REALIST TRADITION,

THE SOVEREIGN STATE POLE,

AND CONCEPTUALIZING CHANGE

Having provided a definition of sovereignty as a result of critical engagement with the realist tradition, it is the purpose of this chapter to ask how this tradition can be used to effectively come to terms with the implications of systemic change (globalization and regional [European] integration) which have prompted talk of the 'end of sovereignty'.[1] The chapter is divided into two parts each of which identifies a way in which realism can be used to rise to this transformational challenge. Part 1 will briefly examine the endurance of sovereignty manifest in its increasing popularity as the number of sovereign states increases sharply, noting the ongoing utility of the entire realist tradition as (as defined by Parts 1 and 2 of chapter 3) a means of coming to terms with this development. Part 2 will then argue at greater length that the endurance of sovereignty can also be seen in its flexibility and readiness to change, as manifest in the process of European integration. In examining this development the chapter will argue that, unlike the entirely closed model of sovereignty, defined by the sovereign state pole of the realist tradition (Part 1 of chapter 3), the wider realist tradition (Part 2 of chapter 3) does have the capacity to engage with the conceptual challenges presented by European integration. Thus, in examining the contemporary utility of sovereignty through the realist tradition - including the lens of the sovereign

state pole and the lens of the broader realist tradition - the chapter will, in line with the contentions of chapter 3, particularly stress the significance of the latter.

PART 1: THE MULTIPLICATION & SOLIDIFICATION OF SOVEREIGNTIES

'Independence! As a people, as a territory, as a nation! One body, one mind one wish!'

Xanana Gusmao,

President of East Timor, May 20th 2002

The day East Timor became (at the time of writing) the world's newest (192nd) sovereign state.

In turning to examine sovereignty in the general context of globalization, in terms that are consistent with English School realism, one is immediately struck by the fact that, far from vanishing, the developments of the last fifty years have witnessed a huge increase in the number of sovereign states, from 75 in 1945 to 190 in 1999[2] and 192 in 2002. Sovereignty is, as Robert Jackson notes, something that everybody wants. Far from bringing about the end of sovereignty, Clark argues, '[t]hose very twentieth century international organizations designed to herald a reformed international order themselves became agents for the universalisation of sovereignty, being unrelentingly committed to its observance and to its imposition as the essential test for membership'.[3]

In the context of this multiplication of sovereignties, moreover, sovereignty has also become a more stable and certain feature of international relations in the sense that it has been rendered more ontologically absolute on account of a particular approach to territory.[4] After the Second World War boundaries became set in stone in a way that had not really been the case previously. 'Existing borders became sacrosanct and lawful border change correspondingly difficult. The right to territorial conquest was extinguished in the twentieth century'.[5]

The broad basis of acceptance for this absolutisation of sovereignty can be seen clearly across a raft of international agreements that have been developed over the past forty plus years. The 1960 United Nations Declaration on the Granting Independence to Colonial Territories and Countries, for instance, stated 'any attempt aimed at the partial or total disruption of the national unity or territorial integrity of a country is incompatible with the purposes and principles of a the Charter of the United Nations'. Three years later the new Organization for African Unity made a point of reiterating the same principle.[6] The Helsinki Final Act of 1975 also stated that 'frontiers can [only] be changed, in accordance with international law, by peaceful means and by agreement'. The 1990 Charter of Paris for a New Europe reiterated the same provision, which was a key reference point in the Dayton Agreement signed by Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Serbia. This is not to say that boundaries have not changed. Germany has been re-integrated and Czechoslovakia has split, but in neither case has this been enforced against the will of the people.[7]

'We are living', Jackson observes, 'at a time when existing state territorial jurisdictions are vested with exceptional value. The principle involved is that of *uti possidetis juris,*

according to which existing ...(fixed/closed)... boundaries are the pre-emptive basis for determining territorial jurisdictions in the absence of mutual agreement to do otherwise'.[8] In light of this he later states: 'In international politics during the twentieth century the juridical-territorial clearly and decisively trumped the socio-national'.[9] These are developments with which the entire realist tradition can readily engage.

The coexistence of the spatio-temporal revolution that is globalization, on the one hand, and the multiplication of ontologically closed sovereign states, on the other, is at first glance curious. If the impact of change introduced through globalization appears to call into being sovereignty, then surely the ontological closure of sovereignty must be impacted with the ontological openness of globalization which must in some senses undermine it? In coming to terms with this question, however, one must call to mind, first, the central distinction made in chapter 3 between internal (positive) and external (negative) sovereignty and, second, the fact that the means by which one measures the multiplication of sovereignty in the context of decolonisation, constitutional independence, is negative and thus only relates to one aspect of sovereignty. Surveyed from the perspective of the negative definition of sovereignty, globalization does not appear to be related to the demise of sovereignty but rather to its flourishing. Sovereign polities, however, do not just exist from the 'outside-in' but also from the 'inside-out', and consequently it is only possible to assess the true impact of systemic change on them by examining them both positively, from the perspective of internal sovereignty, as well as negatively, from the perspective of external sovereignty. The next section examines sovereignty in the context of European integration from *both* its positive and negative perspectives. (Chapters 5 and 6 will then examine this challenge from the wider perspective of globalization).

PART 2: THE EXTENSION OF SOVEREIGNTY

In moving to consider a realist approach to sovereignty in the context of regional integration, this chapter now engages with an example of sovereignty and systemic change that requires a rather more nuanced approach. However, before picking up concerns about the problems of having a narrowly negative account of sovereignty, it is important to make two introductory comments about the English School and European integration.

First, as Thomas Diez and Richard Whitman observe, 'The English School of international relations has rarely been used to analyse European integration',[10] citing the publication of Hedley Bull's 'Civilian Power Europe: A Contradiction in Terms?' in 1982 as a basic cause.[11] This research would endorse this observation, pointing to other 'reasons for' and 'expressions of' this failure to engage. Specifically, Wight's 'Why Is There No International Theory' comments about regional integration[12] and James' (see the previous chapter) failure to successfully engage with the gradual nature of the process of integration, positing the evolutionary relocation of sovereignty.[13]

Second, on those more recent occasions when English School scholars have turned their attention to European integration in order to seriously engage with the transformational process of integration, their approach has either tended to ignore integration as an example of sovereignty transformation or to treat it as an example of transformation from the perspective of what, on the epistemologically plural three traditions spectrum, is classed as revolutionism.[14] This chapter seeks to address this

shortfall by considering sovereignty holistically (positively and negatively) in the context of European integration from what on the epistemologically plural three traditions spectrum is classed as realism. In so doing the chapter draws on the primarily historical work of Murray Forsyth[15] (who was actually much influenced by the English School[16]) which, whilst not applied in great detail to the European Union, provides a rich resource from which to reflect on the process of European integration.[17]

THE CASE FOR THE EXTENSION OF SOVEREIGNTY

Having made the two introductory points above, the chapter can embark on its consideration of the extension of sovereignty, addressing Part 1's concerns about adopting a narrowly negative approach to sovereignty. Specifically, the point must be made that, whilst looking at sovereignty in the context of systemic changes from the narrowly negative perspective can cause one to conclude that systemic changes do not threaten the integrity of sovereignty, one is arguably given a distorted and unhelpful picture. If power flows mean that the ability of sovereignty to sustain an effective constitutional framework that can call things to account is jeopardised by the development of an economic centre of gravity beyond the nation-state, this must surely dent the legal reach of the sovereign state even though it is ongoing? European integration, however, provides grounds for suggesting that sovereignty may be surviving, and not merely on the basis of a simplistic invocation of the imperviousness of its legal character to changes in power flows. Specifically the case can be made that sovereignty is also enduring because polities are deliberately reconstituting it in deference to changes in the centre of economic gravity. Indeed, when one reflects on this development in the context of the broader sweep of history,

considering functionalist conceptions of the development of national sovereignty, it is possible to imagine that sovereignty will not be dented in the long run because it will simply expand to obtain a supranational reach in deference to transnational economic developments.[18] In order to fully appreciate this logic, however, one must locate sovereignty in the context of a brief overview of its historical evolution up to, and including, the process of European integration and the formation of a supranational sovereignty. The chapter includes this overview not for the purpose of making a contribution to understanding the development of the modern state but in order to show how the current European project might be seen as the expression of the reconstitution of the polity in deference to latest developments in its changing economic parameters.

TOWARDS MODERN SOVEREIGNTY

The development of the modern sovereign state must be traced from the demise of the feudal polity. From a functional economic perspective, specifically, this medieval system of government began to lose its grip on the people in the face of an embryonic capitalism as aspiring entrepreneurs diversified and generated profits which gave them an important measure of independence from their feudal overlords.[19] As economic exchange, moreover, became less based on the land and an urban merchant class emerged, the old, agrarian medieval system became increasingly insecure. The needs of this environment, seen in the wider context of the erosion, and then demise, of the *Respublica Christiana,* began to propel the decentralised feudal state towards the early modern, centralised absolutist state. Specifically, this developed as a result of feudal lords endowing the monarch with greater powers in the hope that he would grant them greater support in their now vulnerable relationship with their villagers.[20]

It was in this context of absolutism that the concept of sovereignty first made an impression through the writings of by Jean Bodin and Thomas Hobbes.[21]

A] MERCANTILISM AND STATE SOVEREIGNTY

The absolutist state formation was allied to 'mercantilism', whose innovative quest for the maximisation of economic growth was, of course, from today's perspective, curiously enmeshed in military objectives.[22] Of specific interest to this chapter as it prepares to consider current developments in European integration, the crucial contribution of mercantilism to the advent of the modern state and its sovereign self-understanding came through its development of what Freidrich List described as 'economic nationality'.[23] During the feudal age the decentralisation of political power was reflected through the presence of many internal tariff barriers. Trade from one part of a nation to another thus paralleled the modern experience of trade between nations. Far from having a single market between different nation-states, as one now sees in the European Union, there was not even a single market within nations. When mercantilism was adopted in the context of the moves to increase the monarch's power, however, the single market project became a top priority.[24] Requiring that local economic regulation was replaced by national economic regulation, this development first eroded competing sub-state bases of authority and second, by dint of this process, contributed to calling into being the significant central state apparatus of the modern, absolutist state.

B] MODERN LIBERAL CAPITALISM AND STATE SOVEREIGNTY

Mercantilism was followed by the liberal capitalist approach to wealth creation which triumphed during the 19th century. Liberal capitalism differed significantly from the

mercantilist era because it suggested that the most effective form of wealth generation depended not on state control but on the free market.[25] As capitalism developed rapidly in the context of this new laissez faire philosophy, the reality of the global market place became increasingly significant, expanding beyond the territorial boundaries of the state (which of course in some senses it always had for so long as nations traded). This did not take place, however, in a way that undermined sovereignty. In the first instance sovereign states remained important sources of government and regulation. In the second, at that time the extension of the market became a means of expanding the prestige of national sovereignty as sovereign states gained extensive empires across the globe. It was in this context, moreover, that sovereignty shifted from the person of the monarch to the state. Indeed as an era in which increasing numbers of states embraced constitutional democracy, this was a time when states saw fit to create modern 'nations' in whose name - 'the sovereignty of the people' - sovereignty could be sustained. It was thus a time when, far from disappearing, sovereignty was gaining a newly important role in the operation of modern politics.[26]

C] GLOBALIZATION AND SOVEREIGNTY

In moving to consider late twentieth/early twenty-first century economic globalization, it is important to be mindful of the preceding laissez faire era and not to fall into the trap of thinking that the global market is new. What is new is the demise of the territorial colonial option, the consequent explosion in statehood since 1945 and the technologically increased intensity and extensity of flows. In this context, rather than seeking to extend one's territorial reach by taking control of another part of the world, the response of some European states has been to *freely create* a new and

territorially extended form of polity *between themselves* in which List's concept of economic nationality finds near continental expression.[27]

Having considered sovereignty developments from the perspective of economic imperatives, it is important to conclude this brief section by examining these developments from the perspective of the relevant political imperative. Specifically, one must recall the basic ground rule for the centrality of the sovereign state to the realist frame of reference, namely the need for the formation of islands of civility through the realist group imperative. 'Realism identifies the group as the fundamental unit of political analysis. Once it was the city state, now it is the sovereign state',[28] and, in light of the above, we might add that soon it will be the sovereign supranational state. Thus, whilst the principle of the group endures and is indeed even treated as law like,[29] the actual boundaries of the group change in response to the basic socio-economic imperatives of the age.

In light of enduring realist principles and the changing economic centre of gravity, it would seem possible that any contemporary curtailment of the sovereign state's capacity to subject economic and other processes to its accountability is just a function of a transitory stage that parallels the creation of the national single market and modern sovereign nation-state. Approaching this contention sympathetically, one could argue that the above perspective is less than clear today simply because we are in the midst of the revolution, in the midst of the transition from the nation-state to the supranational state. Once the change is over, however, it will be plain that the essential parameters of sovereignty remain the same. We will just be confronted by a sovereignty writ large.

SOVEREIGNTY AND EUROPEAN INTEGRATION

Working on the basis that a major extension of sovereignty is in progress, the current environment does not threaten sovereignty *per se* but rather its current boundaries. Central to the defence of sovereignty from a realist perspective, therefore, must be the development of the conceptualization of sovereignty in the process of extension. How should one respond rigorously to the challenge of defining sovereignty in the context of that transition?

THE THREE TRADITIONS AND THE CONFEDERAL SPECTRUM

When one considers sovereignty in terms of rationalism or revolutionism from the perspective of the Linklater – Little spectrum - which as chapter 2 explained is the basic interpretation of the three traditions embraced by this spectrum - it is possible to detect sovereignty transformation because these two traditions express movement away from the ontological closure of realist sovereignty. If, however, one wishes to consider change that does not do away with the ontological closure of sovereignty but rather the relocation of its boundaries, whilst it is possible to locate the place of transformation on the Linklater – Little spectrum, it is difficult to see the actual process of that transformation. (Similarly if one wishes to engage with 'change by extension' rather than 'erosion', as one may, in the case of rationalism - for reasons that will become apparent - see chapter 7, it is again difficult to see the actual process of transformation from the perspective of the Linklater – Little interpretation). Having located its investigation of European integration within the realist tradition on the basic Linklater – Little model of the three traditions, therefore, this chapter now turns to the alternative, complementary Wightian interpretation of the three traditions that

can accommodate changes from the status quo on the basis of boundary changes (see Figure 1 chapter 2).[30] Specifically the Wightian spectrum will be unpacked through reference to Forsyth's confederal spectrum. In approaching the confederal spectrum this chapter must consider two tools for conceptualizing sovereignty in transition, the intra/inter-relational tool and the political existence tool. The chapter will then move on to apply this framework to the European Union, making the case that sovereignty is not just surviving in the context of transnational flows, because of an existential imperviousness to power flows, resulting from its juridical-territorial character, but is actually re-constituting and reasserting itself in the midst of those flows.

1) SOVEREIGNTY IN TRANSITION: INTER & INTRA-RELATIONSHIPS

The legal term for relations between two sovereign states is 'federative', which means that they proceed between two equals from the primary act of recognition. They are called inter-relationships. The equality manifest in such relations means that they can have no legal element of compulsion and are based instead upon voluntary co-operation.[31] The legal term for relations within sovereign states, meanwhile, is 'legislative', which means that they are hierarchical, pertaining between a superior and an inferior. In order to understand these fully one must recall the social contract[32] myth wherein self-determining/obligating sovereign individuals in the 'State of Nature' agreed to cede their sovereignty to a ruler in return for his upholding a framework of law within which they could then enjoy civil freedoms, buttressed by civil rights, in the place of their erstwhile anarchical freedom, buttressed by natural rights. Instead of being entirely sovereign, free agents, the people were now subject to a sovereignty and thus hierarchical relationships. These are called intra-relationships.[33] Thus it is clear that wherever there is an inter-relationship, one is

dealing with relating sovereignties, whilst wherever there is an intra-relationship, one is dealing with a single/part of a single sovereignty. The identification of inter and intra-relations can thus be used as a means for assessing the sovereignty structure of any political configuration.

Having developed a clear conception of intra and inter-relationships, recognising their importance in the appraisal of the true locus of sovereignty, it is now possible to subject confederation to rigorous examination in order to establish what exactly is being constituted by it. The chapter will rise to this challenge by deploying the 'inter' and 'intra' tools self-consciously in the context of the confederal spectrum.

- CONCEPTUALIZING TRANSITION: INTRA-TER-RELATIONAL TOOLS AND THE CONFEDERAL SPECTRUM

Represented diagrammatically by Figure 2, the spectrum traces the development of integration between the two poles. Located on the left hand side is the intergovernmental pole, whilst the federal pole is on the right. At the intergovernmental pole are six cubes joined together. Each cube represents a sovereign state. They are joined because they are part of a six member intergovernmental organisation. The legal status of the relationships within each of these states is one hundred per cent intra, whilst the relationships between those states - exercised in, among other things, the business of the intergovernmental organisation - are one hundred percent inter. At the federal state pole, meanwhile, all of the relations pertaining between the six states are intra. Between these two poles exists the confederal spectrum which encompasses the whole gambit of conceptual space demanded by the process of integration.

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FIGURE 2

THE CONFEDERAL
SPECTRUM

INTERGOVERNMENTAL POLE   **FEDERAL STATE POLE**

LOW POLITICS
INTEGRATION

BRINK

HIGH POLITICS
INTEGRATION

REALISM	RATIONALISM	REVOLUTIONISM

The six states at the intergovernmental pole will move into the spectrum when, and only when, they integrate a policy competence. Legally this involves their transforming, through a treaty, some of the previously monopolising inter-relationships between themselves into intra-relationships. This results in the constitution of a new embryonic supranational sovereignty which forms the legal foundation for the newly integrated policy competence. Thus, prior to integration (Wightian realism) the six states have six sovereignties between them. After embarking upon integration, however, they have seven (Wightian rationalism).

In the event that these states should choose to continue to integrate themselves, thus setting more and more policy competencies upon the supranational foundation (Wightian revolutionism),[34] they will move across the spectrum, enlarging the jurisdiction of the supranational sovereignty through the continued transformation of more and more inter-relationships into intra-relationships. Since the policies integrated are not new but are in fact taken from the jurisdiction of the member nation-states, integration necessarily involves the erosion of national jurisdiction over policy competencies until, at the right hand side of the spectrum, the confederation reaches the point which Forsyth calls 'the brink'.[35] At this juncture there is so little policy sustained by the nation-state sovereignties that the nation-states become unsustainable in their own respective rights, and all remaining inter-relationships are transformed into intra-relationships, thereby moving the enterprise off the spectrum and into the domain of the federal state pole. Thus, what began as an intergovernmental organisation involving six states - and therefore six sovereignties -

at the intergovernmental pole, became seven sovereignties, as the six states embarked upon integration, and then finally just one sovereignty once integration was complete.

DEFINITION IN TRANSITION

The spectrum is called the confederal spectrum because it is via the concept of confederalism that one can conceptualize the flux of transition when neither the nation-state nor the supranation is fully sovereign in the conventional sense (i.e. commanding full sovereign jurisdiction over all competencies within their respective territorial remits). Confederalism is found in the simultaneous coexistence of intergovernmentalism and supranationalism in any proportion within the relationships between states. As soon as this co-existence is removed from the political form in question, with the victory of either supranationalism or intergovernmentalism, that body ceases to be a confederation and becomes either a sovereign federal state or simply a collection of sovereign nation-states. Thus, when apprehended within the confederal spectrum, one can see that the implications of integration involve contradictory tendencies but that these contradictions are not the sort that make sovereignty irrelevant. Armed with the confederal spectrum and a clear understanding of the place of inter and intra-relationships, one can obtain an orderly conceptualization of the transitory political formations on the spectrum, tracing the shifting centre of sovereign gravity - which was overlooked by the narrowly closed conceptualizations of sovereignty considered in detail by Part 1 of chapter 3 and subsequently briefly addressed by Part 1 of this chapter - as the union moves from one pole to the other.[36]

At this point it is important to note that in confronting sovereignty in transition, via the confederal spectrum, one can identify a further basis for qualifying the wisdom of the absolute model of sovereignty (see Chapter 3 Part 1) developed by Part 2 of chapter 3. Sovereignty clearly is not like marriage in the sense that, although one cannot be 75% married, a member state certainly could have sovereign jurisdiction over 75% of policy competencies, whilst the EU could have jurisdiction over the remaining 25%. In light of this confederal option it is clear that although sovereignty should indeed be defined from its external perspective in terms of constitutional independence, this independence does not have to be absolute.[37]

THE CONFEDERAL AND THREE TRADITIONS SPECTRUMS

As noted earlier, the fact of the transformation in a potentially epistemologically constant context can be registered by the epistemologically plural account of the three traditions but not the process of that transformation. This requires utilisation of the vertical three traditions spectrum (Figure 1, chapter 2). Having considered integration from the perspective of the confederal spectrum, therefore, it is important to relate it to the conventional three traditions spectrum, hence Figure 2. On the one hand the intergovernmental pole correlates to the realist tradition and separate sovereign states, whilst the federal state pole, on the other, correlates to revolutionism and the transformation of inter-state relationships into what is effectively a new domestic arena. The middle of the spectrum, meanwhile, correlates to the endurance of member state sovereignty in the context of a developing supranational constraint and thus embraces key characteristics of rationalism. In this sense as this chapter applies integration both to the horizontal and the vertical spectrums of Figure 1, one can superimpose the confederal spectrum perspective on the vertical axis.

2) SOVEREIGNTY IN TRANSITION: POLITICAL EXISTENCE

Having considered sovereignty in transition from the perspective of the inter and intra tools, the chapter now approaches this challenge utilising the 'political existence' tool, exploring its deployment within confederation by Carl Schmitt.[38] Again working on the basis that confederation is defined by the coexistence of intergovernmentalism and supranationalism in the same political form, Schmitt identified a number of crucial characteristics of the 'Bund' (confederation) that differentiated it from a straightforward intergovernmental arrangement.[39] First, he claimed that it was critically more than an alliance and as such was not designed to service a particular functional end such as a postal union. Second, as a logical extension of this characteristic, and as a clear indication of its difference from all 'means end' enterprises - that definitionally will only be sustained for so long as it is functionally prudent - the Bund is permanent and thus an end in itself. Finally, and again very much in the same vein, the Bund is based upon the common objective of upholding the self-preservation of all its member states. In order to embrace this commitment there must be a sense of the states in question being joined at a very fundamental level. All three characteristics thus give the development of the Bund deep existential implications, with ramifications for the realm of identity, rather than mere functional expediency.[40]

To press home the reality of the clear qualitative difference between the Bund and a standard intergovernmental organisation, Schmitt claimed that the treaties underpinning them must similarly be qualitatively differentiated from those that give rise to ordinary IGOs. Whilst standard inter-state treaties underpinned the latter,

Bunds, he maintained, were the product of 'inter-state-status treaties' or 'constitutional treaties' which had the effect of articulating the constitutive act of a new nation, a supranation. (This time, instead of being ratified by self-determining and self-obligating individuals, the constitutive act/social contract was the product of agreement between self-determining and self-obligating states.) As such they granted Bunds what an inter-state treaty conventionally does not confer upon an IGO, a 'political existence' and 'political will' of their own.[41]

Schmitt's work helps to add a greater depth to our appreciation of the consequence of newly created supranational intra-relationships. Whilst the legal 'inter-intra' tools bring essentially denotative, ordering delineations to bear upon an apparently confused situation, 'political existence' helps to unpack something of the solid existential reality (the actor with a political will) which lies within these dividing lines. What Schmitt's work helps to demonstrate is that when you integrate you create something far more profound than a new functional efficiency in a particular area of policy. You actually create a new sovereign political entity (agency) with its own being, identity, interests and will.

- CONCEPTUALIZING TRANSITION: THE EXISTENTIAL CONFLICT AND THE CONFEDERAL SPECTRUM

In the context of a confederation (a Bund), Schmitt maintained, that the reality of the 'politically existing' supranation, born through the first inter-state status treaty (which in terms of Figure 2 takes one away from the intergovernmental pole and into the spectrum), and then substantially empowered by subsequent similar treaties, exists in tension with the political existence of the members states as the centre of sovereign

gravity and power shifts from one existence to the other. Although integration will not terminate the political existence of the member states so long as it does not take the confederation in question over Forsyth's brink (see Figure 2), it will nonetheless always weaken the political existence of the nation-state. This weakening is critical in that it impinges on the central contradiction that, Schmitt claimed, is constitutive of the Bund, namely the state's right to secede from the Bund, which is supposedly permanent.[42] Specifically, pulling out of a confederation becomes progressively more unlikely as confederated states move across the spectrum because this involves the reconstitution of more and more of their interests within the supranation. This has the effect of causing proposals for secession to appear increasingly like proposals for departure from a diminishing aspect of their identity in favour of another developing aspect. The chapter will now consider various conceptual markers that help to define the movement of a union across the confederal spectrum and the implications of that movement on the relative standing of the diminishing nation-state sovereignty and emerging supranational sovereignty.

POLITICAL EXISTENCE: PRACTICAL/TECHNICAL, LEASED/SOLD

Given the changes experienced by political existence as one moves across the integrative spectrum and their implications for secession, it is necessary to differentiate between two different forms of political existence, one practical, the other technical. A state enjoying practical political existence continues both to maintain its own identity and will, together with the practical ability to secede from the Union if it so desires. This is because it upholds a sufficient number of policy competencies to maintain its own integrity.[43] A state whose political existence is merely technical, meanwhile, continues to enjoy its own identity and will but in

practical terms would find it very difficult to leave. This is because, unlike the state with practical political existence, this state no longer has a sufficiently extensive sovereign base, in terms of its jurisdictions, and therefore powers, through which to reassert itself.[44]

Another helpful contribution to the quest for a rigorous conceptualization of sovereignty in the context of regional integration is made by Schluter and Lee. Concerned that talk of pooling sovereignty has not provided a particularly rigorous account of what is constituted by integration, since it suggests countries merely seek to derive some functional benefit from holding their sovereignties in common for a period rather than actually building a supranation, Schluter and Lee put forward the concept of leasing and selling sovereignty. They argue that states can establish a supranational sovereignty and lease to it a number of policy competencies. These states can, however, only lease so long as they themselves continue to uphold a sufficient number of competencies in order to guarantee their own functional integrity. If they delegate such a volume of policy competencies to the supranation that they effectively dissolve themselves, then all the leaseholds they have granted will effectively become pure freeholds.[45] To integrate Schluter and Lee's work together with practical and technical political existence, one could argue that once the level of integration moves a state out of practical political existence into the realms of technical political existence, the basis for all delegated policy competencies will cease to be leasehold and become instead freehold. Once past the brink, moreover, the political existences of the erstwhile member states would be replaced by the single political existence of the supranation. Thus, as already demonstrated, instead of there

being a number of competing politically existing ends (sovereignties), henceforth there would only be one politically existing end (sovereignty).

As in the case of the inter-intra tool, political existence also demonstrates the fact that, when in the process of reconfiguring, contrary to the contentions of those submitting an absolutely closed model of sovereignty (see Part 1 of chapter 3 and Part 1 of this chapter) sovereignty clearly is not like marriage. This perspective demonstrates once again that a member state certainly could have, for example, sovereign jurisdiction over 75% of policy competencies, whilst the EU could have jurisdiction over the remaining 25%.[46] In so doing it again makes the point that, whilst sovereignty should indeed be defined from its external perspective in terms of constitutional independence, this independence does not have to be absolute.

THE SPECTRUM: HIGH AND LOW POLITICS

Having considered the fortunes of sovereignty in the context of the spectrum from the perspective of both the inter and intra-relational and political existence tools in general terms, it is now possible to set down some markers regarding the implications of different kinds of sovereignty loss. The chapter will consider this challenge from the perspective of the conceptual distinction between competencies upheld by internal and external sovereignty which will both further clarify the implications of movement along the spectrum and also provide another opportunity for underlining the inter-dependent nature of the relationship between internal and external sovereignty.

i) EXTERNAL SOVEREIGNTY

On the one hand if a state is joined to a new polity from the 'outside-in' so that it loses all external sovereignty, it ceases to be sovereign even if it maintains some controls over domestic government. To gain a clear appreciation of why in this context partial internal sovereignty alone does not amount to sovereignty, one must consider the autonomy of states within a sovereign federal state. Whilst the constituent states might have a measure of autonomy, they are not politically existing sovereign ends in their own right. They uphold competencies not because of their own right but because of that of the supranation, of which they are ultimately a part. It has chosen to divide a portion of its internal sovereignty competence and distribute it between the erstwhile member states in response to either an administrative need and/or a desire to give some recognition to the identities that previously undergirded the states. This arrangement only amounts to the delegation of some policy areas from the politically existing sovereignty. It does not itself give rise to a new politically existing sovereignty. Thus any internal sovereignty complex subject to another external sovereignty will ultimately be dependent on that other sovereignty and consequently ultimately upheld in its name.

On the other hand, however, if a state loses some of its external sovereignty to an emergent supranational sovereignty, whilst critically maintaining some controls over defence and foreign policy, this supranationalism does not terminate its political existence in the sense that its ultimate guarantee/guardianship of political existence, i.e. defence, remains in place. This does not mean that a state's defence may not be tied up very closely with that of other polities but rather that the state cannot be compelled to deploy its defence as a consequence of being tied to a supranational sovereignty. It can

engage the ultimate guarantee of its political existence with other states but it cannot allow them, or any supranational body, to make any kind of decisions regarding the actual deployment of that guarantee. Thus within the confederal spectrum one would conclude that the complete loss of foreign policy and defence competencies takes one over the brink, whilst loss of some internal sovereignty and some external sovereignty (especially that at the lower end of the high politics spectrum, e.g. trade policy) is consistent with sovereignty loss within the spectrum prior to the brink.

ii) INTERNAL SOVEREIGNTY

Having suggested that partial internal sovereignty, set within a sovereign state, does not constitute sovereignty by itself, it is tempting to conclude that the key to maintaining sovereignty in the context of a confederal spectrum relates to external sovereignty. As the previous chapter and Appendix 1 observed, however, it is not possible to conceive of a conventional sovereign state that has external sovereignty but no internal sovereignty. This point is clearly demonstrated by considering those polities that come closest to being entirely internally sovereign and yet not externally so, e.g. crown dependencies. Despite general internal autonomy, the ultimate sense of dependence on British defence, and thus ultimate dependence on British political existence, results in domestic intervention as witnessed in the Isle of Mann in the early 1990s when the British Home Secretary, Kenneth Clarke, stepped in to prevent the execution of a man found guilty of murder. In reality states that genuinely govern themselves in every respect internally, without any sense of dependence on a higher polity, actually always have responsibility for external relations thrust upon them as the result of their existence as a totally independent polity. They cannot exist on such a basis without calling into being the potential for external relationships by dint of the

fact that their polity does not cover the globe. However, this does not mean that they must engage with international relationships, as seen in the early experience of Tuvulan independence, or that they will necessary receive recognition from other states, as in the case of Taiwan.

Having defined the centrality of internal sovereignty to the maintenance of the sovereignty of polities involved in confederal projects, it is important to note that it is not absolute. As in the case of external sovereignty, it is possible to lose some competencies sustained by internal sovereignty, whilst maintaining sovereign political existence. Indeed, as the chapter will demonstrate this has been the basis for the greater part of European integration to date.

In conclusion member state sovereignty can endure on the basis of only partial constitutional independence so long as that state maintains both some internal and some external sovereignty, although there is greater scope for sovereignty to endure in the context of constitutional dependence with respect to internal than external sovereignty. One must be conscious, therefore, that states can continue to be sovereign even whilst they actually cede sovereign jurisdiction over some policy areas. Quantitatively, this makes them partially sovereign. Qualitatively, however, they remain absolutely sovereign in the sense that, whilst brought into political accommodation with an emerging supranational sovereignty, they nonetheless constitute politically existing sovereign ends whose ontologies testify to teleologies that are mutually exclusive to that of the sovereign supranation. Having provided the theoretical framework for conceptualizing the transfer of sovereignty, the chapter will now apply it directly to the example of the European Union.

THE EUROPEAN UNION AND THE CONFEDERAL SPECTRUM

There can be no doubt that the Union continues to maintain a significant measure of intergovernmentalism within the Council of Ministers and European summit system. Having said this, however, even when legislative decisions are made intergovernmentally, their standing is quite unlike inter-relational international law. In coming to terms with EU legislative decisions one must have special regard for two considerations. First, they rest within what the European Court of Justice has described as a 'new legal order' which is neither subordinate to member state law nor a part of international law.[47] As such they are ultimately subject to the jurisdiction of the European Court of Justice not member states. Second, some of the decisions made on the basis of an enduring unanimity result not just in supranational legislation, to be deployed subject to the ultimate interpretation of the ECJ, but in supranational bodies that take decisions affecting all member states on a supranational basis. Perhaps the most pertinent examples of this come with the European Single Currency and the determination of interest rates supranationally by the European Central Bank.[48]

Furthermore, despite an enduring intergovernmentalism, sovereign decision-making has been checked by the introduction of Qualified Majority Voting. In endorsing QMV, each member state agreed that whereas previously, under unanimity, they could reject a measure that was not in their national interest, henceforth, if in an opposing minority, undesired legislation could legally be thrust upon them in much the same way that legislation desired by a majority within a state can be forced upon an unwilling minority sub-state unit. Thus, whenever a majority vote is taken, the states galvanise around themselves the reality of a supranational sovereignty. European

federalists rejoiced at the introduction of QMV which, as Wistrich and Pinder demonstrate, brought to an end twenty years of European constitutional paralysis. To this extent, many of them regarded this step as more significant than the creation of the Single Market which it was introduced to facilitate.[49]

Since the Single European Act, wherein the principle of unanimity was conceded, all subsequent intergovernmental conferences, Maastricht, Amsterdam and Nice have witnessed successive increases in the scope of Qualified Majority Voting.[50] If the proposed European constitution is ratified by the requisite member state referenda, moreover, this will extend QMV to even more fields. Furthermore, of particular concern to larger states, a number of treaties (and the proposed constitution) have also introduced changes in the weighting arrangements with the effect that it is becoming increasingly difficult for single large states to block measures without the development of significant coalitions of support.

Quite apart from creating a European Central Bank which, as noted above, supranationally determines interest rates, Monetary Union of course, in and off itself, constitutes a hugely significant development in the history of the Union, which will perhaps do more than anything else to call into being a new sovereign polity. This is not least because monetary union creates enormous pressures for even deeper integration. To be sure, the 'stability pact' currently goes some way towards mitigating the need for a formal deeper economic integration in the short term.[51] It is, however, difficult to see how in the longer run formal fiscal harmonization can be avoided.[52]

Leaving aside the likelihood of more integration, however, it is important to note that as

long ago as 1998 Anthony Giddens claimed that over 75% of UK economic legislation and 50% of UK domestic legislation was in any event made by the European Union.[53] There would thus already seem to be a significant supranational European sovereignty. Indeed, if it is possible for more of a member state's economic legislation to be defined by the EU than by its home legislature and for as much as its domestic legislation to be defined by the EU as the national parliament, it is surely imperative to recognize that the EU is, in some senses at least, sovereign.

THE EU AND EXTERNAL SOVEREIGNTY

Having seen in the above figures the extent to which integration has advanced, the point must be made that it has been guided by what we will describe as the Jean Monnet strategy. This was/is, in very simple terms, the deliberate attempt to encourage the integration of low political policy competences first (sustained by internal sovereignty), leaving the 'high political', image bearing competencies (sustained by external sovereignty) until last, in the hope that the extensive and 'relatively' inoffensive development of 'low politics' integration would/will accustom the peoples of the European project to the importance of supranational government and bring recognition of the interdependent nature of their futures, preparing their hearts and minds for integration in the 'high political' and emotive realms of currency, defence and foreign policy in the future.[54]

Whilst the bulk of European integration has focused on low politics competencies, the Union has taken tentative steps towards the development of external sovereignty in a number of fields. Initially, although these steps pertained to external sovereignty, they were at the lower end of the high political spectrum. For instance, (and this has actually

long been the case) the EU enters trade negotiations either with the WTO (and previously the GATT) or bilaterally with another economy, rather than the member states pursuing separate trade negotiations. This demonstrates 'the degree to which the EU has become a single actor in the international trade regime'.[55] The Union also determines (again this has long been the case) the Common External Tariff which those approaching the Union from outside must confront.[56] Since monetary union, moreover, this has also been true with respect to the interest rates of EMU states.[57]

Turning to the conventional high politics terrain of foreign policy, the Maastricht Treaty introduced the Common Foreign and Security Policy. Although it is based on an intergovernmental pillar, where it is not subject to the European Court of Justice or the European Parliament, detailed decisions regarding the implementation of foreign and security policy (the basic direction of which would have first been made on the basis of unanimity) can be made on the basis of a qualified majority vote.[58] The CFSP, moreover, now finds greater presence on the world stage through Amsterdam's provision for the position of an EU 'High Representative for Foreign and Security Policy', effectively an EU foreign minister.[59] The proposed European constitution, meanwhile, suggests renaming this post calling it the 'Union Minister for Foreign Affairs' which strategically crosses a psychological frontier in its deployment of the word 'minister'.[60] In this context there was a radical new departure in the Middle East with the sponsorship of the roadmap coming from the 'Quartet' consisting of the United States, Russia, the United Nations and, rather than either of the two European permanent members of the Security Council, Britain or France, 'Europe'. Having said all of this, however, one cannot overlook the fact that the CFSP completely failed to provide any sense of common policy in the context of the 2003 Gulf War.[61]

In terms of defence, meanwhile, the growing insignificance of the Western European Union, the break-up of Yugoslavia on its doorstep and the reluctance to rely on America through NATO, resulted in a 1999 decision to establish a Common European Security and Defense Policy (CESDP), involving a rapid reaction force of 100,000 people from all members states (bar Denmark[62]).[63] Now, to be sure, the EU is a very long way indeed from having an army that can be deployed on the basis of a supranational sovereign decision (i.e. QMV). The contributions of different states cannot be deployed within that force without the agreement of their sending governments, but the fact that there could be a military force, an army, upheld in the name of Europe – a body that clearly has deeper existential ambitions than the intergovernmental 'means-end' treaty organisations that address specific defence issues – adds weight to the sense of an emerging polity.[64]

In conclusion, whilst an external sovereignty is clearly emerging in the sense that the EU is increasingly asserting its own international personality in different areas, its development is far more limited than internal sovereignty integration where decisions are potentially widely processed by QMV and set within the body of EU law. Perhaps, in deference to Monnet's gradualist approach to integration, the EU has first moved tentatively into the area of international affairs by placing issues within its brief that associate it with matters international but initially on an intergovernmental foundation. When people become used to the fact that the EU apparently has a foreign and defence policy brief, it will be easier to incrementally draw this 'high politics' policy area into to the ambit of supranational decision-making. Whilst the current limitations on defence and foreign policy integration demonstrate that the EU has not

yet reached the place of the brink, the fact that it is now moving into the realm of foreign policy and defence demonstrates that 'low politics' integration is quite advanced and that the Union has moved a considerable way across the spectrum.

EU SOVEREIGNTY IN THE CONFEDERAL SPECTRUM

So then, how exactly should one conceive of the emerging supranational European sovereignty that co-exists with that of the member states and which is primarily internal? By transforming some of the inter-relationships between themselves into intra-relationships, the integrating states have created a new politically existing sovereign end. In doing so primarily with respect to low policy competencies that pertain to internal sovereignty, however, the resulting new sovereign end has been impoverished and stunted in the sense that it has not enjoyed the image-bearing, high politics competencies related to external sovereignty but a sovereign end nonetheless it remains. It may pertain mainly to low politics but unlike the measure of domestic autonomy of the states within a federal state (see above), this emergent supranational sovereignty exists outside of any other ultimate sovereignty that guarantees political existence. It thus offers a form of constitutional dependence that is quite unlike that offered by the imperial frame through which conventional checks to sovereignty are understood. Instead of an external sovereignty providing covering from beyond the polity in question, one is confronted with an emergent supranational sovereignty which does not relate to any already existing historic state but rather to an emergent supranation freely created by the effected polities and yet not reducible to them in the sense of conventional intergovernmentalism (i.e. not reducible to the sum of its national parts).

Coming to terms with the nature of the supranational sovereignty which challenges that of member states - curiously primarily from the inside-out rather than, in classic imperial fashion, from the outside-in - requires one to think rather differently about sovereignty and the manner in which it can be challenged and developed. The fact that sovereignty can develop from the 'inside-out', as well as the 'outside-in', is perhaps best communicated through an analogy. Suppose sovereignty (both internal and external), is represented by a clay urn. Within this image internal sovereignty, and the policies that it upholds, are represented by the clay on the inside of the urn, whilst external sovereignty and the policies that it upholds, are represented by the outside of the urn. According to this picture European integration - which, thanks to the genius of Monnet, focused on low politics first - has given rise to the creation of a supranational sovereign urn in which priority has been given to the inside surfaces before the outer surfaces. The result of this is that, whilst lacking its finished outside surfaces, and, therefore, constituting a rather fragile and unattractive piece of work, the EU is nevertheless effectively an urn in its own right from which one can take a drink. To the extent that the EU enjoys its own internal sovereignty, therefore, its own developing urn and not the multiple inside surfaces of the nation-state urns projected onto it, the EU's internal sovereignty is clearly an autonomous sovereignty in its own right. To be sure, now that it is moving into the realm of external sovereignty, some progress is being made in developing the outside surfaces of the urn, although there is a long way to go. The point to grasp here is the fact that, although in recent times it is unconventional to create a politically existing polity from the inside-out, with domestic policy first, this is no more functionally impossible than it is to have a working urn, i.e. an urn that can hold water from which one can take a drink, even whilst it lacks its finished outer surfaces.[65]

INVISIBLE SUPRANATIONALISM?

The fact that even polities that play a very significant role in the domain of high politics like Britain and France (having permanent board membership of the G8, the IMF, World Bank and UN Security Council) do so having lost aspects of their sovereignty as a result of their EU membership, means that one has to be very careful about drawing too many conclusions from the presence of external sovereignty. One must subject all manifestations of sovereignty to careful interrogation. If it is apparent that the intra-relations underpinning the internal sovereignty of the nation-state are wholly part of the political existence of the nation-state, then one can rest assured that the sovereign image of that nation (deriving from the monopoly of inter-relationships between it and the rest of the international community in respect of its high political competencies) is in fact entirely accurate. If, however, the intra-relationships underpinning low policy competencies are part of a supranational political existence rather than that of the nation-state, then one can conclude that the image of a sovereign nation-state, deriving from the continued existence of inter-relationships between that state and its neighbours, in terms of the high politics competencies, does not actually tell the whole story.[66]

According to the above perspective, there is undoubtedly a rapidly emerging supranational EU sovereignty. This sovereignty, however, has not by any means extinguished intergovernmentalism from the Union. Indeed, given that intergovernmentalism remains particularly developed in the context of high politics competencies - the main sovereignty image-bearing competencies - the appearance of national sovereignty remains largely intact. Thus, whilst a significant portion of the previously monopolising inter-relationships between member states have been

transformed into intra-relationships, creating a politically existing, supranational sovereignty and placing the EU very definitely within the confederal spectrum, they have not by any means been wholly transformed, taking the EU into full federal statehood. This, however, remains the aspiration or fear of many observers.[67]

ENGLISH SCHOOL SOVEREIGNTY AND EUROPEAN INTEGRATION

When the openness of the English School approach is made explicit by not adhering to an abstracted and consequently reified conception of sovereignty (i.e. external sovereignty effectively apart from internal sovereignty) it is possible to recognize fundamental transformation. By conceptualizing the process of change from the several sovereign states to the single sovereign supranational state, and the place of the in between, this thesis - drawing particularly on the work of Murray Forsyth - demonstrates how the English School realist tradition can account for sovereignty in the context of profound change. This chapter engages initially with this challenge from the perspective of the Linklater - Little interpretation of the three traditions which underpins the whole of this research. In order to unpack the process of change in detail, however, it makes use of the services of the complementary Wightian spectrum which this chapter has associated with the confederal spectrum, according to which the boundaries of the sovereign state can be modified. Contrary to James *et al*, it is as well to be able to engage with the process of transformation across time and not just the resulting ontology at the end of that transformation. This is of special importance in the current context, given that it is very possible that, whilst European integration has moved beyond the confines of a simple intergovernmentalism, it may well not result in the formation of a United States of Europe. In the framework of English School thinkers like James and neorealists such as Waltz, this would be a

recipe for permanently viewing the EU as an essentially conventional intergovernmental project.

CONCLUSION

In conclusion, therefore, it is the contention of the realist, pro-sovereignty perspective presented in this chapter that globalization does not bring about the end of sovereignty. In the first instance, the numbers of sovereign states has increased dramatically and the territorial fixity of their boundaries has become more certain. In the second instance, moreover, there is also evidence to suggest that sovereignty is actually adjusting to the pressures of systemic change. Through the exploitation of the confederal spectrum, underpinned by the 'intra-inter-relational' and 'politically existing' tools, it is possible to deploy the co-ordinates of sovereignty in the context of European integration. This is significant in that, whilst 'the accountability' reach of the state is constrained by the expansion of economic life beyond the borders of the state, the development of a European supranational sovereignty suggests that rather than being eroded by change, sovereignty itself may actually be being extended in order to secure/provide for its endurance. On both bases the chapter agrees with James - although for different reasons:

'...The idea that this type of arrangement [sovereignty] is somehow becoming insignificant seems, to this observer, totally unreal'.[68]

As noted above, however, the important qualification that must be made is that, whilst there is clear evidence that sovereignty is extending in the current environment in deference to the reconstitution of the realist group imperative, it is by no means clear

that Europe is on a road that will inevitably lead to the creation of a full blown supranational sovereignty of the kind one would associate with a sovereign nation-state writ large, a United States of Europe. It is always possible that the emergent supranational sovereignty might find some form of long-term coexistence with nation-state sovereignty. This would require a permanent confederal frame of reference wherein two sovereignties, each qualitatively absolute but quantitatively relative, sustain different jurisdictions with respect to the same piece of territory. This would not require the rejection of sovereignty but rather its relocation in a long-term confederal, transformational setting. Whether or not this will be necessary will, however, depend upon history which has not yet taken place.

Having considered territorial sovereignty in the context of systemic change from the vantage point of the realist tradition, and therein the sovereignty pole, the thesis will now turn to narrowly consider sovereignty in the context of globalization from the perspective of the revolutionist tradition and therein the post-sovereignty pole. This will confront the peculiarly extra-territorial nature of globalization in detail and consider the case that the impact of the global flows involved is such that it actually presents a form of systemic change that is not compatible with territorial sovereignty.

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[1] Joseph Camilleri and Jim Falk, *The End of Sovereignty? The Politics of a Shrinking and Fragmenting World*, Edward Elgar, Aldershot, 1992, p. 245; Marc Williams, 'Rethinking sovereignty', *Globalization: Theory and Practice*, ed. Elenore Kofman and Gillian Youngs, London, Pinter, 1996, p. 113; Georg Sørensen, 'Sovereignty: Change and continuity in a Fundamental Institution', *Sovereignty at the Millennium*, ed. Robert Jackson, *Political Studies*, Political Studies Association, Oxford, Blackwell, 1999, pp. 168-9; Robert Jackson 'Introduction', *Sovereignty at the Millennium*, p. 4; Richard Falk, 'Sovereignty' in J Krieger ed. *The Oxford Companion to Politics of the World*, pp. 851-3; Ian Clark, *Globalization and International Relations Theory*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1998, p. 70; Jean Marie Guehenno, *The End of the Nation-State*, Minneapolis, University of Minneapolis, 1993, p 57; Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, *Empire*, London, Harvard University Press, 2000, pp. 325-328; David Held, *Political Theory and the Modern State*, Cambridge, Polity Press, 1989, pp. 229-

37; David Held, Anthony McGrew, David Globatt and Jonathan Perraton, *Global Transformations: Politics, Economics and Culture*, Oxford, Polity Press, 1999, p. 5; Zygmunt Bauman, *Globalization: The Human Consequences*, Oxford, Polity Press in association with Blackwell, 1998, p. 64.

[2] Alan James, 'The Practice of Sovereign Statehood in Contemporary International Society', *Sovereignty at the Millennium*, p. 42.

[3] Ian Clark, *Globalization and International Relations Theory*, p. 74. Furthermore, the point should be made that the United Nation's 'Special Committee on the Situation with respect to the implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples', has its sights on some 16 other territories which the decolonisation ethic suggests should obtain independence. Anguilla, Bermuda, the British Virgin Islands, the Cayman Islands, the Falkland Islands (Malvinas), Montserrat, St. Helena, the Turks and Caicos Islands, the United States Virgin Islands, Gibraltar, American Samoa, Guam, New Caledonia, the Pitcairn islands, Tokelau and Western Sahara, see: www.un.org/Depts/dpi/decolonization/trust3.htm Indeed, least anyone should suggest that the small size of these territories (the largest is in terms of population is New Caledonia with a population of just 215,904) means that they would rather remain subject to an imperial power, the United Nations has officially declared 2000-2010 the 'Second International Decade for the Eradication of Colonialism'. It is thus very possible that the international community will be joined by even more sovereign states. Indeed further polities could emerge from the break-up of existing states in the tradition of Czechoslovakia so long as there is a democratic mandate. See General Assembly Paper A/56/61. High on the list of contenders for 2005 is Kosovo (James Pettifer, 'Kosovo: Nation in Waiting', *The World Today*, Volume 61, Number 2, February 2005, London, Royal Institute of International Affairs, pp. 18-20.) Furthermore, the peace deal in Sudan January 2005 makes provision for a plebiscite in 2010 on whether southern Sudan should break away from the north.

[4] James Mayall, 'Sovereignty, Nationalism, and Self-determination', *Sovereignty at the Millennium*, p. 79.

[5] Jackson, 'Sovereignty in World Politics', *Sovereignty at the Millennium*, p. 24.

[6] Mayall, 'Sovereignty, Nationalism, and Self-determination', pp. 60-61.

[7] Jackson, 'Sovereignty in World Politics', p. 24.

[8] Ibid., p. 25.

[9] Ibid., pp. 26-27.

[10] Thomas Dietz & Richard Whitman, 'Analysing European Integration: Reflecting on the English School – Scenarios for an Encounter', *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 2002, Volume 4-0. Number 1. p. 43.

[11] Hedley Bull, 'Civilian Power Europe: A Contradiction in Terms?' *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 1982, Vol. 21, No 1, pp. 149-170.

[12] 'Practical problems of international politics are often described in terms of building a bigger and better state – a European Union or an Atlantic Community or an Arab Union, without seeing that such an achievement would leave the problems of inter-state politics precisely where they were.' Martin Wight, 'Why Is There No International Theory', *Diplomatic Investigations: Essays in the Theory of International Politics*, ed. Herbert Butterfield and Martin Wight, London, George Allen and Unwin, 1966, p. 22.

[13] James, 'Sovereign Statehood in Contemporary International Society', p. 46. Interestingly, even Barry Buzan, who is interested in change, engages with it very much from an outside-in perspective, focusing on the connections between states rather than on their capacity to bring a transformation that generates a new locus of sovereignty in IR as a consequence of both internal and external processes. 'If the EU is not the thickest, most ambitious and most highly developed interstate society ever seen, then it is difficult to imagine what it is. As such, study of it should be playing a leading role in thinking about how solidarist interstate societies, particularly liberal ones, can develop; what problems arise as they get thicker; and where the boundary is between a convergence interstate society on the one hand, and the creation of a new actor at the global level on the other'. Barry Buzan *From International to World Society: English School Theory and the Social Structure of Globalisation*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2004, p. 211.

[14] Ole Wæver, 'Europe's Three Empires: A Watsonian Interpretation of Post-Wall European Security', *International Society after the Cold War: Anarchy and Order Reconsidered*, ed. Rick Fawn and Jeremy Larkins, London, Macmillan, 1996 and Thomas Dietz & Richard Whitman, 'Analysing European Integration: Reflecting on the English School – Scenarios for an Encounter'. Although Barry Buzan and Richard Little do engage with European integration, they do so very briefly such that it is not possible to say whether their approach fits most appropriately with realism or rationalism *International*

Systems in World History: Remaking the Study of international Relations, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1999, p. 352.

[15] Murray Forsyth, *Unions of States: The Theory and Practice of Confederation*, Leicester, Leicester University Press, 1981. It is also important to note that English School theorist Adam Watson has written in terms of European integration that are consistent with a realist ontology, recognising the potential for sovereignty to be extended in the context of the European project rather than replaced. 'In Europe we are witnessing a strong upsurge, or revival, of confederal tendencies towards major voluntary limitations of the independence of its member states. We will examine in the next chapter how this reaction in favour of supranational authority came about, and how the European Union has begun to operate as a collective hegemonial authority for the whole continent'. Adam Watson, *The limits of Independence: Relations between states in the modern world*, London, Routledge, 1992, pp. 3-4. From a federalist perspective 'the principal function of a democratic European community or confederal union is to establish collective control of foreign policy and defence, and so to take away from nation-states the external aspects of sovereignty, such as the ability to make war'. Ibid., p. 34. The Union which the federalists seek involves the gradual but steady surrender of the freedom of action of its once independent member states, externally and internally, until they become little more than autonomous province ceremonially still dressed in the trappings of sovereignty'. Ibid.

[16] Although not a front line English School thinker, like Bull, Forsyth was very much at one with the commitment to examine international relations and indeed domestic politics, through political theory and history. Attending English School seminars, he produced along with, other English School thinkers, Maurice Keens Soper and Peter Savigear, an important early text in this tradition: *The Theory of International Relations*, London, George Allen and Unwin, 1970. His role along with that of Maurice Keens Soper and Peter Savigear is noted by Tim Dunne, *Inventing International Society: A History of the English School*, p. 14 and p. 193.

[17] Whilst this thesis considers the development of supranational sovereignty through the European Union which constitutes the most advances expression of this form of project, it is important recognize that in recent years a number of other similar projects have either got under way or demonstrated interest in embracing significantly greater measures of integration. In South America the EU experience has been regarded with interest (Andy Klom, 'Mercosur and Brazil, *International Affairs*, March 2003, p. 353) and both the Andean Community (Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru and Venezuela) (www.comunidadaina.org) and CARICOM (www.caricom.org) have developed clear supranational structures, including courts of justice. Furthermore, in Mercosur (Brazil, Argentina, Paraguay, Uraguay. Chile and Bolivia are associate members) where this is not the case, there are indications that the development of new supranational sovereignty is on the cards (Michael Mecham 'Mercosur: a failing development project?' *International Affairs*, March 2003, p. 387.) This suggests that development of the facility to engage with the extension of sovereignty is becoming more important than a narrowly Euro-centric view of the world might suggest.

[18] Forsyth, *Unions of States,* chapter 7.

[19] James Anderson and Stuart Hall, 'Absolutism and Other Ancestors', *The Rise of the Modern State*, ed. James Anderson, Brighton, Wheatsheaf Books, 1986, p. 29. Looking beyond the confines of narrow functional economic growth imperatives, it is also important to recognize that long before the shift to the modern sovereign state there was concern that the decentralisation of the feudal state militated against effective administration. The inability to resolve conflicts so that they would go on for a great deal of time, (e.g. England and France's One Hundred Years War 1339-1453, the English Wars of the Roses 1455-85), or deal effectively with national crises such as the Black Death (1347-54) was attributed to the highly fragmented, decentralised nature of feudal government.

[20] This resulted in the monarch obtaining the functions that we now associate with the modern state; having at his disposal a standing army, a bureaucracy of civil servants to execute the functions of his state, a diplomatic service to develop relationships with other states, policies to promote economic growth and the right to raise regular taxation. Anderson and Hall, 'Absolutism and Other Ancestors', p. 30.

[21] Jean Bodin, *Six Books of the Commonwealth*, MJ Tooley (ed), Oxford, n.d. and Thomas Hobbes, *Leviathan*, (Intro Richard Tuck) Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1991.

[22] John Agnew and Stuart Corbridge, *Mastering Space: Hegemony Territory and International Political Economy*, Routledge, London, 1995, pp. 89-90 and Anderson and Hall, 'Absolutism and Other Ancestors', p. 31, pp. 35-36.

[23] Bjorn Hettne, 'The International Political Economy of Transformation', *International Political Economy: Understandinding Global Disorder*, ed Hettne, London, Zed Books, 1995, p. 7.

[24] Anderson and Hall, 'Absolutism and Other Ancestors' p. 31, pp. 33-35; James Anderson, 'The

Modernity of Modern States', *The Rise of the Modern State*, p. 8; Chris Brown, *Understanding International Relations*, London, Macmillan, 1997, p. 127. In this regard Camilleri and Falk make the following observation: 'the principle of sovereignty as the defining category of international political theory, tends to overlook or understate the instrumental role of the nation-state, that is its historical function in the formation of national societies and *national markets*'. (Italics added), *The End of Sovereignty*, p. 241. Historically Britain was somewhat ahead in the creation of the single market David Hetherington, *Economic Management of Resources: A Critique of Classical Economics*, Centre for Migration and Development Studies, The University of Western Australia, 1996, p. 13 and p. 60.

[25] The unfettered movement of capital in the 19th century was born out of the advent of the mature modern state (post-mercantilist) in which the state detached itself from the extraction of surplus. This era when the sovereign state was significant, therefore, was not dependent on List's concept of 'economic nationality'. See Justin Rosenberg, *The Empire of Civil Society: A Critique Of the Realist Theory of International Relations*, London, Verso, 1994, pp. 124-9.

[26] Ibid. To the extent that the 19th century was the age of positive, as opposed to negative sovereignty, it was in an important sense the time when state sovereignty was most developed, see Robert Jackson, *Quasi-States: Sovereignty, International Relations and the Third World*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1990, chapter 2, e.g. pp. 38-39.

[27] As noted earlier this does not just apply to the EU. The rationale is equally, indeed possibly more relevant for new states. As Forsyth observed, 'while they had achieved full politico-economic independence, they had not achieved full politico-economic independence. For them too, where geographical factors permitted it, economic confederation became a rational goal of policy'. Forsyth, *Unions of States,* p. 177. Since the publication of Unions of States in 1981 there have of course been significant regional developments elsewhere e.g. in CARICOM, the Andean Community and Mercosur.

[28] Tim Dunne and Brian C. Schmidt, 'Realism', *The Globalization of World Politics: An introduction to international relations*, ed. John Baylis and Steve Smith, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2001, p. 143.

[29] Ibid., p. 145.

[30] Figure 1 also engages with the point that 'change by extension' is not restricted to the non sovereign state pole part of realism on the horizontal access. This point will be addressed in detail by Part 1 of chapter 7.

[31] Forsyth, *Unions of States*, p. 14.

[32] The idea of a formative 'constitutive act' or 'social contract' is central to the identity of modern political theory as seen in classic texts such as John Locke, *The Two Treatise on Government*, (Intro Peter Laslett) Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1991 and Thomas Hobbes, *Leviathan*, (Intro Richard Tuck) Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1991.

[33] Forsyth, *Unions of States*, p. 10.

[34] Please note that Wightian revolutionism had multiple interpretations ranging from a Dantean vision of uniform governance (the most appropriate for our purposes) to the Kantian vision of a group of similar but separate states, through to a cosmopolitan universe consisting of individuals. The diversity of his account of revolutionism has attracted attention (Brian Porter, Patterns of Thought and Practice: Martin Wight's 'International theory', *The Reason of States*, ed. Michael Donelan, London, George Allen and Unwin, 1978, p. 67.) and criticism (Buzan *From International to World Society: English School Theory and the Social Structure of Globalisation*, pp. 34-35.

[35] Forsyth, *Unions of States*, p. 6.

[36] Although the confederal spectrum, and the above definition of confederalism that it upholds, is very precise in one sense, there is another sense in which it has the potential to be confusing, since it maintains that anything falling between the two poles can quite legitimately be called a confederation. Therefore a political formation that has only just stepped into the spectrum, and thus has a very potent intergovernmental dimension and consequently a weak supranational element, can be called a confederation in just the same way that a political formation with a burgeoning supranationalism, that is about to move over the brink to full federal statehood, can also be called a confederation. In order to overcome the potential confusion flowing from the use of the confederal spectrum, without jettisoning it and the conceptual clarity that it brings, it is necessary to always employ a two-part categorisation of a political formation on the spectrum. First one asserts its confederal status and then one provides an analysis of the prevailing relationship between intergovernmentalism and supranationalism.

[37] Alan James, The Practice of Sovereign statehood in Contemporary International Society, *Sovereignty at the Millennium*, p. 41; Sørensen, 'Change and Continuity in a Fundamental Institution', p. 171 and Hans Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace*, New York, Alfred A.

Knopf, 1948, pp. 303-308. Daniel Philpott makes the point about partial sovereignty in the following terms, 'Absoluteness is a measure of the scope of affairs over which a sovereign body governs within a particular territory. Is it supreme over all matters or merely some? ...The government of France is supreme in defence policy but not in trade, which it governs jointly with other European Union members as prescribed by EU law'. *Revolutions in Sovereignty: How Ideas Shaped Modern International Relations*, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 2001, p. 19. Indeed one does not have to look just at the EU to see sovereign states that do not have exclusive, constitutionally separate jurisdiction over all competencies. Those sovereign states that have a Compact of Free Association with their former colonial master, the United States: the Marshal Islands, Palau and the Federal States of Micronesia, are constitutionally tied to varying degrees to the US both with respect to their internal and external sovereignty. Critically, however, whilst these constitutional ties exist, neither state has surrendered either all of its internal or all of its external sovereignty. The three states remain sovereign by upholding partial internal and partial external sovereignty. Similarly a number of former British colonies remain constitutionally tied to Britain in the sense that the UK provides their highest court of appeal through the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council: Jamaica, Trinadad and Tobago, Mauritius, Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, St Lucia, Grenada, St Vincents and the Grendines, Dominica, Antigua and Barbuda, St Kitts and Nevis and Kribati.

[38] Carl Schmitt was an important political thinker in the Hobbesian tradition whose work and reputation was seriously tarnished after his engagement with the Nazi party in the 1930s. Much of his significant work, however, predates this unfortunate connection and scholars from across the world have continued to engage with this controversial figure. At the heart of his work was the Hobbesian conviction that in order to enjoy the benefits of society it is necessary, by reference to the instrumentality of 'political decision', to create an authority. Indeed for Schmitt the very concept of the political, in making what Schmitt termed the 'friend-enemy distinction', was about political decisions leading to the formation of political identities. Schmitt's interest in the coming together of actors around an identity on the basis of the 'friend-enemy distinction' ran through his whole approach to political life. It is not surprising, therefore, that he was interested in political decisions to bring states together to form a bund and that he should be particularly interested in the quality of that union and how best to measure it. Schmitt used the notion of political existence to articulate the sense in which an effective political decision, armed with as much cultural commonality as possible, could provide the basic friend – enemy distinction underpinning society. Carl Schmitt, *The Concept of the Political*, trans. George Schwab, Chicago, Chicago University Press, 1996 and Jeffrey Seitzer, 'Carl Schmitt's internal critique of Liberal constitutionalism: Verfassungslehre as a response to the Weimar republic', *Legal Theory and Politics*, pp. 281-311.

[39] C Schmitt, *Verfassungslehre*, Berlin, 4th edn 1965, pp. 371-373 quoted in M Forsyth, *Unions of States*, p. 146-155.

[40] Ibid., p. 148.

[41] Ibid., p 150. The centrality of the 'constitutive act' to Schmitt's notion of sovereignty is explained at length by Renato Cristi, *Carl Schmitt and Authoritarian Liberalism*, Cardiff, University of Wales Press, 1998, chapter 5.

[42] Daniel Boucher, *The EU Defined: A Confederal Definition of the European Union*, MA Thesis, (unpublished), 1994, p. 47.

[43] Ibid., pp. 47-49. The significance of beliefs regarding polities providing the best frame for wealth creation depends on citizen's holding GNP in higher regard than national identity. Whilst this is usually the case, especially in the West, it cannot be presumed upon. In those contexts where national identity is valued over GNP departure from the supranation is possible even when it is not in one's best economic interests. One gains some understanding of how nationalist ideals can effectively unseat the 'standing of living imperative' from its 'supreme' position in Western countries by considering Ernest Haas' preface to the 1968 edition of his celebrated *The Uniting of Europe*. It provides his account of the reason why the 1966 Luxembourg compromise should have come about, placing the functionalist logic of his thesis apparently in jeopardy. To be sure, in the case of 1966, it was not a matter of nationalism cleanly displacing standard of living but rather of nationalism having a moderating influence on an enduing concern for standard of living. Haas' preface makes the important point that even in the West, and relative prosperity, one cannot always presume that matters of standard of living will trump nationalist sentiments. Ernest Haas, *The Uniting of Europe*, Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1968, p. xxii-xxvi.

[44] Boucher, *The EU Defined: A Confederal Definition of the European Union*, pp. 47-49.

[45] Michael Schluter and David Lee, *The R Factor*, London, Hodder and Stoughton, 1993, p. 244.

[46] Alan James, 'The Practice of Sovereign statehood in Contemporary International Society', p. 41; Sørensen, 'Change and Continuity in a Fundamental Institution', p. 171; Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations*, pp. 303-308 and Daniel Philpott, *Revolutions in Sovereignty*, p. 19.

[47] Neil MacCormick, *Questioning Sovereignty: Law, State and Nation in the European Commonwealth*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1999, p. 131.

[48] On the politics of EMU see: Malcolm Levitt and Christopher Lord, *The Political Economy of Monetary Union*, The European Union Series, Basingstoke, Macmillan 2000.

[49] 'The tragedy of the past, the primary reason for the stagnation of the Community, lay in the fact that while the Treaties envisaged that after the "transitional period" which ended in 1967, or at least in 1973, the general rule should be majority voting, nevertheless the council of ministers virtually insisted on unanimity'. Lord Cockfield, *The European Union*, p. 62. John Pinder sees the SEA as the means for relaunching the Community, releasing it from the paralysis of intergovernmentalism to which the European project had been subjected since the mid '60s. 'The Draft Treaty can be seen as an attempt to replace the predominance of intergovernmental relations in the Community institutions by a system of constitutional government, with the rule of law and with representative government. ...it is often argued, particularly in Britain, that governments will not agree to federal reform of the Community institutions. But governments have accepted quite significant steps ...[including] ...majority voting for a wide range of decisions in the Council'. John Pinder, *European Community: The Building of a Union*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1991, pp. 40-42. Ernest Wistrich is even more direct in his assessment of QMV. 'Its institutional amendments were the most far-reaching since the adoption of the so-called Luxembourg compromise. The latter had virtually precluded the use of qualified majority voting ...The Single European Act changed the practice'. Ernest Wistrich, *The United States of Europe*, London, Routledge, 1994, p.43.

[50] Rodney Leach, *Europe: A Concise Encyclopaedia of the European Union from Aachen to Zollverein*, London, Profile Books, 1998, pp. 161-2. For more information on QMV in the context of Maastricht see Andrew Moravcsik, *The Choice for Europe: Social Purpose and State Power From Messina to Maastricht*, London, UCL Press, 1999, pp. 454-455 and p. 461. A good example of the expanding supranational was seen with the advent of Negative Assent Procedure at Maastricht. This laid the foundation for a limited codecision between the Council of Ministers and European Parliament, which gave Parliament the right to vote against, and thus defeat, Council measures in those areas where the negative assent procedure was operational.
This constituted a significant supranational development not merely because it substantively increased the power of the European Parliament but also because it built on the embryonic bicameral structure created by 'Co-operation Procedure' whose full development would be key to the successful operation of the legislature of any United States of Europe. It suggested that the Council of Ministers, once the entirely intergovernmental institution that enabled the member-state governments to exercise both executive and legislative control over the direction of the EU, was destined to become merely the upper chamber of a federal legislature.
The Negative Assent Procedure introduced by Maastricht covered the internal market, consumer protection, the free circulation of labour, the right of individuals and companies to establish themselves in member states, the treatment of foreigners, vocational training, public health, the trans-Euro infrastructure and framework programmes.
David Gardiner, 'Strasbourg's MPs straining to flex their new muscles', *The Financial Times*, 12.12.91.

[51] The Stability Pact was set up in 1997 in response to French wishes for a less monetarist regime. It brings discipline through the Stability Council created to co-ordinate the economic policies of participating countries'. Rodney Leach, *Europe: A Concise Encyclopaedia of the European Union from Aachen to Zollverein*, p. 183.

[52] This obtained one of its best-known expressions in the theory of neo-functionalism, and is described by Stephen George in the following terms: 'Without adoption of a common economic policy, it would be doubtful whether the monetary union would hold anyway, because economic policy is one of the key determinants of the stability of a currency'. Stephen George, *Politics and Policy in the European Community*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1991, p, 22.

[53] Anthony Giddens, *The Third Way: The Renewal of Social Democracy*, Oxford, Polity Press, Blackwell, 1998, p. 141.

[54] The functional drift of the Monnet method can be seen clearly in Francois Duchene's discussion of his approach. Francois Duchene, *Jean Monnet: The First Statesman of Interdependence*, New York and London, WW Norton and Company, 1995, pp.374-378. Also see: Jean Monnet, 'A Ferment of Change', *Journal of Common Market Studies Vol 1*: 1963, pp.204-9 and 210-11, Document 11 in

Michael O'Neill, *The Politics of European Integration: A Reader*, London, Routledge, 1996, pp. 168-9. 'The whole point of his approach was that it did not challenge sovereignty seriously in the early stages. The habit of co-operation, it was hoped, would be built up gradually in non-controversial areas'. Stephen George, *An Awkward Partner*, p. 24. Monnet had of course a salutary experience in 1954 with a high politics integration project - which had not had the way prepared through extensive low politics integration - in the form of the federal European Defence Community proposal. The EDC was blocked by Gaullist deputies in the French National Assembly.

[55] Thomas Christensen, 'European and Regional Integration, *The Globalization of World Politics*, p. 508.

[56] Ibid., pp. 507-8 and The EU also carries out extensive diplomatic activities through the development of partnership and association agreements, is the world's fifth largest source of aid to developing countries and a developing role in environmental diplomacy. For detailed examination see Charlotte Bretherton and John Vogler, *The European Union as a Global Actor*, London, Routledge, 1999, chapter 2 (trade), chapter 3 (environmental diplomacy) and chapter 4 (Developing countries).

[57] Malcolm Levitt and Christopher Lord, *The Political Economy of Monetary Union*, chapter 8. For a further definition of the EU's external relations policy apart from the CFSP/ESDP see Brian Crowe's description including: 'the EU's enlargement, not least the current one to the east, the development of a new strategic relationship with Russia, the Euromed/Barcelona process with its accompanying association agreements, the network of other association and cooperation agreements, and the Lomé/Cotonou conventions, not to mention the EU's role in multilateral trade negotiations and many other manifestations of a near-global reach are also crucial to the EU's role in the world and as a foreign policy actor'. These 'constitute wide-ranging instruments for the exercise of 'soft power', Brian Crowe, 'A Common European Foreign Policy after Iraq?, *International Affairs*, Vol. 79, No 3, May 2003, p. 538.

[58] Rodney Leach, *Europe: A Concise Encyclopaedia of the European Union from Aachen to Zollverein*, p. 33.

[59] Thomas Christensen, 'European and Regional Integration, *The Globalization of World Politics*, p. 509.

[60] Proposed European Constitution, July 2003. Crowe argues that properly deployed this proposal could do much to increase the efficacy and importance of the CFSP. Brian Crowe, 'A Common European Foreign Policy after Iraq?, *International Affairs*, pp. 541-545.

[61] '[T]he crisis leading up to war with Iraq seems to epitomize everything that is wrong with the practice and even the concept of the CFSP'. Brian Crowe, 'A Common European Foreign Policy after Iraq?, *International Affairs*, p. 534. Having said this, however, and been very critical of the failure of the CFSP to develop a common policy in Zimbabwe (p. 535), however, Crowe does make it plain that the CFSP has nonetheless had some successes in the area of the Balkans (p. 535 & p. 541). On CFSP also see Charlotte Bretherton and John Vogler, *The European Union as a Global Actor*, chapter 6.

[62] Thomas Christensen, 'European and Regional Integration, *The Globalization of World Politics*, p. 509.

[63] Interestingly, although some have presumed that after the divisions within Europe regarding the 2003 war in Iraq that the ESDP would flounder, it has actually moved forward. 'Paradoxically, as the crisis over Iraq raged, ESDP took the final steps towards becoming fully operational'. (Anand Menon, 'From crisis to catharsis: ESDP after Iraq', *International Affairs 80*, 4 2004, p. 614.) As of July 2004 the ESDP had three missions to its name: 1) The EU Policy Mission: Bosnia Herzegovina: Jan 2003-2006, 2) Operation Concordia: Launched in the midst of the Iraq war, March 31st 20003 in Macedonia: 250 troops, under NATO operational command. 'Despite the far-reaching and highly publicized political disagreements between member states that occurred during the Iraq crisis, the Union proved its operational mettle on the ground in FYROM'. (Ibid., p. 641 and 3) Operation Artemis: June 2003, Bunia, Democratic Republic of Congo 1500 troops. Furthermore in the context of the debate regarding the framing of the European constitution Blair finally agreed to 'structured cooperation' on condition that all member states enjoy a veto over EU military operations'. Ibid., p. 642.

[64] See Common European Security and Defence Policy (CESDP) www.european-defence.org.uk

[65] The advent of sovereign states in recent times has a primarily outside-in perspective with either colonies being cut free from external empire seceding units breaking free of the external body of a supranational state.

[66] Interestingly Article 59 of the proposed European constitution does make provision for the voluntary withdrawal of member states from the Union. One wonders whether this would have been put on offer had members state political existence moved beyond practical to technical political existence. It is inconceivable that it would have been offered had member states lost their external sovereignty

because in that eventuality they would have lost their sovereignty and thus capacity to enter into an intergovernmental treaty. If this provision is adopted, however, it does pose the interesting possibility that member states could effectively lose their external sovereignty but still have the opportunity of completely reasserting it via Article 59, an opportunity which does not present itself to standard federal states. But then any United States of Europe, were it to emerge, would be very different from other federal states e.g. the United States of America because of the long preceding history of the several separate sovereign states.

[67] This position is still widely adhered to positively and antagonistically: This position is still widely adhered to positively and antagonistically: Michael Burgess, *Federalism and Federal Union: Political Ideas, Influences and Strategies in the European Community, 1972-1987,* London, Routledge, 1989; John Pinder, European Community, 1991; Ernest Wistrich, *The United States of Europe,* 1994; Laughland, *Tainted Source,* 1997; Norman Lamont, *Sovereign Britain,* 1995; John Redwood, *The Death of Britain,* Basingstoke, Macmillan, 1999.

[68] James, 'The Practice of Sovereign Statehood in Contemporary International Society', p. 47.

CHAPTER 5

REVOLUTIONISM &

THE POST SOVEREIGNTY POLE:

GLOBALIZATION AND SOVEREIGNTY

Having considered sovereignty from the perspective of the realist tradition, both in terms of definition (chapter 3) and its capacity to respond to European integration, giving rise to 'change by extension' (chapter 4), it is now the purpose of chapter 5 to examine the rather more dramatic systemic change challenge of wider globalization. Approached through consideration of Wight's two agencies of revolutionism, see below, this will suggest that unlike European integration, globalization is giving rise to a new revolutionist ontology which is actually placing sovereignty in jeopardy. Chapter 6 will then go on to consider how, further authenticated by the responses of governments, globalization requires a reconceptualization of sovereignty that can accommodate 'change by erosion', laying the foundation for the definition of revolutionist post-sovereignty.

In reading these chapters it is important to remember that they define a tradition (a tool) which, along with the other traditions, and in deference to the methodology of the English School, prepares the way for developing a distinctive perspective on the role of state sovereignty in the context of systemic change. Armed not merely with an institutional but

also an ontological perspective, the thesis will be better able to engage revolutionism with realism as subsequent (rationalist) chapters seek to develop a refined model sovereignty.

STRUCTURE

This chapter will begin with an introductory examination of the revolutionist tradition, exploring something of its ambiguity, before defining the manner in which this thesis seeks to deploy it. The thesis will then investigate the revolutionist ontology by considering globalization through the two agents of revolutionism defined by Wight, the 'spirit of commerce' and the 'spirit of enlightenment'. Part 1 will investigate the development of revolutionist ontology through the 'spirit of commerce' as it considers economic globalization before Part 2 examines the progress of revolutionism through the 'spirit of enlightenment', focusing on the growth of global moral solidarity. The chapter will demonstrate how these developments have the impact of undermining the ontological closure upon which sovereignty depends to at least some degree. This will prepare the way for the second chapter in this two chapter exploration of revolutionism, chapter 6, which will provide a clear definition of the post-sovereignty position that this thesis' deployment of the Linklater Little spectrum associates with this English School tradition.

INTRODUCING REVOLUTIONISM

The key feature of revolutionism in Wight's thought resides on a commitment to dispense with the division of humanity between closed states. Specifically revolutionists reject the notion that the international arena is a manifestation of the Hobbesian or indeed Lockean state of nature, resulting from the creation of multiple sovereign polities in the absence of any overarching global government. The division of the world, be it within a Hobbbesian (realist)

or Lockean (rationalist) frame, is illegitimate and should be swept away by the processes of history and make way for the expression of global humanity.[1]

The shape of revolutionism is actually the subject of some dispute. Porter contends that alternative manifestations of it define three distinct models, a Roman form of imperialism, a Kantian world federation and a cosmopolitan world society position.[2] Buzan, meanwhile, has more recently made a similar observation, suggesting that this ambiguity is a function of the relative lack of attention afforded revolutionism *vis-à-vis* the other traditions and something that needs correction. Whilst this research agrees that revolutionism requires more attention, however, especially in the context of globalization, unlike Buzan it subscribes to the Linklater – Little perspective which defines the three traditions as an ontological and an epistemological spectrum, which does not see each tradition as a homogenous block but rather as a portion of the flowing (three traditions) whole. In this context it is entirely appropriate to believe that the spectrum extends from a Kantian world federation on the one side (see the neo-Kantian category in Figure 1), sustaining an enduring state form and thus some ontological closure, albeit qualified by a very significant measure of commonality, through to a cosmopolitan arrangement which dispenses entirely with the ontological closure of the state on the far side of revolutionism (see the neo-Dantean, post-sovereignty pole category in Figure 1). Given the need to define revolutionism primarily in terms of its polar expression of complete openness, the post-sovereignty pole, it is especially important to now reflect on the bases for the ontology associated with the cosmopolitan form of governance.

In order to grasp the ontological openness posited by revolutionism's deconstruction of the sovereign state it is helpful to consider the interrelationships between people in different parts

of the world in the context of clear inter-state division (realism) and in the context of greater

global unity (revolutionism). If one subscribes to the realist contention that 'power is anterior

to society, law, justice and morality' it follows that the society in which Mr A resides, upheld

by state Z, must be closed off from the society in which Mr B resides, upheld by state Y.

Interactions between the two in the international arena, therefore, can only be made indirectly

through the two states wherein they reside since it is only the states that bear international

personality. If, on the other hand, subscribing to revolutionism, one locates humanity 'in the

open', people are able to engage with each other on the basis of their common humanity

which posits an ontological openness that unbundles conventional nation-state sovereignty.

In this new order, the bearers of personality, international or otherwise, are people. This

openness, ontologically diametrically opposed to the sovereign state, and championing the

centrality of humanity in its place, is seen again and again in Wight's characterisations of

revolutionism:

'States are not persons, they have no wills but the wills of the individuals who manage their

affairs, and behind the legal facade of the fictitious Society of Nations is the true international

society composed of men'.[3]

Revolutionists 'have emphasized the ideal unity of international society as the standard for

condemning the empirical divisions within the society and believing them to be transitory.

They implicitly repudiate the validity of the state system'.[4]

Revolutionists 'believe that the society of states is the unreal thing – a complex of legal

fictions and obsolescent diplomatic forms which conceals, obstructs and oppresses the real

society of individual men and women, the *civitas maxima*. On this view, international society is none other than the community of mankind. If the community of mankind is not yet manifested, yet it is latent, half glimpsed and groping for its necessary fulfilment'.[5]

Bull's characterisation of revolutionism, meanwhile, clearly echoes that of Wight. 'For Kantians', Bull observed, 'it was only at a superficial and transient level that international politics was about relations among human beings of which states were composed. The ultimate reality was the community of mankind, which existed potentially, even if it did not exist actually, and was destined to sweep the system of states into limbo'.[6]

TWO AGENCIES FOR REVOLUTIONISM

In his definition of the revolutionist tradition Wight, drawing on Kant, identifies two agencies that led the way to revolutionism, 'the spirit of commerce' and 'the spirit of enlightenment'. The commercial spirit, applied to contemporary society, pertains to the global economic flows that characterise this age. As Wight states, writing in 1960: 'We should probably translate it as the growing material interdependence of mankind, due to the economic unification of the world and industrialization'.[7] The spirit of enlightenment, meanwhile, Wight translates 'as the growing moral interdependence of mankind due to education, cultural exchange and intellectual standardization. It is manifested in the formation of a world public opinion, which some see as the animating principle of the United Nations'.[8] This chapter will offer reflection on the rise of revolutionism in the context of globalization from the perspective of these two agents manifest in the explosion of global economic flows, and the not unrelated increase in moral solidarity manifest through a growing willingness to countenance intervention in sovereign states. These two elements of revolutionism give rise

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to two distinct - although none the less interconnected - developments, one of which, economic globalization, is more advanced than the other.

1] ECONOMIC AGENCY

In examining global flows the point must first be made that the rationalist tradition of the English school three traditions spectrum stresses the importance of economic flows between polities.[9] What then is the justification for seeking to come to terms with economic globalization through revolutionism? In the first instance extensive economic interdependence was viewed by Wight as indicative of revolutionism. 'It is worth noting', Wight claimed, 'that the doctrine of *laissez faire*, which was the guiding philosophy of Britain during her Victorian predominance, was as authentically Revolutionist a doctrine as Jacobinism for revolutionary France. Its supreme theoretical exponent was Cobden'.[10] Later in another reflection on *laissez-faire* ideas Wight observes that: 'This *laissez faire* doctrine has many of the marks of Revolutionism. It proclaims the international solidarity of economic interest, repudiates the doctrine of the balance of power, and uses non-interventionism as a mode of intervention'.[11] In the second instance, as the chapter will demonstrate, the nature of economic interdependence has, since the mid-late twentieth century, (by some measures) expanded significantly beyond that experienced even during the nineteenth century such that rationalism is no longer the most obvious tradition to express economic interdependence. This necessarily translates into the selection of revolutionism when one appreciates that the intensity of this interdependence is actually inaugurating a 'time space compression' which threatens the very ontology of the state system - the chief target of revolutionism - with a new global connexity.[12]

In demonstrating the extent and the increase of the 'new temporality', this chapter's examination of economic processes reveals the special relevance of the revolutionist tradition to the current environment. First, it helps to address the criticism that the English School fails to engage with economics. As Richard Little observes: 'Despite acknowledging the importance of economics, there has been a reluctance by the English school to embrace this sector wholeheartedly'.[13] Tony Evans and Peter Wilson, meanwhile, maintain: 'The principal weakness of the English school is its relative disregard of economic and technological factors and the various types of international cooperation that these factors either induce or necessitate'.[14] This is important not least because it provides the opportunity for developing understanding of revolutionism which is undoubtedly the tradition that has been afforded the least attention over the years and in relationship to which most concerns have been expressed. In considering revolutionism in the context of current economic developments the chapter will reveal that there is a sense in which revolutionism is now more important than ever,[15] further justifying the renewed interest in the English School.[16]

2] MORAL AGENCY

These physical flows, in and of themselves, do not generate a new moral solidarity but they do create pressures that can call into being a greater measure of solidarity. An explosion of global flows in the interest of capitalism forges a new level of connectedness between peoples, generating a need for regulation. This new level of connectedness, and associated need for regulation negotiation, inevitably results in the development of common norms that help the cause of global solidarity – a kind of moral globalization. The new level of connectedness also makes it difficult to keep the violation of those norms secret. If human

rights abuses are taking place they can quickly find their way into the public domain and consequently pressure is placed upon governments to act.

This chapter will seek to demonstrate how the fortunes of the above agencies - especially the economic - provide examples of the new temporality identified in chapter 2, giving expression to globalization's spatio-temporal revolution. In doing so, the chapter will reflect directly on their implication for state sovereignty.

PART 1: ECONOMIC GLOBALIZATION

In turning to examine economic globalization in the light of revolutionism, it is important to be clear that it is not the purpose of this thesis to seek to make any contribution to current understanding of economic globalization *per se*, but rather to consider the conceptualization of sovereignty in that context from within the English School frame of reference. Section 1 will thus examine different features of economic globalization namely trade, portfolio finance and foreign direct investment, not to reveal something new about these ingredients of globalization but instead to show how, in contributing to the new openness, they constitute an important contemporary example of revolutionist ontology which is corrosive of the closed sovereign state. Section 2 will then examine the specifically ontological implications of these economic processes in more detail through consideration of finance and the network.[17] In building up an appreciation of revolutionism through consideration of the ingredients of economic globalization, it is important to be clear that it is not the purpose of this approach to use the three traditions as a lifeless, 'moribund classificatory device' whose only rationale is the gathering of empirical examples of the revolutionist tradition.[18] In the first instance, this detailed investigation of revolutionism demonstrates the ontological implications of

economic globalization, providing a framework within which to sensitively consider the conceptualization of international relations and the place of the sovereign state therein. In the second instance, it demonstrates/explains revolutionism's place within the three traditions spectrum in preparation for developing a detailed holistic appreciation of the entire spectrum through which the thesis will later consider the fate of sovereignty in the context of systemic change.

SECTION 1: THREE ECONOMIC FLOWS

1) TRADE AND GLOBALIZATION

In this section the chapter will first consider the possibility of revolutionist ontology resulting from the globalization of trade in general statistical terms before seeking further illumination through specific examination of: i) tariff reduction, ii) the changing definition of tariff barriers and iii) regulation.

Since the Second World War, the globe has witnessed a massive increase in trade. To be sure the relative rate of increase has slowed since the 1970s but the growth of trade has none the less continued, contributing to the increasingly interconnected nature of states. There are some discrepancies in accounts of the development of trade in the post war period. Held, McGrew, Globatt and Perraton claim that trade grew 5.8% per annum 1950-73,[19] whilst Kitson and Michie put the figure at 7.2%[20] and Hirst and Thompson contend that trade grew by 9% per annum during the said period.[21] Between 1973-96 Held, McGrew, Goldbatt and Perraton claim that trade grew 4.1% per annum, whilst world output grew at 3.3% per annum.[22] Kitson and Michie, meanwhile, with slightly different dates, 1973-1990, claim that

trade grew by 3.9% per annum and world output by 2.8% per annum.[23] Despite these marginally different figures and dates, however, if one takes a long term view of the expansion of trade across the course of history, it is clear that, world trade has grown more rapidly in the post-war period than in any earlier era. Whilst the rate of increase has slowed since 1970, the significance of trade has continued to grow such that, 'where the key OECD economies are concerned, the figures ...indicate that trade, as a proportion of GDP (measured in constant prices), has been higher since the early 1970s than in any previous era'.[24] Thus construed world trade has 'played a key role in promoting growth and cementing the bonds of interdependence between the leading Western economies'.[25]

i.   FALLING TARIFF BARRIERS

A key factor in the increase in trade, facilitating a greater connexity, has been the reduction of tariffs secured by the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade from 1948 and then from 1993 the World Trade Organisation. During its life the GATT presided over seven rounds of tariff reduction negotiations.[26] Negotiations brought tariffs down so that by 1979, when the Tokyo Round came to an end, they were lower than they had been during the Gold Standard era. Since then the Uruguay Round has taken them still lower and now of course the WTO is pressing ahead with its Doha Round.[27]

Success has depended on not just involving the big players but in also persuading developing countries to reject protectionism.[28] In the first 1947 GATT negotiations just 23 states took part, in the 1967-70 Kennedy Round of GATT negotiations over 80 countries participated whereas the last Uruguay Round 1986-93 embraced most countries in the world. In 1999 the WTO had 135 members with a further 30, including the likes of China and Russia, seeking

membership. Free trade has thus become the orthodoxy of the late twentieth/early twenty-first century.[29] This has generated a new level of interdependence and connexity between states whose putative sovereignty would suggest, contrarily, at least a very significant measure of ontological closure.

ii. NEW TARIFF BARRIERS

In order to fully appreciate the growing trade interdependence - facilitated in part by the work of the WTO in reducing tariffs - and its implications on putative state sovereignty, predicated upon ontological closure, it is vital to understand recent redefinitions of tariff barriers. Traditionally tariff barriers were legal provisions placing a levy on goods and services entering a country. Today the definition also includes so-called 'link issues' which constitute anything that distorts the reality of a level playing field for foreign goods or services; e.g. state policies regarding government procurement, investment, competition policy, environmental policy or labour policy which have the effect of creating barriers to trade by giving competitive advantages to nationals.[30] As a consequence of the recognition of this reality there have been 'pressures for a much deeper harmonisation of domestic laws and regulatory structures governing business', precipitating the need for a distinction between 'shallow integration', pertaining to conventional tariff reduction and 'deep integration', pertaining to the removal of other distortions of the level playing field.[31]

The movement from a negative/shallow to a positive/deep free trade agenda, through the instrumentality of 'link issues', constitutes a very significant qualitative development with very much greater implications for levels of interconnection. 'This unheralded theme... (deep integration) ...is continued by the 'link issues' which to be effective require harmonisation of

national policies'. In enlarging conceptions of trade barriers from issues such as tariffs, to other obstacles whose governance can impinge upon broader conceptions of the 'political good', there is a greater sense in which the quest to increase trade can be seen to be calling upon a measure of moral consensus that is ordinarily sought within a sovereign polity. Crucially, this has the potential to take one out of the arena of technical 'regularian law' and into the arena of political 'moral/emotive' law.[32] The ontological closure upon which sovereignty is predicated is thus once again called into question by growing transnational linkages.

iii.   STATE SOVEREIGNTY, INTERDEPENDENCE & REGULATION

In the context of increasing mutual vulnerability, resulting from growing trade interdependence, there is a need for new supranational governance which further undermines the ontological closure of the sovereign state without calling into being a new ontological closure in the form of a supranational, federal sovereign state. The WTO does not just exist to encourage states to reduce tariffs. Crucially, the WTO is 'a much more powerful institution [than the GATT] in so far as its dispute panels have the authority to make binding judgements' in the event of trade disputes.[33]   Between 1995 and 2003 282 cases were registered leading to 68 adopted rulings and 64 cases where an out of court settlement was used compared with just 229 cases and 98 rulings in 42 years of GATT history (1948-89).[34] The development of the world's free trade body from a basically intergovernmental structure into something very much more supranational is suggestive of a shifting economic centre of gravity born of the globalization of trade. '[T]he global regulation of trade, by bodies such as the WTO, implies a significant re-negotiation of the Westphalian notion of state sovereignty'.[35]

REVOLUTIONISM AND TRADE

In seeking to translate the ontological implications of recent trade developments into the three traditions spectrum, there is no doubt that they should be located, at least in part, within the revolutionist tradition. There are two bases for making this contention, both of which relate to the implications of the peculiar intensity of contemporary trading practices in championing and sustaining ontological openness. First, contemporary levels of trade introduce an ontological revolution by locating the sovereign state's economic centre of gravity in a context that has to embrace the central importance of trade and thus, at the very heart of its ontology, a basic openness. This was not required by the earlier and more limited trade, whose importance was such that it could only be deemed to constitute an 'enclave'[36] within the broader national economy. Second, this interdependence calls into being global governance which, imposing decisions on members, undermines the ontological closure of the so-called sovereign state.

2) GLOBALIZATION AND GLOBAL FINANCE

Unlike the creation of the national economy during the mercantilist era, globalization is not primarily about a territorial reconfiguration on a larger scale, a quantitative extension of the market. It is rather concerned with a qualitative development of the market which can be seen with great clarity through the lens of an appreciation of the way in which global finance undermines the autonomy of the political through the development of a hyperspatial, extra-territorial financial dimension which is not obviously accountable to the territorial sovereign state. Since the 1960s and 1970s, there has been a massive increase in the significance of global finance[37] which has played a key role in defining contemporary globalization and its implications for state sovereignty. This chapter will now examine recent developments in

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global finance from the perspective of: 1) the advent of the Euro-dollar market and 2) the termination of the Dollar-Gold Standard exchange rate system and the related demise of capital controls, considering their implications for sovereignty

1. MONEY AND VALUE AND THE EURO-DOLLAR

The development which has perhaps done more than anything to graphically generate an extra-territorial global financial realm has been the advent, and subsequent development, of the Euro-dollar market. The Euro-dollar market provides a mechanism whereby one can hold dollars beyond the control of the United States monetary regime or indeed any monetary regime. It thus provides a source of finance which, unaccountable to any state, is completely unregulated. As such its fortunes consequently depend entirely upon the market. Creating many of the tensions which have contributed to the policy of financial deregulation since 1970, the Euro-dollar market has had a definitive influence over the global economy.[38]

Having begun life, according to one account, almost by accident in 1949 and developed quietly during the 1950s, the Euro-dollar market first became public knowledge in the early 1960s.[39] In the context of government acquiescence the Euro-dollar developed rapidly, creating an increasingly significant ethereal, extra-territorial dimension in which money was firstly growing at an incredible rate and secondly being moved around the globe in vast quantities.[40] As such it was having an increasingly significant impact on national economies, despite the fact that it was divorced from any kind of direct relationship to 'the real economy' and thus became, in an important sense, an autonomous, 'economy apart' which was beyond government regulation. The quintessentially extra-territorial, autonomous, global nature of the Euro-dollar market is clearly demonstrated in the following quotation from one of its

greatest champions, Walter Wriston. 'National borders are no longer defensible against the invasion of knowledge, ideas or financial data, ...The Euro-currency markets are a perfect example. No one designed them, no one authorised them, and no one controlled them ...today they are **refugees**, if you will, from national attempts to allocate credit and capital for reasons which have little or nothing to do with finance and economics'. (Emphasis added).[41]

Rapid expansion, of about twenty-five percent every year, continued during the 1970s[42] such that the price of the Euro-dollar fell and consequentially there was a desire to hold extra-territorial money in other rather stronger currencies. During the 1970s the Euro-dollar market was thus complemented by the Euro-sterling, the Euro-mark and Euro-yen market.[43] The attraction of moving out of dollars, whilst maintaining extra-territoriality, was such that demand for the newly favoured Euro-mark pushed its interest rate higher than that in Germany. There was thus a tremendous incentive for the serious investor to evade controls and deposit in this new extra-territorial banking world.[44]

Thus, since the advent of the first extra-territorial currency, growth has been witnessed on two fronts: first, there has been a multiplication of the numbers of extra-territorial currencies and, second, these currencies have expanded very significantly in size. In 1973 there were just $50 billion Euro-dollars; by 1987 there were some $2 trillion. Euro-dollars were approaching the size of the monetary aggregates of the United States economy and yet they apparently had no economy of their own.[45] As long ago as 1979 the value of Euro-dollar transactions were six times those of world trade. By 1986 their value had risen to twenty five times that of world trade.[46]

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THE NEW AUTONOMY

The advent of the Euro-dollar, and other unpatriated currency markets has presented a significant challenge to national sovereignty, providing a form of liquidity that impacts the direction of both national economies and the global economy but over which sovereign governments have no control. Before reflecting in detail on the impact of this new extra-territorial domain on state sovereignty, however, it is important to first consider the demise of fixed exchange rates and capital controls which were partially the result of growing extra-territorial money flows and also a great cause for their further extension.

2. THE END OF FIXED EXCHANGE RATES & CAPITAL CONTROLS

The post war Bretton Woods System (BWS) placed great emphasis on the importance of exchange rate stability which was secured through a fixed exchange rate system underpinned by capital controls. British BWS architect Keynes, with the support of his America colleague, Dexter White, 'consistently and emphatically maintained that national monetary autonomy [secured by the fixed exchange rate system in the context of capital controls] was essential to the successful management of a macroeconomic policy geared to full employment'.[47] The development of significant unregulated capital flows resulting from the advent of the Euro-dollar market, however, placed the integrity of capital controls in unofficial jeopardy from the 1960s onwards. This threat to the integrity of capital controls, moreover, also came to have a measure of official sanction from 1961 with the founding of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). In its founding Convention, OECD members - including all the major capitalist economies of the world and thus those that had negotiated Bretton Woods (the USA, Britain, France etc) - agreed to seek to 'reduce or abolish obstacles to the exchange of goods and services and current payments

and maintain and extend the *liberalisation of capital movements*'.[48] (Italics added). Specifically, the OECD *Code of Liberalisation of Capital Movements* (ratified in December 1961) states that: 'In adhering to the Code, OECD Members have undertaken to remove restrictions on specified lists of capital movements between residents of different countries. OECD Members have thereby waived their right under the IMF's Articles of Agreement to maintain capital controls (while the Code does not alter OECD Members' obligations as members of the IMF). The OECD is to date the only multi-lateral instrument promoting comprehensive capital movements liberalisation as its primary purpose'.[49]

Although in 1964 the OECD decided not to embrace further liberalization for fear of placing Bretton Woods under too much pressure, in 1971 the dollar-gold standard came to an end and the System began to unravel. To be sure, whilst increasing capital flows did place the integrity of the fixed exchange rate system in jeopardy - as Keynes and Dexter White warned - US trade deficits with Europe and Japan, the costs of Vietnam and Johnson's Great Society project arguably had more to do with Nixon's decision to terminate convertibility.[50] Indeed, even with growing extra-territorial currency flows in the absence of the fixed exchange rate system - and thus bereft of a key rationale for capital controls - they initially remained in place, although not for long. America led the way, abandoning its capital controls in 1974, followed by Britain in 1979, Germany in 1981 and France after the dramatic failure of its reflationary policies in the early 1980s.[51] All OECD countries have now jettisoned capital controls and increasingly other countries are following suit. During the 1980s only 40% of countries had floating exchange rates and had thus removed effective capital controls. By 1999 60% of countries had floating exchange rates and had thus removed their controls. Today it is only the transitional and developing economies that maintain capital controls,

although, anxious to draw in foreign direct investment, many of these nations are accepting the need for their abolition.[52]

Having presided over the key change in aspiration in 1961, the OECD has done much - over and above the abolition of many capital controls - to actually encourage the realisation of free capital movements.[53] Age Bakker contends that the liberalisation of capital flows constitutes 'one of the OECD's most important successes'.[54]

THE EROSION OF SOVEREIGNTY:

The removal of capital controls significantly undermines the autonomy of the state by making it much more difficult for a government to control its money supply. 'Capital mobility, deregulation and financial innovation have transformed the capacity of governments to determine the domestic money supply and inflation levels'.[55] The implications of this on the state are best demonstrated through the Mundell-Fleming theorem[56] which maintains that a polity cannot abandon its capital controls at the same time as setting its interest and exchange rates. If a nation sets the interest rate and exchange rate but at the same time abandons capital controls then the free movement of money into and out of the country will immediately disturb its chosen rates. On abandoning its capital controls, therefore, the theorem claims that a state must either choose its exchange rate, and allow the interest rate to move according to the magnitude of money going in and out of the country, or it must choose its interest rate, and allow the exchange rate to move once again according to the movement of money in and out of the country.

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During the 1970s many states thought that they could effectively continue to have an autonomous economic policy, choosing their interest rate, whilst living with the consequences of a rather more fluid exchange rate. In the event, however, Held *et al* contend that exchange rates moved so rapidly that the aspiration for on-going economic independence had to be sacrificed to the global marketplace and its determination of the interest rate.[57]

If it is not practically possible to determine interest rates as a result of allowing exchange rates to fluctuate randomly, however, can the Mundell Flemming theorem be exploited the other way around? Can a state let go of interest rates and set the exchange rate? In practice, Held *et al* contend, this too has proved to be difficult. The shift in the centre of gravity to the bond and currency markets on the global level has meant that both interest and exchange rates are actually being largely determined by the world marketplace.[58] Thus the 'real' economies of the world are presided over by a global financial market which operates in deference to blunt, stock exchange mediated, market forces. This means that the only way in which a country can hope to receive investment is by conforming to the prime imperative of the world's stock markets, low inflation, whatever it takes.

THE EROSION OF SOVEREIGNTY: PRACTICAL CONSEQUENCES

The chapter will now consider a number of the practical consequences of the removal of capital controls for the sovereign state:

i.   THE END OF EFFECTIVE GOVERNMENT INTERVENTION

'Capital controls', Sassen observes, 'provided some defense against speculative attacks and some policy autonomy within a fixed exchange rate system'.[59] Today, however, the controls have been removed from most states and at the same time the massive growth of global financial aggregates over the last thirty years has completely dwarfed the significance of central bank reserves. The sum of all such reserves globally is a mere $1.5 trillion.[60] In a world without capital controls, where the average daily foreign exchange turnover is itself $1.5 trillion, one can see what pitiful leverage sovereign states have at their disposal. Standing against the movement of the financial economy, a state could easily spend its reserves in just a couple of days.[61]

There are many examples of the impact of the massive expansion of currency flows on the sovereign state's capacity to intervene in the markets in the context of the demise of exchange controls. Kenichi Ohmae documents the attempts of the Bank of Japan to prop up the dollar by spending $16 billion between March 1986 and January 1987. Its efforts were to no avail and today, of course, any such initiative would arise from the weaker starting point of a very much more extensive extra-territorial financial realm. 'The FX market', Ohmae contends, 'has become an empire of its own, or the Third Empire, which seems completely independent of the Group of Five [now the G8] or, for that matter, any government'.[62] Later he continues; 'The world's money supply has gone beyond the control of any single government ...Even if the BOJ tightens the money supply, a Japanese banker can borrow an impact loan instantaneously from abroad'.[63]

Turning to the 1990s Ohmae observes: 'as the workings of genuinely global capital markets dwarf their ability to control exchange rates or protect their currency, nation-states have become inescapably vulnerable to the discipline imposed by economic choices made elsewhere by people and institutions over which they have no practical control'. This was demonstrated clearly in the Maastricht related speculation against the franc, the pound and the kronor.[64]

ii.   THE END OF EFFECTIVE STERILIZATION OF INTERVENTION

Furthermore, even when government does seek to intervene, the termination of capital controls means that it loses the opportunity to 'sterilize' its intervention. In the past if a government intervened on the foreign exchange markets in order to support its currency it would then offset this action by intervening in its domestic money market in a process which came to be known as 'sterilization'. This is best explained through an example. Suppose a currency is too strong and so its government intervenes on the foreign exchange markets to sell and thus reduce demand for that currency. If 'un-sterilized' such an action would increase domestic money supply, generating unwanted inflationary pressure. Having intervened to sell the currency on the foreign exchange markets, therefore, government would then sterilize the domestic impact of this intervention by releasing new bonds to mop up the excess money. Once the division between the domestic and foreign exchange markets has been removed, however, then the release of new bonds would put up the interest rate which – in a global market place – would have the effect of drawing in more money which would put up the exchange rate, exaggerating the original problem that selling the currency was supposed to solve.[65]

iii. THE DEATH OF REFLATIONARY POLICY

The death of effective intervention and sterilization carry with them the demise of the option of Keynesian demand management. This fact obtained seminal expression in the case of the French Socialist government in the early '80s which pursued classic reflationary policy in the interest of generating growth. The government sought to stimulate economic growth by lowering the interest rate. Without the effective capital controls of the dollar-gold standard era, however, money left the country in search of more favourable interest rates. This naturally pulled down the exchange rate and rendered imports more expensive which in turn pushed up inflation. The government was thus forced to put interest rates up once again in order to slacken demand. Thus, in an open economy, unprotected by effective capital controls, reflation will not necessarily produce economic growth.[66] 'With rapid and increased capital mobility governments may find it difficult to sustain an expansionary macroeconomic policy. Financial globalization increases the incentives for governments to pursue national macroeconomic strategies which seek low and stable rates of inflation, through fiscal discipline and a tight monetary policy'.[67] One is constantly aware of 'the increasing constraints on national level governance that prevent ambitious macroeconomic policies that diverge significantly from the norms acceptable to international financial markets'.[68]

iv. GOVERNMENT DEBT AND GLOBALIZATION

The global financial markets also threaten the autonomy of sovereign states by undermining their standing and integrity in the arena of debt. Under Bretton Woods, the absence of the major global financial opportunities, subsequently born of deregulation, placed constraints on credit options. In 1973 total net public sector debt, as a share of the GDP of OECD nations, was just 15%. During the '80s, however, financial liberalisation opened the door to many

new forms of credit which governments began to exploit, borrowing where previously they would have been obliged to either raise taxes or reduce expenditure. Total net public sector debt, as a share of GDP in all OECD nations, rose to 40% by 1995. One of the greatest enthusiasts for global credit was the United States which went from being the world's biggest creditor nation to being its biggest debtor nation in less than a decade! Apparently sovereign nations are thus left answerable to international finance. 'Governments with large debts are in fact partly in the hands of investors – whether foreign or national – who can switch their investments to other currencies. Governments and their central banks have thus been losing control over long-term interest rates, no minor matter if you consider that 60% or more of private sector debt in the United States, Japan, Germany, and France is linked to them'.[69]

THE WAY AHEAD?

Looking to the future the suggestion is that, despite their current magnitude, cross-border flows are destined to grow even more, with all that this means for the sovereign state. In 1994 the McKinsey Global Institute suggested that the world was mid-way through a 50 year process that would culminate in full integration. In this context financial markets, they claim, will get even bigger in relationship to the real economy. Locating their forward projection in preceding developments, they observed that, between 1980 and 1992, the total stock of financial assets traded in the global capital market increased from $5 trillion to $35 trillion which was twice the GDP of OECD countries, the 23 richest states in the world. Increasing integration, Sassen observes, can only mean '[m]uch more integration and power may lie ahead for capital markets'.[70]

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THE SOVEREIGN STATE AND AUTONOMOUS FINANCE

Thus the Euro-dollar generated extra-territorial currency flows which placed pressure on capital controls and the state's control of the money supply. This in turn contributed, along with other factors including the trade deficit and the cost of the Vietnam war, to the demise of the dollar gold standard which furthered the movement against capital controls, paving the way for their abolition and the further development of global financial aggregates. In these developments we see the basis for a new power source autonomous from the sovereign state.

Supranational finance, in league with the IMF, has now effectively become the new co-ordinating power of every capitalist economy. It has in a very real sense laid down the universal ground rules to which every serious capitalist nation must adhere regardless of the political persuasion of its government. This, as Strange observes, has had the implication of effectively dictating the thrust of economic policy to states, significantly diminishing their freedom and in some senses eroding the difference between left and right.[71] In this sense it is true that liberal democratic capitalism has indeed brought about Fukuyama's 'End of History'.[72] Thus, whilst the French Left lives on in name, the reflationary projects that it inspired during the early 1980s have had to die. Indeed the Left across the whole of the western world, that is serious about election, has been forced to change out of all recognition from the modern era. It has had to be united with the Right in submission to the new universal jurisdiction of finance. As Harvey observed: 'There had of course always been a delicate balance between financial and state powers under capitalism, but the breakdown of Fordist-Keynesianism evidently meant a shift towards the empowerment of finance capital *vis à vis* the nation-state'.[73]

The advent of unpatriated currency movements such as the Euro-dollar, whose lack of regulation has facilitated their massive growth, has thus effectively taken power from the politicians and in this sense disenfranchised the electorates of the world.[74] 'The formation of a global capital market represents a concentration of power capable of influencing national government economic policy and, by extension, other policies as well. These markets now exercise the accountability functions associated with citizenship: they can vote governments' economic policies down or in: they can force governments to take certain measures and not others. While the power of these markets is quite different from that of the political electorate, they have emerged as a sort of global, cross-border economic electorate where the right to vote is predicated on the possibility of registering capital'.[75]

CAPITAL LIBERALISATION, EXTRA-TERRITORIALITY AND SOVEREIGNTY

The challenge posed by the globalization of capital is that it creates power flows that cannot be married in any sense to sovereign territorial state government whether considered individually or collectively. If the global market consisted of the collective territories of the sovereign states it would be possible to govern them on the basis of those states. In reality, however, the creation of the global market does not simply mean the creation of a new market expression that has its being within the collective extent of the several territories. This new market expression actually generates an extensive extra-territorial reality which cannot be understood merely as the sum of its territorial state parts and governed effectively through the co-ordination of those state parts. Ontologically it calls into being a new end which is qualitatively different from that of the sovereign states and is arguably, therefore, beyond their direct 'onto(logical)-constitutional reach' and thus cannot properly be collectively called to account by them.

GLOBAL FINANCE AND REVOLUTIONISM

In conclusion the revolution in portfolio finance has had significant implications for the sovereign state, undermining the ontological closure upon which it is predicated. The translation of this into 'revolutionism' on the three traditions spectrum has two bases. First, the revolution of global finance constitutes an ontological revolution that undermines the ontological closure of the sovereign state by generating a new global connexity through the advent of a new and influential extra-territorial domain. Second, and very strikingly given the history of other candidates for revolutionism, this manifestation of revolutionism does not just resolidify around a new boundary of closure, once the object of its critique has been deconstructed. In the language developed by chapter 2, its temporal orientation endows it with an enduring ontological openness.

3) FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT (FDI)

Having considered the impact of the deregulation of portfolio finance, the chapter will now turn to address the implications of the deregulation of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI). FDI constitutes an investment in foreign assets which results in the investors taking control of those assets as opposed to foreign portfolio investment wherein an investor places money abroad but does not assume day to day governmental control of the project in which he/she has invested.[76] Thus FDI erodes the ontological closure of the sovereign state on a wider basis than portfolio finance in the sense that it not only involves economic flows but economic flows that involve the actual day to day control of the actual process of production. Animated through the vehicle of the multinational company, FDI 'slices up the value chain'

and co-ordinates the production of goods and services through networks of factories, under their international umbrella, between nations.

Some restrictions on FDI remain in place, aggravated by the failure of efforts to secure the Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MAI) in 1998.[77] Despite this situation, however, it is important to recognize that since 1945: a) some countries have always promoted a liberal approach towards FDI, namely Britain, Germany and the USA, and b) the OECD has played an important role in encouraging other economies to adopt a similar position.[78] In the same way that the post-war period saw a very rapid increase in trade and portfolio finance, therefore, so too has it seen a significant increase in FDI. For most of the post-war period stocks and flows of FDI have grown faster than world income and on some occasions faster than trade, especially during the 1960s and the years immediately following 1985.[79] By 1998, Held *et al* observe that the multi-national net had extended such that there were 53,000 multinational companies and 450,000 foreign subsidiaries, with global sales amounting to $9.5 trillion.[80]

Of particular relevance to this liberalisation has been the complete sea change in the attitudes of developing countries. During the 1970s there was huge suspicion of foreign ownership especially after the Allende government in Chile, which had nationalised the assets of American firms, was removed by a coup in which the said multinationals apparently played a key role.[81] As a reflection of this perception that the multinational's agenda was an exploitative form of neo-colonialism, there were some 336 national expropriations during that decade. In the 1980s, however, there were just 15 national expropriations and the approach of many developing countries began to change as they actually sought to encourage FDI.[82]

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'[L]iberalisation', Held, *et al* note, 'has been incremental but still substantial, with over a hundred countries making their FDI regime more open in the period 1991-5'.[83] The increasing engagement of developing countries with FDI, moreover, has meant that the OECD states' share of the agreements has been dropping as a proportion of the total number of agreements. In 1989 83% of such treaties were negotiated by OECD states. By the late 1990s their share had fallen to 62%.[84] Today most Latin American countries have adopted a liberal approach to FDI, as have most East Asian countries.[85] Even China has moved from a posture of complete control to a more open regime. Whilst the African continent continues to sustain a great deal of diversity in its nations' approaches to FDI, many restrictions were none the less lifted during the 1990s.[86]

A MORE ADVANCED CONNEXITY?

Before moving to examine the direct sovereignty implications of FDI, it is important to recognize that FDI not only constitutes a more advanced form of interdependence than portfolio finance in the sense that it brings with it greater control over the assets in question and inaugurates the transnationalisation of production. Less obviously it also contributes significantly to the development of world trade.

Today the significance of transnational production is such that it 'outweighs exports as the dominant mode of servicing foreign markets',[87] thus providing the basis for the majority of world exporting. The trade perspective on FDI can be seen on three bases. First, and most obviously, FDI enables companies to directly service foreign markets by establishing bases overseas. Second, and less obviously, FDI also supports a process called 'intra-firm' trade which involves trading between units within a multi-national network in different parts of the

globe.[88] Finally, FDI increasingly enables companies to indirectly service foreign markets through the sales of foreign affiliates within transnational production networks. During the 1970s and 1980s sales of affiliates were comparable to world exports. By the late 1990s, however, sales of affiliates were 30% higher than world exports. From the perspective of GDP percentage, the sales from foreign affiliates constituted 10-15% of world GDP during the '70s. Today sales from foreign affiliates constitute 25% of world GDP.[89] When one employs a sufficiently broad conceptualization of FDI - accommodating the three bases for trade cited above - one sees that it takes very significant steps in the constitution of an economic globality on which future economic growth depends.

Thus FDI creates a greater sense of economic interdependence than portfolio finance on three bases. It introduces the day to day control of assets, the transnationalisation of production and also a significant extension of trade. This provides a yet further basis for the contention that FDI presents a greater threat than portfolio finance to the basic ontological closure upon which the sovereign state depends.

A LESS ADVANCED CONNEXITY?

However, whilst FDI might seem like a more advanced expression of globalization in some respects, there is an important sense in which it is less threatening to the autonomy of the sovereign state than deregulated currency flows and portfolio investment. Whilst the latter can be moved around the world effortlessly in milliseconds, FDI investments are much less mobile. Once a multinational has invested in a country and built factories these cannot be moved to another part of the globe by striking some keys on a computer terminal!

Having made this qualification, however, it is important not to overstate the point by concentrating on a dated vision of FDI. In the context of networked multinationals, which are not based on ownership, FDI is considerably more footloose than was once the case. Thomas Friedman notes that: 'While it is true that the Fords, Ciscos, Nikes and Toyotas ...don't move their capital around as fast as ...[the money markets] ...they are shifting it from country to country faster than many people realise'. A lot of MNC investment today 'is not in building factories anymore. It is developing alliances with locally owned factories, which serve as affiliates, sub-contractors and partners of the multinational firms, and these production relationships can be and are moved around from country to country, producer to producer, with increasing velocity in search of the best tax deals and most efficient and low cost labour forces'.[90] To the extent that FDI can be moved with greater speed than was once the case, MNC's now have greater leverage over the state than was the case when all investment resulted in outright ownership of physical plants which could not be moved without significant reallocation costs. Thus, whilst FDI might not be constitutive of an economic autonomy in the tradition of portfolio finance, the former has certainly had the effect of further increasing the autonomy of global economic realities *vis-à-vis* the sovereign state.

FDI, MNCs AND SOVEREIGNTY

FDI can undermine the decisional expression of the sovereign state on a number of bases that the chapter will now briefly examine:

I. MACRO-ECONOMIC POLICY

In the first instance the size of multinationals is such that they can undermine a state's macro-economic policy simply by moving in a contrary direction to that of the government. If a state

wishes to reduce unemployment by boosting domestic demand, for example, the benefit of taking this step may be undone by MNCs choosing to redirect profits to another nation. Similarly an MNC can create havoc with attempts to control the money supply by either borrowing from other nations where money is cheaper when a host government raises interest rates or by using the opportunities of low interest rates in the host country to finance its projects overseas.[91] Furthermore, whilst in a global capital market exchange rates can be manipulated by many different money movements, one should not forget the significance of currency movements initiated by MNCs. As Held *et al* note, 'although speculators may initiate an attack on a currency, it is when MNCs (and institutional investors) shift out of that currency, even as a precautionary measure, that pressure on the exchange rate can become irreversible'.[92]

II. TAXATION POLICY: MANIPULATION

MNCs can also undermine the sovereign state by manipulating its taxation policy. This is done through pressuring host governments to offer preferential tax regimes in order to attract their investment. Over the last twenty-five years, as the transnationalisation of production has grown significantly in importance, corporate tax rates in developed countries have fallen and moved more into line with one another. In the context of pressures from and MNCs and the desire to draw in FDI, Held at al contend that countries and regions today increasingly find themselves trying to out bid each other with tax incentives.[93] More blatant manipulation is witnessed through the practice that Susan Strange describes as 'tax farming'. 'MNCs can be said to be tax farmers because of the freedom that they are often given, unlike other companies and the rest of the population, to determine how much tax they pay'. As examples

Strange cites the oil companies whose tax liability the US government adjusted to compensate for royalties paid to the Middle East. In the end they paid no tax at all.[94]

III. TAXATION POLICY: TRANSFER PRICING

The position of the sovereign state with respect to taxation policy is also undermined by the practice of 'Transfer Pricing' which involves the under or over-charging of internal transactions within MNC networks in order to diminish profits in high tax countries and boost them in low tax countries. It is illegal but the extensiveness of intra-firm trade provides great opportunity for this practice. As governments increasingly share information in order to obtain a clear understanding of the accounts of multinationals, however, it is becoming more difficult for firms to exploit their global leverage. Rousslang estimated that transfer pricing makes MNCs an annual tax saving of somewhere in the region of $8billion.[95]

IV. INDUSTRIAL POLICY

One of the areas in which FDI has exerted its greatest influence over government decision-making, Strange maintains, pertains to industrial policy. In the past countries like France based their industrial policy on the idea of promoting key national champions. In an age, however, where the big firms are, of necessity, 'multi' national, and can move from one country to another, it is more difficult to think in terms of national champions. Increasingly, therefore, industrial policy has looked to the creation of networked projects between nations like, for example, the Europe-wide Airbus project, which means that any sponsoring state must share its influence with the other sponsoring states and the powerful multinational itself, significantly eroding its leverage. [96]

State sovereignty has thus clearly been subject to significant erosion thanks to the rapid development of FDI since 1945 and especially since 1970. Commenting on globalization, Susan Strange contends, that there can be no doubt that developments 'add up to a substantial shift of power from territorial states to world markets, and indirectly therefore to the major operators in those markets, the transnational corporations'.[97]

CONCLUSION

In some ways FDI presents economic life with a greater measure of autonomy from sovereign state control than free trade or free portfolio finance. It achieves this by generating a stronger sense of a global economic centre of gravity, not only by sustaining the affect of a global marketplace (its hidden export function) and the reality of global flows of finance, but also through the transnationalisation of production itself. Whilst FDI may not have quite the quality of autonomy attached to portfolio finance, with its ability to leave instantly, the movement away from making big investments (e.g. building factories) in foreign countries, towards developing instead relational networks of indigenous smaller companies, to which the MNC 'contracts out' specific tasks, is greatly speeding up the potential flow of FDI and thus further undermining the autonomy of government.

FDI LIBERALISATION AND REVOLUTIONISM

In seeking to translate the ontological implications of recent FDI developments into the three traditions spectrum, there is no doubt that its ontological impact should be located within the revolutionist tradition. There are two bases for making this contention, both of which relate to the implications of the peculiar intensity and extensity of FDI flows, championing and sustaining ontological openness. First, contemporary FDI has introduced a level of

interdependence across a broad basis (encompassing basic investment flows, asset control, the transnationalisation of production and trade) such that participating sovereign polities are rendered increasingly open in a way that questions the ontological closure upon which their putative sovereignty is predicated. Second, this interdependence does not seek to refer to ontological openness merely for the purposes of deconstructing that which went before merely to replace it with a new form of closure. FDI flows remain in an inherently dynamic state of flux. They do not solidify around a new point of closure. FDI undermines the significance of state sovereignty because, although it creates a domain that is beyond the territorial jurisdiction of the state, the presence of this extra-territorial domain is able to impact the territorial domain of the sovereign state.

SECTION 2: THE QUEST FOR THE EXTRA-TERRITORIAL ONTOLOGY

In the previous section this chapter examined the increasing importance of economic flows, both between and beyond states, and the manner in which these have contributed to the erosion of the decisional freedom of the supposedly sovereign state. These flows impact the ontological closure upon which putative sovereignty depends on two bases: first through radically increasing the levels of interdependence and second, and more profoundly, through the development of extra-territorial power sources that are beyond the ontological reach of the territorial sovereign state. If one is to fully understand the implications of globalization on state sovereignty, it is now imperative to investigate the ontological character of this extra-territoriality in greater detail. The chapter will do so by examining the dependence of globalization on an accentuated temporality, first through the lens of finance and then through the lens of the network.

I.   FINANCE AND THE NEW TEMPORALITY

The world of finance is inherently predicated on employing the services of time. It seeks to obtain opportunity for change 'today' by reaching into the 'future'. In terms of the spatio-temporal parameters developed in chapter 2, one would say that finance is temporally rather than spatially oriented and is constructive of an openness that releases one from the constraints of 'the given', to create and then access new opportunities.[98]

A helpful perspective on the temporality/openness of the financial economy can be obtained by reference to its identity with what Hardt and Negri describe as 'the plane of immanence' which they define by reference to philosophical developments. The radical philosophical openness born of the Enlightenment, they observe, threatened to erupt with hugely deconstructive implication during the eighteenth century, but was contained by the re-imposition of closure via man-made transcendence and hierarchy. At this time the re-imposition of transcendence was appealing not just because it protected certain vested interests but also because the economic and technological realities of the day affirmed the imposition of boundaries and thus spatially oriented frameworks of transcendence. In the twenty-first century, however, the re-eruption of philosophical immanence, culminating in post-modernism, is being greeted by a very much more amenable economic and technological framework. Sustained by information technology, global capital 'operates on the plane of immanence, through relays and networks of relationships of domination, without reliance on a transcendent centre of power'. As such capital is 'deterritorialising and immanent', a logical economic bedfellow of ideational immanence in a way that modern national political economy never could be.[99] To the degree that all the devices informed by the plane of immanence endeavour to obtain a spatial liberation by reference to time, their

ontology has a temporal root and thus, as demonstrated in chapter 2, a clearly hyperspatial character.

Some people, Castells notes, express the growing importance of the ethereal financial economy by contrasting it with the rather more obvious physical economy as the 'real economy'. The relative significance of finance today, he contends, however, is such that they would do better to attribute 'reality' to finance since it increasingly determines the parameters that inform broader economic policy.[100] Here one sees very clearly the transcendence/contradiction of the closed/given (space) by the open (time) that is definitive of the hyperspatial, the assimilation of space into time. Specifically, to the extent that the size of the financial economy in the context of global deregulation transcends value, there is a clear sense of space (the given, value) being assimilated into time (openness, the possibility of change). In this sense economic globalization has articulated a space-time revolution that has called into being the new rootless, extra-territorial domain of hyperspace.

II.THE NETWORK AND THE NEW TEMPORALITY

The sense in which economic globalization is temporally oriented is not only demonstrated by narrowly considering the ontological implications of finance. It is also seen in its identification with the networked form of organisation which impacts all aspects of economic globalization and has found particularly developed contemporary expression thanks to the services of information technology.[101]

In order to understand the notion of the network, it is helpful to contrast it with the dominant notion that preceded it. If the post-modern age of globalization has given rise to, and is being inspired by, the network, the modern age gave rise to, and was inspired by, the machine.

The notion of the machine is based on the idea that certain ends can be secured by impacting many different discrete parts, cogs, intelligently arranged, with controlled forces. Ontologically these cogs are closed and indeed this is absolutely central to the functioning of the machine given that the operation of cogs depends on the fact that they interact on the basis of antithesis which transfers energy and movement in the interest of realising the objective for which the machine was created.[102] The conception of space which informs the machine is premised on an ontological closure which makes it consistent with sovereignty. Indeed some writers have explicitly linked sovereignty to the machine.[103]

The notion of the network on the other hand involves large numbers of actors that, joined by multiple connections, mediate flows of money, ideas, services etc, securing the command of information that is central to success in a knowledge based economy. Actors embracing the 'networked form' find that the ontological closure - that which secured the centred, boundaried identity of the cog and the machine - is exchanged for an ontological openness that increasingly refashions them as hubs for flows of information, ideas and money. Indeed, in order to really come to terms with the network it is necessary - as this and future chapters will demonstrate repeatedly - to focus on the relationships between actors rather than the actors themselves. As Mulgan reflected '[i]t may still look as if it... [the world today] ...is made up of separate and sovereign individuals, firms, nations or cities, but the deeper reality is one of multiple connections, many of them inexplicable, many invisible'.[104] This

transformation can be described in postmodern language as a form of deconstruction that decentres the subject.[105] As such it testifies to an acute temporal orientation mediated by the flows (see chapter 2) that dominate the actors, demonstrating again contemporary capitalism's dependence on time. The network's commitment to ontological openness, sustaining flows that deconstruct centred actors, means that it is consistent with post-sovereignty.

Armed with this perspective, one can see that globalization's dependence on the networked form provides a further example of contemporary capitalism's dependence on the temporal orientation. As in the case of the previous section, the significance of this temporal orientation from the perspective of sovereignty is that it contributes to the generation an extra-territorial ontology beyond the direct reach of the territorial sovereign state.

SOVEREIGNTY, HYPERSPACE AND REVOLUTIONISM

The advent of an influential hyperspatial component in contemporary culture seen from the perspective of both a) finance and b) the network requires that sovereignty engages with a form of change that results in its erosion and arguably in its deconstruction. In the past any kind of power that threatened the autonomy of a state generally had a spatial orientation as did the state. In this sense it existed in the dimension where the modern state enjoyed its jurisdiction. This is not to say that a power threat to a state necessarily arose from within that state but simply that it arose from either within itself (i.e. a domestic, national civil society source), from within another state (a foreign, national civil society source) or directly from another state. Whilst a state threatened by forces from within another state, or indeed by another state, may not be able to seek solutions by referring to a municipal legal foundation,

given that the threat does not come from beyond the reach of the state *per se* there is a basis for its continued integrity. In light of the mutual desire of polities to uphold their common form, in the case of threats emanating from within another state, the government of that state (State B) may be willing to help the threatened state (State A) by addressing the source of the threat within its (State B's) own territory. In the event that the threat actually comes from the other state itself, in the form of war, then even this would not offend the pertinence of sovereignty in the sense that the most dramatic conceivable outcome would merely be the redistribution of territory in terms of the enduring principle of sovereignty. The deployment of extra-territorial power beyond the ontological-constitutional reach of any state introduces an entirely different threat to the integrity of territorial sovereignty.

Specifically the development of extra-territorial power presents a problem for the realist assertion of a distinction between sovereignty and power. Champions of the realist tradition, as seen in chapter 3, are very clear that the accountability of power to the sovereign state does not make the state omnipotent. Often the state will find itself unable to do as it wishes because it cannot change the international environment but this does not erode its sovereignty because its sovereignty is not a matter of power. States, Morgenthau observed, 'may be unable, because of prevailing actual conditions, to enact and enforce the kinds of laws which they would wish and which more powerful nations are able to enact and enforce. But the authority …to enact and enforce laws they please is not thereby abrogated. The actual inequality of nations and their dependence upon each other have no relevance for the legal status called sovereignty'.[106] (Also see Hinsley, James, Sørensen *et al.*[107]) In the context of a global economy with hyperspatial expression, however, the central conceptual problem with this position is that restraints in the international system are no longer emanating either from

the influence of another sovereign territorial state or developments that are wholly accountable to them. Extra-territorial forces generate international restraint but are not subject to sovereignty. Given that sovereign states have never been able to do whatever they want, it would be easy to say that such restraint is nothing new but in adopting this position one would be turning one's back on the conceptual distinction between territorial and hyperspatial extra-territorial restraint, the rapid expansion of the latter and its considerable implications for sovereignty. In a world where bases for power have been established which are not fully accountable to the sovereign state, there is a very real sense in which such powers stand in competition with those of the state.[108]

In making the distinction between the sovereign state's relationship to territorial power which can be made accountable to it as a territorial category, on the one hand, and hyperspatial, extra-territorial flows on the other that are beyond its direct onto(logical)-constitutional reach, one must have regard for the fact that: 'they are more "real" in time than space, their power is evidenced through the exchange of signs not goods, and their effects are transparent and pervasive rather than material and discrete'. Of huge significance for the manner in which one conceptualizes politics and sovereignty, moreover, 'they [the flows] are "chronopolitical" in the sense that they elevate chronology over geography, pace over space'.[109] The elusiveness of these chronopolitical powers to modern conceptualization, however, does not make them any less real. As Castells notes, although there is no global capitalist class, 'there is an integrated, global capital network, whose movements and variable logic ultimately determine economies and influence societies. Thus, above a diversity of human-flesh capitalists and capitalist groups there is a faceless collective capitalist, made up of financial flows operated by electronic networks'.[110] The network's complete lack of spatial rootedness

is seen in its dependence on 'the non-human capitalist logic of an electronically operated, random processing of information'.[111] Such chronopolitical power cannot be made properly accountable to modern political categories like sovereignty because it is exercised on a hyperspatial, extra-territorial and thus extra-sovereign domain. Crucially this means that Laughland's comments, for example, regarding the irrelevance of the French experience, at the hands of financiers in the early eighties, to fears about the integrity of French sovereignty are misconceived.[112] They are based upon premises regarding the relationship between sovereignty and power which the hyperspatial has swept away.

Given the importance of global economic flows, their networked form, deconstructing the centred ontology upon which sovereign depends, it is the contention of this thesis that globalization provides a powerful and developing expression of contemporary, transnational, revolutionist ontology which Wight did not detect, partially because of his disinterest in economics, and partially because he did not live to see the development of globalization post 1972. It is the contention of this thesis, however, that these developments make his revolutionist tradition, with its transcendence of the sovereign state, extremely relevant to attempts to come to terms with international relations in the twenty-first century.[113]

PART 2: REVOLUTIONISM, GLOBAL SOLIDARITY & INTERVENTION

Having examined revolutionism through the first form of agency identified by Wight, 'the spirit of commerce', it is now important to consider the second form of agency, 'the spirit of enlightenment'. Given that a key indication of the purchase of revolutionism's concept of 'global humanity' on international politics is manifest in a willingness to embrace intervention in the interest of justice, Part 2 will examine recent developments, demonstrating

what is effectively a 'globalization of morality'. This chapter devotes less space to Part 2 for the simple reason that, unlike economics, normative issues of intervention are already the subject of detailed English School analysis, as the footnotes testify.

QUALIFIED SOVEREIGNTY?

Whilst Article 2 (7) of the United Nations convention enshrines the principle of state sovereignty and the allied doctrine of non-intervention, it has of course always been possible to overrule and intervene in the affairs of a state. There are in international law two major bases upon which one may waive the norm of non-intervention. First, Article 51 of the UN Charter gives states the right to attack other states in self-defence. Given that this can be appealed to pre-emptively on the basis of a feared threat to security, it has the capacity to be widely invoked, as it was in 2001 to justify the US - British attacks on Afghanistan.[114] Second, if the Security Council judges that a state is threatening the peace and security of the world then it can pass a Chapter 7 resolution legitimising military intervention in that state to address the perceived threat to peace and security. Both these bases for waiving non-intervention have the effect of violating sovereignty by reference to military means.[115] Beyond these explicit justifications for intervention which relate to self-defence/peace and security, one must also be mindful of the UN's commitments to human rights, which sit somewhat uneasily alongside its simultaneous commitments to state sovereignty. For instance the Preamble states that the organization seeks to "reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights', whilst Article 1(3) asserts the obligation to 'achieve international co-operation ...in promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms for all",[116] and Article 55 undertakes for the human rights and rights to self-determination of peoples of the world. To be sure the UN Charter's reference to human rights are not linked directly to

any explicit commitment to intervention, but there is arguably an inferred need to have a capability to take action, which might have to include intervention, if its commitments are to amount to something more than empty words.

The coexistence of the doctrine of non-intervention, on the one hand, and the right to intervene/the responsibility for monitoring human rights, on the other, would seem at first glance to be contradictory. Paul Taylor, however, points out that careful reading of Article 2 (7) actually introduces a qualification which helps to make the UN's commitments to non-intervention and human rights rather more compatible. 'Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are *essentially* within the jurisdiction of any state or shall require the Members to submit such matters to settlement under the present Charter'.[117] (Italics added) Introduction of the word 'essentially' suggests that there are non-essential issues with respect to which the door for intervention is open.

POST WAR: FROZEN QUALIFICATIONS

Whilst the above qualifications have - since the advent of the UN - denied non-intervention an absolute status in principle, post-war practice suggested otherwise. In this context any intervention was viewed disapprovingly as a simple violation of Article 2 (7) and 'defined in terms of a coercive breach of the walls of the castle of sovereignty'.[118] In order to appreciate the reason for this rejection of intervention *per se*, and thus the effective absolutising of sovereignty, it is important to reflect in some detail on the impact of the Cold War and on the approach to decolonisation that developed after the 1960 Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples.

1. THE COLD WAR

There were two ways in which the Cold War eroded qualifications on state sovereignty:

First, the poignant ultimacy of the Cold War and fear of an impending nuclear meltdown meant that every other difficulty was thrown very much into its shadow, and in some cases, as far as public attention was concerned, effectively rendered invisible. Whilst anyone with an ounce of moral fibre would wish to intervene in another state to address injustices in the interests of a commitment to 'global humanity', the realist contention was always that, if one was really concerned about minimizing suffering, one would resist the temptation to intervene. This was not because of any moral callousness but rather the result of recognition that there was in world politics an 'order versus justice' trade off in relationship to which interventions, however well-meaning, always had the implication of upsetting international order and releasing consequentials which would probably cause even greater suffering in the long run. This Cold War realist logic gained perhaps its most famous expression through the argument of Jean Kirtpatrick who contended that western nations should ignore the human rights abuses of South American regimes during the 1970s in order to keep them on side in the Cold War.[119] The cost of the loss of their support in this ultimate contest would eclipse any benefit resulting from interventions in the name of human rights, no matter how virtuous they might make the intervening state feel.

In this climate there were not surprisingly only three major cases of humanitarian intervention; the intervention of India in East Pakistan in 1971, of Tanzania in Uganda in 1978 and of Vietnam in Cambodia also in 1978. In all cases, despite the horror of human rights abuses in Uganda and Cambodia, the interventions were not well received by the

international community and were actually justified by the intervening states on the basis of self-defence and appeal to Article 51 of the UN Charter, thus making no reference to human rights abuses.[120]

Second, the Cold War also frustrated the qualification of sovereignty by making the Chapter 7 intervention capability a latent constitutional potentiality in the Charter because Security Council decision-making was jeopardised by the presence of an East - West divide. With the exception of Korea in 1950, which gained UN sanction only because the Soviets were absent, there were no Chapter 7 collective security interventions between 1945 and 1989. Indeed, the Korean intervention, bypassing the Military Staff Committee and implemented through the USA, was actually a long way from anything that could honestly be described as collective security.

2. DECOLONIZATION

The post war world approached decolonisation with a very particular philosophy. A colony's qualification for sovereign statehood derived entirely from the fact that it was a colony and thus must be released, at all costs, and as soon as possible, from its imperial shackles. This led, as Robert Jackson demonstrates at length, to a negative view of sovereignty. A polity was eligible for sovereignty not because of any positive substantive capacities but because it was a colony - constitutionally subordinated to an imperial power - which should be cut free and made a sovereign state. To the extent that there were no substantive governance criteria, such as human rights provisions, (or even capability tests – does the government in question actually rule the whole territory that it claims) that must be met in order to obtain and maintain independence, there certainly was no basis for the international community (led for

the most part by former imperial powers) to intervene with internal checks after independence.[121]

REASSERTING QUALIFICATIONS

The purchase of the above restraints on intervention, however, has now been greatly eroded, firstly, as a consequence of the end of the Cold War and, secondly, as a result of pressures for a new approach towards decolonisation and the celebration of 'good governance'. The chapter will explore each of these developments in turn:

I. THE END OF THE COLD WAR

The events of 1989 which (given that they cannot be understood apart from a) the economic failure of the Soviet Bloc outside of the global market place and b) the fact that its demise, sweeping away the bipolar structure, opened the door for a new globality) should be conceptualized as part of the process of globalization, released world politics from its previous all-consuming obsession, avoiding a third world war. This new environment has facilitated a very different approach to security which has very different implications for intervention and state sovereignty. Specifically, the Kirkpatrick logic against intervention, residing on the foundation of the 'order versus justice trade off' - which was so compelling in the context of fears of nuclear meltdown - has been significantly eroded. The implications of the demise of the bipolar structure on the trade-off have been greatly assisted by first, the redefinition of what constitutes a threat to peace and security in the post Cold War world and second, a better informed domestic electorate:

i. BROADER BASIS OF INSECURITY

Against the backdrop of the demise of the Cold War bipolar straight jacket, the complexity of other problems - previously obscured by it - have come into focus. Appreciation of this complexity has brought with it a far greater willingness to recognize that the bases for global insecurity do not just reside directly in the threatened deployment of military hardware. They can also lie in socio-economic disorder which, left to fester, can lead to problems that will ultimately result the deployment of that hardware. In this context the need for order is no longer opposed to the need for justice. The two are intimately related such that the erosion of the latter will precipitate the erosion of the former and vice versa. In this environment a far broader cross section of UN agencies have found themselves drawn into the realm of peace and security. The wider UN system, Paul Taylor observes - together with allied NGOs - has become 'more involved in work which was seen as related to the maintenance of international order'.[122] The promotion of security remains the major focus of the UN but there is now recognition that security is not only maintained by focusing on military developments. It also involves other tasks like humanitarian intervention and surveillance.[123]

ii. PUBLIC OPINION

In the context of a greater awareness of a diversity of problems in the aftermath of the Cold War, the logic of the order versus justice trade off for politicians has also been threatened by increasing domestic concern and awareness of human rights abuses. The advent of the global media ensures that voters get to hear and see unfolding humanitarian catastrophe in great detail. 'Television represents images of humanity in peril that are beamed into living rooms across the globe, and it is this which ...pressurized Western governments into raising new

humanitarian claims to justify the use of force'.[124] Specifically, the greater awareness of humanitarian crisis because of the global media has challenged the notion that the cost of intervening for 'world order' is greater than the benefits it secures for 'world justice'. In the case of the intervention on behalf of the Kurds in Iraq in 1991 and of the Somalis with the breakdown of their government in 1992, the major reason for action, Wheeler and Bellamy observe, 'was the media and domestic public opinion that pressurized policy-makers into taking humanitarian actions'.[125] Talking about the CNN factor, they claim that recent experiences suggest 'that even if there are no vital national interests at stake, liberal states will launch humanitarian rescue missions if sufficient public pressure is mobilized'.[126] James Mayall, meanwhile, argues that action was only taken to protect the Kurds 'because the attention devoted by the Western media to the plight of the Kurds along the Turkish border threatened the political dividends that Western governments had secured from their conduct of the war itself'.[127] In the context of the global media, states have come to understand that ignoring human rights abuses can actually threaten international order. Thus, although '[g]lobalization has generated many of the ills of contemporary life, …it has also created that growing sense of "cosmopolitan awareness" which is beginning to make a reality of Kant's vision of a right's violation in one place being felt everywhere'.[128] During the 1990s statesmen came to understand that 'violations of individual's rights were a major cause of disturbances in relations between states: a lack of internal justice risked international disorder. In consequence there was increasing challenge to the traditional injunction on the behaviour of diplomats that they should ignore the internal affairs of the states with which they dealt in order to preserve international stability'.[129] The global consciousness emerging from the impact of the media, moreover, is greatly assisted by the work of global humanitarian agencies that both draw on and feed the broader media awareness of suffering.

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The fact that western electorates are increasingly aware of the plight of suffering peoples in other countries because of what they see from the media and learn from aid agencies makes non-intervention in the context of great suffering increasingly unsustainable.

II. QUALIFICATION OF THE SIMPLE DECOLONISATION IMPERATIVE

In the same way that the removal of Cold War pressures in the context of the global media and better education have crippled the order versus justice trade-off, so too have they challenged the traditional, 'negative' approach to decolonization, similarly provoking demand for the imposition of substantive testing of 'would be polities'. This is not as a function of any reluctance to release colonies from their imperial shackles, but rather to ensure that aspirant states have the capacity to protect and champion the rights of individual citizens. Charles Beitz, Michael Walser and Terry Nardin argue for substantive tests: 'states were conditional entities in that their right to exist should be dependent on a criterion of performance with regard to the interests of their citizens'.[130] In this context, recent years have seen increasing reference to "good governance" and the notion that all governments - whether recently decolonized or not - should pursue openness and transparency and thereby be willing to subject themselves to international verification.[131]

THE NEW HUMANITARIANISM: THE QUEST FOR JUSTICE

In the context of the end of the Cold War, and therein the erosion of the order versus justice trade off, and the simple decolonization imperative, the 'new humanitarianism' has become very important and consequentially the UN General Assembly has developed some clear position statements regarding humanitarian assistance, A/43/131 and A/46/182. These statements go out of their way to bow the knee to the principle of state sovereignty, as seen in

Article 2 (7). 'The sovereignty, territorial integrity and national unity of States must be fully respected in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations'. The following sentence, however, carries within it the basis for an important qualification. 'In this context, humanitarian assistance should be provided with the consent of the affected country and in principle on the basis of an appeal by the affected country'.[132] Deployment of 'should' and 'in principle' suggest very clearly that, whilst sovereignty should be respected in principle, this may not always be possible. This would seem to describe NATO intervention, against the wishes of the sovereign FYR in Kosovo during 1999 and 2000. In this context politicians are now more ready to pursue justice, and thus intervention and the violation of sovereignty, as a matter of 'national interest'. Strategically justice and the national interest were the reasons given for US intervention in Bosnia in 1996. By extension humanitarian intervention and peacekeeping are increasingly justified as being in the national interest.[133]

THE RISE OF INTERVENTIONISM AND REVOLUTIONISM

The advent of a new interventionism informed by the demise of the Cold War and the globalization of information would certainly seem to describe the reassertion of a 'global humanity' category in deference to the revolutionism of the three traditions spectrum. As Wheeler and Bellamy - writing in the English School tradition - observe, in creating a growing cosmopolitan awareness which is licensing a greater interventionism, globalization has laid the foundation for an expanding expression of the Kantian ethic.[134] This new interventionism undermines the ontological closure upon which sovereignty is predicated, contradicting the closure of the sovereign state through the reality of the connections between the polities of the world through which the notion of an interdependent global humanity flows.

CONCLUSION

In conclusion both of Wight's agencies of revolutionism, the 'spirit of commerce' and 'enlightenment' are calling into being a new connexity within international relations, challenging the notion that the international arena is divided into sovereign states and arguably rendering revolutionism far more significant than it ever was when Wight was writing. No longer confined to the realms of utopian political thinkers, the revolutionist ontology is coming of age at a time when globalization is fostering a new level of interconnectedness across the globe, both in terms of economics and a greater awareness of 'global humanity', generating a greater sense of ontological openness with significant implications for sovereignty. In the next stage of its definition of the revolutionist tradition - chapter 6 - this thesis will consider the impact of the spatio-temporal revolution together with its extensive ontological implications, on the task of actually reconceptualizing the place of the sovereign state in international relations theory.

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[1] Martin Wight, 'An anatomy of international thought', *Review of International Studies*, 1987, 13, pp. 225-226.

[2] Ibid., p. 226 and Wight, *International Theory*, pp. 84-5. Interestingly Brian Porter argues that there are in fact three positions in revolutionism: a Roman form of imperialism, a Kantian world federation and a cosmopolitan world society position. 'Patterns of thought and Practice: Martin Wight's "International Theory"', pp. 66-67.

[3] Martin Wight, 'An anatomy of international thought', pp. 223-224.

[4] Martin Wight, *Systems of States*, Leicester, Leicester University Press, 1977, p. 38.

[5] Martin Wight, 'Western Values in International Relations', *Diplomatic Investigations: Essays in the Theory of International Politics*, ed. Herbert Butterfield and Martin Wight, London, George Allen and Unwin, 1966, p. 93.

[6] Hedley Bull, 'Martin Wight and the theory of international relations', Martin Wight, *International Theory: The Three Traditions*, ed. Gabriele Wight and Brian Porter, London, Continuum, 2002, p. xii.

[7] Wight, 'An anatomy of international thought', p. 224. Linklater reflects on the economic ingredient of revolutionism in the thought of Jurgen Habemas: Andrew Linklater, *Beyond Realism and Marxism: Critical Theory and International Relations*, Basingstoke, Macmillan, 1990, p. 26.

[8] Wight, 'An anatomy of international thought', p. 224.

[9] A good example of someone locating economic flows in rationalism can be found in Bull, who preferred to see revolutionism and world society located narrowly in terms of moral solidarity. Hedley Bull, *The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics*, London, Macmillan, 1977, p. 266.

[10] Wight, *International Theory*, p. 115.

[11] Ibid., p. 263.

[12] Once the status of flows is such that they animate a wider ontological revolution, impacting all aspects of life and the identity, the distinction between positive facts (physical flows) and values and the decision to focus primarily on the latter becomes problematic. In this regard it is interesting to note Little's reflections, having

articulated Bull's preference for this approach: 'The English School seems to work from the position that observable patterns of transnational behaviour must be distinguished from the existence of common values, interests and institutions that must be associated with world society. ...Presupposing that the relationship between international systems and societies can be compared to the relationship between transnational systems and world societies, then it follows that whereas positivistic methods can be used to identify transnational systems, such methods need to be replaced by or at any rate supplemented with hermeneutic methods in order to study world society'. Richard Little, 'The English School's Contribution to the Study of International Relations', p. 15. In other words there has been a tendency to see world society (revolutionism) in terms of an ideational moral solidarity rather than in terms of a physical connexity. Interestingly, whilst this infers that physical facts require positivist epistemology and moral bonds require a hermeneutic posture, the next chapter will argue that, in the context of globalization, this is not necessarily the case.

[13] Ibid., p. 18.

[14] Tony Evans and Peter Wilson, 'Regime Theory and the English School of International Relations: A Comparison', *Millennium: Journal of International Studies*, 1992, p. 329. In some senses this lack of attention to economics was reflective of the concerns of the author of the three traditions, Martin Wight, of whom Bull observes; 'he was not much interested in the economic dimension of the subject ...his failure to deal with the history of thought about economic aspects of international relations is one of the points at which he is vulnerable to criticism'. Hedley Bull, 'Martin Wight and the theory of international relations', pp. xix.

[15] A good assertion of the junior position of revolutionism within the three traditions is seen in: Andrew Linklater, *Beyond Realism and Marxism: Critical Theory and International Relations*, Basingstoke, Macmillan Press, 1990, p. 21; Hedley Bull, 'Martin Wight and the theory of international relations', p. xvi and Richard Little, 'The English School's Contribution to the Study of International Relations', p. 16. By contrast it is interesting to note that Wight gives grounds for taking a different view: 'It might well be asked why revolutionary international politics should be regarded as more normal than revolutionary, since the history of international society has been fairly equally divided between the two'. Wight, *Power Politics*, ed. Hedley Bull and Carsten Holbrand, Leicester, Leicester University Press, 1978, p. 92.

[16] As chapters 1 and 2 have pointed out, Barry Buzan has just produced the first major English School work to which does engage with economic processes. As has been reflected, however, Buzan's approach differs very much from that adopted by this thesis because he does not embrace the three traditions as an epistemological spectrum. Buzan, *From International to World Society: English School Theory and the Social Structure of Globalisation,* Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2004.

[17] A pure definition of globalization would include examination of the movement of goods, services, all factors of production, capital and labour. This chapter does not examine labour because it is not a freely moving economic flow, generating the new connexity in the manner of the other factors of production, and thus it does not provide the best description of the revolutionist ontology. The introduction of immigration controls and passports during the 20th century would suggest that labour is unambiguously the odd man out, although this must be qualified by recognition of the impact of the huge developments in transport since the nineteenth century. This said, however, people movements are very much less unambiguously definitive of the heart of globalization and its erosion of state sovereignty. See: Saskia Sassen, *Losing Control? Sovereignty in an Age of Globalization*, New York, Columbia University Press, 1995, chapter 3 and Paul Hirst and Grahame Thompson, *Globalization In Question, The International Economy and the Possibilities of Governance*, Second Edition, Polity Press, Oxford, 1999, pp. 22-26.

[18] As noted in chapter 1: Roy E. Jones, 'The English school of international relations: a case for closure', *Review of International Studies*, 1981, 7, pp. 10 – 11 and David Boucher, *Political Theories of International Relations*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1998, p. 16.

[19] David Held, Anthony McGrew, David Globatt and Jonathan Perraton, *Global Transformations: Politics, Economics and Culture*, Oxford, Polity Press, 1999, pp. 163-4.

[20] Michael Kitson and Jonathan Michie, 'Trade and Growth: A Historical Perspective', *Managing the Global Economy*, ed. Jonathan Michie and John Grieve Smith, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1995, p. 9.

[21] Hirst and Thompson, *Globalization in Question*, p. 22. Taking slightly different dates, Barrie Axford states that world trade increased by 7.3% per annum between 1948 and 1971. The increase in the volume of trade between 1950 and 1975, meanwhile, he claims, was of the order of 500%, whilst global output rose by 220%. Barrie Axford, *The Global System: Economics, Politics and Culture*, Cambridge, Polity Press, 1995, p. 104.

[22] Held, McGrew, Goldbatt and Perraton, *Global Transformations,* p. 164.
Hirst and Thompson, meanwhile, state that trade grew by 3.6% between 1973 and the mid 1980s, *Globalization in Question*, p. 22.

[23] Kitsin and Michie, 'Trade and Growth', p. 10.
In seeking to understand the increase in trade it is important to appreciate the fact that statistics on traded services have only been available since 1980 and thus the above figures understate the true significance of trade because they only deal with the trade of goods. In a 'knowledge based economy' where the growth of the service sector is becoming increasingly important this constitutes a serious omission. 'Both OECD and developing countries trade a significant proportion of their services output and have done so at least since the mid-1970s'. (Held, McGrew, Goldbatt and Perraton, *Economic Transformations*, p. 170). Services trade was estimated to be worth $1.3 trillion in 1995. As such it approximates to 20% of total trade. On this basis the value of world exports as a proportion of world output, including goods and services, (calculating world income at 1996 market exchange rates) must be increased to 21.8%. On this basis Held, McGrew, Globatt and Perraton contend a global trading system now exists. Today 'protection levels are lower than in previous eras while trade liberalization is likely to continue. Trade levels are higher, both absolutely and in relation to output, than ever before'. Ibid., p. 167.

[24] Ibid., p. 169-170.

[25] Joseph Camilleri and Jim Falk, *The End of Sovereignty? The Politics of a Shrinking and Fragmenting World*, Edward Elgar, Aldershot, 1992, p. 70.

[26] Held, McGrew, Goldbatt and Perraton, *Economic Transformations*, p. 164.

[27] Ibid.

[28] There has been a 'sea change' in opinion within the developing world. In the early post-war years as developing states gained their independence, their initial inclination was towards protectionism. During the 1980s, however, there was a change in philosophy both in response to a domestic recognition of the benefits of free trade and pressure from the World Bank and IMF. Between 1960 and the 1980s the proportion that operated an open trading system was by population below 25% and by GDP below 50%. By the late 1990s the proportion operating an open trading system was by population over 50% and by GDP over 66%. Held, McGrew, Goldbatt and Perraton, *Global Transformations*, p. 165. Also see David Robertson, 'Link Issues and the New Round', *Globalisation and International Trade Liberalisation: Continuity and Change*, ed. Martin Richardson, Cheltenham, Edward Elgar, 2000, p. 111.

[29] Mike Moore, 'Multilateralism and the WTO', *Globalisation and International Trade Liberalisation: Continuity and Change*, p. 139.

[30] Deeper integration focuses on the so-called 'link issues' that were introduced towards the end of the Uruguay Round. These include trade and government procurement, trade and investment, trade and competition, regionalism (trade and economic integration), trade and development, trade and environment and trade and labour standards. Future trade negotiations will be increasingly concerned with these trade-related issues and thus harmonisation. David Robertson, 'Link Issues and the New Round', p. 107.

[31] Mike Moore, 'Multilateralism and the WTO', p. 176 and David Robertson, 'Link Issues and the New Round', p. 107 and p. 110.

[32] The sub-structural political implications of the transfer from technical regularian law to broader forms of law governing community are demonstrated by Majone through the lens of 'legitimacy'. Giandomenico Majone, *Regulating Europe*, London, Routledge, 1996, chapter 13.

[33] Held, McGrew, Goldbatt and Perraton, *Economic Transformations*, p. 165.

[34] Karen J Alter, 'Challenges to the WTO's new dispute resolution system', *International Affairs*, Volume 79, Number 4, July 2003, p. 785.

[35] Held, McGrew, Goldbatt and Perraton, *Economic Transformations*, p.188.

[36] Ibid., p. 149.

[37] Before seeking to engage specifically with the ontology of the extra-territorial financial economy it is important to be clear of its rising importance vis-à-vis the real economy. In his work *World Power and World Money*, Andrew Walter argued that there is a clear relationship between the slow down in the real economy experienced since the '70s and the increasing dynamism of the financial economy. The 'marked lowering of the potential rate of growth as compared with the previous two decades', meant that the wealth that had been accumulated in the real economy was no longer reinvested at the same rate. The financial economy, by contrast, was offering, and continues to offer, increasingly attractive returns on investments. As a consequence firms found 'declining investment opportunities that could provide returns to match yields on securities'. Thus industrial firms of the real economy, which had previously concentrated their energies within it, were now devoting increasing time to the world of finance. (Andrew Walter, *World Power and World Money: The Role of Hegemony and International Monetary Order*, Hemel Hempstead, Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1991, p. 202.) Robert Reich, meanwhile, in *The Work of Nations*, similarly spoke of the shift from the real to the financial economy

inaugurated in the '70s, resulting from a slow down in the real economy Robert B. Reich, *The Work of Nations: Preparing Ourselves for Twenty First Century Capitalism*, New York, Simon and Schuster, 1991, p. 6 and p. 74.

[38] Camilleri and Falk, *The End of Sovereignty*, p. 74.

[39] The Euro-dollar market, according to one account, is said to have emerged as a result of the desire of the new revolutionary government in China to hold dollars where the United States could not touch them. They put them in a Soviet owned bank 'Banque Commerciale pour L'Europe du Nord' in Paris. The USSR followed suit keeping their dollars in their Paris bank and in the Moscow Nardony Bank in London. (Sampson, *The Money Lenders: Bankers in a Dangerous World,* Hodder and Stoughton, 1988, p.121. Einzig by contrast locates its 'experimental beginnings in 1957', Paul Einzig, *Foreign Dollar Loans in Europe*, London, Macmillan, 1965, p 5. Also see: Held, McGrew, Goldbatt and Perraton, *Global Transformations*, p. 201). The Euro-dollar market evolved very slowly during the 1950s at which time no one was really aware of its existence. The extent of this ignorance is well demonstrated in the following quotation from the financial writer Paul Einzig; 'The Eurodollar market was for years hidden from economists and other readers of the financial press by a remarkable conspiracy of silence ...I first stumbled on its existence in October 1959, and when I embarked on an enquiry about it in London banking circles several bankers emphatically asked me not to write about the new practice'. Paul Einzig, *Foreign Dollar Loans in Europe*, pp. 6-7. By the late 1950s London financiers had begun to see that this market, unrestricted by banking controls, could provide the means for making significant amounts of money and thus it began to grow. (Walters, *World Power and World Money*, p. 204. Also see: Korten, *When Corporations Rule the World*, pp. 190-191.) There was concern in the financial world that revelation of its presence to government may well precipitate a fear that, unchecked, this development would lead to the increasing autonomy of economics from politics and thus a desire for regulation. The lending and re-lending of the expatriated money without any kind of controlling central bank could increase the money supply way beyond the real economy's ability to meet demand. Unregulated, there was nothing to make it accountable to value. It was rootless and thus completely open. The Conservative party was in office when the Euro-dollar silence broke. Its reputation as the political ally of the City and tendency to trust its instincts almost certainly dissuaded it from intervening with regulation. There was a real fear, however, that the election of Harold Wilson's Labour government in 1964 would mean tough regulation. (Paul Einzig, *Foreign Dollar Loans in Europe*, p. 153.) In the end, though, the new government did nothing. (Ibid., p. 153, Held, McGrew, Goldbatt and Perraton, *Global Transformations*, p. 215, Sampson, *The Money Lenders*, p. 126.)

[40] Walter Wriston, *The Twilight of Sovereignty*, New York, Charles Scribners and Sons, pp. 62-65.

[41] Ibid., p. 62 and Walter Wriston, Speech to International Monetary Conference, London, June 11, 1979, cited by Sampson, *The Money Lenders*, pp. 124-125.

[42] An important part of the 1970s boost came on the back of OPEC's decision to quadruple the price of oil. Vast amounts of money, that were in no sense a result of increased output, now came into the hands of the oil producers. They earned an extra eighty billion dollars a year from oil exports which amounted to about ten percent of the value of all world exports. This was so much money that it was impossible for them to spend it all on increased imports. In the absence of importing opportunity, the new monies facilitated a massive increase in the level of deposits and thus a very considerable increase in lending and credit creation within the banking system. This had a number of implications. In the first instance, more often than not these petro-dollars were actually re-lent or 'recycled' to the poorer nations who now needed to take out loans in order to pay for the vast increase in the price of oil. The oil Sheikhs were thus paid twice by the poorer importers, once for the oil and once in the form of the interest rate which was paid on their loans. (Will Hutton, *The State We're In*, Great Britain, Johnathan Cape, 1995, p. 59 and Held, McGrew, Goldbatt and Perraton, *Global Transformations*, p. 202.) Between 1974 and 1976 international banks recycled almost $50 billion in response to the rise in oil prices. (Ibid.)

[43] Will Hutton, *The State We're In*, p. 60.

[44] 'After all they were the same marks on deposit with the same banks but by redefining them and depositing them in offshore branches, they could earn more money for no extra risk. International banks were desperate for the deposits and so depositor and bank alike connived at bending the law'. Ibid., p. 61.

[45] David Harvey, *The Condition of Postmodernity: An Enquiry into the Origins of Cultural Change*, Oxford, Blackwell, 1989, p. 163. Also see, Camilleri and Falk, *The End of Sovereignty*, p. 74.

[46] Walter, *World Power, World Money*, pp. 196-197. In 1989 the estimated daily turnover in London, New York, and Tokyo was $187 billion, $129 billion and $115 billion respectively of which 90% was unrelated to current account flows. Ibid., p. 197. 'What is most striking about the last few decades is the liberalisation of capital flows between the major countries and the incredible growth of the Euromarkets, which has averaged about 30

per cent per year since the 1960s. This has so far outstripped the growth of global trade and output that financial flows now utterly dominate real flows between countries in quantitative terms'. Ibid., p. 200.

[47] Held, McGrew, Goldbatt and Perraton, *Global Transformations*, p. 199.

[48] The OECD Convention, December 1961.

[49] Pierre Poret, 'Current Legal Issues Facing Central Banks', OECD, May 1998, p. 1. www.oecd.org/daf/investment/legal-instruments/codes.htm

[50] Hutton, *The State We're In*, p. 58.

[51] 'After a period of turbulence in the 1970s, the 1980s brought a new era in policy attitudes, heralded by the abolition of capital controls by the United Kingdom in 1979 and by Japan in 1980. Other countries have since followed suit'. Held, McGrew, Goldbatt and Perraton, *Global Transformations*, pp. 225-226. Also see: Pierre Poret, 'Current Legal Issues Facing Central Banks', p. 4 and Robert Reich, *The Work of Nations*, p. 7.

[52] Held, McGrew, Goldbatt and Perraton, *Global Transformations*, p. 216.

[53] In 1986 the 'right of settlement' was established and in 1992 the 'cross border financial services' mechanism was instigated. Pierre Poret, 'Current Legal Issues Facing Central Banks', OECD, May 1998.

[54] A F P Bakker, *International Financial Institutions*, Harlow, Addison Wesley Longman Ltd, Open University of the Netherlands, 1996, p. 114. Having said this, however, it must be noted that their ultimate objective of free capital movements, a Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MAI), had to be shelved in 1998 because of opposition David Robertson, 'Link Issues and the New Round', pp. 111-113. 'In 1995, OECD Ministers launched negotiations on a multilateral agreement on investment (MAI) with high standards of liberalisation and investment protection, with effective dispute settlement procedures, and open to non-Members. Negotiations were discontinued in April 1998 and will not be resumed'. For links to Draft MAI NegotiatingText (pdf), Commentary to the Draft MAI Negotiating Text (pdf) and the MAI Document Database See: www.oecd.org/document/35/0,2340,en_2649_34887_1894819_1_1_1_1,00.html

[55] Will Hutton, *The State We're In*, p. 229.

[56] Ibid., p. 61 and Held, McGrew, Goldbatt and Perraton, *Global Transformations*, p. 228.

[57] Held, McGrew, Goldbatt and Perraton, *Global Transformations*, p. 228. A further sovereign state lever on the national economy delivered through interest rates was the provision of an interest rate ceiling. The interest rate ceiling protected those depending on investment from capital flight to higher interest bearing alternatives. In the US the said regulation, known as Regulation Q, was removed in 1985. In response money left the holdings of savings and loan investments in search of higher returns in the global marketplace. This had significant negative implications for the domestic economy, causing a massive slump in mortgages and housing construction see: Sassen, *Losing Control*, p. 48.
The opportunity for the sovereign state to exert control through interest rates, moreover, has in any event been eroded indirectly by global finance through the implications of deregulation on the development of new financial instruments that are less easy for government to manage. This indirect erosion can be seen through the implications of the following arrangements. First, the liberalization that characterises globalization is giving rise to new financial institutions and instruments that are eroding the significance of the traditional banking sector. Thirty years ago banks provided 75% of short and medium-term business credit. Today they supply less than 50%. In the last 70 years the share of commercial banks in financial assets has dropped from more than 50% to 25%. The new environment 'makes it more difficult for governments and central banks to clearly identify, let alone control, the domestic money supply. These developments transform the capacity of governments to control effectively the money supply and interest rates, as well as the impact of both on output and inflation'. Held, McGrew, Goldbatt and Perraton, *Global Transformations*, p. 299. Second, there is the erosion of interest rates through the development of the derivatives market. Derivatives provide an important 'hedge' around investments which helps to protect them from unwanted swings in interest rates. As the use of derivatives expands 'the power of central banks to influence the economy through interest rates will decline further'. Sassen, *Losing Control*, p. 49. The overall effect of both the new financial institutions and derivatives resulting from deregulation, Sassen observes, 'has been to make the effect of a change in interest rates on a national economy more uncertain and to increase the opportunities for mistakes'. Ibid., p. 53.

[58] Held, McGrew, Goldbatt and Perraton, *Global Transformations*, p. 189.

[59] Sassen, *Losing Control*, p. 22.

[60] Zygmunt Bauman, *Globalization: The Human Consequences*, Oxford, Polity Press in association with Blackwell, 1998, p. 66. In the early 1990s this amounted to £800 billion see: Walter, *World Power, World Money*, p. 198 and David Korten, *When Corporations Rule the World*, London, Earthscan, 1995, p. 92 and p. 66.

[61] Walter, *World Power, World Money*, p. 198 and Reich, *The Work of Nations*, p. 308.

[62] Kenichi Ohmae, *The End of the Nation State: The Rise of Regional Economies: How New Engines of Prosperity are Reshaping Global Markets*, London, Harper Collins, 1996, p. 152.

[63] Ibid., pp. 155-156.

[64] Ibid., p. 12. Ohmae is adamant, moreover, that government intervention to protect its economic policy from the global market place is both bound to fail and thus make speculators even richer. 'When the BOJ or New York's Fed intervenes, it tends to create statistically more winners than losers in the market. The notion of a zero-sum game is the only built-in stabilizer in this already unstable market. It is the fear of losing that makes the market recover its sense of balance. If the government is ready to buy dollars when everyone wants to sell, it acts as a volunteer to lose. "Leave them alone and give them no hint". Ibid., p. 171.

In relationship to the specifically European experience, a similar observation is made by Sassen who observes that: 'Since capital controls were dismantled, as in Europe as part of the Single European Market, national defenses against speculative attack are very limited, hence in part the 1992 and 1993 currency crises'. Sassen, *Losing Control*, p. 22.

[65] Begg, Fischer and Dornbusch, *Economics,* p. 631 and p. 633 and Held, McGrew, Goldbatt and Perraton, *Global Transformations*, p. 230.

[66] Susan Strange, *The Retreat of the State: The Diffusion of Power in the World Economy*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1996, p. 76 and Hutton, *The State We're In*, p. 61.

[67] Held, McGrew, Goldbatt and Perraton, *Global Transformations*, p. 230.

[68] Ibid., p. 4.

[69] Sassen, *Losing Control*, p. 52.

The accountability of states to international finance is made rather more poignant by the fact that, in the context of general financial deregulation, interest rates do not seem to convey the magnitude of the loans in question. This is largely because of financial innovation conceived in the context of deregulation. The financial world has essentially transformed various forms of debt into tradable instruments. Such has been their ingenuity that '[a]ny concentrated pile of money has become attractive to traders; whether it is negative (debt) or positive is now somewhat secondary'. Ibid., p. 50. Whilst these developments effectively help financiers to make more money out of debt, they do not help the image of the sovereign state in the long run. They numb the reality of indebtedness which remains often breaking in, sometimes with little warning, once the money making opportunities have dried up. Ibid., pp. 50-51.

The states experiencing the impact of debt most severely have been third world states in the post 1970s oil crisis financial era. Christopher Clapham describes this specifically third world debt crisis, replete with intrusive and demanding Structural Adjustment Programmes, courtesy of the IMF, as an 'assault on sovereignty'.

Christopher Clapham, 'Sovereignty and the Third World', *Sovereignty at the Millennium*, ed. Robert Jackson, *Political Studies*, Political Studies Association, Oxford, Blackwell, 1999, pp. 110-111.

[70] Sassen, *Losing Control*, p. 44.

[71] Strange, *The Retreat of the State*, p. 75.

[72] Francis Fukuyama, 'The End of History', *The National Interest*, Summer 1989, p. 433.

[73] Harvey, *The Condition of Postmodernity*, p. 165.

[74] Korten, *When Corporations Rule the World*, p. 92 and p. 66.

[75] Sassen, *Losing Control*, p. 42.

The erosion of state sovereignty is seen clearly in the erosion of the influence of the electorate to whom the political structures, giving expression to the sovereign authority, are accountable. Saskia Sassen eloquently puts this scenario in the following terms.

'[O]ne thing is certain even though many were excluded, the beneficiaries [of the pre-deregulation order] were from a far wider spectrum of workers, communities, and firms than they are today. Central banks and governments appear now to be increasingly concerned about pleasing the financial markets rather than setting goals for social and economic well-being; to cite just one example, after the Mexican crisis, the Argentinean and Brazilian governments promised not to devalue their currencies, no matter what the cost. In the past, inflation was a way of coping with growing debt. But today the bond markets will raise yields – and hence the cost of loans to governments – thereby sometimes terrorizing governments into keeping inflation under control. Trying to accommodate inflation-obsessed bondholders, governments impose excessive deflation on economies, at the expense of job growth'. Ibid., p. 53.

'...Do we want the global capital market to exercise this discipline over our governments? And to do so at all costs – jobs, wages, safety, health – and without a public debate? ...The global financial markets, in particular, represent one of the most astounding aggregations of new rights and legitimacy that we have seen over the last

two decades. Like the new covenants on human rights, they have taken on more of the powers historically associated with the nation-state than any other institution over the last decades'. Ibid., p. 41.

Also see Bauman. 'Due to the unqualified and unstoppable spread of free trade rules, and above all the free movement of capital and finances, the "economy" is progressively exempt from political control; ...Whatever has been left of politics is expected to be dealt with, as in the god old days, by the state – but whatever is concerned with economic life the state is not allowed to touch: any attempt in this direction would be met with prompt and furious punitive action from the world markets'. Bauman, *Globalization*, p. 66.

For a view that sees the market's new political power and apparently approves see Wriston. 'The electronic global market has produced what amounts to a giant vote-counting machine that conducts a running tally on what the world thinks of a government's diplomatic, fiscal, and monetary policies. ...No matter what political leaders do or say, the screens will continue to be set not by sovereign governments but by global plebiscite'. Walter Wriston, *The Twilight of Sovereignty*, p. 9.

[76] There is a technical distinction between an MNC and TNC. Multinationals are companies with FDI investments but an ongoing loyalty to a particular national centre of gravity in one country. Transnationals, by contrast, are companies which are truly global in the sense that they do not have a home-base. In making this distinction, Axford contends that most companies involved with FDI fall into the former category. Axford, *The Global System*, pp. 96-97.

[77] In this context 'FDI may be subject to review and only permitted on the say so of national authorities'. Furthermore host nations may enforce discriminatory requirements on foreign firms, 'such as requiring them to use a certain proportion of locally produced inputs, employ a certain number of locally recruited employees or reach certain export targets. Tax systems may effectively discriminate against foreign firms, or favour some where incentives are used to attract inward FDI'. Held, McGrew, Goldbatt and Perraton, *Global Transformations*, p. 257.

[78] This code, which has the force of law, requires OECD states to give 'national treatment to international investors', enacting 'transparent, liberal and stable foreign investment rules'. OECD, 'How the OECD promotes the rule of law', Paris, OECD, 1998, p. 1.

[79] Held, McGrew, Goldbatt and Perraton, *Global Transformations*, p, 242.

[80] The following provides more details regarding the increase in FDI in recent times: Camilleri and Falk note that by 1967 the book value of all foreign investment was said to be nearly $110 billion. Four years later it had risen to $165 billion. In 1975, meanwhile, the annual inflow of foreign investment into all economies was estimated to be $21.5 billion. By 1980 this annual inflow had more than doubled to $52.2billion. This process they note continued into the 1980s (Camilleri and Falk, *The End of Sovereignty*, p. 71.) In 1992 Susan Strange observed that there were 35,000 Transnational Companies (TNCs) with some 150,000 affiliates. The book value of total FDI worldwide at the time was $1,700billion. (Susan Strange, *The Retreat of the State*, p. 46.) By the mid 1990s the multi-national net had extended such that, as Hirst and Thompson note, there were approximately 45,000 parent MNCs with about 280,000 affiliates. In 1996 the total stock of FDI was worth $3.2 trillion. MNC's were responsible for sales (domestic and foreign) of $7trillion which far surpassed the value of conventional world trade which was worth $5.2trillion. (Hirst and Thompson, *Globalization in Question*, p. 68.)

[81] Susan Strange, *The Retreat of the State*, p. 46.

[82] Ibid., pp. 49-50.

[83] Held, McGrew, Goldbatt and Perraton, *Global Transformations*, p. 258.

[84] Ibid.

[85] Malaysia has sought to re-impose capital controls in response to its treatment by the markets in the context of the Asian economic crisis, Thomas Friedman, *The Lexus and the Olive Tree*, London, Harper Collins, 1999, p. 137.

[86] Given the absence of a multilateral FDI regime, bilateral investment agreements '...have become a key mechanism for facilitating international production by clarifying tax rules and regulations. In 1996 alone, 182 such treaties were concluded – in excess of three a week – bringing the total number of such treaties to 1,513 in 1998'. Held, McGrew, Goldbatt and Perraton, *Global Transformations*,

[87] UNCTAD, 1997, p. 1 cited by Ibid., pp. 236.

[88] 'Yet another pointer to the globalizing of the world economy and the deterritorialisation of business activity', Barrie Axford contends, 'is the substantial growth of intra-firm transfers and of 'trade' between partners in collaborative ventures or strategic alliances in different parts of the globe'. (Barrie Axford, *The Global System: Economics, Politics and Culture*, p. 104). Susan Strange estimates this to be at least a quarter of all trade, (Susan Strange, *The Retreat of the State*, p. 48),whilst Bonturi and Fukasaku found that between a quarter and a third of some OECD countries trade was intra-firm. (Held, McGrew, Goldbatt and Perraton, *Global Transformations*, p.

247). Reich, meanwhile, maintains that 'in 1990 more than half of America's exports and imports, by value were simply the transfers of such goods and related services within global corporations'. (Reich, *The Work of Nations*, p. 114).

[89] Held, McGrew, Goldbatt and Perraton, *Global Transformations*, p. 246 and p. 167.

[90] Thomas Friedman, *The Lexus and the Olive Tree*, p. 134.

[91] Held, McGrew, Goldbatt and Perraton, *Global Transformations*, p. 276.

[92] Ibid, p. 277.

[93] '[C]ountries and regions', they maintain, 'continue to be drawn into a "beauty contest" by competing on tax incentives'. Ibid., p. 277.

[94] Susan Strange, *The Retreat of the State*, p. 64. Then there were banks which, on the back of imprudent lending, had their tax liability waived so that they could plough their profits back into building up their reserves see Ibid.

[95] Ibid. Strange also cites the invisibility, from the tax perspective, of the benefits which have been enjoyed by managers in MNCs through the increasing tendency for them to be privileged with golden handshakes, stock options, first class air travel, expense accounts for restaurants, luxury hotel accommodation, 'not least the regiment of chauffeurs, gardeners, masseurs, social secretaries, even doctors, dentists and lawyers'. Ibid.

[96] Ibid.

[97] Ibid., p. 53.

[98] Harvey, *The Condition of Postmodernity*, p. 182.

[99] Hardt and Negri, *Empire*, pp. 326-330.

[100] Manuel Castells, *The Rise of the Network Society*, p. 503.

[101] As Castells noted '[w]hile the networking form of social organisation has existed in other times and places, the new information technology paradigm provides the material basis for its pervasive expansion throughout the entire social structure'. Ibid., p. 500.

[102] Geoff Mulgan, *Connexity: How to Live in a Connected World*, London, Chatto and Windus, 1997, chapter 9 and James Dale Davidson and William Rees Mogg, *The Great Reckoning*, London, Sidgwick and Jackson, chapter 8.

[103] This gains particularly clear expression in the following comments from Camilleri and Falk. 'The Hobbesian view of the state, which still colours the modern understanding of sovereignty, owes a great deal to the spatial conciousness implicit in Euclidean geometry, Galilean mechanics and Newtonian physics'. Camilleri and Falk, *The End of Sovereignty*, p. 238,

[104] Geoff Mulgan, *Connexity: How to Live in a Connected World*, p. 3.
In the context of the decentering implication of the network Davidson and Rees Mogg echo Mulgan, claiming that this old, closed, mechanical intuition - with its emphasis on separate, solid, essential cogs, interacting on the basis of linear relationship - constitutes a major cultural blind spot. The proliferation of exchange and connectedness means that every attempt to understand the world in terms that are informed by the old mechanical approach generate a profoundly skewed view of reality. There is, they maintain, a great need to abandon the linear assumption in favour of the non-linearity of complex networks. Davidson and Rees Mogg, *The Great Reckoning*, chapter 8, pp. 211-227. Guehenno is also very clear that globalization has introduced the age of the network: 'we should speak on the global level, of aggregates of networks linked together, like the interlinked rings that are the symbol of the Olympic Games'. Jean Marie Guehenno, *The End of the Nation-State*, Minneapolis, University of Minneapolis, 1993, p. 56. For an excellent definition of the network see; Castells, *The Rise of the Network Society*, especially pp. 500-509.

[105] Whilst the hyperspatial configurations of the network celebrate diversity, their deconstruction of the subject actually has a profoundly homogenising effect. If one jettisons the given of the spatial orientation, one places the ontological sense of individual liberty in jeopardy. As Guehenno has noted, 'if the "given" of the social entity is stripped away, the conformity that is so necessary to the smooth functioning of our societies ...can become a constant effort, and can stiffen into a totalitarian reflex'. Guehenno, *The End of the Nation State*, p. 89.

[106] Hans Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace*, New York, Alfred A. Knopf, 1948, p. 312.

[107] John Laughland, *The Tainted Source: The Undemocratic Origins of the European Idea*, London, Warner Books, 1998, p. 177.

[108] Susan Strange, *The Retreat of the State*, pp. 13-14 and p.43.

[109] James Der Derian, 'The Space of International Relations Simulation, Surveillance and Speed', *International Studies Quarterly*, 1990, 34, p. 297.

[110] Castells, *The Rise of the Network Society*, p. 505.

[111] Ibid.

[112] Laughland, *The Tainted Source*, p. 177.

[113] Having considered the impact of economic developments that significantly undermine the ontology of the sovereign state generally, the point should be made that there is an important sense in which the erosion of sovereignty has obtained a more advanced expression with respect to developing countries that are dependent on the IMF – World Bank institutions (as noted briefly in endnote 69). When these bodies were initially developed, in a world of some 70 rather than 192 sovereign states, the common approach was very much against intervening in the affairs of states. 'Created immediately after the second World War, both institutions originally embodied the then strong consensus against interventionism as expressed in Article 2(7) of the Charter of the United Nations ...' (Ngaire Woods, 'Order, Justice, the IMF and the World Bank', Inequality, Globalization and World Politics, eds. Andrew Hurrell and Ngaire Woods, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1999, p. 81). Furthermore, in this context, although decision-making in the IMF – World Bank institutions inevitably reflected the level of investment made in the respective bodies by member states 'there was a clear and explicit concern to ensure some equality among members to reinforce the "universal" and "public" character of the institutions as opposed to giving them a structure that simply reflected economic and financial strength in the world economy. This was achieved by giving every member of the institution 250 "basic votes", to which were added weighted votes apportioned on the basis of the quota – mentioned above'. (Ibid., p. 87). With the break down of Bretton Woods and the onset of the 1970s debt crisis, (the role of the development of extra-territorial finance and thus economic globalization was central to both of these events) however, the IMF – Bank institutions have, on the back of loans made, become very involved in many of the new and developing countries, and there has been a complete sea change in approach.

Today 'both the IMF and the World Bank embrace areas of policy that it was inconceivable for them to touch prior to the 1980s. Even since the 1980s there has been a very significant increase in intrusion. In a sample of 25 countries Woods notes that the average number of conditions attached to loans was 6 – 10 in the 1980s. In the 1990s this rose to 26! 'No longer are they engaged in merely monitoring specific macroeconomic policy targets in the context of a crisis, or specific project loans and conditions. Both institutions are now engaging governments in negotiations that cover virtually all issues of economic policy-making – and beyond, with good governance extending into the rule of law, judicial reform, corporate governance, and so forth. This new, wide-ranging domain of advice and conditionality directly affects a wider range of policies, people, groups, and organizations within countries'. (Ibid., p. 89) In a crisis countries turn to the IMF – World Bank '[y]et, far from restoring or bolstering their sovereignty, multilateral assistance comes at the price of further international intrusion'. (Ibid., p. 81). "A nation's desperate need for short-term financial help does not give the IMF the moral right to substitute its technical judgements for the outcomes of the nation's political process". (Martin Feldstein, 'Refocusing the IMF', *Foreign Affairs*, 1998, p. 27.) Reflecting on the new Comprehensive Development Framework (CDF) Paul Cammack does not mince his words. 'The CDF is absolutely rigid in the set of fundamental macroeconomic disciplines it imposes. It prescribes on top of these a range of economic and social policies without parallel in their scope and in the depth and intensity of intervention they represent in the affairs of supposedly sovereign states. Presented as a vehicle for incorporating social and structural policies into an agenda previously dominated by macroeconomic policy alone, it is in fact a means of shaping social and structural policies so that they reinforce and extend macroeconomic discipline, and subordinating them to the imperatives of capitalist accumulation. ...The Bank presents itself as the mother of development – but the reality is that it aspires to be the mother of all governments'. Paul Cammack, 'The mother of all governments: The World Bank's matrix for global governance', *Global Governance: Critical Perspectives*, ed. Rorden Wilkinson and Steve Hughes, London, Routledge, 2004, p. 37.

Crucially whilst the range of activities embraced by the IMF – Bank have changed very significantly its accountability mechanisms have remained those of the 1940s. The lack of recognition afforded to developing countries on the executive boards of the IMF and the Bank is hugely problematic given the extensive role of those institutions in the internal affairs of developing states. (To make matters worse the proportion of basic votes attributed to all states in order to sustain equality has 'diminished from its high point of 14 per cent of all votes in 1955 to around 3 per cent in both the Fund and the Bank'. Ngaire Woods, 'Order, Justice, the IMF and the World Bank', p. 87) Even if third world countries were given a greater role on the executive board of the – IMF – World Bank, however, given that the vast majority of countries would not sit on the executive board of the body effectively dictating policy would mean that it would still constitute a violation of sovereignty.

The fact that the above developments erode the significance of the sovereignty of the poorer states of course cannot be interpreted as the negation of sovereignty *per se* in the sense that there are a significant number of states that are not in receipt of IMF – Bank loans.

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[114] Christopher Greenwood, 'International law and the "war against terrorism"', *International Affairs*, 2002, Volume 78, Issue 2.

[115] Article 39 of chapter 7 of the Charter authorises the Security Council to 'decide what measures shall be taken in accordance with Article 41 and 42, to maintain international peace and security'. Article 42 empowers the Security Council to 'take such action as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security'.

[116] UN Charter, Articles 1 (3), 55 and 56.

[117] Ibid., Article 4 (7).

[118] Nicholas J Wheeler and Alex J Bellamy, 'Humanitarian intervention and world politics', *The Globalization of World Politics*, ed. John Baylis and Steve Smith, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2001, p. 472.

[119] Jean Kirkpatrick, 'Dictatorships and Double Standards', *Commentary*, 1979, 68.

[120] Daniel Philpott, 'On the Cusp of Sovereignty', *Sovereignty at the Crossroads: Morality and International Politics in the Post Cold War Era*, ed. Luis E. Lugo, London, Rowman & Littlefield Publishers INC, 1996, p. 44 and Nicholas J Wheeler and Alex J Bellamy, 'Humanitarian intervention and world politics', p 478. Wheeler notes how very striking it was to compare the growing commitment to the notion of humanitarian intervention, expressed at the 54th UN General Assembly's debate on intervention, with that of the 1970s. 'For example, the fact that the Nixon Administration named India's intervention in East Pakistan as a violation rather than a rescue (the alternative interpretation proffered by Senator Kennedy) is significant, because, once this meaning is fixed on an action, it immediately legitimates certain courses of action whilst rendering others as unacceptable'. *Saving Strangers: Humanitarian Intervention in International Society*, Oxford University Press, 2000, p. 287.

[121] The 1960 Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples stated that all 'peoples have the right to self-determination' and 'inadequacy of political, economic, social or educational preparedness should never serve as a pretext for delaying independence'. It is seen, Jackson argued, by many as the second charter of the UN. Robert Jackson, *Quasi-States: Sovereignty, International; Relations and the Third World*, chapter 3.

[122] Paul Taylor, 'The United Nations and International Order', *The Globalization of World Politics*, p. 335.

[123] On how the failure to intervene can result in wider international disorder consider the following reflections on the failure of the international community to intervene in Rwanda in 1994. 'The Tutsi military government that seized power to stop the slaughter went on to trigger a cascade of wars across central Africa that now involve "some one-fifth of African governments and armies from across the continent ...as well as perhaps a dozen or more armed groups", according to the Organization of African Unity's Panel of Eminent personalities to Investigate the 1994 Genocide in Rwanda and Surrounding Events'. Failure to intervene can lead to the 'avoidable cascading violence of regional war', Craig N Murphy, 'Global governance: poorly done and poorly understood', p. 4.

[124] Nicholas J Wheeler and Alex J Bellamy, 'Humanitarian intervention and world politics', p 489. Also see: Nicholas J Wheeler, *Saving Strangers: Humanitarian Intervention in International Society*, Oxford University Press, 2000, pp. 288-9. Mayall makes the following interesting observation: 'The world is now so interdependent, and western governments in particular so vulnerable to public opinion mobilised through the media, that there can be no guarantee that they will not repeatedly be drawn into international crises, even where their own instincts and the balance of professional advice are in favour of non-intervention'. James Mayall, *The New Interventionism 1991-4: United Nations experience in Cambodia, former Yugoslavia and Somalia*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1996, p. 2 (also see p. 22).

[125] Nicholas J Wheeler and Alex J Bellamy, 'Humanitarian intervention and world politics', p 479.

[126] Ibid., p.480.

[127] James Mayall, 'Non-Intervention, Self Determination and the New World Order', *International Affairs*, 1991, p. 426.

[128] Ibid., pp. 488-489.

[129] Paul Taylor, 'The United Nations and International Order', p. 335. Furthermore, human rights agencies have worked hard to extend the language of rights which has greatly increased the intensity of disquiet about abuses. In the past rights were seen primarily in negative civic terms. People must have freedom from any curtailment of their speech, association and religion. Increasingly, however, there has been a commitment to positive substantive rights such as 'the right to basic provisions like food, water, health care and accommodation'. Ibid.

[130] Ibid., p 338. This same point is also made by Daniel Philpott, 'On the Cusp of Sovereignty', p. 54.

[131] Christopher Clapham, 'Sovereignty and the Third World State', p. 111.

[132] United Nations papers: A/43/131 and A/46/182.

[133] Paul Taylor, 'The United Nations and International Order', p. 336.

From an English School perspective specifically, there has been a marked shift in favour of intervention and solidarist assumptions. In the early years pluralism dominated. The concern of scholars like Hedley Bull was that if a general right of intervention were granted this would remove one of the key doctrines of international society, creating uncertainty which would translate into disorder and, in all probability, far greater suffering than that alleviated through intervention. The pluralist position thus bought directly into the order versus justice trade-off. In more recent years, however, there has been a far greater willingness to countenance intervention undoubtedly partially in response to recognition of the demise of the order versus justice trade off. Indeed, it is interesting to note that in later life, Bull seemed to be moving very much more in a solidarist direction, especially in his 1983 Hagey lectures. Since then the likes of RJ Vincent, Nicholas Wheeler and Tim Dunne have sought to move the English School rather more unambiguously into the solidarist camp. Hedley Bull, 'The Grotian Conception of International Society', *Diplomatic Investigations: Essays in the Theory of International Politics*, pp. 51 - 73; Nicholas J Wheeler, 'Pluralists or Solidarist Conceptions of International Society: Bull and Vincent on Humanitarian Intervention', *Millennium: Journal of International Studies*, 1992, Vol. 21 No 3; Tim Dunne, *Inventing International Society: A History of the English School*, Basingstoke, Macmillan, 1998, chapter 7 and 8.

[134] Nicholas J Wheeler and Alex J Bellamy, 'Humanitarian intervention and world politics', pp. 488-489.

CHAPTER 6

THE REVOLUTIONIST TRADITION &

THE POST SOVEREIGNTY POLE:

DEFINING POST-SOVEREIGNTY

Having considered how Wight's two agencies of revolutionism are generating systemic changes that involve the erosion rather than the extension of sovereignty, the primary focus now shifts from 'the flows' to conceptualization of the erosion of the sovereign state and the development of revolutionist structures of governance in the context of these flows. The thesis examines these developments in accordance with the Linklater – Little approach both ontologically (Part 1) and epistemologically (Part 2). This will provide a framework from within which the chapter will be able to translate the implications of the ontological revolution that is globalization into the actual conceptualization of sovereignty.

STRUCTURE

In considering the erosion of sovereignty and the development of revolutionist governance structures ontologically, Part 1 is divided into two sections. Section 1 will examine the erosion of state sovereignty from the vantage point of the social contracted territorial people. Section 2 will then provide further perspective on this process by examining the networked model of governance called into being in its stead. This will manifest the unbundling of sovereignty through an organizational shift away from

government resting on the modern social contracted territorial people to governance resting on multiple foundations each defined by specialized, functional concerns according to the subject in view. The chapter will then reflect on the implications of sections 1 and 2 on the development of English School revolutionism premised on a holistic appreciation of sovereignty. Part 2 of this chapter will then further its conceptualization of unbundled/deconstructed/decentered sovereignty through an epistemological lens, trading on the relationship between strong post-positivism and ontological flux identified in chapter 2. Whilst mindful of the numerous strongly post-positivist critiques of sovereignty, this chapter will consider the basic effect of this approach through the window of the 'unbundling' framework formulated by John Gerard Ruggie, whose historical approach to the future is of special relevance to this thesis because it resonates very much with that of the English School. It will be shown to be particularly useful for the purposes of engaging with the epistemological challenges of revolutionism as disclosed by the Linklater – Little spectrum. Together Parts 1 and 2 will facilitate a clear appreciation of the deconstruction of sovereignty through the rise of revolutionist structures of governance from both an ontological and an epistemological perspective. The net result will be a clear definition of post-sovereignty.

PART 1: FROM SOVEREIGNTY TO POST-SOVEREIGNTY

In embarking upon consideration of the demise of the social contracted territorial people and the development of networked governance, it is important to set out, once again, the central spatio-temporal coordinates that, as chapter 2 has demonstrated, underpin this research. The ontologically closed sovereign state is spatially oriented (time assimilated by space, configuring modern Newtonian concepts of space), whilst the flows that characterise globalization are temporally oriented (space assimilated by

time, configuring postmodern hyperspace). The unbundling of sovereignty and development of a post sovereign category will depend upon the injection of a greater temporality/openness which, as this chapter will demonstrate, results in first the deconstruction of sovereignty and then the development of post-sovereign, networked governance.

SECTION 1: THE SOCIAL CONTRACTED, TERRITORIAL PEOPLE

The deconstructive impact of ontological openness on sovereignty as a consequence of global flows can be seen very clearly by examining the fate of sovereignty as the social contracted territorial people. As the chapter will now demonstrate, this process is widely recognized by people across radically different intellectual backgrounds.[1]

The demise of 'sovereignty as social contract', is clearly expressed in the work of the neo-Marxist hyperglobalizers Hardt and Negri.[2] Specifically, the two scholars contend that the global flows of capital, associated with globalization, generate pressures whose effect is to unbundle the social contracted territorial people that underpins the transcendent authority of the sovereign state, calling into being instead (as we shall see later), an immanent, post-modern, networked, form of governance. 'The concept of the People no longer functions as the organised subject of the system of command ...This shift demystifies and destroys the circular modern idea of the legitimacy of power by which power constructs from the multitude a single subject that could then in turn legitimate that same power'.[3] With the demise of the social contracted, centred 'people' in whose name sovereignty is sustained, the 'transcendental fiction of politics can no longer stand up and has no argumentative utility because we all exist entirely within the realm of the social and political'.[4]

As a consequence of the deconstruction of the centred political self, in which the public private duality ties the state and people together into an essential oneness, one sees the administrative machine beginning to engage with the diverse 'peoples' that are released as a consequence of the deconstruction of 'the people' of the nation-state. 'Precisely to the extent that administration is singularized and no longer functions as the actor for centralized political and deliberative organs, it becomes increasingly autonomous and engages more closely with various social groups: business and labor groups, ethnic and religious groups, legal and criminal groups, and so forth'.[5] Whilst some of these identities may rest primarily within the state, many will be related to larger transnational movements. Thus globalization, in this view, does not just champion revolutionism by eroding the integrity of the sovereign state – upon whose wellbeing realism and rationalism depend – but also by facilitating the development of transnational global identities.[6]

Writing in the liberal hyperglobalist tradition, meanwhile, Guehenno's work *The End of the Nation State* also considers the demise of sovereignty as social contract in the context of global flows. Modern (as opposed to postmodern) 'politics does not exist as a simple outcome of private interests, but presupposes a social contract that precedes it and is greater than all particular contracts. If this premise is abandoned ...politics ...[is] ...reduced to the function of the market ...No economic law can replace the territorial and historical basis of the nation'.[7] This, Guehenno contends, is exactly what has happened in the context of global economic flows.

Guehenno chooses to point to the one time presence (prior to the triumph of global economic flows over politics) and then subsequent absence of the foundational character of the social contract (in the context of the triumph of economic flows over politics) through the state's changing attitude towards war. During the high noon of the modern sovereign state it was able to command mass conscription in the 'total war' scenarios witnessed in the two global conflicts of the twentieth century. 'By making war the ultimate expression of the will of whole populations, and not only the sport of princes, the national age had invented the idea of total war: ...The collective will to live, with its corollary, the will to kill, was, moreover, a sentiment stronger than the sense of duty and honor of the soldiers of the *ancien regime*'.[8] The erosion of the purchase of the social contracted territorial people in the current environment, however, is now seen in the fact that states cannot command that kind of sacrifice. 'No nation today is capable of mobilizing such gigantic forces around an idea. The great bloodbaths of the twentieth century were made possible by the conflation of the absolute power of a nation-state and of a "religion" – nationalist, National Socialist or Communist – that gave it direction'.[9]

As a function of the dissolution of sovereignty as social contracted political community, Guehenno observes, 'community' has to find new bases for its expression. Echoing Hardt and Negri's comments about the replacement of 'the people' with 'various social groups: business and labor groups, ethnic and religious groups, legal and criminal groups',[10] Guehenno contends that today it is 'necessary to rediscover that a human community is not only a political notion but a philosophical and religious one. Having lost the comfort of our geographical boundaries, we must in effect discover what creates and bonds between humans that constitute a

community'.[11] Once again, therefore, one can see the development of revolutionist ontology not only in the erosion of the sovereign state, realist/rationalist ontology, but also in the development of transnational groups that give expression to the notion of 'transnational community'.

Writing again in the liberal 'hyperglobalist school' Kenichi Ohmae, perhaps the leading thinker in this tradition, similarly entitles his major contribution to the debate *The End of the Nation-State*. Ohmae highlights the way in which he believes global flows are undermining the autonomy of the political, and bringing about the deconstruction of the sovereign state, by reflecting on expectations about the provision of a 'civil minimum' of state welfare. In the context of an efficient global market, he contends, there can no longer be a civil minimum of welfare provision, coextensive with the state, and thus no longer a centred, territorial social contract of the kind associated with the modern sovereignty complex.[12] 'Historically, the ethos of equally shared contributions to the common good (even though the benefits may not be shared quite so equally) has been the foundation on which genuinely democratic societies, no less than the nations that grow up around them, rest. When that ethos wanes or goes into eclipse, so does the glue that holds those nations together'.[13]

The deconstruction of the old social contracted people can be seen in Ohmae's contention that sovereign states must be deconstructed into smaller region states which, giving the globe a greater 'edge' to 'centre' ratio, provide more interfaces for connexity and exchange within the networked global economy.[14] 'In a borderless economy, the units that do make sense are what I call region-states – geographical units such as northern Italy; Wales; Baden-Wurttemburg in Germany; San Diego,

California, and Tijuana, Mexico; Hong Kong and southern China...'[15] Real economic progress is only truly possible 'when regions are genuinely open and responsive – *in ways nation-states will not and cannot be*'.[16] These region states would be first economic rather than political units with a global vision that is concerned with maximising their linkages within the network of the global economy. Thus once again, as in the case of Hardt, Negri and Guehenno, there is recognition that the deconstruction of the social contracted territorial people results in the development of new identities, although, in the case of Ohmae, these new identities remain resolutely territorial.[17]

Transformationalists Camilleri and Falk, meanwhile, also unbundle the sovereign state with full blown deconstructive implications for the centred social contract.[18] Specifically, they attribute this to global flows whose impact is the marketisation of politics wherein the state becomes absorbed with the economic project and the classic relationship between the public and private spheres is consequently placed under great pressure.[19] In this context there is a widening gap between state sovereignty and popular sovereignty which is a function of the growing separation between the state and civil society. 'The state may be omnipresent, its tentacles may reach into every nook and cranny of social life, yet its structures, processes and policies may be far removed from the citizen's sense of identity, history and solidarity. *A deep divide may separate the public and private spheres*'. (Italics added)[20] This divide has led to mass disaffection. 'The separation of state and society leads, then, to an essential *schism within the individual between the public and the private self*. The decline of meaningful political discourse, hence of the public sphere, may prompt the individual to retreat to a private world in search of meaning and reward'. (Italics added)[21]

In the death of the social contracted territorial people and the retreat to the private sphere, Camilleri and Falk recognize, (along with Hardt, Negri, Ohmae and Guehenno[22]), that implicit in the deconstruction of sovereignty is the development of new identities. In the private sphere, concerns that would once have found expression in the 'public' are manifest through 'new social movements' and their creation of new *de facto* publics through the effect of what is perhaps best described as a constructed 'corporate private' realm. Producing new bases of identity around differing moral consensuses outside the territorially boundaried, modern political domain, new social movements effectively deconstruct the social contracted, sovereign polity. They replace the imposed common good that they inherit from previous political generations with ones of their own choice with the people of their own choice.[23] Writing in the same vein, Peterson observes, '[e]ven as supranational force alters state power, subnational conflicts expose the illusion of homogeneity promoted by nationalist narratives. In short, identities conventionally 'grounded' in state territoriality are losing ground to a politics of new, or even non-space'.[24] R. J. B. Walker, meanwhile, with his acute awareness of the new flows, also contends that sovereignty seems increasingly unable 'to contain the contemporary profusion of ethnic and cultural identities'. The dissolving of the centred community is seen directly in the unbundling of the sovereign nation-state and the bases for legitimacy that it supports. '[T]he established routine of democratic theory and nationalist aspiration must become increasingly tenuous once the guarantees of state sovereignty lose their credibility'.[25]

Bauman similarly points to the death of sovereignty - expressed through the demise of

political community (social contracted territorial people) - as a result of the impact of global flows. Specifically, Bauman argues, these flows erode the state prerogatives which, he maintains, are central to the state's capacity to maintain its communal identity. 'The task of order making requires huge and continuous efforts of creaming off, shifting and condensing social power, which in turn call for considerable resources that only the state, in the form of a hierarchical bureaucratic apparatus, is able to muster, focus and deploy. Of necessity, the legislative and executive sovereignty of the modern state was perched on the 'tripod' of military, economic and cultural sovereignties'.[26] The latter, he maintained, constituted *'the ability to muster enough cultural resources to sustain the state's identity and distinctiveness through the distinctive identity of its subjects'*.[27] (Italics added.) Strategically, however, this capacity to maintain the centred political community, of the nation-state and thus the 'sovereignty of the people' has now been broken. '[A]ll three legs of the 'sovereignty' tripod have been broken beyond repair. The military, economic and cultural self-sufficiency, indeed self-sustainability, of the state - any state –ceased to be a viable prospect'.[28]

CONCLUSION

Thus, in the context of global flows, basic, positive, internal sovereignty, manifest in the social contracted territorial people, is - according to revolutionism - unbundled and eroded away. Specifically, the politico-legal foundation for administration is replaced by a new functional, technocratic logic and individuals are increasingly released to find their own identity with those of their choice rather than those of their nation.

SECTION 2: THE EMERGENCE OF POST-SOVEREIGN GOVERNANCE

In Section 1 this chapter has considered the first step towards revolutionist ontology with the deconstruction of sovereignty via: a) the demise of the social contracted territorial people that underpinned modern government and b) the emergence of new potentially transnational identities. The chapter will now turn to the second step, namely consideration of the networked form of governance arising on the basis of this deconstruction. After briefly defining the context of increased cooperation in which the shift to governance has been located, the chapter will move to the central task of a providing a definition of networked governance itself.

- INCREASING COOPERATION FACILITATING THE NETWORK

At the heart of the shift towards networked governance is the fact that, under the pressure of global flows, the foreign-domestic dichotomy is breaking down as the inside of the state, the domestic arena, increasingly spills out into the foreign, international arena and new extra-territorial power bases arise.[29] As a function of the erosion of the foreign-domestic dichotomy it is no longer possible for the state to control the issues that were once within its exclusive and direct reach. This has led to a massive increase in the number of global interfaces as states, and an emerging global civil society, have come together in order to address the new challenges presented by the global marketplace. In this context international gatherings are no longer purely for the purpose of discussing geo-politics and defence.[30] 'Along with substantial increases in flows of trade, foreign direct investment (FDI), financial commodities, tourism, cultural links, hazardous waste and knowledge ...there has been a corresponding intensification of forms of international cooperation to manage, regulate, facilitate and sometimes prevent these burgeoning flows and connections'.[31]

The increase in cooperation resulting from the demise of the foreign-domestic dichotomy is best expressed statistically. In 1909 there were just 37 Intergovernmental Organizations but by 1996 the number had risen to 260. The number of treaties between states has similarly risen. Between 1946 and 1975, for instance, the number of treaties in operation between states rose from 6351 to 14061, providing a similar picture of the dramatic increase in global interconnectedness. As noted above, moreover, these bases for governance cooperation do not simply exist between states. Critically they involve states alongside many of the burgeoning numbers of non-state actors within national and global civil society. In 1909 there were just 176 International Non-Governmental Organizations but by 1996 there were 5472.[32] Whilst it is important to be clear that by no means all of the organizations called into being in recent years in order to cater for the need for greater cooperation comprise examples of what the following pages will define as networked governance, one should be aware that an increasing number of bodies do come within this category.[33]

- UNPACKING GOVERNANCE

Having gained some perspective on the rapid expansion of increasing international interfaces, the chapter will now provide a brief introduction to the principles of networked governance in general terms before proceeding to examine specific models that have been developed by different scholars in greater detail, highlighting their points of similarity.

AN INTRODUCTION

The central challenge in seeking to conceptualize networked governance is the need to factor its spatio-temporal profile, informed by the global flows considered above that have undermined the subject-object, public-private, foreign-domestic dualities/dichotomies, into government. As Guehenno observed: 'The logic of networks will completely upset ...[the essential modern perspective]... the frontier is no longer a beginning, but an ending, always precarious, by nature fluid - for fluidity becomes the condition of competition and of dynamism in the age of networks. No juridical space is ever definitely fixed'.[34]

One can begin to gain an appreciation of how best to approach the challenge of factoring in the network by contrasting it with preceding intergovernmentalism. Once inter-dependence passes a certain level it becomes practically very difficult to use the veto and thus the intergovernmental enterprise undergoes a qualitative transformation. In the intergovernmental context, although the movement of relational flows between sovereign states meant that they were not completely closed, the nature of the relationship was such that the actors between which relationship flowed were the centre of attention. In moving into networked governance the intensity of these flows is such that they are forcing the opening of the actors to the point of threatening their deconstruction in the sense that they increasingly eclipse the significance of the actors between which they move. When states are opened up in this way, their closure on the competencies that once existed unambiguously within their remit is removed.[35]

In the context of this demise of functional closure, instead of being set rigidly on the foundation of the social contracted, territorial people, differing competencies draw on

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the emerging global technological elites in each field in order to find their own centres of gravity. The networked governance frame of reference provides a means for coming to terms with this specialisation and its impact for the political through a form of functional systems theory. This should be understood first in terms of the erosion of politics, which instead of being foundational becomes one sub-system among many, and then in terms of the triumph of functional/economic concerns.

'According to systems theory', Jachtenfuchs observes, 'the political system is only one among several functional subsystems of society, and does not occupy any particular place in society. ...This theory radically breaks with the ideal type of the state as an internally and externally sovereign political unit'.[36] This does not mean that politics ceases to influence economics but it does mean that political decisions 'are processed by the economic systems according to its own logic and with incalculable side-effects'.[37] The capacity of the territorial state to inform all policy development through its closed horizon is therefore greatly eroded as competencies find their own functional foundations, with differing territorial reference points. In this context governance becomes a matter of co-ordination between the different technical authorities that preside over differing competencies.[38] Having considered some basic contours of the impact of the network, the chapter will now examine different accounts of this phenomenon through the work of a number of different scholars, purposefully drawn from different backgrounds in order to demonstrate the broad foundation of support for the notion of network governance.

MODELS OF GOVERNANCE

Operating in deference to functional rather than social contracted territorial logic, Guehenno describes the new framework as 'Multi-Dimensional Governance'. In the multi-dimensional form the endness that accompanied the modern state, with its territorial, social contracted foundation, upholding an absolute internal jurisdiction, is replaced by a functional form of governance which runs through the nation-state, breaking up its sovereignty 'into several functional structures'.[39] The net result is a form of decentred governance consisting of different strands of erstwhile sovereignty devoted to different areas of policy. It produces a 'simple operating procedure governing a functional base of sectors of human activity'.[40] The movement of government from a common, boundaried legal-territorial foundation - whose commonality services a basis for debate and resolution, in terms which are not entirely functional - to a network of multiple functional foundations, will bring the end of modern politics and birth of a multi-dimensional political form.[41] This results in conflicting, multiple boundaries with the effect that the modern combination of boundaries and closure is exchanged for the postmodern combination of open, overlapping boundaries and a growing openness. 'The multidimensional world, in which no structure can monopolize all the dimensions of sovereignty, favours openness, in contradistinction to the closed system that is embryonic in all political logic. In this way, as the questions at issue acquire a universal dimension, whether it is a question of drugs, or the environment, or of financial matters, it becomes increasingly absurd to want to resolve them within the same framework. Geographical expansion requires functional specialisation, and any attempt at political totalization, whether European or not, appears as an artificial relic of a bygone age'.[42]

Camilleri and Falk, meanwhile, also observe that one can obtain a particularly clear appreciation of the multi-dimensional networked model of governance, with its rejection of the centred self, replete with its distinction between the inside and outside, through consideration of boundaries.[43] Boundaries are necessary but cannot be seen as the catch-all abstraction of sovereignty with its frozen piece of homogenous, Newtonian territory and essentialist implication. In the first instance, they must differ in that they pertain not to a broad basis of political existence, but rather to a specific function. Given that different functions are better set at different levels, multiple and differently located boundaries must pertain over the same pieces of territory. In the second instance and more fundamentally, however, these boundaries do not merely service physical territory but an extra-territorial realm, providing perspective on a world that is inherently ontologically open not closed, a form that is multi rather than uni-dimensional. 'Expressed more succinctly', Camilleri and Falk maintained, 'boundaries (hence the delineation of systems and subsystems) need not be drawn purely according to jurisdictional or even geographical criteria. A particular issue (e.g. pollution), area of policy (e.g. education), or set of relationships (e.g. international finance) can each in its own way provide a useful and coherent basis of demarcation. It follows that conceptual boundaries must as closely as possible reflect the changing issues and terrain of socio-economic organisation and political conflict'.[44]

Rosenau, meanwhile, similarly recognizes how the radical openness of the governance form is constitutive of what he described as the 'disaggregation' of authority from its erstwhile given, social contracted, territorial foundations. This rejection of the 'common' politico-legal foundation inevitably takes Rosenau, like Guehenno, Camilleri and Falk into the realm of multi-dimensionality. Global

governance, he observes, involves 'literally millions' of control mechanisms. '[A]ny attempt to assess the dynamics of global governance will perforce have *multiple dimensions*', (Italics added) and in this context, moreover, 'any effort to trace a hierarchical structure of authority which loosely links disparate sources of governance to each other is bound to fail'.[45] Herein one sees the radical openness that underpins Rosenau's model of governance. It is, he maintained, in 'a continuous process of evolution, a becoming that fluctuates between order and disorder as conditions change and emergent properties consolidate and solidify. To analyse governance by freezing it in time is to ensure failure in comprehending its nature and vagaries'.[46]

Hardt and Negri's account of governance presents a similar multi-dimensional model to that of Guehenno, Camilleri, Falk and Rosenau. In the modern world, as a function of the public/private duality, the political and administrative aspects of government were supposedly united, facilitating linear integration of conflicts and the rationalization of social life. With the deconstruction of 'the people' (see section 1) and thus the public private duality, the management of political ends are now being separated from the bureaucratic means.[47] Released from its conventional relationship with politics, Hardt and Negri contend, government administration is free to pursue an increasingly 'dynamic' and 'functional' as opposed to 'given' and 'territorial' agenda. 'In the imperial regime, bureaucracies (and administrative means in general) are considered not according to the linear logics of their functionality to goals, but according to differential and multiple instrumental logics. The problem of administration is not a problem of unity but one of instrumental multifunctionality'. Governance 'is created by conforming to the structural logics that are active in the construction of Empire, such as the police and military logics.., the economic logics

...and the ideological and communicative logics. The only way that administrative action gains its autonomy and legitimate authority in the imperial regime is by following along the differentiating lines of these logics'.[48] The stress on functionality and differential logics in the context of unbundled modern polity again resonates directly with the multi-dimensional model of governance that has emerged clearly in this investigation.[49] In the fragmentation witnessed in the above multi-functionality and the deconstruction of the centralized polity into different strands of the public, one can see, as in the case of Guehenno, Camilleri, Falk and Rosenau, the clear multi-dimensional shape of networked governance.

APPRAISAL

One could go on considering other conceptualisations of governance which respond in similar fashion to the temporality of globalization. Sassen for example unpacks governance through what she describes as the 'denationalising of national territory ...in a highly specialized and functional manner that befits the tenor of our era'[50] which causes sovereignty to be 'decentred' into the functional strands of 'a multiplicity of institutional arenas'.[51] Although different accounts have their own particular ways of unpacking networked governance, essentially the reality with which one is confronted is the same. First, it involves the demise of the social contracted territorial people, the basis of internal sovereignty on which external sovereignty depends. Second, in its place emerges a form of organization set out in deference to a primarily functional rather than politico-territorial logic, which is achieved by dividing up the sovereignty of the state into functional strands, each with its own specialist competencies. In the process sovereignty is replaced by new post sovereign categories informed either by specialist/technical interests or by the moral

agendas of a newly created community rather than the territorial social contracted public sphere. To the extent that inherent in governance networks is a) the deconstruction of the social contracted territorial state and b) the accommodation of global flows giving expression to global identities, the development of governance provides a clear example of the rise of revolutionist ontology.[52]

GOVERNANCE AND THE ENGLISH SCHOOL

Having considered the implications of governance from an ontological point of view (Sections 1 and 2), it is important that before moving to consider these same challenges from the perspective of epistemology (Part 2), the chapter pauses to reflect on the implications of the above specifically for the English School. The challenge presented by Sections 1 and 2 for the School pertains to the fact that, if one works on the basis of the classic division between internal and external sovereignty,[53] growing interdependence has to be interpreted simply as increasing connections between enduring sovereign states whose integrity can only be jeopardised by constitutional subservience to another sovereign state. This inability to detect other forms of change is a major problem for the English School given that its commitment to history should make it nervous about creating reifications with ahistoric implications.

Given the plight of international relations in 1958 there was good reason for Wight positing a division between internal and external sovereignty in order to justify the study of international theory in its own right.[54] Forty-seven years later, and with the benefit of globalization (facilitating the demise of the foreign-domestic dichotomy), however, there is a need to question - as this chapter has demonstrated - the boundary between the inside and the outside. The long-term status of international relations for

the English School cannot rest upon the invocation of an absolute divide between internal and external sovereignty that reifies sovereignty with the effect that the only form of change impacting the sovereign state with which one can engage pertains either to the development or termination of constitutional subservience to another polity. The School must rather develop to embrace a model of sovereignty that takes on the lessons of chapter 3, Part 2, recognising that sovereignty is an 'internal-external whole' that can be impacted from both the inside-out and the outside-in. Specifically, this will provide a frame of reference through which (moving way beyond the aspirations of chapter 3, Part 2) one can engage with the break-up of sovereignty into strands pertaining to different functional areas of policy and then unpack the implications of this change for internal sovereignty on external sovereignty and sovereignty as a whole. Armed with this perspective those parts of English School theory that embrace sovereignty will be able to engage with governance theory which has the capacity to greatly enrich conceptions of revolutionist world society, accommodating not only the development of extra-intense relationships between sovereignties born of commonalities, but also the possibility of the very unbundling of sovereignty itself and the development of the notion of post-sovereignty that authenticates revolutionist ontology.

Having pointed out that there has been a distinct lack of interaction between the English School and governance theory (which must be corrected if it is to rise to the challenge of conceptualising the impact of revolutionist ontology on the sovereign state), it is important to note that, whilst not using the language of governance theory, some of the current generation of English School scholars have begun to apply this approach to the long neglected subject of European integration. Ole Wæver has, for

example, employed the notion of empire in seeking to come to terms with the European Union, breaking away from the idea that the EU is simply an intense form of international society, i.e. a framework within which there are close associations between sovereign states. Indeed, Wæver has rejected the sovereign state altogether.[55] This has the benefit of making his position - in the terms of this discussion, informed by the Linklater – Little perspective - clearly revolutionist.

Whilst Wæver provides a model of revolutionism that embraces the deconstruction of sovereignty, however, the impact of his account is the introduction of a radical discontinuity between sovereignty and empire. Unlike this chapter he does not provide a framework that lends itself to engaging with the gradual unbundling of sovereignty through the application of governance theory. The English School perspective can be greatly assisted by embracing both a holistic model of sovereignty and contemporary governance theory and therein the multi-dimensional frame. These will together facilitate an appreciation of the gradual deconstruction of the social contracted territorial people, and attendant development of networked governance over time, as different policy areas are transferred from a territorial-juridical foundation to a functional foundation that contributes towards the development of a multi-dimensional form of governance.[56]

PART 2: POST-SOVEREIGNTY THROUGH AN EPISTEMIC LENS

Having considered the development of contemporary revolutionism from an ontological perspective (via the demise of sovereignty as social contracted territorial people and the advent of networked governance) in Part 1, the chapter will now consider this same development from an epistemological point of view in Part 2. In

rising to this challenge it is crucial that this second chapter considers the manner in which epistemology can both accommodate and authenticate the spatio-temporal changes that are definitive of globalization. It will first recapitulate the basic epistemological principles developed by chapter 2 and then apply these in terms that are sensitive to the English School through the work of John Gerard Ruggie, reflecting on the resulting socio-epistemological implications for the application of revolutionism within the Linklater – Little approach to the three traditions spectrum.

RECAPTILUATION

Chapter 2 made two key observations about strong post-positivism and change. First, it demonstrated that strong post-positivism enables one to see the relationship between the temporal orientation - seen in open ontology - and the celebration of change. Specifically, strong post-positivism abandons the absolute distinction between subject and object, with its attendant reifications, clearing the ground for the object to be changed by the subject. Second, in providing an epistemological perspective on the relationship between the temporal orientation and the celebration of change, it demonstrates how post-positivism can be used to confirm, and seek to shape, change and to translate its implication into the conceptualisation of ontology. Thus, to engage with fundamental transformation in IR one needs to employ strongly post-positivist epistemological assumptions, applying them specifically to the conceptualization of the sovereign state. This will facilitate the definition of post-sovereignty.

POST-POSITIVISM AND UNBUNDLING TERRITORIIALITY

One of the post-positivist applications that is particularly useful for this chapter, as it considers the forms of epistemology that can service globalization and its implications for the sovereign state, is that provided by John Gerard Ruggie. Like other bids to introduce a post-positivist frame of reference to IR, Ruggie challenges the ontological closure of the sovereign state associated with realist positivism through the introduction of epistemologically mediated openness. This thesis selects his approach to provide a window on this process because, whilst it certainly does not present the strongest form of available post-positivism, it engages directly with one of the most obvious expressions of sovereign state closure, the fixity of its territorial extension defined by rigid boundaries. Specifically, Ruggie's attempt to embrace a post-positivist epistemology results in a project that he describes as the 'unbundling of state territoriality' which provides an extremely useful framework through which to come to terms with the basic deconstructive effect of other manifestations of strong post-positivism on territorial sovereignty.[57]

Ruggie's approach is also very relevant because, engaging with the conceptual challenge of coming to terms with the state in the context of globalization through history, it resonates with that of the English School. Invoking the medieval comparison, he follows in the path of Bull who first coined the phrase neo-medievalism in 1977.[58] Furthermore, as a chapter that seeks to demonstrate the relevance of the English School three traditions approach, in the context of globalization, the fact that Wight recognized that medievalism was the first type of revolutionist states system, makes Ruggie's attempt to draw on medievalism in his attempt to come to terms with the impact of globalization (contemporary

revolutionism) on the state very pertinent to this research.[59]

BACKGROUND AND APPROACH

Ruggie's point of departure is an appreciation that the international arena is currently being subjected to fundamental transformation which the IR discipline has been slow to come to terms with. In seeking to be sensitive to this transformation he is very critical of the dominance of positivism. 'As for the dominant positivist posture in our field, it is reposed in a deep Newtonian slumber wherein method rules, epistemology is often confused with method, and the term "ontology" typically draws either blank stares or bemused smiles'.[60] In order to develop an appropriate reconceptualization of the state, Ruggie contends that it is necessary to adopt a post-positivist approach. Whilst never embracing sceptical postmodernist epistemology, his epistemological sensitivity, clearly differentiates him from the presumptions of ontological closure that underpin positivist IR.[61]

Recognising the difficulty that IR is having in engaging with fundamental transformation, Ruggie looks back in history to identify the last example of such a transformation. This he locates in the shift from medievalism to modernism which he assesses epistemologically through the notion of 'social epistemology', which seeks to associate prevailing ideas, with epistemological implication, with the broader physical (i.e. socio-economic-politico-environmental) infrastructure.[62] Having applied this approach successfully to the transition from medievalism to modernity, Ruggie then applies it to the contemporary shift from modernity to post-modernity.

I: FROM MEDIEVALISM TO MODERNITY

In order to both see the social epistemic method before actually confronting the current transformation and gain an appreciation of how best to give expression to the post-modern social epistemology, it is important to take two preparatory steps. First, one must see the socio-epistemic method in the transformation from medievalism to modernism. Second, it is necessary to consider how the ontological closure posited by the social episteme generated difficulties and precisely how these difficulties were addressed.

1] IMAPCT OF THE MODERN SOCIAL EPISTEME

The key to the modern era was, in part, the Reformation and Renaissance's affirmation, contrary to medievalism, that matter was both knowable and good. The weakness of the previously dominant Catholic epistemology, with its strong element of subjectivism, was thus replaced by a confident objectivism which had broad social epistemological implications.[63] Specifically, whilst the former supported a decentred subject the latter configured a centred subject which Ruggie illustrated through consideration of different aspects of life in general - including speech and art - culminating with an examination of its impact on politics and the state:

The most important demarcating development almost certainly took place in the sphere of the arts with the rise of single-perspectivity. During the medieval era artists viewed their subjects from a number of different angles rather than the 'single perspective'. Within this multi-perspectivity there was often a great variation in the scale of subjects considered within the same piece of work. This was not the product of a skilfully invoked distortion of reality in deference to some scientific principle, but

was rather to convey the relative importance of the persons concerned.[64] The architect Bruneschelli, however, broke away from the medieval norm, replacing it instead with the 'single point perspective'.[65]

Put simply single-point perspective suggests that the 'pictorial surface is regarded as a transparent vertical screen, placed between the artist and his subject, on which he traces the outlines [of the visual field] as they appear from a single fixed viewpoint'.[66] The important thing to appreciate is that 'this was precision and perspective from a particular point of view, the point of view of a single subjectivity, from which all other subjectivities were plotted in diminishing size and depth toward the vanishing point'.[67]

This artistic revolution had wide ranging socio-epistemological ramifications that made their presence felt in many quarters, including politics. Before the advent of the single perspective, as Agnew and Corbridge reflect, 'Communities were united only by allegiance and personal obligation rather than by abstract conceptions of individual equality or citizenship in a geographical circumscribed territory. Space was organized concentrically around many different centres depending upon current political affiliations, rather than a singular centre with established territorial boundaries'[68] Once the single perspective was in place, though, the modern political form was born. 'Within the definite boundary of the new territorial state', Mumford observes, 'unified areas of administration were established...In politics as well as in painting after the invention of the easel picture, the new life was held together in a rigid frame... But the new territorial state, on the contrary, could be seen or at least visualised: it was a visible whole, and each country that was politically unified became, so to say, a self-

contained picture. This visualisation of power became possible only when territorial continuity became an attribute of the sovereign state'.[69]

The epistemic confidence of the subsequent modern scientific revolution also did much to strengthen the purchase of the new confident social epistemology on politics and the state. 'The Hobbesian view of the state', Camilleri and Falk observe, 'which still colours the modern understanding of sovereignty, owes a great deal to the spatial consciousness implicit in Euclidean geometry, Galilean mechanics and Newtonian physics'.[70] Approached through this grid, territorial space enjoyed foundational significance in the definition the sovereign state, rendering it entirely logical that international relations should be reduced in complexity such that the realist billiard ball metaphor is invoked.[71]

Ruggie argued that together cultural developments in the arts and the sciences, which in themselves had nothing to do with politics, but everything to do with the prevailing social epistemology, did much to configure the political reality of the ontologically closed modern sovereign state.

2] PROBLEMS WITH THE MODERN SOCIAL EPISTEME

Once configured, the modern sovereign state immediately confronted a whole series of difficulties that were the fruit of its commitment to rigid boundaries. How could such states deal with those parts of the planet that needed to be shared, such as waterways and the sea, and how were such states to define space wherein they could interact? The absence of any sense of relational joining with other states - previously sustained through the supranational Catholic Church and empire in the *Respublica*

Christiana - created very real practical challenges which Ruggie refers to as the 'paradox of absolute individuation'.[72]

This problem initially came to a head with the so-called embassy-chapel question. The English king, Edward VI, demanded that the new English prayer book should be used in his embassies. Charles V of France, however, was not prepared to countenance a Protestant service being conducted in his Catholic court. After much heated debate the dilemma was eventually settled through the advent of the doctrine of 'extra-territoriality'. This idea asserted that an embassy notionally rested on the soil of the nation that it represented. Thus when the ambassador stepped from the street through the door of the British embassy, he was actually leaving France and entering Britain. Thus construed, Protestant services held within were mysteriously projected out of France back to Britain, relieving the French monarch of the thought that he was hosting heresy.

The use of the notion of extra-territoriality was, in Ruggie's judgement, the first example of the modern state being forced to contend with the foolish consequences of its own epistemic arrogance; a fact confirmed by the ridiculous procedures it was forced to adopt as a consequence. This arrogance was a function of an epistemologically (positivist) disclosed model of territoriality premised on absolute ontological closure. The development of the extra-territorial status of embassies, in response to the challenges of this posture, constituted the first step by states towards the 'unbundling of their territoriality', (the generation of openness) in order to facilitate communication and relationship between themselves.[73] It is - as the chapter will now demonstrate - in this old unbundling solution that one can appreciate

something of the impact of the shift to the post-modern social episteme.

II: FROM MODERNITY TO POSTMODERNITY

In essence the old unbundling solution has simply been radicalized in the context of the shift from modernity to post-modernity. The projection of greater openness that facilitates far greater unbundling is disclosed through a social epistemological frame that, like its modern equivalent, is also informed by cultural developments, although with diametrically opposing implications.

In the same way that the ontologically closed, bundled nature of the modern state was disclosed by a particular social episteme, so too must the ontologically open, unbundled post-sovereign form be disclosed by a particular social episteme, albeit different. As in the case of the above, Ruggie seeks to generate an appropriate social episteme by drawing on contemporary culture. To the extent that the modern episteme posited the centred self, the post-modern posits the decentred self.[74] Similarly, in art, whilst the modern social episteme posited the single point perspective, the postmodern has introduced pastiche, abrupt juxtapositions, simultaneity and superimposition, pointing back towards a multiperspectival frame.[75] To the extent that the modern social episteme traded upon an absolute division between the subject and object in which the knowing of the former could not change the latter, thus securing a closed, centred ontology, the postmodern social episteme traded upon the negation of any such division with precisely the opposite consequences. Now the knower could change the known securing an open and decentred ontology.

As noted above, the application of this post-positivist social epistemology, with its

decentering implication, is the radicalization of the earlier unbundling of closed, centred, modern sovereign state territoriality. In using the 'unbundling of territoriality' to explain the consequences of the application of the post-modern social episteme, Ruggie provides a very effective image for responding to sovereignty's relational problem (as defined not just by Ruggie but Walker, Wind, Donnelly, Agnew, Corbridge, Paul *et al*) because, to the extent that bundled territoriality posits the image of a closed, centred unit, it is suggestive of a lack of relationship and communication. One focuses on *a priori* boundaried units rather than on their relationships and on the impact of these relationships on those units. Alternatively expressed one concentrates on the 'centre', the actual unit/body itself rather than its 'edges',[76] the points of contact/joining with other units/bodies. The unbundling of that territorial unit, therefore, infers the advent of a new, open structure which, lacking the closed, centred standing of the previous order, will be inherently relational, joined and connected rather than boundaried and separated.

As growing economic flows, a developing sense of global humanity and expanding global governance make polities ever more interdependent, the imperative for this unbundling has become greater and greater. Today unbundling has proceeded to such an extent that there is a real sense in which a space between nations has emerged which has increasingly had less to do with providing a basis for relationship between states - of being a means to an end - and has instead become a space in its own right. This is, of course, entirely consistent with chapter 5's consideration of the nature of networked, extra-territorial, economic hyperspace, and this chapter's consideration of networked governance (Part 1), which demonstrate a shift in attention away from the entities that are joined to the interface which services their connection.[77]

Crucially the unbundling of sovereign territoriality should not just be seen from the perspective of the generation of a new space between actors but as a new space that involves the transformation of actorhood. Inherent in the process of advanced unbundling is the deconstruction of the sovereign state, producing both the decentering of the state internally and the erosion of its boundaries with other states, and indeed other actors, externally. This, Ruggie contends, replaces the single-point sovereign state of modernity with the multiperspectival political form of postmodernity. 'From the vantage of the present analysis, however, a very different attribute of the EC comes into view: it may constitute the first "multiperspectival polity" to emerge since the advent of the modern era. That is to say, it is increasingly difficult to visualize the conduct of international politics among community members, and to a considerable measure even domestic politics, as though it took place from a starting point of twelve separate, single, fixed view points'. Indeed such is the interconnection that 'the constitutive process whereby each of the twelve defines its own identity – and identities are logically prior to preferences – increasingly endogenize the existence of the other eleven'.[78] Ruggie also sought to apply multi-perspectivity beyond the EU. 'The concept of multiperspectival institutional forms offers a lens through which to view other possible instances of international transformation today. Consider the global system of transnationalized microeconomic links... [These] have 'created a nonterritorial "region" in the world economy – a decentred yet integrated space of flows, operating in real time, which exists alongside the spaces-of-places that we call national economies'.[79]

ENGLISH SCHOOL PERSPECTIVE

Although there is a need to engage with the unbundling of sovereignty from an epistemological perspective, for the reasons given above the English School has, despite the very real potential of the three traditions spectrum in this regard, by and large, failed to rise to this challenge. This would seem to be a function of (as was the case with the ontological reflections of Part 1) the classical English School division between internal and external sovereignty.[80] If external sovereignty is abstracted from internal sovereignty, cutting it off from an important domain of change, this limits the capacity of sovereignty to engage with change and the unbundling of sovereignty. In truth the relatively recent move to see the three traditions explicitly as an epistemological spectrum, proposed by the Linklater and Little approach, means that the door has been opened for the tension between strong post-positivism, on the one hand (which is related to the deconstruction of sovereignty), and the assertion of the ontological closure of sovereignty on the other (which is related to strong positivism) to be highlighted and worked through but the resulting challenge has not been properly engaged with to date. This chapter has sought to make good this failing by unpacking the epistemology of revolutionism's strong post-positivism, as seen from this thesis' modified Linklater – Little spectrum, drawing it into valuable conversation with Ruggie's historical socio-epistemic approach. The result is a three traditions spectrum that services a holistic conception of sovereignty that can properly engage with the transformational implications of major changes.

CONCLUSION

Parts 1 and 2 have demonstrated the unbundling of sovereignty both from an ontological and an epistemological perspective in order to conceptualize the challenge

presented by contemporary revolutionism which they have sought to enlighten through reflection on networked governance theory and strong post-positivism. In drawing together the implications of both Part 1's primarily ontological perspective on the development of post-sovereign revolutionism and Part 2's epistemological perspective on the same process, the crucial intersecting point of resonance is clear. The deconstruction of sovereignty in the decentred structure of networked governance - which, jettisoning the foundational political (social contracted territorial people), celebrates instead the pre-eminence of functional considerations - is readily apprehended by post-positivist epistemology, championing the 'unbundling of sovereignty'. Specifically, the destruction of the subject-object duality at the heart of post-positivism releases the new temporality, in whose name the single-perspectivity and attendant ontological closure of the sovereign state are exchanged for the new multi-perspectival post-sovereign political form. Thus both approaches engage with the new revolutionism, whose consequence is the deconstruction of state sovereignty.[81] Having considered sovereignty in the context of systemic change from the perspective of both the realist (chapters 3 and 4) and revolutionist traditions (chapters 5 and 6), chapters 7, 8 and 9 will now consider it from the perspective of the rationalist tradition.

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[1] This inside-out perspective is very important because it relates primarily to the internal sovereignty upon which external sovereignty also implicitly depends and which, further to chapter 3, the English School has tended to understate. In line with chapter 3, therefore, this chapter's account of governance further underlines the importance of engaging with sovereignty – even when primarily concerned with its deconstruction – as an 'internal – external whole'.

[2] For a definition of 'the hyperglobalist school' please see David Held, Anthony McGrew, David Gobatt and Jonathan Perraton, *Global Transformations: Politics, Economics and Culture*, Oxford, Polity Press, 1999, pp. 3-5.

[3] Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, *Empire*, London, Harvard University Press, 2000, p. 344.

[4] Ibid., p. 353.

[5] Ibid., p. 340.

[6] The development of transnational identities accords directly with Wight's account of revolutionism. As Wight observed, through Burke, the impact of revolutionism is 'to introduce other interests into all countries than those which arose from their locality and natural circumstances ...The warm parties in each state were more affectionately attached to those of their own doctrinal interest in some other country, than their fellow citizens, or to their natural government, when they or either of them happened to be of a different persuasion'. Burke, *Thoughts on French Affairs* in Martin Wight, *Systems of States*, Leicester, Leicester University Press, 1977, p. 36.

[7] Jean Marie Guehenno, *The End of the Nation-State*, Minneapolis, University of Minneapolis, 1993, p. 23.

[8] Ibid., p. 113.

[9] Ibid., pp. 116-7.

[10] Negri and Hardt, *Empire*, p. 340.

[11] Jean Marie Guehenno, *The End of the Nation-State*, p. 139.

[12] Kenichi Ohmae, *The End of the Nation State: The Rise of Regional Economies: How New Engines of Prosperity are Reshaping Global Markets*, London, Harper Collins, 1996, chapter 4, especially pp.46-57 and Kenichi Ohmae, 'Putting Global Logic First', *The Evolving Global Economy: Making Sense of the New World Order*, ed. K. Ohmae, Harvard, Harvard Business Review, 1995, pp. 130-132.

[13] Kenichi Ohmae, *The End of the Nation State*, p. 53.

[14] Ibid., chapter 7.
Ohmae, 'Putting Global Logic First', *The Evolving Global Economy*, pp. 132-134.

[15] Ibid., p. 132.

[16] Ibid., p. 133.

[17] Another perspective on the deconstruction of the social contracted, public-private duality sustaining, centred territorial polity, can be obtained by considering the erosion of the old category of 'National Interest'. (Kenichi Ohmae, *The End of the Nation State,* chapter 5.) In an earlier age, Ohmae observes, the national interest 'used to provide a clear and unmistakable dividing line between what was ours and what was someone else's. This plot of land is ours, not theirs. But does this kind of logic apply today to a Honda plant in Ohio or Nissan plant in Tennessee or an IBM plant in Japan or a Motorola plant in Malaysia?' (Ibid., p. 68.) In the networked economy the interests that these firms serve cannot be apprehended in terms of the 'National Interest'.

[18] For definition of transformationalism see Held, McGrew, Goldbatt and Perraton, *Global Transformations*, pp. 7-9.

[19] Joseph Camilleri and Jim Falk, *The End of Sovereignty? The Politics of a Shrinking and Fragmenting World*, Edward Elgar, Aldershot, 1992, p. 203.

[20] Ibid., p. 204. This interventionism traded upon the state's victory in what Zygmunt Bauman has described as the 'space wars'. Informed by the Enlightenment, the modern spatialisations that it championed were solid, positivist, Newtonian, quantitative, materialist, and, perhaps most critically for the efficiency of our brave new world, homogenous and transparent. It was, Bauman claimed, to be 'resistant to all grass-roots interpretative initiatives which could yet saturate fragments of space with meanings unknown and illegible to the powers-that-be, and so make such fragments invulnerable to control from above'. Zygmunt Bauman, *Globalization: The Human Consequences*, Oxford, Polity Press in association with Blackwell, 1998, p. 31.
The objectivity which denied 'grass-roots interpretation', Hans Rookmaker argued, is one that has been dehumanised by its hatred of the subjective. The *'res extensa'*, he maintained, that flowed out of the Cartesian world-view was fundamentally flawed because it existed in a closed system. There was absolutely no openness for interpretation. Space was simply 'homogenous and cold'. Hans Rookmaker, 'Reality', *L'Abri Lecture*, Audio, 1978.

[21] Camilleri and Falk, *The End of Sovereignty*, p. 205. The feature that the new social movements all have in common that testifies directly to their erosion of sovereignty, is *'rejection of existing legal or institutional arrangements, in particular the dualistic conception of the private and public spheres* implicit in liberal democratic theory and the practice of the welfare state'. (Italics added) Ibid., p. 206. Also see John Agnew and Stuart Corbridge, *Mastering Space: Hegemony Territory and International Political Economy*, Routledge, London, 1995, p. 86.

[22] Ohmae's new identities are qualitatively different in that, although the result of the deconstruction of the sovereign state, they remain 'territorial' and do not easily fit into the new social movement category.

[23] Camilleri and Falk, *The End of Sovereignty*, p. 206.

[24] V. Spike Petersen, 'Shifting Ground(s): Epistemological and Territorial Remapping in the context of globalization', *Globalization: Theory and Practices*, Elenore Kofman and Gillian Youngs, London, Pinter,

1996, p. 12.

[25] R. B. J. Walker, 'State Sovereignty and the Articulation of Political Space/Time', *International Studies Quarterly*, 1990, p. 454.

[26] Bauman, *Globalization*, p. 61.

[27] Ibid., p. 62.

[28] Ibid., p. 64.

[29] Marc Williams contends that one witnesses a 'dissolving of the internal/external distinction crucial to the orthodox definition of sovereignty'. Thus the 'internal/external dichotomy is increasingly redundant'. (Marc Williams, 'Rethinking Sovereignty', *Globalization: Theory and Practice*, ed. Elenore Kofman and Gillian Youngs, London, Pinter, 1996, p. 118.) Having recognized the current spatio-temporal challenge to sovereignty, John Agnew and Stuart Corbridge are similarly clear that part of the problem lies in the clear distinction - propped up by Newtonian assumptions - between the inside and outside (which correlate to the subject and object, the open/time and closed/space) which informs IR through the foreign/domestic divide. The divide prevents one 'seeing the territorial state and its power as dependent on the interaction between global and local (including state-territorial) processes of the political-economic structuration'. Criticizing the positivist configuration of reality, Peterson also identifies the problem with the foreign/domestic divide. The spatio-temporal revolution impacts IR 'questioning foundational assumptions, including its defining dichotomies of domestic-international, order-anarchy, war-peace and realism-idealism ...On this view, order is not fixed within a spatial container called the state, to be contrasted with an outside (of international relations) where anarchy prevails. Rather, disorder also exists within states and various forms of order infuse inter-state relations'. (V. Spike Petersen, 'Shifting Ground(s): Epistemological and Territorial Remapping in the Context of Globalization(s) *Globalization, Theory and Practice*, pp. 15-16.) Ashley, meanwhile, similarly questions the boundary between the 'inside and outside'. His post-structuralist analysis 'regards this boundary - and, with it, the modern constructs of domestic society and sovereign state, on the one hand, and international anarchy on the other - as problematical effects whose production in history is never finally completed, always dependent upon knowledgeable practices that potentially traverse all bounds'.[29] In the context of globalization the problematic status of the inside-out divide has become very much more pronounced, exposing its constructed status and therein the interests for which it was built. (Richard Ashley, 'The Powers of Anarchy: Theory, Sovereignty and the Domestication of Global Life', p. 101.) During the modern age, R. B. J. Walker observes, 'inside and out' and 'here and there' communicated the importance of the difference between the 'self and other, identity and difference, community and anarchy that is constitutive of our modern understanding of political space'. At this time the boundaries which notions such as sovereignty serviced were indeed of great importance. One's success was located in identifying the here that was home from the there that was not and pursuing one's agendas with primary regard to the security and integrity of the former reference point rather than the latter. For it was in this category and in this category alone that one would live and move and have one's being and thus in this category that one would realize success or failure. 'Here we are safe to work out the characteristic puzzles of modernity, about freedoms and determinations, the subjectivities and objectivities of a realm in which we might aspire to realize our peace and potential, our autonomy, our enlightenment, our progress and our virtu(e).. There we must beware'. (Walker, 'State Sovereignty and the Articulation of Political Space/Time' p. 456.) See similar observation regarding 'here and there' in Bauman, *Globalization*, p. 13. Today, however, in the context of the erosion of boundaries and development of the networked connexity that is constitutive of governance, the old perspective is wholly inappropriate. When considering the European Union, MNCs, Space, Sea, planetary habitat, Walker contends, 'it seems more and more difficult to believe that here is indeed here and there is still there'. Realist accounts, he notes, 'still assume that inside and outside can be easily distinguished, but this is an assumption that is now very difficult to take for granted'. (Walker, 'State Sovereignty and the Articulation of Political Space/Time', p. 456.) The new environment, Walker argued, clearly requires reconceptualisation and the development of a new 'common sense'. 'Despite the immediate appeal to a common sense that will insist that of course there is a here here and a there there, it is unlikely that any analysis of contemporary world politics (of the world economy, of nuclear strategy, of communications technologies, of cultural inclusion or social exclusions, of refugees or tourists, of investments, ecologies, markets or literatures) will now avoid some mention of how this once uncommon sense is not quite right. (Ibid., p. 459.) In rising to the challenge of globalization, therefore, it is imperative to recognize that that which seems conceptually absolute is far from absolute. 'Its [sovereignty's] fixing of unity and diversity, or inside and outside, or space and time is not natural or inevitable. It is a crucial part of the practices of all modern states, but they are not natural or inevitable either'. (Ibid., p. 460.) Moving beyond IR theory specifically it should be noted that the problem with the 'domestic – foreign'

distinction is also recognized elsewhere. Duchacek for instance appreciates the significance of the erosion of the inside-outside, foreign/domestic distinction which having informed international relations theory for so long must now be relinquished. 'Constitutional texts generally assume and proclaim that the dividing line between foreign policy and domestic concerns is clear and firm – which it is not'. (Ivo D. Duchacek, *The Territorial Dimension of Politics: Within, Among and Across Nations*, Boulder and London, Westview Press, 1986, pp. 235-6.) Bauman is similarly clear about the demise of the outside-inside distinction. 'The very distinction between the internal and global market, or more generally between the "inside" and the "outside" of the state, is exceedingly difficult to maintain in any but the most narrow, "territory and population policing" sense'. (Bauman, *Globalization*, p. 65.)

[30] Increasingly economic/welfare issues are the subject of conversation. In 1997 for example the G7 summit in London met to consider the challenge of unemployment. It was termed 'a summit for jobs'. This discussion of a domestic issue 'represents an attempt to manage or 'govern' those aspects of political life which escape the control of any single state'. In this context the sense of the creation of a new global centre of gravity as the 'international' becomes more 'domestic' is furthered by the development of global civil society that seeks to engage with international fora in a manner that was absent when they were the preserve of traditional foreign policy/defense issues. Held, McGrew, Goldbatt and Perraton, *Global Transformations*, pp. 52-53.

[31] Ibid., p. 53.

[32] Ibid. As well as impacting international relations and globalization literatures, it is also important to be aware that, restructuring domestic government, networked governance has fostered an extensive domestic (although in some senses this term is inappropriate) governance literature. The marketisation of government in response to deregulation and the Thatcher, Reagan legacy resulted in government departments moving many of their responsibilities to agencies in a new quest for efficiency which caused the development of a networked form of governance. Then one must take account of the development of networked policy communities that involve government and civil society in governance networks. Whilst primarily concerned with considering governance on an international basis, in this age, where the domestic foreign dichotomy can be unhelpful, it is very important to be aware of the domestic perspective: R. Rhodes, 'The Hollowing out of the State', *Political Quarterly*, 65, pp. 138-51; David Osborne and Ted Gaebler, *Reinventing Government*, Penguin, 1993 and *Debating Governance: Authority, Steering and Democracy*, ed Jon Pierre, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2000.

[33] 'The most probable outcome [of the need for greater co-operation]', Camilleri and Falk claim, 'is a network of coalitions and interactions within and between national societies that escape the effective control of the central policy organs of government'. (Camilleri and Falk, *The End of Sovereignty*, p. 252.) This approach, Jachtenfuchs contends (in the context of a discussion about European integration) 'opens up the possibility for a polycentric system of non-territorially based governance'. (Markus Jachtenfuchs, 'Conceptualizing European Governance', *Reflective Approaches to European Governance*, ed K. E. Jorgensen, London, Macmillan, 1996. p. 46.) In the place of the sovereign state, therefore, Guehenno claimed that there is reason to believe that one would be better off with the model presented by the Roman Empire which, quite unlike the modern nation-state writ large, presents a 'sort of universality, [which] better describes the reality of the networked world'. (Guehenno, *The End of the Nation State*, p. 56.)

[34] Ibid., p. 60.

[35] Geoff Mulgan, *Connexity: How to Live in a Connected World*, London, Chatto and Windus, 1997. p. 3.

[36] Jachtenfuchs, 'Conceptualizing European Governance', p. 44.

[37] Ibid.

[38] Ibid., p. 45.

[39] Guehenno, *The End of the Nation State*, p. 55. This multi-dimensional characteristic seen in Jachtenfuchs and Guehenno, is widely recognized e.g: Saskia Sassen, *Losing Control? Sovereignty in an Age of Globalization*, New York, Columbia University Press, 1995, p. 31; Camilleri and Falk, *The End of Sovereignty*, p. 249; Axford, *The Global System*, p. 150; Rosenau, 'Governance and Democracy in a Globalizing World', *Re-imaginging Political Community: Studies in Cosmopolitan Democracy*, ed. Daniele Archibugi, David Held, and Martin Kohler, Polity Press, Cambridge, 1998, in *The Global Transformations Reader*, pp. 182-3 and Negri and Hardt, *Empire*, p. 340.

[40] Guehenno, *The End of the Nation State*, p. 58.

[41] In many ways the governance form was anticipated by the functionalist theory of David Mitrany which 'by linking authority to a specific activity seeks to break away from the traditional links between authority and a definite territory'. David Mitrany, 'A working peace system', 1943, *The Politics of*

European Integration: A Reader, ed. Michael O'Neill, London, Routledge, 1996. pp. 192-3.

[42] Guehenno, *The End of the Nation-State*, p. 57.

[43] Camilleri and Falk, *The End of Sovereignty*, p. 240.

[44] Ibid., p. 249.

[45] Ibid., p. 183.

[46] Ibid., p. 185.

[47] Ibid., p. 344. This resonates very much with the new social movements' rejection of the subject-object duality see: Camilleri and Falk, *The End of Sovereignty*, pp. 211-221.

[48] Hardt and Negri, *Empire*, p. 341.

[49] Ibid., p. 340. This multi-dimensional characteristic resonates with: Guehenno, *The End of the Nation State*, p. 55; Sassen, *Out of Control*, p. 31; Camilleri and Falk, *The End of Sovereignty*, p. 249; Axford, *The Global System*, p. 150 and Rosenau, 'Governance and Democracy in a Globalizing World', *Re-imagining Political Community: Studies in Cosmopolitan Democracy*, pp. 182-3. This division of competence resonates with Hardt and Nergri's observations, in section 1, about the fracturing of the public and need for administration to engage with 'various social groups: business and labor groups, ethnic and religious groups, legal and criminal groups, and so forth.' Hardt and Negri, *Empire*, p. 344.

[50] Sassen, *Losing Control*, p. 33.

[51] Ibid., p. 30.

[52] Of great significance for chapter 4, the point should also be made that governance need not be applied on a strictly global basis. It can be outworked regionally and has been applied to European integration. An example of this is provided by Barrie Axford who maintains that the EU is not significant for extending sovereignty (as suggested by chapter 4) but for actually facilitating the functionalization and therein the de-politicisation politics. It heralds the 'redefinition of a European polity as a space created and recreated by networks of interaction – cultural, educational, commercial and scientific – rather than a space to be governed or regulated in the conventional sense of these terms'. (Axford, *The Global System*, p. 150. There are numerous examples of similar approaches that break away from the United States of Europe, change by extension perspective e.g. Ruggie, 'Territoriality and Beyond', p. 172.) In the functionally animated 'disaggregation' of social contracted territorial government that precipitates the development of governance, one witnesses the demise of the endness proposed by Schmitt in chapter 4. (This account of European integration contrasts directly with that given by the Dutch politician Beyen, when pointing out the need to move the European project away from a narrowly, sectoral and functional approach. 'In a memorandum to his Belgium colleague Paul Henri Spaak, Beyen argued that the sectoral approach was quite inadequate both for economic and psychological reasons'. He instead supported a "general economic integration". '"Such an initiative" he concluded, would have as its objective the creation of a supranational community with the task of realising the economic integration of Europe ...' Murray Forsyth, *Unions of States: The Theory and Practice of Confederation*, Leicester, Leicester University Press, 1981, p. 182.) The solidity of sovereign 'political existence' has been mutated into something that is altogether more functional and more ephemeral. Far from talking of an inter-state-status treaty drawing states together to generate a corporate political existence, the integrative implications of globalization do not lead to a larger modern political form but a fundamentally new kind of administration. In this new world of networked governance, functional means-end treaties about postal unions and the like constitute the way ahead although, as noted earlier, not in the conventional intergovernmental mould, replete with an effective veto/withdrawal option. Markus Jachtenfuchs provides a similar reflection. 'It is only clear that contrary to the long tradition of utopian plans for a world federation or at least a European federation, the idea of governance beyond the state does not mean governance above the state, thus reconstituting the state with all its constituent simply on a higher institutional level. ..At present, the outline of such a new form is completely unclear and is mostly referred to under the metaphor of the 'new middle ages' of a polycentric society.' 'Conceptualizing European Governance', p. 41. In the same article he also observed 'that governance by and within the European Union is developing towards a model of political organization which cannot be adequately described anymore by the concept of the externally and internally sovereign state.' Ibid., p. 39.

[53] As defined by Part 2 of chapter three and Appendix 1.

[54] Martin Wight, 'Why There is No International Theory?' *Diplomatic Investigations: Essays in the Theory of International Politics*, ed. Herbert Butterfield and Martin Wight, London, George Allen and Unwin, 1966.

[55] Ole Wæver, 'Europe's Three Empires: A Watsonian Interpretation of Post-Wall European Security', *International Society after the Cold War: Anarchy and Order Reconsidered*, eds. Rick Fawn and Jeremy Larkins, London, Macmillan, 1996, p. 226.

[56] For more reflection on Wæver, and indeed Dietz and Whitman's recent attempts to use ES theory to address European integration see Appendix 2.

[57] John Gerard Ruggie, 'Territoriality and beyond', p. 147. Although the thesis uses the window provided by Ruggie's post-positivist critique of sovereignty because of the clarity of the image provided by the notion of the unbundling of territoriality and because of its historical focus that resonates with the historical approach of the English School, the point is made that this represents one example of many post-positivist critiques of IR (see chapter 2) which have the effect of deconstructing (unbundling) sovereignty. See R. B. J. Walker 'State Sovereignty and the Articulation of Political Space/Time', p. 457, p. 459 and p. 461; Marlene Wind, 'Rediscovering Institutions: A Reflectivist Critique of Rational Institutionalism', *Reflective Approaches to European Governance*, ed. K. E. Jorgensen, London, Macmillan, 1996; Robert Cox, 'Towards a post-hegemonic conceptualisation of world order: reflections on the relevancy of Ibn Khaldun', *Governance Without Government: Order and Change in World Politics*, ed. by James N. Rosenau and Ernst-Otto Czempiel, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1992, p. 138; Agnew and Corbridge, *Mastering Space*, p. 80; V. Spike Petersen, 'Shifting Ground(s): Epistemological and Territorial Remapping in the context of globalization', *Globalization: Theory and Practices*, Elenore Kofman and Gillian Youngs, London, Pinter, 1996 and Der Derian , 'The Space of International Relations Simulation, Surveillance and Speed', p. 297.

[58] Hedley Bull, *The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics*, London, Macmillan, 1977, p. 254.

[59] Martin Wight, *International Theory: The Three Tradition*, London, Continuum, 2002, p. 9.

[60] Ruggie, 'Territoriality and Beyond', p. 170. Wendt makes this same point in: *Social Theory of International Politics*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1999, p. 22.

[61] Ruggie, 'Territoriality and Beyond', p. 157.
The fact that Ruggie tempers his post-positivism means that it is not as radical as that presented by postmodernists like R. B. J. Walker and Richard Ashley. His particular socio-epistemological account of coming to terms with systemic change is selected nonetheless because of the clarity with which he applies it to the reconfiguration of the sovereign state through the notion of the unbundling of sovereign territoriality. It is also selected because, as noted, it has a very useful historical perspective that resonates very much with the English School approach.

[62] Ibid.

[63] Colin Gunton, *The One, The Three and The Many*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1992, p.75. There were, moreover, forces at work within Catholicism itself that were moving away from a low view of matter. Many scholars would trace these developments back to Thomas Aquinas, whose contentions that, whilst man was fallen, his intellect was not opened the door to a humanism that gave matter a greater merit. This was manifest particularly clearly in art where it gave rise to a new realism and interest in nature. On a general level it provided a greater measure of objectivism, encouraging a rather more confident social episteme.

[64] Ruggie, 'Territoriality and Beyond', p. 159.

[65] Bauman, *Globalization*, p. 31.

[66] Harold Osborne, *Oxford Companion to Art*, New York, Oxford University Press, 1970, p. 608, cited by Ruggie, 'Territoriality and Beyond', p. 159.

[67] Ibid. The centred subject correlates to the centred self which was another product of the new objectivism clearly conveyed, Ruggie observed, through speech. Strange as it may seem today this 'I-form', whose objectivity generated the 'starkest contradistinction between I and you, between you and me and the world' has not always been in place. The weakness of earlier epistemologies, eloquently demonstrated by the heightened subjectivity with medieval households, did not uphold the modern I form. As Ruggie noted (through the eyes of Tuchman): 'Even Kings and Popes received ambassadors sitting on beds furnished with elaborate curtains and spreads. ...Even in greater homes guests slept in the same room with host and hostess'. They were, moreover, often joined by children and servants. 'Never was man less alone ...Except for hermits and recluses privacy was unknown'. This state of affairs has been turned on its head as the modern age, armed with the new objectivism, has 'rigorously demarcated and separated private from public spheres and functions'. Tuchman, *A Distant Mirror*, p. 161, and p. 39, cited by Ruggie, 'Territoriality and Beyond', p. 158.
The advent of single point perspective with its ability to project an objective appreciation of reality into the subjective perception of the subject is directly related to the advent of epistemology founded upon the correspondence theory of truth which Jameson critiques in his introduction to Lyotard's *The Postmodern Condition*. The demise of the subject - object duality inaugurated the 'so-called crisis of representation, in which an essentially realistic epistemology, which conceives of representation as the

reproduction, for subjectivity, of an objectivity that lies outside it [and in so doing] projects a mirror theory of knowledge and art, whose fundamental evaluative categories are those of adequacy, accuracy and truth', is destroyed. (Fedric Jameson, the Foreword to *The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge,* by Jean-Francois Lyotard, trans Geoff Bennington and Brian Massumi, Manchester, Manchester University Press 1994, p. VIII. This identical representational crisis is articulated by Fredric Jameson, 'Postmodernism, or the Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism', *The New Left Review,* 1984, pp. 88-89.)

[68] Agnew and Corbridge, *Mastering Space,* pp. 84-84.

[69] Lewis Mumford, *The Condition of Man,* London, Martin Secker and Warburg Ltd, 1944, p. 169.

[70] Camilleri and Falk, *The End of Sovereignty,* p. 238.

[71] At this point one can clearly see once again the point of intersection between the concept of closure considered in association with the mechanical Newtonian metaphor, and the social epistemic category. Both provide means by which one can understand the essential, boundaried, closed, finished nature of the territorial modern nation-state.

[72] Ruggie, 'Territoriality and Beyond', p. 164.

[73] Ibid., p. 165.

[74] Noel O'Sullivan, 'Political Integration, the Limited State, and the Philosophy of Postmodernism', *Political Studies,* 1993, XLI, pp. 29-31 and Fredric Jameson, 'Postmodernism, or The Cultural logic of Late Capitalism', pp. 62-63.

[75] David Harvey, *The Condition of Postmodernity: An Enquiry into the Origins of Cultural Change,* Oxford, Blackwell, 1989, chapter 3 and Jameson, 'Postmodernism, or The Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism', pp. 53-8.

[76] Geoff Mulgan, *Connexity: How to Live in a Connected World,* London, Chatto and Windus, 1997, p. 69.

[77] Ibid., p. 3

[78] Ruggie, 'Territoriality and Beyond', p. 172.

[79] Ibid. Applying this to chapter 4, one must observe that, whilst the application of the realist tradition changes the allocation of sovereignty in response to European integration, it is premised entirely upon the legacy of single-perspectivity.

[80] See Appendix 1.

[81] Mulgan, *Connexity,* p. 3.

CHAPTER 7

THE RATIONALIST TRADITION & SYSTEMIC CHANGE

Having defined the two polar traditions, realism and revolutionism, and applied them to the conceptual challenge of defining sovereignty in the context of change, this chapter now turns to rationalism. In so doing, it will posit a modified sovereignty - whose conceptual parameters will be further developed by chapters 8 and 9 - that can readily engage with change.

INTRODUCING RATIONALISM

Perhaps the best way to approach rationalism is through Locke's conception of the state of nature, which Wight contrasts with that of Hobbes. Whilst Hobbes believed that the state of nature was characterised by anarchy, which when applied to the international arena resulted in international anarchy and war, Locke argued that, although human sinfulness limited the civic aspirations of the state of nature, it did not prevent natural law encouraging a significant measure of civility.[1] To be sure, this universal legal framework was bereft of an executive and a judiciary but it had purchase on the hearts and minds of humankind because it resonated with human reason. 'Reason means the capacity to know this natural law and the obligations it imposes; this law (of justice) is "written in his heart"'.[2] Thus, whilst, as in the Hobbesian system, there was still a need to obtain a greater measure of civility through the creation of sovereign states, the application of the Lockean state of nature to the relationships

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between states resulted in a significant measure of civility which eluded Hobbes' international anarchy thesis. This of course makes sense when one considers the fact that rationalism represents the space between realism and revolutionism. 'Between the belief that the society of states is non-existent or at best a polite fiction, and the belief that it is the chrysalis for the community of mankind, lies a more complex conception of international society'.[3]

To the extent that a measure of anarchy endures in the Lockean state of nature, the rationalist framework endorses the need for sovereign states. To the extent, however, that it also posits a measure of sociability secured by reason and natural law, albeit dependent upon the judiciary of the heart, these states form together a society of states. As such rationalism provides an ontological framework that posits a model of state sovereignty that, on the one hand, embraces an important measure of ontological closure, shutting out the disorder manifest in the state of nature and yet, on the other hand, embraces a significant degree of ontological openness in the sense that it recognizes that the states are joined by a measure of sociability undergirded by the common norms of natural law.

In addressing rationalism after realism and revolutionism, as Wight himself often did, positing it as the tradition of the 'in between', this chapter will refer to both the polar traditions. As it does so, however, it is important to remember that it is not its purpose to declare that their utility derives merely in their services as guides towards a rationalist synthesis of realism and revolutionism. As chapter 1 made clear, the whole point of the three traditions spectrum, with its methodological, ontological and epistemological pluralism, is that each tradition has a role to play in its own right and not merely as a means to a synthetic end in the context of a dialectic.

The attraction of the three traditions spectrum is precisely the fact that in servicing such ontological breadth it provides a framework wherein one can cater for IR in the context of the ontological revolution called into being by the spatio-temporal revolution that is globalization. Having said this, however - and as also noted by chapter 1 - it is the contention of this thesis that of the three traditions, rationalism is the most useful for coming to terms with sovereignty and change. Although the spatio-temporal profile of the three traditions means that only part of realism embraces a capacity to deal with limited change, whilst only part of revolutionism has the capacity to deal with an enduring sovereignty of sorts, the entirety of rationalism is able to engage with enduring sovereignty in the context of change. Endowed with an openness which does not negate sovereignty, rationalism consequently provides the best framework to deal with sovereignty and change. Specifically - as this chapter will demonstrate - it can cater for the endurance of sovereignty in the context of the two kinds of systemic change considered by this thesis, regional integration, leading to the extension of sovereignty (change by extension) and globalization, leading to the erosion, but crucially not the annihilation, of sovereignty (change by erosion).

STRUCTURE

The need to engage with the endurance of sovereignty in the context of the two forms of change defines the structure of this chapter which is divided into two parts. In Part 1 the chapter will examine the endurance of sovereignty, from the perspective of the rationalist tradition, in the context of regional integration. In Part 2 the chapter will examine sovereignty, from the perspective of the rationalist tradition, in the context of wider globalization. For reasons that will become apparent, Part 2 will occupy significantly more space than Part 1.

PART 1:

RATIONALISM, REGIONAL INTEGRATION & 'CHANGE BY EXTENSION'

In turning to develop an understanding of the endurance of sovereignty as it engages with regional integration, one is immediately reminded of the fact that such an account has already been presented by chapter 4's consideration of sovereignty and change from the perspective of the realist tradition. As was noted in that chapter the model of 'change by extension' has claims to the rationalist tradition.

In order to explain the relevance of chapter 4's account of 'change by extension' to the definition of rationalism it is necessary to reconsider the three traditions spectrum as a whole. As chapter 2 explained, in employing an approach to the three traditions that treats them as constitutive of an ontological spectrum, this thesis does not engage with three different ontologically homogenous blocks but rather a spectrum extending from the place of absolute ontological closure, at the sovereign state pole, through to the place of absolute ontological openness, at the post-sovereignty pole. As such this thesis contends that realism as a whole is not entirely ontologically closed, any more than revolutionism is entirely open, with the consequence that certain manifestations of sovereignty within the realist tradition (the most useful ones) are not completely reified and closed and can consequently engage with a measure of change.

The above approach to the spectrum has two implications. First, the presence of an account of sovereignty that is neither entirely closed nor entirely open is not exclusive to the rationalist tradition. Second, - and crucially for this stage of the investigation - given the fact that the

opportunity to engage with 'change by extension' in the context of such a model of sovereignty (albeit exhibiting a greater measure of closure) has already been explored in chapter 4, there is no need to simply recapitulate our account of it at this stage. Furthermore, given that this form of change is by definition consistent with the endurance of sovereignty (it relocates rather than deconstructs), there is also no need to embark upon a demonstration of why this change does not mean the end of sovereignty. Having identified the importance of needless duplication, though, this chapter can develop understanding of 'change by extension' on two bases that help to demonstrate the special relevance of rationalism.

1. A BETTER FIT

In the first instance, it is important to recognize that because rationalism embraces a greater measure of openness than wider realism, whilst maintaining sovereignty, it is better able to engage with the dynamics of 'change by extension' than the wider realist tradition. Indeed, whilst 'change by extension' can apply to only part of the realist tradition, it can be applied to the whole of rationalism. The confederal spectrum should thus primarily be identified, as per Figure 1 in chapter 2, with rationalism.

2. THE FORTUNES OF 'CHANGE BY EXTENSION'

In the second instance, one can gain a clear insight to the special relevance of rationalism when confronted with some of the limitations of the aspirations of the 'change by extension' model defined by chapter 4. Appreciation of these will point to the superior wisdom of rationalism *vis-à-vis* realism on three bases. The chapter will first consider the shortcomings of the vision of 'change by extension' posited in chapter 4 and then highlight rationalism's bases for superiority.

Critical examination of the progress of European integration reveals that, whilst from a jurisdictional point of view there can be no doubt that the European Union does uphold competencies on a supranational basis, and thus a form of extended sovereignty, it has failed to generate a supranational jurisdiction harnessed to a demos.[4] Positive sovereignty is not just about legal jurisdictions but critically legal jurisdictions upheld by a social contracted territorial people. 'One of the greatest achievements of the nineteenth century model of the European nation-state', William Wallace observes, 'was its ability to bring together identity and order, legitimacy and community, national economy and national welfare within a single framework. The weakest dimension of the emerging post-sovereign European order is that it loosens the ties which bind elites to masses within nation-states and the links between policy outcomes and political accountability, without providing any substantial sense of shared identity, of representation or of accountability at the European level'.[5] Indeed, although the sovereign nation-state may have been subjected to new 'loosening' pressures, there is a clear sense in which the 'social contracted territorial peoples' of the member states remain strong, whilst the sense of a social contracted territorial European people remains very weak and even absent.

The failure of the EU to complement its supranational administration with a supranational identity, and the implications of this for sovereignty, have been demonstrated with great clarity by J. H. H. Weiler. A Union between Denmark and Germany, he observes, would be unacceptable to a Dane even if he were promised a vote and representation in the Bundestag, because democracy is not just about having a vote. 'Their screams of grief will be shrill not simply because they will be condemned, as Danes, to permanent minorityship (that may be

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true for the German Greens too), but because the way nationality, in this way of thinking, enmeshes with democracy is that even majority rule is only legitimate within a Demos, when Danes rule Danes'.[6] Democracy is dependent upon a shared 'social contracted territorial people'.

The implications of this observation are twofold. First, there is no supranational 'social contracted territorial people'. Second, as the following comment from Ulf Hedetoft further underlines, the 'social contracted territorial peoples of the member states remain alive and well. '[I]n theory as well as in the popular mind, sovereignty is an unquestioned axiom, belonging equally to the world of politics and to the world of culture and identity. In fact, sovereignty is a central building block in the wall of national identity. It links people and state within a well defined authority space, where people's consent to be ruled is conditioned by the fact that they feel the rule and the rulers to be their own, and hence refuse to recognize any important distinction between sovereignty as an attribute of the state and as their own cultural property'. In short, referring back to Weiler's example, there is a 'social contracted territorial people' in Germany and in Denmark, but there is no such thing encompassing Germany and Denmark or indeed the other EU states.[7]

The enduring significance of the social contracted territorial people at the level of the state has meant that, whilst there is a sense in which the European Union should be thought of as a federal tier that has taken competencies from national sovereignty, the European Union 'remains, for its member governments and for the overwhelming majority of their citizens, a *secondary and subordinate framework* for political activity'. (Italics added) As an expression of this citizens 'still see the Community policy process refracted through the spectrum of

their national governments, looking to those governments to promote and defend 'their' interests against those of other countries without more than a passive and undefined acceptance of any wider European interest'.[8] Whilst 75% of economic legislation and 50%[9] of domestic legislation is determined by the Europe Union for its member states, the general public continues to engage with the state as if it continued to be by far and away the primary source of law.[10] In the context of the European Union, it seems very doubtful that people are fully aware of just how many decisions are made by EU institutions, because of the rigidly 'national' nature of their self-understanding.[11] There is a real sense in which the Union needs the ongoing appearance of strong member states so that this can continue to provide the political legitimacy upon which the project can rest.[12] 'The central paradox', Wallace observes, 'of the European political system in the 1990s is that governance is becoming increasingly a multi-level, intricately institutionalized activity, while *representation, loyalty and identity remain stubbornly rooted in the traditional institutions of the nation-state*' (Italics added).[13] For the purposes of legitimacy, therefore, governments 'sustain the illusion that [they] can themselves provide their voters with benefits - security, prosperity, regulation of economic and social inter-change - which can in practice be won only through common action with others'.[14]

Thus, whilst from a jurisdictional point of view there can be no doubt that the European Union does uphold competencies on a supranational basis and thus a form of extended sovereignty, to date it seems to have failed to have generated a key element of positive sovereignty, namely the supranational 'social contracted territorial people'. It would thus seem that integration has given rise to a truncated form of supranational sovereignty alongside a dented nation-state sovereignty.[15]

As noted earlier, the above account's assessment of integration points to the wisdom of rationalism by pointing to the need for a significant openness across a number of different bases. First, to the extent that European integration actually does not deny the reality of change by extension, it upholds the need for a form of sovereignty that is open in the sense that it can develop over time. Second, it also supports a model of sovereignty that is open in the sense that it is partial because it only relates to a portion of the policy competencies within its territorial remit and - in a qualitatively different sense - because it has not been able to marry its partial jurisdiction to a demos and thus only sustains part of the conventional sovereignty configuration. Finally, it also sustains a model of sovereignty that is open in the sense that it services nation-state sovereignties that, whilst enduring, are significantly truncated, and thus partial, in the sense that their claim to certain policy competencies has been radically circumscribed and is in a process of on-going circumscription. Thus rationalism can be applied to both the quasi-supranational sovereignty of the EU and to the enduring but truncated nation-state sovereignty of the member states.

PART 2: RATIONALISM AND GLOBALIZATION

As in the case of regional integration and the related 'change by extension' there is no need to define globalization and the attendant 'change by erosion', since this has already been done by chapters 5 and 6. Given that these chapters posited revolutionist post-sovereignty, however, there is a need to explain why a form of sovereignty none the less endures and why this is best engaged with through rationalism.

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STRUCTURE

Part 2 will be divided into three sections. Section 1 will first consider sovereignty in the context of economic globalization - the first threat considered in chapter 5 - demonstrating both its endurance and the manner in which it has been changed. Section 2 will then similarly examine sovereignty in the context of increased state intervention - the second threat considered by chapter 5 - highlighting once again its endurance and the manner in which it has been changed. Having obtained a clear picture of an ongoing sovereignty, albeit subject to changes in the form of erosion in the context of growing extra-territorial flows and increasing state intervention, Section 3 will then ask what this means for the 'unbundling of territoriality', providing a theoretical critique of the previous chapter's revolutionist definition of post-sovereignty. In short Part 2 will first demonstrate that a form of sovereignty endures and second that rationalism presents the best, although not the only, conceptual framework for coming to terms with it.

SECTION 1: SOVEREIGNTY ENDURES DESPITE ECONOMIC GLOBALIZATION

After briefly examining the ongoing significance of qualified sovereignty from the perspective of its negative definition (as set out by chapter 3), this section will then focus on interrogating sovereignty from the perspective of its positive definition (as again set out by chapter 3). This investigation will involve consideration of the endurance of sovereignty from the perspective of legitimacy (Sub-Section 1) and initiation (Sub-Section 2), demonstrating that, whilst the development of an extra-territorial domain through globalization has eroded the ontological significance of the sovereign state, it has been unable to fully displace the sovereign state.

1) NEGATIVE SOVEREIGNTY

As noted in chapter 4, the global economic flows associated with globalization have not placed negative sovereignty - constitutional independence - in jeopardy. The detailed examination of global flows and reflection on political responses in chapter 5 and 6 has not changed chapter 4's key observations firstly that the number of sovereign states actually increased from 75 in 1945 to 190 in 1999[16] and to 192 by 2002 and, secondly, that the territoriality of the nation-state has become even more pronounced in the sense that its boundaries have become more absolute since 1945.[17] With the exception of Antarctica, the surface of the globe continues to be divided into territorial states claiming sovereignty.[18] Viewed from this perspective sovereignty both endures and has no need to accommodate change whether by extension or by erosion. If one was just interested in negative sovereignty, therefore, one's defence of sovereignty in the context of globalization need go no further. As chapter 3 argued, however, depending entirely upon a negative, external definition of sovereignty results in an abstraction that should not sit well in the English School tradition. In light of this fact the chapter will now turn to consider the bases for enduring sovereignty in terms of its positive, internal foundation.

2) POSITIVE SOVEREIGNTY

Sovereignty also endures positively, despite the reality of globalization, although this does result in its erosion. Demonstrating the reality of the endurance of sovereignty positively in the context of this form of systemic change, however, is very much more challenging than demonstrating the endurance of sovereignty negatively and will thus take considerably more space. The chapter

will seek to rise to this challenge first from the perspective of legitimacy (Sub-Section 1) and then from the perspective of power (Sub-Section 2).

SUB-SECTION I: ENDURING POSITIVE SOVEREIGNTY: LEGITIMACY

As the social contracted territorial people (see chapter 3), positive (internal) sovereignty continues to provide a crucial legitimacy function. The chapter will now examine the endurance of positive sovereignty on the basis of this legitimacy function as it is worked out in relationship to the demands of the European Union, global capital, and state decision-making.

i. THE SOVEREIGN STATE AND THE EUROPEAN UNION

In addressing European integration as a local manifestation of globalization whose governmental implications chapter 6 unpacked in terms of a networked model of governance that is deconstructive of sovereignty, the point must be made (as per Part 1) that the social contracted territorial peoples of the member states endure and in so-doing provide a significant measure of legitimacy for the integration project. This suggests that member state sovereignty has no more been wholly 'changed by erosion' in the context of accounts of European integration that view it simply as a local manifestation of globalization, resulting in sovereignty's complete deconstruction, than it has been wholly 'changed by extension' in accordance with those regional integration accounts that champion a supranational sovereignty, completely replacing nation-state sovereignty. This is not to infer, however, that the networked thesis has no merits any more than the endurance of a form of nation-state sovereignty had this implication for the extension thesis. It can be used to show the erosion but not the demise of sovereignty and in so-doing provides a valuable, alternative perspective

on the absence of a supranational European demos, which is not required by extra-territorial, functional governance theory. To the degree that the impact of globalization on government, defined by chapter 6's account of networked governance, is not even associated with the quest for a new social contracted territorial jurisdiction, the EU is arguably even more dependent on enduring member state positive sovereignty for legitimacy than when see from the perspective of regional integration.

ii. THE SOVEREIGN STATE AND GLOBAL CAPITAL: REGULATION

For the reasons set out in chapter 5 the rise of global capital flows has in some senses resulted in the erosion of sovereignty. Crucially, however, although there is a sense in which these extra-territorial flows have been located beyond the direct onto(logical)-constitutional reach of the territorial state, this has not actually released them from state regulation. In the absence of any kind of global government, globalization needs the sovereign state to assume a critical legitimacy role sustaining a regulatory and accountability function which is not being provided by non-state actors. The chapter will now examine the endurance of positive sovereignty, manifest in its legitimacy role, through the scholarship of Panitch, Hirst and Thompson.

Panitch is very clear about the dependence of capital on an enduring sovereign state.[19] Capital requires guarantees of property, contract, standard currency, weights measures, the free flow of factors of production, and maintenance of a macro-economic framework across the globe. Whilst recognising that, in the context of globalization, accountability is no longer the exclusive preserve of individual sovereign states, he is equally clear that it is not a matter of some cosmopolitan networked governance of many different actors wherein the privileged, foundational role of the sovereign state is lost.[20] Instead, drawing on Stephen Gill, he

maintains, globalization depends upon inter-state-based 'neo-constitutionalism'[21] which 'appears to be taking the form …of formal interstate treaties designed to enforce legally upon future governments general adherence to the discipline of the capital market'. The resulting neo-constitutionalism is clearly seen in bodies, created and sustained by sovereign states, such as GATT and NAFTA which witness 'states as the authors of a regime which defines and guarantees, through international treaties with constitutional effect, the global and domestic rights of capital'.[22]

Hirst and Thompson, meanwhile, are equally clear about the need for ongoing state regulation to service capital in the context of globalization. The creation of international agencies and bodies for the purpose of regulation, they argue, means that states are embracing a new role in the 'function of legitimating and supporting the authorities they have created by such grants of sovereignty. If sovereignty is of decisive significance now as a distinguishing feature of the nation-state, it is because the state has the role of being a source of legitimacy in transferring power or sanctioning new powers both "above" it and "below" it'.[23]

The reality of the increasing importance of the sovereign state's legitimacy role, Hirst and Thompson contend, can be seen particularly clearly by considering the needs of the marginalized. In the context of the multiplication of agencies, the movement of competencies between them (which characterises global governance) increases the risks of the marginalised 'falling between the cracks' and becoming net losers, generating unsustainable legitimacy problems for late capitalism. As a consequence '[t]he governing powers (international, national and regional) need to be "sutured" together into a relatively integrated system,'[24] a task for which the sovereign nation-state - set upon the social contracted territorial people,

facilitating an objective legal view that can take account of the *common* good of the whole - is uniquely positioned. 'The nation-state is central to this process of "suturing": the policies and practices of states in distributing power upwards to the international level and downwards to the subnational agencies are the ties that will hold the system of governance together'.[25]

Thus, in the opinion of Hirst and Thompson, the idea that the market can do without regulation from the sovereign states is 'strange'.[26] In reality companies have a strong interest in the continuity of sovereign states: 'Internationally they seek a measure of security and stability in financial markets, a secure framework of free trade, and the protection of commercial rights. Nationally they seek to profit from the distinct advantages conferred by the cultural and institutional frameworks of the successful industrial states'.[27]

In conclusion, consideration of the regulation of extra-territorial global capital clearly demonstrates the endurance of positive, internal sovereignty, namely the social contracted territorial people, through the ongoing dependence of globalization on internal sovereignty for regulation rooted in a widely accepted sense of legitimacy. This does not mean that an erosion of sovereignty is not taking place. To the extent that the extensive and intensive connections between states in this neo-constitutionalism make the reality of the state's veto increasingly implicit, neo-constitutional accountability moves towards a networked form of governance, as defined by chapter 6. To the extent, however, that the state does not actually participate, on a basis of equality with other non-state actors, in networked relationships that unbundle any sense of hierarchical government, this neo-constitutionalism maintains the privileged, politico-legal foundational status of the sovereign state to at least some extent.

With the social contract based nature of government actually significantly preserved (contrary to Ohmae *et al* - see chapter 6) 'neo-constitutionalism' arguably fosters a framework with greater parallels to intergovernmentalism than networked governance.[28]

iii.   SOVEREIGNTY AND DECISION-MAKING

The fact that, whilst eroding positive sovereignty for the reasons given in chapters 5 and 6, economic globalization has not actually resulted in the demise of positive sovereignty can also be seen from the perspective of legitimacy via the social contracted territorial people in relationship to general decision-making. The chapter will make this case by examining the claims of regularian law which are of particular importance to networked models of governance that seek to escape any notion of 'the people'. By way of introduction, it is necessary to briefly define our terms:

MAJORITARIAN LEGITIMACY

Majoritarian legitimacy is given to government as a result of the direct sanction of the electorate expressed through the ballot box. An agenda has majoritarian legitimacy if it was in the manifesto of the winning political party that goes on to form the government. Symmetrically, it lacks legitimacy if it was in the manifesto of a losing party (unless of course it was also in that of the winning party). In the majoritarian context, as Majone observes, '[t]he main if not only source of legitimacy is accountability to voters or to their elected representatives'.[29]

NON-MAJORITARIAN LEGITIMACY

Non-majoritarian approaches to legitimacy, on the other hand, contend that legitimacy is essential 'but deny that a higher level of politicisation of the regulatory process [as seen in the

majoritarian system] is the correct answer'. Wherever possible, non-majoritarianism sets decision-making on a functional technocratic basis in order to protect the judicial, executive and administrative functions of government from representative assemblies and from fickle mass opinion.[30] This involves the dispersal of decision-making out of government departments into specialist technocratic agencies where subsequent determinations are legitimated on the basis that they are undertaken by experts in accordance with predetermined procedures. This basic thrust, whose functional character clearly resonates with the deconstruction of the ideal typical modern, liberal-democratic political form, and with the advent of multi-dimensional governance (defined in chapter 6), is further buttressed by its location in the context of a system of rules which provide a facility for judicial review and the protection of minority rights.[31]

MAJORITARIANISM, NON-MAJORITARIANISM AND SOVEREIGNTY

The dominant form of legitimacy will depend upon the strength of positive sovereignty, as the 'social contracted territorial people'. In the case of a strong sovereignty, supporting an appropriately large public square, legitimacy is sought through vigorous debate, followed by a division and a majoritarian decision made by the people's representatives. Such an approach is possible because the strength of 'the social contracted territorial people' means that the differences of opinion will not place its integrity in jeopardy. It is, moreover, also necessary because the strength of the 'social contracted territorial people' develops the habit of majoritarian democracy which can cause the demos to feel extremely dissatisfied with non-majoritarian substitutes. This renders the political culture of such polities unhappy at the thought of hiving-off decision-making to experts.[32] In the case of polities with a weaker sense of a social contracted territorial people - whose heterogeneous identity means that they

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cannot resolve controversial issues through 'the will of the people' because the category 'the people' is actually too fragmented[33] - non-majoritarian forms of legitimacy are more attractive.[34] The hiving off of policy competencies to functional agencies does not offend the democratic conscience of such societies and consequently projects such as European integration are not perceived as threatening. In the context of globalization, where, as a consequence of greater people movement, states are becoming more heterogeneous, the majoritarian approach to legitimacy is being increasingly displaced by non-majoritarian alternatives.

ENDURING MAJORITARIANISM – ENDURING SOVEREIGNTY

To the extent that decisions are made on a majoritarian basis, positive sovereignty assumptions are drawn on through the instrumentality of 'the social contracted territorial people' and, to this measure, sovereignty is consequently ongoing. Furthermore, whilst non-majoritarian approaches do not directly invoke the people, a state would need all of its decisions to be taken on a non-majoritarian basis for it never to invoke the 'social contracted, territorial people'. No examples come to mind! Indeed, in seeking to conceive of such a polity one runs into the problem that rules cannot always be determined by rules and so ultimately there is a need for politicians and thus elections. The reality of the minimal, social contracted territorial people, underpinning any putative regularian technocracy, must, at the very least, be expressed at elections when the direction of the common polity for the next x years is determined by 'the people' and for 'the people'.

In making these qualifications, it is important to note that some scholars are prepared to be rather more forthright about the limitation of the potential expansion of non-majoritarianism.

Given that 'redistributive decisions' result in certain sections of the population losing out, Majone contends, in deference to Wicksell, that they must be made on a majoritarian basis in the name of a general civic interest.[35] Similarly, although specific decisions may not receive the sanction of the legislature, every executive depends on its majoritarian legitimacy when making decisions about the use of national (non-mercenary) forces that could result in the death of citizens. Whilst the years of mass conscription are over – although national service is not in many countries – armies, unprivatised, remain resolutely national and are deployed in the name of the nation or its figurehead.

Thus it is the contention of this thesis - whether considering decision-making in general or in relationship to the issues that are, according to Majone and Wicksell, particularly resistant to the regularian approach - that the reality of positive sovereignty as the 'social contracted territorial people' is present to some degree in state decision-making, even whilst states increasingly appeal to non-majoritarian legitimacy. Once again, therefore, the notion that globalization has brought about the end of sovereignty would appear to be without foundation.

A POLITY RULED BY FORCE?

Having considered the endurance of sovereignty positively in relationship to the European Union, capital regulation and decision-making, via the social contracted territorial people, the question arises, what about those states that cannot really claim to rest upon such a foundation? Specifically, what of those former colonies that never constituted cohering political units, were only kept together as colonies in the context of a tight imperial grip and which since decolonization have only been sustained through the deployment of power? In

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the first instance even if one concluded that these states were not sovereign, given that there are many other states underpinned by some sense of a social contracted people, the point must be made that this would not enable one to dispense with sovereignty. In the second instance, moreover, whilst polities lacking an effective social contracted territorial people do not enjoy this particular expression of sovereignty, they enjoy others in the sense that they have of course first negative sovereignty, constitutional independence, and positive sovereignty through their enduring capacity to initiate, of which more in Part 2.

RATIONALIST SOVEREIGNTY?

In light of the endurance of positive internal sovereignty in terms of legitimacy, albeit in the context of its erosion, there is a need to provide a conceptual framework that can engage with continuity and change. Rationalism rises to this challenge because of its particular spatio-temporal profile. On the one hand, it is neither wholly spatially oriented and closed, (the sovereign state pole), nor largely spatially oriented and largely closed (see the wider realist tradition). On the other hand, it is neither wholly temporally oriented and open (post-sovereignty pole), nor largely temporally oriented and open (see the wider revolutionist tradition). It consequently embraces an ontological balance between the open and the closed. This capacity to uphold a greater measure of openness than any part of the realist tradition, whilst not provoking the deconstruction of sovereignty, as per revolutionism, results in an extremely useful model of sovereignty because it provides a better means of engaging with the simultaneous demands for change and continuity.

SUB-SECTION II: SOVEREIGNTY AND THE CAPACITY TO INITIATE

Having considered the presence, albeit qualified, of positive sovereignty in the form of the 'social contracted territorial people' from the perspective of legitimacy in relationship to the European Union, global capital and general decision-making, it is now important to consider the endurance of positive sovereignty from the perspective of a continued capacity to initiate. The bulk of those who question the ongoing significance of sovereignty in the context of globalization do so on the basis of loss of decisional room for manoeuvre.[36] Of course, if one responded to this observation from the narrowly negative perspective of James *et al* (see chapter 3, Part 2) one could simply brush these contentions to one side. This thesis, however, has argued that, whilst sovereignty is defined negatively in terms of constitutional independence, it must also be defined positively in terms of a 'social contracted territorial people', which carries within it the clear capacity to initiate (although crucially not absolute power, chapter 3, Part 3), if one is to avoid abstraction. As Camilleri and Falk observe, from a social contract 'emerges a sovereign understood as a conscious agent located at the centre of the body politic' which is 'endowed with a distinctive, identifiable will and a capacity for rational decision-making'.[37] Thus, on the basis that it is not possible to conceptualize sovereignty bereft of power any more than sovereignty bereft of constitutional independence, demonstration of an enduring decisional freedom - no matter how restrained it might be relative to that of the mid twentieth century - constitutes an important expression of the fact that sovereignty endures.

ONGOING SOVEREIGN STATE COMPETENCIES

In moving to consider the presence of positive sovereignty as an enduring capacity to initiate, it is important to be clear that sovereign states have always been constrained by their

resources and environments.[38] Their challenge has been to use the freedom of manoeuvre at their disposal, which will vary from issue to issue, to find the most effective way to promote their interests. Clearly if globalization generated a new environment that removed all freedom of manoeuvre so that the state could no longer initiate, the concept of sovereignty would run into difficulties in the same way that a particular sovereignty would if it was incorporated into another polity. It is the contention of this thesis, however, that, whilst globalization has introduced new constraints that have restricted room for manoeuvre, it has in no sense removed this room for manoeuvre and the continuance of a meaningful capacity to initiate. Furthermore, the restricting implications of globalization should also be balanced by recognition of the fact that there are some areas - as the chapter will demonstrate - in which globalization has increased the options and thus room for manoeuvre within which the enduring capacity to initiate resides.

Quite apart from anything else it is important to recognize that most polities today uphold more extensive state machines, and intervene more in the lives of their citizens, than ever before. In light of this, Giddens and Milward contend that it is rather strange that there has been so much prominent literature suggesting the end of the nation-state.[39] To demonstrate the inappropriateness of such thought, Giddens provides a list of the key state functions which, in his judgement, eloquently demonstrate the continuing importance of the state.[40] Giddens concludes that '[t]he list is so formidable that to suppose that the state and government have become irrelevant makes no sense'. Whilst some of these tasks can be shared with other agencies, they can never become wholly independent of the state in the sense that they are run entirely in deference to market relationships and without regard to some anchoring reference to the politico-legal, social contracted territorial people, i.e.

internal/positive sovereignty. 'Markets cannot replace government in any of these areas, but neither can social movements or other kinds of non-governmental organization (NGO), no matter how significant they have become'.[41]

In turning now to consider this enduring capacity to initiate in some detail, it is important to be clear that it is not the purpose of this thesis to suggest that there are not aspects of the following examples that some would wish to interpret differently. The purpose is simply to point to evidence for some ongoing state decisional autonomy which in turn points to the endurance of positive, internal state sovereignty. The chapter will consider evidence of an enduring freedom to initiate with respect to two broad policy areas: fiscal and monetary policy.

I. STATE AUTONOMY AND FISCAL CONSERVATISM

It is often suggested that globalization has inaugurated a 'race to the bottom' in which levels of government expenditure have fallen thus restraining both the development of public debt, and thereby satisfying the markets, and the level of taxation, and thereby placating otherwise reluctant Foreign Direct Investment. In fact, as a proportion of GDP, average OECD government spending actually increased on average by 100% between 1960 and the mid 1990s (part of the era of globalization). In other words, governments are now very much more involved in direct decision-making about economic resources than they were in 1960.[42] Having highlighted this general fact, the chapter will now consider in greater detail three bases upon which globalization is commonly thought to have resulted in the erosion of state autonomy in the arena of spending, namely borrowing, taxation and welfare provision:

i. GLOBALIZATION AND LIMITS ON TAXATION

As noted above, at the heart of the contentions that deregulation is prompting a reduction in taxation and thus spending is the observation that FDI - which, as chapter 5 demonstrated, is more mobile than one might imagine - forces states to offer competing tax reductions to draw in multi-nationals. If India can present a lower cost environment than Finland then India will get the investment. This logic sounds immensely compelling. In reality, however, as an increasing number of scholars, including Hirst, Thompson, Garrett and Weiss, are now demonstrating, it is not always that simple.[43]

In the first instance, a significant portion of the doubling of expenditure as a percentage of GDP between the mid 1960s and the mid 1990s (see above), resulted from increased taxation. To be sure, taxes of the kind that might chase mobile capital away, e.g. marginal rates of corporate income tax, have fallen in most OECD countries in recent years, but this is not the whole picture.[44] As Garrett observes, effective rates of capital taxation moved up to an average of almost 40% in the early 1990s compared with just 30% during the 1970s. This, he maintains, 'is a long way from the predictions of a free fall in capital taxation resulting from the exit threat of multinational firms and financial speculators'.[45]

In the second instance, one must recognize that multi-national companies - as Held, McGrew, Perraton, Goldbatt, Garrett, Hirst and Thompson have pointed out - have a number of priorities. As well as seeking to avoid unnecessarily heavy taxes, they: a) endeavour to access new technology and new skills that will almost certainly not be available in low cost environments, and b) bid to develop global networks that provide new markets and new

(cost-effective) distribution opportunities.[46] Again, low cost environments will not necessarily produce appropriate markets.

ii.   GLOBALIZATION AND LIMITS ON BORROWING

High government spending is said to be inflationary with the consequence that the market will seek compensation through higher interest rates in order to maintain bond yields. It must thus be restrained. The idea that this market discipline should prevent growth in government expenditure, however, is simply not born out by the facts which tell us that OECD public deficits rose by about seven points between 1960 and 1994.[47] If anything, by providing a whole new extra-territorial domain of finance, deregulation has been significant for expanding the state's capacity to borrow. Indeed part of the attraction of deregulation for states has been the opportunity to access these new funds. As examination of the work of Sassen in chapter 5 made clear, this has actually made it possible for some governments to access more funds than would have otherwise been possible.[48]

Having identified the increased availability of funds as a result of globalization, however, it is important to be clear that there are limits to the new sources of funding and these can constrain the state's freedom of movement. Specifically, one can only continue to borrow for so long as the markets are comfortable, a judgement that usually will depend in large measure upon the ratio of debt to GDP. However, whilst this has certainly constrained the freedom of some states, such as Brazil during the Latin American debt crisis of the 1980s, Garrett observes that it has not presented a serious constraint for industrialized democracies.[49]

The freedom of industrial democracies to go on obtaining loans, despite considerable levels of debt, can be seen with great clarity in the experience of highly indebted Belgium and Italy. Belgium had the greatest public debt between 1988 and 1998 of any OECD country, a deficit that stood at twice that of Germany and yet during that period it did not experience significantly greater interest rates. Italy, meanwhile, with its large public sector deficit, has never, in recent years, seen its interest rates rise more than 3-4% higher than those of Germany. '[I]f this', Garrett concludes, 'is the most brutal fiscal repression wrought by global finance among the industrial countries, the proclamations of many commentators would seem hyperbolic'.[50] Whilst Garrett's observation may not apply to countries like Brazil, the point can nevertheless be made that deregulation need not necessarily constrain a sovereign state by limiting its opportunities to borrow. Indeed, in the cases of many developed nations it has provided scope for initiatives that would have otherwise been absent and has in this sense provided the state with greater room for manoeuvre.

iii.   THE DECLINE OF WELFARE?

In considering the supposed decline in the sovereign state's capacity to initiate, it is important to examine the welfare state in its own right because it is held up as a prime casualty of globalization's restraint on government spending.[51] In light of the above reflections about borrowing and taxation, though, it will come as no surprise that the welfare state does not appear to be about to die, even if the manner of its organisation is being renegotiated.

In understanding the ongoing role of the welfare state, it is important to appreciate the argument that economic globalization needs the welfare state. Those supporting this contention point out that, as the renowned political economist Karl Polanyi demonstrated in the middle of the last century, explosions of economic growth often consist of a 'double

movement'.[52] The first part of the double movement involves market liberalisation and the second a socially protective response to uphold the social environment, ensuring that growth is not jeopardized by social fragmentation and conflict. As Garrett observes '[o]penness increases social dislocations and inequality and hence heightens political pressures for dampening these effects. If protectionism (and the disastrous spiral of economic decline, nationalism, and conflict with which it was associated in the 1930s) is to be averted, government must redistribute market allocations of wealth and risk'.[53] Rieger and Leibfried similarly contend that, if significant sections of the population lose out and conclude that globalization is to blame, then they will demand a return to protectionism. Politicians presiding over such a policy change 'run the risk that potential, putative, and real losers of such policies will turn against globalization, European integration, and other such processes, and demand more control over foreign economic policy – in short, protectionism'.[54] As Stephen Gill points out, therefore, it is clear that neo-liberalism is not an internally self-sufficient philosophy. Despite its assertions to the contrary, neo-liberalism actually requires a measure of interventionism, in the form of welfare, for its own maintenance. Thus welfare provision can help to sustain capitalism.[55]

In light of the above it is not surprising that when one subjects welfare regimes to analysis, the most impressive fact is that there continues to be a very significant level of service provision. 'What is striking', Pierson observes, 'is how hard it is to find radical changes in advanced welfare states. Retrenchment has been pursued cautiously: whenever possible, governments have sought all-party consensus for significant reforms and have chosen to trim existing structures rather than experiment with new programs or pursue privatization'.[56] Having considered the fortunes of the welfare state in the context of globalization Rieger and

Leifried observe, 'the general notion of an inexorable globalization pressure to shrink welfare states is untenable. In fact, at least in Western Europe in general and in Germany in particular, economic globalization has not led to any radical dismantling of welfare states. On the contrary, 'The stronger the pressure of globalization and the more open a country's economy is, the more difficult it becomes to touch the status quo of the welfare state'.[57]

CONCLUSION

Thus, in conclusion, many states, whilst not being able to ignore market disciplines, have maintained positive sovereignty by sustaining an ongoing capacity to initiate in the context of fiscal policy.[58] To the extent that on some occasions this has been eroded, whilst on others it has been increased, there is a clear need for an enduring model of sovereignty that can engage with change.

II. MONETARY POLICY

Having dealt with the sovereign state's enduring capacity to initiate with respect to fiscal policy, it is now important to turn to monetary policy. As chapter 5 demonstrated through the Mundell-Fleming theorem, the demise of capital controls means that a change in the domestic interest rate will result in a change in the exchange rate and vice versa. Henceforth the state can only change its base interest rate or its exchange rate, not both independently, although Held *et al* claim that even trying to select one rate can be difficult.[59]

Whilst this development certainly erodes the state's capacity to initiate, however, it is not symptomatic of the demise of the sovereign state. The endurance of a significant decisional autonomy in the monetary sphere can be seen with greatest clarity by considering: a) its

temporary loss as a result of the state/s in question joining exchange rate regimes and b) the decision of most states - jealous for their autonomy - not to join such regimes. Specifically, in joining an exchange rate regime, states effectively lose control over their interest rates and thus domestic monetary policy and, because of this, exchange rate regimes often remain aspirations precisely because states are unwilling to sacrifice their sovereignty. The disadvantage of the rules-based regime, Benjamin J Cohen observes, is that 'it would require a greater surrender of policy autonomy than many governments now seem prepared to tolerate'.[60] The decision about whether or not to form/join such a regime will depend, therefore, on 'how much basic affinity governments feel in other areas as well – in effect, on the extent to which they feel they share a common destiny across the full spectrum of economic and political issues'.[61] Largely in light of this, he maintains, 'the conditions necessary for a serious and sustained commitment to monetary cooperation are not easy to satisfy and, without major effort, appear unlikely to be attained any time soon'.[62]

Garrett deploys a similar argument in his examination of fixed exchange rate systems. Contending that managing one's own risk portfolio through hedging will be more attractive to many companies, he is at pains to stress the decisional costs involved in the sacrifice of exchange rate flexibility. Maintaining the freedom to bring about a smooth devaluation in a recession in order to increase competitiveness, he argues - an option open to states, according to the Mundell-Fleming theorem, in an integrated financial market - is a great asset for any government and clearly demonstrates an enduring capacity to initiate.[63] This obviously does not provide a sovereign state with the means of being sure that it can get its own way but it does ensure the maintenance of a measure of room for manoeuvre in which the capacity to initiate associated with positive sovereignty can be sustained to at least some extent and in a

way that would be absent in the context of membership of an exchange rate system. 'Talk of lost monetary autonomy', Garrett claims, 'only makes sense if one believed that the integration of financial markets forces governments to peg their exchange rates to external anchors of stability. On recent evidence, the credibility gains of doing so are far from overwhelming; indeed, noncredible pegs (that is, those not consistent with other political and economic conditions) have promoted the most debilitating cases of financial speculation and instability'.[64]

There can be no doubt, as chapter 5 demonstrated, that the dissolution of the boundary between the domestic and foreign markets through the abolition of capital controls has impacted states' freedom of action. In reality, however, whilst freedom was greater in the years when the relationship between foreign and domestic markets was mediated through capital controls, real 'choice', and the freedom for the state to express that choice, at least through devaluation, endures, providing an ongoing foundation for positive sovereignty.[65]

CONCLUSION TO SUB-SECTION II: THE WISDOM OF RATIONALISM

In conclusion, this investigation of state economic competencies in the context of globalization suggests that the latter has not brought about the end of the ability of the sovereign nation-state to initiate. As consideration of the capacity of the government to tax, to borrow, to spend, and to exert some influence through the putative trade-off between interest rates and exchange rates, has demonstrated, it is clear that, whilst the state is in some senses more hemmed in than was the case in the past, it still has at its disposal significant freedom to initiate.[66] This is important because, whilst defining sovereignty negatively in terms of constitutional independence, this thesis contends that there is also a need to

recognize that positively it endures as an evolving social contracted territorial people, sustaining a capacity to initiate.[67] Having recognised the endurance of sovereignty, however, it is important to note that to the extent that the measure of autonomy at the disposal of the state has in certain cases undeniably been eroded, there is again a need to develop a model of sovereignty whose ontology can accommodate this change. This once more points to the importance of the rationalist tradition which, on the one hand is neither wholly spatially oriented and closed, (the sovereign state pole), nor largely spatially oriented and largely closed (see the wider realist tradition) and on the other hand is neither wholly temporally oriented and open (post-sovereignty pole), nor largely temporally oriented and open (see the wider revolutionist tradition). This capacity to sustain a greater measure of openness than any part of the realist tradition, whilst avoiding association with revolutionism and ultimately the deconstruction of sovereignty, results in an extremely useful model of sovereignty when seeking to come to terms with the challenges confronting the sovereign state in the context of regional integration or wider globalization.

In closing, it is interesting to consider the relevance of rationalism via an historical comparison. Specifically natural law, which, as noted at the beginning of this chapter, is consistent with sovereignty even whilst it results in the introduction of an external transnational moral flow and thus affects a measure of openness,[68] has some very real parallels with the transnational economic flows associated with globalization which can similarly affect the direction of the state without negating its sovereignty.

CONCLUSION TO SECTION 1

Thus in conclusion to Sections 1, one can see that positive sovereignty endures positively both

through its provision of legitimacy and through an enduring capacity to take initiative. If a state loses the sense of social contracted territorial people that can provide legitimacy, or the freedom of manoeuvre within which the agency of that people can take action, then it would end up with just negative sovereignty. This constitutes the experience of a very small number of states such as Somalia. To the extent that these remain negatively sovereign, though, even they testify to the enduring importance of sovereignty. In doing so, however, they also demonstrate the difficulty with narrowly reductionist, negative definitions of sovereignty and the need for the English School to maintain a holistic model that engages with the interdependent positive and negative dimensions of sovereignty.

SECTION 2: SOVEREIGNTY ENDURES DESPITE INTERVENTION

Having considered the endurance of sovereignty in the context of economic globalization (the spirit of commerce), it is now necessary to turn to the other dimension of the threat to sovereignty documented by chapter 5, the increasing violation of the principle of non-intervention (the spirit of enlightenment). This violation will be considered from both sovereignty's external and internal perspectives. In so doing it will question the idea that: i) the UN's provision of a framework wherein acts of self-defence and intervention in the interest of 'peace and security' can obtain legitimation, and ii) the increased use of these provisions, are placing sovereignty in jeopardy.

1) NEGATIVE SOVEREIGNTY

Viewed from the perspective of negative sovereignty, one's focus on intervention relates primarily to the 'high political' military act of breaking through into a nation without

invitation. In responding to the suggestion that this places sovereignty in jeopardy, one must bear two considerations in mind.

In the first instance, it is not credible to argue that the use of intervention to repel intervention, e.g. the international community's response to Iraq's 1990 invasion of Kuwait, places sovereignty in jeopardy. Rather it should be seen as an attempt to uphold the constitutional independence, i.e. negative sovereignty of UN member Kuwait, in accordance with the Charter commitment to state sovereignty Article 2 (4). No Chapter VII intervention has placed the role of the sovereign state *per se* in jeopardy. The point should be made, however, that even if the Iraqi annexation of Kuwait had been accepted and constitutional independence consequentially been lost, it would not have removed the concept of sovereignty from international relations but rather reduced the number of the world's sovereign states by one.

In the second instance, from the perspective of self-defence, even before the UN Charter enshrined Article 51, it would not have been credible to argue that the use of military force by one state against another in self-defence resulted in the termination of sovereignty. Article 51 is provided to help states protect their constitutional independence, i.e. their sovereignty. If the integrity of the notion of sovereignty required absolute non-self-defence then it would be a utopian fantasy since states have always, and indeed must always, generally seek to defend themselves in order to sustain their constitutional independence. Self-defence may occasionally result in boundary changes and thus changes in the allocation of sovereignty, but these do not place sovereignty, and the fact that there is in international relations an important conceptual job of work for it to do, in jeopardy.[69]

Considered in the round it should be stated that, as in the case of economic globalization, the increasing trend towards intervention has not resulted in the demise of constitutional independence. Indeed, the new willingness to intervene, resulting from the demise of the Cold War world, has been associated with the rapid increase in the number of sovereign states as the former USSR broke up.

2) POSITIVE SOVEREIGNTY

Viewed from the perspective of positive sovereignty, meanwhile, one's focus relates primarily to the internal governance of the polity in question. Intervention violates positive sovereignty when some aspect of the sitting government's policy is changed by outside force. As chapter 5 demonstrated, in recent years increasing humanitarian concern has done much to animate interest in intervention to change aspects of internal policy; for example, intervening to terminate a policy of ethnic cleansing.

In examining the new interventionism, however, it is important to recognize that no Chapter VII interventions have ever been made purely on humanitarian grounds.[70] The humanitarian dimension has always been grafted on to broader strategic justifications. Examination of intervention in northern Iraq (1991), Somalia (1992), Rwanda (1994), Kosovo (1999), East Timor (1999) confronts one with the fact that the development of a right of intervention solely on a humanitarian basis is being resisted.[71] This resistance has largely been the result of the fact that two permanent, veto-carrying members of the Security Council, Russia and China, have good reason not to want to see the bases for intervention extended. In each case, therefore, whilst (with the exception of Kosovo) they have not sought to prevent specific

interventions, there has always been a clear policy to prevent specific interventions from establishing a general precedent for humanitarian intervention.

On the one hand, despite the fears of the Russians and Chinese, there can be no doubt that increasing concerns about human rights abuses are giving rise to a greater willingness to countenance intervention and this can in some senses be interpreted as giving rise to the erosion but certainly not demise of sovereignty. On the other hand, however, to the extent that humanitarian interventions are justified on the same basis as straight forward military interventions, they should not be judged to be any more threatening than those interventions. If there was a clearly accepted basis for intervention in international law in response to both a) threats to peace and security and b) threats to humanitarian standards, then the basis for intervention would clearly be wider than is actually the case. This would increase the purchase of solidarist, Kantian, revolutionist ontology on the international arena alongside that of the sovereign state, and require a greater qualification of sovereignty. The fact that this has not happened arguably makes sovereignty stronger than would be the case if those solidarist assumptions were embraced by states in the same way that they have been by humanitarian NGOs. Indeed the point should be made that even if there were two Chapter VII bases for intervention, this would not undermine the general significance of sovereignty because, as in the case of interventions viewed from their negative perspective, the international community can only intervene in deference to the UN Charter and thus, whilst an intervention might even result in a change of government, this cannot cause the annihilation of state sovereignty. Furthermore, one must also remember that, whilst there has been an increased sense of global solidarity and a growing willingness to countenance intervention, this is not without limitations. '[W]hat emerges from a study of state practice in

the 1990s', Wheeler and Bellamy contend, 'is that it is not states but an emergent global civil society that is the principal agent promoting humanitarian values in global politics. Globalization is bringing nearer Kant's vision of moral interconnectedness, but as the Rwandan genocide so brutally demonstrates, this growth in "cosmopolitan moral awareness' has not yet been translated into the solidarist project for forcible humanitarian intervention'.[72]

Thus, whilst the end of the Cold War and the new approach to decolonization has resulted in a far greater willingness to countenance intervention, it would be wrong to conclude that this new approach is indicative of the end, or likely end, of sovereignty.[73] In this context there is again a need to be able to cater for an enduring but changing sovereignty. 'The norms of sovereignty and non-intervention remain the key foundations of order, but there is a growing sense – especially among western states – that these principles should be overturned by the collectivity of states in cases of exceptional human suffering'.[74]

CONCLUSION: THE WISDOM OF RATIONALISM

It is at this point that one can again see the great advantage of rationalism. The fact that the closure of the sovereign state is not absolute and that intervention is possible generates some problems for closed realist models of sovereignty, just as the enduring reality of the sovereign state, and the limited bases upon which intervention may be conducted, point to problems for the notion of post-sovereignty. The rationalist tradition, meanwhile, which champions the enduring reality of sovereignty but without claiming that it has ontological closure over all issues, presents an extremely useful tool for the purpose of seeking to come to terms with the state in the context of economic globalization and the growing interest in humanitarian intervention.

In closing it is interesting to note that, as in the case of global economic flows, consideration of intervention from an historical perspective provides insight into the long term importance of rationalism. Although rationalism has always postulated a world divided into sovereign states, classically it has also appealed to natural law, in the name of which sovereign states could intervene in a fellow but wayward sovereign state. Indeed, the leading rationalist Grotius strengthened the basis for such intervention by arguing that the international arena comprised not just sovereign states but also people.[75] This is very useful because, quite apart from anything else, it demonstrates that, across a broad stretch of history, sovereignty and intervention have always coexisted and been seen, by some people at least, as entirely compatible. It is also useful because it demonstrates, once again, that because the rationalist model of the sovereign state was subject to natural law it was never developed on the basis of ontological closure.

SECTION 3: SOVEREIGNTY AND THE LIMITATIONS OF UNBUNDLING TERRITORIALITY

Having examined sovereignty in the context of rising revolutionism (manifest in both economic globalization and intervention) and demonstrated that sovereignty both endures and has been subject to changes in the form of 'change by extension' and 'change by erosion', it is now necessary to reconsider the implications of these findings for chapter 6's claims about the reconceptualization of sovereignty specifically via the 'unbundling of territoriality' (which this chapter deploys generically, and not just to the work of Ruggie, who coined the phrase, to describe the weakening/deconstruction of sovereignty). There are two major points of difficulty pertaining to the unbundling agenda. The first relates to the reductionist conception of territoriality obtaining in the models of sovereignty cited by those seeking its

deconstruction. The chapter will provide a critique of this reductionism from both an historical and a theoretical perspective. The second, meanwhile, (which is a development of the first point of difficulty) concerns the implications of 'unbundling territoriality' *per se* which the chapter will critique in theoretical terms. This section will demonstrate the ongoing, although qualified, importance of the concept of sovereignty to international relations and the special significance of the rationalist tradition for the purpose of engaging with it.

1) TERRITORIAL REDUCTIONISM

The strength of the post-sovereignty position resides in the fact that it is undoubtedly true that there are interconnections between states that are wholly incompatible with the idea of an ontologically closed (as per neorealism) model of sovereignty. The sovereign state must be reconceptualized (unbundled) so not to deny contemporary global flows if it is to clarify rather than obscure understanding of the international arena. If one unbundles sovereignty only in so far as it is necessary to cater for these relationships, however, sovereignty can actually endure. In truth, unlike the *a priori* ontological closure of the neorealist ontology required to license its methodological ambitions, historical sovereignty, as demonstrated below, actually engages with a significant measure of openness.[76]

OPEN SOVEREIGNTY: HISTORICALLY

A brief reconsideration of its past demonstrates that sovereignty has never been about complete ontological closure. For 158 years after the Peace of Westphalia, which is classically associated with the advent of sovereignty, there were in fact significant supranational hangovers from the medieval age. Empowering the Pope and emperor to

intervene in the domestic affairs of sovereign states, these hangovers meant that the new

polities could not be deemed to be ontologically closed.[77] One might think, however, that

given the formal demise of the Holy Roman Empire in 1806, and the association of the

nineteenth century with the apogee of the sovereign nation-state, that an era associated with

the ontologically closed, sovereign state would then follow. In reality, however, even this

period was one of very permeable boundaries. The chapter will consider this openness both in

terms of economic flows and human/minority rights interventions.

i) ECONOMIC FLOWS

During the nineteenth century trade[78], FDI[79] and people[80] moved about the world with a

measure of liberty that exceeded that of much of the twentieth century. Hirst and Thompson

contend that financial openness - measured in terms of the ratio of current account balance to

GNP - demonstrates no increase in openness between 1875 and 1975. In fact there was a

decline in capital movements for six leading countries: Great Britain, Italy, Sweden, Norway,

Denmark and the US.[81] In this context of significant flows, and thus blatant permeability,

Hirst and Thompson go on to argue that 'the degree of constraint on national economies in

the gold standard period seems to have been consistently greater than at any time since'.[82]

Economic enmeshment was further manifest, Krasner observes, through debt, in relationship

to which 'European leaders engaged in a variety of practices that violated the Grundnorm of

sovereignty, noninterference in internal affairs'. When states defaulted lenders set up

collection agencies that *directly* took state revenues to foreign creditors. Such actions had an

impact on the sovereign states of Bulgaria, Greece, Serbia, Persia, the Ottoman Empire and

Argentina.[83]

ii) INTERVENTION

The nineteenth century also saw permeability via interventions born out of concern for minority and human rights. In 1830 Britain, France and Russia signed a protocol guaranteeing Greek independence which insisted that all religions within the state be treated equally. Similarly the Berlin Congress of 1878 stated that religious toleration was a condition of the recognition of Balkan states. Moving into the twentieth century, the Treaty of Versailles made similar demands of central/east European states in relationship to both religion and ethnicity/language. These demands went into considerable detail covering the guaranteed provision of primary education in the language of the relevant minority. In Poland, moreover, a commitment was made not to hold elections on Saturdays so not to violate the Jewish Sabbath.[84]

Given the extensive bases for openness, it seems that in seeking to address an ontologically closed model of sovereignty, the unbundling agenda has been aiming at a straw man. To be sure some forms of realism, especially neorealism, have indulged this desire for methodological reasons, developing a model of sovereignty for critics to deconstruct but, historical sovereignty has never generally been about complete ontological closure.

OPEN SOVEREIGN TERRITORIALITY: THEORETICALLY

In the same way that closure is negated by empirical historical investigation, so too is it negated theoretically both internally (positively) and externally (negatively). Internal, positive sovereignty, manifested through the 'social contracted territorial people' and the government it upholds, is open in two senses, one distant, the other immediate. In the case of the former, internal sovereignty sustains a measure of openness by virtue of the manner of its

constitution. Whilst it may not have been the result of a social contract signing ceremony, the reality of what chapter 3 describes as the 'social contract effect', underpinning polities with a sense of legitimacy, is the result of a process of social construction (trading on openness), drawing on a mixture of shared history, legend and law. The latter and more immediate sense of openness, meanwhile, sustains an ongoing basis for citizens, operating in the private realm, to influence their erstwhile, surrendered natural rights through engagement with national civil society and democratic processes. If this were not the case then the domain of openness (temporally oriented), the private realm, would have been fully collapsed into the domain of closure (spatially oriented), the law. To the extent that the spatial is the domain from whence closure and the absolute is derived, it is quite correct to conclude that its presence is central to the generation of sovereignty. However, it is not the only element of the sovereignty complex. To be positive, modern sovereignty - certainly in a democratic context - sovereignty depends on being connected to a private realm; a private realm that has given, and continues to give it, authority. Presenting what might thus be described as a living social contracted territorial people, the ontology of internal sovereignty is a far cry from closed, asocial Newtonian *res extensa*.[85]

Externally, meanwhile, closure is similarly negated by virtue of the fact that the most basic act of state engagement in international relations is that of 'recognition', where two states mutually assent to the sovereignty of the other. Consideration of this act shows that sovereignty is in part a socially constructed institution.[86] Whilst it may not make for the same kind of order as that obtaining within the state, the reality of recognition demonstrates that the social constructions develop conventions which help to make the international arena, in the words of Hedley Bull (writing in the rationalist tradition), more an 'anarchical society' than

an international anarchy *per se*.[87] States do not collide, in the absence of social mediation, like billiard balls and thus the ontology of external sovereignty is a far cry from asocial Newtonian *res extensa*.

CONCLUSION

If one contends that modern sovereignty is unhelpful because it cannot deal with relationship, one refers to a very specific form of sovereignty informed by the *a priori* Newtonianism of neorealism. If one unbundles neorealist sovereignty merely to remove absolute closure in order to cater for a measure of relationship then one need only unbundle up to the point at which one generates a minimally open form of sovereignty consistent with the wider realist tradition. To be sure if there was a desire to maintain a greater measure of relationship one may unbundle until reaching the rationalist tradition which provides a still more open model of sovereignty. Thus construed one can unbundle to escape Newtonian closure and yet still have sovereignty in place. This does not support the idea that in the current context sovereignty is 'ridiculous'.[88]

2) THE PERILS OF UNBUNDLING TERRITORIALITY *PER SE*

In light of the above the question arises, what if one pursued complete, rather than partial unbundling even though it is not relationally necessary? This, however, gives rise to serious theoretical difficulties. Radical constructivism involves a complete openness and thus the rejection of the spatial pole. Its 'spatialisations' are consequently rootless and hyperspatial. The notion that territoriality is rootless and radically open, however, is problematic.[89] To suggest that territoriality can be devoid of an appreciation of roots is somewhat oxymoronic given that the soil of territory - that to which territoriality relates - is the medium of roots. In

light of the fact that any notion of territoriality must have some sense of spatial loyalty if it is not to betray its own nature, the idea that one can develop concepts to apprehend territory, the ontological accomplice of the spatial orientation, without any reference to the spatial pole, would suggest that one ultimately ends up with some kind of anti- or post-territoriality. Put another way, the radical constructivism informing these approaches is such that any resulting configuration would be hyperspatial which would make it, by definition, extra-territorial, the antithesis of the territorial. The whole point about hyperspace is that it transcends territory. Territory cannot transcend territory without being negated. No amount of inter-subjective projecting can make the given, fixed material extensions of territory - which should inform territoriality - ultimately go away. Inter-subjectively constituted social constructions do of course inform and thereby humanise territory in territoriality, but they work on something that is in some senses given. Territoriality may not be a matter of reified, 'Newtonian' units delimited by tectonics plate, but neither is it a matter of the depthless hyperspatiality, spoken of by Jameson, which flows from the radical constructivism born of the demise of the inside-outside, domestic-foreign dichotomy. In short, whilst it is difficult to argue that territory is entirely given, it is equally difficult to claim that it is entirely constructed.

The given dimension of territory is significant for modern politics and will continue to be for so long as it is informed by a 'social contracted territorial people'. In the event that politics moved to a functional, multi-dimensional frame of reference wherein there was no territorial public just a mass of differing functions pursued by different groups of specialists, then, although spatially oriented territory would endure, it would cease to directly inform politics.[90] If such an arrangement were possible then the removal of territory from the heart of political life would bring with it the demise of sovereignty. Whilst there are aspects of an increasing

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multi-dimensionality in government, however, its hyperspatial consequences exist in tandem with, and not instead of, the modern political form which, although weakened, is ongoing.

THE THREE TRADITIONS AND AN IMPOSSIBLE GLOBALITY?

In conclusion to this critique of unbundling, the point must be made that clear comprehension is often frustrated by the fact that globalization is frequently discussed in terms that suggest that it is a phenomenon that *displaces* the old order. In truth the chief characteristic of globalization is its introduction of a new dislocated world that does not come fully into view within a single perspective. This is not because of an acute temporality *per se*, in the genre of the multi-perspectivity of a hyperspatial *heterotopia*, but because of an acute temporality which *co-exists with the given spatiality that continues to inform much of human experience, including politics*. Extra-territorial flows inaugurate a new global economy that creates, in its transcendence of space, a hyperspatial realm that can have the fullness of its being in a moment without the alienation of distance which may provide the opportunity for difference. This new globality, however, cannot extinguish the ongoing reality of given territory, the social contracted territorial people and constitutional independence. The extra-territorial implications of globalization thus coexist with, rather than displace, territory and territorial government. In light of the above, sophisticated models of sovereignty must clearly engage with both the pressures of change, mediated via extra-territorial developments, and continuity, mediated through enduring territorial givens. The three traditions spectrum is uniquely positioned to address this challenge because it is defined in terms of an ontological pluralism. In this context the rationalist model of sovereignty in particular can provide a great service, recognising, on the one hand, the endurance of sovereignty but, on the other, the fact that this does not have ontological closure on all aspects of life.

CONCLUSION: TOWARDS A MORE OPEN MODEL OF SOVEREIGNTY

It is the contention of this chapter that, of the three traditions, the rationalist definition of sovereignty - the entirety of which embraces a measure of ontological closure and openness - provides the most useful model of sovereignty in the context of a fast changing world. The measure of ontological openness which it embraces means that it does not pretend that sovereignty is reified and closed. In the first instance rationalism caters for regional integration, facilitating the extension of sovereignty - as defined by chapter 4 - but subject to the demos qualification. In the second instance rationalism caters for globalization, providing for the erosion but not the annihilation of the sovereign state. In catering for both continuity and change, rationalism supplies an appropriate expression of the partial unbundling of sovereignty without denying the endurance of sovereignty.

Having set out the utility of the rationalist tradition in the context of the challenge of developing an appropriate conceptualization of sovereignty in the context of systemic change, the next two chapters will seek to provide further perspective on rationalist sovereignty by drawing on the latent resources of the theological dimension of English School three traditions theory. The final chapter will then draw together the implications of this thesis for the conceptualization of sovereignty in the context of systemic changes manifest in European integration and globalization.

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[1] Martin Wight, *International Theory: The Three Tradition*, London, Continuum, 2002, p. 13 and Martin Wight, 'An anatomy of international thought', *Review of International Studies*, 1987, 13, p. 223. This same point is also appropriated by the English School through reflection on Hugo Grotius according to whom sovereign states: 'were not in a state of nature, but part of the great society of all mankind, *magna communitas humani generic*'.

Hedley Bull, 'The Importance of Grotius in the Study of International Relations, *Hugo Grotius and International Relations*, eds. Hedley Bull, Benedict Kingsbury and Adam Roberts, Oxford, Clarendon, 2002, p. 72.

[2] Wight, *International Theory*, p. 14.

[3] 'Western Values in International Relations', *Diplomatic Investigations: Essays in the Theory of International Politics*, ed. Herbert Butterfield and Martin Wight, London, George Allen and Unwin, 1966, p. 95.

[4] Of course chapter 4 noted that, to date, change by extension was limited in the sense that it had not begun to fully engage with high politics integration. The point about the demos is different in that, despite the presence of an EU flag, an anthem etc, low politics policy integration and limited high politics integration have not given rise to a European demos.

[5] William Wallace in 'The Sharing of Sovereignty: The European Paradox', *Sovereignty at the Millennium*, p. 98.

[6] J. H. H. Weiler, 'European Neo-Constitutionalism: in Search of Foundations for the European Constitutional Order', *Political Studies*, 1996, p 523. Also see Maurice Keens-Soper, 'The Liberal State and Nationalism in Post-War Europe', *The History of European Ideas*, 1989, Vol. 10, No 6, pp. 689-703.

[7] Ulf Hedetoft, 'The State of Sovereignty in Europe', *National Cultures and European Integration*, ed. Staffan Zetterholm, Oxford, Berg, 1994, p. 17. Another good example of this point is made by James. 'The reason for this attachment to the idea of sovereignty is not hard to find. It seems that when people have come to feel affinities of the kind which are summed up in the word "national", they also feel that the only proper form of government for them is one which is in the hands of their fellow nationals'. James, 'Sovereign Statehood in Contemporary International Society', p. 48. Also see William Wallace, 'The Sharing of Sovereignty: the European Paradox', p 96 and William Wallace, 'Less than a federation, more than a regime: the community as a political system', H. Wallace, W. Wallace and C. Webb, *Policy Making in the European Community*, London 1983, p. 267. On the relationship between identity and sovereignty theoretically see: Ian Clark, *Globalization and International Relations Theory*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1998, p. 71 and Alexander Wendt, 'Anarchy Is What the States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics', *International Organization* 46, 2 (Spring 1992) in *International Relations Theory: Realism, Pluralism, Globalism and Beyond*, ed. Paul R. Viotti and Mark V. Kauppi, Boston, Allyn and Bacon, 1999, pp. 446-8.

[8] Wallace, 'Less than a federation, more than a regime: the Community as a political system', 267. Also see: Wallace, 'The Sharing of Sovereignty: the European Paradox', pp. 98-9 and Alan Milward, *The European Rescue of the Nation-State.*, London, Routledge, 1992, p. 19.

[9] Anthony Giddens, *The Consequences of Modernity*, Polity Press, Cambridge, 1990, p. 142.

[10] Wallace, 'The Sharing of Sovereignty: the European Paradox', p 96.

[11] G. Majone, 'A European Regulatory State?', J Richardson ed. *European Union: Power and Policy Making*, London, Routledge, 1996, p. 265 and Giddens, *The Third Way*, p. 142.

[12] Wallace, 'The Sharing of Sovereignty: the European Paradox', p 96.

[13] Ibid., p 99.

[14] Ibid., p. 84.

[15] This was anticipated by chapter 4 in the sense that it recognized that European integration had not moved significantly into the arena of 'high politics' image bearing competencies. The point is, however, that significant integration of internal sovereignty does not seem to have generated a sense of supranational civic people although it has clearly demonstrated a supranational jurisdiction.

[16] Alan James, 'Sovereign Statehood in Contemporary International Society', *Sovereignty at the Millennium*, ed. Robert Jackson, Political Studies, Oxford, Blackwell, 1999, p. 42.

[17] Robert Jackson, 'Sovereignty in World politics: a Glance at the Conceptual and historical Landscape', *Sovereignty at the Millennium*, p. 25.

[18] Crucially this must be balanced with recognition of the fact that many of these polities are rather fragile 'quasi states' see: Jackson, Robert Jackson, *Quasi-States: Sovereignty, International Relations and the Third World*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1990.

[19] Leon Panitch, 'Globalisation and the State', *The Socialist Register*, 1994, p. 62.

[20] Ibid.

[21] Ibid., p.64 and Stephen Gill, 'Theorizing the Interregnum: The Double Movement and Global Politics in the 1990s', *International Political Economy: Understanding Global Disorder*, ed. Hettne London, Zed Books Ltd, 1995, p. 78.

[22] Panitch, 'Globalisation and the State', p. 64.

[23] Paul Hirst and Grahame Thompson, *Globalization In Question, The International Economy and the Possibilities of Governance*, Second Edition, Polity Press, Oxford, 1999, p. 276.

[24] Ibid., pp. 269-70.

[25] Ibid., p. 270.

[26] Ibid., p. 272.
Panitch also expresses concern at the 'strange' notion that regulation can take place without the state. He is particularly critical of those who some how imagine that the accountability function can be taken over by new social movements. 'Not only is the world very much composed of states, but insofar as there is any effective democracy at all in relation to the power of capitalists and bureaucrats, it is still embedded in political structures which are national or subnational in scope'. (Panitch, 'Globalisation and the State', p. 62.) To the extent that elections articulate the ability of citizens to influence the direction, and use, of their erstwhile individual sovereignties, which they submitted to the social contract, sovereignty, as the social contracted territorial people clearly continues to exist. If the social contracted territorial people were lost, then so too would be the means of tying people into the state. This would amount to mass disempowerment, whereby people would volunteer to be banished to the private realm and thus lose any means of calling government account. (It is important to point out that some scholars are particularly interested in the idea of communitarian democracy which to some extent describes how the democratic impulse is rising to the challenge of deterritorialisation. It is perhaps more significant, however, for demonstrating the way in which the world could adapt to come to terms with globalization and is, to this extent, prescriptive rather than descriptive. See for example, Anthony McGrew, Democracy Beyond Borders', *The Global Transformations Reader*, ed. David Held and Anthony McGrew, Oxford, Blackwell, 2000, pp. 405-419.)

[27] Hirst and Thompson, *Globalization in Question*, p. 274. Also see Jon Pierre, 'Understanding Governance', *Debating Governance: Authority, Steering and Democracy*, ed. Pierre, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2000, p. 4.

[28] For further reflection on the notion that governance does not result in the demise of the state but rather is transformation see Jon Pierre, 'Understanding Governance', p. 3.

[29] Giandomenico Majone, *Regulating Europe*, London, Routledge, 1996, p. 284.

[30] Specifically, regularian legitimacy can be divided into two categories of criteria, procedural legitimacy and substantive legitimacy. Procedural legitimacy is realised through the definition of subject agencies by democratically enacted laws, the provision of regulators appointed by elected officials, a decision-making process that follows rules, the fact that all decisions must be justified and finally that they should always be open to judicial review. Substantive legitimacy, meanwhile, is realised through policy consistency, the deployment of expertise and problem solving capacity, the protection of interests and adherence to the limits of operation. Ibid., p. 285.

[31] Ibid.

[32] In this sense it is easy to see why Britain has had more struggles with the process of European integration than some of its European neighbours. In the British tradition, before the UK polity is understood as a series of competencies, it is understood as the instrument of a community whose decisions must be made in terms of commitments agreed in the big public realm. Ibid.

[33] Lijphart defined such plural societies as those which are 'sharply divided along religious, ideological, linguistic, cultural, ethnic, or racial lines into virtually separate sub-societies with their own political parties, interest groups, and media of communication'. See: Democracies: *Patterns of Majoritarian and Consensus Government in Twenty-one Countries,* New Haven (CT), Yale University Press, 1984, p. 22, cited by Majone, *Regulating Europe*, pp. 286-7.

[34] In the first instance the increasingly technical nature of society means that many of the decisions it requires are such that they cannot be made by generalists, in the context of debate, in an accessible public sphere. Ibid., p. 286.

[35] 'Only a commitment to efficiency, that is, to the maximisation of aggregate welfare, and to accountability by results, can substantively legitimise the political independence of regulators. The delegation of important policy-making powers to independent institutions is democratically justified only in the sphere of efficiency issues, where reliance on expertise and on problem-solving style of decision-making is more important than reliance on direct political accountability. *Where redistributive concerns prevail, legitimacy can be ensured only by majoritarian means*'. Ibid., p. 290.
Dietz and Whitman make a very relevant but broader point about the need for cultural commonality in cases of redistribution. 'Furthermore, financial redistribution amongst member States is more likely to be regarded as legitimate if there is a sense of having a common identity with a common history'. 'Analysing European Integration: Reflecting on the English School − Scenarios for an Encounter', *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 2002, Volume 4-0. Number 1, p. 53.

[36] Marc Williams, 'Rethinking Sovereignty', *Globalization: Theory and Practice*, ed. Elenore Kofman and Gillian Youngs, 1996, p. 113; Sorensen, 'Sovereignty: Change and continuity in a Fundamental Institution', *Sovereignty at the Millennium*, pp. 168-9; David Held, *Political Theory and the Modern State*, Cambridge, Polity Press, 1989, pp. 229-37; Jackson 'Introduction', *Sovereignty at the Millennium*, p. 4; Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, *Empire*, London, Harvard University Press, 2000, pp. 325-328; Held, McGrew, Goldbatt and Perraton, *Global Transformations*, p. 5; Zygmunt Bauman, *Globalization: The Human Consequences*, Oxford, Polity Press in association with Blackwell, 1998, p. 64; Jean Marie Guehenno, *The End of the Nation-State*, Minneapolis, University of Minneapolis, 1993, p 57 and Clark, *Globalization and International Relations Theory*, p. 70. '[D]ecisions and outcomes do not correspond with the choices of sovereign wills and are not contained by the boundaries within which they operate'. Joseph Camilleri and Jim Falk, *The End of Sovereignty? The Politics of a Shrinking and Fragmenting World*, Edward Elgar, Aldershot, 1992, p. 77.

[37] Ibid., p. 238.

[38] Marc Williams, 'Rethinking Sovereignty', p. 116; Robert Jackson, 'Sovereignty in World Politics: a Glance at the Conceptual and Historical Landscape', p. 10; Sorensen, 'Change and Continuity in a Fundamental Institution', p. 173; Clark, *Globalization and International Relations Theory*, p. 74 and Barrie Axford, *The Global System: Economics, Politics and Culture*, Cambridge, Polity Press, 1995, pp. 136-7.

[39] Giddens, *The Third Way*, pp. 47-8 and Alan Milward, *The European Rescue of the Nation-State*, p. 18.

[40] 'Government exists to: provide means for the representation of diverse interest; offer a forum for reconciling the competing claims of these interests; create and protect an open public sphere, in which unconstrained debate about policy issues can be carried on; provide a diversity of public goods, including forms of collective security and welfare; regulate markets in the public interest and foster market competition where monopoly threatens; foster social peace through control of the means of violence and through the provision of policing; promote the active development of human capital through its core role in the educational system; sustain an effective system of law; have a directly economic role, as a prime employer in macro and micro intervention, plus the provision of infrastructure; more controversially, have a civilizing aim – government reflects widely held norms and values, but can also help shape them, in the educational system and elsewhere; foster regional and transnational alliances and pursue global goals'. Giddens, *The Third Way*, pp. 47-8.
The same point is eloquently made by Alan Milward in the context of his contention that European integration, rather than terminating the state, has actually empowered it with many new competencies. '[I]n the long run of history there has surely never been a period when national government in Europe has exercised more effective power and more extensive control over its citizens than that since the Second World War, nor one in which its ambitions expanded so rapidly. Its laws, officials, policemen, spies, statisticians, revenue collectors, and social workers have penetrated into a far wider range of human activities than they were earlier enabled or encouraged to do'. Alan Milward, *The European Rescue of the Nation-State*, p. 18.

[41] Giddens, *The Third Way*, p. 48. Here one can see again the enduring reality of decision-making depending upon sovereignty as the 'social contracted territorial people', regardless of whether decisions are made directly in terms of that 'people', on a majoritarian basis (in which case there is a high degree of dependence), or at a distance, on a non-majoritarian basis (in which case the degree of dependence is lower).

[42] Geoffrey Garrett, 'Global Markets and National Politics: Collision Course or Virtuous Circle', *International Organization* 52, 4, Autumn 1998, p. 813 and Stephen D Krasner, *Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy*, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1999, p. 13.

[43] Hirst and Thompson, *Globalization in Question*, p. 67; Garrett, 'Global Markets and National Politics: Collision Course or Virtuous Circle', pp. 800-801 and Held, McGrew, Goldbatt and Perraton, *Global Transformations*, pp. 269-270.

[44] '[C]ountries and regions', they maintain, 'continue to be drawn into a "beauty contest" by competing on tax incentives'. Ibid., p. 277.

[45] Geoffrey Garrett, 'Global Markets and National Politics: Collision Course or Virtuous Circle', p. 814. Specific examples of significant taxation in the context of the global economy can be seen in the recent history of Germany and Japan. Germany graphically demonstrated the ongoing liberty to tax, despite mobile FDI, when it significantly increased taxes in the context of reunification. Japan, meanwhile, implemented a major tax hyke in April '97 to fund government programmes to protect employment. Weiss, Linda, *The Myth of the Powerless State: Governing the Economy in a Global Era*, Cambridge, Polity Press, 1998, p. 191. Hirst and Thompson identify room for new taxes in the near future on property and energy see *Globalization in Question*, pp. 221-222.

[46] Geoffrey Garrett, 'Global Markets and National Politics: Collision Course or Virtuous Circle', pp. 800 and Held, McGrew, Goldbatt and Perraton, *Global Transformations*, pp. 269-270.

[47] Ibid.

[48] Saskia Sassen, *Losing Control? Sovereignty in an Age of Globalization*, New York, Columbia University Press, 1995, p. 49. The same point is made by: Geoffrey Garrett, 'Global Markets and National Politics: Collision Course or Virtuous Circle', p. 804.

[49] Ibid., p. 804.

[50] Ibid.

[51] John Gray, *False Dawn: The Delusions of Global Capitalism*, London, Granta Books, 1998, pp. 39-44.

[52] Stephen Gill, 'Theorizing the Interregnum: The Double Movement and Global Politics in the 1990s', pp. 66-7.

[53] One particularly striking example of the stability imperative comes from consideration of one of the flows that one might imagine has no interest in welfare, FDI. Some commentators contend that FDI appreciates the social stability secured through welfare provision. 'Multi-national producers care about the real economy, and factors such as productivity and stability heavily influence their investment decisions, by increasing *human* and physical *capital stocks and by promoting public support for open markets*'. (Italics added) Thus here is an example of welfare being used to boost investment. Geoffrey Garrett, 'Global Markets and National Politics: Collision Course or Virtuous Circle', pp. 796-797.
A good example against the 'race to the bottom' scenario in the context of a discussion regarding welfare provision, is seen in the fact that between 1991-5 France attracted more inward investment than the UK despite offering a more expensive environment ($19 billion per annum V $17.2 billion). Hirst and Thompson, *Globalization in Question*, p. 164.

[54] Elmar Rieger and Stephen Leibdried, 'Welfare State Limits to globalization', *Politics and Society*, vol. 26, no. 3, September 1998, p 380. Hirst and Thompson make the same point, openness increases the welfare imperative: *Globalization in Question*, pp. 164-165.

[55] 'Free trade rests on conditions it cannot create or ensure because of its own *modus operandi*. Most important among those conditions is the idea of a "just" equilibrium between social groups in a nation, as well as the existence of institutions that make comprehensive compensation and redistribution possible, and the existence of extra-economic sources of welfare production. The development of the theory of international trade from David Ricardo to Paul Krugman can be read as a continuous attempt to endogenize such extra-economic foundations'. Elmar Rieger and Stephen Leibfried, 'Welfare State Limits to Globalization', p. 367.
Stephen Gill endorses Garrett's logic and concludes that as a consequence ultimately Neo-liberalism will not triumph because of its inability to provide the second part of the double movement. He is, however, of the opinion that the second part of the double movement has not yet really begun. 'Theorizing the Interregnum: The Double Movement and Global Politics in the 1990s', pp. 93-94. Also see: Garrett, 'Global Markets and National Politics', pp. 796.

[56] Paul Pierson. 'The New Politics of the Welfare State', *World Politics*, 1996, 48 (2), p 174. Pierson continues; 'Economic, political, and social pressures have fostered an image of welfare states under siege. Yet if one turns from abstract discussions of social transformation to an examination of actual policy it becomes difficult to sustain the proposition that these strains have generated fundamental shifts'. The only suggestion that globalization has actually been related to the radical re-structuring of the welfare state, he maintains, is found in New Zealand, which, Pierson contends, is unusual rather than being a pace setter. 'The evidence looks credible only for New Zealand, a tiny country on the periphery of the world economy, which clearly faced severe adjustment problems in light of its long (and unusual) tradition of protectionism. It seems far more reasonable to treat this case as an outlier than to view it as the pacesetter in a global march toward radical reform of the welfare state. Ibid., p. 173. Also see A and Hirst and Thompson, Globalization in Question, chapter 6.

[57] Elmar Rieger and Stephen Leibfried, 'Welfare State Limits to Globalization', pp. 364-5.

[58] For the reasons given in the earlier section on majoritarian V non-majoritarian democracy, from the perspective of sovereignty the ongoing welfare function is also significant because this keeps the state involved in redistributive justice for which it will require majoritarian rather than regularian legitimacy and thus a socially contracted, territorial people with an attendant public private duality, i.e. positive sovereignty.

[59] Held, McGrew, Goldbatt and Perraton, *Global Transformations*, p. 189.

[60] Benjamin J Cohen, 'The Triad and the Unholy Trinity: Problems of international Monetary Co-operation', *International Political Economy: Perspectives on Global Power and Wealth*, ed. Frieden and Lake, Bedford/St Martins, Boston/New York, 2000, p. 248. This is clearly demonstrated by current problems enforcing the Growth and Stability Pact in the Eurozone.

[61] Ibid., p.256.

[62] Ibid., p. 246.

[63] Geoffrey Garrett, 'Global Markets and National Politics: Collision Course or Virtuous Circle', pp. 801-803.

For reflections specifically on the cost of the ERM see: Peter Jay, 'The Economy', *The Major Effect*, ed. Dennis Kavanagh and Anthony Seldon, London, Macmillan, 1994, pp. 181 and pp 184-185.

[64] Geoffrey Garrett, 'Global Markets and National Politics: Collision Course or Virtuous Circle', pp. 823.

[65] For example, in using its sovereign decision to determine whether to prioritise exchange rates or interest rates, a lot of recent British decisions seem to place more emphasis on domestic inflation than the needs of exporters and exchange rate stability. See Minutes of the Monetary Committee, www.bankofengland.co.uk Furthermore, in considering state autonomy in the context of deregulation and its implications via the Mundell-Fleming theorem, one should note the renewed interest in re-regulation following the 1997-8 financial crisis and reflect on its implications for state autonomy and sovereignty. The increasing magnitude and fluidity of global flows whose movements are facilitated by the absence of exchange controls brings a heightened general level of uncertainty that actually raises costs significantly and militates against long term investment and marketing strategies. (Hirst and Thompson, *Globalization In Question*, p. 272.) The very significant and sudden flows of withdrawal that characterised the financial crisis of 1997-8, Hirst and Thompson observe, had very damaging effects on some states, whilst those with capital controls weathered the storms of 1997-8 rather better. For instance India and China fared very much better than the South East Asian countries and Korea. Reflecting on the financial fall out of 1997-8, Soros observed that '[k]eeping domestic financial markets totally exposed to the vagaries of international financial markets could cause greater instability than a country that has become dependent on foreign capital can endure. Some form of capital controls may therefore be preferable to instability, even if it would not constitute good policy in an ideal world'. (George Soros, *The Crisis of Global Capitalism: Open Society Endangered*, Little Brown and Company, London, 1998, pp. 192.) Hirst and Thompson concur recognizing that since '98 there have been 'extensive calls for re-regulation and the reform of major international institutions like the IMF'. (Hirst and Thompson, *Globalization In Question*, p. 271.)
Re-regulations options include the re-imposition of capital controls (Mahathir of Malaysia did respond to 1997-8 with their re-erection) including the provision of a credit guarantee scheme or imposition of taxes on short-term financial transactions e.g. the Tobin Tax (Weiss, *The Myth of the Powerless State*, p. 184). Yilmaz Akyuz, meanwhile, talks in terms of three levels of re-regulation: 1) Prudential regulation: measures to reduce the risk taken by financial institutions e.g. capital adequacy and liquidity requirements, and diversification rules, 2) Protective regulation to shelter investors e.g. deposit insurance and lender of last resort facilities and 3) Macroprudential regulations to reduce systemic instability. Specifically he argues for the introduction of non-interest bearing reserve requirements to discourage banks from holding open positions on the foreign exchanges, tighter regulation of junk bonds and derivatives and the introduction of a tax to reduce speculation. Yilmaz Akyuz, 'Taming International Finance', *Managing the Global Economy*, ed. Michie and Grieve Smith, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1995, pp 87-90. (In reflecting on re-regulation and the impact of this on the autonomy of the state, it is of course important not to forget that a significant minority of states have never deregulated. See David Henderson, *Anti-Liberalism 2000: The Rise of the New Millennium Collectivism*, London, IEA Occasional Paper 115, 2001, p. 4.)
In the current environment it is the Tobin Tax, championed by global civil society groups (See: War on Want: www.tobintax.org.uk Tobin tax Initiative USA: www.tobintax.org Attac France www.attac.org), that is gaining greatest profile. In March 1999 the Canadian parliament passed a motion calling on their government to promote the tax internationally and in November 2001 the French parliament passed a law committing France to the introduction of the tax when other EU countries sign up to it. On 1st July 2004 the Tobin Tax actually entered the statute books in Belgium. (See: David Hillman, 'Belgium clears path to developing world prosperity', *The Guardian*, July 5th 2004.) This has given rise to Early Day Motion 1560 (EDM) in the British House of Commons in which MPs have the opportunity to demonstrate their support for the tax. In a speech given to the Federal Reserve Bank, New York, Chancellor Gordon Brown said he had an "open mind" about the idea. Indeed such is the momentum that those with a contrary view have fought back see: Forrest Capie, *Currency Controls: A Cure Worse Than the Problem?* London, The Institute of Economic Affairs, 2002. Whichever way one surveys the current concerns about the power of unregulated capital flows it seems clear that there is nothing inevitable about an inexorable movement towards a more perfectly global market place. The re-erection of boundaries is a real possibility bringing the possibility for state sovereignty to become more obviously significant.

[66] Furthermore, when considering the levels of intervention, as seen above, it has of course significantly increased its powers. See: Giddens, The Third Way, pp. 47-8 and Alan Milward, *The European Rescue of the Nation-State*, p. 18.

[67] Camilleri and Falk, *The End of Sovereignty*, p. 238.

[68] Daniel Philpott, 'On the Cusp of Sovereignty', in *Sovereignty at the Crossroads: Morality and International Politics in the Post Cold War Era*, ed. Luis E. Lugo, London, Rowman & Littlefield Publishers INC, 1996, p.

48. For other contemporary reflection from the perspective of the English School see: Martin Wight, *International Theory*, p. 234; Donald Mackinnon, 'Natural Law', *Diplomatic Investigations: Essays in the Theory of International Politics*, ed. Herbert Butterfield and Martin Wight, London, George Allen and Unwin, 1966, pp. 74-88; Hedley Bull, *The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics*, London, Macmillan, 1977, pp. 28-29 and Martin Wight, *Systems of States*, Leicester, Leicester University Press, 1977, pp. 116-117.

[69] The point should be made here, however, that, as chapter 4 points, out boundary changes, unless agreed by democratic sanction (e.g. the division of Czechoslovakia and Germany), are very rare. See: Jackson, 'Sovereignty in World Politics', p. 25.

[70] Whilst the new willingness to intervene is associated with the rise of a new 'common humanity' (associated with the new humanitarianism) category that competes against the ' sovereign state' and, whilst the intervening states have referred to humanitarian justification in the media, all major interventions have actually sought legal justification at the UN in terms of peace and security. Thus although humanitarian interventionism has certainly gathered pace post Cold War, it is still being justified, albeit by different UN mechanisms, on the basis of strategic military concerns as in the Uganda and Cambodia interventions back in 1978 when the language of humanitarian intervention was much weaker.

[71] Recent interventions publicly sold in terms of humanitarianism but which were actually justified in international law by reference to 'peace and security' include those listed below. What each case also demonstrates, is a rather evolutionary approach wherein we still have no example of human rights abuses leading to a unanimous, explicitly defined Chapter 7 resolution against the wishes of the state that is the subject of the proposed intervention:
- IRAQ: 1991: To protect the Kurds in Northern Iraq. Security Council resolution 688: No military chapter 7 mandate because Russia and China were nervous that this might establish an intervention norm on the back of concerns regarding human rights abuse. The intervening states nonetheless used 688 to intervene. Russia and China tacitly accepted this by not opposing.
- SOMALI: 794: Passed under chapter 7. Sharp break with the norm, for 'it was the plight of the Somali people which was given as the reason for invoking chapter vii of the Charter and authorising intervention" Greenwood, 1993: 37. BUT the reason was that the Somali state had collapsed so that this was not real intervention.
- KOSOVO: Britain sought a chapter 7 resolution in 1998 but Russia and China said no. Agreed to chapter 7 resolution 1199 calling Serbs not to abuse Kosovo Albanians. No mention of force. NATO used 1199, however, to justify intervention. Greenwood contended that there was a customary right to act in light of 1199 and non-compliance. Russia and China said no. Russia tabled resolution condemning the action but it only got 3 votes. Security Council Resolution (with Russian and American backing) 1244 dealt with bombing and (some say) effectively tacitly endorsed. It did make it clear, however, that the territorial integrity of the FYR must be respected; i.e. there could be no separate state of Kosovo. This was obviously reassuring for nearby Russia in its quest to maintain the integrity of its constituent parts especially Chechnya.
- EAST TIMOR: Resolution 1264 sanctioned intervention but this is only passed on the basis of Indonesian agreement without which Russia and China said they would veto the resolution.
- CHECHNYA: No action can be taken because Russia would always veto it, probably with Chinese support.
- LIBERIA: 1990: Intervention by the Economic Community of West African States to stop a humanitarian disaster. This, however, was done without any reference to the UN and international law, although it subsequently gained retrospective Security Council approval. See Nicholas J Wheeler and Alex J Bellamy, 'Humanitarian intervention and world politics', *The Globalization of World Politics*, ed. John Baylis and Steve Smith, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2001, pp. 483-486.

[72] Ibid., p. 490. 'But the idea that there could be an international humanitarian order, somehow divorced from strategic considerations, was an illusion, as became abundantly clear when the state collapsed in Yugoslavia and Somalia'. James Mayall, *The New Interventionism 1991-4: United Nations experience in Cambodia, former Yugoslavia and Somalia,* Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1996. p. 7.
The sense of the limitations on intervention at the time of writing are particularly pronounced given that, despite the high level of awareness of a humanitarian crisis in Darfur since April 2004 and an increasing acceptance that it does constitute genocide, the international community has still taken no major steps to address the situation. To be sure inaction has a lot to do with the political will as well as the principle of non-intervention and comparisons with the Rwanda response of 1994 actually demonstrate some progress but there is a long way to go. See Hugo Slim, 'Dithering over Darfur?' *International Affairs*, volume 80, Number 5, October 2004, pp. 811-828.

[73] In assessing the implications of intervention in the 1990s and 2000s - be they military or military and humanitarian - it is helpful to take an historical perspective which demonstrates that sovereignty has actually never guaranteed absolute non-intervention. Even if one turns to the nineteenth century, which was in some

senses a high point for state sovereignty, one can see that sovereignty was repeatedly subject to breaches, in the sense that, on occasions, internal policies were determined from outside. Anyone suggesting that evidence of states being influenced by outside forces demonstrates the death of sovereignty is therefore playing with a straw man. Such an absolute conception of sovereignty has never generally existed any more than has the concentration of all state power in one person. Interventions no more testify to the demise of sovereignty than does the separation of powers. Even if it were possible for an intervention to terminate the reality of a sovereign state (which is not possible in the sense that the nearest one could get to this would be regime change, as in Iraq in 2003, which would still ultimately result in the creation of a new government for the resurrected sovereign state or, in the context of fragmentation, new governments for new sovereign states), the idea that this would indicate the demise of sovereignty per se is no more true than would the demise of a particular regime require the termination of regime theory.

Of course, whilst political intervention may have been judged to be unacceptable between 1945-89 (or course global flows meant that the state was in other respects, far from impermeable), it was nothing new. The US Monroe doctrine lasted from 1825-1933, expressing the right of the United States to treat any attack on a western hemispheric state as an attack upon itself. The British imposed the right to stop and search boats for slaves after the abolition of slavery as a treaty condition with other states. Both the Berlin conference of 1878, meanwhile and the 1919 Versailles Treaty, made extensive demands on certain states and their treatments of minorities. In light of this Taylor reflects; 'The United Nations could be heir to the earlier aberrations but this time the principle of non-intervention would be challenged on behalf of universal, rather than particular values. To the extent that values were universal the right to intervene by the instrument of global governance would be justified'. Paul Taylor, 'The United Nations and International Order', *The Globalization of World Politics*, ed. John Baylis and Steve Smith, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2001, p. 341.

[74] Nicholas J Wheeler and Alex J Bellamy, 'Humanitarian intervention and world politics', p. 483.

Paul Taylor placed the situation in context stating: 'Whilst, the post 1989 world has brought with it a far greater level of intervention, it is important to appreciate that, whilst states sometimes may not be enthusiastic and need persuasion, it does not usually go ahead if the state in question is vehemently opposed'. In this regard the UN intervention in Kosovo 'was arguably the first occasion on which international forces had been used in the face of the defiance of a sovereign state to protect humanitarian standards'. Paul Taylor, 'The United Nations and International Order', *The Globalization of World Politics*, p. 340.

[75] 'For Grotius, on the other hand, the right of a sovereign state to take up arms for a just cause applies to civil conflicts as well as international ones; kings, as well as being responsible for the safety and welfare of their subjects are burdened with the guardianship of human rights everywhere'. Hedley Bull 'The Grotian Conception of International Society', *Diplomatic Investigations*, Butterfield and Wight, p. 63. 'While Grotius accepts that the sovereign state is the primary actor, he also accords to individuals a particular status in international relations and under international law'. A Claire Cutler, 'The Grotian tradition in international relations' p. 45. 'Furthermore, states have the right to intervene in the affairs of others on humanitarian grounds when the rights of individuals are being violated or abrogated'. Ibid., p. 46. Also see R. J. Vincent, 'Grotius, Human Rights and Intervention', *Hugo Grotius and International Relations*, pp. 241-256.

[76] Krasner, Stephen D, 'Westphalia and All That', *Ideas and Foreign Policy*, ed. Goldstein and Keohane, Cornell University Press, 1993, p. 258.

[77] Ibid., pp. 247-248.

[78] Hirst and Thompson, *Globalization in Question*, p. 22; Held, McGrew, Goldbatt and Perraton, *Global Transformations*, p. 156 and Michael Kitson and Jonathan Michie, 'Trade and Growth: A Historical Perspective', *Managing the Global Economy*, p. 6.

[79] Held, McGrew, Goldbatt and Perraton, *Global Transformations*, p. 240 and Hirst and Thompson, *Globalization in Question*, pp. 19-21.

[80] Ibid., p, 23 and 30 and Held, McGrew, Goldbatt and Perraton, *Global Transformations*, pp. 296-7.

[81] Hirst and Thompson, *Globalization in Question*, pp. 27-28 and Krasner, *Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy*, p. 13.

[82] Hirst and Thompson, *Globalization in Question*, p. 41. Also see page 60.

[83] Stephen D Krasner, 'Westphalia and All That', p. 258. Also see: Stephen D. Krasner, 'Compromising Westphalia', *International Security*, Vol. 20, no. 3 (Winter 1995), in *The Global Transformations Reader*, ed. Held and McGrew, Cambridge, Polity Press, 2000, Stephen D. Krasner, 'Sovereignty, Regimes and Human Rights, *Regime Theory and International Relations*, ed. Volker Rittberger and Peter Mayer, Oxford, Clarendon, 1995 and Krasner, *Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy*, pp. 132-137.

[84] Krasner, 'Westphalia and All That', p. 259 and Krasner, *Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy*, pp. 84-96.

[85] Clearly in the case of non-democratic states the basis for an enduring openness is less well developed,

although it seems doubtful that a state, bereft of input from at least some kind of civil society (even in the absence of the vote), could sustain itself for very long.

[86] Martin Wight, *Systems of States*, Leicester, Leicester University Press, 1977, p. 23; Wendt, 'Anarchy is what a state makes of it', pp 446-8 and Clark, *Globalization and International Relations Theory*, pp. 70-88.

[87] Hedley Bull, *The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics*, London, Macmillan, 1977.

[88] R. B. J. Walker, *Inside/Outside: International Relations as Political Theory*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1993, p. 447.

[89] Smaller national groups suffocated by the modern metanarrative of the nation-state are obtaining considerable institutional expression or political influence, but, unlike the nationalism of the past it is not necessarily tied to fixed boundaries. The cultural and moral soil which nurtures ethnic solidarity endows it with a spatial flexibility from which the nation-state is precluded by virtue of the legal requirements of sovereignty. See: Camilleri and Falk, *The End of Sovereignty*, p. 214.

[90] There are historical precedents for forms of government that are not territorial at all, or not territorially fixed see: John Gerard Ruggie, 'Territoriality and Beyond: problematizing modernity in international relations', *International Organisation*, 1993, p. 149 and John Agnew and Stuart Corbridge, *Mastering Space: Hegemony Territory and International Political Economy*, Routledge, London, 1995, pp. 78-9.

CHAPTER 8

TOWARDS 'OPEN SOVEREIGNTY':

THE ENGLISH SCHOOL &

THE RESURGENCE OF THEOLOGY IN IR: PART 1

Having established that some form of 'open sovereignty' provides the most appropriate conceptual framework for apprehending sovereignty in the context of systemic change, it is the purpose of the next two chapters to seek to develop a fuller understanding of this model of sovereignty. How should one conceptualise sovereignty so that it can embrace openness and accommodate the two categories of change identified by the previous chapter, 'change by extension' and 'change by erosion'?

In light of the inter-disciplinary breadth that is definitive of the English School, embracing history, law, philosophy and theology, this thesis aims to provide a more detailed examination of open sovereignty, exploiting the sharp focus provided by one particular literature. It selects theology for the following reasons: First, the last twelve years have seen an explosion of interest in the relationship between religion/theology and IR, making the focus provided by this discipline extremely timely. Second, the fact that, whilst largely ignored by IR for many decades, the English School has maintained an interest in theology means that it is in a strong position to make a relevant contribution in this area, providing a further basis for the renewed interest in

the English School itself.[1] Third, part of the reason for the new interest in religion and theology has been the result of the so called 'Revenche de Dieu' which has been a key component of globalization from whence the most significant 'conceptual change' challenges emerge.[2] (It is fitting to engage with something that is involved - in a general sense - with the change that is the source of the conceptual challenge). Finally, and of course most importantly, theology is selected because it has the capacity, as the next two chapters will demonstrate, to throw some necessary new light on to our subject.

Having referred to some of the benefits of adopting this 'theology approach', it is also important to note the limited nature of its objectives. First, it is the purpose of the next two chapters to fill out, rather than fundamentally change, conceptualisation of rationalism and, as we shall see, realism. Second, it is important to be clear that it is not the purpose of this thesis to make substantive theological points but to rather mine a literary genre which, in the context of the new move to 'let culture' and indeed 'religion back in' has an important contribution to make.[3]

OVERVIEW: CHAPTERS 8 AND 9

In turning to the English School's theology component for the purpose of developing a clear understanding of sovereignty, this thesis is immediately confronted by the fact that the most celebrated association between theology and theories about the sovereign state relates to the work of Saint Augustine who is credited both with having inspired 'Christian Realism' (rather than Christian Rationalism) and with having had immense influence on the first generation of English School scholars, especially Martin Wight and Herbert Butterfield. Chapter 8 subjects this Augustinian

legacy to close scrutiny for two major reasons. In the first instance, such is the centrality of Augustine to English School reflection on the sovereign state that it would be quite wrong for any consideration - especially one with a theological interest - to ignore the venerated North African Saint. In the second instance, although the Augustinian legacy is usually judged to leave a form of realism rather than rationalism, it is a realism that none the less embraces a limited capacity to engage with change, which causes this thesis to identify Augustine with that part of the realist tradition which is beyond the sovereign state pole. It thus presents an improvement on the narrowly closed models of sovereignty associated with that pole. Although the Augustinian legacy provides for some openness, however, chapter 8 will argue that it does not embrace a sufficient measure of openness in order to effectively sustain the model of open sovereignty required by chapter 7.

Whilst the prime theological inspiration for the English School approach to sovereignty is undoubtedly Augustine, there are actually lower profile theological sources informing models of sovereignty in rationalism, constituting what one might describe as 'Christian Rationalism'. Chapter 9 will turn to these recognising the openness embraced by rationalist conceptions of sovereignty as a consequence of natural law but will then contend that there is potential for rationalism to embrace a greater appreciation of openness as a result of engaging more effectively with Reformation theology. Highlighting the failure of the English School to fully engage with Reformation theology and its legacy, this chapter will lay the foundation for the thesis to draw on a group of Welsh theologians who played a key role reflecting on state sovereignty in the context of what this thesis calls 'Welsh proto-nationalism'.[4] (The term 'Welsh proto-nationalism' has been chosen for the purpose of referring

specifically to a particular epoch of Welsh nationalist thought from the advent of modern Welsh nationalism in the mid to late nineteenth century through to about 1970. This period is distinctive in that it upheld a frame of reference whose nationalism and was rooted in a comprehensive theological worldview). The chapter will unpack this Welsh proto-nationalist approach, demonstrating the basis for a model of sovereignty that can accommodate change in the context of enduring continuity and thus make an important contribution to the English School, enabling it to develop beyond Augustine, towards a fuller, open, rationalist model of sovereignty.

INTRODUCING CHRISTIAN REALISM

The chapter will first briefly set out the reality of the relationship between Augustine and Christian Realism/the English School as defined in the relevant IR literatures. It will then provide some introductory reflections on the character of Christian Realism before laying out the basic structure of the chapter.

- AUGUSTINE AND CHRISTIAN REALISM

The reality of the relationship between Augustine and Christian Realism/the English School is clearly documented. In his article 'Augustine and Christian Realism', Niebuhr observes, 'Augustine was, by general consent, the first great realist in Western history'.[5] Sean Molloy in his article, 'Bridging Realism and Christianity in the International Thought of Martin Wight', argues that Wight's Christian Realism is directly related to his commitment to Augustine. 'In order to account for this [Christian Realism] we have to make reference to the issue of Augustine's influence on Wight'.[6] Charles Jones in 'Christian Realism and the Foundations of the English School' defines the development of Christian Realism through the impact of

Augustine on Herbert Butterfield and indeed Arnold Toynbee.[7] Roger Epp, meanwhile, demonstrates the centrality of Augustine to all three thinkers in his article, 'The "Augustinian Moment" in International Politics: Niebuhr, Butterfield, Wight and the Reclaiming of a Tradition'.[8] Finally, for our purposes, Michael Loriaux observes, 'Niebuhr, with Herbert Butterfield and Martin Wight laid the foundations of a specifically Christian realism that had a markedly Augustinian tone to it, and which contributed mightily to the development of realist thought generally'.[9]

- INTRODUCTORY REFLECTIONS

The existence of a concept of 'Christian Realism' in IR seems at the same time both logical and illogical. It seems logical because it is from Christian thinkers that realism generally has gained its appreciation of original sin, which is what produces the realist group imperative for government. To the extent that the degree of ontological closure of state sovereignty is an index of the need to expel disorder through strong government, the association of Christianity with realism makes perfect sense. Having made this assertion, however, the existence of Christian Realism seems strange in the sense that, within the Christian frame of reference, any commitment to crude power politics, i.e. national interest expressed through power, must be checked by the reality of some kind of transnational morality with its foundation in God. The ontological closure of Augustine's realism can surely never be a match for secular realism wherein the ontologically closed nature of state sovereignty is sealed by the fact that one is confronted by a survival of the fittest frame of reference, bereft of any kind of transcendent global morality. The fact that Christian Realism both caters for a measure of ontological closure - upon which sovereignty depends - and yet qualifies

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this with a commitment to transnational morality, is suggestive of a potentially helpful frame of reference whose balance differentiates it from secular realisms.[10]

- STRUCTURE

In seeking to unpack the above, it is essential, given the centrality of Augustine to Christian Realism, that Section 1 embarks upon an investigation of Augustinian ontology, first in general terms and then specifically in relationship to government. This will reveal that Augustine presents a largely closed frame of reference which accommodates a limited measure of openness. Section 2 will then seek to identify the implications of the Augustinian ontology in modern Christian Realist thought, demonstrating that it has been primarily used in order to engage with ontological closure rather than flux.

SECTION 1: CHRISTIAN REALISM & AUGUSTINIAN ONTOLOGY

In turning to Augustinian ontology it is important to be clear from the outset that Augustine was a complex thinker who wrote prodigiously over a long period of time and has since been the subject of radically different interpretations over the centuries. In light of this complexity the following examination of his account of earthly ontology (the City of Man/Nature), and of the impact of the spiritual realm (the City of God/Grace) on that ontology, obviously does not pretend to address its every nuance but is rather concerned to obtain an appreciation of its capability to engage with both ontological closure and flux.[11]

A) AUGUSTINIAN ONTOLOGY IN GENERAL

In the Augustinian system the kingdom of God and the kingdom of this world were expressed by his references to the two cities, the City of God and the City of Man. The relationship between the two cities is of great importance because it determines every Christian tradition's understanding of what is possible here on earth and thus has significant ontological consequences. Christian theology posits a range of possible interpretations regarding the relationship between the two cities. In some theologies the kingdom of God is fully accessible here on earth. This optimistic view gained currency in liberal Protestant circles around the turn of the twentieth century, against which Wight, Butterfield and Niebuhr were united in criticism.[12] In other theologies the kingdom of God is said to be partially realized on earth but will not fully come until the second coming.[13] Finally, there are those in the pessimistic Augustinian tradition that state that the kingdom of God will not come in any way until the second coming of Christ.[14]

If God manifests his kingdom either fully or partially on earth and invites humanity to participate in the establishment of this kingdom, then a series of ontological consequences follow. First, the fact that that God is working to establish his kingdom on earth, and invites humanity to engage with this project, dignifies 'this-worldly' change, making it a high priority. Second, it makes it plain that the material with which God and humanity work has an openness in the sense that it is ready to be remoulded by both parties. By contrast, where God is not thought to be interested in the building of his kingdom on earth with human help - instead locating this task in some extra-terrestrial context – life on earth ultimately becomes an arid waiting game, waiting either for one's own death or for the second coming. The earthly ontology,

and human labour therein, consequently is not dignified by the presence of the emerging kingdom and the exhortation to become involved in the kingdom project. Instead the earthly ontology is largely closed and real virtue is found in meditation and focusing on 'otherworldly' spiritual matters.

As a subscriber to a futurist eschatology which locates the advent of the kingdom of God in the second coming, Augustine, whilst arguably resisting the attractions of Gnosticism, had a very otherworldly spirituality. To be sure, humankind lives upon the earth and engages with it, but its celebration and focus must be on the things above. Instead of championing Christian dominion over the earth, Augustine regards all earthly projects with suspicion, referring to them as 'the rivers of Babylon' which he contrasts with the Holy Jerusalem. '[T]he rivers of Babylon are all things which are here loved, and pass away. For example, one man loves to practise husbandry, to grow rich by it, to employ his mind on it, to get his pleasure from it' but, in the ultimate scheme of things, Augustine claims, this project is worthless. He then goes on to consider other forms of enterprise, e.g. the military, the law, business/trade, damning their celebration as inappropriate conduct since they represent the fickle rivers of Babylon. 'But there are other citizens of the holy Jerusalem, understanding their captivity, who mark how human wishes and the diverse lusts of men, hurry and drag them hither and thither, and drive them into the sea. They see this, and do not throw themselves into the rivers of Babylon and upon the rivers of Babylon weep, either for those who are being carried away by them, or for themselves whose deserts have placed them in Babylon'.[15] There is thus no place for celebrating the City of Man and human endeavours therein.[16]

One particularly helpful perspective on Augustinian otherworldliness, and its ontological implication, comes from consideration of his view of time. Colin Gunton identifies three key characteristics of Augustine's conception of time. First there is the germ of an otherworldliness in his 'appearing to deny reality to the present as the disappearing margin between past and future'. Although he agrees that time is created, he chooses to unpack it in terms of ethereal experience rather than through 'the experience of things'. This gives rise to the notion that "we cannot rightly say that time is, except by reason of its impending state of not being". In this context change assumes a somewhat otherworldly standing which inevitably impacts Augustinian thinking regarding 'this-worldly' developments. Second, this otherworldliness takes on a clearer form in Augustine's contention that time is perhaps best understood as a projection of the mind. "I begin to wonder whether it is an extension of the mind itself".[17] Finally, and most importantly, this otherworldiness is seen in the way in which Augustine conceives of time in his theology of history. In this regard the key question, according to Gunton, is 'how far does he conceive the order of time to be inherently and essentially the place of disorder rather than – say – of a fallenness whose redemption is the hope of the Christian gospel?'[18] This question is answered by turning to Augustine's eschatology, which is defined by the fact that he believes that everything is completed in Christ. 'There is no realized eschatology for Augustine, or rather there is an eschatology realized only in the incarnation and at the end of time: accordingly, there is no anticipated eschatology. After the incarnation and before the end, all history is equally fallen. His mature view, says Markus, is, therefore, of the essential homogeneity of history: 'since the coming of Christ, until the end of the world, all history is homogenous ...'[19] Thus one is confronted again

with a sense of ontological closure that on this occasion denies history new openings and fresh departures.[20]

Interestingly, this otherworldy account of time has all the classic hallmarks of that set out by the consideration, in chapter 2, via Plato and Newton, of a closed model of time. The reader will recall that Plato's description of time as 'the moving image of eternity'[21] subscribed to a division between a world of appearance and reality, of the shadowlands, of the here and now and the ultimate world of the 'forms'. In his perspective there is a sense in which time was only a shadow of the ultimate world of truth. To this extent, as chapter 2 observed, one should not seek progress in the world of time but rather in the higher world of 'forms'. In this view real time is found in the universal. Similarly Newton argued that beneath the relative space and time of our experience was an absolute space and time. To obtain real time one must go to the underlying layer of absolute time.[22] In both cases, however, chapter 2 observed that Plato and Newton's absolutisation of time resulted in the abolition of its truly temporal nature. Writing specifically of the Newtonian view, it argued that time 'does not belong to the inner being of things'. Furthermore, 'for Newtonian science time is spatialised, in the sense that it is considered reversible'.[23] Whenever time becomes absolute it loses its finiteness, and thus its temporal character, and dies. Time, chapter 2 argued, is thus assimilated into space. Returning to consider Augustine through the above framework, the fact that the denial of time, realised through his absolute division between the two kingdoms (the immanent shadowlands and the transcendent forms), results in a dominant ontological closure, makes complete sense. Having examined general ontological closure, and resulting otherworldliness, it is now important to consider ontological closure specifically in terms of government.

B) AUGUSTINIAN ONTOGY AND GOVERNMENT

As in the case of general ontology, Augustine's approach to government is informed by his otherworldliness which separates government from the kingdom of God which has implications for changes/openness being mediated through government. First, it is the product of the love of self rather than God, which is actually commensurate with contempt for God. "[T]wo cities have been formed by two loves: the earthly by the love of self, even to the contempt of God; the heavenly by the love of God, even to the contempt of self".[24] Second, in Augustine's view, government is a punishment for sin. 'Political domination entered human society as retribution for sin'.[25] Whilst it can be inspired by common interests, Augustine is clear - in classic realist style - that the government of sinful people does not depend upon liberal aspirations for the common recognition of justice, but on force. Commonwealths, Augustine claimed, 'could not maintain themselves without the imposition of power'.[26] Loriaux observes that 'for Augustine, humankind's self-inflicted alienation from God introduced the supply of rule through coercion'.[27] Recognition of sin provides an imperative for strong government and a developed sense of the ontological closure of state boundaries which shut out disorder and create a framework wherein government can enforce civility. To the extent that sin is central to non-Augustinian forms of realism, Augustinian realism's stress on the importance of sin makes his consequentially low view of government much like that of other forms of classical realism. To the extent, however, that his two cities framework adds another dimension to this, Augustinian realism posits an especially pessimistic view of government. Having set out these introductory principles which hardly suggest that government can be an enlightened instrument for the purpose of inaugurating the kingdom of God, the chapter will first

qualify them by reflecting on the role of civic virtue before then considering Augustine's general approach to government in greater detail.[28]

WHAT ABOUT CIVIC VIRTUE?

Having considered the general ontological closure associated with Augustine's approach to government, it is important to remind oneself about the tension in Augustinian thinking between an understanding of the implications of sin and the realist group imperative, on the one hand, and the reality of transnational moral values, on the other. Crucially, these values can help to stimulate civic virtue. As Loriaux observes 'Christianity is not only the way of salvation but the source of civic virtue. It becomes a wellspring of civic virtue for the elect, and a model of civic virtue to be inculcated in the reprobate'. Niebuhr, meanwhile, spoke of 'Augustine's formula for leavening the city of this world with the love of the city of God ...'[29] Wight also observes how 'the virtues of the City of God flowed back into the organism of temporal society'.[30] If one entertains the notion of civic virtue, however, is it not the case that the provision of a Christian, charged with responsibility for 'this-worldly' government, might introduce something of the kingdom of God, with its redemptive function, and qualify the radical discontinuity between the two cities and thus the ontological closure of the Augustinian position? For the purposes of understanding why enlightened leadership cannot introduce the kingdom of God on earth and why one is consequently confronted with enduring ontological closure, it is important to pause to reflect on the manner in which 'doing good' manifested itself without undermining the division between the two cities.

In examining Augustine's approach to the promotion of civic virtue one must first confront the fact that this was not a priority. '[C]itizens of the heavenly city must care about God's grace to embrace that higher love, *caritas*, that is quite simply what Christians do. It is the Christian's duty to care about the quality of secular life. …"It is love of truth that prompts the search for holy leisure, while it is the compulsion of love (*necessitas caritas*) that makes men undertake a righteous activity in affairs (*negotium iustum suscipit*)"'. However, "'If this burden is not placed upon us, we should use our freedom to discern and contemplate truth; but if it is placed upon us it must be accepted because of this compulsion of love"'.[31]

The fact that Christians should, other things being equal, focus on contemplation, unless 'the *burden* is placed upon us', makes it plain that, whilst it is sometimes necessary to promote righteous affairs on earth, it is better to contemplate the life to come. Thus there is a sense in which, although Augustine seeks to engage with something of the 'this-worldliness' of life on earth, conscious that he must if he is to follow the life of Jesus, he has the greatest of difficulty squeezing this approach into his quasi-Gnostic, neo-platonic mindset. This position regarding public life is eloquently expressed by Herbert Butterfield: 'The Christian will realise that he can never be happy in it [public office] and will never long for it. He will rather pray that he will not have to drink this cup, but if he must accept the office, this is the spirit in which he will. And the same is true even with the office of the Emperor himself – the Christian will accept it as a means of service'.[32] At the end of the day, whilst civic virtue is good for the individual - although less worthy than contemplation - it cannot introduce the kingdom of God and thus cannot change the fact that government will be basically fallen until the impact of the radical discontinuity comes to an end with

the second coming. Thus any sense of openness resulting from Augustine's comments about civic virtue would seem to be limited.

The lack of concern for, and interest in, the kind of changes a Christian ruler might be able to invoke can be seen in the very individualist manner in which Augustine considers the potential of civic virtue.[33] Instead of reflecting on the possibilities for bringing good to a nation through enlightened government, Augustine is far more interested in the inner spiritual life of the ruler than with the substance of his actions. Preoccupied with the inner spiritual dynamic, which located the moral significance of any action in the intention, Augustine could have a surprisingly detached approach to physical politics, leaving Christian rulers extra-ordinarily unrestrained. This can be seen with particular clarity in the case of warfare. 'Fought with love in one's heart', war might be conducted with savage disregard of the rules of *jus in bello* and was likely to prove "a grim and horrible necessity," bringing unavoidable harm to non-combatants'.[34] Thus there is, in an important sense, no real difference between the significance of the decision of the Christian leader and the Christian subject. Both depend on an internal process that is related to the City of God. The fact that the decisions of the Christian leader will have wider consequences is not of primary importance. This reflects the fact that, in Augustine's thought, the prime goal is the development of the individual in question's virtue, in this case a political leader, not with the possibility of building the kingdom.

Thus, whilst there is potential for the City of God to have an impact on the City of Man, which is suggestive of a measure of openness, this openness is limited. Specifically, the opportunity for change is indirect in the sense that it is not there for

the purpose of dignifying earthly exploits. It is more of a question of the City of Man picking up some benefits resulting from Christians focusing on the City of God. To the extent that this indirect City of God input effectively injects a measure of openness, there is a basis for a qualified ontological closure.

As a function of his basic rejection of the notion of Christian government, Augustine was hesitant about making value distinctions between different states.[35] Given that even with fellow Christians in the driving seat, there was no potential for bringing a significant 'this-worldly' change which could be valued in significant 'this-worldly' terms, the Augustinian perspective fostered the sense that there was little point in distinguishing between different kinds of government. Government was basically the mechanically necessary response to sin, resting in a closed system, wherein state history went round and round, repeating itself. Augustine 'reasoned that all civilizations, past and present, pagan and Christian, were bound to suffer similar catastrophes, and argued that all history of the earthly or *post lapsarian* world (the *civitas terrena*) was a process of human suffering, part of a divine plan through which redemption from original sin might finally be achieved'.[36]

CONCLUSION

Thus, in conclusion, one can clearly see the way in which the Augustinian system has imbued Christian Realism with a sense of the absolute divide between the two cities and how this has cut the world off from the domain of dignified openness, rendering it a largely closed system. To be sure, whilst they are two distinctive and separate orders, their commingling effectively provides a very limited openness through which the City of God - via media such as natural law - can have a leavening effect on the

City of Man, but this is indirect in the sense that it is not there for the purpose of dignifying earthly exploits. It is more of a question of the City of Man picking up some benefits resulting from individual Christians focusing on the City of God. Thus Christian Realism, defined through Augustine, gives rise to a 'largely' rather than a 'wholly' closed ontology. Strategically, therefore, it caters for a more open model of sovereignty than that of secular realisms.

SECTION 2: AUGUSTINE, NEIBUHR, WIGHT AND BUTTERFIELD

It is the contention of this chapter that, although Wight, Butterfield and Niebuhr recognise openness manifest in the possibilities of civic virtue, their 'Augustinian' understanding of international relations has primarily been defined by the closure manifest in the Augustinian system. The chapter will seek to demonstrate this tendency first by identifying the reality of the distinctive Augustinian division between the two cities in modern Christian Realism. It will then examine the ontological closure emanating from that divide and its implications for the conceptualisation of the sovereign state and the international system.

I. THE NATURE GRACE DIVIDE IN MODERN REALISM:

MARTIN WIGHT

One of the most fundamental assumptions underpinning Wight's realist and indeed rationalist thinking is his recognition of human sinfulness.[37] He celebrated both Herbert Butterfield and Reinhold Niebuhr's attempts to draw Christianity back 'to the Old Testament or prophetic interpretation of history, with its belief in the sinfulness of

human nature, in cataclysm and tragic conflict, in judgement and providence'.[38] This clearly generated the need for a strong Leviathan.

Recognition of the serious reality of sin informs the division between the fallen kingdom of this world and the perfect kingdom of God and this obtains its clearest articulation in Wight's thought during the late 1940s. Hedley Bull, Roger Epp and Sean Molloy highlight, in this regard, an address given in Switzerland in 1948 and a radio interview that same year.[39] Specifically, Bull and Molloy argue that Wight's commitments made for a very gloomy Augustinian theology.[40] 'In order to account for this [Christian Realism]', Molloy observes, 'we have to make reference to the issue of Augustine's influence on Wight. Following Augustine, Wight differentiated between the City of God, which was perfect, and the City of Man, which was imperfect. Wight as a Christian believed in the eventual victory of the City of God, but this was after the end of history: Wight the political theorist recognised that the saeculum was of a very different order, and operating according to the rule of Man, not God, and thus had a very different logic underpinning the relationship, one that was best understood as conceiving Man as a sinful and corrupted being and a slave to his passions, chief among them greed and anger'.[41] The implications of the division between the two cities, for the reasons given in the previous section, made for a clear sense of ontological closure.

One interesting perspective on Wight's Augustinian theology is seen very powerfully in the division between his personal morality and his reflections regarding international relations. Although all mainstream Christian traditions believe in the notion of a fallen world, the fact that it is corrupted by human sin does not necessarily

mean that these traditions posit an absolute divide between the personal and the public. Specifically, the violation of Christian humanitarian values often gives rise to actions seeking to ameliorate the consequences of their violation with the aim of improving life on earth. Wight, however, demonstrates little interest in writing manifestos for enlightened change.

This curious state of affairs has exercised some onlookers, most famously Michael Nicholson in his 'The enigma of Martin Wight'. While recognising Wight's Christian value system, Nicholson reflects on its separation from his work. 'There is of course no reason at all why one should not describe the world and how the world behaves while deploring it. Indeed to pretend that the world is how one would like it to be in the face of the evidence that it is not, is the most basic of blunders for the social observer. However, there does seem to be a reason for urging that if the world behaves in ways which you believe to be manifestly wrong, that one should endeavour to do whatever one can to right it'.[42] Later Nicholson makes the point, with some exasperation, that 'pessimism does not absolve one from trying to avoid the Holocaust, however poor one thinks one's chances are'.[43] The apparent gulf between Wight's personal, Christian morality, and his resignation to an international order animated by sin, is clearly suggestive of the fact that he has embraced an Augustinian perspective wherein civic virtue is primarily a personal and not a corporate phenomenon. There is no potential to improve matters in the public square through championing bold structural changes. The way to seek improvement is through using one's personal life as a vehicle for *caritas*.[44] Politically, therefore, Wight's thought is very much informed by the Augustinian characteristic of thisworldly ontological closure.

RHEINHOLD NIEBUHR

Reinhold Niebuhr's work is underpinned throughout by a strong 'Augustinian' sense of human sinfulness which, he argued, becomes more problematic when examining national communities, thus rendering sinfulness a greater problem in the domain of international politics. 'A perennial weakness of the moral life in individuals is simply raised to the nth degree in national life'.[45] The impact of this falleness is exaggerated on a national level because, again in the Augustinian tradition, Niebuhr (like Wight) was reluctant to seek to translate Christian principle to the reformation of government.

Religion is, Niebuhr maintained, primarily for the moral invigoration of the individual, not the state. 'Yet the full force of religious faith will never be available for the building of a just society, because its highest visions are those which proceed from the insights of a sensitive conscience. If they are realised at all, they will be realised in intimate religious communities, in which individual ideals achieve social realisation but do not conquer society'.[46] There is something personal and individualistic about Christianity in Niebuhr's view. 'The devotion of Christianity to the cross is an unconscious glorification of the individual moral ideal. The cross is the symbol of love triumphant in its own integrity but not triumphant in the world and society'.[47] Hence, the title of his most celebrated work, *Moral Man, Immoral Society.*

Niebuhr's Augustinian views on salvation and fallenness meant that, whilst he did not reject the possibility of religion impacting politics, and whilst indeed he believed that there are contexts in which religious people's morality should cause them to want to impact the political realm, it is not something to be generally sought after. Once

again, therefore, one is confronted by a key thinker whose political imagination was informed by a dominant ontological closure as a consequence of his Augustinian worldview.

HERBERT BUTTERFIELD

Like Wight and Niebuhr, Butterfield, writing in an Augustinian tradition, is similarly convinced about the importance of human sin. Behind the need for limited war, Butterfield argues 'is the comprehension of man's universal sinfulness, and something of the sense that we are responsible for one another's sins'.[48] Butterfield links the reality of sin explicitly to government, highlighting the need for a strong state, in the following passage: 'Let us be quite clear. The problem of evil is a very formidable thing – terrible because there is so much of this evil that is potentially there, lying in wait for the opportunity, so to speak. History gives us glimpses sometimes of the appalling things that can happen if the whole order of things breaks down, and if, for example, it comes to appear that there is no government capable of bridling the criminals'.[49]

Butterfield similarly does not believe that the church should corporately seek 'this-worldly' change. Instead, he celebrates the fact that the advent of a secular age provides the church with an opportunity to get back to the spiritual basics. The development of Christendom opened the door for the church to become closely associated with the mundane world, with government and culture, distracting it from its prime calling. 'Christian thought has had to repeat the process of disentangling the essential of the spiritual life from the mundane institutions and intellectual systems – from the earthiness – with which it has become intermixed'. The rejection of religion

from the mundane has ensured that 'the spiritual life emerges better for all the purifications it has suffered'.[50] This does not mean, as noted earlier, that the individual Christian should not become involved in public life if such responsibility is thrust upon him, but he should not seek it.[51] Thus one is again confronted with a thinker whose political thought was strongly influenced by a dominant ontological closure as a consequence of his Augustinian worldview.

II. CONFRONTING THE CLOSED SYSTEM

Having defined the radical discontinuity between Nature and Grace and the resultant ontological closure that militates against valuable and creative 'this-worldly' change (wherein government was called into being as an almost mechanical consequence of sin and in which history repeats itself), it is extremely interesting to note Wight, Butterfield and Toynbee's[52] willingness to see the international system in terms of a certain pattern of repetition. In his celebrated 'Why there is no international theory' Wight claims that if Sir Thomas More or Henry IV were to return to consider international relations they would be confronted with similar challenges. Granted, 'the stage would have become much wider, the actors fewer, their weapons more alarming, but the play would be the same old melodrama'.[53] Later in the same article, and sounding in some senses rather like Waltz, Wight contends that '[i]nternational relations is the realm of recurrence and repetition; it is the field in which political action is most regularly necessitous'.[54] Butterfield and Toynbee similarly identified this sense of recurrence that in some senses undermined the particularity and uniqueness of any specific event. 'Both Toynbee and Butterfield took a very long view, freely employing historical analogy. Like many realists – secular as much as religious – they emphasized continuity, even synchronicity'.[55] In embracing this view

there is the clear Augustinian sense of history repeating itself, almost mechanically, trapped in the closed system of the 'kingdom of this world'.

In considering the place of repetition, it is particularly important to examine the Wightian view of war. Wight's approach to war has both of the crucial hallmarks of an Augustinian model of ontological closure. First, from the perspective of Nature, Wight believed that war was inevitable, although particular wars were avoidable. Writing to J. H. Oldham, however, he claimed that one war that was not avoidable - indeed he said it was 'as certain as the return of Halley's Comet' - was a Third World War. Second, from the perspective of Grace, he clearly believed that God was sovereign over history. In this sense, as Bull observed, he 'appears to have felt that even to pray for peace can involve a kind of impiety'. In a broadcast in 1948 he stated; 'Perhaps there is a sense today in which we will have to say that the preservation of civilization and the averting of war are not important, before we can recover our balance and find again the way in which they are important. For what matters is not whether there is going to be another war or not, but that it should be recognised, if it comes, as an act of God's justice and if it is averted, as an act of God's mercy'.[56] Either way one must embrace what happens as a function of God's sovereign determination through the closed system. 'Free will', Molloy observes, 'granted by God to man, but conditioned by man's natural propensity to immorality as a consequence of original sin, acts as a paradoxical tool of God in the divinely ordered universe. Thus men are free to choose, but the results of their actions are in fact determined as a result of God's judgement – punitive or merciful'.[57]

This tendency towards repetition identified in the Augustinian legacy is of particular interest because of its significant parallels with the rise of the scientific method in IR, against which the English School was in some very important senses supposed to have defined itself. This rather ironic relationship is identified by Molloy[58] and Loriaux.[59] One of the most interesting observations in this regard, however, comes from Roy E. Jones' renowned 1981 article which makes no reference to Augustine whatever but perhaps unconsciously highlights his impact on Wight with great clarity. He notes that, like Waltz et al, English School thinkers seem to have an obsessive holism which causes them to have a 'disregard for individual experience'.[60] In this respect he notes with interest the passionate English School critique of the new science. This response, he claimed emotively, can 'be equated with Calaban's howl of horror and rage on being confronted with his own reflection'.[61] In the case of Wight specifically, Jones claims that this holism has caused him to see 'that all states at given levels of power are internationally much the same'.[62] Indeed, he accuses Wight of a certain determinism wherein the sphere for free action that can bring change is fundamentally absent.[63] 'No passion singes Wight's pages'. Having referred to his dependence on 'the impersonal cogs of history', Jones claims that familiarising oneself with Wight's system leads one to conclude that 'what happens to us sinners here below matters very little. To be alive is to be mildly depressed'.[64]

One of the most interesting points about this criticism of the English School's lack of regard for first and second image issues is the fact that it obviously hangs on what Jones saw as a structuralism in the English School. Whilst it is indeed true that the English School defined itself against the new scientific method, one must remember that the behaviouralist revolution, whilst scientific, did not locate its analysis at the

structural level.[65] Indeed, the advent of scientific structuralism in IR did not become influential until after the death of Wight.[66] This prompts the question of whether Wight would have found Waltz's *Theory of International Politics* quite as disagreeable as Kaplan's *System and Process in International Politics?*[67] Interestingly Bull, who led the English School charge against the scientists, thought it an important piece of work.[68] The fact that Waltz did not find himself pounced upon by Bull might be construed as interesting evidence of the reality of an English School structuralism born of an ontological closure secured through Augustinian assumptions.

OPEN SOVEREIGNTY, CLOSED SOVEREIGNTY

Having considered Augustinian ontology on its own terms and having reflected on this directly through the work of modern Christian Realists, it is now possible to consider the relevance of this ontology to the challenge of coming to terms with sovereignty in the context of globalization. Specifically, there can be no doubt that the Augustinian system has had an impact on modern Christian Realism bringing a sense of the divide between the two cities and that this has cut the world off from the domain of dignified openness, rendering it a largely closed system. To be sure commingling provides the opportunity for some leavening impact but this is indirect and does not result in the creation of a bridge between them that lifts them from the place of fundamental incommensurability. To the extent that this opens the door to a limited 'effective openness', Christian Realism defined through Augustine gives rise to a 'largely' rather than a 'wholly' closed ontology, and thus caters for a more open model of sovereignty than secular realism. Modern Christian Realists, however, have neither focused on the reality of this openness nor sought to exploit it. Turning

critically to the theological component of English School thinking has been beneficial to the extent that it has identified an under exploited openness. To the extent, however, that this openness is limited, the Augustinian perspective, although important in the history of the English School, does not seem likely to be able to contribute to the development of a model of sovereignty that is sufficiently open to rise to the conceptual challenge of providing a framework within which to define a model of sovereignty that can engage with the change, defined by chapter 7.[69]

LOOKING BEYOND AUGUSTINE

In seeking to rise to the challenge of open sovereignty, it is the contention of this thesis that the English School Christian Realist tradition should exchange its Augustinian two cities framework, with its consequent futurist eschatology, and attendant ontological closure, for another perspective from mainstream Christian theology. Whilst Waltz sought to move realism forward through neorealism's rejection of human evil, Christian Realism can renew itself, and its relevance, by embracing an ontology that rests upon a less futurist eschatology and which consequentially embraces a less pessimistic view of human fallenness.

Although Augustine does not secure his account of fallenness on the basis of the classic Gnostic division wherein spirit is good and matter is bad, he nonetheless arguably exaggerates the implications of human fallenness on account of embracing what can be argued to be a rather more subtle form of Gnoticism. The peculiarly pessimistic nature of Augustine's position is best demonstrated by critiquing his approach to time through that of another Church Father, Irenaeus, who interestingly inspired a very much more optimistic approach to politics in the 17th century.[70]

Although Irenaeus, as a mainstream Christian theologian, obviously believed in the fallenness of man, the impact of the fall on life on earth and the need for redemption, this did not cause him to relocate redemption to a realm that was discontinuous with life on earth. Thus, whereas within Augustinian thought, the City of God and City of Man were discontinuous, in the Irenean framework the two Cities, whilst distinct, were related. In this lack of fundamental discontinuity, the fallen world was dignified with the possibility of engaging with redemption. As Gunton observes in Irenaeus 'no major contrast is drawn between the perfection of the timeless eternal and the imperfection of the temporal. That would be to concede too much to gnosticism. If the order of time is the order of imperfection, it is not due to its ontological inferiority but for two reasons: first its fallenness, its falling away from its due directedness, and second, and far more important for our purposes, its specific ontology, as created and so as depending upon God for being as it is and for being what it is. That is to say the being of the temporal order consists in its temporal nature. It is what it is only through the fact that it must be perfected in and through time, by the action of the creator of time. Like a piece of music, its peculiar perfection consists in the fact it takes times to be what it is. In that respect it is not ontologically inferior to that which is eternal, but merely different'.[71]

This rejection of the fundamental discontinuity facilitates the injection of openness into the Irenean ontology on two bases, through God's resulting relationship to the world and through humanity's relationship to God in that world. In the case of the former, openness through the triune God's relationship to the world is seen in the fact that God the Father was related to creation through the act of creation, God the Son

was involved in creation through the incarnation and God the Spirit is involved in creation in an ongoing way. In this sense there is openness in the fact that God intervened and continues to intervene in creation and thus the world is not a closed system. In the case of the latter basis for openness, meanwhile, change is seen in humanity's relationship to God in the world and the challenge to do 'good works', facilitating the development of a much bolder conception of civic virtue than anything seen in the work of Augustine. In introducing this point it is important to state that, as an expression of mainstream Christianity, the Irenean theological grid is pessimistic in the sense that it believes that the world is fallen, that sin is real and that man cannot, in his own strength, build anything approaching utopia. To this extent it buys into all of the realism of Augustine. This conceptual framework provides grounds for hope, however, in the sense that it believes that this is a 'real world' in which real changes can be made by humanity, in relationship with God, for the improvement of life on earth. Ireanian ontology is thus partly God given and partly the result of human construction.[72]

Thus Irenaeus provides for a significantly greater measure of openness than Augustine. In so doing it certainly presents a theological framework that would be more useful to the project of developing a cultural reference point/lens through which to apprehend an open model of sovereignty that can engage with change, as required by chapter 7.

CONCLUSION

This chapter's consideration of the best-known direct theological reflection on sovereignty, Saint Augustine, demonstrates his great influence on the English School,

finding expression in the development of Christian Realism. It also reveals, however, that the impact of his thought only provides for a limited, *de facto* ontological openness in the resulting conception of sovereignty. Given that the Augustinian position is in no way definitive of a generally accepted Christian ontology, however, this thesis contends that there is a need to consider the manner in which other Christian theological perspectives can inform conceptualisation of the sovereign state.[73]

In recognising other theological sources, the next chapter will turn to what is arguably a more logical, and yet currently under-developed, framework through which to apprehend the sovereign state in the context of change, namely the legacy of the Reformation theology that actually impacted the advent of the sovereign state. It will be argued that, in the context of the imperative to 'let culture back in', the renaissance of interest in theological reflection within IR, and the need to develop a clearer conceptualisation of sovereignty in the context of globalization, its approach presents the discipline with an important conceptual frame.

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[1] In terms of a renewed interest specifically in theology within the English School please see: Scott M. Thomas, 'Faith, History and Martin Wight: the role of religion in the historical sociology of the English School of International Relations', *International Affairs*, Vol. 77, No 4, October 2001; Charles Jones, 'Christianity and the English School', paper presented to the annual convention of the International Studies Association at Chicago, 2001; Ian Hall, 'History, Christianity and Diplomacy: Sir Herbert Butterfield and International Relations', *Review of International Studies 28*, 2002, pp. 719-36; Sean Molloy, 'Bridging Realism and Christianity in the International Thought of Martin Wight', European Consortium for Political Research, Fourth Pan-European International Relations Conference, University of Canterbury, 8-10th September 2001, and Roger Epp, 'The "Augustinian moment" in international

politics: Niebuhr, Butterfield, Wight and the reclaiming of a tradition'.

In terms of the general renewed interest in theology see: Fabio Petito and Pavlos Hatzopoulos, *Religion in International Relations: The Return from Exile,* New York, Macmillan, 2003; John D Carlson Erik C Owens, *The Sacred and the Sovereign: Religion and International Politics,* Washington DC, Georgetown University Press, 2003; Samuel P Huntington, 'The Clash of Civilizations', *Foreign Affairs* 72, (3), pp. 22-169; Samuel P Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations and Remaking of World Order,* London, Touchstone, 1998; Douglas Johnston and Cynthia Sampson, *Religion, The Missing Element of Statecraft,* Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1994; John L Esposito and Michael Watson, *Religion and Global Order,* Cardiff, University of Wales Press, 2000; K. R. Dark, ed. *Religion and International Relations,* Basingstoke, Macmillan, 2001; Scott M. Thomas, 'The Global Resurgence of Religion and the Study of World Politics', *Millennium: Journal of International Studies,* 1995, pp. 289-299; *Sovereignty at the Crossroads: Morality and International Politics in a Post-Cold War Era,* ed. Prof. Luis Lugo, London, Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 1996; Daniel Philpott, 'The Challenge of September 11 to Secularism in international relations', *World Politics* Vol. 55, October 2002, No 1; Daniel Philpott, 'The Religious Roots of Modern International Relations', *World Politics,* 52, no 2 2000, pp. 217-222; Daniel Philpott, *Revolutions in Sovereignty: How Ideas Shaped Modern International Relations,* Princeton, Princeton University Press, 2001; *Millennium: Journal of International Studies,* 2000, Vol 29, No 3. (Special Edition on Religion and IR) containing essays such as Vendulka Kabulkova, 'Towards an International Political Theology' and Miroslav Volf, 'Forgiveness, Reconciliation, and Justice: A Theological Contribution to a More Peaceful Social Environment'. Also please note new organisational developments, The International Centre for Religion and Diplomacy: www.icrd.org and The Ethelburga Centre: www.ethelburgacentre.org.uk

[2] Beyer, *Religion and Globalization,* London, Sage Publications, 1994.

[3] On the return of culture see: Yosef Lapid, Friedrich Kratochwil, *The Return of Culture and Identity in IR Theory,* Colorado, Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1996. On the return of religion see: Fabio Petito and Pavlos Hatzopoulos, *Religion in International Relations: The Return from Exile,* New York, Macmillan, 2003.

[4] The term 'Welsh proto-nationalism' has been chosen for the purpose of referring very specifically to a particular epoch of Welsh nationalist thought from the advent of modern Welsh nationalism in the mid to late nineteenth century through to about 1970. This period is distinctive in that it upheld a frame of reference whose nationalism was rooted in a comprehensive theological worldview. Since 1970 later modern Welsh nationalism has become increasingly secular, (see: Dorian Llywelyn, *Sacred Place, Chosen People: Land and National Identity in Welsh Spirituality,* Cardiff, University of Wales Press, 1999, chapter 3, p. 52.) although those whose frame of reference was defined pre 1970 e.g. Gwynfor Evans and R Tudur Jones continue/continued to articulate this earlier tradition post 1970.

[5] Reinhold Niebuhr, 'Augustine and Christian Realism', *Christian Realism and Political Problems,* London, Faber and Faber, 1953, p. 115. Whilst Niebuhr was, of course, not a member of the English School, his centrality to the development of Christian Realism and his influence on Wight and Butterfield, means that it is quite impossible to examine Christian Realism, albeit from an English School perspective, without reference to Niebuhr. Furthermore, the point should be made that he had in many senses a very similar caste of mind and in some senses could be said to have defined something of the English School method before the English School existed. Specifically he combined an interest in international relations, theology and history and was also a great critic of the scientific aspirations manifest in behaviouralist IR. (See: Neibuhr, Reinhold, *Moral Man and Immoral Society: A Study in Ethics and Politics,* New York, Charles Scribners, 1932, *Christian Realism and Political Problems* and *Nations and Empires: Recurring Patterns In the Political Order,* London, Faber and Faber, 1959.) Indeed to the extent that Hedley Bull is thought to have provided the beginning of the great debate between the scientists and the classicists with his seminal 1966 article, the point should be made that Niebuhr predated it with his article 'Ideology and Scientific Method' by thirteen years (Reinhold Niebuhr, 'Ideology and Scientific Method', in *Christians Realism and Political Problems,* pp. 76-93.) Moreover, my inclusion of Niebuhr at this point should be considered alongside the willingness of other scholars to welcome people from beyond the British Committee into the fold. For instance Roy E. Jones includes C. A. W. Manning who was never a member of the British committee. Roy E. Jones, 'The English school of international relations: a case for closure', *Review of International Studies,* 1981, pp. 2-5; Tim Dunne includes E. H. Carr: Tim Dunne, *Inventing International Society: A History of the English School,* Basingstoke, Macmillan, 1998, chapter 2 and Charles Jones includes Arnold Toynbee see, Charles Jones, 'Christian Realism and the Foundations of the English School', pp. 11-12. The inclusion of Niebuhr is also of importance when seeking to locate the significance of Christian Realism to the development of realism *per se.* Whilst British writers like

to suggest that the modern realist era was inaugurated in 1939 by the publication of E. H. Carr's *The Twenty Year's Crisis*, the point should be made that Niebuhr's seminal realist text, *Moral Man, Immoral Society* was published some seven years previously. In light of this it is perhaps not surprising that he was described by the leading mid twentieth century realist, George Kennan as 'the father of us all'.

[6] Sean Molloy, 'Bridging Realism and Christianity in the International Thought of Martin Wight', European Consortium for Political Research, Fourth Pan-European International Relations Conference, University of Canterbury, 8-10th September 2001, p. 9.

[7] Charles Jones, 'Christian Realism and the Foundations of the English School', pp. 9-20. The significance of Augustine's influence on Butterfield, the historian, is eloquently demonstrated by the following: 'And taken together his (Augustine's) book (The City of God) must remain – outside the ancient Scriptures – the supreme example for study of one who is interested in the connection between history and belief'. Herbert Butterfield in *Herbert Butterfield: Writings on Christianity and History*, ed. CT McIntire, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1979, p. 125.

[8] Roger Epp, 'The "Augustinian moment" in international politics: Niebuhr, Butterfield, Wight and the reclaiming of a tradition', *The Aberystwyth Papers*, The University College of Wales, Department of International Politics 1991.

[9] Michael Loriaux, 'The Realists and Saint Augustine: Skepticism, Psychology, and Moral Action in International Relations Thought', *International Studies Quarterly*, 1992, 36, p. 406.

[10] The tension between these two poles is well illustrated by Alastair Murray, *Reconstructing Realism: Between Power Politics and Cosmopolitan Ethics*, Keele, Keele University Press, 1997, pp. 47-59.

[11] It is for this reason that this chapter will develop its account of Augustinian ontology, as far as possible, through IR Christian Realist writers or IR scholars reflecting on their work.

[12] This theology is called 'Realised Eschatology' see John Drane, *Introducing The New Testament*, Oxford, Lion Publishing, 1986, pp. 118-119. On Wight, Butterfield and Niebuhr's reaction against the liberal kingdom of God on earth aspiration see: Roger Epp, 'Wight: International Relations as a Realm of Persuasion', pp. 126-127. Realised eschatology, however, is not necessarily liberal in nature see an earlier Puritan variant in Charles Webster, *The Great Instauration: Science, Medicine and Reform 1626-1660*, London, Duckworth, 1975, p. 8.

[13] This theology is called 'Inaugurated Eschatology' see: Drane, *Introducing The New Testament*, pp. 119-120.

[14] This theology is called 'Futurist Eschatology' see: Ibid., pp. 116-118.

[15] Augustine's Commentary on Psalm cxxxvi, v. 3,4.
The above otherworldliness can be seen across the breadth of Augustine's work in many different places. For instance, Niebuhr observes that instead of recognising the double love agape commandment of the Bible to love God and one's neighbour, Augustine's otherworldliness forces him to embrace a single love commandment through his insistence 'that only God and not some mutable good or person is worthy of our love'. (Niebuhr, 'Augustine's Political Realism', *Christian Realism and Political Problems*, p. 133.) Similarly Augustine's otherworldly posture compels him to qualify the love the Christian should have for his family. As Niebuhr again observes, Augustine claimed 'you must not love your family too unreservedly because your wife and children are mortal'. (Ibid., p. 134.)

[16] The above otherworldliness can be seen across the breadth of Augustine's work in many different places. For instance, Niebuhr observes that instead of recognising the double love agape commandment of the Bible to love God and one's neighbour, Augustine's otherworldliness forces him to embrace a single love commandment through his insistence 'that only God and not some mutable good or person is worthy of our love'. (Ibid., p. 133.) Similarly Augustine's otherworldly posture compels him to qualify the love the Christian should have for his family. As Niebuhr again observes, Augustine claimed 'you must not love your family too unreservedly because your wife and children are mortal'. (Ibid., p. 134.) God, however, is immortal.

[17] Confessions, XI. 26, p.274.

[18] Colin Gunton, *The One, The Three and The Many*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1992, p. 83.

[19] Ibid.

[20] Some may point out here that Augustine is often identified as significant because he is contrasted with the preceding Greek view of history which conceived of it cyclically and thus in some very real senses denied the possibility of real change and progress. Given that Augustine is said to play a central role in laying the foundation for a genuine study of history, does this not negate the notion that the Augustinian position is repetitive and homogenous? In truth the basis for Augustine's break with the cyclical view of history is located in his conviction, contrary to the Greeks, that history is headed

somewhere in the sense that it has an end point with the second coming of Christ. Whilst this does inject linearity, however, and a real willingness to examine events in terms of cause and effect, it does not change the fact that the Augustinian account of history is repetitive and homogenous in the sense that a) human sinfulness is constant and b) he has no direct, thisworldly account of a realised kingdom of God. This gives his account of change in the broad sweep of history an homogenous, unprogressive character until the destination point, namely the intervention that will end the radical discontinuity between Nature and Grace, the second coming.

In terms of the impact of the Augustinian view of history on IR, R. B. J. Walker makes the following observation: 'The present is destined to return. The political theorists may have their hidden hand and their optimistic teleologies but theorists of international relations always remember Augustine and shape their doctrines of realism as a *peon* to a temporality without hope of redemption. 'State Sovereignty and the Articulation of Political Space/Time', *International Studies Quarterly*, 1990, p. 459.

[21] Colin Gunton, *The One, The Three and The Many*, p. 79.

[22] Ibid., p. 86.

[23] Ibid.

[24] Saint Augustine, *City of God* Bk XIV, chapter 28.

[25] Ibid. chapter *XIX*.15. Given that political authority is, in Augustine's view, the penalty for sin, it is a form of punishment and as such cannot be regarded with any affection. Furthermore, it is itself, in his view, an expression of sin. "Without injustice the republic would neither increase nor subsist. The imperial city to which the republic belongs could not rule over provinces without recourse to injustice. For it is unjust for some men to rule over others'. (Niebuhr, 'Augustine and Political Realism', p. 120.) Indeed Augustine goes to the extreme of not differentiating between government and slavery since both involve the exercise of the authority of the few over the many. Loriaux elaborates; 'Political domination is not part of the natural order of things, for God "did not wish a rational creature, made in his own image, to have dominion save over irrational creatures: not man over man, but man over beasts'. (Loriaux, 'The Realists and Saint Augustine', p. 406.) Interestingly the only form of rule that Augustine does recognise relates to animals and is unpacked in his deployment of the 'dominion mandate' which he applies in very narrow terms. "This is the prescribed order of nature. It is thus that God created man. For "let them", He says, "have dominion over the fish of the sea and the fowl of the air and over every creeping thing, which creepeth on the earth". He did not intend that His rational creature, made in His image, should have dominion over anything but irrational creation – not man over man but man over beasts. And hence the righteous men of primitive times were made shepherds of cattle rather than kings of men'. (Niebuhr, 'Augustine and Political Realism', p. 123.) This curiously negative view of government had the benefit of reminding Augustine's disciples of the fact that whilst, although a necessary response to sin, government was itself a part of the fallen world. Whilst Hobbes and Luther's unqualified endorsement of the state, Niebuhr observes, was the result of the fact that they only thought of the egotism of the citizens, forgetting the egotism of the ruler, Augustine forgot neither. This avoids the 'later error of the sanctification of government'. Ibid., p. 123.

[26] Ibid., p. 120.

[27] Loriaux, 'The Realists and Saint Augustine', p. 406.

[28] It should be noted that in his early years, Augustine believed that the presence of the Christian Roman Empire had a positive role to play in redemption. It was only in his later years that he jettisoned this aspiration. 'Having discarded the illusions, first, of a rationally ordered world and a socially attainable order, and later, of an assuredly historical destiny embodied in a particular political and social structure – that of the Christian Roman Empire – Augustine now offered us a vision of the social order which springs from a vivid sense of conflicting purposes, of uncertainties of direction, or divergent loyalties and irresolvable tensions'. (Markus, 1983, pp. 9-10). Nor, Loriaux observes, does it have any positive, progressive role to play in creating a framework to ease the salvation of elect Christians since this is entirely a matter of God's sovereign grace. (Loriaux, 'The Realists and Saint Augustine', p.413.)

[29] Niebuhr, 'Augustine's Political Realism', p. 127.

[30] Martin Wight, *International Theory: The Three Tradition*, London, Continuum, 2002, p. 245.

[31] Loriaux, 'The Realists and Saint Augustine: Skepticism, Psychology, and Moral Action in International Relations Thought', p. 413.

[32] Hebert Butterfield, *Herbert Butterfield: Writings on Christianity and History*, p. 128.

[33] On the individualism of the Augustinian position see Alastair Murray, *Reconstructing Realism*, p. 54.

[34] Charles Jones, 'Christian Realism and the Foundations of the English School', p. 15.

[35] Loriaux, 'The Realists and Saint Augustine', p. 407.

[36] Charles Jones, 'Christian Realism and the Foundations of the English School', p. 14.

[37] Wight, *International Theory: The Three Traditions*, p. 25 & p. 29.

[38] Wight, 'History and Judgment. Butterfield, Niebuhr and the Technical Historian', *Frontier*, 1 No 8. 1950, p. 303.

[39] Martin Wight, 'Russia, the Church and the West', *Ecumenical Review 1*, 1948, pp. 25-45. Also see: Epp, 'Martin Wight: International Relations as the Realm of Persuasion', p. 126 and Sean Molloy, 'Bridging Realism and Christianity in the International Thought of Martin Wight' p. 8. 'Wight whilst less explicit in many of his writings, was arguably the most Augustinian of the three [Wight, Niebuhr and Butterfield] in his strict separation of earthly and heavenly cities, his comparison of current concentrations of power in "neo-pagan" states with the biblical Babylon and his warning that Christians should prepare for the coming apocalypse'. Epp, 'The Augustinian Moment', p. 3.

[40] Hedley Bull, 'Introduction: Martin Wight and the study of international relations', in Martin Wight, *Systems of States*, Leicester, Leicester University Press, 1977, pp. 11-14.

[41] Sean Molloy, 'Bridging Realism and Christianity in the International Thought of Martin Wight', p. 9.

[42] Michael Nicholson, 'The Enigma of Martin Wight', *The Review of International Studies*, 1981, 7, p. 16.

[43] Ibid., p. 18.

[44] In recent years the reality of the division between Nature and Grace in Wight's thought has been called into question by Roger Epp and then rebutted by Sean Molloy. Epp argues that the Wightian frame of reference does not present an enigma because, contrary to popular belief, Wight's theological approach did encourage him to seek positive 'this-worldly' changes. Molloy replies that Epp is wrong on two bases. First, he is wrong to suggest that Wight's realist comments are not truly reflective of his position and should be treated as exceptions. Second, he is wrong because he failed to understand the particularly gloomy Augustinian model of Christianity to which Wight subscribed. It is the contention of this chapter that both articles fail to provide a really accurate characterisation of the Wightian position. Molloy is absolutely right to claim that Epp's attempt to suggest that Wight's strongly realist moments should not be dismissed as exceptions, but he is wrong to then suggest that they make Wight a straightforward realist. Epp is absolutely right to point out, contrary to Molloy, that Wight did believe in the importance of encouraging positive change in certain situations, but he is wrong to suggest that the Wightian position does not clearly embrace realism. [In regard to Wight's intervention on behalf of Sarawak, Epp observes: 'It does serve, however, to raise further doubts about the commonplace associations of Wight with eschatological escapism, an incapacity for moral outrage, or a simple inside-outside dichotomy that left consideration of the "good life" strictly for "domestic politics"'. (Roger Epp, 'Martin Wight: International Relations as Realm of Persuasion', p. 130.) Epp also points out that Wight's 'lectures begin with revolutionism, because its universalist "moral dynamism" and its conviction that the world can be changed are "in a special way representative of Western civilization"'. (Roger Epp, 'The English school on the frontier of international society: a hermeneutic recollection', *The Eighty Years Crisis 1919-99*, Tim Dunne, Michael Cox and Ken Booth, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press 1999, p. 61.) Having said this, however, the point must be made that here Wight is addressing revolutionism and not Christian realism]. The whole point about the Wightian position is his commitment to the three traditions, realism, rationalism and revolutionism. Indeed, it is possible to find evidence for all three positions in Wight's thought. Citing evidence supporting one of the traditions in Wight's work to vindicate the claim that, at the end of the day, he actually belongs to this particular tradition, misses the whole point about the methodological and ontological pluralism that is definitive of the three traditions. For our purposes, however, the central point is that Wight's realism was clearly strongly influenced by Augustine.

[45] Niebuhr, *Moral Man and Immoral Society*, p. 107 and indeed chapter 4 in general.

[46] Ibid., p. 81.

[47] Ibid., p. 82.

[48] Hebert Butterfield, *Christianity, Diplomacy and War*, London, The Epworth Press, 1962, p. 98.

[49] Butterfield, *Writings on Christianity and History*, p. 68.

[50] Like Niebuhr and Wight, Butterfield, was very critical of that part of liberal theology that sought in the early 20th century to re-approximate the contact with the mundane enjoyed during the height of Christendom. Thus there is no imperative for a Christian political agenda. The social gospel theology of 1900s liberal theology completely missed the point. *Butterfield: Writings on Christianity and History*, p. 255.

[51] Ibid., p. 128.

[52] Although not a member of the British committee, Toynbee demonstrates some real similarities, not least his commitment to Augustine, on which basis Charles Jones examines Toynbee alongside Wight

and Butterfield. 'Toynbee was not a member of the British Committee. To include him in a treatment of the English School may therefore seem perverse. However it is surely no more perverse than to include Carr, as Tim Dunne rightly did in his history of the School. Just as Carr anticipates substantial elements of a commitment to international society, so Toynbee exemplifies the interest in comparative and universal history and the commitment to close relations between academic and practitioner, that were to be hallmarks of the British Committee. Moreover, as an agnostic writing in Augustinian terms, he provides a valuable reminder of a period in which Christian discourse was a common currency, available as much to those lacking faith as to convinced Christians'. 'Christian Realism and the Foundations of the English School', p. 12. For a comparison specifically between Wight and Toynbee see, Elie Kedourie, 'Religion and politics: Arnold Toynbee and Martin Wight', *British Journal of International Studies* 5, 2, 1979, pp. 6-14.

[53] Martin Wight, 'Why There is No International Theory?' *Diplomatic Investigations: Essays in the Theory of International Politics*, ed. Herbert Butterfield and Martin Wight, London, George Allen and Unwin, 1966, p. 26.

[54] Ibid.

[55] Charles Jones 'Christian Realism and the Foundations of the English School', p. 12.

[56] Martin Wight, 'Christian Commentary', talk on BBC Home Service, 29th October 1948, cited by Hedley Bull, 'Introduction: Martin Wight and the Study of International Relations', p. 13 and Molloy, 'Bridging Realism and Christianity in the International Thought of Martin Wight', p.7.

[57] Ibid., p. 7.

[58] Molloy 'Bridging Realism and Christianity in the International Thought of Martin Wight', pp. 4-5.

[59] Loriaux, 'The Realists and Saint Augustine: Skepticism, Psychology, and Moral Action in International Relations Thought', p. 407.

[60] Roy Jones, 'The English School of international relations: a case for closure', p. 7

[61] Ibid

[62] Ibid., p. 10.

[63] Ibid., p. 11.

[64] Ibid., p. 12.

[65] The division between a scientific behaviouralism and scientific structuralism was fought most prominently between Kaplan and Waltz see: Morton A. Kaplan, *Towards Professionalism in International Theory: Macrosystem Analysis,* New York, The Free Press, 1979, chapter 1. Kenneth A. Waltz, *Theory of International Politics,* 1979.

[66] Kenneth Waltz was developing his structural neo-realist frame of reference during the 1970s, although this did not find detailed published expression until the 1979 publication of *Theory of International Politics.* Wight died in 1972.

[67] Morton A. Kaplan, *System and Process in International Politics,* New York, John Wiley & Sons, 1957.

[68] Andrew Hurrell, 'Society and Anarchy in the 1990s', BA Robertson ed. *International Society and the Development of International Relations Theory,* London, Pinter, 1998, p.20.

[69] Given the imposition of a very limited qualification of openness, it is interesting to note that Wight actually suggests that Augustine's approach to war was rationalist and not realist in the sense that he treated peace as the norm which war violated and argued that the aim of war was eventual peace. See Wight, *International Theory,* p. 216.

[70] Charles Webster, *The Great Instauration: Science, Medicine and Reform 1626-1660,* p. 16 and 21.

[71] Gunton, *The One, the Three and the Many,* p. 81.

[72] In this sense the Ireanean system differs from the Augustinianism of Wight who argued that hope was only a 'theological' and 'not a political virtue'. (See Hedley Bull, 'Introduction: Martin Wight and the study of international relations', p. 11.) It only makes sense to introduce an absolute divide between theology and politics if you believe in the radical discontinuity. In the Irenean frame of reference there is no reason why theological virtue should not significantly inform practical political virtue.

[73] To appreciate the particularity of the Augustinian position in the context of great potential diversity, one must be mindful first of the threefold eschatological diversity considered at the beginning of this chapter, in relationship to which the Augustinian position is just one particular interpretation in the context of just one (the futurist) eschatological framework. We have just seen an excellent contrast, moreover, in the work of Ireneaus.

CHAPTER 9

TOWARDS 'OPEN SOVEREIGNTY':

THE ENGLISH SCHOOL &

THE RESURGENCE OF THEOLOGY IN IR: PART 2

Having considered Christian Realism, this thesis now proceeds to examine the importance of what it calls 'Christian Rationalism'. This chapter will unpack the ontology of the sovereign state, first from the perspective of natural law, a traditional English School theological referent (Part 1), and then via the Reformation theological legacy manifest specifically in 'Welsh proto-nationalism'[1] (Part 2), which has not previously been applied to the School. In so doing it will provide a holistic definition of a model of sovereignty, in the rationalist tradition, that is sufficiently open in order to be able to rise to the challenges of systemic change set out by chapter 7.

The natural law perspective on rationalism, as noted in chapter 7, posits an open model of sovereignty on the basis that it constitutes an external, transnational moral influence that reaches into the government of the sovereign state. To the extent, however, that this openness is inferred from the outside by reference to the impact of natural law, rather than understood from direct consideration of the open nature of state sovereignty, natural law provides an essentially negative account of open sovereignty. Examination of the Welsh theologians that inspired 'Welsh proto-nationalism', however, will provide a theological framework for

developing a positive account of the development and sustenance of open sovereignty from the inside-out. Having considered the Welsh theology in question, the chapter will demonstrate how, by complementing the negative, natural law perspective on rationalist sovereignty with the positive, Welsh theological perspective, one can gain a framework that can be applied to obtain a holistic appreciation of rationalist sovereignty, well able to rise to the challenges of change. From an English School theory perspective specifically, this investigation will contend that a holistic rationalist appreciation of sovereignty, drawing on Welsh theology, presents a more useful framework for the School as it grapples with systemic change than does the historically dominant Christian Realism, with its debt to Saint Augustine. In making this case the chapter will thus demonstrate how the development of English School theological reflection in the context of the current resurgence of religion/religious ideas, can be used to increase the conceptual relevance of the School as a whole.

PART 1: OPENNSS FROM THE OUTSIDE IN: NATURAL LAW

Although chapter 7 has already reflected on negative rationalist models of sovereignty, it is important for this chapter, which specifically focuses on Christian Rationalism, to briefly reconsider its definition through theologically disclosed natural law.

In approaching natural law from the perspective of rationalism, it is first important to recognize that it is not peculiar to rationalism. As noted in the previous chapter, Augustine, who is classically associated with realism, recognized natural law. To understand the rationalist character of natural law, however, one must see it connected to a broader belief that, whilst the absence of a global government makes the realisation of a society comparable

with that of the domestic arena impossible, the presence of natural law can help to create an important measure of society and therein the capacity for a measure of progress that will always elude the Augustinian frame of reference.

Wight's chosen figurehead for the rationalist tradition, Grotius is considered to be the father of international law, a concept that, unlike later international lawyers, he based on natural law. In doing so Grotius was in good company. The late 15th and early 16th century was, in a real sense, the age of natural law. During this time Catholic neo-scholastics Francisco Victoria and Francisco Suarez championed the notion of natural law whilst, in his own Protestant camp, Grotius was joined by Alberico Gentili and Hugeut Lambert. 'They all believed that politics and war were to be governed by moral precepts that are written on the heart and thus accessible to all reasoning beings: the natural law (Romans 2: 14-15). They believed in Christian truth, but held – with some variation among them – that a certain portion of it was accessible to humans by virtue of their rational capacity and that this natural law was to be the basis of relations, the *jus inter gene*, between people of different creeds'[2]

In light of the presence of this natural law, Grotius claimed that it was wholly proper for states to intervene in the affairs of a wayward polity on certain occasions in the event of its violation of natural law. For Grotius, Bull observes, 'the right of a sovereign state to take up arms for a just cause applies to civil conflicts as well as international ones; kings, as well as being responsible for the safety and welfare of their subjects are burdened with the guardianship of human rights everywhere'.[3] This celebration of intervention in the name of natural law, however, in no sense changed the fact that Grotius was committed to state sovereignty. Indeed Grotius had a very clear commitment to sovereignty: 'Of its

[international law's] major political philosophers, he is the strongest proponent of sovereignty: "That power is called sovereign, whose actions are not subject to the control of any other power, so as to be annulled at the pleasure of any other human will. The term 'any other sovereign will' exempts the sovereign himself from this restriction, who may annul his own acts'".[4]

The fact that sovereign polities endured, despite the reality of a transcending international law, lays the foundation for a model of sovereignty that is eroded rather than replaced. The reality of erosion rather than replacement is seen, first, in the fact that the transnational law does not call into being a formal international constitution that provides the basis for the determination of its direction, thereby effectively placing it in a new supranational sovereign polity. Erosion rather than replacement is also seen in the character of natural law and the fact that, far from being located in a polity and having access to a supranational judiciary, this law instead manifests itself in the realm of 'hearts and minds', drawing on a universal commonsense, endorsed by different religions. As a form of law that exists in an important sense apart from the state, natural law brings an openness by breaking into the sovereign state, introducing change through erosion rather than replacement.

Parallels to the present situation can be seen on two bases. First, today global power flows, like natural laws, break into states, influencing their conduct but without completely negating their sovereignty. Second, transnational moral norms, upheld principally by international law, license interventions in the affairs of states, demonstrating the fact that sovereignty is not absolute, whilst at the same time strategically not negating that sovereignty. Both the above perspectives on global power flows and international intervention imply a domain beyond the

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sovereign state. Like extra-territorial, hyperspatial economic flows and international law, natural law is ontologically above and apart from the sovereign state and yet it can still impact the direction of the sovereign state. In this sense because the ontology of sovereignty, although important, is not self-sufficient (i.e. it cannot provide a grid on the totality of 'reality'), it is necessarily ontologically open.

In addressing the role of sovereignty in the context of the spatio-temporal revolution that is globalization - wherein closed ontologies have lost ground to the new openness evidenced through increasing global flows - this thesis argues that it makes sense to revive the model of rationalist sovereignty premised on the ontologically open implication of natural law.[5] The fact that sovereignty is consistent with this extra-territorial form of quasi-spiritual law demonstrates with great clarity that the notion of open sovereignty, whilst less than attractive to the IR theory of recent years, because of certain positivist, methodological aspirations with ontological implications, has a good historic pedigree. There is a need to release sovereignty from the grip of *a priori* ontological closure that has been its lot in recent years in both the thinking of neorealists and the other realists who need closure to invoke their methodology and in the thinking of reflectivists who reject sovereignty precisely because they say it is defined by ontological closure.

PART 2: OPENNESS FROM THE INSIDE-OUT:

Although the above provides an account of a measure of openness, it is important to recognize that Christian theology is not limited to providing an explanation of the ontological openness of rationalist models of sovereignty negatively, from the outside, by natural law. It can also rise to this challenge by positively reflecting directly on the sovereign state itself.

This chapter will now examine the lack of recognition afforded to Reformation thought in modern international relations theory's conceptualization of the sovereign state, first from a general IR, and then from a specifically English School, perspective (Section 1). In so doing, it will demonstrate the potential of Reformation thought to contribute to positive conceptualizations of open sovereignty through special reference to theologically disclosed 'Welsh proto-nationalism', (Section 2). When this direct, positive reflection on the sovereign state is brought alongside the indirect, negative perspective of natural law, this will give rise to a fuller account of open sovereignty that can readily accommodate change.

SECTION 1: THE REFORMATION

One of the curious things about Christian Realism, as noted in chapter 8, is its dependence on one theologian, Augustine. Had the modern states system emerged in a secular age and had nothing to do with theology then it would not have been strange for those English School thinkers interested in theology to look elsewhere and draw on an influential fifth century saint. The truth is, however, that the modern state system did not emerge in a secular age and neither did it emerge without theological reflection. There seems to be at least some sense then in which English School thinkers bought into the widespread contention that the advent of the states system itself was a secular development, necessitating their reference to theology from other historical epochs. The chapter will first consider this position from the general perspective of IR theory and then home in on its impact on the English School.

a) THE SECULAR STATES SYSTEM?

In challenging the historical basis for the identification of the sovereign state and advent of modern international relations with the denial of religion, the critique of IR theory provided

by the work of scholars such as Fabio Petito, Pavlos Hatzopoulos and Daniel Philpott is of special interest.[6] Petito and Hatzopoulos contend that international relations has always been based on the denial of religion. '[R]eligion was the object that needed to vanish for modern international politics to come into being. Religion has been, and largely remains, what the discipline of International Relations (IR) can speak about only as a threat to its own existence'.[7] In light of this observation it is hardly surprising that theorists should not look to religion to obtain a better understanding of the sovereign state. In sympathy with this conviction there has been a tendency, Philpott observes, for international relations scholars to account for sovereignty narrowly in terms of material developments. The sovereign state triumphed in the modern era because it provided the best institutional frame within which to fight wars and produce wealth.[8] Furthermore, when a more ideational approach is adopted modernity and its politics tends to be seen through the lens of 1789, as if sovereignty was a secular, Enlightenment phenomenon. Whilst not wishing to deny the important role played by material and Enlightenment imperatives in the advent of sovereignty, one must take care not to assess the development of sovereignty without due regard for the Reformation and the critical century in the run up to 1648, and the Treaty of Westphalia, in which theology played an important part.[9] Crucially, Philpott observes, every state that embraced sovereignty during the 1648 era had a strong Reformation crisis, whilst every polity that showed no interest had no Reformation crisis.[10]

b) SECULAR & OTHERWORLDLY ASSUMPTIONS IN THE ENGLISH SCHOOL

Although the English School is distinct in modern IR for having sustained an interest in theology at a time when it was afforded scant attention from elsewhere, even its treatment of the Reformation legacy has been lacking. Specifically there have been two English School

commitments that have animated its reluctance to engage with the advent of the states system positively in terms of its theological motivation.

In the first instance Wight seems to have viewed the significance of Reformation thought almost entirely in terms of revolutionism, i.e. the subversion of the modern states system. To be sure, there is no doubt that the different expressions of Protestantism would have liked the whole world to have been filled with like-minded Protestant states and to this extent there is a sense in which the central figures of the Reformation should be seen as embracing something of revolutionism. Critically, however, unlike the Catholic counter revolutionaries with whom Wight contrasts them, the main implication of the reformers' agenda was to seal the break-up of the previous revolutionist structure, the *Respublica Christiana*, and to lay a foundation for the modern states system with a new realist or rationalist ontology. Given the centrality of their theologically charged discourse to the advent of the modern states system, the decision to locate the reformers primarily in the tradition defined in terms of transcending the modern states system, referring instead for theological insight regarding that system to a Saint, removed by one thousand years of history, seems very strange.[11]

In the second instance on the one occasion when Wight does see fit to discuss Luther in the context of his consideration of realism, he makes it very plain that he does not think much of his thought. Although, for reasons considered in chapter 8, Augustine can certainly be accused of peddling an otherworldly theology, Wight seems to be of the opinion that Luther pursued this project with even greater vigour such that it becomes problematic. Whereas Augustine provided the means for mediation between the City of God and the City of Man, Luther did not. 'It was in the spirit of Lutheran thought to attribute totality of value to inward

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morality, and depreciate external morality, the moral issues involved in power, property, war or slavery, even though this morality was still stated in terms of natural law'.[12]

The notion, however, that Luther's doctrine of justification by faith gave rise to an otherworldly spirituality is highly contentious. Whilst Luther taught that good works could never earn a man or woman his/her salvation, he was very clear that good works were of great importance for the Christian.[13] 'Luther', Cargill Thompson observes, 'held that good works are necessary in this life because the Christian does not exist solely for himself or in a spiritual relationship with Christ. In this world, he exists among men: he is in continual contact with other men and he therefore has a duty to serve his neighbours to the best of his ability. ..It is because the Christian does not exist for himself alone that he is bound to devote himself to the service of others'.[14]

Wight's critique of Luther then continues, specifically addressing his approach to the two kingdoms. 'Luther echoes Augustine's antimony between the city of God and the earthly city. But Augustine reconciled the antinomy through the fundamental unity of Christian ethics: through the Church the virtues of the city of God flowed back into the organism of temporal society. ...A prince may be a Christian, but must govern not as a Christian but as a prince. This was an attempt to spiritualise the church, leaving the dirty work of history to the state. It was in effect an abdication of all moral and organizing activity into the hands of the state'.[15] Lacking proper relationship to the earthly city, Luther represented 'anti-intellectualist religious thought, or mysticism, and a predominance of sentiment and feeling over intellect'. He reveals 'too a swollen consciousness of self, and religious egocentrism, leading to complete subjectivism. ...Luther subverted supernatural morality and the doctrine of grace'.[16]

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The notion that the two cities in Luther's frame of reference have no means of reconciliation, forcing Christians into an otherworldly posture, seems to lack any appreciation that in Luther's threefold deployment of the terms, two of its applications (the two realms and the two regiments) do not invoke any kind of division in the Augustinian sense. When applied to the two realms and the two regiments, Luther's usual applications, the two domains exist side by side in a complementary relationship.[17] It is only in the third and less frequent application, of the two cities formula, which does not impact the Christian's attitude to politics, that the tension exists. This is the eschatological opposition between the kingdom of God and the kingdom of the devil in relationship to which reconciliation is not relevant.[18]

Thus, although Luther used the two kingdoms dichotomy to argue strongly for a division between church leadership and political leadership, he in no sense argued for an otherworldly spirituality, encouraging Christians to vacate the social and political realm in order to go into spiritual retreat. 'For Luther', Cargill Thompson observes, 'it is a basic principle of his theology that the Christian in this world is not concerned solely with his relationship to God nor should he turn his back on the world. God has created both the temporal and the spiritual order and He has placed man in both. Besides his spiritual calling to Christ man has a temporal calling in this world in which God has placed him in order that he may serve his fellow men'.[19] The outworking of this calling can be seen in and through Luther's own political exploits, like the publication of 'The Ordinance for a Common Chest of the Town of Leisnig' which was concerned with welfare provision.[20] Thus, far from being more otherworldy, there are actually very good grounds for arguing that Luther was more this-worldly in his concerns than Augustine.

SECTION 2: EXPLOITING THE REFORMATION LEGACY THROUGH WELSH NATIONALISM

Having considered the curious decision to ignore the theology of the Reformation era in seeking to come to terms with the sovereign state, despite the fact that this was the theological framework in which the sovereign state was born, the chapter will now examine what is arguably a more appropriate alternative. Mindful of the actual scope of Reformation thought (seen above in relationship to Luther but also applicable to other Reformation theologians, e.g. Calvin), it is the intention of this chapter to turn to reflect in detail on one expression of this Reformation legacy found in the work of the Welsh theologians whose work played such a key role in defining Welsh nationalism between approximately 1870 and 1970. Specifically, this chapter will examine their spatio-temporal commitments, the consequent ontology of their aspirant polity and its implications for the conceptualization of state sovereignty. The resulting conceptualization of sovereignty will be shown to embrace a significant measure of openness and consequentially be especially useful in contexts that need to accommodate change, be it 'change by extension', as a result of e.g. European integration, or 'change by erosion', as a result of globalization.

The relevance of a theological referent does not depend on its association with nationalism. Augustine's theology did not have to be nationalist to be significant. The fact that the Welsh theology in question is associated with a nationalism, however, provides two further bases for its relevance. First, it builds on the English School's long commitment to the examination of international relations in the light of different cultures and indeed a commitment to homing in on particular national cultures e.g. see its references to the Chinese school.[21] Second, it is also

important because it resonates with the 'return of culture and identity in IR theory' born of post Cold War, post-positivist epistemological innovation.[22] In this regard Daniel Deudney's article 'Ground Identity: Nature, Place and Space in Nationalism', which looks at conceptions of place and space within national traditions and their implication for IR theory is an important inspiration.[23]

In addressing religion in a national context, the question inevitably arises, why focus on Wales as opposed to any other nation? First, Wales is a small nation whose distinctive characteristics have been historically obscured by the wider British identity and as such it presents the kind of identity overshadowed by an 'other' metanarrative that the 'letting culture back in' manoeuvre is designed to address. (This had added significance in the sense that the author is from England - the perceived source of the British metanarrative - but conducted his research at a Welsh university). Second, it is a nation whose political self-understanding and aspiration was until very recently deeply enmeshed in religion. In selecting Wales it is not the purpose of this thesis to argue that what it demonstrates is unique. Such a claim could not be made unless investigations were executed regarding all the nations of the world which would require many theses! What this study can be clear about, however, having considered some other religious nationalisms, is that there are certainly other religious nationalisms - indeed other Christian nationalisms - of a wholly different character from Welsh proto-nationalism, suggesting that the Welsh perspective is at least interesting and possibly distinctive.[24]

Beginning its substantive investigation of the spatio-temporal commitments of Welsh proto-nationalism with general definition (Sub-Section II, Part I), the chapter will move on to focus

on two of the most important figures in the definition of the theology of Welsh nationalism during the twentieth century, J. R. Jones and R. Tudur Jones (Sub-Section II, Part II). Before embarking upon this project, however, there is a need for some preliminary definitions (Sub-Section I).

SUB-SECTION I: DEFINITIONS:

a. UNDERLYING RELATIONSHIPS

In coming to terms with the relevance of Welsh proto-nationalism for a theologically informed conceptualization of state sovereignty, one must first be clear about the basis for the extremely close relationship between Welsh identity and Christianity and second the sovereignty aspirations of Welsh nationalism.[25] Given the extensive material that could be drawn upon to develop and defend these relationships, and the desire not to lose sight of its main focus, this chapter will simply make brief reference to the relevant evidence and point to more detailed information in its appendices.

The very close relationship between Wales and Christianity can be seen in developments such as the fact that Welsh identity and the Welsh language emerged at the same time that Christianity was embraced by the people of Wales and more latterly in the key role played by the Church in sustaining the Welsh language especially through the translation of the Bible into Welsh. Developments such as these have made the relationship between Wales and Christianity peculiarly intense so much so that it has given rise to what has been described as the 'Wales as Church' paradigm.[26] This has laid the foundation for theology to make a major contribution to the development of Welsh proto-nationalism. Prof. R. Tudur Jones begins his paper 'Christian Nationalism' (which is about Welsh nationalism) with a long list of clerics

and Christian thinkers who have been central to the definition of Welsh national identity.[27]

Dorian Llywelyn makes a similar point in his important examination of the relationship between notions of Welsh territoriality and spirituality. 'The theology of nationality and the theological justification of nationalism have been very minor concerns for most theologians ...For Welsh theologians of this century, however, they have been central issues. That many of the writers in Welsh on nationalism in general have been clergymen and academics is not surprising'.[28]

Despite a reluctance to use the language of sovereignty, Welsh proto-nationalism did aspire for Wales to have its own governance and membership of the international community on a basis of equality with other constitutionally independent polities and thus sovereignty. This can be seen in assertions that Wales should obtain membership of first the League of Nations and a proposed European confederation and then latterly the United Nations. None of these positions is possible without sovereignty and thus it is clear that Welsh proto-nationalism did seek sovereignty.[29]

b. HERMENEUTICAL PARADIGMS

Having set out the above underlying relationships, it is now necessary to define three key hermeneutical paradigms, drawn from Dorian Llywelyn's *Sacred Place, Chosen People: Land and National Identity in Welsh Spirituality,* which inform this section's approach to its subject matter. This will lay the foundation for this chapter to then interrogate the territorial ontologies (defined by its spatio-temporal commitments) of Welsh proto-nationalism's aspirant polity, and related conception of sovereignty, trading on the fact that, in the

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theological frame of reference, the relationship between time and space is reflected in the relationship between spirit and matter.[30]

1) CHALCEDON

The first of these paradigms derives from the fundamental basis of the relationship between time and space in Christian theology, namely the nature of Christ. The key theological statement on this subject came from the Council of Chalcedon. It declared that Jesus is both fully God and fully man. He is one person with two natures;

'perfect both in his divinity and in his humanity...We declare that the one selfsame Christ, only begotten Son and Lord, must be acknowledged in two natures, without commingling or change or division or separation; ...the distinction between the natures is in no way removed by the union, but rather the specific character of each nature is preserved and they are united in one person and one hypostasis; he is not split or divided into two persons, but that there is one selfsame, only begotten Son, God the Word, the Lord Jesus Christ'.[31]

The Chalcedonian hermeneutic describes the union of two realities without a mixing to produce a third reality in which both survive, neither being subsumed into the other and within which each finds its full realization.

2) INTERPENETRATION

Llywelyn then posits a philosophic expression of the spatio-temporal commitments of Chalcedon in the form of the celebrated Christian Welsh philosopher J. R. Jones' hermeneutic, 'interpenetration'. 'Substances interpenetrate when one goes as it were into the

other, without merging, but rather creating an interior relationship which does not come about when substances are merely joined together'.[32]

3) PERICHORESIS

Llywelyn's last hermeneutical paradigm, meanwhile, is located in the perichoretic nature of the relationship between the different members of the Trinity. Perichoresis is 'a term which suggests that union and differentiation within the Godhead is a dynamic process in which the ontological differences between persons or spheres are actually strengthened, rather than dissolved, by their uniting'.[33]

Thus all three paradigms are interrelated in the sense that they focus on upholding unity in diversity and are arguably a function of a Trinitarian grid which seeks to reconcile the open, diversity of the Godhead with the closed, unity of the Godhead. The Chalcedonian and interpenetration hermeneutics, however, also engage with unity and diversity specifically with respect to the coming together, but without commingling, of spirit and matter. The chapter will now turn to consider Welsh proto-nationalism through the lens provided by these hermeneutical paradigms in order to consider precisely how they endow it with the conceptual resources to develop a model of sovereignty that can cater for both the endurance of the sovereign state and the reality of global flows.

SUB-SECTION II: TIME AND SPACE IN WELSH TERRITORIALITY

In the first instance the chapter will consider the spatio-temporal commitments of Welsh proto-nationalism in general terms, suggesting a Chalcedonian frame of reference (Part I). It will then address this same question through two leading nationalist theologians whose

thought makes the Chalcedonian nature of Welsh proto-nationalism, and its aspirant sovereign polity, even clearer (Part II).

PART I: SPATIO-TEMPORAL COMMITMENTS: GENERAL

A] SPATIALITY IN PROTESTANT TERRITORIALITY:

The spatial orientation and therein givenness of territoriality depends on two factors: first, the self-evident physical givenness and fixity of the land (territory) and second its relatedness to God, the absolute. Unlike medieval Catholic notions of territoriality, however, wherein relatedness to God was posited through a sacramental union with the physical substance of territory, God's relatedness to territory in Welsh proto-nationalism, sustained in the broader notion of the territorial nation, was instead usually located in his ordaining the nation.[34] Emrys ap Iwan, 'one of the founding fathers of modern Welsh political nationalism',[35] maintained that the nation constitutes an order of creation. In one sermon he exhorted his congregation '[r]emember also that you are a nation, through God's ordinance'.[36] J. E. Daniel, the third president of Plaid Cymru similarly contended that nations are 'a social divinely ordained reality'.[37] Writing more recently Dewi Watkin Powell expressed the same conviction. 'If the nation of Israel was and is God's creation, it follows that every nation is his creation and that he has created it, as he created Israel for his own purpose'.[38] In other accounts, meanwhile, as this chapter will demonstrate, provision is made for the nation to be related to God, even whilst the notion that God ordained nations is actually rejected.[39]

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B] TEMPORALITY IN PROTESTANT TERRITORIALITY:

The temporally oriented openness in Welsh proto-nationalism, meanwhile, is seen in the fact that neither the territorial fixity of the land, nor Wales' relatedness to God, removes openness and an enduring role for human agency in the definition of the nation and its territoriality. The chapter will examine this openness through the lens of Welsh proto-nationalism's approach to: i) territoriality, ii) language and finally through its iii) internationalism.

i) TERRITORIALITY

In order to come to terms with the partially constructed nature of Welsh territoriality it is first necessary to consider the distinction developed by Llywelyn between 'place' and 'space'. Space is experienced by people whose culture lacks the temporality that sustains the openness that makes interpretation, and therein the development of a cultural, personable bond between a people, and their territory, possible. It upholds a kind of 'existential vacuum, a location which is devoid of truly human society. In this way, "space" is also a kind of "anti-place" connoting a certain existential emptiness, non-being, anti-value or chaos'.[40] Denied any sense of social construction, it is condemned to being a barren, homogenous desert. Place on the other hand has been appropriated by the people it sustains through a dynamic process of interpretation set in time. Charged with meaning, it is deeply personable and anything but cold and homogenous. '[P]lace and time are intimately and inseparably connected. I would like to suggest therefore, that what all comprehensive concepts of 'place' involve is time'.[41] Thus the configuration of territory in the Welsh proto-nationalist tradition has two ingredients, time and space, not just space (or for that matter just time). This is a function of 'the connection and mutual co-implication between two expressions of the fundamental

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existential planes of space and time, along with another two theological considerations, namely the human (both individual and the social) and the divine'.[42]

Having understood the distinction between place and space, however, one must move on to consider the heightened capability of Welsh proto-nationalism to engage with openness and construction that results from the fact that when place arises as a theological issue in Welsh thought, 'then', as Llywelyn observes, 'it is as a function of social issues'. Specifically, the non-conformist, Protestant background of the majority of Welsh theologians means that they reject the notion, popular before the Reformation, that the divine can be mediated through earthly channels. 'Among such writers, if holy places in Wales are discussed at all, it is generally only as a derivative of the religious nature of national identity'. Indeed such is Protestant Welsh nationalism's focus on dynamic social factors that its treatment of the land is often somewhat implicit. In recognition of this Llywelyn writes: 'Despite their theological preferences, in the works of many of these thinkers concerning what it is to be fully human, an interest in place is evidenced by the particular emphasis they attribute to the historical and geographical context of social insertion. In the Welsh mind, as expressed through these writers, one's place and one's society play a significant part in who one is as an individual. Place – understood as a social and geographical reality – defines, shapes and guides each human being'.[43]

ii) LANGUAGE

Strategically one can see the explicit presumption of an ongoing openness in Welsh proto-nationalism in the fact that it contains constant exhortations to uphold Wales by preserving the language, something that depends primarily on man. Emrys ap Iwan, balances the

givenness of the nation, manifest through its divine ordination, with recognition that people have the capacity to either, with God, sustain the nation or, without God, destroy it. 'Remember that God who made men also ordained nations; to destroy a nation is only one grade less of a disaster than to destroy the whole of mankind, and to destroy the language of a nation one grade less of a disaster than to destroy the nation itself ...Remember also that you are a nation, by maintaining its language, and all other valuable things that may pertain to it. If you are not faithful to your country and your language and your nation, how can you expect to be faithful to God and humanity?[44]

iii) INTERNATIONALISM

The rejection of ontological closure, moreover, can be seen with great clarity in Welsh proto-nationalism's outer focused internationalism. Writing in philosophical-theological terms Waldo Williams (a Baptist who subsequently became a Quaker) claimed that the 'nation and the community in which... [the Welshman] ...seeks his roots is not an end in itself: it is man's link with eternity'.[45] In other words instead of the nation being a universal that can be held up as the source of Wales' salvation, it is actually a 'particular', albeit one of great importance.[46] Providing a link to eternity, to the universal, it is self-consciously aware that there is a greater truth beyond, and this means that such a nationalism is in no way definitionally mutually exclusive to external universals that order relations between nations, such as international laws. Furthermore, the status of the nation as a 'link to eternity', i.e. the universal, which is by definition subordinate to that universal, suggests that, far from constituting potentially 'opposing universals', other nations may perhaps also constitute different links to the universal and thus find reconciliation through relationship with the same universal.[47]

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The openness of Welsh proto-nationalism manifest in its internationalism is also testified to in more narrowly theological terms by the non-conformist theologian, and president of Plaid Cymru Prof. J. E. Daniel.[48] In his sermon 'The Blood of the Family' Daniel contended that Acts 17. 26 ('and he made of one blood all nations of men to dwell on all the face of the earth, and determined the times before appointed and the bounds of their habitation') lays the foundation for a nationalism that is inherently internationalist. God made the nations, therefore, God made Wales, therefore, it is right that the people of Wales should celebrate their identity. God, however, also made all other nations and did so crucially from one blood. '*He* made every nation of one blood. That puts an end to any Christian attempt to set the nation in place of God …He made every nation from *one* blood. That puts an end to any idea of Herrenvolk or "lesser breeds without the law". Here once and for all, is the unity of mankind'.[49]

CONCLUSION

Having considered the tension between elements of givenness and elements of construction in Welsh proto-nationalism, it is now possible to point to its Interpenetrative-Chalcedonian credentials. In doing so, however, it is helpful to first consider how both Newtonian spatialisations and postmodern hyperspatialisations (defined by chapter 2) violate Chalcedonian spatio-temporal co-ordinates. In the case of Newtonian spatialisations, time (spiritual), as chapter 2 observed, is assimilated into space (material). This results in both commingling and the transformation of the temporal.[50] Symmetrically hyperspatialisations, again as chapter 2 observed, involve the assimilation of space (material) by time (spiritual) and thus the Chalcedonian hermeneutic underpinning Welsh territoriality is again violated. There is a commingling giving rise to the transformation of space. What then of Welsh proto-

nationalism? Of great significance, the relationship between the material (spatially oriented, body) and the spiritual (temporally oriented, mind) in this theologically disclosed nationalism suggests an ontology that involves something other than either the material *res extensa* that attends positivist epistemology or the hyperspatial, extra-territoriality of post-positivism. In the first instance, the spiritual sustains an important interpretative relationship between space and its inhabitants which prevents it from merely being a 'given' in nature. Territory has a relationship to societies and individuals 'all of whom have a temporal, intrahistorical aspect'.[51] It is in part a social construction. In the second instance, however, this partial constructivism takes place in the context of a measure of givenness, deriving implicitly from the fixity of the land and through relatedness to God. Combining an ongoing commitment to the spatial orientation with a commitment to the temporal and a consequent openness which strategically is not just seen in the constructed nature of Welsh territoriality but more fundamentally in its capacity to provide an enduring openness over time (see, for example, the ongoing role of human agency in the use of the language), the Welsh proto-nationaist framework is certainly suggestive of the imprint of the Chalcedonian hermeneutic.[52] It is, as such, of strategic relevance to any open, rationalist conception of sovereignty because it presents a lens with the capacity to accommodate change over time.

PART II: TEMPORALITY IN PROTESTANT TERRITORIALITY: J. R. & R. TUDUR JONES

The chapter will now examine the conceptual resources provided by Welsh proto-nationalism in greater depth through focused analysis of the approaches provided by the Calvinistic Methodist, Prof. J. R. Jones and Congregationalist, Prof. R. Tudur Jones:

TERRITORIALITY AND INTERPENETRATION: J. R. JONES

Whereas many Welsh writers start from the position of taking the givenness of territory as read, against which they stress its constructed component, J. R. Jones, impressed by the widespread appreciation of openness/construction, instead asserts territorial givenness.[53] Human existence, J. R. Jones contended, is set in terms of both time and space. In the context of an open world, however, the tendency for the self to transcend itself means that 'humans constantly live in danger of finding themselves lost in a meaningless world, in a vacuum of identity'. That self then needs to 'come home'.[54] He/she needs, as seen through the Welsh tradition's emphasis on roots, something of a spatial orientation.[55] 'The need for roots is to be understood above all else as a need for an earthly place, or a foothold ...The need for roots becomes a need for a neighbourhood, community and a country. It is impossible to overemphasize the *territorial* aspect'.[56] Later he observed: 'Humankind needs a "familiar place" in a vacuum and infinity of space ...'[57] (Italics added). Thus, to the degree that self-transcending is the option of radical openness and its attendant rootlessness, 'coming home' can actually be construed as an attempt to keep the hyperspatial, the 'infinity in space', in check.

Deploying his 'interpenetration hermeneutic', however, Jones' concern for the land does not result in it being made into an absolute. As demonstrated earlier, like the Chalcedonian hermeneutic, interpenetration involves time and space relating but without merging. 'Substances interpenetrate when one goes as it were into the other, without merging, but rather creating an interior relationship which does not come about when substances are merely joined together'.[58] Thus temporality and the possibility of change is not negated by concern for physical territory because concern for space ultimately is not inversely related to

concern for time. Specifically the temporality of J. R. Jones' position is demonstrated through the insertion of the self-reflexive people whose identity is maintained, he argued, through the Welsh language. Failure of the people of Wales to use their freedom in order to sustain the language, and thus the specific interpenetration that is constitutive of Wales, would place its future in jeopardy. In Jones' view the openness expressed through language and the closed, givenness expressed through the land combine in a crucial relationship that gains further solidity from its status as part of God's creation. 'Any threat to that marriage of land and language besmirches that distinctiveness and brings us nearer to the destruction of the Welsh national community, a unique piece of God's creation'.[59]

J. R. Jones' approach, therefore, strategically does not foster a view of the world whose narrow spatial orientation generates a panorama filled with absolute, homogenous spatialisations that (as defined in chapter 2), when applied to the sovereign state in the context of international relations, gives rise to the billiard ball metaphor. On the other hand, however, neither does his approach support a perspective whose narrow temporal orientation fosters a world filled with rootless, heterotopic, hyperspatialisations (as defined in chapter 2) whose radical inessentialism sustains a flux that upholds a depthless surface carrying the superficial image of a radical diversity. Jones' interpenetrative grid is actually all about championing the Chalcedonian balance between spirit and matter, the open and the closed, diversity and unity, time and space. His interpenetrative hermeneutic facilitates an aspirant state territoriality that is partially constructed, and open to ongoing construction and change, and yet not entirely the fruit of man's creativity. Neither wholly inessential nor wholly essential, Welsh proto-nationalism provides a conceptual tool that can cater for change, whilst remaining faithful to the enduring givenness of the subject matter.

TERRITORIALITY AND INTERPENETRATION: R. TUDUR JONES

Perhaps one of the strongest statements in favour of a temporality but one that, in deference to the Chalcedonian hermeneutic, does not negate a simultaneous spatial orientation, is found in the work of R. Tudur Jones who pursues a greater sense of openness than that of J. E. Daniel and others by rejecting the notion that nations are one of the orders of creation.[60] '[H]is non-sacramental theology does not allow for any mediated or derived holiness. Making no distinction between the divine and the sacred, worship and veneration, Jones asserts that to insert the nation into the order of creation is to run the risk of divinising it and of adopting the political manifestation of this divinisation in the form of imperialism'.[61] Seen in the context of the cultural mandate, set in time, it is clear, Jones argued, that man has rightly engaged in his cultural responsibilities and, within the economy of God, these have given rise to nations. Boldly Jones proclaimed 'God did not create nations. God created man and man formed nations. That is why it is misleading to talk of nations as one of the orders of creation'.[62]

This rejection of the notion that nations are orders of creation, however, does not actually negate the reality of a simultaneous spatial commitment and/or givenness. In the following passage R. Tudur Jones deployed a sophisticated conceptual framework underpinned by his interpenetrative, Chalcedonian hermeneutic that makes this balance clear. 'God is the Creator. As Creator He has set his creation under the rule of law. That is that God has brought into being an orderly universe. God's law is a dynamic one. The order which He has given to his creation is such as to allow for development and growth. *He has not imprisoned his creation in a rigid, congealed framework where creativity is impossible. On the contrary,*

his law is the servant of freedom. It is intended to allow for the unfolding and revealing of the riches implicit in creation from the beginning' (Italics added).[63] God did not want to cast essential nations in place by divine fiat. Instead, in partnership with man, through the instrumentality of the dominion mandate,[64] R. Tudur Jones maintains that the nation is actually something of a joint effort. 'In this sense, a Christian nation is both the work of man and the work of God'.[65] It is partly given and partly constructed.

Jones underlines this point by referring back to Emrys ap Iwan. 'After God had made men of one blood, he divided them into nations and scattered them over the face of the earth and appointed their times and determined the bounds of their habitation. But there is a tension in his [Emrys ap Iwan's] thinking. Nations he considers, are God's creations. And yet, they are the product of human activity too. Since God has made you into a nation, maintain your nationhood; since he took thousands of years to form an appropriate language for you, keep that language; because if you co-operate with God in his intentions towards you, you will the more easily find Him when you seek Him'.[66]

Thus, despite his interest in time and construction, R. Tudur Jones clearly has a commitment to the spatial pole. Having championed the temporal as a means of protecting against the danger of absolutising the nation he stated none the less; 'It must be admitted that a great nation, with a history extending over many centuries has a *solidity, an objectivity, a giveness* which obscures the individual's contribution to its life'.[67] (Italics added) This 'solidity', 'objectivity' and 'givenness', moreover, which contrasts starkly with the ephemerality of pure construction, is seen clearly in R. Tudur Jones' argument in favour of national territorial government. 'It is time for us to demand for the nation the chief medium which God has

ordained for it to bear responsibilities, namely a government chosen by the people of Wales and answerable to them. Self-government for Wales is not a convenient policy. It is rather the next step in Wales' growth towards maturity before the King of Kings'.[68] Rather more starkly, and actually using the language of sovereignty he contends, 'Welshmen must strengthen the bond of brotherhood between them that they may create *a sovereign State* of their own to which Welshmen can offer unembarrassed allegiance'.[69] (Italics added)

THE DISTINCTIVE CHARACTER OF WELSH PROTO-NATIONALISM?

Before moving to its conclusion, it is important to reiterate that it is not the purpose of this thesis to suggest that the use of a Christian theological frame by Welsh proto-nationalism in its development of the ontology of the aspirant Welsh state is unique. As noted earlier, such a claim could only be made after examining every form of religiously inspired nationalism which would demand many theses. Whilst one cannot state that the ontology of Welsh proto-nationalism is unique, however, one can be clear that its ontology is not commensurate with all other Christian nationalisms. Quite apart from the fact that Augustinian ontology contrasts sharply with that of Wales, reference to Russian Nationalism and the Russian Orthodox Church, Ukrainian nationalism and the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church and Protestant German nationalist philosophy reveals a clear divergence between the open, Chalcedonian Welsh tradition and the profoundly closed, monistic nationalisms in the other countries, *even whilst they all relate to the Christian faith.* None of this means that one can argue that Welsh proto-nationalism is unique but - given its difference from at least some other Christian nationalisms - there clearly are some grounds for asserting its distinctiveness.[70]

CONCLUSION: THE CHALCEDONIAN WELSH NATIONALIST FRAME AND IR

Welsh non-conformist theology, disclosed through Welsh proto-nationalism has an important contribution to make to the conceptualization of the sovereign polity, in the face of the pressures of systemic change. Specifically, Welsh proto-nationalism aspires to sovereign statehood but not a model of sovereign statehood that expresses pure ontological closure. It is the contention of this thesis that, set in the context of the global village, where one witnesses the increasing significance and dynamism of the temporal pole alongside the ongoing givenness of physical territory, the interpenetrative, Chalcedonian framework of the Welsh approach posits a particularly significant conceptual grid for the English School. Upholding an open model of sovereignty, Welsh proto-nationalism is in a good position to account for both 'change by extension' and 'change by erosion'. Far from relu ctantly recognizing the actual implications of permeability, for instance, Welsh proto-nationalism is able to deal with the ontological challenges emanating from global flows between and beyond states because of the reservoir of openness sustained within its conception of aspirant sovereign statehood. Developed within a national and a theological perspective, moreover, the Welsh proto-nationalist contribution fits well in the English School tradition. More importantly, however, it makes a contribution to the School by providing a positive 'inside-out perspective' on aspirant rationalist sovereignty to dovetail in with the negative 'outside-in' perspective provided by natural law. This perspective is of particular interest, given that it draws on the capacity of the Protestant Reformation theology to inform understanding of state sovereignty, which the English School has thus far overlooked in deference to its traditional preference for Saint Augustine.

Having considered the way in which the resurgence of religion/religious ideas can be used by the English School to rise to the conceptual challenge of open, rationalist sovereignty in the context of systemic change, the thesis will now draw together the implications of this research as it moves to its conclusion.

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[1] The term 'Welsh proto-nationalism' has been developed for the purpose of referring very specifically to a particular epoch of Welsh nationalist thought from the advent of modern Welsh nationalism in the mid to late 19th century through to about 1970. After this date Welsh nationalism became very much more secular.

[2] Daniel Philpott, 'On the Cusp of Sovereignty', in *Sovereignty at the Crossroads: Morality and International Politics in the Post Cold War Era*, ed. Luis E. Lugo, London, Rowman & Littlefield Publishers INC, 1996, p. 48. For other contemporary reflections from the perspective of the English School see: Martin Wight, *International Theory: The Three Tradition*, London, Continuum, 2002, p. 234; Donald Mackinnon, 'Natural Law', *Diplomatic Investigations: Essays in the Theory of International Politics*, ed. Herbert Butterfield and Martin Wight, London, George Allen and Unwin, 1966, pp. 74-88; Hedley Bull, *The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics*, London, Macmillan, 1977, pp. 28-29 and Martin Wight, *Systems of States*, Leicester, Leicester University Press, 1977, pp. 116-117.

[3] Hedley Bull, 'The Grotian Conception of International Society', *Diplomatic Investigations*, p. 63.

[4] Philpott, 'On the Cusp of Sovereignty', p. 52.

[5] Philpott develops the notion of limited sovereignty on the back of natural law suggesting that it might play a useful role in coming to terms with humanitarian interventions by other states rather than global economic flows. Ibid., pp. 54-58.

[6] Daniel Philpott, *Revolutions in Sovereignty: How Ideas Shaped Modern International Relations*, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 2001, pp. 8-9.

[7] Fabio Petito and Pavlos Hatzopoulos, *Religion in International Relations: The Return from Exile*, Basingstoke, Macmillan, 2003, p. 1.

[8] These material drivers were recognized in chapter 3 e.g.: James Anderson and Stuart Hall, 'Absolutism and Other Ancestors', *The Rise of the Modern State*, ed. James Anderson, Brighton, Wheatsheaf Books, 1986, p. 31, pp. 33-35 and James Anderson, 'The Modernity of Modern States', *The Rise of the Modern State*, p. 8.

[9] Daniel Philpott, 'The Religious Roots of Modern International Relations', *World Politics*, 52, no 2 2000, pp. 217-222 and Daniel Philpott, *Revolutions in Sovereignty*, pp. 102-104.
There would seem to be an assumption that, whilst on a personal level the Reformation was in no sense animated by the rejection of a theological view of life, its impact on international relations via 1648 was essentially concerned with the negation of theology. Looking back at the Reformation it was of course easy for scholars to conclude that, whilst the Reformation was a religious movement, its political implications were remarkably similar to those of the Enlightenment. The objectivism of the Reformation drove truth out of the mysterious realms of non-propositional, corporate sacramental immanence, to propositional claims which individuals could embrace or caste off in deference to the demands of their own reflection. To the extent that the centre of faith was about private reflection and decision, the Reformation placed great emphasis on personalising one's relationship with God and consequentially, in some senses, privatising faith. Luther's contention, moreover, that one should see reality in terms of two kingdoms, the 'kingdom of God' and the 'kingdom of this world', and that strategically these should be kept separate, certainly seemed to suggest that there was no place for faith to impact the public realm in the sense of affecting politics. It was thus easy to see how superficial analysis of the Reformation could be understood to resonate with the idea that the advent of the modern state was something that should be seen in theologically negative terms, and thus, even whilst born out of theological commitment, to all practical, political, long-term intents and purposes, effectively commensurate with the Enlightenment.

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[10] 'Thus every polity that came to have an interest in a system of sovereign states had experienced a strong Reformation crisis, whereas in every polity that fought against a sovereign states system, the Reformation won few converts'. Phlipott, 'The Religious Roots of Modern International Relations', p. 224. Also see: Philpott, *Revolutions in Sovereignty*, pp. 110-122.

[11] Interestingly, Wight gives the impression of being very frustrated with the reformers for their lack of direct, explicit consideration of the Reformation. This may explain why Wight chooses to consider them in the effectively domestic context of revolutionism? (Martin Wight, 'Why Is There No International Theory', *Diplomatic Investigations*, p. 24.) Interestingly, however, Luther Hess Waring finds sufficient material to devote two chapters to Luther's thought about state sovereignty both internally and externally (interestingly external sovereignty is effectively defined as constitutional independence, *The Political Theories of Martin Luther*, New York, G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1910, p. 107), see chapters 4 and 5.
The fact that the reformers combine an implicit commitment to sovereignty with a desire that their model should be replicated elsewhere, not through a Calvinist or Lutheran one world government but through a state system, suggests real parallels between their agenda and the neo-conservative agenda of George W Bush. Although Bush has jettisoned the amoral realism of Kissinger and Nixon, promoting a new kind of idealism, no one would suggest that Bush, who has refused to sign up to the International Criminal Court and Kyoto, is not jealous of his nation's sovereignty and does not believe in a world made up of sovereign states. To be sure there is a sense in which, in his desire to spread certain values, Bush, like Calvin (and quite unlike Kissinger and Nixon), can be described as a 21st century revolutionist, but to focus on his commitment to fostering change to the exclusion of his enduring commitment to state sovereignty would be extremely foolish. Bush does not seek to overturn the state system he rather seeks to inject it with certain values. (For reflection on those values see The National Security Strategy of the United States of America: www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nssall.html) On his enduring realism see David Wedgwood Benn, 'Neo-conservatives and their American critics', *International Affairs*, Volume 80 Number 5 October 2004, p. 966.

[12] Wight, *International Theory: The Three Traditions*, p. 245.

[13] In the 'Treatise on Good Works' Luther includes a section on the role of government in 'doing good works' *Martin Luther, 'Treatise on Good Works', Luther's Works Volume 44: The Christian in Society I*, ed. James Atkinson, General ed. Helmut T. Lehman, 1966, pp. 93-99. In his *Appeal to the German Nobility*, meanwhile, Luther includes another section instructing political leadership in the way of good works. Ibid., pp. 212-217.

[14] WDJ Cargill Thompson, *The Political Thought of Martin Luther*, Brighton, Harvester Press, 1984, p. 39.

[15] Wight, *International Theory: The Three Traditions*, p. 245.

[16] Ibid., p. 12.

[17] Thompson, *The Political Thought of Martin Luther*, chapter 3.

[18] Ibid., p. 39. Indeed Thompson contends that Luther's 'own doctrine of the Two Kingdoms, as it was worked out after 1522 was a much more subtle and complex doctrine than Augustine's and it went much further than Augustine's in providing a concrete foundation for a genuine Christian political theory'. Ibid., p. 3. This must of course also be seen in light of the work of Philpott cited above, Daniel Philpott, *Revolutions in Sovereignty*, p. 107. A similarly high view of government and of Christian involvement in government can be seen in Luther Hess Waring's scholarship. 'In his Address to the German Nobility, Luther asserts that the temporal power is a fellow-member of the Christian body, and although it has a bodily work, it is nevertheless of spiritual estate'. *The Political Theories of Martin Luther*, New York, G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1910, p. 78; 'Although the work of the temporal power relates to the body, it yet belongs to the spiritual estate'. Ibid., p. 97.

[19] Thompson, *The Political Thought of Martin Luther*, p. 167.
In similar vein William H Lazareth observes that 'the two kingdoms must always be properly distinguished, but never separated in secularism or equated in clericalism'. *Luther's Works Volume 44: The Christian in Society I*, ed. James Atkinson, General ed. Helmut T. Lehman, 1966, p. xiii. In this Lutheran frame of reference, Lazareth maintains 'the church can "Christianize politicians and economists but not economics and politics'. Ibid., p. xvi. Luther clearly expresses an ongoing commitment to Christian principle informing the conduct of government when he claims that the Bible should provide all the laws society needs. Expressing his concern that there are far too many laws, he observes, 'Surely good governors, in addition to the Holy Scriptures, would be law enough', Martin Luther, *Appeal to the German Nobility*, cited Luther Hess Waring, *The Political Theories of Martin Luther*, p. 119. Luther goes on to talk in more detail about the input of the City of God into the City of the World. 'The King of Babylon obtained his kingdom by force and robbery; yet God would have it governed by the holy princes Daniel, Hananiah, Azariah, and Mishael. Much more then, does He requires this empire to be governed by the Christian princes of Germany...' *Luther's Works Volume 44: The Christian in Society I*, p.210.

[20] In considering Luther's approach to the world and politics it is helpful to examine his own conduct which, contrary to Wight, makes it plane that he was not interested in 'leaving the dirty work of history to the state'. Demonstrating great engagement, one of his tracts, 'The Ordinance for a Common Chest of the Town of Leisnig', advocated local government welfare provision. *Luther's Works Volume 45, The Christian and Society II*, ed. Walker Brandt, General ed. Helmut T. Lehman, Fortress Press, Philadelphia, 1962, pp. 161-194. Indeed, as Lazareth observes in his introduction to the said volume, Luther wrote on many socio-political issues. 'What is not so well known – or, at least, not so commonly acknowledged – is the impressive social reformation which Luther's theology envisioned and partially brought about in the broad and inclusive expanse of the common life'. Ibid., p. xiv. (Further consideration of his 'thisworldly' concern for poverty and education can be been in Luther Hess Waring, *The Political Theories of Martin Luther*, chapter 8.) Furthermore, Luther also advised new Protestant governments rendering his theology even more pertinent to the advent of the modern state system. 'Throughout his career his advice was constantly sought on political issues, most frequently by his sovereigns, the successive Electors of Saxony to whom he wrote endless memoranda in the course of his later life, but also by other rulers, princes and town councils. Nothing could be further from the truth than the image of Luther as turning his back on the political world out of indifference. He was actively and continually involved in it'. Ibid. It would thus seem possible that Wight, writing at a time when - it is now appreciated – the general approach to Luther had been twisted by Tawney's influential but distorted description of the German reformer, fell upon a somewhat caricatured understanding of Luther and missed his importance to the development of the modern states system. Tawney argued that Luther's destruction of the medieval order resulted in the introduction of a great schism between Nature and Grace, in which the latter was all important. 'Grace no longer completed nature; it was the antithesis of it. Man's actions as a member of society were no longer the extension of his life as a child of God: they were its negation'. R. H. Tawney, *Religion and the Rise of Capitalism*, West Drayton, Penguin, 1937, pp. 106-107. By contrast Cargill Thompson concludes her study of Luther's political thought with the following: 'One of the purposes of this study has been to show that Luther deserves serious consideration as a major political thinker. He was not by any means the impulsive, erratic figure, rumbling away like a volcano, depicted by Tawney; nor was he indifferent to political affairs, as he was portrayed by JW Allen, Cargill Thompson, *The Political Thought of Martin Luther*, p. 170.

[21] Examples of this approach can be seen with particular clarity in: Martin Wight, *Systems of States*, 1977; Hedley Bull and Adam Watson, *The Expansion of International Society*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1984; Michael Cox, Tim Dunne and Ken Booth, *Empires, Systems and States: Great Transformation in International Politics*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2001 and Yiwei Wang, 'The End of International Relations Theories and the Rise of the Chinese School'.

[22] Yosef Lapid, Friedrich Kratochwil, *The Return of Culture and Identity in IR Theory*, Colorado, Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1996.
Although, as Tim Dunne has observed, this assertion is 'subversive of the post-positivist claim that 'culture and identity are making a 'dramatic come back' in the post Cold War era. Civilizations, cultures, values, rules, encounters, meaning and some never went away; at least not for thinkers working within the English School from the early 1950s onwards'. Tim Dunne, 'Colonial Encounters in International Relations: Reading Wight, Writing Australia', *Australian Journal of International Affairs*, 51, 1997, pp. 309-323.

[23] Daniel Deudney's 'Ground Identity: Nature, Place and Space in Nationalism', *The Return of Culture an Identity in IR Theory*, ed. Yosef Lapid and Freidrich Kratochwil, Boulder Colorado, Lynne Rienner Publishers, pp. 129-145.

[24] There are some other more tangential points that make the Wales focus of interest. First, Wales was the first nation to have a chair for international relations, endowed by David Davies, ('and to Davies must go the credit of having set up, with his sisters ...the world's first Chair of International Politics (Or International Relations) and so started a new discipline of study which is now to be found in universities all over the world'. Brian Porter, 'David Davies: a hunter after peace', *Review of International Studies* 1989, p. 27) and yet, to my knowledge, no one has exploited distinctively Welsh thought in IR. To the extent that one can argue that modern IR has its home in Wales, I hope that demonstrating the hitherto untapped resources of Welsh thought makes this contribution particularly interesting. Second, when Welsh academic Roy E. Jones (Prof of Politics at Cardiff) decided to come up with the term English School, he did so having chosen to explicitly reject the idea of a British School because he argued that to use the term British would suggest that it was like the 'truly British liberal tradition of economic and political studies ...to which numbers of outstanding Scotsmen and even one or two prominent Welshmen made significant contributions'. (Roy E. Jones, 'The English School of international relations: A Case for Closure', *Review of International Studies*, 1981, p. 2.) This logic was always rather strange given that Manning was South African and Bull Australian, but the provision of distinctively Welsh

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content further highlights the problems with the term, demonstrating that there are in fact grounds for claiming that it could be seen as British. Given that he did not like the English School one could be forgiven for wondering whether the term English was actually selected as a means of distancing Jones' own nation from what he judged to be an ill-considered development?

[25] In this characteristic Welsh proto-nationalism has a very clear parallel with that of the American nationalism considered by Deudney. US national identity 'was created by a people whose religious orientation tended toward the more puritanical versions of Protestant Christianity'. Daniel Deudney's 'Ground Identity: Nature, Place and Space in Nationalism', p. 135. This point of commonality is interesting bearing in mind, as Deudney observes, most modern nationalisms have been seen as secular developments, replacing previous religious worldviews. Ibid. p.132.

[26] For more information please see Appendix 3.

[27] 'It is a noteworthy fact that nationalist thought in Wales has been founded by men with strong Christian convictions. Michael D. Jones, Emyr ap Iwan, Thomas Gee, Thomas E. Ellis, E. T. John, J. E. Daniel, J. R. Jones, Saunders Lewis, Gwenallt, D. J. Williams, Miall Edward, Gwynfor Evans, Waldo Williams, J. Gwyn Griffiths, Pennar Davies, D. Eiwyn Morgan, to mention no others', R. Tudur Jones, 'Christian Nationalism', *This Land and People* eds. Paul H. Ballard and D. Huw Jones, Collegiate Centre of Theology, University College, Cardiff, 1979. p. 74.

[28] Dorian Llywelyn, *Sacred Place, Chosen People: Land and National Identity in Welsh Spirituality*, Cardiff, University of Wales Press, 1999, p. 47.

[29] For more information please see Appendix 4.

[30] Time and space and their relationship to the divine is discussed again within IR in the context of the 'letting culture back in' debate, by Daniel Deudney, 'Ground Identity: Nature, Place and Space in Nationalism', pp. 131-133.

[31] Llywelyn, *Sacred Place, Chosen People*, p. 5. Religious conceptions of the state tend to be informed by the relevant definition of God. This point is well made by David Nicholls in *Deity and Domination: Images of God and the State in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries*, which considers the implications of differing conceptions of God on conceptions of the state. 'Subtle connections', Nicholls observes, 'are made and conclusions drawn as a result of the analogy – sometimes explicit, frequently implicit – between God and the state. A people's image of God affects political behaviour and assumptions about the nature of authority in one sphere necessarily affects beliefs and actions in the other'. (David Nicholls in *Deity and Domination: Images of God and the State in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries*, London, Routledge, 1994, p. 2.) He continues, 'successive concepts and images of God have been related to political rhetoric and how they have to some degree echoed, or at times heralded, changes in the social structure and dynamics – in the economic, political and cultural life – of given communities'. Ibid., pp. 2-3.

[32] Llywelyn, *Sacred Place, Chosen People*, p. 6. For more reflections on perichoresis see: Colin Gunton, *The One, The Three and The Many*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1992, pp. 163-166. For reflection about the relevance of this Trinitarian text see: Scott M Thomas, 'The Global Resurgence of Religion and the Study of World Politics', *Millennium* 24, 2, 1995, p. 299. This is reflected on later in the chapter.

[33] Llywelyn, *Sacred Place, Chosen People*, p. 6.

[34] Welsh proto-nationalism was primarily informed by Protestant thought and it was in this regard that Welsh nationalism developed some distinctive (although not necessarily unique) and relevant characteristics. This is not to say that Catholic thought did not also play a role, especially in the thought of Saunders Lewis. The Catholic lens, however, is less relevant and given, moreover, that Welsh Catholic territoriality displays common features with that of Catholic territoriality across Europe, it does not lay the foundation for anything like a distinctive claim.

[35] Llywelyn, *Sacred Place, Chosen People*, p. 210. Methodist, Emrys ap Iwan (Robert Ambrose Jones) was one of the most influential 19th century writers whose efforts, along with those of the Rev Michael D. Jones, President of the Congregationalist College at Bala, and others, laid the foundation of Welsh proto-nationalism which soon found expression in Cymru Fydd. It was Iwan who first coined the Welsh word for self-government, 'ymreolaeth', Gwyn A. Williams, *When Was Wales*, p. 210.

[36] Homiliau (ail arg., 1907), 52, trans R. Tudur Jones, R. Tudur Jones, *The Desire of Nations*, Ammanford, Christopher Davies Publishers, 1974, p. 185.

[37] Torri'r Seiliau Sicr: Detholiad o Ysgrifau J. E. Daniel, *Making the Firm Foundations: A Selection of the Writings of J. E. Daniel*, Llandysul, Gomer, 1993, p. 74. Trans Llywelyn, *Sacred Place, Chosen People*, p. 56.

[38] Dorian Llywelyn, *Sacred Place, Chosen People*, p. 60.

[39] Ibid.,p. 62.

[40] Ibid., p. 16.

[41] Ibid., p. 19.

[42] Ibid. Daniel Deudney adopts a similar approach to space and place, 'Ground Identity: Nature, Place and Space in Nationalism', p. 133.

[43] Llywelyn, *Sacred Place, Chosen People,* pp. 46-47.

[44] Ibid. p. 54. A similar example can be seen in the following challenge from another late 19th century nationalist, Rev. Gwilym Hiraethog. 'Nothing would be more pleasing to Satan than to find you, the menservants, asleep ...and looking at Wales, without doubt he would like to see our ancient tongue fall into disuse soon, ...and this is indeed what has happened to a large extent ...There is no Englishman in England, nor any traitor to the language in Wales who would like to see this happen as much as Satan'. Ibid. p. 51.

[45] Waldo Williams, 'Pa Beth Yw Dyn' (What is man?) Dail Pren, Leaves of a Tree) Gwasg Gomer, 1956, p. 67, quoted by Osmond, *Creative Conflict*, Llandysul, Gomer Press (and London, Routledge), 1977, p. 251.

[46] Rejection of the notion that the nation is an absolute is seen with great clarity in the following:
Writing of Waldo Williams, John Rowlands notes: "[H]e comes nowhere near worshipping Wales and the Welsh. For him they are not absolute principles. They embody principles". John Rowlands, 'Waldo Williams', trans Dorian Llywelyn, *Sacred Place, Chosen People*, p. 165.
R. Tudur Jones, meanwhile, also engages directly with the language of the absolute: 'It is no part of the desire of nationalists in Wales to make an absolute of the nation. A nationalism which elevates the nation or the nation-state above all things human is an evil thing. It enables men in the name of the nation to trample upon all that is moral and civilized'. R. Tudur Jones, *The Desire of Nations*, p. 205
'And it is a vision of community which holds out real promise for the future. The accent is on a community, rich in tradition and culture, warm in respect for individual persons, refusing to make an idol of anything created and deferring to the absolute authority of God alone. Ibid., pp. 206-7.

[47] Interestingly John Osmond adopts a similar approach through his characterisation of Welsh nationalism in terms of Aristotelianism, which he contrasts with British nationalism, characterised in terms of Platonism. Whilst the British state, in true Platonic style, involves celebration of the objective and complete 'universal', Welsh identity, Osmond argues, does not see the nation as a type of philosophical universal, the answer to every problem. It is a 'particular' and as such does not provide a complete window on reality or indeed all the answers. (Osmond, *Creative Conflict*, pp. 232-231.) Implicit in recognition of its status as a particular - as *part* of the whole picture rather than *being* the whole picture - is an appreciation of otherness and its need for relationship with other contingent particulars.

[48] D. Densil Morgan, *The Span of the Cross: Christian Religion and Society in Wales 1914-2000*, Cardiff, University of Wales Press, 1999, p. 157 and Peter Beresford Ellis, *The Celtic Revolution: A Study in Anti-Imperialism*, Talybont, Y Lolfa, 1997, p. 85.

[49] *Making the Firm Foundations,* p. 84. Trans Dorian Llywelyn, *Sacred Place, Chosen People*, pp. 57-58.
Welsh theologian, R. Tudur Jones testifies to the internationalist character of Welsh nationalism through developing the term 'polycentric nationalism'. This fosters the notion that 'each nation has something valuable to contribute to the life and culture of the family of nations'. (R. Tudur Jones, 'Christian Nationalism', p. 74.) It is not afraid of the prospect of interdependent relationships with other nations. Writing in a similar vein, meanwhile, Welsh nonconformist Philosopher Prof. R. M. Jones contends that, far from demeaning other nations, the celebration of national identity by a polycentric, Aristotelian, lower case nationalism increases the wellbeing of other nations. 'A healthy nationalism is synonymous with love, a fertile and active love of one's country's culture and civilisation, a love for just relations between the world's nations, and a love for people of all nations without exception'. (RM Jones, 'Gweddnewid Gwladgarwch' in Y Cylchgrawn Efenglaidd Cyf 12, Rhif (tr.) R. M. Jones, 'Language in God's Economy: A Welsh and International Perspective', *Themelios*, Vol 21 No 3, April 1996.

[50] John Polkinghorne, *Science and Providence*, London, SPCK, 1994, pp. 77-78.

[51] Llywelyn, *Sacred Place, Chosen People*, p. 7.

[52] The significance of this distinctive will become apparent as the chapter develops, especially when it later compares Welsh proto-nationalist thought with that of some key German nationalist thinkers.

[53] Prof J. R. Jones, was a philosopher based at Swansea who engaged extensively in theological debate and became very much involved in Welsh nationalism during the 1960s. Densil D. Morgan, *The Span of the Cross*, pp. 226-230.

[54] Llywelyn, *Sacred Place, Chosen People*, P. 67. For more information on rootedness please see Appendix 4.

[55] Osmond, *Creative Conflict*, p.172, p. 247 and p. 250.

[56] J. R. Jones, *Gwaedd yng Nghymru*, Swansea, Cyhoeddiadau Modem Cymreig, n.d., 1. Trans by Dorian Llywelyn, *Sacred Place, Chosen People*, p. 67.

[57] J. R. Jones, *Cristnogaeth a Chenedlaetholdeb*, Christianity and Nationalism, p. 6, cited by Ibid., p. 67.

[58] Dorian Llywelyn, *Sacred Place, Chosen People*, p. 6.

[59] Ibid., p. 71.

[60] Prof R. Tudur Jones (1921-1998) was professor of Church History at the Congregationalists Bala-Bangor seminary.

[61] Dorian Llywelyn, *Sacred Place, Chosen People*, p. 62.

[62] R. Tudur Jones, 'Christian Nationalism', p. 79.

[63] Ibid., p. 76. Given the need to better appreciate the importance of reformation thought it is interesting to note the ontological parallel between Luther and R. Tudur Jones working later within his Protestant legacy. 'For Luther, God's activity as creator did not cease with the creation, it is a continuing process which is still going on. He is not a divine clock maker in the eighteenth century sense, who sets the universe in motion and then leaves it to operate according to its own predetermined laws. Far from it. He is continually active in His creation, upholding and sustaining the universe and replenishing His creation'. Cargill Thompson, *The Political Thought of Martin Luther*, p. 49. In this eschewal of Newtonian mechanism, licensed through the enduring role played by God in creation, one sees the rejection of pure ontological closure.

[64] R. Tudur Jones, 'Christian Nationalism', p. 79.

[65] Ibid. p. 85.

[66] Ibid.

[67] Ibid.

[68] R. Tudur Jones, 'Crist: Gobaith Cenedl' [Christ: The Hope of the Nation] in Dewi Eurig Davies ed. *Gwinllan a Roddwyd*, Llandybie, Christopher Davies, 1972, p. 110, trans, Dorian Llywelyn, *Sacred Place, Chosen People*, p. 63.

[69] R. Tudur Jones, *The Desire of Nations*, p. 205.

[70] Whilst it is not the purpose of this thesis to claim that Welsh proto-nationalism is unique, it is worth noting in passing that a number of other forms of nationalism with Christian identity content, point to very different theologies that develop very different, monistic influences on the aspirant polity. The fact that there are other Christian theologically inspired nationalisms with radically different implications suggests that the Welsh approach is at least distinctive.

The close relationship between Russian nationalism and the Russian Orthodox Church has been subjected to close analysis by Andrew Evans. Contrary to the open, Perichoretic, Chalcedonian character of Welsh proto-nationalism, the Russian Orthodox Church has informed a very closed model of nationalism that struggles with pluralism, internationalism and diversity. (Andrew Evans, 'Forced Miracles: The Russian Orthodox Church and Postsoviet International Relations', *Religion, State and Society*, Vol. 30, No. 1, 2002, pp. 33-43. A similarly closed Christian nationalism is also clearly expressed in Ukraine by the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church: Sophia Senyk, 'The Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church Today: Universal Values versus Nationalist Doctrines', *Religion, State and Society*, Vol. 30, No 4, 2002, pp. 317-332.)

Eighteenth and nineteenth century German Protestant scholars were similarly adept at using their theology to generate very monistic conceptions of the nation and its state. In, *Deity and Domination: Images of God and the State in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries*, David Nicholls argues - in much the same way as Llywelyn - that a thinker's conception of God will impact his conception of the state. (Nicholls, *Deity and Domination: Images of God and the State in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries*, p. 2 and Llywelyn, *Sacred Place, Chosen People*, p. 5.) His reflections on Fitche and Schleiermacher in this regard eloquently demonstrate the negation of the Chalcedonian hermeneutic with significant implication for their consequential conception of the state:

Fitchte presents a closed view of God, suggesting that God is monistic, autarkic and changeless. God is the Absolute 'reposing within and upon itself, without change or alteration, firm and complete of itself ...without any foreign influence; for every thing foreign must vanish when we speak of the Absolute'. For Fichte the idea of God always involves self-sufficiency. The idea of independence – Selbstandigkeit – which played such a vital role in Fichte's ethical theory as the necessary condition for free and moral action, becomes the goal of the state, though it is perfectly realised only in God'. (Ibid., p. 170.) Fitche's view of God translates, Nicholls observes, directly into his view of the state. 'In the political sphere Fichte's ideal of a 'closed commercial state', set forth in 1800 in his tract of that title, and his subsequent espousal of German unity and the nationalist cause embody the autarkic principle, while his religious writings increasingly portray God as an absolute, unchanging and impassible being'. (Ibid., P. 162.) Fitche's romantic nationalism, approached through what is effectively a

Unitarian theological lens, thus has quite different consequences to that approached through the self-consciously Perichoretic, Trinitarian, Chalcedonian theological lens of the traditional Welsh genre considered above.

The German nationalist scholar, Schleiermacher, meanwhile, Nicholls observes, similarly posited a monistic, unchangeable, conception of God. God, Schleiermacher argued, is timeless and thus unable to engage in the world since this would suggest his dependence. 'Implicit in the eternity or timelessness of God is the notion of his unchangeability. "No religious emotion shall be so interpreted, and no statement about God so understood, as to make it necessary to assume an alteration on God of any kind'. Furthermore, God must be conceived as independent – not depending upon anything beyond himself'. (Ibid., p. 176.)

At the heart of this independent and closed vision of God was of course a rejection once again of the Trinity with the possibility for interaction and change. 'While discussing Trinitarian doctrine, Schleiermacher assumed that dependence involves imperfection and implies subordination. Thus he rejected any real distinctions in the godhead, maintaining that such distinctions would imply that "the Father is superior to the other two Persons', owing to the dependence of the Son on the Father and the "twofold" dependence of the Spirit'. Once again, Nicholls argued, this helped to inform a very closed and monistic model of nationalism. 'Every nation, my friends which has developed to a certain height is degraded by receiving into it a foreign element, even though that may be good in itself; for God has imparted to each its own nature, and has therefore marked out bounds and limits for the habitations of the different races of men on the face of the earth'. (Ibid., p. 174)

CHAPTER 10

CONCLUSION:

SOVEREIGNTY AND SYSTEMIC CHANGE:

AN ENGLISH SCHOOL PERSPECTIVE

It is widely claimed that sovereignty has been made radically less significant and even redundant as a consequence of recent systemic changes especially globalization.[1] This thesis has responded in two ways. First, it has sought to demonstrate that sovereignty endures, despite systemic changes, and second, it has provided a means of conceptualizing sovereignty in the context of these changes by critically engaging with the English School three traditions spectrum. In so-doing it has argued that, appropriately applied, the three traditions spectrum has a greater contribution to make today than at the time of its initial development. It is the purpose of this concluding chapter to draw together the different components of the argument of this thesis, provide an overview of its main findings and to reflect on how this research may be taken forward in the future.

STRUCTURE

The chapter begins by defining the English School methodological framework of this thesis before moving to engage with the two central problems which this research has addressed. First, Part 1 engages with the question, 'does sovereignty endure in the context of systemic change?', and in so-doing necessarily provides a detailed

definition of sovereignty, before Part 2 then moves on to the rather more challenging terrain of defining a framework for coming to terms with sovereignty in the context of systemic change. The chapter concludes with a summary overview of the main findings of this thesis and reflections about the direction of future research.

THE METHODOLOGICAL FRAMEWORK

In order to come to terms with the challenge of examining the conceptual utility of sovereignty in the context of systemic change this thesis has pursued its analysis through a spectrum. This has a number of benefits.

First, and most obviously, a spectrum provides one with the possibility of being able to engage with change across a range of positions embracing state sovereignty both before and during regional integration/globalization. This approach has the benefit of not just providing an account of where sovereignty is now but of where it has been, of where it could go, and of how journeying across the spectrum impacts upon its integrity.

Second, the spectrum is also important because the fact that different states have different strengths and resources and respond differently to changes like regional integration and globalization means that these changes affect different states in different ways. Any conceptual frame, therefore, that rises effectively to globalization's challenge must be able to accommodate the fact that at any one time the 192 polities of the world will be differently affected by it and thus best serviced by a flexible model of sovereignty. A spectrum approach rises to this challenge by

facilitating a conceptualization of sovereignty which can vary ontologically, within certain parameters, from one place on the spectrum to another.

The third and final rationale for selecting a spectrum approach relates narrowly to the challenge of the ontological diversity generated by globalization. Globalization is defined as a 'time-space compression', the term developed to describe the manner in which growing interdependence has altered human experiences of the basic dimensions that are constitutive of reality, namely time and space. Specifically, globalization touches these basic dimensions, giving rise to an ontological revolution in which it is said that the closure (fixedness) of given space is transcended (as the thesis will demonstrate) by the openness (potentiality) of time.[2] This generates a new ontology *alongside, rather than in place of,* the previous ontology. Thus, there is a need to keep in view both the new and the old ontologies at the same time. Once again, therefore, one is confronted with the challenge of needing to cater for a breadth of conceptual space that can only be serviced by a spectrum.

THE ENGLISH SCHOOL

In rising to the challenge of providing an appropriate framework within which to conceptualize the fortunes of sovereignty in the context of systemic change, this thesis has adopted the ontologically plural English School 'three traditions' spectrum which can cater for change in the form of movement between the said traditions.[3] Replete with this capability, it is the contention of this thesis that the English School approach is actually more relevant today, where it has to deal with the new ontological pluralism of coexisting territoriality and extra-territoriality, than it was at the time of its development in the 1950s. Thus far, however, this latent potentiality has been

somewhat overlooked, a failing that this thesis makes good by developing understanding of the three traditions spectrum in terms of its definition and application.

- DEVELOPING THE DEFINITION OF THE THREE TRADITIONS

Noting Brian Porter's challenge regarding the need for ongoing refinement of the three traditions,[4] this thesis has sought to develop the three traditions spectrum both by equipping it to deal with different forms of change and also by unlocking its potential through the perspective of specific subject areas.

1. DIFFERENT FORMS OF CHANGE – DIFFERENT SPECTRUMS

This research has engaged with two different kinds of change: globalization, resulting in the erosion of sovereignty and European integration, resulting in the territorial extension of sovereignty. Given that the most demanding and widespread systemic change in view is globalization, and that European integration can actually be interpreted as part of this wider process, this thesis has defined its basic approach to the three traditions in terms of the need to engage with this challenge, selecting the ontologically and epistemologically plural approach defined by Linklater and Little (Figure 1). In an attempt to provide a better framework for coming to terms with regional integration understood as 'change by extension', however, this thesis has also provided a complementary alternative perspective based on the conventional Wightian model (which is applied in chapter 4 - and is also relevant to chapter 7 - *alongside and not instead of* the basic Linklater – Little perspective. Again see Figure 1). Although it is possible to locate the place of European integration, leading to 'change by extension', on the Linklater – Little spectrum, it is not possible to unpack

the process of that change between traditions because it does not involve any epistemological transformation. The Wightian model, however, can rise to this challenge. The chapter will now consider each spectrum in turn.

i) THE LINKLATER – LITTLE MODEL

The thesis has developed the Linklater – Little model in two ways. First, it has been more explicit about the capability of the three traditions to define a full epistemological spectrum which extends from a tight positivist pole through to a radical postmodern, post-positivist pole. In so-doing it has drawn on Manners' critique of Linklater and Little, maintaining their association between revolutionism and critical theory, whilst also inserting a more radical postmodern expression of post-positivism at the far side of the tradition. Second, in an effort to stress the fact that the three traditions constitute a spectrum from ontological closure and positivism, on the one hand, through to a radical ontological openness and post-positivism, on the other, rather than three separate ontologically homogenous blocks, this research has employed sub-divisions within the three traditions. The resulting spectrum (moving from realism to revolutionism) begins with the 'sovereign state pole' at the extremity of the realist tradition, which is definitive of complete ontological closure, whilst the broader realist tradition is defined by a dominant ontological closure, albeit embracing a gradually increasing measure of ontological openness as one moves towards rationalism. This tradition is generally associated with positivism, extending from strong positivism at the 'sovereign state pole', through to a weaker positivism in wider realism. On entering the rationalist tradition one encounters the place where the spatial and temporal orientations find a balance, although exhibiting a bias towards closure at the realist end of the rationalist tradition and a bias towards openness at the

revolutionist end of the rationalist tradition. This tradition is generally associated with mild post-positivism in the interpretivist/hermeneutic mould. Finally, on moving into the revolutionist tradition, one is faced first with a dominant ontological openness in whose presence the remaining spatial orientation declines until arrival at the place of complete ontological openness at its extremity, which this thesis defines as the post-sovereignty pole. This tradition is related to strong post-positivism, extending from critical theory, associated with the wider realist tradition, through to radical postmodernism, associated with the post-sovereignty pole.

ii) THE WIGHTIAN MODEL

This thesis has developed the conventional Wightian approach in two ways. First, it has applied the spectrum to European integration (which Wight considered uninteresting) associating it with the confederal spectrum. Second, it has developed the spectrum by integrating it with the new Linklater – Little spectrum, and gives this diagrammatic expression through Figure 1.

2. DEVELOPING SUBJECT PERSPECTIVES ON THE TRADITIONS

In examining the English School 'three traditions' spectrum and highlighting its relevance for engaging with systemic change, this thesis has also sought to develop understanding of its relevance by engaging with two important subject perspectives.

In the first instance, it has worked on the application of the spectrum to economic phenomena especially in chapters 4 to 7. This is important because, as many observers have noted, the English School's preference for history, law, philosophy and theology has meant that it has only made passing references to what is arguably

the central element of the systemic changes in view, economics. As Richard Little observes: 'Despite acknowledging the importance of economics, there has been a reluctance by the English School to embrace this sector wholeheartedly'.[5] Tony Evans and Peter Wilson, meanwhile, maintain: 'The principal weakness of the English school is its relative disregard of economic and technological factors and the various types of international cooperation that these factors either induce or necessitate. If the characteristic feature of the Grotian conception of international society is continual international intercourse such as trade, as Wight held, then it is quite an omission for the English school to largely ignore the growth of trade and other economic relations in their account of the evolution in of international society'.[6] More importantly in his call for the reconvening of the English School, Barry Buzan identified economic/globalization challenges as an important gap, requiring future research.[7] In addressing economic globalization from the English School perspective, this thesis has demonstrated the increasing importance of the three traditions spectrum, especially revolutionism.[8]

In the second instance, this thesis has sought to develop three traditions understanding of 'open sovereignty' in the context of systemic change by drawing on the perspective of religion/theology (chapters 8 and 9). For many years the English School was unique in sustaining an interest in theology and religion, as the greater part of the modern IR discipline ignored this area. Recently, however, there has been a renewed interest in the role of religion and religious ideas in international relations.[9] This development, in the context of the revival of interest in the English School, and the location of the so-called *La Revanche de Dieu* within globalization,[10] render this an important area within which to develop the 'three traditions' schema - and especially,

as chapter 9 argues, the rationalist tradition - demonstrating that it has an important contribution to make when it comes to understanding sovereignty in the context of contemporary systemic change.

In considering the challenge of change through the three traditions, developing their perspective through working on economics and theology, this thesis has highlighted the need for the renewal of English School methodology. Specifically, it has argued that there is a need to underline the interdependent nature of the relationship between internal and external sovereignty if the School is to remain faithful to its aspiration for historical sensitivity. This chapter will make reference to the need to respect the interdependent nature of the internal and external dimensions in defining enduring sovereignty in Part 1 and for the purpose of engaging with sovereignty and change in Part 2.

PART 1: ENDURING SOVEREIGNTY DEFINED

Having considered the English School methodological framework selected by this thesis and its development, it is now important to examine the definition and endurance of sovereignty in general terms that this thesis has developed. Specifically, as noted above, this thesis has argued that sovereignty must be viewed from two *inter-dependent perspectives*, one negative, focusing on its external character, and the other positive, focusing on its internal character. (The failure of the English school to fully engage with the implications of the interdependent nature of the internal and external dimensions of sovereignty will be taken up in detail by Part 3). This has revealed the ongoing significance of sovereignty, rebutting the contentions of those who speak of its demise or relegation to practical insignificance.[11]

I. NEGATIVE/EXTERNAL SOVEREIGNTY:

From the external perspective the English School (and indeed other theoretical approaches) defines sovereignty as constitutional independence.[12] According to this approach a non-sovereign political unit (e.g. a colony or a sub-state nation) is constitutionally joined in a subservient relationship to a sovereign state. The polity generally has no freedom in the realm of foreign and defense policy, although it may have some autonomy in domestic policy. When the ties to the superior political form are broken, however, the state becomes constitutionally independent and gains sovereignty.[13] On this basis the rich and powerful United States is no more constitutionally independent than is relatively impoverished and weak Sri Lanka. The fact that US GDP gives it greater global leverage and a greater capacity for maintaining decisional autonomy than Sri Lanka has no negative impact on Sri Lankan sovereignty whatsoever.[14] Viewed from this negative perspective it is clear that sovereignty is ongoing. Indeed, in the context of the last fifty years with the demise of empire, sovereignty has triumphed with the number of constitutionally independent states rising from 75 (1945) to 190 (1999) and 192 (2002). On this basis talk about the end of sovereignty is patently inappropriate.[15]

II. POSITIVE/INTERNAL SOVEREIGNTY:

This thesis has argued, however, that whilst any effective definition of sovereignty must embrace constitutional independence, one runs into difficulties if one does not have a proper regard for its positive components. The relationship between internal and external sovereignty is recognized by the English School but in practice the thesis

has shown that there is a tendency to focus on external sovereignty apart from internal sovereignty.[16]

i. POSITIVE SOVEREIGNTY AND PRESENCE

In the first instance, sovereignty is not just about an absence, the absence of constitutional ties, but also a presence. If one makes constitutional independence the central definition of sovereignty, then one implicitly injects a closed Newtonian assumption that the granting of constitutional independence will release a 'given' unit to uphold sovereignty.[17] The difficulty with this approach is that if a colony merely cohered under the influence of imperial power, then when made constitutionally independent it could break down into anarchy. In this sense there may not actually be anything in which to invest sovereignty. Conversely, if the colony becomes a stable sovereign state, then this is because the positive elements of sovereignty are present. There are two basic forms of positive sovereignty whose definition and endurance the chapter will now examine: a) the social contracted territorial people and b) the quasi-state ruled by force.

- THE SOCIAL CONTRACTED TERRITORIAL PEOPLE

Typically, the positive presence of sovereignty is given expression through the social contracted territorial people. The social contract is a conceptual device – of dubious historical validity – developed to describe the formation of civil society. Whilst it might have been satisfying from the perspective of rights to be a self-determining sovereign individual, the implication of everyone brandishing such rights and refusing to submit to any authority, other than their own, was anarchy. Given that a measure of order was required for people to peaceably pursue their objectives, government was

necessary and thus the self-determining, natural rights bearing, sovereign individuals surrendered their unlimited state of nature prerogatives to facilitate the formation of a polity sustaining the rule of law. Upheld in the name of the people, the resulting sovereignty provided the underpinning foundation for a framework of law, replacing the erstwhile state of nature with civil society.[18] More recently, in the context of democratization, moreover, there has been an appreciation of the need for the contracting parties to have an enduring institutionalised influence over their collective sovereignty via the ballot box which has provided the means whereby they can continue to inform that sovereignty as individuals within their 'people' and has in-so-doing contributed to the development of the notion of the 'sovereignty of *the people*'. Thus, whilst one can be clear that without constitutional independence polities cannot be sovereign, it is equally true that without a positive presence, securing coherence - which will often be manifest through the social contracted territorial people - they will also lack effective sovereignty. Critically, therefore, it is not appropriate to state that, as a concept in international relations, sovereignty can be defined simply by constitutional independence.

The continued existence of sovereignty as 'social contracted territorial people' has been demonstrated through the ongoing significance of its 'peopled' status - especially highlighted in the context of democracy and references to the 'sovereignty of the people' - which has been examined through the lens of legitimacy. Specifically, part of the reason why submitting to the laws of one's own nation is judged to be acceptable, whilst submitting to the laws of another is not, is that the law in question is felt in some meaningful senses to be the law of one's own people. It is sustained in the name of the social contracted people, the sovereignty of which one is a part. On

this basis one can see the endurance of sovereignty as the social contracted territorial people as a function of its enduring legitimacy function.

Referring specifically to the EU, J. H. H. Weiler points out the endurance of nation-state sovereignty as a social contracted territorial people, by considering the implication of its replacement. A Union between Denmark and Germany, he observes, would be unacceptable to a Dane even if he were promised a vote and representation in the Bundestag because democracy is not just about having a vote. 'Their screams of grief will be shrill not simply because they will be condemned, as Danes, to permanent minorityship (that may be true for the German Greens too), but because the way nationality, in this way of thinking enmeshes with democracy is that even majority rule is only legitimate within a Demos, when Danes rule Danes'.[19] Alan James, meanwhile, also picks up on the endurance of sovereignty via its continuing legitimacy function. 'The reason for this attachment to the idea of sovereignty is not hard to find. It seems that when people have come to feel affinities of the kind which are summed up in the word "national", they also feel that the only proper form of government for them is one which is in the hands of their fellow nationals'.[20] Referring back to Weiler's example, therefore, the point that must be made is that there is a social contracted territorial people in Germany and a social contracted territorial people in Denmark but there is no such thing held in common between Germany and Denmark.

- QUASI-STATE AND ENFORCED ORDER

In considering positive sovereignty, the thesis has also engaged with quasi-states. Quasi-states are constitutionally independent and thus negatively sovereign but they

lack the full positive content of 'social contracted territorial sovereignty' and thus depend, either on enforced coherence (through the machinery of the state i.e. police or military), or they don't really exist as coherent polities even though they still enjoy external sovereignty.[21] Examples of such polities include Somalia, Chad and Angola.[22] In maintaining external sovereignty even these polities testify to the ongoing reality of sovereignty, although they eloquently demonstrate the problems associated with the general use of the English School's narrowly negative definition of sovereignty.

ii. POSITIVE SOVEREIGNTY AND THE CAPACITY TO INITIATE

Beyond investigating the endurance of sovereignty positively in terms of coherence, this thesis has also considered it in terms of a capacity to initiate. The whole point about sovereign states is that they are not just about sustaining a passive legal framework but also involve an actor that acts. In the case of one of the positive presences for instance, the social contracted territorial people, it is said: from a social contract 'emerges a sovereign understood as a conscious agent located at the centre of the body politic'. This sovereignty, moreover, is 'endowed with a distinctive, identifiable will and a capacity for rational decision-making'.[23] As R. Tudur Jones put it, 'without a sovereign state of its own, a nation is bereft of the only body that can officially and formally act and speak in the name of the whole nation'.[24] Thus, once again, whilst one can be clear that there can be no sovereignty without constitutional independence neither can there be sovereignty without the positive capacity to take action and thus express power.

The endurance of sovereignty from the positive perspective has been demonstrated in the ongoing capacity to initiate sustained via extensive state machines intervening domestically and internationally.[25] Furthermore, examination of the state's economic role - often said to be the main casualty of globalization - has revealed enduring room for manoeuvre in relation to which its judgement remains important in spending,[26] taxation,[27] borrowing,[28] interest and exchange rate policies.[29] This is not to say that the state's freedom has not been significantly constrained, especially in some areas such as monetary policy following the demise of capital controls, but the sovereign state continues to be able to make meaningful political decisions. Indeed in some senses globalization and heightened borrowing opportunities provide greater room for initiation.[30]

In confronting the fact that states initiate both domestically *and internationally* this thesis has provided a further demonstration of the importance of respecting the interdependence of internal and external sovereignty. Specifically, to the extent that the capacity to initiate usually depends on the agency of the social contracted territorial people, it can be tempting to connect it with internal sovereignty. In reality, however, external sovereignty does not just amount to constitutional independence. It also involves agency that presides over foreign and defence policy decisions. The capacity to make decisions and initiate, therefore, does not relate purely to internal policy competencies. The agent of the social contracted territorial people (or quasi-state) acts both domestically and internationally.

CONCLUSION

In terms of the definition of sovereignty, whilst it certainly does depend on constitutional independence there needs to be something coherent that can be made independent. Independence does not give rise to a naturally cohering timeless given in nature. Coherence is secured either by a) an effective social contracted territorial people, or b) the power of quasi-states to enforce civic order. (In the absence of either of these positive presences a form of anarchy will prevail, although this does not necessarily infer the complete negation of sovereignty in the sense that it can endure negatively e.g. Somalia). Furthermore, as well as requiring something coherent that can be made sovereign as a result of constitutional independence, state sovereignty also requires a form of agency to take action domestically and internationally. Although this thesis would contend, therefore, that sovereignty is defined by constitutional independence and not in terms of absolute power,[31] it does not adopt a purist legal position, asserting that sovereignty is not a matter of power. In this sense, whilst this thesis is very committed to the centrality of 'constitutional independence' to the definition of sovereignty, it contends that independence only provides part of the definition of sovereignty. In light of these points this thesis is critical of those, such as James, Sørensen and Waltz, who contend that the internationally relevant sense of sovereignty can simply be defined negatively.[32]

In terms of endurance, meanwhile, examination of sovereignty from both its interdependent negative and positive dimensions reveals that it is ongoing, although it (and in some senses its negative content) has certainly been subject to erosion. The thesis is consequently critical of those positing the end of the nation-state/the end of sovereignty thesis/practical insignificance of the sovereign nation-state without sufficient qualification e.g. Walker, Camilleri, Falk, Jim Falk, Hardt, Negri, Guehenno, Ohmae, Wriston, Horsman, Marshall, and Bauman.[33]

PART 2: SOVEREIGNTY & CHANGE

Having defined sovereignty and its the endurance in Part 1, it is now important to consider the conceptual challenge presented by an enduring but *changing sovereignty* in detail. As noted above, the conceptual apparatus of the English School is particularly interesting for anyone considering the place of sovereignty and systemic change in the sense that the three traditions spectrum provides the conceptual space within which to accommodate both sovereignty (most obviously in the realist and rationalist traditions but also to some degree in early revolutionism) and its transformation. Whilst these features make the three traditions extremely relevant, however, it has been the contention of this research that their capability to rise to this challenge has been undermined by the way in which the division between internal and external sovereignty, and subsequent focus on the latter, has been asserted by the English School. This division has the effect of invoking ontological closure which can be considered from a number of perspectives.

1. SOVEREIGNTY BY INFERENCE

First, the point must be made that the division between internal and external sovereignty, followed by the adoption of external sovereignty narrowly conceived, results (as noted earlier) in the definition of sovereignty as constitutional independence, suggesting that what is liberated constitutes a naturally cohering unit that can then be made sovereign. As Ian Clark observes, there is in this failure to address in any way the nature of that unit, an essential Newtonian assumption that it is a natural self-sustaining, self-cohering, closed, unchanging actor that will endure.[34]

Far from constituting an appropriate historically rooted approach, this definition is profoundly ahistorical.

2. OBSCURING INSIDE-OUT CHANGE

Second, the division between internal and external sovereignty effectively separates external from internal sovereignty and in so-doing cuts it off from what – certainly in the current environment of economic transformation – is an important low politics/economics process arena of change. Furthermore, to the extent that external sovereignty depends foundationally on the social contracted territorial people of internal sovereignty which is treated as effectively closed because of the above division between internal and external sovereignty, this arguably does not just impart external sovereignty with ontological closure in the sense that a source of openness is denied. As a basis upon which external sovereignty rests, it also has the capacity to inform the character of that external sovereignty with closure.

3. ABSOLUTE CONSTITUTIONAL INDEPENDENCE

Finally, the fact that the abstracted external sovereignty - resulting from the division between internal and external sovereignty - is defined in terms of an absolute constitutional independence makes it wholly incapable of engaging with gradual change that might result in the slow development or erosion of constitutional independence. Alan James defines the absoluteness of sovereignty in the following terms: 'constitutional independence is either possessed or not. The relevant entity is sovereign (and therefore 100% sovereign) or lacks sovereignty – lacks it totally'.[35] Georg Sørensen, meanwhile, echoes the constitutionally absolute status of sovereignty by drawing an analogy with other legal categories marriage and citizenship. A person

is either married or not, there is no legal status of 75% married. A person is either a citizen or not, there is no legal status of 75% a citizen. '[A] state either does have sovereignty in the sense of constitutional independence or it does not have it. There is no half way house, no legal in between'.[36]

Thus the ironic consequence of subscribing to the negative definition of sovereignty is the fact that one ends up with an ontologically absolute account of sovereignty that is more appropriate for ontologically closed neorealism than historically rooted approaches such as the English School.[37] The ontological implications of this tendency seriously undermine the School's capacity to deal with the sovereign state and systemic change and thus the sovereign state in the context of European integration and globalization.

One can see a good example of the problems of engaging with change that result from the closed conception of sovereignty in Alan James' account of European integration. In James' view there is only room for sovereign nation-states or sovereign supranational states. There is no conceptual space for the 'in between'. James claims that the EU is nowhere near becoming a sovereign state but the only other model he appears to have is one that addresses international bodies from an essentially intergovernmental perspective. Prior to sovereign federal statehood; organizations 'do not have independent lives of their own; they do not have independent sources of finance; they do not have independent armed forces. All they have comes from or is loaned to them by states. Consequentially, organizations are unable to devour, as it were, their creators, and therefore present no threat at all to states' constitutional independence'. Thus it would seem that even when one deals with integration projects

between states with growing supranational components, these are deemed to be a function of the nation-state sovereignty, as in any conventional intergovernmental arrangement, until some day presumably their extent is such that they become a single new sovereign state.[38] Thus, as suggested above, when one subscribes to an absolute conception of sovereignty (i.e. when an actor is either 100% sovereign or not sovereign at all), it is not really possible to contemplate a gradual transfer of sovereignty bit by bit.[39] It is, therefore, hardly surprising that one should be forced into accepting a framework that basically infers that one must move at a specific moment in time from a place where the member states are wholly sovereign (and the EU is not) to a place where the EU is wholly sovereign (and the members states are not).[40] This absolute approach to sovereignty may have worked when considering the advent of new sovereign states, released at specific moments from imperial rule, but it is not applicable to European integration, nor does it help when considering any other conceivable process of the gradual transfer of sovereignty over time.[41]

In the context of contemporary systemic changes emanating from the world of low politics/economic processes, the decision to deal with sovereignty as 'external sovereignty' abstracted from internal sovereignty has been a major problem for the English School. There is a clear need for it to embrace a holistic 'negative and positive' model of sovereignty that can be subjected to changes emanating from the inside-out as well as the outside-in. This must provide a capacity to deal with the positive presences of the social contracted territorial people or quasi-state governments which must be seen as capable of initiation if they are to properly inform any definition of sovereignty.[42]

ENGAGING WITH TWO CHANGES

Having recognized the importance of developing a holistic account of sovereignty that can engage with change, this chapter will now consider the two forms of sovereignty transformation with which this thesis has engaged, 'change by extension' and 'change by erosion' through the approach to the three traditions spectrum defined in Part 1.

1) REGIONAL INTEGRATION & 'CHANGE BY EXTENSION'

As noted above, one subject that requires English School engagement with change is European integration where the transformation in question is classified as 'change by extension'. This concluding chapter will first define the relevant application of the three traditions and then consider the actual process of 'change by extension'.

This thesis has engaged with European integration through both the models of the three traditions defined by Figure 1. From the perspective of the epistemological account of the spectrum (the horizontal axis, Figure 1) which is adopted as the basic approach of this research, 'change by extension' is examined in terms of the non-sovereign state pole part of realism and rationalism. As noted in Part 1, however, given that this account of the spectrum can only locate epistemologically constant transformations rather than unpack them, this thesis has deployed the complementary Wightian perspective (in tandem with the confederal spectrum) in order to tease out the transformation from nation to supranation, from realism to revolutionism (the vertical axis, Figure 1).

According to the functionalist perspective, it was the liberation of factors of production from sub-units of what would become a national economy that resulted in

the creation of the modern nation and the sovereign nation-state. Extrapolating forward within this framework, this research has considered the possibility that the current explosion of factors of production out of the national economy testifies to the need for a larger supranational territorial market and thus polity. On this basis it would seem that European integration, for instance, is about the development of the sovereign nation-state writ large and thus the extension rather than the negation of sovereignty.

This thesis demonstrates, however, that although a supranational jurisdiction is emerging on a functional basis, it is not giving rise to a supranational social contracted territorial people nor the demise of the member state social contracted territorial peoples. Presenting a form of 'interest' rather than 'identity based' jurisdiction, the emerging supranational base constitutes what might be described as a truncated sovereignty that exists, for legitimacy purposes, very much in subjection to the several social contracted territorial national sovereignties of the member states.[43]

In light of this, the confederal framework developed for studying the emergence of supranational jurisdiction in chapter 4 (and applicable to both wider realism and the whole of rationalism) is very relevant so long as one appreciates that, on the basis of current experience, the EU shows no signs of having the capacity to go over Forsyth's brink and generate a United States of Europe, replete with a European demos. The sovereign member states thus continue to remain very important, coexisting with the growing supranational jurisdiction. By facilitating recognition of the development of a supranational jurisdiction that does not result in the demise of the member states, the approach developed by this thesis provides an important service. On the one hand it

avoids the difficulties of theories based on abstracted Newtonian models of sovereignty (be they based on a narrow English School concern for constitutional independence or the Newtonianism of positivist IR, whether neorealist or neoliberal). These permanently view the EU as a conventional intergovernmental project, failing to see the gradual emergence of something new.[44] On the other hand it avoids some of the pitfalls of strongly post-positivist critiques which, in their eagerness to detect radical breaks from the past, tend to lose sight of the continuity of the sovereign state either in spite of the change or as part of it.[45]

2) GLOBALIZATION & 'CHANGE BY EROSION'

Having recognized the importance of seeing 'change by extension' in the context of European integration, it is now important to consider 'change by erosion' in the context of wider globalization. This thesis has associated this challenge primarily with the revolutionist tradition, as disclosed in the Linklater-Little spectrum (see the horizontal axis of Figure 1), considering it from the perspective of both economic and political developments. This chapter will now explore each in turn:

a. ECONOMIC CHANGE AND THE DIMINISHMENT OF SOVEREIGNTY

Whilst globalization involves the quantitative extension of factors of production which can be interpreted as the next stage of the functionalist account of the nation-state heading towards a supranational destination, it is arguably very much more about a qualitative transformation.[46] Defined as a revolution in the nature of space and time, globalization has given rise to a new ontologically autonomous, extra-territorial domain wherein power flows operate that constrain the liberty of the state which are

crucially located beyond its direct onto(logical)-constitutional reach which is by definition territorial.[47]

To the extent that extra-territoriality is driven by power flows that contradict the will of the sovereign state, one might be tempted to say that it can't change sovereignty because sovereignty has never been about power in the sense of guaranteeing states the capacity to do exactly what they want. In adopting this position, however, one would be turning one's back on the conceptual distinction between territorial and extra-territorial restraint, the rapid expansion of the latter through globalization and its considerable implications for territorial sovereignty. In a world where power bases have been established which are not directly accountable to the sovereign state, there is a very real sense in which such powers stand in competition with those of the state, eroding it in a way that was not and is not true of territorial power.[48] Crucially this means that Laughland's comments, for example, regarding the irrelevance of the French experience, at the hands of financiers in the early eighties, to fears about the integrity of French sovereignty are misconceived.[49] They are based upon ontological premises which the hyperspatial has swept away. Thus there is a need to account for changes that affect sovereignty by taking jurisdictions beyond sovereignty's direct onto(logical)-constitutional reach and consequentially result in its curtailment.[50]

The ontological impact of globalization's spatio-temporal revolution on sovereignty can be seen with particular clarity when one examines the attempts of some scholars to relocate sovereignty to the extra-territorial realm. Reflecting on the rising significance of hyperspatial, extra-territorial flows, Sassen contends that 'rather than sovereignty eroding as a consequence of globalization and supranational

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organizations, it is being transformed. There is plenty of it around, but the sites for its concentration have changed over the last two decades – and economic globalization has certainly been a key factor in all this'.[51] Whilst this research does not support this approach because the centrality of territory to sovereignty effectively makes any extra-territorial category definitionally post-sovereign, this reference demonstrates very clearly the movement of power into the extra-territorial realm, and thus beyond the direct onto(logical)-constitutional/jurisdictional reach of territorial sovereignty.

b. POLITICAL CHANGE AND THE DIMINISHMENT OF SOVEREIGNTY

The thesis has considered two bases for the erosion of sovereignty through political developments relating both to a) the increasing numbers of interventions in the affairs of sovereign states and also b) networked interpretations of the reactions of polities to the governance challenges of globalization. This chapter will now review both in turn.

I. INTERVENTION

Consideration of the curtailment of sovereignty through intervention reveals the increasing willingness of states, to intervene in the domestic affairs of other states in the absence of the old Cold War restrictions. Not only is this giving rise to a greater number of interventions but also interventions on a wider basis that can be interpreted as taking steps towards the authentication of a global humanitarian ethic in violation of the division of the planet between separate sovereign states.[52]

II. NETWORKED GOVERNANCE

Examination of the state's response to extra-territorial power flows through the development of networked governance also demonstrates the diminishment of

sovereignty. Specifically, rather than checking the erosion of sovereignty, it is said that there is a sense in which, by embracing the networked organizational form, states themselves actually develop an extra-territorial political domain to govern extra-territorial life which itself contributes to the erosion of sovereignty. To properly understand this development one must examine the networked form that is definitive of governance, first in general terms of its impact on participating actors and conceptions space and then narrowly in terms of government.

Actors embracing the 'networked form' find that ontological closure is exchanged for an ontological openness that increasingly refashions them as hubs for flows of information, ideas and money. Indeed, in order to really come to terms with the network, it is necessary to focus on the relationships between actors rather than on the actors themselves. As Mulgan reflected, '[i]t may still look as if it [the world today] is made up of separate and sovereign individuals, firms, nations or cities, but the deeper reality is one of multiple connections, many of them inexplicable, many invisible'.[53]

In seeking to come to terms with the impact of states embracing the network the central challenge is the need to factor the flows associated with the network - bringing the demise of the subject-object, public-private, foreign-domestic dualities/dichotomies, and its consequential hyperspatial co-ordinates - into government. 'The logic of networks will completely upset ...[the essential modern perspective]... the frontier is no longer a beginning, but an ending, always precarious, by nature fluid - for fluidity becomes the condition of competition and of dynamism in the age of networks. No juridical space is ever definitely fixed'.[54] On the one hand,

as demonstrated below, the network erodes old sovereign spaces; on the other hand, it creates new spaces.

In terms of eroding old spaces, networked governance, operating in deference to functional rather than social contracted, territorial logic, has tended to exchange the all-purpose, fixed boundaries that enclosed 'life' during the modern era for a new multi-dimensional political form. Specifically, in the multi-dimensional form the endness that accompanied the modern state, with its social contracted, territorial foundation, upholding a potentially universal legal jurisdiction within its territorial boundaries, is replaced by a functional logic which runs through the nation-state, breaking up its sovereignty 'into several functional structures'.[55] The net result is a form of decentred governance consisting of different strands of what used to be called sovereignty devoted to different areas of policy.

In developing new spaces, networked governance is becoming part of extra-territoriality such that there is a real sense in which a space between nations is emerging. This has increasingly less to do with providing a basis for relationship between states - of being a means to an end - and has instead become a space in its own right. 'Consider the global system of transnationalized microeconomic links... [These] have 'created a nonterrritorial "region" in the world economy - a decentred yet integrated space of flows, operating in real time, which exists alongside the spaces-of-places that we call national economies'.[56]

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CATERING FOR CHANGE BY EROSION

In light of the above examples of 'change by erosion', it has been important for this thesis to consider how to introduce the requisite conceptual adjustment. In rising to this challenge it has used the epistemological lens provided by strongly post-positivist critiques of sovereignty, focusing particularly on the approach identified by John Gerard Ruggie, 'the unbundling of territoriality'. The need to unbundle sovereignty is born of the fact that sovereignty is 'bundled', i.e. ontologically closed, such that the sovereign state is not sensitive to relationships between itself and other actors - be they other sovereign states or non-state actors - and any resulting changes. The sovereign state must be reconceptualized (unbundled), in order to give expression to contemporary global flows and change, if it is to clarify rather than obscure understanding of the dynamic international arena.[57]

Whilst this thesis supports the use of the unbundling of sovereignty as a means of coming to terms with 'change by erosion', however, it has argued that, although there can be no questioning the reality of 'change by erosion', the evidence suggests that, it has not actually resulted in the deconstruction of sovereignty. In truth, as noted in Part 1 (and chapter 7), sovereignty endures and thus the impact of 'change by erosion' has been crucially partial. Whilst sovereignty clearly has experienced some erosion as a consequence of global flows, intervention and the emergence of networked governance, it has not been deconstructed. Indeed, even whilst there is a sense in which aspects of life have been relocated to an extra-territorial realm that is beyond the direct onto(logical)-constitutional reach of the sovereign state, as chapter 7 demonstrated, this has not prevented them still drawing on the 'legitimate' regulation of states rooted in the social contracted territorial people. This provides another

opportunity to highlight problems with the traditional legal defence of sovereignty. In asserting that sovereignty, as a legal rather than a power category, is unaffected by globalization, it is the contention of this thesis that those scholars like James, Jackson, Sørensen, Hinsley and Laughland who stress a narrowly negative definition of sovereignty fail to recognise the very real way in which globalization does diminish it ontologically.[58]

Having considered the impact of both 'change by extension' and 'change by erosion', the chapter will now turn to the model of sovereignty which this thesis has sought to develop in order to engage with these two forms of change.

RATIONALISM: TOWARDS OPEN SOVEREIGNTY?

Both 'change by extension' and 'change by erosion' require a model of sovereignty that can engage with a measure of ontological openness which this thesis has defined as 'open sovereignty'. In the case of 'change by extension' the notion of open sovereignty is useful because it engages with the reality of an enduring sovereignty which, not reified in the sense of being unpliable and fixed, can be extended albeit (to date) in truncated form. In the case of 'change by erosion', meanwhile, the notion of open sovereignty is useful because the unbundling of sovereignty required to come to terms with global flows and intervention gives rise to the development of a form of sovereignty that, whilst eroded, and thus changed, none the less endures. Indeed, to the extent that completely ontologically closed (bundled) sovereignty is pure abstraction, open sovereignty can also be used to refer to pre-globalization sovereignty, although the point must be made that in the context of current pressures, there is clearly a need for any relevant model of sovereignty to accommodate a greater

measure of openness. To the extent that this model of sovereignty is neither completely closed, in the neorealist (sovereign state pole) tradition, nor completely open, in the revolutionist (post-sovereignty pole) tradition, open sovereignty finds its natural home in the rationalist tradition. Open sovereignty is of strategic importance because, on the one hand its enduring spatial orientation provides a way of recognising the ongoing reality of territorial sovereignty (continuity), whilst its temporal orientation provides a means for engaging with extension, permeability, global flows and intervention (change).

Given the above foundation for rationalism's revived significance, this thesis has endeavoured to contribute to the development of the conceptualization and application of rationalism in a way that is sensitive to the current environment. In doing so, mindful of both the multi-disciplinary nature of the English School, and the need to maintain a narrow focus, this thesis has sought to make its contribution to the conceptualization of rationalism through concentrating on one of the relevant disciplines, theology. This provides a very appropriate lens because of a) its increasing importance in the context of globalization, b) the fact that it resonates with the current desire to 'let culture back in' and c) because it is also the subject of renewed interest as a function of the current revival of the English School.[59]

Examination of rationalism demonstrates the role of theology at its genesis through natural law assumptions.[60] This posits an ontologically open model of sovereignty in the sense that this external, transnational moral imperative, affects the direction of the sovereign state from the outside-in but strategically without negating its sovereignty. In seeking to develop understanding of rationalism in order to make it a fuller

concept, however, this thesis has sought to complement this outside-in, theologically disclosed perspective on rationalism with one that is inside-out. This strategy has two benefits, one pertaining narrowly to the definition of open sovereignty, the other relating to the wider development of English School thought:

i. DEVELOPING THE DEFINITION OF OPEN SOVEREIGNTY

Examination of the Augustinian legacy revealed the foundation for a very limited form of openness.[61] This thesis has demonstrated, however, that the English School can develop its theologically disclosed understanding of open sovereignty by reaching out beyond Butterfield and Wight's engagement with Saint Augustine. Drawing on Welsh proto-nationalism, this research has demonstrated a theological source that can provide the requisite openness to describe an 'inside-out' account of open sovereignty. This chapter will first look at openness from a Welsh proto-nationalist perspective in general terms and then specifically from the outside-in and then the inside-out perspective.

On the one hand, its temporal orientation renders it ontologically open in a way that will always elude Augustinian (not to mention especially Newtonian) models of sovereignty. As a consequence it is able to engage with, and be sensitive to, both relationship between international actors and change. On the other hand this new temporal orientation and attendant openness does not terminate an enduring spatial orientation which provides it with the capacity to appreciate, and account for ongoing sovereign territorial government. Strategically, it is the spatial orientation of the spatio-temporal balance of open sovereignty that ensures that it is 'open *sovereignty*' rather than just *openness* (post-sovereignty). Unlike those accounts that seek a radical

unbundling/deconstruction of territorial sovereignty, open, rationalist sovereignty maintains a clear, partially bundled territorial ontology. It does not become hyperspatial and extra-territorial, thereby negating its character as sovereignty manifested in the form of a social contracted territorial people enjoying the recognition of fellow sovereign polities.

Approached from the outside-in, the temporality of open sovereignty posits a state that is not ontologically cut off from the international realm through an obscurantist absolute foreign/domestic dichotomy.[62] It avoids the suggestion that the international arena is a matter of states that - constituting hard, unrelational billiard balls crashing into each other – generate an asocial 'no man's land' which, entirely 'silent'[63] on the subject of positive relationships, can only understand 'war'.[64] It can accommodate relational interaction, facilitating the development of social institutions that mean that, rather than merely being a realm of anarchy, the international arena can sustain a mixture of anarchy and hierarchy, openness and closure.[65] Not claiming to have closure on all issues, open sovereignty can cater for the possibility of extra-territorial flows that are not within its direct onto(logical)-constitutional reach.

Approached from the inside-out, meanwhile, open sovereignty, unlike neorealist sovereignty, avoids blocking endogenous changes of interest.[66] As a partially open category, the polity bearing open sovereignty is not endowed with entirely fixed interests deployed *a priori*. Thus the rationalist sovereign state (unlike the neorealist sovereign state) is not condemned to being a timeless category that 'effaces our understanding of the historically constituted character of political life, and of the

specific articulation of spatio-temporal relations we have come to treat as the *a priori* condition of all political existence'.[67]

ii.   THE BROADER THE ENGLISH SCHOOL BENEFIT

The cultural lens provided by the Welsh proto-nationalist literature is also useful because it contributes to the development of English School theological reflection by highlighting an alternative interpretation of the Reformation (conventionally associated with revolutionism) which actually lays the foundation for the contention that the Reformation is central to the definition of the sovereign state and is thus of primary importance to the realist and rationalist traditions. This has provided an opportunity to place the School's approach to the sovereign state (and thus realism and rationalism) in a theological context that is wider than that of Augustine and, in the context of systemic change, more useful.

CONCLUSION

This thesis has not criticised the English School's difficulties with change to argue that it is theoretically bankrupt. It has rather affirmed the three traditions spectrum as a framework for coming to terms with continuity and change, serviced by its classical and historically cautious approach. In doing so, however, it has highlighted the importance of not abstracting external from internal sovereignty and allied low political processes, including economic change. There is a need to renew the three traditions approach so that it can cater for the full breadth of potential contemporary change through the reaffirmation of the relationship between internal and external sovereignty.[68] Given the English School's rooted, practical approach, it argues that this development of a more holistic approach to sovereignty (not abstracting external

from internal sovereignty) provides a model that is more in line with undergirding English School philosophy, removing the basis for Jones' mistaken believe that he was confronting an ontology associated with a scientific project.[69] Developing this renewed approach to sovereignty means that rather than simply catering for changes effecting sovereignty as an 'external whole', like decolonisation or secession, it can engage with current transformations that bring both gradual 'change by extension', (associated primarily with the vertical Wightian spectrum and gradual 'change by erosion', (associated with the horizontal epistemological spectrum). In rising to this challenge, the thesis has championed an open rationalist model of sovereignty in the context of a renewed interpretation of the wider three tradition spectrum drawing on the Linklater Little approach, the challenges of globalization and the conceptual resources of theology.

CONCLUDING SUMMARY

The following provides an overview of the six main contentions of this thesis:

First, the partial nature of globalization has inaugurated a dislocated world, embracing both modern territoriality, which this thesis associates primarily with realism, and post-modern extra-territoriality, which this thesis associates with revolutionism. This requires the development of an ontological spectrum in which the ontological pluralism of the English School three traditions spectrum comes into its own. Indeed, in light of the ontological challenges of globalization, it is the contention of this thesis that the three traditions spectrum is more relevant today than at the time of its development.

Second, the tendency to separate positive/internal sovereignty from negative/external sovereignty, if pressed too far, can lead to an abstracted, ahistorical view of sovereignty that cannot cater for change. The fact that this tendency has been especially true of the English School, which is characterised by a concern for history, is particularly ironic. It must guard against treating sovereignty as essentially 'constitutional independence' and develop instead a holistic appreciation that is sensitive to the interdependent nature of the positive and negative dimensions of sovereignty. Failure to rise to this challenge results in an ontology that is just as problematic as that of Hobbesian or neorealism. This has resulted in this thesis parting company with neorealists like Waltz and Mearsheimer and, more importantly those writing more in the English School tradition, like James and Sørensen.[70]

Third, in applying a holistic, change sensitive, definition of sovereignty in the context of globalization, there are two kinds of change with which one must engage:

In the first instance there is a need to account for 'change by extension'. In the context of European integration the movement of competencies from one sovereign jurisdiction to another results in the erosion of some sovereignties and the formation of a new supranational sovereignty, albeit bereft of a demos and consequentially adopting a narrowly interest rather than a broader interest/culture/history based identity. These changes result in partial sovereignties (relating to some rather than all competencies), offending the notion that sovereignty is a necessarily absolute condition, as argued by those positing ontologically closed models of sovereignty namely realists, neorealists and those English School thinkers subscribing to an

abstracted negative definition of sovereignty e.g. Morgenthau, Waltz, Hinsley, James, Sørensen, etc.

In the second instance there is a need to account for 'change by erosion'. The spatio-temporal revolution that is definitive of globalization results in the removal of some aspects of economic and political life beyond the direct onto(logical)-constitutional, reach of the sovereign state.[71] Sovereignty may be a constitutional, legal category whose reality has never been negated by environmental constraints but globalization has transformed the world by complementing power flows that are directly within its onto(logical)-constitutional reach with those that are not. The massive increase in constraining power flows beyond the direct onto(logical)-constitutional reach of the territorial state is such that it results in a new kind of erosion of state sovereignty.

Fourth, whilst this unbundling is an appropriate means of introducing ontological change to sovereignty to account for changes beyond sovereignty, it is not appropriate to unbundle sovereignty *per se*. One should only unbundle to the extent that there is a need to develop a non-Newtonian ontology that is partially open. There is no case for unbundling sovereignty *per se* because investigation of it both negatively and positively demonstrates that sovereignty endures. The thesis is consequently critical of those positing the end of the nation-state/the end of sovereignty thesis without sufficient qualification e.g. Walker, Camilleri, Falk, Jim Falk, Negri, Hardt, Guehenno, Ohmae, Wriston, Horsman, Marshall, and Bauman.[72]

Finally, in order to develop a model of sovereignty that, whilst enduring, can accommodate both 'change by extension' and 'change by erosion', this thesis turns to

the rationalist tradition. Seeking to develop its conceptualization and application, the thesis complements disclosure of its partially closed – partially open ontology through natural law, from the outside-in perspective, with disclosure of that same ontology via the theologically disclosed interpenetrative-Chalcedonian hermeneutic of Welsh proto-nationalism, from the inside-out. This results in a model of what this thesis describes as 'open sovereignty' which provides the best framework within which to conceive sovereignty in the context of European integration/globalization because its enduring spatial orientation enables it to be sensitive to continuity whilst its temporal orientation enables it to engage with change. In introducing a new inside-out grid on rationalism, the thesis makes an important contribution to English School theory, suggesting that Wight, Butterfield and Niebuhr under-estimated the significance of Reformation theology in their definition of realism and rationalism.

Thus it is the contention of this thesis that sovereignty is ongoing and that talk about the end of sovereignty/end of the nation-state is consequently unhelpful. Sovereignty has, however, been subject to both 'change by extension' and 'change by erosion' and thus the idea that it is not affected by contemporary systemic change is untenable. It must be able to cater for an international arena in which the sovereign state remains an important player but self-consciously alongside, extra-territorial flows and sometimes within transnational networked organisational forms. The 'open sovereignty', rationalist approach, developed by this thesis, provides the spatio-temporal framework within which to rise to this challenge.

FUTURE DIRECTION OF RESEARCH

This research can be taken forward on a number of fronts.

First, there is room for a more 'in depth' comparison between: a) this thesis' approach to change manifest through globalization, defined as the revolution in space and time and its associated epistemological logic and b) that associated with Barry Buzan's *From International to World Society*.[73] It would be helpful to consider to what extent there is a place for drawing the more functional/structural approach of Buzan, alongside the moral solidarist approach of Vincent, Dunne and Wheeler, and also the epistemologically plural approach associated with this research and that of Linklater, Little and Manners. In considering these three different English School approaches juxtaposed to each other, however, one is forced to ask whether or not the School may be becoming the site of the very fragmentation that Buzan, in his call for reconvening the School, suggested it might be the English School's distinctive contribution to avoid?[74]

Second, in terms of European integration there is need for a comparison between those English School approaches that see European integration giving rise to the extension of sovereignty and those that see it resulting in the erosion of sovereignty and the development of what this research characterises as networked post-sovereign governance. In so-doing it would be important to draw networked governance theory more into conversation with revolutionism (exploiting the work of chapter 6). In so-doing it will be important to ask whether, rather than debating which perspective has the most merits, it might be more useful to approach the EU using both the Wightian

and Linklater-Little approaches to the three traditions, giving equal importance to both change by extension and erosion?

Third, the conceptual challenge of regional integration, moreover, is becoming more important in the context of the rapid development of other projects beyond the EU. There is a special need for a comparative analysis between the EU, the Andean Community and CARICOM, through an English School framework both in terms of the extension of sovereignty thesis (realism/rationalism) and the erosion manifest in the networked governance thesis (revolutionism).

Fourth, there is a need, as ever, to maintain the sharpness of the application of the three traditions spectrum by keeping informed of the extent to which revolutionist ontology is strengthened either as a result of new developments in terms of global economic flows or a developing culture of intervention fuelled by a new humanitarianism. Conversely, it is important to have regard for the fact that globalization is not necessarily a one way street, mindful of the fact that social dislocation on the back of deregulation may precipitate re-regulation: see for example the discussions after the 1997-8 East Asian financial crisis. None of this will require the development of a new framework over and above that contained in this thesis but there will be a need to adjust interpretation through that framework in accordance with contemporary developments.

Fifth, in the context of the renewed interest in theology and IR, it is worth reflecting in greater detail on the attention afforded Saint Augustine by English School definitions of 'Christian Realism' and the tendency to define the impact of

Reformation theology, which actually informed the advent of the modern state system, as revolutionist (seeking to overturn the state system) rather than realist or rationalist. In doing so there is an opportunity for considering to what extent releasing these thinkers from revolutionism might free up revolutionism/world society to play a clearer role especially in the context of globalization.

Sixth, from the perspective of Welsh proto-nationalism, specifically, there would be great value in providing a more detailed comparison between it and the other very much more 'closed' forms of Christian nationalism mentioned by this thesis to underline its importance, at the same as looking for traditions that overlap rather more with it.

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[1] Marc Williams, 'Rethinking Sovereignty', *Globalization: Theory and Practice*, ed. Elenore Kofman and Gillian Youngs, London, Pinter, 1996, p. 113; Marc Williams, 'Rethinking Sovereignty', *Globalization: Theory and Practice*, eds. Elenore Kofman and Gillian Youngs, London, Pinter, 1996, pp. 168-9; David Held, *Political Theory and the Modern State*, Cambridge, Polity Press, 1989, pp. 229-37; Jackson 'Introduction', *Sovereignty at the Millennium*, p. 4; Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, *Empire*, London, Harvard University Press, 2000, pp. 325-328; David Held, Anthony McGrew, David Globatt and Jonathan Perraton, *Global Transformations: Politics, Economics and Culture*, Oxford, Polity Press, 1999, p. 5; Zygmunt Bauman, *Globalization: The Human Consequences*, Oxford, Polity Press in association with Blackwell, 1998, p. 64; Jean Marie Guehenno, *The End of the Nation-State*, Minneapolis, University of Minneapolis, 1993, p 57 and Ian Clark, *Globalization and International Relations Theory*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1998, p. 70. Also see: 'decisions and outcomes do not correspond with the choices of sovereign wills and are not contained by the boundaries within which they operate'. Joseph Camilleri and Jim Falk, *The End of Sovereignty? The Politics of a Shrinking and Fragmenting World*, Edward Elgar, Aldershot, 1992, p. 77.

[2] The notion that globalization is essentially about a revolution in time and space, a time-space compression, has a very broad basis of support from people coming from a number of different theoretical positions: David Harvey maintains that globalization leads to 'an intense phase of time-space compression that has had a disorienting and disruptive impact upon political-economic practices, the balance of class power, as well as upon cultural and social life'; David Harvey, *The Condition of Postmodernity: An Enquiry into the Origins of Cultural Change*, Oxford, Blackwell, 2000, p. 284. Mittleman claims that '[d]riven by changing modes of competition, globalization compresses the time and space aspects of social relations'. James Mittleman, 'The Dynamics of Globalization', *Globalization: Critical Reflections*, ed. James Mittleman, Boulder Colorado, Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1996. Williams claims that 'globalization presents a different articulation of time and space. Authority structures need no longer be fixed to territorial actors'. Marc Williams, 'Rethinking Sovereignty', *Globalization: Theory and Practice*, ed. Elenore Kofman Gillian Youngs, London, Pinter, 1996, pp. 117-18. Also see: Zygmunt Bauman, *Globalization: The Human Consequences*, chapters 1 and 2; David Held, Anthony McGrew, David Globatt and Jonathan Perraton, *Global Transformations: Politics, Economics and Culture*, pp. 14-16; John Gerard Ruggie, 'Territoriality and beyond: problematizing modernity in international relations', pp. 146-7; James Der Derian, 'The Space of International Relations Simulation,

Surveillance and Speed', *International Studies Quarterly,* 1990, pp. 295-310; Anthony Giddens, *Beyond Left and Right: The Future of Radical Politics,* Cambridge, Polity Press, 1994, p. 4 and Anthony Giddens, *The Third Way: The Renewal of Social Democracy,* Oxford, Polity Press, Blackwell, 1998, p. 31.

[3] Barry Buzan, 'The English School: an underexploited resource in IR', *Review of International Studies,* 2001, pp 476.

[4] Brian Porter, 'Patterns of Thought and Practice: Martin Wight's "International theory"', *The Reason of States,* ed. Michael Donelan, London, George Allen and Unwin, 1978, p. 73.

[5] Richard Little, 'The English School's Contribution to the Study of International Relations', presented to BISA Annual Conference, 20-22 December 1999, University of Manchester p. 18. http://www.leeds.ac.uk/polis/englishschool/

[6] Tony Evans and Peter Wilson, 'Regime Theory and the English School of International Relations: A Comparison', *Millennium: Journal of International Studies,* 1992, p. 329.

[7] Barry Buzan, 'The English School: an underexploited resource in IR', pp. 484-485.

[8] In employing this approach the thesis engages in a project not dissimilar to that of Buzan in: *From International to World Society: English School Theory and Social Structure of Globalisation,* Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2004. It differs significantly, however, in the sense that it engages with globalization defined in terms of a spatio-temporal revolution and connects with its specific challenges through employing the three traditions as an epistemological spectrum.

[9] In terms of a renewed interest specifically in theology within the English School please see: Scott M. Thomas, 'Faith, History and Martin Wight: the role of religion in the historical sociology of the English School of International Relations', *International Affairs,* Vol. 77, No 4, October 2001; Charles Jones, 'Christianity and the English School', paper presented to the annual convention of the International Studies Association at Chicago, 2001; Ian Hall, 'History, Christianity and Diplomacy: Sir Herbert Butterfield and International Relations', *Review of International Studies 28,* 2002, pp. 719-36; Sean Molloy, 'Bridging Realism and Christianity in the International Thought of Martin Wight', European Consortium for Political Research, Fourth Pan-European International Relations Conference, University of Canterbury, 8-10th September 2001, and Roger Epp, 'The "Augustinian moment" in international politics: Niebuhr, Butterfield, Wight and the reclaiming of a tradition'.
In terms of the general renewed interest in theology see: Fabio Petito and Pavlos Hatzopoulos, *Religion in International Relations: The Return from Exile,* New York, Macmillan, 2003; John D Carlson Erik C Owens, *The Sacred and the Sovereign: Religion and International Politics,* Washington DC, Georgetown University Press, 2003; Samuel P Huntington, 'The Clash of Civilizations', *Foreign Affairs* 72, (3), pp. 22-169; Samuel P Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations and Remaking of World Order,* London, Touchstone, 1998; Douglas Johnston and Cynthia Sampson, *Religion, The Missing Element of Statecraft,* Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1994; John L Esposito and Michael Watson, *Religion and Global Order,* Cardiff, University of Wales Press, 2000; KR Dark, Ed. *Religion and International Relations,* Basingstoke, Macmillan, 2001; Scott M. Thomas, 'The Global Resurgence of Religion and the Study of World Politics', *Millennium: Journal of International Studies,* 1995, pp. 289-299; *Sovereignty at the Crossroads: Morality and International Politics in a Post-Cold War Era,* ed. Prof. Luis Lugo, London, Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 1996; Daniel Philpott, 'The Challenge of September 11 to Secularism in international relations', *World Politics* Vol. 55, October 2002, No 1; Daniel Philpott, 'The Religious Roots of Modern International Relations', *World Politics,* 52, no 2 2000, pp. 217-222; Daniel Philpott, *Revolutions in Sovereignty: How Ideas Shaped Modern International Relations,* Princeton, Princeton University Press, 2001; *Millennium: Journal of International Studies,* 2000, Vol 29, No 3. (Special Edition on Religion and IR) containing essays such as Vendulka Kabulkova, 'Towards an International Political Theology' and Miroslav Volf, 'Forgiveness, Reconciliation, and Justice: A Theological Contribution to a More Peaceful Social Environment'. Also please note new organisational developments, The International Centre for Religion and Diplomacy: www.icrd.org and The Ethelburga Centre: www.ethelburgacentre.org.uk

[10] Beyer, *Religion and Globalization,* London, Sage Publications, 1994.

[11] Camilleri and Falk, *The End of Sovereignty,* pp. 203-205, p. 245 and p. 256; R. B. J. Walker, 'State Sovereignty and the Articulation of Political Space/Time', *International Studies Quarterly,* 1990, p. 447; Hardt and Negri, *Empire,* p. 139, pp. 332-333, and p. 336; Guehenno, *The End of the Nation-State,* especially chapters 2 and 4; Ohmae, *The End of the Nation State: The Rise of Regional Economies: How New Engines of Prosperity are Reshaping Global Markets,* London, Harper Collins, 1996, chapter 4, especially pp.46-57; Kenichi Ohmae, 'Putting Global Logic First', *The Evolving Global Economy: Making Sense of the New World Order,* ed K. Ohmae, Harvard, Harvard Business Review, 1995, pp. 130-132; V. Spike Petersen, 'Shifting Ground(s): Epistemological and Territorial

Remapping in the Context of Globalization', *Globalization: Theory and Practice*, p. 12; Bauman, *Globalization*, pp. 64-65; Horsman and Marshall, After *the Nation State*, London, Harper Collins, 1994 and Walter Wriston, The *Twilight of Sovereignty*, New York, Charles Scribner's sons, 1992.

[12] Martin Wight, *Systems of States*, Leicester, Leicester University Press, 1977, pp. 129-130; Martin Wight, *International Theory: The Three Tradition*, London, Continuum, 2002, pp. 1-3; Alan James, 'The Practice of Sovereign Statehood in Contemporary International Society', *Sovereignty At the Millennium*, ed. Robert Jackson, Oxford, Blackwell, 1999, pp. 38-40; Georg Sørensen, 'Sovereignty: Change and Continuity in a Fundamental Institution', *Sovereignty at the Millennium*, p. 170; Hidemi Suganami, 'Sovereignty, intervention and the English School', presented to 4th Pan-European International Relations Conference, 8-10 September 2001, University of Kent at Canterbury, pp 2-3. http://www.leeds.ac.uk/polis/englishschool/ and Hans Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations*, p. 309.

[13] James, 'The Practice of Sovereign Statehood in Contemporary International Society', pp. 42-44 and Alan James, 'Sovereignty: Ground Rule or Gibberish?' *Review of International Studies*, 1984, p. 11.

[14] Sørensen, 'Sovereignty: Change and Continuity in a Fundamental Institution', p. 173; Hans Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations*, p. 312.

[15] Robert Jackson, 'Sovereignty in World Politics: a Glance at the conceptual and Historical Landscape', *Sovereignty At the Millennium*, p. 42; Clark, *Globalization and the Theory of International Relations*, p. 74 and James, 'The Practice of Sovereign Statehood in Contemporary International Society' pp. 35-36.

[16] Wight, *Systems of States*, pp. 129-130; Wight, *International Theory*, pp. 1-3; Suganami, 'Sovereignty, intervention and the English School', pp 2-3.

[17] Clark, *Globalization and the Theory of International Relations*, p. 71.

[18] Initially, the sovereignty of the contracting people was invested in an individual and he was thus conceived to be a servant of the contracting parties although not a contracting party himself. In order to be the bearer of sovereignty he did not surrender his own sovereignty see Neil MacCormick, *Questioning Sovereignty: Law, State and Nation in the European Commonwealth*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1999, p. 123.

[19] J. H. H. Weiler, 'European Neo-Constitutionalism: in Search of Foundations for the European Constitutional Order', *Political Studies*, 1996, p. 523; also see Maurice Keens-Soper, 'The Liberal State and Nationalism in Post-War Europe', *The History of European Ideas*, 1989, Vol. 10, No 6, pp. 689-703.

[20] James, 'The Practice of Sovereign Statehood in Contemporary International Society', p. 48.

[21] Robert Jackson, *Quasi-states: Sovereignty, International Relations and the Third World*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1996, p. 21. This is not to say that quasi-state sovereignty cannot be used by rulers for the purpose of consolidating power, see Christopher Clapham, 'Sovereignty and the Third World State', *Sovereignty At the Millennium*, pp. 103-104.

[22] Ibid., p. 103.

[23] Camilleri and Falk, *The End of Sovereignty*, p. 238.

[24] R. Tudur Jones, *The Desire of Nations*, Ammanford, Christopher Davies Publishers, 1974, p. 20.

[25] Anthony Giddens, *The Third Way: The Renewal of Social Democracy*, Oxford, Polity Press, Blackwell, 1998, pp. 47-8 and Alan Milward, *The European Rescue of the Nation State.*, London, Routledge, 1992, p. 18.

[26] Geoffrey Garrett, 'Global Markets and National Politics: Collision Course or Virtuous Circle', *International Organization* 52, 4, Autumn 1998, p. 310; Paul Hirst and Grahame Thompson, *Globalization In Question, The International Economy and the Possibilities of Governance*, Second Edition, Polity Press, Oxford, 1999, p. 164; Stephen Gill, 'Theorizing the Interregnum: The Double Movement and Global Politics in the 1990s', *International Political Economy: Understanding Global Disorder*, ed. Ed Hettne London, Zed Books Ltd, 1995, pp. 93-94 and Weiss, Linda, *The Myth of the Powerless State: Governing the Economy in a Global Era*, Cambridge, Polity Press, 1998, p. 192.

[27] Hirst and Thompson identify room for new taxes in the near future on property and energy see *Globalization in Question*, pp. 221-222. Also see: Geoffrey Garrett, 'Global Markets and National Politics: Collision Course or Virtuous Circle', p. 310; Weiss, *The Myth of the Powerless State*, p. 191 and Held, McGrew, Goldbatt and Perraton, *Global Transformations*, pp. 269-270.

[28] Saskia Sassen, *Losing Control? Sovereignty in an Age of Globalization*, New York, Columbia University Press, 1995, p. 49 and Geoffrey Garrett, 'Global Markets and National Politics: Collision Course or Virtuous Circle', *International Organization*, vol. 52, no 4 (Autumn 1998), p. 301, p. 309.

[29] Benjamin J Cohen, 'The Triad and the Unholy Trinity: Problems of international Monetary Co-operation', *International Political Economy: Perspectives on Global Power and Wealth*, ed. Frieden

and Lake, Bedford/St Martins, Boston/New York, 2000, p. 248; Geoffrey Garrett, 'Global Markets and National Politics: Collision Course or Virtuous Circle', p. 306.

[30] Sassen, *Losing Control*, p. 49; Geoffrey Garrett, 'Global Markets and National Politics: Collision Course or Virtuous Circle', *International Organization*, vol. 52, no 4 (Autumn 1998), p. 301, p. 309.

[31] Approached from the outside-in, the legal status of sovereignty, and again its disinterest in relative power constraints, can be seen negatively by reference to constitutional independence. Approached from the inside-out the legal status of sovereignty, and its obliviousness to relative power constraints, can be seen positively by reference to the social contract.

[32] The following demonstrate ontological closure either through an under qualified approach to abstracted negative sovereignty or through a commitment to structure and the timeless sovereign state. James, 'The Practice of Sovereign Statehood in Contemporary International Society', p. 39; James, 'Ground Rule or Gibberish', p. 11; Hans Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations*, p. 312; Jackson, 'Sovereignty in World Politics: a Glance at the conceptual and Historical Landscape', p. 10; Sørensen, 'Sovereignty: Change and Continuity in a Fundamental Institution', pp. 170-171 and Waltz, Kenneth N, *Theory of International Relations*, New York, Random House, 1979, pp. 93-95.

[33] Camilleri and Falk, *The End of Sovereignty*, pp. 203-205, p. 245 and p. 256; Walker, 'State Sovereignty and the Articulation of Political Space/Time', p. 447; Negri and Hardt, *Empire*, pp. 139, 332-333, 336; Guehenno, *The End of the Nation-State*, especially chapters 2 and 4; Kenichi Ohmae, *The End of the Nation-State*, chapter 4, especially pp.46-57; Ohmae, 'Putting Global Logic First', *The Evolving Global Economy*, pp. 130-132; Peterson, 'Remapping in the Conflict of Globalization', p. 12. Bauman, Globalization, pp. 64-65; Horsman and Marshall, After *the Nation State and* Walter Wriston, The *Twilight of Sovereignty*, New York, Charles Scribner's sons, 1992.

[34] The legal thesis that sees sovereignty as an enabling precondition rather than a power 'seems to imply an "essentialist" concept of sovereignty, immune to historical change: the attributes of sovereignty exist in perpetuity and produce a single form of state'. Ian Clark, *Globalization and International Relations Theory*, p. 71.

[35] Alan James, The Practice of Sovereign statehood in Contemporary International Society, *Sovereignty at the Millennium*, p. 41.

[36] Sørensen, 'Change and Continuity in a Fundamental Institution', p. 171.

[37] The irony of this, given the rooted and historical identity of the English School is clearly demonstrated in the following: 'Unlike neorealism, which largely confines itself to the international system pillar, takes an essentialist view of sovereignty and makes system structure dominant over units, English School theory is much more inside-out, than outside-in. International society is constructed by the units, and particularly by the dominant units, in the system, and consequently reflects their domestic character (Hollis and Smith, 1991: 95) Buzan, *From International to World Society: English School Theory and Social Structure of Globalisation*, p. 95.

[38] Alan James, 'Sovereign Statehood in Contemporary International Society', p. 46.

[39] The problem with the 100% definition of sovereignty on the basis of constitutional independence is that constitutional independence is increasingly no more absolute than power. This is obvious in relationship to the EU but also the Andean Community and CARICOM for instance. Daniel Philpott makes the point about partial sovereignty in the following terms: 'Absoluteness is a measure of the scope of affairs over which a sovereign body governs within a particular territory. Is it supreme over all matters or merely some? ...The government of France is supreme in defence policy but not in trade, which it governs jointly with other European Union members as prescribed by EU law'. *Revolutions in Sovereignty: How Ideas Shaped Modern International Relations*, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 2001, p. 19. Indeed one does not just have to look at regional integration to see sovereign states that do not have exclusive, constitutionally separate jurisdiction over all competencies. Those sovereign states that have a Compact of Free Association with their former colonial master, the United States: the Marshal Islands, Palau and the Federal States of Micronesia, are constitutionally tied to varying degrees to the US both with respect to their internal and external sovereignty. Critically, however, whilst these constitutional ties exist, neither state has surrendered either all of its internal or all of its external sovereignty. The three states remain sovereign by upholding partial internal and partial external sovereignty. Similarly a number of former British colonies remain constitutionally tied to Britain which provides their highest court of appeal through the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council: Jamaica, Trinadad and Tobago, Mauritius, Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, St Lucia, Grenada, St Vincents and the Grendines, Dominica, Antigua and Barbuda, St Kitts and Nevis and Kribati. All of these polities, however, are nonetheless sovereign.

[40] The stark inability to deal with change is striking because it is a criticism that is usually directed at neorealists with their particular strand of positivism and associated ontological closure. On its inability

to deal with change see e.g. Little, 'The English School's Contribution to the study of International Relations', p. 12.

[41] Given the comments made earlier about the divide between internal and external sovereignty shadowing a divide between high and low politics, it is interesting to note the passage of a colony to independent statehood, not only happens at a specific moment of time, it is also a thoroughly high political event at which government representatives raise and lower flags amidst much pomp and circumstance. It is, therefore, quite unlike the process of European integration which happens in a rather more gradual, functional and piecemeal manner across many years.

In light of the difficulties with the internal-external sovereignty divide, it is interesting to reflect on some observations made by Ian Clark when reviewing Alan James' *Sovereign Statehood*. Clark observes, 'Theoretically, the matter has customarily been disposed of by positing a dualism, in terms of which sovereignty has an internal and an external aspect, resulting in supremacy within, and independence without, the state. Beyond this, presumably, the student of international relations should not decently enquire'. Ian Clark, 'Making sense of sovereignty', *Review of International Studies*, 1988, p. 303. Later Clark returns to the problems of this division specifically addressing concerns about the relationship between sovereignty as a narrowly legal concept which is, as it happens, not divorced from power. In the course of invoking the distinction between internal and external sovereignty 'James reiterates the distinction between sovereignty as legal standing as contrasted with the notion of sovereignty as physical capability: 'sovereignty is a matter of law and not of stature' (p. 40). This does not mean that physical attributes are unimportant because the argument is qualified to allow that 'sovereignty requires the consonance of legal and physical realities'. (p. 41), although, at the end of the day, the legal condition is not altered by physical realities' (p. 41). This is a less than lucid section of otherwise careful and workmanlike study'. Ibid., p. 305.

[42] For more information about the division between internal and external sovereignty in the English School and its impact on the School's capability to conceptualize change please see Appendix 1.

Having stressed the centrality of the English School and its historic figureheads, it is important to note that one of the best contemporary examples of fractured sovereignty is manifest in the work of Stephen D. Krasner, which, whilst not traditionally located in the English School, has in recent years become increasingly closely associated with it. (See especially *Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy*, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1999 chapter 2.) Krasner claims that there are four views of sovereignty: 'Interdependence sovereignty', 'Domestic sovereignty', 'Vattelian sovereignty' and 'International legal sovereignty' see: Ibid., pp. 9-25 and Stephen D Krasner, 'Rethinking the sovereign state model', *Empires Systems and States: Great Transformations in International Politics*, eds. Michael Cox, Tim Dunne and Ken Booth, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2001, pp 17- 42.

Interdependence sovereignty pertains to the ability of the state to control movement of money and ideas across its borders. Domestic sovereignty refers to the authority structures in states that sustain behaviour regulation. This depends on a) acceptance of authority and b) the level of control the state can actually exercise. Effective states have strong domestic sovereignty, whilst failed states have none. Vattelian sovereignty, meanwhile, refers to the right of non-intervention in the domestic affairs of a polity. Finally, international legal sovereignty pertains to the equality of all sovereign states regardless of their size and power, on the basis of their recognition and consequent membership of the international community. Crucially these different perspectives are potentially independent. 'The rules institutions and practices that are associated with these four meanings of sovereignty are *neither logically nor empirically linked in some organic whole*'. Ibid., p. 21.

Whilst it is important to break aspects of sovereignty down into bit sized chunks, whose fate one can readily follow, Krasner's approach has the effect of abstracting features away from the sovereign state. These features do not exist apart from state sovereignty. To really understand sovereignty, one must understand the phenomenon with respect to which the above provides different perspectives. We are not confronted by four autonomous characteristics. They are all related to the same reality. Thus contrary to Krasner, it is indeed the contention of this thesis that the four sovereignties that he describes are '*linked to some organic whole*' and that failure to recognise this will lead to distorted understanding of sovereignty and thus the international arena, e.g. the 'constitutional independence' definition produces an artificially closed models of sovereignty that cannot deal with change.

[43] Indeed, to the extent that it lacks a social contracted territorial people there are some parallels between the EU and quasi-states on which basis one might assert that supranational EU jurisdiction could be described as a 'quasi-state like' sovereignty. Weiler expresses the aspiration that the EU should evolve into an interest rather than demos based polity, J. H. H. Weiler, 'European Neo-constitutionalism: in Search of Foundations for the European Constitutional Order', pp. 525-533.

[44] Moravcsik, 1993, p. 507; Andrew Moravcsik, *The Choice for Europe: Social Purpose and State Power From Messina to Maastricht*, London, UCL Press, 1998, P. 22. For a critique of this position see: Wind, 'Rediscovering Institutions', p. 27 and Matlary p. 7.

[45] Thomas Christiansen, 'Reconstructing Space: From Territorial Politics to European Multilevel Governance', *Reflective Approaches to European Governance*, ed. K. E. Jorgensen, London, Macmillan, 1996. p. 54.

[46] Williams, 'Rethinking sovereignty', p. 119 and Clark, *Globalization and Theory of International Relations*, p. 79.

[47] The notion that globalization is essentially about a revolution in time and space, a time-space compression, has a very broad basis of support from people coming from a number of different theoretical positions: David Harvey maintains that globalization leads to 'an intense phase of time-space compression that has had a disorienting and disruptive impact upon political-economic practices, the balance of class power, as well as upon cultural and social life'; David Harvey, *The Condition of Postmodernity: An Enquiry into the Origins of Cultural Change*, Oxford, Blackwell, 2000, p. 284. Mittleman claims that '[d]riven by changing modes of competition, globalization compresses the time and space aspects of social relations'. James Mittleman, 'The Dynamics of Globalization', *Globalization: Critical Reflections*, ed. James Mittleman, Lynne Rienner Publishers Boulder Colorado, 1996. Williams claims that 'globalization presents a different articulation of time and space. Authority structures need no longer be fixed to territorial actors'. Marc Williams, 'Rethinking Sovereignty', pp. 117-18. Also see: Zygmunt Bauman, *Globalization: The Human Consequences*, chapters 1 and 2; David Held, Anthony McGrew, David Globatt and Jonathan Perraton, *Global Transformations: Politics, Economics and Culture*, pp. 14-16; John Gerard Ruggie, 'Territoriality and beyond: problematizing modernity in international relations', *International Organisation*, 1993, pp. 146-7; James Der Derian, 'The Space of International Relations Simulation, Surveillance and Speed', *International Studies Quarterly*, 1990, pp. 295-310; Anthony Giddens, *Beyond Left and Right: The Future of Radical Politics*, Cambridge, Polity Press, 1994, p. 4 and Anthony Giddens, *The Third Way: The Renewal of Social Democracy*, Oxford, Polity Press, Blackwell, 1998, p. 31.

[48] Susan Strange, The Retreat of the State: The Diffusion of Power in the World Economy, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1996, pp. 13-14 and p. 43.

[49] John Laughland, *The Tainted Source: The Undemocratic Origins of the European Idea*, London, Warner Books, 1998, p. 177.

[50] Please note that the fact that extra-territorial flows may be beyond the direct onto-constitutional reach of the sovereign state, does not mean that they are necessarily beyond their indirect reach which can be asserted through co-operating sovereign states. A good example of this is provided by chapter 7's consideration of capital regulation.

[51] Sassen, *Losing Control*, p. 31.

[52] Nicholas J Wheeler and Alex J Bellamy, 'Humanitarian intervention and world politics', and Paul Taylor, 'The United Nations and International Order', *The Globalization of World Politics*, ed. John Baylis and Steve Smith, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2001, *Saving Strangers: Humanitarian Intervention in International Society*, Oxford University Press, 2000 and James Mayall, *The New Interventionism 1991-4: United Nations experience in Cambodia, former Yugoslavia and Somalia*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1996.

[53] Geoff Mulgan, *Connexity: How to Live in a Connected World*, London, Chatto and Windus, 1997, p. 3. Guehenno is also very clear that globalization has introduced the age of the network. e.g. 'we should speak on the global level, of aggregates of networks linked together, like the interlinked rings that are the symbol of the Olympic Games'. *The End of the Nation-State*, p. 56.

[54] Ibid., p. 60.

[55] Ibid., p. 55. This multi-dimensional characteristic is widely recognized e.g: Sassen, *Out of Control*, p. 31, Camilleri and Falk, *The End of Sovereignty*, p. 249; Axford, *The Global System*, p. 150; James N. Rosenau, 'Governance and Democracy in a Globalizing World', *Re-imaginging Political Community: Studies in Cosmopolitan Democracy*, ed. Daniele Archibugi, David Held, and Martin Kohler, Polity Press, Cambridge, 1998, in *The Global Transformations Reader*, pp. 182-3; Hardt and Negri, *Empire*, p. 340.

[56] Ibid. Also see: Castells, Manuel, *The Rise of the Network Society: the Information Age: Economy Society and Culture, Vol. 1*, Oxford, Blackwell, 2001, pp. 500-509.

[57] Ruggie, John Gerard, 'Territoriality and beyond: problematizing modernity in international relations', *International Organisation*, 1993, p. 139 and 169. Although the thesis uses the window provided by Ruggie's post-positivist critique of sovereignty because of the clarity of the image provided by the notion of the unbundling of territoriality and because of its historical focus that resonates with the

historical approach of the English School, the point is made that this represents one example of many post-positivist critiques of IR (see chapter 2) which have the effect of deconstructing (unbundling) sovereignty. See R. B. J. Walker 'State Sovereignty and the Articulation of Political Space/Time', p. 457, p. 459 and p. 461; Marlene Wind, 'Rediscovering Institutions: A Reflectivist Critique of Rational Institutionalism', *Reflective Approaches to European Governance*, ed. K. E. Jorgensen, London, Macmillan, 1996; Robert Cox, 'Towards a post-hegemonic conceptualization of world order: reflections on the relevancy of Ibn Khaldun', *Governance Without Government: Order and Change in World Politics*, ed. by James N. Rosenau and Ernst-Otto Czempiel, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1992, p. 138; Agnew and Corbridge, *Mastering Space*, p. 80; V. Spike Petersen, 'Shifting Ground(s): Epistemological and Territorial Remapping in the context of globalization', *Globalization: Theory and Practices*, Elenore Kofman and Gillian Youngs, London, Pinter, 1996 and Der Derian , 'The Space of International Relations Simulation, Surveillance and Speed', p. 297.

[58] Williams clearly comes to terms with the spatio-temporal revolution that is globalization and the fact that this takes us beyond interdependence. In his mind, however, this seems to dissolve the state and there is some doubt as to whether it should continue. (Williams, 'Rethinking Sovereignty', p. 118-9) It is the contention of this thesis, however, that the striking reality about the spatio-temporal revolution is not the new temporality *per se*, but the new temporality in the context of an enduring spatial orientation. It is about an ontological revolution that does not replace the old ontologies so much as complement them with new ontologies. To this extent one need not be ambivalent about the ongoing reality of sovereignty but this need not involve one relaxing back into a model of interdependence. The new ontologies do not make the significance of constitutional independence irrelevant (Ibid., p. 119) but they do mean that the legal tradition must be aware of its onto-constitutional diminution.

[59] Yosef Lapid, Friedrich Kratochwil, *The Return of Culture and Identity in IR Theory*, Colorado, Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1996; Fabio Petito and Pavlos Hatzopoulos, *Religion in International Relations: The Return from Exile*, New York, Macmillan, 2003; Beyer, *Religion and Globalization*, London, Sage publications, 1994; Samuel P Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations and Remaking of World Order*, London, Touchstone, 1998; Douglas Johnston and Cynthia Sampson, *Religion, The Missing Element of Statecraft*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1994; Scott Thomas, The Global Resurgence of Religion and the Study of World Politics, *Millennium: Journal of International Studies*, 1995, p. 289; John L Esposito and Michael Watson, *Religion and Global Order*, pp. 17-18; *Sovereignty at the Crossroads: Morality and International Politics in a Post-Cold War Era*, ed. Prof. Luis Lugo, London, Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 1996; Ken Dark, *Religion and International Relations*, Macmillan, 2000 and *Millennium: Journal of International Studies*, Special Issue: Religion and International Relations, 2000, Vol. 29, No. 3.

[60] Daniel Philpott, 'On the Cusp of Sovereignty', *Sovereignty at the Crossroads: Morality and International Politics in the Post Cold War Era*, ed. Luis E. Lugo, London, Rowman & Littlefield Publishers INC, 1996, p. 48; Martin Wight, *International Theory: The Three Tradition*, London, Continuum, 2002, p. 14 & p. 234; Donald Mackinnon, 'Natural Law', *Diplomatic Investigations: Essays in the Theory of International Politics*, eds. Herbert Butterfield and Martin Wight, London, George Allen and Unwin, 1966, pp. 74-88; Hedley Bull, *The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics*, London, Macmillan, 1977, pp. 28-29; Martin Wight, *Systems of States*, pp. 116-117 and Hedley Bull, 'The Grotian Conception of International Society', *Diplomatic Investigations*, p. 63.

[61] Reinhold Niebuhr, 'Augustine and Christian Realism', *Christian Realism and Political Problems*, London, Faber and Faber, 1953, p. 115; Sean Molloy, 'Bridging Realism and Christianity in the International Thought of Martin Wight', presented to 4th Pan-European International Relations Conference, 8-10 September 2001, University of Kent at Canterbury p. 9, http://www.leeds.ac.uk/polis/englishschool/; Charles Jones, 'Christian Realism and the Foundations of the English School', presented to 4th Pan-European International Relations Conference, 8-10 September 2001, University of Kent at Canterbury. pp. 9-20, http://www.leeds.ac.uk/polis/englishschool/; Herbert Butterfield in *Herbert Butterfield: Writings on Christianity and History*, ed. CT McIntire, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1979, p. 125 and Roger Epp, 'The "Augustinian moment" in international politics: Niebuhr, Butterfield, Wight and the reclaiming of a tradition', *The Aberystwyth Papers*, The University College of Wales, Department of International Politics 1991.

[62] Ivo D. Duchacek, *The Territorial Dimension of Politics: Within, Among and Across Nations*, Boulder and London, Westview Press, 1986, pp. 235-6; Guehenno, *The End of the Nation-State.*, p. 65; Marc Williams, 'Rethinking Sovereignty', p. 118; Agnew and Corbridge, *Mastering Space*, p. 91; V. Spike Peterson, 'Shifting Ground(s: Epistemological and Territorial Remapping in the Context of Globalization(s)', pp. 15-16 and Richard Ashley, 'The Powers of Anarchy: Theory, Sovereignty and

the Domestication of Global Life', *International Theory: Critical Investigations*, ed. James Der Derian, London, Macmillan, 1995, p. 101.

[63] Walker, 'State Sovereignty and the Articulation of Political Space/Time', pp. 447-449.

[64] Darel E. Paul, 'Sovereignty, Survival and the Westphalian Blind Alley in International Relations', *Review of International Studies*, 1999, 25, p. 217 and Jack Donnelly, *Realism and International Relations*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2000, p. 81.

[65] Ibid., pp. 87-89 pp. 95-96.

[66] Axford, *The Global System*, p. 37. See further exploration of the giveness of preferences in Judith Goldstein and Robert O. Keohane, 'Ideas and foreign Policy: An Analytical Framework', *Ideas and Foreign policy: Beliefs, Institutions and Political Change*, p. 4.

[67] Alexander Wendt, 'Anarchy is What State's Makes of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics', p. 449.

[68] For more detailed analysis please see Appendix 1.

[69] Roy E. Jones, 'The English school of international relations: a case for closure', *Review of International Studies*, 1981.

[70] The following demonstrate ontological closure either through an under qualified approach to abstracted negative sovereignty or through a commitment to structure and the timeless sovereign state.
James, 'The Practice of Sovereign Statehood in Contemporary International Society', p. 39; James, 'Ground Rule or Gibberish', p. 11; Hans Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations*, p. 312; Jackson, 'Sovereignty in World Politics: a Glance at the conceptual and Historical Landscape', p. 10; Sørensen, 'Sovereignty: Change and Continuity in a Fundamental Institution', pp. 170-171 and Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, pp. 93-95.

[71] Again please note that the fact that extra-territorial flows may be beyond the direct onto-constitutional reach of the sovereign state, does not mean that they are necessarily beyond their indirect reach which can be asserted through co-operating sovereign states. A good example of this is provided by chapter 7's consideration of capital regulation.

[72] Camilleri and Falk, *The End of Sovereignty*, pp. 203-205, p. 245 and p. 256; Walker, 'State Sovereignty and the Articulation of Political Space/Time', p. 447; Negri and Hardt, *Empire*, p. 139, pp. 332-333 and p. 336; Guehenno, *The End of the Nation-State*, especially chapters 2 and 4; Kenichi Ohmae, *The End of the Nation-State*, chapter 4, especially pp.46-57; Kenichi Ohmae, 'Putting Global Logic First', *The Evolving Global Economy*, pp. 130-132; Peterson, 'Remapping in the Conflict of Globalization', p. 12; Bauman, *Globalization*, pp. 64-65; Horsman and Marshall, *After the Nation State* and Walter Wriston, *The Twilight of Sovereignty*.

[73] Buzan, *From International to World Society: English School Theory and Social Structure of Globalisation*, 2004.

[74] Barry Buzan, 'The English School: an underexploited resource in IR', p. 488.

APPENDIX 1

THE THREE TRADITIONS,
DIVIDED SOVEREIGNTY &CHANGE

The main body of the text engages with the tendency for the English School to invoke the division between internal and external sovereignty and makes the point that this has made for an effectively closed model of sovereignty which undermines the capacity of the three traditions to engage with change. One can, however, obtain greater clarity about the reality of the closed nature of English School sovereignty - and the irony of it, given the School's commitment to being historically rooted and thus sensitive to change - by exploring the background/origin of the division. It is the purpose of this appendix to rise to this challenge, demonstrating how a commitment to a holistic conception of sovereignty that can accommodate change from the inside-out as well as the outside-in has been compromised with the consequence that sovereignty is reified in a way that undermines its capability to engage with transformations. It will then make the case for a renewed, holistic English School model of sovereignty that can engage with change.

HOLISTIC SOVEREIGNTY
In the English School there are clear grounds for suggesting that internal and external sovereignty should be treated - at least in some senses - as a whole. Indeed, two of the greatest influences on the author of the three traditions, and 'godfather'[i] of the English School, Martin Wight, were people who engaged with sovereignty holistically, mindful of both its interdependent internal and external character. Lest anyone should be tempted into thinking that Grotius (who was of special significance for Wight, since he was selected to be the symbolic head of the rationalist - Grotian - tradition), was solely concerned with sovereignty from a narrowly international perspective, Wight observed that 'in Grotius there is more about sovereignty as a principle of internal organization than as the mark of membership of international society ...'.[ii] Grotius had in fact a holistic approach to sovereignty, engaging with both its internal and external dimensions. The person who perhaps achieves the most perfect balance for Wight, however, is Machiavelli. 'The only political philosopher of whom it is possible to argue whether his principal interests was not in the relations between states rather than – or even more than – the state itself, is Machiavelli. With him, the foreign and domestic conditions for the establishment and maintenance of state power are not distinguished systematically; and this alone – without other reasons – would have justified his being annexed, by detractors and admirers alike, as the tutelary hero of International Relations'.[iii] Machiavelli was, as such, not merely made the symbolic head of realism (the Machiavellian tradition) but also the founder of international relations *per se*.

Writing more recently, Robert Jackson provides an important perspective on the fundamental unity of sovereignty in Wight's thought through consideration of the notion of the 'good life'. He claims that one should not interpret Wight's plea for the study of international theory as indicative of the fact that the domestic and international realms should be divorced from each other. It is not a case of the good

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life residing 'within' and crude anarchic survival residing 'without'. 'There would be no point in external security if Leviathan afforded little or nothing of domestic value. Here is the underlying morality of realism. To repeat, the state is a perfect association which significantly lessens the necessity of transcendental political association or even merely substantial international co-operation'.[iv] Later he continues: 'If there were no basis for the good life in states, there would be no point in their survival. In other words, international theory is part of the theory of the state, not separate from it, just as, for example, diplomacy, international law and armed forces are part of the means of good government'.[v] Thus with respect to the division between internal (good life, political theory) and external sovereignty (survival, international theory), Jackson observes: 'Although each facet can of course be distinguished analytically and theorised separately, *neither is ontologically independent of the other*'.[vi] (Italics added). In light of this it is interesting to note that it was Jackson who, in the context of examining third world states, later went on to argue that it was important to recognise that polities should not just be assessed for sovereignty negatively (external sovereignty) but also positively (internal sovereignty).[vii]

This holism makes sense given the fact that an historically rooted approach - which is what the English School seeks to provide - should be open to change, from any direction, be it from the inside-out or from the outside-in.

DIVIDED SOVEREIGNTY
It is the contention of this thesis, however, that, whilst there is a good basis upon which to affirm the interdependence of the internal and external aspects of sovereignty, much English School scholarship has focused almost exclusively on the latter to the extent that this it has effectively been cut off from the low politics arena of change associated with internal sovereignty.[viii] The basis for this development has been informed, at least in part, by a combination of a) a theoretical ambition and b) an apparently favourable environment. This appendix will now consider each in turn, exploring their interaction.

a) THEORETICAL AMBITION
Martin Wight's foundational British Committee essay 'Why Is There No International Theory' is not defined primarily in terms of the goal of making a divide between internal and external sovereignty but it arguably had this effect. Specifically, it set out to champion the importance of international theory through a comparison with domestic political theory that suggested that the failure/neglect of the former was directly related to the success/profile of the latter. Wight set out his argument in robust terms. 'The principle that every individual requires the protection of a state, which represents him in the international community, is a juristic expression of the belief in the sovereign state as the consummation of political experience and activity which has marked Western political thought since the Renaissance. That belief has absorbed almost all the intellectual energy devoted to political study. It has become natural to think of international politics as the untidy fringe of domestic politics …and to see international theory in the manner of the political theory textbooks, as an additional chapter which can be omitted by all save the interested student. The masterpiece of international politics is the system of the balance of power, as it operated from the time of Elizabeth down to that of Bismarck; but if we ask why the balance of power has inspired no great political writer to analysis and reflection, the answer surely is that it has flourished with the flourishing of the modern state, and has

been seen as a means to that end'.^{ix} International theory was thus very much subordinated to political theory.

In *International Theory*, meanwhile, Wight made a very similar observation. 'The development of the sovereign state implied also the development of the modern states-system or modern international relations (diplomacy, war, international law, international institutions etc), but this was treated as a by-product or corollary of that sovereign state itself. The crystallization of the state was what excited the best minds at that time, and they gave political philosophy that concentration on the state which it has never since lost'.^x Thus once again international theory was very much subordinated to political theory.

Wight highlighted the subordination of international to political theory in contemporary scholarship by referring to two of its practical consequences on academic research. In the first instance, even those who apparently were committed to international theory allowed domestic theory to cast its shadow through the fact that the international arena was only deemed worthy of consideration from a very domestic perspective. Although, in an important sense, scholars like Morgenthau based their entire work on the international arena, they built their study narrowly around the concept of national interest. Wight's desire was to study the international system as a whole in general terms rather than merely through the parochial grid of national interest.^{xi} In the second instance, and more frustrating, was the fact that many scholars, who might otherwise have contributed to the development of international theory, were allowing themselves to be distracted by concerns about the integration of states. 'Practical problems of international politics are often described in terms of building a bigger and better state – a European Union or an Atlantic Community or an Arab Union, without seeing that such an achievement would leave the problems of inter-state politics precisely where they were'. There was a need, Wight contended, for a sense of perspective and priority. First, in terms of perspective, even if this integration project was successful it would not change the structure of international relations *per se*. Second, in terms of priority, in the absence of a coherent international theory, allowing the energy of the best minds to be distracted by a tentative experiment in European integration seemed to be part and parcel of the inappropriate objective of investing greatest effort in seeking to understand domestic theory and the good life. It suggested that the international domain only became interesting when injected with elements of domestic politics that gave it a 'good life' capability. It seemed to be symptomatic of the notion that 'the division of international society into separate states is a temporary phase, emerging out of the medieval unity …and destined to be replaced by a world state'.^{xii} Scholars must, however, refuse to be put off by the lack of 'good life' capability that the international arena has to offer and take it seriously on its own terms.

The impact of this celebration of international theory, whose poor fortunes were provocatively shown to be negatively related to those of domestic political theory, had the effect of raising the profile of former against the latter. In championing the fortunes of international theory in this way, Wight inevitably put something of a wedge between the approaches to sovereignty associated with the two sets of theory, internal sovereignty, which he primarily associated with domestic political theory and external sovereignty, which he primarily associated with international political theory. Thus, it is the contention of this appendix that whilst Wight was right to see a close

relationship between internal and external sovereignty, which Jackson has helpfully highlighted (and indeed embraced in his own work), the impact of Wight's unpacking of his theoretical ambition for IR, resulting in his effective concentration of external rather than internal sovereignty, laid the foundation for the relationship to be compromised in practice.[xiii]

b) AN APPARENTLY ACCOMODATING ENVIRONMENT
This appendix suggests that Wight was able to effectively concentrate on external sovereignty apart from internal sovereignty, with the result his model of sovereignty in IR became increasingly reified, on account of the fact that, although a rooted, empirical, historian who believed in change, examination of his work suggests that he thought the possibility of sovereignty being significantly impacted by change from its internal dimension extremely remote. This commitment to 'inside-out' continuity can be seen by examining his reflections on the role of economic versus political change. Critically Wight first attributed priority to the high politics rather than low politics/economic processes and then significantly constrained the potential for political change.

i. THE ECONOMIC ENGINE FOR CHANGE
One gains the clear impression when reading Wight that he thought that the economic engine for integration, 'the spirit of commerce',[xiv] did not have the wherewithal to deliver, certainly in the short to medium term. In this regard Wight's comments about the relationship between the high levels of interdependence during the late nineteenth/early twentieth century and the outbreak of the First World War are very relevant. 'The great discoveries led to the economic unification of the world, and the completion of a world market in the nineteenth century. There was wide belief that political unity would follow naturally. It is surprising how often contemporary publicists compared the Victorian peace, particularly the armed peace of 1871-1914, to the Pax Romana, overlooking the essential contrast between a single imperium and a dubious concert of quarrelsome great powers'.[xv] Given that instead of securing greater unity the 1871-1914 period gave rise to the First World War and that levels of interdependence had since then in any event fallen dramatically, it seemed clear that economic factors were unlikely to deliver political unity and that even if interdependence did increase again it would continue to be subjected to political decisions which could always thwart any emerging unity.

One specific example of the limitations of transformation in IR driven by economic development can be seen by referring to Wight's comments about sanctions whose efficacy depended upon change manifest in growing interdependence. 'In the nineteenth century sea power gave a deceptive impression of providing political stability; economic blockade seemed the decisive weapon of the First World War; the League was built upon the expectation that economic sanctions could keep the world in order'. But, 'the world was not yet so interdependent economically, nor was sea power so effective strategically, that it could bring pressure uniformly on the world's surface'.[xvi] Between the late nineteenth century and the time at which Wight was writing, moreover, the levels of interdependence had of course fallen.

ii. THE POLITICAL ENGINE FOR CHANGE?
This appendix will view the impact of the priority of the political on Wight's approach to change from two perspectives, demonstrating how both constrain the

actual possibilities for change. In the first instance it will consider how very weak some of Wight's claims for politically driven change actually were. In the second instance it will demonstrate how in Wight's thinking the possibility of dramatic political change, having briefly arisen in the immediate post-war world, soon became very remote.

I.   POLITICAL LOGIC CONSTRAINS VISION OF CHANGE

One can obtain a helpful perspective on the political bias in Wight's appreciation of transformation - in a way that actually limits the nature of the change in question - by considering his definition of revolutionism and some of its anomalies. The traditional Wightian arrangement of the three traditions spectrum services transformation from the unqualified sovereignty of the sovereign state pole within realism through to the qualified sovereignty of rationalism and then on to the demise of sovereignty in the post-sovereignty pole of Dantean revolutionism. There is on the way, however, something of a problem with the part of revolutionism that comes before the Dantean section, namely Kantian revolutionism. According to the above logic Kantian revolutionism should describe a more qualified form of sovereignty than does rationalism. In truth, however, Wight defines Kantian revolutionism as a development beyond rationalist international society through the provision of added principles of commonality to the state system which strategically do not necessarily have the effect of securing the erosion/qualification of sovereignty.

For example, the notion that Mazzini's vision of a world divided into self-determining nation-states makes him a revolutionist because he argues all states should be national and self-determining is like saying that because all sovereign states have submitted to the principle of sovereignty they can all be classified in the revolutionist category when in reality, in and of itself, this particular commonality could provide grounds for their all being defined as realist.[xvii] Similarly, the notion that a Protestant league constitutes the erosion of the sovereign state does not follow. To be sure, if all nations were of the same strain of Protestantism then there would be some things about which they may not disagree but, in the absence of a supranational one world Protestant executive, the states would undoubtedly still find much about which they could come into conflict. Furthermore, to the degree that the 'constraints' in view are the result of Protestant commonality which constitutes part of the identity of the states concerned, there would be no sense of the sovereign states being eroded on account of a common Protestantism because their conduct would not be checked against their will.[xviii] Indeed, as noted in chapter 9, given that it was the Reformation that actually paved the way for the break-up of the *Respublica Christiana* and advent of the modern states system, Protestantism can make a good claim to have inaugurated the modern states system and thus international relations consisting of the presence, and not the subordination of, the sovereign state.

If states could only be eroded through narrowly political developments, the emergence of a system based on greater political commonality than the more minimal forms of international society associated with rationalism would surely give them a good claim to have generated a form of the world society associated with revolutionism? If, however, one first considers the status of sovereignty (i.e. is it eroded or not?), and, second subscribes to a broader conception of the potential means by which a sovereign state can be changed, one can see the very limited nature of the erosion, if any, potentially posited by some manifestations of this kind of

revolutionism e.g. Mazzini . If the three traditions is represented as a spectrum from unqualified sovereignty, to qualified sovereignty, to the demise of sovereignty, then early revolutionism should show the state engaging with a transnationalism whose impact is to significantly undermine sovereignty which late revolutionism will completely deconstruct. (Similarly, if the three traditions is viewed as a spectrum from unqualified nation-state sovereignty, to qualified nation-state sovereignty and an emerging supranational sovereignty, to the ultimate demise of nation-state sovereignty and triumph of supranational sovereignty, then early revolutionism should show the advanced demise of nation-state sovereignty ahead of its complete demise - and the complete triumph of revolutionist sovereignty - in the extreme expressions of revolutionism). A partially ontologically open manifestation of sovereignty in rationalism would actually provide a more advanced expression of sovereignty and change - either by erosion or extension - than a putative revolutionism based on Mazzini or a Calvinist protestant league.

II.   POLITICAL LOGIC CONSTRAINS THE OPPORTUNITY FOR CHANGE

One can see, however, that the political bias in Wightian thought actually also curtails change by restricting the window for transformation. Specifically, in Wight's thinking, serious change depended upon the coincidence of a viable alternative with a truly dreadful option. Such a condition, he maintained, could facilitate the revolutionist decision of the kind spoken by Kant (see especially endnote xx) and existed during the four years when the Americans alone had the atomic bomb - a period when 'it was reasonable to assert that the states-system was ripe for unification, the world ripe for world-government'.[xix] Writing in 1958, when both superpowers commanded nuclear weapons, the possibilities of transcending the states system seemed remote.[xx]

ENTER SYSTEMIC CHANGE! THE WIGHT LEGACY

Having considered Wight's cautious approach to transformation in IR, it is important to confront the great irony that, although history often justifies pessimism, the Third World War that he predicted[xxi] did not materialise and instead, globalization - drawing on low political processes - has since propelled the world with great speed in a very much more revolutionist direction. Had Wight any notion of the very significant changes that were just around the corner he might have qualified his position rather more. This then prompts the question, how did those carrying Wight's legacy engage with the realities of globalization and regional integration that became so powerfully manifest in the years following his death?

In considering English School engagement with change after Wight, it is helpful to look at the way in which Hedley Bull carried forward Wight's legacy as economically driven transformation - especially European integration - became more evident. Although Bull recognized the importance of trade, he did not appear to think that economics should be treated as an autonomously significant factor in international relations. It should be - as in the case of Wight - very much subject to politics. In this regard he was deeply critical of what he described as the neo-idealist tendency of the 1970s to stress economic flows apart from the sovereign state. 'The widening of the agenda of world politics to include greater attention to economic, social and cultural matters did not mean, as Nye and Keohane argued, that "transnational relations" were depriving the states system of its autonomy, but on the contrary that the states system

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was spreading its tentacles to bring areas of "transnational relations" within its grip that had previously been left to the private sector. Possession of scarce resources was a source of power to militarily weak states only for so long as militarily strong states chose not to use their force. More generally, the power or influence exerted by the European community and other civilian actors was conditional upon a strategic environment provided by the military power of states, which they did not control'.[xxii]

Bull's perception of the relative unimportance of economic *vis-à-vis* high political factors translates directly into his understanding of European integration. 'I do not find it helpful to approach the issue by beginning with what seems to me the purely theoretical question whether or not the Europe of community visionaries needs to possess military power if it is to be an effective actor in international affairs. "Europe" is not an actor in international affairs, and does not seem likely to become one; the Europe with which I am concerned is the actual one of state governments, in which a minor role is played, chiefly as instruments of cooperation among governments, by various committees, assemblies and secretariats bearing the designation "European", including those of the EC among others'.[xxiii]

The above quotation makes two principles apparent. First, the logic of economic imperatives is very much subject to that of high political-military logic. Integration projects can take place and seem to develop new actors, but in a world whose structure is fundamentally determined by politico-military concerns, there must be something very inessential/minor about those actors. Real/significant actorhood remains with those who control military concerns, which the EU did not. Second, there is actually a restriction on potential political changes for whilst Bull rejects changes in actorhood via the functionalism of Jean Monnet he also rejects the successful application of political logic, in the tradition of Altierio Spinelli *et al*, to this goal. The reason would seem to relate to his understanding of the role of national identity. 'There is no supranational community in Western Europe but only a group of nation-states (moreover, if there were a supranational authority in Western Europe, *this would be a source of weakness in defence policy rather than a strength; it is the nation-states of Western Europe – France, Germany, Britain – their capacity to inspire loyalty and to make war – that are the sources of its power)'.* (Italics added).[xxiv] Thus, as in the case of Wight, the potential for systemic change arising from low political/economic developments would appear to be entirely subject to transcending, higher, given political realities and, once again, as in the case of Wight, the actual likelihood of high political transformation – on this occasion because of the centrality of the sovereign nation-state – seems remote.

FIRST PRINCIPLE POLITICAL DECISION?
The fact that Bull, contemplating a significantly more globalized world than Wight, did not engage with the possibility that systemic transformation, driven by low-politics economic developments, could change the states system, suggests that, whilst he was committed to history,[xxv] and thus change, there were certain kinds of change he thought very unlikely and maybe even impossible. Indeed, when one accounts for both the use of Kant to suggest that, at the end of the day, political decision is what really determines the future (see Wight, especially endnote xx) and the conviction that the nation-state alone can sustain political loyalty (see Bull), it would seem that within the heart of the early English School, there was something like a first principle conviction that economic imperatives were simply incapable of bringing change.[xxvi]

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At the very least one can state that Wight and Bull thought that: a) economically driven change was not particularly significant and b) the opportunities for political transformation were actually very limited, and that this enabled them to engage with a model of sovereignty that was effectively reified in the sense of being cut off from the key source of domestic openness associated with the domain of internal sovereignty.

The above facilitates a very limited view of change. Mindful of both the priority of the political and the effectively closed nature of sovereignty in the Wightian system, it is very interesting to observe that political imperatives for change in the international system have tended to have an absolute and immediate or fairly immediate impact, whereas economic imperatives have a gradual impact. Consider for example Alan James's account of change as a colony moves at a specific instance, literally a second of time between 23.59 pm and 00.00 midnight to being a fully independent sovereign state. One moment it is not sovereign, the next moment it is fully sovereign. Given that the change of decolonisation does not happen over many years, witnessing the gradual development of new actors and the erosion of others, but rather over a short period of time, there is no need to conceptualise such changes as a process. In the context of decolonisation, secession or unification, sovereignties are gained or lost as wholes at specific moments. If one could eliminate the need for gradual change, one could, in some senses, effectively deal with sovereignty as a reified whole. In reality, however, as well as recognising the need to be able to engage with changes that effect sovereignty at specific moments in time, e.g. decolonisation at midnight on May 19th 2002, one must also recognise the need to be able to deal with changes that impact sovereignty gradually over a process of time and consequentially the imperative for a holistic conception of sovereignty that can cater for change from the inside-out as well as the outside-in.

PERSPECTIVE
In drawing this discussion to a close, it is useful to consider two observations from scholars who have questioned the English School approach to sovereignty.

i. ROY E. JONES: ENGLISH SCHOOL SCIENCE!?
Mindful of the priority of the political and the consequentially effectively closed nature of sovereignty in the Wightian system, it is at this stage possible to obtain an appreciation of the reason why Roy E. Jones ironically associated English School ontology with that of science.[xxvii] To the degree that early English School scholars believed that the high political issues were the most important, there is a sense in which they invoked the *ceteris paribus* condition that underpins modern science, reducing the complexity of the world by effectively setting aside internal bases for change. In so doing they were like the scientist who seeks to isolate certain variables in a laboratory context for the purpose of doing science. This, however, is not appropriate for an approach that wishes to be rooted and historically sensitive. Thus, whilst the traditional English School rejected ahistorical, scientific American IR, for philosophical reasons that resulted in it giving priority to the political, it has ended up with an ontology that is not so dissimilar.

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ii. IAN CLARK: INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL SOVEREIGNTY

Mindful of the need for holism to see change, it is interesting to note Clark's expression of concern about the division between internal and external sovereignty back in 1988. Reviewing Alan James' *Sovereign Statehood,* Clark observed: 'Theoretically, the matter has customarily been disposed of by positing a dualism, in terms of which sovereignty has an internal and an external aspect, resulting in supremacy within, and independence without, the state. Beyond this, presumably, the student of international relations should not decently enquire'.[xxviii] Later Clark returned to the problems of this division specifically addressing concerns about the relationship between sovereignty as a narrowly legal concept which is, as it happens, not divorced from power. 'In the course of invoking the distinction between internal and external sovereignty 'James reiterates the distinction between sovereignty as legal standing as contrasted with the notion of sovereignty as physical capability: 'sovereignty is a matter of law and not of stature' (p. 40). This does not mean that physical attributes are unimportant because the argument is qualified to allow that 'sovereignty requires the consonance of legal and physical realities' (p. 41), although, at the end of the day, the legal condition is not altered by physical realities' (p. 41). This is a less than lucid section of otherwise careful and workmanlike study'.[xxix] For all the reasons given in this research, Clark had every right to be concerned.

CONCLUSION

Endowed with the three traditions spectrum, its commitment to history and its generally cautious approach, the three traditions presents an extremely relevant framework within which to come to terms with sovereignty in the context of change. This capability, however, has been compromised because of the effective implementation of a division between internal and external sovereignty which cuts sovereignty in IR off from an important source of change. In order to engage with the changes in view there is a need for a renewal of the English School, as championed by this thesis, involving its embracing a new holism that can cater for bottom-up, low political/economic change (the domain of internal sovereignty) and top-down, high political change (the domain of external sovereignty).

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[i] Tim Dunne, Tim, *Inventing International Society: A History of the English School,* Basingstoke, Macmillan, 1998, p. 47.

[ii] Martin Wight, *International Theory: The Three Tradition,* London, Continuum, p. 3.

[iii] Martin Wight, 'Why Is There No International Theory?' *Diplomatic Investigations: Essays in the Theory of International Politics,* eds. Herbert Butterfield and Martin Wight, London, George Allen and Unwin, 1966, p. 20.

[iv] Robert Jackson, 'Martin Wight, International Theory and the Good Life', *Millennium,* 19, 1990, p. 264.

[v] Ibid., p. 265.

[vi] Ibid., p. 261.

[vii] Robert Jackson, *Quasi-states: Sovereignty, International Relations and the Third World,* Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1996, p. chapter 1.

[viii] The following sets out a list of examples of the internal external divide and reflections by others on its centrality to the English School:

Historians of political thought 'have traced the development of internal sovereignty, of a supreme law-making authority in each community...'We are more concerned with the development of external sovereignty, the claim to be politically and juridically independent of any superior'. 129-30

Martin Wight, *Systems of States,* Leicester, Leicester University Press, 1977.

'On the one hand, states assert, in relation to [their] territory and population, what may be called internal sovereignty, which means supremacy over all other authorities within that territory and population. On the other hand, they assert what may be called external sovereignty, by which is meant not supremacy but independence of outside authorities'. Hedley Bull, *The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics*, London, Macmillan, 1977.Pp. 8-9

'States necessarily are janus-faced: they simultaneously look inward at their subjects and outward at other states. Although each facet can of course be distinguished analytically and theorised separately, *neither is ontologically independent of the other*'.

Robert Jackson, Martin Wight, International Theory and the Good Life, *Millennium*, 19, 1990, pp. 261.

'Theoretically, the matter has customarily been disposed of by positing a dualism, in terms of which sovereignty has an internal and an external aspect, resulting in supremacy within, and independence without, the state. Beyond this, presumably, the student of international relations should not decently enquire'.

Ian Clark, 'Making sense of sovereignty', *Review of International Studies*, 1988, p. 303.

'But having been brought up in the English school tradition, especially under the influence of Manning and James in this particular respect, I was of the view that there was one most basic, internationally relevant, sense of the word "sovereignty". When the word is used in this specific sense, it is interchangeable with "constitutional independence"; sovereign states are thus constitutionally independent political communities'. Ibid., p. 2.

Hence their talk of sovereignty in its internationally relevant senses as opposed to domestically relevant senses; or external sovereignty as opposed to internal sovereignty. Of the internationally relevant senses, the most basic is said to be the sovereign state's institutional standing as an entity which is constitutionally independent. Ibid., p 2-3.

Suganami, Hidemi, 'Sovereignty, intervention and the English School', presented to 4th Pan-European International Relations Conference, 8-10 September 2001, University of Kent at Canterbury. http://www.leeds.ac.uk/polis/englishschool/

Alan James, 'The Practice of Sovereign Statehood in Contemporary International Society', Sovereignty at the Millennium, Oxford, Blackwell PSA 1999, p. 42.

[ix] Martin Wight, 'Why Is There No International Theory?', p. 21.

[x] Martin Wight, *International Theory: The Three Tradition*, London, Continuum, 2002, p. 2.

[xi] Martin Wight, 'Why Is There No International Theory?', p. 21

[xii] Ibid., p. 22.

[xiii] Robert Jackson, 'Martin Wight, International Theory and the Good Life', *Millennium*, 19, 1990, p. 264.

[xiv] Martin Wight, 'An anatomy of international thought', *Review of International Studies*, 1987, 13, p. 224. Linklater reflects on the economic ingredient of revolutionism in the thought of Jurgen Habemas: Andrew Linklater, *Beyond Realism and Marxism: Critical Theory and International Relations*, Basingstoke, Macmillan, 1990, p. 26.

[xv] Martin Wight, *Systems of States*, p. 192.

[xvi] Ibid., p. 193.

[xvii] Wight, *International Theory*, p. 42.

[xviii] Ibid., p. 8.

[xix] Wight, *Systems of States*, p. 193.

[xx] In considering this point one is confronted with what it perhaps the theoretical basis for Wight's attributing priority to the political. Specifically Wight notes that, having talked about the 'spirit of commerce', as a harbinger of revolutionism (see chapter 5), Kant actually locates the delivery of his revolutionist vision in the development of the conviction that the alternative of war is too dreadful. Thus economic logic by itself would appear not to be enough. Revolutionism ultimately depends upon political decision. Wight, 'Why There is No International Theory', p 28.

[xxi] Hedley Bull, 'Introduction: Martin Wight and the study of international relations', *Systems of States*, p. 12.

[xxii] Hedley Bull, 'Civilian Power Europe: A Contradiction in Terms', *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 1982, pp. 150-1.

[xxiii] Ibid, p., p. 151,

[xxiv] Ibid., p. 163.

This assertion has been the source of much frustration! See Thomas Dietz & Richard Whitman, 'Analysing European Integration: Reflecting on the English School – Scenarios for an Encounter', *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 2002, Volume 4-0. Number 1 and Charlotte Bretherton and John Vogler, *The European Union as a Global Actor*, London, Routledge, 1999, p. 2.

On the subject of loyalty specifically Bull's comments resonate with those of Wight.
'Modern man in general has shown a stronger loyalty to the state than to church or class or any other international bond. A power is a modern sovereign state in its external aspect, and it might almost be defined as the ultimate loyalty for which men today will fight'. *Power Politics*, ed. Hedley Bull and Carsten Holbrand, Leicester, Leicester University Press 1978, p. 25.

[xxv] It is interesting to note that Grotius who is used to characterise the rationalist tradition which was the central novelty of the English School contribution, providing the basis for a commitment to openness in the sense of recognising that a measure of sociability could be depended upon without the compulsion of a global executive, did not uphold such a liberal view when dealing with domestic government. In this sense, whilst he was committed to the measure of openness which has come to characterise rationalism, he did not identify an openness emerging from within the domain associated with internal sovereignty. Thus, although this influential English School figurehead did not posit a divide between internal and external sovereignty, to the extent that his openness came from the 'outside-in' rather than the 'inside-out', it had the effect of presenting a model of sovereignty that was closed off to internal openness and change. '[H]owever much Grotius may be reckoned to have upheld progressive causes in matters of international relations, in his view of domestic society and politics he was the champion of absolutist forms of government, and hostile to notions of popular or national self-determination and to the right of oppressed subjects to rebel against their rulers'. Hedley Bull, 'The Importance of Grotius in the Study of International Relations, *Hugo Grotius and International Relations*, eds. Hedley Bull, Benedict Kingsley and Adam Watson, Oxford, Clarendon, 2002. p 66.

[xxvi] Talking in these terms perhaps suggests that more recent European integration and globalization has witnessed economic processes overpowering political decision. In relation to this of course one must remember that every step of European integration depends of the decisions of member states. Furthermore, states have done much to regulate and hold economic globalization to account so that growth in maximised in an acceptable way. Challenging the early English School preference for undergirding political factors is not for asserting a crude economic determinism which would, quite apart from anything else undermine the contention of this thesis that sovereignty, whilst eroded, endures. It is simply to demonstrate that political decisions that do embrace integration, perhaps largely in response to economic imperatives, can change the international arena in the sense of developing new international actors, and change the balance in the relative importance of actors. In short economic factors can inform political decisions that bring gradual transformation to the international system.

[xxvii] Roy E. Jones, 'The English school of international relations: a case for closure', *Review of International Studies* 1981, 7, p. 3 (regarding the abstraction of sovereignty) pp. 7 – 8 and pp. 10-11 (regarding the way it parallels science). Interestingly Andrew Hurrell also notes this curious connection between the English school and American IR Andrew Hurrell, 'Society and Anarchy in the 1990s', BA Robertson ed. *International Society and the Development of International Relations Theory*, London, Pinter, 1998, p.20.

[xxviii] Ian Clark, 'Making sense of sovereignty', *Review of International Studies*, 1988, p. 303.
[xxix] Ibid., p. 305.

APPENDIX 2

EUROPEAN INTEGRATION, GOVERNANCE &
THE CONTEMPORARY ENGLISH SCHOOL

Although the implications of the divide between internal and external sovereignty have dominated and undoubtedly informed the lack of English School engagement with governance theory and European integration, it is important to note that in recent years there have been some significant changes. These have been helpful in the sense that they have facilitated greater engagement with change but less than helpful - as the main body of the text suggested (hence their treatment in an appendix) - at dealing with sovereignty in the context of that change. This appendix will consider one example of ES engagement with change in the context of European integration which does not see this change in terms of the member states whose status is ongoing (Dietz and Whitman) and one example of ES engagement with change in the context of European integration which does posit the demise of the sovereign nation-state but provides no framework within which to conceptualise the process of that demise (Wæver).

1. Dietz and Whitman

A recent approach to European integration which engages very much more with the possibilities of change than earlier investigations into European integration is that presented by Thomas Dietz and Richard Whitman. This, however, is not particularly useful for the purposes of defining a model of revolutionism that actually unbundles sovereignty because it does not engage with the transformational impact of flows on the sovereign state. Although it certainly does not represent an example of positivist regime theory, the Dietz and Whitman approach has some parallels in the sense that its focus on the connections between states (society) is such that they do not give close attention to the impact of these flows on the sovereign state. To the degree that there is an assumption that connections flow between states, this approach can be read as having the effect of reifying the state, at least to some degree. Dietz and Whitman's focus on the connections (society) between actors rather than the connections and the actors is almost certainly a function of the traditional English School predisposition to focus on international society informed by the divide between internal and external sovereignty (see chapter 3 and Appendix 1). The reification of the state is also assisted by a commitment to the principle that if allowed to develop in an unconstrained manner world society/revolutionism will undermine international society/rationalism which, in their judgement, would be inappropriate.[i]

2. Wæver

Ole Wæver, drawing on the work of Adam Watson, meanwhile, has developed understanding of European integration by making reference to the notion of 'empire' and its expressions across the centuries. Historically empire has tended to present a form of rule through concentric circles that has extended from: 'direct rule' in the centre; to 'dominion' in which subject communities have a measure of internal autonomy but no external autonomy; to 'hegemony' where states have complete internal autonomy but are either controlled or influenced externally; to 'sovereign states' where polities are entirely independent. There is thus an important measure of flexibility, decentralisation and subsidiarity in the imperial model.

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Engaging directly with the functional developments that have provoked the specialisation that has called into being multi-dimensional governance, Wæver contends that the decentralised rule associated with concentric circles would seem to be coming of age once again because the centralised rule associated with the modern state has become too expensive. 'Throughout the 1980s, the order of the day has been deregulation, flexibilisation and privatisation. In the private sphere, firms have undertaken divisionalisation, decentralisation and franchising'.[ii] In this context the suggestion is that '[s]tructural trends in political economy could make suzerainty and soft empires possible options, although not necessarily the models to be emulated around the world, nor options inherently inferior to centralised national states'.[iii]

Mindful of the decentralised, concentric nature of imperial rule, Wæver introduces a distinction between 'radial' and 'territorial' political power. 'Empires are about radial not territorial power; the former are differentiated, the latter homogenous'.[iv] Wæver continues, 'both classical empires and some modern federations like the EU take the radial, concentric circles form, while both centralised nation-states and some federations (the USA, Germany) are territorial and homogenous power units. The concentric-circle features of the three contemporary power centres of Europe are therefore better visualised through the lens of "empires" than federations.[v]

Wæver's contribution through his consideration of 'empire' is significant for providing a model that engages with change. Helpful perspective on this capability can be seen by considering his rationale for developing his approach against that of regime theory which ended up focusing on increasing connections between *enduring sovereign state actors*. The purpose of adopting an English School approach was precisely because it would engage with a form of transformation that would *not take the endurance of the sovereign state for granted*. This basic sense of openness is confirmed by a commitment to a measure of construction. 'The English School, by introducing the elements of time and meaning, thereby opens up analysis to more than just the mechanical laws governing relations between sovereign states. We still study "power politics", but not in an abstract world of physical forces; it is re-inserted into a general history of human cultures and polities'.[vi]

In true revolutionist style Wæver's account of change actually involves his rejecting the notion of sovereignty. His rationale for doing-so is best understood by reference to his critique of Michael Doyle's definition of empires which states that they 'are relationships of political control imposed by some political societies over the effective sovereignty of other political societies'. The trouble with this definition, Wæver contends, is that it treats 'societies' as given and constant units which is problematic 'because when one moves towards the imperial end, it is the empire as such that becomes a political unit with a centre and to varying degrees rules this larger space and acts as a unit towards the external world. It is a mode of political organisation extending over an area which combines a particular mix of central authority and local powers. To define it as the (unequal) relationship between central and peripheral units is to interpret empires through the lens of sovereign equality; as a deviation from some privileged norm'.[vii] The benefits of the empire approach are that 'it ensures that we avoid analysing the contemporary constellation of power in terms of the straitjacket imposed by assumptions of sovereign equality, a move which would seriously compromise our ability to understand the emergent political pattern'.[viii]

Later he observes: 'Instead of envisioning a world of geographic states, borders, and expanses of pink, green and yellow on the map, we have to think in terms of spots, degrees of control, and subordinate centres at lower levels, which can accommodate each other without demanding "equality" and without recognising any "sovereign" authority'.[ix]

It is not the purpose of this appendix to suggest that it is not helpful to consider the rise of governance through the model of empire completely apart from sovereignty. For the purpose of this thesis, however, as it seeks to come to terms with the capability of the three traditions to engage with sovereignty and change, the simple rejection of sovereignty generates a radical disjunction rather than explaining the process of change.[x]

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[i] Dietz, Thomas, & Whitman, Richard, 'Analysing European Integration: Reflecting on the English School – Scenarios for an Encounter', *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 2002, Volume 4-0. Number 1, p. 54.

[ii] Ole Wæver, 'Europe's Three Empires: A Watsonian Interpretation of Post-Wall European Security,' *International Society after the Cold War: Anarchy and Order Reconsidered*, eds. Rick Fawn and Jeremy Larkins, London, Macmillan, 1996, p. 247.

[iii] Ibid., p. 248.

[iv] Ibid., p. 226.

[v] Ibid., p. 246.

[vi] Ibid., p. 221.

[vii] Ibid., p. 226.

[viii] Ibid.

[ix] Ibid., p.240. It is interesting to note that, whilst Wæver's work on European integration draws on Watson's reflections on empire, Watson's own reflections about European integration (noted by chapter 4) seem to talk of it in is terms of the extension of sovereignty rather than the unbundling of sovereignty. 'In Europe we are witnessing a strong upsurge, or revival, of confederal tendencies towards major voluntary limitations of the independence of its member states'. He goes on to talk about 'this reaction in favour of supranational authority'. Adam Watson, *The limits of Independence: Relations between states in the modern world,* London, Routledge, 1992, pp. 3-4. The Union which the federalists seek involves the gradual but steady surrender of the freedom of action of its once independent member states, externally and internally, until they become little more than autonomous province ceremonially still dressed in the trappings of sovereignty.' Ibid. p. 34.

[x] Another recent publication which makes a number of references to European integration is Barry Buzan's *From International to World Society?* These comments constitute tantalizingly brief reflections that consider different possibilities but never pursue them into detailed study. Sometimes he writes of the EU simply as an intense form of international society (121, 211) whereas at others he makes it clear that its solidarist intensity is such that it can result in the transformation of the actors concerned (92, 211). Whether this should be translated into a new state (change by extension) or the unbundling of the state (change by erosion) is not clear. His reference on page 203, which fits into the conventional cosmopolitan definition of revolutionism gets closest to defining unbundled sovereignty in the tradition of governance. 'Each type of unit would be acknowledged by the others as holding legal and political status independently, not as a gift from either of the others. Individuals and firms would thus become subjects of international law in their own right. Humankind has not yet seen a world society in this sense, though the EU may be heading in that direction'. *From International to World Society: English School Theory and the Social Structure of Globalisation*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2004.

APPENDIX 3

THE IDENTITY BETWEEN WALES AND CHRISTIANITY

Between 450-600 AD 'Christianity and the life of the emerging nation had become so tightly interlaced as to be virtually indistinguishable, and for nearly a millennium-and-a-half Welsh identity and religious affiliation became totally entwined'.

Prof. D. Densil Morgan[i]

'From the outset the Christian religion seemed to be part of the essence of Welshness'.

Prof. Glanmour Williams[ii]

The close relationship between Welsh identity and Christianity, which profoundly impacted the definition of Welsh proto-nationalism, has its basis in approximately fifteen hundred years of history. Christianity played a crucial role in the formation of Welsh identity on two counts. First, as Gwynfor Evans observes, the Welsh language, and thus Welsh identity, emerged between the 4th and 7th centuries at the very time when Christianity was taking hold in the land of Wales.[iii] Second, at this same time Welsh identity was strengthened by virtue of its distinction from that of its neighbours in modern day 'England' who were the initially heathen Anglo-Saxons.[iv] Religious distinction was sustained, moreover, when Anglo-Saxon England adopted Christianity, since, despite experiments with Celtic Christianity, the nation became predominantly Roman Catholic from the Council of Whitby in 664. Wales, meanwhile, maintained the Celtic Christian tradition. This distinction went to the very heart of Welsh identity partly because of the bold way in which 'little Wales' rejected the powerful Catholic Church's attempt, through St Augustine, to enforce itself on the nation as it had England.[v]

The late Phil Williams put it like this:

'Perhaps the first expression of nationhood representing the whole peninsular of modern Wales was the convocation of bishops that met in 602 before going to greet Augustine on the banks of the Severn. It is claimed that this meeting took place in Llangoed, and if so Llangoed Hall can be regarded as the site of the first National Assembly. ...Augustine failed to greet the Welsh bishops with sufficient respect, and the full unity with the Catholic Church was delayed for 166 years'.[vi]

In 786 Wales' bishops finally accepted the Roman date for Easter, but made no other significant concessions to Catholicism until the arrival of the Normans.[vii]

When the Normans came they sought to take Wales out of the Celtic world and into Latin Europe, introducing changes which impacted all areas of life including church.[viii] Whilst the Norman period generally witnessed the attempted suppression of the Celtic tradition, however, Wales resisted valiantly and, contrary to earlier times when, although not ruled from abroad, there was no single national government, it

was during this era that the Welsh princes sought after united national government. This witnessed the celebrated expression of Wales and Welsh identity through the leadership of Owain Glyndwr. Between 1400-8 Glyndwr expelled the Anglo-Normans, united Wales and strategically took Welsh church governance from Canterbury, restoring it to St David's.[ix] Again religion was a key basis for identity distinction which both animated the quest, and formed the foundation, for independence.

The close relationship between Wales and Christianity however, arguably became even more intense in the context of the denial of political freedom after the Act of Union in 1534 and the translation of the Bible into Welsh. The Act of Union, seeking to generate a strong cultural joining between England and Wales, 'prohibited all "sinister usages" of the Welsh language henceforth, in any public sphere'.[x] The language of governance and the law courts thus became English. An exception, however, was made for the churches where it was hoped that the translation of the Bible into Welsh would provide a surer means for the engagement of the Welsh with Protestantism.[xi]

'The Welsh Bible of 1588 (along with the Welsh Book of Common Prayer of 1567) ensured that the only official and public use to which Welsh might be put was religious: its civil status taken by the Act of Union, was restored by the 1588 Bible, but transferred to a spiritual plane'. This was of enormous strategic significance for Welsh identity which was in an important sense spiritualised by the Elizabethan linguistic division of labour. '[T]he association of language and religion gave Welsh something of the odour of sanctity, making it a symbol and a tabernacle of a separate national-religious identity'.[xii]

The spiritualisation of Wales and the Welsh language, inherent in this identity, is demonstrated powerfully by the following statement from the Rev. William Roberts. 'When the world is spoken of on the Sabbath, then let care be taken that one speaks of it in English, lest our ancient Welsh tongue be sullied by such a usage'.[xiii]

Such was the strength of the relationship between Wales, the Welsh language and Christianity that, 'The revival of Welsh identity became identified with evangelical religion, most especially Nonconformism, which, if it was conscious of the Welsh national past, was perceived as being a break with that past, and as the creating of a new, vibrant and essentially Protestant Wales. ...By 1885, three-quarters of the population of Wales were members of Nonconformist churches, the majority of which used Welsh as their sole language of worship'. In this context; 'Being Welsh was within a hairsbreadth of meaning the same as being a Christian. It was difficult to describe national characteristics without referring to Christianity'.[xiv] 'In the nineteenth-century vision, Wales is considered primarily as socio-religious unity, in the Wales as Church paradigm'.[xv]

The nature of Welsh history, especially its close relationship with the language, informed the development of Welsh proto-nationalism whose foundations were laid in the mid to late nineteenth century by Rev Michael D Jones, Principal of the Congregationalist college at Bala and the Methodist writer, Emrys ap Iwan finding their initial expression in Cymru Fydd and then later in Plaid Cymru. DH Davies in his history of Plaid Cymru notes the very considerable influence of Christianity and

non-conformist ministers in particular.[xvi] Indeed, four of the early presidents were devout Christians, Lewis Valentine[xvii] was a Baptist minister, Saunders Lewis[xviii] was a nonconformist who rather unusually became a Catholic whilst president of Plaid, Prof. JE Daniels[xix] was actually a professional theologian and a minister and Gwynfor Evans who was the president of the Union of Welsh Independents nonconformist denomination.[xx] This laid the foundation for the intense involvement of theology in the definition of Welsh nationalism cited by Prof. R Tudur Jones[xxi] and Dorian Llywelyn in the body of chapter 9.[xxii]

Bearing the association between Welsh identity and Christianity in mind, it is not surprising that the creation of a National Assembly for Wales should have provoked further academic reflection on this theme and is the introductory point of departure of Pope's *Religion and National Identity*.[xxiii]

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[i] D Densil Morgan, 'The Essence of Welshness"?: Some Aspects of Christian Faith and National Identity in Wales, c 1900-2000' *Religion and National Identity Wales and Scotland c 1700-2000*, ed. Robert Pope, Cardiff, University of Wales Press, 2001, p. 139.

[ii] Glanmour Williams 'The Welsh and their Religion', Cardiff, 1991, p. 14.

[iii] Gwynfor Evans, *The Fight for Welsh Freedom*, Talybont, Y Lolfa Cyf, 2000, p. 17.

[iv] Gwyn A. Williams, *When Was Wales: A History of the Welsh?* London, Penguin, 1991, pp. 43-44. The Anglo Saxon contrast gave rise to an important source for Welsh identity even before Wales existed as a nation through its use by the British monk Gildas (540 AD). Gildas saw the history of the British (Celtic Church) through the prism of Israel, whilst the Anglo-Saxons were classified as the non-Israel, 'heathens', giving rise to the basis for an identity between Wales and the Kingdom of God. Dorian Llywelyn describes this identity as the 'Wales-Israel' paradigm see: Llywelyn, Dorian, *Sacred Place, Chosen People: Land and National Identity in Welsh Spirituality*, Cardiff, University of Wales Press, 1999, pp. 80-91.

[v] Gwyn A Williams, *When Was Wales*, pp. 43-44.

[vi] Phil Williams, *The Psychology of Distance*, Cardiff, Welsh Academic Press, 2002, p. 23.

[vii] Ibid.

[viii] Gwyn A Williams, *When Was Wales*, p. 62, & pp. 68-68.

[ix] Peter Beresford Ellis, *The Celtic Revolution: A Study in Anti-Imperialism*, Y lollfa Cyf, Talybont, pp. 77-78.

[x] Llywelyn, *Sacred Place, Chosen People*, p. 47.

[xi] Indeed, quite apart from the language of the Bible, Anglican Churches were required by statute to conduct their services in Welsh in those places where Welsh was the dominant language, see Geraint Tudur, 'Howell Harris and the Issue of Welsh Identity', *Religion and National Identity: Wales and Scotland c1700-2000*, p. 55.

[xii] Llywelyn, *Sacred Place, Chosen People*, p. 48. Also see, Beresford Ellis, *The Celtic Revolution*, pp. 78-79.

[xiii] Quoted by R. Tudur Jones 'Yr Eglwysi a'r Iaith yn Oes Victoria', *Llen Cyymru*, 19 (1996) 165. Trans by Ibid., p. 51. On the role of the 'language of heaven' see also. WP Griffith, 'Preaching Second to No Other under the Sun': Edward Matthews, the Nonconformist Pulpit and Welsh Identity during the Mid-Nineteenth Century', *Religion and National Identity*, pp. 61-83.

[xiv] Llywelyn, *Sacred Place, Chosen People*, p. 49.

[xv] Ibid., p. 50.

[xvi] 'The high proportion of nonconformist ministers among the party's members reflected their attachment to the chapel-going tradition of Welsh speaking Wales. Out of a sample of 28 leading party figures, there were 14 Calvinistic Methodists, 8 Congregationalists, 2 Baptists, 2 Anglicans and 2 Roman Catholics. Nationalists held their meetings, as one member put it, in 'secluded chapel vestries' and not in workmen's institutes or upstairs rooms in public houses...' D. Hywel Davies, *The Welsh Nationalist Party 1925-45*, Cardiff, University of Wales Press, 1983, p. 205. The close relationship between Welsh identity and Christianity is readily demonstrated in the following comment from Kenneth O. Morgan regarding Plaid Cymru. 'The Welsh culture and the Christian

message were the twin poles of the new party's ideology'. *Rebirth of a Nation: Wales 1880-1980*, Oxford, Oxford University Press/University of Wales Press, 1982, p. 207.

[xvii] D. Densil Morgan, *The Span of the Cross: Christian Religion and Society in Wales 1914-2000*, Cardiff, University of Wales Press, 1999, p. 74 and Laura McAllister, *Plaid Cymru: The Emergence of a Political Party,* pp. 44-47.

[xviii] Williams, *When Was Wales?,* p. 284. Indeed Williams argues that Lewis' Catholicism was a major reason why he was pushed from the presidency in 1939. Ibid., p. 284. D. H. Davies documents the hostility expressed to Saunders Lewis in more detail. Davies, *The Welsh Nationalist Party 1925-1945*, pp. 198-200 and Laura McAllister, *Plaid Cymru: The Emergence of a Political Party,* p. 47.

[xix] D. Densil Morgan, *The Span of the Cross: Christian Religion and Society in Wales 1914-2000*, p. 157. Peter Beresford Ellis, *The Celtic Revolution*, p. 85.

[xx] Llywelyn, *Sacred Place, Chosen People,* p. 57.

[xxi] 'It is a noteworthy fact that nationalist thought in Wales has been founded by men with strong Christian convictions. Michael D. Jones, Emyr ap Iwan, Thomas Gee, Thomas E. Ellis, E. T. John, J. E. Daniel, J. R. Jones, Saunders Lewis, Gwenallt, D. J. Williams, Miall Edward, Gwynfor Evans, Waldo Williams, J. Gwyn Griffiths, Pennar Davies, D. Eiwyn Morgan, to mention no others', R. Tudur Jones, 'Christian Nationalism', *This Land and People* ed Paul H. Ballard and D. Huw Jones, Collegiate Centre of Theology, University College, Cardiff, 1979. p. 74.

[xxii] Llywelyn, *Sacred Place, Chosen People*, p. 47.

[xxiii] Robert Pope, 'Introduction', *Religion and National Identity Wales and Scotland c 1700-2000,* p 1.

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APPENDIX 4

SOVEREIGNTY IN WELSH PROTO-NATIONALISM

Some might respond with surprise to the assertion that Welsh nationalism has relevance to the conceptualisation of state sovereignty given that it has often sought to avoid using the term. This appendix will first examine the basis for suggesting that Welsh proto-nationalism has no interest in sovereignty (Part 1) before considering the actual basis for a very clear relationship between the two (Part 2).

PART 1: SOVEREIGNTY, COMMUNITY AND WELSH NATIONALISM

The rejection of sovereignty is implicated in the common reference point found in neo-medievalism which John Osmond argues generates what he describes as an organic, Aristotelian emphasis on roots and the 'bottom-up'. This perspective - which can be equally well attributed to the Celtic worldview - celebrates grounded, local, subjective relationships with the environment both human and physical.[i] Rejecting the British state tradition with its quest for splendid monistic definition from the outside-in, Welsh identity is far more concerned with the community from the inside-out.[ii] If one starts from the most immediate community and works outwards one soon discovers that there are a whole series of communities on differing levels that come together to constitute what Saunders Lewis termed that 'community of communities', Wales.[iii] Thus construed Wales was, Lewis claimed, one of the old European nations of the 'essentially pre-national age' of the Respublica Christiana which offered the nation a far greater measure of autonomy than that given to Wales as a member of the United Kingdom. This was, however, critically less than the complete autonomy associated with the materialistic and highly statist nationalism of the modern era.

It would be possible to locate many expressions of the bottom-up, decentralized tradition of Welsh proto- (and indeed contemporary) nationalism which find classic expression in the oft used characterization of Wales a 'community of communities'. For the purpose of obtaining a brief over-view, however, this appendix cites two examples one from the late 19th century and one from the 20th.

The leading 19th century Welsh nationalist and President of the Congregationalist College at Bala, Michael D Jones, wanted Wales to become politically independent but was very clear that he did not want Wales to pursue centralised 'scientific' statehood. In his judgement, as R Tudur Jones observed, this would become 'a menace to precisely those values which have given Welsh life its distinctive social flavour ...And so in his thinking, the principle of centralization, of nationality, was balanced by the principle of localization'.[iv]

Celebration of the local is also reflected in the work of the Welsh nationalist Baptist (and then later Quaker) poet Waldo Williams. In his thinking the import of the local is such that it is through the local that one encounters the national. In William's thinking, Llywelyn explains: '[t]he Kingdom is built up in and through the specific, the concrete and the local. In Waldo's terms, there is no brotherhood, unless individual, specific people live practically ...Only in the space of the bro – the place of one's own neighbourhood – may national identity be made real and experienced ...Wales as place and as nation can only be experienced in the local'.[v] To underline

this important point that goes right to the heart of Welsh proto-nationalism's decentralized ethic, Llywelyn later continues, 'there is for Waldo no opposition but mutually necessary complementarity between the local and the national, ...'[vi]

The depth of commitment to decentralised community, meanwhile, supposedly negatively related to sovereignty, is also seen in Roger Tanner's article 'National Identity and the One Wales Model'. In a list of Welsh characteristics he includes '"Brogarwch" (love of locality), "Cymdogaeth" (good-neighbourliness) ...strong kinship ties, a tradition of home ownership, scattered and small-scale close-knit communities ...The result of these [and other features] is a society of warm, intimate, radical communities, which inspires a love of country in both Welsh and English-speaking Welshmen alike. Perhaps "Cydymunedaeth" (literally "co-communityism") or some other word could be popularised as summarising the social aspects of the Welsh identity'. [vii]

The Welsh conviction that authentic community identity must necessarily derive from the bottom-up, from a subjective rootedness in community, results in great criticism of the perceived source of the objectivism which cuts British identity off from its roots, the sovereign British state.[viii] It is suggestive of a legal shell, the foundation of an outer boundary, comprehension of which requires an outside perspective, and an objective position from which one can survey the whole nation. This is not really consistent with the notion of having an internal, subjective posture within a nation which, whilst a cohesive community in one sense, is actually a mass of many contingent communities. As a result of its concerns about sovereignty, Welsh nationalism usually avoids the language of sovereignty. Collapsing its conception of sovereignty into a narrow British model, defined in terms of the destruction of roots, the rhetoric of sovereignty has not been attractive in most Welsh nationalist circles. [ix]

The perceived negative relationship between sovereignty and community and the celebration of the latter in favour of the former can be seen in Richard Wyn Jones' article entitled 'Care of the Community', which is deeply critical of the place of sovereignty within the British polity. He laments that many of the Welsh Liberals of the 19th century were taken in by this alien notion. '[T]heir political thinking never escaped from the shackles of parliamentary sovereignty and the unitary state despite all their romantic blather about the hen and wlad and its gwerin'.[x] The same was also true for many twentieth century Welsh Socialists, no doubt because of the modern objectivism which underpinned their creed. '[U]ltimately, Labour and the Left, like the Liberals before them, fetishized parliamentary sovereignty and the unitary state'.[xi]

PART 2: CHAMPIONS OF A WELSH SOVEREIGNTY
The above consideration of Welsh proto-nationalism reveals an agenda that has been all about distancing the Welsh approach from that of Britain. To the extent that British identity celebrates sovereignty Welsh identity must not! In reality, however, whilst the rhetoric of national sovereignty has not been attractive to much of Welsh nationalism, the reality of their agenda has not concurred with this abstinence in any way, unless you subscribe to a very narrow Jean Bodin - Thomas Hobbes definition of sovereignty which includes the centralisation of power/control.[xii]

Perhaps the most dramatic admissions of the desire of Welsh proto-nationalism for sovereignty can be found in its aspirations in the international arena where it sought objectives that were wholly at variance with an absence of sovereignty. Plaid in the

1920s-30s contended that Wales should be granted Dominion status within the British Empire and be welcomed into the League of Nations.[xiii]

Whilst Dominion status involved a certain institutionalised deference to Britain, this restraint did not change the fact that those nations with Dominion status had their own governments, foreign ministries and defence forces and could not be forced down a political avenue against their will. To this extent they must consequently be conceived as the bearers of sovereignty. Similarly membership of the League of Nations was the preserve of sovereign states. Its founding Covenant specifically undertook 'to protect and preserve …the territorial integrity and existing *political independence* of all Members' (Article 10)[xiv] (Italics added).

Rather more recently Gwynfor Evans wrote passionately of Wales' right to membership of the United Nations. 'Forty countries in the UNO, most of them new, have a smaller population than Wales. Iceland, whose population is smaller than Cardiff's is placed next to India in the General Assembly. The representatives of Wales would sit between Venezuela and Yemen, which came into existence during the last century and a half. It is outrageous that Wales, an old European nation whose civilisation goes back to Roman time, is excluded from the international community'.[xv] Again one of the conditions of membership of the United Nations is that a state is sovereign. Such is its importance that it features right at the beginning of the UN Charter in Article 2 (7) which enshrines the principle of the equal sovereignty of all Members.[xvi] Indeed such is the identity between the UN and sovereignty, as seen in chapter 3, that accession is recognised as often being the first key international authentication of a polity becoming sovereign. [xvii]

Less dramatically, but nonetheless importantly, Welsh proto-nationalism also expressed objectives in relationship to Europe that were not consistent with the denial of sovereignty. Long before the advent of the European Economic Community, Saunders Lewis, inspired by the *Respublica Christiana*, advocated the creation of a European supranation that would provide participating nations a healthy measure of autonomy. It would be enough to prevent the suffocation and control of the kind Wales endured in its relationship with England but less than the complete autonomy that led to the materialistic and highly statist nationalism of the modern period.[xviii] The granting of this measure of autonomy would critically result in the nations concerned having international personality, and an inner core of competencies pertaining to that personality over which they would or could not generally be overruled. This would produce an arrangement not unlike that later sought by the SNP in its EU strategy of 'sovereignty in Europe' or Plaid's own, recently amended, 'full national status' strategy. Both these approaches would, if implemented, have resulted in Scotland and Wales being able to engage in the intergovernmentalism of the Union with respect to those issues still determined by consensus. Those states would obtain sovereignty to the extent of consensus competencies.[xix]

CONCLUSION
It would seem that many Welsh nationalists have associated sovereignty with centralisation and top-down control. In truth, however, from the perspective of IR, sovereignty has nothing to do with centralisation or decentralisation which are decisions facing every sovereign state about the structure of its government. One sovereign state might be centralised another highly decentralised. Welsh proto-

nationalism clearly sought after sovereignty but for the purpose of seeking after a decentralised polity.

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[i] To some degree the significance attributed to the medieval view is the result of the work of Saunders Lewis whose conversion to Catholicism gave him a very high regard for medievalism. This controversial departure from his roots, however - he was the son of a non-conformist minister and was himself a non-conformist when he became leader of Plaid Cymru, converting whilst in office – did not cause Welsh nationalism to cease to be Protestant. (Williams, Gwyn A. *When Was Wales: A History of the Welsh?* London, Penguin, 1991, p. 284.) Indeed Williams argues that Lewis' Catholicism was a reason why he was pushed from the presidency in 1939. (Ibid., p. 284.) Also see: D. Hywel Davies, *The Welsh Nationalist Party 1925-45*, Cardiff, University of Wales Press, 1983, pp. 198-200 and Laura McAllister, *Plaid Cymru: The Emergence of a Political Party*, Bridgend, Seren, 2001, p. 47.

[ii] Osmond, John, *Creative Conflict*, Llandysul, Gomer Press (and London, Routledge), 1977, p. 172, p. 247 and p. 250.

[iii] Ioan Bowen Rees, *Government by Community*, London, Charles Knight and Co, 1971, p. 209.

[iv] Jones, R. Tudur, *The Desire of Nations*, Ammanford, Christopher Davies Publishers, 1974, p. 187.

[v] Dorian Llywelyn, *Sacred Place, Chosen People: Land and National Identity in Welsh Spirituality*, Cardiff, University of Wales Press, 1999, p. 164.

[vi] Ibid., p. 165.

[vii] Roger Tanner, 'National Identity and the One Wales Model', *Planet: The Welsh Internationalist*, April/May 1973, pp. 32-33.

[viii] Laura McAllister, 'The Perils of Community as a Construct for the Political Ideology of Welsh Nationalism', *Government and Opposition*, Vol. 33, No 4, Autumn, 1998, p. 508.
McAllister's article is beneficial to this research to the extent that it helps to demonstrate the centrality of the concept of community to Plaid thinking which underpins its worldview and thus approach to sovereignty. To the extent that she acknowledges this tradition in order to be critical, however, some might question whether reference to this article is helpful. In response to this, though, one must recognize that McAllister criticizes Plaid's deployment of 'community' from the perspective of electoral success. Community has not helped Plaid at election time. Whether that is the case or not has no bearing on the spatio-temporal facility of the cultural lens provided by theologically disclosed Welsh proto-nationalism and its capacity to come to terms with globalization.

[ix] Richard Wyn Jones, 'The Council of the Isles', *Planet 136*, August September 1999, p. 77.
This is not to say that others have not happily spoken of the need for Wales to become a sovereign state. See the following as an example: 'Welshmen must strengthen the bond of brotherhood between them that they may create *a sovereign State* of their own to which Welshmen can offer unembarrassed allegiance'. R. Tudur Jones, *The Desire of Nations*, p. 205. Standing outside Welsh proto-nationalism, examining sovereignty in the twenty-first century, in the context of the 2003 Plaid Cymru leadership contest, the non-conformist minister, the Rev. Rhodri Glyn Thomas, Assembly Member for Carmarthen East and Dinefwr began to celebrate the virtues if sovereignty describing himself as a 'sovereigntist' Rhodri Glyn Jones, 'Sovereignty without Separation', *Agenda*, Institute of Welsh Affairs, Cardiff, Summer 2003, pp. 39-40. (It is interesting to note an ongoing relationship between Plaid and non-conformity even in later modern Welsh nationalism.)

[x] Richard Wyn Jones, 'Care of the Community', *Planet: The Welsh Internationalist*, 109, p. 17.

[xi] Ibid., p. 18.

[xii] It is worth pointing out at this stage (as has been noted elsewhere) that the Welsh academic who christened the 'English School', was of the opinion that sovereignty should be understood in terms of centralization and the negation of constitutionalism. 'An achievement of the liberal tradition is to have constructed a notion, and structure, of statehood which is the antithesis of sovereignty. The liberal state was inspired by a passion to regulate, even do away with sovereigns. Roy E. Jones, 'The English school of international relations: a case for closure', *Review of International Studies*, 1981, p. 6.

[xiii] Davies, *The Welsh Nationalist Party*, p. 93.

[xiv] Robert Jackson, 'Sovereignty in world Politics: a Glance at the Conceptual and Historical Landscape, 'Sovereignty in World Politics: a Glance at the Conceptual and Historical Landscape', *Sovereignty at the Millennium*, ed. Robert Jackson, Political Studies, Oxford, Blackwell, 1999. p. 24.

[xvxv] Gwynfor Evans, *Fighting for Wales*, Talybont, Y Lolfa Cyf, 1991, p. 156.
Although not part of the development of early Plaid Cymru, and thus Welsh proto-nationalism, the curious nature of Plaid's position in relationship to sovereignty continues. It was eloquently demonstrated during the 2001 General Election campaign when Plaid Cymru's Westminster leader,

Elfyn Llwyd MP was interviewed by Andrew Rawnsley on Radio 4's 'Westminster Hour'. Mr Llwyd said that Plaid would like to see Wales having membership of the United Nations but was not looking for Wales to become a sovereign state. Mr Rawnsley then asked Mr Llwyd how many states were members of the United Nations were not sovereign to which Mr Llwyd replied that he thought there were a few. Mr Rawnsley then informed Mr Llwyd that there are none because one cannot be a member of the United Nations unless one is a sovereign state.

Rhodri Glyn Thomas AM and Adam Price MP have interestingly since called for Plaid to embrace sovereignty whilst rejecting the quest for full independence. They argue that this circle can be squared via the category of UN membership called 'free association' (see chapter 3) with respect to which a state is sovereign but continues to have constitutional ties to larger polities. See Rhodri Glyn Jones, 'Sovereignty without Separation', pp. 39-40.

xvi Robert Jackson, 'Sovereignty in world Politics: a Glance at the Conceptual and Historical Landscape', *Sovereignty at the Millennium*, ed. Robert Jackson, Political Studies, Oxford, Blackwell, 1999. p. 24.

xvii Alan James, 'Sovereignty: Ground Rule or Gibberish?' *Review of International Studies*, 1984, p. 11.

xviii Davies, *The Welsh Nationalist Party*, p. 115.

xix Laura McAllister, *Plaid Cymru: The Emergence of a Political Party*, pp. 149-150.

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