

A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF
THE EARLY BUDDHIST THEORY OF CAUSALITY
AS EMBODIED IN THE PALI NIKAYAS AND
THE CHINESE AGAMAS

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Abstract.

The present work is an attempt to examine the early Buddhist theory of causality as embodied in the Pāli Nikāyas and the Chinese Āgamas. Since the Buddhist theory is a product of criticism, assimilation and synthesis of ideas found in the different streams of pre-Buddhistic thought, a detailed analysis of this background was found to be necessary. Chapter I deals with the main ideas on the problem of causality found in the Vedic tradition, represented by two main theories, self-causation and creation by God. The Materialist, Ajīvika and Jaina theories have been examined in Chapter II and it has been shown how information from the Chinese Āgamas contribute to a better understanding of some of the obscure concepts in these schools. In Chapter III an attempt has been made to clear some misconceptions with regard to the use of terms expressive of causality and to trace the origin of these misconceptions. Confusion of the Sarvāstivāda theories with those of early Buddhism necessitated a detailed examination, not only of the problem of causality, but also some allied conceptions such as change, impermanence, dharma, etc., and covers the first part of the Chapter IV, while the second part is devoted to an examination of the philosophical significance of the general formula of causality. Chapter V is on the special application of the causal principle and the importance of the Chinese sources in shedding more light on the definition of ignorance (avijjā) has been pointed out. Chapter VI shows how the causal principle has been applied in almost every sphere of life. A comparison of the early Buddhist theory with some later developments, with special reference to Mādhyamika thought is the subject matter of Chapter VII. The status of the causal principle and the method of its verification is discussed in Chapter VIII and the importance of the extrasensory perceptions has also been pointed out. In Chapter IX an attempt has been made to determine, with the information available, the relationship between the Nikāyas and the Āgamas. The Appendix was necessitated by a problem in Chapter III.

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PREFACE.

Studies on the philosophy of early Buddhism have so far been mostly confined to the material available in the Pāli Nikāyas which represent only one of the early Buddhist traditions. Some Japanese scholars like Prof. Ui Hakuji and Akanuma Chizen have examined the teachings embodied in the Chinese Āgamas. Unfortunately, these treatises, being in Japanese, are not accessible to us. Akanuma Chizen as well as Prof. M. Anesaki have rendered yeoman's service to those who are interested in comparative studies of the Nikāyas and the Āgamas by compiling catalogues of the sūtras in these two bodies of literature. The present work was undertaken with a view to comparing the teachings on the problem of causality as embodied in the Pāli Nikāyas and the Chinese Āgamas. The importance of the Chinese Āgamas for the study of early Buddhist thought is two-fold. First they supply corroborative evidence in support of some of the major concepts in the Pāli Nikāyas whose authenticity has been questioned by some scholars during recent times (v. infra. 357). Secondly, they throw much light on the understanding of some obscure concepts in the Nikāyas.

Indian thinkers before and during the time of the Buddha have put forward a wide variety of views regarding the problem of change and causality. The Buddhist theory is a product of criticism, assimilation and synthesis of these ideas. As a result most of these theories have been examined in the early Buddhist texts, namely, the Pāli Nikāyas and the Chinese Āgamas. In Chapter I an attempt has been made to trace the gradual development of the causal theories in the Vedic tradition

with a view to establishing the historical basis of some of the theories mentioned in the Pāli Nikāyas and the Chinese Āgamas. Here the evidence from the Āgamas was mainly corroborative. An examination of some of the philosophical sections of the Vedas, Brāhmaṇas, Aranyakas and the Upaniṣads has led to the conclusion that the theories of self-causation (sat-kārya) and creation by God (īśvara-nirmāna) were two of the major causal theories in the Vedic tradition. These were referred to in the early Buddhist texts as sayam katan (tzu tso 自作) and issaranimmāna (tsun yu tsao 尊祐造). The Buddhist criticism of these theories as emerging from the Pāli Nikāyas and the Chinese Āgamas has also been examined.

Chapter II is devoted to the analysis of the ideas found mainly in the non-Vedic tradition. The causal theories of the Materialists, the Ajīvikas and the Jainas were discussed in detail, especially because of the possible influence exerted by these on the Buddhist theory of causality. Here the evidence gleaned from the Chinese Āgamas has been of immense value in understanding of some of the obscure concepts such as niyatisaṅgatibhāva (v.infra.74 ff.), etc. The close similarity between the theories of moral causation put forward in Jainism and Buddhism has led to confusion on the part of some scholars who wrote on this subject (v.infra.111). This necessitated a lengthy discussion of the Jaina standpoint and with the help of the commentaries of Śilāṅka it has been possible to determine the relationship between the two schools of thought with some precision. How the philosophical theory of causation formulated in Jainism led to the acceptance of a deterministic

theory of moral causation was also pointed out. The influence of some of the Ajīvika theories on Jainism was not overlooked. Apart from the doctrines of these major schools of thought, we have examined several other causal theories which were mentioned in the early Buddhist texts.

Chapter III represents an effort to determine the meaning of some of the terms expressive of causality in the early Buddhist texts. The different views, ancient as well as modern, with regard to the use of the terms hetu (yin 因) and pratyaya (yüan 緣) were discussed. All the evidence from the Pāli Nikāyas and the Chinese Āgamas have led to the conclusion that during the earliest phase of Buddhism, the two terms were used synonymously and that they did not express any distinction comparable to the distinction between 'cause' and 'subsidiary condition'. Doctrinal as well as textual evidence point to a theory that such a distinction originated with the Sarvāstivādins.

Chapter IV deals with the philosophical significance of the general statement of causality. This involved a discussion of the nature of things which are causally conditioned, i.e., the conception of dhamma. There are many important discussions on this subject by modern scholars. Outstanding among them are "The Central Conception of Buddhism and the meaning of the term Dharma" by Stcherbatsky which is primarily based on the source material in the Abhidharmakośa, and "Pāli Dhamma" by Prof. and Mrs. Geiger where in the authors have examined almost every reference to the term dhamma in Pāli Literature,

canonical as well as commentatorial, with a view to determining the wide variety of meanings the term connotes. A fresh look at this material was found to be necessary especially in view of the information supplied by the Chinese Āgamas. Examining the conception of dhamma (fa 法) put forward in the Pāli Nikāyas and the Chinese Āgamas, it was found that it differed from the conceptions of dharma in some of the major schools of thought like the Sarvāstivāda, the Sautrāntika and the later Theravāda. Although attempts have been made by scholars to minimize the difference between the teachings in the Nikāyas and the Āgamas on the one hand and the later schools on the other,¹ we have endeavoured to show that the difference is far too great to be ignored. For example, the acceptance of a logical theory of momentariness (kṣāṇikavāda) instead of an empirical view of change and impermanence (anitya)(v.infra.175-177) gave rise to a host of problems the solution of which created significant differences not only among the later schools but also between these and early Buddhism. The Sarvāstivādins, it was pointed out, accepted an eternal underlying substratum (dravya, svabhāva) in things(dharma). It was this fundamental conception of Sarvāstivāda, a school which had gained much prominence in India after the third century B.C., was the target of Nāgārjuna's dialectics. Thus with much justification the Mahāyānists attributed a theory of puḍgala-nairātmya but not dharma-nairātmya to the Sarvāstivādins and claimed superiority over them for formulating the latter conception. Since at this time the Sarvāstivāda was the most prominent of the Hīnayāna schools, the Mahāyānists, without much justification, extended their criticism to all the Hīnayāna schools.

1. Stcherbatsky, Conception of Buddhist Nirvāna, (Leningrad, 1927), pp.23-24; Mūrti, T.R.V., Central Philosophy of Buddhism, (London, 1960), p.66.

Moreover, it seems that with the emergence of different Buddhist schools and the compilation of the Abhidharma literature together with the ancilliary works, the study of the early Sūtra literature came to be relegated to the background. As a result, the Abhidharma was looked upon as the primary source for the study of early Buddhism. The Sautrāntika school, claiming to base its doctrine on the source material in the Sūtras (sūtrānta), may have emerged as a reaction against giving such priority of place to the Abhidharma. But in the case of the Sautrāntikas too, the acceptance of the theory of momentariness has moved them away from the standpoint of early Buddhism.

The view that the Sarvāstivāda represents the earliest phase of Buddhism seems to have prevailed in the minds of the compilers of the Sandhinirmocana Sūtra (7.30) as well as historians like Bu-ston (v.infra.p.311,n.1). Taking the various phases of Buddhism as represented by the different schools in India during their own time, they seem to have formulated the conception of tricakra-parivartana, i.e., the "three swingings of the Wheel of Law". Such a theory seems to have completely ignored the Sūtra literature the content of which, as we have endeavoured to point out, was not much different from the ideas expressed ^{and} the critical attitude adopted by Nāgārjuna and his followers. The theory put forward by Stcherbatsky that the earliest phase of Buddhism was a form of Radical Pluralism and that during the course of time it led to Monism and finally to Idealism, was contested by Schayer who held the view that Pluralism, Monism and Idealism were parallel currents of thought found in early Buddhims.¹

1. Pre-canonical Buddhism, in Archiv Orientální (Prague, 1935), vol.7, pp.131-132.

It may be possible to trace the germs of Pluralism, Monism as well as Idealism in the thought of the Buddhist canon in the same way as one is able to see different trends of thought in the Upaniṣads. But the teachings in the Pāli Nikāyas and the Chinese Āgamas which are primarily based on the speculations of one individual, unlike in the case of the Upaniṣads, should lend themselves to one single interpretation. The examination of the conception of dhamma (fa 法) in the Nikāyas and the Āgamas has led to the conclusion that, as far as the philosophical content of these texts are concerned, one is justified in calling it a form of 'phenomenalism'.¹ But even this would not be satisfactory because early Buddhism accepted the validity of extrasensory perceptions and the 'verification' through such means data which do not come within the range of sense perception. The latter part of this chapter is devoted to an evaluation of the philosophical significance of the general formula of causality.

1. Baldwin, in his Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology, (New York, 1940-1949), vol.2, p.288, records two different theories of phenomenalism. (1) The theory that all knowledge is limited to phenomena (things and events in time and space) and that we cannot penetrate into reality in itself. (2) The theory that all we know is a phenomenon, that is reality present to consciousness, either directly or reflectively, and that phenomena are all that there are to know, there being no thing-in-itself or object out of relation to consciousness. Of these, the former which is similar to the view put forward by Kant (v.Höffding, H., A History of Modern Philosophy, London, 1908, vol.2, p.58 ff.) may be represented in Buddhism by the Sarvāstivāda school which accepted a reality (svabhāva) in phenomena which was considered to be unknowable. The latter which is advocated by philosophers like Husserl (v.Husserl, E., Ideas: General Introduction to Pure Phenomenology, tr.W.R.Boyce Gibson, London, 1931, pp.125-127) and Ayer (V. Ayer, A.J., Language, Truth and Logic, London, 1962, p.53, also p.32), may come very close to the theory found in the Nikāyas and the Āgamas because of the emphasis laid on sense data as the content of our empirical knowledge (v.infra.27,227) and the denial of any real substratum behind phenonena.

The twelve-fold causal formula which had been the subject of several important disquisitions by modern scholars has constituted the subject of Chapter V. The Chinese Āgamas, with corroboration from the fragments of the Sanskrit canon discovered in the caves of Turfan and the other places, have shed new light on the definition of ignorance (avijjā, wu ming 無明) in the special application.

Modern scholars writing on the problem of causality in Buddhism have confined their treatment to the twelve-fold formula¹ mainly because this is seen to dominate the teachings in early Buddhism. Chapter VI is primarily devoted to an examination of the various other applications of the causal principle. It shows how the causal principle was applied to explain problems in almost every sphere of life. The Buddha and the early Buddhists gave even thought even to the causality of plant life, not to speak of other aspects such as the causality of the human personality, perception, moral behaviour, etc. In the process of this discussion, several other related problems emerged, but since these were later developments or were problems not coming within the scope of the present work, no attempt has been made to analyse them in detail. For example, in the description of the evolution and dissolution of the world process we have referred only to the impact of earlier speculations, especially in the R̥gveda. The close similarity between the cosmological speculations in the Buddhist texts and the Purāṇas, being a very extensive subject in itself, was left out. In the subsection on

1. v. Thomas, E.J., The History of Buddhist Thought, (London, 1959), p.58 ff.

"The causality of the human personality" there emerged several problems which may have a direct bearing on some later developments (v.infra.259,262,etc.).

A comparison of the theory of causality in the Nikāyas and the Āgamas with some of the later developments (Chapter VII) was undertaken with a view to pointing out that Mādhyamika thought, considered to be a 'Copernican revolution'¹ is not much different from early Buddhism. In fact our investigations have led to the conclusion that Mādhyamika philosophy represents a restatement of the philosophy of early Buddhism as embodied in the Pāli Nikāyas and the Chinese Āgamas, but with an emphasis on a monistic interpretation.

Chapter VIII deals with the validity of the causal law and the method of its 'verification'. It has been pointed out how the acceptance of the validity of extrasensory perception has made a significant difference to the status of the causal law in Buddhism.

The last chapter is intended to set out the current views with regard to the relationship between the Nikāyas and the Āgamas. With the present state of our knowledge it is difficult to reach any definite conclusions regarding the doctrinal relationship. But on the basis of our inquiry into the nature of causality as expounded in these two bodies of literature, it was found that they hardly differ from one another and that it is possible to envisage a common source of both these traditions.

1. Mūrtil, Central Philosophy, p.123.

The Appendix includes a comparison of the theory of pratyaya of the Theravāda as enunciated in the Paṭṭhāna with those of the Sarvāstivāda and Yogācāra. Correspondences among these theories have been noted.

My thanks are due to Drs.S.Weinstein and D.L.Friedman not only for patiently reading through the whole of the original draft and making many valuable suggestions but also for leaving their invaluable collections of books at my disposal. I am grateful to Dr.(Mrs.) K.P.K.Whitaker for the help and encouragement she gave me throughout the period I was engaged in this research programme, and to Mr.G.F.Weys under whom I had my first lessons in Classical Chinese. The assistance I received from Dr.D.L.Snellgrove by way of discussing some difficult passages from the Tibetan translations has been of immense value in understanding the corresponding Chinese translations. I should not fail to mention the keen interest shown by Professors D.C.Twichett and J.Brough in this work, and the latter for encouraging me to work on this subject. I wish to thank Professor K.N.Jayatilleke for having spared his valuable time, during his short stay in London, to read through the entire original draft and making useful comments. This project would not have been undertaken and brought to a conclusion if not for the ungrudging help I received from Professors N.A.Jayawickrema and G.P.Malalasekera. Thanks are due to my friend, Mr.W.Zwalf of the British Museum for helping me in various ways. Last but not least, I must record my indebtedness to the British Council for the grant of a scholarship and to the University of Ceylon for defraying the expenses during the latter part of my stay in England.

Note on references.

All references to Chinese Buddhist texts are based upon the Taishō Shinshū Daizōkyō unless otherwise stated. The volume number of the Taishō Shinshū Daizōkyō (abbreviated as TD) is given first, followed by the page number. The column is indicated by a, b, or c. The name of the text is given in abbreviated form in parenthesis after the TD reference. The fascicle number and the number of the sūtra within that fascicle is then indicated. Thus TD 1.443c (Chung.4.2) is to be read Taishō Shinshū Daizōkyō, volume I, p.443, third column, which is Sūtra number two of the fourth fascicle of the Chung-o-han-ching.

List of abbreviations.

A	: Aṅguttara Nikāya.
AA	: Aṅguttara-aṭṭhakathā, Manorathapūranī.
Abhs	: Abhidharmasamuccaya.
Abvn	: Abhidhammatthavibhāvinī-ṭīkā.
AD	: Abhidharmadīpa.
Ait Ar	: Aitareya Aranyaka.
AK	: Abhidharmakośa.
AKV	: Abhidharmakośa-vyākhyā.
AM	: Asia Major.
ASS	: Arya Śālistamba Sūtra.
AV	: Atharvaveda.
Bbh	: Bodhisattvabhūmi.
BCAP	: Bodhicaryāvatāra-pañjikā.
BHSD	: Buddhist Hybrid Sanskrit Dictionary.
Brh	: Brhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad.
BSOAS	: Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies.
Ch	: Chāndogya Upaniṣad.
Chang	: Ch'ang-o-han-ching.
ChB	: Chāndogya Upaniṣad Bhāṣya.
Ch'eng	: Ch'eng-wei-shih-lun.
Chung	: Chung-o-han-ching.
CL	: Ta-ch'eng-o-pi-ta-mo-chi-lun.
CPFPL	: Chung-pien-fen-pieh-lun.
CSL	: O-pi-ta-mo-chü-she-lun.
CSSL	: O-pi-ta-mo-chü-she-shih-lun.
D	: Dīgha Nikāya.
DA	: Dīgha-aṭṭhakathā, Sumaṅgalavilāsinī.
DCBT	: Dictionary of Chinese Buddhist Terms.
Dh	: Dhammapada.

- DhA : Dhammapada-aṭṭhakathā,
 DhsA : Dhammasaṅgani-aṭṭhakathā, Atthasālinī.
 Dial : Dialogues of the Buddha.
 EB : Encyclopaedia of Buddhism.
 ERE : Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics.
 GS : Gradual Sayings.
 GV : Gaṇḍavyūha.
 J : Jātaka.
 JAOS : Journal of the American Oriental Society.
 JASB : Journal of the Asiatic Society of Bengal.
 JB : Jaiminiya Brāhmaṇa.
 JBORS : Journal of the Bihar and Orissa Research Society.
 JDLUC : Journal of the Department of Letters, University
 of Calcutta.
 JPTS : Journal of the Pāli Text Society.
 JRAS : Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society.
 Kaṭha : Kaṭha Upaniṣad.
 Kauṣ : Kauṣītaki Upaniṣad.
 Kośa : De la Vallée Poussin's French translation of
 O-pi-ta-mo-chü-she-lun.
 KS : Kindred Sayings.
 LPSSC : Liao-pen-sheng-ssu-ching.
 LV : Lalitavistara.
 M : Majjhima Nikāya.
 MA : Majjhima-aṭṭhakathā, Papañcasūdanī.
 Mbh : Mahābhārata.
 Miln : Milinda Pañha.
 MK : Mādhyamakakārikā.
 MKV : Mādhyamakavṛtti.

- Muṇḍ : Muṇḍaka Upaniṣad.
 MVBB : Madhyāntavibhāga-bhāṣya.
 NK : Nyāyakusumāñjalī.
 PCPL : Pien-chung-pien-lun.
 Pieh-i-tsa : Pieh-i-tsa-o-han-ching.
 PIPC : Proceedings of the Indian Philosophical Congress.
 Ps : Paṭisambhidāmagga.
 PSTCC : P'u-sa-ti-ch'ih-ching.
 PTS : Pāli Text Society.
 PTSD : PTS Dictionary.
 PU : Principal Upaniṣads, ed. by S.Rādhakrisnan.
 RS : Ratnakūṭa Sūtra, Kāśyapaparivanta.
 RV : Rgveda.
 S : Samyutta Nikāya.
 SA : Samyutta-aṭṭhakathā, Sāratthappakāsinī.
 ŚB : Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa.
 SBE : Sacred Books of the East.
 SDS : Sarvadarśanasanġraha.
 SDSM : Śaddarśanasamuccaya.
 Siddhi : De la Vallée Poussin's French translation of
 Ch'eng-wei-shih-lun.
 Skr : Sūtrakṛtāṅga, commentary on Sū by Śilāṅka.
 Sn : Sutta Nipāta.
 STCL : She-ta-ch'eng-lun.
 Sū : Sūyagadāṅga.
 Śv : Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad.
 Tait : Taittirīya Upaniṣad.
 TCL : O-pi-ta-mo-tsa-chi-lun.
 TD : Taishō Shinshū Daizōkyō.

- Thag : Theragāthā.
- Tikap : Tikapaṭṭhāna, with Buddhaghosa's commentary.
- TS : Tattvasaṅgraha, with pañjikā of Kamalaśīla.
- Tsa : Tsa-o-han-ching.
- Tseng : Tseng-o-han-ching.
- UCR : University of Ceylon Review.
- Ud : Udāna.
- UdA : Udāna-aṭṭhakathā, Paramatthadīpanī.
- VA : Vinaya-aṭṭhakathā, Samantapāsādikā.
- Vbh : Vibhaṅga.
- VbhA : Vibhaṅga-aṭṭhakathā, Sammohavinodanī.
- Vin : Vinaya Piṭaka.
- Vism : Visuddhimagga.
- WZKS&O : Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde Süd - und
Ostasiens und Archiv für indische Philosophie.

CHAPTER ONE

Historical Background—1. Vedic Period.

(1) Speculation on the problem of causality has engaged the attention of the pre-Buddhistic Indian thinkers to such an extent that when the Buddha appeared on the scene there were several divergent theories in existence. The earliest form of Buddhist literature, namely, the sūtras included in the Pāli Nikāyas and the Chinese Āgamas, present us with a mass of information about the existing theories of causation constituting the background against which the Buddha presented his own views about causation. The pre-Buddhistic theories mentioned in the Pāli Nikāyas and the Chinese Āgamas may be classified into four main types as follows:

(i) Self-causation (sayam katham, ¹attakatham, ²tzu tsao 自造 ³ tzu tso 自作 ⁴), a metaphysical theory which was intimately connected with two concepts, namely, the concept of soul or self (ātman, P. atta) and the conception of evolution. In the Upaniṣadic system of thought it was closely associated with the concept of ātman, both in the theories of evolution and in the theories of creation. The basis assumption of this metaphysical postulate was that the cause and the effect are identical in essence (v.infra.26 f).

(ii) External causation (param katham, ⁵ta tsao 他造, ⁶ ta tso 他作 ⁷) which includes several different theories.

1. S 2.18.

2. ibid., 1.134.

3. TD 1.76a (Chang.12.1).

4. ibid., 2.81a (Tsa.12.6), 86a-c (Tsa.12.20,21), 93c (Tsa.14.1).

5. S 2.18.

6. TD 1.76a (Chang.12.1).

7. ibid., 2.81a (Tsa.12.6), 86a-c (Tsa.12.20,21), 93c (Tsa.14.1).

Śilānka, the Jaina commentator, defining the term annakaḍam (anyakṛtam, P. parakataṃ) occurring in the Sūtrakṛtāṅga, lists the following theories under this category:

- (a) Time (kāla, v.infra.82),
- (b) Creation by God (īśvarakṛtaka, v.infra.29 f.),
- (c) Inherent nature (svabhāva, v.infra.46 f.),
- (d) Action or behaviour (karma, v.infra.110 f.),
- (e) Fate (niyaṭi, v.infra.72 f.) and from the Buddhist texts we may add another theory which could be described as
- (f) Biological regeneration and social impact (v.infra.97 f).

The acceptance of the difference between the cause and the effect is the basic premiss of the philosophical theory of external causation (v.infra. 102).

(iii) Internal as well as external causation (sayam katan ca param katan ca,¹ tzu tso ta tso 自作他作²) which is a combination of the first two theories (v.infra.104 f.).

(iv) Neither internal nor external causation (asayamkaram aparamkaram,³ fei tzu fei ta... tso 非自非他 ...作⁴) which in actual fact is not a theory of causation but a theory of change which accepts complete indeterminism (adhiccasamuppanna,⁵ wu yin tso 無因作⁶, yadrcchā⁷).

1. S 2.18.
2. TD 2.81a (Tsa.12.6), 86a-c (Tsa 12.20,21), 93c (Tsa.14.1).
3. S 2.18.
4. TD 2.81a (Tsa.12.6), etc.
5. S 2.18.
6. TD 2.81a (Tsa.12.6), etc.
7. Śv 1.2.

(2) Although it may be possible to find the seeds of most of these theories in the Vedic literature, yet we propose to classify them under two broad categories as Vedic and non-Vedic. The theory of self-causation as well as the theory of creation coming under the category of external causation being the predominant theories of the Vedic tradition are examined in this chapter.

Primitive conception of causation.

(3) The origin of the theory of self-causation can be traced back to the time of the tenth book (maṇḍala) of the Ṛgveda. It is here that we notice the beginnings of metaphysical speculations. But before any metaphysical speculations began to appear, we find in the earlier parts of the Ṛgveda¹ what may be called a primitive conception of causation founded on a belief in the uniformity of nature. Commenting on the psychological background which gave rise to the conception of gods in the Ṛgveda, Prof. Hiriyanna says: "Unless primitive man had noticed the regularity with which natural phenomena recur and unless he were inwardly convinced that every event has a cause to account for it, he would not have resorted to the creation of such deities in explanation of them".² Simple facts of every day experience such as the daily rising and setting of the sun, the alternation of day and night and of the seasons, the movements of the stars and the moon, etc., would have been sufficient to convince primitive man of the existence of order

1. L. Renou has pointed out that as a result of the various criteria adopted by Vedic scholars, it has been possible to maintain that books II to VII represent the oldest sections of the Vedas, v. L'Inde Classique, (Paris, 1947), vol. I, p. 272.
2. Outlines of Indian Philosophy, (London, 1956), p. 31.

or uniformity of nature. Most of the fervent hopes and expectations expressed in the Vedic hymns are, therefore, the result of the belief in the uniformity of nature and the conception of causation. This is illustrated by one of the hymns addressed to Parjanya.

"The wind blows forth, the lightning falls; the plants shoot up; heaven overflows. Nurture is born when Parjanya quickens the earth with seed.

... ..

Give us, O Maruts, the rain of heaven; pour forth the streams of your stallion. Hither with this thunder come, pouring down the waters as the divine spirit our father. Bellow towards us; thunder; deposit the germ; fly around with thy water bearing car. Draw well thy water skin unfastened downwards; let the heights and valleys be level.

... ..

Thou hast shed rain; now wholly cease; thou hast made the deserts passable again. Thou hast made the plants to grow forth for the sake of food; and thou hast found a hymn of praise from (thy) creatures".¹

(4) This passage, among a host of others, exemplifies the belief in the uniformity of nature based on the primitive conception of causality.

'Rain causes the plants to shoot up'.

'It (rain) has made the heights and valleys level'.

'It (rain) has made deserts passable again'.

1. RV V, 83.4, 6, 7, 10. v. MacDonnell, A.A., A Vedic Reader for Students, (Oxford, 1917), pp. 106 ff.

These three assertions are good examples of the primitive conception of causality. Three features stand out prominent from these assertions. First, the assimilation of causation to personal agency.¹ Secondly, the relation of cause and effect as being one of production,² and thirdly, the effect being regarded as relatively passive.³ These features characterise the primitive as well as the common sense notions of causality which are constructed on the model of our own experience,⁴ such as the moving of our limbs. Our own efficiency is measured by our volitional actions and consciousness of effort. As a result, it is natural for us to interpret external events by ascribing to them the actions and passions which we experience ourselves. The Vedic Aryans conceived of natural phenomena in the selfsame manner interjecting their own experiences into the external objects. They tried to understand the working of the forces of nature by positing inner wills or agents in them. This comes very close to the activity view of causation, except for the fact that it partakes of a greater degree of anthropomorphism than the activity view of causation.⁵ Thus the first beginnings of a theory of causation can be traced back to the earliest stages when natural phenomena were deified.⁶

1. Stebbing, L.S., A Modern Introduction to Logic, (London, 1962), p.260.
2. ibid., p.261.
3. ibid.; Russell, B.A.W., Our Knowledge of the External World, (London, 1926), p.227.
4. Stebbing, op.cit., p.261. Also v. ERE 3.261, art. 'Cause and causality' by F.R.Tennant.
5. Stebbing, op.cit., p.261 quotes Prof.T.P.Nunn who wrote (in 1926) that even the average student of physics "today" is still at heart an anthropomorphist. See also Russell, External World, p.237.
6. Ayer, A.J., Language, Truth and Logic, (London, 1962), p.116, says: "It is to be remarked that in cases where deities are identified with natural objects, assertions concerning them may be allowed to be significant".

(5) The regularity observed in the functioning of phenomena was looked upon as being due to the the greatness or divinity of the gods.¹ Order prevails in the world owing to the nature of the gods. It is the conception of ṛta or truth that we come across in the Vedic literature.²

Theory of self-causation in the Vedas.

(6) But coming down to the tenth book (maṇḍala) of the Rgveda we find the beginnings of metaphysical speculation. Some of the hymns included in this book represent the metaphysical thought of individual thinkers. Their attempt was to explain the origin and development of the universe. In this the Vedic thinkers posited various substances such as water, and abstract principles such as the 'year' (saṃvatsara) and then explained the universe as a product of the gradual evolution of these original substances.

(7) Aghamarṣana is one of these thinkers and he believed that warmth (tapas) is the first creative principle. From warmth originated law (ṛta) and truth (satya). These in their turn produced darkness (tamas) and from darkness was produced water (āpas). Water gave rise to the year (saṃvatsara) or the time principle and the year formed in due course the sun and the moon, the heaven and the earth, the firmament and the light, and ordained the days and nights.³ Prajāpati Parameṣṭin, in a similar fashion, offered a theory of natural evolution starting from water (salila) as the primeval substance. From water sprang up, in due course, everything in the universe, animate as well as inanimate.⁴

1. RV I, 115.

2. Heinrich Luders maintains that ṛta in the Vedas is never an adjective but only a noun and has only one meaning, that is to say, truth. v. Varuṇa, (Göttingen, 1951, 1956), vol. II, p. 405.

3. RV X. 190.

4. ibid., X. 129.

According to these theories, chance has no place in the creative evolution of nature.¹ The principle of movement is inherent in these substances, and the world evolves from this immanent energy of nature (svadhā). It is a self-determined movement. This idea of self-causation is also to be found in the theological speculations of the time when the creator God is called svayambhū (self-created).²

Self-causation in the Aranyakas.

(8) The idea of self-causation appears in a more refined form in the philosophy of Mahīdāsa Aitareya in the Aitareya Aranyaka.³ Here the problem of causation is presented along with the problem of change. Mahīdāsa appears to have been aware of the problem presented by 'the unceasing mutability of existence', which is considered to be one of the most persistent problems in the whole range of philosophy.⁴ He seems to have conceived the idea that within the unity of the one thing there is a succession of different states. He believed that all change and diversity in the world have an immutable ground of unity and this is implied in his statement: "That body into which goes the indestructible (the breath) which we have joined (in meditation), proceeding from the indestructible (the highest Brahman), that body which the harnessed horses (the senses) draw about, that body where the true of the true follows after, in that body all gods become one".⁵

1. Barua, B.M., A History of pre-Buddhistic Indian Philosophy, (Calcutta, 1921), p. 11.

2. SB 13.7.1.1.

3. Ait Ar. 2.1.3.

4. Taylor, A.E., Elements of Metaphysics, (London, 1961), p. 159.

5. Ait Ar. 2.3.8.3; SBE 1.233.

Unlike the conception of change enunciated in some of the Upaniṣads (v.infra.14), a change which is merely an illusion of our deceptive senses because it is incompatible with a permanent reality, Mahīdāsa conceived of change as the transformation of a single bodily reality, a transition from the potential to the actual, a concept which is quite similar to the Sāṅkhyan view.

(9) This conception of change determined to a great extent the nature of the theory of causation in the philosophy of Mahīdāsa which is set out in the following passage.

"Then comes the creation of the seed. The seed of Prajāpati is the gods; the seed of the gods is the rain; the seed of rain is herbs; the seed of herbs is the food; the seed of food is the living creatures; the seed of living creatures is the heart; the seed of the heart is the mind; the seed of the mind is the speech; the seed of speech is action; the act done is this man, the abode of Brahman".¹

(10) The use of the term seed (retas) in the above example is very significant in that it affords a clue to the meaning of causation set out in the philosophy of Mahīdāsa. Just as a sprout is produced by a seed, even so Prajāpati produces the gods, gods in their turn produce rain, and so on.

1. Ait Ar.2.1.3, Athāto retasaḥ sṛṣṭiḥ, prajāpate reto devā devānāḥ reto varṣaḥ varṣasya reto oṣadhaya oṣadhīnāḥ reto'nnam annasya reto prajāḥ prajānāḥ reto hrdayaḥ hrdayasya reto mano manaso reto vāg vaco retaḥ karma tad idaḥ karma kṛtamayaḥ puruṣo brāhmaṇo lokaḥ.
v.Keith, A.B., Aitareya Aranyaka, in Anecdota Oxoniensia, Aryan Series, 3, part IX, 1909, pp.203-204.

Thus a chain of causation is established, each link in the chain producing on its own the one following. Speculating on the origin of the universe, Mahīdāsa says:

"Was it water? Was it water? This world was water.

This was the root (mūla), that the shoot (tūla).

This the father, those the sons. Whatever there is of the son's, that is the father's; whatever of the father's, that is the son's".¹

This statement further illustrates the nature of the connection between two links in the chain of causation. Sāyana maintains that there is a unity or oneness between the cause and the effect and that there is no complete division or distinction between the two as between clay and a jar made of clay.² It is interesting to note that this is the first reference to the division of the causal process into two compartments as cause and effect. It seems that according to Mahīdāsa's view, the cause (i.e., root, mūla) passes its characteristics on to the effect (i.e., shoot, tūla), just as a father bestows some of his characteristics, physical as well as mental, to the son, or as the son inherits the characteristics of the father.

(11) In accordance with his theory of evolution and change, Mahīdāsa has attempted to explain the nature of causality.

1. Ait Ar. 2.1.8, āpa ityāpa iti tad idam āpa evedam vai mūlam adas tūlam ayam pitaite putrā yatra ha kva ca putrsya tat pitur yatra vā pitus tad vā putrasyety etat tad uktam bhavati. v. Keith, op.cit., p.
2. Commentary on the Ait Ar. by Sāyana Acārya, edited by Rājendralāla Mitra, Bibliotheca Indica, (Calcutta, 1876), p.188, Kāryakāraṇayor mrdghaṭayor atyantabhedādarśanāt.

The theory of self-evolution or self-causation formulated by Aghamarṣana (v.supra.7) finds detailed and more systematic treatment in the philosophy of Makīdāsa. Yet his analysis is so much tempered by speculative metaphysics that it may be said that he shows a greater zeal for First and Final causes rather than a rational explanation of things and their inter-relation.

(12) In addition to his views on metaphysical problems such as the origin of the universe, etc., there is another interesting part of his philosophy which falls into the category of biological speculations. According to him there is a gradation in the types of beings or things in this world.¹ Earth, stones, and such other objects occupy in nature a position which can be distinguished from that of plants and herbs since the latter possess sap or moisture. More developed than these two types, which are considered to be immobile (sthāvara), are those that can move from place to place at will. Animals and men fall into this category. Animals in whom there is understanding or consciousness confined to mere receptivity of external stimuli are distinguished from man in whom the self has attained greater development. Man differs from other animals in that not only understands empirical reality, but can comprehend spiritual truths as well.

1. Ait Ar. 2.3.2.

(13) This gradation in nature is a recognition of the existence of distinct species. These different species evolve according to the causal pattern which Mahīdāsa believed is found in the world. The influence of these biological speculations may be found in the teachings of the Ājīvikas (v.infra.78).

Causality in the Upaniṣads.

(14) During the time of the Upaniṣads, we find that greater emphasis was laid not so much on the theory of change which would have given rise to a theory of causality, but on the theory of permanence. The attention of almost all the thinkers of this period was concentrated on demonstrating and proving the permanence of the self (ātman), the reality underlying the phenomenal world. Thus the Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad says: "That eternal should be known as present in the self (ātma-saṁstha), Truly there is nothing higher than that to be known. When one recognizes the enjoyer, the object of enjoyment and the universal Actuator, all has been said. This is the threefold Brahma".¹ Deussen makes a pertinent remark when discussing the concept of Brahman in the Upaniṣads. He says: "Causality is nothing else than the universal rule according to which all changes in the world proceed. Where there is no change there is no causality. It amounts, therefore, to an assertion of Brahman's independence of causality when, as early as the most ancient Upaniṣad texts, although they are

1. 1.12, Etad jñeyam nityam evātmasaṁstham,
nātaḥ paraṁ veditavyam hi kificit.
bhoktā bhogyam preritāraṁ ca matvā,
sarvam proktaṁ trividhaṁ brahman etat.

v. Hume, R.E., The Thirteen Principal Upaniṣads, (London, 1921), p.396.

not yet able to grasp the conception of causality in the abstract, all change is denied of Brahman".¹ The keynote of all the Upaniṣads, in fact, was the immutable or imperishable nature of Brahman. The Kaṭha Upaniṣad says: "The wise one (i.e., the soul, the ātman, the self) is not born nor dies. This one has not come from anywhere, has not become anyone. Unborn, constant, eternal, primeval, this one is not slain when the body is slain".² Although the Upaniṣadic thinkers recognised two forms of knowledge, the higher (para) and the lower (apara), emphasis was laid on the higher (para) form of knowledge which consisted of the understanding of the imperishable Brahman.³

(15) From these few instances it becomes clear that the attempt of the Upaniṣadic thinkers was directed towards the understanding of the 'Absolute' (Brahman or Atman) which is celebrated as the 'imperishable' (akṣara).¹ Speculations on the problems of this nature would not yield fruitful results in the field of causality. The primary aim of the Upaniṣadic thinker was to expound the immutability of the ātman, individual or universal. Hence, speculation on the problem of causality was seriously handicapped. It was only a subsidiary theme. As a result, the Upaniṣadic contribution to the theory of causality remained negligible. It seems that they only inherited and systematised some of the theories enunciated in the earlier period. These systematizations are to be found in the theories of evolution which, at least to some extent, make use of the notion of causality. In these we

1. Philosophy of the Upaniṣads, pr. A.S. Geden, (Edinburgh, 1906), p. 154.

2. 2.8; v. Hume, Upaniṣads, p. 349.

3. Mund 1.4-5; Hume, Upaniṣads, p. 366-367.

4. Brh 3.8.8.

find the ātman being considered as the cause chronologically antecedent and the manifold universe as the effect.¹ Yet, these come under the category of metaphysical speculation because they represent investigations into First causes² rather than empirical causal events.

(16) The theories of evolution in the Upaniṣads seem to follow a similar pattern as the theories of self-causation enunciated by Aghamarṣana (v.supra.7) and elaborated by Mahīdāsa (v.supra. 9-11). One of the most important theories of evolution is that of Uddālaka Aruṇī set out in the following passage from the Chāndogya Upaniṣad.

"In the beginning, ..., this world was just Being (sat), one only, without a second. To be sure, some people say: 'In the beginning this world was just Non-being (asat), only one, without a second; from that Non-being Being was produced.' But verily, ..., whence could this be? said he. 'How from Non-being could Being be produced? On the contrary, ..., in the beginning this world was just Being, one only, without a second'. It bethought itself: 'Would that I were many! Let me procreate myself!' It emitted heat. That heat bethought itself: 'Would that I were many! Let me procreate myself!' It emitted water. ... That water bethought itself: 'Would that I were many! Let me procreate myself!' It emitted food. Therefore, whenever it rains, then there is abundant food. So food for eating is produced just from water".³

1. Ch 4.1.3.

2. Śv 1.1 ff; Muṇḍ 1.1.6.

3. 6.2.1-4; v. Hume, Upaniṣads, p.241.

Uddālaka then proceeds to explain how beings are constituted of various elements which evolve in this manner, and later on enumerated this process of evolution in its reverse order.

"On this point, ..., understand that this (body) is a sprout (suṅga) which has sprung up. It is not without a root (mūla). What else could its root be than food? Even so, ..., with food for a sprout, look for water as the root. With water, ..., as a sprout, look for heat as the root. With heat, ..., as a sprout, look for Being as the root. All creatures here, ..., have Being as their root, have Being as their home, have Being as their support".¹

Here, the words mūla and suṅga have replaced the words mūla and tūla of Mahīdāsa's description.

(17) Sāṅkara makes a distinction between the conception of Being (sat) in Uddālaka's philosophy and the conception of matter (prakṛti) in the Sāṅkhya philosophy. According to him, the Sāṅkhya accepts a primordial substance which is insentient, while in Uddālaka's theory Being (sat) is sentient because it is able to make a wish, namely, a wish to procreate which sets the whole chain of causation in motion.² The persistent endeavour on the part of the Vedic and Upaniṣadic thinkers to attribute sentience even to material things seem to be the result of an attempt to explain the functioning of phenomena on the analogy of human behaviour. It was observed earlier that

1. Ch 6.8.3-4; v. Hume, Upanisads, p.245.

2. ChB p.331, Tataś ca pradhānaṃ sāṅkhyaparikalpitaṃ jagatkāraṇaṃ pradhānasyācetanatvābhyupagamat. idaṃ tu sac cetaṇam ikṣitṛtvāt.

the primitive notion of causa assimilates causation to personal agency (v. supra. 4) and Uddālaka's conception of causation is not much different from this.

Buddhist Criticism of self-causation.

(18) The Arya Śālistamba Sūtra¹ of the Buddhists criticizes this very attempt to assimilate causation to personal agency. Although the description of the causal process in this sūtra may closely resemble the description given by Uddālaka, yet it criticizes the very ideas that Uddālaka was enunciating. Here, the causal process is stated thus: "From the seed arises the sprout; from the sprout the leaves; from the leaves the stalk; from the stalk the stem; from the stem the trunk; from the trunk the calyx; from the calyx the bud; from the bud the flower; from the flower arises the fruit".² The connection between two links of the series is further explained thus:

1. There are five Chinese translations and one Tibetan translation of the Arya Śālistamba Sūtra. The five Chinese translations are as follows:

- (1) Liao-pen-sheng-ssu-ching, 了本生死經, tr. by Chih Chien, TD 16.815b ff.
- (2) Fo-shuo-tao-kan-ching, 佛說稻芋經, tr. by an unknown author, TD 16.816c ff.
- (3) Tz'u-shih-p'u-sa-so-shuo-ta-ch'eng-yüan-sheng-tao-kan-yu-ching, 慈氏菩薩所說大乘綴生稻蒜喻經, tr. by Amoghavajra, TD 16.819a ff.
- (4) Ta-ch'eng-she-li-so-tan-mo-ching, 大乘舍黎婆擔麻系經, tr. by Dānapāla, TD 16.821b ff.
- (5) Fo-shuo--ta-ch'eng-tao-kan-ching, 佛說乘稻芋經, tr. by an unknown author, TD 16.823b ff.

The Tibetan translation is published in the Tibetan Tripitaka (Peiking Edition), vol. 34, p. 303.1 ff.

The Sanskrit text has been restored from quotations found in various works. There are two such restorations. (1) By De la Vallée Poussin in Théorie des Douze Causes, Gand, 1913 and (ii) by N.A. Śāstri, (Adyar, 1956). References in the present work are to De la Vallée Poussin's edition.

2. p. 73.

"In the absence of the seed, the sprout does not arise. As long as the flower does not arise, so long the fruit does not come into existence. When the seed exists, the sprout manifests itself. Even so when the flower comes into existence, the fruit manifests itself".¹ Dismissing, as it were, the view which attributes personal agency to causation, it was said: "Herein, the idea does not occur to the seed that it is making the sprout manifest. Even to the sprout it does not occur that it has been manifested by the seed".² The same is repeated of the various other conditions that are necessary for the germination of a seed.

(19) Moreover, while commenting on the word Being (sat) occurring in the description of evolution given by Uddālaka, Sāṅkara says that it stands for that entity which is "mere esse" (astitāmātram).³ In the Samyukta, the Buddha is represented as rejecting the concept of 'Being' (atthitā 若有 = astitā) as an extreme view, because it is an unobservable entity, hence, a metaphysical postulate.⁴ He says that, "To one who observes with proper understanding the passing away of things of the world, there would not be the belief in Being (existence)".⁵

1. ibid., p.73, asati bīje 'ṅkuro na bhavati, yāvad asati puṣpe phalaṃ na bhavati; sati tu bīje 'ṅkurasyābhinirvṛttir bhavati, evaṃ yāvat sati puṣpe phalasyābhinirvṛttir bhavati.
2. ibid., pp.73-74, Tatra bījasya naivaṃ bhavaṭy ahaṃ aṅkuraṃ abhinirvartayāmīti; aṅkurasyāpi naivaṃ bhavaty ahaṃ bījenābhinirvartita iti.
3. ChB p.322, sad ity astitāmātram.
4. S 2.17; TD 2.85c (Tsa.12.19).
5. S 2.17, Lokanīrodhaṃ kho ... yathābhūtaṃ sammappaññāya passato yā loke atthitā sā na hoti. TD 2.85c (Tsa.12.19).

According to the commentator Buddhaghosa, Being (atthitā) connotes permanency (sassatā).¹ Moreover, the Buddha maintained that the theory of self-causation leads to the belief in permanency (v.infra.26). Thus both the conception of Being (sat) and the theory of self-causation which are knitted together in the philosophy of Uddālaka lead to one result, namely, the belief in permanency. The theory of self self-causation was maintained by the pre-Buddhistic thinkers by assuming an immutable basis such as the ātman and hence they considered the cause and the effect as being identical in essence (v.supra.10). This view of cause and effect was accepted by the Sāṅkhya school of thought and came to be known as Satkāryavāda.² Buddha rejected this view because it has a metaphysical basis and is not verified by observation. On similar grounds, Nāgārjuna criticised it on a later occasion.³

(20) In the Pāsādika Suttanta,⁴ a list of wrong views concerning the beginning of things (pubbantakappanā, pen sheng pen chien 本生本見) is given and one of them refers to the self-causation of the self and the world.⁵ This certainly is a reference to such cosmological speculations as those of Uddālaka and his predecessors.

(21) The Buddhist counterpart of Uddālaka's theory of evolution is to be found in the Aggaññā Suttanta of the Dīgha Nikāya.⁶

1. SA 2.32, atthitan'ti sassatam.

2. Dasgupta, S., A History of Indian Philosophy, (Cambridge, 1963), vol. I, p. 257 f.

3. MK 1.1.; MKV p. 13 ff.

4. Ching ching ching 精淨經 (Chang. 12.1).

5. D 3.137 f sayam kato attā ca loko ca. v. also Ud. p. 69. The Chinese version of the Pāsādika Suttanta does not refer to the soul but merely says: "The world is self-caused". (世間自造), TD 1.76a (Chang. 12.1).

6. Hsiao yüan ching 小緣經 (Chang. 6.1).

The keenness of the Indian mind for cosmological speculations was so great that even the Buddhists, who, for empirical reasons, abstained from discussing the problem of the origin of the world,¹ were compelled at least to give a rational explanation of the problem of evolution (v.infra.237f). But unlike in the theories of Uddālaka and his predecessors where the principle of evolution is one of self-causation, the Buddhist theory is characterized by the application of the general formula of causation (v.infra.242) to explain the process of evolution.

(22) The causality of the individual self or soul (ātman) is discussed in the Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad. But this has to be supplemented with the discussion of the origin of the self found in the Taittirīya Upaniṣad. The Taittirīya says: "In the beginning this (world) was non-existent. Therefrom, verily, Being (sat) was produced. That made itself (svayam akuruta) a Soul (ātman). Therefore, it is called the well-done (sukṛta)".² Here the idea of self-causation is very clearly exemplified. It describes the causality of the universal, rather than the individual self. But because the individual self was considered to be part and parcel of the universal self,³ what is said of the latter may at least in part be true of the former.

1. Jayatilleke, K.N., Early Buddhist Theory of Knowledge, (London, 1963), p.475.

2. 2.7; Hume, Upaniṣads, p.278.

3. Brh 4.4.5.

Referring to the reincarnating individual self, the Śvetāśvatara says: "Coarse and fine, many in number, the embodied one chooses forms (rūpa) according to his qualities".¹ Thus the nature of the physical form is determined by the actions or qualities of the soul (dehī = ātman).

(23) This theory is referred to and criticised in the Samyukta, where the question is raised as to who made this body and Bhikkhūnī Selā is represented as saying that it is neither self-made nor wrought by another (v.infra. 127). Rejecting the use of a metaphysical principle to explain the causality of the human personality, the Buddhists, after a perusal of observable facts, explained it as being due to a concatenation of several conditions (v.infra. 127).

(24) Applying the theory of self-causation in the sphere of moral responsibility, the Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad says: "Whoever has qualities is the doer of deeds that bring recompense and of such action surely he experiences the consequences. Undergoing all forms characterised by the three qualities, treading the three paths, the individual self wanders along according to its deeds".² Both Mahāvīra and the Buddha adversely criticised this conception of moral responsibility.

1. 5.12, sthūlāni sūkṣmāṇi bahūni caiva, rūpāni dehī svagunair vṛṇōti. v. Hume, Upaniṣads, p.407.
2. 5.7, guṇānvayo yaḥ phalakarmakartā, kṛtasya tasyaiva sa copabhoktā. sa viśvarūpas triguṇas trivartmā, prāṇādhīpas saṃcarati svakarmabhiḥ. v.Hume, Upaniṣads, p.407. Instead of the phrase 'roams about' we have substituted the phrase 'wanders along' since the latter expresses the meaning of saṃcarati better.

(25) In the Sūtrakṛtāṅga, Mahāvīra is represented as rejecting the view that suffering is self-caused (na taṃ sayam kaḍam dukkhaṃ).¹ The commentator Śilāṅka says: "Caused by oneself' (sayam kaḍam) means 'caused by one's own human effort' (ātmanā puruṣakārena kṛtaṃ)",² and he adduces empirical arguments for the rejection of this view by Mahāvīra. He points out that, "If one experiences happiness, etc., caused by one's own human effort, then why should there be disparity in, or even absence of, results to be reaped by servants, traders, farmers and others when they seem to exert equal human effort. Some, even in the absence of any profession such as servitude, appear to enjoy great gains. Therefore, there cannot be anything achieved by reason of one's own effort" (v.infra. 108).³ This line of argument leaves room for the introduction of another agency to which the effect (phala) could be attributed when one's own exertion does not seem to be the determining factor. Thus according to the Jaina theory of causation, it is not only human exertion alone, but some other agency that combines to produce the effect (v.infra. 109).

(26) Early Buddhist literature makes numerous references to the theory of self-causation of suffering (and happiness).⁴ The Samyukta records a very interesting dialogue between

1. Sū 1.1.2.2.

2. Skṛ 1, fol.30.

3. ibid., I, fol.30-31, yadi puruṣakāraḥ sukhaḥ anubhūyeta tataḥ sevaka-vaṇik-karṣakādīnāṃ samāne puruṣakāre sati phalaprāptivaisadrṣyaṃ phalaprāptiś ca na bhavet. Kasyacit tu sevādi vyāpārābhāve'pi viśiṣṭaphalāvāptir drṣyata iti. ato na puruṣakārāt kiñcit āsādyate.

4. D 3.138; S 2.19 ff; Ud p.69; TD 2.86a (Tsa.12.21); 93c (Tsa.14.1)

a man called Acela Kassapa¹ and the Buddha.² Here, Kassapa raises the question whether suffering is self-caused to which the Buddha gives a negative answer. Buddha argues thus:

"One and the same person both acts and experiences (the result)' —this, Kassapa, which you called at first, 'suffering self-wrought', amounts to the eternalist theory".³ This explanation shows that the Buddha was very much aware of the problem of personal identity connected with the theory of moral responsibility. For the Buddha the Upaniṣadic solution was not at all a satisfactory one. Commenting on the above explanation of the Buddha recorded in the Samyukta, Mrs. Rhys Davids says: "We fare no better in the editorial hands over the way in which the Founder is shown teaching another important application of the causal law. We mean the statement of continuous identity".⁴ This criticism would seem to lack any force if we consider carefully the nature of the argument in the light of the Buddha's attitude towards metaphysical concepts. Buddha is represented as rejecting the theory of self-causation of happiness and suffering because he was aware that the acceptance of the theory of self-causation results in the adoption of a metaphysical entity such as a permanent self or soul (v. supra. 19) and is therefore no satisfactory solution to the problem of personal identity.

1. A-chih-lo chia-she, 何支羅迦葉

2. S 2.18 ff; TD 2.86a (Tsa. 12.21).

3. S 2.20, so karoti so paṭisaṃvediyatīti kho Kassapa ādito sato sayam kataṃ dukkhaṃ'ti iti vadaṃ sassatam etam pareti.

The Chinese passage which is more concise reads 自作自覺 則隨常見, TD 2.86 (Tsa. 12.21).

4. KS 2.x.

His empirical attitude prevented him from accepting the permanent and immutable self (ātman) serving the functions of both the agent (kartā) and the enjoyer (bhoktā) of consequences. This is evident from a conversation which the Buddha had with a monk called Moliya Phagguna¹ who raised the question as to who feeds on consciousness-sustenance.² The Buddha pointed out that "It is not a proper question. I am not saying (someone) feeds on it. If this were my position, your question would be a fitting one. But I am not saying so. And since I do not say so, if you were to ask me, 'Of what, now Lord, is consciousness the sustenance?' this would be a fitting question!"³ This does not mean that the Buddha despised the beliefs of commonsense. His attitude is comparable to that of a modern Logical Positivist who despises the "unreflecting analysis of those beliefs, which takes the grammatical structure of the sentence as a trustworthy guide to its meaning".⁴ Hence, the Buddha re-formulates the question without leaving room for the introduction of any substantive ego, an ātman.

1. P'o-ch'iu-na, 頗求那 (* Phagguna).

2. S 2.13 ff; TD 2.102a ff (Tsa.15.8).

3. *ibid.*, Na kallo pañho'ti Bhāgavā avoca. Ahāretī'ti na ahaṃ vadāmi. Ahāretī'ti cāhaṃ vadeyyaṃ tatr assa kallo pañho 'ko nu kho bhante ahāretī'ti. Evañ cāhaṃ na vadāmi. Evaṃ mam avadantaṃ yo evaṃ puccheyya 'kissa nu kho bhante viññānāhāro'ti esa kallo pañho. TD 2.102a (Tsa.15.8).

4. Ayer, Language, Truth and Logic, p.51. For a detailed discussion of this problem, v. Jayatilleke, Knowledge, p.277 ff.

(27) Taking up the question of the self-causation of suffering, the Buddha says: "Even those who believe that (happiness and) suffering are self-caused, also depend on contact (phassa, chu 觸, with the world) for it is impossible to have any experience without contact".¹ The inference that one can draw from this reply is that the Buddha reduced the substantive ego (ātman) of the Upaniṣadic thinkers to (what may be described in Humean terms as) "a bundle of collection of different perceptions".² To say something about the self, according to the Buddha, was to say something about the sense-experiences. Resorting to these arguments, the Buddha rejected the Upaniṣadic conception of moral responsibility, which in its turn was based on the theory of self-causation.

(28) The inherent conflict in the Upaniṣadic theory of self-causation could not lie dormant for a long time. Evolution or transformation of an immutable and permanent self (ātman) was a paradox.³ The Upaniṣadic thinkers, therefore, gradually came to consider change as a mere illusion of our deceptive senses because it could not be reconciled with a permanent and homogeneous bodily reality.³ Starting from the time of the Brāhmaṇas and Aranyakas, they were gradually led to

1. S 2.33, tatrāvuso ye te samaṇabrāhmaṇā kammavādā sayam kataṃ (sukha-) dukkhaṃ paññāpentī tad api phassapaccayā. ... te vata aññatra phassā paṭisaṃvedissanti'ti n'etaṃ ṭhānaṃ vijjati. TD 2.94a (Tsa.14.1); also v. TD 1.76a (Chang.12.1) where the same argument is adduced against the theory of the self-causation of the world.

2. Hume, David., Treatise on Human Nature, bk.1, pt.4, section 6.

3. Taylor, Metaphysics, p.159, says that this was the attitude of Parmenides and his Eleatic successors.

a complete denial of plurality.¹ Although the search for an essential unity of things was crowned with success, yet philosophy suffered a setback as a result of this Transcendentalism. As Deussen puts it: "This unity excluded all plurality, and therefore, all proximity in space, all succession in time, all interdependence as cause and effect, and all opposition as subject and object".² Reality was considered to be beyond space,³ time,⁴ change⁵ and therefore, of causality. Change is a mere matter of words, nothing but a name (vācārambhanam vikāro nāmadheyam).⁶ After this, metaphysical speculation took the upper hand and any serious attempt to give a rational explanation of the things of experience is lacking in the Upaniṣads.

The theories of Creation.

(29) The theory of creation of the world by an omniscient, omnipotent God (issara, tsun yu 尊亦在)⁷, although included under the category of external causation (v. supra.1), more properly belongs to the Vedic tradition and may therefore be discussed in this chapter. The theories of creation mentioned in the pre-Buddhistic literature are numerous. They appear to be the product of reasoning as well as of religious experience. Of these two methods, it was by the former that

1. Brh 4.4.19; Kaṭha 4.10-11.
2. Philosophy of the Upaniṣads, p.156.
3. Brh 3.8.7.
4. ibid., 4.4.15; Śv 6.5; Kaṭha 2.14.
5. Brh 4.4.20.
6. Ch 6.1.4-6.
7. D 3.28; M 2.222; A 1.173; TD 1.435b (Chung.3.3), etc.

the concept of God and creation, as it appears in the Vedas and Brāhmanas, seems to have been arrived at. The argument from religious experience was mostly adduced during the period of the later Upaniṣads (v.infra.37).

(30) The examination of the process of reasoning by which the conception of God has been arrived at in the Vedas and Brāhmanas points to the existence of two types of arguments, namely, the cosmological and the teleological or the argument from design.

Cosmological argument.

(31) The cosmological argument is based on the basic assumption that infinite regress of time is meaningless. The problem of the infinite regress of time is hinted at in the Nāsadīya Sūkta.¹ The conception of the infinity of time (as well as of space) seems to have been personified in the form of Aditi.² But the Vedic thinkers could not reconcile themselves to the idea of infinite regress. Even Prajāpati Parameṣṭin, who appears to have been aware of the problem of infinite regress of contingent phenomena and who raised genuine doubts as to whether anybody could say what the beginning of the universe was, himself had to fall back upon something which he described with attributes which are the opposite of those of existence. Therefore he maintained: "That One, breathless, breathed by its own nature".³

1. RV 10.129.

2. *ibid.*, 10.72.

3. *ibid.*, 10.129.1.

This is a clear indication of the attempt to avoid the infinite regress of contingent phenomena by resorting to a non-contingent factor.¹ While the reluctance to accept the infinite regress of phenomena contributed to the development of the idea of God, it was further supported by the theory of self-causation. According to the theory of self-causation, a phenomenon produces from within itself another phenomenon. Tracing these backwards, the Vedic thinkers posited primordial substances such as (the heavenly) water (āpas), etc.(v.supra.7,10). But this is only a material cause which is insentient and inanimate. Therefore, the necessity to posit an intelligent being as the creator of the universe may have been felt even at an early date.

(32) This theoretic desire to determine the first cause of the world grew keener and keener and we find several hymns devoted to it, Nārāyana's "Hymn of Creation" (Puruṣa Sūkta)² being one of the best known. Although the so called cosmological argument led to the belief in an original Being (sat) which possessed characteristics which are the opposites of those of the world of experience, yet the concept of a personal God as the creator of the universe was not arrived at. As Barua has rightly remarked, it was the conceptions of Hiraṇyagarbha and Viśvakarman that show a considerable advance in the direction of the idea of God.³

1. This is the method by which Aristotle arrived at the conception of God as the 'Unmoved Mover', v.Randall, J.H., Aristotle p.137 f.; same was adopted by Thomas Aquinas, v.Copleston, F.C., Aquinas, (Pelican Philosophy Series), ch.3; Russell, B.A.W., History of Western Philosophy, p.446.

2. RV 10.90.

3. Pre-Buddhistic Indian Philosophy, p.34.

In one of the hymns of the R̥gveda, things of the world are traced back to their causes.¹ The sun which was called the Golden Germ (hiranyagarbha) was looked upon as the great power of the universe, from which all other powers and existences, divine and earthly, are derived. It represents the "origin of life".² The sun which denotes fire or the generating principle was the solar essence. But this was itself contained in the (heavenly) water. The author of the hymn was not satisfied in explaining the origin and development of the world by resorting to water as the first principle, for there ~~was~~ conceivably was a higher principle behind it. It was Prajāpati, the God of gods, who brought forth water and provided the generating principle and the ordaining power of things. This was the theory posed in reply to the question, "What God should we adore with our oblations".³

Teleological argument.

(33) The other argument, namely, the teleological argument or the argument from design appears to be the basis of the conception of the creator God found in the hymn addressed to Viśvakarman.⁴ The question raised here is, "What was the tree, what wood in sooth produced it, from which they fashioned out the earth and heaven?".⁵ The critics of the teleological argument have tried to show that the argument does not prove that the God is a creator but only an architect who arranges the material.⁶ But this criticism does not hold good in the

1. RV 10.121.

2. Bosch, F.D.K., The Golden Germ, An Introduction to Indian Symbolism, p.53.

3. RV 10.121.

4. Ibid., 10.82.

5. ibid 10.82.4; Griffith, The Hymns of the R̥gveda, (Benares, 1889-), 4.260.

6. Edwards, P. and Pap, A., A Modern Introduction to Philosophy, (New York, 1963), p.507.

case of the Vedic conception, for according to the hymn, the original substance out of which the universe was fashioned derived its being from the creator God. The commentator Sāyana says that there is no contradiction in applying the attributes of 'created' and 'creator' to one and the same being because of the ability to assume both these attributes by the power of heat (tapas).¹ Thus the creator is one with the creation, although he was the maker, disposer and the omniscient.²

(34) Most of the theories of creation in the Ṛgveda partake of the idea of mechanical and organic views of creation. But in the hymns addressed to Viśvakarman we come across, for the first time, the idea of a personal creator God, which became a favourite topic of speculation during the period of the Brāhmaṇas. In the sacrificial metaphysics of the Brāhmaṇas, theological speculation is centered round Prajāpati who replaces various other concepts found in the philosophic hymns of the Ṛgveda and the Atharvaveda. In the Taittirīya Brāhmaṇa, Prajāpati is identified with Viśvakarman.³ The idea of the continuity in the cycle of creation is hinted at when it is said, at several places in the Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa, that Prajāpati, after creating the beings, became exhausted and was healed by the gods (his offspring) by the power of the sacrifice.⁴ Although Prajāpati was the creator, yet his ability in continuous procreation was dependent on the sacrifice. In the Brāhmaṇas we meet with only a few instances

1. Commentary on RV 10.82.1, na caikasya janyajanakabhāvo virudhyate tapobalena śarīradvayasvikārāt. Ṛgveda, edited by Max Muller, vol.6, p.172.
2. RV 10.82.5, Dhātā vidhātā paramota samṛk.
3. 3.7.9.7; v. also SB 7.4.2.5.
4. 1.6.3.35 ff; 7.1.2.1 ff; St. Augustine believed that the preservation of the world is a continuous procreation, ERE 4.229.

where the theory of creation is presented independent of the sacrificial metaphysics. Once it is said that Prajāpati who alone was at the beginning (agra) and who thought of procreation, created, by the power of heat (tapas), the three worlds.¹ An attempt was also made to explain how Prajāpati created living beings of various species. Side by side with the conception of Prajāpati, we find the conception of Brahman (neuter)² and also the concept of Brahmā (masculine)³ serving the function of a creator God. This becomes evident from a statement repeated in several texts belonging to different periods of thought. In the Pañcaviṃśa or Tāṇḍya Mahā Brāhmaṇa, Brahma (neuter) is said to be "the first born of the divine order".⁴ In the Taittirīya Brāhmaṇa, the same is said in identical words, with regard to Prajāpati.⁵ Thus it is possible to believe that the concepts of Brahma (neuter), Brahmā (masculine) and Prajāpati were used without much discrimination during the time of the Brāhmaṇas,⁶ and this may be considered a formative stage in the conception of a personal God.

(35) The rational justification of the existence of God and the creation of the world by him was continued during the time of the Aitareya Aranyaka. Here we find the amalgamation of the two arguments, the cosmological and the teleological, for the existence of God. We have already seen how Mahīdāsa Aitareya

1. ŚB 2.5.1.1 ff.

2. *ibid.*, 11.2.3.1.

3. JB 3.17.2.

4. 21.3.7.

5. 8.1.3-4.

6. v. Jayatilleke, Knowledge, p.178 ff.

explained the causality of phenomena. Things arise as effects (tūla) from causes (mūla). Tracing these causes backward, he arrived at the conception of water (āpas). This original matter was the first root of which the universe is the shoot (v. supra. 10). This primordial matter which was passive and which served as the substratum of change required to be energised; hence the idea of God brooding over matter.¹ The principle of motion by which passive matter was set in motion was considered to be something other than matter. This was the God, the highest truth (sātyasya satyam).² This argument is extensively used by Uddyotakara in his Nyāya Vārttikā to prove the existence of God. He maintains that, "Just as an axe, not being intelligent itself, acts (only) after having been directed by an intelligent carpenter, in the same manner do unconscious pradhāna, atoms and karma act. Therefore, they are also directed by an intelligent cause".³

(36) Speculative theories which were based on rational explanations rather than mystical experience seem to be a characteristic feature during the period of the Vedas and Brāhmaṇas. Such speculative theories about the existence of God and the creation of the world by him were continued during the time of the early and middle Upaniṣads. Thus the Brhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad contains a speculative theory which retains the salient features of most of the earlier ones.⁴

1. Ait. Ar. 2.1.8.

2. ibid., 2.3.6.2.

3. p.457, yathā vāśyādi buddhimatā takṣṇādhiṣṭhitam acetanatvāt pravartante, tathā pradhāna-paramāṇu-karmāṇi acetanāni pravartante. tasmāt tānyapi buddhimat kārānādhiṣṭhānam. These arguments have been clearly stated by C. Bulcke, The Theism of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, Its Origin and Early Development, (Calcutta, 1947), pp. 36 ff.; v. also G.M. Bhattacharyya, Studies in Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika Theism, (Calcutta, 1961), pp. 53 ff.

4. Brh 1.4.

While this theory partakes of most of the ideas expressed in the Vedas, Brāhmaṇas and Aranyakas, it tries for the first time to explain how the original unitary Being gave rise to the world of variety and manifoldness.¹ As is evident, the belief was that the Self (ātma) which served the function of a creator God was solely responsible for the creation of the world of diversity. With the disappearance of the distinction between ātman and brahman on the one hand,² and the synonymous use of the concepts of brahman and brahmā, which are not strictly distinguished during the period of the early Upaniṣads,³ on the other, the latter, that is, Brahmā assumed the role of a personal creator God. It is this stratum of thought that is preserved in the Muṇḍaka Upaniṣad when it says: "Brahmā arose as the first among the gods, the maker of the universe, the protector of the world".⁴ It is an echo of the statements made about Brahman and also about Prajāpati in the Brāhmaṇas referred to above (v. supra. 34).

(37) The intuitional method of verifying the existence of God appears to have been adopted during the time of the later Upaniṣads. During this period we find more and more importance being attached to yogic concentration and the mental powers attained by such methods. Meditation was considered to be the means of beholding God. The Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad says:

1. Bṛh 1.4.1-5.

2. ibid., 2.5.19; 4.4.25; Ch 3.14.4, etc.

3. Jayatilleke, Knowledge, p.477.

4. 1.1, Brahmā devānāṃ prathamāṃ sambabhūva,
viśvasya kartā bhuvanasya goptā.

"By making one's own body the lower friction stick and the syllable 'Om' the upper friction stick, by practising the friction of meditation (dhyāna), one may see the God (deva) who is hidden, as it were".¹ In the same Upaniṣad, the following question has been posed, "Presided byer by whom do we live our different conditions in pleasure and pain?".² Having rejected some of the theories of causation such as Time (kāla), Nature (svabhāva), Necessity or Fate (niyati), Chance (yadṛcchā), etc., posited by the contemporary thinkers, the Upaniṣad gives the following reply to the question raised earlier, "Those who have followed after meditation and abstraction saw the self-power of God hidden in his own qualities. He is the one who rules over all these causes, from 'time' to 'the soul'".³ The repeated occurrence of the terms īś⁴ and īśvara⁵ in the sense of an omnipotent God is significant feature of the Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad. Also the word deva occurs in almost every stanza in this Upaniṣad and points to the fact that the idea of God as a personal being was the predominant conception. This God (īśvara) is the creator of all,⁶ and receives the appellation of viśvakarmā.⁷ He is the supreme Lord of Lords, the highest deity of deities.⁸ The function of the creation of the world attributed to Brahmā in the earlier Upaniṣads is transferred to īśvara in the Svetāśvatara Upaniṣad. This appears to be the formative stage of the concept of īśvara which was to dominate the theological speculations of a later date.⁹

1. 1.14; also 2.15; Hume, Upaniṣads, p.396.

2. 1.1, Adhiṣṭhitāḥ kena sukhetareṣu vartāmahe ... vyavasthām.

3. 1.3.

4. 3.7,20; 4.7.

5. 4.10; 6.7.

6. 4.14; 5.13, viśvasya sraṣṭāraṃ.

7. 4.17, esa devo viśvakarmā.

8. 6.7, Tam īśvarānāṃ paramaṃ maheśvaram
tam devatānāṃ paramaṃ ca daivatam.

9. v. Nyāyakusumāñjalī of Udayana, etc.

(38) Side by side with this new concept of Īśvara we find the continuation of the earlier concept of Brahmā (masculine).¹ Therefore, when the Buddhist texts refer at times to Brahmā as a personal creator God² and, at other times, to Īśvara (issara, tsun yu 尊祐) playing the same role,³ they are not referring to fanciful accounts of their own imagination,⁴ but are presenting genuine conceptions found in the mainstreams of the Vedic tradition. As we have already seen, the terms brahmā and Īśvara were used synonymously in the later Upaniṣads and this is reflected in the statements found in the early Buddhist texts where it is often said: yo kho so bhavaṃ brahmā mahābrahmā abhibhū anabhibhūto aññadatthudaso vasavatti issaro kattā nimmātā seṭṭho sañjitā vasi pitā bhūtabhavyānaṃ⁵ (That illustrious Brahmā, the Supreme One, the Mighty, the All-seeing, the Ruler, the Lord of all, the Maker, the Creator, the Chief of all, appointing to each his place, the Ancient of days, the Father of all that are and are to be ...⁶). The Chinese Agamas preserve this statement and here too the two terms are used synonymously: 彼是大梵。彼能自造。無造彼者。盡知諸義典千世界。於中自在。最為尊貴。能為變化微妙第一。為眾生父。⁷

1. Sv 5.6.

2. D 1.17 f; TD 1.

3. M 1.222; A 1.173 f; J 5.228; TD 1.435b (Chung.3.3).

4. Thomas, E. J., History of Buddhist Thought, (London, 1959), p.90.

5. D 1.18; M 2.227.

6. Dial 1.32.

7. TD 202 1.90c (Chang.14.1); v. also TD 1.69a (Chang.11.1); 547b (Chung.19.1).

Moreover, in the Pāṭika Suttanta Buddha refers to some teachers who advocated the traditional doctrine of creation of the world by Īsvara, by Brahmā,¹ and the commentator believes that here the two terms Īsvara and Brahmā are used synonymously.²

Buddhist criticism of the conception of creator God.

(39) The intuitional method of verifying the existence of God is referred to and criticised in the Brahmajāla Suttanta.³ Herein, the Buddha does not adopt a negative approach which would treat all forms of religious experience as illusions or hallucinations. He adopts the more sober attitude, comparable to that of Broad and Stace in modern thought,⁴ according to which human beings do, in some religious experiences, come into contact with "an aspect of reality" not given in more ordinary types of experience, but that this aspect of reality is probably misdescribed by the use of theological language.⁴ This method of refutation was adopted by the Buddha in criticising the claims of the the sages who maintained that they have witnessed God in their trances. Buddha's argument is put forward in the form of a parable. He says: "At the dissolution of the world process, some of the beings are born in the realm of Brahmā, and of these, the being, who is to be born in that realm first comes to be of long life, good complexion and is powerful. Beings who follow him are inferior.

1. D 3.28, issarakuttaṃ brahmakuttaṃ aggaññaṃ paññāpentī.
The Chinese version (TD 1.69a, Chang.11.1) reads 一切世間
梵自在天造 where the two terms brahma (fan 梵) and
issara (tzu tsai 自在) seem to be amalgamated.
2. DA 3.830.
3. D 1.18; TD 1.90b-c (Chang.14.1).
4. The arguments adduced by different scholars to refute the intuitional method of verifying the existence of God are discussed by Edwards and Pap, Introduction, p.458.

It so happens that one of the beings who came later, having passed away from that realm, is reborn in this world. After being reborn here he adopts the life of a religious mendicant and practising mental concentration is able to reach such rapture of thought that he can recollect his past births up to some moment (of his life in the Brahma world) and not beyond. Then with regard to the being who was first born in the realm of Brahmā, he maintains that 'he is the great Brahmā, the supreme one, the mighty, the all-seeing, the ruler, the lord of all, appointing to each his place, the ancient of days, the father of all that are and are to be, and we must have been created by him'.¹ This fanciful account is intended merely to refute the idea of creation. At the same time it testifies to the existence of people who depended on religious experience to make assertions with regard to the existence of a creator God. Buddha seems to have been aware of the difficulty into which these religious teachers had fallen, and as the parable shows, he rejected these views not because they are illusions or hallucinations but because they are misdescriptions of an aspect of reality given to extrasensory perception.

(40) Further, the view that the origin of the world was due to the creative activity of God was refuted by putting forward a counter-theory which appears to reject each one of the salient features of the pre-Buddhistic theory. First of all, the view that the world process had a conceivable beginning is rejected when it was suggested that the process is one of dissolution (samvatta, huai 土襲) and evolution (vivaṭṭa, pien 變) without a beginning. Rejecting the Upaniṣadic idea that the first being

1. D 1.18; TD 1.90c (Chang.14.1); v. also TD 1.547b (Chung.19.1).

became as big as a man and woman embracing each other and that the parting of this very body into two resulted in the appearance of man and wife,¹ the Buddhist text maintains that just like the first being, another appeared in this world having deceased from the world of Brahmā.² Then it proceeds to explain how the being who came first formed the misconception that he was the creator of other beings who came later. Because the first being hoped for the company of another, on the appearance of the second, the former thought that it was due to his wish that the latter came into existence. As for those other beings who appeared later, they thought that the being who appeared first was their creator. This story exposes the fallacy of creation of the world by an almighty God and perhaps also the view that the prior or the preceding is always the cause of the subsequent.

(41) Buddha's objection to the view that the world of beings, with their happiness and suffering, is created by an omnipotent and omniscient God is based on two grounds. First, it denies the doctrine of moral responsibility of man and, secondly, because it is detrimental to the religious life.

(42) According to the Mahābodhi Jātaka, "If God (issara) were to determine the life of all beings, including their happiness and misery, virtue and vice, then man is carrying out the commandments of God. Therefore, it would be the God who would be smeared by their actions".³ This argument which makes

1. Brh. 1.4.3.

2. D. 1.18 f; TD 1.90c (Chang. 14.1).

3. J. 5.238, Issaro sabbalokassa sace kappeti jīvitam,
iddhivyanabhāvañ ca kammaṃ kalyānapāpakaṃ,
niddeśakārī puriṣo issaro tena lippati.

use of the idea of creation itself to refute the theory of creation is compared to the action of bringing down a mango by striking it with another mango.¹ Another argument was adduced to the same effect and is stated thus: "If beings experience pleasure and ^{pain} because of theistic determination, then the Niganthas, for example, are created by an evil God because they experience extreme forms of suffering; and the Buddha, because he, being freed from defilements, enjoys extreme happiness, would be a creation of a beneficent God".² From these arguments it becomes evident that the Buddha's objection to the idea of creation is that it tends to undermine the idea of moral responsibility.

(43) On the other hand, if we hold that evils such as murder or taking away of life, theft, etc., are due to theistic determination, it would destroy the foundation of religious life. The Anguttara says: "For those who fall back on the idea of creation by God as the essential reason there is neither desire nor effort, nor the sense of 'ought' and 'ought not'. Thus in the absence of such (disposition and discrimination) in truth and verity, the term recluse cannot be applied (to such a person) because he lives in a state of bewilderment with the faculties unguarded".³ The doctrine of creation (issaranimmāna-hetu, yin tsun yu tsao 因尊祐造), along with two other views, namely, that everything is due to past action (pubbekata-hetu, yin su ming ssao 因宿命造) and that everything is

1. Loc.cit.

2. M 2.222, 227; TD 1.444a, 444c-445a (Chung.4.2).

3. A 1.174; TD 1.435b (Chung.3.3).

due to chance occurrence (ahetu appaccayā, wu yin wu yüan 無因無緣) are considered to be sectarian tenets (titthâyatana, tu ch'u 度處) which lead to a traditional doctrine of inaction (akiriya).¹

(44) In the light of the foregoing evidence it is not possible to agree with the view expressed by M.D.Śastri that the conception of Iśvara as "an omnific, omnipresent, supreme God, who is the lord of all, above all gods" is not to be found even during the time of the Buddha.² To prove this Śastri maintains, first, that the Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad is not as old as the other ten Upaniṣads,³ secondly, that the references to Iśvara or Iśvaravādins in early Buddhist literature are to a conception of God more or less similar to the departmental Vedic gods and, thirdly, that some of the references may also belong to a time much posterior to Buddha.⁴ Of these, the first argument does not prove anything. Although the principal Upaniṣads are considered to be ten in number, yet we find Śaṅkara commenting on eleven Upaniṣads including the Śvetāśvatara,⁵ which means that it is fairly old. It is considered to be contemporary with the Buddha, if not pre-Buddhistic.⁶ The second and third arguments appear to contradict each other. If the references in the early Buddhist texts are to the Vedic conception of gods,

1. loc.cit; TD 1.435a (Chung.3.3).

2. 'History of the word Iśvara and its idea', in The Proceedings of the AAI-India Oriental Conference, VII, Baroda, 1933, pp. 487-503.

3. *ibid.*, p.495.

4. *ibid.*, p.499 n.

5. Radhakrisnan, S., The Principal Upaniṣads, (London, 1953), p.21.

6. Jayatilleke, Knowledge, p.65 places the rise of Buddhism somewhat before the Maitrī Upaniṣad and the Ajīvikas, a pre-Buddhistic school, as contemporary with the Śvetāśvatara, v. p.482.

there is no reason to maintain that these references belong to a period much posterior to the Buddha, for the Vedic teachings originated before the time of the Buddha and the Buddha would certainly have been aware of them. We believe that the conception of God in the Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad, which was the basis of the later concepts, was known to the Buddha and that the references in the Nikāyas and the Āgamas are to a genuine tradition existing during the time of the Buddha.

CHAPTER TWO

Historical Background—2, Non-Vedic.

(45) The different theories coming under the category of external causation, except the theory of creation by a personal God (v. supra. 29 ff.), are predominantly non-Vedic, although the germs of these theories may be found in the Vedic tradition itself. Most of these theories may be classified under the broad category of Naturalism.

Schools of Naturalism.

(46) In the history of Indian thought we notice the existence of three types of Naturalism. The first type of Naturalism is synonymous with Materialism, which regards all facts of the universe as sufficiently explained by a theory of matter.¹ Matter is considered to be the ultimate fact of the universe, and all phenomena, including the phenomenon of consciousness, are reduced by this theory to transformations of material molecules. The transformation of the material molecules takes place according to inherent nature (svabhāva). This school of thought is represented in Indian philosophy by the Cārvāka or the Lokāyata or the Bārhaspatya. The second type of Naturalism is the one which is advocated by the Ajīvikas who, while accepting the materialist conception of the universe, laid emphasis on the theory of complete natural determinism (niyati), but unlike the Materialists believed in transmigration. The third type of Naturalism is that which limits itself to what is natural or normal in its explanation of the universe as against appeal to what is supernatural. Its scope is not limited to physical nature alone, but takes into consideration

1. Baldwin, Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology, 2.137 f.

mental phenomena which are also considered to be fundamental constituents of the universe. It may be this type of Naturalism which Riepe had in mind when he said: "Every school that is materialistic is also naturalistic although it is by no means true that all naturalistic schools are materialistic".¹

Svabhāvavāda.

(47) Let us consider the first type of Naturalism, namely, Materialism. Materialism is generally thought to be a product of the incipient rational temper pervading the pre-Buddhistic philosophical atmosphere,² and especially a revolt against the ritualism of the Vedas and Brāhmanas and some of the idealistic metaphysics of the Upaniṣads. A systematic treatment of Materialism is met with quite late in the history of Indian philosophy. The sources for the reconstruction of the teachings of this school may be classified into three broad categories.

(i) The references to materialistic teachings in the orthodox as well as the Jaina and the Buddhist literature. These accounts are tinged with an element of partiality since only those aspects of materialistic teaching which are opposed to the teachings of the school quoting them are emphasised to the neglect of other aspects (v.infra.94). (ii) The accounts given in the histories of philosophical systems such as the Śaddarśana-samuccaya, Sarvadarśanasamgraha, etc., which, in spite of the fact that the authors may belong to a particular faith, present the views of the Materialists as a comprehensive whole. In this category may be included the account of Materialism found in

1. Naturalistic Tradition in Indian Thought, (Seattle, 1961), p.57.
2. Jayatilleke, Knowledge, p.71.

the Sānti-parvan of the Mahābhārata.¹ (iii) The Tattvopaplavasimha of Jayarāsi Bhaṭṭa is a unique work in that it is the only treatise on Materialism belonging to a materialistic school.

(48) There is no doubt that the information supplied by the sources of the first category is the earliest. Yet it would be unfair to depend on them for a true picture of the materialistic philosophy. On the other hand, it would be more fitting to evaluate the information gathered from the first category in the light of the information afforded by the second and third, for the latter presents us with a systematic treatment of Materialism.

(49) There are several important discussions by modern scholars on the subject of Indian Materialism.² Many have traced the origins of materialist thinking in the thought of the early Upaniṣadic period.³ Dr. Jayatilleke maintains that "the Materialists themselves seem to trace their doctrines to the early Upaniṣads when they quote a statement attributed to Yājñavalkya in the Upaniṣads in support of their doctrine".⁴

1. 12, chapters 222, 224.

2. Hiriyanna, M., Svabhāvavāda or Indian Materialism, in PIPC 1936, reprinted in Indian Philosophical Studies, (Mysore, 1937), 1. 71 ff; Tucci, G., A Sketch of Indian Materialism, in PIPC 1925, pp. 34-43; Riepe, D.M., Naturalistic Tradition in Indian Thought, pp. 53-78; Ruben, Walter, Über den Tattvopaplavasimha des Jayarāsi Bhaṭṭa, eine agnostizistische Erkenntniskritik, in WZKS & O. 1. pp. 141-153 (Vienna, 1958); Jayatilleke, Knowledge, pp. 69-108; Chattopadhyaya, B., Lokāyata, A Study on Ancient Indian Materialism, (New Delhi, 1959).

3. Dasgupta, S., History of Indian Philosophy, 3. 528; Chattopadhyaya, Lokāyata, p. 45; Sinha, Jadunath, History of Indian Philosophy, 1. 230.

4. Knowledge, p. 70.

Discussing the ontological speculations of Uddālaka, Ruben calls them a form of "hylozoistische Monismus"¹ and traces the germs of Materialism in the thought of Uddālaka.² On the other hand, we find Śāṅkara making an attempt to distinguish Uddālaka's theory from the more materialistic Sāṅkhya and to interpret it as a form of Idealism (v.supra.17). For Uddālaka and his predecessors, as in the case of the Milesians,³ the union of matter and spirit in a primordial substance was an assumption that raised no doubt. But as time went on, matter and spirit were tugging more and more strongly at the bonds which united them until the emergence of completely materialistic as well as naturalistic schools on the one hand and the idealistic schools on the other. Therefore, it would be possible to trace the origins of Materialism as well as of Idealism in the hylozoistic tendencies found in the thought of Uddālaka and his predecessors.⁴

(50) It was pointed out that the theory of self-causation was at the basis of the philosophy of change accepted by Uddālaka (v.supra.16 f.). The material elements which were considered to be sentient were able to produce out of themselves succeeding elements. But even the Sāṅkhya, which, according to Śāṅkara, considered the material elements to be insentient, accepted a theory of self-causation. But being

1. Die Philosophen der Upanisaden, (Bern, 1947), p.163.

2. ibid.

3. Gutherie, W.K.C., History of Greek Philosophy, (Cambridge, 1962), 2.145.

4. Analysing the ontological speculations of Parmenides whose conception of 'Being' may be considered as similar to the conception of sat in the Upaniṣads, J. Burnet says that, while some are inclined to consider Parmenides as the "father of Idealism", he himself is inclined towards the view that Parmenides is the "father of Materialism", v. Early Greek Philosophy, (London, 1958), p.182.

unable to explain how movement can be initiated in insentient matter (prakṛti), the Sāṅkhya posited an external spiritual principle, puruṣa, to create the movement in matter. Therefore, in the ultimate analysis, it is the spirit or puruṣa which sets the chain of causation moving. The Materialists who could not subscribe to such a theory, rejected the spiritual principle which accounted for movement and considered change as taking place due to inherent nature (svabhāva).

(51) Although no separate work of the Materialists belonging to the pre-Buddhistic period has come down to us, yet there is no doubt that the school existed independently, fighting against the ritualistic and the idealistic schools of thought current at the time. This is borne out by the Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad which refers to several contemporary theories of change and causation, two of which are the "theory of elements" (bhūtāni) and the "theory of inherent nature" (svabhāva).¹ There is a tendency to identify Materialism with the "theory of elements",² but not with the "theory of inherent nature". In the later sources of the Materialist school, we find that materialism or the theory of elements (bhūtāni) is inextricably connected with the theory of inherent nature (svabhāva).³ Dr. Jayatilleke opines that in the Sarvadarśanasamgraha the Materialists have adopted the theory of nature (svabhāva).⁴ But in the Mahābhārata we have an earlier reference to the close connection between Materialism and Svabhāvavāda.⁵

1. 1.2.

2. Jayatilleke, Knowledge, p.71.

3. Mbh 12.222, 224; SDS p.13; Tattvopaplavasimha, p.88.

4. Knowledge, p.444.

5. 12.222, 224.

Unfortunately, the early Jaina and Buddhist texts make no reference to this aspect of Materialism in spite of the reference to it in the Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad. But is this silence on the part of the Buddhists and the Jainas a proof of the non-acceptance of the "theory of inherent nature" (svabhāva) by the Materialists? If svabhāvavāda was adopted by the Materialists at some stage, what was their position before its adoption? Was it a theory of chance (yadr̥cchā) that they propounded? But this is not plausible, because even the Nihilist school of Materialists are represented as accepting a theory of inherent nature (v.infra.66). For reasons given below (v.infra.63ff) we are inclined to believe that svabhāvavāda was part and parcel of Materialism, even of pre-Buddhistic times.

(52) Dr. Jayatilleke, who has made a study of the epistemological standpoint of this school, maintains that the Materialists could be classified into three schools, viz., (i) those who upheld the validity of perception alone and denied inference and other forms of knowledge, (ii) those who upheld the validity and priority of perception, but admitted inference in a limited sense, denying other forms of knowledge, and (iii) those who denied all means of knowledge including perception.¹ Since the epistemological question does not concern us much here, and since Dr. Jayatilleke has given a detailed analysis of such questions, we would confine ourselves only to their conception of reality.

1. Knowledge, p.71.

(53) All accounts of Materialism admit the plurality of elements.¹ Even the Tattvopaplavasimha, which purports to 'upset all realities' (tattva-upaplava) including the material elements, admits, at the level of conventional truth, the reality of the four elements, earth, water, fire and air.² The general agreement among scholars was that according to the Materialists the material or the physical world was the only reality and that non-material phenomena such as consciousness are unreal. But this is not so. The Tattvopaplavasimha testifies to the existence of a slightly different philosophy of Materialism. Comparing the conceptions of reality given in the sources mentioned above (v. supra. 47), it would be possible to classify the Materialists into two schools as (i) those who upheld a theory of evolution (parināti) of physical objects, and ascribed reality to these, denying the reality of mental phenomena, and (ii) those who upheld a nihilistic theory denying the reality even of physical objects.

(54) Group (i) is certainly the best known. Both the Ṣaḍdarśanasamuccaya of Haribhadra and the Sarvadarśanasamgraha of Mādhava present this theory. The Ṣaḍdarśanasamuccaya states the theory thus: "As a result of the evolution (parināti) of body (deha) by the combination of the elements of earth, etc., consciousness arises".³ The same theory is set out in the Sarvadarśanasamgraha which says: "Here the

1. D. 1.55; TD 1.108b (Chang. 17.1); SDSM p.306; SDS p.2; Mbh 12.222.

2. p.1, prthivyāpastejovāyur iti tattvāni.

3. p.306, prthivyādīsamhatyā tathā dehāparīṇateḥ madaśaktiḥ surāṅgebhyo yadvattadvaccidātmani.

elements, earth, etc., are the four realities; from the evolution of the form of body (dehākāra) from these (realities), consciousness is produced".¹ Thus, according to this theory, body (deha) and such other physical things are real in that they are directly evolved from real material elements. But these bodies are distinguished from consciousness which arises in the bodies once they have evolved (parinatebhyaḥ). This implies that the physical bodies are real as the material elements that go to constitute them, while consciousness is only a by-product and therefore unreal. This is the theory presented by the first two groups of Materialists of Dr. Jayatilleke's classification (v. supra. 52). Because they accepted perception (and also inference in a limited sense) as a valid form of knowledge, they were able to grant the reality of physical bodies, but rejected consciousness, etc., as unreal because these are not subject to perception, i.e., adrṣṭa.

(55) The belief in the evolution of the physical personality (deha=rūpa) from material elements and the granting of a greater degree of reality to objects which have evolved in this manner than to consciousness, may have led these Materialists to accept a personality lasting as long as life does, and as a result gave rise to a school of Materialists who are represented as holding the view that the soul is the same as the body (tajjīvataccharīravāda) referred to in the Buddhist² as well as the Jaina texts.³

1. p.2, tatra pṛthivyādīni bhūtāni catvāri tattvāni, tebhya eva dehākāraparinatebhyaḥ ... caitanya upajāyate.
2. D 1.55, attā rūpī cātummahābhūtiko; TD 1.108b (Chang.17.1); M 1.426, taṃ jīvaṃ taṃ sarīraṃ, TD 1.804a (Chung.60.6).
3. Sū 2.1.9, tajjīvataccharīraetti.

(56) The teachings of group (ii) are represented in the Tattvopaplavasimha. Here the constitution of the phenomenal world is described in a slightly different way. It does not speak of an evolution but maintains just that "earth, water, fire and air are the realities, and as a result of their combination (arise) body, senses, objects and consciousness".¹ The important feature in this statement is that even the body, the senses and the external objects are put into the category of consciousness. As the statement goes we cannot make any distinction between the body, the senses and the objects on the one side, and consciousness on the other. Now, consciousness is considered by all the Materialists as unreal, and therefore the conclusion that according to this school even physical bodies are unreal is irresistible. Such a theory is quite plausible when we consider the epistemological standpoint of this school of Materialists. As Dr. Jayatilleke has pointed out, they denied even perception (v. supra. 52) and thus there was no ground for them to hold that physical bodies are real.

(57) Dialectical arguments were adduced by this school of Materialists to refute the conception of causality (hetuphalabhāva).² Jayarāsi rejects the idea of production (janakatva)³ as well as of concomitance (sahotpāda).⁴ The rejection of the idea of production or of origination led Jayarāsi to deny the idea of destruction (viṇāsa).⁵ It appears to be the result of

1. p.1, pṛthivyāpastejovāyur iti tattvāni, tat samudaye śair śarīrendriyaviṣayaśaṅjñā. Gunaratna, in his Tarka rahasya-dīpikā (p.307) quotes a similar passage where viṣaya is placed before indriya, with an addition, namely, tebhyaś-caitanyaṃ, which Dr. Jayatilleke considers to be a reference to an emergent ātman, v. Knowledge, p.81, n.2.
2. ~~ibid~~ Tattvopaplavasimha, p.87 f.
3. ibid.
4. ibid., p.70 f.
5. ibid., p.106.

of the a priori premiss that "What is does not perish, and from nothing comes nothing",¹ which is attributed by Śilānka to one of the schools of Materialism.² With the rejection of destruction (vināsa) Jayarāśi had to accept the permanence of all realities.³ This he does without any hesitation when, after criticising the conception of causality, he comes to the conclusion that "anterior or posterior activity is not generated by immovable or static matter (avicalitarūpa)".⁴ This means that the Nihilist school of Materialists upheld a theory of motionless permanence (avicalita-nityatvam). With the acceptance of the principle of motionless permanence, these Materialists were compelled to maintain the unproductivity or barrenness of phenomena and this idea is certainly hinted at by Jayarāśi when he said: "The wise do not query about causation or absence of causation in the case of a barren woman's child who is non-existent".⁵

(58) In the light of these explicit references to the doctrine of motionless permanence (avicalita-nityatvam), we cannot agree with Dr. Jayatilleke when he maintains that "it is unlikely that the Nihilist Materialists would have made a detailed denial of the reality of motion since they merely denied the existence of the world as such on epistemological grounds, because there were no valid means of knowing it".⁶

1. Sū.2.1.10, sato natthi vināso asato natthi sambhavo.

2. Skr. vol.2, fol.17; v. Jayatilleke, Knowledge, p.70.

3. Tattvopaplavasimha, p.106, tadā sarvabhāvānām nityatvam āpadyate vināsasyāsambhavāt.

4. ibid., p.87, avicalitarūpena pūrvāparakāryam na janyate; also ito'pi dahanadhūmayoḥ hetuphalabhāvānupapattiḥ yathā avicalitadahanarūpasya Pūrvāparānekakāryāvīrbhāvakatvam nā pratipadyate.

5. ibid., p.106, nā hi vandhyāsuatsyābhāve sahetukatvam nirhetukatvam vā vicārayanti santāḥ.

6. Knowledge, p.256.

It is very surprising to find that in spite of this remark, he tries to identify the Materialist teaching referred to by Śilānka with the teachings of the Nihilist school.¹

This inconsistency may be due to the failure to notice the occurrence of the doctrine of motionless permanence in the Tattvopaplavasimha. Dr. Basham too, when he analysed the Ajīvika doctrine of motionless permanence,² failed to notice that it occurred in this treatise of the Nihilist Materialists.

(59) The criticism of causality, coupled with the theory of motionless permanence (avicalita-nityatvam) of material phenomena, led these Materialists to believe that the world perceptible to the senses was unreal. Dr. Jayatilleke has, for the first time, observed the connection between this theory and the doctrine attributed to Ajita Kesakambali in the early Buddhist texts³ and which maintains that "Neither this world nor the other exists".⁴

(60) In the Sūtrakṛtāṅga, the doctrine of motionless permanence (avicalita-nityatvam) has been attributed to a school of akiriyavādins and is stated as follows: "Those akiriyavādins, who have no understanding, posit various theories. . . . the sun does not rise or set, the moon does not wax or wane, rivers do not flow and wind do not blow; the whole world is deemed unreal (vañjho)".⁵

1. Knowledge, pp.255-256.

2. History and Doctrines of the Ajīvikas, p.236 ff.

3. Knowledge, pp.90-91.

4. D 1.55; M 3.71, natthi ayam loko natthi paro loko. The Chinese version of the Sāmaññaphala Suttanta attributes the statement 無有今世, 亦無後世, to Makkhali Gosāla, v. TD 1.108b (Chang.17.1).

5. 1.12.6-7, te evam akkhanti abujjamānā virūvarūvāni akiriyavāi . . . nāicco uei na atthameti, na candimā vaḍḍhati hāyati vā, salilā na sandanti na vanti vāyā vañjho niyato kasine hu loe.

While commenting on this passage, Śilānka has identified this theory with the teachings of both the Cārvākas and the Buddhists.¹ As we have already pointed out (v.supra.59), this doctrine was the basis of the conception of reality given in the Tattvopaplavasimha. When Śilānka made this identification he was definitely aware of the existence of this school of Materialism, for he refers to their epistemological standpoint depending on which they maintained that this world is unreal. He says: "In putting forward the theory that 'nothing exists' the Lokāyatikas admit no means of knowledge, for it has been said 'all principles have been upset' ...".² In the light of this evidence we maintain that the doctrine of motionless permanence (avicalita-nityatvam) was part and parcel of the teachings of the Nihilist school of Materialists and that Śilānka was definitely aware of this when he made this identification, but not that he was suggesting a plausible hypothesis, as Dr. Jayatilleke maintains.

(61) The idea of indestructibility, and, therefore, of permanence of matter is implied in the teachings of Ajita Kesakambali, who is considered to be the earliest and the chief representative of materialistic thought in India.

1. Skt. vol.1, fol.220, on Sū 1.12.6.
2. ibid., Lokāyatikānām sarvaśūnyatve pratipādye na pramāṇam asti, tathā c'oktaṃ tattvāny upapluṭānī'ti. Dr. Jayatilleke seems to have quoted this passage wrongly when he stated it thus: Lokāyatikānām sarvaśūnyatve pratipādyatvena pramāṇam asti, and has translated it as: "The Lokāyatikas do have a means of knowledge in putting forward the theory that nothing exists, ...", in spite of his admission that they "denied the existence of the world as such on epistemological grounds, because there were no valid means of knowing it", Knowledge, p.256.

His doctrine is set out in the early Buddhist texts thus:

"Man is composed of the four great elements; when he dies the earth returns to the earth aggregate, water to water, fire to fire and air to air, while the senses vanish into space".¹

The most significant feature of this theory is that it implies the indestructibility of matter, an idea which is generally attributed to the Ajīvika teacher Pakudha Kaccāyana.² We are told that the physical personality consisting of the four great elements (cātummahābhūtiko puriso, shou sū ta jen 受四大人), according to Ajita Kesakambali's theory, is completely cut off and destroyed (uochijjissati vinassissati, chieh hsi huai pai 皆悉壞敗) but not the material elements. They return (anupeti anupagacchati, huan kuei 還歸) to their natural places, earth to earth, water to water, fire to fire and air to air. This implies that these material elements are indestructible and permanent. Therefore, not only in the matter of denying the reality of this world (v. supra.59), but also with regard to the conception of matter, Ajita Kesakambali's teachings represent the doctrines of the Nihilist school of Materialists in germinal form.

(62) While this school of Materialists believed that this world is unreal, firstly, because there is no way of knowing it, and secondly, because all things are immutable (avicalita), barren (vandhya) and fixed (niyata), the Sūnyavāda Buddhists arrived at the same conclusion by an altogether different method. The Sūnyavādins made use of dialectical arguments

1. D 1.55, cātummahābhūtiko ayaṃ puriso, yadā kālaṃ karoti paṭhavi paṭhavikāyaṃ anupeti anupagacchati āpo āpokāyaṃ ... tejo tejokāyaṃ ... vāyo vāyokāyaṃ ... , ākāsaṃ indriyāni sankamanti; TD 1.108b (Chang.17.1).

2. D 1.56; v. Basham, Ajīvikas, p.16.

to refute the idea of production as well as of destruction, but yet as a result they did not arrive at the conclusion that the phenomenal world is characterised by motionless permanence (avicalita-nityatvam). Instead they believed that because things are causally conditioned (pratītyasamutpanna) they have no reality (svabhāva) and are void (śūnya) (v.infra.161). But unlike the Materialists, the Buddhist maintained this theory of the unreality of the phenomenal world in relation to the transcendental reality, i.e., nirvāna (v.infra.308). Therefore, Śilānka's identification of the theory of motionless permanence (avicalita-nityatvam) with the teachings of the Materialists as well as of the Buddhists is a result of the confusion of the two different standpoints of these two schools of thought. As has been pointed out,¹ the Buddhist texts refer to the doctrine of motionless permanence in terms quite similar to the description in the Sūtrakṛtāṅga. It runs: "Winds do not blow, rivers do not flow, women with child do not give birth, the moon and the sun do not rise or set, but stand firm as pillars".² Here it is called a heretical teaching (diṭṭhi) and is no doubt a reference to the conception of the world presented by the Nihilist school of Materialists, But a passage expressing a similar view of a static universe, but which is only a description of the transcendental world in relation to the phenomenal, is to be found in the Udāna. It reads thus: The stars do not shine there, neither does the sun nor the moon, and there is no darkness there".³

1. Jayatilleke, Knowledge, p.256.

2. S 3.202, na vātā vāyanti na najjo sandanti, na gabbhiniyo vijāyanti, na candimasuriyā uđenti vā paenti vā esikaṭṭhāyiṭṭhitā; cp. TD 2.45a (Tsa.7.24).

3. Ud p.9, na tattha sukkā jotanti, ādicco nappakāsati, na tattha candimā bhāti tamo tattha na vijjati.

(63) Of all the doctrines of the Materialists that which is most relevant to our study is their conception of Natural Determinism (svabhāvavāda). It can be maintained without doubt that it was the Materialists who first put forward a systematic theory of inherent nature (svabhāva). Both Rāmatīrtha Svāmi¹ and Nṛsiṃha Aśrama², while commenting on the Samkṣepaśārīrika³ of Sarvajñātma Muni, attribute the svabhāvavāda to the Materialists.

(64) It has been observed that according to the first school of Materialists (v. supra. 54) there is a plurality of elements and the phenomenal world is the product of the evolution of these material elements. The most popular school of Materialists, as we are informed,⁴ denied the validity of inference. If so how did they explain evolution? What was the principle according to which the plurality of elements go to form the world of experience? Dr. Jayatilleke brings out the problem which the second school of Materialists, according to his classification (v. supra. 52), would have faced as a result of the change in their epistemological standpoint; but he leaves it unsolved. He says: It is difficult to say whether this school asserted that there was a necessary connection between cause and effect or merely held that concomitance or sequence was only probable and therefore the inference was only probable".⁵ As a result of the change of its epistemological outlook anyone would have expected this school of Materialists

1. Anvayārthaprakāśikā, p.390, svabhāva iti svabhāvavādinō nāstikaviśeṣaś cārvākādayaḥ.
2. Tattvabodhinī, p.461, svabhāvavyatirekena kāryakāraṇabhāva-nirūpanāyogāt svabhāvāḥ kāraṇam iti cārvākāḥ.
3. 1.528.
4. v. SDS p.3 ; v. also Jayatilleke, Knowledge, p.72.
5. Knowledge, p.77.

to propound a theory of causation. But it must be remembered that although for practical reasons and as a result of the criticism of other schools of thought these Materialists accepted the validity of inference in a limited sense, yet the idea of the inferable as being confined to the sphere of the verifiable weighed heavily in their minds. Thus we cannot expect them to have gone beyond the school of Materialists who accepted only sense perception as a valid means of knowing, and put forward a theory of causation based on the inductive principle.

(65) According to the best known school of Materialists, "a universal proposition is not established even by the observation of several instances because of the possibility of error even after a thousand instances have been observed. Though by the observation of several instances, we come to the conclusion that smoke and fire are concomitant, we cannot know that there is no smoke in the absence of fire, even after repeated observation".¹ This denial of the validity of inference and thus of universal propositions militated against the acceptance of the principle of causation.

(66) Does this mean that the plurality of phenomena perceptible to the senses are destitute of causes? The Materialists of the Sarvadarśanasamgraha raise this question thus: Nanv adrṣṭāniṣṭau jagad vaicitryam ākasmikam syād iti,

1. Nyāyamañjarī, p.109, bhūyodarśanagamyā'pi na vyāptir avakalpate sahasraśo'pi tad drṣṭe vyabhicārāvadhāranāt bhūyo ~~drṣṭvā~~ drṣṭvā ca dhūmo'gnisahacārītigamyatām agnau tu sa nāstī'ti na bhūyodarśanādgaṭiḥ; v. Jayatilleke, Knowledge, p.78.

i.e., if what is not perceived is ^{not} granted (as existing), is it not that variety in the world is due to chance occurrence?¹ As this school of Materialists were opposed to indeterminism, the answer to this question in the Sarvadarśana-saṅgraha is in the negative. The use of the word ākasmika to denote the idea of chance occurrence is very significant, because Śāṅkara has made use of the very same word to explain yadṛcchāvāda. Commenting on the Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad, he says: yadṛcchā ākasmikī prāptiḥ.² If the term ākasmika is a synonym of yadṛcchā, then certainly, the Materialist theory set forth in the Sarvadarśanasamgraha cannot be considered a "curious admixture of Svabhāvavāda and Yadṛcchāvāda", as Prof. Hiriyanna would make us believe,³ because ākasmika is rejected as a solution and in its place the belief in inherent nature (svabhāva) is upheld.⁴ Even the Nihilist school of Materialists, who accepted a doctrine of motionless permanence (avicalita-nityatvam), appears to have believed in a theory of inherent nature (svabhāva) as a guiding principle in phenomena.⁵

(67) Defining the word svabhāva occurring in the Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad (1.2), Śāṅkara says: "Svabhāva is the unique power or property restricted to (individual or classes of) objects, like the warmth of fire".⁶ It is one's own uniqueness.

1. p.13.

2. Comy. on Śv., Bibliotheca Indica, 7.276.

3. Indian Philosophical Studies, p.73.

4. SDS p.13, svabhāvād eva tad upapattēḥ.

5. Tattvopaplavasīṃhā, p.88.

6. Bibliotheca Indica, 7.276, svabhāvo nāma padārthānām pratiniyatā śaktiḥ, agner auṣṇyam iva.

Udayana Acārya, in his Nyāya Kusumāñjalī, supports this view and explains it further. He says: "What pertains to all cannot be inherent nature (svabhāvatva) and indeed, the same thing cannot be the nature of more than one; otherwise there is contradiction".¹ Vardhamāna, while commenting on this passage says: "Svabhāva is said to be the property restricted to one (class of) object. If that pertains to everything, then there would not arise the state of inherent nature (svabhāvatva) or uniqueness (asādhāraṇatva)".² Vardhamāna's explanation is significant in that he equates inherent nature (svabhāva) with uniqueness (asādhāraṇatva). This means that svabhāvavāda involves the idea of necessary connection or invariability (niyamatva). Udayana Acārya defines invariability as "the dependence of the effect on the cause",³ and goes on to argue that if the Svabhāvavādins are to accept such a theory of invariability, then this svabhāvavāda is acceptable.⁴ Commentator Varadarāja too maintains that "This itself (i.e., invariability) is the dependence of the effect on the cause (in such a way) that this happens only when that exists. If assistance devoid of invariability is not meant (by svabhāvavāda), then svabhāvavāda would be accomplished. ... If there be a svabhāvavāda (which holds) that smoke exists when there is fire, it would be acceptable to us".⁵

1. p.59, sarvasya bhavataḥ svabhāvatvānupapatteḥ. na hy ekam anekasvabhāvaṃ nāma vyāghātāt.
2. Prakāśa, p.59, ekaniyato dharmāḥ svabhāva ity ucyate, tad yad sarvasya sambhavet tadā svabhāvatvam asādhāraṇatvaṃ nopapadyate.
3. NK p.57, niyamasyaivāpekṣārthatvāt.
4. ibid.
5. Bodhanī, p.57, idam eva hi kāryasya kāraṇāpekṣitvaṃ nāma, yat tasmīṃ saty eva bhavati'ti. Yadi niyamātirikta upakāro nāṅgikriyate tarhi svabhāvavāda eva siddhaḥ syād ... dahanādīsu satsv eva dhūmādayo bhavanti'ti dṛśaḥ svabhāvavādaś cet sa asmābhir iṣyata eva.

(68) This interpretation of svabhāvavāda makes it a theory of causation according to which an invariable concomitance can be established between two things such as fire and smoke. It would be to grant the validity of a universal proposition which was categorically denied by the Materialists (v.supra.65). As Varadarāja himself points out, the svabhāvavāda accepted by the Materialists is different from this.¹ The example quoted by Udayana Ācārya to illustrate the Materialist theory of svabhāva seems to refute the idea of interdependence,² and Varadarāja believes that the belief in permanence is for the sake of affirming non-dependence (anapekṣatva).³ The belief in the permanence of material elements was one of the corner stones of the Materialist creed (v.supra.57). Therefore, it is clear that the svabhāvavāda propounded by the Materialists was opposed to interdependence. For the Svabhāvavādin, a phenomenon does not depend on another phenomenon or group of phenomena for its existence, but is due to inherent nature (svabhāva). Inherent nature (svabhāva) was the only cause (kāraṇa). Therefore, Nṛsiṃha Āśrama, commenting on the Samkṣepaśārīrikā, says: "The Cārvākas maintain that inherent nature (svabhāva) is the cause because of the inadmissibility of positing a theory of cause and effect apart from inherent nature".⁴ This is because the Materialists were reluctant to draw any inferences beyond what is perceived. They abstained from depending on past experiences to draw inferences to

1. Bodhanī, p.56,

2. NK p.56.

3. Bodhanī, p.56; anapekṣatvapratipatyārthaṃ nityagrahanam.

4. Tattvabodhinī, p.461, svabhāvavyatirekena kāryakāraṇabhāva-nirūpanāyogāt svabhāvaḥ kāraṇam iti cārvākāḥ.

the present or the future. Denying induction, they were forced to abandon causality, and they maintained that all things, for example, the sharpness of the thorns, the variegated instincts of the birds and of the beasts, etc., are born of inherent nature (svabhāva).¹ To maintain this it was not necessary to assume the validity of something unseen. It was an inference which did not go beyond the horizon of the verifiable, or more correctly, the perceptible.

(69) The rejection of interdependence as well as any form of causation except inherent nature (svabhāva) by the Materialists, earned them the appellation of non-causationists (ahetuvādā) (v.infra.89). But it must be emphasised that they were not indeterminists in that they accepted the determinism of nature (svabhāva)(v.infra.117).

(70) The interpretation of svabhāva as the unique power or property of an object or a class of objects implies the classifiability of the things of the world according to the resemblance they bear to one another, and this has left diversity or plurality in the end as the characteristic of the universe. The prefix sva in the term svabhāva means "one's own" implying contrast with the other, and is therefore definitely opposed to monism.² In fact, the Tattvopaplavasīṃha emphasises the presence of diversity in the world, for it says:

1. Tarkarahasyadīpikā, p.13, kaḥ kaṅṭhakānāṃ prakaroti taikṣṇyam, vaicitrabhāvaṃ mṛgapakṣiṇāṃ ca, ... svabhāvataḥ sarvaṃ idaṃ pravṛttaṃ.
2. Hiriyanna, Indian Philosophical Studies, p.74.

"Because things are determined, each according to it's own nature, by nature, ... they partake of individuality or diversity".¹

(71) If svabhāva is to be interpreted as inherent nature or self-nature, why did the Buddhists and the Jainas include it under the category of external causation (param katham, ta tso 他作) in opposition to self-causation (sayam katham, tzu tso 自作)? The idea of self-causation, as we saw earlier (v. supra. 19 ff.) was wedded to the conception of ātman considered to be the reality in man as well as things. But svabhāvavāda which recognises no such entity like ātman as a reality, formulated this theory of inherent nature (svabhāva) to explain the force at work in material phenomena. It was a purely physical law. The individual was only an automaton functioning according to the dictates of the stuff out of which his physical personality was composed. Nature was a power over which human beings had no control; in this sense it was external to him. Hence, its inclusion under the category of external causation by those who recognised the validity of human exertion as a causal factor. This being the case, it is difficult to subscribe to the view put forward by Dr. Basham that according to the svabhāvavāda the individual was "rigidly self-determined by his own somatic and psychic nature".² Such a wider application of svabhāvavāda to include psychic phenomena could not have been found especially in the teachings of the Materialists who alone, apart from the Ajīvikas,

1. p.88, sarve bhāvāḥ svabhāvena svasvabhāvavyavasthiteḥ ...
vyāvṛttabhāgiṇaḥ.

2. Ajīvikas, p.226.

put forward a theory of inherent nature (svabhāva) before the rise of Buddhism. Dr. Basham himself maintains that the Ajīvikas "viewed the individual as determined by forces exterior to himself".¹ If even the Ajīvikas, who accepted phenomena like rebirth, did not consider the psychic personality as being self-determined, it is difficult to see how the Materialists could do so. In fact, this interpretation by Dr. Basham has resulted from a consideration of svabhāvavāda as a philosophy distinct from Materialism.

Niyativāda.

(72) Another conception coming under the category of external causation and which has close connection with svabhāvavāda is niyativāda or complete Determinism or Fatalism. Much has been said about the conception of niyati which was put forward by the Ajīvika school of thought.² Dr. Basham, explaining the close connection between svabhāvavāda and niyativāda says that some heretics exalted svabhāva to the status of niyati in the regular Ajīvika system.³ To illustrate this connection he quotes from the Prasavyākaraṇa of Jñānavimala and the Tarkarahasyadīpikā of Gunaratna.⁴

(73) One of the earliest exponents of niyativāda or Fatalism was Makkhali Gosāla. His teachings are recorded in the Sāmaññaphala Suttanta thus: "There is neither cause nor basis for the impurity of living beings; they become impure without

1. Ajīvikas, p.226.

2. Basham, Ajīvikas, pp.224-239; Jayatilleke, Knowledge, p.142 ff.

3. Ajīvikas, p.226.

4. ibid.

cause or basis. There is neither cause nor basis for the purity of living beings; they become pure without cause or basis. There is no deed performed either by oneself or by others, no human exertion or action, no strength, no courage, no human endurance or human prowess. All beings, all that have breath, all that are born, all that have life are without power, strength, energy and are evolved according to destiny (niyati), species (saṅgati) and nature (bhāva) and experience pleasure and pain in the six types of existence".¹

(74) The crucial phrase in this passage is niyatisaṅgati-bhāvaparīṇatā. Dr. Basham translates it as "developed by Destiny (niyati), chance (saṅgati) and nature (bhāva)".² Dr. Jayatilleke equates saṅgati with yadṛcchā (chance).³ In doing so they seem to have been guided by a more rare meaning of the term given by the lexicographers. MacDonell gives the following meanings: meeting with, resorting to a place, frequenting, association, intercourse; alliance (rare); accidental occurrence (rare); fitness, appropriateness; connection, relation; by chance, haply.⁴ Monier Williams gives a similar list of meanings.⁵ Since chance (yadṛcchā)

1. D 1.53, Natthi ... hetu natthi paccayo sattānaṃ saṅkilesāya, ahetu-appaccayā sattā saṅkilissanti. Natthi hetu natthi paccayo sattānaṃ visuddhiyā, ahetu-appaccayā sattā visujjhanti. Natthi attakāre natthi parakāre natthi purisakāre, natthi balaṃ natthi viriyaṃ natthi purisathāmo natthi purisaparakkamo, sabbe sattā sabbe pānā sabbe bhūtā sabbe jīvā avasā abalā aviriyā niyatisaṅgatabhāvaparīṇatā chass'evābhijātīsu saukhadukkhaṃ paṭisaṃvedenti. The Chinese version of this Sūtra attributes this teaching to Pakudha Kaccāyana, v. TD 1.108c (Chang.17.1); v. also TD 2.44a (Tsa.7.17).
2. Ajivikas, p.225.
3. Knowledge, p.144.
4. Sanskrit-English Dictionary, p.328, col.2.
5. Sanskrit-English Dictionary, p.1047, col.2.

is opposed to both forms of determinism, namely, destiny (niyati) and inherent nature (svabhāva) (v. supra. 66),¹ Dr. Jayatilleke tries to reconcile these contradictory ideas by maintaining the Makkhali Gosāla is a "syncretic thinker" and that these central concepts of different schools are welded together in his teachings.² Dr. Basham as well as Dr. Jayatilleke seem to have overlooked the traditional explanation of the word saṅgati. An examination of the comments of Buddhaghosa and Śīlānka in the light of the Ajīvika cosmology would show that the term saṅgati occurring in the description of Makkhali Gosāla's teaching does not stand for chance occurrence (yadṛcchā).

(75) Śīlānka, commenting on the word samgāyam,³ says: samgāyam'ti samyak svaparīṇāmena gatih,⁴ i.e., "development or behaviour according to proper self-evolution". The use of the word samyak is extremely important in that it points to the absence of any incongruity or inconsistency. In order to understand the full significance of the above statement, it should be examined in the light of the rest of Makkhali Gosāla's teaching. We have already seen that the Svabhāva-vādins advocate plurality and the classifiability of this plurality accordance to the resemblance they bear to one another (v. supra. 70). Makkhali Gosāla accepted svabhāvavāda as well as the classifiability of things; and in accordance with this, presented the theory of the six types of existence (cha abhijāti, lu sheng 六生).⁵ Buddhaghosa explains

1. v. Bunge, Mario, Causality, The Place of the Causal Principle in Modern Science, (Cambridge Massachusetts, 1959), p. 13.

2. Knowledge, p. 144.

3. Sū 1.1.2.3.

4. Skr vol. 1, fol. 30.

5. D 1.53; TD 1.108c (Chang. 17.1).

saṅgati as: channam abhijātinaṃ tattha tattha gamanam,¹
 'movement or development according to any one of the six
 types of existence'. The explanations of the concept of
saṅgati given by Buddhaghosa and Śīlāṅka seem to be very
 similar, the only difference being that the former gives
 a more specific description of the way things or beings
 are evolved, i.e., according to the six types of existence,
 while the latter explains it in very general terms as
 self-evolution (svaparīṇāma). Hoernle appears to follow
 Buddhaghosa in translating saṅgati as "environment".²
 Moreover, while commenting on the words sattā, pāṇā, bhūtā
 and jīvā, occurring in the statement of Makkhali's teaching,
 Buddhaghosa does not consider them as synonyms, but take
 them as referring to different types of existence, viz.,

sattā = camels, buffaloes, donkeys, etc.,

pāṇā = beings with one sense, with two senses, etc.,

bhūtā = beings born from eggs, born in the womb, etc.,

jīvā = rice, barley, wheat and such other plants.³

The description of niyatīvāda in the Chinese version of the
Sāmaññaphala Suttanta, which appears to be more lucid and
 less obscure than the Pāli version, confirms Buddhaghosa's
 analysis of beings into different species. The Chinese
 equivalent of the phrase sabbe sattā sabbe pāṇā etc., reads
 thus: 一切衆生, 有命之類,⁴ and may be literally
 rendered as "all beings, species of living things".

1. DA 1.161; SA 2.341; J 5.237.

2. ERE 1.261, v. art. Ajivikas.

3. DA 1.161.

4. TD 1.108c (Chang.17.1); cp. TD 2.44a (Tsa.7.17).

(76) A comparison of the Pāli and Chinese versions of the Devadaha Sutta of the Majjhima would throw much light on the exact meaning of the word saṅgati. Here five pre-Buddhistic theories are mentioned.¹ They are as follows:

<u>Pāli version.</u>	<u>Chinese version.</u>
P(i) <u>pubbekatahetu,</u> _____	C(i) 因本作
P(ii) <u>issaranimmāṇahetu,</u>	C(ii) 因合會
P(iii) <u>saṅgatibhāvahetu,</u>	C(iii) 因爲命
P(iv) <u>abhijātihetu,</u>	C(iv) 因見
P(v) <u>diṭṭhadhamma-upakkamahetu,</u>	C(v) 因奪祐

Here P(i) and C(i) represent the Jaina theory of karma (v.infra.110 f). P(ii) and C(v) represent the theory of creation (v.supra.29 ff.). P(v) and C(iv) refer to a theory put forward by those who upheld the validity of present human exertion. The Chinese characters in C(ii), namely, he hui 合會 meaning 'coming together' or 'harmony' have been used to render the Pāli term sannipāta, a term occurring in passages describing the process of rebirth, or more properly, conception of a being.² Therefore, in the present instance, these characters may be taken as representing the term saṅgati. Thus, C(ii) is the equivalent of P(iii). Then we are left with P(iv) and C(iii). Of these, C(iii) may be translated as "by reason of destiny" (=niyati?), which along with C(ii) would constitute the Ajīvika theory of niyatisaṅgati-bhāvahetu. But P(iii) and P(iv) appear to overlap each other because, according to Buddhaghosa's analysis (v.supra.75),

1. M 2.222; TD 1.443c (Chung.4.2).

2. TD 1.769b (Chung.54.2). Cp. M 1.265 f. (Mahā Tanhāsankhaya sutta, M.38).

saṅgati can be explained on the basis of the theory of the six types of existence (abhiḥāti). Thus it appears that the Chinese version of the Devadaha sutta presents the Ajīvika conception of niyatisaṅgatibhāva, having split it into two parts where wei ming 爲命 refers to niyati and ho hui 合會 represents saṅgati(bhāva), while in the Pāli version we find a repetition of the conception of species (saṅgati).

(77) The fact that even Gautama Saṅghadeva, in his translation of the Devadaha sutta (v. supra. 76), has understood the term saṅgati as 'coming together' or 'harmony', and not in the sense of 'chance' (yadṛcchā), is evident from the rendering of the term as ho hui (合會). The problem, then, would be how to interpret this 'coming together' or 'harmony'.

Another Chinese rendering of the phrase niyatisaṅgatibhāva-pariṇatā¹ becomes helpful in solving this problem. Here we have the phrase 定分相續轉變, where ting fen 定分 represents niyati; hsiang hsü 相續, saṅgati(bhāva) and chuan pien 轉變, pariṇatā. The phrase hsiang hsü 相續 is generally used in Buddhist Chinese in the sense of 'stream' or 'continuity' (santati, santāna).² Therefore, the 'coming together' or 'harmony' represented by the characters ho hui 合會 may be understood as the "harmony of the characteristics which constitute one stream". According to the Ajīvika theory of existence, a thing has to fall into one of the six categories of existence. The particular characteristics possessed by a thing determine the nature of the species into which it falls.

1. TD 2.44a (Tsa.7.17).

2. DCBT s.q. hsiang hsü 相續; Index to the Mahāyāna-Sūtrā-lankāra, 2.225; The Sanskrit-Chinese Dictionary of Buddhist Technical Terms, p.70 gives prabandhaḥ as an equivalent.

It is the 'concurrence' of these characteristics that is denoted by the term saṅgati. The concurrence is not haphazard. It is strictly determined by Destiny (niyati). Once the nature of the species (saṅgati) is determined by Destiny (niyati), then that species (saṅgati) begins to evolve (pariṇāma) according to the nature (bhāva=svabhāva) of that species. This may be the proper self-evolution (samyak svapariṇāma) which Śīlāṅka had in mind. Considering the three factors separately, as Buddhaghosa does,¹ we find that they are presented in a particular order. Destiny (niyati) is placed at the beginning because of its universality and all-comprehensiveness. It is the cause which accounts for the diversity and manifoldness of the universe. Then comes a more specific factor, namely, species (saṅgati), and lastly, nature (bhāva), that is, the nature of that particular species.

(78) This description of the evolution of the different types of existence is reminiscent of the biological speculations of the earlier thinkers like Mahīdāsa Aitareya (v. supra. 12 f.).² In fact, Dr. Basham too, in his analysis of the Ajīvika doctrines, has recognised the impact or the earlier biological speculations on the teachings of the Ajīvikas.³

1. DA 1.161.

2. v. also Law, B.C., Influence of the five heretical teachers on Jainism and Buddhism, in JASB, (N.S.), 1919, vol. 15, p. 134.

3. Ajīvikas, p. 225

(79) Thus, according to Makkhali Gosāla, things evolve determined by three factors, namely, Destiny (niyati), species (sāngati) and inherent nature (bhāva or svabhāva). This explanation would eliminate the necessity to consider Makkhali Gosāla as a syncretic thinker. It would also not be necessary to give a special explanation as to why the idea of evolution came to be associated with the teachings of Makkhali Gosāla,¹ because evolution was the very basis of his biological speculations, as it was with some of the thinkers of the Vedic tradition (v.supra.11 ff.). In this connection, it may be noted that even a group of Materialists accepted a theory of evolution (v.supra.54 ff.).

(80) If sāngati is to be understood in the above manner, then the Sūtrakṛtāṅga passage may be translated as follows: "Sāngaiyam means development or behaviour according to proper self-evolution. Whatever experience of pleasure and pain, of whosoever, in whatever time or place, that is (according to) one's species. Therein, Destiny is their natural lot. They say that since pleasure and pain, etc., are not produced by human exertion and so on, therefore, their evolution is caused by Destiny and species".²

1. Jayatilleke, Knowledge, p.144.

2. Skṛ vol.1, fol.31, Sāngaiyam'ti sanyak svaparīṇāmena gatiḥ. Yasya yadā yatra yat sukhaduḥkhānubhavaṇaṃ sā sāngatiḥ. Niyatis tasyāṃ bhavaṃ sāngatikam. Yataś caivaṃ na puruṣakārādikṛtāṃ sukhaduḥkhādi, ātaś tat teṣāṃ parīṇāmaṃ niyatikṛtāṃ sāngatikam ity ucyate. To illustrate this statement Śilāṅka quotes a verse which emphasises complete Determinism rather than Indeterminism. It runs thus:

Prāptavyo niyatibalāśrayena yo'rthaḥ,
so'vaśyaṃ bhavati nṛṇāṃ subhāsubho vā.
bhūtānāṃ mahati kṛte'pi hi prāyatne,
nābhavyaṃ bhavati na bhāvino'sti nāśaḥ.

In fact, Śīlānka identifies saṅgati with niyati.¹ Thus it is possible to eliminate the idea of chance (yadr̥cchā) from the teachings of Makkhali Gosāla and the evidence given above would show how, in the words of Dr. Basham, "some heretics exalted svabhāva to the status of niyati in the regular Ajīvika system".²

(81) Summing up the whole doctrine Buddhaghosa says: "Whatever should happen, will happen in that same way. Whatever should not happen will not happen".³ Thus it is complete Determinism, but not Indeterminism, that is the basis of Ajīvika Fatalism. If the phrase niyatisaṅgatibhāva-parinatā is interpreted in this manner, it is clear that chance (yadr̥cchā) has no place in the teachings of Makkhali Gosāla and, therefore, of the Ajīvikas. This analysis leads to a very important conclusion. Makkhali Gosāla's was not an attempt to reconcile the central teachings of different schools of thought. With due recognition of his ingenuity, it may be held that he was presenting a set of beliefs, logically and mutually consistent, leading from a theory of complete Natural Determinism to a doctrine of Fatalism.

(82) Dr. Jayatilleke has rightly observed the influence of the earlier speculations regarding the problem of time (kāla) on the determinist thesis of the Ajīvikas.⁴ In the Atharvaveda we find Time (kāla) conceived as an hypostatized

1. loc.cit., niyater eve'ti, etac ca dvitīyaślokānte'bhīdhāsyē (i.e., at Sū 1.1.2.3).

2. Ajīvikas, p.226.

3. DA 1.161; cp. Ayer, A.J., The Concept of a Person and other essays, p.235.

4. Knowledge, p.142.

entity which has everything in the world under its control.¹ Time produced what was in the past and would produce what would be in the future.² This conception of Time (kāla) as the cause of the things in the world was mentioned in the list of theories given in the Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad.³ The influence of this conception of Time is to be found especially in the Ajīvika theory of salvation. (v.infra.83).

(83) In keeping with his Determinism, Makkhali Gosāla propounded a theory of transmigration which, in the words of Dr. Basham, "seems to have been thought of on the analogy of the development and ripening of a plant".⁴ As may be expected, this form of rebirth has its appointed end. Thus Makkhali Gosāla maintained that, "saṃsāra is measured as with a bushel, with its joy and sorrow, and its appointed end. It can neither be lessened nor increased, nor is there any excess or deficiency of it. Just as a ball of thread will, when thrown, unwind to its full length, so fool and wise alike will take their course and make an end of pain".⁵

1. AV 19, 53, 54.

2. *ibid.*, 19.54.3, Kālo ha bhūtaṃ bhavyaṃ ca ... ajanayat.

3. 1.2.

4. Ajīvikas, p.225.

5. D 1.54, doṇamite sukhadukkhe pariyantakate saṃsāre natthi hāyanaṇṇaṇṇe natthi ukkaṃsāvakaṃse. Seyyathāpi nāma suttaguḷe khitte nibbeṭhiyamānam eva phaleti evam eva bāle ca paṇḍite ca sandhāvitvā saṃsaritvā dukkhassantaṃ karissanti. It has not been possible to trace this important description of salvation in the Chinese Agamas.

This came to be known as samsārasuddhi or purification through wandering in the cycle of existence.¹ It is interesting to note that this theory is said to have been propounded by the non-causationist (ahetuvādī),² because he denied any form of causation other than species and nature.³

(84) Let us examine the moral and ethical implications of the conception of Natural Determinism, for it is this aspect which comes under the persistent criticism of the Jainas and the Buddhists. The Śānti-parvan of the Mahābhārata⁴ presents us with a model account of svabhāvavāda. Although it is a later account, yet it is the most comprehensive. It combines the main features of Lokāyata Materialism⁵ and Ajīvika Determinism.

(85) Here, Bhīṣma is represented as quoting an old narrative of a discussion between Prahlāda and Indra in order to dispel a doubt as to whether a man is the doer or not of the actions producing consequences.⁶ Prahlāda is represented as an upholder of svabhāvavāda, for he maintains that everything comes into being and then ceases in consequence of their own nature (svabhāva).⁷ Depending on this main thesis he draws

1. M 1.81-82.

2. J 5.228, Tesu ahetukavādī ime sattā samsārasuddhikā'ti mahājanam ugganḥāpesi.

3. J 5.237.

4. 12, chapters 222, 224.

5. *ibid.*, 224.17, It is maintained that all creatures spring up from the elements, earth, fire, space, water and wind constituting the fifth.

6. *ibid.*, 222.1-3.

7. *ibid.*, 222.15.

several conclusions. Firstly, there is no personal exertion as such because nothing is achieved by it.¹ Secondly, in the absence of personal exertion, it is evident that no personal agent exists.² Thirdly, there is no effect of good or bad deeds, no moral responsibility.³ Lastly, freedom and emancipation come through inherent nature (svabhāva).⁴

(86) The denial of human exertion is a necessary corollary of svabhāvavāda. As we have already pointed out, nature (svabhāva) is a force external to man in the sense that he is unable to control or change the course of nature (v. supra. 71). He has no power over his own physical personality, because this physical frame is subject to the physical laws that govern nature. Speaking about the arguments adduced by the Niyativādins against causal determination, Dr. Jayatilleke has pointed out that these arguments are said to hold against the connection between human exertion and its fruits.⁵ Dr. Jayatilleke quotes only Śīlānka (9th century), although the argument is stated in the selfsame manner in the Mahābhārata. Here the argument is attributed to the Svabhāvavādin, thus showing the close connection between svabhāvavāda and niyativāda. It is stated thus; "Even among persons doing their utmost, the suspension of what is not desired and the attainment of what is desired are not seen. What comes then of personal exertion?"

1. ibid., 222.19-20.
2. ibid., 222.16-17.
3. ibid., 222.18-22.
4. ibid., 222.23.
5. Knowledge, p. 146-147.

In the case of some, we see that without any exertion on their part, what is not desired is suspended and what is desired is achieved. This then must be the result of nature (svabhāva)".¹ Whatever be the philosophical implications of this argument,² it has been made use of by the Svabhāvavādins to refute the belief in the validity of human exertion.

(87) The denial of the validity of human exertion is, according to the Sāmaññaphala Suttanta, one of the main theses of the fatalist, Makkhali Gosāla.³ Thus the Materialists who upheld a theory of nature (svabhāva) as well as the Ajīvikas who accepted Determinism (niyati) agree in repudiating human exertion as having any influence on the course of nature.

(88) If we are to accept the Mahābhārata account of svabhāvavāda as genuine, then we are compelled to admit that the absence of personal exertion implies the absence of a personal agent. This brings together the teachings of Makkhali Gosāla and Pakudha Kaccāyana because, while the former believed in the absence of human exertion, the latter reiterated the absence of a personal agent. Pakudha Kaccāyana maintained that, "No man slays or causes to slay, hears or causes to hear, knows or causes to know",⁴ and this is because "even if a man cleaves another's head with a sharp

1. Mbh 12,222.19-20,

Aniṣṭasya hi nirvṛttir anirvṛtṭiḥ priyasya ca,
lakṣyate yatamānānām puruṣārthaḥ tataḥ kutāḥ.
Aniṣṭasyābhinirvṛttim iṣṭasamvṛttim eva ca,
aprayatnena paśyāmaḥ keṣāñcit tat svabhāvataḥ.

2. Jayatilīke, Knowledge, p.146-147.

3. D 1.53; TD 1.108c (Chāṅg.17.1) where it is attributed to Pakudha Kaccāyana.

4. D 1.56, Tattha natthi hantā vā ghātetā vā sotā vā sāvetā vā viññātā vā viññāpetā vā; TD 1.108a (Chāṅg.17.1).

sword, he does not take life, for the sword cut passes through or between the elements".¹ It is in this very tone that the Svabhāvavādin of the Mahābhārata says: "When one slays another, one slays only that other's body".² The Chinese version of the Sāmaññaphala Suttanta attributes this doctrine to Pūraṇa Kassapa.³ Pakudha was an Ajīvika who is represented as putting forward a theory of motionless permanence (avicalita-nityatvam).⁴ We have shown that the Nihilist Materialists also propounded a theory of motionless permanence while accepting svabhāvavāda as one of the central tenets (v. supra. 66). Therefore, it is not improbable that Pakudha Kaccāyana too accepted a theory of Natural Determinism (svabhāvavāda).

(89) Further, according to the Svabhāvavādin of the Mahābhārata, the denial of human exertion as well as the repudiation of a personal agent leads to the denial of moral responsibility. He maintains that, "What we have now become is neither due to any act of ours nor of others. Everything is due to inherent nature (svabhāva)".⁵ The denial of moral responsibility is explicitly stated as a part of the teachings of Ajita Kesakambali,⁶ Pūraṇa Kassapa,⁷ and Makkhali Gosāla,⁸ and implied in the teachings of Pakudha.⁹

1. Loc. cit., Yo'pi tīṇhena satthena sīsam chindati na koci jīvitā voropeti, sattannam eva kāyānam antarena satthavivaram anupatati. A similar account of the repudiation of a personal agent and responsibility is to be found in the Bhāgavad-gītā (2.19 ff.).
2. 12, 224. 14.
3. TD 1.108a-b (Chāṅg. 17.1).
4. Basham; Ajīvikas, p. 17.
5. Mbh 12,
6. D 1.55.
7. ibid., 52-53.
8. ibid., 53-54.
9. ibid., 56.

This means that the Materialists as well as the Ajīvika Determinists who accepted svabhāvavāda as a basic principle held the view that there is no moral responsibility, no effect of good and bad deeds. The teachings attributed to Makkhali Gosāla in the Sāmaññaphala Suttanta are, in another place,¹ called ahetuvāda, the teachings of Pūraṇa Kassapa, akiriyavāda, and the teachings of Ajita Kesakambali, natthikavāda. The three terms ahetuvāda, akiriyavāda and natthikavāda are used in another context,² and here they appear to have been used as synonyms.³ This is evident from the Chinese rendering of at least two of the terms. The term akiriyavāda is rendered into Chinese as shuo wu tso (說無作) and the phrase natthikavāda as shuo wu yeh (說無業),⁴ the only difference being that the character tso (作) expresses a more active meaning than that which is conveyed by the character yeh (業). Here the rendering of the term natthikavāda as shuo wu yeh (說無業), i.e., "he who maintains that there is no (effect of) action", shows that the definition of the term given by the compilers of the PTS Dictionary⁵ is inaccurate and misleading in the context not only of the Pāli Canon⁶ but also of the Chinese Agamas.

1. M 1.401 ff.

2. M 1.78; TD 1.736c (Chung.94.3); v. also A 2.31.

3. Dr. Jayatilleke seems to be reluctant to consider them as synonyms, v. Knowledge, p.94.

4. TD 1.736c (Chung.49.3).

5. s.v. natthikavāda.

6. Jayatilleke, Knowledge, p.94, n.3.

(90) Dr. Basham has observed that "In certain passages of the Pāli Canon the description of doctrines among the six teachers is significantly altered, in a way which strongly suggests that the credos ascribed in the Sāmaññaphala Suttanta to Makkhali, Pūraṇa and Pakudha were aspects of a single body of teaching".¹ The examination of the svabhāvavāda described in the Mahābhārata confirms this and also points to the close connection between Materialism and Ajīvika Determinism. Therefore, it is difficult to question the authenticity of the Chinese version of the Sāmaññaphala Suttanta, as Dr. Basham does,² although it does not agree with the Pāli version in the distribution of the teachings of these six heretical teachers.

(91) Thus we are led to the conclusion that the svabhāvavāda as described in the Mahābhārata is a synthesis of Materialism and Ajīvika Determinism. It incorporates the teachings of four of the six heretical teachers, namely, Ajita Kesakambali, Pakudha Kaccāyana, Pūraṇa Kassapa and Makkhali Gosāla, all of whom, in spite of the differences in the degree of emphasis they laid on certain aspects of their teachings, were Naturalists, accepting Natural Determinism (svabhāvavāda) as the basis of their teachings.

(92) The Devadaha Sutta of the Majjhima Nikāya, although mainly devoted to the refutation of the Jaina theory of karma, is also an attempt to demonstrate the fact that the belief in external determination undermines the belief

1. Ajīvikas, p.18.

2. ibid., p.23.

in moral responsibility. Buddha argues that if happiness and suffering are caused by Destiny (niyati, wei ming 爲命) or one's lot or species (saṅgatibhāva, ho hui 合會), then the Nigaṅṭhas, because they undergo extreme forms of suffering, have an evil Destiny or are of evil species.¹ The Buddha who is freed from all the defiling tendencies and who, therefore, enjoys extreme forms of happiness, has a good Destiny or is of good species.² This criticism represents an attempt to show the fallacy of positing an external agency even in cases where individual responsibility is clearly manifest, because the Nigaṅṭhas undergo severe pain inflicted upon them by themselves, while the Buddha's happiness is a direct result of his untiring effort.

(93) Another criticism of this theory of external causation is to be found in the Mahābodhi Jātaka.³ Here it is said: "If man's behaviour depends on one's species (saṅgatyā) and nature (bhāvāya), then his actions, which should or should not have been committed, are committed without any intention (on his part). If so, who is it that would be smeared by the evil consequences when these actions are unintentional".³ This form of argument was adduced to refute the belief in a creator God (issara) too (v. supra.42).

1. M 2.222, sace... sattā saṅgatibhāva-hetu sukhadukkham paṭisaṃvedenti, addhā ... nigaṅṭhā pāpasāṅgatikā yam etarahi dukkhā tibbā paṭukā vedanā vediyanti. As pointed out earlier, in place of abhijātihetu in the Pāli version, the Chinese version has yin wei ming 因爲命, cp. TD 1.443c (Ching.4.2).

2. Loc.cit.

3. J 5.237, Udīraṇā ce saṅgatyā bhāvāyamanuvattati, akāmā akaraṇīyaṃ vā karaṇīyaṃ vā pi kubbati, akāmakaraṇīyasmiṃ kuvidha pāpena lippati.

(94) Therefore, whenever the Buddhists cite the doctrines of the heretical teachers for criticism, they seem to refer to only those aspects of their teachings with which they disagreed. The conception of inherent nature (svabhāva) which was common to the teachings of the four teachers is not referred to, except in the case of Makkhali Gosāla. In the case of Makkhali Gosāla too, reference to the conception of svabhāva may have been made because it was exalted to the status of Destiny (niyati). It is significant to note that the word svabhāva is rarely mentioned in the early Buddhist texts, and even where it occurs it is in the sense of 'truth'.¹ A criticism of the philosophical theory of Nature (svabhāvavāda) is conspicuous by its absence, although it definitely existed during the time of the Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad. This does not mean that the Buddhists accepted in toto the theory of Nature (svabhāvavāda) of the pre-Buddhistic teachers. The Buddhists would have certainly objected to the attempt to limit svabhāva to physical nature alone, ignoring the moral and mental aspects of natures which according to the Buddhists are fundamental constituents of nature.² But the silence of the Buddhist texts with regard to svabhāvavāda may be accounted for if we are to admit the influence of this theory on the Buddhist theory of natural causal Determinism.

1. J 3.20, 214; 5.198, 459; Vism 238.

2. The conception of svabhāva discussed above and the theory of svabhāva propounded by the Sarvāstivādins appear to be different. The svabhāva of the Materialists and the Ajīvikas refer to the pattern of change and comes closer to the conception of dhammatā in early Buddhism (v.infra.95). But svabhāva of the Sarvāstivādins signifies an underlying eternal substance in phenomena as opposed to their characteristics (lakṣaṇa) which are subject to change according to the causal pattern. The term svabhāva seems to have been used in this sense in the Sāṅkhya school where it stands as a synonym of prakṛti as opposed to the three evolutes of prakṛti, v. J.A.B.van Buitenen, Studies in Sāṅkhya, JAOS, vol.76, p.156.

Naturalism in Buddhist Philosophy.

(95) The third type of Naturalism referred to above (v.supra.46) does not fall into the category of either Materialism or complete Determinism. Naturalism in this sense is expressed in the Buddhist texts by the term dhammatā (nature of things). While the word is used to explain the behaviour of physical phenomena,¹ it is not confined to that alone. Even psychological attitudes are given naturalistic explanations and are illustrated by parallel examples from physical nature. The Kosambiya Sutta says:

"It is the nature (dhammatā) of a person endowed with right understanding that whatever kind of offence he falls into, he makes known the removal of such an offence, for he confesses it, discloses it, declares it quickly to the teacher or to intelligent co-religionists; having confessed, disclosed and declared it, he comes to restraint in the future. Just as an innocent little baby lying on its back quickly draws back its hand or foot if it has touched a live ember ...".²

It is also "the nature (dhammatā) of a person endowed with right understanding that if he is zealous concerning those many duties to be done for co-religionists, then he becomes of strong aspiration or training in the higher conduct

(adhisīla), higher thought (adhicitta) and higher intuitive wisdom (adhipaññā). Just as a cow with a young calf, while she is pulling the grass, keeps an eye on the calf ...".³

1. M 1.185; TD 1.464c (Chung.7.2).

2. M 1.324, dhammatā esā ... diṭṭhisampannessa puggalassa: kiñcāpi tathārūpim āpattim āpajjati yathārūpāya āpattiyā vuṭṭhānam paññāyati, atha kho naṃ khippam eva satthari vā viññūsu vā sabrahmacārisu deseti vivarati uttānikaroti, desetvā vivaritvā uttānikatvā āyatim samvaram āpajjati. Seyyathā'pi ... daharo kumāro mando uttānaseyyako hatthena vā pādena vā angāram akkamitvā khippam eva paṭisamharati ...

3. loc.cit.

(96) Even extrasensory perceptions and emancipation are not considered as supernatural, but natural occurrences. "It is in the nature of things (dhammatā, fa tzu jan 法自然), that a person in a state of concentration knows and sees what really is. A person who knows what really is, does not need to make an effort of will to feel disinterested and renounce. It is in the nature of things that a person who knows and sees as it really is, feels disinterested and renounces. One who has felt disinterested and has renounced does not need to make an effort of will to realize the knowledge and insight of emancipation (vimutti, chieh t'o 解脱). It is in the nature of things that one who has felt disinterested and had renounced, realizes the knowledge and insight of emancipation".¹ According to this account, mental concentration, which is a product of training and effort, is a causal factor (upanisā, yin 因) in the production of knowledge leading to emancipation. It is categorically stated that in the absence of right mental concentration the cause for the production of knowledge and insight is absent.² This does not mean that they are absolutely determined by Destiny (niyati) or any such thing, as the Ajīvikas believed (v.supra.73), but that they are natural causal occurrences. Thus the teachings of the Buddha, in some of its aspects, may be said to fall into the third category of Naturalism.(v.supra.46).

1. A 5.3, 313; TD 1.485b-c (Chung.10.2); v. Jayatilleke, Knowledge, pp.420-21.
2. A 3.200; TD 1.486c (Chung.10.7); v. also TD 2.129a (Tsa.18.6).

Biological Regeneration and Social Impact.

(97) Last of the theories coming under the category of external causation and which we have designated biological regeneration and social impact (v.supra.1), is based on a passage occurring in the Majjhima Nikāya,¹ and repeated in the Anguttara Nikāya.² While discussing the question of moral responsibility, the Buddha is represented as saying: "That evil action of yours is not the work of your mother or the father, the brother or the sister, friends and colleagues, or the blood relations, the śramanas and brahmins or the gods".³ The Chinese version reads: "This evil action of yours is committed neither by the father nor by the mother. Neither is it the work of the king, nor of gods, nor of śramanas and brahmins".⁴ Taking into consideration the two distinct groups of people mentioned here, especially in the Chinese version, the father and mother on one side and the rest on the other, we have designated this form of causation as biological regeneration and social impact.

(98) Biological regeneration had been a topic of discussion, especially in relation to the question of rebirth, during the time of the early Upaniṣads. There appears to have been some thinkers who considered rebirth on the pattern of biological regeneration. The belief was that a human being springs up from the semen of the parents, just as a sprout

1. M 3.180.

2. A 1.139.

3. ibid., taṃ kho pana te etaṃ pāpakammaṃ n'eva mātaraṃ kataṃ na pitarā kataṃ na bhātaraṃ kataṃ na bhaginiyā kataṃ na mittāmaccehi kataṃ na ñātisālohitehi kataṃ na samaṇa-brāhmaṇehi kataṃ na devatāhi kataṃ,

4. TD 1.504a,b,c (Chung.12.1),

is produced from a seed obtained from a surviving plant. In the Brhadâraṇyaka Upaniṣad, Yājñavalkya is represented as refusing to accept this as a form of rebirth.¹ The influence of this conception of biological regeneration on the problem of moral responsibility is to be seen in the Kauṣītaki Upaniṣad which records a dying father's bequest of his various powers to his son.² The dialogue between the father and son is given as follows:

Father : "My deeds (karman) in you I would place".

Son : "Your deeds in me I take".

Father : "My pleasure and pain in you I would place".

Son : "Your pleasure and pain in me I take".

(99) The second part of the theory, namely, social impact, appears to supplement the theory of biological regeneration. It may be an attempt to explain the influence of a society on a person once he is born. For example, a despotic ruler whose decisions can determine to a great extent the destinies of his subjects, or a śramaṇa or a brāhmaṇa possessed of psychic powers who also could control the actions of man and therefore the consequences. It is difficult to say whether such a theory of social impact existed or not,

1. 3.9.28.

2. 2.15.

3. *ibid.*, karmāṇi me tvayi dadhānīti pitā, karmāṇi te mayi dadha iti putrah, sukhaduḥkhe me tvayi dadhānīti pitā, sukhaduḥkhe te mayi dadha iti putrah.

or whether it is only an attempt on the part of the Buddhists to account for all the possible causal factors that could be included under a theory of external causation.


General criticism of the theory of external causation.

(100) The above mentioned theories of external causation (param katan, t'a tso 他作) were criticised by the Buddhists for two reasons. First, because they implied a denial of the validity of human exertion and posited a principle external to man as the cause of his pleasure and pain (v.supra.71). Secondly, because they led to a belief in annihilation. This latter reason is stated in the early Buddhist texts thus: "The theory of external causation of suffering, according to which one acts and another experiences, amounts to a theory of annihilation (uccheda, tuan 斷)".¹

(101) If we are to understand annihilation (uccheda, tuan 斷) in the usual sense of destruction of life and the absence of rebirth,² then the statement that external causation leads to a theory of annihilation presents a problem. How are we to include the Ajīvika theory of Determinism (niyati, wei ming 爲命) under this category? The Ajīvikas, unlike the Materialists, did not hold that a being is cut off and completely destroyed at death,³ for we find that they believed in some kind of survival (v.supra.83). This problem could be solved if we are to distinguish two slightly different uses of the term uccheda (tuan 斷). In the above context, it may

1. S 2.20, añño karoti añño paṭisaṃvedīyatīti ... param katan dukkhan'ti iti vadam ucchedam etaṃ paretī. TD 2.85c (Tsa.12.18).
2. J 5.228, ucchedavādī ito paralokagatā nāma natthi ayam lokō ucchijjatī'ti gaṇhāpesi.
3. D 1.55, bāle ca paṇḍite ca kāyassa bhedā ucchijjanti vinassanti na hontī parammaraṇā. TD 1.108b-c (Chang.17.1).

be possible to interpret annihilation as the annihilation of action (kamma), that is to say, the cutting off of the connection between action and its consequences. Annihilation in this sense can be taken as a denial of moral responsibility, and may be synonymous with natthikavāda (v. supra. 89). Thus the two terms ucchedavāda and natthikavāda mainly represent the theories denying moral responsibility, while in a more specific sense, are used to denote nihilistic systems.

(102) The criticism of the theory of external causation brings us once again to the problem of personal identity. It was mentioned that the theory of self-causation led to a theory of permanence, a belief in a permanent entity underlying the empirical reality (v. supra. 26). According to it, the person who acts (i.e., the cause) and the person who experiences the consequences (i.e., the effect) are one and the same; the identity of the two individuals or the cause and the effect being maintained on the basis of a permanent substance. The theory of external causation leads to an opposite result, namely, the belief in annihilation (uccheda, tuan ). This means that a person who acts and the person who experiences the result are two different persons; the cause and the effect are different. All the statements made in the early Buddhist texts to the effect that a person acts and reaps the consequences,¹ are made to refute the theory which purports to deny the identity. But these statements should not be

1. M 1.180; A 1.139; TD 1.504a-c (Chung.12.1).

taken as referring to an ultimate reality; they are only empirical statements and the identity is maintained not by positing an extra-empirical entity such as a soul (ātman), but by a theory of causality (paṭiccasamuppāda, yüan ch'i fa 緣起法, v.infra.207).¹

(103) Thus there were two main theories criticised by the Buddha. They are, (i) the doctrine which posited a permanent soul (ātman) on the basis of which personal identity, moral responsibility as well as survival were explained and which came to be known as atthikavāda (shuo yu lun che 說有論者), and (ii) the doctrine which did not posit such a soul, denied personal identity, moral responsibility as well as survival and which came to be known as natthikavāda (shuo wu lun che 說無論者). Both these theories were rejected by the Buddha on empirical grounds. We have already stated the argument for the rejection of the first (v.supra.26 f.). In the same way, the Buddha appealed to experience in his refutation of the second. He maintained that, "to one who sees, with proper understanding, the arising of the things in the world, the belief in non-existence would not occur".²

1. Cp. Ayer, A.J., The Concept of a Person and other essays, p.127, "... even if someone could remember the experiences of a person who is long since dead, and even if this were backed by an apparent continuity of character, I think that we should prefer to say that he had somehow picked up the dead man's memories and dispositions rather than that he was the same person in another body; The idea of a person's leading a discontinuous existence in time as well as in space is just that much more fantastic. Nevertheless, I think that it would be open to us to admit the logical possibility of reincarnation merely by laying down the rule that if a person who is physically identified as living at a later time does have the ostensible memories and character of a person who is physically identified as living at an earlier time, they are to be counted as one person and not two"
2. S 2.17; TD 2.85c (Tsa.12.18).

The Jaina theory of causation.

(104) The third of the four main categories of causation is that which upholds internal as well as external causation (sayam katañ ca param katañ ca, tzu tso ta tso 自作他作). This is a relativist theory which attempts to combine the two theories discussed above, namely, self-causation and external causation. There appears to be two such theories in Indian thought. One is propounded by the Jainas who are recognised as relativists.¹ The other, as pointed out by Dr. Jayatilleke,² is found mentioned in the Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad.³

(105) We have seen how the Upaniṣadic thinkers conceived of Being (sat) or reality as permanent, immutable and eternal and rejected impermanence, mutability and change as being illusions (v. supra. 28). The Jaina thinkers, prompted by a desire to account for the various forms of experience such as change, continuity, impermanence as well as duration, and supported by their epistemological standpoint that absolute judgments are not possible at the mundane level,⁴ maintained that Being (sat) is multiform in that it exhibits the different characteristics of production (utpāda), destruction (vyaya) and permanence or durability (dhrauvya).⁵ This came to be known as pariṇāmanityavāda,⁶ a theory which comes very close to that of Mahidāsa Aitareya (v. supra. 8).

1. Jacobi, H., "Jainism", in ERE 7.465 ff; Sinha, J., A History of Indian Philosophy, 2.197 ff; Mishra, U., History of Indian Philosophy, 1.229 ff; Dasgupta, S., A History of Indian Philosophy, 1.305 ff; Hiriyanna, M., Outlines of Indian Philosophy, p.157 ff; Mookerjee, S., The Jaina Philosophy of Non-Absolutism, p. 25 ff.
2. Knowledge, p.261.
3. 5.11.
4. Sinha, J., History, p.197.
5. Tattvārthādhigama Sūtra, 5.29, utpādavyayadhrauvyayuktaṃ sat.
6. Mishra, U., History, p.300.

It was pointed out that the rejection of change and mutability as being illusory impeded fruitful speculation on the problem of causality during the period of the Upaniṣads (v.supra.14 f.). When the Jainas accorded a greater degree of reality to experiences such as change, mutability, etc., they certainly initiated a very serious discussion of the problem of causality. It has been held that the first attempt at a systematic analysis of the causal problem was made by the Ajīvikas.¹ But we have noticed that because of their theory of Strict Determinism and Fatalism they were reluctant to accept any cause other than Destiny (v.supra.73). On the other hand, the Jainas with their relativist epistemological outlook made a genuine effort to determine the nature of causality.

(106) The locus classicus of their theory of causality is the Sūtrakṛtāṅga and its commentary by Śīlāṅka. In the former, Mahāvīra is represented as criticising several theories concerning the causality of suffering. It is interesting to note that some of the theories referred to here also come under the persistent criticism of the Buddha (v.supra.1). This means that these theories had a historical basis and were not mere imaginations of the Buddha or Mahāvīra. Mahāvīra says: "Suffering is not caused by oneself (sayam kaḍam); how could it be caused by another (annakaḍam)? Happiness and suffering, final beatitude and temporal (pleasure and pain) are not caused by themselves nor by others; it is due to one's own lot or species (saṅgaiyam). This is what they (i.e., the Fatalists) say".²

1. Jayatilleke, Knowledge, p.146 ff.

2. Sū 1.1.2-3, na taṃ sayam kaḍam dukkhaṃ, kao annakaḍam ca naṃ, suhaṃ vā jai vā dukkhaṃ, sehiyaṃ vā asehiyaṃ, sayam kaḍam na aṇṇehiṃ vedayanti puḍho jiyā, saṅgaiyam taṃ taḥā tesiṃ, ihamegesi āhiaṃ.

(107) The phrase "caused by oneself" (sayam kaḍam) is explained by Śilānka as "caused by one's own human exertion" (ātmanā puruṣakārena kṛtam)¹ and this^{is} rejected because it is found that even when there is equal human effort, sometimes there is difference in the results reaped or even absence of results (v. supra. 25, 86). While explaining the phrase "caused by another" (annakaḍam), Śilānka lists several existing theories such as Destiny (niyati), Time (kāla), God (īśvara), Nature (svabhāva) and karma.² Of these, Destiny is identified with species (saṅgati),³ and taken up for criticism later.⁴ The other conceptions are taken up one after another and various arguments are adduced to refute their causal status.

(108) Mahāvīra then says: "Those who proclaim these views are fools who fancy themselves learned; they have no knowledge and do not understand that things are partly determined and partly undetermined (niyayāniyayaṃ saṃtam)".⁵ Śilānka's commentary on this verse is very important and following is a full translation of the relevant passage. "Because they unconditionally (ekāntena) resort to the theory of creation by Destiny (niyatikṛtam, i. e., pre-destination) 'when things are partly determined and partly undetermined', that is to say, happiness, etc., are partly determined, brought about necessarily (avasyambhāvayudayaprāpitam) and partly undetermined

1. Skṛ vol. 1, fol. 30.

2. ibid.; vol. 1, fol. 31.

3. ibid.; niyater eve'ti etac ca dvitīyaślokānte' bhidhāsyē, (i. e., at Sū 1.1.2.3).

4. ibid.

5. Sū 1.1.2.4, evam eyāni jaṃpamtā, bālā paṇḍiamāṇiṇo, niyayāniyayaṃ saṃtam ayānamtā abuddhiyā.

brought about by one's own human exertion (ātmapuruṣakāra), God (īśvara), etc., therefore, they are ignorant; they have no knowledge of the cause of happiness, suffering, etc., are devoid of knowledge. But in the teachings of the Jainas (arhatānām), some part of happiness, suffering, etc., is due to Destiny (or predetermination) (niyatita eva)—it is said to be caused by Destiny (or predetermination) because of the necessary manifestation of (past) karma as a cause at some moment or other. Similarly, some part is undetermined (aniyatikṛtam), that is, caused by human exertion (puruṣakāra), Time (kāla), God (īśvara), Nature (svabhāva), karma, etc., Herein, the effectiveness in some way or other of human exertion in the case of (the production of) happiness and suffering, etc., is maintained. Since an action yields results, and the action depends on human exertion, it has been said: 'One should not give up one's effort thinking (that everything is due to) Destiny (daivam). Bereft of effort who would be able to obtain oil from sesamum?'. But the inequality of result obtained when there is equal human exertion, although remarked as being a fallacy, is not a fallacy. Because in such a case, the difference in human exertion is the cause of the inequality of the results. If for some person, there is absence of result when there is equal human exertion, then it is the work of something unseen (adṛṣṭakṛtaḥ). That too has been given causal status by us. Thus Time (kāla) too is a cause because the bakula (Mimusops Elengi), the campaka (Miceliya Campaka), the aśoka (Jonesia Asoka Roxb), the punnāga (Rottleria Tinctoria), the nāga (Mesua Roxburghii), the sahakāra (a kind of mango) and such other trees are seen to bloom and bear fruit only during the proper season, but not always. The statement that variety in the world is not

possible because of the oneness of time (kālasyaikarūpatvāt) does not hold good in the case of our theory. For we do not accept the agency of Time (kāla) alone, but accept karma too; therefore, cosmic variety is not a fallacy".¹ In a similar way, other factors such as God, Nature, etc., are taken up for examination and their causal status partially asserted.²

(109) A careful examination of Mahāvīra's statement in the light of Śīlāṅka's commentary would reveal two main features of the Jaina theory of causation. First, because of their epistemological standpoint, the Jainas refused to posit unconditionally (ekāntena) one single cause. They have

1. Skr vol.1, fol.31-32, yato niyayāniyayaṃ saṃtaṃ iti sukhādikaṃ kiñcid niyatikṛtaṃ—avasyambhāvvyudaya-prāpitaṃ tathā aniyataṃ —ātmapuruṣakāreśvarādi prāpitaṃ sat niyatikṛtaṃ evaikānten-āśrayanti, ato 'jānānāḥ sukhaduḥkhādi kāraṇam abuddhikā buddhirahitā bhavanti'ti. Tathā hi arhatānāṃ kiñcid sukhaduḥkhādi niyatita eva bhavati—tat kāraṇasya karmaṇaḥ kasmimścid avasare 'vasyambhāvvyudayasadbhāvān niyatikṛtaṃ ity ucyate, tathā kiñcid aniyatikṛtaṃ ca—puruṣakāra-kāleśvara-svabhāvakarmādi-kṛtaṃ, tatra kathañcit sukhaduḥkhādeḥ puruṣakārasādhyatvam apy āśriyate, yataḥ kṛiyātaḥ phalaṃ bhavati, kriyā ca puruṣakārayattā pravartate, tathā coktaṃ, na daivam iti sañcītya tyajed udyamam ātmanaḥ, anudyamena kas tailaṃ tilebhyaḥ prāptum arhati? Yat tu samāne puruṣa-vyāpāre phalavaicitryaṃ dūṣanātvenopanyastaṃ tad adūṣanam eva, yatas tatrāpi puruṣakāra-vaicitryam api phalavaicitrye kāraṇam bhavati. Samāne vā puruṣakāre yaḥ phalābhāvaḥ kasyacid bhavati so 'dṛṣṭakṛtaḥ. Tad api ca asmābhiḥ kāraṇātvenāśītam eva. Tathā kālo pi kartā, yato bakula-cāmpakāśoka-punnāga-nāga-sahakārādīnāṃ viśiṣṭa eva kāle puṣpaphalādyudbhavo na sarvadeti, yac coktaṃ kālasyaikarūpatvāḥ jagadvaicitryaṃ na ghaṭata iti, tad asmān prati na dūṣanam, yato 'smābhir na kāla evaikā kartṛtvenābhyupagamyate api tu karmā pi, tato jagadvaicitryam ity adoṣaḥ.
2. ibid., vol.1, fol.32.

examined each one of the causes posited by various thinkers, causes such as human exertion (puruṣakāra), Destiny (niyati), Time (kāla), God (Īśvara), Nature (svabhāva), action (karma),¹ etc., and showed that these do not, by themselves, constitute causes. But in the end they have agreed that these can be assigned causal status depending on the point of view from which they are considered. Taking up the problem of human exertion, Śilāṅka maintains that if it were to fail as a cause, then it is because there are other causes which are not directly seen (adrṣṭa). Thus their theory partakes the idea of relativity as well as of plurality. But this plurality of causes can be divided into two broad categories, viz., (i) internal causes such as human exertion (puruṣakāra), and (ii) external causes such as Time, God, Nature, karma, etc. The first can be included under the category of self-causation (sayam katham, tzu tso 自作) and the second, under the category of external causation (param katham, ta tso 他作). Although these are considered to be untenable as causes when taken individually, yet when considered in a group or from different standpoints their causal status can be asserted. Thus the theory referred to in the early Buddhist texts as 'internal as well as external causation' (sayam katañ ca param katañ ca, tzu tso ta tso 自作他作) can be attributed to the Jainas.

(110) Secondly, a different grouping of causal factors can be noticed when Śilāṅka classified them as those that are destined to occur (niyata) and those that are not (aniyata). The only example of the former, given by Śilāṅka, is karma

1. The Jainas viewed karma as a "certain form of infra-atomic particles of matter" because of which the natural perfections of the pure soul are sullied, v. Das Gupta, Indian Philosophy, vol.1, pp.190 ff.

"because it can necessarily manifest itself (as a cause) when the opportunity is available" (kasmiñcid avasare'vasyam-bhāvyudayasadbhāvāt). Karma is again included in the category of undetermined (aniyata) causes such as human exertion (puruṣakāra), Time (kāla), etc. Therefore, a distinction has to be made between these two forms of karma. We are inclined to think that karma which is determined (niyata) to occur refers to past karma, while that which is undetermined (aniyata) refers to the present and future karmas. If so, the connection between past karma and niyati is very significant. It shows that just as the Ajīvikas raised species (saṅgati) or nature (svabhāva) to the status of niyati, the Jainas have raised karma to the status of niyati. It may be mentioned that the Jainas did not have to face the problem of personal identity because they believed in the existence of individual souls which were considered to be substances and therefore eternally independent.¹ By maintaining that karma as a cause necessarily arises, the Jainas viewed the present as being strictly determined by past karma. If one's personality is so strictly determined, then it is possible to maintain that there is no freedom of will. But this problem is solved by the way in which the statement 'undetermined' (aniyata) is explained. It is said that what is undetermined is what is caused by one's own human exertion, God, etc. It was pointed out that the Jainas recognised the validity of human exertion as a causal factor under certain circumstances (v. supra. 109). This means that although one's present state is determined by one's past karma, yet one could change the future because one's human exertion is an effective cause. Therefore, man is endowed

1. ERE 7.468b.

with the freedom of will. It is this belief that is referred to in the early Buddhist texts as pubbekatahetu¹ or yin pen tso (因本作)² or yin su ming tsao (因宿命造).³ A stock passage in the early Buddhist texts runs thus: "Whatever this individual experiences, whether pleasant or painful or neither painful nor pleasant, all is due to what was done previously. Thus by burning up, by making an end of, past deeds, by the non-doing of new deeds, there is no overflowing into the future. From there being no overflowing into the future comes the destruction of deeds; from the destruction of deeds comes the destruction of anguish; from the destruction of anguish comes the destruction of feelings; from the destruction of feelings all anguish will be worn away. Thus say ... the Nigaṇṭhas".⁴ From this passage it becomes evident that a knowledge of causes and conditions is at the back of the Jaina theory of existence. The first part of the theory is tempered by a belief in Strict Determinism (niyata); that everything a human being experiences is completely determined by his past karma and that there is no escape from it. The second part partakes of the idea of conditionality such that when A happens B happens. Herein, causal factors such as human exertion, God, Nature, etc., are recognised. This seems to have been

1. M 2.217; A 1.174.

2. TD 1.442c (Chung.4.2).

3. ibid., 1.435a (Chung.3.3).

4. M 2.214, yaṃ kiñcāyaṃ purisa-puggalo paṭisaṃvedeti sukhaṃ vā dukkhaṃ vā adukkhamasukhaṃ vā sabbam taṃ pubbekatahetu; iti purāṇaṃ kammānaṃ tapasā vyantibhāvā, navānaṃ kammānaṃ akaraṇā āyatim anavassavo āyatim anavassavā kammakkhaya kammakkhayā dukkhakkhaya dukkhakkhayā vedanakkhaya vedanakkhayā sabbam dukkham nijjinaṃ bhavissati'ti. Evamvādino ... Nigaṇṭhā. TD 1.442c (Chung.4.2).

taken by the Jainas as indeterminism (aniyata). Thus Mahāvīra's belief that things are "partly determined and partly undetermined" (niyayāniyayaṃ) is certainly reflected in the Buddhist statement of the Jaina theory of karma.

(111) The account of the Jaina theory of karma given by Dr. Barua is very confusing. He starts by attributing a certain theory to the Jainas and towards the end of the discussion accepts an altogether different proposition. He says: "The Buddha understood that Mahāvīra, in opposition to current beliefs that our happiness and misery are caused by others—determined wholly and solely by external factors and conditions—formulated a new theory, namely, that they are caused by the individual agent of our free-will. That our weal and ill are conditioned solely by or dependent upon external causes is one extreme, and by opposing to this a new individualistic theory, Mahāvīra ran to the other extreme, neither of which can a man with true insight reasonably accept".¹ Dr. Barua makes such a statement because he considers the doctrine of self-causation (sayam katham) mentioned in the Pāli Nikāyas is a reference to the Jaina theory of karma.² He has failed to see that this same theory was rejected by Mahāvīra (v. supra. 106). Moreover, after comparing some of the descriptions of the theory of karma, both in the early Buddhist and the Jaina sources, he maintains that it is "hardly possible for us to detect any differences between their opinions".³ But being unable to ignore the large

1. Pre-Buddhistic Indian Philosophy, pp. 385-386.

2. ibid., p. 386, n. 1.

3. ibid., p. 391.

number of passages in the Pāli Canon where the Buddha is represented as criticising the Jaina theory of karma, Dr.Barua was forced to see whether there is any difference between the two schools. Eventually he comes to the conclusion which contradicts his earlier statement of the Jaina doctrine. He says: "In accordance with Mahāvīra's view I am not, as a thinking subject, wholly and solely the maker of my moral being, but I am partly a creature of circumstances".¹ And in support of this view he quotes Mahāvīra's statement that "things depend partly on fate and partly on human exertion".² We have pointed out that this relativistic theory is mentioned in the Pāli Nikāyas and the Chinese Āgamas and there it is presented as a combination of self-causation and external causation (v.supra.109). The theory of self-causation is therefore not a Jaina theory, as Dr.Barua seems to think, but a theory formulated by the thinkers of the Vedic and Upaniṣadic traditions (v.supra.6 ff).

(112) In the Pāli Nikāyas and the Chinese Āgamas we find that the theory of complete determinism in moral responsibility, namely, that everything that we experience is due to past karma (pubbekatahetu, yin pen tso 因本作), is clearly attributed to the Jainas (v.supra.110), but not the relativistic theory of internal and external causation (sayam katañ ca param katañ ca, tzu tso ta tso 自作他作). The problem would then be to find out the connection between these two theories. On the authority of the commentator Śilāṅka

1. op.cit., p.393.

2. ibid.

it was pointed out that for the Jainas self-causation (sayam kadam) stood for causation by one's own human exertion, while external causation (annakadam) included the work of Time, God, Nature, etc. (v. supra. 107). We agree with Dr. Barua when he says: "... Mahāvīra appears to be in sharp antagonism with Gosāla".¹ This is because Mahāvīra disagreed with Gosāla's denial of moral responsibility and free-will activities. But it is important to note that Mahāvīra did not reject the theory of determinism (niyati) advocated by Gosāla. This is evident from Mahāvīra's dictum that "things are partly determined and partly undetermined" (niyayāniyayam). Here then lies the main problem faced by Mahāvīra. While accepting a theory of determinism (niyati), Mahāvīra wanted to uphold the belief in moral responsibility and free-will activities. The acceptance of the doctrine of karma satisfied his desire to accommodate the belief in free-will and moral responsibilities. By holding the view that man's present life as well as the future is completely determined by his past karma, he was able to accommodate the theory of determinism (niyati). Thus the theory of moral responsibility according to which everything that a person experiences is due to past behaviour (pubbekatahetu) is only a corollary of the philosophical theory of the combination of self-causation and external causation.

(113) It is not possible to consider the theory of moral responsibility put forward by the Jainas as a strictly individualistic theory. That would be to defeat the very

1. op.cit., p. 394.

purpose for which it was formulated by Mahāvīra. In fact, as mentioned earlier, the individualistic theory of moral responsibility was rejected by him. What Mahāvīra would have expected was to maintain that the individual is responsible for his activities, but once he has committed an act (karma), that action completely determines his future and thus becomes something external to him for he cannot control it. It is interesting to note that this theory is grouped by the Buddhists with two other theories, namely, creation by God (issaranimmāna, tsun yu tsao 尊祐造) and indeterminism (ahetu appaccayā, wu yin wu yūan 無因無緣), all of which were called sectarian tenets (v.supra.43). The theory of creation where an external personal agent is posited was a widely prevalent view. As opposed to this personal agent was the impersonal principle, namely, karma. These were two of the major theories of moral causation, the third one being a denial of any form of causation. Here it is specifically stated that the theory of pubbekatahetu, along with the other two, lead to a denial of moral responsibility (akiriyāya). Why was it that the Buddhists considered the Jaina theory of karma, which purports to explain moral responsibility, as leading to a denial of moral responsibility? This may be due to the fact that the Jaina theory partakes of determinism. Moreover, if the identification of pubbekatahetu with the theory of karma referred to by Śilānka is correct,¹ then Śilānka was justified in including it under external causation, although it was intended to occupy an intermediate position between self-causation and external causation.

1. Jayatilleke, Knowledge, p.151.

It may be due to the fact that man is powerless in the matter of controlling already committed actions that, as the Buddhist texts would make us believe, the Jainas attempted to expiate for past actions by the practice of austerities and prevent further accumulation of karma in the future by nān-action (v.supra.110).

(114) Buddha's criticism is levelled against the first part of the theory which maintains that every experience of the human being is completely determined by his past behaviour (pubbekatahetu, yin-pen-tso 因本作). Considering karma to be an external force, as the Jainas themselves did, the Buddha says: "If one's experiences of pleasure and pain are due to what was done in the past, then that person is paying his debt, to wit, his former sins. Who, when freed from debt, would be smeared by the sins?"¹ The argument that was adduced to refute the idea of creation as well as of 'species' (saṅgati)(v.supra.42,92) is also made use of in the refutation of the Jaina theory of karma. It is maintained that "if the experiences of a human being are determined by past karma, then the Nigaṇṭhas, who in this life undergo extreme forms of suffering, would have been of evil behaviour in their past lives",² and the "Tathāgata who experiences extreme forms of happiness was of good behaviour in his past life".³

1. J 5.238, Sace pubbekatahetu sukhadukkhaṃ nigacchati, porāṇaṃ kataṃ pāpaṃ taṃ eso mūccate iṇaṃ, porāṇaṃ iṇamokkha kuvidha pāpena lippati.
2. M 2.222, Sace, ... sattā pubbekatahetu sukhadukkhaṃ paṭisaṃvedenti, addhā, ..., Nigaṇṭhā pubbeḍḍakataṅkamma-kārino yaṃ etarahi evarūpā dukkhā tippā kaṭṭhā vedanā vediyanti; TD 1.443c (Chung.4.2).
3. loc.cit., tathāgato pubbesukataṅkammakārī, yaṃ etarahi evarūpā anāsavā sukhā vedanā vedeti.

(115) Apart from these few instances, the Buddha's criticism is directed, not so much at the theory itself, but at the epistemological basis of the theory. The Buddha questions the Jainas as to whether they knew that they existed in the past or not, whether they knew that they committed such an action or not, to which the Jainas replied in the negative and claimed that they depended on the testimony of their teacher, Nigaṇṭha Nāthaputta.¹

Another relativistic theory of causation.

(116) While the Jainas posited karma as an external cause and upheld the validity of human exertion as an internal cause, the Theists mentioned in the Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad believed that God is the external cause and that the person assumes various forms according to his deeds.² As Dr. Jayatilleke has pointed out, Dhammapāla, while commenting on the Udāna,³ has referred to this theory thus: "It is the belief of some that God, etc. (i.e., Nature, Destiny, etc.), in creating the soul and the world do not create entirely of their own accord but take into consideration the good and evil of each being (considered as) a co-operative cause and thus the soul and the world are self-caused and caused by another".⁴

1. M 2.214 ff; TD 1.442c (Chung.4.2); Jayatilleke, Knowledge, p.461.

2. 5.11.

3. p.67.

4. UdA 345, yasmā attānaṃ ca lokaṃ ca nimminantā issarādayo na kevalaṃ sayam eva nimminanti, atha kho tesāṃ tesāṃ sattānaṃ dhammādhammaṃ saha-kārikāraṇaṃ labhitvā'va tasmā sayam kato ca paraṃ kato ca attā ca loko cāti ekaccānaṃ laddhi. v. Jayatilleke, Knowledge, p.261.

CHAPTER THREE

CLARIFICATION OF MEANING OF TERMS.Paṭiccasamuppāda and idappaccayatā.

(118) One of the terms used most frequently in the early Buddhist texts to denote the theory of causality is paṭicca-samuppāda (Sk. pratītyasamutpāda) which is a combination of the two terms paṭicca, meaning 'having come on account of' (prati+√i+(t)ya), and samuppāda meaning 'arising'. Buddhaghosa defines it thus: "Causality or Dependent Origination (paṭicca-samuppāda) is the mode of causes (paccayākāra). The mode of causes is that according to which co-ordinate phenomena are produced mutually. Therefore, it is called causality".¹ Again defining the term 'arisen' (samuppanna) he says: "When arising, it arises together, that is co-ordinately, not singly or without a cause",² or "that which has arisen depending on causes".³ It may be noted that these definitions emphasise the existence of a group of causes and their occurrence together.

(119) Another term used in the early texts to denote the theory of causality is idappaccayatā (Bsk. idampratyaayatā⁴) which means 'conditionality'. It is an abstract noun derived from the combination of the two terms ida or idam (neuter of ayam), meaning 'this', and paccaya (from prati+√i) 'foundation', 'basis' or 'cause'. Thus the Pāli-English Dictionary (PTS) explains it as "having its foundation on this, that is to say, causally connected, by way of a cause".⁵ Buddhaghosa suggests

1. SA 2.6, Paṭiccasamuppādan'ti paccayākāraṃ. Paccayākāro hi aññamaññaṃ paṭicca saḥite dhamme uppādeti. Tasmā paṭicca-samuppādo'ti vuccati.
2. Vism 521, uppajjamāno ca saha samā ca uppajjati na ekekato na pi ahetuto'ti samuppanno.
3. SA 2.41, paccaye nissāya uppannaṃ.
4. Gv 89; Bbh 110, 204, 304, 396.
5. p.120, col.1.

the following meaning: "From the standpoint of the condition (hetu) or group of conditions (hetusamūha), which give rise to such states as decay and death, as stated, there is said to be conditionality".¹

(120) Edgerton opines that the two words idampratyayatā and pratītyasamutpāda constitute one compound and that the editors of the Pāli texts, such as the Vinaya (1.5.1), have wrongly separated them.² The different uses of the term idappaccayatā in the Pāli texts would leave no room for such a surmise. In the Pāli texts we come across two main uses of the term idappaccayatā. Sometimes it is used to denote a characteristic of paṭiccasamuppāda as, for example, in the statement: "Causation is said to have (the characteristics of) objectivity, necessity, invariability and conditionality".³ There is no doubt that here the two words are used separately, the term idappaccayatā being used to define one of the characteristic of causality (paṭiccasamuppāda). But sometimes it is used as a synonym of paṭiccasamuppāda and used along with it.⁴ In such cases, almost always the term paṭiccasamuppāda is preceded by the term idappaccayatā. Out of the four characteristics of causality mentioned above, the importance of the characteristic denoted by the term idappaccayatā (v.infra.198) may be taken as the raison d'être for using it as a synonym of paṭiccasamuppāda. It is this usage of the term which may have misled Edgerton to opine that the two terms constitute one compound.

1. SA 2.41, yathā vuttānaṃ etesaṃ jarāmarañādīnaṃ paccayatō vā paccayasamūhato vā idappaccayatā'ti vutto. Cp. Vism 518.
2. BHSD p.114, col.1.
3. S 2.26, tathatā avitathatā anaññathatā idappaccayatā ayaṃ vuccati paṭiccasamuppādo; TD 2.84b (Tsa.12.14).
4. Vin 1.5; D 2.36-37; M 1.167; S 1.136, duddasaṃ idaṃ ṭhānaṃ yadidaṃ idappaccayatā paṭiccasamuppādo.

(121) Moreover, a comparison of some of the Pāli passages in which the word idappaccayatā occurs with the corresponding passages in the Chinese Agamas would show that the latter, except in one single instance, do not have a special translation for this term. In the example quoted in the preceding paragraph (i.e., S 2.26) the term tathatā is rendered as ju fa erh (如法爾), avitathatā as fa pu li ju (法不離如), anaññathatā as fa pu i ju (法不異如) and the phrase sui shun yüan ch'i (隨順緣起) may be taken as a rendering of the term idappaccayatā.¹ The absence of a special translation for the term idappaccayatā or idampratyayatā is more evident in the Chinese translations of the later Buddhist texts such as the Bodhisattvabhūmi.² This may be due to the fact that when the Buddhist texts were translated into Chinese, its usage as a synonym of the term paṭiccasamuppāda had gained currency with the result that the characters used to translate paṭiccasamuppāda were also used to render the term idampratyayatā.³

The definition of cause as a group of causes.

(122) The definitions of the term paṭiccasamuppāda given by Buddhaghosa, as well as some of the discussions of the theory of causality found in the early texts (v. infra. 126f) imply the recognition of a group or number of causes. A 'cause' implies a 'harmony of causes' that go to constitute one cause which

1. TD 2.84b (Tsa. 12.14), 此等諸法, 法在法空法如法爾。法不離如, 法不異如, 審諦真實不顛倒, 如是隨順緣起。
2. Cp. Bbh 110(23) and TD 30.905b(23) (PSTCC.3); 204(25) and 921b(3) (PSTCC.6); 304(22) and 938a(18) (PSTCC.8); 396 (21) and 957c(11) (PSTCC.10).
3. *ibid.*

has the capacity to produce the effect. Thus Buddhaghosa maintained that if there is a deficiency of any of the several causes that go to constitute a single cause, there would be no effect.¹ The group of causes (hetusamūha) producing the effect would not be able to do so were they mutually independent or were some of them lacking.² Therefore, through mutual dependence, equally (samaṃ) and together (saha), they produce the effect or the resultant states.³

(123) In the Chinese Agamas we come across several different translations of the term paṭiccasamuppāda. Two of the most popular renderings are as follows:

(i) yin yüan fa (因緣法)⁴, and

(ii) yüan ch'i fa (緣起法).⁵

In example (i) the character yüan (緣), which is generally used to render the term pratyaya, is used as a verbal form like ch'i (起) in example (ii) to express the idea of 'arising'. But in some instances it is possible to find the two characters yin (因) and yüan (緣) used in compound form but yet denoting hetu and pratyaya respectively. For example, the phrase hetuṃ paṭicca sambhūtaṃ⁶ has been rendered into Chinese as yin yüan hui erh sheng (因緣會而生) and yin yüan ho ho sheng (因緣和合生).⁷ Here, although the Pāli version refers to the cause in the singular as hetuṃ (i.e., as a collective noun), the Chinese versions seem to

1. SA 1.193.

2. Vism 521.

3. *ibid.*

4. TD 2.84b (Tsa.12.14).

5. *ibid.*, 2.85b (Tsa.12.17).

6. S 1.134.

7. TD 2.327c (Tsa.45.6).

be very definite in implying a harmony of several causes. Even if we are to accept the fact that in Classical Chinese yin (因) means the cause as opposed to yüan (緣) which refers to an indirect cause, yet this distinction cannot be made in the case of the early Buddhist texts, because the technical meaning they have acquired in Buddhist Chinese is based on the meaning of those words which they represent, namely, hetu and pratyaya. Even if we are to translate the two Chinese passages as "arisen on account of the harmony of hetu and pratyaya", yet the usage of the two terms hetu and pratyaya in the early Buddhist texts would not leave room for the recognition of a distinction between them as cause and supporting condition respectively.

Synonymous use of hetu and pratyaya.

(124) The idea of a group or number of causes has misled some scholars mentioned below to think that Buddhism recognises a difference between hetu and pratyaya, two of the words which were most frequently used to denote the idea of 'cause'. Thus Monier Williams, discussing the meaning of the word pratyaya, says: "... (with the Buddhists) a co-operating cause, the concurrent occasion of an event as distinguished from its approximate cause".¹ Soothill and Hodous² as well as Jaschke³ and Saratchandra Das⁴, while quoting the statement of Monier Williams, have followed his interpretation. Soothill and Hodous

1. Sanskrit-English Dictionary, p.673, col.3.

2. DCBT .p.440, §v. ~~緣~~

3. Tibetan-English Dictionary, p.17, q.v. rkyen.

4. Tibetan-English Dictionary, p.80, q.v. rkyen.

have gone further in their comments when they said: "It is circumstantial, conditioning, or secondary cause, in contrast with ☒ hetu, the direct or fundamental cause. Hetu is the seed, pratyaya the soil, rain, sunshine, etc."¹ La Vallée Poussin too believes that "A distinction is to be made between the cause (hetu) and the conditions (pratyaya)"² In his article on 'Identity' he seems to elaborate on this point when he says: "Yet like all the Buddhists³, the Vātsīputriyas admit--basing their faith on scripture and experience--that a flame is always being renewed, and that it never remains for one moment identical with itself. The flame of the lamp on the third watch of the night is the continuation of the flame in the first watch, these two flames form a series (santati): the first is the cause (hetu) of the second, for they have both the same nature, the wick and oil are not causes but only co-efficients (pratyaya)"⁴

(125) It may be interesting to find out whether there is any distinction made between cause (hetu, yin ☒) and condition (paccaya, yuan 緣) in the early Buddhist texts. Words expressing the idea of 'cause' in the Pāli Nikāyas are numerous. Buddhaghosa has given a list of such terms, e.g., paccaya, hetu, kāraṇa, nidāna, sambhava, pabhava, and maintains that although the words are different, they express the same meaning.⁵ To the above

1. Op.cit.
2. ERE 9.848, col.2. v.art. 'Philosophy' (Buddhist).
3. Italics are mine.
4. ERE 7.99, col.1.
5. Vism 532, paccayo hetu kāraṇaṃ nidānaṃ sambhavo pabhavo'ti ādi atthato ekaṃ vyañjanato nānaṃ. AA 2.154, nidānaṃ hetu saṅkhāro paccayo rūpaṃ'ti pi hi etāni kāraṇavevacanān'eva. Referring to the two terms hetu and paccaya Buddhaghosa says: evaṃ atthato ekaṃ'pi vohāravasena vacanasiliṭṭhatāya ca tatra etaṃ ubhayaṃ'pi vuccati, VA 1.185.

list may be added upanisā.¹ A similar list of synonyms is given in the Sphuṭārthâbhīdharmakośavyākhyā of Yaśomitra.² Of these paccaya and hetu occur very frequently in the Pāli Nikāyas and the former appears to have been most favoured. In the Chinese Āgamas too the two characters yin (因) and yüan (緣) which represent the words hetu and paccaya are widely used.

(126) It is very probable that the two words hetu (yin 因) and paccaya (yüan 緣) were used synonymously in the Pāli Nikāyas and the Chinese Āgamas, although some of the early interpreters have mistakenly rendered them as 'cause' and 'effect' respectively.³ The phrase "What is the cause, what is the condition (reason)?" occurs very frequently in the Nikāyas⁴ and the Āgamas,⁵ and also in texts like Saddharmapundarīka⁶ and Lalitavistara⁷ which belong to a later period. Another example which illustrates the synonymous use of the two terms is to be found in the Nikāyas and Āgamas where it is said: "There are two causes, two conditions for the arising of right view (sammādiṭṭhi, cheng chien 正見). Which two? Testimony of another (paratoghosa, tsong ta wen 從他聞) and proper reflection (yoniso manasikāra, cheng ssu wei 正思惟)".⁸

1. S 2.30-31; Jayatilleke, Knowledge, p.446. v. also D 2.217, 259; M 3.71.
2. 1.188, hetu pratyayo nidānaṃ kāraṇaṃ nimittaṃ lingam upaniṣad iti paryāyāḥ.
3. Edgerton, in his BHSD p.375, points out that Burnouf, Kern and Foucaux have mistakenly rendered them in this manner.
4. M 1.442, 444; 2.45, 74; A 1.55, 66, 200, etc., ko hetu ko paccayo.
5. TD 2.57c (Tsa.9.9), 343b (Tsa.47.10), etc.
6. p.8.
7. pp.120, 128.
8. M 1.294; A 1.87; TD 1.50a (Chang.8.2).

It is this same passage which is quoted in the Sphutârth-âbhidharmakośavyākhyā by Yaśomitra when he wanted to illustrate the synonymous use of the two terms in the early texts.¹

Therefore, the view expressed by some of the later Buddhist scholars that "Hetu is as the seed and pratyaya as the soil, rain, sunshine, etc." (v.supra.124) does not seem to be applicable in the case of the literature cited above. Such definitions would wrongly imply that in the early Buddhist texts hetu (yin 因) denotes 'cause' and paccaya (yüan 緣) stands for 'condition', even though this distinction is part and parcel of the commonsense notion of causality.²

(127) Let us consider the example quoted by Soothill and Hodous to illustrate the distinction between cause and condition (v.supra.124). This very example is found to occur in the Samyukta, both in the Pāli³ and in the Chinese⁴ versions. Here Bhikkhuni Selā⁵ is represented as rejecting two of the existing theories of causation, namely, self-causation (attakataṃ, tzu tsao 自造) and external causation (parakataṃ, ta so tso 他所作) when she said: "This personality is not caused by oneself, nor is it caused by another. It comes into being

1. 1.188. hetūnāṃ pratyayānāṃ ca kaḥ prativīśeṣaḥ. na kaścid ity āha. Tathā hy uktāṃ Bhagavatā. dvau hetū dvau pratyayau samyag-dṛṣṭer utpādāya. katamau dvau. parataś ca ghoṣo 'dhyātmaṃ ca yoniśo-manasikāra iti.
2. Stebbing, Introduction, pp.270-271; J.S.Mill says: "Nothing can better show the absence of any scientific ground for the distinction between the cause of a phenomenon and its conditions, than the capricious manner in which we select from among the the conditions that which we choose to denominate the cause". A System of Logic, (London, 1872), ~~xxx~~ 2.380.
3. S 1.134.
4. TD 2.327c (Tsa.45.6).
5. The Chinese text seems to suggest the name Vīrā (毘羅).

on account of a cause (hetum paṭicca¹) and disappears when that cause is destroyed".² She then quotes the simile which runs thus: "Just as a seed, which when sown in a field, would grow if it is supplied with the essence of the earth and moisture, even so the (five) aggregates, the (eighteen)'elements' and the six senses come into being on account of a cause and disappear when that cause is destroyed".³ Taking the Pāli version, we find that the word denoting 'cause' is in the singular as hetum, but in the simile three causes or conditions are enumerated, that is to say, (i) the seed, (ii) the fertility of the soil and (iii) the moisture. Does it mean that the seed is the cause and the others are secondary conditions? If that is so, then the seed should be able to produce the sprout without the other factors, because according to the Buddhist theory of causality a cause must be able to produce or give rise to an effect invariably (v.infra.197). But the seed in the above simile is not capable of producing or giving rise to the sprout without the support of the other two factors. Therefore, in this case, the seed by itself cannot be regarded as a cause. Moreover, the seed itself has to satisfy several other conditions, namely,

1. The Chinese version reads "arising as a result of the harmony of causes" 因緣會而生 or 因緣和合生
2. It may be objected that an effect does not disappear if the cause is removed or destroyed, as for example when the seed which has given rise to the sprout is destroyed the sprout itself is not destroyed. But this can be maintained only by taking the seed alone to be the cause. But if we consider the cause as consisting of all the factors such as fertility of soil and moisture, then with the destruction of all these conditions the sprout would fail to grow.
3. § 1.134, yathā aññataram bījaṃ khetto vuttam virūhati, paṭhavirasam ca āgamma sinehañ ca tadūbhayaṃ, evaṃ khandhā ca dhātuyo cha āyatanā ime, hetum paṭicca sambhūtā hetubhaṅgā nirujjhati.

TD 2.327c (Tsa.45.6).

it should be unbroken, not rotten, not destroyed by the wind or sun and fresh and also it must be well planted. Otherwise it would not sprout, grow up and attain maturity (v.infra.251). A cause in this context can therefore be described as the sum total of the conditions.¹

(128) This point may further be illustrated by another example from the Majjhima Nikāya. Here we find an exact linguistic equivalent of the phrase hetuṃ paṭicca occurring as paccayaṃ paṭicca,² which clearly shows that the two terms hetu and paccaya are interchangeable and were used synonymously. It occurs in a passage describing the causality of perception. Although the text does not refer to all the conditions that should be satisfied for any act of perception to be possible (v.infra.270), yet it refers to two of the conditions, namely, the sense organ and the corresponding sense object. But as in the example quoted earlier (v.supra.127), although there is more than one condition, yet they are referred to in the singular as paccayaṃ.

(129) These few examples illustrate two main features of the early Buddhist theory of causality which have been misunderstood by the scholars mentioned above (v.supra.124). Firstly, they show that the early Buddhist theory transcends the commonsense

1. Mill, Logic, 1.383. Russell argues thus: "If the inference from cause to effect is to be indubitable, it seems that the cause can hardly stop short of the whole universe. So long as anything is left out, something may be left out which alters the expected result. But for practical and scientific purposes phenomena can be collected into groups which are causally self-contained, or nearly so. In the common notion of causation, the cause is a single event But it is difficult to know what we mean by a single event; and it generally appears that, in order to have anything approaching certainty concerning the effect, it is necessary to include many more circumstances in the cause than unscientific commonsense would suppose. External World, pp.229-230. v.also p.235.
2. M 1.259; cp. TD 1.767a (Chung.54.2).

notion of causality, in that, while recognizing several factors which are necessary for the production of an effect, it does not select one from among a set of jointly sufficient conditions presenting it as the cause of an effect. In speaking of causality, it recognizes a system the parts of which are in mutual dependence. This dependence has been designated the "dependent origination" (paṭiccasamuppāda). This is in conformity with the definition given by Buddhaghosa.¹ Thus, although there are several factors, all of them constitute one system or event and, therefore, are referred to in the singular. Only and if only a cause includes all the necessary conditions it would give rise to the effect. As a result of the acceptance of this position early Buddhism does not make any distinction between cause (hetu, yin 因) and condition (pratyaya, yüan 緣),² even if current convention were to recognise such a distinction.

(130) The definition of a cause as the sum total of several factors which gives rise to the consequent led to further developments in the Buddhist theory of causality at a subsequent stage. During the period of the Abhidhamma, the Buddhists started investigating into the nature of the several factors that go to constitute a cause. They found that each of the several factors stands in a different relationship to the effect. These different relations were analysed in the Paṭṭhāna of the Theravādins³ and the philosophical treatises of the other schools of Buddhism.

1. Vism 520.

2. This is the position accepted by the Logical Positivists. Stating the Positivist view Prof. A. J. Ayer says: "Another point in which our formula is somewhat at variance with popular notions of causality is that it does not differentiate between a 'cause' and the accompanying 'conditions', the presence of which is considered to be necessary for the cause to produce the effect". Foundations of Empirical Knowledge, (London, 1962), p. 181.

3. v. Nyanatiloka, Guide Through the Abhidhamma Pitaka, (Colombo, 1957), pp. 118-127; Kalupahana, D. J., The Philosophy of Relations in Buddhism, UCR 20.19-23.

(131) When the analysis of "jointly sufficient conditions" was undertaken during the period of the Abhidhamma, the meaning of the word hetu (yin 因) was restricted to denote the 'root' or 'primary', but the word pratyaya (yüan 緣), which stood for 'cause' in general, was always suffixed to the word hetu (yin 因). In this manner, we get the compound hetu-pratyaya (yin yüan 因緣) which means 'primary or root cause'. In this case hetu is only an adjective qualifying the word pratyaya, and the word hetu alone does not seem to have been used in the sense of primary cause. With this specialization of the meaning of the word hetu (yin 因), its former function of denoting a cause was taken over by the word pratyaya (yüan 緣). But alongside with this special use of the term hetu (yin 因), the Yogācārins retained its earlier usage of denoting cause in general (v.infra.140). According to the Abhidhammika definition, paccaya is "that depending on which the (fruit or effect) derived comes",¹ and hetu means root.² A similar definition of the concept of pratyaya is given by Nāgārjuna in his Mādhyamika Kārikā where he says: "Those which, through dependence, give rise (to effects) are called the pratyayas".³ If we are to explain the simile quoted by Soothill and Hodous in the light of this new philosophy, then we may maintain that the seed (bija, chung tzu 種子) would be the hetu-pratyaya (yin yüan 因緣), but not hetu (yin 因), meaning primary cause. The essence of the earth

1. Vism 235; Tikap 1.11, paṭicca etasmā eti'ti paccayo. Sumāṅgala, in his Abhidhammatthavibhāvinī-ṭīkā (p.133), gives a similar definition.

2. Vism 235; Tikap 1.12, mūlaṭṭhena hetu.

3. MK 1.5, Utpadyante pratītyeṃān iti'me pratyayāḥ kila. v.MKV p.81.

(paṭhavirasa) and moisture (sineha, shui 水) as well as temperature (huo 火) may be put into the category of nutritive cause (āhārapaccaya).¹ The earth (ti 地) as given in the Chinese text (v.infra.373f) may be considered as a supporting cause (nissayapaccaya).² Paccaya or pratyaya (yüan 緣), therefore, stands for the cause whether it is primary or secondary. As pointed out earlier, the use of the term hetu (yin 因) as denoting a cause in general was not completely given up, for we find references to ten hetus (sometimes called kāraṇa) some of which are only supporting conditions as, for example, sahakāri-hetu³ (t'ung shih yin 同事因⁴) or sahakāri-kāraṇa⁵ (t'ung shih neng tso 同事能作⁶). It is important to note that these different types of causes do not, by themselves, constitute causes which can invariably give rise to effects. Although for purposes of examination the various causes are distinguished, they do not make any difference in the case of the production of the effects.⁷

Origin of the distinction between hetu and pratyaya.

(132) It was the Sarvāstivādins who appear to have made a distinction between hetu (yin 因) and pratyaya (yüan 緣) which misled the scholars mentioned above (v.supra.124) who indiscriminately held that Buddhists (in general) accepted it.

1. Tikap 1.5; the Abhs refers to it as the 'cause of stability' or stithikāraṇa (p.28) and Dharmapāla includes it under adhipati-pratyaya (TD 31.40a, Cheng.7).
2. The Abhs seems to take it as dhṛti-kāraṇa (v.infra.375).
3. Siddhi, p.459.
4. TD 31.41c (Cheng.8).
5. Abhs p.28.
6. TD 31.671c (CL.3).
7. Ayer, Foundations, p.181, "... this use of a special name to refer to one among a number of 'jointly sufficient conditions' may serve to single out an event as one in which the speaker is particularly interested, it does not correspond to any difference of function with regard to the production of the effect".

The Sarvāstivādins formulated a theory of six hetus (yin 因),¹
viz.,

- (1) kāraṇaheṭu, neng tso yin 能作因
- (2) sahabhūheṭu, chü yu yin 俱有因
- (3) sabhāgahetu, hsiang ying yin 相應因
- (4) samprayuktakahetu, t'ung lui yin 同類因
- (5) sarvatragahetu, pien hsing yin 徧行因
- (6) vipākahetu, i shu yin 異熟因

and also a theory of pratyayas (yüan 緣),² namely,

- (1) hetupratyaya, yin yüan 因緣
- (2) samanantarapratyaya, teng wu chien yüan 等無間緣
- (3) ālambanapratyaya, so yüan yüan 所緣緣
- (4) adhipatipratyaya, tseng shang yüan 增上緣

The mere fact that the Sarvāstivādins were the first to formulate a theory of causality with two aspects, one of hetu (yin 因) and one of pratyaya (yüan 緣) may be taken as sufficient evidence in favour of the view that they were the first to make a distinction between hetu and pratyaya.

(133) Apart from the formulation of a theory of causality with two aspects, there is a specific statement in the Abhidharmakośa which points to the recognition of a distinction between hetu and pratyaya. It is a quotation from an unnamed sūtra and is preserved in both Chinese translations of the Abhidharmakośa. The two versions are as follows:

1. AK 2.49; TD 29.30a (CSL 6); Kośa., p.245.

2. AK 2.61; TD 29.36b (CSL 7); Kośa., p.299.

- (a) 亦當當知。眼因色緣能生眼識。¹
 (b) 比丘眼是因色是緣。能生眼識。²

and may be translated as follows: "Monks, it should be known that the visual organ (yen 眼) is the hetu (yin 因) and the external object (se 色) the pratyaya (yüan 緣) for the arising of visual perception".

(134) Unfortunately, the Sanskrit text of the Abhidharmakośa does not include the chapter on Pudgalaviniścaya in which the above statement occurs. The Sphuṭārthābhidharmakośavyākhyā quotes only the first part of this statement as cakṣur bhikṣo hetur iti.³ Following this La Vallée Poussin reconstructs the whole passage thus: cakṣur bhikṣo hetuḥ cakṣurviññānotpādāya rūpaṃ bhikṣo pratyayaḥ.⁴ The specific use of the term hetu to describe the visual organ and the word pratyaya to denote the external object is very significant. Analysing this causal process of perception in the light of the popular notion of causality (v. supra. 129), it may be maintained that the visual organ is the 'cause' and the external object the 'condition' or 'contributory cause'. In an act of perception commonsense would consider the visual organ as being more important a cause than the object of perception.⁵ Therefore, it would be possible to say that according to the above example there is a distinction between hetu (yin 因) and pratyaya (yüan 緣) corresponding to the distinction between cause and condition in the commonsense notion of causality.

1. TD 29.153c (22-22) (CSL.29), tr. by Hsüan Tsang (玄奘).
2. TD 29.305b (13-14) (CSSL.22), tr. by Paramārtha (真諦).
3. p.703.
4. Kośa, ch.9, p.241, n.3.
5. Stebbing, Introduction, p.262 says: "Further, in determining which of the various occurrences that are present is to be taken as the cause commonsense again selects what is striking". v. also p.271.

(135) It would be interesting to find out from where the above quotation in the Abhidharmakośa comes. Saeki Kyokuga, in his edition of the Chinese version of the Abhidharmakośa, identifies this passage with a statement in the Samyukta Agama, 9.6.¹ This seems to be a reference to the wood-block edition of the Chinese Tripitaka and is therefore not easily accessible. Matters are made easy by Nishi Giyū who, in his Japanese translation of the Abhidharmakośa appearing in the Kokuyaku Issaikyō,² refers to the Taishō edition of the Agamas and the Samyukta statement is here found to occur as: 眼因緣色眼識生。³ The Pāli version of this statement is everywhere found as: cakkhuñ ca paṭicca rūpe ca uppajjati cakkhuvijñānam. It occurs in several places in the Pāli Nikāyas,⁴ and the Chinese Agamas,⁵ and even in the Buddhist Sanskrit texts of a later date.⁶ It may be translated as follows: "Visual perception is dependent upon the visual organ and the visible object in order to arise". This is a stereotyped account of the causality of perception found in the Buddhist texts.

(136) It is quite evident that there is a difference between the statement quoted in the Chinese version of the Abhidharmakośa and its restoration by De la Vallée Poussin on the one hand and the statement found in the Chinese Agamas and the Pāli Nikāyas on the other. Placing them side by side it would be possible to note the differences easily.

1. Kando edition,

2. 國譯一切經, 毘曇部, vol.26/2, p.479, n.165.

3. TD.2.57c (Tsa.9.9).

4. M 1.108 ff.; S 2.72 ff.; 4.32, 67, 166 f.

5. TD 1.604b (Chung.28.3); 2.78b (Tsa.11.10); 87c (Tsa.13.3), etc.

6. LV p.176, cakṣuṣ pratītya rūpataḥ cakṣuvijñānam'ih'opajāyate.

I Statement in the Nikāyas
and the Āgamas.

cakkhuñ ca paṭicca rūpe ca
uppajjati cakkhuvīññānam.

眼因緣色眼識生。

II Statement in the Abhidharma-
kośa and its vyākhyā.

cakṣur bhikṣo hetuḥ
cakṣurvijñānotpādāya
rūpaṃ bhikṣo pratyayaḥ.

眼因色緣能生眼識。

The statement in the Abhidharmakośa presents the visual organ (cakṣuḥ, yen 眼) as hetu (yin 因) and the external object (rūpa, se 色) as pratyaya (yüan 緣), but no such distinction is implied in the statement in the Nikāyas and Āgamas. In the Nikāyas and Āgamas it is not possible to find a statement corresponding to the statement in the Abhidharmakośa. This leads us to the conclusion that if the Sarvāstivādins were actually quoting from the Nikāyas and the Āgamas, they have changed the statement found in the sūtras to suit their own theory of causality.

(137) If the Sarvāstivādins were recognising a distinction between cause (hetu, yin 因) and condition (pratyaya, yüan 緣), then their theory of causality would fall in line with the commonsense notion of causality. The distinction between cause and condition is said to be the result of the commonsense notion of a 'thing'.¹ It is believed that "... common sense distinguishes between a thing and its states".² The thing or phenomenon is regarded as something substantial; a substance persisting through a period of time but of which there are states which change. This commonsense notion of substance was, no doubt,

1. Stebbing, Introduction, p.271.

2. ibid., p.266.

part and parcel of the Sarvāstivāda teachings. For the first time in the history of Buddhist thought, the Sarvāstivādins accepted a bifurcation of elements as having substance and characteristics (v.infra.156f). This came to be called the dravyavāda and is believed to be the result of Vaiśeṣika influence.¹ The acceptance of such a bifurcation leads to the recognition of a distinction between cause and condition. For example, if clay is considered to be the substance and the form it assumes as a jar, etc., its characteristics or states, then clay itself would be considered as the cause and the potter, the potter's wheel, etc., which gives clay its shape would be only subsidiary conditions.² Thus all the evidence, textual as well as doctrinal, go to prove that the Sarvāstivādins were the first to make a distinction between cause (hetu, yin 因) and condition (pratyaya, yüan 緣).

(138) Therefore, when Yaśomitra wrote his Sphuṭārthābhidharma-kośavyākhyā there were differences of opinion among the Buddhist scholars as to whether hetu (yin 因) and pratyaya (yüan 緣) were identical. In one place Yaśomitra refers to the earlier view according to which the two terms were used synonymously.³ A quotation from the sūtras is given in order to prove this point (v.supra.126). On a later occasion, while commenting on the statement cakṣur bhikṣo hetur (v.supra.134), he refers

1. Jaini, Padmanabh S., Introduction, Abhidharmaḍipā (Patna, 1959), pp.95 ff.
2. For more examples illustrating this point, v. Stebbing, Introduction, pp.270-271.
3. p.188, hetūnāṃ pratyayānāṃ kaḥ prativīśeṣaḥ. nā kaścīd ity āha.

to several dissentient views thus: "Hetu is the proximate cause, the remote one is the pratyaya; others say hetu is what generates (produces), whereas pratyaya is only the supporting condition, still others maintain that the two are synonymous".¹

(139) The only text of the Theravādins, as far as we know, which upholds this distinction between hetu and paccaya is the Nettippakaraṇa included in the Khuddaka Nikāya. Discussing the category or requisites or conditions (parikkhāra-hāra), it is said that "there are two things that give rise to or produce (a phenomenon), namely, cause and condition".²

Explaining the characteristics of a cause and a condition, the same treatise points out that the cause has the characteristic of being unique, and the condition the characteristic of being common.³ The example of the sprout is put forward in order to illustrate this distinction and it is said that the seed is the unique 'cause' for the arising of the sprout, while the earth and water, being common, are only 'conditions'.⁴ At the end of the discussion it was observed: "Intrinsic nature is the cause, extrinsic nature is the condition; cause is internal, a condition is external; the cause generates (produces), the condition supports; that which is unique is the cause, that which is common is the condition".⁵ It is possible to agree with

1. *ibid.*, p.703, *hetu āsannaṃ pratyayaṃ; viprakṛṣṭas tu pratyaya eva; janako hetuṃ, pratyayas tv ālambanamātram ity apare; paryāyāv etāv ity apare.*

2. p.78, *Dve dhammā janayanti: hetu ca paccayo ca.*

3. *ibid.* *asādhāraṇalakkhaṇo hetu, sādharmaṇalakkhaṇo paccayo.*

4. *ibid.*, *yathā ankurassa nibbattiyā bījam asādhāraṇaṃ paṭhavi āpo ca sādharmaṇā. Ankurassa hi paṭhavi āpo ca paccayo.*

5. *ibid.*, *iti sabhāvo hetu, parabhāvo paccayo, ajjhattiko hetu bāhiro paccayo, janako hetu pariggāhako paccayo, asādhāraṇo hetu sādharmaṇo paccayo.*

Nānamoli when he, while commenting on the analysis of the category of requisites (parikkhāra-hāra) in the Nettipakarāṇa, says that the distinction between hetu and paccaya seems peculiar to this work and that in the suttas no such difference is discernible.¹ Considering the fact that such a definition implying a distinction between hetu and paccaya is not to be found in the other works of the Theravādins, it may be possible to surmise that the compilers of the Nettipakarāṇa were influenced by the ideas expressed on the subject at the time the Sphuṭārthābhīdharmakośavyākhyā came to be compiled (v. supra. 138)

(140) While the theory of causality put forward by the Sarvāstivādins consisted of the two facets, one of hetu (yin 因) and one of pratyaya (yüan 緣), the Vijñānavādins and the Theravādins emphasised the theory of pratyayas. Moreover, the Vijñānavādins extended the theory of pratyayas by enumerating twenty sub-divisions of the hetu-pratyaya (yin yüan 因緣).² Of these twenty sub-divisions, ten are referred to in the Madhyāntavibhāgaśāstra of Vasubandhu³ and also in the Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi of Dharmapāla.⁴ In the former they are called kāraṇa (neng tso 能作) and in the latter hetu (yin 因). This shows that even at the time when the jointly sufficient conditions came to be analysed, the words hetu (yin 因), kāraṇa (neng tso 能作) and pratyaya (yüan 緣) were used synonymously. What are given as sub-divisions of hetu-pratyaya (yin yüan 因緣) are called kāraṇa (neng tso 能作) in one text and hetu (yin 因) in another.

1. Guide, p. 111, n. 456/2.

2. Abhs p. 28-29; TD 31.671b (CL.3).

3. TD 31.467b-c (PCPL.2); also v. TD 31.454a-b (CPPL.2).

4. TD 31.41b (Ch'eng.8); Siddhi, p. 453-463.

The division of hetu-pratyaya into twenty kāraṇas in the Abhidharmasamuccaya appears to be very significant. With the other three pratyayas they make a total of twenty three and we find much correspondence between this and the list of twenty four paccayas enumerated in the Paṭṭhāna of the Theravādins (v.infra.358 ff.).

The attempt to reconcile the two theories.

(141) Once the Sarvāstivādins had put forward a theory of causality with two facets, one of hetu (yin 因) and one of pratyaya (yüan 緣), the Vijñānavādins made an attempt to resolve the problems created by this dichotomy by fusing the two theories together. The Abhidharmasamuccaya describes several ways in which a primary cause (hetu-pratyaya, yin yüan 因緣) can be recognised.¹ They are by way of—

- (1) self-nature or inherent nature (svabhāva, tzu hsing 自性),
- (2) diversity (prabheda, ch'a pieh 差別),
- (3) assistance (sahāya, chu pan 助半),
- (4) co-existence (sampratipatti, teng hsing 等行),
- (5) increase (vṛddhi, tseng i 增益),
- (6) opposition (paripantha, ch'ang ai 障礙), and
- (7) grasping (parigraha, she shou 攝受).



Haribhadra, in his commentary on the Abhidharmasamuccaya, maintains that the first two characteristics, namely, inherent nature and diversity, establish the kāraṇa-hetu (neng tso yin 能作因) and the remaining five characteristics, in order,

1. p.28; TD 31.671b (CL.3).

elucidate the sahabhū- (chü yu 俱有), sabhāga- (hsiang ying 相應), samprayuktaka- (t'ung lui 同類), sarvatraga- (p'ien hsing 徧行) and vipāka- (i shu 異熟) hetus.¹ This indicates very clearly an attempt on the part of the Vijñānavādins to bring about a reconciliation between the two theories put forward by the Sarvāstivādins. While the Abhidharmakośa includes all the five hetus (yin 因) except kāraṇa-hetu (neng tso yin 能作因) under the hetu-pratyaya,² the Abhidharmasamuccaya goes one step further to include even the kāraṇa-hetu under this category. Moreover, Haribhadra concludes by saying that all the hetus can be included under the kāraṇa-hetu,³ thus making kāraṇa-hetu and hetu-pratyaya identical. The distinction between the standpoints of the two schools could be clearly seen from the diagrams given below (v.infra. p.142).

(142) The purpose of this classification by the Vijñānavādins is to define the hetu-pratyaya in such a way that whatever causes (hetu, yin 因) that appeared separately according to the Sarvāstivāda classification could be brought under the hetu-pratyaya. Even though the terms hetu and kāraṇa are retained by the Vijñānavādi yet they do not represent any distinction. Instead they are interchangeable and are used synonymously. Therefore we may conclude that early Buddhism as depicted in the Nikāyas and Āgamas, as well as the later Theravāda and Vijñānavāda schools do not recognise a difference between 'cause' and 'condition' and that the words hetu and pratyaya too do not denote such a distinction.

1. TD 31.713a (TCL.4).
2. AK 2.61; Kośa, 2.299.
3. TD 31.713a (TCL.4).

ABHIDHARMAKŌŚAABHIDHARMA SAMUCCAYA

CHAPTER FOUR.

Paṭiccasamuppanna-dhamma and Paṭiccasamuppāda.

Buddha's discovery.

(143) In our daily experiences "we are accustomed to distinguish between occurrences that we regard as being regularly connected and occurrences that we consider to be accidentally, or casually, conjoined".¹ There is no doubt that primitive man discovered some minor uniformities, and that he made use of this knowledge as a guide to his daily activities. But where such uniformities could not be discovered he resorted to rituals and magical practices.² His ritual practices may therefore be explained as unconscious attempts at overcoming or avoiding what he considered to be accidental occurrences. The two types of events enumerated above, namely, those that are regularly connected and those that occur accidentally, have been called uniformities and multiformities respectively.³ Scientific knowledge is said to consist in resolving these multiformities into a uniformity of a higher generality and greater abstraction, or to explain the causality of what has been described as accidental occurrences so that the belief in events that sometimes happen may be replaced by the belief in events which always happen.

(144) The Buddha made a similar discovery when, with the insight he gained as he sat under the Bodhi-tree on the banks of the river Nerañjarā, he was able to penetrate into the nature of dhammā.⁴ The truth he discovered is summarised in a discourse

1. Stebbing, Introduction, p.258.

2. Malinowski, B.K., "Magic, Science and Religion", in Religion, Science and Reality, ed. J. Needham, (London, 1925), pp.30-31.

3. Stebbing, Introduction, p.259.

4. Vin 1.1 f.; Ud p.1.

which he delivered to his disciples on a later occasion.¹ He speaks of two aspects of his discovery, namely, 'causality' (paṭiccasamuppāda, yin yüan fa 因緣法) and 'causally produced dhammā' (paṭiccasamuppanne ca dhamme, yuan sheng fa 緣生法).² The So-ch'u-ching³ makes this distinction very clear when it uses the two phrases yin yüan ch'i (因緣起) and yin yüan ch'i so sheng fa (因緣起所生法) to denote paṭiccasamuppāda and paṭiccasamuppanna dhamma respectively.⁴ The former is further defined in relation to the general formula of causality (v.infra.188) and the latter is explained in terms of the twelve factors of the special application (v.infra.209).⁵ This implies that the general formula of causality which is stated as "When this exists, that exists; when this does not exist, that does not exist. When this arises, that arises; on the cessation of this, that ceases", i.e., the causal pattern or the rule according to which things are conditioned, is what is called paṭiccasamuppāda, and the things which are causally conditioned or produced, namely, the twelve factors of the special application are the paṭiccasamuppanna dhamma. Thus it is a distinction between the relation and the related. The problem of causality therefore involves two aspects, the rule or pattern according to which things change and the things themselves which are subject to change.⁶

1. S 2.25 ff.; TD 2.84b (Tsa.12.14).

2. loc.cit., paṭiccasamuppādañi ca vo bhikkhave desissāmi paṭiccasamuppanne ca dhamme, 我今當說因緣法及緣生法。

3. 所處經 (=Chachakka sutta, M 3.280-287).

4. TD 1.562c-563a (Chung.21.3).

5. ibid.

6. Cp. Russell, B.A.W., Human Knowledge; Its scope and limits, (London, 1948), p.439, "What passes for knowledge is of two kinds: first, knowledge of facts; second, knowledge of the general connections between facts".

Meaning of the term dhamma (fa 法).

(145) An analysis of the nature of the 'causally produced dhammā' (paṭiccasamuppanna dhamma) would throw much light on the problem of causality. Therefore it seems feasible to start with such an analysis. There is no doubt that the conception of dhamma (fa 法) is fundamental to Buddhist philosophy. Conze has observed that "In its essentials the Dharma-theory is common to all schools, and provides the framework within which Buddhist wisdom operates".¹ The term dhamma is used in a wide variety of meanings.² The implications of the term have been analysed by the commentators and the various uses are given in two slightly different lists.³ Prof. and Mrs. Geiger have amalgamated these two lists, giving five different uses as follows:

- (i) guṇa, "Eigenschaft, Fähigkeit, Tugend",
- (ii) desanā, "Lehre, Predigt",
- (iii) hetu, "ursache",
- (iv) pariyatti, "heiliger, kanonischen Text", and
- (v) nissatta (=nijjīva), "Unbelebtes, Ding, Sache".⁴

Of these we are primarily concerned with the third and the fifth uses of the term which, for the sake of convenience, could be treated as one. Dhamma in this sense too has undergone multifarious changes in the different schools of Buddhist thought. Our main attempt would be to examine the conception of dhamma as embodied in the Pāli Nikāyas and the Chinese Āgamas,⁵ but references would be made to other developments when necessary.

1. Buddhist Philosophy in India, (London, 1961), p. 92.
2. Geiger, Magdalene and Wilhelm, Pāli Dhamma, (Munich, 1921); Conze, op.cit., pp. 92 ff.
3. (i) DA 1.99; DhA 1.22; (ii) DhSA 38.
4. Pāli Dhamma, p. 4.
5. v. Stcherbatsky, Central Conception of Buddhism and the meaning of the term "Dharma", which is mainly devoted to the analysis of the conception of dharma in the Abhidharma-kośa.

(146) A wide variety of translations of the term dhammā have been suggested by scholars. Stcherbatsky renders it as 'elements'.¹ Mrs. Rhys Davids seems to prefer the term 'phenomena'.² Prof. and Mrs. Geiger have translated it as 'Ding(e)',³ or more properly, 'die empirischen Dinge'.⁴ We propose to leave the term untranslated until the nature of the conception in the Pāli Nikāyas and the Chinese Agamas is fully examined so that in the end it would be easier to determine which translation would best render the meaning of the term in these early texts.

(147) The most important characteristics of a dhamma are said to be impermanence (anicca, wu chāng 無常), suffering (dukkha, kū 苦) and non-substantiality (anatta, wu wō 無我).⁵ Various other characteristics have been given. But all these, in one way or other, are representations or even further elaborations of the three major characteristics. There is, for example, the triad consisting of impermanence, suffering and change or transformation (vipariṇāmadhamma, pien i fa 變易法),⁶ where the last characteristic replaces non-substantiality (anatta) because it represents the opposite of substantiality (atta, wō 我) reckoned as the unchanging immutable substratum of empirical reality. Of the three characteristics mentioned earlier, the most important one is impermanence (anicca, wu chāng 無常), while the other two are corollaries.⁷

1. Central Conception, p.2 ff.; Buddhist Logic, 1.3 ff.

2. Buddhism, (Home University Library of Modern Knowledge, London), pp.49, 51 ff.

3. Pāli Dhamma, p.4.

4. ibid., p.85.

5. S 3.41, 67, 180; 4.28, 85, 106 ff.; TD 2.66a (Tsa.10.6), ff.

6. S 3.43, 139; 4.68; TD 2.8b (Tsa.2.4), ff.

7. S 3.67; TD 2.66a (Tsa.10.6).

The theory of impermanence.

(148) Discussing the Buddhist theory of impermanence of dhammā, Stcherbatsky makes the following observation.

"The elements of existence are momentary appearances, momentary flashings into the phenomenal world out of an unknown source. Just as they are disconnected, so to say, in breadth, not being linked together by any pervading substance, just so they are disconnected in depth or in duration, since they last only one single moment (kṣaṇa). They disappear as soon as they appear, in order to be followed in the next moment by another momentary existence. Thus a moment becomes a synonym of an element (dharma), two moments are two different elements. An element becomes something like a point in time-space. The Sarvāstivādin school makes an attempt mathematically to determine the duration of a moment. It, nevertheless, admittedly represents the smallest particle of time imaginable. Such computations of the size of the atom and the duration of the moment are evidently mere attempts to seize the infinitesimal. The idea that two moments make two different elements remains. Consequently, the elements do not change, but disappear, the world becomes a cinema. Disappearance is the very essence of existence; what does not disappear does not exist. A cause for the Buddhist was not a real cause but a preceding moment, which likewise arose out of nothing in order to disappear into nothing".¹

1. Central Conception, pp.31-32.

(149) The conception of dharma described in the above passage is one that is definitely influenced by the theory of momentariness. Stcherbatsky seems to think that the theory of momentariness is one of the corner-stones of the earliest (to use his phraseology, the first period) of Buddhist philosophy.¹ Thus the conception of dharma which he attributes to the earliest period of Buddhism is largely modified by the theory of momentariness.

The difficulties presented by a theory of momentariness.

(150) Let us first examine the theory of momentariness (kṣaṇikavāda). The difficulties faced by the Buddhists who accepted a theory of momentariness is well illustrated, not only by the criticism of non-Buddhist thinkers like Śāṅkara, but also by the objections raised by some of the Buddhists themselves, as is evident from the Tattvasaṅgraha of Śāntarākṣita. Śāṅkara has pointed out that "Those who maintain that everything has a momentary existence only admit that when the thing existing in the second moment enters into being the thing existing in the first moment ceases to be. On this admission it is impossible to establish between the two things the relation of cause and effect, since the former momentary existence ceases or has ceased to be, and so has entered into the state of non-existence, cannot be the cause of the later momentary existence".² In the Tattvasaṅgraha,

1. Buddhist Logic, 1.4-5.

2. Śāṅkarabhāṣya on Brāhma Sūtra, 2.2.20, kṣaṇabhāṅgavādinō 'yam abhyupagāma, uttarasmim kṣaṇa utpādyamāne pūrvaḥ kṣaṇo nirudhyata iti. Na caivam abhyupagacchatā pūrvottarayoh kṣaṇayor hetuphalabhāvaḥ śakyate sampādayitum, nirudhyamānasya niruddhasya vā pūrvakṣaṇasyābhāvagrastatvād uttarakṣaṇa-hetubhāvānupapatteḥ.

Śāntarakṣita quotes the views of Bhadanta Yogasena¹ who maintains that "Causal efficiency cannot be established in the case of momentary existences".²

(151) Yamakami Sōgen wrongly accuses Śāṅkara of "complete ignorance of the Buddhist doctrine of Universal Impermanence".³ On the contrary, Śāṅkara has convincingly shown the logical implications of a theory of momentariness. His criticism, it may be mentioned, does not affect the theory of impermenence (anicca, wu ch'ang 無常) as expounded in the Pāli Nikāyas and the Chinese Āgamas (v.infra.175f). The theory of momentariness which can be considered as a product of pure logical demonstration of the theory of impermanence, presents a problem, as Śāṅkara and Yogasena have pointed out, with regard to the conception of causality. If a thing exists only for one moment, reckoned as the smallest particle of time imaginable, then how can the causal efficiency of that moment be recognised?

(152) There are two ways of resolving, though not very satisfactorily, this problem of causal continuity created by the acceptance of a theory of momentariness. The first is by recognizing an unchanging substratum underlying the momentary flashes of the apparent phases of dhammā. The second is by formulating a theory of immediate contiguity and granting the causal efficiency of this immediately preceding dhammā. As may be seen, the Sarvāstivādins have adopted both these methods, while the Sautrāntikas and the Theravāda Abhidhammikas have criticised the first and adopted the second.

1. Said to be a Buddhist of the Hinayāna school, v.Mookerjee, S., The Buddhist Philosophy of Universal Flux, (Calcutta, 1935), p.39.
2. TS 1.153.
3. Systems of Buddhistic Thought, (Calcutta, 1912), p.134.

(153) Yamakami Sōgen, in his anxiety to defend the Buddhist standpoint from the onslaught of Śāṅkara's criticism, says: "The substratum of everything is eternal and permanent. What changes every moment is merely the phase of the thing, so that it is erroneous to affirm that, according to Buddhism, the thing of the first moment ceases to exist when the second moment arrives".¹ This distinction between the substratum of a thing and its changing phases, a distinction similar to the one made in the commonsense notion of causality as primary characteristics and causal characteristics,² has been the keynote of the Sarvāstivāda teachings. Of the schools coming under the broad category of Sthaviravāda, only the Sarvāstivādins seem to have accepted such a bifurcation of a dharma as having substance or primary nature (svabhāva) and causal characteristics (lakṣaṇa).

The Sarvāstivāda conception of dharma.

(154) In his discussion of the Sarvāstivāda teachings, Stcherbatsky uses the term 'element' to translate the word dharma (v. supra. 146). The term 'element' has been defined as "that which cannot be reduced to simpler terms under the conditions of the investigation".³ Thus in Science, the term refers to the different kinds of atoms, the sort of material, of which the world is composed.⁴ The use of the term 'element'

1. Systems of Buddhistic Thought, p. 134.

2. Stebbing, Introduction, p. 265 ff. Following C.D. Broad (The Mind and its place in Nature, p. 432), she says: "What changes are the states; what does not change is the thing of which the states are the states".

3. Baldwin, Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology, 1.313b.

4. ibid.

to render the word dharma may be in keeping with the teachings of the Sarvāstivādins. Dharmas are, according to them, the simplest elements to which an empirical object could be reduced. Stcherbatsky points out that these elements were considered to have four salient features; (i) they were not substance (i.e., all dharmas are anātman)—this refers to all the seventy five elements, whether eternal or impermanent; (ii) they had no duration (all saṃskṛta-dharmas are anitya)—this refers only to the seventy two impermanent elements of phenomenal existence; (iii) they were unrest (i.e., all sāśrava-dharmas are duḥkha) and their unrest has its end in final deliverance (their nirvāna alone is śānta).¹

(155) After enumerating these four salient features of a dharma, Stcherbatsky goes on to explain the first of these in detail. He maintains that "the term anātman is usually translated as 'non-soul', but in reality ātman is here synonymous with a personality, an ego, a self, an individual, a living being, a conscious agent, etc. The underlying idea is that, whatsoever be designated by all these names is not a real and ultimate fact, it is a mere name for a multitude of interconnected facts, which Buddhist philosophy is attempting to analyse by reducing them to real elements (dharma)".² Thus according to the Sarvāstivāda teachings, as interpreted by Stcherbatsky, a being (pudgala), is nothing but a congeries of elements; it is in itself no 'ultimate reality (not a dharma)'.³

1. Central Conception, p.21.

2. ibid., pp.21-22.

3. ibid.

This implies that although the individual is not a real individual, yet the elements (dharma) to which he can be reduced are ultimate realities. But these ultimate realities are separate disconnected elements which, according to the second of the four salient features, are momentary (kṣāṇika). To use Stcherbatsky's expression, "they are momentary appearances, momentary flashings into the phenomenal world out of an unknown source".¹ Thus came about the dichotomy of an element (dharma) as having a substance (svabhāva) which is unknowable and its phenomenal appearances (lakṣaṇa) which are causally conditioned. While the underlying substratum came to be called svabhāva by all the teachers who propounded the Sarvāstivāda doctrine, the causal characteristics (lakṣaṇa) were variously denoted.

(156) The Abhidharmakośa refers to four main theories put forward by the exponents of the Sarvāstivāda system on the nature of causal characteristics (lakṣaṇa).² Of these, the first is the view advocated by Dharmatrāta who taught a theory of change of state (bhāvānyathātva, let i 類異). He maintained that a thing existing in the three periods of time changes its state (bhāva), but not the underlying substance (dravya). This is compared to the changes that take place in the different shapes assumed by gold as compared with gold itself which does not change. Thus the three epochs, past, present and future, are differentiated by the non-identity of the states (bhāva). Ghoṣaka, another

1. Central Conception, p.31.

2. TD 29.104c (CSL 20); Kośa.5.52 ff.; TS 1.504; AKV pp.44,471 ff.

teacher of the Vaibhāṣika school, put forward the view that only the characteristics of a thing change (lakṣaṇā-nyathātva, hsiang i 相異). According to him, an entity has three courses always. When a thing is present, it certainly has the seeds of the past and future. Even so with regard to things that existed in the past and those that would exist in the future. This is illustrated by the example of a man who is attached to one woman, and is not detached from other women. The third is the view adopted by Vasumitra who believed that a thing, when passing through the three periods of time does not change its nature (dravya), but changes its condition (avasthānyathātva, wei i 位異). The condition is determined by causal efficiency (kāritra). "When the efficiency is present, the thing is said to be present; when the efficiency is given up, it is said to be past and when it is going to have efficiency, it is future".¹ And finally, Buddhadeva upheld a theory of change of relation (anyonyathātva, tai i 待異). A thing is said to change because of the change of its relation with the past and the present. Thus one woman can both be a daughter as well as a mother. A refutation of all these views is to be found in the Tattvasaṅgraha-pañjikā of Kamalaśīla.² In this manner, the Sarvāstivādins recognised "two hemispheres"³ in the world of empirical reality. One is the world of experience and knowledge; it has no ultimate reality since everything consists of fleeting momentary appearances. The second is the world of reality; the reality behind the momentary appearances.

1. TS 1.504, tathā kāritre'vasthite bhāvo vartamānas tataḥ pracyuto'tītas tad aprāpto'nāgata iti.

2. ibid., pp.504-505.

3. Cp. Bradley, F.H., Appearance and Reality, (Oxford, 1951), p.110.

(157) It is true that the Sarvāstivādins denied the substantiality of the individual (pudgala). But induced by the necessity to explain the problem of continuity resulting from the acceptance of discrete momentary elements (dharma) they came to believe in an underlying substratum (svabhāva) which was considered to be eternal (heng yu 恒有 = sarvadā asti).¹ We therefore agree with Dr. Ninian Smart when he said that the "difficulties of this kind were one motive for the Realist school to insist strongly upon the existence of everything past, present and future: so that events could enter into relations with one another".² By his interpretation of the term dharmatā, Stcherbatsky seems to authenticate the Sarvāstivāda theory of eternal elements. In a passage occurring in the Mādhyamikavṛtti, a passage which was already found in the Nikāyas and the Āgamas (v.infra.186), it is said: utpādād vā Tathāgatānām anutpādād vā Tathāgatānām sthitaivaiṣā dharmānām dharmatā.³ Stcherbatsky seems to have taken the term dharmatā in this context as referring to the "essence of dharmas", that is, their svabhāva as opposed to their causal characteristics (lakṣaṇa).⁴ Therefore, he translates the word dharmatā as "ultimate realities".⁵ And as the statement in the Mādhyamikavṛtti goes, these realities are eternal irrespective of whether the Tathāgatas were to arise or not. But we have pointed out that dhammatā refers to the causal connection between two dharmas, rather than an underlying substratum of the dharmas (v.supra.95; infra.186). It is synonymous with dhammaniyāma (v.infra.186). If the term dharmatā stands for

1. TD 29.104b (CSL 20),

2. Doctrine and Argument in Indian Philosophy, (London, 1964), p.183.

3. p.40.

4. Conception of Buddhist Nirvāna, p.123, n.4)

5. Central Conception, p.22.

the causal connections, then it cannot mean an ultimate reality (dharmasvabhāva) as the Sarvāstivādins would have understood it, because we find Nāgārjuna and his followers rejecting the conception of svabhāva depending on the argument from causality (v.infra.161).

(158) This theory according to which all elements (dharma) in their ultimate nature (svabhāva) exist during the three periods of time, past (atīta, ch'ü 去), present (vartamāna, chin 今) and future (anāgata, lai 來), gave the Sarvāstivādins their appellation.¹ In support of the view that the theory of the Sarvāstivādins represents the earliest form of Buddhist thought, Stcherbatsky quotes a passage from the Samyukta Agama.² Here the question has been asked as to what is meant by "everything exists" (i chieh yu 一切有) and the Buddha's reply was: "Everything exists means the twelve āyatanas exist".³ Stcherbatsky comments: "Now the twelve āyatanas are merely one of the many classifications of the elements of existence of matter and mind. The Sarvāstivādin school admitted seventy five such elements. These elements were called dharmas".⁴ We are strongly inclined to think that the implications of the above passage have been misjudged by Stcherbatsky. When it is said that "Everything exists means the twelve āyatanas exist", it does not mean that the twelve āyatanas, past, present and future, exist, as the Sarvāstivādins would have interpreted. Here there is no reference to the past and future.

1. TD 29.104c (CSL 20).

2. Central Conception, p.4. In fact, it is a quotation from McGovern.

3. TD 2.91a (Tsa.13.16).

4. Central Conception, pp.4-5.

It only means that the causes of the sense data, namely, the six sense organs and the corresponding sense objects exist. This idea is very clearly expressed in another sūtra which immediately follows the one quoted. Here it is said that, "Visual organ and visible object (produce) visual perception and contact. As a result of (yin yüan 因緣 =paṭicca) visual contact (yen chü 眼觸) these arises feelings which are either pleasant, unpleasant or neutral. This is what is meant by 'everything exists'".¹ This passage makes it very clear that the reference is to the present sense data and their causes. According to early Buddhism, there is no denial of the present sense data, and therefore, their causes, namely, the sense organs and the corresponding sense objects. What is denied is that these sense organs and the sense objects have substance. This is expressly stated in the sūtra which immediately precedes the one which speaks of the twelve āyatanas.² Thus even the elements (dharma), which, according to Stcherbatsky, were considered to be ultimate realities by the Sarvāstivādins, are looked upon as being non-substantial (wu wo 無我 =anātman). They have no substance (svabhāva) which survive during the three periods.³

(159) Furthermore, the theory that everything, past, present and future, exists may seem to be contradicted by another ~~important~~ sūtra in the Nikāyas and the Āgamas.⁴ According to the analysis

1. TD 2.91b (Tsa.13.17-18).

2. *ibid.*, 2.91a (Tsa.13.15).

3. This interpretation of the passage in the Samyukta Āgama would mean that Stcherbatsky is not justified in maintaining that the "Theravādins have suppressed it because it did not agree with their particular tenets" (Central Conception, p.4, n.13). Its absence in the Pāli Nikāyas may be a mere matter of accident.

4. S 3.70-73; cp. TD 2.65c-66a (Tsa.10.5) which refers only to the past skandhas.

found in this sūtra, the Sarvāstivāda theory that dharmas past, present and future exist, may be taken as an instance of overstepping the limits of conventional usage. The description in the Pāli version runs thus: "There are these three linguistic conventions or usages of words or terms which are distinct, have been distinct in the past, are distinct at present and will be distinct in the future and which are not ignored by the recluses and brahmins who are wise. Which three? Whatever material form (rūpa) there has been, which has ceased to be, which is past and has changed is called, reckoned and termed 'has been' (ahosi); it is not reckoned as 'it exists' (atthi) nor as 'it will be' (bhavissati). (The same is repeated with regard to the other four aggregates). ... Whatever material form is not arisen, not come to be, is called, reckoned or termed 'it will be' (bhavissati) and is not reckoned as 'it exists' or as 'it has been'. ... Whatever material form has been and has manifested itself is called, reckoned or termed as 'it exists' (atthi) and is not reckoned as 'it has been' nor as 'it will be'. This statement should have served as a warning for the Sarvāstivādins to avoid the mistake of maintaining that dharmas in their ultimate reality exist during the past, present and future. The Sarvāstivāda theory may therefore be taken as a new development in Buddhist thought resulting from the acceptance of the theory of momentariness. Thus, when it is stated in the Bodhicaryāvatāra¹ that the Hīnayānist Arhats labour under the four kinds of misconceptions (viparyāsa), the fourth being "the perception of self in things without self, thinking non-existent things as existent", it may be taken as a reference to the Sarvāstivāda and not to all Hīnayānist schools in general, as Dutta thinks.²

1. Edition of the Asiatic Society of Bengal, p.350.

2. Aspects of Mahāyāna Buddhism and its relation to Hīnayāna, (London, 1930), pp.228-229.

(160) Speaking of the non-substantiality of the individual (pudgala) Stcherbatsky makes the following remark: "The underlying idea is that, whatever be designated by all these names, it is not a real and ultimate fact, it is a mere name (i.e., sammuti) for a multitude of interconnected facts".¹ This seems to be an echo of a statement found in the Pāli Nikāyas and the Chinese Āgamas illustrating the doctrine of non-substantiality. It runs thus:

Yathā hi āngasambhāro hoti saddo ratho iti,
evaṃ khandhesu santesu hoti satto'ti sammuti.²

Examining the simile quoted in the above verse, we find that a chariot is unreal (i.e., non-substantial) because it is a mere name for a multitude of different parts assembled in a certain way, parts such as wheels, axle, etc. But the question can be asked whether these individual and separate parts are real. On a closer scrutiny we find that they too are unreal in that they are causally produced, just like the whole, namely, the chariot. Therefore, the view accepted was that just as an individual is unreal, even so the component parts, the aggregates are unreal in that they have no substance (ātman=svabhāva), being subjected to becoming, composition and causal production.³ Thus anātmavāda becomes a synonym of niḥsvabhāvavāda.

1. Central Conception, p.22.

2. S 1.135; Kv p.66; Miln p.28.

Cp. TD 2.327b (Tsa.45.5); 454c (Pieh-i-tsa.12.5),

如和合眾材 世名之爲車
諸陰因緣合 假名爲衆生

3. Bhūta, sāṅkhata, paṭiccasamuppanna.

(161) It was this line of argument that was adopted by Nāgārjuna to refute the Sarvāstivāda conception of reality. He has devoted one whole chapter in his Mūla-Mādhyamika-kārikā to the refutation of the doctrine of the substantiality of elements.¹ Basing himself on the fundamental proposition in Buddhist philosophy that there is nothing in this empirical world that is not causally produced,² Nāgārjuna raises the following question: "How could a contingent svabhāva be possible?"³ Candrakīrti explains it thus: "The concept of contingency (kṛtakatva) and svabhāva cannot be combined in one meaningful unity (asaṃgatārtham), for they form a contradiction in terms (parasparaviruddhatvād). According to realistic logic, the term svabhāva has more or less the meaning of 'Thing-in-itself' (svo bhāvo). Even with regard to this definition, nobody in the world would designate contingent reality as svabhāva. So, for example, heat (as a property) of water (is a contingent reality and for that reason not its svabhāva)".⁴ At this stage Candrakīrti anticipates the reply of the opponent which is stated thus: "Svabhāva is non-contingent (akṛtaka), as for example, the heat as a property of fire, for in this example the inherence relationship (samparka) of the thing (padārtha) and its attribute (antara) is not causally produced (ajanita). Therefore, one can speak of a svabhāva".⁵ To this the Mādhyamika replies thus:

1. Ch 15 called svabhāvaparīkṣā.
2. MK 24.19, Apratītyasamutpanno dharmah kaścin na vidyate; MKV p.505.
3. MK 15.2, svabhāvaḥ kṛtako nāma bhaviṣyati punaḥ katham.
4. MKV p.260, Kṛtakaś ca svabhāvaś cati parasparaviruddhatvād asaṃgatārtham eva tat. Iha hi svo bhāvaḥ svabhāva itit vyutpatter yaḥ kṛtakaḥ padārthaḥ sa loke naiva svabhāva iti vyapadiśyate tad yathā apāmauṣṇyam ...
5. ibid., yas tv akṛtakaḥ sa svabhāvas tad yathā agner auṣṇyam ... sa hi teṣāṃ padārthāntarasamparkājanitatvāt svabhāva ity ucyate.

"It must be stressed, of course, that this acceptance of a non-contingent svabhāva is only true from the point of view of commonsense experience (lokavyavahāra). On the contrary, we maintain that heat as a property of fire is not a svabhāva, for fire is itself contingent (kṛtaka). It originates in correlation to (sāpekṣatā) to certain causes and conditions through the co-operation of various factors: the lense, fuel, the sun or owing to the friction of pieces of wood. There is no heat independent of fire. So heat too is produced in correlation to the causes and conditions and is therefore also a contingent (kṛtaka). And being contingent, it cannot be a svabhāva, just as the heat of water cannot be a svabhāva".¹ Here too the attempt of the Mādhyamikas was to show that dharmas are devoid of substance (svabhāva) because they are causally produced or contingent. This is the very argument adduced in the Nikāyas and the Āgamas to show the non-substantiality of dhammas.

(162) Moreover, the Mādhyamikas are seen to quote a statement of the Buddha in order to justify their standpoint in rejecting the Sarvāstivāda conception that dharmas are eternal. Nāgārjuna says: "Recognizing the (problems of) 'Being' and 'non-Being', the Buddha has, in the Kātyāyana sūtra,

1. MKV p.260, Tad evam akṛtakāḥ svabhāva iti lokavyavahāre vyavasthite vyaṃ idānīm brūmo yad etad auṣṇyaṃ tad apy agneḥ svabhāvo na bhavati'ti grhyatām kṛtakatvāt. Iha maṇḍhanādityasamāgamād arañinighrṣaṇādeś cāgner hetu-pratyayasāpekṣataivopālabhyate, na cāgnivyatiriktamauṣṇyaṃ sambhavati, tasmād auṣṇyaṃ api hetupratyaya-janitaṃ, tatas ca kṛtakaṃ, kṛtakatvāc cāpām auṣṇyavat svabhāvo na bhavati'ti sphuṭam avasiyate.

rejected both concepts 'it is' and 'it is not'".¹ Candrakīrti points out that this sūtra is studied in all schools of Buddhist thought.² It is also to be found in the Nikāyas and the Agamas and there the two concepts, "everything exists" and "everything does not exist" are rejected because they are said to lead to the belief in permanence (sassata, ch'ang chien 常見) and the belief in annihilation (uccheda, tuan chien 斷見) respectively (v. supra. 26, 100). For the Buddha, these were metaphysical problems. The Sarvāstivāda theory that dharmas in their own nature (svabhāva) exist during the three periods of time may be taken as a theory resulting from the metaphysical speculation on the problems of time and continuity or identity.³ It is possible to believe that the Sarvāstivāda theory leads to the belief in permanence, although Stcherbatsky makes an attempt to show that it does not.⁴ This becomes clear from the fact that Nāgārjuna viewed the theory of svabhāva in the same way as the Buddha viewed the Upaniṣadic conception of 'Being' (sat).⁵ Therefore, in his attempt to counteract the Sarvāstivāda conception of svabhāva, Nāgārjuna considered it appropriate to quote the statement of the Buddha refuting the Upaniṣadic conception of 'Being' (sat).

1. MK 15.7, Kātyāyanavivāde cāstī(ti) nāstī'ti cobhayaṃ, pratiṣiddhaṃ bhagavatā bhāvābhāvavibhāvinā.
2. MKV p.269, idaṃ ca sūtraṃ sarvanikāyeṣu paṭhyate.
3. For a discussion of these problems in general, v. Bradley, Appearance and Reality, pp.38-39.
4. Central Conception, p.3 f.
5. MK 15.10, Astī'ti śāśvatagrāho nāstī'ty ucchedadarśanam. Cp. S 2.17 and TD 2.85c (Tsa.12.19).

(163) Even a later Theravāda text like the Kathāvatthu is unequivocal in its criticism of the Sarvāstivāda conception of dharma-svabhāva.¹ Ignoring this explicit criticism in the Kathāvatthu, Mūrti says: "It is a mistake to think that the Mahāyāna schools reversed the denial of the soul and reaffirmed its reality. If anything, they were more thorough in carrying out the Nairātmya doctrine. They denied not only substance (of the individual, puḍgala-nairātmya) but extended the denial to the elements too (dharma-nairātmya) which the Hīnayānist schools had uncritically accepted as real".² The theory of the non-substantiality of all dharmas, as pointed out earlier (v. supra. 160), was not new to the Pāli Nikāyas and the Chinese Āgamas. In the Pāli Nikāyas we find specific references to the doctrine of non-substantiality of all dharmas (dharma-nairātmya) in the statement sabbe dhammā anattā.³ Not being able to accept the fact that early Buddhism made such a denial of the substantiality of dharmas, La Vallée Poussin, while quoting a passage from the Āṅguttara Nikāya where this statement occurs,⁴ changed it to sabbe saṅkhārā anattā,⁵ indirectly implying that it is either a misreading or a later interpolation. But this is a futile attempt because we come across specific statements even in the Chinese Āgamas which read i chieh fa wu wo (一切法無我).⁶

1. p. 115 ff.

2. The Central Philosophy of Buddhism, (London, 1960), p. 26; cp. Stcherbatsky, Nirvāna, p. 41.

3. M 1.228; S 3.133; 4.401; A 1.286; Thag 678; Dh 279.

4. A 1.286.

5. Théorie des Douze Causes, p. 111.

6. TD 2.66b-67a (Tsa. 10.7); 668c (Tseng. 23.4); v. also TD 1.9b (Chang. 1.1), which reads:

The conception of dhamma in early Buddhism as depicted in the Pāli Nikāyas and the Chinese Āgamas and also in later Theravāda Abhidhamma as presented in the Kathāvatthu would therefore be much different from the Sarvāstivāda conception. Hence it is possible to maintain that it was the Sarvāstivādins who propounded a theory of the substantiality of dharmas and that there is no justification in extending the criticism to other Hīnayānist schools.

Asatkāryavāda.

(164) The second method of reconciling the doctrine of causal continuity with the theory of momentariness was adopted by the Sarvāstivādins as well as by the Sautrāntikas and the Theravādins with slight variations. The Sarvāstivādins accepted four characteristics of a conditioned thing (samskrta), one of which is duration (sthitī).¹ Analysed according to the theory of momentariness, it represented a static moment. This static moment is further defined according to its causal efficiency. "The projection of a result (phalākṣepa) by a dharma endowed with a potency gained as a result of coming into (present) existence and the harmony of (external and internal) conditions, is said to be kāritra".² To maintain causal continuity of such momentary dharmas, they formulated the theory of immediately contiguous cause (samanantara-pratyaya, teng wu chien yuan 等無間緣). But the Sautrāntikas who did not recognise the duration of a moment,³ believed that

1. AD p.104.

2. ibid., p.281, Vartamānādvasampātāt sāmāgryāṅgaparigrahāt, labdhaśakteḥ phalākṣepaḥ kāritram abhidhīyate.

3. TD 29.27c (CSL 20) 由諸法剎那無住而有滅。

Kośa 2:228, kṣaṇikasya hi dharmasya sthitim vinā bhaved vyayaḥ.

a dharma disappears immediately on the spot as soon as it appears.¹ For them, what is perceived as duration is the series of successive moments with a continuous flow.² This conception of momentariness presented other problems. If existence is a series of successive moments, how can birth, decay and destruction be explained? The Sautrāntikas attempted to solve this by maintaining that birth is the beginning of a series, decay represents the fact that in a given series each successive moment is slightly different from the preceding one, and lastly, destruction is the end of a series.³ The causality of each individual moment in a series would then be reduced to invariable antecedence.⁴ But still they had to explain the origin or beginning of a series. This they maintained was something which being non-existent came into existence (abhūtvā bhāva utpāda, pen wu chin yu sheng 本無今有生).⁵

(165) The view that a thing being non-existent comes into existence (abhūtvā bhāva utpāda) seems to have been the basis of the theory of causality which came to be known as asatkāryavāda. All the evidence go to prove that it was the Sautrāntikas who advocated this view. Yet Mūr̥ti thinks that it is the theory of causality put forward by the Sarvāstivādins.⁶

1. AKV p.33, kṣaṇikānām nāsti desāntaragamanam yatraivotpattiḥ tatraiva vināśaḥ.
2. TD 29:27c (CSL 20)
3. ibid., 相續初名生 滅謂終盡位。
中隨轉名住 住異前後別
4. Cp. Russell, B.A.W., Analysis of Mind, ch.5; Stebbing, Introduction, p.282 ff.
5. TD 29:27c (CSL 20); Kośa 2.228.
6. Central Philosophy, p.170 ff.

But a statement in the Śikṣāsamuccaya seems to contradict this view. Here it is said: "A thing being non-existent comes into existence and having been it passes away because it has no substance (svabhāva)".¹ Abhūtvā bhāva utpāda, therefore, is a theory which contradicts the Sarvāstivāda conception of dharma-svabhāva because svabhāva is said to exist during the past, present and future (v. supra. 158). This is further exemplified by Candrakīrti's statement: "Thus heat is said to be without substance (svabhāva), because of the fact that fire itself is associated with causes and conditions. Fire, by being previously non-existent and coming into existence later on, is contingent or causally produced".² Finally, the Sphuṭārthābhīdharmakośa-vyākhyā definitely attributes this theory to the Sautrāntikas.³ The Sarvāstivādins who accepted a theory of eternal dharma-svabhāva did not have to face the problems which confronted the Sautrāntikas. When the Sautrāntikas, who were the adherents of asatkāryavāda, were questioned as to why the sesamum should produce oil, and not any other substance, though they are equally non-existent in the causal entity, their reply was that there cannot be any questioning with regard to the ultimate laws of nature, which are unthinkable and beyond the scope of speculation.⁴

1. p.248, iti hy abhūtvā bhavati bhūtvā paṭivigacchati svabhāvarahitatvāt.
2. MKV p.263, atha avauṣṇyam agner hetupratyayapratibaddhatvāt pūrvam abhūtvā paścād utpādena kṛtakatvāc ca na svabhāva iti yujyate.
3. p.294, utpādaś ca nāmābhūtvābhāvalakṣaṇaḥ. Sautrāntikanayenā otpattir dharmasya tadānīmtanaiva bhavati'ti. Also, na cāsau pūrvam utpādāt kāścīd astī'ti Sautrāntikamatena.
4. TS 1.155, Niyatācintyaśaktīni vastūnī'ha pratikṣaṇaṃ, bhavanti nānujojyāni dahane dāhaśaktivat.

(166) After examining in detail the arguments for and against the Buddhist theory of momentariness (kṣāṇikavāda), Mookerjee says: "From the elaborate exposition of the theory of causation with its confused tangle of criticism and counter criticism, . . ., one cannot resist the impression that the Sautrāntika has failed, in spite of his logical acumen and wealth of dialectic, to carry any conviction. The fact of the matter is that causation is as unintelligible in the theory of flux as in the theory of permanent cause".¹

Nāgārjuna as well as Śaṅkara have made use of their dialectics to prove the inherent contradictions both in the theory of satkārya (production of a potentially existing cause) and in the conception of asatkārya (the production of a previously non-existent effect). A very lucid account of the Mādhyamika criticism of asatkāryavāda is given by Mūr̥ti,² a repetition of which is thought to be unnecessary here. When Dasgupta said that "the effect according to the Buddhists was non-existent, it came into being for a moment and was lost",³ he was not confusing the non-Buddhist theory with the causal theory of the Buddhists, as Dr. Jayatilleke seems to think,⁴ but was referring to a theory of causality actually held by one of the schools of Buddhism, namely, the Sautrāntikas. The wrong impression conveyed by Dasgupta is that this was the theory accepted by all the early Buddhist schools.

1. Buddhist Philosophy of Universal Flux, p.54.
2. Central Philosophy, p.170 ff.
3. History of Indian Philosophy, 1.257.
4. Knowledge, p.453.

Asatkāryavāda and early Buddhist theory compared.

(167) An attempt has been made by La Vallée Poussin to equate the Sautrāntika theory of abhūtvā bhāva utpāda with the conception of causality in the Pāli Nikāyas. He has quoted a statement pertaining to causality from the Majjhima Nikāya and placed it side by side with the Sautrāntika statement of causality.¹ The statement in the Majjhima runs thus: "In this manner, these dhammas, being non-existent, come to be" (evam khīla me dhammā ahutvā sambhonti).² It seems that by placing these two statements together, La Vallée Poussin is trying to show that the Sautrāntika theory is similar, if not identical, with the theory of causality in early Buddhism.

(168) It is true that the two statements abhūtvā bhāva utpāda and ahutvā sambhonti convey the same idea. But such a superficial similarity should not be taken as a key to a comparison of concepts which have rather different substructures. Mookerjee, as mentioned earlier, has pointed out all the difficulties presented by the theory of momentariness, especially with regard to the problem of causality. The Sautrāntikas came to adopt the theory of abhūtvā bhāva utpāda because of the acceptance of the theory of momentariness. But a theory of momentariness is conspicuous by its absence in the Nikāyas and the Āgamas (v.infra.176). Here we do not find any metaphysical speculations on the problem of time. Therefore, the phrase ahutvā sambhonti occurring in the Nikāyas can be considered as a straightforward empirical statement and does not involve any speculation about momentariness.

1. Kośa 2.228, n.1.

2. M 3.25.

It simply states that a dhamma which did not exist before comes into existence (when the necessary conditions are present). Thus it can be shown that the objections raised against the Sautrāntika conception of abhūtvā bhāva utpāda do not apply to this. For instance, Śāntarakṣita refers to a criticism of the theory of momentariness by Bhadanta Yogasena thus: "Since there cannot be causal efficiency either successively or simultaneously, the belief in momentariness is vain. When no peculiarity cannot be brought about (in the cause) by the auxiliaries, the series is rightly held to be undifferentiated (i.e., there is no occasion for diversity; it would produce the same seed-series, instead of the dissimilar sprout-series)".¹ But this form of criticism cannot be levelled against the teachings in the Nikāyas and the Āgamas where there is a recognition of empirical things, impermanent but seen to exist for some time (v.infra.177), not necessarily momentary. The causes, therefore, are observable facts existing for some time and they can act successively or simultaneously because they are not momentary.

(169) H.V.Guenther opines that the statement in the Majjhima Nikāya (i.e., ahutvā sambhonti), in spite of its high authority, is rejected by the author of the Milinda Pañha.² This is because of the Milinda statement: natthi keci saṅkhārā ye abhavantā jāyanti.³ But Guenther has failed to notice that

1. TS 1.153, Kramena yugapac cāpi yatas te'rthakriyākṛtaḥ, na bhavanti tatas teṣāṃ vyarthaḥ kṣaṇikatāśrayaḥ, saḥakārikṛtaś caivaṃ yadā nātiśayaḥ kvacit, sarvadā nirviśeṣaiva tadā santatir iṣyate.
2. Philosophy and Psychology in the Abhidhamma, (Lucknow, 1957), p.259, n.1; v.also Kośa 2.228.
3. p.52.

the very statement from the Majjhima Nikāya is asserted by the author of the Milinda Pañha when he said: yam ahutvā sambhoti hutvā paṭivigacchati esā purimā koṭi pāññāyati.¹ Moreover, the statement natthi keci saṅkhārā ye abhavantā jāyanti does not contradict the statement ahutvā sambhoti because there is a difference of time referred to by the words ahutvā and abhavantā. While ahutvā refers to the past, abhavantā refers to the present. Of these two statements in the Milinda, the former may be translated as "There are no dispositions that are produced which are not (susceptible to) arising",² the reason being that when the necessary conditions are present the effect would be produced.

(170) Moreover, the phrase ahutvā sambhoti does not imply the metaphysical question as to whether the effect is not inherent in the cause. This is attested by a statement in the Śikṣāsamuccaya which runs thus: "Here, O King, the subjective heat element arises; it does not come from somewhere, nor does it, when ceasing, go into accumulation somewhere".³ On the other hand, the statement natthi keci saṅkhārā ye abhavantā jāyanti too does not imply that the effect is inherent or immanent in the cause. The examples quoted in the Milinda clearly state that the causes exist and that depending on these causes the effect is produced. For example, in the case

1. pp.51-52.

2. Miss. I. B. Horner has translated this passage as follows: "There are no karmic formations that are produced without a (continued) becoming". v. Questions of Milinda,

3. p.248, Tatra mahārāja ādhyātmikāś tejjodhātūr utpadyate, na kuṭāścid āgacchati nirudhyamāno na kvacit sañcayam gacchati. For a discussion of the significance of this statement v. AD p.266 ff. Here it is said to be a quotation from the Paramārthaśūnyatā Sūtra.

of a house which did not exist before, it is said that there was wood in the forest, clay in the earth, and as a result of human exertion on the part of men and women in handling these material, there arose the house.¹ The part played by these causes is no more than mutual dependence in the production of the effect. Thus according to the *Abhidhammikas* a cause is that which supports (upakārako), or that on which the effect depends (paṭicca).² Therefore, Nāgārjuna, after criticising the metaphysical theories of causation, accepts 'Dependent Arising' (pratītyasamutpāda) as the central teaching of the Buddha.³

(171) It was mentioned that the *Sautrāntikas* did not recognize the duration of a moment (v. supra. 164). This theory was given authority and sanctity when it was attributed to the Buddha himself. Kamalāsīla, in his commentary on the Tattvasaṅgraha, records the Buddha as saying; "All forces are instantaneous. But how can a thing which has no duration nevertheless have the time to produce something?"⁴ and the following answer is then given: "This is because what we call 'existence' is nothing but efficiency (kriyā) and it this very efficiency which is called a creative cause".⁵

1. Miln p.53, Natthi kiñci bhante idha abhavantaṃ jātaṃ bhavantaṃ eva jātaṃ, imāni kho bhante dārūni vane ahesum ayaṇ ca mattikā paṭhaviyam ahoṣi, itthīnaṇi ca purisānaṇi ca tajjena vāyameṇa evaṃ idaṃ gehaṃ nibbattaṃ.
2. Kalupahāna, D.J., *The Philosophy of Relations in Buddhism* (1), in UCR vol.20, pp.25-26.
3. Mūrtili, Central Philosophy, p.122.
4. TS 1.11, Kṣaṇikāḥ sarve saṃskārāḥ asthirānāṃ kutaḥ kriyā; Cf. Stcherbatsky, Buddhist Logic, 1.119; Freedman, David, *The Creative Force in Buddhism*, in The Buddhist, vol.28, p.117.
5. TS 1.11, bhūtir yeṣāṃ kriyā saiva kārakaṃ saiva c'ocyate.

(172) The Abhidhammikas of the Theravāda tradition, unlike the Sautrāntikas, recognised the duration of a moment. They divided existence into three phases, namely, origination (uppāda), duration (ṭhiti) and destruction (bhaṅga).¹ Like the Sarvāstivādins and the Sautrāntikas, they seem to have recognised the causal efficiency of the momentary existence. This came to be known as paccaya-satti (pratyaya-śakti).² Moreover they emphasised the theory of correlation (paṭṭhāna-naya) as set out in the Paṭṭhāna. The difficulties presented by the acceptance of a theory of momentariness is well illustrated by the formulation of two causal relations, instead of one, emphasising the contiguity of dhammā. They are the relation of contiguity (anantara-paccaya) and the relation of immediate contiguity (samanantara-paccaya).³ It is interesting to note that Sumaṅgala, author of the Abhidhammatthavibhāvinī-ṭīkā, rejects the view held by some people that the relation of contiguity refers to the spatial relation and the relation of immediate contiguity refers to the temporal relation.⁴ He maintains that there is no difference between the two with regard to the things they refer to and that whatever difference there is between them is merely verbal.⁵

1. VbhA 7; v. also Vism 292, 473.

2. This term is reported to have been coined by Ariyavaṃsa, a notable Burmese teacher of the 15th century, v. Mrs. Rhys Davids, Buddhist Psychology, (London, 1914), p. 196.

3. Tīkap 1.3.

4. Abvn p. 138, yaṃ pana keci vadanti atthānantaratāya anantarapaccayo kālānantaratāya samanantarapaccayo'ti.

5. ibid., byañjanamatten'eva hi tesam viseso; atthato pana ubhayaṃ pi samanantaraniroduddhasāeva adhivacanaṃ, na hi tesam atthato bhedo upalabhati.

(173) Yet, some of the problems which the Sautrāntikas had to face as a result of the theory of momentariness, problems such as co-production, do not seem to have been explained satisfactorily till the time of Buddhaghosa and also the Abhidhamma manuals and their commentaries of the twelfth century. The first attempt at a solution of this problem was made in the Visuddhimagga and the Abhidhamma commentaries belonging to the same period. Here the relative speed of vibration of thought and matter, as it is found in the Nikāyas and the Āgamas (v.infra.176), is distinguished. As in the canonical literature, it is held that thought changes rapidly and breaks up more quickly than matter.¹ The Visuddhimagga says that the three phases of a moment of thought are of the same duration, while in a point instant of matter the nascent and the evanescent phases are short and the static is long. It is the point instant of matter in its static phase that remains while sixteen thought moments arise and pass away.² In this manner, the later Abhidhammikas explained how the individual consciousness becomes attuned with vibrating matter in the outside world, and perception is set up. But it is in the Abhidhammatthasaṅgaha of Anuruddha and its commentary by Sumaṅgala that we come across a detailed treatment of this subject.³ Thus an attempt was made to explain the problem of perception which involves the correlation of subject and object. But the production of physical things such as plants by the co-ordination of seed, manure, etc, according to the theory of moments did not receive satisfactory explanation.

1. VbhA 25, rūpaṃ garupariṇāmaṃ dāndhanirodham arūpaṃ lahu-pariṇāmaṃ khippanirodham; v.also Vism 613.

2. p.614.

3. The details of this theory have been explained by Dr.Saratchandra, v. Buddhist Psychology of Perception, p.42 ff.

(174) The foregoing account shows how the Sarvāstivādins and the Sautrāntikas in their attempt to present a logical analysis of the doctrine of impermanence (anicca) came to accept a theory of momentariness which in its turn led to several theories not consistent with early Buddhism. While the Sarvāstivādins accepted the belief in an underlying substratum in dharmas, thus going against the non-substantialist (anātma) position of early Buddhism, the Sautrāntikas were led on to adopt a theory of causality which was similar to the one rejected in the early Buddhist texts (v. supra. 100). These differences would show that there is no justification in considering the teachings in the Abhidharmakośa as representing the earliest phase of Buddhism.

The theory of impermanence in early Buddhism.

(175) What then is the theory of impermanence found in the early Buddhist texts? Hardly any evidence can be gathered from the Pāli Nikāyas and the Chinese Āgamas in support of the view that things were considered to be momentary (kṣanika, ch'a na 刹那). We do not come across any statements such as "All forces are momentary".¹ The theory of momentariness is not only foreign to early Buddhism, but even contradicted by some statements found in the Nikāyas and the Āgamas. For example, we come across two suttas called Assutavā in the Samyukta² which describe how a man should give up attachment to the physical body made up of the four elements because it is seen to grow and decay, come into being and perish.

1. TS 1.11, kṣanikāḥ sarve saṃskārāḥ, BCAP p.376, kṣanikāḥ sarvasaṃskārāḥ; v. also TD 29.27c (CSL 5). The statement found in the Nikāyas and the Āgamas always reads: sabbe saṅkhārā aniccā.

2. S 2.94-97; TD 2.81c-82a (Tsa. 12.7,8).

(176) Comparing the vacillation of the mind with the change taking place in the physical body, it is said: "This physical body made up of the four great elements is seen to exist for one, two, three, four, five, ten, twenty, thirty, forty, fifty, hundred or more years. That which is called the mind, thought or consciousness arises as one thing and ceases as another whether by night or by day".¹ It may be observed that the above description of mind and body is not inspired by a theory of momentariness (kṣaṇikavāda). In fact it refutes the idea of momentariness by holding that the physical body is comparatively more stable than the mind. Physical bodies are experienced as enduring for some time, although they are subject to change and decay, a change that is not perceptible as occurring every moment. Even in the case of the mind, there is no suggestion that it is subject to momentary changes. The suttas only emphasise the different speeds at which the body and mind change.

(177) This is an empiricist account of change. The statement that "All conditioned things are impermanent" is, as Prof. Wijesekera has observed,² "not given as a result of metaphysical inquiry or of any mystical intuition, but a straightforward judgment to be arrived at by investigation and analysis. It is founded on unbiassed thought and has a purely empirical basis".

1. S 2.94-95, 96, Dissatāyaṃ bhikkhave cātummahābhūtikā kāyo ekam'pi vassam'pi tiṭṭhamāno, dve'pi ..., tīṇi'pi ..., cattāri'pi ..., pañca'pi ..., dasa'pi ..., vīsati'pi ..., timsam'pi ..., cattārīsam'pi ..., paññāsam'pi ..., vassatāni'pi tiṭṭhamāno, bhīyyo'pi tiṭṭhamāno. Yaṃ ca kho bhikkhave vuccati cittaṃ iti pi maṇo iti pi viññāṇaṃ iti pi taṃ rattiyā ca divasassa ca aññadeva uppajjati aññaṃ nirujjhati. Cp. TD 2.81c, 82a (Tsa.12.7,8) which gives a more brief description.
2. The Three Signata, (Kandy, 1960), pp.2-3.

Buddhaghosa's exposition of impermanence.

(178) Buddhaghosa's commentary on these suttas betrays an overwhelming influence of the conception of momentariness. His attempt, to use Stcherbatsky's words, "is to seize the infinitesimal". He maintains: "Just as the flame of a burning lamp, without leaving the area of the wick, breaks up then and there and when it burns or flickers in a connected succession throughout the night, it is called a lamp, even so, here too, taking the succession (of states) this body is presented as enduring for a long time".¹ Here, Buddhaghosa is trying to explain the perceived duration of the body by resorting to a theory of moments. It is reminiscent of the Sautrāntika solution to the problem of duration (v. supra. 164). In fact, Sphuṭārthābhīdharmaśāstra-vyākhyā makes use of the simile of the flame to explain the momentariness of elements (bhūtāni). It runs thus: "The movement of the stream of elemental properties whose nature is such that it appears in successive places, is like the flame because of its momentariness. The comparison with a flame is given because the momentary character of a flame is an established fact".² With regard to mental phenomena, Buddhaghosa says: "There is no single thought which can endure for one night, or even for one day, (for) during a moment of the snapping of the fingers, there arises several hundred thousand myriads of thoughts".³

1. SA 2.99, Yathā pana padīpassa ujjalato jālā taṃ taṃ vaṭṭippadesam anatikkamitvā tattha tath'eva bhijjati, atha ca pana pavenīsambandhavasena sabbarattim jalito padīpo'ti vuccati, evam idhāpi pavenīvasena ayam'pi kāyo ciraṭṭhitiko viya katvā dassito.

2. p.33.

3. SA 2.99, ekarattim pana ekadivasam vā ekam eva cittaṃ ṭhātum samattho nāma natthi. Ekasmim accharakkhaṇe anekāni cittakoṭṭisatasahasāni uppajjanti.

(179) Does this explanation of Buddhaghosa represent the original position with regard to the theory of impermanence? The empiricist attitude of early Buddhism does not warrant an answer in the affirmative. According to early Buddhism, things are impermanent, not because they are momentary, but because they are characterised by birth (uppāda, ts'ung ch'i 從起), decay or change (thitassa aññathatta, ch'ien pien 遷變) and destruction (vaya, mieh chin 滅盡).¹ Whatever is born is considered to be impermanent,² since what is born is sure to perish. What is conditioned or compounded is also impermanent,³ and so is that which is subject to decay.⁴ In short, impermanence is a synonym for arising and passing away, or birth and destruction.⁵ This pattern of things, that is to say all conditioned things are impermanent (anicca), unsatisfactory (dukkha) and all dhammas are non-substantial (anatta), is said to be eternal.⁶

Conception of dhamma in early Buddhism.

(180) The term dhamma, when applied to empirical things, is always used in the sense of paṭiccasamuppanna-dhamma, for, as Nāgārjuna has rightly remarked, there is nothing in the world which is not causally produced.⁷ The phrase "causally

1. SS 3.41, 67, 180; 4.28, 85 etc.; TD 2.607c (Tseng.12.15).

2. A 5.187, yaṃ kiñci bhūtaṃ ... tad aniccaṃ.

3. M 1.350; 3.108; A 5.343-6, yaṃ abhisankhataṃ tad aniccaṃ.

4. S 1.186; Thag 1215, yaṃ kiñci parijīyati sabbam aniccaṃ.

5. Ps 1.191, uppādavayaṭṭhena aniccā. D 2.157, 199; S 1.191, 3.146, aniccā vatā sankhārā uppādavayaṭṭhammino;

TD 2.153cc (Tsa.22.1),

6. A 1.286.

7. MK 24.19, apratītyasamutpanno dharmāḥ kaścin na vidyate, v.MKV p.505. It may be interesting to note that even space (ākāśa), which in the later Abhidharma was considered to be one of the asaṃskṛta-dhātus (v.Stcherbatsky, Central Conception p.91), is in early Buddhism considered to be relative (paṭicca) to material form (rūpa) (v.infra.202).

produced dhamma" (paṭiccasamuppanna-dhamma) seems to have been used as a synonym of 'compounded dhamma' (sāṅkhata-dhamma),¹ in contrast to a 'component' as signified by Stcherbatsky's rendering of the term dhamma (v. supra. 154). It appears that the idea of 'component' is better expressed by the term sāṅkhāra. This may be exemplified by the statement which describes the personality consisting of the five aggregates as a 'bundle of components' (sāṅkhārapuñja).² The Chinese translators of the passage were aware of this general use of the term sāṅkhāra when they rendered the phrase sāṅkhārapuñja as yin chü (陰聚)³ which means a 'collection of aggregates' and avoided using the character hsing (行) which expresses the more specialized meaning of 'disposition' (v. infra. 218). The character yin (陰), meaning 'shady', 'dark', 'secret', 'mysterious', etc., is generally used in the Buddhist texts in the sense of 'aggregate' (skandha). Therefore, there is no doubt that the term sāṅkhāra in the above context is used to denote all the aggregates, including 'dispositions'.⁴ It is significant to note that nirvāna, which is sometimes referred to as sabbasāṅkhārasamatha,⁵ is called asāṅkhata because it is a state in which causality cannot hold its sway.⁶

1. S 3.96, bhūtaṃ sāṅkhataṃ paṭiccasamuppannaṃ; TD 2.14a (Tsa. 2.25) v. also AKV 174, saṃskṛtatvaṃ pratītyasamutpannatvaṃ iti paryāyāv etau. Sametya sambhūya pratītyayaṃ kṛtaṃ saṃskṛtaṃ. Taṃ taṃ pratītyayaṃ pratītya samutpannaṃ pratītyasamutpannaṃ'ti.
2. S 1.135.
3. TD 2.327b (Tsa. 45.5); v. also TD 2.454c (Pieh-i-tsa. 12.5).
4. Cp. Mrs. Rhys Davids, Buddhist Psychology, p. 51, n. 3. v. also Compendium of Philosophy, p. 275.
5. S 1.136.
6. S 4.362, yo eva so dhammo appaccayo, so eva so dhammo asāṅkhato.

(181) The evidence adduced above would suggest that there is a subtle distinction between saṅkhāra and saṅkhata (=paṭiccasamuppanna) corresponding to the distinction between 'component' and 'compounded'. Therefore, when the Buddha speaks of saṅkhāra and saṅkhata or paṭiccasamuppanna, it may be taken as a reference to 'causes' and the 'caused'. This distinction is to be observed even in the famous dictum which is said to summarize the essence of the Buddha's teaching, namely, "The Great Recluse says that the Tathāgata has spoken of causally produced dharmas, their cause (or causes) and also their cessation".¹ Here too the term dhammā is used to denote causally produced (hetuppabhavā) dhammā as opposed to the causes (hetuṃ). Thus when the Nikāyas and the Āgamas record the Buddha as saying: sabbe saṅkhārā aniccā, sabbe saṅkhārā dukkhā, sabbe dhammā anattā,² we may take it as a reference to the nature of causes and causally produced dhammā, although Prof. and Mrs. Geiger see no distinction between the two terms saṅkhāra and dhamma.³ Taking into consideration the emphasis laid by early Buddhism on 'causes' and 'causally produced dharmas', the above statement may be more consistently translated as: "All components (i.e., causes) are impermanent, all components lead to suffering and all (causally produced) dharmas are non-substantial".

1. Vin 1.41, Ye dhammā hetuppabhavā tesam hetuṃ Tathāgato āha, tesañ ca yo nirodho evaṃvādī Mahāsamaṇo.
v. also Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra, p.444; Āryapratītyasamutpāda Sūtra, p.26.
2. M 1.228; S 3.133; 4.401; A 1.286; TD 2.66b-67a (Tsa.10.7); 668c (Tseng.23.4); v. also TD 1.9b (Chang.1.1). which is also in the Āgamas.
3. Lamotte has collected many references to this statement in the early as well as later Buddhist texts (v. L'Enseignement de Vimalakīrti, p.165, n.51).
3. Pāli Dhamma, p.86.

(182) As pointed out earlier (v.supra.160), although 'compounded' (sāṅkhata) or 'causally produced' (paṭicca-samuppanna) dhammas, as for example, the human personality, etc., are considered to be non-substantial (anatta), yet there is no implication in the Nikāyas and the Āgamas that the components or causes, for instance, the five aggregates (khandha, yin 陰) which go to constitute the personality, are substantial. Commenting on the nature of the khandhas, the editors of the PTS Dictionary say: "Being the 'substantial' factors of existence, birth and death depend on the khandhas".¹ In a similar tone Mūr̥ti says: "As a matter of dialectical necessity then did Buddha formulate, (or) at least suggest, a theory of elements. The Mahāyāna systems clearly recognise this dialectical necessity when they speak of the puḍgala-nairātmya—the denial of substance (of the individual)—as intended to pave the way for Absolutism. Sūnyatā is the unreality of the elements as well (dharmā-nairātmya)".² These comments would imply that according to early Buddhism the individual was unreal but that the components (khandhā) are real or have substance. But such a view is contradicted by the large number of statements in the Nikāyas and the Āgamas which emphasise the unreality of the khandhas as well. The most explicit denial of the reality of the elements or components, which is quoted by Nāgārjuna himself (v.infra.314) is stated thus: "All material form is comparable to foam; (all) feelings to bubbles; all sensations are mirage-like; dispositions are like the pliant trunk; consciousness is

1. p.233, col.2.

2. Central Philosophy, pp.49-50.

but an illusion; so did the Buddha illustrate (the nature of aggregates)".¹ Moreover, the aggregates (khandhā), etc., are considered to be causally produced (hetum paṭicca sambhūtā).² The same characteristics that could be noticed in the dhammas are said to be found in the causes. They are said to be anicca, sankhata and paṭiccasamuppanna,³ and therefore are not substantial.⁴ Speaking of these three characteristics, Mrs. Rhys Davids has rightly observed: "Hereby we see how interwoven are these three concepts; ... And they are held in such a way as to elude the metaphysical problems of (a) realism and idealism, and (b) of mechanism and atomism".⁵ Thus we see that the causes and the caused have been described in similar terms. In this sense one may be justified in maintaining that sankhāras (i.e., the components) and dhammas (causally produced dhammas) are similar. Therefore it is possible to conclude that early Buddhism as depicted in the Nikāyas and the Āgamas does not posit the substantiality of dhammā as the Sarvāstivādins did (v. supra. 155 ff.). It may be an awareness of this fact that made Candrakīrti to make the following statement: "Indeed, the Tathāgatas never posit the real existence (astitva) of a soul or the aggregates".⁶

1. § 3.142, Phenapiṇḍūpamaṃ rūpaṃ vedanā bubbulūpamā, marīcikūpamā saññā saṅkhārā kadālūpamā, māyopamaṃ ca viññānaṃ dīpitādiccabandhunā.
TD 2.69a (Tsa.10.10).
2. § 1.134; TD 2.327c (Tsa.45.6).
3. § 3.96; TD 2.14a (Tsa.2.25).
4. § 3.103; TD 2.14b-15a (Tsa.2.26); v. also TD 2.14a (Tsa.2.25).
5. Buddhism, p.82.
6. MKV p.443, Na hi Tathāgatāḥ kadācid apy ātmanaḥ skandhānām vāstitvaṃ prajñāpayanti.

(183) Another rendering of the term dhamma is 'phenomenon' (v.supra.146). The term 'phenomenon' connotes the idea of 'appearance',¹ especially in contrast to Noumenon or the 'Thing-in-itself'.² Phenomenon in this sense would be a better rendering of the Sarvāstivāda conception of dharma-lakṣaṇa because it is opposed to dharma-svabhāva which may be taken as an equivalent of 'Thing-in-itself' (v.supra.161) and thus coming under the category of 'unknowable'. Because early Buddhism did not recognise any underlying substance in dhammā, and also because all dhammas were considered to be empirical (cp.supra.27), we prefer the rendering of the term given by Prof. and Mrs.Geiger as "die empirischen Dinge" (v.supra.146), i.e., empirical things.


(184) Schayer is of opinion that "the extension of the term dharma to all elements of the mundane and of the supra-mundane existence is an innovation of later scholastics and that the antithesis of rūpa and dharma is a survival of precanonical Buddhism which actually divided the world into two opposite categories of rūpa and dharma".³ He bases this conclusion on the old Mahāyānist theory of the dvikāya, namely, the rūpakāya and the dharmakāya, and also on the use of the term dharma in the phrases dharmāyatana and dharmadhātu where it represents 'mental object' or 'concept'. If this theory is to be accepted, then the use of the term dhamma in the passage ye dhammā hetuppabhavā etc.(v.supra.181) and also in the

1. Baldwin, Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology, 1.

2. *ibid.*

3. Pre-canonical Buddhism, in Archiv Orientální (Prague, 1935), vol.7, p.126 ff.

general statement summarising the Buddha's teaching, namely, paṭiccasamuppādañ ca vo bhikkhave desissāmi paṭiccasamuppanne ca dhamme (v.supra.144), may have to be taken as referring to 'mental facts' only. But this is not so, for we find even rūpa (se 色), especially nāmarūpa (ming se 名色) denoting not only the psychological but also the physical personality, being included under the category of paṭiccasamuppanna dhamma.¹ Here the term dhamma is used in a very broad sense to include physical as well as mental facts. Therefore, the relationship between dhamma as signifying 'concepts' and paṭiccasamuppanna dhamma as implying everything empirical can be diagrammatically represented thus:



(185) In the light of the above analysis of the conception of dhamma it would be difficult to agree with Stcherbatsky, Mūrti, Schayer and others in their interpretation of early Buddhism as a form of Radical Pluralism. Moreover, according to early Buddhism, pluralism (nānaṭṭa) as well as monism (ekatta) are metaphysical views,² which, as the commentator has remarked, are similar to Annihilationism and Eternalism respectively.³

1. S 2.26; TD 2.84b (Tsa.12.14).

2. S 2.77. It has not been possible to trace this passage in the Chinese Āgamas.

3. SA 2.76; v. also Jayatilleke, Knowledge, pp.50 ff.

Paṭiccasamuppāda.

(186) The second aspect of the Buddha's discovery consists of the pattern according to which change takes place in things (dhammā). The change in things is not haphazard or accidental. It takes place according to a certain pattern, and this pattern of things, this orderliness in things is said to be constant. It is a cosmic truth which is valid eternally independent of the advent of the Tathāgatas.¹

This pattern has been variously described, sometimes as 'conditionality' (idappaccayatā, sui shun yüan ch'i 隨順緣起) and sometimes as 'causality' (paṭiccasamuppāda, yüan ch'i fa 緣起法) (v. supra. 118 ff.). Thus according to the Buddha's philosophy, there are no accidental occurrences; everything in the world is causally conditioned or produced (paṭicca-samuppannaṃ). The realization of the fact that every occurrence is a causal occurrence is said to clear the mind of all doubts which is a characteristic of perfect knowledge and enlightenment.² This truth the Tathāgata discovers and comprehends; having discovered and comprehended it, he points it out,

1. S 2.25, Uppādā vā Tathāgatānam anuppādā vā Tathāgatānaṃ ṭhitā va sā dhātu dhammatthitatā dhammaniyāmatā idappaccayatā; TD 2.84b (Tsa. 12.14), 若佛出世。若未出世。此法常住。法住法界； v. also MKV p.40; ASS p.73; Theorie des Douze causes, pp.111-112. Cp. Russell, B.A.W., Our Knowledge of the External World, p.217, "It is to be observed that what is constant in a causal law is not the object or objects given, nor yet the object inferred, both of which may vary within wide limits, but the relation between what is given and what is inferred". v. also Mysticism and Logic, p.142.
2. Ud p.1, Yādā hāve pātubhavanti dhammā
 ātāpino jhāyato brāhmaṇassa,
 ath'assa kankhā vapayanti sabbā,
 yato pajānāti sahetudhammaṃ.

he teaches it, lays it down, establishes, reveals, analyses, clarifies it and says, 'look!'.¹ The significance of the discovery is such that, according to the Buddhist texts, he who perceives the causal law sees the truth and he who sees the truth perceives the Buddha.²

(187) This theory of causality has been called the 'middle path' (majjhimā paṭipadā,³ majjhimena,⁴ chung tao 中道⁵), because it steers clear of two extreme views (anta, pien 邊) with regard to causation, to wit, self-causation which leads to the belief in Eternalism (v.supra.19) and external causation which tends to the belief in Annihilationism (v.supra.100).

The general formula of causality.

(188) The general formula of causality is often stated in the following manner:

(a) Pāli version.

Imasmim sati idam hoti, imassa uppādā idam uppajjati.
Imasmim asati idam na hoti, imassa nirodhā idam
nirujjhati.⁶

(b) Buddhist Sanskrit version.

Imasya satō, idam bhavati; imasya asato idam na
bhavati;⁷ imasyotpādād idam utpadyate; imasya nirodhād
idam nirudhyati.⁸

1. S 2.25; TD 2.84b (Tsa.12.14).
2. M 1.191 and S 4.120; TD 1.467a (Chung.7.2) and 16.815b(LPSSC); v. also ASS p.70.
3. S 4.330.
4. ibid., 2.17, 20, 23.
5. TD 2.85c (Tsa.12.18,19).
6. M 1.262-264; S 2.28, 70, 96; Ud p.2.
7. At MKV p.9, the Locative Absolute construction is given asmim sati idam bhavati, asyotpādād idam utpadyate.
8. Mahāvastu, 2.285, which seems to be the only complete statement whereas in the other places only the first part of the formula is to be found.

(c) Chinese version. I.

此有故彼有 . 此起故彼起.

此無有故彼無有 . 此滅故彼滅. ⁴

Chinese version II.

若有此則有彼 . 若無此則無彼. ^{2.}

These may generally be rendered into English as follows:

When this is present, that comes to be; from the arising of this, that arises. When this is absent, that does not come to be; on the cessation of this, that ceases.

(189) There are two main points in the versions quoted above which should be clarified at the very outset. Firstly, in the Pāli version of the formula only one and the same demonstrative adjective 'this' (idaṃ) is used and not the pair 'this, that' (idaṃ, asau) as in the Buddhist Sanskrit versions, although we have translated it into English using the latter. Commenting on this problem, Mrs. Rhys Davids has said that "this should not lead the reader to see in the formula a set of merely identical propositions. Pāli diction does not distinguish between the two terms in our way; but the context invariably shows that there are two terms and not one".³ Moreover, in any statement of causality it is held that the referents, in this case, those denoted by the demonstrative adjectives, "must differ from one another in at least one respect".⁴

1. TD 2.67a (Tsa.10.7), 100a (Tsa.14.16), etc. Instead of the character sheng (生) sometimes we find the character ch'i (起), v. TD 2.85b-c (Tsa.12.17,18).
2. TD 1.562c (Chung.21.3); 2.713c-714a (Tseng.30.2).
3. ERE 9.672, v. art. Paṭiccasamuppāda.
4. Bunge, Causality, p.37.

The Buddhist Sanskrit version of the Pratītyasamutpāda Sūtra, discovered in a fragmentary form, uses the two words 'this' (idam) and 'that' (asau).¹ In giving the above translation into English we have also followed the Chinese translators who almost always distinguished the two terms by the use of the two characters tz'u 此 (this, these) and pi 彼 (that, those).

(190) Secondly, it has been argued that the form of the causal principle such as "C, therefore E", or "E because C", is inadequate to pour causation into, because it has the form of an explanatory statement.² It suggests only a reason, and does not express the idea of conditionality.³ This is true with regard to the Chinese version I where the Chinese character ku (故) denotes only a reason. But the Locative Absolute construction in Pāli and Sanskrit, as in the statements imasmiṃ sati idam hoti or asmim satīdam bhavati, and also the use of the characters jo (若) and tse (則), in the Chinese version II, seem to express the idea of conditionality in a more definite form, and these versions may therefore serve as a corrective to the Chinese version I.

(191) Causality or causation (paṭiccasamuppāda, yin yüan fa 因緣法), as described in the Samyukta, is synonymous with the causal nexus, as for example, between ignorance (avijjā,

1. Archaeological Survey of India, 1910, p.76.

2. Bunge, Causality, p.35.

3. ibid., p.36, where Bunge maintains that "an adequate statement of the causal principle should not involve the assumption that C actually exists but should instead say that, if C is the case, then E will also be the case; in short, the statement must be a conditional. The emphasis should be on the relation rather than on the relata ... and on the conditions for the occurrence of facts of a certain class, rather than on the facts themselves".

wu ming 無明) and dispositions (sāṅkhārā, hsing 行). This causal nexus is said to have four main characteristics, namely, 'objectivity' (tathatā, ju fa erh 如法爾), 'necessity' (avītathatā, fa pu li ju 法不離如), 'invariability' (anaññatathatā, fa pu i ju 法不異如) and 'conditionality' (idappaccayatā, sui shun yüan ch'i 隨順緣起).¹ Keith, who made a persistent attempt to restrict the Buddhist theory of causality to the so-called 'Chain of causation' (v.infra. 207), seems to have overlooked the importance of this passage when he said: "The lover of causation would have insisted on each link; for the practical Buddhist all that was necessary was to show that evil was caused and the minor details could be left vague".² Let us examine each one of these characteristics of causality in detail.

Objective validity of the causal law.

(192) The first of the four characteristics is 'objectivity' (tathatā, ju fa erh 如法爾) which describes the status of the category of causality in Buddhism. We have already shown how some of the Upaniṣadic thinkers considered change, and consequently causation, as a mental construct, as a purely subjective phenomenon ((v.supra.28). For them causality had no ontological status; it was a purely epistemological category belonging solely to our description of experience.³ If causality is only a mental construct, then it should be a concoction

1. S 2.26, Avijjā-paccayā bhikkhave saṅkhārā. Iti kho bhikkhave yā tatra tathatā avītathatā anaññatathatā idappaccayatā, ayaṃ vuccati bhikkhave paṭiccasamuppādo. TD.2.84b (Tsa.12.14).
2. Buddhist Philosophy in India and Ceylon, (Oxford, 1923), p.96.
3. It may be mentioned that this is very similar to the position accepted by Berkeley and Hume for whom causality had no ontological status, v.Bunge, Causality, p.5.

of man, a hypothesis without any external basis. Therefore, a very pertinent question has been raised, in the Samyukta Agama,¹ as to who constructed or fabricated this theory of causality, whether it was the Buddha or some other person.² Buddha's reply to this question was: "It is neither made by me nor by another. Whether the Tathāgatas were to arise in this world or not, this pattern of things (fa chieh 法界³ = dhammadhātu, v. supra. 186) is eternally existent". Concerning this (pattern of things) the Tathāgata has insight, is fully enlightened".⁴ This reply on the part of the Buddha certainly emphasises the objective validity of the causal law.

(193) Moreover, the 'objectivity' of causality is further illustrated when the Buddha compared its discovery to the discovery of a buried city.⁵ The simile is stated thus: "Just as if a man faring through the forest, through the great woods, should see an ancient path, an ancient road traversed by men of former days. And he were to go along it

1. TD 2.85b-c (Tsa. 12.17). This short but very important sūtra is unfortunately not found in its Pāli version.
2. *ibid.*, 世尊謂緣起法爲世尊作, 爲餘人作耶.
3. *ibid.*, 2.217c (Tsa. 30.16) has 法性常住 where the character hsing (性) meaning 'nature' replaces the character chieh (界).
4. *ibid.*, 2.85b (Tsa. 12, 17), 緣起法者, 非我所作, 亦非餘人作. 然彼如來出世及未出世. 法界常住. 彼如來自覺此法. 成等正覺.
5. S 2.104-107, called Nagara Sutta. The Chinese Buddhists seem to have considered this to be a very important sūtra as is evident from the existence of three individual translations apart from its two entries in the Samyukta (TD 2.80b-81a) and Ekottara (TD 2.718a-c) Agamas. These individual translations are (i) attributed to Chih Chien (TD 16.826b ff.), (ii) by Hsuan Tsang (TD 16.827b ff.) and (iii) by Fa-hsien (TD 16.829a ff.).

and should see an ancient city, a former prince's domain, where men of former days lived, a city adorned by gardens, groves, pools, foundations of walls, a beautiful spot. ... Even so did I behold an ancient path, an ancient way traversed by the former Buddhas. ... Following that path, I came to understand fully decay and death, their arising, their cessation and the path leading to their cessation".¹

(194) It may be noted that of the four Noble Truths discovered by the Buddha, the second and the third refer to the theory of causality. These references would be sufficient to show that according to Buddhism, at least as embodied in the Nikāyas and the Āgamas, causality is not a category of relations among ideas but a category of connection and determination corresponding to an actual feature of the factual world both subjective and objective so that it has an ontological status. It is not only a component of experience, but also an objective form of interdependence obtained in the realm of nature. Therefore, Buddhaghosa while commenting on the word 'objectivity' (tathatā), says: "As those conditions alone, neither more nor less, bring about this or that event, there is said to be objectivity",² thus emphasising the objective validity of the causal principle.

1. S 2.105-106, Seyyathā'pi ... puriso araññe pavane caramāno passeyya purāṇaṃ maggaṃ purāṇaṃ añjasāṃ pubbakehi manussehi anuyātaṃ, so taṃ anugaccheyya taṃ anugacchantaṃ passeyya purāṇaṃ rājadhāniṃ pubbakehi manussehi ajjhāvuttham ārāma-sampannaṃ vanasampannaṃ pokkharāṇisampannaṃ uddāpavantaṃ ramaṇiyaṃ. ... Evam eva khvāhaṃ ... addasaṃ purāṇaṃ maggaṃ purāṇañjasāṃ pubbakehi sammāsambuddhehi anuyātaṃ. ... Taṃ anugacchiṃ, taṃ anugacchantaṃ jarāmaṇaṃ abbhāññāsiṃ jarāmaṇasamudayaṃ abbhāññāsiṃ jarāmaṇanirodham abbhāññāsiṃ jarāmaṇanirodhagāminiṃ paṭipadam abbhāññāsiṃ. TD 2.80c (Tsa.12.5), etc.
2. SA 2.41, so tehi tehi paccayehi anūnādhikehi eva tassa tassa dhammassa sambhavato tathatā'ti. Cp. Vism 518.

(195) Nathmal Tatia has translated the word tathatā as regularity of sequence and considers it to be the positive characteristic of the causal law, while avitathatā is absence of irregularity, which is the negative characteristic.¹ His translation seems to be based on a literal explanation of the comments of Buddhaghosa (v.supra.194). But the regularity of sequence is more emphatically expressed by the two characteristics of causality which can be described as 'necessity' (avitathatā, fa pu li ju 法不離如) and 'invariability' (anaññathatā, fa pu i ju 法不異如). The word tathatā (from tathā > tatha) in the early Buddhist texts means 'correspondence',² and was used in the later Buddhist texts to denote 'true essence', 'actuality', 'truth' (tatha=sacca, Sk. satya).³ The use of the term tathatā to denote a characteristic of causality is more significant especially at a time when causality was considered to be only a mental construct (v.supra.28). In this context, therefore, the word can be interpreted as referring to "what corresponds to reality", that is, objective reality.

Necessity as a characteristic of the causal law.

(196) The second characteristic of the causal nexus, namely, avitathatā (fa pu li ju 法不離如), has been rendered as necessity and this is in conformity with the explanation given by Buddhaghosa who maintains: "Since there is no failure even for a moment to produce the events which arise when the

1. Nava-Nālanda Mahāvihāra Research Publication, vol.1,p.179.

2. PTSD p.296, col.1.

3. BHSD p.248.

conditions come together, there is said to be 'necessity'".¹ The question whether the concept of necessity should be included in an adequate formulation of the causal principle has been the subject of much discussion during recent years.² The traditional anthropomorphic meanings attached to the word necessity has been rejected and the Empiricist view that the word 'necessity' denotes lack of exception or the existence of regularity has been accepted.³ The word avitathatā therefore, if we are to accept the definition given by Buddhaghosa, means necessity in the sense of lack of exception. It has also been observed that "If the notion of necessity is stripped of its anthropomorphic and fatalistic associations, it is reduced to ... constancy and uniqueness ...",⁴ a view which is also implied by Buddhaghosa's definition.

Invariability as a characteristic of causality.

(197) The third characteristic of causality or the causal nexus is invariability (anaññathatā, fa pu i ju 法不異如) which Buddhaghosa defines in the following manner. "Since no effect different from (the effect) arises with (the help of) other events or conditions, there is said to be 'invariability'". This definition of invariability should not be understood as implying "same cause, same effect or every event has a cause, and this cause is always the same".⁶ The theory of causation

1. SA 2.41, sāmaggim upagatesu pāccayesu muhuttam api tato nibbattānaṃ dhammānaṃ asambhavābhāvato avitathatā.

Cp. Vism 518.

2. Bunge, Causality, p.39 f.

3. Feigl and Sellars, Readings in Philosophical Analysis, p.523; Bunge, Causality, p.40.

4. Loc.cit.

5. SA 2.41, aññadhammapaccayehi aññadhammānuppattito anaññathatā'ti.

6. Bunge, Causality, p.38; Russell, B.A.W., Our Knowledge of the External World, p.234.

which involves the idea that if the same cause is repeated, the same effect will result, is said to have the shortcoming of emphasising the sameness of causes and effects,¹ and therefore inadequate.² It has no scope at all, "since the same cause never occurs exactly".³ But the characteristic of invariability (anāññatā), in the early Buddhist texts, does not refer to the nature of causes and effects. On the contrary it refers to the nature of the relation existing between causes and effects. It only states that there is a constant relation between cause of certain kinds and effects of certain kinds. It emphasises the constancy of the relation rather than the sameness of causes and effects.

Conditionality.

(198) The fourth characteristic of causality is 'conditionality' idappaccayatā, sui shun yüan ch'i 隨順緣起). The fact that it has been used as a synonym of causality in the early B Buddhist texts (v. supra. 120 f.) points to its great importance. Buddhaghosa's definition runs thus: From the condition or group of conditions which give rise to such states as decay and death, etc., as stated, there is said to be 'conditionality'. Buddhaghosa's explanation seems to imply that a thing comes into existence if and only if the necessary condition or group of conditions is available. Conditionality as a

1. Bunge, Causality, p.38.

2. Russell, Our Knowledge of the External World, p.234.

3. ibid., p.217.

4. SA 2.41, Yathā vuttānam etesaṃ jarāmarañādīnaṃ paccayato vā paccayasamūhato vā idappaccayatā'ti vutto.

characteristic of causality is still more important in that it prevents causality being interpreted as a form of strict determinism. It places causality midway between fatalism (niyatīvāda, v.supra.81) and accidentalism (yadrucchāvāda, v.supra.117). Fatalism or strict determinism and accidentalism are said to be the two extreme forms of lawlessness.¹ If so, conditionality may be called the 'middle path' because it avoids the two extremes, namely, the unconditional necessity asserted by fatalism and the unconditional arbitrariness assumed by accidentalism. It has been observed that "the statements of causal laws, and in general, scientific laws, do not assert that something will inevitably happen under all circumstances, regardless of the past or the present conditions. Quite on the contrary, statements of causal laws assert that if and only if certain conditions are met certain results would follow."² While this is implied in Buddhaghosa's definition of conditionality, it is also clearly expressed in the general formula of causality when it uses the Locative Absolute phrase as, "When A exists, B exists", where the word when would represent the conditional particle 'if'.

(199) Nathmal Tātia has failed to grasp the real import of this characteristic of causality when he translated the word idappaccayatā as 'determinacy'.³ A similar confusion of the conception of conditionality with ^edeterminism has been made by Keith when he accused Buddhism in the following words.

1. Bunge; Causality, p.103.

2. ibid.

3. Nava-Nālanda Mahāvihāra Research Publication, 1.179.

"Moreover, man has the power to act; strange as it may seem when one ground of the denial of the self is remembered, and the apparent determinism of the Chain of Causation, the Buddha has no doubt whatever that the determinism of Makkhali Gosāla is the most detestable of all heresies. The position is the more remarkable because one of the arguments in the Canon and later against the existence of the self is that such a thing must be autonomous, while all in the world is conditional and causally determined. But the issue is solved by the simple process of ignoring it and Buddhism rejoices in being freed from any error of determinism to menace moral responsibility".¹ Oltramare seems to agree with Keith, for he puts forward a similar theory that "Le Bouddhisme a poussé jusqu'aux dernières limites son explication phénoméniste et déterministe des choses".²

(200) Necessity (avītathatā), in the sense of lack of exception, and invariability (anaññathatā) are also expressed in the general formula of causality when it gives the negative aspect as: "When this is absent, that does not come to be; on the cessation of this that ceases" (v.supra.188). It has been pointed out earlier that with regard to a relation there are two possibilities; that it holds sometimes or it holds always and that the scientific explanation of the causal principle is obviously inconsistent with the former alternative because the causal connection is supposed to hold universally (v.supra.143). Thus the specific mention of the

1. Buddhist Philosophy in India and Ceylon, p.116.

2. La Formule Bouddhique des Douze Causes, (Geneva, 1909), p.48.

two characteristics, necessity and invariability, as well as their expression in the general formula brings the Buddhist theory of causality very close to a scientific theory of causality.

Constant conjunction and production.

(201) The characteristics of causality discussed above refer only to objectivity, necessity and regularity. But there is another important characteristic which is not directly stated but which is clearly implied in the statement of the general formula of causality. We have seen how early Buddhism criticised the idea of self-causation which implied the prior existence of the effect (satkāryavāda) (v. supra. 19) and also the idea of external causation which referred to the previously non-existent effect (asatkāryavāda) (v. supra. 100). The rejection of these two views may imply that the Buddhist theory of causality expresses only constant conjunction of two things.¹ The first part of the general formula of causality, namely, "When this exists, that exists or comes to be", certainly expresses this idea of constant conjunction or association. While criticising the ideas of self-production

1. From the time of Hume, the formula of constant conjunction has been regarded as exhausting the meaning of causation. It is considered to be a correct statement of the causal bond. Thus Prof. A. J. Ayer maintains that, "every general proposition of the form 'C causes E' is equivalent to the proposition of the form 'whenever C, then E'", (Language, Truth and Logic, p. 55). The Empiricists appear to have held that "the meaning of causation consists in the statement of an exceptionless repetition, a constant union between cause and the effect". This is what William James criticised as "a world of mere witness, of which the parts were only strung together by the conjunction 'and'", (Pragmatism, p. 156).

as well as the production of a non-existent effect, early Buddhism was not prepared to reduce causation to constant conjunction, and in particular to constant association of successives, i.e., to regular succession, because such a form of causation "does not represent a category of determination through change, but only as an antecedent",¹ although such a view may have been accepted by some of the Buddhist schools who accepted a theory of momentariness (v. supra, 148 ff.). Therefore, the statement that "Whenever A exists, B exists or comes to be", is immediately followed by the statement: "On the arising of this, that arises" (imassa uppādā idam uppajjati), thus combining the principle of lawfulness or constant conjunction with that of productivity. The use of the word 'arising' (uppāda, ch'i 起) along with the word 'exists' (bhavati, yu 有) is therefore not a mere repetition or only the statement of a concrete formula as opposed to the abstract formula given first,² but represents a determined effort to include the idea of productivity in the statement of causality. This is further exemplified by the use of the term paṭiccasamuppāda (yüan ch'i fa 緣起法) to denote causal production. Even the Buddhists of a later date who, with the acceptance of a theory of momentariness, emphasised the constant conjunction of things, made an attempt to accommodate the idea of production when they defined a momentary thing as having the capability to produce the effect (arthakriyākāritra) (v. supra. 164).

1. Bunge, Causality, p. 42.

2. Jayatilleke, Knowledge, p. 449; Keith says: "But in any event the extraordinarily imperfect character of the definition is obvious; the first member expresses the idea of an essential condition, the next a co-efficient; and the last the cause of a generation", (Buddhist Philosophy, p. 96). On the contrary, the statement bears the stamp of comprehensiveness rather than imperfection.

Relativity.

(202) Another interpretation of the statement "When this exists, that exists", is given by Nāgārjuna in his Ratnāvalī. Here he finds only the idea of relativity, not active causation, as in the case of the idea of shortness existing only in relation to the idea of long.¹ It is the type of relation according to which the determination of a thing or object is possible only in relation to other things or objects, especially by way of contrast. Nāgārjuna maintains that the relationship between the ideas of 'short' and 'long' is not due to intrinsic nature (svabhāva).² This rare interpretation of the causal principle is not completely foreign to the Pāli Nikāyas and the Chinese Āgamas, for we find in one place the idea of relativity being very clearly expressed. It occurs in a passage in the Samyukta which runs thus: "That which is the element of light ... is seen to exist on account of (i.e., in relation to) darkness; that which is the element of good is seen to exist in relation to bad; that which is the element of space is seen to exist in relation to material form".³

One-one correlation.

(203) Comparing the theories of causality put forward by the practical agent and the scientific investigator, Stebbing says:

1. 1. 48, 48, Asmin satīdaṃ bhavati dīrghe hrasvaṃ yathā sati.
2. 1.49, Hrasve sati punar dīrghaṃ na bhavati svabhāvataḥ.
3. S 2.150, Yāyaṃ ... ābhādhātu ayaṃ dhātu andhakāraṃ paṭicca paññāyati. Yāyaṃ ... subhādhātu ayaṃ dhātu asubhaṃ paṭicca paññāyati. Yāyaṃ ... ākāsañcāyatanadhātu ayaṃ dhātu rūpaṃ paṭicca paññāyati;

TD 2.116c (Tsa.17.1), 彼光界者。緣闇故可知。
淨界緣不淨故可知。無量空入處界者，
緣色故可知。

"The practical agent, however, is content with a relation that is determinate only in the direction from cause to effect: whenever X occurs, E occurs. Such a relation may be many-one; given the cause, then the effect is determined, but not conversely. But a scientific investigator wants to find a relation that is equally determinate in either direction, that is, he seeks a one-one relation: whenever X occurs, E occurs, and E does not occur unless X has occurred".¹

The general statement of causality: "Whenever A exists, B exists or comes to be", when coupled with its negative aspect, "Whenever A is absent, B is absent" (imasmin asati idam na hoti), establishes a one-one relation which is identical with the latter view discussed by Stebbing.

Plurality of causes.

(204) Apart from the one-one relation discussed above, we come across an instance of the 'practical commonsense view'² which implies the existence of a plurality of causes. It is remarked that: "When a plurality of causes is asserted for an effect, the effect is not analysed very carefully.

Instances which have significant differences are taken to illustrate the same effect. These differences escape the untrained eye, although they are noticed by the expert".³

In the Dvayatānupassanā sutta of the Sutta Nipāta the problem is raised as to how suffering (dukkha) originates and how it could be ended.⁴ The reply was that it is due to the substratum of rebirth (upadhi). But the interlocutor's


1. Introduction, p.264.

2. Jayatilleke, Knowledge, p.449.

3. Cohen, M.R., and Nagel, E., An Introduction to Logic and Scientific Method, (London, 1949), p.270.

4. Sn p.139 ff.

intention of finding out whether there would be any other causes seems to have been read by the Buddha when he said that according to another standpoint (aññena pariyāyena) ignorance (avijjā) is the cause of suffering. In this manner he proceeded to enumerate ten different causes which are listed below. This may be taken as an instance of many-one relation which is determinate only in one direction, that is, from cause to effect.



(205) Thus the general formula of causality as stated in the Pāli Nikāyas and the Chinese Āgamas includes all the important features of a scientific theory of causality such as objectivity, uniqueness, necessity, constant conjunction, productivity, relativity as well as one-one correlation.

CHAPTER FIVE

Special application of the causal formula.

(206) In the Pāli Nikāyas and the Chinese Agamas we come across several applications of the causal principle discussed in the previous chapter. These have been grouped into two categories as (i) the "special application" and (ii) the "general applications".¹

Importance of the special application.

(207) The special application, which was incorrectly designated as the "Chain of Causation" (v.infra.208), consists of twelve interconnected factors and is found to dominate the early Buddhist texts with the result many scholars considered this to be the only aspect of causation discussed in Buddhism.² The existence of many other important applications of the causal principle (v.infra.236ff) would show that this is not the case. Moreover some of these scholars have maintained that the main purpose of the special application is to explain the origin and cessation of suffering (dukkha). Thus Keith says: "We can now see the limited character of the Chain of Causation, it is intended to explain the coming into being of misery. ...".³ This evaluation seems to take into account only one aspect of the special application to the neglect of many other important aspects. It is possible to

1. Jayatilleke, Knowledge, p.450.

2. Keith, Buddhist Philosophy, pp.96-114; La Vallée Poussin, Théorie des Douze Causes; Thomas, E.J., History of Buddhist Thought, pp.58-70, 78-80; Stcherbatsky, Central Conception; Oltramare, P., La Formule bouddhique des Douze Causes; Masson-Oursel, P., Essai d'interprétation de théories des douze conditions, in Revue de l'Histoire des Religions, (1915), vol.71, pp.30-46.

3. Buddhist Philosophy, p.109; v. also Thomas, Buddhist Thought, p.58.

maintain that the ultimate purpose of the special application is to explain the origin and cessation of suffering. But this is not all. There are some other important issues involved. We have already seen how the Upaniṣadic thinkers, who were able to verify the continuity of the human personality either rationally or intuitionally, came to believe in eternalism (sassatavāda, ch'ang chien 常見) which was defended by a metaphysical theory of causation that came to be known as self-causation (v.supra.7 ff.). On the other hand, there were Materialists and Ajīvikas who denied self-causation and adopted a theory of external causation which led them to believe in the annihilation (uccheda, tuan 斷) of the human personality at death and also of karma. (v.supra.100 ff.). Buddha, for whom karma and rebirth were realities as they were to some of his predecessors, was reluctant to contribute to any one of these metaphysical theories. The empiricist approach of the Buddha prevented him from positing an unverifiable soul to explain the continuity of the individual after death. On the other hand, he was far removed from the materialist standpoint to deny the continuity of the individual, and also his moral responsibility. Thus the problem confronted by the Buddha was to explain the working of karma and the process of rebirth without falling into the two extreme views of Eternalism and Materialism, thereby avoiding the metaphysical theories of self-causation and external causation. The raison d'être, as Dr. Jayatilleke points out, of the special application "lies in the necessity to give a causal account of the factors operating in maintaining the process of human personality and thereby of suffering".¹ This is very clearly

1. Knowledge, p.451.

expressed in the passage from the Samyukta which runs thus: "In the belief that the person who acts is the same as the person who experiences (the result) ... he posits Eternalism; in the belief that the person who acts is not the same person who experiences (the result) ... he posits Materialism. Avoiding both these extremes, the Tathāgata preaches the doctrine in the middle. On ignorance (avijjā, wu ming 無明) depends dispositions (sāṅkhārā, hsing 行). ... In this manner there arises this mass of suffering".¹ The theory of causation is placed not only against these two metaphysical theories. There are two others, namely, a combination of internal and external causation (v. supra. 104 ff.) and fortuitous origination (v. supra. 117). Keith finds the doctrine placed in a very difficult position because of a passage in the Samyutta Nikāya² where the Buddhist theory is opposed to all four pre-Buddhistic theories, mainly because "all these issues belong to the realm of the indeterminates".³ Therefore, he comes to the conclusion: "We obtain nothing more than the vague general assertion that things as compounded come into being under the effect of causes, but we have to put beside this the doctrine that we do not know anything definite as to their operation; ...".⁴

1. § 2.20, So karoti so paṭisamvediyatī'ti ... sassatam etaṃ pareti. Añño karoti añño paṭisamvediyatī'ti ... ucchedam etaṃ pareti. Ete te ... ubho ante anupagamma majjhena Tathāgato dhammaṃ deseti: avijjāpaccayā sāṅkhārā ... evam etassa kevalassa dukkhakkhandhassa samudayo hoti; TD 2.85c (Tsa.12.18).
2. § 2.19-20; cp. TD 2.85c (Tsa.12.18).
3. Buddhist Philosophy, p.110.
4. ibid., p.112.

(208) The four theories against which the Buddhist theory of causality was preached represent a four-fold scheme. these four alternatives were dismissed by the Buddha with the words 'do not (ask) thus' (mā h'evam),¹ because he considered them to be indeterminate (avyākata, wu chi 無記)² and therefore to be set aside. They are indeterminate because categorical answers to the first two alternatives and therefore also to the third and fourth alternatives which represent the assertion and denial respectively of the combination of the first two, lead to metaphysical theories to which the Buddha was reluctant to contribute (v. supra. 26 ff.). Without being a partisan to any one of these metaphysical views, the Buddha adduced empirical causal explanations. Thus it would be unfair to equate the Buddha's theory of causality with those of the pre-Buddhistic teachers, as Keith does. Further, the formulation of the special theory giving empirical causal explanations of the birth and development of the individual eliminated other metaphysical problems such as creation by God, First Cause or even Final Cause. This was observed by Buddhaghosa who raises the question: "Is ignorance (which is placed at the head of the special application), like the primordial matter (pakati) of the Sāṅkhya school of thought (pakativādīnaṃ), an uncaused first cause of the world?",³ and gives the following reply:

1. S 2.19; Dr. Jayatilleke points out that in the case of some logical alternatives which may be false the Nikāyas use the phrase no h'idam (it is not so) and not mā h'evam (do not ask thus), Knowledge, p. 293.
2. S 2.19-20; TD 2.86a (Tsa. 12.20).
3. VbhA 132-133, kiṃ pakativādīnaṃ pakati viya avijjā'pi akāraṇaṃ mūlakāraṇaṃ lokassāti.

"It is not uncaused. The cause of ignorance has been declared when it was said 'On account of the defilements (āsavā) ignorance arises'".¹ Moreover, in support of the view that ignorance is not without a cause (akāraṇaṃ) he quotes a passage from the Nikāyas² which runs: "The first beginning of ignorance is not known, (for us to maintain that) 'before this there was no ignorance; at this point there arose ignorance'.³ But the fact that ignorance is causally produced, can be known".³ This means that the special application cannot be designated a 'chain' of causation because here no absolute beginning is envisaged. On the contrary, it is better represented by a circle, a round, without any beginning. Thus the special application has come to be known as vaṭṭa-kathā.⁴

Statement of the special application.

(209) In the Pāli Nikāyas and the Chinese Āgamas, the special application of the causal formula is introduced in many ways. Sometimes it is directly presented with the statement, "I will preach to you, O monks, the doctrine of causation".⁵ At other times, the formula is introduced while explaining such things as ageing and death (jarāmaraṇa, lao su 老死),⁶ the four forms of nutrition (āhāra, shih 食),⁷ the five aggregates

1. VbhA 132-133, Na akāraṇaṃ āsavāsamudayā aviḥḥāsamudayo'ti hi aviḥḥāya kāraṇaṃ vuttaṃ; cp. M 1.55.
2. A 5.113.
3. VbhA 133, Purimā bhikkhave koṭi na paññāyati aviḥḥāya ito pubbe aviḥḥā nāhosi, atha pacchā sambhavi'ti. Evañ c'etaṃ bhikkhave vuccati. Atha ca pana paññāyati idappaccayā aviḥḥā.
4. Compendium of Philosophy, p.262.
5. S 2.1,25, Paṭiccasamuppādaṃ vo bhikkhave desissāmi; TD 2.84b (Tsa.12.14); 85a (Tsa.12.16), 我今當說緣起法.
6. S 2.5-11; TD 2.101c (Tsa.15.2).
7. S 2.11; TD 2.101c (Tsa.15.7).

(khandhā, yin 陰) which make up the individual,¹ the causality of moral behaviour,² or while criticizing some of the current philosophical theories,³ etc. Once, while discussing the relative origin and cessation of the five aggregates, the Buddha states the formula in the following manner: "When this exists, that comes to be; on the arising of this, that arises. When this does not exist, that does not come to be; on the cessation of this, that ceases. That is to say, on ignorance depend dispositions; on dispositions depends consciousness; on consciousness depends the psychophysical personality; on the psychophysical personality depend the six 'gateways'; on the six 'gateways' depends contact; on contact depends feeling; on feeling depends craving; on craving depends grasping; on grasping depends becoming; on becoming depends birth; on birth depend ageing and death In this manner there arises this mass of suffering".⁴

(210) Here we find the stereotyped formula of twelve factors to which the general formula of causality (v. supra. 188) has been prefixed. Thomas is of opinion that the prefixing of the general formula to the special application is late.⁵ As emerging from the early Buddhist texts, the philosophical importance of the general formula of causality as well as

1. S 2.28.

2. ibid., 19 ff.; TD 2.85c f. (Tsa.12,19); 86a (Tsa.12.20).

3. S 2.17 f.; 76 f.; TD 2.85c (Tsa.12.18).

4. S 2.28, Iti imasmim sati idam hoti, imassa uppādā idam uppajjati, imasmim asati idam na hoti, imassa nirodhā idam nirujjhati, yadidam avijjāpaccayā saṅkhārā, saṅkhārapaccayā viññāṇaṃ, viññāṇapaccayā nāmarūpaṃ, nāmarūpapaccayā saḷāyatanaṃ, saḷāyatanaṃ paccayā phasso, phassapaccayā vedanā, vedanāpaccayā taṇhā, taṇhāpaccayā upādānaṃ, upādānapaccayā bhavo, bhavapaccayā jāti, jātipaccayā jarāmaraṇa ... sambhavanti. Evam etassa kevalassa dukkhakkhandhassa samudayo hoti. v. also M 1.262 f.; cp. TD 2.98a-b (Tsa.14.6).

5. Buddhist Thought, p.60, n.1.

the place accorded to it in early Buddhism (v.supra.191 ff.) would not warrant such an assumption. In the passage quoted above (v.supra.209), Buddha is represented as demonstrating his intellectual powers by referring to his knowledge of the arising and passing away of the psychophysical personality. The general formula of causality was something that he discovered with his attainment of enlightenment. Therefore when he had to explain the arising and the passing away of the psychophysical personality, he seems to have adopted the more instructive method of stating the formula first and then applying it to explain the causality of this personality. This is quite a logical procedure. Moreover, in most of the sūtras of the Samyukta Āgama, where the theory of the twelve factors is discussed, we find the statement of the general formula being introduced, even though the Pāli counterparts do not show any such thing.¹ Considering the large number of passages in the twelfth fascicle of the Samyukta Āgama, which roughly corresponds to the Nidāna Samyutta of the Samyutta Nikāya, where the general formula has been prefixed to the theory of twelve factors, it would be difficult to reject them as late compositions, as Thomas does. On the contrary, it may even be possible that it is an earlier version and that the practice of prefixing the general formula was given up when it was taken for granted that the special application represented a specific instance of the general formula.

1. TD 2.83c, 84b, 85a-c, 86a-b (Tsa.12.11-20).

(211) Let us examine each one of the factors of the special application referred to above (v. supra. 209). There are several important treatises in which the twelve factors are analysed. For example, La Vallée Poussin, in his article Theorie des Douze Causes, has made an exhaustive study of the twelve factors based on the material found in the Pāli Nikāyas and the later Buddhist literature, Pāli as well as Sanskrit.¹ The present attempt therefore would be confined to a comparative study of the material found in the Pāli Nikāyas and the Chinese Āgamas.

Ignorance.

(212) In the Vibhaṅga sutta of the Samyutta Nikāya² we come across a definition of each one of the causal factors. Here ignorance (avijjā) is defined as the "ignorance of (i) suffering, (ii) its arising, (iii) its cessation and (iv) the path leading to its cessation",³ that is to say, the ignorance of the four Noble Truths. The Chinese version of the same sutta gives a more elaborate description of ignorance. In addition to the ignorance of the four Noble Truths, it lists various other things such as the ignorance of good and bad, what is pure and what is defiled, etc., as coming under the category of ignorance. Of these we are mainly interested in the first three and the eighteenth, namely, ignorance of the past (ch'ien chi 前際), ignorance of the future (hua chi 後際),

1. v. also Oltramare, P., La Formule bouddhique des Douze Causes, (Geneva, 1909).

2. 2.2-4.

3. *ibid.*, Katamā ca bhikkhave avijjā. Yaṃ kho bhikkhave dukkhe aññāṇaṃ dukkhasamudaye aññāṇaṃ dukkhanirodhe aññāṇaṃ dukkhanirodhagāminiyā paṭipadāya aññāṇaṃ, ayaṃ vuccati bhikkhave avijjā; v. also D 2.90; S 5.439; Sn 724; TD 2.797b (Tseng.46.5).

ignorance of both past and future (ch'ien hou chi 前後際) and ignorance of causally produced things (yin so ch'i fa 因所起法).¹

(213) It is interesting to note that a similar definition of avijjā is to be found in the Nettipakarana. In addition to the four forms of ignorance enumerated in the Nikāyas (v. supra. 212), it mentions the ignorance of the past (pubbanta), of the future (aparanā), of both past and future (pubbantâparanata) and of causally produced things (idappaccayatâpaṭiccasamuppannā dhammā).² Knowledge is here defined as the knowledge of the past, etc.³ Not being able to find this description of ignorance in the Nikāyas, Buddhaghosa, while commenting on the Vibhaṅga of the Abhidhamma Piṭaka, says that it belongs to the Abhidhamma tradition (abhidhammapariyāya) rather than to the Suttanta tradition (suttantapariyāya).⁴ It is difficult to see how this view can be maintained, especially in view of the fact that the Dasuttara Suttanta includes a definition of knowledge (ñāṇa)

1. TD 2.85a-b (Tsa.12.16). The important place occupied by this sūtra is evident from the several versions found in Buddhist Sanskrit, Chinese and Tibetan. The Buddhist Sanskrit version was found in the manuscript of the Nidāna Samyukta discovered in the caves of Turfan (ed. by Chandrābhāl Tripāthī, Fünfundzwanzig Sūtras des Nidānasamyukta, Berlin, 1962, pp.42-43) and two brick inscriptions from Nālandā (ed. N.P. Chakravartī, Epigraphia Indica, vol.21, pp.179-199); a fragmentary portion of the sūtra was also found inscribed in a dhvaja-pillar in the Minchou temple near Tunhuan in China, v. Sino-Indian Studies, 1.19 f. In addition to the Chinese version included in the Samyukta, there is another translation by Hsuan Tsang called Yüan-ch'i-ching 緣起經 TD 2.547b f. (No.124). N.A. Śāstri has reconstructed the Sanskrit version from the Tibetan, v. Arya Śālistamba Sūtra.
2. p.75.
3. *ibid.*, p.76.
4. VbhA 138, Nikkhepakāṇḍe pana Abhidhammapariyāyena pubbante aññāṇam'ti aparesu pi catusu thānesu aññāṇam gahitaṃ.

as knowledge of the past (atītamse hānam), knowledge of the future (anāgatamse hānam) and knowledge of the present (paccuppannamse hānam),¹ unless we consider the Dasuttara Suttanta as belonging to the Abhidhamma tradition.

(214) Although the more general meaning of the term anta or chi (際) is 'end', 'extreme', 'edge', and therefore the compounds pubbanta or ch'ien chi (前際) and aparanta or hou chi (後際) may be taken to mean the prior end and final end respectively, we have rendered them simply as past and future. This is because the term anta is used in the early Buddhist texts in a wide variety of meanings.² In addition to the use of the term anta in the sense of 'end', like the word koṭi (pīen chi 邊際³ or pen chi 本際⁴), it is also used in the sense of 'side' (ansa, v. supra. 213).⁵ Therefore, it would be difficult to consider the two words pubbanta or ch'ien chi (前際) and aparanta or hou chi (後際) as always being used in the sense of prior end and final end. Dr. Jayatilleke, in his attempt to show that the special application of the causal principle is intended to avoid the explanation of the origin and development of the individual in terms of metaphysical first causes and final causes, has quoted a statement from the Majjhima Nikāya which runs thus:

1. D 3.275.

2. Buddhaghosa, in his Sumāṅgalavilāsinī (1.103), says: "This word anta is seen to be used in the sense of end, interior, limit, inferior, precinct and part" (Tattha anto'ti ayaṃ saddo anta-abbhantara-mariyādā-lāma-ka-parabhāga-koṭṭhāsesu dissati.).

3. As in the statement anamataḅḅo'yaṃ bhikkhave saṃsāro pubbā-koṭi na paññāyati ... S 2.178 f.; TD 2.485c (Pieh-i-tsa. 16.1).

4. TD 2.241b ff. (Tsa. 34.1 ff.).

5. PTSD p.46.

api nu tumhe bhikkhave evaṃ jānantā evaṃ passantā pubbantam
vā paṭidhāveyyātha aparantam vā ādhāveyyātha.¹ He translates
the phrase as follows: "Would you, O monks, knowing and seeing
thus probe (lit., run behind) the prior end of things ...
or pursue (lit., run after) the final end of things".²

The Chinese version of the above passage would not warrant
the interpretation of the words pubbanta and aparanta as
prior end and final end respectively. Therefore it is difficult
to consider this passage as representing a refutation of
first causes and final causes. As the Madhyama Agama shows,
the Chinese translators have understood the words pubbanta
and aparanta as referring to the past and the future, and not
as denoting prior end and final end. Hence their rendering
of the terms pubbanta as kuo ch'ü (過去) and aparanta as
wei lai (未來).³ This interpretation of pubbanta and
aparanta is quite consistent with Buddhaghosa's explanation.⁴
He defines the former as "past life or time, the past aggregates,
elements and spheres",⁵ and the latter as "future life or time,
future aggregates, elements and spheres".⁶ Therefore, Miss
I.B.Horner's translation of the two terms as "times gone by"
and "times to come"⁷ may be taken as renderings faithful to
the original.

1. M 1.262.

2. Knowledge, p.451.

3. TD 1.769a (Chung.54.2); v.also M 1.8 (Sabbāsava sutta),
TD 1.432a (Chung.2.5).

4. VbhA 139; MA 2.309.

5. VbhA 139, Tatthā pubbanto'to atīto addhā atītāni khandha-
dhātu-āyatanāni; MA 2.309, pubbantam'ti purimakoṭṭhāsam
atītāni khandha-dhātu-āyatanāni.

6. loc.cit., Aparanto'to anāgato addhā anāgatāni khandha-
dhātu-āyatanāni.

7. Middle Length Sayings, 1.320-321. v.also a similar
translation by Nānamoli in 'The Guide' p.106; Kośa 5.14,
7.108 and 3.67.

(215) One may object that the Chinese version of the Vibhāṅga sutta is a later compilation in that it gives a more elaborate account of ignorance (wu ming 無明) when compared with the Pāli version. But the lateness of compilation does not make any difference to the subject matter discussed therein. It does not contain anything that can be regarded as late or alien to the early teachings. Any objection that the definition of ignorance as "the ignorance of pubbanta, aparanta, etc.", is late because the Buddha has rejected speculation about pubbanta, etc., rests on the assumption that these words are used only in the sense of 'end' and no other. But if we are to accept the interpretation of the words pubbanta and aparanta as simply past and future, at least in some of the contexts, we would be able to resolve the apparent contradiction. Moreover, we have already seen how knowledge of the past and future was emphasised in the Pāli Nikāyas (v. supra. 213). The special application of the causal formula is intended to explain the problems of rebirth and moral responsibility (v. supra. 207 ff.). Therefore, a knowledge of one's past as well as one's future would certainly give an insight into the proper working of the psychophysical personality. This is evident from the description of retro-cognition (pūrvanivāsajñāna) in the Bodhisattvabhūmi which runs: "Thus he remembers for himself those past (pūrvānte) lives, and also causes others to remember".¹ What the Buddha condemns is only an unnecessary anxiety about the past and a longing for the future, coupled with the tendency to see a permanent entity in the causal

1. pp. 66-67, ye pi te sattvakāyāḥ pūrvānte tān apy ātmanā smarati pareṣaṃ smārayati.

continuity of the psychophysical personality. This is what the Buddha meant when he, after explaining the causality of the personality, said: "Would you, O monks, knowing and seeing thus, run back to the past thinking: 'Now, did we exist in the past or did we not? What were we in the past? How were we in the past? Having been what, what did we become in the past?', ... or run after the future thinking: 'Will we come to be in the future or will we not? What will we come to be in future? Having been what, what will we come to be in the future?'"¹ According to the early Buddhist texts, such speculations give rise to one or more of the six wrong views which admit a permanent soul or deny survival.² Therefore, Buddhaghosa says: "Here when (one raises the question) 'Did we exist or not?', one is concerned about one's existence or non-existence in the past, and for this one depends on the belief in permanence or accidental occurrence respectively".³ Moreover, the words paṭidhāveyyātha and ādhāveyyātha occurring in the passage quoted above have both been translated into Chinese as p'o (皮頁),⁴ which means 'to be inclined to one side, to lean on to, etc.'. Buddhaghosa too gives a similar meaning to the terms when he said: "To run back to means to follow with attachment and prejudice".⁵

1. M 1.264-265, Api nu tumhe bhikkhave evaṃ jānantā evaṃ passantā pubbantaṃ vā paṭidhāveyyātha: ahesumha nu kho mayam atītam addhānaṃ, na nu kho ahesumha atītam addhānaṃ, kin nu kho ahesumha atītam addhānaṃ, kathan nu kho ahesumha atītam addhānaṃ, kiṃ hutvā kiṃ ahesumha nu kho mayam atītam addhānaṃ ti ... aparantaṃ vā ādhāveyyātha: bhavissāma nu kho mayam anāgatam addhānaṃ, na nu kho bhavissāma anāgatam addhānaṃ, kiṃ nu kho bhavissāma anāgatam addhānaṃ, kathan nu kho bhavissāma anāgatam addhānaṃ; TD 1.769a (Chung.54.2).
2. M 1.8; TD 1.432a (Chung.2.5).
3. MA 1.68.
4. TD 1.769a (Chung.54.2).
5. MA 2.309, paṭidhāveyyāthā'ti taṇhādiṭṭhivasena paṭidhāveyyātha.

(216) In the special application of the causal principle, ignorance (avijjā, wu ming 無明) heads the list of twelve factors. While pointing out that ignorance in this context cannot be compared with the primordial matter (pakati) of the Sāṅkhya school of thought (v.supra.208), Buddhaghosa explains why it is placed at the beginning of the formula. With the help of a simile, he points out that "ignorance is the special cause of the behaviour of those who adopt an evil life".¹ Quoting from the early Buddhist texts he emphasises the causality of ignorance (v.supra.208). Moreover, ignorance can be looked upon as the 'root' (mūla)² because it is the factor which can be destroyed by the attainment of enlightenment.

(217) The word avijjā has been generally translated into Chinese as wu ming (無明). The character ming (明) which means 'bright', 'clear', 'intelligent', etc., when prefixed with the negative word wu (無), represents a literal translation of the term a-vijjā. This rendering of the term avijjā seems to have been preferred to all others when the Chinese translators began to systematise the technical terms used in translations. But before such a clear-cut terminology was adopted, we find some of the translators using the term ch'ih (癡) to denote avijjā.³ This latter rendering, which means 'silly', 'stupid', etc., and which gives a positive

1. VbhA 133, Duggatigāmino hi kammaṣṣa viśesahetu avijjā.
2. Vism 578.
3. TD 1.7b-c (Chang.1.1); 1.60b (Chang.10.2), translations by Buddhayaśas. v.also TD 16.827a (translation of the Nagara suttā, S 2.104-107) by Chih Ch'ien.

description of ignorance, shows how the early translators of Buddhist texts into Chinese understood the concept of avijjā in Buddhism. To them it did not convey any cosmic or metaphysical meaning. Thus La Vallée Poussin has rightly remarked: "Rien ne permet de reconnaître a l'avidyā de Bouddhistes un caractere cosmique et metaphysique: c'est un facteur psychologique, l'etat de celui qui est ignorant".¹

(218) In the theory of twelve factors, avijjā (wu ming 無明) is said to condition sāṅkhārā (hsing 行). The problems of translation and interpretation of the word sāṅkhāra have been noted by La Vallée Poussin when he said: "Beaucoup de traductions ont été proposées pour ce terme difficile et, a part celles qui sont de purs équivalents (con-fectious, syn-thesis), aucune ne peut être regardée comme satisfaisante; aucune ne couvre tous les emplois de ce mot complaisant".² Dr. Jayatilleke has examined some of these translations of the term sāṅkhāra and has also made an attempt to determine the meanings by taking into consideration the different uses of the term in the Pāli canon.³ He suggests that the word 'disposition'⁴ could be utilized with much greater success to render sāṅkhāra⁵ because of several reasons. First, it denotes pattern reactions. Secondly, it has the necessary dynamic quality of sāṅkhāra in influencing the present and thirdly, it comes to mean an an organised mental tendency produced from past experience.⁶

1. Theorie des Douze Causes, p.6; v.also p.16.

2. ibid., p.9; v.also pp.10-11.

3. v. art. "Some Problems of Translation and Interpretation, I", in UCR 7 (1949), p.208 ff.

4. Defined as "an effect of previous mental process, or an original endowment, capable of entering as a co-operative factor for subsequent mental process", Baldwin, Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology, 1.287.

5. Especially in the special application of the causal formula.

6. Problems, p.223.

But Dr. Jayatilleke adds that even this is not completely satisfactory because "it is perhaps not so strong enough to imply the present acts of will as well, unlike sāṅkhāra".¹

(219) Of the numerous uses of the word sāṅkhāra (hsing 行), we are mainly concerned with its use in the first two links of the special application of the causal formula, namely, "ignorance conditions dispositions" and "dispositions condition consciousness".² Of these, the former represents the relationship between knowledge and conduct. Analysing the causal process, we find that the presence of ignorance is invariably followed by or is concomitant with the presence of dispositions and the absence of ignorance by its cessation.³ Thus a change in one is correlated with a change in the state of the other. For example, if a man entertains the true belief that poison is harmful to living organisms, a volitional act of his when dealing with poison would be different from what it would be if he were not aware of this belief or held the false belief that poison is not harmful.

(220) This relationship between ignorance and dispositions may always be noticed in the behaviour of human beings. But in the present context, the dispositions are those that give rise to rebirth. Thus the phrase avijjāpaccayā sāṅkhārā

1. Problems, p.223.

2. avijjāpaccayā sāṅkhārā and sāṅkhārapaccayā viññāṇaṃ.

3. S 2.7, avijjāya kho asati sāṅkhārā honti, avijjāpaccayā sāṅkhārā; ibid., 2.9, avijjāya kho asati nāṅkhārā na honti, avijjāya norodhā sāṅkhāranirodho'ti; TD 2.80c (Tsa.12.5).

has to be understood in the following manner: The absence of correct knowledge with regard to the nature and destiny of the individual, which constitutes ignorance (v. supra. 214 ff), is correlated with the presence of dispositions or volitional activities which determine the nature of one's future life. This is further exemplified by the next causal nexus, namely, sāṅkhārapaccayā viññānaṃ, where the term viññāna (shih 識) refers to "the psychic factor which survives physical death and by entering the womb helps in the development of a new individuality in conjunction with the bio-physical factors".¹ Thus the term sāṅkhāra (hsing 行) in the special application should be taken in the sense of 'motive force' giving rise to rebirth. The fact that even the early Chinese translators have understood the term sāṅkhāra in this manner is attested by the rendering of the term as yang chung shih (殃種識).² The character yang (殃) stands for calamity, misfortune and also retribution.³ This may mean that sāṅkhāra was a form of retributive consciousness, either good or bad, the acquisition of which leads to calamity or misfortune because they lead to rebirth in some form or other. Moreover, in the Sāṅkhāruppatti sutta it is specifically stated that a man endowed with faith, virtue, learning, charity and intelligence could determine his next existence by willing to be born in some particular form of life. After he has decided what form

1. Jayatilleke, Problems, pp. 214-215. The problem of rebirth as it occurs in the Nikāyas and the Āgamas would be discussed in greater detail under the sub-heading, "Causality of the human personality" (v. infra. 254 f).
2. TD 16.827a, a translation of the Nagara sutta, attributed to Chih Ch'ien (v. supra. 193).
3. v. Giles, Chinese-English Dictionary, s.v. yang. also Mathew's Chinese-English Dictionary.

of life it should be, he has only to entertain "that thought, establish it firmly and develop it so that those acts of will and that life of his will tend to bring about his birth in that state".¹ Dr. Jayatilleke has rightly emphasised the dynamic import of the term sāṅkhāra,² especially in the use of the related term abhisāṅkhāra.³ He also refers to the pictorial representation of the "wheel of becoming" (bhavacakra)⁴ where sāṅkhāras are represented by a potter with wheel and pots. This dynamic import of the term is also expressed by the Chinese rendering hsing (行) which implies the idea of movement.

(221) The nature of sāṅkhāras is further exemplified by a statement in the Anguttara Nikāya where it is said that i one who has attained "the state of concentration free from cogitative and reflective thought can comprehend with his mind the mind of another and by observing how the mental sāṅkhāras are disposed in the mind of that particular individual also predict that he would think of such and such a thought at a later time".⁵ As is evident from the passage,

1. M 3.99-100, so taṃ cittaṃ dahati, taṃ cittaṃ adiṭṭhāti taṃ cittaṃ bhāveti, tassa te sāṅkhārā ca vohāro ca evaṃ bhāvitā bahulikātā tabb'uppattiyā saṃvattanti. According to the Chinese version, it is a monk who has attained to the jhānas who could make such a decision, and the Chinese version starts with the decision to be reborn in the celestial spheres, which in the Pāli version is given later on. Cp. TD 1.700c f. (Chung.43.4).
2. Problems, p.215.
3. M 1.297; A 1.112.
4. Problems, p.215.
5. A 1.171.

the subject is not himself aware of this thought process which is cognised by the telepathic insight of another. Thus, as Dr. Jayatilleke has observed,¹ this is "perhaps the earliest historical mention of unconscious mental processes", and which constituted the 'stream of becoming' (bhavasota or viññānasota).² It is this stream of becoming which maintains a continuity between two lives without interruption, but existing in a state of flux.³ Thus the phrase sankhārapaccayā viññānaṃ may be taken as referring to the connection between the dispositions and consciousness, such that, on the nature of one's volitional activities depends the nature of that part of consciousness in the next life where the impressions of the volitional activities persist in a state of flux surviving physical death and influencing the new personality.

Consciousness and the psychophysical personality.

(222) The next causal nexus is between consciousness (viññāna, shih 識) and the psychophysical personality (nāmarūpa, ming se 名色). It explains one of the most important stages in the development of the human personality. Consciousness which is identified with paṭisandhi-viññāna or "the first stirring of mental life in the newly begun individual"⁴ and which is influenced by the impressions of the past life in the form of sankhāras (v. supra. 221), is connected with the psychophysical personality by way of a reciprocal relationship.

1. Problems, p. 216.

2. D 3.105 (viññānasota); S 4.291 (bhavasota).

3. D 3.105, purisāssa ca viññānasotaṃ pajānāti ubhayato abbočchinnam idhaloke patiṭṭhitaṃ ca paraloke patiṭṭhitaṃ ca; TD 1.77b (Chāng. 12.2).

4. PTSD p. 665.

This is very clearly stated in the Nagara sutta. Here, after determining the cause of the psychophysical personality (nāmarūpa) as consciousness (viññāna), an attempt has been made to find out the cause of consciousness. The results of this investigation showed that "This consciousness turns back, it goes no further than the psychophysical personality. ... The psychophysical personality is conditioned by consciousness; consciousness is conditioned by the psychophysical personality".¹ The mutual dependence of the two factors is here emphasised. Moreover, in the Mahā Nidāna Suttanta the question is raised as to whether the psychophysical personality can develop and grow into maturity (in the mother's womb) if consciousness were not to enter the mother's womb.² A negative answer was approved by the Buddha. This is only a figurative representation of the first stirring of consciousness in the newly begun individual and should not, therefore, be taken literally. The two factors, namely, consciousness and the psychophysical personality, taken together represent the formation of a new personality which is influenced by the dispositions (sāṅkhārā) of the past life. According to the Mahā Tanhāsankhaya sutta a conception of a being takes place when three conditions are satisfied.³ First, there should be coitus of the parents,

1. S 2.104, Paccudāvattati kho idaṃ viññānaṃ nāmarūpamhā nāparam gacchati. ... yadidaṃ nāmarūpapaccayā viññānaṃ viññānapaccayā nāmarūpaṃ. Of the several Chinese translations, only the translation attributed to Chih Ch'ien gives a complete translation of this passage. Cp. TD 16.826c. This passage is also quoted in the Cheng-wei-shih-lun,³ (TD 31.17a).
2. D 2.63; TD 1.61b (Chang.10.2).
3. M 1.266, tiṇṇaṃ kho bhikkhave sannipātā gabbhassāvakkanti hoti; TD 1.769b (Chung.54.2).

secondly, the mother should have her period and lastly, the gandhabba (hsiang yin 香陰) should be present.¹ Gandhabba or hsiang yin (香陰) in this context cannot be taken as a demi-god who "presides over child-conception",² but refers to the paṭisandhi-viññāna mentioned above.³ It is, as La Vallée Poussin has described, the "premier germe de l'être nouveau".⁴

The psychophysical personality and the six senses.

(223) Depending on the psychophysical personality (nāmarūpa, ming se 名色) there arises the six senses (salāyatana, lu ju ch'u 六入處). It has been noted that there is no English equivalent for the word āyatana, because āyatana refers to the sense organ as well as the object of sense,⁵ as is evident from the Sampasādanīya Suttanta.⁶ But in the present context, the word āyatana refers to the sense organs, for the Vibhaṅga sutta defines it as follows: "What are the six āyatanas? They are, eye, ear, nose, tongue, body and mind. These are the six āyatanas".⁷ Moreover, the Chinese version of the Vibhaṅga sutta definitely refers to them as subjective (nei 內 = ajjhattikāni)⁸ as opposed to the objective (wai 外 = bāhirāni) world.⁹ Here, āyatana is used in the sense of

1. M 1.266; TD 1.769b (Chung.54.2).

2. PTSD p.244.

3. v. also Wijesekera, O.H. De A.; Vedic Gandharva and Pāli Gandhabba, in UCR 3.1 (1945), p.88.

4. Theorie des Douze Causes, p.12.

5. Compendium of Philosophy, p.183.

6. D 3.102; TD 1.77a (Ch'ang.12.2).

7. S 2.3.

8. TD 2.85b (Tsa.12.16).

9. M 1.190; TD 1.467a (Chung.7.2) where reference is made to ajjhattikāñ cakkhum (內眼處) and bāhirā rūpā (外色).

door or place of entry for the sense data. The fact that there is emphasis on the sense organ rather than on the sense object, which seems to have been taken for granted, goes against Dr. Schayer's interpretation of the causal formula as a "Kosmische Emanations-formel".¹ It explains the sentient process of the individual during his wandering through the cycle of existences. If saḷāyatana refers to the six senses, then the relationship between nāmarūpa and saḷāyatana should not be taken as one of subject and object.

The six senses and sense-contact.

(224) The six senses (saḷāyatana, lu ju ch'u 六入處) give rise to sense-contact (phassa, ch'u 觸). This represents the beginning of the perceptual process of the individual. A more detailed analysis of the perceptual process is found elsewhere in the Nikāyas and the Āgamas where it is said: "Visual cognition depends on the eye and objective form for its arising. The coming together of all these three factors is sense-contact".² It is with this description in mind that the compiler of the Arya Śālistamba Sūtra defines contact (sparsā) as the "concurrence of the three factors",³ in spite of the fact that all three factors, namely, the sense organ, the object and sense-consciousness are not mentioned in the special application. Therefore, in the special application

1. v. Thomas, Buddhist Thought, p.79.

2. M 1.111-112, Cakkhuṃ ca paṭicca rūpecca uppajjati cakkhu-viññāṇaṃ, tiṇṇaṃ saṅgati phasso, ...
TD 1.604b (Chung.28.3).

3. p.80, Trayānāṃ dharmānāṃ sannipātaḥ sparśaḥ.

the causality of the perceptual process is given only in abstract. The six senses (saḷāyatana) imply the existence of their counterparts, the six objects of sense and thus become the cause of sense-contact. Here too a form of correlation exists in such a way that a change or defect in one is reflected in a change or defect in the other.

Sense-contact and feeling.

(225) The direct result of sense-contact (phassa, ch'u 觸) is feeling (vedanā, shou 受) which is sometimes analysed into three forms as painful, pleasurable and neutral¹ depending on the nature of the object; at other times, it is analysed into six forms depending on the media through which the sense data are conveyed to the individual, as in the case of feeling arising from visual contact (cakkhusamphassajā, yen ch'u sheng 眼觸生).² Feeling is therefore defined as the enjoyment or experience of sense-contact.³

Feeling and conation.

(226) The relationship between feeling (vedanā, shou 受) and conation or craving (tanhā, ai 愛) is expressed by the next causal nexus, according to which the presence of feeling is invariably followed by or is concomitant with the presence of craving, in such a way that a change in the state of one is correlated with a change in the state of the other.

1. S 2.53, 82, etc.; TD 2.85b (Tsa.12.16).

2. S 2.3; TD 2.34b (Tsa.5.7), 50c (Tsa.8.11), 87a (Tsa.13.1).

3. ASS p.80, sparsânubhavo vedanā.

If the object is a less pleasurable one, then the degree of craving that one develops is very slight. If, on the other hand, the feelings are very strong, one's craving would be equally great. Intellection, feeling and conation, to use the terminology adopted by Robertson,¹ are three things which are very closely associated in the life of a human being. This is implied in a passage in the Samyukta which maintains that "in the case of ordinary men feelings give rise to craving born of ignorance".² To put this more precisely, conditioned by ignorance feelings give rise to craving. But this is not so in the case of those who have attained enlightenment,³ because in that state, even though one experiences pleasurable or painful feelings, one is not moved by such feelings since ignorance has been completely destroyed.⁴ Thus the exception to the rule that feelings always give rise to conation is found only in the life of enlightened persons. The Buddhists were therefore justified in formulating an invariable relationship between feeling (vedanā, shou 受) and craving (tanhā, ai 愛) in the special application, for it is only a causal explanation of the life of an ordinary man. This does not mean that the part played by ignorance (avijjā, wu ming 無明) in producing craving is ignored.

(227) Craving (tanhā, ai 愛), like feeling, is defined in various ways. Sometimes it is the craving for the six objects of experience;⁵ sometimes it is the craving for the world of

1. Elements of Psychology, ed. Mrs. Rhys Davids (London, 1896), pp. 21 ff.
2. S 3.96; TD 2.14a (Tsa. 2.25).
3. La Vallée Poussin, Théorie des Douze Causes, p. 24.
4. It p. 38; TD 2.579a (Tseng. 7.22).
5. S 2.3; TD 1.54a (Chang. 9.1).

sense (kāmatanḥā, yü ai 欲愛), of form (rūpatanḥā, se ai 色愛) and of the formless world (arūpatanḥā, wu se ai 無色愛),¹ or more frequently, instead of the last two, the craving for existence (bhavatanḥā, yu ai 有愛) and craving for non-existence (vibhavatanḥā, wu yu 無有愛).²

Grasping.

(228) The next link in the formula of causation is between craving (tanḥā, ai 愛) and grasping (upādāna, ch'ü 取). The term "grasping" is used in the sense of taking upon oneself, and is synonymous with taḥḥā,³ nandī⁴ and chandarāga.⁵ It is grasping after sense desires (kāma-upādāna, yü ch'ü 欲取), views (ditṭhi-upādāna, chien ch'ü 見取), moral vows (sīlabbata-upādāna, chieh ch'ü 戒取) and belief in a soul (attavāda-upādāna, wo ch'ü 我取).⁶ It has been described as the "cause de la force qui projette l'acte",⁷ and the actions proceed from excessive craving. This intense craving provides a support for consciousness (viññāna, shih 識)⁸ which leads to the formation of a new psychophysical personality when the former one is destroyed at death. For this reason, grasping has been declared the cause of becoming (bhava, yu 有) which is the next link in the causal formula.

1. D 3.216; TD 2.85b (Tsa.12.16).
2. D 2.61, 308; 3.216, 275; S 3.26, 158; 5.420; It p.50; TD 1.50a (Chang.8.2); 53a (Chang.9.1); 57c (Chang.9.2); etc.
3. S 4.400; the Arya Śālistamba Sūtra defines it as trṣṇā-vaipulya, v.p.80.
4. M 1.266; S 3.14, yā vedanāsu nandī tad upādānam; cp. TD 1.769c (Chung.54.2) 若樂覺者是為愛 where the character shou (受) is used to denote upādāna and not feeling (vedanā).
5. S 3.101, 167; 4.89; TD 2.11 (Tsa.2.12).
6. S 2.3; TD 2.85b (Tsa.12.16).
7. La Vallée Poussin, Théorie des Douze Causes, p.27.
8. S 2.101; TD 2.103a (Tsa.15.10).

Becoming.

(229) "Becoming" (bhava, yu 有) is used in the sense of continued becoming in the form of rebirth (punabbhavābhinnibbatti, tang lai yu 當來有)¹ defined as the "production de tous les éléments matériels et spirituels de l'être" (nāmakāyarūpakāyasambhavanalakkhana).² The theory of becoming denoted by the term bhava "implies some kind of dynamism",³ but unfortunately the Chinese rendering yu 有 does not properly convey this idea. Bhava is said to have "its rationale in saṃsāric evolution, which is nothing else but the 'becoming (bhava) due to karma'".⁴ The Abhidhammikas have distinguished two aspects of becoming, namely, kammabhava implying all action leading to becoming which can be considered as the causal aspect and uppattibhava implying the various states of rebirth, which is the fruitional aspect.⁵

Becoming and birth.

(230) The next link in the special application is between becoming (bhava, yu 有) and 'birth' (jāti, sheng 生) which is the same as the relationship between kammabhava and uppattibhava mentioned in the preceding paragraph. This relation accounts for the phenomenon of rebirth, as does the relation between dispositions (sāṅkhārā, hsing 行) and consciousness (viññāṇa, shih 識) (v. supra. 220). Vasubandhu provides an explanation of the difference between these two forms of

1. S 2.101; TD 2.103a (Tsa. 15.10); Pratītyasamutpāda-vyākhyā, p. 621.
2. La Vallée Poussin, Theorie des Douze Causes, p. 27.
3. Wijesekere, O.H. De A., Vitalism and Becoming: A comparative study in UCR vol. 1, no. 1 (1943), p. 57. Here the author has contrasted the Buddhist theory of 'Becoming' with the theories of Vitalism in the Upaniṣads as well as some of the modern theories.
4. *ibid.*, p. 58.
5. Cp. Compendium of Philosophy, p. 189, n. 1.

relations in the special application. He maintains that in the process of rebirth, the relation between becoming and birth represents the manifestations of the activity (labdhavṛtti) of the seeds of existence (vāsanā), while the relation between dispositions and consciousness denotes the state in which the seeds remain dormant, not finding an opportunity to manifest themselves (alabdhavṛtti).¹ As a further illustration of the latter, Vasubandhu quotes a verse which runs: "The actions of beings are not exhausted even after a ~~hundred~~ aeons. Having obtained the harmony of causes and in due course they come to fruition".²

(231) The eight links in the special application from consciousness (viññāna, shih 識) to becoming (bhava, yu 有) explain one life term starting from birth and going up to the time when the seeds are sown for another life. None of them refers to death. They only show how a being from the time of birth builds up the foundation on which his next life is to be erected. After explaining this main problem of rebirth, the resultant is described by the other two factors, namely, birth (jāti, sheng 生) and the consequent ageing (jarā, lao 老), death (marāṇa, ssu 死), etc. The Abhidhammikas therefore maintained that these two factors of the causal process belong to the future life,³ not because these are not part and parcel of this life, but because they represent the effect of rebirth in a summarized form.

1. Pratītyasamutpāda-vyākhyā, p.622.

2. ibid., na pranaśyanti karmāṇi api kalpaśatair api, sāmagriṃ prāpya kālañ ca phalanti khalu dehināṃ.

3. Vism p.578.

Authenticity of the special application.

(232) Doubts have been cast on the authenticity and antiquity of the special application consisting of the twelve factors discussed above mainly because of the existence of other versions.¹ Of special significance is the formula with ten factors, that is, excluding ignorance (avijjā, wu ming 無明) and dispositions (sāṅkhārā, hsing 行); because unlike in some of the versions which differ from the generally accepted formula with twelve factors, here we find the same order of factors as in the special application. A decision as to whether ignorance and dispositions must be taken as addenda for the sake of completeness cannot easily be reached.² The mere existence of still other versions of the formula, as for example the one mentioned in the Atthirāga sutta of the Samyukta, makes it difficult, for reasons given below, to consider the one as late and the other as early. The last mentioned formula runs thus: "Whenever there is attachment, clinging or craving for sustenance (āhāra, shih 食), there consciousness finds a support to grow into maturity; whenever consciousness finds a support, then the psychophysical personality is conceived; where there is conception of the psychophysical personality, there is growth or increase of dispositions; when there is increase of dispositions, there is rebirth in future; where there is rebirth in future, there is birth and death; when there is birth and death, I call it suffering, etc."³ Here the order in which the factors are

1. Conze, Buddhist Thought in India, p.157.
2. The present author too accepted the view that the special application with twelve factors represents the final development, but wishes to change his view in the light of the material presented here. His earlier view is set out in an article, Prolegomena to the Philosophy of Relations in Buddhism, in UCR vol.19, pp.185 ff.
3. S 2.101; TD 2.103a (Tsa.15.10).

placed is somewhat different from that of the special application with twelve factors. We find dispositions (sāṅkhārā, hsing 行) placed after the psychophysical personality (nāmarūpa, ming se 名色), unlike in the special application where it precedes consciousness (viññāṇa, shih 識). Here the aim was to explain how craving for the four forms of sustenance leads to endless misery in the form of birth and death. From this it becomes evident that the Buddha, in his attempt to explain the problem of rebirth and the consequent suffering, varies the causal formulas in accordance with the way he approached a particular problem. But it should be noted that these different statements are not mutually contradictory.

(233) Thus when, in the Nagara sutta, only ten factors are given at the beginning, it does not mean that ignorance (avijjā, wu ming 無明) and dispositions (sāṅkhārā, hsing 行) are later additions for the sake of completeness. Rather, it shows that the text emphasises the present life term beginning with consciousness (viññāṇa, shih 識) and ending with birth and death, which are the results of the craving and grasping that had been accumulating from the time of birth. Therefore after this problem had been explained fully, we find towards the end of the discourse, everything being attributed to the dispositions (sāṅkhāra, hsing 行), the cause of which, in turn, was traced back to ignorance (avijjā, wu ming 無明).¹ Thus as Mrs. Rhys Davids concludes, "In the central

1. S 2.104; TD 2.80c (Tsa.12.5); v. also TD 16.827a, 828b etc.

links we have the working out of the process of sentience, culminating in the central links--sense, feeling, desire--and representing a fresh ebullition, a new source of causal force reaching on into the next birth. There its resultant is renewed sentience, eventually again to be darkened by the inevitable disease-decay-death--a centre of effects in sentience due to causes in the past".¹ These past causes have been simplified and given in abstract form while the present is analysed in detail from conception to grasping after another life. Thus it would be difficult to agree with Beckh who maintains that the idea of the 'chain' cannot be spread over three lives.²

Nature of the special application.

(234) Several attempts have been made to compare this special application of the causal principle with the Sāṅkhya series, based mainly on slender evidence like the similarity of terms used, etc.³ Thus Jacobi and Pischel are of opinion that the theory is derived from Sāṅkhya. Keith sees close parallels. Senart finds burrowings only in the first two terms, the argument being, "if ignorance is, as in Buddhism, empiric, it has no claim to head the list of terms".⁴ The nature of ignorance and the reasons for placing it at the head of the formula has been discussed earlier (v. supra. 208). These views may have originated from a misinterpretation of terms used in the special application as well as a wrong assessment of the

1. ERE 9.673b.

2. v. Keith, Buddhist Philosophy, p.108.

3. ibid., p.99 f.

4. ibid., p.

purpose for which the theory has been formulated. First, the Sāṅkhya theory purports to explain the evolution of the world from the primordial source (prakṛti). No such thing is envisaged by the Buddhist theory, which is mainly intended to explain the problem of rebirth and moral responsibility, especially in relation to the individual (v.supra. 207 ff.). Secondly, since the Sāṅkhya accepted a theory of self-causation (satkāryavāda), according to them each factor in the causal series is produced out of or from the other (v.supra.17). But such a relation is not proposed in the Buddhist theory (v.supra.18). The wrong interpretation of the causal formula by Keith prevented him from agreeing with Oltramare who gave a reasonable analysis of how the theory came to be propounded.¹ Keith is opinion that the suggestions made by Oltramare are ingenious but too coherent and logical to be primitive.²

1. La Formule bouddhique des Douze Causes, pp.28-29.

2. Keith, Buddhist Philosophy, p.107.

CHAPTER SIX.

General applications of the causal principle.

(235) Apart from the special application of the causal principle discussed in the previous chapter, there are several other general applications which throw much light on the Buddha's conception of man and his environment.

Causal description of the evolution of the world.

(236) One of the problems which attracted much attention from the pre-Buddhistic thinkers was that of the origin and development of the world. The keenness of the Indian mind for cosmological speculation is well depicted in the large number of theories put forward during this period. We have seen how speculation starting as far back as the time of the Ṛgveda came to be systematised and assumed final form in the theories of the Upaniṣadic thinkers like Uddālaka (v.supra. 16 ff.). Most of these thinkers accepted a First Cause such as Being (sat) and explained the world as the final product of evolution mostly by way of self-causation. Others who conceived this First Cause in the form of a personal creator God considered the world as the creation of this omnipotent Being (v.supra.29 ff.). As we have seen, most of these views were known to the Pāli Nikāyas and the Chinese Āgamas.

(237) For empirical and logical reasons the Buddha abstained from any discussion of the problem of the origin of the world.¹ He emphatically declared that "it is not possible to know or determine the first beginning of the cycle of existence of

1. Jayatilleke, Knowledge, p.475.

the beings who wander therein deluded by ignorance and obsessed by craving".¹ Although the question of the origin of the world was left unanswered by the Buddha, he found it necessary to give a rational explanation of the problem of evolution, especially in order to refute the claims of the Brahmin caste to superiority for which they made use of the theory of creation of the world by Brahmā. Thus the Aggaññā Suttanta,² which discusses the evolution of the world process, was preached in order to explain the evolution of the existing social order, namely, the four castes.³

1. S 2.178 ff., anamataggo'yaṃ ... saṃsāro pubbakoṭi na paññāyati avijjānīvaraṇānaṃ sattānaṃ taṇhāsaññojanānaṃ sandhāvataṃ saṃsarataṃ.
TD 2.485c (Pieh-i-tsa.16.1), 生死長遠 無有邊際。
無有能知其根源者。一切衆生皆爲無明之所覆蓋。愛結所使纏繫其頸

v. also TD 2.214b (Tsa.34.1). It is interesting to note that the phrase anamatagga occurring in the Pāli version and which means "inconceivable is the beginning", is in most of the Buddhist Sanskrit texts (v. Edgerton, BHSD p.21) found to occur as anavarāgra. In the Mādhyamaka Kārikā (11.1), Nāgārjuna says: Pūrvā prajñāyate koṭir netyuvāca mahāmuniḥ, saṃsāro'navarāgro hi nāsyādir nāpi paścimaḥ. (v. Jacques May, Chandrakīrti, Prasannapadā Mādhyamakavṛtti, Paris, 1959, p.170). Although the term anavarāgra means "sans début ni terme" (May, op.cit., p.170), the Agama version seems to imply "without prior limit" (wu yu pen chi 無有本際, TD 2.214b). Again comparing the two terms anamatagga and anavarāgra, it seems that the former is more in keeping with the teachings of early Buddhism than the latter. The term anavarāgra as well as the Agama version, 無有邊際 or 無有本際, imply a positive denial of a beginning, whereas the term anamatagga implies the difficulties of knowing or determining the beginning, hence an epistemological rather than an ontological problem.

2. D 3.80 ff.; Hsiao-yüan-ching 小緣經 TD 1.36b ff. (Chang.6.1).
3. The Chinese version, unlike the Pāli version, specifically states this: 今當爲汝說四姓本緣 TD 1.37b.

(238) Without positing a First Cause such as the Being (sat) of Uddālaka, the Buddha, after having stated that the beginning of the cycle of existence (samsāra) is difficult to know and determine, described the world as being subject to a process of dissolution (saṃvaṭṭa, huai 壞) and evolution (vivaṭṭa, pian 變). The description runs thus:

"There comes a time, ... when, sooner or later, after the lapse of a very long period, this world passes away (or is destroyed). And when this happens, beings (who have reached the end of their life span¹) are reborn in the world of Radiance;² and there they dwell, made of mind, they feed on rapture, are self-luminous, traverse in the air, remain in glory and thus they stay for a long period of time. There comes also a time, ... when, sooner or later, this world begins to re-evolve. (When this happens, beings who have passed away from the world of Radiance,³ usually come to life as humans. And they too are made of mind, they feed on rapture, are self-luminous, traverse the air, abide in glory and remain thus for a long time⁴)".

(239) Whatever the credibility of the above description be, it illustrates two important features of the Buddhist cosmological speculations.⁵ First, it implies that the world in

1. 衆生命終 (not found in the Pāli version).
2. The etymology of the term ābhassara has presented problems and the PTSD derives it from ābhā + sva, 'to shine', and takes the word to mean "shining in splendour" (p.103). The Chinese translators seem to have followed an existing traditional explanation when they rendered it as kuang yin (光音), i.e., bright speech (ābhā=bright, sva=syllable).
3. Here the Chinese version adds: "On account of the exhaustion of merit (福盡 = pūññakkhaya?) and the termination of the life span (命盡 = āyukkaya?)".
4. In Chinese the section within parenthesis is given later another passage.
5. v. Malalasekera and Jayatilleke, Buddhism and the Race Question, p.32 ff.

which we live is only a small part of an extensive universe. Although speculation about the origin and extent of the universe is generally discouraged in early Buddhism, yet the vastness of space and the immensity of time are never lost sight of. In this vastness of cosmic space are to be found an endless number of worlds of which this earth is only a very small part. The above passage from the Aggaññā Suttanta implies that there can be mutual influence between these different worlds. Thus when the earth undergoes a process of dissolution, beings living there are reborn in another sphere, whence they come back to earth as it starts evolving again. In this manner, a continuity is maintained amidst dissolution and evolution without there being complete extinction of life. Such speculations enabled the Buddhists to avoid the question of the beginning of the world process and therefore of life. Secondly, it emphasises the immeasurable length of time between dissolution and evolution and also between evolution and dissolution. These processes of evolution and dissolution take immensely long periods of time measured in aeons (kappa, chieh 劫). The duration of a single aeon is such that it can only be explained by parables.¹ Several such parables are utilised, one of which is as follows: "If there were to be a great mountain, one league in width, one league in length and one league in height, a solid mass without chasms or clefts. And a man at the end of every hundred years were to strike it once each time with a kāsī cloth, that mountain would be sooner done away with and ended than would an aeon".²

1. S 2.181-184; TD 2.242a-243b (Tsa.34.8-15).
2. S 2.181; TD 2.242c (Tsa.34.10).

(240) Describing the relative beginning of the process of evolution (vivaṭṭa, pien 變), the Aggaññā Suttanta says:

"Now at that time, all had become one world of water, encircled by dense darkness. Neither moon nor sun appeared. No stars or constellations were seen. Neither was night manifest nor day, (neither months nor half-months), neither seasons nor years, (neither female nor male)".¹

This passage is strongly reminiscent of the description in the Nāsadiya Sūkta of the R̥gveda.² This is an instance where the Buddha, in order to explain the relative beginning of the period of evolution, made use of current speculations which were not inconsistent with his own philosophy. It seems that in order to be consistent with the description of the state of the world at the time of evolution, the Buddha maintained that beings of the world of Radiance were self-luminous and capable of traversing the air and continued to be so even after being reborn on this earth because no other beings could be expected to survive under such conditions.

(241) Another stage in the process of evolution is described in the next passage which runs thus:

"And to those beings, ... sooner or later, after a long period of time, the earth with its savour was spread out in the waters.³ (Even as scum forms on the surface of boiled milky rice that is cooling, so did the earth appear⁴). It became endowed with colour, odour and taste.

1. Passages in parenthesis are not found in the Chinese version.

2. 10.129.1-4.

3. According to the Chinese version, the earth gushed forth or bubbled up like a fountain and this was in appearance like cheese or honey.

4. This simile does not occur in the Chinese version.

Even as well-made ghee or pure butter, so was its colour; even as the flawless honey of the bee, so sweet it was. Then ... one of the beings with greedy disposition said, 'Lo now! What will this be?' and tasted the savoury earth with his fingers. He, thus tasting, because suffused with the savour and was overcome by craving. Other beings, who followed his example and tasted the savoury earth with their fingers, were also suffused with the savour and overcome by craving. Then those beings began to feast on the savoury earth, breaking off lumps of it with their hands. And as a result their self-luminosity faded away. Thereupon the moon and the sun became manifest. When the moon and the sun became manifest, night and day became manifest. After this, the seasons and years became manifest. Thus far did the world evolve".

(242) Comparing the description of the evolution of the world given above with the theories put forward by the earlier thinkers like Mahīdāsa (v.supra.9 ff.) and Uddālaka (v.supra.16), it is possible to determine one of the salient features of the Buddhist theory of evolution. Unlike the theories of Mahīdāsa and Uddālaka where the basic pattern according to which things evolve is one of self-causation, here we find the application of the general formula of causality of the form, "When this exists, that becomes; etc." (v.supra.188). This is especially illustrated by the last part of the above description in the Pāli version, where as in the case of the general formula, the Locative Absolute construction is used: sayam pabhāya antarahitāya candimasuriyā pāturaḥamsu; candimasurīyesu pātubhūtesu nakkhattāni tāraḥarūpāni pāturaḥamsu.

(243) Although the account of the evolution of the world from a chaotic state given in the Aggaññā Suttanta is no more than a hypothetical description, as every description of the origin of the world would be, it reveals, as Professor Rhys Davids has observed, "a sound and healthy insight and is much nearer to actual facts than the Brahman legend it was intended to replace".¹ The importance of it lies mainly in the fact that it gives a causal account of physical change.

Causal description of the dissolution of the world.

(244) The foregoing causal account of the evolution of the world should be supplemented by the causal account of the dissolution which is found in the Anguttara.² While explaining the impermanent nature of all component things (sāṅkhārā, hsing 行) with a view to inculcate the doctrine of renunciation, the Buddha describes how the great earth would be destroyed by a cosmic catastrophe. Following is a summary of the description of the process by which the world dissolves.

"There comes a time after many hundreds of thousands of years, when there will be no rain. All vegetation, including the giant trees of the forests will be dried up by the heat of the sun and destroyed.³ After a further long period, a second sun appears as a result

1. Dial 1.107.

2. A 4.100-103; TD 2.736b-c (Tseng.40.1).

3. According to the Chinese version, it is at this stage that the small rivers and the water spouts, nay, even the four great rivers would be completely dried up, a phenomenon which occurs, according to the Pāli version, after the appearance of the second sun.

of which all the streams and water spouts will dry up and disappear.¹ With the appearance of a third sun, the great rivers² will be parched and dried up without leaving a trace behind. The huge lakes which are the sources of the great rivers will be completely dried up when a fourth sun appears. The appearance of a fifth sun will be the cause of the gradual drying up and disappearance of the four great oceans. The waters of the four great oceans will recede a hundred leagues and so on until they reach seven hundred leagues. Then the waters remaining at a depth of seven palm trees³ will gradually dry up so that they remain in depth up to a man's ankle. What is left is comparable to puddles of water left in the footprints of cows during an autumnal rain.⁴ With the appearance of the sixth sun, both this earth and the Sumeru, the king of mountains, begin to belch forth clouds of smoke. Lastly, when a seventh sun appears, the earth bursts into flames becoming a single sheet of fire".

(245) Here too we find the application of the general formula of causality to explain the gradual process of dissolution, as is illustrated by the statements such as: deve kho pana avassante, ye kec'ime bījagāmabhūtagāmaosadhitiṇavanappatādayo te ussussanti vinassissanti na bhavanti, i.e., when there is

1. According to the Chinese version, the appearance of the second sun is followed by the drying up and destruction of all vegetation.
2. While the Pāli version refers to five rivers, namely, Gaṅgā, Yamunā, Aciravatī, Sarabhū and Mahī, the Chinese version mentions only four, viz., Gaṅgā, Sindhu, Śītā and Oxus.
3. The account in the Chinese version starts with seven hundred leagues and going down to one league.
4. This simile is not found in the Chinese version.

no rain, whatever seed life and vegetation such as herbs, grass and trees would be parched and dried up and will disappear. The account of the gradual increase in the number of suns appearing in the sky may be taken as a poetic way of describing the increase of the heat of the sun which is believed to cause the destruction or dissolution of the earth.

Causality of earthquakes.

(246) In the early Buddhist texts we come across a causal account of the earthquakes (bhūmicāla, ti tung 地動). While the Anguttara Nikāya and its Chinese counterpart¹ enumerate eight causes for the occurrence of earthquakes, the Madhyama Āgama² gives three causes. Of these, the first is a purely physical cause. Discussing this physical cause, it is said: "The great earth is established in water, water on air and air is contained in the sky. There comes a time when great winds blow across the sky. When great winds blow, the waters are disturbed; when the waters are disturbed, the earth is disturbed. This is the cause of the earthquakes".³ The first part of this description giving a close description between the different spheres, namely, earth, water and air, seems to be an echo of a description found in the Brhadāranyaka Upaniṣad.⁴ The Buddhist contribution lies in the fact that while making use of the existing cosmological speculations which are not inconsistent with the main doctrines of Buddhism,

1. A 4.312; TD 2.753c (Tseng.37.5).

2. TD 1.477b (Chung.9.1).

3. The account in the Madhyama Āgama (Chung.9.1) agrees more with the Pāli version than the account given in the Ekottara Āgama (Tseng.37.5).

4. 3.6.

it gives a causal account of a purely physical phenomenon. What is really significant is that at a time when mythological speculations dominated such descriptions, the Buddhist have adduced physical causal explanations.¹

Causal account of the failure of rain.

(247) Another instance of physical causation is to be found in the *Anguttara Nikāya* where an attempt has been made to account for the failure of rain (vassassa antarāya).²

It is said: "If the element of heat (tejodhātu) in the atmosphere above is to be turbulent or increased (pakuppati), then the rain clouds which have already formed would be driven away by that", or again "if the element of air (vāyodhātu) in the atmosphere above is turbulent (pakuppati), the rain clouds which have already formed would be driven away by it". The cooling of moist air seems to have been looked upon as the cause of rain when it was held that there would be no rain if the heat element in the upper region of the sky were to increase. It is also interesting to note that wind turbulence has also been considered as one of the causes for the absence of rain.³

1. Even with the great strides made by physical sciences today, it is believed that "the attempts to explain the origin of these movements—the ultimate causes of earthquakes—are very nearly in the realm of pure speculation", Encyclopaedia Britannica, 7.856b.
2. A 3.243. It has not been possible to trace this passage in the Chinese *Āgamas*.
3. Encyclopaedia Britannica, 15.353a.

Causality of plant life.

(248) Every now and then there are references in the Pāli Nikāyas and the Chinese Āgamas to the causality of plant life. Most of these discussions have been occasioned by an attempt to explain the causality of either the human personality¹ or psychic facts² or even moral behaviour.³ Thus we find analogies being drawn between the growth of plants and the arising of the human personality. As an explanation of the process by which a person comes to be reborn in an inferior existence, it has been said: "Behaviour is the field, consciousness the seed, and craving the moisture which cause beings, who are deluded by ignorance and obsessed by craving, to be reborn in an inferior existence".⁴ There are many similar illustrations which would enable us to give an account of the Buddha's views about plant life.

(249) An instance of a causal explanation of the germination of a seed has already been mentioned (v.supra.127). It was pointed out that a seed (bīja, chung tzu 種子) when sown in a field (khette vuttam) would grow up if it is supplied with the essence of the earth (paṭhavirasa, ti 地⁵) and

1. S 1.134; TD 2.327b (Tsa.45.6); 455a (Pieh-i-tsa.12.6);
2. S 3.54; TD 2.9a (Tsa.2.7); A 1.223 f.
2. A 1.135, 136; 3.404.
3. A 1.134-135; TD 1.647b (Chung.34.6); Sn 77; Thag 363, 388.
4. A 1.223-224, Iti kho Ananda kammaṃ khettaṃ viññānaṃ bījaṃ taṇhā sineho aviḍḍhānānaṃ sattānaṃ taṇhāsamyojanānaṃ hīnāya dhātuyā viññānaṃ paṭiṭṭhitaṃ ... We have not been able to trace this passage in the Āgamas, but it seems to have been known to the compiler of the Arya Śālistamba Sūtra (p.84).
5. The Pāli version takes "the essence of earth" as a causal factor while the Chinese gives only earth (ti 地). The latter is preferred in the Arya Śālistamba Sūtra which considers earth as a support or basis (sandhāraṇakṛtyaṃ karoti). Buddhaghosa too gives a similar explanation: "Earth is the supporting earth below" (paṭhavī'ti heṭṭhā paṭiṭṭhānapaṭhavī, SA 2.272).

moisture (sineha, shui 水). The Chinese version adds two more factors, namely, temperature (huo 火) and air (feng 風).¹ A more detailed description is to be found in the Arya Śālistamba Sūtra according to which the earth (prthivi), water (āpas), light (tejas), air (vāyu), space (ākāśa) and season (ṛtu) are essential factors for the germination of a seed.²

(250) Of the factors mentioned above, the seed (bīja, chung tzu 種子) and the earth (pathavi, ti 地) or the field (khetta) have been analysed further. The Samyutta Nikāya³ and its Chinese counterpart⁴ refer to five types of seeds, namely, those that germinate from (a) the root,⁵ (b) the trunk,⁶ (c) the bud,⁷ (d) the joint⁸ and (e) the seed.⁹

1. TD 2.327b (Tsa.45.6); 455a (Pieh-i-tsa.12.6).

2. p.74.

3. S 3.54.

4. TD 2.8c (Tsa.2.7); v. also TD 1.147c (Chang.22.2); 593a (Chung.26.2).

5. i.e., mūlabīja, ken chung tzu 根種子. As examples of this kind Buddhaghosa (SA 2.272) gives tumeric, ginger and such kinds of roots which can propagate.

6. Khandhabīja, hsing chung tzu 莖種子 and sometimes referred to as shu chung tzu 木樹種子 (TD 1.593a, Chung.26.2). Examples given by Buddhaghosa (loc.cit.) are the fig and the banyan.

7. Aggabīja. PTSD takes the term to mean "having eggs from above" (opp. of mūla), ... i.e., propagated by slips or cuttings" (p.4). Examples given by Buddhaghosa are very obscure. If we are to accept the interpretation in the PTSD, then we cannot accept the order in which the five kinds of seeds are enumerated in the Pāli and Chinese versions. This is because chieh chung tzu 節種子 coincides clearly with phalubīja and the rendering of aggabīja would then be tzu lo chung tzu 自落種子 which means "a seed that falls (on its own)" which reminds us the way in which some plants like the cactus propagate.

8. Phalubīja, chieh chung tzu 節種子 or plants propagated from joints, e.g., sugar-cane, bamboo and reed.

9. Bijabīja, shih chung tzu 實種子, those which germinate from seeds, e.g., paddy, beans, etc.

(251) The capacity of a seed to germinate is said to depend on several factors or conditions pertaining to the seed itself.¹ If these conditions are not met within the seed, then it would not serve the purpose of a seed.² First, the seed should not be broken or damaged.³ Secondly, it should be fresh and not rotten.⁴ Thirdly, it should not be destroyed by wind and heat,⁵ and fourthly, it must be possessed of essence.⁶ Thus in general if a seed does not possess these characteristics it would not be able to germinate and there would be no causal efficiency. Moreover, the seed should be well embedded for some time before it is planted should it be expected to produce a shoot.⁷

1. S 3.54; A, 1.135-136; 3.404; TD 2.8c-9a (Tsa.2.7); 1.601b-c (Chung.27.6); v. also Fo-shuo-lo-nuu-feng-ching 佛說阿耨羅風經 TD 1.853c ff. (No.58).
2. SA 2.272, *bijatthāya na upakappati*.
3. Akhaṇḍāni, 不斷不壞 or 不壞不破. Buddhaghosa maintains that a seed, from the time it is damaged, would not serve the purpose of a seed, i.e., would not sprout forth (loc.cit.).
4. Apūtīni, 不腐 which is defined by Buddhaghosa as "not rotten as a result of being soaked in water" (loc.cit.).
5. Avātātapahatāni which corresponds more with the Chung-o-han passage 不為風熱所傷 (TD 1.601c) than with the passage in the Tsa-o-han (TD 2.8c-9a) which merely has 不中風. Buddhaghosa says that when a seed is exposed to wind and sun it is deprived of its essence (*nirojataṃ pāpitāni*) and a seed without essence would not germinate (loc.cit.).
6. Sārādāni.
7. Sukhasayitāni. The Chinese version says that the seed should be left under cover during the autumn time 秋時密藏. The same idea is expressed by Buddhaghosa when he said that "it should be left in a store-room or nursery for about four months" (*cattāro māse koṭṭhe pakkhittaniyāmen'eva sukhaṃ sayitāni*), before being planted (loc.cit.).

(252) Since the nature of the field (khetta, t'ien 田) in which the seeds are planted is said to determine their germination and growth, the Buddhists have paid great attention to an analysis of the different kinds of fields depending on their suitability for cultivation. In one place the fields are said to be of three kinds,¹ namely, the best,² the moderate and the inferior,³ the last being unsuited for cultivation because it is sandy, saline and rough.⁴ More details are given in the Anguttara Nikāya which discusses eight types of fields which are not suitable for cultivation. They are the lands which are (i) undulating, (ii) covered with sand and gravel, (iii) saline, (iv) not resting in depth of soil and not well founded, (v) and (vi) with no drainage, (vii) without water courses and (viii) without demarkations.⁵ Such land is said to be unsuited for cultivation, while that which has the opposite characteristics is believed to yield best results.⁶ Even a piece of good land should be properly prepared before any cultivation is possible;⁷ a detailed description of how this is done is given in the Vinaya Piṭaka.⁸

1. S 4.315; TD 2.231a (Tsa.32.11).

2. Agga. It is defined in the Chinese text as "rich and fertile" 沃壤肥澤.

3. Hīna, or according to the Chinese version "barren" 瘠薄.

4. Jangalam ūsaṇaṃ pāpabhūmikaṃ.

5. A 4.237, Atthangasamannāgate, ... khetta bījaṃ vuttaṃ na mahapphalaṃ hoti na mahassādaṃ na phātiseyyaṃ. Idha ... khettaṃ unnāmininnāmi ca hoti pāsāṇasakkharillaṃ ca hoti, ūsaṇaṃ ca hoti, na ca gambhīrasitaṃ hoti, na āyāmasampannaṃ hoti, na apāyasampannaṃ hoti, na mātikāsampannaṃ hoti, na mariyādāsampannaṃ hoti.

6. *ibid.*, p.239.

7. A 1.135, suparikammakatāya bhūmiyā nikkhattāni.

8. 2.180-181.

(253) Another important condition necessary for the germination of a seed is the presence of moisture (sineha or āpo, shui 水). Even a seed possessed of all the characteristics mentioned above and which is sown in a well prepared field would not germinate and grow into maturity if it is not supplied with the necessary quantity of moisture,¹ either in the form of rain² or by way of water courses (v. supra. 252). Moisture is an essential factor for the continued growth of a plant and "if a young seed were to be deprived of water there would be change in its growth".³

Causality of the human personality.

(254) Some aspects of the causality of the human personality were discussed in the previous chapter when explaining the special application of the causal principle. Further information is to be found in the early Buddhist texts, an examination of which would throw much light on this problem.

(255) In the Nikāyas and the Āgamas, the human personality is generally represented by the term nāmarūpa or ming se (名色) and sometimes ming hsiang (名像) where nāma or ming represents the psychic personality and rūpa or se (hsiang) stands for the physical personality. This is further expanded when man is explained in terms of elements (dhātu, chieh 界).⁴ They are the elements of earth (pathavi, ti 地), water (āpa, shui 水), heat (tejo, huo 火), air (vāyu, feng 風), space (ākāsa, k'ung 空).

1. S 3.54 f.; TD 2.8c f. (Tsa. 2.7).

2. A 1.135-136; 3.404; TD 1.601b-c (Chung. 27.6).

3. S 3.91-92, Seyyathā'pi nāma bījānaṃ taruṇānaṃ udakam alabhantānaṃ siyā aññathattaṃ siyā vipariṇāmo.

4. M 3.239, chadhāturō'yaṃ ... puriso'ti. TD 1.690b (Chung. 42.1). For an idealistic interpretation of the theory of six elements, v. Schayer, Precanonical Buddhism, p. 130.

and consciousness (viññāna, shih 識).¹ Here the psychic personality is represented by one element, namely, consciousness, while the physical personality has been analysed further in order to show that a permanent element such as a soul (ātman) posited by the Upaniṣadic thinkers is absent. But this analysis of the human personality into six elements was not so popular as another classification according to which personality could be reduced to five aggregates (khandha, yin 陰). In this latter classification the physical personality is represented by one aggregate, namely, material form (rūpa, se 色), while the psychic personality is further analysed into four aggregates. They are feeling (vedanā, shou 受), sensation (saññā, hsiang 想) dispositions (sāṅkhārā, hsing 行) and consciousness (viññāna, shih 識). The raison d'être of the predominance of this five-fold classification was the tendency on the part of the Upaniṣadic thinkers to find a perduring soul which is more of a psychical character than material.² With regard to these five aggregates, we agree with Mrs. Rhys Davids when she said: "There is here no order in function and evolution".³ The four immaterial aggregates merely represent the different aspects of the psychic personality which, in the earlier classification, was denoted only by the element of consciousness (viññāna, shih 識). These five have been called the five aggregates of grasping (upādānakkhandha, shou yin 受陰⁴) because they

1. Although man is said to be composed of six elements, the Pāli version enumerates only five omitting the element of water (āpo).
2. Ch 8.8.1 ff., where the ātman is progressively defined starting with the theory that it is the physical body. But this view is rejected in favour of the view that the ātman is best represented by the mind in the Turiya state.
3. Buddhist Psychology, (London, 1914), p. 41.
4. Sometimes rendered as ch'eng yin (盛陰), v. TD 1.464c (Chung.7.8); 788a-b (Chung.58.1); but better translated as ch'ü yun (取蘊), v. TD 2.499c (No.102).

represent the five factors to which a person clings as his personality.¹ It is specifically stated that these five aggregates of grasping, constituting what may be called a personality, are causally conditioned (paṭiccasamuppanna, yin yüan sheng 因緣生).²

(256) Explaining the causality of the human personality it was pointed out that conception of a being takes place as a result of three factors (v. supra. 222). They are: (i) the coitus of the parents, (ii) the mother should have her period and (iii) the presence of a gandhabba (hsiang yin 香陰). The first of these accounts for the seed which goes to form the physical personality (rūpa, se 色). This is clearly expressed in the Hsiang-chi-yü-ching³ where it is said that the physical body, which consists of matter, is derived from the four gross elements, and is born from the parents and sustained by liquid and gross food.⁴ The second and third conditions describe the circumstances under which the seed provided by the parents would grow up in the mother's womb. Even though the seed is provided by the union of the parents, if the mother were not to have her period and if a gandhabba (hsiang yin 香陰) were not present, then that seed could not germinate.⁵ Of these two circumstances,

1. M 1.299, Pañca kho me ... upādānakkhandhā sakkāyo vutto Bhagavatā; TD 1.788a (Chung.58.1).
2. M 1.191, Paṭiccasamuppannā kho pan'ime ... pañcupādānakkhandhā; TD 1.467a (Chung.7.2).
3. 身跡家經 (Chung.7.2) TD 1.464b ff. Cp. Mahā Hatthi-padopama sutta, M.1.184 ff.
4. TD 1.465b (Chung.7.2), 我受此身色法麤質四大之種從父母生飲食長養.
Cp. D 1.76, So evaṃ pajānāti: ayaṃ kho me kāyo rūpī cātummahābhūṭiko mātāpettikasambhavo odanakummāsa-upacayo ...
5. M 1.265-266.

the first is purely a temporal one. The latter is very significant in that it determines the nature of the psychic personality of the newly born individual. Gandhabba (hsiang yin 香陰) in the above context was identified with consciousness (viññāna, shih 識) which is described as "the psychic factor that survives physical death and that by entering the womb helps in the development of a new individuality in conjunction with the bio-physical factors" (v.supra.220). The Chinese translation of a passage describing the three factors necessary for the conception of a being, confirms the above statement because it uses the term shih shen 識神 as the equivalent of hsiang yin 香陰 (=gandhabba).¹ According to a passage quoted earlier (v.supra.248), consciousness is the seed (bīja) which gives rise to a new existence (bhava) and therefore, a series of future births (punabbhavābhiniḥḥatti). In another place, consciousness is said to serve as food (āhāra, shih 食) for beings who are born as well as those seeking birth (sambhavesī).² The word viññāna (shih 識) is here used in an eschatological rather than a psychological sense.

(257) Let us examine the question of rebirth a little further. Dr.Sarathchandra has made a determined attempt to reject the view that rebirth constituted one of the central tenets of early Buddhism.³ He points out that Mrs.Rhys Davids, in her earlier book on Buddhist psychology, has suggested that the

1. TD 2.603a (Tseng.12.3). The parallel passage is to be found in the Mahā Tanhāsankhaya sutta, M 1.265-266.
2. M 1.261; TD 1.767c (Chung.54.2).
3. Buddhist Psychology of Perception, (Colombo,1958), p.18 ff.

belief in viññāna as a transmigrating entity is an intrusion into Buddhist thought from the folklore religion.¹ This is a complete misrepresentation of the views of Mrs. Rhys Davids. What Mrs. Rhys Davids seems to suggest is not that the belief in viññāna as a transmigrating entity is an intrusion from folklore religion, but that the garb in which it is presented in some of the texts, especially in the Mahā Nidāna Suttanta, "may be a case of folklore speech adopted by the Suttanta teaching".² Thus what she states in her later book on the same subject is not different. Dr. Sarathchandra also finds that the interpretation given in the Mahā Nidāna Suttanta to the statement viññānapaccayā nāmarūpaṃ is peculiar and that it is due probably to the influence of this non-Buddhist belief, i.e., the belief in rebirth. He insists that we should not take this as representative of the original Buddhist position.³ The reason for this is that he sees contradiction in the statement in the Mahā Nidāna Suttanta where the question is raised as to whether the psychophysical personality would grow up into maturity if consciousness were not to enter the mother's womb.⁴ Dr. Sarathchandra maintains that, "The very contradiction inherent in the explanation shows it up as a later intrusion. It is said that, if viññāna did not descend into the mother's womb, the growth of nāmarūpa would be prevented. If nāmarūpa here stands for the whole individual composed of mental and psychic factors, we should have to regard

1. Buddhist Psychology of Perception, p.20.
2. Buddhist Psychology, p.22; v.also pp.20-21.
3. Buddhist Psychology of Perception, p.20.
4. ibid.

viññāna as something over and above nāmarūpa, a position which is not consistent with the rest of the Buddhist teaching. Nāmarūpa, whenever it stood for the individual, always included viññāna as well".¹ Let us see whether this is a correct interpretation of the early Buddhist texts.

(258) In the Ānguttara it is stated that "conception (gabbhassāvakkanti, sheng mu t'ai 生母胎) is dependent on the six elements, and when there is conception there comes into existence the psychophysical personality (nāmarūpa)".² In fact, here conception is identical with the arising of the psychophysical personality. This is confirmed by another passage in the Samyutta which says: "That which is thought of, that which is reflected upon and that which is dwelt upon, that becomes the basis (lit., object, ārammaṇa) for the establishment of consciousness. Where there is a basis, there consciousness is provided with a foothold. When consciousness is established thereon and develops, then there is the conception of the psychophysical personality (nāmarūpassāvakkanti, ju yu ming se 入有名色)".³ Thus the two terms gabbha (mu t'ai 母胎) and nāmarūpa (ming se 名色) in the two phrases gabbhassāvakkanti and nāmarūpassāvakkanti may be taken as synonyms. If so, nāmarūpa (ming se 名色) stands for a

1. Buddhist Psychology of Perception, p.20.
2. A 1.176, Channaṃ ... dhātūnaṃ upādāya gabbhassāvakkanti hoti, okkantiyā sati nāmarūpaṃ, TD 1.435c (Chung.3.3) reads: "Because of the harmony of the six elements, there is conception. Because of the six elements, the six senses come into being". In the special application, the six senses are said to depend on the psychophysical personality. Therefore it seems that the six elements represent the man consisting of these elements, i.e., nāmarūpa.
3. S 2.66, yañ ca ... ceteti yañ ca pakappeti yañ ca anuseti ārammaṇaṃ etaṃ hoti viññānaṃsa t̥hitiyā, ārammaṇe sati patiṭṭhā viññānaṃsa hoti, tasmim̐ patiṭṭhite viññāne virūl̥he nāmarūpassāvakkanti hoti; TD 2.100b (Tsa.14.19).

completed conception (gabbha, mu t'ai 母胎), i.e., an individual consisting of psychic and physical factors. This, as pointed out earlier, is said to depend on the six elements, including the element of consciousness (viññādhātu, shih chieh 識界). But the material elements were said to be derived from the parents (v.supra.256), not the element of consciousness. The Buddha disagreed with the Materialists when they held that consciousness is a by-product of matter, as intoxicating liquor is the product of the combination of the several ingredients (v.supra.54,95). He held the view that consciousness is a survival from the past, which in conjunction with the bio-physical factors provided by the parents constitute the new personality. The bio-physical factors would not produce or grow up into a psychophysical personality (nāmarūpa, ming se 名色) if consciousness (viññāna, shih 識) were not to enter the mother's womb. To adopt the translation of the Mahā Nidāna Suttanta passage given by Mrs. Rhys Davids, "Were viññāna, . . ., not to descend into the mother's womb, would body and mind become constituted therein?".¹ If the statement in the Mahā Nidāna Suttanta were to be understood in this manner, then there would not be the contradiction which Dr. Sarathchandra sees in it.

(259) While the term viññāna (shih 識) was used in passages describing process of rebirth, it was also employed in the descriptions of the attainment of enlightenment, because enlightenment culminates in the cessation of rebirth.²

1. Buddhist Psychology, p.22.

2. With the realization of the attainment of enlightenment it is said that one realises the fact that one has put an end to rebirth (khīnā jāti, sheng i chin 生已盡).

In the Samyutta we come across two passages describing the passing away, immediately after the attainment of enlightenment, of two of the disciples of the Buddha. They are Godhika¹ and Vakkhali.² According to this description, they "attained perfect release with consciousness finding no support or basis (appatiṭṭhitena viññānena parinibbuto)", which statement too has been brushed aside by Dr. Sarathchandra as another popular interpretation.³ The fact that the word viññāna in this context is used in an eschatological sense is further proved by the Chinese rendering. The statement appatiṭṭhitena viññānena has been rendered into Chinese as wu yu shen shih 無有神識 (that is, there is no rebirth consciousness)⁴ or as pu chu shih shen 不住識神 (i.e., without a continuity in rebirth consciousness).⁵ As pointed out earlier, the phrase shen shih 神識 has been used to render the idea expressed by the phrase hsiang yin 香陰 (=gandhabba) denoting an eschatological concept (v. supra. 256).

(260) The qualification of the term for consciousness, namely, shih (識) with the character shen (神) is very interesting, especially in view of the fact that shen (神) is used to translate the word atta (ātman) in the sense of a soul.⁶

1. S 1.122; TD 2.286b (Tsa.39.11); 383a (Pieh-i-tsa.2.8).
2. S 3.124; TD 2.347b (Tsa.47.25).
3. Buddhist Psychology of Perception, p.20, n.65.
4. TD 2.383a(12) (Pieh-i-tsa.2.8) which is more close to the Pāli version.
5. TD 2.347b(11) (Tsa.47.25).
6. TD 1.596b,c (Chung.26.4) Hsiang-ching 想經 = Mūlapariyāya sutta, M.1.1 ff. It should be noted that the term shen (神) is never used alone, in the Chinese Agamas, to denote consciousness which survives death.

This conception of viññāna no doubt created problems even during the time of the Buddha. We find one of the immediate disciples of the Buddha, Sātī by name, holding on to the belief that "it is this consciousness which transmigrates without change".¹ Questioned by the Buddha as to what he means by this 'consciousness', Sātī replied: "It is that which speaks, feels and experiences the effects of good and bad deeds".² From this it becomes clear that he was admitting the existence of a subject or agent within the psychophysical personality, an agent of all the actions as well as the enjoyer of all the experiences. The reasons why the Buddha refused to contribute to such views were discussed earlier (v. supra, 26). This, therefore, is a very clear attempt to interpret the Buddha's teaching as being not much different from those of the Upaniṣads, an interpretation which has its modern supporters.³ Rejecting this idea of a permanent consciousness which functions as the subject or agent, the Buddha insisted that he has "in many ways spoken of consciousness as being causally produced and that apart from causes there would be no arising of consciousness".⁴

1. M 1.256, Taḍ eva idaṃ viññānaṃ sandhāvati saṃsarati anaññaṃ. TD 1.766c (Chung.54.2), 今此識往生不更異, which specifically states that consciousness does not change or alter.
2. M 1.258, yvāyaṃ ... vado vedeyyo tatra tatra kalyānapāpakānaṃ kammānaṃ vipākaṃ paṭisaṃvedetī'ti. TD 1.767a (Chung.54.2), 謂此識說覺作教作起等起。謂彼作善惡業而受報也, which says that consciousness is "the doer as well as the causer to do, etc."; v. also Miln pp.54-56, 86 f.
3. Mrs. Rhys Davids, KS 3.viii. E. Zurcher points out that, "The Chinese (not unreasonably) were unable to see in the doctrine of rebirth anything else than an affirmation of a survival of a 'soul' (shen 神) after death", v. The Buddhist Conquest of China, (Leiden, 1959), p.11.
4. M 1.256-257, Nanū mayā anekapariyāyena paṭiccasamuppannaṃ viññānaṃ vuttam, aññaṭṭha paccayā natthi viññānaṃ sambhavo'ti. TD 1.766c (Chung.54.2).

The above use of the term consciousness (viññāna, shih 識) as a form of connecting link between two existences would render baseless Dr. Sarathchandra's view that the concept of viññāna in an eschatological sense is not part and parcel of the early teachings. Moreover, while explaining the connection between consciousness and the psychophysical personality, the Cheng-wei-shih-lun maintains that vijñāna in this context refers to the eighth vijñāna, i.e., the ālaya-vijñāna, because the other seven forms of consciousness are not continuous.¹ The fact is that the term viññāna (shih 識), like the term sāṅkhāra (hsing 行), is used in the early Buddhist texts in a wide variety of meanings which Dr. Sarathchandra has failed to distinguish. There are at least three important uses of the term viññāna (shih 識) which can be clearly distinguished. First, it is used to denote psychic phenomena in general, synonymous with the terms citta, hsin 心 "mind" and mano, 意 "thought".² Secondly, it stood for the connecting link between two lives, a form of consciousness which was later designated rebirth consciousness (paṭisandhiviññāna), and thirdly, it was used to describe a complete act of cognition or perception (v. infra. 269). While the first of these refers to psychic life in general, the last two represent two important aspects of consciousness.

(261) The difficulty faced by Dr. Sarathchandra was in the matter of reconciling the last two meanings of the term viññāna as it occurs in the Pāli Nikāyas. In his attempt to Empiricism

1. TD 31.17-a-b (Cheng.3); v. also Siddhi, pp.199-200.
2. S 2.94, cittam iti pi mano iti pi viññānam, where the words are used synonymously; TD 2.81 (Tsa.12.7).

which takes only sensory experience as a valid form of knowing,¹ Dr. Sarathchandra was led on to reject every statement in the Pāli Nikāyas which explains the theory of rebirth as being later interpolations or popular interpretations, because rebirth was a phenomenon that could not be directly verified by means of sensory experience. But coming down to the Abhidhamma he found how rebirth consciousness and perceptive consciousness were explained in detail and not being able to reject the bulk of the treatment there, he says: "Abhidhamma scholasticism answered some of these questions and brought about a certain amount of consistency to the whole position. It reconciled the psychological and eschatological views of viññāna and assigned to consciousness a central organ where it resided potentially during the inactive state of the living organism. ... Consciousness as manifested in perceptive activity was, more or less, another aspect of this dormant consciousness, and it was this same principle which, in its aspect of rebirth consciousness (paṭisandhi-viññāna) passed from one life to the other in its wanderings through samsāra".² In this manner he gives credit to Buddhaghosa for having evolved a consistent hypothesis to solve the problems created by the original Buddhism.³

(262) Let us see whether early Buddhism is characterised by the inconsistencies seen by Dr. Sarathchandra. If one does not accept the methodology adopted by Dr. Sarathchandra, namely, to reject all the instances where the word viññāna occurs in

1. Ewing, A.C., The Fundamental Questions of Philosophy, (London, 1958), p. 39.

2. Buddhist Psychology of Perception, p. 21.

3. ibid., p. 105.

an eschatological sense as being later interpolations, then it is possible to see very clearly three different usages of the term as it occurs not only in the Pāli Nikāyas, but also in the Chinese Āgamas (v.supra.260). The problem would be to find out whether any attempt has been made to reconcile the last two uses of the term viññāna (shih 識), namely, the psychological and the eschatological. In an earlier discussion reference was made to a passage which points to the germs of a theory of unconscious mental processes (v.supra. 221). It refers to dispositions (saṅkhārā, hsing 行) latent in man's psychic life without any awareness on his part but which are perceived by the telepathic insight of another. It was also pointed out that this unconscious mental process in which the dispositions are stored up came to be called the "stream of becoming" (bhavasota) or the "stream of consciousness" (viññānasota). This stream of consciousness, while being in a state of flux, maintains a continuity between two lives. A person who has developed the extrasensory faculties is said to be able "to perceive a man's unbroken flux of consciousness established both in this world and in the next".¹ It was the selfsame consciousness which was described as gandhabba (hsiang yin 香陰) or the consciousness that enters the mother's womb, or even, according to the special application of the causal formula, the consciousness that conditions the psychophysical personality. In the last case, it was found that

1. D 3.105, ... purisassa ca viññānasotaṃ pajānāti ubhayato abboccinnam idhaloke patiṭṭhitañ ca paraloke patiṭṭhitañ ca; TD 1.77b (Chang.12.2), 唯觀心識在何處住。為在今世。為在後世。今世不斷後世不斷。今世不解脫後世不解脫。

The Chinese passage has hsin shih 心識 (consciousness) instead of viññānasota (stream of consciousness) given in the Pāli version. But it gives some more details when it added: "... not released while in this world nor in the other".

the dispositions (saṅkhārā, hsing 行) condition consciousness (viññāna, shih 識). This means that the dispositions, by conditioning consciousness (or more correctly, the unconscious process), determine the nature of the psychic personality of the newly born individual. But these dispositions, in the ultimate analysis, are the result of perceptive activity. This is very clearly implied in a passage in the Samyukta which discusses the difference between a dead man (mato kālakato, wei ssu 為死) and a man who has entered the state of mental concentration characterised by the cessation of sensation and feeling (saññāvedayitanirodham samāpanno, ju mieh cheng shou 入滅正受).¹ It is said that "In the case of a dead man, his dispositions, bodily,² verbal³ and mental,⁴ cease to exist and are pacified; life has come to an end; breath is calmed and the senses are destroyed. But in the case of a man who has attained to the state of cessation of sensation and feeling, even though his dispositions have ceased to exist and are pacified, his life has not come to an end, breath is not calmed and the senses are not destroyed". According to this account, although the senses of the man who has attained to the state of cessation of sensation and feeling are in tact, because there is a temporary cessation of perceptive activity he does not accumulate any dispositions. The conclusion to

1. S 4.294; TD 2.150a-b (Tsa.21.10).

2. The bodily dispositions are defined as exhaling and inhaling.

3. Verbal dispositions are reflection and investigation.

4. Mental dispositions are sensations and feeling (saññā, vedanā), but the Chinese version seems to imply sensation and volition (hsiang, ssu 想 思).

be drawn from this is that dispositions are the results of perceptive activity.¹ Thus not only the tendencies in the conscious mind, but even those in the unconscious process could be taken as the results of perception. Therefore, as early as the time of the Nikāyas, the conclusion was reached that "mind is luminous by nature and that it is defiled by adventitious defilements".² This no doubt was the germ of the theory of ālaya-vijñāna formulated with great precision and detail by the Vijñānavādins. But the question as to when this mind, pure and luminous, first came to be defiled by adventitious elements, was more or less a question as to the origin of saṃsāric existence. Therefore, as far as early Buddhism was concerned, it was a problem which came under metaphysics (v. supra.237).

1. This implies that a saint, who has come out of a trance characterised by the cessation of sensation and feeling and whose perceptive faculties are once more active, accumulates saṅkhāras and is therefore not different from an ordinary man or at least is liable to fall away from sainthood. This may be one of the reasons why the Sarvāstivādins believed that a saint could fall away from the state to which he has attained (v. Vasumitra's Nikāyālambara Śāstra, tr. J. Masuda, Origin and Doctrines of Early Indian Buddhist Schools, in AM vol.2, p.27). But according to early Buddhism, the difference between an ordinary man and a saint (arhat) is that in the case of the latter the dispositions are inoperative because he has attained to the state of "pacification of all dispositions" (sabbasaṅkhārasamatha).
2. A 1.10, Pabhassaram idaṃ ... bhittaṃ tañ ca kho āgantukehi upakkilesehi upakkiliṭṭhaṃ. Lamotte has collected most of the references to the conception of "luminous mind" in Buddhist literature, and points out that the Sarvāstivāda Vaibhāṣikas disagreed with the Vibhajyavādins (Theravādins?) on this problem, v. L'Enseignement de Vimalakīrti, pp.52 ff; v. also Bareau, A., Les Sectes bouddhiques du Petit Véhicule, (Saigon, 1955), pp.67-68.

(263) Dr. Sarathchandra has noticed the germs of the ālaya theory in the Abhidhamma conception of bhavaṅga,¹ but refuses to see it in the early texts even when the idea is specifically mentioned in the Anguttara Nikāya. The term bhavaṅga occurs in the Anguttara² but because the commentator reads it as bhavagga,³ Dr. Sarathchandra considers it to be a later interpolation. But the use of the term bhavaṅga in the sense of "limb" or "member" of existence was prevalent even in the Āgama tradition. Thus, the twelve factors of the special application of the causal formula were called bhavaṅga (yu chih 有支).⁴ This same usage is to be found in the O-pi-ta-mo-chu-she-lun.⁵ The conception of bhavaṅga is very popular in the Ch'eng-wei-shih-lun and here bhava (yu 有) is defined as the three existences (san yu 三有) and anga (fen 分) as cause (yin 因).⁶ Even if we are to take the term as bhavagga, as the Pāli commentator is inclined to do, there is no reason to accept the translation of the term agga as 'perfection'⁷ to be the only possible one. on the contrary, it can also be rendered as "extremity". In fact, one of the phrases occurring along with bhavagga is saññagga, which

1. Buddhist Psychology of Perception, p.89 ff.

2. A 2.79.

3. AA 3.107.

4. Pi-p'o-shih-fō-ching 毘婆尸佛經, TD 1.155c-156a (Taisho, No.3), which is a translation of the Mahā Nidāna Suttanta by Fa-t'ien.

5. TD 29.48c ff. (CSL 9), which refers to the Mahā Nidāna Suttanta by name, v 48b.

6. TD 31.15c (Ch'eng.3); v. also Siddhi, p.179; TD 31.43b (Ch'eng.8), Siddhi, p.479.

7. GS 2.88.

in another place is used in the sense of "end of sensation".¹ If so, bhavagga can also mean "the (relative) end or extremity of existence". What is more important is that it occurs along with three other phrases, namely, rūpagga, vedanagga and saññagga. Taking these three as representative of three of the five factors of the khandha-classification (v.supra.255), we may notice that bhavagga occurs in place of sāṅkhāragga and viññānagga, two of the factors which, as pointed out earlier, have direct relevance to the doctrine of rebirth, or bhava. Thus it would not be so easy to reject them as later interpolations.

(264) The explanation that can be adduced in favour of these rare and isolated expressions is that while rebirth was accepted as a reality, speculation about it was not encouraged mainly because rebirth does not come under the sphere of logical demonstration (atakkāvacara). It can only be realised by the development of the extrasensory faculties. Thus, these ideas, although found scattered here and there in the early Nikāyas and the Āgamas, have not been fully worked out in detail. If we are to accept this position, the originality attributed to Buddhaghosa by Dr.Sarathchandra would appear in a different light. Although the word viññāna is used indiscriminately in the Pāli Nikāyas to denote perceptual as well as rebirth consciousness, we find that the translators of the Āgamas into Chinese have clearly distinguished them.

1. D 1.184 ff.

Even the Yogācāra school, while explaining some statements from the sūtras which pertain to the problem of rebirth, statements which were dismissed by Dr. Sarathchandra as later interpolations, has observed this distinction between perceptive and rebirth consciousness. Where the term viññāna was used in the sense of rebirth consciousness, they always maintained that it was the eighth consciousness (ti pa shih 第八識), namely, ālaya-viññāna (ai lai ya shih 阿賴耶識) which was meant but not the six forms of transformed consciousness (pravṛtti-viññāna, chuan shih 轉識, v. supra. 260).

(265) Consciousness (viññāna, shih 識) can be described as something that is conditioned as well as something that conditions. On the one hand, consciousness arises because of conditions (paccayaṃ paṭicca, sui so yüan sheng 隨所緣生), as for example, the contact of the sense organ and the sense object (v. infra. 269). In the special application of the causal principle, it serves as a cause in that it conditions the psychic personality of the newly born individual. In this manner, the problem of perception (v. infra. 268ff) as well as the problem of rebirth which were solved by the Upaniṣadic thinkers by positing an immutable perduring soul, were, in the early Buddhist texts, given causal explanation.

(266) The causality of the human personality, especially the causal connection between rebirth consciousness and the physical personality arising from the seeds supplied by the parents, is said to be the object of extrasensory perception, especially clairvoyance (cutūpapātañāna, sheng ssu chih 生死智) which is directed towards gaining a knowledge

of the decease and survival of beings and also the working of karma. It is said that one who has gained such extrasensory powers can "with his clear paranormal clairvoyant vision perceive beings dying and being reborn, the low and the high, the fair and the ugly, the good and the evil, each according to his karma ...".¹ Clairvoyant vision constitutes one of the six intellectual powers attained by the Buddha.² It is also included in the three-fold higher knowledge (tevijjā, san chih 三知) which in Buddhism was to replace the traditional knowledge of the three Vedas.³ The essence of the Buddha's enlightenment can be summarised as the three-fold knowledge.

(267) Dr. Sarathchandra starts with a certain a priori assumption as to what the original teaching of the Buddha was. Therefore, he adopts the curious methodology of dismissing every statement in the early texts which does not support his thesis as being a later interpolation. Eventually he was led on to a position where he had to dismiss the intellectual powers attributed to the Buddha. Speaking about the description in the Sāmaññaphala Suttanta of supernormal powers such as clairvoyance, clairaudience and the remembrance of past lives, he says: "Such powers were, no doubt, attainable, but the Buddha never encouraged them as ends in themselves. Whether these were later tacked on to the text or not, the description of ñāṇa that is given before this list of supernormal powers, appears to be more like what the Buddha meant it to be".⁴ Here, no doubt, is an example of how the "baby was emptied with the bath".

1. D 1.82; TD 1.86b (Chang.13.1).

2. M 1.69; S 2.217, 222, etc.; TD 2.303c (Tsa.41.24).

3. M 1.482-483; TD 1.748a-b (Chung.51.1); v. also TD 2.223b-c (Tsa.31.25) for a definition of tevijjā.

4. Buddhist Psychology of Perception, p.100.

Causality of the perceptual process.

(268) After giving a causal account of the human personality and rejecting the belief in a metaphysical entity encased in the physical frame of the human being, the Buddha proceeded to explain the process of perception. For the Buddha this was a problem of prime importance, because he realised that all the misery and unhappiness in this world is due to the evils inherent in sense perception. It produced attachment which was the root cause of most of the suffering in the world. At the same time the Buddha realised that a proper understanding of the operation of the sensory process would enable man to detect the evils and eradicate them, thus paving the way for the attainment of perfect happiness. Hence, in the Samyutta Nikāya, the higher life (brahmacariya) lived under the guidance of the Buddha, is said to be aimed at understanding the sense organ, the sense object and sense contact because they are unsatisfactory or lead to suffering.¹

(269) The theory of sense perception is represented in the special application of the causal formula by saḷāyatana (liu ju ch'u 六入處, v. supra. 223). The term āyatana (ju ch'u 入處) which, to use a term from modern psychology, means 'gateway'² denotes both the sense organ and the sense object (v. supra. 223). The origin of perception or cognition from the subject-object relationship is described in an oft

1. S 4.138, Cakkhuṃ kho āvuso dukkhaṃ tassa pariññāya bhagavati brahmacariyaṃ vussati. Rūpā dukkhā tesam pariññāya bhagavati brahmacariyaṃ vussati. Cakkhusamphasso dukkho tassa pariññāya bhagavati brahmacariyaṃ vussati. It has not been possible to trace this passage in the Chinese Agamas.
2. Munn, Norman L., Psychology. The Fundamentals of Human Adjustment, (London, 1961, Fourth Edition), p. 507.

recurring statement in the Nikāyas and the Āgamas. It runs thus: "Visual perception depends on eye and visible form for its arising; the concurrence of the three is contact; feeling arises as a result of contact; what one feels one senses (i.e., recognises); what one senses one thinks about; ...".¹ Dr. Sarathchandra who has made a special study of the problem of perception in Theravāda Buddhism based on the Pāli sources, puts forward the theory that viññāna in the above context means "not full cognition, but bare sensation, a sort of anoetic sentience".² Dr. Jayatilleke has argued with much force against this view. He has pointed out, with the help of several quotations that in the early Nikāyas, the word viññāna is used in the sense of "knowing", "perceiving" and has a distinctly cognitive connotation.³ He refers to the statement in the Nikāyas which runs: "The states of paññā and viññāna are intermingled; it is not possible to analyse and specify the difference—what one understands one knows and what one knows one understands".⁴ The statement is also preserved in the Chinese Āgamas where the characters chih hui 智慧 and shih 識 represent paññā and viññāna respectively.⁵

1. M 1.111-112, Cakkhuñ ca paṭicca rūpe ca uppajjati cakkhu-viññānaṃ, tinnaṃ saṅgati phasso, phassapaccayā vedanā, yaṃ vedeti taṃ sañjānāti, yaṃ sañjānāti taṃ vitakketi ... TD 1.604b (Chung.28.3).
2. Buddhist Psychology of Perception, p.4.
3. Knowledge, p.434 ff.
4. M 1.292-293, Yā c'āvuso paññā yañ ca viññānaṃ ime dhammā saṃsaṭṭhā no visamaṣṭṭhā, na ca labbhā imesaṃ dhammaṇaṃ vinibbhujitvā vinibbhujitā nānākāraṇaṃ paññāpetuṃ. Yaṃ hi āvuso pajānāti taṃ vijānāti, yaṃ vijānāti taṃ pajānāti.
5. TD 1.790c (Chung.58.2), 此 = 法合不別。此 = 法不可別施設。所以者何。智慧所知即是識所識。

As Dr. Jayatilleke has pointed out, it is difficult to accept any interpretation which assumes a temporal succession of the different states enumerated in the above formula. He also quotes a passage from the commentary of Buddhaghosa to the effect that feeling (vedanā) and the rest arise simultaneously along with contact (phassa) and not in temporal succession. It runs thus: "On account of that contact, depending on that contact, there arises feeling (vedanā) in a co-nascent manner, etc."¹ But unfortunately this does not illustrate the point clearly. It only refers to the arising only of feeling (vedanā) simultaneously with the arising of contact (phassa), although Dr. Jayatilleke inserts an "etc." immediately after the word "sensation" (i.e., feeling) which is not warranted by the text. But a more specific statement is made by Buddhaghosa in the next paragraph where he says: "Here contact (phassa), feeling (vedanā), and sensation (saññā) arise in a co-nascent manner with visual perception (cakkhuviññāṇena)"² Moreover, it is not necessary to fall back on a commentary for evidence to support this view. In fact, evidence for this view is to be found in the Nikāyas and the Āgamas themselves. For example, the Samyukta says: "Having come into contact (phuṭṭho), one feels (vedeti); having come into contact, one thinks (ceteti); having come into contact, one senses (sañjānāti)"³ The Chinese Āgamas too have explicit references to this effect. The Samyukta Āgama

1. MA 2.77, Tam phassaṃ paṭicca saḥajātādivasena phassapaccayā vedanā uppajjati.
2. *ibid.*, Tattha phassa-vedanā-saññā cakkhuviññāṇena saḥajātā honti.
3. § 4.68, Phuṭṭho ... vedeti phuṭṭho ceteti phuṭṭho sañjānāti.

describes how several mental states are produced, each one directly from sense contact, as, for example, visual contact (yen chu 眼觸 = cakkhusamphassa) which produces feeling (shou 受 = vedanā), as well as sensation (hsiang 想 = saññā), reflection (ssu 思 = cetanā or vitakka) and craving (ai 愛 = taṇhā).¹ These statements would amply illustrate the fact that there is no temporal succession between the different states.

(270) A more elaborate account giving a strictly causal explanation of the process of perception than the one quoted earlier (v. supra. 269) is found in the Mahā Hatthipadopama sutta.² Here it is stated that visual cognition results from the presence of three conditions, namely, (i) the existence of an unimpaired internal visual organ, (ii) the entry of the external visible form into the range of vision, and (iii) an appropriate act of attention on the part of the mind.³ All these conditions should be satisfied for any act of perception to be possible. Thus, it is maintained that if condition (i) alone is satisfied but not (ii) and (iii) there would be no perception. Likewise, if conditions (i) and (ii) alone are satisfied and not condition (iii) perception would not be possible.⁴

(271) Let us examine these three conditions in more detail. Condition (i) represents a more precise definition of the first of the conditions given in the oft recurring causal

1. TD 2.34b-c (Tsa.5.7), 50c (Tsa.8.10).

2. Hsiang-chi-yu-ching 象跡 經 TD 1.464a ff. (Chung.7.2).

3. M 1.190, Ajjhattikañ c'eva cakkhum aparibhinnaṃ hoti, bāhirā ca rūpā āpātham āgacchanti, tajjo ca samannāhāro hoti. TD 1.467a (Chung.7.2) 若內眼處不壞者。外色便為光明所照。而便有念。眼識得生。

4. M 1.190; TD 1.467a (Chung.7.2).

formula of perception (v.supra.269). This definition takes into account the possibility of a distortion of the perception if the sense organ were not to be in perfect condition, as for example, the perception of colour. Colour blindness is said to be due to some defect in the cones or in their neural connections.¹ Of special significance is the adjective 'internal' (ajjhattikaṃ, nei 內) because it is not the mere existence of the sense organ but the perfect condition of the internal structure of the sense organ that is important for the genesis of perception without any form of distortion.² The Chinese version seems to imply a person whose visual organ is unimpaired.³

(272) Condition (ii) is defined differently in the Pāli Nikāyas and the Chinese Āgamas. The Pāli version emphasises the coming of the external object into proper focus or within the range of vision. The etymology of the word āpātha being doubtful, the PTS Dictionary suggests another meaning, namely, "to become clear".⁴ The Chinese version more specifically gives this meaning when it maintains that "the external object should be illuminated by light". In the later Buddhist texts, light (āloka), which purports to illuminate the object,⁵ has been laid down as a separate condition necessary for the genesis of perception.⁶ This represents a further elaboration of the theory found in the Āgamas.

1. Munn, Psychology, p.522.

2. ibid., pp. 520, 522.

3. TD 1.467a (Chung.7.2).

4. p.102.

5. āloko'vabhāsaḥ karoti.

6. ABS p.85; MKV p.567.

(273) The elements of this part of the theory, namely, the mutual dependence of the subject and object, has been traced in the Upaniṣads.¹ It is found in the Kauṣītakī Upaniṣad which describes the ten sensory and motor organs. The text says: "The material elements cannot exist without the cognitive elements, nor the cognitive elements without the material elements and from either alone no form would be possible".² This theory differs from that given above in that it conceives of the cognitive elements as agents of perception, thus assuming a metaphysical standpoint.

(274) The third condition necessary for the production of perception is attention. The Pāli text uses the phrase samannāhāra which literally means "bringing together" (sam+anu+hr). It may be interpreted as bringing together of the subject and object. Dr. Sarathchandra has raised the question as to whether this attention referred to the automatic act of sensory attention brought about by the intensity of the stimulus, or whether it meant a deliberate act directed by interest.³ He is inclined to accept the former interpretation on the basis of the Sanskrit tradition and rejects the interpretation given by Buddhaghosa.⁴ He refers to the passages in the Arya Śālistamba Sūtra and the Mādhyamikavṛtti, both of which do not seem to support his view. Here the term tajjamasikāra, which has a more active meaning of "reflection arising therefrom"

1. Jayatilleke, Knowledge, p.434.

2. 3.8, Yaddhi bhūtamātrā na syur na prajñāmātrā syur, yad vā prajñāmātrā na syur na bhūtamātrā syuḥ, na hy anyatarato rūpaṃ kiñcana sidhyet.

3. Buddhist Psychology of Perception, p.21.

4. MA 2.229, Tajjassāti tadanurūpassa.

occurs instead of the phrase tajjo samannāhāro. The whole argument of Dr. Sarāthchandra seems to depend on the linguistic analysis of the term tajja. If we are to take the term manasi-kāra as expressing a more active meaning, and this is supported by the Chinese rendering of the Āgama passage which has nien (念) a term meaning "to think, to recall, to remember", then it would be possible to accept Buddhaghosa's interpretation of the term tajja as "appropriate" (tadanurūpa).

(275) Attention as a condition necessary for perception is emphasised in the Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad which says: "My mind was elsewhere, I did not see; my mind was elsewhere, I did not hear, for with the mind does one see and with the mind does one hear".¹ This passage not only emphasises the importance of attention in any act of perception, but also implies the co-ordinating function of the mind (v.infra.276).

(276) The Nikāyas and the Āgamas refer to six kinds of perceptions, namely, visual (cakkhu, yen 眼), auditory (sota, erh 耳), olfactory (ghāna, pi 鼻), gustatory (jivhā, she 舌), tactile (kāya, shen 身) and mental (mano, i 意).² The Mahā Tanhāsankhaya sutta³ maintains that they are so reckoned because of the different causes that produce them.⁴ Thus, perception that arises depending on the visual organ and visible form is known as visual perception.⁵ Elsewhere it is pointed

1. 1.5.3, anyatra manā abhūvaṃ nādarśaṃ, anyatra manā abhūvaṃ nāśrauṣaṃ iti manasā hy eva pasyati, manasā sṛṇoti.
2. M 1.53; TD 1.51c (Chang.8.2).
3. 摩訶經 TD 1.766b ff. (Chung.54.2).
4. M 1.259, yaññadeva ... paccayaṃ paṭicca uppajjati viññāṇaṃ tena ten'eva saṅkhaṃ gacchati. TD 1.767a (Chung.54.2).
5. loc.cit., cakkhuñ ca paṭicca rūpe ca uppajjati viññāṇaṃ cakkhuvivāṇaṃ tv'eva saṅkhaṃ gacchati.

out that the five sense organs—excluding the mind—have different sensory fields and do not encroach upon or share the sensory fields of one another.¹ But mind (mano, i 意) can survey all the spheres and is a co-ordinating factor of the different perceptions, a form of sensus communis.² While this conception of mind as a co-ordinating factor of different perceptions is implied in the Upaniṣadic passage quoted earlier (v. supra. 275), it is very clearly expressed in another passage in the Kāṭha Upaniṣad. Here it is said: "Know the self (ātman) as a rider in a chariot, the body (śarīra) as the chariot, the intellect (buddhi) as the chariot driver and mind (manas) as the reins. The senses (indriyāni) are said to be the horses, the objects of sense (viṣayān) are what they range over. The self (ātman) combined with the senses and the mind is called the 'enjoyer' (bhoktr) by wise men".³ According to this theory, mind is a co-ordinating factor which brings together the different perceptions. But over and above the mind, a self (ātman) is posited which is a hyper-phenomenal entity functioning as the enjoyer (bhoktr) of the different sensations. The senses as well as the mind (manas) are merely instruments with which the self performs the function of perceiving. The Buddhist, on the other hand, rejects any such hyper-phenomenal entity and while accepting the mind as a co-ordinating factor, gives a causal account of the process of perception.

1. M 1.295, Pañca imāni ... indriyāni nānāvisayāni nānāgocarāni na aññamaññassa gocaravisayaṃ paccanubhonti seyyathīdaṃ cakkhundriyaṃ sotindriyaṃ ghaṇindriyaṃ jivhindriyaṃ kāyindriyaṃ. TD 1.791b (Chung.58.2).
2. loc.cit., imesaṃ kho pañcannaṃ indriyānaṃ nānāvisayānaṃ nānāgocarānaṃ na aññamaññassa gocaravisayaṃ paccanubhontānaṃ mano paṭisaraṇaṃ mano ca nesaṃ gocaravisayaṃ paccanubhoti.
3. Kāṭha 3.3-4.

(277) Thus, according to the Buddha, the external world is purely relative; it is dependent on the activities of the senses.¹ As far as the individual is concerned, both the origin and the cessation of the world are "within his fathom long conscious body".² The external world is said to exist as long as one is conscious of it.³ Thus perception, which is the main avenue through which an ordinary man comes to know of the external world, is described as everything (sabbaṃ, i ch'ieh 一切).⁴ The emphasis laid on the sense organ as well as the external object eliminates the possibility of interpreting early Buddhism as a form of Idealism. On the one hand, there is no explicit denial of the external world. It is a reality that we cannot get behind. On the other hand, there is no implication that the world is mind made or a mental projection. The emphasis on sense contact (phassa), or to use a modern psychological term, sense data, prevents any attempt to see any form of Realism in the early Buddhist texts. Statements to the effect that the external world is limited to sense data alone and that there would be no concepts, no theories, no speculation, independent of sense data lead to the irresistible conclusion that early Buddhism presents us with a phenomenalist account of the world.

1. S 4.87, cakkhuñ ca paṭicca rūpe ca ... ayaṃ lokassa samudayo; ibid., 39-40, yattha ... atthi cakkhum atthi rūpā atthi cakkhuvīññāṇam atthi cakkhuvīññātabbā dhammā atthi tattha loko vā loka paññatti vā.
2. S 1.62; A 2.48, Api cāham āvuso imasmiṃ yeva byāmatte kalebare sasaññimhi samanake lokāñ ca paññāpemi lokasamudayañ ca
3. D 1.215.
4. S 4.15; TD 2.91a (Tsa.13.17).

Causality of moral behaviour.

(278) We have already seen that before the rise of Buddhism there were several different theories of moral causation put forward by the Indian thinkers. The Eternalists of the Vedic and Upaniṣadic traditions held the view that man is both the doer (kartr) of the actions as well as the enjoyer (bhoktr) of the consequences (v.supra.26). This theory was maintained on the basis of a metaphysical perduring soul believed to reside in the individual. Hence, they accepted the theory that whatever happiness and suffering a man experiences is due to self-causation (v.supra.26). On the other hand, there were Nihilists who denied any form of moral responsibility. Firstly, there were Materialists who accepted a strictly determined law such as the principle of inherent nature (svabhāva)(v.supra.89). Secondly, there were the Ajīvikas, led by Makkhali Gosāla, who believed in fate (niyati) and therefore, could not grant man's responsibility for his actions (v.supra.73). The Theists who transferred man's responsibility for his actions to an omnipotent God (iṣṣara) were criticised by the Buddha as denying moral responsibility (v.supra.41 ff.). As opposed to these different schools of thought, there were the Jainas who considered moral behaviour as being completely determined. The present, they believed, was completely determined by one's past behaviour (pubbekatahetu). Karma was an inexorable law which cannot be escaped (v.supra. 110 ff.).

(279) After rejecting all these views as being unsatisfactory, the Buddha gave a causal account of human behaviour. Behaviour consists of three forms, viz., bodily (kāya, shen 身),

verbal (vaci, k'ou 口) and mental (mano, i 意). Emphasis was laid on the psychological aspect of behaviour. Once when explaining what immoral behaviour is, the Buddha is represented as maintaining that both bodily and verbal behaviour has mind as the basis.¹ On another occasion, interrogated by the Jaina ascetic Dīghatapassī, who held the view that bodily punishment (kāyadaṇḍa, shen fa 身罰) is more blameworthy than mental punishment (manodaṇḍa, i fa 意罰), the Buddha turned the discussion from punishment (daṇḍa, fa 罰) to action (kamma, yeh 業) and maintained that mental behaviour should be considered more blameworthy in the case of commission or perpetuation of evil.² This is a clear example of the Buddha's emphasis on the psychological aspect of behaviour than on external behaviour manifested by way of body and speech. Hence, he proceeded to define behaviour (kamma, yeh 業) as volition (cetanā, ssu 思).³ The emphasis laid by the Buddha on the psychological aspect of behaviour led some of his contemporaries to think that according to the Buddha's view, "Bodily behaviour is unreal. So is verbal behaviour. Only mental behaviour is true or real".⁴ One such person who understood the Buddha's teaching in this manner was the ascetic Piṭhaliputta, but Venerable Samiddhi was present to correct this misrepresentation. Samiddhi pointed out that

1. M 2.25-26; TD 1.720c (Chung.47.2).
2. M 1.373, Imesaṃ kho ahaṃ Tapassi tiṇṇaṃ kammānaṃ evaṃ paṭivibhattānaṃ evaṃ paṭivisiṭṭhānaṃ manokammaṃ mahā-sāvajjatarāṃ paññāpemi pāpassa kammaṃ kiriyāya pāpassa kammaṃ pavattiyā, no tathā kāyakammaṃ no tathā vacīkammaṃ. TD 1.628b (Chung.32.1).
3. A 3.415, Cetanāhaṃ bhikkave kammaṃ vadāmi; cetayitvā kammaṃ karōti kāyena vācāya manasā. TD 1.600a (Chung.27.5).
4. M 3.207, Moghaṃ kāyakammaṃ moghaṃ vacīkammaṃ manokammaṃ eva saccaṃ'ti. TD 1.706b (Chung.44.2).

a man "experiences pain after having committed volitional acts (sañcetanikaṃ kammaṃ, tso yeh 作業), bodily, verbal as well as mental".¹ When the discussion between Poṭaliputta and Samiddhi was reported to the Buddha, he rebuked Samiddhi thus: "This foolish person Samiddhi has given a categorical answer to a question which demands a conditional or analytical reply".² After accusing Samiddhi in this manner, the Buddha went on to explain the problem thus: "Having committed a volitional act leading to pleasurable feeling with the body speech and mind, one experiences pleasurable feeling. (And so with regard to volitional acts leading to painful and neutral feeling)".³ Even from this analytical answer given by the Buddha it is evident that volition serves as the basis for the three forms of behaviour, bodily, verbal and mental. Thus the two statements—(i) that mind is the basis of bodily and verbal behaviour, and (ii) that volition is the ground of all three forms of behaviour, bodily, verbal as well as mental—were made at different levels and should not be confused. The former analyses the three forms of behaviour according to degree of importance, while the latter describes the psychological motives or springs of behaviour, bodily, verbal as well as mental.

1. M 3.207, Sañcetanikaṃ ... kammaṃ katvā kāyena vācāya manasā dukkhaṃ so vediyatī'ti; TD 1.706c (Chung.44.2), 若故作業作已成者必受苦也. The character tso 作 seems to represent the idea of 'conscious' (sañcetanikaṃ) which in another place was rendered by the character chih 知, v. TD 1.600a (Chung.27.5).
2. M 3.207, Iminā ... Samiddhinā moghapurisena Poṭaliputtassa paribbajakassa vibhajja byākaraṇīyo pañho ekansena byākato. TD 1.707a (6-7) (Chung.44.2).
3. loc.cit., Sañcetanikaṃ ... kammaṃ katvā kāyena vācāya manasā sukhavedaniyaṃ, sukhaṃ so vediyati.

(280) Let us consider the causes of moral behaviour. Taking into consideration the Buddha's theory of conditionality, one is not justified in looking out for an over-all postulate presented as an explanation of the causality of moral behaviour. Buddha did not attempt to provide an all-inclusive theory of moral causation, as the Jainas did (v. supra. 104 ff.), but gave answers to the different types of questions in specific contexts. Therefore, it is possible to find several causal explanations of behaviour in the early Buddhist texts.

(281) In the *Anguttara*, the problem of the causality of behaviour is raised. The answer given by the Buddha was that "contact (phassa, keng lo 更樂) is the cause of behaviour (kamma, yeh 業)".¹ This statement could be interpreted in two ways. Firstly, taking phassa (keng lo 更樂) as representing sense data (v. supra. 277), it may be interpreted as a broader or more general cause of behaviour. This is because the mental tendencies such as craving (taṇhā, yü 欲), etc., which are considered to be specific causes of behaviour (v. infra. 282), are only resultants of contact (phassa). This is exemplified by the statement that the cause of craving "is an agreeable object. (Because) in the case of a person who reflects wrongly on an agreeable object, craving which has not yet arisen arises and craving that has already arisen increases".² Secondly, taking phassa (keng lo 更樂) in a more physical sense to represent a causal explanation in terms

1. A 3.415, Phasso ... kammānam nidānasambhavo. TD 1.600a (Chung.27.5), 因更樂則便有業. Here the characters keng lo 更樂 are used to translate the term phassa, v. also TD 1.435c (Chung.3.3).
2. A 1.200.

of stimulus-response sort of model where reflex movement is followed by sensory excitation. It may be illustrated by the example of a person who, while crossing a road, jumps up either because of a twinge in his stomach or because a car happen to back-fire.¹

(282) Apart from this more general cause (or the physical cause of sensory stimulation, whichever we may take it to be), there are certain other motives such as craving (rāga, t'an 貪), hate or aversion (dosa, wei 嗔) and confusion (moha, ch'ih 癡) which are more or less conscious tendencies that can be regarded as causes of behaviour.² Generally it is evil or immoral behaviour which is believed to be produced by these causes. Hence, morally good behaviour is produced by mental tendencies which are the opposites of those mentioned above. These fall into the category of volition (cetanā, ssu 思) according to which the gravity of an action is to be determined. The elimination of these springs of action has been emphasised in Buddhism. Hence, the importance of mental culture.

(283) In addition to these conscious motives which are considered as causes of behaviour, there is yet another kind of unconscious motive which determines the behaviour of man. This is represented in the early Buddhist texts by the term "disposition" (sāṅkhāra). There are dispositions which have been accumulated either consciously (sampajāno) or unconsciously

1. Peters, R.S., Concept of Motivation, p.15.

2. A 1.134, Tīn'imāni ... nidānāni kammānaṃ samudayāya. Katamāni tīni? Lobho ... doso ... moho nidānaṃ kammānaṃ samudayāya. TD 1.438c (Chung.3.6).

(asampajāno).¹ It was pointed out that in the special application of the causal principle the term sāṅkhāra (hsing 行) stood for unconscious dispositions (v. supra. 221), and also accounted for the problem of moral responsibility. The cause of behaviour given in the Samyutta may be taken as a specific instance of such unconscious motives. It is here pointed out that a man who, when told that such and such things, as for example, deadly poison, etc., lead to disaster, would run away from them because he "desires to live (jīvitukāmā, ch'iu sheng 求生²), recoils from death (amaritukāmā, yen ssu 厭死³), hankers after happiness (sukhakāmā, ch'iu lo 求樂) and recoils from death (dukkhapaṭikkulā, yen k'u 厭苦)".⁴

Once a person is informed that such an thing would be harmful to him, his behaviour in the presence of that thing would be determined by these unconscious drives.

1. A 2.158.

2. The character sheng 生 which means 'birth', 'arising', etc., may be taken in this context in the sense of 'life' or 'existence'.

3. While the Pāli term amaritukāmā is used as a synonym of the term jīvitukāmā, the Chinese rendering clearly implies 'aversion to death'.

4. S 4.172 ff.; TD 2.313b (Tsa.43.9). The first two instincts enumerated above come very close to what Freud called the Life instinct, i.e., the drive for self-preservation, v. Brown, A.J.C., Freud and the post-Freudians, Pelican, (London, 1963), p.27 f. The last two represent another idea which, in the psychological speculations of Freud, came to be called the Pleasure Principle. Freud said: "It seems that our entire psychical activity is bent upon procuring pleasure and avoiding pain, that it is automatically regulated by the PLEASURE PRINCIPLE", Freud, Sigmund, Introductory Lectures on Psycho-Analysis, translated from German by Joan Riviere, (London, 1949), pp. 298-299.

(284) Depending on the nature of the problem, the Buddha gave causal explanations, which shows, in the words of a modern writer, "the sensitivity to the different sorts of questions that can be asked about human actions and the different sorts of answers that are appropriate".¹ It also represents a reluctance on the part of the Buddha to posit an over-all theory of motivation which may create confusion by elevating an answer to a limited type of question to the status of a highly general postulate.

(285) While human behaviour is itself produced by causes, it is followed by the correlated consequences. This correlation between action (kamma, yeh 業) and consequence (phala, pao 報 or vipāka, i shu 異熟) constitutes the doctrine of kamma in Buddhism. An examination of some of the texts which deal with the problem of moral behaviour and responsibility would reveal the fact that it is generally founded on the doctrine of rebirth. This is evident from the Cūla Kammavibhaṅga sutta which maintains that a person who kills living creatures and has no compassion for them would, on account of that behaviour, be reborn in an evil state after death. If he were not to be reborn in an evil state, and if he were to come to life as a human, wherever he is born he would be short-lived.² This implies that the doctrine of moral responsibility, like the doctrine of rebirth, is properly "verified" by the development of extrasensory powers (v.infra.334). On the basis of the data available to such forms of telepathic insight as clairvoyance (cutūpapātañāna, sheng ssu chih 生死智), inductive

1. Peters, Concept of Motivation, p.50.

2. M 3.203; TD 1.705a (Chung.44.1).

inferences were drawn. Reading through the texts we find two forms of correlations being drawn between action (kamma, yeh 業) and consequence (vipāka, i ku 異熟). These may be grouped as specific and general correlations.¹

(286) A list of specific correlations is to be met with in the Cūla Kammavibhanga sutta. Following is a summary of the correlations found therein. "A person who kills living creatures ... tends to be short-lived, while a person who refrains from taking life ... tends to be long-lived. A person who harms creatures ... tends to be sickly, while one who refrains from harming creatures ... tends to be healthy. One who is irritable ... tends to be ugly and one who is not irritable ... tends to be handsome. A person who is jealous ... tends to be weak, while one who is otherwise ... tends to be powerful. A person who is miserly ... tends to be poor, while a person who is liberal ... tends to be rich. A person who is haughty ... tends to be reborn in a good family, while one who is humble ... tends to be reborn in an evil family. He who does not consult the religious teachers for advice with regard to what is good and bad ... tends to be ignorant, while one who does so ... tends to be of great wisdom".²

(287) Depending on these specific correlations, further generalizations were made which also had to be verified by telepathic insight. Thus we find the theory that a person who leads an immoral life would be reborn in an evil state.

1. Jayatilleke, Knowledge, p.460.
2. M 3.203 ff.; TD 1.705a ff. (Chung.44.1).

These inductive inferences cannot be taken as the basis of absolute laws implying complete determinism. This is explicitly stated in the Mahā Kammavibhaṅga sutta where the Buddha refers to some recluses and brahmins who, by a thorough application and concentration of mind, were able to see beings who have led an immoral life and have come to be reborn in an evil state. As a result of this telepathic insight, they came to the conclusion: "He who takes life, steals, ... who is of wrong views, would be reborn in an evil state after death. They who know this have right knowledge. Others are mistaken".¹ To consider this conclusion to be the "only truth and that all else is false"² is, according to the Buddha, a very grave mistake. The difficulty of drawing such conclusions is demonstrated by the Buddha. He points out that a person who sees a man who is reborn in a happy state after leading an immoral life, comes to the conclusion which is diametrically opposed to the one given above. He maintains that: "There is no effect of good and bad deeds".³ Here the Buddha does not doubt the attainments of the person who perceives the phenomenon of rebirth and moral responsibility;⁴ rather he doubts the validity of the inference because certain aspects of the causal process were not taken into consideration. Buddha points out that in the case of a person who has led an immoral life and is reborn in a happy state, there may have been counter-acting tendencies such as leading a good life at some time

1. M 3.210; TD 1.707b f. (Chung.44.2).

2. Loc.cit., idam eva saccaṃ moghaṃ aññaṃ,
— 向著說此是真諦餘皆虛妄。

3. ibid.

4. ibid.; v. Jayatilleke, Knowledge, p.463.

during the past lives or in the present, or the entertaining of right views at the moment of death.¹ An interesting illustration of this problem is to be found in the Lonaphala Vagga of the Anguttara Nikāya.² Here the Buddha says that if a person maintains that "Just as this man does a deed, so does he experience it",³ then the living of the holy life would be meaningless; there would be no opportunity for the complete destruction of suffering. But if one were to accept the theory: "Just as this man does a deed which would be experienced in a certain way, so does he experience its consequences",⁴ this makes the religious life meaningful and there is opportunity for the complete destruction of suffering. The former statement may be taken as implying a form of complete determinism in the sphere of moral responsibility, comparable to the theory accepted by the Jainas (v. supra. 110). It may be for this reason that the Buddha considered it to be harmful to religious life and the achieving of the goal. We agree with Woodward when he says that "this does not controvert the doctrine of the deed, but means that the particular kind

1. M 3.214, 215; TD 1.708b (Chung.44.2).
2. 1.249. The Chinese version is included in the Madhyama Agama, TD 1.433 (Chung.3.1) and here it is called the Sūtra of the "salt-simile" 鹽喻經.
3. Yathā yathāṃ puriso kamman karoti tathā tathā taṃ paṭisaṃvediyati, 隨人所作業. 則受其報.
4. Yathā vedanīyam ayaṃ puriso kamman karoti tathā tathāssa vipākaṃ paṭisaṃvediyati. The Chinese version does not show this difference in the two statements. Woodward translates the Pāli passage thus: "Just as this man does a deed that is to be experienced, so does he experience its fulfilment" (GS 1.227). But in our opinion this does not convey emphatically the difference in the two statements. The two words yathā vedanīyam should be taken as emphasising the way in which it would be experienced.

of action does not find its exact replica in fulfilment".¹ However, we cannot agree with the reasons given by him for this. He thinks that it is because "times and men and things are always changing".² The reasons for our disagreement may become clear from the following analysis.

(288) The sutta goes on to describe two identical deeds committed by two people. "Now, for instance, there may be some trifling evil deed of some person which may lead him to hell. There may be a similar trifling evil deed of some person which may be experienced in this very life, (not much of it, nor even a modicum of it would be seen³)".⁴ Now here we find two people committing similar, if not identical, evil deeds but reaping different consequences in different ways. In the case of one person the consequence is magnified and is reaped in another evil existence. In the case of the other this same evil deed is not forceful enough to lead him to an evil state after death, but may be experienced in this very life or may not even be seen. The reason for this is not that "times and men and things are always changing", but that there are differences among the people committing these deeds. This is confirmed by the sutta itself when it is stated:

1. GS 1.227, n.2.

2. ibid.

3. Here Woodward (GS 1.227), following the commentator, adds the phrase "hereafter", but this is not essential to the understanding of the passage.

4. A 1.249, *idha ... ekaccassa puggalassa appamattikaṃ'pi pāpaṃ kammaṃ kataṃ tam enaṃ nirayam upaneti. Idha pana ... ekaccassa puggalassa tādisam eva appamattikaṃ pāpaṃ kammaṃ kataṃ diṭṭhadhamme c'eva vedaniyaṃ hoti nānu'pi khāyati bahud eva.* TD 1.433 (Chung.3.1). The passage within parenthesis is not found in the Chinese version.

"Here a certain person has not properly cultivated his body, behaviour, thought and intelligence, (is inferior, insignificant) and his life is short (and miserable).¹ Of such a person ... even a trifling evil deed done leads him to hell. ... In the case of a person who has proper culture of body, behaviour, thought and intelligence, (who is superior and not insignificant) and is endowed with long life, the consequences of a similar evil deed is to be experienced in this very life (and much of it or even a modicum of it would not be seen)".² This passage illustrates one of the salient features of the Buddhist theory of moral responsibility. The effect (phala, pao 報) of a deed (kamma, yeh 業) is not determined solely by the deed itself, but also by the nature of the person who commits the deed, and we may add, by the circumstances in which it is committed. Several interesting similes are given in the above sutta to illustrate this point, one of which may be summarised as follows. "If a man throws a grain of salt into a little cup of water, the water in that cup would become salty and undrinkable owing to that grain of salt. But if a man were to throw a similar grain of salt into the river Ganges, because of the great mass of water therein, it would not become salty and undrinkable".³ This illustrates further the dangers inherent in the practice of drawing absolute conclusions on the basis of generalizations.

1. Woodward seems to have had difficulties in rendering the phrase appadukkhavihārī (v. GS 1.228, n.1). Following the Chinese passage which reads 壽命甚短 (TD 1.433a) and also the translation of the phrase appamānavihārī as 壽命甚長 (TD 1.433b) we have taken the word appa as referring to the length of life and the term dukkha as denoting the nature of life.
2. Passages within parenthesis are not to be found in the Chinese version.
3. A 1.250; TD 1.433a-b (Chung.3.1).

(289) From the description in the Mahā Kammavibhaṅga sutta it appears that some of the contemporaries of the Buddha, although they had developed extrasensory powers by which they could verify the decease and survival of beings, have neglected certain important aspects of the causal process when drawing the inferences. The views of those who denied moral responsibility have already been analysed in detail (v. supra. 85). A comparison of these theories with the Buddhist theory presents no problem. But the theory of complete determinism in the sphere of moral responsibility which, as pointed out earlier, was adopted by the Jainas (v. supra. 112 ff.) was very often confused with the Buddhist theory of moral causation (v. supra. 111). It may be pointed out that while the Jaina interpretation of karma is based on a theory of complete determinism (niyati), the Buddhist conception is founded on the theory of causality (paṭiccasamuppāda, yin yúan fa 因緣法). This is the main difference between the two schools of thought. The Buddha did not hold that everything is completely determined by one's past behaviour (pubbekatahetu, yin pen tso 因本作). Acquisition of merit in the past (pubbe ca katapuññatā) is only one of the factors which, along with "life in an appropriate surrounding" (paṭirūpadesavāsa) and "proper self-resolve" (attasammāpanidhi), contribute to an auspicious or good life.¹ Moreover, according to the statement in the Mahā Kammavibhaṅga sutta, even an evil doer could be born in a happy state of existence provided that he entertains a right view at the moment of death or has done good deeds in an earlier existence. Taking a specific instance of the causality of the human personality, the Buddha pointed out that "action or behaviour (kamma) is the field, consciousness (viññāna) the seed, and

1. Sn 260, Paṭirūpadesavāso ca pubbe ca katapuññatā,
attasammāpanidhi ca etam maṅgalam uttamam.

craving (taṇhā) the moisture which lead to the rebirth of a being" (v.supra.248). Therefore it is only one of the causes that determine the nature of one's future life. Even in this case, the possible existence of counteracting causes is not ruled out. Thus it is not complete determinism but conditionality (v.supra.198) which is the basis of the Buddha's theory of moral responsibility. Only in so far as behaviour is contributory, in this manner, to the determination of man's future life, it is said that he "has kamma as his own, kamma as his matrix, kamma as his kin, kamma as his refuge".¹ In this way kamma is said to divide beings as inferior and superior.² Therefore, according to Buddhism, there is no need to expiate for past actions or to avoid performing actions in the future. What Buddhism emphasises is the avoidance of evil actions, cultivation of morally good actions and the purification of the mind³ as being the way to the attainment of perfect happiness.

Causality of social behaviour.

(290) One of the major social philosophies dominating the life of the Indians before the rise of Buddhism was the fourfold caste system enunciated in the Puruṣa Sūkta of the R̥gveda.⁴ According to this account, the four social hierarchies were divinely ordained. The Pāli Nikāyas and

1. M 3.203; A 3.72, 186; 5.88, 288, Kammassakā sattā kamma-dāyādā kammayoni kammabandhu TD 1.704c (Chung.44.1).
2. *ibid.*, kammaṃ satte vibhajati yadidaṃ hīṇappaṇītātāya.
3. D 2.49, Sabbapāpassa akaraṇaṃ kusalassa upasampadā, sacittapariyodapanā etāṃ Buddhānasāsanāṃ.
4. 10.90.

the Chinese Agamas abound with refutations of this social theory.¹ Of special significance is the Aggaññā Suttanta² which refers to the existing theory of caste, and as a refutation of it, presents an evolutionary account of the world (v. supra. 236 ff.). The fact that at this time the Brahmin caste was claiming the highest position in this social hierarchy is evident from the statement: "Only a brahmin is of the highest social class; other classes are low. Only a brahmin is of white complexion; others are dark. Only brahmins are of pure breed, not the non-brahmins. Only brahmins are genuine children of Brahmā, born of his mouth, offspring of Brahmā, created by Brahmā, heirs of brahmā".³ In the Aggaññā Suttanta, after giving an evolutionary account of the world, the Buddha explains how the different social grades came into existence. Following is a summary of this description. "... Then differences of sex appeared; households were formed; and the lazy stored up the rice, instead of gathering each evening and morning; and the rights of property arose and were infringed. And when lusts were felt and thefts committed the beings, now become men, met together, and chose men differing from others in no wise except in virtue (dhamma) to restrain the evil doers by blame or fines or banishment. These were the first kṣatriyas. And others they

1. The data available in the Pāli Nikāyas have been subjected to exhaustive analyses, v. R. Fick, Social Organization in North-East India in Buddha's Time, (translated by S. Maitra) Culcutta, 1920); G.P. Malalasekera and K.N. Jayatilleke, Buddhism and the Race Question, Unesco, 1958.
2. D 3.80 ff.; Hsiao-yüan-ching 小 緣 經 TD 1.36c ff. (Chang. 6.1).
3. D 3.81, Brāhmaṇo va seṭṭho vaṇṇo, hīno aṅṅo vaṇṇo; brāhmaṇo va sukko vaṇṇo, kaṇho aṅṅo vaṇṇo; brāhmaṇā va sujjhanti no abrahmaṇā; brāhmaṇā va Brahmaṇo puttā orasā mukhato jātā Brahmajā Brahmanimmitā Brahmaḍāyādā. TD 1.36c (Chang. 6.1).

chose to restrain the evil dispositions which led to the evil doing. And these were the first brahmins, differing in no wise, except only in virtue (dhamma). Then certain others, to keep their households going, and maintain their wives, started various occupations. And these were the first vessas. And some abandoned their homes and became the first recluses (samana). But all these were alike in origin, and the only distinction between them was in virtue".¹ In this manner, the Buddha insisted that caste and other divisions in society were occupational in origin and also maintained that one does not have to follow a particular caste merely because he was born to parents who followed such caste. Moreover, to refute the Brahmins' claim to superiority and also the universal validity of the caste system, the Buddha quoted the example of a society where there were only two castes, namely, the masters (ayya, ta chia 大家) and slaves (dāsa, nu 奴), and pointed out that even this is not a rigid division because a slave can become a master and a master a slave.² From the standpoint of his own spiritual teachings, the Buddha considered moral life as being the factor which determines the status of beings; from the social and economic standpoints, he held that wealth is what creates the differences. Therefore, he says: "A śūdra acquiring wealth and fame can command the services of even the kṣatriyas, brāhmaṇas and vaiśyas".³

1. Dial 1.106.

2. M 2.149; TD 1.664a (Chung.37.3). The two countries mentioned are Yona and Kāmbōja. The Chinese version reads Yu-ni (餘尼) and Chien-fu (僉浮).

3. M 2.84; TD 2.142b (Tsa.20.12).

(291) Apart from this Vedic theory of Determinism in social life, there is yet another philosophical theory of Natural Determinism in the sphere of social life which does not seem to have exerted much influence on contemporary society. It is an application of the fatalistic theory of Natural Determinism propounded by the Ajīvikas (v. supra. 72 ff.). This social philosophy is attributed to Pūraṇa Kassapa, who was himself one of the leading Ajīvika teachers. He held the view that human beings belong to one or the other of the six types of existence or species (abhijāti).¹ They were the black species (kaṇhābhijāti), the blue species (nīlābhijāti), the red species (lohitābhijāti), the yellow species (haliddābhijāti), the white species (sukkābhijāti) and the pure white species (paramasukkābhijāti). Prof. Malalasekera and Dr. Jayatilleke have raised doubts as to whether these colours denoted differences in their physical complexion and suggest that the classification implies genetically different physical and psychological types.² But considering the various types of beings included under the different categories, it is difficult to say whether the classification implies genetically different physical and psychological types. The groups are described thus:

- (1) black species :- butchers, fowlers, hunters, fishermen, dacoits, executioners, and all those who adopt a cruel mode of living;

1. A 3.383. We have not been able to trace this passage in the Chinese Agamas. It may be noted that the term 'species' (abhijāti) in this context is used in a very narrow sense to include only human beings, whereas in the philosophy of Makkhali Gosāla it was used in a broader sense to denote "all beings, etc." (v. supra. 75), although Buddhaghosa has explained it in the light of the six human types (DA 1.162).

2. Buddhism and the Race Question, pp. 38-39.

- (2) blue species :- monks leading ascetic lives¹ and such people who accept the doctrine of moral responsibility.
- (3) red species :- the Nigaṇṭhas (Jainas) wearing only one robe.
- (4) yellow species :- the laymen wearing white robes and the disciples of the naked ascetics.
- (5) white species :- male and female Ajīvika disciples.
- (6) pure white species :- Nanda, Vaccha, Kisa, Sankicca and Makkhali Gosāla.

A careful examination of the above list would reveal the fact that the groups mentioned here do not represent categories differing in physical appearance, but denote a gradation of people according to the degree of moral advancement judged by standards accepted by the Ajīvikas. This is the reason why even the lay disciples of the Ajīvikas were considered to be superior to the disciples of other religious teachers. The Ajīvikas in general are considered to be of the white species, while the Ajīvika teachers come under the category of the pure white species. We have seen how the Brahmins considered themselves to be white (v. supra. 290), while all the rest, even the Kṣatriyas and the Vaiśyas, who belonged to the same stock and were ~~thoughted~~ thought to be fair-skinned as opposed to the dark aborigines, were considered to be black. This same principle was adopted by the Ajīvikas who increased the number to six groups denoted by colours starting from black and gradually becoming lighter, the pure white being the last and the best. Whatever it may be, these 'typologists' believed

1. Kaṇḍakavuttikā, which is explained by the commentator as kaṇṭakavuttika (AA 3.394). See GS 3.273.

that man is born into these various groups as a result of fate and that one is incapable of altering it by his own will or effort (v.supra.73). Thus both these schools of thought, the Brahmins insisting on the divine ordination of social behaviour and the Fatalists emphasising strict determinism, presented social philosophies which were static and lacking any dynamism.

(292) Dismissing these views, the Buddha gave an evolutionary account of social life. It was pointed out that "living in an appropriate surrounding" (paṭirūpadesa-vāsa) was, among other things, considered to be one of the auspicious factors which contribute to the moral and spiritual advancement of the individual (v.supra.289). Being concerned for the welfare of the living beings, the Buddha could not neglect their social life. As a social reformer, therefore, he was led on to analyse the causes of social evils and suggest remedies. Just as Buddhahood is the goal of those who have renounced the world seeking for the perfect happiness of nibbāna, even so is universal kingship (cakkavatti-rajja, chuan lun sheng wang 轉輪聖王) the ideal for the layman who chooses to live the household life to perfection. Therefore, in Buddhism, the social or secular philosophy is on several occasions set forth by the universal monarch.

(293) A universal monarch is said to be a person who has conquered the whole world, not by force, but by virtue.¹

1. D 1.89, So imaṃ paṭhaviṃ sāgarapariyantam adaṇḍena asatthena dhammena abhivijjiya ajjhāvasati. TD 1.82b (Chang.13.1).

But the state of a universal monarch is one that cannot be obtained by virtue of heredity. The Cakkavatti-sihanāda Suttanta¹ relates an incident about the accession of a son to the throne of his father who was a universal monarch. Immediately after his accession, the glories of a universal monarch² which the son inherited disappeared. The son who was very much dejected reported this matter to the father who said: "The glories of a universal monarch cannot be considered as paternal heritage (pettikaṃ dāyajjaṃ, fu ch'an 父產)".³ The implication here is that one cannot even claim to material possessions, not to speak of moral and spiritual distinction, on the grounds of one's birth. This certainly is a reaction against the claims of the Brahmins to superiority on the basis of their birth into that particular caste. Moreover, it emphasises the fact that even the highest secular position has to be earned, not inherited. According to the Lakkhana Suttanta the state of a universal monarch can be attained by a person leading a virtuous life.⁴

(294) The duties of a universal monarch are to impart moral instructions and to look after the moral as well as the material advancement of the people. For this it was necessary for him to analyse the causes of social evils and make an attempt to remedy them. In the Cakkavatti-sihanāda Suttanta

1. Chuan-lun-sheng-wang-hsu-hsing-ching 轉輪聖王修經^行
TD 1.39a ff. (Chang.6.2).
2. The glories of a universal monarch are said to consist of seven jewels, v. D 3.142; TD 1.493b (Chung.11.2).
3. D 3.60; TD 1.39b (Chang.6.2).
4. D 3.142 ff.; TD 1.493a ff. (Chung.11.2).

we come across an instance where the universal monarch applied himself to the problem of social evils. He found that "As a result of the non-accruing of wealth to the destitute, poverty increased; when poverty increased, there was a rise in thefts; when thefts increased, there was escalation of violence; when violence was rampant, there was increase in murder; when murder increased, lying grew common; when lying grew common, the life span as well as the comeliness of human beings diminished".¹ The suttanta goes on to describe how all the social evils such as stealing, improper sexual behaviour, hate, jealousy, disrespect towards parents, elders, and teachers, etc., are caused as a result. This is a strictly causal account of social evils and it is interesting to note that poverty and maldistribution of wealth were considered to be major causes of social evils. According to the Aggañña Suttanta, the king was first appointed when these evils first appeared in society and his duty was to uproot their causes and prevent such evils from arising again.² Since maldistribution of wealth was one of the major causes of social evils, it is the duty of the king to find out ways and means by which they could obtain wealth,³ for material or spiritual prosperity cannot be achieved through praying (patthanahetu) or begging (āyācanahetu).⁴ But this alone is no solution as there are bound to be people who, while protecting one's own share,

1. D 3.68, Iti kho ... niddhanānam dhanam anuppādiyamāne dāliddiyam vepullam agamāsī, daliddiye vepullagate adinnādānam vepullam agamāsī adinnādāne vepullagate sattham vepullam agamāsī satthe vepullagate pānātipāto vepullam agamāsī pānātipāte vepullagate musāvādo vepullam agamāsī musāvāde vepullagate tesam sattānam āyu pi parihāyi vāṇo pi parihāyi. ... TD 1.40c-41a (Chang.6.2).

2. D 3.95 f.; TD 1.38b-c (Chang.6.1)

3. D 3.65; TD 1.40b (Chang.6.2).

4. A 3.47-48.

would try to misappropriate what belongs to others.¹ This implies that maldistribution of wealth is not the only cause that produces social evils. It may be one of the circumstances which appears prominent in certain cases. There are equally important causes such as greed, etc., which are mental tendencies found in people irrespective of the fact that they are destitute or rich. This being so, the mental tendencies of the individual can be considered causes which are as important as the maldistribution of wealth. For this reason, the universal monarch is a person who instructs the people on material (attha) as well as spiritual (dhamma) advancement.²

(295) Moreover, Buddhism lays emphasis on the mental tendencies which are the causes of social evils. This is because material progress alone cannot bring about the changes necessary for the moral advancement of man although it is a pre-requisite. Psychological tendencies such as greed, aversion, etc., must be gradually eliminated. Although these psychological tendencies depend on external things or sense data (nimitta), pleasurable (sukha) or unpleasurable (paṭigha), they are mostly due to the lack of understanding or improper reflection (ayoniso manasikāra) on such objects that produce these evil tendencies in man.³ Hence the importance laid on knowledge and mental concentration as means to the elimination of causes that give rise to suffering for oneself as well as for others.

1. D 3.92, atha kho ... aññataro satto lolajātiko sakaṃ bhāgaṃ parirakkhanto aññataraṃ bhāgaṃ adinnaṃ ādiyitvā paribhuñji. TD 1.38b (Chang.6.1).
2. D 3.155 ff.
3. A 1.200.

Causality of religious life.

(296) The Buddha criticised three of the existing theories of causation on the grounds that they are harmful to religious life (v.supra.43). The acceptance of the belief that one's happiness and suffering is determined by an external agent such as God, meant the surrender of one's freedom and ability to work out one's own salvation. As opposed to this theory of theistic determination, the Buddha held that "purity and impurity depend on oneself and that nobody can purify another".¹ The theory of determinism in the sphere of moral responsibility, such as the one advocated by Mahāvīra (v.supra.110 ff.), or even that adopted by the Ajīvikas (v.supra.73 ff.), did not leave room for individual freedom. The theory of indeterminism led to the denial of the efficacy of religious life in that one cannot be sure of what would happen during the next moment.

(297) The acceptance of a theory of causal dependence, not only in the sphere of individual and social life, but even in the physical world, enable one to put an end to suffering by removing the causes that produce them. Therefore, the Buddha maintained that there are causes for the defilement of man.² Hence, his purity is also causally conditioned.³ The Bodhisattva-bhūmi explains how both processes, namely, the process of defiling (saṅkléśā) and the process of purifying (vyavadāna) take place according to the ten causes (dasabhir hetubhiḥ).⁴

1. Dh 165, suddhī asuddhī paccattamī nāññam añño visodhaye.

2. S 3.69 ff.; TD 2.21a (Tsa.3.23).

3. ibid.

4. p.99 ff.

(298) It was pointed out that wrong understanding of, or reflection on, the perceptual world produced attachment or aversion which led to most of the suffering in the world (v. supra. 268). Proper reflection termed yoniso manasikāra implies reflection according to the genesis (yoni) of things, that is to say, reflection on the causality of things. The purpose of this is to avoid the two extreme views, namely, eternalism (sassatavāda) and annihilationism (ucchedavāda), which are said to promote evil tendencies such as egoism, etc. Knowledge of causality should go hand in hand with the restraint of the senses (indriyasamvara, hu ch'u ken 護處根) which enables one to cut at the roots of craving. Thus the religious life is directed at cutting the tangle of wrong views and the development of insight (paññāvimutti, hui chieh t'o 慧解脫) or the freedom of mind (cetovimutti, shin chieh t'o 心解脫) or both.¹ The final outcome of this release is the attainment of the knowledge of emancipation, the knowledge that one has "put an end to rebirth, that the higher life has been lived to its perfection, and that there is no hereafter".² This final knowledge is not attained by a beginner all of a sudden. The Buddha declared: "I do not say that one can win final knowledge at the very outset; it is had from a gradual discipline, a gradual mode of action and conduct".³

1. D 2.251-252; TD 1.34a (Chang.5.1).

2. M 1.184, ikkhāna jāti vusitaṃ brahmacariyaṃ kataṃ karaṇīyaṃ nāparaṃ ittatthayā'ti; TD 1.658a (Chung.36.2), 生死已盡, 梵行已立, 所作已辦, 更不受有。

3. M 1.479, 480; 3.1, Nāham ... ādiken'eva aññārādhanaṃ vadāmi api ca anupubbasiikkhā anupubbakiriyaṃ anupubbapaṭipadā aññārādhanaṃ hoti. Cp. TD 1.652a (Chung.35.3) which merely reads 漸次第至成就訖, 解脫已便。

(299) The gradual stages of the attainment of this final knowledge is described in the Nikāyas¹ and the Agamas.² Briefly, it consists in the practice of the virtuous life (ariyena sīlakkhandhena, shen chieh chü 聖戒聚) and this is followed by the restraint of the senses (indriyasamvara, hu chü ken 護處根). When a man is confronted with a sense-object, he does not allow the evil tendencies such as covetousness and displeasure to flow in and in this manner he restrains the senses. He then develops mindfulness (sati-sampajañña, cheng chih chü ju 正知出入) and strives to eliminate the five impediments. This leads him to the first stage of the jhāna and by developing the mind further he is able to reach up to the fourth jhāna. When he has reached the fourth jhāna his mind is serene and supple to such an extent that he is able to develop the sixfold higher knowledge (abhiññā, chih t'ung 智通). Three of these are necessary for the final knowledge of emancipation. They are: (i) retro-cognition (pubbenivāsānussatiñña, su ming chih 宿命智), with which he verifies the fact of pre-existence. According to the Bodhisattvabhūmi, this knowledge is necessary for the refutation of the theory of eternalism (śāśvatavāda) posited by some of the Sramanas and Brāhmaṇas;³ (ii) clairvoyance (cutūpapātañña, sheng ssu chih 生死智) with which he verifies the decease and survival of beings and the doctrine of karma, and (iii) the knowledge of the destruction of the defiling impulses (āsavaṇaṃ khayañña, lov chin chih 漏盡智).

1. D 1.70, 172, 181; M 1.180-181, 269, 346; A 2.210, etc.

2. TD 1.657b (Chung.36.2); 733c-734a (Chung.49.1), etc.

3. p.67.

It is with this that he verifies the four Noble Truths. "As he thus knows and sees, his mind is emancipated from the inflowing impulses of sensuous gratification (kāmāsava, yü lou 欲漏), of personal immortality (bhavāsava, yu lou 有漏) and of ignorance (avijjāsava, wu ming lou 無明漏); along with this emancipation arises the knowledge that emancipation has been attained".¹ The Samyutta Nikāya gives a strictly causal account of the various stages of the path to enlightenment.² This is in opposition to the view held by Pūraṇa Kassapa that there is no cause or condition for the lack of knowledge and insight or for the presence of knowledge and insight.³ Thus the genesis of suffering as well as the cessation of suffering and the attainment of release are causally explained. These two constitute the second and the third of the four Noble Truths in Buddhism.

1. M 1.181-184; TD 1.657b-658a (Chung.36.2).

2. S 2.29 ff.

3. ibid., 3.126.

CHAPTER SEVEN

Comparison of the theory of causality in the Nikāyas and the Āgamas with some of the later developments.

Early Buddhism and Sarvāstivāda.

(300) On the basis of the foregoing analysis, it may be possible to maintain that the teachings preserved in the Pāli Nikāyas and the Chinese Āgamas show no difference at least with regard to the conception of causality (paṭiccasamuppāda, yin yüan fa 因緣法) and causally produced things (paṭiccasamuppanne dhamme, yüan sheng fa 緣生法). If the Pāli Nikāyas are taken as representative of the early Theravāda standpoint, then it would suggest that the teachings of the early Theravāda, so far as they are embodied in the Nikāyas, are substantially different from those of the Sarvāstivāda (and also the Sautrāntika) as depicted in the Abhidharmakośa and the later Theravāda as embodied in the Abhidhamma literature including the commentaries. But the general concensus of opinion is otherwise. For example, Stcherbatsky maintains that "the Vaibhāṣikas are only the continuators of one of the oldest schools, the Sarvāstivādins. They derive their name from the title of a huge commentary upon the Kanonical works of this school and follow in philosophy generally the same lines as did the original school".¹ Mūrtil says: "The Theravāda and Sarvāstivāda, in spite of some important differences, may be considered as representing one metaphysical standpoint".² Both Mūrtil and Stcherbatsky have thus failed to make a distinction between early and later Theravāda Buddhism, and they attribute the teachings of the Sarvāstivādins and the later Theravādins to the earliest period of Buddhism. Having minimised the differences, Mūrtil makes a general statement about the nature of their teachings. "The Vaibhāṣika teaching is a radical

1. Conception of Buddhist Nirvāna, pp.23-24.

2. Central Philosophy, p.66.

pluralism erected on the denial of substance (soul) and the acceptance of discrete momentary entities. Dharma is the central conception in this as in the other schools of Buddhism".¹ Stcherbatsky has gone further in attributing these teachings to the Buddha himself when he said: "Matter and Mind appeared to him as split in an infinite process of evanescent elements (dharmas), the only ultimate realities, beside space and Annihilation. ... The analysis of the world into its elements of Matter and Mind was probably, to a certain extent, prepared by the work of the Sāṅkhya school. The originality of Buddha's position consisted in denying substantiality altogether, and converting the world-process in a concerted appearance of discrete evanescent elements. Forsaking the Monism of the Upaniṣads and the Dualism of the Sāṅkhyas, he established a system of most radical pluralism".²

(301) Let us see whether these comments are applicable to the teachings preserved in the Nikāyas, therefore of the Theravādins and also the ideas embodied in the Chinese Āgamas. In an earlier discussion, we have argued against the view that early Buddhism as depicted in the Pāli Nikāyas and the Chinese Āgamas accepted a theory of discrete momentary elements (v.supra.175 ff.). It was pointed out that the "theory of moments" is a product of the attempt to demonstrate logically the doctrine of impermanence. The theory of impermanence in the early Nikāyas and the Āgamas is a strictly empirical one (v.supra.176-177). Because early Buddhism does not put forward a theory of discrete momentary entities,

1. Central Philosophy, p.69.
2. Nirvāna, p.3.

we are not justified in designating it as a form of radical pluralism. The term 'radical pluralism', or even 'realism' may be used to designate the teachings of the Sarvāstivādins who, as we have pointed out (v.supra.156 ff.), were pre-occupied with the analysis of elements into eternal substances (dravya) and fleeting momentary appearances (lakṣana, etc.). Early Buddhism considered pluralism (nānatta) as well as monism (ekatta) as two extreme and metaphysical views.¹ The theory of momentariness (kṣaṇikavāda) seems to have made inroads into the Theravāda tradition during the time of Buddhaghosa and his successors. There is evidence to show that Buddhaghosa was aware of the developments taking place in Buddhist thought during his time in Northern India (v.infra.354). Although he made a great attempt to present the teachings of the Pāli canon according to the Theravāda interpretation, yet we find his knowledge of the new developments, especially the theory of momentariness, interfering with the elucidation of the early texts (v.supra.178). The acceptance of this theory of momentariness created many problems which kept the later Theravāda scholars occupied (v.supra.173).

(302) We have also adduced sufficient evidence to show that Buddhism embodied in the Pāli Nikāyas and the Chinese Āgamas not only speak of the non-substantiality of the individual (pudgalanairātmya) emphasised by the Sarvāstivādins, but also

1. S 2.77.

vehemently insisted on the non-substantiality of elements (dharmanairātmya)(v.supra.180 ff.). Thinking that all the schools of the so-called 'Hīnayāna', including Theravāda, accepted uncritically the substantiality of elements, scholars like Mūr̥ti and De la Vallée Poussin tended to consider Mahāyāna as being superior. Our analysis, however, has shown that Mahāyāna cannot lay claim to such originality (v.supra.182).

(303) Lastly, Mūr̥ti's statement that "Dharma is the central conception in this, as in the other schools of Buddhism" is true, but it would leave a wrong impression if we are to speak of dharmas without a reference to their causal characteristics. This may not be true of the Sarvāstivāda tradition which emphasised the conception of dharma and went so far as to bifurcate each single dharma as having 'essence' and 'characteristics'. But the emphasis of early Buddhism was on 'causally produced dhamma' (v.supra.180 ff.). According to early Buddhism, causality and causally produced things are inseparable and intermingled; we cannot speak of one without referring to the other (v.supra.144). Even during the time of the Theravāda Abhidhamma, when every single event came to be classified in the Dhammasaṅgani, the complementary aspect of things, namely, the causal relation, was thoroughly scrutinized and the Paṭṭhāna, enumerating twenty four forms of relations, came to be compiled. While the Dhammasaṅgani analyses things (dhammā), the Paṭṭhāna carries on the process of synthesizing.

(304) This evidence leads to the irresistible conclusion that Theravāda and Sarvāstivāda teachings are substantially different and represent two divergent standpoints. The fact that the Sautrāntikas depended on the Sūtra literature rather than on the commentaries (such as the Vibhāṣās), would in itself be sufficient evidence to show that their teachings are comparatively far removed from those of the Sarvāstivādins than from the teachings of early Buddhism as embodied in the Nikāyas and the Āgamas. But in spite of their dependence on the sūtras, they have accepted new doctrines, such as the theory of momentariness (kṣaṇikavāda) and evolved new ideas about the theory of causation, such as ahutvā bhāva utpāda (v.supra.164) which create a difference between their teachings and those preserved in the Nikāyas and the Āgamas. Although the later Theravādins were influenced by the theory of momentariness in their interpretation of the teachings, we find them trying to maintain the early doctrines faithfully (v.supra.172 ff.). Thus it would be wrong to ignore these differences in the teachings of the Nikāyas and the Āgamas on the one hand and those of the Sarvāstivādins and the Sautrāntikas or even the later Theravādins on the other, when evaluating the doctrines of some of the later schools like the Mādhyamika.¹ After observing the differences between the teachings of the early texts and those of the later schools, it would be pertinent to compare the former with the ideas expressed by Nāgārjuna and his followers.

1. Mūrtil says: "The opinion of competent scholars like McGovern and Stcherbatsky is that the Southern or Ceylonese sect had little or no direct influence in the development of Buddhist schools in India. For our purpose it may be ignored; at best, it may supply corroborative evidence at places", Central Philosophy, p.69.

Early Buddhism and Mādhyamika thought.

(305) It was pointed out that early Buddhism as depicted in the Nikāyas and the Āgamas, criticised four major theories relating to the problems of change and causation on the grounds that they are metaphysical in character. They were the theories of (i) self-causation, (ii) external causation, (iii) both self- and external causation and (iv) non-causation (v. supra. 1 ff.). Having rejected these four theories, early Buddhism presented a theory of causal origination (paṭicca-samuppāda). During the time of Nāgārjuna, the four theories mentioned in the early Buddhist texts came to assume final form. The first came to be known as satkāryavāda and was systematised by the Sāṅkhya school. It was a theory of inherence which maintained the identity of cause and effect.¹ The second was adopted by the Vaiśeṣikas who insisted on the emergent aspect of effect and the non-identity of cause and effect. This came to be designated asatkāryavāda.² The Sautrāntika theory of causality had close affinities with this theory. They believed that the effect being non-existent (abhūtvā, pen wu 本 無) came into existence (bhāva, chin yu 今 有) (v. supra. 164 ff.), a theory which implied that the cause and effect are distinct or not identical. When the Mādhyamikas were criticizing the non-identity theory, they referred to the Vaiśeṣikas as well as the Buddhists³ who upheld this view. But modern Buddhist scholars like Mūr̥ti,⁴ Das Gupta,⁵ and

1. Central Philosophy, p.168.

2. ibid.,

3. MKV p.76, atrāhuḥ svayūthyāh.

4. Central Philosophy, p.168.

5. History of Indian Philosophy, vol.1, p.257.

and Ninian Smart¹ did not distinguish between the early Buddhist theory of causation and the Sautrāntika theory and thus reached the conclusion that Buddhists, in general, before Nāgārjuna accepted the non-identity theory. According to Ninian Smart, Buddha's own theory of causality came to be criticised by Nāgārjuna.² The non-identity theory (asatkārya-vāda) which is called parata utpatti by Nāgārjuna³ is not different from the theory of external causation (param katham, ta tso 他作) (v. supra. 100 ff.) mentioned in the Nikāyas and the Agamas. Here it is criticized as a theory which is both extreme and metaphysical and hence rejected. We are thus led to the conclusion that the standpoint of early Buddhism as embodied in the Nikāyas and the Agamas and the theory adopted by Nāgārjuna and his followers are not different.

Mādhyamika conception of causality.

(306) While criticizing the four theories mentioned above, the Mādhyamikas are seen to advocate the theory of causal production (pratītyasamutpāda). Their attempt was to show that the Buddha himself adopted this standpoint, and this is evident from Candrakīrti's statement: "Thus it is that the Buddha wished to elucidate the fact that entities are produced only in the sense of being co-ordinated. He therefore maintains that they are produced neither at random, nor from a unique cause, nor from a variety of causes; he denied that they are self-caused, caused by another or by both".⁴ Thus, while

1. Doctrine and Argument, p.54.

2. ibid., p.183.

3. v. MKV pp.12-13.

4. ibid., p.10, Tad evaṃ hetupratyayāpekṣaṃ bhāvānām utpādaṃ paridīpayatā bhagavatā ahetvekahetuviśamahetusambhūtatvaṃ svaparobhayakṛtakatvaṃ ca bhāvānām niṣiddhaṃ bhavati.

rejecting the four metaphysical theories, the Mādhyamikas believed in the origination (utpāda) of things (bhāva) as a result of causal dependence (hetupratyayâpekṣam). Moreover, in his Ratnāvalī, Nāgārjuna is represented as accepting the general formula of causality referred to in the Nikāyas and the Agamas (v.supra.202). Nāgārjuna gives two examples to illustrate the statement "When this exists, that exists; on the arising of this, that arises". The statement that "when this exists, that exists" is illustrated by an example which emphasizes the relativity of things, such as the existence of something 'long' in relation to something 'short'. This theory of relativity, as we have pointed out, is not foreign to the Nikāyas and the Agamas (v.supra.202). The second part of the statement is illustrated by the example of the arising (utpāda) of light (prabhā) when a lamp is brought into existence (dīpotpādāt).¹ In the face of statements like these, it is difficult to subscribe to the view put forward by Ninian Smart that "Nāgārjuna's critique of causality applies to the Buddha's own doctrine of origination".² The doctrine of origination was denied by the Mādhyamikas only at the level of Transcendental reality. Candrakīrti makes a statement to this effect. "From the Transcendentalists' point of view it is a condition where nothing disappears, (nor something new appears), etc., and in which there is no motion. It is a condition characterised by the eight above characteristics, 'nothing disappears', etc."³ The application of such epithets to describe the state of nibbāna is not rare in the early texts.

1. Ratnāvalī, 1.48.

2. Doctrine and Argument, p.183.

3. MKV p.10; ... āryajñānâpekṣayā nâsminnirodho vidyate. yāvan nâsmīn nirgamo vidyate. ity anirodhâdibhir aṣṭâbhir viśeṣanair viśiṣyate. v. Stcherbatsky, Nirvāna, p.90.

The Middle Path in early Buddhism and Mādhyamika thought.

(307) The early Buddhist theory of causation, as pointed out earlier (v.supra187), was called the Middle Path because it steered clear of two extremes, namely, the theories of existence (atthitā) and non-existence (natthitā). These two views, it was argued, led to the belief in eternalism (sassata) and annihilationism (uccheda) and therefore were rejected by the Buddha. The Kaccāyanagotta sutta which embodies the above analysis is specifically mentioned by Nāgārjuna in his Mādhyamaka-kārikā.¹ Analysing the two extremes of existence (astitva) and non-existence (nāstitva), Nāgārjuna comes to the same conclusion: "(The theory that everything) exists means adherence to eternalism. (The theory that) nothing exists is annihilationism. Therefore the wise do not adhere to either of the views of existence or non-existence".²

But in the Mādhyamika literature we come across two versions of the analysis found in the Kaccāyanagotta sutta. The first is the Kāśyapaparivarta of the Ratnakūṭa Sūtra which is profusely quoted in the Mādhyamakavṛtti of Candrakīrti and the other is the Mādhyamakavṛtti itself. A comparison of the two versions would throw much light on the difference between the early Buddhist and Mādhyamika theories of causality.

In the Ratnakūṭa Sūtra, where the interlocutor is not Kaccāyana but Kāśyapa, it is said: "'(Everything) exists',

1. 15.7, Kātyāyanāvāde cāstīti nāstīti cobhayaṃ
pratiśiddhaṃ bhagavatā bhāvābhāvavibhāvinā.
Candrakīrti says: uktaṃ hi bhagavatā kātyāyanavivāda sūtre,
and goes on to maintain that this sūtra is studied in all
the (Buddhist) schools (idaṃ ca sūtraṃ sarvanikāyesu
paṭhyate), v.MKV p.269.
2. 15.10, Astīti śāśvatagrāho nāstīty ucchedadarśanaṃ
tasmād astitvanāstīte nāsrīyeta vicakṣaṇaḥ.

Kāśyapa, is one extreme. '(Everything) does not exist' is the second extreme. In between these two extremes, Kāśyapa, is the middle path and this is the correct perception of things".¹ The Ratnakūṭa Sūtra then goes on to describe this middle path (madhyamā pratipad) and this is done in terms of the twelve-fold causal formula in its progressive and reverse order.² This description is very close to the one found in the Pāli Nikāyas³ and the Chinese Agamas.⁴ The same passage is found to occur in the Mādhyamakavṛtti and was identified by De la Vallée Poussin.⁵ But here it is found with an addition.⁶ Unlike in the earlier references, here the middle path (madhyamāpratipad) is qualified by several other epithets such as arūpya, anidarśana, apraṭiṣṭha, anābhāsa, aniketa and avijñaptika, most of which are applied to the Transcendental reality, nirvāna. But the definition of the middle path as consisting of the twelve-fold causal formula is omitted. Here we see a gradual development in the Mādhyamika thought. The Ratnakūṭa Sūtra, like the Nikāyas and the Agamas, rejects the two metaphysical theories and gives a causal account of phenomenal reality. In fact, the Nikāyas and the Agamas adduce purely empirical arguments for the rejection of the two extreme views (v.sūpra.19,103). But in the Mādhyamakavṛtti we find the

1. RS p.90, astīti kāśyapa ayam eko'ntaḥ nāstīty ayam dvitīyo'ntaḥ yad etayor dvayor antayor madhyam iyam ucyate kāśyapa madhyamā pratipad dharmānām bhūtapratyavekṣāt*.
2. ibid., pp.91-92.
3. S 2.17.
4. TD 2.85c (Tsa.12.19).
5. MKV p.270, n.1.
6. ibid., p.270, Astīti kāśyapa ayameko'nto nāstīti kāśyapa ayam eko'ntaḥ, yad enayor dvayor madhyam tad arūpyam anidarśanam apratiṣṭham anābhāsam aniketam avijñaptikam iyam ucyate kāśyapa madhyamā pratipad dharmānām bhūta-pratyavekṣeti.

criticism of these two views from the standpoint of ultimate reality. While the middle path (madhyamā pratipad) in the former is empirical and phenomenal, the middle path in the latter is a transcendental one. In fact, the general tendency in the Mādhyamakavṛtti is to identify causality (pratītyasamutpāda) with the transcendental reality. It is said:

The perfect Buddha,

The foremost of all Teachers I salute.

He has proclaimed

The Principle of (Universal) Relativity.

'Tis (like) blissful (Nirvāna),

Quiescence of Plurality.

There nothing disappears,

Nor anything appears,

Nothing has an end,

Nor is there anything eternal.

Nothing is identical (with itself),

Nor is there anything differentiated,

Nothing moves,

Neither hither nor thither.¹

(308) The transcendental standpoint was adopted by the Mādhyamikas to reject all forms of views (drṣṭi). Thus we find in the Ratnakūṭa as well as in the Mādhyamakavṛtti, the extremes of 'permanence' (nitya) and 'impermanence' (anitya), of 'substantiality' (ātman) and 'non-substantiality'

1. MKV p.11, anirodham anutpādam anucchedam aśāśvatam
anekāntam anānārtham anāgamam anirgamam
yaḥ pratītyasamutpādam prapañcopasamam śivam
deśayāmāsa sambuddhas taṃ vande vadatāṃ varam.
Stcherbatsky, Nirvāna, pp.91-92.

(anātman), of 'defilement' (samkleśa) and 'purity' (vyavadāna), being rejected as unreal from the standpoint of transcendental reality (paramārtha satya).¹ Commenting on these statements in the Ratnakūṭa, Mūr̥ti says: "Dialectic is engendered by the total opposition between two points of view diametrically opposed to each other. And the required opposition could have been provided only by the ātma-view of the Brahmanical systems and the anātma-vāda of earlier Buddhism".² This means that not only the anātmavāda of earlier Buddhism, but also the anātmavāda of the Mādhyamikas themselves, as well as the pratītyasamutpāda, which earlier was considered to be the middle path between two extremes (v. supra. 187, 307), would come under the category of extremes. Yet Mūr̥ti seems to be reluctant to admit this, for he maintains that "As a matter of dialectical necessity then did the Buddha formulate, or at least suggest, a theory of elements. The Mahāyāna systems clearly recognise this dialectical necessity when they speak of pudgala-nairātmya—the denial of substance—as intended to pave the way for Absolutism. Sūnyatā is the unreality of elements as well (dharma-nairātmya)".³ Mūr̥ti seems to consider that pudgala-nairātmya, as opposed to ātma-vāda, is an extreme, but not dharma-nairātmya. On the other hand, it is hard to believe that the Buddha formulated a system which he knew was not consistent with reality merely for the sake of creating a dialectical conflict and thereby pave the way for some form of Absolutism. The above statement of Mūr̥ti

1. RS p.82-88; MKV p.358.

2. Central Philosophy, p.27.

3. ibid., pp.49-50.

seems to be based on the assumption that the Buddha and therefore the early Buddhists formulated only a theory of elements, not a theory of the non-substantiality of elements (dharma-nairātmya), which enabled the Mādhyamikas to bring about a 'Copernican revolution' in Indian thought.¹ But our investigations have shown that this is an untenable view. We have provided definite examples, not only from the Pāli Nikāyas but also from the Chinese Āgamas, to prove that early Buddhism as embodied in these texts has put forward a theory of the non-substantiality of elements (dharma-nairātmya) and that it is no new innovation of the Mahāyānists (v. supra. 181 ff.). Mūr̥ti, following orientalist like Kern, Otto Franke, De la Vallée Poussin, has observed the anticipations of the Mādhyamika dialectic in the Pāli Nikāyas.² But because of the extension of the Sarvāstivāda theory of elements to the early Theravāda and therefore to the Pāli Nikāyas, Mūr̥ti has failed to observe the close similarity between Mādhyamika philosophy and the teachings of early Buddhism as preserved in the Pāli Nikāyas and the Chinese Āgamas. He himself quotes a sufficient number of examples from the Pāli Nikāyas to illustrate the dialectical consciousness of the Buddha. But he has failed to see that as a result of this awareness of the antinomial conflict, the Buddha himself had to accept a form of Absolutism when he, from the transcendental point of view, criticised all forms of theorising. The Aṭṭhakavagga of the Sutta Nipāta, contains many discussions of this problem; specially the Cūla Vyūha Sutta which points

1. Central Philosophy, p.123 ff. This view may be based on the division of Buddhism into three periods, which was called the three swingings of the Wheel of Law (tricakra) representing a gradual unfolding of the meaning of Buddha's teaching (buddha-dharma), v. Sandhinirmocana Sūtra, 7.30; History of Buddhism by Bu-ston, translated from Tibetan by E. Obermiller, (Heidelberg, 1931-32), vol.2, pp.52 ff.; v. also Stcherbatsky, Buddhist Logic, vol.1, pp.3 ff.
2. Central Philosophy, pp.50 ff.

to the Buddha's awareness of the conflict in reason¹ and how from the transcendental standpoint the Buddha accepted that "There is only one truth; there cannot be a second".² But such conclusions were based on an analysis of phenomenal reality from the standpoint of the transcendental. The theory of causality (paṭiccasamuppāda) refers only to the phenomenal reality. It is synonymous with what is conditioned (sankhata, yu wei fa 有為法)³ and is contrasted with the transcendental reality which is unconditioned (asankhata, wu wei fa 無為法).⁴

Samsāra and nirvāna.

(309) But the Madhyamikas seem to have confused the two standpoints when they applied the characteristics such as arūpyam, etc., to the theory of causality (pratītyasamutpāda). This error on the part of the Madhyamikas may be due to an indiscriminating analysis of the unanswered questions (avyākata vastūni). In Buddhist literature, we come across two lists of unanswered questions. The Pāli Nikāyas⁵ and some of the sūtras of the Chinese Āgamas⁶ preserve a list of ten questions. The Chinese counterpart of the Aggivacchagotta sutta⁷ and also the later Buddhist Sanskrit literature⁸ mention a list of fourteen. The difference between the two is that the former

1. Sn 878-883.
2. ibid., 884, ekaṃ hi saccaṃ na dutīyam atthi.
3. AKV 174, saṃskṛtatvaṃ pratītyasamutpannatvaṃ iti paryāyāv etau; the Chinese Āgamas contain a passage where 'the conditioned' is described as that which is subject to arising, mutability, change and cessation while the 'unconditioned' is said to be otherwise, TD 2.83c (Tsa.12.11).
4. TD 2.83c (Tsa.12.11).
5. D 1.191; M 1.426, 484-485; S 3.257; A 2.41.
6. TD 1.804a-b (Chung.60.6) = 917b-c (Taisho.94) = M 1.426; also TD 1.803c (Chung.60.5) = 917a (Taisho.93).
7. TD 2.245c (Tsa.34.23) = 445a-b (Pieh-i-tsa.10.7) = M 1.484-5.
8. AKV 709; MKV 446.

enumerate only two possibilities with regard to the duration and extent of the universe, while the latter enumerate four possibilities. For our purpose, it makes no difference whether we consider the list of ten or the list of fourteen, because we are mainly interested in the different sets of questions the number of which are the same in both lists, namely four. The list of ten being common to both Pāli and Chinese, it would be more appropriate to consider it. These ten questions may be divided into four sets in the following manner.

(a) Duration of the universe.

- (i) the world is eternal;
- (ii) the world is not eternal;

(b) Extent of the universe.

- (iii) the world is finite;
- (iv) the world is infinite.

(c) Nature of the soul.

- (v) the soul is identical with the body;
- (vi) the soul is different from the body.

(d) Destiny of the saint.

- (vii) the saint exists after death;
- (viii) the saint does not exist after death;
- (ix) the saint does and does not exist after death;
- (x) the saint neither exists nor does not exist after death.

(310) A careful examination of these ten questions would reveal the fact that they pertain to two different spheres. The first six questions are related to the phenomenal world, that is to say, the nature of the world and the individual who is confined to the sufferings of the world. The last four

questions are about the transcendental reality, namely, the state of a person who has attained emancipation (nibbuta). Dr. Jayatilleke has pointed out that the first four questions are left unanswered because "there seems to be a recognition of the limitations of empiricism and of the impossibility of discovering the truth about these questions by empirical investigation".¹ He thinks that the questions (v) and (vi) represent theories which are the results of metaphysical arguments based on empirical premises.² These two and the last four questions, according to him, "appear to have been discarded on the grounds that they were (logically) meaningless".³ But here too a distinction has to be drawn between the fifth and sixth questions and the last four questions. Although the last four questions are said to be meaningless, yet the state referred to by these questions, namely, nirvāna, is said to be realisable. The meaninglessness of these last four questions is thus partly due to the inadequacy of concepts contained in them to refer to this state.⁴ It is said that the person who has attained the goal is without measure; he does not have that with which one can speak of him.⁵ The Tathāgata freed from the conception of form, feeling, sensation, dispositions and consciousness is said to be deep, immeasurable and unfathomable like the great ocean.⁶

1. Knowledge, p.475.

2. ibid.

3. ibid.

4. ibid.

5. Sn 1076; Atthangatassa na pamāṇam atthi,
yena naṃ vajju taṃ tassa natthi.
 v. Jayatilleke, Knowledge, p.475.

6. M 1.487; TD 2.445b (Pieh-i-tsa.10.7).

(311) The first six metaphysical questions were posed by the non-Buddhists with regard to the nature of the phenomenal reality. The theory of causality in Buddhism is put forward as an explanation of this phenomenal reality. It is the opposite of the transcendental reality which is comprehended by the last four questions. But it seems that the Mādhyamikas have treated these questions as being on the same level. Taking up the last four questions, Nāgārjuna says:

"What is the Buddha after nirvāna?

Does he exist or does he not exist?

Or both or neither?

We will never conceive".¹

Candrakīrti says that it is beyond our understanding, beyond our concepts.² And Nāgārjuna concludes by saying:

"There is no difference at all

Between Nirvāna and Saṃsāra.

There is no difference at all

Between Saṃsāra and Nirvāna.

What makes the limit of Nirvāna

Is also the limit of Saṃsāra.

Between the two we cannot find

The slightest shade of difference".³

Explaining this equation, Candrakīrti says that "the phenomenal world being (in its real essence) nothing but the Absolute, it is impossible to imagine neither its beginning nor its end".⁴

1. MK 25.17, Param nirodhād bhagavān bhavatīty eva nohyate, na bhavatyubhayañ ceti nobhayañ ceti nohyate.

Stcherbatsky, Nirvāna, p.203.

2. MKV 535, yathā ca nājyaṃ na cohyaṃ tathā tathāgataparīkṣāyāṃ pratipāditam.

3. MK 25.19,20; Stcherbatsky, Nirvāna, p.205.

4. MKV 535, na ca kevalaṃ saṃsārasya nirvānenāviśiṣṭatvāt pūrvāparakoṭikalpanā na sambhavati.

Here then lies the clue to the solution of the problem. The beginning of the phenomenal world (samsāra) or its end is said to be inconceivable (v.supra.237). The state of nirvāna too is similarly described (v.supra.310). Depending on this similarity the Mādhyamikas seem to have reached the conclusion that phenomenal reality and the transcendental reality are but one. In this manner, the theory of causality (pratītyasamutpada) came to be characterised by epithets which were used to describe the transcendental state.

(312) The application of the eight attributes such as non-disappearing (anirodham), non-arising (anutpādām), etc., as characteristics of causality may also have been engendered by a statement in the early Buddhist texts (v.supra.186). This statement is found in the Mādhyamakavṛtti and is stated thus: "Whether the Tathāgatas were to arise or not, this nature of phenomena exists".¹ In the early Buddhist texts, it was intended to show that causality has objective validity (v.supra.192).

1. MKV 40, Utpādād vā tathāgatānām anutpādād vā tathāgatānām sthitaivaiṣā dharmānām dharmatā. In spite of the occurrence of this passage in the Nikāyas, the Āgamas, the Arya Śālistamba Sūtra, the Mādhyamakavṛtti and several other texts, Stcherbatsky is of opinion that "the second tathāgatānām must be dropped and the first understood with Mādhavācārya, Sarvadarś(anasamgraha) p.21.8, in the sense of tathāgatānām mate", (Nirvāna, p.123, n.4). Having misconstrued this important statement, in spite of its wide acceptance by all the schools of Buddhism, Stcherbatsky suggests a translation which is not very much consistent with the teachings of early Buddhism (op.cit., p.123). In the Mādhyamakavṛtti the passage has been quoted by Candrakīrti to indicate the opponents view that the early teachings did accept the fact of 'arising' (utpāda) and also of 'passing away' (nirodha), which the Mādhyamikas were trying to refute.

(313) Lastly, the identification of samsāra with nirvāna may have been the result of another simple equation worked out in the following manner. The Mādhyamikas considered that everything phenomenal is non-substantial (śūnya) because everything is causally produced (pratītyasamutpanna),¹ and therefore without essence (svabhāva).² It is devoid (śūnya) of reality (svabhāva). Next, they found that ultimate reality, nirvāna, is not grasped by conceptual categories.³ It was therefore devoid (śūnya) of any empirical and logical determinations.⁴ Thus we have the simple equation:

pratītyasamutpāda = dharmanairātmya = śūnyatā.
nirvāna = anirvacanīya = śūnyatā.

Therefore,

pratītyasamutpāda = nirvāna.

Śūnyatā.

(314) Because the theory of causality was formulated to account for the arising and passing away of things, the question has been raised as to how we can deny events like disappearance (nirodha), etc.⁵ Candrakīrti is represented as saying that it is for the explaining of this problem that Nāgārjuna composed the Mādhyamaka Śāstra, for herein he shows that there is a difference between the real meaning (neyārtha) and the conventional meaning (nītārtha) of the scriptures.⁶

1. MK 24.18, yaḥ pratītyasamutpādaḥ śūnyatām taṃ pracakṣmahe. MKV 591, iha sarvabhāvānām pratītyasamutpannatvāc chūnyatvaṃ sakalena śāstrena pratipāditam.
2. MKV 591, aśūnyaṃ hi phalam apratītyasamutpannaṃ svabhāva-vyavasthitam.
3. MK 25.17; MKV 535.
4. ibid.
5. MKV 39-40.
6. ibid., 40-41, For a discussion of the two types of truth by De la Vallée Poussin, v. Mélanges Chinois et Bouddhiques, vol.5, pp.159-187.

This classification is not foreign to the Pāli Nikāyas and the Chinese Āgamas.¹ Again Candrakīrti quotes a statement which runs thus: "That, O monks, is the ultimate (paramaṃ) truth, that is to say, the non-deceptive nirvāna. All compounded things (samskārah) are deceptive, possess a deceptive quality".² Here we find the relative or the phenomenal reality being rejected from the standpoint of ultimate reality. Such arguments are not absent in the Nikāyas and Āgamas. In fact, another statement quoted by Candrakīrti to prove this point is found to occur in the Samyukta, both in the Pāli and Chinese versions. It runs thus:

"(All) material form is comparable to foam,
 (all) feelings to bubbles,
 All sensations are mirage-like,
 Dispositions are like the plantain trunk.
 Consciousness is but an illusion,
 So did the Buddha declare".³

Candrakīrti says that this is because all dharmas are non-substantial.⁴ Obsessed with the Sarvāstivāda theory of elements (dharma), Stcherbatsky says that in the Samyutta passage "the illusion regarding the five skandhas must be understood as referring to the theory of pudgala-nairātmya. Here (i.e., in the Mādhyamakakārikā) evidently Candrakīrti takes it as referring to the theory of dharma-nairātmya",⁵ thus making a distinction which has no justification whatsoever.

1. A 1.60; cp. TD 2.592c (Tseng.9.9).

2. MKV 41, etaddhi bhikṣavaḥ paramaṃ satyaṃ yad uta amoṣadharmam nirvānam, sarvasamskārah ca mṛṣāmoṣadharmāṇaḥ.

3. ibid., 41; Cp. S 3.142; TD 2.69a (Tsa.10.10); v.supra.182.

4. ibid., 42, nairātmakatvāc ca dharmāṇām.

5. Nirvāna, p.125, n.4.

The relationship between early Buddhism and Mādhyamika thought.

(316) The above analysis shows that there is a closer relationship between the Mādhyamika thought and early Buddhism than that which has been observed by Mūrti between Sarvāstivāda and early Buddhism (v. supra. 300). We have shown that as a result of a metaphysical inquiry into the problems presented by change and continuity, the Sarvāstivādins developed some theories which ultimately created a wide gap between early Buddhism and Sarvāstivāda. The very fact that the Theravādins had to compile a treatise such as Kathāvatthu in order to refute the heretical views put forward by the Sarvāstivādins indicates the attempt of the former to preserve the earlier teachings which they found in the Nikāyas. It may be held that the Sarvāstivāda teachings paved way for the emergence of the Sautrāntika and the Mādhyamika schools. The observation was made that "whenever the Mādhyamika philosophers refer to the Hīnayāna Abhidharma works, the Sarvāstivāda are the only ones quoted. In fact, among the Mādhyamikas the term Abhidharma is used as a synonym for Sarvāstivādin".¹ Since the Pāli Nikāyas as well as the Theravāda Abhidhamma literature were introduced into Ceylon during the reign of king Aśoka, it may be possible that after some time they completely disappeared from Indian soil and that Nāgārjuna and his followers, therefore, had no access to them. It is difficult, however, to say whether they were not aware of the existence of the Āgamas which certainly

1. McGovern, W.M., A Manual of Buddhist Philosophy, vol.1, p.17.

were preserved by the various schools even after the Pāli version was introduced into Ceylon. In fact, the Āgamas were translated into Chinese during the second and third centuries A.D. The number of quotations from these early texts in the Mādhyamika treatises is so large that one cannot help but assume that the Mādhyamika teachers were at least aware of the Āgamas, if not the Nikāyas. Therefore, it may be possible to maintain that the chief endeavour of Nāgārjuna and his followers was to restore the original teachings of the Buddha as they were preserved in these early texts and to expose the heretical views developed by the Sarvāstivādins and others. Moreover, if one were to accept the teachings preserved in the Pāli Nikāyas and the Chinese Āgamas as representative of early Buddhism, then the Mādhyamika philosophy is neither a "Copernican revolution"¹ nor a system by which "the whole edifice of early Buddhism was undermined and smashed".²

1. Mūrti, Central Philosophy, p. 123.
2. Stcherbatsky, Nirvāna, p. 46.

The validity of the causal law and the method of its verification.

(317) In the history of Indian thought before the time of the Buddha, we come across two major schools which denied the validity of the causal law. One is the Idealist school according to which change and, therefore, causality are only a matter of words, they are only mental constructions.

(v.supra.28). The other is the Materialist school which did not accept inference, both inductive and deductive, as valid forms of knowing and, as a result, rejected the view that there can be any general proposition. Thus they too denied the validity of the causal principle (v.supra.65). Following a middle path, the Buddha emphasised the objective validity of the causal propositions and the possibility of their verification through inductive reasoning.

(318) As pointed out earlier (v.supra.144,186), the causal law (paṭiccasamuppāda, yin yúan fa 因緣法) in Buddhism is the uniformity or the constant relation between two events, as, for example, between ignorance (avijjā, wu ming 無明) and dispositions (sāṅkhārā, hsing 行). Emphasis was laid on the constancy of the relation between the two events. As will be pointed out in the following pages, the constancy of the causal relation has been verified inductively. An attempt to find out the nature of the causal law in Buddhism, therefore, involves an examination of the means of knowing. The most thorough analysis of the early Buddhist theory of knowledge based on the Pāli Nikāyas so far is by Dr.K.N.Jayatilleke.¹

1. Stcherbatsky's voluminous work, Buddhist Logic, is primarily based on the "system of logic and epistemology" formulated by Dignāga and Dharmakīrti.

He has examined in detail the problem of inference in early Buddhism. Without going over trodden ground, we shall confine ourselves to a few problems connected with the verification of the theory of causality.

Causality and inference.

(319) Dr. Jayatilleke maintains that inductive inferences in Buddhism are based on a theory of causation.¹ In the same way, it may be argued that a theory of causality is itself based on inductive inferences.² Therefore, one may be justified in maintaining that inductive inference and the theory of causality are interdependent. While the belief in a theory of causation is essential for any valid inductive inference, inductive inference itself is needed for the verification of the validity of the causal propositions.

(320) Whatever that may be, the inductive inferences in Buddhism are made on the data of perception, normal as well as paranormal. Dr. Jayatilleke has given concrete examples of such inferences in the Pāli Nikāyas.³ The causal relation between birth (jāti) on the one hand and decay and death (jarāmaraṇa) on the other is one such empirical generalization based on normal perception. An example of an inductive inference based on the data of extrasensory perception is to be found in any statement with regard to the fact of rebirth.

1. Knowledge, pp. 443, 457.

2. Russell, Our Knowledge of the External World, p. 226; Mysticism and Logic, p. 143; Edwards and Pap, Introduction, pp. 122-123.

3. Knowledge, p. 457 ff.

It is said that a person "with his clear paranormal clairvoyant vision sees beings dying and being reborn, low and the high, the fair and the ugly, the good and the evil, each according to his karma" (v.infra.334). We have pointed out that the two factors in the special application of the causal formula, namely, consciousness (viññāna) and the psychophysical personality (nāmarūpa) explain the problem of rebirth and moral responsibility (v.supra.222). Therefore, the causal relation between these two factors may be taken as an instance of a generalization based on the data of extrasensory perception.

(321) While accepting certain causal propositions on the basis of evidence given to normal and paranormal perceptions, the Buddha seems to have been very cautious in formulating them as deterministic laws. Dr. Jayatilleke refers to an interesting statement occurring in the Samyutta according to which a proposition held to be true by some recluses and brahmins is refuted by the Buddha on empirical grounds. The proposition is that "all those who kill living creatures experience pain and sorrow in this life itself".¹ This is said to be false on the grounds that some people are seen to be honoured in this very life if they kill the king's enemies.² The question is whether one is justified in holding that this example of people being honoured as a result of killing the king's enemies invalidates the truth of the causal proposition that "those who

1. S 4.343, Yo koci pāṇam atimāpeti sabbo so diṭṭh'eva dhamme dukkhaṃ domanassaṃ paṭisaṃvediyati; TD 1.446a (Chung.4.3); Jayatilleke, Knowledge, pp.458-459.

2. Loc.cit.

kill living creatures suffer pain in this life", Here, then, is an example of the apparent failure of a certain constant relation between two events. But with the failure of this general proposition, "it is usually possible to discover a new, more constant relation by enlarging the group".¹ This process may go on providing us with causal laws which are very specific² and which account for the exceptions to the general law. But these exceptions should not diminish the value of the general propositions for practical and scientific purposes.³ It has been suggested that "if the inference from cause to effect is to be indubitable, it seems that the cause can hardly stop short of the whole universe. So long as anything is left out, something may be left out which alters the expected result".⁴

(322) The attempt to enlarge the causal situation in order to account for certain exceptions is not foreign to the Buddhists. We have quoted an example from the early Buddhist texts according to which a person who led an evil life was reborn in a happy state (v. supra. 287). It is an instance of a phenomenon verified by extrasensory perception. Depending on this direct perception some of the recluses came to the conclusion that there are no evil acts, no evil consequences of misconduct and that those who kill living creatures, steal, etc., are reborn in happy states after death. Buddha pointed out that this inference was mistaken because there

1. Russell, Our Knowledge of the External World, p.230.

2. Wisdom, J.O., Foundations of Inference in Natural Science, p.110, "With a series of causal propositions, it is shown that the more specific the subject, the stronger the argument is".

3. Russell, Our Knowledge of the External World, p.229.

4. *ibid.*

were certain special circumstances which contributed to the result. The apparent exception was due to the performance of good deeds sometime or another in one's past lives or due to a change of heart at the moment of death (v.supra.287). Such exceptions were very clearly explained by the salt-simile (v.supra.288). With the enumeration of the special circumstances, we therefore have a more constant relation which carries more certainty.

(323) The same can be said of the Buddhist theory of the causality of plant life. First we found a very general statement which took into account three factors necessary for the arising of a plant. They were the seed, earth and moisture (v.supra.249). The description in the Chinese Āgamas and the commentaries of Buddhaghosa adds another factor, namely, heat (v.supra.249). In another place the seed was further defined in order to make the causal proposition more certain (v.supra.251), and in yet another place, the earth was analysed in greater detail (v.supra.252). But the latter analysis would not invalidate the truth of the first causal proposition. The first may be defined, in the terminology of Russell, as "a relatively isolated system".¹

(324) The description of the causality of the perceptual process too betrays similar characteristics. First, the two factors which produce perceptual consciousness are mentioned, to wit, the visual organ and the visible object (v.supra.269).

1. Mysticism and Logic, p.143.

Then in another place, this same causal situation is further expanded, giving more details of the visual organ in order to make it certain that there would be no failure in the arising of visual consciousness (v.supra.270).

(325) This analysis may seem to contradict the characteristic of causality described in the Buddhist texts as 'invariability' (anāññathatā, fa pu i ju 法不異如). But in fact it does not. The failure of the general law does not leave room for the belief in chaos, as was the case with the Indeterminists (v.supra.117). On the contrary, it led to the discovery of more specific relations which carry greater certainty (v.supra. 321). Moreover, such failures are accommodated in the Buddhist theory by the characteristic of causality described as 'conditionality' (idappaccayatā, sui shun yüan ch'i 隨順緣起) which again is emphatically expressed in the general formula of causality (v.supra.198).

(326) The causal relation between events as discussed earlier constitute the uniformity of nature (dhammatā, fa tzu jan 法自然) in Buddhism (v.supra.96).¹ It does not assert what has been called the "trivial principle", namely, "same cause, same effect", but the principle of the permanence of law.² But this uniformity of nature is not known a priori, nor is it considered a law proved by pure reason alone.³

1. v.also § 2.25, Uppādā vā tathāgatānam anuppādā vā tathāgatānam thitā va sā dhātu dhammaṭṭhitatā dhammaniyāmatā idappaccayatā; TD 2.84b (Tsa.12.14).
2. Russell, Mysticism and Logic, p.143.
3. Joseph, H.B.W., An Introduction to Logic, (Oxford, 1925), pp.405-410. A criticism of his views is to be found in J.O.Wisdom's Foundation of Inference in Natural Science, pp.124-129.

On the contrary, it is an empirical generalization which is based on immediately given particular instances. Thus, for example, having analysed particular instances of ageing and death (jarāmaraṇa) the Buddha reached the conclusion that it is the result of birth (jāti). On the basis of this realization, he then made the empirical generalization that birth is the cause of old age and death.

Sense perception and inference.

(327) One of the most essential tenets of empiricism is that knowledge of particular facts must depend upon perception.¹ It has been argued that knowledge of particular facts is only possible if the facts are perceived or remembered or inferred by a valid argument from such as are perceived or remembered.² As a result, the amount of certainty or the degree of credibility that can be attached to causal laws have been greatly diminished. While presenting some remarkable about these laws, some modern thinkers have gone to the extent of considering that "The law of causality ... like much that passes muster among philosophers, is a relic of a bygone age, surviving, like the monarchy, only because it is erroneously supposed to do no harm".³ Such scepticism is the result of the dependence on sensory perception alone in the verification of the truth of causal laws. Thus it is held that "the highest degree of credibility to which we can attain applies to most perceptive judgments; varying degrees apply to judgments of memory according to their vividness and recentness."⁴

1. Russell, Human Knowledge, p.518.

2. ibid.

3. Russell, Mysticism and Logic, p.132.

4. Human Knowledge, p.360.

In the same manner, the validity of the causal law in the physical and the mental spheres were distinguished. During the early part of the twentieth century it was observed that "in the mental world, the evidence for the universality of causal laws is less complete than in the physical world. Psychology cannot boast of any triumph comparable to gravitational astronomy".¹

Extrasensory perception and inference.

(328) But the acceptance of the validity of extrasensory perception and the employment of such means of knowledge in the verification of the truth about phenomena without doubt led the Buddhists to attach a greater degree of credibility and certainty to causal laws. Extrasensory perceptions are recognised as valid forms of knowing not only in the matter of perceiving and verifying of mental phenomena, but even of physical phenomena which are not given to immediate sensory perception.

(329) According to the early Buddhist texts, the Buddha claims to have attained the six-fold higher knowledge.² These six are as follows:

- (i) psychokinesis (iddhividha, ju i tsu 如意足),
- (ii) clairaudience (dibbasota, t'ien erh 天耳),
- (iii) telepathy (cetopariyañāna, ta shin chih 他心智),
- (iv) retro-cognition, (pubbenivāsānussatiñāna, su ming chih 宿命智),

1. Russell, Our Knowledge of the External World, p.222.
 2. M 1.69; TD 2.186c-187a (Tsa..26743); also TD 1.54b (Chang.9.1) Slightly different classifications are to be met with in early Buddhist literature. For a detailed analysis of these six extrasensory powers, v. Lindquist, Sigurd, Siddhi und Abhiññā, (Uppsala, 1935).

(v) knowledge of the decease and survival of beings (cutūpapātañāna, sheng ssu chih 生死智) also known as clairvoyance (dibbacakkhu, t'ien yen 天眼), and

(vi) knowledge of the destruction of defiling impulses (āsavakkhayañāna, lou chin chih 漏盡智).¹

Clairaudience.

(330) Of these, the first is not relevant to our discussion here because it represents a form of psychic power rather than an actual form of knowledge. The second is very important in that it points to the possibility of perceiving sounds even at a distance without the intervention of physical media of hearing.² It is said: "With one's clairaudience, normal and paranormal, one hears two kinds of sounds, human and divine, far and near".³ This extension of the auditory perception (without the medium of the sense organ) both in extent as well as in depth would enable a person to perceive directly certain correlated phenomena which are only inferred by others. The Majjhima records an instance where a conversation between two people, the brahmin Bhāradvāja and the ascetic Māgandhiya, was heard at a distance by the Buddha.⁴ Perceptions like these would no doubt make the Buddhists more certain with regard to certain causal relations.

1. D 1.78 ff.; TD 1.553b-c (Chung.19.3). See also TD 1.86a ff. (Chang.13.1).
2. D. Tischner, Rudolf, Telepathy and Clairvoyance, tr from German by W.D.Hutchinson, (London, 1925), p.2.
3. D 1.79; M 2.19; So dibbāya sotadhātuyā visuddhāya atikkanta-mānusikāya ubho sadde suṇāti, dibbe ca mānuse ca, ye dūre santike ca; TD 1.86a (Chang.13.1).
4. M 1.502; TD 1.670b (Chung.38.2).

Telepathy.

(331) The faculty of telepathy (cetopariyañāna, ta shin chih 他心智) enables one to know the general state as well as the functioning of another's mind.¹ It is claimed that one who has developed this faculty is able to comprehend the minds of others in the following manner: "He knows as it is a passionate mind, a dispassionate mind, a mind full of hatred and free from hatred, ignorant and devoid of ignorance, attentive and distracted, exalted and unexalted, inferior and superior, somposed and not composed, emancipated and not emancipated".² It is as if "one were to observe one's face in a mirror or a pan of water and noticing whether there is a mole or not".³ In the same way one is able to perceive the process of working of another's mind.⁴

(332) The Anguttara Nikāya refers to four ways of knowing another's mind.⁵ They are (i) by observing external signs (nimitta),⁶ (ii) by obtaining information from others, (iii) by listening to the vibration of thoughts of another as he thinks and reflects, and (iv) by comprehending the mind of another individual and observing how the mental dispositions are placed in the mind of that particular individual whereby he is able to predict that such and such thought are likely to arise. It will be seen that the first two ways depend on normal perception and the last two on

1. v. Jayatilleke, Knowledge, p.439-440.

2. D 1.80-81; TD 1.86a (Chang.13.1).

3. ibid.

4. D 1.213, parasattānaṃ parapuggalānaṃ cittam'pi ādisati cetasikam'pi ādisati ... vitakkitam'pi ādisati ... vicāritam'pi ādisati; TD 1.101c-102a (Chang.16.1).

5. A 1.170-171.

6. Cp. "muscle-reading", Tischner, Telepathy and Clairvoyance, p.4.

on paranormal perception. While the first two ways can be called "mediumistic", the last two are direct perceptions. This direct perception of the thought processes enabled the Buddha and his followers who had developed such faculties to entertain a greater degree of certainty with regard to the functioning of mental phenomena. In fact, the certainty was so great that they were able to say, after observing a good number of cases, that "such and such thoughts would follow such and such thoughts invariably".¹ The difficulty of knowing directly another's mind was, therefore, the raison d'être with regard to the scepticism about the uniformity of mental phenomena (v. supra. 327). Such sceptics are referred to by Śilānka when he mentions one of their arguments thus: "Scepticism is best since it is difficult to gauge the thought processes of another".²

Retrocognition.

(333) The next form of knowledge is retrocognition (pubbe-nivāsānussatiñāna, su ming chih 宿命智), by which one is able to verify one's past history.³ It is said: "When the mind is supple and pliant on attaining the fourth jhāna, one recalls one's manifold past existences, one birth, two births and so on for many periods of the evolution and dissolution of the world in the following manner: "I was in such a place

1. A 1.170-171, yathā imassa bhoto manosānkhārā pañihitā imassa cittassa antarā amunnāma vitakkaṃ vitakkissatī'ti. So bahuñ ce pi ādisati tath eva taṃ hoti no aññathā.
2. Skr I.35, paracetovṛttinām duranvayād ajñānam eva śreyah. v. Jayatilleke, Knowledge, p.117.
3. P. Demiéville in his article on "La Memoire des Existences Antérieures" has made a comparative study of the material available in the Nikāyas and the Āgamas on the subject of retrocognition, v. Bulletin de l'École Française d'Extrême Orient, vol.27, pp.283-298.

Extrasensory perception and verification.

(335) By means of the knowledge of past existences and the knowledge of the decease and survival of beings, the Buddha was able to verify the problem of rebirth. In Buddhism, the propositions about the phenomenon of rebirth are inductive inferences based on the data of direct experiences.¹ Buddha is represented as criticizing the Jaina ascetics for not personally verifying the truth or falsity of the theory of survival and moral retribution.² In contrast to this, it is maintained that the Buddha and his disciples have personally verified the doctrine of survival and moral retribution, with the result that the inductive inferences with regard to the possibility of survival carry more certainty with them.

(336) Moreover, the vision of contemporaneous events which are not immediately subject to normal perception also come under "clairvoyance".³ The Nikāyas and the Āgamas refer to several such visions that the Buddha had.⁴ Therefore, the degree of certainty with regard to inductive inferences is greatly increased. In the case of certain causal propositions, the inference is from the perceived to the unperceived, for example, from smoke which is immediately perceived to fire which is not immediately given. The inference is made on the

1. C.D. Broad who believes that the question of the possibility of human survival of bodily death is partly empirical and partly philosophical, says: "It is empirical in the sense that if it can be clearly formulated and shown to be an intelligible question, the only relevant way to attempt to answer it is by appeal to specific observable facts.

... The relevant observable facts are some of those investigated by psychical researches and in particular certain phenomena of transe-mediumship". Human Personality and the Possibility of its Survival, p.1.

2. M 1.93; TD 1.587b-c (Chung.25.2); Jayatilleke, Knowledge, p.461

3. Tischner, Telepathy and Clairvoyance, p.2.

4. M 1.170; A 3.336; TD 1.777b (Chung.56.1).

basis of the inductive principle that every instance of smoke perceived is associated with an instance of fire. Since the fire is not immediately given, the degree of certainty is less. The doubt about this causal proposition exists so long as the inferred, namely, the fire, is not perceived. But the situation changes if one is able to see the fire by some means other than ordinary perception, for example, with the faculty of clairvoyance. The Buddha and his disciples who had developed this faculty could make pronouncements which for them carried more certainty.

(337) With the knowledge of the destruction of defiling impulses, one is able to verify the four Noble Truths as well as the origin and cessation of defiling impulses.¹ This knowledge is peculiar to Buddhism, while the other five forms of extrasensory perception were developed by the pre-Buddhist contemplatives in India.²

Inferring future events.

(338) One of the important features to be noted about these six forms of higher knowledge is that all of them are concerned with the past and present. There is no reference to the future. It is believed that the "essential function which causality has been supposed to perform is the possibility of inferring the future from the past, or more generally, events at any time from events at certain assigned times".³

1. D 1.83-84; TD 1.86c (Ch'ang.13.1).
2. Vism 411.
3. Russell, Mysticism and Logic, p.144.

Thus, after observing a number of causal relations, as for example, between birth and the arising of decay and death, Buddha made inductive inferences concerning the future.¹ Here the knowledge of these causal relations is called "knowledge of things" (dhamme ñāṇam). Describing the inductive inferences made on the basis of such knowledge, it is said: "By seeing, experiencing, acquiring knowledge and delving into these phenomena, he draws an inference (nayaṃ neti) with regard to the past and the future (atītānāgate) as follows: 'All those recluses and brahmins who thoroughly understood the nature of decay and death, its cause, its cessation and the path leading to the cessation of decay and death did so in the same way as I do at present; all those recluses and brahmins who in the future will thoroughly understand the nature of decay and death ... will do so in the same way as I do at present'—this constitutes his inductive knowledge (idam assa anvaye ñāṇam)".² This represents an inference from specific instances to a general law.³

1. S 2.58; cp. TD 2.99c-100a (Tsa.14.14-15); v. Jayatilleke, Knowledge, p.442-443.
2. Loc.cit., So iminā dhammena diṭṭhena viditena akālikena pattena pariyogālhena atītānāgate nayaṃ neti: ye kho keci atītam addhānaṃ samaṇā vā brāhmaṇā vā jarāmaṇaṃ abbhāññāsu, jarāmaṇaṃ samudayaṃ ... jarāmaṇanirodhaṃ ... jarāmaṇanirodhagāminiṃ paṭipadaṃ ... seyyathāpāhamaṃ etarahi ... Ye hi pi keci anāgataṃ addhānaṃ samaṇā vā brāhmaṇā vā jarāmaṇaṃ abhijānissanti ... seyyathāpāham etarahi'ti, idam assa anvaye ñāṇaṃ.
The Chinese version gives a very brief description of the contents of the Pāli passage. The phrase fa chu chih 法住智 (=anvaye ñāṇam?) may be interpreted as "the knowledge of the continuity of (the nature of) things".
3. For two kinds of inferences, see A.J.Ayer, The Problem of Knowledge, Penguin Books, 1957, p.72, quoted by Jayatilleke, Knowledge, p.442, n.2.

Causality and free-will.

(339) If these inductive inferences are true, then the causal dependence can be taken as a principle which is valid for the future too. The question may be raised at this point as to whether the acceptance of the validity of the causal law in the future interferes with the problem of free-will. It is said that the advocates of free-will depend on the apparent indeterminateness of the future as compared with the determinateness of the past,¹ the reason being that what is foreseen is considered to be fated. The acceptance of the determinateness of the future, therefore, seems to lead to the denial of free-will activities. This is exemplified by the philosophy of Makkhali Gosāla, who accepted a form of strict Determinism (v. supra. 73 ff.). Dr. Jayatilleke maintains that "the Buddhist theory of causation was not deterministic, since it included mental decisions among the causal factors and these were not considered to be strictly determined".² But unfortunately the implications of this view is not very clear since it has not been fully worked out. It has been well argued that dependence on future indeterminateness for the propounding of a theory of free-will is the result of our ignorance, because "it is plain that no desirable kind of free-will can be dependent simply upon our ignorance; for if that were the case, animals would be more free than men, and savages than civilized people".³ If we are able to recollect some of our past volitions, volitions which have changed the course of our life, then we would certainly feel

1. Russell, Our Knowledge of the External World, p.238.

2. Knowledge, p.453.

3. Russell, op.cit., p.238.

that we were free in the past. Similarly, we might be in the future even if we are able to perceive our future volitions. Therefore, the definition of freedom as that which "demands only that our volitions shall be as they are the result of our own desires, not of an outside force compelling us to will what we should rather not will",¹ seems to be consistent with Buddhism.

(340) Dr. Jayatilleke has quoted two statements from the Pāli Nikāyas to show that causality "is only a probability and not a necessity when psychological factors are involved".² The first is the statement that "a person who knows and sees things as they are, need not make an effort of will (saying), 'I shall become disinterested'; it is in the nature of things that a person who knows and sees becomes disinterested".³ This statement implies that causality reigns supreme in the sphere of psychological life. As opposed to this, Dr. Jayatilleke quotes another statement which says that if a person "being ardent, gains knowledge and insight and because of it, praises himself and looks down on others, he would not progress on to the next stage of his spiritual development".⁴ Comparing these two statements, one in which causality seems to work, and the other in which the same causal process failed, Dr. Jayatilleke came to the conclusion that causality is only a probability when psychological factors are involved. But a careful examination would show that these two statements explain two different causal situations. There is no doubt

1. Russell, op.cit., p.239.
2. Knowledge, pp.453-454.
3. A 5.313; TD 1.485b-c (Chung.10.2).
4. M 1.195; cp. TD 2.759b-c (Tseng.38.4).

about the first statement according to which causality is a valid law in the sphere of psychological life. In the second example, the individual disposition, that is to say, the inclination to be satisfied with the knowledge he has gained, appears to have interfered with the natural process and therefore produced a result which is different from what it would otherwise have been. Thus the difference between the two examples is that in the case of one of the causal factors, namely, the disposition to be satisfied, is absent and in the case of the other it is present. If we are to dismiss the importance of this disposition as a causal factor, then only can we maintain that causality in this present case is only a probability, not a necessity. On the contrary, the above examples illustrate the fact that causality is not incompatible with free-will when psychological factors such as dispositions are given causal status. It was the knowledge that causality was effective in the past, is effective in the present and would be effective in the future, which enabled the Buddha and his disciples to put an end to suffering and thereby attain perfect peace. This may have been a very good reason for the inclusion of ignorance (avijjā, wu ming 無明) of the past (pubbanta, ch'ien chi 前際) as well as of the future (aparanta, huo chi 後際) under the category of avijjā (v. supra. 212 ff.).

CHAPTER NINE

The relationship between the Pāli Nikāyas and the Chinese Agamas.

(341) In the preceding chapters we have made an attempt to see how far the teachings on the problem of causality in the Pāli Nikāyas agree with those in the Chinese Agamas. The methodology adopted was to examine all the likely references to the doctrine of causality in the Nikāyas and the Agamas and to note the differences, if any, and also any modifications that the doctrine has undergone during the course of time as it was transmitted in the different schools to which these texts belonged.

Different views on the nature of the Nikāyas and the Agamas.

(342) In recent times, two different views have been expressed by scholars on the nature of the Nikāyas and the Agamas. One point of view was put forward by scholars like Lu Chêng according to whom "each important school of Śrāvakayāna Buddhism had its own four Agamas (the Theravādins of the south called them Nikāyas), differing from those of other schools in contents as well as in the arrangement of these contents".¹ The other is the point of view put forward by scholars like Prof. Lamotte who maintain that variations chiefly concern the form of expression and the arrangement of material while the fund of doctrines common to the Nikāyas and the Agamas is remarkably uniform.²

(343) Of the two aspects involved in this question, the literary and the doctrinal, we are unable to make any

1. EB 1.241b.

2. Histoire du Bouddhisme indien, (Louvain, 1958), p.171; Brough, J., The Gāndhārī Dharmapada, (London, 1962), pp.32-33; Renou, L'Inde Classique, vol.2, pp.417 ff.

pronouncements on the former because the foregoing analysis was mainly concerned with the doctrinal aspect. Our main task would be to determine the doctrinal relationship between the Nikāyas and the Āgamas. But a summary of the views expressed by eminent scholars on the literary aspect of the relationship and also the history of the literatures themselves will lead to a better understanding of the doctrinal relationship.

The Pāli Nikāyas.

(344) The consensus of opinion is that the home of the Pāli Nikāyas, which came to be introduced into Ceylon during the time of king Aśoka, was Avanti. Nalinakṣa Dutt says: "The Theravādins remained in the central belt of India, making their position stronger in Avanti where Mahā Kaccāyana had laid the foundation of Buddhism and from which place Mahinda was sent to Ceylon to propagate Theravāda Buddhism".¹ The introduction of the Pāli canon into Ceylon and its relative isolation from the rest of the busy centres of Buddhistic learning in Northern India,² made it possible to preserve the teachings in these texts with much less additional matter that may occasionally be found in the Chinese Āgamas (v.infra.351 ff).

(345) Although the home of the Pāli canon may be fixed with some certainty, yet we are comparatively in dark with regard to the original language of the Āgamas and also the schools

1. Aspects of Mahāyāna Buddhism and its relation to Hīnayāna, (London, 1930), p.32.
2. Clark, W.E., Some Problems in the Criticism of the Sources for Early Buddhist History, Harvard Theological Review, xxiii, 1930, pp.132.

to which they belonged. Many scholars have attempted to find out the nature of the original language in which the Āgamas were transmitted before they were translated into Chinese. One of them was Fredrick Weller who tried to determine the original language on the basis of some transliterations found in the Chinese version of the Pāṭika Suttanta of the Dīrgha Āgama. His investigations led to the conclusion that the text from which the translation was made was not in Sanskrit.¹ Professor Bailey, in his article on "Gāndhārī", has convincingly pointed out the close similarity between the earlier Chinese Buddhist transliterations as, in particular, in the Dīrgha Āgama and a Middle-Indian dialect in the north-west of India, centred in the old Gāndhārī region. He uses the term "Gāndhārī" to designate this language.² An example of a text surviving in this language is the Dharmapada which has been edited by Professor J. Brough. In the introduction to this edition of the Dharmapada, Prof. Brough has re-examined most of the arguments set out by various scholars on the nature of the original language of the Āgamas. He confirms Prof. Bailey's view that the Chinese transcriptions point to the fact that (at least some of) the Āgamas were translated from a North-Western Prakrit

1. Über den Aufbau des Pāṭikasuttanta, AM 5 (1928-1930) pp. 104 ff.; quoted by Brough, Dharmapada, p. 53
2. BSOAS 9.764 ff.

and insists that "the points of agreement make a very strong case and it is difficult to see how the general picture can be explained except on the hypothesis that the original of these Dīrghāgama transcriptions was fundamentally the same as that of the Dharmapada".¹ This problem has also been discussed by Prof. Lamotte who maintains that the original of the Madhyama Agama seems to have been in Sanskrit and the Dīrgha and Ekottara Āgamas in a Middle-Indian dialect.² But unfortunately he does not give any concrete evidence in support of his view that the Madhyama Agama is a translation of a Sanskrit original. Thus the researches of scholars like Weller, Bailey, Brough and Lamotte have contributed much to the theory that at least some of the existing Chinese Āgamas were based on originals which existed in a North-Western Prakrit.

Division of Buddhist literature.

(346) Before the results of the research work mentioned in the preceding paragraph came to light, the generally accepted view was that there were only two canons, one in Pāli and the other in Sanskrit. The emphasis on this division was so great that even a scholar of the calibre of Hoernle was induced to say that "The texts written in Khotanese and Kuchean were translated from a Sanskrit original seems obvious from the fact of other texts found along with them which are written in Sanskrit. That by the side of the Pāli canon existing among

1. The Gāndhārī Dharmapada, p.54.

2. Histoire du Bouddhisme indien, p.170.

the Southern Buddhists of Ceylon, there once existed a corresponding Sanskrit canon among the Northern Buddhists was well known from surviving portions ...".¹ W.E.Clark holds a view contrary to this when he says: "One fixation of texts into a canonical form was made in the East (in Pāli), in or somewhat to the west of, Magadha by the third or second century B.C. Another fixation was made at about the same time (or at least between that time and the first Christian century), presumably in Prakrit in North-Western India. It was this latter collection which was translated or recast into Sanskrit in the 1st Christian century".² But these views, as Prof. Brough has rightly remarked, appear "to be much too slight to serve as a basis for the interpretation of a situation which was certainly extremely complex".³ Whether the Sanskrit canon was a reconstitution of the Gāndhāri or not, it seems probable from the available information⁴ that there were at least two canons, if not more, one in Pāli and one in Gāndhāri, before the Christian era.

Northern and Southern Buddhism.

(347) The absence of any major differences in the fundamental concepts of early Buddhism as embodied in the Pāli Nikāyas and the Chinese Āgamas (v.infra.355f), while suggesting the existence of a "primitive canon", would leave the general classification of Buddhist thought as Southern and Northern Buddhism without any doctrinal basis. In the Indian context,

1. Manuscript Remains of Buddhist Literature found in Eastern Turkestan, (Oxford, 1916), vol.1, pxxx.
2. Op.cit., p.146.
3. Dharmapada, p. 32.
4. Ibid., pp.50-54.

if we confine the use of the term "early Buddhism" to denote the common fund of doctrines embodied in the Nikāyas and the Āgamas, then the rest could be considered as later developments. Leaving aside the major doctrinal changes which mark the emergence of Mahāyāna schools, doctrinal developments of some significance include the theory of momentariness (v. supra. 148 ff.), the two conceptions of dharmasvabhāva and dharmalakṣaṇa (v. supra. 154 ff.), and the doctrine of ahūtvā^b bhāva utpāda (v. supra. 164 ff.). The later phase of Theravāda Buddhism in the south came to be influenced by some of these doctrinal developments. But the major conceptions of early Buddhism are, without any appreciable degree of difference, embodied in the Pāli Nikāyas, the Chinese Āgamas and the portions of the Sanskrit canon discovered in places like Turfan and others. Thus the distinction between Northern and Southern Buddhism has only a regional basis and does not imply any doctrinal differences. As far as the doctrinal differences are concerned, the most appropriate division seems to be as early and later Buddhism.

Doctrinal differences between the Nikāyas and the Āgamas.

(348) The concluding remarks of Prof. Lamotte on the nature of the Pāli Nikāyas and the Chinese Āgamas may serve as a basis for an inquiry into the differences that may exist between these two forms of literature with regard to the doctrines preserved in them. He says: "Les Āgamas renferment un plus grand nombre des sūtra que les Nikāya et les rangent

différemment. Clos plus tardivement ils font place à les productions de date relativement récente ...".¹

(349) In our study of the problem of causality in the Nikāyas and the Āgamas, we found that almost all the important statements regarding causality are found in both traditions. In spite of the great difference in the arrangement not only of different sūtras in each collection, but even of the subject matter within many of the sūtras themselves, there is a remarkable uniformity in the teachings. The number of statements on the problem of causality found in the Nikāyas but not occurring in the Āgamas and vice versa is negligible. Moreover, these few statements are not of great significance; they pertain to minor details. On the whole every statement of some significance was found to be the common stock of both traditions.

(350) On many occasions we found that the descriptions of certain doctrines in the Chinese Āgamas were more concise than the descriptions in the Pāli Nikāyas which tended to be more detailed. The Pāli version, in most cases, seems to be more uniform. These instances may indicate the extent to which the editorial hands were at work. But it must be emphasised that the editing was confined to a systematization of expression but not the doctrines. There is only a difference in the description but not the matter described.

1. Histoire du Bouddhisme indien, p.170.

(351) We do come across a few examples where the Āgama version adds more information than that found in the Nikāyas. One of the most important examples is the Vibhaṅga sūtra of the Samyukta. In the definition of ignorance (avijjā, wu ming 無明), it was pointed out that the Pāli version refers only to the ignorance of the four Noble Truths. But the Chinese version gives, in addition to this, a long list of things, the ignorance of which constitutes avidyā (v.supra.212). We cannot deny the fact that it is an advancement on the Pāli version. Although there is nothing that can be considered as late or alien in the Chinese version, yet as a composition it seems certainly later than the Pāli version. It represents a re-formulation of the ideas which were already found in the traditions. Because the Pāli Nikāyas came to be closed earlier, these ideas came to be incorporated in the Abhidhamma and the commentarial literature.

(352) Apart from the Material found in the Vibhaṅga sutta, there are a few other examples which show that the ^{final} redaction of the Āgamas took place later than the closing of the Nikāyas. The Nikāya version of bikkhunī Selā's statement refers only to three causes necessary for the germination of a seed, while the Āgama version adds a fourth (v.supra.249). It is important to note that Buddhaghosa while accepting this fourth factor, defines the function of earth in the same way as it is represented in the Chinese Āgamas.(v.supra.249).

(353) Moreover, the Nikāyas never refer to the number of factors of the special application of the causal formula as twelve (dvādasāṅga), while the number is specifically

stated in the Āgamas in a large number of instances as shih erh yin yüan (十二因緣).¹ In addition to these, there are many portions of later Buddhist texts which have been incorporated in the Āgama texts. Prof. Lamotte has pointed out that the Samyukta Āgama includes within itself large sections from the Aśokāvadāna,² Sections from the Divyāvadāna have also been traced in the Madhyama,³ and the Ekottara Āgamas.⁴ Thus whatever differences there are between the Nikāyas and the Āgamas may be due to the late closing of the latter.

(354) Some of the examples discussed above seem to indicate that Buddhaghosa was quite aware of the existing Āgama tradition. In fact, the present Āgamas were translated into Chinese during the second and third centuries A.D.⁵ There is little doubt that the Āgamas continued to exist in India even after they were translated into Chinese. It is difficult to believe that an enthusiastic and energetic scholar like Buddhaghosa who made his way to Ceylon in search of the Pāli Nikāyas and the commentaries, was unable to lay hands on the Āgama literature which survived in the Indian sub-continent. The competence with which Buddhaghosa carried out the translations of the commentaries and compiled a treatise like the Visuddhimagga no doubt pre-supposes

1. TD-1.7c (Chang.1.1), 60b (Chang.10.2); 2.101b (Tsa.15.5), 156c (Tsa.22.15), 667a (Tseng.23.2), 730c (Tseng.33.4), 797c, 798a (Tseng.46.5), etc.

2. Histoire du Bouddhisme indien, p.170.

3. TD 1.494-ff.

4. *ibid.*, 2.660a ff.

5. Lamotte, *op.cit.*, p.169.

6. Lamotte, *op.cit.*, p.169.

an extensive knowledge of the Sūtra literature, and we may not be justified in holding that he was not conversant with the Sūtra literature until he came to Ceylon. Moreover, the use of the term āgama itself in the colophons to the commentaries and also the importance attached by him to the first four Nikāyas reflects his knowledge of the Āgamas and the controversies with regard to the Kṣudraka.

Uniformity of the teachings in the Nikāyas and the Āgamas.

(355) But in spite of these few additions the teachings in the Nikāyas and the Āgamas are remarkably uniform. Apart from the doctrine of causality, we have examined several allied problems such as the theory of impermanence (anicca, wu chang 無常) and non-substantiality (anatta, wu wo 無我) and compared them with the developments that took place later in the history of Buddhist thought. Taking the theory of impermanence, we found that both the Nikāyas and the Āgamas presented an empirical view of change and did not advocate a logical theory of momentariness (v. supra. 175 ff.). As for the teachings on non-substantiality, we do not find a bifurcation of things, as was done by the Sarvāstivādins later on, but a theory of the non-substantiality of both the individual (pudgala) and component things (samskāra) and also of the compounded things (dharma) (v. supra. 180). Thus we are unable to agree with the view put forward by Lu Chêng that the Nikāyas and the Āgamas differ both in regard to the arrangement as well as the contents. On the other hand, our investigations confirm the observation of Prof. Lamotte to the effect that while the arrangement is different, there is a remarkable uniformity in the teachings.

The observation made by Prof. Brough with regard to the different versions of the Dharmapada may also be taken as being true of the Nikāyas and the Āgamas. He says: "Whether we consider the common ancestor of these versions as a definite text or merely as a rather fluid tradition of ethical verses, but already tending to be gathered into some sort of groupings in the earliest period of Buddhism, the only likely hypothesis is that the various schools have to a greater or lesser degree modified, rearranged and expanded a common fund of inherited materials. . . . The final differences between recensions are probably due to accident and intention in varying degrees in each case".¹ But the doctrinal differences, when compared with the differences in the composition and the arrangement of material, are remarkably less, so that we are forced to conclude that hardly new material had been added which changed the main concepts inherited by the different schools.

Importance of a comparative study.

(356) It is difficult to arrive at definite conclusions regarding the uniformity of the doctrines in the Nikāyas and the Āgamas with the present state of our knowledge. Studies of other doctrines in greater detail should precede any attempt to reach definite conclusions as to the nature of the teachings in these two bodies of literature. But on the problem of causality there seems to be no significant differences. A comparative analysis of the Nikāyas and the Āgamas would not only prove the authenticity of some of the

1. Dharmapada, p.28.

doctrines such as anātmavāda in early Buddhism,¹ but also would greatly facilitate the proper understanding of some of the obscure concepts in either of these traditions. We have already referred to a few problems in the Pāli Nikāyas, the solution of which was made easy by their corresponding statements in the Chinese Agamas. One of them is the concept of saṅgati which was mistakenly interpreted as "chance", while on the authority of the Agamas we were able to explain it more consistently as "species" (v.supra.74 ff.). Another is the interpretation of the terms pubbanta and aparanta where the Chinese version explicitly distinguishes two usages (v.supra.214 ff.).

(357) The play of subjective bias in the assessment of the teachings in the Pāli Nikāyas is clearly evident from some of the works of scholars like Mrs. Rhys Davids, who saw the Upaniṣadic conception of soul (ātman) in them, Dr. Sarathchandra, who denied the fact that rebirth was a central tenet, and Professors Stcherbatsky and Mūrtil who found the Sarvāstivāda conception of real momentary elements. After observing these different views, Dr. Winternitz remarked: "With the growth of this vast literature, not only our knowledge of Buddhism ... has greatly increased and widened, but also new problems have arisen, and much that has seemed to be certain results of scientific research, has today become an object of earnest doubt, of scepticism and a great deal of controversy".² Such doubts have been occasioned by

1. Lamotte, op.cit., p.171

2. "Problems of Buddhism", in Viśvabhāratī Quarterly, New Series, vol.2, (1936-1937), pp.41-42. He refers to the doubts expressed by Mrs. Rhys Davids on the doctrine of non-substantiality (anatta) in early Buddhism.

the conflicting views put forward by scholars on the nature of the teachings in Buddhist literature. These views may easily be classed as subjective hypotheses. Such subjective hypotheses emerge as a result of the dependence on a single class of sources or a single tradition without corroboration from others. This is very clearly brought out by Prof. Lamotte's comment: "Tout essai de construction d'un bouddhisme 'précanonique' s'écartant du concensus entre āgama et nikāya ne peut aboutir qu'à des hypothèses subjectives".¹ But a comparative study of the Nikāyas and the Āgamas would eliminate most of these doubts and enable a proper assessment and determination of the teachings of early Buddhism.

1. Histoire du Bouddhisme indien, p.171.

The theory of pratyayas in the Theravāda compared with the theories in the Sarvāstivāda and the Mahāyāna.

(358) The definition of a cause as the sum total of several factors led to further developments in the Buddhist theory of causality (v. supra. 130). During the period of the Abhidharma, the Buddhists began to analyse each one of these several factors with a view to determine the exact nature of the relationship between them. In the Theravāda such speculations are embodied in the Paṭṭhāna, while in the other schools of thought these analyses are to be found in almost every text. The theory of four pratyayas (yuan 緣) mentioned in the Abhidharmakośa seems to be the nucleus out of which the more elaborate theories developed. The fact that most of the early schools possibly started with these four pratyayas is attested by the important place accorded to them in the different schools. In the Theravāda Abhidhamma they are listed as the first five, the samanantara-pratyaya being counted as two, namely, anantara- and samanantara-paccayas. In the Sarvāstivāda and the Mādhyamika schools the number was fixed as four and no more.¹ Hence when the Yogācārins wanted to account for certain relations which are not covered by these four, they had to sub-divide one of them, namely, the hetu-pratyaya (v. supra. 140). But the Theravādins who were not restricted by such limitations went on multiplying the number freely until they formulated a theory of twenty four paccayas. We have pointed out that the Yogācāra school enumerated seven characteristics of the primary causa (hetu-pratyaya, yin yuan 因 緣) one of which was sub-divided into twenty forms (v. supra.

1. AK 2.61, catvāraḥ pratyayā uktāḥ; v. Kośa, 2.299.

MK 1.2, catvāraḥ pratyayā hetuś cālambanam anantaram
tathaiivādhipateyañ ca pratyayo nāsti pañcamah.

MKV p.76.

Of the seven characteristics of hetu-pratyaya, six were related to the six hetus enumerated by the Sarvāstivādins, while the other, i.e., prabheda, represents twenty subdivisions. The first ten are mentioned in the Madhyāntavibhāgabhāṣya¹ of Vasubandhu and the last ten are treated in the Bodhisattvabhūmi² and the Ch'eng-wei-shih-lun.³ Thus the four pratyayas represented a very broad classification of causes, while their subdivisions provide a detailed analysis of all the different causes. In his translations of the Q-pi-ta-mo-chü-she-lun⁴ and the Ch'eng-wei-shih-lun,⁵ De la Vallée Poussin has discussed in detail the various pratyayas formulated in these texts.⁶ A critical analysis of the theory of twenty-four paccayas of the Theravādins was given by Nyanatiloka.⁷ We do not propose to undertake the superfluous task of examining these causal relations all over again. Our attempt here will be to compare the ~~the~~ theory of paccayas presented by the Theravādins on the one hand and the theories enunciated in the Sarvāstivāda and Yogācāra schools on the other, with a view to finding any correspondence between them.

Hetu-paccaya and hetu-pratyaya.

(359) Hetu-paccaya or the primary cause is the first of the twenty four forms of relations enumerated in the Paṭṭhāna. It occupies a place of similar importance in the Sarvāstivāda and Yogācāra teachings. In the philosophy of early Buddhism, the psychological motives such as greed (lobha, t'an 貪), hate or aversion (dosa, wei 恚) and confusion (moha, chih 癡) are referred to as roots (mūla, ken 根),⁸ in the sense of

1. p.31; v. also Madhyāntavibhāgaṭīkā, pp.84-89.

2. pp.97-98.

3. TD 31.41b (Ch'eng.8); Siddhi, pp.453 ff.

4. Kōśa, 2.299-331.

5. Siddhi, pp.453 ff.

6. v. also Théorie des Douze Causes, pp.51-67.

7. Guide Through the Abhidhamma Piṭaka, pp.118-127.

8. D 3.214; TD 1.50c (Chang.8.2).

primary causes. The Paṭṭhāna quotes these psychological motives as examples of the primary causes (hetu-paccaya),¹ and Buddhaghosa maintains that a thing can be a primary cause in the sense of being the root (mūlaṭṭhena).² These three motives are compared to the roots of a tree which feed and nourish the other parts of a tree.³ Just as greed, etc., are the primary causes of evil (akusala, pu shan 不善), even so their opposites are the primary causes of good (kusala, shan 善).⁴

(360) According to the Yogācāra school, the 'store-consciousness' (ālayavijñāna), which serves as a ^{receptacle of} seeds (bīja), is the primary cause of the seven forms of active consciousness (pravṛtti-vijñāna) which are the effects.⁵ But here the ālayavijñāna includes both good and bad tendencies,⁶ although according to the Abhidharmasamuccaya, which represents a formative stage in the evolution of Yogācāra thought, only the good tendencies (kuśalavāsanā) are considered to be the primary causes.⁷

Arammaṇa-paccaya and ālambana-pratyaya.

(361) The ārammaṇa-paccaya or the ālambana-pratyaya (so yuan yuan 所緣緣) is the objective cause or condition. Discussing the ālambana-pratyaya, Yaśomitra says: "There are two kinds of causal conditions, namely, that which produces (janaka)

1. Tikap 1.27.

2. Vism 235.

3. Abvñ p.137.

4. Tikap 1.27; D.3.214; TD 2.50a (Chang.8.2).

5. TD 31.40a (Ch'eng.7); Siddhi, p.436; Madhyāntavibhāgaṭīkā, pp.32-33; tr.by Friedman, p.42.

6. Madhyāntavibhāgaṭīkā, p.33; tr. by Friedman, p.43.

7. p.28, hetu-pratyayaḥ katamaḥ, ālayavijñānaḥ kuśalavāsanā ca.

and that which does not produce (ajanaka). The ālambana-pratyaya does not produce because it is only an objective condition".¹ Here the reference is to the 'image' produced by the object (viṣaya) rather than to the object itself. Inasmuch as the 'image' has already been produced by the object, it need not be produced again in the mind by the object and therefore it serves only as an objective support. Hence the distinction between the ālambana-ṣaṭka (i.e., the six forms of vijñāna) and the viṣaya-ṣaṭka.²

(362) For the manifestation of metalⁿ phenomena some kind of objective support is a sine qua non. Buddhaghosa maintains that there is nothing in this world that would not become the object of consciousness.³ While the five forms of sense consciousness which are produced from external stimuli serve as objective support for the five forms of sensory perception, all forms of mental co-efficients, all terms expressive of concepts, and nibbāna are related to mind by way of objective support.

(363) The Yogācāra school which does not accept the reality of an external object, nevertheless recognizes this relation. They believed that consciousness (vijñāna) contains within itself the ingredients of the subject-object relation and represents one stage in the evolution of consciousness.⁴

1. AKV p.218; dvidhā hi pratyayāḥ, janakās cājanakās ca. ālambanapratyayaś cājanakaḥ. ālambanamātratvād.
2. Stcherbatsky, Central Conception, p.50, n.175.
3. Vism 533; v.also Abvn p.138.
4. Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi, p.22.

Adhipati-paccaya and adhipati-pratyaya.

(364). Adhipati-paccaya is the dominant cause. It represents the efficient cause because it exerts its influence over the effect.¹ For example, the six internal bases of cognition (i.e., the eye, etc.) are related to the six forms of cognition in this manner.²

(365) The Pāli Abhidhamma distinguishes two forms of the dominant cause. They are (i) objective dominance (ārammaṇ-ādhipati) and (ii) co-existent dominance (sahajātādhipati).³ The first accounts for the impressions created by external objects on the mind. The external world presents us with various agreeable and disagreeable objects. These impressions determine to a great extent the nature of our cognitions. Moreover, not only the impressions, but also the nature of the sense organs themselves (v. supra. 270, 364) would settle the character of the cognitions. But apart from these objective presentations or the nature of the sense organs, there are certain motives which dominate our consciousness and which are said to arise along with consciousness. Intention, will, energy or effort, reason and investigation are said to fall into this category and are considered as co-existent dominant causes.⁴ In the ultimate analysis it appears that even such mental concomitants are engendered by external objects. But because of the dominating or 'over-powering' influence of these motives a distinction seems to have been made between objective and co-existent dominance.

1. Stcherbatsky, Buddhist Logic, 1.139; Friedman, translation of Madhyāntavibhāṅgikā, p.109.

2. Cp. Kośa, 2.299 ff.; Siddhi, p.227 ff., 436 ff.

3. Tikap 1.13.

4. ibid.

(366) The Sarvāstivādins and the Yogācārins give a much wider meaning to the adhipati-pratyaya (tseng shang yuan 增上緣). According to the Sarvāstivāda it is a comprehensive and universal cause.¹ The Yogācārins go to the extent of including the other three causes, hetu, samanantara and ālambana under this category.² While the other three causes explain specific relations, the adhipati-pratyaya accounted for any possible relations. Hence we find the Sarvāstivādins identifying it with kāraṇa-hetu.³ The difference between the Theravāda and Sarvāstivāda conceptions may be explained thus: The Theravādins whose speculations were not restricted by the limitations imposed by other schools, continued to expand the original theory of four pratyayas enunciating new causes as occasion demanded. Therefore, there was no necessity to accept a cause which could accommodate anything that did not come under the other three causes. As a result their definition of adhipati-paccaya was narrow and precise. On the contrary, the Sarvāstivādins who accepted the theory of four pratyayas and formulated a theory of six hetus, defined the adhipati-pratyaya in such a way that anything not accounted for in these two theories could be included in it. The Ch'eng-wei-shih-lun states that the adhipatipratyaya exerts influence in four ways, namely, by being a generating cause (sheng 生), a sustaining cause (li 位 or chu 住), an accomplishing cause (cheng 成) and a cause of acquisition (te 得).⁴ Thus all primary and subsidiary causes fall into this category.

1. Kola, 2. 299, n. 1.

2. 前三緣亦是增上. TD 31.41a (Ch'eng.7); Siddhi, p.448.

3. AK 2.62d, kāraṇahetuḥ adhipatipratyaya ucyate.

4. TD 31.41a (Ch'eng.7); Siddhi, pp.448-449.

Samanantara-paccaya and abhinirvṛtti-kāraṇa.

(367) The samanantara-paccaya or the samanantara-pratyaya (teng wu chien yuan 等無間緣) is defined as the proximate or contiguous cause. The Theravāda tradition has formulated two forms of this pratyaya, although they are not strictly distinguished (v.supra.172,358). The formulation of this relation may have been at first necessitated by the rejection of the idea of annihilation (uccheda, tuan 斷), but with the development of the theory of momentariness during the period of the Abhidharma, its importance in accounting for the rapid succession of momentary phenomena came to be greatly emphasised (v.supra.172). With the formulation of this relation, the Sarvāstivādins as well as the Sautrāntikas, who formulated a theory of momentariness, and also the later Theravādins who accepted this theory, were able to explain the continuity of momentary phenomena, physical as well as mental. According to the definitions given by all schools of thought, any phenomenon which serves as a cause for an immediately succeeding phenomenon without any pause could be called an immediately contiguous cause.¹ The abhinirvṛtti-kāraṇa² (or hetu) mentioned in the Yogācāra treatises also emphasizes this aspect of the immediate production of the effect, and is therefore called the proximate cause (āsannaḥ pratyayaḥ).³

1. Tikap 1.3; AK 2.62a-b; Kośa 2.233 f; 236, 245; Abhs p.29; TD 31.671c (CL.3.1); 714a-c (TCL.4); 40c (Ch'eng.7); Siddhi, p.437 f.
2. Sheng ch'i neng tso 生起能作
3. Abhs p.28; TD 31.671c (CL.3.1); 41b (Ch'eng.8); Siddhi, p.456.

Sahajāta-paccaya and sahabhū-hetu.

(368) Next in the list of twenty four paccayas of the Theravādins is the sahajāta-paccaya or the co-nascent cause. In the Paṭṭhāna it is defined as "that which arises helping or assisting the arising of another phenomenon".¹ The example of the lamp is quoted to illustrate this relation. When a lamp is lighted, the light comes along with the lighting of the lamp. When the lamp is burning, it burns together with its heat and light. In this case, the heat and light are related by way of co-nascent.

(369) This corresponds to the sahabhū-hetu (chu yü yin 俱有因) of the Sarvāstivāda classification. The Abhidharmakośa-vyākhyā quotes an example from the early texts as an illustration and it runs thus: "These three members of the path accompany right view. Along with them have arisen feeling, sensation, volition, etc."² De la Vallée Poussin had translated it as "cause mutuelle".³ This relation refutes the idea that a cause should always be temporally prior to the effect. Thus an effect will appear when the necessary factors summarised by the cause have been fulfilled—not necessarily after the cause.⁴ The idea that factors mutually support each other in order to give rise to the effect and continue to do so even after the effect has come into existence is implied by this relation.⁵

1. Tikap 1.14, uppajjamāno saha-uppajjamānabhāvena upakārako paccayo sahajātapaccayo; Abvn p.138, attano anuppattiyā ... sahuṭṭhānānaṃ sahuṭṭhāpābhāvena paccayo.
2. AKV 188, imāni trīṇi mārgaṅgāni samyagdr̥ṣṭim anuparivartante. taiḥ sahajātā vedanā saṃjñā cetanā ceti.
3. Kośa, 2. 245.
4. Russell, Our Knowledge of the External World, p.219.
5. AKV 188, anyonyānuparivartanaikakṛtyārthena hy eṣa vyavasthāpyate.

In this respect it is similar to the co-relative cause (aññamañña-paccaya, v.infra.370). This, according to the Abhidharmasamuccaya, is a characteristic of the primary cause (hetu-pratyaya) and is described as 'assistance' (sahāya, chu pan 助半).¹ It is further explained as the relation between those "phenomena which arise together and exist without deficiency, like the primary and derived elements".²

Aññamañña-paccaya and sampratipatti and sabhāga-hetu.

(370) Not all relations are genetic or 'intrinsic'. There are innumerable cases where we find a form of interdependence rather than genetic connection. The reciprocal or co-relative cause (aññamañña-paccaya) was formulated in order to account for such connections. The idea was first expressed in the Upaniṣads where it is said: "The body is founded on breath, and breath is founded on the body".³ In the early Nikāyas and the Āgamas it is maintained that such a form of relation is obtained between consciousness (viññāṇa, shih 識) and the psychophysical personality (nāmarūpa, ming se 名色), and are compared to two reeds which stand leaning against one another and if one were to be taken away the other would certainly fall.⁴ The example of the three sticks (tidanda) is usually quoted in the Pāli Abhidhamma to illustrate this relation.⁵

1. p.28; TD 31.671b (CL.3.1).

2. Abhs p.29, ye dharmāḥ sahabhāvenotpadyante nānyatamavaikalyena tad yathā bhūtāni bhautikañ ca.

3. Tait 3.7.1, Prāṇe śarīraṃ pratiṣṭhitam, śarīre prāṇaḥ pratiṣṭhitah; v.also Kauṣ 3.7-8; 4.20.

4. S 2.114.

5. Abvn p.138.

(371) The Yogācārins include this under the characteristic of the primary cause (hetu-pratyaya) defined as 'co-existence' (sampratipatti, teng hsing 等行).¹ Co-existence is explained as the function of a phenomenon which, existing together, serve another phenomenon by way of an objective support, like the mind and the mental concomitants.² According to Haribhadra's classification (v.supra.144), it coincides with the sabhāga-hetu (hsiang ying yin 相應因) formulated by the Sarvāstivādins. In the She-ta-ch'eng-lun, Asaṅga is represented as maintaining that the two forms of consciousness, namely, the ālaya-vijñāna and the pravṛtti-vijñāna are reciprocal causes (anyonyapratyaya = aññamañña-paccaya).⁴

(372) The interdependence here, unlike in the relation discussed earlier (v.supra.368-369), does not mean genetic interrelation, but rather mutual interdependence among existents, "a static net of reciprocal dependencies like that among the parts of a steel frame".⁵

Nissaya-paccaya and dhṛti-kāraṇa.

(373) The dependence-cause (nissaya-paccaya) is described as the ground or basis for the existence of some other phenomenon.⁶ This relation is slightly different from the two preceding, namely, sahajāta and aññamañña paccayas. For example, the earth is the dependence-cause or the basis on which a tree

1. Abhs p.28; TD 31.671b (CL.3.1).

2. ibid., p.29, Ye dhārmāḥ sahabhāvenālanbanam sampratipadyante tad yathā cittam caitasikāś ca, TD 31.671c (CL.3.1).

3. TD 31.713c (TCL.4).

4. TD 31.135b (STCL.1); Lamotte, La Somme du Grand Véhicule d'Asaṅga, p.46.

5. Bunge, Causality, p.91.

6. Vism 535.

could grow. But as in the case of the co-nascent cause (sahajāta-paccaya), the earth does not arise with the tree, nor does the earth depend on the tree for its existence, as in the case of the co-existent or reciprocal cause (aññamañña-paccaya). In psychology, the six 'gateways' (āyatana) of sense perception serve as dependence causes for the six forms of cognitions (viññāna).

(374) The counterpart of this cause is to be found in the dhṛti-kāraṇa (ch'ih neng tso 持能作) of the Yogācārins.¹ It is a sub-division of the primary cause (hetu-pratyaya). According to their definition, the earth is related in this manner to the beings who live therein,² because the earth holds the beings and prevents them from falling.³ It is not possible to find a separate cause corresponding to this in the Sarvāstivāda classification. But it may be possible to include it under the adhipati-pratyaya which, according to the Yogācāra definition, functions as a supporting cause (pratiṣṭhā).chu 住).⁴

Upanissaya-paccaya and sarvatraga-hetu.

(375) Buddhaghosa defines the 'sufficing cause' (upanissaya paccaya) as "excessive dependence".⁵ It designates a powerful means or inducement.⁶ According to the Tikapatṭhāna, there are

1. Abhs p.28; TD 31.671b (CL 3.1).

2. ibid., dhṛtikāraṇaṃ tad yathā pṛthivī sattvānāṃ.

3. TD 31.713b (TCL.4).

4. TD 31.41a (Ch'eng.7); Siddhi, p.448.

5. Vism 536.

6. Nyanatiloka, Guide Through the Abhidhamma Piṭaka, p.102.

Three forms of the sufficing cause. They are (i) the objective sufficing cause (ārammaṇūpanissaya), (ii) the immediate sufficing cause (anantarūpanissaya) and (iii) natural sufficing cause (pakatūpanissaya).¹ Of these, (i) is similar to the dominant influence of the object (ārammaṇādhipati, v.supra.365); (ii) is similar to the immediate contiguous cause (samanantara paccaya, v.supra.367). The importance of (iii) lies in the fact that it explains moral and spiritual advancement. Because of the sufficing causes such as faith (saddhā), one gives alms, observes the moral rules, performs the uposatha functions, develops meditative powers and insight, etc.²

(376) In a certain way this relation is similar to the sarvatraga-hetu (pien hsing yin 遍行因) of the Sarvāstivādins. It may be argued that any phenomenon acting as a powerful inducement for the cultivation of certain forms of behaviour, moral or immoral, is seen to persist until the goal is achieved. In this sense the upanissaya-paccaya resembles the sarvatraga-hetu, for according to the latter a false view entertained by a man dominates all his behaviour, bodily, verbal and mental. His behaviour becomes infused with the false view and makes it disagreeable to others.³ False view while serving as a strong inducement, runs through his entire behaviour. Haribhadra has pointed out similarities between the sarvatraga-hetu and the characteristic of the primary cause (hetu-pratyaya) described as 'opposition' (paripantha, chang ai 障礙).⁴

1. 1.15.
2. UCR 20.p.38 f.
3. AKV 189, mithyādr̥ṣṭeḥ puruṣapudgalasya yac ca kāyakarma tad dr̥ṣṭeḥ yac ca vāk-karma yā cetanā yaḥ prañidhiḥ ye ca saṃskārās tad anvayaḥ. sarve py ete dharmā anīṣṭatvāya samvartante 'kāntatvāyāpuriyatvāyāmanāpatvāya.
4. TD 31.713c (TCL.4).

Purejāta-paccaya and ākṣepa-hetu.

(377) The pre-existence or pre-nascence condition (purejāta paccaya) recognises the prior existence of some phenomenon as a condition for the production of another phenomenon. Helping or supporting the arising of a thing by way of prior existence is the function of this cause.¹ Among the list of hetus or kāraṇas put forward by the Yogācārins we do not come across one which corresponds exactly with this cause. But the ākṣepa-hetu (chao yin neng tso 招引能作) or the projecting cause, which is a sub-division of the primary cause (hetu-pratyaya),² in certain aspects, resembles the pre-existent condition. The ākṣepa-hetu accounts for the problem of action at a distance, hence been defined as the 'remote cause' (vidūrah pratyayaḥ). Ignorance (avidyā) produces old age and death (jarāmaraṇa) and is therefore a remote cause.³ According to the Bodhisattvabhūmi, a seed producing another of its kind is a remote cause because the intermediary stage of the tree is not given.⁴ But the Theravāda description seems to imply the continued existence of the cause even after the effect has come into existence. Thus the only similarity between the two forms of relations lies in the recognition of a time lag between the cause and the effect.

1. Tikap 1.17, Paṭhamataram uppajjitvā vattamānabhāvena upākārako dhammo.
2. Abhs p.28; TD 31.671c (CL.3.1); Bbh p.97; TD 31.41c (Ch'eng.8); Siddhi, p.456.
3. Abhs p.28; TD 31.671c (CL.3.1).
4. p.97.

Pacchājāta-paccaya and sthiti-kāraṇa.

(378) That which serves as a support for the continued sustenance of a phenomenon which has already come into existence is said to be the post-nascent or post-existent condition (pacchājāta-paccaya).¹ For example, the continued supply of the necessary quality of moisture, etc., is necessary for an already existing plant to grow into maturity. Otherwise there would be change in its growth (v. supra. 253). In the same way this personality, which has come into existence because of past causes, requires continued sustenance in the future. If the four kinds of food, namely, material food, contact, volitions and consciousness were not to feed this personality, it would not develop or continue to exist.² This definition is quite similar to that of the nutriment cause (āhāra-paccaya, v. infra. 384) and may therefore be compared with the cause of stability (sthiti-kāraṇa, chu neng tso 住能作) which is a subdivision of the primary cause (hetu-pratyaya).³

Āsevana-paccaya and puṭṭi.

(379) According to the Tikapaṭṭhāna, anything that causes its resultant to accept its inspiration so that the latter could gain greater and greater advancement is called the habitual recurrence condition (āsevana-paccaya).⁴

1. Tikap 1.17, purejātānaṃ ... dhammānaṃ upatthambhakatṭhena upakārako dhammo.
2. ibid.
3. Abhs p.28; TD 31.671b (CL.3.1); MVBB p.31.
4. 1.17.

The term āsevana is used in the sense of habituating by constant repetition. If a man were to develop thoughts of loving kindness (mettā) once, that would enable him to develop the same with a greater degree of perfection later on. One important feature to be noted with regard to this relation is that it exists among things of the same order, among likes.

(380) The same relation is expressed by the characteristic of the primary cause (hetu-pratyaya) termed 'increase' (puṣṭi, tseng i 增益).¹ It is explained thus: "The good, bad and neutral dharmas previously cultivated which cause greater and greater efficiency of the dharmas, good, bad and neutral respectively, to be produced in the future".² Haribhadrammaintains that this is similar to the samprayuktaka hetu.³ According to the Abhidharmakośa-vyākhyā, there are five characteristics of hetu one of which is upabr̥mhana and this is defined in the same way as puṣṭi is defined in the Abhidharmasamuccaya.⁴

Kamma-paccaya and vipāka-hetu.

(381) The need to account for the problem of moral responsibility gave rise to the relation of kamma (kamma-paccaya). The problem of the causality of moral behaviour and responsibility was discussed earlier (v. supra. 278). The importance of this problem may have induced the Abhidhammikas to formulate

1. Abhs p.29. It is missing from the list of characteristics given on page 28. TD 31.671b (CL.3.1).
2. ibid., pūrvabhāvitānām kuśalākuśalāvyākṛtānām dharmānām yā aparānte uttārōttarā puṣṭatarā puṣṭatamā pravṛttiḥ.
3. TD 31.713c (TCL.5.1).
4. p.29, jananān niśrayāt sthānād upastambhopabr̥mhanāt; also upabr̥mhana-hetur vṛddhi-hetutvāt.

a special relation to account for it. According to the Theravāda Abhidhamma, kamma here refers to the particular function of the volitions.¹ It is a reflection of the statement found in the early texts that kamma is merely volition (v.supra.279). Two forms of kamma-relations were distinguished by the Abhidhammikas. They are (i) the asynchronous (nānakkhānika) and (ii) the co-nascent (sahajāta).²

(382) The psychophysical personality which arises in this existence is due to the dispositions (sankhārā) or volitions (cetanā) of the past life. This is the asynchronous kamma relation because the dispositions or the volitions belong to the past.³ On the other hand, there are certain thoughts, good (kusala) or bad (akusala) which arise along with the volitions themselves. Such volitions are related to the thoughts by way of co-nascent kamma-relation.⁴

(383) In several respects, the kamma-relation resembles the vipāka-hetu (i shu yin 異熟因) of the Sarvāstivādins. Like the kamma-relation, the vipāka-hetu emphasises the volitional aspect of karma.⁵ Like the asynchronous kamma-relation, it partakes of the idea of projection (ākṣepakatva) of the effect,⁶ and recognises a time lag between the cause and the effect. Haribhadra has equated the vipāka-hetu with

1. Tikap 1.45, kamman'ti cetanā kammañi c'eva; Abvn p.139.

2. ibid., 1.18.

3. ibid., 1.45-46.

4. ibid., 1.46.

5. AKV 189, sañcetanīyasya karmanāḥ kṛtasyopacitasya vipāka itī vipāka-hetuḥ.

6. ibid., iha kṛtasya karmanāḥ kuśalasya s'āsravasya bhāvanā-mayasya tatrotpannā vipākaṃ pratisaṃvedayante. ... eṣa hi visadr̥śaphalākṣepakatevna vyavasthāpyate.

the characteristic of the hetu-pratyaya given in the Abhidharmasamuccaya as 'grasping' (parigraha, she shuo 攝受).¹ The characteristic of 'grasping' is explained by the example of "bad and defiling tendencies causing the belief in a (permanent) soul".² But a closer relationship can be observed between the asynchronous kamma-relation and the ākṣepa-kāraṇa (chao yin neng tso 招引能作) or the projecting cause enumerated by the Yogācārins.³ In the asynchronous kamma-relation, the kamma signifies a particular energy. It does not cease, though the volition ceases to be evident, but is found in latent form and as soon as it obtains a favourable opportunity, and when the other necessary conditions are available, it produces the effect.⁴

Ahāra-paccaya and sthiti-kāraṇa.

(384) The nutriment cause (āhāra-paccaya) is one that is pre-supposed in the Pāli Nikāyas and the Chinese Agamas. The Nikāyas and the Agamas refer to four things, namely, material good, contact, volition and consciousness, which serve as nutrition for beings who are born and for those seeking birth (v. supra. 256). But the Abhidhammikas have specified the function of food (āhāra). They maintain that "even though food has the power of generating (some effect), yet the primary function of food is supporting or sustaining (that which has already come into existence)".⁵ This view is clearly implied in the sthiti-kāraṇa (chu neng tso 住能作).⁶

1. TD 31.713c (TCL.5.1).

2. Abhs p.29; TD 31.671c (CL.3.1).

3. Abhs p.28; TD 31.671c (CL.3.1); Bbh p.97; TD 31.41c (Ch'eng.8); Siddhi, p.456.

4. Tikap 1.46, avasesapaccayasamāyoge sati phalam uppādeti.

5. Abvn p.139, sati hi pi janakabhāve upatthambhakattam eva āhārassa padhānakiccaṃ.

6. Abhs p.28; TD 31.671b (CL.3.1); MVBB p.31.

Indriya-paccaya and adhipati-pratyaya.

(385) The faculties (indriya), such as faith (saddhā), energy (virīya), mindfulness (sati), concentration (samādhi), knowledge (paññā), etc., which control the behaviour of man, come under the category of controlling conditions (indriya-paccaya). During the time of the Abhidhamma twenty such faculties were enumerated.¹ Because of the importance of these faculties in determining the behaviour of an individual, the Paṭṭhāna has formulated this special kind of cause. But the idea of dominance (adhipati) implied in this relation makes it quite similar to the adhipati-paccaya (v. supra. 364 f.) and therefore the Sarvāstivādins and the Yogācārins may have been satisfied with the formulation of the adhipati-pratyaya.

Magga-paccaya and prāpana-kāraṇa.

(386) The constituents which are stages on the path to any goal are considered by the Abhidhammikas as causes (paccaya), because each stage has the power of clearing the ground and assisting the attainment of the succeeding stage. Such causes or conditions were called path-conditions (magga-paccaya).² This relation resembles the prāpana-kāraṇa (teng chih neng tso 等至能作)³ which has been illustrated by the example of the path leading to nirvāna.⁴ The Ch'eng-wei-shih-lun refers to it as an aspect of adhipati-pratyaya.⁵

1. Vbh 5.

2. Tikap 1.18.

3. Abhs p.28; TD 31.671b (CL.3.1) which may be read as samāpatti-kāraṇa; MVBB p.31 has prāpti-kāraṇa; cp. TD 31.454b (CPFPL.2).

4. Abhs p.28, mārgo nirvānasya.

5. TD 31.41a (Ch'eng.7); Biddhi, p.449.

Sampayutta-paccaya and samprayukta-hetu.

(387) The sampayutta-paccaya or the association-condition accounts for the synthesis of phenomena which have been analysed into different parts for the sake of examination. Statements referring to the association of ideas are not rare in the Nikāyas and the Agamas.¹ This relation corresponds in many respects to the samprayukta-hetu (t'ung lui yin 同類因) formulated by the Sarvāstivādins. The Theravāda and Sarvāstivāda definitions of these two causes are similar. The former maintains that association takes place in four ways, namely, (i) having one base (ekavātthuka), (ii) having one object (ekārammaṇa), (iii) arising simultaneously (ekuppāda) and (iv) ceasing together (ekanirodha).² Speaking of the samprayukta-hetu, the Abhidharmakośa-vyākhyā says that "it is determined by its function of having one object".³ In the Ta-ch'eng-o-pi-ta-mo-tśa-chi-lun, Haribhadra says the same with regard to the characteristic of the primary cause (hetupratyaya) described as sampratipatti (teng hsing 等行),⁴ although he prefers to identify samprayukta-hetu with the characteristic puṣṭi (tseng i 增益).⁵

Atthi-paccaya and Vsahakāri-kāraṇa.

(388) The atthi-paccaya or the presence condition is defined in the Theravāda Abhidhamma as "that which renders service by being a support to another through presence".⁶

1. S 1.25,38; 4.37; M 1.38; TD 1.575c (Chung.23.5).

2. Tikap 1.19.

3. p.189, ekālabhanakṛtyena hy eṣa vyavasthāpyate.

4. TD 31.713c (TCL.4).

5. ibid.

6. Tikap 1.20; Vism 540, Paccuppannalakkhaṇena atthibhāvena tādisass'eva dhammassa upatthambhakattena upakārako dhammo atthipaccayo.

This may appear to be a redundancy, but yet the importance of this relation becomes clear when we consider the early Buddhist notion of 'cause'. It was pointed out that a cause is the sum total of several factors (v. supra. 122). Taking the example of a plant, it was pointed out that there are three factors essential for its arising (v. supra. 127). The presence of earth and moisture is essential not only for the arising of the sprout, but also after the seed has changed into a sprout. It was this aspect of the presence of certain conditions which is emphasised in this relation.

(389) The atthi-paccaya seems to correspond to the sahakāri-kāraṇa (t'ung shih neng tso 同事能作)¹ or sahakāri-hetu (t'ung shih yin 同事因).² The sahakāri-kāraṇa or the supporting cause is a subdivision of the primary cause (hetu-pratyaya) and is defined as the concurrence (sāmagrī, ho ho 和合) of the various factors,³ thus emphasising the need for the presence of several conditions.

(390) Thus, nearly eighteen of the twenty four conditions enumerated in the Paṭṭhāna have counterparts in the Sarvāstivāda and Yogācāra theories. We have not been able to find parallels for six of the relations enumerated by the Theravādins. But in addition to these mentioned above, the Yogācāra list contains about thirteen more relations which have no counterparts in the Theravāda Abhidhamma.

1. Abhs p.28; TD 31.671c (CL.3.1).
2. TD 31.41c (Ch'eng.8); Siddhi, p.459.
3. Abhs p.28; TD 31.671c (CL.3.1).

Paccayas in Theravāda without parallels in the other schools.

(391) The vipāka-paccaya does not, by definition, correspond to the vipāka-hetu of the Sarvāstivādins. The former, unlike the latter (v. supra. 381-383), does not emphasise the importance of volitional activity. In fact, the Paṭṭhāna maintains that a phenomenon which helps without exerting any effort for the arising of another phenomenon is called the vipāka-paccaya or the resultant condition.¹

(392) The jhāna-paccaya or the contemplation condition was formulated by the Theravādins to explain the process of concentration. The factors by means of which the mind is able to view closely are the causes (paccaya). Some of these factors are as follows: initial application (vitakka), sustained application (vicāra), pleasurable interest (pīti), joy (somanassa), indifference (upekkhā), and one-pointedness of mind (ekaggatā).²

(393) While the relation by way of association (sampayutta) illustrated the homogeneous nature of consciousness, the relation by way of dissociation (vippayutta) explains the distinction between mental and physical phenomena.³ It purports to refute the views of the Idealists that material elements are mere projections of the mind. While explaining the interdependence of mental and physical phenomena, it helps to keep them apart.

1. Tikap 1.18; v. also Abvn p.139.

2. ibid., 1.51.

3. ibid., 1.20.

(394) An important aspect of the causal situation not explained by the presence-condition (atthi-paccaya, v. supra. 388-390) is expressed by the absence-condition (natthi-paccaya). The presence-condition emphasises only the presence of certain factors for the arising of a thing. But there are certain factors which should disappear in order to make room for the appearance of the effect. In the example of the sprout, we found that the presence of three conditions were necessary, but if the sprout is to come into existence the seed has to give way, but still the other two conditions may have to be present and continue to support the sprout. It is this disappearance and making room for the effect to manifest itself which is emphasised in the absence-condition.¹ These speculations were no doubt engendered by the acceptance of a theory of moments according to which a phenomenon disappears in order to make room for a succeeding momentary phenomenon.

(395) The ~~disappearance~~-condition (vigata-paccaya)² and the contunuanace-condition (avigata-paccaya)³ are defined in the same way as the absence- and presence-conditions respectively (v. supra. 388-390, 394). The formulation of these two conditions may have been occasioned by the problems inherent in the theory of momentariness. The absence-condition (natthi-paccaya) may imply the momentary destruction, and therefore the ~~disappearance~~-condition (vigata-paccaya) was formulated to emphasise the gradual disappearance. In the same way continuance-condition explains continuity better than the presence condition, for the latter is prone to convey the idea of permanency.

1. Tikap 1.21.
2. ibid.
3. ibid.

Kāraṇas in the Yogācāra which have no counterparts in Theravāda.

(396) Following is a brief account of the thirteen forms of relations discussed in the Abhidharmasamuccaya which have no counterparts in the Theravāda list. (i) Utpatti-kāraṇa (sheng neng tso 生能作)¹ is the producing or generating cause and is defined, like the supporting cause (sahakāri-kāraṇa, v.supra.389), as the complex (sāmagrī) of causes which give rise to the effect. It is illustrated by the relationship which the complex of causes such as the visual organ, etc., bear to the visual consciousness (cakṣurvijñāna).² Haribhadra, in his Ta-ch'eng-o-pi-ta-mo-tsa-chi-lun, says that it is the cause of production because it gives rise to an effect which did not exist earlier.³ The Ch'eng-wei-shih-lun, which does not refer to the first ten causes enumerated in the Abhidharmasamuccaya, includes the producing cause under adhipati-pratyaya by pointing out that production (janana) is one of the modes by which the adhipati-pratyaya manifests its activity (v.supra.366). (ii) Prakāśa-kāraṇa (chao neng tso 照能作) is the revealing cause, like the lamp which reveals objects (or colours)⁴ by destroying darkness.⁵ (iii) Vikāra-kāraṇa (pian huai neng tso 變壞能作) or the cause of alteration which brings about a change in another phenomenon. The example of fire which alters the nature of

1. Abhs p.28; TD 31.671b (CL.3.1). De la Vallée Poussin has reconstructed the term as janana-hetu, Siddhi, p.433, n.(c).
2. Utpattikāraṇaṃ tad yathā cakṣuḥ sāmagrī vijñānasya.
3. TD 31.713b (TCL.4).
4. Abhs p.28, prakāśakāraṇaṃ tad yathā pradīpo rūpānām; TD 31.671b (CL.3.1); Siddhi, p.453, n.(c) gives vṛaṅjana-hetu.
5. TD 31.713b (TCL.4).

anything inflammable is put forward as an illustration.¹ Haribhadra points out that it is a cause which changes one series to another, as for example, a series which is called 'wood' to a series which is called 'charcoal'.² (iv) Viyoga-kāraṇa (fen li neng tso 分離能作) or a separating cause such as a sickle in relation to what is to be cut.³ It is instrumental in cutting into two what is connected or conjoined.⁴ (v) Parinati-kāraṇa (chuan pien neng tso 轉變能作) or transforming cause like the skill in arts in relation to gold, silver, etc.⁵ Here there is only a transformation of certain basic material; this is therefore different from the cause of alteration which implies a complete change. (vi) Sampratya-kāraṇa (hsin chieh neng tso 信解能作) or the cause of agreement, ^{or concomitance} like smoke for fire,⁶ because by comparison or inference what is not manifest can still be known.⁷ (vii) Sampratya-yana-kāraṇa (hsien liao neng tso 顯了能作) is a cause of making known or proving, as, for instance, a proposition, a reason and an example.⁸ (viii) Vyavahāra-kāraṇa (sui shuo neng tso 隨說能作) or the cause of reference or denomination is the basis of speech.⁹ Speech depends on names (nāma), conception (saṃjñā) and perception (darśi) which therefore are the causes of reference.

1. Abhs p.28; TD 31.671b (CL.3.1); Siddhi, p.453,n.(c) has dhvamsana-hetu.
2. TD 31.713b (TCL.4).
3. Abhs p.28; TD 31.671b (CL.3.1); Siddhi, p.453,n.(c), chedana-hetu.
4. Haribhadra, loc.cit.,
5. Abhs p.28, etc. Siddhi, p.453,n.(c) vikāra-hetu.
6. ibid. jñāpana-hetu.
7. Haribhadra, loc.cit.
8. Abhs p.28; etc. Siddhi, has avāgama-hetu.
9. ibid. anuvyavahāra-hetu.

Here nāman names the object, sañjñā perceives its outline and drṣṭi adheres to it.¹ Thus all forms of speech are determined by names, sensations and perceptions (nāmasañjñādrṣṭihetukā).

(ix) Apekṣā-kāraṇa (kuan tai neng tso 觀待能作) is the cause of expectation which is illustrated by the relation between hunger, thirst, etc., on the one hand and the search for food, drink, etc., on the other.²

(x) Avāha-kāraṇa (yin fa neng tso 引發能作) is defined as the coinciding or agreeing cause because it is supposed to bring about the results which are in conformity (anukūla) with the causes.³

It is illustrated by the example of proper service to royalty as leading to the gaining of confidence of the royalty.

(xi) Pratiniyama-kāraṇa (ting pieh neng tso 定別能作) is the cause of specialized activity. The dispositions (samskārah) in so far as they possess a special force to produce their own fruits are called pratiniyama-kāraṇa.⁴

For example, birth in any one of the five realms is determined by the appropriate causes producing birth in that realm, and this is taken as emphasising the diversity of causes.⁵

(xii) Virodhi-kāraṇa (hsiang wei neng tso 相違能作) is the cause of opposition which is an obstructing factor, like hail towards corn.⁶

(xiii) Avirodhi-kāraṇa (pu hsiang wei neng tso 不相違能作) is merely the absence of obstruction, therefore, a negative cause.⁷

1. Siddhi, p.454,455.

2. Abhs p.28; TD 31.671b (CL.3.1).

3. ibid.

4. ibid., samyag rājasevā rājārādhanāya.

5. ibid.; Siddhi, p.458.

6. ibid., p.29; TD 31.671c (CL.3.1).

7. ibid.

Analysis of causes in the Sumaṅgalavilāsinī and Abhidharma-samuccaya.

(397) A passage in the Sumaṅgalavilāsinī of Buddhaghosa is strongly reminiscent of the analysis of the pratyayas in the Abhidharmasamuccaya and other Yogācāra treatises. Here Buddhaghosa describes the various ^wpoers and types of knowledge that the Buddha possessed.¹ One of them consists of the knowledge that ignorance (avijjā) is related to the dispositions (saṅkhārā) in nine different ways. The nine ways are described as follows. As a cause o

- (1) of production or genesis (uppādo hutvā, cp. utpattikāraṇa),
- (2) of natural happening (pavattaṃ hutvā=pravṛtti, cp. abhinirvṛtti?),
- (3) of objectivity (nimittaṃ hutvā, cp. ārammaṇa, ālambana),
- (4) of influence (āyūhaṇaṃ hutvā).
- (5) of association (saṃyogo hutvā, cp. samprayukta=sampayutta),
- (6) of obstruction (palibodho hutvā, cp. paripanthato, virodhi-kāraṇa),
- (7) of arising (samudayo hutvā),
- (8) of primary support (hetu hutvā), and
- (9) of dependence (paccayo hutvā).

The marked similarity between this analysis and that found in the Abhidharmasamuccaya strengthens our claim that Buddhaghosa was quite aware of the developments taking place in Northern India during his time and that his interpretation of the Theravāda teachings was coloured by these ideas.

1. DA 1.101.

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