

THE PAHLAVI ANDARZ LITERATURE.

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A B S T R A C T

The first part of the work gives a survey of the andarz books extant in Pahlavi. The texts are arranged according to whether they are attributed to a likely or legendary author or are anonymous. The sixth book of the Dēnkart, the largest collection of andarz, is dealt with separately. The discussion contains in each case, besides details of bibliographical interest, remarks on the character and structure of the text and notes on its relationship to other andarz compositions. Philological notes are included on difficult passages. The last sections of the first part deal with some general problems of the andarz literature; and an attempt is made to distinguish types of books and to comment on various stylistic devices used in these books. The question of the midrashic technique is discussed in some detail.

The second part is devoted to analyzing the religious system of thought reflected in the andarz books, and particularly in Dk vi. This is done partly by examining the use of terms in different contexts. The main subjects discussed are: the various associations connected with the notion of wisdom; some techniques of instruction; the concepts of faith and

religion; the complex of ideas centred round the term 'spirit'; the various ways of righteousness and the ideas connected with sin; the attitude to this world; the concept of poverty and the poor; the idea of the measure; the reward in afterlife, the notion of xwarr, the problem of fate and free will. The probable existence of esoteric doctrines in Sasanian Iran is also considered.

Part One.

SURVEY OF THE ANDARZ BOOKS EXTANT
IN PAHLAVI.

1. Introductory.

There are about 25 andarz pieces extant in Pahlavi. They vary considerably in length, from a few lines in the case of some to a volume of some bulk in the case of Dk vi; they also show certain variation in style and method of composition as well as in subject matter. It is proposed to treat the individual pieces separately at first, arranged, for convenience, by their supposed author (if they are attributed to one). It will be more possible to assess afterwards the general characteristics and the variations which can be noticed in these books.

Before ^{we} ~~proceeding~~, however, to discuss the individual andarz books some previous work done in this field ought to be mentioned. A description of all works extant in Pahlavi and Pāzand, which is still indispensable, is contained in the contribution of E. W. West to the Grundriss der iranischen Philologie¹; much useful material, although little concerning andarz books directly, is also given in his introductions to the volumes translated by

him in the Sacred Books of the East series.² A recent work of similar nature, which brings the bibliographical data up to the date of its publication, is the book by J. C. Tavadia,³ Some other general books contain references to our subject-matter, but their value for the study of the andarz books is limited.⁴

The question of late Zoroastrian ethics, which is connected with that of the andarz books, has also received some attention. The first serious study of the subject was made by L.-C. Casartelli, La philosophie religieuse du mazdéisme sous les Sassanides, Paris-Bonn-London, 1884.⁵ The subject is also treated, though more superficially, by A. V. W. Jackson, first in his article on the Iranian religion in the GIPh.,⁶ and later, with some additions, in his volume of Zoroastrian studies.⁷ A small book devoted to the subject of ethics was written by M. A. Buch.⁸ A summary review of the andarz literature and its ideas was made by A. Christensen,⁹ An important contribution to the study of the historical questions involved, as well as for the understanding of the structure of the lists of virtues and vices in the andarz books, was made by J. -P. de Menasce in his book on the Dēnkart.¹⁰ Some instructive remarks on the subject are

made by R. C. Zaehner in his recent synthesis of Zoroastrianism,¹¹ and the results achieved so far are summarized with characteristic lucidity by J. Duchesne-Guillemin in his general book on the Iranian religion.¹²

The Pahlavi andarz literature has aroused special interest from the point of view of its influence on the corresponding adab literature in Islam. One of the early studies done on this subject is by Inostrantsev, first published in Russian¹³ and later translated into English.¹⁴ A number of studies have been devoted to Islamic compositions of the type of 'a mirror for princes', (Fürstenspiegel) which are closely related to the andarz genre. That this is a rewarding line of inquiry not only from the point of view of the history of Arabic and Persian literature but also for the better understanding of Sasanian literature and mores can be seen from the studies of G. Richter,¹⁵ F. Gabrieli,¹⁶ and the recent works by Muḥammad Muḥammadi.¹⁷ Much as it may have been desirable to study these questions from the point of view of what remains from the andarz literature in Pahlavi, it has seemed best in the present work to try and understand the Pahlavi andarz books in their own terms. Only one Arabic text has been fairly consistently utilized

in the discussion of the topics of the andarz literature, as it has been shown^{to contain} at least one direct translation of a work extant in Pahlavi, as well as a number of identifiable fragments from other works. The text is the Jāwīdān xirad by Miskawayh,¹⁸ the relationship of which to the Pahlavi texts was first established by Professor Henning.¹⁹

The Pahlavi andarz literature was preceded by a similar Avestan genre of literature; all that remains of that are a few summaries contained in the eighth book of the Dēnkart,²⁰ and some sections in the ninth book.²¹ These have only occasionally been referred to in the discussions which follow in Part Two of this work. A thorough investigation of Dk ix, which must be based on a new edition of the text, is a task by itself.

2. The andarz texts.

Three of the independent andarz treatises which bear an attribution to an author are obviously apocryphal: chapter 195 of Dk. iii which is attributed to Zoroaster, chapter 197, attributed to his disciple Sēn, and Andarz ī Ōšnar ī dānāg, attributed to the sage Aōšnar. The other andarz texts bear the names of persons of Sasanian or later time, ^{who} and could be considered as possible authors.

The largest number of ^{surviving} andarz writings is attributed to Ādurbād ī Mahraspandān, the sage who lived under Šāpūr II in the fourth century A.D. His son, Zardušt, may be the one who is intended by the attribution of Cīdag andarz ī pōryōtkēšān to Zardušt. There is, however, no evidence for this attribution in the body of the text. The grandson of Ādurbād ī Mahraspandān, Ādurbād ī Zarduštān, also has a short text which bears his name.

The celebrated Sasanian king, Xusrō ī Kawādān, has two collections of sayings attributed to him. His not less famous counsellor, Wuzurgmihr, has a fairly large collection of sayings. The same period, the sixth century A.D., was also the time when the priest Baxt-āfrēd lived; some short sayings are attributed to him.

For the ninth century A.D. there is only one short text attributed to Ādurfarnbag ī Farrozzādān.

a. Texts attributed to Ādurbād ī Mahraspandān.

Five pieces of andarz are attributed to Ādurbād, three of them are included in the collection of texts published by Jamasp-Asana; one forms a chapter of Dk.iii, and another one forms the final chapter of the Rivāyat which precedes the Dādistan ī Dēnīg.

i. Andarz ī Ādurbād ī Mahraspandān (AdMah).¹

This collection of sayings is presented as the words spoken by Ādurbād son of Mahraspand to his son Zardušt. The opening words set out the supposed circumstances in which the text was composed:

This too is manifest: Ādurbād had no son of his body (?) born to him. He then put his trust in the gods, and not long time had passed when a son was born to Ādurbād. Because of the healthy character of Zardušt, son of Spitāma, he called him Zardušt. He said: 'Rise up, my son, that I may teach you education' (PhLT. 58 para. 1).

The formula, 'This too is manifest,'² may indicate that this collection originally formed part of some larger text, though it may also be due to the convention to begin almost any traditional story by these words.

The Arabic text given in Miskawayh's Jāwīdān xirad as the words spoken by Ādurbād to his son,³ contains a considerable number of sayings which are the same as those given here, some of which have already been pointed out

by Henning.⁴ Although the relationship of Miskawayh's text to AdMah is undeniable, it is clear that the composition of the text, and the phrasing of some of the corresponding sayings, and particularly the order of the sayings are totally different. In examining the other pieces attributed to Ādurbād we shall have occasion to see that they often use a common stock of sayings: it seems therefore likely that a number of different redactions of admonitions attributed to Ādurbād and deriving from a common source were in current use. It may therefore be assumed that the Arabic piece in Miskawayh is not a corrupted edition and translation of AdMah, but a translation of a different, shorter version of sayings attributed to Ādurbād. This version may have existed in Pahlavi side by side with AdMah., and need not be the outcome of the latter's translation into Arabic. Certain considerations make the assumption of another Pahlavi source more acceptable than that of an Arabic editor's meddling with the text: Misk. contains sayings which are not preserved at all in AdMah; to explain them on the basis of an Arabic redaction we would have to assume that the redactor used two Pahlavi originals, AdMah and another text, which he combined together. The assumption of a Pahlavi version where the same mixture

occurred seems simpler, especially if we take into account the fact that in Middle Persian the andarz collections were, no doubt, current at first in oral transmission for a fairly long period. It is much easier for a number of completely different versions to be formed in conditions of oral transmission than in a scribal tradition, where though a text can become corrupt, it is not so likely to have the order of sentences totally upset. In effect, apart from the muddle in the order of sayings, as compared with AdMah, there is no evidence of corrupt text in the Arabic redaction and, consequently, ⁱⁿ its Pahlavi Vorlage.

To establish the relationship between the Arabic text of the admonitions of Ādurbād and our Pahlavi text the following list of correspondences will perhaps be helpful:

Misk	26.3-7	PhlT	63f. § 71-80
	26.11-13		64 § 85
	26.15		59 § 11; 149 § 48-49
	26.15-27.1		58 § 3
	27.1-2		60 § 22
	27.2-3		60 § 28-30
	27.4-6		59f. § 17-21
	27.5		60f. § 34
	27.10-12		65 § 89

27.12-14	60 § 22
27.14-15	61 § 40
27.16-17	68 § 113-114
28.6ff.	145 § 13

It may be noticed that Misk. 26.15 corresponds more closely to the text of WāzAd (PhlT 149 § 48-49) than to that of AdMah,⁵ and that 28.6ff. has an equivalent only in WāzAd. It is, of course, possible to assume that WāzAd was one of the sources for the Vorlage of Misk, but it seems more likely that both the Vorlage of Misk and the compiler of WāzAd used an Ādurbād text which was related to, but not identical with, AdMah.

The collection of andarz in AdMah has a number of features which distinguish it from similar compilations. It contains a long passage which gives advice on what to do on each of the thirty days of the month (§ 119-148). This may have been an independent composition which was incorporated into the present text. The fact that the Arabic version of Misk does not contain this portion cannot, however, be used as evidence (even were we to assume that Misk ~~is~~ ^{to be} based on AdMah), since the omission of such a passage, which is based on the Zoroastrian calendar, might be expected of an Islamic translator.

Another point which characterizes AdMah is the

relative abundance of similes. The wealth of this world is compared to a bird which flies from one branch to another and does not settle permanently on any tree (§89).⁶ A man while his parents are alive is like a lion in the forest, afterwards he is like a widowed woman (§90). A wise man is like a fertile piece of land (§91). A violent man who talks without restraint is like fire which falls in a forest and burns everything (§93). An old enemy is like a black snake, an old friend is like old wine (§100-101). Men are like a water-skin full of air (§117), or like a suckling babe (§118).

Sayings like: 'When you know well many spells of snakes, still do not stretch your hand hastily to a snake lest it bite you and you die immediately' (§113),⁷ and the one that follows, which is a warning not to go hastily into violent water, even if one can swim well,⁸ are of course also meant to be taken as similes of a sort: they are examples of how one ^{ould} shall distrust all the dangers of this world.

Some of the prominent themes in this collection are: the transience of the things of this world and the importance of wisdom;⁹ moderation in anger and mirth,¹⁰ eating,¹¹ laughing,¹² punishing¹³ and drinking wine.¹⁴ Not to be overmuch joyed at a good thing or too distressed

at a bad thing.¹⁵ Not to worry about things which have passed.¹⁶ It is necessary to speak with deliberation, especially when one wants to use sharp words.¹⁷

There is great respect for wise men; they ought to be sought out for advice and taken as a husband to one's daughter.¹⁸ Respect is enjoined for the old,¹⁹ for men in authority,²⁰ and for one's parents.²¹ One ought to avoid association with bad people.²²

Advice concerning women includes not to tell them secrets;²³ to 'educate' them and the children.²⁴ Concerning marriage: to seek a wife for oneself by oneself,²⁵ to seek a bashful wife²⁶ and a young one;²⁷ an old man should avoid marrying a young woman, and a young man an old woman.²⁸ One ought to have the expenses ready before marriage²⁹ and not to deceive other people's wives.³⁰

Other advice concerns business matters: to invest in land, vines and water, where the capital is safe³¹; to take loans only from friends and relatives,³² and in any case not lend ^{to} or borrow from, a man of bad nature.³³

One is enjoined not to wager anything for a thing which is self-evident;³⁴ not to start a quarrel³⁵ and not to be the antagonist of a scribe.³⁶ One ought not to hurt people by words or otherwise³⁷, not to smite people,³⁸ not

to quarrel in a banquet,³⁹ not to be wilful towards any one⁴⁰ and not to answer back.⁴¹ A curious saying advises not to be in the heavy part of the battle.⁴²

As could be expected, truthfulness is enjoined.⁴³ Religious injunctions are not numerous: to be diligent and dedicated (jān-ābspār) in the matter of the gods,⁴⁴ to bless the gods and keep one's heart in joy⁴⁵ and to remember always the soul.⁴⁶

ii. Wāzag ēcand ī Ādurbād ī Mahraspandān, (WāzAd).⁴⁷

The text purports to be 'some words spoken by Ādurbād son of Mahraspand to the people of the world at the time of his passing away' (§1).

The problem arises, however, with regard to this text whether it is an original composition or a compilation of sayings culled from various other sources. WāzAd presents this question because of the considerable number of sayings which it shares in common with a number of other texts, particularly PN. The corresponding sentences can be set up in the following list:

§ 1	cf. DkM 216.3-4 (Ad Dk).
3	cf. DkM 216.1-2 (Ad Dk).
5	cf. DkM 216.6-7 (Ad Dk).
11	cf. DkM 216.5-6 (Ad Dk).
16	cf. DkM 216.4-5 (Ad Dk).
19	PhlT 46 § 35 (PN)
21f.	PhlT 71 § 149 (AdMah); 150 § 60f. (WāzAd).
23	PhlT 46 § 35 (PN)
26-32	Dk vi. A.5
39	PhlT 56 § 5 (AdMah); AdPriv § 25 (p.199.1-4); Dk vi. 2.

§ 48f	PhlT 59 §16 (AdMah); Misk 26.19
59	Misk 76.15-17.
66	PhlT 47 §41-42 (PN)
69	PhlT 47 §43 (PN) 59 §16 (AdMah).
70-73	PhlT 47f. §44f. (PN)
75	PhlT 46 §36 (PN).
76f	PhlT 50 §55-57 (PN), cf. also DkM 216.9-10 (Ad Dk).
77	PhlT 88 §17 (AW).

An examination of the correspondences between WāzAd and PN shows that there must be direct literary dependence of the one text on the other. The long sequences of WāzAd §69-73 and §76-77 are identical in the two texts, and this cannot be due merely to a common oral, or even written, source: it seems almost certainly due to the one text borrowing from the other. It is possible to establish that PN was the borrower by a number of considerations: a saying identical with WāzAd §66 is reproduced in PN (PhlT 47 §42) and is introduced by the phrase padiš guft estēd 'It has been said concerning it', which marks the saying as a quotation. A comparison of WāzAd §19 and §23 ^{with} to the corresponding saying in PN shows

that if there is direct borrowing it must be from the former to the latter.⁴⁸ Other marks of borrowing by PN from WāzAd are the fact that a word correctly written in WāzAd §69 is erroneously spelt in PN §43;⁴⁹ and that the sequence in WāzAd §76-77 is ~~the sequence~~ shortened in PN §55-57 by the omission of the last member.

The sayings which have identical counterparts in texts other than PN show to what extent the attribution of sayings to one author, in this case Ādurbād, is consistent. The correspondences are with AdMah, AdDk, or with Dk vi.A.5, which is also attributed to Ādurbād. The only exception is a few words in §77 which have a counterpart in AW, but here it is more a question of an identical turn of phrase than of borrowing on either side. §59 corresponds to a saying in Misk 76.15-17, which offers a different version of it.⁵⁰ The text in Misk is anonymous. It is possible that WāzAd quotes from the Pahlavi text which served as a source for the translation given in Misk 76. The saying in MāzAd is introduced by the words: ēd rāy cē 'for this reason that', which may here be an indication of a quotation, especially as this is brought in as an extra dictum after another one on the same subject in §58, both justifying the injunction of §57.

A survey of the themes around which most of the sayings in this collection centre will show that the difference between this andarz composition and AdMah is quite marked, though both texts are attributed to the same author and even show marks of common literary origin (or possibly of dependence through borrowing). Against the predominantly secular and worldly preoccupation of AdMah the strongly religious attitude of WāzAd is striking. There are practically no admonitions which have no religious significance; there are hardly any instances of pragmatic advice, a type which is so common in Admah.

Purely religious expressions and injunctions are here numerous: not to doubt the gods even in misfortune;⁵¹ to have only a single desire, and not to let oneself be torn between the desire of the body and that of the soul;⁵² not to be too merry or depressed,⁵³ not to amass fortune except righteousness.⁵⁴ To avoid vices like maliciousness, self-love, enmity to the good, irascibility, greediness, calumny, lie, 'lest your body become ill-famed and your soul wicked',⁵⁵ and to confess sins to the chiefs.⁵⁶

There are other expressions which show the religious preoccupation of WāzAd. 'Look at the mortal body and at the soul and do good deeds; for the soul exists and not

the body, the spiritual world exists, and not the material world'.⁵⁷ Pieces of advice, such as to eat in right measure, are justified by the words '(for one who does ^{not do} so) is a destroyer of the spirit' (mēnōg-wišōb),⁵⁸ and similar phrases lend religious colouring to most other sayings.

One ought not to mete out evil to the wicked but also not to associate with them.⁵⁹ Vengefulness has to be suppressed.⁶⁰ Hospitality is emphasized;⁶¹ one ought not to scoff ^{at} other people,⁶² and not to speak without benefit.⁶³ One ought to be truthful in pleading,⁶⁴ and not to break an oath.⁶⁵

The value of consultation ^{with} the good and going to the fire-temple is stressed.⁶⁶ The religious injunctions concerning the eating of the flesh of cattle and sheep is mentioned.⁶⁷ One is advised to marry relatives so as to keep the lineage.⁶⁸ To the religious field belongs also the command to till the land.⁶⁹

Of more worldly character is the advice to distrust women and not to tell them secrets.⁷⁰ One ought to sit where one is seated.⁷¹

iii. PRiv 62: Andarz ī Ādurbād ī Mahraspandān (AdPRiv).⁷²

This andarz treatise occurs at the end of the Rivāyat which precedes the Dādistan ī Dēnīg.

Unlike the other compositions attributed to Ādurbād ī Mahraspandān it does not purport to be a text originally said by Ādurbād: Ādurbād delivers it as an andarz which he himself had heard from his master Mihr-Ōhrmazd, who in his turn had got it from Ādurag.⁷³ This latter person is also mentioned as an authority in ZWY vi.10.

The text opens with a short introductory story of an unnamed disciple who asks Ādurbād to give him instruction (frahang), to which Ādurbād replies by giving the general precepts: 'Be without doubt concerning the gods, hold truthfully righteous thought, speech and action, do not think, speak or do any sin whatsoever; (then) you will be ahlaw' (PRiv 194.1-3). The disciple answers: 'I am not perfect in that which the ērbad has said, but give me particular instruction so that I may do it and become ahlaw.'⁷⁴ Here Ādurbād begins his instruction which consists of a list of 22 virtues⁷⁵ followed by an explanation of each.

In structure and contents this andarz resembles the

much shorter saying Dk vi. 23, which contains only five terms and definitions. The use of the terms is, however, close enough to assist in the reading of words in PRiv.⁷⁶ The attribution of the text to Ādurbād gains some strength from the fact that at least one saying here parallels one in AdMah and WāzAd.⁷⁷

The general character of the text is again, like Wāzad, religious rather than worldly. The advice is pietistic, and the style is reminiscent of Dk vi. Apart from a number of correspondences, which have been noted elsewhere, it shares with Dk vi the technique of midrashic interpretation.⁷⁸ An example from AdPRiv is:

'Patience (bāristānīh) is this, one for whom the load of the soul is incumbent upon the body (kē bār ī ruwān ō tan abāyēd). When hardship comes upon him, and he is able to push it over to someone else, he does not push it, but accepts patience upon himself'. (PRiv p.198. 12-199.1).⁷⁹

The somewhat strange definition of patience by reference to the load of the soul is explicable by the desire to explain the word, as it were, etymologically, or rather midrashically.

- iv. Dēnkart iii, 199: The ten precepts of Ādurbād son of Mahraspand and other orthodox sages (Ad Dk).⁸⁰

This andarz forms part of four similar chapters in the third book of the Dk devoted to the precepts of various great masters of religion.

The attribution to Ādurbād seems confirmed from a series of correspondences to WāzAd. Although the sayings do not have always the same wording, their kinship is unmistakable. A synopsis of these parallel sayings presents the following picture:

- | | | |
|----|------------|-----------------------------------|
| §1 | PhlT 144 | §3 |
| 2 | PhlT 144 | §1 |
| 3 | PhlT 146 | §16 |
| 4 | PhlT 145 | §11 |
| 5 | PhlT 144f. | §5 |
| 6 | PhlT 145f. | §13ff. |
| 7 | PhlT 153 | §75 (not a close correspondence). |
| 8 | cf. Dk vi. | 291. |
| 9 | cf. Dk vi. | 264. |
| 10 | Dk vi. | 131. |

The differences in wording between the admonitions of AdDk and WāzAd are in some cases so marked that the

conclusion is inevitable that AdDk, though based on a collection attributed to Ādurbād, is not based on WāzAd. The addition of 'other righteous orthodox sages' (anē-z pōryōtkēšan ī ahlaw) in the title of this andarz is justified by the fact that the last three admonitions are found not in collections attributed to Ādurbād but in Dk vi., with no name of author.

As no edition or translation of the text exist, as far as I know, apart from Sanjana's, a short summary of the contents of the admonitions is here given:

1. Do not keep sinful vengeance in your mind.
2. Do not amass wealth greedily so that want may not come upon you.⁸¹
3. Receive guests well, so that you may be well received in the next world.
4. Take a wife from your own seed so that your family may proceed truthful.
5. Plead truthfully in court either as claimant or as respondent so that you may be saved better in ^athe ^{suit}law.
6. Abstain from killing cattle and sheep unlawfully for by that you will have harsh reckoning.
7. Do not hold this world as a principle.⁸²
8. Leave the things of this world to the gods and be free from doubt in the matter of the gods, then the world

will become yours.⁸³ Do the things of the spiritual world for yourselves by yourselves.

9. [Put the demons out of your bodies]⁸⁴, for if they are not in your bodies they are not in the whole world, and make the gods to dwell in your bodies, for when they dwell in your bodies they dwell in the whole world.
10. Put in order such and such a place in such and such a person, yourselves, then you will have put in order the whole world.

v. Ādurbād's saying on the 25 divisions of the world.⁸⁵

This short text establishes that there are twenty-five parts in this world, which can be arranged in five categories: fate, action, habit, substance and heritage, each of which controls five parts.⁸⁶

b. Zardušt ī Ādurbādān and his son.vi. Pand nāmag ī Zardušt or Cīdag andarz ī pōryōtkēšān (PN).¹

The attribution of the text to Zardušt, son of Ādurbād, seems late. The text itself only relates itself to the pōryōtkēšān, a word which is explained in Pahlavi as fradom-dānišnān 'those who have the earliest knowledge'.² The idea that Zardušt was the author of this text may have been based on the realization that this collection owes so much to that of Zardušt's father, WāzAd, as we have already seen.³ Apart from the passages borrowed by PN from WāzAd there is a short passage which corresponds to Dk vi.1 (cf. PhIT 45 §27). There is probably no direct dependence of either version on the other, as the structure of the saying is different in the two sources.⁴

In contrast to most other andarz texts, this collection has a well-defined general structure and is not spread over many scattered themes. This is due to the fact that it is strictly religious in character, and may have been designed to serve as an instruction book for the young in religious matters.

It begins, in effect, with a sort of catechism: a group of questions which every one upon reaching the age of fifteen ought to know the ^{correct} answers to. The answers to the

questions form a short summary of the fundamentals of the Zoroastrian religion. The section containing these answers is introduced by the following words, which have not yet been properly translated:

Nūn wizīdār ī cim dast abar nihādan hamēdōnīh ī
warrawišn miyāncīgīhā. Pad rāh ī xrad bē abē-gumānīhā
sazēd dānistan ku ... (PhlT 42.1-3).

'Now the discerner of wisdom ought to indicate⁵ the manner of belief like a miyāncīg -judge.⁶ One ought to know without doubt by way of wisdom⁷ the following.....'

The 'catechism' is followed by a short section which enumerates the five most important things: profession of faith in the religion, setting up a family, agriculture, tending flocks and dividing the day into three equal parts for study, work and rest with recreation.

After this the central part of the treatise is taken up by a series of paragraphs which introduce various essential religious themes by the words pad ēn abēgumān būdan 'To be free from doubt concerning this'. These include the doctrine of the two ways (PhlT. 43 § 9-11), the tenet of the two antagonistic principles (43f. § 12-14), the resurrection and the need to associate with the good (44 § 15-22), acceptance

of the religion,⁸ and the belief in gods and demons inhabiting the body.⁹

The duty to perform the ritual¹⁰ and to give religious instruction is stressed (46 §33-34). Miscellaneous sayings concerning sin and good deeds, reward, not to honour the wicked and to pursue the path of wisdom follow. The sun calls to men three times a day (48 §47-51). The text ends with an eschatological section which is concluded with a few final admonitions. A translation of the last sayings is offered here, as they have presented difficulties owing to the corruption of the text:

Do not abandon the respect of the soul because of the body, do not forget the transience of the things of this world because of the respect ~~of~~ ^{for} any one. Do not desire that thing because of which your body will come to punishment and your soul to torment, but desire that things whose fruit is everlasting joy.

Being joyful is [from] a doer of good,
 the doing of good is from diligence,
 the birth of [diligence] is from *perception,¹¹
 for *perception is from seeking,
 seeking is from awareness, having awareness is from
 the knowledge of the spirit; a possessor of knowledge

is that faculty by which that which is, was and
will be ^{is} known, the teacher of the management of the
new creation, the arranger of things: all that
ought to be done, the wisher of benefit to all in both
settings of the two worlds. (PhIT. 50 §56-59).¹²

vii. Ādurbād ī Zarduštān.¹³

To this sage, the grandson of Ādurbād ī Mahraspandān, only a short andarz piece is attributed in PhlT 8lf., as the second part of a text without a title. Apart from this he has to his credit two sayings in Dk vi.D8, D.9. On the person of Ādurbād we have the somewhat obscure text in Dk iii, where Ādurbād ī Zarduštān is said to have shown 'to that Lord Yazdegerd son of Šāpūr, the king of kings, the consideration (ōšmarišn) in the religion through wise dumbness (? tušt-mēnišnīh)¹⁴ and also through the picture which is very clear.'¹⁵

Three sayings make up the andarz of Ādurbād son of Zardušt in PhlT. 8lf. The first one enumerates the virtues of each of the three positions in life: being wealthy, poor and a ruler. The second saying consists of a string of phrases in which a positive action is commended and a negative one rejected. Some of them are based on a pun: 'To eat with an intimate friend is good, not to "eat" an oath';¹⁶ 'to give part of one's possession is good, not to give false evidence'.¹⁷ The third saying consists of a number of phrases built on the model of 'one who consults (the wise) is not deluded', 'one who is helped by the gods is saved from all evil'.

c. Xusrō ī Kawādān and other authors of his period.

The most celebrated Sasanian king was Xusrō, and he is also ^{the} ~~one of the most popular authors~~ to whom andarz sayings were ^{most popularly} attributed. A very large number of sayings attributed to him exist in the Islamic literature, but only two collections survive in Pahlavi.

viii. Andarz ī Xusrō ī Kawādān (Xus).¹

This collection purports to contain the words spoken by the king on his death bed: 'when his time was completed (?) (ka^{*} purr-gāh būd) he said in admonition to the people of the world before his living soul was separated from the body' (PhlT. 55.3-5). Appropriately enough, the theme of this short composition is dominated by the thought of the impending death. The first words of the king are:

'When this living soul will be separated from my body, lift me [from] this bed and carry me to the place of rest² and lay me on the place of rest, and raise your voices over the people of the world (saying):' (PhlT 55.5-8).³

There follows a call to perform good deeds strengthened by reflections on the transience of man.

The next section also contains pious injunctions concluded by a remembrance of the final judgment.⁴ The next section emphasizes the triviality of this world as against the next.⁵ The treatise is concluded with a section on self-inquiry.

ix. Dk. iii chapter 201: the ten admonitions of Xusrō
the king of kings son of Kawād.⁶

The text is corrupt and in many places obscure, and bears no resemblance to the other Xusrō text preserved in Pahlavi.

A paraphrase of some of the admonitions is: to think of the Good Religion by the essential being, to speak the truth by knowledge, to do acts of generosity discriminately (No. 2); to abolish from Ērān-šahr the teaching and action⁷ of the heretics (No. 4); to follow the teachings of the sacred word of religion according to what is being taught and done by the disciples of Ādurbād son of Mahraspand (No. 5); not to stop from the provinces of Ērān hospitality to righteous people, good care to the bounteous fire and the purification of waters (No. 6); to increase through perfect effort the religion, knowledge, essential being and giving thought to it (?), to give generously to people of stable character and to guard against the evil of heretics (No. 7); to increase the worship and performance of the actions of the gods in full measure in the provinces of Ērān, and banishing from them the antagonistic demonic idolatry and apostasy (No. 8);⁸ to devote ourselves body and soul to this our religion in propagating and advocating it (No. 9); help your kinsmen by giving them power and wealth and bear enmity against those foreign to you (No. 10).⁹

x. Ayādgār ī Wuzurgmihr (AW).¹⁰

This composition, attributed to the famous sage Wuzurgmihr ī Buxtagān, is the andarz treatise which has best survived the vicissitude of the times. It is preserved not only in the Pahlavi original but also in a fairly close Arabic version, preserved in Misk.¹¹, and also in verse form in Persian as part of the Sāhnāma.¹² Apart from these two old versions there exist many late editions and paraphrases of this text in Arabic and Persian.¹³

The opening section states that it was written by Wuzurgmihr at the command of Xusrō the King of Kings for the instruction of those 'who, by accepting the [decree of] those above, have been created in a well-fashioned and worthy manner'. The treatise was deposited according to this opening section in the royal treasury.

The next section is devoted to showing the futility and transience of the things of this world, and this is followed by an exposition of the main tenets of the religion in the form of questions and answers. Among other things this part of the treatise contains a list of the worst demons created by Ahriman to mislead

man, and the faculties of wisdom and virtue which were created by Ohrmazd to counter the demons.

There follows a long section which consists of questions concerning the abstract notions which qualify for various superlative adjectives like 'Which is the best nature?', 'Which habit is best?' etc. These questions form the greatest bulk of the collection.

The composition has a definite structure and it is clear that it was written as a single literary piece. The main tenor of the book is pious though not quite of the type of priestly piety encountered in PN.

xi. The sayings of Baxt-āfrīd.¹⁴

Baxt-āfrīd, a commentator and sage from the time of Xusrō ī Kawādān,¹⁵ has two sayings attributed to him quoted together in the first part of a collection without title in PhLT. Several other sayings by the same author are preserved in Dk vi.A.4 and E.22. The second of the sayings in PhLT can in fact be regarded as a variant on the saying recorded in Dk vi.E.22d.

'He said this too: If all the people in this world assemble together, they will not be able to overpower me, for when I take with one hand and give with the other the victory¹⁶ remains with me.' (PhLT 81.3-6).

The saying in E.22d. uses for the same idea the simile of pulling a rope.

All the sayings ascribed to Baxt-āfrīd are marked by an individual style: there is a tendency to use sharp rhetorical effects, as in the first saying in PhLT ('There is no man who is more powerful¹⁷ than I am, except for one who is more contented than I', PhLT 81.2-3); and especially to use seemingly paradoxical statements, which have a near-mystical quality, as in the majority of sayings in Dk vi.E.22.

d. Ādurfarnbag and Weh-zād.xii. Ādurfarnbag ī Farroxzādān.¹

This author is a fairly well known personality of the ninth century. He was one of the compilers of the *Dēnkart* and flourished as head of the Zoroastrian community circa 815-835.² A saying which bears the name of *Ādurfarnbag* in *Dk vi. D.10* may be ascribed to him, though it may also be due to his Sasanian namesake.³

The short treatise is concerned with wisdom and has poetic form. The second part of the text uses the simile of agricultural work.

xiii. Weh-zād ī Farrox-pērōz.⁴

The date of this sage is not known; his attributes here are 'the speaker of truth, having wise words' (rāst-guftār, frazānag-saxwan). The text is interrupted by the loss of a folio in the manuscript *MK*. The first section of the text, before the interruption, is exclusively devoted to themes connected with wisdom. 'I have experienced: wisdom is the best spirit, everything in the activity of this world has been distributed by wisdom' (*PhlT 73.7-8*);⁵ the appeal to his own experience occurs also on p. 74 §6, and serves to show the unity of both parts, despite the gap in the manuscripts.⁶

Here are other examples of sayings on wisdom and the wise: 'There are two who have pleasure from their own action, one is a discerning person and one is a foolish person; the discerning one because of the wisdom which he has, and the foolish one because of the awareness which is not in his body' (PhlT 73.9-12). 'There are two discerning wise men who are capable authorities: an authority of wisdom when he has no property, and a capable man of religion when he is not haughty' (PhlT 73.12-14).⁷

A short section is concerned with fate:

'he is diligent with... and amasses good deeds,
and does not turn away from performing his duty;
he is resigned to fate.

He has no confidence in himself,
and is discontent with the slightest sin;
he does not boast (even) of the highest power,
and does not exploit the power of other people.

He does not consider sloth to be due to fate but to action,⁸ and is diligent and discerning in benefit, confident and well-meaning with regard to fate'.⁹

The man described in these lines (which seem, incidentally, to possess certain rhythmic qualities), is obviously one who should serve as an example.

The next section is a hymn to wisdom.¹⁰ It is followed by a long discourse on the transience of this world and the inevitability of death and judgment.

The text as given by Jamasp-Asana in PhlT is particularly unreliable. Most of the correct readings are to be found among the variants.

e. Pseudepigraphic andarz.

While it is possible that some of the works so far discussed are spuriously attributed, there is no doubt that the three works included in this section cannot be the creations of the authors whose name they bear.

xiv. The ten admonitions of Zoroaster.¹

This chapter of Dk iii opens ^a ~~the~~ series of eight chapters, of which four give ten admonitions of one of the great figures of the Zoroastrian religion and the other four give the opposite teachings of one of the great heretics or opponents of the religion. It is appropriate that the series should begin with Zoroaster himself. The text of this chapter is in some places corrupt, but the general sense is clear enough. A summary of the injunctions is:

1. To have faith in the Creator Ohrmazd and the earthly lord, the protector of the creation.
2. To have faith in the root of righteousness of the Good Religion.
3. To establish (winārišn) in the world lordship, mastership and chieftainship and the law of religion (oxīh ud xwadāyīh ud radīh ud dēn-dādōstān) so that the creatures may thrive.
4. Not to do evil to any man whatsoever.

5. To correct one's character so as to banish (pazdīgih) the demons from one's body and to let the gods come into it.
6. To do the righteous thing which one knows and to enquire about that which one does not know for the effectiveness of the corrected character (kārīgih ī wirāstag xēm rāy).
7. To separate from the wicked in all acts of wickedness and to associate with the good in goodness so as to achieve purity from sin and adornment by good deeds.
8. To accomplish the xwētōdas so that the demons may have more fear from one and that the blessing of the righteous may dwell more in one's body (wēš samih ī dēwān aziš ud wēš mehman ī dahman afrin pad tan rāy).
9. To keep a true authority in religion so as to be pure from sin and to have a wide avenue of approach to the reward of good deeds.
10. To perform the worship and ritual of the Creator Ohrmazd and the Amahraspands and the other gods in one's thought so as to gain gratitude for that which has come and be worthy of the new goodness.

xv. The ten admonitions of the righteous Sēn.²

This is the second set of Zoroastrian admonitions in Dk iii, and it is ascribed to Zoroaster's disciple, Sēn.³ The text here presents many more difficulties of understanding than that of the chapter of Zoroaster's andarz. It is almost exclusively concerned with praising the law.

A rough summary only of the contents of these admonitions is possible:

1. To smite back lawfully one who smites unlawfully and make him repay.
2. To return to its rightful owners a thing unlawfully taken.
3. To choose (war dōšīdan) a judge who knows the law and a witness who is truthful, discerning and applying the Good Religion.
4. To enlarge and develop more firmly the law relating to Dād as a chief and protection over that of Hadha mānthra and Gāthā, for through it the purity of the Good Religion is achieved.⁴
5. To enlarge more firmly the pillar of lordship, the enclosing wall (pargān) of the world.
6. The command of the rulers ought to be purely lawful, and their law the religion of the Mazdaeans, and they

ought to abstain from demonic (?) law.⁵

7. Religious lordship according to the law is even above the lord and ruler of the world; the lord himself is the most humble servant in the law.
8. Even those of bad religion praise the greatness and wonder of the law of the Mazdaean religion.
9. The root of the law is from the Creator in order to reject lack of law and to smite the attack.
10. The law will ultimately vanquish all lack of law and oppression.

xvi. Andarz ī Ošnar ī dānāg (Ošnar).⁶

The attribution of this text to Ošnar the wise is an obvious case of spurious authorship. The name of Ošnar⁷ seems to have been confused with that of Hošang,⁸ who has an andarz collection attributed to him in Arabic translation.⁹ That collection has some vague affinity with the Pahlavi composition of Ošnar: it does not share any passages with Ošnar, but it consists largely of the same type of sayings which are built round various numerals.¹⁰

The literary frame for the andarz of Ošnar is the sentence: 'The disciple asked the wise Ošnar, "Tell me a word in education for every utterance from one to a thousand"'.¹¹ Ošnar proceeds to answer the question, although he never reaches as far as a thousand, which should be taken here to be merely an extravagant term for a 'large number, many'. The composition does, however, concentrate, at least in the first part, on the use of numbers. It begins with sayings the first word of which is ewag, 'one', proceeding to dō, 'two' and further until šaš 'six' (§ 41), where there is a lacuna in the manuscripts. If the Hošang text of Misk can be relied upon, some sayings there are based on the number 'eight'.¹²

There follows, in the latter part of the book, a miscellany of sayings, introduced by questions from the disciple.

The first virtue, according to the beginning of the andarz, is wisdom (§2). A theme which occupies a number of passages in Ošnar is poverty: on the whole it is a thing to be avoided.¹³ The main concern of the text is with lay, pragmatic matters, but the theme of the transience of the things of this world and the need to avoid excess of wealth: is *also* stressed:

'Much wealth is harmful to every person, for because of excess (one is) outside the measure' (Ošnar 54).¹⁴

Towards the end of the book there is a passage written in the usual pietistic style:

'He (sc. the wise man) said this too: The dearest things and persons of people diminish every day; one who is not diligent in that which deserves most thanks should not regard himself alive through the benefit of this world' (Ošnar 55).¹⁵

There follows a passage in praise of the pious man:

'Happy is the person who has given great praise of the gods for the ritual, satisfaction, protection, and upholding, and whose hope is for Ohrmazd the Lord and the greatest spirits, the Amahraspands, and all the good spirits. The arrangement of both

this world and the next is manifest from him.
We, people, ought to be diligent in giving sweet
praise, and in reckoning the gratitude towards
Ohrmazd the Lord and the Amahraspands and all
goodspirits' (ibid.).¹⁶

f. Anonymous andarz texts.xvii. Andarzihā ī pēšenīgān I (APēš I)¹

A short mnemonic composition giving a list of things each of which is 'best' in its own class. As most of the sentences end with weh it has rhyme-like quality. The syntax is notable: each sentence has a subject compounded of two notions connected by an izāfat, the relationship between which is that of apposition; e.g.

xwāstag ī tan-drustih weh 'wealth which is health is best';

frazand ī ahlayih weh 'children, i.e. righteousness, is best';

brād ī husrawih weh 'brother, i.e. good fame, is best'.

§7 should be read: dōst ī ruwān ī xwēš weh; rāyēnidār ī gāhānīg [weh] 'friend, i.e. one's own soul, is best; the governor, i.e. the one who follows the Gāthā, [is best]'.
best]'

xviii. Andarzihā ī Pēšenīgān II (APēš II)²

The text begins with a few injunctions after which comes a short section of self-inquiry followed by a few sentences on the last judgment:

'For this world is but like a one-day inn, whereas in the other world it is necessary to be eternally,

and one gives account of good deeds and sins. He whose good deeds are more numerous than his sins, Srōš-ahlay takes his hand and leads him to Paradise; he whose sins are more numerous than his good deeds the demon Wizarš takes his hand and leads him to hell. When they cry, (the demons) will not have mercy, and when they raise their voices, (the demons) will not listen' (PhLT 39.17-40.3, §5-8).³

There is a semblance of a rhyme in the text: §1-5 have infinitives at the end of phrases, §6-8 has verbs ending with -ēd, and §8 has verbs with -ēnd at the end of the two phrases. The rhyme does not seem to have been planned, but the effect ^{of assonance} may be conscious.

xix. Andarzīhā ī pēšenīgān III (APēš III).⁴

This is a short composition which consists of a series of sentences, all ending with the words nē dārēd, which state the hardships caused by the lack of various things like wisdom, a wife, offspring etc. The point of the piece is the last sentence: 'Of all these it is worst for him who does not have a soul'.⁵

xx. Andarzīhā ī pēšenīgān IV (APēš IV).⁶

The tone of this short piece is much more pessimistic than that of the previous ones. Here too there is semblance

of rhyme by the presence of the word nēst at the end of all phrases; the construction of all the sentences is simple: 'x. rāy y. nēst' 'To x. there is no y.'

The point of the piece is again at the end: 'Of all these it is worst for him who dies and the Lord is dissatisfied with him; all those with whom the Lord is dissatisfied have no place in the resplendent paradise'.⁷

xxi. Andarz ī dānāgān ō Mazdēsnān (Dān).⁸

The text begins with a brief enumeration of the main ritual and ethical duties of the Zoroastrian during the day, and this is followed by a reminder of the final judgment and the transience of man. Man, according to §4, is like a tree:

'The corpse of men is like a tree: when they plant it and it grows and increases and develops, they break it up, cut it, pile it up,⁹ put it on fire, and the fire burns and consumes, and the righteous wind scatters it in the world; afterwards, except for the man who planted it, no one else knows even whether it ever was or not,¹⁰ (PhlT 52 §4).

There follow some admonitions: one who amasses fortune for charity is laudable, and one ought not to break an oath with relatives, friends and people of different religion.

Two Avestan quotations with Pahlavi commentary follow.

The text is concluded with a long poetic composition, the second part of which was treated by W. B. Henning.¹¹ It deals with the subject which is so popular with writers of andarz: the futility and transience of this world. The first part of this section is transcribed here, arranged with some hesitation, by a proposed division of lines. Although there is no obvious external mark that these phrases were intended as poetry, as there is in the latter part, the roughly equal number of stresses and the rhythm of the lines suggest that it was.

1. wuzurg ummēd ī kirbag rāy wināh ma kunēd,
pad juwānīh wistāxw ma bawēd, mardomān ošōmandān,
2. cē was kasān ī pad aburnāyīh az gētīg
bē widard hēnd, wanē ud apaydāg būd hēnd.
3. būd ī dēr zamān pattāyist bē pas-iz frazām
widašt, wanē ud apaydāg būdan abāyast.
4. bē nūn ēn kunēm ī ciš ī fraškerdīg abāyēd.
dēr zamān pattāyēd ud nē wišōbēd.
5. tan hangār ku-m widīrēd kār ī gētīg,
hān ī grāmīg mazīg kālbuđ barēnd,
6. pad gyāg frāmōšēn anōh anayād bē nihēnd,
rōz pad rōz frāmōšēntar ud anayādtar bawēd.
(būd ī abar paykārēnd ud drōn nē yazēnd.)

7. ud man kē ruwān hēm ud stāyišnōmand,
 az tō tan mustōmand ud garzišnīg bawēm.

(PhlT 53f. §13-16)

1. 'For the great hope of good deeds do not commit sins,
 be^{not} confident as regards youth, mortal men;
2. for many people departed from this world in their
 youth, vanished and disappeared.
3. Some survived for a long time, but then finally passed
 away, they had to vanish and disappear.
4. But now I shall do this, which is necessary for the
 Renovation, which lasts for a long time and does not
 decay.
5. Consider yourself: "The work of this world escapes
 me, they will carry that dear and delicate body;
6. They will lay it forgotten in the place, there
 unremembered, day by day it will become more forgotten
 and less remembered. (Sometimes they quarrel over
 it and do not sacrifice the drōn ritual.)
7. I, who am the soul and am praiseworthy, carry complaint
 and lamentation over you, the body"'.

Some obvious difficulties in the arrangement of the lines
 raise the doubt whether the assumption of a poetical
 composition is right. Most lines offer themselves for a
 division into two parts of five stresses each, but in lines

2 and 3 the division is not so natural. Line 6 seems to contain a gloss, which looks out of style even without the assumption of poetic lines. The first half of line 7 is somewhat too short.

xxii. Rādīh kardan...¹²

This is a short didactic piece, which looks like a chant consisting of short phrases all ending with infinitive verbs. The emphasis is on religious duties.

xxiii. Kirbag kardan rāy...¹³

A short didactic text which is characterized by the fact that every phrase, after a few introductory sentences, points out the essential feature of some virtue or desirable thing. All sentences thus have the structure: hān X. nē pad X. abāyēd dāštan kē ...

The first part is concerned with defining religious concepts, the second part is devoted to terms of social and family life.

xxiv. Andarz ī dastwarān ō wehdēnān.¹⁴

Although the title of this text in PhLT begins with the word andarz,¹⁵ it is not in effect written in the style of the andarz texts, and its contents too do not conform to the convention of this type of books. It is

It is rather a short treatise in the form of questions and answers dealing with ritual problems. It therefore clearly belongs to the type of books represented by some parts of the Rivāyat literature or Šāyast nē Šāyast.

xxv. Abar 5 xēm ī āhrōnān ud 10 andarz ...¹⁶

From the fact that this text is found in various traditional selections of texts, it seems that it was one of the most popular Pahlavi books.

The text sets out 'the five characters of priests and the ten admonitions to which all the admonitions of the religion are connected'.

The five characters are: To be free from sin.
 To have right thoughts, speech and action discriminately.¹⁷
 To keep religious authority, like a chief who is taught by the knowledge of religion and teaches truthfully.¹⁸
 To worship the gods by the correct wording and ritual.
 To accomplish one's duty, fight the adversary and adhere to the profession of the religion.

The admonitions are: (1) to behave in a manner deserving good fame so as to ^{preserve} ~~keep~~ the good name of one's ruler, teacher, chief and father.

(2) To avoid bad fame so as to ^{keep} ~~prevent~~ bad name from one's superiors.

- (3) Not to report things in the name of one's teacher which one has not heard from him.
- (4) To tell worthy people generously things one has learnt from one's teacher so as not to deprive the righteous of the manifestation of their name.¹⁹
- (5) To give lawful reward and punishment.
- (6) To keep the way of the good open to one's house so as to make the symbol of righteousness dwell in one's house.²⁰
- (7) Not to be vengeful towards good people and not to persist in lack of repentance from sin, so as not to make the demons grow in one's mind without awareness.²¹
- (8) To banish vengeance from one's mind and repent swiftly of sin.
- (9) To know the progression and retrogression of religion: in the former, to hold religion in front and to seek affairs through it, in the latter, when adversity comes to religion, to retrieve it and to hold the body as a shield.²²
- (10) To be an obedient listener to one's lord, chief and authority in religion.

It is clear from the above summary that the admonitions have a similar structure to that of the chapters containing the ten admonitions in Dēnkart iii. It also seems certain that the admonitions are addressed to priests. This is evident not only from the title and from the fact that

the characters are those attributed to the ideal priest, but also from the nature of the admonitions themselves, which deal with people who are engaged with learning and who have to give punishment etc.

xxvi. Dārūg ī hunsandīh²³

This short text is included here chiefly because of its subject matter, although in structure it is not strictly an andarz text. It is somewhat whimsical in character, giving a recipe for a medicine to achieve contentment by the use of various abstract components, such as 'If I do not do this, what shall I do?', 'From to-day until to-morrow it may become better'. The phrasing of the text seems to suggest a conscious, and perhaps ironical, use of magical conventions.²⁴

xxvii. Abar xēm ud xrad ī farrox mard²⁵

This text, although not gnomic in structure, is a treatise on themes which are prominent in the andarz books. Its language is not easy, and its style is baffling at places. Bartholomae's judgment of its age is: 'Es ist ein ganz eigentümliches Stück. Die merkwürdige Fabel vom Wildesel und Löwen 163.18ff. mag höherem Alters sein, aber das Ganze macht auf mich den Eindruck eines

späten Erzeugnisses mit manieriertem, wenig klarem Stil'.²⁶

The style seems constrained perhaps because most of the text is to be read as a poem. The arrangement of lines has been successful in some passages, but as the book falls outside the strict limits of andarz literature, and as many difficulties still remain with regard to the text, it will not be discussed here. A very clear poetic passage, however, has already been transcribed and translated by J. C. Tavadia, but his treatment is not quite satisfactory.²⁷

Some sentences from the beginning of the book will give an idea of its contents: 'A happy man is manifest from this: he pays attention to the effort of goodness²⁸ and to virtue, he is diligent in living in righteousness so as to make a weapon, he desires good deeds greedily and makes lust powerless over his mind and dismisses it, he throws away from himself corruption (? naštagiḥ) and love of self, he abstains from small-mindedness ...' (PhLT 162.1-6).

xxviii. X^vāškārī [i] rāōaka (Schulgespräch)²⁹

A pazand text which contains precepts for school-children: this is andarz in its most proper and most

elementary form. The text seems to be made up of two original compositions combined together, the second one beginning with §25: andarz kunōm ōi šumā kōdaka... Most of the precepts are concerned with the simple ritual duties of purity and with the requirements of respect for the elders and the like.

g. The sixth book of the Dēnkart (Dk vi)¹

Dēnkartvi is the largest collection of andarz literature, and is also the most important compilation from the point of view of its contents.

It was written in the ninth century A.D., but there is no doubt that much of the material contained in it is based on traditions of the Sasanian period.² The book is introduced as being concerned with 'what has been done and held by the orthodox and the utterances of the Mazdaean religion'. The orthodox, pōryōtkēšān, are explained as being 'the early sages' (dānāgān pēšēnīgān).³ The sayings in the first part of the book are introduced by the formula 'They held this too thus', which relates them to the same traditional source. Similar formulae are used in other parts of the book. Besides these vague attributions there are some sayings which are specifically ascribed to a sage by name. The names thus mentioned are Ādurbād ī Mahraspandān,⁴ Ādurbād ī Zarduštān,⁵ Xusrō of immortal soul,⁶ Baxt-āfrīd,⁷ Ādurfarnbag.⁸ Besides these names which have already been encountered above as authors of andarz we come across some less familiar figures: Ōhrmazd ī Sijīg,⁹ Wehdād ī Ādur-Ohrmazdān,¹⁰ Ādur-Mihr and Ādur-Narseh,¹¹ Ādur-bōzēd.¹² Of these names those which are known to us from other sources can be

ascribed to the Sasanian period,¹³ and it seems that andarz was not much composed in the post-Islamic period, or perhaps rather, that andarz composed in that late period would either be left anonymous or would bear a pseudepigraphic attribution.¹⁴

The existence of Avestan andarz, which must have served as starting-point for the composition of andarz in Sasanian times has already been suggested by some scholars.¹⁵ Dk vi does in effect have passages which derive undoubtedly from Avestan sources,¹⁶ although those which are clearly Avestan do not seem to possess the character of the andarz literature. Many of the sayings in Dk vi seem to have developed ^{from} ~~as~~ a system of commentary on Avestan phrases and notions, which may be designated midrashic.¹⁷

Dk.vi is thus obviously a compilation from various sources. That it is not a homogenous collection by a single hand can perhaps be seen from the fact that it is naturally divided into a number of separate collections which are distinguishable by external marks, such as the opening words of each saying, which are remarkably uniform in the different parts of the book. Sanjana based on this feature the division of paragraphs and sections in his edition. Although this system of division is, in principle,

the best, as it prevents the prejudices of an editor from interfering with the text, it is clear that in some points the structure of the book has suffered by this procedure. It is clear that, in some cases, the sayings do not begin ~~where~~^{with} the formula ~~is found~~,¹⁸ and that in other cases different sayings have been grouped together merely because the formula is not found.¹⁹ In the division of sections the shift from one formula to another does not always mark the beginning of a new collection.²⁰ Despite these deficiencies, it has seemed best to retain Sanjan's system of numbering the paragraphs for convenience of reference.

Another fact which shows that Dk.vi is not the work of a single original compiler is the existence of a number of identical passages in different parts of the book.²¹ Many of the sayings must have circulated independently or in different collections, as can be seen from the fact that some sayings of Dk vi are found isolated in the Arabic collection of Mikawayh.²²

There are certain phrases which seem to mark the end of an original collection incorporated into Dk vi. Thus, for example, the saying:

'He who knows to consider these several chapters

which are written in this book comes better to know himself and others' (Dk vi.66), would be an appropriate closing or opening sentence of a collection, but appears strange and out of context in the place where it is found. Similarly,

'(This) copy, which was from the book of Ādurbād son of Mahraspand, they came and stood to do it through consultation with the orthodox' (Dk vi.A.6).

It is clear from this remark that here ended one of the collections which were put together by the compiler of Dk vi; as often happens in such compilations, the final editor does not take the trouble to smooth out the stitches which show the original components of his book.

As far as can be judged from the present state of the book, the whole group of sayings from the beginning, §1, to §A.6, forms one large section, devoted mainly to religious matters, with emphasis on inner piety and devotion to the gods. It does, however, contain smaller groups of sayings which deal with related subjects.²³

There follow a number of shorter units: §B.1-B.47 is a collection which begins with the statement of the difference of the creation of Ohrmazd from that of Ahreman, the function of Zoroaster for the Renovation, the

difference between truth and lie, righteousness and sin, and the two kinds of wisdom, which leads us into an enumeration of the various practical applications of the faculty of wisdom in the discernment of the excesses from the qualities which are in accordance with the measure (paymān); this section ends with a warning for great circumspection in one's behaviour in this world.

§B.47-C.47 is a large section which contains sayings which have identical structure: 'One ought not to for one who does

It may have belonged to the same collection as the previous section, for both sections are mainly concerned with judging the various human qualities. One should, however, observe that, in contrast to the order and deliberate selection of qualities in §B.47-C.47, which is somewhat pragmatic in character, the approach of §B.14ff. is very much more systematic, based as it is on the principles of Aristotelian ethics.²⁴

§C.48-C.83 might have belonged to one collection. Much of this section consists of sayings which enumerate various qualities or activities which lead to other qualities or attitudes, good or bad. This section concludes with a number of lists of various qualities.

§D.1-D.12 is a distinct group of sayings which is characterised by the fact that most of the paragraphs refer to authors by name and that it contains a number of short stories which are presented as exempla with a moral.

§E.1 to the end is again a collection of miscellaneous sayings on religious subjects, mostly anonymous.

Despite the fact that Dk vi is thus made up of a number of distinct sections, and that the order of sayings in each of the groups is more or less arbitrary,²⁵ the sixth book of the Dēnkart is not altogether an aimless collection of miscellaneous sayings. It is almost exclusively concerned with religious matter, and its general character is much more contemplative and devotional ^{than that of} ~~when compared to~~ the andarz compilations discussed so far. Most of the other andarz texts are also pious, but they are mostly concerned with the ceremonial duties, with the confession of faith and the right beliefs, and with the moral duties which form an essential part of the Zoroastrian religion. But in none of them is there so much emphasis on inner concentration upon the gods and the effort of retaining spiritual joy. These points will be further demonstrated in the second part of this work, which

can be regarded as a detailed commentary on Dk vi.

Apart from the interest which Dk vi holds from the point of view of its contents, it is also a very important collection for the study of methods of exegesis and literary structure in Sasanian times. Some observations on the subject are offered in the next section.

3. Types of andarz books.

The most useful criterion for deciding what books belong to the andarz genre should be the question of their literary structure. Most of the books which are referred to as andarz are compositions of gnomic character, consisting of fairly short sentences on miscellaneous subjects and often addressed to a second person or persons whether specifically named or defined as 'people of the world' or left without any explanation. This seems to be the proper, or original, structure of an andarz composition: these are also the characteristics of the wisdom books in the Assyrian and Babylonian sphere of culture.¹ Some of the books have a frame-story, usually consisting of no more than a sentence or two, which establishes the collection of sayings as one said by a famous sage on his death bed or in advice to his son.

A somewhat different type of andarz composition is presented by the collections which are constructed round a number - ten admonitions, five characters or the like -- or in answer to one basic question (AdPriv, Ošnar). Others are addressed to a type of man -- school-children, for example (Schulgespräch), or priests (Abar 5 xēm...).

From the point of view of subject-matter the various books are roughly divided into two groups: those which offer mainly pragmatic advice and those which are basically religious books. The distinction is not absolute, because the pragmatic collections would also contain religious sentences, for there is very little purely 'secular' literature in Middle Persian, while the religious books include advice concerning matters of everyday life, like marriage, agriculture or even business, for there is no field of life in Zoroastrianism which is not affected by the religious attitude. The distinction nevertheless holds some practical validity and may enable us to see the intention of the various books with more clarity. It is interesting, for example, to notice that the two main compositions attributed to Ādurbād ī Mahraspandān and which have, moreover, strong family relationship between them, AdMah and WāzAd, clearly belong to two different types from the point of view of their main preoccupation, the former being mainly pragmatic while the latter is markedly more pious. The three other pieces of andarz attributed to Ādurbād ī Mahraspandān also belong to the second type, the religious andarz. The only other andarz compositions which can be said to have pragmatic character are Ošnar and Wehzād.²

It is thus clear that of the andarz which survived in Pahlavi the great bulk of books belonged to the type of books which could be used in religious instruction. That much else existed in Sasanian times is certain from the fragments preserved in Islamic books, as well as from books whose character is akin to andarz, such as Xusrō ud rēdag or Wizārišn ī catrang.

Among the andarz books of religious character the difference between Dk vi and the other books is striking. The other religious andarz books have the character of general, exoteric, popular-religious compositions. They greatly emphasize the value of wisdom and make much of the transience of this world and the shortness of man's life, for which reason it is not worthwhile to expend too much effort in matters of this world.

The preoccupations of Dk vi are quite different. In the second part of this work it will be attempted to show that Dk vi is not a collection addressed to the uninitiated lay Zoroastrian, and that it contains esoteric material couched sometimes in ambiguous language, which can be grasped only by the few who are in possession of sufficient spiritual powers and who have the knowledge of certain secrets.

The large group of popular-religious writings contains one or two texts which are primarily addressed to priests. Such is naturally the case of Abar 5 xēm ī āhrōnān. There is no reason, however, to assume that the text was not supposed to be read by non-priests.

There are also texts which may have been meant chiefly to serve as school texts for the education of the young. Apart from the Schulgespräch, which is an obvious case, there is PN, which in its systematic treatment of subjects, and especially the catechism which forms its first part, would appear to be ideally suited for this purpose, especially as it states at the beginning that knowledge of the contents of the catechism is incumbent upon every one by the age of fifteen. A text like Rādīh kardan (No. xxii) seems like a didactic chant with a primitive rhyme which may have been used in the education of children.

Two of the texts discussed above do not have gnomic structure at all, and would not be regarded as properly part of the andarz literature, but their discussion of contentment (Dārūg ī hunsandīh, No. xxvi) and of the character and wisdom of a happy man (Abar xēm ud xrad, No. xxvii), make them close in spirit to the andarz books.

Another text which has some kinship with the andarz literature is the Dādīstān ī mēnōg ī xrad (MX),³ which, as it has the Spirit of Wisdom as its main spokesman, and as it touches upon a variety of subjects in much the same spirit as the andarz texts, has been drawn upon in the discussion of certain themes in the second part, although it cannot be considered an andarz book from the point of view of its structure.

4. Remarks on style and literary techniques in the
andarz books.

a. Similes, parables and other devices.

Despite their reputation to the contrary, the andarz books are not all completely dry, and do not consist merely of insipidly phrased advice. It is clear that at least some of them were not meant only to be read with solemnity and boredom, but that they were also read for pleasure. This is certainly true more of the pragmatic worldly books, which have hardly come down to us, than of the more serious-minded religious andarz books. Thus the two pragmatic books preserved in Pahlavi contain many more examples of the art of pleasant moralising than the religious texts. We have had occasion to point out the little parables which abound in AdMah and the numerical plays which Ošnar indulges in. In this respect these books are akin to the other kinds of wisdom literature of the non-gnomic type, like Draxt asūrīg or King Xusrō and his boy, which were ^{composed} ~~written~~ mainly for entertainment.

Dk vi also indulges often in figurative speech. Some examples are: character is numerous like the grass on hills and plains (§186); joy should be kept with as much

gentleness as a young boy: when he desires something harmful, a date or a walnut is substituted (§189, 222, E.30b); a teacher is like a mirror (§224); one pays for one's disobedience like a warrior who fights contrary to his orders in a safe place and is beaten (§234); people ^{withdraw} ~~move~~ away from poverty, just as they fight shy of the expenses involved in providing a well to store rain-water, or in building a fortress and making provision against a siege (§304); religion and the sacred word are like flesh and skin (§324); the body should be made like a cavity, not like a peak (§208, E.35b).

Besides these more obvious literary tools the sixth book of the Dk, uses a number of other devices. To force a point, a sharp and exaggerated contrast is deliberately made between two notions. The distinction between 'shame' (šarm) and 'bad shame', or 'disgrace' (nang) is said to be that the former 'does not let one commit a sin', while the latter 'does not let one do a good work' (§7); the point is here somewhat too sharply made, because nang ^{is} often ~~comes~~ ^{paired with} ~~as a synonym of~~ šarm and does not always have a bad connotation. The sharp contrast, which was no doubt considered witty, is a thing which evidently delights the author and the readers. The difference between

'character', xēm, and 'wisdom', xrad, is thus that the former is typical of one who does not deceive anyone, while the latter belongs to one who does not deceive himself (§4). Another saying in Dk vi makes a similar witty verbal contrast:

'If a man lives by the religion of the gods, the gods see his toil in this world, so that even if he has come into pain by foot, he lives rightfully on his work, done by hand' (§106).

There is no need to multiply examples. The device is an obvious one, and other cases will be found in the second part of this work. It is very likely that this taste for putting things in sharp opposition to each other is here fortified by the general inclination of the Zoroastrian theology ~~which tends~~ to see the world in black and white.

Another device favoured by the compiler of Dk vi is the phrasing of a sentence first in obscure words, as a puzzle, which is solved afterwards by a following explicatory sentence. A good example is:

'There is that thing which he who is in it does not move away from it, and he who is not in it moves towards it' (§57).

'Every one who is in religion does not move away from where he stands' (§58).

The first paragraph is completely incomprehensible without the second one, and there is no doubt that it is deliberately phrased so as to be unintelligible at first sight. The practice of using this device seems to be explicable best from the habit of oral speaking in the form of sermons. Preachers in various cultures have had recourse to this device which is calculated to captivate their audiences. An alternative explanation may possibly be that some of the loftier secrets of religion were couched deliberately in obscure language; the master would perhaps give these shrouded hints to his disciples to ponder about, and after some time, when they had grappled with the problem and shown themselves ripe enough, he would give them the correct solution. This is again a practice which is well attested in other cultures. If the solution offered in the case of the example given above seems to be too trivial to deserve so much effort at hiding it, it is just possible that the solution itself is no more than a hint and is not completely explicit.

The first proposed explanation seems on the whole the more likely one, especially when we consider some further examples of such riddles in Dk vi:

'Every person ought to desire a seed of good deeds. When he has secured a seed of good deeds, from then on good deeds become abundant and sins become few. "A seed of good deeds" was said by them to be this: to accept a wise authority of religion and the association of the righteous' (§53).

'A man is to put in order a place the size of a fathom. When that one place of a fathom is in order, then all the world is in order, and when that one place of a fathom is not in order, then no place at all is in order. They said: That one place of a fathom is one's own body' (§131).

'Every person has had a poor one at the beginning, and that poor one is his own soul' (§A.3).

'One is not little and a thousand is not much: one is the thing of the spirit and a thousand is earthly things' (§E.13, and cf. E.14).

b. The midrashic technique.

One common device of the andarz books is that of playing on the similarity of word sounds. This may be useful in some cases for the modern investigator, because if it can be established that a pun was intended, it may teach us something about the pronunciation of certain words at the time when the saying was first said. A case in point is the following:

pad kār ī frāz rasēd meh-kārīh nigīrišn, ud kē
meh-kārīh nē dānēd. mid-kārīh nigīrišn (§46).

'In a case which comes about, one ought to contemplate great action. One who does not know great action ought to contemplate being aloof'.

In this case, the ~~fact that a~~ play on the similarity of the words meh-kārīh and mid-kārīh lends some support to Bartholomae's vocalisation of the latter word with a front vowel.¹

Other examples of puns in Dk.vi. are: a play on the double meaning of ox: 'essential being' and 'lord' (§30). The play on the word kār / kārān is the basis of the following definition:

kār ī xwēš ēd bawēd. kē abāg druz ī xwēš kōšēd,
nē abāg druz ī kārān, cē ardīg-kāmag bawēd kē

abāg druž ī kārān kōšēd (§132).

'One's work is this: one who fights against his own demons, not against those of other people, for he who fights against the demons of other people is a seeker of battle'.

A similar use of pun caused the following definition:

māndag hān bawēd ī bē mānēd (§37).

'Māndag (a kind of sin) is that which remains'.

Similarly:

ka ciš pad xēm ī frārōn nigīrīhēd ēg hamāg hōg
ud āhōg bē wēnīhēd (§260).

'When a thing is looked at by character, all habit and fault is seen',

the coupling of 'habit' and 'fault' is no doubt due to the similarity of sound.

An example where this technique is used outside Dk vi occurs in Ad PRiv, where the term bāristānīh, 'patience', is explained with reference to bār 'burden'.

19om bāristānīh hān bawēd kē bār ī ruwān ō tan
abāyēd, ka-š škeftīh abar rasēd u-š ō kas tawān
spuxtān nē spōzēd, bē bāristānīh[ā] xwad abar
padīrēd (PRiv 62.24, p.198f.).

'19th, patience, is this: one for whom the burden

of the soul is incumbent upon the body, and when misfortune comes upon him and he has the power to transfer it to another person he does not transfer it but accepts it upon himself patiently.'

It must be clear from these examples that the attempt to explain words through such similarities does not necessarily involve an effort at etymological interpretation. Words coupled in this way may of course sometimes be philologically cognate, but for the authors of these andarz sayings the satisfaction was derived from the fact that they managed meaningfully to associate two different words which have similar sounds, and to arrive as a result of these acrobatics at some new expression of religious wisdom. It is necessary to insist on this point because one so often comes across scornful references to the Pahlavi authors, blaming them for not being familiar with the principles of Indo-European comparative philology, especially in the exegesis of the Avesta. Once it is realised that their object was not to give a historical interpretation of the text of the Avesta, but to read into it some important meaning, the whole subject of the ignorance of the Pahlavi authors can be seen in a different light. We have seen how the definition of different Pahlavi terms, such as kār, māndag, bāristānīh, rested on words which have the same

sounds as the one which is to be defined. The defined words are among the most common in Pahlavi, and a simple, elementary explanation of them would be ludicrous. The whole point of the definition is to pour some new meaning into them, or to point out some hitherto unnoticed aspect of them, which may benefit the reader. The explanation is in fact an exercise in creating new facets of wisdom. It is clear that the same activity is carried out in many of the supposed Pahlavi translations of Avestan passages. Pun is of course not the only way by which new meaning can be imparted to a common concept. The technique of contrasting concepts, discussed shortly above, also gives the same results: our understanding of nang and šarm, of xēm and xrad gains something in subtlety or in depth by the opposing juxtaposition. A case where both a play on words of a sort and the technique of contrast are at work is the following:

hunsand-xīrān ahunsand ī xrad ud dānišn. (§197)

‘Those who are satisfied with things are dissatisfied with wisdom and knowledge’.

The translation can hardly do justice to the play on words. The compound hunsand-xīr is in meaning synonymous with hunsand, ‘content’, but when it is contrasted with what follows the second part of the compound must assume some

independent meaning. The play with ideas in this case will perhaps be better appreciated when the following paraphrase of the thought behind this saying is given. Contentment is an expression of the highest ideal of this type of pietist religion, but it is not a mere passive spiritual state, for it involves effort in the field of inner perfection. It is therefore not paradoxical to say: 'The contented are discontented^d with (their) wisdom and knowledge'. To sharpen the contrast between the two parts of the sentence, the subject is expressed by the compound hunsand-xīr rather than by the simplex hunsand.

Having noticed that the sayings of Dk vi are characterized by a deliberate manipulation of words and concepts, it is not difficult to realise that the techniques employed by the authors of Dk vi are very close to those of the authors of the Jewish midrash, who flourished in Sasanian times in Palestine and Babylonia.² It would seem fruitless at this stage to attempt a comparison and still less to try and show historical dependence of the one on the other.³

One aspect of the midrashic technique as employed by the authors of Dk vi is worth going into in some detail, as it has crucial importance for the understanding of many

fragments of texts. For lack of a better word we propose to call it here 'spiritualized interpretation.' The process is basically that of endowing a common term or notion with meaning which it does not possess in normal parlance or writing; this meaning is usually of a higher religious order, bordering in some cases on the esoteric.

A simple example for this is the following saying, which consists apparently of a quotation from some traditional source which advocates certain things with regard to eating, and these phrases are later interpreted:

"He has eaten a hearty meal" was said (to mean) this: he is content with that which has come. "He has eaten pure (food)" is this: he eats of that which is his lawful share as is befitting to him according to the custom. ...' (§319)

Most of the definitions of terms in Dk vi give the terms they define some specialized, higher meaning which they do not possess otherwise. Typical of this trend are the definitions in §23 and §91. An example from the latter is:

'Generosity is this: one who surrenders himself to the gods only because of love for the soul and religion'.

Such definitions are of course not to be taken as final and binding statements on the subject. They are made up for their context; it is therefore not rare to see that the same term is variously defined in different sayings. Generosity, for example, is defined in §23 in the following words: 'One who gives a present to a person from whom he does not hope for any reward to come to him in this world, and of whom he does not even have the hope that he should hold him abundantly in gratitude and favour'.

Typical midrashic statements are found in a paragraph which begins: 'People have three things which are very good, these are, drinking haoma, drinking wine and ~~carrying~~^{wearing} the sacred girdle'. The three activities are then explained as follows:

'Drinking haoma is this: when one stands upon one's essential being. Drinking wine is this: when one stands on peace. Carrying the sacred girdle is this: when one is separated from the wicked'. (§108).

The three terms are thus used as symbols of spiritual attitudes.

Vices are also capable of midrashic interpretation:

'Evil thinking means one who considers evil to

good people, righteous men and good friends.

Theft means one who shows himself different from what he is. Robbery means one who says of a thing which is not his, "would that it were mine".

Lustfulness means one who does not desire the virtue of another person. Bad soul means one who speaks right but does not do it himself.' (§269)

The definitions here seem deliberately to seek the witty effect by the reversal of most ordinary acceptations of the words. Robbery is defined in terms of greediness, while lustfulness is explained as the attitude of having no lust for the things which are really important, virtues.

Some other, shorter examples for the use of this technique may be given.

' "Selecting" means to select one's thought, speech and action away from the power of aliens towards the help of one's kinsmen' (§267),

where the terms used seem to be allegorical references to the demons and the gods, respectively. A combination of the midrashic technique with the device of posing a riddle and its solution can be found in §322:

'The three greatest duties of men are these: to make an enemy into a friend, a druwand into a righteous man and an ignorant person into a wise

man'.

The explanations which follow show that making an enemy into a friend should be taken to mean 'one who holds the things of this world in front of him and becomes a friend to them in his thoughts'. The explanation of the other two terms makes them refer to one's own conversion, one's education of oneself.

Some other definitions of terms, partly in a midrashic sense, are found in §113. An example from there is: 'Lordship is this, one who keeps himself back from doing sin'. In §3 the midrashic process has given the following result: 'Be a friend to every one, and this to you is wisdom' etc. A string of midrashic definitions is found in §D.1c, of which we may quote: 'Peace is one who is in peace with his own soul'.

PART TWO. RELIGIOUS IDEAS IN THE ANDARZ TEXTS.

I. Knowledge and Wisdom.

1. Self-inquiry.

One of the recurrent themes in the andarz books concerns the duty of every person to set to himself a number of questions with regard to his religious adherence. These are the opening phrases of FN:

'The orthodox, viz. the adherents of the first wisdom¹, have said by the revelation which is from the² religion: every man, when he reaches the age of fifteen years, should know these several things, "Who am I? whose am I? from whence did I come? whither do I return? of what lineage and seed am I? what is the duty of this world from me? what is the reward of the other world? did I come from the other world or did I originate in this world? do I belong to Ohrmazd or to Ahreman? do I belong to the gods or to the demons? do I belong to the good or to the wicked? am I a man or a demon? how many ways are there? which is my religion? what is my benefit, what is my damage? who is my friend, who is my enemy? is there one

principle or two? from whom is there goodness and from whom evil? from whom is there light and from whom darkness? from whom is there fragrance and from whom stench? from whom is there lawfulness and from whom lack of law? from whom is there forgiveness and from whom lack of compassion?' (PhlT 41).³

There follow in the text the answers which ought to be given to these questions, and which combine together to give a review of the main tenets of Sasanian Zoroastrianism. Leaving aside for the moment an examination of the answers, we notice that the same pattern of questions occurs in many other places in the literature with which we are concerned. Thus a much abbreviated sequence of questions is given at the end of AXus:

'This too has been said: Every person should know: "From whence did I come? for what reason⁴ am I here? whither do I have to return? what is required of me?' (PhlT 57 §11).

Compare to this the formula attributed to Ādurbād in Dk vi. D.9 which consists of three basic questions, summarized, (1) whence? (2) wherefore? (3) whither? A similar series of questions is given in Dk vi. 298; they are left there unanswered, apparently assuming that there is no need to provide them with the obvious replies. The

number of questions there is fixed at five. These questions can be summarized as follows: (1) one's essence: 'What am I?' (2) one's origin: (3) one's belief: 'What do I stand by?' (4) one's company: 'Whom do I follow?' (5) one's reward: 'Where do I return'?

It does not seem accidental that both formulae in Dk vi are more systematic than those of either PN or AXus. In PN there is a proliferation of unorganized questions, and in AXus the fourth question is already implied in the second and is therefore superfluous.

The questions which a man ought to ask himself are part of a duty of constant self-scrutiny:

'Every man should surrender himself to the gods three times a day, when the sun rises, and speak of the existence of the religion and the gods and the non-existence of Ahreman and the demons. He should be contrite towards the gods and repentant with regard to every sin which he thinks he will be guilty of that day in thought, speech and deed. He ought each time to reckon with himself: "What have I enjoyed and possessed today? What have I done? In what manner have I done my business? Have I been today an instrument of the gods or of the demons?"' (Dk vi. 227)⁵.

This activity of self-scrutiny is one of the three 'best' things a man ought to do, and he is required to do it 'at least three times a day' (Dk vi. 302). It is also the 'most profitable' to a wise man (Dk vi. D.6a). More practically, one is urged to ask oneself with regard to every desire which one has whether it is good or bad (Dk vi. 136).

The requirement that every individual should probe into himself is only part of the wider principle of self-knowledge; but it underlines particularly the fact that in Zoroastrianism one is never quite certain about one's adherence in the battle between good and evil, or at any rate one always needs to be reassured of one's place and to be told that one does not fall short of what is expected of one.

Such self-knowledge can also be achieved through another person. One of our texts advises ~~to~~ appointing another man as a censor over oneself. This is a function of the faculty of religion:

'The faculty of religion is this: one who has faith; faith is this: one who makes a friend who is of good nature, pure and a good man a ruler over himself, says to him, "Speak to me of whatever

fault you should know, so that I may correct it", listens eagerly and willingly, and is obedient to what he says.' (Dk vi. 115).

Religion (dēn), defined as 'one who has faith', seems to contain, as an essential aspect, this constant worry concerning one's failings and shortcomings. We shall see that dēn signifies the religious conscience itself⁶: the definition of it given here is therefore not at all inappropriate.

The piety of the andarz books lays great stress on knowledge, wisdom and related concepts. In this context it is interesting to point out that an important definition of wisdom, xrad, is 'one who does not deceive himself' (Dk vi. 4), besides the more worldly definition of 'one whom no one can deceive' (ibid. D. 1c).

The connection between wisdom and self-scrutiny comes out in the following quotation:

'One who for a long time follows wise men, and is himself wise, this one knowledge is most beneficial to him, (namely,) if he constantly looks into himself (asking): "What am I, what do I stand upon, what am I after?"' (Dk vi. D.6a).

2. Wisdom.

The theme of wisdom, expressed by various terms to be discussed below, occupies a central position in the andarz books.

It would be convenient to begin the discussion of this term by a reference to its occurrence in a book outside the strict limits of the present survey: Dādistan ī Mēnōg ī Xrad. Although it contains many andarz elements MX would hardly qualify to be considered an andarz book; it resembles in general conception and structure more closely a book of the Rivāyat type.¹ In its great emphasis on wisdom, however, MX has special interest for us.² Here are some quotations from the first chapter:

'They said through the revelation of religion: Of the good things which come to men wisdom is best, for it is possible to conduct this world through the power of wisdom and it is also possible to make the other world one's own through the power of wisdom.

This also is manifest: Ōhrmazd created this creation which is in this world with innate wisdom. The management of the visible and invisible worlds

is through wisdom' (MX 1.45-50).

The introductory words of the two sayings indicate that they are accepted as quotations from some authoritative religious text. The author of MX goes on to elaborate on these sayings, making the spirit of wisdom a nearly independent agent, worthy of worship in its own right:

'When he (viz. the author) saw in this manner the great merit and worth of wisdom, he became more grateful to Ohrmazd the Lord and the Amahraspands and the Spirit of Wisdom; he took the Spirit of Wisdom as protection, and rendered more reverence and adoration to the Spirit of Wisdom than to the other Amahraspands.

He also knew this; it is possible to make all the good deeds and the righteous actions one's own by the power of wisdom, and one should be diligent in satisfying the Spirit of Wisdom. From then on he was more diligent in worshipping the Spirit of Wisdom' (MX 1.51-56).

The Spirit of Wisdom, as a personified concept, is here

elevated to the sublime company of the Amahraspands and is even raised to a position above them. It is, admittedly, not completely out of place in the company of the Amahraspands, for they are basically also a set of personified abstract concepts; Vohu Manah in particular may be regarded as a Spirit of Wisdom. MX is nevertheless unique in this treatment of the Spirit of Wisdom, and its particular approach is greatly stressed and amplified in Ch. 57, which is a long praise of wisdom, identified more specifically with asn-xrad 'innate wisdom'.

The place of wisdom in Dk vi is markedly different. The attitude of adoration and the attempt to make of wisdom a personified mythological figure are totally absent. A reference to the function of wisdom in helping God create the world occurs also in Dk vi, but this is followed, characteristically enough, by an interpretation which twists the meaning in a significant manner.

'They held this too: The Lord Ohrmazd
 created this world by knowledge and He
 keeps it by wisdom and manliness. Ulti-
 mately it is held by them'³

(Dk vi.311).

This saying seems to be based on an ancient tradition,
 of the type quoted also by MX. Despite some uncer-
 tainty with regard to the last words, the idea of the
 sentence is clearly the same as that found in MX,
 namely that wisdom (here represented by dānāgīh and
xrad, 'knowledge' and 'wisdom'), made it possible
 for Ohrmazd to create the world and preserve it, with
 the aid of 'manliness' (mardābagīh). When we
 read on, however, we notice that the author of Dk vi
 is anxious to impose on the text some specific, and
 far from obvious, interpretation:

'They held this too: The wise men said,
 The things of wisdom, insight and
 manliness are the hope of

the Renovation.' (Dk vi. 312)

That this is an interpretation of the preceding saying is seen from a number of signs: it uses the same notions, and it adds to the usual opening formula 'They held this too' the phrase, 'The wise men said'; this phrase presumably indicates that the saying originates from a secondary, human source. For 'knowledge' and 'wisdom' of §311 we have here the sequence 'wisdom' and 'insight' (xrad and frazānagīh). The two sets of terms seem to be more or less interchangeable.

The best way to explain the interpretation of §312 is by noticing that it does not comment at all on the first sentence of §311: it only explains the last words. According to the commentary of §312, the words ud abdom padiš dāšt bawēd 'and it is [or: will be] held ultimately by them' indicate that the three notions mentioned before hold the world at the end, hence they are the hope towards the Renovation of the world. The interpretation is typical of the well-known midrashic technique of highlighting one single feature of a text and enlarging upon it. It is also characteristic of the conception peculiar to Dk vi of the eschatological aspect of knowledge.

The emphasis on this aspect is indeed a frequent theme in this book. In the passage which follows wisdom is likened to fire because it 'is seen from a distance and it makes manifest the saved and the condemned.' The text goes on to explain that 'one who is saved by fire is saved eternally, and one who is condemned by fire is condemned eternally' (Dk vi.313). Wisdom is obviously identified here with the ordeal of fire at the end of the world, presumably because it is capable of bringing out the fundamental religious distinctions, just as fire can in the ordeal.

Another saying which clearly shows the connection which is felt to exist in Dk vi between wisdom and eschatological ideas is the following:

'A man full of wisdom is one who remembers at every moment the end of the world'. (Dk vi.199)

In the words of yet another text, 'best knowledge' occurs 'when that which one knows one knows in a manner that is full of salvation' (Dk vi.E.44).

The same concern with eschatology in connection with wisdom may also underlie the following saying:

'Ohrmazd the Lord created these creatures by character, He holds them by wisdom, and takes

them back to himself by religion.' (Dk vi.11).

There is^a certain ambiguity in this saying, which lies in the fact that the phrases 'by character', 'by wisdom' 'by religion' may syntactically refer either to Ohrmazd or to the creatures. To attribute character, wisdom and religion to men rather than to Ohrmazd seems better suited to the context of Dk vi and also to the sense of this passage; xēm, besides, is not attested as a quality of Ohrmazd. The phrasing here however uses (perhaps on purpose) the same structure as that of the traditions concerning the creation and the end of the world and the tools used by the Creator in accomplishing his task.⁴

Knowledge is identified with the religion in both Dk vi and MX. The same saying, with minor variations, occurs in both texts:

'They held this too: The desire of Ohrmazd the Lord from people is this: "Know me", for He knows: "If they know me, every one will follow me". The desire of Ahriman is this: "Do not know me", for he knows: "If they know me no one will follow me" ' (Dk vi.31; MX 40.24-28).⁵

Being a good Zoroastrian means, in effect, 'knowing' the two principles.

Many of the definitions of wisdom in Dk vi emphasize the point that the primary aspect of wisdom is complete candour with oneself. It is wisdom, says one of the sections, to ask about what one does not know (Dk vi.154). 'The highest knowledge', says another passage, 'is the apprehension of a thing; the best apprehension is to know of that thing which one does not know: "I do not know it" (Dk vi.E.36). This theme is also emphasized in the following saying:

'He who says of a thing which he does not know: "I know (it)", as a substitute for that saying a thousand things which he does know will depart from him' (Dk.vi. 183).⁶

One is also enjoined to speak only as much as one knows (Dk vi. C.2).

Of the functions proper to wisdom we have a clear statement in a passage of Dk vi, where xrad, 'wisdom', is contrasted with wīr and huš, which here seem to signify 'perception' and 'memory' respectively. The function of wisdom is 'to make distinctions, to recognise the good and the evil, to do that which is good and to abandon that which is evil' (Dk vi. 64). The moral attributes play an essential part in the definition of wisdom: both that of

absolute truthfulness with oneself, and that of the ability to make moral distinctions. This quality distinguishes wisdom in the last passage from the other two intellectual concepts, wīr and huš, which are purely concerned with the perception and storing of knowledge.

Wisdom is chiefly a moral and religious faculty (cf. Dk vi.64 and 56). In the words of one text 'wisdom is the abode of goodness', just as 'earth is the abode of water' (§C.83). Character may eliminate the desire for forbidden things, but wisdom acts as a restraining force even when man desires the illicit (§154).

The faculty admired as wisdom is not a contemplative or passive one. Its active character is emphasized a number of times: 'Wisdom is manifest in action' (§24). Character, in relation to wisdom, is like a well which can only be brought into action by a diligent man who knows how to make the best use of it (§314).

Wisdom is not good in itself. Even a very perspicacious and wise man is likely to fall in the trap of heresy (§128). The warning is put even more severely in WāzAd:

'Wisdom which has much knowledge, when there is no goodness with it turns perspicacity into heresy and wisdom into tyranny'. (PhlT 151f. §68).

In contrast to MX, wisdom is not given in Dk vi the highest position. It is defined in one passage in almost utilitarian terms as 'one who knows how to eat the fruit of a good thing which has come and does not carry a price for an evil thing which has not come' (Dk vi. 2).⁷ The selfish character of wisdom in this definition is particularly marked in comparison with the definition of xēm in the same paragraph as 'one who does not do to another that which is not good for himself' (ibid.). This supremacy of 'character' over 'wisdom' in religious matters is strongly outlined in another passage:

'Character is not in wisdom, but wisdom is in character, and religion is in both wisdom and character.'⁸ Spiritual things are known through disciplining the character, the body is preserved by wisdom, the soul is redeemed by the union of both' (Dk vi.6).

Wisdom is concerned with man's body, although its participation is evidently indispensable for salvation.

This conclusion as to the secondary position of wisdom in Dk vi is supported by a sufficient number of texts. In Dk vi E.8 wisdom is dependent on character, and religion, in its turn, is dependent on wisdom. The instrument of

being, says §253, is character; that of character, righteous custom and that of custom is wisdom.

This is not an ascending hierarchy. The word 'instrument' (abzār) indicates that the quality to which it is applied is subordinate to the one which precedes it, and this is borne out by the fact that the instrument of wisdom is stated to be the consultation of the wise,⁹ which is evidently an 'instrument' in the accepted sense of the term.

To make the point about the relative position of wisdom within the hierarchy of religion according to Dk vi more convincing, an abstract of some lists of qualities which occur in various parts of Dk vi is given:

xēm -- xrad -- wīr §2 (a descending hierarchy)

xrad -- dēn -- ruwān §3 (an ascending hierarchy)

xēm -- xrad -- dēn §4, 5, 11 (descending)

dēn > xrad > xēm §6

dēn -- xēm -- xrad -- hunar -- xwarr §115

šnāyišn -- xēm -- xrad -- tawānīgih etc. §127¹⁰

xēm -- xrad -- āštīh -- paymān -- dādīstān §D.1c.

xēm > xrad > dēn > wināh nē kunēd etc. §E.8.

Despite the flexibility in the order of elements in these lists, xrad is not given at the top of any of them.

One saying, indeed, makes it specifically inferior to 'character':

'Everything has a sea. The sea of knowledge is character, the sea of light is the sun, the sea of water is Vorukaš, and the sea of the soul is the essential being'. (Dk vi.164).

From the other examples it is clear that 'sea' has the meaning of 'origin', perhaps even 'essence'.

Let us now compare the position of wisdom in the shorter andarz texts. The definition given to a wise man (dānāg) in Ayādgar ī Wuzurgmihr is instructive:

'Who is the wisest? One who knows the end of the body, who recognises the enemy of the soul, and who best knows how to guard himself from the enemy of the soul and to keep himself

free from fear' (PhLT 89 §25-26).

It is interesting to note that here, too, 'the end of the body' is the first object of the wise man's knowledge.

The definition seems to be religious as opposed to intellectual, pragmatic or simply moral. Wisdom is unquestionably the first virtue or faculty to be given in any list in AW. Here is one example:

xrad -- mēnišn -- uš -- xēm -- hōg --
 hunsandīh -- ummēd -- ox -- bōy --
 frawahr (PhLT 92 §53-6).¹¹

The text which follows is also relevant:

'Which of the virtues in man is best?

Knowledge and wisdom' (PhLT 92 §57-8).

Another definition of knowledge and wisdom follows at this point:

'That which knows how to
 guide one in a manner most

free from fear, sin and pain' (Ibid. §60).

It is evident that the emphasis in Ayādgar ī Wuzurgmihr is different on this point from that of Dk vi. Wisdom, in AW, is essentially taken to mean knowledge of the basic tenets of religion, and this knowledge is the starting point of the religious life. Taken in this sense wisdom is the most important of all human faculties. Nothing illustrates this point better than the following passage from AW:

'The creator Ohrmazd, in order to hold back those several demons, and to help man, created so many watchful things of the spirit: innate wisdom, acquired wisdom, character, hope, contentment, religion and the consultation of the wise.

What is the function of each one of these spirits? The function of innate wisdom is to guard oneself from causing fear, from deliberate sin, and from fruitless toil, to pay heed to the decay of the things of this world and the end of the body, not to decrease that which pertains to the Renovation and not to increase that which pertains to one's passing away. The function of acquired wisdom is to recognise the righteous path and way and to stand in

it, to consider that which has passed before and to be cognizant of that which comes after, not to believe that which cannot be, and not to begin work which cannot be completed' (PhlT 90-1 §43-7).

There follow passages on character, hope, contentment etc. The definitions of innate wisdom here are exclusively concerned with religious matters, and so, for the most part, are those of acquired wisdom.

Wisdom is assigned, in a similar way, first position in the treatise PN, where a sequence of the following virtues appears: xrad -- hunsandih -- srōš -- hucašmih -- wēdwarih -- āstih -- rāstih (PhlT 46f. §37-8).

Quite a different picture is obtained when another group of andarz texts is studied. Here xrad also occupies a position of great honour, but the whole spirit which accompanies it is totally different from what we have been accustomed to in either the theological and moralistic book, Dk vi, or the popular-religious ones, like PN or AW. The following instructive passage is taken from Andarz ī Ādurbād ī Mahraspandān (AdMah):

'To you I say, my son, who is fortunate: The best thing for men is wisdom; for if, heaven forbid, wealth be gone, or ~~the~~ cattle die, wisdom shall

remain. Be diligent in the profession of religion,
for contentment is the greatest knowledge and the
greatest hope is the spirit' (PhlT 67 §104f.)

The reasons advanced for the importance of wisdom are here pragmatic, and the sentences are phrased in terms which betray a certain religious naiveté. One gets the same impression from the advice to marry one's daughter to a wise man (cf. PhlT 62 §50 and 65 §91).

A fragmentary composition in PhlT, attributed to Wehzād ī Farrox-pērōz,¹² has the following hymn in praise of wisdom:¹³

text p. 329

'For I have experienced all evil from the creatures,
and all prosperity and succour from wisdom.

For wisdom leads man to a great height,

wisdom saves him from the fiercest misfortune.

Wisdom is the preserver and protector of the living soul,

wisdom is the saver and releaser of the body.

In opulence wisdom is best,

in scarcity of possession too wisdom is the best
protector.

Here¹⁴ wisdom is best for help,

there, as backing, wisdom is the best protector.

A strong man is more powerful through wisdom,

the embellishment of one's name is from wisdom.

Generosity through wisdom is the most helping,

a s^{tr}ong man illumines his family through wisdom.

The certainty of religion is evident because of wisdom,

knowledge is praised more because of wisdom.

The right measure is manifest more because of wisdom,

knowledge is more effective because of wisdom.

For whoever has wisdom has also virtue,

for whoever has wisdom has also wealth.

For every good action

he lays its foundation through wisdom.'

The conception of wisdom which underlies this passage seems to be akin to that of AdMah rather than to that of Dk vi or the popular-religious texts. Its capacity to make a strong man even more powerful, to embellish the name of its possessor and to enable a strong man to 'illumine his family' would hardly figure prominently in the 'religious' texts. The transience and worthlessness of fame and family are in effect among the central themes of Ayādgār ī Wuzurgmīhr. The belief in the tenets of religion, though mentioned in our Wehzād text, is fairly unimportant; it is merely one more field in which wisdom shows its supremacy.

The most important of the pragmatic-type andarz texts is the one attributed to Ošnar. The following

statement occurs at the very beginning of the book:

'As first virtue in men wisdom is best' (§2). That this book properly belongs to the same group of andarz as AdMah can be seen from the following passage:

'By these five things one ought to regard a man as wise and not as a fool: one, he does not ^{bear} ~~carry~~ affliction for a thing which is gone and departed; secondly, he does not think deceitfully of a thing which has come; thirdly, he is content with regard to a thing which has come; fourthly, he has hope (only) for a thing which is proper to be; fifthly, he does not become grieved by a misfortune and not drunk by a good fortune'. (Ošnar §39).

Immediately afterwards there follows a list which gives the marks of a fool: he becomes angry without reason, does not distinguish a friend from an enemy, speaks much without use, cannot keep a secret, laughs out of place and trusts everyone (§40). Such characterizations show that the principal concern of the Ošnar text is different from that of the 'religious' andarz of either the popular or the theological varieties.

Another short text wholly devoted to wisdom is attributed to Ādurfarnbag son of Farroxzād.¹⁵ It uses a somewhat obscure allegorical language and almost

certainly has a serious religious intention which is not easily grasped by the uninitiated. It thus belongs more to the type of writing represented by Dk vi than to that represented by PN and AW.

It seems from the above remarks that the treatment of the concept of wisdom can serve as a useful criterion for distinguishing types of approach in the different andarz texts. We have seen that Dk vi in contrast to other texts, does not consider wisdom to be foremost; it shares, however, with the popular-religious texts the view that wisdom is an ^{faculty}~~organ~~ chiefly devoted to the perception of religious concepts. The pragmatic books, in contrast, regard wisdom as a tool which excels both in everyday social life and in fulfilling the religious requirements. As opposed to the andarz texts proper, MX deifies and personifies the concept of the spirit of wisdom.

Supplementary note to section 2, 'Wisdom'.

A word which comes in close contact with xrad and dānišn has caused some trouble in translation. It is spelt dxšn or dxyšn, and none of the accepted readings of it seems satisfactory. The known readings of the word are:

- (1) dahišn, the participial form connected with the verb dādan 'to give' or 'to create';
- (2) dāšn 'gift';
- (3) jahišn, which is sometimes taken in its participial sense, from the verb jastan 'to jump', but which is used more often as a noun meaning 'fate'. (Some remarks on this word are given in Dk vi.C.82, translation, note).

The existence of a further meaning to this Pahlavi word seems certain in view of the numerous contexts where a word meaning some faculty of knowledge or perception is required. This is seen clearly in some extracts from AW:

pad mardomān xrad weh ayāb dxšn? xrad šnāxtārīh
ī kār ud dxšn passandišn ī kār (PhlT 92 § 61f.).

'In men is wisdom best or dxšn? Wisdom is the knowledge of an affair and dxšn is the approval of an affair'.

Unfortunately there is no Arabic translation of this passage.

dxšn kadār weh? wehīh (Ph1T 92 §67f).

'What dxšn is best? Goodness'.

The reading adopted is that of the Ms. TD. The two other manuscripts of this passage, JU and JJ (the latter being a copy of MK, which is deficient at this point), read here the question: dād ī cē weh? TD, which often has better readings than MK (JU is generally unreliable), gives here a lectio difficilior. The Arabic translation has:

qāla ayyu 'l-sayr arqā, qultu al-'adl (Misk 32.18).

'He said, Which behaviour is the most pleasant?

I said, Justice'.

Our word dxšn is thus rendered here 'behaviour'. It seems conceivable that the Arabic translator had before him a reading like MK's¹, which he interpreted jahišn in the etymological meaning of 'movement', giving as its literal equivalent in Arabic sayr, which also possesses the original meaning of 'movement, journey'. If the Arabic does not shed definitive light on the meaning of the word, at least it seems to confirm the reading of MK. That the meaning it assigns to the word is probably

not the right one can be seen from comparing the further instances of the occurrence of this word. Two passages in Ošnar may serve as examples:

ud ēwag pad mardomān farraxwīhātom ciš dānišn ud dxyšn. (§5).

'One thing, which is most fortunate for men, is knowledge and dxyšn.'

2 pērāyag pad mardomān ēn weh, dxyšn ud dānišn. (§14).

'These two ornaments are best for men, dxyšn and knowledge'.

If the passages quoted so far have tended to show how unsatisfactory the known meanings of dxšn are for explaining the word, they have not been very helpful in pointing towards a positive solution of the problem. Some help may however, be found in the following passage from Zātspram:

[man] kē ōhrmazd hēm ka abāz nigīrēm pad zamīg, āb, urwar, wād pad rōšn dxšn bē dānēm, ēwag az did bē šnāsēm. cē pad wisp-dānišnīh pad rōšn-mēnišnīh ēwag az did ā'ōn wizīhēm ... (Zs 34.16)

'I, who am Ohrmazd, when I look back upon the earth, water, plants and wind, know by my bright dxšn and

recognize the one from the other. For by all-
knowledge, by bright thinking, I distinguish thus
the one from the other...'

It is clear that in this context a faculty of perception
is necessary. This was recognized by Zaehner, who read
tentatively² dīdišn. This reading is clearly impossible:
It would have to be written in Pahlavi by the spelling
dytšn and not d'šn // dxšn, dxyšn. As a word meaning
basically 'sight' would be very acceptable in this context
one may think of an old present stem derived from the
same root as the past stem, being an original day-
which would give for our form the hypothetical original
form *dayišn. This would have ^{been assimilated to the} ~~given way early in the~~
~~word dayišn / dahišn 'creation' etc. from nda.~~
~~development of Middle Persian to a form with a hiatus~~
~~consonant h instead of the y.~~ The word would there-
~~fore normally present itself in MP under the shape dahišn,~~
~~which is indistinguishable in pronunciation from the word~~
~~for 'creation'.~~ The separate meaning was, however,
strictly preserved. For the sake of clarity we shall
refer to this word under its historical form, so as
to avoid confusion with its homonyms.

Passages to establish the semantic connection between sight and wisdom will be quoted at the end of this note. Here are first the other texts where *dayišn is indisputably present:

gētīg pad ēn 6 ciš rāyēnīhēd, pad zamān ud *dayišn
ud dānišn ud hayyār ud abzār ud tuxšāgīh... (Dk vi.C.83b)
'This world is governed by these six things: time, sight, knowledge, help, power and effort'.

The text goes on to specify that zamān, *dayišn and dānišn are 'spiritual' (mēnōgīg) whereas the other three are material. Zaehner's emendation of *dayišn into gās³ is unwarranted.

rāmišnīg-bawīh [az] hukunišnīg, nēwag-kunišnīg warzīg
az tuxšišn, [tuxšišn-] zāyīh az *dayišn. cē *dayišn
az xwāyišn, xwāyišn az huš, hušīh az mēnōg dānišn ...
(PN, Ph1T 50 §57f).

1.30 (A translation of the whole passage is given in Part One, text No. vi).

A further relevant passage occurs in PRiv p.200 §28: the text and translation are given in section 4 below. The sentence which contains our word reads:

cē az frahang ī xwadāy bē kard kē *dayišn ahlaw.

'For from the instruction of the ērbad one who has

vision becomes ahlaw'.

The following passage also belongs probably here:

ud āhang ī ō rāyēnišnīgih ī az hān xradīg ud hu-
dxšn rāyēnīdār ud pahrēz ī az xurdag wināh.

(DkM 59.8-10).

'And inclination towards arrangement which comes from an arranger with wisdom and with good dxšn and avoidance of petty sin'.⁴

The interpretation of dxšn = *dayišn as meaning 'sight, vision, perception' gains some force from the fact that other words for 'sight' are also often associated with wisdom or knowledge. Examples are:

dušxradān framān ma padīrēd ku ō wanē-būdagih nē
rasēd. cē 4 ciš dōšīdagān rāy ēn wēš pad kār andar
abāyēd: xrad ud hunar, ud dīdan ud dānišn (dānistan),
tawāngarīh ud rādīh, xūb-gōwišnīh ud xūb-kunišnīh.

(WāzAd, Ph1T 149 §50f).

'Do not accept the command of fools so that you should not come to destruction. For it is necessary to perform more these four things by pairs: wisdom and virtue, seeing and knowledge, wealth and generosity good speech and good action'.

cē dānāg pad bun kār dānēd, dušāgāh pad sar
wēnēd. (Weh-zād, PhlT 76 §21).

'For a wise man knows the affair at the beginning,
but the fool sees it (only) at the end'.

pursīd ku xrad cē ud dīdār ī xrad cē? (Ādurfarnbag,
PhlT 79 §1).

'He asked, "What is wisdom, and what is the seer
of wisdom?"'

It seems from these quotations that there is no difficulty
in attributing to *dayišn the meaning 'vision'. We may
recall at this point the definition given by AW §62 according
to which 'wisdom is the knowledge of a matter and *dayišn
is the approval of a matter': it would seem that *dayišn
acquired a somewhat more specialised meaning, perhaps
'discerning vision', vision which passes judgement.⁵

In this context we may also refer to an apparently
related word, dxyk swxšnyx (DkM 371.17), which is the false
virtue resembling the true virtue dānišn 'knowledge'.
Menasce⁶ translates dahīk sōhišnīh by 'connaissance sensible
vulgaire', apparently taking dahīk to belong to dēh 'country,
province'. It is more likely that the idiom means something
like 'visionary sensation', perhaps implying 'mirage, false
vision'.

3. Consultation ^{with} ~~of~~ the wise.

One way of obtaining wisdom of the traditional, acquired, type (gōšōsrūd-xrad) is through the consultation ^{with} ~~of~~ the good.

One is enjoined to enquire about anything which one does not know (cf. Dk vi.76). 'Even that is wisdom', says one text, 'when one asks that which one does not know' (Dk vi.154). The references to the duty of consultation are frequent.

'A man ought to direct his soul... towards the gate of the wise so that he should become wiser and one whose body is inhabited more by religion' (Dk vi.323).

The precise directions with regard to this consultation occur in WāzAd:

'Every day go forth to the assembly of good people for the sake of consultation; for one who goes more to the assembly of good people will be allotted more good deeds and righteousness' (PhlT. 152 §70f., also PN, 47 §44).

The manner of this institution, if it is a formalized one, is not very clear. There seems to be a daily

assembly of people, which may be connected with the fire-temple.¹ The people who gather there would seem to be religious authorities, though they are usually referred to merely as wehān, 'the good'. This term is however much more significant than may seem from its English equivalent.²

This assembly is a forum before which one sets one's religious problems. This is the impression one may get from the following passage:

'A person who is reverent before the gods is one to whom this is a great (matter): he does not withdraw anything at all from the consultation ^{with} ~~of~~ the good' (Dk vi.251).

Some vague idea of what is involved in these consultations may be gleaned from another passage of Dk vi:

'No one can correct these things except one who corrects them by consultation with the good in religion' (§255).

It is clear that one's faults and shortcomings could be brought for discussion with 'the good', out of which the way to correct them may emerge. This gathering is

attended not only by those who have problems and require spiritual help, but also by other people, who are, in fact, very strongly advised to come as often as possible. This comes out clearly in the following saying:

'One ought to be diligent daily in the consultation of the good, so that one should listen and not seek. For that which is heard from the consultation of the good in which there is no daily (participation) is digested³ more than water and plants' (Dk vi. 294).

Only by going daily and listening to the proceedings one learns enough, and does not forget, one's religious duties.

Performing the duty of consultation ensures that one is restrained from evil desires and that defects are prevented ~~from~~ ⁱⁿ one's action (PhlT 91 § 51). Through the virtue of consultation, we are assured in Dk vi, one can gain possession of the virtues of other people as well as of oneself. (§95).

From the fact that participation in these public meetings of the good is so frequently mentioned in the

text and is so highly praised it seems that its importance in the daily routine of the religion was considered nearly as much as is confession in Catholicism. These meetings did not involve, of course, an absolution of sins, but the discussion in the assemblies was probably a correction which might prevent sins in the man who would be raising the problem as well as in those who were present.

Apart from what one imagines to be rather formal gatherings of a number of people there is also the more private type of consultation. Sayings of the type of the following passage are fairly common:

'Consult and be a friend to a man of noble extraction, skilful, intelligent and of good character.'

(PhlT 60, AdMah §31)

This saying, however, is quoted from a collection which is less concerned with religious ideas than with practical advice.

The practice of consultation is part of the larger theme of association with the wise or the good. Advice for being in the company of the wise is found in all types of andarz; cf., e.g., Ošnar 27; PhlT 99 AW §204. There is also advice to respect the wise, cf. PhlT 61 AdMah §36. To be a helper to the wise, or at least not to oppose them, may lead one

to paradise (Dk vi.205). There is a marked difference in flavour between the reasons given for seeking the company of the wise in a book of the pragmatic type, like AdMah, and those which occur in the more religious books. According to AdMah a clever man, even if he is poor, is bound to gain fortune from the gods (PhlT 62 §55); the persistent advice to give one's daughter in marriage to a wise man (PhlT 62 §50; 65 §91) may therefore refer to the prospect of material gain.

4. Education

The connection between education and wisdom is obvious:

'Be diligent in seeking education for education is the seed of knowledge, and its fruit is wisdom. Wisdom is the arrangement of the two worlds'.¹

frahang, translated here 'education', is in fact a much looser term. It means also on the one hand good manners generally, ^{and} more specifically chastisement for the correction of manners. 'Education' seems however to be the central connecting notion, and in many cases, as in the passage just quoted, it is the nearest translation.

The same sentiment as in the previous quotation can also be seen in a pair of passages in Dk vi:

"From good education comes good wisdom, from good wisdom comes good habit, from good habit comes good character, from good character comes righteous action, by righteous action the demons are driven out of the world' (§C.49, cf. also §C.50 where the opposite series is given.)

Education is, if not at the root of all good and bad, at least the starting point for progress in a good or bad direction.

Responsibility for educating the young lies with their parents, who bear the guilt for sins committed by their children if they did not teach them (cf. PN, PhLT 46 §34). A man must never leave his wife and children without 'education' (frahang), in this case probably in the sense of reprimanding them for evil which they commit (AdMah, PhLT 59 §13). A moderate course is enjoined in this respect:

'One ought to treat one's wife and children well and not to leave them without education (Dk vi.B.53). 'Treating them well' and 'giving them education' are here obviously two contrasting but mutually complementary

activities. Some further practical advice in this field is contained in Dk vi: not to speak to the wife and children continually of their faults (§C.33), to love them, though without being excessively passionate, for this is the best way by which one can educate them (§C.38).

Adurbād^T Mahraspandān tells his son, 'If you have a son send him in his youth to the dibīristān (the school of writing, elementary school), for the art of writing is happiness' (AdMah, PhLT 63 §58). Children who attend the dibīristān are those addressed in the Schulgespräch, and they are exhorted to behave well in various ways. The end of the Schulgespräch contains some fairly obscure sentences, from which one may understand that at the end of the school training, by the age of twenty (?), one undergoes some questioning by wise men, priests (harwada) and religious authorities (dastūra), which seems like a final test (cf. Schulgespräch §41-43).

The other andarz books are addressed to adults: the institute of learning which applies for them is the ērbadistān, a priestly establishment where religious subjects are discussed.

'One ought not to stop attending the ērbadistān, for one who attends the ērbadistān for many years

upon this word, namely that he is without doubt as to the gods, (believing) that the gods are and the demons are not, Ohrmazd the Lord does not bring punishment upon him'. (Dk vi.98 cf. also §84).

The phrase ērbadistān kardan 'To do, or attend, the ērbadistān', is the idiom used for this activity, and it is curiously applied also to priests of some substantial spiritual stature, as in the case of Ādur-Narseh and Ādur-Mihr, in Dk vi.D.2. It is doubtful whether the phrase should be interpreted in such cases as meaning 'teaching in the ērbadistān'. It is not clear what kind of activity would go on in an ērbadistān. It may be legitimate to imagine that it is a place where sermons would be preached or the scriptures taught.

An important kind of tuition in the Pahlavi texts is one which consists of personal guidance of a disciple by a master. This relationship is known in Pahlavi by the term hāwištīh.

'These several things are best for men: abundance of patience, abundance of shame, abundance of distinction, asking reward from the spirits and being a disciple (hāwištīh kardan). For in these the best thing is being a disciple, because it is possible to know all these five by being a disciple.'

(Dk vi.110).

The education given by this method is apparently specialized religious training. It seems that the special learning of priests would fall under this heading. We have a kind of manual of exhortations to priests which is concerned to a large extent with one's attitude to the master. The following selections are taken from the text Abar panj xēm ī āhrōnān:

'These ten admonitions: First, to behave in a manner deserving good fame, so as to give one's chief, master, judge and father their due of good fame. (The second admonition contains the opposite rule: to avoid bad fame.)

Third, not to impart a thing one has not heard from one's master in his name so as not to beat one's master with the longest club and not to aggrrieve him.

Fourth, to deliver back to the worthy generously that which one has heard from one's master so as not to deprive the righteous of the manifestation of their name".²

The first four rules of this code refer, as we see, to the duty of a man who has been instructed with regard to his instructor and chiefs: his own fame reflects upon

theirs, and he has to be careful not to quote them falsely and, on the other hand, not to avoid mentioning their teachings when that is appropriate.

Abar panj xēm ī āhrōnān is a book apparently addressed to priests; but this kind of high religious instruction is almost certainly not confined to priests. The master in this personal type of tuition is however apparently an ērbad:

'He is not an ērbad who, when a man surrenders himself to him, does not make him ahlaw in this world' (Dk vi.325).

The type of tuition which would go on in meetings between a master and a hāwišt is preserved at least in idealized form in a number of texts, such as AdPRiv and Ošnar: the wisdom taught could be either of the highest religious principles or it could consist of clever insights into conducting one's everyday life in the best manner. The attitude to this instruction is seen from the following speech of the disciple to his master in the former book:

'The disciple said: May the lord ērbad be righteous! For one who has *vision³ becomes ahlaw from the instruction of the ērbad. Only this instruction is most helpful for the faculties and most growth-

encouraging to us in particular. If we do not fail in either wisdom or diligence, then we, all men, when we carry out this instruction, shall become⁴ ahlaw by the will of the gods and their power, force, beneficence and compassion'.⁵

The theme of the tutorship and the relationship between masters and disciples is much discussed outside the andarz literature in the ninth book of the Dēnkart. Some details from there are quoted and commented upon by J. de Menasce.⁶ The broader questions of education in Sasanian times have been discussed by A. Christensen.⁷ A small book on the subject of education in ancient Iran was earlier written by J. J. Modi.⁸

To conclude our discussion of education in the andarz books the views expressed concerning some side issues connected with this subject may be briefly mentioned. Some passages in Dk vi point out the limitations of education. It is impossible to convert bad nature into good by education, and good nature will remain good even without education. Education really helps only those who are in the middle (cf. Dk vi.68). Some natures have so deteriorated 'that even in great application to the doing of the law much ^{ability} ~~instrument~~ and education are

necessary until it is possible to make manifest whether they are good or bad' (Dk vi.104). It is possible to test the nature of men by giving them education and watching to see whether it gives the desired results (cf. Dk vi.102).

Dk vi contains a number of passages which point out the importance of teaching by personal example:

'In teaching one's fellow this one thing is best, when one corrects one's character to do a pact with oneself and to keep it before one's fellow. The fellow looks, sees and learns from it'. (Dk. vi.223).

In order to teach someone else it is inevitable that one should first correct oneself. This is justified by a simile which compares the process of instruction to looking into a mirror: a mirror tells people how they look like only when it is brighter than the object, and so the master must be brighter than his disciple. (Dk vi.224).⁹

II

Faith and religion5. Faith (warrawišn)¹

Knowledge, according to a saying in Dk vi, gives rise to 'belief in the spirits', which brings about 'friendship of the soul' and so on up to the point where 'the soul is saved' (§C.53). The salvation of the soul is, explicitly or implicitly, the aim of nearly every advice given in Dk.vi, and one of the first steps towards it is ~~the~~ faith in the spirits. Such faith is indispensable in matters of religion. Without it 'it is better for him not to go than to go' (Dk vi.E.45n).

Faith is not merely a passive conviction, but is rather a perpetual active preoccupation. 'A believer in the spirits [thinks] constantly of the good spiritual and earthly beings and becomes tired and hungry of other thoughts' (Dk vi.E.4). A device for achieving this constant preoccupation is to entrust a friend with the task of criticising one's faults (Dk vi.E.38a).

Deep faith is described by adjectives like 'hot' or 'ardent' which underline its active character:

'In the same way as a blacksmith inflames the

iron and makes it hot (garm), so also a man ought to inflame his mind towards good things and keep it hot' (Dk vi.E.22f).

When the priest Wahdād was asked by two of his colleagues why he was more extolled in priestly matters than they were, he answered by using a similar expression: 'If I once grow warm (taft) for a righteous purpose I never cool off' (Dk vi.D.10).²

Devotion seems usually directed towards action, though some passages have distinct contemplative flavour.³ The emphasis on action seems also to underlie a saying like the following:

'A thousand people cannot induce one man to belief through speech in such a way as one man can induce a thousand people through action' (Dk vi.E.15).

As the saying deals, however, with the best method of giving an example of faith, its evidence is not conclusive. Another, more ambiguous, saying may be interpreted as going against any contemplative tendency.⁴ Already the classical triad of Zoroastrianism, 'thought, speech and action', shows that action is an essential aspect of the religion: thought seems to lead towards it through the intermediary of speech, it is realized through action.

It is, appropriately, in the sphere of action that 'religion keeps its throne' (Dk vi.1b).

It would, however, be a mistake to regard action as an exclusive criterion for righteousness. The disposition or intention of man is at least as important as his action; in some cases, indeed, the intention is regarded as the decisive factor. A man 'who believes that that which he does is righteous, and he does it for the sake of the soul', if his actions are unacceptable he is merely regarded as 'deceived', but he is at the same time righteous (ahlaw) (Dk vi.274). We are left with no doubt as to the principle:

'He who does everything for the sake of the gods alone becomes righteous by it no matter how he does it' (Dk vi.273).

The phrase 'for the sake of the gods', or, more frequently, 'for the sake of the soul' (ruwān rāy) is a key expression in these texts.⁵

This attitude is carried even further. A man who has done righteousness as much as is in his power, even these good deeds which he has not accomplished are considered in the 'assembly of the spirits' as actually accomplished. Similarly, even the *egil* which has not

been committed by a wicked person is taken into account (Dk vi.140). The principle can be illustrated by quite a number of further examples. Good works performed out of impure motives are not meritorious (Dk vi.54); poverty is a virtue only when it is practised 'not out of constraint, but solely for the sake of the goodness and desirability of poverty' (Dk vi.141); if one has the right approach and 'stands by the gods alone in faith for the sake of the soul', when one does not observe the proper religion 'God makes this favour to him that he makes his head (turn) towards religion and the path of the gods' (Dk vi.210); if a man, on the other hand, worships the gods, but has 'the thought of their non-existence and that it is not incumbent to keep the (spiritual) things', the verdict is: 'That man is an enemy of the gods and his place is in hell' (Dk vi.D.1b).

It may be open to some doubt whether faith is entirely within the scope of the individual's choice and free-will.⁶ Bad religion, for example, may not be necessarily an indication of one's own evil decision: it could be the outcome of one's having been deceived.⁷ This view is expressed in terms which disclose some sympathy and compassion towards the evil-doer:

'A wicked man first has a grief in his soul, then he knows, "I have been deceived" ' (Dk vi.E.12).

The common expression for faith in the gods, apart from the more formal word abastān 'trust',⁸ is the phrase xwēš-tan abspārdan 'to surrender oneself'. Once this act of self-surrender is accomplished, one feels oneself under the total care of the gods.⁹ But this care does not save one from the danger of falling off from faith: the matters of the spirit are in the responsibility of man alone:

'People are in this way deluded, that they strive themselves after the things of this world and put their trust in the gods as regards the things of the soul' (Dk vi.291).

6. Religion (dēn)¹

a.

Faith, we have seen, is self-surrender. Religion, according to a passage of Dk vi, is 'that for which one believes one's self must be surrendered' (Dk vi.166). The wording of this definition seems subjective, depending as it does on what one believes one ought to exercise self-surrender for. Similarly 'subjective' are also the following explanations:

'Every person has one thing which is to him dearer than other things. When he puts that thing in order, even though other things are left out of hand, he is still joyful. That thing is to him religion.' (Dk vi. 33))

'Religion is that which a man always does.' (§34).

'Religion is one who does comfort to every creature.'
(§36).²

It is clear that these definitions are midrashic in structure and in intention. They wish to make a point, to push forward a facet of their subject, rather than to be comprehensive and balanced. The arrangement of §33 is like a riddle; the listener or reader is left guessing what 'that thing' is until the end. Despite these considerations, we ought to take the subjective aspect of the concept of dēn seriously. Another quotation which shows the wide range of subjective approach to religion may be given:

'Every one can stand in religion ...

For if a man is one of those whose desire is, "May I become very noble and of great wealth" ... he becomes righteous by this very thing.

If a man is one of those whose desire is, "May I become very poor ...", ... he becomes righteous by this very thing.

If a man is one of those whose desire is, "May I become a school for the instruction of much Avesta and Zand", ... he becomes righteous by this very thing.

If a man is one of those whose desire is, "May I not do much Avesta and Zand", ... he becomes righteous by this very thing.' (Dk vi. 310).

The passage thus forms a long exposition of the first sentence, 'every one can stand in religion'. The phrase 'to stand in religion' comes to mean as much as 'to abide in one's own disposition', provided one does it righteously.

The notion of dēn as a faculty or disposition of man is inherent in the word from Old Iranian times. It seems that a reminiscence of this survived in Middle Persian and perhaps even came down into New Persian.³ Another aspect of the notion in Old Iranian was that of a double of man, an outward reflection of man's religious figure.⁴ The ability of dēn to reflect man's religious capacity is still a very strong feature of the concept in our texts:

'The nature of religion is like a mirror. When one looks into it one sees oneself in it. It is indeed so that whoever knows how to look all goodness and evil is seen (by him)'. (Dk vi. 261).

It is not clear from this saying whether one looks outside or inside oneself, and this ambiguity seems to be inherent in the concept; it is the pivot of the following saying:

'Whenever a man thinks, speaks and does something righteous, at the same time a light grows out from it and becomes his leader towards religion.

Whenever a man thinks, speaks and does something sinful, a darkness comes up from it and settles within the religion of the man and the religion of the man sees less' (Dk vi. 290).

In the first part of this passage dēn is something outside oneself, towards which one strives to move. In the second part it is an organ of sight.⁵ This does not break up the symmetry of the passage. It serves, rather, to enhance the contrast between the two parts, playing as it does with the double meaning of the word. A third sense of dēn can also be discerned in the above passage. Apart from the two subjective meanings of the term, one as an object of sight and a kind of conscience, and another as an outward projection of man's religiosity, there is of course the common usage of dēn as designating 'religion' as an institution, as a sum of doctrines, beliefs and practices. The light which grows out from the righteous deed of man

and which leads him towards 'religion', probably is in itself an aspect of dēn which leads towards the orthodox notion of religion.

The play on the double meaning of notions, especially that which vacillates between the subjective and the objective meanings of certain religious terms, is not rare in Dk vi:

'The duty of every person is to do these four things, the Renovation, the creation of creatures, the resurrection and the future body. The Renovation is this: one who becomes separate from the demons. The creation of creatures is this: one who does this thing best, - thinking, speaking and acting. The resurrection is this: one who knows to bring back that which has been taken from him. The future body is this: one who knows to go back there from where he came' (SE.45k).

We have here one of the best examples of the midrashic technique in Dk vi: the four central concepts of the cosmology are allegorically transformed into symbols for the moral activity of an individual member of the community. Viewed from a different angle we may say that the religious duties of every man are projected on the work of the

Creator; man, by fulfilling his religious calling, is put in place of God. The work of the individual is a realization of the cosmic mythology.

In §290, we may recall, man aims to approach religion by the aid of the light which grows forth from his deeds. Movement is often associated with religion. Religion is 'the king's road', for it leads one who walks upon it safely to paradise (Dk vi. 173). Religion is a thing which, if one is in it, one does not move away from it, and if one is not in it one moves towards it (Dk vi. 57f.). In another text we read:

'Whenever you go forth one step towards religion, religion comes in return a thousand steps towards (you)' (Dk vi. 61).

The reciprocal action between man and religion is strongly reminiscent of the figure of dēn which embodies man's good or evil deeds and which confronts him after death, and also of the mirror metaphor quoted above (Dk vi. 261). Religion, as the objective conception of orthodox institution, is woven in §61 together with dēn as the idea of man's double. This interpretation is made more acceptable when we compare a neighbouring passage:

'He who turns his face towards religion and corrects his character, religion shows him a thousand sayings which he has never heard from anyone, and when he discusses (the thing) with priests and wise men, it is right' (Bk vi. 63).

That dēn as the concept of a part of man's soul is implied in this process is undeniable. But at the same time the fact that it has knowledge of the 'objective', orthodox tenets of religion, and ones, at that, which are apparently hidden from the average man, shows that this dēn has the power to partake of the nature of the general, common religion. It would be reasonable to conclude from this that the two aspects of the concept of dēn are much less distinct in Iranian thought than they are in ours. Religion, as the general, institutional concept, has a counterpart in a good man's soul. The picture of the concept is completed by the idea that dēn, the religious soul in man, can be outwardly projected. The three notions thus obtained are nevertheless but aspects of the same basic concept. To show the unity of these three ideas it is best therefore to translate them into English uniformly as 'religion', though in some cases the result may seem incongruous.

b.

Righteousness, the achievement of which is religion, is referred to as being recognizable by the fact that there are 'things which are stated in the world with certainty as being righteousness or wickedness' (Dk vi. 136). The phrasing seems to refer to some consensus of opinion. A reference to the general practice as a criterion is perhaps made in Dk vi. 80 by the use of the passive form to indicate an action generally or commonly done.⁶ Dependence on the opinion of other people is also noticeable in contexts where consultation or taking someone as authority are advised, or the company of good people is praised,⁷ though these are of course types of approach basically different from that which advocates reliance on public opinion. There is nevertheless some indication that the community of opinion is a factor to be reckoned with in the behaviour of the individual:

'One ought to govern oneself in such a way as is reputed best among men, not in such a way as seems best to oneself' (Dk vi. C.41).

This advice is justified in the following manner:

'For he is always regarded in the world as haughty and people are more hurt by him who does not govern

himself in such a way as seems best to men but governs himself in such a way as seems best to himself' (ibid.). It is true that the group of sayings in which this passage occurs is marked by a certain pragmatic or utilitarian tendency.⁸

This recourse to the general opinion may be part of the reason why religion is referred to as 'the king's road' (Dk vi. 173), for, if one follows this path, one has constantly the support of the common opinion of good people.⁹

There is, however, evidence to show that the type of religion which Dk vi presents is not one which is superficially dependent on the general opinions of society. The concept of faith as portrayed in the previous section goes against such an idea, as well as the distinction which is carefully made between classes of religious attitude.¹⁰ Besides, Dk vi is imbued with an insistence on the individual's whole-hearted, uncompromising attitude towards religion:

'One disposes or does not dispose of the whole of religion (only). For one disposes when one does not commit a sin, and one does not dispose except when one performs good deeds' (Dk vi. 176).

The saying is meant to contrast with the one that precedes

it (§175), which explains that there are various ways by which to attain the possession of material things, for some people are never satisfied with any possession and others have complete possession when they have extremely little. Against this there is only one way by which one can gain possession of religion, and that is to possess it wholly. In another sense, disposing of the soul (which is here a synonym of religion) is like disposing of material things, for with both one either has possession or one does not: there is no half way (Dk vi. 174). Religion, it transpires, requires total possession, possession of the whole, and also absolute possession, without compromise.

7. Religion and the scriptures

'Religion', dēn, is found in contrast to the pair 'Avesta and Zand' in more than one passage. The relative merit of these two items is pointed out in the following text:

'One ought to be more diligent in the consideration of religion than in the Avesta and Zand, for the consideration of religion is the youth¹¹ of the soul' (Dk vi. 266).

The understanding of this passage is somewhat impaired by the obscurity of the phrase 'the consideration of religion'. It may mean either 'deliberation of what one ought to do according to the religion', or 'contemplation of the dēn' whether in the personal or the institutional sense, or else it may mean 'observation through the faculty of dēn'. It is clear, at any rate, that the expression 'Avesta and Zand' stands here for the body of the accepted traditions against which some type of personal religion is contrasted and preferred. This conclusion gains support from a passage already quoted above (Dk vi. 310), in which 'standing in religion' was seen to be an expression which embraces a great variety of possible attitudes; the teaching of the Avesta and Zand was merely one mode of that, and even with the express desire not to learn much Avesta and Zand it is possible to stand in religion.

That 'religion' and 'the sacred word' (an expression which refers to the Avesta and Zand) form a habitual pair of opposites can be seen from the following passage:

'He who does not consider these ten things together but each one separately is not orthodox but a heretic:

mēnog and gētīg,

body and soul,

innate wisdom and acquired wisdom,

action and fortune,

religion and the sacred word' (Dk vi. E.45d).

The passage clearly does not intend to say that an orthodox person ought to take all ten things together. The elements in the list form five obvious pairs of opposites; the juxtaposition of action and fortune, which is common, implies, for example, the problem of free-will and fate. According to this saying, both members of each pair have to be given equal value. The contrast between religion and the sacred word is thus, apparently, one which exists between the inner religious conscience and the body of traditional revelation. The mark of orthodoxy according to §E.45d is that both religion and the sacred word are given their full weight of importance, whereas a heretic would tend to over-value the one at the expense of the other.

It is no doubt because of this distinction that a number of passages in Dk vi. have to insist that religion and the scriptures are not mutually exclusive:

'Religion is connected to the sacred word and is non-contradictory to it in the same way as the flesh is bound to the skin and the veins to their enveloping hide' (Dk vi. 324).

Religion, one may conclude from this, is dependent for its protection upon the sacred word which envelops it in the manner of a skin or a hide. A similar image is recorded in another passage:

'Religion consists of seven walls. The farthest out among them are the sacred word and the Zand' (Dk vi. 215).

The meaning is again clear: the scriptures and their commentary provide the best protection for the religion.

A totally different relationship however emerges from the following passage:

'Everything has a sea. [The sea of] the nobility of the king of kings is perfection, the sea of religion is the sacred word and the sea of light is the sun' (Dk vi. 259).

'Sea' (zrēh) is a metaphor for the origin or the main store of some good; this is seen in the relationship of the light to the sun and also in another passage of Dk vi.² The conclusion required by this saying, that

religion originates from the sacred word, seems to conflict with the impression gained from the previous texts, but the difference may be merely one of emphasis. A saying which strikes a balance and resolves the difficulty raised by this conflict of emphasis may be quoted:

'From the knowledge of religion comes the recitation of the sacred word. From the recitation of the sacred word comes the increase of (one's) calling in religion and the worship of the gods. From the increase of (one's) calling in religion and the worship of the gods comes the driving away of the demons from the world. From the driving away of the demons from the world comes immortality, the renovation and the resurrection' (Dk vi. C.75).

Recitation of the sacred word is presented here as a stage in the development of the individual's religion.

It should be noted with regard to difficulties such as the one just raised that Dk vi, being written in a rhetorical style, tends to put things in an exaggerated manner. Thus, for example, various virtues are presented as being 'more important' or 'more necessary' than the

whole of Avesta and Zand.³ One passage emphasizes that knowledge of the whole Avesta and Zand is not sufficient to make one a priest.⁴ These utterances incidentally show how much the Avesta and Zand are held in veneration, for only an object of high esteem can be used as a point of rhetorical comparison.

The plain importance of the scriptures comes out in many passages.

'That man lives by the command of Ohrmazd who thinks, speaks and acts according to the authority and knowledge of the sacred word' (Dk vi. E.38e).

The two chief mōbads, Adurfarnbag and Adurbōzēd, enquire of their colleague Wahdād why his reputation in priestly matters was higher than theirs. The argument they use to show that they too have a claim to a high position in the religion is: 'We, too, have the Avesta and Zand by heart' (Dk vi. D.10). The recitation of the Avesta and Zand in the course of everyday work is a sign of great piety in Dk vi. D.3 and D.5.

A curious passage sets out an aspect of the practical importance of the scriptures:

'One who desires that his word may come well in the assembly let him speak the Avesta with commentary (?)

openly' (Dk vi. 125).

It is significant that in this passage the familiar combination 'Avesta and Zand' does not occur. The word which replaces Zand is not known to me from other texts, but it seems to mean 'explanation'. One may assume that the omission of Zand here is deliberate, as Zand was not to be spoken publicly:

'Good deeds should be spoken to every person. Zand should be spoken (only) in the household. Secrets should be spoken (only) to reliable people' (Dk vi. 254).

'Good deeds', 'Zand' and 'secrets' are arranged here in a mounting hierarchy of secrecy.⁵ It may seem puzzling at first that Zand should be treated with any measure of secrecy at all; but this must be due to the fact that it contains some doctrines which cannot be divulged to the uninitiated public, and also because of the danger of heresies:

'One ought not to speak, do or arrange the business of the interpretation (zand) differently from what the orthodox [spoke,] did, taught and brought up. For heresy comes to the world by one who teaches, speaks or does the business of the interpretation differently ...' (Dk vi. C.26).

This passage is followed by two others, §C.27-28, which warn particularly against learning the Avesta and Zand from wicked people or ^ateaching it to them. By discussing the Avesta and Zand with wicked people one puts arms in the hands of heretics and one may be influenced by them. The Avesta itself, being a fixed text and probably accessible to most learned men, the crucial difference between orthodoxy and heresy must have been in the way it was interpreted. It is the orthodox interpretation therefore that had to be carefully guarded from the knowledge of wicked people and strangers in general.⁶

The warning to keep the propagation of Zand restricted seemingly conflicts with such statements which declare:

'Every one who knows how to reflect with innate wisdom knows best that which is manifest from the Avesta and Zand' (Dk vi. B.12).

But the point of this statement is not, of course, that any sensible person knows the contents of the Avesta and Zand intuitively and without learning, but that their doctrines are in accordance with reason and are therefore acceptable by any person endowed with innate wisdom. Similar claims were made by Zoroastrian apologetics as well as by other religions.⁷ As innate wisdom is naturally disposed to accept the teachings of the Avesta and Zand,

it is not difficult to see the point of the following saying:

'The memory of people is of thirty seeds. It is necessary to know (that) this one seed is the easiest which is taught by the Avesta and Zand' (Dk vi. 217).

III

The Spirits8. Mēnōg

a.

Mēnōg and gētīg¹

The term mēnōg covers two distinct meanings. It is used as an adjective or abstract noun to denote a mode of being, in opposition to gētīg; and it is also used, as a substantive, to denote a class of beings, 'spirits'. The latter connotation will be dealt with in the second part of this section; in this part we shall only be concerned with the former meaning. Three distinct, though complementary, aspects of the term in the abstract meaning may be shown to exist. Its basic idea is that of the invisible form of existence. This, in its turn, is used to denote also the higher, 'spiritual', mode of existence, the one which represents pure religious values. The third aspect of this notion, closely related to the previous one, is that of the next world in the eschatological sense.

The basic notion, as we have said, is that of the non-material, invisible form of being. A clear example for this usage is found in Dk vi:

'Ardwahišt is seven months in gētīg and five months in mēnōg. During the five months when he is in mēnōg he sits in the body of the plants in mēnōg form, guards the roots of the plants and causes them to grow: during those five months he creates the plants. During the seven months when he is in gētīg he comes outside the body of the plants, the plants bud forth and give fruit. (This is) because the place of the genius of the god Ardwahišt is for seven months in the year in manifestation and for five months not' (Dk vi.79).

Mēnōg is here explicitly defined as the state of not being in manifestation. Although this phase is essential for the growth of the plants, there is no hint that it is a higher state of being. On the contrary, it may be assumed that the plants achieve their proper realization only in their final, gētīg shape.

The contrast between mēnōg and gētīg can still perhaps be interpreted as between the visible and the invisible states of being in the following interesting application of the adjectives:

'.....Happy is one who (gives?) to the worthy and who knows to whom he ought to carry it. For

both religions are his, the mēnōg and the gētīg one...' (Dk vi.185).

Would the use of these two attributes with regard to dēn refer to a distinction between the dēn of the individual as against its mēnōg counterpart, which would be perhaps the idea of dēn? Or can it be interpreted as the distinction between speech and works (material) on the one hand against faith (invisible) on the other? Or else can it be the distinction between dēn in this world as against one's dēn in the next? The last possibility seems in this context the most likely.

The second aspect of the opposition mēnōg : gētīg is that which uses the two terms not merely as two states of being with equal value, but rather as symbols for the lesser and higher grades of religious existence.

'A man who excessively adorns this world (gētīg) is a destroyer of the other world (mēnōg). For this reason one must take this world moderately, to the extent that one does not destroy the other world' (Dk vi.E.16).²

In order to bring out the full meaning of the text it seems justifiable in such a context to translate the two terms by 'this world' and 'the other world' (using

terms such as 'spiritual' and 'material' may be misleading). It is important to note that the text just quoted does not advocate complete abandonment of gētīg but only warns not to indulge in it excessively.

The permanence of mēnōg as compared with the transience of gētīg are common themes in the andarz books:

"When they considered it, the ancient wise and learned sages saw the transience of the things of this world and the constancy of the things of the other world. When worldly matters are conducted, except for conducting those (affairs) which cannot be in measure, and when they are not harmful and destructive to the other world, this seemed to them reasonable.³ They relinquish (however) the things of this world which are in excess of the measure so that they should not, on account of this world's deceit (?), lose that which is better than this world' (ibid.)⁴

The superiority of the mēnōg world over gētīg is put in clear terms. Whenever there is the necessity of choice the other world must be preferred, as it is "better than this world".

Mēnōg and gētīg are not necessarily incompatible with each other.

"[One whose] action is for the sake of his soul, this world is his own and the spiritual world is even more his own. One whose action is for the sake of the body, and who voluntarily abandons the spirit, this world is taken away from him against his wish' (Dk vi.A.2))

'For the sake of the soul' is the term normally designating the right religious intentions:⁵ one who has them does not have to give up either of the two worlds. The ideal to aim at is to harmonize between the two worlds:

"That man is happiest who thus mixes this transient thing of the world with that which is intransient' (Dk vi.180).

Despite the possibility of combining the two sets of values, there is a hint that gētīg is likely to interfere and disturb in the contemplation of mēnōg:

"Every person sees that which he thus contemplates, hears that to which he thus listens, finds that which he thus seeks. When one contemplates mēnōg with the work of gētīg on one's hand, one's mēnōg is ineffective, except in some places" (Dk vi.E.39).

The contemplation of mēnōg evidently requires complete dedication, and so one should, at least for the period of contemplation, try to free oneself from the work of this world.

The matters of the other world fall within the scope of one's own responsibility, whereas in worldly matters one may have trust in the gods. Ohrmazd gave this order to men:

'Be diligent in saving your souls, but as regards your bodies I shall take care (of that). For it is impossible to save your souls without you' (Dk vi. 291).

The saying goes on to complain that most people are deluded in striving to achieve the things of this world, while they leave those of the soul to the gods.

The things of the spirit have considerable power:

'In the arrangement of gētīg a thousand powers are nothing. In the arrangement of mēnōg one power is that thing' (Dk vi.E.14).

The things of this world are never sufficient, and never lead to contentment, and they are made up of innumerable divisions. The thing of the spirit is single, homogenous.

and sufficient. The saying which precedes the one just quoted is based on the same idea, but is arranged like a riddle preparing the ground for the explicit statement which follows it:

'One is not a little, a thousand is not much.

One is the thing of the spirit and a thousand is earthly things' (Dk vi.E13).

The third aspect of the opposition between mēnōg and gētīg is eschatological:

'Whoever accepts upon himself in this world toil and pain in this manner, besides the virtue of seeing that toil and pain, the spiritual beings keep for him in mēnōg even as much as the thing which he has borne, and deduct it from the other sins which he has committed' (Dk vi.81).

The place of reward is 'in mēnōg', i.e., in the spiritual state after death, in the next world. The idea that suffering in gētīg is a virtue and will be balanced by bliss in the next world is well established.⁶

The recurrent phrase 'the hope of mēnōg'⁷ refers presumably to the reward expected in the next world. A man should engage in righteous deeds 'so that when he

passes away he may become mēnōg' (Dk vi.180). There is great urgency about performing the 'things of the spirit', as if one knew: 'I shall live one day (only), and what I do not accomplish to-day I shall not be able to do later' (Dk vi.151).

b.

Mēnōgān, the spirits: gods
and demons

Mēnōgān, 'the spirits', is the generic name for the class of beings to which both gods and demons belong.

'There is no man born of a mother over whom these six spirits do not fight: Wahman and Akōman, Srōš and Xēšm, Spandarmad and the demon Tarōmad' (Dk vi.77).

The word in this sense is a development from OIr. manyu-, confused with the MP adjective mēnōg 'spiritual'. The use of the adjective in contexts which could have given rise to such a development can be seen, for example, in the sentence:

'One who fights against the spiritual demons (druz ī mēnōg), whatever demons they be...'
(Dk vi.23).

or in idioms such as the phrase mēnōgān yazdān 'the spiritual gods'.⁸

The relationship of the spirits, gods and demons, to man is fairly complex. The spirits dwell in man:

'In men's essential being there is a thought, there are some in whom a god keeps his throne and some in whom a demon keeps his way...' (Dk vi.1a).

Men can be divided according to whether they serve as a dwelling-place for a god or for a demon. Deliberate effort should be made to make gods dwell in one's body and to prevent demons from penetrating it:

'The joy and splendour which are in the body should be guarded against harm, for one whose body is joyful Wahman dwells in his body; when Wahman dwells in the body it is difficult to commit a sin. One should much keep away from distress, for one who lets distress into his body Akōman penetrates into it; one whose body is penetrated by Akōman it is difficult for him to do a righteous thing' (Dk vi.193).⁹

The association between the mood of the person and the spirit which dwells in him is very close: when a man is

joyful Wahman inhabits his body, when he is distressed Akōman penetrates it. In fact the very names of the god and the demon in this case, Wahman and Akōman, 'Good Mind' and 'Bad Mind', denote roughly the states of mind referred to. When Wahman or Akōman are said to dwell in a man's body this seems merely to be a way of figuratively alluding to the state of the man's mind. Wahman and Akōman, in other words, may be concluded to be terms denoting both an independent spirit, which exists in the abstract, and a projection of the subjective attitude in man. We have already had occasion to establish this double meaning fused into the notion of dēn.¹⁰

A particularly instructive passage is one in which the spirit which figures in such an ambiguous rôle is Srōš:

"....Just as among vessels of gold, silver and other metals those which are purer and freer from faults have sweeter sound, so also a man who is purer in the things of the gods and freer from faults in himself, and who knows how to care better for the small ones, his Srōš produces a better sound and he is more worthy of greatness' (Dk vi.90).

Srōš, the name of the divinity, is also a word denoting the abstract notion 'obedience'. It is hard to decide in this text whether it is preferable to render the word as the abstract 'obedience' or to leave it as a proper name. In Middle Persian, however, the word is very seldom, if ever, used as a common noun.¹¹ If, as seems almost certain, the god's name is meant here, the use of the possessive pronoun is remarkable, implying as it does that every man possesses a Srōš, and that each individual Srōš produces a sound which reflects the degree of righteousness of the man in whom he dwells.

The ambiguous nature of the spirits can be fully appreciated when the arch-demon himself is treated in the same manner:

'It is possible to put Ahreman out of the world in this way, that every person, for his own part, should chase Ahreman out of himself, for the dwelling of Ahreman is in the bodies of men. Then, when there is no dwelling for him in the bodies of men, he will be annihilated from all the world. For as long as there is in this world dwelling even for a small demon in a single person, Ahreman is in the world' (Dk vi.264).¹²

This statement is typical of Dk vi, standing as it does in contrast to the cosmological texts. It would be hardly compatible with the spirit, as well as with the actual utterances of those texts, to say that the principle of evil has no existence in the world outside man. There is of course the existence of the noxious creatures, through whom Ahreman manifests himself in the world as much as he does in wicked men, which is ignored by this passage of Dk vi. It will not do, however, to dismiss the validity of this passage as a piece of evidence on the ground that it is an example of gross rhetorical exaggeration, as it is so much in harmony with rest of the book. On the other hand it cannot be claimed that the compiler of Dk vi did not believe in the separate existence of the gods and the demons, for this would have marked him as a heretic, and it goes against the evidence of some other texts.¹³ What seems clear, however, is that the author of Dk vi was not interested in questions of mythology of cosmology. The great themes of Zoroastrianism are largely interpreted (partly by the aid of midrashic devices) in terms of individual morality and religiosity, and the figures of the gods and the demons are mostly approached as symbols of the various powers in the human soul, which they also legitimately are.

A conclusion which may be drawn from our discussion so far is that phrases alluding to a god or a demon who dwells in the body of a man can be interpreted as denoting that the man possesses a certain quality associated with the particular spirit. We have practically a glossary of these names interpreted in terms of human qualities:

'One whose body is inhabited by Wahman this is his mark: he is ardent in good works, is well connected with good people, is easy in making peace...

One whose body is inhabited by Akōman this is his mark: he is cool as regards good works, is badly connected with good people, is difficult in making peace...

One whose body is inhabited by Srōš...

One whose body is inhabited by Xēšm...

One whose body is inhabited by Spandarmad...

One whose body is inhabited by Tarōmad...! (Dk vi.78)¹⁴

This list of definitions can be applied to the occurrence of the names in other texts. Thus, for example, in the saying:

'In authority beat anger, and in lack of authority beat cares, so that Wahman should take a throne

in your body. For one in whose body Wahman does not take a throne, his soul does not take a throne in paradise' (Dk vi.E.31a), the phrase 'Wahman takes a throne in your body' would mean 'you are friendly and peaceful'. The structure of the phrase is basically the same as the one which occurs in the following text:

'One who surrenders himself to the gods and good people so much goodness inhabits him and fault and evil are odious to him' (Dk vi.C.77).

'Goodness inhabits him' means simply 'he is good', and need not imply a separate existence of a spirit of goodness.

A god which is part of man's being in the world also inhabits the body:

'Wonderful is one who gives shelter to a god, worships him and is reverent to him, and he (viz. the god) then saves him from evil. They said of that god: It is one's own soul' (Dk vi.237).¹⁵

Man's soul is of course a spirit, and it is a god (yazd) inasmuch as it is worthy of worship. The fravaši, the souls of the departed righteous, are objects of divine veneration already in the Avestan texts.¹⁶ The soul of every individual symbolizes for him the world of the gods, and he is enjoined

to do everything 'for the sake of his soul'.¹⁷ To call one's soul a god is nevertheless unusual in the Pahlavi literature, and the fact that the saying was arranged as a riddle, with the solution coming at the end, suggests that the final statement was expected to come as a surprise even to the Zoroastrian readers of the text. There is nothing sacrilegious in the statement; it is merely that §237 draws a logical, though unexpected, conclusion from accepted premisses.

After death, of course, man is a pure spirit, and may hope to be in the company of the gods:

"...In the Reckoning of the Spirits the gods would not let this man who is in that manner to the demons, but would say: "He is our own, for that spirit was created by us..." " (Dk vi.101).

It is in the context of the judgement of the soul after death that the spirits can be seen to be reflections of tendencies and actions in man:

"One should never depart from the matter of the gods in one's thought.... For always as long as a man thinks of virtuous deeds and righteousness the gods who are in his body remain in it and the demons are beaten and depart, and when he thinks a sinful thing

the demons rush into his body. If at the time when the man dies there are demons in his body, it will be more difficult for the gods to extract that body from the hands of the demons than for some one to have beaten the demons away from his body in this world by himself' (Dk vi. 236).

The judgement is presented as the strife between the gods and the demons who resided in the man during his lifetime. It is crucially important not to have demons in the body at the moment of death, and as that moment must be anticipated at any time, one realizes the function of the constant self-inquiry imposed on every Zoroastrian.¹⁸

The wording of the questions can be aptly done in terms of gods and demons:

'Every person ought to consider within himself at least three times every day: "Who is with me, a god or a demon?" If there is a god with him, he ought to accommodate him more in himself; if a demon, he ought to make him powerless over him' (Dk vi. E.2).¹⁹

The double nature of the spirits can be seen with particular clarity in a passage which shows the relationship between man's sin and the demon who both represents and tries to perpetuate it:

'When a man corrects (his adherence to) the law and puts it into practice, the demons in front of whom he committed sins stands out of the body of that man, carries out (the sin), rushes to the spiritual demon and stands confronting the spiritual demon. From there he turns upon the man from whose body he rushed forth, calls (to him), raises his voice and shows him (as follows): "Be repentant of that which you have done ..." If the man is repentant ..., the demon rushes back to the body and harms him further ... And if ... the man does not desist from the things of the gods, the demon is seized by the spiritual demon himself and is broken, destroyed and annihilated by him' (Dk vi. 315).

The demon 'in front of whom the man committed sins' is evidently one whose whole existence is dependent on the sins thus committed, and he has no right of being outside the sins of man. This demon, the idea of the sins of the man, confronts 'the spiritual demon' (druz ī mēnōg), the idea, so to speak, of all the individual ideas. The context throws some light on the text previously discussed, according to which Ahreman will be annihilated when the least demon is chased out of men. Just as each of the demons exists only in so far as he reflects sins, so one must assume the arch-demon exists merely as a reflection of the myriad demons

who reflect the sins of men. The passage, which shows how the demons are projections of human sins, also illustrates the way in which they are used as persons in a cosmic drama.

For a final observation on the subject we now turn to the beginning of Dk vi, which describes man as the battleground in the fight between the spirits:

'In the essential being (ox) there is a mind:

Wahman keeps his throne, Akōman keeps his way.

In the mind there is a desire: Srōš keeps his throne, Xēšm keeps his way.

In the desire there is a thought: Spandarmad keeps his throne, Tarōmad keeps his way.

In the thought there is a speech: wisdom keeps its throne, lust keeps its way.

In speech there is a deed: religion keeps its throne, self-love keeps its way' (Dk vi. 1b).²⁰

It is interesting to see in this passage that the group of three gods and three demons at the beginning of this list is complemented by abstract notions which represent human qualities. The list of those who dwell in man is:

- | | |
|---------------|---------|
| 1. Wahman | Akōman |
| 2. Srōš | Xēšm |
| 3. Spandarmad | Tarōmad |

4. Xrad (Wisdom) Waran (Lust)

5. Dēn (Religion) Xwad-dōšagīh (Self-love)

Wisdom and religion do not commonly count as gods in the Zoroastrian pantheon, just as Lust and Self-love do not figure usually as demons.²¹ It seems that in Pahlavi it is possible to introduce spirits ad hoc, according to the occasion. The liberty to invent spirits is significant. It shows, first, that the idea of a pantheon is not valid at all here, as there is not a strictly defined group of gods. More important, it shows that in Middle-Persian times the names of Avestan gods and demons still retained their proper meanings as abstract notions and were not yet treated as mere proper names, for otherwise the transition between the first group of gods and the group of Pahlavi common nouns would have been incongruous and abrupt. As gods and demons stand both for the qualities which they represent and for the independent spiritual entities, there was no difficulty in enriching the latter group by treating further abstract nouns in the same way as gods and demons.²²

9. Man and the spirits

a.

Man's attitude to the spirits

Men are required to have faith in the gods and to trust them,¹ and this faith is supported by ~~the~~ knowledge of the gods.² The basic contents of this knowledge are: to be 'without doubt as to the gods, that the gods are and that the demons are not' (Dk vi. 98).³ Both parts of this knowledge are, one imagines, a source of comfort and strength in the fight waged against the demons. The statement that the demons do not exist seems, however, paradoxical when we recall the lifetimes of righteous effort chiefly dedicated to the task of eradicating them. The only way by which one may try to answer the paradox is by assuming that when the demons are said to be non-existent this is not meant in the literal sense but as implying that the demons do not exist on the same plane as the gods, that compared to the existence of the gods the abject being of the demons amounts to non-existence. This may be based on a thought such as that while Ohrmazd is eternal and a creator, Ahreman's being is merely one based on antagonism and bent on destruction and that it is due ultimately to be destroyed.⁴

The two primary duties imposed on man by his Creator are as follows:

'Ohrmazd the Lord created every creature for these two benefits, in order to destroy the adversary through it and so that it may be a witness to him' (Dk vi.135).

Of these two tasks the one which is the most emphasized is that of fighting the demons.⁵ Being a witness for Ohrmazd through knowing and proclaiming him is much less often mentioned.⁶

The battle between Ohrmazd and Ahreman has direct bearing on the mode of life prescribed to man:

'The way to paradise is the religion of ~~the~~ measure. When Ohrmazd set this way, Ahreman laid at the same time two ways, one excess and one deficiency. He set them both as far as darkness, and from there on he can set no more' (Dk vi.172).

The counter creations of Ahreman are offset by protective creations of Ohrmazd:

'Ohrmazd the Lord created a medicine for every single illness and disease brought into the world by Ahreman. These medicines smite the illnesses and diseases in the same way as bread and water smite and keep away hunger and thirst' (Dk vi.308).

A pious Zoroastrian must be 'together' or 'in union'

(hamīh) with the gods and 'separate' (wizīhīdagīh)⁷ from the demons.⁸ The clearest expression for these desirable attitudes is found in the following saying:

'In religion there are three principal things:
union, separation and moderation.

Union is this: one who, in thought, speech and action, in every righteousness, is together with the gods and good people. This union never perishes.

Separation is this: one who separates himself in every iniquity and sin from Ahreman, the demons and wicked people.

Moderation is this: one who is a guardian over that union and separation, and it never perishes'
(Dk vi.43).

We may notice here, in anticipation, that 'gods and good people' form one object of union, just as 'demons and wicked people' are the unified object of separation.⁹

Another text interprets the terms in a midrashic vein:

'Union means chiefly one who keeps his thought, speech and action righteous together.

Separation means one who drives every demon away from his body and does not let them come back to it' (Dk vi.320).

'Union', which originally refers to association with the gods is interpreted here by a phrase which carries the notion out of its natural sphere.¹⁰ The midrashic technique through which this transformation of meaning is affected is incomplete, as it was not applied to the definition of 'separation'.

It is not easy to answer the question what such a union with the gods implies. The only way to seek an answer to it is to survey the passages which describe the proper worshipful attitude to the gods and assume that they may throw light on the question.

Faith implies, as we have seen,¹¹ constant pre-occupation with the thought of the gods. That this leads to an association with the gods is clear from the following passage:

'One should never depart from the consciousness of the gods in one's thought. One ought to stick to it so much that one never reflects a sinful matter in one's thought...For always as long as a man thinks of virtuous deeds and righteousness the gods who are in his body remain in it and the demons are beaten and depart, and when he thinks a sinful thing the demons rush into his body' (Dk vi.236).

To judge from this passage 'union with the gods' would imply the dwelling of the gods in one's body. The friendship of the gods also seems to imply union with them:

'He who is a friend of the gods never separates his thoughts from the friendship of the gods' (Dk vi.20).

Reverence is another attitude which helps to establish an association with the gods:

'One ought to have reverence (tarsagāh) for the gods, so that if hardship has come they may save one from it, and if it has not come less may come (of it) to one' (Dk vi.E.38d).

One usually has reverence to the gods, it seems, in connection with a misfortune and the desire to be saved from it.¹²

One of the most important expressions of worship is that of self-surrender (xwēš-tan abspārdan):

'Every man should surrender himself to the gods three times every day, when the sun rises, and speak of the existence of the religion¹³ and the gods and the non-existence of Ahreman and the demons' (Dk vi.227).¹⁴

'To speak of the existence of the religion and the gods' is probably a description of the manner in which it is possible for a man to surrender himself to the gods.

The act of self-surrender is one in which the worshipper comes into close communion with goodness:

'He who surrenders himself to the gods and good people so much goodness inhabits him and fault and evil are odious to him' (Dk vi.C.77).¹⁵

The fact that self-surrender can cause a spirit to dwell in oneself may make it relevant for the idea of the union with the gods. Surrendering oneself is an act of giving, which makes it apt to be used as a midrashic definition of generosity:

'Generosity is this: one who surrenders himself to the gods only because of love for the soul and for the religion' (Dk vi.91).

The act of self-surrender may bring one into a special sort of relationship with the gods, in which one finds oneself totally under the care and protection of the gods:

'When a man has corrected his character and surrendered himself to the gods in submission, from that moment on the gods guard him and keep

him like a man who has a promising calf and who ties a cord round its horn and leads it to the tilled land, keeping it there where there is good pasture and keeping it away from a place where there is harm' (Dk vi.E1).

The association which a man can achieve with the gods is, as we see, one in which both parties play their full share. The reciprocity and tenderness which characterize this relationship are also illustrated in other texts:

'The gods keep the man of godly character in this world not by his own desire and as is best for his body, but they keep and serve him by that which is most salutary to his soul'.

'The gods serve the man of godly nature in such a way that they do not prepare and do not let him have the desire of this body, just as a man whose sick son desires food which seems to him very tasty but if he eats it he will die or his illness will be more serious, that man does not assist his son to have his desire with that food' (Dk vi.221f).

Both this quotation and the previous one have in common the fact that the worshipper's surrender of himself is answered by the care of the gods.¹⁶ According to another

text, when men strive for spiritual things, the gods provide them with their earthly needs.¹⁷

Other evidence that contact between man and the gods is direct and warm is found in various forms:

'Truthfulness is this: one who, whatever he says, says (only) that which it is necessary to say, and says it with such circumspection as if god and the Amahraspands stand before and behind him listening to his word and visible' (Dk vi.91).

The reference to the gods listening to man's words may of course be merely figurative, but the expression reflects the feeling of personal proximity which is often found in passages dealing with man's association with the gods.

The help accorded to man by the gods is not confined to material assistance only. Help in finding one's way out of religious error for a man whose intention is pure is specifically mentioned:

'One who stands by the gods alone in faith for the sake of the soul, even though that thing by which he stands is not the religion and the way of the gods, God does this favour to him that he makes his head (turn) towards religion and the path of the gods' (Dk vi.210).

Apart from help by giving him guidance out of his error

we also hear that the gods disclose certain secrets to a man who is worthy:

'One ought to be worthy of every secret of the battle of the gods (...?). For when a man is worthy, the gods themselves inform him of the secret of their battle, for the gods desire a reliable treasurer' (Dk vi.214).

The gods themselves instruct man of their secrets.

Their interest in this is in keeping with the idea that man was created so as to be a witness to god.¹⁸ People's knowledge of the gods is by itself in the interest of the gods.¹⁹ The passage quoted above can therefore explain: 'the more people know the more the gods are powerful' (Dk vi.214).

On a less sophisticated level, the association of man with the gods is achieved by simply going often to the fire-temple:

'A man ought to go as many times as possible to the fire-temple and to perform the fire ritual reverently, for the Amahraspands assemble every day three times in the fire temple and leave there good deeds and righteousness. He who goes there...the good deeds and the righteousness which the gods leave there come more to dwell in his body' (Dk vi.301).

The process is one by which one infects oneself, so to speak, with the beneficial residue of the presence of the gods. The fact of the gods' actual presence in this world is mentioned several times in Dk vi:

'The coming of the spiritual gods to this world is first to the fire of Warahrān and afterwards to other places' (Dk vi.230).

We may also recall the statement according to which Ardwaḥišt spends seven months in gētīg and five months in mēnōg, governing the growth of plants throughout the year.²⁰ The gods also come to people's houses:

'One ought to keep one's gate open so that more people may come to one's house, for he to whose house people do not come the gods do not come to his house, because the gods always come most to a place where people come most, and people come most to a place where they get food and maintenance' (Dk vi.110).

Hospitality thus serves as another means by which one can come into association with the gods. The passage also indicates that the desire for the company of men is as strong among the gods as the desire of being together with the gods.

is among righteous people. In the words of another passage:

"For people are after bread, the gods are after people, and splendour follows the gods" (Dk vi.187).

b.

Man fighting the demons

The purpose for which Man was created by Ohrmazd is to fight the demons and to be a witness to Ohrmazd.²¹ The task of making war against the demons is an arduous one:

"The demons should be fought persistently and one should not be overcome, for when the damage (caused by them) comes to nought, the demons fight" (Dk vi.268).

Fighting the demons means primarily not to let them penetrate into one's body:

"This virtuousness is best: one who fights against the spiritual demons, whatever demons they be, and does not let especially these five demons inside him: Greed, Envy, Lust, Wrath and Disgrace" (Dk vi.23).

Man being a microcosm,²² the significance of his overcoming the demons who are in his body is enormous:

it amounts to ousting the demons from the whole world.

'The demons should be driven out from that place where, if they are turned out from there, they are turned out from the whole of this world ... That place is this: oneself and one's family' (Dk vi. 130).²³

The point of this saying is here presented again as a solution to a riddle: there is an obvious element of surprise in the disclosure that what one has to do in order to banish the demons from the whole world is merely to expel them from oneself. But there is another, equally important, though somewhat puzzling, aspect to this idea. It is by no means a good practice to seek to fight the demons who are not in one's own house:

'One should look for the demons in one's own house, not in that of other people. For one who looks in his own house finds, and when he desires he can drive them out of his house; but one who looks for them in the house of other people does not find them' (Dk vi.129).

A man who engages in fight against the demons of other people is, in the words of another passage, 'a seeker of battle' (Dk vi. 132). One may wonder what reason there is for putting such a restriction on the battle against the demons whom, one may imagine, one ought to fight wherever they can be found. Two complementary suggestions can be advanced. The

war on the demons is a personal matter. As the demons dwell in man, only the one concerned with them can advance real resistance and ultimately drive them away. Another man can no more than explain and instruct, but he cannot fight that man's demons. On the social level, it would seem that the practice of fighting the demons of other people may easily lead to the phenomenon of witch-hunting, which must have been an inherent danger in such a strictly dualistic society. The warnings to concern oneself with one's own demons and not with other people's may be calculated to avert this very real danger.²⁴

Ideally, if every one devotes himself to the task of fighting his own demons, it will be possible to drive Ahreman entirely away from the world, as his place is only in the bodies of men.²⁵

Ahreman and the demons constantly try to gain mastery over people by various stratagems. These include worship of self, worship of wealth, hypocrisy and heresy;²⁶ they try to instil into a person the hope and confidence that he will not be caught.²⁷ It is possible to fight the demons by love and friendship,²⁸ by charity,²⁹ by poverty³⁰ and by righteous action.³¹ It is possible to defeat the demons

by the sacred fires,³² to split them by avoiding bad character,³³ to smite them by doing righteous deeds at the appropriate time.³⁴ When it is difficult to vanquish the demons by rejecting them outright, it is still possible to resort to the device of cheating them by constantly delaying the commission of their sins, saying, 'Not today but tomorrow I shall do it', thus causing them great distress when they discover their deception.³⁵ Other things which protect a man from the temptations of Ahreman are the thought of the chiefs, the meeting of the good and the birth of high priests.³⁶

It is extremely important for a man never to feel himself completely under the sway of the demons, even after he has committed sins:

'For a sin and offence (?) which are committed one should not tear oneself away from belonging to the gods and should not surrender oneself to the demons. One should not think in this manner: "As I have committed a sin, for this reason I belong to the demons".'

When a man commits a mortal sin and does not surrender himself to the demons, Ahreman and the demons can regard him less as their own than a man who has committed a paltry sin and surrenders himself to the

demons of his own accord and regards himself as belonging to the demons' (Dk vi.272).

The danger is that despondency for sins committed may lead one to think that he belongs to the demons, which thought would amount nearly to an act of self-surrender to the demons, the worst enormity which is the counterpart to the surrender of oneself to the gods.³⁷

Despair in the face of the power of evil is unjustified, as the capacity which Ahreman and the demons possess to cause harm is limited.³⁸ The damage which they are able to inflict upon the world is no more than a small part of what they aim at:

'If Ahreman and the demons were capable of bringing into the material world even a small discomfort and harm which they desire to inflict on the creatures of Ohrmazd just as they desire and prepare it in the spirit, - then all the creatures of Ohrmazd would be destroyed. But ... when they arrive in the material world only a very trifling thing remains and little harm is done' (Dk vi.307).

c.

Reward from the spirits

The counterpart to fighting the demons is the reward or boon which one is not only entitled to expect from the spirits, but which is actually a virtue to expect:

'The belief in the spirits is of many kinds. This too is belief in the spirits: those who believe the spirits to be benevolent, so that they can give the goodness of this world to men, and they seek the goodness of this world from them' (Dk vi.102).

The benevolence of the gods extends to providing man with things of this world.³⁹ To believe in this, and to demonstrate this belief by asking the gods to provide one with their good things is a commendable pious attitude:

'Every person ought to desire things from the gods, for whoever desires finds' (Dk vi.137).

A way of obtaining things from the gods, we are told, is by worshipping them openly.⁴⁰

It is an expression of faith in a high degree to expect good things from the gods even after a misfortune.⁴¹ Such an expectation demonstrates, one assumes, the continuing trust in the gods and the fact that one is not subject to despair.

The common form under which one expects good things

from the gods is the desire for reward for good deeds. To desire such a reward is considered one of the greatest duties of the Zoroastrian:

'To men these three things are the greatest duties: to have one's eyes on the world, not to blame a sinner who is guilty of accidental sin, and to ask the reward of good deeds from the spirits' (Dk vi.13).

Other sayings specify more clearly that the injunction is 'to seek reward for good things from the spirits, not from earthly beings'.⁴²

A more subtle form of reward is to have the gratitude (spās) of the gods:

'One ought to be a suppressor of complaint, resigned, diligent and confident in doing good deeds, and to seek gratitude from the spirits' (Dk vi.29).

That the gods owe gratitude to men for their good deeds or sufferings on their behalf in this world is also confirmed by the words of the two priests who undertook hard labour. One of the reasons for their way of life, as they explained to Wahdād, son of Adur-Ohrmazd, is that 'in this thing there is to us even gratitude, and there is consideration and approval from material and spiritual beings' (Dk vi.D.5). Another illustration for this pious attitude is found in the sentence of Baxt-Afrīd: 'I had no blissful thought

until I desired purity from myself and approval from the gods' (Dk vi.E.22e).

Although we have had clear reference for the expectation of good things from the gods in this world, the hope of reward from the gods is largely a matter of the expectation for the life after death. Various passages illustrate how the gods rescue the spirit of a righteous man in the Reckoning of the Spirits from the hands of the demons, claiming that that spirit is their own.⁴³ Part of the reckoning consists of questions in answer to which the man has to report of his desires and deeds in the world.⁴⁴ The aim of the reckoning is to achieve a balance to the amount of toil and suffering undergone by the man during his life:

'If a man lives by the religion of the gods, the gods see his toil in this world, so that even if he has come into pain by foot, he lives rightfully on his work, done by hand. Discomfort, hunger, thirst, care and disease which come to him, - the spirits carry them for him at the Reckoning and preserve them' (Dk vi.106).

The idea of the balance between the suffering and bliss of the two worlds serves to justify the pain voluntarily accepted by pious men in this world.⁴⁵

As the expectation of reward is an expression of the religious attitude, and as the righteous and the gods form a common army against the demons and the wicked, it is natural that the life of righteousness should be viewed in terms of self-interest, for one is ensured of reward for this effort and one helps at the same time to vanquish one's enemies:

'Ohrmazd desires of men this: "Whatever you do, do it for yourselves, and do it as much as you wish".

Ahreman desires this: "Don't do it for yourselves, and [do not] do it as much as you wish" (Dk vi.32).

d.

Gods and good people

The frequently used phrase 'gods and good people' (yāzdān ud wehān) has considerable significance for the understanding of the structure of the religion of Dk vi. It comes in such sentences as: 'Union is this: one who is ... together with the gods and good people'; or:

'One who surrenders himself to the gods and good people so much goodness inhabits him and fault and evil are odious to him' (Dk vi.C.77).

It seems remarkable that one can surrender oneself not only to spirits but also to people. From another quotation

it seems that to associate with good people is in itself a way of associating oneself with the gods:

'One who is here with the good will be there with the gods. One who is here with the wicked will be there with the demons. (On) being here with the good and the wicked this was said: With whomsoever one is in thought, speech and deed, one is the same (as he is)' (Dk vi.133).

The passage shows that association with good people 'here' corresponds in some way to association with the gods 'there': the adverbs are as usual equivocal, as they may refer either to the distinction between the material world and the spiritual world (gētīg and mēnōg) or the distinction between this world and the next. Another saying in Dk vi shows clearly, however, that association with the gods is basically of the same kind as association with good people, though there is a difference of level. Those who belong to the level of the Gāthā, it says, associate with the gods, while those who belong to the level of the Hadha mānthra associate with righteous people, and those who belong to the Dād section of the Avesta associate with worthy people.⁴⁶ Each of the two latter kinds of association can be regarded as reflections, on a somewhat lower level, of the highest ideal, which is to be together with the gods. That this

is how the authors of the sayings in Dk vi regarded the matter is clear beyond doubt from a midrashic interpretation of a curious phrase:

' "He has eaten with the gods" is this: to eat with good people' (Dk vi.319).

The close connection which is felt to exist between gods and good people is no doubt connected with the doctrines we have already had occasion to discuss; the idea that the gods dwell more in good people than in ordinary men is certainly a factor which explains the notion. The term 'good people' clearly refers to the group of human beings who embody in themselves the highest religious virtues and the greatest proximity with the gods. They seem almost to be more than mere humans:

Ūhrmazd xwēš hēm ayāb Ahreman?

yazdān xwēš hēm ayāb dēwān?

wehān xwēš hēm ayāb wattarān?

mardom hēm ayāb dēw? (PN, PhLT 41.9-11)

'Do I belong to Ohrmazd or to Ahreman?

Do I belong to the gods or to the demons?

Do I belong to the good or to the wicked?

Am I a man or a demon?'

The order in this passage, in which the question with regard to belonging to the good or the wicked precedes the one which enquires whether the questioner himself is a man or a demon, seems to suggest that wehām denotes some being who is more than a man. It is also perhaps significant that the question with regard to the good and the wicked is phrased in the same words as the two previous ones, and it may be taken to imply that one can belong to the good or to the wicked in the same way as one belongs either to Ohrmazd and the gods or to Ahreman and the demons. It seems, therefore, that this passage lends support to the impression one gets from the previous quotations that 'good people' is a technical term which denotes the small group of people in the community who have attained to the highest spiritual level; to associate with them is thus nearly as desirable as to associate with the gods. The various injunctions for consultation of good people become more precise and definite in the light of this realization, and also such sayings as the following:

'One ought to be grateful to the gods for a good thing which has come and to share it with the gods and good people, and to leave it to the gods, for the reward comes by itself from that place where it ought to

come' (WāzAd, PhIT 151 §62).⁴⁷

The expression 'to share things with good people' would thus refer specifically to sharing with certain known people in the community, and would cease to be a vague and general statement.⁴⁸ The question as to the identity of these people is very likely to be related to that of the poor, driyōš, who are discussed below. Another term which sometimes refers to these people is ahlaw 'the righteous', but usually this is a much wider term.⁴⁹

IV

Righteousness10. Ahlaw and druwand

A Ahlawih is the condition of being righteous, ahlāyih denotes the idea of righteousness. They come in opposition, the first to druwandih and the second to druzih or druzanih. The notion of righteousness in Zoroastrianism does not indicate an ideal state of being the attainment of which is almost impossible in this world. It represents rather a code of faith and behaviour which is incumbent on every member of the community:

'Righteousness is principally that thing which every one is capable of doing, and which Ohrmazd the Lord also requires of every one. He who does not do it is under guilt' (Dk vi.19).

Not only is this a condition which is open to every one, it is also within free reach of every one, for it is one of the two things which fall within the category of 'action' (kunišn), viz. own or independent action, in the scheme devised by Ādurbād.¹ The heading kunišn comprises, apart from being an ahlaw or a druwand, only the condition of 'being a (proper) priest, warrior, or husbandman'. Of the five categories which make up the world only 'action' can be regarded as entirely left to the freedom of the individual. All the other categories

imply a position over which the individual has no power.²

Every one should be able to distinguish between the two states of being, ahlawih and druwandih:

'At all times one should distinguish one's desire, and with regard to things which are stated in the world with certainty as righteousness or wickedness one should consider: "Am I of good or evil desire?" ...' (Dk vi.136).

The criterion here, as has already been noticed,³ is the common opinion of the people. This serves as an objective standard against which it is possible to check one's own desire. But it may also have been meant to help achieve the ideal of the joint effort of the community. This ideal ranks so high that it can legitimately offset even a good action:

'They said this concerning one who is cooperative in this world: (It is) that man who does not wish to do anything apart. When he is told to do much good and evil apart, even then he does not act apart' (Dk vi.82).

If our translation is correct the saying seems to commend a man who refuses to act 'apart', that is, presumably, in a manner different from other people, even if he is asked to do a good thing. The passage illustrates the

great importance attached to collaboration between people, for which other examples are also found.⁴ The gods set the standard for this mode of behaviour, for 'they benefit each other', for which reason they are eternal, whereas the demons deceive each other.⁵

Righteousness is indeed a way of following the gods. It is the one thing in this world which does not perish.⁶ Doing good deeds means 'to do the matter of the gods' (Dk vi.267). If a man 'does everything for the sake of the gods alone', he 'becomes righteous by it no matter how he does it' (Dk vi.273). The one binding condition for an action to be righteous is that it must be in, or through, religion (pad dēn, Dk vi.41).

That 'righteousness is principally that thing which every one is capable of doing' (Dk vi.19, quoted above) is true in another sense as well. Almost any action can be regarded as righteous if it is done with the right intention. Whether one desires to be wealthy or poor, learned or one without learning, it is always possible for one to be ahlaw provided one has the right pious attitude.⁷ But although there are various ways by which one can become ahlaw, there are different degrees or levels of this state. The highest are those who belong to the Gāthā: they are

characterized by 'spiritual apprehension' concerning wickedness. Those who belong to the Hadha mānθra division of the Avesta have apprehension from bad fame. The lowest degree, those who belong to Dād, have apprehension from an earthly ruler (Dk vi.70). The last attitude is specifically discouraged in the passage which comes earlier:

'Not for anxiety or for fear should a man seek escape from sinfulness' (Dk vi.69).

Despite this disapproval, doing virtuous actions for fear of an earthly ruler is still considered to be within the limits of righteousness in Dk vi.70. It is however the mark of the lowest, the most earthly type of piety, the one which is associated with the division of the Avesta concerned with giving prescriptions for everyday behaviour. Another passage of the same type gives a threefold division of mankind corresponding to the sections of the Avesta where a different set of distinguishing marks for the groups is found. Three marks are made use of in this passage: the company which they keep -- gods and not demons, righteous and not sinners, worthy and not unworthy; the measure of their possession -- evening and morning meal for the first group, what may be done righteously for the second, and what may be done by law for the third group; and finally the

punishment for their sins, which is shame and reproof for the Gāthā group, the whip of atonement for the middle group and short life for the Dād group (Dk vi.206). The distinctions made in this passage amplify and to a certain extent throw further light on the distribution of the righteous made in Dk vi.70. The two texts combined give us a picture of an established view of religious hierarchy, which has nothing to do with the priestly one, where people are judged by their spiritual achievement: the highest degree is characterized by extreme continence as regards material possessions, but in the field of spiritual attainment they converse directly with the gods, their apprehension is 'spiritual', and all the punishment they require is shame and reproof. On the lowest level people are bound by the regulations of the law and by the fear of a ruler.⁸

The divisions discussed so far are not the only ones which we find in the andarz texts. A threefold division of people is a favourite theme with the Pahlavi writers:

"People consist of three types: one is saved, one is not guilty, one is guilty. Saved is he who hears the things from the gods and carries it out. Not guilty is he who follows that man who heard the thing. Guilty is he who turns away from the laws" (Dk vi.204).

Here only the two first groups are within the bounds of righteousness. The view of society in this passage is simplified, for the division of men contained in the previously discussed texts implied a fourth type, those who are outside the pale of religion. Among the virtuous we have in our present text the basic distinction between the godly man, the one 'who hears the thing from the gods' directly, who corresponds undoubtedly to the first type in the previous texts, the one who is in the company of the gods; and the average pious man, who follows the teachings of the divine: this group is divided into two classes in the previous texts. We see from this comparison that although the number three in the division of men is fortuitous, both systems share a certain basic evaluation of people according to their degree of righteousness, one which recognizes a degree of spiritual accomplishment high above the average, while it accepts and tolerates the fact that most people fall far short of that level.

Other passages dealing with groups of people in relation to their righteousness are found. A text which deals with two types on the fringe of religion says:

'People who do not stand in the religion of the gods are of two kinds: deceiver and deceived. The deceiver is one who knows himself that what he does

should not be done, and he does it for the sake of lust and bodily desire. The deceived one is a person who believes that what he does is righteous, and he does it for the sake of the soul. Every one who is a deceiver is druwand, and a deceived person is ahlaw' (Dk vi.274).

In this distinction it is significant that the criterion for marking the borderline of righteousness is the man's intention. The notion of righteousness which emerges from this text is again in conformity with the conclusions previously drawn. It is clear that the concept of ahlaw includes every man who is not actually druwand, and that it does not by itself denote any particularly high spiritual achievement, although it may sometimes be used in a sense which makes it close to the much more narrowly defined term 'good people' (wehān).⁹

Righteousness, it is certain, is a notion which reflects standards of 'subjective' attitude, as opposed to ones which are based on legally definable rules. Thus, for example, a text says: 'There are cases when one tells the truth and becomes thereby druwand, and there are cases when one tells lies and becomes thereby ahlaw' (Dk vi.B.8). As we remember

that truth and lie are basic opposites of the Zoroastrian religion, it is possible to appreciate the concession made by this sentence. The elementary position of Zoroastrianism was phrased in the preceding paragraph: 'The foremost thing is truthfulness, and the worst thing is deceitfulness' (Dk vi.B.7); nevertheless, the religious significance of a human utterance is determined not only by its being truthful or otherwise but also by its context and intention. This is not the only place in Zoroastrian literature where the absolute ideas of good and evil are considered to be capable of undergoing modification in accordance with reality;¹⁰ but it may well be that the type of thought encountered here is part of an elaborate religious system which is characteristic of the circle of readers to whom the Dk is addressed.¹¹

Apart from spiritual distinctions in levels of righteousness there seem also to be ritual distinctions. There is a scale of values to virtuous deeds:

'Many are those works of virtue which are so petty that (even) when one does them to very numerous (?) people one cannot become righteous through them. And there are those works of virtue that are so great than when one does them to a single person

one becomes righteous through them. We men should be very diligent so that the great works of virtue may become ours' (Dk vi.161).

It is not desirable to be too much absorbed in the doing of petty virtuous works, 'for he who performs petty works of virtue overmuch, the great work of virtue becomes removed from him' (Dk vi.158). Indulging in the performance of petty works carries with it considerable danger:

'A petty work of virtue is a hiding of sins.

For a grievous sin which is committed is less evident on account of the petty work of virtue and it comes less to correction' (Dk vi.160).

The relative evaluation of works of virtue by the orthodox must have been contested by heterodox sects, for a reversal of orthodox values in this respect is considered to be a mark of heresy (Dk vi.159).

Obedience to a ruler has as much weight as any virtuous deed:

'Even the greatest act of virtue, when the lord ruler has given one the order not to perform it, one should not perform it, and he who does it is a knave. For (if it is performed) it is not an act of virtue but a grievous sin, and

one is, for one's own part, under guilt, and the lordship is extinguished' (Dk vi.232).

Lordship has supreme religious value of its own,¹² which disobedience is likely to undermine. A specific example for this rule is given in the passage which follows the one quoted, where the case of a subject who asks his ruler whether to perform the drōn ritual is mentioned. Although the ruler ought not to refuse permission, if he does and the subject nevertheless performs the ritual, 'it is not an act of worship but a sin'. One is reminded of the exception clause in the andarz of Wuzurgmihr where he declares his desire to strive in doing righteousness:

'Now since my desire is to strive in righteousness and to abstain from sin, I have refrained from deliberate sin by my desire as much as I know, -- excepting that (sin) which has arisen from doing the commands of the lords of the time and of bad sovereignty, with regard to which I am helpless' (AW, Ph1T 86f §4).¹³

This clause, it is now clear, is not apologetic in character, because to obey the ruler in such matters is obviously the correct thing to do.

The phrase acār ud nē wizīrēd 'without remedy and

not being able to dispose' describes a state of constraint under which one is free from responsibility for sins committed or for good deeds omitted, and it may also perhaps refer primarily to constraint under orders.¹⁴ Mortal sins, however, are not covered by this excuse (Dk vi.100).¹⁵

One trait of the concept of righteousness which has not yet been stressed is its character of active, diligent striving:

'One ought to be diligent in righteousness, beneficent and of good share in eating and possessing, for even the man who is most diligent, virtuous, beneficent and least powerful, when he comes to the Reckoning of the Spirits his desire is this: would that I had eaten and possessed less and had done more' (Dk vi.211).

There is never a sense of satisfaction in one's righteous achievement when it comes to be measured by the scales of the last judgement:

'In the Reckoning of the Spirits people are overcome by contrition and repentance for not doing additional pious deeds which they could have done in

this world and did not do...' (Dk vi.219).

But this feeling of insufficiency should never turn into one of despair, for then one is likely to fall into the hands of Ahreman,¹⁶ nor should it be allowed to become one of morose despondency, for this goes against the aim of Zoroastrianism, to achieve joy.¹⁷ The marks of one who is ahlaw are visible when he is drunk: reverence, peacefulness, friendship to people, generosity and desire of peace.¹⁸

11. Sin and repentance.

a.

Sin.

Freedom from sin is as much a description of righteousness as the positive accomplishment of virtue is:

'The essential thing for the orthodox is lack of sinfulness' (Dk vi.8).¹

Another expression for the idea of being free from sin is being free from fear (abēbīmīh),² viz. the fear of the final judgement, 'for when a man is free from sin he has no fear from any one' (Dk vi.319). One should avoid everything with regard to which one's desire ultimately

will be: 'Would that I had not taken and done this'.³

Knowledge of sin is important, and doing things without sufficient knowledge are labelled "self-love" (xwad-dōšagīh).⁴ Common opinion is here too an important criterion for deciding what things are sinful.⁵ The existence of strong public opinion against the commission of sins may be inferred from the fact that sins are said to be committed in secret.⁶

Three common terms for sin are differentiated in the following saying, but as the treatment of them is midrashic, the insight gained into the precise definition of the terms is limited:

'Bazag is that which concerns the law; wināh is that which is through negligence and contempt; māndag is that which will remain' (Dk vi.37).

The last definition is the least helpful.⁷ Bazag is made to be an offence against the law (dād), and this could be interpreted as meaning that it is a sin typical of people who are on the level of Dād, or, what is more likely, that it is a sin against the specifically legal regulations. Other contexts in andarz texts do not help very much to differentiate the precise meanings of the terms. It seems that wināh is the general word, which covers any type of

sin and offence. It is the common antithesis to kirbag.⁸ Bazag comes by itself much less frequently (though it often accompanies wināh), and is set in opposition to ahlayh⁹ and to nēwagih.¹⁰ Māndag seems to come mainly in the fixed formula māndag garzīdan 'to confess a sin'.¹¹

Constant effort is exerted in restraining oneself from doing sin. 'Lordship' is defined in a midrashic context as 'one who keeps himself back from doing sin' (Dk vi.113). Concerning a man who accepts religion upon himself we hear: 'For fear of that toil and pain, even with regard to a sin which is being (generally) committed, he will not turn towards sodomy and other sins of custom which have been committed' (Dk vi.80): from which passage we may incidentally conclude that sodomy is seen as a common and not a very grave sin, and a man who avoids it shows a degree of piety above the average. Another midrashic text explains the phrase 'to make a druwand into an ahlaw' by the words: 'One who turns himself away from a sin through which he may become druwand' (Dk vi.322).

The responsibility for a sin rests squarely on the man himself: 'It is a man himself who does an impropriety'

(Dk vi.112), although in the discussion at the time of the individual judgement after death the good spirits try cunningly to disclaim this and to put the blame for the sins committed by the person on the demons.¹² On the other hand, once a man has shown his good desires, the gods direct him further:

'If a man's action is righteous, the gods come to him and keep him in such a way as is best for that man' (Dk vi.112).

Despite the responsibility which a man has for his sins, he is exempted when he has committed them in a state of helplessness.¹³ The main deterrent from the commission of sins is shame. Two types of shame are, however, distinguished, one of which goes against virtue:

'Shame (šarm) is that which does not let one commit a sin. Disgrace (nang) is that which does not let one do a good thing' (Dk vi.7) ¹⁴

b.

Attitude to sinners

One of the dicta which recur several times in Dk vi is 'not to blame a sinner for his sin'¹⁵. Another version of this is 'not to blame a sinner who is guilty of an accidental sin'.¹⁶

One reason why this idea should receive so much emphasis in Dk vi is perhaps the general desire to direct attention to the positive aspects of life rather than to wickedness:

'One ought to speak the gratitude and thanks which are from good people, and not to speak the complaint which is from bad people' (Dk vi.286).

'To suppress one's complaint' is a very common phrase in the andarz texts.¹⁷ Being given to complaint undermines one's joy and perhaps is likely to spread gloom among other people.

Another reason why there is so much insistence on not blaming a sinner for his sins is the desire that people should not be prying into each other's affairs in search of faults. We have already noticed the injunctions not to look for demons in the house of other people.¹⁸ Thus we hear that one should consider one's own fault but the other man's goodness.¹⁹ To be concerned with one's own character and not to be spying on the faults of other people are two of the three duties but for the fulfilling of which a man may be under guilt. The third duty is the obscure injunction 'to keep one's eye upon the world' (Dk vi.228).

A third point which may be made to explain the injunction not to blame a sinner for his sin is that there are signs of genuine human concern and feeling of pity towards the sinner:

'No one should be an enemy and a wisher of evil to a person who commits a sin, one should thus be merciful to a person who is guilty of a sin and think: It is indeed grief when Ahreman deceives and misleads in this manner' (Dk vi.243).

The pity which ought to be felt towards a sinner is apparently the clue to this riddle-like saying:

'One ought not to blame him who is worthy of pity and not to praise him who is worthy of blame' (Dk vi.15).

We may also recall the passage in which the sinner is described as a person who feels a pain and then he knows: 'I have been deceived'.²⁰

A very delicate approach to the sins of other people is however recommended in an andarz of Ādurbād:

'Being well-disposed towards people is this: one who observes the faults and virtues of other people, strives to correct his own fault, manifests goodness to good people and tells them of their faults privately (?) not with violence but in a friendly manner so that they may correct them' (AdPriv 25, PRiv.p.199)²¹

The task of correcting people is however chiefly the business of the ērbads:

'He is not an ērbad who, when a man surrenders himself to him, does not make him ahlaw in this world' (Dk vi.325).

One of the 'three greatest duties of men' is 'to make a druwand into ahlaw! and the original meaning of the sentence must have been concerned with trying to convert the sinners. In the text where it occurs it is however given a midrashic twist.²² Another passage which seems to recognize the practice of trying to improve one's fellows warns 'not to tell a self-loving man of bad mind the faults which he has', because of the adverse reaction which may come from the other party.

Negative injunctions against association with sinners are also found.²³ It is particularly important not to learn the Avesta and Zand from wicked people and not to teach it to them, because this is the way heresies come into the world.²⁴ It is clearly not desirable to praise wicked people.²⁵

Restraint is advocated in the question of punishing the sinner. One whose body is inhabited by Srōš 'does not chastise one who is thus sinless, and him who is sinful he chastises with measure' (Dk vi.78); the reverse

is true of one whose body is inhabited by Xēšm (ibid).

'Unjust punishment' is the adversary of 'punishment of evil-doers' (Dk vi.B.14, No.26). Other andarz collections also have similar advice on punishment:

'Be not greedy in punishing people' (AdMah, PhLT 60 §27).²⁶

'For fear of hell punish with circumspection' (op.cit., (PhLT 63 §69).²⁷

Punishment apparently may vary according to the people concerned and the circumstances:

'There are some whom if one kills it is a sin, and others whom it is better to kill.'

'[Sometimes] it is not allowed to give anything to evil men, at other times one ought to give to evil men the best and most delicious food' (Dk vi. B.9f.)

It is not absolutely certain that the first of these sayings refers to the practice to be followed in dealing with wicked men. But it seems that B.10 is a commentary, in the manner of a midrash, on it. The question of whether one is allowed to give things to evil people is one which occupies a number of passages in Dk vi.

'One ought not to withhold the earthly elements for eating and possessing from men of bad religion

and all other people whom one should regard as heretic' (Dk vi.288).

Against this we have the following texts:

'One ought not to give a present to ungrateful and evil people, for there is loss to the property and a state of wickedness for the soul of one who gives a present to ungrateful and evil people' (Dk vi.C.19).

'One ought not to give anything whatsoever to wicked people when it can be avoided, for to his possessions there is damage and to his soul there is a state of wickedness who gives anything to wicked people when it can be avoided' (Dk vi.C.42).

'A squanderer is one who gives anything to wicked people' (Dk vi.E.24).

The seeming conflict between the two views may perhaps be resolved by pointing out that in the first quotation, §288, the people spoken of are heretics and men of bad religion, whereas the other texts speak of wicked or evil people. We have, however, a text outside the Dk vi where the same lenient view is expressed with regard to evil men:

'Do not mete out evil to the wicked, for the wicked man comes by himself to his own doing' (WāzAd, PhLT 148 §34).²⁸

C.

Repentance.

A passage in Dk vi shows how even a very heavy sinner is less subject to the power of Ahreman after repenting than a righteous man who is given to brooding over his sin:

'When a man commits a thousand sexual offences (?) and is contrite and repentant of them and says: I belong no longer to Ahreman....., Ahreman holds him less as his own and is less capable of making him his own than a man who is guilty of a very small sin, and because of that sin he is powerless to do good deeds and says: "What is now my good deed, when I belong after this to Ahreman" ' (Dk vi.168).

The passage illustrates the particular conception of sin which characterizes Zoroastrianism. It is not only a question of the weight or gravity of sins committed which is relevant here, but also the question of whether, by the force of sin, one must be considered as belonging to the camp of evil, and this depends not only on the objective measure of the sin but also on the mental attitude of the sinner. Even a grave sin may be shaken off and put aside by an act of repentance whereby a man declares that he does

not belong to Ahreman, but on the other hand even a small sin may lie so heavily upon a man that he cannot rid himself of it and regards himself as inevitably belonging to Ahreman.

Repentance means 'to be contrite and repentant' of a sin and not to commit it again.²⁹ Its function is to wash and clean the soul from sin,³⁰ to purify it.³¹ Repentance paves the way to paradise.³² If a man repents of his sins it is possible for the gods to claim him as their own at the time of the final judgement.³³ Repentance is a powerful weapon against every one of the demons.³⁴

The daily routine of self inquiry consists not only of repentance for sins committed but also of a declaration of remission in advance for sins to be committed:

'He should be contrite towards the gods and repentant with regard to every sin which he thinks he will be guilty of that day in thought, speech and deed' (Dk vi.227).

The formula of repentance includes blessings and curses:

'One who confesses of a sin ought to bless Ohrmazd the Lord and the amahraspands and the chiefs and the righteous and the good ones who have been born

and who will be born, and to curse Ahreman and the demons and the evil one' (Dk vi.123).

The expression 'to confess a sin', māndag garzīdan, occurs usually with the indirect object: māndagō radān garzīdan 'to confess a sin to the (spiritual) chiefs'.

A fairly obscure passage in WazAd says:

'Do not hold as light confessing a sin to the spiritual chiefs, carrying the srōšig whip and practising union and separation (?) (PhLT 148 §40).³⁵

The term māndag cannot be defined precisely.³⁶ Apart from its occurrence in the formula with garzīdan³⁷, it comes sometimes together with wināh.³⁸

12. Heresy

The great danger which heresy presents to orthodoxy lies in the fact that it is not entirely outside the confines of religion but is a 'false associate' of religion, in contrast to being non-Iranian or lack of religion

(Dk vi.246). This is explained in the following sayings:

'Religion consists of seven walls. The farthest out among them are the sacred word and the Zand'.

'There is no one who is a more serious enemy to religion than the heretic, for except for the

heretics there is no one who is across the wall who can come inside the farthest end of religion from the very outside. The heretic has come inside across the farthest wall (equipped) with the garment of a carrier of the sacred word, and he comes from the very outside into the selfness and nearness of religion' (Dk vi.215f.)

The simplest explanation of the phrase 'the farthest out' is that the Avesta and its authorized commentary, the Zand, are the most external of the protecting walls of the religion, the others being of more confined or esoteric nature. The heretic comes in from 'across the wall', into 'the farthest end of religion', his starting point being 'from the very outside'. All this confirms the conception of the Avesta and Zand as the most exoteric of the elements of the religion.

The particular quality of the heretic is the fact that he is not manifestly an outsider, for he has on him 'the garment of a carrier of the sacred word', and so he may easily deceive people into accepting his false orthodoxy. It is for this reason necessary to avoid teaching the Avesta with the commentary to heretics and wicked people (Dk vi.C.28), or to learn the Avesta and Zand and other

education from wicked people (Dk vi.C.27).

One of the best safeguards against heresy is to be as faithful to the tradition of the orthodox commentary of the Avesta as possible:

'One ought not to speak, do, or arrange the business of the commentary differently from what the orthodox did... For heresy comes to the world by one who teaches....the commentary differently...' (Dk vi.C.26).¹

'Not to speak the commentary differently from the orthodox' would presumably not mean a requirement for verbal fidelity, but adherence to the general spirit of orthodox commentary. The business of the commentary, one imagines, was still very much alive by late Sasanian times. The numerous midrashic interpretations of both Avestan and other traditional expressions which are found in Dk vi as well as in other books, and of which many are incompatible with each other, show that the art of interpretation enjoyed at the time of their composition a considerable amount of freedom. Our text is anxious, however, to stress that it is not allowed to apply a commentary to the scriptures in a manner which departs significantly from the spirit of tradition.

Heretics, it is clear, stand on the same ground as

orthodox Zoroastrianism, but depart from the latter in some important details. One of the masters of heresy is mentioned by name in a passage of Dk vi, but little else is known about him:²

'There are three kinds of heretics: the deceiver, the deceived, and the self-lover. A self-lover is one who says that Sēn is better than Ādurbād and adopts that Sēn out of self-love. A deceived man is like the disciples of Sēn. A deceiver is like Sēn himself who deliberately twists round things of that which the early orthodox taught' (Dk vi.C.83d).

It is unfortunately not explained how Sēn twisted round the teachings of the ancient orthodox.

Of the three groups of human 'seeds', heretics belong to the group whose seed is indifferent, and may become better or worse through education. Some members of that group 'carry out righteous education into sinfulness, just as the heretics (do with) the tenets of religion' (Dk vi.68). Heresy is one of the four stratagems of Ahreman, together with worship of self, worship of wealth, hypocrisy (Dk vi.47). The danger arising from the subtle, stratagem-like character of heresy is constant and it is necessary always to be on one's guard against it:

'One should beware of heresy even after a long time. Even a very perspicacious and learned man should not be confident, (thinking:) "Are they capable of binding me?" For this dust, which is so small and soft, has all been made from hard and solid stones' (Dk vi.128).

Heresy, like wind or water, being slow and imperceptible in action, achieves its aim after a long time.

An obviously important but difficult text says the following:

'Heresy has destroyed the source. When it first came into the world, it made people chiefly believe in the soul, and it increased (that faith) because it had not come to power. When it reached power, chiefly those who abandoned faith were with the authority which was with it. Later too, because people abandoned faith, it did not increase (it)' (Dk vi.21).

The translation is offered here without much confidence as to its accuracy. One of the main difficulties of the text comes from the fact that the verb abzāyīdan 'to increase', like its English counterpart, can be either

transitive or intransitive, and much of the meaning of the passage depends on whether it is the one or the other. The past tense of the verbs is also puzzling, for it seems that a universal fact is established, and not a historical event (or was the passage first said at the time of the reign of a heresy, for example that of Mazdak?). The general purport of the saying seems to be that heresy gains adherents through feigning orthodox faith in the soul, which turns out to be a deceit when it comes to power. By then it is too late to remedy the situation: people abandon faith under the influence of the heresy which has already gained power.

One point on which heretics are said to differ from the orthodox, perhaps as a result of the fact that they possess an independent commentary of the Avesta, is the question of the relative merit of virtuous deeds:

"The mark of heresy is this: One who considers a great work of virtue as petty and a petty work of virtue as great' (Dk vi.159).

Heretics are not charged with denying the importance of virtuous works and they are not said to add to or detract from the list of such deeds. They differ from the orthodox in the relative value which they attach to certain

acts. Their real error, it would seem, is that they over-value the merit of petty works. The first part of the sentence may have been put in merely for the sake of symmetry, for the passages which precede and follow the text quoted warn only against attributing too much importance to petty works of virtue:

'One ought not overmuch to perform petty works of virtue, for one who performs the petty works of virtue overmuch the great work of virtue becomes removed from him' (Dk vi.158)³

From the emphasis here it seems that the controversial issue was the undue attention accorded to small works rather than deliberate neglect of great duties.

Another error, of a similar nature, which the heretics are guilty of is not to have a balanced view of certain concepts:

'He who does not consider these ten things together but each one separately is not an orthodox but a heretic: mēnōg and gētīg, body and soul, innate wisdom and acquired wisdom, action and fortune, religion and the sacred word' (Dk vi.E.45d).

It is by no means clear what kind of heresy is referred to by this saying. People with strong ascetic tendencies, such as the Manichaeans, could be said to prefer mēnōg

to gētīg, soul to body, and thus to 'take them separately'.⁴ Extreme materialists might be inclined to make the opposite choice.⁵ Fatalists would take 'fortune' separately from 'action'. In contrast to the heretics, orthodox Mazdaeanism prides itself in having a balanced and comprehensive view, which accords full weight to each of the members in the five pairs of opposites.⁶

As the points of difference between heresy and orthodoxy are subtle, and laymen may not be conversant with them, they ought to refrain from arguing against the heretics:

'When the heretics come to religion and raise controversy over the existence of non-existence of the good religion and the gods, then, but for the (religious) authority whose duty it is and who is able to speak his own salvation and the defeat of the heretic, no other people must go into the controversy and speak anything by themselves under their own leadership except when they seek them and ask of them' (Dk vi.231).

The prohibition on laymen is obviously based on the fear that they may themselves be caught in the snare of the heretic. A note which concludes the above passage adds: 'But when they seek and ask them, one must say a truthful

thing even unto a small infidel (?), and one who does not say that is under guilt' (ibid).

It is also particularly proper that the priests, the religious authorities, should conduct the argument against heresy, as they are the ones whom heresy seeks to undermine.⁷

Heretics, according to Dk vi, should not be harshly treated, and one ought not to withhold from them food.⁸

It is interesting to note that members of other religions are not considered by a saying in Dk vi to be druwand ('merely because of their being of bad religion'. Jews are cited as a concrete example in this saying (Dk vi.321).

Two references in WāzAd may supplement our discussion of heresy. The last couple in a series of pairs which are said to be dependent upon each other is:

'Good speech, when it is not accompanied by good action, is manifest heresy' (Ph1T 150 §55).⁹

This plainly conforms to the idea of heresy as dishonestly manifesting itself under different colours from what it actually is. The following passage contains some textual difficulties:

'The marks of heretics are six: ~~Amān~~ of good-character luminosity is (in their eyes) reputed of evil character; one reputed of no luck is (in their

eyes) of evil action; to other people they speak widely, but by themselves they are of narrow hand; they seem generous but are of evil disposition; a long-suffering person is disreputable (to them); they have unorthodox thought, speech and action' (Ph1T 150 §56).¹⁰

The translation is doubtful on many points, but the general sense can be established: heretics seem or pretend to be better than they are.

V.

This world

13. Attitude to this world

a.

It is commonly accepted that Zoroastrianism is not a religion which negates the world, but it has been claimed to be possible by studying the Pahlavi books to discover traces of a Zurvanite pessimistic view of the world,¹ or even to discover elements of moral asceticism which reflects orthodox opinion in the sixth book of the Dēnkart.² An objection to both these recent views from the point of view of method can be made by observing that it is not a sound procedure to treat passages in isolation from the rest of the text. Books, even in Pahlavi, do not as a rule consist of independent utterances. To set out to look for 'pessimistic' passages, with the aim of showing them to be at variance with a preconceived idea of an 'optimistic' orthodoxy, is bound to lead to unacceptable results. It is necessary therefore to examine in some detail all the significant utterances which reflect the attitude to this world in our texts. If any serious discrepancy is noticed we may be entitled to conclude that some heresy has found its way into Dk vi. From the outset this must seem

unlikely, in view of the severe warnings on the subject of heresy contained in the book, unless it is possible to assume that the compiler did not know what the main heresies of his day were. It is hoped to show, however, that the evidence of the andarz books on this subject is remarkably harmonious, though the attitude which emerges is by no means simple.

A common theme concerning the problem of the attitude to this world is expressed in the following words: 'One should not embellish the things of this world excessively, for an excessive embellisher of this world is a destroyer of the other world' (Dk vi.149), the terms used for 'this world' and 'the other world' are gētīg and mēnōg respectively, and it has been noticed already that the latter is recognized as superior to the former.³ Whatever effort is expended in furthering the interest of the things of this world, the matters of the other world should never suffer from neglect.⁴ The things of this world are capable of delay, to the extent that one should imagine, 'I shall live a thousand years, and what I do not do today I shall do tomorrow', whereas things of the spirit should be treated with the greatest urgency.⁵

Utterances concerning the soul and the body reflect

the same attitude. If there is a misfortune it is best to give up first wealth and authority, and afterwards, if further sacrifice is necessary, the body, but not to renounce the soul.⁶ A man can be joyful if his dēn is in order, even though other things are abandoned.⁷ The body is to be made 'a cavity, not the peak of a mountain' (Dk vi.208), cf. also §209). The simile seems to indicate humility, though the text interprets it in a different way midrashically.⁸ The soul being the symbol of the spiritual realm of religion in man, the need to suppress this world from excessive prominence is suitably expressed in terms of opposition between the soul and the body: 'The happy man serves the soul. The unfortunate man serves not the soul but the body' (Dk vi.207). 'When one does not fulfil the desire of the body', says another text, 'one does more benefit to one's soul' (Dk vi.89).

A quality which makes this world worthless is its transience; 'within one day it may happen that a man', who was 'healthy, active and of far-reaching hope', becomes suddenly ill and dies. 'People ought to reflect thus: "It may happen that this man is me, and in such a manner will it come to me, why then do I strive excessively after the things of this world?"' (Dk vi.200). It is futile

to regard the world as worth anything, 'for it is transient and one must let it go' (Dk vi.A.6). To overcome the desire of the body it is best to remember 'the transience of the body and of the things of the world' (Dk vi.198). A wise man constantly remembers the end of the world (Dk vi.199).

The transience of this world seems to have been a favourite theme with preachers and admonishers. Ohrmazd I Sijig said to his disciples 'in admonition' three words which would enable them to acquire spiritual goodness:

'Always hold thus: "We shall die within thirty years. It is no use at all to commit sins for the sake of the desire and lust of our bodies".

Think of your wives and children thus: "It will be necessary for them to seek bread from others". Consider your wealth as dust thrown in the desert.

Be diligent in virtuous deeds which can be done and do not postpone them' (Dk vi.D.12).

Similar edifying texts are found in other andarz books.⁹ There is no difference in this respect between the more pragmatic texts and the religious books. AdMah contains some strong phrases on the transience of this world; worldly wealth is likened in one of them to a bird which never stops at one place (PhlT 65 §89). One passage in

Dk vi mentions that even Yima, who possessed the things of this world more completely than any one else, had to part with them ultimately, 'and his trust was only in the soul' (Dk vi.152).

b.

Despite these constant reminders of the worthlessness and impermanence of the things of this world, there are clear indications in the text of Dk vi that a man is not expected to give up this world, but only, as we have seen in some previous quotations, to find the right balance between the two.

'That man is happiest who thus mixes this transient thing of the world with that which is intransient, so that when he passes away from this world he may become spiritual' (Dk vi.180).

In accordance with this conception it is a laudable quality of a man whose body is inhabited by Spandarmad that 'when he has a large share of the things of this world he does not turn away from the things of the gods' (Dk vi.780).

An attractive midrashic commentary puts this attitude in the following words:

"To make an enemy ^{into} of a friend" is this: One who holds the things of this world in front of him and becomes a friend to them in his thoughts' (Dk vi.322).

The meaning of this passage is probably that, having recognized the things of this world to be an enemy, one should try and befriend them so as to take away their sting, perhaps by 'mixing' them with spiritual things, to use the expression of the previous sentence. This may also be the meaning of the phrase which mentions as one of three things which are 'the greatest duties' the following virtue: 'To have one's eye on the world' (Dk vi.13).¹⁰ Another concept which may help to elucidate this idea is that one must strive to keep joy with great gentleness in one's body and not to let it depart. The simile used for this is the way one treats a small child when it desires something harmful: one tries to keep it cheerful by giving it some edible matter as a substitute.¹¹ By careful treatment of one's worldly desires, it seems, one can fulfil the requirement of 'making an enemy into a friend'.

In view of this attitude it is not surprising that there is positive encouragement to acquire property,¹²

and that, once property is obtained, it should be enjoyed:

'One ought not to lead a miserable life with the good things which one has, for he is regarded in the world as miserly and he himself gets less when it is needed who leads a miserable life ...' (Dk vi.C.32).¹³

A noble person is 'one who perfectly possesses, consumes and gives away his powerful means and worldly wealth in duty and benefit' (Dk vi.142). The consumption of the earthly goods is the greatest service which it is possible to render to them:

'The greatest service of the earthly elements is when that person eats and possesses them who is worthy of that which he eats and possesses' (Dk vi.88).

If the good things of this world are used by worthy people they fulfil their proper function. The spirits themselves are distributors of good things to deserving people, and it is a mark of faith in them to desire such goods from them.¹⁴ The right to expect such boons from the spirits may be claimed from a promise put in the mouth of Ohrmazd himself.¹⁵ People are urged to give up their effort concerning things of this world, as these are cared for by the spirits, and to concentrate on the endeavour

concerning spiritual things.¹⁶ When one desires a boon from the gods after a disaster, one demonstrates one's faith in a powerful manner.¹⁷

c.

Material success, increase of honour and authority, can thus be viewed as a sign of the gods' favour. The achievement of worldly happiness is the necessary outcome of piety:

'From truthfulness and the speaking of truth in wisdom there is increase of the possession of splendour (xwarr), and the increase of men is from it. From the possession of splendour and thereby the increase of men a man comes to the honour of authority and to the affairs of this world' (Dk vi.C.69).

Deceit, on the contrary brings about ultimately damage to the good things which a man has (Dk vi.C.70). Righteous effort, similarly, causes wealth to last longer and to be kept more easily, and sinful effort brings about the destruction of wealth (Dk vi.C.67f.). The possession of wealth can therefore be regarded not only as good in itself and as part of the religiously pursued enjoyment of life, but it also indicates the favour of the gods:

'The furtherance, goodness and increase in the good fortune of the good is always in the world because of the favour of the gods' (Dk vi.E.35c).

Wealth can be made to be eternal by giving it away in charity to worthy people. 'One ought to regard property as eternal, that is that they give the remainder of their property to men, or they let men to their property' (Dk vi.E.23); 'the remainder' being, presumably what is in excess of what is needed for the household. On the other hand, by giving presents to wicked people one becomes a 'destructor' of one's property (Dk vi.E.24).¹⁸ A natural conclusion from this idea is to amass fortune mainly in order to give it away:

'That generousman is most laudable who seeks to be powerful through the toil and labour which is in the amassing of fortune, and who gives it to the worthy' (Dk vi.E.29).

Striving after authority and wealth is thus a righteous endeavour, provided it is 'for the benefit and good of men' (Dk vi.156), and the reward obtained is that 'the gods make him ruler in the world' (ibid.). It is however wrong to produce property through sin; in punishment for this the property will decay (Dk vi.C.1). Possessions should not be kept if they hamper the man from the fulfilment of

his duty (Dk vi.202), and they should be given up before anything else if there is some distress (Dk vi.26).

Good fame is the direct outcome of righteousness, ill-fame is caused by wickedness (Dk vi.140). Respect is only accorded to man for righteousness, not for authority or wealth (Dk vi.148). It is wrong, however, to seek fame for its own sake. Search of fame may lead to poverty (Dk vi.71), and it causes one to be devoid of fame (Dk vi.E.22c). Worship of fame may lead to hell (Dk vi.E.20).

d.

In previous parts of this section it has been seen that the primacy of the other world, the world of the spirit, over this world, is asserted; that this world should not be given importance or prominence because of its relative insignificance and impermanence. On the other hand it has been noticed that many passages in Dk vi urge man to use this world so as to achieve the religious aims of joy, dedication to the other world, and charity, and that success in this world can be regarded as a mark of the gods' favour. A rather more radical attitude towards this world can also, however, be noticed in Dk vi:

'He who does not neglect this does not hold that,
and he who does not see that does not neglect this.

'This' is gētīg and 'that' is mēnōg' (Dk vi.E.22b).

The saying uses the familiar device of the riddle-like construction, with the reader, or listener, left guessing what 'this' and 'that' mean. It presents the two worlds as mutually exclusive: if one desires to get the one it is necessary to abandon the other.

Extreme distrust of this world is also expressed in the following passage:

'As one is not wholly soul, but is in the world for a period for the preservation of the body, it is necessary to act with such circumspection as if one were a man without shoes and the whole of this world were full of snakes, scorpions, noxious reptiles and thorns, and one had fear thus: "Let not the reptiles bite me or the thorns pierce me" ' (Dk vi.B.47).

Man's being in the world is for a limited period and for a limited purpose, and his presence here is a cause of much anxiety, for the world is full of deadly dangers. A saying which seems to go further in this attitude, advocating the suffering of pain in this world is the following. Its meaning is not absolutely clear, but the general sense seems

well established:

'That man is happiest who carries hell in this world as far as possible ...¹⁹ By "carrying in this world" they meant the pain and discomfort which come in the world and which are unavoidable unless they are thus done ...' (Dk vi.305).

The words 'pain and discomfort' (arg ud ranz, which could also be translated by 'effort and labour') are further interpreted as referring to the occupations which are useful but perhaps unpleasant, such as scribeship, being a servant or a blacksmith etc. This may be a true interpretation of the phrase, but it is equally possible that it is merely a midrashic commentary, for the wording 'carries hell in this world' seems too strong an expression for such an easy matter as doing one's work. There is in fact some authority for regarding the reference to hell in this world as having a meaning nearer its literal sense:

'Whoever accepts upon himself in this world toil and pain in this manner, besides the virtue of seeing that toil and pain, the spirits keep for him in mēnōg even as much as the thing he has borne and deduct it from the other sins which he has committed' (Dk vi.81).

There are two reasons, according to this saying, for bearing suffering in this world. One is because there is an inherent virtue in seeing toil and pain in this world, and the other is that, because of the balance of suffering between this world and the next, suffering borne here is deducted from that to be endured in the next world as punishment for sins. The second idea is particularly familiar from other passages in Dk vi.²⁰

An enlightening story in this connexion is given in Dk vi.D.5. Two priests (ērbad) are seen to be carrying on their backs fire-wood from a mountain, a work involving physical effort and apparently not considered to be in keeping with the dignity of a priest. The chief mōbad passes by and, realizing their piety and ability, asks for the reason for this occupation. Their answer is: 'We have heard that every person must, according to his degree, undergo the evil created by Ahreman at one place, either in this world or the next. It seems to us better if we pass through our share (of evil) in this world, where together with undergoing evil we also see the light of the sun and moon and get possession of food and medicine, a remedy to evil, and much other good. In this thing there

is to us even gratitude;²¹ rather than that we should go through (evil) in the next world, in hell, where there is nothing good intermixed, and there is no consideration and approval from anyone in the first place (?), and that we should also be separated from a place as wonderful as paradise'. The two ideas encountered in the previous quotations are found here too but in a more sophisticated form. The first idea here is that it is better to undergo evil in this world because there is no pure evil here: evil is always mixed with good, and a remedy can be found to every evil, whereas in the next world evil is unmixed. The second idea here, as in the preceding quotations, is that there is approval for evil suffered in this world from the spirits, whereas in the next world evil comes merely as punishment, for which no gratitude is due. The first idea asserts, by implication, the goodness of the good things in this world; the gratitude of the spirits, which is given as the second reason, cannot therefore refer to a simple preference which the spirits have for the suffering of people, but presumably for suffering in a good cause, such as, in this case, doing some beneficent hard work, carrying fire-wood.

Another edifying story which belongs here tells of two pious priests who were on their way to the courts 'to settle affairs'. They apparently used to keep provisions in a house on the way, where they would stop. It happened once that they were left without food and went out to collect desert leek and to drink water from a well. As a result of this experience they came to realize that hunger, the manifestation of Āz, the fiercest of the demons, can be overcome by the simplest and humblest food and drink, leek and water. This led them to the conclusion: 'If it is possible to beat the fiercest demon by the humblest food, why should we give ourselves to the judgement of this world, and be doubtful in sinfulness?' They did not continue their journey to the court but turned back home and 'walked in fulfilment of duty and discipline' (Dk vi.D.2). The point of this story seems to be that it is wrong to be discontented and to strive to achieve more than is sufficient for the satisfaction of one's desires. Since hunger and thirst are satisfied by leek and water it became obvious to the two priests that their journey in pursuance of worldly affairs was in search of things which were beyond their strict requirements, hence it was motivated by greed. The story, though it sets an example of piety

far above that required by other texts for more ordinary believers, does not preach mortification or abstinence: it only praises extreme restraint and moderation.

Yet another story on a similar subject tells of two pious and capable priests who were engaged in manual labour and were seen by the chief mōbad who desired to interrogate them and sent for them to come to him. They refused to leave their work and invited him instead to come to them. The mōbad came, was favourably impressed and praised them (or tried to give them some present).²²

They refused saying:

'To us this thing is not necessary. It seems to us better if in any case (?) we live [by] the labour of our own hands. But, as we have heard, even singing is beginning to penetrate the house of the ērbad. Act in such a way as to prevent the ērbad from dying of too much water and others from dying of scarcity of water'.

The chief priest (referred to, in their speech, as ērbad) understood that the words contained a reproof addressed to him on account of his great wealth, and when he came home he sent them two thousand drahms. They took two drahms each and returned the rest with the message:

'... We have taken what is needed and sent back the rest. Give it to that man who has more expenses than we have and who needs it more' (Dk vi.D.3). Here the story ends, and the moral seems to corroborate the interpretation of the preceding stories. The two priests are dedicated to live of work done by their own hands, presumably for considerations similar to those of the previous stories, and they disapprove of excessive riches. They also add a note of criticism in alluding to the social injustice of the chief mōbad having so much while other people have so little. It is interesting, incidentally, to note that the symbol for a life of corrupting luxury in this story is singing, apparently referring to the practice of hiring professional singers.²³ There is no sign in this story of any rejection of earthly goods in principle, though there is preaching of restraint, simplicity and moderation. Excessive enjoyment of wealth is objected to on much the same grounds as excessive destitution. Both are unhealthy and may lead to death, the one of the soul and the other of the body. The importance of physical labour is so naturally accepted by the chief mōbad that he does not regard it as a sign of disrespect when he is required by subordinate priests to come to them so that they may not have to stop work. On the other hand it is

obvious from the story that the sight of priests working was unusual enough for the chief mōbad to stop and enquire about them.

The most remarkable story in this series is the following:

'A man went to a mountain and saw another man who lived on that mountain. He asked, "What is your name, what is your action, what is your food?"

The fellow answered, "My name is Pain-repelling (ranz-spōz); my food is the fruit of the trees; my action is this, that I do not commit sin".

The man said, "Good indeed is this name, good indeed is this action, good indeed is this food".

The fellow said, "What do they take away from you?"

That man said, "They take discontent away from me" '

(Dk vi.D.11).

The story is obviously an allegory. No names or other precise details are given. The name ranz-spōz, 'Pain-repelling', is obviously a symbolic one.²⁴ The fellow on the mountain is characterized by eating the fruit of the trees, that is the simplest, most natural food, and by not committing sins. It is not clear whether seclusion is part of his way of life. The point of the story is

that his three qualities release him from discontent; the moral is that one should be content with the simplest things available, or even that only the simplest things in the world can cure one of discontent. The effect of contentment is that one can cause pain to vanish: this detail is hinted in the fellow's name.

The passages quoted in this part of the section seem on the whole to combine to a fairly consistent set of ideal requirements with regard to the life of this world. Although these requirements seem considerably more stringent than those which emerge from many of the texts in Dk vi and the other andarz books, they can be said to be based on the same assumptions carried, however, to their logical conclusions. The principle of restraint and moderation, for example, is a universal one in all the texts. But the idea that anything beyond the bare minimum requirements of the body should be avoided as it is corrupting and engendering discontent is typical to these texts and is not shared by the majority of passages in Dk vi and the other andarz texts, although it may be argued that moderation and restraint as regards bodily needs means precisely this. The conclusion seems unavoidable: we have in a certain number of passages in Dk vi an example of religious behaviour which is typical of men of a spiritual

level higher than the ordinary. It would be misleading to call this attitude ascetic. It is merely one which consistently tries to partake of this world only to the extent that it does not interfere with one's pursuit of the spiritual world. Passages in favour of striking a balance between the two worlds have been quoted above: the highest pious approach, as we now see, is to tip the scales heavily in favour of the spiritual world, though without ever condemning this world per se, only rejecting all indulgence as undesirable excess. That different standards of behaviour towards this world exist in Zoroastrianism is fortunately established by a direct testimony:

'The group which belongs to the Gāthā is (characterized by) being together with the gods and separating from the demons; the standard of their possession is the evening and morning meals.....

The group which belongs to the Hadha mānθra...the standard of their possession is that which is done righteously...

The group which belongs to Dād...the standard of their possession is according to what may be done by law...' (Dk vi.206).

We thus can legitimately expect to find in Dk vi sayings which represent different standards of behaviour, and it is not surprising to see that the exemplary stories which tell of the piety of great religious authorities would describe people on the level of the Gāthā. It is also certain, however, that the difference between the various levels of conduct is only one of degree and not of principle. The three levels use the same scale of values, but whereas moderation for worldly people consists in enjoying whatever they can lawfully obtain, the same principle for the more spiritual people prevents them from accepting anything beyond their two meals a day. The idea as applied to the people of Gāthā is explained in the following passage:

'The fruit of the things of this world is a meal, and the fruit of a meal is the keeping of the body. The fruit of the body is [the soul] and the fruit of the soul is the future body. The fruit of the future body is intransient joy which always is and always will be' (Dk vi.229).

Everything in this series depends on the one which precedes it, and each item in its turn is subordinate to and is meant to prepare the one which follows. Intransient joy thus ultimately depends on the one meal which keeps the body.²⁵

An interesting author of sayings in andarz collections is Baxt-āfrīd. He offers advice on the strategy of dealing with this world:²⁶

'Until the time of the Renovation all those whose name in this world is 'Pain-repelling', when this world holds them they let it go, and when they let it go it holds them' (Dk vi.E.22a).

People who can be called 'Pain-repelling' are apparently of the highest spiritual class. By renouncing to strive after this world for the sake of the other world they do not lose this world either, for the world offers itself to them and holds them precisely when they forsake it. The same idea structurally applies also to fame, according to Baxt-āfrīd: 'He will become without fame who seeks fame. Ultimately fame belongs to one who does not need fame' (Dk vi.E.22c). Another saying which betrays the same playful and somewhat ^{accommodating} cunning attitude of Baxt-āfrīd to the world is the following: _{subtle}

'If all the people in the world had one end of a single rope in their hands, and I (had) the other end, they would not be able to separate (me from the rope). For whenever they draw it I would let (it) go' (Dk vi.E.22d).

The technique consists in letting the rope go without however loosening one's grip on it. In this way one always keeps one's end of the rope and does not have to fight for it. Although the style of these fragments of advice is unique and charmingly personal, the idea behind them is clearly the one we have come to recognize. The art of piety consists in not striving after this world and in concentrating instead on the spiritual world, but by neglecting this world one does not really lose it.

14. Poverty

a.

There are various standards of conduct in so far as the attitude to the things of this world is concerned. The highest degree, it has been noticed in the last section, is one in which the renunciation of everything beyond the bare necessities of the body is called for, as all those things are regarded at that level as being in excess of the measure and as causing distraction from the task of complete absorption in spiritual matters. This voluntary abandonment of all superfluous wealth is highly praised:

'Make ready for the best poverty, for poverty is the best thing. He who ^{lives} ~~stands~~ in poverty not out of constraint but solely for the sake of the goodness.

and desirability of poverty, Ahreman and the demons are driven by him out of the world, and every good work which he may uphold in the world may proceed like a river which is always navigable (?)' (Dk vi.141).¹

Poverty, it is clear, is by itself a virtue. Men who undertake to exercise this discipline are obviously people who aspire to achieve the supreme spiritual position, and they may be inclined to look down upon those who have not attained their degree. They have to be specifically warned against despising the rich:

'If the poor correct this one thing, the contempt of ~~the big~~ ^{great} ones and the wealthy, then in a century not one (of them) will come to hell' (Dk vi.147).²

It is true that Dk vi contains also the opposite warning:

'Even a great person becomes very much druwand by this one sin, when he regards the poor with contempt' (Dk vi.281),

but the difference between the two passages is significant. ~~The~~ Contempt ^{for} ~~of~~ the wealthy by the poor is regarded merely as a flaw in perfection, whereas ~~the~~ contempt ^{for} ~~of~~ the poor by the rich is considered to be a grave sin, enough to make the guilty 'very much druwand'.

Among the people to whom Dk vi is addressed it is clearly natural to regard the poor ^{man} as by far superior to one who is not poor, and quite a number of passages in the book have had to be devoted ^{ing} to correct this superficial view:

'Because of one's own decrease, poverty and incapacity one ought not to think of another person as being less and to regard his goodness as being less than it is ...'

'Because of one's own satisfaction, wealth and authority one ought not to regard the goodness of another person as more than it is ...' (Dk vi.C.23f.).

Similarly we read:

'One ought not to regard a man as devoid of goodness solely because of his wealth and much property, and not to praise (a man) thus for being good because of his little property and his being needy, unless the thing has been investigated and is known in its principle ...' (Dk vi.71).³

The text goes on to explain that it is possible to mistake a rich man who is generous and righteous and think him wicked, and on the other hand to regard a poor man who has

lost his wealth out of discontent, squandering, laziness and the like as being good. It may be concluded from this warning that when a man is poor for worthy reasons he does deserve respect, and that, on the other hand, many people in society would give honour to a poor man without examining his piety.

The warnings quoted merely serve to emphasize the extreme importance of poverty in the eyes of Dk vi. In contrast to preceding quotations there are complaints uttered about the fact that people fail to see the great worth of poverty. The attitude of people to rain and snow or to the construction of a fortress with provisions against attack is likened to the feeling which many people have about poverty. Both the coming of rain and the need to spend money on construction are regarded as unwelcome hardships at first, but afterwards, when the benefit of these things becomes manifest, all people would have had more of them. Poverty too is unpleasant to bear in this world, but at the Reckoning of the Spirits 'even the poorest of men wishes: "Would that I had been poorer and had seen and borne more of the affliction which comes from poverty, so that now I would have a smaller and lighter trial"' (Dk vi.304).⁴

A somewhat midrashic definition of poverty says:

'Poverty is this: One whose body is prosperous and whose essential being is perfect with regard to the powerful wealth of the world, in whose urge and thinking he is content and in whom there is no distress' (Dk vi.143).

The phrase 'whose essential being is perfect' seems in this context to mean, like the similar idiom 'perfect thinking' (bawandag mēmišnīh), basically 'reverence' or 'humility'. The point of this definition seems to be that the poor man is content with humble means. It is, however, remarkable that an explanation of poverty does not mention the basic requirement of poverty, to be without wealth: this omission is no doubt due to the midrash-like approach in this saying. That the idea of material destitution is an essential part of the concept, and that the word is not merely a figurative one,⁵ can be seen from a number of texts, some of which have already been quoted. A clear passage in the andarz of Wehzād says:

'There are two discerning wise men who are capable authorities. An authority of wisdom when he has no property, and a capable man of religion when he is not haughty' (Ph1T 73.12-14).⁶

A curious saying is attributed to Ādurbād ī Zarduštān:

'I have come to wealth, poverty and authority. In wealth I was generous and a discerning giver (of charity); in poverty I was diligent and a keeper of measure; in authority I was humble and non-violent' (PhlT 81 §3).⁷

Two ways of explaining this saying exist: one can either take the use of the terms to be allegorical, being wealthy referring to the quality of generosity, being poor referring to diligence and keeping to the measure etc.; or it is possible to take it literally as denoting successive stages in the life of the speaker. In any case it would not have strictly autobiographical value but would be an exemplary saying, mentioning ideals to be aimed at rather than ~~actual~~ data.

It is not every one's privilege to be capable of ~~standing~~^{existing} in poverty:

'He can ~~stand~~^{live} in poverty who has more joy in the lowest substance which is necessary for this body than in the largest substance. He who acts thus can ~~stand~~^{live} in poverty, and one who acts differently is driven away from poverty in the course of time' (Dk vi.141).

The definition of poverty which mentions the preference for

the lowest, or simplest substance, over the largest, presumably highest and more refined, is reminiscent of the story of the two priests with the desert leek and water,⁸ and helps to elucidate it.

To be virtuous poverty must be undertaken voluntarily, one has to ~~stand~~^{live} in it 'not out of constraint but solely for the sake of the goodness and desirability of poverty' (Dk vi.141). The exalted position of poverty is stressed by the use of the preverb ul- 'up': 'One ought willingly to stand up in poverty' (Dk vi.E.30a). ul-estādan perhaps even implies an active movement towards poverty.⁹

As willingness is the essential requirement of poverty in the particularly high religious meaning attached to it, poor people who are discontent with their lot are regarded as wicked:

'škōhīh is this: One who does not have the powerful wealth of the world completely, is discontent by that, regards himself as unlucky, is contemptuous of one who has wealth and riches, but strives constantly himself towards wealth and riches' (Dk vi. 145).

The term škōh is opposed in this context to driyōš, which is defined in the parallel passage §143 as one who is content and undistressed. The contrast between the two

terms is not universal, as in other contexts: škōh does not have a pejorative meaning.¹⁰

The last passages referred to form part of a small collection of sayings on the theme of poverty which is found in Dk vi (§141-148). This collection in its turn is part of a larger group of sayings ^{on} ~~round~~ the subject of ^{men's} ~~(the)~~ attitude to this world: it is preceded by three sayings on fame (§138-140) and is followed by a cluster of sayings on the theme of 'the things of this world', with the advice not to embellish them, to delay them and not to have trust in them (§149-152).¹¹ The collection on poverty begins with a reference to the Andarz to Men, which is perhaps the title of an andarz book,¹² and with a general call: 'Make ready for the best poverty' (§141). This is followed, in the same paragraph, by a definition. There follows a description of four (types of people,) two good (āzād-mardīh 'nobility', and drivōšīh 'virtuous poverty'), and two bad (karabīh, a quality of wicked wealthy people in this context, and škōhīh, here 'sinful poverty').¹³ The comparison of the four types, which occupies §142-145, is summarized in the following saying (§146), where the possible vices of the wealthy and the poor are enumerated, two for

each group, with the comment: 'But for these adversaries they would both together be virtuous, the noble poor would be equal against the noble wealthy'. The two sayings that follow warn against the contempt of the poor ~~to~~ ^{for} the wealthy and state, at the same time, that there is no honour for wealth and authority by themselves (§147f.)

The main defect of the poor, we have seen in a number of quotations, is that they tend to regard themselves as being superior to the rich and to despise the latter. The summary contained in §146 presents the two adversaries of the poor in the following words: 'One, not to teach the ~~big~~ ^{great} ones¹⁴ in the matters of the soul because of contempt, and one, ~~thinking complaint~~ ^{complaining thought}'. The second vice, to think complaint, viz. to be dissatisfied and to grumble about their miserable lot, is a common fault admonished in the andarz books.¹⁵ The first vice contains a new element. The contempt of the poor ~~for~~ the wealthy leads them to avoid their apparent duty of instructing the latter. The fact that they have such ^a function shows that in the restricted technical acceptance of the word ~~it~~ ^{'the poor'} refers to people who not only have voluntarily given up material possessions and are highly pious, but who are at the same time men of knowledge. It seems, in fact, that in this sense they are the

same people referred to as 'the good' (wehān): the numerous sayings which enjoin giving things in charity to 'good people' imply the poverty of the latter.¹⁶ The poor have power to bless, and this is mentioned in an Avestan andarz which is summarized in Dk ix as the reason why it is desirable to share one's good things with them.^{16a}

'The poor' is used in a sense almost like 'the company of the faithful' in a sentence which occurs in PRiv, where it is said that if Zoroaster were to gain immortality 'the resurrection and the future body would not happen when the poor hope for them' (PRiv 36.6, p.113).¹⁷

An insight into the peculiar use of the word 'poor' as referring to a semi-divine being, a numinous entity, is gained from the following curious saying:

'Every person has had a poor one at the beginning, and that poor one is his own soul' (Dk vi.A.3).

We recall a saying quoted earlier in a different context according to which the soul is a god.¹⁸ Each of these sayings is concerned to highlight one particular aspect of the nature of the soul. Here presumably the chastity and sanctity of the soul are meant. The phrase 'at the beginning' may refer to the unmixed state of mēnōg, before man is born. Only the righteous, one imagines, retain their soul throughout their lifetime as 'a poor one'.

It thus seems clear that driyōš is a term, when used technically, which refers to highly revered people who are supposed to possess numinous qualities. The same meaning is attached to the word in New Persian, and it has been shown to have certain antecedents already in Avestan.¹⁹

b.

The particular virtues of 'nobility' (āzād-mardīh) in the collection of sayings about poverty in Dk vi are:

"There is no harm to people on account of the powerful means of that person. In whatever happens, he is an intercessor for the poor and does good to them. He works for the poor and acts so that all men regard the wealth and riches which are his as open to them and are confident: if evil and misfortune come to us he will seek a remedy and bring it' (Dk vi.142).

As opposed to this, a man who practises karabīh is "contemptuous of a poor and contented person, makes him light and worthless, and regards poverty as harmful" (Dk vi.144). The main merit of a 'noble' person seems to be that he is an intercessor and protector of the poor, and this is stressed by the vices of karabīh as well as by the two vices of the wealthy, as summarized in §146:

'One, not to respect poverty, and one, not to distinguish the oppression of the poor'.

The function of ~~the~~ protection^{of} and intercession for the poor has recently been the subject of a special article by P.J.de Menasce.²⁰ It seems however doubtful whether it was in fact an office in its own right, similar to that of a judge. The texts quoted give the impression that it was an attribute of judges and similar personalities. In MHD it seems to have been originally used merely as the attribute of the mōbads of Pārs, and was never the title of an office in its own right.²¹ In the seal impressions the expression driyōšān jādag-gōw ud dādwar or jādag-gōw dādwar ī driyōšān²² is likely again to be the title of a priestly judge. If such an office as that of a miyānjig, a kind of ethical inspector, existed,²³ one of his functions seems to have been again to protect the poor.²⁴

Whatever the actual meaning of this title in Sasanian times, the andarz books seem to take it as a general virtue of the noble wealthy. The andarz chapter of PRiv lists jādag-gōwīh, 'intercession', as the seventh virtue in a list which comprises 22. It is defined as follows: 'One who speaks a word concerning a widowed woman, hungry children, fires, cattle, sheep and other helpless (creatures), particularly for the sake of his own soul' (AdPRiv 12, PRiv.p.196).

There is, curiously, no mention of poor men among the recipients of this intercession. In general terms the definition corresponds to one that is given in Dk vi; the latter is more detailed and it does mention the poor:

'This intercession is best: One who speaks for ~~those people~~ ^{that man} who do ^{es} not speak, and who is not capable of speaking his own complaints and groaning. That person speaks only for the sake of his (own) soul and that of the poor and aggrieved (?) people and of these six earthly elements' (Dk vi.23).

Here again it is emphasized that the intercession should be done purely for the sake of the intercessor's soul, i.e. out of religious motives alone, to exclude the hope of any kind of material gain.²⁵ The same condition is encountered in a definition of gōwāgīh, 'eloquence', which employs the midrashic licence of pretending that eloquence means nothing but intercession:

'Eloquence is this: one who intercedes for that person in a case when, were he not to intercede, there would be no intercessor, and to intercede on behalf of that person for the sake of his own soul' (Dk vi.91).

What is common to all the three definitions of intercession

quoted is that the intercessor acts for the protection of people or creatures who have no other means of defending themselves. The omission of the specific reference to the protection of the poor in many of these passages can perhaps be explained by the fact that these andarz texts were primarily addressed to 'the poor', in the more technical sense, for they can almost be regarded as manuals of ethical meditation for the poor, i.e. the highly pious. This seems almost certainly true of Dk vi, and may apply also to AdPRiv.

Recalling the various phrases where intercession is said to be spiritually valid only when it is done "for the sake of one's own soul", it is puzzling to come across the following passage:

'He who believes in intercession for the soul is less bad than one who does not believe in any thing' (Dk vi.35).

If the text is not corrupt, the only way of explaining it is by a paraphrase such as: a man who believes that there is intercession to the soul at the time of the final judgement, though his belief is wrong, is less bad than one who has not faith. The belief attributed to this man is presumably that although he has done wicked things it will always be possible to plead on behalf of the soul.

or for the soul to plead on its own behalf. The point of the passage according to this interpretation is that in the final judgement only actions count. In this view our text enlarges on the idea expressed in the passage which precedes it: 'Religion is that which a man always does' (Dk vi.34).. This interpretation gains some substantiation from a passage in WāzAd where again the emphasis is on actions, and they are called 'intercessor' on the man's behalf:

'Be content in adversity and patient in misfortune. Be not confident in life, but have confidence in righteous action. For good actions are one's intercessor,²⁶ and evil actions are one's opponent. For of thoughts, speeches and actions action is the most excellent' (PhlT 146f. §23-25).²⁷

It seems, therefore, that the phrase 'intercession for the soul' is used in Dk vi.35 in a sense which confirms the idea of this passage from WāzAd, and thus has nothing to do with the idea of interceding for other people or creatures 'for the sake of one's own soul'.

Apart from protecting the poor by interceding on their behalf there is the more common help through charity.

'A poor man, (even) if he is thus of bad religion or not of righteous behaviour, yet one ought to give him something. He who gives him drives out of the

world for his own part the demons who clamour for want, and pushes away from himself adversity and damage. From the body of that person there will be born no one who will come to destitution'

(Dk vi.292).

It is curious to see here, after the numerous passages in praise of poverty, the promise that the offspring of the man will be saved from destitution. But poverty as mere lack of material needs, without being a voluntary state of piety, is clearly not a desirable thing. This attitude is of course very much more characteristic of the pragmatic books than it is of Dk vi. A passage in the popular pious book AXus, for example, encourages people to give to the poor, as wealth is transient and poverty and hardship may easily come to oneself (PhlT 56 §6).

The attitude of Ošnar is on the whole quite hostile to poverty. Here is a selection of quotations:

'And one thing which is evil,²⁸ which is the hardest of all evil, and which is impossible to hide: poverty' (§6).²⁹

'Two are those in whose hearts poison is always spread: one is a poor man who desires everything out of want, and another a ruler who is fierce and fickle' (§16).³⁰

'Of these two things one must not be ashamed: of

illness and of a poor relative' (§19).³¹

But in Ošnar we also find clear traces of the high reverence in which the righteous poor men are held:

'Two things should be held as most precious: a righteous poor man and a ruler who is well-disposed and patient' (§17).³²

'He who is poor, by what shall he rejoice?

In what can a wicked man have hope, when there is no goodness which is better than righteousness and no evil which is worse than wickedness? For a poor man can amass a treasure of good deeds, and he who is a helper of the gods how can he be alone' (§49)³³.

15. ~~The~~ Measure

'Religion is ~~the~~ measure (paymān)' (Dk vi.39). This is not a mere arbitrary definition, but is, in so far as religion is taken to mean the way of life represented by the religion, literally correct. The way is prepared for this statement by the one which immediately precedes it:

'The essential of sin is excess and deficiency.

The essential of virtue is ~~the~~ measure' (Dk vi.38).

'Excess' and 'deficiency' are explained (in Dk vi.42) as,

respectively, thinking, speaking and doing things which ought not to be thought, spoken and done; and not thinking, speaking and doing things which ought not to be thought, spoken and done. In contrast ~~the~~ measure is achieved by that which ought to be performed by the three modes of activity. Religion consists of three principal things, union, separation and the measure. ~~The~~ Measure is 'one who is a guardian over that union (with the gods and the good) and separation (from the demons and the wicked), and it never perishes' (Dk vi.43). The measure thus serves as a hinge which keeps together the two main tenets of religion.

Great pride is taken in the high esteem in which the idea of paymān is held in Iran. A passage in Dk iv says:

'Iran has always praised the measure and criticized excess and deficiency. In Byzantium the philosophers have been mostly praised, in India the knowers, in other places the cognizant have been mostly praised, those from whom skill of speech is manifest. The Kingdom of Iran approved of people with insight' (DKM 429.11-15).¹

Despite this great emphasis on paymān being typically Iranian, the concept has been shown to be a borrowing from the philosophy of Aristotle.² As is however often the case with borrowings of this type, the notion does not seem

to have been entirely foreign to Iran even before the contact with Greece. The term paymān, which is so prominent in Zoroastrian cosmology, itself means etymologically 'measure', the meaning 'pact' being probably secondary.³ Besides, certain cases in which the word is used in Pahlavi suggest that it has a peculiarly Iranian connotation which is not necessarily a development from the Aristotelian conception of the mean. Thus, for example, we have a passage which establishes a different paymān for each of the three levels of religious existence. The xwāstag paymān, the measure of property of those who belong to the Gāthā is 'evening and morning meals', that of the second group is 'what is done in righteousness', and of those who belong to Dād it is 'what may be done by law' (Dk vi.206). One would have to collect some further materials before it would be possible to tell whether this usage of the term is not a survival of an original Iranian notion.

The andarz books contain two basic types of lists of virtues and vices. The majority of lists are based on the principle of the mean, and mention virtues in contrast to vices which represent the excess, deficiency or false associate of each particular virtue. These lists have, essentially, a fourfold structure, even if they refer only to two or three related qualities at a time. The second type of lists is exclusively Iranian: these lists are in effect

collections of human qualities endowed with divine or demonic character.

A systematic chapter in Dk iii may serve as a good introduction to the structure of lists based on the idea of the mean.⁴ It is not, by itself, an andarz text, but is one which forms part of the theological plan of Dk iii. It does however serve to elucidate the approach to these lists. There are two kinds of virtues, it explains, some are forward-inclined (frāz-āhangīg) and others are backward-inclined (abāz-āhangīg). A wise man has virtues of both types in the right measure (paymānīhā), allotted to him by the Creator. There are also two types of time: ascendance and depression (abrāz, nišēb), the first one requiring generally forward-inclined virtues, the other backward-inclined ones, though there are exceptions in both cases according to occasions and people (hangāmīhā ud kasīhā). In order to make the performance of virtues effective one has to adjust the two types of virtue to the two types of time. Wisdom, which recognizes the right time for each virtue, is the leader of virtues. The chapter contains, besides the introduction which has been paraphrased in the preceding lines, two lists of virtues, each followed by its corresponding excess. The defects serve to underline and define the virtues more closely, as they are the qualities

from which the virtues must be 'free'.⁵ The forward-inclined virtues are active, enterprising ones, like swiftness (tagīgih), movement (jumbišn), diligence (tuxšāgih), generosity (rādih). The backward-inclined ones are passive, restraining qualities, like circumspection (nigīrīdārīh), endurance (burdih), contentment (hunsandih). The two lists are very carefully correlated, so that if we set the good and bad qualities to correspond we get four parallel columns, two for the two types of virtue and two for their two particular excesses. The excess of the backward-inclined virtue is of course at the same time a deficiency of the forward-inclined virtue.

The same scheme is repeated in Dk iii ch. 336, though the harmony is disturbed by the absence of a few items.⁶ Dk iii ch. 391 again gives a fairly elaborate and nearly complete list of this fourfold structure,⁷ and the same may be said of Dk iii ch. 76, where the list consists of three series of four qualities.⁸ The list given in the medical chapter Dk iii 157 is also based on the same principle, though it is somewhat more elaborate.⁹

The section in Dk vi.B.14ff. which belongs to this type of lists seems at first sight to be merely based on a long string of pairs of opposite qualities. On closer

inspection it becomes clear that it must have had as a vorlage a list based on the principle of the fourfold scheme, as in the previous examples. The list in §B.14, complemented by the items omitted from it and found in the paragraphs which follow, has a definite logical structure which can be discovered when it is noticed that it consists of 32 pairs of opposites. This can be divided into two groups of 16, and within each group one may distinguish two fairly parallel lists of eight pairs each. Although the order of the items in each group of eight is totally lost, many double pairs of qualities can be re-grouped when they are compared to the fourfold designs in the chapters of Dk iii. Thus, for example, the first pair in Dk vi.B.14 is radīh v. wanēgarīh, and their natural complement in all the other lists is fšōnišn v. panīh, which pair is effectively found in the corresponding group of eight pairs. The pair tuxšāgīh: ahunsandīh goes naturally together with hunsandīh: ašgahānīh. Other groups also form acceptable companions, e.g. wistāxwīh: wastārīh / hušarmīh: awistāxwīh. In the second division of 16 pairs of opposites the association is between groups of two pairs following each other. Thus, for example, we have wuzurg-mēnišnīh: abar-tanīh / nihādagīh: ōbastīh, for which cf. Dk iii 68 No. 12.¹⁰

These lists do not mention paymān itself as one of the virtues. This is appropriate, for paymān is the principle behind all these lists, when it is grasped that its effect is to direct the man to act in accordance with the right quality which is appropriate to the particular time. The point comes out clearly in a chapter of Dk iii¹¹ which declares the 'summary' (hangirdīg) or essence of goodness to be paymān, the essence of which is the law (dād), and its offspring to be seven qualities: wisdom, character, shame, love, generosity, truthfulness, gratitude. The corresponding 'summary' of evil is excess and deficiency (frēhbud ud abēbud), which give rise to lack of law and to bad qualities corresponding to the virtues. Both the measure and the law precede the list of virtues,¹² the whole system being presided over by paymān.

The list of seven virtues and vices contained in the chapter last referred to, Dk iii 203, differs from the lists previously discussed in that it cannot be regarded as belonging to the fourfold type of schematic lists which is based on the idea of two corresponding virtues with two opposing vices at both ends. It is not in fact a list of the Aristotelian kind at all, for it begins with xrad, which would have no place in such a list. This list belongs rather to the ancient Iranian tradition of qualities

turned into spirits, as a comparison with a similar list in AW will show.¹³ Here the system is frankly and simply dualistic, as opposed to the subtler threefold or fourfold scheme ^{presumably} derived from Greek philosophy. It is significant that the qualities, good and bad, in Dk iii 203 are not presented as virtues and vices of the individual man but as the 'offspring'¹⁴ of the principles of good and evil. Although the chapter is clearly based on a traditional pattern, it is organized in the systematic theological way which characterizes the approach of Dk iii; no such attempt at organization is apparent in the corresponding text of AW, where the good and bad qualities, called simply spirits and demons, are not made to match exactly, and where they are not put under the general heading of paymān.

The notion of ~~the~~ measure itself is extremely common in the andarz books. It is specifically applied to things such as eating,¹⁵ toil,¹⁶ power and wealth,¹⁷ love of one's wife and children,¹⁸ thinking of one's virtue,¹⁹ honour,²⁰ and 'things of this world',²¹ There are things however which are excluded from the rule of the measure:

'Keeping ~~the~~ measure is this: one who gauges everything according to ~~the~~ measure, so that he should not have more or less, for every thing of perfection is ~~the~~ measure. For those things ^{for} which there is no

keeping of the measure are knowledge, friend(ship),
and good deeds' (PRiv 197.7-10, AdPRiv §18).²²

Everything which has to do with spiritual matters is excluded from the rule of ~~the~~ measure by passages of Dk vi:

'As regards the soul, to be able in a measure is not to be able. As regards possessions, to dispose of them in a measure is not to dispose' (Dk vi.174).

The ability of the soul is compared, in the passage quoted, to the power which a man exercises over material things, where, in both cases, only complete possession is valid. This comparison is put forward, however, in order to point out the difference between the two fields:

'To dispose of a thing or not to dispose of it changes according to the person. Some people do not dispose unless they possess completely a seat and gold, silver and other possessions. Other people can dispose (even) when their desire does not go beyond one head of cattle'.

'One disposes or does not dispose of the whole of religion (only). For one disposes when one does not commit a sin, and one does not dispose except when one performs good deeds' (Dk vi.175f.).

Only absolute possession of religion has any validity: no limited measure is applicable.

16. Contentment and joy

In the attitude to be taken towards this world the idea of ~~the~~ measure is complemented by that of contentment. One may almost say, although there is no text to confirm this, that the relationship between the two concepts is similar to that which results in the dependence of ~~the~~ doing of good deeds on ~~the~~ right intention. Poverty, for example, which is the proper measure of the truly spiritual, can be a bad condition if a man who stands in it is discontented and strives constantly towards wealth and riches, for this is the description of the sinful position of škōhīh.¹

There are two separate attitudes which combine together in the ideal attitude to this world. One is the passive, uncomplaining acceptance of whatever comes, the attitude of contentment. The other is the active endeavour of joy. For contentment we may quote the following typical example:

'One ought to be content with the decree of the gods, for he lives always in discontent and distress who is not content with the decree of the gods.'

(Dk vi.C.17).

In practical terms this means that 'one ought not to be malignant and upset in crime and distress' (Dk vi.C.9)

and that 'one ought not to have pain and grief over a thing which has not come' (Dk vi.C.10).²

It is possible to achieve contentment by the recognition of the inevitability of things, by the knowledge that they depend on fate.³ Contentment enables one to face calmly a misfortune which cannot be averted:

'By (knowing) contentment, when misfortune befalls one in such a manner that it is impossible to seek remedy, one becomes willingly content with it and does not make evil twofold: one, that which springs from misfortune, and another, (that which springs) from discontent' (Dk vi.D.4).

The main virtue of contentment is that it may act as a buttress against the fiercest demon, obviously the demon of greed (Az).⁴ Thus, in a series of midrashic interpretations of injunctions originally concerned with food the first sentence, 'One ought to eat a hearty meal', is interpreted to mean: 'He is content with that which has come' (Dk vi.319).

It is particularly emphasized that one ought to refrain from complaining. This is among the commonest themes in the andarz books. In a mild form the injunction occurs in Dk vi.C.46: 'One ought not to inform many people of the pain,

offence and distress which have befallen one ...' This is phrased more sharply, although with a special intention, in another passage:

'One ought to speak the gratitude and thanks which are from the good, and not to speak the complaint which is from the wicked' (Dk vi.286).

The virtue of suppressing complaints is expressed by the adjective compound gilag-obār 'one who swallows complaints'.⁵

The text reads: 'One ought to suppress complaint, be resigned (?), diligent and confident in doing good deeds, and to seek gratitude from the spirits' (Dk vi.29).

'Complaint' also figures among the 'four faults in man' which 'have been said to be enmity' (Dk vi.C.83c).

The active element in contentment is also duly emphasized.

'Let one consider the dwelling in righteousness and religion as the storing up of contentment' (Dk vi.27).

Both aspects of the notion of contentment are equally brought out in a definition of hunsandih which is found in AdPRiv:

'Contentment is this: one who is content and resigned with regard to the authority and wealth which he has, and is so diligent and gives up his life so much with

regard to that thing from which the increase of soul may come about that as long as he is alive he never becomes content with it' (PRiv p. 199 §26).⁶

Contentment is clearly not taken here to mean a state of mere inactive acceptance of anything, and there is careful differentiation between this-worldly matters and spiritual aims. Similarly, 'those who are content with wealth are discontented with wisdom and knowledge' (Dk vi.197).

The 'false associate' (brādarōd) of contentment in various schematic lists is sloth (aṣḡahānīh), and the virtue which is associated to it is diligence (tuxšāgīh).⁷ The way to achieve contentment finds amusing expression in a short composition by the name of 'The medicine of contentment', which is a sort of elaborate popular midrashic treatment of the theme of contentment, making what seems to be ironical use of magical conventions.⁸

An intense expression of the feeling of contentment is that of joy (rāmišn):

'One ought to keep oneself in joy, and one ought to keep one's joy in righteous things as tenderly as one keeps a child, and to be diligent in it so much that joy will never abandon one's body' (Dk vi.E.30b).

Joy requires effort and concentration. This point is illustrated by the sentences which follow in the same passage:

'When joy desires that thing which, if it is done according to its desire an offence may occur, one ought not to do that thing but another thing which when it is done, the joy increases and an offence may not occur. By no means ought one to allow joy to abandon one's body' (ibid.).

There follows the example of the child who sometimes desires harmful things. Instead of refusing the desire and upsetting the child one can replace the harmful object by some edible thing which would keep the child happy. The desires of the soul, treated similarly, would keep the man in joy without complying with his frivolous wishes. The text concludes: 'With regard to a joy as worthy the wise spoke of contentment' (Dk vi.E.30b).

Contentment leads towards joy, the latter being, on the highest level, the bliss of the righteous in ultimate things. Thus we may recall the saying 'Those who are content with regard to wealth are discontented with regard to wisdom and knowledge' (Dk vi.197) in which 'wisdom and knowledge' are the notions which point towards the end of the world.⁹ Another saying which seems to take 'true' joy as being the final bliss is:

'That joy should not be regarded as joy which afterwards becomes the foundation of worry' (Kirbag kardan rāy,

PhlT 78f. §6).¹⁰

The eschatological meaning of joy is particularly clear in sayings preserved only in the Arabic version of Miskawayh,¹¹ but it is also felt to be underlying the whole collection of sayings in Dk vi which deals with rāmišn (Dk vi.189-199). For example:

'The fruit of every good deed is joy, and the fruit of every evil deed is distress' (Dk vi.195),¹²

where joy and distress evidently refer to the reward in afterlife. That joy is essentially the condition of ultimate bliss of the righteous can also be seen in the following quotation from AW:

'Who is most joyful? One who is saved from grave fear and misfortune' (PhlT 95 §137f.).

'Fear', as a rule, refers to the condemnation received for evil deeds, again in connection with the judgement.¹³

It is indeed nearly impossible to dissociate earthly, material joy in our texts from ultimate, spiritual bliss. The two seem to be undifferentiated aspects of the same condition. Thus joy is sought on the earthly level, in a good and obedient wife (Dk vi.127); on the other hand, the thing which causes always joy is religion (Dk vi.33). For the prototypes of joy and distress one looks, as in

other fields of life, to Ohrmazd and Ahreman:

'The essential thing in joy is contentment and the essential thing in distress is discontent. For were Ohrmazd the Lord not content with the goodness which is his, he would not have goodness, and were Ahreman not discontented with his wickedness, he would not have wickedness' (Dk vi.196).

VI

Beyond this world.

17. Afterlife: judgement and reward.

It is typical of the andarz books that they refer very often to the impermanence of the things of this world, to the thought of imminent death, as well as to the Reckoning of the Spirits. Life is to be conducted in a way that one is ready at all times for the final trial and the trial is anticipated by frequent self-inquiry. Our texts do not go into detailed discussion of the fate of the soul after death or of the judgement, but the subject is familiar enough from other texts.¹ These topics are only approached in the andarz texts as edifying themes for sermons.

Some points however emerge from the andarz texts which are worth mentioning. This world and the spiritual world complement each other and are in some balance to each other. Thus when a man who suffers a disease bears it without maligning the gods and is always resigned and content, 'the gods in the Reckoning of the Spirits take and consider that pain and discomfort which have come to him through illness and disease and deduct it from the (sum of)

sins committed by him' (Dk vi.306). It is not only the willingness to endure unavoidable pain which counts in this passage, but also the pain itself, in whatever form it has come upon one, counts in the balance.

The two pious priests who were wearily carrying on their backs loads of fire-wood say in self-justification: "We have heard that every person must, according to (his) degree, undergo the evil created by Ahreman at one place, either in this world or in the next. It seems to us better if we pass through our share (of evil) in this world..." (Dk vi.D.5).²

The doctrine of the common balance helps to explain some of the points which cause Adurbād joy when he suffers a misfortune (Dk vi.A.5):

"The store of Ahreman is full of misfortune, he keeps it for good people. Whatever has come to me has diminished the store of Ahreman and he will not be able to do it again to a good man". It seems that the idea of the limited store of Ahreman applies to his powers on both levels, that of gētīg as well as that of mēnōg. This is certainly the case with another source of joy with which Adurbād comforts himself: "The misfortune has come not to my soul but to my body, for it is possible to pass(it) more easily in the body than in the soul". The distinction between body and soul seems to refer to the choice between bearing a misfortune

in this world, in the body, or in the next world, when one is soul, the implication being that once distress has been endured in one form it will not be repeated in another.

There is continuity not only between the two worlds but also, in this world, between the generations, for in another joyful thought of Ādurbād he says: "Every evil or misfortune which (Ahreman) causes reaches either oneself or one's offspring. It has come to me and will not reach my offspring' (ibid). The idea of the mutual responsibility of generations is not very well supported by other examples,³ and it does not seem to go well with the scrupulous weighing of individual good deeds and sins in the final judgement.

As there is some interdependence of the two worlds in the matter of the balance of happiness and suffering, the gods have the choice of the place where they will award the reward:

"The gods, however, are knowers of benefit, and they know with regard to a good thing done to a person which way it is most befitting (to reward the doer), in this world or in the next. They contemplate and consider, and assign the reward of the worthy to there where it is best assigned, for both the mēnōg and gētīg worlds are theirs"

(Dk vi.D.7d).

Other passages do not echo this idea about the freedom of the gods in allotting the reward to wherever they wish:

'Whoever accepts upon himself in this world toil and trouble in this manner, besides the virtue of seeing that toil and pain, the spirits keep for him in mēnōg even as much as the thing he has borne and deduct it from the other sins which he committed' (Dk vi.81, cf. also Dk vi.106).

There is, however, no real discrepancy between the two passages, the difference being only one of context. The latter quotation deals with a man who prefers of his own will to undergo suffering in this world, and his reward is sure to come in the next world.

Life in this world is to be conducted by the pious in a way which anticipates at every turn the coming of death and the ultimate judgement. The best form of diligence is said to be the activity of one 'who does the thing he sets out to do in such a way that at every moment he is sure in himself that were he even to die at that very minute he would not have to do anything differently (from the way he has done)' (Dk vi.23). References to the judgement and the reward are frequent in relation to various activities,⁴ expectation of reward is commended,⁵ and reward

is said to come from him whom one worships.⁶ Expectation of paradise is a goal of the righteous life,⁷ and repentance saves one from hell.⁸ The goal of the soul's endeavour is the future body.⁹ Going to hell after death is not necessarily final and irretrievable. People who committed only small offences are allowed out of hell and into paradise after they have completed their period of punishment. They walk from hell to paradise on a road which is 'more fragrant than any fragrance which is on earth' (Dk vi.287).

It is paradoxical that punishment for sins committed belongs to the realm of Ahreman, although by committing sins one really fulfils the devil's desire. The paradox is heightened by passages which refer to punishment as a purifying agency: 'It is easier to wash and clean the filth and pollution which attach themselves to the body than those which come to the soul which cannot be washed and cleaned except through repentance, punishment and heavy and difficult chastisement' (Dk vi.E.31b). When, in the previous quotation, we see that people are taken to hell for a limited span of time to complete their period of punishment for the sins they committed, it seems almost as if Ahreman serves as a tool of purification in the hands of Ohrmazd. Such an interpretation would of course be

unacceptable to Zoroastrians, but it serves to show the incongruity of the conception which is, however, unavoidable, as it arises from the very structure of the dualistic system in which every kind of suffering is evil by definition.

The significant point about the judgement after death is that the individual soul is not the only one that is put to trial. The litigants are the spirits, gods and demons, and the result of the trial is a triumph ~~to~~ ^{for} one of the camps of spirits. A scene of what happens to the soul after death is described dramatically: 'If when the man dies there are demons in his body at the time, it will be more violent for the soul, and as a consequence it will be more difficult for the gods to extract that body from the hands of the demons...'

(Dk vi.236). If the demon who has been appointed to corrupt the man in his lifetime failed in his mission and the man performs good deeds which he does not regret, the demon is seized and 'is broken, destroyed and annihilated' by the spiritual demon himself (Dk vi.315). Such a failure evidently weakens the whole array of the powers of evil. There is no doubt about the final victor in the cosmic battle: when Ahreman saw the renovation (fraškerd) and

the resurrection (ristāxēz) he fell to his knees and lay afterwards vanquished for three thousand years (Dk vi.258).

The specific contribution which Dk vi adds to the subject of eschatology is not, as we have seen, in adding any new information; it consists rather in making typological interpretations of texts relating to the Renovation.

"The duty of every person is to do these four things: the Renovation, the creation of the creatures, the resurrection and the future body.

The Renovation is this: one who becomes separate from the demons. The creation of the creatures is this: one who does this thing best, thinking, speaking and acting. The resurrection is this: one who knows to bring back that which has been taken from him. The future body is this: one who knows to go back there from where he came'

(Dk vi.E.45k).

The technique of this interpretation consists in transforming the cosmic notions into ethical precepts. Just as man's life and individual activities are directed towards the ultimate things, so the intellectual pun exercised by this saying translates notions relating to the destiny of the world into terms of the everyday duties of religion.

The circle is thus closed, and the mutual dependence of cosmic and individual notions once again asserted. The interpretation of the resurrection, 'to bring back that which has been taken from one', refers presumably to repentance; the explanation of the future body as 'one who knows to go back there from where he came' is to be understood in the light of utterances such as that of Ādurbād: 'I, for my part, know that I came from Ohrmazd the Lord ... and I shall return to Ohrmazd' (Dk vi.D.9).

Another, but somewhat vaguer, midrashic interpretation of terms relating to eschatology is found in the following passage:

'Immortality means to be again just as one was.

The future body means one is born again just as one was born' (Dk vi.267).

The difference between the two terms defined here is that the second implies interruption, death, whereas the first has continuous existence in the same state. The passage perhaps tries to interpret the first term as being in an uninterrupted state of righteousness ('immortality'), as opposed to righteousness regained after repentance ('the future body'). Whatever the precise intention of this midrash, the idea of the Renovation as opposed to immortality is familiar in a more conventional way:

"Zoroaster asked for immortality. Ohrmazd said:
 "If I make you immortal now it will be impossible
 to make the Renovation" " (Dk vi.B.5, cf. also
 Dk vi.B.6).

The idea is quite clear, for there is no possibility of
 Renovation unless it is preceded by death.

On a more mundane level the concept of the Renovation
 is used as a symbol of continuation in this world as
 effected between the generations. "The relationship of
 the Renovation is this, one who takes a wife in time,
 desires children and ~~arranges~~ ^{propagates} his ~~relationship~~ ^{line}' (Dk vi.92).
 The idea that the continuity from this world to the next is
 analogous to that which a man achieves through his offspring
 may be related to the notion of the balance of misfortune
 which takes effect between man and his descendants.¹⁰

18. Salvation

The verb "to save" (buxtān) and its derivatives
 are often used in the andarz texts, but their frequent
 occurrence is not sufficient to make the religion represented
 by these writings a religion of salvation. The precise
 meaning of the verb will become clear from an examination
 of the passages in which it occurs.

A thing by which the ^SSoul is saved 'is', viz. is eternal, permanent, whereas that by which the soul is made druwand 'is not' (Dk vi.C.80). The use of these verbs of existence is reminiscent of the distinction made along the same lines between Ohrmazd and Ahreman.¹ 'To be saved' is often used to replace 'to become ahlaw'.² The captivity from which the soul is saved is not that of this world; it is an escape from the grip of the demons:

'Men ought to know bad character and to keep away from it, for one who has learnt to know bad character and avoided it has split the demons and saved the man' (Dk vi.D.7a).

It is also the escape of man from hell: 'Tenthly, good completion is best, and in it the salvation of the soul from hell is best' (Dk vi.127), or from the eschatological bridge.³

There is reason to assume that the term buxtan has a marked juridical flavour, that it primarily implies acquittal at a trial. Its opposite is eraxtan (with the noun erangih). This emerges quite clearly from the following passage:

'One who has the nature of a man should follow that one who shows him the salvation of the soul. But

there are times when one ought to make oneself *as if* deaf, blind and mute. ~~Why?~~ For blindness is better when one has looked at a thing...which brings harm to the soul; deafness is better when one has heard a thing which may bring about the trial and the interrogation of the soul; muteness is better when one has said a thing through which one becomes ultimately condemned and doomed (ēraxtag ud abōzišnīg)" (Dk vi.E.34).

Other instances of the use of the verb buxtan in purely legal contexts have been noticed.⁴ That salvation in the Pahlavi texts is principally a negative blessing, a state of escaping from evil judgement, is also seen in the following definition: "Separation from the demons is the salvation of the soul" (Dk vi.E.45f). The ability to be acquitted in the final judgement is made the principle according to which three classes of men are distinguished: "One is saved, one is not guilty, one is guilty" (Dk vi.204).

The prominence in which the terms for salvation are held in these texts is therefore another illustration ^{of} to the fact that the final judgement is very much the goal of man's religious activity according to Zoroastrianism.

19. Xwarr

The notion of xwarr, with its Avestan antecedents and cognates in other Iranian languages has been fully treated by H.W.Bailey.¹ The primary meaning of the word was shown by him to be 'a good thing, a desirable thing, possessions, good things',² from which the meaning 'fortune', 'royal fortune' is assumed to have developed. This was often associated with light,³ as in the case of Zoroaster. The personal and psychological concepts connected with xwarr are considered to be a late development of the notion.⁴ It may however be suggested that as far as the Zoroastrian texts are concerned xwarr has the same complex structure as so many other concepts in Zoroastrianism, that is, basically, the threefold ramification of a concept into, first, an abstract notion, secondly, an independent mēnōg hypostasis, and thirdly, an entity which resides in the individual person and has the character of a 'psychological' spirit. All three aspects are well documented in the texts brought together in Zor.Pr. and if this structure does not emerge from the discussion with complete lucidity, this is due to the fact that the main concern there is to distinguish between two other aspects of the notion, the one being 'material gain, riches, prosperity' and the other

'fortune' as an abstract idea.⁵ As Professor Bailey himself remarks concerning the difference between 'riches' and 'prosperity': 'It may even be that the speakers did not seek to distinguish between the two'.⁶ It seems probable that in such cases the original idea may already have possessed some of the complexity of later developments. As regards the distinction between the abstract notion and the material objects signified by the same word hvarnah (xwarr), one notices that the corresponding Sanskrit terms lakṣmī and śrī also have the same double meaning,⁷ which is a feature of words meaning 'fortune' in several languages. One wonders therefore whether it is not simpler to assume that such notions already carried some complexity of meaning in their primitive stage, rather than regard the complexity as an independent parallel accretion in the different languages.

The three hypostases of hvarnah in the Avesta⁸ do not spoil the clear threefold structure of the notion. They do not form a category of meaning in themselves but are an example of the constant process of turning abstract notions into independent spirits. The xwarr of a group of people (the Aryans or the Kayanians), or the individual xwarr of an outstanding

person such as Zoroaster are the externalized mēnōg entities derived from the personal xwarr of the people whom they represent.⁹

Further contributions to the understanding of the concept of xwarr have been made by R. C. Zaehner,¹⁰ and also by M. Molé,¹¹ in whose book a number of important texts are given and discussed.

Some remarks arising from the examination of xwarr in the andarz texts may still however contribute towards the understanding of the subject. A passage in Dk vi says:

'The satisfaction of the joy of the gods is the splendour¹² of the body of the good' (Dk vi.192).

The passage may not be immediately clear. One notices a parallel between the gods and the good: šnāyišn, 'satisfaction', applied to the gods, is paralleled by xwarr, connected ^{with} ~~to~~ the good.¹³ The point of the saying becomes much clearer when it is noticed that it follows another saying with very much the same structure:

'The satisfaction of the joy of the gods is that after which there is no more distress' (Dk vi.191).

The wording of Dk vi.191 is vague, it contains an allusion which calls for an explicit explanation, and this comes in the following passage (Dk vi.192), quoted before).

The relationship between the two short texts is like ^{that of} a riddle ^{and its} ~~to a~~ solution. 'That after which there is no more distress' is explained by the phrase 'the splendour of the body of the good'. The xwarr of the good in this world is seen by this parallel to be identical with the final bliss of the righteous. This xwarr is 'the satisfaction of the gods' joy' (šnāyišn I yazdān rāmišn), which phrase may mean either the joy experienced by men at coming into contact with the gods or the joy of the gods themselves. The former meaning is apparently the one which should be adopted, as it is confirmed by a text which belongs to the same group of sayings:

'The joy and splendour which are in the body should be guarded against harm ...' (Dk vi.193).

'Joy' and 'splendour' are here parallel notions, both found in the bodies of men. As the passage goes on to explain, their presence in the body can help one to avoid sin. In what sense one should understand the relationship between the gods and such qualities which reside in men can be seen from another passage:

'One ought to keep the door open to people, for one who does not keep the door open to people, people do not come to his house. One to whose house people do not come, the gods do not come

to his house either. One to whose house the gods do not come does not possess splendour. For people are after bread, the gods are after people and splendour follows the gods' (Dk vi.187).¹⁴

The possession of xwarr is seen thus to depend on the favour of the gods. This same conclusion may be drawn from another reference to xwarr: 'The enclosing wall of xwarr is the performance of the ritual in the presence (of the gods)' (Dk vi.109).

A number of passages stress the dependence of xwarr on truth: 'The instrument of splendour is truthfulness' (Dk vi.253); 'The life of splendour is from truthfulness' (Dk vi.C.81); 'The faculty of splendour is this: truthfulness and being of good promise'.¹⁵ The dependence is established in causal terms: 'From truthfulness and the speaking of truth in wisdom there is increase of possession of splendour, and the increase of men is from it' (Dk vi. C.69). The opposite of this is found in the passage which follows (Dk vi.C.70), where the bad notion which corresponds to xwarr is zad-brēhīh, lit. 'having (one's) radiance smitten', hence 'bad luck'.

Of the various other qualities which are connected with xwarr one may particularly mention eloquence, wise

and timely speaking, which increase it (Dk vi.C.63, the opposite is in Dk vi.C.64); gratitude, which brings about possession of xwarr which in its turn brings kindness and peace (Dk vi.C.51), opposite in Dk vi.C.52). One who keeps a scoffer near himself may find his xwarr diminished, because 'he always casts doubts on people for qualities which they lack' (Dk vi.C.4).

It will have been noticed that xwarr flourishes mostly in contact with people: hospitality, speaking of truth with wisdom, eloquence, gratitude, avoiding finding fault with people etc. The connection is put in clear terms: 'From possession of splendour and thereby the increase of men a man comes to the honour of authority and the affairs of the world' (Dk vi.C.69). It would seem that the main earthly mark of the possessions of xwarr is the popularity which one has among one's fellow human beings.

One final sentence concerning xwarr may be considered:

'There is nothing more beneficial than religion, for that splendour which religion casts is never injurious to men' (Dk vi.74).

Does this passage imply that there are kinds of xwarr other than that cast by religion which may be injurious? It seems that the answer to this question is positive.

In a passage of Dk iii we read: 'When (someone) forgets the friendship, praise and gratitude of the Creator's xwarr and forsakes it, he becomes unprotected by xwarr, and the xwarr kills him unprotected. That is the xwarr killer of demons'.¹⁶ The idea which underlies this statement is perhaps that a man who abandons the Creator is left unprotected by his righteous xwarr, and since he has turned out to be a demon he is killed by another, demon-killing, xwarr. That the various kinds of xwarr have a function to fulfil in the act of ultimately smiting the demons can be seen from other texts.¹⁷

The idea of the harmful xwarr appears also to be contained in another passage which comes in Dk iii:

'On the injury of the Creator's xwarr (to) a possessor of xwarr who scorns xwarr. From the instruction of the Good Religion.

The Creator made the creation for a work, the creation is an agent of the Creator. The good fulfilment of their work is through xwarr and xwēškārīh. Through reverence to xwarr there is xwēškārīh, from xwēškārīh there is execution of the work of the Creator, fulfilment of the Creator's work is doing His desire and the satisfaction which ensues from that.

When they scorn xwarr through non-duty (axwēškārīh) the Creator's work is hampered, that which is according to His desire is undone, and the injury which ensues from that'.¹⁸

The concise language used by this text caused Molé to misunderstand its intention. The injury (āzār) in the title of the chapter and at the end, as well as the satisfaction which is mentioned at the end of the first part of the chapter, clearly refer to man, the possessor of xwarr, and not to the Creator's xwarr.

20. Fate and freedom of the will

The problems of fate and predestination have attracted a great deal of attention from scholars of Iranian religion.¹ The two questions are in effect quite separate. Fate is only one instance of what may be the cause for a limitation on the exercise of free will by the individual. In Zoroastrianism it seems not to be the main cause at all; scholars who view the whole question of free will as depending on the conception of fate seem therefore to be mistaken.

It is perhaps not an accident that there are not many utterances concerning fate in the long andarz texts.

The main source for a discussion of the attitude to fate has been the Mēnōg I Xrad, which has been described as semi-Zurvanite largely because of its preoccupation with this problem.² It is best therefore to start by an examination of the passages concerning fate in MX:

'The wise man asked of the Spirit of Wisdom: Why is it that sometimes a slothful, ignorant and bad man reaches great honour and prosperity, and that a capable, wise and good man sometimes reaches grievous distress, misfortune and want?

The Spirit of Wisdom replied: When fate helps him, that sloth of the slothful, ignorant and bad man becomes like diligence, that ignorance becomes like wisdom, that badness becomes like goodness. When fate opposes him, that wisdom of the wise, capable and good man turns into lack of wisdom and foolishness, that capacity into ignorance. His knowledge, virtue and capacity appear to be a weak (MX 51).³

If the chapter is read carefully one notices some significant points of phrasing. The qualities which change are as follows:

From bad to good: slothful, ignorant, bad;

From good to bad: capable, wise, good.

The first items in the two lists do not form a pair, for 'capable' is not the opposite of 'slothful'. We further notice that sloth (ašgahānīh) becomes 'like'⁴ diligence, whereas capacity (šayandagīh) turns into ignorance (dušgāhīh). This lack of symmetry is apparently not fortuitous, and the explanation of it is unwittingly given by R. C. Zaehner, although his words were meant to have the opposite effect. 'Energy' (tuxšagīh), 'says Professor Zaehner, 'is the very source and fountain-head of action, the quality by which salvation can be won, and in which, for the Mazdean, fate should have no part'.⁵ But Professor Zaehner did not notice that diligence is indeed outside the scope of fate in this passage. Under the influence of fate, our passage says, sloth can become like diligence, that is, it obtains without effort the same desirable results as are normally obtained by diligence, but it is not the quality itself which changes.⁶

Another passage in MX has the following text:

'The wise man asked the Spirit of Wisdom: Is it possible to fight against fate with wisdom and knowledge or not?

The Spirit of Wisdom answered: Even with the valour and strength of wisdom and knowledge it is not possible to fight against fate. When the decree comes forth, for good or for its opposite, a wise man is led astray in his work and an ignorant man becomes skilful, a coward becomes courageous⁷ and a courageous man coward, a diligent man becomes lazy and [a lazy man] becomes diligent, in such a way that in every thing which has been decreed there comes to it an occasion which pushes away every other thing' (MX 23).⁸

The last sentence of the chapter explains how the decree of fate takes effect in the world. For the decree to materialize it needs an 'occasion', where it can intervene and turn the tide of events in its direction, but it does not change the natural order of cause and effect. The occasion, viz. the coincidence of various causes, provides the ground for the action of fate, and this answers the question put by the wise man: it is not possible to fight against fate with wisdom and knowledge, because fate, from the moment of its intervention (the 'occasion'), governs the course of events through the concomitance of natural causes and not as an imposition coming completely from the outside. Under such conditions the wise man may find himself ignorant, as he cannot foresee or prevent

the direction of events; the coward may find himself courageous under certain circumstances, and the diligent man may turn out to have accomplished as ~~much~~^{little} as a slothful man. Nothing can avail against fate. There is no hint, however, that any moral faculty is impaired by the intervention of fate, only the effects are changed. There can be no doubt that the two chapters of MX make no statement which implies any limitation of the moral responsibility of the individual; they merely state that man cannot hope to achieve pragmatic results against the power of fate. The question in MX 51 was why a slothful, ignorant and bad man sometimes reaches great honour and prosperity and the opposite happens to a man of great ability; the question in MX 23 is very similar in content. The problem is properly answered by attributing to fate powers to direct natural developments. There is thus no trace of any unorthodox fatalism in the Mēnōg ī Xrad.

The ideas of MX about fate conform remarkably closely to those found in the other Pahlavi texts. To quote a clear passage from AW:

'That which comes to man is it by fate or by action? Fate and action together resemble body and soul: for a body without soul is an inactive shape, and a soul without body is a wind which cannot be grasped,

and when they are mixed together they are powerful and greatly beneficent' (PhlT 94 §105-107).⁹

The interaction of these two factors upon each other is further explained in the following manner:

'What is fate and what is action? Fate is the reason and action is the occasion of what comes to man' (PhlT 94 §108f.).¹⁰

The term wahānag 'occasion' occurs also in the chapter of MX quoted earlier (ch. 23). Fate, as we see here, is credited with being the 'reason' of what happens, it leads the natural causes in the direction which they ought to follow, whereas action provides the occasion, the frame in which the effect of fate can take place. The Arabic translation of this exchange is interestingly different:

'He said: What is fate? I said: Fate is the cause of what is existent and action is the cause of what is not' (Misk 33.13f.)¹²

This translation may of course merely betray the lack of understanding of the translator, but as in other places the Pahlavi is usually rendered adequately it seems that the Arabic translator chose in this case to make a meaningful paraphrase of the text. The distinction between fate and action may be said to be that action

provides the various possibilities from which fate selects those which can be carried out. Action may therefore be called the cause of things which either exist or do not (i.e. possibilities), whereas fate established only that which exists. The wording of the Arabic saying is therefore somewhat inaccurate, but this is done in order to achieve a sharp contrast between action and fate.

This kind of interaction between the two principles is fully borne out by another passage of MX:

'The wise man asked the Spirit of Wisdom: Is it possible to appropriate worldly wealth and possessions through diligence or not?

The Spirit of Wisdom answered: It is not possible to appropriate that good thing which has not been decreed, but that which has been decreed will come soon on account of diligence. Diligence, when time does not go with it, is fruitless in this world, but afterwards, in the next world, it comes to the help (of man) and increases in the balance' (MX 22).¹³ Th

The idea that the effect of diligence is greatly enhanced by a favourable decree of fate and that it is thwarted by adverse fortune is in perfect agreement with previous texts quoted,¹⁴ and even more so the emphasis on the fact that diligence counts in the next world even if it does not

achieve its end in this world. The other various passages on the relationship of fate to action are all in keeping with what has been seen in MX and AW: the Epistle of Tansar likens the two to the two bales on the back of a mule, which have to be equally heavy if the traveller wishes to arrive at his destination.¹⁵ The classical epitome of the Zoroastrian attitude on this question is the phrase gētīg pad baxt, mēnōg pad kunišn 'Material things are through fate, spiritual things are through action'.¹⁶

Dk vi shows much less preoccupation with fate than do some other books, but there is no doubt that it takes the overwhelming power of fate for granted:

'One ought not to carry a price for this world for anything, and not to hold it as anything, and not to let it go from one's hand. "Not to carry a price", because all that which has been decreed will come... It is possible to avert everything except the decree of the gods...' (Dk vi.A.6).

The lesson to be drawn from a recognition of the power of fate is that it is not worth while to cling to this world. In the words of another saying 'from knowledge of one's fate comes contentment' (Dk vi.C.57). The knowledge of fate brings to resignation concerning everything which is governed by fate, and, in the case of highly pious men, it actually brings about joy.¹⁷

The notion of fate lives somewhat uneasily in the religious system of Zoroastrianism. The irregular nature of the world is already explained to a large extent by the battle between gods and demons, yet fate is an extraneous force. Sometimes it is identified with the decree of the gods,¹⁸ but often it is associated with the movement of the planets¹⁹ or with the idea of time.²⁰ It does not seem possible to identify these various attributions with any sectarian views; much depends no doubt on the level and intention of the particular books. Dk vi, which evidently addresses itself mainly to the spiritual members of the community, allots very large authority over fate to the gods:

"One who is respectful towards the gods because of a misfortune which has come or one which has not come, they will save him from that which has come and the one which has not come earlier will not reach him' (Dk vi.126).²¹

"Good people should have trust in the gods so that they may be without harm from the demons and wicked people... And even when the demons become fierce and bring upon them destruction, that (the gods) may make effort in restoring them...' (Dk vi.E.38f).

The second of these passages attributes the misfortunes which come upon man to the demons, and man can be saved from them by the gods. In the first the gods are said to have the power over misfortunes which are presumably caused by fate. It seems the decision whether to blame fate or the demons with any particular misfortune would be a fairly arbitrary matter, but thatⁱⁿ a book like Dk vi, the main concern of which is religious devotion, fate cannot be a very prominent theme, and so the demons would be regarded more as the direct agents of evil things, rather than fate.

A scheme of the world where fate has its proper place together with other factors is reproduced in one passage of Dk vi:

"The venerable Ādurbād son of Mahraspand established the things of this world under twenty-five headings: five under fate, five under action, five under habit, five under substance and five under heritage.

Living, wife, children, lordship and wealth are mostly under fate;

being ahlaw or druwand, being a priest, warrior or husbandman is mostly under action;

eating, walking, going to women, sleeping and discharging one's (natural) functions are mostly under habit;

character, love, goodness, generosity and truthfulness
are mostly under substance;

intelligence, memory, body, luminosity and seemliness
are mostly under heritage' (Dk vi.D.1a).²²

Under this scheme fate is confined to one-fifth of the elements which make up man's whole life. But this is not sufficient to ensure man of much freedom of action, for the things controlled by 'habit', i.e. what we would call instinct, substance and heritage are equally out of any man's control. The only field in which a man can truly exercise his freedom of will is the one labelled 'action', and it comprises essentially two things: whether he is ahlaw or druwand and whether he fulfils the functions of his class properly.²³ Of the great variety of human activity a man is held responsible for two things only: the way he accomplishes his religious as well as his social duties. This is sufficient to endow man with the attribute āzād-kām 'of free will' which forms the subject of a chapter in Dk iii.²⁴

21. Esoteric doctrines

a.

It is possible to show, I believe, that Sasanian Zoroastrianism, in so far as it is reflected in the Pahlavi

texts, possessed a body of esoteric teachings confined to a small circle of people, although this has not been noticed so far.¹ The idea that secret doctrines formed part of the Zoroastrian system of religion would seem less surprising when the various texts which point out the different levels of religious perfection are considered. Such a group of sayings is found in Dk vi. 204-206, where the division, in the first passage, is into three classes: 'saved', 'not condemned' and 'condemned'. The second passage has a division into 'wise', 'helper of the wise' and 'non-opposer of the wise'. The division contained in the third passage is: 'those who belong to the Gāthā', 'those who belong to the Hadha-mānthra' and 'those who belong to Dād'. Despite the obvious difference between the three sayings the principle is the same: the community of the orthodox is not regarded as homogenous; the division in mankind is not simply in two, the good and the wicked. There are a number of grades among people. In the first passage, Dk vi.204, the gradation encompasses both good Zoroastrians and sinners, whereas in the other two, §205 and §206, the distinctions are made only among 'the saved' of the former passage. A threefold division based on the sections of the Avesta occurs also in Dk vi.70, where the yardstick for distinguishing between the various classes is

the object of their fear, whether it is spiritual, worldly or fear of the ruler. The threefold division of the community following the Avestan sections is found also in texts outside Dk vi.² A similar text, containing a division into four classes, not referring to the sections of the Avesta, is given in Dk iii 140.³ It consists of the following groups: those who are with the Aryans, those who are with men of good religion, those who are with the good and finally those who are with the gods.⁴

These various texts suggest that the idea of inner, exclusive circles of devout people is not strange to Zoroastrianism. These groups are distinguished by various signs of piety and poverty, but they were apparently not organized in any formal way. They do not seem to be connected particularly closely with any social class, although there are certain indications which suggest that they were in the main associated with priestly circles. The pietist anecdotes of Dk vi.D are centred round ērbads, but from the discussion which ensues with their superiors in the priestly hierarchy it is clear that their mode of conduct was by no means natural for the majority of priests. It is doubtful whether some of the great figures of Sasanian pietistic wisdom, like Wuzurgmihr, were priests. On the other hand a book like Abar panj xēm ī āhrōnān,

which addresses itself to priests, seems also to contain the notion of esoteric teachings.⁵

The divisions of men according to their degree of piety were almost certainly not 'institutional' organizations based on social conventions like classes or professions. This seems abundantly clear from the fact that the various divisions which occur in the texts referred to are not by any means uniform in conception. They vary in the number of classes (from two to four) and in their scope (some embracing all mankind, others confined to righteous Zoroastrians). They also vary in the criteria employed for the division, the allusion to the sections of the Avesta being only one method of classification. All this goes to show that the distinctions contained in these texts do not reflect any consensus of opinion, or even any firm conviction of one author, but are only used (or invented) in each case to drive home a point. Thus, for example, the point is clear when the lowest kind of piety based on fear of worldly authority is contrasted with the highest type, which comes from spiritual apprehension (Dk vi.70).⁶ The only type of piety which seems, nevertheless, to be represented by a fairly well-defined group of people is that of the highest spiritual level, that represented by 'the good', or, more precisely, by 'the poor' (ḍriyōšān),⁷

who have to be materially supported by other members of the community.

It seems therefore probable that if any esoteric doctrines of a spiritual kind are found in Zoroastrianism they would be restricted to this group of ^{the}devouts, the poor. The simple member of the community is encouraged to aspire, as his highest goal, to be 'with good people', whereas the good people find themselves in company with the gods.⁸

The evidence for the existence of esoteric doctrines must now be considered.

'One ought to say the word (only) to reliable people, discuss the religion (only) among those of the same religion, and speak about good deeds and sins to every one' (Dk vi.55).

The passage is constructed in the well-known pattern of a descending hierarchy. What 'the word' means can be guessed when we notice that the next item is 'religion' and the last one is 'good deeds and sins'. It seems certain that 'the word' does not refer to a trivial personal matter but to something closely related to the core of religion. The second subject, 'religion', i.e. probably the inner religious disposition,⁹ is open to discussion only among people who share the same religion; as all the people involved here (even in the last group) are in any

case Zoroastrians, people of the same religion are presumably those on the same level of spiritual attainment as oneself, to exclude the more vulgar.¹⁰

The passage which follows throws some further light on the theme of 'the word':

'One ought to say the word (only) to a person who has such comprehension that he grasps it, and who has such awareness that he does not forget (?) it, and who has such wisdom that he is capable of doing good to his fellow' (Dk vi.56).

This passage tells us what the author means by the term 'reliable people' which occurs in the previous passage. The qualities which characterize such people are intellectual, but have an unmistakably religious flavour. This comes out in a neighbouring passage which defines the three terms:

'The function of comprehension is this, to seek a thing. The function of awareness is this, to do the work of a treasurer and to look after the thing which comprehension has sought. The function of wisdom is this, to make distinctions, to recognize the good and the evil, to do that which is good and to abandon that which is evil' (Dk vi.64).

The first two faculties possess an object of knowledge and preserve it in the memory, while the third faculty puts it

into practical use, that is, makes use of it in the practice of morality. Thus 'the word' seems to be a notion of knowledge and awareness which can be applied practically in the moral field.

Another passage which belongs to the subject of the esoteric doctrines, and which may help to elucidate their contents to some extent is the following:

'One ought to be worthy of every secret of the battle of the gods and the gods' 'dyn'y, for when a man is worthy, the gods themselves inform him of the secret of their battle. For the gods desire a reliable treasurer. The 'dynyx of the gods and the secret of their battle is not hidden from any one, for they know that the more people know (them) better, ^{more powerful are the gods} ~~the gods are more powerful~~. "To be worthy" was said by them to mean this, that a man becomes so good that the gods have a way into his body, and that they show him the secret of their things' (Dk vi.214).

The passage unfortunately contains an unknown word. 'dyn'y, 'dynyx looks deceptively like the ideogram ADYN (ēg), 'then', but is obviously some other word. It can conceivably be an anomalous spelling, or a dialectal variant, of āyēn, ēyēn, normally spelt in Pahlavi 'dwyn

(=ewēn), Parthian 'bdyn, 'course, manner, habit'.¹¹

It may seem strange that the secret of the battle of the gods is 'not hidden from any one', but this should be understood in the sense that the gods desire to have as many people share their secrets as possible, but they can divulge them only to reliable people.

It is clear from the last passage that some esoteric knowledge is connected with the knowledge of the secret of the battle of the gods, apparently with the demons. The special relationship of a man who is worthy of association with the gods implies direct contact, the gods entering his body. It seems probable that in other cases where there is talk of the gods communicating with or residing in the body of people the implication is that the relationship is similar to the one described here.

We have seen that rāz, 'secret', was used in the last passage in a phrase which combined it with the battle of the gods. Two quotations from texts outside the field of the andarz literature may help in determining the sense of the term more precisely:

'And it¹² came to Kay Syāwaxš the Brilliant. He built it Kang-diz, the wondrously-made, by beneficent keeping and protection of the great miracle, splendour

and secret of the religion. From this was manifest the organization of the time and the restitution of the lordship of Iran and the attachment of power and victory back to the religion of Ohrmazd'

(DkM 598.15-20).¹³

rāz comes here in company with two other words charged with meaning of particularly numinous character. All three terms seem in this context to represent the aspect of force and power in the religion, and are thus probably related to the idea of the battle of the gods. A much closer relationship is seen in the other passage:

'He [Yam] took some of the great miracle and splendour of the Creator, went in bodily form to hell, and spent thirteen winters in hell in the form of a demon. By miraculous and skilful means he brought back from the demons the secret and the weapon by which the demons can be vanquished and made powerless over men. He smote and vanquished the demons by this very weapon, made them powerless over men and removed them away from men' (DkM 296.17-297.1).¹⁴

The interest of this passage lies particularly in the fact that it combines the use of the three words encountered in the previous text: Yam, armed with warz

and xwarr, goes to the demons to retrieve from them the rāz which would enable him to vanquish them. In these two passages, as in the one quoted from Dk vi.214, the secret has to do with the battle of the gods with the demons. Knowledge of the secret enables one to vanquish the demons.

It is not certain whether the secret always refers to the same technical concept of the battle against the demons. A passage of the hierarchical type which again makes use of the term 'secret' may be considered:

'Peace and love should be given to every creature.

Good deeds should be spoken to every person. Zand

should be said (only) in the household. The secret

should be spoken (only) to reliable people' (Dk vi.254).

This is the first part of a saying, and it contains four phrases in mounting order. The text is strongly reminiscent of Dk vi.55, quoted above; the term 'secret' comes here instead of 'the word' in that passage. The vague term 'religion' in Dk vi.55 is here paralleled by the more defined 'zand'.¹⁵ That the secret here too is a notion which implies a high degree of intimacy with the gods may be seen by a comparison of the second part of the same passage, which contains an independent hierarchy:

'The discipline and the law should be kept in public.

Joy should be experienced in the myazd ritual. The

worship of the gods should be done in discretion (?)'

(Dk vi.254).

The meaning of the last word in this saying is not quite established.¹⁶ It is however certain that it denotes some degree of privacy, in contrast to 'joy', which is experienced in the myazd ceremony, or the discipline, which is open and public. This saying seems to parallel the last three phrases in the first half of the same passage: 'good deeds' correspond to 'discipline'; 'zand' occupies the same position as 'joy', which has here the specific religious meaning discussed above; and 'the secret' comes in place of 'worship of the gods'. The term 'secret' thus again implies, if we rely on this correspondence, a kind of personal experience of the gods.

An allusion to mystery doctrines may also occur in the following sentence:

'Religion consists of seven walls. The farthest out among them are the mānθra and the zand'

(Dk vi.215).

The sacred word and the commentary are the farthest wall of the religion, presumably meaning that they are the most easily accessible. They are called a wall because they are not open to every one,¹⁷ but, as we already

know from other texts, they are much less restricted than 'the word' or 'the secret'. The number seven given here can be regarded of course as purely conventional, not indicating a precise value.

Needless to say, the word rāz is very often used also in the plain meaning of a commonplace secret, without referring to a religious mystery. Thus, for example:

'One ought not to tell a secret (rāz) to gossips and women, for the secret will become widely known and he will come to regret it who tells secrets to gossips and women' (Dk vi.B.48);

or, in another passage:

'One ought not to tell a secret to many people, for the secret becomes public, and many people have to keep it secret, and he has to fear from many people, who tells a secret to many people' (Dk vi.B.44).

These two quotations come from a section in Dk vi which is concerned with more mundane matters than those of other parts of the book.¹⁸ A similar usage of the term for practical matters occurs in the following passage:

'The best virtue and faculty in the service and attendance of the lords and chiefs is discretion (?),

which is obedience and the hiding of secrets ...'
(Dk vi.E.43b).

The term rāz is similarly used, in a non-andarz text, in connection with secrets which are revealed through confession:

'The person before whom repentance is done ought to listen well (to the repentant), not to blame him and not to convey his secrets. For if he blames him for a sin committed or conveys his secrets, he becomes equal to him' (ŠnŠ 8.9, p. 107).¹⁹

Here the secret or secrets are of course those referring to the repentant's affairs or sins.

The last quotations show that the word rāz is used even in religious contexts in all the wide variety of associations that go with the English word 'secret'. That it did possess also the narrow technical meaning of religious mystery seems nevertheless certain from the texts quoted previously as well as from the fact that it tended, as a loan-word in other languages, to be specifically used for this purpose.²⁰

b.

If the existence of a body of esoteric doctrines in Zoroastrianism is recognized, it is clear that special techniques of teaching would have been adopted by the

masters so as to test their disciples and to ensure that they divulged their instruction only to the deserving. There is perhaps a slight hint at discriminating instruction in the wording of one of the 'characters' of priests:

'To keep religious authority, like a most wise and truth-speaking chief who is taught by the knowledge of the religion and who teaches truthfully' (PhLT 129 §4).²¹

The fact that he is not expected to teach 'by the knowledge of the religion' but merely 'truthfully' may indicate that he is not expected to teach his knowledge to every one.

Dk vi is a book which is largely built on the principle of cryptic, midrash-like utterances, and this seems very likely to be a reflection of the oral methods of instruction, in the course of which many of the most important themes are merely alluded to, and the disciple is left to work out the solutions largely by himself. An example of this may be found in the saying:

'There is that thing which he who is in it does not move away from it, and he who is not in it moves towards it' (Dk vi.57),

which is explained in the paragraph which follows as being the religion. This seems a typical case where oral instruction is committed to writing. The solution of the riddle posed in this passage may have been considered

a secret, the inference from it being perhaps some kind of union with religion, as is more explicitly said in a passage not far from the last one quoted: 'He who turns his face towards religion ... religion shows him a thousand sayings which he has never heard from any one, and when he discusses (them) with priests and wise men, they are right' (Dk vi.63). Here religion conveys to man certain hidden things. These two sayings, significantly, form part of a whole group of paragraphs which deal with the mysteries. We have already discussed in the first part of this section the sayings contained in §55-56, and also §64, which explains the faculties of 'reliable men'. In the same collection of sayings we also find the following passage:

'If you are true of tongue, should you say to a mountain, "Go forward", it will go' (Dk vi.60).

The mystery flavour of this saying seems undeniable, though its precise significance escapes us. Another saying which strikes me as alluding to something which is not transparent from its actual wording is the following:

'Unless one has done oneself, or one's ancestors did, some specific good deeds, one has no union with orthodoxy' (Dk vi.62).

It is possible, if the translation is correct, that the obscurity of the passage is deliberate.

There are other passages which look as though they may have been deliberately intended to be cryptic:

'Selecting means to select one's thought, speech and action away from the power of aliens towards the help of one's kinsmen' (Dk vi.267), which apparently alludes to man's relations with the gods and the demons, but perhaps with some further veiled reference as to the method, which only the initiated understand. In the same paragraph, the definition 'Being righteous means to be clothed in righteousness', which looks like a tautology, has perhaps an underlying allusion which eludes us. The same would apply to another definition, 'Being spotless means unity' (ibid.).

The whole of that passage in fact is not improbably a kind of catechism for the initiated. The introductory phrase is significant: 'Among good people there are some who asked and some who explained'. Good people, as we know, is often used in a technical sense for people on the highest level of perfection, and their exchange of questions and answers can hardly be trivial. Given this assumption we may try to consider the whole structure of that saying. The definitions are:

'Being righteous' means to be clothed in righteousness;

'Good deeds' means to do the matters of the gods;

'Purity' means separation from the demons;

'Doing one's duty' means being free from sin;

'Selecting' means to select one's thought, speech and action away from the power of aliens towards the help of one's kinsmen;

'Being spotless' means unity;

'Being a giver' means mainly one who owes goodness to every person;

'Truthfulness' in summary means not to lie in anything concerning anything;

'Deathlessness' means to be again just as one was;

'The future body' means one who is born again just as *he* one was born. (Dk vi.267).

The list seems to have a certain order, leading as it does from the state of preparation for spiritual advancement to the goal which is expressed by the last two items.

Thus one may assume that 'righteousness' and 'good deeds' are the two initial steps to be taken, 'purity' and 'duty' signify the release from the adverse effect of the demons, 'selection' and 'spotlessness' show the motion towards union with the gods, 'giving' and 'truthfulness' are allusions to two supreme virtues, the precise meaning of

which is impossible to guess. The ultimate achievement is represented by 'deathlessness' and 'the future body', which are here interpreted in a way which shows that they are not taken in the eschatological sense. The word hangerdig 'in summary', which follows 'truthfulness', may perhaps be explained on the ground that it introduces the last stage before the goal is reached.²²

All this is of course hypothetical, and no validity is claimed for the interpretation of the passage offered here. It is only suggested that this type of analysis of a text, based on the assumption that it conveys some mystery which is concealed from the casual reader, can be one way of coming to a closer understanding of such obscure texts.

CONCLUSION

At least one important Iranian scholar, E. Herzfeld, held an extremely negative view of the value of Persian literature in Sasanian times. 'Sasanian literature,' he said, 'reveals a poverty of mind almost inconceivable and rarely attained elsewhere' (Archaeological history of Iran, London 1935, 100). This harsh judgement stands in no relation to reality: one can be sure of this even from the little that has withstood the calamities which befell the Zoroastrian community after the Muslim conquest of Iran. But the fact that it could have been uttered demonstrates how inaccessible the material is even for well-informed people. Part of the reason why this literature is not more easily accessible has been suggested above. In Sasanian times, and perhaps already earlier, there appears to have existed a tendency to conceal certain basic ideas which bear upon the mode of devotion of the pious and to write about them in a language which is not readily assimilated by one who is unprepared. It seems indeed not unlikely that this way of writing had some influence in the development of the ṣūfī style in Islamic times.

The second part of the present work has tried to

give a composite picture of the religious world of the main andarz texts. These texts have been treated as far as possible in isolation from the rest of Zoroastrian literature. Not only is this method more expedient for a work which has had to be completed within certain limits of time, but it has also seemed to have the advantage of enabling one to notice the characteristic marks of this type of literature. Although one cannot expect to find great differences in substance between andarz and theological writing, there obviously exists some marked difference in emphasis and approach.

A group of short studies on the use of a number of terms relating to man, such as ox, wārom, kāmag, tan, jan, ruwān, has been prepared in the course of the present work but has not been finally included in it, as it seemed pointless to base such a discussion only on andarz texts; to do it on the basis of an exhaustive collection of passages on the other hand, would not be appropriate in a work on andarz.

One of the problems which faces anyone who wants to deal with the andarz type of literature was pointed out by no less an authority than Nöldeke. His words, said in apology for not having undertaken a comprehensive study of parallel passages of andarz, are: '... aber freilich erfordert

die Untersuchung dieser ermüdenden Stücke ein ungewöhnliches
Maass von Geduld' (cf. his Persische Studien II,
Sitzungsberichte Wien. Akad. CXXVI, Vienna 1892, 29).
It is hard to disagree with him. One may at least hope
that the discussion of themes from the andarz literature
contained in this work has not taxed the patience of the
reader beyond endurance.

Appendix A.

Texts on wisdom and contentment from PhlT.

1. Hymn on wisdom, PhlT. 74f. (Wehzād, Text)
2. Some words of Adurfarnbag son of Farrozzād, PhlT. 79f. (Text and translation)
3. The remedy of contentment, PhlT. 154 (Text and translation)
4. Poem in praise of wisdom, PhlT. 165f. (Text and translation)

(1) Hymn on wisdom

PhLT. 74f. §6-18. Cf. above, Part Two, section 2, ^{p. 106}
 'Wisdom', where the translation is given. In the
 following reconstruction the division of sentences in
 PhLT. had to be ignored, and the text was often restituted
 from the variants in the footnotes. As it would be very
 cumbersome to reproduce here the apparatus given in PhLT,
 one is advised to consult it together with the transcription
 offered here.

The metre of the hymn consists of three stresses to
 a hemistich. The two parts of a line are for the most
 part well paralleled both in sense and in wording. The
 last line is somewhat too short and cannot easily be
 divided into two. It may be merely a prose summary of
 the contents of the poem.

cē-m uzmūd harw wad az dām,

hamāg frāxwīh ud friyādišn az xrad.

cē mard ō wuzurg afrāz xrad nayēd

ud az škifttom ōrēb¹ xrad bōzēnēd.

xrad dāštār ud pānāg ī jān

xrad buxtār ud friyādāg ī tan.

andar tawānīgīh xrad weh,

ud padiz kem-xīrīh xrad pānagtar.

ēdar pad hayyārīh xrad weh,

anōh pad pušt xrad pānagtar.

abzār pad xrad pād̄yāwandtar,

nām pērāyag az xrad.

rādīh pad xrad friyādišnīḡtar (xrad),

dūd̄ag-abrōzišnīh abzār pad xrad wisēd.

dēn-ēwarīh tāštīḡ xrad rāy,

dānišn xrad rāy stāyīdagtar.

paymān paydāgtar xrad rāy,

dānišn xrad rāy kārīḡtar.

cē harw kē-š xrad ast hunar-iz ast,

cē harw kē-š xrad ast xwāstag-iz ast.

cē harw kār ī nēwag

bun pad xrad wisēd.

1. For this word cf. note to Dk vi.C.9, translation. ^{1.234}

(2) Text on wisdom by Ādurfarnbag son of Farroxzād

PhLT. 79f. Cf. above, Part One, text No.xii and Part Two, section 2, 'Wisdom'.

Saxwan ēcand ī Ādurfarnbag ī Farroxzādān

pursīd ku xrad cē ud dīdār ī xrad cē?

u-š hān awiš [guft ku] mard-ē dānāg abāg

xēm hunar wehīh ud wāpar husrawīh ud ōstwarīh.

xēm andar āmad u-š gyāg[...] bē kard,

hunar andar āmad u-š gyāg pāk bē kard,
 wehīh andar āmad u-š bē gāh arāyēd,
 husrawīh andar āmad u-š gyāg hubōy bē kard,
 ōstwār andar āmad ud pad gāh bē nišast,
 ud wābar andar āmad ud rāstīh ud ōstwār bē padīrift.

pursīd ku kištan ī xrad cē?

u-š guft ku kištan ī xrad amōxtārīh ud āb hān ī

niyōšīdārīh ud bār hān ī wizīdārīh ud gyāg hān wahišt
 ī rōšn ī hamāg xwārīh.

anōš-ruwān bād Ādurfarnbag ī Farroxzādān kē-š

ēn saxwan guft.

frazaft.

Some words of Ādurnfarnbag son of Farroxzād.

He asked, 'What is wisdom and what is the sight of wisdom?'

He told him, 'A wise man is with character, virtue, goodness, credibility, good fame and reliability.'

Character came in and made him a [...?] place;
 virtue came in and made him a clean place;
 goodness came in and adorned him a throne;
 good fame came in and made ^{him} a fragrant place;

reliability came in and seated him on the throne;
credibility came in and accepted truthfulness and
reliability."

He asked, 'What is the sowing of wisdom?'

He said, "The sowing of wisdom is learning, the
water is listening, the fruit is discernment, the place
is that bright paradise of all bliss."

May Adurfarnbag son of Farrozzād, who said these
words, be immortal.

Completed.

(3) The remedy of contentment

PhlT. 154. Cf. above, Part One, text No. xxvi and
Part Two section 14b. 'Contentment'.

Dārūg ī hunsandīh

pad nām ī yazdān.

dārūg ī hunsandīh pad ciš ī carīg nē baxt ēstēd;

ud hāniz ī carīg darmān āsanīh ēn ī jahēd.

dārūg-ē bawēd ēd dram sang mēnišnīg āmixtan: dānišnīgihā

šnāxtan ī hunsandīh dāng-ē sang.

ud ka ēn nē kunēm cē kunēm dāng-ē.

az im rōz tā fradāg weh šāyēd būdan dāng-ē sang.

ma agar az ēn wattar šāyēd būdan dāng-ē sang.

pad ēn ī mad ēstēd hunsand būdan man āsāntar dāng-ē sang.

ud ka hunsand nē bawēm pad kār nē weh ud man dušxwārtar
dāng-ē sang.

ēn dārūg ī šāh andar hāwan ī škēbāgīh kardan, pad hāwan

dastag ī niyāyišnīh kustan ud pad parnīgān ī wēdwarīh

wīxtan ud harw rōz azēr ī bāmdād 2 kabcag pad kabcag

ī abastān ī yazdān ī yazdān ō dahān abgandan ud āb ī

cē šāyēd kardan az pas xwardan, pas abēgumānīhā hunsand
būdan, cē pad tan ud ruwān abēr sūdōmand.

frazaft.

The remedy of contentment

In the name of the gods.

The remedy of contentment has not been distributed for something which can be escaped. The remedy for a thing which can be escaped, moreover, is this relief which comes about.

This is a remedy: to mix in thought a dram weight (as follows): one weight of a dāng of 'recognition of contentment by knowledge'; one dāng of 'if I do not do this, what shall I do?'; one weight of a dāng of 'From to-day until tomorrow it may be better'; one weight of a dāng of 'It could have been worse

than this'; one weight of a dāng of 'It is easier for me to be content with that which has come to me'; one weight of a dāng of 'If I am not content, it is no better for the matter and it is more difficult for myself'.

Put this royal remedy in the mortar of patience, pound it with the pestle of ritual, sift them with the silken sieve of resignation, and every day under dawn put two spoons (of it) in the mouth for every spoon of trust in the gods, afterwards drink the water of 'What can one do?', then be content without doubt, for this is very beneficial for the body and the soul.

Completed.

(d) Poem in praise of wisdom

PhlT. 165.14-166.4. Cf. above, Part One, text No. xxvii. The metre seems to consist of four stresses to the half-line. Here too the lines are easily divisible into two symmetrical halves.

cē raft hēm andar āwām	was-am wazīd kustag kustag,
was-am just az dēn mānsr	was-am az nibīg ud nāmag kard,
man dastwar ud wizārdār kard,	man hampursagīh stāyīdag dīd.
[nē] dānāg ī xrad āzād	nē-z wizīdār dīd acārag,

nē husraw andar ^{oreb} [a]	ud nē pad niyāz mard ī pad xrad.
u-m anjaman dīd ī wuzurgān,	pad guft ud uskār ud wīr ud
u-m dēn-dastwarān pursīd ku	^{xrad,} xwāstag weh ayāb xēm ud xrad,
u-šānūpād hamāg cāštag guft ku	nām padīrišnīh[az] zōhr ī xrad,
cē xwāstag ud ganz ī amar	xēm pahrezēd ud xrad dārēd.
pad mard hangadīh xrad weh,	handōxt ī pēšag arzōmandtar.

'For I have lived much in time,

I have much travelled from region to region,
have much sought from the sacred word of religion,

have studied much scriptures and books,

I have made myself an authority a discerning man,

have seen consultation praised.

Never have I seen a free learned man of wisdom

or a discerning man without remedy.

Never have I seen a man of good fame in trouble,

or a wise man in want.

I have seen an assembly of men, great

in speech, deliberation, wit and wisdom,

and have asked the authorities of religion:

Is wealth best or character and wisdom?

They said with all their teaching:

The attainment of fame is from the power of wisdom,

for boundless wealth and treasure (is this:)

abstain by character and keep wisdom.

For the opulence of man wisdom is best,

the hoarding of profession is most valuable."

a. For this word see note to Dk vi.C.9.

Appendix B

Texts and notes for 'the Measure'

I. Texts and translation:

1. Dk iii 68
2. Dk iii 76
3. Dk iii 203 (extracts)
4. Dk iii 310
5. Dk iii 336

II. Lists abstracted from the various passages:

- 1-5. as above
6. Dk iii 391
7. Dk vi B.14ff.
8. Ph1T 89f.

I. Texts and translations

1. Dk iii ch.68, DkM 57.14-59.10. Cf. Menasce, Encyclopédie 42f.

abar zamānag rāyēnīdārīh šōnag. az nigēz ī wehdēn.

had zamānag rāyēnīdārīh šōn abērdar pad xrad hunar rāyēnīdan. ud awē ī frazānag cē'on-aš frāz-āhangīg abāz-āhangīg hunarān ī xwēš paymānīhā az dādār āfrišn pad cīhr hanbārdag, u-š xrad pēšōbāy ī hunarān. pad xrad zamānag bē šnāsēd. ud zamānag ī-š rāyēnišn abrāz hamargīhā pad frāz-āhangīg, ud hangāmīhā ud kasīhā pad abāz-āhangīg. hān ī-š rāyēnišn nišēb hamargānīhā pad abāz-āhangīg, ud hangāmīhā ud kasīhā pad frāz-āhangīg. hunar rāyēnīdan ī pad xūb-burdārīh ī 2 ēwēnag hunar andar 2 gōnag zamān o kār kārīgēnīdār, hunarān ī sūd-kardār ī kārān ud xūb-rāyēnīdār(īh) ī zamānag handāxtār ī xwēš husrawīh ud huruwānīh ud bōzišn bawēd.

ēd a'on ku hān ī-š abrāz zamānag xrad pēšōbāyīhā rāyēnīdan abērdar pad

- (1) abāyišn [ī pāk] az āz
- (2) tagīgīh ī abēzar az xēšm
- (3) jumbišn ī pāk az jōyāgīh (?)
- (4) tuxšāgīh ī pāk az waranīgīh
- (5) āzād-mardīh ī pāk az karabīh

- (6) rāmišn ī pāk az rēdih
- (7) āzādagih ī pāk az anēr-pākih
- (8) rādih ī pāk az wanēgarih
- (9) *hayyārwandih ī pāk az sturgih
- (10) *atarsih pāk az stardih
- (11) dādīgih ī pāk az *siftārih
- (12) wuzurg-mēnišnih ī pāk az abar-mēnišnih
- (13) društ-cašmih ī pāk az duš-cašmih
- (14) ēwēn-xwayišnih ī pāk az waranīgih
- (15) cābukih ī pāk az cīnagih
- (16) amāwandih ī pāk az zišt-mēnišnih

ud abārīg hunarān ī pāk az brādarōd āhang ō rāyēnidārīh
 ī abarmānd ud xwadīh passazag kardan ī wuzurg ud dūr-
 -nāmīg ud pattāy kār ud kirbag.

ud hān ī-š nišēb zamānag rāyēnidan xrad pēšobāyih
 abērdar pad

- (1) nigīrīdārīh ī pāk az spōzgārīh
- (2) burdih ī pāk az a-ēwih (?)
- (3) xāmōših ī pāk az tušt-mēnišnih
- (4) hunsandih ī pāk az ašgahānih
- (5) driyōših ī pāk az škōhīh
- (6) hunsandih ī brahmagih (?) ī pāk az rīmanih

- (7) wizīnagīh ī xwāyišn ī pāk az anāzagīh
 (8) fšōnišn ī pāk az panīh
 (9) šarm ī pāk az tarsūgīh
 (10) pahrēz-kārīh ī pāk az wirēg az kirbag
 (11) xwābarīh ī pāk az bōšīh
 (12) ēr-mēnišnīh ī pāk az ōbastāgīh
 (13) hucašmīh ī pāk az waran-cašmīh
 (14) bāristānīh ī pāk az kēn-hanbārīh
 (15) āwāmīgīh ī pāk az *gilag
 (16) abar-passand ī pāk az wināh hamīh

ud abārīg hunarān ī pāk az brādarōd āhang ō rāyēnišnīgīh
 ī az hān ī xradīg. hujahišn rāyēnīdār ud pahrēz ī az
 xurdag wināh.

Translation

On the manner of the timely governing (of things).
 From the instruction of the Good Religion.

The manner of the timely governing (of things) is
 mostly the governing of virtue through wisdom. The wise
 man, as he has forward-inclined and backward-inclined
 (virtues), his virtues are assembled in his nature by the
 creation of the Creator. Wisdom is the foremost of his
 virtues. He knows the (right) time by wisdom. A time
 the governing of which is ascendance, is generally (to be

treated) by forward-inclined(virtues), though for (certain) occasions and people through backward-inclined. A time whose governing is decline is (to be treated) generally by backward-inclined (virtues), though for (certain) occasions and people through forward-inclined(virtues). The governing of virtues which is done by good bearing of the two kinds of virtue in the two sorts of time is effective in carrying out (its purpose). The virtues which carry out actions beneficially and which govern time well become that which measures out one's good fame, the possession of good soul and salvation.

One whose time is ascendance, wisdom should govern him as a leader mostly through --

- (1) necessity, which is free from lust
- (2) swiftness which is free^[a] from wrath
- (3) movement which is free from^[b]
- (4) diligence which is free from greediness
- (5) nobility which is free from karabih^[c]
- (6) joy which is free from filth (?).^[d]
- (7) freedom which is free from lack of Iranian purity,^[e]
- (8) generosity which is free from squandering,
- (9) helpfulness^[f] which is free from fierceness,

- (10) lack of fear which is free from stupidity,
- (11) lawfulness which is free from stiffness, [g]
- (12) great mindedness [h] which is free from arrogance,
- (13) severity which is free from cruelty,
- (14) desire of one's due (?) which is free from greed,
- (15) refinement [i] which is free from fastidiousness, [j]
- (16) strength which is free from ugly thinking,

and the other virtues which are free from the inclination which is their false associate. (This is to be done) so as to govern one's heritage and one's selfness, and make seemly the good deeds which are great, of lasting memory and abiding.

One whose time is decline, wisdom should govern him as a leader mostly through --

- (1) abstention [k] which is free from rejection,
- (2) patience which is free from disobedience (?), [l]
- (3) taciturnity which is free from dumbness, [m]
- (4) contentment which is free from sloth,
- (5) poverty which is free from misery,
- (6) contentment in dressing (?) which is free from filth,
- (7) discernment of desire which is free from lack of craving,
- (8) thrift which is free from avarice,
- (9) shame which is free from fear, [n]

- (10) avoidance which is free from steering away from good deeds,
- (11) benevolence which is free from vanity (?), [o]
- (12) humility which is free from abasement,
- (13) good disposition which is free from greed,
- (14) long-suffering which is free from storing of vengeance,
- (15) timeliness (?) which is free from complaint, [p]
- (16) approval of things which is free from complicity in sin,

and the other virtues which are free from the inclinations which are their false associates. (This is to be done) so as to govern that which is from wisdom. A man of good fortune is one who governs and abstains from the small(est) sin.

NOTES

[a] abēzār, ~~which is synonym of pāk~~ here replaces ^{pāk} ~~the~~ pāk ~~letter~~ in order to avoid the confusion which might have arisen from the similarity in writing between the ending of tagīgīh and the ideogram for pāk (DKYA)

[b] This word could be connected with justan and be assumed to mean 'search, uncertainty'. It is perhaps from the same puzzling verb which occurs in Dk vi.56, 294, see ibid. The

word also seems to occur in a mutilated form in DkM 167.13, 14.

[c] Cf. the opposition between āzād-mardīh and karabīh in Dk vi.142, 144.

[d] Cf. also DkM 789.14. On the verb from which this noun is derived cf. Bailey, BSOS 6 (1930/32) 82.

[e] The translation 'pureté non aryenne' (Menasce, Encyclopédie 42) does not seem possible.

[f] In a parallel list, DkM 372.7, the word is spelt 'y'lwndyx, which would not, however, be the normal spelling for hayyār-. In DkM 312.22 the word is spelt arwandīh; but in 328.1ff. both hayyārwandīh and arwandīh occur, and it is clear that the former represents the same word as ours (it comes with sturgīh and šarm).

[g] In the parallel list, DkM 371.21, the word occurs as kplyx, which may suggest perhaps dibīrīh or the like. The reading proposed here seems preferable as it is supported by the occurrence of much the same word in DkM 419.17 (sift-kārīh, siftag-dārān), 419.20 (siftagān), although the context there does not allow the meaning to be conclusively established.

[h] wuzurg-mēnišnīh an Iranian compound built on the model of the Greek megalopsuxia, which has much the same

position in Aristotle's scheme of qualities, cf. e.g. Nichomachean Ethics II.vii.7.

[i] cābukīh has this meaning in Pahlavi, cf. the sequence ābādīh ud arāyišn ud cābukīh ud abrang ud huniyāgīh ud rāmišn (DkM 337.4f.). It also occurs in a clear context as follows: ēn 3 ciš paymān dāštār ast cašm ud dahān ud uzwān ud gōš ud grīw, cašm az zanīn ud dahān az xwarišn ī anēwēn ud uzwān az halagīh ud gōš az huniyāgīh ud grīw az cābukīh (DkM 160.21-161.2, cf. Bailey, Zor.Pr. 114 note),

'He guards these three (read: 'five') things in measure: the eyes, the mouth, the tongue, the ear and the neck; the eye from women, the mouth from eating food against custom,¹ the tongue from vain speech, the ear from music, the neck from refinement'.

1. Bailey, *ibid.*, differently.

[j] The word is perhaps to be read wizīnagīh '(over-)selectiveness, choosiness, fastidiousness'. Menasce's suggestion 'esprit de lucre' is also possible, retaining the reading cīnagīh.

[k] nigīrīdārīh obviously serves in a meaning like 'abstention, careful and deliberate approach', in keeping with the spirit of the list which consists of backward-inclined virtues. One cannot help feeling that this usage of the word is connected with the apparent

derivative nigīrāy 'denying, repudiating', on which cf. Dk vi.59.

[l] The reading and translation are not certain. Cf. also DkM 67.5; 329.3; 371.18. The positive form of the same word is found in DkM 329.5(?).

[m] Cf. for tušt mēnišnīh DkM 140.14; 201.4 (tuštīh). Also Dhabhar, PhlYasna, Glossary 97.

[n] The form of the word is strange.

[o] bōšīh is also found in the same opposition in DkM 371.21, 329.2. The translation here, from NP bauš, defined in Burhān-i Qāṭi ' karr u farr va x^v ad-namā'ī, does not seem quite suitable.

[p] Written grān, this is obviously the same word which occurs in Dk vi either as gilag-ōbār or grān-ōbār, the second form of which is assumed to be a corruption (or a variant) of the first, which is the correct compound. Cf. Dk vi.29 and further references: ibid.).

2. Dk iii ch. 76, DkM 67.3-68.8, cf. Menasce,
Encyclopédie 46.

abar āsn-xrad ud waran abzārān. az nigēz ī wehdēn.

had wisp hunarān hēnd āsn xrad abzār, u-š māyagwar
ēn 3 hamyuxt hunar --

(1) ēwag bawandag-mēnišnīh ī pāk az a-ēw-mēnišnīh ī-š
brādarōd; ud tagīgīh ī pāk az xēšmenīh ī-š brādarōd
pad hamyuxtīh

(2) ud ēwag tuxšāg[īh] ī pāk az āzwarīh ī-š brādarōd;
ud hunsandīh ī pāk az ašgahānīh ī-š brādarōd pad hamyuxtīh.

(3) ud ēwag xrad-dōšagīh ī (ī-š) pāk az waranīg *xwad-
dōšagīh ī-š brādarōd; ud abāz-pursīdār dānišnīh
(āhangīh?) [ī pāk] az *nālag-xwāhīh ī-š brādarōd pad
hamyuxtīh.

ud kē āsn-xrad pad abāgīh ī ēn 3 hamyuxt abzār mad
ēstēd. abardar burdār āsn-xrad padiš buxtagtar ud
burzišnīgtar andar mardom.

hamāg āhōg hēnd waran abzār, u-š māzantar (aziš)
ēn 3 hamyuxt āhōg --

(1) - (2) - (3) [The above list reversed.]

ud kē waran pad hamīh ī ēn 3 hamyuxt āhōg dārēd
škifttar burdār ud arāh waran padiš ērangīgtar ud
kōxšīdagtar andar mardomān.

ud kēšdārān kē ranz ērang ud škarwišn ud gannāgīh
 ī mardom yazd andar mardom kard kēš ī-šān, harw wizand
 ud anāgīh ī mardom az arāh ī waran paywast abar yazd,
 ud xrad hamēstārīh-iz ud mardomān dušmanīh guft bawēd.
 yazdīh az-iš bē [...] guft bawēd.

Translation

On the instruments of innate wisdom and of greed.
 From the instruction of the Good Religion.

All virtues are the instruments of innate wisdom,
 the most important of them are these connected virtues:

- (1) one, reverence which is free from disobedience, its false associate; and swiftness which is free from wrath which is its false associate through inter-connection.
- (2) One, diligence which is free from greediness, its false associate; and contentment which is free from sloth, its false associate through inter-connection.
- (3) One, love of wisdom which is free from lustful love of self, its false associate; and knowledge which questions back which is free from desire of grief (?), its false associate through inter-connection.

One who has become supreme carrier of innate wisdom in company with these three connected instruments, innate wisdom is most saved and most honoured among men.

All vices are the instruments of greed, the most devilish among them are these three connected vices: (1) - (2) - (3) [The vices of the above list are presented in opposition to their 'false associates', the virtues of the same list.]

One who holds greed together with these three vices, is the fiercest carrier and is devoid of a way, greed is the most condemning and most quarrelsome in him among men.

The holders of the belief that the pain, condemnation, stumbling and wickedness of man were made in man by god, all the harm and evil of man is attached to the god from the lack of way of greed, and (god) is said to be even the adversary of wisdom and the enemy of men. According to this view the character of the god is said to be [that of the demons?].

3. Extracts from Dk iii ch. 203. Cf. Menasce, Encyclopédie
46.

[DkM 222.7ff]

ud wimand ī wehīh hān ī-š frašmišn az xwēš ud
a-frašmišn az bē-xwēš, cē'on zīndagīh ī pad xwadīh
abāyišnīg ud stāyišnīg, u-š anabāyišnīgīh astišnīh az
bē-xwēš, ī ast wimārīh ud waštīh ud zarmanīh ud wināh ud
druwandīh.

ud wahān ī wehīh andar dahišnān xwadīg wehīh,
rādīh ī dāmān pid ud xwadāy ud dādār ohrmazd.

u-š cim abāyišn ud kām ī-š abar dahišnān sūd,
madan ī-š wehīh o dahišnān.

ud wehīh hangerdīg paymān.

u-š zahag dād.

zahag ošmarišnān xrad, xēm, šarm, mihr, rādīh,
rāstīh, spāsdārīh ud abārīg hunarān. pad-iš amahraspand
hamist abārīg mēnōgān *yazdān xwadīh ī mardom zīndagīh ud
drust ud ābādīh ud xwadāyīh ud dēn-dānāgīh ud kirbag
ahlawīh hamist gētīg weh dahišnān nēwagīh winārīšn.

[DkM 223.10ff.]

ud wimand ī wattarīh hān ī pad xwadīh a-frašmišnīgīh

u-š frašmišn az bē, cē'on margīh ī pad xwadīh anabāyišnīg
 *astišnīh u-š abāyišnīgīh ud stāyišnīgīh az bē, ī ast
 wimārīh ud waštīh ud zarman ud škōhīh ud bēš ī wattar
 az marg.

ud wahān ī wattarīh andar gētīg ud mēnōg dāmān
 hamāg wadīh bun gannāg mēnōg ēbgad.

ud cim ī rasišn ī ō dāmān wehīh ēbgadīg anāgīh
 kām ī awē druz pad ziyān ī spanāg mēnōg dāmān ahōgēnīdan
 ī-šan pad hān wattarīh ī bun ud wahān ī harw anāgīh.

ud wattarīh hangerdīgīh frēhbud ud abēbud.

ud wattarīh hunušk adād.

hunušk ōšmarišnān āz ud xēsmud kēn ud arišk ud
 druxtārīh ud drō[za]nīh ud panīh ud ansapāsīh ud abārīg
 ahōgān. pad-iš dēw druz dušxwadīh (u-š) mardom sāstārīh
 ud ahlamōgīh ud wimārīh ud škōhīh ud dušgāhīh ud wināh
 druwandīh hamist abārīg gētīg dahišnān anāgīh wišōbišn.

Translation

(DkM 222.7ff.)

The limit of goodness is that the radiance of which
 is from itself, and its lack of radiance is from outside
 itself, like living, which is in its essence necessary

and praiseworthy, and the being of its unnecessary (counterpart) is from outside itself, that is illness, malady, decrepitude, sin and wickedness.

The cause of goodness among creatures is the essence of goodness, the generosity of the father, lord and creator of creatures, Ohrmazd.

Its reason is the necessity and the desire which He has for the benefit of the creatures, the coming of His goodness to the creatures.

The summary of goodness is the measure.

The offspring of it is the law.

The categories of the offspring are: wisdom, character, shame, love, generosity, truth, gratitude, and the other virtues. By them the Amahraspands together with the other spiritual gods keep in order the essence of man's living, health, prosperity, lordship, knowledge of religion, good deeds together with the good of the other worldly creatures.

[DkM 223.10ff.]

The limit of badness is that which is, by itself, without radiance, and whose radiance is from without, like death, which is by itself an unnecessary existence, and

whose necessity and praiseworthiness is from the outside, that is illness, malady, decrepitude, misery and affliction which is worse than death.

The cause of badness in the earthly and spiritual creatures is the root of all evil, the attack of the Evil Spirit.

The reason of the coming of the attack on goodness to the creatures is the desire for evil which that demon possesses for the damage of the creatures of the Bounteous Spirits and for contaminating them with that badness which is the root and cause of all evil.

The summary of badness is excess and deficiency.

The malformation of badness is lack of law.

The categories of the malformation are: lust, wrath, vengeance, envy, deceitfulness, wickedness, avarice, ingratitude and the other vices. Through them the deceitful demons corrupt the evil essence of men's tyranny, heresy, illness, misery, ignorance, sin and wickedness together with the evil of other earthly creatures.

4. Dk iii ch. 310, DKM 312.15-313.8. Cf. Menasce,
Encyclopédie 46f.

abar harw hunar ī yazdīg dēn ī mazdēsna ham zahag.
 harw *āhōg ī dēwīg jādūgih ham *wišūdag ast. az nigēz
 ī wehdēn.

had harw hunar ī yazdīg^[a] dēn ī mazdēsna ham zahagih,
 harw āhōg ī dēwīg jādūgih ham *wišūdagih paydāg, az hān ī
 dēn ī mazdēsna gēhān frēh-dādār ud jādūgih gēhān marnzēnidār-
 (ih).

ud hunsandih ud xwēškārīh ud tuxšāgih ud bawandag-
 mēnišnīh ud šarm ud *hayyārwandih ud xwābarīh ud dādīgih ud
 abāz-pursīdārīh ī xrad ud huniyōših ud ērīh ud wuzurg-
 mēnišnīh ud rādih ud rāstih ud spāsdārīh ud hucašmih
 ud abārīg hunarān pad āsn-xrad hamnāf, dēn ī mazdēsna
 ham-zōrīh, gēhān frēh-dādār.

ud āzwarīh ud kēnwarīh ud axwēškārīh ud ašgahānīh ud
 tar-mēnišnīh ud nangwarīh ud sturgih ud ariškēnīh ud
 adādih ud anabāz-pursīdārīh ī xrad ud xwad-dōšāgih ud
 anērīh ud karabih ud panih ud drōzanīh ud anaspāsīh ud
 dušcašmih ud abārīg āhōgān pad waran hamewišūd, jādūgih
 ham-zōrīh, gēhān marnzēnidār.

Translation

Concerning the fact that all the divine virtues together are the offsprings of the Mazdean religion, and that all the demonic vices are the malformations^[b] of sorcery. From the instruction of the Good Religion.

It is manifest, that all divine virtues are together the offsprings of the Mazdean religion, and all demonic vices are together the malformations of sorcery, because the Mazdean religion is that which causes the world to be created forth and sorcery is that which causes destruction to the world.

Contentment, duty, diligence, reverence, shame, courage, benevolence, lawfulness, questioning wisdom back, obedience, humility, magnanimity, generosity, truthfulness, gratitude, good disposition and the other virtues are akin to innate wisdom, are of the same power as the Mazdean religion, cause the world to be created forth.

Greed, vengeance, lack of duty, sloth, arrogance, shamefulfulness, stiffness, envy, lack of law, lack of questioning back of religion, self-love, lack of humility, karabāh, avarice, deceitfulness, ingratitude, bad disposition and the other vices are of the same malformation as lust, of the same power as sorcery, and cause destruction to the world.

Notes

[a] This word is preceded in Madan by YATWNyt which seems a mere corruption of the following yzdtyk (which looks like y'tnyk). This is confirmed by the parallel of the opposite sentence which follows.

[b] The spelling šwtk/y'wtk for wišūdāg is extremely common. Cf. note 5 to Part One, section 2, e, 'Pseudepigraphic andarz'.

5. Dk iii ch. 336, DkM 327.19-329. 10. Cf. Menasce,
Encyclopédie 45.

abar frāz-āhangīg ud abāz-āhangīgān hunarān sar ud
 *āhōgān kamār. az nigēz ī wehdēn.

had frāz-āhangīg hunarān ardēštārīh ud xwadāyīh
 xēmīh sar.

u-š ošmarišnān ēn-iz: dādīgīh ud tagīgīh ud
 hayyārwandīh ud arwandīh ud rādīh ud yazdān kām handāzišnīg
 rāst guftārīh ud wuzurg-mēnišnīh ud tuxšāgīh ud āškārag
 warzīdārīh, hamist abārīg xwadāyīh xēm frāz-āhangīg
 hunarān.

abāz-āhangīg hunar āhrōnīg ud bandag xēmīh sar.

u-š ošmarišnān ēn-iz: xwābarīh ī dādīg, ud bawandag-
 mēnišnīh ī tagīgīh, ud šarm ī hayyārwandīh, ud nihānīh ī
 arwandīh, ud *fšōnišn ī rādīh, ud sūd-guftārīh [ī] rāst-
 guftārīh, ud ēr-mēnišnīh ī wuzurg-mēnišnīh, ud hunsandīh
 ī tuxšāgīh, ud pōryōtkēšīh ī āškārag-warzīdārīh hamyuxt,
 hamist abārīg bandag xēm abāz-āhangīg hunarān.

frāz-āhangīg āhōgān kamār sāstārīh xēm.

u-š ošmarišnān ēn-iz: *siftārīh ī dādīgīh brādarōd
 ud xwābarīh hamēstār, ud xēšmenīh ī tagīgīh brādarōd ud
 bawandag-mēnišnīh hamēstār, ud sturgīh ī hayyārwandīh

brādarōd ud šarm hamēstār, ud widang-kārīh ī arwandīh
 brādarōd ud nihānīh hamēstār, ud wanēgarīh ī rādīh
 brādarōd ud fšōnišn hamēstār, ud rāst pad saxwan
 wizīn ziyān guftārīh ī yazdān *kām handāzišnīh sūdmand
 rāst-guftārīh brādarōd ud sūd-guftārīh hamēstār, ud
 abar-mēnišnīh ī wuzurg-mēnišnīh [brādarōd ud ēr-mēnišnīh]
 hamēstār, ud āzwarīh ī tuxšāgīh brādarōd ud hunsandīh
 hamēstār. ud pad and-cand grān wināh was ud kirbag
 xurdag. ud āškārag ī dēsag-judārīh ī āškārag warzīdārīh
 brādarōddud pōryōtkēš jam-xēmīh hamēstārīh, hamist
 abārīg [frāz-]āhangīgān āhōgān ī brādarōd ud hamēstār
 hēnd ī 2 ēwēnag hunarān.

ud abāz-āhangīg āhōgān *kamār ahlamōgīh (u-š) xēm.

u-š *ōšmarišnān ēn-iz: bōšīh ī xwābarīh brādarōd
 ud dādīgīh hamēstār(īh), ud *a-yw-mēnišnīh ī bawandag-
 mēnišnīh brādarōd ud tagīgīh hamēstār, ud *nangwarīh ī
 šarm brādarōd ud hayyārwandīh hamēstār, ud ywnyx ī
 nihānīh brādarōd ud arwandīh hamēstār, ud panīh ī
 fšōnišn brādarōd ud rādīh hamēstār, ud obastag-mēnišnīh
 ī ēr-mēnišnīh brādarōd ud wuzurg-mēnišnīh hamēstār, ud
 ašgahānīh ī hunsandīh brādarōd ud tuxšāgīh hamēstār,
 hamist abārīg abāz-āhangīg āhōgān ī brādarōd ud hamēstār

hēnd ī 2 ēwēnag hunarān.

Translation

On the head of the forward-inclined and backward-inclined virtues and the demonic chief of the (corresponding) vices. From the instruction of the Good Religion.

The head of the forward-inclined virtues is the character of warriors and lords.

Its categories are these: lawfulness, swiftness, helpfulness, courage, generosity, telling the truth so as to live in accordance with the gods' desire, magnanimity, diligence, acting openly, together with the other forward-inclined virtues which have the character of lordship.

The head of the backward-inclined virtues is the character of priests and slaves.

Its categories are these: benevolence which is connected [a] to lawfulness, reverence which is connected to swiftness, shame which is connected to helpfulness, humility which is connected to courage, thrift which is connected to generosity, beneficial speech which is connected to telling the truth, modesty which is connected to magnanimity, orthodoxy which is connected to open activity, together with the other backward-inclined virtues

which have the character of slaves.

The demonic chief of the forward-inclined vices is the character of tyranny.

Its categories are these: severity which is the false associate of lawfulness and the opponent of benevolence, irascibility which is the false associate of swiftness and the opponent of reverence, stiffness which is the false associate of helpfulness and the opponent of shame, causing distress which is the false associate of courage, and the opponent of humility, squandering which is the false associate of generosity and the opponent of thrift, telling the truth discriminately for damage which is the false associate of telling the truth for benefit so as to live by the god's desire and the opponent of beneficial speech, haughtiness which is the false associate of magnanimity and the opponent of modesty, greediness which is the false associate of diligence and the opponent of contentment; in (these) several things the heavy sins are much and the good deeds small. Publicly manifesting a different form which is the false associate of open activity and the opponent of having the orthodox character of Yima, together with the other forward-inclined vices which are false

associates and opponent of the two kinds of virtues.

The demonic chief of the backward-inclined vices is the character of heretics.

Its categories are these: vanity(?) which is the false associate of benevolence and the opponent of lawfulness, lack of obedience (?) which is the false associate of reverence and the opponent of swiftness, disgraceful attitude which is the false associate of shame and the opponent of helpfulness, ... (?) which is the false associate of humility and the opponent of courage, avarice which is the false associate of thrift and the opponent of generosity, abasement which is the false associate of modesty and the opponent of magnanimity, sloth which is the false associate of contentment and the opponent of diligence, together with the other backward-inclined vices which are false associates and opponents of the two kinds of virtues.

Note

[a] hamyuxt which comes at the end of the list is obviously meant to serve for all the pairs.

II. Lists abstracted from the various passages

a. Systematic lists based on four elements.

1. Dk III 68

'forward-inclined'

'backward-inclined'

virtue	vice	virtue	vice
1. abāyišn	āz	nigīrīdārīh	spōzgarīh
2. tagīgīh	xēšm	burdīh	a-ēwīh (?)
3. jumbišn	jōyāgīh (?)	xāmōšīh	tušt-mēnišnīh
4. tuxšāgīh	waranīgīh	hunsandīh	ašgahānīh
5. āzād-mardīh	karabīh	driyōšīh	škōhīh
6. rāmišn	rēdīh	hunsandīh ī brahmagīh	rīmanīh
7. āzādagīh	anēr-pākīh	wizīnagīh ī xwāyišn	anāzagīh
8. rādīh	wanēgarīh	fšonišn	panīh
9. *hayyārwandīh	sturgīh	šarm	tarsūgīh
10. *atarsīh	stardīh	pahrēz-kārīh	wirēg az kirbag
11. dādīgīh	*siftārīh	xwābarīh	bōšīh
12. wuzurg- mēnišnīh	abar-mēnišnīh	ēr-mēnišnīh	ōbastagīh
13. društ-cašmīh	duš-cašmīh	hucašmīh	waran-cašmīh
14. ēwēn- xwāyišnīh	waranīgīh	bāristānīh	kēn-hanbārīh
15. cābukīh	cīnagīh	āwāmīgīh (R)	gilag
16. amāwandīh	zišt mēnišnīh	abar-passand	wināh-hamīh

2. Dk iii 76

'forward-inclined'

'backward-inclined'

virtue	vice	virtue	vice
1. tagīgih	xēšmenih	bawandag- mēnišnih	a-ēw-mēnišnih
2. tuxšāg[ih]	āzwarih	hunsandih	ašgahānih
3. abāz- pursidār dānišnih	*nālag- xwāhišnih	xrad-dōšāgih	waranig *xwad- dōšāgih
5. <u>Dk iii 336</u>			
1. dādīgih	siftārih	xwābarih	bōših
2. tagīgih	xēšmenih	bawandag- mēnišnih	a-ēw-mēnišnih
3. hayyārwandih	sturgih	šarm	*nangwarih
4. arwandih	widang-kārih	nihānih	'ywynyx
5. rādih	wanēgarih	fšōnišn	panih
6. rāst-guftā- rih	wizīn ziyān- guftārih	sūd-guftārih	[...]
7. wuzurg- mēnišnih	abar-mēnišnih	ēr-mēnišnih	ōbastag- mēnišnih
8. tuxšāgih	āzwarih	hunsandih	ašgahānih
9. āškārag- warzidārih	āškārag I dēsag judārih	pōryōtkēš jam- xēmih	[...]

6. Dk iii 391 (Text not given in this Appendix. Cf. Menasce, Encyclopédie 43f.) DkM 370.14-372.10.

'forward-inclined'

'backward-inclined'

virtue	vice	virtue	vice
1. xradīg- handāzišn (= dānišn)	dayīg-sōhišnīh	huxēmīhā kunišn (= xēm)	frēftārīh
2. tagīgīh	xēšmenīh	bawandag- mēnišnīh	a-ēw-mēnišnīh
3. abāyišnīh	waranīgīh	nigīrīdārīh	spōzgarīh
4. tuxšāgīh	āzwarīh	hunsandīh	ašgahānīh
5. dādīgīh	*siftārīh	xwābarīh	bōšīh
6. āzādagīh	lūdagīh	dādīg- barišnīh	wināhīh
7. wuzurg- mēnišnīh	karabīh	ēr-mēnišnīh	ōbastagīh
8. rādīh	wanēgarīh	fšōnišn	panīh
9. ābāz-pursīdār xradīh	*nālag-kašīh	hunsand- xradīh	[...]
10. srōšīgīh	awizīn- warrawīšnīh [a]	wizīn- warrawīšnīh	awarrawīšnīh
11. xrad-dōšagīh	xwad-dōšagīh	cimīg-kārīh	nīrangīgīh
12. hayyārwandīh	sturgīh	šarm	nang
13. tuxšāg- kirbagīh (= kirbag warzīd-arīh)	wināhēnīdār kirbagīh	awināhīh	pādērān- kirbagīh

[a] In the second part of this chapter the list which contains the vices opposed to the virtues of the first list has the order of items 10, 11 and twelve changed.

7. Dk vi. B.14ff.: A tentative rearranged list

'forward-inclined'

'backward-inclined'

virtues		vices		virtues		vices	
1,9.	rādih	wanēgarih		fšonišn		panih	
2,13.	wistāxwih	wastārih		hušarmih ud huškōhih		awistāxwih	
3,14.	yazišn ī yazdām	dēw-izagih		āhrōnih		ahlamōgih	
4,15?	ātaxš ī Warahrān	uzdēsih		sārārih		dušpādixšāyih	
5,11.	rāmišn ī mardomān ud niwāxtag ī wehān	asrušt wisāndagih		dōstih		waranigih	
6,10.	mēnōg- warrawišnih	uzdēs- parastih		weh-dēnih		ag-dēnih	
7,16.	tuxšāgih	ahunsandih ud widangih		hunsandih		ašgahānih	
8,12?	bawandagih	frēhbud		dil-dardih		sturgih	
17, 18	mihr ud dil- sōzag, abaxšāyišn	šewag moyag		wišād- xandagih ud xurramih		absōsgarih	
19, 20	pākēzagih	tan-cīnagih		dōstih ī zam ī xwēš		jēh-marzih	

'forward-inclined'

'backward-inclined'

virtues:		vices	virtues:		vices
21,	wuzurg-	abar-tanih	nihadagih		obastih
22	menišnih				
23,	gowagih ud	nazenagih	dast-kirrogih		abesud-karih
24	rastih-				
	gowishnih				
25,	padišsayih	hamahl-	padifrāh ī		abarōn-zadarih
26	ī wehān	xwadāyih	wināhgārām		
27,	dādistānigih	emār-kaših	erih ud		arg ud bār
28		ud wad-xwahih	dehbaddih		
29,	frahang	pādarih	zanišn ī		kēnwarih ud
30	kardan ī	pādifrāh	dušmanān		xēšmenih
	pad' pēšag				
	pēšag				
31,	azād-mardih	sāstarih	xwarišn ud		apaymān-
32	ud mēh-		dārišn ī		xwarišnih ud
	mardih		mardomān		apaymān-
					dārišnih

The first sixteen pairs in the above list are treated differently from the second group of sixteen pairs. The correspondence can only be established by coupling together pairs from the first eight with corresponding ones from the second group of eight but without consistent system. In the second half of the list two consecutive pairs always form a homogenous group.

b. Lists based on the traditional Zoroastrian
conceptions

3. Dk iii 203

	good	evil
wīmand:	hān ī-š frāšmišn az xwēš	hān ī pad xwadīh a-frāšmišnīgīh
wahān:	rādīh ī dāmān pid ...	gannāg mēnōg ēbgad
cim:	abāyišn ud kām ī-š...	kām ī awē druz
hangerdīg:	paymān	frēhbuđ ud abēbuđ
zahag/hunušk:	dād	adād
ōšmarišnān:	xrad	āz
	xēm	xēšm
	šarm	kēn
	mihr	arišk
	rādīh	panīh
	rāstīh	druxtārīh ud drō[za]hīh
	spāsdārīh	anaspāsīh

The list of virtues and vices (ōšmarišnān) contains
seven pairs.

4. Dk iii 310

(1)	hunsandīh	āzwarīh ud kēnwarīh
(2)	xwēškārīh	axwēškārīh
(3)	tuxšāgīh	ašgahānīh
(4)	bawangag-mēnišnīh	tar-mēnišnīh
(5)	šarm	nangwarīh
(6)	*hayyārwandīh	sturgīh
(7)	xwābarīh	ariškēnīh
(8)	dādīgīh	adādīh
(9)	abāz-pursīdārīh I xrad	anabāz-pursīdārīh I xrad
(10)	huniyōšīh	xwad-dōšagīh
(11)	ērīh	anērīh
(12)	wuzurg-mēnišnīh	karabīh
(13)	rādīh	panīh
(14)	rāstīh	drōzanīh
(15)	spāsdārīh	anaspāsīh
(16)	hucašmīh	dušcašmīh

Although the list contains elements of the fourfold structure, it is clearly built on the principle of simple opposition between good and evil. The good qualities and vices are not merely human but are offspring of the two principles in the world, just as in the list of Dk iii 203.

8. PhlT 89f., AW §29-30, 43

kadār ud cand hān druz?

(1) āz (2) niyāz (3) xēšm (4) arišk (5) nang (6) waran
(7) kēn (8) būšyāsp (9) druz ī ahlamōgīh. (spazgīh is a
late addition).

'Watchful spiritual things':

(1) āsn-xrad (2) gōšōsrūd xrad (3) xēm (4) ummēd
(5) hunsandīh (6) dēn (7) hampursagīh ī dānāg.

N O T E S

Part One: Survey of the Andarz books

Section 1. Introductory.

1. GIPh. II 75-129.
2. SBE 5, 18, 24, 37, 47.
3. cf. Tavadia, Mpers. Spr. u. Lit., 103-110, where the small andarz texts are grouped together; other texts are discussed separately.
4. An example is the book by Maneckji N. Dhalla, Zoroastrian Civilization, New York 1922, chapter XLIII, 'Pahlawi and Pazandi literature', pp. 274-294.
5. cf. chapter VI, 'La morale', pp. 137-166.
6. GIPh. II 678-683.
7. A. V. Williams Jackson, Zoroastrian studies, New York 1928, 132-142.
8. Maganlal A. Buch, Zoroastrian ethics, Baroda 1919.
9. Christensen, Iran, 431ff.
10. cf. Menasce, Encyclopédie, the chapter entitled 'La sagesse morale', pp. 37-55.
11. Zaehner, Dawn, chapters 13 and 14 (pp. 265-301).
12. Duchesne-Guillemin, Religion, 125ff.
13. K. A. Inostrantsev, Persidskaya literaturnaya traditsiya v perviye vyeka islama, in Mémoires de l'Académie Impériale des Sciences de St. Pétersbourg, 8e série, Vol. VIII, No. 13, St. Pétersbourg 1909.

14. M. A. Inostrantsev, Iranian influence on Moslem literature, Part I, translated ... by G. K. Nariman, Bombay 1918.
15. G. Richter, Studien zur Geschichte der älteren arabischen Fürstenspiegel, Leipzig 1932 (Leipziger Semitistische Studien, N.F. III).
16. Of particular interest are the following articles by F. Gabrieli: 'Etichetta di corte e costumi sāsānidi nell Kitāb ahlāq al-mulūk di al-Ġāhiz', RSO 11 (1926/28) 292-305, and 'L'Opera di Ibn al-Muqaffa⁶', RSO 13 (1931/32) 197-247. On Ibn al-Muqaffa⁶ cf. further P. Kraus, 'Zu Ibn al-Muqaffa⁶', RSO 14 (1933/34) 1-20 and C. A. Nallino, ibid. pp. 130-134.
17. cf. his articles: Kitāb al-tājj li'l-Jāhiz wa-⁶alāqatuhu bi-kutub "Tājnāma" fī 'l-adab al-fārisī al-sāsānī, in: Al-Dirāsāt al-adabiyya / Etudes Littéraires, Revue trimestrielle traitant des cultures arabe et iranienne, Beyrouth, I, 1 (1959) 29-67; Kutub "Ā'im nāma" wa'l-maqāti⁶ al-bāqiya minhā fī 'l-masādir al-⁶arabiyya, ibid. I, 2-3 (1959) 15-39; Kitāb al-tājj fī sīrat Anūširwān, ibid. Vol. 3 (1961/2) 237-264, 345-378. The author has announced a forthcoming book of his, to be called Al-rawāfid al-fārisiyya fī 'l-adab al-

‘arabī, ('The Persian tributaries in Arabic literature')

of which the last mentioned article is an extract.

18. Abū ‘Alī Aḥmad ibn Muḥammad Miskawayhi, Al-hikma al-kālida, Jawīdān kirād, edited by ‘Abdurrahmān Badawī, Cairo 1952. Badawī's edition is unsatisfactory, especially as he did not use the best manuscript of the text, Oxford Ms. Marsh 662. The fact has already been noticed by M. S. Khan, ZDMG 112 (1962) 309-318, and it is specifically demonstrated by A. J. Arberry in JSS 8 (1963) 145ff.
19. W. B. Henning, 'Eine arabische Version mittelpersischer Weisheitsschriften', ZDMG 106 (1956) 73-77.
20. cf. Menasce, Encyclopédie 38f.
21. Some examples are given in Menasce, Encyclopédie 67ff.

Section 2. The andarz texts.

a. Texts attributed to Adurbād ī Mahraspandān

1. Cf. the bibliographical data contained in GIPh II, 112 §73 and Tavadia, Mpers. Spr. u. Lit. 103. The text is published in PhIT 58-71, having been published in India some three times before. A subsequent edition of the text, made by J. C. Tarapore, Pahlavi andarz nāmak, Bombay 1933, 21-33, does not constitute an advancement on Jamasp-Asana's edition, but there is a translation into English and some notes. A previous translation was done by de Harlez in Le Muséon 6. (1887) 66-78. A recent translation of the text is in Zaehner, Teachings 101-110. As this translation is readily accessible, it will be referred to for comments and corrections. A recent translation into Persian was made by M. Nawabi in RFLT 11 No. 4 (Winter 1938) 502-528.
2. ēniz paydāg: -c is found in practically all the manuscripts. MK alone has ZNH MH, which reflects a corruption of ēniz.
3. Misk 26-28.
4. ZDMG 106 (1956) 75.
5. Compare the terse text of AdMah §11: rāz ō zanān ma bar, to the longer version of Misk: 'Have no confidence in

women and do not tell them a secret', and to that of
WāzAd: pad zanān wistāxw ma bawēd ku ō šarm ud
pašēmānīh nē rased; rāz ō zanān ma bared ku tām ranz ī
abēbar nē bawēd.

6. The corresponding text in Misk 27.10-12 says: 'Do not grieve over wealth which you have lost, for property is like a bird which moves from one elevated spot to another. It is quick to come and swift to move away'.
7. The text in Misk which corresponds to this and the following saying was translated by Henning, loc. cit. 75. Zaehner's translation is incorrect.
8. The correct translation is: 'If you know well much swimming in water, do not go hastily into violent water lest the water carry you and you die immediately'.
9. PhlT 67 §104; 71 §154. The wording in both places is identical: tō rāy gōwēm pus ī man kē jahūšn-hayyār,
pad mardomān ciš ī xrad weh. This phrase seems to open and close a semi-independent section in this collection.
10. cf. §117, and particularly §15 where the edition of PhlT is unreliable. Read: dibahr ud *niyufsišm pad
paymān kun, 'Do anger and merriment in moderation'.

The reading of *niyufsišn is conjectural (from ni + gaub- with inchoative?), but its meaning is established from PhLT 69 §130; Ošnar §42; ZWY iv. 50 (I owe the explanation of the word to Dr. D. N. Mackenzie).

11. PhLT 71 §150.
12. PhLT 59 §14, read: abēgāh was ma xand. Zaehner's translation is mistaken.
13. PhLT 60 §27; 63 §69 pad nigirišn 'with deliberation, with consideration'.
14. PhLT 68 §112.
15. PhLT 71 §149, cf. WazAd, PhLT 146 §61f., 150 §60.
16. PhLT 58 §3, read: hām ī būd ud uzīd frāmōš kun ...
cf. Misk p. 26. 15-27.1. The idea and even the wording are a commonplace of the andarz books. Cf. AW, PhLT 91 §49; Ošnar 39.
17. PhLT 62 §52; 63 §59, read: saxwam ī tēz pad nigirišn gōw, cē saxwam ast ī guft weh ud ast ī pād, ud hām ī pād weh az hām ī guft. 'Say a sharp word with consideration for there are words which are better said and others which are better kept, and those which are kept are better than those which are said'.
18. PhLT 60 §31; 65 §91.
19. PhLT 62 §56; 63 §67.

20. Ph1T 58 §4 (translate: 'Be not self-confident and wilful as regards a lord and a ruler'); 59 §6 (ēwagānag means 'submissive, obedient', cf. particularly AW, Ph1T 93 §101, which is translated in Misk 33.5 by tawādu; cf. also further in AdMah §74); 60 §33 ('Keep away from a vengeful man with authority'); 62 §48. Ph1T 67 §103 should be translated: 'Do not curse a ruler, for they are guards over the realm and bring about good to the people of the world'. One other injunction which relates to matters of government may be quoted here: 'Do not appoint a pitiless man as an overseer in prison, but make a chosen great (? most Mss. have wynlg) person and an intelligent man who is in prison (read: ī pad band, which is in all Mss. but M16) a prison-warden (zindānbān) over the prisoners (abar band)'. (Ph1T 62 §57; Zaehner, Teachings has a wrong translation).
21. Ph1T 65 §90; 66 §94 (the middle of this saying is not completely clear).
22. Ph1T 59f. §17ff. is a series of injunctions not to have a fool as a confidant, not to take an irascible man as a companion for travel etc. A comparable series occurs in Misk 27.4-6, but only one saying actually corresponds (§21 = Misk 27.4). Ph1T 65 §87 warns not to sit in an assembly next to a foolish man (dušagān).

23. PhIT 59 §11.

24. PhIT 59 §13, read: zan ud frazand ud *xwēšāwand (?)

ud bandag ī xwēš-tan jud az frahang bē ma hil ...

'Do not leave your wife, children, relatives(?) and slaves without education ...' The reading xwēšāwand is extremely doubtful; that bandag should be read afterwards has been seen by Henning, cf. Nawabi, loc. cit. 519 n. 9. The translation 'education' for frahang is not precise: the whole range of training in good manners and reprimanding for incivility is intended. A son should be sent to the dibīristān, cf. PhIT 63 §58.

25. PhIT 61 §42.

26. PhIT 62 §50, 54.

27. PhIT 67f. §111.

28. PhIT 71 §152.

29. PhIT 61 §41 (Zaehner, Teachings has an erroneous translation).

30. PhIT 64 §82.

31. PhIT 61 §43.

32. PhIT 62 §49.

33. PhIT 60 §22: this saying deals both with giving and taking a loan. In Misk these are two sentences, 27.1f.

- and 27.12-14; the text of the latter saying in Misk seems corrupt.
34. This seems to be the meaning of PhlT 61 §39.
35. PhlT 65 §86, read: fradom saxwan ī dušcihr ma gōw
'Be not the first to speak a malicious word'.
36. PhlT 60f. §34.
37. PhlT 61 §44f.; Zaehner's translation of §44 is incomprehensible to me: the last words are clearly pad saxwan ma āzār.
38. PhlT 60 §29.
39. PhlT 60 §28.
40. PhlT 60 §70.
41. PhlT 64f. §85, the text should be read: ka-t mānēnd guft-iz carbīhā namāz bar, cē az namāz burdan pušt bē nē škanēd ud az carb pursīdan dahām gandag nē šawēd. 'Even if you have words left to you, do obeisance politely, for from doing obeisance the back is not broken and from polite asking the mouth does not become foul'. Misk 26.11-13 has only 'Accustom yourself to be submissive to people. This will not lower your worth, but will rather raise you and add to your value'.

42. PhLT 60 §32. The text should, apparently, be read: pad nibard bahr ī grām abar ma bāš, abēr tars 'In battle be not on the heavy part; have much fear'.
43. cf. PhLT 68 §115 ('Do not by any means break an oath, lest leprosy [pēsēn] come to your hand'); 60 §25 ('Do not sign a false document before rulers').
44. PhLT 59 §10.
45. PhLT 67 §102. For rāmišm in the religious sense cf. Part Two section 16.
46. PhLT 67 §106; cf. also §105 'the greatest hope is the spirit'.
47. cf. West, GIPh II, 114 §80 and Tavadia, Mpers. Spr. u. Lit. 103. The text is printed in PhLT 144-153. A translation into English was done by Sohrab Kavasji Dastur Meherji Rana, Bombay 1930 (under the title Denā vājak ī aīchand ī Atropāt Māraspandān). A recent translation into English is in Zaehner, Teachings 110-116, to which reference will be made here. A translation into Persian with notes was done by M. Nawabi in RFLT 13 No. 1 (Spring 1340) 11-30.
48. Compare the two sayings: PhLT 146 §19: pad kirbag hamdādistān ud pad wināh jud-dādīstān ud pad nēwagīh spāsdār ud pad petyārag hunsand ud az dušman dūr ud

pad kirbag nē wizandgār ud pad wad hayyār ma bawēd.

'Be a collaborator in good deeds, and dissociate from sin, be thankful ^{for} ~~of~~ a good thing and content in adversity, keep away from an enemy, be not harmful in good works, and be not a helper for evil'.

PhLT 146 §23: pad petyārag hunsand ud pad astānag bāristān, pad zīndagīh wistāxw ma bawēd, bē pad kunišn ī frārōn wistāxw bawēd.

'Be content in adversity and patient in disaster. Have no confidence in living, but be confident in righteous action'.

The two sayings overlap to a certain degree. They both have the phrase pad petyārag hunsand: in §19 it comes in the middle, while in §23 it begins the series. The corresponding saying in PN, PhLT 46 §35 has the two sayings of WāzAd combined: it has the same text as WāzAd §19 up to pad petyārag hunsand and then it continues with the text of §23, though with an omission and some change of wording. It seems more acceptable to assume that the version of PN is a contraction of two sayings than to make the opposite hypothesis, viz. that WāzAd has an inflated version in which a single series was split into two and considerably enlarged.

49. WāzAd §69 has š'dyndk (=šayēndag), whereas PN: §43 has š'ykyk.

50. Compare the translation of the two versions:

PhlT 150 §59

Misk 76.15-17

For this reason that	Things are followers of things.
every virtue needs wisdom,	All virtues follow wisdom,
every wisdom needs know- ledge,	
every knowledge needs experience,	Opinion ^[a] follows experience,
every honour needs good fame,	happiness ^[b] follows good fame,
every action needs fortune,	proximity follows friendship, action follows fate, ^[c]
every wealth needs eating and giving,	
every joy needs lack of fear.	spending follows exertion. ^[d]

[a] Arab. ra'y // Phl. dānišn.

[b] Arab. gibṭa // Phl. burzišn.

[c] Arab. qadar // Phl. jahišn.

[d] Arab. jidda.

51. PhlT 146 §20.

52. Ph1T 148f. §41-43, read: ewag-*kāmag hēd, mardom hēd;
ma nigīrēd o harw dō kāmāg. Cē nē bawēnd tam ud ruwān
harw dō ham-kāmāg. Cē tan pad tan-kāmāgih šayēd dāštam
ud ruwān pad ruwān-kāmāgih. 'Be single-desired, be
men, and do not have regard for both of the two desires.
For body and soul are not both of the same desire, for
it is possible to keep the body by the desire of the body
and the soul by the desire of the soul'. Cf. for this
the similar text in Dk ix: ud ēniz ku nē harw kas tan
abāg ruwām ham-kāmāg bawēd, xwarišn hān tan kāmāg ud
xwāstagiz, hanbār ī ahlāyēnidārīh ruwām kāmāg (DkM
799.17-19). 'This too: not every person's body and
soul have the same desire; the desire of the body is
eating and also wealth, and the desire of the soul is
the treasure of producing righteousness'.
53. Ph1T 146 §21f.; 150 §60f.
54. Ph1T 144 §1-2, read: ayād ud pad daxšag dārēd, ud kār
aziš kunēd ud *hanbār ma kunēd, ku-tān niyāz abar nē
rasād, cē hanbār ī kard nē bē o niyāz ud kam nē rasēd.
Hanbār ewiz ahlāyīh wēš tuxšēd ... 'Remember and keep
in mind, and carry it out. Do not amass (wealth), lest
want come upon you. For a hoard which is not amassed
does not come to want and deficiency. Be diligent only

- in amassing righteousness ...' The text is not corrupt (contrary to Zaehner, loc. cit.) and gives a perfectly good translation.
55. Ph1T 148 §33. Another set of vices to avoid is given in Ph1T 152 §74: 'Keep yourselves away from the sin of deceit, from a woman in menstruation, a courtesan woman and a woman in milk, and rigorously avoid them, lest the evil which is in the soul be added to the harm which is in the body'. Zaehner's 'a harlot in milk' surely makes no sense.
56. Ph1T 148 §40.
57. Ph1T 153 §76 (Zaehner translates otherwise), and cf. the paragraphs which follow there.
58. Ph1T 145 §10; 146 §18.
59. Ph1T 148 §34-36. §35 should be translated: 'Remember and keep in mind the passing away of the wicked by the power of goodness'. rāy is superfluous.
60. Ph1T 144 §3-4. In §4 ud gugārēdī kēm andar wārom ī xwēš means 'digest vengeance in your mind', i.e. suppress it, and not '... you will (perpetually) brood over vengeance in your heart' (Zaehner).

61. Ph1T 146 §16; 151 §65.
62. Ph1T 152 §69.
63. Ph1T 150 §57.
64. Ph1T 144f. §5.
65. Ph1T 149 §47.
66. Ph1T 152 §70-73.
67. Ph1T 145f. §13-15. The text should be translated as follows: 'Abstain much from the flesh of cattle and sheep, lest there be upon you harsh reckoning in this world and the next. For a man who has eaten the flesh of cattle and sheep while having his hand in sin, the sin which he is thinking, speaking and doing [and the grave sin which the cattle or the sheep may have committed, both will be taken in the account of the man who eats the flesh.] When he has eaten even a small fish while having his hand in sin, if in some other place a camel kills a man, this will be the same as if he (sc. the eater) killed him in his own hand.'

The reconstruction of this saying, of which half a sentence was omitted in §14, is possible by comparing two passages in PRiv where the same theme is discussed and the same phrases occur. Chapter 14 of PRiv tells the myth which explains this curious notion of the

danger in eating flesh while being a sinner. According to that story Ohrmazd told the animals at the time of their creation that they would provide food for man. When the animals saw the affliction they were going to undergo they implored Ohrmazd and He made a safeguard that the sins committed by the animals would not go to their account but to that of the man who eats them while in sin (Öhrmazd guft ku awē kē gōšt ī šmāh xwarēd ud dast andar wināh dārēd, hamāg wināh ī gōspand kunēd awē ō bun bawēd). Ohrmazd continues: 'For when he has eaten even a small fish (cē *ka-š māhīg ī kūc-ē *xward ēstēd) while committing a sin, if a camel kills a man, even that will be to his account'. (PRiv 39f.). Another passage which deals with the same subject in much the same terms as does WāzAd is found in chapter 61 of PRiv (p. 192f.). The sentence about a man eating a fish in sin suffering the punishment due to a camel killing a man is here introduced by the words: ast kē ēdōn gōwēd 'Someone says', which probably indicates that this is not a generally accepted theory and is only the view of one school of tradition. It is obvious that this view was attributed to Ādurbād in WāzAd; Ādurbād in fact

goes further than any explicit statement in PRiv to warn against the eating of the meat of cattle and sheep. A similar injunction of Adurbād's to abstain from killing cattle unlawfully (adādihā) occurs as the sixth admonition in Dk iii. 199 (DkM 216.8-9). An echo of these admonitions also occurs in the passage devoted to the wisdom of Adurbād in Misk 28.6-11, which again advocates abstention from killing animals, though omitting the provision 'unlawfully'. The explanation given in the Arabic text why the killing of animals should be avoided is in the following words: 'consider its bad issue also in this world, for in every place where there is less killing and bloodshed the number of people is bigger; evil does not appear in it atrociously, the welfare of people is more general, the rule of bane and affliction is weaker, the corruption of demons and sorcerers smaller and feebler'. The terms used in this saying seem too Zoroastrian to have been the addition of an Islamic editor, although they are not familiar to me from a text in Pahlavi. (Acknowledgment is due to the thesis by Mirza on PRiv for help in elucidating some points in the above discussion.)

68. PhlT 145 §11-12.
69. PhlT 151 §63.
70. PhlT 149 §48f.
71. PhlT 146 §17 (from pad xwaran ...; here the division of sentences in PhlT is defective).
72. The text was edited by Dhabhar, Bombay 1913, and a transcription, translation and notes were prepared by Mirza in his London University thesis, 1940.
73. cf. PRiv 194. 5-7: Adurbād guft ku hām 22 wāzag ī Mihr-Ohrmazd man ērbad az Adurag *ašnūd andar kār dār ud ahlaw bawēh. 'Adurbād said, "Perform those twenty-two sayings which Mihr-Ohrmazd, my ērbad, heard from Adurag, and you will become ahlaw"'. (Mirza did not understand the text and tried unnecessarily to emend it.) The reading of the name, Adurag, is not absolutely certain.
74. PRiv 194.3-5. The text was slightly emended by Mirza to read: bē-m frahang ī nāncištīg gōw tā kunēm ud ahlaw bawēm.
75. In the explanations which follow 23 virtues are actually given: after No. 20, mardom-dōstīh, hucašmīh is added in §25 (PRiv 199. 4-8), though it is not given an ordinal number.

76. It confirms, for example, the reading of the fifth virtue as hunarāwandīh, as the same definition in Dk Vi. 23 applies to hunarōmandīh. Dk.vi.23 corresponds to the first five terms of AdPRiv. The definitions of the first two, rāstīh and rādīh, are not so close to AdPRiv as those of the other terms.
77. AdPRiv §25 (PRiv 199.1-4), cf. PhlT 58f. §5 (AdMah) and PhlT 148 §39 (WāzAd). A similar wording is found also in Dkvi. 2.
78. See on this below, section 4a in Part One.
79. Mirza reads the first word bahristānīh 'dispensation', and translates the whole passage differently.
80. DkM 215.20-216.18. Certain phrases from this chapter are repeated in the next one, which contains the alleged precepts of Mānī against those of Aduwād, and which has been dealt with by a number of scholars. Cf. Jackson, Researches in Manichaeism, New York 1932, 203-217; Henning, OLZ 1934, 755f.; Menasce, ŠGV 228ff.
81. The wording of this precept is doubtful, though the sense is clear. I read: āzwarīhā hanbār ma sazed, ku-tān y'mkw (?) ud niyāz abar nē rasād.
82. The last four words in this injunction are not clear. cē ds nē būd; perhaps emend: ku-t *sēž nē *bawēd, 'so that ruin may not come upon you'.

83. There follows an obscure sentence. Read perhaps:
ēdōn *handāznd (?) cē'on-tām pad tan ud ruwām pahlom
bawēd, 'They (sc. the gods) will arrange (things) in such
a way as is best for your body and soul'.
84. This addition is required by the sense and by the
parallels in Dk vi., and it also exists in the parallel
chapter, DkM 218.7.
85. Dk vi.D.1.a; Ph1T 82.9-16 (this passage is not
attributed to Adurbād). An Arabic version is found
in Misk 67.4-12, and a New Persian one in Ghazālī,
Naṣīhat al-mulūk, Tehran 1315/17, 123ult.-124.10 (given
anonymously). Cf. also Qazwīnī, Tārīx-i Guzīda,
London 1910, 73.11-17; Salemann-Shukovsky, Persische
Grammatik, *41; Nöldeke, Persische Studien II, 29 n. 2.
Text and translation are in Zaehner, JRAS 1940. 36-39;
cf. also Zurvan 407f; Dawn 243. Cf. the observations
of Henning, ZDMG 106 (1956) 75 (which helped in
completing the bibliographical references given here).
86. A detailed comparison of the various versions of this
text is made in the note to the translation of Dk vi.
D.1a.

b. Zardušt ī Adurbādān and his son.

1. On the texts and manuscripts see West in GIPh II, 111f. 170 and Tavadia, Mpers. Spr. u. Lit. 104. The edition of the text is contained in PhLT 41-50. Cf. also A. Heiman, 'Pand-nāmak ī Zaratuxšt', WZKM 20 (1906) 149-165, 237-280 (also apparently published as a dissertation in Vienna, 1906); Nyberg, Hlfsb. I, 17-30; J. C. Tarapore, Pahlavi andarz-nāmak, Bombay 1933, 1-12. The collection was translated into English by Zaehner, Teachings 20-28. An advancement on this translation is made in the book by Ervad Maneck Fardunji Kangay, Citak handarž i Pōryōtkēšan, a Pahlavi text, Bombay 1960, which contains, besides a reproduction of the text from PhLT, a transcription, translation and glossary. Another recent translation of this text is by Henry Corbin, 'Le livre des conseils de Zartusht', Prof. Poure Davoud Commemoration Volume II, Bombay 1951, 129-160. Cf. also M. Nawabi, RFLT 12 No. 4 (Winter 1339) 513-535.
2. Cf. below, Part Two, section 1 note 1.
3. Cf. above in the discussion of WāzAd.

4. The basic difference is that in PN the association between mēnišn-gōwišn-kunišn and the spirits is done in a mounting hierarchy of the spirits, whereas in Dk vi.1 the spirits are arrayed in a descending line:

	PN	Dk. vi. 1b.
mēnišn	wahman/xēšm	spandarmad/tarōmad
gōwišn	xrad/waran	xrad/waran
kunišn	spenāg mēnōg/ gannāg mēnōg	dēn/xwad-dōšagih

5. Cf. NP. dast bar nihādan 'to indicate, point out'.
6. miyāncīghā is an adverb which seems to refer to the office of the 'judge-arbiter' miyāncīg of whose function we read in Ardā Virāf:

Ēn ruwān ī awē druwand mard kē šahr pad miyāncīgh
awiš *dād^[a] ēstād, ud hān ī sazēd kardan ud framūdan
nē kard ud framūd. ud sang ud kafīz ud paymānag keh
dāšt, u-š az driyōšan ud az kārwanīgān garzišn nē
niyōšid.

[a] Text dāšt.

'This is the soul of that wicked man to whom the country was given for the exercise of the function of miyāncīg and who did not do and order that which he ought to have done and ordered. He kept the weight-stone, the capacity measure and the length measure smaller, and

did not listen to complaints from poor people and travellers'.
(AVn. 67. 7-9)

It is not hard to deduce from here what a miyāncīg was expected to do; as he was evidently in charge of the business ethics of the markets and was concerned with protecting strangers he seems to have been a figure not unlike that of the Islamic muhtasib. On the function of the latter see the article muhtasib in EI (written by R. Levy) and R. Levy, The social structure of Islam, Cambridge 1957, 334-338. According to Gaudefroy-Demombynes, Les institutions musulmanes, Paris 1946, 158f., this function was a continuation of the Roman curule magistrate through Byzantine intermediary.

If the use of the adverb miyāncīgihā in our passage of PN is to be taken literally, it may seem that among his functions the miyāncīg was also concerned with the instruction of religious doctrine; but the use of the word need not imply more than what may be rendered by a vague descriptive adverb such as 'in fairness' (i.e., like the miyāncīg). The word miyāncīgih occurs also in MX 2.118, applied to the function of Mihr, Srōš and Rašn in the eschatological judgement.

7. pad rāh ī xrad bē: 'following the way of wisdom', for the construction cf. az ... bē.
8. PhlT 44f. §23. The text has not been accurately translated: 'I say: I accept the Good Religion of the Mazdaeans, and am free from doubt concerning it. Neither for the love of the body nor for that of the soul, nor for good living or for a long life, nor yet because consciousness leaves my body shall I depart from the Good Religion of the Mazdaeans. I am free from doubt concerning it. I do not praise or honour heretics, and I do not believe them concerning it.' PhlT 45 §25 is a difficult text. The best reading seems to me: cē ox awinast, mēnišm [ud gōwišn] agriftār, ud kunišn griftārōmand. 'For the essential being is pure, thought [and speech] are unseizable and action is seizable'. Nyberg's emendation of ox to saxwan is unacceptable: saxwan never comes instead of gōwišn, and 'speech' never precedes 'thought' in this triad. For awinast cf. ŠGV v.5 agunast 'pure' (Skt. version anāvila), cf. Bailey, Zor.Pr. 103. For other series in which the sequence ox--mēnišn--gōwišn--kunišn figures cf. Dk. vi. 1a.

9. PhlT 45 §27, cf. above in this section. Kang's translation of §29 is to be preferred to Zaehner's.
10. PhlT 46 §33 should be translated as follows: 'For whoever is in this world ought to perform the yašt as many times as possible, and to know the sins which are in (the region of) the hand and foot, except for one who is deaf or dumb, who is (considered) without ability. But when (that) is done, this too must be done: to attend the ērbadistām and to know the zand'.
11. For this word (*dayišn) cf. Part Two, section 2, supplementary note.
12. The division of sentences in PhlT is wrong. The text, as I read it, is:
- (56) tam rāy āzarm ī ruwām bē ma hilēd, ud ma framōšēd (57) pad āzarm ī kas frasāwandīh ī xīr ī gētīg. kāmāg abar hān ciš ma barēd kē-tām tam ō puhl ud ruwān ō pādifrāh rasēd, bē ō hān ciš barēd kē-š bar rāmišn ī hamāyīg. rāmišnīg-bawīh [az] (58) hukunišnīg, nēwag-kunišnīg warzīh az tuxšišn, [tuxšišn]-zāyīh az *dayišn; az cē *dayišn az xwāyišn, xwāyišn az huš, hušīh az mēnōg dānišn, dānišnīg hām abzār kē ast, būd ud bēd (59)

padiš dānīhēd, nōg-dādārīh +wirāyišn amōxtār, cišan
wirāstār harw I sazēd kardan, sūd-xwāstār I wispān
pad harw 2 axwān rāyēnišnān.

For the last four words cf. the expression xrad harw 2
axwānīg rāyēnišn in PhlT 47 §41.

13. A translation into Persian is given by M. Nawabi in RFLT No. 2 (Summer 1339) 259f.
14. Cf. DkM 58.21 and Dhabhar, PhlYasna, Glossary 97.
15. Cf. the whole text in DkM 140. 12-17. Also West, GIPh II, 113 §75 and Molé, Culte 52.
16. PhlT 81f. §7: 'to eat an oath', sōgand xwardan is of course an idiomatic expression for 'to swear'.
17. PhlT 82 §8, dādam again being used both idiomatically and literally.

c. Xusrō I Kawādān and other authors of his period.

1. The text is published in PhLT 55-57. Cf. West, GIPh II, 112 §72. A transcription and translation were made by Salemann, 'Mittelpersische Studien', Mélanges Asiatiques tirés du Bulletin de l'Académie Impériale des Sciences de St. Pétersburg, 9 (1887) 242-253; Casartelli, 'Two discourses of Chosroes, the immortal-souled', Babylonian and Oriental Record I, London 1887, pp. 97-101; J. C. Tarapore, Pahlavi Andarz-Nāmak, Bombay 1933, 18-20; a translation was made by Ervad Maneck F. Kanga, 'The testament of Khusrav I', Sanj Vartaman Annual, 1948. A translation into Persian was done by M. Mokri, Andarz-i Xusrō Qubādān, Teheran 1951 (2nd ed.); M. Nawabi, RFLT 12 No. 1 (Spring 1339) 142-144.
2. The word haspām has not yet been satisfactorily translated. It seems however to be connected with the well-established Middle Persian word for 'rest' haspēn, haspām, cf. Dd 37.26; 40.11 and the other passages quoted by Zaehner, BSOS 9.901. For MPT 'nspyn, hspyd cf. Bailey, JRAS 1934, 146 and Henning ZII 9.253.

3. cē'om ka ēn jān az tam ī man judāg bēd, [az] em taxt man abar dārēd, ud pad haspān man barēd, ud pad haspān man bē nihēd, ud pad sar ī gēhānīgān wāng kunēd ... (PhlT 55.5-8).
4. PhlT 56 §2 should be read apparently:
 mardomān ī gēhām drūdōmand bawēd ud rawēd,
 rāyēnišm pad mēnišm ī rāst, ud *harw warzīgarīh pad kār,
 gēhānīgān tuxšag zēnāwand bawēd.
 The text seems to have poetic rhythm, though no metre.
 The end of §7 should read: ud tam ruwān rāy nē padīrēd;
bē ka was kirbag kard estēd enyā frāz ō cinwad puhl
widārdan nē tawān. (The last seven words are obviously a gloss.) 'and he (i.e. the judge) does not accept the body for the sake of the soul; except when it (sc. the soul) has done much good deeds, it cannot cross the Cinwad bridge.'
5. The last words of §10 (PhlT 57. 1-2) are:
 nēwagīh pad kardan dār, bazag pad ranz-spōz, mēnōg pad xwēš-kunišm. 'Hold goodness as something to do, hold sin by repelling pain, hold the spiritual world as your own doing.' A variant of this saying is found in Dk vi. 18.

6. DkM 218.16-219.22.
7. The text (DkM 219.8) has ktk, emend to krtk.
8. Read ewag yazišn ud kerdagām ī yazdān purr-paymānīhā andar ērān dēhān abzāyēnīdan, aziš hambediḡ dēwiḡ (ōzīhā) uzdēs asrušt zadan škastam abgandan.
9. The intention is almost certainly allegorical, meaning gods and demons; cf. Dk vi.267 and Part Two, section 21.
10. The text is published in PhLT 85-101. The beginning was translated by F. Müller in WZKM 12 (1898) 55-58; ~~the last part was translated into French in Le Muséeon 4 () 265-266;~~ a transcription and translation into English is given in J. C. Tarapore, Pahlavi andarz nāmak, Bombay 1933, 38-57. Partial translation was also made by A. Christensen in Acta Orientalia 8 (1930) 81-128, esp. pp. 114-118. A translation into Persian was made by M. Nawabi in RFLT 11 No. 3 (Autumn 1338) 302-333 (a translation into Arabic of Nawabi's Persian translation by Ahmad Tarjānī Zādah is given in the subsequent number of RFLT). I have made a detailed study of the text of AW in comparison with the available versions in Arabic and Persian, which I hope to publish separately. Detailed observations

on the text are therefore excluded from the present discussion.

11. Misk 29-41. The relevance of Misk to AW was first observed by W. B. Henning in ZDMG 106 (1956) 76f.
12. A comparison of the text of the Šāhnāma with AW has been done by Nawabi, loc. cit.
13. The most interesting perhaps is a version published by Louis Cheikho under the title Hikam Buzurjmihir in Machriq 6 (1903) p. 205-207, 250-254. It is based on an Arabic version which differs from that of Miskawayh.
14. PhLT 81. Cf. West, GIPh II, 113 §75. Persian translation by Nawabi, RFLT 12, No. 2 (Summer 1339) 259.
15. See further references on this person in Justi, Iran. Nb. 61.
16. rōz seems here to mean either 'victory' (cf. pāyrōz) or 'power', cf. NP. rōz (Farhang-i Nafisi).
17. tawāngar may also mean 'wealthy'.

d. Ādurfarnbag and Weh-zād.

1. PhLT 79f. A Persian translation was done by M. Nawabi, RFLT 12 No. 2 (Summer 1339) 258f. An edition of the text is given in Appendix A.
2. On the person of Ādurfarnbag see particularly the data collected in A. Barthelemy's introduction to his edition of Gujastak Abalish, Paris 1887 (Bibliothèque de l'École des Hautes Etudes, Sciences Philologiques et Historiques, 69e fascicule), p. 1-2. See also West, GIPh II, 105, 113; Justi, Iran Nb. 48f. (s.v. Ātarex Warenašn No. 6).
3. B. Faravashi in Anjoman-e Farhang-e Iran-e Bastan 1, No. 2 (December 1963) Persian text 56 n. 1, does not even consider the possibility that the person may be of the ninth century.
4. PhLT 73-77. Cf. West, GIPh II, 113. See also a discussion and an abridged translation of the text in B. T. Anklesaria's introduction to PhLT 27f.
5. Ku-m uzmūd hēd xrad mweh mēnōg; kunišn ī gētīg harw ciš-ē pad xrad baxt ēstēd.

6. This observation was already made by B. T. Anklesaria, loc. cit. 24.
7. 2 hēnd dānāg ī wizīdār ī abzārōmand dastwar, xrad-dastwar ka nē xwāstag, dēn-abzārōmand ka nē abartan.
8. Cf. Zaehner, Zurvan, 257 n. 1, who construes this differently.
9. ... abāg tuxšāg bawēd ud kirbag handōzēd,
 ud az xwēškārīh bē nē wardēd,
 wēdwar bawēd pad baxt.
 pad xwēš-tan wistāxw nē bawēd
 ud pad nihangtom wināh ahunsand;
 pad abartom abzār nē drāyēnēd,
 ud pad abzār ī kas kār nē kunēd;
 ašgahānīh baxt nē bē kunišn āmārēnēd,
 pad sūd tuxšāg wizīdār,
 ud pad baxt wistāxw hukāmag.
 As a rule, the readings of TD have been preferred.
10. The text is reconstructed in Appendix A, translation given in Part Two, section 2, 'Wisdom'.

e. Pseudepigraphic andarz.

1. Dk. iii. 195, DkM 209.
2. Dk. iii. 197, DkM 212.8-213.15. The name in the text is corrupt, but it was recognised to represent Sēn already by Darmesteter, Zend-Avesta II, 530 n. 181.
3. On Sēn see Jackson, Zoroaster 137, where references are given.
4. It is interesting to compare here the version of this admonition which is given in the parallel chapter which follows (ch.198). The term dādīg is replaced by gētīg and the two other terms are rendered here by mēnōg (cf. DkM 214.10-11). This alteration was required so as to make the contrast with the belief of the heretic Rašn Rēš sharper, for according to him the material law is in opposition to the spiritual one.
5. The text is not very clear. The word rendered here 'demonic' is spelt in the text dxwtyk, which could be read Jahūdīg 'Jewish', but this seems here out of place. I read the word *wišūdīg; a similar corruption of the same word occurs in DkM 312.16 (Menasce, Encyclopédie 108, transcribed it Yahūtak but did not translate it at the bottom of the page). The version of chapter 198 throws some light on the meaning: 'The enlarger of the world ought to praise the law, the ruler of the time ought to choose the law, and to rule over

- the world. The disturber (?) of the world is the sorcerer, the ruler ought to abstain from him and to command his extinction' (DkM 214.18-21)..
6. Edited and translated by Ervad Bamanji Nasarvanji Dhabhar under the title Andarj-i Aōshnar-i Dānāk, Bombay 1930 (Pahlavi Text Series No.4). The text was transcribed into Arabic characters and translated into Persian by Rashīd Rāsimī, Andarz-i Ušnar-i dānāk, Tehran 1313. Cf. Tavadia, Mpers. Spr. u. Lit. 106f.
 7. On the person of Ūšnar see especially in Dhabhar, op.cit., Preface p. v, xff.
 8. A variant of the name in Pahlavi is Hušwar, cf. loc.cit. xiii.
 9. Misk 6-18.
 10. Cf. the remarks by Henning, ZDMG 106 (1956) 76.
 11. pursīd hašāgerd ōšnar ī dānāg ku ēwag tā 1000 harw mārīg ēd rāy saxwan pad frahang bē gōw.
 12. Misk 12.1ff.
 13. Cf. Part Two, section 14, 'Poverty'.
 14. (pad) xwāstag ī was pad harw kas was ziyānkārtar ēd rāy cē frēhbudīh rāy bē az paymān.
 15. u-š ēn-iz guft ku mardomān āzarmīgtom ciš ud kas harw rōz andar kāhišn. pas [kē] pad hān ī spāsānīgtom nē tuxšāg xwēš-tan pad gētīg sūd zīndag nē dārišn. (Dhabhar construed this sentence differently)..

16. farrox awē tan kē wuzurg āfrīn ī yazdān arīnīd
 ēstēd ō ezbayišn ud šnāyēnišn ud pānāgīh ud dāštārīh
 ud ummēd ō ōhrmazd ī xwadāy ud mēnōgān ī mahist
 amahraspandān ud harwisp mēnōg ī weh. rāyēnīdārīh
 ī mēnōg ud gētīg aziš paydāgēnēd ud amāh mardomān xwaš
 stāyēnīdārīh ud spās ōšmardārīh ī andar ōhrmazd ī xwadāy
 ud amahraspandān ud harwisp mēnōg ī weh tuxšāg abāyēd
 būdan. (Dhabhar's translation of these sentences is
 somewhat different).

f. Anonymous andarz texts

1. PhIT. 29. Persian translation by M.Nawabi, RFLT 12
 No.2 (Summer 1339) 256. See also B.N.Dhabhar, Sir
Jamsetjee Jejeebhoy Madressa Jubilee Volume, Bombay 1914,
 73-74.
2. PhIT. 39f. The title Andarzīhā ī Pēšēnīgān (which is in
 any case an addition of the editor) does not apply to
 this text or to the following two, but it will be used as
 a convenient designation. A Persian translation of this
 text is given by M.Nawabi loc.cit. 256.f.
3. cē ēn gētīg espanj ī ēwag-rōzag humānāg, ud jāwēdān.
 anōh abāyēd būdan, ud pad kirbag ud bazag amār bawēd. cē
 harw kē-š kirbag wēš ku wināh ēgiš srōš-ahlāy dast gīrēd
 ud ō wahišt nayēd. awē kē wināh wēš ku kirbag ēgiš
 wizarš dēw dast gīrēd ud ō dušox nayēd. ka griyēnd nē

abaxšayēnd ud ka wāng kunēnd nē niyōšēnd.

4. PhlT 40. 6-11. A Persian translation is given by M.Nawabi, loc.cit. 257.
5. az ēn hamāg awē wattar kē ruwān nē dārēd.
6. PhlT 40.12-20. A Persian translation is given by M.Nawabi, loc.cit.257.
7. az ēn hamāg awē wattar kē bē mīrēd ud xwadāy az awē hušnūd nēst. ud harw kē xwadāy az awē hušnūd nēst awē rāy andar wahišt ī bāmīg gyāg nēst.
8. PhlT 51-54. J.C.Tarapore, Pahlavi andarz-nāmak, Bombay 1933, 13-17. Translated by Ervad M.F.Kanga, Sanj Vartaman Annual, Bombay 1947. Persian translation is given by M.Nawabi, RFLT 12 No.1 (Spring 1339) 136-141.
9. Text wcynd, read *wizīnēnd, cf. MPT wcyd-, wcyn-.
10. pad kālbud ī mardom a'ōn humānāg cē'ōn draxt-ē ka kārēnd ud rōyēd ud abzāyēd ud waxšēd škanēnd ud brīnēnd ud *wizīnēnd ud abar ō ātaxš nihēnd, ud ātaxš sōzēd ud gugārēd ud wād ī ardāy andar ō gēhān afšānēd. pas bē ō awē kē kārēd *ēnyā did ēwiz nē dānēd ku xwad būd ayāb nē.
11. W.B.Henning, 'A Pahlavi poem', BSOAS 13 (1950) 641-648, cf. esp. p.647f.
12. PhlT 78. A Persian translation is given by M.Nawabi in RFLT 12 No.2 (Summer 1339) 257f.

13. PhlT 78f. A Persian translation is given by M.Nawabi loc.cit.258. His translation of §6 is to be corrected. Read: ud hān rāmišn nē pad rāmišn abāyēd dāstan kē pas az hān andōh fragān bawēd 'One ought not to hold as joy that joy which becomes afterwards the beginning of worry' (thus already Zaehner, Zurvan 289).
14. PhlT 121-127. Dastur Kaikhusru Jamaspji Jamasp-Asa in Sir Jamsetjee Jejeebhoy Madressa Jubilee Volume, Bombay 1914, 38-88. A comparison of this text with the version of Vijdēn is made by B.T.Anklesaria in his introduction to PhlT 41ff.
15. The title is not in the manuscripts and was given to the text by Jamasp-Asana. Cf. PhlT, Introduction 41.
16. PhlT 129-131; Zs chapter 27 (p.94-98); Vijdēn. 13-16. The first section (§2-6) is given in transcription and translation in Bailey, Zor.Pr.158f. Cf. West, GIPh. II, 113; §79.
17. wizīn-kerdārīh seems to mean 'practising discriminately', rather than 'niceness' (Bailey).
18. There seems to be a distinction between dēn-agāhīhā amōxtēd and rāstīhā amōzēd, the first phrase referring to the learning 'according to the knowledge of the religion', for a dastwar is obviously required to possess knowledge of theology; and the latter phrase speaking of 'teaching

truthfully', for a teacher does not have necessarily to teach the contents of dēn-āgāhīh to all his disciples, he merely has to teach them all truthfully, not to mislead them, while he may reserve the more esoteric knowledge of religion to those who are capable of grasping it (cf. further on this Part Two, section 21). Even if this interpretation is regarded as far-fetched, there seems certainly to be a distinction in meaning between the two verbs āmōxtēd and āmōzēd (the former being a secondary present stem formed from the stem of the past participle). Bailey, ibid., translates them both 'teaches'.

19. nām paydagīh az ahlawān nē appurdan rāy.
20. ahlāyīh daxšag andar xwēš mān mehman kardan rāy.
21. druz andar wārom ahušihā nē waxšēnīdan rāy.
22. magindīh: for this word cf. the remark in BSOAS 27 (1964) 449.
23. Ph1T 154. Text reproduced with translation by B.N. Dhabhar in Dastur Hoshang Memorial Volume, Bombay 1918, 193-195 (reprinted in B.N.Dhabhar, Essays on Iranian subjects, Bombay 1955, 39-41). Given in Appendix A.
24. Examples of magical texts in Pahlavi exist in the Rivāyat which follow Dd, cf. PPriv ch.63-64 (p.201-206).

Similar Manichaean texts were published by W.B.Henning in BSOAS 12 (1947) 39-57.

25. PhIT. 162-167 and cf. the Introduction to PhIT 52f; West, GIPh. II, 114 §84. J.C.Tarapore, Vijârishn i Chatrang and other texts, Bombay 1932, 9-11, 20-23. Translated by M.F.Kanga, 'Characteristics of a fortunate man according to the Middle Persian text', Kaiser-i-Hind Naoroze Number, Bombay 1951; text and translation are given in a stencil fascicule by the same author, Apar Xēm ut xrat i farrōx mart, a Pahlavi text, Bombay 1953. Cf. also Pagliaro, 'Note di lessicografia pahlavica', RSO 19 (1941), 289ff.
26. Bthl.MirMund.iv.17.
27. J.C.Tavadia, Khareghat Memorial Volume I, Bombay 1953, 271-275; also printed in Tavadia, Indo-Iranian studies, Santiniketan 1950, 86ff. Tavadia was constrained in the first part of this 'poem' to distort the normal construction of phrases in order to achieve a division of lines which would satisfy the requirement of an equal number of syllables to each line; this conception of Middle Persian metre has however been proved to be mistaken by Henning, BSOAS 13 (1950) 641ff. A proposed reconstruction is given in Appendix A.

28. The compound ranz-wehīh, as well as its opposite ranz-wattarīh, occur a number of times in this text, but their meaning is not clear.
29. The text is quoted by the paragraph division in the text of Junker. Editions of the text are: PazT 73f. ; Heinrich F.J.Junker, 'Ein mittel-persisches Schulgespräch', Sitzungsberichte der Heidelberger Akademie der Wissenschaften, Philos. - hist. Klasse, 1912, 15. Abhandlung; a Leningrad manuscript which was not used by Junker was published, without knowledge of Junker's edition, by A. Freiman, 'Andarz i Kōtakân', Dastur Hoshang Memorial Volume, Bombay 1918, 482-489. A fragmentary translation is provided by Freiman, which at some points improves on that of Junker. The text was previously published by J. Darmesteter, 'Les devoirs de l'écolier', JA 8e série, vol. 13 (1889) 355-363.

g. Dk vi

1. The book is found in the two editions of the Dk (see List of Abbreviations). In Sanjana's edition it is spread over the volumes X to XIII. A full transcription and translation of the text have been prepared by me in course of the present work. Some remarks on the book are found in West, GIPh. II, 94f. 838 and Menasce,

Encyclopédie 37ff.; cf. also Tavadia, Mpers.Spr.u.Lit.

63-66. I have also greatly benefited from a transcription of Dk vi done by Bahram Faravachi in a thesis he presented to the University of Paris, École Pratique des Hautes Études, for the Doctorat de 3ème cycle, Paris 1961. This thesis contains also a glossary, lists of parallel opposed or related terms and qualities, proper names, and a table of contents. It was sent to me thanks to the kindness of Father J. de Menasce. A portion of the text (§D.8-D.12) has recently been published, translated and discussed by B.Faravashi in Anjoman-e Iran-e Bastan, 1 No.2, December 1963, 44-58. Other publications on Dk vi are by Heinrich F.J.Junker, 'Collation notes from Denkart, Book VI', Sir Jamsetjee Jejeebhoy Madressa Jubilee Volume, Bombay 1914, 106-115; M. -E. Chaumont, 'Vestiges d'un courant ascétique dans le zoroastrisme sassanide d'après le VIe livre du Dēnkart', RHR, 156 (1959) 1-23.

2. Cf. Tavadia, Mpers. Spr. u. Lit. 65.
3. Dk vi. 1.
4. SA.5, A.6, C.83, D.1, D.7.
5. SD.8, D9.
6. SD.4.
7. SA.4, E.22.
8. SD.10.

9. §D.12.
10. §D.5, D.6, D.10.
11. §D.2.
12. §D.10.
13. There may be some doubt with regard to Adur-farnbag, who may be identical with the ninth-century compiler of the Dk, but this is not very likely. Cf. above text No.xii.
14. There is a single known exception to this, the case of Adurfarnbag ī Farrozzādān, cf. ibid.
15. Cf. Tavadia, Mpers. Spr. u. Lit. 65, and Menasce, Encyclopédie 39.
16. Especially §B.1^{ff.}, and particularly §B.4.
17. Cf. below section 4b in this part.
18. Cf. e.g. §D.8, and also cases like §575-8, §B.1-B.3, and also closely related groups of sayings like §142-148.
19. Cf. the cases where it was necessary to subdivide paragraphs, e.g. §82a and §§2b, §C.83 a & b, §D1a, b & c.
20. §B.48-C.47 evidently form one collection.
21. Examples are: §13 and 14, 110, 181;; 113 / 118; 94 / E.11; 115 / E.38a; 119 / E.38b; 120 / E.38c; 153 / E.31g.
22. §31 / Misk 38.18f.; §131 / Misk 39.3f.; §224 / Misk 39.5f.; §127 / Misk 67.18ff.; §178 / Misk 75.10-15.
23. For example, §138-152 (cf. below, Part Two section 14, 'Poverty').

24. Cf. below, Part Two section 15, 'The measure'.
25. It is not altogether arbitrary, though. Many sayings come together because they deal with the same subject or by association, thus, e.g. §103-105 (on gōhr); §129-132; §141-152 etc.

3. Types of andarz books

1. Cf. W.G.Lambert, Babylonian wisdom literature, London 1960. Also J.J.A. van Dijk, La sagesse suméro-accadienne, Leiden 1953; J.Fichtner, Die altorientalische Weisheit in ihrer israelitisch-jüdischen Ausprägung, Giessen 1933 (Zeitschrift für die alttest. Wissenschaft Beiheft 62); O.S.Rankin, Israel's wisdom literature, Edinburgh 1936.
2. Cf. the attempt at classification made in Part Two, section 2, by using as criterion the attitude to the concept of wisdom.
3. The edition quoted is by T.D.Anklesaria, Dânâk-u Mainyô-f Khard, Bombay 1913, the references being to the division of chapter and verses by West, The book of Mainyô i Khard, Stuttgart 1871; cf. SBE 24. On the text cf. West, GIPh.II 107 §55; Tavadia, Mpers. Spr. u. Lit. 98-101, where further bibliography is given.

4b. The midrashic technique

1. Cf. Bth. SR I.42 & n.1; also AirWb.1181f.1ii.
2. For a general idea of the character of the midrashic literature one may refer to articles in the standard Encyclopaedias. Cf. particularly The Jewish Encyclopedia vol.8, 548 ff. (s.v. 'Midrash'); ERE vol.8, 624ff. (s.v. 'Midrash and midrashic literature').
3. Many points of contact seem to exist. Apart from several sayings in Dk vi which have the same structure and idea as corresponding sayings in Jewish midrashim (particularly Pirge Abot), one may quote concepts like seyag which is reminiscent of Pahlavi frawand. The numerical andarz sayings of Ošnar can be compared to those in the Passover Haggadah and Pirge Abot, but they also have correspondences already in Babylonian literature and in Proverbs.

Part Two

1. Self-inquiry.

1. pōryōtkēšan ī fradom-dānišnān cannot, of course, mean 'the ancient sages, in their primeval wisdom' (Zaehner, similarly Kanga); fradom dānišnān obviously serves here as an explanatory gloss on pōryōtkēšan, giving a literal rendering of the two members which make up the Avestan compound paoiryō.tkaēša. This explains the plural ending of dānišnān, for the two words form together a bahuvrihi compound. A similar gloss on pōryōtkēšan: dānagān pēšenīgān, 'the early sages', occurs in Dk.vi.1, cf. also Tavadia, Mpers. Spr. u. Lit. 63.
2. Some other examples of the construction az ... bē show the following meanings of this expression:
 - (1) 'coming from, originating from', e.g. ud aziš bē bar daštārīh ī kišwar 'and the fruit from it is the preservation of the clime', Dk.vi. C.83a; az yazdān bē '(comes) from the gods', Dk.vi. E.45g.
 - Hence (2) 'according to, on the authority of', e.g., yazdīh aziš bē družīh abar guft ēstēd 'according to it (the term) "divinity" has been applied to demonic nature', DkM. 118.15f; az dastwarān bē gyāg-ē nibišt ku... 'one passage, following the religious authorities, writes...'
 - Another meaning is (3) 'because of', cf., e.g., DkM.

297. 1 az hān bē.

It therefore seems that Molé was not right when he criticised Zaehner for his translation of the sentence nibēgihā-z ī az dēn bē abar biziškīh ...

(DkM. 412.18f.), which Molé proposed to translate 'écrits étrangers à la religion, sur la médecine ...'

(cf. Molé, RHR 162, 1962, 196f., and n.l. on p. 197).

I know of no other case of az ...bē signifying 'outside of, alien to'; only the well-known, but different, idiom bē az means 'without, except, outside'.

3. Details of recent translations of this text (by R.C.Zaehner, M.F.Kanga and others) will be found above, in Part One.

The translation offered, here differs in some minor points from the previous ones.

4. Mss. MHm = cē-m, obviously a mistake for cim.

5. A similar text about daily self-scrutiny is found in APēš II §5: ud harw rōz abāg xwēš-tan amār bē kardan ku im-rōz cē sūd ud cē ziyān, cē kirbag ud cē wināh, ud cand pad rāh ī frārōn raft hēm ud cand pad rāh ī abārōn... (PhIT 39)

"Every day one ought to reckon with oneself, 'To-day what benefit and what harm (have I done) what good deeds and what sins, how much have I walked in the path of righteousness and how much in the path of sinfulness' ". Very much the same questions are also prescribed in Dk vi. E.2,

E.3 & E.31e. The duty of self-inquiry is also mentioned at the beginning of SGV ch.X.

6. See below section 6.

2. Wisdom.

1. See above, Part One, section 3, 'Types of andarz books'.
2. This subject is discussed at some length in Casartelli, Philosophie religieuse, 29ff., who is mainly concerned, however, to prove the dependence of the doctrine in MX on foreign influences.
3. i.e. the world is held by the three qualities. This is the way in which the compiler of Dk vi understood the last words of this text (cf. the discussion below). That 'He', viz. Ohrmazd, is held by wisdom would seem to be sheer blasphemy. The reading šayēd for dāšt, favoured by most manuscripts, is unsatisfactory: the corruption of dāšt into šayēd is easy and common.
4. The connection between wisdom and the Renovation has also been noticed, in other texts, by Molé, Culte 492ff.
5. An Arabic translation of this text exists in Misk:

irādatu 'llāhi min al-nās an ya^ʿrifūhu, fa-innahum idā ^ʿarafūhu aṭā^ʿūhu, wa-irādatu 'l-šayṭān min al-nās an yajhalūhu, fa-innahum idā ^ʿarafūhu hāna ^ʿalayhim fa-^ʿaṣawhu. (Misk 38.18-19). 'The desire of God from men is that they should know Him, for if they know Him they will obey Him.

The desire of the devil from men is that they should ignore him, for if they know him he would be despised by them and they would disobey him'. The saying forms part of a collection attributed to Buzurjmihr.

6. See also, in a similar vein, Dk vi.2.
7. On this expression see the note to the translation of this passage.
8. Syntactically the opposite construction of the sentence is also possible, namely: "Character does not include wisdom, but wisdom includes character, and religion includes both". The ambiguity arises because andar, which is here a postposition, can refer to either of the two nouns which precede it. The translation given above is however preferable because it alone accounts for the sentence which follows: 'Spiritual things are known through disciplining the character', which shows that knowledge is in effect implied in character.
9. The three sentences which are given last in §253 do not belong here. By their construction it is obvious that they form a different and independent list, or are borrowed from one.
10. This saying has a parallel in Misk 67.18ff.
11. Although the question in §85 (PhLT 93) begins the list with 'character', the detailed answers (§86ff.) begin with xrad.

12. Cf. Part One, text No. xiii.
13. The text is given in Appendix A.
14. 'Here' refers to this world, and 'there' to the next world.
15. Text and translations are given in Appendix A.

Supplementary note to section 2, 'Wisdom'

1. It is certain that the Arabic translator did not have dād in front of him, for else he would have rendered it by either dīn (as in AW §9, 10) or amr (as in AW §8).
2. BSOAS 10.384, 615.
3. Zurvan 388.
4. Cf. also PhIT 150 §56, discussed in section 12 'Heresy' and note 9 ibid.
5. Another text where the word seems to mean precisely 'approval' is the following: ud abar driyōš ī mustōmand pahlom darman garzišn, ud mustgar az garzišn ī mustōmand abāz... (?) ud a-padīrišnīh ud a-wābarīgānīh ud a-dayišnīh būdan (DkM 790.1-4). 'And concerning a poor oppressed man, one ought to complain (for him and get him) the best remedy. With regard to the oppressor, one ought to keep him back (?), not to accept him, not to believe him and not to approve (?) of him.'
6. Menasce, Encyclopédie 44.

3. Consultation of the wise

1. The two injunctions, concerning consultation and making frequent visits to the fire-temple, follow each other in Wazad and PN (PhLT 152 §70-73; 47f. §44-45).
2. See below, section 9d, 'Gods and good people'.
3. 'To digest', gugārdan, means to forget, lose or repress. Cf. the idiom kēn gugārdan.

4. Education

1. pad frahang xwāstārīh tuxšag bawēd, cē frahang tōhm ī dānišn u-š bar xrad, ud xrad harw 2 axwānīg rāyēnišn (PN, PhLT 47 §41).
2. hān ī 10 andarz. fradom husrawīh ī xwēš sārār ud āmōzgār ud rad ud pid abāyastan rāy husrawīhā raftan. sedīgar hān ī xwēš āmōzgār pad hān ī drāztar cōb nē xadan ud nē bēšīdan rāy cē nē ašnawēd az xwēš āmōzgār padīš nām nē srawēnīdan. cahārom nām paydāgīh az ahlawān nē appurdan rāy cē āmōxt az xwēš āmōzgār rādīhā abāz ō arzānīgān *abspārdan. (PhLT 130 §7, 9, 10).
3. For a discussion of *dayišn cf. Supplementary Note to section 2 above.
4. There is a strange change of person at this point, the verb coming in the 3rd person pl.

5. Mirza's translation in his thesis is somewhat different.

hāwišt guft ku ērbad xwadāy ahlaw bawēh. cē az frahang ī ērbad bē kard kē *dayišn ahlaw. pad nāmcišt pad amāh ēwiz ēn frahang abzār-hayyāpēnīdārtar ud waxšēnīdārtar. ud agar az xrad ud agar az tuxšāgīh amāh bē nē mānēd, ēg amāh harwisp mardom az ēn frahang ka andar kār dārēnd ahlaw bawānd pad yazdān kām ōz nērōg xwābarīh ud āmurzīdārīh (PRiv p.200, §28).

6. Menasce, Encyclopédie 67ff.

7. Christensen, Iran 416ff.

8. J.J.Modi, Education among the ancient Iranians,

Bombay 1905. A summary of the subject is also given in L.H.Gray's article 'Education (Persian)' in ERE 5, 207-208. A similar general treatment is also contained in Aly-Akbar Mazahéri, La famille iranienne aux temps anté-islamiques, Paris, 1938, 168-185.

9. This passage is also found in an Arabic version, Misk 39.5-6; the teacher is here labelled al-imām al-mu'addib 'the instructing guide'.

II Faith and religion

5. Faith

1. The verb is derived from Av. var- (so already Horn, Npers. Etym. 203) with a no- suffix.
2. Cf. also Dk vi. 78 (taftig as against absard).
3. Cf. Dk vi.E4, quoted above.
4. Cf. Dk vi.96.
5. Cf. below section 8.
6. There is however no doubt of man's responsibility for his faith. Cf. also below section 20.
7. Cf. Dk.vi.274, quoted above.
8. The word occurs in Dk vi.152; E.9 etc. For its use in Sassanian seals and inscriptions see some references in E. Herzfeld, Paikuli I, Berlin 1924, 143.
9. Cf. Dk vi.28; E.1.

6. Religion

1. On dēn cf. the summary of the etymologies proposed and some further references in Duchesne-Guillemin, Religion 329-331. Of the recent studies of the subject the one by M.Molé, 'Daēnā, le pont Cinvat et l'initiation dans le Mazdéisme', RHR 157 (1960) 155-185, deserves special notice, though its conclusions are too one-sided.

2. This saying can also be translated: 'Religion is that which does comfort to every creature'.
3. Cf., e.g., the expression dil u dīn in Sa'dī, Gulistān, Tehran 1316, 77.
4. The materials concerning this were gathered and discussed in Jal Dastur Cursetji Pavry, The Zoroastrian doctrine of a future life: from death to the individual judgment, New York 1926, 28-48.
5. This fits in nicely with the accepted etymology from day- 'to see'.
6. Cf. Dk vi.80, note to the translation.
7. Advice with regard to taking someone as authority occurs, e.g., in Dk vi.53, 92, 115. For consultation see above, section 3, and for the company of good people see the remarks made below in section 9d.
8. Cf. in Part One the remarks on the group Dk vi. SB.47-C.47.
9. A different, though not contradictory, interpretation of this saying has been offered above.
10. For further material on this cf. below section 21, 'Esoteric doctrines'.

7. Religion and the scriptures

1. This word, if read *zīwišnīh, should be translated 'life'. Cf. notes ad loc.

2. Cf. Dk vi.164.
3. Cf. Dk vi.182. The term used in the corresponding passage §13 is 'the greatest duties' (without reference to Avesta and Zand).
4. Dk vi.E.45c.
5. Cf. on the subject the remarks in section 21 'Esoteric doctrines'.
6. On the question of zand and heresy see further below, section 12.
7. ŠGV is impregnated with this spirit. Cf. the notion of theologia naturalis in Christianity and the idea of fiṭra in Islam.

III. The Spirits.

8. Mēnōg

1. Recent discussions of the terms are to be found in Zaehner, Dawn 200ff., and Duchesne-Guillemin, Religion 311ff.
2. The injunction against excessive adorning of the things of this world is also found elsewhere in Dk vi (cf. §149f.).
3. i.e. it seemed to them reasonable to conduct worldly matters which can be kept within limits of moderation and which are not harmful to the other world.
4. The theme of the transience of this world is discussed separately below, section 13 'Attitude to this world'.
5. Cf. above section 5 and below in this section.
6. Cf. below section 13 'Attitude to this world'.
7. Cf. e.g. Dk vi.E.35a.
8. E.g. MX 2.156f.
9. Cf., in a similar vein, Dk vi.87.
10. Cf. above section 6. The same figures of speech are used with regard to dēn as with regard to the other spirits. Cf. Dk vi.91: 'Faith means to make religion dwell in one's body and to vanquish the demons from one's body', and also Dk vi.323.
11. I cannot recollect any clear instance of its being thus used.

12. This passage is complemented by the one which follows it, §265. Cf. also: 'A man who stands up in poverty... drives away from the world for his own part Ahreman and his misbegotten creatures' (Dk vi.E.30a), and Dk vi.130. The same idea occurs also in the admonitions of Adurbād in DkM 216.13f.
13. Cf. below in this section.
14. A somewhat similar text, which makes the seven Amahraspands correspond to ten qualities, is found in Dk vi.E.45h. 'The law of Wahman', according to that passage, is 'desire of peace'.
15. The wicked man apparently has no soul, cf. Apēš III §6, PhlT 40.
16. Yašt 13 is devoted to their praise. Cf. some notes and further references in Duchesne-Guillemin, Religion 217f., 328f.
17. Cf. above note 5 and section 5. The expression corresponds to another, less common one: yazdān rāy 'for the sake of the gods' (Dk vi.273, quoted in section 5).
18. See above section 1.
19. Cf. also Dk vi. 302.
20. Cf. a similar text in PhlT 45 §27.
21. That the terms 'wisdom' and 'religion' do not form a regular part of this series can be seen from Dk vi.77f.,

where only the first three pairs of our passage occur.

A fairly arbitrary list of demons is also found in AW, PhLT 89 §30, countered by a list of good spirits which includes the two types of wisdom, character, hope, contentment, religion and consultation in PhLT 90 §43.

22. Cf. e.g. the way goodness is treated as a spirit in Dk vi.C. 77, quoted above.

9. Man and the spirits

1. See above section 5, 'Faith'.
2. See above section 2, 'Wisdom'.
3. Cf. also Dk vi.277-278; AW, PhLT 87 §4.
4. A similar problem exists in Christianity with regard to the conception of the devil representing the evil principle, which according to the accepted theology is a mere lack of goodness (privatio boni). The question was dealt with at length by C.G.Jung, cf. his Psychology and religion: West and East, The Collected Works of C.G.Jung vol.11, Bollingen Series XM, New York 1958, 167ff.
5. This is the only task according to Adurbād son of Zardušt, Dk vi.D.9.

6. Though of course all the numerous references to the faculties of knowledge created by Ohrmazd to combat Ahreman belong here. Cf., e.g., AW, PhlT 90 §43.
7. Another word used to express the notion of 'separation' is 'judāgīh (Dk.vi.267). wizīhīdagīh, properly 'distinctness', also occurs in Dk vi. 43, 320.
8. Cf. Dk vi.206.
9. Cf. below, in the last part of this section.
10. There is, however, the possibility that the text is corrupt and some words omitted in the definition of hamīh.
11. Above section 5.
12. Cf. also Dk vi.126: 'One who is respectful (tarsagāh) towards the gods because of a misfortune which has come or one which has not come...' Also: 'Pleasure is this, one who holds the spiritual gods in reverence (bawandag mēnēd) for a good thing which has come, and the gods bring him pleasure which has not come to him and take away from him misfortune which has come to him...' (Dk vi.113).
13. The ambiguity of dēn is here again in evidence.
14. A similar saying is found in Dk vi.E.31c.
15. The opposite of this saying is found in the paragraph which follows, §C.78.

16. Cf. also. 'If a man lives by the religion of the gods, the gods see his toil in this world, so that even if he has come into pain by foot, he lives rightfully on his work done by hand' (Dk vi.106). The gods' defence of man at the time of the final judgement is described in Dk vi.101.
17. Cf. Dk vi.291, quoted above in section 5.
18. Dk vi.135, cf. above.
19. Cf. the discussion above section 2, 'Wisdom'.
20. Dk vi.79.
21. Dk.vi.135.
22. On the idea of the microcosm cf. most recently Molé, Culte, 406ff., where previous literature is mentioned and discussed.
23. More elaborate commentary is given elsewhere.
24. The question will be dealt with below in section 11b 'Attitude to sinners'.
25. Dk vi.264, quoted above.
26. Dk vi.47.
27. Dk vi.59.
28. Dk vi.242.
29. Dk vi.292.
30. Dk vi.E.30a.
31. Dk vi.C.49f. also 521.

32. Dk vi.323, cf. also §225.
33. Dk vi.D.7a.
34. Dk vi.D.8.
35. Dk vi.89.
36. Dk vi.300.
37. Dk vi.C.78.
38. Cf. Dk vi.A.5, D.5, D.7b.
39. Cf., e.g., Dk vi.29b.
40. Dk vi.125.
41. Cf. Dk vi.170.
42. Dk vi.14; cf. the notes to the translation of Dk vi. 13. Also Dk vi.78, E.5.
43. Dk vi.101.
44. Dk vi.280.
45. Cf. eg., Dk vi.D.5.
46. Dk vi.206, 'righteous' used in a sense similar to that of 'the good'; cf. also below section 21.
47. pad nēwagīh ī mad ēstēd andar yazdān spāsdārīh kunišn ud yazdān ud wehān aziš bahr kunišn ud pad yazdān bē hilišn, cē pādāšn az hān gyāg ku abāyēd madan xwad rasēd.
48. Cf. also such expressions as: wehān arzānīgān rāy ciš dādan (PhLT 78.5-6), 'To give something to the worthy good'. xwad nē xward ud ō wehān nē dād ud bahr nē kard (AVn 31.7), 'He did not eat it himself, did not give it to the good and did not share it'. māh rōz 3 ciš rāy

tuxšišn kunišn, rāmišn ī xwēš ud passand ī wehān ud
šnāyēnišn ī kirbag mizd rāy (Ošnar 32), 'In the days
of the month one ought to strive for three things, one's
own joy, the approval of the good and the satisfaction
of good deeds'.

49. Cf. above note 45 and section 10 below. Also DkM 219.

12-14: padīrišn ī mardān ī ahlawān hubarišnīh ī ātaxš ī
abzōnīg yōšdāhrīh ī abān ī wehān az ērān dehān nē wisānīdan

'Not to remove from the provinces of Ērān the hospitality
of righteous men, the good care of bounteous fire, and
the purification of the good waters'.

IV. Righteousness

10. Ah law and druwand.

1. Dk vi.D.1a, and see parallels mentioned in the note to the translation.
2. Cf. on this below, section 20, 'Fate'. It is interesting to note in this connection that righteousness is said to be allotted by the gods: cē awē kē andar mān ī ataxšān wēš šawēd...ēgiš xwāstag ud ahlayih wēš baxšēnd (PN, PhIT 48 §45).
3. Above section 6b, 'Religion'.
4. Cf. Dk vi.E.43e: husāzagih ī abāg mardomān, and cf. the note to the translation of Dk vi.82b.
5. Dk vi.E.38d.
6. This is a commonplace idea in the andarz books. Cf. Dk vi.A.6; AW, PhIT 86 §3.
7. Dk vi.310.
8. Cf. further on the subject of the divisions of man below, section 21, 'Esoteric doctrines'.
9. Especially in the passage Dk vi.206, where 'the righteous' is clearly used in the specific sense of wehān. Cf. above section 9, 'Man and the spirits', d, especially note 47.

10. Cf. SGV 3.22ff. The context there is however completely different from the one we have here.
11. Cf. below section 21, 'Esoteric doctrines'.
12. The subject has now been amply discussed and illustrated in Molé, Culte 37ff.
13. Nūn man, cē'onam kāmāg tuxšišn ī pad ahlāyīh warzīdan ud pahrēz ī az wināh kardan, ēdōn - - bē kīān ī andar jast ēstēd az kunišn ī framāyišn ī āwām-xwadāyān ud duš-pādixšāyīh ī padīš acārag hēm ēnyā, - - az wināh ī nigīrišnīg pad kām cand-am dānišn pahrixt ēstēm... (PhLT. 86-87⁹⁴).
14. The definition given to a state of acār ud nē wizīrēd is when, 'if one does not commit a perversity, one has this fear from it, that one would not be able to keep one's body alive and healthy' (Dk vi.100).
15. The excuse of being without remedy or helpless which enables one to commit a sin is apparently not easily adopted by more pious and sensitive people, who fear that they may fall into wickedness. These are warned: 'A man who holds all the people in this world to be wicked, but himself he holds to be not wicked but righteous, (saying:) "I belong to Ohrmazd", - - Ahreman carries him less to himself than a "helpless" man of little sin, who says himself, "I am wicked"' (Dk vi.169).

The second man is obviously one who committed little sin, and that always under constraint, but is yet dispirited by this to the extent that he regards himself as belonging completely to Ahreman.

16. Cf. preceding note.
17. Cf. below, section 16.
18. Dk vi.E.11; a somewhat different list is given in Dk vi.94: generous, peaceful, reverent, speaker of wisdom.

11. Sin and repentance

1. Cf. also in AW: kāmag kadār frārōntar? Awināhīh.
'What desire is most righteous? Lack of sin'
(PhLT 92 §69f.)
2. Cf. AW: hān kē tan abēbīmīhātar ud awināhtar ud aranzagīhātar dānēd rāyēnīdan 'One who knows how to govern himself in a manner most free from fear, sin and pain' (PhLT 92 §60.)
3. Dk vi.17.
4. Dk vi.5.
5. Dk vi.303.
6. Dk vi.119.
7. It is clearly based on a pun.

8. Cf. APēš II, PhlT 40 §8; Ošnar 42: ud kē wināh ud bazag kard ēstēd pašēmān ud pad padīd būdan ud anē-z wināh nē kardān; AXus, PhlT 55 §1; Dk vi.38, 168 etc.
9. Cf. Dk vi.18.
10. AXus, PhlT 56f. §10; also in opposition to kirbag in Ošnar 51.
11. WāzAd, PhlT 148 §40; Dk vi.123 etc. Cf. also at the end of this section.
12. Cf. the words of the gods: '(He is) our own, for that spirit was created by us, then he thought of us and praised us, and the sin which that demon committed was created by you' (Dk vi.101).
13. Cf. Dk vi.100 and above, prec. section.
14. In other places too nang sometimes has a pejorative connotation, e.g. Dk vi.54; AW, PhlT 89 §30, 36, but in some cases it is used in a good sense, cf. AW, PhlT 95 §140; Dk vi.181. Both šarm and nang are used synonymously in a bad sense in AdMah, PhlT 66 §95.
15. Dk vi.14, cf. also §181, 182. In the latter of these passages the negative particle is omitted, but there is no doubt, in view of the parallels and the further material, that this is a copyist's error.
16. Dk vi.13, cf. also note to the translation.
17. Dk vi.29, §E.30a.
18. Dk vi.129 and cf. above.

19. Dk vi.212.
20. Dk vi.E.12, cf. above section 5.
21. hucašmīh hān bawēd kē āhōg ud hunar ī kasān bē nigīrēd,
 azpas āhōg ī xwēš wirāstan tuxšēd, wehān rāy wehīh
 āškārag, āhōg īšān ast xwēšihā nē pad snēh bē dōstihā
 wirāstan rāy *awiš gōwēd. Cf. also in a similar
 spirit: andak āhōg ī xwēš bē wirāstan, pas āhōg ī
 kasān bē guftan. 'One ought to correct one's own
 small(est) fault, then to speak the fault of other
 people' (Ošnar 42).
22. Dk vi.322.
23. E.g. Dk vi.C.22.
24. Dk vi.27f.
25. Dk vi.289.
26. pad pādifrāh ō mardomān kardan waranīg ma bāš.
27. bīm ī dušox rāy pādifrāh pad nigīrišn kun.
28. ma handāzēd wad ō wattarān cē wattar awē xwad rasēd ō
 hān ī xwēš kunišn. The opposite, severe view, demanding
 not to show pity towards the wicked, is expressed in
 PRiv ch.33 (p.105f).
29. Dk vi.50, cf. SE.31d.
30. Dk vi.D.31b.
31. Dk vi.E.28.
32. Dk vi.50.
33. Dk vi.101.

34. Dk vi.A.4.
35. māndag ō radān garzīdan ud aštar ī srōšīg burdan ud hamīh [ud] vičidāiti kardan pad xwār ma dārēd.
36. Cf. MPT m'ndg in TPS 1944.114. For the Phl expression cf. Bthl., MirMund 2.32, 40ff.
37. I have noticed only one occurrence of wināh instead of māndag in this formula: SnS 8.2.
38. Dk vi.272 (corr.), E.31d.

12. Heresy.

1. Attention was drawn to this text by Menasce, Encyclopédie 66f. The question of Zand and heresy is dealt with by Molé in Oriens 13/14 (1961) 1-28, esp. p.1-11. The words kār ud dādīstān are taken by both scholars as two concepts independent of zand, the sentence being translated: 'Il ne faut pas dire le Zand ni accomplir les oeuvres ni établir les lois autrement...' (Molé). But apart from the fact that Zand, kār and dādīstān make an incongruous series, the words kār ud dādīstān are a well-established idiomatic expression meaning simply 'affair, matter, business'.
2. There can hardly be any connection between this and the celebrated Sēn, the disciple of Zoroaster, as

West seems to suggest, cf. GIPh II,95. To judge from our context Sēn the heretic should be a contemporary of Ādurbād (who is probably Ādurbād ī Mahraspandān). This Sēn is also mentioned in ŠnŠ 6.7, cf. Tavadia's edition p.97f.

3. Cf. also Dk vi.160, 161.
4. Cf. the admonitions attributed to Mani in Dk iii ch. 200, DkM 216-218, and the discussion in Menasce, ŠGV 228ff.
5. Such views are expressed by the heretic Rašn Rēš, Dk iii ch. 198, DkM 213-215, and by the Dahriyya, cf. ŠGV ch. VI.
6. Cf. also above section 7.
7. Cf. Dk vi.245.
8. Dk vi.288, and cf. above, prec. section.
9. xūb+gōwišnīh ka-š hukunišnīh abāg nēst ahlamōgīh ast ī āškārāg.
10. ahlamōgān daxšag 6: huxēmrēh dušxēm-srōg; abē-jahišn-*srōg anāg kardār; pad kasān frāxw dranzišn ud pad xwad tang dast; rād humānāg ud wad-*dayišn; bāristān dušnām; ud jud-mēnišn ud jud-gōwišn ud jud-kunišn.

Reading wad-*dayišn one may connect the second word in the compound to the word discussed above, in the supplementary note to section 2, 'Wisdom'. The compound would give roughly the opposite meaning of hucašmīh.

V. This world.

13. Attitude to this world.

1. Notably by R.C.Zaehner in his two major works, Zurvan and Dawn. The view has been criticized by Marijan Molé, 'Un ascétisme moral dans les livres pehlevi?', RHR 155 (1959) 145-190.
2. M.-L. Chaumont, 'Vestiges d'un courant ascétique dans le zorastrisme sassanide d'après le VI^e livre du Dēnkart', RHR ¹⁵⁶ (1959) 1-23.
3. See above section 8.
4. Cf. Dk vi.150 and §E.16.
5. Dk vi.151, cf. also §89.
6. Dk vi.26, cf. also §25.
7. Dk vi.33.
8. The word tan can also conceivably mean in this case, as often, 'self'.
9. Cf. AW, PhLT 85f. §2f.; APēš II, PhLT 39 §5f.; Weh-Zād, PhLT 75ff. §19ff.
10. Cf. also Dk vi.228 and the note to the translation of Dk vi.13.
11. Dk vi.189, E.30b, and cf. below section 16, 'Contentment and joy'.
12. Dk vi.177, and cf. further in this section.

13. Cf. also AVn ch.31 the description of the sinner who amassed much wealth, did not enjoy it himself and did not share it with good people, and only kept it in his treasure.
14. Dk vi.102.
15. Dk vi.291.
16. Ibid and Dk iii ch. 199, DkM 216.10-13.
17. Dk vi.170.
18. The etymological meaning of wanēgar, 'squanderer', is 'destructor'.
19. A phrase is unintelligible here.
20. Dk vi. 106, A.5, D.7b.
21. i.e., the gratitude of the spirits; cf. section 9.
22. The text is not clear at this point.
23. The practice of hiring minstrels as well as other questions connected with this art have been dealt with by M.Boyce, 'The Parthian gōsān and Iranian minstrel tradition', JRAS 1957.10-45.
24. See note to the translation of that text.
25. Further on joy see Dk vi.189-193 and section 16 below.
26. One such advice has already been quoted above, at the beginning of part d of this section.

14. Poverty

1. Cf. also Dk vi.E.30a.
2. The same idea occurs also in Dk vi.143.
3. A similar corrective intention is seen in §282.
4. A saying to the same effect is in Dk vi.218.
5. As is the concept of 'the poor in spirit' in the New Testament.
6. For a transcription of the text cf. above, Part One, text No.xiii.
7. guft ku ō tawāngarīh ud driyōšīh ud pādixšayīh mad hēm. andar tawāngarīh rād ud wizīdār-dahišn, ud andar driyōšīh tuxšag ud paymānīg, ud andar pādixšayīh ērmēnnud azadār būd hēm.
8. Dk vi.D.2, cf. prec. section.
9. The preverb ul- occurs in both §141 and §E.30a. In another, but also religiously loaded text, ul- is used with a number of verbs in Dk vi.290.
10. Cf., e.g. AdMah, PhlT 62 §55; huxēm ud drust ud kārāgāh mard agar ōhiz škōh hād... But it seems true to say that whenever poverty is to be used in a bad context škōh is used in preference to driyōšīh. Cf. AW, PhlT 94 §114f.: ud kē mustōmandtar? škōh ud dušpadēxw ī druwand. AdMah, PhlT 71 §152: cē 3 čiš pad tan ī mardomān ēn wattar dušagāh abāg xwēš-tan kunēd...ēwag škōh ī abarmēnišn kē abāg angad mard nibard barēd...Cf. also Dk vi.71. škōhīh comes in opposition to xwarr in DkM 791.2-3.

11. It is of course part of the first large section of Dk vi, cf. above in Part One.
12. Though it may be merely a form of address.
13. A similar contrast between driyōš mardom and āzād mardān is seen in Wēzād, PhlT 77 §29.
14. viz., the wealthy.
15. See on this below, section 16 'Contentment and joy'.
16. Cf. Wāzād, PhlT 151 §62; PhlT 78.5f.; AVm 31.7, and above, section 9.
- 16a. ku-t hān ī xwarēh anōšag šād-ē ku driyōšan bahr kunēnd u-t driyōš āfrīnēnd. ud driyōš ī ahlaw dādīstān-aš pahlom ast āfrīn. DkM 791.22-792.2.
17. ud ristāxēz ud tan ī pasēn nē bawēd ka-š driyōšan ēmēd awiš dārēnd.
18. .Dk vi.237.
19. K. Barr, 'Avestan dregu-, driyu-', Studia Orientalia Ioanni Pedersen...dicata, Copenhagen 1953, 21-40. Cf. also the remarks made by J. de Menasce in Mélanges Massé, Tehran 1963.
20. J. de Menasce, 'Le protecteur des pauvres dans l'Iran sassanide', Mélanges Massé, Tehran 1963. To the references mentioned by Menasce one may add the seal-impression from Qašr-i Abū Našr, quoted ^{by} W.B.Henning, Asia major 2 (1951) 144, which reads sthly dīgws'n y'tkgwby W d'twb'ly. On the word gādag-gōw cf. Bthl.

AirWb, 1283, MirMund 2.18ff., zSR 2.13, 4.52-57.

Hübschmann in ZDMG 46 (1892) 324-325, and the references to texts which are given further.

21. MHD facsimile 93.4-9, Bulsara 43.12-13 (p.610f.),
cf. Menasce, loc.cit. The text, as I understand
it, is:

ēwag ēn ku muhr^[a] ī pad kār framān dāštan hān ī
mōbadān [ud] amārgarān fradom pad framān ī kawād ī
pērōzān, ō hān ī dādwarān fradom pad framān ī
xusrō ī kawādān.

ka muhr mōbadān ī pārs kand mōbadān nē pad nām
ī mōbadīh bē pad nām ī driyōšān jādag-gōwīh xwānd ud
nibišt. ud pad hān cim abar muhr hamgōnag kand
ēstēd.

'One is this. The seal for executing orders
was first instituted for mōbads and accountants by
the order of Kawād son of Pērōz. For the judges it
was first instituted by the order of Xusrō son of Kawād.

When the mōbads of Pārs engraved a seal, they
called the mōbads and wrote (on the seals) not by the
name of the office of mōbad but by the name of the
capacity of an intercessor for the poor. For this
reason it has been written on seals in the same manner'.
According to this tradition it is seen that the formula

'intercessor for the poor' was first used by the priests of Pārs and was later adopted by other holders of office.

[a] The word is here consistently spelt mwdl. In the same way it is also spelt in ZWY IV.37.

22. The first in the Staxr seal, cf. Henning, loc.cit., and the second in the seal of Shiraz, cf. Herzfeld, Transactions of the International Numismatic Congress, London 1938, 417, and de Menasce, loc.cit.
23. Cf. above, Part One, text No. vi.
24. Cf. AVn 67.10: u-š az driyōšān ud az kārwanīgān garzišn nē niyōšīd 'and he did not listen to complaint from the poor and from travellers'.
25. Menasce overlooked the force of the phrase ruwān ī xwēš rāy when he translated it in his article, loc.cit., by 'pour l'âme de celui-là'.
26. i.e. 'advocate'.
27. pad petyārag hunsand, ud pad astānag bāristān; pad zīndagīh wistāxw ma bawēd, bē pad kunišn ī frārōn wistāxw bawēd. cē hukunišnān hān ī xwēš (kunišn)^[a] jādag-gōw ud duškunišnān hān ī xwēš hamēmār. cē [az] mēnišnām ud gōwišnān ud kunišnān kunišn pahlomtar.
- [a] The word is out of place, though given by all Mss.
28. i.e. 'a hardship'.

29. ud ēwag ciš ī anāgih kē az harw anāgih-ē dušxwārtom
[ud] nihuftan nē šāyēd driyōših.
30. 2 hēnd kē hamwār zahr pad dil abgand ēstēd, ēwag
driyōš kē harw ciš pad niyāz xwāhēd ud didīgar
pādixšā ī tund ī nāzōg.
31. az ēn 2 ciš šarm nē abāyēd kardan, ēwag az wimārīh ud
didīgar az xwēšāwand ī driyōš.
32. 2 ciš grāmīgtar dārišn, ēwag driyōš ī rāst, didīgar
pādixšā ī weh-ox ī burd.
33. The text seems, by its style and rhythm, to have
poetic structure. The following arrangement of
lines is suggested:

kē driyōš pad cē xurram?	druwand ēmēd o kē dārēd?
ka nē wehīh ast	weh az ahlāyīh
ud nē wattarīh-ē ast	wattar az druwandīh?
*cē hanbār ī kirbag	driyōš kardan tawān
kē yazdān-hayyār ēw-tāg	cē'on šāyēd būdan?

There seem to be two stresses to a hemistich.

15. The Measure

1. ērān hamē paymān stāyīd, frēhbud ud abēbud nikōhīd.
pad Hrōm filōsōfāy ud pad Hindūgān dānāg ud pad abārīg
*gyāg šnāsag hān abērdar stāyīd kē gōwišn nēzumānīy

- azišan paydāgīhast, frazānagān Erān šahr passandīd ēstād.
 Cf. text and translation in Zaehner, Zurvan 252 and n.2, but
 the translation offered here differs from that slightly.
2. Cf. Menasce, SGV 30f., and Encyclopédie 54; also Zaehner,
Zurvan 251ff.
 3. On the etymology of paymān cf. Horn, Npers. Etym. 80f.
 The distinction made by Zaehner, Zurvan 252 between
patmān as the treaty between the two divinities, which
 is purely Iranian, and the same notion as the mean,
 which is an Aristotelian borrowing, is therefore perhaps
 too one-sided.
 4. Dk iii.68, DkM 57.14-59.10. Cf. below Appendix B, as
 well as Menasce, Encyclopédie 42f.
 5. The word used in the lists to express the notion of
 'free' is pāk with the exception of the second pair,
 where pāk is replaced by abēzār. The reason for this
 replacement seems to be the desire to achieve clarity
 in spelling. The word pāk, being normally spelt DKYA,
 is identical in appearance with the ending of tagīgīh.
 In the phrase tagīgīh ī pāk az xēšm, pāk would seem
 like a dittography with the ending of the previous
 word. It is strange however that the copyist did not
 replace the ideographical spelling by the phonetic one,
p'k, where such a confusion cannot arise.

6. DkM 327.19-329.10, see Menasce, Encyclopédie 45 and below, Appendix B.
7. DkM 370.14-372.10. See Menasce, Encyclopédie 43f. and below, Appendix B.
8. DkM 67.3-68.8. See Menasce, Encyclopédie 46 and below Appendix B.
9. DkM 167.3-15. Cf. Menasce, Encyclopédie 47f.
10. Cf. the abstract list of SB.14 in Appendix B.
11. Dk iii 203, DkM 221.11-224.8. See Menasce, Encyclopédie 46 and below, Appendix B.
12. The arrangement of the list in Menasce, loc.cit. is therefore misleading.
13. Cf. AW, PhIT 89§29f., and Appendix B.
14. zahag and hunušk respectively for the good and evil qualities.
15. Dk vi.C.15, E.17-18.
16. Dk vi.C.16.
17. Dk vi.C.21.
18. Dk vi.C.38.
19. Dk vi.C.61-62.
20. Dk vi.E.31f.
21. Dk vi.149, E.16.
22. 13om paymānīg[īh] hān bawēd kē harw ciš bē ō paymān handāzēd ku wēš ud kam andar nē abāyēd, cē harw xīr

bawandagīh paymān. cē hān ciš kē paymānīgīh nēst
dānāgīh ud dōst ud kirbag.

16. Contentment and joy.

1. Dk vi.145.
2. Cf. also hān ī būd ud uzūd frāmōš kun ud hān ī nē mad
ēstēd rāy tīmār ud bēš ma bar (AdMah, Ph1T 58 §3);
and AW, Ph1T 91 §49; Ošnar 39.
3. Cf. Dk vi.C.57, C.60.
4. Dk vi.E.28.
5. Dk vi.29, E.30a, and cf. notes to translation of §29.
6. hunsandīh hān bawēd kē xwadāyīh ud xwāstāg ī-š ast u-š
awiš mad ēstēd hunsand ud bāristān, ud pad hān ciš kē-š
abzāyišn ī ruwān aziš šāyēd būdan ēdōn tuxšāg ud jān-
abspār ī tā zīndag hagrīz aziš hunsand nē bawēd.
7. Cf. Dk iii 68, 336, 391, 76; Dk vi.B.14 No.16 (all in
Appendix B).
8. Cf. above, Part One, text No.xxvi.
9. Cf. Dk vi.199 and above, section 2.
10. hān rāmišn nē pad rāmišn abāyēd dāštan kē pas az hān
andōh fragān bawēd.
11. E.g.,
سئل ما إلى السرور وما اللذة. قال السرور ما كان معه رجاء الأثرة وما سوي ذلك
من السرور لهو زوال وهو إلى الاضمحلال. سئل هل يكون لهو بلا اثم. قال لا.

(Misk 56.17-21). 'He (sc.Anūširwān) was asked: "What

is joy and what is enjoyment?" He answered: "Joy is that with which there is the hope of the next world. Any other joy but this is mirth and impermanence and leads to extinction." He was asked: "Is there mirth without guilt?" He answered "No" (Misk 56.17-21). Cf. also Misk 43.1-4, where the contrast is between farah 'joy' on the one hand and lahw with la^cab 'mirth and play' on the other, the first leading to the next world.

12. Cf. also Dk vi.E.32.
13. Cf., e.g., abēbīm, AW, PhlT 89§26; abēbīmihā, AW, PhlT, 92 §60; mahist bīm, WazAd, PhlT 144 §4.

VI Beyond this world.

17. Afterlife: judgement & reward

1. The materials have been collected by Jal Dastur Cursetji Pavry, The Zoroastrian doctrine of a future life: from death to the individual judgment, New York 1926. Apart from general books on Zoroastrianism which devote space to this subject, one may mention the concise synthesis by Molé, 'Le jugement des morts dans l'Iran préislamique' in Le jugement des morts, Sources Orientales 4, Paris 1961, 145-175.
2. Cf. also the comments above, in section 13d.
3. But cf. below at the end of this section, the remarks on Dk vi.92.
4. Cf. e.g. Dk vi.17, 219, 280, 298.
5. Cf. the various passages on desiring reward from the spirits: Dk vi.13, 14, 29, 78, 102, 110, 113, 125, 126, 137, 181, 182, E.5, E.30a.
6. Dk vi.65, 249.
7. Religion is the king's way to paradise, Dk vi.173, cf. also Dk vi.172, 205.
8. Dk vi.50.
9. Dk vi.229, where the expression is 'the fruit of the soul'.
10. Dk vi.A.5, and cf. above in this section.

18. Salvation

1. Cf. e.g. Dk vi.278.
2. Cf. the opposition between ruwān bōzihēd in Dk vi. C.53 and mardom druwand bawēnd in Dk vi.C.54.
3. kē hān ī mahist kē frāmōšēd jān az hān ī mahist bīm bōzēnd pad cih widarg (WāzAd, PhLT 144 §4). Cf. also the reference to the ordeal of fire in Dk vi.313.
4. andar pēšēmārīh ud pasēmārīh saxwan rāstīhā gōwēd ku pad dādīstān buxtagtar bawēd (WāzAd, PhLT 144f. §5); pad pēšēmārīh ud pasēmārīh dādīstān rāst rāyēnīdan ku pad dādīstān buxttar bawēd (Dk iii 199 precept No.5, DkM 216.7).

19. Xwarr

1. The first two chapters of Bailey, Zor.Pr. are devoted to this term.
2. Zor.Pr. 2. One may add a reference to DkM 791.2-3 which says: abar baxšīšn ī ō tuxšāgān xwarr ud ō ašgahānān škōhīh, 'On the apportioning of xwarr to the diligent and poverty to the lazy', where xwarr evidently means 'riches'.
3. Here also seems to belong the interpretation in PhlVd 1.21 bāmīg ku xwarrōmand 'radiant, that is full of xwarr' (cf. Zor.Pr.43).
4. Cf. especially Zor.Pr.33.

5. Zor.Pr. 20f.
6. Op.cit.20.
7. Op.cit. 13.
8. Op.cit.22ff.
9. Some incidental remarks on matters discussed in Zor.Pr in connection with xwarr may be made here. In the phrase ud kayān xwarr TYNA karb būd (DkM 816.13, Zor.Pr. 29) 'and the xwarr of the Kays had the form of....' the word TYNA has caused difficulty as the expected reading, i.e. gil 'clay', was rejected by the author of Zor.Pr. because 'it makes little sense' (op.cit.30). The reading is however confirmed from another passage, where it was unnoticed:

zardušt andar hān ī abēzag rōšnīh hāwand ī
 amahraspandān az bun dahišn ōrōn ham-hangerdīg ham-
 ōšmardīg bawandag apargand azešihā padīriftārīh ud
 rawāgēnīdārīh ī dēn andar gēhān rāy mēnōgīg tāšīd
 frāyist ēstād.

ud ka ō gil-paymōgīh ud stī ī gētīgīg paydagīh
 fristīhast wuzurg xwarr ud rōšnīh a'ōn abar dīdārīg
 būd ī ham cē'ōn andar yim tōhmag (DkM 434.9-14; the
 second sentence is given in ZorPr.33; West, SBE XLVII.
 122).

'Zoroaster was first fashioned in an invisible form in that pure light like to the Amahraspands, beginning with the first creation onwards, with the same composition and measurement with perfect unscattered (?) issues,^a so that the religion be accepted and made to propagate in the world. And when he was sent to appear in a clothing of clay^b and in a visible being,^c so much xwarr and light was visible upon^d him even as in the seed of Yima'.

Notes on the text: a. azešihā: cf. the abstract azeših 'issue, upshot, result', DkM 36.21; 203.10; 251.11; 252.1, and the form azešig 'product', DkM 399.4. The preceding word is doubtful. West translates: 'completely unmixed'. b. gil-paymōgih: in view of the corresponding TYNA klp in DkM 816.13 there is hardly any doubt that our reading is correct. Professor Bailey emended the text here (perhaps by oversight, as the change is not noted), reading karp-patmōkīh, whereas the text has only one -p-. The expression gil-paymōgih renders the same idea as pidān-paymōgih in Dd 36.25, for 'flesh' is derived from the element 'earth', gil. c. stī: the word was considered superfluous by Professor Bailey. The existence of this word, distinct from though often misleadingly written very much like setig,

is well attested. Stī is said to be limited in contrast to zamānag in DkM 199.6; it is a category of being in DkM 207.9, 17 (tōhmagān tōhmag ī stī bun 'the seed of seeds which is the origin of stī'); 208.14 (ud stī wīmandīg ēwtāgīg tanān, cē'on wahmān ciš ud wahmān kas 'the definition of stī is the separate individuals, such as that particular object or person'); cf. also DkM 208.19, 20, 21; 203.7, 10; 345. 6, 7, 13, 15, 16; 334.8, 10. The concept of stī, as is evident from the definition quoted, is that of a particular entity in the world, and so its occurrence in our text is appropriate. d. Professor Bailey takes apar-dītārik to be a compound. It seems however more likely that abar is a postposition governing the subject of the preceding verb, i.e. Zoroaster.

Towards the end of the first chapter of Zor.Pr. (p.50) there is a quotation from AW. The text, as given ⁱⁿ Zor.Pr., is:

ut cē frāx^vtar. x^varraḥ ī rātān

ut cē tangtar. x^varraḥ ī panān.

The reading of the ideogram GDH/YDH as x^varraḥ, though possible, seems to me unlikely. The point of the exchange would emerge better if the alternative reading, dast, is adopted; the translation obtained would then be: 'What is the broadest? The hand of the

generous. What is the narrowest? The hand of the avaricious'.

10. Zaehner, Dawn 150ff; also Zurvan 371 and 173f. Molé, Culte 434, pointed out with justice that xwarr and xwēškārīh are not identical.
11. Culte 434-439.
12. 'Splendour' is preferred in these translations to 'fortune' as it is more neutral in meaning. Cf. its opposite, zad-brēhīh, Dk vi.C.69, mentioned further below.
13. Cf. the dependence of šnāyišn on xwarr in the passage DkM 343.17-344.3 given below.
14. A different translation was given by Zaehner, Zurvan 173 n.4.
15. humīhrīh could also mean, in a different context, 'love', cf. DkM 248.9.
16. It is worthwhile to reproduce the whole text, as the interpretation given to it in Molé, Culte 434f. seems to me mistaken:

abar pānagīh ud pāsīh ī dām. az nigēz ī wehdēn.

had kadārcē pāsīh ī xwēš dām xwarr pad abēzag

dōstīh ud stāyišn ud spās ī xwarr ī dādār. ud ka

frāmōšīdār bawēd dōstīh ud stāyišn ud spās ī xwarr

ī dādār u-š hilēd, bawēd xwarr apās, u-š marnjēnēd

xwarr pad apāsīh, hān xwarrī marnjēnīdār ī druz.
(DkM 344.4-9).

'On the protection and defence of creatures.

From the instruction of the Good Religion.

Whatever protection of its own creatures is by xwarr through the pure friendship, praise and gratitude of the xwarr of the Creator. When (a man) forgets the friendship, praise and gratitude of the xwarr of the Creator and abandons it he becomes unprotected by xwarr, the xwarr kills him being unprotected, that is the xwarr the demon-killer'.

17. Cf. DkM 129.17-130.17, transcribed and translated in Molé, Culte 37f.

18. abar āzār ī xwarr ī dādār xwarrōmand ī xwarr tarmēnēd.
az nigēz ī wehdēn.

had dādār dahišn o kār dād, dahišn kārēgārōmand ī dādār. u-šan xūb-rawāgīh ī kār pad xwarr ud xwēškārīh. pad xwarr bawandag mēnīdārīh xwēškārīh, az xwēškārīh rawāgīh ī dādār kār, ud rawāgīh dādār kār sāzišn ī o-š kām ud šnāyišn ī padiš.

ud ka pad axwēškārīh tarmēnīdār bawēnd xwarr pādērānīh^a bawēd ī dādār kār, asāzišnīg ī o-š kām, ud āzār ī padiš. (DkM 343.17-344.3).

a. On this word cf. Henning, OLZ 1934. 755.

The text is given in translation in Zaehner,

Dawn 151f. and in both transcription and translation in Molé, Culte 434. Both renderings seem to me unsatisfactory.

20. Fate and freedom of the will

1. Among the more recent contributions to the study of this subject the following may be mentioned: A.V.W. Jackson, Zoroastrian studies, New York 1928, 219ff., whose treatment of the texts deserved the criticism of J.C.Tavadia, 'Pahlavī passages on fate and free will', ZII 8 (1931) 119-132; H.W.Bailey Zor.Pr. 34f.; Menasce, SGV 223; Zaehner, Zurvan 254ff., and Dawn 205ff., 240ff., 271f.; J.Duchesne-Guillemin, 'Miettes iraniennes', Hommages à Georges Dumézil, Collection Latomus, vol.XLV, Bruxelles 1960, 102-103, and Religion 130ff. The problem in the Avesta is treated in Lommel, Rel.Zar. 156ff.
2. Zaehner, Zurvan 256, Dawn 243. Cf. against this Molé, RHR 162 (1962) 199.
3. Cf. Zaehner, Zurvan 403f., 258.
4. The Pāzand text repeats the word humānā three times, after each of the nouns tuxšāi, dānāi and vāhī, whereas in the Pahlavi the corresponding humānāg comes only after the third noun. While the text of the Pahlavi

seems more acceptable from the point of view of style, there is no difference between the two versions in meaning, humānāg naturally applying to all three nouns.

5. Zaehner, Zurvan 258.

6. It would be meaningless to say that diligence was acquired by a man through fate, for the term diligence implies an effort of will. The terms of the question itself exclude such a possibility of interpreting the answer, as the question is why a slothful man reaches honour and prosperity and not why he becomes diligent.

The same idea, with regard to wisdom, is seen in a

saying found only in Misk 38.10f.: وقال من الدليل على قدراته
حق تانى الامور لاهل الجهل بجهلهم وامتناعها على اهل العلم بعلمهم

'He said: An evidence for fate is the fact that things are (sometimes) mild with the ignorant despite their ignorance and that they are inaccessible to the wise despite their wisdom'. This saying is attributed to Buzurjmihir. Cf. also Misk 51.9-10, which is attributed to Anūšīrwān.

7. The text has (d)dldtl/glđtl, read by the Pāzandist dilertar, which seems an easy emendation of the Pahlavi. The comparative ending which has no place here makes the Pāzand reading particularly suspect.

Nyberg, trying to retain the Pahlavi version reads dilītar (cf. JA 1929.258), which is unacceptable; Zaehner adopts the reading of the Pāzand. A minimum transposition of letters in the Pahlavi would give us the reading *gurd-dil 'having a hero's heart', which is unattested but seems reasonably possible. An alternative reading could be gurd-gīr, defined in Burhān-i Qāṭi by šajā va dilāvar gīrandah 'One who seizes heroes'.

8. Cf. Zaehner, Zurvan 402f.; the wording of the Pāzand seems again to be an amplified version of the Pahlavi.
9. The text is reproduced in Zaehner, Zurvan 404f.
10. Text given ibid.
11. It would not be correct to translate cim as 'cause'. The etymology (for which cf. Nyberg, Hilfsbuch II, Glossar s.v.) and the numerous occurrences in the texts suggest the meaning 'reason'. Here 'cause' is excluded by the context.
12. قال وما القدر. قلت القدر علة ما هو كائن والعمل علة ما لم يكن

A more appropriate translation of a similar saying occurs in another part of the texts translated into

Arabic from Persian andarz: التوفيق والاجتهاد زوج الاجتهاد سبب التوفيق والتوفيق سبب نجاح الاجتهاد

'Fate and effort are a pair; effort is the cause of fate and fate is the cause of the success of effort' (Misk 77.4f.)

- 13.. Cf. Zaehner, Zurvan 402, where previous literature is mentioned.
14. The same idea is also expressed in Dk iii 269, DkM 284. 11-20, transcribed and translated in Zaehner, Zurvan 406f. The phrase cē ruwān wizāyišnīg pahrēz pad hān ī ruwān sāzišnīg tuxšāg mardom (lines 17f.) should not be translated: 'For abstention (from action) is injurious to the soul; (yet) to the man who cultivates the soul and makes an effort (on its behalf)...' (Zaehner), but rather: 'For a man who refrains from doing injury to the soul through being diligent in cultivating the soul...' ruwān-wizāyišnīg-pahrēz and ruwān-sāzišnīg-tuxšāg are compounds.
15. Tansar p.45; cf. Zaehner, Zurvan 405.
16. PhlVd 5.9; cf., in the same vein, DkM 284.13f.. The sentence which seemed to Zaehner, Zurvan 406, to represent the opposite point of view, manifests in effect the same approach:
 baxt-šān abar hān ī brihēnīdārīh pad kunišn, ud
 kunišn abar hān ī kerdārān, brīn-iz andar mēnōgān

gētīgīg xwad ē wizēd. *ham-šān guft bašt abar hām
 ī az mēnōgān, kunišn abar hān ī az gētīgān (DkM 416.
 22-417.4).

'Fate, according to them, is (manifest) in action according to that which is decreed, action is according to those who act. Even (that which is) a decree among the spirits, an earthly being may choose himself. They also said: Fate is according to that which comes from the spirits, action is according to that which comes from earthly beings'.

The passage establishes that fate is meaningful only from the point of view of the spirits. Man, being unaware of the decree, has only action. Thus an earthly creature may be seen choosing a thing which, viewed by the spirits, is a decree of fate.

17. Cf. Dk vi.A.5; D.7b.

18. Cf. Dk vi.A.6..

19. MX 12 and 38, cf. Zaehner, Zurvan 399ff., 254f. and the chapter on 'the Luminaries', ibid. 147ff.

20. e.g. MX 22, quoted above.

21. Cf. also Dk vi.E.38d..

22. Cf. note to the translation of this passage.

23. Zaehner's comment on this passage: 'Fatalism in its

extreme form... was challenged and overcome... Thus the operation of fate is restricted to a bare minimum' (Dawn 243, cf. Zurvan 256) seems to miss the point; cf. already Molé, RHR 162 (1962) 198.

24. DkM 186.13-188.16. The text, which has some importance, was disappointingly treated by Jackson, op.cit., and Tavadia, loc.cit. Cf. also Menasce, SGV 223.

21. Esoteric doctrines

1. It has in fact been positively denied. Cf. e.g. the words of Father J. de Menasce: 'Ainsi, de même que la sotériologie mazdéenne ne nous fournit rien qui puisse s'aligner au type gnostique, de même, dans le mode de transmission de la révélation, rien qui nous rappelle une initiation de caractère sélectif et occulte. La prédication est si ouverte qu'elle s'accommode de la guerre sainte menée au nom de la foi par des défenseurs fort bien munis du glaive temporel. Bien plus, c'est un des reproches que les Mazdéens adressent le plus volontiers aux autres religions, que de se propager de manière secrète, cachée

et comme honteuse'. Menasce, 'Les mystères et la religion de l'Iran', Eranos Jahrbuch XI, 1944 (Zürich 1945), 185-186.

2. The texts are given with a discussion in Molé, Culte 61ff. Of the three divisions of the Avesta we hear also in the admonitions of Šēn, Dk iii 197: ēwag hān ī dādīg dād rad pānagiz ī abar ō hādag-mānsrīg ud gāhānīg dād ī padīš abēzagīh ī wehdēn bawēd rāy ōstīgāntar mehēnīdan ud waxšēnīdan (DkM 212.19-22). 'One, to enlarge and increase more firmly the law of Dād, so that it may become even the protector and the chief over the law of Hādha-mānthra and Gāthā, from which is the purity of the Good Religion'. The meaning of this admonition is made clearer by a comparison of its parallel in the opposite chapter, ch. 198: ēn ī gētīg dād padiz rad pānagīh ī ō hān ī mēnōg dād stāyīdan ōstīgānēnīdan waxšēnīdan (DkM 214.10f.). 'To praise, make firm and increase this law of gētīg even as a chief and protection of that law of mēnōg'. It is interesting to note that in the second quotation Dād is interpreted as 'this world' and the other two sections of the Avesta as 'the other world'.

3. DkM 143.20-144.6. The text is given in Mōlē, Culte 67f. The third sentence should read: ud ēwag andar hudēnān hamīh ī abāg wehān pad dahišn ēzišniz, *judāgīh ī az watterān pad adahišnīh anēzišnīhiz.

'One, among men of good religion, being together with the good by giving and doing the ritual, and being separate from the wicked (who) do not give or sacrifice'.

4. Two further texts may be quoted to show the awareness of distinctions in spiritual classes from Miskawayh's translation of Persian texts. One passage says:

وقال آخر لتلميذه. ضعوا من رفعته العامة وأرفعوا من وضعته فانهم لا يفعلون شيئا بحقول تامة ولا بافهام راجحة ولا بعزائم صحيحة.

'Another (sage) said to his disciple: Lower what the common people elevate and elevate what they lower, for they do nothing with complete wisdom or with preponderant understanding or with wholesome resolution' (Misk 68.14f.).

Another passage has the following text: وعلى الحاقل ان يجعل الناس طبقتين متباينتين ويلبس لهم لباسين مختلفين. فطبقة من العامة يلبس لهم لباس انقباض وانحجاز وتحرز في كل كلمة. وطبقة من الخاصة يخلع عندهم التحرز ويلبس لهم لباس الامنة واللطف والمفاوضة. ولا يدخل في هذه الطبقة الا واحدا من الف ليكون كلهم ذوي فضل في الراي وثقة في المودة وامانة في السرور ووقفا بالاخاء

'The wise man should distinguish two separate classes among men and to clothe himself in two different garments

towards them. As regards one class, the common people, he should clothe himself for them in the garment of contraction, withdrawal and refraining in every word; the other class are the select, with whom he takes off the restraining attitude and puts on the garment of sincerity; kindness and consultation. He does not admit into this (latter) class more than one in a thousand, so that all of them have excellence of thought, trust in friendship, fidelity in joy and fulfilment of promise in fraternity' (Misk 72.5-9). This passage underlines very clearly the esoteric approach of 'the wise man'.

5. See below, note 21.
6. These considerations throw some doubt, to my mind, on Molé's ingenious attempt to harmonize between the facts of the religion of the Achaemenids and those of the Gāthā, the former being, according to him, an expression of the Dād type of religion. For the solution to be acceptable in this form, one would expect the three types of religion to be much more formally definable than seems possible from the Pahlavi texts which mention this division. The idea could of course serve as a working hypothesis in a more moderate formulation, namely, for example, that

the Achaemenids were not very observant of religious practices; but this is not a novel idea. Molé's suggestion deserves however some further consideration.

7. Cf. Dk vi.143-145, and the discussion above, section 14.
8. See Dk iii 140, DkM 143.20-144.6.
9. It may possibly refer to the zand, the orthodox commentary, if we follow the parallel of Dk vi.254, quoted below.
10. It could also conceivably be interpreted to mean 'the orthodox', to exclude the heretics.
11. See on this word Henning, TPS 1944.110f. and Mirisch 71; on the NP forms Lazard, Langue des plus anc.mon. 145.
12. The subject is waxš 'speech', or 'the spirit', mentioned on p.594.10.
13. A few words are quoted in Bailey, Zor.Pr. 28. The central sentence, somewhat differently construed, is given by Zaehner, BSOAS 10 (1940/42) 614. The text is:
 ud mađ ō kay-syāwaxš ī bāmīg, pađiš dēsīd kang-diz
 ī abd-kard pad hugar-dārišnīh ud pānagīh ī was warz
 ud xwarr ud rāz ī dēn, aziš wirāyišn ī āwām ud abāz-
 ām[ā]stārīh ī ērān xwadāyīh ud abāz-paywandišnīh ī

- amāwandīh ud pērōzgarīh ō hān ī ōhrmazd dēn paydāg.
14. az wuzurg warz ud xwarr ī dādār abar burd, pad tanōmandīh ō dušox mad ud l3 zamistān andar dušox pad dēw-karbīh raft, rāz ud abzār kē padiš dēw wānīhēnd ud az mardom apādixšāy[īh]ēnd warzāwand nēzumān cārīhā az dēwān abāz burd, ud dēwān pad xwad abzār zgd ud wānīd, ud az mardomān apādixšāyēnīd ud dūrēnīd. The text is not given correctly in Zaehner, Zurvan 263, 250. (The words which begin the sentence which follows our text, az hān bē, should be translated 'because of that', not merely as Zaehner, 'thus').
15. That zand should be confined to a small circle of one's kinsmen is also seen in a text outside the andarz literature. In ZWY we hear that king Xusrō called to him the greatest sages of his time in order to counter the heresy of Mazdak, 'and asked of them promise, (saying:) "Do not keep the Yasnas in confinement, (but) do not teach the zand outside your kinsmen" ' (ZWY II.3). The text is: u-š paymān aziš xwāst ku ēn yasnīhā (?) pad nihān ma dārēd, bē pad paywand ī šmāh zand ma cāšēd.
16. On this word (škwđšn) cf. note to the translation of Dk vi.122 and the references given by Zaehner in

BSOS 9. 315. The word comes often in association with šarm, and seems to be the same as huškōhīh, cf. Dk vi.B.14, B.27; AW, PhIT 92 §54; 78; 93 §96; 94 §121, the meaning of which is established from the Arabic translation as 'bashful'. Cf. also Menasce, Encyclopédie 48f., whose interpretation does not seem satisfactory.

17. Cf. above in this section and sections 7 and 12.

18. Cf. above in Part One.

19. ud hān kē pēš padīd bawēd aš xūb bē niyōšišn u-š nē awwēnišn u-š rāz bē nē barišn, cē ka pad wināh ī kard bē awwēnēd ayāb rāz bē barēd aš hāwand bawēd. Tavadia's translation is slightly different.

20. Cf. the references in L. Koehler and W. Baumgartner, Lexicon in Veteris Testamenti libros, Leiden 1958, 1123; M. Jastrow, A dictionary of the Targumim, the Talmud...., New York 1950, 1464. Also the usage in the Aramaic incantation texts, references in J.A. Montgomery, Aramaic incantation texts from Nippur, Philadelphia 1913, 302.

21. sedīgar dastwar-dārīh cē'ōn hān ī rad ī dānāgtar ī rāst-gōwišntar kē dēn-āgāhīhā amōxtēd ud rāstīhā amōzēd. Cf. also above, Part One, text No. xxv.

22.. One might deal on similar lines with the series of definitions in Dk vi.E.45c. If that is addressed to the same type of people as Dk vi.267,, it is significant that it says that a man who does not know the five 'spells' (?) may not 'sit in the place of priests', which adds some power to the assumption that adherents of the esoteric doctrines were largely identified with priests.

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

[The list contains only bibliographical details of books quoted in shortened form. Other references to publications will be found in the body of the work.]

- AdDk Dk iii chapter 199, cf. Part One, text No. iv.
- AdMah Andarz ī Adurbād ī Mahraspandān, PhLT, cf. Part One, text No. i.
- AdPRiv PRiv chapter 62, cf. Part One, text No. iii.
- AJām Ayādgar ī Jāmāspīg, quoted according to: G. Messina, Libro apocalittico persiano: Ayātkār i Jāmāspīk, Rome 1939.
- APēš I - IV Andarzīhā ī pēšenīgān, PhLT, cf. Part One, texts No. xvii - xx.
- Av. Avestan.
- AVn Ardā Virāf (Virāz) nāmāg, quoted according to: M. Haug and E. W. West, The book of Arda Viraf, Bombay-London 1872.
- AW Ayādgar ī Wuzurgmihr, PhLT, cf. Part One, text No. x.
- AXus Andarz ī Xusrō ī Kawādān, PhLT, cf. Part One, text No. viii.

- Bailey, Zor.Pr. H. W. Bailey, Zoroastrian problems in the ninth-century books. Ratanbai Katrak lectures. Oxford 1943.
- BSO(A)S Bulletin of the School of Oriental (and African) Studies.
- Bthl. C. Bartholomae.
- , AirWb --, Altiranisches Wörterbuch, 2. unveränderte Auflage, Berlin 1961.
- , MirMund --, Zur Kenntnis der mitteliranischen Mundarten I - VI, Heidelberg 1916-1925 [Sitzungsberichte der Heidelberger Akademie der Wissenschaften.]
- , zSR Zum sassanidischen Recht I - V, Heidelberg 1918-1923.
- Casantelli, Philosophie religieuse
L. C. Casartelli, La philosophie religieuse du mazdéisme sous les Sassanides, Paris 1884.
- Christensen, Iran A. Christensen, L'Iran sous les Sassanides, 2e édition, Copenhagen 1940.
- Dān Andarz I dānāgān ō wehdēnān, PhIT, cf. Part One, text No. xxi.

Darmesteter, Zend-Avesta

J. Darmesteter, Le Zend-Avesta I - III,
Paris 1892-1893 [Annales du Musée
Guimet].

Dd

The Datistan-i Dinik, Part I, Pursishn I -
XL, edited by Ervad T. D. Anklesaria,
Bombay.

Dhabhar, PhlYasna

B. N. Dhabhar, Pahlavi Yasna and
Visperad, Bombay 1949 [Pahlavi Text
Series No. 8].

Dk

Dēnkart: quoted by book and chapter
according to the edition of P. B.
Sanjana, The Dinkard, Bombay 1874-

DkM

Dēnkart, quoted by page and lines from
the edition of D. M. Madan, Bombay 1911.

Duchesne-Guillemin, Religion

J. Duchesne-Guillemin, La religion
de l'Iran ancien, Paris 1962 ["Mana",
Introduction à l'histoire des religions -
1, III].

EI

Encyclopaedia of Islam.

- GBd Greater Bundahišn, quoted according to:
The Bûdahishn, Being a facsimile of
the TD Manuscript No. 2 ..., edited by
T. D. Anklesaria, Bombay 1908.
- Gershevitch, Gr. Man. Sogd.
I. Gershevitch, A grammar of Manichaean
Sogdian, Oxford 1954 [Publications of
the Philological Society XVI].
- Gershevitch, Mithra I. Gershevitch, The Avestan hymn to
Mithra, Cambridge 1959.
- GGA Göttinger Gelehrte Anzeigen
- GIPh Wilhelm Geiger and Ernst Kuhn (ed.),
Grundriss der iranischen Philologie
I - II, Strassburg 1895-1904.
- Henning, Mirisch. W. B. Henning, 'Mitteliranische', in
Handbuch der Orientalistik, I.
Abteilung, 4. Band; Iranistik, I.
Abschnitt: Linguistik, Leiden-Köln
1958, 20-130.
- Horn, Npers. Etym. P. Horn, Grundriss der neupersischen
Etymologie, Strassburg 1893.
- IIJ Indo Iranian Journal.

JAJournal Asiatique.Jackson, Zor.St.A. V. W. Jackson, Zoroastrian Studies: the Iranian religion and various monographs, New York 1928 [Columbia University Indo-Iranian Series 12].JRASJournal of the Royal Asiatic Society.JSSJournal of Semitic Studies.Justi, Iran. Nb.F. Justi, Iranisches Namenbuch, Marburg 1895.Lazard, Langue des plus anc. mon.G. Lazard, La langue des plus anciens monuments de la prose persane, Paris 1963 [Études Linguistiques II].Lommel, Rel. Zar.H. Lommel, Die Religion Zarathustras, nach dem Awesta dargestellt, Tübingen 1930.Menasce, EncyclopédieJean-Pierre de Menasce, Une encyclopédie mazdéenne, le Dēnkart. Quatre conférences données ... sous les auspices de la fondation Ratanbai Katrak, Paris 1958 [Bibliothèque de l'École des Hautes Études, Sciences Religieuses, LXIXe vol.].

- Menasce, ŠGV P. J. de Menasce, Une apologétique mazdéenne du IXe siècle: Škand-gumānik vičār, la solution décisive des doutes, Fribourg 1945 [Collectanea Friburgensia N.S. XXX].
- MHD Bulsarā S. J. Bulsarā, The laws of the ancient Persians as found in the Mātikān ē hazār dātastān or the digest of a thousand points of law, Bombay 1937.
- MHD facsimile Mādigān-i-hazār dādīstān, A photozincographed facsimile of a Ms ... with an introduction by J. J. Modi, Bombay 1901 [Pahlavi Text Series II].
- Mirzā See Priv
- Misk Abū 'Alī Aḥmad ibn Muḥammad Miskawayh, Al-ḥikma al-kālida, Jāwīdān kirad, ed. 'Abd al-Raḥmān Badawī, Cairo 1952.
- Molé, Culte M. Molé, Culte, mythe et cosmologie dans l'Iran ancien: Le problème zoroastrien et la tradition mazdéenne, Paris 1963 [Annales du Musée Guimet, Bibliothèque d'Études, t. 69].

- MP Middle Persian
- MPT Middle Persian of the Manichaean fragments from Turfan.
- MX Mēnōg ī xrad, quoted according to the edition of T. D. Anklesaria, Dânâk-u Mainyô-i Khard, Bombay 1913, using however the accepted numbering of chapters introduced by E. W. West, The book of the Mainyo-i-Khard, Stuttgart-London 1871.
- NP New Persian
- Nyberg, Hlfsb. H. S. Nyberg, Hilfsbuch des Pehlevi I - II, Uppsala 1928-1931.
- OLZ Orientalistische Literaturzeitung.
- PazT Pâzend texts, collected and edited by E. K. Antiâ, Bombay 1909.
- PhlT The Pahlavi texts contained in the codex MX ... I-II, edited by Dastur Jamaspji M. Jamasp-Asana, Bombay 1897-1913.
- PhlVd Pahlavi Vendidad: Hoshang Jamasp, Vendidad, 2 vols. Bombay 1907.

- PN Pand-nāmag ī Zardušt, or Cīdag andarz
ī poryōtkēšan, PhLT, cf. Part One
text No. vi.
- PRiv The Pahlavi rivāyat accompanying the
Dādīstān-ī Dīnik, ed. Ervad Bamanji
Nasarvanji Dhabhar, Bombay 1913.
- , Mirza's thesis Hormazdyār P. Mirza, The Pahlavi
rivāyat preceding the Dādestān ī
Dēnīy, Ph.D. thesis, University of
London, 1940.
- Pth. Parthian.
- RFLT Revue de la Faculté des Lettres,
Université de Tabriz; Našriyya-ye
Dāniškada-ye Adabiyāt-ī Tabrīz.
- RHR Revue de l'Histoire des Religions
- RSO Rivista degli Studi Orientali.
- S.B.E. M. Müller (ed.), Sacred books of the
East.
- ŠGV Škand-Gumānik Vicār, quoted according
to the edition of H. Jāmāspji Jāmāsp-
Āsānā and E. W. West, Shikand-
gūmānik vijār, Bombay 1887.
Cf. also Menasce, ŠGV.

ŠnŠ

Šayast-nē-šayast, a Pahlavi text on
religious customs, ed. Jehangir C.

Tavadia, Hamburg 1930 [Alt- und Neu-
Indischen Studien herausg. von Seminar
für Kultur u. Geschichte Indiens an
der Hamburgischen Universität 3].

Tansar

The epistle of Tansar, quoted according
to the edition of Mojtabā Minovi,

Nāma-ye Tansar be Gošnasp, Tehran 1311.

Tavadia, Mpers. Spr. u. Lit.

Jehangir C. Tavadia, Die mittelpersische
Sprache und Literatur der Zarathustrier,
Leipzig 1956 [Iranische Texte und
Hilfsbücher Nr. 2].

--, ŠnŠ

cf. above ŠnŠ.

TPS

Transactions of the Philological Society.

VijDēm

Vijīrkart ī āēnīk, printed Bombay

about 1848, but not published.

WazAd

Wāzag ēcand ī Adurbād ī Mahraspandām,

PhIT, cf. Part One, text No. ii.

WZKM

Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde des
Morgenlandes.

Zaehner, Dawn

R. C. Zaehner, The dawn and twilight of Zoroastrianism, London 1961.

--, Teachings

--, The teachings of the Magi; a compendium of Zoroastrian beliefs, London and New York 1956.

--, Zurvan

--, Zurvan: a Zoroastrian dilemma, Oxford 1955.

ZDMG

Zeitschrift der Deutschen Morgenländischen Gesellschaft.

ZII

Zeitschrift für Indologie und Iranistik.

Zs

Vichitakîhâ-î Zâtsparam, printed in Bombay but not published.

ZWY

Zand-î Vohûman Yasn, ed. Behramgore T. Anklesaria, Bombay 1957.

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