



UNIVERSITY OF LONDON THESIS

Degree *PhD*Year *2001*Name of Author *SECKINGTON, I. M.***COPYRIGHT**

This is a thesis accepted for a Higher Degree of the University of London. It is an unpublished typescript and the copyright is held by the author. All persons consulting the thesis must read and abide by the Copyright Declaration below.

COPYRIGHT DECLARATION

I recognise that the copyright of the above-described thesis rests with the author and that no quotation from it or information derived from it may be published without the prior written consent of the author.

LOAN

Theses may not be lent to individuals, but the University Library may lend a copy to approved libraries within the United Kingdom, for consultation solely on the premises of those libraries. Application should be made to: The Theses Section, University of London Library, Senate House, Malet Street, London WC1E 7HU.


REPRODUCTION

University of London theses may not be reproduced without explicit written permission from the University of London Library. Enquiries should be addressed to the Theses Section of the Library. Regulations concerning reproduction vary according to the date of acceptance of the thesis and are listed below as guidelines.

- A. Before 1962. Permission granted only upon the prior written consent of the author. (The University Library will provide addresses where possible).
- B. 1962 - 1974. In many cases the author has agreed to permit copying upon completion of a Copyright Declaration.
- C. 1975 - 1988. Most theses may be copied upon completion of a Copyright Declaration.
- D. 1989 onwards. Most theses may be copied.

This thesis comes within category D.

This copy has been deposited in the Library of _____



This copy has been deposited in the University of London Library, Senate House, Malet Street, London WC1E 7HU.

ProQuest Number: 10731726

All rights reserved

INFORMATION TO ALL USERS

The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted.

In the unlikely event that the author did not send a complete manuscript and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if material had to be removed, a note will indicate the deletion.



ProQuest 10731726

Published by ProQuest LLC (2017). Copyright of the Dissertation is held by the Author.

All rights reserved.

This work is protected against unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States Code
Microform Edition © ProQuest LLC.

ProQuest LLC.
789 East Eisenhower Parkway
P.O. Box 1346
Ann Arbor, MI 48106 – 1346

**Policy-Making in the PRC: A Study of the Variations in
Decision-Making Across Three Issue Areas; 1969-1978**

Ian Mark Seckington

School of Oriental and African Studies

This thesis is submitted for the degree of Doctorate of Philosophy



Abstract

This thesis examines the policy-making process in the People's Republic of China (PRC) between 1969 and 1978. By undertaking a study of three issue areas (agriculture, foreign policy and higher education), this thesis challenges many of the conclusions of earlier single-issue or broad band studies of the decision-making process in the PRC which failed to generate sufficiently detailed information to allow comparisons to be made regarding policy-making across issue areas.

This thesis highlights variations in the decision-making process which suggest that the pattern of decision-making in each of the three issue areas under study appears to be independent of most of the developments in the other fields. Policy-making in each area appears to follow its own internal logic such that a radical upsurge in one field is not necessarily matched by a similar upsurge in either, or one of, the other areas. Furthermore, the influence of the various groups competing over policy also appears to vary, both across each area and with time. So, for example, the radical Left dominated higher education policy from 1969 to their purge in 1976, but had little influence over foreign policy during this period.

This study suggest that the fundamental reason for these variations is that the senior Party leadership, and in particular Mao Zedong, made an assessment as to the possible consequences of failure for radical policies in each of the three issue areas, and that where the cost was seen as too great, the radical influence was restricted and a more pragmatic line adopted. So, for example, this research shows that throughout this period agriculture was characterised by a cyclical pattern whereby radical policies were curtailed during Spring and Autumn, periods of peak activity for agriculture. Similarly, radical activity in the foreign affairs system was stopped following the threat of a possible war with the Soviet Union in 1969.

Table of Contents

List of abbreviations used	4
Chapter One Decision-making in the People's Republic of China	5-36
Chapter Two Political Developments in the PRC, 1969-1978	37-80
Chapter Three Higher Education	81-168
Chapter Four Agriculture	169-262
Chapter Five Foreign Policy	263-326
Conclusion The Compartmentalization of Policy-making in the PRC	327-344
Bibliography	345-380

List of Abbreviations Used

CAS	Chinese Academy of Sciences
CCP	Chinese Communist Party
CPPCC	Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference
CRSG	Cultural Revolution Small Group
MFA	Ministry of Foreign Affairs
NPC	National People's Congress
PLA	People's Liberation Army
PRC	People's Republic of China
RMB	Renminbi
SEG	Science and Education Group
UN	United Nations
UNESCO	United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
US	United States of America
USSR	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

Chapter One Decision-making in the People's Republic of China

As it emerges as a leading actor in world politics there is an ever greater need for a clearer understanding of the decision-making process in the People's Republic of China (PRC). China now plays an increasingly important role both regionally and internationally, and its political system has been the focus of considerable academic interest. As other countries engage with China over a wide range of issues it is important that this interest generates clearer insights into the decision-making process in the PRC which will both deepen our understanding of its political system and which can underpin western responses to that country.

The importance of this topic is compounded by the opacity of the decision-making process in China, which has made any study of that process very difficult. Since its foundation in 1949, the political system in China has largely remained closed to outside observers, hampering foreign, as well as domestic, commentators. The failure to institutionalize the decision-making system and a restricted official media are leading factors behind the opacity of the policy-making process which hamper further research: In the PRC, decision-making on key issues usually takes place in private, closed-door sessions, leaving the public meetings of bodies like the National People's Congress to pass decisions that have already been taken.

This thesis attempts to illuminate the decision-making process in China through a study of policy-making in higher education, agriculture, and foreign policy during the period 1969-78. Using newly available material, newspapers and journals, this study will examine variations in the policy-making process across these three areas and suggest that there is a high degree of "compartmentalization" in the policy-making process in China, such that

decision-making in each area had its own coherent logic and followed a pattern largely independent of the other areas. While drawing on the contributions of earlier studies of decision-making in the PRC, this thesis attempts to develop an explanation for this apparent "compartmentalization", a phenomenon that has been ignored by these earlier works.

In attempting to explain this phenomenon this thesis underlines the importance of senior political leaders like Mao Zedong, Zhou Enlai and Deng Xiaoping in setting the agenda in each of the three areas studied. The leading role of Mao in the decision-making process is recognized in line with the "Mao-in-command" and "Mao-as-arbiter" models as set out by authors such as Frederick Teiwes and Galen Fox, but this thesis also examines the role of other senior leaders and attempts to set out the factors that mediated Mao's and their role to develop a new explanation of the policy-making process during the Cultural Revolution.

The findings of this thesis also question the view of decision-making during the Cultural Revolution that emphasizes the importance of informal relationships, that is factional ties, bureaucratic affiliation etc. over formal position and structures. Without completely over-turning this view, the findings of this thesis suggests that greater emphasis needs to be placed on formal position, that is membership of leading decision-making and administrative bodies, as a means of influencing the policy-making process.

This thesis examines the period from 1969-78. Although developments in this period were not isolated from the mobilization phase of the Cultural Revolution, I begin in 1969 as this year marked the start of a series of intense policy debates generated by concerns over China's future direction during efforts to rebuild in the wake of the worst excesses of the Cultural Revolution. As major policy debates were occurring in a number of sectors, this facilitates the approach of this thesis, which attempts to contrast policy-making across

different areas, by providing examples of major policy decisions in each of the three areas chosen; higher education, agriculture, and foreign policy.

Furthermore, newly available sources offer detailed insights into these debates and were a major reason for choosing to study policy-making during the second part of the Cultural Revolution. Policy-making during this period has often been over-looked in studies which have only focused on factional conflict between competing groups at the expense of the policy process, or in general studies seeking to understand the origins of the Cultural Revolution.

It follows from the above that higher education, agriculture, and foreign policy were chosen as during the period 1969-78 they saw a number of major policy decisions which are reflected in the available literature and which can be used to illustrate the policy-making process in that area: In higher education there are the examples of the decision to reintroduce a form of the national university entrance exam, and later the reintroduction of key-point schools; in agriculture there was conflict over the significance of the model brigade at Dazhai and the introduction of responsibility systems; and in foreign policy there was the decision to improve relations with the US.

In this thesis higher education, agriculture and foreign policy are described as "issue areas". The term "issue area" is used to refer to the set of problems, goals and policies relating to each of the three areas chosen and the policy debate surrounding these. Developments in these three areas are not seen as always happening in isolation from each other (this is not the meaning of the "compartmentalization" of decision-making), so, for example, the importance of maintaining agricultural production to provide the raw materials for industry and the significance of the quality of higher education graduates for China's economic reforms are noted. However the main focus of each chapter is the policy debates around three or four key questions **within** that issue area rather than the inter-linkages between and among the various issue areas.

Within each issue area a set of three or four themes have been chosen to

illustrate the policy debate. These are not meant to be exhaustive, but they do reflect some of the major debates within each issue area during the period 1969-78 as shown in the Chinese media and highlighted by both Chinese and western writers. They provide illustrative examples which underline this thesis's main argument that decision-making in each area had its own coherent logic and followed a pattern largely independent of the other areas.

The problem of definitions

The basic argument of this thesis is that there is a greater degree of variation in policy-making across the three issue areas than has previously been understood. If leading actors in the policy-making process adopt different policy positions in each of the three issue areas, then this brings into question the single definitions of actors as "moderates" or "radical" which have been adopted in previous works of policy-making in the PRC. The question of definitions is further complicated by the different connotations of western definitions of "conservative," "moderate," and "radical" when applied to the setting of socialist China.

In this thesis the terms "moderate" and "radical" are used to characterize the basic approach of individual and groups of actors. This thesis sees "radicals" as more reliant on the use of political campaigns as a means of mobilizing support, to be more willing to break down extant systems and organisations as a means of bringing about progress and to be more dismissive of the importance of experience. In contrast "moderates" placed greater emphasis on encouraging individuals through material rewards, they generally worked through the existing system (although the example of the introduction of responsibility systems in agriculture is an exception) and sought to develop and encourage expertise.

These general definitions are used to describe the basic positions of individuals and groups of actors, however they are not intended as an exact

definition of their policy position across all issue areas. This thesis will highlight the flexibility, pragmatism, and inexperience that often led actors to accept or adopt different policy positions in each of the three areas and which underpins the notion of the “compartmentalisation” of decision-making in the PRC.

Conceptualizing the decision-making process in the PRC

Earlier works on the decision-making process in the PRC reflect a number of different approaches and adopt a variety of models to explain policy-making during this period. Some of these draw on models developed from earlier studies of the Soviet Union and from western political science. This section will review some of these earlier works, focusing in particular on those which look at the period from 1969 to 1978.

Type I Models: Mao-in-Command/Mao-as-Dictator

Any model of the decision-making process in China during the Cultural Revolution needs to take into account the role of Mao. It is clear from even a cursory glance at works on this period that Mao’s role was often pivotal and the first generation of scholarship, often influenced by the former Soviet Union stressed the importance of Mao.

Mao-in-command and Mao-as-arbiter models of the Chinese decision-making process emphasize the importance of Mao Zedong as the head of the Chinese Communist Party as well as Mao’s charismatic authority as leader of the Chinese communist revolution. Frederick Teiwes has undertaken a short analysis of the Cultural Revolution using Mao-in-command and Mao-as-arbiter models.¹ He sees the mobilizational phase as a triumph of Mao’s charisma over Party norms:

¹ Fredrick Teiwes, *Leadership, Legitimacy, and Conflict in China. From a Charismatic Mao to the Politics of Succssion*, (Armonk, New York, 1984), pp.68-76.

Opposition to Mao on any issue under any circumstances, and beyond that any deviation from a highly idealized version of Mao's Thought, was now judged culpable... The newly dominant view demanded the unqualified obedience characteristic of charismatic authority.²

This view clearly reflects the Mao-in-command model, and puts Mao at the centre of the decision-making process.

Type IIa Models: Policy conflict - Mao-as-arbiter

In contrast to the first model, which sees any policy conflict as being largely subordinated to Mao's own authority, most writers who have studied the decision-making process in the PRC during this period have described it as being characterized by a degree of conflict between competing groups who are organized along policy or ideological lines. However, some authors have continued to emphasize the importance of Mao's role, and portray the decision-making process as one in which Mao acts as a final arbiter, deciding between the "policy platforms" of the competing groups.

In his dissertation, "Campaigning for Power in China During the Cultural Revolution Era 1967-1976" Galen Fox employs the Mao-as-arbiter model. Rather than enforcing his own policy preferences, Galen Fox argues that Mao acted as an arbiter between competing coalitions. He writes that "China's leaders responded to each question of how to fill vacant policy positions by dominating, reducing, and subordinating the conflicts that divided them until they had selected the two most important issues. Each of the two issues defined a coalition, or issue/leadership package, **that was eventually presented to Mao, who decided between them**" (emphasis added).³ While the author believes that decision-making in the PRC at that time was characterized by a coalition-building process, it was Mao who held the ultimate authority to choose between these coalitions.

² *Ibid*, pg.69.

³ Galen Wheeler Fox, *Campaigning for Power in China During the Cultural Revolution Era 1967-1976*, (Ann Arbor, Michigan: University Microfilms International, 1978), pg.iv.

Galen Fox's argument highlights the role Mao sometimes played in deciding between coalitions (this is perhaps most apparent in his support for the radical line in higher education in 1975 and his backing of Hua Guofeng's agricultural policies in the same year). However this argument cannot explain the apparent lack of conflict over foreign policy, where Mao repeatedly acted to suppress coalition politics rather than adjudicate between competing sides, or Mao's frequent failure to intervene.

This thesis will develop a model of policy-making in the PRC during this period that recognizes Mao's leading role and builds on the "Mao-in-command" and "Mao-as-arbiter" models, but which also attempts to account for the variations in the way Mao participated in and contributed to, the policy-making process across different issue areas. The works of Teiwes and Fox do not address this important point. It is also clear that other senior leaders played a leading role in the decision-making process, a factor that can be overlooked by those models which give almost omnipotent influence to Mao. This thesis will attempt to set out the way in which other leaders participated in the policy-making process, how they interacted with Mao, and the factors which mediated Mao's and their influence over policy outcomes.

Type IIb Models: Policy conflict - Coalition and Factional politics

In contrast to the Mao-as-arbiter model, which continues to emphasize the role of Mao, the majority of authors who have studied the decision-making process in China during this period have described this process as being driven by competition between groups of actors, who form along policy or ideological lines. Authors have characterized these groups in terms of "radical", "moderate", "reformist" or "conservative" coalitions or in terms of factional conflict. This approach reflected the way in which the Chinese themselves wrote about their system during the Cultural Revolution when the Chinese described their own political system in terms of a struggle between

'two-lines' and although this characterization later proved to be too simplistic it highlighted the element of competition over policy that typified this period. This impression was reinforced by the Red Guard newspapers and wall posters published during the Cultural Revolution, which highlighted the degree of conflict within the political system in China at this time. This was in stark contrast to the image of unity that had characterized portrayals of the Chinese leadership prior to this event.

Harry Harding in his work *China's Second Revolution*, identifies what he sees as three different policy positions which can be identified in the policy articulations of the main actors in the late-1970s and early 1980s:⁴ The revolutionary Maoists; the restorationists; and the reformers. After the fall of the revolutionary Maoists in 1975-1976, and the victory of the reformers over the restorationists, Harding claims that by the 1980s there were only two competing policy positions, those advocating radical reform, and those who supported more moderate reforms. For Harding political competition and policy-making in China during this period were driven by competition between the programs of these groups which were broad policy platforms incorporating both political and economic elements.

This early work by Harding was clearly influential for subsequent scholars of the decision-making process in China. But these characterization of a coalition as "moderate" or "conservative" fail to capture the variations in the policy positions of each of the coalitions which I noted above, variation that occurs both across individual issue areas and through time. For example, a closer study of the position of, say, Harding's "radical reformers", shows that during the period from 1976-1978 they were successful in implementing radical reforms with regards to higher education, while generally supporting Hua Guofeng's conservative line in foreign policy. Similarly, in the period to 1978,

⁴ Harry Harding, *China's Second Revolution: Reform After Mao*, (Washington: The Brookings Institute, 1987), pp.40-41.

Hua's agricultural line dominated policy, and it was only in the wake of the third plenum of the 11th Central Committee that this group were able to introduce "radical" reforms into agriculture.⁵

Carol Lee Hamrin's refinement of the coalition-building model into the concept of 'policy-packages' has been very influential.⁶ Hamrin identifies three groups, conservatives, pragmatic reformers and orthodox reformers who emerged as advocating different policy approaches. Each of these 'policy-packages' has been formed through a process of coalition-building. According to Hamrin:

this process is characterized by cycles or rounds of competition in which the leaders of smaller personal factions and geographic or professional interest groups form alliances. These coalitions are formed, dissolved and reformed in new configurations as rounds are 'won' or 'lost'. Policy 'consensus' is forged at private high-level meetings preceding public Party or government sessions where the compromise program is formalized and publicized. Dissension again emerges between meetings as winners press to expand their gains and losers point to the problems that arise in implementing policy. Coalitions are reconfigured around competing 'solutions' until the next consensus is hammered out.⁷

Carol Lee Hamrin is at pains to point out that the idea of a 'package' should not be seen as being a static concept.⁸ Rather that this "conceptualization should be viewed as dynamic, rather than static. Continual and sometimes rapid change was evident in individual and group positions on specific policy issues within a general shift between 1977 to 1984 away from the 'left' end of the political spectrum."⁹

This dynamic element of the coalition-building process is one which must be

⁵ Richard Baum adopts a very similar approach in his analysis of Chinese politics in the post-Mao era. See *Burying Mao Chinese politics in the age of Deng Xiaoping*, (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1994).

⁶ Carol Lee Hamrin, "Competing 'Policy Packages' in Post-Mao China," in *Asian Survey*, Vol. XXIV, No. 5 (May 1984) pp. 487-518.

⁷ *Ibid*, pp.488-489.

⁸ Carol Lee Hamrin, "Competing Political-economic strategies" in *China's Economy Looks Toward the Year 2000: Volume 1. The four modernizations*, (Washington: US G.P.O., 1986), pg.72.

⁹ *Ibid*, pg.73.

captured in a model of the Chinese policy-making system and Hamrin is right to identify the general shift away from the "left" that occurred during this period. However as noted above, any successful model of the Chinese decision-making process must also explain variations in the positions of the different coalitions across issue areas and why their influence varied in different issue areas.

Another model of elite politics in China which emerged from studies of the new material published during the Cultural Revolution was the factionalism model. In an important article in the *China Quarterly*, Andrew Nathan developed a comprehensive typology of factional politics in the PRC.¹⁰ Unlike those studies based on a coalition-building model, where actors align along policy lines, for Andrew Nathan, factions are based on "clientelist ties", personal links between two people established for the mutual exchange of gifts and services. Within a faction these clientelist ties develop to form a wide network of interaction which engages in conflict in the political system in exchange for the potential benefits which may accrue to the winning faction.

For Andrew Nathan there are a number of important structural characteristics which have an effect on the way factional politics works. Factions are based on personal ties and as such are limited in size; communications proceed through sub-leaders and not directly to all members simultaneously, thus preventing the faction from becoming too large as information may then easily become distorted and slow to disseminate. A faction depends for success on the leaders continued ability to secure benefits for the faction as a whole. If however the benefits dry up temporarily, the faction is able to cease functioning until a better situation occurs. Finally, a faction is reliant on its leader, thus it cannot survive him or her and will breakdown following their death. This tendency towards breakdown may occur prior to the leader's death if the faction is very large and

¹⁰ Andrew Nathan, "A Factionalism Model for CCP Politics", in *The China Quarterly*, 53, (Jan-Mar 1973), pp.34-66.

there are a considerable number of sub-leaders. These sub-leaders may feel removed from the centre of power of the faction, and have sufficient resources to break away and establish their own pattern of clientelist ties.

These factors, argues Nathan, meant that because of the relative limits on their size, no single faction will be able to dominate any other faction for an unlimited period of time. Also, because of their ability to act intermitently, it is impossible for one leading faction to extinguish another. Because of this, factional politics tends to be characterized by defensive strategies, any new policy approach will be prepared in secret and launched in a "surprise offensive". The defensive nature of factional politics will ensure that the other factions unite to block any new initiative. If a policy decision is to be made, then, argues Nathan, it must be made by consensus between all of the factions.

These characteristics lead to a typical cycle of action. Following a political crisis, necessity means that the various factions realize the need to cooperate. Consensus leads to the formation of a faction, or an alliance in government, with the power to resolve the particular crisis. However, as a result of the decisions they take, decisions which usually benefit those in power, fighting between factions breaks out once more, thus factional politics is a cyclical one of cooperation and conflict. Nathan's approach offers a detailed alternative model to those studies that see political alliances forming on policy lines. However his characterization of the policy-process as being based on consensus-building seems at odds with much of the policy conflict that dominated this period. Where there was "consensus", as in foreign policy, this seems as likely to have been imposed from above as it was to have been reached by the coalitions themselves.

Type III Models: Structural explanations

In his study of politics in the PRC since 1949, Avery Goldstein describes the period between 1966 and 1978 as being characterized by balance-of-power

politics, with actors or coalitions of actors engaging in a process which aimed at ensuring their political survival.¹¹ He contrasts this type of politics to that during the period to 1966, which he sees as being a different process, namely “bandwagon” politics.

Goldstein argues that issues of political survival remained at the forefront of individual’s minds, even after the end of the mobilizational phase of the Cultural Revolution, and he characterizes this period as the “anarchic realm”. Despite official statements that the 9th Party Congress of 1969 marked the start of a period of Party and government reconstruction, competing factions were “acutely aware of the potential threat they posed to one another”.¹² Goldstein argues that the mobilizational phase of the Cultural Revolution had dispersed resources which had previously been concentrated in the hands of a few senior leaders. Individual and groups of actors were able to use these resources to ensure their political survival. Actors pursued this aim by engaging in balance-of-power politics, forming coalitions and seeking to enhance their resources to guarantee political survival.

Avery Goldstein’s work is useful as it is the only study of the Chinese decision-making process to identify a variation in that process through time. However, this variation is described only in very broad terms. His point about the dispersal of resources amongst the Party and government leadership during the mobilizational phase is also useful, and one I will return to. However, here it is perhaps worth underlining that this redistribution was not even, both in terms of locus and personnel: Not all resources were redistributed and not all actors received an equal share. This point is closely related to the assessment of risk by the leadership I have described above.

¹¹ Avery Goldstein, *From Bandwagon to Balance-of-Power Politics: Structural Constraints and Politics in China, 1949-1978*, (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1991), pp.165-166.

¹² *Ibid*, pg.167.

Studies of policy-making in individual issue areas

There are fewer studies of policy-making in individual issue areas, especially in the period to 1976. Of these David Zweig's *Agrarian Radicalism in China, 1968-1981* is one of the most comprehensive. For Zweig, policy-making in agriculture in China between 1968 and 1978 was "the direct result of struggles between different factions".¹³ Decision-making in agriculture was influenced by intense competition between these factions and the shifting personnel changes that characterized this period. Zweig argues that in this atmosphere, actors favouring a "radical solution to the rural problem in China" were seldom in the majority and were forced to use informal means, what he calls "policy winds", to mobilize support for their policy program.

Radicals used political campaigns to mobilize support for their policy programs, "circumventing national-level bureaucrats to implement policies which were not advocated through official Party or government channels". They also used their control over the media to mobilize support for their policies and used the political campaigns to pressure local-level leaders into ensuring their implementation. Political campaigns also offered an opportunity to replace any local-leaders who were not compliant to the radicals program

Other studies of decision-making in a single issue area include Kenneth Lieberthal and Michel Oksenberg's study of policy-making with regards to China's energy policy.¹⁴

While all of these works have contributed to a better understanding of the policy-making process in the PRC there are significant limitations in the way in which they have approached the study of this issue. Works like that of Harding and Hamrin are broad studies which focus on the policy-making process as a

¹³ David Zweig, *Agrarian Radicalism in China, 1968-1981*, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1989).

¹⁴ Kenneth Lieberthal and Michel Oksenberg, *Policy Making in China Leaders, Structures, and Processes*, (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1988).

whole. Although they offer interesting insights and suggest ways in which we may characterize this process, they are not able to explain the apparent differences in policy-making **across** issue areas. As the subsequent chapters will show, at any given time, there are often distinct variations in the positions of the various coalitions in each of the three issue areas I examine, variations which a broad study cannot identify or explain. Definitions of policy in a given period as being characterized as “moderate” or “left” or “right” appear too simplistic as an adequate description of the complicated pattern that emerges from this research.

Similarly, works like that of Zweig cannot offer a complete picture of the policy-making process in China. These detailed studies of a single issue-area offer a far more accurate picture of the policy process in that area than is possible with a broader study. (Certainly the subsequent chapter on agriculture confirms many of Zweig's findings, and Lieberthal and Oksenberg's work on the energy sector is one of the most detailed studies of policy-making in any single issue area). However, as even Lieberthal and Oksenberg recognize, the findings for one issue area are not necessarily transferable to another.¹⁵

The review of earlier works and this research suggest three possible patterns to policy-making in the PRC during the period 1969-1980: Firstly, there are periods of across-the-board radicalization or moderation, such that a radicalization in agricultural policy is matched by a similar radicalization in higher education. This is the view of authors like Solinger, Baum and Hamrin; Secondly, there is the possibility that there is a balancing between different factions in different areas, with Mao playing a leading role in ensuring that no one faction dominates the policy-making process. This is the view of Galen Fox in his study of the Cultural Revolution; Finally, there is the possibility that there

¹⁵ Lieberthal and Oksenberg accept that the decision-making process in the energy sector are neither “typical” or “representative” of other issue areas. *Ibid*, pg. 20.

is variation in each policy arena such that each issue area had its own coherent logic and followed a pattern independent of other issue areas. This is the possibility suggested by this research.

The Compartmentalization of Policy-making

Two kinds of variation in the policy-making process emerge as a result of this research. Firstly, there is variation in the **relative strength** of the various groups in setting the agenda in each of the three issue areas under study. The strength of the radical Left in the field of higher education has been noted above, however members of this group appear to have had little influence over foreign policy and agricultural policy. Similarly, while Hua Guofeng and his coalition of Cultural Revolution beneficiaries dominated agricultural policy-making from at least 1975 to 1977, they had less influence over policy in higher education at that time. Other examples will be highlighted in the course of the studies on the three issue areas.

Secondly, the relative strength of the various groups in setting the agenda for each of the three issue areas also varies **over time**, but not to a uniform degree, so that any increase or decrease in influence in one area was not necessarily accompanied by a similar reaction in other areas. While some general trends across different policy areas were noticeable, such as an upsurge in radical activity in the wake of the Tenth Party Congress, its impact varied in different issue areas. Similarly moderates were able to launch a series of reform programs in the wake of the 4th National People's Congress in January 1975, but these reforms progressed at different rates in different areas. These examples suggest that developments in different policy areas were insulated from each other to a much higher degree than previous studies have suggested.

This research suggests that the leading variable which describes the two types of variation outlined above was the perception of a group of senior

Chinese leaders of the consequences of the failure of radical policy in each of the policy areas. The assessment of the risk of failure by Mao Zedong, Zhou Enlai, and, to a lesser extent, other senior Chinese leaders set variable parameters on the extent to which that policy area was allowed to become radicalized. In addition to this risk assessment, this research suggests that membership of leading decision-making and administrative bodies and previous experience in each of the three issue areas acted as intervening variables which could enhance or detract from an individual's influence and effect likely policy outcomes.

The perception of risk

That China's senior leaders viewed the possible impact of radical policies in each of the three issue areas differently is shown in a number of ways. It is clear that the Party and government leadership sought to protect agriculture from the worst excesses of the mobilizational phase of the Cultural Revolution, with the Central Committee initially issuing orders forbidding Red Guard units from travelling to the countryside where they might disturb production.¹⁶ Subsequent to this, there is a noticeable cycle in agricultural policy which saw efforts to moderate policy during peak times of agricultural activity, only for policy to be re-radicalized following the successful completion of spring sowing or autumn harvest work. This suggests an acute awareness on the part of the senior leadership of the possible consequences of failure in agriculture, less than a decade after the devastating famine that followed the Great Leap Forward.

In contrast to agriculture, both higher education and foreign policy underwent a period of intense radicalization during the mobilizational phase of

¹⁶ See, for example, "Regulations of the CCP Central Committee Concerning the Great Cultural Revolution in the Countryside Below the County Level", in *CCP Documents of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution 1966-1967*, (Hong Kong: Union Research Institute, 1968), pg.79.

the Cultural Revolution. However, while higher education policy continued to be influenced by elements of the radical line even after Mao's death, this influence was eliminated in foreign policy very early on in 1969. While some members of the Party and government leadership sought to restrict the impact of the radical line on China's universities and colleges, the closure of these institutions did not have immediate consequences for China's political or economic environment. It was only after Mao's death, when Chinese leaders like Hua Guofeng and Deng Xiaoping began to place renewed emphasis on economic and technological development that significant measures were taken to ameliorate the radical line in education, highlighting that education was largely seen as a support for a greater good.

In foreign policy, as China's relations with the Soviet Union deteriorated through 1969, China's senior leadership were made aware of the threat of war and moved to end policy conflict in the foreign affairs system. By the end of 1969, they had established a moderate line which sought to consolidate China's international position by moving to establish relations with the United States. It seems that the importance of this line and the consequences of failure (the possibility of war) were such that the senior leadership in the form of Mao and Zhou and a small number of other officials sought to retain the decision-making authority in their own hands and thus control policy conflict.

Agenda setting by the senior leadership

An important point in examining the way in which the senior leadership assessed the degree of risk is the role of Mao and to what extent he dominated this process. Was Mao the key individual making such an assessment as suggested by the "Mao-in-command" and "Mao-as-arbiter" models? To what extent were other members of the senior leadership involved in the assessment.

As noted above, this thesis sees Mao as being the leading figure in Chinese

politics from 1969 until his death in 1976, but does not accept that he was able to dominate his colleagues to the degree suggested by authors such as Frederick Teiwes. Mao Zedong's role in the assessment of risk was often pivotal, as befitted the Chairman of the Party, but it varied across issue areas and through time. This variation is not captured in the "Mao-in-command" and "Mao-as-arbiter" models. One important point which arises from this thesis is the ambivalence in Mao's own thinking, which sought to both protect the "successes" of the mobilizational phase and promote economic growth. This gave scope for both "radicals" and "moderates" to promote their own views. As the review of literature showed, at times Mao often appears to have sought to balance the competing sides however, at other times, Mao's influence appears decisive in granting access to either one side or another. However it is also important to note that he did not always play a decisive role and sometimes took a back seat in the policy-making process which allowed other individual or groups of actors to play the leading role.

Together with Mao, Zhou Enlai was influential in the assessment of risk in each of the three issue areas examined in this thesis. Zhou's own stature and his position as head of the State Council meant he remained an important figure at the heart of the decision-making process. Zhou generally appears to have sought to moderate or prevent the introduction of radical policies, which sometimes set him in, generally non-confrontational, opposition to Mao.

Other senior leaders who can be identified as having some input into the process of risk assessment are Deng Xiaoping, Wan Li, Ye Jianying, Lin Biao, Hua Guofeng and members of the radical Left. Their input was not consistent during the period to Mao's death, although after 1976, the influence of figures like Deng, Ye, Wan and Hua naturally grew. Membership of leading decision-making and administrative bodies and previous experience in policy-making in a given issue area have been identified as significant for the way in which other individual or groups of actors participated in the decision-making process,

however the ambivalence in Mao's thinking noted above could also leave space for greater participation by other actors.

Groups such as the radical Left, the moderates, and the Cultural Revolution beneficiaries around Hua Guofeng appear to have identified a set of costs and benefits regarding the possible radicalization of policy in any given issue area, which fed into the assessment of risk and the wider conflict over policy. In agriculture, the famine engendered by the failure of the Great Leap Forward was fresh in many people's minds and may have under-pinned the broad consensus on protecting agriculture that was apparent during the mobilizational phase of the Cultural Revolution. However, while the importance of agriculture for providing food and the raw materials for industry was accepted, the way to promote production was debated by each of the three groups.

The radical Left did not outline detailed agricultural policies, rather their main concern appears to have been with the political situation in China's countryside, although this was implicitly linked to production. The main danger they identified was the decline in collective agriculture and the continued presence of the "small-producer" mentality which had resulted from the implementation of a moderate line in agriculture following the collapse of the Great Leap Forward. To this end they placed a strong emphasis on on-going political education in rural areas and advocated raising the level of collectivization, in contrast to the position outlined in the moderate "60 Articles", adopted in 1962 and which continued to form the basis of agricultural policy throughout the Cultural Revolution¹⁷.

Moderates opposed this line, fearing that the move to higher levels of collectivization, and the tendency towards egalitarianism this implied, together with the emphasis on political incentives, severely damaged peasant

¹⁷ "Regulations on the Work in the Rural People's Communes (Revised Draft)" *Issues and Studies*, Vol.XV, No.10, (October 1979).

enthusiasm, with concomitant results for production output. They argued that the best way to increase production was by boosting peasant enthusiasm by increasing material rewards and increasing their influence by lowering the level of ownership and accounting to the production team level, the smallest unit of the Commune system.

The group of Cultural Revolution beneficiaries under Hua Guofeng outlined a clear alternative in agricultural policy which recognized the need to boost peasant incentives by increasing material rewards but was also critical of capitalist tendencies in the countryside and emphasized raising the level of collectivization. This group advocated raising the level of collectivization as a means of facilitating the mechanization of agriculture and the establishment of rural industries which would boost peasant incomes. Although they identified the threat of a "capitalist restoration" in the countryside, the main way to overcome this problem was to demonstrate the superiority of the collective in providing better incomes, rather than through increased political education.

In higher education, the radical Left identified the threat of universities and colleges becoming elite institutions, dominated by the interests of "bourgeois academics" and isolated from the realities of China's factories and farms. Entry procedures, teaching material and the length of courses meant that universities no longer served the interests of workers and peasants, the "red" classes, who had been largely excluded from the higher education system. Reforms to the higher education system such as introducing a system of recommendation for potential university candidates, shortening courses, and reforming teaching material were intended to break the monopoly of the bourgeois academics, open universities for the working and peasant classes and align higher education more closely with the pressing needs of production.

Moderates saw these reforms as a threat to the quality of graduates produced by Chinese universities with potentially serious implications for China's reforms. This threat became especially pressing when, under first Hua

Guofeng, and then Deng Xiaoping, China emphasized the importance of science and technology and opening up to the outside world as part of the reform program. For moderates, the urgency of the reforms meant that resources should be focused in a number of key-point schools who would take the best students, judged on the basis of a national entrance exam. Only in this way could China hope to catch up with the outside world.

The Cultural Revolution beneficiaris around Hua Guofeng did not elaborate detailed higher education policies of their own. They appear to have favoured retaining elements of the reformed entry procedures which had dramatically increased the percentage of workers and peasants attending university, but the requirements of Hua Guofeng's ambitious economic reform program appears to have led this group to accept the moderates policies.

In foreign policy the clearly identified threat of a Soviet invasion appears to have led to less open policy differences amongst the three groups who, at least in public, aligned behind the policy of rapprochement with the US. It is clear that some members of the radical Left did feel a sense of apprehension at aligning with an ideological enemy, but any conflict over foreign policy was largely isolated to debate over the extent to which China should rely on its own economy or engage in more international trade.

Membership of leading decision-making and administrative bodies

While this thesis suggests that the assessment of risk by the leadership was the leading variable effecting the extent to which policy-making was allowed to become radicalized, it is apparent that membership of leading decision-making and administrative bodies and previous experience in policy-making in a given area were intervening factors in the policy-outcomes in each of the three issue areas.

The mobilizational phase of the Cultural Revolution had destroyed many of the organizational norms of the Party and government structure and had led to

the closure, or sidelining, of many government and Party organs. New ad hoc bodies like the Cultural Revolution Small Group and the Science and Education Group were established outside of the usual channels of control to replace the functions of ministries which had been closed or ceased to function on an effective basis.

The assessment of risk by the senior leadership was a significant factor in the formation of these new bodies and sometimes influenced the promotions and appointments to these bodies and subsequent promotions to the reformed ministries. Where the senior leadership were most aware of the consequences of failure, (such as in foreign policy) control over the decision-making process was apparently retained at the highest level. In appointing four PLA marshals to look at China's strategic position in 1969, it seems that Mao and Zhou deliberately excluded Lin Biao and individuals associated with the radical Left.

In agriculture too, where there appears to have been a general awareness of the high cost of failure, control over the decision-making process was concentrated in the hands of senior leaders, although here there appears to have been greater room for policy conflict and the main influence over policy passed through the hands of a number of different individuals. The State Council and the various ministries associated with agriculture also played a significant role. However in education, where the consequences of failure were not seen as serious, an ad hoc body, the Science and Education Group (SEG) was established which oversaw most of the decision-making process in higher education until it was disbanded in 1975.

Although the assessment of risk on the part of the leadership was an important factor in carrying out new appointments, once this redistribution of power had taken place in the late-1960s and early-1970s, membership of these bodies did give individual and groups of actors some ability to resist the will of Mao and other senior leaders like Zhou Enlai and were another way in

which alternative views on the assessment of risk, in line with those outlined above, could enter into the policy-debate. A leading example is the radical Left's domination of the SEG which strengthened their ability to resist Zhou Enlai and Zhou Rongxin's efforts to introduce moderate reforms in higher education.

The importance of membership of these bodies implies that policy-making in the PRC during this period was more of a mixture of formal and informal structures than the current literature would suggest. The general picture of the political system in China during the Cultural Revolution is one of conflict between informally based groups. Without completely overturning this view, this research suggests that following the mobilizational phase of the Cultural Revolution (1966-68) formal organs began to be an important means of mobilizing support for policy positions. These organs could act as the formal structures around which informal factional conflict was waged, with competing groups each seeking to place their "men" into leading positions on the key decision-making bodies.

Positions within administrative bodies were also important and it is significant here that the State Council continued to function throughout this period. Under Zhou Enlai, the State Council appears to have been able to dilute some of the influence of the radicals in both higher education and agriculture, however, as a non-decision making body, the State Council did not have the authority to overturn radical initiatives.

As China re-established Party and government organizational norms in the wake of the mobilizational phase of the Cultural Revolution, organs such as the Politburo and the Secretariat began to function again. Ministries also began to function more effectively and often had a lot of input into policy-making. It is noticeable that the promotion of several members of the radical Left to the Politburo at the Tenth Party Congress in 1973 led to renewed conflict over policy in higher education and agriculture, suggesting an increased influence

within the policy-making process as a result of their promotions. Elsewhere the gradual promotion of supporters of Deng Xiaoping to the Politburo in the post-Mao period was effective in sidelining Hua Guofeng.

The importance of previous experience

In addition to membership of leading decision-making and administrative bodies, previous experience of policy-making in each of the three issue areas emerges as an important intervening variable. Here previous experience can refer both to the pre-Cultural Revolution period and, in the case of actors like Hua Guofeng, to experience gained during in the Cultural Revolution itself. It is clear that the radical Left had little experience in agricultural policy before the Cultural Revolution and this weakness continued through the period to 1976, restricting their influence over agricultural policy-making. Another clear example is that of Hua Guofeng. Hua sought to continue the policies of the Cultural Revolution in both foreign policy and higher education, areas where he had limited experience, but in agriculture, a field he had worked in since 1971, he attempted to introduce radical reforms.

Experience in a particular field or decision-making body is probably significant as it allowed an individual to develop a network of personal ties in that system, or *xitong*, that can help develop and build support for new initiatives and policy positions at a later date. This informal relationship balances the role of formal position noted above in influencing policy outcomes, suggesting that both factors were significant.

In attempting to outline the compartmentalization of policy-making I have identified three factors that help to explain the variations in the decision-making process highlighted by this research. The main variable is the question of an assessment of risk by China's senior leaders. I have identified Mao as the most important individual in making this assessment, however this is not the same as

the traditional "Mao-in-command" and "Mao-as-arbiter" models. While Mao could dictate this process, other senior leaders were consistently involved. Furthermore, the ambivalence in Mao's own thinking appears to have left room for both radical and moderate figures to promote their own policy positions.

I have also identified two intervening variables that explain the variations across the three issue areas. The first of these, membership of leading decision-making and administrative bodies was in part linked to the assessment of risk. However, once bestowed, membership of these bodies could give an individual the additional stature to challenge senior leaders like Mao, Zhou and Deng. The importance of formal position suggests that models of politics during the Cultural Revolution which only emphasize informal power structures such as factional ties, present a one-sided picture. This thesis suggests that formal structures were more significant than previously assumed, although it recognizes that these were often an alternative means of waging factional struggle rather than an independent power structure of their own.

The second variable identified, the importance of previous experience, underlines the on-going importance of informal ties. This thesis suggests that previous experience allowed an individual to build up connections within a particular system, or *xitong*, which helped with policy innovations and implementation at a later date.

Together, these variables suggest that policy-making during the period 1969-78 did not automatically follow the top-down pattern of the "Mao-in-command" model. The decision-making process appears to have been much more of an interactive process than has previously been thought with some individuals "capturing" parts of the policy-making process in a way which varied across the three issue areas, but which gave them an input into the decision-making process in that area and which mediated the role of senior leaders like Mao and Zhou.

Sources

Any study of elite politics in China is hampered by problems with sources. As I noted in the introduction, the Chinese decision-making process has remained largely closed to outside observers and there are few accounts of the events studied in this thesis by the participants themselves. Nor is there an open account of proceedings of meetings as there might be for a similar study of policy-making in the US or the UK.

Problems with sources on the Chinese decision-making process have included: 1) A scarcity of information. Early studies were hampered by the availability of material and were limited to media sources such as the *Renmin ribao* and radio broadcasts picked up outside of China which effected the conclusions they were able to draw. 2) Editing to reflect the correct political line. This is evident in later accounts of the Gang of Four and Lin Biao, but speeches are frequently edited, both before publication and later. Given the on-going sensitivity of the Cultural Revolution for China's leaders today, it is important to remain aware of this problem even with more recent material. 3) Accuracy. There is a general problem with the veracity of Chinese statistics and information. 4) Attribution. Many speeches were not written by the individual who delivered them. This leads to problems of attribution and whether the speech accurately reflect the views of that individual. 5) Irregular coverage. Not all speeches from a particular meeting, or in a particular policy debate are available, which in the past has led to one-sided interpretations of particular events or decisions.

This study utilizes a wide-variety of sources and seeks to take advantage of the large volume of recently published material on this period in order to overcome these problems. Sources used include a number of newspapers as well

as more recent collections of selected works¹⁸ and policy documents¹⁹, biographies²⁰, and volumes of reminiscences.²¹

Official newspapers such as the *Renmin ribao* and the *Guangming ribao* and journals such as *Hong qi* have traditionally formed the backbone of most studies of Chinese politics. Caution is required in using these sources which generally reflect the official line of that time with little or no indication of the policy-debate that formed the background to the announcements they carry. There are also major problems with attribution regarding the speeches and articles they carry. (For example, this problem is evident with most of Lin Biao's speeches and Zhou Enlai's speech to the 10th Party Congress carried in the *Renmin ribao*). This can lead to major problems in continuity and attribution in the reporting contained in these sources.

Despite these problems newspapers and journals contain key editorials and articles which with detailed textual analysis provide important insights into the views of senior Party and government figures. Editorials and leading articles were an important way of putting over views on policy and as such can be used to determine the policy positions of individual and groups of actors. (The series of articles by Guo Dajiang on Dazhai and agriculture and the column "How Should We Manage a Socialist University" are leading examples used in this thesis).²² Newspapers are also an important source of basic factual information on meetings, conferences, overseas visits etc.

¹⁸ See, for example, *Wan Li wenxuan*, (*Wan Li's Selected Works*), Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 1995, *Ye Jianying xuanji*, (*Selected Works of Ye Jianying*), Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 1996, and *Mao Zedong waijiao wenxuan*, (*Selected Foreign Policy Works of Mao Zedong*), Beijing: Zhongyang wenxuan chubanshe, 1994.

¹⁹ See, for example, *Jianguo yilai nongye hezuo shiliao huibian*, (*An anthology of historical material on agricultural collectivization since the founding of the PRC*), Beijing: 1992.

²⁰ See, for example, *Chen Yi zhuan*, (*Biography of Chen Yi*), Beijing: Dangdai Zhongguo chubanshe, 1991, and Yang Quan, *Chen Yonggui zhuan*, (*Biography of Chen Yonggui*), Wuhan: Changjiang Wenyi chubanshe, 1996.

²¹ See, for example, Fan Shuo, *Ye Jianying zai 1976*, (*Ye Jianying in 1976*), Beijing: Zhongyang dangxiao chubanshe, 1995, Zhang Hanzhi, *Wo yu Qiao Guanhua*, (*Qiao Guanhua and I*), Beijing: Zhongguo qingnian chubanshe, 1994, and Deng Zhirong (ed.), *Deng Xiaoping waijiao*, (*The Foreign Policy of Deng Xiaoping*), Haikou: Hainan chubanshe, 1996.

²² See Chapter Four on agriculture and Chapter Three on higher education for a detailed discussion of the articles contained in these columns.

Because of their general value, newspapers are an important source for all of the chapters of this thesis, providing factual information, editorials, policy documents and speeches in all three of the issue areas studied and for Chapter Two on political developments during this period. In addition, the column "How Should We Manage a Socialist University" is of particular value for the chapter on higher education and the series of articles by Guo Dajiang are an important element of my analysis of agricultural policy in Chapter Four.

Selected works and collections of speeches are an important source of primary material and this study has benefitted from the publication of a number of new collections (see footnote 17 above). Like official newspapers, those volumes published in China have suffered from editing to reflect the official line of that time. Obvious gaps, such as Mao's official Selected Works ending before the Cultural Revolution have to some extent been overcome with the publication of unofficial Red Guard volumes and works overseas, however problems with selection remain, often dictated by political requirements. This has meant that there are only limited numbers of speeches available for leading individuals like Lin Biao and Jiang Qing and other members of the Gang of Four. In addition, many speeches have been excluded from those collections that have been published, for example Deng Xiaoping's speech at the First Dazhai Conference. As noted above, questions regarding the attribution of some of the speeches need to be considered.

Despite the above, volumes of selected works do provide a number of key texts, a leading example here is the publication of Wan Li's Selected Works which has shed new light on the debate on agricultural policy in the post-Mao period. The publication of collections of speeches by Wan Li and other Cultural Revolution survivors such as Ye Jianying has served to highlight the differences of opinion within the policy-making process and overcome the one-sidedness that was apparent when only *Mao's Selected Works* and those of other members of the radical Left were available. New specialist volumes such

as the *Selected Foreign Policy Works of Mao Zedong and Comrade Deng Xiaoping on Education*²³ offer greater insights into the continuity of thinking of individual leaders on specific issues.

Volumes such as the *Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping* and the *Selected Works of Ye Jianying* contain texts that are important for each of the three issue areas and are utilized throughout this thesis. However the specialist volumes, such as those noted above are of importance for one particular area. This is also the case for *Wan Li's Selected Works* which is mainly of interest for the study of agriculture.

Policy documents share many of the problems of collections of selected works, however as statements of policy they are less likely to suffer from subsequent editing to reflect political line, rather, a new policy document is issued. The main problem remains availability with very irregular coverage, making it difficult to follow the evolution of policy through time.

This thesis uses all the traditional sources of policy documents, including newspapers and journals, as well as volumes such as *An Anthology of Historical material on Agricultural Collectivization Since the Founding of the PRC*²⁴ and Peter Seybolt's *Revolutionary Education in China Documents and Commentary*.²⁵ As with the collections of selected works, sources of policy documents such as newspapers are of value for all three issue areas while collections like those noted above are used in individual chapters.

The expansion in the number of biographies of leading individuals involved in this period is one of the most noticeable developments in the study of Chinese politics in recent years and this thesis utilizes biographies including Ye Yonglie's impressive series on the Gang of Four and Chen Boda as well as Yang Quan's biography on Chen Yonggui and the recent biographies of

²³ *Deng Xiaoping tongzhi lun jiaoyu* (*Comrade Deng Xiaoping on Education*), (Beijing: Renmin Chubanshe, 1990).

²⁴ See footnote 18 above.

²⁵ Peter J. Seybolt, *Revolutionary Education in China Documents and Commentary*, (White Plains, New York: International Arts and Sciences Press, Inc. 1973).

China's marshals to help draw new conclusions regarding policy-making during the period 1969-78.²⁶

In utilizing these new volumes it is important to note that problems of sources exist for Chinese writers almost as much as they do for western authors. When writing about the Cultural Revolution issues of the correct line also exist, although Ye Yonglie's biographies do attempt a neutral analysis of the Gang of Four. In addition it is important to be aware of any attempt to portray the subject in the best light. A peculiarly Chinese problem is the tendency to avoid writing biographies of the living, so important figures like Hua Guofeng are not covered in detail.

Despite these problems authors such as Ye Yonglie are widely respected for their academic approach and much of the content of these volumes can be confirmed by cross-referencing with other sources. Biographies provide valuable insights into the activities behind the formal policy-making process which contrast to official sources such as newspapers, selected works and policy documents. Good examples in this thesis are the insights into the way in which Mao and Zhou employed the four side-lined military leaders to oversee a change in foreign policy, and Deng's position in the run-up to the First Dazhai Conference revealed in some of the new biographies.

Specific biographies are utilized in different issue areas: Yang Quan's biography of Chen Yonggui is used in the chapter on agriculture and the biographies of the four marshals are used in the chapter on foreign policy. Ye Yonglie's biographies of the Gang of Four and Chen Boda are mainly used in Chapter Two but also offer valuable insights for each of the individual issue areas.

Volumes of reminiscences share all of the main problems of biographies,

²⁶ See, for example, Ye Yonglie, *Jiang Qing zhuan*, (*Biography of Jiang Qing*), Beijing: meitan gongye chubanshe, 1993; Yang Quan, *Chen Yonggui zhuan*, (*Biography of Chen Yonggui*), Wuhan: Changjiang Wenyi chubanshe, 1996; and *Chen Yi zhuan* (*Biography of Chen Yi*), Beijing: Dangdai Zhongguo chubanshe, 1991.

however, as these volumes were authored by individuals involved in the politics of the period, they can provide some of the most important insights. The value of these volumes has been demonstrated by Sun and Teiwes' use of Zhang Yunsheng's study of Lin Biao to provide a radical reinterpretation of Lin's involvement in decision-making during the Cultural Revolution.²⁷ Similarly Wang Dongxing's account of his journey with Mao at the height of the Lin Biao affair also sheds new light on this period.²⁸ This thesis uses this type of volume to provide general background into some of the major events of this period, while specific volumes such as *Qiao Guanhua and I* and *The Foreign Policy of Deng Xiaoping* are used in individual chapters, here foreign policy.²⁹

By using as wide a selection of sources as possible I hope to overcome some of the difficulties noted above. While useful sources of information, newspapers, selected works, and policy documents provide authorized accounts of events which in the past have tended to lead to a one-dimensional portrayal of the decision-making process which often erased signs of dissent. However newly published material means that a wider spectrum of views on key issues is available leading to much more diverse picture where policy-conflict is often at the heart of the decision-making process. New sources such as some of the newly published volumes of selected works are significant here as they broaden the spectrum of views available for detailed study.

Biographies and volumes of reminiscences offer important insights into the background of key decisions which are not discussed in official sources like newspapers and journals. While information contained in these volumes

²⁷ Zhang Yunsheng, *Maojiawan jishi: Lin Biao mishu huiyilu*, (*True Account of Maojiawan: Reminiscences of Lin Biao's Secretary*), Beijing: Chunqiu chubanshe, 1998. Zhang was Lin Biao's secretary during this time. His account portrays Lin Biao as isolated from the rest of the central leadership and demonstrating little interest in major policy issues. See Frederick C. Teiwes and Warren Sun, *The Tragedy of Lin Biao Riding the Tiger During the Cultural Revolution 1966-1971*, Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 1996.

²⁸ Wang Dongxing, *Mao Zedong yu Lin Biao fangeming jituan de douzheng* (*The Struggle Between Mao Zedong and Lin Biao's Counter-revolutionary Clique*), Beijing: Dangdai zhongguo chubanshe, 1998.

²⁹ See footnote 20 above.

needs to be treated with some caution, many of the details can be checked against other sources. These volumes can also help with problems of attribution, such as the detail surrounding the drafting of Zhou Enlai's speech to the 10th National Party Conference contained in Ye Yonglie's biography of Chen Boda.

Without interviews of key participants or auto-biographies it is clear that we cannot come to a perfect understanding of the background to the decision-making process in China during this period, however by utilizing as wide a variety of sources as possible I believe that this study can offer significant new insights into the Chinese policy-making process.

Chapter Two: Political Developments in the PRC, 1969-1978

1. Introduction

The Cultural Revolution can be divided into two clear phases: First the mobilization phase from mid-1966 to the end of 1968. This period was marked by the worst excesses of the Cultural Revolution, with the mobilization of the Red Guards, seizures of power across the country and fighting that bordered on civil war in some areas of China. The second phase, from 1969 to the death of Mao in October 1976, was marked by attempts to reconstruct Party and government organizations destroyed during the mobilization phase and to re-establish order across China and reform China's economy.

As outlined in the Introduction, this thesis concentrates on the period from 1969 to 1978. This includes the reconstruction phase of the Cultural Revolution and the early post-Mao period from 1976 to 1978. Although by 1969 the worst excesses of the Cultural Revolution had ended, and the Red Guard movement had been disbanded, purges of Party and government officials continued. The 1969-78 period was characterized by an on-going tension between the issue of ideological purity and the need to mobilize China's population for economic development. This tension was expressed in a series of intense policy debates within China's senior leadership, some of which form the basis of the subsequent chapters on higher education, agriculture, and foreign policy. This chapter sets out the wider domestic and international developments which formed the backdrop to these policy debates.

This chapter is divided into five parts: First, the impact of the Cultural Revolution up to the 9th Party Congress in April 1969; Second, the period from the 9th Party Congress to the death of Lin Biao in September 1971; Third, the period from September 1971 to the 10th Party Congress in August 1973;

Fourth, from the 10th Party Congress to the death of Mao Zedong and the arrest of the Gang of Four in autumn 1976; and Fifth, from late-1976 to the Third Plenum of the 11th Central Committee in December 1978.

2. The Impact of the Cultural Revolution in the PRC up to the 9th Party Congress

By April 1969 the mobilization phase of the Cultural Revolution was over. The end of this phase of the Cultural Revolution is in effect marked by the 9th Party Congress, held from 1-24 April, 1969. The Congress made an attempt by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) to reassert its national leadership and return to normal working practices. Despite this, the 9th Party Congress revealed the devastation of the Cultural Revolution: Local Party organs, who normally elected delegates to the National Congress, had been so weakened by the Cultural Revolution that the usual selection procedure was abandoned in the majority of provinces. Most candidates were simply selected by the Provincial leaderships dominated by the PLA.

a). The impact on Party and government organs

As a result of attacks on provincial and municipal Party leaders, the civilian Party system had largely collapsed during the Cultural Revolution. Even where Party leaders had been successful in resisting Leftist organizations, they were frequently removed from office during February and March 1967 when regional military forces took over much of the responsibility for provincial matters. In many areas the Party stopped work altogether.

At the Centre the Party's main decision-making bodies had also ceased to function effectively. The Cultural Revolution Small Group replaced the Politburo and the Secretariat as the main locus of decision-making (the latter was disbanded during the mobilization phase of the Cultural Revolution).

Formally established on 28 May, 1966, the Cultural Revolution Small Group (CRSG) initially had eighteen members and was headed by Chen Boda. Other members included Jiang Qing, Zhang Chunqiao, Yao Wenyuan, Wang Li, Guan Feng and Tao Zhu. At first, the group had acted as a 'secretarial' body, gathering documents and issuing directives, but through the course of the Cultural Revolution its influence had grown. With the purge of leading cadres from the Secretariat and Politburo, and as more and more senior cadres were side-lined, the work of these two leading bodies became paralysed. The CRSG largely took-over the powers of these two bodies and became the leading political body up to April 1969.

Government departments and ministries were similarly effected. For example, in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, senior Chinese diplomats were recalled and junior officials left overseas often proselytized in the name of Mao. By the end of the mobilizational phase of the Cultural Revolution China's circle of foreign friends was limited to Albania, Pakistan and a handful of African countries. At home the day-to-day work of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) was hampered by power struggles between the radical Left and senior government and Party officials like Zhou Enlai and Chen Yi, the Minister in charge of the MFA. The day-to-day management of foreign affairs work reached a low-point with the storming of the British Embassy in Beijing on 22 August, 1967.

The collapse of the Party and government structures meant that the PLA was the only national organisation which had retained a coherent organisation and as a consequence it came to play a leading role in domestic politics. By April 1969 the PLA dominated the provincial leadership. According to Jürgen Domes some 51 percent of the Chairmen, Vice-Chairmen and members of the Standing Committees of the Provincial Revolutionary Committees established during the 'seizure of power' were from the PLA. The PLA also sent 'military representatives' into virtually all sectors of society. Usually PLA officers or

political commissars, these representatives took on leadership roles in universities, factories, schools, agricultural units, communes, newspapers, radio stations and cultural units. ¹

b). Effects on senior Party and government personnel

The Cultural Revolution had a devastating effect on the membership of Party and government organs. According to Domes only thirty-four of the ninety-two members of the 8th Central Committee were re-elected to the new 9th Central Committee. In all there were one hundred and thirty-six new entrants to this Central Committee. At the Politburo level there were fifteen new members out of a total of twenty-five. Either through being purged, or merely being side-lined from day-to-day work, many senior members of the Party and government had been forced out of office.

The main early targets of the radical Left were the Beijing Municipal Party Committee, the Secretariat, the original Cultural Revolution Small Group and the Propaganda Department of the CCP. Wu Han, author of the play *Hai Rui ba guan*, (*Hai Rui petitions the Emperor*) and one of the original targets of the radical Left, was also a Vice-Mayor of Beijing. By attacking Wu Han, the radical Left were indirectly attacking the Beijing Party Committee under Peng Zhen. Beijing was one of a number of areas that had been slow to publish Yao Wenyuan's article criticizing Wu Han's play, but the Beijing Party Committee was singled out for criticism by Mao Zedong during an expanded Poliburo meeting, held in Hangzhou in eastern China's Zhejiang Province on 16 April 1966. From this time on Beijing's First Party Secretary Peng Zhen was forced to stop work.

As the mobilization phase of the Cultural Revolution continued, other senior leaders including Deng Xiaoping, Liu Shaoqi, Peng Dehuai, He Long, Chen Yi, Ye Jianying and Tao Zhu were attacked or sidelined. Writing in 1970 Donald

¹ Jürgen Domes, *China after the Cultural Revolution Politics Between Two Party Congresses* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1975), pg.53.

Klein notes that roughly half of China's Ministers and Vice-Ministers were out of the press between spring-1966 and 1968, suggesting they had come under attack.²

c). Effects on Industry and agriculture

The effects of the mobilizational phase of the Cultural Revolution on industry and agriculture were mixed. The central leadership had passed a series of resolutions which sought to reduce the impact of the Cultural Revolution on production units, but these were not always effective. The "Resolution on the Proletarian Cultural Revolution", passed at the 11th Plenum of the 8th Central Committee, clearly stated that maintaining production was as important as conducting the Cultural Revolution. On 14 September, 1966 the Central Committee passed the "Regulations [on conducting] the Cultural Revolution in Rural Areas Below the County Level". These regulations stated that students and Red Guards from Beijing or other areas could not go to communes and production brigades below the county level. They also restricted cadres and commune members from these levels from leaving their units to travel to the capital or other areas. During the autumn harvest, communes and brigades were to focus their efforts on harvest work and could temporarily suspend other, political, activities.³ Under the slogan of "grasp the revolution, promote production" the centre urged production units to continue normal work. On 2 September, 1966 the Central Committee and State Council issued a directive instructing work units in the railway system to participate in the revolution in a staggered fashion in order to maintain order. The directive called the railway system the "lifeblood of the national economy".⁴ However on 31 October 1966 the Central Committee and the State Council issued an "Emergency Directive on

² Donald Klein "The State Council and the Cultural Revolution", in John Wilson Lewis (ed.), *Party Leadership and Revolutionary Power in China*, (Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1978), pg.355.

³ Chen Mingxian, *Xin Zhongguo sishi wu nian yanjiu*, (*Research on the 45 years of new China*), (Beijing: Beijing ligong daxue chubanshe, 1994), pg 258.

⁴ *Ibid*, pg.258

Maintaining Order in Railway Transport”, indicating a deterioration in the situation.

In 1967, the combined value of industrial and agricultural output fell by 9.6 percent. Disruption in factories, breaks in transport links and general unrest were the main reasons for the drop in value, although there was a slight growth in agricultural output value, showing that rural areas were less effected. The decline continued in 1968, with the total output value of agriculture and industry falling by 4.2 percent, of this industrial output value fell by 5 percent and agricultural output value by 2.5 percent.

The two consecutive drops in output value caused concern amongst the central leadership, and by 1969 they had taken a number of measures to improve the situation. I will look at the measures taken to improve agricultural output in more detail in the subsequent chapter, however in 1969 the production value of industry and agriculture rose by 23.8 percent, due mostly to a 34.3 percent rise in the value of industrial output, agricultural output value only rose by 1.1 percent.

3. From the Ninth Party Congress to the Downfall of Lin Biao

The events from the Ninth National Party Congress of the CCP, held in April 1969, to the death of Lin Biao in a plane crash in Mongolia in September 1971 are still shrouded in considerable mystery, and subject to numerous interpretations. Conventionally, and largely in line with the official Chinese interpretation, Lin Biao is portrayed by most western writers as having used his new position as Mao’s chosen successor to build a powerful clique from amongst his supporters within the military. Lin then challenged Mao Zedong, the radical Left and Zhou Enlai, both over issues of policy and re-establishing the position of State Chairman. He is also accused of attempting to prolong the military domination of Chinese politics. Following a number of policy reversals

(notably over Chinese policy towards the United States), and public criticism of some of his closest supporters following the second plenum of the 9th Central Committee, Lin Biao is then said to have plotted a coup to overthrow Mao and seize power. Following the failure of these efforts, Lin then attempted to flee to the Soviet Union.⁵

It is only more recently with the emergence of personal accounts of events by people such as Zhang Yunsheng that this view has been challenged, most notably by Frederick Teiwes and Warren Sun, who claim that Lin was essentially passive, subject to clever manipulation by his wife and family, and that there is no evidence of a “Bonapartist” challenge to Mao.⁶

While I do not accept the argument that Lin was a bystander to most of the events of this period, my analysis does question the extent of Lin Biao’s direct opposition to Mao Zedong, and in particular the extent to which he resisted a de-militarization of Chinese politics. The extent of his participation in any planning for a coup is also unclear. This section will examine events from the Ninth National Party Congress in April 1969 to the death of Lin Biao in September 1971, focusing in particular on efforts to rebuild the Party structure and the activities of Lin Biao’s supporters in the two years following the Congress. I will also assess the various interpretations placed on these actions and to what extent the claims against Lin Biao are correct.

⁵ Works that adopt this approach include: Roderick MacFarquhar’s chapter in the Cambridge History of China (hereafter CHOC), “The succession to Mao and the end of Maoism”, in Volume 15, CHOC, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991); Jaap van Ginneken, *The Rise and Fall of Lin Biao*, New York: Penguin Books, 1976); and Gao Gao and Yan Jiaqi, ‘*Wenhua dageming’ shinianshi 1966-1976*’, (*History of the ‘Cultural Revolution’ Decade 1966-1976*), (Hong Kong: Chaoliu chubanshe, 1989).

⁶ Zhang Yunsheng, *Maojiawan jishi: Lin Biao mishu huiyilu*, (*True Account of Maojiawan: Reminiscences of Lin Biao’s Secretary*), (Beijing: Chunqiu chubanshe, 1988). Zhang was Lin Biao’s secretary during this time. His account portrays Lin Biao as isolated from the rest of the central leadership, and demonstrating little interest in major policy issues. See Frederick C. Teiwes and Warren Sun, *The Tragedy of Lin Biao Riding the Tiger during the Cultural Revolution 1966-1971*, (Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press, 1996).

a). The Ninth Party Congress

The Ninth Party Congress was held in Beijing from 1-24 April, 1969. 1512 delegates attended the meeting, most of them chosen by the military. This reflected the on-going paralysis of Party organs outside of Beijing. Although the majority of the delegates to the Congress were military personnel, most came as representatives of civilian organizations, not the PLA. Although preliminary moves had been taken to rebuild Party organs outside of the capital, the extent to which Mao and the radicals were ready to re-establish Party control within the new power structure remained unclear as long as Mao continued to have doubts as to the loyalty of the Party's membership.

Party re-construction touched on the on-going issue of finding successors to the revolution. "Three-in-one" revolutionary committees (made up of representatives from the military, the veteran cadres and the mass organizations) had been established in all provinces by the time of the Ninth Congress, but given the weakness of Party organizations, the issue of who would actually dominate these committees was less clear. The central Party did authorize the creation of provisional Party branches within the revolutionary committees. These new branches were expected to guide a "purification of the ranks", expelling those criticized during the Cultural Revolution and bringing in many of the activists who had proved themselves in the previous two years.⁷ Party building was a key theme of the period immediately before and after the Ninth Congress, in particular the relative importance of the veteran cadres, with their administrative experience, continued to be debated. Despite the introduction of "new blood", Mao clearly remained dissatisfied with the functioning of the revolutionary committees at the time of the Congress.

Lin's work report to the Ninth Congress, entitled "On Preparations for the Proletarian Cultural Revolution", focused extensively on the Cultural Revolution and criticism of Liu Shaoqi. Lin detailed the build-up to the Cultural Revolution

⁷ CHOC, Volume 15, pg.193.

and devoted considerable time to praising Chairman Mao's role in defeating Liu Shaoqi and his supporters. In the report Lin detailed some of Liu Shaoqi's earlier errors as evidence of his capitalist line. Using quotes from Marx, Lenin and Mao, he developed the argument that a Communist Party must always be on the look out for those following the capitalist line, even **within** the Party. Lin concluded the first section of his report by saying that the Cultural Revolution was "absolutely essential and extremely timely".⁸ Lin spoke at some length about Party building and rectification and stressed the importance of Party leadership for the People's Democratic Dictatorship.

Elections for the new Central Committee, Politburo and other leadership organs took place at the 1st Plenum of the Ninth Central Committee, held immediately after the Congress. Official Chinese reports suggest these elections took place on the 28 April 1969. However Jürgen Domes suggests that elections for the new CCP took eleven to twelve days, indicating intense debate amongst the leadership about the composition of the new Committee.⁹

In his detailed analysis of the membership of the new Central Committee, Jürgen Domes notes two significant trends. First, was the rise in the number of representatives from the PLA. Of the 170 full members of the Ninth Central Committee, 85, or 50 percent were from the PLA. (Roderick MacFarquhar, writing in the Cambridge History of China, suggests the figure is 45 percent¹⁰, while Philip Bridgham suggests only 40 percent¹¹). The second trend was the increase in representation of cadres who worked in the provinces rather than at the centre, up from 30 percent at the 8th Central Committee to 58 percent. The biggest increase was the representation for regional military cadres, up from 2.2 percent to 26.6 percent.¹²

⁸ "Work Report at the Ninth Congress of the CCP" in the *Renmin ribao*, 28 April, 1969.

⁹ Jürgen Domes, *China after the Cultural Revolution*, pg 29.

¹⁰ CHOC, Volume 15, pp.306-307.

¹¹ Philip Bridgham, "Mao's Cultural Revolution: The Struggle to Seize Power", in *The China Quarterly (CQ)*, No. 41, January-March 1970, pg.16.

¹² Jürgen Domes, *China after the Cultural Revolution*, pg.36.

The Ninth Congress is often portrayed as the springboard from which Lin Biao launched his bid for power. His election, together with that of many of his closest colleagues and his confirmation as Mao's successor certainly suggested that Lin was growing in status. Writing in the *Cambridge History of China*, Roderick MacFarquhar describes the Ninth Plenum as "a triumph for Lin Biao individually and for the PLA institutionally".¹³ However, both he and Harry Harding make little distinction between Lin Biao and military representation as a whole,¹⁴ and a more detailed analysis shows that Lin's position was not as powerful as it first appeared.

Policy differences were later to emerge between Lin and some of the regional commanders, and senior military figures at the centre such as Ye Jianying owed little loyalty to Lin. Teiwes and Sun note that while Lin emerged from the Congress with his position enhanced, a number of veteran cadres were also rehabilitated and promoted.¹⁵ Both Bridgham and Sun and Teiwes suggest that as China moved towards reconstructing the political system there is evidence that Mao was increasingly dissatisfied with the performance of the revolutionary committees, and in particular the military who dominated these bodies. There was continued controversy over the relative value of veteran cadres' experience and the efforts to rejuvenate the Party with younger, but less experienced cadres. Overshadowing Party-building efforts was the role of the military who undertook most of the responsibility for this work. It is this role, and their presence in civilian institutions across China that appears to have led some authors to suggest that Lin Biao continued to resist the de-militarization of Chinese politics following the Ninth Congress, and that it was following the failure of this effort that he launched his abortive coup attempt.

Following the end of the Ninth Party Congress, work continued to re-establish the Party system at lower levels. Starting in late-autumn 1970, the

¹³ CHOC, Volume 15, pg.306.

¹⁴ See Harry Harding's analysis of the new Central Committee in CHOC, Volume 15, pg.198.

¹⁵ Frederick C. Teiwes and Warren Sun, *The Tragedy of Lin Biao*, pg.104.

first provincial level Party Congress since the movement to seize power met in Hunan. It appointed a new Provincial Party Committee on 4 December. This process continued until the final Committees were formed in Sichuan, Ningxia, Tibet and Heilongjiang in August 1971. As the Party organs at lower levels were still in the process of being established, it is likely that delegates to the Committees were simply appointed by the Revolutionary Committees.

The PLA maintained its dominance of the new Provincial-level organs. Of a total of 158 members and alternate members of the secretariats of the new Provincial Party Committees, 98, or 62 percent came from the PLA.¹⁶ Six of the then ten Commanders of Military Regions became First Secretaries on the Party Committees, five Commanders of Provincial Military Districts became First Secretary and ten political commissars with PLA backgrounds were also appointed to the post of First Secretary. In all, twenty-one of China's then twenty-nine major administrative units were headed by military personnel.¹⁷

The extent to which the military dominated the polity during this period is generally accepted by most writers, even Teiwes and Sun, who are sceptical as to whether there was any bid for power by Lin, agree that the military were in a very powerful position after the Ninth Congress.¹⁸ However, the significance of this domination is less clear. Teiwes and Sun see it merely as a process of necessity,¹⁹ in that there were no other forces available to Mao who could conduct this work. Roderick MacFarquhar suggests that Lin Biao and the PLA as a whole failed to accept Mao's injunctions to rebuild the Party. However he offers little evidence to support this claim except their dominance of the new Party Committees.²⁰ Domes and Philip Bridgham seem right when they argue that the PLA was essentially loyal, despite its dominant position.

The military were placed in a difficult position as they were expected to

¹⁶ Jürgen Domes, *China after the Cultural Revolution*, pg.50

¹⁷ *Ibid*, pg.50

¹⁸ Teiwes and Sun, *The Tragedy of Lin Biao*, pg.128.

¹⁹ *Ibid*, pg.132.

²⁰ CHOC, Volume 15, pg.313.

balance the interests of the veteran cadres and the Cultural Revolution radicals. It is clear that during this period Mao vacillated in the significance he gave each side, twice being forced to reverse his decision to promote more radicals onto the revolutionary committees when disorder and attacks on veteran cadres followed.²¹ The military, particularly at the local level, appear to have favoured the stability and experience the veteran cadres represented. This may be one origin of the idea that the military were somehow opposed to Mao, however in implementing the sometimes vague or contradictory directives on Party-building, there appears to be little evidence of any opposition to Mao, nor of a co-ordinated plot to resist Mao. If there was any resistance, it tended to be from the regional commanders who were seeking to ensure stability within their regions, and who had little connection with Lin Biao.

b). To the Second Plenum of the 9th Party Congress

The Second Plenum of the 9th Party Congress was held at Lushan in Jiangxi Province from 23 August to 6 September, 1970. The Plenum saw an open split between Mao Zedong and some of Lin Biao's supporters and clearly discredited Lin in the eyes of Mao. As attacks on Lin's supporters continued he may have felt that it was increasingly unlikely that he would succeed Mao as Chairman of the Party. In the official Chinese line, and in many western studies, the failure of Lin's supporters at Lushan led them to start planning for a military coup.

A number of Chinese and western accounts of Lin's downfall focus on policy differences within the senior Chinese leadership and Lin's bid to become State Chairman²². As part of this struggle, a number of studies address

²¹ See Philip Bridgham, "Mao's Cultural Revolution: The Struggle to Seize Power", in *CQ*, No. 41, pp.1-25.

²² See Gao Gao and Yan Jiaqi, '*Wenhua dageming' shinianshi 1966-1976*, (*History of the 'Cultural Revolution' decade 1966-1976*), as well as Roderick MacFarquhar's account in the Cambridge History of China, Volume 15 and Jaap van Ginneken, *The Rise and Fall of Lin Biao*.

Lin Biao's alleged resistance to Sino-US rapprochement.²³ The study by Jürgen Domes also suggests that Lin was personally associated with a radical agricultural policy, based on the policies of the Great Leap Forward, and introduced in a speech he delivered on China's National Day, 1 October, 1969.²⁴ However the recent publication of Zhang Yunsheng's memoirs have portrayed Lin Biao as showing little interest in policy matters and Teiwes and Sun have argued that there is little evidence of Lin ever advocating Leftist policies of his own.²⁵

One area where Lin Biao does appear to have gone against the wishes of Chairman Mao was over the issue of the State Chairmanship. The official line is that in pressing for the re-establishment of this post, Lin Biao was seeking to have himself nominated, thus strengthening his position as Mao's successor. This issue would dominate the second plenum at Lushan.

At a meeting in March 1970 Mao had proposed firstly that the centre should convene the Fourth National People's Congress (NPC), and that secondly, this meeting should revise the constitution and remove the position of State Chairman (this post had previously been held by Liu Shaoqi and had been vacant following his death). These proposals were discussed at a series of meetings through March and appear to have received general approval. Lin Biao, however, apparently continued to raise the issue of keeping the post of State Chairman. Right up to the eve of the second Plenum, Lin is reported to have proposed that the post be kept and that Mao Zedong be made State Chairman, but Mao continued to reject Lin's proposals.²⁶

Lin and his supporters were also pushing for the new constitution to include a phrase praising Mao as having 'natural talent', (*tian cai*) although Mao had already rejected a proposal that the work report to the Ninth Party Congress

²³ Jaap van Ginneken in particular places emphasis on this issue.

²⁴ Jürgen Domes, *China after the Cultural Revolution*, pg.61.

²⁵ Teiwes and Sun, *Riding the Tiger*, pg.116.

²⁶ Chen Mingxian, (ed.), *Research on the 45 Years of New China*, pg.320.



include this phrase.²⁷

c). The Second Plenum of the Ninth Central Committee

The agenda for this meeting had originally intended to discuss the revision of the Constitution, drawing up national economic plans and the question of “preparing for war” (in the face of the perceived Soviet threat). It is normal policy for Party Plenums to break up into regional groups following the main speeches to discuss them in detail. Lin’s supporters in the various regional groups appeared to be ready to demand a change in the agenda to discuss Lin’s own speech to the Plenum. Chen Boda also produced some pre-prepared material at the regional meeting he attended. All this seems to indicate that this was a planned deviation from the agenda.

At the opening ceremony Lin Biao made a speech in which he discussed the question of “natural talent”, ignoring Mao’s rejection of the phrase. Lin praised Mao for having *tian cai* and said that anyone who did not agree with this point of view was going against the basic principles of Marxism. In the evening at a Politburo meeting which was discussing economic plans, Wu Faxuan, (Commander of the PLA Air Force) appears to have demanded that the whole Plenum discuss Lin’s speech, and that the agenda should be changed. Ye Qun, (Lin’s wife), passed Wu’s comments on to Li Zuopeng and Qiu Huizuo , close military colleagues of Lin. She demanded that they raise the question of discussing Lin’s speech in their regional meetings. The next afternoon, Chen Boda, Ye Qun, Wu Faxuan, Li Zuopeng and Qiu Huizuo all called for their regional groups to study Lin’s speech. In the North China Group meeting Chen Boda called for the State Chairmanship to be re-established, and issued material on the question of “natural talent”. On the morning of the 25 August Chen’s speech was published and appears to have caused enough confusion

²⁷ Ye Yonglie, *Chen Boda zhuan*, (A Biography of Chen Boda), (Beijing: Zuojia chubanshe, 1993), pp. 518-519. Right on the eve of the plenum Chen Boda is reported to have sent a colleague to a library in nearby Jiujiang to gather material.

that the intended agenda was abandoned.

In the afternoon of the 25 August Mao called an enlarged meeting of the Standing Committee of the Politburo which resolved to recall copies of Chen's speech and stop further discussion of Lin's speech of the 23. On the 31 August Mao made an important speech of his own, later included in his *Selected Works* entitled "Some of My Opinions," (*Wo de yidian yijian.*), which severely criticized Chen Boda and rejected the theory of "natural talent". Mao also criticized the actions of Wu Faxuan, Ye Qun, Li Zuopeng and Qiu Huizuo. At the closing ceremony Zhou Enlai announced that Chen Boda would undergo investigation for his activities.

While the activities of Lin Biao's supporters certainly had the appearance of being an organized attempt to change the agenda for the plenum meeting, Teiwes and Sun have questioned whether this represented a direct attempt by Lin to be given the position of State Chairman. Teiwes and Sun quote Party historian Wang Nianyi as suggesting that it was Ye Qun who was responsible for promoting this issue,²⁸ although they then contradict this statement by saying that in pushing the idea Lin and Chen Boda were only doing a job of "promoting Mao".²⁹ This seems one of the weaker arguments in what is otherwise an excellent study of these events. The challenge to Party norms that the activities of Lin's supporters represented was considerable, indeed Lin's own speech at the start of the plenum had not been cleared by Mao, as was usual, and as such represented an affront to the Chairman. If, as Teiwes and Sun suggest, Lin was essentially passive and sensitive to the concerns of Mao, it seems likely that he would have been reluctant to make such a provocative move. Chinese writers, sensitive to the niceties of Chinese politics make much of Lin's bid³⁰, however Lin's move seems more in the line of a bid to

²⁸ Teiwes and Sun, *Riding the Tiger*, pp.135-136.

²⁹ *Ibid*, pg.137.

³⁰ See for example, Chen Mingxian's *Zhonghua renmin gonghe guo shi*, (*History of the People's Republic of China*), (Beijing: Beijing ligong daxue chubanshe, 1993) pp.266-268.

secure his own position as Mao's successor at a difficult time, rather than a move to challenge the Chairman and the Central Committee.

Following the Second Plenum the Party launched a "movement to criticize Chen Boda" (*Pi Chen Zhengfeng*) and on the 16 November Mao's speech "Some of My Opinions" was published. Following Mao's instructions Zhou Enlai convened a meeting of the North China Conference which ordered the purge of Li Xuefeng and Zheng Weishan, (two close supporters of Lin) and at a meeting held on 29 April, Zhou Enlai also openly criticized Huang Yongzheng, Wu Faxian, Ye Qun, Li Zuopeng and Qiu Huizuo.

There appears to be sufficient evidence to prove that Lin's son, Lin Liguó was involved in planning the overthrow of Mao Zedong to forestall the possible demotion of his father, however the extent of Lin Biao's knowledge of their activities is unclear. Reports suggest that Lin, Ye Qun and Lin Liguó had begun to seriously discuss plans for a coup in February 1971.³¹ The planning is then said to have been left to Lin Liguó. On 18 March Lin Liguó and Yu Xinye travelled to Shanghai, where they met Li Weixin and Zhou Yuzhe. Between 22 and 24 March these four young Air Force officers are alleged to have drawn up the so-called "Document 571" (in Chinese 571 is a homonym for "armed uprising").

Mao himself appears to have been aware of at least some of this activity. On the 14 August he left Beijing and began a tour of southern provinces. In a series of talks with provincial civilian and military leaders Mao emphasized the need for unity and stressed that "the incident of the Second Plenum is not resolved yet". He openly criticized Lin Biao, saying that he should "shoulder some of the blame".³² Mao's behaviour during this tour, as revealed by Wang

³¹ Jürgen Domes, *China after the Cultural Revolution*, pg 128.

³² See Wang Dongxing's account of Mao's meetings during his southern tour in Wang Dongxing, *Mao Zedong yu Lin Biao fangeming jituan de douzheng*, (*The Struggle Between Mao Zedong and Lin Biao's Counter-revolutionary Clique*), (Beijing: Dangdai zhongguo chubanshe, 1998), pp.87-176. Wang Dongxing had formerly served as Mao's bodyguard. He accompanied Mao on his tour as his secretary and personally attended all of the meetings.

Dongxing, shows that he was increasingly concerned not just with Lin Biao's behaviour, but with the loyalty of the military itself and he castigated himself a number of times for not paying enough attention to military affairs in recent years.³³

Mao's comments during his tour were relayed to Lin's family by Zhou Yuchi, Yu Xinye and Li Zuopeng and appeared to have caused alarm. When Mao's train returned to Beijing safely on 21 September its arrival certainly caused a panic at Lin's house in Beidaihe. Lin, his wife Ye Qun, Lin Liguo and a number of their supporters boarded a Trident jet at Qinghuangdao airport and flew towards the Soviet Union. It is this flight that appears to be the most damning evidence against them, for such a dramatic step remains hard to explain unless they were fleeing from a serious situation. Having forced the plane to take off before fully refuelling, it then crashed in Mongolia, apparently having run out of fuel.

4. From the Death of Lin Biao to the Tenth Party Congress

In the wake of the fall of Lin Biao some 60 leading military officials were purged. The majority came from the two areas which had supported Lin Biao most closely, the central organs of the PLA, in particular the Air Force, and the 4th Field Army (this was the Field Army Lin had commanded during the Civil War). However, although many military figures were purged, the PLA continued to maintain its strong influence within the Chinese political system. In particular a number of regional military figures were promoted at the expense of Lin's supporters. Ye Jianying became the new Minister of Defence and would play a leading role for the rest of the period under study.

In addition, Mao's eventual successor, Hua Guofeng was promoted to the centre at around this time and appointed to lead the investigation into Lin

³³ *Ibid*, pg 121.

Biao's activities. This position demonstrates Mao's trust in a figure who had previously been leader in Mao's own bailiwick of Hunan. Hua makes a number of appearances in the media in the following years and clearly had a degree of influence within the leadership, however it is only with the first of the National Conferences to Study Dazhai in 1975 that he rose to greater prominence.

The period following Lin's downfall was characterized by an intensifying conflict between members of the radical Left and moderates such as Zhou Enlai. Lin Biao's dramatic overthrow appears to have given Zhou Enlai some room to organize a partial readjustment of industrial, agricultural and social policies introduced during the Cultural Revolution, and to begin to bring back some of the veteran cadres purged during the mobilization phase of 1966-69. As was later shown by his opposition to some of these reforms, Mao had not abandoned his backing for the Cultural Revolution's line, however, in the wake of Lin's death, he appears to have given his tacit approval for these actions, indeed on one occasion shortly after Lin's death, Mao, speaking to Ye Jianying, went out of his way to praise the actions of the veteran cadres during the so-called "February adverse current", saying they had been opposing Lin Biao.³⁴

An editorial in the *Renmin ribao* 28 April, 1972 noted that the veteran cadres were "loyal in the majority", had "considerable organization skills" and were "relatively rich in experience".³⁵ Statements such as these justified a wave of rehabilitations including Marshal Zhu De in 1972, and culminating with the reappearance of Deng Xiaoping in Beijing in April 1973.

a). Policy Readjustments

With Lin's fall, and the return of many of the purged cadres, moderates, under the leadership of Zhou Enlai, initiated a period of policy readjustment. According to Domes this was aimed primarily at reducing the burden of

³⁴ Zheng Qian and Han Gang, *Mao Zedong zhi lu Wan nian sui yue*, (*Mao Zedong's Road His Later Years*), (Beijing: Zhongguo qingnian chubanshe, 1993), pg. 481.

³⁵ Jürgen Domes, *China after the Cultural Revolution*, pg.144.

demands that had been placed on the masses by Lin's mobilizational policies, however it would be more accurate to say that they challenged a much wider range of Cultural Revolution policies. Efforts to reform higher education would prove particularly controversial, and directly challenged many of the initiatives of the radical Left, not Lin Biao.

In general these new policies were part of a broader revision of the extreme leftist position of the Cultural Revolution. From the beginning of 1972 the Chinese media carried attacks on "egalitarianism" and "ultra-left deviations". It is also clear that there was a decline in the Mao cult that had emerged during the Cultural Revolution. A number of provinces stopped reading quotes from the Chairman before the news broadcasts as had been customary before. Even the little Red Book, the symbol of the Red Guard movement, came in for some criticism. The provincial Party newspaper in Guangdong carried an article in June 1972 which called for a more detailed study of Mao's original works, claiming that "one should not be content to read only 'sayings and quotations'".³⁶

The reforms of 1972 and 1973 were strongly opposed by members of the radical Left. Although the position of the leftists at the provincial level had been weakened, they still dominated the central propaganda apparatus and had close contacts with sections of the military (most notably the People's Militia) and leaders in a number of provinces and municipalities. Most importantly, they continued to enjoy the support of Mao Zedong. Mao's position upto his death in September 1976 remained unchanged: He recognized the superior administrative skills of the veteran cadres, and recognized the need for a degree of readjustment, while continuing to defend the Cultural Revolution and the radical Left. His continued support for both groups gave room for policy conflicts to emerge and intensify, and it was only with the second purge of Deng

³⁶ *Nanfang ribao*, 2 June, 1972, in Jürgen Domes, *China after the Cultural Revolution*, pg. 172.

Xiaoping in 1976 that Mao came down decisively on either side.

Although the rehabilitated cadres continued with the new policy drive through 1972 and 1973, the media began to carry a series of critical articles sponsored by the Left. In March 1973 *Hong qi* issued an appeal to “defend and develop the fruits of the victory of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, which was both ‘necessary and opportune’”.³⁷ The radical Left also attempted to launch an attack on Zhou Enlai using a campaign to criticize the writings of Confucius. Although this campaign was to have little impact in the run-up to the 10th Party Congress, it indicates the Left’s growing confidence that they could attack one of the most senior figures in the leadership.

b). The Tenth Party Congress

The Tenth Party Congress met in secret from 24 to 28 August 1973 in Beijing. The downfall of Lin Biao and the purge of his supporters had necessitated that this Congress meet early. In all some 1,249 delegates attended the meeting.

In his Political Work Report Zhou Enlai concentrated mainly on an account of the Lin Biao crisis, publically naming Lin and Chen Boda as Party enemies for the first time and announcing their expulsion from the Party. Zhou also discussed China’s foreign policy, and set out his arguments for China’s growing rapprochement with the United States. He called for planning and co-ordination to be strengthened and for Party organizations to pay close attention to questions of economic policy, and to concern themselves with the well-being of the masses.

In contrast Wang Hongwen in his Report on the Revision of the Party Constitution launched a strong attack on ‘revisionism’ and repeated Mao’s quote that it was “a Marxist-Leninist principle” to “swim against the tide”. He criticized the tendency to suppress criticism of the Party:

³⁷ *Hong qi*, No. 3 1973, in Jürgen Domes, *China after the Cultural Revolution*, pg.175.

There are still after all a small number of cadres, **especially some leading cadres**, [my emphasis] who will not tolerate the differing views of the masses inside or outside the Party. They even suppress criticism and retaliate, and it is quite serious in some individual cases.³⁸

Jürgen Domes claims that both the make-up of the new Central leadership organs, and the language of the new Party Constitution suggests that a compromise was reached between the radical Left and the advocates of the readjustment policy. However, Frederick Teiwes suggests that "the balance of forces in the Politburo selected at the Tenth Congress in August 1973... if anything underestimated the overall dominance of the old-line administrators and exaggerated the radicals' strength in the elite as a whole".³⁹ An examination of the make-up of the new Politburo suggests that Teiwes' comment is correct, for while the radical Left and the veteran cadres were largely balanced on the new Politburo, the Congress failed to reverse the moderates' policy readjustment.

5. From the 10th Party Congress to the Autumn of 1976

Immediately following the 10th Party Congress in August and September, more articles appeared in the Chinese press criticizing Confucius and Confucian thinking. On 15 September 1973 the first edition of *Xuexi yu pipan* (*Study and Criticism*), (a magazine established under the auspices of Zhang Chunqiao and Yao Wenyuan) published an article entitled "On Honouring Confucianism and Opposing Legalism" (*Lun zunrui fanfa*). The article, which was published in the name of the Shanghai Municipal Party Committee's Writing Group, stated:

Resolutely criticizing the ideological trend of honouring Confuciansim and opposing legalism is a struggle which possesses

³⁸ *Ibid*, pg. 186.

³⁹ Frederick C. Teiwes, *Leadership, Legitimacy, and Conflict in China From a Charismatic Mao to the Politics of Successor*, (New York: MacMillan Press Ltd. 1984), pg. 113.

great importance for the ideological realm. Thoroughly carrying out this struggle will help us to further recognize and carry out the real class and line struggles, it will help us recognize those conspirators who are engaged in capitalist restoration... and will help to strengthen the proletarian dictatorship and resist capitalist restoration. ⁴⁰

Further articles appeared in the *Renmin ribao* 27 September 1973, in the second edition of *Xuexi yu pipan*, in the 11th edition of 1973 of *Hong qi*, the *Beijing ribao* 12 September and in the *Wenhui Bao* 26 September.⁴¹ The latter article, entitled "Is Confucius a rebel or a conservative?" (*Kongzi shi zaofanpai haishi baoshoupai?*), claimed "[Confucius] was an ultra-conservative who was opposed to innovation, and advocated the restoration of the old ways; he was an obstinate diehard who had been defeated once but wanted to try again".⁴² Other articles appeared in both the central and local press.

On 18 January 1974 a collection of material entitled "Lin Biao and the Doctrine of Confucius and Mencius" (*Lin Biao yu Kong Meng zhi dao*) was published as the Party Central Committee's Document No 1. The material had been collected by units at Peking and Tsinghua universities at the instigation of Jiang Qing and Wang Hongwen who wrote to Mao on 12 January urging him to have the material published.⁴³ The Central Committee's Document No 1 stated:

The capitalist careerist, conspirator, double-dealer, renegade and traitor Lin Biao is an out-and-out follower of Confucius. Like all...reactionaries in history, [he] honours Confucius and opposes Legalism, attacks Qinshi Huangdi, and turns the Doctrine of Confucius and Mencius into a counter-revolutionary weapon to secretly usurp the Party's power and restore capitalism.⁴⁴

Following the publication of Document No.1 the campaign to 'Criticize

⁴⁰ Li Qichen, *Qian qiu gong guo*, (*Successfully cross one thousand autumn's*), (Beijing: Guangming Ribao Press, 1994), pg.53.

⁴¹ *Ibid*, pp.54-56.

⁴² *Ibid*, pg.55.

⁴³ *Ibid*, pg.58.

⁴⁴ *Ibid*, pg.59.

Confucius and Lin Biao' became more widespread. In the first half of 1974 articles appeared in the *Renmin ribao*, *Hong qi* and many other central and local newspapers. The radical Left, who had widespread support throughout the propaganda organs were able to use these articles not only to criticize Lin Biao, but to launch attacks on current leaders, notably Zhou Enlai, and the 'readjustment' policies. Many of the attacks used historical allusion and allegory rather than directly naming Zhou, but increasingly the articles began to criticize "modern Confucianists" and warned of the continual threat of revisionism.

a). From the 4th National People's Congress to Zhou Enlai's death: 1975

In the run up to the 4th NPC the radical Left continued to attack both Zhou Enlai and Deng Xiaoping, who, as Zhou became increasingly frail, was taking on more of Zhou's administrative responsibilities. Despite these attacks, during the summer of 1974, the decision was made to appoint Deng Xiaoping as first Vice-Premier, placing him in line to succeed Zhou Enlai. The left would have hoped that Zhang Chunqiao would become Premier and Deng's appointment must have been a significant blow to them. However Mao had praised Deng on a number of occasions, and his appointment highlighted the failure of the Left to find a suitable successor to Zhou Enlai with the necessary administrative experience.

At a Politburo meeting held on 17 October 1974, the radical Left launched an attack against Deng for worshipping foreign goods, (the attack, known as the *Fengqing* incident was sparked by the first successful voyage of a large-sized merchant vessel built in China). Wang Hongwen flew to Changsha the next day to report the incident personally to Mao but he was critical of the actions of Jiang, Zhang and Wang. Later, on 23 December 1974, during a meeting between Mao, Wang and Zhou Enlai, Mao told Wang that "the Premier [Zhou] is still our Premier". He told Zhou "you are unwell, after the 4th NPC,

you must rest carefully... We can let Deng Xiaoping manage the State Council's work".⁴⁵ On 5 January, 1974 The Central Committee's Document No 1 appointed Deng Xiaoping Deputy-Chairman of the Central Military Commission and Chief of the General Staff Department of the People's Liberation Army (PLA). Zhang Chunqiao was appointed to the post of Director of the Political Department of the PLA.⁴⁶

The first plenary session of the 4th NPC was held in Peking from 13-18 January 1975, the first NPC meeting in some ten years. In his Government Work Report to the meeting, Zhou Enlai outlined his goal of "all-out modernization of agriculture, industry, national defence and science and technology", the so-called "four modernizations".⁴⁷ Zhou's call was used by the moderates, to press for further policy reforms following the Congress.

Despite the significance of the meeting, Mao Zedong did not appear at any of its sessions, nor is he reported to have sent any messages, this is despite the fact that he held a meeting with a visitor from Germany on the 16 January, while the Congress was in session.⁴⁸ Domes suggests that Mao did not attend because he was displeased its proceedings.

While ideological attacks by the radical Left on the moderates' reform program increased in the wake of the NPC meeting, they were still able to launch an extensive reform package in industry and education. Despite some criticism of elements of these reforms by Mao Zedong, the moderates were able to continue their program through 1975. The contradiction inherent in Mao's stance lay at the heart of the intensifying conflict, with Mao backing the administrative experience of the veterans, but unhappy at any challenge to the

⁴⁵ *Ibid*, pg.121.

⁴⁶ *Ibid*, pg.122.

⁴⁷ Zhou Enlai, "Report on the work of the government," *Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo di Sijie Zhongguo Renmin Daibiao Dahui di Yici Huiyi Wenjian*, (*Documents of the first meeting of the Fourth National People's Congress of the PRC*), (Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 1975), pg. 10.

⁴⁸ Jürgen Domes, "The 'Gang of Four' and Hua Kuo-feng: Analysis of Political Events in 1975-76", *CQ* pg.480.

fundamental policies of the Cultural Revolution. As the moderates' reforms progressed, he would become increasingly concerned on this latter point.

Shortly after the NPC meeting closed, The *Renmin ribao* published an "important directive". In the directive Mao called for a "restriction of bourgeois rights" and launched a strong attack on the eight-grade wage system then being implemented in industry in China.⁴⁹ Mao's directive went directly against the decisions recently made by the NPC. The March and April editions of *Hong qi* published articles by Yao Wenyuan and Zhang Chunqiao which developed Mao's ideas. Their articles called for vigilance against "capitalist roaders in the Party," and called for an equalization of wages, the restriction of private activities by the peasants and a gradual transmission of powers from the production team to the brigade and the commune.

Although the official media focused on ideological rhetoric, in the fields of economic and social policy the line of the 4th NPC continued to be implemented. It appears that moderates, under the leadership of Zhou were able to resist calls from the radical Left and Mao to reverse the policy decisions of the 4th NPC. Zhou's own stature is important, (his subsequent death in January 1976 marked a temporary end to the reform program), however Mao's increasing isolation was also significant. If Mao had attended the sessions of the 4th NPC it seems likely that the views he expressed in his later directive would have prevailed. Mao's apparent refusal to attend the Congress meetings gave the reformers the opportunity to introduce the moderate policies. What is more, his withdrawal from day-to-day decision-making allowed senior Party figures like Zhou and Deng to oversee policy implementation through the State Council which they controlled.

Deng led an "all-round rectification", trying to make progress on a number of fronts simultaneously. From 15 February 1975 to 8 March 1975 a National Meeting of Industrial Secretaries was held in Beijing. Speaking at the meeting

⁴⁹ *Ibid*, pg.480.

Deng pointed out: "at the moment some comrades only dare to grasp revolution, they don't dare grasp production....This is wrong".⁵⁰ While the meeting was in session the Central Committee issued the "Resolution Concerning Strengthening Railway Work" which set out guidelines for improving the management over China's rail network which had suffered considerably during the Cultural Revolution.

With the support of Zhou Enlai and Deng Xiaoping, Minister of Education Zhou Rongxin chaired a series of meetings which sought to improve the situation in China's universities and schools. Zhou Rongxin appears to have launched a strong attack on the leftist influence over education policy. At one meeting he is reported to have criticized the policy of allowing workers and peasants to attend university on the basis of their political background:

Workers, peasants and soldiers who attend university are unable to become technicians, they are unable to become cadres, they only return to become workers and peasants. What is the worth in this?⁵¹

A number of articles appeared which criticized the attitude of the radical Left that 'hardwork could replace study', (*yi gan dai xue*).

As the policy reforms deepened, Mao clearly became concerned that they threatened some of what he saw as the "achievements" of the Cultural Revolution; Teiwes states that the 1975 reforms simply "arouse[d] Mao's suspicions".⁵² In talks with the Danish Prime Minister on 20 October, 1974 Mao commented that the eight grade pay system, reintroduced during the reforms and which allocated wages according to work, not need, were similar to the wage system of pre-Liberation China.⁵³ Mao returned to this theme when discussing preparations for the 4th NPC with Zhou Enlai and Wang Hongwen. Quoting Lenin, Mao emphasised that there will always be those who engage in

⁵⁰ Li Qichen, *Successfully cross one thousand autumns*, pg.130.

⁵¹ *Ibid*, pg.136.

⁵² Frederick C. Teiwes, *Leadership, Legitimacy, and Conflict in China*, pg.118.

⁵³ Li Qichen, *Successfully cross one thousand autumns*, pg.150.

capitalism and capitalist classes, even amongst the Party and workers and that it is only by implementing the proletarian dictatorship that this phenomena can be restrained. Mao urged Zhou and Wang to commission Zhang Chunqiao and Yao Wenyuan to study Lenin's writings on proletarian dictatorship and publish articles.⁵⁴

This theme was continued in the media and in a number of Central documents published after the 4th NPC had closed. On 9 February 1975 the *Renmin ribao* published an editorial entitled "Study the Theory of the Proletarian Dictatorship". On the 18 February the Central Committee published the "Circular on Studying Mao's Directives on Ideological Questions" and on 22 February the *Renmin ribao* published an article written by Zhang Chunqiao and Yao Wenyuan entitled "Marx, Engels and Lenin on Proletarian Dictatorship".

In the second half of 1975 indirect criticism of Zhou and Deng increased, linked to a campaign to criticize the classic Chinese novel "The Water Margin" (*Shuihu Zhuan*). The campaign appears to have been launched as a result of discussions Mao had in August 1975 with a teacher from Peking University's Chinese Literature Department concerning the novel. Mao is reported to have criticized the novel for only opposing corruption within the traditional imperial system and not the system itself.

On 28 August, 1975 *Hong qi* published an article entitled "Attach Importance to Commentaries on the Water Margin". The article stated "Song Jiang's [the leading character in the novel] counter-revolutionary path proves: if you engage in revisionism, then you will inevitably be a capitulationist, sell out the revolution and be a running dog of the reactionaries. These are all the characteristics of revisionism".⁵⁵ The *Hong qi* article was reprinted in the *Renmin ribao* 31 August with a much longer commentary, "Criticize 'The Water

⁵⁴ *Ibid*, pg 151.

⁵⁵ *Ibid*, pg.166.

Margin", written by Zhu Fangming. This commentary stated "During the historical stage of socialism, we must guard against and prevent revisionism, continue the revolution under the dictatorship of the proletariat and we must recognize the capitulationists and oppose the capitulationists".⁵⁶

At the First Conference on In Agriculture Study Dazhai, held at the Shanxi brigade in September 1975, Jiang Qing is reported to have linked the Campaign to Criticize 'The Water Margins' to the present day. Jiang used her speech to the conference to indirectly attack Deng: "Capitulationists and revisionists in our party are able to do things an open enemy could not do....By criticizing 'The Water Margin' we know that there are capitulationists in our Party".⁵⁷

Significantly, this meeting also saw the emergence of Hua Guofeng onto the national political scene. Hua appears to have gained the support of a group of figures including Dazhai's former Party Secretary Chen Yonggui and other supporters of the Shanxi brigade. Both Deng and Jiang gave speeches during the Conference, however Mao selected Hua to deliver the key-note speech. Mao also appeared to support Hua's line (based on the experiences of Dazhai) against that of both Deng and Jiang. I will discuss these developments in more detail in the chapter on agriculture.

Deng Xiaoping, who directed the 1975 reform program owing to Zhou Enlai's ill-health, came under increasing pressure in late-1975 and by the end of the year the reforms had been brought to a stop, as a result of continued criticism from the radical Left and the ultimate withdrawal of Mao's support. On 8 November Zhang Chunqiao is reported to have attacked Deng's education reforms, saying: "One [system] raises educated exploitationists with capitalist consciousness; one [system] raises uneducated workers with [class] consciousness. Which would you want? I would rather have an uneducated

⁵⁶ *Ibid*, pg.168.

⁵⁷ *Ibid*, pg.169.

worker than an educated exploitationist".⁵⁸ The Minister of Education, Zhou Rongxin was forced to undergo a number of struggle sessions and on 12 April 1976 he collapsed and died.

On 4 December 1975 the *Renmin ribao* published an article entitled "It is not Easy to Distort the Direction of the Educational Revolution". The article, published in the name of a joint-criticism group based at Peking and Tsinghua universities, launched a strong attack on the education reforms, stating:

Today, the strange theories of the educational field are trying to reverse cases on behalf of the revisionist education line and are denying [the policies of] the Cultural Revolution and changing the revolutionary line of Mao Zedong. Revisionism is still the most important danger at this moment. The struggle over the educational line is a part of the struggle going on in society between the two classes, the two paths and the two lines".⁵⁹

Deng Xiaoping was placed in a difficult position, trying to continue with the readjustment policies, while being criticized in the media. A joint commentary published in the *Renmin riabo*, the *Jiefangjun ribao* (*Liberation Army Daily*) and *Hong qi*, to mark the New Year applauded the successes of the Cultural Revolution and warned of the need to continue vigilance against capitalism. Less than a week after the publication of this editorial, Deng's most important political patron, Zhou Enlai, died on the morning of 8 January, 1976.

Deng delivered the eulogy for Zhou on 15 January, but this was the last time he was seen in public until July 1977. The death of Zhou, and the withdrawal of Mao's support left him vulnerable to the radical Left's attacks. Criticism of him increased, and he was named on critical wallposters that appeared in Peking University. Two editorials that appeared in the *Renmin ribao* 10 and 28 March appeared to be directly aimed at Deng, although they still did not name him:

⁵⁸ *Ibid*, pg.178.

⁵⁹ *Ibid*, pg.180.

While making socialist revolution, we still do not know where the bourgeoisie really is - it sits right in the Communist Party - the bourgeoisie are the power-holders within the Party who take the capitalist road!

This man does not understand Marxism-Leninism, he represents the capitalist class...He said he will "never reverse verdicts," yet this cannot be trusted. What does that mean, "Three directives as the link"? - class struggle is the link, everything else hinges on it! ⁶⁰

On 2 February it was announced that Hua Guofeng, not Deng Xiaoping, had been appointed acting-Premier, replacing Zhou Enlai. The radical Left would have hoped that with Deng Xiaoping sidelined their candidate, Zhang Chunqiao, might have been nominated. Instead the leadership, at the behest of Mao Zedong, adopted a figure who was largely unknown outside of China, but somebody who could be seen as both a compromise candidate and a proven administrator.

b). The Tian'anmen Incident

Starting on 29 March 1976 there were a series of demonstrations in Tian'anmen Square in Beijing of people wishing to remember the late-Zhou Enlai. These followed earlier demonstrations in memory of Zhou in Nanjing. As well as paying their respects, demonstrators also used this opportunity to attack figures of the Left, in particular Jiang Qing, and express support for Deng Xiaoping. There were a series of clashes with security forces, peaking on 5 April, the date of China's *Qingming* festival, when Chinese people traditionally went to clean and worship at the graves of their ancestors. On that day as many as 2 million people demonstrated in the Square. The protest later turned to violence when police and militia members clashed with the demonstrators. 38 people were arrested. Other incidents occurred in cities across China.

In the morning of 6 April a Politburo meeting, which, critically, was not

⁶⁰ *Renmin ribao* 10 and 28 March, quoted in Jürgen Domes, *The Government and Politics of the PRC*, pg.132.

attended by the key central figure Ye Jianying⁶¹, criticised the rioting of the previous day and labelled it a “counte-revolutionary” incident. Deng was blamed for instigating the protests. In the evening of the same day in a speech to a meeting at the Great Hall of the People Zhang Chunqiao said: “The Tian'anmen Incident is in reality China's Hungarian incident, those people who support Deng Xiaoping really want to use him as China's Nagy [Imre]”.⁶² In the evening of the 7 February, at the behest of Mao, who had now fully abandoned Deng Xiaoping, the Politburo announced that Hua Guofeng had been appointed as First Vice-Chairman of the Party and Premier, and that Deng had been expelled from all of his posts.

The purge of Deng Xiaoping strengthened the position of the radical Left by removing their leading opponent. They were able to use their influence over the central media to launch a campaign against Deng, accusing him of an “attempt to ‘whip up a Right deviationist wind of reversing correct verdicts.’”⁶³ However the stagnation in policy-making that characterized the period up to Mao's death suggests an intensifying power struggle within the Party and government organizations between the radical Left, and an emerging coalition of central “survivors” (including Ye Jianying), the new Premier Hua Guofeng and his supporters, and the veteran cadres.

Following Zhou Enlai's death, a series of calamitous events struck China. On July 28 1976 a powerful earthquake struck the city of Tangshan in Hebei Province, killing over a quarter of a million people. This event had been preceded by the death of Marshal Zhu De on July 6. Finally, events in 1976 came to a head with the death of Mao Zedong on 9 September 1976.

c). The Beijing 'Coup d'Etat'

Members of the Gang intensified their manoeuvres to succeed Mao shortly

⁶¹ Richard Baum, *Burying Mao Chinese Politics in the Age of Mao*, (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1994), pg.36.

⁶² Li Qichen, *Successfully Cross one thousand autumns*, pg.244.

⁶³ Richard Baum, *Burying Mao*, pg.31.

after he died. It seems that it was these actions which galvanized support against them, leading to their eventual arrest. The Gang of Four are reported to have tried to establish a 'Central Office' (*zhongyang gongting*) under the control of Wang Hongwen with the intention of establishing a new communications link between the centre and provincial leaders, circumventing the normal Party and government channels.⁶⁴ Elsewhere, Yao Wenyuan organized the Gang's supporters at Peking and Tsinghua universities to petition the Central Committee, urging them to appoint Jiang Qing as the new Party Chairman.⁶⁵

As early as the day after Mao died Ye Jianying is reported to have visited Hua Guofeng and warned him that he must take resolute action. Ye had already held talks with Nie Rongzhen, Wang Zhen, Chen Yun and Li Xiannian⁶⁶ and a powerful coalition of veteran and military cadres was forming in support of Hua Guofeng. Jürgen Domes argues that it was Hua Guofeng who "changed sides" and "joined the military-bureaucratic complex in a new coalition,"⁶⁷ however Ye Jianying's subsequent actions do not suggest that he was acting against Hua Guofeng, rather he was seeking to protect Hua's position from the radical Left.

On the evening of the 6 October 1976 Zhang Chunqiao, Wang Hongwen and Yao Wenyuan were arrested as they arrived for what they had thought would be a meeting of the Politburo in the leadership compound of Zhongnanhai. Jiang Qing was arrested separately at her residence. In Shanghai, the main stronghold of the Gang of Four, the Municipal Party had mobilized the Shanghai workers' militia, however troops of the PLA under the temporary

⁶⁴ Li Qichen, *Successfully cross one thousand autumns*, pg.288.

⁶⁵ Richard Baum, *Burying Mao*, pg.40.

⁶⁶ Fan Yingshuo's *Ye Jianying zai 1976*, (*Ye Jianying in 1976*) (Beijing: Zhonggong zhongyang dangxiao chubanshe, 1995) offers an interesting account of Ye's efforts to mobilize support to oust the Gang of Four and is used by Richard Baum in his analysis of these events. See also *Nie Rongzhen Zhuan*, (*Biography of Nie Rongzhen*), (Beijing: Dangdai Zhongguo chubanshe, 1994), pg.686 and Ting Wang, *Chairman Hua*, (London: C. Hurst, 1980), pp.114-115 for other accounts of Ye's activities.

⁶⁷ Jürgen Domes, *The Government and Politics of the PRC*, pg.137.

command of Guangzhou Military Region Commander Xu Shiyou, entered Shanghai on the 6 October and disarmed the militia. The Politburo met quickly on 7 October and appointed Hua Guofeng to the posts of Party Chairman and Chairman of the Central Military Commission;⁶⁸ these were in addition to the post of Premier which he already held. Owing to the continued uncertainty in the internal situation, these appointments were not announced publicly until 24 October.⁶⁹ Moving to consolidate their position, on 20 October the new leadership established a special investigation unit under Wang Dongxing to investigate the Gang's activities. At the same time the Propaganda Department of the Central Committee was re-established, strengthening the new leadership's hold over an area formerly dominated by the Gang's supporters.

6. Autumn-1976 to winter-1978

Hua Guofeng's position following his accession to power was delicate. As Richard Baum points out he had had to rely heavily on the coalition of veteran civilian and military cadres to oust the Gang of Four. Although figures like Ye Jianying continued to offer their full support to Hua, they were also more interested in rehabilitating Deng Xiaoping, recognizing his administrative skills, and in many cases, having worked with him in the past. Hua reportedly rebuked Ye and Li Xiannian for suggesting that Deng be returned to power.⁷⁰ His major dilemma was that having been so closely involved in the original decision to label the Tian'anmen incident "counter-revolutionary", he and supporters such as Beijing Mayor Wu De, could not easily reverse their decision. Speaking to members of the Party propaganda organs on 26 October, Hua called for the continued criticism of Deng Xiaoping.⁷¹

A second problem for Hua was his close association with Mao. Beginning in

⁶⁸ *A dictionary of major events of the CCP*, pg.465.

⁶⁹ Richard Baum, *Burying Mao*, pg.42.

⁷⁰ Richard Baum, *Burying Mao*, pg. 42.

⁷¹ *Ibid*, pg 43.

October 1976 a story appeared which claimed that in April that year, Mao had told Hua that "with you in charge, I am at ease!", (*Ni banshi, wo fang xin*)⁷² The story was used to boost Hua's standing and a series of paintings appeared which showed Hua at Mao's bedside, apparently at the point of receiving this "benediction".⁷³ Hua's association with Mao made it difficult for him to directly question Mao's legacy, and in particular the events of the Cultural Revolution (although he did revise a number of its policies). He was left defending a line that in the course of the next two years would become increasingly isolated.

In his speech of 26 October, Hua offered a justification of his policy of upholding Mao Zedong's general line, claiming that there should be "no criticism of whatever Chairman Mao instructed or approved".⁷⁴ Later, Hua's comments were developed in a joint-editorial published by the *Renmin ribao*, *Hong qi* and the *Jiefangjun ribao* on 7 February. The editorial stated:

[Our] Great Leader and Teacher Chairman Mao led our struggle for over half a century, [he led us] through ten major struggles over the Party's line. The history of this 50 years has repeatedly demonstrated that at whatever time, if we uphold Chairman Mao's revolutionary line, adhere to Chairman Mao's directives, then the revolution will be victorious; If, at whatever time, we leave Chairman Mao's revolutionary line, violate his directives, then the Revolution will fail, and [we] will suffer defeat.⁷⁵

Whatever policies Chairman Mao formulated we shall all resolutely defend, whatever instructions Chairman Mao gave we shall all steadfastly abide by!⁷⁶

This line, which came to be known as the 'Two Whatevers' (*liang ge fanshi*) was later used by Deng to attack Hua Guofeng, but in the period immediately following Mao's death Hua sought to use this approach to consolidate his

⁷² Jürgen Domes, *The Government and Politics of the PRC*, pg. 143.

⁷³ *Ibid*, pg. 143.

⁷⁴ Richard Baum, *Burying Mao*, pg. 43.

⁷⁵ Li Qichen, *Successfully Cross One Thousand Autumns*, pp.353-364.

⁷⁶ Jürgen Domes, *The Government and Politics of the PRC*, pg.145.

position by drawing on the charismatic appeal of Mao Zedong.

a). The Rehabilitation of Deng Xiaoping

Criticism of Deng Xiaoping had continued after the arrest of the Gang of Four. Speaking at a rally held in Tian'anmen Square on 23 October, 1976 Wu De had said "we shall continue to criticize Deng".⁷⁷ As I noted above, Hua had repeated this message three days later. Elsewhere, speaking at a National Propaganda Work Meeting Wang Dongxing is reported to have opposed a reassessment of the Tian'anmen incident and, in a speech to the third session of the 4th NPC on 30 November, 1976, Wu De said: "the opposition to the Gang of Four at the time of the Tian'anmen incident was wrong. At that time they were members of the central leadership and [the opposition] was aimed at splitting the Central Committee".⁷⁸ Wu went on "we must link criticism of the 'Gang of Four' with criticism of Deng".

Despite these statements of support for Hua's policy, the media slowly stopped calls for continuing the criticism of Deng Xiaoping. The last of these appeared in a radio broadcast in Hunan, Hua's own balliwick, in early January 1977.⁷⁹ On the anniversary of Zhou Enlai's death a number of posters appeared in Beijing criticising Chen Xilian and Wu De (both close supporters of Hua Guofeng) for following the Gang of Four in suppressing the Tian'anmen movement and calling for the rehabilitation of Deng.

On 1 February, 1977 two Politburo members, Xu Shiyou and Wei Guoqing apparently sent a letter to the Party Central Committee which called for the rehabilitation of Deng and other veteran cadres.⁸⁰ The two generals, who had close ties to Deng, reportedly wrote in their letter that Mao had made mistakes and that he had been wrong to brand everyone who disagreed with him as a

⁷⁷ *Ibid*, pg.145.

⁷⁸ Li Qichen, *Successfully Cross One Thousand Autumns*, pg.355.

⁷⁹ Jürgen Domes, *The Government and Politics of the PRC*, pg. 145.

⁸⁰ *Ibid*, pg.147.

'class enemy'.⁸¹

At a central work meeting held in Beijing from 10-22 March, Hua Guofeng was apparently criticized by a number of veteran cadres. Speaking at the meeting Chen Yun, whose own rehabilitation had been blocked by Hua, said:

I believe that the vast majority of the masses that went to Tian'anmen Square went to mourn Premier Zhou Enlai, we must investigate whether or not the Gang of Four played a part in the Tian'anmen incident, whether or not there was some ruse. Deng Xiaoping had no connection with the Tian'anmen incident. It is absolutely right and essential that for the needs of the Chinese Revolution and the Party's cause, Deng Xiaoping should be allowed to take part in the central leadership's work once more.⁸²

Hua reportedly resisted the calls for Deng's rehabilitation made at the Central Work Conference, allegedly saying "Criticising Deng and counter-attacking the rightist wind to reverse verdicts were [policies] laid down by Chairman Mao, criticism is necessary".⁸³ However, under the intense pressure from senior Party figures it appears that Hua Guofeng was forced to give way. Ye Jianying reportedly devised a compromise whereby Hua Guofeng would agree to a reassessment of the Tian'anmen Incident while Deng would write a letter to the Central Committee accepting Hua's leadership.⁸⁴

Ye's role is widely recognized in Deng's rehabilitation, but perhaps his motives were less than altruistic. Ye may have recognized the inevitability of Deng's return, and so moved to act sooner rather than later so as to garner favour with Deng.⁸⁵ Certainly, Ye Jianying was unwilling to accept a challenge to Hua Guofeng's position as Chairman, and continued to speak in support of Hua.

Deng was formally rehabilitated at the third session of the 10th Party

⁸¹ *Ibid*, pp.146-147.

⁸² Li Qichen, *Successfully Cross One Thousand Autumns*, pg.359.

⁸³ Li Jian, *Deng Xiaoping san-jin, san-chu Zhongnanhai*, (*Deng Xiaoping's three entrances and three exits from Zhongnanhai*), (Beijing: Zhongguo dadi chubanshe, 1993), pg.314.

⁸⁴ Richard Baum, *Burying Mao*, pg.45.

⁸⁵ Benjamin Yang, *Deng A Political Biography*, pg.203.

Congress, held 16-21 July 1977. He was reinstated as Vice-Chairman of the CCP, Vice-Premier, Vice-Chairman of the Central Military Commission and Chief of the General Staff Department of the PLA.⁸⁶ A few days later on 31 July Deng appeared together with Hua Guofeng and Ye Jianying at a reception marking the anniversary of the founding of the PLA. The appearance of these three leaders demonstrated the new power-balance at the top of the CCP.

b). The Eleventh Party Congress

The three leaders made the key speeches at the Eleventh Congress of the CCP, held from 12-18 August, 1977 in Beijing. Deng's speech at the closing ceremony of the Congress confirmed his rehabilitation, but the proceedings were dominated by Hua's political work report, which lasted for over seven hours. During his speech Hua proclaimed the end of the Cultural Revolution, although he commented that this kind of political revolution would continue in the future.

In his speech on the reform of the Party Constitution Ye Jianying affirmed the leadership of Hua Guofeng:

Comrade Hua Guofeng was chosen by Chairman Mao himself as his successor... Chairman Hua is worthy of being called Chairman Mao's good student and successor, the wise leader of our Party and people and the brilliant supreme commander of our army. Chairman Hua can certainly continue to carry forward our proletarian revolutionary cause pioneered by Chairman Mao and lead our Party, our army, and the people of all nationalities triumphantly into the twenty first century.⁸⁷

Ye also supported Mao's decision to launch the Cultural Revolution, saying it was a "vital weapon against capitalist restoration" and he too warned that similar movements may be needed in the future.⁸⁸

⁸⁶ *A Dictionary of Major Events of the CCP*, pg.470.

⁸⁷ Ye Jianying, "Speech on the Reform of the Party Constitution", in Jürgen Domes, *The Government and Politics of the PRC*, pg.149.

⁸⁸ Richard Baum, *Burying Mao*, pg.49.

In contrast to Hua and Ye, Deng's speech was extremely brief, lasting only eight minutes, however it contained a number of subtle rebukes of Hua and his idea of the "two-whatevers":

We must restore and give full play to the fine traditions and style of seeking truth from facts, the mass line, criticism and self-criticism ... which Mao Zedong established for us....⁸⁹

In suggesting that the Party's traditional work style needed to be "restored", Deng was going against statements by supporters of Hua Guofeng who said only that it needed to be upheld. In taking this line Deng was apparently supported by Chen Yun.⁹⁰ Furthermore, his revival of Mao's own statement that the Party should "seek truth from facts" offered a more pragmatic solution to solving China's current problems than Hua's "two-whatevers" and was clearly raised as a direct challenge to that policy.⁹¹

In the aftermath of the Eleventh Party Congress Hua Guofeng sought to bolster his image. A biography of Hua was published, billboards of Hua at Mao's bedside were put up, and songs and dances were commissioned in praise of the new Chairman.⁹² At the 5th NPC held from 26 February-5 March, 1978, Hua used his political work report to set out a new ten-year economic plan in which he "sought to fashion a reputation as a forward-thinking leader and economic strategist".⁹³ Between the years 1978 and 1985 Hua called for an annual growth rate of 4-5 percent in agriculture and over 10 percent in industry, more than double recent averages in some cases.⁹⁴ At the heart of his plan was the completion of some "120 new large-scale capital construction

⁸⁹ Deng Xiaoping, "Closing speech at the 11th Party Congress", in Li Qichen, *Successfully Cross One Thousand Autumns*, pg.372.

⁹⁰ Richard Baum, *Burying Mao*, pg.50.

⁹¹ Dorothy J. Solinger offers an interesting account of the use of language during the political maneuvering in China during this period. See "The Fifth National People's Congress and the Process of Policy Making: Reform, Readjustment, and the Opposition", in *Asian Survey*, Vol.XXII, No. 12, December 1982, pg.1241.

⁹² Richard Baum, *Burying Mao*, pg.51

⁹³ *Ibid*, pg.52.

⁹⁴ Immanuel C.Y. Hsu, *China Without Mao*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1983), pg.34.

projects". The intended investment in capital construction in the ten year period was expected to at least equal the amount invested in this area in the whole of the period 1949-1976.⁹⁵ In order to equip these and other projects, Hua abandoned the long-standing tradition of self-reliance and proposed to rely heavily on technological imports. These developments severely over-taxed China's financial and technical capabilities and led to widespread criticism.

c). Practice is the sole criterion of truth

Immediately following the Party Congress Deng Xiaoping intensified his criticism of Hua Guofeng. A theme which he repeatedly returned to, and which was used to challenge the 'two whatevers' formulation was the idea first enunciated by Mao, of 'Seeking Truth from Facts', (*shishi qiushi*). Deng called for a complete understanding of Maoist thinking, and the need to balance ideology and practice.

An article by the veteran Marshal Nie Rongzhen in support of Deng's line appeared in the *Renmin ribao* 5 September 1977:

If we want to uphold Marxism-Leninism, uphold Mao Zedong Thought, we must uphold the concept of seeking truth from facts. If we depart from the revolutionary style of seeking truth from facts then we will depart from Marxism-Leninism, Mao Zedong Thought and we will become idealists, separated from reality and our revolutionary work will fail. Therefore whether or not we uphold the revolutionary style of seeking truth from facts will become a basic criterion for distinguishing between real and false Marxist-Leninists and [upholders] of Mao Zedong Thought.⁹⁶

A further article by Chen Yun in support of the concept of 'seeking truth from facts' appeared in the *Renmin ribao* 28 September. Elsewhere, in a series of meetings held in the first half of 1978, Deng spoke at length on China's scientific and technological backwardness. He called for China not just to

⁹⁵ Dorothy Solinger, "The Fifth National People's Congress and the Process of Policy Making", pg.1246.

⁹⁶ Li Qichen, *Successfully Cross One Thousand Autumns*, pg.378-379.

import western technologies, but to study Western science and he called for China's scientists and technicians to be reclassified as "working people", so as to "give full play to... creative energy and initiative".⁹⁷

Differences within the leadership over rhetorical issues surfaced at a National Army Political Work Conference which was held in Beijing 27 April to 6 June, 1978. While the meeting was in session the *Guangming ribao* published an article which argued that all ideological guidelines always had to stand the test of whether they correspond to political, economic, and social realities.⁹⁸ As Roderick MacFarquhar notes, this "struck at the roots of Cultural Revolution doctrine... that Mao's writings and statements were eternal verities that should not be tampered with, whatever the circumstances".⁹⁹ Although the article was published anonymously, it is now known that it was edited under the guidance of Hu Yaobang, a close supporter of Deng's line.

On 29 May Hua Guofeng and Ye Jianying addressed delegates to the meeting. Both Hua and Ye avoided mentioning the phrase "practice is the sole criterion of truth", however in a speech to the meeting on 2 June Deng reiterated his call to seek truth from facts and launched a stinging attack on the "two-whatevers":

Some comrades... talk about Mao Zedong Thought every day, but often forget, abandon, or even oppose Comrade Mao's fundamental Marxist viewpoint and method of seeking truth from facts.... Some people even go further: They maintain that those who persist in seeking truth from facts... are guilty of a heinous crime. In essence, their view is that one need only parrot what was said by Marx, Lenin, and Comrade Mao Zedong - that it is enough to reproduce their words mechanically.... This issue... is no minor one.¹⁰⁰

Support for Deng's line grew throughout the summer and autumn of 1978,

⁹⁷ Richard Baum, *Burying Mao*, pg.57.

⁹⁸ Jürgen Domes, *The Government and Politics of the PRC*, pg.156.

⁹⁹ CHOC, Volume 15, pg 378.

¹⁰⁰ Deng Xiaoping, "Speech at the All-Army Conference on Political Work" (June 2, 1978), in *Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping, Volume 2*, pg.128, reproduced in Richard Baum, *Burying Mao*, pg. 58.

backed by figures such as Hu Qiaomu, who had been appointed President of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, and Hu Yaobang, who used his old links to the Communist Youth League to get their newspaper *Zhongguo qingnian* (*China Youth*) to publish a number of pro-Deng articles. Aside from this high-level support, it is also clear that Deng enjoyed considerable support amongst ordinary people.

Linked to criticism of Hua's regime was the continuing question of a reassessment of the Tian'anmen incident. Two of the staunchest supporters of Hua Guofeng, Wu De, Chairman of the Beijing Municipal Party Committee and Chen Xilian, Commander of the Beijing Military Region, had been closely involved in suppressing the demonstrations. In late-1978 Deng Xiaoping appears to have managed to rally a majority of the senior leadership to remove both Wu and Chen from their posts in Beijing. Speaking at a Central Work Conference which opened on 10 November, Chen Yun now affirmed that the Tian'anmen incident had been "revolutionary", he also criticized Wang Dongxing for being too close to the Gang of Four in the past.¹⁰¹ On 15 November Xinhua News Agency published a resolution passed at an enlarged meeting of the Beijing Municipal People's Congress Standing Committee which publically reversed the verdict on the "incident".¹⁰²

This reassessment led to an immediate public reaction. A number of wall posters appeared in Beijing criticizing Wu De. Deng appears to have given his tacit support to these demonstrations and the public security forces stopped interfering with those putting up these posters.¹⁰³ This marked the start of the so-called 'Democracy Wall' movement which developed over the next few months into criticism of Hua Guofeng and the "whateverists" and questions about Mao's role in the Cultural Revolution.¹⁰⁴

¹⁰¹ Richard Baum, *Burying Mao*, pg.62.

¹⁰² Jürgen Domes, *The Government and Politics of the PRC*, pg.158.

¹⁰³ *Ibid*, pg.159.

¹⁰⁴ Richard Baum, *Burying Mao*, pg.70.

d). The Third Plenum of the 11th Party Congress

Meeting in this highly charged atmosphere the leadership held the Central Work Conference in preparation for the third plenum. The meeting lasted a full month, from 11 November to 15 December and debated a wide range of policy issues. Under intense pressure, Hua Guofeng and his supporters were forced to concede to implementing a series of reforms, along the lines proposed by Deng Xiaoping, Chen Yun and other reformers. These policies were formally implemented at the Third Plenum of the 11th Central Committee which was held from 18-22 December. This plenum was clearly a significant victory for Deng Xiaoping, but both Chen Yun and Hu Yaobang were important in mobilizing support for Deng.¹⁰⁵ The plenum's communique, issued on 22 December endorsed Deng's formulation, stating "the plenum has highly evaluated the discussion of whether reality is the only norm of truth, which has given the Party a new, lively guideline".¹⁰⁶ The communique, in its evaluation of Mao Zedong, also began to question his legacy, and in particular the issue of the Cultural Revolution:

The great merits which comrade Mao Zedong has established in long years of revolutionary struggle cannot be extinguished. He was indeed a great Marxist....However, to expect a revolutionary leader to be without faults and mistakes would not be genuinely Marxist.

The Plenum also posthumously rehabilitated Peng Dehuai, who had been purged in 1959 following his criticism of the policies of the Great Leap Forward.

Personnel changes increased support for Deng in both the Central Committee and on the Politburo. Chen Yun was appointed to the Standing Committee of the Politburo, and Deng Yingchao (Zhou Enlai's widow), Hu Yaobang and Wang Zhen were appointed to the Politburo. Hu Yaobang was also named as the new head of the CCP's Propaganda Department, replacing

¹⁰⁵ *Ibid*, pg.64.

¹⁰⁶ Jürgen Domes, *The Government and Politics of the PRC*, pg.162.

Zhang Pinghua, a close supporter of Hua Guofeng. Baum suggests that Deng stopped short of ousting Hua at the plenum in order to win support for his new policies from veterans like Ye Jianying and Li Xiannian, who were not ready to see a wholesale break from the Maoist past.¹⁰⁷ Roderick MacFarquhar suggests that it was only after the new promotions to the Central Committee had been completed that Deng was in the ascendancy, and so any purge would have to wait.¹⁰⁸ Given the sweeping nature of many of the new policies, it certainly seems that Deng was in the ascendancy, however, even with this degree of support, to oust the incumbent Party Chairman would not have been simple, and it seems that Deng may just have been biding his time.

The plenum introduced wide-ranging policy changes. Most significantly, the communique announced that the Party was shifting the focus of its work from class struggle to “socialist modernization”. The plenum announced the decentralization of much of the economic decision-making powers to provincial- and local-levels and introduced “responsibility systems, [and] performance-based rewards and punishments.”¹⁰⁹ As Roderick MacFarquhar notes, the plenum marked a significant shift away from the pro-collectivization policy advocated by Hua,¹¹⁰ but it also represented a wider end to revolutionary politics in the PRC.

7. Conclusion

The above description of political developments in the PRC highlights how coalitions of political actors competed over economic and social policy during this period and shows the importance of the utopian and bureaucratic themes inherent in Mao’s thinking. The dichotomy between these two strands created a space in which political actors were able to express a wide variety of views.

¹⁰⁷ Richard Baum, *Burying Mao*, pg.64.

¹⁰⁸ CHOC, Volume 15, pg.380

¹⁰⁹ Richard Baum, *op cit*, pg.64.

¹¹⁰ CHOC, Volume 15, pg.381.

Mao's apparent support for both the economic reform program of moderates like Zhou and Deng and the more ideologically oriented position of the radical Left only exacerbated policy conflict as both sides were able to claim his support. Even after Mao's death these twin themes continued to dominate elite politics in China.

The intensity of the political conflict between these coalitions also served to hide the emergence of alternative policy positions. It is noticeable, for instance, that many writers begin a study of post-Mao agricultural policy in 1978, ignoring the fact that by the end of 1975 Hua Guofeng had a clearly enunciated, and radically different, agricultural policy which dominated this issue area for the next three years.¹¹¹ The following chapters will undertake a detailed examination of this policy conflict in three issue areas: Higher education, agriculture, and foreign policy.

¹¹¹ Even Richard Baum's otherwise excellent book, *Burying Mao* is silent on this issue. Nicholas Lardy also begins his review of "post-Mao" agricultural reforms in 1978 in "RECASTING OF THE ECONOMIC SYSTEM: Structural Reform of Agriculture and Industry", in Michael Ying-Mao Kau and Susan H. Marsh (eds.), *China in the Era of Deng Xiaoping A Decade of Reform* (Armonk, New York: M. E. Sharpe Inc, 1993), pg.103.

Chapter Three: Higher Education

1. Introduction

More than any other sector education, and in particular higher education, suffered as a result of the mobilization phase of the Cultural Revolution. Universities and colleges across China closed as many students joined rival Red Guard units and teachers and other staff were often subject to brutal attacks and ritual humiliation. In the wake of the mobilizational phase, higher education policy became the focus of an intense debate within the senior leadership.

This focus on higher education was clearly a result of its inherently political nature. Education was directly related to training successors and imparting the values and lessons of the revolutionary generation. In the early stages of the Cultural Revolution Mao had expressed concern about how this successor generation was being educated and raised the fear that higher education (along with the "cultural" realm in general) continued to be dominated by bourgeois academics. Mao saw the Cultural Revolution itself as a means of regenerating and re-invigorating the Party through participation in the Cultural Revolution. Thus educational issues lay at the heart of the burgeoning movement.

The debate over the direction of higher education reflected the wider political issue of how far ideological issues should influence economic and social policy. The views of the various coalitions on this issue are clear from the debates over access to education, quality of education, and the extent to which students should be expected to participate in manual labour. Concerns that China's universities should train enough qualified engineers or scientists to support economic development often clashed with the ideal of wider access for workers and peasants. In education, this debate had been summarized in the

phrase, "Red versus expert" and the extent to which each element should be emphasized. The period from 1969 to 1978 was characterized by a constantly shifting content of just what this phrase meant.

a. The significance of a study of higher education

In terms of policy making, higher education contrasted with both agricultural and foreign policy in the extent to which it was allowed to become radicalized. The radical Left's influence over higher education during the mobilizational phase of the Cultural Revolution has been widely commented upon. This study will show that they retained this influence all the way through to their ouster in 1976, despite a number of reform initiatives from senior moderate figures like Zhou Enlai and Deng Xiaoping in the early 1970s.

Mao's support for the radical Left was clearly important for the radicals' continued domination of educational policy. After the mobilizational phase of the Cultural Revolution, Mao continued to be concerned with ideological issues and this found expression in his views on higher education policy. Higher education was one area where Mao did see the need for policy to be led by ideological concerns to a far greater extent than he did in either agricultural or foreign policy.

Higher education is significant as the only major policy area where major decision-making bodies were controlled by the radical Left throughout the Cultural Revolution period. Higher education had suffered considerably during the mobilizational phase of the Cultural Revolution and had been the scene of intense activity by the radical Left. Supporters of the Left had gained control of a number of key institutions within the government that controlled higher education policy, in particular the State Science and Education Group (SEG), which effectively replaced the Ministry of Education as the locus of decision-making in the period 1969-1975.

The radical Left had also gained control of a number of leading universities,

most notably Tsinghua and Peking universities, as well as universities in their bailiwick of Shanghai, such as Fudan. Together with their control of the SEG, this presence gave the radical Left access to the policy debate on higher education in a way that they failed to achieve in any other field (except perhaps propaganda work) and allowed them to develop and publicize prominent models.

Despite this apparent influence, this study highlights the apparent weakness of the radical Left in the field of policy implementation, even in an area in which they seemingly dominated the propaganda debate. Zhou Enlai's control over the State Council and the authority of senior figures like Deng Xiaoping are significant as it gave them the ability to resist many of the more radical policy initiatives of the Left and to push their own policies which were more concerned with issues of quality and training than with increased access and political correctness. The apparent strength of both sides led to periods of stalemate, characterized by limited or stagnated reform: The contrasting examples of the introduction of a limited entrance exam for would-be university students and the radical Left's attempts to overturn it are instructive.

Finally, this study of higher education shows the apparent weakness of Hua Guofeng in this field. With no experience of working on higher education, Hua Guofeng appears to have been unable to resist the reform initiatives of moderates under the leadership of Deng Xiaoping in the period 1977-1978. Hua's weakness in this area and in foreign policy was in stark contrast to agriculture where he launched a major policy programme and dominated the decision-making process at the centre throughout 1977 and early-1978.

b. Policy issues in the debate over higher education

Although there are a number of important issues that made up the debate over higher education policy this chapter will focus on three key themes: Changes in the aims of education; selection procedures for universities; and

issues relating to the curriculum. These lay at the heart of the competing lines in higher education during this period.

Education received a high priority after the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) assumed national power in October 1949 and was initially charged with fulfilling two main aims. Faced with administering a vastly expanded territory, the CCP had an acute personnel shortage, and graduates from schools, colleges and universities were expected to fill the gap as quickly as possible. In addition, schools and universities were expected to play an integral role in transforming the ideological outlook of the population and ensuring their political loyalty.¹

In the early 1950s, under the influence of the Soviet Union, Chinese universities were reorganized following the Soviet model. The rationale behind this restructuring was simple, to transform higher education in China so that it could support "the economic and social goals of the First Five-Year Plan" and to train the personnel necessary to achieve these goals.² To meet these practical aims, curricula in Chinese universities underwent wholesale reform, adopting the Soviet model of focusing on training students in specific specialities which accorded with the needs of the economic plan.

During the Great Leap Forward and the period leading up to the Cultural Revolution this wholesale adoption of the Soviet model came in for criticism from Mao and members of the radical Left. Mao expressed concerns about the need for a greater emphasis on political education, shortening courses, adapting teaching material to better reflect China's conditions and combining study with labour. Above all else, Mao became concerned that higher education was under the influence of 'bourgeois academics' and that the

¹ A number of authors have recognized these two functions. See, for example, Theodore Hsi-en Chen, *Chinese Education Since 1949*, (New York: Pergamon Press, 1981), pg.9, Stuart E. Fraser (ed.), *Education and Communism in China An anthology of commentary and documents* (London: Pall Mall Press, 1971), pg.9, and R.F. Price, *Education in Communist China* (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1970), pg.28.

² Ruth Hayhoe, *CHINA'S UNIVERSITIES 1895-1995 A century of cultural conflict* (New York: Garland Publishing, Inc., 1996), pg.78.

reforms introduced in higher education after 1949 had led to the exclusion of China's "revolutionary" classes, the workers, peasants and soldiers, from leading universities and colleges .

The reforms introduced by Mao and the radical Left during the mobilizational phase of the Cultural Revolution sought to "re-radicalize" higher education policy by breaking the monopoly of the bourgeoisie by revolutionizing the leadership of China's universities and changing enrollment procedures to benefit workers, peasants and soldiers. The Cultural Revolution saw renewed emphasis on political issues as a fundamental aim of higher education, however the radical Left remained aware of its role in training scientists and technicians to take part in China's economic reforms. This is highlighted in the debate over academic quality that took place in 1970-71, and the radical Left's efforts to demonstrate the quality of students enrolled under the new procedures.

In the post-Mao era, Hua Guofeng sought to balance the twin aims of revolutionizing higher education and improving access with the need to support economic reform, however, as China placed renewed emphasis on the 'Four Modernizations' and opening to the outside world, Deng Xiaoping and other moderates placed far more emphasis on the issues of academic knowledge and learning. 1977-78 saw a return to the policies of the pre-Cultural Revolution period which once again focused on training students to support "the economic and social goals" of economic reform.

c. Higher education in the PRC, 1966-1969.

As part of the wider "cultural" sphere, education became a major focus for criticism from the radical Left during the Cultural Revolution. The "Decision of the Chinese Communist Party Concerning the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution" (the "16-Points"), adopted by the Central Committee 9 August,

1966, explicitly targetted education for radical reform.³ Institutions of higher education played a leading role in the opening stages of the Cultural Revolution and the suffering of many academics during this period and the destruction of educational facilities has been well documented both by outside observers and those actually involved in the conflict.⁴

The "Decision on Enrollment in Higher Educational Institutions" of 13 June, 1966 had envisaged universities and colleges closing for a period of six months while students took part in Cultural Revolution activities, however, as Theodore Hsi-en Chen noted, "it was far easier to close the schools down than to reopen them".⁵ Students from China's universities took advantage of free travel on China's railways to spread their message of revolution across the country, or simply to engage in sightseeing or visit their families. In order to speed up the return of the students, Mao issued a new directive on March 7, 1967, which called on the military to help with the re-opening of the schools.⁶ The military presence in China's universities after Mao's directive was issued was instrumental in allowing classes to resume, although often they had to forcibly ensure calm on the campuses.

Workers and peasants were also given a direct role in the administration of universities and colleges in an attempt to ensure proletarian leadership over the institutions of higher education and prevent a return to what had been seen as the domination by "bourgeois" (professional) academics, at the expense of members of the proletariat. In a directive issued on 30 August, 1968, Mao

³ "Decision of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party Concerning the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution", in the *Peking Review*, August 12, 1966, in Theodore Hsi-en Chen *The Maoist Educational Revolution* (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1974), Appendix B.

⁴ See, for example, Anne Thurston, *Enemies of the People: The ordeal of intellectuals in China's Great Proletarian Revolution*, (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1988), Nien Cheng, *Life and Death in Shanghai* (New York: Grove Press, 1987), and William Hinton, *Hundred Day War The Cultural Revolution at Tsinghua University*, (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1972).

⁵ Theodore Hsi-en Chen, *Chinese Education Since 1949*, pg.90.

⁶ "Mao's 'March 7 Directive' Concerning the Great Strategic Plan for the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution", translated in the *Peking Review*, March 15, 1968, reprinted in Chen, *The Maoist Educational Revolution*, Appendix D.

stated:

In carrying out the proletarian revolution in education it is essential to have working-class leadership; it is essential for the masses of workers to take part and, in co-operation with the Liberation Army fighters, bring about a revolutionary 'three-in-one' combination, together with the activists among the students, teachers and workers in the schools who are determined to carry the proletarian revolution through to the end.⁷

In line with Mao's directive, millions of workers and peasants were drafted in to take part in what were officially known as Mao Zedong Thought Propaganda Teams. Together with any military personnel based in the universities, these teams played a leading role in the re-opening and administration of China's universities and colleges.

In the following section I will examine the radical assessment of higher education between 1969 and 1971, focusing in particular on some of the model institutions they developed in their attempt to influence higher education policy-making.

2. The radical assessment of higher education in China: 1969-1971

The 9th National Congress of the CCP marked the end of the mobilization phase of the Cultural Revolution and the end of the worst of the violence directed towards China's intellectuals. In his political report to the Congress, Lin Biao summarized this trend somewhat crudely when, discussing the Party's policy towards intellectuals and cadres, he said "[We] should expand the amount of education, and reduce the amount of hitting" (*yao kuoda jiaoyu mian, suoxiao daji mian*). Lin stated that when dealing with intellectuals and cadres, the Party should fully implement the more moderate policy of "learning

⁷ "Mao's Directive on Working Class Leadership" translated in the *Peking Review*, August 30, 1968, reproduced in Chen, *The Maoist Educational Revolution*, Appendix E.

from past mistakes to avoid future ones, and curing the sickness to save the patient" (*chengqian bihou, zhibing jiuren*). He also talked at length on the significance of Mao Zedong's 1957 speech "On the Correct Handling of Contradictions Among the People", which Mao had used to try and launch the '100 Flowers' movement. Lin repeated Mao's earlier message that it was important to distinguish between the two kinds of contradictions, antagonistic, and non-antagonistic, when handling the cases of intellectuals and cadres and treat the latter with leniency.⁸

However, while intellectuals found themselves subject to less direct violence, the emerging Party line emphasized the need for intellectuals to undergo "re-education" (*zai jiaoyu*).⁹ This work was to be led by the military and the Mao Zedong Thought Propaganda Teams, and the newly established 'Three-in-one' revolutionary committees. While offering intellectuals an opportunity to reform, literally a "way out" (*chulu*), in practice re-education often meant undergoing lengthy sessions of study and self-criticism and long periods in May 7th cadres schools located across the countryside of China.

a. The new leadership in China's institutions of higher education

As described above, millions of workers, peasants and soldiers had entered China's schools at all levels during 1968 and 1969 as part of the Mao Zedong Thought Propaganda Teams. The activities of these teams received prominent media coverage, and together with the military personnel also based in China's universities and the 'revolutionary' students and teachers, they exercised a dominant influence over China's institutions of higher education during the period 1969-71, indeed, speaking in August 1968, Mao Zedong had envisaged a permanent role for the teams:

⁸ Lin Biao, "Report at the 9th National Congress of the CCP", in the *Renmin Ribao*, 28 April, 1969, pg.3.

⁹ Only a month after the 9th National Congress closed, the *Renmin Ribao* carried a front page article, "Jiji reqing de dui zhishi fenzi jinxing zai jiaoyu" (Vigourously and enthusiastically carry out the re-education of intellectuals), in the *Renmin Ribao*, 29 May, 1969, pg.1.

The workers' propaganda teams should stay permanently in the schools and take part in fulfilling all the tasks of struggle-criticism-transformation in the schools, and they will always lead the schools.¹⁰

In a highly publicized display of support for the activities of the teams, Mao donated a gift of mangoes he had received from the visiting Pakistani Foreign Minister, Arshad Husain to the Work Team stationed at Tsinghua University.¹¹

While the majority of the members of the teams were poorly educated and had been chosen mainly for their loyalty to Mao Zedong and the Party centre, some of the team members were senior Party and military cadres. Many of these figures assumed leading roles in the administration of the various universities and colleges as the regular Party committees were re-established in schools across China after the 9th Party Congress. Beneficiaries of the Cultural Revolution in higher education, these figures were natural allies to the radicals within the Party who had promoted that line.

Two figures in particular, Chi Qun and Xie Jingyi, both members of the propaganda team that entered Tsinghua University in 1968, were strong supporters of the radical Left and close to Jiang Qing and Zhang Chunqiao. They were subsequently purged following the Gang's arrest in October 1976. It is worth looking at their background's as they were probably typical of many of the senior members of the propaganda teams (although without comprehensive biographical material this is difficult to confirm). The propaganda team that entered Tsinghua University was drawn largely from members of the elite 8341 central bodyguard unit of the People's Liberation Army (PLA), highlighting the concern the leadership felt with regards to Tsinghua's successful reopening. At that time Chi Qun was the Head of the Propaganda Section of this unit, a significant post in such a prestigious unit.

¹⁰ "Mao's Directive on Working Class Leadership" translated in the *Peking Review*, August 30, 1968, in Theodore Hsi-en Chen, *The Maoist Educational Revolution*, Appendix E.

¹¹ Edward E. Rice, *Mao's Way*, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1974), pg.455.

Xie Jingyi also worked in Unit 8341, "handling confidential material".¹² Chi Qun later went on to serve as Secretary of the Party Committee of Tsinghua University and dominated the political scene at Tsinghua in the first half of the 1970s. He was also a leading figure in the Central Science and Education group formed in 1970 to lead work in education. Xie Jingyi served as Deputy-Director of the Revolutionary Committee of Tsinghua University and later became First Secretary of the Beijing Communist Youth League. Chi Qun in particular was active in support of the Gang of Four and played a leading role in the National Educational Work Conference of 1971 which I discuss below and the launch of the 'Campaign to Criticize Confucius and Lin Biao' in 1973. Both Chi Qun and Xie Jingyi were key figures in the "Peking and Tsinghua Universities' 'Criticism Group'", a mouthpiece for the policies of the Gang of Four, which often published under the name "*Liang Xiao*", a homonym for "two schools", a reference to the two universities from which most of its members were drawn.

As the violence in China's universities and colleges subsided, it was under the guidance of figures such as Chi Qun and Xie Jingyi that the movement to "re-educate" the intellectuals took place. The presence of figures like Chi and Xie in some (but not all) of China's universities, and their role on central organs like the Science and Education Group was significant in giving the radical Left access to, and influence over, the policy debate on higher education.

b. The "re-education" of intellectuals

Lin Biao, in his report to the 9th Congress, had emphasized the need for the Party to conduct re-education amongst intellectuals and that where-ever possible they should be offered a "way out" (*chulu*). The Party's line had emerged in a series of directives and newspaper articles published towards the

¹² Wen Lequn and Hao Ruiting (ed.), '*Wenhua Dageming' zhong de mingren zhi sheng* (*The Rise of Famous People during the 'Great Cultural Revolution'*), (Beijing: Zhongyang minzu xueyuan chubanshe, 1993), pg. 338.

end of 1968.

A joint commentary by the *Renmin ribao* and *Hong qi* on 21 September, 1968 set out the main ideas behind the policy of "re-education":

The great leader Chairman Mao teaches us that the remolding of the intellectuals remains a question of major significance throughout the course of the socialist revolution and socialist construction. After seizing political power, the proletariat should remold the intellectuals in accordance with its own outlook and build up an army of proletarian intellectuals that serves it. This is essential for consolidating and developing the dictatorship of the proletariat and preventing the restoration of capitalism; it is essential for establishing the proletariat in the position of absolute domination in all spheres of ideology and culture.

The commentary expressed confidence in the intellectuals willingness to undergo "remoulding", and emphasized the need to adopt more moderate tactics during the re-education process.¹³

However, on 29 January 1969, only four months after this commentary was published, the CCP Central Committee approved a report by the propaganda team stationed at Tsinghua University on work to re-educate intellectuals at that institution which appeared to adopt a more confrontational tone in its assessment of the failings of the intellectuals and in the numbers who had 'taken the capitalist road'. The report stated that before the Cultural Revolution the large majority of teachers at Tsinghua University had a "bourgeois world outlook". It went on to say that students whose parents had been labelled as "traitors", "spies", or those who "took the capitalist road" had been required to go through a process of differentiating themselves from their families, eliminating the influence of Liu Shaoqi from their own actions, and standing on the side of Mao Zedong's revolutionary line, (*hua-qing-zhan*).¹⁴

¹³ "On the Reeducation of Intellectuals", *Hong Qi*, No 3, 1968 (September 10, 1968) in Theodore Hsi-en Chen, *The Maoist Educational Revolution*, Appendix A.

¹⁴ *Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Jiaoyu Dashiji, 1949-1982*, (Chronicle of Major Events in Education in the People's Republic of China, 1949-82), (Beijing: Jiaoyu kexue chubanshe 1983), pg.425. (Hereafter, *Chronicle of Major Events in Education*).

The tougher line towards assessing the intellectuals' mistakes in the Tsinghua report was an early indication of the position of radicals within the Party and of their supporters such as Chi Qun who as head of the propaganda team at Tsinghua University would have played a leading role in drafting this report. It also appears to presage his role in the National Education Conference of 1971 and in the drawing-up of what became known as the '2-estimates' which were adopted at the 1971 conference and which echoed some of the language of this report.

The most visible manifestation of the campaign to re-educate intellectuals was the mass departure of 1,258 cadres and intellectuals from the Ministry of Education and its associated organs to a May 7th Cadre school located in Fengyang County, Anhui Province. Only a handful of military personnel were left behind to guard the Ministry's buildings and property. In Anhui the intellectuals were expected to "temper [themselves] through labour and continue [the movement] to struggle, criticize and transform".¹⁵ They were led in this work by the workers' propaganda team stationed in the Ministry of Education.¹⁶

While intellectuals and administrators in China's universities and colleges were no longer subject to indiscriminate violence, the dispatch of cadres and intellectuals from the Ministry of Education symbolized the continuing persecution of higher education personnel in China and the marked lack of trust shown towards these figures. It also marked the effective disbandment of the Ministry, which had ceased to function during the Cultural Revolution. Without a national administrative and policy-making body there was a lack of co-ordination over higher education policy in the period following the end of the mobilization phase of the Cultural Revolution and the years 1968-1971 were marked by a series of articles published under the auspices of members of the

¹⁵ *Ibid*, pg.428.

¹⁶ *Ibid*, pg.428.

radical Left, which attempted to popularize the experiences of a number of model institutions of higher education in a bid to promote their own line in higher education. In the following section I will look in more detail at some of these models, and how members of the radical Left took the lead in promoting them.

c. Radical models for institutions of higher education

While the radical Left promoted the experiences of a number of different institutions of higher education as worthy of emulation, these various models tended to be placed into one of three categories: Colleges of science and engineering (*li-ke-gong daxue*); arts and humanities universities (*wenke daxue*); and agricultural colleges (*nongye xueyuan*). In describing the experiences of these model institutions the various articles attempted to set out simple policy guidelines for each type of university or college, in science and engineering it included “selecting students from among the workers”, in the arts and humanities it was to “treat the whole of society as one’s factory”. The Left used these articles to repudiate the old higher education policy and promote their own educational line by highlighting the success of the changes popularized by these institutions. With strong support from the official media, the radical Left were able to dominate policy discussion. The example of these models were highly influential, and their example was a significant factor in the regulations adopted outlining enrollment procedures, curriculum content and administration in the universities once they reopened in 1970-71.

i. Science and engineering.

Many of the radical Left’s initiatives were based on often brief statements or directives from Mao Zedong. This was certainly the case with regards to science and engineering colleges. In a new directive issued on 21 July, 1968, Mao had said:

It is still necessary to have universities; here I refer mainly to colleges of science and engineering. However, it is essential to shorten the length of schooling, revolutionize education, put proletarian politics in command and **take the road of the Shanghai Machine Tools Plant in training technicians from among the workers.** (My emphasis). Students could be selected from among workers and peasants with practical experience, and they should return to production after a few years' study.¹⁷

Four days after Mao's comments the *Renmin Ribao* published an investigation report "The Way to Train Engineering and Technical Personnel as Viewed from the Shanghai Machine Tool Plant". The report outlined the experiences of the factory in training its own workers as advanced technicians and designers, and contrasted the university graduates the factory employed unfavourably against these new "revolutionary technicians". The "bookish" knowledge of the university graduates was said to be ill-suited to the practical conditions found in the factory and these technicians apparently made little contribution to the effective running of the factory when compared to the technicians promoted from the ranks of the workers. The latter were better able to understand the practical requirements of their colleagues, and the limitations that the scant resources available to the factory posed on technical design and development within the factory.

By highlighting the inadequacies of the graduate students, the report sought to underline the perceived deficiencies in higher education policy before the Cultural Revolution. It went on to suggest four proposals for the "revolution in education" based on its own experiences:

1. Schools must educate "workers with socialist consciousness and culture." This would prevent a recurrence of the situation before the Cultural Revolution when schools were said to train "'intellectual aristocrats' who were alienated from proletarian politics, the broad masses of workers and peasants, and

¹⁷ "Chairman Mao Tse-tung's Latest Directive", translated in the *Peking Review*, 2 August, 1968, in Theodore Hsi-en Chen, *The Maoist Educational Revolution*, Appendix F.

production work.

2. The combination of "school education" with "productive labour". As well as reforming intellectuals' "world outlook", engaging in productive labour would overcome the problem that was felt to exist under the old education system where theory was separated from practice. The report claimed that "only by doing practical work can one master theory quickly and thoroughly, and apply it creatively".

3. The report also recommended that workers from the factory should be selected to attend university. The report cited practical, as well as political reasons for adopting this policy. Although workers were said to "have a better political background", the report also argued that having already engaged in productive labour, after graduation the student would be able to "work independently", whereas a graduate of university "generally will be able to work independently only after two or three years of internship". (This was a somewhat specious argument as under the new regulations, graduates would still have to undergo a period of internship, only it would be before graduation, not after).

4. Finally, the report suggested organizing technicians at the factory who had attended college or university before 1949, or when universities were subject to "revisionist educational policy" to undergo re-education to enable them to adopt the right world outlook.¹⁸

By drawing students from the ranks of the workers and placing the education of their technicians in the hands of the factory staff, the school had broken what was perceived as a monopoly over higher education controlled by the 'bourgeois' (professional) academics and their political backers that had hindered workers, peasants and soldiers from entering university and made the

¹⁸ "The Way to Train Engineering and Technical Personnel as Viewed from the Shanghai Machine-Tool Plant", in the *Renmin Ribao*, 22 July, 1968, reprinted in Peter J. Seybolt, *Revolutionary Education in China*, (White Plains, New York: International Arts and Sciences Press, Inc., 1973) pg.250.

education on offer at these institutions irrelevant to their practical needs. In addition, by placing the school in the factory, they fulfilled the concept of combining theory with practice.

On 29 March, 1969, the *Renmin Ribao* carried an article written by the Workers' Propaganda Team stationed at Tsinghua University under the leadership of Chi Qun. The article "How Should [We] Manage a Socialist University?" (*Shehuizhuyi daxue yingdang ruhe ban?*) marked the start of a special column of the same name which ran intermittently for the next five years. That the first article was written by such a prominent supporter of the radical Left shows that it was launched under their auspices and the column acted as a mouthpiece for the radical Left and provides more detailed information on their higher educational policies. The article "How Should [We] Manage a Socialist University?" discussed the issue of working class leadership in China's schools and the work of the propaganda team since it entered Tsinghua University in July 1968:

In this proletarian educational revolution, the working class must firmly grasp leadership authority over the educational revolution and transform the field of education that has long been under the control of the bourgeoisie.

At the moment we are acting in accordance with Chairman Mao's great instruction to "follow the path of the Shanghai Machine Tool Factory and train technicians from the ranks of the workers" and organizing revolutionary teachers and students to go right into factories and the countryside and be subject to the workers', peasants', and military's "re-education".¹⁹

The Shanghai Machine Tools Factory was not the only model promoted by the radical Left during this period. Starting in late-1967, the experiences of Tongji University in Shanghai were discussed in the Chinese media. A number of departments of Tongji University had combined with a construction unit in

¹⁹ "Shehuizhuyi daxue yingdang ruhe ban?" (How should [we] manage socialist universities?) in the *Renmin Ribao*, 29 March, 1969, pg 1.

Shanghai to form the "May 7th Commune" (named after Mao's May 7th directive of 1966 which had urged students "to learn other things" and study "industrial work, farming and military affairs"). An article in the *Peking Review* claimed that the formation of the May 7th Commune would form "an integrated whole having [the] three-fold function of tuition, designing and building. This will change the present phenomenon of education being divorced from production".²⁰ A second article from 17 May, 1968 claimed:

In accordance with Chairman Mao's teaching to "learn warfare through warfare," Tongji's revolutionary teachers and students, in addition to necessary classroom studies, also take part in designing and building together with the workers and designers, learning as they work... this has fundamentally changed the previous state of affairs when bourgeois intellectuals monopolized the teaching platform.²¹

As classes resumed in 1970-71, Tsinghua University would also be promoted as a model science and engineering institution.

The culmination of the radical Left's activities to promote these models during 1969-71 was the publication of the article "Strive to Build Socialist Universities of Science and Engineering", written by the Qinghua Propaganda Team under Chi Qun. While this article was still in the process of being drafted, members of the radical Left convened the Discussion Meeting on the Education Revolution in Science and Engineering Universities in Shanghai on 2 June, 1971. The meeting discussed a draft of the Tsinghua article and the experiences of a number of universities of science and engineering in Shanghai. A summary of the discussion meeting and the final article were published in *Hong Qi*, issue 8, 1970 and together these two documents represent the clearest description of the Left's policy toward these types of universities.

²⁰ "Some Tentative Programmes for Revolutionizing Education", translated in *Peking Review*, November 7, 1967, in Theodore Hsi-en Chen, *op cit*, Appendix G.

²¹ "Tongji University's Programme for Revolutionizing Education: Six Month's Practice", translated in the *Peking Review*, May 17, 1968, in *ibid*, Appendix G.

"Strive to Build Socialist Universities of Science and Engineering" set out a number of policies which these universities were expected to adopt. These expanded on many of the points of the articles already described above. I outline the key suggestions of the article below under the five original sub-headings:

1. "The Working Class, Through Struggle, Must Maintain Firm Leadership Over the Revolution in Education". Working class leadership would ensure the complete eradication of the influence of the bourgeoisie in China's universities and colleges, and would guarantee the success of the education revolution. The article did note that working class leadership should not "mean the monopolization of everything or the use of crude methods to overwhelm everything". The Workers' Propaganda Teams were expected to cooperate with, and develop the initiative of, all 'revolutionary' teachers and students.

2. "While Making Use of the Original Teaching Staff, Transform it; Form a Three-in-One Teacher Corps". Establishing a new corps of teachers which was made up of workers, peasants, soldiers, the new "revolutionary technicians" and "members of the original teaching staff" was seen as the most important policy in carrying out the education revolution, and in "putting a complete end to the domination of our schools by the bourgeoisie and the intellectuals". Workers and peasants were to be recruited as teachers in universities. Their participation so far was said to have "advanced working class leadership in schools, effectively assured the proper political orientation of teaching, and promoted the remolding of intellectuals and the transformation of education". Former members of staff were to be employed, once they had undergone re-education. It was recognized that much of the professional knowledge of this group continued to be vital for China's economic success.

3. "Establish a New Three-in-One System Combing Teaching, Scientific Research, and Production". Higher education policy was expected to

implement the line that "education must serve proletarian politics and be combined with productive labour". Education policy before the Cultural Revolution had been criticized for being isolated from the practical needs of China's factories and communes. Under the new system, education, research and production were to be closely integrated, with factories running schools, and schools running factories, bringing workers and students together and ensuring students take part in manual labour. Under the new system, education and research would directly cater to the needs of industrial production.

4. "In Training Worker, Peasant, and Soldier Students It Is Imperative to Maintain Class Struggle as the Principal Part of the Curriculum and to Maintain the Unity of Theory and Practice". The residual influence of the bourgeoisie in China's universities and colleges was felt to be strong, and new students drawn largely from the workers and peasants and enrolling in 1970 and 1971 were still to be subject to continued political education to ensure the success of the education revolution. The article warned against the viewpoints of having been "born red" and having "entered school to learn an occupation and that they would patch up their politics after they returned home."

5. "Destroy Slavish Comprador Philosophy and the Doctrine of Trailing Behind at a Snail's Pace; Complete New, Proletarian Teaching Materials". Original science and engineering textbooks were thought to reflect the worldview of the bourgeoisie. Consequently it was necessary to draw up new teaching materials. Material was thought to be overly-complicated, with numerous superfluous or duplicated material. In re-writing the material, it would simultaneously be simplified, and courses could be radically shortened to reflect the new material, speeding up the training of new graduates.²²

²² "Wei chuanban shehuizhuyi likegong daxue er fendou" (Strive to Build Socialist Universities of Science and Engineering), *Hong Qi*, Issue 8, 1970 (21 July, 1970), in Peter J. Seybolt, *Revolutionary Education in China*, pp. 272-300.

The discussion meeting held in Shanghai probably had only a small impact on the eventual content of the article, however it undoubtedly served to demonstrate the strength of support for the radical Left's policy line and the content of the article. 19 people attended the meeting, including students and teachers from Tongji University's 'May 7th Commune', and the Party Secretary of the Shanghai Machine Tool Factory's school, now renamed the 'July 21st Workers' University' after the date of Mao's directive.²³

While a number of further articles discussing these issues were printed prior to the National Educational Work Conference, these two articles represented the clearest expression of the radical Left's policy towards science and engineering colleges. Their publication in *Hong qi* was celebrated two days later by a front page article in the *Renmin Ribao* which declared that they marked the start of "a new high tide in the proletarian educational revolution".²⁴

ii. Arts and Humanities Universities

Mao's July 21st directive had focussed on universities of science and engineering. In the period immediately prior to the 9th Party Congress there were few articles discussing policy for arts and humanities universities along the lines of those describing the experiences of Tongji University and the Shanghai Machine Tools Factory. Aside from the influence of Mao's directive, the difficulty of linking liberal arts courses to practical, hands-on labour in the way in which it was possible to link, for example, engineering courses, may also have prevented the early establishment of experimental programs. Some liberal arts courses may also have been seen as less ideologically sound, touching as they did on subjects such as literature, music, and art, which had all been targeted by the radical Left in the early-stages of the Cultural

²³ "Shanghai likegong daxue jiaoyu geming zuotanhui jiyao" (A Summary of the Shanghai Discussion meeting on the Educational Revolution in Universities of Science and Engineering), in *Hong Qi*, Issue 8, 1970 (21 July, 1970), pg. 23.

²⁴ "Juexin zai Mao Zhuxi jiaoyu geming luxian zhiling xia xianqi wuchanjieji jiaoyu geming de xin gaochao" (Under the guidance of Chairman Mao's line on the education revolution, resolve to set of a new high tide in the proletarian education revolution), *Renmin Ribao*, 27 July, 1970, pg 1.

Revolution. It is clear from a number of the articles discussed below that the influence of those opposed to the radical line was seen to be strongest in liberal arts institutions. For these reasons, the main institution promoted by the radical Left as a model for arts and humanities universities, Peking University, only really emerged as a model much later, in the summer of 1971, after students had begun to return to class. Prior to this, media discussion had focused only on general policy suggestions for these institutions.

An article in the first edition of the special column, "How should [we] manage socialist universities", in the *Renmin Ribao* 29 March 1969 discussed policy towards "comprehensive universities" (*zonghe daxue*) rather than arts and humanities universities (*wenke daxue*). In line with the debate on colleges of science and engineering at that time, it was suggested that they adhere to Mao's July 21st directive and "shorten courses, revolutionize education, place proletarian politics in command and follow the line of the Shanghai Machine Tools Factory in training technicians from the ranks of the workers".²⁵

A second article appeared in the 12th edition of the same column, published in the *Renmin Ribao* 15 October, 1969. The article, written by the Education Revolution Group of the South China Normal College, developed a new theme. It described how the college had used "mass criticism" to reform the thinking of its teachers involved in liberal arts courses, and to "eliminate" what the article called the "venom of revisionism" (*suqing xiuzhengzhuyi liudu*) in the various classes.²⁶ The article claimed that "politics was in command of professional work", with students being organized to study Mao Zedong's speeches and articles. In this way they learnt that writing essays was inherently political, and that "all essays had a political aim, and served a particular political

²⁵ The Workers' and PLA Mao Zedong Thought Propaganda Team stationed at Fudan University, "Women zhuzhang chedi geming" (We advocate carrying the revolution through to the end), in the *Renmin Ribao*, 29 March, 1969, pg. 1.

²⁶ Education Revolution Group of South China Normal College, "Daxue wenke yao ba dapipan lie wei zhengshi kecheng", (Mass criticism should be made a part of the formal curriculum), in the *Renmin Ribao*, 15 October, 1969, pg. 3.

standpoint".²⁷

The theme of "mass criticism" was picked up in a much fuller and more significant article, written by the Shanghai Revolutionary Mass Criticism Writing Group and published in *Hong Qi* Issue 1, 1970. The article discussed the difficulty of reforming the liberal arts because of the continuing influence of the "bourgeoisie" in these institutions. It clearly sets out the thinking of the Left, who felt that this influence was particularly strong in the liberal arts as courses such as economics, politics, education, philosophy and literature were all seen as being closely tied to the overall worldview and political line of the bourgeoisie. Because of this arts and humanities needed to undertake mass criticism not only of the bourgeoisie, but also of the thinking that lay behind the content of their courses and the courses themselves. Quoting Mao Zedong that "liberal arts should take all of society as their factory", the article went on:

Society is a society of class struggle, and taking society as a workshop [factory] means linking the liberal arts intimately with the class struggle of society and with criticism of the bourgeoisie. Therefore revolutionary mass criticism is not only the fundamental task of socialist arts and humanities universities, it is also an urgent militant task in the current reform of the old arts and humanities universities. We should not only criticize the bourgeoisie in society but also carry revolutionary mass criticism into the liberal arts themselves to criticize the reactionary bourgeois ideological systems in philosophy, history, literature, political economy, journalism, education, and other fields. Only in this way can the old arts and humanities universities gain new life through criticism.²⁸

As with the colleges of science and engineering, the old arts and humanities universities were criticized for not combining theory with practice, and of being too isolated from the masses. In the new colleges and universities, students would better themselves in the course of mass criticism, participating in the

²⁷ *Ibid*, pg.3.

²⁸ Shanghai Revolutionary Mass Criticism Writing Group, "Wenke daxue yiding yao gao geming dapipan", (Arts and humanities universities must carry out revolutionary mass criticism), in *Hong Qi*, Issue 1, 1970 (1 January, 1970), translated in Peter J. Seybolt, *Revolutionary Education in China*, pg.303.

repudiation of the old structures and the creation of new, more revolutionary ones. The article cited the example of students who had participated in work to create new 'revolutionary' operas under Jiang Qing:

The ranks of revolutionary literature and art workers that emerged in the course of the work of Comrade Chiang Ch'ing [Jiang Qing] in fostering revolutionary model operas under the guidance of Chairman Mao's revolutionary line, and with the help of Mao Tse-tung thought, have reformed, tempered, and improved themselves in the course of acute class struggle, in the course of penetratingly and persistently developing revolutionary mass criticism in connection with artistic practice, in the course of criticism of the counterrevolutionary revisionist line and foreign and conventional dogmas, and in the course of detailed scientific criticism against a batch of ancient and contemporary Chinese and foreign works. This sort of criticism is not only acute class struggle but is also very good study and self-transformation.²⁹

As students began to return to the arts and humanities universities and colleges in 1970 and 1971, the experiences of a number of institutions in "taking the whole of society as their factory" began to be published. In particular, Peking University emerged as a model promoted by supporters of the radical Left. In June, 1971, the workers' propaganda team stationed at Peking University published an article "The Liberal Arts Should Take the Whole of Society as Their Factory",³⁰ which set out their experiences of applying Mao's and the radical Left's line in the liberal arts. The article is one of the clearest descriptions of how the Left saw these types of colleges and universities being run.

In line with the earlier *Hong Qi* article, the Peking University article claimed that "only by taking society as your factory, could you conduct thoroughgoing mass criticism of the bourgeoisie". It was necessary to "thoroughly eradicate the feudalistic, capitalist and revisionist ideological system in the liberal arts".³¹

²⁹ *Ibid*, pg. 307.

³⁰ Workers' and PLA Mao Zedong Thought Propaganda Team stationed at Peking University, "Wenke yao ba zhengge shehui zuowei ziji de gongchang" (The Liberal Arts Should Take the Whole of Society as Their Factory), in the *Renmin Ribao*, 19 June, 1971, pages 1 and 4.

³¹ *Ibid*, pg.1.

According to the article, "taking society as your factory" meant that students should also engage in labour as well as studying, however the article did recognize the need for classroom teaching to continue and the importance of the teachers' role. Students at Peking University were said to have conducted visits to factories and villages, listening to the experiences of workers and peasants. They also engaged in social surveys, trying to relate their courses to the real conditions found in China's cities and countryside.

d. The restoration of administrative control and the resumption of enrollment

A major obstacle to the normal resumption of classes was the lack of a central administrative body which could coordinate the implementation of a new higher education policy. As described above, the entire staff of the Ministry of Education had been sent to a 'May 7th' Cadre School in October 1969 for re-education, and they were only allowed to return to Beijing at the start of 1971. In the absence of a central body to coordinate higher education policy, the day-to-day administration of many of these institutions was left in the hands of the propaganda teams that had entered the universities in 1968 and 1969. As the situation stabilized on campus, revolutionary committees, and later Party committees were established, (or in the case of the Party committees, re-established), however personnel from the propaganda teams often continued to dominate these new organizations. Without a central governing body it was difficult to coordinate the various institutions.

I have described above how the radical Left sought to dictate the line in higher education by publicizing the experiences of model institutions that were under its control. With their control over much of the media, the Left were able to dominate most of the policy debate. However the radical Left lacked a strong position within the State Council, which might have given them more influence over the actual implementation of policy. While they were able to press successfully for a higher education policy which largely reflected their

views, the extent to which they were able to ensure its implementation in institutions not under the control of their supporters is less clear. Zhou Enlai was the senior State Council figure to survive the mobilization phase of the Cultural Revolution, and at the start of 1970, much of the administrative control over higher education policy probably lay in his hands, and his more moderate outlook, backed by the surviving cadres of the State Council, offered some balance to the views of the radical Left.

In June 1970 it appears that the Party Central Committee, and in particular, Zhou Enlai, moved to address both of the problems facing higher education in China at that time, announcing, only a few days apart, that Peking and Tsinghua Universities would once again begin to enroll students and the formation of the Science and Education Group (SEG) under the State Council which would oversee higher education policy.

Demonstrating the influence of the radical Left in policy formation, the resumption of classes in China's universities was heavily influenced by the experiences of the model institutions outlined above. On 27 June, 1970, the CCP Central Committee approved the distribution of the "Report of Peking University and Tsinghua University Requesting Instructions on Enrolling Students (Pilot Projects)". The "Report", coming from two of the institutions under the control of supporters of the radical Left, stated that having gone through the last three years of the Cultural Revolution, the two universities already possessed the necessary conditions to enroll students once more. The report made the following proposals which were intended to act as guidelines for the resumption of enrollment and the day-to-day functioning of the universities:

1. The objectives of training: "To train workers with both cultural and scientific knowledge and practical experience who will raise high the great banner of Mao Zedong Thought, and devote themselves absolutely

to Chairman Mao, Mao Zedong Thought and Chairman Mao's revolutionary line and devote themselves wholeheartedly to serving the socialist revolution and socialist construction". (This placed the emphasis very much on "redness" over "expertese").

2. The educational system: According to the specific needs of each speciality, it will be divided into either two or three year [courses]. There will also be advanced courses of one year.

3. The content of courses: Establish "political classes with Chairman Mao's important works as the basic teaching material; implement the integration of study, research and production; and [establish] military training classes which take the preparation for war as their content". All students must take part in productive labour.

4. Requirements for students: Workers, peasants, soldiers and young cadres with a good political background, who are healthy, and have three years practical experience [of work]. They must be around 20 years old, and have the equivalent of a lower-middle school education or better.

Workers and poor and lower-middle peasants with a rich work experience are not subject to the age or education-level restrictions [my emphasis]. We must also pay attention to enrolling 'sent-down' and 'returned' [*hui xiang*] youth.

5. Method of enrollment: We will implement the method of combining recommendation by the masses, approval by the leadership, and ratification by the school.

6. Remuneration of students: Workers with over 10 years work experience will be paid by their original unit (however they must deduct the 19.5 Yuan issued by the school). All other students from factories and the countryside will receive a monthly subsidy of 19.5 Yuan. Students from the PLA will be paid for by their units.

7. Principles of allocation [of work after completion of studies]: After the

completion of studies, in principle [students] should return to their original unit or original area to work. However, in accordance with the needs of the state, a number of students will be allocated [work] centrally.³²

These guidelines were later formally approved and on 15 October, the State Council reportedly telegraphed local administrations across China to carry out enrollment work for 1970 in accordance with the content of the "Report". In total, some 1,870 students from the ranks of the workers, peasants and PLA are reported to have enrolled in China's universities that year in line with the new regulations.³³ The figure for new enrollments rose to 42,420 in 1971, bringing the total enrollment in China's institutions of higher education to 83,400, down dramatically from the total of 674,436 in 1965, the year before the Cultural Revolution broke out.³⁴

Shortly after the first publication of the report, the formation of the State Council Science and Education Group (SEG) was announced. The SEG was to take over the work of the Ministry of Education and the State Science Commission. The initial make-up of the SEG suggested that Zhou Enlai and the radicals had compromised over its membership. When the formation of the SEG was announced, day-to-day management was said to be under the joint control of Li Siguang, Liu Xiyao and Chi Qun. Chi was clearly allied to the radical Left, and worked very closely with Zhang Chunqiao on educational matters at this time. However, Li Siguang was a veteran geologist who had served at Peking University in the 1920s. Since 1949 he had served on both the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) and the National People's Congress (NPC) and been deputy head of the Chinese Academy of Sciences (CAS). As a long-standing academic, who had worked

³² "Report of Peking University and Tsinghua University Requesting Instructions on Enrolling Students (Pilot Projects)" in *Chronicle of Major Events in Education*, pg.433.

³³ *Ibid*, pg.434.

³⁴ *Zhonghua renmin gongheguo jiaoyu dashiji 1949-1982, (Achievements of Education in China, 1949-1982)*, (Beijing: Jiaoyu kexue chubanshe, 1983) pg.50.

in higher education before liberation, Li would not be expected to support the line of the radical Left. His time in the NPC, when he served in a number of high-ranking posts suggests he might have been closely allied with Zhou Enlai.³⁵ Liu Xiyao had also served in the State Council under Zhou Enlai as Vice-Chairman of the Science and Technology Commission. He had apparently disappeared from public view in 1963, only reappearing at the 9th Party Congress when he was elected an alternate member of the Central Committee. Liu later went on to serve as Minister of Education after the purge of the Gang of Four, so it also seems unlikely that he would have been a supporter of the line of the radical Left as the majority of these figures were purged after October 1976. This initial balance may not have favoured the radicals, however Li Siguang's health appears to have been failing at this time (he died in May the following year), and this appears to have allowed Chi Qun's influence to dominate. Later a number of close supporters of the radical Left were also made members of the SEG, including Xie Jingyi, Xu Jingxian and Xu Haitao, underlining their influence within this body.

e. The National Educational Work Conference and the '2-Estimates'

The ability of the radical Left to dictate the policy and ideological line to be taken in higher education was demonstrated at the National Educational Work Conference, which opened in Beijing 15 April, 1971. The conference was convened by the State Council and coincided with the return of personnel from the Ministry of Education, however the influence of these figures appears to have been negligible.³⁶ In all 631 delegates drawn from relevant departments in the State Council and the provinces, the military and people from 198 institutions of higher education attended.³⁷ As Suzanne Pepper notes, the intention of the conference was to institutionalize the experiences of the

³⁵ Union Research Institute, *Who's Who in Communist China*, (Hong Kong, 1965), pg.358.

³⁶ Suzanne Pepper, *Radicalism and Education Reform in 20th-century China*, pg.467.

³⁷ *Chronicle of Major Events in Education*, pg.438.

experimental models that had been implemented since 1968.³⁸ Although the Left eventually dominated the outcome of the meeting, the fact that it lasted for over two and a half months and did not close until 31 July suggests that there was considerable internal debate over the final conclusions.

The most significant result of the meeting was the adoption of what became known as the “two-assessments”. At the start of the conference Xu Haitao, (who was a close supporter of Zhang Chunqiao), and a number of other delegates from Shanghai are reported to have proposed the conference adopt the line that in the seventeen years before the Cultural Revolution (1949-1966), schools had been under the leadership of “traitors, special agents, and those who followed the capitalist road”. Also, that schools had been “places to train bourgeoisie intellectuals”. This line was set down in a summary (*Jiyao*) of the conference, drafted by Chi Qun and revised by Zhang Chunqiao and Yao Wenyan.³⁹ The summary, which was finally published on 13 August, 1971, set out the ‘two-estimates’, which “defined the first 17 years of education work (1949-1966) as being bourgeois dominated and decreed that the great majority of intellectuals were capitalist in their world outlook”.⁴⁰ This was the line set out in the 27 June, 1970 report from Peking and Tsinghua Universities.

Elsewhere, the conference accepted the approach towards managing institutions of higher education set out in that report. The meeting was undoubtedly a success for the radical Left, as it adopted their policy package based largely on the experiences of the model institutins they had promoted. However, it also represented the peak of their attempts to define a radical approach to higher educational policy. Within a year of the conference, Premier Zhou Enlai was leading attempts to undermine key elements of their policies, demonstrating his continued influence in the administration of policy. As more cadres, purged during the early phase of the Cultural Revolution

³⁸ Suzanne Pepper, *op cit*, pg.467.

³⁹ *Chronicle of Major Events in Education*, pg.438.

⁴⁰ Suzanne Pepper, *op cit*, pg. 467.

began to be rehabilitated, the group of cadres around Zhou Enlai were able to move to challenge some of the basic elements of the radical line.

3. Criticism and defence of the radical policy in higher education: 1972-1974

The ideological significance of higher education policy during the Cultural Revolution, and the strength of support for the radical Left in a number of key educational institutions, meant that any attempt to reform the new line in higher education was likely to be subject to intense criticism. However, beginning in early-1972, concerns began to be raised by moderates about the quality of the new students being enrolled in China's universities and colleges. This in turn led to calls for enrollment procedures to be reformed and for the emphasis to be placed once again on academic ability. By 1973, a limited examination that tested potential student's knowledge in a range of subjects had been introduced, however, a number of articles were at pains to point out that this did not represent a return to the old examination system where "test scores were in command" (*fenshu guashuai*). The new examinations were described as a part of a wider examination of students abilities, which also tested their moral (i.e. political) and physical abilities. Articles in the official media were at pains to point out that more emphasis was placed on political standing, and that where test scores were identical, preference would be given to those with higher achievements in the other areas. In addition to the re-introduction of examinations, there were other signs of normalization in the day-to-day activities of China's universities and colleges, with students once more going overseas to study, and universities that had been closed during the mobilization phase of the Cultural Revolution re-opening through 1973 and 1974.

The ability of moderates to introduce these limited reforms and the way in which a number of articles printed in the media reflect their views shows that

although the radical Left could dominate the policy debate, they had less influence over policy implementation. Here, the State Council, controlled by Zhou Enlai appears significant.

a. The issue of academic quality

The academic quality of the new 'worker-peasant-soldier' students emerged as an issue very quickly. The first classes of students enrolled under the new regulations had entered university in 1970 and 1971. Robert McCormick reveals that even in the first year of enrollment, students entering Fudan University were required to spend two to three months reviewing their middle school work.⁴¹ Similarly, he reports that students entering Guangzhou's Medical college were given a six month course covering politics, culture, language, mathematics, physics and chemistry.⁴²

Even though numbers were low in these first two years, a report issued by the SEG in May 1972 revealed concerns about their low academic ability. The "Report by the Science and Education Group of the Beijing Revolutionary Committee on the Trial Running of Remedial Classes in Institutions of Higher Education", published by the SEG 8 May, 1972, described the situation in 11 colleges and universities in Beijing. Of the 'worker-peasant-soldier' students enrolled in these institutions, only 20 percent had an educational level above junior-middle school level, 60 percent had received a junior-middle school education, and 20% had only attended primary school. The report claimed that the Beijing Revolutionary Committee had demanded these schools lay on 6 month remedial classes for those students whose academic ability did not match the demands of their courses. In an announcement published at the time of the release of the report, the SEG stated that "All institutions of higher education can demand that students whose educational levels do not meet the

⁴¹ Robert McCormick, "'Revolution in Education' Committees", in *The China Quarterly*, No 57, (Jan/March 1974), pg.135.

⁴² *Ibid*, pp.135-136.

requirements can be required to attend remedial classes according to the demands of the various specialities".⁴³

Only two days after the release of this report, the "Discussion Meeting on the Education Revolution in Composite Universities and Foreign Language Colleges" opened in Beijing. The meeting, which was convened by the SEG, ran until 20 June. Delegates from 15 colleges and universities, including Peking University, Fudan University and the Shanghai Foreign Languages Institute attended, as well as representatives from education bureaus in Beijing, Shanghai and Liaoning. Delegates appear to have been chosen mainly from institutions and locations loyal to the radical Left, however the conference appears to have discussed the issue of the academic quality of students at some length, suggesting that delegates representing the Left were at least willing to recognize the issue. The meeting is reported to have "emphasized the need to pay close attention to raising quality", called for "the development of the basic sciences", and recognized the need to "train talented people for scientific research".⁴⁴ Significantly, the meeting is also reported to have called for the protection of "essential teaching time", perhaps reflecting concerns that students were engaged in too many other activities, such as manual labour and political study which were affecting their academic study.

Premier Zhou Enlai placed his personal authority behind the drive to raise academic standards, meeting with Chinese-American scholar Yang Zhenning 2 July, 1972. Peking University professor Zhou Peiyuan also attended the meeting. Yang made a number of suggestions as to how China could strengthen its basic theoretical research and train future researchers, which Zhou Enlai personally endorsed. Speaking to Zhou Peiyuan, Zhou Enlai is reported to have said "You should go back and manage Peking University's sciences well and raise the level of basic theoretical [knowledge]".⁴⁵ Later, on

⁴³ *A Chronicle of Major Events in Education*, pg.443.

⁴⁴ *Ibid*, pg.443.

⁴⁵ *Ibid*, pg.434.

20 July, Zhou Peiyuan wrote to Zhou Enlai outlining his views on basic theoretical research and teaching in China. Zhou circulated the letter amongst members of the SEG and other leading figures in the field of education. Adding his own comments to the letter, Zhou Enlai wrote "At the moment we emphasize practice, there is not enough said about theory, basic theory classes in school are also rare". Challenging one of the cornerstones of the new enrollment policy, Zhou went on, "We have prospects for developing social science theories and natural science theories. After graduation, middle school students shouldn't solely labour for two years, they should be able to both study and work".⁴⁶

Later in the year, Zhou Peiyuan set out his views in a more detailed article, "Some Views on the Education Revolution in the Sciences in Composite Universities", published in the academic newspaper *Guangming ribao* 6 October, 1972. Zhou's views challenged another core element of the new line in higher education policy, namely the value of engaging in manual work and linking theoretical study with labour. Zhou questioned the view that you could "substitute teaching in the laboratory with schools running their own factories". He called for more emphasis to be placed on basic theoretical teaching and for more time to be spent in laboratory training.⁴⁷ Zhou Peiyuan's arguments were strongly criticized in a series of articles published in the Shanghai-based *Wenhui Bao* on the instructions of Yao Wenyuan and Zhang Chunqiao.

The question of focusing solely on academic standards had of course, been one of the focal points for attack by the radical Left. An article in the *Renmin ribao*, 3 August, 1972, addressed this point and sought to distinguish this new emphasis on academic ability from the old problems of "professionalism in command" (*yewu guashuai*) and "intellectual development first" (*zhiyu diyi*) which had been subject to so much criticism. The article claimed that the

⁴⁶ *Ibid*, pg.444.

⁴⁷ *Ibid*, pg.446.

damage done by Lin Biao in education meant that the quality of teaching did not meet the “three great revolutionary movements”, namely class struggle, economic production and scientific research. Cadres were told to distinguish between raising education standards and the old slogan of “intellectual development first”. The article went on to say that schools should make full use of the special skills and knowledge of veteran intellectuals and strengthen teaching in basic skills and knowledge.⁴⁸

The question of the quality of new students was directly related to the issue of the new enrollment procedures. Students were only expected to have received an education to junior-middle school level, but even this requirement could be waived for workers and peasants with over ten years work experience. A meeting to discuss enrollment work in institutions of higher education was held in Beijing 15 July-9 August, 1972, however, while delegates to the meeting emphasized the need to ensure students' academic quality, they apparently placed equal emphasis on ensuring the students' political standing too.⁴⁹ No changes in regulations for enrollment in 1973 appear to have been made at that time.

Articles in the official media continued to discuss the issue of raising academic standards, although as often as not, these articles originated from institutions associated with supporters of the radical Left, suggesting that they had been forced to confront the issue of quality as a result of the growing debate.⁵⁰ An article describing the experiences of some of the new students at Tsinghua University described the difficulties that had faced the students

⁴⁸ “Qieshi jiaqiang dangwei dui jiaoxue lingyu geming de lingdao”, (Conscientiously strengthen the leadership of the party committee over the revolution in the educational field), in the *Renmin Ribao*, 3 August, 1972, pg 2.

⁴⁹ *Chronicle of Major Events in Education*, pg.444.

⁵⁰ See for example “Jianchi zou ‘yi shehui wei gongchang’ de daolu” (Continue to follow the path of ‘taking society as [your] factory’), describing the experiences of Peking University, in the *Renmin Ribao*, 3 January, 1973 and “Banhao tushuguan renzhen zuzhi xuesheng zixue” (Run libraries well and conscientiously organize students to study on their own), written by the Education Revolution Group at Shanghai Normal University, in the *Renmin Ribao*, 23 November, 1972.

coming from a background of low academic achievements.⁵¹ As described in the article, the key factor for these students was their willingness to work hard to overcome these difficulties. This appears to have been the line taken by the radical Left at this time; they recognized the academic weakness of many of the students enrolled under the new system, but the good political background of these students and their proven ability to work hard, meant that they would overcome all difficulties. The emphasis here was still on political qualifications taking precedence, however the Left's argument had shifted slightly to counter the new discussion on academic quality by arguing that political qualifications were the best way to ensure academic quality.

The conflict over the relative significance of academic and political qualifications may have been responsible for the SEG failing to come up with any comprehensive guidelines on this issue for enrollment work in 1973. However in the course of May and June, 1973, a series of announcements on specific subjects did clearly place the emphasis on academic qualifications. Although it seems unclear exactly when, or if, a central decision was taken, candidates hoping to enroll in a university in 1973 were once again to be subject to an examination to test their knowledge in a wide range of subjects.

The main decision taken at this time with regard to testing students academic knowledge appears to be the SEG's "Opinions on Enrollment Work in 1973 for Institutions of Higher Education", approved by the State Council on 3 April, 1973. The document stated that enrollment work should continue along the lines of the previous years, except that universities and colleges should:

Pay attention to examining the education level [of candidates] and understand the extent of basic theoretical knowledge of those being recommended and their analytical and problem-solving ability. [Universities] should ensure that students entering their school really have completed an education up to or above the level of junior-middle

⁵¹ "Qianjin zai you hong, you zhuan de daolu shang Fang Qinghua Daxue xuesheng" (Move forward on the path of 'Red and Expert' A visit to Tsinghua University students), in the *Renmin Ribao*, 23 February, 1973, pg.2.

school.

Despite this statement, the SEG appeared unable to set out a comprehensive policy which might be followed nationally. Rather the document said simply:

Each province, municipality and autonomous region can conduct experiments into the content and method of examination in light of specific conditions and the demands of the different specialities.

It appears that it was on the basis of decentralizing control over the exams as set out in this document that tests for candidates wanting to attend university were re-introduced in 1973.

If this decision was somewhat hedged, later decisions for students of physical education and foreign languages were much clearer and confirmed the renewed emphasis on academic quality. On 8 May, 1973, the State Sports Commission and the SEG jointly announced that that year students wanting to study physical education would be required to undergo a unified (national) exam. In addition, physical education colleges would be able to take a small number of senior-junior school graduates, without first requiring them to take part in manual labour for two years. On 2 June, the State Council also approved the "Report on Enrollment Work for 1973 at the Beijing Foreign Languages Institute". This report stated that as this institute trained students for the whole country, it would be allowed to undertake enrollment work on the basis of its own regulations. As with students of physical education, the report said that Beijing Foreign Languages Institute would be allowed to select a small number of junior-middle school graduates. These two examples, where moderates used a plea of specialization to justify an end to some of the radical Left's policies acted almost as a "foot in the policy door", gradually undermining the coherence of the Left's arguments, however these were the only significant alterations to the new enrollment policy before 1977 and even these reforms continued to be hotly debated.

As the abolition of the old examination system had been a significant component of the new, radical, line in higher education, the reintroduction of exams for students wanting to attend university was politically very sensitive. This fact was recognized in the 48th issue of the column "How should [we] manage socialist universities?" The lead article in this issue, "Conscientiously carry out university enrollment work" sought to differentiate these new examinations from the old national entrance exam.⁵¹ In a lengthy defence of the new examinations, the article claimed:

In accordance with the needs of the complete development of moral, academic and physical [education], during this year's enrollment work, on the basis of recommendation by the masses, we are carrying out examinations of education [level]. Some people have said that since you are carrying out examinations, you should rely [solely] on these to judge who is successful [*ding gao-di*]. To counter this we have mobilized the masses to deepen their criticism of the counter-revolutionary fallacies of Liu Shaoqi and others and to help the masses draw three clear distinctions in accordance with the [Party's] line: The distinction between studying knowledge and technology for the revolution and following the path of 'Red and Expert', and "putting intellectual development first" and "test scores in command"; the distinction between carrying out essential academic tests under the guidance of the correct political line and using tests to "shut-out, block and oppress" [*guan-ka-yao*] the workers, peasants and soldiers; and the distinction between emphasizing academic standards under the premise of "politics in command" and placing "test scores in command". In the course of the examination, we pay attention to the correct relationship between intellectual knowledge and moral and physical standards and insist on making a concrete analysis of the worth of all three. Therefore, with regards to academic standards, it isn't a question of relying only on scores and making a decision. Rather we integrate the results of the examination with an investigation into the recommended candidates analytical and problem-solving ability and from this clarify their actual level.

It seems likely that this line probably represented the maximum extent of public criticism of the current line in higher education possible at that time. With the rehabilitation of many cadres purged during the Cultural Revolution, the

⁵¹ Zhunyang District Revolutionary Committee, Jiangsu Province, "Qieshi zuohao daxue zhaosheng gongzuo" (Conscientiously carry out university enrollment work), in the *Renmin Ribao*, 20 June, 1973, pg. 3.

influence of professional academics who had been engaged in education work prior to 1966 was growing. It seems likely that the preference of this group would have been for the complete abolition of the system of recommending people for university places and a return to the national examination system that had been in place before, with its emphasis on academic quality. However the impact of the Cultural Revolution had changed the ideological environment in which these rehabilitated cadres now worked making it difficult to challenge the underlying philosophy behind the new exam system. Any changes had to be framed within the ideological vocabulary of the time. Faced with this problem, any change tended to be ad hoc and incremental, however even limited moves drew a sharp response from the radical Left, who, rightly, saw any changes as undermining their own policy position.

b. A return to regular activities in China's universities and colleges

In addition to the discussion on academic standards and the reintroduction of a form of testing, there were numerous other signs that academic activity was returning to a more 'regular' track through 1972 and 1973. On 7 August 1972, the SEG published the "Circular on Re-establishing the People's Education Publishing House". The circular stated that one of the responsibilities of the newly reopened publishing house would be the compilation and publication of material for basic theoretical classes in engineering and the sciences for universities.⁵² Elsewhere China sent its first ever delegation to attend a meeting of UNESCO in October 1972 and later the same year the first group of students since 1966 were selected to go overseas to study.⁵³ In 1973 China also began to accept overseas students once more, with a total of 383 coming to China that year, again the first since 1966.

The number of colleges and universities re-opening gradually increased through 1972-1974. In October 1972 the Beijing Languages Institute re-

⁵² *A Chronicle of Major Events in Education*, pg.445.

⁵³ *Ibid*, pg.447

opened. A further eight institutions were reopened in March 1973, including the Beijing Commerce Institute, Beijing Normal College, the Northwest Nationalities Institute and the Chengdu Physical Education College. Another 27 colleges re-opened in June 1974.⁵⁴ As these schools reopened the total number of students grew significantly from 83,400 in 1971 to 429,981 in 1974.⁵⁵

A further sign that institutions of higher education were returning to what might be termed a more regular track was the gradual reduction in numbers of workers and soldiers stationed on campuses as part of the Workers Propaganda Teams. This was in part due to the impact of the fall of Lin Biao which I will discuss below, but the gradual reduction in numbers also reflected the return of academics and administrative staff to their former institutions, reducing the need for the propaganda teams. Figures show that in 1973 there were a total of 4,892 people involved in the propaganda teams stationed in universities across China. This was down from a total of 12,804 in 1971. A quarter of China's universities, 87 institutions, had no propaganda teams at all.⁵⁶

c. The death of Lin Biao and the 'Campaign to Criticize Lin Biao and Confucius'

Lin Biao's apparent coup attempt and his subsequent death while fleeing to the Soviet Union in September 1971 was followed by a reduction in the numbers of military personnel stationed on university campuses across China as members of the Mao Zedong Thought Propaganda Teams. Suzanne Pepper views the withdrawal of the military as a consequence of post-Cultural Revolution "consolidation", rather than as a direct result of Lin's flight,⁵⁷ certainly, the signs of normalization discussed above demonstrate a desire to place the operation of China's universities and colleges on a more secure footing even before Lin's death.

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*

⁵⁵ *Achievements of Education in China*, pg.50

⁵⁶ *A Chronicle of Major Events in Education*, pg.456.

⁵⁷ Suzanne Pepper, *Radicalism and Education Reform in 20th-century China*, pg.469.

Lin's fall from grace offered an opportunity for moderate figures like Zhou Enlai to criticize Lin and some of the policies of the Cultural Revolution which Lin had been associated with. Significantly, criticism of Lin Biao seems to have developed into more concrete attacks on the new higher education policies introduced during the Cultural Revolution. A report by the SEG for the CCP Central Committee and the State Council, dated 21 May, 1973, summarized some of the criticisms raised in the last 6 months by intellectuals and other people involved in education work. The criticisms suggested that there was widespread discontent within the academic community. They included:

Thinking that the quality of education today was low, that the worker-peasant-soldier students did not resemble university students, and that the education revolution was "chaotic, crude, and lowered [standards]"; having conflict with regards to the "two estimates" set out in the "Summary of the National Educational Work Conference", believing that the "Summary" was a heavy millstone pressing down on the intellectuals, and that it was a product of the extreme "left" line of Lin Biao.⁵⁸

Highlighting the continued Leftist influence within the SEG, the report criticized these views, saying they represented "muddled thinking" and "ideological confusion" and that "you could even say they were an 'attack'". The report stated that Lin Biao's "revisionist line" was actually "rightist", not left as these criticisms implied. It added that the "transformation" (*gaizao*) of intellectuals should continue to be strengthened.⁵⁹

Obviously the content of the report reflected the thinking of the radical Left. It was in their interest to refute any criticism of Lin Biao that labelled his policies as extreme "left" as this could then be used to attack their own policy line. It seems likely that within the SEG itself, Chi Qun was involved in drafting the report. Only a few months later, Chi played an instrumental role in launching the 'Campaign to Criticize Lin Biao and Confucius'. This campaign, which

⁵⁸ *A Chronicle of Major Events in Education*, pg.451.

⁵⁹ *Ibid*, pg.451.

continued through 1973 and 1974, provided a background to decision-making in general, but a number of meetings were held linking the campaign directly to education work. The numbers of Mao Zedong Thought Propaganda Teams in universities and colleges briefly rose again during the campaign, suggesting they played a leading role in its implementation in institutions of higher education.

The launch of the Campaign to Criticize Lin Biao and Confucius (*pi Lin, pi Kong yundong*) was marked by the publication of the article "The Confucian School and the Reactionary Philosophy of Confucians" in the *Beijing Ribao*, 4 September 1973. The article was published under the pen-name "*Liang Xiao*", the name used by the writing group of Peking and Tsinghua Universities. As noted above, this group was lead by Chi Qun and Xie Jingyi. Jiang Qing was later to proclaim that this was "my group" (*wo de ban*).⁶⁰ Only four days after the publication of this article, Jiang Qing reportedly instructed Chi Qun to use the authority of the SEG to convene the "National Discussion Meeting on Criticizing Confucius in the Education System". Speaking at the meeting Chi is reported to have called on all areas to take part in the campaign.⁶¹ Subsequently, in the field of education, the Campaign to Criticize Lin Biao and Confucius was linked to warnings of "restorationism" (*fubi*) in higher education policy. The alleged "restorationist" activities of Lin Biao were compared with, and used to attack, the reintroduction of exams or the use of the "back door" by cadres to get their children into university. These phenomenon were described as a counter-current (*huichao*) in higher education. In the following section I will outline how the radical Left launched a number of attacks on the new exams, and how they called on students to "go against the counter-current", (*fan huichao*). I will also discuss how these attacks were linked to the Campaign to Criticize Lin Biao and Confucius and

⁶⁰ Wen Legun and Hao Ruiting (eds.), *The Rise of Famous People during the "Great Cultural Grevolution"*, pg.341.

⁶¹ *Ibid*, pg.341.

attacks on the senior leadership seen as responsible for the new policies.

d. "Going against the tide"

As noted above, beginning in 1972, the Left had been forced to address the issues of academic quality and enrollment. This had been done in two ways. Initially, they issued a series of articles which sought to demonstrate that although the academic level of the new worker-peasant-soldier students may be lower than former university students, their political consciousness and demonstrated ability to work hard mean that they would be able overcome this obstacle. A number of articles in the official media addressed this point.⁶²

As well as addressing the agenda of their opponents in this way, the Left also launched a series of attacks which sought to directly refute the more moderate policies that emerged during 1972 and 1973, culminating with the reintroduction of the exam for would-be university students in mid-1973. The Left manipulated a series of incidents in schools and universities across China, encouraging students to "go against the tide". At the same time, examples of what they saw as "restorationism" in higher education were tied to the Campaign Against Lin Biao and Confucius.

As early as October 1972, Zhang Chunqiao and Yao Wenyuan had launched a series of attacks on Zhou Peiyuan's article of 6 October, 1972. This had outlined his view on the education revolution in science departments in China. Zhou had criticized the emphasis on taking part in manual labour and called for more teaching of basic scientific theory and more laboratory work. Zhang and

⁶² Articles include, "Tsinghua daxue shoujie gong-nong-bing daxuesheng biye shijian qude fengying chengguo", (The first worker-peasant-soldier university graduates from Tsinghua University have achieved rich rewards in practice), in the *Renmin Ribao*, 27 March, 1974, pg.1, "Fudan daxue like shoujie gong-nong-bing xuesheng shengli jieye", (The first group of worker-peasant-soldier science students at Fudan University victoriously complete their courses), in the *Renmin Ribao*, 16 April, 1974, pg.1, "Tongji daxue 'wu qi' gongshe jianchi kaimen banxue yue ban yue hao", (Tongji University's 'May 7th' Commune sticks to [the principle] that the more you run open-door schools the better it is), in the *Renmin Ribao*, 9 May, 1974, pg.1, and "Quanguo you zhaoshou shiliuwan duo ming gong-nong-bing daxuesheng", (The whole country enrolls over 160,000 worker-peasant-soldier university students), in the *Renmin Ribao*, 15 October, 1974, pg.1.

Yao published a series of articles in *Wenhui Bao* including "Is this way of putting forward problems appropriate?", "Marxism is the most basic theory", and "What kind of basic theory are you laying down?".⁶³

A more significant move came on 19 July, 1973, when the *Liaoning ribao* published a letter from a sent down youth, Zhang Tiesheng, attacking the new exams. This letter was reprinted in the *Renmin ribao* 10 August, 1973, with an editorial comment, and its publication marked the start of the campaign to encourage students to "go against the tide". Reports suggest that Mao Zedong's nephew, Mao Yuanxin played an important role in having the letter published and in checking on Zhang Tiesheng's background to ensure he was a suitable subject for Jiang Qing and other members of the radical Left to promote. In 1973 Mao Yuanxin was Deputy Director of the Liaoning Revolutionary Committee and Deputy Director and Political Commissar of the Shenyang Military Region, which included Liaoning Province in its area of responsibility. Shortly after the SEG published the "Opinions on Enrollment Work in 1973 for Institutions of Higher Education", which emphasized the need to ensure university candidates' academic qualifications, Mao Yuanxin is reported to have travelled to Beijing where he held discussions with Jiang Qing on a number of education issues.⁶⁴ Shortly after these talks, Zhang Tiesheng, who was sitting the new exam, sent in his letter, complaining that he had not had time to prepare as he had been engaged in the summer harvest. Seizing this opportunity, Mao Yuanxin used his authority to have the letter published in the *Liaoning ribao*.

Zhang Tiesheng had voluntarily gone to the countryside to work in 1968. At the time he took the exam he had risen to become a production team leader in the Baita Commune in Xingcheng county, Liaoning. A number of authors have mistakenly written that Zhang handed in a blank exam paper. This was not the

⁶³ *A Chronicle of Major Events in Education*, pg.446.

⁶⁴ Wen Lequn and Hao Ruiting (eds), *The Rise of Famous People During the "Great Cultural Revolution"*, pg.357.

case. Zhang took the exam, but only achieved an overall score of 38 percent. This included a good score of 61 percent in mathematics, but only 6 percent in physics.⁶⁵ These marks were not enough for Zhang to gain a place at university, and seemingly knowing he would fail, Zhang wrote his letter on the back of the exam paper. In the letter, addressed simply to the “Dear leaders”, Zhang pleaded emotionally that he had not had enough time to prepare for the exam as he had been taking part in the summer harvest:

During the urgent work of the summer harvest, I didn't have the heart to put production work to one side and ignore it and lock myself into a little room [to study] for myself, that would be too selfish. If I had acted in that way, I would have suffered the condemnation of my own and the poor and lower-middle peasants revolutionary hearts and my revolutionary conscience. I have something that I can console myself with, namely that for this [the exam] I did not delay the work of the collective and within the team I took overall and complete responsibility.⁶⁶

An editorial comment published with Zhang's letter in the *Liaoning ribao*, and reprinted in the *Renmin ribao* added:

When universities enroll students, it is necessary to carry out an appropriate academic assessment on the basis of mass evaluation and mass recommendation. But is the aim of this academic assessment to understand a student's analytical and problem-solving ability, or is it to test how many middle school syllabuses they can remember? Is the main criterion for enrollment their conduct during participation in the three great revolutionary movements, or is it their scores in a test? Is it to encourage young people to willingly accept re-education at the hands of the poor and lower-middle peasants and workers and to engage in research and complete their own work, or is it to encourage them to isolate themselves from the three great revolutionary movements and close themselves indoors reading books?⁶⁷

The *Renmin ribao*'s own comment suggested that Zhang Tiesheng's letter

⁶⁵ *Ibid*, pg.392.

⁶⁶ “Yi fen fa ren shengsheng de dajuan” (A response paper that sets people thinking), in *Renmin ribao*, 10 August, 1973, pg. 1.

⁶⁷ *Ibid*, pg.1.

raised important questions for the 'two line struggle' in education. It went on:

It has already been five years since Chairman Mao published his directive "We must select students from among the workers and peasants with practical experience, and after spending a few years at school, they should return to take part in production". The campaign to struggle, criticize, and transform in education is currently being continued and deepened. We must conscientiously study and resolutely implement Chairman Mao's directives, carry out investigations and research, sum up our experience and carry out the proletarian education revolution well.⁶⁸

A subsequent article appeared in the *Renmin ribao* 16 August, 1973, praising Zhang Tiesheng's letter for "overflowing with the revolutionary spirit of going against the tide" (*Yangyizhe fanchaoliu de geming jingsheng*).⁶⁹ The *Renmin ribao* article quoted Marx and Mao Zedong to show that "going against the tide" was part of the spirit of being a true Marxist. Indirectly criticizing the new exams as reactionary and backward, the article warned that to go against the tide you must have good judgement:

You must be good at distinguishing two different kinds of tide. In a socialist society, reactionary, backward tides often dress themselves up as revolutionary, progressive tides. Because of this, if you haven't got sharp and incisive judgement, you won't succeed.⁷⁰

The articles comments on "going against the tide" were repeated a week later when Zhou Enlai delivered the political work report to the 10th National Party Congress, 26 August, 1973, however, as the report was drafted under the leadership of Zhang Chunqiao, these comments did not necessarily reflect Zhou's own views. The Congress met in secret to discuss the political situation in the wake of the death of Lin Biao. Zhou devoted a part of his report to discussing the various internal struggles of the CCP and it was in this context that he discussed the issue of "going against the tide":

⁶⁸ *Ibid*, pg.1.

⁶⁹ Yang Pu, "Yangyizhe fanchaoliu de geming jinsheng", "Uphold the spirit of going against the tide", in the *Renmin ribao*, 16 August, 1973, pg.3.

⁷⁰ *Ibid*, pg.3.

... when a mistaken tendency rises like a tide, we should not be afraid of being isolated, we must dare to go against the tide, we must dare to hold out tenaciously. Mao Zedong said: "Going against the tide is one of the principles of Marxism". During the ten internal struggles over the Party's line, Chairman Mao dared to oppose the tide, dared to act as a representative and guide of the correct line. Everyone of us should conscientiously study Chairman Mao and uphold this principle.⁷¹

Although speaking in a different context, Zhou Enlai's words would have added some weight to the emerging campaign. Wang Hongwen, who would receive a "helicopter" style promotion to the number two spot in the Party at the 10th Congress, also devoted a section of his report on amendments to the Party Constitution to the idea of "going against the tide". According to Wang, the idea that "We must have the revolutionary spirit of daring to go against the tide" (*Yao you ganyu fanchaoliu de geming jingshen*) would be written into the new Party Constitution.⁷²

As well as publicizing incidents like Zhang Tiesheng's letter, members of the radical Left attacked policy changes at the highest level, warning of "restorationism" and "counter-currents". A number of articles were published in the *Renmin ribao* and *Hong qi* defending the higher education policies introduced during the Cultural Revolution. In particular a number of articles attempted to analyse the significance of Mao Zedong's 'July 21st Directive'. Criticism of the new line was also tied to the continuing "Campaign to Criticize Lin Biao and Confucius".

The article "The profound significance of reforms in the university enrollment system", published in *Hong qi*, Issue 8, 1973 under the name Zhu Yan, used the fifth anniversary of the publication of Mao's 'July 21st Directive' to defend changes to enrollment procedures during the mobilizational phase of the Cultural Revolution. The article warned:

⁷¹ Zhou Enlai, "Political report to the 10th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party", in *Zhongguo gongchandang di shi ci quanguo daibiao dahui wenjian huibian* (*An anthology of documents from the 10th National Congress of the CCP*), (Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 1973), pp.18-19.

⁷² Wang Hongwen, "Report on Amendments to the Party Constitution", in *ibid*, pg.45.

The type of person universities enroll and the type of person they train directly reflects the political orientation of education. Enrolling a group of people can influence a whole generation and effects which road you guide young people to take. Before the Cultural Revolution, under the control of the revisionist education line, the old examination system was an important element of the bourgeois academic's control over schools. It manifested itself in slogans such as "everybody is equal with regards to [test] scores", but in reality, it was the cultural dictatorship of the bourgeoisie, and served to keep the broad masses of the workers and peasants and their children out of university.

Our giving control over university enrollment to the masses symbolizes the leadership of the working class and the supervision of the broad masses of workers and peasants over education work.⁷³

In this atmosphere of renewed confrontation, Chi Qun launched one of the most significant campaigns against intellectuals since the mobilization phase of the Cultural Revolution in his own bailiwick of Tsinghua University. In what became known as the "Three month campaign" (*san ge yue yundong*), some 403 members of staff at Tsinghua University were criticized by name. Of these 64 were specially investigated and underwent "key criticism" (*zhongdian pipan*).⁷⁴ During the campaign Chi Qun published two articles in *Jiaoyu geming tongxun* (*Education Revolution Dispatches*) under the name Qin Huaiwen. The two articles, "Consolidate and Develop the Fruits of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution", and "Another Discussion [on how to] Consolidate and Develop the Fruits of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution" criticized teachers and students who had expressed dissatisfaction with the education revolution and the two estimates. Chi claimed that "a wind to reverse cases had appeared", and that these teachers were "launching a counterattack to settle old scores" (*gao fangong daosuan*).⁷⁵

A further target of the Left's criticism was the film "The song of the gardener" (*Dingyuan zhi ge*). The film, which was based on the plot of a Hunan opera,

⁷³ Zhu Yan, "Gaibian daxue zhaosheng zhidu de shenyuan yiyi", (The profound significance of reforms in the university enrollment system), in *Hong qi*, Issue 8, 1973, pp.9-13.

⁷⁴ *Ibid*, pg.456.

⁷⁵ *Ibid*, pg.456.

described the experiences of a teacher Yu Ying in helping one of her pupils. The film was criticized at some length in an article published in the *Renmin ribao* 4 August, 1974, (although it had been criticized before this). The article "Which education line are you singing in praise of?" criticized the film for refuting the new form of student-teacher relations established during the Cultural Revolution in which teachers both taught, and learnt from, their students:

In our socialist schools, revolutionary teachers and revolutionary students are both under the leadership of the Party, they are comrades and battle companions following the same line, they should be teaching and studying each other, going forward together. "The song of the gardener" refutes this new form of student-teacher relations and wants to restore the old relationship of the exploiting classes of the last several thousand years with so-called "gardeners" [*dingyuan*] and "pupils" [*taoli*, literally "peaches and plums"]. This fundamentally denies the proletarian education system and denies the leadership of the Party over education.⁷⁶

One line from the film in particular came in for criticism, namely when Yu Ying says "without an education you won't be able to take on the heavy burdens of the revolution". The *Renmin ribao* article criticized this line, saying it only "emphasized the importance of education" and denied that "proletarian politics should be in command".⁷⁷

These attacks by the radical Left were linked to the continuing 'Campaign to Criticize Lin Biao and Confucius'. The SEG convened the "Second Discussion Meeting on Criticizing Lin Biao and Confucius in Education" in Beijing, 5-8 February, 1974. In a speech to the meeting Chi Qun called for the campaign to be "carried through to the end". Chi also called on all areas to "seize the representatives of the restorationist forces".⁷⁸ The special column, "How should [we] manage socialist universities" carried a series of articles which tied

⁷⁶ Chu Lan, "Wei nar tiao jiaoyu luxian chang zange?" (Which education line are you singing in praise of?), in the *Renmin Ribao*, 4 August, 1974, pg.2.

⁷⁷ *Ibid*, pg.2.

⁷⁸ *A Chronicle of Major Events in Education*, pg.462.

conducting the 'Campaign to criticize Lin Biao and Confucius' with the continuation of the 'education revolution' and other aspects of education policy.⁷⁹ One article attacked Liu Shaoqi and Lin Biao for following the line of Confucius' disciple, Zi Xia. The article used classical quotes to criticize the education policies of Liu Shaoqi and Lin Biao.⁸⁰ It stated that Liu Shaoqi and Lin Biao had emphasized that those who did well in their studies would receive a good job, "the theory of studying to achieve official office", (*Dushu zuoguan lun*). The article linked this to the quote from Zi Xia in chapter 19 of *The Analects*: "when a student finds that he can more than cope with his studies, then he takes office", (*xue er you ze shi*).⁸¹ This criticism was used to attack Liu Shaoqi's and Lin Biao's education policy and highlight the changes in education policy made during the Cultural Revolution.

While these attacks continued, it is clear that moves towards normalization in China's universities and colleges continued, albeit at a slow pace. Once again, the inability of the radical Left to influence policy implementation appears significant. There was no move to rescind the decision to re-introduce the entrance exam, despite the intense criticism levelled at this policy by members of the radical Left. At the beginning of 1975, the 4th National People's Congress made the decision to reopen the Ministry of Education. At the same time, in his speech to the Congress, Premier Zhou Enlai made his famous statement that China must achieve the "four modernizations" (in agriculture, industry, the military and science and technology) by the end of the century. These two decisions were to have important consequences for the direction of

⁷⁹ See for example, Column No. 56, "Shenru pi Lin, pi Kong, konggu he fazhan jiaoyu geming chengguo", (Deepen the campaign to criticize Lin Biao and Confucius, consolidate and develop the fruits of the education revolution), in the *Renmin Ribao*, 14 February, 1974, and Column No. 61, "Zai pi Lin, pi Kong zhong nuli banhao hanzhou jiaoyu", (During the course of the campaign to criticize Lin Biao and Confucius conscientiously manage correspondence education well), in the *Renmin ribao*, 11 November, 1974, pg.3.

⁸⁰ Tong Wenxiao, "'Xue er you ze shi' de fandong jiaoyu sixiang bixu pipan" (The reactionary education philosophy of "a good scholar will always make an official" must be criticized), in *Renmin ribao*, 16 January, 1974 pg.1.

⁸¹ *Confucius The Analects*, translated by D.C. Lau, (London: Penguin Books, 1979), pg.155.

higher education policy.

4. Intensification of the struggle over higher education policy: January 1975 to the death of Mao Zedong

Following the re-opening of China's universities and colleges in 1970, limited reforms to the higher education policy introduced during the Cultural Revolution had been carried out against a background of continual criticism from the radical Left. This pattern intensified in the period from January 1975 to the death of Mao Zedong in September 1976 as moderate Party and government figures, led by Zhou Enlai, Deng Xiaoping and Zhou Rongxin, sought to introduce more comprehensive reforms to China's higher education policy. They were acting partly in response to Zhou Enlai's call to focus on the "four modernizations", made at the 4th National People's Congress. Zhou's call focused attention on the need for sufficient technical personnel to complete this program, and hence the need for universities and colleges to train well-qualified graduates. This debate reflected the wider pattern outlined in chapter two where I described the policy debate during this period as being characterized by how much ideological issues should influence social and economic policy making.

In contrast to the moderates, in early 1975, the radical Left launched a campaign to study the theory of the dictatorship of the proletariat. Their statements on higher education policy quickly shifted to meet the needs of this campaign. In December 1975 the radicals issued a strong denunciation of the moderates' programme, claiming that it threatened the achievements of the Cultural Revolution. This claim clearly echoed Mao Zedong's growing feeling that the Cultural Revolution was being undermined by the reforms introduced by the moderates in a number of different areas. Following the death of Premier Zhou Enlai in January 1976, Deng Xiaoping and Zhou Rongxin were

both purged, Zhou Rongxin later died whilst undergoing criticism. This brought an abrupt halt to further reforms, but in the atmosphere of intensifying political struggle, the Left seemed unable to push their own higher education programme effectively. The struggle over education policy subsided as the political struggle intensified, and it was only with the death of Mao Zedong and the purge of the Gang of Four that higher education policy was again discussed in any significant way. This section will examine these developments.

a. The 4th National People's Congress

i. The re-opening of the Ministry of Education

The decision to disband the SEG and re-open the Ministry of Education was approved by the 4th NPC on 17 January, 1975. The Congress appointed Zhou Rongxin as Minister of Education. In addition, Zhou Hongbao, Li Qi, Liu Aifeng and Yao Li were listed as 'responsible persons' within the Ministry,⁸² although at the time it appears they may have been serving in other departments.⁸³

Reflecting the on-going struggle between the radical and moderate lines, these figures represented a spectrum of political views, however, as the Ministry of Education was subordinate to the State Council, Premier Zhou Enlai appears to have had a decisive say in making some of the appointments. In particular, Zhou Rongxin's political career had been very close to that of Zhou Enlai. He had been appointed deputy Secretary-general of the State Council in March 1963, however following the fall of the Secretary-general, Xi Zhongxin, Zhou was appointed acting Secretary-general in July 1963. He was formally appointed Secretary-general at the 3rd NPC in January 1965.⁸⁴ It is the duty of the Secretary-general to deal with much of the day-to-day work of the State

⁸² *A Chronicle of Major Events in Education*, pg.472.

⁸³ Li Qi is listed as being identified as a member of the Ministry of Culture in March 1975 by Wolfgang Bartke, in *Who's Who in the People's Republic of China*, (Armonk, New York: M.E. Sharpe, 1981), pg.184.

⁸⁴ Donald W. Klein and Anne B. Clark, *Biographic Dictionary of Chinese Communism 1921-1965, Volume I: Ai Szu-ch'i-Lo I-nung*, (Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1971), pg.223.

Council, and his work would have brought Zhou Rongxin into close and regular contact with Zhou Enlai. His promotion to Minister of Education suggests that Zhou Enlai wanted someone he knew and could trust in that position. Zhou Enlai's backing was clearly an influential factor as Zhou Rongxin and Deng Xiaoping attempted to introduce further reforms in the field of higher education.

Less is known about the other new appointees. Li Qi had served as Vice-Minister of Culture on the eve of the Cultural Revolution. Along with other senior officials from that ministry, Li disappeared from public view in 1967. His first public appearance after his purge was as a member of a Sino-Japanese Friendship delegation which visited Japan in April 1973. In July of that year he was appointed as a member of the SEG, where he served until that body was disbanded. In March 1975 he was identified as a cadre in the Ministry of Culture, however in October 1977 he was appointed as a Vice-Minister of Education. His purge in 1967 and subsequent promotion to Vice-Minister after the arrest of the Gang of Four suggests he supported the line of Zhou Enlai, Deng Xiaoping and Zhou Rongxin.

The other figures appear to be more closely allied to the radical Left. Little is known about the backgrounds of Liu Aifeng and Yao Li, but both disappeared after 1976, suggesting close ties to the Gang of Four. Zhou Hongbao had clear ties to the Left. He had formerly served as a lathe operator at Shanghai's No. 1 Iron and Steel Factory. He was later promoted to Deputy Head of the Leadership Small Group of the Headquarters of the Shanghai Militia. The militia were closely associated with Zhang Chunqiao, Jiang Qing and Yao Wenyuan and were mobilized following the death of Mao Zedong to secure Shanghai for the radical Left.

While Zhou Rongxin can be definitely shown to have played a leading role in pushing attempts to introduce reforms to the higher education policy that emerged after the mobilization phase of the Cultural Revolution, the position of the ministry as a whole is less clear. While senior cadres from the ministry

continued to be rehabilitated, it seems likely, that initially at least, they remained unwilling, or unable, to fully support the line of Deng and Zhou. This reflected the organizational difficulties facing the CCP as it attempted to rebuild Party and government structures. Some individuals may have been reluctant to press for reforms in the light of their recent experiences during the Cultural Revolution, but others would have found it equally difficult to assert their authority in a climate where organizational norms were still uncertain.

ii. Zhou Enlai's work report

Zhou Enlai delivered the government work report to the 4th NPC on 13 January, 1975. The most significant part of his report concerned his statement on the need to achieve the 'four modernizations'.⁸⁵ Although Zhou stated in his speech that the primary task at that time was still the continuation of the Campaign to Criticize Lin Biao and Confucius, pro-reform figures like Deng Xiaoping were able to use his comments on the 'four modernizations' to justify further reforms to China's economic system.

Zhou's speech to the 4th NPC strengthened the hand of those pressing for reforms in higher education. The practical focus on economic development allowed these reformers to call for reforms which would generate the educated personnel necessary to fulfill the 'four modernizations'. This naturally shifted the debate towards issues of "expertise", at the expense of "redness". However, Zhou Enlai, Deng Xiaoping and others associated with the rectification movement were challenging the policies that had emerged from the mobilization phase of the Cultural Revolution. Mao Zedong and members of the radical Left were still in positions to defend these policies, and Mao's increasingly defensive posture was particularly significant in the failure of this initial reform attempt. In addition, while the focus of the Party's and government's work was expected to be political issues such as the Campaign

⁸⁵ *Zhou Enlai de yi sheng ziliao xuanji, (xia ce)* (*The Life of Zhou Enlai A collection of material (Vol 2)*), (Hong Kong, 1977), pg.487.

to Criticize Lin Biao and Confucius, any reforms to Cultural Revolution policies were liable to criticism on political grounds.

b. The rectification movement in higher education: January-October, 1975

The rectification movement proceeded at different speeds and in different ways in different policy areas. As early as March, 1975, Minister of Railways, Wan Li, was making speeches on the need to improve the functioning of China's railway network.⁸⁶ Publically, the earliest criticism and comments in the field of higher education appear to have been made by Vice Premier Wang Zhen on 11 July, although Zhou Rongxin is reported to have made a number of internal speeches during May in which he called for reform.⁸⁷ Wang was speaking at a meeting on foreign aid work, however he is reported to have made the comment "I don't approve very much of agricultural colleges studying Chao Yang" (a reference to the Chao Yang Agricultural College). Wang Zhen's comments were in direct contrast to the campaign to promote the experiences of that college then underway.

A more direct criticism of the policies of the radical Left came on 13 August in the form of an attack on Chi Qun in a letter to Mao Zedong from four members of staff at Tsinghua University. The letter, written jointly by three deputy-secretaries of the university's Party committee, Liu Bing, Hui Xiandiao and Liu Yi'an and the director of the political department, Lu Fangzhen, criticized Chi Qun for a variety of arrogant behaviour, including not letting others have a say (*gao yiyantang*), violating Party policies and appointing people by favouritism and offering official posts and making lavish promises (*renren weiqin, fengguan xuyuan*).⁸⁸ Liu Bing wrote a second letter to Mao two months later.

On 23 August, a discussion meeting on junior and primary education in the four provinces and cities of Beijing, Shanghai, Tianjin and Guangdong opened

⁸⁶ *Wan Li Wenxuan (Selected Works of Wan Li)*, (Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 1995), pp.72-75.

⁸⁷ *A Chronicle of Major Events in Education*, pg.477.

⁸⁸ *A Chronicle of Major Events in Education*, pg.476.

in Beijing. The meeting, which lasted until 30 August, had been convened by the Ministry of Education. Zhou Rongxin gave a number of speeches in which he launched several stinging attacks on education policy since the end of the mobilization phase of the Cultural Revolution. He also called for stronger resolve on the part of officials within the ministry. Although the meeting was ostensibly about junior and primary education, his comments appear to have concerned the issue of education as a whole:

Chairman Mao has never said we don't need education [*wenhua*]. In "On New Democracy" Chairman Mao pointed out that we must build a scientific and popular education for the nation. Now, as soon as you mention education people turn pale as if at the mention of a tiger and are afraid to death, hurriedly talking about some "reverse current" or [saying] its "the wind of 72 again".⁸⁹

A second meeting involving officials from the four provinces of Hunan, Hubei, Shandong and Jiangsu was held in Wuxi, Jiangsu Province from 15-23 September, reinforcing the message from the Beijing conference.

Vice-Premier Deng Xiaoping played a leading role in co-ordinating the various aspects of the rectification movement and pressing for further reforms. His selected works for 1975 contain a number of speeches calling for rectification in the army, the Party's work style, industry and science and research work. Speaking at a discussion meeting on agricultural work on the 27 September and again on the 4 October, Deng spoke at some length on the need for rectification in all areas. His comments have been compiled into a single article "All areas must be rectified" which appears in volume two of his selected works.⁹⁰ In this article, Deng spoke on rectification in education, and tied his comments to the 'four modernizations'. He invoked Mao Zedong Thought to back up his comments, and repeated Zhou Rongxin's message of not being afraid to carry out reform in the education field:

⁸⁹ *Ibid*, pg.477.

⁹⁰ *Deng Xiaoping Wenxuan (Di er ji) (Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping (Volume 2))*, (Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 1994), pp.35-37.

At the moment, the majority of school students aren't studying (*dushu*), this also doesn't conform with Mao Zedong Thought. What Comrade Mao Zedong opposed was education being divorced from reality, divorced from the masses, and divorced from labour, it wasn't that he didn't want [students] to study, rather he wanted them to study even better. Comrade Mao Zedong gave young children the message [*tici*] "study well and make progress every day". In addition, Comrade Mao Zedong spoke about the four modernizations, he also spoke about class struggle, the struggle in production and scientific research being the three basic social practices, but today, we've cut out scientific research and we're all afraid to talk about it, as if talking about it was a crime. How can this be right?⁹¹

In addition to the vertical co-operation in the rectification campaign in education between Vice-Premier Deng Xiaoping and Minister of Education Zhou Rongxin, there is one example of what might be called horizontal co-operation, between Zhou Rongxin and the Minister of Railways, Wan Li. Wan Li had been appointed Minister of Railways at the 4th NPC. In 1975 he led a very successful campaign to restore order to China's railway network, disrupted by the factional fighting of the Cultural Revolution. In 1975 Wan Li appears to have been working very closely with Zhou Enlai and Deng Xiaoping.

On 20 October 1975 the Personnel Bureau of the Ministry of Railways convened a discussion meeting on education. Its main aim appears to have been to discuss the situation in the seven railway colleges run directly by the Ministry of Railways. Zhou Rongxin was invited to attend the meeting and he used this opportunity to deliver a critical speech in which he attacked a number of the policy statements of the radical Left, including the issue of the 'two estimates' and their attack on the film "The Song of the Gardener". Zhou also linked reforms in education to meeting the needs of the 'four modernizations'. Zhou's speech "Education must meet the needs of the four modernizations" was not published until January 1979⁹², after the death of Mao Zedong and the

⁹¹ *Ibid*, pg.37.

⁹² Zhou Rongxin, "Jiaoyu yao shiying si ge xiandaihua de yaoqiu" (Education must meet the needs of the four modernizations), originally printed in *Jiaoyu Yanjiu* (*Educational Research*), issue 1, 1979, reprinted in *Zhongguo dangdai jiaoyu sichao 1949-1989* (*Contemporary trends in education in China 1949-1989*), (Shanghai: Sanlian shudian, 1991), pp.256-259.

arrest of the Gang of Four. This suggests that its content was too controversial for general publication in 1975. Many of Zhou's statements presage the debate over education that was to emerge following Mao's death, including the idea that the failure to reform education would hinder the completion of the 'four modernizations'. It is worth quoting Zhou's speech at some length as it is one of the clearest statements of the thinking of those conducting the rectification movement in education at that time:

If we want to carry out the four modernizations this requires that the Ministry of Education train qualified personnel who can consolidate the dictatorship of the proletariat and meet the needs of the four modernizations. If we don't modernize then our country won't be at the forefront of the world. The magnificent task of developing the national economy raises a great and arduous historical task for the Ministry of Education.

If we want to carry forward the four modernizations, science and technology must be given priority, and your schools must train numerous and quality technical cadres.

I wish to talk about the question of intellectuals. The National Educational Work Conference [of 1971] discussed one question with regards to intellectuals, namely the question of the last 17 years, calling it the 'two estimates'. With regards to these 'two estimates', we still haven't resolved this today. What is the problem that we haven't resolved? Its a question of line, a question of a struggle between two lines. Some people simply label all intellectuals as bourgeois intellectuals, and say that in 17 years we've only trained bourgeois intellectuals. Some people say that the students we've trained over the last 17 years are all undermining the foundations of socialism and that's even more dangerous than the bourgeois intellectuals. When Chairman Mao discussed the question of intellectuals in 1957, he said that the majority are patriotic and willing to serve socialism. This is our country's real situation.

How we should evaluate "the Song of the Gardener" still requires detailed research. Speaking from an educational point of view, it [the film] lays a foundation for how junior and primary school students should be organized to study Mao Zedong Thought, study socialist cultural and scientific knowledge and ensure time in class.

The four modernizations require us to train people with a high political awareness and high cultural and scientific knowledge, if we don't pay attention to this point in the future it will hold us back (*tuo houtui*). If we don't change the current situation, then its very likely it

will hold us back. If we hold back the four modernizations so that we can't progress, isn't this a return to the past (*fujju*)?⁹³

Shortly after Zhou Rongxin made these comments he is reported to have started work on drafting a report on developments in the field of education to be delivered to the next NPC meeting.⁹⁴ It is unclear as to what the content of that document might have been as it was later suppressed by the radical Left following Zhou's purge at the beginning of 1976. However the very fact that the document was suppressed suggests that its content was similar to Zhou's comments above which challenged many of the core ideas of the radical Left's line on higher education.

The suppression of this document shows that the movement to rectify work in education should not be seen as taking place in isolation from other developments. The emerging reforms in turn fuelled the development of the radical Left's own policy line, leading temporarily to the victory of the radicals following the death of Zhou Enlai. In a subsequent section I will show how the efforts to rectify education work gradually drew the ire of Mao Zedong, so that beginning in late-1975 the radical Left were able to gain his tacit support for the campaign to criticize Deng Xiaoping. Following the death of Zhou Enlai, Deng's, and Zhou Rongxin's key backer, the radical Left were able to purge these two figures and temporarily put an end to efforts to reform higher education policy.

c. The campaign to study the theory of the dictatorship of the proletariat and its impact on higher education policy: October, 1974-January 1976

The campaign to study the theory of the dictatorship of the proletariat emerged from a series of comments made by Mao Zedong in late-1974. Members of the radical Left issued a number of key articles which attempted to develop Mao's comments and provide a theoretical justification for the new

⁹³ *Ibid*, pp.256-258.

⁹⁴ *A Chronicle of Major Events in Education*, pg.478.

campaign. From the very start, the radical Left tied the new line with their higher education policy and a series of statements and articles appeared in the national media on this subject. In particular the experience of a new model institution, the Chao Yang Agricultural College was promoted by the radical Left.

The new Constitution passed at the 4th NPC on 17 January referred specifically to the need for proletarian control over education. Article 12 of the new Constitution stated:

The proletariat must implement an all-round dictatorship over the bourgeoisie in all cultural realms of the superstructure. Culture and education, literature and the arts, sport and health, and science and research must all serve proletarian politics, serve the workers, peasants and soliders, and be unified with productive labour.⁹⁵

Beginning in January 1975, the national and educational media carried a series of articles calling for schools to be turned into “tools of the dictatorship of the proletariat”. On 10 January the first edition of the *Education Revolution Dispatches* carried an article “Strive to turn schools into tools of the dictatorship of the proletariat”. This article contained a strong criticism of schools, saying they were places that focused exclusively on transmitting knowledge (*chuanbo zhishi de changsuo*) and that they emphasized “putting intellectual development first”.⁹⁶

An article on the same theme appeared in the *Renmin Ribao* 18 February, 1975. The article “Run schools so as to make them powerful tools of the dictatorship of the proletariat” repeated the experiences of the Shanghai Machine Tools Factory’s “July 21st” University and tied these to the new campaign. The article stated:

“July 21st” universities have grown strong in the course of the fierce struggle between two lines and two kinds of ideology. Over the last few years we have upheld the principle of putting proletarian politics

⁹⁵ *A Chronicle of Major Events in Education*, pg.472.

⁹⁶ *Ibid*, pg. 471.

in command and unceasingly criticized capitalism and criticized the revisionist ideas of “professionalism in command”, technology in command” and “putting intellectual development first”. We have carried out a resolute struggle against old customary forces and traditional influences and only then have we ensured that workers’ universities, this section of the education sector, are firmly in the control of the working class, and ensured that education better serves proletarian politics.⁹⁷

d. Chaoyang Agricultural College

Chaoyang Agricultural College emerged as a new model of the radical Left at the same time that the new campaign to study the theory of the dictatorship of the proletariat was launched, however initial articles reporting the experiences of the college focused on its innovative system of student enrollment and job allocation, referred to as “from the commune, to the commune” (*she-lai, she-qu*). It was only in March 1975 that Chaoyang Agricultural College was linked to the new campaign.

Chaoyang Agricultural College had been formed in 1970 in response to calls for agricultural colleges to work more closely with China’s peasantry. A number of departments of the Shenyang Agricultural College had moved to Chaoyang in the west of Liaoning Province. There they had combined with the smaller Chaoyang District Agricultural Sciences Research Institute, the Chaoyang Water Conservancy School and a number of units from a local agricultural school to form the new college. There were four departments, agriculture, orchards and forestry (*guo-lin*), animal husbandry, and water conservancy. In December 1974 there were reported to be 1,200 students and over 300 members of staff.⁹⁸

Initial articles focused on the college’s system of student enrollment and job allocation, known as *she-lai, she-qu*. One of the first articles to discuss the

⁹⁷ “Ba xuexiao bancheng wuchanjieji zhuanzheng de youli gongju”, (Run schools so as to make them powerful tools of the dictatorship of the proletariat), in the *Renmin Ribao*, 18 February, 1975, pg 1.

⁹⁸ “Nongda biye dang nongmin hao” (When you graduate from agricultural college its good to work as a peasant), in *Renmin Ribao*, 2 December, 1974, pg. 1.

experiences of the Chaoyang Agricultural College appeared in the *Renmin Ribao* in December, 1974.⁹⁹ This article linked the new enrollment system to Mao's "July 21st" Directive of 1968 which had said that "students should be selected from among workers and peasants with practical experience, and they should return to production after a few years' study".¹⁰⁰ By locating the college closer to the peasants, and more directly catering to their needs by running shorter courses, the new school was said to overcome the old isolation of agricultural colleges which had led many of their students to refuse to return to the countryside after graduation.

At the start of 1975 a number of articles in the *Renmin Ribao* and the special column "How should [we] manage socialist universities" continued to discuss the significance of Chaoyang's system of "*she-lai, she-qu*". This concept was tied to the on-going campaign to Criticize Lin Biao and Confucius and was even used as part of the campaign attacking the classical quote "when a student finds that he can more than cope with his studies, then he takes office", (*xue er you ze shi*). One article, printed in the *Renmin Ribao* 19 January, 1975 claimed that the college's students had succeeded in breaking the mentality of students at the old agricultural colleges:

For the last several thousand years, the doctrine of Confucius and Mencius has been continuously preaching the idea of "when a student finds that he can more than cope with his studies, then he takes office". Today, the students of Chaoyang Agricultural College use their everyday actions to implement a thorough break with this kind of old traditional viewpoint. They aren't "studying only to become officials", [*dushu zuoguan*], rather they are "studying to work in agriculture" [*dushu wu nong*]. They come to agricultural college harbouring the powerful hope that they can win the war to emancipate agriculture. Using their own words, they have resolved with an iron heart to become new peasants.¹⁰¹

⁹⁹ *Ibid.*

¹⁰⁰ Theodore Hsi-en Chen, *The Maoist Educational Revolution*, Appendix G.

¹⁰¹ "Zaixiao zuo gongxian Biye dang nongmin", (At school make contributions, on graduation become a peasant), in the *Renmin Ribao*, 19 January, 1975, pg.4.

Beginning on 15 March, 1975, the Ministry of Education ran two special classes for education officials at the Chaoyang college. The classes, which ran in March and April of that year, are reported to have studied the experiences of Chaoyang Agricultural college in "opposing the revisionist line of the last 17 years in education, strengthening the dictatorship over the bourgeoisie in the field of education and turning schools into a tool of the dictatorship of the proletariat".¹⁰² These classes were the first sign that Chaoyang was being promoted by the radical left as a model institution in the new campaign to study the theory of the dictatorship of the proletariat.

Shortly after these classes were held the State Council approved a report by the Ministry of Education calling for the experiences of Chaoyang Agricultural College to be promoted nationally. The report called on all areas to summarize the experiences of Chaoyang and to draw up plans on how to make education better meet the needs of a socialist economy and become "tools of the dictatorship of the proletariat". The Ministry of Education report suggested that for 1975, schools of higher education adopt Chaoyang's method of enrolling students and allocating work.¹⁰³

The significance of Chaoyang was formally recognized when in June the same year the Ministry of Education issued a notification that all enrollment work for 1975 in universities and colleges should be carried out in accordance with the principles set out in the April 23 report.¹⁰⁴ At the same time, a second article appeared in the special column, "How [we] should manage socialist universities", written by the Party Secretary of Chaoyang Agricultural College, Xu Ming. Speaking about Chaoyang college, Xu used what would become one of the radical Left's more infamous slogans:

Proletarian education must continue the direction of taking university students from amongst the workers and peasants and

¹⁰² *A Chronicle of Major Events in Education*, pg.472.

¹⁰³ *Ibid*, pg.473.

¹⁰⁴ *Ibid*, pg.474.

returning them to the workers and peasants. We must tear down the ladder which the exploiting class used to turn study into a means to climb up to the privileged classes and become an intellectual aristocrat (*jingshen guizu*). In order to realize **the intellectualization of the workers, and the integration of the intellectuals with the working people** [*laodong renmin zhishihua, zhishi fenzi laodonghua*] we must build bridges to gradually reduce the three major distinctions [between town and country, industry and agriculture and mental and physical labour]. We have resolved to act in accordance with Chairman Mao's "July 21st" Directive and implement the [system] of "from the commune, to the commune", and train a new type of peasant with both a socialist consciousness and a [high-level] of education.¹⁰⁵

e. The culmination of the struggle between the radical Left and the moderate reformers over higher education policy, October 1975-October 1976

As I noted above, developments in the policy approaches of the radical Left and the moderate reformers should not be seen as occurring in isolation. The two sides fed off the initiatives of each other, using policy statements, speeches and articles issued by the other side to publish their own rebuttals or highlight what they felt were significant areas of their own policy approach. One example is the way in which each side approached the issue of "studying only to achieve office" (*dushu zuoguan*). As Deng Xiaoping and Zhou Rongxin continued with their rectification campaign in the field of higher education, the denunciations of the radical Left grew stronger, fuelled by Mao Zedong's growing concern over the direction the campaign was taking. Indeed Mao's support against the moderates would prove to be vital in bringing about an end to their reforms in higher education. The radical Left's criticism of efforts to reform higher education reached a peak in December 1975 with the publication of the article "The orientation of the education revolution cannot be

¹⁰⁵ Xu Ming, "Zaojiu wei konggu wuchanjieji zhuanzheng er douzheng de xinren", (Train new people who will struggle to consolidate the dictatorship of the proletariat), in the *Renmin Ribao*, 5 June, 1975, pg.3.

distorted easily".¹⁰⁶ This article sparked a wave of criticism of the moderates higher education policy in the mass media. Backed by Mao Zedong, the radical Left were able to launch a campaign to criticize Deng Xiaoping in early-1976. It was only after the death of Mao Zedong and the arrest of the Gang of Four that the debate over policy resumed.

Beginning in September 1975, Zhou Rongxin started work drafting a report on education to be delivered to the next NPC meeting. The intensification of the struggle between the reformers and the radical Left can be seen in the fact that the Left had this and Hu Yaobang's report on the work of the Chinese Academy of Sciences suppressed. Members of the radical Left also took more direct action to criticize the actions of the reformers. On 25 October, apparently at the instigation of Chi Qun, Lin Junwan, a member of the personnel section of Tsinghua University, wrote to Mao Zedong criticizing Zhou Rongxin. Echoing the letter written to Mao Zedong by Liu Bing and three other senior members of staff at Tsinghua in which they criticized Chi Qun's actions, Lin accused Zhou Rongxin of "appointing people by favouritism, and engaging in factionalism".¹⁰⁷ Defending Chi Qun, Lin accused Zhou Rongxin of driving Chi out of the leadership group (*lingdao banzi*) of the Ministry of Education and of attempting to discredit the work of the SEG.

In November, Chi Qun organized an enlarged meeting of Tsinghua's Party committee which met to criticize the actions of Liu Bing in sending the two letters to Mao Zedong. Mao had already issued instructions on how to handle this incident, claiming that Liu Bing's letters represented a "rightist wind to reverse correct verdicts".¹⁰⁸ The Tsinghua meeting marked the start of the

¹⁰⁶ Peking Daxue, Tsinghua Daxue dapipan zu (The mass criticism group of Beijing and Qinghua Universities), "Jiaoyu geming de fangxiang burong cuangai", (The orientation of the education revolution cannot be distorted easily), in *Hong Qi*, Issue 12, 1975. This article was reprinted along with a number of other pieces in a pamphlet of the same title in Hong Kong in 1976. Hereafter I will refer to this pamphlet as *The Orientation of the Education Revolution Cannot be Distorted Easily*.

¹⁰⁷ *A Chronicle of Major Events in Education*, pg.479.

¹⁰⁸ *A Dictionary of Major Events of the CCP*, pg.461.

“campaign to counter-attack the rightist wind to reverse verdicts” and highlighted the way the radical Left used attacks on higher education reforms for a wider political purpose. At its climax on 18 November, Beijing’s First Party Secretary, Wu De attended the Tsinghua meeting and passed on Mao’s instructions on this issue. The meeting denounced Liu Bing for “denying the education revolution and using reactionary statements and conduct to reverse the correct verdict of the Cultural Revolution”.¹⁰⁹ Following this incident ‘big-character’ posters appeared at Peking University publicly criticizing Liu Bing and Zhou Rongxin.

While the meeting at Tsinghua University was under way, Zhang Chunqiao, who was Vice-Premier in charge of education, met with Zhou Rongxin to discuss education issues. Zhang is reported to have heavily criticized Zhou, asking if he supported the educational revolution: “In society, there is a trend (*feng*) to refute the Cultural Revolution and to refute the education revolution... With regards to the last 17 years, what do you, Zhou Rongxin, think?...” Returning to Xu Ming’s slogan, Zhang asked “One [school] trains educated exploiters and an intellectual aristocracy with a capitalist consciousness, one trains uneducated workers with a [socialist] consciousness, which one do you prefer? **I would rather have an uneducated worker than an educated exploiter** or intellectual aristocracy”, (my emphasis).¹¹⁰

By the end of November, the positions of Deng Xiaoping and Zhou Rongxin looked increasingly untenable. Zhou Rongxin in particular continued to be subject to criticism, both within the ministry and in public. Meeting with an Albanian education delegation on 30 November, Zhang Chunqiao is reported to have said “The head of our ministry of education has some problems”.¹¹¹ As Mao Zedong became increasingly unsatisfied with Deng Xiaoping’s actions during the rectification movement as a whole, the radical Left were able to

¹⁰⁹ *A Chronicle of Major Events in Education*, pg.479.

¹¹⁰ *Ibid*, pg.480.

¹¹¹ *Ibid*, pg.480.

publish a critical article on the reformers' line in higher education. The publication of this article, "The orientation of the education revolution cannot be distorted easily" was followed by a series of articles in the national media and effectively marked the end of further reforms in higher education policy until the purge of the Gang of Four.

The article, written by the mass criticism group of Peking and Tsinghua universities, the two universities most closely associated with the radical Left, stated that recently there had been a number of what it called "absurd arguments and strange theories" (*qitan guailun*) spread in the field of education. The article warned that there was a stark choice between continuing the education revolution or restoring capitalist control over schools:

Whilst the general situation is good, we must be aware that in the field of education, class struggle and the struggle over line is still very sharp and complicated. Recently, in the field of education, there have been a number of absurd arguments and strange theories which say that since the Cultural Revolution the education revolution has been no good, or that something else has been no good. [They say] that the orientation of the education revolution has "never been resolved clearly", and therefore we "must turn around". Put simply they say that the education revolution has been carried out to excess and we've made a mess of it so we must "turn" around the orientation of the education revolution. The problem is very clear, at the moment the point at issue is this: should we uphold the orientation of the education revolution and continue the proletarian education revolution to the end, or overturn a correct verdict on behalf of the revisionist education line and restore the old education system where bourgeoisie academics controlled our schools?¹¹²

The article also set out a clear definition of the radical Left's view on the question of the quality of education, a key point in the struggle between the two coalitions, the article stated:

With regards to the quality of education, different classes have different opinions. We believe that the students trained by socialist universities must serve (*fuwu*) the consolidation of the dictatorship of the proletariat and socialist construction. Because of this, when you look at the issue of quality, you must first look at orientation, look at

¹¹² *The Orientation of the Education Revolution Cannot be Distorted Easily*, pg.1.

line, and look at the overall development of moral, physical and intellectual education. Even if you talk about vocational study, you should not treat attending a few classes and reciting a small number of textbooks as a standard, rather you must look at [a student's] ability to link theory and practice and their analytical and problem solving ability.¹¹³

On 14 December, the Party's Central Committee formally approved the "Situation report from Tsinghua University on the great debate in the education revolution". This report greatly increased the political significance of the debate over education policy as it represented formal party support for the criticism of Zhou Rongxin. The report described the November meeting held at Tsinghua University to criticize Liu Bing. According to the report, Liu's criticism of Chi Qun was actually targetted at Mao Zedong and claimed that the two letters Liu Bing sent to Mao were politically motivated.¹¹⁴

By December 1975, Mao Zedong and the radical Left saw Deng Xiaoping's rectification movement as an attempt to discredit the "achievements" of the Cultural Revolution. Mao was later to defend the Cultural Revolution, saying it was one of the two greatest achievements of his life. It seems that the radical Left were able to play on this very personal fear of Mao's that his life's work was being undone by bureaucrats within the Party to once again discredit and isolate Deng Xiaoping. Without his support, the rectification movement could not continue.

The Tsinghua report, published in the name of the Central Committee marked the end of Zhou Rongxin's tenure as Minister of Education. He continued to be criticized in the national media, one article published in the first edition of *Red Flag* in 1976 attacked his quote from October 1975 when he had warned about a failure to reform education possibly hindering the four modernizations.¹¹⁵ The death of Zhou Enlai on 8 January, 1976 removed any

¹¹³ *Ibid*, pg 7.

¹¹⁴ *A Chronicle of Major Events in Education*, pg.481.

¹¹⁵ "Jiaoyu geming 'tuo sige xiandaihua de houtui' ma?" (Does the education revolution 'hinder the four modernizations?'), in *Red Flag*, Issue 1, 1976, pp.44-48.

residual protection for both Deng Xiaoping and Zhou Rongxin and shortly after Zhou Enlai's death, the radical Left launched the campaign to criticize Deng Xiaoping. Deng's appearance at Zhou's funeral to deliver the eulogy was his last public appearance before he was removed from his official posts. Zhou Rongxin was also removed from his position and forced to attend criticism meetings, despite being hospitalized. He later died on 12 April, 1976.

Following Zhou Enlai's death, the radical Left were able to move to consolidate their position over the Ministry of Education, but interestingly they were either unwilling, or unable, to appoint a new minister who might have supported their line. Instead, the radical Left chose to work outside the official state channels. On 24 February, 1976, Zhang Chunqiao is reported to have approved the establishment of a "temporary leadership small group" (*linshi lingdao xiaozu*) within the Ministry.¹¹⁵ This body was responsible for "political campaigns within the leading bodies and day-to-day work" and appears to have taken over the running of educational matters.¹¹⁶ The small group was staffed by supporters of the radical Left. Zhou Hongbao was appointed head while the deputy head was Xue Yushan. Xue had previously served on the SEG. He was formerly the Deputy Political Commissar of the 75th Artillery Division, a unit based in the Shenyang Military Region under Mao Yuanxin's control. His background was similar to that of Chi Qun and Xie Jingyi. Both Zhou and Xue were investigated following the arrest of the Gang of Four. In addition to these two figures, three other supporters of the radical Left, Yao Li, Ren Weimin and Liu Aifeng were appointed members of the small group.

In another sign of the radical's increasing authority, the magazine *Education Revolution Dispatches* was closed down in January. Zhou Rongxin had used this magazine to publish a number of articles in support of the reformers position.¹¹⁷

¹¹⁵ *A Chronicle of Major Events in Education*, pg.486.

¹¹⁶ *Ibid*, pg.485.

¹¹⁷ *Ibid*, pg.485.

While the radical Left were able to consolidate their control over the Ministry of Education's day-to-day operations, the debate over the correct line in higher education itself appeared to peter out. Following the wave of articles published in the national media in December 1975 and January and February 1976, very few articles appeared in the following months. The special column "How should [we] run socialist universities" was only published intermittently in 1976, before stopping altogether: The seventieth issue appeared in the *Renmin ribao* on 14 December, 1975, but it was a full seven months before the seventy-first issue was published on 21 July, 1976. The main reason for this change appears to be that the debate over policy in higher education was subsumed in a wider political struggle in the run-up to Mao Zedong's death. Many of the articles that appeared used a discussion of higher education to promote the campaign to criticize Deng Xiaoping.

The only major initiative in higher education reported in the period from January to Mao's death was a meeting of education officials from nine provinces and municipalities which met in Beijing in May and June to promote the experiences of Liaoning Province in implementing the system of "from the commune, to the commune". The meeting met from 6 May to the 23 June and discussed what was known as the "three comes and the three returns" (*san-lai, san-qu*). This referred to the original slogan from Chaoyang Agricultural College, "from the commune, return to the commune" which had now been expanded to include two new versions, "from the factory, return to the factory" (*chang-lai, chang-qu*) and "wherever your come from, return there" (*nar-lai, nar-qu*).¹¹⁸ The experiences of Liaoning Province were formally recognized in a report issued by the Ministry of Education on 25 July. The report "A summary of enrollment work in institutions of higher education by Liaoning Province's Education Bureau in 1975" stated:

The experiences of Liaoning Province last year in implementing the

¹¹⁸ *A Chronicle of Major Events in Education*, pg.486.

“three comes and the three returns” in institutions of higher education are very good.

[This system] is one of the most important measures to reform the enrollment and work allocation systems at ordinary schools, to restrict bourgeois legal rights, to deepen the education revolution and to turn schools into tools of the dictatorship of the proletariat and train ordinary workers who have shown themselves to be equal to the workers and peasants. The general orientation is completely correct.¹¹⁹

Underlining the message of this conference, on 22 June the State Council ratified a report by the Ministry of Education and the State Planning Commission on problems in allocating work for graduates from institutions of higher education. The report repeated the line of the Left that it was important for graduates to return to the grass-roots level and engage in production. It went on to say that except where the state had special requirements, graduates should return to their original work units. It added that if students wanted to volunteer to go to the countryside, “this should be supported positively”.¹²⁰

In the following sections I will look at how Hua Guofeng attempted to establish himself as the inheritor of Mao Zedong's legacy in higher education. I will then examine how, following his rehabilitation in mid-1977, Deng Xiaoping mobilized support for reform to China's higher education policy from a broad cross-section of political, military and educational figures. By late-1977 it seems clear that there was a general consensus about the need to restore the national university entrance exams and re-introduce the policy of key-point universities. I will then examine to what extent, if any, Hua Guofeng and his supporters resisted these reform efforts.

¹¹⁹ *Ibid*, pg.486.

¹²⁰ *Ibid*, pg.486.

5. Renewed struggle and the triumph of Deng's line: October 1976-1978

a. Purging the influence of the 'Gang of Four' in higher education: October, 1976-August, 1977

On 13 October, only one week after the arrest of the Gang of Four, the CCP Central Committee sent four officials, Zhang Jizhi, Fan Ge, Xiao Han and Jin Guixiang, to the Ministry of Education to lead a campaign to "expose and criticize the 'Gang of Four'" (*jiefa pipan "Sirenbang" de yundong*).¹²¹ This campaign appears to have been conducted with some vigour in November 1976.

The line that emerged during the campaign to "expose and criticize" the activities of the 'Gang of Four' focused on how the Gang had "distorted" Mao Zedong's higher education policy. The new Party Chairman, Hua Guofeng, seeking to portray himself as Mao's rightful successor, used this approach in a number of other policy areas as well, but in education it hampered his ability to adopt new measures and made it harder to defend this line against the criticism that emerged in the following years.

One of the most significant articles published in the initial period after the arrest of the Gang of Four was printed in the academic newspaper the *Guangming ribao*, 23 November, 1976. The article, by the Mass Criticism Group of the Ministry of Education, was titled "Isn't it easy to distort Chairman Mao's education policies?" a direct reference to the December 1975 article written by the Mass Criticism Group of Peking and Tsinghua Universities, "The direction of the education revolution isn't easy to distort". The *Guangming* article criticized the Gang of Four's education policies and launched a strong attack on Zhang Chunqiao's statement of October 1975 that "I would rather have an uneducated worker than an educated exploiter".

The *Renmin ribao* published two more interesting articles in late-November

¹²¹ *A Chronicle of Major Events in Education*, pg.487.

1976, both attacking key elements of the radical Left's critique of higher education policy. The first article, "Smothering 'The Song of the Gardener' was also in order to usurp the Party and seize power" was published in the *Renmin ribao* 29 November. Interestingly, the article was written by the Propaganda Department of the Hunan Party Committee, Hua Guofeng's old powerbase. In an introduction to the article it was claimed that Hua had played a leading role in having "The Song of the Gardener" made into a play, (the script had been based on an old Hunan opera and had first been used as a basis for a play by actors within the province).¹²² Not surprisingly, the article strongly refuted the Left's criticism of the play and praised Hua Guofeng's role in its production.

The second article, "A reactionary political fraud", appeared in the *Renmin ribao* the following day, 30 November. This article, written by reporters from the *Liaoning ribao*, attacked the way in which the radical Left had manipulated Zhang Tiesheng's letter. Significantly, the article contained a strong defence of the reforms to enrollment procedures introduced by Zhou Enlai and Deng Xiaoping in 1973 that had seen a reintroduction of exams to test university candidate's level of education:

These regulations gave a clear direction for university enrollment work after the Great Cultural Revolution, they were of benefit to achieving the consolidation and development of the proletarian education revolution and possessed a great significance for thoroughly implementing Chairman Mao's education policy and training students to be labourers with [both] a socialist consciousness and an education.¹²³

On 15 January, 1977, the Central Committee approved the transfer of Liu Xiyao to become Minister of Education. At the same time, Yong Wentao was appointed Vice-Minister. These moves mark the first senior appointments in the

¹²² Zhonggong Hunan shengwei xuanchuanbu (The Propaganda Department of the Hunan Provincial Party Committee), "Esha 'yuanding zhi ge' ye shi weile cuandang duoquan" (Throttling "The Song of the Gardener" was also in order to usurp the Party and seize power), in the *Renmin ribao*, 29 November, 1976, pg.2.

¹²³ "Yi ge fangeming de zhengzhi pianju", (A reactionary political fraud), in the *Renmin ribao*, 30 November, 1976, pg.2.

ministry since the death of Mao Zedong. Liu had served as Vice-Chairman of the State Science and Technology Commission until 1963, when he disappeared from public view. In 1971 he had been appointed head of the SEG, however he disappeared from public view again in 1973, reappearing in January 1975 when he was appointed Minister of the 2nd Machine Building Ministry. Yong Wentao had no background in education. Prior to the Cultural Revolution he had served with Tao Zhu in the Central-South Bureau and in Guangdong. He had been purged together with Tao in January 1967. He reappeared in public in November 1972, and prior to his appointment as Vice-Minister he had resumed working in Guangdong Province. Both their backgrounds suggest that they were a "safe pair of hands", rather than education specialists.

The line that had emerged in this initial period supported the reforms introduced in higher education during the Cultural Revolution, for example the idea that candidates for university should be recommended by the masses and that senior-high school graduates should undertake two years of manual labour before they could go on to university. However, in the light of Hua Guofeng's ambitious industrial policy, which sought to achieve a rapid "leap" forward, senior officials appear to have recognized the need for an increase in the numbers of trained graduates leaving China's universities and colleges. Articles such as that defending the play "The song of the Gardener" recognized the importance of education itself and the role it played in socialist construction, other articles also recognized the positive role of intellectuals, reversing the negative attitude adopted by the radical Left. In this period before Deng Xiaoping's rehabilitation, it appears that there was already an acceptance of the reforms introduced by Zhou Enlai, such as the limited exams to test university candidates. What emerges from these early articles is a rejection of the chaos in China's institutes of higher education and a practical recognition of the importance of education itself. However, the reforms of the Cultural

Revolution were still seen as correct. Education, and intellectuals, are seen in a better light, in line with Mao Zedong's 1958 statement that the majority of intellectuals are willing to serve socialism, however, intellectuals were still expected to undergo re-education at the hands of the workers and peasants, and education was seen as a means to educate the masses so that they could consolidate the dictatorship of the proletariat.

Hua Guofeng's line on higher education emerged more clearly from his speech to the 11th National Party Congress, held in August 1977.¹²⁴ At the same time, the national media launched a campaign promoting the experiences of the Jiangxi Communist Labourer's University. It was an interesting choice for a model. The university had been founded in 1957, one of several hundred institutions that had been founded during the period of rapid expansion of institutes of higher education during the Great Leap Forward. It had originally established some 30 branches in some of the poorest areas of the province, including the old Communist base area of Jinggangshan. Aside from this revolutionary cachet of being associated with some of Mao Zedong's old revolutionary haunts, the university may have been attractive as a model as one of Hua Guofeng's key supporters, Wang Dongxing, had formerly been Party Secretary of the University.

On 30 July, the Central Committee instructed all newspapers to print a copy of a letter Mao had sent to the university on 30 July, 1961. The letter, known as the "July 30th' Directive," praised the school for its work-study programs which meant that the university "did not need a penny from the state".¹²⁵ Mao called on all Party, government, and mass organizations to establish similar schools. Mao's simple instructions were developed in a series of articles into an

¹²⁴ Hua Guofeng, *Zai Zhongguo gongchandang di shiyi ci quanguo daibiao dahui shang de zhengzhi baogao*, (*Political Report at the 11th National Congress of the CCP*), (Hong Kong: Joint Publishing Co., 1977).

¹²⁵ "Weida lingxiu he daoshi Mao zhuxi 'Gei Jiangxi gongchanzhuyi laodong daxue de yi feng xin'", (*The great leader and teacher Chairman Mao's "Letter to the Jiangxi Communist Labourers' University"*), in *Hong qi*, Issue 8, 1977, pp.3-4.

extensive argument on the values and aims of education, including higher education. A typical article, published in the *Renmin ribao* the same day as Mao's letter claimed:

Practice makes us realize, Chairman Mao's "'July 30th' Directive" is an important Marxist document, it has important practical significance and deep historical significance for continuing the revolution under the dictatorship of the proletariat, developing the proletarian education revolution, realizing the integration of the intellectuals with the working class and the intellectualization of the working class, narrowing the three major distinctions, constructing socialism and gradually making the transition to communism.¹²⁶

This campaign, together with Hua's speech set out the two key elements of Hua Guofeng's higher education policy: Firstly, upholding what were seen as the achievements of the Cultural Revolution. Here, the reforms to higher education policy introduced during the Cultural Revolution were generally seen in a positive light. It was felt that the reforms had been successful in opening higher education to the influence of the peasants and working class, and had succeeded in transforming the world outlook of intellectuals so that they were now willing to work with the proletariat. The importance of part-work, part-study schools was defended. Secondly, in response to Hua Guofeng's radical industrial plan, emphasis was placed on higher education, in all its forms, training sufficient scientists, technicians and qualified cadres to support industrial and agricultural modernization. Renewed emphasis was placed on academic learning in slogans such as "study for the revolution" (*wei geming xuexi*) and "master the skills needed for serving the people" (*zhangwo wei renmin fuwu de benling*). This emphasis explains Hua Guofeng's support for the reintroduction of tests that had occurred in 1973, and his promotion of the campaign to recognize the role of intellectuals as a whole.

¹²⁶ Jiangxi Provincial Party Committee, "Gaoju Mao zhuxi "qi-san-ling zhishi" de guanghui qizhi shengli qianjin" (Hold high the radiant banner of Chairman Mao's "July 30th directive" and march forward victoriously), in *Hong qi*, 30 July, 1977, pg.2.

Hua's simultaneous support for both continuing with the policies introduced during the Cultural Revolution and recognition of the need for more trained technicians highlights the dilemma he faced in the immediate post-Mao period. As the wider debate shifted (under Hua's leadership), to recognizing that less ideological restraints should be placed on economic and social policy, supporting higher education policies introduced during the Cultural Revolution looked more and more anachronistic. Certainly the ease with which Hua's line was superseded by that of Deng Xiaoping and the moderate coalition suggests that Hua too recognized the limitations of his position.

b. The 'two-line struggle' resumes: August-1977 - December 1978

i. Deng Xiaoping's line on education

Although Deng was not formally rehabilitated until the third plenum held in July, it is clear that following his letter of 10 April to Hua Guofeng in which he contritely admitted making some mistakes, Deng was free to meet with a number of senior Party and military figures. Almost straight away, Deng appears to have engaged in discussions on a number of issues, including education. On 24 May Deng met with Wang Zhen and Party elder, Deng Liqun.¹²⁷ Some of Deng's comments made during this meeting have since been written up in his selected works under the title "Respect knowledge, respect talented people" (*Zunzhong zhishi, zunzhong rencai*). This article represents his first comments on education since the rectification movement of 1975.

Despite not being formally rehabilitated, Deng's comments, as they have been edited, show a determination to reintroduce two of the most controversial elements of pre-Cultural Revolution higher education policy, namely key-point schools and the national, unified, university entrance exam. Like Hua Guofeng, Deng tied his comments to the need to modernize China and train scientists

¹²⁷ Shi Zhongquan and Chen Dengcai (eds.), *Deng Xiaoping zai 1978*, pg.102.

and technicians to take part in the four modernizations. However, unlike Hua, Deng was willing to argue that China had go beyond the Cultural Revolution reforms, or rather that China should return to the policies implemented before the Cultural Revolution. He felt that key-point schools and exams could be justified because they were only way China was going to modernize successfully:

If we want to bring about modernization, the key is improving science and technology. In developing science and technology, if you don't pay attention to education then you won't get far. Relying on empty talk won't bring about modernization, you must have knowledge and talented people. Without knowledge, without talented people, how can we progress? How can we progress when our science and technology are this backward? We must recognize our backwardness, when we recognize this then we have hope.

When paying attention to science and technology at the same time you must pay attention to education. Starting from now, I hope that in five years we will see some progress, in ten years there will have been more progress, and in fifteen years we will have made great progress. In running education we must walk on two legs, that is concentrate both on popularizing [education] and raising standards. We should run key-point primary schools, key-point middle schools and key-point universities. **Using a rigorous examination**, [my emphasis] we must concentrate the outstanding people in key-point middle schools and universities.¹²⁸

Deng Xiaoping elaborated on these comments at more length during a discussion meeting on science and education work, held in Beijing from 4-8 August, only shortly after having been rehabilitated. Deng himself was reported to have convened the meeting which was attended by thirty scientists and educationalists. In his speech to the meeting, Deng announced "I offered to undertake the difficult task of managing science and education work and the Central Committee has agreed".¹²⁹

¹²⁸ Deng Xiaoping, "Zunzhong zhishi, zunzhong rencai", (Respect knowledge, respect talented people), in *Deng Xiaoping tongzhi lun jiaoyu*, (*Comrade Deng Xiaoping on education*), (Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 1990), pp.24-25.

¹²⁹ Deng Xiaoping, "Guanyu kexue he jiaoyu gongzuo de ji dian yijian", (Some opinions on science and education work), in *ibid*, pg.27.

Deng's speech challenged almost all of the Cultural Revolution reforms in higher education. It contained a systematic defence of the role of intellectuals and education. He refuted the negative assessment of intellectuals that had characterized the policies of the radical-Left (although he did not directly mention the "two-estimates" and the 1971 National Educational Work Conference). Deng argued that the work undertaken by scientists and teachers should be seen in the same light as physical labour. Although he recognized the usefulness of part-work, part-study colleges, Deng Xiaoping called for the government's emphasis to be placed on regular institutions, and in particular the key-point schools. Deng called for the system of mass-recommendation for candidates for university to be scrapped and the national entrance exam to be restored. He also said that senior-high school graduates should be allowed to go directly to university. At the heart of his argument was the very practical defence that this was the fastest way to train new personnel and achieve early results (*zao chu rencai, zao chu chengguo*) for economic construction.¹³⁰

Deng's speech challenged a number of the elements of Hua Guofeng's line on higher education as it had emerged since October 1976. His call for the centre to focus its resources on a small number of key-point schools appeared to go directly against the on-going campaign to popularize the experiences of the Jiangxi Communist Labourers' University, a part-work, part-study school. Deng's emphasis was very much on raising standards, rather than popularizing education. Deng's statements that "mental labour (*naoli laodong*) should be seen in the same light as physical labour also appear to contradict Hua Guofeng's speech to the 11th Party Congress where he had repeated that classroom teaching needed to be combined with labour. Most significantly, Deng appeared to be redefining the value of intellectuals, and education itself. No longer was education, and the intellectuals, to "serve proletarian politics". With the main task now to develop China economically, and achieve the four

¹³⁰ *Ibid*, pg.36.

modernizations, education had a full, and equal role to play. This line presaged developments at the third plenum of the 11th Central Committee when the Party's focus was shifted from class struggle to economic construction. In this, higher education appears to have been ahead of many other sectors.

ii. The triumph of Deng Xiaoping's line

During the second half of 1977, Deng appears to have used his own personal authority to overcome resistance to further reforms. By the end of 1977 the unified university entrance exam had been reintroduced and in February 1978, the first list of 60 key-point universities and colleges to be re-established since the Cultural Revolution was announced. During discussions in late 1977 Hua Guofeng continued to defend elements of the Cultural Revolution reforms, however by the time of the first session of the 5th NPC, held in February 1978, Hua appears to have moved to accept many of the policies being introduced by Deng Xiaoping. Although there is little evidence to show why Hua Guofeng made this shift, it seems likely he was influenced by the strength of the coalition against him and his own calls for education to train new personnel to meet the needs of his ambitious modernization programme.

Hua Guofeng seems to have wanted to ensure that the benefits that had accrued to the workers and peasants not be lost, particularly the increased access under the "open schools" policy and through "mass recommendation". It is unclear how much Hua resisted the reintroduction of the national university entrance exam, however, once that decision had been taken, Hua's policy seems to have been one of trying to protect the workers and peasants by having quotas on the numbers of senior-middle school graduates who could directly enroll in university.

Throughout the second half of 1977 it is clear that there was an intense debate on reforming enrollment procedures in China's universities. It is reported that the Ministry of Education held a meeting on enrollment work for

universities in Taiyuan from 29 June to 15 July. This meeting reportedly decided to continue with the system of mass recommendation, but as a compromise they would also allow between 4-10,000 students to enroll directly from senior-middle school. (This would have represented between 2 and 5 percent of all new enrollments)¹³¹ Following the rehabilitation of Deng Xiaoping, the Ministry of Education held a second meeting on enrollment work from 13 August to 25 September. The length of this meeting suggests that there were considerable differences over reform to what was a key element of the Cultural Revolution line. This meeting discussed two draft documents outlining reforms to enrollment procedures for 1977: "Opinions on enrollment work in institutions of higher education for 1977" and "Opinions on enrolling research students in institutions of higher education". These documents were approved by the State Council on 12 October.

"Opinions on enrollment work in institutions of higher education for 1977" represented a clear break from the Cultural Revolution line, and the line adopted by the Taiyuan meeting held only three months before and was a clear victory for Deng Xiaoping and the moderates. The "Opinions" called for the reintroduction of the unified exam. It also called for the abandonment of "mass recommendation", saying that students should be allowed to put their own names forward. The document continued to place the emphasis on workers, peasants, sent down youth and demobilized soldiers, saying that any person in these categories could put their name forward. However, reflecting the influence of Deng Xiaoping, "Opinions" also stated that the percentage of senior-middle school graduates who could directly enroll in university should be raised to between twenty and thirty percent.¹³²

A reorganization of the Ministry of Education in October 1977 must have improved its professionalism by isolating the management of key sectors of

¹³¹ *Ibid*, pg.499.

¹³² *Ibid*, pg.499.

higher education from the part-work, part-study programme. The reorganization appears to have been carried out under the auspices of Deng Xiaoping who had assumed responsibility over educational affairs since his rehabilitation. The ministry established thirteen bureaus and offices, namely: General Office; Political Bureau; Planning Department; Higher Education Department No 1 (this covered the liberal arts, sciences, teacher training and foreign languages); Higher Education Department No 2, (this covered industrial, agricultural and medical colleges); Technical Secondary Education Department; Ordinary Education Department; Workers and Peasants Education Department; Physical Education Department; Student Management Department; Science and Technology Bureau; Foreign Affairs Bureau; and the Production Supply Management Bureau.

At the same time three new Vice-ministers were appointed on 15 October 1977. The three, Li Qi, Li Qitao and Gao Yi all had backgrounds in education or youth affairs, showing an improvement in professionalism amongst senior staff in the ministry.

Through October, November and December, attacks on key elements of the radical educational line increased. On 6 November, the Central Committee published a report by the Ministry of Education which called for the Workers' Propaganda Teams to withdraw from China's schools as quickly as possible.¹³³ Elsewhere, two key model institutions promoted by the Gang of Four were criticized. An article in the *Liaoning ribao* 17 October criticized the way in which the Gang of Four had used Chaoyang Agricultural College as a means to gain control over the CCP. This article sparked a wave of criticism of that institution, and it was later closed down in March 1978.¹³⁴ Elsewhere, the newly re-opened magazine *Renmin jiaoyu* (*People's Education*) published an article criticizing Tongji University's "May 7th Commune", claiming it had damaged the

¹³³ *Ibid*, pg.501.

¹³⁴ *Ibid*, pg.499.

education cause. The commune was also disbanded in 1978, and the original departments that had formed the commune restored.¹³⁵

iv. The National Educational Work Conference of 1978

The National Educational Work Conference, held in Beijing from 22 April to 16 May consolidated the reforms introduced into higher education in late-1977 and early-1978, however the language of Deng Xiaoping's speech, and that of Liu Xiyao, still reflected the influence of the "educational revolution", particularly the idea that China needed to develop intellectuals from the ranks of the workers who were both "red and expert". At the same time, both these speeches stressed the significance of education for economic modernization. The two themes should not necessarily be seen as being opposed. In many ways they reflected Deng's broader approach to policy. He was pragmatic in the way he recognized that economic modernization was essential for China, and the CCP, to overcome the results of the Cultural Revolution. At the same time, Deng never advocated a weakening of the Party's control and he saw education as playing the leading role in political indoctrination. So it was possible for Deng to simultaneously advocate reforms in education that boosted China's economic construction and at the same time continue to stress the political aspects of higher education.

In his report to the conference, Liu Xiyao outlined the contents of the Ministry of Education's 1978-1985 National Education Plan. Liu also called for Communist Labourers' Universities and July 21st Universities to be brought up to the standard of other technical universities and colleges. Liu emphasized that efforts were to be focused on key-point schools and universities. These were to enroll the best students. They were also to encourage specialists from science colleges and other departments to come to teach classes. Liu said that this would facilitate academic exchange and raise the standard of teachers

¹³⁵ *Ibid*, pg.502.

in these institutions. Liu did devote a section of his report to linking education and production, but, aside from being the smallest section of his speech, Liu repeated Deng Xiaoping's warnings that university students should only engage in labour that was relevant to their future careers.¹³⁶ Liu's report was approved by the State Council 8 July.¹³⁷

Deng Xiaoping's speech to the conference was less controversial than some of his earlier speeches and talks, for instance he did not mention the "2-Estimates", nonetheless, it represented a critical attack on Cultural Revolution reforms in higher education and a critique of Hua Guofeng's line. Deng Xiaoping defended the reintroduction of entrance exams and called for teachers to be shown more respect by the whole of society. When discussing education and economic development, Deng called for a rethink of the way education was linked with productive labour:

The rapid development of a modern economy and technology demands that educational quality and education's effectiveness also rise rapidly. It also demands that we constantly have new developments in the ways and methods in which we unite education and productive labour.

If we want to do this, each level and each type of school must make prudent arrangements as to what kind of labour students take part in, how they visit factories or go down to the countryside, how much time they spend [taking part in labour] and how to link this closely with their studies. Even more important is that education must be suited to the needs of national economic development; if studies are irrelevant to practice and practice is irrelevant to studies (*Xue fei zuo yong, yong fei suo xue*), isn't this fundamentally destroying the policy of combining education and productive labour? If we do that what possibility is there of mobilizing the students' will to study and labour, what possibility is there of fulfilling the arduous demands placed on education by the new historical era?¹³⁸

In many ways, the National Education Work Conference had a greater

¹³⁶ Liu Xiyao, "Zai quanguo jiaoyu gongzuo huiyi shang de baogao", (Report at the National Educational Work Conference), in the *Renmin ribao*, 12 June, 1978, pg.2.

¹³⁷ *A Chronicle of Major Events in Education*, pg.517.

¹³⁸ Deng Xiaoping, "Zai quanguo jiaoyu gongzuo huiyi shang de jianghua", (Speech to the National Educational Work Conference), in *Comrade Deng Xiaoping on Education*, pg.63.

impact on higher education than the third plenum of the 11th Central Committee held in December the same year, in that the practical policies confirmed by the work conference were more significant than the policy decisions made at the third plenum. However in one respect, the third plenum was important. The decision taken at the plenum meeting to move the focus of the Party's work from class struggle to socialist construction led to a swift reassessment of the role of intellectuals and an announcement that they were no longer to be subject to reform and re-education. Three months after the third plenum, the "2-Estimates" were also formally discredited. The final section of this chapter will look at the way gradual reforms continued to be introduced following the National Education Work Conference. I will then examine the impact of the third plenum of the 11th Central Committee in higher education.

d. The third plenum of the 11th Central Committee and the eclipse of Hua Guofeng

i. The third plenum of the 11th Central Committee and the reassessment of education: December 1978-March 1979.

By the time of the third plenum, the structure of China's education system, its enrollment and job allocation policies, and the course content and teaching methods had largely returned to their pre-Cultural Revolution position. In this sense the plenum had little impact on practical policies in higher education. However, the plenum's decision to shift the focus of the Party's work from class struggle to socialist construction did lead to an important reassessment of the value and role of intellectuals and education itself. This was symbolized by the formal denunciation of the policy of the "2-Estimates" in March 1979.

The "Communique of the third plenum of the 11th Central Committee of the CCP" did not mention education specifically. The meeting focused on developing China's agriculture and industry, and to this end it announced that the focus of the Party's work would be moved from class struggle to socialist

modernization.¹³⁹ Although it was claimed that the class struggle would be maintained, the Communique added:

However, just as Comrade Mao Zedong said, large scale mass class struggle, carried out like a hurricane, is already basically over. With regards to class struggle in a socialist society, we should resolve [problems] strictly in accordance with the policy of distinguishing between the two different types of contradictions, and resolve [problems] in accordance with the Constitution and laws and regulations. We must absolutely not permit the muddling of the two different contradictions, and **we must absolutely not permit any harm to the stability and unity essential for socialist modernization.** (My emphasis).¹⁴⁰

It was this shift, outlined in the plenum communique, that was perhaps most significant for higher education as it represented a clean break from the negative assessment of intellectuals and the role of education that had characterized the Cultural Revolution reforms. Shortly after the third plenum closed the *Renmin ribao* carried an editorial "Completely and correctly understand the Party's policy on intellectuals" which reflected this change. The editorial claimed that intellectuals were already an integral part of the working class and should no longer be subject to the policies of education and transformation:

During the early period after Liberation, our Party proposed the policy of unite, educate and transform [*tuanjie, jiaoyu, gaozao*], with the bourgeoisie and the petty-bourgeois intellectuals as the main intended targets. Today, for the majority of intellectuals, this is no longer applicable. They are already not the kind of target for uniting, educating and transforming as they were in the early period after Liberation. They are members of the working class who engage in mental labour, they are a dependable force for the Party.¹⁴¹

¹³⁹ *Zhongguo gongchandang di shiyi jie zhongyang weiyuanhui di san ci quan ti huiyi gongbao*, (Communique of the third plenum of the 11th Central Committee of the CCP), (Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 1978), pg.1.

¹⁴⁰ *Ibid*, pg. 5.

¹⁴¹ "Wanzheng de zhunque de lijie dang de zhishifenzi zhengce", (Completely and correctly understand the Party's policy on intellectuals), in the *Renmin ribao*, 4 January, 1979, reprinted in *A Chronicle of Major Events in Educations*, pg.539.

What was important was that intellectuals be freed from the threat of political campaigns so that they could be fully mobilized to take part in socialist (economic) modernization. Universities and colleges were once again to become centres of academic and scientific excellence, places that would train the cadres to lead economic development. They were still expected to carry out political education, but the emphasis was, for the moment, very much on the professional aspects of teaching. This more positive assessment of the role of intellectuals and education in China's development was underlined when the Central Committee approved the Ministry of Education's report calling for the "Summary of the National Education Work Conference", adopted in 1971, to be revoked. It was this document that had contained the "2-Estimates".

8. Conclusion

As this chapter has shown, higher education policy was subject to intense policy debates within the senior leadership of the CCP. During the mobilization phase of the Cultural Revolution, higher education had suffered more than any other field, with the mobilization of students to take part in the Red Guard movement, attacks on teachers and staff and the closure of universities and colleges across China. The inherently political nature of education in general, and higher education in particular, and its role in training a successor generation had led Mao to focus on education and what he saw as the bourgeois domination of China's universities and colleges.

This radicalization in higher education policy and in university and college campuses created the conditions for the radical Left to assume positions of power in a way that, as subsequent chapters will show, didn't happen in areas like agriculture or foreign policy. Supporters of the radical Left like Chi Qun rose to power in key universities like Tsinghua University and on central government and Party organs like the Science and Education Group. This

gave the radical Left access to the policy debate. In addition, they were able to develop institutions under their control into models which were popularized in the media and which had a considerable influence over policy.

Despite this influence over policy-making, it is clear that Zhou Enlai's position within the State Council gave him considerable power over the way policy was implemented. Zhou's personal authority was probably enhanced by the sending down of all the cadres working at the Ministry of Education, effectively closing the Ministry, and placing the onus on Zhou. In addition, it is clear that there were immediate doubts as to the suitability of many of the new worker-peasant students, enrolled under the new selection procedures. Zhou and other reformers appear to have been able to use these doubts to introduce limited reforms to the policies brought in during the mobilization phase of the Cultural Revolution.

Mao's prevarication between the two sides is significant. In the last ten years of his life, Mao appeared to focus more on ideological issues, however this is not to say that he ignored economic factors. His ambivalence on this issue created the space in which both reformers and the radical Left could promote their policies and served to intensify the policy debate. It was only when Mao was convinced that reforms were challenging what he saw as the successes of the Cultural Revolution that he came down in favour of one side, the radical Left.

In contrast to developments in agriculture which I will discuss below, Hua Guofeng made no major policy initiatives in higher education. Hua supported many of the reforms introduced during the Cultural Revolution, but significantly, he did not move to undo the introduction of testing for university candidates. Hua was in an ambivalent position, much of his legitimacy was based on him being the inheritor of Mao's line, however Hua also introduced an ambitious economic policy which required expanded numbers of technicians and scientists. He sought to defend the Cultural Revolution line while accepting the

reforms introduced in 1973-74. Ultimately the imperatives of economic reform exposed this contradiction, and paved the way for the victory of Deng Xiaoping's line. This saw a return to the policies of the pre-Cultural Revolution period, with the reintroduction of exams for university candidates, streaming, and key-point schools, all in stark contrast to the Cultural Revolution reforms.

Chapter Four: Agriculture

1. Introduction

In the late-1970s and early-1980s sweeping reforms to agricultural policy in the PRC were widely seen, not least by the Chinese themselves, as heralding a new phase of development in China following the end of the Cultural Revolution. The historic "Communique of the third plenum of the 11th Central Committee", approved on 22 December, 1978, announced reforms to agricultural policy which in effect represented a return to the post-Great Leap Forward policies of 1962.

The early introduction of these measures might suggest that rural areas and agricultural production had been severely affected by developments during the Cultural Revolution, however a number of authors have argued convincingly that the rural sector was mainly untouched by the mobilizational phase of the movement which caused so much damage to other areas.¹ Indeed it is clear from official documents that the centre was anxious to protect the rural sector from the worst excesses of the Cultural Revolution in order to ensure production.

The significance of maintaining agricultural production, not only to feed China's burgeoning population, but also to supply industry with the necessary raw materials clearly loomed large in the thinking of nearly all of the central leadership, after all, the post-Great Leap Forward famine had occurred only five years before.

¹ See, for example, Richard Baum, "The Cultural Revolution in the Countryside: Anatomy of a Limited Rebellion", in Thomas W. Robinson (ed.), *The Cultural Revolution in China*, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971) and David Zweig, *Agrarian Radicalism in China, 1968-1981*, (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1989). Both authors suggest that the rural sector was largely untouched by the Red Guard movement during the initial stages of the Cultural Revolution, and that it was not until 1968 that radical figures, most notably Lin Biao, attempted to introduce new agricultural policies.

a. The significance of a study of agriculture during the Cultural Revolution

What makes agricultural policy during this period particularly interesting is the difficulty radical leaders faced in both generating and then implementing a set of policies which reflected the ideological imperatives of their broader campaign, but which did not disrupt overall production. Leaders of the radical Left might have dominated the tenor of the debate in higher education, but they could not afford to halt agricultural production in the same way that they had closed China's universities. Agriculture was essential for feeding China's population and generating the raw materials for industry. The economic imperatives proved a considerable restriction on the implementation of a radical agenda for agriculture, and moderates appeared able to make use of problems in production to justify what might otherwise be seen as inappropriate measures in the climate of the Cultural Revolution. A noticeable seasonal cycle in the policy-making process in agriculture emerges, with periods of radicalization being restricted at key points in the agricultural calendar.

From the very start the central leadership, seemingly with Mao's approval, sought to restrict the impact of the Cultural Revolution in rural areas. An editorial in the *Renmin ribao* 7 September, 1967, entitled "Grasp Revolution, Promote Production" banned Red Guards from "interfering in rural politics".² Shortly after this, the Central Committee issued the "Regulations of the CCP Central Committee Concerning the Great Cultural Revolution in the Countryside Below the County Level". The "Directive" specifically prohibited Red Guards from travelling to communes and brigades below the county level and in article two warned that efforts should be focused on agricultural tasks during the forthcoming harvest season.³

Although this ban on Red Guard's travelling to rural areas was later lifted, the

² Richard Baum, "The Cultural Revolution in the Countryside", pg.384.

³ "Regulations of the CCP Central Committee Concerning the Great Cultural Revolution in the Countryside Below the County Level", in *CCP Documents of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution 1966-1967*, (Hong Kong: Union Research Institute, 1968), pg.79.

conflict over the relative merits of production and ideological factors remained at the heart of the debate over agricultural policy throughout the Cultural Revolution and a study of agriculture should offer insights into economic restrictions on radical policy during this period.

In addition, agricultural policy during this period is significant as agriculture is one of the few areas where two leading Party figures, Lin Biao and Hua Guofeng, are thought to have made significant contributions to the policy debate. New information, including a number of speeches previously unpublished offer clearer insights into their thinking on agriculture, and their respective roles.

Following the mobilization phase of the Cultural Revolution, it was Lin Biao, together with Chen Boda, who is reported to have put forward the most radical policies for agriculture.⁴ Lin was also reported to be a strong advocate of Dazhai's distribution system which placed greater emphasis on political attitude.

Hua Guofeng made a number of significant contributions to the debate on agricultural policy, both before and after the death of Mao Zedong. Hua delivered both the key-note speeches at the two Dazhai conferences, held in 1975 and 1976. From 1971, Hua had also been responsible for agricultural mechanization policy, and he developed a comprehensive industrial and agricultural policy which sought to accelerate the pace of mechanization in agriculture. A study of agricultural policy during this period offers further insights into Hua's thinking on this subject which represents his most clearly enunciated policies.

b. Policy issues in the debate over agricultural during the Cultural Revolution

Although there were a wide variety of issues that were debated in agricultural policy during this period, four issues stand out: The level of

⁴ David Zweig, *Agrarian Radicalism in China*, pg.56.

ownership and accounting within the commune; the extent to which political or material incentives, such as the use of private plots, should be allowed or encouraged; how to interpret the significance of the campaign to study the model brigade at Dazhai; and the best way to achieve the mechanization of agriculture.

Following the collapse of the Great Leap Forward, there was widespread criticism of egalitarian tendencies in agricultural distribution and it was proposed that the level of ownership and accounting be lowered to the production team level and that distribution be based once more on work undertaken. The "Regulations on the Work in the Rural People's Communes", adopted in 1962, clearly stated that the production team was to be "the basic accounting unit of a people's commune".⁵ On the whole, the principles contained in the "Regulations" remained in place throughout the period to 1978, however it seems clear that radical figures, in particular Lin Biao and Chen Boda, did place pressure on rural areas to raise the level of accounting once more in the two years before Lin's downfall. Hua Guofeng, popularizing the experiences of Dazhai, also called for the expansion of brigade accounting.⁶

The extent to which political, rather than material incentives should be used to boost peasant enthusiasm and agricultural production was a much more significant point of contention. Associated with this issue was the question of the use of private plots, which were seen by the radicals as a residual attachment to private property on the part of the peasant,⁷ and the use of rural markets to boost peasant income. For the radicals, influenced by Mao's voluntaristic thinking, the use of political incentives to change an individual's

⁵ "Regulations on the Work in the Rural People's Communes (Revised Draft)", in *Issues and Studies*, Vol. XV, No.10, (October 1979), pg.94.

⁶ David Zweig, *Agrarian Radicalism in China*, pg.72.

⁷ David Zweig, "Agrarian Radicalism as a Rural Development Strategy, 1968-1978", in Joseph, Wong and Zweig (eds.), *New Perspectives on the Cultural Revolution*, (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1991), pg.70.

orientation would ensure advances in agricultural production, but moderate figures argued that some form of material incentive was required to boost, and reward, the peasant's output.

The third issue that is of interest in the debate over agricultural policy is the significance of the campaign to study the experiences of Dazhai. This campaign is interesting as it continued, with renewed vigour, after Mao's death and the purge of the Gang of Four when other models in this and other fields were often roundly condemned or dropped. Although there were a number of other model communes, in particular two promoted by the Gang of Four, none was as influential as Dazhai.

The final issue that I will focus on in this study is the issue of agricultural mechanization. Because all sides favoured mechanization, there was less policy debate on this issue than in the other three areas highlighted. However, how to achieve agricultural mechanization continued to be debated, particularly in light of the radicals' views on self-sufficiency for local areas. Hua Guofeng in particular placed considerable emphasis on the role of agricultural mechanization for boosting support for collective agriculture.

c. Agricultural policy during the mobilizational phase of the Cultural Revolution, 1962-1969

As I noted in my introduction to this chapter, a number of authors argue that rural areas of China were not significantly affected by the radical turn of events that occurred in China's urban areas during the mobilizational phase of the Cultural Revolution. David Zweig argues that the first effort to introduce "radical agricultural policies" began in spring 1968.⁹ Richard Baum, in his study of the impact of the Cultural Revolution on rural China writes:

From its advent in the spring of 1966 until mid-autumn of 1968, China's Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution was primarily an urban phenomenon. A substantial majority of China's rural villages not

⁹ David Zweig, *Agrarian Radicalism in China*, pgs. 56 and 63.

only failed to experience significant Red Guard agitation, "power seizures," or internecine factional struggles, but also remained, throughout much of this two and one-half year period, effectively insulated from all but the most cursory information concerning the occurrence of such events elsewhere.⁹

Although Baum contradicts his statement on no power seizures occurring later, on the whole these views appear to reflect the reality of most of China's rural areas. The vast distances and difficult communications certainly served to isolate much of the countryside from travelling groups of Red Guards. While villages may have been isolated from urban Red Guards, Baum does however recognize the threat to stability in these areas posed by the organization of indigenous Red Guard groups and this phenomenon is described in some detail in *Chen Village*.

In Chen Village, a small Red Guard group formed in October 1966, although it appears to have had little effect on the day-to-day affairs of the village. It is clear, however, that other areas were affected more severely. With the advent of the autumn harvest season, it appears that the central leadership was concerned about the damage that might be caused by the spread of the Red Guard movement to the countryside. Reflecting these fears, the *Renmin ribao* published an editorial 7 September entitled "Grasp Revolution, Promote Production" which banned urban Red Guards from travelling to rural areas.¹⁰ Shortly after this the Central Committee issued new regulations which repeated this message, and called for "concentrated efforts" during the autumn harvest.¹¹

The message preventing Red Guards from travelling to rural areas was repeated in a further *Renmin ribao* editorial on 10 November, although for the first time it was stated that "the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution should be

⁹ Richard Baum, "The Cultural Revolution in the Countryside", pg.367.

¹⁰ *Ibid*, pg.384.

¹¹ "Regulations of the CCP Central Committee Concerning the Great Cultural Revolution in the Countryside Below the County Level", in *CCP Documents of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution 1966-1967*, pg.79.

carried out in both urban and rural areas actively and step by step".¹² Richard Baum argues that there were two apparent reasons for this shift: Firstly the "overall leftward swing" which occurred in Chinese politics at this time; and secondly, the continued obstructionism of some local cadres who used the phrase "Grasp Revolution to Promote Production" to emphasize production. While the centre may have resented this emphasis on production, it seems that they were anxious that the autumn harvest be a success. With the autumn harvest over, new regulations published on 15 December, 1966, clearly called for the launch of the Cultural Revolution in rural areas.¹³ The "Directive" called for the formation of Red Guard units in the countryside, made up primarily of the sons and daughters of poor and lower-middle peasants. In response to these new instructions, *Chen Village* describes how a new Red Guard organization was formed which ousted the earlier group whose class credentials no longer met requirements.¹⁴

Following the publication of the new "Directive" there were a wave of attacks on rural cadres in January and February 1967. Many cadres simply refused to work, and faced with the impending spring planting season, the centre was once again forced to take measures to ensure that production was not harmed. A new circular was published on 7 March, 1967 which expressly forbade further seizures of power in rural areas and sought to promote farm work:

The present is the very busy season for spring farming. Under this excellent situation, rural areas all over the country should earnestly implement Chairman Mao's directive, "grasp revolution and promote production," and immediately whip up an earth-shaking upsurge of spring farm work.

During the very busy season for spring farm work, struggle for seizing power should not be carried out in production brigades and

¹² *Ibid*, pg.398.

¹³ "Directive of the CCP Central Committee Concerning the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution in the Countryside (Draft)", in *ibid*, pp.139-142.

¹⁴ Anita Chan, Richard Madsen, and Jonathan Unger, *Chen Village The Recent History of a Peasant Community in Mao's China*, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984), pg.117.

production teams.¹⁵

As part of the movement to carry out spring farm work, large numbers of PLA officers and men were dispatched to communes across China. One effect of sending such large numbers of PLA personnel to the rural areas was to restore social order, disrupted by the January and February "power seizures" in communes, brigades and production teams across China. Aside from an upsurge of Red Guard violence in the first half of 1968, the countryside remained calm for the rest of this period. The military's role in ensuring stability was identical to the role it played in other fields. For the remainder of the mobilizational phase of the Cultural Revolution the focus was on consolidating control in the rural areas. This was to be achieved through the establishment of three-in-one committees, and again, as in other areas, the PLA played a leading role in organizing and staffing these bodies.

Thus towards the end of the mobilizational phase, there was a considerable military presence at the grass-roots level in rural China. Some authors have linked this presence to a radical upsurge in agricultural policy beginning in 1968 and associated with Lin Biao. In the following section I will examine the content of this radical upsurge, and try and identify to what extent it can be linked with Lin Biao.

2. Lin Biao in Command? The Conflict over Agricultural Policy 1968-1971

Lin Biao's influence over China's political system was at its highest in the year immediately before and following the Ninth Party Congress. The collapse of much of the Party and government structure in the wake of the mobilizational phase of the Cultural Revolution and the threat of a Soviet attack had served to raise the prestige of the military and give it a very real role in government, Party,

¹⁵ "Circular of the CCP Central Committee Concerning the Undesirability of Seizure of Power in Rural Production Brigades and Production Teams During the Spring Farming Period", in *CCP Documents of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution 1966-1967*, pg.349.

economic and educational organizations across the country.

In rural areas, military personnel had entered many villages in an effort to restore order and to help to establish new leading bodies. This development is confirmed in *Chen Village*, where the authors describe the PLA entering the village in 1967 to help the villagers elect a "Cultural Revolution Leadership Small Group".¹⁶ Although they left Chen Village as soon as the elections had taken place, the authors do state that a "corps of several junior officers took control of the administration of the commune...."¹⁷

It is this domination by the military of both central and lower-levels of administration that has lead many authors to conclude that Lin Biao, (with the support of members of the radical Left such as Chen Boda), was able to launch a radical agricultural policy.¹⁸ Certainly, beginning in 1968, there was an increasingly radicalized environment in China's countryside. This was reflected in the central and provincial press, with articles in the *Renmin ribao* criticizing the use of material incentives and calls for peasants' commercial activities to be restricted. There was an emphasis on studying and applying Mao Zedong Thought to the everyday activities of the peasants, and calls for the collective rural economy to be developed.

In early 1969 there were calls for a "New Flying Leap" in agriculture. David Zweig ties this new "Leap" to Lin Biao, but claims that Lin launched the campaign in November 1969, some nine months after the *Renmin ribao* had actually carried articles on this issue. Lin Biao certainly made use of Mao's call to "prepare for war" (*bei zhan*), and following the issuing of this new directive there were a number of articles in the media on the need to "store grain" (*chu liang*) in preparation against the threat of a Soviet invasion. There was also renewed emphasis on self-sufficiency, one of the old themes of the "Study Dazhai" campaign.

¹⁶ Chan, Madsen, and Unger, *Chen Village*, pg.130.

¹⁷ *Ibid*, pg. 130.

¹⁸ This is the view of both David Zweig and Jürgen Domes.

The major difficulty in establishing the extent of Lin Biao's involvement in this radical upsurge in the countryside is the lack of material on Lin's own views. Apart from Lin's political report delivered at the Ninth Party Congress, there are few comments by him on agriculture, and even this report is limited to a few sentences. The work report is now known to have been drafted by Zhang Chunqiao and Yao Wenyuan.¹⁹ Interestingly, Zhang and Yao's draft replaced an earlier version drafted by Chen Boda. Zhang and Yao apparently criticized Chen's report for "advocating 'the theory of [only concentrating on] production forces'" (*guchui 'wei shengchanli lun'*).²⁰ This suggests that the policies of Chen Boda, an ally of Lin Biao, were not as radical as those of other members of the radical Left.

The extent of Lin's influence over agriculture can also be questioned as by early-1970, when Lin Biao is still assumed to have retained his influence within the Chinese political system, the radical upsurge in agricultural policy was being challenged in the media. By the end of 1970, a more moderate line had been adopted, which emphasized the production team as the level of ownership and gave permission to peasants to engage in sideline production. I will analyze these developments below.

a. The radical upsurge in China's countryside: 1968-1969

Although the PLA had succeeded in stabilizing the situation in China's rural areas, the general political atmosphere continued to become increasingly radicalized in 1967-68. In particular, as Zweig notes, two political campaigns, the Cleansing the Class Ranks Campaign and the Three Loyalties Campaign increased radical pressures in the countryside, and set the tone for the radical upsurge in rural areas in 1968.²¹ The Three Loyalties Campaign (loyalty to Mao, to Mao's thought and to his revolutionary line) was significant as it led to

¹⁹ Ye Yonglie, *Chen Boda Zhuan*, (*Biography of Chen Boda*), (Beijing: Zuojia chubanshe, 1994), pg. 495.

²⁰ *Ibid*, pg.495.

²¹ David Zweig, *Agrarian Radicalism in China*, pg.57.

an intensification of the "Cult of Mao". The way in which this effected the day-to-day lives of China's peasants is described in *Chen Village* :

To show their loyalty, the Chen Villagers now marched with big wooden placards bearing Mao's portrait to their evening political meetings. There, before the session opened, they joined hands in a circle and clumsily danced Loyalty Dances... to the tune of "Sailing on the Seas Depends on the Helmsman, Making Revolution Depends on Mao Zedong Thought."²²

Before every meal, in imitation of the army... Chen Village families began performing services to Mao. Led by the family head, they bowed to a portrait of Mao; intoned in unison a selection of Mao quotations; sang "The East is Red"; and as they sat to eat, they recited a Maoist grace.²³

In the media, a number of articles extolled the value of studying the "three constantly read works" (*lao san pian*), Mao's three articles "Serve the People", "In Memory of Norman Bethune", and "The Foolish Old Man Who Moved the Mountain". The emphasis was placed on political and ideological correctness, as a means to encourage people to work harder at achieving a better harvest. An article in the *Renmin ribao*, 3 May, 1968 called on peasants to "arm their brains with Mao Zedong Thought" and to "use the revolution to command production" (*yong geming tongshuai shengchan*).²⁴ The same article also called on peasants to "Study Dazhai". In a new development of the Dazhai movement the May article praised Dazhai's peasants for their loyalty to Mao, and the way in which they used Mao Zedong Thought. The article recommended that villages across China follow Dazhai's lead in setting up classes to study Mao's works, however, interestingly, it did not discuss Dazhai's system of distributing work points on the basis of an individual's attitude to work even though the political attitude of a peasant had become a significant factor in Dazhai's distribution system.

²² Chan, Madsen and Unger, *Chen Village*, pg. 169.

²³ *Ibid*, pg. 170.

²⁴ "Quanguo xianqi honghong lielie chunji shengchan huodong" (The Whole Country Launches Mighty Spring Production Activities), in the *Renmin ribao*, 3 May, 1968, pg. 2.

In this increasingly radicalized atmosphere, a number of articles appeared attacking the use of material incentives (*wuzi ciji*) in agriculture. In particular the policy of "*sanzi yibao*" (more private plots for private use, more free markets, more enterprises with sole responsibility for their own profit or loss, and fixing output quotas on a household basis) was heavily criticized for fostering the selfish interests of rich and upper-middle peasants. Peasants were encouraged to study Mao's Thought in order to overcome these tendencies and work harder for the collective economy. Reflecting the radical upsurge, Chen Boda and Lin Biao are reported to have established their own test points in Beijing and Hangzhou respectively. At these sites private plots were said to be restricted and the Dazhai system of distributing work points was instituted.²⁵ If these test points were successful, the official media appears not to have devoted much space to their achievements or to the Dazhai distribution system.

Moving into 1969, there were clearer signs of Lin Biao's involvement in agricultural policy as China made preparations to counter the perceived threat of a Soviet invasion. China's peasants were instructed to "store grain" (*chu liang*) and Dazhai's spirit of self-sufficiency was promoted as resources were diverted to the military. At the same time, China's media called for a "new leap" in agriculture.

One of the first references to the "new leap" (*xin feiyue*) appeared in the *Renmin ribao*, 7 February, 1969. The article praised the efforts of peasants in Hubei for their labours during winter production work and claimed that they had "fired the first shots in bringing about a new leap in agricultural production".²⁶ The article claimed that 2,500,000 peasants in the province were engaged in constructing fields or building and repairing irrigation works during the slack winter months. Interestingly, as well as referring to the campaign to "Study

²⁵ David Zweig, *Agrarian Radicalism in China*, pg.56.

²⁶ "Daxiang nongye shengchan xin feiyue di yi pao" (Firing the first shots in the new leap in agricultural production), in the *Renmin ribao*, 7 February, 1969, pg.4.

Dazhai", the article also claimed that peasants in Hubei were "responding to the great leader Chairman Mao's instruction for 'the whole country to study the PLA'", a reference to the campaign first launched in 1964 which had brought Lin Biao to international attention.

In a speech which otherwise said very little about agriculture, Lin Biao emphasized the need to "take agriculture as the foundation" in his work report at the Ninth People's Congress. Lin Biao also used the work report to the Congress to repeat one of Mao's earlier instructions: "Be prepared against war, be prepared against natural disasters, and do everything for the people" (*bei zhan, bei huang, wei renmin*).²⁷ During preparations for the Congress, serious clashes had occurred between the Chinese and the Soviets along their mutual border in the northeast. These clashes continued after the Congress closed, and the threat of a Soviet attack appeared considerable.

The campaign to prepare for a possible war with the Soviet Union, which was closely associated with Lin Biao, had a major impact on agricultural policy. Beginning in the first half of July, the *Renmin ribao* and *Hong qi* carried a series of articles calling on peasants to "Store grain and prepare granaries, prepare for war and prepare for famine" (*chu liang chu cao, bei zhan bei huang*). Peasants were instructed to make planned use of grain and be economical in how much they used. In this way they could ensure that more grain was sold to the state, and more stored for future emergencies. The emphasis was on self-reliance, both as a means of reducing state-funding, and to ensure food supplies in the event of an attack.

Articles in the *Renmin ribao* 11 July, 1969 introduced the new policies to readers, highlighting the message of self-reliance:

In the past, the Taiping Production Brigade of Tongda Commune was well-known as a brigade which brought [state] grain for its rations and used loans to spend money, it relied on aid to plant its land. In the course of implementing Chairman Mao's great strategic directive,

²⁷ China Problems Research Center *Selected Works of Lin Biao*, (Hong Kong: Chih Luen Press, 1970), pg.46.

“prepare for war, prepare for natural disasters, everything for the people”, this brigade used the revolutionary spirit of self-sufficiency and hard work and firmly grasped revolution, boosting production. In only three short years they had transformed the situation of backward production. Today, not only does this brigade sell its surplus grain to the state, the collective is also able to store grain.²⁸

The article encouraged peasants to rely on their own resources to build granaries, but interestingly, this was still to be done within production teams, not production brigades or at higher levels. In the past, the need to mobilize labour for large-scale capital construction projects had been used by radicals to call for the merger of production teams and raising the level of ownership to the brigade level as a means of freeing more production forces, however the *Renmin ribao* article underlined that self-sufficiency at the lowest possible level was the main order of the day.

Despite this call for construction work to be undertaken at the production team level, statistics show that the overall number of production teams fell in the year 1969-1970, reaching its lowest point since the Great Leap Forward. This demonstrates that local leaders were pressurizing peasants to merge teams to free labour for granary and other construction projects although there was no apparent central policy on this issue. Figures quoted by David Zweig show that the number of production teams fell from 5,100,000 in 1966 to only 4,600,000 in 1969-70.²⁹ One place where this occurred was Chen Village, where land ownership and accounting were transferred to the brigade level at the end of the Three Loyalties Campaign.³⁰

Zweig notes that during 1969 peasants came under pressure to increase sales of grain to the state and that in an effort to achieve self-sufficiency in grain many areas dug up cash crops and private plots in order to grow wheat and

²⁸ “Yikao qunzhong dagao chu liang jian cang gongzuo” (Rely on the masses to carry out work to store grain and build granaries), in the *Renmin ribao*, 11 July, 1969, pg.1.

²⁹ David Zweig, *Agrarian Radicalism in China*, pg.58.

³⁰ Chan, Madsen, Unger, *Chen Village*, pg.172.

rice.³¹ Dazhai's renowned emphasis on self-reliance was the subject of numerous articles, which also stressed the importance of expanding farmed land to boost production further.³²

The issue of the mechanization of agriculture was also tied to moves to develop self-sufficiency at the local level. An article written by the director of the revolutionary committee of a commune in Hubei appeared in the tenth issue of *Hong qi*. The article underlined the importance of Mao's directive that "the fundamental way out for agriculture lies in mechanization" and then defended Mao's policy that collectivization must precede mechanization. Significantly the article criticized individuals who felt a commune required investment from the state to achieve mechanization:

With regards to the question of achieving agricultural mechanization, should we rely solely on state investment, or rely on the strength of the collective and self-sufficiency. Some people advocate holding our hands out to higher [levels] and relying solely on state investment. They say: "the investment required for mechanization is considerable, if we want to do it, then we can only rely on the state." To counter this kind of idea, we have launched a great debate and after studying Chairman Mao's instructions on "self-reliance" and "hard struggle", everybody's thinking was unified and our socialist awareness was raised and a great mass fervour to achieve mechanization ourselves unfolded in a flourishing manner.³³

Overall, it is clear that preparations for a possible war with the Soviet Union had a major impact on agricultural policy in China. There appears to have been a transfer of resources away from agriculture to war preparations, and increasingly localities were encouraged to rely on their own efforts to boost production and achieve long-term policy goals such as the mechanization of

³¹ David Zweig, *op cit*, pg.58.

³² See for example, "Dazhai ren zai jixu geming dadao shang qianjin" (Dazhai's people advance along the broad road of continuing the revolution), in the *Renmin ribao*, 17 September, 1969, pg.2, and "Qianyang xian chu liang jian cang qude xianzhu chengji" (Qianyang county has achieved outstanding results in storing grain and building graneries), in the *Renmin ribao*, 29 August, 1969, pg.4.

³³ "Zai hezuohua de jichu shang shixian jixiehua" (Achieve mechanization on the basis of cooperativization), in *Hong qi*, Issue 10, 1969, pp.64-65.

agriculture. In the drive to achieve self-sufficiency in grain and increase the amount supplied to the state, many regions appear to have further restricted the cultivation of private plots, ploughing these up to grow grain. However, it appears that in the radicalized environment many of these developments at the lower-level were spontaneous, for instance the reduction in the number of production teams, occurring even though no central policy had been announced on this issue.

Lin Biao was closely involved in the preparations for a possible war with the Soviet Union, even Sun and Teiwes who are otherwise quite sceptical as to Lin's participation in the policy process, accept that he played a leading role on this issue.³⁴ However the extent to which he was responsible for the radical upsurge in agricultural policy that characterized this period is unclear as there are no major central policy documents from this period available, and few comments by Lin himself. Nor can any of the model communes described in the central media be easily linked with Lin Biao or his supporters.

What is clear from media reports and anecdotal accounts is that 1968 and 1969 were a time of considerable upheaval in the Chinese countryside. *Chen Village* describes how three separate work teams were dispatched to the village within the space of three months in early 1969.³⁵ There is a degree of confusion between media accounts and developments that appeared to be occurring at the local level, suggesting a high degree of spontaneity at the grass-roots level.

Following the closure of the Ministry of Agriculture during the mobilizational phase of the Cultural Revolution there was little central guidance over China's countryside during this period. What presence there was tended to be in the form of work teams participating in the Three Loyalties Campaign or the Campaign to Cleanse Class Ranks. These groups were concerned mainly

³⁴ Warren Sun and Frederick Teiwes, *Riding the Tiger, Lin Biao During the Cultural Revolution*, (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 1996).

³⁵ Chan, Madsen and Unger, *Chen Village*, pp.181-182.

with the leadership structure in the villages, not agricultural policies per se, however the political climate at the grass-roots level during these campaigns became increasingly radicalized. This trend was reinforced by the calls to prepare for a possible war with the Soviet Union. In this environment it appears that many of the developments at the local level were spontaneous responses to the radical environment, rather than centrally led policies.

b. Conflict over agricultural policy: Autumn 1969-Winter 1970

By the latter half of 1969, it appears that moves were underway to stabilize the situation in rural areas. *Chen Village* reports that the radical upsurge that characterized the two political campaigns "had left peasants confused and emotionally exhausted".³⁶ Without discarding class struggle altogether, the workteam stationed in the village now stressed that increasing agricultural production was to be the main task.³⁷ Significantly, in November 1969, the Central Committee issued a directive which "stipulated that the implementation of the Tachai [Dazhai] distribution system could be postponed if the ideological level of the peasants in a people's commune or production brigade was not high enough".³⁸ There is no evidence of a similar directive introducing the system, however the fact that the Central Committee felt compelled to issue this directive suggests that the pressure to introduce this system had been fairly widespread.

The issue of the Dazhai distribution system was tied to the question of how to boost the peasants incentives to work. It is clear that where the system was implemented, there was general dissatisfaction at the tendency towards an egalitarian distribution of work points which characterized the way the system developed. Rather than truly reflecting an individual's efforts, the Dazhai system soon developed into a fairly standardized form of distribution, with little

³⁶ *Ibid*, pg.178.

³⁷ *Ibid*, pg.181.

³⁸ David Zweig, *Agrarian Radicalism in China*, pg.58.

variations in the work points awarded. Encouraging peasants to work hard became a key issue, and this once again revolved around the question of whether to use ideological or material stimuli to boost the peasants efforts.

At the start of 1970, the *Renmin ribao* carried an editorial which called on rural cadres to pay more attention to the peasants to raise their enthusiasm. As the spring planting season once again approached there were warnings that the main focus of work should be agricultural tasks. "Proletarian politics" were still "in command", but there was a new emphasis on moderating rural policy to increase output. This seasonal cycle in policy had been apparent during the mobilizational phase of the Cultural Revolution and appears to have reflected the concerns of the leadership as a whole that agriculture provide enough food and raw materials. However it is noticeable that the State Council, under Zhou Enlai, began to play a leading role in calling for further reforms in agricultural policy.

On 7 March, 1970, the *Renmin ribao* carried the editorial "Discuss with the masses, reap another plentiful harvest in agriculture". The editorial warned that "human elements were the most important" (*ren de yinsu di yi*). While the editorial repeated the message that peasants needed the "revolutionary spirit of 'self-sufficiency' and 'hard struggle'", cadres were instructed to discuss issues with the peasants and raise their enthusiasm for agricultural work.³⁹ A further article, written under the pen name Zhao Bountiful Year (Zhao Fengnian) appeared in the third edition of *Hong qi*, warning that many rural cadres were afraid to focus on production, especially those that had undergone some form of criticism in the past.⁴⁰

A number of articles appeared criticizing elements of the radical upsurge in the countryside, in particular, moves to raise the level of accounting and

³⁹ "Tong qunzhong shanglian, duoqu nongye xin fengshou" (Discuss with the masses, reap another plentiful harvest in agriculture), in the *Renmin ribao*, 7 March, 1970, pg.1.

⁴⁰ Zhao Fengnian, "Tuchu wuchanjieji zhengzhi, zhuajin chungeng shengchan" (Emphasize proletarian politics, firmly grasp spring ploughing and production), in *Hong qi*, Issue 3, 1970, pp.44-45.

ownership, and the focus on grain production at the expense of other crops. An article in the second issue of *Hong qi* warned that peasants should not be forced into higher levels of collectivization and defended ownership by the production team:

Just as we could only lead the peasants step by step to move away from individual ownership to collective ownership in the past, so we can only lead the peasants step by step in their transition from a smaller system of collective ownership to a greater system of collective ownership, but we cannot and more over should not attempt to complete this course at one stroke.⁴¹

We should see that the People's Commune system we are currently implementing, with three levels of ownership with the team as the base, is basically in accordance with the level of development of production forces. In the current stage we must uphold and perfect this system so as to give full play to the superiority of the People's Commune system.⁴²

Elsewhere, in a sign that the State Council was resuming some control over agricultural policy, it convened a national conference on cotton production in Beijing in early February. This conference was a platform for calls for more all-round development in agriculture, countering the focus on grain production that had characterized the radical upsurge. An article in the *Renmin ribao* 7 March, called for rural areas to implement Mao's directive to "take grain as the key and develop in an all round way" (*yi liang wei gang, quanmian fazhan*).⁴³

The trend in the national media was clearly towards moderating the radical upsurge of the last two years, however Jürgen Domes notes a number of signs that suggested significant opposition towards any movement away from the radical line. The February edition of *Hong qi*, which had carried the warning about not enforcing higher levels of ownership on the peasants also stated:

⁴¹ Quoted in David Zweig, *Agrarian Radicalism in China*, pg. 58.

⁴² Writing group of the Henan Revolutionary Committee, "Wo guo shehuizhuyi nongye de fazhan daolu" (The road of development for our countries socialist agriculture), in *Hong qi*, Issue 2, 1970, pg. 8.

⁴³ "Zi li gengsheng, jianku fendou, ba wo guo mianhua shengchan tuixiang genggao shuiping", (Self-reliance, hard effort, push our country's cotton output to an even higher level), in *Renmin ribao*, 7 March, 1970, pg.1.

The system of collective property in the People's Communes must progress from the lower to the advanced level, and we need even more urgently a transfer of collective property into the property of all the people.⁴⁴

Elsewhere, in a speech to activist representatives on 1 February, 1970, the Commander of the Xinjiang Military Region, General Long Shujin, is reported to have called on them to study the Dazhai distribution system, despite the Central Committee's directive of November.⁴⁵

The two main authors who have written about agricultural policy during this period (David Zweig and Jürgen Domes), disagree on the significance of developments during this period. For Domes, General Long's speech marked the start of a new "Study Dazhai" campaign, launched by Lin Biao and his supporters. Domes suggests this new campaign continued through 1970 and into 1971, but came under increasing criticism, not least by regional military commanders, for the impact it had on peasant initiative.⁴⁶

In contrast, Zweig sees the June-October 1970 Northern Districts Agricultural Conference (which I discuss in more detail below), as marking the beginning of a more moderate phase in agricultural policy. Zweig describes the new "Study Dazhai" campaign launched in September as having been "deradicalized".⁴⁷ The radicals were further undermined by criticism from regional military figures and criticism of Chen Boda, a leading member of the radical Left, following the second plenum of the 9th Central Committee. More moderate policies were then introduced throughout 1971, culminating with the issue of the Central Committee's directive "Distribution in the People's Communes", which criticized "blindly learning from Dazhai".⁴⁸

⁴⁴ In *Hong qi*, Issue 2, 1970, quoted in Jürgen Domes, *Socialism in the Chinese Countryside Rural Societal Policies in the People's Republic of China 1949-1979*, (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1981), pg. 68.

⁴⁵ *Ibid*, pg.67

⁴⁶ *Ibid*, pg.72.

⁴⁷ David Zweig, *Agrarian Radicalism in China*, pg.61.

⁴⁸ *Ibid*, pg. 62.

In reality, the actual situation appears to have lain somewhere between these two accounts. The final communique from the Northern Districts Agricultural Conference certainly reflected a more moderate approach to agricultural policy and called for the "Sixty Articles" to continue to be implemented. However, as Zweig notes, this call appears to have gone unregarded in the immediate aftermath of the conference.⁴⁹ Significantly, the new campaign to "Study Dazhai", launched while the conference was meeting, continued to warn against former landlords and "bad elements" who had entered the leadership and were blocking the campaign and called on peasants to guard against "rightist conservatism". The tone was still one which was heavily influenced by the voluntaristic elements in Mao Zedong's thinking.

The contrast between the communique of the conference, and the early articles in the new "Study Dazhai" campaign suggest at best confusion in the central leadership, and at worst conflict over issues such as the use of material or political stimuli. However, the extent of any opposition to the moderate line is unclear, and may only reflect the uncertain situation nationally as China moved to a period of consolidation and construction after the mobilizational phase of the Cultural Revolution. By early 1971, a number of articles had appeared criticizing developments in the new campaign and underlining the importance of key policies such as the three levels of ownership and peasants engaging in sideline industries.

On 1 May 1970, the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry was established. According to Zweig this represented the start of a "conservative trend",⁵⁰ however, the appointment of Sha Feng, formerly the director of the PLA Armour School,⁵¹ suggests a more mixed picture and reflects the confused message over agricultural policy that characterizes this period, (although his

⁴⁹ *Ibid*, pg. 61.

⁵⁰ *Ibid*, pg. 59.

⁵¹ Michael Lamb, *Directory of Officials and Organizations in China, 1968-1983*, (Armonk, New York: M.E. Sharpe, 1983).

appointment may have reflected the fact that the majority of tractor operators were former tank drivers).

On 25 June, shortly after the establishment of the new Ministry, the State Council convened a preparatory meeting for the Northern Districts Agricultural Conference (*Beifang diqu nongye huiyi*). Following this, the conference opened on 25 August in Xiyang county (the location of the Dazhai brigade). In all the conference ran for over one month and clearly saw an extensive debate over agricultural policy, including a lengthy discussion on the experiences of various regions in conducting the campaign to "Study Dazhai". While the conference was still meeting, a major new campaign to study Dazhai was launched in the national media. A final report on the meeting was issued by the State Council on 5 October, 1970,⁵² however there is little further information on who spoke at the meeting.

In the final report on the Conference, the State Council called on rural authorities to continue to implement the "60 Articles", the moderate document that had been introduced in the wake of the Great Leap Forward to restore agricultural production. On issues such as the level of ownership and accounting and private plots the final report adopted a much more moderate line which is worth quoting at some length:

In December 1967 the Central Committee clearly set down: "Currently, rural People's Communes have a system of three levels of ownership, with the production team as the basis". In February 1969 an editorial in the *Renmin ribao* emphasized once more: "with regards to new problems in policy that have emerged in the course of the movement, especially problems related to ownership, we should handle them cautiously, and seek advice from higher levels.

We must eliminate the residual influence of "the three freedoms and one guarantee", and the "four big freedoms", however where it does not effect the development and superior position of the collective economy, commune members can engage in [working] private plots and family sideline industries. We must resolutely eliminate the residual influence of "material incentive" and "work points in

⁵² For a copy of this report see Huang Daoxia, *Jian guo yilai nongye hezuohua shiliao huibian*, (An Anthology of Historical Material on Agricultural Collectivization since the Founding of the PRC), (Beijing, 1992), pp. 832-833.

command", however we must also uphold the principle of "to each according to their work" and oppose egalitarianism. We must both criticize the mistaken tendency of "allocating everything and eating up all the food" [*fenguang chijin*] and avoid excessive accumulation which might effect commune members income. Under the premise of submitting to the national unified plan, we must allow the flexibility of production teams planting according to their local conditions.⁵³

While the conference was under way, the national media launched a new phase of the long-running campaign "In Agriculture Study Dazhai". The final report issued on 5 October dealt with two issues which it claimed were important if the new campaign was to be successful: Firstly, Dazhai's emphasis on "placing proletarian politics in command" and using Mao Zedong Thought to raise peasants' socialist consciousness; and secondly, ensuring correct leadership of the movement in the commune and brigade. Despite this latter point, the report emphasized that the majority of cadres were good. The report also emphasized that localities should pay heed to their own conditions in implementing the campaign (*jue bu neng bugu ziji de tiaojian*).⁵⁴

The *Renmin Ribao* published a key editorial and leading article on 23 September, based on an investigation of Dazhai.⁵⁵ This was followed by a series of further articles which marked the launch of the new stage in the campaign. The main focus of these early articles was to criticize the influence of the "right" and to warn of the residual influence of landlords, rich peasants and other "bad elements".

The *Renmin Ribao* article stated that the main issue in carrying out this stage of the campaign to "Study Dazhai" was to resolve any remaining problems with leading organs in the communes and brigades. While the article emphasized that only a very small minority of communes had a problem it stated:

⁵³ *Ibid*, pg.832.

⁵⁴ *Ibid*, pg.832.

⁵⁵ "Cong Dazhai dadui dao Xiyang xian" (From Dazhai production brigade to Xiyang county), in *Renmin ribao*, 23 September, 1970, reprinted in *Xinhua yuebao*, (*Xinhua Monthly*), September 1970, pp.128-132.

In a very small number of cases, the leading organs in communes and brigades have allowed bad people to enter. These people allow landlords, rich peasants, counterrevolutionaries and bad people to come out and cause damage. They don't practice socialism, rather they practice capitalism, they don't practice the dictatorship of the proletariat, rather they practice the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie.⁵⁶

During ideological rectification, Xiyang county severely criticized the various forms of rightist conservative thinking which existed amongst the cadres and which were blocking the [campaign] to study Dazhai. People with this kind of thinking felt, "Studying Dazhai involves suffering", "Studying Dazhai is too hard", "Studying Dazhai is too difficult". They only thought of protecting their patch [*shou tan*], they didn't want to do anything new, they only wanted to work slowly, in a small way, not think big or work fast.⁵⁷

The emphasis of this article was clearly influenced by the voluntaristic elements of Mao Zedong's thinking. The article called for peasants to be educated in the revolutionary spirit of "one, not being afraid of hardship and two, not being afraid of death".

As the campaign developed, there are indications that there was a further radical upsurge in the countryside. Jürgen Domes suggests that the Dazhai system of distributing work points became "increasingly predominant", and that distribution was often based solely on political behaviour. In addition he notes other phenomenon reported in the regional media such as confiscation of private plots and restrictions on sideline businesses, attempts to raise the level of accounting to the brigade level and renewed pressure to sell larger quantities of grain to the state.⁵⁸

Peasant opposition to these developments was said to be widespread and a number of key regional military commanders began to voice their opposition. Significantly it was often the military, who drew the majority of their recruits from rural areas, who had the clearest picture of developments in the countryside. Complaints to serving soldiers by family members were reportedly the origin of

⁵⁶ *Ibid*, pg.129.

⁵⁷ *Ibid*, pg.130.

⁵⁸ Jürgen Domes, *Socialism in the Chinese Countryside*, pp. 67-69.

Peng Dehuai's concerns with the policies of the Great Leap Forward. In a speech broadcast twice by the Jiangsu Radio, General Xu Shiyou, commander of the key Nanjing Military Region openly criticized elements of the new campaign:

We must combine revolutionary enthusiasm with a practical and scientific attitude. Blind passion must be avoided. Under all circumstances, we must be considerate of the people's suffering.⁵⁹

Later, in a resolution on launching the movement to study Dazhai, the Guangxi Revolutionary Committee, led by a former comrade of Xu's, General Wei Guoqing, guaranteed peasants the right to cultivate private plots and engage in sideline businesses and warned that agriculture must guard against "interventions from the Right **and Left**" (my emphasis).⁶⁰ Xu and Wei's interventions highlight an important element of the implementation of the new campaign, that is regional variations. Both Xu and Wei were later seen as strong supporters of the moderate coalition under Deng Xiaoping and their interventions must be seen in this light. Although it is beyond the scope of this thesis, it is clear that provincial leaders played an important role in determining the impact of a given campaign within their own bailiwick. Mao Yuanxin's use of developments in Liaoning to support the Gang of Four is a contrasting example.

That the campaign was developing in an unexpected direction was confirmed with the publication of a key editorial in the *Renmin ribao* in early 1971. At the same time another article criticized formalism and commandism in the campaign. Following this, the tone of the column "In Agriculture Study Dazhai" changed, with calls for rural cadres to implement the Party's agricultural policies more thoroughly and in a prudent and cautious manner.

As in previous years, seasonal factors appear significant in the attempt to de-

⁵⁹ Jiangsu People's Broadcasting Station, 28 October and 5 November, 1970, quoted in *ibid*, pg.71.

⁶⁰ *Ibid*, pg.71.

radicalize the movement. The editorial implied that the onset of spring planting lay behind the more moderate interpretation of Dazhai; its first line warned "The busy spring ploughing season will soon be here".⁶¹ Although the editorial repeated the importance of applying Mao Zedong Thought in all rural activities, it also defended the principle of "distributing according to labour" and underlined that in the current stage of development China should continue to implement the system of three levels of ownership in the communes. These points were clearly intended as criticism of developments in rural China since the launch of the new Dazhai campaign.

A second article had been published four days before this editorial which went much further in its criticism of developments in China's countryside over the last four months.⁶² This article criticized formalism and commandism in the conduct of the campaign, and criticized the excessive focus on grain production. It also defended ownership by the production team and private plots, and warned against excessive accumulation at the expense of the peasants' income. On formalism and commandism, the article warned:

Because we've been victorious, some comrades have become arrogant and conceited and think they are terrific, they just think something's OK without carrying out an investigation; they use their impressions to replace policies, engage in formalism, commandism, and what I say goes, or one person alone has a say, they speak lies, they don't follow the true path, they follow evil ways. This is a big obstacle to implementing Chairman Mao's revolutionary line.⁶³

The article also warned against only focusing on grain production (*dandayi*) and called on rural areas to fully implement the policy of "taking grain as the

⁶¹ "Yanzhe Mao zhuxi geming luxian duoqu nongye xin fengshou", (Follow Chairman Mao's revolutionary line to achieve a new bountiful harvest in agriculture), in *Renmin ribao*, 18 February, 1970, pg.1.

⁶² "Dangqian nongye xue Dazhai yundong zhong de yixie wenti" (Some current problems in the campaign "In Agriculture Study Dazhai"), in Huang Daoxia, *An Anthology of Historical Material on Agricultural Collectivization*, pp. 833-835. This document is reported to have emerged as a result of discussions at the 1971 National Planning Meeting held in Beijing from 15 February to 21 March, however, it was first published on the eve of that meeting, and was perhaps rather the result of preliminary discussions on the economy which preceeded the planning meeting.

⁶³ *Ibid*, pg. 833.

key, develop all-round" (*yi liang wei gang, quanmian fazhan*).

Central documents reflected the renewed emphasis on a moderate line, with the State Council again taking a leading role. A State Council report on a conference on cotton, oil and sugar production, approved by the Central Committee on 30 March, underlined the continued importance of the "60 Articles" which had guaranteed private plots and the three-levels of ownership.

Following the publication of the February editorial further articles appeared which emphasized that the Party's agricultural policies should be implemented more thoroughly, underlining the view that recent developments did not match the Party's original intentions. Articles criticized both Left and Right interference. The special column "In Agriculture Study Dazhai" reflected these developments, and also warned of the need for more prudence in studying Dazhai.⁶⁴ An article in the *Renmin ribao* 21 March criticized brigade cadres in a commune in Anhui and seemed to suggest that many of the recent developments in the campaign to study Dazhai had been spontaneous:

...in the last few years, because brigade leaders have not conscientiously implemented the Party's economic policies for agriculture, they have gone against the principle of "to each according to their labour" and damaged the masses enthusiasm for the socialist revolution and effected the movement to study Dazhai.⁶⁵

In August, in a further sign that a more moderate line was in place, a Central Committee notice on state purchases of grain warned against excessive buying of grain and, in a return to using material stimuli, the notice suggested that in plentiful years, the state could purchase above quota grain at 30 percent more

⁶⁴ See for example, "Qianxu qinzhen zuo xue Dazhai de daitou ren" (Be modest and prudent, in becoming a leader in the movement to study Dazhai), in *Renmin ribao*, 8 April, 1971, pg. 3, "Renzhen luoshi dang de zhengce zhazha shishi de xue Dazhai" (Conscientiously implement the Party's policies, study Dazhai in a down-to-earth manner), in *Renmin ribao*, 27 April, 1971, pg. 4, and "Diaocha jiushi jiejué wèntí" (Investigate in order to resolve problems), in *Renmin ribao*, 14 June, 1971, pg.3.

⁶⁵ "Renzhen luoshi zhengce, qieshi xuehao Dazhai", (Resolutely implement policies, thoroughly study Dazhai), in *Renmin ribao*, 21 March, 1971, pg.3.

than the usual price.⁶⁶

It seems clear that by August 1971 a moderate line was in place in agricultural policy and this was to remain the dominant line until late-1973. The period from 1968-1971 was characterized by two radical upsurges in the Chinese countryside, firstly from late-1968 to spring-1970, and then from late-1970 to spring-1971. In both instances, the immediate pressures of agricultural work and securing a harvest appear to have led the centre to attempt to moderate the renewed radicalization in agricultural policy. Identifying individuals, or indeed groups, with specific policy stances during this period is problematic as there are few speeches or quotes available. This makes it very difficult to verify the extent to which Lin Biao was directly responsible for the radical agricultural policies of this period which a number of authors have attributed to him.

Rural China emerged from the mobilization phase of the Cultural Revolution relatively unscathed, however, PLA and militia units had played a significant role in rural areas in helping to establish new, revolutionary, leading organs. It appears that in some areas military personnel also took over the leadership at the commune and brigade level. This presence by the military at the grass-roots level has been seen as enhancing Lin Biao's ability to launch a radicalization of agricultural policy, but this must be questioned as many military units were more interested in securing stability after two years of disruption, rather than continuing with even more radical policies. What appears to have been more significant for the radicalization of rural areas during 1968-1969, as shown in works such as *Chen Village*, were the two Party campaigns, The Three Loyalties Campaign and the Cleansing the Class Ranks Campaign.

In this radicalized environment, many of the developments at the grass-roots

⁶⁶ "Zhonggong zhongyang guanyu jixu shixing liangzhi zhenggou renwu yiding wunian de tongzhi" (Central Committee notice on continuing to implement [the system] of fixing grain requisitions for five years), in *A Collection of Documents on Rural Policy*, pg.325.

level appear to have been spontaneous, rather than the result of central policy. One central policy which did have an impact on rural areas was the movement to "prepare for war" (*bei zhan*). It seems clear that this was directly responsible for moves to increase extraction of grain and calls for rural areas to become more self-sufficient, however there is no evidence that there were calls for production teams to be merged or that private plots be abandoned, rather these seem to have been spontaneous developments in response to the radicalization of the Chinese countryside. When it became clear that these moves were effecting peasant morale, and with spring planting looming, the centre were quick to issue calls for moderation in agricultural policy.

From the spring of 1970 to September the same year, moderates at the centre were trying to implement a more moderate line in agriculture, certainly the final communique of the Northern Districts Agricultural Conference adopted a very moderate tone, issuing a strong defence of ownership by the production team and the right to work private plots. However, at the same time, indications such as the appointment of Sha Feng as the new Minister of Agriculture and Forestry and the launch of a new campaign to "Study Dazhai" suggest a more mixed picture.

The campaign "In Agriculture Study Dazhai", launched in the *Renmin ribao* on 23 September 1970 returned to the voluntaristic elements in Mao's thinking, calling on individuals to not "fear death". As Domes and Zweig note, the winter of 1970-71 saw a second radical upsurge in rural areas, with reports of private plots being confiscated and ownership being transferred to the brigade. Once again there is no sign that these developments were the result of central policy, rather they again appear to have been the result of the re-radicalization of rural areas through the "Study Dazhai" campaign. Once again, when spring planting loomed in 1971, the centre took steps to moderate the tone of the campaign, and by late-spring, early-summer 1971 the centre was once again emphasizing a moderate line in agricultural policy which would dominate until

late-1973.

3. The moderates predominate in agricultural policy: Summer-1971-August 1973

A number of external factors were significant in assisting moderate figures at the centre in implementing a more moderate line in agricultural policy at the end of 1971 and beginning of 1972. Firstly, the death of Lin Biao during his apparent flight to the Soviet Union led to a general de-radicalization of Chinese politics during this period. There was mild criticism of radical policies in a number of policy areas (see for example my comments in the previous chapter on higher education). Secondly, as David Zweig points out, personnel changes at the provincial level saw Lin Biao's supporters on provincial revolutionary committees replaced by regional military figures who backed Zhou Enlai's line. In addition, supporters of the Gang of Four were not represented in large numbers on these committees.⁶⁷

In light of these developments, moderates were able to call for a return to the agricultural policies of the post-Great Leap Forward period, with renewed emphasis on ownership and accounting at the production team level and stressing the importance of private plots. 1971 also saw a major attempt to set out China's agricultural mechanization policy for the next ten years with a national conference being held in Beijing. This conference repeated Mao's basic line on mechanization being achieved through the self-sufficient efforts of communes and brigades, however a report on this conference did warn against accumulating capital resources at the expense of peasant incomes. Hua Guofeng is reported to have chaired this meeting, and he clearly had considerable input into policy on agricultural mechanization, however assessing his impact on agricultural policy in general is much harder.

⁶⁷ David Zweig, *Agrarian Radicalism in China*, pg. 62.

a. Establishing the moderate line: August-December 1971

Although it is clear that the moderate line was in the ascendancy by August 1971, there are indications that this line was not thoroughly clarified until November and December.

Through the second half of 1971, a series of articles in the *Renmin ribao* called for cadres at lower-levels to undergo education in the Party's agricultural policies, and for those policies to be thoroughly implemented. However these articles also reveal that the main target of official criticism, that is "rightist" or "leftist" errors underwent a shift during these months. In particular, two articles by Zhao Fengnian, published less than a month apart, show a significant change in line.⁶⁸ An article printed in the *Renmin ribao* on 14 October focused on what could be termed "errors of the right", warning against "sticking to conservatism" and "only chasing production figures". However, in a second article printed in the *Renmin ribao* on 7 November, the same writer warned against interference from both the "Left" and the Right, and warned that "some comrades... believe that 'Left' is better than Right" (*yi wei "zou" bi you hao*). A second article printed in the *Renmin ribao* on the same day was much clearer in its condemnation of "leftist errors", warning against leftist practices such as collectivizing trees around peasants' homes and not rewarding peasants for handing manure over to the collective.

Criticism of leftist excesses in agricultural policy culminated in 1971 with the publication of the Central Committee's "Directive Concerning the Question of Distribution in the Rural People's Communes" on 26 December 1971.⁶⁹ In its preamble the directive stated that a "rectification movement for criticizing revisionism" had been launched in rural areas, "smashing the

⁶⁸ Zhao Fengnian, "Guanjian zaiyu xian de lingdao" (The key lies with the county leadership), in *Renmin ribao*, 14 October, 1971, pg.3 and "Yansu renzhen luoshi dang de zhengce" (Seriously and conscientiously implement the Party's policies), in *Renmin ribao*, 7 November, 1971, pg.2.

⁶⁹ A copy of this directive appears in *A Collection of Rural Policy Documents*, pp.353-357 and is translated in Jürgen Domes, *Socialism in the Chinese Countryside*, pp.159-164.

counterrevolutionary conspiracy of careerist, conspirator, renegade and traitor Lin Biao". This campaign was tied to successes in promoting the "overall development in agriculture, forestry, animal husbandry, sideline production and fisheries."⁷⁰

The directive focused on six problems in distribution work in communes and brigades which it claimed needed to be resolved. It warned against excessive accumulation by a commune and stated:

We should make every possible effort to enable the peasants to receive better personal incomes in normal situations from the increased production year after year.⁷¹

The directive continued to call for the smooth completion of state grain purchases, but also warned against over-purchase of grain, a problem that had been apparent during the leftist upsurge in the countryside. Significantly the directive also called for the principle of "from each according to his ability and to each according to his work" to be upheld and warned against egalitarian distribution. On Dazhai, the directive warned communes against copying the brigade's experiences without considering local conditions. Underlining the importance of material incentives, the directive called for rural "commercial departments" to "actively" organize sideline occupations and to not "reduce... price[s] so as to promote the development of multiple business in rural areas". A draft document "Certain Questions Concerning the Strengthening of Rural Commerce (Draft)" was published in February the following year which expanded on these points, although it is unclear if this document was subsequently formally adopted.⁷²

This December 26 directive formed the basis for the moderate line in agricultural policy that characterized the period until the Tenth Party Congress

⁷⁰ Jürgen Domes, *ibid*, pg. 159.

⁷¹ *ibid*, pg. 160.

⁷² "Guanyu jiaqiang nongcun shangye de ruogan wenti (caogao)", (Certain Questions on Strengthening Rural Commerce (Draft)", in *A Collection of Rural Policy Documents*, pp.358-367.

in August 1973.

b. Agricultural mechanization

1971 saw a major effort to boost the mechanization of agriculture by China's central leadership, with the convening of a national conference to discuss this issue, and the publication of two major policy documents setting out five and ten year plans for mechanization and reporting the conference's conclusions. There was also considerable coverage of this issue in the central media.

The national conference was chaired by Hua Guofeng. Although Hua Guofeng was still officially working in Hunan at this time, Ting Wang does suggest that he took over responsibility for agricultural mechanization in 1971. Hua's role demonstrates that, at least in agriculture, he played a more leading role than many writers have argued.

The National Conference on Agricultural Mechanization opened in Beijing on 6 August, 1971.⁷³ This was the first serious attempt to discuss this issue since the start of the Cultural Revolution and it is clear that the meeting discussed future plans for mechanizing agriculture in China as on the 16 September the centre issued the discussion document, "The National Programme for the Development of Agricultural Mechanization 1970-1980".

This document adopted a cautious approach to the issue of mechanization, repeating Mao's line that mechanization could only be achieved on the basis of collectivization. In addition, mechanization was tied to, and seen as secondary to, preparations for a possible war with the Soviet Union:

Agricultural mechanization must be linked with [the policy] "prepare for war, prepare for natural disasters, everything for the people". First is prepare for war. Soldiers and armies must always be the first to have food to eat and clothes to wear, only then can they fight, otherwise, even if they have rifles and cannons, they won't be any use. Second is preparing for natural disasters. When they have a natural disaster, if the locality hasn't prepared any grain, cotton or oil for natural disasters, then they will have to rely on the outside to give

⁷³ *Zhongguo nongye dashiji, 1949-1980, (Major Events in Chinese Agriculture, 1949-1980)*, (Beijing: Nongye chubanshe, 1982), pg.140.

financial help, this can't be said to be long-term planning. If there is a war, it will be even worse. Third, state accumulation mustn't be too great, we must think of those people who don't have enough to eat, and only a few clothes to wear.⁷⁴

The "Programme" emphasized that mechanization should be undertaken on the basis of local initiative.⁷⁵ The majority of implements and machinery were to be made at the local level, and to be small or medium sized. To help with this development, local "five small" (*wu xiao*) industries were to be expanded. (The "five small" industries were local, small-scale, iron and steel factories, coal mines, cement plants, fertilizer factories and hydroelectric power plants, an idea Hua would return to later).⁷⁶ The Programme set the target of 70 percent of "main processes" (*zhuyao zuoye*) in agriculture, forestry, animal husbandry and fisheries, to be mechanized by 1980.⁷⁷

Three months after the "Programme" was published, the State Council issued the "Report on Problems in Accelerating the Realization of Agricultural Mechanization". Although this report repeated the basic line of the first document, the tone was less political, and it set out much clearer targets for the next five and ten years. In particular, the need to tie agricultural mechanization to preparations for war was relegated to the last few paragraphs and there was a slightly more urgent note in the calls for Party organs at all levels to focus on this issue.⁷⁸ Interestingly, a 1976 State Council report suggests that this latter point was contested by members of the Gang of Four. Zhang Chunqiao is reported to have complained that "agricultural mechanization is something for the industrial ministries, Party committees shouldn't pay attention to it".

⁷⁴ "Quanguo nongye jixiehua fazhan gangyao 1970-1980", (The National Programme for the Development of Agricultural Mechanization, 1970-1980), in *A Collection of Rural Policy Documents*, pg.328.

⁷⁵ *Ibid*, pg.328.

⁷⁶ *Ibid*, pg.330.

⁷⁷ *Ibid*, pg.329.

⁷⁸ "Guowuyuan guanyu jiasu shixian nongye jixiehua wenti de baogao", (The State Council Report on Problems in Accelerating the Realization of Agricultural Mechanization), in *ibid*, pp.338-352.

Elsewhere, Yao Wenyuan is reported to have blocked publication of the editorial "Mechanization is the basic way forward for agriculture", drafted under the supervision of Hua.⁷⁹ Both Zhang and Yao appear sceptical that the target of achieving mechanization by 1980 could be met, although Zhang's comments, if true, suggest this was not an issue which they saw as a priority.

c. The moderate line in agriculture prevails: January 1972-August 1973

Both David Zweig and Jürgen Domes agree that this was a period where moderates, led by Zhou Enlai, had the most influence over the formation of agricultural policy at the centre. The publication of the December directive on distribution in communes appears to have precipitated a wave of criticism of radical agricultural policies in the provincial media, and in particular criticism of local-level cadres who adopted these policies.

One document that is available outside of China and which is indicative of the overall trend during this period is the somewhat awkwardly titled "Simao District Party Committee's Opinion About the Implementation of the 'CCP Central Committee Directive Concerning the Question of Distribution in the Rural People's Commune'".⁸⁰ Whilst it did criticize the "rightist" line in agriculture, this document strongly advocated key elements of the moderate line, including distribution according to labour, criticism of blind copying of Dazhai and praising peasants' who "overfulfilled tasks assigned".

The Simao document warned that cadres should "pay attention to overcoming egalitarianism and reasonably give rewards to commune members according to the quality and quantity of work".⁸¹ The document also advocated a simple form of production responsibility, the "four-fix" for production teams, namely, "fixed time, fixed quality, fixed quantity and fixed work points".⁸²

⁷⁹ In *A Collection of Rural Policy Documents*, pg.378.

⁸⁰ A translation of this document appeared in *Issues and Studies*, Vol.IX, No.6, (March 1973), pp.91-97.

⁸¹ *Ibid*, pg.92.

⁸² *Ibid*, pg.93.

However, the extent to which peasants would receive material rewards for overfulfilling any quota was unclear as the Simao document simply said peasants should be "praised" if they "overfulfilled tasks assigned". On Dazhai, the document not only warned against blind copying of Dazhai, it also warned that the Dazhai system of distribution should only be introduced with the consent of the masses.⁸³

Chen Village is reported to have dropped Dazhai's distribution system in favour of "piece-rate" working, although they appear to have been considerably more cautious than the Simao district, only finally abandoning the Dazhai system in the summer of 1973.⁸⁴

Two elements of the Directive on Distribution which attracted considerable media attention during this period were the slogans "Take grain as the key, develop all-round" (*yi liang wei gang, quanmian fazhan*) and "Take agriculture as the base and industry as the leading factor" (*yi nongye wei jichu, gongye wei zhudao*). Both slogans had emerged in the post-Great Leap Forward period, and the fact that the media concentrated on them at this point reflects the way in which the central leadership were returning to the readjustment policies Liu Shaoqi and Deng Zihui introduced in the early 1960s in an effort to boost agricultural production again.

The 26 December directive had given considerable prominence to the notion of all-round development in agriculture, that is not focusing exclusively on grain production, a policy closely associated with Lin Biao's call to "prepare for war" under which grain extraction by the state rose significantly. The call for all-round development was repeated in an editorial in the *Renmin Ribao*, 16 April, 1972. Whilst calling for continued efforts in grain production, the editorial warned:

At the same time, we must also take care, grain production and the diversified economy are not two unrelated things, rather they help

⁸³ *Ibid*, pg.92.

⁸⁴ Chan, Madsen and Unger, *Chen Village*, pg. 249.

each other develop. If we want to both increase grain production and have a diversified economy and develop all-round, then there will definitely be certain contradictions in labour power, land, and capital resources. However these contradictions can all be solved. Moreover, as long as we arrange grain production and the diversified economy well, then the able-bodied, the semi-able, the part-time workers and those commune members with a speciality will all be able to work to the best of their abilities and will always have something to do whatever the season.⁸⁵

In response to these calls local cadres in Chen Village reportedly encouraged peasants to expand their fishponds and engage in other "profitable" sidelines.⁸⁶

A series of articles in the *Renmin Ribao* and the provincial press also addressed the issue of achieving a better balance between agricultural and industrial development, summarized in the slogan, "Take agriculture as the base and industry as the leading factor". In general, these articles emphasized the need for the simultaneous development of agriculture and industry, in particular local-level, light industry which could supply machinery and raw materials for agriculture. This idea reflected Hua's point on developing the "five small" industries and suggests his influence, although this cannot be confirmed.⁸⁷ Further articles told cadres to "proceed from actual conditions",⁸⁸ be hardworking and thrifty,⁸⁹ "seek truth from facts",⁹⁰ and to rid themselves of

⁸⁵ "Yi liang wei gang quanmian fazhan", (Take grain as the key, develop all-round), in *Renmin ribao*, 16 April, 1972, reprinted in *Xinhua yuebao*, April, 1972, pg. 1.

⁸⁶ Chan, Madsen and Unger, *Chen Village*, pg. 240.

⁸⁷ See for example, Zhong Licheng, "Zongjie zhengque chuli nong, qing, zhong guanxi de jingyan" (Summarize the experiences in correctly handling the relationship between agriculture, light and heavy [industry]), in the *Renmin ribao*, 22 June, 1972, reprinted in the *Xinhua yuebao*, June, 1972, pp.50-53, "Sichuan sheng Leshan diqu, Guangdong sheng Jiangmen shi, Yunnan sheng Gejiu shi renzhen zhixing 'yi nongye wei jichu, gongye wei zhudao' de fangzhen", (Leshan district in Sichuan, Jiangmen city in Guangdong and Gejiu city in Yunnan are all conscientiously carrying out the general policy of "take agriculture as the base and industry as the general guide"). This was originally a series of articles printed in the *Renmin ribao* on the 2, 7 and 23 of August. Reprinted as a single article in the *Xinhua yuebao*, August, 1972, pp.107-109.

⁸⁸ "Cong shiji chufa, zuo juti zhidao", (Proceed from actual conditions, give specific directions), in the *Renmin ribao*, 13 January, 1973, pg.4.

⁸⁹ "Jianchi qinjian de yuance", (Maintain the principle of [being] hardworking and thrifty), in the *Renmin ribao*, 23 January, 1973, pg.2.

⁹⁰ "Zuo shishi qiushi de mofan" (Act as a model of seeking truth from facts), in the *Renmin ribao*, 8 February, 1973, pg.3.

idealistic tendencies.⁹¹ Behind these instructions there appears to have been implicit criticism of the way in which local cadres had implemented radical policies with little thought as to the consequences in their villages. Certainly, *Chen Village* highlights how many of the radical policies had been implemented with little thought for local conditions.⁹²

A key element of the moderate's line appears to have been to reduce blind copying of central policy and the experiences of other areas. As part of this trend, I have already commented on warnings against repeating Dazhai's experiences in areas where it was unsuitable. This trend towards re-evaluating Dazhai's experiences continued into 1973, as the moderates carried out a reassessment of the significance of Dazhai as a model.

The extent of this reassessment was demonstrated in a speech given by Dazhai's Party Secretary, Chen Yonggui at a meeting of agricultural cadres held in Chengdu in April 1973. In his speech, Chen Yonggui declared that five conclusions could be drawn from a "study of the experiences" of Dazhai:

- (1) The production of grain and the delivery of quotas to the public registration organisation, as well as the peasants' rations, must be raised.
- (2) Forestry, animal breeding, fishing and sideline occupations are to be developed 'in a big way'.
- (3) It is important to make a "great leap" in the building of irrigation and drainage works.
- (4) The mechanisation of agriculture must be strongly encouraged.
- (5) 'Great changes' have to be enforced in all villages.⁹³

Although certain elements of the earlier campaigns to "Study Dazhai"

⁹¹ "Xishua weixin jingshen, jiasu qianjin bufa", (Clear oneself of idealism, quicken the pace forward), in the *Renmin ribao*, 20 March, 1973, pg.2.

⁹² In *Chen Village*, the authors relate how, in order to achieve a degree of self-sufficiency, the peasants were made to grow cotton and to plant wheat and sorghum as winter crops. These were all unsuited to Chen Village's tropical climate and yields were low. In addition, the extra crops reduced nutrients in the soil, and adversely effected output of rice, the villages main crop. Elsewhere, in imitation of Dazhai, the villagers were made to create terraces in the mountainous areas surrounding the village, even though there was insufficient topsoil to make them viable for crops.

⁹³ Jürgen Domes, *Socialism in the Chinese Countyside*, pg.78-79.

remained, particularly the emphasis placed on irrigation works, much of the rest marked a moderation of the campaign. Gone was the emphasis on politics in command" that had dominated the *Renmin Ribao* editorial of 23 September, 1971. Emphasis was now placed on all-round development, encouraging peasants with increased rations and developing sideline industries.

Elsewhere, policy documents and articles in the media endorsed two other key features of the moderate line, ownership and accounting at the production team level, and the use of material incentives to boost production (or at worst a de-emphasis on the use of political incentives, as seen in the reassessment of Dazhai's experiences).

The one area under study in this chapter that remained relatively unchanged during this period was the policy towards agricultural mechanization. The two key central documents adopted in late 1971 continued to advocate the Maoist line of self-sufficiency and local initiative. The main reason for this decision appears to have been the continuing difficulty in finding sufficient capital resources to fund a more significant central- or provincial-led effort. Constrained economically, moderates appear to have been unable to radically alter the line on agricultural mechanization, although they did attempt to moderate its implementation with warnings against excessive accumulation by brigades and communes at the expense of peasant incomes.

Moderates in the central leadership benefitted during this period from a general de-radicalization following the flight and death of Lin Biao. The consolidation of provincial organs had also benefitted the moderates as Lin Biao's supporters were replaced by regional military commanders who were generally more interested in stability following the disruption caused by the implementation of radical policies in the countryside. Supporters of other radical figures like Jiang Qing and Zhang Chunqiao and representatives of mass organizations were only poorly represented on these provincial bodies.

However, beginning in early-1973, radical supporters of Jiang Qing and Zhang Chunqiao launched a counter-attack. Following the promotion of Jiang Qing, Zhang Chunqiao, Wang Hongwen and other radical figures at the Tenth National Party Congress held in August 1973, these attacks intensified. While the main focus of their criticism were reforms in education policy, in April 1974, members of the Gang of Four linked the on-going "Campaign to Criticize Lin Biao and Confucius" to agricultural policy. Renewed political campaigns in the countryside also served to re-radicalize the atmosphere in rural areas.

From late-1973 until the death of Mao Zedong in September 1976, members of the Cultural Revolutionary Left competed with two coalitions of leaders over agricultural policy: moderates, under the leadership of Zhou Enlai, and other Cultural Revolutionary beneficiaries such as Chen Yonggui and Hua Guofeng. Hua in particular played a leading role in agricultural policy during this period, delivering the key note speech at the First National Conference of "In Agriculture Study Dazhai". This period is particularly interesting as it highlights the policy issue on which Hua appeared best able to put forward a coherent policy platform and generate a coalition of supporters for his line. I will examine these developments in the following section.

4. Renewed conflict over agricultural policy: August 1973-September 1976

a. The re-radicalization of the debate on agriculture

Even before the 10th Party Congress in August 1973, there were indications in the media of a re-radicalization of the debate on agriculture. The *Renmin ribao*, (when reporting Chen Yonggui's speech at Chengdu in which he outlined new criteria for studying the experiences of Dazhai), chose instead to report his comments on "smashing conservative thinking" and "going all-out",

slogans of the radical Left.⁹⁴ From April, a series of articles written under the pen-name Guo Dajiang appeared in the *Nongye xue Dazhai* column in the *Renmin ribao*. These articles returned to themes of reforming cadres way of thinking and their working style and relying more on the “pioneering spirit” (*chuanye xing*) of the masses. “Guo’s” articles tied these developments to the on-going *pixiu zhengfeng* movement that had been underway in China since 1971.

It is possible that “Guo’s” articles represent an early exposition of the views of Hua Guofeng and Chen Yonggui. The name Guo Dajiang is a clear play on an early slogan from the campaign to study Dazhai, “crossing the big river”, which referred to fields which produced over 800 *jin* of grain per *mu*. Certainly the first articles did focus on Chen Yonggui and the experiences of Dazhai, however without further evidence their background remains speculative.

In an article printed in the *Renmin ribao* 19 May, 1973, Guo Dajiang warned that cadres needed to understand and trust the masses more. Because rural cadres did not understand that the peasants wanted a total transformation of production conditions, they became timid and conservative, and it was only as a result of the *pixiu zhengfeng* that this way of thinking had been overcome.⁹⁵ In a second article two days later Guo called on rural areas to develop their pioneering spirit in undertaking winter field construction projects and bring about the radical transformation in the countryside which Chen Yonggui had talked about. The emphasis on mobilizing the collective economy was reminiscent of the earliest stages of the Dazhai campaign with its emphasis on organizing production teams into larger units to undertake capital construction projects:

⁹⁴ Guo Dajiang, “Zhi neng dagan, bu neng xiaogan”, (We can only go all out, we can't act timidly) and Party Committee of Su County, Anhui, “Po baoshou sixiang, shu xiongxin zhuangzhi” (Smash conservative thinking, foster lofty ambitions and great ideals), in the *Renmin ribao*, 24 April, 1973, pg 3. Both articles report a speech given by Chen Yonggui, although no date or location is given for the speech.

⁹⁵ Guo Dajiang, “Yao liaojie qunzhong zai xiang xie shenme”, (We must understand what it is the masses are thinking), in the *Renmin ribao*, 19 May, 1973, pg.2.

To transform agricultural production conditions and undertake large-scale basic field construction is a great socialist cause. Only by continuing with the socialist direction and relying on the great strength of the collective economy of the People's Communes will we be able to radically transform agricultural production conditions. And it is only by radically transforming agricultural production conditions that we can fully demonstrate the superiority of the collective economy of the People's Communes and accelerate the development of socialist agriculture.⁹⁶

The emphasis in articles published in the *Renmin ribao* in the run-up to the 10th Congress was very much on fostering the right attitude in both cadres and peasants, and only then would agriculture be able to advance. This may well be a reflection of Mao's growing displeasure at wider developments, or a sign that the radical Left were seeking to use this displeasure to press their own agenda. Policy slogans such as "take grain as the key, develop all-round" continued to appear in the press, but the main themes were educating cadres, fostering the correct attitude and adhering to Mao's line.

At the 10th Party Congress Zhou Enlai delivered the political work report. He called for the Party to continue to implement the policy of "taking grain as the base and industry as the main guide", but he also warned that China's economy was weak and it was still necessary to implement the policies of self-sufficiency and self-reliance, struggling hard and "walking on two legs".

On Dazhai, Zhou returned to the idea of politics being in command, contained in the 23 September editorial. He also repeated many of the themes of the articles discussed above:

[In the campaigns] in industry study Daqing, in agriculture study Dazhai, we must continue to place proletarian politics in command, carry out major mass movements, and fully bring into play the masses' enthusiasm, wisdom and pioneering spirit.⁹⁷

⁹⁶ Guo Dajiang, "Fayang chuangye jingsheng", (Make full use of the pioneering spirit), in *Renmin ribao*, 21 May, 1973, pg.3.

⁹⁷ Zhou Enlai, "Zai Zhongguo gongchandang di shi ci quanguo daibiao dahui shang de baogao" (Report to the 10th National Congress of the CCP), in *Zhongguo gongchandang di shi ci quanguo daibiao dahui wenjian huibian* (A Collection of Documents from the 10th National Congress of the CCP), (Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 1973), pg.32.

David Zweig suggests that a campaign to educate rural Party cadres in the CCP's basic line began "immediately after the Tenth Party Congress".⁹⁸ While the campaign certainly appears to have intensified after the Congress closed, articles in the *Renmin ribao* suggest that this campaign was well underway on the eve of the conference. The new "Line Education Campaign", together with the on-going *pixiu zhengfeng*, and later the Campaign to Criticize Lin Biao and Confucius clearly re-radicalized the environment in rural China and led to a resurgence of radical practices.

Articles in the press returned to the themes of political correctness and criticized "rightist tendencies". One article in the *Renmin ribao* 21 August criticized the tendency of peasants to avoid work that did not receive a high number of work points and called for peasants and cadres to undergo education in the Party's line to overcome this tendency.⁹⁹

As the Line Education Campaign unfolded similar articles appeared in the press throughout 1973 relating its impact in rural areas across China.¹⁰⁰ As China moved into 1974 it was clear that members of the radical Left had been successful in re-radicalizing the debate over agriculture by using these new campaigns to launch their criticism of moderate agricultural policies. A new radical upsurge swept China's countryside through the spring and summer of 1974.

b. A new radical upsurge in agricultural policy: 1974

On 3 April, 1974, the *Renmin ribao* published a front page editorial "Criticize Lin Biao and Confucius, Carry Out Spring Ploughing Well" (*Pi Lin pi Kong, gaohao chun geng*). Immediately following this editorial a short series of

⁹⁸ David Zweig, *Agrarian Radicalism in China*, pg. 64.

⁹⁹ Lin Zhenshan, "Genju dang de luxian, luoshi juti zhengce" (In accordance with the Party's line, implement concrete policies), in *Renmin ribao*, 21 August, 1973, pg.2.

¹⁰⁰ See for example, "Dang de jiben luxian shi laodong renmin de shengmingxian", (The Party's basic line is the lifeblood of the people), in *Renmin ribao*, 21 November, 1973, pg.3 and "Jinjin zhuazhu nongcun zhong liang tiao daolu douzheng de dashi", (Firmly grasp the major task of the two-line struggle in the countryside), in *Renmin ribao*, 3 December, 1973, pg.3.

articles were published in three issues of a special column of the same title, published on the 4, 10 and 23 of April. Opinion as to the impact of the campaign to Criticize Lin Biao and Confucius on agriculture is mixed. Jürgen Domes suggests that attempts by the radical Left to promote the experiences of Xiaoqinzhuang brigade in conducting the campaign to Criticize Lin Biao and Confucius were unsuccessful.¹⁰¹ The short duration of the special column also suggests that the new Campaign had a limited impact.¹⁰² What seems clear is that although the new campaign per se may have had only a minor impact on rural areas, it was a part of a wider radicalization of Chinese politics that occurred in 1973-74 and that again encouraged a return to many of the radical agricultural policies of 1970-71. In particular, the renewed emphasis on political criteria led to criticism of private plots and sideline industries.

Returning to the theme of ideological correctness, the editorial of 3 April stated:

The Campaign to Criticize Lin Biao and Confucius is a political and ideological struggle to uphold Marxism-Leninism and oppose revisionism. As this campaign deepens and develops, our country's millions of peasants' understanding of class struggle and line struggle will be raised, and their revolutionary spirit will be developed even further.

Line is the key link, once it is grasped, everything else falls into place. We must firmly grasp the Campaign to Criticize Lin Biao and Confucius, this task is of primary importance and we must once and for all raise the broad masses of cadres and peoples' awareness of class struggle and line struggle, raise their awareness of continuing under the dictatorship of the proletariat, and turn the Campaign to Criticize Lin Biao and Confucius into a powerful motive force to promote spring ploughing, production and all other work.¹⁰³

Other articles in the column linked the successful implementation of the

¹⁰¹ Jürgen Domes, *Socialism in the Chinese Countryside*, pg.85.

¹⁰² David Zweig suggests that interviews and press reports from the provinces show the campaign did have a significant impact on rural areas. See *Agrarian Radicalism in China*, pg.63.

¹⁰³ "Pi Lin pi Kong, gao hao chun geng", (Criticize Lin Biao and Confucius, carry out spring ploughing well), in *Renmin ribao*, 3 April, 1974, pg.1.

Campaign to Criticize Lin Biao and Confucius with boosting the peasants' enthusiasm for such revolutionary tasks as collecting fertilizer and taking part the construction of irrigation projects.

A significant part of efforts to promote the campaign in rural areas appeared to be the dispatch of work teams made up of regional, county and commune leaders. An article printed in what appears to be the final issue of the special column on 23 April claimed that in the Shantou District of Guangdong, some 10,000 cadres from the district, county and commune leading bodies had gone to over 400 production teams where they had engaged in productive labour and worked with the masses in carrying out the Campaign to Criticize Lin Biao and Confucius.¹⁰⁴

The impact of such large numbers of work teams on rural areas would have been considerable if repeated across China, however in Chen Village the actual content of the new campaign appears to have been beyond the grasp of most peasants:

The new campaign seemed inscrutable. Even the urban youths who remained in the village were totally perplexed about the conceivable relevance of denouncing Confucius.

When the cryptic, indigestible essays maligning "Confucianism" were read out at the mass meetings and it was time for audience participation, the cadres and activists obediently stood up to denounce Confucius and to recount how Confucian feudalistic thinking manifested itself in their daily activities. "But," admits one of them, "we couldn't think of anything to say that had much to do with Confucius or much to do with anything."¹⁰⁵

Accounts in the *Renmin ribao* and *Chen Village* suggest that numerous work teams were dispatched across China, both as part of the Campaign to Criticize Lin Biao and Confucius and the Line Education Campaign, and that

¹⁰⁴ "Shantou diqu nongcun yipian chungeng fanmang jingxiang", (The countryside in Shantou district is a vast scene of spring ploughing activities), in *Renmin ribao*, 23 April, 1974, pg. 4.

¹⁰⁵ Chan, Madsen and Unger, *Chen Village*, pp.250-251.

peasants were mobilized to attend political meetings. David Zweig quotes reports suggesting that there was an upsurge in criticism of private plots and sideline industries during 1974 and that "specialized construction groups" were formed, facilitating the "expropriation" of labour from the production teams.¹⁰⁶ In September 1974 two articles appeared in the *Renmin ribao* promoting the experiences of the Xiaoqinzhuang production brigade on the outskirts of Tianjin. This brigade had been developed as a model on the initiative of Jiang Qing. As well as outlining the experiences of Xiaoqinzhuang during the Campaign to Criticize Lin Biao and Confucius, these articles described how the brigade focused on strengthening the collective economy of the commune, downplaying the function of individual production teams.¹⁰⁷

Clearly, developments in three of the four issue areas I focus on in this chapter indicate that the radical Left were the dominant influence over agricultural policy during 1974, seemingly as a result of the re-radicalization of politics in general. The prominence given to political study and political incentives overturned the tendency towards increasing material rewards seen in 1973. In the "Study Dazhai" campaign, numerous articles repeated the radical line of the 1971 editorial that Dazhai's main experience was "putting proletarian politics in command". Elsewhere there are indications that some brigades restricted the independence of individual production teams, once again focusing on developing ownership at the brigade and commune levels, and expropriating labour for large-scale capital construction projects.

The impact of these developments in rural areas across China was mixed. David Zweig suggests that the implementation of radical policies "varied from place to place and year to year", again suggesting that local leadership was important in their implementation. In one example, one county in Jiangsu

¹⁰⁶ David Zweig, *Agrarian Radicalism in China*, pp.63-64.

¹⁰⁷ See particularly, "Xiaoqinzhuang de zhengzhi yexiao", (Xiaoqinzhuang's political night school), in the *Renmin ribao*, 8 September, 1974, pg.1. This article describes the impact of the brigade's night school in raising the political consciousness of brigade members. The article particularly emphasises the role played by poor and lower-middle peasants.

Province launched attacks on capitalistic tendencies, including private plots and running collective enterprises, however this campaign did not take off in the rest of the province.¹⁰⁸ There were other examples of the radicalization of China's countryside across China, with private plots and sideline industries subject to renewed restrictions in Guangdong and rural fairs closing in Fujian.¹⁰⁹

c. From the 4th National People's Congress to the 1st Dazhai Conference:
January-October 1975

Political developments at the end of 1974 and beginning of 1975 generally favoured members of the moderate coalition with the on-going rehabilitation of victims of the Cultural Revolution strengthening their position. The moderates were able to use their new strength to criticize radical policies. Deng Xiaoping and Zhou Enlai also used the Fourth National People's Congress to re-launch Zhou's slogan of achieving the "Four Modernizations" by the end of the century.

The 4th NPC opened 13 January, 1975. In his work report to the Congress, Zhou Enlai stated that the Party's main task should be completing the Four Modernizations by the end of the century. Zhou's statement redirected attention onto economic issues, and was used as a clarion call by moderates to launch a wholesale rectification of Party and government work, including agriculture. Elsewhere, in a speech that was otherwise dominated by political and foreign policy issues, Zhou did praise the PRC's achievements in agriculture. He claimed that although China's population had risen by 60 percent since 1949, grain output had risen 1.4 times and cotton output 4.7 times, thus "guaranteeing the basic food and clothing needs of the people".¹¹⁰

The new Constitution, adopted by the Congress, affirmed the "three-level system of ownership" (thereby underling the position of the production team)

¹⁰⁸ David Zweig, *Agrarian Radicalism in China*, pg.64.

¹⁰⁹ *Ibid*, pg.64.

¹¹⁰ Zhou Enlai, "Zhengfu gongzuo baogao", (Government political report), in the *Renmin ribao*, 21 January, 1975, reprinted in *Xinhua yuebao*, January, 1975, pg.12.

and guaranteed private plots and sideline occupations.¹¹¹ In his speech to the Congress on amendments to the Constitution Zhang Chunqiao set out the Party's guarantees, and distinguished the new policy from both "rightist" and "leftist" excesses:

The draft revisions have set out regulations [*zuo guiding*] regarding non-agricultural self-employed labourers and regarding commune members being able to run a small number of private plots and family side-line industries. These regulations combine the principle of maintaining socialism with the necessary flexibility, and draw a clear distinction from the absurd proposals of Liu Shaoqi and Lin Biao for fixing output quotas for each household [*baochan daohu*] or abolishing private plots completely.¹¹²

The outcome of the Congress clearly marked the launch of a new moderate line in agriculture, but Zhang's subsequent change of line suggests that he did not support many of the ideas he had discussed in his speech. Key radical policies, such as criticism of private plots and sideline activities were themselves criticized and the role of the production team reaffirmed, however only a month after the Congress closed members of the Gang of Four, seemingly with Mao's support, launched a new campaign to "Study the Theory of the Dictatorship of the Proletariat".

Mao Zedong did not attend the NPC and it is apparent that he was displeased with the outcomes of these meetings. Criticism by Mao of China's eight-grade wage system and the practice of distribution according to labour were published in the *Renmin ribao* in February. Mao criticized these tendencies, saying they were a legacy of the "old society". Mao labelled them "bourgeois rights" and called for these phenomenon to be restricted, through the dictatorship of the proletariat.¹¹³

The new campaign was not directed against agriculture per se, however in

¹¹¹ Jürgen Domes, *Socialism in the Chinese Countryside*, pg. 83.

¹¹² Zhang Chunqiao, "Guanyu xiugai xianfa de baogao", (Report on amendments to the Constitution), in the *Renmin ribao*, reprinted in *Xinhua yuebao*, January, 1975, pg.11.

¹¹³ Jürgen Domes, *Socialism in the Chinese Countryside*, pg. 83.

two key articles published in March and April, Yao Wenyuan and Zhang Chunqiao did discuss the situation in China's rural areas and set out their own policies. Zhang contradicted much of what he had said in his report to the NPC only three months earlier. Further articles appeared discussing the experiences of Xiaoqinzhuang and articles were published on He'ertao, a brigade in Liaoning which had been developed as a model under the auspices of Mao's nephew, Mao Yuanxin.

Yao Wenyuan's article, "On the social basis of Lin Biao's reactionary clique" appeared in the third issue of *Hong qi* and was reprinted in the *Renmin ribao* 1 March.¹¹⁴ The bulk of the article was devoted to a criticism of the current ownership structure and the graduated wage system, in line with Mao's comments printed in the *Renmin ribao* the month before. Lin Biao was also criticized for advocating the use of material incentives. In a criticism which was directed more at the policies of the moderate figures in 1975 than Lin Biao in 1970, Yao Wenyuan attacked an unspecified member of Lin Biao's "clique" for writing: "The principles of distribution according to labour and material benefit' are the 'decisive factor' in developing production forces".¹¹⁵

A month after the *Renmin ribao* published Yao's article, the same paper printed an article by Zhang Chunqiao "On the Comprehensive Dictatorship Over the Bourgeoisie".¹¹⁶ In this article Zhang wrote at some length on problems in the ownership system in China's countryside. Zhang called for the expansion of ownership by the commune, in direct contradiction to his January speech where he had affirmed the importance of the three-level ownership system. He also criticized the policy of continuing to allow private plots and sideline industries:

In agricultural resources, approximately 90 percent of arable land and irrigation machinery and 80 percent of tractors and livestock are

¹¹⁴ For a copy of this article see *Xinhua yuebao*, March 1975, pp.1-6.

¹¹⁵ *Ibid*, pg.2.

¹¹⁶ For a copy of this article see *Xinhua yuebao*, April 1975, pp.5-9.

owned by the collective. Ownership by the whole people [i.e. through the commune] is relatively small. Because of this over 90 percent of grain and all economic crops are produced through the collective economy. The proportion [produced] by state farms is very small. Apart from this, we still continue to have a small amount of commune members' private plots and sideline industries.¹¹⁷

Zhang used figures from his own bailiwick, Shanghai, to call for a growth in the amount of ownership at the commune level:

Taking the suburbs of Shanghai as an example, in 1974, the proportion of overall income earned by the commune level rose from 28.1 percent in the previous year to 30.5 percent, at the brigade [level] it rose from 15.2 percent to 17.2 percent and at the production team [level] it fell from 56.7 percent to 52.3 percent. The superiority of the communes being both larger in size and having a higher degree of public ownership [*yi da er gong*] was more and more apparent.¹¹⁸

Zhang warned that the transition to accounting by the commune would take a "relatively long time", however he called for renewed efforts to be made, and warned against "slackening our guard" just because China had carried out one Cultural Revolution.¹¹⁹

In addition to these long articles, a number of articles appeared in the *Renmin ribao* in the first half of 1975 promoting the experiences of two model communes, Xiaoqinzhuan in Hebei and He'ertao in Liaoning. These articles set out other elements of the Gang's agricultural policies, however they were not as successful in having the experiences of these models incorporated into agricultural policy in the same way that they had with a number of model higher education institutions they promoted, most probably because Dazhai remained the dominant model in agriculture and the Gang of Four appeared to have little influence over its leadership.

Together, these reports and the two longer articles by Yao Wenyuan and Zhang Chunqiao are the clearest exposition of the radical Left's agricultural

¹¹⁷ *Ibid*, pg.6.

¹¹⁸ *Ibid*, pg.6.

¹¹⁹ *Ibid*, pg.7.

policy. Perhaps most important, as seen in the example of Xiaoqin Zhuang, is the use of political education and mass mobilization through political campaigns as a means of bringing about advances in agriculture. The reverse of the same coin was the criticism of "capitalist" tendencies, such as the advocacy of private plots and sideline industries, although it was at least recognized that these were phenomena that must be eradicated gradually. Finally, Zhang Chunqiao had set out a clear call for the level of ownership to be raised progressively to that of the commune. Interestingly, in light of developments at the First Dazhai Conference, members of the Gang of Four appear to have said nothing significant about agricultural mechanization. This would be one of the key planks in Hua Guofeng's policy platform, as set out at the Conference.

On 2 July, 1975, Jiang Qing wrote a letter to delegates attending the Central Committee's All-China Conference on Professional Work in Agriculture in which she repeated the radical Left's call for the focus of work to be on political education. Wang Hongwen apparently attended the meeting, held in Shijiazhuang, Hebei, as the senior Party representative. In her letter Jiang warned the delegates against curtailing ideological education in times of difficulties:

... I hope that the Comrades will understand that the most basic condition for developing an excellent situation is to constantly arm our leadership with the theories of Marxism, to thoroughly investigate and study, to use the arrow of Chairman Mao's Thought to shoot at the ultimate source of the problem, and to oppose the concept that "the people regard food as the first requisite", so when revolution and production are in conflict the grasp of revolution should be somewhat slackened, and in calamities where agricultural production cannot catch up, revolutionary movement should be postponed. Only under the guidance of the correct ideology, can we have correct and effective revolutionary actions and find the ways and means to overcome difficulties.¹²⁰

¹²⁰ "Chiang Ch'ing's Letter to the Delegates Attending the CCP CC All-China Conference on Professional Work in Agriculture", in *Issues and Studies*, October 1975, pg.87.

Criticism of moderate policies and their impact in the countryside was not only confined to members of the radical Left. Immediately following the 4th NPC, Chen Yonggui, who was promoted to the position of Vice-Premier at the Congress, began a series of tours of rural areas, to promote the experiences of Dazhai. However it is clear that many of the developments he saw during his tours made him feel uneasy. Chen subsequently launched a strong attack on "the restoration of capitalism" in the countryside.

Writing in his biography of Chen Yonggui, Yang Quan states that Chen began a series of tours to Guangxi, Fujian, Tibet, Zhejiang and other areas immediately after the 4th NPC had closed.¹²¹ During a visit to a township in Fujian, Yang suggests that Chen was shocked at the continued strength of private enterprise in the area. As Chen's car would arrive at a new spot, small stall holders and private traders would pack up and quickly make their exit. In an internal report of his visit to Changle district in Fujian, made in February 1975, Chen made a stinging criticism of capitalist tendencies in the area:

The restoration of capitalism in the district... of Ch'ang-le has assumed extremely alarming proportions. In reality, the situation there is about the same as during the period of the rule of the Kuomintang. The only thing which is missing is the Kuomintang flag... There are thirty-five groups of people who produce exclusively for their own benefit... They have distributed the arable land to the individual households and have made the individual household into a distribution organ... In an entire *hsien* [*xian*], everybody, cadres as well as the population, are busy with speculation... Some people live in one room with three generations... while the cadres live a life of luxury.¹²²

The failure of the radical Left's efforts to promote their own model brigades and communes led them to try and cultivate Chen Yonggui however Yang Quan suggests that Chen did not get on well with either Jiang Qing or Zhang Chunqiao. Following his appointment to the Politburo Chen moved into the

¹²¹ Yang Quan, *Biography of Chen Yonggui*, pg.239.

¹²² Excerpts of Chen's report are printed in *Zhongyao diqing huibao (Important Reports on the Situation of the Enemy)*, No. 176, (Taipei, 15 October, 1976). Quoted in Jürgen Domes, *Socialism in the Chinese Countryside*, pg. 90.

Diaoyutai state guesthouse, home of the Gang of Four. Chen also reportedly studied with Wang Hongwen to try and overcome his poor literacy.¹²³ However, in May 1975, Chen Yonggui moved out of Diaoyutai into a house very close to that of Wu Jianxian, the model textile worker from Shanghai, who Chen reportedly felt much closer to as the other token model worker on the Politburo. Among Chen's other visitors at his new residence, Yang Quan notes that Hua Guofeng, Chen Xilian and Wu De were frequent callers.¹²⁴ This is one of the few indications of Chen's growing association with Hua Guofeng which would become more apparent at the First Dazhai Conference and subsequently after Mao's death in September 1976.

d. The First Dazhai Conference to Mao's death: September 1975-September 1976

It is clear that in the course of 1975 three policy positions emerged with regards to agriculture: Firstly, that of the moderate figures, under the nominal leadership of Zhou Enlai and including Deng Xiaoping and Wan Li. They continued to support the use of private plots and sideline industries, and sought to protect the role of the production team as the main unit of ownership and accounting. They also downplayed the importance of political education, although this was often done indirectly, by using slogans such as the "Four Modernizations" which placed the emphasis back onto economic issues. Their policies had been set out in the 1971 "Directive Concerning the Question of Distribution in the Rural People's Communes" and the documents passed at the 4th National People's Congress; Secondly, members of the radical Left. They had set out their policies in the two key articles written by Yao Wenyuan and Zhang Chunqiao and in a series of articles promoting the experiences of Xiaoqinzhuang brigade and He'ertao commune. They stressed the importance of political education and mass mobilization, criticized the use of private plots,

¹²³ Yang Quan, *Biography of Chen Yonggui*, pg.257.

¹²⁴ *Ibid*, pg.262.

sideline industries and other "material incentives", and called for the gradual transfer of ownership to the commune level.

At the same time a third line was emerging, centred around two of the leading Cultural Revolution beneficiaries, Hua Guofeng and Chen Yonggui. Hua had had responsibility for agricultural mechanization since 1971. Chen, of course, had been promoted to the Politburo on the strengths of his success in developing the model brigade at Dazhai and together these two had considerable experience in agriculture. It is probable that the articles by Guo Dajiang reflected the views of this group, these articles reappeared on the eve of the conference, however it is only with the publication of Hua's speech at the First Dazhai Conference that the policies of this group are clearly set out. Representatives of the three groups, Deng Xiaoping, Jiang Qing and Hua Guofeng, each delivered a speech to the Conference. Apparently siding with his new protegee, Hua Guofeng, Mao blocked publication of Deng's and Jiang's speeches. Hua's speech was published together with those of a number of leading figures from the Dazhai commune who were closely associated with Chen Yonggui.

Uniquely, for there is little evidence of Hua Guofeng dominating the debate in any other policy area in a similar way prior to Mao's death, Hua's line, adopted by the conference formed the basis of agricultural policy in China for the next three years. It came in for strong criticism from the Gang of Four who roundly criticized Hua for not going far enough. In the months leading up to Mao's death, the main conflict over agricultural policy was between these two groups. It was only following Mao's death and the subsequent arrest of the Gang of Four that Hua could consolidate his control over agricultural policy at the Second Dazhai Conference.

The First Conference on In Agriculture Study Dazhai opened on 15 September in the Shanxi brigade before moving to Beijing for the second half of the conference on 15 October. Over 3,700 delegates attended the first stage

of the meeting, which was held in a makeshift arena converted from a workshop in the brigade's tractor plant. Both Deng Xiaoping and Jiang Qing delivered their speeches at the opening ceremony on 15 September, but interestingly, Hua Guofeng did not deliver his speech until the conference had moved to Beijing, one month later. This was despite the fact that he attended the 15 September ceremonies.

Chen Yonggui, the former Brigade leader of Dazhai, chaired the opening ceremony, and delivered the opening address. Chen used the address to set out the agenda for the meeting, which was to consist of two main subjects: summing up the experiences of the campaign to study Dazhai, and discussing how to achieve the target of basic mechanization of agriculture by 1980.¹²⁵ This latter point clearly reflected the influence of Hua Guofeng, who had chaired the 1971 meeting on agricultural mechanization which had set out this policy. This suggests that Hua had had considerable influence over preparations for the First Dazhai Conference and defining its agenda.

In his biography of Chen Yonggui, Yang Quan makes it clear that Deng Xiaoping was already in political difficulties when he attended the First Dazhai Conference. Although the official report on the opening ceremony states that Deng Xiaoping delivered his speech on behalf of the Central Committee¹²⁶ this may have been little more than a token public recognition of his position as First Vice-Premier. Yang Quan suggests that Deng had been ordered to attend the Conference and had been instructed to only talk about Dazhai. Deng was also reportedly interrupted on a number of occasions by Jiang Qing.¹²⁷ This would have been a significant public slight for Deng as he was a member of the Standing Committee of the Politburo and First Vice-Premier, while Jiang Qing was only a member of the Politburo.

¹²⁵ "Quanguo nongye xue Dazhai huiyi zai Xiyang longzhong kaimu", (The National Conference on Agriculture Study Dazhai solemnly opened in Xiyang), in the *Renmin ribao*, 15 September, 1975, reprinted in *Xinhua Yuebao*, September 1975, pg.4.

¹²⁶ *Ibid*, pg. 4.

¹²⁷ Yang Quan, *A Biography of Chen Yonggui*, pg. 277.

Unfortunately, Deng's speech has never been made public. Yang Quan quotes one sentence by Deng, "When studying Dazhai, I ask everybody to be careful, you mustn't focus only on how much grain is produced, you must study the specific policies of Dazhai and Xiyang...."¹²⁸ Although it is impossible to confirm, this sentence does seem to have been typical of Deng's stance. Jürgen Domes suggests that subsequent attacks on Deng in the spring and summer of 1976 indicate that he called "for a further relaxation of the rural collective economy... and at least the maintenance of the *status quo* which was created by the revision in 1961/2".¹²⁹

In contrast, a full copy of Jiang Qing's speech has been published in Taiwan, even though Mao blocked publication of this speech as well as Deng's. In contrast to what is known about Deng's comments, Jiang's speech focused on ideological issues, warning of the threat of capitalist restoration in the countryside. Jiang listed six problems which continued to hamper agricultural production, all overtly political in their content:

First, capitalism is very much alive in the countryside. Second, basic-level Party committees in certain areas persist in paying little attention to the movement to learn from Tachai in agriculture, do not strive to mobilize the masses, and even exercise passive resistance. Third, leadership in certain places still remains in the hands of bad persons. Fourth, a number of our comrades still lack the fervor to continue the revolution under the dictatorship of the proletariat. Fifth, class enemies are stirring up trouble from their hideouts. Sixth, the peasants still harbor to a serious degree the notion of a small peasant economy. The above-mentioned phenomena must be criticized and corrected from now on in the agricultural rectification campaign.¹³⁰

In her speech Jiang called for a mass rectification movement in the countryside. Her comments were clearly influenced by Mao's voluntaristic thinking, and were reminiscent of the language of the Great Leap Forward. On specific

¹²⁸ *Ibid*, pg.277.

¹²⁹ Jürgen Domes, *Socialism in the Chinese Countryside*, pg.95.

¹³⁰ "Chiang Ch'ing's speech at the National Conference on Learning from Tachai in Agriculture (Summary)", in *Chinese Law and Government*, Spring 1977 (Vol.X, No.1), pg.14.

policies Jiang warned that agricultural workers who had migrated to urban areas should be forced to return to take part in the new mass mobilization. She also claimed, in the name of Mao, that some of the policies laid down in the moderate "Sixty Points" would be amended, although she added that the amendments had not yet been agreed by the Standing Committee of the Politburo.

There were two more key-note speeches, the first by the new Dazhai Brigade Secretary Guo Fenglian on 24 September and the second by Deputy Secretary of Xiyang County, Wang Jinzi on 27 September. This second speech is particularly significant as it foreshadows much of Hua Guofeng's own speech, and suggests a degree of uniformity between Hua and a close associate of Chen Yonggui.

In his speech Wang Jinzi listed the two main achievements of Xiyang county as capital construction of new farm land (*zao tian*) and efforts to achieve mechanization. Hua Guofeng would repeat this message in his speech three weeks later. The line which emerged from Wang's speech was one which recognized the importance of boosting peasant's livelihoods and rewarding hard work, but which also called for the strengthening of the collective economy and raising the level of ownership to the commune level. Significantly, as outlined by Wang, the peasants' enthusiasm for the collective would be boosted when they saw the benefits of participation in large-scale capital construction projects rather than direct political education as emphasized by the radical Left.

Wang stated that the movement to study Dazhai had strengthened the collective economy and led to major developments in ownership by the commune. At the same time however, Wang warned that "major improvements in the collective economy must bring about major changes in people's

livelihoods".¹³¹ Recognizing at least a partial need for material rewards, Wang quoted figures which claimed that the average amount of income distributed collectively across the whole county had risen from 47.5 Yuan per person in 1966 to 94 Yuan in 1974. Wang also called for the principle of "to each according to his labour" to be implemented correctly.¹³²

On mechanization, one of the key elements of Hua Guofeng's speech, Wang called for the pace to be stepped up. He claimed that Xiyang had combined the movement to study Dazhai with efforts to bring about mechanization and used the Dazhai spirit to promote work in this field. Wang underlined that in Xiyang, mechanization had been achieved on the basis of the county's own efforts, 83 percent of investment in tractors, irrigation equipment and other machinery had come from the county itself, and only 13 percent of investment had come from the State. The money for this investment came from increased accumulation following increases in production and the profits of communal enterprises.¹³³

Wang's speech makes it clear that he expected a transition to higher levels of ownership in the near future. Apart from generating the increases in production which would fund higher levels of accumulation for mechanization, Wang argued that participation in large-scale, communal projects fostered a greater degree of unity and cooperation. Hua would return to this theme in more detail in his speech.

The conference reopened in the Great Hall of the People in Beijing on 15 October. Over 7,000 delegates attended this stage of the meeting, which was once again chaired by Chen Yonggui. The only speech at this stage was given by Hua Guofeng and given the month gap between Deng and Jiang's speeches and that of Hua, it seems likely that this speech was intended as a

¹³¹ Wang Jinzi, "Xue Dazhai buduan geming, zhua genben jianchi douzheng", (Study Dazhai's continuous revolution, seize the basics, continue to struggle), in the *Renmin ribao*, 28 September, 1975, reprinted in *Xinhua yuebao*, September 1975, pg.148.

¹³² *Ibid*, pg.150.

¹³³ *Ibid*, pg.151.

summing up of the conference's proceedings.

In his analysis of the First Dazhai Conference, David Zweig suggests that Hua Guofeng was constrained by the presence of Deng which "prevented him from pushing a more radical program".¹³⁴ A closer analysis of Hua's speech shows that he supported key elements of the Left's agricultural program, including the transfer of ownership to the commune level, the reorganization of "people going it alone" (*dan gan*) and the reclamation of excess private plots. Hua appears to have been in a strong position throughout the conference and rather than Hua being constrained, Yang Quan suggests that it was Deng Xiaoping who was in difficulties. The previous chapter on higher education shows that by October 1975, when the second half of the conference opened, Deng had lost the support of Mao and was increasingly sidelined.

Yang Quan appears closer to the truth when he suggests that this conference marked "a turn to the left" (*zhe ge hui deque shi ge xiang zuo zhuan de hui*).¹³⁵ Hua shared the radical Left's objective of strengthening the commune-level economy, at the expense of the production team and brigade. However, while Hua made a passing reference to the radical Left's idea of political mobilization and re-education, it is clear that he saw participation in basic-field construction (*zao tian*) and the mechanization of agriculture as the best means of "educating" the peasantry on the superiority of the commune system. These were the two issues that Wang Jinzi had highlighted as the main achievements of Xiyang county during the conference.

In his speech, Hua Guofeng undertook a partial re-writing of Zhou Enlai's "four modernizations", placing the emphasis on modernizing agriculture as the means to achieving modernization in the other three areas and so underlining the importance of his agricultural reforms. When discussing Dazhai Hua set out six criteria by which to judge if a county had reached the standard of the

¹³⁴ David Zweig, *Agrarian Radicalism in China*, pg. 67.

¹³⁵ Yang Quan, *A Biography of Chen Yonggui*, pg.275.

model commune and become a "Dazhai-type county" (*Dazhai xian*). These criteria reflected the influence of both the radical Left and the moderates, but also contained his own influences, particularly with regards to mechanization and basic field construction:

- 1) It has a core county leadership which continues to implement the Party's line and policies and the unified struggle.
- 2) It has established the superiority of the poor and lower-middle peasant classes, is able to actively carry out the resolute struggle against the bourgeoisie and carries out effective supervision and reform of the class enemies.
- 3) The county, commune and brigade leadership are able to continue to take part in productive labour in the manner of Xiyang county.
- 4) With regards to basic field construction, agricultural mechanization and scientific cultivation, progress must be fast and the results significant.
- 5) As the collective economy grows, the production and income of poor communes and brigades should reach or exceed the current levels of middle-level teams in that locality.
- 6) Agriculture, forestry, animal husbandry, sideline industries and fisheries should all be developed to make major increases in production, make larger contributions to the state and gradually improve the livelihood of commune members.¹³⁶

On distribution, Hua warned against insufficient accumulation by the collective and criticized the phenomenon of distributing everything and eating everything (*fen guang chi jing*).¹³⁷ Perhaps the most significant part of Hua's speech came in a section entitled "Speed up the construction of large-scale agriculture" (*Jiakuai jianshe shehui zhuyi danongye*). In this section Hua discussed the impact of participation in capital construction project and the mechanization of agriculture as a means of boosting the peasants enthusiasm and belief in higher levels of ownership. Field construction and mechanization were not only means of achieving better rates of production, they would also

¹³⁶ Hua Guofeng, "Quan dang dongyuan, daban nongye, wei puji Dazhai xian er fendou", (Mobilize the whole Party, go in for agriculture in a big way, fight to popularize Dazhai-type counties), in the *Renmin ribao*, 21 October, 1975, reprinted in *Xinhua yuebao*, October 1975, pg. 15.

¹³⁷ *Ibid*, pg. 16.

educate the masses to accept higher levels of cooperativization. Hua appears to have substituted this idea in place of the radical Left's emphasis on mobilization through political education and campaigns, and this policy would later be criticized for "focusing only on production forces" (*wei shengchanli lun*).¹³⁸

As this is a key element of Hua's agricultural line, it is worth quoting him at some length:

The experience of Dazhai-type counties everywhere shows, wherever great achievements have been made in basic field construction, the superiority of the commune in being both larger and having a higher degree of public ownership has been shown, the old legacy of the small-producer [mentality] has undergone a major transformation, and there are even better conditions for agricultural mechanization. During the course of basic field construction the peasants awareness of the collective and organizational discipline have both increased greatly, people believe in the collective even more and they have built up their socialist vigour and the [spirit of] "the more I work the more I want to work, the more I work the more I dare to work, the more I work the more I can work". Because of all of this, we have gone a step further in consolidating and advancing the victory in criticizing capitalism and carrying out socialism.¹³⁹

Developing agricultural mechanization doesn't only enable us to significantly raise agricultural labour's production ratio, give more spare time to the broad masses to develop the mixed economy and build a flourishing and wealthy new socialist countryside, it also gives full play to the commune's role as a mixed organization for peasants, workers, merchants, students and soliders. It gives full play to the superiority of the commune, being both larger and having more public ownership and it helps to reduce the three major disparities between town and countryside, workers and peasants and physical and mental labour, all of which is of major significance.¹⁴⁰

Hua phrased his words very carefully, but it is clear that his objective was to encourage people to transfer ownership to higher levels:

The People's Communes possess enormous vitality and truly spurs

¹³⁸ Yang Quan, *Biography of Chen Yonggui*, pg.275.

¹³⁹ Hua Guofeng, "Mobilize the whole Party, go in for agriculture in a big way, fight to popularize Dazhai-type counties", in *Xinhua Yuebao*, October 1975, pg. 17.

¹⁴⁰ *Ibid*, pg.17.

on progress in all our nation's agricultural tasks. In the current stage, the People's Commune system of "three levels of ownership, with the production team as the base" is basically in accordance with the [conditions] in the majority of areas and with the development of production forces. At the same time, we should see that following the development of the campaign to build Dazhai-type counties, following the development of large-scale socialist agriculture, particularly the strengthening of the commune and brigade economies, this kind of system which has the production team as the basic accounting unit, will, when the time is right, gradually transform into a system with the brigade, or even the commune, as the basic accounting unit. Looking even further, the People's Communes must change from collective ownership to ownership by the whole people, and then from the socialist type of ownership by the whole people to communist ownership by the whole people.¹⁴¹

Hua Guofeng's comments on raising the level of ownership to that of the commune echoed Jiang Qing's speech and other articles by members of the Gang of Four. However, Hua's apparent de-emphasis of political education and mass rectification, in favour of participation in labour as a means of educating the masses, drew criticism from Jiang Qing, Zhang Chunqiao and Yao Wenyuan. Hua's recognition of the need to boost peasant livelihoods also appears to have attracted the criticism of the radical Left.

Jiang Qing criticized Hua's report for being "revisionist", however the report was approved by Mao and distributed as Central Committee document No. 21.¹⁴² It was published in the *Renmin ribao* on the 21 October, however Yao Wenyuan was apparently successful in blocking its publication in *Hong qi*. In addition, Zhang Chunqiao barred the distribution of Hua's report in Shanghai and organized a number of close colleagues in Shanghai to criticize Hua's report "clause by clause".¹⁴³ In some areas, supporters of the Gang of Four were able to block work teams sent out to implement the report from entering rural areas.

The death of Zhou Enlai and the subsequent ouster of Deng Xiaoping

¹⁴¹ *Ibid*, pg. 18.

¹⁴² Yang Quan, *A Biography of Chen Yonggui*, pg.277.

¹⁴³ Ting Wang, *Chairman Hua Leader of the Chinese Communists*, (London: C. Hurst, 1980), pp.97-98.

temporarily put an end to the moderate line in agriculture. In higher education, the death of Zhou and the removal of Deng largely put an end to the policy debate in this issue area because two key opponents to the Gang of Four were no longer present. Policy conflict over higher education largely faded until the death of Mao Zedong. The case of agriculture was different: Hua Guofeng had set out a new policy position at the First Dazhai Conference, which adopted a middle-line between the moderates and the radical Left. His appointment as acting-Premier nominally gave him the power to implement this line. Although the policy debate over agriculture was gradually subsumed in the wider intensifying political conflict in the run-up to Mao's death, Hua's strength on this issue appears to have ensured that he remained a target for criticism from the Gang of Four and agriculture remained an important issue through the first half of 1976.

The impact of Hua Guofeng's speech was mainly felt in the mobilization of peasants and workers to participate in capital-construction projects, traditionally organized during the slack winter season. David Zweig reports that during the winter of 1975-76 some 130 million people worked on construction projects, "with more turning out than ever before for winter field work in Hebei, Shandong, Anhui, Henan, Guangdong, Jiangxi, and Xinjiang".¹⁴⁴ In addition as many as 1.6 million cadres were sent to the grassroots to work, although many of these were transferred as part of the on-going Line Education Campaign.

Attacks on Hua Guofeng's agricultural policies by the radical Left were stepped up following the April Tian'anmen Incident and the second purge of Deng Xiaoping. In his speech to the Second Dazhai Conference, held in December 1976, Chen Yonggui stated that in April of that year the Gang of Four had blocked an attempt to reaffirm Hua's speech at the first conference,

¹⁴⁴ David Zweig, *Agrarian Radicalism in China*, fn. 102, pg. 67.

stopping the speech from being republished.¹⁴⁵ The Campaign to Counter-attack the Rightist Wind to Reverse Verdicts offered the radical Left new opportunities to attack Hua's line by linking it to criticism of Deng Xiaoping.

An article published in *Hong qi* in April was an implicit criticism of Hua's policies, claiming that the most basic experience of Dazhai was the need for continued class struggle:

Dazhai has a wealth of experience, but if we concentrate them into one lesson, then that is that we must always firmly grasp the key link of class struggle, carry out mass criticism of revisionism and capitalism and work energetically for socialism.¹⁴⁶

Another article in the same issue reportedly accused Deng Xiaoping of ignoring Dazhai's emphasis on class struggle.¹⁴⁷

Yang Quan suggests that Deng Xiaoping's speech at the First Dazhai Conference came in for criticism as part of the Campaign to Counter-attack the Rightist Tendency to Reverse Verdicts. While this might be expected, Yang also suggests that the whole conference was criticized as an attempt to "overturn correct verdicts" (*fan an*). Yang reports that a number of big character posters appeared criticizing Chen Yonggui's speech for only concentrating on productive forces (*wei shengchanli lun*), and so ignoring the importance of political and ideological issues.¹⁴⁸

Elsewhere in the media, an article appeared in the *Renmin ribao* in late June linking the Campaign to Criticize Deng Xiaoping with the on-going movement to study Dazhai. This article also criticized what it said was the tendency to focus only on productive forces:

At the start of the Campaign to Counter-attack the Rightist tendency to reverse verdicts, the county committee mobilized the masses to

¹⁴⁵ *Ibid*, pg. 68.

¹⁴⁶ Lu Yang, "Xue Dazhai yao yi jieji douzheng wei gang", (In studying Dazhai we must take class struggle as the key link), in *Hong qi*, Issue 4, 1975, pg. 63.

¹⁴⁷ David Zweig, *Agrarian Radicalism in China*, pg. 68.

¹⁴⁸ Yang Quan, *A Biography of Chen Yonggui*, pg. 277.

relate these ideological tendencies and criticism of the tendency to concentrate on productive forces. This led the broad masses of cadres and people to realise, only concentrating on productive forces and developing socialist production are two separate things, and criticising only focusing on productive forces is not the same as criticising developing socialist production. Criticising concentrating on productive forces is criticising the revisionist line of not taking class struggle as the key link in all work. Only by thoroughly criticising concentrating on productive forces can we successfully carry out socialist production.¹⁴⁹

Although the main target of criticism in the article is Deng, the way in which the same criticism was directed at Chen Yonggui suggests that the radical Left were using this campaign to indirectly attack Hua Guofeng, in much the same way they used the Campaign to Criticize Lin Biao and Confucius to attack Zhou Enlai. As a consequence of the radical's attacks, David Zweig reports that there was a further radical upsurge in the countryside, with many areas reporting they had adopted the He'ertao commune's system of controlling trade fairs, renewed restrictions on private plots and sideline industries and the introduction of brigade accounting.¹⁵⁰ It should be noted however that the latter two policies had been advocated by Hua Guofeng in his speech to the First Dazhai Conference and so it is unclear how much they were a result of radical pressure and how much it was a result of Hua's own advocacy of these policies.

Whether or not the radical Left were responsible for this new upsurge in the countryside, by the second half of 1976 the debate over agricultural policy had been subsumed in the intensifying struggle at the centre and the media were focusing on other issues.

¹⁴⁹ "Pi Deng douzheng youli tuidong Xiyang xue Dazhai yundong", (The struggle to criticize Deng Xiaoping is a powerful motive force in Xiyang's movement to study Dazhai), in the *Renmin ribao*, 28 June, 1976, reprinted in *Xinhua Monthly*, June, 1976, pg.143.

¹⁵⁰ David Zweig, *Agrarian Radicalism in China*, pg. 69.

5. Hua Guofeng, Wan Li and production responsibility systems: October 1976-December 1978

a. Hua consolidates his position: October-December, 1976

Following the arrest of the Gang of Four in October Hua Guofeng sought to consolidate his position as the new leader of the CCP. Agriculture, and the conflict with the Gang of Four over agricultural policy, formed a major part of Hua and his supporters' consolidation effort and Hua's first major act following the Gang's arrest was to convene a second Dazhai conference, allowing him to return to themes with which he was confident and could expect strong support from people like Chen Yonggui. Elsewhere, an editorial on agricultural mechanization from 1971, drafted under the guidance of Hua, but suppressed by the Gang of Four, was finally published with a strong critique of the Gang. During this period Hua appeared to place more emphasis on the theme of class struggle than before, adopting one of the Gang's key policies. However both he and Chen continued to emphasize the twin tasks of basic field construction and achieving mechanization in agriculture by 1980 as the main issues in agricultural policy. These would become the dominant themes as Hua developed his agricultural policies through 1976-1977.

One month after the arrest of the Gang of Four, the *Renmin ribao* published the article "The mighty revolutionary current of 'In Agriculture Study Dazhai' cannot be stopped".¹⁵¹ The article was written by the Mass Criticism Group of the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry and appears to have been the first significant article on agriculture following the Gang's demise. It strongly criticized the Gang of Four for blocking the implementation of Hua Guofeng's speech at the First Dazhai Conference and for causing confusion in rural areas in China. The article took a middle line, both defending the need to improve

¹⁵¹ "Nongye xue Dazhai de geming hongliu bu ke zudang", (The mighty revolutionary current of 'In Agriculture Study Dazhai' cannot be stopped), in the *Renmin ribao*, 21 November, 1976, reprinted in *Xinhua yuebao*, November 1976, pp.172-175.

production forces, a policy associated with the moderates, and stressing that the main experience learnt in the movement to study Dazhai was "taking class struggle as the key", a key element of the radical Left's line.¹⁵²

The publication of this article formed the backdrop to the opening of the Second Dazhai Conference in Beijing on 10 December, 1976. One of the main aims of the conference was to further discredit the Gang of Four, but the conference also discussed agricultural policy and the importance of agricultural mechanization. Although the conference opened on 10 December, the two major speeches were only given on 20 and 25 December, by Chen Yonggui and Hua Guofeng respectively. According to Chen's speech, delegates had filled their time by studying Mao's "On the Ten Major Relationships", discussing Hua Guofeng's speech at the First Dazhai Conference, and studying a number of Central Committee documents and material on the Gang of Four's crimes.¹⁵³ In addition, a State Council report "On the basic realization of agricultural mechanization by 1980" appears to have been delivered to the meeting on 25 December.

The fact that delegates discussed Mao's "On the Ten Major Relationships" appears significant. In this essay, Mao had discussed the importance of achieving a better balance between agriculture, light and heavy industry, and of industry supporting agriculture more. This was particularly important for Hua Guofeng as he placed a lot of emphasis on mechanizing agriculture, something that could only be achieved with help from industry. In addition, he wanted to develop local, commune and brigade level enterprises to fund increasing levels of accumulation by the commune in support of mechanization.

Hua only spoke in general terms on agriculture. Summing up the

¹⁵² *Ibid*, pg.173.

¹⁵³ Chen Yonggui, "Chedi pipan 'sirenbang' xianqi puji Dazhai xian yundong de xin gaochao", (Thoroughly criticize the "Gang of Four", set off a new upsurge in the movement to popularize Dazhai-type counties), in *Nongye xue Dazhai - Di er ci quanguo nongye xue Dazhai huiyi zhuanji*, (In Agricultural Study Dazhai - A special issue on the Second National Conference on In Agriculture Study Dazhai), (Beijing: Nongye chubanshe, 1977), pg. 27.

conference's discussion, he said that the meeting had set out the twin tasks of popularizing Dazhai-type counties and achieving agricultural mechanization. He reaffirmed the Party's commitment to achieving the "four modernizations" by the end of the century, but added that the next ten years (1976-1985) would be the key to completing this goal. Hua also defended the importance of productive forces, quoting Mao, saying that only by developing productive forces sufficiently would the socialist economic and political systems have a sufficient material base.¹⁵⁴

It was left to Chen Yonggui and the State Council report on agricultural mechanization, to provide more details of future agricultural policy. Both of these documents returned to themes set out at the First Dazhai Conference, but the State Council report was also heavily influenced by the 1971 conference on agricultural mechanization. This was underlined by the publication of Hua Guofeng's 1971 editorial "The basic way forward for agriculture lies in mechanization" only two days before the State Council report was presented at the conference.¹⁵⁵

Chen's speech was one of the clearest expositions of his and Hua's line on agriculture. After paying tribute to Hua Guofeng for arresting the Gang of Four, and criticizing the Gang for their actions in damaging agricultural policy, Chen set out three key tasks for work in agriculture: Firstly, turning one-third of counties in China into Dazhai-type counties by 1980 (Chen did not give any criteria on how to judge a "Dazhai-type county" but it seems likely that Hua Guofeng's six criteria, laid out at the First Dazhai Conference were still the ideal model); Secondly, achieving the basic mechanization of agriculture; and thirdly, achieving all-round development, with production in grain, cotton, oil crops, meat and other economic crops all to exceed planned targets.

Chen returned to one of the major themes of the "study Dazhai" campaign,

¹⁵⁴ *Ibid*, pg.22.

¹⁵⁵ "Nongye de genben chulu zaiyu jixiehua", (The basic way forward for agriculture lies in mechanization), in the *Renmin ribao*, 23 December, 1976, pg.1.

stressing the importance of continuing work in basic field construction and warning against any slackening of efforts:

We have already had considerable achievements in this field, however development has been very uneven, in a few places the mountains and rivers are as before, their appearance hasn't changed. These places still rely on heaven to eat [*kao tian chi fan*]. We cannot let this situation continue to exist. We must combine a mass movement with specialist units and launch a People's War in basic field construction.¹⁵⁶

Chen called for the pace of agricultural mechanization to be speeded up. He repeated the message of the 1971 conference, calling for the "five small" industries to be developed to boost mechanization. Although Chen repeated the message of self-sufficiency, in a sign that the central leadership now placed more emphasis on this issue he went on:

... the State should energetically support [*dali bangzhu*] each province and autonomous region to develop local, small-scale iron and steel enterprises and industries that support agriculture as quickly as possible, so as to ensure the completion of the major task of basically achieving mechanization by 1980, put forward by Chairman Mao.¹⁵⁷

Chen also called for higher rates of accumulation, stating that this would be beneficial to consolidating the commune and boosting the commune members enthusiasm for socialism. However he also warned that local leaders should ensure peasant livelihoods continued to rise, saying that except for years of natural disasters, at least 90 percent of peasants should see a rise in living standards every year.¹⁵⁸

The Second Dazhai Conference provided a significant boost to efforts to increase the mechanization of agriculture in China, with the publication of Hua's 1971 editorial and the State Council report "On the basic realization of

¹⁵⁶ Chen Yonggui, "Thoroughly Criticize the 'Gang of Four'", pg. 42.

¹⁵⁷ *Ibid*, pg. 43.

¹⁵⁸ *Ibid*, pg. 44.

agricultural mechanization by 1980".¹⁵⁹ Hua's role in this issue was underlined, firstly with the publication of the editorial itself, and secondly in a lengthy discussion of the 1971 conference which Hua had chaired and his 1975 speech in the State Council report. With his experience of leading work in this field since 1971, and prior to that in Hunan Province, Hua clearly felt confident in pressing this policy.

Publishing the 1971 editorial seems to have mainly served the purpose of giving Hua Guofeng another vehicle in which to promote himself and criticize the Gang of Four as the State Council report provided more concrete policy details. An editorial comment published with the original article, lambasted Yao Wenyuan's actions in suppressing the editorial in 1971:

Yao Wenyuan's arbitrary withholding of this editorial amply demonstrates his opposition to the basic line of our Party on agricultural issues put forward by Chairman Mao and his opposition to Chairman Mao's great slogan of basically achieving the mechanization of agriculture by 1980. At the same time it brought him into conflict with Chairman Hua and other leading comrades at the centre who were resolutely continuing to implement Chairman Mao's revolutionary line.¹⁶⁰

The editorial comment went on to praise Hua's role at the First Dazhai Conference and call for further efforts to achieve the target of basic mechanization by 1980.

The State Council report set out clear policy guidelines for achieving agricultural mechanization. It called for a clear division of labour, with the main focus to be on locally-produced, small- and medium-scale machinery. At the

¹⁵⁹ "Guanyu yi jiu ba ling nian jiben shang shixian nongye jixiehua de baogao", (Report on the basic realization of agricultural mechanization by 1980), in *A Collection of Rural Policy Documents*, pp.376-385. Although this document does not make it clear if this report was presented at the Second Dazhai Conference, it is dated the 25 December, and is in the form of a speech. It also begins "Chairman Hua, delegates..." suggesting that Hua Guofeng was present. As it is unlikely he would have attended a second meeting after delivering his report on the 25 December, the State Council report must have been presented at the Dazhai Conference. This copy of the report does not make it clear who gave the report at the conference.

¹⁶⁰ "Nongye de genben chulu zaiyu jixiehua", (The basic way forward for agriculture lies in mechanization), in the *Renmin ribao*, 23 December, 1976, pg.1.

same time the State would manage larger pieces of machinery. Local areas should concentrate on building up the "five small" industries to support efforts to mechanize agriculture.

The report also gave specific targets for the number of new tractors and amount of irrigation capacity to be achieved by 1980. The new targets were drastic revisions of those set out in the 1971 report: The new target for the number of tractors to be in use by 1980 was between 650,000 and 800,000, compared to only 400,000 in the 1971 report; and the target for irrigation capacity in 1980 was over 70,000,000 horsepower, compared to only 35,000,000 horsepower in 1971.

In addition to setting out concrete policies and targets, the report also outlined the impact on an individual's world view that increasing levels of mechanization would achieve. As I noted above this was a key element of Hua Guofeng's line on this issue:

In some counties, communes and brigades that uphold Chairman Mao's revolutionary line, continue to struggle against the revisionist line and that have basically achieved agricultural mechanization, a magnificent picture of large-scale socialist agriculture is unfolding. In these areas there have been major increases in labour productivity, their ability to withstand natural disasters has improved dramatically, they have developed all aspects, agriculture, forestry, animal husbandry, sideline industries and fisheries, and they have amply demonstrated the superiority of the People's Communes, being both larger and having higher levels of public ownership. The broad masses of the poor and lower-middle peasants have realized more profoundly that socialist modernized agriculture [*shehui zhuyi xiandaihua nongye*] is absolutely superior to the small-scale agricultural economy and capitalism, they have become more conscious of changing the habits of the small producer, and have split with the private ownership mentality and old traditional views, and they now follow the socialist path more resolutely.¹⁶¹

The report was approved for distribution by the Central Committee on 19

¹⁶¹ "Guanyu yi jiu ba ling nian jiben shang shixian nongye jixiehua de baogao", (Report on achieving the basic mechanization of agriculture by 1980), in *A Collection of Rural Policy Documents*, pg.379.

January, 1977.

b. Hua in command: 1977

Through 1977 there was little sign of any coherent opposition to Hua Guofeng's agricultural policies. The *Renmin ribao* and *Hong qi* carried a series of articles by close supporters of Hua promoting his line and indications such as the numbers participating in basic-field construction suggest that these policies were being implemented throughout China. Although Deng Xiaoping was formally rehabilitated in March of this year most of his efforts were directed at criticizing Hua Guofeng's general ideological position, not specific policies. Other key figures at the centre, including Ye Jianying, apparently spoke in support of Hua's line.

However, late in 1977, Wan Li, Party Secretary of Anhui, spoke in defence of the rights of production teams, in stark contrast to Hua's line which foresaw the imminent raising of the level of ownership to the brigade and commune level. It appears that a number of test-sites were launched in Anhui in late-1977 which experimented with forms of production responsibility systems, again in stark contrast to Hua's line. Although these experiments were limited in number, they presaged developments in 1978 when similar projects in Sichuan and those in Anhui would lead to radical reforms in agricultural policy at the third plenum of the 11th Central Committee.

There were a number of key articles in the central media written by supporters of Hua Guofeng including Chen Yonggui, Wang Qian, Party Secretary of Shanxi, and Guo Fenglian, the new Brigade Secretary of Dazhai. There were three main themes in these articles: Achieving the target of one third of counties meeting Hua Guofeng's six criteria for being a "Dazhai-type county" by 1980; continuing work to complete agricultural mechanization; and work on basic field construction. Other central leadership figures, including Ye Jianying spoke in support of these policies.

In the second half of the year a number of articles appeared discussing the issue of basic field construction and rural capital construction. Hua convened a meeting on rural capital construction in Xiyang county in the summer of this year. The October issue of *Hong qi* also carried a long article by Chen Yonggui on this subject. Figures in David Zweig's book *Agrarian radicalism in China* show that participation in basic field construction reached a peak in the period 1977-78. This issue was one of Hua's six criteria, and the successful completion of construction work was tied to efforts to build Dazhai-type counties.

The October issue of *Hong qi* carried Chen Yonggui's article "Manage basic field construction as if it were a great socialist cause". Relating Dazhai's own experiences, Chen warned that basic field construction was an arduous task but one which brought rewards in improving production and safeguarding against natural disasters. Chen added that large-scale capital construction projects demonstrated the superiority of the socialist economy, as they would be impossible to organize if everybody was "going it alone".¹⁶²

Figures quoted by David Zweig show that in the Nanjing region rural capital construction reached a peak during 1977 and 1978, with some 99,260,000 cubic metres of earth being moved in 1977, up from 89,230,000 in 1976 and only 59,880,000 in 1975. David Zweig reports that by October some 390,000 projects were underway across China and by mid-November, "over 80 million rural laborers were involved".¹⁶³

In another important article, Guo Fenglian, the Brigade Secretary of Dazhai, touched on the ideological significance of mechanizing agriculture:

In Dazhai we have developed from the small implements, old technology and drought prone areas of before to the new agriculture of having a certain level of mechanization, irrigation and science. Not

¹⁶² Chen Yonggui, "Ba nongtian jiben jianshe dangzuo weida de shehuizhuyi shiye lai ban", (Manage basic field construction as if it were a great socialist cause), in *Hong qi*, Issue 10, 1977, reprinted in *Nongye xue Dazhai (di ershisan ji)* (*In Agriculture Study Dazhai (Volume 23)*), pg.9.

¹⁶³ David Zweig, *Agrarian Radicalism in China*, pp.70-71.

only has this rapidly developed productive forces, raised grain production... and made greater contributions to the state, in addition, in the course of developing agriculture, peasants have seen the superiority of socialism and have warmer feelings for the socialist system. What is more their thinking has made a great leap, their spirit has been liberated, they are standing higher, seeing further, and their vision is wider, leading them to constantly transform their traditional small producer outlook and the traditional forces.¹⁶⁴

It is clear from these and other articles that there was a definite radical upsurge in rural China through 1977. Although political education was downplayed, in contrast to the radical Left's line, peasants were mobilized to participate large-scale construction projects and leaders emphasized the importance of developing the brigade- and commune-level economy. In particular, the development of agricultural mechanization was seen as necessitating higher levels of ownership.

This radical upsurge culminated with a meeting of the Politburo in December 1977. Although details of this meeting are sketchy, it is reported to have called for "a mini-Great Leap in agricultural output" and set new targets for grain and cotton production.¹⁶⁵ Delegates also called for 10 percent of brigades to establish brigade level accounting through the winter of 1977-78.

On the eve of the meeting, the *Renmin ribao* printed the editorial "Accelerating the pace of agricultural development is a fighting task [*zhandou renwu*] for the whole Party".¹⁶⁶ The editorial presaged developments at the Politburo meeting by calling for a significant increase in grain production and production of other economic crops. To achieve these aims, the editorial stated that the key question on which accelerating the pace of development depended was the correct understanding of Dazhai's experiences. Local leaders should rigidly adhere to the six criteria, continue with the campaign to

¹⁶⁴ Guo Fenglian, "Rang Dazhai hongqi geng xianyan", (Let the red flag of Dazhai be even brighter), in *Hong qi*, Issue 9, 1977, pg.103.

¹⁶⁵ David Zweig, *Agrarian Radicalism in China*, pg.71.

¹⁶⁶ "Jiakuai nongye fazhan sudu shi quandang de zhandou renwu", (Accelerating the pace of agricultural development is a fighting task for the whole Party), in the *Renmin ribao*, 11 December, 1977, reprinted in *Xinhua yuebao*, September 1977, pg.168.

criticize the actions of the Gang of Four in agriculture, ensure cadres participated in labour and make strenuous efforts to complete basic capital projects.¹⁶⁷ In a clarion call to rural leaders the editorial concluded:

Historical experience proves that every new leap in the national economy is always preceded by a new leap in agriculture. At the moment we are facing a new high tide in economic and cultural construction and accelerating the pace of agricultural development is a task which brooks no delay. The general situation is good, but pressing. The whole Party must respond to the call of Chairman Hua... mobilize, go in for agriculture in a big way, popularize Dazhai-type counties and struggle to accelerate the pace of agricultural development.¹⁶⁸

c. Hua's agricultural line is overturned: 1978

At the beginning of 1978, Hua Guofeng's agricultural policies appeared very much in the ascendency: further articles appeared at the start of the year in support of the transition to brigade accounting.¹⁶⁹ However developments at the provincial level as early as November 1977 posed a challenge to Hua's line. In particular, Wan Li led a determined campaign to guarantee the autonomy of the production team, in stark contrast to the line being promoted at the centre. Through 1978, production team autonomy became a key issue around which opposition to Hua Guofeng consolidated. Wan Li was at the forefront of this campaign and published a series of articles on this subject in the provincial and national media.

Unlike higher education, Hua Guofeng appears to have retained considerable influence over agricultural policy right up to the pivotal third plenum, with key elements of Hua's programme being incorporated into the

¹⁶⁷ *Ibid*, pg. 169.

¹⁶⁸ *Ibid*, pg. 170.

¹⁶⁹ "Guanyu guodu dao dadui hesuan wenti de jiankuang", (A brief comparison on the question of the transition to brigade accounting), in Nonglinbu (Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry), *Puji Dazhai xian dongtai* (*Developments in popularizing Dazhai-type counties*), Issue 2, reprinted in Huang Daoxia (ed.), *An Anthology of Historical Material on Collectivization*, pp.873-874. This report outlined the intention of some counties in Jilin, Beijing, Shanxi and other provinces to have as many as 67 percent of brigades as the basic accounting unit by the end of the first half of the year.

documents approved at the plenum. In March, Hua repeated his call for a new leap in agriculture at the first session of the 5th NPC. The new constitution adopted by the Congress also repeated the call for the transition to brigade accounting, although “only when conditions were ripe”. Later in the year a number of articles appeared promoting the experiences of Wuxi and Suzhou in successfully managing work in running commune- and brigade-level enterprises and carrying out rural capital construction work, two core elements of Hua Guofeng’s agricultural line. Interestingly, both of these policies were coopted by the moderates into the new line that emerged in the wake of the third plenum and the development of local enterprises would later become a core element of Deng Xiaoping’s rural developmental policy.

i. Wan Li and developments in Anhui Province

As I noted above, Wan Li had been an active participant in Deng Xiaoping’s 1975 rectification movement. He was transferred to Anhui as First Party Secretary in June 1977 and he quickly focused on improving the province’s rural economy. Together with two other leading figures in the province, Gu Zhuoxin and Zhao Shouyi, Wan Li undertook a number of radical reforms which directly challenged key elements of the line in agriculture being promoted at the centre at that time. It is unclear how much support he received from Deng Xiaoping and other moderates at the centre, but the extent to which his ideas were publicized by the central media suggests that he had extensive backing in Beijing.

As early as November 1977, Anhui’s Provincial Party Committee approved the document “Regulations concerning a number of problems in current rural economic policies (trial draft)”, otherwise known as the “Six Articles”. This document was reportedly based on inspections carried out personally by the three leaders and returned to themes contained in the moderate “Sixty Articles” of the post Great Leap Forward period. At a time when Hua Guofeng and other

central leaders were calling for renewed efforts and a new “leap” in agriculture, this document put forward a strong defence of individual peasants’ rights and the autonomy of the production team. The call for the development of sideline industries and rural markets was also a radical departure from central policy at that time. The main themes contained in the “regulations” were:

(1) Carry out rural economic management well and permit production teams to set up different production responsibility systems in accordance with farm work... (2) Respect the autonomy of production teams; (3) reduce the burdens on teams and commune members; (4) carry out the policy of to each according to their work; (5) the distribution of grain should take account of the interests of the state, the collective and the individual; (6) permit and encourage commune members to run private plots and household sideline occupations and lift the ban on [*kaifang*] rural markets and commerce.¹⁷⁰

Wan Li repeated the message to respect the rights of production teams at a provincial meeting on rural work, held in November 1977. Attacking another of the core elements of Hua Guofeng’s line, Wan Li warned:

How do we get agricultural policies right, how do we carry out management well? The most important thing is to maintain [the policy of] matching policies to local conditions and matching policies to the season [*yin di zhi yi, yin shi zhi yi*], seeking truth from facts and following the mass line. Paying attention to mechanization is completely right. **However the most important productive force is man and the socialist enthusiasm of the broad masses. Without the enthusiasm of the people, we’re not in a position to talk about anything, even if we achieve mechanization, it will be hard to fully utilize its effect** (my emphasis).¹⁷¹

Crucially, Wan Li was developing the argument that more pragmatic steps needed to be taken to develop rural productive forces, and that this should include a far higher degree of material reward to raise the “socialist

¹⁷⁰ *Wan Li wenxuan, (Wan Li’s Selected Works)*, (Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 1995), fn. 18, pg. 645.

¹⁷¹ *Ibid*, pp. 101-102.

enthusiasm" of the masses.

A further article by Wan Li appeared in the March issue of *Hong Qi*, on the eve of the first session of the 5th National People's Congress. Perhaps because he was writing in the Party's leading theoretical journal, Wan Li does pay lip service to the notion of moving to accounting at the brigade-level. However he warns that this should only be undertaken when the "conditions are ripe" (*tiaojian chengshu*), a phrase that was to be repeated in the new State Constitution. Wan Li also repeats Hua Guofeng's line that to accelerate the pace of agriculture local leaders should study Dazhai and undertake rural capital construction projects. Once again, however, he qualifies this support by repeating his argument of February that "the most basic factor [in accelerating the development of agriculture] is relying on people's enthusiasm".¹⁷²

Wan Li discussed Anhui's experiences in implementing the "Six Articles", and in particular work to boost peasant incomes and reduce the burdens on individual peasants and the production teams. For Wan Li this was the best way to boost agricultural production, and these would become two of the main themes used to discredit Hua Guofeng's agricultural line. Significantly Wan Li also discusses Anhui's experiences in contracting out certain agricultural work to work teams (*zuoyezu*) as reportedly outlined in the "Six Articles". These contracts were a development of the "three fixes" (*san ding*) which had fixed quotas for production, purchase and marketing of grain. The *Hong qi* article discusses what might be called the "four fixes", fixed quotas for tasks, quality, time and work points (*ding renwu, ding zhiliang, ding shijian, ding gongfen*).¹⁷³ Wan Li specifically prohibits the idea of household contracting (*bao chan dao hu*), opposition on this issue remained strong enough that this policy was not adopted by the third plenum. However, the ideas on contracting he outlined very much presaged developments at the December meeting and would be

¹⁷² Wan Li, "Renzen luoshi dang de nongcun jingji zhengce", (Conscientiously implement the Party's rural economic policies), in *Hong qi*, Issue 3, 1978, pg. 92.

¹⁷³ *Ibid*, pg. 95.

incorporated into documents on agriculture adopted by the plenum.

Clearly Wan Li's views and the experiences of Anhui played a key role in mobilizing opposition to Hua Guofeng's agricultural policies. It seems certain that they were more significant in discrediting Hua's line in the run up to the third plenum than developments in Sichuan, which have been portrayed as playing the decisive role by a number of authors. As Jürgen Domes notes, "For most of 1978, the new debate centred on the question of the 'sovereignty of the production team', which soon became the shibboleth for those who opposed the rural policies of Hua".¹⁷⁴ Although Domes does not identify this policy with any one leader, Wan Li's speeches had developed this idea extensively in the first half of 1978. Although Hua Guofeng continued to defend his policy line, developments in Anhui acted as a touchstone for moderates which would lead to the introduction of radical reforms at the third plenum.

d. Intensifying conflict over agricultural policy

At the first session of the 5th National People's Congress, which opened in Beijing on February 24, a compromise position on agriculture between Hua Guofeng's line and that of Wan Li, Deng Xiaoping and other moderates was adopted. In his political work report to the Congress Hua called for 4-5 percent annual growth in overall agricultural production in the years 1978-1985, a much higher target, and for 85 percent of major agricultural work to be mechanized by the end of the plan period. He repeated his call for one-third of counties in China to be Dazhai-type counties by 1980 and called for rural areas to continue to study the example of the Shanxi brigade.¹⁷⁵ At the same time Hua recognized the rights of individual peasants to run private plots, although he added that these should be "few in number" (*shao liang*), he supported

¹⁷⁴ Jürgen Domes, *Socialism in the Chinese Countryside*, pg. 101.

¹⁷⁵ Hua Guofeng, "Tuanjie qilai, wei jianshe shehuizhuyi de xiandaihua qianguo er fendou", (Unite and struggle to build a modern, strong, socialist country), in *Zhonghua renmin gongheguo di wu jie quanguo renmin daibiao dahui di yi ci huiyi wenjian*, (*Documents of the first session of the 5th National People's Congress of China*), (Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 1978), pp.24-25.

“appropriate” rural markets and opposed egalitarianism and the arbitrary transfer of resources (*yi ping er diao*) from production teams.¹⁷⁶

The new Constitution, adopted by the Congress on 5 March also reflected both Hua’s line and the views of the moderates. Article 7 recognized ownership by the production team, a key element of the moderates’ line, but also called for the transfer to brigade accounting “when its conditions are ripe” (repeating Wan Li’s phrase). On private plots Article 7 stated:

Provided the absolute predominance of the collective economy of the people’s commune is ensured, commune members may farm small plots of land for personal needs, engage in limited household side-line production, and in pastoral areas they may also keep a limited number of livestock for personal needs.

Articles in the media in the months following the NPC meeting suggest an on-going conflict over agricultural policy, with articles supporting key elements of both the moderates and Hua Guofeng’s agricultural lines. Not all of Hua Guofeng’s line came in for uniform criticism from the moderates. Key elements of his agricultural policy appear to have been supported by moderate figures, including the importance of developing rural enterprises to support agriculture and rural capital construction. Both of these policies received strong support from Zhao Ziyang in a November speech.

On 21 April, the *Renmin ribao* published a strong defence of sideline industries and individual peasants’ rights to engage in “legitimate” sideline production, based on Article 7 of the new Constitution.¹⁷⁷ Interestingly, the article also used the “60 Articles” as a justification for this line regarding household sideline industries, quoting the 1962 document that “[We] should permit **and encourage** commune members to utilize their spare time and

¹⁷⁶ *Ibid*, pg. 31.

¹⁷⁷ “Zenme kandai zhengdang de jiating fuye?”, (How should we view appropriate household sideline industries?), in *Renmin ribao*, 21 April, 1978, reprinted in *Xinhua yuebao*, April, 1978, pg.124.

holidays to develop household sideline industries".¹⁷⁸ A number of other articles promoting the moderate line would return to the "60 Articles" for inspiration and as a justification for their policy line.

In June the Central Committee approved a report from Xiangxiang county in Hunan Province on reducing the burdens on peasants. Although Hunan was widely seen as being Hua Guofeng's old bailiwick, this report was an implicit criticism of radical mobilizational tactics, which Hua had adopted, which placed inappropriate burdens on peasants across China. Articles in the *Renmin ribao* popularized the report's message, and tied this to boosting peasant's enthusiasm for agriculture, and reducing the burdens on peasants became an important element for mobilizing support for the moderate line in agriculture.

The Central Committee formally approved the Xiangxiang report on 23 June.¹⁷⁹ Shortly after this a key editorial and an article appeared in the *Renmin ribao*, introducing the Xiangxiang report and calling for the burdens on peasants to be reduced. The editorial "Implement the Party's policies, reduce the burdens on peasants" stated:

If we want to implement the various policies of the Party in the countryside, then reducing the irrational burdens on the peasants, truly carrying out [the policies of] increasing income when we increase the harvest and more pay for more work and being able to honour allocations are part of the decisive elements [*shi you jue ding yi yi de yi huan*].¹⁸⁰

In an effort to reduce the burdens on peasants the editorial repeated calls for farm labourers who left rural areas for the city to return to their homes. It also called for cadres to continue to take part in agricultural labour and for the

¹⁷⁸ *Ibid*, pg.123.

¹⁷⁹ See "Zhonggong zhongyang guanyu zhuangfa Hunansheng Xiangxiang wei baogao de pishi", (Central Committee instructions on transmitting the report of the Xiangxiang County Committee, Hunan Province), in *An Anthology of Historical Material on Agricultural Collectivization*, pp.874-875.

¹⁸⁰ "Luoshi dang de zhengce jianqing nongmin fudan", (Implement the Party's policies, reduce peasant burdens), in *Renmin ribao*, 5 July, 1978, reprinted in *Xinhua Yuebao*, July 1978, pp.96-97.

numbers of non-production labourers to be reduced.¹⁸¹

An article discussing the Xiangxiang report appeared alongside the editorial. This listed eight different "irrational burdens" that had been placed on peasants. These included: (1) **Inappropriate transfer of the labour, capital and material resources of the production team**; (2) extravagance, the flouting of rules and corruption; (3) too many people not engaged in production; (4) the costs of construction projects such as roads and educational facilities being transferred to the peasants; (5) **too many peasants being transferred from production teams to work in commune enterprises without appropriate reward**; and (6) **excessive rural capital construction projects which went on too long**¹⁸² (my emphasis).

Clearly a number of these points challenged key elements of Hua Guofeng's agricultural policies, including large-scale rural capital construction and the mobilization of labour from the production team. Speaking in October, Hu Qiaomu, a close supporter of Deng Xiaoping called for the "sovereignty of the production team" to not only be protected, but "even broadened".¹⁸³ Another close supporter of Deng, the economist Xue Muqiao, tied this issue to the failure to increase agricultural production significantly, despite "a great deal of basic farm construction".¹⁸⁴

The *Renmin ribao* also carried a number of other reports which promoted key elements of Hua Guofeng's agricultural line. In particular, the experiences of Wuxi in running commune and brigade enterprises and Suzhou in conducting rural capital construction were promoted. Both of these ideas were

¹⁸¹ *Ibid*, pg.97.

¹⁸² "Zhonggong Xiangxiang xianwei caiqu youxiao cuoshi luoshi zhengce, jiejie nongmin fudan guozhong wenti", (The Xiangxian County Committee has adopted effective measures to implement the Party's policies and solve the problem of excessive demands on the peasants), in *Renmin ribao*, 5 July, 1978, reprinted in *Xinhua yuebao*, July, 1978, pp.99-100.

¹⁸³ Quoted in *Renmin ribao*, 6 October, 1978, reprinted in Jürgen Domes, *Socialism in the Chinese Countryside*, pg. 101.

¹⁸⁴ Quoted in *Renmin ribao*, 18 October, 1978, translated in *ibid*, pg.101.

incorporated into the third plenum's documents on agriculture, and although large-scale construction projects had been criticized for placing excess demands on peasants, both these ideas appeared to have had the support of moderate figures. Parts of Hua's line were clearly incorporated, albeit in a modified form, into the moderates' programme, and the way in which these programmes were altered to suit the moderates' own line is apparent in these articles.

On the 4 April, the *Renmin ribao* carried a report on the successful running of commune- and brigade-level industrial enterprises in Wuxi county, Jiangsu. In line with Hua Guofeng's agricultural policies, these enterprises were praised for providing investment for agriculture, promoting mechanization and encouraging rural capital construction. In all these enterprises were said to have invested over 96 million yuan in agriculture over the last 10 years and increased the number of tractors in the county from 130 in 1970 to over 4,300 in 1977.¹⁸⁵ Furthermore, in contrast to statements on protecting the sovereignty of production teams, the article praised the way the development of these enterprises had led to changes in the three-level ownership structure of communes in the county, with the proportion of the overall commune economy generated at the commune- and brigade-level rising from only 22 percent in 1970 to 64 percent in 1977.¹⁸⁶

Elsewhere, on 23 July, the *Renmin ribao* carried an editorial and an article discussing Suzhou's experiences in conducting rural capital construction. These two articles clearly show the impact of the moderates' criticism of this policy in that they contain warnings against making excessive demands on the peasants and avoiding the irrational transfer of resources away from the production team.

As the figures for nearby Nanjing quoted above show, rural capital

¹⁸⁵ "Nongye gaosudu fazhan de tujing", (The path of high-speed development in agriculture), in *Renmin ribao*, 4 April, 1978, reprinted in *Xinhua Yuebao*, April 1978, pg. 121.

¹⁸⁶ *Ibid*, pg.122.

construction reached a peak in 1977-78. State investment in basic-field construction and other projects was raised significantly in 1978.¹⁸⁷ The editorial continued to underline the importance of work in this field, repeating the line that it was beneficial to maintaining a high pace of development in agriculture and was an important factor in guarding against natural disasters.¹⁸⁸ However the editorial warned against placing excessive demands on individual peasants and production teams, and called for State aid where necessary:

If we practice "excessive egalitarianism and inappropriate transfer of resources" and increase inappropriate burdens on the peasants, then the peasants will not be able to sustain their enthusiasm. We must remember the lessons of history and protect the enthusiasm of the masses one hundredfold. We cannot commit the mistake of "excessive egalitarianism and inappropriate transfer of resources". Those production teams that won't receive any benefits, but send labour to participate in basic field construction cannot be allowed to subsidise costs and grain [*tie qian pu liang*]. They must be given appropriate compensation. With regards to important basic field construction projects, the state and locality must give aid.¹⁸⁹

The moderate line developed through 1978 to incorporate a number of elements. Firstly, it emphasized the "sovereignty" of production teams, the lowest of the three levels of commune ownership, and warned against excessive and inappropriate transfer of resources away from the production team to facilitate capital construction projects or the development of commune and brigade enterprises. Moderate leaders warned against premature transition to higher levels of ownership, a key element of Hua Guofeng's agricultural line, unless "conditions were ripe". With no clear definition of what conditions were necessary, this allowed for a degree of prevarication. Ownership and accounting at the production team level were defended as being in accordance with the current stage of development of rural productive

¹⁸⁷ David Zweig suggests investment in the Nanjing region trebled in 1978 when compared to the figure for 1977. *Agrarian Radicalism in China*, pg.70.

¹⁸⁸ "Cong Suzhou kan nanfang", (See the south from Suzhou), in *Renmin ribao*, 23 July, 1978, reprinted in *Xinhua yuebao*, July, 1978, pp.94-96.

¹⁸⁹ *Ibid*, pp.95-96.

forces and ideological awareness of commune members.

Secondly, moderates emphasized the use of material rewards to boost peasant enthusiasm and increase productivity. Both Hua Guofeng and the moderates had downplayed the importance of political and ideological stimulus. Instead Hua Guofeng suggested that mobilizing the rural population to take part in rural capital construction projects, and the achievement of basic mechanization would raise the enthusiasm of individual peasants and boost productive forces. This theory was discredited in a series of articles by Wan Li and other moderates who saw the enthusiasm of individual peasants as the most important factor, and took a pragmatic line that a wide variety of material stimuli should be employed to reward increased productivity on the part of China's rural workforce.

Thirdly, the moderates placed far greater importance on respecting local conditions. This was used to downplay the significance of Dazhai as a national model. In November an article criticized some areas actions during the campaign to "study Dazhai" for being too rigid in their application of Dazhai's experiences. The idea of acting in accordance with local conditions" (*yin di zhi yi*) was also extended to rural capital construction work and developing local industrial enterprises. With this proviso, these latter two points were adopted by the moderates as part of their agricultural line.

Finally, on mechanization, the moderates continued to advocate the basic mechanization of agriculture by 1980. However, targets were lowered at the third plenum. Mechanization was still seen as an important way to increase productivity in agriculture, however the role assigned to it by Hua Guofeng in raising peasants' enthusiasm for higher levels of collective ownership was downplayed

e. The third plenum of the 11th Central Committee

In the run up to the historic third plenum criticism of some elements of Hua

Guofeng's agricultural line intensified. As mentioned above, an article appeared in the *Renmin ribao* in November criticizing the way the "study Dazhai" campaign had been implemented. Articles called for more account to be taken of local conditions. Other articles, reflecting the moderates' emphasis on material rewards called for the "taboo" on making money to be lifted. At the same time leading moderate figure Zhao Ziyang spoke in support of Suzhou's experiences in carrying out basic field construction and running commune and brigade enterprises. All of these themes would be incorporated into the documents of the third plenum.

On 26 November, while the Central Work Conference which preceded the third plenum was still meeting, the *Renmin ribao* published an article based on an interview with Shanxi Province's First Deputy Party Secretary, Li Hanxiao, in which he outlined a number of problems in the campaign to popularize the experiences of Dazhai brigade. Li discussed five problems: Firstly, there had been too much blind copying of Dazhai's policies, without any thought of local conditions, particularly the blind copying of Dazhai's system of allocating work points; secondly, criticism of "capitalist tendencies" had gone too far and legitimate sideline industries had been criticized; thirdly, political and ideological issues had been overemphasized, at the expense of material stimuli; fourthly, in implementing the policy "from each to the best of their ability, to each according to their work", local areas had demanded more from peasants without truly rewarding extra work; and finally, the balance between the collective economy and "small freedoms" had been upset, and private plots, sideline industries and rural markets had been unduly criticized.¹⁹⁰

This was a strong critique of a key element of Hua Guofeng's agricultural policy, and a direct attack on a number of his supporters, including Chen Yonggui who were closely associated with Dazhai. Other articles printed in the

¹⁹⁰ "Dadan jiefang sixiang, jiasu fazhan nongye", (Boldly liberate thinking, accelerate the development of agriculture), in *Renmin ribao*, 26 November, 1978, reprinted in *Xinhua yuebao*, November 1978, pp.117-118.

Renmin Ribao at the same time also called for more attention to be paid to local conditions, quoting Li Xiannian's speech at the July 1977 National Conference on Basic Field Construction: "Our policies are: Take grain as the key, develop all-round, **suit measures to local conditions**, with an appropriate [degree of] centralization".¹⁹¹

It is clear that by the eve of the third plenum, the ground had been prepared for the increased use of material rewards. An article in the *Renmin ribao* 6 December related the experiences of Yibing County in Sichuan in raising production. Their success was attributed to lifting the "taboo" on the word money, (*bu yao jiwei yi ge "qian" zi*).¹⁹² Presaging developments at the plenum, the article warned that ideological work must not be conducted without consideration of material issues:

... People's thinking is closely linked with material conditions. We must constantly imbue the peasants with socialist ideas and educate the peasants "to love the commune as if it were your family", and plant the fields for the revolution. However, education in political ideology must be conducted alongside economic work and concern for the material benefits of the commune members, only then will it achieve obvious results.¹⁹³

Although, under the leadership of Zhao Ziyang, Sichuan had been at the forefront of developing the moderate programme in agriculture, not all the elements of Hua Guofeng's agricultural line were rejected out of hand by the provincial leadership. In particular the experiences of Suzhou and Wuxi in carrying out rural capital construction and managing commune and brigade enterprises were recognized as significant.

¹⁹¹ Gao Shangquan, "Anzhao keguan gulu fazhan nongye", (Develop agriculture in accordance with objective laws), in *Renmin ribao*, 16 November, 1978, reprinted in *Xinhua yuebao*, November, 1978, pg.117.

¹⁹² Huang Yanjun and Yu Quanling, "Sichuansheng Yibingxian xiashitang dadui jianshe shehui zhuyi xin nongcun de diaocha", (An investigation into the construction of a socialist new countryside in Xiashitang brigade, Yibing County, Sichuan Province), in *Renmin Ribao*, 6 December, 1978, reprinted in Huang Daoxia, *An Anthology of Historical Material on Agricultural Collectivization*, pg.882.

¹⁹³ *Ibid*, pg 883.

Speaking on 1 October at a meeting of Sichuan's county party secretaries, Zhao Ziyang spoke at some length, and in glowing terms, of emulating Suzhou and Wuxi's experiences. In a section of his speech that could have been taken straight from Hua's work report at the Fifth NPC, Zhao stated:

Two experiences of Suzhou Prefecture in Jiangsu Province stand out and merit our earnest emulation. One is the all-out effort in farmland capital construction to build fields that yield a ton of grain per *mu*. Another is the extensive operation of commune- and brigade-run enterprises to follow the path of comprehensive development of agricultural, sideline, and industrial production. These two are interrelated and each can help the other move forward. Only by going in for commune- and brigade-run industrial operations in a big way can we accumulate enough funds and material for the construction of fields that yield a ton of grain per *mu*; and with the construction of this kind of field grain yield and output of diversified economy can be raised by a big margin; then more work force, raw materials, and feed will be released for the development of commune- and brigade-run industrial operations. This is what we describe as "running industries around agriculture and promoting agriculture by means of industrial growth".¹⁹⁴

In modified form, Hua's policy of using industry to stimulate agricultural growth would be incorporated into the third plenum's conclusions.

The third plenum opened on 18 December, however the decisions on reforms to agricultural policy had all been taken at the preceding Central Work Conference which met for over a month from 10 November to the 15 December. It is clear that although Hua Guofeng's political position had been severely weakened by developments in the run up to the plenum, he still intended to play a leading role in the work conference's proceedings. On agriculture, Shi Zhongquan and Chen Dengcai suggest that it was Hua who as early as 13 November, demanded that the work conference focus on agriculture, and that it was one of Hua's leading supporters, Vice-Premier Ji Dengkui, who introduced

¹⁹⁴ Zhao Ziyang, "Speed up the development of agriculture in an effort to wrest a still greater harvest next year [Excerpts]", in *Chinese Law and Government*, Spring 1982, (Vol.XV, No.1), pg.85.

the two key documents on agriculture that the plenum would later adopt.¹⁹⁵ Whatever Hua's intention, there was apparently widespread criticism of the draft documents which intensified as the work meeting progressed. The political momentum at the work conference was clearly with Deng Xiaoping and the moderates and the final documents on agriculture adopted by the third plenum largely reflect their viewpoints.

The final communique of the third plenum, issued on 22 December announced the historic shift in the Party's work from focusing on class struggle to carrying out socialist modernization. On agriculture the communique stated that the "People's Communes should continue to implement the system of three levels of ownership, with the team as the base", and in a break from the line adopted at the Fifth NPC, that this would be a "stable, unchanging" policy (*wending bubian*). The communique also guaranteed commune members the right to run private plots and sideline industries and added that these and rural markets were "an essential supplement to the socialist economy".¹⁹⁶ In order to raise the peasants enthusiasm for agriculture, the communique called for their material interests to be taken care of and for their democratic rights to be protected.¹⁹⁷

More concrete policies were set out in the two documents adopted by the plenum: "Decisions of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China on Some Questions Concerning the Acceleration of Agricultural Development (Draft)" and the "Regulations on the Work in the Rural People's Communes (Draft for Trial Use)".¹⁹⁸ These documents were issued jointly by the Central

¹⁹⁵ Shi Zhongquan and Chen Dengcai (eds), *Deng Xiaoping zai 1978*, (*Deng Xiaoping in 1978*), (Shenyang: Liaoning renmin chubanshe, 1994), pg.240.

¹⁹⁶ "Zhongguo gongchandang di shiyi jie zhongyang weiyuanhui di san ci quanti huiyi gongbao", (Communique of the third plenum of the 11th Central Committee of the CCP), in *Shiyi jie san zhong quanhui yilai zhongyao wenxian xuandu Shang ce*, (*A Selection of Important Documents since the third plenum of the 11th Central Committee, Volume One*), (Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 1987), pg.8.

¹⁹⁷ *Ibid*, pg.7.

¹⁹⁸ Translations of these two documents appeared in the July, August and September, 1979 issues of *Issues and Studies*.

Committee on 14 January as Central Document (1979) No.4.

There were a number of key policies set out in these documents which formed the backbone of agricultural policy over the following years. On ownership, the system of three levels of ownership, with the production team as the base was reaffirmed. The "Decision" also warned against transferring accounting to higher levels "without fulfilling all requirements". Any unit wishing to establish brigade accounting had to submit a proposal to the provincial leadership.¹⁹⁹ The rights of the production team were guaranteed and the arbitrary transfer of resources forbidden.

More specific measures to boost agricultural production included the introduction of contracting out of agricultural tasks to "work groups". Over-fulfilment was to be rewarded, however contracting with individuals or households was specifically prohibited.²⁰⁰ Furthermore, sideline industries were to be "encouraged" so as to increase peasant's "personal income and invigorate the rural economy".

To stimulate production, the "Decision" announced that the requisition price for grain would be raised by 20 percent, and the price for above-quota requisitions was to be raised by 50 percent. At the same time the prices of key agricultural inputs such as fertilizers, machinery, and other manufactured goods was reduced by 10 to 15 percent. In addition to paying more for its purchases of grain, the "Decision" said that State investment in agriculture would rise over the next three to five years to "18 percent of total investment in capital construction" and that "expenditure on agricultural projects and aids to the communes, brigades, and teams, will also be raised to 8 percent out of the state's total expenditure."²⁰¹

In addition to the emphasis on using material incentives, the "Decision" also

¹⁹⁹ "Decision of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China on Some Questions Concerning the Acceleration of Agricultural Development (Draft)", in *Issues and Studies*, July 1979, pp.111-112.

²⁰⁰ *Ibid*, pg.111.

²⁰¹ *Ibid*, pg.112.

reaffirmed the importance of continuing rural capital construction and agricultural mechanization, although the target of 85 percent mechanization by 1985, set at the 5th NPC, was reduced to 80 percent. Finally, the role of commune and brigade enterprises was underlined. The "Decision" called for the value of the enterprises' output with regards to the total revenue of the commune to rise from the current 28 percent to more than 50 per cent by 1985.²⁰²

The impact of these reforms on agricultural production has been well documented. From a figure of 609.5 billion *jīn* (one *jīn* is equal to half a kilogram) of grain crops produced in 1978, production rose sharply to 641.1 billion *jīn* in 1980, 709.0 billion *jīn* in 1982 and 814.6 billion *jīn* in 1984. Cotton production saw similar growth, from 4.3 billion *jīn* in 1978 to 12.5 billion *jīn* in 1984. Average per capita consumption of grain (in *jīn*) rose from 319 in 1978 to 531.3 in 1984 and pork consumption rose from 15 to 21.1 *jīn* over the same period. The social impact on rural areas was also significant, although the major change, the abolition of the communes, is outside the scope of this thesis, occurring in 1981.

7. Conclusion

As this chapter has shown, the economic and social importance of agriculture meant that senior figures within the Party initially attempted to shield rural areas from the full impact of the Cultural Revolution. These non-political factors acted as a significant block to the full implementation of a radical agricultural line, as production imperatives over-rode political idealism. The material examined in this chapter has shown how radical agricultural policies were often set aside in the spring and autumn when agricultural work reached a peak and has highlighted how the radical Left's agricultural policy followed a noticeably different pattern to that outlined in the chapter on higher education.

²⁰² *Ibid*, pg.116.

Perhaps the most important part of this chapter has been to examine the extent of the influence of Lin Biao and Hua Guofeng over agricultural policy. Although the material does not reveal the degree to which Lin Biao participated in the debate over agricultural policy, it is clear that preparations for a possible war with the Soviet Union, with which Lin was closely involved, did lead to a radical upsurge in the countryside. The material presented here suggests that Lin was not directly involved with agriculture, but rather that the radical upsurge was an indirect result of the military and industrial policies being pursued at that time.

It seems that Lin Biao did not have strong ties with either the government bureaucracy or leading Party figures closely involved with agricultural policy. The one exception was Chen Boda, who had been closely involved with agricultural collectivization in the 1950s, however his influence over agricultural policy had declined by the late 1960s and early 1970s. A number of authors have argued that the military's presence in rural areas following the mobilizational phase of the Cultural Revolution allowed Lin Biao to implement a radical line. However I believe that not all of these soldiers should be seen as being under the control of Lin Biao, and that many of these local forces and their leaders were more interested in stability than the continued implementation of radical policies, (the example of Xu Shiyou's intervention is instructive). Together, this suggests that Lin Biao had little direct influence over agricultural policy and that instead, his influence came as an indirect result of the military policies that he was implementing at this time.

In contrast this chapter has shown that Hua Guofeng had a much greater influence over agricultural policy than has previously been thought, and that his involvement with this issue at the centre began as early as 1971. This chapter has shown how Hua Guofeng used his influence over agricultural mechanization and agricultural policy in general to build a coalition of support based primarily on ties with the model Dazhai brigade and the support of Mao

Zedong. From late-1975, before Zhou Enlai's death, it was Hua Guofeng's coalition who had the most influence over agricultural policy and Hua used this issue after Mao's death to mobilize wider support for his leadership.

In contrast to Lin Biao and Hua Guofeng, members of the Gang of Four appear to have had little influence over agricultural policy, indeed it appears that in Zhang Chunqiao's case he had little interest in agricultural policy per se, only showing real interest in issues of political leadership in China's rural areas. The Gang of Four had few ties to leaders in rural areas, or to those involved with agricultural policy at the centre. Attempts to win over Chen Yonggui failed, and model communes developed at their initiative received only sporadic coverage in the media. This weakness appears to be the main reason for their lack of influence over agricultural policy, although they continued to launch strident attacks on the policies of both the moderates and Hua Guofeng.

As I have shown in this chapter, agricultural policy fluctuated significantly during the period under study. Political factors such as the ideological climate, political campaigns and power struggles at the centre were clearly influential in leading developments in agricultural policy and lending weight to a given coalition's position, so the purge of Lin Biao temporarily strengthened the position of the moderate coalition. However, as noted above, this chapter has also shown how economic factors, as seen from both the centre and at local levels were significant. One interesting development was the spontaneous introduction of reforms at the local level, before the introduction of central policy directives, the best example being the introduction of production responsibility systems in Anhui before the third plenum of December 1978 which formally approved this policy. These developments were generally in response to local difficulties and were seen as a means of boosting production in difficult times. Moderates at the centre both used, and encouraged, the development of these experiments in order to strengthen their own policy position which placed more

emphasis on economic elements in policy-making. Their success was an important factor in the moderates' ability to overcome the opposition of Hua Guofeng in a field where he demonstrated greater influence than has generally been recognized.

Chapter Five: Foreign Policy

1. Introduction

The period of 1969-1978 saw two major shifts in China's foreign policy, namely the move to establishing better relations with the United States of America and the general opening to the outside world (*dui wai kai fang*), symbolized by mainland China's entry into the United Nations, the establishment of diplomatic relations with a broad range of countries and the beginning of large-scale trading, firstly under Hua Guofeng, and then more significantly under Deng Xiaoping's leadership. And yet both of these developments came against a domestic backdrop characterized by increased ideological rhetoric, which targetted both the United States and the Soviet Union, US military involvement in southeast and northeast Asia and an economic policy that emphasized notions of self-sufficiency and local initiative.

As many authors have noted, China's international relations suffered considerable damage during the mobilizational phase of the Cultural Revolution.¹ The actions of junior diplomats and students studying overseas, who sought to proselytise in the name of Mao, together with the withdrawal of most of China's ambassadors, meant that by 1969 the PRC was only on friendly terms with a handful of nations. At home Red guard units even succeeded in taking over the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) for a short period and issuing instructions to embassies overseas. Red Guard actions in Macao and the burning of part of the British Embassy in Beijing only reinforced the image of a radical upsurge in China's foreign policy.

Despite the seriousness of these events, it is clear that actions such as the burning of the British Embassy marked the peak of radical activity in foreign affairs. China's international position and wider security concerns relating to

¹ See, for example, Melvin Gurtov, "The Foreign Ministry and Foreign Affairs in the Chinese Cultural Revolution", in Thomas W. Robinson (ed.), *The Cultural Revolution in China*, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971), pp.313-366.

deteriorating Sino-Soviet relations led China's senior leadership to intervene to control disorder in the foreign affairs system. Under the personal guidance of both Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai, senior military and MFA officials met to discuss China's strategic position, discussions which led directly to the re-start of talks with the US. Although the on-going war in Vietnam, and US incursions into both Cambodia and Laos complicated negotiations, the general trend throughout this period was one of ameliorating Sino-US relations, culminating in the establishment of diplomatic relations in 1979.

Elsewhere, China's accession to the UN in 1971 symbolized the end of the period of isolation engendered by the mobilizational phase of the Cultural Revolution. China established diplomatic relations with a series of countries around the world during this period, including Japan, Italy, West Germany, and a number of African and Latin American countries. Although China's isolation during the early part of the Cultural Revolution is sometimes over-stated, under Hua Guofeng's leadership the PRC began trading internationally on a much larger scale than had been seen previously.

a. The significance of a study of China's foreign policy

A study of China's foreign policy during the period 1969-1978 is significant for a number of reasons: Firstly, developments in this field followed a different pattern to those in either higher education or agriculture discussed in the preceding chapters; secondly, decision-making in the foreign policy arena was dominated by a small number of senior leaders, most notably Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai and although there were clearly a number of important differences of opinion within the Chinese leadership over foreign policy decisions, it was not riven by the factionalism that characterized the two issue areas discussed in the previous chapters; thirdly, a study of China's foreign policy highlights the role of military figures in foreign policy decision-making in China.

Developments in foreign policy followed a different pattern to those in both agriculture and higher education. In contrast to agriculture, the most radical phase for China's foreign policy was during the mobilizational phase of the Cultural Revolution, from 1967-1968. From 1969 onwards, the trend was towards moderating the position of this earlier period. Although higher education suffered in a similar manner during the mobilizational phase, there was little success in moderating policies for a number of years. Higher education was also marked by dramatic policy reversal, for instance the re-radicalization in 1974-1975, which was not the case with foreign policy.

The main reason for the differences in the way in which foreign policy developed during this period is the domination of the policy debate by a small group of senior leaders. While they were alive, Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai were the main authorities on foreign policy. Later Deng Xiaoping was also able to lead foreign policy, although never to the extent of Mao. Surrounding Mao, Zhou and Deng were a small group of leading Party, military and government officials who were involved in the decision-making process. These included Lin Biao, Ye Jianying, Chen Yun, Chen Yi, China's Foreign Minister during the early part of the Cultural Revolution, and a number of other MFA officials, including Qiao Guanhua, Huang Hua and Ji Pengfei.

This core group of officials appears to have held the authority to take all major foreign policy decisions and was isolated from much of the factionalism that characterized developments in other areas, and that had been present in foreign affairs during the mobilization period. As I will show below, the personal authority of Mao and Zhou and the overriding importance of security concerns appear to have acted to prevent major factionalization in this field. This is not to say that there weren't divisions within the leadership over key issues: There is evidence to suggest that Lin Biao opposed Sino-US

rapprochement² and Jiang Qing and the Gang of Four attacked Deng Xiaoping for undermining China's policy of self-sufficiency. However, the debate over these issues was, on the whole, restricted to the senior leadership; little of the on-going negotiations with the US prior to Kissinger's 1971 visit is reflected in the national media for instance. This served to isolate most developments in foreign policy from the domestic situation.

Finally, a study of foreign policy during this period highlights the role of a number of military figures in this field, both as a radical force and a force for moderation. While Lin Biao reportedly opposed Sino-US rapprochement, it was on the initiative of four other PLA marshals that Mao and Zhou Enlai moved to improve relations between the two countries. The PLA certainly had a bureaucratic interest in China's foreign policy as the main guarantor of the PRC's security, however this interest was advocated by individual PLA members who held senior positions within the Party and government structure. Since they held a variety of views there was no single "PLA position" on any issue. But senior PLA commanders played a leading role in the making of foreign policy, in contrast to the situation in either agriculture or higher education where PLA influence tended to be indirect, filtered through implementation.

b. Policy issues in the debate over foreign policy during the Cultural Revolution

This chapter will focus on four interlocking issues: Firstly, China's relationship to the two superpowers, the United States and the Soviet Union. This period saw the transition from China's position of opposition to both of the superpowers to the evolution of the strategic triangle between China, the US and the Soviet Union with China "leaning" towards the US as a counter-balance to the perceived threat from the Soviet Union. Secondly, I will examine

² This is the line adopted by John Garver in *China's Decision for Rapprochement with the United States, 1968-71*, (Boulder: Westview Press, 1982) and Japp van Ginneken's *The Rise and Fall of Lin Biao*, (New York: Penguin Books, 1972).

China's foreign economic and trade policy. Even while Mao Zedong was alive, foreign trade grew considerably. In 1975 Deng Xiaoping attempted to open further to the outside world, but his efforts were criticized by the radical Left. Hua Guofeng adopted many of Deng's policies and initiated a policy of large-scale foreign trade, in particular to purchase technology unavailable in China.

Thirdly I will look at China's position on the Vietnam War and the wider conflict in southeast Asia. This issue, together with the question of Taiwan, lay at the heart of the Sino-US relationship and later influenced Sino-Soviet relations. Finally, I will look at the evolution of what might be called China's world view, as reflected in the statements of Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping. This encompasses Mao's "Three Worlds" theory and notions of "opening to the outside world". These statements set the broad parameters within which China's foreign policy evolved and was applied, and framed China's relations with other nations.

c. Foreign policy in the PRC, 1966-1968

The mobilizational phase of the Cultural Revolution had a damaging impact on China's foreign policy in two main regards: Firstly, the activities of radical junior diplomats and students studying overseas severely damaged China's foreign relations. Attempts to popularize Mao Zedong Thought overseas, demonstrations, and the crass behaviour of inexperienced diplomats meant that by 1968 China was on friendly terms with only a handful of countries, most prominently Pakistan and Albania. All of China's ambassadors, except Huang Hua in Cairo, had been withdrawn, handicapping any efforts to improve the situation, whilst some eighteen Chinese diplomats had been declared *persona non grata* between 1966 and 1969, highlighting the sensitivities felt by many host countries.³

³ George P. Jan, "The Ministry of Foreign Affairs in China Since the Cultural Revolution", in *Asian Survey*, Vol XVII, Nos.6 (June 1977), pg.519.

Secondly, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Beijing had been hampered by Red Guard attacks and purges of senior staff, limiting its capacity to function effectively. (The Ministry did however remain open, in contrast to both the Ministry of Education and the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry). The Minister of Foreign Affairs during this period, Chen Yi, came under attack from Red Guard units for his role in supporting the use of work teams in the Ministry to limit the impact of the mobilizational phase of the Cultural Revolution. Significantly, Chen received the personal support of Zhou Enlai and the Central Committee and remained in place, however he was forced to make several self-criticisms and was hampered in carrying out day-to-day work.⁴ There is no evidence that at this stage Chen was attacked on foreign policy issues, rather he was criticized for his handling of the impact of the Cultural Revolution within the MFA.⁵

Elsewhere, Jan writes that a total of five, out of eleven, Vice-Ministers were purged. The two assistants to the MFA disappeared from public view and six Directors and twenty Deputy Directors of the fifteen geographical and functional departments within the MFA were purged. The massive loss of experienced staff could only undermine the efficiency of the MFA during this period.⁶

Domestic developments, including the attack on the British Embassy, together with the deterioration in China's foreign relations with key allies such as Cambodia and Burma, appear essential in convincing Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai that the radical influence needed to be brought under control within the foreign affairs system and led to a definite change of heart on the part of Mao to end radical activities overseas and in the MFA. This downturn in radical activity coincided with increased controls over the wider Red Guard movement, but wider security concerns relating to China's deteriorating international

⁴ Melvin Gurtov, "The Foreign Ministry and Foreign Affairs in the Chinese Cultural Revolution", in Thomas Robinson (ed.), *The Cultural Revolution in China*, pp.323-334.

⁵ *Ibid*, pg.320.

⁶ George P. Jan, "The Ministry of Foreign Affairs in China", pp.518-519.

position must also have been significant.

New regulations were introduced on the day of the attack on the British Embassy, restricting Red Guard activities in the diplomatic quarters in Beijing, and specifically forbidding them from "beating, smashing, burning, invading and obstructing".⁷ Key members of the radical Left, including Jiang Qing and Kang Sheng, also spoke out against Red Guard activities in the field of foreign affairs. On 1 September 1967, Kang Sheng distinguished between criticism of Chen Yi and the government's foreign policy line, stating that it was the Central Committee, not the MFA, that dictated foreign policy. Kang also forbade any further power seizures in foreign affairs and the Foreign Ministry.⁸ Elsewhere, a speech by Jiang Qing was published on 5 September in which she called for an end to attacks on foreign embassies.

Through the latter half of 1967 and 1968, Chinese officials worked hard to repair much of the damage caused by radical activities during the mobilizational phase of the Cultural Revolution. This included statements of support for Cambodia, a donation of 10,000 yuan to the Burmese Red Cross to help victims of a hurricane and the issuing of exit visas for British diplomatic personnel previously refused permission to leave.⁹

The restoration of order domestically, did mean senior Chinese leaders were once again able to resume control over the day-to-day running of foreign affairs. Indications such as the appointment of many MFA careerists as new ambassadors, and the initiative towards improving Sino-US relations suggest that the foreign affairs system was able to recover quickly from the impact of developments during the mobilizational phase and was able to continue functioning despite many of the most influential figures in this area being supposedly side-lined from day-to-day work. I will look at these and other

⁷ Melvin Gurtov, "The Foreign Ministry and Foreign Affairs in the Chinese Cultural Revolution", pg.352.

⁸ *Ibid*, pg.353.

⁹ *Ibid*, pg.355-356.

developments below.

2. A Differentiated Approach to the Two Superpowers Emerges: 1969-1971

While Red Guard attacks on the Ministry of Foreign Affairs had stopped by 1969, the impact of the mobilizational phase of the Cultural Revolution led to a concerted effort in the first half of 1969 to restore effective functioning within the Ministry. More urgently, escalating border clashes with the Soviet Union in March and April 1969 forced China's senior leadership to review its international position. These clashes were provoked by the Chinese, but the Soviet response in the ensuing period appears to have led to a major change in the strategic thinking of China's leadership. Four of the most senior PLA Marshals, including Minister of Foreign Affairs Chen Yi, held a series of meetings to discuss the international situation which led directly to China's renewed overtures to the US.

Throughout this three year period, China's assessment was that the US was a waning power, beset by economic and social crises at home, and embroiled ever more deeply in Vietnam and southeast Asia. Mao's assessment was that the more involved America became in Vietnam, the stronger the resistance, both in southeast Asia and elsewhere to US aggression. China's assessment of the US as an imperialist power did not change during this period, however the perception of America as a weakening superpower, and so a country less likely to pose a serious military threat to the PRC, allowed the majority of Chinese leaders to make an approach to America to ease Sino-US relations as a counter to the growing threat of the Soviet Union. Apparent opposition from some leaders, including Lin Biao, and the on-going and escalating conflict in Vietnam made negotiations difficult, and it was a full two years after the first meeting of the four PLA marshals before Kissinger made his first secret visit to China. I will examine these issues below.

a. Consolidation in the MFA: 1969

Although Chen Yi had survived the mobilizational phase of the Cultural Revolution as nominal head of the MFA, ill-health meant that the day-to-day leadership of the Ministry was undertaken first by Vice-Minister Qiao Guanhua and then, from April 1970, Vice-Minister Ji Pengfei, who was made acting-Minister on 1 April that year.¹⁰ Both Qiao and Ji had long careers in foreign affairs¹¹ and both should be seen as close allies of Zhou Enlai. The presence of Qiao and Ji would certainly have made it easier for Zhou to maintain tight personal control over the activities of the Ministry.

In addition to Qiao and Ji, two other Vice-Ministers had come through the mobilizational phase of the Cultural Revolution unscathed. They were Li Yuewen, who according to George Jan “represented the People’s Liberation Army... in the Foreign Ministry” and Han Nianlong, who had served as the Deputy Political Commissar of the Shanghai garrison region.¹² Han’s background suggests possible ties with the radical Left in Shanghai, but without further details it is difficult to assess either of their possible allegiances. It is perhaps significant that neither Li or Han appear in media reporting to the extent of Qiao Guanhua and Ji Pengfei, although Han would remain in his post until 1982.

One of the most visible signs of re-organization and consolidation within the MFA was the appointment of new ambassadors to serve in China’s embassies. This process began in May 1969 and gathered pace with the appointment of 17 ambassadors in June and July of that year. By the end of 1970 34 new ambassadors had been appointed, filling half of the vacant posts. Significantly, the majority of the appointees were career diplomats, with 29 of the 34 coming from the foreign service or MFA. Six of these simply returned to their former

¹⁰ George P. Jan, “The Ministry of Foreign Affairs in China”, pg.519.

¹¹ See, for example, their biographies in Wolfgang Bartke, *Biographical Dictionary and Analysis of China’s Party Leadership 1922-1988*, (Munich: K.G. Saur, 1990), pgs. 75 & 170.

¹² George P. Jan, *op cit*, pg.520.

posts.¹³ When contrasted to the radical leadership that was then entering China's universities and colleges as part of the Mao Zedong Thought Propaganda Work Teams, the difference is considerable and suggests that the impact of the mobilizational phase in foreign affairs was much more short lived than in higher education.

b. Deteriorating Sino-Soviet relations: March-October, 1969

Sino-Soviet relations had continued to worsen throughout the mobilizational phase of the Cultural Revolution. Disputes over the transit of Soviet supplies of weaponry to Vietnam, clashes over policy in the Middle East, and the Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia in 1968 all served to heighten the tension between the two countries. In particular the Chinese leadership were vehement in their condemnation of Brezhnev's doctrine of "Limited Sovereignty", seeing a threat to China's own position. The *Peking Review* later labelled Brezhnev's policy "an outright doctrine of hegemony".¹⁴

Brezhnev's doctrine and the Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia are correctly seen as having played an important part in the Chinese leadership's reassessment of its position vis-a-vis the two superpowers. Certainly the idea that the Soviet Union felt it had the right to intervene militarily in any socialist country was taken seriously by the Chinese. However the perceived threat to China's security that the Soviet Union might pose was only translated into decisive action following border clashes along the Ussuri river in the northeast of China. The Chinese media carried powerful condemnation of the clashes, which continued throughout March and April, and had a direct impact on China's assessment of its international position.

Untangling the details of the various incidents from contemporary reports is

¹³ Melvin Gurtov, "The Foreign Ministry and Foreign Affairs in the Chinese Cultural Revolution", pp.365-366.

¹⁴ *Peking Review*, 24 April, 1970, pg.10, reprinted in Alfred D. Low, *The Sino-Soviet Confrontation since Mao Zedong Dispute, Detente, or Conflict?*, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1987), pg.34.

difficult owing to the propaganda value that both sides sought to extract from the clashes, however, a number of writers have suggested that the first clashes were provoked by the Chinese.¹⁵ The first incident occurred on 2 March, 1969, on the disputed Zhenbao Island in the Ussuri River. A number of Chinese border guards were reported killed and wounded during the clash. Although there had been a number of incidents along the length of the border prior to this, this particular attack proved to be flashpoint which increased tension significantly as the island had been the focus of competing territorial claims between the two sides.

Two days after this incident the *Renmin ribao* and the *Jiefangjun ribao* published a joint editorial, "Overthrow the New Tzars" (*Dadao xin shahuang*) which carries a stinging attack on the "Soviet revisionist renegade clique" (*Suxiu pantu jituan*):

The Soviet revisionist renegade clique has persistently viewed the Chinese people as its enemy. Particularly since our country launched the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, achieving a great and decisive victory, the Soviet revisionist renegade clique has both hated and been afraid [of us] and further intensified its anti-Chinese activities. Not only do they wantonly slander and criticize China and carry out activities to destabilize and damage [us], along the Chinese-Mongolian and Chinese-Soviet borders they have massed troops, constantly violating our territory and air space, creating border incidents and carrying out military intimidation of our country. They put all their effort into colluding with American imperialism and reactionary forces in all countries and try to organize an anti-China encirclement.¹⁶

How different is this kind of bandit action by the Soviet revisionist renegade clique to the wanton occupation of other countries' territory, violation of other countries' sovereignty and riding-roughshod everywhere [carried out by] American imperialism?

¹⁵ See, for example, Lowell Dittmer, *Sino-Soviet Normalization and Its International Implications, 1945-1990*, (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1992), pg.190 and Richard Wich, *Sino-Soviet Crisis Politics A Study of Political Change and Communication*, (Cambridge, Mass. Council on East Asian Studies, Harvard University, 1989), pg.98.

¹⁶ "Dadao xin shahuang", (Overthrow the New Tzar), in the *Renmin ribao*, 4 March, 1969, pg. 1.

The People's Daily carried a series of articles reporting demonstrations across China protesting Soviet actions.¹⁷ Subsequently there were a series of further incidents in the area. An official Chinese note of protest, printed in the *Renmin ribao* on 14 March listed Soviet incursions on the 4, 5, 7, 10, 11 and 12 March.¹⁸ Two more serious incidents occurred on the 15 March, when some 50 Soviet tanks and armoured vehicles crossed into Chinese territory and on the 17 March when 3 tanks and over a hundred Soviet soldiers were involved in further clashes.¹⁹

c. Reassessing China's strategic position: March-October, 1969

These events had a decisive impact on China's strategic thinking. While they were continuing, Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai organized four of China's most senior military figures, Foreign Minister Chen Yi, Ye Jianying, Xu Xiangqian and Nie Rongzhen, to meet on a weekly basis to discuss China's strategic position. It was as a result of these talks, which continued into October, that China moved to re-open negotiations with the US.

The first of the meetings of the four Marshals actually took place on 1 March the day before the first serious border incident at Zhenbao Island. It seems likely that the growing tension along the border and a number of smaller-scale incidents had led Mao and Zhou to take the initiative in organising these meetings. Whatever the reason for convening the meetings, the initial discussions of the four Marshals were clearly dominated by the escalating conflict with the Soviet Union. For Kuo-kang Shao, Zhou Enlai's major foreign policy aim at this time was avoidance of a major war with the Soviet Union.²⁰ In this light, Chinese provocation on the border may seem ill-advised, but rather

¹⁷ See, for example, the front pages of the *Renmin ribao* on the 6, 7, 8, and 9 March.

¹⁸ "Wo guo zhengfu xiang Sulián zhengfu tichu qiāngliè kāngyì", (This country's government has raised a strong protest with the Soviet government), in the *Renmin ribao*, 14 March, 1969, pg. 1.

¹⁹ *Zhongguo gongchandang da shidian*, (A Dictionary of Major Events of the CCP), (Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 1991), pg.439.

²⁰ Kuo-kang Shao, *Zhou Enlai and the Foundations of Chinese Foreign Policy*, (London: MacMillan, 1996), pg. 172.

than suggesting on-going radicalization in Chinese foreign policy or policy differences within the leadership, Dittmer seems right when he suggests that "Chinese leaders calculated that a sharp, short warning blow would deter future Soviet encroachments...".²¹ In fact, the tough Soviet response only served to underline the threat to China's security, a threat that was reinforced by the on-going build up of the Soviet military along the border and explicit threats to China's nascent nuclear weapons program.

The selection of the four PLA Marshals was strange in that at that time they had been side-lined from day-to-day work as a result of their clash with members of the radical Left in 1967 in what had become known as the "February adverse current". The four Marshals had all played a prominent role in the arguments with Jiang Qing, Chen Boda, and Kang Sheng. At the time that Mao instructed the four to meet to discuss the international situation, it is clear that they were still in some disgrace; the biography of Ye Jianying notes that Ye and the other Marshals were "squatting" in Beijing's "six factories and two schools".²² (This phrase refers to six model factories in Beijing and Peking and Tsinghua Universities. These were held up as model institutions in the movements to cleanse class ranks and rectify the Party. Party figures stayed, i.e. "squatted", at these institutions in order to undergo reform). That Mao felt it was necessary to employ these four despite their apparent disgrace suggests a high degree of pragmatism in his attitude in that ideological purity was less significant than securing China's international position. This decision also suggests a reluctance to use figures from the radical Left on major foreign policy initiatives.

In all the four marshals met a total of 23 times. The first series of meetings were held in March and appear to have discussed the on-going border incidents with the Soviet Union. Following the Ninth Party Congress the four

²¹ Lowell Dittmer, *Sino-Soviet Normalization*, pg. 190

²² Compilation group for the "Biography of Ye Jianying", *Ye Jianying zhuan*, (*Biography of Ye Jianying*), (Beijing: Dangdai zhongguo chubanshe, 1995), pg. 598.

held a second and more important series of meetings which addressed wider strategic issues. It is clear that the four military leaders were the only senior figures to attend these meetings and that there were no representatives of either the radical Left or supporters of Lin Biao, despite his leading position at the time. Together with the knowledge that Lin Biao did not write his political report to the Congress, which dwelt at some length on the issue of China's relations with the two superpowers, Lin's exclusion from the meetings suggests that he did not play a leading role in formulating China's foreign policy. It is significant that Mao himself had suggested the four meet, but had chosen not to include his "close comrade-in-arms and successor". While it is clear that he was excluded from these meetings, the degree to which he opposed the outcome of the deliberations of Ye and the others is less clear owing to a lack of attributable material.

After the first series of meetings in March, Ye Jianying undertook the drafting of a report summarizing the discussions. The report was titled "In the forest of the world we can see the tree of Zhenbao Island". (In Chinese Zhenbao means precious, so Ye's title conveys a sense of Zhenbao Island being precious to the Chinese). The report linked Soviet aggression to attempts by the two superpowers to control the whole world and highlighted the growing contradictions between countries across the globe. It also reportedly made concrete proposals on military training, building up of the militia and military-industrial production.²³

At the Ninth Party Congress, which opened on 1 April, 1969, the Soviet Union came in for further criticism. The section of Lin Biao's political report on China's foreign relations, which was actually drafted by Yao Wenyuan and Zhang Chunqiao, was dominated by a stinging attack on the Soviet Union:

Since Brezhnev came to power, with its baton becoming less and less effective and its difficulties at home and abroad growing more and more serious, the Soviet revisionist renegade clique has been

²³ *Ibid*, pg. 598.

practising social-imperialism and social-fascism more frantically than ever... Its dispatch of hundreds of thousands of troops to occupy Czechoslovakia and its armed provocations against China on our territory Chenpao Island are two foul performances staged recently by Soviet revisionism.²⁴

Lin's political report balanced this attack on the Soviet Union with criticism of US actions in Vietnam and Taiwan. Many commentators have taken these statements as a sign that Lin Biao was resistant to the move to improve relations with the US, preferring a position of opposing both superpowers at once. In as much that Lin Biao did not write the political report it is impossible to ascribe a particular position to him. Even if we take this report as a representation of the position of Yao Wenyuan and Zhang Chunqiao, two members of the radical Left, it is difficult to see in it any opposition to the line subsequently taken by the central leadership to improve relations with the US.

Lin Biao's political report was scathing in its criticism of the US, but it also highlighted what the Chinese saw as the declining position of America:

The paper-tiger nature of US imperialism has long since been laid bare by the people throughout the world. US imperialism, the most ferocious enemy of the people of the whole world, is going downhill more and more. Since he took office, Nixon has been confronted with a hopeless mess and insoluble economic crisis, with the strong resistance of the masses of the people at home and throughout the world and with the predicament in which the imperialist countries are disintegrating and the baton of US imperialism is getting ever less effective.²⁵

These comments were in accord with a number of articles on America that appeared in the media at the time of the Congress.²⁶

In the following months this sort of assessment of US strength played an important part in the deliberations of the four marshals and in the decision to

²⁴ China Problems Research Center (ed.), *Selected Works of Lin Biao*, (Hong Kong: Chih Luen Press, 1970), pp.57-59.

²⁵ *Ibid*, pg.56.

²⁶ " Meiguo heiren zhengqu ziyou jiefang douzheng xiang zongshen fazhan", (The struggle for freedom and liberation by America's blacks is developing in depth), in the *Renmin Ribao*, 16 April, 1969, pg.5.

renew discussions with American officials. Opposition to US actions, most notably in Vietnam and southeast Asia, did not decline as a result of this decision and negotiations between the two sides suffered continual set-backs as a result of the on-going conflict. However China's assessment that the US was a declining power which no longer posed a direct military threat appears to have convinced Chinese leaders that it was right to ease Sino-US relations as a counter-balance to the greater danger of increased Sino-Soviet tension.

In the wake of the Ninth Congress, the four marshals, who all retained their positions on the Central Committee, resumed their meetings. As I noted above, this second set of meetings appears to have focused on the wider strategic situation. Underlining the perilous situation China faced, in June Soviet nuclear bombers were brought from western USSR to practice attacks of mock ups of Chinese nuclear facilities in northwestern China.²⁷ Elsewhere, also in June, Soviet leaders proposed establishing an Asian collective security system, explicitly aimed at containing China.²⁸

Early on in the second series of meetings, Chen Yi is reported to have called for efforts to improve Sino-US relations, stating: "We must make the resumption of Sino-US talks and an improvement in relations an important part of our report to the Central Committee."²⁹ In an indication of the sensitivity of such a move, and the fact that Chen Yi remained in a weak position, others attending the discussion are reported to have been concerned that Chen might face renewed criticism. Chen is reported to have stood by his comments: "I still maintain my opinion, we must resume the Sino-US ambassadorial-level talks [a reference to the talks in Poland] as soon as possible, so as to develop Sino-US relations."³⁰

During the fours' discussions Ye Jianying is reported to have expressed

²⁷ Lowell Dittmer, *Sino-Soviet Normalization*, pg. 190.

²⁸ *Ibid*, pg. 173.

²⁹ *Biography of Chen Yi*, Pg. 614.

³⁰ *Ibid*, pg. 599.

similar sentiments. Ye said China should take advantage of the contradictions between the US, the Soviet Union and some European countries to develop Sino-US relations. Ye felt that the US was bound to withdraw its troops from Vietnam and that it was afraid that the Soviet Union would fill the vacuum left behind.³¹

On the 11 July, the four marshals signed a report "A preliminary estimate of the situation in the war" (*Dui zhanzheng de chubu guji*) which was presented to Zhou Enlai and Mao Zedong. The report had been drafted by Xiong Xianghui, a career diplomat who had attended the second series of meetings. It assessed that the contradiction between China and the Soviet Union was greater than that between China and America, and that the contradiction between the US and the Soviet Union was greater than that between China and the Soviet Union. Having conducted a detailed analysis of the international situation it recommended that China re-open negotiations with the US.³²

This report was part of the wider reassessment of China's strategic position which occurred at this time in the face of the Soviet threat. By July-August 1969, the majority of the Chinese leadership appears to have given its support to the position of Zhou Enlai, Mao and the four marshals of differentiating between the two superpowers and seeking to improve relations with the US, a position that remained unchanged for the rest of the period covered by this study.

China's new determination coincided with a new direction in US policy which was seemingly based on a similar analysis of the relative strengths and weaknesses of the relationships within the strategic triangle of China, America, and the Soviet Union. During a tour of Pakistan, Nixon told Pakistan's leadership that the US would not support the Soviet Union in isolating China.

³¹ *Biography of Ye Jilanying*, pg.599.

³² *Ibid*, pg.600.

Following the autumn border clashes between China and the Soviet Union, Under Secretary of State Elliot Richardson stated that America would not side with either the Soviet Union or China against the other country.³³ In October 1969, Kissinger instructed the US ambassador in Poland, Walter Stoessel, to offer a resumption of the ambassadorial-level talks in Warsaw, an offer which the Chinese accepted and the first of these renewed meetings was held on 20 January, 1970.

d. "Getting past first base": Difficulties in dealing with an "imperialist" power: 1970-July 1971

The difficulties China faced in negotiating with what it saw as an imperialist power, involved in a war with its southeast Asian allies, were fully exposed in 1970. Throughout this year, relations between the two sides were constantly subject to developments in Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos. At times negotiations had to be suspended. However, it is important to note that criticism of US actions in southeast Asia, while leading to temporary breaks in negotiations, did not derail the general trend towards improving Sino-US relations.

Throughout 1970 the Chinese analysis remained that the US was a declining power. Further escalation of the war in southast Asia would serve only to deepen America's economic and political crisis. As I argued above, this perception of the US as a declining threat to China allowed the PRC leadership to continue its approach to what in public was still seen as China's leading enemy. The fact that the formation of foreign policy lay in the hands of one or two senior leaders seems to have enabled the decision-making process to be isolated from much of the factional infighting that might otherwise have derailed negotiations at these sensitive stages. In early June, only a few weeks after the publication of a key Mao editorial calling for a united front to oppose American

³³ John W. Garver, *Foreign Relations of the People's Republic of China*, (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall Inc., 1993), pg.79.

imperialism, Zhou Enlai was telling diplomats from eastern Europe that he was looking forward to resuming contacts with the United States in Warsaw.

Sino-US talks resumed on 20 January, 1970. As Kissinger relates, it seemed apparent that the thinking in Washington and Beijing on the eve of this meeting had followed similar lines. When the US Ambassador Walter Stoessel read out a prepared statement which included a proposal that America would be willing to send a representative to Beijing, or accept a Chinese representative in Washington, his Chinese counterpart, also reading from a prepared statement, replied:

We are willing to consider and discuss whatever ideas and suggestions the U.S. Government might put forward in accordance with the five principles of peaceful coexistence, therefore really helping to reduce tensions between China and the U.S. and fundamentally improve relations between China and the U.S. These talks may either continue to be conducted at the ambassadorial level or may be conducted at a higher level or through other channels acceptable to both sides.³⁴

Subsequently, Nixon made a conciliatory statement in the President's Foreign Policy Report which was aimed at assuring China that the US would not take sides in the Sino-Soviet conflict:

Our desire for improved relations is not a tactical means of exploiting the clash between China and the Soviet Union. We see no benefit to us in the intensification of that conflict, and we have not intention of taking sides. Nor is the United States interested in joining any condominium or hostile coalition of great powers against either of the Communist countries.³⁵

Following this announcement, the Chinese, at the next Warsaw meeting, held in February, accepted the US proposal to send a representative to Beijing.

Despite this apparent progress in negotiations, events on the ground in Vietnam put a temporary halt to any further improvement in relations.

³⁴ Henry Kissinger, *White House Years*, (Boston: Little Brown, 1979), pg. 687.

³⁵ *Ibid*, pg.689.

Beginning in April, South Vietnamese forces, backed by US troops, entered parts of Cambodia in an attempt to eradicate Vietnamese base areas.

Sihanouk fled to Beijing, where he established a Cambodian government in exile. He was greeted personally by Mao, Zhou, Lin Biao and other senior leaders.³⁶

In his memoirs *White House Years*, Henry Kissinger suggests that the Chinese waited a full three weeks before issuing a statement criticizing America's "brazen" invasion of Cambodia.³⁷ Such a delay would have been significant, however the Chinese side issued a short ten line statement on the 5 May, some two weeks before the editorial Kissinger notes. This earlier statement was accompanied by an editorial which directly criticized Nixon's actions. As well as attacking this new escalation, the editorial repeated the earlier analysis that such actions would only hasten America's decline and were indicative of the deepening domestic crisis in the US.³⁸

This editorial was followed two weeks later by a full front-page article, published in Mao's name: "People of the world unite, defeat the American aggressors and all their running dogs". It was this article that Kissinger labelled "remarkably bland", however his assertion that it "is not personally abusive toward you [Nixon]" seems at odds with the article's characterization of Nixon's actions in America as "fascist".³⁹ The article claimed that the main trend in the world today was revolutionary, and that there was a new high-tide in the struggle against American imperialism around the world, with people in Asia,

³⁶ "Weida lingxiu Mao zhuxi he ta de qinmi zhanyou Lin fu zhuxi jiejian Jianpuzhai guojia yuanshou xihanuke qinwang he furen", (The great leader Chairman Mao and his close comrade in arms Lin Biao met with Cambodia's State Leader Prince Sihanouk and his wife), in the *Renmin ribao*, 2 May, 1970, pg.1.

³⁷ Henry Kissinger, *White House Years*, pg. 692.

³⁸ "Nikesong zhengfu de xin de zhanzheng maoxian", (The Nixon government's new military adventure), in the *Renmin ribao*, 5 May, 1970, pg.1.

³⁹ "Quan shijie renmin tuanji qilai, dabai meiguo qinluezhe ji qi yiqie zougou!", (People of the world unite, defeat the American aggressors and all their running dogs), in *Mao Zedong waijiao wenxuan*, (*Selected foreign policy works of Mao Zedong*), (Beijing: Zhongyang wenxuan chubanshe, 1994), pg.585.

Africa and Latin America rising in “revolutionary struggle”.⁴⁰

Although the US incursion brought about a temporary halt in the on-going Sino-US meetings in Warsaw, it is clear that in early June, moderates in China were already looking to reopen these talks.⁴¹ Throughout June Chinese signals appeared mixed, suggesting the possibility of conflict within the senior leadership over correct policy. Aside from Zhou’s comments on reopening the Warsaw talks, on the 2 July, the Chinese attempted to intercept a US spy plane flying 100 miles off its coast. This was reportedly the first time that China had attempted to do this since 1965.⁴² The leadership of the PLA Air Force were key supporters of Lin Biao, however it may be stretching a point to suggest that this action indicates an attempt on the part of Lin’s supporters to sabotage Sino-US relations. Key anniversaries for the Chinese, such as the twentieth “anniversary” of President Truman’s decision to send the Seventh Fleet to the Taiwan Strait, and the twentieth anniversary of America’s entry into the Korean War were all marked by editorials which further soured the atmosphere.⁴³

Whatever the internal situation, the Chinese decision to release the American Bishop James Walsh, who had been imprisoned for spying for twenty years in 1960, marked a conciliatory gesture. This was matched by the US government who eased some of the trade sanctions imposed on American companies wanting to trade with China.

At the time of the 21st anniversary of the founding of the PRC, China made perhaps the most famous, and most famously misunderstood, gesture of reconciliation towards the US, when Mao invited Edgar Snow and his wife onto Tian’anmen Gate to take part in the anniversary celebrations. Mao and

⁴⁰ *Ibid*, pg.585.

⁴¹ Henry Kissinger states that Zhou Enlai is reported to have told a number of eastern European diplomats that he was “looking forward” to the resumption of these talks as soon as possible. See *White House Years*, pg. 696.

⁴² *Ibid*, pg.697.

⁴³ See, for example, “Yazhou renmin tuanjie qilai, ba meiguo qinluezhe cong yazhou ganchuqu!” (People of Asia unite, drive the American aggressors out of Asia!), in the *Renmin ribao*, 25 June, 1970, pgs. 1&2.

Zhou personally welcomed Edgar Snow onto Tian'anmen Gate, and pointedly posed with him in numerous photographs. However, Kissinger noted that this action had "overestimated our subtlety, for what they conveyed was so oblique that our crude Occidental minds completely missed the point".⁴⁴

Elsewhere, Lin Biao's speech at a meeting marking the 21st anniversary of the PRC carried renewed criticism of the US and messages of support for anti-imperialist struggles around the world. This speech was printed in the *Renmin ribao* on 2 October.⁴⁵ Once again it is almost impossible to ascertain if this speech is truly representative of Lin's own views, however it was in line with other articles printed both before and after Lin gave his speech. Meanwhile, the Chinese leadership did not allow improving Sino-US relations to interfere with negative reporting of US actions in southeast Asia. Nor did it lead China to abandon any of its fundamental positions, such as its stance on Taiwan. In light of the on-going criticism of America, any similar criticism by Lin should not necessarily be taken as indicating his opposition to Sino-US rapprochement, however without a correctly identifiable body of work by Lin Biao, is almost impossible to assess how out of line with the central leadership his position was.

Lin Biao's speech was interesting in that it contained a negative reference to "social imperialism", indicating the Soviet Union, suggesting that "American imperialism and social imperialism are extremely isolated and finding the going tougher".⁴⁶ John Garver's analysis of articles in the *Peking Review* in 1970 suggests that this year saw a pro-Soviet tilt on the part of the Chinese.⁴⁷ Certainly the central media carried few articles criticizing the Soviet Union,

⁴⁴ Henry Kissinger, *White House Years*, pg.698.

⁴⁵ "Lin Biao fu zhuxi zai qingzhu zhonghua renmin gongheguo chengli ershiyi zhou nian dahuishang de jianghua", (Vice-Chairman Lin Biao's speech at the mass meeting to celebrate the 21st anniversary of the founding of the People's Republic of China), in *Renmin ribao*, 2 October, 1970, reprinted in *Xinhua yuebao*, October 1970, pp.8-9.

⁴⁶ *Ibid*, pg.8.

⁴⁷ John Garver, "Chinese Foreign Policy in 1970: The Tilt Towards the Soviet Union", in *The China Quarterly*, No.82 (June 1980), pp.41-54.

however this may simply reflect the end of the large-scale border incidents of 1969, or may be the result of an effort to reduce tension to support the struggles of the three southeast Asian nations. Lin's comments were not out of step with those of other senior leaders. In a conversation with Pakistan's President Yahya Khan, Zhou Enlai was equally dismissive of both superpowers:

Therefore we can see, if a nationally independent country relies primarily on its own strength and doesn't listen to orders from the superpowers, it doesn't matter if its American or Soviet interference, it will all be defeated.⁴⁸

Yahya Khan's visit to China marked a new stage in Sino-US relations. Khan had earlier visited the US and met with Nixon on 25 October. Knowing of Khan's impending visit to the PRC Nixon briefed him on some of the Warsaw talks and asked him to convey the sentiment that America "regarded a Sino-US rapprochement as essential".⁴⁹ Khan was in China from 10-15 November where he clearly passed on his message. Some three weeks after his return, the Pakistani ambassador to America met with Kissinger to verbally pass on a personal message from Zhou Enlai to Nixon. Zhou emphasized that he spoke not only for himself, but also Mao **and** Lin Biao. Zhou's message stated that China:

has always been willing and has always tried to negotiate by peaceful means.... In order to discuss the subject of the vacation of Chinese territories called Taiwan, a special envoy of President Nixon's will be most welcome in Peking.⁵⁰

The mutual covert signalling of intentions continued into 1971, with the Chinese sending a further message via the Romanian ambassador to the US, indicating their willingness to accept an envoy as long as the US were

⁴⁸ "Minzu dili yundong zai buduan gaozhang", (The movement for national independence is continually rising), in *Zhou Enlai wajiao wenxuan*, (*The foreign policy works of Zhou Enlai*), (Beijing: Zhongyang wenxuan chubanshe, 1990), pg. 467.

⁴⁹ Henry Kissinger, *White House Years*, pg.699.

⁵⁰ Quoted in *ibid*, pg.701.

prepared to resolve the issue of Taiwan, which was said to be "the one outstanding issue between the United States and China".⁵¹ Kissinger replied through the same channel, but showing some oriental subtlety of his own he only sent an oral message, not a written reply, demonstrating his preference for the "Pakistani channel".

Developments in southeast Asia once again threatened to cause difficulties for the cautious negotiations. Through February and early-March, South Vietnamese forces, backed by America, entered Laos in an effort to cut the Ho Chi Minh trail. An editorial in the *Renmin ribao* 14 February, 1971, described "American imperialism" as "currently the most reactionary, most corrupt force, it is always trying to go against the tide and is always trying to overturn history".⁵² Ten days earlier the *Renmin ribao* had carried another article denouncing US actions in Laos, but as Kissinger points out, on the same day the Chinese Vice-Minister, Qiao Guanhua, a close ally of Zhou Enlai, approached the Norwegian Ambassador in Beijing. Qiao said that although the war in southeast Asia made it impossible for the Warsaw talks to resume, Qiao felt that the Chinese would soon want to meet with the Americans. Qiao also asked that this message be brought to the American's attention.⁵³ Certainly it seems that moderates like Qiao and Zhou were anxious to limit the impact of new developments in southeast Asia on the on-going negotiations and it seems likely that given Mao's close involvement in the opening out to the US, their actions had his blessing.

One of the most significant moments in the torturous negotiations was the invitation by the Chinese for an American table tennis team to visit China. The visit was the clearest sign yet of the thaw in Sino-US relations and came less than a month after the lifting of the ban by the US State Department on US

⁵¹ Henry Kissinger, *ibid*, pg. 703.

⁵² "Quanli zhihuan yinduzhina san guo renmin de kangmei jiuguo zhanzheng", (Wholeheartedly support the people of the three Indochina nations in their war to resist America and save their countries), in the *Renmin ribao*, 14 February, 1971, pg. 1.

⁵³ Henry Kissinger, *White House Years*, pg. 706.

citizens travelling to China. On the Chinese side the symbolic significance of such a visit was clear and once it became apparent that the US team wanted to visit China, Zhou Enlai approached Mao for his personal approval, which he duly gave on 7 April.⁵⁴ Placing his own seal of approval on the visit Zhou Enlai met with members of the US team. The visit of the American table tennis team appeared to finally pave the way for Henry Kissinger's first visit to China, although the convoluted means of communication, and bureaucratic obstructionism in America, delayed this visit until July.

The significance of the meeting for the Chinese was highlighted by their sending four foreign office officials to Pakistan to "escort" Kissinger on his journey. They included Zhang Wenjin, the head of the West European, American, and Oceania Department of the MFA, Tang Wensheng, (Nancy Tang), an American born Chinese who acted as interpreter, and Wang Hairong, Mao's niece, who later rose to become a Vice-Minister in the MFA.⁵⁵ The presence of the latter highlights the importance Mao himself attached to the visit. At the airport in Beijing, Kissinger was greeted by Ye Jianying, one of the four Marshals who had first proposed easing Sino-US relations and Huang Hua, China's ambassador to Canada.⁵⁶ It is noticeable that representatives of the radical Left and supporters of Lin Biao did not attend this, or subsequent meetings.

Kissinger's visit appears to have achieved two main aims: Firstly, it allowed both sides to set out their positions on a variety of issues. After the difficulty of communicating through Pakistani intermediaries, it was clearly a relief to both sides to meet face-to-face; and secondly to prepare for a visit by President Nixon with the announcement to be contained in a joint-statement. The first of these aims was conducted in marathon talks with Zhou Enlai, which lasted

⁵⁴ Gong Li, "Zhongguo 'pingpang waijiao' de gaoceng juece", (The high-level decision on China's "ping-pong diplomacy"), in *Dangshi yanjiu*, (*Research on Party History*), February 1991, pg.9.

⁵⁵ Henry Kissinger, *White House Years*, pg.741.

⁵⁶ *Ibid*, pg.743.

seventeen hours. The second task was undertaken in negotiations between the American delegation and Huang Hua, with an agreement on wording only being reached as the deadline for Kissinger's departure loomed.⁵⁷ The joint statement was published simultaneously in China and the US on 19 July, announcing that the PRC had issued an invitation to Nixon to visit China before May 1972.

e. Sino-Soviet relations: 1971

Sino-Soviet relations had eased slightly in 1970, with a noticeable reduction in Chinese polemic directed at the Soviet Union. However, in 1971, tensions increased again, particularly around the issues of nuclear disarmament and the Soviet proposal for a five-power summit, and the conflict between India and Pakistan and the establishment of Bangladesh. Chinese and Soviet diplomats would clash over these issues following the PRC's entry into the UN.

A joint editorial in the *Renmin ribao*, *Hong qi* and the *Jiefangjun ribao*, published to mark the 100th anniversary of the Paris Commune, denounced Brezhnev as a "renegade" and launched a stinging attack on "Soviet revisionism":

In today's Soviet Union the title Soviet [suweiai] hasn't changed, the title of the country hasn't changed, however the class content has completely changed. The Soviet state, whose leadership authority has been usurped by the Soviet revisionist clique is already no longer a tool of the proletariat to suppress the bourgeoisie, but has become a tool to restore capitalism and suppress the proletariat. The Soviet revisionist clique has turned the Soviet Union into a playground for a handful of new style, bureaucratic monopoly capitalists and a jail for hundreds of thousands of workers; this is the whole meaning of a "Soviet socialist state of the whole people" and "Soviet democracy".⁵⁸

⁵⁷ *Ibid*, pg.752.

⁵⁸ "Wuchan jieji zhuanzheng shengli wansui", (Long live the victory of the dictatorship of the proletariat), *Hong qi*, Issue 4, 1971, pg.14.

In contrast, the editorial contained only mild criticism of the US. Kissinger and the Americans reportedly saw this editorial as marking a shift, which meant that the Chinese now perceived the Soviet Union as the main enemy.⁵⁹

Brezhnev's proposal for a five-power summit on nuclear disarmament (to include China, the Soviet Union, the US, France and Great Britain), was handed to the Chinese on 15 June. Perhaps occupied by Henry Kissinger's visit, the Chinese did not appear to reply until 30 July. This statement was subsequently printed in the *Renmin ribao* on 8 August. In their statement, the Chinese side claimed that all countries, not only the five big powers, should be involved in any disarmament talks.⁶⁰ It also repeated the assertion that China would never be the first to use nuclear weapons.

f. The PRC's entry into the United Nations

Mainland China could not play any direct role in the on-going debate within the UN over whether to admit the PRC, however the Chinese leadership was able to apply considerable pressure on UN members, and particularly the US, over the issue of Taiwan. The position of both the PRC and the leadership on Taiwan was that there should only be one Chinese representative in the UN, however Kissinger notes that the US State Department sought a way to admit the PRC whilst allowing the Taiwanese to retain a seat.⁶¹ When, on 2 August, the US proposed that the UN recognize both the PRC and Taiwan the Chinese MFA issued a strongly worded statement criticizing efforts to create "two Chinas":

The Chinese government solemnly declares: The government of the People's Republic of China resolutely opposes "two Chinas", "one China, one Taiwan" or other similar absurd propositions, it resolutely opposes the fallacy that "Taiwan's status hasn't been resolved yet" and it resolutely opposes the conspiracy of "Taiwan independence". If ever

⁵⁹ Richard Nixon, *The Memoirs of Richard Nixon*, (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1990), pg 707.

⁶⁰ "Zhonghua renmin gongheguo de shengming", (A Statement by the Government of the People's Republic of China), in the *Renmin ribao*, 8 August, 1971, pg. 1.

⁶¹ Henry Kissinger, *White House Years*, pg. 719.

"two China's", "one China, one Taiwan", "Taiwan's status hasn't been resolved yet" or other similar circumstances arise at the United Nations, then the government of the People's Republic of China will resolutely not develop any relations with the United Nations. This solemn and just stand of the government of China will never waver.⁶²

One month after this statement, the *Renmin ribao* published an article by one of its commentators which continued the attack on the actions of the US.⁶³

It seems clear that China would have resisted any offer of admission to the UN which entailed continued representation for Taiwan, however, US resolve on this issue was at best limited and this ambivalence must have added to the momentum in favour of admitting mainland China. The PRC was finally admitted to the UN following a vote at the 26th Session of the United Nations General Assembly on 25 October. An editorial in the *Renmin ribao* on 30th October declared the vote a "victory for Chairman Mao's revolutionary foreign policy line", and claimed that it showed the "bankruptcy" of America's plan to create two China's.⁶⁴

Qiao Guanhua, Zhou Enlai's close colleague, was appointed to head China's first delegation to the United Nations. Huang Hua, who had played a leading role in negotiations with Kissinger and who was another career diplomat was made the deputy-head of the delegation and was subsequently appointed China's permanent representative at the UN. Other members of the delegation included Wang Hairong, Mao's niece, and Xiong Xianghui, who had worked with the four marshals in drafting the report that had first suggested opening to the United States.

The delegation was given a send off normally reserved for only the top leaders. Over seventy Party, government and military leaders were at the

⁶² "Zhonghua renmin gongheguo waijiaobu shengming", (A Statement by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China), in the *Renmin ribao*, 21 August, 1971, pg.1.

⁶³ "Jianjue fandui meiguo zhizao 'liangge zhongguo' de yinmou", (Resolutely oppose America's plot to create "two China's"), in the *Renmin ribao*, 25 September, 1971, pg.1.

⁶⁴ "Zhonghua renmin gongheguo zhengfu shengming", (A Statement by the government of the People's Republic of China), in the *Renmin ribao*, 30 October, 1971, pg.1.

airport, including Ye Jianying, Zhang Chunqiao, Yao Wenyuan, Li Xiannian, Ji Pengfei, Wang Dongxing and Hua Guofeng (interestingly first in a list of over twenty government officials who are reported to have attended the ceremony).⁶⁵

Qiao Guanhua gave his opening speech to the United Nations on 15 November. It was a wide ranging speech which set out China's position on Taiwan, Korea, southeast Asia, the Middle East and other issues. On disarmament he repeated the earlier government statement that China would not resort to first use of nuclear weapons and called on the Soviet Union and America to match this pledge.⁶⁶ Qiao was critical of the two superpowers for ignoring the desire of the people of the world for arms cuts, particularly in nuclear weapons, and of speaking about disarmament, but in practice only increasing their military power. Qiao made a further speech at the United Nations during a debate on the Middle East and once again he was critical of the actions of both the Soviet Union and the US, accusing them of manipulating the United Nations over this issue.⁶⁷

A subsequent editorial in the *Renmin ribao* continued with the theme of superpower domination of the United Nations, claiming however that this session of the general assembly had seen significant defeats for both the US and the Soviet Union at the hands of smaller countries. Summarizing events at the meeting, the editorial of 27 December claimed that this was one of the most significant meetings since the founding of the UN. In particular the votes to approve mainland China's entry into the UN and the call for a ceasefire in the on-going Indian-Pakistan conflict were seen as defeats, respectively, for the US

⁶⁵ "Woguo chuxi lianda diershiliu jie huiyi de daibiaotuan likai Beijing, daoda niuyue. Qiao Guanhua tuanzhang zai niuyue jichang fabiao jianghua" (Our delegation attending the 26th United Nations General Assembly left Beijing and arrived in New York. Head of the delegation Qiao Guanhua gave a speech at New York airport), in the *Renmin ribao*, 10 November, 1971, reprinted in *Xinhua yuebao*, November 1971, pg.144.

⁶⁶ "Zhonghua remin gongheguo diabiliaotuan tuanzhang Qiao Guanhua zai lianda diershiliu jie quanti huiyi shang de fayan", (The leader of the People's Republic of China's delegation Qiao Guanhua's speech to the 26th United Nations General Assembly), in the *Renmin ribao*, 17 November, 1971, reprinted in *Xinhua yuebao*, November 1971, pg.148.

⁶⁷ Warren kuo, (ed.), *Foreign-Poicy Speeches by Chinese Communist Leaders 1963-1975*, (Taipei: Institute of International Relations, 1976), pg.61.

and the Soviet Union at the hands of the smaller countries.⁶⁸

Qiao's comments in his various speeches presaged theoretical developments in China's foreign policy and the emergence of a new line which, in an echo of the non-aligned policies of the 1950s, sought to place China together with Third World countries as the main "bulwark" against the two superpowers' activities. I will examine these development below.

g. China changes its world view

China's characterization of the Soviet Union as a superpower was part of an on-going shift in China's perception of the world situation. It is clear from the material available that it was Mao who was the leading authority on reinterpreting China's world view and who led this reassessment. Those statements we have on this subject from other leaders are largely only comments on Mao's pronouncements. While Zhou Enlai certainly played a leading role in this shift, Mao's authority on theoretical issues appears to have been most significant, leaving Zhou the task of elaborating some of the details, and devising policies to implement this shift (in themselves significant and influential tasks).

In the early- and mid-1960s, Chinese leaders had characterized the world as being divided into what might be called four "camps", namely, the US, the socialist camp, (including both China and the Soviet Union), and two "intermediary belts" (*zhongjian didai*). The first of these "belts" was defined as encompassing all of Africa, Asia and Latin America, whilst the second included Europe and other "advanced capitalist countries", such as Japan and Canada and the countries of "Oceania".⁶⁹ The two belts were explicitly defined in terms of their opposition to, or reliance on, the US.

⁶⁸ "Ping lianheguo dahui di ershiliu jie huiyi", (Evaluate the 26th session of the United Nations General Assembly), in the *Renmin ribao*, 27 December, 1971, pg.1.

⁶⁹ "Zhongjian didai you liangge", (There are two intermediary belts), in *Selected Foreign Policy Works of Mao Zedong*, pp.506-509. This section contains three separate talks given by Mao Zedong in March 1963, January 1964 and July 1964, however the general content of the three talks is similar, defining the two belts in the way outlined above.

By 1971 it is clear that although Mao still characterized the Soviet Union as a member of the socialist camp, he saw it as somewhat different to other socialist countries because it possessed nuclear weapons. Mao also felt that China could work with the countries in the second belt, those reliant on the US, through exploiting the tensions between these countries and America:

We have diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union, and moreover we are two of the countries in the Socialist camp. However, Sino-Soviet relations are not as good as China's relations with the Japanese Liberal Democratic Party, let alone as good as China's relations with Ikeda's party. This is worth thinking about for a moment, what are the reasons [for this]? It is because America and the Soviet Union both have nuclear weapons, they want to control the whole world, but the Liberal Democratic Party is controlled by the US. Speaking from an international position, comparing Japan to America and the Soviet Union, it is in second place. Other countries in second place like this include England, France, West Germany, Italy etc. We still have some work we can do [with them]. Japanese monopoly capitalists are not that united with US. England and American [relations] are fairly good, but they aren't that united either. France angers America. West Germany's position is becoming more important, in this way, the situation will definitely develop into opposition to America.⁷⁰

It is clear that escalating tensions between China and the Soviet Union added weight to the Chinese analysis that saw the Soviet Union as being outside the socialist camp. In a conversation with Pakistan's President Yahya Khan in November 1970, Zhou Enlai characterized the Soviet Union as a superpower on the basis of its superior nuclear weapons. However he was also critical of joint US-Soviet action in the UN to restrict the extent of territorial waters a country could claim.⁷¹ This was the latest of a series of actions such as the Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia in 1968 and the border incidents of 1969, which clearly led the Chinese leadership to see the Soviet Union in terms of being a superpower and aggressor.

⁷⁰ *Ibid*, pp.507-508.

⁷¹ Zhou Enlai, "Minzu duli yundong zai buduan gaozhang", (The movement for national independence is ceaselessly rising), in *Selected foreign policy works of Zhou Enlai*, pp.465-468.

Subsequent to this re-analysis of the Soviet position, the Chinese leadership also re-evaluated the role of countries in what Mao had called the "first belt". Chinese leaders began referring more frequently to these countries as the Third World. From the start Mao had defined these countries in terms of their opposition to US imperialism and in a talk from July 1970, "Imperialism is afraid of the Third World", America remained the target of his comments.⁷² However, as Zhou Enlai's comments from a few months later, quoted above show, by the end of 1970 Chinese leaders were also praising the opposition of third world countries to Soviet actions.

It is clear that through 1971 and 1972, developments throughout the Third World led the Chinese leadership to place increasing emphasis on these countries as the main bulwark against the two superpowers, replacing the role of the socialist camp that had formed the foundation of Mao's earlier analysis. China's position in this analysis at this point was unclear. Without the Soviet Union, did China now lead the socialist camp? Or was China allied with the Third World? The comments on the role of the Third World in opposing both the US and the Soviet Union suggest the latter, but for a number of years Chinese leaders did not make this direct claim.

A key editorial celebrating the 23rd anniversary of the founding of the PRC commented that "Third World countries are playing a growing importance in international affairs".⁷³ This article continued to analyse the world in terms of two belts and highlighted ongoing differences between countries in the second belt and the two superpowers. However the main successes had been achieved in the Third World. The article cited the examples of Egypt's expulsion of Soviet military advisers and on-going resistance to America in Vietnam and southeast Asia. China's position in this analysis is not made clear, however in the next two years, China would increasingly identify herself

⁷² "Diguozhuyi pa di san shijie", (Imperialism is afraid of the Third World), in *Selected foreign policy works of Mao Zedong*, pp.587-588.

⁷³ "Duoqu xin de shengli", (Seize new victories), in *Hong qi*, Issue 10, 1972, pg.5.

with the Third World countries. This would lead Mao to espouse his "Three Worlds Theory", which formed the basis of Deng Xiaoping's major speech to the United Nations in 1974. I will look at these developments below.

3. President Nixon's visit and on-going differences over southeast Asia: 1972-1974.

a. President Nixon's visit to China

In the run up to President Nixon's visit to the PRC in February, the Chinese media continued to criticize American actions in southeast Asia and to criticize Nixon personally. In an analysis of Nixon's "State of the Union Address" an article by a *Renmin ribao* commentator on 30 January claimed that Nixon's comments reflected the fact that the situation was less and less beneficial to America. The article was also highly critical of Nixon's policy of "Vietnamization", claiming this was simply "using Asians to fight Asians".

A second article printed in the *Renmin ribao* on 29 January was also highly critical of Nixon's "8-point Proposal" to resolve the conflict in southeast Asia, announced in a speech given on 25 January. The article criticized the proposal for continuing to support the idea of the "Vietnamization" of the conflict and went on to claim that faced with problems at home and abroad, Nixon's proposal was really an attempt to deceive the American people and continue the war in Vietnam.⁷⁴

On the 4 February the Chinese government issued a statement condemning the 8-point Proposal and criticizing American aggression in Vietnam. At the same time the *Renmin ribao* published a key editorial which continued the criticism of the proposal and put forward two conditions for resolving the "Vietnam problem", that is that America unconditionally withdraw all of its troops

⁷⁴ "Meidi qinlue Yuenan de xin pianju", (A new fraud in American imperialism's invasion of Vietnam), in the *Renmin ribao*, 29 January, 1972, reprinted in *Xinhua yuebao*, January 1972, pg.12.

from Vietnam and that it stop "all interference in South Vietnam's internal affairs."⁷⁵ Even on the day before Nixon's arrival, the *Renmin ribao* published an article criticizing US bombing raids on North Vietnam:

This kind of military provocation and intimidation by American imperialism towards the Democratic Republic of Vietnam nakedly exposes [the fact] that the American government isn't really "resolving" the Vietnam war and peacefully solving the Vietnam problem, but rather that it is continuing to expand and intensify this criminal war of aggression.⁷⁶

Reconciling these statements with the warm welcome afforded to President Nixon is difficult, however as I have noted a number of times previously, the Chinese appear to have pursued Sino-American rapprochement without any easing of their position on issues such as Taiwan or the Vietnam War. Kissinger felt he detected an easing in the polemic directed at both America and Nixon personally prior to his ground-breaking visit. Certainly, in comparison to the early, mobilizational phase of the Cultural Revolution, this was the case, but similar statements could be made about China's reporting of its relations with other countries too, this was simply a reflection of the changing conditions within China itself.

What is important to note is that the Chinese world view, as I have outlined it above, now saw the US as a weakening, although nonetheless still powerful, nation. Chinese leaders assessed that the possibility of a war between the two sides had greatly reduced. China sought better relations with America as a means of resolving issues like Taiwan, and as a bulwark to what was now perceived as the main threat to China's security, the Soviet Union. So Nixon could be warmly welcomed, while he and his government continued to be criticized in the media.

⁷⁵ "Meidi bixu liji tingzhi qin yue zhanzheng", (American imperialism must immediately stop its war of aggression towards Vietnam), in the *Renmin ribao*, 4 February, 1972, pg. 1.

⁷⁶ "Meiguo zhengfu bixu tingzhi qinglue yuenan de yiqie zhansheng xingdong", (The American government must stop all of its military actions of invading Vietnam), in the *Renmin ribao*, 20 February, 1972, reprinted in *Xinhua yuebao*, February 1972, pg. 193.

Assessing the extent of any divisions within the Chinese leadership over Nixon's visit is difficult. It may be significant that members of the radical Left were absent from the ceremonies in Beijing, however Zhang Chunqiao and Wang Hongwen, in their capacity as leaders of the Shanghai Revolutionary Committee, did host a banquet in Nixon's honour during his stay in Shanghai. Perhaps the most notable absentee from proceedings was Jiang Qing, who appears not to have attended any of the banquets laid on for the American delegation, only appearing at a performance of a revolutionary opera attended by President Nixon. Less than a month later she did attend a banquet in honour of Prince Shihanouk and was listed first in a list of government representatives, ahead even of Ye Jianying. Simply appearing with representatives of "American imperialism" may have been too galling for the most prominent representative of the radical Left, while Zhang and Wang, as the official hosts in Shanghai would have had little option to stay away.

What is most apparent is that those who had the closest contact with Nixon, aside from Mao, were members of the foreign policy system closely associated with Zhou Enlai, or senior moderate figures. Zhou personally accompanied Nixon during his visit in Shanghai. Mao's insistence on the earliest possible meeting with Nixon gave it his personal seal of approval and would certainly have served to stifle any internal criticism of the visit, however given Mao and Zhou's close personal control over the preparation for the historic meeting, it seems likely that the radical Left, or indeed any other group, had little scope for direct opposition.

Nixon arrived in China on 21 February and was greeted personally by Zhou Enlai and a delegation including Ye Jianying, Li Xiannian, Guo Moruo and the new Foreign Minister Ji Pengfei. (Ji was another career diplomat who had been purged during the Cultural Revolution. He was rehabilitated in 1971, when he was appointed acting-Foreign Minister during Chen Yi's illness). Zhou and Nixon shared a car on the way into Beijing and Nixon wrote that

during the journey Zhou commented, "Your handshake came over the vastest ocean in the world - twenty-five years of no communication".⁷⁷ Within hours of his arrival he had been informed that Mao would like to meet him and Nixon and Kissinger spent an hour with Mao in a wide-ranging and apparently warm discussion. This meeting was also attended on the Chinese side by Zhou, Mao's niece Wang Hairong and Nancy Tang.

The warm atmosphere continued into the banquet hosted by Zhou in Nixon's honour. However, in his toast to welcome Nixon, Zhou displayed a pragmatic awareness of the difficulties China and America faced in easing relations between the two sides:

At present, pushing forward the normalization of relations of [our] two countries and striving for a relaxation of the tense situation has become the ardent hope of the people of China and America. People, as long as we have the people then we have the force to create world history [*chuanzao shijie lishi de dongli*]. I believe that one day, this joint hope of our two peoples will be realized.

The social systems in China and America are fundamentally different, and there are enormous differences between the government of China and America. However, these kinds of differences should not prevent China and America from establishing normal state relations on the basis of mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, mutual non-aggression, mutual non-interference in internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit and peaceful coexistence, what is more they shouldn't lead to war.⁷⁸

Zhou Enlai and Nixon held a number of meetings where both sides engaged in a frank exchange of views. While there is no public record of these discussions from the Chinese side, Nixon's memoirs contain a detailed account of the conversations. On Vietnam and the wider conflict in southeast Asia Zhou admitted frankly that as long as the US continued with its policy of the "Vietnamization" of the war, and as long as the Vietnamese continued to fight,

⁷⁷ Richard Nixon, *The Memoirs of Richard Nixon*, pg.560.

⁷⁸ "Zhou zongli zai huanying nikesong zongtong anhuishang de zhujuci" (Premier Zhou's toast at the banquet to welcome President Nixon), in the *Renmin ribao*, 22 February, 1972, reprinted in *Xinhua yuebao*, February, 1972, pg. 24.

China had no choice but to continue to support them.⁷⁹ Zhou's language matched that of the *Renmin ribao* editorials discussed above, highlighting that this was the majority view within the Chinese leadership, but that it was not seen as an obstacle to further negotiations.

The biggest sticking point during the visit was over the wording of a joint-statement. The Chinese side proposed that the statement reflected each side's views, without papering over the obvious differences in opinion that existed at that time. Nixon's somewhat strange comment that the usual procedure was "to have meetings for several days... and then put out a weasel-worded communique covering up the problems" was met with a sharp response from Zhou Enlai who is reported to have replied "if we were to act like that we would not only be deceiving the people, but we would be deceiving ourselves".⁸⁰ Finally both sides agreed to adopt the Chinese approach and the final communique, now known as the "Shanghai Communique" after the location where it was signed, contained separate sections setting out the position of each side on key issues.

The most contentious issue covered by the communique was Taiwan. The Chinese reaffirmed their position that the "government of the PRC is the only legal government of China", and that "Taiwan is a province of China". In addition they condemned all activities which aimed at creating "two Chinas" or "one China, one Taiwan".⁸¹ In contrast, the American side produced the now famous wording that while recognizing that Taiwan was an integral part of China, did not give precedence to the government of either the PRC or the regime on Taiwan: "The United States acknowledges that all Chinese on either side of the Taiwan Strait maintain there is but one China and that Taiwan is a part of China. The United States government does not challenge that

⁷⁹ Richard Nixon, *The Memoirs of Richard Nixon*, pg. 569.

⁸⁰ *Ibid*, pg.564.

⁸¹ "Lianhe gongbao", (Joint communique), in the *Renmin ribao*, 28 February, 1972, reprinted in *Xinhua yuebao*, February 1972, pg.20.

position".⁸²

The publication of the Shanghai Communiqué was a landmark event in Sino-US relations, however its wording highlighted the gulf between the positions of the two sides. While the visits of Kissinger and Nixon served to break the deadlock between China and the US and facilitate further negotiations, it was a full six years before diplomatic relations were established. The issue of Taiwan, and the presence of US troops on the island remained the key to improving relations between the two sides, however, the on-going war in Vietnam also plagued efforts at rapprochement in 1972 and 1973. One important consequence of Nixon's visit was that it freed many of America's allies to seek better relations with China. In particular, Japan's Prime Minister Tanaka made the first visit of a Japanese leader to China in September of 1972, marking a breakthrough in Sino-Japanese relations.

b. On-going differences on resolving the Vietnam War

Negotiations on resolving the conflict in Vietnam had been underway in Paris for a number of years, when, on 23 March, 1972, the US side announced that it was temporarily suspending participation in the talks. An article in the *Renmin ribao* claimed that this exposed America's plot to "hamper the resolution of the Vietnam problem and continue the war of aggression".⁸³

When President Nixon subsequently announced the bombing of North Vietnam and the mining of harbours there, the Chinese government issued a sharply worded statement criticizing US actions:

The American aggressor army in Vietnam and Indochina has used all sorts of barbarous methods and slaughtered thousands of people. The American government doesn't talk about this, rather it shouts about "defending" the lives of American soldiers. In reality American youth losing their lives on the Vietnamese battlefields is a result of the aggressive policies of the American government. The problem is very simple, all it needs is for the American government to immediately stop

⁸² Richard Nixon, *The Memoirs of Richard Nixon*, pg.576.

⁸³ "Meiguo zhengfu de manheng xingjing", (The American government's arbitrary action), in the *Renmin ribao*, 31 March, 1972, pg.1.

its aggression, withdraw all of its troops unconditionally, and stop supporting the puppet cliques, then American prisoners of war could return home at an early date and the lives of American soldiers will naturally be insured. If the American government continues to wantonly escalate the war, this will only cause even more young Americans to lose their lives, can we call this "defending" their lives?⁸⁴

As the difficult negotiations in Paris continued, the Chinese continued to criticize what it saw as US prevarication. When a deadline for signing a joint Vietnamese-US agreement passed, the Chinese lambasted America for "raising obstacles and going back on their word".⁸⁵ An editorial of 1 November claimed the US was facing a major trial and warned, "The facts show, no force in the world can break the iron will of 40 million Vietnamese people to realise their sacred national rights".⁸⁶

c. Sino-Soviet relations in 1972

Relations between China and the Soviet Union continued to deteriorate in 1972. The two sides clashed over what the Chinese saw as Soviet support for India and Bangladesh against Pakistan, with China using its veto power to block a Soviet motion during a discussion on the entry of Bangladesh at an August session of the United Nations Security Council. The Chinese also continued to be highly critical of Soviet proposals for nuclear disarmament.

Speaking at the 27th Session of the UN General Assembly in October 1972, China's representative Qiao Guanhua launched a strong attack on Soviet proposals for a nuclear test ban treaty, claiming this was an attempt by the Soviet Union to prevent smaller nations from acquiring nuclear weapons and maintain its own ability to carry out nuclear blackmail:

In order truly to do away with the nuclear treat, it is necessary to

⁸⁴ "Zhonghua renmin gongheguo zhengfu shengming", (Statement by the government of the People's Republic of China), in the *Renmin ribao*, 12 May, 1972, pg.1.

⁸⁵ "Zhonghua renmin gongheguo zhengfu shengming", (Statement by the government of the People's Republic of China), in the *Renmin ribao*, 31 October, 1972, pg.1.

⁸⁶ "Meiguo zhengfu mianlin kaoyan", (The American government is facing a trial), in the *Renmin ribao*, 1 November, 1972, pg.1.

completely prohibit and thoroughly destroy nuclear weapons. Yet the Soviet Government dares neither to undertake not to be the first to use nuclear weapons nor to touch on the question of complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons but advocates the cessation of all nuclear tests. Why? As everyone knows, the Soviet Union has made hundreds of nuclear tests. When it had made enough tests in the atmosphere, it proposed the partial ban on nuclear tests. Now when it has made enough underground tests, it calls for a ban on all nuclear tests. Actually this means that the Soviet Union could make any kind of tests when it had the need, and that when it no longer has the need others are not permitted to make any tests. This is another trap blatantly designed to maintain its nuclear monopoly, following the partial nuclear test ban treaty and the treaty on non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.⁸⁷

A joint-editorial published in the *Renmin ribao*, *Hong qi*, and the *Jiefangjun ribao* also published in October 1972 accused the Soviet Union of military expansionism and continued the criticism of Soviet proposals for nuclear disarmament.⁸⁸

d. The end of the Vietnam War

The signing of the Agreement on Ending the War in Vietnam and Restoring Peace by the various parties on 27 January, 1973 was marked by the Chinese with a triumphal editorial in the *Renmin ribao*. The editorial claimed that the victory of the Vietnamese showed that all oppressed nations could defeat their aggressors if they were willing to take up arms.⁸⁹

Although the Chinese saw the ending of the Vietnam War as a victory over American imperialism, the promise of the eventual withdrawal of US troops from Vietnam also served to ease Sino-US relations by ending one possible source of direct conflict between the two sides. These developments appear to have boosted Beijing's confidence in its own assessment of the international situation and in the immediate aftermath of the agreement the Chinese also

⁸⁷ Kuo, (ed.) *Foreign-Policy Speeches by Chinese Communist Leaders 1963-1975*, (Taipei: Institute of International Relations, 1976), pp.75-76.

⁸⁸ "Duoqu xin de shengli", (Seize new victories), in *Hong qi*, Issue 10, 1972, pg.7.

⁸⁹ "Huanying yuenan xieding de qianding", (Welcome the signing of the Vietnam agreement), in the *Renmin ribao*, 28 January, 1973, pg.1.

appeared optimistic that the Paris accord would lead to a quick solution to the situation in Cambodia.⁹⁰

On their way back from the conference in Paris, the Vietnamese delegation stopped in Beijing, where the Chinese held a celebratory meeting and banquet to commemorate their success. The banquet is perhaps most noteworthy for the prominence of members of the radical Left in official reporting of this event. Jiang Qing appeared second in a list of Party and government leaders attending the meeting, after Zhou Enlai. Zhang Chunqiao and Yao Wenyuan were listed fourth and fifth respectively, after Ye Jianying, but ahead of Li Xiannian. Zhang Chunqiao also gave the keynote speech.⁹¹

The period in the run-up to the Tenth Party Congress in August 1973 certainly saw a resurgence in the activities of the radical Left in other areas however it is difficult to explain the presence of the three radical figures in these terms. The reporting on their presence at this meeting is similar to that of a banquet in honour of Prince Shihanouk, held in March 1972. Jiang, Zhang and Yao had attended this banquet, and were listed in identical positions in official reporting, in stark contrast to reports of their activities during Nixon's visit only a month earlier. Similarly, official reports of the banquet held in September 1972 in honour of the visiting Japanese Prime Minister Tanaka show that none of the three radical figures attended.⁹²

All this suggests that the political orientation of the three was sufficiently strong to lead them to avoid, where possible, being associated with figures from "imperialist" countries. Little can be deduced from Zhang's speech at the banquet in honour of the Vietnamese delegation as it followed the official line

⁹⁰ "Zhichi Jianpuzhai Wangguo minzu tuanjie zhengfu de yanzheng lichang", (Support the grave position of the Government of National Unity of the Kingdom of Cambodia), in the *Renmin ribao*, 1 February, 1973, pg.1.

⁹¹ "Shoudu longzhong jihui relie qingzhu Yuenan tingzhan heping xieding jiangding", (A grand assembly in the capital warmly celebrates the signing of the peace agreement on ending hostilities in Vietnam), in the *Renmin ribao*, 3 February, 1973, pg.1.

⁹² "Tianzhong Jiaorong zongli dachen dadao Beijing Zhou zongli juxing anhui huanying Tianzhong shouxiang", (Prime Minister Tanaka Kakuei arrives in Beijing Premier Zhou held a banquet to welcome Prime Minister Tanaka), in the *Renmin ribao*, 26 September, 1972, pg.1.

of criticizing all "big powers",⁹³ however, the subsequent elevation of Wang Hongwen to second in the Party hierarchy may have given the radical Left an increased influence over foreign policy. Certainly, in late-1973, Wang began to attend a number of meetings between Mao and visiting foreign dignitaries, although he continued to be listed after Zhou Enlai.

Despite the Paris agreement, ongoing US support for the regimes in Saigon and Phenom Phen continued to draw Chinese criticism. A number of articles appeared in the Chinese media throughout the rest of 1973 and into 1974 attacking US actions, although much of the language of these articles appears routine.⁹⁴ Certainly, any concerns the Chinese had were not allowed to interfere with a visit by Henry Kissinger in February 1973, who held meetings with Mao, Zhou and Ji Pengfei.

e. China is a part of the Third World

Beginning in 1973 Chinese leaders made a number of statements clearly identifying the PRC as a member of the Third World. This marked a fundamental shift from China's position at the start of the Cultural Revolution which had described China as being a member of the socialist camp and identified China with what was seen as the main characteristic of the present world situation, the fight of Third World nations against US and Soviet aggression.

Mao first identified China as a member of the Third World during during a talk with the leader of Mali in June 1973.⁹⁵ An editorial published on 13 September marking the fourth meeting of heads of the non-aligned movement, repeated

⁹³ "Zhang Chunqiao tongzhi de jianghua", (Comrade Zhang Chunqiao's speech), in the *Renmin ribao*, 3 February, 1973.

⁹⁴ See, for example, "Jianpuzhai renmin bi sheng", (The Cambodian people will certainly win), in the *Renmin ribao*, 23 March, 1973, pg.1, "Tuanjie, zhandou, shengli de sannian", (Three years of unity, struggle and victory), in the *Renmin ribao*, 25 April, 1973, pg.1, and "Relie huanying laizi Yuenan nanfang de qinmi zhanyou", (Warmly welcome our close comrade in arms from Southern Vietnam), in the *Renmin ribao*, 18 November, 1973, pg.1.

⁹⁵ Chen Donglin, Miao Yang, Li Danhui, (eds.), *Chugoku bunku daikakumei jiten*, (A dictionary of the Chinese Cultural Revolution), (Fukuoka: Chugoku shoten, 1997), pg. 938.

this line, and linked China with the struggles of third world countries for independence:

China is a developing socialist country, and is part of the Third World. During the long mutual struggle, China and the people of the countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America have formed a deep friendship. We resolutely support the desire for independence of the people of Asia, Africa and Latin America, uphold the struggles of the righteous nations and people against imperialism, new and old colonialism, apartheid, Zionism and big power hegemonism, and resolutely support the non-aligned countries in carrying out policies of peace and neutrality. We believe, if the nations and people of the Third World rely on their own strength, resolutely struggle, strengthen their unity, maintain their vigilance and increase their defences then they will definitely achieve even bigger victories in their struggle against imperialism, against colonialism and against hegemonism.⁹⁶

China's championing of the Third World was used to criticize the actions of the Soviet Union and should partly be seen in the light of Sino-Soviet competition for influence in Africa and Asia.

As China moved into 1974, this identification with the Third World would form an integral plank of Mao's new "Three Worlds Theory", which formed the basis for Deng Xiaoping's major speech to the United Nations.

4. Further differentiation between the superpowers and Mao's "Three Worlds Theory": 1974-1976

a. Mao's "Three Worlds Theory"

At the beginning of 1974, China marked the first anniversary of the signing of the agreement on ending the Vietnam War with a low-key editorial in the *Renmin ribao*. The editorial celebrated successes such as the withdrawal of US troops from South Vietnam, however it also continued the earlier criticism of the Saigon regime, and US support for that regime, for not fully implementing

⁹⁶ "Zhuhe disici bujiemeng guojia shounao huiyi shengli bimu", (Congratulate the victorious conclusion of the fourth meeting of heads from the non-aligned countries), in the *Renmin ribao*, 13 September, 1973, pg.1.

the accord.⁹⁷ China's earlier optimism on a quick resolution to the problems in southeast Asia had faded, and a number of further articles and editorials critical of US support for the regimes in Saigon and Phnom Penh continued to appear in the media throughout 1974.

During the first four months of that year, Mao met with a number of foreign visitors and newspaper reports show that Wang Hongwen also attended these meetings in his capacity as Vice-Chairman of the Party. As I noted above, Wang had risen to second in the Party hierarchy at the Tenth Party Congress and it seems that attending these meetings was a reflection of this new status. There is no record of Wang having spoken at any of these meetings, and he continued to be listed after Zhou Enlai, however his presence at the meetings would have been a significant boost to the radical Left, giving them access to these high-level meetings.⁹⁸

Despite his elevation, Wang was not chosen for what proved to be one of the most symbolic events in Chinese foreign policy during the Mao-era, the delivery of a speech to the United Nations outlining Mao's "Three Worlds Theory". Instead, the radical Left's arch-rival, Deng Xiaoping, was chosen. The selection of Deng may be an indication of Mao's tendency to balance appointments between contending coalitions, but it seems more likely that this was an indication of Wang's lack of experience on the international stage, suggesting that Mao was reluctant to entrust such an important speech to the inexperienced Wang.

Mao had earlier outlined the idea of the countries of the world being divided into three areas during a talk with the Zambian President Kenneth Kawanda. Mao stated that he saw the US and the Soviet Union as the first world, Europe,

⁹⁷ "Bali xieding yingdang chedi zhixing", (The Paris agreement should be fully implemented), in the *Renmin ribao*, 27 January, 1974, pg.1.

⁹⁸ Wang is variously reported to have attended meetings between Mao and the Zambian President (*Renmin ribao*, 23 February, 1974, pg.1), Mao and the Tanzanian President, (*Renmin ribao*, 26 March, 1974, pg.1), and Mao and a Cambodian delegation, (*Renmin ribao*, 3 April, 1974, pg.1).

Japan, Australasia, and Canada as the second world, and the remaining countries as the third world, this included China.⁹⁹ Mao distinguished between the countries in terms of money and possession of nuclear bombs:

America and the Soviet Union have nuclear weapons, and they are comparatively wealthy; The second world, Europe, Japan, Australia and Canada, don't have many atomic weapons, and they aren't as wealthy [as the US and the Soviet Union]; however, compared to the third world, they are wealthy.¹⁰⁰

This simple definition was to form the foundation of the Chinese world view for the remaining period under study in this thesis, even though Mao appears to have made no further comment on the subject. The publication of a leading editorial in 1977 saw these simple comments elevated to the proportions of a "theory".

The Chinese leadership used a special meeting of the UN, held to discuss questions of resources and development, to publicise China's new position. That the leadership took this seriously is shown by the fact that they dispatched Deng to New York, rather than rely on Huang Hua, China's permanent representative to the UN.

The selection of Deng above Wang Hongwen suggests the influence of Zhou Enlai, but Mao personally chose Deng Xiaoping, and criticized Jiang Qing when she objected to Deng going to New York.¹⁰¹ Since his rehabilitation in April 1973, Deng and Zhou had worked together in a number of areas, however Deng had not played a prominent role in the foreign policy arena, for instance he had not appeared at any of the meetings between Mao and senior foreign dignitaries attended by Zhou and Wang. Wang reportedly had incurred the Chairman's displeasure for his naivete with Mao telling Wang "Politically,

⁹⁹ "Guanyu san ge shijie huafen wenti", (On the problem of differentiating the three worlds), in *Selected foreign policy works of Mao Zedong*, pg.600.

¹⁰⁰ *Ibid*, pg.600.

¹⁰¹ Benjamin Yang, *Deng A Political Biography*, (Armonk, New York: M.E. Sharpe, 1998), pg.179.

you are no good, and Deng Xiaoping is far better".¹⁰² This seems the likeliest reason for the selection of Deng.

Whatever the politics of Deng's selection, he was given a send off at Beijing airport that involved nearly all of China's senior leadership, again underlining the importance of his speech. Jiang Qing, Wang Hongwen and Yao Wenyuan attended the farewell as well as other leading Party, government and military figures including Zhou Enlai and Li Xiannian. Ye Jianying, Nie Rongzhen and Xu Xiangqian were also prominent in the list of those present, as was Hua Guofeng, who was listed ninth. Foreign Minister Ji Pengfei and all five of the current Vice-Ministers also attended.¹⁰³

Deng delivered his speech to the United Nations on 10 April. He began by outlining the Chinese view that the trend in the world was one of "chaos" (*tianxia daluan*), and that as a result of numerous lengthy conflicts there had been major political changes and re-organizations. Deng argued that the independence movement in the Third World had strengthened, and that at the same time the "western imperialist clique" had split as a result of uneven development. Because of these changes, countries could be divided into three "worlds" that were at once mutually linked and mutually opposed to each other. Deng repeated Mao's formulation that the US and the Soviet Union made up the first world. Asia, Africa, Latin America and other developing countries like China made up the Third World, and Europe, Canada, Australasia and Japan made up the second world. In a sign of the intensifying Sino-Soviet conflict, Deng singled out the Soviet Union as the worst of the two superpowers.¹⁰⁴

Deng developed the theme that had been apparent in Chinese statements of

¹⁰² *Ibid*, pg.179.

¹⁰³ "Deng Xiaoping fu zongli shuai daibiaotuan li jing pu niuyue chuxi lianda tebie huiyi", (The delegation led by Vice-Premier Deng Xiaoping has left Beijing and arrived in New York to attend the special meeting of the United Nations General Assembly), in the *Renmin ribao*, 7 April, 1974, pg. 1.

¹⁰⁴ "Zhonghua renmin gongheguo daibiaotuan tuanzhang Deng Xiaoping zai lianda di liu jie tebie huiyi shang de fayan", (Leader of the delegation of the People's Republic of China, Deng Xiaoping's speech at the 6th special meeting of the United Nations General Assembly), in the *Renmin ribao*, 11 April, 1974, reprinted in the *Xinhua yuebao*, April 1974, pg.8.

the last few years that characterized the Third World as the most revolutionary because they had endured the most exploitation. This appears to be a development of the notion that the Chinese people were a "blank canvas". The countries of the second world were said to be both exploiters and exploited and so, much as in the united front, some countries could serve as allies to the Third World. Their opposition to the "big power politics" of the two superpowers was said to have had a "significant influence on the development of the international situation".¹⁰⁵

On China's position of self-reliance, Deng underlined that China advocated "relying on the strength and wisdom of your own people". However he went on:

Maintaining independence and keeping the initiative in one's own hands and self-regeneration isn't "closing the country to international intercourse" [*biguan zihou*] and refusing outside aid.¹⁰⁶

This is the clearest indication of China's desire to open to the outside world following the end of the mobilization phase of the Cultural Revolution. In the following year and a half it would form a major point of contention between Deng and the moderates and members of the radical Left.

Deng's visit to the UN was something of a personal triumph and his performance clearly won Mao's support. Following Deng's return, he was included in Mao's meetings with foreign visitors, eclipsing Wang Hongwen, who was apparently left out of many of these meetings.¹⁰⁷

As is clear from Deng's comments at the UN and the editorial of 9 April, the Soviet Union continued to come in for increasing criticism from the PRC in 1974. Early in the year, a series of incidents served to increase the tension between the two sides. In January, relations deteriorated over an alleged spying incident. This was followed by a series of tit-for-tat expulsions of Soviet

¹⁰⁵ *Ibid*, pg.9.

¹⁰⁶ *Ibid*, pg.10.

¹⁰⁷ Yang, *DENG A Political Biography*, pg.181.

and Chinese diplomats. The *Renmin ribao* published an alleged confession of the spy, Wang Hongshu, on 22 January.¹⁰⁸

b. Disputes between the radical Left and Deng Xiaoping

Following his successful visit to the United Nations in May, Deng Xiaoping eclipsed Wang Hongwen in the field of foreign affairs, appearing in Wang's stead with Mao during his meetings with foreign dignitaries. This was probably a result of Wang's failure to learn how "to conduct himself appropriately" and that he "remained an embarrassment in the presence of foreign dignitaries".¹⁰⁹ As I have related in early chapters, through 1974 and 1975, Deng Xiaoping and Zhou Enlai's reforms came in for increasing criticism from members of the radical left. There are indications that the two coalitions clashed over elements of foreign policy during this period, in particular over the issue of further opening to the outside world. However, the overall foreign policy line had been laid down by Mao as outlined above, and the radical Left did not, or could not, criticize the main elements of this line.

Deng's Selected Works do not contain any speeches from 1973 or 1974, however it is clear from his comments in later speeches that Deng supported greater economic contact with the rest of the world, in particular he advocated increasing exports to pay for imports of equipment and technology to modernize the Chinese economy. In a speech from August 1975, Deng stated:

Traditional export products such as industrial and handicrafts must use every means to increase exports. We must consider exporting chemical products. We should also consider exporting coal and should think of signing long-term contracts with foreign countries to import technology and equipment to develop new coal mines and use coal to pay [them] back. There are many benefits in doing this: (1) We increase exports, (2) we can bring about the technological transformation of the coal industry, and (3) we can increase productive forces. This is a major policy, and as soon as the Central Committee

¹⁰⁸ "Suxiu paiqian tewu Li Hongshu de yi fen gongci", (The confession of the Soviet spy Li Hongshu), in the *Renmin ribao*, 22 January, 1974, reprinted in the *Xinhua yuebao*, January 1974, pg.11.

¹⁰⁹ Yang, *DENG A Political Biography*, pg.181.

has approved it we will carry it out. In short, we must strive to export more goods, swapping them for more high-grade, precision and advanced technology and equipment, so as to speed up the technological transformation of industry and raise productivity.¹¹⁰

Although Deng's actual position in 1974 is unclear, he did come in for intense criticism from the radical Left on the issue of increasing economic contact with the world, most notably over what became known as the *Fengqingjun* Incident.

The *Fengqing* was the first domestically built cargo ship over 100,000 tons to successfully complete a voyage to Europe. The ship arrived back in Shanghai on 30 September, the eve of China's National Day, and its voyage was given prominent media publicity by the radical Left's supporters. An article written by two reporters from the Shanghai newspaper *Jiefang ribao*, (*Liberation Daily*) linked the successful voyage to Mao's policy of independence and "regeneration through one's own efforts" (*duli zizhu, zili gengsheng*):

The workers who built the steamer "*Fengqing*" are pioneers in thoroughly implementing Chairman Mao's policies of **independence and maintaining the initiative in one's own hands and regeneration through one's own efforts**, [original in bold] the crew of the steamer "*Fengqing*" are heroes who dare to sail against the wind. In order to defend Chairman Mao's revolutionary line, they together with the boat builders, have launched a fierce attack against the thinking of worshipping and having blind faith in foreign goods, smashing the slavish comprador philosophy that says [only] "foreign built ships can navigate long-distances", and built the first long-distance vessel made completely of Chinese equipment.¹¹¹

At a Politburo meeting on 17 October, Jiang Qing used the success of the *Fengqing* to launch a strong attack on those who advocated importing foreign vessels, claiming this was "worshipping foreign things and fawning on foreign

¹¹⁰ Deng Xiaoping, "Guanyu fazhan gongye de jidian yijian", (A few ideas on developing industry), in *Deng Xiaoping wenxuan, (di er juan)*, (*Deng Xiaoping's Selected Works (Volume 2)*), (Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 1983), pg. 29.

¹¹¹ "Duli zizhu, zili gengsheng de yiqu kaige", (A song of triumph for maintaining independence and keeping the initiative in one's own hands and regeneration through one's own efforts), in the *Renmin ribao*, 12 October, 1974, reprinted in *Xinhua yuebao*, October 1974, pg. 174.

powers”, (*chongyang meiwai*).¹¹² In an attack on Deng Xiaoping and Zhou Enlai, who in 1970 had advocated importing foreign ships, Jiang Qing demanded that Deng make his position clear.

The issue of foreign economic policy formed only a part of the wider conflict between moderates like Deng and the radical Left, however it is significant in that it was the major bone of contention between the two sides with regards to China’s overall foreign relations. As I noted above, Mao’s authority in the field of China’s foreign policy limited the radical Left’s scope for criticism, thus the *Fengqing* Incident gave the radical Left an opportunity to criticize Deng Xiaoping and the moderates for apparently going against Mao’s stated policies of self-reliance and self-regeneration. However on theoretical issues and on issues of China’s relations with the two superpowers, statements by both sides essentially follow the overall line¹¹³ and the radical Left’s use of the *Fengqinglun* Incident was a relatively weak attempt to influence foreign policy.

With Wang Hongwen’s eclipse, and Mao’s ambivalence towards the factional activities of the Gang of Four in foreign affairs, the radical Left had little direct input into foreign-policy decision-making. Mao continued to dominate this field, despite growing ill-health, and moderates in the State Council, in the form of Zhou Enlai, Deng Xiaoping and MFA officials controlled the implementation of China’s foreign policy. The moderates’ influence can only have increased with the appointment of Vice-minister Qiao Guanhua, as the new Minister of Foreign Affairs in November 1974. Qiao was a career diplomat and a long-time colleague of Zhou Enlai.

One area where the radical Left did try to increase their influence over foreign affairs was in extending the implementation of on-going political campaigns to the MFA and in particular to officials serving in China’s

¹¹² Wang, *A dictionary of major events of the CCP*, pg.456.

¹¹³ See, for example, Jiang Qing’s comments in an address to diplomatic cadres in which she repeats the standard line with regards to the US and the Soviet Union, in Kuo, *Foreign Policy Speeches by Chinese Communist Leaders 1963-1975*, pg. 37.

embassies overseas. However, even here, they appear to have accepted some of the arguments of the moderates that officials overseas had important work that could not be disrupted to the same extent as officials serving at home. In an address to diplomatic cadres, Jiang Qing is reported as saying:

The task on the diplomatic frontline is different from that on other frontlines. Because diplomatic workers have to spend a considerably longer time working abroad, we cannot make demands of them as we do people at home. Nor can we use the methods we are using at home.¹¹⁴

The dispute between the radical Left and moderates would continue throughout 1975, however there is no evidence that the moderates' influence weakened before the death of Zhou Enlai in January 1976, with Deng continuing to attend Mao's meetings with foreign dignitaries and leading the meetings during US President Ford's visit in December 1975. This was in contrast to Deng's apparently weakened position at the First Dazhai Conference in September and the criticism of moderate reforms to higher education.

c. Breakthroughs in southeast Asia and China's relations with the two superpowers

The capture in April of Phnom Penh by forces loyal to Prince Sihanouk, and the subsequent liberation of Saigon in May were greeted with triumphant editorials in China. These victories confirmed for the Chinese the view set out by Deng Xiaoping in his speech to the United Nations that the "main trend in the world today was for countries to want independence" and that the "two superpowers were beset with difficulties at home and abroad".

The differentiation in the PRC's treatment of the two superpowers sharpened in 1975. Although the Chinese leadership's analysis saw the world situation as being harmful to both the US and the Soviet Union, it also characterized

¹¹⁴ "Chiang Ch'ing's Address to Diplomatic Cadres", in *ibid*, pp.40-41.

America as a weakening power and argued that the Soviet Union would seize on this weakness to expand its influence. Shortly after the Communist victory in Vietnam, the new Foreign Minister Qiao Guanhua delivered a major foreign policy speech to senior Party members. In his speech, Qiao set out China's view in somewhat colourful language:

One special characteristic of the recent world situation is the decline and impairment of American imperialism and the consequent elation of social-imperialism [the Soviet Union]. The Soviet union expects American imperialism to retract its dirty hands and wash them in the Mississippi so that the Soviet Union can replace the United States in world hegemony.¹¹⁵

Deteriorating Sino-Soviet relations clearly had an impact on China's relations with Vietnam. John Garver traces the origins of Vietnamese discontent to China's 1972 rapprochement with the US and to Chinese pressure on the Vietnamese to accept a peace deal which included Nguyen Van Thieu's regime in Saigon.¹¹⁶ The Chinese were anxious that any power vacuum left by the sudden withdrawal of American troops could be filled by the Soviet Union and so pressured the North Vietnamese to temporarily accept a partial US presence in the south. While Vietnam was still engaged in fighting the Saigon regime, these tensions remained hidden under the surface, however the liberation of Saigon clearly removed this obstacle, and Sino-Vietnamese relations deteriorated rapidly in the following years.

In contrast to the strong Chinese polemic directed against the Soviet Union, Sino-US relations improved throughout 1975, culminating with the visit of US President Gerald Ford in December. Certainly the victories in Cambodia and Vietnam over US-backed forces removed two of the main stumbling blocks to improved relations with America. Deteriorating Sino-Vietnamese relations, and the Vietnamese ties with the Soviet Union may also have raised Chinese fears

¹¹⁵ "Ch'iao Kuan-hua's Speech on Foreign Policy", in Kuo, *Foreign-Policy Speeches by Chinese Communist Leaders 1963-1975*, pg.11.

¹¹⁶ John Garver, *Foreign Relations of the People's Republic of Chian*, pp.168-169.

of Soviet encirclement, leading them to seek better relations with the US. China continued to criticize American actions, particularly with regards to the Middle East and Latin America, however these attacks were moderate in contrast to criticism of the Soviet Union.

Gerald Ford visited the PRC from 1-5 December in only the second ever visit by a US President. Zhou Enlai, whose health was failing, delegated Deng Xiaoping to lead the Chinese side during Ford's visit. Deng hosted the main banquet in Ford's honour, attended the meeting between Ford and Mao and met with Ford on his own. This all suggests that Deng still held Mao's confidence, however these were Deng's last major appearances with foreign dignitaries before his second purge following Zhou's death in January 1976. This apparent confidence in Deng in foreign affairs is in contrast to Yang Quan's comments that Deng was already in political difficulties at the time of the First National Conference to Study Dazhai, held in September of that year.¹¹⁷

5. The death of Mao and the Hua Guofeng interregnum: 1976-1978

Whatever Mao's confidence in his Vice-Premier in December, by January this had clearly evaporated in the face of prolonged agitation by members of the radical Left and Mao's own concerns regarding educational reforms introduced by Deng. The death of Zhou Enlai on 8 January left Deng Xiaoping without his main political backer and crucially, at this point, Mao chose to back the radical Left against Deng. After delivering the eulogy at Zhou's funeral on 15 January, Deng disappeared from public view for over a year. The radical Left certainly campaigned to have Zhang Chunqiao appointed as the new Premier, however, Mao, disenchanted with some of their overt political activities, chose Hua Guofeng as a compromise candidate. He was appointed acting-Premier in early February.

¹¹⁷ Yang Quan, *Chen Yonggui zhuan*, (*Biography of Chen Yonggui*), (Wuhan: Changjiang wenyi chubanshe, 1996), pg.277.

Hua Guofeng very quickly took on the role of meeting with foreign dignitaries, but only in a role supporting Mao. Mao continued to show an interest in meeting foreign visitors despite his ill-health, and Hua appeared at Mao's side in a position variously filled at one time or another by Zhou Enlai, Wang Hongwen and Deng Xiaoping. He attended Mao's meetings with former US President Nixon on 23 February, with a Laotian delegation on 18 March, and at one of Mao's last public appearances at a meeting with Pakistan's Prime Minister Bhutto on 27 May. Hua also held independent talks with the Laotian delegation, also attended by Yao Wenyuan.¹¹⁸

The death of Zhou Enlai and the purge of Deng Xiaoping does not appear to have effected the position of moderate figures within the MFA. Qiao Guanhua continued to serve as Foreign Minister, although he would be replaced in November, following Hua Guofeng's elevation to Party leader. All of the current Vice-Ministers also continued in post. But the activities of these figures reduced considerably in the run-up to Mao's death in September. Qiao Guanhua evidently attended the February meeting between Mao and Nixon, but he did not attend either of the other meetings mentioned above. It seems likely that in the intensifying political conflict that characterized this period MFA officials found it increasingly difficult to carry out routine work. Mao's personal interest, as far as he was able to express this, also appears to have reduced factional competition within the foreign affairs system and would have hampered the radical Left's ability to criticize the activities of individual officials.

There were no major policy initiatives in the period leading up to Mao's death, although in the first two months of 1976 there were signs that the policy of further differentiating between the two superpowers was continuing. Only

¹¹⁸ See, "Mao Zedong zhuxi huijian meiguo qian zongtong nikesong he furen", (Chairman Mao Zedong met with former US President Nixon and his wife), in the *Renmin ribao*, 24 February, 1976, pg.1, "Mao Zedong zhuxi huijian Kai Shan tongzhi shuailing de laoguo dangzheng daibiaotuan", (Chairman Mao Zedong met with a Party and government delegation from Laos led by Comrade Kai Shan), in the *Renmin ribao*, 18 March, 1976, pg.1, and "Mao Zedong zhuxi huijian butuo zongli he furen deng guibing", (Chairman Mao Zedong met with Prime Minister Bhutto and his wife and other honoured guests), in the *Renmin ribao*, 28 May, 1976, pg.1.

two weeks before giving former US President Nixon a warm welcome, the *Renmin ribao* had published a front page editorial highly critical of Soviet actions in Angola.¹¹⁹ Subsequently, Prime Minister Bhutto's visit was used to criticize Soviet actions in South Asia.¹²⁰

The period after Mao's death in September was characterized by a high degree of uncertainty, as was bound to happen after the death of China's paramount leader. However the arrest of the Gang of Four in October eased tensions internally, and established Hua Guofeng as the leader of the CCP as well as Premier. They followed a period of consolidation, both for China and for Hua Guofeng, and it is clear that Hua used the opportunity afforded him as China's Party and government leader to meet with foreign guests to further bolster his position. During December 1976 the *Renmin ribao* gave prominent coverage to his meetings with delegations from Vietnam and Tanzania. A telegram marking the election of a new General Secretary of the Vietnamese Communist Party was sent in Hua's name alone, where before other senior political and military figures might also have signed it.¹²¹

As I discussed in earlier chapters, there were no major personnel changes at this point in the fields of higher education or agriculture, but Qiao Guanhua was replaced as Foreign Minister by Huang Hua in December 1976. It is hard to interpret this move. Qiao was 64 and may simply have felt the need to retire. His replacement, Huang, can in no way be seen as being closer to Hua Guofeng. Huang was another career diplomat who had served as China's permanent representative to the United Nations since 1971 and had thus largely been away from Beijing for the time Hua had been working at the centre. By promoting Huang, Hua Guofeng may have been trying to gain his

¹¹⁹ "Suxiu zhimin kuangzhang de dabaolu", (A major expose of Soviet revisionism's colonial expansionism), in the *Renmin ribao*, 4 February, 1976, pg.1.

¹²⁰ "Relie huanying bajisitan guibing", (Warmly welcome the honoured guest from Pakistan), in the *Renmin ribao*, 26 May, 1976, pg.1.

¹²¹ "Hua Guofeng zhuxi de hedian", (Chairman Hua Guofeng's telegram of congratulation), in the *Renmin ribao*, 22 December, 1976, pg.1.

support within the MFA.

In contrast to agriculture, the period immediately after Mao's death saw no major new policy initiatives, indeed, unlike either agriculture or higher education, foreign policy saw little policy conflict in the period 1977-1978. Hua and Deng would later clash over Hua's policy of increasing foreign trade, however this argument was about the extent of contact with foreign countries, not the contact itself. Hua's most significant initiative, launched in November 1977, was to elevate Mao's concept of the "Three Worlds" into the status of a theory, however this move appears to have had the support of a broad range of leaders, including Deng. The "Three Worlds Theory" continued to form the basis for China's strategic view for the remainder of the period under study in this thesis. The policy of differentiating between the two superpowers also continued through 1977-1978, with Sino-Soviet relations worsening following the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia in 1978, in stark contrast to the formal establishment of Sino-US diplomatic relations at the start of 1979.

a. Hua's Guofeng and the "Three Worlds Theory"

The period of consolidation in China's foreign policy continued through the first months of 1977, with a noticeable reduction in foreign visitors to China. However, beginning in April, the *Renmin Ribao* once again began to show Hua Guofeng meeting foreign delegations. Although Hua was invariably pictured greeting the guests, Li Xiannian and Ye Jianying are also reported to have attended many of these meetings, reflecting their position in the post-Mao period.¹²²

Hua's first major foreign policy statement was contained in his political report

¹²² "Hua zhuxi huijian riben jing-tuan-lian fanghua daibiaotuan", (Chairman Hua met a delegation from the Federation of Japanese Economic Organizations visiting China), in the *Renmin Ribao*, 3 April, 1977, pg.1, "Hua zhuxi huijian saqieer furen", (Chairman Hua met Mrs. Thatcher), in the *Renmin Ribao*, 10 April, 1977, pg.1. and "Hua zhuxi, Ye fuzhuxi huijian yuenan junshi daibiaotuan", (Chairman Hua and Vice-Chairman Ye met a military delegation from Vietnam), in the *Renmin Ribao*, 3 June, 1977, pg.1.

to the 11th National Party Conference, held in August 1977. Hua's comments did not deviate from the earlier line set out by Mao, indeed, this speech can be seen as the first step forward elevating Mao's idea of dividing the world into three camps into a theory. On the two superpowers, Hua repeated the view that America and the Soviet Union were competing to be the hegemonic power, but that it was the Soviet Union that was the major threat to world peace. On Mao's "Three Worlds Theory", Hua went on:

Mao's theory of distinguishing between three worlds clearly shows the main trend in the current international struggle, and makes clear who are the main revolutionary forces, who are the main enemies, and who are the intermediate forces we must struggle against or unite with; this lets the world international proletarian struggle unite with all possible forces, forming the broadest possible united front to oppose the main enemy... The experience of the past few years has shown that this theory of Chairman Mao's is completely correct. Following the passage of time it will display even greater power.¹²³

Hua's comments regarding Mao's "Three Worlds Theory" were the first in a series of major statements eulogizing its importance. In elevating Mao's few comments from 1974 to the status of a theory, Hua was clearly trying to draw on Mao's legacy to bolster his own position. As I noted above, Mao had dominated the formulation of foreign-policy during his lifetime and the idea of distinguishing between three worlds had already been outlined by Deng Xiaoping in an address to the United Nations. Hua had little experience of foreign policy work and did not have close contacts with senior MFA officials. Therefore it seems Hua chose to develop Mao's idea, which had broad support amongst the senior leadership, rather than attempt to create new policies of his own.

On 1 November, the *Renmin ribao* devoted almost all of that issue to publishing the theoretical article "Chairman Mao's theory of distinguishing

¹²³ Hua Guofeng, "Zai zhongguo gongchandang dishiyi ci quanguo daibiao dahui shang de zhengzhi baogao", (Political report at the 11th National Conference of the CCP), (Hong Kong: Joint Publishing Co., 1977), pg.33.

between three worlds is a major contribution to Marxism-Leninism". Apparently based on only three lines of comment by Mao in 1974, this six-page article set out to place Mao's new theory as a development of the thinking of Marx, Lenin and Stalin. The article traced Mao's evolving thinking, and highlighted Hua's own comments at the 11th Party Conference.¹²⁴

As I've noted above, there is little evidence of any disagreement within the senior leadership over Mao's Three Worlds Theory, although there may have been some unease over eulogizing Mao so strongly. However even Deng Xiaoping, speaking at the end of 1977, praised the Three Worlds Theory, claiming that it formed the basis of China's international struggle against hegemony.¹²⁵

b. Opening to the world, China's foreign economic relations in 1978

Although there was a broad consensus amongst the Chinese leadership over China's foreign policy, the launch of a new economic policy by Hua Guofeng led to disputes between China's top leaders. Hua's radical plans, which saw investment rates higher than those of the Great Leap Forward, led to economic chaos which played a great part in his ultimate downfall, however at the time of their launch at the 5th National People's Congress in February 1978, they enjoyed widespread support from a number of senior leaders. Hua's new policies are significant as they went directly against the Maoist notions of self-sufficiency and autarky in the national economy and called for substantial increases of imports of western technology. Hua's ambitious plans borrowed some elements from Deng Xiaoping and paved the way for China's wider opening to the West and the subsequent introduction of Special

¹²⁴ "Mao zhuxi guanyu sange shijie huafen de lilun shi dui makesi-lieningzhuyi de zhongda gongxian", (Chairman Mao's theory of distinguishing between three worlds is a major contribution to Marxism-Leninism), (Hong Kong: Shenghuo, dushu, xinzhi sanlian shudian fendian, 1977), pp. 26-29.

¹²⁵ "Zai zhongyang junwei quanti huiyi shang de jianghua", (Speech at a full meeting of the Central Committee's Military Commission), in *Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping, Volume 2*, pg.77.

Economic Zones in the south of China.

In his work report to the 5th National Congress, held in Beijing from 26 February-5 March, Hua Guofeng called for major advances in agricultural and industrial output and set out targets for the next ten years. In industry he announced the new construction of 120 large-scale projects, including 10 new iron and steel works, 8 major coal mines, 10 large oil fields and 30 large-scale power stations.¹²⁶ As Richard Baum points out, many of these new projects were to rely on large-scale imports of western and Japanese technology.¹²⁷

Although enjoying wide support, Hua's new ten-year plan had disastrous results. Imports of new technology and sometimes entire "turnkey" factories led to a growth in imports of 85 percent in 1977 and 1978.¹²⁸ Many of the items imported were unsuitable for Chinese conditions, and little thought had been given to the training required for their use. It was expected that increases in coal and oil output would pay for imports, however delays in bringing new projects on line led to a massive budget deficit of RMB 17.1 billion in 1979.¹²⁹

Discontent grew throughout 1978, however the main focus of moderate attacks on Hua Guofeng was political, focusing in particular on his policy of the "two whatevers". Certainly *Deng Xiaoping's Selected Works* remains quiet on economic issues in 1978, although Richard Baum suggests that this is a result of the fact that Hua had "borrowed" so many of Deng's own ideas.¹³⁰ Certainly the resemblance between Hua's plans and Deng's comments from 1975 quoted above are noticeable. The key third plenum did see a shift in Party policy in agriculture, but wholesale reform of Hua's ten-year plan did not occur

¹²⁶ Hua Guofeng, "Tuanjie qilai, wei jianshe shehuizhuyi de xiandaihua qianguo er fendou", (Unite and strive to build a modern and strong socialist country), in *Zhonghua renmin gongheguo di wu jie quanguo renmin daibiao dahui di yi ci huiyi wenjian*, (*Documents from the first session of the Fifth National People's Congress*), (Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 1978), pg.32.

¹²⁷ Richard Baum, *Burying Mao Chinese Politics in the Age of Deng*, (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1994), pg.54.

¹²⁸ *Ibid*, pg.55.

¹²⁹ *Ibid*, pg.56.

¹³⁰ *Ibid*, fn.30, pg.395.

until a central economic work conference in 1979.

6. China's foreign relations in 1978

a. A collapse in Sino-Vietnamese relations

China's relations with Vietnam deteriorated rapidly in 1978, firstly over Vietnam's expulsion of overseas Chinese resident in Vietnam, and then, more significantly, following Vietnam's invasion of Cambodia in the autumn of 1978. Improving Soviet-Vietnamese relations also played an important part in Chinese calculations and a key editorial from 1978 blamed Soviet "smears" for the Vietnamese expulsions of overseas Chinese.¹³¹ As I noted above, the Chinese had welcomed a senior Vietnamese delegation as late as December 1977, however the culmination of the expulsions and growing Soviet-Vietnamese cooperation effectively ended contact at the senior level between the two sides.

Following Vietnamese attacks on Cambodia in the autumn, the *Renmin ribao* published a leading editorial which criticized Vietnam for wanting to become the hegemonic power in Southeast Asia. In an effort to garner support against Vietnam, the editorial warned that Vietnam would go on to threaten Thailand, Malaysia and Burma.¹³²

b. The third plenum of the 11th Central Committee and Sino-US normalization: December 1978

The Communiqué of the third plenum said very little about China's foreign policy or foreign economic policy. Discussions had been dominated by the issue of agriculture, the Party's focus of work, and Hua Guofeng's own position, perhaps leaving little room for discussion of other topics. Hua's foreign economic policy would come in for severe criticism in the new year, however on

¹³¹ "Guangming leiluo shizhong ruyi", (Open and above board, it has always been like that), in the *Renmin ribao*.

¹³² "Su Yue baquanzhuyizhe yuanxing bilu", (The Soviet and Vietnamese hegemons must be revealed for what they are), in the *Renmin ribao*, 16 December, 1978, pg.1.

foreign policy and China's foreign relations there still appears to have been a broad consensus within the Chinese leadership. Certainly this meeting saw no major policy initiatives in the way that it did for agriculture.

While the plenum was meeting, China and the US formally announced they would establish diplomatic relations from 1 January, 1979, some seven years after President Nixon's ground-breaking visit.¹³³ Negotiations between the two sides had continued quietly and although the question of Taiwan remained a problem, the establishment of diplomatic relations was a major success for the PRC and appeared to have broad support within the senior leadership. Deng Xiaoping would seal this achievement with a triumphant visit to the US in January.

The Chinese side clearly saw the establishment of diplomatic relations with the US as an opportunity to resolve the issue of Taiwan and on the same day that relations were formally established the PRC took the conciliatory step of formally ending the bombardment of the offshore islands still occupied by Taiwanese troops.¹³⁴ On the same day the *Renmin ribao* also published a letter of petition from the NPC Standing Committee to Taiwan, which used the mainland's diplomatic triumph to issue a new call for reunification.

The establishment of diplomatic relations with the US was clearly a major victory for the PRC. Despite serious concerns regarding Vietnam's invasion of Cambodia and the deteriorating relationship with the Soviet Union, Deng, speaking at a meeting to discuss the petition to Taiwan, talked in glowing terms about China's international position:

Last year, in international affairs, the basic policies we followed were those that had formerly been laid down by Chairman Mao and Premier Zhou, however they had been unable to realize them before

¹³³ "Zhonghua renmin gongheguo he meili jianhe zhongguo guanyu jianli wajiao guanxi de lianhe gongbao", (Joint Communiqué by the People's Republic of China and the United States of America on establishing diplomatic relations), in the *Renmin ribao*, 17 December, 1978, reprinted in *Xinhua yuebao*, December 1978, pg. 240.

¹³⁴ "Guofang buzhang Xu Xiangqian shengming tingzhi paoji da, xiao Jinmen deng daoyu", (Minister of Defence Xu Xiangqian announces the end of the bombardment of large and small Jinmen and other islands), in the *Renmin ribao*, 1 January, 1979, pg.1.

their death. We have realized a part of their legacy. The signing of the Sino-Japanese friendship treaty and the normalization of Sino-US relations are beneficial to world peace and stability and are beneficial to the development of the international anti-hegemonistic cause. At the present, we face numerous problems and we must continue to strive hard. In international affairs we must continue to consolidate and expand the excellent position we have already achieved. I believe, those committee members present must be happy and optimistic at our current position, and that they happily made their own contributions.¹³⁵

7. Conclusion

In contrast to the two previous chapters on higher education and agriculture, this chapter has shown that from late-1969, foreign policy decision-making was not characterized by conflict over policy to the extent seen in the other two issue areas. The main reason for the lack of factionalization highlighted by this chapter was the perception on the part of China's senior leaders of the cost of failure in foreign policy (the threat of a war with the Soviet Union) which served to create a stronger consensus on major policy issues than might otherwise be expected during the Cultural Revolution period. The domination of foreign policy decision-making by a handful of senior leaders was also significant, further dampening any factional tendencies, and the authority of Mao and his strong stance served to reduce policy conflict in this field in a way that was not evident in either agriculture or higher education.

This chapter has shown that although the foreign policy system underwent a period of radicalization similar to higher education during the mobilizational phase of the Cultural Revolution, the debilitating effects of the radical upsurge on China's foreign relations led China's senior leaders to restore order in the foreign policy system and this was followed by a de-radicalization of policy that continued throughout the period under study in this thesis. Intensifying border clashes with the Soviet Union in the first half of 1969 led directly to a strategic

¹³⁵ "Jiejue Taiwan wenti, wancheng zuguo tongyi daye tishang juti richeng", (A concrete agenda for resolving the Taiwan problem and completing the great cause of the unification of the Motherland), in *Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping, Volume 2*, pg.155.

change in China's foreign policy stance and renewed overtures to the US in an attempt to balance the perceived Soviet threat. This change in policy was on the personal initiative of Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai and came on the advice of four senior military figures who had undertaken a review of China's strategic position. The selection of these four and the exclusion of Lin Biao and members of the radical Left from their deliberations suggests a high degree of pragmatism in foreign policy decision-making.

There is some evidence of the radical Left's displeasure at this change in policy (notably the way they stayed away from meetings with visitors from America and Japan), however policy statements by radicals and Lin Biao have been shown to have largely followed the overall line of the Party. This line of differentiating between the two superpowers remained in place throughout the Cultural Revolution period and continued under Hua Guofeng. The major policy initiative during this period, Mao's "Three Worlds Theory," received support from all sides. Even though Hua Guofeng was under attack politically, there is little indication of serious disagreements over China's foreign policy within the senior leadership during this period, Deng Xiaoping even went out of his way to show his support for the Three Worlds Theory in a number of speeches both at home and abroad.

Hua Guofeng's major contribution to China's foreign policy had been to attempt to maintain the status quo by promoting Mao's concept of Three Worlds into a theory. This move is reminiscent of his support for Mao's educational line, and, as in the case of education, suggests Hua had little experience of his own to lay out a major new policy line. Hua might also have been trying to tap into the broad support for Mao's "Three Worlds Theory" to bolster his own position.

In contrast Hua's foreign economic policy was a radical departure from China's former posture of self-reliance, although the continued promotion of slogans like *zili-gengsheng* in the media had hidden the fact that contact with

the outside world had been expanding since the end of the mobilizational phase of the Cultural Revolution. Hua's ambitious economic plans came under attack when they led to a major budget deficit, however Hua's main opponent, Deng Xiaoping, remained largely quiet during this criticism. It is clear that many of Hua's ideas had come from documents drafted under Deng's auspices during 1974-1975 and Deng shared many of Hua's views that China should open more widely to the outside world. The major point of contention between Hua and Deng was not whether China should open to the West, but to what extent. Following Hua's ouster Deng would lead the drive to further contacts and launch the Special Economic Zones policy.

Conclusion: The Compartmentalization of Policy-Making in the PRC

In undertaking this study of agriculture, higher-education and foreign policy, I have attempted to highlight variations in the policy-making process across different issue areas and provide an explanation of the reasons for this variation. A review of earlier literature on the policy-making process shows that it used two models to describe decision-making in the PRC during the period 1969-1978: The first model characterizes the Cultural Revolution by periods of across-the-board radicalization or moderation of policy, such that a radicalization in agricultural policy is matched by a similar radicalization in higher education, or a period of moderation in foreign policy is matched by a similar line in both of the other two areas; The second model focuses on the balancing between different factions, with Mao playing a leading role in ensuring that no one faction dominates the policy-making process.

This research rejected these two views and put forward a third alternative, that there is a high degree of "compartmentalization" of the Chinese decision-making process. This suggests that there is variation in policy-making across different policy areas and that each issue area had its own coherent logic and followed a pattern that was far more independent of other issue areas than earlier research suggests. The previous chapters on higher education, agriculture and foreign policy have shown that this possibility best reflects the reality of decision-making in the PRC during this period.

The perception of the risk of failure by senior leaders has been identified as the leading variable which explains this variation. In addition I have suggested that membership of leading decision-making and administrative bodies and previous experience acted as intervening variables which could enhance or detract from an actor's influence and effect policy outcomes. I will outline the

findings of each of the three studies of individual issue areas below before highlighting the apparent variations in policy-making across the three areas. I will then outline the reasons for these variations before going on to suggest an improved model of the policy-making process in the PRC.

Higher Education

More than any other sector, higher education suffered as a result of the mobilizational phase of the Cultural Revolution. Universities and colleges across China closed as many students were mobilized to take part in the Red Guard movement and teachers and other staff were often subject to brutal attack. The issue of higher education became the focus of intense debate in the early stages of the Cultural Revolution and universities and colleges were the focus of competition between the different coalitions, particularly during the controversy over the role of the work teams sent by Liu Shaoqi and his supporters to restrict the burgeoning movement. Although it had originally only been intended that universities would close for six months, it was not until 1970 that they began to re-open nationally.

The "Decision of the Central Committee of the CCP Concerning the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution", adopted by the eleventh plenum of the 8th Central Committee in August 1966 was intended to provide a blueprint for the prosecution of the Cultural Revolution. It called for the transformation of the old educational system, including the shortening of courses, the simplification of teaching material, and increased participation in manual labour. As the universities and colleges re-opened a key element of the new line was the abolition of the national entrance examination and the introduction of a system of recommendation of potential students, which emphasized the importance of political factors. This policy was an attempt to improve the low numbers of students being enrolled from groups such as the workers, peasants and military, the "red classes".

The radical Left were able to use model institutions such as the Shanghai Machine Tools Factory school to develop a comprehensive policy programme which covered both science and engineering colleges and arts institutions. The radical Left's influence over the formation of higher-education policy was enhanced by their role on leading bodies such as the Science and Education Group (SEG), which oversaw policy-making in this area until 1975, and their control of key educational institutions such as Peking, Tsinghua and Fudan universities. These institutions acted as test-points for the radical Left's line. Their control over higher education policy was underlined at the National Educational Work Conference which convened in Beijing in April 1971. This conference adopted the infamous "two-assessments" which stated that in the seventeen years before the Cultural Revolution schools had been under the leadership of "traitors, special agents, and those who follow the capitalist road" and that schools had been "places to train bourgeois intellectuals".¹

In the face of the strength of the radical's position, moderates under Zhou Enlai appear to have been unable to challenge the basic leftist line. Beginning in 1971 Zhou did launch a concerted move to raise the question of the quality of the new students enrolling under the system of recommendation. Supported by Peking University professor, Zhou Peiyuan, Zhou called for more emphasis to be placed on theoretical teaching and laboratory work. The radical Left were forced to address this issue and countered criticism of the academic quality of the new students by saying that they had already proven their ability to work hard and overcome any obstacle. Limited reforms were carried out to the enrollment procedure, including the introduction of a new exam, however media reports emphasized that this was only one part of the overall procedure, which would still be based primarily on political factors.

Even these limited reforms prompted a strong response from the radicals. In July 1973 they manipulated an incident in which Zhang Tiesheng, a sent-down

¹ *Jiaoyu dashiji*, pg.438.

youth, claimed to have failed the new entrance exam as he had not had time to prepare because he was involved in harvest work. The Left used this incident to criticize the renewed emphasis on academic standards and claimed Zhang's actions in complaining were "overflowing with the revolutionary spirit of going against the tide".² Radical attacks on the moderate line in higher education continued through 1973 and 1974.

The 4th National People's Congress, held in January 1975, marked a temporary turning point in higher education policy. Significantly, the Congress approved a decision to disband the SEG and re-open the Ministry of Education. Together with Deng Xiaoping, the newly appointed Minister of Education, Zhou Rongxin, played a leading role in trying to introduce more comprehensive reforms in higher education. Zhou Enlai's speech to the Congress, in which he called for the completion of the Four Modernizations was also significant as it was used by the moderates to reinforce their calls for further reforms in education. The practical emphasis of the four modernizations undermined the significance of political education and placed the emphasis firmly on technical ability.

In the period to October, Zhou Rongxin gave a series of speeches in which he launched several stinging attacks on education policy since the end of the mobilization phase of the Cultural Revolution. He also called for stronger resolve on the part of officials within the ministry. In a speech given at a meeting of the Personnel Bureau of the Ministry of Railways, convened to discuss education, Zhou directly linked the importance of training qualified personnel to completing the four modernizations.

Whatever the intention of reformers like Zhou and Deng, their efforts to improve the situation in higher education were undermined by Mao's fears that their policies would harm the so-called "fruits" of the Cultural Revolution. The

² Yang Pu, "The spirit of going against the tide", in the *Renmin Ribao*, 16 August, 1973, pg.3.

Campaign to study the theory of the dictatorship of the proletariat, launched in February 1975, had already criticized the idea that schools were focusing exclusively on transmitting knowledge. The radical Left launched a new model, the Chaoyang Agricultural College, whose students returned to work in the fields following the completion of their courses, rather than seek an advantageous position because of their education. Ultimately, it appears to have been Mao's displeasure with the attempted reforms to education policy that led to the downfall of the moderate line, and also to Deng's eventual dismissal in January 1976. However the intensifying political conflict in the wake of Zhou Enlai's death meant that the radical Left were unable to effectively use their new position to promote their policies.

In the period following Mao's death, Hua Guofeng adopted a somewhat contradictory line: He supported the reforms introduced in higher education during the Cultural Revolution, including the idea that candidates for university should be recommended by the masses, but he also recognized the need to increase the numbers of trained graduates to support his ambitious industrial policy. As the wider debate shifted (under Hua's leadership), to recognizing that less ideological restraints should be placed on economic and social policy, supporting higher educational policies introduced during the Cultural Revolution looked more and more anachronistic.

Following his return in August 1977 (and even before his formal rehabilitation), Deng Xiaoping placed considerable emphasis on reforming higher education. Like Hua, Deng tied his comments to the need to modernize China and train scientists and technicians to take part in the four modernizations. However, unlike Hua, Deng was willing to argue that China had to go beyond the Cultural Revolution reforms, or rather that China should return to the policies implemented before the Cultural Revolution. He felt that policies such as key-point schools could be justified because they were the only way China was going to modernize successfully. In a series of speeches

in 1977, Deng also strongly condemned the "two-assessments" of 1971.

Hua's position continued to be that he wanted to retain some of the elements of the line introduced during the Cultural Revolution, particularly the improved access for students from a worker or peasant background. However, by early-1978, Deng Xiaoping appears to have built up a broad consensus on the need for reforms to entrance procedures and the need to re-establish key-point schools. At the National Educational Work Conference, held in Beijing in April-May 1978, a series of reforms along the lines proposed by Deng were introduced. This meeting, rather than the third plenum held in December 1978, was significant for higher education policy, and the line it adopted remained in place until the end of the period under study in this thesis.

Agriculture

In direct contrast to developments in higher education, the chapter on agricultural policy highlights how the senior leadership sought to restrict the impact of the mobilizational phase of the Cultural Revolution in rural areas. There was a clear understanding of the economic and social importance of agriculture, both for feeding China's population and generating the raw materials for industry. I noted that a September editorial in the *Renmin Ribao* banned Red Guards from "interfering in rural politics" and shortly after this, the Central Committee issued the "Regulations of the CCP Central Committee Concerning the Great Cultural Revolution in the Countryside Below the County Level". The "Directive" specifically prohibited Red Guards from travelling to communes and brigades below the county level and in article two warned that efforts should be focused on agricultural tasks during the forthcoming harvest season.

Underlining the importance of agriculture, this research has shown that a clear cyclical pattern emerged in agricultural policy which can be seen almost throughout the period under study and which served as a background to

overall policy-making. This pattern was characterized by periods of retrenchment during seasons of peak activity in agriculture, namely in the spring and autumn at times of planting and harvesting when the destabilizing effects of radical policies would be felt the most, followed by the re-radicalization of policy when these periods had passed. Key examples of retrenchment and re-radicalization can be seen in the period from September 1966-April 1967 and in the spring of 1971.

In the spring of 1967 large numbers of PLA troops entered the countryside as part of a movement to carry out spring farm work. Some authors have linked this presence to a radical upsurge in agricultural policy which began in 1968 and which was associated with Lin Biao. This research found no direct evidence linking Lin with this upsurge, suggesting instead that it was the indirect result of the policies to prepare for a possible war with the Soviet Union and of the political campaigns that were conducted in rural areas in 1968 and 1969 which led rural cadres to spontaneously implement a more radical line. During this period there were numerous reports of the confiscation of private plots, the introduction of the Dazhai system of allocating work points, and attempts to raise the level of accounting to the brigade and commune-level.

At the start of 1970, and with spring planting looming, these developments came in for criticism in a series of media articles. On 1 May, 1970, the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry was established (some five years before the Ministry of Education would be re-opened). The moderate trend was confirmed at the Northern Districts Agricultural Conference, held from June-October 1970 which emphasized the continuing importance of the "60 Articles", the moderate document that had been introduced in the wake of the Great Leap Forward to restore agricultural production. The Conference's final report also emphasized the importance of private plots, sideline industries and opposing egalitarianism, key elements of the moderate line. While the conference was meeting, an editorial on the model brigade at Dazhai launched a new stage in the

campaign "In agriculture study Dazhai". Interestingly, the editorial took a more radical line, and following its publication there were further reports of a radical upsurge in the countryside, in contrast to the policies being discussed at the Northern Districts Conference. However, at the beginning of 1971, senior leaders took a series of measures to end these trends, and the period from 1971-1973 was characterized by a more moderate line.

Following the promotion of members of the radical Left to the Politburo at the 10th National Party Congress, there was renewed contention over the formation of agricultural policy. With little influence within leading bodies overseeing agricultural policy, the radical Left utilized political campaigns such as the Campaign to Criticize Lin Biao and Confucius to mobilize rural cadres and peasants. Although these campaigns had little impact on agricultural policies per se, they were part of a wider radicalization of Chinese politics and their focus on political criteria led to a renewed attack on phenomenon such as private plots and sideline industries. The radical Left even set up their own model brigade, at Xiaoqinzhuang on the outskirts of Tianjin, to promote their policies.

A study of agricultural policy during this period is significant as it highlights the role of Hua Guofeng in policy-making on this issue, both before and after Mao's death. It is clear that by 1975, a coalition of actors had formed around Hua which included leading figures associated with the Dazhai brigade such as Chen Yonggui. Their policies were based on Hua's role in managing agricultural mechanization since his move to Beijing in 1971, and their interpretation of the experiences of the movement to study Dazhai. In contrast to the moderate line, this group continued to emphasize the importance of raising the level of ownership and accounting within the commune, however, unlike the radicals, who emphasized political education, this group stressed the importance of mechanization and large-scale field construction which would bring rewards to the peasants and boost their enthusiasm for collective

agriculture.

While the radical Left continued to focus their criticism on the moderate line throughout 1974 and 1975, it was Hua's group that emerged victorious from the First National Conference on "In Agriculture Study Dazhai", held in December 1975. With Mao's support, Hua and Chen Yonggui dominated the proceedings at this meeting, and the conference adopted policies based on their line. Although these policies subsequently came in for attack from the radical Left, they remained the basis of agricultural policy upto Mao's death, and formed a core element of Hua's overall line in the period from 1976-1978.

Hua's strength in this field is apparent in the way he used agriculture and the conflict with the Gang of Four over agricultural policy to bolster his position. Hua used the debate over agricultural policy to launch a strong critique of the Gang's activities and he and his supporters focused especially on events at the First Dazhai Conference and efforts by the Gang to stop the publication of Hua Guofeng's speech at that meeting. Hua's first major act following the Gang's arrest was to convene a second Dazhai conference which repeated the importance of the twin tasks of basic field construction and achieving mechanization as the main issues in agricultural policy. This remained the basic line in agriculture up to the eve of the third plenum in December 1978. This period saw an enormous mobilization of rural labour to engage in capital construction projects and an on-going emphasis on raising the level of collectivization.

From late-1977, Hua's line began to be challenged by a group of moderate figures under the leadership of Deng Xiaoping and including Anhui Province's Party Secretary Wan Li. Anhui was the site of a number of experiments in organizing agriculture, including the first major use of contract responsibility systems that would subsequently be adopted at the third plenum. The moderate line developed through 1978 to incorporate a number of elements. Firstly, it emphasized the "sovereignty" of production teams, the lowest of the

three levels of commune ownership, and warned against excessive and inappropriate transfer of resources away from the production team to facilitate capital construction projects. Secondly, it emphasized the use of material rewards to boost peasant enthusiasm and increase productivity. Thirdly, the moderates placed far greater importance on respecting local conditions. This was used to downplay the significance of Dazhai as a national model. Finally, on mechanization, the moderates advocated far lower targets than Hua Guofeng.

This line was adopted at the third plenum of the 11th Central Committee, which saw a fundamental shift in the Party's overall line. The post-Hua leadership have portrayed the plenum as a major turning point in agricultural policy, although it did not mark a complete break with Hua's line. The documents adopted by the meeting contained a number of elements of Hua's policies, including the importance of mechanization and developing local industries in support of agriculture. Significantly, the meeting had specifically forbidden contracting with individual households, despite the fact that experimental projects had been underway in Anhui Province since the autumn of 1978.

Foreign policy

The final chapter on foreign policy showed that like higher education, foreign policy-making was severely effected by the mobilizational phase of the Cultural Revolution. The withdrawal of China's ambassadors, together with the actions of junior diplomats and students studying overseas, who sought to proselytise in the name of Mao, severely effected China's relations with other countries. Domestically, radical activity peaked in the summer of 1967, with Red Guard attacks on the Foreign Minister, Chen Yi and the occupation of the Ministry itself and the burning of the British Embassy.

These developments, together with the deterioration in China's foreign

relations with key allies such as Cambodia and Burma appear to have been essential in convincing Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai that the radical influence needed to be brought under control within the foreign affairs system. New regulations were introduced on the day of the attack on the British Embassy restricting Red Guard activities in the diplomatic quarters in Beijing. Significantly, these moves received support from key members of the radical Left, including Kang Sheng and Jiang Qing.

The impact of the mobilizational phase of the Cultural Revolution both domestically and with regards to China's international relations, led to a concerted effort in the first half of 1969 to restore effective functioning within the Ministry. More urgently, this chapter has shown how escalating border clashes with the Soviet Union in March and April 1969 forced China's senior leadership to review its international position and led directly to China's renewed overtures to the US.

A number of writers have suggested that Lin Biao opposed China's rapprochement with the US, but this research could find no evidence to support this theory, rather, those comments by Lin that are available suggest his views were in line with those of other leaders. This consensus on China's foreign policy continued throughout the period under study, and meant that there were no major policy initiatives following China's move to improve Sino-US ties in 1969. As this chapter has shown, a major factor in this consensus was the control exerted by Mao, Zhou Enlai and other senior leaders, who tended to keep the decision-making authority over foreign policy in their own hands. Outside of this handful of senior figures, few other leaders had any input into the policy-making process, and dissent was stifled by the control exerted by Mao, Zhou, Deng and Hua.

The policy of differentiating between the two superpowers formed the basis of China's foreign policy throughout the period under study and lay behind many other issues such as China's policy towards southeast Asia and its

position with regards to the Third World. Again, these policies remained stable throughout the period under study and it is not the intention of this chapter to review them in detail again.

The one issue over which there was some contention between the radical Left and moderate figures was over China's economic relations with other countries. This issue allowed the radicals to criticize Deng Xiaoping and other moderates for apparently going against Mao's stated policies of self-reliance and self-regeneration. However on theoretical issues and on issues of China's relations with the two superpowers, statements by the radical Left essentially follow the overall line. Significantly, the death of Zhou Enlai and the subsequent purge of Deng Xiaoping did not effect the position of moderate figures within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs such as Qiao Guanhua, who continued to serve as Foreign Minister, in stark contrast to the fate of Zhou Rongxin the Minister of Education.

Following the death of Mao Zedong, both Hua Guofeng and Deng Xiaoping continued to emphasize the importance of Mao's basic foreign policy line, embodied in the Three Worlds Theory. Although China's isolation during the Cultural Revolution has sometimes been overstated, Hua did move to increase trade and educational contacts with other countries. These policies were non-contentious as they were based on Deng's comments from 1974-1975. Deng's stature meant that he eclipsed Hua in the field of foreign policy decision-making even while Hua was still in office, however, there was little change in the basic line as there was broad consensus on its correctness.

The Compartmentalization of Policy-making

The three core chapters, together with these summaries clearly demonstrate the variation in policy-making discussed in the introduction to this thesis: Firstly, it is apparent that there is variation in the **relative strength** of the various groups in setting the agenda in each of the three issue areas, so that

while the radical Left were a dominant influence in higher education policy, this was not matched by a similar influence in agricultural and foreign policy. Similarly, while Hua Guofeng dominated agricultural policy-making from at least 1975-77, they had less influence over policy in higher education at that time.

Secondly, it is apparent that the relative strength of the various groups in setting the agenda for each of the three issue areas also varies **over time**, but not to a uniform degree. This research has highlighted some general trends, such as the move to moderate policies in the wake of the death of Lin Biao, an upsurge in radical activity following the Tenth Party Congress, and moves to reform policy after Deng Xiaoping's rehabilitation in 1977. However it is clear that these developments proceeded at different rates in different policy areas. (As there was broad consensus amongst the senior leadership with regards to foreign policy, the main indications of this variation can be seen in the variable pace of reforms in agriculture and higher education).

One of the clearest examples of this pattern can be seen in Zhou Enlai's efforts to introduce reforms in agriculture and higher education in 1971-72. The chapter on agriculture has demonstrated that as early as August 1971, moderates under Zhou dominated the formation of agricultural policy. Criticism of leftist excesses in agricultural policy culminated with the publication of the Central Committee's "Directive Concerning the Question of Distribution in the Rural People's Communes" on 26 December, 1971. This document supported key elements of the moderate's line, including sideline activities, maintaining the principle of "to each according to his ability and to each according to his work" and boosting peasant incomes.³ In direct contrast to these developments, in August 1971 the radical Left published a summary of the National Educational Work Conference which contained the '2-Estimates'

³ "Directive Concerning the Question of Distribution in Rural People's Communes", in Jürgen Domes, *Socialism in the Chinese Countryside*, pp.159-164.

discussed above. While reforms in agriculture proceeded apace in 1972, Zhou Enlai and other moderates were only able to introduce limited reforms in higher education. Other examples can be seen with the attempt by the radical Left to further radicalize agricultural and higher education policy in the wake of the Tenth Party Congress, and Hua Guofeng's reform programme following Mao's death.

In highlighting these variations across the three issue areas, this study has suggested that policy-making in each of these areas had its own coherent logic and followed a pattern largely independent of other issue areas.

Developments in agriculture, higher education and foreign policy appear insulated from each other to a much higher degree than previously thought. This research has identified the assessment of risk by senior leaders of the consequences of failure in any given policy area as the leading variable explaining these variations. In addition I have suggested that membership of leading decision-making and administrative bodies and previous experience could act as intervening variables effecting policy outcomes.

The Assessment of Risk and the Role of Senior Leaders

This research has suggested that the most important factor in the compartmentalization of policy-making was that senior leaders such as Mao, Zhou and Deng, made an assessment of the risk of failure which set variable parameters on the extent to which that policy area was allowed to become radicalized. The three studies of policy-making in agriculture, foreign policy and higher education have highlighted how concerns amongst the Party and government leadership as to the possible consequences of radical policies introduced in the mobilizational phase of the Cultural Revolution impacted in different ways in each of the three issue areas.

This thesis has highlighted a number of examples of such an assessment being made. Perhaps the clearest example is in foreign policy where the

escalating risk of a war with the Soviet Union led to a moderation in policy. The on-going threat of war throughout the period under study appears to have acted as a restraint on policy-making in this area. The economic and social importance of agriculture was such that China's leaders also sought to protect rural areas from the impact of the mobilizational phase of the Cultural Revolution. Although there were periods of radicalization in agricultural policy, it is also noticeable that there was a clear cycle of retrenchment at times of peak agricultural activity in an attempt to protect output.

In contrast, it is apparent that higher education was seen largely as a cause for a greater good, with few immediate costs if policy were allowed to become radicalized. It was only following Mao's death when greater emphasis was placed on economic reform, that education's role in training people who could take part in economic construction was recognized and reforms to higher education introduced.

In examining this assessment of risk by the senior leadership, this thesis recognizes the important role of Mao Zedong, but does not except that he was able to dominate other Chinese leaders to the degree suggested by authors like Frederick Teiwes. Mao's role in the assessment of risk was often pivotal, but it varied across issue areas. There were also times when Mao took a back-seat in policy-making. This thesis has identified the ambivalence in Mao's own thinking, which sought to both "protect" the successes of the Cultural Revolution and promote economic reforms and suggested that this gave scope to both "radicals" and "moderates" to promote their own views. Other leaders who can be identified as having some input into the process of risk assessment are Deng Xiaoping, Zhou Enlai, Wan Li, Ye Jianying, Lin Biao, Hua Guofeng, and members of the radical Left.

Membership of leading decision-making and administrative bodies

In part, membership of leading decision-making and administrative bodies

was influenced by the assessment described above. As I noted in the introduction, there had been a substantial redistribution of positions during the mobilizational phase and this continued into the period covered in this study. In part this redistribution was dictated by the awareness of the consequences of failure in each area. However, this thesis has highlighted how individual and groups of actors were able to use membership of leading decision-making and administrative bodies to "capture" part of the policy-making process to promote their own policies. It could even give them some ability to resist the will of senior figures like Mao Zedong or Zhou Enlai.

In higher education, the radical Left's control of the SEG and leading academic institutions such as Peking, Tsinghua and Fudan universities was a significant factor in their ability to resist efforts by moderates like Zhou Enlai and Zhou Rongxin to introduce reforms. Elsewhere, Zhou Enlai's position as the head of the State Council was also significant as it appears to have given him the opportunity to dilute or stall implementation of some of the radical Left's policies. Membership of decision-making bodies became increasingly important as China re-established Party and government organizational norms. In particular, in the post-Mao period, the gradual promotion of supporters of Deng Xiaoping to the Politburo was effective in sidelining Hua Guofeng.

I have suggested that membership of these bodies implies that policy-making in the PRC during this period was more of a mixture of formal and informal structures than has been previously understood. This research suggests that membership of formal organs was an important means of mobilizing support for policy positions and could form the structure around which informal factional conflict was waged, with competing groups each seeking to place their "men" into leading positions on key decision-making and administrative bodies.

Previous experience

The final intervening variable highlighted by this research is the importance of previous experience. This study has suggested that the radical Left's lack of experience in the field of agriculture was a significant factor in their inability to dominate this area in the way they had higher education. Elsewhere, Hua Guofeng's role in promoting agricultural mechanization following his promotion to the centre in 1971 appears to be an important factor in his subsequent control of this area. This was in stark contrast to his lack of experience in either higher education or foreign policy, areas where he more readily conceded control to Deng Xiaoping.

I have suggested that previous experience in a particular field was probably significant as it allowed an individual or group of actors to develop a network of personal ties in that particular area, or *xitong*, that could be used at a later date to mobilize support for new policy initiatives. This informal relationship balances the role of formal position noted above and suggests that both were important factors in influencing policy outcomes.

By undertaking this study of three separate issue areas, this thesis has been able to offer radically new insights into the policy-making process in the PRC between 1969 and 1978. In contrast to earlier broad-band studies and studies of single issue areas, this thesis has generated detailed information on three issue areas, highlighting the variations in the policy-making process both across these areas, and through time. This model, suggesting the compartmentalization of the policy-making process with developments in each issue area being largely isolated from each other, is in clear contrast to those works that see the policy-making process in this period as being characterized either by across-the-board radicalization or moderation, or as a process of balancing by senior leaders between the various coalitions. Policy-making has also been shown to be more interactive than has generally been understood,

with individual or groups of actors dominating or “capturing” parts of the decision-making process in some of the issue areas, gaining a role in policy-making in that area.

This research also offers new insights into the Cultural Revolution itself. Although it does not cover the mobilizational phase of the Cultural Revolution in detail, it is apparent that the compartmentalization of the policy-making process was important in restricting the impact of the burgeoning movement in rural areas, suggesting a more rational prosecution of this stage of the movement than has previously been assumed. Elsewhere, the picture generated in this research suggests that we cannot simply identify periods of radicalization and moderation. The Cultural Revolution was not a wave like movement, with peaks and troughs of radicalization, rather it progressed at a different pace in different areas. Finally, although almost all of this subject matter has been covered in earlier studies, this thesis has generated new information on the late Cultural Revolution period and in particular the role of Hua Guofeng. This period, which formed the backdrop to Deng’s eventual rise to power, has been highlighted as an important area for further study.

Bibliography

General

Books in Chinese

Chao Feng, (ed.), *'Wenhua dageming' cidian (A Dictionary of the Great Cultural Revolution)*. Hong Kong: Ganglong chubanshe, 1993.

Deng Xiaoping wenxuan Di er juan (Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping Volume Two). Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 1994.

Fan Shuo, *Ye Jianying zai 1976 (Ye Jianying in 1976)*. Beijing: Zhonggong zhongyang dangxiao chubanshe, 1995.

Gao Gao and Yan Jiaqi, *'Wenhua dageming' shinianshi 1966-1976 (History of the 'Cultural Revolution' Decade 1966-1976)*. Hong Kong: Chaoliu chubanshe, 1989.

Ge Dexing, (ed.), *Zhonghua renmin gongheguo shi (History of the People's Republic of China)*. Kaifeng: Henan daxue chubanshe, 1989.

Jiang Qing guanyu wenhua dageming de yanjiang ji (A Collection of Speeches by Jiang Qing in the Great Cultural Revolution). Macau: Tianshan chubanshe, 1971.

Li Jian, *Deng Xiaoping san-jin, san-chu Zhongnanhai (Deng Xiaoping's three entrances and three exits from Zhongnanhai)*. Beijing: Zhongguo dadi chubanshe, 1993.

Shiyi jie san zhong quanwei yilai zhongyao wenxian xuandu (A Selection of Important Documents Since the Third Plenum of the 11th Central Committee (Two Volumes)). Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 1987.

Shi Zhongquan and Chen Dengcai (eds.), *Deng Xiaoping zai 1978 (Deng Xiaoping in 1978)*. Shenyang: Liaoning renmin chubanshe, 1994.

Wan Li wenxuan (Selected Works of Wan Li). Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 1995.

Wen Lequn and Hao Ruiting (eds.), *'Wenhua dageming' zhong de mingren zhi sheng (The Rise of Famous People During the 'Great Cultural Revolution')*. Beijing: Zhongyang minzu xueyuan chubanshe, 1993.

Li Qichen, *Qian qiu gong guo (Successfully cross one thousand autumns)*. Beijing: Guangming Ribao Press, 1994.

Chen Mingxian, *Xin Zhongguo sishiwu nian yanjiu (Research on the 45 years*

- of new China*). Beijing: Beijing ligong daxue chubanshe, 1994.
- Zhonghua renmin gongheguo shi (History of the People's Republic of China)* . Beijing: Beijing ligong daxue chubanshe, 1993.
- Wang Dongxing, *Mao Zedong yu Lin Biao fangeming jituan de douzheng (The Struggle Between Mao Zedong and Lin Biao's Counter-revolutionary Clique)* . Beijing: Dangdai zhongguo chubanshe, 1998.
- Yao Wenyuan *wenji (1965-1968) (Collected Works of Yao Wenyuan (1965-1968))* . Hong Kong: Lishi ziliao chubanshe, 1971.
- Ye Jianying *xuanji (Selected Works of Ye Jianying)* . Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 1996.
- Ye Yonglie, *Chen Boda zhuan (Biography of Chen Boda)* . Beijing: Zuojia chubanshe, 1993.
- Hu Qiaomu (Hu Qiaomu)* . Beijing: Zhonggong zhongyang dangxiao chubanshe, 1994.
- Jiang Qing zhuan (Biography of Jiang Qing)* . Beijing: Meitan gongye chubanshe, 1993.
- Yao Wenyuan zhuan (Biography of Yao Wenyuan)* . Changchun: Shidai wenyi chubanshe, 1993.
- Zhang Chunqiao zhuan (Biography of Zhang Chunqiao)* . Changchun: Shidai wenyi chubanshe, 1993.
- Zhang Yunsheng, *Maojiawan jishi: Lin Biao mishu huiyilu, (True Account of Maojiawan: Reminiscences of Lin Biao's Secretary)* . Beijing: Chunqiu chubanshe, 1988).
- Zheng Qian and Han Gang, *Mao Zedong zhi lu Wannian suiyue (Mao Zedong's Road His Later Years)* . Beijing: Zhongguo qingnian chubanshe, 1993.
- Zhongguo gongchandang dashidian (A Dictionary of Major Events of the CCP)* . Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 1991.
- Zhou Enlai *de yi sheng Ziliao xuanji (xia ce) (The Life of Zhou Enlai A Collection of Material (Volume 2))* . Hong Kong: Jiefangjun wenyi chubanshe, 1977.
- Documents, Speeches and Newspaper articles in Chinese
- Deng Xiaoping, "Jianchi si xiang jiben yuanze" (Uphold the four cardinal principles), in *Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping, Volume 2* , pp.164-165.

"Zai zhongyang junwei quanti huiyi shang de jianghua" (Speech at a full meeting of the Central Military Commission), in *ibid*, pp.72-84.

Hua Guofeng, *Zai Zhongguo gongchandang di shiyi ci quanguo daibiao dahui shang de zhengzhi baogao*. (*Political Report at the 11th National Congress of the CCP*). Hong Kong: Joint Publishig Co., 1977.

"Lin Biao fu zhuxi zai qingzhu zhonghua renmin gongheguo chengli ershiyi zhou nian dahuishang de jianghua" (Vice-Chairman Lin Biao's speech at the mass meeting to celebrate the 21st anniversary of the founding of the People's Republic of China), in the *Renmin ribao* 2 October, 1970, reprinted in *Xinhua yuebao*, October 1970, pp.8-9.

Ye Jianying, "Zhongshi fahui renmin shengxie de zuoyong" (Pay attention to giving full play to the role of the People's Political Consultative Conference), in *Selected Works of Ye Jianying*, pp.470-477.

Zhang Chunqiao, "Lun dui zichanjieji de quanmian zhuanzheng", (On the all-round dictatorship over the bourgeoisie), in *Hong qi*, Issue 4, 1975, pg.3-12.

Zhongguo gongchandang di shi ci quanguo daibiao dahui wenjian huibian. (*An Anthology of Documents from the 10th National Congress of the CCP*). Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 1973.

Zhongguo gongchandang di shiyi jie zhongyang weiyuanhui di san ci quan ti huiyi gongbao (*Communique of the Third Plenum of the 11th Central Committee of the CCP*). Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 1978.

Zhonghua renmin gongheguo di si jie quanguo renmin daibiao dahui di yi ci huiyi wenjian (*Documents of the first meeting of the Fourth National People's Congress of the PRC*). Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 1975.

Zhonghua renmin gongheguo di wu jie quanguo renmin daibiao dahui di yi ci huiyi wenjian (*Documents from the first session of the 5th National People's Congress*). Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 1978.

Books in English

A. Doak Barnett, *Uncertain Passage China's Transition to the Post-Mao Era*. Washington, D.C: Brookings Institute, 1974.

Cadres, Bureaucracy and Political Power in Communist China. New York: Columbia University Press, 1967.

Wolfgang Bartke, *Who's Who in the People's Republic of China*. Armonk, New York: M.E. Sharpe, Inc., 1981.

- Biographical Dictionary and Analysis of China's Party Leadership 1922-1988*. Munich: K.G. Saur, 1990.
- Richard Baum, *Burying Mao Chinese Politics in the Age of Mao*. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1994.
- Cambridge History of China Volume 15*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991.
- CCP Documents of the Great Proletarian Revolution 1966-1967*. Hong Kong: Union Research Institute, 1968.
- Y.C. Chang, *Factional and Coalitional Politics in China The Cultural Revolution and its Aftermath*. New York: Praeger Publishers, 1976.
- Jerome Ch'en, *Mao Papers Anthology and Bibliography*. London: Oxford University Press, 1970.
- Lowell Dittmer, *China's Continuous Revolution The Post-Liberation Epoch 1949-1981*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987.
- Jürgen Domes, *China after the Cultural Revolution Politics between Two Party Congresses*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1975.
- The Government and Politics of the PRC: A Time of Transition*. Boulder: Westview Press, 1985.
- Galen Wheeler Fox, *Campaigning for Power in China During the Cultural Revolution Era 1967-1976*. Ann Arbor, Michigan: University Microfilms International, 1978.
- Jaap van Ginneken, *The Rise and Fall of Lin Biao*. New York: Penguin Books, 1976.
- Avery Goldstein, *From Bandwagon to Balance-of-Power Politics Structural Constraints and Politics in China, 1949-1978*. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1991.
- Jack Gray, *Rebellions and Revolutions China from the 1800s to the 1980s*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1990.
- Harry Harding, *China's Second Revolution Reform after Mao*. Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1987.
- Immanuel C.Y. Hsu, *China Without Mao*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1983.
- William A. Joseph, Christine P.W. Wong, and David Zweig, *New Perspectives on the Cultural Revolution*. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The Council on

- East Asian Studies/Harvard University, 1991.
- Ying-Mao Kau and Susan H. Marsh (eds.), *China in the Era of Deng Xiaoping A Decade of Reform*. Armonk, New York: M.E. Sharpe, 1993.
- Donald W. Klein and Anne B. Clark, *Biographic Dictionary of Chinese Communism 1921-1965*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1971.
- Michael Lamb, *Directory of Officials and Organizations in China, 1968-1983*. Armonk, New York: M. E. Sharpe, 1983.
- John Wilson Lewis, *Leadership in Communist China*. Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1978.
- Kenneth Lieberthal, *Central Documents and Politburo Politics in China*. Ann Arbor: Center for Chinese Studies, The University of Michigan, 1978.
- Kenneth G. Lieberthal and Bruce J. Dickson, *A Research Guide to CENTRAL PARTY and GOVERNMENT MEETINGS in CHINA 1949-1986*. Armonk, New York: M.E. Sharpe, Inc., 1989.
- Kenneth Lieberthal and Michel Oksenberg, *Policy Making in China Leaders, Structures and Processes*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988.
- Selected Works of Lin Biao*. Hong Kong: Chih Luen Press, 1970.
- Roderick MacFarquhar, *The Origins of the Cultural Revolution: Contradictions Among the People, 1956-57*. London: Oxford University Press, 1974.
- The Origins of the Cultural Revolution: The Great Leap Forward, 1958-1960*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1983.
- The Origins of the Cultural Revolution: The Coming of the Cataclysm, 1961-1966*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992.
- Maurice Meisner, *Mao's China and After A History of the People's Republic*. London: The Free Press, 1977.
- Michel Oksenberg and Gail Henderson, *Research Guide to People's Daily Editorials, 1949-1975*. Ann Arbor: Center for Chinese Studies, University of Michigan, 1982.
- Michel Oksenberg, Carl Riskin, Robert A. Scalapino, and Ezra F. Vogel, *The Cultural Revolution: 1967 in Review*. Ann Arbor: Center for Chinese Studies, The University of Michigan, 1968.
- Edward E. Rice, *Mao's Way*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1974.
- Thomas Robinson, (ed.), *The Cultural Revolution in China*. Berkeley:

- University of California Press, 1971, pp.323-334.
- Stuart Schram, *Chairman Mao Talks to the People Talks and Letters: 1956-1971*. New York: Pantheon Books, 1974.
- Franz Schurmann, *Ideology and Organization in Communist China*. Berkeley: The University of California Press, 1968.
- Dorothy J. Solinger, *China's Transition from Socialism Statist Legacies and Market Reforms 1980-1990*. Armonk, New York: M.E. Sharpe, 1993.
- Frederick C. Teiwes, *Leadership, Legitimacy, and Conflict in China From a Charismatic Mao to the Politics of Succession*. New York: MacMillan Press Ltd. 1984.
- Frederick C. Teiwes and Warren Sun, *The Tragedy of Lin Biao Riding the Tiger during the Cultural Revolution 1966-1971*. Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 1996.
- Ting Wang, *Chairman Hua Leader of the Chinese Communists*. London: C. Hurst, 1980.
- Lynn T. White III, *Policies of Chaos The Organizational Causes of Violence in China's Cultural Revolution*. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1989.
- Allen S. Whiting, *Chinese Domestic Politics and Foreign Policy in the 1970s*. Ann Arbor: Center for Chinese Studies, The University of Michigan, 1979.
- William W. Whitson, *The Military and Political Power in China in the 1970s*. New York: Praeger Publishers, 1972.
- Who's Who in Communist China*. Hong Kong: Union Research Institute, 1965.
- Benjamin Yang, *Deng A Political Biography*. Armonk, New York: M.E. Sharpe, 1998.
- Hong Yung Lee, *The Politics of the Chinese Cultural Revolution A Case Study*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978.

Speeches, Documents and Newspaper articles in English

- "Mao's Directive on Working Class Leadership", in *Peking Review*, 30 August, 1966, reprinted in Theodore Hsi-en Chen, *The Maoist Educational Revolution*. New York: Praeger Publishers, 1974, Appendix E.
- "Mao's 'March 7 Directive' Concerning the Great Strategic Plan for the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution", in *Peking Review*, 15 March, 1968, reprinted in *ibid*, Appendix D.

Mao Zedong, "Speech at a Meeting with Regional Secretaries and Members of the Cultural Revolutionary Group of the Central Committee", in Stuart Schram, *Chairman Mao Talks to the People Talks and Letters: 1956-1971*. New York: Pantheon Books, 1974, pp.256-259.

"Sixty Points on Working Methods", in Jerome Ch'en, *Mao Papers Anthology and Bibliography*. London: Oxford University Press, 1970.

Articles in English

Richard Baum, "Ideology Redivivus", in *Problems of Communism*, 16 (May-June, 1967), pp.1-11.

Phillip Bridgham, "Mao's 'Cultural Revolution': Origin and Development" in *The China Quarterly*, No.29 (January-March, 1967), pp.1-35.

"Mao's Cultural Revolution: The Struggle to Consolidate Power", in *The China Quarterly*, No.41 (January-March, 1970), pp.1-25.

Parris H. Chang, "Regional Military Power: The Aftermath of the Cultural Revolution", in *Asian Survey*, 12, No.12 (December 1972), pp.999-1013.

Lowell Dittmer, "Chinese Informal Politics", in *The China Journal*, No.34 (July 1995), pp.1-24.

"Informal Politics Reconsidered", in *The China Journal*, No.34, (July 1995), pp.193-205.

"Power and Personality in China: Mao Tse-tung, Liu Shao-ch'i, and the Politics of Charismatic Succession", in *Studies in Comparative Communism*, Vol. 7, 1974, Nos.1 & 2, pp.21-49.

"The 12th Congress of the Communist Part of China", in *The China Quarterly*, No.93 (March 1983), pp.108-124.

Lowell Dittmer and Lu Xiaobo, "Personal Politics in the Chinese *Danwei* Under Reform", in *Asian Survey*, Vol.XXXVI, No.3 (March 1996), pp.246-267.

William F. Dorrill, "Power, Policy, and Ideology in the Making of the Chinese Cultural Revolution", in Thomas W. Robinson (ed.), *The Cultural Revolution in China*, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971, pp.21-112.

Joseph Fewsmith, "Institutions, Informal Politics, and Political Transition in China", in *Asian Survey*, Vol. XXXVI, No.3 (March 1996), pp.230-245.

Edward Friedman, "Cultural Limits of the Cultural Revolution", in *Asian Survey*, 9 (March 1969), pp.188-201.

Carl Friedrich and Zbigniew Brezezinski, "Totalitarian Dictatorship and

- Autocracy", in Jerry Hough and Merle Fainsod, *How the Soviet Union is Governed*, Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1979.
- Carol Lee Hamrin, "Competing 'Policy Packages' in Post-Mao China", in *Asian Survey*, Vol.XXIV, No.5 (May 1984), pp.487-518.
- "Competing Political-economic strategies", in *China's Economy Looks Toward the Year 2000: Volume 1. The Four Modernizations*. Washington: U.S. G.P.O., 1986.
- Chalmers Johnson, "China: The Cultural Revolution in Structural Perspective", in *Asian Survey*, Vol.VIII, No.1 (January 1968), pp.1-15.
- Ellis Joffe, "The Chinese Army after the Cultural Revolution: the Effects of Intervention", in *The China Quarterly*, No.55 (July-September, 1973), pp.450-477.
- Ying-Mao Kau and Pierre M. Perrolle, "The Politics of Lin Piao's Abortive Coup", in *Asian Survey*, 14 (June 1974), pp.558-577.
- Donald Klein, "The State Council and the Cultural Revolution", in John Wilson Lewis (ed.), *Party Leadership and Revolutionary Power in China*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970, pp.351-372.
- Melanie Manion, "Policy Implementation in the People's Republic of China: Authoritative Decisions versus Individual Interests", in *The Journal of Asian Studies*, 50, No.2 (May 1991), pp. 253-279.
- Roderick MacFarquhar, "The Succession to Mao and the End of Maoism", in *Cambridge History of China*, Volume 15, pp.305-401.
- Andrew Nathan, "A Factionalism Model for CCP Politics", in *The China Quarterly*, No.53 (January-March, 1973), pp.34-66.
- Michel Oksenberg and Steven Goldstein, "The Chinese Political Spectrum", in *Problems of Communism*, Vol.XXIII (March-April, 1974), pp.1-13.
- Richard M. Pfeffer, "The Pursuit of Purity: Mao's Cultural Revolution", in *Problems of Communism*, 18 (November-December, 1969), pp.12-25.
- Lucian W. Pye, "Factions and the Politics of *Guanxi*: Paradoxes in Chinese Administrative and Political Behaviour", in *The China Journal*, No.34 (July 1995), pp.36-53.
- Stuart R. Schram, "China After the 13th Congress", in *The China Quarterly*, No.114, (June 1988), pp.177-197.
- Dorothy J. Solinger, "The Fifth National People's Congress and the Process of Policy-Making: Reform, Readjustment, and the Opposition", in *Asian Survey*,

Vol. XXII, No. 12, (December 1982), pp. 1238-1275.

Frederick C. Teiwes, "Chinese Politics 1949-1965: A Changing Mao Part I", in *Current Scene*, Vol. XII, No. 1, (January 1974), pp. 1-14.

"Chinese Politics 1949-1965: A Changing Mao Part II", in *Current Scene*, Vol. XII, No. 2, (February 1974), pp. 1-18.

"The Paradoxical Post-Mao Transition: From Obeying the Leader to 'Normal Politics'", in *The China Journal*, No. 34, (July 1995), pp. 55-94.

Tang Tsou, "Prolegomenon to the Study of Informal Groups in CCP Politics", in *The China Quarterly*, No. 65 (March 1976), pp. 98-114.

"The Cultural Revolution and the Chinese Political System", in *The China Quarterly*, No. 38 (April-June, 1969), pp. 63-91.

Andrew Walder, "Cultural Revolution Radicalism: Variations on a Stalinist Theme", in Joseph, Wong and Zweig, *New Perspectives on the Cultural Revolution*, pp. 41-62.

Lynn T. White III, "The Cultural Revolution as an Unintended Result of Administrative Policies", in Joseph, Wong and Zweig, (eds.), *New Perspectives on the Cultural Revolution*, pp. 83-104.

Higher Education

Books in Chinese

Ba wuchan jieji jiaoyu gemin jinxing daodi (Continue the Proletarian Educational Revolution to the very end). Shanghai: Shanghai renmin chubanshe, 1974.

Deng Xiaoping tongzhi lun jiaoyu (Comrade Deng Xiaoping on Education). Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 1990.

Guanyu jiaoyu benzhi wenti de lunzhen (Debates on Questions of the Essence of Education). Beijing: Renmin jiaoyu chubanshe, 1980.

Jiaoyu geming de fanxiang burong cuangai (It is Not Easy to Usurp the Direction of the Education Revolution). Hong Kong: Sanlian shidian, 1976.

Yao Ruobing, *Zhongguo jiaoyu (1949-1982) (Education in China (1949-1982))*. Hong Kong: Huafeng shuju, 1984.

Zhang Xiaodao, *Zhongguo zhaosheng kaoshi zhidu yanjiu (Research on China's System of Enrollment Examinations)*. Nanjing: Nanjing daxue chubanshe, 1994.

Zhongguo guanyu zhishi fenzi zhengce de wenjian huibian (An Anthology of CCP Documents on Policy Towards Intellectuals). Hong Kong: Contemporary China Research Institute, 1972.

Zhongguo dangdai jiaoyu sichao 1949-1989 (Contemporary Trends in Education in China 1949-1989). Shanghai: Sanlian shudian, 1991.

Zhongguo gaige quanshu (1978-1991) Jiaoyu gaige juan (Documents on China Reforms (1978-1991) Education). Dalian: Dalian chubanshe, 1992.

Zhongguo jiaoyu chengjiu 1949-1983 (Achievements of Education in China, 1949-1983). Beijing: Jiaoyu chubanshe, 1984.

Zhonghua renmin gongheguo jiaoyu dashi ji 1949-1982 (A Chronicle of Major Events in Education in the People's Republic of China 1949-1982). Beijing: Jiaoyu kexue chubanshe, 1983.

Speeches, Documents and Newspaper Articles in Chinese

"Ba xuexiao bancheng wuchan jieji zhuanzheng de youli gongju" (Run schools so as to make them powerful tools of the dictatorship of the proletariat), in the *Renmin ribao*, 18 February, 1975, pg.1.

Peking daxue, Tsinghua daxue dapipan zu (The Mass Criticism Group of Peking and Tsinghua Universities), "Jiaoyu geming de fangxiang burong cuangai" (The orientation of the education revolution cannot be distorted easily), in *Hong qi*, Issue 12, 1975, pp.5-12.

Chu Lan, "Wei nar tiao jiaoyu luxian chang zange?", (Which education line are you singing in praise of?), in the *Renmin ribao*, 4 August, 1974, pg.2.

"Dali fazhan ge ji ge lei jiaoyu shiye" (Strive to develop all levels and all types of education), in the *Renmin ribao*, 7 December, 1977, pg.1.

Deng Xiaoping, "Guanyu kexue he jiaoyu gongzuo de ji dian yijian" (Some opinions on science and education work), in *Deng Xiaoping tongzhi lun jiaoyu (Comrade Deng Xiaoping on education)*, Beijing: Renmin jiaoyu chubanshe, pp. 27-39.

"Zai quanguo jiaoyu gongzuo huiyi shang de jianghua" (Speech to the National Educational Work Conference), in *ibid*, pp.58-66.

"Zunzhong zhishi, zunzhong rencai" (Respect knowledge, respect talented people), in *ibid*, pp.24-26.

Education Revolution Group of Shanghai Normal University, "Banhao tushuguan renzhen zuzhi xuesheng zixue" (Run libraries well and conscientiously organize students to study on their own), in the *Renmin ribao*,

23 November, 1972, pg.2.

Education Revolution Group of the South China Normal College, "Daxue wenke yao ba dapipan lie wei zhengshi kecheng" (Mass criticism should be made a part of the formal curriculum), in the *Renmin ribao*, 15 October, 1969, pg.3.

"Fudan daxue like shoujie gong-nong-bing xuesheng shengli jieye" (The first group of worker-peasant-solider science students victoriously complete their courses), in the *Renmin ribao*, 16 April, 1974, pg.1.

"Jianchi zou 'yi shehui wei gongchang' de daolu" (Continue to follow the path of 'taking society as [your] factory'), in the *Renmin ribao*, 3 January, 1973, pg.1.

Jiaoyubu dapipan zu (Mass Criticism Group of the Ministry of Education, "Mao zhuxi de jiaoyu fangzhen qi rong cuangai" (Is it easy to distort Chairman Mao's education policies?), in the *Renmin ribao*, 25 November, 1976, pg.3

"Jiaoyu geming 'tuo sige xiandaihua de houtui' ma?" (Does the education revolution 'hinder the four modernizations?"), in *Hong qi*, Issue 1, 1976, pp.44-48.

"Jiji reqing de dui zhishi fenzi jinxing zai jiaoyu", (Vigorously and enthusiastically carry out the re-education of intellectuals), in the *Renmin ribao*, 29 May, 1969, pg.1.

"Juexin zai Mao zhuxi jiaoyu geming luxian zhilin xia xianqi wuchan jieji jiaoyu geming de xin gaochao" (Under the guidance of Chairman Mao's line on the education revolution, resolve to set off a new high tide in the proletarian education revolution), in the *Renmin ribao*, 27 July, 1970, pg.1.

Liu Xiyao, "Zai quanguo jiaoyu gongzuo huiyi shang de baogao" (Report to the National Educational Work Conference), in the *Renmin ribao*, 12 June, 1978, pg.2.

Nie Yuanzi, "Song Shuo, Lu Ping, Peng Peiyuan, zai wenhua geming zhong jiujiu gan xie shenme?" (What actually did Song Shuo, Lu Ping and Peng Peiyuan get up to in the Cultural Revolution?), in *Hong qi*, Issue 11, 1966, pg.22.

"Nongda biye dang nongmin hao" (When you graduate from agricultural college its good to work as a peasant), in the *Renmin ribao*, 2 December, 1974, pg.1.

"Qianjin zai you hong, you zhuan de daolu shang Fang Qinghua Daxue xuesheng" (Move forward on the path of 'Red and Expert' A visit to Tsinghua University students), in the *Renmin ribao*, 23 February, pg.2.

- "Qieshi jiaqiang dangwei dui jiaoxue lingyu geming de lingdao" (Conscientiously strengthen the leadership of the Party committee in the realm of education), in the *Renmin ribao*, 3 August, 1972, pg.2.
- "Tsinghua daxue juxing dier jie gong-nong-bing xueyuan biye dianli" (Tsinghua University holds the second graduation ceremony for worker-peasant-soldier students), in the *Renmin ribao*, 18 December, 1975, pg.1.
- "Tsinghua daxue shoujie gong-nong-bing daxuesheng biye shijian qude fengying chengguo" (The first worker-peasant-soldier graduates from Tsinghua University have achieved rich rewards in practice), in the *Renmin ribao*, 27 March, 1974, pg.1.
- "'Qi-san-ling zhishi' guanghui zhao gongda" (The "July 30th directive" radiantly shines on Jiangxi Communist Labourers' University), in the *Renmin ribao*, 20 August, 1977, pg.3.
- "Quanguo you zhaoshou shiliuwan duo ming gong-nong-bing daxuesheng" (The whole country enrolls over 160,000 worker-peasant-soldier university students), in the *Renmin ribao*, 15 October, 1974, pg.1.
- "Shanghai li-ke-gong daxue jiaoyu geming zuotanhui jiyao" (A Summary of the Shanghai Discussion Meeting on the Educational Revolution in Universities of Science and Education), in *Hong qi*, Issue 8, 1970, pp.20-34.
- "Shehui zhuyi daxue yingdang ruhe ban?" (How Should [we] Manage Socialist Universities?), in the *Renmin ribao*, 29 March, 1969, pg.1.
- "Shenru pi-Lin, pi-Kong, konggu he fazhan jiaoyu geming chengguo" (Deepen the campaign to criticize Lin Biao and Confucius, consolidate and develop the fruits of the education revolution), in the *Renmin ribao*, 14 February, 1974, pg.2.
- "Tongji daxue 'wu.qi' gongshe jianchi kaimen banxue yue ban yue hao" (Tongji University's 'May 7th' Commune continues to uphold the policy of open-door schools which gets better and better), in the *Renmin ribao*, 9 May, 1974, pg.1.
- Tong Wenxiao, "'Xue er you ze shi' de fandong jiaoyu sixiang bixu pian" (The reactionary education philosophy of 'A good scholar will always become an official' must be criticized), in the *Renmin ribao*, 16 January, 1974, pg.2.
- "Wanzheng de zhunque de lijie dang de zhishifenzi zhengce" (Completely and correctly understand the Party's policy on intellectuals), in the *Renmin ribao* 4 January, 1979, pg.1.
- "Weida lingxiu he daoshi Mao zhuxi 'gei Jiangxi gongchanzhuyi laodong daxue de yi feng xin'" (The great leader and teacher Chairman Mao's "Letter to the Jiangxi Communist Labourers' University), in *Hong qi*, Issue 8, 1977, pp.3-4.

Workers' and PLA Mao Zedong Thought Propaganda Team stationed at Fudan University, "Women Zhuzhang chedi geming" (We advocate thorough-going reform), in the *Renmin ribao*, 29 March, 1969, pg.1.

Xu Ming, "Zaojiu wei konggu wuchanjieji zhuanzheng er douzheng de xinren", (Train new people who will struggle to consolidate the dictatorship of the proletariat), in the *Renmin ribao*, 5 June, 1975, pg.3.

"Yi fen fa ren shensheng de dajuan" (A response paper that sets people thinking), in the *Renmin ribao*, 10 August, 1973, pg.1.

"Yi ge fangeming de zhengzhi pianju" (A reactionary political fraud), in the *Renmin ribao*, 30 November, 1976, pg.2.

"Zai pi-Lin, pi-Kong zhong nuli banhao hanzhou jiaoyu" (During the course of the campaign to criticize Lin Biao and Confucius conscientiously manage correspondence education well), in the *Renmin ribao*, 11 November, 1974.

"Zai xiao zuo gongxian Biye dang nongmin" (At school make a contribution On graduation work as a peasant), in the *Renmin ribao*, 19 January, 1975, pg.4.

Zhonggong Hunan sheng wei xuanchaunbu (Propaganda Department of the Hunan Provincial Party Committee), "Esha 'Yuanding zhi ge' ye shi weile cuandang duoquan" (Throttling 'The Song of the Gardener' was also in order to usurp the Party and seize power), in the *Renmin ribao*, 29 November, 1976, pg.2.

Zhonggong Jiangxi sheng weiyuanhui (Jiangxi provincial Party Committee), "Gaoju Mao zhuxi 'qi-san-ling zhishi' de guanghui qizhi shengli qianjin" (Hold high the radiant banner of Chairman Mao's "July 30th" directive and march forward victoriously), in the *Renmin ribao*, 30 July, 1977, pg.2.

Zhou Rongxin, "Jiaoyu yao shiying si ge xiandaihua de yaoqiu" (Education must meet the needs of the four modernizations), originally printed in *Jiaoyu yanjiu* (*Educational Research*), Issue 1, 1979, and reprinted in *Contemporary Trends in Education in China 1949-1989*, pp.256-259.

Zhu Yan, "Gaibian daxue zhaosheng zhidu de shenyuan yiyi" (The profound significance of reforms in the university enrollment system), in *Hong qi*, Issue 8, 1973, pp.9-13.

Zhongyang District Revolutionary Committee, Jiangsu Province, "Qieshi zuohao daxue zhaosheng gongzuo" (Conscientiously carry out university enrollment work), in the *Renmin ribao*, 20 June, 1973, pg.3.

Books in English

Theodore Hsi-en Chen, *Chinese Education Since 1949*. New York: Pergamon Press, 1981.

The Maoist Educational Revolution. New York: Praeger Publishers, 1974.

Nien Cheng, *Life and Death in Shanghai*. New York: Grove Press, 1987.

Confucius, *The Analects*. (Translated by D.C. Lau). London: Penguin, 1979.

Ruiqing Du, *CHINESE HIGHER EDUCATION A Decade of Reform and Development (1978-1988)*. London: Macmillan Press, 1992.

Stuart E. Fraser (ed.), *Education and Communism in China An Anthology of Commentary and Documents*. London: Pall Mall Press, 1971.

Chinese Communist Education: Records of the First Decade. Nashville: Vanderbilt University Press, 1965.

Merle Goldman, *CHINA'S INTELLECTUALS Advise and Dissent*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1981.

John N. Hawkins, *Mao Tse-tung and Education His Thoughts and Teachings*. Hamden, Connecticut: Linnet Books, 1974.

Ruth Hayhoe, *CHINA'S UNIVERSITIES 1895-1995 A Century of Cultural Conflict*. New York: Garland Publishing, Inc. 1996.

CHINA'S UNIVERSITIES and the Open Door. Armonk, New York: M.E. Sharpe, Inc. 1989.

William Hinton, *Hundred Day War The Cultural Revolution at Tsinghua University*. New York: Monthly Review Press, 1972.

Victor Nee, *The Cultural Revolution at Peking University*. New York: Monthly Review Press, 1969.

Suzzane Pepper, *China's Education Reform in the 1980s Policies, Issues and Historical Perspectives*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990.

Radicalism and Education Reform in 20th-Century China. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996.

R.F. Price, *Education in Communist China*. New York: Praeger Publishers, 1970.

Peter J. Seybolt, *Revolutionary Education in China Documents and Commentary*. White Plains, New York: International Arts and Sciences Press,

Inc., 1973.

Anne Thurston, *Enemies of the People The Ordeal of Intellectuals in China's Great Proletarian Revolution*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1988.

Jonathen Unger, *Education Under Mao Class and Competition in Canton Schools, 1960-1980*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1982.

Speeches, Documents and Newspaper Articles in English

"Chairman Mao Tse-tung's Latest Directive", in *Peking Review*, 2 August, 1968, reprinted in Chen, *The Maoist Educational Revolution*, Appendix F.

"On the reeducation of Intellectuals", in *Hong qi*, Issue 3, 1968, reprinted in Chen, *The Maoist Educational Revolution*, Appendix A.

"Liberal Arts Universities Must Carry Out Revolutionary Mass Criticism), in *Hong qi*, Issue 1, 1970, translated in Seybolt, *Revolutionary Education in China*, pp.303-312.

"Some Tentative Programmes for Revolutionizing Education", in *Peking Review*, 7 November, 1967, reprinted in Chen, *The Maoist Educational Revolution*, Appendix G.

"Strive to Build Socialist Universities of Science and Education", in *Hong qi*, Issue 8, 1970, translated in Peter J. Seybolt, *Revolutionary Education in China*, pp.272-300.

"The Way to Train Engineering and Technical Personnel as Viewed from the Shanghai Machine-Tool Plant", in the *Renmin ribao*, 22 July, 1968, translated in Seybolt, *Revolutionary Education in China*, pg.250

"Tongji University's Programme for Revolutionizing Education: Six Month's Practice", in the *Peking Review*, 17 May, 1968, in Chen, *The Maoist Educational Revolution*, Appendix G.

Periodical Articles in English

Ruth E.S. Hayhoe, "China's Higher Education Reforms in Historical Perspective", in *The China Quarterly*, No.110 (June 1987), pp.196-230.

Robert McCormick, "Revolution in Education Committees", in *The China Quarterly*, No.57, (January/March 1974), pp.133-139.

Donald J. Munro, "Egalitarian Ideal and Educational Fact in Communist China", in J.M.H. Lindbeck (Ed.), *China: Management of a Revolutionary Society*, London: Allen and Unwin, 1972.

Suzanne Pepper, "Chinese Education After Mao: Two Steps Forward, Two Steps Back and Begin Again?", in *The China Quarterly*, No.81, (March 1980), pp.1-65.

"An Interview on Changes in Chinese Education After the 'Gang of Four'", in *The China Quarterly*, No.72, (December 1977), pp.815-824.

Jan S. Prybyla, "Notes on Chinese Higher Education: 1974, in *The China Quarterly*, No.62, (June 1975), pp.271-301.

David S. Zweig, "The Peita Debate on Education and the Fall of Teng Hsiao-p'ing", in *The China Quarterly*, No.73, (March 1978), pp.140-158.

Agriculture

Books in Chinese

"*Deng Zihui zhuan*" bianji weiyuanhui zhu (Editorial board for a "Biography of Deng Zihui"), *Deng Zihui zhuan (A Biography of Deng Zihui)*. (Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 1996).

Huang Daoxia, (ed.), *Jianguo yilai nongye hezuohua shiliao huibian (An Anthology of Historical Material on Agricultural Collectivization Since the Founding of the PRC)*. Beijing: 1992.

Nongcun zhengce wenjian xuanbian (A Compilation of Agricultural Policy Documents). Beijing: Beijing jingji xueyuan, 1977.

Nongye xue Dazhai (In Agriculture Study Dazhai). Hong Kong: Sanlian shudian, 1970.

Nongye xue Dazhai Di wu ji (In Agriculture Study Dazhai, Volume 5). Beijing: Nongye chubanshe, 1972.

Nongye xue Dazhai Di shiwu ji (In Agriculture Study Dazhai, Volume 15). Beijing: Nongye chubanshe, 1975.

Nongye xue Dazhai Di shiliu ji (In Agriculture Study Dazhai, Volume 16). Beijing: Nongye chubanshe, 1975.

Nongye xue Dazhai Di ershiyi ji (In Agriculture Study Dazhai, Volume 21). Beijing: Nongye chubanshe, 1978.

Nongye xue Dazhai Di ershier ji (In Agriculture Study Dazhai, Volume 22). Beijing: Nongye chubanshe, 1978.

Nongye xue Dazhai Di ershisan ji (In Agriculture Study Dazhai, Volume 23). Beijing: Nongye chubanshe, 1978.

San zhong quanhui yilai de zhongda juece (Important Policy Decisions Since the Third Plenum). Beijing: Zhongyang wenxian chubanshe, 1994.

Yang Quan, *Chen Yonggui zhuan (A Biography of Chen Yonggui)*. Wuhan: Changjiang wenyi chubanshe, 1996.

Zhongguo nongye dashiji, 1949-1980 (Major Events in Chinese Agriculture). Beijing: Nongye chubanshe, 1982.

Speeches, Documents and Newspaper Articles in Chinese

Chen Yonggui, "Ba nongtian jiben jianshe dangzuo weida de shehuizhuyi shiye lai ban" (Manage basic field construction as if it were a great socialist cause), in *Hong qi*, Issue 10, 1977, reprinted in *In Agriculture Study Dazhai* (Volume 23), pp.1-20.

"Chedi pipan 'sirenbang' xianqi puji Dazhai xian yundong de xin gaochao", (Thoroughly criticize the 'Gang of Four', set off a new upsurge in the movement to popularize Dazhai-type counties), in *Nongye xue Dazhai - Di er ci quanguo nongye xue Dazhai huiyi zhuanji (In Agriculture Study Dazhai - A special issue on the Second National Conference on in Agriculture Study Dazhai)*. Beijing: Nongyechubanshe, 1977.

"Cong Dazhai dadui dao Xiyang xian" (From Dazhai production brigade to Xiyang county), in the *Renmin ribao*, 23 September, 1970, reprinted in *Xinhua yuebao*, September, 1970, pp.128-132.

"Cong shiji chufa, zuo juti zhida" (Proceed from actual conditions, give specific directions), in the *Renmin ribao*, 13 January, 1973, pg.4.

"Cong Suzhou kan nanfang" (See the south from Suzhou), in the *Renmin ribao*, 23 July, 1978, reprinted in *Xinhua yuebao*, July 1978, pp.94-96.

"Dadan jiefang sixiang, jiasu fazhan nongye" (Boldly liberate thinking, accelerate the development of agriculture), in the *Renmin ribao*, 26 November, 1978, reprinted in *Xinhua yuebao*, November 1978, pp.117-118.

"Dang de jiben luxian shi laodong renmin de shengmingxian" (The Party's basic line is the lifeblood of the people), in the *Renmin ribao*, 21 November, 1973, pg.3.

"Dangqian nongye xue Dazhai yundong zhong de yixie wenti" (Some current problems in the campaign 'In Agriculture Study Dazhai'), in Huang Daoxia, *A Collection of Historical Documents on Agricultural Collectivization*, pp.833-835.

"Daxiang nongye shengchan xin feiyue di yi pao" (Firing the first shots in the new leap in agricultural production), in the *Renmin ribao*, 7 February, 1969, pg. 4.

"Dazhai dadui zhansheng yanzhong miehai huode hao shoucheng" (Dazhai production brigade has been victorious over serious natural disasters and reaped a good harvest), in the *Renmin ribao*, 17 October, 1968, pg.4.

"Dazhai ren zai jixu geming dadao shang qianjin" (Dazhai's people advance along the broad road of continuing the revolution), in the *Renmin ribao*, 17 September, 1969, pg.2.

"Diaocha jiushi jiejie wenti" (Investigate in order to resolve problems), in the *Renmin ribao*, 14 June, 1971, pg.3.

Gao Shangquan, "Anzhao keguan guilu fazhan nongye" (Develop agriculture in accordance with objective laws), in the *Renmin ribao*, 16 November, 1978, reprinted in *Xinhua yuebao*, November 1978, pg.117.

"Guanyu guodu dao dadui hesuan wenti de jiankuang" (A brief comparison on the question of the transition to brigade accounting), in *An Anthology of Historical Material on Collectivization*), pp.873-874.

"Guanyu jiaqiang noncun shangye de ruogan wenti (caogao)" (Certain questions on Strengthening Rural Commerce (Draft)), *A Collection of Rural Policy Documents (Volume 2)*, pp.358-367.

"Guanyu yi jiu ba ling nian jiben shang shixian nongye jixiehua de baogao" (Report on basically realizing agricultural mechanization by the year 1980), in *A Collection of Rural Policy Documents (Volume 2)*, pp.376-385.

Guo Dajiang, "Fayang chuangye jingsheng" (Make full use of the pioneering spirit), in the *Renmin ribao*, 21 May, 1973.

"Yao liaojie qunzhong zai xiang xie shenme" (We must understand what it is the masses are thinking), in the *Renmin ribao*, 19 May, 1973, pg.2.

"Zhi neng dagan, bu neng xiaogan" (We can only go all out, we can't act timidly), in the *Renmin ribao*, 24 April, 1973, pg.3.

Guo Fenglian, "Rang Dazhai hongqi geng xianyan" (Let the red flag of Dazhai be even brighter), in the *Hong qi*, Issue 9, 1977, pg.103.

"Guowuyuan guanyu jiasu shixian nongye jixiehua wenti de baogao" (The State Council Report on Problems in Accelerating the Realization of Agricultural Mechanization), in *A Collection of Rural Policy Documents (Volume 2)*, pp.338-352.

Hua Guofeng, "Quan dang dongyuan, daban nongye, wei puji Dazhai xian er fendou" (Mobilize the whole Party, go in for agriculture in a big way, fight to popularize Dazhai-type counties), in the *Renmin ribao*, 21 October, 1975, reprinted in *Xinhua yuebao*, October 1975, pp.13-19.

“Tuanjie qilai, wei jianshe shehuizhuyi de xiandaihua qianguo er fendou” (Unite and struggle to build a modern, strong, socialist country), in *Zhonghua renmin gongheguo di wu jie quanguo renmin daibiao dahui di yi ci huiyi wenjian* (Documents of the first session of the 5th National People's Congress of China), pp.24-25.

Zhongguo gongchandang zhongyang weiyuanhui zhuxi Hua Guofeng tongzhi zai di er ci quanguo nongye xue Dazhai huiyi shang de jianghua, (CCPCC Chairman Hua Guofeng's speech at the Second National Conference on In Agriculture Study Dazhai). Beijing: Renminchubanshe, 1976.

Huang Yanjun and Yu Quanling, “Sichuan sheng yibigxian xiashitang dadui jianshe shehuizhuyi xin nongcun de diaocha”, (An investigation into the construction of a socialist new countryside in Xiashitang Brigade, Yibing County, Sichuan Province), in *An Anthology of Historical Material on Agricultural Collectivization*, pp.878-883.

“Jiakuai nongye fazhan sudu shi quandang de zhandou renwu” (Accelerating the pace of agricultural development is a fighting task for the whole Party), in the *Renmin ribao*, 11 December, 1977, reprinted in December 1977, pg.168.

“Jianchi qinjian de yuance” (Maintain the principle of [being] hardworking and thrifty), in the *Renmin ribao*, 23 January, 1973, pg.2.

“Jinjin zhuazhu nongcun zhong liang tiao daolu douzheng de dashi” (Firmly grasp the major task of the two-line struggle in the countryside), in the *Renmin ribao*, 3 December, 1973, pg. 3.

Lin Zhenshan, “Genju dang de luxian, luoshi juti zhengce” (In accordance with the Party's policies, implement concrete policies), in the *Renmin ribao*, 21 August, 1973, pg.2.

“Luoshi dang de zhengce jianqing nongmin fudan” (Implement the Party's policies, reduce peasant burdens), in the *Renmin ribao*, 5 July, 1978, reprinted in *Xinhua yuebao*, July 1978, pp.96-97.

Lu Yang, “Xue Dazhai yao yi jieji douzheng wei gang” (In Studying Dazhai we must take class struggle as the key link), in *Hong qi*, Issue 4, 1975, pg.63.

“Nongye de genben chulu zaiyu jixiehua” (The basic way forward for agriculture lies in mechanization), in the *Renmin ribao*, 23 December, 1976, pg.1.

“Nongye gaosudu fazhan de tujing” (The path of high-speed development in agriculture), in the *Renmin ribao*, 4 April, 1978, reprinted in *Xinhua yuebao*, April 1978, pg.121.

“Nongye xue Dazhai de geming hongliu bu ke zudang” (The mighty

revolutionary current of 'In Agriculture Study Dazhai' cannot be stopped), in the *Renmin ribao*, 21 November, 1976, reprinted in *Xinhua yuebao*, November 1976, pp.172-175.

"Pi Deng douzheng youli tuidong Xiyang xue Dazhai yundong" (The struggle to criticize Deng Xiaoping is a powerful motive force in Xiyang's movement to study Dazhai), in the *Renmin ribao*, 28 June, 1976, reprinted in *Xinhua yuebao*, June 1976, pg.143.

"Pi Lin pi Kong, gaohao chun geng" (Criticize Lin Biao and Confucius, carry out Spring ploughing well), in the *Renmin ribao*, 3 April, 1974, pg.1.

"Po baoshou sixiang, shu xiongxin zhuangzhi" (Smash conservative thinking, foster lofty ambitions and great ideals), in the *Renmin ribao*, 24 April, 1973, pg.3.

"Qianxu qinzen zuo xue Dazhai de daitou ren" (Be modest and prudent, become a leader in the movement to study Dazhai), in the *Renmin ribao*, 8 April, 1971, pg.3.

"Qianyang xian chu liang jian cang qude xianzhu chengji" (Qianyang county has achieved outstanding results in storing grain and building graineries), in the *Renmin ribao*, 29 August, 1969, pg.4.

"Quanguo nongye jixiehua fazhan gangyao, 1970-1980" (The National Programme for the Development of Agricultural Mechanization, 1970-1980), in *A Collection of Rural Policy Documents (Volume 2)*, pp.327-334.

"Quanguo nongye xue Dazhai huiyi zai Xiyang longzhong kaimu" (The National Conference of In Agriculture Study Dazhai solemnly opened in Xiyang), in the *Renmin ribao*, 15 September, 1975, reprinted in *Xinhua yuebao*, September 1975, pg.4.

"Quanguo xianqi honghong lielie chunji shengchan huodong" (The whole country launches mighty spring production activities), in the *Renmin ribao*, 3 May, 1968, pg.2.

"Renzen luoshi dang de zhengce zhazha shishi de xue Dazhai" (Conscientiously implement the Party's policies, study Dazhai in a down-to-earth manner), in the *Renmin ribao*, 27 April 1971, pg.4.

"Renzen luoshi zhengce, qieshi xuehao Dazhai", (Resolutely implement policies, thoroughly study Dazhai), in the *Renmin ribao*, 21 March, 1971, pg.3.

"Shantou diqu nongcun yipian chungeng fanmang jingxiang" (The countryside in Shantou district is a vast scene of spring ploughing activities), in the *Renmin ribao*, 23 April, 1974, pg.4.

"Sichuan sheng Leshan diqu, Guangdong sheng Jiangmen shi, Yunnan sheng

gejiu shi renzhen zhixing 'yi nongye wei jichu, gongye wei zhudao' de zong fangzhen" (Leshan district in Sichuan, Jiangmen city in Guangdong and Gejiu city in Yunnan are all conscientiously carrying out the general policy of 'take agriculture as the base and industry as the general guide), *Xinhua yuebao*, August 1972, pp.107-109.

"Tong qunzhong shangliang, duoqu nongye xin fengshou" (Discuss with the masses, reap another plentiful harvest in agriculture), in the *Renmin ribao*, 7 March, 1970, pg.1.

Wang Jinzi, "Xue Dazhai buduan geming, zhua genben jianchi douzheng" (Study Dazhai's continuous revolution, seize the basics, continue to struggle), in the *Renmin ribao*, 28 September, 1975, reprinted in *Xinhua yuebao*, September 1975, pg.148.

Wan Li, "Renzhen luoshi dang de nongcun jingji zhengce" (Conscientiously implement the Party's rural economic policies), in *Hong qi*, Issue 3, 1978, pp.92-97.

"Wei cujin nongye shengchan de xin feiyu zuochu gongxian" (Make contributions to promote a new flying leap in agricultural production), in the *Renmin ribao*, 7 February, 1969, pg.4.

Writing group of the Henan Revolutionary Committee, "Wo guo shehuizhuyi nongye de fazhan daolu" (The road of development for our country's socialist agriculture), in *Hong qi*, Issue 2, 1970, pp.5-15.

"Xiaoqinzhuang de zhengzhi yexiao" (Xiaoqinzhuang's political night school), in the *Renmin ribao*, 8 September, 1974, pg.1.

"Xishua weixin jingshen, jiasu qianjin bufa" (Clear oneself of idealism, quicken the pace forward), in the *Renmin ribao*, 20 March, 1973, pg.2.

"Yanzhe Mao zhuxi geming luxian duoqu nongye xin fengshou" (Follow Chairman Mao's revolutionary line to achieve a new bountiful harvest in agriculture), in the *Renmin ribao*, 18 February 1970, pg.1.

"Yikao qunzhong dagao chu liang jian cang gongzuo" (Rely on the masses to carry out work to store grain and build graineries), in the *Renmin ribao*, 11 July, 1969, pg.1.

"Yi liang wei gang quanmian fazhan" (Take grain as the key, develop all-round), in the *Renmin ribao*, 16 April, 1972, reprinted in *Xinhua yuebao*, April 1972, pg.1.

"Zai hezuohua de jichu shang shixian jixiehua" (Achieve mechanization on the basis of cooperativization), in *Hong qi*, Issue 10, 1969, pp.63-65.

Zhao Fengnian, "Guanjian ziyu xian de lingdao" (The key lies with the county

leadership), in the *Renmin ribao*, 14 October, 1971, pg.3.

"Tuchu wuchan jieji zhengzhi, zhuajin chungeng shengchan" (Emphasize proletarian politics, firmly grasp spring ploughing and production) in *Hong qi*, Issue 3, 1970, pp.44-45.

"Yansu renzhen luoshi dang de zhengce" (Seriously and conscientiously implement the Party's policies), in the *Renmin ribao*, 7 November, 1971, pg.2.

"Zhonggong zhongyang guanyu jixu shixing lianzhi zhenggou renwu yiding wunian de tongzhi" (Central Committee notice on continuing to implement [the system] of fixing grain requisitions for five years), in *A Collection of Documents on Rural Policy*, pp.325-326.

"Zhonggong zhongyang guanyu zhuangfa Hunan sheng Xiangxiang wei baogao de pishi" (Central Committee instructions on transmitting the report of the Xiangxiang County Committee, Hunan Province), in *An Anthology of Historical Material on Agricultural Collectivization*, pp.874-875.

Zhong Licheng, "Zongjie zhengque chuli nong, qing, zhong guanxi de jingyan" (Summarize the experiences in correctly handling the relationship between agriculture, light and heavy [industry]), in the *Renmin ribao*, 22 June, 1972, reprinted in *Xinhua yuebao*, June, 1972, pp.50-53.

Zhong Shannong, "Zai tong 'sirenbang' douzheng zhong shenru kaizhan puji Dazhai xian yundong" (During the struggle against the 'Gang of Four' develop the movement to popularize Dazhai-type counties in depth), in *Hong qi*, Issue 12, 1976, pg.50.

"Zuo shishi qiushi de yuance" (Act as a model of seeking truth from facts), in the *Renmin ribao*, 8 February, 1973, pg.3.

Books in English

Robert F. Ash (ed.), *Agricultural Development in China, 1949-1989 The Collected Papers of Kenneth R. Walker (1931-1989)*. Oxford: Oxford University Press: 1998.

A. Doak Barnett, *Communist China: The Early Years 1949-1955*. London: Pall Mall Press, 1964.

Richard Baum, *Prelude to Revolution Mao, The Party and the Peasant Question 1962-66*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1975.

Richard Baum and Frederick C. Teiwes, *Ssu-Ch'ing: The Socialist Education Movement of 1962-1966*. Berkeley: Center for Chinese Studies, 1968.

Bill Brugger (ed.), *CHINA The Impact of the Cultural Revolution*. London:

- Croom Helm Ltd., 1978.
- John P. Burns and Stanley Rosen (eds.), *Policy Conflicts in Post-Mao China A Documentary Survey with Analysis*. New York: M. E. Sharpe Inc., 1986.
- Anita Chan, Richard Madsen, and Jonathen Unger, *Chen Village The Recent History of a Peasant Community in Mao's China*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984.
- C. S. Chen (ed.), *RURAL PEOPLE'S COMMUNES IN LIEN-CHIANG Documents Concerning Communes in Lien-chiang County, Fukien Province, 1962-1963*. Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1969.
- Jack Chen, *A Year in Upper Felicity Life in a Chinese Village During the Cultural Revolution*. London: Harrap, 1973.
- Jürgen Domes, *SOCIALISM IN THE CHINESE COUNTRYSIDE Rural Societal Policies in the People's Republic of China 1949-1979*. Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1980.
- William Hinton, *FANSHEN A Documentary of Revolution in a Chinese Village*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997.
- SHENFAN*: London: Martin Secker & Warburg Limited, 1983.
- Asizur Rahman Kan and Eddy Lee, *Agrarian Policies and Institutions in China After Mao*. Bangkok: International Labour Office, 1983.
- David M. Lampton (ed.), *Policy Implementation in Post-Mao China*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987.
- Jan Myrdal, *Report from a Chinese Village*. London: Picador, 1975.
- William L. Parish and Martin King Whyte, *Village and Family in Contemporary China*. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1978.
- Elizabeth J. Perry and Christine Wong (eds.), *The Political Economy of Reform in Post-Mao China*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1985.
- Simon G. Powell, *AGRICULTURAL REFORM IN CHINA: From Communes to Commodity Economy 1978-1990*. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1992.
- Peter Schram, *The Development of Chinese Agriculture, 1950-1959*. Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1969.
- Vivienne Shue, *PEASANT CHINA IN TRANSITION The Dynamics of Development Toward Socialism, 1949-1956*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980.

Franz Schurmann, *Ideology and Organization in Communist China*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1968.

Michael Ying-Mao Kau and Susan H. Marsh (eds.), *China in the Era of Deng Xiaoping A Decade of Reform*. New York: M. E. Sharpe, 1993.

David Zweig, *Agrarian Radicalism in China, 1968-1981*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1989.

Speeches, Documents and Newspaper Articles in English

"Chiang Ch'ing's Letter to the Delegates Attending the CCP CC All-China Conference on Professional Work in Agriculture", in *Issues and Studies*, (October 1975), pp.86-87.

"Chiang Ch'ing's Speech at the National Conference of Learning from Tachai In Agriculture (Summary)", in *Chinese Law and Government*, Vol.X, No.1, (Spring 1977), pp.12-16.

"Circular of the CCP Central Committee Concerning the Undesirability of Seizure of Power in Rural Production Brigades and Production Teams During the Spring Farming Period", in *CCP Documents of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution 1966-1967*, pp.349-350.

"Decisions of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China on Some Questions Concerning the Acceleration of Agricultural Development (Draft)", in *Issues and Studies*, Vol. XV, No.7, (July 1979), pp.102-119 and Vol. XV, No.8, (August 1979), pp.91-112.

"Directive of the CCP Central Committee Concerning the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution in the Countryside (Draft)", in *CCP Documents of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution 1966-1967*, pp.139-142.

"Document No.22 of the CCP Ssumao District Committee", in *Issues and Studies* Vol.IX, No.6, (March 1973), pp.91-97.

"Regulation of the CCP Central Committee Concerning the Great Cultural Revolution in the Countryside Below the County Level", in *CCP Documents of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution 1966-1967*, pp.79-80.

"Regulations on the Work in the Rural People's Communes (Revised Draft)", in *Issues and Studies*, Vol.XV. No.10, (October 1979), pp.93-111 and Vol.XV. No.12, (December 1979), pp.107-115.

"Resolution on the Further Strengthening of the Collective Economy of the People's Communes and Expanding Agricultural Production", in .C. S. Chen, *Rural People's Communes in Lien-Chiang*, pp.81-89.

Zhao Ziyang, "Speed up the Development of Agriculture in an Effort to Wrest a

Still Greater Harvest Next Year" [Excerpts], in *Chinese Law and Government*, Vol.XV, No.1, (Spring 1982), pp.79-92.

Periodical Articles in English

Robert F. Ash, "The Evolution of Agricultural Policy", in *The China Quarterly*, No.116 (December 1988), pp.529-555.

Richard Baum, "The Cultural Revolution in the Countryside: Anatomy of a Limited Rebellion", in Thomas W. Robinson, (ed.), *The Cultural Revolution in China*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971.

Chris Bramall, "Origins of the Agricultural 'Miracle': Some Evidence from Sichuan", in *The China Quarterly*, No.143, (September 1995), pp.731-755.

Ch'en Po-wen, "Agriculture in Mainland China as Revealed in CCP Documents: An Analysis", in *Issues and Studies*, Vol.XV, No.11, (November 1979), pp.46-58.

Ch'en Ting-chung, "'In Agriculture Learn from Tachai' - A Review of Several Long-standing Problems", in *Issues and Studies*, Vol.XII, No.1, (January 1976), pp.84-96.

"Mainland China's Current Agricultural Policy: A Review of the 'Diversified Economy' and 'Fixing Output Quotas Based on Individual Households'", in *Issues and Studies*, Vol.XVIII, No.10, (October 1982), pp.41-58.

"Ch'en Yung-kuei - A Politburo Member of the 10th CCP Central Committee", in *Issues and Studies*, Vol.X, No.5, (February 1974), pp.90-93.

"The Conflict Between Mao Tse-tung and Liu Shao-Ch'i Over Agricultural Mechanization in Communist China", in *Current Scene*, Vol.VI, No.17, (October 1968), pp.1-20.

Frederick W. Crook, "Chinese Communist Agricultural Incentive Systems and the Labor Productive Contracts to Households: 1956-1965", in *Asian Survey*, Vol.XII, No.5, (May 1973), pp.470-481.

Robert F. Dernberger, "The Problem for Agricultural Transformation in Mainland China", in *Issues and Studies*, Vol.XIV, No.10, (October 1978), pp.64-81.

Hsiao Yeh-hui, "Changes in Chinese Communist Guidelines and Policies on Agriculture", in *Issues and Studies*, Vol.XV, No.8, (August, 1979), pp.64-81.

Robert C. Hsu, "Agricultural Mechanization in China: Policies, Problems and Prospects", in *Asian Survey*, Vol.XIX, No.5, (May 1979), pp.436-449.

Li Ming-hua, "A Study of the CCP Two-Road Struggle in the Countryside", in *Issues and Studies*, Vol.IV, No.8, (May 1968), pp.7-18.

Lin Ch'en, "The Inside Information on the Model of 'Tachai'", in *Issues and Studies*, Vol.XII, No.10, (October 1976), pp.29-38.

"The 'Learn-from-Tachai' Movement: An Analytical Study", in *Issues and Studies*, Vol.XIII, No.3, (March 1977), pp.1-17.

"The 1975 Agricultural Picture of Communist China", in *Issues and Studies*, Vol.XI, No.11, (November 1975), pp.25-38.

"The Chinese Communist Rural Commune Policy Suffers Another Setback", in *Issues and Studies*, Vol.IV, No.5, (February 1968), pp.17-29.

Li Tien-min, "People's Communes: A Basic Cause of the Mao-Liu Conflict", in *Issues and Studies*, Vol.IV, No.5, (February 1968), pp.6-12.

"New Directions in the Current Rural Socialist Education Movement", in *Issues and Studies*, Vol.VII, No.1, (October 1970), pp.94-102.

Stuart R. Schram, "Mao Tse-tung and Liu Shao-Ch'i, 1939-1969", in *Asian Survey*, Vol.XII, No.4, (April 1972), pp.275-293.

E. B. Vermeer, "Rural Economic Change and the Role of the State in China, 1962-78", in *Asian Survey*, Vol.XXII, No.9, (September 1982), pp.823-842.

Kenneth R. Walker, "China's Grain Production 1975-80 and 1952-57: Some Basic Statistics", in *The China Quarterly*, No.86, (June 1981), pp.215-247.

"Chinese Agriculture During the Period of the Readjustment, 1978-83", in *The China Quarterly*, No.100, (December 1984), pp.783-812.

David Zweig, "Opposition to Change in Rural China The System of Responsibility and People's Communes", in *Asian Survey*, Vol.XXIII, No.7, (July 1983), pp.879-900.

"Agrarian Radicalism as a Rural Development Strategy, 1968-1978", in Joseph, Wong and Zweig (eds.), *New Perspectives on the Cultural Revolution*, pp.63-83.

Foreign Policy

Books in Chinese

"Chen Yi zhuan" bianxie zu, (Compilation group for "Biography of Chen Yi"), *Chen Yi zhuan, (Biography of Chen Yi)*. Beijing: Dangdai Zhongguo chubanshe, 1994.

Deng Zhirong, *Deng Xiaoping waijiao (Foreign Policy of Deng Xiaoping)*, Haikou: Hainan chubanshe, 1996.

He Chunlin, *Zhong mei jianjiao mi xin - Deng Xiaoping fang xei (Secret Labours in Establishing Diplomatic Relations Between China and America - Deng Xiaoping Visits America)*. Hong Kong: Wandalong guoji wenhua shiye youxian gongci, 1994.

Jiang He, *Zhongguo waijiao daguangjiao (A Broad View of Chinese Diplomacy)*. Shenyang: Shenyang chubanshe, 1994.

Li Chonglu (ed). *Zhou Enlai waijiao huodong dashiji, 1949-1975 (Major Events in Zhou Enlai's Diplomatic Activities, 1949-1975)*. Beijing: Shijie zhishi chubanshe, 1993.

Li Yongtai, *Mao Zedong yu meiguo (Mao Zedong and the United States of America)*. Kunming: Yunnan renmin chubanshe, 1993.

Mao Zedong, *Mao Zedong waijiao wenxuan (Selected Foreign Policy Works of Mao Zedong)*. Beijing: Zhongyang wenxuan chubanshe, 1994.

Mao Zhuxi guanyu san ge shijie huafen de lilun shi dui Makesi Lieningzhuyi de zhongda gongxian (Chairman Mao's theory of distinguishing three worlds is a major contribution to Marxism-Leninism). Hong Kong: Shenghuo, dushu, xinzhi sanlian Shudian fendian, 1977.

"Nie Rongzhen zhuan" bianxie zu (Compilation group for "Biography of Nie Rongzhen"), *Nie Rongzhen zhuan (Biography of Nie Rongzhen)*. Beijing: Dangdai Zhongguo chubanshe, 1994.

Pei Jianzhang (ed.), *Huainian Chen Yi (Remembering Chen Yi)*. Beijing: Shijie zhishi chubanshe, 1991.

Wang Jingke, *Chen Yi de Waijiao yishu (The Diplomatic Art of Chen Yi)*. Jinan: Shandong University Press, 1994.

Xie Yixian, (ed.), *Zhongguo waijiao shi Zhonghua renmin gongheguo shiqi 1949-1979 (A Diplomatic History of China The Period of the People's Republic of China, 1949-1979)*. Kaifeng: Henan renmin chubanshe, 1988.

Zhongguo waijiao shi Zhonghua renmin gongheguo shiqi 1979-1994 (A Diplomatic History of China The Period of the People's Republic of China, 1979-1994). Kaifeng: Henan renmin chubanshe, 1995.

"Xu Xiangqian zhuan" bianxie zu (Compilation group for "Biography of Xu Xiangqian"), *Xu Xiangqian zhuan (Biography of Xu Xiangqian)*. Beijing: Dangdai Zhongguo chubanshe, 1991.

Ye Jianying, *Ye Jianying Xuanji (Selected Works of Ye Jianying)*. Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 1996.

"Ye Jianying zhuan" bianxie zu (Compilation group for "Biography of Ye

Jiaying”), *Ye Jiaying zhuan*, (*Biography of Ye Jiaying*). Beijing: Dangdai Zhongguo chubanshe, 1995.

Yu Jimin, *Xin Zhongguo waijiao fengyun* (*Storms in New China's Diplomacy*). Beijing: Shijie zhishi chubanshe, 1990.

Zhang Hanzhi (ed.), *Wo yu Qiao Guanhua* (*Qiao Guanhua and I*). Beijing: Zhongguo qingnian chubanshe, 1994.

Zhang Zhirong (ed.), *Deng Xiaoping waijiao* (*The Diplomacy of Deng Xiaoping*). Haikou: Hainan chubanshe, 1996.

Zhou Enlai, *Zhou Enlai waijiao wenxuan* (*Selected Foreign Policy Works of Zhou Enlai*). Beijing: Zhongyang wenxuan chubanshe, 1990.

Speeches, Documents and Newspaper Articles in Chinese

“Bali xieding yingdang chedi zhixing” (The Paris agreement should be fully implemented), in the *Renmin ribao*, 27 January, 1974, pg.1.

“Dadao xin shahuang” (Overthrow the New Tzars), in the *Renmin ribao*, 4 March, 1969, pg.1.

“Deng Xiaoping fu zongli shuai daibiaotuan li jing pu Niuyue chuxi lianda tebie huiyi” (The delegation led by Vice-Premier Deng Xiaoping has left Beijing and arrived in New York to attend to the special meeting of the United Nations General Assembly), in the *Renmin ribao*, 7 April, 1974, pg.1.

“Duli zizhu, zili gengsheng de yiqu kaige” (A song of triumph for maintaining independence and keeping the initiative in one's own hands and regeneration through one's own efforts), in the *Renmin ribao*, 12 October, 1974, reprinted in *Xinhua yuebao*, October 1974, pg.174.

“Duoqu xin de shengli” (Seize new victories), in *Hong qi*, Issue 10, 1972, pg.5.

“Guofang buzhang Xu Xiangqian shengming tingzhi paiji da, xiao Jinmen deng daoyu” (Minister of Defence Xu Xiangqian announces the end of the bombardment of large and small Jinmen and other islands), in the *Renmin ribao*, 1 January, 1979, pg.1.

“Hua Guofeng zhuxi de hedian” (Chairman Hua Guofeng's telegram of congratulations), in the *Renmin ribao*, 22 December, 1976, pg.1.

“Huanying Yuenan xieding de qianding” (Welcome the signing of the Vietnam agreement), in the *Renmin ribao*, 28 January, 1973.

“Hua zhuxi huijian Riben jing-tuan-lian fanghua daibiaotuan” (Chairman Hua met a delegation from the Federation of Japanese Economic Organizations

- visiting China), in the *Renmin ribao*, 3 April, 1977, pg.1.
- "Hua zhuxi huijian Saqieer furen" (Chairman Hua met Mrs. Thatcher), in the *Renmin ribao*, 10 April, 1977, pg.1.
- "Hua zhuxi likai Beijing qianwang Luomaniya" (Chairman Hua left Beijing for Romania), in the *Renmin ribao*, 15 August, 1978, pg.1.
- "Hua zhuxi, Ye zhuxi huijian Yuenan junshi daibiaotuan" (Chairman Hua and Vice-Chairman Ye met a military delegation from Vietnam), in the *Renmin ribao*, 3 June, 1977, pg.1.
- "Jianjue fandui meiguo zhizao 'liangge zhongguo' de yinmou" (Resolutely oppose America's plot to creat "two China's"), in the *Renmin ribao*, 25 September, 1971, pg.1.
- "Jianpuzhai renmin bi sheng" (The Cambodian people will certainly win), in the *Renmin ribao*, 23 March, 1973, pg.1.
- "Jiejue Taiwan wenti, wancheng zuguo tongyi daye tishang juti richeng" (A concrete agenda for resolving the Taiwan problem and completing the great cause of the unification of the motherland), in the *Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping Volume 2*, pp.154-155.
- "Lianhe gongbao" (Joint communique), in the *Renmin ribao*, 28 February, 1972, reprinted in the *Xinhua yuebao*, February 1972, pg.20.
- Mao Zedong, "Diguozhuyi pa di san shijie" (Imperialism is afraid of the Third World), in *Selected Foreign Policy Works of Mao Zedong*, pp.587-588.
- "Guanyu san ge shijie huafen wenti" (On the problem of differentiating the three worlds), in *ibid*, pp.600-601.
- "Quan shijie renmin tuanjie qilai, dabai meiguo qinluezhe ji qi yiqie zougou!", (People of the world unite, defeat the American aggressors and all their running dogs), in *ibid*, pp.584-586.
- "Zhongjian didai you liangge" (There are two intermediary belts), in *ibid*, pp.506-509.
- "Mao Zedong zhuxi huijian Butuo zongli he furen deng guibing" (Chairman Mao Zedong met with Prime Minister Bhutto and his wife and other honoured guests), in the *Renmin ribao*, 28 May, 1976, pg.1.
- "Mao Zedong zhuxi huijian Kai Shan tongzhi shuailing de Laoguo dangzheng daibiaotuan" (Chairman Mao Zedong met with a Party and government delegation from Laos led by Comrade Kai Shan), in the *Renmin ribao*, 18 March, 1976, pg.1.

- "Meidi bixu liji tingzhi qin Yue zhanzheng" (American imperialism must immediately stop its war of aggression towards Vietnam), in the *Renmin ribao*, 4 February, 1972, pg.1.
- "Meidi qinlue Yuenan de xin pianju" (A new fraud in American imperialism's invasion of Vietnam), in the *Renmin ribao*, 29 January, 1972, reprinted in the *Xinhua yuebao*, January, 1972, pg.12.
- "Meiguo heiren zhengqu ziyou jiefang douzheng xiang zongshen fazhan" (The struggle for freedom and liberation by America's blacks is developing in depth), in the *Renmin ribao*, 16 April, 1969, pg.5.
- "Meiguo zhengfu bixu tingzhi qinlue Yuenan de yiqie zhanzheng xingdong" (The American government must stop all of its military actions of invading Vietnam), in the *Renmin ribao*, 20 February, 1972, reprinted in the *Xinhua yuebao*, February 1972, pp.193.
- "Meiguo zhengfu de manheng xingjing" (The American government's arbitrary action), in the *Renmin ribao*, 31 March, 1972, pg.1.
- "Meiguo zhengfu mianlin kaoyan" (The American government is facing a trial), in the *Renmin ribao*, 1 November, 1972, pg.1.
- "Nikesong zhengfu de xin de zhanzheng maoxian" (The Nixon government's new military adventure), in the *Renmin ribao*, 5 May, 1970, pg.1.
- "Ping lianheguo dahui di ershiliu jie huiyi" (Evaluate the 26th session of the United Nations General Assembly), in the *Renmin ribao*, 27 December, 1971, pg1.
- "Ping meiguo zongtong ziwen" (Evaluate the American President's State of the Union Address), in the *Renmin ribao*, 30 January, 1972, reprinted in the *Xinhua yuebao*, January, 1972, pg.11.
- "Quanli zhihuan yinduzhina san guo renmin de kangmei jiuguo zhanzheng" (Wholeheartedly support the people of the three Indochina nations in their war to resist America and save their countries), in the *Renmin ribao*, 14 February, 1971, pg.1.
- "Relie huanying Bajisitan guibing" (Warmly welcome honoured guests from Pakistan), in the *Renmin ribao*, 26 May, 1976, pg.1.
- "Relie huanying laizi Yuenan nanfang de qinmi zhanyou" (Warmly welcome our close comrade in arms from Southern Vietnam), in the *Renmin ribao*, 18 November, 1973, pg.1.
- "Shanghai shi geminghui zhuren Zhang Chunqiao juxing anhui huanying Nikesong zontong he furen yihang" (Chairman of the Shanghai Municipal

Revolutionary Committee Zhang Chunqiao held a banquet to welcome President Nixon, his wife and party), in the *Renmin ribao*, 28 February, 1972, reprinted in the *Xinhua yuebao*, February 1972, pp.29-30.

“Shoudu longzhong jihui relie qinzhu Yuenan tingzhan heping xieding jianding” (A grand assembly in the capital celebrates the signing of the peace agreement on ending hostilities in Vietnam), in the *Renmin ribao*, 3 February, 1973, pg.1.

“Suxiu paiqian tewu Li Hongshu de yi fen gongci” (The confession of the Soviet spy Li Hongshu), in the *Renmin ribao*, 22 January, 1974, reprinted in the *Xinhua yuebao*, January 1974, pg.11.

“Suxiu zhimin kuangzhang de dabaolu” (A major expose of Soviet revisionism’s colonial expansionism), in the *Renmin ribao*, 4 February, 1976, pg.1.

“Su Yue baquanzhuyizhe yuanxing bilu” (The Soviet and Vietnamese hegemon must be revealed for what they are), in the *Renmin ribao*, 16 December, 1978, pg.1.

“Tong meiguo pingpangqiu daibiaotuan de tanhua” (Talk with the American table tennis delegation), in *Selected Foreign Policy Works of Zhou Enlai*, pp.474-475.

“Tianzhong Jiaorong zongli dachen dadao Beijing Zhou zongli juxing anhui huanying Tianzhong shouxiang” (Prime Minister Tanaka Kakuei arrives in Beijing Premier Zhou held a banquet to welcome Prime Minister Tanaka), in the *Renmin ribao*, 26 September, 1972, pg.1.

“Tuanjie, zhandou, shengli de sannian”, (Three years of unity, struggle and victory), in the *Renmin ribao*, 25 April, 1973, pg.1.

“Weida lingxiu Mao zhuxi he ta de qinmi zhanyou Lin fu zhuxi jiejian Jianpuzhai guojia yuanzhou xihannuke qinwang he furen” (The great leader Chairman Mao and his close comrade in arms Lin Biao met with Cambodia’s State Leader Prince Shihanouk and his wife), in the *Renmin ribao*, 2 May, 1970, pg.1.

“Weida lingxiu Mao zhuxi he ta de qinmi zhanyou Lin fu zhuxi chuxi shoudu zhichi shijie renmin fandui xiedi douzheng dahui” (The great leader Chairman Mao and his close comrade in arms Vice-Chairman Lin attended a mass meeting of the capital [Beijing] supporting the people of the world in the struggle to oppose American imperialism), in the *Renmin ribao*, 22 May, 1970, pg.1.

“Wo guo chuxi lianda diershiliu jie huiyi de daibiaotuan likai Beijing, daoda Niuyue Qiao Guanha tuanzhuang zai Niuyue jichang fabiao jianghua” (Our delegation attending the 26th United Nations General Assembly Meeting left

Beijing and arrived in New York. Delegation head Qiao Guanhua gave a speech at New York airport), in the *Renmin ribao*, 10 November, 1971, reprinted in the *Xinhua yuebao*, November, 1971, pg.144.

“Wo guo zhengfu xiang Sulian zhengfu tichu qianglie kangyi” (This country’s government has raised a strong protest with the Soviet government), in the *Renmin ribao*, 14 March, 1969, pg.1.

“Wuchan jieji zhuanzheng shengli wansui” (Long live the victory of the dictatorship of the proletariat), in *Hong qi*, Issue 4, 1971, pp.5-20.

“Yazhou renmin tuanjie qilai, ba meiguo qinluezhe cong yazhou ganchuqu!” (People of Asia unite, drive the American aggressors out of Asia!), in the *Renmin ribao*, 25 June, 1970, pgs 1&2.

“Zhichi Jianpuzhai wangguo minzu tuanjie zhengfu de yanzheng lichang” (Support the grave position of the Government of National Unity of the Kingdom of Cambodia), in the *Renmin ribao*, 1 February, 1973, pg.1.

“Zhonghua renmin gongheguo daibiaotuan tuanzhang Deng Xiaoping zai lianda di liu jie tebie huiyi shang de fayan” (Leader of the delegation of the People’s Republic of China, Deng Xiaoping’s speech at the 6th special meeting of the United Nations General Assembly, in the *Renmin ribao*, 11 April, 1974, reprinted in the *Xinhua yuebao*, April 1974, pp.7-12.

“Zhonghua renmin gongheguo daibiaotuan tuanzhang Qiao guanhua zai lianda diershiliu jie quanti huiyii shang de fayan” (The leader of the People’s Republic of China’s delegation Qiao Guanhua’s speech at the 26th United Nations General Assembly Meeting), in the *Renmin ribao*, 17 November, 1971, reprinted in *Xinhua yuebao*, November 1971, pp.145-148.

“Zhonghua renmin gongheguo de shengming” (A Statement by the People’s Republic of China), in the *Renmin ribao*, 8 August, 1971, pg.1.

“Zhonghua renmin gongheguo he meili jianhe zhongguo guanyu jianli waijiao guanxi de lianhe gongbao” (Joint Communiqué by the People’s Republic of China and the United States of America on establishing diplomatic relations), in the *Renmin ribao*, 17 December, 1978, reprinted in the *Xinhua yuebao*, December 1978, pg.240.

“Zhonghua renmin gongheguo waijiaobu de shengming” (A Statement by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China), in the *Renmin ribao*, 21 August, 1971, pg.1.

“Zhonghua renmin gongheguo zhengfu de shengming” (A Statement by the Government of the People’s Republic of China), in the *Renmin ribao*, 30 October, 1971, pg.1.

“Zhonghua renmin gongheguo zhengfu shengming” (A Statement by the

Government of the People's Republic of China), in the *Renmin ribao*, 12 May, 1972, pg.1.

"Zhonghua renmin gongheguo zhengfu shengming" (A Statement by the Government of the People's Republic of China), in the *Renmin ribao*, 31 October, 1972, pg.1.

Zhou Enlai, "Minzu duli yundong zai buduan gaozhang" (The movement for national independence is ceaselessly rising), in *Selected Foreign Policy Works of Zhou Enlai*, pp.465-468.

"Zhou zongli zai huanying Nikesong zontong anhuishang de zhujuci" (Premier Zhou's toast at the banquet to welcome President Nixon), in the *Renmin ribao*, 22 February, 1972, reprinted in the *Xinhua yuebao*, February 1972, pp.24.

"Zhuhe disici bujiemeng guojia shounao huiyi shengli bimu" (Congratulate the victorious conclusion of the fourth meeting of heads from the non-aligned countries), in the *Renmin ribao*, 13 September, 1973, pg.1.

Periodical Articles in Chinese

Ding Xinhao, "Mei su kangzheng zhong meiguo ruhe kan 'Zhongguo yinsu'" (How America Viewed the 'China Element' During Sino-US Contention), in *Shijie Jingji yu Zhengzhi Neican (Inside World Economics and Politics)*, Issue 2, 1983, pp.23-26.

Gong Li, "Zhongguo 'ping pang waijiao' de gaoceng juece" (The High Level Decision on China's 'Ping pong diplomacy,') in *Dangshi yanjiu (Research on Party History)*, Issue 2, 1991, pp.8-11.

Li Yuanming, "Shitan mei su zhengba xingshi xia de wo guo duiwai zhengce" (Some thoughts on our country's foreign policy under the situation of the Soviet-US struggle for supremacy), in *Shijie Jingji yu Zhengzhi Neican (Inside World Economics and Politics)*, Issue 11, 1983, pp.7-10.

Wang Shuzhong, "Mei Su zhengba de Meiguo dui hua zhanyue" (America's strategy towards China in its struggle for supremacy with the Soviet Union), in *Shijie Jingji yu Zhengzhi Neican (Inside World Economics and Politics)*, Issue 3, 1983, pp.6-12.

Wei Shiyan, "Zhou Enlai de waijiao sixiang" (The Diplomatic Thought of Zhou Enlai), in *Zhonggong dangshi yanjiu (Research on Chinese Communist Party History)*, Issue 2, 1988, pp.3-8.

Books in English

- O.B. Borisov and B.T. Koloskov, *Soviet-Chinese Relations, 1945-1970*.
Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University Press, 1975.
- Committee of Concerned Asian Scholars, *China Inside the People's Republic*.
New York: Bantam Books, 1972.
- Lowell Dittmer, *Sino-Soviet Normalization and its International Implications, 1945-1990*. Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1992.
- John Garver, *China's Decision for Rapprochement with the United States, 1968-1971*. Boulder: Westview Press, 1982.
- Foreign Relations of the People's Republic of China*. Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1993.
- John Gittings, *The World and China 1922-1972*. London: Eyre Methuen, 1974.
- Melvin Gurtov, "The Foreign Ministry and Foreign Affairs in the Chinese Cultural Revolution", in Thomas Robinson, (ed.), *The Cultural Revolution in China*. Berkeley, 1971), pp.323-334.
- Michael H. Hunt, *The Genesis of Chinese Communist Foreign Policy*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1996.
- C.G. Jacobsen, *Sino-Soviet Relations Since Mao: The Chairman's Legacy*. New York: Praeger Publishers, 1981.
- Ronald C. Keith, *The Diplomacy of Zhou Enlai*. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1989.
- Henry Kissinger, *White House Years*. Boston: Little, Brown, 1979.
- Warren Kuo, *Foreign Policy Speeches by Chinese Communist Leaders, 1963-1975*. Taipei: Institute of International Relations, 1976.
- Alfred D. Low, *The Sino-Soviet Confrontation Since Mao Zedong: Dispute, Detente, or Conflict?* New York: Columbia University Press, 1987.
- Richard Nixon, *The Memoirs of Richard Nixon*, New York: Simon & Schuster, 1990.
- Gerald Segal, *Sino-Soviet Relations after Mao*. London: The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1985.
- Kuo-kang Shao, *Zhou Enlai and the Foundations of Chinese Foreign Policy*. London: Macmillan, 1996.

Edgar Snow, *China's Long Revolution*. London: Penguin Books, 1971.

Robert G. Sutter, *Chinese Foreign Policy after the Cultural Revolution, 1966-1977*. Boulder: Westview Press, 1978.

Richard Wich, *Sino-Soviet Crisis Politics A Study of Political Change and Communication*. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Council on East Asian Studies, Harvard University, 1989.

Michael Yahuda, *Towards the End of Isolationism: China's Foreign Policy after Mao*. London: MacMillan Press Ltd, 1983.

Speeches, Documents and Newspaper Articles in English

"Chiang Ch'ing's Address to Diplomatic Cadres", in Kuo (ed.), *Foreign-Policy Speeches by Chinese Communist Leaders*, pp.35-43.

"Ch'iao Kuan-hua's Speech at the 28th U.N. General Assembly Session", in *ibid*, pp.80-95.

"Ch'iao Kuan-hua's Speech at the 29th U.N. General Assembly Session", in *ibid*, pp.96-111.

"Ch'iao Kuan-hua's Speech on Foreign Policy", in *ibid*, pp.9-34.

Speech by Huang Hua, Chairman of the Chinese Delegation at a Plenary Meeting of the Tenth Special Session of the United Nations General Assembly. Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 1978.

Periodical Aricles in English

He Di, "The Most Respected Enemy: Mao Zedong's Perception of the United States", in *The China Quarterly*, No.137, (March 1994), pp.144-158.

Stephen Fitzgerald, "Overseas Chinese Affairs and the Cultural Revolution", in *The China Quarterly*, No.40, (October-December, 1969), pp.103-126.

John Garver, "Chinese Foreign Policy in 1970: The Tilt Towards the Soviet Union", in *The China Quarterly*, No.82, (June 1980), pp.214-249.

John Gittings, "The Great power Triangle and Chinese Foreign Policy", in *The China Quarterly*, No.39, (July-September, 1969), pp.41-54.

Joachim Glaubitz, "Anti-Hegemony Formulas in Chinese Foreign Policy", in *Asian Survey*, Vol.XVI, No.3, (March, 1976), pp.205-215.

Melvin Gurtov, "The Foreign Ministry and Foreign Affairs during the Cultural Revolution", in *The China Quarterly*, No.40, (October-December, 1969),

pp.65-102.

Gene T. Hsiao, "Prospects for a New Sino-Japanese Relationship", in *The China Quarterly*, No.60 (October-December, 1974), pp.720-749.

"The Sino-Japanese Rapprochement: A Relationship of Ambivalence", in *The China Quarterly*, No.57 (January-March, 1974), pp.101-123.

Michael H. Hunt and Odd Arne Westad, "The Chinese Communist Party and International Affairs: A Field Report on New Historical Sources and Old Research Problems", in *The China Quarterly*, No.122, (June 1990), pp.258-272.

Akira Iriye, "Chinese-Japanese Relations, 1945-90", in *The China Quarterly*, No.124, (December, 1990), pp.624-638.

George P. Jan, "The Ministry of Foreign Affairs in China since the Cultural Revolution", in *Asian Survey*, Vol.XVII, No.6, (June 1977), pp.513-529.

James Mulvenon, "The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy: The 1979 Sino-Vietnamese Border War", in the *Journal of Northeast Asian Studies*, Fall 1995, pp.69-88.

William H. Overholt, "President Nixon's Trip to China and its Consequences", in *Asian Survey*, Vol.XIII, No.7, (July 1973), pp.707-722.

Edward E. Rice, "The Sino-US Detente: How Durable?", in *Asian Survey*, Vol.XIII, No.9, (September 1973), pp.805-811.

Robert S. Ross, "From Lin Biao to Deng Xiaoping: Elite Instability and China's US Policy", in *The China Quarterly*, No.118, (June 1989), pp.265-299.

Daniel Tretiak, "China's Vietnam War and its Consequences", in *The China Quarterly*, No.80, (December 1979), pp.740-767.

Michael Yahuda, "Chinese Foreign Policy after 1963: The Maoist Phases", in *The China Quarterly*, No.36, (October-December, 1968), pp.93-113.

"The People's Republic of China at 40: Foreign Relations", in *The China Quarterly*, No.119, pp.517-539.

"Deng Xiaoping: The Statesman", in *The China Quarterly*, No.135, (September 1993), pp.551-572.

