

Thesis submitted for examination
for the Degree of Ph.D.

The Kwangsi Clique in Kuomintang
Politics, 1920-1936

DIANA LARY

OCTOBER, 1968.



ProQuest Number: 10731661

All rights reserved

INFORMATION TO ALL USERS

The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted.

In the unlikely event that the author did not send a complete manuscript and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if material had to be removed, a note will indicate the deletion.



ProQuest 10731661

Published by ProQuest LLC (2017). Copyright of the Dissertation is held by the Author.

All rights reserved.

This work is protected against unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States Code
Microform Edition © ProQuest LLC.

ProQuest LLC.
789 East Eisenhower Parkway
P.O. Box 1346
Ann Arbor, MI 48106 – 1346

ABSTRACT

This thesis examines the question of regional independence in China under the Kuomintang rule and takes as a case study the Kwangsi Clique, which ruled the province of Kwangsi from 1925 to 1949, and whose leaders periodically played important roles in Kuomintang politics. The Introduction describes the development of regionalism and militarism in the late 19th century and their further growth in the early years of the Republic. Chapter I gives a historical account of the province of Kwangsi and sets out the career of Lu Yung-t'ing, who ruled the province from 1911 to 1921. Chapter II deals with the background, education and early careers of the men who were to lead the Kwangsi Clique. Chapter III describes the rise of these men within Kwangsi during the long period of civil war which racked the province after 1921 and ended with the alliance of Kwangsi with the Kwangtung of the Kuomintang in 1926. Chapter IV is an account of the activities of the Kwangsi leaders in 1926 and 1927 and of the evolution of the Kwangsi Clique as a force in Kuomintang politics. Chapter V describes events within Kwangsi between 1926 and 1929, when a strong regional base was consolidated for the

Clique. Chapter VI examines the role of the Clique in national politics in 1928 and 1929, when its great regional power holding threatened the authority of the Kuomintang government at Nanking, and relates the Clique's defeat by the National Government in 1929. Chapter VII gives an account of the Clique's reduced independence, within one province, between 1930 and 1936 and of its Reconstruction Movement, which attempted to develop an alternative form of government to that practised from Nanking. The Conclusion attempts to assess the effect of independent regional power holding on the fortunes of the Kuomintang; it also gives a brief description of the careers of the leaders of the Kwangsi Cliuqe after 1936, when its autonomy was finally shattered.

CONTENTS

<u>INTRODUCTION.</u>	Regional Militarism in Republican China.....1
<u>CHAPTER I.</u>	Kwangsi Province: Historical Background.....27
<u>CHAPTER II</u>	The Background, Education and Early Careers of the Leaders of the Kwangsi Clique.....50
<u>CHAPTER III</u>	The Background to the Unification of Kwangtung and Kwangsi in 1926.....68
<u>CHAPTER IV</u>	Kwangsi and the Northern Expedition.....111
<u>CHAPTER V</u>	Kwangsi: 1926-1929.....183
<u>CHAPTER VI</u>	The Kwangsi Clique in National Politics, 1928-1929.....240
<u>CHAPTER VII</u>	The Kwangsi Clique in the 1930s: the Reconstruction Movement in Kwangsi.....313
<u>CONCLUSION</u>362

NOTES TO TEXT.....372

SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY.....477

GLOSSARY.....492

TABLES AND MAPS.....498

INTRODUCTION

Regional Militarism in Republican China

The failure of the Nanking Government to establish effective control over the whole of China after the technical unification of the nation at the end of the Northern Expedition, constituted one of the most serious weaknesses of that government. Throughout the period from 1928 to 1937, when the Kuomintang's policies for rebuilding a strong nation were supposedly being implemented, the actual area of China controlled by the Kuomintang was considerably less than the whole nation it claimed to rule; various provinces maintained a de facto independ^ence, giving nominal allegiance to Nanking and to the policies of the Kuomintang, but allowing little Central participation in or direction of their internal affairs, and contributing little to the Centre in terms of tax revenue or military support.

The degree of independ^ence varied from province to province, and from period to period, with the strongest tendencies towards autonomy existing in the provinces furthest distant from Nanking. A rough diagram can be constructed, of a series of concentric circles with their hub in the Nanking/Shanghai region, each circle indicating a receding degree of Central control. Chekiang, Kiangsu

and Anhwei were firmly controlled from Nanking, from the time of their occupation by Kuomintang forces in 1927. The propinquity of the provinces to Nanking was reinforced, as a factor encouraging Central control, by the fact that the military, economic and political leaders of the Nanking Government were commonly natives of these provinces, who maintained strong ties with local leaders and gentry members. One step further removed from Central control were the provinces of Fukien, Kiangsi, Hunan and Honan, where movement away from Central control after the initial conquest in 1926 and 1927 had been arrested by Nanking military conquest; these provinces were bound to Nanking by military control, the degree of which varied from harsh occupation in Kiangsi to mild supervision in Hunan, where Ho Chien maintained a tacit autonomy. Further out still were the provinces of Kwangtung, Kwang^ssi, Kweichow, Yunnan, Szechwan, Shansi and Shantung, which were effectively independant^e, and occasionally actively hostile to Nanking.¹ In North China, Manchuria, and the Inner-Asian frontier provinces, the problem was not so much one of regional independance^e, though the pull towards local autonomy was strong among the non-Han peoples of these provinces, but of foreign incursion, which by 1937 had severed them from Central control.

The Nanking Government made strenuous efforts, from

1929 on, to crush the most obvious manifestations of defiance of Central control; the regional groupings headed by the Kwangsi Clique, by Feng Yü-hsiang and by Yen Hsi-shan were smashed in civil wars in 1929 and 1930. In 1934, the holders of regional power most abhorrent to the Nanking leaders, the Communists in Kiangsi, were driven out of the province, and into the wilderness, from which they emerged a year later, after the Long March, in North-West China. The regional power groupings which could directly threaten the Nanking government were destroyed, but the more insidious regional autonomy, based on individual provinces, was not. Only after the contraction of Kuomintang China, after the Japanese invasion, was anything like full Central control established, over a much restricted area, and in a time of national disaster.

19th Century Regionalism

The concentration of power in the hands of regional leaders was not a new phenomenon of the Republican period. The regionalism of the post-Taiping period, which Franz Michael defines as "the emergence in key areas of China of military and political power centres that assumed some of the important functions of the state but still remained within its framework"² played a powerful role in the formation of late-Ch'ing policies, and is widely regarded as one of the major contributory

factors to the fall of the Manchu dynasty. This devolution of power is also seen as the first stage of China's decline into the regional fragmentation of the 'official' Warlord Period, from 1916 to 1927.

The nature of regional power-holding during the second half of the 19th Century differed in one major respect from that of the Republican period; though the holders of regional power helped unwittingly to undermine the power of the Centre, their fundamental loyalty was to the throne, and to the concept of Confucian universality, not to their individual regions. "The founders of regional power, Tseng Kuo-fan and Li Hung-chang, were interested not in securing satrapies for themselves, but in assuring the survival of the Confucian order; only later, when the Confucian order was clearly doomed, did the disastrous *sauve-qui-peut* attitude become common." ³ Though their armies were recruited on a regional basis, and their officers tied to them by bonds of personal loyalty, creating the kind of regional, personal army which characterised later warlord armies, men like Tseng and Li remained committed to a higher authority, and saw no clash of interest between their regional power holding and their loyalty to the Centre. In Li's case, for example, "no clear line could be drawn between his central and regional functions, and he therefore appeared to represent central and regional power simultaneously."

Yuan Shih-k'ai, the founder of the modern army, was the first military commander to make use of his personal army to advance his own fortunes. Before his emergence, the holding of regional military, economic and governmental power, independently of the Centre, was tempered by ideological adherence to the Centre; the taking of regional power was seen only as a stop-gap measure, until the Centre could reassert itself and take over the government of the whole country again. But the Centre did not reassert itself, and ironically, one of the reasons that it failed to do so was that it had lost too much power to the regions.

Regionalism and Militarism

The key to the successful establishment of a regional seat of power was the holding of military power. "The establishment of a bureacratic administration and a system of taxation was made possible by military control".⁵ There could be no regional independence without military independence. This was true in the post-Taiping period, and even more so after the fall of the dynasty, when the holding of military power became the sole criterion for the holding of any authority, central or regional. For while the authority of the Centre over the regions declined, so did the authority of civilians over military men, who acquired a prestige unknown before as the army was modernised. The collapse of the imperial system

destroyed one political system without offering a viable alternative. In the disruption which accompanied the fall of the Manchus, the modern army, united under Yuan Shih-k'ai's control, represented "the only effectively organised element capable of competing for political power".

Until 1916, Yuan Shih-k'ai's commanding position ensured that though the military was in the ascendancy over the infant political organisations of the Republic, the control of the military was at least centralised under himself. But his attempt to set himself up as emperor, and his subsequent death, set the course towards military disintegration, and towards the swift development of full-scale regional warlordism; in the first place, his imperial adventure detached the powerful Southern commanders, who though outside the Peiyang military system had given allegiance to Yuan up to 1916, and in the second his death destroyed the only focus capable of maintaining unity within the Peiyang system. After 1916, military control descended into the hands of a large number of independant regional militarists, whose power extended over areas varying in size from a single hsien to several provinces.

These men were what James Sheridan has called "the Early Warlords", ⁷ commonly but less accurately referred to simply as "the Warlords", a class of men held in deepest contempt both by Communist and Kuomintang historians, who accuse them of oppressing the people,

speeding up the decay of China, allying with China's imperialist enemies, and impeding the process of national revival. These accusations are difficult to quarrel with, and the recent western studies of warlords, by Winston Hsieh on Ch'en Chiang-ming,⁸ by James Sheridan on Feng Yü-hsiang,⁹ and by Donald Gillin on Yen Hsi-shan,¹⁰ though they set out to examine the phenomenon of warlordism with more objectivity than do Communists or Kuamintang historians, and though they deal with warlords of very different types, do not attempt to disguise the generally unpleasant characteristics of warlord rule. But instead of regarding the warlords as inherently evil men, who deliberately set out to corrupt and degrade China, these writers see them as products of a period in which there was no single militarist strong enough to unite the rest, nor any political or ideological impetus sufficient to provide a centripetal force which would drive them towards unity.

Cultural Regionalism

Warlord rule combined the twin features of militarism and regionalism, and encouraged the one to accentuate the other; it did not however create either. Regionalism came into the ascendancy as Confucianism declined, depriving China of a centralised, universal political system and code of ethics. The universality of Confucianism raised it above regionalism; its elite of bureaucrats and gentry members were attached not to

their places of origin, but to a supra-regional identity. But below the universal culture of Confucianism, there existed a patchwork of regional cultures, "myriad examples of interest sympathy, even consciousness, cut off and seen to be cut off well below the level of any national integration...",¹¹ which found their most obvious manifestations in regional differences of language, diet, housing and social customs. Regional differences arose naturally from the size of China, and from the variations in climate and topography which exist within its borders. In their most specifically expressed forms, these local characteristics were attached to individual provinces; the stereotyping of provinces and their inhabitants was a long-established practice. The ties to the provinces were felt strongly by the mass of the people, (provided they had reached a level of sophistication sufficient to allow them to think in larger terms than of the hsien), and even to some extent by the Confucian elite, who made use of them for such purposes as employing secretaries, and finding lodging outside their own areas, but as a convenience, not as an expression of deep loyalty.

The existence of cultural regionalism did not threaten the unity of the state so long as it was not coupled with regional military independence. When the Centre was strong, the centralised bureaucracy and the dispersed educated elite acted as centralising forces, which, combined with the dependence of the army on the

Centre, and a centralised taxation system, depressed tendencies towards the development of regional autonomy. Nevertheless, these tendencies were latent; when the power of the Centre was relaxed, they came to the surface, and could then be exploited by those who had established regional military control, that is by the warlords.

It is not intended to make any detailed discussion of the warlord period here, nor to analyse the characteristics of the early warlords, but rather to examine the interaction of warlordism and regionalism, and to look into the legacy which these phenomena left to the Kuomintang.

The development of regionalism, which, especially in South China, sometimes developed to a point where it could be described as local chauvinism or local nationalism, can be seen as a reaction to the loss of a higher focus of loyalty, an attempt to find a substitute for the absence of an effective supra-regional authority; the region represented the most natural substitute, and offered a conservative haven from the confusion of the national scene. Although the growth of regionalism in the early Republic did not create the warlordism of the period, it helped to perpetuate it. The warlords did not create regionalism, but they could manipulate it to maintain their positions, by posing themselves as leaders of local-nationalist movements: Kwangtung for the Cantonese,

Hunan for the Hunanese, Greater Kwangsi-ism. Regionalism and warlordism complemented each other, and on occasion became so closely enmeshed that they were indistinguishable. "It is conventional to say that the 'warlord' exploited a province or a region. Sometimes it would be more realistic to say that the 'warlord' was but the effective agent spearheading a regional separatism that was supported by the populace." ¹²

Regionalism and Nationalism

Regionalism was anathema to the advocates of nationalism, the forward-looking political parties of the early Republic, notably the Kuomintang (under its various metamorphoses) and the patriotic intellectual youth, who were aroused to national consciousness in the May 4th Movement and its aftermath. Regionalism worked against nationalism, preventing its development; regionalism tended to be conservative and backward-looking, nationalism forward-looking and progressive. For the nationalists, the two could not coexist.

Sun Yat-sen found the regionalist military leaders of South China amongst the greatest trials of his whole troubled career, for though he railed against such men as Ch'en Chiung-ming and Lu Yung-t'ing, he was forced to cooperate with them; his cooperation compromised his principles, without in the end bringing him the advantages he had hoped for from such cooperation. Sun's military

weakness meant that if he was to establish a government, he had to obtain external military support; this was most easily found through playing on regional ties, and by entering into alliances with fellow-Cantonese. Twice he made such alliances, in 1916 and 1920, and twice he was ejected from Canton, having failed to break the regional allegiances of the military leaders with whom he was dealing, which were stronger than their allegiance to him, or to impose his political authority over them. The Kuomintang had to bow before Cantonese chauvinism.

The antipathy of nationalism to regionalism was strengthened by the close links between nationalism and anti-imperialism. It was widely held that China would not be able to resist imperialist incursions until the nation was united under a strong central government, which the existence of regional spheres of power prevented from materialising. At the same time, because of the disunity of China, the imperialist powers were able to develop their strength in individual areas of China, without having to bargain with any central authority. "British policy in the mid-1920s was predicated upon an image of China which was federal rather than centralised."¹³ This attitude was shared by all the major powers, with the exception of the United States, which still maintained an official adherence to the Open Door Policy. The Powers went through the formality of recognising the succession of government at Peking, and of maintaining embassies there, but they developed their interests in whatever part

of China interested them most, and their policies did not reflect a belief in the integrity of China.

The weakness of China in relation to the imperialist powers shamed and enraged a growing body of Chinese during the early 1920s, and led them to accuse the warlords, whose regional independence prevented national reunification, of being the tools of the imperialists. The charge of collusion with foreign powers, though inadequately substantiated, proved an ideal stick with which to beat the warlords; it was a direct, simplistic weapon, easier to use, and more emotive than attacks on the social and economic evils of warlordism. As in 19th century Japan, where anti-Bakufu forces had used criticism of the weakness of Bakufu foreign policy to attack the Bakufu, so in 20th century China opponents of existing power holders found that accusations of betraying the nation had a strong appeal: "It was an accusation which invariably aroused popular excitement however little it accorded with the facts."¹⁴ In South China, T'ang Chi-yao of Yunnan and Lu Yung-t'ing of Kwangsi were accused of being in league with the French in Tongking, and Ch'en Ch'ing-ming of Kwangtung of being the tool of the British in Hong Kong; but there is little evidence that foreign aid was a material determinant of their policies. Whatever aid they received was bought in return for foreign trade and commerce, and though such concessions may have damaged South China's own economic life, they may not have had a great influence in moulding the policies of the southern warlords in the

interests of the British or the French, who probably found them just as aggravating and difficult to work with as did the Kuomintang.

Federalism

By the early 1920s, regionalism was strongly enough established in South China to give rise to a movement for the creation of a federal state in China, which would legitimise the holding of regional power. The advocates of federalism argued that China was too large and too diversified to be governed under a unitary system, and that a union of semi-autonomous provinces similar to the United States of America would provide a more logical and efficient method of governing and developing China. The federalist movement was centred on province of Hunan, where the local tuchün, Chao Heng-t'i, had a federalist provincial constitution promulgated in 1922.¹⁵ Chao was supported by other provincial leaders in the South-West, notably T'ang Chi-yao in Yunnan, who also had a programme of federal government compiled for his province,¹⁶ and Ch'en Ching^u-ming in Kwangtung. But it proved impossible to find any support for federalism from political leaders with national following, who regarded it as a rationalisation of regional militarism, and the movement petered out. In 1926, when it was already a dead letter, it was attacked at the 2nd Congress of the Kuomintang: "Major warlords used the pretext of military unification to seize control of the Central government;

minor ones used the pretext of federal autonomy to gain regional control".¹⁷

Federalism was the only major attempt to justify the decline in central power, and to put regionalism into a political framework; though it appealed to the conservative and to the confused, who found a refuge from national disorder in regionalism, it ran counter to the growing pull of nationalism, and the desire for a revival of strong, centralised government, which came to be felt, during the early 1920s, not only by patriotic students and professional politicians, but also by workers, merchants and overseas Chinese, groups which were increasingly organised under the leadership of the Kuomintang and the Communist Party, especially in Kwangtung province. In many of these people, nationalist and regionalist loyalties coexisted, on different planes, the one rarefied and idealistic, the other practical and immediate; though they did not and could not reject the cultural regionalism bred into them, the idea of openly abandoning the concept of a unitary state was intolerable. The growing commitment to nationalism, fired by national humiliation, demanded that they support efforts to reunify the nation: "...increasingly wide sectors of the population were prepared to throw their support to whoever gave most promise of effective central government".¹⁸

The Kuomintang and Regional Militarists

In 1923, when he returned for the third time to

Canton, and set about establishing his third regime there, the disastrous experience of his previous sojourns in Canton, and the advice of his new Soviet advisors, determined Sun Yat-sen to establish an independent military force for the Kuomintang, which would eventually free the Kuomintang from dependence on existing local militarists. But in the meantime, Sun had to continue to depend on such men to maintain his position in Kwangtung. In addition to Cantonese troops, he drew his support from Yunnanese and Kwangsi troops whom he brought into the province as mercenaries.

Sun's alliance with militarist forces was essential if he was ever to establish the Kuomintang as a potent force, and build up its armies; there was no alternative for him, but to form alliances with non-Kuomintang militarists, men who were prepared to make only a limited commitment to the Kuomintang, determined chiefly on mercenary considerations. This practice sowed the seeds of later problems, which manifested themselves during and after the establishment of Kuomintang rule over the whole of China. Chiang Kai-shek continued Sun's policy of forming alliances with regional militarists, who gave nominal loyalty to the Kuomintang without surrendering regional power. The emphasis on military development within the Kuomintang, initiated by Sun Yat-sen on the basis of objective circumstances, and perpetuated by Chiang Kai-shek not least in the interests of strengthening his own position, led to the domination of the military over the civilian within the Kuomintang. "An undue

reliance on military power, and a tendency to prefer military support to loyalty to his [Sun's] political testament, were destined to characterise the regime of his own followers".¹⁹ Sun helped, unwittingly, to set the Kuomintang on a course which gave the upper hand to the military, and which permitted the allegiance to the Kuomintang of incompletely converted regional militarists, encouraging the continuance of modified military regionalism after the victory of the Kuomintang. Sun's use of alliances with regional militarists endorsed the split between the Centre and the regions, and also blurred the distinction between outright militarist rule, under a full-blown warlord, and military rule under the auspices of the Kuomintang.

The Northern Expedition

In 1926, the Kuomintang launched the Northern Expedition, with the intention of reunifying the nation and wiping out the warlords.²⁰

Ardent nationalists within the Kuomintang and its armies believed that Kuomintang military victory would be followed by the establishment of a genuine national government, led by civilians. The early successes of the Kuomintang, the apparent strength of political motivation within the army, instilled by political commissars, and the rapid development of mass movements in the wake of the Kuomintang armies, appeared to confirm

the hope that the country would be reunited, not under apolitical generals, but under politicians-in-uniform.

But even before the Expedition started, two ominous developments occurred. The first was the ascendancy of Chiang Kai-shek to personal military control over the National Revolutionary Army, demonstrated forcibly in the Chung-Shan Incident of March, 1926, and by the detachment of the General Headquarters for the Expedition from political control. The second was the formation of Kuomintang alliances with regional militarists outside Kwangtung, with the new Kwangsi leaders and with T'ang Sheng-chih in Hunan, who were prepared to fight for the Kuomintang, but not to be fully amalgamated into it, and who, with many other militarists who were brought into the Kuomintang forces as the Expedition progressed, retained a high degree of control over their armies and their regional bases.

In 1927, after the Kuomintang forces had reached the Yangtze, an all-out clash developed between the Right-Wing of the Kuomintang, and the Left-Wing and Communists. All attention was focused on this drama; the failure of the military command to remould its new militarist allies was unremarked. The new "revolutionary" generals achieved the respectability of alliance with the most potent new powers in China, but, perhaps to their surprise, were required to surrender little of their independence. The one instrument which might have drawn their teeth, by

weakening their control over their armies, that is the political training and activation of their troops, was virtually destroyed by the purge of communists and Left-Wingers, which began in April, 1927, for it was these people who had seriously undertaken political training. The discipline and political motivation of the "principled troops" (chu-i ti chün-tui)²¹ of the Kuomintang, notably in the 4th Army commanded by Chang Fa-k'uei, which had given such an excellent (and astonishing) impression when the Kuomintang forces first moved north, broke down in the welter of political confusion. Regionalist feelings, which bound together the men of individual units (usually raised in a single area), asserted themselves to fill the political vacuum, and were capitalised by regional militarists to strengthen their own independence. "During 1927, the Kuomintang, to a gradually increasing extent, lost control over its own militarists, so that at the present time [February, 1928] Kuomintang militarists are as independent from any central authority as Northern militarists normally are".²²

Residual Warlordism

James Sheridan describes the period after the completion of the Northern Expedition, and before the Anti-Japanese War, as the "Period of Residual Warlordism".²³ Many of the "old" warlords, especially in North China, had been crushed, but regional independence under military rule persisted. Frequently, this regional independence was simply a perpetuation of established regional rule;

in outlying provinces which were now technically loyal to Nanking, established regional militarists, such as Huang Shao-hsiung in Kwangsi, Yen Hsi-shan in Shansi and Feng Yü-hsiang in Shansi and Honan, reestablished their hold which had been slightly disturbed by the activities of Kuomintang and Communist political workers in 1926 and 1927. The brief progress towards mass mobilisation and the installation of the spirit of nationalism which had been made in such provinces was arrested after the purge of communists and Left-Wingers in April, 1927. A more disturbing feature of resurgent regional independence was the emergence of new regional leaders, notably those connected with the Kwangsi Clique, who established autonomous control over provinces which had previously appeared to be under central Kuomintang control. Kwangtung became the personal domain of Li Chi-shen, Hupei of Li Tsung-jen and Pai Ch'ung-hsi.

The completion of the Northern Expedition in June, 1928, and the Disbandment Conference which followed it, did not ease the situation. The new military organization of four Group Armies, which came into being for the final drive on North China, confirmed the existence of four major regional spheres of power, dominated by Chiang Kai-shek and the National Government, Feng Yü-hsiang, Yen Hsi-shan and the Kwangsi Clique. Politically, there was little to distinguish the four groups from one another; all were anti-communist and authoritarian. In administratio

their principle concern was the maintenance of law and order, which can be generally taken to mean the suppression of all opposition, especially from the Left, and the strict regulation of mass organisations. Each based their control on regional ties; army commanders were valued for personal loyalty, often above military competence, civilian officials were chosen on the basis of regional connections rather than technical worth. Professional politicians outside the four main groups, such as the Left-Wing of the Kuomintang, were reduced to impotency. Even the Left-Wing, which claimed for itself the greatest devotion to nationalism, was forced to use the tools of regionalism in its attempts to oppose Nanking. The attempts of the Left-Wing to reassert itself, in 1927 and in 1929, were prefaced by attempts to reestablish military control at Canton through the agency of Chang Fa-k'uei, and his Cantonese troops, for Canton, besides being the birthplace of the revolution, was also the place of origin of most of the Left-Kuomintang leaders, and the place where they had the closest connections.

Chiang Kai-shek, though the national commander-in-chief, and the dominant figure in the National Government at Nanking, was no more immune from utilising regional relationships than were the other big militarists. His closest allies were Chekiang and Kiangsu men, most valuable of all, the merchants and bankers of Shanghai. His region was richer and more advanced than any other,

and the prestige of the National Government, combined with the economic power and favourable geographic location of this region to raise him above the other regional militarists. From this superior position, he was able, between 1929 and 1930, to crush his three most powerful rivals, the Kwangsi Clique, Feng Yu^u-hsiang and Yen Hsi-shan. But while they were deprived of their power over extended, multi-province regions, only Feng was driven from power completely. Yen clung to his autonomy in Shansi, the Kwangsi Clique retained its absolute hold over Kwangsi.

Large-scale regional autonomy was defeated, but provincial autonomy continued. The provincial militarists were less colourful but better educated and trained than their predecessors in the Warlord period, and their power was often more firmly entrenched. In Kwangtung, Kwangsi, Yunnan, Kweichow, Szechwan and Shansi, only lip-service was paid to the Nanking government. Shantung was to all intents and purposes independant; its governor, Han Fu-chü^u, allowed no Nanking interference, and attempted to make his own quietus with the expansionist Japanese in his province. The three provinces of Manchuria were lost to Japan in 1931, while Hopei, Jehol, Suiyuan and Chahar came increasingly under Japanese domination. Hsinkingang was under Soviet suzer^eignity, Tibet under pro-British rule. Sikang and Chinghai were virtually independant, the non-Chinese populations rebuffing Nanking attempts to establish its rule there; the same kind of situation obtained in Ninghsia and parts of Kansu, where Moslem

leaders, (all surnamed Ma, though not all related to each other) were the ruling elements. Until 1934 much of Kiangsi was under Communist rule, and in Shansi, Kansu and Ninghsia, communist power was spreading. Fukien was under Nanking rule, but there was a serious rebellion against Nanking in the province in 1933. Hunan was faithful to Nanking, but independent in administration. Only in Hupei, Honan, Anhwei, Chekiang, Kiangsu and parts of Shensi and Kansu was Nanking control strong, that is in the provinces originally occupied by Chiang's 1st Group Army, together with three provinces taken from Feng Yu-hsiang and one from the Kwangsi Clique.

The implications of such wide-scale regional independence for the Nanking Government were formidable; Nanking had to maintain an enormous army, not only for action against the Communists, but also to keep the regional militarists in check.²⁴ The army had to be financed out of a 'national' budget to which many provinces made no contributions; an undue proportion of the budget went to the army, leaving little money available for the projected reconstruction of China. Nanking's difficulties in collecting revenue from the provinces encouraged an existing tendency to put too heavy a reliance on the support of the developed sectors of China's economy, and to encourage the further growth of the urban sector of the economy in the Shanghai region,²⁵ ignoring the urgent

problems of the agricultural sector, thus ensuring the alienation from the Kuomintang of the mass of the Chinese population, the peasantry. In international relations, and especially in the question of relations with Japan, Nanking was critically weakened by the disunity of China. Chiang Kai-shek's slogan of "First Unite the Country, then Resist the Japanese" was inadequate in a situation where Japanese imperialism was growing faster than national unity. China's disunity made her an easy victim for physical assault; it also allowed the Japanese to deal with individual regions and provinces separately, and to carry out a joint policy of encroachment through agreements with local leaders, and of actual military attacks. Yet the call for all-out resistance to Japan after 1937 proved the one rallying call which could unite China, bringing together (briefly) the Kuomintang and Communist parties, and inducing even the most recalcitrant holders of regional power to cooperate with the Central Government. Chiang's failure to make an adequate response to the calls for resistance to Japan made from 1931 on, by the Communists, the students, and ~~from~~ diverse regional groupings, including the militarists in South China, and his continuing failure to make use of the power of nationalism during the anti-Japanese War, when his prestige as the national leader increased, allowed the custodianship of the awakened nationalism of the Chinese people to pass to the Communists.

Regional Military Government

The administration of the autonomous and semi-autonomous provinces during the period from 1929 to 1937 was as authoritarian and as totally dependant on military control as had been the administrations of the early warlords, and as were those of the provinces directly governed from Nanking. Regional militarism of the residual warlords retained the worst features of early warlordism: heavy land taxation, coupled with the extortion of numerous "petty and vexatious" taxes, which impoverished the peasantry and hit hard at small merchants; the perpetuation of an ^eoppressive agricultural system, which sank the peasantry into debt and destitution, and depressed the rural economy; the unfettered demands of the military, for recruits,²⁶ for a huge prop^ortion of provincial income, and for the subordination of transport facilities to their needs, and the swift crushing of any manifestations of social and political unrest.

Within these enormous limitations, there is reason to believe that many of the autonomous provinces were better administered than those controlled directly from Nanking. At the top of the list of so-called "model provinces" was Shansi, while Shantung, Kwangtung and Kwangsi all had reputations for efficient government. The rule of the Kwangsi Clique, one of the most persistent defenders of regional autonomy, was authoritarian and conservative, and yet, in the context of China in the

first half of the 1930s, relatively progressive. The system of wide-scale militia training as a method of mass organisation emphasised the strongly militaristic flavour of the provincial administration, and gave Kwangsi the reputation of being a "Modern Sparta". The dominance and efficiency of the military ensured at least a stable order within the province, and freed the population from the curse of banditry, for which the province was traditionally noted. Kwangsi gained a high reputation in anti-Nanking circles for discipline, lack of corruption and conservative progressiveness. The methods of the provincial leaders were praised by those who rejected both the Communists and the Kuomintang, and who criticised the incapacity of Nanking to come to grips with China's problems. ".....if one wished to make a comparative study of the various provincial administrations in China, one would not hesitate to put Kwangsi at the top of the list as the best governed province, inhabited by poor, but happy, contented people'.²⁷ The degree of happiness and contentment of the people is debatable; the existence of efficient administration is widely confirmed, though it was small compensation for the other ills suffered by the population.

Conclusion

The continuance of autonomous regional power-holding up to the outbreak of the anti-Japanese War baulked the processes of national regeneration which, it had been

hoped, would follow the establishment of a Kuomintang government in China. It encouraged conservative provincialism, with its implications of cultural stagnation and rejection of social and political reform. The existence and strength of such phenomenon in the provinces promoted the emergence of similar traits in the National Government; the Centre and the regions turned away, in a parallel but separate process, from the spirit of Sun Yat-sen's Three Peoples' Principles, though all maintained a technical allegiance to the letter of the Principles, a practice made easy by the vagueness of the Principles, which allowed almost any interpretation to be put on them.

The local nationalism of the province worked against centralised nationalism, and delayed the emergence of organised nationalism, the only force that proved capable of achieving unification and national revival. It helped to prevent China from gaining equality with other nations, and to lay China open to foreign aggression. Regionalism, a response to weak central government, and to inadequate national leadership, was an alternative to chaos and to lack of administration; it offered a short-term solution to the inability of the Centre to cope with its domains, but at the same time it had the long-term result of impeding the Centre's efforts to establish strong rule.

CHAPTER I

Kwangsi Province: Historical Background

In 1903, a French officer on an official visit to Kwangsi to attend the unveiling of a monument to a murdered Catholic missionary was appalled by the contrast between Kwangsi, and the French colony of Tongking. He described Kwangsi as "a rugged, mountainous province, ruined by civil war, terrorised by piracy, impoverished by the exactions of the mandarins, depopulated by poverty..."¹ His observations touched on the two most distinctive features of Kwangsi, both at this period and for a considerable time to come: its extreme poverty and its persistent lawlessness.

Kwangsi's chronic poverty and unrest stemmed in part from geographical factors, from the natural barrenness and isolation of the region. The province lies in the upper basin of the West River, whose tributaries rise in the high plateau beyond the borders of Kwangsi, and carve deep valleys through the tableland of Kwangsi as they flow east. In some parts of the province, notably around Kweilin, erosion of karst formations has created strange stone pinnacles and steep-sided hills.² "...the very name of Kwangsi aroused in the minds of educated Chinese the idea of a place like no other, where the fairy landscapes - pine-clad mountains of fantastic shape

rising abruptly from a lake-studded plain, and breaking through wreaths of mist to show glimpses of ravines and waterfalls - which for centuries had haunted the imagination of poets and artists, really existed."³ Most of the hills are riddled with caves, which made ideal lairs for bandits; an old saying of the province goes: "there is no place without hills, there are no hills without caves, and no caves without bandits."⁴

The province is surrounded by mountain ranges, whose only natural break lies on the frontier with Kwangtung. Geographically and economically, Kwangsi is the hinterland of Kwangtung; the two provinces are isolated from the rest of China by mountains and by the sea, giving rise to a strong regional integrity between the two.⁵

Like Kwangtung, the area that is now Kwangsi was brought late under permanent Han rule. It was first colonised during the Ch'in Dynasty; to aid communications with central China, a canal was dug between the headwaters of the Li River, a tributary of the West River, and the headwaters of the Hsiang River in Hunan.⁶

It was not until the T'ang Dynasty that Lingnan, as Kwangsi and Kwangtung were then known, was firmly brought under Han rule. Kwangsi was constituted as a province during the Ming Dynasty, and at this time, and during the Ch'ing, the first large-scale Han-migration into the area occurred.⁷

Han migration drove the natives inhabitants of the province, people of the Chuang, Miao, Yao and other races, up into the hills in the western part of the province, while the Han settled in the fertile valley bottoms in the south and east of the province. The dispossessed tribal peoples existed in deep poverty, scratching a living in the infertile hill country. Relations between the two groups were tense and hostile, and the tension frequently erupted into rebellions by the tribal peoples. The economic and social malaise suffered by the Kwangsi ethnic minorities, and by the large number of Hakka people in the province, was a contributory factor in the development of the Taiping Rebellion in the province.⁸ The Hakkas injected a further rebellious streak into the province: "their pillaging character, avid for combat, is the cause of the continual movements of revolt which are for ever breaking out in Kwangsi, and against which the imperial authority seems powerless."⁹

Although Kwangsi was the source of the Taiping Rebellion, after the Taiping armies moved north, the province enjoyed a period of relative calm. But the suppression of the Rebellion, and the revenge which Peking wrought on the source of the Rebellion, plunged the province into desolation and anarchy. Some of the associates of the Taipings in Kwangsi fled the province, and moved with their troops into Tongking, among them Liu Yung-fu, the leader of the Black Flags, a semi-bandit, semi-military

band. Liu formed an alliance with the native authorities in Tongking, and his soldiers acted as mercenary troops for them. When, in the early 1880s, the French started to expand into Tongking, Liu and his Black Flags formed the mainspring of the Tongkinese defence, and worked closely with the Chinese authorities, who had become embroiled in the question of Tongking's sovereignty to the extent that China was drawn into war with France.¹⁰ The war ended less unfavourably for China than was the case with most of the wars waged by the Powers against China in the 19th Century; China was not able to prevent the annexation of Tongking by the French, but the French won no concessions on Chinese soil. Liu gained fame as a patriot, and as the scourge of 'foreign devils', which was enhanced by his subsequent activities, as a general in the Chinese Army, against the Japanese.¹¹

The activities of the Taipings, and of Liu Yung-fu, gained for Kwangsi a warlike reputation, and a name for nurturing fine fighting men. The same French officer who had deprecated everything else about the province, found the troops of Su Yüan-ch'ün, the military governor at the turn of the century "robust, sober, with capacities of endurance, very well drilled to marching, kept always on their toes by the pursuit of rebels and pirates..."¹²

Su's favoured method of pacifying bandits was to incorporate them into his own forces, a practice which led to his impeachment by Ts'ên Ch'un-hsüan, when he

became governor-general of Kwangtung and Kwangsi in 1903.¹³ Ts'en impeached Su on the grounds that he had tolerated the activities of bandits, and had allowed his own troops to degenerate to such an extent that there was very little distinction between them and the bandits they were persuing. Nevertheless, he continued Su's policy of cooperating with the more amenable bandits to suppress the more intractable. He retained the services of two important ex-bandits, Lu Yung-t'ing and Lung Ch'i-kuang, and brought them into his forces as regular officers.¹⁴ With their help, he was able to check the worst excesses of banditry, but in 1904, his efforts were disrupted by a military rising at Luichow, in the centre of the province, led by secret societies with connections with the T'ung Meng Hui; though the uprising was put down by the end of the year, Luichow remained the chief centre in Kwangsi for anti-Manchu activity.¹⁵ In 1907, another attack by revolutionary forces, led by Sun Yat-sen in person, ended in fiasco, after his forces, which had just participated in an abortive rising in Kwangtung, were defeated by Lu Yung-t'ing on the border between Kwangsi and Tongking.¹⁶ Lu was becoming an increasingly important figure in the province; his career was not hampered by the disgrace of Ts'en Ch'un-hsüan, his sponsor,ⁱⁿ 1906.¹⁷

Economically speaking, Kwangsi was rather better off during the last years of the Ch'ing than it was in the early years of the Republic. As a poor province, it

received inward transfers of money and grain from more prosperous provinces, and a considerable military subsidy from Kwangtung, to help support the 13,000 old-style troops, and the 6-7,000 modern troops in the province.¹⁸ Under official guidance, there were small-scale attempts to exploit the rich mineral resources of the province. Some 'deposits' were less fruitful than expected. Good quality coal 'discovered' by local officials for a foreign prospector in an area near the Kwangtung border turned out to be a cargo of Cardiff coal, judiciously arranged across the top of a worthless seam.¹⁹

The poverty of Kwangsi deterred foreign merchants from expanding their trade into the province. The only foreign power seriously interested in Kwangsi was France; the Tongking authorities went so far as to build a railway line up to the Kwangsi border. But the Chinese did not reciprocate by building a line on their side, and without it, it was considered that there was no hope of developing trade.²⁰ "Can the French hope to find there an outlet for their commerce? We do not hesitate to say: no!"²¹ The only trade which flourished between Tongking and Kwangsi was said to be the trade in human beings, which was conducted along small, unguarded paths across the border. The 'cargoes' were women and girls, kidnapped in Tongking, "a chosen land for the supply of human flesh", and destined for Canton and Hong Kong.²² French Missionaries

were more hopeful about the potential that Kwangsi offered for their work, but were sadly disappointed. In 1925, a missionary reported that: "In spite of fifty years of work, it [Kwangsi] is still far from having received even a veneer of Christian civilization, few of its inhabitants having been attracted up till now by the beauty of the doctrine of our Lord and Sovereign Master."²³ Catholic missionary work in Kwangsi, which started in the mid-19th Century, passed through many vicissitudes, especially at times when relations between France and China were bad. Many missionaries were murdered, and the compensation demanded by the French government for these murders worsened the relations between the priests and the people of Kwangsi. Kwangsi was one of the least rewarding of all Chinese provinces, from the point of view of catholic conversions; in 1921, it had only 5,000 converts, scarcely more than Tibet, at the bottom of the convert table.²⁴ Of 125 seminarians enrolled between 1893 and 1925, only 14 were ever ordained.²⁵ Converts often demonstrated the wrong motives in attaching themselves to the Catholic Church, as was understandable in a province beset by poverty and banditry. Catholic priests detected desire for the financial gain and physical security offered by foreign protection in short-term converts: "nothing

is more common in Kwangsi than ingratitude....a cause of suffering for the missionary heart." ²⁶

The catholics were aggrieved by what they considered the unscrupulous activities of the protestant missionaries in the province, who arrived many years after the catholics; "the temporal advantages which the American sects offer to their followers are a strong temptation for some of our new christians." ²⁷ They suspected that the protestants were stealing marches on them by their offers of medical aid, and of instruction in English in their schools, a foreign language more popular in Kwangsi than was French. But they over-estimated the success of their rivals: "shortly before 1910, a missionary [Protestant] walked through Kwangsi one thousand English miles, seventy-two days, without seeing a single Christian or coming near a gospel hall." ²⁸

The lack of success of both missionaries and foreign merchants in Kwangsi confirmed the belief held by most foreigners, and shared by many Chinese, that Kwangsi was a hoplessly uncouth and backward province, with nothing to recommend it beyond its extraordinary scenery, and its fame for bandits, rebels and fighting men. After the 1911 Revolution, one of Kwangsi's warriors, Lu Yung-t'ing, emerged as a leading figure in South-West China, as the leader of the first Kwangsi Clique.

Lu Yung-t'ing

Lu Yung-t'ing started his careers~~s~~ as a bandit, operating in the Kwangsi/Tongking border region. Like other bandits in this area, he occasionally acted for the regular army as an 'unofficial guerilla' in operations over the border in Tongking. Lu served in this capacity at the time of the Sino-French War, and later under Su Yüan-ch'ün, the military governor of Kwangsi, who brought him into the regular army on a permanent basis.²⁹ Lu's career flourished under the benign eye of Ts'en Ch'un-hsüan, Su's successor; with another protege of Ts'en's, Lung Ch'i-kuang, Lu came to share control over the bulk of Kwangsi regular troops, while at the same time maintaining close contacts with his former bandit friends. Their only rival in the province was the Kwangsi unit of modern troops, which was not large enough to offset their authority.³⁰ In April, 1911, Lung was sent into Kwangtung, to help put down the Huang-Hua-Kang Uprising, and Lu rose to the position of military governor (t'i-tu) of Kwangsi.³¹

After the Wuchang Uprising in the late summer of 1911, a group of revolutionaries and subordinate army officers at Liuchow prepared to declare their independence. Lu Yung-t'ing gauged the strength of their movement, and put himself briefly at the head of it,

ensuring that when the formal declaration of the province's independence was made on September 17th, he should emerge as the leader of the province.³² Within a few days of the declaration, he was able to enforce the departure of all the imperial office holders in the provincial government, and to have himself declared tu-tu.³³ There was no political revolutionary motivation in Lu's activities; his concern was to make himself the ruler of Kwangsi, and he quickly moved to relieve the revolutionaries, and the officers who had participated in the anti-Manchu activities in the province, of what authority they had. When, in 1913, they attempted to stage a second uprising at Liuchow, he crushed them summarily.³⁴ He assured his position by bringing more of his old bandit friends into the regular army: "After the foundation of the Republic, Kwangsi's military affairs were controlled by local bandits turned generals. An examination of the situation led them to the realisation that being a bandit was a short cut to being an official, and so all those who held local military or financial power did extremely well..."³⁵ The tradition of the Black Flags continued: "The Kwangsi soldiers of the Republic seem to have charged themselves with proving that they still have in their veins the blood of those to whom they have shown themselves worthy successors."³⁶

Lu gave no sign of wishing to do anything more than dominate Kwangsi; but in 1915 and 1916, external events impinged themselves upon Kwangsi, and as a result, Lu found himself in control of Kwangtung as well; the normal relationship between Kwangtung and Kwangsi was reversed, with the backward, poverty-stricken province dominating its rich and advanced neighbour. The circumstances which brought about the elevation of Kwangsi's status was the imperial adventure of Yuan Shih-k'ai, and the anti-monarchist Hu-kuo (Protect the Nation) Movement which sprang up in reaction to it.

The situation in South-West China in late 1915, as Yuan Shih-k'ai prepared to make himself emperor, was fluid. None of the four South-Western provinces were garrisoned with Peiyang troops, and though Yuan had been currying the favour of the provincial leaders, he had succeeded in gaining the firm support only of Lung Ch'i-kuang, who had gained control over Kwangtung ⁱⁿ since 1914. ³⁷ Lu Yung-t'ing did not favour Yuan, apparently because he felt slighted by the lowly rank in the Hung-Hsien nobility which Yuan had conferred upon him; ³⁸ but he had no plans for opposing his ⁱⁿ actively. He was linked to Lung Ch'i-kuang, Yuan's most loyal ally in the South-West, by marriage; Lung's nephew was his son-in-law. ³⁹ The civilian leaders of Kwangsi

were Yuan appointees.⁴⁰ He depended on Yuan for financial contributions. Most important of all, his son, Lu Yü-hsün, was virtually a hostage of Yuan Shih-k'ai; the boy lived in Peking, with the sons of other dubious allies, who were supposedly to receive military training, but were in fact there to ensure their fathers' loyalty.⁴¹

Events forced Lu to renounce the neutrality over the monarchical issue that he would have preferred. He came under increasingly strong pressure from the leaders of the anti-Yuan movement, centred on Yunnan province, who included his former chief, Ts'en Chün-hsüan, a long-time enemy of Yuan's.⁴² Lu found this pressure difficult to resist; he petitioned Peking for sick leave, in order to extricate himself from his dilemma, and asked for the return of his son to care for him. His son started south, but died in mysterious circumstances, probably murdered, at Wuchang.⁴³ It was generally believed that Yuan had caused the boy's death.

Meanwhile, the military situation in the South-West was swinging against Yuan. Yunnan declared its independence on December 25th, 1915, and launched attacks into Szechwan and Kweichow. Kweichow declared its independence on January 27th, 1916.⁴⁴ Bitter fighting was in progress in Szechwan; to relieve his forces there, Yuan Shih-k'ai planned an attack on

Yunnan from Kwangsi, and when Lu Yung-t'ing showed reluctance in mounting it, he ordered the brother of Lung Ch'i-kuang, Lung Ch'in-kuang, to attack from Kwangtung through Kwangsi.⁴⁵ Lung raised troops in Kwangsi for the expedition against Yunnan. Lu was down-graded by Yuan, and ordered to go to Kweichow and organise an expedition against Yunnan from there, granting him for the purpose one million yüan.⁴⁶

Lu's downgrading proved the final incentive to him to come out against Yuan.⁴⁷ On March 15th, he declared the independence of Kwangsi, and named himself commander-in-chief of the Kwangtung/Kwangsi Hu-Kuo Chun. Liang Ch'i-ch'ao, a leading supporter of the Hu-Kuo Movement, arrived in Kwangsi two days later and became chief-of-staff.⁴⁸ The army of Lung Ch'in-kuang, moving slowly towards the Yunnanese border, was taken unawares by Lu's move, and was disarmed.⁴⁹ With the collapse of Yuan's flank attack on Yunnan, the Hu-Kuo Movement grew from a localised rebellion to a movement powerful enough to force the independence of all southern and south-western provinces.

In Kwangtung, Lung Ch'i-Kuang's position was being eroded by the defection of local Cantonese armies. At the same time, Lu Yung-t'ing was massing forces for an attack into Kwangtung from Kwangsi. On April 6th, Lung, under strong pressure from Lu, declared the

independence of Kwangtung, but without denouncing Yuan Shih-k'ai.⁵⁰ He reached a compromise with Lu Yung-t'ing and the Hu-Kuo leaders whereby a military government was set up at Chao-ch'ing, on the West River above Canton, of which Ts'en Ch'un-hsüan became the acting head.⁵¹

The declaration of independence by Hunan in mid-May, under military pressure from Hu-Kuo forces, sealed the doom of Yuan Shih-k'ai's imperial adventure. Yuan died early in June; his death marked the end of unified national government in China. Li Yuan-hung succeeded to the Presidency, and the 1912 Constitution was reactivated, nullifying the pretext for the independence of the provinces which supported the Hu-Kuo movement. The Military Government was therefore wound up on July 14th.⁵²

Lung Ch'i-kuang, who still regarded himself as loyal to Peking rather than to the Military Government, had preempted the dissolution of the Military Government by rescinding the independence of Kwangtung, in early June. His move, which was coupled with hostile moves against Hu-Kuo forces in the province, led to a military campaign against him, and to his downfall as ruler of Kwangtung.⁵³ Lu Yung-t'ing became tu-chün of Kwangtung, an appointment made by the Peking government, but which was not a choice on the part of that government, but a confirmation of the existing power situation in Kwangtung. Lu, aided by Yunnanese and

local Cantonese units, had installed himself as de facto ruler of Kwangtung, a manoeuvre accomplished more by chance than by design, through Kwangsi's fortuitous connection with the Hu-Kuo Movement. Though Kwangsi's declaration of independence in March gave valuable help to the Hu-Kuo Movement, the Hu-Kuo Movement gave Kwangsi a disproportionate gain, that of extending Kwangsi control to the rich and populous province of Kwangtung. ⁵⁴

In October, 1916, Lu Yung-t'ing set up his headquarters at Chao-ch'ing, as tu-ch'ün of Kwangtung. The open breach between North and South China had been healed, but individual provinces in the South remained independent in all but name. As a result of the Hu-Kuo Movement, Northern troops had been withdrawn from Hunan and Szechwan; ⁵⁵ Yunnan was controlled by T'ang Chi-yao, Kwangtung and Kwangsi by Lu Yung-t'ing. The phenomenon of the independent provincial warlord, was already perceptible. Lu severed his connections with the politicians with whom he had been associated during the Hu-Kuo Movement, ⁵⁶ giving his administration in Kwangtung and Kwangsi an uncompromisingly militarist flavour.

Lu took little part in the regular administration of Kwangtung and Kwangsi; his brother-in-law, T'an Hao-ming, was tu-ch'ün of Kwangsi, and Ch'en P'ing-kun of Kwangtung; these two men were responsible for civil and military government, while Lu was in charge

of affairs concerning both provinces, in his capacity of Commissioner for the two Kwangs.⁵⁷ His post, and those of T'an and Ch'en were confirmed by the Peking Government, after Lu had visited the capital in March, 1917.⁵⁸ Though he no longer gave genuine allegiance to the Peking government, he still felt the need for official sanction for his appointments; he was not prepared to renounce his independence, but neither did he intend to be blatant about it. Since he had no political antipathy to the Peking government, there was no point in his renouncing its technical authority, as demonstrated by asking its confirmation of his appointments to office. His inclination was to maintain friendly relations with Peking, first because there was the possibility that he would need its aid against opponents in the South, and secondly because he felt uncomfortable operating outside the framework of national government. His concept of regional independence was of local control confirmed by a higher authority, i.e. the Peking government.

While in the North, Lu was approached by Chang Hsün, who was then planning his attempt to restore the Manchu monarchy. His meetings with Chang, and with P'u Yi, gave rise to rumours that he was associated with the Restoration Plot.⁵⁹ Whether he planned to support the Restorationists is uncertain, for when the crisis in the North occurred in June, 1917, Lu found his hands tied; the strength of

opposition in Kwangtung to the Restoration, and to the seizure of power by Tuan Ch'i-jui which followed it, was such that Lu was forced to bow to it, and to welcome Sun Yat-sen to Canton; Sun had put himself at the head of a movement known as the Hu-Fa (Protect the Constitution) Movement, and who enjoyed the support of many of the groups in Kwangtung who were not committed to Lu.⁶⁰ Under this pressure, Lu was forced to agree to the declaration of independence by Kwangtung and Kwangsi provinces, in protest against the dissolution of Parliament in Peking.⁶¹

Sun arrived in Canton on July 17th, and began to make plans for the convention of an extraordinary parliament in Canton, made up of members of the Peking Parliament who had come south after its dissolution, and for the establishment of a military government in Canton. This government was set up at the beginning of September, a few days after the first meeting of the Extraordinary Parliament. Lu was not pleased about Sun's moves, and he did not at first give Sun any material backing.⁶² Nevertheless, he was drawn closer to Sun by events in Hunan, which once again became the pivot of conflict between North and South. Tuan Ch'i-jui felt confident enough of his authority after the failure of the Restoration and the dissolution of Parliament, to attempt to extend Northern control into Hunan again, the first step in his wider plan to reunify China.⁶³ He started moving troops

into Hunan at the end of July, in an attempt to oust the Hunan tuehün, T'an Yen-k'ai, who was sympathetic to Sun Yat-sen. Fighting started in Hunan in September, and in October, Kwangsi forces moved into the province to give T'an assistance,⁶⁴ partly in the interest of safe-guarding Kwangsi's security, and partly to fulfill a secret alliance that Lu had made with Feng Kuo-chang of the Chihli Clique, which was quietly working against Tuan and the Anhwei Clique in the North. The fighting in Hunan petered out in November, after the Chihli/Anhwei split had come out into the open, and Tuan had resigned.⁶⁵ Lu proceeded to enter into negotiations with the Northern forces for a peaceful settlement of the North/South division.

The Kwangsi expedition into Hunan, and the Kwangsi negotiations with the North, were undertaken without the sanction of the Military Government in Canton, and without reference to it. Sun Yat-sen was enraged by Lu's intention of reaching a settlement with the North before the constitutional issue had been settled; he ordered a bombardment of the headquarters of the Kwangtung tuehün by gunboats loyal to himself, in an attempt to oust the Kwangsi generals from Kwangtung.⁶⁶

The Hunan leaders were equally incensed by Lu's actions, since their aim of expelling Northern troops from their province had not been achieved. Under

combined pressure from Sun and from Hunan, Lu was forced to reactivate the conflict in Hunan early in 1918, and by the end of the month, Kwangsi and Hunan forces had cleared the province. ⁶⁷

The renewed fighting in Hunan, and the Southern setbacks which followed, helped to recreate a tenuous cooperation between the Kwangsi military authorities in Kwangtung and the Military Government, but by May, when Hunan had been completely lost to Northern forces, the dissension between the two groups had reemerged. Acting through Tsen Ch'un-hsüan and his political followers, Lu Yung-t'ing was able to get a motion passed by the Extraordinary Parliament which provided for the reorganisation of the Military Government under a Directorate of seven, instead of under a Grand Marshall. Although Sun Yat-sen, the former Grand Marshall, was to be retained as one of the Directors, this position was obviously untenable for him, and he resigned, and left Canton. ⁶⁸ Lu reopened peace negotiations with Peking, and though the negotiations did not get under way until 1919, and never led to a settlement, they effectively stopped the Hu-Fa Movement, which faded out. ⁶⁹

T'ang Shao-i, another of the seven Directors, left Canton with Sun, and a third, T'ang Chi-yao of Yunnan, never attended the meetings of the Directorate. The Directorate was merely a tool of Lu Yung-t'ing,

administered for him by Ts'en Ch'un-hsüan. Lu continued his laissez-faire policies towards local government, relying solely on his military strength to maintain his position in Kwangtung and Kwangsi. ⁷⁰ At this time, Lu's forces numbered about 50,000. The majority were commanded by untrained officers, whose military experience had been gained as bandits; the major exception was the Model Battalion, set up in 1917, which was commanded by a foreign-trained officer, Ma Hsiao-chün, and was officered by young graduates of military schools. For the rest, Lu's troops were ill-trained and oblivious to modern military methods; they owed their success in Kwangtung not to their own ability, but to the disunity of the Cantonese forces. But their presence in Kwangtung proved a unifying force to the Cantonese generals, while their stay in Kwangtung, and their enjoyment of the riches of the province, weakened their fighting capacity. The Kwangsi forces in Kwangtung sunk into a satiated stupor, unaware of the threats which were building up against them.

Early in 1920, the rumour that Ts'en Ch'un-hsüan was about to sign a peace treaty with Peking, ending officially Southern independence, spurred those members of the Extraordinary Parliament who had remained in Canton after Sun Yat-sen's departure, to leave Kwangtung,

in protest against the abject surrender on constitutional issues which the treaty was said to contain.⁷¹ Wu T'ing-fang, the commissioner of finance in the Military Government, made off for Hong Kong with the bulk of the contents of the treasury, which, it was intended, would finance the reestablishment of the Extraordinary Parliament in the foreign concessions at Shanghai. Part of the money was used to pay the fares of the members of parliament to Shanghai, but the remainder was sequestered by the foreign police there, as stolen property.⁷²

These developments were coupled with a military threat to Kwangsi power in Kwangtung. Ch'en Chiung-ming, one of Sun Yat-sen's closest supporters, was marshalling his forces in Fukien, preparing to attack into Kwangtung; T'ang Chi-yao of Yunnan, a former ally of Lu Yung-t'ing, had been alienated by a clumsy Kwangsi attempt to detach the loyalty of his troops still stationed in Kwangtung, and was planning to ally with Ch'en,⁷³ while within Kwangtung itself, the local-nationalist movement was gaining strength, and had won the support of most Cantonese generals. In the summer of 1920, local Cantonese troops rose against the Kwangsi forces, and in response, Ch'en Chiung-ming launched his attack from Fukien. Kwangsi forces crumpled before this dual onslaught. The Military Government collapsed, and Kwangsi forces began to

retreat from Kwangtung, their withdrawal hampered by the loot of four years of occupation which they carried with them. ⁷⁴

It appeared that the Cantonese would be satisfied with the expulsion of Kwangsi troops from Kwangtung. Sun Yat-sen returned to Canton at the end of November and set about reorganising the Military Government there. The Cantonese had nothing to gain from launching an attack into Kwangsi, and they believed that Lu Yung-t'ing would appreciate the reality of his position, sandwiched between two hostile provinces, Kwangtung and Yunnan, and would give no further trouble. But Lu's loss of territory, and of prestige, irked him, and in the spring of 1921, he attempted to launch a counter-attack into Kwangtung, with backing from the Peking government. His attack was a fiasco; his subordinate deserted him, his troops scattered, and instead of revenging himself upon the Cantonese, he succeeded only in laying his province open to Cantonese invasion. In the summer of 1921, Cantonese troops under Ch'en Chiung-ming advanced up the West River into Kwangsi, almost without resistance, and took all the major centres in Kwangsi. ⁷⁵ The Kwangsi troops, who fled before the invasion were subjected to aerial bombardment from Cantonese planes; since bombs were unobtainable, the Cantonese satisfied themselves with dropping baulks of wood, which did little

damage. ⁷⁶ Lu fled from Kwangsi across the Tongking frontier, and entered upon his first exile, which was to last just over a year. The province passed from the relative calm which had marked Lu's ten year rule into anarchy and disruption, which was only ended in 1925 when the leaders of the new Kwangsi Clique consolidated their hold over the province.

CHAPTER II

The Background, Education and Early Careers of the Leaders of the Kwangsi Clique

Two features distinguish the leaders of the Kwangsi Clique from other warlords or regional militarists of the Republican period. Firstly, the Clique was not dominated by a single individual, but was led by a triumvirate of military men of virtually equal authority. Secondly, the Clique showed an enduring internal cohesion, which contrasted with the pattern of shifting loyalties commonly associated with warlord politics, and allowed the Kwangsi Clique to endure for over a quarter of a century, showing a durability only matched by Yen Hsi-shan in Shansi. This cohesion, and the ability of three men to maintain a relationship of mutual cooperation, may be ascribed in part to the similarities in their backgrounds, education and early careers, which established strong bonds between them and reinforced the ties of fellow-provincials; their equality of education and experience discouraged the domination of one of the three over the other two.¹

The Clique also drew strength from the stability of the second echelon of leadership, which was made up of men who shared the social and educational backgrounds of the Clique leaders. (See Chart 1).

The ties which bonded the Clique together were formed in two military schools, at the Kwangsi Military Preparatory School (Kuang-hsi Lu-chün Hsiao-hst'eh)², and at the Paoting Academy near Peking. Kwangsi officers who were trained in Japan, or at the Whampoa Academy in Kwangtung, do not appear to have formed connections with the Clique, but seem to have served outside their native province.

Before we discuss the education of the leaders of the Kwangsi Clique, we must look at their social backgrounds. Considerably more information is available on Li Tsung-jen, Huang Shao-hsiung and Huang Hsü-ch'u than on Pai Ch'ung-hsi and the greater attention given to the first three men reflects this imbalance rather than the relative importance of the four men.

Li Tsung-jen³

Li Tsung-jen was born in 1891, near Kweilin, into a family which had once been prosperous, but had suffered a serious decline over the past decades, partly as a result of the ravages of the aftermath of the Taiping Rebellion in Kwangsi, in which the Li family home had been destroyed. Li's father was a failed scholar, who made his living by tutoring and pen-pushing, while his mother ran the small family farm, assisted by her five sons.

When he was six, Li started to attend the village school, which was run by his father, spending half his time studying the Classics with his father, and the other half working in the fields with his mother. His schooling was adjusted to the farming calendar: at harvest time, or when the fields were being planted, he spent his whole time on agricultural work, but at slack seasons, he would go to school full time.

Li's father was bitterly anti-Manchu and anti-foreign; at the same time he appreciated the need for a modern education, in which 'western'

subjects were included. When a modern elementary school was set up in Lin-kuei Hsien, near Li's home, his father sent him to it. Li did not take well to the education offered by this school, and within a short time he had moved to another 'modern' school, the provincial Cotton Weaving Institute in Kweilin. Li completed a course at this school, but could find no work when he graduated, and returned in low spirits to his parents' farm. After a period of work on the farm and with his father, he returned to Kweilin in 1908, and enrolled in the Kwangsi Military Elementary School, a course of action which was dictated by his failure to gain an adequate education in other schools, rather than from his own or his parents' desire that he should be a soldier, a career that was still widely deprecated, especially by people with some pretension to scholarly pursuits, such as Li's father.

Huang Shao-hsiung.⁴

Huang Shao-hsiung was born in 1896, in a village

in Jung-hsien, only a few miles from the Kwangsi/Kwangtung border. His father, like Li's, was a failed scholar, and a school teacher; in addition he practised Chinese medicine and also drew income from renting land. Like Li, Huang studied in his father's school, a clan school which had been set up by the Huang clan elders. His childhood was unrestricted and boisterous; through his father he was introduced to a certain amount of modern ideas, though his education in the Classics was neglected. The freedom of his childhood, and the encouragement to modern thinking and physical daring given him by his father, marked Huang out from his contemporaries. In 1908, he went to Kweilin to enroll in the Military Elementary School; his departure from his home at so young an age, and his desire to become an officer aroused considerable parental misgiving.

Huang Hsu-ch'u.⁵

Huang Hsu-ch'u, like Huang Shao-hsiung, was a native of Jung-hsien. His family had declined from an earlier prosperity; his father worked as

a tutor, and made repeated attempts to pass the Imperial examinations, while his mother managed the family farm. When his father finally became a hsiu-tsai, in 1900, he found his qualification worthless; he could get no worthwhile post, and rather than continue his tutoring, he enrolled, with his son, in the Wuchow Sericulture Institute. For Huang Hsü-ch'u, the experience was just as abortive as was Li Tsung-jen's at the Kweilin Weaving Institute; it only served to delay his entry into the Military Elementary School. When he arrived there in 1912, Huang Shao-hsiung, Pai Ch'ung-hsi and most of the members of the second echelon of the Kwangsi Clique had already left. Huang played an active part in the 1911 Uprising at Liuchow, and this episode in his life enabled him to claim, later on, a revolutionary record.

It is significant that the fathers of Li Tsung-jen, Huang Shao-hsiung and Huang Hsü-ch'u should all have been men who attempted to achieve success in the traditional way, through becoming

scholar-bureaucrats, and that all should have failed. The example of their fathers must have turned their sons away from seeking traditional careers, and towards making their way in the army, which must have appeared to them a far better prospect for advancement than had been their fathers' choices.

Pai Ch'ung-hsi.⁶

Pai Ch'ung-hsi was born in 1893, near Kweilin. Little is known of his family background, beyond that his forebears had migrated to Kwangsi from Nanking at the end of the Taiping rule in Nanking. The most distinctive feature of his family was that it was a Muslim family, one of the very few in Kwangsi. Otherwise it is only recorded that Pai's father was a 'farmer', that Pai was the fifth of six sons, and that he enrolled in the Military Elementary School at about the same time as Huang Shao-hsiung and Li Tsung-jen.

The Kwangsi Military Elementary School.⁷

The Kwangsi Military Elementary School (Kuang-hsi

Lu-chün Hsiao-hst'eh) was established at Kweilin in 1906, as part of a programme instituted in Peking to set up military preparatory schools in every province, to improve the calibre of the officers of the Chinese Army. The military preparatory schools were the lowest of three levels of officer training; at the next level were four military middle schools, and at the top was the Paoting Military Academy.⁸ The military schools were financed by the central government, and the prospect of getting a free education appealed to young men whose parents could not afford to have them educated privately or abroad.

The Kwangsi school gave a highly-disciplined, spit-and-polish training, under the instruction of officers trained in Japan. 'Modern' subjects, such as science, mathematics and foreign languages, were taught, in addition to military training. The first head of the school was Ts'ai Ho, who later achieved fame as the leader of the 1916 anti-monarchist movement, and under his tolerant administration, the school attracted

many instructors with revolutionary leanings; revolutionary ideas were widely, if secretly, discussed, and there were many secret members of the T'ung Meng Hui in the school.

When the Wuchang Uprising occurred in the late summer of 1911, there was great excitement in the school, which was increased by the declaration of Kwangsi's independence from Peking. The new Kwangsi authorities decided to send a small force north to the Yangtze, to participate in the anti-Manchu fighting there; a small band of students from the Military Elementary School and other Kweilin schools went with it.¹⁰ The leader of the student group was Chao Heng-t'i, then a teacher in a Kweilin school and one of the leading revolutionary activists in the province.¹¹ Huang Shao-hsiung and Pai Ch'ung-hai were included in the group, along with several other students who were later to play important rôles in the Kwangsi Clique. Li Tsung-jen was not, and his exclusion meant that he missed the chance of further military education in Central and North China which came to

the participants.

The students from Kwangsi, to their chagrin, played little part in the fighting against the Manchus. By the time they reached the Yangtze, it had died down. After several months of inactivity, which most of the students devoted to sight-seeing in Nanking and the surrounding area, the student unit was disbanded early in 1912. Huang Shao-hsiung and some of his comrades were able to enroll in the Military Preparatory School (Lu-chün Yü-pei Hsüeh-hsiao) at Wuchang, formerly the Military Middle School (Lu-chün Chung-hsüeh). Huang graduated from this school in 1915, and with Pai Ch'ung-hsi and others went north to Paoting and enrolled in the 3rd Class of the Paoting Academy. They graduated in 1916, having received a sketchy and inadequate education; the Academy was seriously affected by Yuan Shih-k'ai's distrust of the staff and students of the Academy, which he regarded as a hot-bed of agitators.¹²

Whatever the drawbacks of the education given at Paoting at this time, their stay there was valuable

for the future Kwangsi leaders, for while they were there they met many of the future generals of the Kuomintang. and of warlord armies, and were afterwards linked to them in the old-school network. The fellow-feeling of Paoting graduates was never as important as that of Whampao graduates, but it was activated from time to time to cement alliances, notably in 1927, when it was used to organise opposition to Chiang Kai'shek.¹³ In this respect, it was occasionally of great use to the Kwangsi leaders.¹⁴

After their graduation, Huang Shao-hsiung and Pai Ch'ung-hsi returned to Kwangsi, along with several other Kwangsi graduates, to serve in the army of Lu Yung-t'ing. Pai Ch'ung-hsi had earlier considered going to serve in Sinkiang, instead of in Kwangsi, probably drawn to Sinkiang by his Moslem background.¹⁵ Several Kwangsi graduates did not return to their native province, but made their careers elsewhere, especially in Hunan. Amongst these were several men who were later identified with the Kwangsi Clique.

The Kwangsi Model Battalion¹⁶

The failure of some of the Kwangsi cadets graduating from Paoting in 1916 to return to their native province was caused in part by their uncertainty as to whether they would be able to make careers in Kwangsi. There was known to be considerable hostility among the senior officers of Lu Yung-t'ing's army to modern-trained young officers, who did not fit in well with officers from bandit origins, and there was little chance that such young men would be employed in Lu's regular units. Some of them chose not to return to Kwangsi; those who did had to be given posts of some kind, for Lu's advisors felt that otherwise there was a danger of their organising opposition to Lu. In 1917, a Model Battalion was organised, headed by Ma Hsiao-chün, and officered by the young graduates of Paoting and the Kwangsi Military Preparatory School.

Ma had been attached to Lu Yung-t'ing's headquarters for some time, but he was of a very different calibre from the majority of Lu's

officers; "he stood out as the one red spot in a mass of green branches".¹⁷ He was a hsiu-tsai, and a graduate of a military academy in Japan; he had been active in both the 1911 and the Second Revolutions. He was exceptionally well qualified to command a battalion staffed by modern young officers, and his influence on his subordinates was crucial in their later careers.

The battalion was formed at Nanning, in May 1917, and consisted of about thirty young officers, all military school graduates, and about five hundred soldier-cadets, many of whom were middle school or primary school graduates.

Huang Shao-hsiung, Huang Hsü-ch'u and Pai Ch'ung-hsi, plus a number of other men who were to become long-term associates of the Kwangsi Clique, served in the battalion; Huang Hsü-ch'u, who had recently graduated from the Peking Military College (Pei-jing Lu-chün Ta-hsüeh); was a company commander, while the others held lower posts.¹⁸

The battalion was not conceived as a fighting

force, but as a training unit, and as an oubliette for Kwangsi's potential dissidents. Ma Hsiao-chün had presumably been warned that there was to be no agitation in the battalion, for in spite of his former revolutionary connections, there was no overt political work in the battalion.

The battalion saw no action until 1919, when it was sent to deal with bandits in the west of the province, although it participated in the Hu-Fa advance into Hunan in 1917. In 1920, when Kwangsi forces in Kwangtung came under attack from Cantonese forces, the battalion was sent into Kwangtung, but was thrown back into Kwangsi with the defeated Kwangsi forces before having engaged the Cantonese forces. The battalion retreated into western Kwangsi, and was stationed at Po-se, in the Right River Valley. In June 1921, Ma Hsiao-chün surrendered to the advancing Cantonese forces, to allow his unit to remain intact; this surrender made the battalion the target of attacks in 1922 by forces of the Autonomous Army, a loose organisation of the forces

of former subordinates of Lu Yung-t'ing, who reasserted themselves after the withdrawal of Cantonese troops in 1922. Ma left the battalion, while Huang Shao-hsiung and Pai Ch'ung-hsi led as many men as they could keep together across country and into Kwangtung. Huang Hsú'-ch'u also left the battalion, and returned to his home in Jung-hsien, thus forfeiting his seniority over the other future members of the Kwangsi Clique. After a brief stay in Kwangtung, Huang Shao-hsiung, now completely alone in command of the remnants of the battalion, (since Pai Ch'ung-hsi had gone to Canton for medical treatment), moved his troops back into south Kwangsi, where he joined Li Tsung-jen, who was established in an area centering on Yü-lin Hsien.

Li Tsung-jen's Career after 1911.¹⁹

Having failed to join his fellow-students on their expedition to Wuchang, Li Tsung-jen had to be content with remaining in Kweilin and finishing his course at the Military Primary School, from which he graduated in 1913. Soon after his

graduation, the school was closed, and was replaced by a school named the Officers' Training Centre (Chiang-chiao Chiang hsi Suo). Li obtained a junior post in the new school, but it brought him little satisfaction; standards had declined with the departure of the best students and instructors for Wuchang, and there was little for Li to do; he spent his time at rifle practice and physical training. In 1914, the school stopped functioning altogether, and Li found himself unemployed. In spite of his own estimation of his popularity, which led him to believe that his qualities of amiability, sincerity and devotion to duty were widely appreciated, he could not find another job. He was forced to become a physical training instructor in a middle school; the job had one compensation, in that it paid him well, but it was not the career which either he or his parents had envisaged for him.²⁰

In 1916, Li left his job to enroll as a lieutenant in a Yunnanese unit, which was passing through Kwangsi on its way to Kwangtung, to

participate in the Hu-Kuo action in Kwangtung. In Kwangtung, Li transferred to a unit commanded by Lin Hu, a Kwangsi native who had served in Kwangtung and Kiangsi, and who was to become one of the chief supporters of Ch'ém Chiung-ming. Li saw his first action in the campaign against Lung Ch'i-kuang, the Kwangtung tuchün and supporter of Yuan Shih-k'ai, who was driven from the province by Lu Yung-t'ing.²¹

Li spent the years from 1916 to 1920 in Kwangtung and in Hunan, serving under Lin Hu and under Ma Ch'i, the adopted son of Lu Yung-t'ing, and one of his closest supporters; during this time, Li rose to the rank of major. In 1920, when Ch'en Chiung-ming drove the Kwangsi forces from Kwangtung, Lin Hu's troops were dispersed; some remained in Kwangtung, and were amalgamated with Cantonese forces, while others, including Li Tsung-jen's unit, which was made up of Kwangsi men, withdrew into Kwangsi.²² Each unit became virtually autonomous, and self-sufficient, living off the land. Li made his way to Yüclin, in southern Kwangsi, where he stayed until 1921, when Cantonese forces invaded Kwangsi;

then he withdrew with his troops into the Sixty Thousand Hills (Liu-wan Shan), on the Kwangsi/Kwangtung border, to prevent forcible amalgamation into the victorious Cantonese forces. Here he gathered together various wandering bands of soldiers, and emerged some time later with 2,000 well-armed men. This strength allowed him to negotiate with the Cantonese occupation forces, and to have himself named commander of the Third Route of the Kwangtung/Kwangsi Border Protection Army, stationed at Pei-liu, a neighbouring hsien to Yu^u-lin. In the confused conditions which accompanied the Cantonese withdrawal from Kwangsi in 1922, Li was able to extend his control to cover five hsien, including Huang Shao-hsiung's native Jung-hsien and to reach a working arrangement with the Autonomous Army, by which he maintained his independence and his local control. It was here that Huang Shao-hsiung joined him at the end of 1922, and it was from this base that he and Huang launched the actions which gave them, by 1925, control over the whole of Kwangsi, the base from which the Kwangsi Clique launched its activities on the national scene. (See Map I).

CHAPTER III.

The Background to the Unification of Kwangtung and Kwangsi in 1926.

In March 1926, the Central Political Committee of the Kuomintang passed an Act of Alliance, which formally united Kwangtung and Kwangsi. This was an important step in the Kuomintang's struggle for power in China; for the first time its power was officially extended beyond the boundaries of Kwangtung. Its significance for Kwangsi was much greater. It indicated that the province had emerged from the period of chaos and isolation into which it sunk after the Cantonese invasion of 1921, and was ready again to take a part in national affairs.

Lu Yung-t'ing, who ruled Kwangsi from 1911 to 1921, also dominated Kwangtung between 1916 and 1920. In 1920, Ch'en Chiung-ming marched into Kwangtung from Fukien, and drove Lu Yung-t'ing back into his own province. Ch'en's campaign allowed Sun Yat-sen to re-establish himself in Canton, where he soon revived his plans for a Northern Expedition.¹ It must be launched, Sun decided, from Kwangsi into Hunan, which meant that Kwangsi would first have to be subjugated.

A threatened counter-attack from Lu Yung-t'ing into Kwangtung gave an added pretext for Kwangtung military action against Kwangsi. In the summer of 1921, Cantonese troops under Ch'en Chiung-ming marched into Kwangsi, and by the end of September, had occupied all the key towns in the province.² The Kwangsi troops put up little resistance; with the exception of Lungchow, near the Annam border, all fell without major fighting.³ The important opium centre of Posei, near the Yunnan border, was taken in a co-ordinated attack by Yunnanese forces.⁴

The Cantonese campaign was brutal; the soldiers were avenging themselves for four years of Kwangsi occupation of their own province. "The invaders pillaged everything in their route, abducting women and girls...there was a great fear almost everywhere; as soon as the Cantonese soldiers were seen arriving, the alarm was given, and a sauve-qui-peut général followed".⁵ French missionaries in the province suddenly found themselves appreciated. Their compounds were crowded with refugees, and there were numerous conversions, "non pas toutes

désintéressés".⁶

In many areas, no such protection was available. Between Nanning, the capital, and Poose, for instance, a thousand hamlets were destroyed, by Cantonese or Kwangsi troops.⁷ In the midst of the turmoil and disruption, Lu Yung-t'ing fled to Annam. His rule had given Kwangsi nine years of calm. "...there had been no serious natural disasters...nor had there been any currency collapse or advance collection of land taxes, nor any miscellaneous taxes to cause the people distress. The fact that the operations of the Kwangsi troops were all outside the province had brought about something difficult to achieve: no trouble from soldiers within the province. The only negative aspect was that the government had not been active in pursuing the welfare of the people, but, because there was less of the oppression of bad government, the people could live their rough and simple lives without interference..."⁸ All that was now ended.

The sufferings of the people were compounded by the rapid spread of banditry. The Kwangsi Army disintegrated before the advancing

Cantonese; its commanders in areas occupied by the Cantonese either surrendered, fled the province, or took to the hills, transforming themselves into bands of brigands.⁹ Those in unoccupied areas maintained their positions, but independent of all higher authority. In these circumstances, the distinction between soldiers and bandits became academic. Kwangsi became an "immense field of desolation".¹⁰ The trade of the province for the whole of 1921 was down by half - indicating that it must have virtually ceased on the Cantonese invasion in June.¹¹ The Kwangsi Bank collapsed, and its whole issue of 27 million yüan in paper notes became worthless.¹²

The Cantonese did not press their attack beyond the conquest of the major cities. These they "bled white, with their intemperate requisitions, their exorbitant demands for war contributions, exasperating the population with their vexations of every kind".¹³ Sun Yat-sen appointed Ma Chün-wu governor of the province. Ma, a Kwangsi native, doctor of Berlin University and close/associate of Sun's,

was filled with good intentions concerning the administration of Kwangsi; he himself lived with the greatest frugality, and was determined to bring good frugal government to the province. But he was powerless; the only economies he could bring about were in official entertaining.¹⁴ His control did not extend far beyond the walls of his yamen at Nanning; he was distrusted by the Cantonese, as a Kwangsi man, and by the Kwangsi people, as a puppet of Canton.¹⁵ He was caught up in the growing hostility between Sun Yat-sen and Ch'en Chiung-ming, over the proposed northern expedition, for which, at the end of 1921, Sun was making preparations at Kweilin. Ch'en, however had already started to withdraw his own troops into Kwangtung.¹⁶ As they withdrew, the remnants of the Kwangsi Army took over the areas they vacated, contracting the area nominally controlled by Ma. In the spring of 1922, when Cantonese troops withdrew completely, Ma admitted defeat. He packed up his seals of office, and the translations on which he had been working during the long hours of inactivity entailed in administering an area one

does not control, and took a boat for Canton. At Kuei-hsien, it was attacked by soldiers of Li Tsung-jen, and, to Ma's desolation, his favourite concubine was killed.¹⁷

By mid-summer, the last 'guest' troops had left the province. A semblance of centralised provincial government remained; a series of governors held office, but effective provincial government fell into abeyance. Kwangsi was divided between an assortment of armies and bandit gangs. Some were allied into a loose federation known as the Autonomous Army, which was set up in May, 1922.¹⁸ Lin Ch'ün-t'ing was its official commander-in-chief, and from August on, he also held the title of governor, conferred on him by the Peking government.¹⁹ Lin's authority as commander-in-chief was purely nominal; most of his 'subordinates' were entirely independent, each ruling the area, often very small, which his forces dominated. Kwangsi was teeming with petty warlords: "there were more battalion commanders than dogs, and the streets were full of commanders (ssu-ling) running around".²⁰ In addition to small bands,

there were at least fifteen forces in Kwangsi with several thousand troops.²¹ The two largest individual forces were those of Shen Hung-ying, controlling the northeast of the province, and of Lu Yung-t'ing on the Tongking border.²² Li Tsung-jen, controlled an area on the Kwangtung border, where he was joined in the summer of 1922 by Huang Shao-hsiung, his main collaborator in the unification of Kwangsi.²³

Petty Warlords: The area which Li and Huang controlled lay along the Kwangtung/Kwangsi border, and included Huang's native hsien, Jung-hsien, which became his personal stronghold. The bitter enmity felt in Kwangsi towards the Cantonese, and especially towards Ch'en Chiung-ming, who in 1922 was the dominant figure in Kwangtung, made open contact with Canton impossible. But when Sun Yat-sen returned to Canton early in 1923, the situation changed.

Sun was aided in his resumption of power by Yunnanese and Kwangsi mercenary troops, who attacked into Kwangtung from Kwangsi; amongst

these troops were the troops of Shen Hung-ying, who had taken over the port of Wuchow, on the Kwangtung/Kwangsi border, in December 1922.²⁴ Shen's area of control bordered on that of Huang Shao-hsiung, at Jung-hsien. Shen offered Huang the chance he wanted to expand his area of control. Huang felt impotent in his alliance with Li Tsung-jen, whose subordinate he was in real terms; Li had 2000 men and 1000 rifles, to Huang's 1000 men and 900 rifles.²⁵ Huang did not want to break with Li, but he felt the need for action, and expansion, which he felt would not come with the slow and cautious Li. When Shen invited him to join his command, and move his troops into the Wuchow area, he agreed.

Superficially, this new alliance was a poor one. Shen, an ex-brick layer and bandit, was notoriously untrustworthy. But Huang had relatives in Shen's entourage and he knew that the first alliance Shen planned to break was that with Sun Yat-sen; Shen was expecting to extend his power in Kwangtung by an attack on other forces loyal to Sun. Huang believed that

he would fail, and that after Shen was defeated, he himself would be able to gain control of the Wuchow region, if he first moved troops there under the guise of an alliance with Shen.

Li Tsung-jen believed that the element of risk involved was too large, and was strongly opposed to it, but the gamble was irresistible to Huang.

In the event, Huang was proved right. War broke out between Shen and Kuomintang forces in April 1923.²⁶ Shen was swiftly driven back up the North River, away from Kwangsi; Wuchow was left defenceless.²⁷ Huang, using Pai Ch'ung-hsi in Canton as a go-between, now laid plans for a concerted attack by himself and forces from Kwangtung on troops of Shen Hung-ying remaining at Wuchow.²⁸ The attack was launched in July, and the city taken over quietly on July 18th. Apparently through the intervention of an American gunboat lying at Wuchow, Shen's commander in the city, Feng Pa~~o~~-Ch'u, surrendered without a fight.²⁹ Huang officially 'surrendered' to the Kuomintang forces at the same time,³⁰ but Pai Ch'ung-hsi, who returned to Wuchow with the incoming Cantonese forces, brought with him

instructions from Sun Yat-sen which made Huang commander of the anti-Bandit Army (T'ao Tse Chün), as Huang's forces were now renamed.³¹ Huang was to operate in Kwangsi, in close liaison with Cantonese troops of the 1st. Division, who were to be stationed along the West River in Kwangtung, as far as Wuchow. Their commander was Li Chi-shen, a native of Wuchow, who had made his career in the Cantonese Army. He was now appointed Rehabilitation Commissioner for the West River, with his headquarters at Chao-ch'ing.³² This was the start of a long co-operation between Li Chi-shen and the emergent leaders of the Kwangsi Clique, which eventually led to his complete identification with the Clique.

Huang Shao-hsiung intended to use his base at Wuchow for further expansion up the West River valley into Kwangsi. His rear was secured by his entente with Canton, but before he could move, he had to secure the base itself, by removing Shen Hung-ying's subordinate, Feng Pao-ch'u, who was still believed loyal to Shen. Feng was arrested at a party on board a local

'flower-boat' (i.e. brothel), attended by all commanders in the region, in honour of Teng Yen-ta, who had come to Wuchow with the Cantonese troops.³³ He was thrown into the vault of the local bank, and subsequently executed.³⁴

Huang increased his forces after the capture of Wuchow, by the standard procedure of amalgamating defeated enemy troops, bringing his strength up to three regiments, in all 3000 men.³⁵ Pai Ch'ung-hsi was his chief of staff. The Opium Suppression Board at Wuchow gave him a substantial income. Control of opium revenues, that is the ability to tax opium in transit from Yunnan and Kweichow to Canton, was the key to success for any militarist in Kwangsi. Those who won control of a city through which the opium trade passed found it "far more advantageous to encourage and tax this industry rather than to hinder it".³⁶

Huang maintained his connection with Li Tsung-jen, though this was now undercover. Officially, Li supported Lu Yung-t'ing, who had returned from exile in the autumn of 1922,

establishing himself in his native region of Lungchow.³⁷ At the end of 1923, he had built his troops up to a point where he felt strong enough to return to Nanning, and to his ruined mansion at nearby Wuming, which had been sacked by Cantonese troops in 1921.³⁸ He assumed the title of tu-pan.³⁹ His power was centred in the south and west of the province, where Li Tsung-jen's own satrap lay. Li was not strong enough to oppose him; by giving him superficial support, however, he could maintain his own independence; he assumed the title of commander of the 5th Independent Brigade, which Lu conferred on him.⁴⁰ His independence did not, however, go far enough to allow any open connection with Huang Shao-hsiung, who was considered to be in the camp of the Kuomintang, Lu's sworn enemy.

Neither Li nor Huang believed that Lu would be able to regain overall control of Kwangsi, for many of his former subordinates, notably Shen Hung-ying, were reluctant to accept his renewed authority. Li and Huang believed that their future lay in connections with Canton and the

Kuomintang. For the moment, however, it suited them to have a foot in both camps. Their own private alliance must have been widely suspected, but in an atmosphere of constant shifts in loyalty, it would have been quite possible to believe that the apparent split between them was an actual one. Li can have been no less reliable than the majority of Lu Yung-t'ing's subordinates. Li himself claims that Lu trusted him, and that on his advice, Lu abandoned a plan for an attack into Kwangtung via Wuchow, and decided instead to go on 'tour' through the north and east of Kwangsi.⁴¹ This tour, which saved Huang Shao-hsiung at Wuchow from the danger of attack by Lu's forces, was Lu's undoing.

At Wuchow, Huang was extending his contacts with Canton. Early in 1924, he went to Canton for his first meeting with Sun Yat-sen. The material aid which he hoped for, and in ^ypersuit of which he made suitable declarations of revolutionary devotion, was not forthcoming. Sun made it clear to Huang that true revolutionaries must stand on their own feet - perhaps as a

test for Huang, who had yet to display any revolutionary characteristics.⁴² Another year was to pass before he even joined the Kuomintang.⁴³ There were other, more influential Kwangsi generals in Canton, the mercenaries, who had helped to bring Sun Yat-sen back to power in 1923. They probably prevented the Kuomintang from financing their fellow-provincials, whose activities in Kwangsi they regarded as threatening to themselves.⁴⁴

By early 1924, Li and Huang, though still not openly allied, had consolidated their hold on lower Kwangsi, and by crushing a minor warlord who held an area between them on the West River, had linked their two domains firmly together.⁴⁵ In a pincer action from east and west, they squeezed the offending warlord out; their troops met at Pengchua on the West River, the former Chin-t'ien, the starting point of the Taiping Rebellion.

At this moment, the power balance in Kwangsi suddenly shifted violently. Troops of Shen Hung-ying besieged Lu Yung-t'ing at Kweilin. Lu had left on his tour in January 1924, taking with

him a guard of 2000 men.⁴⁶ After discussions on the Hunan border with representatives of Chao Heng-t'i, the Hunan tuchün, and advocate of federalism, concerning a possible joint attack into Kwangtung, he made his way to Kweilin,⁴⁷ which was again controlled by Shen Hung-ying. Lu apparently believed that Shen was still subservient to him; he entered the city, and ordered Shen's troops to withdraw, which they obediently did. They returned, however, in the middle of April, and besieged the city.

The two strongest forces in Kwangsi were neutralised. The siege promised to be a long one. The topography of the Kweilin region made it difficult to attack. The small plains, dominated by weird, sheer-sided hills, were easily defended. The besiegers were safe from attack by the reinforcements which Lu Yung-t'ing immediately sent for. None of the four armies which he summoned - two from Kwangsi, two from Hunan, one commanded by his adopted son, Ma-Chi - were able to break through to his

rescue. The besieged on the other hand were safe behind the thick walls of the city. Their main enemy was to be hunger.

The siege started gaily, with a New Year celebration in which fire-crackers competed with the sound of gunfire.⁴⁸ But as food supplies dwindled, it became increasingly unpleasant. Lu Yung-t'ing was impatient to be out, and had himself carried on to the wall, where "rifle in hand the old man...fired away at the foe".⁴⁹ The foreign community was brought low by the death of the Reverend Cunningham, struck down by a stray bullet. His death occasioned the appearance of posters which proclaimed: "Jesus God was not a strong spirit, that one of his missionaries has been killed!"⁵⁰ An attempt by a group of missionaries from Wuchow, led by the flamboyant 'Cowboy missionary', Rex Ray of Texas, to break through to their besieged brethren ended in their own capture by bandits, and to an incident whose settlement involved the execution of a large number of Chinese.⁵¹

The siege lasted three months. By the time it neared its end, Lu Yung-t'ing's authority

in the province had effectively been eroded; the time had come for Li Tsung-jen to break with him. Li now renamed his army the Army to Settle Kwangsi (Ting-Kuei Chun),⁵² and in June, he and Huang Shao-hsiung launched a joint expedition against the provincial capital, Nanning.

Strategically, their task was easy; the bulk of Lu's forces were in the Kweilin region, attempting to extricate him from the city.⁵³ But both had misapprehensions about attacking Lu;⁵⁴ they regarded him as a worthier man than Shen Hung-ying, their other potential candidate for attack; it went against the grain to attack Lu rather than Shen. But this was no time for moral scruples, and Li and Huang found it within themselves to overcome them. They reached an accommodation with Shen whereby they would join with him to take the important city of Liuchow, in central Kwangsi, from Lu.⁵⁵

For their attack on Nanning, Li and Huang marshalled about 8000 troops.⁵⁶ Huang commandeered a large number of boats at Wuchow to transport his men up river; additional financing was taken care of by a grant from

Canton of 30,000 yuán.⁵⁷ Foreign sources believed that the attack was ordered by Sun Yat-sen,⁵⁸ and it certainly had his support,⁵⁹ nevertheless, the troops of Li and Huang were still fighting under the personal banners of the two men.⁶⁰

In the event, the 'battle' for Nanning was fought and won before Li and Huang arrived. The local Chamber of Commerce paid Lu Yung-t'ing's forces in the city 30,000 yuan to evacuate peacefully. T'an Hao-ming, the local commander (and Lu Yung-t'ing's brother-in-law), retired to Lungchow. Lin Chun-t'ing, the illiterate governor, whom Lu had permitted to retain his sinecure after Lu's return to Nanning the year before, had earlier moved down into the Nan-Lu area of Kwangtung, where he teamed up with a group of anti-Kuomintang militarists.⁶¹

Having gained Nanning, Li and Huang sent troops, under Pai Ch'ung-hsi, to attack Liuchow in conjunction with Shen Hung-ying, who had already raised the siege of Kweilin; the town fell in August.⁶²

Other troops of Li and Huang continued the campaign up river to Lungchow. Although

resistance was expected in this region - the officers of the attacking army took their coffins with them - the defenders fled into Tongking, commandeering a fleet of taxis which had recently started operating between Lungchow and Langsom, over the border, along a road which Lu Yung-t'ing had built, perhaps just for this purpose. The French consul made a large amount of money by extending consular territory to cover an assortment of buildings, where he housed such of the terrified local inhabitants as could pay the entrance fee.⁶³

The final consolidation of Kwangsi:- The emergent Kwangsi Clique had won quick success from their first major campaign. Except at Liuchow, their forces were scarcely extended. Part of the reason for their easy victories lay in their reputation as formidable fighters, which preceded them, and struck fear into their enemies. The continuing unity between Li, Pai and Huang gave them an advantage over other warlords; instead of one man dominating a group of subordinates, these three men acted as a team. Their unity was founded on their

common backgrounds and experience, and on ties of friendship; it was also based on the realisation that none of them would ever come to anything without the others, and that their forces were too small for them to operate singly. The three men's characters complemented each other: Huang supplied the dash and daring that was necessary to allow any advance, and Li the caution which prevented Huang from over-reaching himself, while Pai brought to the group the military skill which gave them victory on the battle-field. Pai was undoubtedly one of the best field commanders of his generation in the whole of China, and in Kwangsi he was in a class of his own. Their unity was strained immediately after the capture of Nanning. In July, 1924, a joint Headquarters was set up at Nanning, under which the two armies of Li and Huang were officially amalgamated for the first time. Li Tsung-jen became commander in chief, and Huang his deputy. Huang appears to have resented his lower status. However, he realised that a split at this stage would cost them all that they had

won to date; he swallowed his pride, and dramatically smashed his wine-glass as a pledge of his loyalty to Li, during the banquet to celebrate the establishment of the new headquarters.⁶⁵

In spite of their success, there was no time to relax; threats were looming from several directions. There were many small militarists still to be dealt with; Shen Hung-ying was a dubious ally; and an attack from Yunnan seemed likely. The first threat that had to be dealt with was not, however, a military one. It concerned the nature of their relationship with Canton.

Sun-Yat-sen was desperately trying to curtail the power of his Yunnanese and Kwangsi allies in Canton, who now dominated the city and its revenues. It seemed an attractive idea to send Liu Chen-huan, the Kwangsi commander in Canton, back to Kwangsi, and to make him governor of Kwangsi. Sun ordered his appointment to this post in November, 1924, shortly before his own departure for Peking.⁶⁶ Li and Huang

could not accept this solution to Sun's problem; they were indignant at this response to their efforts to unify Kwangsi, which they had believed would lead them into closer co-operation with the Kuomintang. Rather than accept Liu as governor, they named themselves Rehabilitation Commissioner and Deputy Commissioner (Shan-hou Tu-pan, Hui-pan) of Kwangsi, a few days after Sun had made Liu's appointment.⁶⁷ Huang then went down to Canton for consultations with Hu Han-min, who was temporarily in charge of Kuomintang affairs during Sun's absence. On Huang's insistence, the leaders of the Kuomintang accepted the principle that he and Li Tsung-jen, of all the Kwangsi leaders within and without the province, would have sole right to Kuomintang recognition and support. Their new appointments were confirmed, and Huang returned to Nanning, where he and Li officially took up their new posts; their armies were renamed the 1st. and 2nd. Kwangsi Armies. The Kuomintang was forced to shelve the problem of the Kwangsi forces in Canton, and to abandon the plan of making Liu Chen-huan governor of Kwangsi.⁶⁸ The new relationship between Li and

Huang and the Kuomintang was symbolised by Huang's action in joining the Kuomintang, which he did at a special ceremony while he was in Canton.⁶⁹ The recognition given to Li and Huang also represented an explicit rejection of Shen Hung-ying, who, although still technically allied to Li and Huang, was given no official recognition. The alliance had never been regarded as anything more than temporary, and now that Lu Yung-t'ing was defeated, war was anticipated between Li and Huang, and Shen.⁷⁰

At the beginning of 1925, Kwangsi entered into its fifth consecutive year of civil war. The province was overburdened with troops; there were possibly as many as 100,000 men under arms which put the province in the same class as rich and populous provinces such as Kwangtung, Szechwan, Kiangsu, Chihli and Hupei.⁷¹ The trade of the province was still badly disrupted, and the various currencies in circulation were completely unstable. Bandits still controlled most of the rural areas of the province, while the cities were periodically looted by warlord

armies. The populations of the cities suffered terribly during the sieges which warlords resorted to from time to time, and from the occasional use of arson as a military tactic.⁷²

Alongside the impending war with Shen Hung-ying, a threat was building up from Yunnan. Sun Yat-sen had made T'ang Chi-yao, the ruler of Yunnan, Deputy Grand Marshall in September 1924, before his departure for Peking, in an attempt to obtain a measure of unity in the South-West before launching his Northern Expedition, which got under way in November. T'ang was however more interested in expanding his own influence and that of the Federalist movement,⁷³ with which he was then involved; he saw Sun's absence from Canton as a chance for him to move into Kwangtung,⁷⁴ The route to Kwangtung lay through Kwangsi.

T'ang moved troops to Pose in January 1925, but was delayed there while he attempted to dispose of a large stock of opium, with which he proposed to finance his expedition.⁷⁵ This delay gave Li, Huang and Pai a chance to start their attack on Shen Hung-ying.

Shen struck first, attacking in strength

between Wuchow and Nanning, in the hope of dividing the forces of Li and Huang. His attack was driven back, due in part to the spontaneous flight of a large section of Shen's army, who took the repositioning of one of their own gun batteries to be a sign for retreat.⁷⁶ Shen's forces put up a better fight for Liuchow, which nevertheless fell in February. Kweilin was abandoned and occupied by Pai Ch'ung-hsi; the region north of Wuchow was secured by a combined Cantonese/Kwangsi expedition from Wuchow.⁷⁷

Before the campaign against Shen was finished, Li and Huang were forced to withdraw troops to meet T'ang Chi-yao, whose troops took Nanning in mid-February, at about the same time as Pai Ch'ung-hsi entered Kweilin. The small body of troops guarding Nanning withdrew without a fight.

In response to urgent appeals from Kwangsi, Canton sent the 2nd. Yunnanese Army, long stationed in Kwangtung, to their aid. This army was commanded by Fan Shih-sheng, an old enemy of T'ang Chi-yao. He entered Kwangsi in

early March, and advanced up river towards Nanning with Huang Shao-hsiung. Between them they had 20,000 men, plus a quantity of supplies from Kwangtung;⁷⁸ at the beginning of April, they laid siege to Nanning.

The withdrawal of troops from the campaign against Shen Hung-ying, before he had been finally defeated, allowed him to counter-attack in March and recapture Kweilin. At the same time, Han Ts'ai-feng, a former subordinate of Lu Yung-t'ing, attacked Liuchow, but was driven off after heavy fighting. Kweilin was soon recaptured by Pai Ch'ung-hsi, but not until it had been thoroughly looted by Shen Hung-ying's troops, who had earlier looted Liuchow.⁷⁹ The people of the cities of Kwangsi were undergoing greater hardship than at any time since the Cantonese invasion of 1921. Nanning, under siege, had become "a city of mourning".⁸⁰

In March, on the death of Sun Yat-sen, T'ang Chi-yao announced his intention of succeeding Sun as Grand Marshall. His announcement provoked immediate condemnation from the

Kuomintang. Although superficially T'ang appeared to have a good deal of strength in the South-West, and was seen by some foreign newspapermen as the "saviour from bolshevism"⁸¹ he was actually beset with difficulties. He had withdrawn troops from Kweichow for his attack into Kwangsi, and now found his own rear threatened by an attack from local Kweichow troops. An attack on Liuchow ended disastrously; three thousand Yunnanese were killed on the battlefield, or drowned in the river into which they were driven by victorious Kwangsi troops.⁸² In June, T'ang's potential Yunnanese and Kwangsi allies in Canton, Yang Hsi-min and Liu Chen-huan were crushed by Kuomintang forces. The Yunnanese besieged in Nanning were increasingly weakened by hunger and disease, as were the townspeople. The Yunnanese were, according to missionaries in the city incredibly dirty and uncouth, and their heavy death roll from illness was due in part to filth of their living conditions.⁸³ In July, the Yunnanese ~~were~~ finally broken out of the siege, and made their way back to Yunnan, ^upersued by

Fan Shih-sheng.⁸⁴ The province of Kwangsi, exhausted after five years of continuous civil war was unified under the control of the new Kwangsi Clique - Li Tsung-jen, Huang Shao-hsiung and Pai Ch'ung-hsi. Alliance with Kwangtung:- They had completed the first - and at this stage probably the only - part of their grand design. They had become rulers of their native province, province, provincial warlords. Their power and authority were entirely based on the armies they commanded; no civilian authority was functioning, except the Customs, which was run by functioning, ~~except the Customs, which was run~~ by foreign nationals. Their achievement differed little from that of other men who had fought their way to the top in one province, except in that the situation in Kwangsi had been so confused for so long: there were so many petty militarists, that their struggle for power had been rather more protracted and arduous than it might have been if they had only had to overthrow one strong man.

But there were some striking features about Li and Huang, and their immediate supporters. They were still very young; none of them was much over thirty. Their military education had made them aware of the need to train their soldiers properly, and they devoted a great deal of time to this. They differed most noticeably from

more traditional warlords, in that they were not impervious to the modern ideas and ideologies abroad in China. Their horizons had been extended beyond the borders of their own province; by their birth, into educated if declining families, which gave them some pretensions to the universal values of Confucianism; by their education, which introduced them to new ideas on the role of the soldier; and by their contacts with revolutionary ideas, as in 1911, when Huang and Pai went to Wuchang with a student corps. They had lost the unthinking provincialism of men such as Lu Yung-t'ing, for whom Kwangsi had been the world, but on the other hand, they had far stronger connections with the province, and identification with it than the most distinguished contemporary Kwangsi natives, Ts'en Ch'uen-hsuan["], whose roots were clearly national and cultural, not provincial. Li, Huang and Pai were uncomfortable amalgams of petty provincial warlords, and young men with modern nationalist leanings. The only way out of this

predicament was to accept the position they had won for themselves, and to try and cover it with more seemly clothing, that is to associate their warlord dominions with a modern, nationalist group outside the province. They would offer their military strength to an alliance, in return for achieving respectability as members of a national group. This need not, and did not, entail any loss in real power, or in real control over their province. Geographically, traditionally and economically, as well as politically, the only choice for Kwangsi was an association with the Kwangtung of the Kuomintang.

It appeared, in the summer of 1925, that Kwangtung and Kwangsi were about to form an alliance. From the start of their careers as independant military leaders, Li and Huang had formed their main external connections with the Kuomintang. They had sent representatives to the Aftermath Conference (Shan-hou Hui-yi), organised by the Tuan Ch'i-jui in Peking, in early 1925,⁸⁵ but this was the only sign of interest in external contacts elsewhere. The

Kuomintang had given Li and Huang significant help in the past, and now seemed prepared to enter into a formal union. In his speech to the newly formed Military Committee of the National Government on July 6th 1925, Chiang Kai-shek outlined plans which called for the complete unification of the two provinces. He saw Kwangsi as the first stepping stone on the route of a future northern expedition, and therefore proposed the establishment of military schools, arsenals and even an aeroplane factory in Kwangsi, in the Kweilin region. Strategic roads linking the two provinces would be built. Chiang referred to the geographic importance of Kwangsi for Kwangtung, and to its "very close connection with revolutionary history", to which he added the loyalty of its present leaders to Canton. He also made it clear that such an alliance would involve the incorporation of Kwangsi's armies into the Kuomintang Army on an absolute basis. His tone was severe; he was not offering an alliance of equals, but the submission

of the one to the other.⁸⁶ Many Kuomintang leaders in Canton were not convinced of the purity of the motives of the new Kwangsi leaders in entering an alliance with the Canton, and would not trust them except in a subsidiary position.⁸⁷

Nevertheless, moves were made to prepare for an alliance. On August 6th, the Kuomintang Government at Canton ordered Li Tsung-jen and Huang Shao-hsiung to take charge of all affairs in Kwangsi, in the name of rehabilitation, preparatory to reorganisation.⁸⁸ At the same time, Li Chi-shen visited Nanning, to discuss full-scale unification, and Kwangsi participation on a future northern expedition.

The Kwangsi leaders accepted his proposals.⁸⁹ Wang Ching-wei also visited Kwangsi in the summer of 1925 for similar discussions.⁹⁰

But the assassination of Liao Chung-k'ai at the end of August and the start of the second Eastern Expedition against Ch'en Chiung-ming diverted Kuomintang attention from matters of less urgency, and for a time there was no further

progress towards unification.

It is also probable that the Kwangsi leaders were deterred by the demand that they surrender sovereignty over their armies. Their whole position within their province depended on their armies; it was one thing to put them at the service of an ally, another to hand over control completely.

The question of unification was shelved. In September, Kwangsi set up a Civil Affairs Office, to run the province, headed by Huang Shao-hsiung. This organisation was independent of Canton, and kept Kwangsi's internal affairs firmly in Kwangsi hands. Co-operation and collaboration between Kwangtung and Kwangsi did exist, however, in two fields. Kwangsi followed Kwangtung's lead in supporting the anti-foreign strike and boycott then in progress, especially in Hong Kong and Canton, and in encouraging the anti-foreign and anti-imperialist movement within Kwangsi. In the Cantonese-dominated city of Wuchow, the boycott was 'rigid'. Servants and food were withdrawn from the local Japanese Customs officials.⁹¹ The Labour Federation, which had

been organised in Wuchow in December 1924, was strong enough to demand compulsory union membership. It was also strong enough to oblige the local military authorities to arrest vessels suspected of breaking the boycott.⁹² British residents were withdrawn from Wuchow on the advice of their consul there, in July, and shortly afterwards the consulate was wrecked by a mob.⁹³ Demonstrations by workers and students echoed those in other parts of China. Even in Nanning, remote from Cantonese influence, a workers' syndicate was formed in the summer of 1925.⁹⁴ It was believed by foreigners that Li Tsung-jen and his colleagues had become bolsheviks.⁹⁵ Anti-foreign agitation was worst along the West River, but the wave of hatred for foreigners spread throughout the province, even into the remote areas on the Kweichow border.⁹⁶

The demonstrations and boycotts were tolerated and in many cases encouraged by the new rulers of Kwangsi; in February 1926, Huang Shao-hsiung personally led a demonstration to

the catholic mission in Nanning.⁹⁷ But although resident foreigners felt that the "red peril" had arrived in Kwangsi, the Cantonese authorities did not share their feelings about mass action in the province. The manifesto of the 2nd Kuomintang Congress, held in January 1926, reported that the mass movements in Kwangsi were poorly developed, and that they had not yet established a proper revolutionary base.⁹⁸ The mass movements were prevented from developing independant bases, and though encouraged by the rulers of Kwangsi, they were also carefully channeled and directed, into anti-foreignism, which was quite harmless to the Kwangsi authorities, and away from social questions, which might have threatened the position of the Kwangsi rulers.

On the military front, Kwangsi forces took part in two campaigns, which, though less important than the Eastern Expedition against Ch'en Chiung-ming, played an important

role in the unification of Kwangtung itself. Having built up large forces to fight their internal enemies, the Kwangsi leaders now had surplus military capacity, which they could deploy to aid their neighbour, especially when, as in these two campaigns, their own interests were directly involved.

The first campaign, against Hsiung Ko-wu, took place in the North River valley of Kwangtung. Hsiung had long-standing connections with the Kuomintang, and was currently a member of the Central Executive Committee.⁹⁹ After a chequered career in his native Szechwan, where he had been for some time tuchun,["] he was driven from Szechwan into Hunan, in 1923. In the summer of 1925, he was on the move again, this time into Kwangtung, prodded by the Hunan tuchun,["] Chao Heng-t'i, who wanted him out of his province.¹⁰⁰ The Kwangsi leaders did not hinder his passage through north Kwangsi into Kwangtung¹⁰¹ but when, in September, Hsiung went to Canton, and was arrested on suspicion of being in collusion with Ch'en Ch'iu-ning, they

sent troops into Kwangtung and mopped up his troops.

The second campaign involving Kwangsi troops was in the Nan-lu area of south Kwangtung. Here, three former subordinates of Lu Yung-t'ing, Teng Pen-yin, Shen Pao-i and Lin Chun-t'ing controlled several hsien, and had established a new 'province', Kwangnan.¹⁰² As long as these men remained independant, they offered a threat both to Canton, and to Kwangsi, their native province. At the end of 1925, a combined Kwangtung/Kwangsi campaign was launched against them. Kwangsi troops attacked south from Kwangsi, while Cantonese troops moved west along the coast. By December, all important points on the mainland had fallen, and by January 1926, Hainan Island had also fallen.

Some of the defeated troops from this campaign were incorporated into the Kwangsi armies; their contribution to the strength of the Kwangsi armies was less, however, than that of the arms captured from them and from Hsiung K'o-wu. Kwangsi was still largely dependant on external supplies of armaments; her own

arsenal at Kueiping appears only to have produced bullets.¹⁰³ With the end of the Nan-Lu campaign, Kwangtung was completely reunified for the first time under the Kuomintang. The time had come for the Kuomintang to expand beyond Kwangtung, Negotiations started again to bring Kwangsi into a full alliance with Kwangtung.¹⁰⁴ At the end of January, as a prelude to formal negotiations, Wang Ching-wei, chairman of the Canton government, and T'an Yen-k'ai paid a courtesy visit to Wuchow. The two men made a round of speeches and visits, and were rapturously received by the citizens of Wuchow. Informal discussions were held with Kwangsi leaders - "they exchanged ideas on co-operation".¹⁰⁵ The Kwangsi leaders again signified their desire for co-operation, and their willingness to participate in a northern expedition.¹⁰⁶ It remained only to draw up a detailed agreement. It was decided that Pai Ch'ung-hsi should go down to Canton, to negotiate individual points, and to act as chief Kwangsi delegate on the Kwangtung/Kwangsi Unification Committee, which was set up shortly

afterwards in Canton.

Pai Ch'ung-hsi arrived in Canton in February. If he had hoped for a quick settlement, he was disappointed; negotiations did not go smoothly. There were three main points of dissension: the number of armies which Kwangsi would contribute to the National Revolutionary Army; financial aid from Kwangtung, and army pay. Kwangsi wanted two armies, the 7th and 8th Armies of the National Revolutionary Army, while Canton wanted Kwangsi to have only one, the 7th; Kwangsi wanted financial aid from Kwangtung, which Kwangtung felt unable to give; Canton felt that soldiers should be paid 10 yüan per month, which Kwangsi could not afford to pay without financial aid.¹⁰⁷ Deadlock was reached, and Pai returned to Kwangsi at the end of February. The suspicion was strengthened in Canton that all Kwangsi really wanted was financial aid from Kwangtung.¹⁰⁸

The Kwangsi leaders were determined to continue negotiations. They drew up a new set of pre-conditions to an alliance, whereby they undertook to finance themselves independantly, provided that they were allowed to establish

two armies.

In March, Huang Shao-hsiung went down to Canton to continue negotiations, and an agreement was finally reached, but not on Kwangsi terms. Only one army was established, the 7th Army. No definite arrangement was reached about financial matters, though some money was promised. Half of Kwangsi's troops were put into the new 7th Army, commanded by Li Tsung-jen; the rest remained under the control of the Kwangsi Military Bureau, and were later formed into the 15th Army.

On March 15th,^{an} official act of unification was passed by the Central Political Committee in Canton.¹⁰⁹ Huang Shao-hsiung returned to Kwangsi with a crowd of young political workers, and an incompetent Russian adviser, Mamaey, a former steel-worker.

The unification was achieved. If it caused any excitement in Canton at the time, it was overshadowed almost immediately by the Chung-shan Incident, for in the Chung-shan incident, crucial questions of revolutionary direction were involved, while revolutionary considerations were hardly uppermost in the Kwangtung/Kwangsi

alliance. Kwangtung needed allies, so did Kwangsi. By linking Kwangsi to the ideology of the Kuomintang, by enrolling their armies into the Kuomintang en masse, as the leap in Kwangsi party enrollment between 1925 and 1926 indicate that they did,¹¹⁰ the Kwangsi leaders stood a greater chance of maintaining their position within their own province, where revolutionary ideas had already gained ground. It was a marriage of convenience, and a quiet one at that. Canton was seething with its own problems. Li, Huang and Pai looked quizzically at the factions and cliques of Canton, and tightened their own unity, laying the foundation of their own clique.

Three months after the signing of the act of unification, Kwangsi forces were already in action on the Northern Expedition. Over the next three years, Li Tung-jen and Pai Ch'ung-hsi carved out for themselves careers on the national stage. But they kept their base inviolate, under the control of Huang Shao-hsiung. When they were forced to retire there in 1929, they reverted to the roles they had shunned in 1926 - provincial warlords. They had cause to

be grateful that the unification of 1926 had been so sketchy, and that the Kuomintang had failed to establish any real authority in the province.

The alliance with Kwangsi was the first which the Kuomintang government made with another province. For a variety of reasons - lack of time, lack of resources, lack of funds, the relative unimportance of Kwangsi, the Kuomintang failed to establish any significant measure of control over Kwangsi. This set a pattern for the subsequent treatment of provinces which came into the Kuomintang fold. In almost every case, government of the province was entrusted to existing provincial power holders, a tacit recognition of the inability of the Kuomintang government to impose any other settlement in the first instance.

In Kwangsi, the first addition to the Kwangtung base, the Kuomintang ignored, in practice, the question of real unity. It would have been difficult for it to have done anything else. Canton could send a few young activists to encourage political work, but could not force the submission of pro-Kuomintang militarists who wished to maintain their independence, short of

waging war on them; and the Kuomintang was not strong enough to fight its allies, however dubious their allegiance.

CHAPTER IV.

KWANGSI AND THE NORTHERN EXPEDITION.

The Kwangsi militarists were the first militarists not based in Kwangtung to ally themselves with the Kuomintang. Their alliance with the Kuomintang grew out of their discomfiture as petty militarists, out of the traditional links between Kwangtung and Kwangsi, and out of their need to strengthen their position within Kwangsi through external allies. Their position in relation to the Kuomintang was singular in that, because there was a disproportionate number of soldiers within the province after five years of civil war, and because of the very close relationship between the three Kwangsi leaders, they could afford to operate on behalf of the Kuomintang outside their province, without losing control of it; two of the three could leave the province, and confidently leave the control of their base to the third.

T'ang Sheng-chih and the Kuomintang: T'ang Sheng-chih of Hunan was the second warlord convert to the Kuomintang. His activities in Hunan during the first four months of 1926, and his alliance with Canton, were crucial factors in

the Kuomintang decision to launch the Northern Expedition in the summer of the year. The Kwangsi leaders played an important part in the obscure and complicated negotiations which led up to T'ang's entry into the Kuomintang camp.

T'ang was an amalgam of the traditional and the modern, a graduate of the Paoting Academy, but also a devout Buddhist, strongly influenced by his personal priest, Ku Tzu-t'ung.¹ He was one of four division commanders whose forces made up the Hunan Army, and Shan-hou Tupan for South Hunan, though his influence extended into the other divisions through the old-school network of Paoting.² T'ang was an ambitious man, and he wanted to take over the whole of Hunan. But first he had to secure defensive alliances with militarists in neighbouring provinces, especially with Fang Pen-jen in Kiangsi³ and *with* Kwangsi. An alliance with Kwangtung was unlikely, since the Kuomintang Army contained two Hunanese units, under T'an Yen-kai and Ch'eng Ch'ien, who were old enemies of T'ang's. His first overtures to the Kwangsi leaders were made in the winter of 1925, without any apparent outcome.⁴ Then, in January 1926, a further Hunanese delegate

appeared in Wuchow. This man, Yeh Ch'i, was a Kwangsi native who had made his career in the Hunan Army; he was also a t'ung-hsiang of Huang Shao-hsiung, and a Paoting classmate of both Huang and Pai Ch'ung-hsi.⁵ He was therefore an ideal go-between for talks about the formation of a Hunan/Kwangsi alliance. As it turned out, Yeh's visit to Wuchow was to have a direct influence on the formation of T'ang's alliance with the Kuomintang, though this was not his original mission.

Yeh was representing not T'ang Sheng-chih, but Chao Heng-t'i.⁶ He had come to Wuchow to follow up his visit to Nanning in the summer of 1925, when he had brought to the Kwangsi leaders Chao's proposal that they take up the Federalist cause.⁷ In 1925, Federalism was a strong enough force in South China to force the Kwangsi leaders to take overtures from Chao Heng-t'i seriously, and this may explain why there was a delay in their reaching a settlement with the Kuomintang. At the same time, the possibility of Kwangsi forming an alliance with the Federalist forces, which would put the Kuomintang at great disadvantage, probably encouraged the Kuomintang

to make its own alliance with Kwangsi. Chao had a strong personal claim on the Kwangsi leaders - he had been their teacher. Chao was in Kwangsi around the time of the 1911 Revolution, working in various military schools, and had played an important part in the revolutionary movement in the province.⁸

What changed the nature of Yeh Ch'i's visit to Wuchow, and helped to secure T'ang Sheng-chih's entry into the Kuomintang camp, was that it coincided fortuitously with the visit of Wang Ching-wei and other Kuomintang leaders, who had come to establish the basis of Kwangsi's alliance with the Kuomintang. Yeh was impressed with the pro-Kuomintang demonstrations which he saw in Wuchow, and with the new-found revolutionary zeal of the Kwangsi leaders, and wavered in his own support of Federalism. The Kwangsi leaders then forced his hand by spreading rumours that he had come to negotiate T'ang's alliance with the Kuomintang.⁹ Yeh was put in the position of appearing to represent T'ang while in fact representing Chao, and was obliged to change his allegiance to T'ang. To reinforce his change in loyalty, he was taken down to Canton and given an

official reception at Whampao.¹⁰

T'ang Sheng-chih, who found himself allied to the Kuomintang without ever having intended such a development, saw no harm in it once it had occurred. Strategically, it was convenient, since it protected his rear. From January on, his connection with Canton was common knowledge, and it spurred his attack on Chao Heng-t'i, a bitter opponent of the Kuomintang. In March, he launched an attack north from his base in South Hunan. Two of the other three Hunan divisions remained neutral, and the third was easily swept back. T'ang took Ch'angsha on March 16th, and soon held the whole Hsiang Valley as far as Yochow.

It now became clear that T'ang did not intend his 'alliance' with the Kuomintang to hamper his own ambitions as far as Hunan was concerned. He adopted the slogan of the provincial warlord, 'pao-ching-an-min',¹¹ had himself proclaimed governor of Hunan, undertook to uphold the federalist provincial constitution of Hunan and denied all connection with the Kuomintang.¹² He sent an emissary to Wuhan to try and secure Wu P'ei-fu's non-intervention in

Hunan, and also tried negotiating through the consular body there.¹³

T'ang was not strong enough to maintain his position in Hunan, for Wu had decided to throw his considerable strength behind Chao, and help him to win back the province. Chao still had support in West Hunan, and T'ang knew that he could not resist the combined forces of Chao and Wu. He now needed help from Kwangtung, and when Pai Ch'ung^{hsi} and Ch'en Ming-shu visited him late in March, he assured them of his sincerity and of his loyalty to the Kuomintang.¹⁴

The start of the Northern Expedition:-

T'ang was driven back as easily as he had advanced, when the counter-attack started early in April, and by the beginning of May he was back at Hengyang, where he held the enemy on the edge of the hills.¹⁵ Although T'ang managed to halt the enemy advance, he was still under heavy pressure, and had lost his protective cover in Kiangsi, where ^{Wu} P'ei-fu had engineered the downfall of Fang Pen-jen.¹⁶ He called desperately for aid from Kwangtung, which Canton was obliged to offer him, since his defeat would

leave them face to face with Wu P'ei-fu. On April 24th, a meeting of military leaders in Canton decided to send troops to T'ang's aid.¹⁷

Canton could raise such troops from two sources: either from the 2nd. and 6th Armies, the troops of Tan Yen-k'ai and Ch'eng Ch'ien, then stationed in North Kwangtung; or from the Kwangsi 7th Army. There were two objections to sending the Hunanese troops: in the first place they were not good fighting forces, and in the second they were totally unacceptable to T'ang Sheng-chih.¹⁸ The enmity he felt for these exiled Hunanese equalled that which he felt for Wu P'ei-fu, and there was a danger that he would chose to submit to Wu rather than have them back in Hunan.

The Kwangsi forces, on the other hand, were acceptable to T'ang and were already mobilised on the border between Hunan and Kwangsi. At the Wuchow Conference in January, Li Tsung-jen had proposed sending two Kwangsi brigades into Hunan¹⁹ and had moved troops up to the Hunan border when T'ang first started north.²⁰ Heavy recruiting had been going on in Kwangsi since January.²¹ Kwangsi's build-up was not disinterested. Defeated Kwangsi troops had fled into Hunan at

the time of the reunification of the province in 1925, and were serving under Chao Heng-t'i and Wu P'ei-fu. Wu was negotiating with Kwangsi's most powerful enemy, T'ang Chi-yao of Yunnan to launch a two-pronged attack on Kwangsi from Yunnan and Hunan, if his expedition into Hunan succeeded.²² T'ang Sheng-chih provided a bulwark between the Kwangsi troops in Hunan and Kwangsi itself, and Kwangsi was obliged to give aid to T'ang to protect it.

It was thus in the interest both of the Kuomintang and of Kwangsi that the 7th Army should go to the aid of T'ang. The Kuomintang Military Committee ordered Kwangsi troops into Hunan in the first week of May.²³

The Northern Expedition had long been the chief military aim of the Kuomintang, and Sun Yat-sen, whenever he returned to Canton, had tried to launch a Northern Expedition. Sun's troops had never advanced far beyond Kwangtung, because of the weakness of his armies, and because of betrayals in the rear. The reorganised Kuomintang had set about organising a Party Army, which would be able to spearhead an expedition, and securing Kwangtung firmly, so that the expedition would

not be betrayed from the rear. The second of these conditions was fulfilled when the last opposition in Kwangtung was crushed at the end of 1925, but there was still considerable doubt as to whether the Kuomintang was strong enough, Militarilly and economically, to launch an expedition in early 1926. Nevertheless, the Canton Government issued a manifesto denouncing the northern warlords Wu P'ei-fu and Chang Tso-lin on February 25th, an action tantamount to a declaration of war.²⁴ The Kuomintang, however, was not united in its desire for an expedition at this time. Chiang Kai-shek had been calling for an early start since the 2nd. Congress in January,²⁵ but his enthusiasm was not shared by the Left-Wing or the Communists. Their hand was forced, however, first by Chiang's successful coup of March 20th, which brought him absolute control over the Kuomintang armies, and caused the departure from Canton of Wang Ching-wei, the leader of the Left-Kuomintang, and second by the southward drive of Wu P'ei-fu, and the necessity if created to dispatch Kuomintang troops to aid T'ang Sheng-chih; there was a strong strategic case for the expansion of

the Hunan operation into a full-scale Northern Expedition.²⁶ Li Tsung-jen saw Chiang Kai-shek at Whampoa on May 11th and 12th, and pressed him to start the Expedition immediately.²⁷ Li was supported by Li Chi-shen, the Chief-of-Staff and commander of the 4th Army, who was also prepared to send troops into Hunan.²⁸ Chiang Kai-shek needed little convincing; he realised the strategic advantages of an immediate start, and also the unifying force which the Expedition would exert on the troubled Kuomintang; the Party would rally behind him as leader of the Expedition. On May 21st, the 2nd. Plenum of the Kuomintang Central Executive Committee declared its intention of embarking on an immediate expedition.²⁹

Kwangsi troops reached Hengyang on May 12th, and went into action immediately, helping T'ang Sheng-chih to push the enemy back over the Lien River.³⁰ Yeh Ch'i defected from the enemy at the end of May,³¹ and at the beginning of June units of the 4th Army arrived from Kwangtung. By mid-June, there were 50,000 troops under the Kuomintang flag in Hunan.³² T'ang Sheng-chih became the commander of the 8th Army, which his army was renamed, and Field Commander (Ch'ien-ti tsung-chih-hui), of the

Kuomintang forces. The Kuomintang found itself in the anomolous position of having its great revolutionary undertaking directed, at the front, by a man who a few weeks before had been a not very distinguished warlord.

At the beginning of July, the Kuomintang forces again attacked north, and met with little resistance. The floods in Hunan that summer were so severe that the opposing armies had not expected the Kuomintang to attack, and were caught off-balance.³³ They were forced to abandon Ch'angsha, to avoid being trapped there, and the city was occupied by the Kuomintang on July 10th. Two days later the Northern Expedition was officially launched in Canton.

The political workers who followed the armies north started work at once, organising mass movements, and bringing together existing revolutionary organisations in the province. This work was largely in the hands of low-level communist and Left-wing Kuomintang cadres, and was immediately successful. At the top the Hunan Provincial Committee came into being on July 30th, with T'ang Sheng-chih as chairman.³⁴ For all his status as top Kuomintang man in the province,

T'ang was not prepared to allow active political work in his army. He appointed one of his own subordinates, Liu Wen-tao, head of the Political Bureau in the 8th Army, and continued to encourage his troops to worship Buddha rather than the Three Principles of the People.³⁵

After the fall of Ch'angsha, there was a hiatus while the next stage of the Expedition was planned. Operations continued to mop up all of Hunan south of the Tungt'ing Lake, but there was no serious fighting. Further Hunanese units converted to the Kuomintang, and the armies of Kweichow offered their allegiance too. There was a possibility that an agreement would be reached with the ruler of the five south-eastern provinces (Kiangsu, Chekiang, Anhwei, Fukien and Kiangsi) Sun Ch'uan-fang, which would recognise his authority over those provinces in return for his neutrality towards the Northern Expedition. This would have allowed the Kuomintang to move directly north, through Wuhan to Peking. A series of emissaries from Sun had been to Canton from the beginning of the year on, to negotiate with the Kuomintang. Sun felt more threatened

by Chang Tso-lin and Chang Tsung-ch'ang to his north than by the Kuomintang in the south.³⁶ The Kuomintang considered Sun to be more enlightened than other big warlords, though his rule of the five provinces probably fell short of the claims that it had turned the region into an arcadia (shih-wai t'ao-yuan)³⁷

These negotiations broke down when Sun saw how powerful the Kuomintang was becoming, and how easily it was attracting converts. He decided that he could not allow them to get any stronger; in early September, he issued an ultimatum to the Kuomintang to withdraw from Hunan, and a few days later war started in Kiangsi.³⁸

At the beginning of July the Kuomintang's main forces in Kwangtung, with the exception of the 5th and part of the 4th, which were to garrison Kwangtung, were mobilising to move north. Chiang Kai-shek was appointed Commander-in-Chief, and left Canton at the end of July, for Ch'angsha. A top-level military meeting was held there on August 13th, at which it was decided to launch an immediate expedition against Wuhan, taking advantage of Wu Pei-fu's preoccupation with Feng Yü-hsiang.³⁹ The planned attack on Kiangsi

would be put off until Wuhan had fallen, though troops coming north from Kwangtung would stay on the Hunan/Kiangsi border to prevent Sun Chuan-fang from attacking into Hunan and cutting the Kuomintang forces in two. The Ch'angsha meeting was marked by a move by Chiang Kai-shek to impose his authority on Li Tsung-jen and T'ang Sheng-chih, who had acted independently on the campaign to Ch'angsha, while the General Headquarters was still in Canton. Their plan for the continuation of the Expedition was rejected⁴⁰ and their position as subordinates of Chiang's underlined. T'ang took the snub hard, and revealed for the first time his jealousy and resentment of Chiang Kai-shek.⁴¹

For the attack on Wuhan, the 4th, 7th and 8th Armies were to bear the main burden of the fighting, while the 9th and 10th (Kweichow) Armies made a flanking attack through West Hunan. With the exception of the 4th Army, (which had only half its strength in Hunan) these armies were all recent converts, and the Kuomintang cannot have had much confidence in their revolutionary character. In speeches delivered to the 7th and 8th Armies in Ch'angsha, Chiang Kai-shek attempted to

instil some revolutionary spirit into the men, by praising their courage, their unity and their achievement in conquering Hunan; he even held them up as examples to the whole National Revolutionary Army.⁴² But T'ang Sheng-chih, whose eyes were set on Wuhan, was not moved; his chief concern was to ensure that this rich plum should fall into his own hands.

The campaign for Wuhan saw the first heavy fighting of the Expedition. On August 18th, the 4th, 7th and 8th moved across the Milo River on a wide front. The 4th, fighting up the railway line to Wuhan met heavy opposition, but the 7th advanced through wooded, sparsely populated country, and with the help of local guides,⁴³ was able to break through behind Yochow, forcing the enemy to abandon the city to the 8th, which was advancing parallel to the Tungt'ing Lake. In the last week of August, the 4th Army was caught up in very heavy fighting for a series of strategic bridges on the railway to Wuhan. These were the last defensive positions before Wuch'ang, and Wu P'ei-fu was so determined to hold them that he rushed to the front himself from north China. To instil discipline, he

ordered all men who broke rank to be beheaded.⁴⁴ But the 4th drove his forces back and swept on to Wuchang, whose gates were closed on September 1st.

The siege of Wuchang struck terror into the enemies of the Kuomintang, who had never believed that the Kuomintang was capable of seriously threatening them. "The southerners whose preparation for the attack on Yochow was regarded with a smile of indifference a week ago are now hammering on the gates of Wuchang..."⁴⁵ The 4th and 7th launched a series of attacks on the city, but were unable to break in. However, T'ang Sheng-chih's forces, which had crossed the Yangtse up river, entered Hankow and Hanyang without opposition on September 6th; the local commander, Liu Tso-lung, had secretly arranged to defect to the Kuomintang in August, and now came out openly.⁴⁶ Soon afterwards he was made commander of the 15th Army, to the fury of the Soviet adviser, Teruni, who believed that Liu could easily have been defeated, and that bringing a "scoundrel" like him into the Kuomintang armies was only storing up future trouble.⁴⁷

Converted Warlords;

At the beginning of September, the Kuomintang found itself with 15 armies under its control, only six of which had any long standing connection with the Party. The other nine had all defected: "...there had been very few engagements during the original northward drive... in which the National Army had not been assisted in or presented with victory by the treachery of troops either in the actual fighting army of the enemy or in the rear".⁴⁸ The Kuomintang cannot have calculated on so many defections, but nor could it spurn those who defected, since it was saved the necessity of fighting them. The speed of the expansion of the Kuomintang armies made it impossible to bring these newly-acquired armies under full Party control and to instil genuine revolutionary consciousness into them, without halting the Northern Expedition temporarily. But the impetus of success, and the threatening attitude of Sun Ch'uan-fang drove the Kuomintang on. The warlord converts were left to their own devices. Most of them, however, realised that it was the possession of ideology which had allowed the ill-equipped, out-numbered Kuomintang forces

to defeat Wu P'ei-fu. They were also aware that the ideology of the Kuomintang had an impact outside its own armies. "Mercenary armies were no longer always reliable. Soldiers, recruited from the pauperised masses, were liable to be infected by the spirit of revolt spreading through the peasant masses. Minor militarists tried to exploit that psychological atmosphere for promoting their own ambition. They declared their adhesion to the Kuomintang and the anti-imperialist movement, in order to retain the loyalty of their soldiers..."⁴⁹ The converted warlords were anxious to have political instructors attached to their armies,⁵⁰ who they believed would ginger up their troops: "it is felt that the Southerners in some degree are fighting for an ideal, which however erroneous it may be considered, gives them an enthusiasm entirely lacking among the Northerners."⁵¹ The desire to instil a little political training into the men did not mean that the militarists intended to remould themselves. Their primary concern remained to hang onto their regional control. Most of the warlords who were transformed into generals of the National Revolutionary Army,

now and during the rest of the Northern Expedition, were neither revolutionary nor nationalist. They could no longer be called 'warlords', since this category was reserved for "all those military leaders who were not in alliance with the Kuomintang, or all those who had no 'chu-i', which was another way of saying the same thing."⁵² They found their new titles comfortable; old-style warlordism was becoming increasingly unfashionable as the country was stirred by nationalism. They also secured their regional positions for the time being by joining the Kuomintang voluntarily.

There was one compelling reason for not surrendering local control to the Kuomintang civil authorities; the question of finance and supply. Kuomintang finances, inadequate before the Expedition began, had not been improved by the fall of Hunan, for the provincial treasury turned out to be empty.⁵³ The considerable revenues of Wuhan had to go in part to supplying the Hunan troops, as well as the Hupei ones, while the Kwangtung finances had to be devoted to the forthcoming campaigns into Kiangsi and Fukien. No finance was available for troops from other

provinces. Greed and selfishness apart, no converted militarist could afford to surrender control of a source of income; to do this, he had to retain local power. A vicious circle was created, which made it impossible for the Kuomintang to set up a centralised finance system in occupied areas. The 7th Army, operating away from its base, found itself in constant difficulties over supply. Though the 7th was promised financial aid from Canton at various stages, this was seldom paid; Kwangsi had to bear a large part of the costs of her troops on the Expedition, a task made difficult both by the poverty of the province and by the increasingly large distances separating the troops from Kwangsi.⁵⁴ The 7th was chronically short of weapons, ammunition and clothing; the troops started out from Kwangsi in summer uniforms, and suffered badly from the cold as the autumn wore on. In Hunan, they had been forced to pay for their needs - requisitioning was forbidden - by issuing virtually worthless paper currency, which was as unpopular with the local people as requisitioning would have been.⁵⁵

The Kiangsi Campaign.

Early in September, the menacing activities of Sun Ch'uan-fang in Kiangsi and on the Yangtze made it clear that the Kuomintang forces would have to attack into Kiangsi or be attacked themselves. The siege of Wuchang, which showed signs of being a long one, since the Kuomintang lacked the necessary artillery to break down the walls,⁵⁶ was continued, but with a reduced force. The campaign into Kiangsi began in the first week of September, with the bulk of the attacking force moving in from West Hunan; the 7th (later reinforced by a unit of the 4th) moved east along the Yangtze from Hupei, aiming for Kiukiang, while further units marched north from Kwangtung, along the Kan Valley. The campaign, which started off on a note of wild enthusiasm - the 7th was for example ordered to take Kiukiang by September 17th⁵⁷ - quickly ran into difficulties. Nanch'ang, the provincial capital, was taken towards the end of September, but not held; the attackers were thrown back in confusion. On the Yangtze, the 7th advanced easily at first, but then found itself cut off when the enemy landed

troops up river.⁵⁸ On the Nanch'ang front, the situation became chaotic. The 6th had taken 50% casualties during the abortive attack on the city, and fell back, no longer in any shape to fight.⁵⁹ The 1st. Army also fell back. The 7th, now out of contact with headquarters, had been forced to change direction by the enemy threat to its rear. Though it was able to drive the enemy back, it did not resume its move towards Kiukiang, because its way was blocked by flooding,⁶⁰ but struck across instead towards the Kiukiang/Nanch'ang Railway. The army took Tean, midway between the two cities, on October 4th, taking the enemy by surprise, and relieving the Kuomintang forces near Nanch'ang. It could not hold the town, however, which was recaptured by enemy reinforcements two days later.

By this stage, Sun Ch'uan-fang appeared to have abandoned his intention to hold Kiangsi. He was threatened with the defection of his commander in Anhwei, Ch'en T'iao-yuan, and preferred to pull back into Chekiang and Kiangsu before his troops were further reduced. He made a new attempt at a negotiated settlement with the Kuomintang, but when this failed,⁶¹

fighting started again, with another Kuomintang thrust. Nanch'ang and Kiukiang fell into Kuomintang hands within a few days. Sun's troops on the Yangtze, now virtually independent of Sun, pulled back into Anhwei,⁶² while those further south were withdrawn into Chekiang, though floods in the P'oyang Lake region prevented many of them from getting clear, and the Kuomintang took 30,000 prisoners.⁶³

The Kiangsi campaign lacked the easy successes and low casualties of the Hunan campaign. The Kuomintang lost at least 7,000 men killed in Kiangsi.⁶⁴ The troops were demoralised by supply difficulties, and by the approaching winter. There was serious trouble in the 7th Army, over supplies.⁶⁵ The end of the Kiangsi campaign might have been a good time to straighten out these difficulties, and to consolidate the converted warlord armies; the only fighting was now in Fukien, where Ho Ying-ch'in's section of the 1st. Army was advancing. Instead of postponing for a while any further increases in the size of the revolutionary armies, the Kuomintang continued to welcome all defectors, and its emissaries continued to pay secret

visits to susceptible enemy generals, hoping to persuade them to defect at the appropriate moment. In October and November, a motley crowd of generals from Fukien, Kiangsi, Chekiang and Szechwan joined the Kuomintang forces. In the short run, it was easier for the Kuomintang to win these men over peacefully, rather than fight them. But in the long run, the Party was in danger of corrupting itself, and diluting the revolutionary spirit.

In December, the Kuomintang decided to press its attack into Chekiang. The attack from Kwangtung into Fukien was well advanced, and the defection of Ch'en T'iao-yuan in Anhwei was assured for a future date. Most of the forces which had taken part in the Kiangsi campaign were rested, and not used for the Chekiang campaign. The 7th took up defensive positions on the Anhwei border.⁶⁶ The Kuomintang put great reliance for the attack into Chekiang on the forces of a Chekiang defector, Chou Feng-ch'i. Pai Ch'ung-hsi was given command of the campaign; up to that stage he had been acting as Chief-of-Staff to Chiang Kai-shek, standing in for Li Chi-shen, the official Chief-of-Staff, who

had stayed in Kwangtung. The campaign started, and then hung fire until the end of January 1927.

The split in the Kuomintang.

Until the end of 1926, the schisms in the Kuomintang, the tensions between the Communists and the Kuomintang, and the divergence of ambitions within the Revolutionary Army remained hidden. Superficially, the Party and the Army were united behind the commander-in-chief. The political upheavals at ground level which followed in the wake of the Kuomintang advance, and the growing power of the mass movements attracted great attention, masking other questions. But at the end of 1926, these divisions, which had been fomenting below the surface, started to come out into the open, and the seemingly cohesive Kuomintang structure was split progressively into many parts.

The first issue which provoked the emergence of these divisions was the question of moving the capital, which became urgent in December 1926. It was obvious that the Kuomintang Government had to be moved, now that almost all of China south of the Yangtze was under Kuomintang control.

Wuhan was the logical place for it to move to. But militarily, Hunan and Hupei were dominated by Tang Sheng-chih; politically the Communists and the Left-wingers were in the ascendancy in the area. Chiang Kai-shek's power would be circumscribed if the government was set up there. While a substantial section of the Kuomintang leaders, who saw no objection to the establishment of the capital at Wuhan, participated in a joint Committee of the Central Executive Committee, and the Government Council, which was established there to direct the government in December, Chiang kept his headquarters at Nanch'ang, and gathered there a group of Central Committee members unwilling to serve at Wuhan. Relations between Wuhan and Nanch'ang deteriorated through the early months of 1927, until, in March Wuhan stripped Chiang of all his offices. In April, when Chiang turned on the communists and established his own capital at Nanking, the split became absolute.

These developments took place against a background of continuing success for the Kuomintang; the victories of its armies, the social revolution which followed in their wake, and the forceful

diplomacy of the Wuhan government, established the ascendancy of the Kuomintang throughout South China. The growth of the Kuomintang as the new repository of orthodoxy encouraged even more militarists to put themselves under its command; by the end of 1926, there were 30⁶⁷ Kuomintang armies. The tasks of turning these armies into useful, reliable components of the National Army, of reducing their commanders' local power, and placing the armies under central control was not pursued; the in-fighting within the Kuomintang made the task more difficult than ever. From the point of view of maintaining mass support for the Kuomintang, it was essential that armies under its banner should not behave like traditional soldiers, as converted but unreformed warlord troops were likely to do. But it was impossible to avoid this while political work within the armies was not pressed.⁶⁸ The Kuomintang was repeating Sun Yat-sen's mistake, that had caused him so much trouble in Kwangtung, of allying with non-Party militarists for short-term gains, and then failing to bring them under Party control and remould their men. The major difference was that in 1926 and 1927, the

Kuomintang did this on a far wider scale than Sun had ever been able to. At the end of its rule in Wuhan, the Left-Kuomintang issued a pronouncement on the dangers of revived warlordism, of warlordism under the guise of the Party, which attacked men who had gained power in the name of the Party or had hung on to existing power by allying with the Party. But by then the damage was done.⁶⁹ "A pitfall in the path of the Nationalist Government is the old-fashioned but seemingly converted warlord...The encirclement of the National Government by a band of friendly tuchung" is as much a menace to civilian government as a direct attack by enemy tuchung...the observer wonders whether the Kuomintang will have time enough to whip these acquired armies into shape, or will find itself in the maelstrom of tuchun" politics".⁷⁰ The answer was debatable.

At the end of January, the advance into Chekiang got under way again. There was considerable fighting for the province. In one important battle the surname of the Kuomintang commander, Pai Ch'ung-hsi, played a crucial part. His personal standard, the character Pai

on a plain background, was flying in the Kuomintang ranks. One of the enemy commanders was Pai Pao-shan, whose personal standard was also the character Pai on a plain background. When the enemy troops saw the Pai banner flying on the opposing side they assumed that Pai Pao-shan had defected, and that defeat was near; they fled.⁷¹ An intriguing aspect of this incident is that, unless a deliberate trick was intended, Kuomintang troops were still going into battle under personal banners, essentially a warlord practice.

In mid-February, Hangchow, the provincial capital of Chekiang fell, and Sun Ch'uan-fang's troops withdrew into Kiangsu. South of the Yangtze only the Shanghai/Nanking region remained outside Kuomintang control, but that region was now defended heavily, largely by Fengtien and Shantung troops.⁷²

The Kuomintang planned to attack the region from the south and from the west; on the Yangtze, Ch'ang Ch'fen moved along the south bank, Li Tsung-jen along the north; from Chekiang, Pai Ch'ung-hsi attacked by the railway to Shanghai, while Ho Ying-ch'in moved around the

Tungt'ing Lake towards Nanking. Li Tsung-jen's troops did not have to fight; the arranged defection of Ch'en T'iao-yuan occurred at the beginning of March, at the price, it was rumoured, of 600,000 yuan.⁷³ The attack on Shanghai was held back until early March; the Shanghai workers virtually took over the city in advance, allowing Pai Ch'ung-hsi to enter the city on March 21st. almost without opposition. Three days later, Nanking was taken by Ch'eng Ch'ien's troops; his arrival was followed by the Nanking Incident, which aroused the mighty wrath of the Powers, and since it was popularly blamed on communists in Ch'eng's army, gave Chiang Kai-shek a useful pretext for his attack on the communists three weeks later.

The Purge.

With the fall of Nanking and Shanghai, the split between Wuhan and Chiang Kai-shek intensified. Chiang now controlled Chekiang, Kiangsu, Anhwei and Fukien; Wuhan controlled Hunan and Hupei, Li Chi-shen Kwangtung, Huang Shao-hsiung Kwangsi; Chu P'ei-te in Kiangsi was caught awkwardly between Wuhan and Chiang Kai-shek's forces, but as long as the General

Headquarters remained in Nanch'ang, Kiangsi was dominated by Chiang.

The newly found identification of the converted militarists became hopelessly confused; they were forced to ally with whichever power bloc was nearest to them. Li Tsung-jen, whose troops were in Anhwei, naturally turned to Chiang. Politically, the Kwangsi leaders favoured Chiang's turn to the right. They gave Chiang their full support during the Furge of April, 1927. This was the first occasion on which the Kwangsi leaders worked together as a Clique, on the national scene. Up to this point on the Northern Expedition, each of the Kwangsi generals had performed his specific job, under the auspices of the General Headquarters; there had been no opportunity to work as a clique or pressure group. But now the four Kwangsi generals came together for the first time for a year, and worked closely together; they deployed their forces simultaneously and in different places against the communists.

Pai Ch'ung-hsi, who became garrison commander of Shanghai, after its fall, immediately put

himself to pains to reassure the foreign residents of Shanghai, in a state of complete hysteria after the Nanking Incident, that he would protect their lives and their property, and would rigorously suppress all "unorthodox activities in the city", a clear reference to communist activities.⁷⁴

Pai shared with the other Kwangsi generals a great antipathy towards the communists, the origins of which are difficult to trace. The communists did not threaten their personal positions; there had been relatively little communist activity in Kwangsi, or in the 7th Army. Li Tsung-jen had kept a strict hand on the political department of the army, and had not allowed its original political director, Huang Jih-k'uei, to march north with the 7th; instead he had taken with him Mai Huan-chang, a less radical figure.⁷⁵ Li and Huang Shao-hsiung had taken strongly against Borodin, because they felt he patronised them,⁷⁶ but this alone cannot explain their bitterness towards the communists.⁷⁷ Perhaps Li had been alarmed by incidents in Anhwei in March, when clashes between Kuomintang and communist elements resulted in the sacking of the

Anhwei Kuomintang and Union Headquarters.⁷⁸ He must certainly have been concerned with the decline in discipline in his army, a result of the privations the men had suffered from the 7th Army's continuing supply difficulties. In January they had taken part in looting at Kiukiang,⁷⁹ and they had gained the reputation of being a "particularly lawless lot".⁸⁰

Whatever drove the Kwangsi leaders into their extreme anti-communism, the fact of its existence proved an enormous asset to Chiang Kai-shek in his attack on the communists. All four Kwangsi leaders (Li Tsung-jen, Huang Shao-hsiung, Pai Ch'ung-hsi and Li Chi-shen) attended the preparatory meetings for the Purge (Ch'ing-tang) held in Shanghai at the beginning of April, and gave their full support to the measures which Chiang proposed.⁸¹ Without their support, it would have been virtually impossible for Chiang to have carried out the Purge. Pai Ch'ung-hsi was garrison commander of Shanghai, Li Chi-shen controlled Canton and Li Tsung-jen led the least communist-influenced troops in the vicinity of Nanking. These were

the three centres where the Purge would have to start.

In Shanghai, the Purge started on April 15th. Pai's official adherence to the Kuomintang policy of friendship with the communists (jung-kung) was maintained for some time before that day, but his real views were so well-known that reports of an interview in which he spoke of his acceptance of 'Jung-Kung' were footnoted to say that there must have been a mistake in reporting, since Pai was a known anti-communist.⁸² As the actual Purge drew near, he dropped his pretences: "the approach of zero-hour could almost be plotted graphically in the half-page advertisements run daily in the Chinese press by the political department of Pai Ch'ung-hsi's headquarters".⁸³ On the day itself, Pai's troops disarmed labour unions and worker units in the city, but left most of the butchery to the obscurely directed Shanghai gangsters. Pai, who later seems to have regretted the scale of the slaughter, adopted the predictable excuse that he was only 'obeying orders'.⁸⁴ He apparently performed one charitable act, in releasing the arrested

Chou En-lai, whom he had known in Canton.⁸⁵

Li Tsung-jen's contribution to the Purge was to move troops from Anhwei into Nanking, to help carry out the Purge in the 1st. Army stationed there, which contained communist elements.⁸⁶ There was also a slight purge in the 7th Army itself.⁸⁷

In Canton and Kwangtung, Li Chi-shen's well laid plans for a purge were put into operation two days after the Shanghai Purge started. Li himself was in Shanghai, but had prepared a "Doomsday Book" of those he wanted purged before he left Canton.⁸⁸ The Canton Purge represented the culmination of Li's anti-communist activities, which had been going on since the Kuomintang government moved to Wuhan in December, leaving Li in control in Kwangtung. Li's early moves against communists had a strong influence in shaping the anti-communist attitude of the other Kwangsi leaders.⁸⁹

In Kwangsi itself, the Purge was less brutal than elsewhere, and was confined to the cities along the West River; it did not touch the communist-dominated hsien in the north-west of the province.⁹⁰

Li Chi-shen's relationship with the other three Kwangsi leaders at this stage is interesting. He had made his career in Kwangtung, and his power and ambitions were still centred there. But since the emergence of Li, Pai and Huang as leaders of Kwangsi, he had become increasingly identified with them - almost in the role of a father-figure, for though he was only slightly older than they, he was much more experienced, politically and militarily; it was natural that they should turn to their fellow-provincial for advice and guidance.⁹¹

Chiang Kai-shek's Resignation and the
Wuhan-Nanking Rapprochement.

The government established by Chiang Kai-shek at Nanking on April 18th depended for its political support on the right-wing of the Kuomintang, and for its financial support chiefly on the wealthy of Shanghai, whose contributions were not always given voluntarily, for the 'Purge' continued in Shanghai after the communists had been disposed of: wealthy Chinese were kidnapped, and those who reappeared came back poorer men.⁹² Militarily, Nanking's most reliable units were the 1st, under Ho

Ying-ch'in, and the 7th, under Li Tsung-jen; otherwise ~~his army~~ ^{its forces} consisted of recent converts from Chekiang and Anhwei.⁹³

Nanking was faced immediately with two military threats, from the Northern troops north of the Yangtze, and from Wuhan troops up-river. It seemed that Wuhan might take military action against Chiang because of his action against the communists; but at the end of April, the 7th Army disarmed units of the 6th Army in Anhwei, and removed the threat from that direction.⁹⁴ Li Tsung-jen also reached a non-aggression pact with Chu P'ei-te, then garrisoning Kiangsi.⁹⁵ A tacit agreement appeared to exist between Chiang Kai-shek and T'ang Sheng-chih, that the continuation of the Northern Expedition should be given top priority.⁹⁶ Negotiations, which cannot have been approved by the government at Wuhan, took place, which envisaged Nanking's recognition of the autonomy of Hunan and Hupei under T'ang's control, in return for T'ang's recognition of Nanking as the Central Government, and his undertaking to purge the communists at Wuhan. Though there were no concrete results from these negotiations, they may have helped to prevent Wuhan/Nanking hostilities.

Nanking troops crossed the Yangtze at the beginning of May, and moved easily north towards Hsüchow. Wuhan forces were also moving north at the beginning of May, but encountering much fiercer opposition. The 4th Army in particular was engaged in very heavy fighting and suffered appalling casualties;⁹⁷

Chengchow fell to Feng Yu-hsiang, who had been enabled to move east out of Shensi by the march north of the Wuhan forces, at the same time that Nanking forces took Hsüchow at the beginning of June. It was clear that if either Nanking or Wuhan could win the support of Feng, it would be in a commanding position over the other. Feng was the most powerful pro-Kuomintang militarist in North China; he had declared his allegiance to the Kuomintang in September, 1926. The Wuhan/Nanking Split had not at first concerned him, but now the time had come for him to show his hand. He held talks, first at Chengchow with the Wuhan leaders, and then at Hsüchow with the Nanking leaders. He gave his support to Nanking, but not until he had drawn from Wuhan an undertaking to withdraw their troops from Honan. Feng's action was a terrible blow to Wuhan,

which had counted on his support, but as Professor Sheridan shows, it was the obvious course for Feng to take.⁹⁸

Wuhan was now in a desperate position. A Nanking-sponsored attack on Wuhan by Hsia Tou-yin at the beginning of June had been repulsed, but politically and economically, the government there was on its last legs. The river trade on which Wuhan depended for much of its livelihood had been curtailed by the breach with Nanking. Politically, an open breach with the communists was approaching, which spelled suicide for both the Left-Kuomintang and the Communist Party.

Nanking, on the other hand, was improving its position, strengthened by its alliance with Feng Yu["]-hsiang. But Nanking's situation was reversed in July, when the prospect of open war on the Yangtze between Wuhan and Nanking developed. Nanking troops which had started to move north into Shantung (only to find their way blocked by Japanese intervention) were withdrawn from the northern front to the Yangtze. The loyalty of the converted warlord troops which were left to hold the front proved shaky,⁹⁹ and they offered no resistance when the Northern forces

counter-attacked. They were driven back to the Yangtze in a complete rout; there was no time even to destroy the railway bridges. Northern forces poured south and recaptured Pukow.

This was a very serious setback, and though the blame for it was put on Wang T'ien-p'ei, commander of the 10th (Kweichow) Army, who was executed in August, it was obvious that it really lay with the commander-in-chief, Chiang-Kai-shek.¹⁰⁰

The futility of the defeat was enhanced by the slackening of the war threat on the Yangtze; an unwillingness to fight had become apparent in the Wuhan and Nanking armies facing each other. On the Wuhan side, the Chang~~Fa~~-k'uei's armies held the front. The Wuhan purge of communists, in mid-July, further unsettled the already discontented ^{4th} Army, which was pro-communist, and made it quite unreliable. On the Nanking side, Chiang Kai-shek's subordinates, in particular the Kwangsi generals, were incensed by the collapse of the northern front, and by the heavy casualties taken in the retreat. They were deeply disturbed by the chaos into which the wrangling between Nanking and Wuhan had thrown the whole Kuomintang, and by the fact

that civil war within the Kuomintang appeared to be given higher priority than the Northern Expedition. Chiang was discredited as a general, and as a politician. His subordinates were no longer prepared to fight his civil war within the Kuomintang.

As a result of the recent downhill slide at Wuhan, Wang Ching-wei, the government leader there, was almost as discredited as Chiang. Technically, since Wuhan had now purged the communists, the chief point at issue between Nanking and Wuhan no longer existed, and Feng "Yu-hsiang was putting pressure on both sides to settle their quarrel; there seemed a strong possibility of a settlement.

There was a separate issue involved in the unwillingness of the front-line armies of Wuhan and Nanking to fight each other. The 7th had been withdrawn from the Northern front, and was now holding the line on the Yangtze for Nanking. It was an exhausted and bitter army; there was a feeling that all it had gained from a year of fighting was "the name of the Steel Army and 20,000 casualties".¹⁰¹ It was not in good fighting shape, and it was particularly unwilling

to fight Chang Fa-k'uei's troops.¹⁰² Chang's 4th Army had originally been commanded by Li Chi-shen; its men were raised from west Kwangtung, near the Kwangsi border, and it had helped the Kwangsi generals during their consolidation of their province. There was great fellow-feeling between the 4th and 7th. Now the 7th was being asked to fight the 4th "to satisfy the Napoleonic ambitions of a Ningpo man".¹⁰³ Li Tsung-jen refused.¹⁰⁴ As it turned out, his refusal was unnecessary, for on August 1st, the Nanch'ang Uprising occurred, and Chang Fa-k'uei's forces were split into three: one section, the 20th Army, now openly communist, returned to Kwangtung, followed by a second section, the 4th Army; the third section, the 11th Army, moved off into Fukien.

The question of civil war on the Yangtze was the culmination of a series of difficulties between the Kwangsi generals and Chiang-Kai-shek. Pai Ch'ung-hsi had been closely associated with Chiang, as Chief of Staff for much of the Northern Expedition, but there had been friction between the two men for some time.¹⁰⁵ Pai was an extremely competent professional soldier, but

poorly versed in political manoeuvre; he was aware of his worth as a soldier, an astringent, even arrogant character, not given to flattery, and quite unsuited for Chiang Kai-shek's entourage. Li Tsung-jen was more conciliatory to Chiang, but he did not want to see his army, his only capital, weakened by factional fighting in which he had no personal involvement. In May, he had reached an agreement with Chu P'ei-te in Kiangsi, which had helped to neutralise the Yangtze Front until this time, and which had envisaged the formation of a third force, standing between Nanking and Wuhan.¹⁰⁶ At the beginning of August, he emerged as a leading figure in moves to secure a rapprochement between the two sides.¹⁰⁷

Telegrams flew back and forth between Nanking and Wuhan. It was some days before it became clear that the communist forces at Nanch'ang would move south, and fear on both sides of a communist attack into the Yangtze Valley spurred negotiations. The chief obstacle was the continuing presence of Chiang Kai-shek as leader at Nanking. But his position was slipping. From the end of July, articles questioning his continuance in office appeared in the Chinese press, and there was a poster campaign against

him in Nanking itself.¹⁰⁸ The Kwangsi generals no longer accepted his orders, and though he bitterly opposed their negotiations with Wuhan, he could do nothing to stop them.¹⁰⁹ Finally, his most trusted subordinate, Ho Ying-ch'in also abandoned him,¹¹⁰ leaving him without any personally loyal troops in the Nanking/Shanghai region.¹¹¹

With a northern counter-attack mounting across the Yangtze, a stormy meeting of the Military Committee took place at Nanking on August 13th. Chiang was openly defied, resigned on the spot and departed for Shanghai.¹¹² The Military Committee took over all political and military responsibility,¹¹³ and power at Nanking passed to Li, Pai and Ho.

The new Nanking leaders moved to secure a formal agreement with Wuhan, concentrating their efforts on the more moderate leaders there, T'an Yen-k'ai and Sun Fo.¹¹⁴ On August 22nd. Li Tsung-jen met Wang Ching-wei and these two men at Kiukiang. Wang agreed to consider the transference of the Wuhan Government and the Central Executive Committee of the Kuomintang to Nanking, apparently on the understanding that the regime at Nanking was on its last legs, and would

shortly be wound up. Wang also pressed, successfully to his belief, for the summoning of the 4th Plenum of the Central Executive Committee. At the end of the meeting, T'an and Sun ~~then~~ departed for Nanking with Li Tsung-jen, supposedly to prepare for Wang's arrival there. In fact, it soon became clear that they had abandoned Wang, and switched their allegiance to Nanking. There was to be no question of Wang's taking over authority at Nanking.¹¹⁵

Chiang Kai-shek was more fortunate with his political supporters; the bulk of the senior politicians left Nanking with him.¹¹⁶ It was a sensible time to leave Nanking. The city was being shelled by the Northerners, and seemed likely to fall to them. Their first attempt at a Yangtze crossing was made on August 24th, but was thwarted by the action of the gunboat bringing Li, T'an and Sun back from Kiukiang, which ran into several junks loaded with Northern soldiers, and managed to drive them back to the northern shore. During the action, Li and T'an blazed away with their pistols through the cabin windows, while Sun lay on the floor.¹¹⁷

The Special Committee.

When they took over control at Nanking, neither

the Kwangsi leaders, nor anyone else, imagined that they would be able to establish any permanent authority there. They were only there as a stop-gap. They commanded no support in either of the main sections of the Kuomintang. The politicians who went to Shanghai with Chiang Kai-shek believed that Chiang would soon return. Wang Ching-wei had thought he had a chance of establishing himself at Nanking, which had been lost by the desertion of his subordinates; he was bitterly hostile to the new Nanking leaders.

In the short run, the Kwangsi leaders had an urgent task to perform, to defend Nanking against invasion. Li Tsung-jen moved the 7th back from Anhwei into Nanking, and Pai Ch'ung-hsi started moving his troops in from Shanghai. Ho Ying-ch'in's troops were already in the Nanking region. Between them, the three generals commanded about 200,000 men, though they only had about 100,000 rifles.¹¹⁸

On the night of August 25th, in thick mist, Sun Ch'uan-fang's forces crossed the Yangtze, landing near Lungt'an, outside Nanking. Within a few hours they had occupied high ground in the area, and cut the railway line between Nanking and Shanghai, cutting off Pai Ch'ung-hsi from

Nanking. His troops, and those from Nanking counter-attacked desperately. Bitter fighting went on for four days; eventually, the Northern forces were defeated. Sun was not able to withdraw his troops, and 30,000 prisoners were taken. Many of these 'escaped', giving rise to the theory that they were not all from Sun's own units, but were Chekiang troops recently converted to the Kuomintang, whose defection Sun had been counting on.¹¹⁹ Chou Feng-ch'i, their commander, resigned shortly afterwards.¹²⁰

Once the immediate military crisis was past, the political and governmental situation had to be sorted out. The Kuomintang seemed exhausted after its months of in-fighting, and there was a "get-together spirit in the ranks".¹²¹ The anti-communist Western Hills faction of the Kuomintang, which had been out of power since the Western Hills Meeting (Hsi-Shan Hui-i) in November, 1925, was anxious for a settlement which would bring it back into the mainstream. Its members had been peeved by Chiang Kai-shek's failure to employ them after he had turned against the communists.¹²² Sun Fo and T'an Yen-k'ai went to Shanghai late in August to carry out preliminary

negotiations for a three-way settlement between Nanking, Wuhan and the Western Hills faction, whose headquarters were in Shanghai. Wang Ching-wei also arrived in Shanghai, his arrival having been delayed by the fighting on the Yangtze.¹²³

At the beginning of September, a series of meetings was held in Shanghai between the three factions; agreement was reached to suspend temporarily the Central Executive and Supervisory Committees, to reorganise the Government and Military Committees, and to set up a Special Committee to take over the functions of the two Central Committees until the 3rd. Congress could be called - within three months.¹²⁴ After the discussions, members of the three factions went to Nanking, where, on September 15th, the Special Committee was officially set up. Its inaugural proclamation blamed the troubles within the Kuomintang on the communists, and vowed to continue the Northern Expedition and the purge on the communists.¹²⁵ The Special Committee was attacked from its inception as illegal; technically a Plenum of the Central Executive Committee would have been the only body qualified to make such a sweeping change in party and governmental structure,

but it was known that it would be impossible to get a majority of the Central Executive Committee to support such moves. To overcome this obstacle, a temporary joint committee of members of the Central Executive and Supervisory Committees was convened to set up the Special Committee.¹²⁶ This joint meeting was attended only by thirteen of the thirty-four members of the two Committees; none of the close supporters of either Wang Ching-wei or Chiang Kai-shek were there.¹²⁷ The Special Committee was scarcely legal, in terms of the regulations of the Kuomintang, but its supporters from the Western Hills faction tried to justify its establishment by claiming that the Kuomintang had sunk into such confusion with three rival centres (at Wuhan, Nanking, and in Shanghai, where the Western Hills faction had its headquarters), that a solution to the confusion could only be found through reacting to objective circumstances, and that 'legality' had become meaningless.¹²⁸ This explanation satisfied those who played an active role in the Special Committee, but no-one else.

The Special Committee had 32 members, six from each faction, and 14 neutrals. On September

17th, a new Government Committee and a new Military Committee were set up. Many of the members of these three committees were not in Nanking; the only important politicians in Nanking were T'an Yen-kai, Sun Fo and the Western Hills faction. Of the Kuomintang's three most important political figures, Chiang Kai-shek was in Japan, Wang Ching-wei back in Wuhan, and Hu Han-min in Shanghai. Only two of the five members of the Government Committee, T'an Yen-kai and Li Lieh-chün, were in Nanking. C.C.Wu was Foreign Minister, and Sun Fo Minister of Finance.¹²⁹

The inability of the Nanking leaders to gain any support from the two main Kuomintang factions put the seal of impermanence on the Special Committee. The only sector in which the Committee could operate effectively was the military. On the diplomatic front, none of the Powers was prepared to negotiate with an administration that they regarded as temporary.¹³⁰ Economically, it was harassed by the fact that contributions to Nanking from Shanghai had been secured through Chiang Kai-shek's personal relationship with the Shanghai capitalists. While

Chiang managed to raise 40 million yüan in Shanghai between May and July,¹³¹ Pai Ch'ung-hsi only extracted 300,000 yüan from the Chinese Chamber of Commerce in Shanghai towards establishing the Special Committee.¹³² Li Chi-shen supplemented the meagre budget by remitting large sums of money from Canton, but this aroused great resentment in Canton, and could not continue indefinitely.¹³³

However, in September and October, military problems were still uppermost, and they did something to disguise the other weaknesses of the Special Committee. The Northern Expedition got under way again; Ho Ying-chin led troops into North Kiangsu, on the Yangtze, preparations for war with Wuhan were resumed.

During the Northern attack on Nanking at the end of August, T'ang Sheng-chih had, with Nanking agreement, moved troops into Anhwei against a Northern attack.¹³⁴ Before the establishment of the Special Committee, T'ang had been planning to form a purely military alliance with the Nanking leaders, reactivating his Paoting connection with Pai Ch'ung-hsi to appeal to him.¹³⁵ But so many differences had grown up between Pai and T'ang that the Paoting

link no longer had any power, and T'ang's offer was rejected. T'ang went ahead on his own, to extend his authority, and bring Anhwei firmly under his control. At the beginning of September, he ousted all remaining Nanking troops from the riverine cities of Anhwei, and established his own subordinate, Ho Chien, as governor of Anhwei. He underlined his independence by setting up a Branch Political Council in Wuhan on September 1st, in accordance with a decision of the now-defunct Wuhan Government taken in August, when it was planning to move to Nanking, but since counter-manded by the Nanking.¹³⁶ Wang Ching-wei became chairman of this Council but stayed in Wuhan only a month, since it was quite clear that he was only to be a pawn of T'ang Sheng-chih.¹³⁷ At the end of October, he departed for Canton.

Nanking had already secured the defection of some of T'ang's units in Hunan and Hupei,¹³⁸ and the action of these forces, combined with forces advancing west from Nanking, and the Nanking Navy, which played a key role, was sufficient to bring T'ang down. On November 12th, T'ang fled from Wuhan. His remaining loyal units withdrew unscathed into Hunan, and control of Hupei passed to the

Jse

6th and 7th Armies. Hu Tsung-to, commander of the 19th Army, an offshoot of the 7th, and a Hupei native, became garrison commander of Wuhan, and another Hupei native, Chang Chih-pen, chairman of the province. Negotiations to secure the surrender of T'ang's forces in Hunan got under way immediately after the fall of Wuhan, and a cease-fire was agreed;¹³⁹ it seemed that a peaceful settlement would be reached. Before this could happen, the situation in Kwangtung changed drastically, affecting the whole position of the Kwangsi leaders, and the Hunan negotiations were abandoned.

Li Chi-shen had taken over control of Kwangtung after the Government moved from there to Wuhan at the end of 1926. His authority there was seriously shaken in the late summer of 1927, when two sections of the former 4th Army,¹⁴⁰ returned to Kwangtung at the end of August. Li launched an immediate attack on the communist section. He sent Kwangsi troops under Huang Shao-hsiung, which had been in the North River area of Kwangtung since June,¹⁴¹ into the Swatow region where Ho_△^{Lung} and Yeh_△^{T'ing} had established themselves while troops under Ch'en

Chi-t'ang moved into the East River area. Huang and Ch'en defeated the communist forces in September, driving them from Swatow and into Hailufeng and Kiangsi. But the second section, Chang Fa-k'uei's troops, posed a much more serious threat to Li and could not be dealt with so easily. Chang was the favourite son of Kwangtung, and had powerful military friends in the province. Li had no choice but to welcome Chang back, and to give him a triumphal reception in Canton.¹⁴²

With Chang's troops actually in Canton, Li's position became very precarious. His best units were away from the capital, fighting the communists. His political authority started to slip. He could not prevent the establishment of a Branch Political Council, set up under the same regulations as the one in Wuhan, which was dominated first by Chang's supporters, and then, from the end of October, by Chang's hero, Wang Ching-wei. Li had long been the bitter enemy of the Left in Kwangtung; now he found that he could no longer count on the loyalty of the conservative merchant class either; his oppressive taxation, necessary to raise money to send to the Kwangsi generals in Nanking, had alienated the

merchants.¹⁴³ Worst of all, as a non-native, he aroused no loyalty in the insular Cantonese, who were critical of him for his use of Kwangsi troops within Kwangtung.

The Canton Branch Political Council took up the chorus of attacks on the illegality of the Special Committee, and issued insistent demands for the calling of the 4th Plenum, which, it proposed, should be held in Canton. Li was forced to echo their demands, even though it meant attacking his fellow Kwangsi leaders in Nanking. The call for the 4th Plenum was taken up in Shanghai, where Chiang Kai-shek was living after his return from Japan. At the beginning of November, all former antipathy forgotten, Chiang and Wang Ching-wei came out together for the convention of a preliminary meeting for the Plenum, in Shanghai. Wang left for Shanghai in mid-November, taking Li Chi-shen with him. Before he left, he and Chang Fa-k'uei laid plans to destroy Kwangsi power in Kwangtung. They recruited from Hong Kong a former officer of the Kwangsi Army, Yu["] Tso-po, who had been sent out of Kwangsi at the time of the Purge, on suspicion of being a leftist.¹⁴⁴ He was to take over command of Kwangsi troops from Huang Shao-hsiung.

Wang Ching-wei left for Shanghai on November 15th. The next day, a surprise attack was made on Huang Shao-hsiung, who had come to Canton to take over Li Chi-shen's posts while he was away.¹⁴⁵ Huang escaped from his house, and fled, disguised as a peasant. He made his way back to Kwangsi via Hong Kong and Hanoi. At the same time, the Whampoa Academy, the Shihching Arsenal, the Humen Forts, and other key installations were taken over by Chang Fa-k'uei's troops. The coup caused a sensation in Canton.¹⁴⁶ Most Cantonese were delighted by the fact that the coup, and the military action in the West River ^{valley} against Kwangsi itself, which followed the coup, spelled disaster for the Kwangsi Clique.

The coup was less well received in Shanghai; Wang Ching-wei was attacked by the Right-wing of the Kuomintang for having acted too arbitrarily.¹⁴⁷ For the Kwangsi leaders in Nanking the coup had very serious implications. In the first place, it put an end to hopes of a settlement with the Hunan generals; both Chiang Kai-shek and Wang Ching-wei encouraged them to fight on,¹⁴⁸ as they were no longer threatened by an attack from Kwangsi if they did not submit to Wuhan. In the second

place, it undermined the whole position of the Kwangsi Clique. In the aftermath of the coup, it seemed that Kwangsi itself might fall to the Cantonese.¹⁴⁹ The province was the cornerstone of the Clique's structure of power; if it were lost, it would be finished, for ultimately, its power depended not on its holdings outside the province, but on Kwangsi. So long as the Clique held it, its leaders had a solid base from which to mount their moves on the national scene, and a haven to which they could retire if necessary. If they lost Kwangsi, they would be rootless, and open to attack. Indeed, even as they lost power in the South, their position at Nanking was slipping.

Chiang Kai-shek, back in Shanghai, was actively working for the downfall of the Special Committee, as were the majority of Kuomintang politicians, both on the Left and the Right. Alongside the calls for the convention of the 4th Plenum, there was a growing movement to reinstate Chiang Kai-shek. The Special Committee could offer no adequate opposition to the calling of the 4th Plenum, and could only quibble about the date at which it should be held.

The Kwangsi Clique itself was sanguine about

the chances of survival of the Special Committee, and Li did not oppose the calling of the Plenum.¹⁵⁰ Now that Kwangsi was threatened, Li and Pai were more concerned with saving Kwangsi than with saving the Special Committee. It would be necessary for them to launch an expedition through Hunan to Kwangsi, and it would be therefore more sensible for them to move their centre of operations to Wuhan. All their pretensions of playing a national role, saving the Kuomintang and fighting for the nation went by the board when their home province was threatened. The Western Hills faction, which stood to lose everything if the Special Committee collapsed, tried to pressure the Kwangsi leaders into opposing the 4th Plenum, but without success.¹⁵¹ Pai Ch'ung-hsi handed over his command of the Shanghai garrison to Ho Ying-ch'in on November 19th, and made preparations to move his troops to Wuhan.¹⁵²

In Nanking, the position of the Special Committee and the Western Hills faction was deteriorating rapidly. On November 22nd, during celebrations to mark the defeat of T'ang Sheng-chih, there were many casualties when soldiers began firing on the crowd. The tragedy was blamed on the

Western Hills faction, although there were rumours that it had been engineered from Shanghai,¹⁵³ to discredit the Special Committee.

Everywhere, pressure increased for the calling of the 4th Plenum, and for Chiang Kai-shek's return to office. At the beginning of December, preparatory sessions for the 4th Plenum were held in Shanghai; it was decided to wind up the Special Committee at the end of December, and summon the 4th Plenum in the new Year.

Chiang was emerging again as leader of the Kuomintang; his unpopularity of the summer was forgotten. In a speech on December 10th, Chiang accused the Nanking leaders of having done just what they had accused him of doing - starting a war on the Yangtze between Wuhan and Nanking. He bitterly denounced the Nanking generals for their failure to obey orders from the Party, and for their disregard for the welfare of their own men, and of the population as a whole. He threatened the development of a new warlordism, worse than the old, unless the armies of the Kuomintang were brought under Party control again.¹⁵⁴

However, before government changes at Nanking could take place, there was a communist uprising

in Canton and the Canton Commune^{was} established, radically changing the situation in the South again.¹⁵⁵ In Kwangtung, Chang Fa-k'uei was caught off balance, with his troops moving on Kwangsi, and Canton undefended. The Kwangsi troops which had been marshalling at Wuchow to try and stop Chang's attack into Kwangsi found themselves on the offensive when Chang's troops rushed back to Canton. These troops, and others in the Nan-Lu area of Kwangtung, and ⁱⁿ Fukien loyal to Li Chi-shen, started moving on Canton. The Canton rising itself was put down by Chang and Li Fu-lin in mid-December, but they themselves were then attacked by Li Chi-shen's troops, and driven towards Kiangsi. The threat to the southern dominions of the Kwangsi Clique was removed.¹⁵⁶

Chiang Kai-shek returned to Nanking on January 5th, "in martial splendour, in a special train escorted by three armoured trains".¹⁵⁷ The Special Committee was wound up, and the members of the Western Hills faction went abroad.¹⁵⁸ The Kwangsi leaders established themselves at Wuhan: "the rowdy Kwangsi generals went behind the scenes, and only faint whispers of their off-stage operations reached Nanking".¹⁵⁹

The Kwangsi Clique was no more sorry to see the Special Committee wound up than was Chiang Kai-shek. If the past few months had proved anything, it was that the Kwangsi generals did not constitute a faction strong enough to run a national government. Chiang Kai-shek might be able to perform "the traditional juggling act, to keep regional warlords or politicians balanced in a framework of personal politics practically devoid of ideology".¹⁶⁰ The Kwangsi generals certainly could not. They were good generals, and they were later to prove efficient administrators of one province, but they could not cope with the tangled fabric of national political life. Their only achievements while at Nanking were in putting down T'ang Sheng-chih, and in disbanding a certain number of the more useless converted warlord troops - Tsou Lu puts the number of disbanded men at 100,000, though this figure may be inflated.¹⁶¹

Their alliance with the Western Hills faction was one of temporary convenience, based on a common hatred of Chiang Kai-shek, and of the communists. Li Tsung-jen's anti-communism reached new heights during this period. The North China

Herald stated approvingly (and improbably) that "nothing that has appeared in these columns as to the menace of Soviet influence in China has been couched in stronger terms than those used by General Li in his excoriation of the Soviet regime in China".¹⁶² The link with the Western Hills faction did not continue; that faction was a spent force after the collapse of the Special Committee. But it had served its purpose of conferring a dubious respectability on the Kwangsi generals; the members of the Western Hills faction at least had long records within the Kuomintang, which the Kwangsi Clique, with the exception of Li Chi-shen, did not. In 1927, Pai Ch'ung-hsi still had no position in the Kuomintang hierarchy, while Li Tsung-jen and Huang Shao-hsiung were only alternate members of the Supervisory Committee, elected at the 2nd Party Congress in January 1926. They were justifiably regarded by most senior members of the Kuomintang as upstarts.¹⁶³

As for the operations of the Clique itself, during the autumn of 1927, it was hampered by the inability of Li Chi-shen and Huang Shao-hsiung in the South to support the other members at

Nanking, because of the situation in Canton. Li Tsung-jen and Pai Ch'ung-hsi co-operated smoothly most of the time, but at the end, Li was not able to persuade the more headstrong Pai to compromise with the returning Chiang Kai-shek, and reach some kind of amicable settlement.

At the beginning of 1928, the Kuomintang, after a terrible year of internecine fighting, was a very different party from the one which had launched the Northern Expedition in 1926. The Kuomintang had failed to impose any degree of centralisation on its conquered provinces, it had failed to amalgamate the converted warlord armies into a national army; existing regional power-holding had not been checked. Political training of the army, which had been one of the Kuomintang's major policies, had been virtually abandoned. Officers and generals mouthed the now established credo of the Three Peoples' Principles, but the common soldier was still the illiterate peasant, steeped in tradition and superstition, not political ideology, who had always made up warlord armies. Another 'ideology' was growing in strength, an ideology-by-default, that of regionalism.

It is difficult to imagine that the Kwangsi

generals started on the Northern Expedition with the idea of establishing a regionalist base for themselves in central China, linked with their original base in Kwangsi; nevertheless, this is what they were doing at the beginning of 1928. They still paid lip-service to Kuomintang ideology, but the immediacy had gone. Their adherence to the Kuomintang was expressed "only through the colours of the Government flag".¹⁶⁴

The Kwangsi Clique at Wuhan.

After their move to Wuhan, the Kwangsi leaders laid new plans. They broke off all co-operation with Nanking, and set about building their own empire, which was to include the four provinces of Kwangtung, Kwangsi, Hunan and Hupei. To do this, they had to strengthen their hold over Hupei, and assert some kind of control over Hunan, which was still independent of Wuhan. They concentrated their efforts on establishing their overall military authority; they did not intend to set up colonial governments. They employed secondary figures to conduct every day administration in each province, choosing natives of the province for these jobs. Hu Tsung-to was given charge of military affairs in Hupei, and it was generally

expected that Ch'eng Ch'ien would hold a similar post in Hunan, once the province was pacified.

Pai Ch'ung-hsi's troops started moving into Hunan in January, and met T'ang Sheng-chih's forces at the Milo River - where in the summer of 1926 they had fought together against Wu P'ei-fu. The Hunanese were driven south, splitting into two groups, one retreating south down the Hsiang Valley, the other towards Kweichow. Ch'angsha fell on January 25th.

The Hunan forces were being backed in their resistance by Nanking: "what appeared to be a struggle between Hunan and Hupei was in fact a disguised battle between Chekiang and Kwangsi".¹⁶⁵ Although the Kwangsi generals had issued the requisite telegrams welcoming Chiang's return to office - delayed in Pai's case - they had no intention of accepting his order for a cease-fire in Hunan. They did however amend their original pretext for the campaign, of returning to Kwangtung to help suppress the communists there,¹⁶⁶ to one of suppressing the Hunanese communist, Ho Chien.¹⁶⁷ They cannot have missed the irony of this, since Ho had been the first Wuhan general to attack the communists, in May 1927, and was notoriously

anti- communist.

By mid-February, Hunan troops retreating up the Hsiang Valley had been pushed almost to the Kwangtung border, and were in danger of being caught in a trap by Kwangsi troops moving in from the South. They surrendered on February 23rd, and at the same time a cease-fire was arranged with the troops in West Hunan.¹⁶⁸

The Hunan campaign was arousing considerable concern in Nanking. The insubordinate actions of the Kwangsi Clique were holding up the continuation of the Northern Expedition, since Chiang Kai-shek could not launch his troops north while a potentially hostile grouping was developing on his flank. He reached an agreement with Feng Yu["]hsiang, whose forces were stationed in Honan, bordering on Hupei, to bring pressure on Wuhan which would prevent the continuation of the campaign in Hunan, and bring Wuhan to heel.¹⁶⁹ The Kwangsi Clique knew they could not resist the combined forces of Chiang and Feng. They decided not to force the total surrender of their opponents in Hunan, but ^{to} arranged a cease-fire, and then to work out a compromise with Nanking.

Li Chi-shen came north to arrange it. He extracted from Nanking an undertaking to recognise

the autonomy of the four Kwangsi-dominated provinces, to recognize Yunnan and Kweichow as within the Kwangsi sphere of influence, to sever connections with Wang Ching-wei and the Left Kuomintang, to move Chang Fa-k'uei's forces into north China, and to waive Nanking's right to revenue from Kwangtung; in return the Kwangsi Clique agreed to recognise Nanking, to make no plans to threaten its rear, and to send forces on the Northern Expedition, financed by Nanking.¹⁷⁰ To confirm the new situation, Li Chi-shen was made acting Chairman of the Military Committee, and Li Tsung-jen commander of the 4th Group Army.¹⁷¹ Chiang had originally wanted to appoint T'an Yen-k'ai to command the 4th Group Armies. T'an was thought to be acceptable both to the Kwangsi Clique and to Nanking. But the Kwangsi Clique would only accept a Kwangsi man. Li was appointed in March, but did not take up his post until May.¹⁷²

Li Chi-shen's successful negotiation demonstrated the benefit which the Kwangsi Clique could draw from operating on several different fronts at once. Since he was not involved directly in the present Wuhan/Nanking trouble, he could negotiate from the side-lines.

The Nanking agreement confirmed the regional

independence of the Kwangsi Clique. Its regional power was formalised by the appointment of Li Tsung-jen as 4th Group Army commander, and by the establishment of a Branch Political Council at Wuhan, as at Kaifeng, T'aiyuan and Canton. These councils, established by the 4th Plenum, operated as independent regional governments. Nanking regarded them as a temporary expedient, a recognition that the powerful Kuomintang militarists would have to be allowed to remain independent until the Northern Expedition was completed.¹⁷³

At Wuhan, the Kwangsi Clique started to apply its concepts of regional rule. It found ideological backing for its position in the ideas of Li Shih-tseng a senior member of the Kuomintang Right-wing.¹⁷⁴ The situation in Hunan was complicated by the fact that the Kwangsi leaders had to allow the appointment of Lu T'i-p'ing as chairman of Hunan, on Nanking pressure. In Hupei, they left the mechanics of government in more trusted hands, those of Hu Tsung-to and Chang Chih-pen.¹⁷⁵ Hu was a zealous opponent of communism. The Soviet Consulate in Wuhan was closed in December, 1927, and during the early part of 1928 executions of communists took place every day. The Wuhan authorities were catholic in their dislike of foreigners; they

arrested Red Russians and White Russians, impartially, banned the recently re-established mission schools from using the Bible in instruction, and maintained an anti-imperialist line against both the Soviets and the Japanese; there was even trouble with the French consul.¹⁷⁶ The regime was unsophisticated and unenlightened, in its external and internal policies.

In the South, Li Chi-shen continued his operations against communist remnants in Kwangtung, while in Kwangsi Huang Shao-hsiung struck against the communist-held hsien in the north-west of the province.¹⁷⁷ The attitude of the southern Kwangsi leaders towards international policy was more pragmatic than that of the Wuhan leaders. Only one power concerned Canton - Great Britain, and its colony, Hong Kong. Li Chi-shen started negotiations at the beginning of 1928 to restore good relations with Hong Kong, and in March the governor of the colony paid an official visit to Canton. This visit would have been unthinkable at any stage during the past few years, and it was the clearest possible indication of the defeat of radicalism in South China.¹⁷⁸

The divergence of policy towards the Powers

in the South and at Wuhan again pointed up the convenience to the Kwangsi Clique of operating from two centres. The divergence became particularly clear, when, at the time of the Chinan incident, anti-Japanese demonstrations were forbidden in Canton, but were officially encouraged in Wuhan.¹⁷⁹ Wuhan had nothing to lose by pursuing an anti-imperialist policy, but Canton found it more convenient to appease the British and the Japanese. Because of the physical separation, this contradiction did not cause a split in the Clique itself.¹⁸⁰

An unexpected policy, in Wuhan and Kwangsi, was the promotion of universities (Canton already had one). Huang Shao-hsiung set up Kwangsi University at Wuchow, and called in Kwangsi's most distinguished civilian, Ma Chun-wu, to run it. In Wuhan, a university was set up in the summer of 1928, though its beautiful campus beside the East Lake was not built until 1930.¹⁸¹ The motive for setting up these universities was partly to train people to take part in the reconstruction which was to follow the completion of the Northern Expedition, and for this reason both had a strongly technical orientation. But the universities

were also regarded as prestige undertakings, the pet projects of not very learned generals who demonstrated their cultural sensitivity by establishing seats of learning.

In April, 1928, the Northern Expedition got under way again. The 1st Group Army advanced north from Hsueh["] along the railway line to Tientsin, the 2nd into Chihli and West Shantung, and the 3rd moved east out of Shansi. The 4th was to be used as a general reserve, and did not participate in the fighting. On April 29th, Pai Ch'ung-hsi announced that his troops had reached Chengchow;¹⁸² (Pai was commanding the troops of the 4th Group Army that went North).

Pai Ch'ung-hsi himself left Wuhan on May 19th, and conferred with Chiang Kai-shek and Feng Yu["]-hsiang at Chengchow on May 21st. His departure from Wuhan was followed swiftly by the arrest of Ch'eng Ch'ien. Ch'eng had co-operated with the Kwangsi Clique in their attack on T'ang Sheng-chih, but had been a liability to them ever since. The original plan of installing him in Hunan had not come off, and he felt cheated. His bitter hatred of Chiang Kai-shek was irrepressible, and a source of embarrassment to the Kwangsi leaders after their

reconciliation with Nanking. Their action in arresting him was immediately approved by Nanking.¹⁸³

Peking fell to Yen Hsi-shan on June 12th.¹⁸⁴ Troops of the 4th followed Yen's troops into Peking, where they proceeded to make a quiet challenge to Yen's forces for power in the Peking/Tientsin region. At the beginning of July, Li Tsung-jen and Chiang Kai-shek came to Peking, and went with Yen Hsi-shan and Feng Yü-hsiang to Pi-yün-ssu, (The Temple of Azure Clouds) in the Western Hills outside Peking, to announce the end of the Northern Expedition to Sun Yat-sen's spirit, which supposedly lay in the great silver casket in the temple. "A dramatic episode marked the impressive memorial rites...Chiang Kai-shek flung himself sobbing upon the casket containing the dead leader's remains, and was led sobbing from the scene by Feng Yuh-siang (sic)".¹⁸⁵

The Northern Expedition was finished; with the exception of a few pockets of resistance, China south of the Great Wall was reunified. The next few years would show quite how specious this reunification was.

CHAPTER V.

Kwangsi: 1926-1929.

When the 7th Army left Kwangsi in the late spring of 1926, to take part in the Northern Expedition, two of the three Kwangsi leaders, Li Tsung-jen and Pai Ch'ung-hsi, left the province; the third, Huang Shao-hsiung, was left behind to govern Kwangsi. Huang, more active and outward-looking than Li, was bitterly disappointed that he was not able to leave his remote corner of China, and go forth to make his name on the national scene, but his natural resilience exerted itself, as it was to do on the many subsequent occasions that his career took an unwelcome turn, and he set himself to develop Kwangsi, and to form close links with Kwangtung.¹ For the next three years, he ruled Kwangsi independantly of his two colleagues, and imprinted his energetic and forward-looking nature on the province. Huang's activities were set within the framework of Kuomintang policies, but since, especially after the middle of 1927, he was neither given nor asked for direction from the central Kuomintang authorities, his rule took on an increasingly individualistic aspect. It

was authoritarian, militaristic and politically right-wing, but not static; economically, Huang tried to drag Kwangsi out of its abysmal backwardness and set it on the road to modernisation. His ambition was to establish a tranquil, well-run model province, poor but hopeful, which would stand out in the continuing chaos of most of the rest of China.

The conduct of civil government by the Kwangsi leaders up to 1926 had been haphazard. Before the unification of the province in 1925, Li and Huang had left the administration of areas under their control to the existing magistrates, appointing new ones where necessary from the local gentry. They were perpetuating a form of local government unchanged since the Ch'ing Dynasty, and one which, Huang observes, was "genuine local self-government".² In 1924, the provincial capital, Nanning, fell into their hands, and the question of establishing some form of provincial government arose. They appointed the head of the Kwangsi Provincial Assembly, Ch'ang Yi-ch'i, governor. However, early in 1925, Yunnanese forces took the city, *and* Ch'ang fled, so that when the Kwangsi leaders defeated the Yunnanese in the summer and

consolidated their rule over the whole province, they were again faced with installing some form of civil government. They recognised neither the Peking Government, nor the recently formed National Government in Canton, and could not ask either government to appoint a governor; they did not want to recruit another governor from among the old-fashioned elders of the Provincial Assembly. They therefore established an Office of Civil Government (Min-cheng Kung-shu), of which Huang Shao-hsiung became the first head in September, 1925. This was, as Huang said, equivalent to "setting himself up as king", (tzu li wei wang).³

Initially, the new administration made little impact. Most of the province was still disturbed, and local government remained in the hands of the magistrates; some headway was made in the unification of tax collection, but the administration continued to depend for the bulk of its income on the easily-collected tax on opium in transit from Yunnan and Kweichow, to Kwangtung and Hong Kong.⁴

Huang's chief concern in late 1925 and early 1926 lay in mopping up the remaining areas of resistance within the province, in improving the

standard of Kwangsi's troops, and in forming closer ties with the Kuomintang and Kwangtung. Civil administration was a secondary matter. Not until after a regular provincial government had been set up in June, 1926, in accordance with the Act of Union between Kwangtung and Kwangsi, promulgated in March, 1926, did Huang give more attention to it.⁵ We shall look at the major problems he faced individually.

Establishment of Order within the Province.

This was Huang's paramount problem. The province was still riddled with dissident soldiers, and bandit gangs; it was also threatened from outside, from Yunnan. To cope with this multiple threat, two thirds of the troops under the command of the new Kwangsi leaders (three divisions) remained in Kwangsi, while the rest went North.⁶ Huang was reasonably successful in coping with the unorganised bandits; some were hunted down and exterminated, either by regular forces, or by local militia; others were simply incorporated into the regular army.⁷ The main lines of communication were cleared, and the larger towns and cities protected from bandit attacks, though sporadic bandit attacks occurred in more isolated

areas for many years.⁸

Dissident soldiers, chiefly former subordinates of Lu Yung-t'ing, had in most cases already been incorporated into the forces controlled by Li Tsung-jen and Huang Shao-hsiung. The problem was now to draw their teeth, and ensure their loyalty and docility. Huang achieved this by sending large numbers of his own troops into the western areas of the province, where Lu's troops had surrendered, thus robbing them of the chance to establish strongholds of their own, from which they could plan rebellion.

These troop concentrations had an additional function, that of meeting the potential threat to Kwangsi's security from Yunnan. In addition to Huang's troops, there was a large Yunnanese unit in the area, commanded by Fan Shih-sheng; Fan had previously been stationed in Kwangtung, as part of Sun Yat-sen's Yunnan/Kwangsi mercenaries, and had been sent to Kwangsi's aid in 1925, when the province was invaded by rival Yunnanese troops. Together the troops of Huang and Fan were able to repulse a faint-hearted Yunnanese attack in the late summer of 1926, timed to coincide with Wu P'ei-fu's final defence of the

Wuhan region. (Wu had formed an alliance with T'ang Chi-yao, the Yunnan warlord, and with Liu Chen-huan, a displaced Kwangsi general, to launch this diversionary attack).⁹ Kwangsi's recurring problems with Yunnan were finally settled in 1927, when T'ang was overthrown, and Yunnan threw in its lot with the Kuomintang, though there were difficulties with Fan Shih-sheng, who was unable to fulfil his ambition of returning to Yunnan, and remained a 'guest' in Kwangsi. He was later transferred to the Kiangsi/Kwangtung border region, where, for a brief period in 1928 and 1929, he gave sanctuary to Chu Te after Chu's defeats in Kwangtung.¹⁰ After 1927, Kwangsi had no further problems with her neighbours, all of whom were now adherents of the Kuomintang.

The problem of Finance.

Huang faced formidable problems in the ordering of Kwangsi's finances, which stemmed from the blank poverty of the province. His commitments were enormous: to support an army of somewhere between 15,000 and 28,000 men¹¹ within the province, and to contribute to the upkeep of the 7th Army outside. In addition he had to stabilise the currency, to restore trade and commerce, and to

make an attempt to reconstruct the ravaged province.

The amount of money that Kwangsi contributed to the 7th is uncertain, and it must have decreased as the army moved further north, and~~/~~acquired its own garrison areas; but until it reached the Yangtze, it was probably dependent on remittances from Kwangsi which may have totalled several million yuan.¹² Military expenditure was a crippling burden for Kwangsi, as for China as a whole; even in 1928, when the province was completely stabilised, it accounted for 60% of the provincial income - probably a conservative estimate.¹³ Kwangsi did receive contributions from Kwangtung, though the amount and regularity of these is difficult to assess. Basically, Huang depended on two sources to raise the money he needed to fulfil all his commitments: regular taxation, and the tax on opium.

The regular tax system had fallen into disrepair during the five years of civil war from 1921. Even with the re-establishment of order, from 1925 on, it yielded only a sum of between 13 and 16 million yuan in 1926.¹⁴ This rose to 22 million in 1927,¹⁵ chiefly as a result of the reforms in tax collection instituted early in 1927, when a Tax Regulation

Committee (Cheng-li Shui-wu Wei-yuan-hui) was set up.¹⁶ The lucrative gambling tax was tightened up, by confining gambling to government-run dens, selective import tariffs were introduced, and the number of taxes cut.¹⁷ But the majority of taxes were still collected inefficiently, tax farming continued, and as much as 50% of actual revenue never reached government hands.¹⁸

The opium tax was a far more secure source of income. Even in 1923, when the province was in a state of almost complete anarchy, the Kwangsi opium monopoly yielded five million dollars.¹⁹ The trade continued when most other trade ceased, simply because it was so valuable that it could carry enormous transportation costs, both in transit taxes, and in the armed convoys which the opium merchants were forced to organise. But though the trade never dried up, however chaotic the areas through which it passed, it flourished only when there was a stable military authority, which guaranteed its passage, in return for tax payments. One of Huang Shao-hsiung's first acts after he had gained control of Wuchow in 1923 was to set up an Opium Suppression Bureau (i.e. an opium taxation bureau). Huang's bureau was staffed

day and night; searchlights played on the river during the hours of darkness to prevent evasion.²⁰

The trade grew in proportion to the stability of the province, and between 1926 and 1929 yielded an average of 10 million yuan per annum.²¹ The Kuomintang was of course pledged to the suppression of opium in China, but for Kwangsi the moral objections remained abstract, though they found expression in the fact that the trade itself was seldom mentioned publicly, except by indignant foreigners, who found in it a proof of Chinese "hypocrisy".

For Kwangsi, the trade was economically essential, and was recognised as such by the Kwangtung authorities, (whoever they might be at any given time), who saw that without the trade, Kwangsi would become dependent on Kwangtung. In November, 1926, Chiang Kai-shek told Huang Shao-hsiung that it would be "inconvenient" to reduce the trade, while the possibility of financial assistance to Kwangsi from Kwangtung remained limited.²² In 1928, Li Chi-shen stated that while opium suppression in Kwangtung was technically desirable, this would have severe repercussions for Kwangsi, Yunnan and Kweichow, all of which depended on the trade.²³

Throughout the 1930s, until in 1935 the opium from Kweichow was diverted (after that province came under Nanking control when Nanking troops entered it in pursuit of the communist forces on the Long March), Kwangsi remained dependent on opium, which gave an income of about 15 million yüan per annum, or half the provincial government's total income.²⁴

In common with other Chinese leaders who depended on opium revenue, Kwangsi's leaders found it embarrassing to refer to it directly, since they were at the same time pursuing an official policy of banning opium. Opium smoking was banned in January 1929,²⁵ and token arrests were made.²⁶

The restoration of a stable currency in Kwangsi was essential for the revival of trade and commerce. In 1925, the currency was virtually worthless; paper money had no backing, and coins in circulation were debased. The old currency had collapsed in 1921 when Lu Yung-t'ing fell; in the following years, paper currencies were issued by any militarist, strong enough to force their acceptance, while private speculators minted debased coins.²⁷ The new Kwangsi leaders themselves

indulged in these practices; their mint at Kueip'ing was turning out 20,000 yüan worth of 20 cent coins per day in May 1925, which were 60% alloy.²⁸ They subsequently refused their own coins as tax payment.²⁹ The only stable currencies circulating in the province were foreign ones - Cantonese, Hong Kong and Indo-Chinese.

In January 1926, all debased coins were recalled, melted down, and new coins cast from the six million yüan worth of pure silver obtained after the melting process.³⁰ The reissue was completed within a year. In May, the Kwangsi Bank was established at Wuchow; it issued paper money, backed initially by the proceeds (two million yüan) from the sale of a huge consignment of opium siezed near the Yunnan border. This backing Huang Shao-hsiung described as "turning black goods into white silver".³¹

The currency was temporarily stabilised, but by 1928, the Bank was being used as a subsidiary provincial treasury, issuing large amounts of unbacked paper money. In 1929, the paper issue failed completely, after the defeat of the Kwangsi Clique.³²

Kwangsi's external trade had withered in 1921, when Lu Yung-ting's fall ushered in prolonged

civil war. An important factor in Kwangsi's trade was traditionally the role of Cantonese merchants, who conducted a large part of it. They departed when the province descended into chaos, to return only when the new leaders brought stability to the province. By 1926, total trade, excluding the opium trade, and 'native' trade, had reached the kind of proportions of pre-1921 trade, but imports were almost double exports.³³ The Maritime Customs revenue for Kwangsi's three treaty ports was still lower in 1927, however, than it had been in 1912.³⁴

The upturn in trade continued until 1929, although the import surplus also rose.³⁵ Kwangsi's exports were limited, agricultural products, livestock, wood-oil, firewood, charcoal, and minerals. Its special products were bizarre: "the world's supply of star-anise is produced here. Cassia is also produced...fishing lines, made from the intestines of a species of silk-worm form a speciality peculiar to this province".³⁶ Kwangsi also exported live anteaters, for the gourmets of Canton and Hong Kong.³⁷ Kwangsi's exports of tin and manganese were more valuable; production rose sharply between 1926 and 1929.³⁸ Tung oil was most valuable of all.³⁹

The Kwangsi government made attempts to encourage exports, ^{by} introducing protectionist taxes,⁴⁰ by supporting anti-foreign boycotts⁴¹ and by organising a trade exhibition of local products at Liuchow.⁴² Mining production was fostered through loan schemes and official sales bureaux.⁴³ But none of these measures were sufficient to alter the adverse balance of trade, which continued so long as Kwangsi remained dependent on imports to supply the great bulk of her needs in manufactures and semi-manufactures.

The Formation of Links between Kwangtung and Kwangsi.

The relationship of Kwangsi to Kwangtung in the mid-1920's was complex. On the one hand, there was deep enmity and division, the result of Kwangsi's depredations in Kwangtung between 1916 and 1921, and of Kwangtung's revenge for these actions in 1921 and 1922. On the other hand there was a political alliance under the flag of the Kuomintang, an alliance strengthened by the close personal ties between the Kwangsi leaders, and Li Chi-shen, who gained control of Kwangtung with the departure of the Northern Expedition. Kwangtung was prosperous, industrially and commercially advanced; its capital, Canton, was the commercial and cultural centre of South China. Kwangsi was poor, undeveloped,

culturally backward and wild. If it had any fame, it was as a barbarous place; its only contribution lay in producing fierce, effective fighters. It was variously described as Kwangtung's "vassal",⁴⁴ its "step-child",⁴⁵ or, with greater panache, (by a Kwangsi government guest), as Rome to Kwangtung's Greece.⁴⁶

Kwangsi's whole outlook, commercial, political and cultural, was to Kwangtung. Wuchow, its largest city and commercial centre, was virtually a Cantonese city. Wuchow handled the great bulk of Kwangsi's external trade. Trade with Tongking was minimal; although the Tongking authorities had extended a railway up to the Kwangsi border, which linked with a good road down to the highest point of navigation within Kwangsi, at Lungchow, the opening of communications had not encouraged trade. "Ce que l'un des pay vend n'est pas ce que l'autre demande!"⁴⁷

Kwangsi's relationship to Kwangtung was one-sided, and that of an inferior, in every respect except one: her soldiers. Over the past century, Kwangsi had developed a tradition of producing tough, aggressive fighters, especially

from among the Hakka people settled in the province. These fighters had made their mark first in the Taiping Rebellion, and then in the Sino-French War of 1884/5; they allowed Lu Yung-t'ing to dominate Kwangtung between 1916 and 1921, and they formed virtually the only 'liquid asset' of the Kwangsi Clique during the whole of its career up to 1949. Kwangsi's political ties with the Kuomintang were cemented by the 'export' of her troops, to take part in the Northern Expedition, and also, on numerous occasions, to help in suppressing dissident forces in Kwangtung. Kwangsi troops were sent into Kwangtung in late 1925, to help put down non-Kuomintang militarists in the North River area, and in the Nan-Lu area of Kwangtung; in 1927 they helped Li Chi-shen to maintain his precarious position in Kwangtung, against communist and Cantonese opposition. (The relationship of Li Chi-shen to Kwangsi will be discussed below). In May, 1927, Kwangsi troops (one division) were in action against communist-led peasant and worker bands, who had moved into the North River area after the Purge in Canton.⁴⁸ In August, the same troops, supplemented by an additional division, went into action against the troops of Ho Lung and Yeh T'ing near the Fukien

border.⁴⁹ In November, there were Kwangsi *troop* movements in the West River Valley, probably in support of a planned coup against Chang Fa-k'uei, which was preempted by Chang's own coup.⁵⁰ In December and January, Kwangsi troops were in action against Chang's remnants in the East River Area. There was little fighting in Kwangtung for the rest of 1928; in 1929, after the leaders of the Kwangsi Clique at Wuhan and Peking had been expelled, and Li Chi-shen arrested in Nanking, Cantonese generals opposed to the Kwangsi Clique turned on Kwangsi, and helped to bring about the temporary eclipse of the Clique.

Particularly in 1927, Kwangsi's troops played a crucial role in maintaining the right-wing domination of Kwangtung by Li Chi-shen. Their actions, and Li's political identification with the Kwangsi Clique, underlined the fact, less noticeable before, the Li was not a Cantonese native, but a Kwangsi man. He became the butt of local opposition, both political, from the left, and local-chauvinist, from native Cantonese.

The Kuomintang, Communists and Mass Movements in Kwangsi.

Kwangsi's military interventions in Kwangtung were her only 'contribution' to Kwangtung;

otherwise, the relationship between the two provinces was one-sided, with Kwangsi the receiver of influences from Kwangtung. Kwangsi frequently reflected, on a reduced scale, trends at work in Kwangtung. This was particularly true of the political activity which swept Canton and Kwangtung in the mid-1920's, and overflowed into Kwangsi, pushing up the West River and its tributaries like a tidal wave.

The establishment of Kuomintang organisation in Kwangsi preceded the official link between the two provinces in March, 1926. A Party branch was established at Wuchow after the first Kuomintang Congress in January, 1924.⁵¹ It had no connection with the emergent Kwangsi leaders, whose troops actually garrisoned the city,⁵² but was concerned with organising the local workers and students. A labour federation was formed there at the end of 1924,⁵³ and by the middle of 1925, union membership was compulsory.⁵⁴ These unions were organised by activists sent in from Kwangtung, many of whom were communists; they gradually extended their activities out from Wuchow, to all the major centres of Kwangsi.⁵⁵ A Communist Party Bureau, and a branch of the Communist Youth League (Ch'ing-nien T'uan) were established in the

province in 1925, and worker, peasant, student and women's organisations set up.⁵⁶

This Kuomintang and Communist-led activity was not controlled by the military leaders of Kwangsi. When they themselves came out officially for the Kuomintang, they found themselves at the head of an independent growth. Though they were believed by foreigners in the province to have adopted the "bolshevik code of behaviour", and thrown in their lot with the "Red Government", of Canton,⁵⁷ their position was nominal, a situation that was reflected in the composition of the first provincial Executive and Supervisory Committees, elected at the first Provincial Kuomintang Congress in January 1926; although Huang Shao-hsiung was chairman of the Executive Committee, a majority of the nine members were either communists or left-wingers.⁵⁸

For a while, the Kwangsi leaders were prepared to let themselves be carried by the tide, and they gave their support to the mass movements, and in particular to their anti-imperialist and anti-foreign manifestations. As missionaries made up the bulk of the tiny foreign community in Kwangsi, they bore the brunt of anti-foreign agitation, though this was augmented by the

anti-religious movement which was launched by the Kwangsi leaders, to coincide with the existing mass activity.

Pai Ch'ung-hsi was the chief sponsor of the anti-religious movement, which started in the Kweilin region, and was particularly aimed against superstitious practices. Early in 1926, Pai's troops went into action, smashing idols, beheading statues, and converting temples for use as schools and Party headquarters. In an article entitled "The Twilight of the Gods", a Kweilin correspondent described the destruction of the idols in a building "which formerly housed a realistic model of hell".⁵⁹ Many of the soldiers who carried out the work were so disturbed by the sacrilege that they believed they were committing that they prayed for forgiveness to the idols before smashing them.⁶⁰ In some areas, this iconoclasm led to serious clashes between the troops carrying out the destruction, and their radical supporters, and the conservative inhabitants.⁶¹ It is difficult to assess how much of the activity against local religions was a genuine attempt to get rid of traditional, superstitious practices, and how much of it was a reflection of Pai Ch'ung-hsi's own distaste, as a Moslem, for

religions alien to himself. His policy was supported by Huang Shao-hsiung, but Huang allowed himself to be over-ridden by his mother in the case of his own village; there the idols were allowed to remain, and Huang stood at her side while she worshipped them.⁶²

The anti-foreign demonstrations throughout the province forced the majority of foreigners to leave the province. British merchants were evacuated from Wuchow in December 1925,⁶³ The French catholic missionaries, stationed chiefly in the west of the province, were subjected to constant harassment, but did not leave their posts as did their protestant rivals.⁶⁴ The Southern Baptist Mission hospital at Wuchow was evacuated by an American gunboat in April. The Kwangsi Chinese Christian Promotion Society, "supported by Bolshevik elements, the military headquarters, the labour unions and the strikers", issued a proclamation which stated that: "The saying that missionaries and doctors are vanguards of the Imperialistic invaders proves to be a fact undeniable. Fragrances and stink must be separated..."⁶⁵ Rex Ray, the Cowboy missionary, was glad to get away from the "devil's crowd", and

return to the "good old U.S.A. and Texas sunshine".⁶⁶ The Americans, who had passed relatively easily through the anti-British agitation of 1925, now found themselves under attack. They were unable to protect their converts; the business agent of the Southern Baptist mission in Kweilin was seized and paraded through the streets of the town, with firecrackers exploding at his heels. He was denounced at a series of public meetings, and finally branded on both cheeks with the characters "yang-nu", (foreign slave).⁶⁷

These incidents were of course minor in comparison to the fury of the anti-foreign and anti-missionary movement in other provinces, notably Hunan. The most serious was the Wuchow Incident in June 1926, which involved a British gunboat. The gunboat, en route to pick up the body of a British oil salesman murdered by bandits in the Lungchow region, blockaded the port at Wuchow in retaliation for the Chinese refusal to provide the boat with pilots. This action on the part of the commander led to protests from the Canton Government, and to questions being raised in the House of Commons. Austen Chamberlain, the Foreign Minister, supported the commander: "Happily for the British Empire and the peace of the world,

they [naval officers] have shown themselves very capable of using their discretion".⁶⁸

Anti-missionary incidents continued sporadically throughout 1927, though most were directed only against property. The real force of the movement was lost after the Hong Kong Strike was ended in October, 1926, removing much of its immediacy from the anti-foreign movement.

But by this time, there had been a recession over the whole spectrum of mass movements in the province, and an increasing coldness had grown up between the official Kuomintang apparatus and the Communists. As early as April, 1926, attempts were made to curb the activities of the unions in Kwangsi.⁶⁹ Hostility increased when, at about this time, control of the local communist organisation passed from Ch'en Mien-shu, who was concurrently a member of the Kuomintang Executive Committee, to the much more radical Huang Jih-k'uei and his Russian adviser.⁷⁰ The root of the hostility lay in the fact that though the Kwangsi leaders had tolerated and even encouraged anti-foreign, anti-missionary and iconoclastic manifestations, they were deeply alarmed when the mass movements started to agitate for higher wages, for an end to corruption, and for a curtailment of the opium

trade; these were features of Kwangsi society which, for all their outward show of revolutionary zeal, the Kwangsi leaders had no intention of correcting. Huang Shao-hsiung wanted a 'disciplined' mass movements which would ignore local evils, and concentrate on attacking 'foreign devils', whose actual importance in Kwangsi was irrelevant. (The foreign community in Kwangsi might have been designed specifically to fill the role of butt of mass agitation, since it was small, weak and given to retreating to Hong Kong).

From the spring of 1926, Huang began to exert pressure on the mass movements. He did not abandon his radical public facade, but acted through local police chiefs and army commanders, who were given powers to suppress mass agitation. In Nanning, the provincial capital, the editor of the Kuo-min Jih-pao, Huang Hua-piao, acted as his front man in conducting a campaign against radical students and union members.⁷¹ In July, the Guide Weekly printed a letter which reported repression and reaction in Kwangsi. The letter, and the advice given to the writer, revealed the confusion and uncertainty of the Kwangsi communists; they were advised not to go underground, but to continue to work openly, in line with official

communist policy.⁷² Their confusion, and the confusion within the local Kuomintang, which reflected all the strands of national Kuomintang activity, gave Huang Shao-hsiung, who was not confused, the chances he needed. The radical camp was divided, it had no outstanding local leader, and it was vulnerable to Huang's counter moves.⁷³ Huang asserted control over the mass movements, long before the full-scale repression of April, 1927.⁷⁴

The confusion and inefficiency of local radicals was shown up most clearly in the case of the peasant movement. While other provinces occupied in the early stages of the Northern Expedition quickly had millions of peasants organised in associations,⁷⁵ only a few thousand individuals were organised in Kwangsi. There were only two hsien peasant associations, and only 34 hsiang ones, many of which were dominated by politically reactionary gentry.⁷⁶ The head of the Kuomintang Peasant Department was an elderly chü-jen, who took to wearing peasant clothing, and was regarded by Huang Shao-hsiung as naive and eccentric, and incapable of organising the peasantry.⁷⁷

Much of this inefficiency was probably due to

the lack of interest shown in backward, isolated Kwangsi by the central communist and radical Kuomintang leaders, who rightly felt that their manpower was better deployed in provinces such as Hunan and Kiangsi. Young activists wanted to be nearer the real centre of mass activity; thus when Huang Shao-hsiung organised the most radical elements in the province into a comfort corps for the soldiers at the front, and sent them off to Wuhan, there were no protests.⁷⁸

By the end of 1926, the mass movements in Kwangsi had been nipped in the bud. The actual Purge in April 1927 was almost an anti-climax, and only the final stage of a long process of repression. The Purge, which started on April 12th, was directed by Huang's subordinates, Huang Hsü-chu and Wu T'ing-yang, since he himself was in Shanghai, where he participated in the planning sessions for the Purge held by Chiang Kai-shek.⁷⁹ The number of arrests made in Kwangsi is unclear, but probably did not number more than a few hundred.⁸⁰ Most of the communist and radical leaders fled the province, though several were captured, and probably executed, including two members of the Kuomintang Executive Committee.⁸¹ Other executions

took place in the late summer and autumn.⁸²

The second provincial Kuomintang Executive Committee, which took office shortly after the Purge, had a completely ^{different} composition from the first; Huang Shao-hsiung was the only member of the first to sit on the second.⁸³ The mass movements were dead; there were occasional anti-foreign demonstrations, but there was no effective opposition to the Kwangsi Clique, nor were there any serious internal threats to their position until 1949. The people of Kwangsi, who had been crushed into apathy by years of poverty and civil war, retreated into apathy. The upsurge of 1926 and 1926 was not strong enough to challenge the military strength of the Kwangsi Clique, (even if it had seriously attempted to do this, while Huang was technically in the revolutionary camp). Only in one area of the province was there serious and sustained opposition to the Kwangsi Clique, in the Chuang region in north-west Kwangsi.

The Chuang Peasant Movement and Soviet.

The province of Kwangsi, now the Kwangsi-Chuang Autonomous Region, has a high proportion of non-Han minority peoples in its population. In 1958, when the Autonomous Region was set up, it was estimated

that, out of a population of 19 million, 7 million were Chuangs (35%), 11 million Han (58%), and the rest members of small minority groups.⁸⁴ Similar figures are given for the 1930's.⁸⁵ The Chuangs, with the other minority peoples such as the Miao and the Yao, are the most ancient inhabitants of Kwangsi. They once occupied the whole of the area which later became the province of Kwangsi, but as the Han pushed into the area, they were driven westwards, and up into the hills in the north and west of the province.⁸⁶ The vast majority of the Chuang did not preserve their identity as a separate people, but became sinicised. Only a few, in the remoter areas of the province, preserved their Chuang identity, and remained outside the control of the provincial authorities. It was among these people that the Chuang peasant movement developed in the early 1920's.

Relations between the Han and sinicised Chuang and the real minority peoples approached a state of permanent warfare. The minority peoples suffered sporadic persecution from the dominant Han.⁸⁷ In 1919 and 1920, there were Miao rebellions, and the military repression which followed these outbursts left behind wells of hatred.⁸⁸ The minority peoples, backward and

uneducated, were constantly at the mercy of Han and sinicised Chuang traders and government officials. Most of the minority peoples were desperately poor; they farmed the infertile hill land, while the fertile valley land was in the hands of Han and sinicised Chuang.

In 1923, the sufferings of the minorities were exacerbated by the deprivations of roving bands of soldiers who became the only authority in the area after the collapse of civil order in 1921. In response to this anarchic situation, Wei Pa-chün, the son of a local landlord, started to organise the peasants of Tunglan Asien into self-protection associations.⁸⁹

These first stirrings of peasant organisation were soon squashed by the local landlords, and in 1924, Wei was forced to flee. He went to Canton, and attended the Peasant Movement Training Institute there (later directed by Mao Tse-tung).⁹⁰ In 1925, Wei returned to Tunglan, and took up his organisation work again, setting up his own institute for training peasants.⁹¹ Perhaps because of Wei's training in Canton, the movement was better able to resist the attacks made on it by the local landlords, (though in one clash two

hundred peasants were killed).⁹²

In spite of Wei's connections with communists and radicals in Canton, the Tunglan movement still had the character of blind revolt, motivated more by racial anti-Han considerations than by socialist ones. There was a strong ritual element; oaths were sworn and the blood of chickens drunk before clashes with the landlords.⁹³

During 1925 and 1926, the movement expanded, aided by the preoccupation of the Kwangsi leaders with other parts of the province, and with Kwangtung. In January, 1926, the town of Tunglan was taken,⁹⁴ and a revolutionary committee was set up there.⁹⁵ When the peasants started executing landlords, Huang Shao-hsiung sent in troops to suppress them, and installed his uncle, Huang Shou-hsien, as magistrate. But when the troops were withdrawn, the peasant movement surged up again. Huang Shao-hsiung found it embarrassing to continue his policy of repression, since Wei had by this time attracted attention and support outside the immediate area; the organisation of peasant associations and the reduction of rents were official Kuomintang policies, which Huang himself subscribed to, and he could hardly treat this particular peasant movement as a rebellion.

He was forced to negotiate.⁹⁶ The negotiations were successful, but they had an ironic twist; the leader of the official negotiating team was Ch'en Mien-shu, a member of the Kuomintang provincial executive committee, and also a communist. He became magistrate of Tunglan, and quickly brought Wei and the other peasant leaders into the Communist Party.⁹⁷ Communist Party and Youth League branches were organised in the area.⁹⁸

By the spring of 1927, when the Purge occurred, the peasant movement in Tunglan and the surrounding area had grown to such proportions that the organisation was able to survive the repression and the military action against the area in 1928, though it was forced to retire into the hills.⁹⁹

In 1929, after the defeat of the Kwangsi Clique by the Central Government at Nanking, control of Kwangsi fell into the hands of a group of leftist officers from Li Tsung-jen's forces in Wuhan, who had defected to Nanking and precipitated the coup against Li. Their defection had been arranged by Yü Tso-po, a prominent Kwangsi left-winger, who had been forced to leave the province in 1927. In return for his services, the Nanking government appointed him governor of

Kwangsi in August 1929, while his cousin, Li Ming-jui became the leading military figure in the province.¹⁰⁰

Yü's co-operation with Nanking had official communist sanction, and as soon as he was established in Kwangsi, communist workers were sent into the province. They concentrated their efforts on infiltrating the forces of Li Ming-jui (who was already very left-wing), leaving the agents of Chiang Kai-shek and Wang Ching-wei, who were also sent into the province, to wage a more open struggle for influence over Yü Tso-po.¹⁰¹

As it turned out, the Kwangsi Clique was not finished; ^{its leaders} they were preparing a come-back. They took advantage of the upheaval following a coup against Yü Tso-po, launched by (temporarily) pro-Chiang forces, in response to Yü's own pro-Wang moves against Nanking, to regain control of the majority of the forces in Kwangsi by the end of 1929.¹⁰²

Yü Tso-po's defeat came in October; most of the troops officially under the command of his cousin, Li Ming-jui, were lost through defection, but three regiments, by this time communist-controlled, retreated into the west of the province, some into the Tso Chiang (Left River) Valley, and some into

the Mu Chiang (Right River) valley. Li Ming-jui went with them, and shortly afterwards joined the Communist Party.¹⁰³ Yü Tso-po went back into exile in Hong Kong.

During his brief period as governor of Kwangsi, Yü had not ignored the peasant movement in Tung-lan. He had been sending them supplies, while the local communists had sent in cadres to improve the local organisation.¹⁰⁴ When the communist-led units retreating from the provincial capital entered the Mu Chiang Valley, and took the important commercial centre of Pose, Wei Pa-chün immediately entered into liaison with them. A further group of communist cadres, under the direction of Teng Hsiao-p'ing, the chief representative of the CCP Central Committee in Kwangsi, arrived.¹⁰⁵

The capture of Pose gave the communists a rich revenue from the tax on opium in transit through the city,¹⁰⁶ for Pose was the main opium centre of west Kwangsi; with the help of this income, and of the more experienced cadres drafted into the area, the peasant movement was able to expand rapidly; several more hsien were brought under communist control, and the armed forces under Wei's control were expanded, both by the arrival

of the communist-led troops and by the incorporation of defecting Kuomintang units. On December 11th, 1929, the second anniversary of the Canton Commune, the Yen Chiang Soviet was set up, and at the same time the armed forces in the area were given the name of Red 7th Army.

The establishment of the Soviet and of the Red Army marked the eclipse of the local Chuang people in the leadership of their own movement. All top positions were held by cadres who had come in from outside. Chang Yün-~~ji~~, was commander of the 7th Army, T'eng Hsiao-p'ing was the political chief of the area.¹⁰⁷ T'eng was apparently acting directly under the orders of the CCP Centre, then in Shanghai, though direct contact between the Soviet area and Shanghai took 40 days.¹⁰⁸

In February, 1930, a second soviet was set up, in the Tso Chiang Valley at Lungchow, and the 8th Red Army formed from troops which Yü Tso-yü, the younger brother of Yü Tso-po, had led there after his brother's defeat in the previous autumn, and from locally incorporated units, mainly bandits.¹⁰⁹ Initially the activities of this soviet were much more violent than those of the Right River Soviet; the French consulate at Lungchow

was sacked, and the local catholic mission entered, on suspicion, undoubtedly justified, that the French were harbouring landlords and 'bad elements'.¹¹⁰ (The Tongking authorities immediately closed the border with Kwangsi.¹¹¹)

The military organisation of the 8th Army was very shaky, and when in March 1930, the Kwangsi Clique sent an expeditionary force into the Tso Chiang Valley, the bandit members of the 8th Army defected, leaving a much depleted force to make its way across country into the Yu Chiang Valley, where it was amalgamated with the 7th Army.¹¹² The Tso Chiang Soviet lasted less than two months.

The Yu Chiang Soviet was established on a firmer basis. It grew to control eleven hsien;¹²³ land was confiscated from landlords, and distributed to the peasants,¹²⁴ though little other action was taken against landlords and local gentry who had not fled. This proved to be a serious oversight; when the 7th Army, emboldened by its early success in expanding the Soviet area, decided to make expeditions outside the area, and bring in still more hsien, the landlords revived themselves, and their militia, and struck back at the peasants.¹¹⁵ Pose and other towns in

the Yu Chiang Valley were lost, and though some of them were recaptured when the 7th came hurrying back from its expedition into Kweichow, the structure of the Soviet was badly shaken.

It was never given a chance to recover, for in August 1930, Teng Hsiao-p'ing arrived back from Shanghai where he had been consulting with the Communist Centre, with instructions (written in June) that the 7th and 8th Armies should leave the Soviet Area and move to the Central Soviet in Kiangsi.¹¹⁶ This order was apparently in line with the Centre's recent decision, initiated by Li Li-san, to fight for cities, and therefore to centralise all scattered military units. It was an unrealistic order. To get to Kiangsi, the armies would have to march hundreds of miles over very rough territory, territory which was garrisoned by uniformly hostile forces. The Soviet Area itself would be left virtually undefended. There was apparently a clash between Wei Pa-chün and Teng Hsiao-p'ing as to whether the Central Committee's order should be obeyed, but Teng forced its acceptance, and in September, the greater part of the communist forces left the area.¹¹⁷ They did not arrive in Kiangsi (at Chingkangshan) until the spring of the

following year; their journey was an agonising battle against cold, hunger, rugged terrain and constant enemy attacks, a foretaste of the rigours of the Long March. Only a third of the number who had started out actually arrived - about 6,500 men.¹¹⁸

The Soviet area itself came under attack from the forces of the Kwangsi Clique soon after the departure of the communist forces. Tunghlan hsien was devastated, but the Soviet administration and many of the local inhabitants retreated into the hills, where they held out for some time, living in caves. Eventually, however, they were crushed, and Wei Pa-chün himself betrayed and executed.¹¹⁹ His head was displayed throughout the province, as a grisly warning to would-be dissidents.¹²⁰ Several other leaders of the Kwangsi Communist movement met similarly violent ends. Yü Tso-yü, the leader of the 8th Red Army, fled to Hong Kong, but was extradited by the British authorities to Canton, where he was executed.¹²¹ Li Ming-jui went with the main force into Kiangsi, but was executed there by the communist authorities, on suspicion of being in league with Wang Ching-wei.¹²²

After this debacle, there was no further

effective communist activity in Kwangsi until shortly before the final victory in 1949, although a skeleton underground organisation was maintained in the major cities.¹²³ The cause of the collapse of the Kwangsi Soviet can be ascribed largely to the ineptitude both of the local leaders, who failed to establish a firm basis for the Soviet, and of the Centre, who removed its only prop. Insufficient advantage was taken of the opportunity to organise the masses during the first half of 1930, when the Kwangsi Clique was preoccupied with other enemies. When the Kwangsi Clique went into the offensive in the second part of the year, the Soviet area was poorly defended, and lacked sufficient popular organisation to put up adequate resistance to the forces of the Kwangsi Clique and their landlord allies. With the collapse of the Soviet came the suppression of Chuang resistance to the Han, their autonomous movement destroyed largely as a result of the opportunism of communist Hans, who had taken over their movement, expanded it to a point where it invited massive retaliation from the provincial authorities, and then left it defenceless.

The activities of the Chuang peasant movement had little effect on the rest of the province, either before or after the formation of the Soviet there. They are interesting chiefly in the light they throw on the position of the minority peoples at the time, and because of their connection with the policies of the communist centre at the time. For the Kwangsi authorities they represented only a minor irritant, which did not interfere with the general process of government. From 1926 on, the province was militarily secure, and, after the suppression of the mass movements by the end of that year, the bulk of the civilian population was under firm control. These were the conditions that Huang Shao-hsiung wanted to carry out his plans for the reconstruction of the province.

Reconstruction in Kwangsi

Sun Yat-sen laid out his plans for national reconstruction in his Chien-kuo Ta-kang, published in 1924. It consisted of twenty-five articles, which contained provisions for the work to be undertaken at the various stages of the revolution, military, tutelary and constitutional. They recognised that development

would be uneven, and that individual regions would move ahead at different speeds. One of their main aims was to prepare the way for local self-government, and to provide the economic conditions in which this self-government could function.¹²⁴ Huang Shao-hsiung's ideas on reconstruction differed, in that they contained little that would foster popular self-government. Technically, according to Article 7 of Sun's plan, Kwangsi should have moved out of the military period and into the tutelary one as soon as the military settlement of the province was achieved. But although Kwangsi set up the organs of civilian control, such as a provincial Government Committee, the province remained under military dictatorship, and no attempt was made to undertake the training in self-government at hsien level which Article 8 provided for. Kwangsi's reconstruction consisted simply of attempts to put the province's economy on a viable footing.

Kwangsi lacked both the financial and human capital necessary to make substantial steps in economic reconstruction. However, it was fortunate in that during the period from 1926 to 1929, when Huang Shao-hsiung was ruling the province, most of the rest of China was seriously affected by civil

war; Kwangsi was able to attract experts from other parts of China who were temporarily unable to work in their own areas. 80% of the experts engaged in reconstruction in Kwangsi came from outside the province.¹²⁵ In addition to these resident experts, other experts visited the province on short trips (which were often combined with officially sponsored tourist trips in the Kweilin region, one of China's most famous scenic areas). In 1928, a large group of experts was sent into the province by the *Academia Sinica*. Kwangsi was chosen for this scheme, the first of its kind, because it "has for a number of years enjoyed peace and order, and has itself started on a programme of reconstruction and internal development".¹²⁶ In the same year, an educational seminar was held at Kweilin, to discuss plans for the development of education in the province; 2000 academics and teachers attended, many of them nationally-known figures from outside the province.¹²⁷ At the end of the year, the provincial Reconstruction Assembly met at Liuchow, in the centre of the province; again many external experts attended.¹²⁸

The visiting experts were chiefly concerned with making plans for the long-term development

of the province's agriculture, industry and mining, which were slow to show results; the noticeable achievements in Huang's rule were in the reconstruction of the superficial fabric of the province, chiefly in the cleaning up of its cities, and in the development of roads. Many of the other projects never passed beyond the planning stage, a common fate for reconstruction measures in Kuomintang China.

By 1926, the cleaning up of Kwangsi's cities and towns had become urgent. Most of them were built on the banks of the West River and its tributaries, and were subject to severe flooding, since the level of the river fluctuated enormously at different seasons.¹²⁹ As well as being subjected to periodic inundations, the cities of Kwangsi were frequently ravaged by fire, for the houses were densely packed. In 1924, one third of the city of Wuchow was destroyed by fire, and 70,000 people made homeless,¹³⁰ and in 1928, Liuchow was similarly devastated.¹³¹ Appalling urban conditions also encouraged the spread of disease, in a province where malaria, dysentery, cholera, smallpox, meningitis, typhoid, leprosy, diphtheria and plague were all endemic.¹³² There

were frequent epidemics of these diseases, and though vaccination, the only effective safeguard, was already being practised in Kwangsi at the turn of the century,¹³³ it was inconceivable, with the medical resources available, that a comprehensive programme could ever be implemented. Urban improvements offered some hope of at least limiting the spread of disease.¹³⁴

Huang Shao-hsiung started a programme of urban modernization soon after he took over the direction of civil government in 1925. The work was concentrated on Wuchow, the main commercial centre,¹³⁵ on Nanning the provincial capital, and on Liuchow, at the geographical centre of the province, which Huang hoped would become the capital of the province. Streets were widened, roads surfaced, sewers installed, and water and electricity plants set up. The widening of streets aroused the same kind of local opposition as was shown in Nanking, where thousands of people were displaced to make way for the access road to Sun Yat-sen's mausoleum, but in general the improvements were welcomed, especially by foreign residents, one of whom even saw in them a sign that "a new day has dawned in China."¹³⁶

Road construction proceeded rapidly, from

1925 on. Kwangsi's communications had been up to this time almost exclusively by river. But river traffic could be very slow, especially on journeys upstream, and was frequently interrupted by changes in water level. The construction of roads was undertaken partly with the aim of speeding transport in goods, and thus the encouragement of trade, and partly to make the movement of troops within the province easier; the construction of a good road to the Kweichow border facilitated the transit of opium from Kweichow, a consideration which cannot have escaped the road's planners. The road building programme was the most successful facet of reconstruction in Kwangsi at this period; a great deal of money was devoted to it, though most of the labour for it was provided by corvée.¹³⁷ By 1928, Kwangsi apparently had more roads than any other province in China.¹³⁸

Other aspects of the development of communications were less successful. The idea of building a branch railway line between Kweilin and Hengchow, in Hunan, first mooted in 1912, was revived, but came to nothing; the line was not built until the anti-Japanese War. Nor did anything come of another projected railway, between Lungchow and

Nanning (to link up with the railway constructed up to the Chinese border in Indo-China). An air network, linking the cities of Kwangsi with Canton, did not come into being until after 1930, nor were the wooden planes envisaged by Huang Shao-hsiung ever built in Kwangsi, though some were made in Kwangtung, where enthusiasm for aviation reached fever-pitch at this time.¹³⁹

Huang Shao-hsiung was aware that as long as Kwangsi had no industry, the province would be dependent on imports to provide many basic necessities, and that the adverse balance of trade would continue; he believed that if Kwangsi could set up a few small-scale light industries, the burden of imports could be eased. He sponsored a scheme to set up small factories, with official capital.¹⁴⁰ He also tried to raise capital from wealthy overseas Chinese, who originally came from Kwangsi. Very little progress was made; the only plants which started functioning in Kwangsi between 1926 and 1929 produced such goods as cigarettes, ice and matches, which had little role to play either in easing Kwangsi's import surplus, or in aiding the development of the province.¹⁴¹

It was clear that though Kwangsi could depend

temporarily on external experts to help in its reconstruction, it would eventually need experts of her own. It was decided therefore to set up a university at Wuchow, which would train technicians and scientists for reconstruction work. It was established at Wuchow, in 1928. Its first director was Ma Chün-wu, the most distinguished living Kwangsi native, a former secretary of Sun Yat-sen, former governor of Kwangsi, and a well-known educator. The university was Huang Shao-hsiung's pet scheme, and he formed it to suit his own tastes; he had no respect for arts courses, and so none were offered. He wanted to train only the tools for his reconstruction programme, not "high-level vagrants" (kao-teng yu-min).¹⁴² A large proportion of the provincial education budget (three million yüan in 1928) was devoted to the university, presupposing a relative lack of interest in lower education.¹⁴³

Some attention was paid at this period to the mammoth task of improving agriculture; the prospect of attempting to make all round improvements was too daunting, and the Kwangsi authorities contented themselves with setting up an experimental station at Liuchow. This centre, which was staffed almost

entirely by experts from Canton, conducted various experiments on crop improvement and livestock rearing; unfortunately, its schemes were too impractical for poverty-stricken Kwangsi. Most peasants could not afford to rebuild their own houses, let alone put up chickenhouses which cost more than an average peasant's house.¹⁴⁴ The one policy which might have made a slight improvement in the lot of the peasantry, that of a general reduction in land rents, which was still official Kuomintang policy, was discontinued in Kwangsi and in the other three provinces controlled by the Kwangsi Clique in 1928.¹⁴⁵

Some progress was made in reclamation work, and in reforestation; a reclamation area was designated near Liuchow, and reclamation work allocated to disbanded soldiers, each of whom was allotted ten mou of land.¹⁴⁶ The planting of trees was encouraged throughout the province. Tung trees grew particularly easily in Kwangsi, and could fulfill a dual purpose: in preventing erosion on hills which had been stripped bare in the past, and in providing a valuable product for export, tung oil. ~~Tung~~ Tung trees are hardy, and need little care; they could be planted on otherwise barren hill land. ~~Tung~~ Tung oil, extracted

from the nuts of the tree, is used in many manufacturing processes, especially in the paint industry. For China, it was a very important export; it was produced chiefly in Yunnaq, Szechwan and Kwangsi. A Chinese exporter of tung oil described the importance that was given to the trade: "a good many of my fellow-countrymen entertain the idea that China Tung Oil is absolutely indispensable for foreigners, as if it were bread and butter...it is simply beyond their imagination that Tung Oil is only used as a drying oil - they insist on a conception nothing short of metaphysical".¹⁴⁷ At Nanning, Huang Shao-hsiung introduced a scheme whereby civil servants were required to plant a certain number of tung trees; ~~and~~ it was while he himself was engaged on this work one day in spring 1929 that he received a telegram telling him of the arrest of Li Chi-shen in Nanking.¹⁴⁸ Chiang Kai-shek had struck the first blow in his campaign to destroy the Kwangsi Clique. The period of stability which had allowed Huang Shao-hsiung to carry out his limited reforms in Kwangsi was at an end.

Li Chi-shen and Kwangsi.

It was ironic that it should be Li Chi-shen's

arrest which signalled the irrevocable split of the Kwangsi Clique from the Nanking government, for it was he who had been instrumental in bringing the Kwangsi leaders into the Kuomintang camp, and it was he who played a major role in establishing a close relationship between Kwangtung and Kwangsi.

Li was a native of Wuchow, but from an early age had made his career in the Cantonese army. His connections with Kwangsi only became marked when the new leaders rose to power there. He was particularly close to Huang Shao-hsiung, who came from a neighbouring hsien of Wuchow, Jung-hsien.¹⁴⁹ During the period of their consolidation of power in Kwangsi, from 1923 to 1925, Li Chi-shen, who was then stationed in western Kwangtung, was almost a paternal figure to the young and inexperienced Kwangsi leaders, but later, during the Northern Expedition, the position was reversed; Li's activities were confined to Kwangtung, where he held a paramount position, but they did not bring him the national reputation that came to Li Tsung-jen and Pai Ch'ung-hsi. He found himself identified not as an independent figure, but as a member of the newly-emerged Kwangsi Clique.

Li's political standpoint was almost

indistinguishable from that of the Kwangsi leaders; its main features were a strong leaning to regional independence and autocratic rule based on military control, coupled with a desire for modernisation, a fierce anti-communism, and even fiercer antipathy to Chiang Kai-shek.¹⁵⁰ It can be assumed that many of these features originated with Li Chi-shen, and were adopted by the Kwangsi leaders, whose experience lagged behind his, but this is not to say that he ever persuaded them to accept ideas with which they were not in sympathy. Li's role as a 'pathfinder' for the Kwangsi Clique was particularly prominent in the question of relations with Chiang Kai-shek. At the beginning of 1926, a Russian adviser in Kwangtung noted "a great secret enmity" between Chiang and Li, which arose, on Chiang's side at any rate, out of his conviction that Li was his rival.¹⁵¹ Li was not Chiang's rival for control of the Kuomintang, but he certainly desired to see Chiang and the Kuomintang armies out of Kwangtung. Li's troops controlled a large area of southern and western Kwangtung; in addition

Wang Ching-wei had granted Li control over the local customs revenue for the two areas.¹⁵² Li was anxious to see all 'guest' troops out of the province, and the tremendous drain on Kwangtung's resources lessened; but whether it would have served his interests to conduct a personal campaign against Chiang Kai-shek is dubious. Nevertheless, an obscure anti-Chiang campaign, believed to originate in Li's headquarters, was under way in March 1926. Scurrilous pamphlets were circulated, calling for Chiang's departure from Canton. After the Chung-Shan Incident at the end of March, the trouble was smoothed over, and the agitation ascribed to communists in Li's entourage, an equally unsatisfactory explanation of the campaign.¹⁵³ There was no further overt hostility between Chiang and Li until 1929; Li did not openly support his colleagues in the Kwangsi Clique when they forced Chiang's resignation in August 1927, but the coldness and suspicion persisted between the two men through the intervening years.

Li gained the control over Kwangtung that he wanted when the bulk of the Kuomintang forces, including a section of his own army, under

Ch'ang Fa-k'uei, moved north in the summer of 1926. He was made rear commander of the National Revolutionary Army, and was the senior military commander in Kwangtung, which was garrisoned chiefly by his troops. He was in a far more powerful position than T'an Yen-k'ai, who was in charge of the Kuomintang government, which remained in Canton until the end of the year. In December, when the government moved north, a branch political council was set up in Canton, and Li became its first chairman. Kwangtung became virtually independent; the Kuomintang was preoccupied with affairs in the Yangtze provinces, and with the growing rift in the Kuomintang itself. Having established his autonomy, Li proceeded to give full play to his authoritarian and rightist tendencies, and moved to curtail the mass movements in Kwangtung. In December, regulations were issued restricting workers' activities.¹⁵⁴ Repression mounted through the early months of 1927, and culminated in the Purge of April 1927, which was carried out as ferociously in Kwangtung as it was in Shanghai.

Li co-operated with Chiang Kai-shek over the

planning of the Purge, but he did not allow the co-operation to go too far. He continued to refuse to allow Nanking appointees to take up posts in Kwangtung, and to remit to Nanking the sums of money ^{ib} demanded.¹⁵⁵ His independence was shattered, however, by the events of the late summer of 1927; with the return of Ch'ang Fa-k'uei to the province, Li lost much ground, and although he was able to re-establish his control early in 1928, after the failure of the Canton Commune, several of his subordinates had managed to grasp strongholds for themselves in different sections of the province, from which Li could not dislodge them.¹⁵⁶

In addition, Li began to suffer from his connection with the Kwangsi Clique. The anti-Kwangsi 'Canton-for-the-Cantonese' movement, initiated by Wang Ching-wei and Ch'ang Fa-k'uei in the autumn of 1927, was still gaining ground. Unwisely, Li continued his practice of bringing Huang Shao-hsiung to Canton to hold the fort for him when he was out of the province. Huang spent eight months in Kwangtung between November 1926 and November 1927 ~~in Kwangtung, and also a good part of 1928~~, and also a good part of 1928; Li was absent for more than half the year, in Nanking. This was unwise;

it emphasised Li's connection with the Kwangsi Clique, at a time when he should have been trying to assuage the local nationalism of the Cantonese. But Li did not trust his Cantonese subordinates any longer. When he left the province in the summer of 1928, to attend the 5th Plenum of the Kuomintang Central Executive Committee, he took his chief rival, the Kwangtung governor, Ch'en Ming-shu, with him, and kept him with him for the duration of his stay in the north. Li managed to maintain his hold on Kwangtung, which was increasingly precarious, until his arrest in March, 1929, in Nanking; this marked the severance of his links with Kwangtung.

Li introduced a programme of reconstruction in Kwangtung, on which the Kwangsi programme was probably modelled. But the process of reconstruction in the two provinces was vastly different. With an enormously wealthy merchant community, Kwangtung could count on industrial and commercial development taking place through private enterprise, so long as the provincial government was prepared to co-operate by controlling the mass movements which many merchants had come to hate. Li concentrated on major schemes, such as the construction of a railway between Kowloon and Canton, and the

improvement of Whampao harbour facilities. He negotiated with Hong Kong to raise a loan to build the railway, thus incurring the odium of local financial circles, who wished to finance the development themselves.¹⁵⁷

It is probable that after the establishment of the Kwangsi Clique's main centre at Wuhan, at the end of 1927, Li Chi-shen played a lesser role in the formulation of Clique policy. But he continued to act as the Clique's chief spokesman within the Kuomintang, since he was still the only member to hold a seat on the Central Executive Committee. The advantages which his position in Kwangtung brought to the base province, Kwangsi, were substantial, but were less material than psychological. Kwangsi was free for four years from any sustained military threat from Kwangtung; the province felt secure and less isolated than it had been during the years of internal civil war.

Huang Shao-hsiung's rule over Kwangsi between 1925 and 1929 was a great improvement on anything that had preceded it; it gave the province much needed internal security, a luxury which few other provinces enjoyed at the time. A tentative start was made towards modernisation, though it was little more than a foundation for the more systematic efforts

at reconstruction made by the other leaders of the Kwangsi Clique in the early 1930's. Huang's efforts might have been more successful if he had not suppressed a large number of the most effective and modern-minded people in the province, when he turned against communists and left-wingers.

Huang's efforts should be seen not as a preconceived scheme of modernisation, but as piece-meal, unco-ordinated responses to opportunities for modernisation which occurred naturally, or forced themselves upon his attention. His primary function throughout the period was to maintain a stable and efficient military organisation in the base province of the Kwangsi Clique. This was the rôle demanded of him by his colleagues in Wuhan and in Peking. They made no objection to his attempts at reconstruction, particularly as many of them had the effect of increasing military efficiency. Huang Shao-hsiung only met Li Tsung-jen once during the whole period from the departure of the Northern Expedition, in the spring of 1926, to Li's precipitate return to Kwangsi three years later; he did not see Pai Ch'ung-hsi at all. There was thus no opportunity for detailed discussions on the government of Kwangsi, which was left entirely in Huang's hands. Huang kept a firm hand

on the Clique's base, periodically supplied the leaders outside the province with the additional troops they needed, and helped Li Chi-shen to maintain his position in Kwangtung; all these activities were time-consuming, and his efforts at reconstruction could be little more than a side-line. He lacked any ideological or theoretical framework in which to mould his plans, which in consequence took on a patch-work nature, often giving the impression of having been decided on whim. He had a penchant for superficial, quickly-realised schemes, rather than for basic reforms. A university was tacked onto a virtually non-existent basic education system; an extensive bus service was set up, though the majority of the inhabitants of Kwangsi could not afford bus fares; sophisticated agricultural experiments were carried out, while the peasants of Kwangsi still suffered under an oppressive agricultural system, which was left unchanged; electricity plants were installed, but their output was so low that the lighting provided was weaker than ordinary oil lamps. None of these reforms affected the basic social and economic structure of the province, or did anything to alleviate the chronic poverty and misery of the

vast bulk of the inhabitants. Only the Chuang peasant movement, which was anathema to Huang, made any attempt to improve the lot of the peasantry. In the rest of the province, the peasants were still under the rule of the same landlords and gentry who had ruled before Huang took over the government of the province; the only improvement in their position lay in the removal of the danger of deprivations by bandits and lawless soldiers. This in itself was an achievement, but hardly sufficient to justify praise for Huang's rule.

CHAPTER VI

The Kwangsi Clique in National Politics, 1928-1929

In 1928, after the completion of the Northern Expedition, the Kuomintang set about consolidating its rule over a reunified China; the Period of Tutelage, which Sun Yat-sen had decreed should follow the completion of the unification of China by military means, began. The Kuomintang had moved out of its period of fervent revolution, but the hope of sudden transformation which had underlain the lost revolutionary fervour remained, and found its expression in a stream of speeches, articles, official plans and conferences, whose themes were unification, modernisation, independence, progress, democracy and national revival. The words which expressed the hope took on a life of their own; the leaders of the Kuomintang spoke with passion of their plans for a new China, and felt they had achieved something with their words alone. A delusive and schizophrenic process was underway: faced with the magnitude of China's problems, her new leaders shied away from the effort that a real solution of her problems would call for, and satisfied themselves with outpourings of words, as if the words themselves contained solutions. They

failed to devote themselves to the practical application of the Kuomintang policies of reform and reconstruction ~~and~~ devoted themselves to expounding their own theories, and building their personal careers. Their fault was not that they were cynical, self-interested men, though many of them were, but that they lacked genuine political commitment. Their original commitment to the Kuomintang had been eroded by the strife within the Party, and by the influx of men without any commitment, with whom they had to contend for power. They were disunited; ^{the} ideology of the Kuomintang was no longer strong enough to provide a unifying force, and a spur to action, and the social and legal sanctions which might have obliged the new leaders of China to put aside individual and factional interests were virtually non-existent. There was no leader strong enough to stand above the factionalism which now dominated the Party. Chiang Kai-shek's position depended on his consummate ability to manoeuvre and manipulate within the framework of factions, rather than on any moral or popular superiority. Nanking's independent military allies, Feng Yü-hsiang, Yen Hsi-shan and the Kwangsi Clique, consolidated their regional bases while the Kuomintang leaders quarrelled with each other. The Kuomintang had

defeated one group of warlords, only to find that two-thirds of the provinces which were nominally Kuomintang-controlled were in the hands of "Kuomintang warlords", men who were prepared to pledge themselves to the Kuomintang cause, but were not prepared to hand over authority or regional control to 'national' leaders whom they did not respect, and who could not compel their submission.

After the Northern Expedition, Chiang Kai-shek decided that if unity could not be reached by mutual agreement, he would achieve it by force. He moved, first to throw out the political factions most strongly opposed to himself, and second to crush the holders of regional power. In the spring of 1929, the Kwangsi Clique, the most vulnerable of the regional groups, was crushed, and over the following year, Feng Yü-hsiang and Yen Hsi-shan were defeated. The most glaring abuses of disunity were destroyed; but the more fundamental abuse, the gulf between words and action, between policies and their implementation remained.

In his memoirs, Chou Fu-hai laments the lost chances of the Kuomintang:

"If, after the memorial service to [Sun Yat-sen's] spirit in the Western Hills, in July, 1928, everyone had buried themselves with one determination in the [work of] rehabilitation and reconstruction, how could there have been the battles at Wuhan in the spring of 1929, and in Hunan in the winter of 1929? Even

more so, how could there have been the large-scale Central China Plain fighting in 1930? In this fighting, the extent of the losses in matériel and man power were really staggering. If there had not been these repeated civil wars, how could the communists have gone on the rampage and given rise to successive years of military operations to suppress them?"

But the Kuomintang in 1928 suffered from ~~a~~ mass of internal conflicts, and no common will existed to resolve them. The opportunities offered in the crucial period after the reunification were allowed to slip away; everyone supported the ideas of unification, and of social, economic, political and military reform, but in an atmosphere of mutual suspicion and intrigue, little was done to realise them.

The Failure of Voluntary Disbandment

On July 11th, 1928, shortly after the victory of the Northern Expedition had been announced to Sun Yat-sen's spirit in the Temple of the Azure Clouds outside Peking, the four commanders of the Group Armies met in closed session at T'angshan, near Peking, to discuss the future of their armies. The following day a communiqué was issued, which recognised the supreme authority of the National Government over all four armies, and called for the establishment of a Disbandment Committee, for the reorganisation of Kuomintang forces into sixty

divisions, for the reduction of overall troops numbers to about 500,000, and, for the smooth reintegration into civilian life of disbanded soldiers. In the meantime, individual group army commanders were to be responsible for disbandment in their own armies, and were to attempt reduce their troops by between 30% and 50% within the next six months.³ An order forbidding further recruitment had been issued on July 9th.⁴ The number of troops in China was estimated to be about two million.⁵ In terms of the area and population of China, this figure was not excessive, but "given economic backwardness, the protracted period of warfare, the decline in production, and the sufferings of the people, [China] was really not up to bearing the burden of support for these great numbers of troops."⁶ The bulk of China's troops were not financed by the National Government in Nanking; some were still outside even nominal Kuomintang control; others, in the three areas controlled by the 2nd, 3rd and 4th Group Armies, were financed locally. But while Nanking did not have to finance these troops, it did not receive any revenue from the provinces which they controlled. Only Chekiang, Kiangsu, Anhwei, Kiangsi and Fukien contributed to the revenue of the National Government, and only the first two made reliable payments. In a speech to the Disbandment Conference

in January, 1929, T.V. Soong, the Minister of Finance, described the situation in other provinces:

"The national revenues from such provinces as Hunan, Hupeh, Kwangtung, Kwangsi, Shensi, Kansu, Honan, Shansi and Suiyuan, not to mention those from the Three Eastern Provinces, Szechwan, Yunnan and Kweichow are entirely appropriated by the localities mentioned. In the provinces of Hopei, Shantung and Fukien, the revenue officials are at least commissioned by the Central Government, but in other provinces they are appointed by local and military authorities, and most of them even fail to render accounts." 7

From its limited revenue, Nanking had to support not only its own troops, of the 1st Group Army, but also the apparatus of national government. How limited this income was is indicated by the fact that in Soong's calculations of the optimum revenue from the provinces to the National Government, Kwangtung, Kwangsi, Hupei and Hunan, the four provinces controlled by the Kwangsi Clique, were supposed to contribute 45% of it, whereas in reality, they contributed nothing.⁸ It was clear that if the finances of the National Government were to be put on a viable footing, this retention of revenue by individual provinces would have to be stopped. At the same time, the percentage of revenue devoted to the armed forces, which accounted for as much as 80% of the total, would have to be cut. This could most easily be done by reducing the number of troops.

Just as the National Government was crippled

by the demands which military expenditure made on its revenue, so were the areas controlled by the other group armies. Feng Yu⁴-hsiang was forced to impose enormous taxes on his provinces to support his forces; this over-taxation was one of a number of factors which reduced many of the inhabitants of Feng's provinces to starvation.⁹ Yen Hsi-shan brought financial chaos to Shansi, by diverting so much of the provincial revenue for military purposes that the provincial government had to be financed with unbacked paper currency.¹⁰ The 4th Group Army centre at Wuhan was plagued with financial difficulties, though the situation there may have been eased by payments from Nanking, extracted as a condition of further participation in the Northern Expedition.¹¹

There was no opposition to the general principle of disbandment, and the broad outline contained in the T'angshan Communiqué was ratified by the 5th Plenum, meeting at Nanking in August. There were however disagreements on the part of the four group commanders as to the desirable relative strengths of their armies, and as to the methods of disbandment.¹² Nevertheless, a certain amount of voluntary disbandment did take place. Desertion was very common, and the halting of

recruitment, which prevented the replacement of deserters, soon reduced numbers. All the group armies contained soldiers which their commanders were happy to get rid of - opium smokers, old men, troops incorporated from the armies of old-fashioned warlords. Chiang Kai-shek's 1st Group Army had especially large numbers of such men, and early reported large numbers of demobilisations.¹³ In Kwangtung, Li Chi-shen used the pretext of disbandment to get rid of several units, originally subordinate to his rivals.¹⁴ The 4th Group Army, which contained a large number of non-Kwangsi units, attempted to redress this situation by cutting up such units and amalgamating sections with reliable units, and by disbanding altogether units that were not trusted.¹⁵ This reorganisation was carried out in conjunction with the reorganisation of all Kuomintang troops into divisions (often accomplished by substituting the word 'shih' for 'ch'un'), which was completed by November; by that time, 340,000 men had been disbanded.¹⁶

By January, 1929, when the Disbandment Conference opened in Nanking, it had become clear that hopes for wide-spread disbandment were unfounded. A certain amount of dead wood had been trimmed, and many enemy soldiers had been demobilised, but there were still, according to

Ho Ying-chin, the Chief-of-Staff, at least 1,600,000 troops in China, of which only 900,000 were in the four group armies; and while the 1st Group Army, with 240,000 men, was larger than any of the other group armies, it was considerably smaller than the combined forces of the Kwangsi Clique (4th Group Army and Kwangtung/Kwangsi troops), which numbered 350,000.¹⁷

Chiang Kai-shek's appeal to his allies to disband more of their troops entitled "My hopes for the Disbandment Committee", which was published on January 1st, gave some indication, by the nature of its entreaties to his "armed comrades", of how fragile military unity within the Kuomintang might be. He called on them to abandon selfish, personal ambitions, and independent power, and to follow instead the examples of Japan and Turkey in uniting under central leadership. He made concessions to regional independence, in speaking with approval of the federal systems of the United States and Germany, though he stressed that these systems worked only because the central government had control over military and foreign policy.¹⁸ He appealed to the patriotism of his fellow commanders, and called for their loyalty to the Centre, an appeal which might have been emotive

enough had not these men been convinced that the 'Centre' meant only the power base of a rival clique, dominated by one man, Chiang himself.¹⁹

The Conference passed a number of resolutions concerning the financing of disbandment, and setting out plans for the employment of disbanded soldiers and officers, but the most important decision was one which in effect confirmed the regionalist structure of the Kuomintang armies; the titles of Group Armies were abandoned, but the Disbandment Area Headquarters which replaced them corresponded to the areas controlled by the group armies, with the personnel in charge unchanged. This 'reform' in military structure was simply a change of nomenclature, as the reorganisation of units from armies into divisions had been; the control of Nanking over the forces of the three largest Kuomintang militarists, Feng Yü-hsiang, Yen Hsi-shan and Li Tsung-jen was as illusory as ever.²⁰

T.V. Soong's report to the Conference underlined the seriousness of the situation. Nanking's inability to exert its authority over all its forces meant that disbandment could not be enforced, and that military expenditure could not be reduced. Soong reported that 78% of the Nanking's government revenue went on military

expenditure, and that unless this proportion was reduced, China would never be able to undertake the programmes of reconstruction and reform envisaged by Sun Yat-sen.²¹

When the Disbandment Conference closed at the end of January, it was clear that voluntary reform and reduction in size of the Kuomintang armies had failed, that regional militarists were as firmly entrenched as ever, and would not surrender their positions of their own accord. From this followed the corollary that China's other internal problems could not be solved: "putting the army in order was the basis of putting finances in order; if nothing was done about finances, there was no point in talking about People's Livelihood, or Reconstruction; so the Disbandment Conference really was the key to the rehabilitation (regulation) of internal government".²²

'Disbandment' remained current in Chinese military life only to the extent that the word remained in use as a part of the names of military headquarters, which were increasingly concerned, not with disbandment, but with waging renewed civil war. "The plan to reduce the armed forces was scrapped. The civil wars swelled the strength of the army to over two hundred divisions of heterogeneous troops, and the only reductions were

those effected by casualties as thousands of men perished in internecine war".²³

The 5th Plenum

The moves towards military rationalisation and centralisation after the completion of the Northern Expedition were unsuccessful; moves towards political unity were even more so. Contending forces within the Kuomintang continued to flourish, as was blatantly revealed at the 5th Plenum of the Central Executive Committee, held at Nanking in August, 1928. The Plenum reflected the deep enmity between the Right wing of the Party, as represented by a group of senior Kuomintang politicians, commonly referred to as the Elders or Genro, and the Left-wing, now known as the Canton group.²⁴ The enmity stemmed from the events of the second half of 1927; the Left wing blamed the Kwangsi Clique, and the Right wing, for their ouster, first from Wuhan, and then from Canton. They regarded the Kwangsi Clique as the most obvious manifestation of military regionalism, as a force which threatened not only the Kuomintang's chances of establishing central control over China, but also the ability of the Party to ensure the ascendancy of civilian over military rule. Chiang Kai-shek, their old enemy, joined them in their fear of regional independence,

and he and the Left wing came together in an uneasy alliance whose aim was the destruction of the Kwangsi Clique, and the regional tendencies for which it stood.²⁵ The clash between the proponents of centralised authority and of regional independence was centred on the question of the Branch Political Councils, which was one of the dominant themes of the Plenum (and the only one to be discussed here).²⁶

To state the animosity which dominated the Plenum simply in terms of regionalist versus centralist tendencies is too bald. The hostility of the Left wing to the Kwangsi Clique, and to the Elders, had additional roots, as did the hostility of Chiang Kai-shek to the Clique, but this was the issue around which hostility crystallised at this time.

The Branch Political Councils

The Branch Political Councils had been set up at Wuhan, Taiyuan, and Kaifeng after the 4th Plenum, in February, 1928, as a rationalisation of regional control during a period of continuing warfare against the Northern warlords.²⁷ They had considerable powers for the execution of civil and Party rule in the areas assigned to them, which corresponded with the areas ruled by the Group Armies, and were in effect the civilian branches

of these Armies, dominated by their commanders. They were completely independent of Nanking, though their actions were phrased within the framework of official Kuomintang policy. With the exception of the Peking Council, their chairmen were regional militarists - Li Tsung-jen at Wuhan, Feng Yü-hsiang at Káifeng, Yen Hsi-shan at Táiyuan and Li Chi-shen at Canton. Yen and Feng appear to have attached little importance to them, presumably because both men were content to rule without even the semblance of civil rule sanctioned from Nanking, but Li Tsung-jen and Li Chi-shen, who had longer contacts with the Kuomintang, and who had previously pledged themselves more firmly to the concept of Party rule, appear to have felt the need for official clothing for their actual regional independence, to maintain the outward forms of adherence to unitary government which ~~they~~ prophesied.

When the Left wing campaigned at the Plenum for the dissolution of the Branch Political Councils Li Chi-shen, the only member of the Kwangsi Clique qualified to attend the Plenum, spoke out strongly in their defence. Li, who had been making speeches on the desirability of regional local government for some time past, claimed, disingenuously, that the Councils represented no threat of the development of independent regional power, but

were a practical necessity for effective government in a country as vast as China.²⁸ He was supported by the Elders, who underlined their position by walking out of the Plenum when it appeared that it might decide to dissolve the Councils.²⁹ Eventually, a compromise was reached, by which the Councils were to be retained until the end of 1928, though with increased restrictions, notably on the appointment and dismissal of officials within the areas controlled by the Councils.³⁰

The 5th Plenum solved few of the problems facing the Kuomintang after the Northern Expedition which it had been expected to, and the constant walk-outs by delegates gave the whole affair a farcical appearance. When it was over, Chiang Kai-shek and the majority of the other delegates retired from Nanking. Chiang went first into hospital in Shanghai, for treatment of "severe tooth-ache", and then on to his native Fenghua. In a neighbouring room in the hospital was Li Tsung-jen, with eye trouble (possibly a recurrence of trouble from an old wound in the face). Li Chi-shen went off to Mokanshan, with some of the Elders.³¹ Only Feng Yu-hsiang stayed in Nanking, providing a spectacle for the inhabitants, and an

embarrassment to luxury-loving Kuomintang officials, with his ostentatious frugality.

The Regional Power of the Kwangsi Clique.

In the summer of 1925, three obscure young men had established their control, after four years of constant fighting, over one of China's most backward and poverty-stricken provinces. Three years later, in the summer of 1928, these three, now joined by a fourth, found themselves controlling an empire within an empire, which extended from "Chennankuan in the south to Shanhaikuan in the north".³² Huang Shao-hsiung controlled Kwangsi, Li Chi-shen Kwangtung, Li Tsung-jen Hunan and Hupei; Pai Ch'ung-hsi was established in Peking, though his control extended from there only towards Manchuria, and did not cover the area between Wuhan and Peking. The Kwangsi leaders must have been just as startled and excited by this rapid transformation in their fortunes as the leaders at Nanking were alarmed by it. Their position did not compare with that of Feng Yü-hsiang or Yen Hsi-shan, who had established their positions as militarists independently of the Kuomintang, and had given their allegiance to it from a position of strength. The Kwangsi leaders had started from a negligible base, the control of a province

unimportant economically or strategically, and had carved out their empire fortuitously, through luck and design, in the context of the vicissitudes that accompanied the rise to national power of the Kuomintang. One thing is certain: the Kwangsi leaders cannot have started their co-operation with the Kuomintang, or committed troops to the Northern Expedition, with this end in view. If their ambitions in 1926 were regional, they lay chiefly in protecting Kwangsi from invasion from Hunan. They wanted to play some part in what was the most important and forward-looking political and military movement in China at the time, an adventure which they could afford to take while retaining control over their home base as an insurance against disaster. But though they may have had originally committed their forces to the Kuomintang without thought of thereby extending their own regional domains, they found themselves caught up in the welter of competing political groupings, in a situation where central leadership of the Kuomintang shifted, where unity ceased to have any meaning. The Kwangsi leaders were thrown back on to a narrower unity, that of the regional group, which was preserved through the bonds of common origin, shared experience and personal friendship. This unity was unshakeable. Since

there were four of them, they could operate in four different areas; Kwangsi power could be extended over a wide range, if the casual opportunities offered by the confusion within the Kuomintang were seized. "This [the extension of Kwangsi power] was actually a state of affairs which had developed naturally from the general situation, but the Centre in Nanking regarded this.....as a tremendous threat"³³

It was a situation which the Kwangsi leaders found slightly embarrassing, for they knew that their position as regional militarists was nearer to that of the old warlords than it was to the Kuomintang ideal of soldiers subordinate to the Party. To compensate for this gap between theory and practice, Li Tsung-jen and Pai Ch'ung-hsi attempted, in the numerous speeches and circular telegrams~~es~~ that they issued at this time, to present themselves as loyal Party men, practical and progressive. Both made repeated references to the necessity of disbandment, called for the peaceful settlement of the Manchurian question, for the suitable employment of disbanded soldiers, for a start on the work of Reconstruction, and for the summoning of the People's Convention. Pai Ch'ung-hsi's projection of a progressive image was so successful that he was accused in the foreign press of following "discredited Red instruction".³⁴

Pai Ch'ung-hsi was very interested in Sinkiang, and made numerous proposals for the settlement of disbanded soldiers in that province, to prevent its 'sovietization'. There was a possibility, at the end of 1928, that he might lead an expeditionary force into the North-west himself.³⁵ It was envisaged that he would become a "new Tso Tsung-t'ang," re-establishing central authority on the borders of China.³⁶

Pai's interest in Sinkiang and in other predominantly Moslem areas stemmed from his Moslem background.³⁷ Pai took his status as a minority person seriously; after the fall of Peking, he called on Nanking to give special aid to the Mongols (Ch'i-min), and in November he became a member of the Committee of the China Moslem Society (Chung-kuo Hui-chiao Hui).³⁸ In a speech in December, 1928, he called for more support from Nanking for the minority peoples of the Inner Asian border regions, citing Sun Yat-sen's call for the unity and equality of the five races of China. He drew attention to the exploitation of these peoples by foreign powers - the Manchus in Manchuria by the Japanese, the Mongols in Outer Mongolia by the Soviet Union, the Moslems in Sinkiang by the Soviets, and the Tibetans by the

British. The Moslems in particular, he said, were spirited and courageous and united by ties of religion with Moslems in other countries; given the chance, they could act as their co-religionists had in Turkey, to throw off external oppression and to help to secure China's independence from foreign oppression; (Pai did not envisage that they should try and secure their independence from Han oppression).³⁹ Pai's ideas on Sinkiang did not arouse great interest, perhaps because there were so few other Moslems in public life, and he never went to Sinkiang; his position at Peking, and as a leader of the Kwangsi Clique was too finely balanced to allow him to leave, without precipitating trouble for his colleagues in the Clique.

In mid-1928, the Kwangsi Clique ruled four provinces, (Hunan, Hupei, Kwangtung and Kwangsi) and three major urban areas (Canton, Wuhan and Peking). It controlled about 350,000 troops, of whom 120,000 were stationed in Kwangtung and Kwangsi and 230,000 in Hunan, Hupei and the Peking/Tientsin region; ⁴⁰ superficially, this represented a formidable strength, but it was a shakey edifice, and ironically its main source of weakness lay in regional rivalries within the Clique's empire,

the same threat which, on a larger scale, the Kwangsi Clique represented to Nanking. Outside Kwangsi, only a minority of the forces of the Kwangsi Clique were actually from Kwangsi. Kwangtung was garrisoned almost exclusively by Cantonese units, and Hunan by Hunanese ones; in both areas local chauvinism had a long history, which was reinforced in Kwangtung by a tradition of hostility to Kwangsi. The position at Peking, and in Hupei, was more complex. The troops commanded by Pai Ch'ung-hsi at Peking, where he held the post of Field Commander (ch'ien-ti tsung-chih-hui), were mainly Hunanese, the former troops of T'ang Sheng-chih, whose downfall the Kwangsi Clique had brought about at the end of 1927. But three of Pai's immediate subordinates at Peking, Li P'in-hsien, Yeh Ch'i and Liao Lei, were Kwangsi natives (and fellow-students of Pai's at Paoting), who had made their career in the Hunan army. (1) They were regarded by the Kwangsi Clique as loyal; in fact their loyalties were confused and wavering, for whatever the nature of their personal relationship with the Clique, and with Pai, their own subordinates were all Hunanese, loyal to T'ang Sheng-chih, who was in Hong Kong, fulminating against the Kwangsi Clique. 42

The situation in Hupei paralleled that in Peking, but in reverse; there the problem was not 'foreign' troops commanded by Kwangsi men, but Kwangsi troops commanded by 'foreign' officers. Two of the senior commanders at Wuhan, Hu Tsung-to and T'ao Chün, were Hupei natives, who had served for many years in the Kwangsi Army, and who had moved into the Wuhan region with Kwangsi troops late in 1927. Once established in Hupei, their ties with Kwangsi weakened, and they quickly created strong positions for themselves, partly with the aid of Li Tsung-jeñ, who believed that he could placate local antipathy towards 'foreign' troops by raising up local men, whose real loyalty would remain with him. In this he miscalculated, for Hu and T'ao became less and less amenable to Kwangsi control, and came to regard Kwangsi units in the province as 'guest troops', whom they discriminated against in the distribution of local revenue. Their independent stance was assisted by the fact that both men now controlled, in addition to Kwangsi troops, substantial numbers of local Hupei troops, whose original commanders had been dismissed.⁴³ This elevation of Hu and T'ao angered and alienated Kwangsi men of similar rank, such as Hsia Wei, Li Ming-jui, Yang Teng-hui, and

Chung T'su p'ei. Chung returned to Kwangsi in disgust, but the other three remained in Hupei, a prey, in their bitterness, to external influences.⁴ These influences took the form of secret political connections with Yü Tso-po, a prominent Kwangsi left-winger, and bitter enemy of the Kwangsi Clique. Yü was a cousin of Li Ming-jui, and was able through him to channel existing discontent amongst Kwangsi officers stationed in Hupei against the Clique leaders.

The overall military position of the Kwangsi Clique in late 1928 was this: of the thirteen division commanders in the 4th Group Army, only two were Kwangsi natives who had served in the Kwangsi Army; five had strong connections with Kwangsi, either because they were Kwangsi natives serving in Hunan units, or because they were Hupei natives serving with Kwangsi ones, but their loyalty was suspect; and five had no prior connection with Kwangsi.⁴⁵ In addition, there were the troops in Kwangtung and Kwangsi, which had not been incorporated into the Group Army system. Huang Shao-hsiung's control over troops in Kwangsi was solid, and he also had about 5,000 Kwangsi troops in Kwangtung.⁴⁶ But command over the rest of the Cantonese forces, though nominally Li Chi-shen's,

was in fact in the hands of his immediate subordinates, all Cantonese, upon whose loyalty Li could not count.

This military situation was not healthy, from the Clique's point of view, for it made it very vulnerable to betrayal, as warlord armies had traditionally been. To build up a large military clique on the basis of provincial loyalty had been impossible; Kwangsi itself was incapable of supplying the necessary men. Other units had been amalgamated, but since the fundamental loyalty of the Clique was to Kwangsi, a loyalty outsiders could not share, it was impossible to make them loyal and reliable to the Clique. They were amenable, under the right circumstances, to offers and bribes from outsiders to abandon the Clique.

At least one of the Kwangsi leaders appreciated the danger of this situation; at the end of 1928, Huang Shao-hsiung sent a representative to Wuhan, proposing to Li Tsung-jen that the Clique should withdraw forces from Hupei, and concentrate them nearer Kwangsi.⁴⁷ But Li could not conceive of abandoning the position he had acquired in Central China, however compelling the reasons for such an action might be; he preferred to try and hold on to as much territory as possible.

Kwangsi's shortage of dependable military personnel was outweighed by an almost complete absence of civilian aides. There was no question of the Clique being able to staff civil government organs in the areas under its control with Kwangsi men. Local men were therefore selected, the main criteria being that they should be politically right-wing. Their loyalty to the Clique was not important, since they would exercise no decisive authority, and would be subordinate to military authorities. In Hupei, Li Tsung-jen took no part in civilian government, adopting a policy of "Hupei for the Hupei natives".⁴⁸ This took the form of a "loose laissez-faire rule which was approved by the merchants and farmers who resented official interference in their affairs".⁴⁹ The government of Hunan was entirely in the hands of Hunanese, and the Kwangsi Clique appears to have made no attempt to impose its authority there until February 1929, when the provincial governor, Lu Ti-p'ing was dismissed by the Wuhan Branch Political Council. In Kwangtung, Li Chi-shen was chairman of the Canton Branch Political Council, but he was involved in a struggle with the Kwangtung Provincial Chairman, Ch'en Ming-shu for control of Kwangtung.⁵⁰ In Peking, the situation was rather different, for

the Branch Political Council there, headed by Chang Chi, an ardent Right-winger, and ally of the Kwangsi Clique, had some independent standing, because of its composition. But the Council was made impotent by the tension between Yen Hsi-shan and Pai Ch'ung-hsi (see below), and was never able to develop any functional independence of the military. ⁵¹

The economic weakness of the areas controlled by the Kwangsi Clique provided the final facet of a gloomy picture. The provinces of Hunan and Kwangtung, and the cities of Canton, Wuhan and Peking, were traditionally among China's more prosperous areas; Hupei too was affluent in comparison with Kwangsi. But in 1928 Kwangtung and Hunan were still recovering from the troubles of 1927, a process which was particularly slow in Hunan, where there was continuing Communist activity. There was a very serious failure of the autumn harvest in both Hunan and Hupei in 1928, caused by drought; by the end of 1928, there was widespread famine in the two provinces. ⁵² Peking was suffering from a catastrophic commercial decline which set in after the establishment of the government at Nanking, and the departure of national and international organisations to Nanking.

Between June and November, 1928, 3,500 businesses in the city closed down, rents slumped, and about a quarter of a million people were driven into destitution. ⁵³ An article in December described the previous six months as a "period of retreat" for the Peking/Tientsin area, which was becoming a backwater. The waterways connecting Tientsin with the sea were silting up; in Peking itself the economic decline was reflected in the physical decline of the city. ⁵⁴ Wuhan was still gravely affected by the curtailment of foreign business, which, in the context of continuing anti-foreign (especially anti-Japanese) boycotts, showed little sign of reviving. There were 100,000 people unemployed in the three Wuhan cities. ⁵⁵ But in contrast to Peking a certain amount of superficial reconstruction work was carried out there; streets were widened, the city wall of Wuchang torn down, and ancient buildings restored. ⁵⁶

The weakness of the situation of the Kwangsi Clique, militarily, governmentally and economically made it unlikely that the Clique would be able to survive a powerful attack from Nanking. It had two additional handicaps, the geographic location of the forces of the Clique, and its lack of political support in the top echelons of the Kuomintang.

The main force of the Kwangsi Clique was concentrated around Wuhan, up-river from Nanking; for the defence of Wuhan against river-borne attack, a strong naval force on the Yangtse was essential; troops numbers were relatively unimportant. Nanking had a stronger river fleet than did the Kwangsi Clique. Wuhan's connections by land with the other centres of the Kwangsi Clique were tenuous. Peking and Wuhan were connected only by the thin tentacle of the Wuhan/Peking Railway, large sections of which were not under Kwangsi control. The railway link between Wuhan and Canton was still not complete, though there were plans to complete the missing section between Ch'angsha and Shaokuan.⁵ Strategically, the deployment of Kwangsi forces was cumbersome and potentially dangerous. Politically, the Kwangsi Clique's chief allies were the Party Elders, Wu Chih-hui, Chang Ching-chiang, Li Shih-tseng and Ts'ai Yuan-p'ei, a group whose members had prestigious records within the Kuomintang, but little actual power within the Party structure. They were generally regarded as old-fashioned and impractical, though their integrity was respected.⁵⁸ Many of them still kept to the vows of frugality and abstinence that they had made as young anarchists twenty years

before. The four of them had been leading anarchists, and though they had lost their political fervour, they had not lost their dislike of bureaucratic government. Li Shih-tseng in particular advocated the devolution of central authority, which the Kwangsi Clique took as a justification of their own regional power. The Elders gave their support to the Kwangsi Clique partly because they themselves had no other allies within the Kuomintang, and partly because they approved of the discipline and public frugality of the Kwangsi leaders. 59

The Kwangsi Clique had a few supporters in the Government, presumably men who had been appointed as Kwangsi nominees. These were the Minister of Agriculture, Yi Pei-chi, and the Minister of Health, Hsueh Tu-pi. Neither of them was important. 60

In September, Hu Han-min returned from his period of voluntary exile, which dated from the end of 1927. Hu's prestige within the Party was enormous, as one of Sun Yat-sen's chief followers, but he was unable after his return to assume the kind of authority that he felt he deserved. He did however establish himself as the leader of the Right-wing of the Kuomintang, where his sympathies lay, and through his link with the Elders became

also linked with the Kwangsi Clique.⁶¹ This increased the prestige of the Clique's political supporters, but made little real difference to the political balance of power, which had swung firmly in Chiang Kai-shek's favour; the Left-wing was again in decline.

The hostility between Chiang Kai-shek and the Kwangsi Clique increased throughout the period from the summer of 1928 to the spring of 1929, in spite of efforts, chiefly by the Right wing, to bring about a rapprochement. The outright clash, which did not occur until March, 1929, was widely anticipated, and surprised no one when it came. The nature of the clash revealed that the Kwangsi Clique had not been able to correct the weakness of their military position, or make adequate preparations to meet a Nanking offensive.

Pai Ch'ung-hsi in Peking.

Pai Ch'ung-hsi is in many ways the most interesting member of the Kwangsi Clique; he was undoubtedly the most gifted of the Kwangsi leaders, especially as a soldier. He was also the least parochial, and was more reflective and deliberate in his actions than Li Tsung-jen, who responded to situations rather than manipulating them. Pai's

bearing and his public utterances suggest that he felt himself an exceptional man, a man of destiny, on the national scene, not in the narrow world of Kwangsi, where the more homely Li was in his element. Pai's nine months in Peking should have been a time for reinforcing the reputation that he had built up during the course of the Northern Expedition. Yet surprisingly they were empty months, very different from the early years of the 1930s when Pai, forced to retreat to Kwangsi, was able to stamp his personality on the province. Perhaps this was due to the facts that he had no existing following in the North; that the Peking region was undergoing a major recession, both political and economic; that Pai himself was ill for part of the time; that his time in Peking was too short to do anything spectacular; and that he was involved in a power struggle with Yen Hsi-shan. Whatever the reason, Pai's failure to realise his potential in Peking must have been a great disappointment to him; he never again appeared so arrogant or confident as he had during the Northern Expedition.

As the armies of the Northern Expedition approached Peking, the chief concern of the commander-in-chief, Chiang Kai-shek was that the

city and surrounding region should not fall into the hands of Feng Yu''-hsiang or Yen Hsi-shan, and become a regional stronghold for one or other of them. Feng Yu''-hsiang, who was in a good position to take Peking area, did not do so, apparently in deference to the wishes of the National Government, and of the Diplomatic Corps.⁶² (It may also be suspected that Chiang Kai-shek had promised Feng some other plum, such as control of Shantung.) Yen Hsi-shan was made Peking/Tientsin Garrison Commander on June 4th, two days before his troops entered Peking, but his authority in the area was immediately circumscribed by the arrival of troops of Pai Ch'ung-hsi, which had been rushed north by train in the final stages of the Expedition. While Yen was grateful for their presence, since they reinforced his position in relation to Feng Yu''-hsiang, he also regarded them both as a threat and as a sign of Chiang Kai-shek's determination to curtail his power.

Pai's participation in the occupation of Peking had been bought at a high price,⁶³ which he was able to demand, since his troops were the only 'independent' force which Chiang could insert between Feng and Yen, as a block to the supremacy of either one, while his own troops were bogged

down in Shantung. Chiang's invitation to Pai possibly had a deeper motive, in that he knew that Pai would not be able to resist the temptation to try and establish himself in Peking, and that in doing so the forces of the Kwangsi Clique would be dangerously over-extended and thus an easier target for attack. He knew that he could count on the co-operation of T'ang Sheng-chih, the original commander of the troops which went north with Pai, if Pai became too obstreperous: "if Pai Ch'ung-hsi proves recalcitrant, he can be checked by the recall from Hong Kong and the rehabilitation of T'ang Sheng-chih..."⁶⁴ Pai was being used by Chiang as a pawn in his attempts to divide and rule his unruly militarist colleagues. He was secretly instructed by Chiang to keep an eye on Yen Hsi-shan; he later discovered that Feng Yu-hsiang had been given the same instructions concerning himself.⁶⁵ Pai must have been aware of the long-term weakness of his position in Peking, and yet it did not deter him from entering into a furtive battle with Yen Hsi-shan, to establish his ascendancy there.

The battle started immediately after the fall of Peking. Yen Hsi-shan's appointees found themselves being crowded out, by Nanking civilian officials, and Kwangsi military ones.⁶⁶ His first

major setback came when his appointee to the post of mayor of Peking was forced to resign at the beginning of July, before even taking up office, in favour of a Nanking man. ⁶⁷ By the end of July, he had been out-maneuvred, and he stumped back to T'aiyuan in high dudgeon, refusing to go to Nanking to attend (as an observer) the 5th Plenum. He withdrew a number of his troops in the Peking/Tientsin region into Shansi. ⁶⁸ Militarily, he was more powerful in North China than was Pai Ch'ung-hsi, but having failed to gain overall control of Peking and Tientsin by installing his own supporters in key civil and military posts in the area, he could not afford to try and take it by force, since he would be opposed in such an enterprise not only by Pai Ch'ung-hsi, but also by Feng Yu-hsiang, and would probably fail. He did not resign his position as Garrison Commander, however; he remained the technical controller of the area, and he left sufficient troops to prevent his total eclipse. ⁶⁹

It was widely rumoured that Pai Ch'ung-hsi was trying to open up "a new sphere of power" in the north. ⁷⁰ Pai denied these rumours, and substance was given to his denials when in August he was forced to transfer south about a third of

the troops he had brought north with him, because of the development of potential threats to the position of the Kwangsi Clique on the Yangtse. There was trouble in Hunan, where P'eng Te-huai rebelled in July, and at the same time, there was fear of an attack from Nanking. ⁷¹ Nanking was building up troops around Kiukiang, and Wuhan was uncertain whether they were meant for use against itself, or against the communists in Kiangsi. ⁷²

At the same time Pai was preparing an expedition into East Hopei, to clear that area of the forces of Ch'ang Tsung-ch'ang. It had been expected, immediately after the fall of Peking and Tientsin, and the assassination of Ch'ang Tso-lin, that Chang Hsueh-liang would submit peaceably to the Kuomintang. But after he had withdrawn into Manchuria, it became clear that he no longer exercised control over his ally, Chang Tsung-ch'ang, in East Hopei, who was threatening to move into Manchuria. Negotiations for the switch of Chang Hsueh-liang to the Kuomintang, in which Pai ch'ung-hsi and Li Tsung-jen had been playing an active part, broke down at the end of July. ⁷³ In September, Pai launched a swift expedition into East Hopei; Chang Tsung-ch'ang's forces were trapped on the Luan River, by Chang Hsueh-liang's forces sent to prevent their retreat

into Manchuria.⁷⁴ Some of Chang Tsung-ch'ang's forces were evacuated into East Shantung, and the rest were demobilised in East Hopei. At the beginning of October, Pai started negotiations with Chang Hsüeh-liang's representatives, which were followed by a series of visits by Chang's representatives to Nanking, culminating in Chang's attachment to the Kuomintang in December.

The Kwangsi Clique appear to have been unhappy about the full acceptance of Chang Hsüeh-liang into the Kuomintang, and in particular about his being made a member of the State Council. They clashed with Chiang Kai-shek, on the matter, Li Tsung-jen saying that he would "never shake the hand of a Fengtien man".⁷⁵

Pai's involvement in East Hopei, and the weakening of his position in Peking caused by the enforced departure of some of his units, was taken by Yen Hsi-shan as the cue for his own return to the offensive in the power struggle for control of Peking. He returned to the city in September, and stayed there until December, shadow boxing with Pai.⁷⁶ Pai came up on top again.⁷⁷ But by the start of 1929, his position had begun to slip in relation to his own troops. His movements became increasingly mysterious, and the part he played in

the military and civil government of Peking and the surrounding area increasingly small.

He did not continue his early attempts to place the population of Peking under a firm military discipline, the most striking example of which had been his attempt, in July, 1929, to crush the nascent labour unions. Pai's authoritarian nature disliked any mass activity that was not strictly controlled, and he was appalled to see union membership leap from nil to about 30,000 in the month after the Kuomintang occupation of Peking,⁷⁸ At the first meeting of the Peking Branch Political Council on July 18th, he put forward a motion calling for the closure of the unions, and got the consent of Yen Hsi-shan, his technical superior, to issue an order banning unions, on August 16th.⁷⁹ Unfortunately, Pai based his action on the resolution of the 4th Plenum, which had envisaged firm control of mass movements, but which had been reversed by a resolution of the 5th Plenum, meeting early in August, which gave the mass movements protection from interference by military or local authorities: his order was soon countermanded from Nanking. Union activity continued, and some unions even brought their members out on strike - the postal workers in September, and the tram workers in

November. 80

Pai's period in Peking was not a happy one, and his secret and ignominious flight from the city in March was a fitting end to it. He had attempted to beat a dignified retreat from the area in November, 1928, after Yen Hsi-shan's return to Peking, by resigning, but he had been dissuaded from doing so by Nanking delegates, who were presumably worried that Pai's withdrawal would effect the balance of power in the north, in Yen Hsi-shan's favour. 81

Pai's return to the south would also have strengthened the Wuhan branch of the Kwangsi Clique, a development which Nanking could not have welcomed, especially since the Kwangsi Clique seemed to have been emboldened by its success at the 5th Plenum, when with the Party Elders, it had held its own against the combined forces of the Left and Chiang Kai-shek, to attempt to extend its authority still further in central and south-west China.

The Kwangsi Clique's Conceit

It was apparent by the early autumn of 1928 that the extension of the power of the Kwangsi Clique had gone to its (collective) head, and that over-weaning ambition had replaced calm calculation in its desire to extend itself further. Huang

Shao-hsiung, as we have seen, was aware of the danger of this hasty, unconsolidated expansion, but his advice was ignored.

The Kwangsi Clique's ambitions lay towards Yunnan, Kweichow, and Szechwan, which they hoped to bring into a defensive alliance, dominated by Kwangsi and Kwangtung. In September, a five province meeting was held in Liuchow, Kwangsi, to discuss matters of common defence (wu-sheng li^eon-fang hui-i).⁸² In October, Kweichow delegates arrived in Canton to continue discussions, though whatever progress may have been made towards an alliance was wiped out when civil war started in Kweichow in November.⁸³

The Clique was showing itself very casual of public opinion, as was demonstrated in the Shanghai opium scandal, which blew up in December, 1928. The traffic in opium was one of the most widely attacked practices of the old-style warlords, and the Kuomintang had pledged itself to wipe it out. The Conference for the Suppression of Opium met in Nanking in November, and passed sweeping resolutions on the banning of the trade in opium, and the smoking of opium. But at the end of the month, the Shanghai Municipal Police discovered a consignment of 20,000 ounces of opium being off-

loaded, at night and under military guard, from a steamer recently arrived in Shanghai from Wuhan. The police tried to seize the opium, but were prevented from doing so by the guards, who informed them that the opium was 'official' and consigned to the Shanghai Garrison commander, Hsiung Shih-hui (an old colleague of the Kwangsi Clique). They then rushed off with the opium into the French Concession.

The matter might have ended there, if the Shanghai Commissioner of Police had not raised it with the Opium Suppression Commission in Nanking. Public protest was aroused and a team was sent to Shanghai to investigate, but before it could get down to work, there was an official clamp-down, and a ban on newspaper comment. The Commissioner of Police was dismissed, the head of the Opium Suppression Board and the mayor of Shanghai resigned; the case was never solved, nor were any of the high-ranking official and military men implicated ever exposed. Only a few minor smugglers were prosecuted. But the case had badly strained the faith of the optimists who believed that social reform would follow in the wake of the Kuomintang victory; the provisions of the Kuomintang's own policy on the suppression of

opium had been blatantly disregarded immediately after they had been laid down. Since the clamp-down on investigation and press reporting had been decreed from Nanking, the central authorities shared part of the discredit which fell upon the Kwangsi Clique, the presumed owners of the opium, who were believed to have sold the opium to private merchants in order to raise money for arms shipments; but the Clique was branded with the stigma of old-style warlord, because, for all their protestations to be modern-minded and soberly progressive, they had been caught behaving exactly as the old-style warlords did. ⁸⁴

The Nanking/Kwangsi Split

After the unsatisfactory conclusion of the Disbandment Conference, in January, 1929, it was widely expected that a clash between the Nanking Government and its militarists allies would not be long delayed. If the National Government was to live up to its claim to have reunified the whole of China, and to convince the foreign governments with which it was conducting negotiations for the revision of unequal treaties that its rule represented a departure from that of 'national' governments during the warlord period, it had to discipline its embarrassing allies, whose open

independence of Nanking made mockery of Nanking's claims to national sovereignty. There were two reasons why the first target for attack should be the Kwangsi Clique: first, the deployment of the Clique's forces, and the location of its main stronghold, at Wuhan, made it an easy target from the strategic point of view, and second, the Clique had made many enemies through its political ineptitude. Its leaders had continued their policy of agrandisement in the face of mounting hostility, both at Nanking, and from influential civil and military circles in the regions under their control. "The warlords of the Kwangsi Clique were quite unaware that Heaven was angry and the people murmuring in resentment, and simply continued with their plans to extend their sphere of power".⁸⁵ The Nanking Government did not have to look for a specific pretext on which to attack the Kwangsi Clique; the Clique provided one by flouting the central authority so seriously that Nanking was forced to take action. This was the Hunan Incident of February, 1929.

On February 19th, the Wuhan Branch Political Council issued an order for the dismissal of the Chairman of Hunan, Lu Ti-p'ing, and his chief subordinate, T'an Tao-yuan, an order which was

carried out forcibly by the two senior Kwangsi commanders at Wuhan, Yeh Ch'i and Hsia Wei, who occupied Ch'angsha, drove Lu and his troops into Kiangsi, and pursued T'an into West Hunan. ⁸⁶

Several theories have been put forward for the reasons for Wuhan's dismissal of Lu Ti-p'ing. Wuhan's official pretext was that Lu had been dilatory in attacking communists still operating in Hunan, and that he had retained for himself Hunan provincial revenue which he should have remitted to Wuhan. ⁸⁷ Nanking claimed on the other hand that in dismissing Lu Wuhan was trying to prevent him from remitting national tax revenue direct to Nanking. ⁸⁸ These questions of distribution of revenue were important, but it is likely that they were outweighed by Wuhan fears that Chiang Kai-shek was trying to detach Hunan from the control of the Kwangsi Clique, and to disrupt the connection between the central and southern branches of their empire. Ho Chien, a T'ang Sheng-chih man, had reported to Wuhan in mid-February that Nanking was supplying Lu with large amounts of arms and ammunition, to enable him to declare his independence of Wuhan. ⁸⁹

Whatever the reason for Wuhan's action, it constituted a direct challenge to Nanking's

authority, for though the Wuhan Branch Political Council claimed that its action lay within the range of action permitted to the branch political councils by the centre, this claim was only valid in terms of the original regulations for the councils, passed at the 4th Plenum of the Kuomintang Central Executive Committee in February, 1928; the modified regulations, passed by the 5th Plenum, in August, 1928, had removed from the councils the right of appointment and dismissal. Technically, Wuhan's action was illegal. It was also rash, for Chiang Kai-shek had consolidated his own position at Nanking, and in the process, the power of the Nanking Government, and he was now in a position to meet overt challenges of this kind. The foundations of a centralised and bureaucratic governmental regime had been laid at Nanking. Peripheral political groupings were being squeezed out, notably the Left-Kuomintang, which had now lost all power at Nanking; the mass movements were dead. Chiang's position at Nanking was unassailable. In the military field, Nanking had hired a group of German military advisers, who arrived in China at the end of 1928. They were to lay the foundations of a more professional and better equipped army, ⁹⁰ and although their impact

on overall military policy had had little effect as yet, they were able to offer Chiang valuable strategic and tactical advice.

The new situation at Nanking suggested that the holders of independent regional power should adopt a cautious attitude in the assertion of their independence. The Wuhan leaders failed to do this; they acted arrogantly and defiantly. The leaders of the Kwangsi Clique realised the danger of such action, and subsequently tried to exonerate themselves by claiming that they had not been aware of what the Wuhan Branch Political Council was planning to do, and had been taken by surprise by the dismissal of Lu Ti-p'ing.⁹¹ This seems unlikely. It is true that Li Tsung-jen was not in Wuhan at the time, and did not attend the meeting of the Wuhan Council where the decision was taken to dismiss Lu, but his hurried, nocturnal departure from Nanking two days after Lu's dismissal, followed by his defence of Wuhan's action, from the security of a hospital in the French Concession at Shanghai, suggests that he was implicated in Wuhan's actions.⁹² Pai Ch'ung-hsi probably knew of Wuhan's plans too, though he may not have participated in their drafting, and may have tried to prevent their being carried out.⁹³

Li's claim that Wuhan action caught him by surprise is negated by the fact that military preparations for a coup against Lu, and for a strengthening of Kwangsi authority in Hunan, and possibly for its extension into Kiangsi, had been under way for a considerable time before Lu's actual dismissal. Yeh Ch'i had moved his division into north Hunan in December, 1928; other troops of the 4th Group Army were being drawn up along the Kiangsi border officially to defend against Communist incursions.⁹⁴ These troop movements went beyond defensive moves and must have been regarded with concern in Nanking.

Nanking had been making its own preparations to cope with the Kwangsi Clique for some time before the Hunan Incident provided the pretext for action. Chiang Kai-shek had brought Chou Fu-hai from Shanghai early in February to plan a propaganda campaign against the Kwangsi Clique.⁹⁵ He had built up his troop strength in north Kiangsi and in Anhwei, officially in preparation for action against communists in Kiangsi, and bandits in Anhwei. Of greater significance were Chiang's undercover 'diplomatic' activities, which secured the support of Feng Yü-hsiang for Nanking, and the promise of defection from the Kwangsi Clique of many of its subordinates. It is difficult to date these

negotiations accurately, since they were secret, and their results were not revealed until the end of March; but they probably took some time to complete, and must have been taking place before the Hunan Incident. (The details of Chiang's 'diplomacy' will be discussed below.)

In the light of the preparations made both by the Wuhan authorities, and the Nanking Government in anticipation of a clash, it might have been supposed that once a suitable pretext was provided such as the Hunan incident, war would follow swiftly. This did not happen; there was a hiatus, during which feverish negotiations to reach a peaceful settlement took place. The prime movers in these negotiations were the Kuomintang Elders, who acted as political brokers, trying to appease Chiang Kai-shek, and to get Li Tsung-jen to go to Nanking and answer, in his capacity as chairman of the Wuhan Branch Political Council, for its actions. Probably due to their efforts, a commission of enquiry was appointed on February 27th to investigate the Hunan Incident; its members were Li Tsung-jen, Li Chi-shen, Ts'ai Yuan-p'ei and Ho Ying-ch'in, a composition which suggested it would not be critical of the Kwangsi Clique.⁹⁶ Li Tsung-jen and Pai Ch'ung-hsi joined in the conciliatory moves of the

Elders; on March 4th, Li issued a telegram stating his personal loyalty to Chiang Kai-shek, which was followed two days later by a similar telegram from Pai.⁹⁷ But Li was not prepared to go to Nanking, as the Elders urged him; He preferred to make his gestures of conciliation from the security of a foreign concession, and, as was his practice in times of stress, from a hospital bed. Li Chi-shen was less cautious. He came north to sit on the commission of enquiry; in Shanghai he was met by the Elders, who accompanied him to Nanking, and gave their personal guarantees for his safety.⁹⁸ Li Chi-shen apparently believed that he could stop war breaking out between Nanking and Wuhan, as he had done a year before, just before the start of the final stage of the Northern Expedition, when a Wuhan/Nanking clash had been expected, but was headed off by Li's intervention. Li Tsung-jen was not so sanguine; he recognised the situation as hopeless, and resigned all his posts on March 8th, the day before Li Chi-shen arrived in Shanghai.⁹⁹

The situation was hopeless. By the middle of March, Nanking had at least 150,000 troops drawn up in west Kiangsi and west Anhwei, faced by only 60,000 Wuhan troops.¹⁰⁰ Other Wuhan troops

were in west Hunan, pursuing T'an Tao-yuan, and at Wushengkuan, on the border between Hupei and Honan, where another enemy faced them - Feng Yü-hsiang. ¹⁰¹ In addition, the defection of supporters of the Kwangsi Clique at Peking, in Hunan, in Kwangtung and at Wuhan itself had been secured.

As in the Wuhan/Nanking crisis of the summer of 1927, the attitude of Feng Yü-hsiang, who dominated the northern flank of both the Nanking and the Wuhan forces, was crucial. Feng was approached by both sides, but, as before, he chose to side with Nanking. On March 4th, Feng and Yen Hsi-shan issued telegrams, pledging themselves to Nanking. ¹⁰² Yen's action was a natural reflection of the hostility between himself and Pai Ch'ung-hsi, which had centred on their struggle for power in the Peking/Tientsin region. Feng's attitude was not dictated by personal hostility, but by strategic considerations; he calculated that Wuhan was likely to be defeated, and that it would be wise to ally with the probable victor.

In addition, Feng could sell his support to Nanking at a good price - in this case the control of Shantung - whereas Wuhan had nothing to offer him. Feng also accepted two million dollars from Nanking, and in return deployed Han Fu-ch'u¹⁰³ with

60,000 men on the Hunan/Hupeï border. 103

Feng's attachment to Nanking foreshadowed the defeat of the Kwangsi Clique at Wuhan; its fate was sealed, at Wuhan and in every other area controlled by the Clique except Kwangsi, by the defections of its subordinates.

In Hunan, where the first defection occurred, Ho Chien, who had been appointed by the Wuhan Branch Political Council to succeed Lu Ti-p'ing as chairman of the province, resigned on March 9th after only a few days in office, declaring that the divisions existing within China would "deeply wound the Tsung-li's [Sun Yat-sen's] spirit in Heaven". 104 His resignation was clearly a rejection of the authority of the Wuhan Branch Political Council, and a move towards Nanking. 105

The second open defection occurred in Peking, where Pai Ch'ung-hsi's position had been precarious for some time. He had never succeeded in entrenching himself firmly in Peking, and by early 1929 he appeared to have given up the attempt. He made several attempts to resign, as did the head of the Peking Branch Political Council, Chang Chi; (106) when they failed, Pai, like Li Tsung-jen, retired into hospital at the end of January. (107) In February, Pai came out of hospital, and went to

rest and recuperate in the villa of Hsiung Hsi-ling, at Hsiangshan, outside Peking. (108) There he remained incommunicado for almost a month, while Peking buzzed with rumours about his position, which were intensified when he came back to Peking early in March, only to retire into hospital again. He transferred control of military affairs under his command to his immediate subordinate, Li P'in-hsien, an official confirmation of a transfer which had in fact occurred some time before, and then disappeared completely; he was believed to have left hospital, but no one was sure whether he had left Peking, or gone into the Legation Quarter, until on March 14th, it was revealed that he had left Peking two days earlier. (109)

What had happened was that Pai's subordinates had deserted him for their old commander, T'ang Sheng-chih, who had just arrived in north China. (110) The threat that Chiang Kai-shek had dangled before Pai Ch'ung-hsi ever since he came to Peking, of reactivating T'ang Sheng-chih should Pai need to be restricted, had materialised. One of T'ang's aides secretly visited T'ang former subordinates in the north, armed with two and a half million yuan, almost certainly supplied by Chiang Kai-shek, and obtained their defection from Pai. (111) Pai

owed his escape from Peking to the dual loyalties of his most immediate subordinates, Li P'in-hsien and Liao Lei, who were Kwangsi natives; they could not resist the pressure within their Hunanese units to welcome T'ang Sheng-chih back, but they made sure that their fellow-provincial should escape. 112

Pai may have intended to leave Peking by air and fly to Wuhan. A plane had flown north from Wuhan to Peking the week before, ostensibly making one of the many exhibition flights which were currently in vogue. His biography states that he did go to Wuhan, and there were similar reports in the Chinese press. 113 But most accounts of his escape claim that he went south by boat, and that after an adventure off Shanghai, when he evaded arrest by the Nanking authorities either by hiding in a wardrobe or by transferring from one ship to another, he reached Hong Kong at the end of March, and made his way from there to Kwangsi, still in secrecy, for by then the Kwangtung leaders had declared for Nanking. 114

Nanking had also arranged for further defections, to be revealed only when fighting started. In Kwangtung, Ch'en Chi-t'ang and Ch'en Ming-shu, the two senior leaders in the absence of Li Chi-shen

had arranged to declare for Nanking.

At Wuhan, the defection of two senior Kwangsi commanders, Li Ming-jui and Yang Teng-hui had been arranged, using methods of inducement which played on family and educational links, but also involved questions of political principle, which other defections from the Kwangsi Clique did not. Li and Yang were sworn brothers; they had both left Kwangsi in 1926 as junior officers, and had won steady promotion up to the rank of brigadier. But they were far from contented; during the year they had been at Wuhan, they had suffered discrimination from the local Hupei generals, and in particular from the Hupei men who had made their careers in the Kwangsi army. Li's career had also been adversely affected by the fall from grace of his cousin, Yu Tso-po. (See Chapter V, p.) Li himself was a left-winger, and was soon to join the Communist Party. Some time early in 1929, Chiang Kai-shek's agents contacted Yu Tso-po, who was living in exile in Hong Kong, and asked him to co-operate in the destruction of the Kwangsi Clique, in return for a reward which would probably be the chairmanship of Kwangsi. Yu agreed to do so, and obtained the sanction of his communist mentors in Hong Kong to do so. ¹¹⁵ He did not go to Wuhan himself; a

fellow-student of Li Ming-jui's went secretly to Wuhan, and laid plans with Li and Yang whereby they would come over to Nanking when fighting started on the Yangtse, ¹¹⁶ Yü did not go to Wuhan until the fighting was on; he travelled up river on one of the Nanking gunboats. ¹¹⁷

By the middle of March, Nanking's plans for the destruction of the Kwangsi Clique were complete. All that remained was the military drive up the Yangtse, but the hiatus continued, while the Elders and Li Chi-shen tried to reach a negotiated settlement. On March 13th, the Central Political Council discussed the Hunan Incident, and put the whole blame for it on Hu Tsung-to, the senior commander at Wuhan in the absence of Li Tsung-jen, and on Chang Chih-pen and Chang Hua-p'u, the senior civilian officials there; Li Tsung-jen was absolved of complicity. ¹¹⁸ For a week, it seemed possible that the Incident would be settled peaceably. The Elders believed that they had succeeded in "transmuting a large affair into a small one, and a small one into nothing". ¹¹⁹ Their confidence was misplaced. In the first place, Hu Tsung-to and T'ao Chün refused to accept the censure passed on them by the Political Council,

and sent instead an angry telegram to Nanking denouncing Nanking's military build-up against Wuhan.¹²⁰ In the second, Li Chi-shen was arrested in Nanking, on March 21st, accused of plotting against the Nanking Government.

Li's arrest caused a sensation among the delegates attending the 3rd Kuomintang Congress, which had opened in Nanking a few days earlier, and to which Li was a delegate. It also upset Feng Yü-hsiang, who subsequently refused to visit Nanking, in case the same thing happened to him.¹²¹

Li's imprisonment was not arduous; he was kept under house-arrest at T'angshan Hot Springs near Nanking, kept company by some of his guarantors, the Party Elders. 'Two Gun' Cohen, who was now Li's bodyguard, was informed by Sun Fo (then Minister of Communications) that Li would not be harmed:

"You must surely know that two of my venerable colleagues have guaranteed with their lives that General Li would be safe in Nanking. The senior of these has already honoured his pledge. He made the customary preparations for self-destruction, and warned General Chiang that unless he was allowed to share Li Chai-sum's imprisonment, he would commit suicide within the hour. He is now incarcerated with your chief." 122 (sic)

After Li's arrest, developments came swiftly. On March 26th, the 3rd Congress dismissed Li Tsung-jen, Li Chi-shen and Pai Ch'ung-hsi from all their

posts, and expelled them from the Kuomintang for life. War was officially declared on the Kwangsi Clique. ¹²³ The official denunciation of the Clique (T'ao-fa Kuei-hsi Hsuan-chu'an Ta-kang), which was published three days later, accused the Kwangsi Clique of having shattered the unity of the nation, and the authority of the Kuomintang; abuse was heaped on Pai Ch'ung-hsi, the evil genius of the Clique, who was accused of having wormed his way into Chiang Kai-shek's confidence, and of then abusing it. ¹²⁴ Chiang accused the Clique leaders of being feudal regionalists, selfish, secretive and opportunistic; of having joined the Kuomintang only to further their private aims; of having been in touch, during the Northern Expedition, with the Kuomintang's enemies, chiefly Sun Ch'uan-fang; of having looted Nanking in 1927; of having tried to sow dissent among the group army commanders; of having disregarded the regulations governing disbandment, and those governing the branch political councils; of having tried to form an anti-Nanking alliance in the South-west; and in general terms, of being crude, primitive, old-fashioned and a disgrace to China. ¹²⁵

Nanking's military moves against Wuhan started immediately after the Declaration of War on March 26th

Fighting started the same day on the Anhwei/Hupei border; ¹²⁶ Wuhan fell little more than a week later. Nanking troops advanced on four fronts: Liu Chih advanced along the north bank of the Yangtze; Chu P'ei-te along the south; Han Fu-ch'u moved south from Hunan, ^{Honan (?)} Chang Fa-k'uei [?] west out of Kiangsi. ¹²⁷ The Nanking forces advanced on Wuhan in forced marches, crushing the ineffectual resistance offered by Wuhan forces. At the beginning of April, Li Ming-jui and Yang Teng-hui pulled out of the front line, according to plan, ¹²⁸ and on April 4th, seeing that the situation was hopeless, Hu Tsung-to and T'ao Chün evacuated Wuhan, leaving the city to be occupied by Nanking forces the following day. ¹²⁹

This was a shattering defeat, and one which could not be explained simply in terms of Chiang Kai-shek's political machinations; it indicated serious tactical errors and weaknesses at Wuhan. The Wuhan commanders had deployed their troops unwisely, committing a disproportionate number to the pursuit of T'an Tao-yuan in west Hunan - a mistake which a more experienced commander, such as Li Tsung-jen or Pai Ch'ung-hsi might not have made. ¹³⁰

A further serious miscalculation lay in the

Clique's inability to get reinforcements through to Wuhan from the south. Huang Shao-hsiung sent troops into Hunan, possibly as many as 30,000,¹³¹ but he did not commit them until after the arrest of Li Chi-shen, and their advance was blocked by Ho Chien, who had now been reappointed chairman of Hunan by Nanking.¹³² The Kwangtung commanders, Ch'en Ming-shu and Ch'en Chi-t'ang, turned Huang's flank when they declared for Nanking on March 30th, and issued an ultimatum to Huang to withdraw all Kwangsi troops from Kwangtung by April 1st.¹³³ Huang's campaign ground to a halt only a few miles within the southern border of Hunan.

Without adequate leadership at Wuhan, and without reinforcements from the South, it is doubtful that the Kwangsi Clique could have resisted the kind of multi-fronted operation which Nanking launched against it, but given the superiority of Nanking's tactical planning, its naval superiority on the Yangtze, and the speed of its attack, the outcome was a foregone conclusion. The speed of attack, permitted by forces marched, surprised the Wuhan commanders, while Nanking's naval superiority made riverine positions below Wuhan and the Wuhan cities themselves indefensible.

But it was Nanking's tactical skill which really

shattered Wuhan defence, and for this, much was owed to Nanking's German military advisers, in particular to Colonel Bauer. ¹³⁴ Bauer was credited with the detailed planning of Nanking's campaign against Wuhan, and went up river with Chiang Kai-shek to give additional advice as the campaign progressed. ¹³⁵ It was his first and last campaign with Chiang Kai-shek; he caught smallpox in Wuhan, and died of the disease a month later.

After the fall of Wuhan, Nanking forces pursued Hu Tsung-to and T'ao Chün up-river, where they found their retreat cut off by Liu Hsiang, in Szechwan, who had declared for Nanking. ¹³⁶ Instead of making their way south along the Hunan/Szechwan border into Kwangsi, as Li Tsung-jen had ordered, Hu and T'ao allowed their troops to be disarmed, and took up Chiang Kai-shek's offer of \$100,000 in travelling expenses to go abroad. ¹³⁷

With the fall of Wuhan, the great edifice of Kwangsi power was destroyed. The chief reason for the failure of the Clique was its inability to establish adequate control over the regions and armies that it controlled, and its over-extension and over-confidence. The leaders of the Clique paid a heavy price for their mistakes; in addition to their territories outside Kwangsi, they

lost the bulk of their troops, retaining only those in Kwangsi.

Chiang Kai-shek, who had supervised the expedition against Wuhan in person, stayed in Wuhan long enough to establish firm control over Hupei and then visited Ch'angsha to ensure that the same process was carried out in Hunan.

The Aftermath of Defeat

At the beginning of April, Li Tsung-jen, Pai Ch'ung-hsi and Huang Shao-hsiung met at Huang's home near Wuchow. It was the first time that Li and Pai had been in their home province since the start of the Northern Expedition three years before, and instead of returning home in triumph, they came as refugees. They were seething with anger and disappointment at their defeat, and humiliated by its ease. Huang Shao-hsiung was less agitated; he had not had the experience of being translated from a petty regional leader to being an important figure on the national scene, and he was possibly less than sympathetic at his colleagues' distress. The unity between the three men became taut and uneasy.

Huang had come to regard Kwangsi as his own private domain, and had shown a genuine, if erratic and ineffective, interest in improving it; his

ambitions had been limited to Kwangsi and Kwangtung. Li and Pai however had regarded Huang not as the owner, but as their bailiff, and they had expected a great deal from him. He had been expected to keep Kwangsi quiet and secure, and from time to time to give military support for Clique operations in Hunan and Hupei; he was also expected to supply new recruits to the Kwangsi forces in the north, and to send financial help, particularly during the early stages of the Northern Expedition. His work had been carried out in comparative obscurity, and he had not won the fame that Li and Pai had. Now his defeated colleagues returned home, involving him in a crisis which he had had no hand in creating, and which he had tried to avoid. Huang understood the realities of the new situation more clearly than did the other two. He saw that the Clique's large-scale regionalism had been defeated, and that their only hope now lay in a return to narrower provincialism and in an accommodation on these lines with Nanking, rather than in an attempt to assert a new regional control in South China which Li and Pai favoured. His realism brought him suspicion and distrust from Li and Pai, ¹³⁸ a breakdown in co-operation which was the more serious because Li Chi-shen was not on hand to patch it up.

The first overt sign of a split in the Kwangsi leadership was shown in the reaction to peace feelers from Nanking and from Kwangtung. It was unclear at this time whether Nanking intended to press the attack on the Kwangsi Clique into their home province. Nanking was involved with other problems, the question of impending trouble with Feng YÜ-hsiang, and, on the international front, the question of the Chinese Eastern Railway; and the new leaders of Kwangtung appeared unwilling to go beyond the expulsion of Kwangsi troops from Kwangtung, possibly because of a prior arrangement with Huang Shao-hsiung.

The Cantonese leaders were prepared to make a generous settlement with Huang Shao-hsiung, provided he agreed to confine his activities to Kwangsi; the settlement included the continuing payment of a large military subsidy to Kwangsi every month, and a guaranteed purchase of opium exported to Kwangtung from Kwangsi. 139

The Nanking approaches consisted of a long letter to Li, Pai and Huang from Li Chi-shen in prison in Nanking, and a conciliatory telegram from T'an Yen-k'ai and Ho Ying-ch'in. Li's letter advised the Kwangsi leaders to surrender, admit their faults, and go abroad to improve themselves.

The Kwangsi leaders ignored the letter and its advice, considering that it was written under duress, and did not express Li's real feelings. ¹⁴⁰ Their reply to the T'an/Ho telegram was a fierce demand for the release of Li Chi-shen, and the restoration of the good name of Li Tsung-jen and Pai Ch'ung-hsi, a reply which Huang Shao-hsiung was unhappy about, but which he could not oppose without causing an immediate split with Li and Pai. ¹⁴¹

After this reply, negotiations with Nanking were broken off, though Huang Shao-hsiung remained in contact with Canton. ¹⁴² A fight-to-the-end spirit was deliberately created in Kwangsi, and the situation compared to the last stand of the Taipings. ¹⁴³ Li and Pai were in a reckless mood, and were determined to win back something of what they had lost. They decided to launch an attack into Kwangtung, using the remaining troops of the Kwangsi Clique. The troops which Huang Shao-hsiung had sent into Hunan to reinforce Wuhan were withdrawn, and drawn up with others for an attack down the West River. ¹⁴⁴

This use of the Clique's remaining troops must have been a further source of aggravation to Huang Shao-hsiung. Li and Pai, having lost

enormous numbers of troops, were preparing to put Huang's troops at risk in what he regarded as a hopeless attempt to set up in South China a multi-province bloc, such as the Kwangsi Clique had just lost. Huang knew that the casual opportunities which had come to the Kwangsi Clique in the political and military confusion of the Northern Expedition would not be repeated, and that a hysterical, unplanned expedition such as the present one would only lead to disaster. But Huang was still a cautious provincial militarist, while Li and Pai were outraged regionalists, whose pride had been pricked, and whose indignation drove them to make an attempt, however foolhardy, to restore their position as regional chiefs.

Faced with the intransigence of the Kwangsi leaders, Nanking decided to launch a multi-fronted attack on Kwangsi, using not Nanking's own forces, which were preparing for war with Feng Yu^h-hsiang, but the forces of Kwangsi's neighbours. The main attacks were to come from Hunan and Kwangtung, but it was also planned that Yunnan, Kweichow and Szechwan should participate. By the end of April, Ho Chien's forces were already moving south towards the Kwangsi border. ¹⁴⁵ Kwangsi's former ally, Fan Shih-sheng, now stationed in the Kiangsi/Hunan

/Kwangtung border region, declared his willingness to fight Kwangsi, and put himself under Ho's command. 146

Lung Yün, who now controlled Yunnan, took up the post of commander of the 10th Anti-Kwangsi Route Army, and announced his plan to attack Kwangsi via Kweichow. Lung's interests lay not in attacking Kwangsi, but in extending his control over Kweichow, then much weakened by civil war. 147 Kweichow, to the extent that it could rise above its internal strife, was more concerned with repelling Lung's attack than with attacking Kwangsi. It did not seem likely that Szechwan would play any useful part in an attack on Kwangsi, for the province was sunk in its unending civil wars. 148

The Kwangtung leaders continued to display unwillingness to attack Kwangsi, and up to the end of April continued to press Huang Shao-hsiung to make a peaceful settlement with Nanking, an attitude which was supported by various groups within Kwangsi, including the leading citizens (yao-jen) of Kweilin. 149

Li and Pai had no intention of submitting, and their refusal to do so led Nanking, on May 4th to dismiss Huang Shao-hsiung as chairman of Kwangsi, and to replace him with one of his subordinates, Wu T'ing-yang; Lü Huan-yen became Disbandment

Commissioner for the province (i.e. military chief), a post previously held concurrently by Huang.¹⁵⁰ The following day, Kwangsi forces attacking down the West River clashed with Cantonese forces. Kwangsi forces fought as the Protect the Party, Save the Country Army (Hu-tang Chiu-kuo Chun), a title which also used at this time by Feng Yü-hsiang.¹⁵¹

Initially, the prospects for the invading Kwangsi forces seemed hopeful. As they moved down the West River in two routes, Hsü Ching-t'ang, a Kwangtung division commander, declared for Kwangsi in the East River district of Kwangtung. Part of the Cantonese Navy declared its independence at the same time.¹⁵² Li Tsung-jen had gone to Hong Kong to try and secure further support from the many 'exiles' living there, leaving the direction of the campaign into Kwangtung to Pai Ch'ung-hsi. Li's chief hope was probably to form some kind of alliance with Feng Yü-hsiang, who had already been accused by Nanking of being in league with the Kwangsi Clique.¹⁵³ In fact, the vicissitudes of the Kwangsi Clique at this time, and Feng's own difficulties in North China seem to have prevented the formation of any effective co-operation;

The Kwangsi drive down the West River was at first so successful that Canton itself seemed threatened. Confusion and panic in the city were increased when bombs were dropped on it. The bombing was at first blamed on the Kwangsi Airforce, (which did not exist), but subsequently turned out to be the work of Cantonese aeroplanes, which were trying to hit naval vessels believed to be supporting the Kwangsi Clique, which were anchored off the Bund. ¹⁵⁴ But Kwangsi forces got bogged down while trying to cross the North River, giving the Kwangtung generals time to mount a counter-attack; in the second week of May, Pai Ch'ung-hsi was heavily defeated at Painsi, while Hsu Ching-t'ang was thrown back from Shihlung, which was captured on May 13th. ¹⁵⁵

Meanwhile, a serious threat to Kwangsi was building up from Hunan. By concentrating their forces for an attack into Kwangtung, the Kwangsi leaders had left their northern flank almost undefended, a situation which Ho Chien quickly took advantage of; on May 14th, his troops took Ch'uanchow, just outside Kwangsi, and advanced towards Kweilin. ¹⁵⁶ Pai was forced to withdraw into Kwangsi, to launch a counter-attack against the Hunanese. He was able to throw Ho Chien back

temporarily, but in doing so he was forced to leave the West River front inadequately held. The Cantonese counter-attacked. They had been reinforced by the arrival from Wuhan of the troops of Li Ming-ju and Yang Teng-hui, which had been transferred south by sea; these forces were entrusted with the task of attacking into Kwangsi; Wuchow fell to them on June 6th. ¹⁵⁷ Soon afterwards, Nanking appointed Li Ming-ju Disbandment Commissioner for Kwangsi, and Yu Tso-po the provincial chairman, replacing Lu Huan-yen and Wu T'ing-yang, who had proved insufficiently useful to Nanking. ¹⁵⁸

Huang Shao-hsiung and Pai Ch'ung-hsi fled from Kwangsi through the back door, via Lungchow, and after a brief stay in Tonking, made their way to Hong Kong. Their rule over Kwangsi was ended, temporarily.

Their flight, and the fighting which had preceded it, brought Kwangsi close again to the despairing chaos which it had passed through in the period between the fall of Lu Yung-t'ing and the rise to power of the Kwangsi Clique. The local currency collapsed again, as it had after Lu's flight, trade and commerce were badly dislocated, and civil government broke down.

Huang thought of Lu as he and Pai fled from the province, taking the same route that Lu had used to make his escape eight years before; he must also have been aware of the similar legacy of disorder and disruption that he and Pai were leaving to their province. ¹⁵⁹ A French missionary in Nanking described the situation that they left behind:

'The civil war in Kwangsi fizzled out; the leaders of the Clique, seeing defeat falling upon them, fled lamentably, and while they are now junketing in Tonking and Hong Kong, the wretched people are suffering from the bankruptcy which they have brought about.' 160

The Aftermath of the Kwangsi Clique's Defeat

A few years after his fall in 1929, when Li Tsung-jen and Pai Ch'ung-hsi were again established as overlords of Kwangsi, Li made a speech which, perhaps unwittingly, described his career to 1929.

"Since the Republic the majority of senior officers have received an education, and some have also received higher education. But they have still not been able to nurture pure and lofty characters [which would induce them] to go out and strive for the nation. The result is that we are still sunk in the chaos of warlordism; the nation's peril increases daily, and society becomes increasingly disturbed. What is the reason for this? It is entirely due to the lack of psychological reconstruction, to the pervasiveness of self-seeking.....
When they [the senior officers] started out, though they wanted to work for the nation, ~~but~~ they found themselves in a corrupt environment, surrounded by an atmosphere of self-seeking, tainted and misled. They could not stand up to it." 161

Four years of control of Kwangsi and three years of participation in national affairs had had the effect of bringing out similarities between them and Lu Yung-t'ing which had been less obvious when they defeated him in 1924. The similarities expressed themselves in a series of negative characteristics: lack of political conviction, lack of social responsibility, lack of allegiance to higher authority. They had made the same mistake as Lu, in trying to carve out a Kwangsi Empire which they did not have the strength to maintain.

The manner of their rise to power in Kwangsi, in the context of warlord struggles, had assured that these characteristics would be latent in them. But in 1926, when they first entered national politics, a possibility had existed that they would go another way. Two paths had lain open to them: either to stay in Kwangsi and pursue careers as provincial warlords, or to move into new careers as servants of the national revolutionary movement. They had kept a foot in both camps, by leaving one of their number behind, and sending two out. Huang Shao-hsiung had remained a provincial warlord, though not of Lu Yung-t'ing's type; he had shown greater interest in the management of the province,

and in the introduction of new ideas and his rule represented some progress from Lu's.

By contrast, Li and Pai had moved backwards, in terms of their political position and commitment to a national movement. The characteristics of local chauvinism, self-aggrandisement and authoritarian government latent in them from their earlier careers had been enhanced during their careers in the Kuomintang. An orthodox interpretation, Kuomintang or Communist, would blame this on their basic veniality. But it can also be argued that it was a reaction to the failure of the Kuomintang to create in China circumstances which would have made it impossible for the Kwangsi generals, and many other men like them, to operate as independent militants, circumstances in which they would have been forced to submit to civilian control. They were certainly more willing to do this in 1926 than they were after the disintegration of Kuomintang political unity in 1927.

Some of the officers of Li's and Pai's generation managed the transformation from petty warlord to military servant of a political party, but not under the Kuomintang. Chu Te is a remarkable example of such a transformation, and one which is the more striking since Chu's career as a

warlord made him a more unlikely candidate for transformation than the Kwangsi leaders. It spanned a longer period of time, and it had corrupted him as a person more deeply, for it had led him, amongst other things, to opium smoking. But Chu is a remarkable man, and there are elements in his make-up which Li and Pai lacked. They went another way. The possibilities for transformation within them were not developed; conditions under the Kuomintang allowed them and even encouraged them to slip back into warlord practices. In the end, the Kuomintang, having failed to remould its warlord allies, was forced to continue the anti-warlord wars officially ended with the completion of the Northern Expedition, and to crush its erstwhile allies, or at any rate those who dominated extensive areas of Kuomintang China.

In the process, Chiang Kai-shek established himself as absolute master of the Kuomintang, its government and its armies. The Kuomintang was not again threatened by large-scale regional independence.

This victory did not, however, give Chiang absolute control over China. Large-scale regionalism was replaced by provincial independence. These independent provinces constituted little threat to Nanking, since their leaders were no longer

tempted to expand their power outside their own provinces, but they did represent a contradiction to the Kuomintang's claims to have fully reunified China, a contradiction which was conveniently ignored by the Kuomintang and its friends in China and abroad.

CHAPTER VII

The Kwangsi Clique in the 1930s: The Reconstruction Movement in Kwangsi

After the flight from Kwangsi of the leaders of the Kwangsi Clique in the spring of 1929, control of the provincial government passed to Yu Tso-po and Lu Huan-yen. Yu's connections with the communist movement in Kwangsi, and with Wang Ching-wei, led, in the early autumn of the same year, to a rupture with Nanking, shortly after which Yu and his followers were driven from power, when various army commanders in Kwangsi transferred their allegiance to Nanking. The leaders of the Kwangsi Clique used the confusion which this transfer of power engendered to return secretly to the province and to establish contact with various army units still loyal to them. By the end of November, they had re-established their control over the province. ¹

At the same time, Chang Fa-k'uei arrived in the province with his troops, having marched south from the Yangtze after quarrelling with Nanking. Chang, who had remained loyal to Wang Ching-wei, was trying to repeat his southward march of 1927 and to launch an attack into Kwangtung, in order to re-establish

Wang at Canton. ² At the end of 1929, Chang and the Kwangsi leaders drove down the West River into Kwangtung. The expedition was poorly conceived, and hastily planned; after some initial successes, the Chang/Kwangsi troops ran into heavy Cantonese resistance, and were driven back in disarray into Kwangsi. Wuchow was lost to the Cantonese. ³

In March, 1930, Feng Yuⁿ-hsiang and Yen Hsi-shan allied for an attack on Chiang Kai-shek and acquired the political support of Wang Ching-wei and his clique, now known as the Reorganisationists. An Expanded Conference (K'uo-ta Hui-i) was convened in Peking, with Wang as its chairman. ⁴ Through their alliance with Chang Fa-k'uei, the leaders of the Kwangsi Clique found themselves allied with Wang, in spite of the past history of enmity between themselves and Wang. ⁵ It was decided that they and Chang should attack north into Hunan, with Nanking as their ultimate goal, in a pincer offensive coordinated with attacks by Feng and Yen in North China. Pai Ch'ung-hsi commanded the Kwangsi troops in the field; had he and Chang made adequate arrangements for the defence of their rear against possible attacks from Kwangtung and Yunnan, these two generals, whose standing as field commanders was unsurpassed in Kuomintang military circles, might have come near to achieving their objective. They took Ch'angsha, and were pressing on north towards

Wuhan, when they found themselves cut off. Cantonese troops were moving towards Kwangsi, and into Hunan. Chang's former subordinate, Ts'ai T'ing-k'ai, had managed to interpose his troops between the Chang/Pai forces and reinforcements under Huang Shao-hsiung moving north from Kwangsi.⁶ At the same time, a Yunnanese attack into Kwangsi from the north-west had penetrated as far as Nanning and the city was besieged.⁷ Chang and Pai were forced to withdraw in haste into Kwangsi, but were not able to prevent several cities in the West River Valley near the Kwangtung border from falling into Cantonese hands.⁸

Huang Shao-hsiung had been unhappy about the refusal of the other leaders of the Clique to come to terms with Nanking and Canton after their defeat in the spring of 1929; the reckless attacks into Kwangtung and Hunan added to his discontent, and caused an open breach between him and Li Tsung-jen and Pai Ch'ung-hsi. He left Kwangsi at the end of 1930 and never again worked directly with the Clique, though his relations with its leaders remained friendly.⁹

The crushing defeats which the Kwangsi Clique suffered in Kwangtung and Hunan forced upon Li Tsung-jen and Pai Ch'ung-hsi the realisation that they could no longer hope to re-establish themselves as overlords of a regional grouping extending over several provinces. Their military strength, much weakened by the defections

of 1929 and by their string of subsequent defeats, was sufficient only to allow them to retain control over Kwangsi. Their defeat in the Yangtze Valley had strengthened Nanking's authority, which now made itself felt over a formidable core area to the north and south of the Yangtze, from which attacks on dissident militarists in North and South China could be launched without the earlier fear of a flank attack from Wuhan. The failure of Wang Ching-wei's attempt to establish himself at Peking, blocked by the opposition of Chang Hsueh-liang, impressed on Li and Pai the futility of putting their weight behind any attempt by a rival Kuomintang faction to unseat Chiang Kai-shek. Such enterprises laid Kwangsi open to attack from Nanking 'loyalists', such as Lung Yün in Yunnan. ^{9A} At the end of 1930, one of Kwangsi's most pressing needs was to re-establish good relations with her neighbours, to protect herself from possible attacks, rather than to invite further ones.

The continuing hostility between Kwangtung and Kwangsi was seriously affecting Kwangsi's communications with the outside world, and therefore depressing trade and undermining the province's economy. Short of complete economic collapse, Kwangsi had to resume normal relations with Kwangtung. An occasion for ~~re~~^{re}approach₂ment arose in February, 1931, when Hu Han-min, the Chairman of the Legislative Yuan, was arrested in Nanking for his opposition to the promulgation of the

Provisional Constitution.¹⁰ Hu's arrest caused an upsurge of opposition to Chiang Kai-shek, both from the Right and from the Left, which culminated in the establishment of a separate government in Canton, made up of a coalition of anti-Chiang politicians and militarists.¹¹ A defensive alliance of southwestern provinces was formed, in which Kwangsi participated, and in the summer, a short-lived expedition was launched into Hunan against Nanking.

The independent government at Canton soon found itself in the same unfortunate position as Sun Yat-sen had each time he had tried to set up his own government there: the government was independent of the central government, but not of the local military commanders. Ch'en Chi-t'ang proved recalcitrant and when, after the Mukden Incident, national feeling swung in favour of a settlement between Canton and Nanking, the politicians at Canton gladly accepted a reunion with Nanking.

Southern independence continued after the departure of the politicians for Nanking. Kwangtung and Kwangsi were openly defiant of Nanking; Yunnan and Kweichow maintained a de-facto independence. In December, 1931, three organisations were set up in Canton, the South-West Executive Section of the Central Executive Committee (Chung-yang Chih-hsing Wei-yuan-hui Hsi-nan Chih-hsing Pu), the South-West Political Council of the National Government (Kuo-min Cheng-Fu Hsi-nan Cheng-wu Wei-yuan-hui) and the South-West Military Branch Council of the National Government (Kuo-min Cheng-Fu Hsi-nan

Chun-shih Fen-hui); these organisations claimed a dubious legality, though they were in defiance of the Kuomintang and the National Government and were not sanctioned from Nanking. They were said to represent the five provinces of Kwangtung, Kwangsi, Yunnan, Kweichow, and Fukien, but they had authority only in the first two. Even then, they played no part in the internal affairs of either province, but functioned only as organs of opposition to Nanking. ¹³

With the re-establishment of friendly relations with Kwangtung, Kwangsi was assured against attack from the quarter most dangerous to her, and so long as Kwangtung was friendly, Kwangsi was also protected against an attack from Yunnan. ¹⁴ There was no danger of an attack from the north, since Nanking was fully occupied in North China and in Kiangsi, and the Hunanese authorities were far more concerned about their communist neighbours in Kiangsi than about their neighbour to the south.

Kwangsi's security from external threats did not permit the Kwangsi Clique to plan offensive actions outside the province; the vision of 'Kwangsi Empire' had dissolved in the aftermath of the defeats in 1929 and 1930. The Clique was forced to readjust its policies, and to accept its reduced position, within the scope of a single province; a concrete, practical formula for the government of Kwangsi needed to be

worked out. For the first time, the leaders of the Clique were forced to outline specific policies and to establish guiding principles; they could no longer rely on their earlier practice of making spot adjustments to the turns of national events, with a guiding aim of extending Kwangsi power; since they were now outside national politics, this was no longer relevant. They adopted a scheme of authoritarian reform, for the military, political, economic and cultural reconstruction of Kwangsi.

As before, the Clique was ruled by a triumvirate. Huang Shao-hsiung was replaced by Huang Hsü⁴-ch'u (no relation), an army officer with a long career in the second echelon of the Clique. Li, Pai and Huang shared responsibility for planning and policy-formation and divided responsibility for individual facets of administration. Li was responsible for external relations and for the generation of popular support within the province; as such his position was most conspicuous to the outside world, and he was often considered to be the outright ruler of the Clique; in fact, while Huang occupied a slightly inferior position, Li and Pai were equals, with the balance of power if anything in Pai's favour. Pai managed military affairs within the province and ran the militia, while Huang was concerned with the civilian government of the province. ¹⁵

The general tone of the Reconstruction Movement

in Kwangsi, which got under way in 1931, was authoritarian and spartan, its policies reflecting the military backgrounds of its leaders. In theory, these policies were cast within the framework of Sun Yat-sen's Three Principles of the People, but the vagueness of the Principles gave wide scope for their modification to suit the particular of circumstances of Kwangsi, and to conform to the personal ideas of the leaders of the province. Their long connection with the Kuomintang and the token acceptance of Sun's principles in almost all parts of China except those under communist control encouraged a continuing adherence to the ideology of the Kuomintang even after they had split with Nanking. In any event, the Kwangsi leaders regarded other political alternatives as unsuitable. Huang Hsu-ch'u stated that: "our feelings towards the highest political lines were that communism was untrustworthy, capitalism was unworkable, and consequently only the Three Principles of the People were suitable".¹⁶

The Kwangsi leaders referred to external political influences, but their selection was random and indiscriminate. Pai Ch'ung-hsi cited with respect ideas of Darwin, Kropotkin and Kuan-tzu;¹⁷ Li Tsung-jen mentioned Confucius and Gibbon,¹⁸ it is unlikely that either man had more than a remote grasp of the significance of the foreign theories they cited. These ideas probably came from 'tame' intellectuals with

pretensions to sophistication working on their staffs, who would have picked them up in the numerous articles devoted to every form of western philosophy and political thought, which appeared in magazines such as Tung-fang Tsa-chih and Kuo-wen Chou-pao.

The influence of the western ideas listed above was negligible, but another source of western influence may have been more important. Mussolini's ideas of the Corporate State and of national regeneration coupled with dictatorial internal rule found parallels (which may have been unwitting) in the policies of the Kwangsi Government. A French missionary reported in 1934 that: "It seems certain that while the word of command is to rely in the main on the principles given by the Founder of the Republic in his Triple Demism, the mode of execution of the plan is based on Italian Fascism. The fascist doctrine is in fact frequently presented in the government journal at Nanning, and a long exposé of this doctrine, its aims and its methods is laid out in a booklet of about a hundred pages on sale in all the modern bookshops.." ¹⁹ Both Li Tsung-jen and Pai Ch'ung-hsi sent personal followers to Europe during the early 1930s, to study Italian and German Fascism. ²⁰

Fascist influence in Kwangsi is difficult to document, since much of the official explanation and justification of Kwangsi policy in the early 1930s did not appear in print until the late 1930s and early 1940s.

During the intervening period, the Italian annexation of Abyssinia in 1935 and the formation of the Axis alliance between the European Fascists and Japan caused feeling to swing strongly against Mussolini, and to identify with oppressed Abyssinia rather than with aggressive Italy. However, in the early 1930s, the influence of Italian Fascism was widely felt in China; the desire to build up a strong nation in China appeared to correspond with what was being attempted in Italy and Germany, "countries which many believe to have achieved 'national revival' by means of authoritarian rule in the teeth of economic depression, communism and international opposition". ²¹

The Kwangsi leaders were able to justify their adherence to Sun Yat-sen's philosophy while remaining outside the mainstream of contemporary Kuomintang politics first by claiming that the Nanking Government was perverting Sun's aims, and second by manipulating relevant sections of Sun's programme to their own ends. Clause 17 of Sun's Chien-kuo Ta-kang (Outline of National Reconstruction), which refers to the period of constitutional government, (which had not yet been reached) states that: "During this period, the division of power between the central and the provincial governments shall follow the line of equilibrium. Those

affairs which have the nature of uniformity for the whole nation shall belong to the central government. Those that are particular to the locality, and need particular attention shall belong to the local government." ²² The Kwangsi leaders ignored earlier clauses of the Chien-kuo Ta-kang which called for hsien self-government before such a division of power between the centre and the provinces should take place, and Sun's emphasis on the hsien rather than the province as the unit of local autonomy; they claimed that the perversion of Sun's ideals by the Nanking Government was such that his true followers, such as themselves, had a duty to carry out his policies in the best way that they could, even if this meant within one province only, in the hope that their example would influence others. At the same time they maintained that Kwangsi differed so fundamentally from other areas that only local rule was applicable. ²³ In spite of their amendments to Sun's ideas, and their rejection of one of his most fundamental principles, national unity, Huang Hsü-ch'u felt able to claim that Kwangsi's policies were: "completely in accord with the principles laid down by the Kuo-Fu (Father of the Republic) and also absolutely without contradiction in relation to actual conditions." ²⁴

The Kwangsi Reconstruction Movement had a strong appeal to and depended for much of its support on the highly developed localism and provincialism which

characterised the province, isolated from the rest of China by geographical barriers, poverty and a tradition of rebelliousness towards central authority. The moving force of the Movement was often referred to as 'Greater Kwangsi-ism' (Ta Kuang-hsi Chu-i),²⁵ or local patriotism (l'amour de la petite patrie).²⁶

Fortunately for the Kwangsi Clique, this inward-looking provincialism was associated with Kwangsi's warlike tradition; in a province's whose heroes had all been soldiers, it was easy for military men to attract to themselves the support of local chauvinists.

Within the small world of Kwangsi, a lower form of regionalism existed, based on the strong regional differences between the north-eastern part of the province, around Kweilin, settled originally from North and Central China, and the south-eastern section around Wuchow, settled from Kwangtung. This form of regionalism was expressed by the development of groupings within the Clique and its chief supporters, whose membership was also determined by questions of profession and outlook. Li Tsung-jen was supported by the old-fashioned landed interests, Pai Ch'ung-hsi by younger army officers and other modern-minded men, and Huang Hsuⁿ-ch'u by bureaucrats and merchants.

Opinions vary as to the quality of the relations between the leaders of the Clique and as to the balance of power between them. There was no overt friction

between the leaders, although Li Tsung-jen's position relative to Pai Chung-hsi probably declined sharply within the province during the period up to 1936.²⁷ Li concerned himself little with affairs within the province, and spent much of his time in Canton, but although his absences weakened his position in relation to Pai, there is no evidence that Pai ever tried to deprive him of authority.

The Militia

The Kwangsi Militia, or Peoples' Corps (Min-T'uan), was the fundamental organisational framework of the Kwangsi Reconstruction Movement. It was first set up in 1930, in response to the chaos which descended on the province after the defeats of the Kwangsi Clique in 1929 and 1930. The establishment of a militia was a traditional response to troubled conditions. Militia units were raised either by established governmental authorities to supplement inadequate regular troops, as for example the force raised by Lin Tse-hsü^u near Canton during the Opium War, or by civilian leaders in an individual locality where government protection was insufficient. There were historical precedents in Kwangsi for the first type of organisation, notably during the time of the Taiping Rebellion, when militias had been organised by the provincial authorities to counter the activities of the nascent Taiping forces and later towards the end of the Rebellion, to help

to crush the defeated Taipings. Organisations of the second type had existed widely in Kwangsi during the recurrent periods of anarchy within the province, and had helped to produce a people who took naturally to arming themselves against bandits and petty warlords and who ^{were} accustomed to para-military activities.²⁸

The militia established by the Kwangsi Clique in 1930 was an amalgamation of existing but uncoordinated militia units, organised to cope with a situation where the regular army had been so weakened by defection and defeat that it could no longer guarantee internal order. The Kwangsi leaders decided to secure internal order by giving official sanction and organisation to the existing guardians of local order.

The first commander of the militia was Huang Shao-hsiung, who held the post for a few months before his departure from the province at the end of 1930.²⁹ After his departure, control of the militia passed to Pai Ch'ung-hsi, who treated the militia as an offshoot of the provincial military establishment. In June, 1932, the militia was transferred to the provincial government, headed by Huang Hsü-ch'u, but after a year, it was returned to Pai Ch'ung-hsi, who retained control of it over the succeeding years.³⁰

The structure of the militia organisation at its inception was very simple; each hsien was ordered to

train four corps of ninety men each for full-time militia service, under the direction of twelve area commands. The militia was to be financed by the hsien authorities and armed by local requisitioning of weapons. By the end of 1931, about 50,000 militiamen had been organised.³¹ The militia handled the problems of local order and bandit suppression, while the regular army concentrated on eradicating serious resistance, especially in the communist-held region in north-west Kwangsi. All able-bodied men between the ages of 18 and 45 were eligible for militia training, which was compulsory for those drafted. There was great opposition to the scheme at first on the part of the men taken away from their normal work,³² but in spite of the opposition of participants, the militia scheme was so successful in maintaining order that the Kwangsi leaders decided in 1933 to extend its scope and to use the militia organisation for the application of economic, social and political policy and as the vehicle for mass organisation. Its most important function remained that of local defence and for this purpose the original scheme of full-time, short-service militiamen was modified to a rota system, under which all able-bodied men were trained, first for a brief full-time period, and then for a longer part-time period, to form a huge reserve which could be mobilised in case of emergency.

Compensation was given to wage-earners during full-time training, but peasants, most of whom were considered to be self-employed, were expected to give their services 'voluntarily', thus removing what the Kwangsi leaders conveniently regarded as the mercenary stigma of the traditional militias.³³ By 1935, the Kwangsi Government claimed that over 450,000 men had been trained.³⁴

34 The basis of the militia organisation was the village corps, but units were also set up in schools, government offices and higher education institutions. None was exempt from militia training except the sick, the criminal and members of certain professions.³⁵

The militia, as conceived after 1933, had a triple aim and was based on a policy known as the Policy of Three-fold Self-Reliance (San-tzu Cheng-ts'e), which consisted of Self-defence, Self-Sufficiency and Self-Government. "The militia does not merely ensure self-defence. Although it does not permit of the immediate achievement of self-government, it tends by its training to create conditions which will bring self-government nearer realisation. As regards self-sufficiency, the militia constitutes an instrument enabling the Provincial Government to orient the production and consumption of the province according to its own plans."³⁶

The aim of the leaders of the Kwangsi Clique was to obtain the organised participation of the people in

the defence of the province and in its social, economic and political reconstruction. Technically, this participation was supposed to be the first step on the road towards local self-government, and a training ground in the practice of democracy, but there is little evidence to suggest that the Clique ever intended the members of the militia to play any but a strictly directed role. Military discipline was to be maintained, with the aim of "applying the military spirit to the direction of politics".³⁷ The Clique accepted the concept of democracy only in their own interpretation of participation without rights. They convinced themselves that while low-level organisation was essential for the mobilisation and unification of the province (and the nation), the people were not sophisticated or educated enough to be entrusted with any real democratic powers.³⁸

The Clique believed that one of the chief failings of the Nanking Government was its failure to extend the power of the government down to village level; until this was done, local power would remain in the hands of the traditional village leaders, who had no interest in promoting the policies of Sun Yat-sen. Huang Hsu-ch'u felt that the schemes which Nanking sponsored in the field of rural reconstruction, which typically involved only individual hsien, were too narrow; while these hsien might receive expert help, such limited schemes

offered little to the reconstruction of the whole of Chinese rural life. ³⁹

Nanking sponsored experimental hsien at Lanhsi in Chekiang, and at Chiangning in Kiangsu; the government also carried out reconstruction work in Kiangsi after the expulsion of the communists from that province in 1934. There were provincially sponsored reconstruction areas in Hopei, attached to Mass Education Movement run by James Yen, and in Shantung, where the provincial chairman Han Fu-ch'u promoted the work of Liang Sou-ming in the Tsoup'ing Village Reconstruction Research Institute. ⁴⁰ The proportion of the national income devoted to rural reconstruction was tiny: 0.2% was allocated in 1931/2, 3.9% in 1934/5. ⁴¹ Opponents of the Nanking government felt that too much time and money was spent on research and planning, and too little in implementation, and that many reconstruction projects were vitiated by bureaucratic management. These faults the Kwangsi leaders hoped to avoid.

Under the enlarged militia system, three posts had to be filled in every village on street unit: village/street head, militia chief, and school head. As there were over 25,000 village or street units, and as there was a scarcity of competent personnel, it was inconceivable that the province would be able to install three men in each unit. But it was within the bounds of

possibility that one man could be trained for each unit to fulfill the three functions; a 'shoe-string method' (ch'iung tzo-fa) was adopted, whereby one man would be trained to be concurrently village/street head, school head and militia chief. The man appointed would have his offices in the village school, which would also act as the village bureau (ts'un kung-suo) and as the militia headquarters, and would be located in a village temple or ancestral hall.. Candidates for the triple post were trained in government-run schools, for a period varying from six to eighteen months, according to the previous educational experience of the trainee, and were given instruction in military, economic, political and cultural subjects. 42

The system, which was known as 'Three-in-One' (San-Wei Y'i-t'i), had the advantage of giving rural cadres sufficient authority to prevent the sabotaging of the militia programme by unsympathetic local leaders. The headship of the village provided local power and the headship of the school the salary of the cadre. The payment of a salary would allow men without private means to perform village management functions which had traditionally been in the hands of local gentry, who did not receive salaries for their work. 43

The trained cadres were in theory capable of directing work in Self-Defence, Self-government and Self-Sufficiency, the three parts of the San-tzu Cheng-tse. The detailed specifications for this policy

were found in the Outline for the Reconstruction of Kwangsi (Kuang-hsi Chien-she Kang-ling), adopted in August, 1934, by a Joint Committee of Government, Military and Party representatives, the highest authority in the province. ⁴⁴

The most striking feature of the Kwangsi militia was its para-military appearance. Its organisation was modelled on army ranks; each militia-man was held to be the equivalent of a private soldier, and militia units at village, hsiang and hsien levels corresponded to units in the army. ⁴⁵ This structure was designed to promote an atmosphere of discipline and duty, which would ensure the efficiency of militia members in their local defence functions, and in their other activities. The policies contained in Self-Sufficiency section of the San tzu Cheng-ts'e did not contain any radical programmes for the reform of Kwangsi's economy, but consisted of communal and cooperative schemes, such as reafforestation, the planting of tung trees, instruction in agricultural method, communal ploughing, the establishment of village granaries and fish ponds, and the provision of corvée labour for government projects. The income from profit-making enterprises of this nature was eventually expected to pay for the salary of the village cadre. ⁴⁶ The provisions of the Self-Government policy called for the taking of censuses, and the registration of land, in preparation for local self-

government; both these tasks were carried out, but with so little efficiency that their results were virtually useless.⁴⁷ It was also believed that militia training would instill the collective spirit and discipline needed for self-government at some unspecified time in the future. Militia registration played an important role in population control: it prevented the free-movement of individuals, since individuals were not permitted to be without registration, or to move from place to place without permission.⁴⁸

The most important function of the militia system after its role in local defence was its educational function. Large numbers of basic schools were set up in villages and streets, to give children the rudiments of education and to train them for eventual participation in local government. The mass education movement, launched in 1933, called for compulsory education for children between six and twelve, and for part-time instruction for illiterate adults. Though the scheme can never have achieved universal education, it does appear to have been remarkably successful. Even a communist attack on the Kwangsi Clique states that education had penetrated even to the most backward areas of the province, though the form of education given is seen as an attempt to "traduce the intellectuals and dupe the people".⁴⁹ The schools were usually very simple and no attention was paid to the external trappings

of education. Children came to school in whatever clothing they had, often in rags and barefoot.⁵⁰ The aim was to provide quantity, not quality, and in consequence, the standard of instruction was probably very low. The mass education movement was directed by Lei Pei-hung, an American-trained educator, and one of the few foreign-trained men working for the Kwangsi Government.

The militia subsumed many of the functions of local government in Kwangsi. The San-wei I-t'i system operated at hsiang and hsien levels as well as in the villages, and local power tended to be concentrated in the hands of militia officers. The Kuomintang Party organisation within the province played only a very limited role in the management of provincial and local affairs. The Party was out of touch with the Kuomintang headquarters in Nanking and was controlled directly by the Kwangsi Government, which expected it to play a only minimal role, in propaganda and political training.⁵¹ Party membership was stagnant throughout the period 1931 to 1936.⁵² Local civil servants were governed by stringent regulations issued by the provincial government, and from 1933 on were in theory subject to government competency examinations.⁵³ Civil servants at local levels and in the provincial government were expected to wear grey homespun (t'u-pu) uniforms; silk clothes and western style clothes were banned.⁵⁴ Heavy fines and punishments were laid down

for officials breaking regulations or behaving corruptly, which appear to have been implemented at least partially; in 1933, there were twenty-two former magistrates in prison in Nanning on charges of corruption.⁵⁵ A French missionary report of 1934 noted the improvement in quality of government officials and the removal from office of the utterly incompetent; officials were constrained to accept a simple and disciplined life, with poor financial rewards: "no luxury, no waste, only an aurea mediocritas (golden mean) with the satisfaction that the accomplishment of one's duty gives, helped by a convinced patriotism."⁵⁶ The Kwangsi Clique advocated the breakdown of the local power of the gentry, who had incurred the rage of the Clique by refusing to carry out its policies of militia training during the period 1931-1933. But the Clique had previously depended for its local support on the gentry, and it is unlikely that it was willing to deprive itself entirely of this support; it was only concerned to draw the teeth of gentry power, and to be able to implement policies of which the gentry disapproved.⁵⁷

The Provincial Government

The provincial government was reorganised in July, 1931 after a period in abeyance during the troubles following the defeat of the Kwangsi Clique in 1929; its new chairman was Huang Hsú-ch'u, Huang introduced measures to streamline the operations of the government,

and eventually in 1934 all branches of government were amalgamated into a single office, The Combined Government Office.⁵⁸ The government was responsible for the economy of the province, for large-scale reconstruction enterprises, for financial affairs and for middle and higher education. Military affairs remained independent of civilian control under the Headquarters of the 4th Group Army; the army was the paramount authority in the province and had financial priority, but its chiefs seemed prepared to give the civilian government some degree of autonomous authority.⁵⁹ The policies of the government were determined, like those of the militia, by the San-tzu Cheng-ts'e, though the government was not concerned with those sections of it which dealt with self-defence.

In the economic field, the government was concerned to ensure Kwangsi's economic independence, and to build up its internal strength. Self-Sufficiency was interpreted not as a closed economy, but as a situation in which trade would be in balance.⁶⁰ In attempting to strengthen Kwangsi's economy, the government was handicapped by the province's poverty, by the generally depressed international economic situation, and by the fluctuating rates of exchange between Kwangsi's currency and other Chinese and foreign currencies. Kwangsi's exports were largely agricultural, consisting of livestock and other perishables for the Canton market,

and of products such as tung oil for the international market. Over the preceding years there had been considerable falls in the prices which Kwangsi's products realised, as a result of the world economic depression and of internal disruption, and the market for many of them was declining.⁶¹ This led to a contraction of total trade, as evidenced by a large number of business failures in the main commercial centres of the province.⁶²

As trade declined, Cantonese merchants, who dominated the trade and commerce of the province, began to remove themselves and what capital they could salvage from the province, thus weakening the overall situation still further. By 1935, the population of the economic hub of the province, Wuchow, had shrunk to half the figure of 120,000 which it had reached at its peak of prosperity.⁶³ The decline in private economic activity meant that little private capital was available for new investment.

The poor trading situation had serious implications for the stability of the province's internal economy, for the weakness of the Kwangsi currency in relation to other currencies affected internal confidence in it, and helped to force up prices within the province.⁶⁴ The attempts of the government to strengthen the province's economy were therefore directed chiefly towards improving the trading situation and bringing trade into balance. The methods used consisted

of instituting tariffs and controls on imports, of developing local industries to provide import-substitutes, and of encouraging existing and potential export industries. A major internal block to trade and commerce, poor communications, was to be remedied by a heavy programme of road building. The currency was to be controlled by the re-established Kwangsi Bank, which was directly under government control, in an attempt to stabilize the currency.⁶⁵

To regulate imports, and to check the quality of exports, a trade bureau was set up at Wuchow in 1935. Various imports, particularly of luxury goods, were banned; imports of woven cotton were discouraged, in the hope that 'foreign' cotton would be replaced by locally-woven t'u-pu.⁶⁶ One section of imports virtually disappeared: the boycott against Japanese goods, instituted after the Mukden Incident, was almost watertight.⁶⁷

To provide locally manufactured import-substitutes, the Kwangsi government adopted a dual policy of encouraging private enterprise through tax concessions and of injecting government capital into wholly or partially government-owned enterprises. A number of factories and workshops were set up, but the scale of individual undertakings was so small that their output can have had little effect on import figures.⁶⁸ Attempts were made to obtain foreign capital, especially from Kwangsi natives living outside the province, but there

is no evidence that this scheme yielded significant amounts of investment.⁶⁹ Investment from foreign countries was equally difficult to obtain: "The provision of foreign capital for sound schemes is the principal requirement of this area (Kwangtung and Kwangsi), but the present [1935] world unrest, the lack of clearly defined and realisable security, and the spirit of economic nationalism and high taxation in China, do not at present dispose financial interests to engage in schemes involving long credits." ⁷⁰

The development of export industries centred on the tung oil trade, which usually accounted for as much as 30% of Kwangsi's exports in any one year, and on mineral products.⁷¹ In 1933, every able-bodied man in the province was ordered to plant a minimum of ten tung seedlings per annum and tung committees were set up in every hsien to supervise the work; Kwangsi was to be turned into 'the Land of Tung' (t'ung chih kuo). ⁷² Kwangsi possessed large deposits of tin and manganese, which might prove commercially valuable if methods of extraction could be improved. The provincial government did not intend to enter the mining field directly, but planned to leave exploitation to private mining companies, controlling the industry in a limited way through licensing.⁷³ In 1934, a survey was carried out to study the feasibility of constructing a railway from Hohsien in Kwangsi to Sanshui in Kwangtung, which

would be built as a combined operation of the two provincial governments, and would aid the Kwangsi mining industry by facilitating the export of minerals from the Hohsien area. ⁷⁴

The railway scheme never materialised, nor did other attempts to improve the trade balance meet with great success. Although the import surplus was reduced, from the point in 1933 where imports had been three times as great as exports. ⁷⁵ Kwangsi was not able to bring her trade into balance, nor to halt the outflow of silver from the province, needed to pay for imports; an order of 1932 banning the export of silver was ignored. ⁷⁶ Tung oil production, instead of rising, actually fell. ⁷⁷

A further feature of government economic activity in Kwangsi was the attempt to streamline the taxation system and to balance the provincial budget. Many petty taxes were abolished; systems of direct tax collection were instituted to avoid tax-farming and the corruption it involved. ⁷⁸ The limited tax reforms were sufficient to ensure a rise in provincial revenue every year until 1937, when Kwangsi was reintegrated into the national system and various revenues formerly retained by the provincial government passed to Nanking, but, except in 1934, the rise was not sufficient to keep pace with expenditure. ⁷⁹ The chief cause of the balancing of the provincial budget in 1934 was an

enormous rise in the income from 'opium suppression fines', that is the tax on opium in transit through Kwangsi.⁸⁰ This rise may be ascribed to the restoration of normal traffic after the confusion of the preceding period, for the income from this tax in 1934 was no higher than that recorded in the years before 1929. Income from opium taxation usually accounted for 50% of the annual revenue of the provincial government.⁸¹ 70% of opium in transit through Kwangsi originated in Kweichow, the rest in Yunnan. The commercial prosperity of Kwangsi, what there was of it, depended on the opium trade, in which a large proportion of the commercial organisations of Wuchow and Nanning were involved.⁸² After the occupation of Kweichow in 1934 by Nanking troops in ^ypersuit of communist forces on the Long March, the Kwangsi revenue from opium declined sharply, precipitating a severe financial crisis in the province, and providing a compelling reason for Kwangsi's submission to Nanking in 1936.⁸³

This development confirm a judgement of H.G.W. Woodhead, the editor of the China Year Book, that regional independence in the South-West depended to a great extent on the opium revenues available to regional militarists there: "it is difficult to see how disbandment will ever become practicable until the Szechwan, Yunnan, Kweichow and Kwangsi militarists

have been deprived of this [opium] source of revenue. They are able to obstruct or defy the Central Government only because they are in a position to maintain their armies out of this illicit revenue. Deprived of this source of income, they would have to conform to the wishes of the National Government".⁸⁴

The crisis precipitated by the loss of opium revenue was an indication of the fundamental instability of the Kwangsi financial situation. The disproportionate dependence on income from opium and the equally disproportionate expenditure on the armed forces created an extremely shaky situation which could easily be upset, as was shown by Nanking's actions in 1935.⁸⁵

The most successful feature of economic reconstruction in Kwangsi was the road building programme. Huang Shao-hsiung's administration between 1926 and 1929 had laid the foundations of an integrated road system; the achievements in road building during his rule were indicated by the fact that in 1933 Kwangsi still had more roads than any province except Shantung and Kwangtung, in spite of the fact that there had been little construction after the beginning on 1929.⁸⁶ Roads were constructed partly by corvée labour and partly by bands of unemployed men, disbanded soldiers, and rural lay-abouts. The use of this second category of labour had the beneficial side-effect of preventing these men from becoming bandits, a frequent recourse of such

groups in the past.⁸⁷ There was some doubt as to whom the roads were to benefit. In Kwangsi, as in other provinces, it seemed that: "military and strategic, rather than economic reasons have prompted most of this [road] development..." The peasants suffered rather than benefited from such construction; land was taken from them, often without compensation, and they were obliged to supply corvée labour to build the roads.⁸⁸ The Kwangsi government had a further incentive for building roads, aside from strategic considerations, which was to facilitate the opium traffic. The Kwangsi/Kweichow opium trade benefited, before 1935, by the linking of the two provinces by a good motor road.⁸⁹

Little progress was made in other forms of communications. Main rivers were dredged, and a prestige airline was established in 1934 to link the major Kwangsi cities with Canton,⁹⁰ but there was no railway construction until after the start of the Anti-Japanese War, when the link with Hengchow in Hunan was finally constructed, after more than twenty years of planning.

In its scheme of reconstruction, the Kwangsi government was sometimes tempted to undertake projects which owed more to prestige than to sound economic considerations, though such projects conflicted with the desire of the Kwangsi leaders to give an impression

of frugality and simplicity. Prestige undertakings, apart from the airline, tended to take the form of urban improvements. In Nanning, the provincial capital, modern government offices were erected and wide boulevards driven through previously congested sections of the city. Waterworks and electricity stations were installed at Wuchow and Nanning. None of these schemes were essential and many of them did not function very successfully; visitors to the province were more impressed with the spartan spirit of the 'New Kwangsi' than with this backwoods' modernisation. 91

It is difficult to tell whether the spartan spirit applied to the private as well as to the public life of Kwangsi leaders and civil servants and whether it went deeper than the compulsory wearing by officials, civil servants and students of a simple grey uniform, the compulsory militia training of the same groups, and the serving of simple dishes at banquets. But these manifestations on their own were enough to amaze visitors from other parts of Nationalist China, where such practices among the official class would have been remarkable.

The outward puritanism of the Kwangsi leaders was expressed in policies which resembled those of the Nanking-sponsored New Life Movement, launched in 1935 after such policies had become established in Kwangsi.

It was decreed that men's trousers and women's skirts should come below the knee and women's sleeves below the elbow. ⁹² Prostitution, gambling and opium smoking were not banned, but their operations were confined to certain areas, and their practice forbidden to soldiers and civil servants. ⁹³

The campaign against superstition and native religion, first launched under Huang Shao-hsiung's rule, continued, to the delight of the French Catholic missionaries, who believed that the Kwangsi people would turn towards Christianity rather than live without religion. ⁹⁴ There was a satisfying upturn in the number of conversions, while the construction of a new chapel at Nanning which coincided with the destruction of a large temple in the city, was a source of ironic pleasure to the missionaries. ⁹⁵ For the first time their charitable work received official approval, a reflection of Madame Li Tsung-jen's attempts to cast herself in the role of a minor Madame Chiang Kai-shek. ⁹⁶ Madame Li, whom Li Tsung-jen married in his late twenties, presumably as his second wife, was a strong and forceful character and a great strength to her husband, whose work she was keenly interested in. ⁹⁷ Madam Pai Ch'ung-hsi, in contrast, was shy and retiring. ⁹⁸

The government's educational programme, which was concerned only with middle and higher education, laid stress on practical and vocational training, to produce

248

the technicians and managers needed for the reconstruction programme. The shortage of teachers capable of giving this kind of instruction and the large capital outlays needed for the construction of technical schools and universities meant that the middle and higher education programme was small-scale and that there was an enormous imbalance between the number of children attending primary school and those attending higher level institutes. In 1933, there were only 577 university students and 14,533 middle school students to 650,000 primary school children.⁹⁹ Many wealthy families continued to send their children outside the province for higher education.

In the field of agricultural reconstruction and improvement, the provincial government sponsored in 1933 a full-scale economic and agricultural survey of Kwangsi, which was conducted by a team of experts from Peking, headed by Ch'ien Chia-chü.¹⁰⁰ The report, published in 1936, was remarkably frank and revealing, and gave a picture of desperate poverty and backwardness. The findings of the report were confirmed by statistics produced by the statistical bureau of the Kwangsi Government itself, which revealed that all the traditional ills from which the peasants suffered were becoming more acute. Even though the government was fully informed on the plight of the peasantry, it had no intention of making fundamental changes in the existing

agricultural system. Palliative reforms, such as the holding of rents at 37% of the crop, were ordered, but there is no evidence that they were ever implemented on a wide scale. ¹⁰¹ The government was determined not to unleash a new rural revolution, but it was prepared to introduce agricultural reconstruction measures which did not strike at the system itself. Several agricultural experimental stations were set up, the largest of which was at Liuchow in the centre of the province, where Wu T'ing-yang continued the work he had begun under Huang Shao-hsiung. The area covered 100,000 mou, and was designed to demonstrate techniques of land reclamation, in the hope that this would encourage a province-wide movement to open up the very large amount of unused agricultural land in Kwangsi. ¹⁰² The experiment attracted much publicity, but was not an unqualified success. Many of the peasants drafted into the area as guinea pigs departed, and Wu was eventually forced to resign, accused of over-spending and of overbearing behaviour. ¹⁰³

The provincial government also sponsored schemes of reafforestation, irrigation and veterinary work, but it is extremely doubtful whether any of these piecemeal measures contributed anything to a general improvement of agricultural conditions. The major impact of government policy upon the Kwangsi peasants was probably in the increased demands for corvée and militia work. ¹⁰⁴

A Kwangsi native returning to his home in 1935, after a long period outside the province was impressed by the superficial order and organisation of the province, but noted bitterly that the Reconstruction Movement was doing nothing to alleviate the bankruptcy of the rural population, but was putting new burdens on them, for it was they who provided the labour for reconstruction schemes, and they who indirectly paid for them. The militia was no game (hao-wan ti tung-hsi), but a demanding, time-consuming activity. 105

The Army

Kwangsi's standing army was modernised and retrained during the period of Kwangsi's independence from Nanking. Under Pai Ch'ung-hsi's keen surveillance and rigid discipline, the army was quickly restored to its former efficiency. The organisation of the army differed in one key respect from the forces which Pai, Li Tsung-jen and Huang Shao-hsiung had trained in the mid-1920s: it was incorporated much more closely into civilian life and strenuous attempts were made to break down the division between civil and military. The militia system, which instilled the rudiments of military training into all able-bodied men, was only one section of a tripartite policy, the San-yü Cheng-ts'e, whose aim was to encourage the interdependence of the army and the civilian population. The other two sections covered

the military training of students and the raising of troops through conscription rather than on a mercenary basis. The system of training students was designed to create a large body of potential officers and was necessitated by the shortage of junior officers in the Kwangsi Army; it also suited the anti-intellectual prejudices of the Kwangsi leaders. This prejudice was paralleled by a desire to attain respectability for their military rule by bringing the educated youth of the province into the military organisation.

Li Tsung-jen expressed the anti-intellectual prejudice when he described most students as flabby, in mind and in body; he believed that military training would stiffen them up, and give them the backbone that they needed. He and Pai Ch'ung-hsi criticised students and intellectuals for their inactivity in the defence of the nation and for their tendency to satisfy their outrage at the nation's shame in speeches, instead of in action. ¹⁰⁶ They wanted to eradicate the stigma against the military, which kept the educated and privileged away from the army; enforced military training of students would have this effect while at the same time supplementing the meagre production of the regular military schools. It would also purge the students of their romantic and impractical attitudes, which were characterised by such 'perverse habits' as the playing of violins and flutes. ¹⁰⁷ The atmosphere

at Kwangsi University, the main showplace of student military training, was severe and puritanical; all students wore military uniform, and lived a life disciplined in the extreme.¹⁰⁸ The training of students was organised directly by the Army; students in middle schools were expected to reach the level of reserve officers and in higher education establishments of junior officers.¹⁰⁹ The policy was forced through in spite of early resistance, which led many students to go and study outside the province.¹¹⁰ It proved its worth during the Anti-Japanese War, when Kwangsi was able to officer her greatly expanded armies without difficulty.¹¹¹

Conscription was also very unpopular when first introduced. Conscription levies, under which each hsien was obliged to provide a certain number of recruits, were first held in 1934; not more than two-fifths of the men obtained at these levies were volunteers.¹¹² There was considerable corruption: wealthy families bought their sons out, ignoring the system of selection by lot, which was supposed to be used to fill local quotas.¹¹³ Nevertheless, the conscription system had so much to recommend it to the Kwangsi military authorities that they persisted with it. Men who were obtained through this system could be reintegrated more easily into civilian life after their service; the quality of recruits could be

ensured; and by presenting conscription as the duty of the citizen, the authorities provided themselves with an excellent pretext for paying low wages to serving soldiers. Nanking adopted a conscription scheme in 1934, at about the same time as the Kwangsi scheme got underway, but it was not as well-organised or thorough-going. During the Anti-Japanese War it degenerated into a system of press-ganging.

In spite of the poverty of Kwangsi, large sums of money were spent on building up the army's capacity. In 1934, \$1,000,000 was set aside for developing the provincial arsenals, notably the one at Nanning, where German munitions experts were employed. ¹¹⁴

Under Pai Ch'ung-hsi's guidance the warlike reputation of Kwangsi, which had declined after the defeat of the Kwangsi Clique in 1929, was restored. Its first major external test came in 1934 when communist troops on the Long March passed through the northern part of the province, pursued by large numbers of Nanking troops. Eleven of Kwangsi's fifteen regular ~~divisions~~ ^{regiments} were sent into the area, supplemented by about 200,000 militia men. ¹¹⁵ The Kwangsi leaders were less concerned with the communist forces, who were moving west, than with the prospect of Nanking troops entering their province. To keep the Nanking troops out, they had to chase the communists out as fast as they could. Pai Ch'ung-hsi adopted a scorched earth policy, destroying food supplies in the path of

the communist advance, and sending fire-raisers disguised as communists into the same areas, to make the local people turn against the communists: "In this way, on the one hand the Red Army had nowhere to lodge, and nowhere to eat; on the other hand, the local people suspected the Red Army as fire-raisers, and therefore showed hatred towards the Red Army." ¹¹⁶ Nanking acknowledged Kwangsi's contribution: "...the Generalissimo at this time had the satisfaction of being able to obtain the cooperation of the Kwangsi authorities in harassing the Reds." ¹¹⁷ The communist forces were only in Kwangsi for seventeen days, and during that time apparently suffered heavy casualties.

The Second Defeat of the Kwangsi Clique

The independence of Kwangsi and of other southwestern provinces from Nanking during the first half of the 1930s had been permitted to continue partly because of Nanking's military involvement in other parts of China, against the communists in Kiangsi, against Feng Yuⁿ-hsiang and Yen Hsi-shan in North China, and against the Japanese. The independent southwestern provinces did not represent a military threat to Nanking, since the leaders of these provinces were no longer expansionist, and since the communists in Kiangsi provided an unwitting bulwark between the two sides. After the failure of the Canton Government in

1931, the South-western generals did not give their support to other anti-Nanking moves; they restricted their opposition to Nanking and to Chiang Kai-shek to virulent propaganda campaigns. Neither Kwangtung nor Kwangsi joined in the 1933 Fukien Revolt against Nanking, although one of its leaders was Li Chi-shen, who, it was believed, would bring in his former allies in Kwangsi.¹¹⁸ They wanted no open breach with Nanking which might involve them in all-out war, but only to remain independent. On the other hand, there was no advantage for them in acting against the Fukien Rebels, for the trouble in Fukien threatened Nanking and weakened it in relation to themselves. But where they shared a common enemy with Nanking, they were willing to cooperate with Nanking. Ch'en Chi-t'ang's troops participated in several of the Extermination Campaigns against the communists in Kiangsi.

By 1935, the national situation had changed. Nanking had triumphed over most of its major opponents and had extended its authority to Fukien, Kiangsi and Kweichow. The leaders of the South-western alliance, that is the leaders of Kwangtung and Kwangsi, found themselves surrounded by Nanking troops. This encirclement had a catastrophic effect on Kwangsi's provincial budget, by causing the diversion of the Kweichow opium trade into other channels. In Kwangtung, Ch'en Chi-t'ang's position was threatened by

Nanking's purchase of some of his subordinates. Although Ch'en's rule had brought unusual prosperity and security to Kwangtung, too many of the fruits of this prosperity had gone into the pockets of his family and friends and resentment against him was rising. 119

Nanking was anxious to settle the quarrels between itself and the South-western generals, in view of the growing threat from Japan, and of mounting demands for national unity. But since the main pretext for South-western independence had been opposition to Nanking's appeasement of Japan, and since Nanking had yet to take a strong stand against Japan, there seemed little hope that the South-west would agree to a settlement. 120 It seemed unlikely that the dissident generals would submit to anything but overwhelming military pressure. They had nothing to gain from closer association with Nanking and much to lose; so long as they could assuage their own nationalism and that of their populations by claiming that Nanking was betraying the true principles of the Kuomintang and the national destiny of China, they had sufficient ideological justification for their defiance.

Nevertheless, Nanking pressed for a negotiated settlement. Emmisaries were sent to Hong Kong and Canton in 1934, but none of them, not even the former

leader of the Kwangsi Clique, Huang Shao-hsiung, who was still on good terms with the Kwangsi leaders, were able to achieve anything.¹²¹ In 1935, the new Nanking-appointed governor of Kweichow, Wu Chung-hsin, an old friend of the Kwangsi leaders and formerly chief-of-staff to Pai Ch'ung-hsi in Peking, tried to bring about a settlement, but he too failed.¹²²

Nanking therefore decided on military action, or the threat of it, by late 1935, Nanking troops had encircled Kwangtung and Kwangsi. Numbering between 400,000 and 600,000¹²³ they were massed in a huge arc stretching through Fukien, Kiangsi, Hunan, Kweichow and Yunnan. Against these troops, Kwangtung and Kwangsi could muster between 270,000 and 300,000 men.¹²⁴

The death of Hu Han-min in May, 1936 stimulated a nationalist and anti-Nanking upsurge, and the southwestern leaders decided to make use of it to launch a new crusade against Nanking, in the name of resistance to Japan, thus preempting an attack from Nanking. Kwangtung and Kwangsi forces were organised as the Anti-Japanese National Salvation Forces (K'ang-jih Chiu-kuo Chun), commanded by Ch'en Chi-t'ang, Li Tsung-jen and Pai Ch'ung-hsi.¹²⁵ Ts'ai T'ing-k'ai, the hero of the 1931² Shanghai fighting with Japan, was persuaded to return from exile in Hong Kong to lend his prestige to the undertaking.¹²⁶ The campaign was

launched on June 1st, 1936, and was therefore named the Liu-l Yun-tung; a battery of telegrams was launched, calling for ~~the~~ active resistance to Japan, and was followed by the dispatch of troops into Hunan, officially moving north to fight the Japanese. 127

The campaign never proceeded any further! Chiang Kai-shek had made preparations for defections, the same method that he had used to defeat the Kwangsi Clique in 1929. He was unable to detach any of the subordinates of the Clique itself, but his 'persuasion' won the defection of some of Ch'en Chi-t'ang's subordinates. Early in July, Yü Han-mou, stationed near the Kiangsi border in north Kwangtung, went over to Nanking, and at the same time the Cantonese Air Force defected en masse. Ch'en fled to Hong Kong, his career in Kwangtung ended, but his retirement provided for by a fortune deposited in Hong Kong banks. 128

After the Cantonese collapse, Kwangsi forces were withdrawn into Kwangsi in preparation for a siege. A general mobilisation was declared and all able-bodied men were drafted for military service. Transport was requisitioned by the military; civilians fled from the towns, fearing bombing. 129 The Kwangsi currency slumped and the provincial government started printing money to subsidise the army. 130 Pai Ch'ung-hsi planned the establishment of an independent 'national' government at Nanning, of which Li Chi-shen became chairman. 131

Kwangsi's own armed forces were supplemented by the reorganisation of Ts'ai T'ing-k'ai's 19th Route Army, disbanded after the Fukien Rebellion. Ts'ai came to the province to command it. ¹³²

Nanking still preferred to negotiate a peaceful settlement, rather than launch a campaign, which would undoubtedly be bitter and protracted, into the mountain fastness of Kwangsi. In August, Chiang Kai-shek flew to Canton to conduct negotiations with Kwangsi representatives there. At the same time a propaganda campaign was set in motion against Kwangsi, which accused the Kwangsi Clique of being in league with Japanese against Nanking, and of receiving arms and ammunition from Japan. ¹³³

At the end of August, an incident occurred at Pakhoi, on the south-western coast of Kwangtung, which brought a settlement nearer. Units of the 19th Route Army took the city, and precipitated an international incident by killing the only Japanese in the city, a medicine dealer. Japanese gunboats moved into the harbour, and for a while it was feared that they might use the incident as a pretext for further aggression. The incident was settled at the end of September, but by that time, the threat of Japanese repercussions and the realisation of the danger in which China stood had forced the Kwangsi leaders to accept that they should make an immediate settlement with Nanking, rather than

try and continue their resistance: this would be a patriotic act, showing unity in face of a common danger. By bargaining before defeat, they could obtain better terms, which in the event were not harsh and represented a much lesser blow to the Kwangsi leaders than had their defeat in 1929. "The Generalissimo, favourably impressed by the admitted excellence of the administration of Kwangsi affairs, was not inclined to be harsh in his demands..."¹³⁴

Under the terms of the settlement, agreed in early September, Li Chi-shen, who had returned to Kwangsi to head Pai Ch'ung-hsi's independent government, was to go abroad, Pai Ch'ung-hsi was to go to Nanking and serve on the Military Affairs Commission there, and Li Tsung-jen was to remain in Kwangsi as Pacification Commissioner. Civil administration in Kwangsi was to remain in the hands of Huang Hsu^u-ch'u, but he would be obliged to work closely with Nanking appointees in key financial posts. Nanking would make an immediate draft of three million yuan available to Kwangsi, to ease the financial crisis. The Kwangsi Army was to be reduced in size, while Nanking would remove its troops from the Kwangsi border.¹³⁵ On September 16th, Li, Pai and Huang took up their new appointments, and on the following day, Li flew to Canton to see Chiang Kai-shek.¹³⁶ Pai did not go to Nanking; in spite of personal guarantees for his safety made by Chu Cheng,^u Chu P'ei-te

and Ch'eng Ch'ien, Pai remained in Kwangsi, and did not go to Nanking until the following summer, when most of China's regional militarists met to plan resistance to Japan. 137

The patriotic anti-Japanese movement gained a much needed boost from the Liu-i Yun-tung, for Kwangsi's defiance of Nanking in the name of resistance to Japan brought the issue out into the open. Although the patriotic organisations never allied themselves directly with the South-western leaders, they supported their stand and welcomed the publicity which they brought to the anti-Japanese cause. Kwangsi's strident demands on Nanking to resist the Japanese also eased the pressure which Nanking had been applying to clamp down the patriotic movement, by making it too embarrassing for Nanking to continue such policies. "Whatever may have been the motives of the Southwest leaders in their anti-Japanese propaganda, the fact remains that they have unleashed a flood of patriotic passion throughout their own provinces, and have gained for themselves wide-spread sympathy among patriotic elements of the nation." 138

For the second time, the Kwangsi Clique had succumbed to Chiang Kai-shek, though on this occasion the defeat was far less shattering than in 1929. Though its activities were now restricted, the Clique retained control of Kwangsi and the policies of reconstruction evolved in

the early 1930s continued to be implemented, in many cases with greater success than in the early period. The militia expanded enormously, especially after the start of the Anti-Japanese War, which brought an economic boom to the province, as industries and schools, displaced from Occupied China, moved into the province. The Reconstruction Movement launched by the Kwangsi Clique in the early 1930s marked a second and distinct phase of the careers of the Kwangsi leaders in Kuomintang politics. Forced to retreat into their home province, they attempted to formulate a policy which fitted both the demands of independent militarism and of the principles of the Kuomintang, and came up with a programme which called for the application of modified forms of the Three Peoples Principles within a framework of mass mobilisation and militarisation. This compromise policy may have represented a more effective method of government than was found in most other parts of Kuomintang China. Kwangsi was widely held to be a well governed province, its administration noticeably less corrupt than those of provinces under direct Nanking control.

It is difficult to measure the exact measure of success which the Reconstruction Movement achieved. Large amounts of material were published by the Kwangsi leaders describing their aims and their achievements, and though the whole oeuvre is permeated with propaganda,

many of the claims of achievements do not seem outrageous. Year books and statistical handbooks, often very revealing, were also published, and independent reports, such as the economic report prepared by Ch'ien ~~Chia~~-chü, were sponsored. Accounts of visitors to the province were published, both in Kwangsi and elsewhere, and were consistently favourable. Catholic missionaries reported from the province during the whole period, and were generally well-disposed towards the Reconstruction Movement. Even communist accounts are not completely damning, though their tone is extremely hostile.

The Reconstruction Movement represented an attempt to come to terms with the problems besetting China and the Kuomintang government as China recovered from the turmoil of the late 1920s; it sought to modernise the province and to prepare resistance to external aggression. The policies of the Kwangsi Clique ^{were} primarily designed to ensure the Clique's survival and to maintain its sovereignty in Kwangsi; despite the reforming tone in which they were couched, they did little to improve the worst ills of Kwangsi society, though they were successful in cleaning up the surface and in securing internal peace. When compared with the standards of provincial administration in Nanking-controlled China, the Reconstruction Movement of the Kwangsi Clique must be judged to have provided a preferable alternative; in absolute terms it was probably insignificant.

CONCLUSION

This study of the Kwangsi Clique was looked at one of the leading regionalist groupings in Republican China and examined it in its relation to the Kuomintang and in its activities as ruler of an independent province. We have seen that regional power holding emerged during the second half of the 19th Century, when the decline of central authority encouraged the establishment of regional armies, and that the devolution from the centre reached its height after the collapse of the imperial system in the Warlord Period between 1916 and 1928. The Kwangsi leaders established themselves during this period, within the warlord system; their early careers were spent fighting the battles of petty warlordism, an experience which was to colour their subsequent careers. But their backgrounds, as sons of families which, though declining, still had pretensions to culture, and their education, in modern military schools, cut them off from the bandit-warlords of Kwangsi, and encouraged them to associate themselves with the new orthodoxy of South China, the Kuomintang. Once attached to the Kuomintang, their advancement was rapid, thanks to the fortuitous chances which the confusion of 1927 threw their way; by 1928 Kwangsi forces controlled four provinces and had a foothold in the Peking/Tientsin region. Their relations with the leader-

ship of the Kuomintang was increasingly strained; in the space of six months in 1927 they broke first with the Left-wing and then with Chiang Kai-shek, cutting themselves off from the intricacies and wangling of Kuomintang political life, in which they were out of their depth, and turning to the straightforward relationship of a regional clique. Their alienation from the Kuomintang leadership was a dual process of rejection: their reversion to regional loyalties occurred only after the Kuomintang had rejected them by failing to absorb them into a national framework.

The split between the Kwangsi Clique and the Centre in 1929 deprived the Clique of large-scale regional power, but failed to crush it completely; the Clique retained control of its native province, which had been kept as a private kingdom while the Clique's major activities were concentrated outside the province. The process of local regeneration which had been started between 1926 and 1929 was continued and expanded; a reconstruction movement was launched, within the framework of the Three Peoples' Principles but in opposition to the leadership of the Kuomintang designed to create a new order in Kwangsi to stand as an example for the rest of China. The militia system, the main channel of reconstruction, stressed discipline and austerity; it was authoritarian and demanded mass participation on a strictly directed basis. As a challenge to Nanking,

and as an attempt to show up Nanking's activities in the field of reconstruction, the reconstruction movement was successful, for it kept Kwangsi free of external interference for six years, and won for Kwangsi a reputation for ordered progress and good government unrivalled in Kuomintang China.

In setting up their reconstruction movement within a single province, the Kwangsi leaders had certain advantages over Nanking: though they lacked the financial resources and human expertise which Nanking could draw on, they exercised an absolute control over their province which allowed them to mobilise the civilian population while keeping it well disciplined; they had no opponents to reconcile, but instead a group of loyal and long-serving subordinates; strong local control allowed the crushing of the Kwangsi communist movement, whereas communist activity continued in many Nanking-controlled provinces; continuity of leadership allowed the application of consistent policies, while in Nanking-controlled provinces the top leadership was constantly changing, and policies with it.^I

The achievements of the Kwangsi Clique on behalf of the people of Kwangsi were limited; though the Kwangsi leaders made much of their humble origins, and exaggerated them to the point of distortion, they felt no deep concern for the welfare of the common people;

they presented themselves as the sons of peasants only to win the loyalty of the peasantry. They did not attempt to disturb the existing social order or to introduce agrarian reform; nor did they buttress the civilian population from economic decline, brought on partly by the world depression, and partly by their own economic policies.

While the autonomy of the Kwangsi Clique was at its height, between 1931 and 1936, there was no connection between Kwangsi and Nanking. And yet the Kwangsi Clique remained closely identified with the ideology of the Kuomintang and with the concept of national unity. Their autonomy was a defiance of a weak national government, not of the national orthodoxy; it contained no hint of secession from the nation, for regional warlords, whether in the Warlord Period or after the technical reunification of China under the Kuomintang, never thought in terms of secession. The leaders of the Kwangsi Clique clung to the belief that they were loyal supporters of the Kuomintang and loyal Chinese, however much their actions weakened their objects of loyalty. Conveniently for them and other heterodox adherents on the Kuomintang, its ideology was vague enough to accommodate a wide range of political belief. Sun Yat-sen left behind no specific credo, and none was elaborated by his disciples after his death:

his broad principles could be interpreted to suit many tastes. The nebulousness of the ideology of the Kuomintang encouraged internal division; out of division grew two dangerous tendencies: first the habit of making unworkable compromises between poorly reconciled factions, in the interest of temporary stability; and second the development of cliques whose membership and aims were clearly defined, but on mutual interest or common origin rather than on political belief. These tendencies had the effect of concentrating the energies of Kuomintang leaders on manipulations between factions, rather than on the innovation and reconstruction for which the Kuomintang officially stood.

The Later Careers of the Leaders of the Kwangsi Clique

Within a year of the collapse of Kwangsi's independence, China was at war with Japan. The Kwangsi armies were rapidly expanded from the reserve of trained men which the militia system had produced, and once again Kwangsi troops went north to fight in Central China. Li Tsung-jen and Pai Ch'ung-hsi left the province, Li to become the director of the 5th War Zone and Pai director of military training and deputy chief of staff.

Kwangsi ceased to be the preserve of the Kwangsi Clique; Huang Hsü-ch'u remained chairman of the province until 1949, but he had to share his authority with

outsiders who moved into the province in increasing numbers as the Anti-Japanese War progressed and their own provinces were occupied by the Japanese. (Kwangsi was invaded in 1939, but the Japanese were driven back; large parts of the province were occupied in 1944). The Kwangsi Clique continued to exist, but only as a focus of loyalty for Kwangsi men serving outside the province; it did not represent a threat to the Centre. On the surface, relations between the leaders of the Clique and Chiang Kai-shek were harmonious, and Pai Ch'ung-hsi in particular seemed close to him.² But antipathy between the Clique and Chiang did not disappear. Li Tsung-jen's hostility towards Chiang grew stronger during the long periods of inactivity which marked his war career after his victory at Taierchuang in 1938; the victory had come in the middle of a series of shattering defeats for the Chinese Army, and had established Li as a patriotic general and national hero; he blamed his subsequent idleness on Chiang's jealous refusal to use him.

Li's hostility was not eased after the war; he was consigned to head the Generalissimo's Headquarters in Peking, and again found himself isolated and inactive, in what was a purely nominal post. In 1948, he made an open challenge to Chiang by running for the office of Vice President against Chiang's nominee, Sun Fo. Li won the election and the following year became Acting President when Chiang resigned shortly before the

Kuomintang's final defeat on the mainland. Li's open defiance of Chiang made it impossible for him to go into exile on Taiwan, as Pai Ch'ung-hsi did;³ he went instead to America. The other Kwangsi leaders went different ways: Li Chi-shen and Huang Shao-hsiung stayed on the mainland,⁴ while Huang Hsu-ch'u settled in Hong Kong. Thus the Kwangsi Clique broke up.

There was an unexpected postscript: in 1965 Li Tsung-jen returned to China to a tremendous welcome; he was hailed as a patriot, his past career as an anti-communist conveniently ignored. Li's motives for returning home were straightforward: fifteen years in New Jersey had not reconciled him to exile, he was old and homesick; his wife, whose influence over him had always been strong, was chronically ill and believed that she could be cured by Chinese doctors (in fact she died in 1966). For Peking, the return of a prominent Kuomintang general was a propaganda coup, which may have been designed in part to encourage the return of other Chinese living abroad, by demonstrating that even a man with an apparently black record would be well received. If this was Peking's motive, it was badly timed, for the start of the Cultural Revolution prevented any such development. It has incidentally provided a spectacle of considerable

irony: Li Tsung-jen, former warlord and bitter opponent of communism, appears now on state occasions alongside a decimated Communist leadership; among the absentees are his most bitter personal enemies in the Communist camp, Chu Teh and Teng Hsiao-p'ing.

The Eclipse of Regional Independence

The start of the Anti-Japanese War marked the end of regional independence in Kuomintang China (though the pressures towards devolution of power in times of Central weakness have not been eradicated, as has been demonstrated by emergence of powerful and independent regional leaders during the Cultural Revolution). The last redoubts of autonomy were overwhelmed and turned into 'central' provinces by the influx of government organisations, schools, factories and civilian driven from Occupied China into the former hinterland. Foreign invasion ended the 'balkanisation' of China by warlordism, a phenomenon which had dominated the early years of the Republic and had tenaciously survived long after warlords were officially a thing of the past. As with the political splits in 1927 and 1928, regional defiance of central authority left deep scars of disunity on the Kuomintang, which persisted even during the anti-Japanese War, when pressures for unity were strongest. ~~The~~ impermanent and fragmentary unity of the Kuomintang

weakened its war effort and prevented it from putting up a good showing in the Anti-Japanese War or in the Civil War which followed it.

This failure to reestablish a genuine unity within the Kuomintang was matched by a failure to move away from the conservatism and authoritarianism which had come to characterise its leadership, through its struggles with the Communists and the Left-wingers and with its regionalist 'allies'. The struggle with the Communists and Left-wingers had led the Kuomintang to abandon the idea of mobilising the masses and to turn its face against social reform. And in the attempts to bring the regional independents to heel, the Centre had compromised itself by resorting to the very tactics which had enabled the regionalists to maintain their autonomy: basing its power solely on military might; concentrating its efforts on establishing rigid population control rather than on attracting popular support; and forming cliques based on personal and regional ties. The partiality, conservatism and caution of regionalism were reflected in the Centre; its vitality was sapped by internal division, and even the crisis of invasion did not restore it. The leaders of the Kuomintang abdicated the role of directing the passionate mass nationalism which the actions of a brutal invader evoked to the Communist Party, which identified

itself with the masses, and channelled their new-found nationalism into effective resistance. The identification of the Communist Party with mass nationalism was a crucial factor in the eventual Communist victory on the mainland.

Between the Northern Expedition and the Anti-Japanese War, the Kuomintang was preoccupied with its internal divisions, with its struggle against the Communists and with attempts to enforce its rule over the areas it technically governed; these problems took precedence over the application of longer term policies of reconstruction and regeneration, and the Kuomintang chance of establishing an effective government over the nation it had struggled so long to dominate slipped away. The crisis of the Anti-Japanese War and the Civil War which followed it denied the Kuomintang a second chance.

List of Abbreviations used in the Notes

<u>BSME</u>	Bulletin de la Société des Missions-Etrangères de Paris.
<u>CYB</u>	China Year Book.
<u>Compte Rendu</u>	Compte Rendu des Travaux de la Société des Missions-Etrangères de Paris.
<u>KHCCS</u>	Kuang-hsi chih Chien-she.
<u>KHHHKMTL</u>	Kuang-hsi Hsin-hai Ko-ming Tzu-liao.
<u>KHKMHIL</u>	Kuang-hsi Ko-ming Hui-i Lu.
<u>KMWH</u>	Ko-ming Wen-hsien.
<u>KWCP</u>	Kuo-wen Chou-pao.
<u>NCH</u>	North China Herald.
<u>TCSSNCKCSS</u>	Tsui-chin San-shih-nien Chung-kuo Chün-shih Shih.
<u>TFTC</u>	Tung-fang Tsa-chih.

INTRODUCTIONNotes to pp. I-8

1. Shensi, which lay in this belt, was an exception, in that for the greater part of the period it was occupied by the Manchurian troops of Chang Hsüeh-liang.
2. Franz Michael, "Regionalism in Nineteenth Century China," introduction to Stanley Spector, Li Hung-chang and the Huai Army (Princeton, 1964), p. xxv.
3. Mary Clabaugh Wright, The Last Stand of Chinese Conservatism (Stanford, 1957), p. 221.
4. Stanley Spector, Li Hung-chang and the Huai Army (Princeton, 1964), p. 171.
5. Michael, op.cit., p. xxv.
6. Lucien Pye, "Armies in the Process of Political Modernisation," in The Role of the Military in Underdeveloped Countries, ed. John J. Johnson (Princeton, 1962), p. 84.
7. James Sheridan, Chinese Warlord, the Career of Feng Yü-hsiang (Stanford, 1966), p. 9.
8. Winston Hsieh, "The Ideas and Ideals of a Warlord; Ch'en Chiung-ming (1878-1933)," in Harvard Papers on China, XVI (1962), pp. 198-244.
9. Sheridan, loc. cit.
10. Donald Gillin, Warlord: Yen Hsi-shan in Shansi Province, 1911-1949 (Princeton, 1967).
11. Joseph Levenson, "The Province, the Nation and the World," in Approaches to Modern Chinese History, ed. Albert Feuerwerker, Rhoads Murphy and Mary Wright (Berkeley, 1967), p. 270.

Notes to pp. 9-16

12. J.E. Spencer, "On Regionalism in China," Journal of Geography, XLVI, No.4 (April, 1947), pp.132-3
13. ^{China} ~~Heeda~~ Iriye, After Imperialism (Cambridge, Mass., 1965), p. 73
14. W.G. Beasley, Select Documents on Japanese Foreign Policy 1853-1868 (London 1955), p. 93
15. Li Chien-nung, The Political History of China, 1840-1928, pp. 404-5
16. Shen Yün-lung ed., T'ang Chi-yao, Chin-tai Chung-kuo Shih-liao Ts'ung-k'an, series 3, (Taipei, 1967), pp. 117-120.
17. Chung-kuo Kuo-min-tang Chung-yang Chih-hsing Wei-yuan-hui, Chung-kuo Kuo-min-tang Ti-er-tz'u Tai-piao Ta-hui Hsüan-yen Chi Ch'ueh-yi-an (Canton, 1926), p.14
18. Mary Clabaugh Wright, "Modern China in Transition, 1900-1950," Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, (January, 1959), p. 4
19. Ch'ien Tuan-sheng, "The Role of the Military in Chinese Government," Pacific Affairs, XXI (1948), p.76
20. The term 'warlord' (chün-fa) was used at this stage, in Kuomintang terminology, for all militarists who did not support the Kuomintang; regional militarists in South China who were allied to the Kuomintang were not known as warlords, though there was little qualitative difference between them and the 'real' warlords of North and Central China. The leaders of the Kwangsi Clique did not officially become 'warlords' until 1929, when they broke with Nanking, although by that time they had dominated Kwangsi as military leaders for four years. The Kuomintang used the term 'warlord' to define the relationship between the Kuomintang and an individual militarist, rather than to describe a specific phenomenon. cont...

Notes to pp. 18-25.

"As soon as a military figure joined the camp of the Kuomintang alliance he was no longer a warlord, but a 'revolutionary general'. Once a 'revolutionary general' rebelled, he might again be called a warlord." See Hsieh, op.cit., pp. 198-9.

21. KWCP, IV, No.36 (September 18th, 1927), ta-shih, p.5.
22. George Sokolsky, "The Kuomintang," in CYB, 1929-30, p.1174.
23. Sheridan, op.cit., pp. 14.15.
24. In spite of its size, Nanking's army proved incapable of performing the most crucial task of all, that of defending China against Japanese aggression.
25. Douglas Paauw, "The Kuomintang and Economic Stagnation," Journal of Asian Studies, XVI, No.2 (February, 1957), p.216.
26. The large number of unemployed meant that army recruitment quotas could usually be filled without difficulty, though conscription and impressment became increasingly common, especially after the start of the Anti-Japanese War.
27. China Weekly Review, LXVI, No.2 (September 9th, 1933), pp. 54-5.

Notes to pp 27-30

1. Trois Mois au Kouangsi (Souvenirs d'un Officier en Mission), (Paris, 1906), p. iv.
2. Naval Intelligence Division, China Proper (London, 1945), I, pp. 125-6.
3. Henry Macaleavy, The Black Flags (London, 1968), pp. 98-99.
4. Kuang-hsi Yin-hsiang Chi (n.p., 1935), II, p. 32.
5. Chi Ch'ao-ting, Key Economic Areas in Chinese History (London, 1936), p. 30.
6. During the northward march of the Taipings, this canal proved very useful for the transportation of supplies. Se Laai Yi-faai, "The River Strategy of the Taipings," Oriens, V (1952), No.2, 306.
7. Herold J. Wiens, Han Chinese Expansion in South China (Hampden, Connecticut, 1967), p. 132 p. 144.
8. Franz Michael, The Taiping Rebellion (Seattle, 1966), pp. 18-19.
9. Joseph Dautremer, "Yunnan et Kouangsi, Frontières Indo-Chinoises," Bulletin de l'Association Amicale Franco-Chinoise, I (1909) No.5, 284.
10. As long as he operated outside China, Liu was not regarded as a bandit by the Chinese authorities, but as an ally. Se Rene Ristelhuebber, "Notre Conflit avec la Chine au Sujet de Tonkin," Revue d'Histoire Diplomatique, No.3 (1954), 2.
11. Kuang-hsi Sheng Cheng-fu T'ung-chi Ch'u, Ku-chin kuang-hsi Lü-kuei Jen-ming Chien (Kweilin, 1934), pp. 92-3 Hereafter cited as Ku-chin Kuang-hsi Macaleavy, op.cit., pp. 99-109. 202 pp. 281-3

Notes to pp 30-32

12. Trois Mois au Kouangsi, p. 93.
13. Ts'en was the son of the celebrated governor-general of Yunnan and Kweichow at the time of the Sino-French War, Ts'en Yü-ying, a violent xenophobe who had cooperated with Liu Yung-fu in his opposition to the French in Tongking. Ts'en Ch'un-hsüan won fame in 1900, when he escorted the Empress Dowager to Sian after the occupation of Peking by foreign troops. His appointment to the governor-generalship of Kwangtung and Kwangsi may have been made in part as a sign of her gratitude. See the biographies of Ts'en Yü-ying in Arthur Hummel, Emminent Chinese of the Ch'ing Period (Washington, 1943), II, 743-6.
14. Ts'en Ch'un-hsüan, Lo Chai Man Pi (Peking, 1933), (reprinted Taipei, 1962, ed. Wu Hsiang-hsiang) "Ts'en Ch'un-hsüan," pp. 11-12.
15. Kuang-hsi Shao-shu Min-tsu She-hui Li-shih Tüao-ch'a Tsu, Kuang-hsi Hsin-hai Ko-ming Tzu-liao (Nanning, 1960), p.5. Hereafter cited as KHHHKMTL
16. Li Tsung-huang, Chung-kuo Kuo-min-tang Tang Shih (Nanking, 1935), p. 68.
17. Hummel, op.cit., p. 745.
18. KHHHKMTL, p.7, p.11.
19. Trois Mois au Kouangsi, p. 129.
20. A different version of the French failure to develop trade is given in a British source: "The French are neither as capable as pioneers, nor as competent to fill lonely outposts as Albions's bulldog breed." See Wilbur Burton, The French Stranglehold on Yunnan (Shanghai, 1933), p. 7.

Notes to pp. 32-36.

21. Dautremer, op.cit., p. 282.
22. André Baudrit, Bétail Humain: Rapt, Vente, Infanticide dans l'Indochine et dans la Chine du Sud (Saigon, 1942), p. 20.
23. Father Joseph Cuenot, Au Pays des Pavillons Noirs (Hong Kong, 1925), p. 5.
24. Compte Rendu des Travaux de la Société des Missions-Etrangères de Paris, 1921 (Paris, 1922), p. 78. Hereafter cited as Compte Rendu.
25. Bulletin de la Société des Missions-Etrangères de Paris, No. 110 (February, 1931), p. 95 Hereafter cited as BSME.
26. Cuenot, op.cit., p. 137.
27. Compte Rendu, 1920 (Paris, 1921), p. 44.
28. Mary R. Anderson, Protestant Mission Schools for Girls in South China (New York, 1943), p. 141.
29. Ku-chin Kuang-hsi, p.74 .
Hsiao Yüan (pseud.) "Chi Lu Yung-t'ing pt.1," Kuo-Wen Chou-pao, XIII, No.12 (March 30th, 1936), p. 36
Hereafter cited as KWCP.
30. Wen Kung-chih, Tsui-chin San-shih-nien Chung-kuo Chün-shih Shih (Shanghai, 1930), (reprinted Taipei, 1962, ed. Wu Hsiang-hsiang), II, pp. 334-5.
Hereafter cited as TCSSNCKCSS.
T'ao Chü-yin, Chin-tai I-wen (Shanghai, 1945), p. 56
31. K'un Kung (pseud.), "Lu Yung-t'ing Fa-chi Ch'ien-hou Yü-wen Pu-lu," Ch'un-Ch'iu, No.122 (August 1st, 1962), pp. 11-12.

Notes to pp. 36-39.

32. Huang Hsü-chü, "Ts'an-chia Hsin-hai Ko-ming Liu-chou Tu-li ti Hui-i," Ch'un-Ch'iu, No.66 (April 1st, 1960), pp. 7-8.
33. T'ao Chü-yin, Pei-yang Chün-fa T'ung-chih Shih Ch'i Shih-hua (Peking, 1957), I, p. 68.
34. Chin Tien-jung, "Hsi-nan Lao-chiang Liu Chen-huan Chuan-chi," Ch'un-Ch'iu, No.166 (June 1st, 1964), pp.3-4.
Li Mo-hsing, "Hsin-hai Ko-ming tsai Liu-chou," Chin-tai Shih-tzu-liao, (1958, Pt.2), No.19, p. 48.
35. Lo Hsiang-lin ed., Ko-ming Wen-hsien (Taipei, 1958-), XII, p. Hereafter cited as KMWH.
36. Cuenot, op.cit., p. 1.
37. T'ao Chü-yin, Chin-tai I-wen, p.57.
Li Chien-nung, The Political History of China, 1840-1928, (trans. Teng Ssu-yu and Jeremy Ingalls) (New York, 1956), p. 325
38. Tsou Lu, Hui Ku Lu (Chungking, 1943), p. 78.
39. T'ao Chü-yin, Chin-tai I-wen, p.58.
40. Huang Hsü-ch'ü, "Pa-kuei I-wang Lu no. 25," Ch'un-Ch'iu, No.177 (November 16th, 1964), p. 14.
T'ao Chü-yin, Pei-yang Chün-fa, II, p. 73.
41. *ibid*, p. 175.
42. Ts'en Ch'un-hsüan, op. cit., pp.10-11.
43. Hsiao Yu'an (pseud.) "Chi Lu Yung-t'ing, pt.2," KWCP, XIII, No.14 (April 13th, 1936), p. 28.
44. TCSSNCKCSS, III, p.35.

Notes to pp. 39-42

45. Hsiao Yüan, loc.sit.
T'ao Chü-yin, Pei-yang Chün-fa, II, p. 177.
46. *ibid*, p.178.
47. Jerome Ch'en, Yuan Shih-k'ai, 1859-1916 (London, 1961)
p. 126.
48. T'ao Chü-yin, Pei-yang Chün-fa, II, p. 179.
49. TCSSNCKCSS, III, p. 42.
50. Li Chien-nung, *op.cit.*, p.337.
T'ao Chü-yin, Pei-yang Chün-fa, II, p. 194.
51. TCSSNCKCSS, III, p. 45.
T'ang Chi-yao, of Yunnan, was the actual head of the Military Government, but he remained in Yunnan, and took no part in the running of the Government. See Li Chien-nung, p. 339.
52. Ts'en Ch'un-hsüan, *op.cit.*, p. 13.
53. Huang Hsü-ch'u, "Pa-kuei I-wang Lu, no.6," Ch'un-Ch'iu, No.158 (February 1st, 1964), p. 7.
54. The campaign against Lung Ch'i-kuang provided the first experience of military campaigning for a young lieutenant in the Kwangsi Army, Li Tsung-jen.
55. Ts'en Ch'un-hsüan, *op.cit.*, p. 14.
56. TCSSNCKCSS, III, pp.48-49.
57. Lu spent most of his time at his home near Nanning, and appears to have given very little attention to governing his provinces.
58. T'ao Chü-yin, Pei-yang Chün-fa, III, p. 105

Notes to pp. 42-47.

59. Huang Hsü-ch'u, op.cit., p. 8.
60. Although Lu commanded the largest single body of troops in Kwangtung, consisting of the troops under three Kwangsi generals, Ma Ch'i (Lu's adopted son), Lin Hu and Lin Chün-t'ing, he had only technical control over local Cantonese units, over the provincial guard, which was directly under the governor, Chu Ching-lan, and over Yunnanese troops which had remained in Kwangsi after the Hu-Kuo Movement. See TCSSNCKCSS, II, p.337 and T'ao Chü-yin, Pei-yang Chün-fa, III, pp. 169-171.
61. Huang Hsü-ch'u, loc.sit.
62. T'ao Chü-yin, Pei-yang Chün-fa, III, p. 171.
63. Li Chien-nung, op.cit., p. 378.
64. Huang Hsü-ch'u, "Pa-kuei I-wang Lu, pt.8," Ch'un-Ch'iu, No. 160 (March 1st, 1964), p. 16.
65. Li Chien-nung, op.cit., p. 380.
66. Ts'en Ch'un-hsüan, op.cit., p. 19.
67. Li Chien-nung, op.cit., p.382.
68. Ts'en Ch'un-hsüan, op.cit., p.14.
69. Li Chien-nung, op.cit., p.388.
70. Huang Shao-hsiung, Wu-shih Hui-i (Shanghai, 1945), p. 35.
71. Li Chien-nung, op.cit., p. 398.
72. T'ao Chü-yin, Pei-yang Chün-fa, V, pp.118-121.
73. Chu Wei, Chün-fa Pien-luan (Shanghai, 1936), p. 36.

Notes to pp. 48-49.

74. T'ao Chü-yin, Pei-yang Chün-fa, V, pp. 193-204.

75. *ibid*, VI, pp. 19-23.

76. Huang Shao-hsiung, *op.cit.*, p. 45.

Notes to pp.50-53

1. The only major split within the Clique occurred in 1930, when Huang Shao-hsiung left the Clique, and was replaced in the top echelon by Huang Hsü-ch'u.
2. In 1912, the name of this school was changed to the Short-Course Preparatory School (Kuang-hsi Lu-chün Su-ch'eng Hsiao-hsüeh).
3. The chief sources for Li Tsung-jen's early life are Li Tsung-jen, Li Tsung-ssu-ling Tsui-chin Yen-chiang Chi (Nanning, 1935) pp.5-16, and Li Tsung-jen's unpublished Autobiography, (deposited in the Butler Library, Columbia University, New York), Chapters 1-2. Very similar accounts to the one found in Li Tsung-ssu-ling Tsui-chin Yen-chiang Chi are found in Feng Chü-p'ei, Kang-chan chung ti Ti-wu Lu-chün (Hankow, 1938), pp. 82-91, and in Li Tsung-jen et.al., Kuang-hsi chih Chien-she Kuang-hsi Chien-she Yen-chiu-hui Ts'ung-shu (Kweilin 1939) pp. 12-20.
4. The main account of Huang Shao-hsiung's early life is contained in Huang's autobiography: Huang Shao-hsiung, Wu-shih Hui-i (Shanghai 1945), pp. 1-10. This autobiography was probably

Notes to pp. 54-57

- prepared for Huang by his secretary, Li Tse-min.
5. Huang Hsü-ch'u has given an account of his family background in: Huang Hsü-ch'u, "Wo ti Mu-chin", Ch'un-Ch'iu, No. 259 (March 1st, 1968), p.2. There are also brief accounts in Chou Ch'üan, Kuei-hsi Chieh-p'ou (Hong Kong 1949), p.34 and in Huang Hsü-ch'u, "Ts'an-chia Hsin-hai Ko-ming Liu-chou Tu-li ti Hui-yi", Ch'un-Ch'iu, No. 66 (April 1st, 1960), p.7.
 6. Brief accounts of Pai Ch'ung-hsi's early life are contained in T.S. Ch'en, "General Pai, Chinese Patriot", Asis, XLII, No. 12 (December, 1942), p.715; Chang Kuo-p'ing, Pai Ch'ung-hsi Chiang-chün Chüan (Shanghai, 1938), pp. 1-2; Feng Chū-p'ei, p. 92; Hsiang Yü (pseud.), "Pai Ch'ung-hsi Ts'ao-ch'i Chüeh-ch'i Kuang-hsi ti Ching-wei", I-wen Chih, No.16 (June 1st, 1916), p.20.
 7. Information on the Kwangsi Military Preparatory School is found in Huang Shao-hsiung, op.cit., pp.11-30; Hsiang Yü, op.cit., p.20; Li Tsung-jen Autobiography, Chapter 3.
 8. Ralph L. Powell, The Rise of Chinese Military Power (Princeton, 1955), p.290, p.299.

9. KHHHKMTL, p. 271.
10. The motive for sending this force was possibly to remove the most active revolutionary elements from Kwangsi, to make Lu Yung-ting's task of establishing his control over the province simpler.
11. KHHHKMTL, p. 274. Chao later gained fame as the tuchün of Hunan, and as one of the leading protagonists of the federalist movement in the early 1920s.
12. Yuan's attitude to the Academy had been coloured by the difficulties he had had with an earlier head of the Academy, Chiang Pai-li, who had quarrelled bitterly with Yuan over what he considered to be the inadequate financial support received by the Academy. Having failed to persuade Yuan to make larger contributions, Chiang took drastic action. In March, 1913, he addressed an impassioned speech to the assembled students, and then drew a revolver and shot himself, saying he would rather die than see his work being destroyed by lack of money. He did not die; he was only slightly wounded, and recovered sufficiently in hospital to woo his Japanese nurse, whom he

Notes to pp.60-61

- married on his discharge from hospital. See Ts'ao Chu-jen, Chiang Pai-li P'ing Chuan (Hong Kong, 1963), pp. 9-11.
13. C. Martin Wilbur and Julie How, Documents on Communism, Nationalism and Soviet Advisors in China, 1917-1927 New York, 1956, p. 393, p. 411, p. 418.
14. Among the Paoting graduates who rose to high positions within the Kuomintang military structure were T'ang Sheng-chih, Ch'en Ming-shu, Chiang Kuang-nai, Ho Chien, Chang Fa-k'uei, Liu Shih, Ku Chu-t'ung, Ch'en Ch'eng, Miao Pei-nan, Ch'ien Ta-chün, Liu Hsing, Mao Ping-wen, and Hsü Ching-t'ang. Chiang Kai-shek also attended the Paoting Academy before 1911.
15. Ma Hsiao-chün, "Kuang-hsi Ko-ming-chün Fa-yuan Chih-lüeh", Chuan-chi Wen-hsüeh, VIII, No. 1 (January-June, 1966), p.38.
16. Information on the Kwangsi Model Battalion is contained in Huang Shao-hsiung, pp. 36-8; Ma Hsiao-chün, op.cit., pp. 38-9; Hsiang Yü, op.cit., pp. 20-1; Kao Tung, "Li Tsung-jen, Huang Shao-hsiung Ch'i Chia Chen-shih pt. 1", Ch'un-Ch'iu,

Notes to pp. 62-65

- No. 72 (July 1st, 1960), p.12.
17. Huang Shao-hsiung, op.cit., p. 36.
18. Perhaps Huang Hsü-ch'u's education at the Peking Military college had been better than that received by the others at Paoting, causing Ma to appoint him to a higher post than the others.
19. For Li Tsung-jen's career after 1911, see Li Tsung-ssu-ling Tsui-chin Yen-chiang Chi, pp. 7-11; Li Tsung-jen Autobiography, Chapters 4-8.
20. Chu Te's first post after the completion of his formal education was also as a physical training instructor. The reaction of his parents, illiterate peasants, to the news that he was going to teach physical training, gives some indication of the low regard in which such work was held; though Chu is several years older than Li, the attitude of his parents was probably much the same as Li's:
- "The effect of my confession was terrifying... First there was a long silence, then my father asked what physical training meant. When I explained, he shouted out, saying that the whole family had worked for twelve long years to educate one son to save them from starvation, only to be told that he intended to teach boys to throw their arms and legs around. Coolies could do that, he shouted in violent bitterness.."
- See Agnes Smedley, The Great Road, The Life and Times of Chu Teh, (London, 1958), p. 76.

Notes to pp. 66-67.

21. In this action, Li was wounded in the face. The recurrence of trouble from this wound was to be the pretext for many visits to hospital during Li's later career, especially at times when the Kwangsi Clique found itself temporarily embarrassed. It was Li's equivalent of Chiang Kai-shek's tooth-ache, Wang Ching-wei's diabetes, Yen Hsi-shan's heart-trouble and Feng Yü-hsiang's stomach upsets, maladies which struck them down when the political atmosphere appeared to demand a brief retirement. See John Fairnsworth, "China Needs Healthier Leaders," China Weekly Review, LXXV (1933), p.338.
22. Huang Hsü-ch'u, "Pa-kuei I-wang Lu, pt.18," Ch'un-Ch'iu, No.170 (August 1st, 1964), p.17.

Chapter IIINotes to pp. 68-69.

1. Sun's reasons for wanting to move out of Kwantung whenever he established even a toehold there are obscure. Theoretically speaking, such plans were the embodiment of his intention to reunify China. But there may have been more immediate reasons: his difficulty in working with the Cantonese militarists who gave him support may have encouraged him to try and establish a base for his operations in Hunan or Kiangsi. Equally well, he may have reached an agreement with the Cantonese militarists whereby he agreed to take non-Cantonese 'guest' troops (k'o-chün) who supported him out of the province, in return for continued Cantonese support. The 'guest' troops were extremely unpopular with the local people, and with the Cantonese militarists.

2. Hu Han-min states that "all the tactical planning was made for him by Chiang Kai-shek". See Hu Han-min, "Liu Yueh Shih-liu chih Hui-ku," in Chung-kuo Hsien-tai Shih Ts'ung K'an, ed.

Wu Hsiang-hsiang (Taipei, 1960), II, p.411

3. Société des Missions-Etrangères de Paris, Bulletin de la Société des Missions-Etrangères

Notes to pp. 69-72.

de Paris, No.2 (February, 1922), p.48

Hereafter cited as BSME.

4. KHHHKMTL, p.26.

5. Joseph Cuenot, Au Pays des Pavillons Noirs
(Hong Kong, 1925), p.51.

6. Cuenot, op.cit., p.69.

7. BSME, No. 3 (March, 1922), p.107.

8. Huang Hsü-ch'u, "T'an-tao Ma Chün-wu Ch'u
Kuei-cheng Hsiang-ching, " Ch'un-Ch'iu, No. 85,
(January 16th 1961), p.8.

9. Société des Missions-Etrangères de Paris,
Compte Rendu des Travaux de la Société des
Mission-Etrangères de Paris, 1921, (Paris, 1922),
p.80, Hereafter cited as Compte Rendu.

10. Cuenot, op.cit., p.52.

11. Ch'ien Chia-chü, Han Te-chang, Wu Pan-nung,
Kuang-hsi Sheng Ching-chi Kai-k'uang, Kuo-li
Chung-yang Yen-chiu-yuan She-hui K'o-hsüeh
Yen-chiu Su^o Ts'ung-k'an, No. 8 (Shanghai, 1936),
p.226.

13. BSME, No.2. (February 1922) p.48.

14. On occasion, Ma fed his guests on food
brought in from stalls in the market outside
his yamen, adapting the amounts purchased to the
apparent appetites of his guests. Ye Ho, (pseud.)

Notes to pp. 72-74.

"Ma Chün-wu Tsen-yang Tang Sheng-chang?" Ch'un-Ch'iu, No.38 (February 1st, 1959), p.10.

15. BSME, No.3 (March, 1922), p.240.

16. As Ch'en withdrew his troops from West Kwangsi, Sun Yat-sen hurried back from North Kwangsi to Kwangtung, hoping to forestall Ch'en's expected coup. He succeeded briefly, but in June he was driven from Canton.

17. Huang Shao-hsiung, op.cit., p.52. Ma never recovered from his loss; years later when he revisited her grave at Kuei hsien, he was overcome with grief. See T'an Tang-tang Chai-chü, Hsien-tai Chung-kuo Ming-jen Wai-shih (Peking, 1935), p.184.

18. Huang Hsü-ch'u, "Pa-kuei I-wang Lu, pt. 18," Ch'un-Ch'iu, No.170 (August 1st, 1964), p.17.

19. KHHHKMTL, p.257.

20. Ibid.

21. Li Tsung-jen, Unpublished Autobiography, Chapter 10, p.8.

22. Lu himself did not return to Kwangsi until the winter of 1922.

23. Huang brother officer, Pai Ch'ung-hsi, was

Notes to pp.75-76.

at this stage in Canton, receiving medical treatment for a leg injury. He had been injured in 1922, not on the battle field, but during a nocturnal inspection of his troops to check that none of them were gambling. In Canton, he came to act as a liaison between the Kuomintang and Li and Huang. See Huang Shao-hsiung, op.cit., p.52.

24. North China Herald, January 27th, 1923, p.219. Hereafter cited as NCH.

25. Li Tsung-jen Autobiography, Chapter 11, p.8.

26. The obstreperous behaviour of Shen and his men had warned the Kuomintang authorities that trouble could be expected from him, and they were prepared to deal with it. See Ts'ai T'ing-k'ai Tzu Chuan (n.p., 1946), pp.174-5.

26. After his defeat, Shen and his men were without a base for almost a year. They wandered around in the Hunan/Kwangtung/Kiangsi border region until early 1924, when Shen was reunited with Sun Yat-sen, who supplied him with money and arms, enabling him to return to Kwangsi, where he re-established himself in Kweilin. Sun was then planning an offensive

Notes to pp. 76-78 .

against Ch'en Ch'iung-ming in the East River region, and needed to secure his rear. See Ting Wen-chiang, "Kuang-tung Chün-shih Chi," Chin-tai Shih Tzu-liao, 1958, pt.3, pp.51-3; and TFTC, XXI, No.13 (July 10th, 1924), p.3.

28. Huang Shao-hsiung, op.cit., p.62.

29. Lo Chia-lun, Kuo-fu Nien-p'u Ch'u-kao (Taipei, 1959), p.606.

~~30. Chiang Chi~~ su-ch'eng, Min-kuo Shih-wu-nien i-ch'ien chih

Chiang Chie-shih Hsien-sheng (Shanghai, 1936), p.201.

31. Huang Shao-hsiung, op.citi, p.62.

32. Li Tsung-jen Autobiography, Chapter 11, p.10.

33. Teng was at this stage a regimental commander, serving under Li Chi-shen in the 1st Division. See Teng Yen-ta Hsien-sheng I-chu (Hong Kong, 1949), p.8.

He later became famous as the chief of the General Political Department of the National Revolutionary Army. He was a leading radical, and broke with Nanking in 1927. He was executed by the Nanking Government in 1931.

34. NCH, August 18th, 1923, p.447; and KHHHKMTL, p.258.

Notes to pp. 78-81

35. Li Tsung-jen Autobiography, Chapter 12, p.12.
36. NCH, June 9th, 1923, p.657.
37. Lu had received money and ammunition from the Peking Government, then dominated by Ts'ao K'un, who hoped to use Lu to foment trouble against Sun Yat-sen. Hua-tzu Jih-pao, September 23rd, 1923, n.p. (I have not been able to consult this source; my thanks are due to Dr. Jerome Ch'en for making this reference available to me).
38. Cuenot, op.cit., p.71.
39. KHHHKMTL, p.258.
40. Li Tsung-jen Autobiography, Chapter 12, p.3.
41. Li Tsung-jen Battle Collection (Collection of documents, maps and military materials on microfilm at Columbia University; no pagination.) Part I (T'ang-i Kuang-hsi Chang-shih Ch'u-kao), Chapter 1 (T'ao-Lu T'ao-Shen chih Hsien-sheng).
42. Huang Shao-hsiung, op.cit., p.71.
43. Li Tsung-jen, a long-standing member of the T'ung Meng Hui, was re-registered as a member of the Kuomintang at the end of 1923, when new registers of Party members were being compiled

Notes to pp. 81-84.

for the First Kuomintang Congress in January, 1924.

See Li Tsung-jen Autobiography, Chapter 12, p.3.

44. In addition to the resistance of Kwangsi generals in Kwangtung to the idea of giving aid to fellow-provincials whom they regraded as enemies, there was probably opposition from Cantonese leaders, who were always opposed to the supporting of non-Cantonese forces from Kwangtung funds.

45. Huang Shao-hsiung, op.cit., p.72. Previously, the connection between Yülin and Jung hsien had been overland. Now they were linked by water, making communications considerably easier, and preventing misunderstandings, such as had occurred in the past, due to poor communications.

46. KHHHKMTL, p. 259.

47. NCH, March 22nd, 1924, p.434.

48. Ibid, June 21st, 1924, p.447.

49. South China Morning Post, July 21st, 1924, p.10.

50. Ibid.

51. Rex Ray, Cowboy Missionary in Kwangsi (Nashville, Tennessee, 1964), p.18.

52. Huang Hsü-eh'u, "Pa-kuei I-wang Lu, pt.19,"

Notes to pp. 84-85

Ch'un-Ch'iu, No. 171 (August 16th, 1964), p.18.

53. Aside from strategic considerations, there were additional incentives for Li and Huang in attacking the provincial capital. Possession of the capital of a province divided between a number of warlords usually conferred upon the occupying warlord the right to appoint civilian officials and brought recognition from Peking. In addition, if the city was wealthy, possession of the city gave easy access to tax income, in the case of Nanning from the rich opium trade which passed through the city.

54. Li Tsung-jen Autobiography, Chapter 12, p.79 and Huang Shao-hsiung, op.cit., pp.88-90.

55. In October, an alliance was formed between Li, Huang and Shen; Li and Huang were the dominant partners, having 14,000 troops to Shen's 5,000. Hua-Tzu Jih-pao, November 8th, 1924. (See Note 38).

56. Li Tsung-jen Battle Collection, Part I, Chapter i, no page. (See Note 42).

57. Nan-yang Shang-pao, June 30th, 1924, p.8.

58. BSME, No. 32 (August, 1924), p.532.

59. Mao Ssu-ch'eng, op.cit., p.353.

60. Huang Shao-hsiung, op.cit., p.81. Li's flag

Notes to pp. 85-89.

was the character 'Li' in red on a black background; Huang's was the character 'Huang' in red on a white background.

61. Nan-yang Shang-pao, June 30th, 1924, p.8.

62. After the fall of Kweilin, Shen mopped up the north-eastern part of Kwangsi, and drove Lu Yung-t'ing and most of his remaining troops into Hunan, where they were amalgamated into the Hunan Army.

TCSSNCKCSS, II, p.346. Lu himself retired to Soochow. His home there was confiscated by Kuomintang troops when the city fell in March, 1927. NCH, April 2nd, 1927, p.4.

63. NCH, ~~April 2nd~~ January 17th, 1925, p.87.

64. Huang Hsu-ch'u, "Pa-kuei I-wang Lu, pt.20," Ch'un-Ch'iu, No.172 (September 1st, 1964), p.18.

65. Ibid, p.29.

66. Lo Chia-lun, Kuo-fu Nien-pu Ch'u-kaio, p.705.

67. Mao Ssu-ch'eng, op.cit., p.357.

68. The Kuomintang's decision to support Li and Huang was probably taken against considerable opposition from the Kwangsi generals in Canton. So great was their antipathy that they tried to murder Huang when he arrived in the city. Huang Shao-hsiung, op.cit., pp.78-9.

Notes to pp. 90-91.

69. Ibid, p.80I

70. Shen was believed to be in secret alliance with the Kwangsi generals in Canton, and could not therefore expect to keep good relations with the Kuomintang, or with Li and Huang. TFTC, XXII, No.6 (March 24th, 1925), p.3.

71. Ching Pao, February 20th, 1925. In Hatano Ken'ichi, Gendai Shina no ki'roku (Enjin-sha, n.p., n.d.), February, 1925, p.60.

72. At the end of November, while Huang was in Canton, a disastrous fire, rumoured to have been started at the instigation of the Kwangsi generals in Canton, destroyed a third of Wuchow, Huang's stronghold. China Weekly Review, January 3rd, 1925, p.140; and NCH, December 13th, 1924, p.443.

73. TFTC, XXII, No.3 (February 10th, 1925), p.7; and No.8 (April 29th, 1925), p.5.

74. Superficially, the Federalist movement was much stronger in South and South-west China at this time than was the Kuomintang. It was strong in Hunan and Yunnan, and also in those parts of Kwangtung controlled by Ch'en Chiung-ming. In addition, T'ang had close ties with Yunnan and Kwangsi generals in Kwangtung, and

Notes to pp. 91-97.

he also exerted a strong influence in Kweichow.

75. Li Tsung-jen Autobiography, Chapter 13, p.7.

76. Li Tsung-jen Battle Collection, Part I, Chapter 3, no page. (See Note 42).

77. The Canton authorities had placed the Kwangtung 1st Division, under Li Chi-shen, at the disposal of Li and Huang.

78. KHHHKMTL, p.264.

79. BSME, No.42 (June, 1925), p.369.

80. NCH, May 2nd, 1925, p.198.

81. China Weekly Review, April 4th, 1925, p.;46.

82. Huang Shao-hsiung, op.cit., p.101.

83. BSME, No. 43 (July, 1925), p.435.

84. Fan had doubled the size of his army with deserters from the Yunnan forces, and had also captured a consignment of opium; he seemed about to fulfill his ambition of returning to his native province. But though he drove T'ang out of Kwangsi at the end of July, he was held on the Yunnan border, and never got home.

China Weekly Review, September 26th, 1925, pp. 353-4.

85. Shan-hou Hui-i Kung-pao (Peking, February, 1925), No.1, p.317. This did not represent a betrayal of the Kuomintang, for Sun Yat-sen's ~~xxx~~ original

Notes to pp. 99-102

intention in going to Peking had been to attend a conference of this sort.

86. KMWH, XI, p.300.

87. Huang Shao⁵hsiang, op.cit., pp.113-4.

88. KMWH, XX, p.3919.

89. Huang Hsu⁴-ch'u, "Pa-kuei I-wang Lu, pt.25," Ch'un-Ch'iu, No.177 (November 16th, 1964), p.14.

90. Chang Kuo-p'ing, Pai Ch'ung-hsi Chiang⁶cht⁷n Chuan, p.4; and Kuei K'o (pseud.) "Li Tsung-jen Shih-l⁸eh," Hsien-tai Shih-liao (Shanghai, 1934/5), III, p.91.

91. NCH, October, 24th, 1925, p.145.

92. China Weekly Review, December 6th, 1924, p.28; August 29th, 1925, p.280; September 26th, 1925, p.353.

93. NCH, July 25th, 1925, p.46; September 5th, p.295.

94. Jean Chesneaux, Le Mouvement Ouvrier en Chine (Paris, 1962), p.418.

95. Compte Rendu, 1925 (Paris, 1926), p.775.

96. BSME, No.48 (December, 1925), p.83.

97. "On February 27⁹th...there was a big procession, in Nanning itself, of the bolshevik elements of the city. While passing in front of the mission, the military governor Houang Tchao Hiung (sic), who was at the head of the procession, himself began to storm: "Down with French

Notes to pp. 103-105.

Imperialism.'" And the crown^d chorused after him."

BSME, No.52 (April 1926), p.250.

98. Chung-kuo Kuo-min-tang Chung-yang Chih-hsing Wei-yuan-hui, Chung-kuo Kuo-mingtang Ti-er Tz'u Tai-piao Tai-hui Hsuan-yen chi Ch'ieh-i-an (Canton, 1926), p.85.

99. Hsiung was used by Chu Te as his 'Exhibit X', "to explain the evolution of a one-time revolutionary into a warlord." He had served the revolutionary forces in 1911 and again in 1917, during the Hu-Kuo Movement, but was subsequently seduced by the desire for personal power and wealth. See Agnes Smedley, The Great Road, 2 the life and times of Chu Teh (London, 1958), pp.126-7.

100. China Weekly Review, September 26th, 1925, p.92.

101. Li Tsung-jen Battle Collection, Part I, Chapter 5, (Ch'ü Hsiung), no page. (See Note 42).

102. Nan-yang Shang-pao, June 21st, 1924, p.8.

103. Huang Shao-hsiung, op.cit., pp.75-77.

104. Li Tsung-jen and Huang Shao-hsiung were elected alternate members of the Central Supervisory Committee at the ~~2nd~~ Kuomintang Congress in January, 1926, a sign that the Kuomintang intended to bring them

Notes to pp. 105-108.

firmly into the Kuomintang camp. Ibid, p.122.

105. Mao Ssu-ch'eng, op.cit., p. 60.

106. In return for a Kwangsi promise to send troops into Hunan when necessary, Wang Ching-wei promised the Kwangsi leaders 300,000 taels and a quantity of arms and ammunition. Hua-tzu Jih-pao, February 3rd, 1926, no page. (See Note 38). There is no indication that Canton backed Wang's promises of financial aid, which soon became a subject of contention between the two sides.

107. Li Tsung-jen Battle Collection, Part II, Chapter 1, (Pei-fa ch'ien chih Chun-pei), no page. (See Note 42).

108. Huang Hsu-ch'u, "Pa-kuei I-wang Lu, pt. 23," Ch'un-Ch'iu, No. 175 (October 16th, 1964), p.23.

109. KMWH, XX, p. 3916.

110. Li Tsung-huang, Chung-kuo Kuo-min-tang Tang-shih (Nanking, 1935), p.443. The Kwangsi Party membership in October, 1926, of 128,394, represented a gain of 90,394 over the previous figure of 38,000, and increase of 337%. A similar rise, from 48,000 to 156,915, was recorded for Kwangtung.

Notes to pp.112-113

1. Wu Hsiang-hsiang, "Ju-lai-fo yü Tang Sheng-chih". Chuan-chi Wen-hsueh, VIII, No.3 (1966), p.15.
2. Chao H^eng-t'i, the tupan of Hunan, and official commander of the Hunan Army, had lost much authority to his subordinates, and his influence no longer extended much beyond the provincial capital, Ch'angsha. See KHCCS, p.21.
3. Yi Shih Pao, April 3rd. 1926. In Hatano Kenichi, Gendai Shina mo kiroku, April 1926, pp.36-9
4. Wu Hsiang-hsiang, opcit., p.16. Li Tsung-jen and Huang Shao-hsiung may have suggested to the Kuomintang in September 1925 that there might be a possibility of the Kuomintang forming an alliance with T'ang. See Tang Leang-li, The Inner History of the Chinese Revolution (London, 1930), p.227
5. Biographical details on Yeh Ch'i are given in Kuang-hsi Sheng Cheng-fu T'ung-chi Ch'u, Ku-chin Kuang-hsi Lu-kuei Jen-ming Chien (Kweilin, 1934), p.89.
6. Yeh was not a subordinate of T'ang Sheng-chih, but of Liu Hsing, another Hunan division commander. See Kuo-fang Pu Shih-cheng Chu, Pei-fa Chan-chih (Taipei, 1959), p.69. Yeh was accompanied on his visit to Kwangsi by Su Wei, the head of Chao Heng-t'i's political bureau. Hua-tzu Jih-pao, January 26th, 1926, no page. (I am indebted to

Notes to pp. 113-116

Dr. Jerome Ch'en for bringing this information to my attention.)

7. Yin Shih (pseud.), Li-Chiang Kuan-hsi yü Chung-kuo (The Chiang-Lee Relationship and China) (Hong Kong, 1954), p.13. 'Yin Shih' is a pseudonym of Ch'eng Ssu-yuan, Li Tsung-jen's closest friend and advisor. In 1965, Ch'eng returned to Peking with Li from exile in the United States.
8. KWCP, III No. 31 (August 15th 1926), biography of Chao Heng-t'i, no page.
9. Mao Ssu-ch'eng, Min-kuo Shih-wu-nien i-ch'ien chih Chiang Chie-shih Hsien-sheng, p.616; and Yin Shih, op. cit., p.14. The Kuo-wen Chou-pao published a rumour that Yeh Ch'i was in Wuchow to negotiate T'ang Sheng-chih's entry into the Kuomintang camp while the Wuchow Conference between Kuomintang and Kwangsi leaders was still in session. See KWCP, III, No.3 (January 24th 1926), ta-shih, p.1.
10. Mao Ssu-ch'eng, op. cit., p.616.
11. Literally "protect the frontiers and pacify the people".
12. TFPC, XXIII, No. 6 (March 25th, 1926), p.1; and KWCP, III No.11 (March 28th 1926), p.36, No. 12 (April 4th, 1926), p.31.
13. KWCP, III, No. 14 (April 18th, 1926), p.29.

Wu's main stronghold was at Wuchang; he was Hunan's most powerful neighbour, and his neutrality was essential if T'ang were to gain any hold over Hunan. See also NCH, May 1st, 1926, p.190.

14. TFTC, XXIII, No. 9 (May 10th, 1926), p.141; and KWCP, III, No.4 (April 18th, 1926), p.29.

Pai Ch'ung-hsi and Ch'en Ming-shu were chosen for this mission to ascertain T'ang's real loyalty on the basis of their common Paoting background. There were graduates of Paoting scattered through the armies of China's warlords; those, such as the Kwangsi leaders, who attached themselves to the Kuomintang played a role in bringing over their school-mates. See Ministry of National Defense, Wei-ta ti Chiang Chu-hsi (Shanghai, 1946), p.64.

15. There are no natural defensive positions in the Hsiang Valley from Hengyang northwards; whoever is on the offensive can usually count on a clean sweep through the valley.

16. Li Tsung-jen Battle Collection, Part II, Chapter 1, Section 3 (Yuan-t'ang Ting-Hsiang), no page.

17. Ch'en Pao, May 15th, 1926, in Hatano, op. cit., May 1926, p.207.

18. The enmity between T'ang Sheng-chih and other

Hunanese generals was rooted in the struggles for control of Hunan over the past decade. Hunanese leaders of this period were well known for their inability to co-operate with each other. While other fellow-provincials clung together, the Hunanese were at each others' throats.

19. Hua-tzu Jih-pao, February 3rd, 1926, no page. (See Note 6).

20. Yin-Shih, op.cit., p.14.

21. NCH, January 30th, 1926, p.186.

22. Yi Shih Pao, May 22nd 1926 in Hatano, op.cit., May 1926, pp.300-302; and Ch'en Pao, May 21st, 1926, ibid, pp.288-9.

23. KWCP, III, No.17, (May 9th, 1926), p.26; and No. 18 (May 16th), pp.31-2. The threat to Kwangsi was sufficient to have impelled Kwangsi troops to move even without sanction from Canton, and they appear to have been moving into Hunan before the official orders from Canton arrived. See Lj Tsung-jen Autobiography, Chapter 15, p.2; and Yi Shih Pao, May 7th, in Hatano, op.cit; May 1926. p.96.

24. Tang Leang-li, op.cit., p.241.

25. Wu Tien-wei, "Chiang Kai-shek's March Twentieth Coup D'Etat of 1926", Journal of Asian Studies, XXVII (1968), p.590.

Notes to pp. 120-121

26. Louis Fischer, The Soviets in World Affairs, (London, 1930), p.648.
27. Mao Ssu-ch'eng, op.cit., p.665.
28. Li Chi-shen's concern to see the Northern Expedition started was based in part on his desire to see the bulk of the Kuomintang forces presently in Kwangtung out of the province, for when they had departed, his own position in Kwangtung would be much strengthened. Li was then commander of the most powerful of the Kuomintang armies, the 4th; he was prepared to help the Expedition on its way by contributing part of his army, provided that he could retain the rest in Kwangtung, to establish his control there. See Fischer, op.cit., p.656.
29. Mao Ssu-ch'eng, op.cit., p.668 and KWCP, III, No. 19 (May 23rd, 1926), p.30.
30. KMWH, XII, p.72.
31. Mao Ssu-ch'eng, op.cit., p.672.
32. TFTC, XXIII, No. 15 (August 10th 1926), p.28. The 7th Army (Kwangsi), with 30,000 men was the largest in the National Revolutionary Army, but it mobilised only half its men for the Northern Expedition. See Tang Leang-li, op.cit., p.252.
33. Alice T. Hobart, Within the Walls of Nanking,

Notes to pp.121-123

(London, 1928), p.58; and NCH, July 10th 1926, p.60 and July 31st, p.200.

34. Mao Ssu-ch'eng, op.cit., p.673.

35. Wilbur and How, Documents on Communism, Nationalism and Soviet Advisors in China, 1918-1927. p.411.

36. Ibid, p.368; and Ts'ao Chu-jen, Chiang Pai-li P'ing-chuan, pp.23-4.

37. TFTC, XXIII, No.22 (November 25th, 1926), p.1.

38. Sun, who controlled five provinces, of great economic and strategic importance, could not have been induced to change his flag by fear of military annihilation, as were many of the petty warlords who joined the Kuomintang at this time; militarily, he was stronger than the Kuomintang, and the Kuomintang was unable to offer him sufficient non-military incentives to bring about a voluntary switch.

39. Feng's forces had been holding Wu P'ei-fu's forces at the Nankou Pass outside Peking since April, after Wu had ousted Feng from Peking. The stubborn defense of Nankou is one of the most famous military exploits of the Republican period; it was incidently a great help to the Kuomintang, for it kept Wu tied up, giving the Kuomintang

Notes to pp. 123-128

time to make its own advance from the south against Wu's stronghold in Wuhan. See Sheridan, Chinese Warlord, pp.190-3.

40. KMWH, XII, pp.91-5 contains details of the T'ang/Li plan, and Chiang Kai-shek's plan. See also Wu Hsiang-hsiang, op.cit., p.16.

41. Wilbur and How, op.cit., p.393.

42. Chiang Tsung-t'ung Yen-lun Hui-pien Pien-chi Wei-yuan-hui, Chiang Tsung-t'ung Yen-lun Hui-pien (Taipei, 1956), VIII, p.229 ff.

43. Hollington Tong, Chiang Kai-shek, Soldier and Statesman (Shanghai 1937) I, p.108.

44. Kuo Mo-jo, Pei-fa T'u-tz'u (Shanghai, 1947), p.39

45. The first arrivals at Wuchang were a detachment of cooks from the 4th Army, who had become detached from their main force, and arrived at Wuchang before the gates were closed, well in advance of any regular troops. Li Tsung-jen Autobiography, Chapter 19, p.6.

45. NCH, September 11th, 1926. p.485.

46. KMWH, XII, p.129

47. Wilbur and How, op.cit., p418.

Teruni was chief Soviet advisor to the General Political Department of the National Revolutionary Army.

48. H.O. Chapman, The Chinese Revolution 1926-7

(London, 1928), p.10.

49. M.N. Roy, Revolution and Counter-Revolution in China (Calcutta 1946), p.403.

50. Kuo Mo-jo, op.cit., p.141.

51. NCH, September 11th, 1926. p.485.

52. Patrick Cavendish, Some Characteristics of the K.M.T. during the Northern Expedition and a survey of some K.M.T. policies of 1928-29; unpublished paper for the Working Group on China and the World, Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1965.

53. Yi Shih Pao, August 5th, in Hatano, op.cit., August, 1926, p.57; see also TFTC, XXIII, No. 20 (October 25th, 1926), p.131

54. Huang Shao-hsiung, op.cit., p.127; and Mao Ssu-ch'eng, op.cit., p.672, p.711.

55. Ch'en Pao, August 4th, in Hatano, op.cit., August 1926, p.49; and NCH, August 14th, 1926, p.295.

56. Chang Ch'i-yun["], Tang-shih Kai-yao (Taipei, 1951-2), II, p.526.

57. Mao Ssu-ch'eng, op.cit., p.765.

58. Sun Ch'uan-fang, with his fleet of gunboats, was at great advantage in any operations near the Yangtze; for this reason, after the fall of ~~K~~ Jiukiang in November, the Kuomintang did not press their attack into Anhwei. See Yi Shih Pao, in Hatano, op.cit., November, 1926, p.200.

Notes to pp. 132-138

59. Chang Tzu-sheng, "Kuo-min Ko-ming-chün Pei-fa Chan-cheng chih Ching-kuo", TFTC, XXV, No. 15 (August 10th, 1928), p.27.
60. Mao Ssu-ch'eng, op.cit., p.816.
61. ibid., p.866.
62. TFTC, XXIII, No. 24 (December 25th 1926), p.145.
63. Li Tsung-jen Battle Collection, Part 2, Chapter 3, Section 1 (Tean chih I), no page.
64. Mao Ssu-ch'eng, op.cit., p.988.
65. Wilbur and How, op.cit., p.428; and Mao Ssu-ch'eng, op.cit., p.900: p,980.
66. Ch'en Pao, November 23rd, in Hatano, op.cit., November, 1926, p.310.
67. The number of Kuomintang troops increased from 100,000 in July 1926, to 260,000 in December. See Wilbur and How, op.cit., pp.381-2. This figure does not include the forces of Feng Yu["]-hsiang, which were now allied to the Kuomintang.
68. Political work was most actively pursued in the 2nd, 4th and 6th Armies; the 1st. Army lost its political commissar, Chou En-lai, after the Chung-Shan Incident in March, 1926, and its political work never recovered. See Hu Hua, ed. Chung-kuo Hsin-min-chu chu-i Ko-ming Shih (Peking 1950), p.78.
69. KWCP, IV, No.34 (September 4th, 1927) ta-shih, p.1.

Notes to pp. 138-142

70. George Sokolsky, "The Kuomintang", in China Year Book, 1928 (Tientsin, 1928), p.1350.
71. See Chang Tzu-sheng, op.cit., TFTC, XXV, No.16 (August 24th, 1928), p.185. According to KMWH, XIV, p.446, Pai Pao-shan was then commander of the 5th Division of the 4th Front Army in Sun Ch'uan-fang's forces, though another source states that his unit had been disbanded after the first Chekiang offensive at the end of 1926. See T'ao Chu["]-yin, Wu P'ei-fu Chiang-chun Chuan (Shanghai, 1941) p.169.
72. Sun had formed an alliance with the northern warlords Chang Tso-lin and Chang Tsung-ch'ang, and had entrusted the defence of Shanghai and Nanking to them, while he concentrated on securing his own position in north Kiangsu.
73. Yi Shih Pao, March 19th, 1927, in Hatano, op.cit., March 1927, p.260-1.
74. NCH, March 26th, 1927, p.488; April 2nd. p.7.
75. Huang Shao-hsiung, op.cit., p.125.
76. ibid, p.140; and Li Tsung-ssu-ling Tsui-chin Yen-chiang Chi, p.32.
77. FF.Liu, an associate of the Kwangsi Clique, states that "Li and Pai shared a soldier's suspicion for the motives of the Communist Internation^a in China", but does not elaborate on

Notes to pp. 143-145

the nature of this suspicion. F.F. Liu,
A Military History of Modern China, (Princeton 1956),
 p.47.

78. Harold Isaacs, The Tragedy of the Chinese
 Revolution (New York, 1966, 2nd. Revised Edition)
 p.144.

79. Arthur Ransome, The Chinese Puzzle,
 (London 1927) p.112.

80. NCH, April 23rd, 1927. p.142.

81. Chiang Yung-ching, Pao-lo-t'ing yu Wu-han
 Cheng-ch'uan (Taipei, 1963), p.158.

82. Ch'en Pao, March 29th, in Hatano, op.cit.,
 March 1927, p.376.

83. Isaacs, op.cit., p.173.

84. Chang Kuo-p'ing, Pai Ch'ung-hsi Chiang-chun
 Chuan, p.21.

85. Ibid, p.23; Agnes Smedley quotes the same
 story in The Great Road, p.191, but refers only to
 "a Kwangsi unit", not to Pai in person.

86. Isaacs, op.cit., p.146; and F.F. Liu, op.cit.,
 p.47; see also Li Tsung-ssu-ling Tsui-chin Yen-chiang
 Chi, p.42.

87. Huang Shao-hsiung, op.cit., p.182. Huang,
 the titular political chief of the 7th Army,
 directed the purge in the 7th Army himself.

88. NCH, April 30th, 1927. p.159.

Notes to pp. 145-147

89. Kwangsi troops were sent into Kwangtung to help Li Chi-shen carry out his anti-communist activities in April. 6,000 were sent to Canton, and others into the North River area, where communist-led peasants put up a determined resistance. See NCH, May 7th, 1927, p.236; and Ch'en Pao, May 9th, in Hatano, op.cit., May, 1927. p. 109.
90. NCH, May 21st, 1927, p.326. See Chapter 5 for full details of the communist movement in Kwangsi.
91. There were very few Kwangsi natives holding influential position in the Kuomintang. The Kwangsi Clique appear to have had no contact with Kan Nai-kuang, the only important practising politician from Kwangsi. Ma Chün-wu, who had been a close colleague of Sun Yat-sen, was later close to the Kwangsi Clique, but at this time was out of politics.
92. Chapman, op.cit., p.232; and Isaacs, op.cit. p.180-1.
93. Nanking's strength was considerably below Wuhan's in military terms; it commanded about 35,000 troops to Wuhan's 65,000. See Fischer, op.cit., p.668.
94. KWCP, IV, No. 16 (May 1st, 1927), jih-chi.

Ch'eng Ch'ien had switched his allegiance from Chiang Kai-shek to Wuhan, after his army was allowed to take the blame, unfairly as he felt, for the Nanking Incident.

95. KWCP, IV, No. 20 (May 29th 1927), ta-shih, p.3.

96. Ibid.

97. The spirit of this, the finest Kuomintang army, was broken by the battering it received, and by the immediate ceding of the territory it had won to Feng Yu-hsiang. It was withdrawn to the Yangtze, its officers and men deeply disillusioned, and wanting only to return home to Kwangtung. See Ts'ai T'ing-k'ai Tzu-chuan, pp.212-4.

Ts'ai was a division commander in the 11th Army at this time, formerly part of the 4th Army.

98. Sheridan, Chinese Warlord, pp.228-232.

99. NCH, July 20th 1927, p.178; and Huang Pao July 7th, in Hatano, op.cit., July 1927, p.85.

100. KWCP, IV, No. 32 (August 21st, 1927), jih-chi, and No. 49 (December 18th), ta-shih, p.1. See also Anatole Kotenev, New Lamps for Old, (Shanghai, 1931), p. 281. Feng Yu-hsiang states that Chiang's execution of Wang T'ien-p'ei had a profound effect on the attitude of Li Tsung-jen and Pai Chung-hsi to Chiang; they were appalled by his arbitrary action and came to mistrust him, and to refuse to

Notes to pp. 151-154

obey his orders. See Feng Yu-hsiang, Feng Yu-hsiang Hui-i Lu (Shanghai, 1949), p.5.

101. See "Huang Shao-hsiung Shu Yueh-pien Ching-kuo", in "Liang-tu Kuang-chou Shih-pien yü Chung-yang Chih-Chien Ta-hui", p.8, KWCP, IV, No. 49 (December 18th, 1927).

102. The 4th had in fact been split into three armies, the 4th, 20th and 11th; all three armies were under the control of Chang Fa-k'uei.

103. NCH, August 20th 1927, p.311.

104. Ch'en Pao, August 17th, in Hatano, op.cit., August, 1927, p.226. Li Chi-shen was so anxious to avoid a clash that he sent a special representative to Chang Fa-k'uei in Kiukang, asking him to return home rather than fight. See Ch'en Kung-po Chou Fö-hai Hui-i-lu Ho-pien (Hong Kong, 1967), p.80.

105. Chiang-shang-ch'ing (pseud.), Cheng-Hai Pi-wen (Hong Kong, 1966), p.114.

106. Chiang Yung-ching, op.cit., pp.427-8; and TFTC, XXIV, No. 13 (July 10th, 1927), p.108.

107. On August 8th, Li Tsung-jen's name appeared at the head of a list prominent Nanking figures, who sent a telegram to Wuhan calling for a settlement. Tang Leang-li, op.cit., p.290.

108. NCH, August 13th, 1927. p.266.

109. Ch'en Pao, August 24th, in Hatano, op.cit.,

Notes to pp. 154-158

August 1927, p.215.

110. Chiang-shang-ch'ing (pseud.) op.cit., p.115.

111. Lei Hsiao-ts'en, San-shih-nien Tung-luan Chung-kuo (Hong Kong, 1955), p.89.

112. Chapman, op.cit., p.239.

113. TFTC, XXIV, No.20 (October 25th 1927) p.107.

114. Gustav Amann, Chiang Kai-shek und die Regierung der Kuomintang in China (Berlin 1936) p.36.

115. See Chiang Yung-ching, op.cit., pp.439-440; and Tang Leang-li, op.cit., pp.294-6.

116. Chang Ching-chiang, Hu Han-min, Wu Chih-hui, Li Shih-tseng, Ts'ai Yüan-p'ei all left Nanking with Chiang.

117. KMWH, XVI, p.818; and TFTC, XXIV, No. 20 (October 25th, 1927), p. 108.

118. Huang Pao, August 18th in Hatano, op.cit., August 1927, p.249.

119. NCH, September 3rd, 1927, p.389; and KMWH, XVI, p.843. The 'prisoners' had been disarmed by troops of the 1st and 7th, to prevent their defection.

120. TFTC, XXIV, No. 23 (December 10th 1927) p.136

121. NCH, September 3rd, 1927. p.395.

122. Tsou Lu, Hui-ku Lu, p. 193; and Lei Hsiao-ts'en, op. cit., p.76. The Western Hills faction had split with the rest of the Kuomintang over the

Notes to pp. 158-162

question of communist influence on the Kuomintang, which they feared.

123. TFTC, XXIV, No. 21 (November 10th 1927) p.128.

124. Amann, op.cit., p. 45; Tsou Lu, op.cit., pp.200-2; and KWCP, IV, No. 37 (September 25th 1927) ta-shih, p.1.

125. KMWH, XVI, p. 2846.

126. Tsou Lu, op.cit., p. 207.

127. Tang Leang-li, op.cit., p. 303.

128. Chang P'u-ch'uan (Chang Chi), Chang P'u-ch'uan Hsien-sheng Ch'üan-chi (Taipei, 1952), p. 98.

129. Amann, op.cit., p.45.

130. Ikeda Iriye, After Imperialism, pp. 148-158.

131. Ch'en Pao, August 24th, in Hatano, op.cit., August, 1927, p. 328.

132. NCH, September 3rd, 1927, p. 389.

133. Ibid, November 26th, p. 358.

134. Ch'en Pao, August 27th, in Hatano, op.cit., August 1927, p. 377.

135. "T'ang Sheng-chih yü ko fang-mien chih kuan-hsi", pp. 2-4, in KWCP, IV, No. 42 (October 30th 1927).

136. KWCP, IV, No. 38 (October 2nd, 1927), ta-shih,p.2.

137. Pai-Shan (pseud.), "Ts'ung Fan-Kung tao Tung-cheng ti T'ang Sheng-chih", in Hsien-tai Shih-liao, I, p. 37.

Notes to pp. 162-166

138. TFTC, XXIV, No. 24 (December 25th 1927) p.121.
139. KMWH, XVII p. 3028; and Ch'en Pao, November 19th, in Hatano, op.cit., November 1927, p. 259, and Huang Pao, November 22nd, ibid, p. 297.
140. The first section to arrive in Kwangtung was communist, led by Ho Lung and Yeh T'ing; it moved into the Swatow region. The second section, under Huang Ch'i-hsiang, Chang Fa-k'uei's second-in-command, who appeared to have no intention of attacking the communist section, made for Canton.
141. Kwangsi troops entered Kwangtung en route for Hunan, where they were to back up a possible Nanking attack on Wuhan with a move from the south.
142. Chang joined his men in Canton, having come south from the Yangtze by sea. Ch'en Kung-po Chou Fu-hai Hui-i Lu, p.80.
143. NCH, November 26th, 1927, p. 358.
144. Huang Shao-hsiung, op.cit., p. 181; and NCH, December 10th, p. 440.
145. Huang's arrival in Canton was in contravention of an agreement which Li Chi-shen had apparently reached with Wang Ching-wei, and gave fuel to the rumours that the Kwangsi leaders were planning a coup against Wang and Chang Fa-k'uei. See Tang

Notes to pp. 166-169

Leang-li, op.cit., p. 311; and NCH, December 3rd 1927, p. 397.

146. Even Huang Shao-hsiung, though on the run, was pleased with the publicity, since it transformed him from a secondary figure to a person "famous throughout the land". See Huang Shao-hsiung, op.cit., p. 194.

147. Wang denied knowledge of the coup, but his denials were not taken seriously. Rumours were put about, fostered by Li Chi-shen, that the coup was communist-inspired, which further blackened Wang's name. Ch'en Pao, November 23rd, in Hatano, op.cit., November 1927, p. 307. Hu Han-min, a leading figure on the Right of the Kuomintang, refused to see Wang. TFTC, XXV, No. 2 (January 25th, 1928), p. 146.

148. KMWH, XVII, p. 2868; and Ch'en Pao, December 7th, in Hatano, op.cit., December 1927, p.95.

149. NCH, December 24th, p.524.

150. KWCP, IV, No. 48 (December 11th 1927), ta-shih, p.1.

151. Yi Shih Pao, November 19th, in Hatano, op.cit., November 1927, p. 261.

152. KWCP, IV, No. 47 (December 4th 1927), ta-shih, p.7.

Notes to pp. 169-174

153. Tsou Lu, op.cit., p. 209; and Ch'en Pao, December 7th, in Hatano, op.cit., December 1927, p.81.
154. Chiang Kai-shek, address to Central Supervisory Committee, December 1927; in KMWH, XVI, pp.2875-9.
155. It also meant the exile of Wang Ching-wei, who was completely discredited by his association with events in Canton.
156. The fighting to secure Kwangtung was marked by bitter fighting between Kwangsi troops, and the troops of Chang Fa-k'uei, the same troops that the 7th Army had refused to fight in July. Huang Shao-hsiung made a show of regret, calling the fighting "tragic, painful and shameful". Huang Shao-hsiung, op.cit., p. 196.
157. NCH, January 7th, 1928, p.1.
158. Yi Shih Pao, December 30th 1927, in Hatano, op.cit., January 1928, p.1.
159. Amann, op.cit., p.47.
160. John K. Fairbank, introduction to Robert C. North, Kuomintang and Chinese Communist Elites, (Stanford, 1952), p.vii.
161. Tsou Lu, op.cit., p. 208.
162. NCH, December 10th, 1927, p.437.
163. Yin Shih (pseud.), Li-Chiang Kuan-hsi yü Chung-kuo, p.35.

Notes to pp. 174-178

164. Amann, op.cit., p.85.
165. Yi Shih Pao, January 7th, 1928, in Hatano, op.cit., January, 1928, pp.50-1.
166. TFTC, XXV, No. 4 (February 25th 1928) p.135.
167. KWCP, V, No. 4 (February 5th 1928), ta-shih, p.6.
168. Yi Shih Pao, February 22nd, in Hatano, op.cit., p.366.
169. Ch'en Pao, February 13th, ibid, p.175; and Huang Pao, February 18th, ibid, p.244.
170. KWCP, V. No. 12 (April 1st 1928), 'ta-shih, ^{Section} pp.1-2; and Ch'en Pao, March 4th, in Hatano, op.cit., March 1928, p.59; March 14th, ibid, p.185; March 20th, ibid, p.266.
171. Four Group Armies had been set up by the 4th Plenum, which met in February 1928; they corresponded to the forces of Nanking, Feng Yü-hsiang, Yen Hsi-shan and the Kwangsi Clique.
172. TFTC, XXV, No. 14 (July 25th 1928), p.122.
173. After Peking fell, attempts were made to wind up the councils. The 5th Plenum, meeting in July 1928, decided to close them by the end of 1928, but at the end of the year, the date was put back to March 1929, to coincide with the opening of the 3rd. Congress.
174. Li advocated a form of federalist government,

Notes to pp. 178-182

the "cooperation of separate governments"

(Fen-chih ho-tso), See KWCP, V, No. 3 (January 15th 1928), ta-shih, p.6.

175. Chang Chih-pen was a minor Kuomintang politician, who had been dismissed from the Party in 1926 because of his association with the Western Hills faction.

176. NCH, December 24th, 1927, p. 523; and February 18th, 1928, p. 248.

177. Ch'en Pao, February 1st, in Hatano, op.cit., February, 1928, p.7.

178. NCH, March 17th, 1928, p.425.

179. Ibid, May 19th, 1928, p.264; and May 26th, p.314, p.324.

180. The difference in attitude to foreigners also reflected, to some extent, differences in character within the Clique. Li Tsung-jen and Pai were markedly more hostile towards foreigners than were Li Chi-shen and Huang Shao-hsiung.

181. Kuo-li Wu-han Ta-hsüeh, Kuo-li Wu-han Ta-hsüeh I-lan (Hankow, 1936), pp.4-6.

182. KMWH, XIX, p.3500. On their way north, Pai's troops helped to put down the rebellion of Fan Chung-hsiu against Feng Yü-hsiang. KWCP, V, No. 20 (May 27th 1928), ta-shih, p.2.

183. Ch'en Pao, May 29th, in Hatano, op.cit.,

Notes to pp. 182-

May 1929, p.401. Ch'eng was released in November 1928. See KWCP, V, No. 47 (December 2nd, 1928), jih-chi.

184. The 1st. Group Army had been held up in Shangtung by the Chinan Incident, and Feng Yü-hsiang's 2nd. Group Army, perhaps in deference to the wishes of the Diplomatic corps, did not enter Peking.

185. Manchester Guardian, July 7th, 1928. p.16.

Notes to pp. 183-188

1. Huang Shao-hsiung, Wu-shih Hui-i, pp.126-7.
2. Ibid, pp.133-4.
3. Ibid, p.130.
4. In financial affairs, as in other fields, the administration was bedevilled by the scarcity of honest, modern-minded men. The first director of finance in the new administration resigned because Huang refused to back his scheme to reinstate Confucian rites. Ibid, p.131.
5. KMWH, XX, p.3886.
6. Huang Shao-hsiung, op.cit., p.188.
7. NCH, December 4th 1926, p.444.
8. Reports of major bandit activity occur in NCH, February 11th, 1928, p.217, and October 20th 1928, p.190; also in BSME, No. 61 (January, 1927), p.52; No. 69 (September, 1927), p.569; No. 78 (June, 1928), p.370.
9. Wu had formed an alliance with T'ang Chi-yao, the Yunnan warlord, and with Liu Chen-huan, a displaced Kwangsi general, to launch this diversionary attack. Ch'en Pao, September 29th, in Hatano Ken'ichi, Gendai Shina no kiroku, September 1926, pp.362-5.
10. Something akin to a fellow-provincial relationship existed between natives of Yunnan and Szechwan when they met each other outside their

Notes to pp. 188-190

own provinces, and this was part of the reason why Fan gave aid to Chu. See Kung Ch'u,

Wo yü Hung-chün, (Hong Kong, 1954), pp.89-91.

See also Agnes Smedley, The Great Road, p.213.

11. The first figure, 15,000, is given in a report on Kwangsi in 1928. See Kuang Hsiao-an, "Chien-she-hua ti Kuang-hsi, pt.1," in KWCP, V, No. 43 (November 4th, 1928), p.3. The second figure is for a slightly earlier date, and appears in CYB, 1928, p.1296. The second figure is probably more realistic than the first.

12. See Huang Shao-hsiung, op.cit., p.127; and Kuang-hsi Chien-she Chi-p'ing (1935, n.p.), p.57.

13. Kuang Hsiao-an, op.cit., p.1.

14. Ibid, p.8.

15. Chung-kuo Kuo-min-tang Kuang-hsi Kuo-min Ko-ming-chün T'e-pie Tang-pu Ch'ou-pan Hsüan-ch'uan-pu, Kuang-hsi Ko-ming-chün Pan-yueh K'an, No.2 (July, 1926), p.67.

16. Huang Shao-hsiung, op.cit., p.149.

17. Ibid.

18. Huang Hsü-ch'u, "Pa-kuei I-wang Lu, pt.26", Ch'un-Ch'iu, No. 178, (December 1st, 1964), p.15.

19. League of Nations, Report of the First Opium Conference, (Geneva, 1926), Reports and Annexes, p.100

Notes to pp. 190-193

The figures quoted in the report are given in terms of dollars (unspecified); Chinese sources used to tend to be vague about the currency in terms of which figures are quoted; most figures are therefore only rough guides, rather than exact figures. Currencies quoted are those listed in individual sources.

20. NCH, August 16th 1925, p.252.

21. Huang Hsü-ch'u, loc.cit.

22. Mao Ssu-ch'eng, Min-kuo shih-wu-nien i-ch'ien chih Chiang Chie-shih Hsien-sheng, p.922.

23. NCH, December 1st 1928, p.350.

24. Kuang-hsi Chien-she Chi-p'ing, p.61; and Chiang-Shang-Ch'ing (pseud.) Cheng-hai Pi-wen, p.10.

25. KWCF, VI, No.2 (January 13th 1929), jih-chi.

26. Kuang-hsi chün-ch'u cheng-chih-pu, Kuang-hsi Ko-ming Hui-i-lu (Nanning 1959), p.65. Hereafter cited as KHKMHIL. One of those arrested, in north-west Kwangsi, was a retired magistrate, who was however provided with all the paraphernalia of opium smokers while in gaol.

27. Ch'ien Chia-chü, Han Te-chang, Wu Pan-nung, Kuang-hsi Sheng Ching-chi Kai-k'uang, p.171.

28. NCH, May 16th 1925, p.276.

29. BSME, No. 52 (April 1925), p.249.

30. Huang Shao-hsiung, op.cit., p.132. Ch'ien Chia-chü

Rom.

Notes to pp.193-196

op.cit., p.171.

31. Huang Shao-hsiung, op.cit., p.133.

32. Ch'ien Chia-chü, op.cit., p.172.

33. Ibid, p.226.

34. See the Maritime Customs figures for 1911, in CYB, 1916, pp.132-3, and for 1928, in CYB, 1929/30, pp.135-6.

35. Ch'ien Chia-chü, op.cit., p.226.

36. George Sokolsky, China (Shanghai 1920), p.11.

Mr. Sokolsky does not make it clear what kind of silkworms he is referring to, or whether silkworms normally have intestines.

37. NCH, February 23rd, 1929, p.39.

38. T.Z. Tyau, Two Years of Nationalist China, (Shanghai, 1930), p.188.

39. Exports of minerals and of wood oil were favourably effected by the political upheavals in Hunan during 1927 and 1928; exports which normally went north through Hunan to Wuhan were temporarily diverted through Wuchow. Ch'ien Chia-chü, op.cit. p.9.

40. Huang Shao-hsiung, op.cit., p.154.

41. Kuang Hsiao-an, op.cit., p.2.

42. NCH, March 17th 1928. p.429.

43. Kuang Hsiao-an, "Chien-she-hua ti Kuang-hsi, pt.2", KWCP, VI, No. 44 (November 11th, 1928) p.4.

44. NCH, June 25th, 1927, p.429.

Notes to pp. 196-201

45. Dieter Schulze, Das Politisch-geographische Kräfteverhältnis zwischen den drei chinesischen Provinzen (Heidelberg, 1940), p.137.
46. Kuang Hsiao-an, "Chien-she-hua ti Kuang-hsi, pt.3" KWCP, VI, No.45 (November 18th 1928) p.5.
47. Wang Wen-yuan, Les Relations entre l'Indochine française et la Chine (Paris, 1937), pp.79-81.
48. Huang Shao-hsiung, op.cit., p.188; and Ch'en Pao, May 9th 1927, in Hatano, op.cit., May, 1937, p.109.
49. Huang Shao-hsiung, loc.cit.
50. NCH, November 19th, 1927, p.310.
51. Huang Shao-hsiung, op.cit., pp.167-9.
52. Huang Hsü-ch'u, "Pa-kuei I-wang Lu, pt.27", Ch'un-Ch'iu, No. 179 (December 16th, 1964), p.16.
53. ^{China Weekly} Millard's Review, December 6th, 1924. p.28.
- There were student associations at Wuchow and Kweilin. See Yang Chia-ming, Min-kuo Shih-wu-nien Hsüeh-sheng Yün-tung (Shanghai, 1927) p.96.
54. NCH, September 26th, 1925, p.92.
55. Shih Hua (pseud.) "Kuang-hsi Kung-ch'an-tang chih Kuo-ch'ü chi Hsien-tsai," Hsien-tai Shih-liao, II, pp.316-8.
56. KHKMHIL, p.150.
57. BSME, No. 48 (December, 1925), p.775; and NCH, January 30th, 1926, p.186.
58. Huang Shao-hsiung, op.cit., p.169. Communist or

Notes to pp. 201-205

Left-wing members of the Executive Committee were: Ch'en Li-ya, Ch'en Hsien-wu, Huang Chia-chih, Liang Liu-tu, and Ch'en Mien-shu. Huang Shao-hsiung and T'an Ch'ao were on the Right. The political identity of the last two members, Liu Pai-k'uei and Chou Hsi-huan, is uncertain.

59. NCH, January 23rd, 1926. p.144.

60. Huang Hs'u-chu, "Pa-kuei I-wang Lu, pt.25", Ch'un-Ch'iu, No. 177 (November 16th, 1964), p.15.

61. NCH, January 15th, 1927, p.62.

62. Huang Shao-hsiung, op.cit., pp.135-6.

63. NCH, January 2nd, 1926, p.10. The gunboat Cicada was sent up to Wuchow from Canton to evacuate them.

64. BSME, No. 56 (August, 1926), p.511.

65. South China Morning Post, April 12th, 1926, p.46, p.49.

66. Rex Ray, Cowboy Missionary in Kwangsi, pp.30-1.

67. NCH, April 17th, 1926, p.105.

68. Ibid, June 26th, 1926, p.579; July 24th, p.153; July 31st, p.196; and August 21st, p.374.

69. Ibid, May 1st, 1926, p.198.

70. Shih Hua, op.cit., p.318. Huang Jih-k'uei became the leading communist figure in Kwangsi. Ch'en Mien-shu should not be confused with the Cantonese general Ch'en Ming-shu (Chen-ju).

Notes to pp. 205-207

71. KHKMHIL, p.151.
72. The Guide Weekly, IV, No. 165 (August 7th, 1926), p.1651.
73. Huang Hs^u-ch'u, "Pa-kuei I-wang Lu, pt.27", Ch'un-Ch'iu, No. 179 (December 16th, 1964) p.17.
74. In one incident, Huang refused to halt the press-ganging of coolies to act as porters for the army. See Huang Shao-hsiung, op.cit., p.171. In another, the Police in Wuchow were permitted to open fire on demonstrating workers. See Li Yün-han, Ts'ung Jung-kung Tao Ch'ing-tang, (Taipei, 1966). p. 659.
75. In Hunan, Hupei and Kiangsi, the first provinces to fall to the Kuomintang forces, peasants and workers were organised on a very wide-scale, largely with the help of political workers who followed the advance of the Kuomintang troops. Many of these political workers were communists, and it was in these provinces, and in Kwangtung, that the Kuomintang subsequently encountered the fiercest left-wing and communist opposition.
76. Jen-min Ch'u-pan She, ed., Ti-i-tz'u Kuo-nei Ko-ming Chan-cheng Shih-ch'i ti Nung-min Yün-tung (Peking 1953), p.436.
77. Huang Shao-hsiung, op.cit., p.172.
78. Ibid, p.173. The comfort corps was known as

Notes to pp. 207-209

a wei-lao-tui.

79. Ibid, p.177.

80. In KHKMHIL, a figure of 200 arrests for Nanning is given; see KHKMHIL, p. 158.

Anti-communist sources give much lower figures, 16 arrests for Nanning (see Li Yün-han, op.cit., p.660), and 20 for Wuchow (see NCH, May 21st, 1927, p.326.

81. See Li Yün-han, op.cit., p.660. The members of the Executive Committee were Liang Liu-tu and Huang Chih-chih. Lei Pei-t'ao, a member of the Kuomintang Supervisory Committee was also executed, and his brother, the head of the Kwangsi Education Bureau, Lei Pei-hung, left the province. See KHKMHIL, p.158, and Huang Shao-hsiung, op.cit., p,181.

82. NCH, November 19th, 1927, p.314.

83. Huang Shao-hsiung, op.cit., p.180.

84. Preparatory Committee for the Kwangsi-Chuang Autonomous Region, ed., Kuang-hsi Chuang-tsu Tzu-chih-ch'ü (Peking, 1958), p.43.

85. P'ang Tun-chih, Kuang-hsi She-hui T'e-chih (Hong Kong, 1950), p.20.

86. Herold J. Wiens, Han Chinese Expansion in South China, p.144.

87. Economic Geography of South China (Washington,

1962). Joint Publications Research Service, No. 14,954, p.227. This is a translation of Hua-nan Ti-chu Ching-chi Ti-li (Peking, 1959).

88. Compte Rendu, 1920 (Paris 1921), p.59.

89. Wei's family were probably sinicised Chuang. His parents died when he was quite young, and he sold their land and went travelling. In 1916, he returned to Tunglan and organised ^athe small band which supported the Hu-Kuo Movement. This band was amalgamated into a regular army unit, whose commander sent Wei to study at the Kweichow Military Academy. He graduated in 1919, and then travelled again, to Chungking and Canton. During this period, he became acquainted with Marxism-Leninism. In 1922, he returned to Tunglan, and in 1923 started organising the peasants there. See Chu Chung-yü, ed., Wei Pa-chün (Peking 1960), pp.9-12.

90. Kuang-hsi ^{Sheng} Cheng-fu T'ung-chi Ch'u, Ku-chin Kuang-hsi Lü-kuei Jen-ming Chien, p.43.

91. Chang Yu-i, ed., Chung-kuo Chin-tai Nung-yeh Shih Tzu-liao (Peking, 1957), II, p.275.

92. The Guide Weekly, IV, No. 165, (August 7th, 1926), p.1651.

93. KHKMHIL, p. 95.

94. Li Yün-han, op.cit., p.659.

Notes to pp. 212-216

95. Hsieh-Fu-min, "Chuang-tsu Jen-min Yu-hsiu ti Er-tzu Wei Pa-chün," Hung-chi P'iao-p'iao, V, p.55
96. Huang Shao-hsiung, op.cit., pp.171-2.
97. Shih Hua, op.cit., p.319.
98. KHKMHIL, p.151.
99. Huang Hsü-ch'u, "Pa-kuei I-wang Lu, pt.35" Ch'un-Ch'iu, No. 187 (April 16th, 1965), p.10.
100. Kung Ch'u, op.cit., p.165. Until April, 1927, Yü was head of the Peasant-Worker Bureau in the Kwangsi Provincial Government.
101. Ibid, p.168.
102. Ibid, p.171. See also KHKMHIL, p.121.
103. Yin Shih (pseud.) Li-Chiang Kuan-hsi yü Chung-kuo, p.44.
104. Kung Ch'u, op.cit., p.174; and KHKMHIL, p.9.
105. KHKMHIL, p.9, p.22.
106. Ibid, p.10; See also Kung Ch'u, op.cit., p.173.
107. Chang Yün-i, a Cantonese, had previously served under Chang Fa-k'uei in the 4th Army. Wei Pa-chün held the post of column commander, subordinate to Chang Yün-i.
108. KHKMHIL, p.12.
109. Ibid, p.138.
110. Ibid, p.127, pp.137-8. See also BSME, No.100, (April, 1930), p.240.
111. Huang Shao-hsiung, op.cit., p.138.

Notes to pp. 216-222

112. KHKMHIL, p.139.
113. Huang Hsü-ch'u, op.cit., p.10.
114. KHKMHIL, p.26, pp.36-9.
115. Kung Ch'u, op.cit., p.202. The landlords received help in the form of arms and ammunition from the Kwangsi authorities, with which to organise their own militia units.
116. Ibid, p.196.
117. Ibid, pp.198-9. Only Wei Pa-chün's troops were left to guard the Soviet Area.
118. Ibid, p.262.
119. Hsieh Fu-min, op.cit., p.61.
120. P'ang Tun-chih, Ch'ing-suan Kuei-hsi, (Canton, 1950), p.14.
121. Shih Hua, op.cit., p.322.
122. Kung Ch'u, op.cit., p.242. Kung, who served as chief of staff in the Red 7th Army, himself broke with the communists after several years in Kiangsi, and fled from Kiangsi. One of the few survivors of the Kwangsi Soviet was Chang Yün-i; Chang served as deputy commander of the new 4th Army during the Anti-Japanese War; from 1949 to 1958 he was governor of Kwangsi.
123. Shih Hua, loc.cit.
124. Chang Ch'i-yün, Chung-hua-min-kuo Shih-kang (Taipei, 1954), I, pp.284-301.

Notes to pp.222-224

125. Kuang Hsiao-an, "Chien-she-hua ti Kuang-hsi, pt.3", KWCP, VI, No. 45 (November 18th, 1928) p.5.
126. CYB, 1929/30, p.532. The well-known geologist and cartographer and military historian, Ting Wen-jiang, also came to the province in 1928, and conducted a partial geological survey, a prerequisite for the deveopment of Kwangsi's mining industry. See Ting Ku-tsung-pan Wen-chiang Shih-shih Nien Chou-nien Chi-nien K'an, in Chung-yang Yen-chiu-yuan Yuan-k'an, III (Taipei, 1956), p.72.
127. Kuang Hsiao-an, op.cit., p.2.
128. TFTC, XXVI, No. 3 (February 10th, 1928), p.137; and Huang Shao-hsiung, op.cit., p.160.
129. The highest water level recorded at Wuchow was 68 feet above the lowest; in consequence, all riverside buildings were built on pontoons. Naval Intelligence Division, China Proper III, p.244.
130. NCH, December 12th, 1924. p.443. China Weekly Review, January 3rd, 1925, p.140.
131. BSME, No. 85 (January, 1929), p.149.
132. Li Tsung-jen et.al., Kuang-hsi chih Chien-she, p.248.
133. Trois Mois au Kouangsi, p.123.
134. Other methods of preventing the spread of disease were tried. In 1928, during a cholera

Notes to pp. 224-228

epidemic at Nanning, a campaign was launched against germ-carrying vermin; three yüan an ounce was paid for dead flies, and a lesser amount for dead rats, on a scale varying according to the size of the rat. BSME, No. 68 (August, 1927), p.513.

135. Wuchow was also the native place of many of Huang's personal followers; he himself came from a neighbouring hsien.

136. NCH, November 26th, 1927, p.358; and July 14th, 1928, p.58.

137. *Ibid*, December 3rd, 1927. p.401.

138. CYB, 1929/30, pp.436/443.

139. Kuang Hsiao-an, "Chien-she-hua ti Kuang-hsi, pt.1," KWCP, VI, No. 43 (November 4th, 1928), p.5.

140. *Ibid*, pt.2, KWCP, VI, No. 44 (November 11th, 1928) p.2.

141. Ch'ien Chia-chü, et.al., *op.cit.*, p.4.

142. Kuang Hsiao-an, "Chien-she-hua ti Kuang-hsi, pt.1", KWCP, VI, No. 43 (November 4th, 1928), p.2.

143. Huang Shao-hsiung, *op.cit.*, p.156. Education was financed from a 10% surtax on the land tax; the surtax was first levied in 1926. Kuang Hsiao-an, *op.cit.*, pt.3. KWCP, VI, No. 45 (November 18th, 1928) p.2.

144. *Ibid*, p.4; and NCH, February 9th, 1929, p.232.

145. Huang Shao-hsiung, *op.cit.*, p.180.

Notes to pp. 228-239

146. KWCP, V, No. 35 (September 9th, 1928), jih-chi.
147. C.C. Chang, China Tung Oil and its Future, (Hong Kong, 1940), p.2.
148. Huang Shao-hsiung, op.cit., p.163.
149. Li and Huang were both Cantonese speakers, whereas Li Tsung-jen and Ch'ung-hsi spoke southern mandarin (kuan-hua), which was spoken in the Kweilin region.
150. Li was known in the foreign press as "Kwangtung's Mussolini". NCH, September 3rd, 1927, p.397.
151. Wilbur and How, Documents on Communism, Nationalism and Soviet Advisors, p.269.
152. NCH, March 27th, 1926, p.566.
153. Ibid, March 13th, 1926, p.468; March 20th, p.517 and March 27th, p.566. See also KWCP, III, No. 10 (March 21st, 1926), ^{Szech}ta-shih, p.1, and No. 12 (April 4th), ta-shih, p.2.
155. TFTC, XXIV, No. 4 (February 25th, 1927), p.111.
156. Notably Ch'en Chi-t'ang, who ousted the Kwangsi Clique from Kwangtung in 1929.
157. As his agent for deals with Hong Kong, Li used the services of Moshe 'Two-Gun' Cohen, an adventurer who had originally come to China as body-guard to Sun Yat-sen. 'Two-Gun's' speciality was deals in 'sewing-machines', or armaments, but

Notes to p. 239

while working for Li, he claims to have concentrated on industrial deals. See Maurice Cohen and Charles Drage, Two Gun Cohen (London, 1954), p.184.

Notes to pp. - 245

1. Ch'en Kung-po Chou Fu-hai Hui-i Lu Ho-pien (Hong Kong, 1967) pp.209-210.
2. Chang Ch'i-yün, Tang-shih Kai-yao, II, p.671.
3. KWCP, V, No.27 (July 15th, 1928), ta-shih, p.3.
4. TFTC, XXV, No. 17 (September 10th, 1928), p.126.
5. See James Sheridan, Chinese Warlord, p.243, for a detailed discussion of troop numbers. Estimates of troop numbers tended to be very vague, and ranged as high as 2,200,000. See TFTC, XXV, No.17, (September 10th 1928), p.125.
6. TCSSNCKCSS, II, p.473. It was widely believed that what China needed was a smaller, more efficient army, and that a decline in numbers would be compensated by a higher standard of training and efficiency. See also F.F. Lin, A Military History of Modern China, pp.71-2.
7. Soong's speech is quoted in Harley Farmsworth MacNair, China in Revolution, (Chicago, 1930), p.160. The National Government exercised no governmental control over these provinces either; this was demonstrated by the fact that when the Civil Government Conference (Min-cheng Hui-i) met in December 1928, only the five provinces of Chekiang, Kiangsu, Anhwei, Kiangsi and Fukien were represented. TFTC, XXVI, No.3 (February 10th, 1929), p.140.

Notes to pp. 246-247

8. T.V. Soong, "Ch'ueh-ting Chün-fei T'ung-i Ts'ai-cheng chi' T'i-an", KWCP, VI, No.6 (February 22nd, 1929), ta-shih, p.6.
9. See Sheridan, op.cit., p.248.
10. Donald Gillin, Warlord, pp.109-110.
11. Wuhan's financial difficulties were caused chiefly by the difficulties of financing the large number of troops in Hunan and Hupei. One of the reasons that the Wuhan leaders agreed to send troops on the continuation of the Northern Expedition to Peking was to relieve the pressure on limited resources by sending some troops out of the area. See Ch'en Pao, March 23rd, 1928, in Hatano Ken'ichi, Gendai Shihna no kiroku, March 1928, p.316; and NCH, May 19th, 1928, p.274.
12. Feng, Yen and Li all believed that Chiang Kai-shek was trying to strengthen himself at their expense, and treated his proposals, and those of Ho Ying-ch'in, Chiang's chief lieutenant, with great suspicion. See Li Tsung-jen, Li Tsung-ssu-ling Tsui-chin Yen-Chiang Chi, p.45; Feng Yü-hsiang, Feng Yü-hsiang Hui-i Lu, p.10, p.12; Ch'en Shao-hsiao, Chün-fa Pieh-chuan, (Hong Kong, 1966), p.23; and F.F. Liu, op.cit., p.73.
13. Chung-yang Chou-pao, No. 17 (October 1st, 1928) p.4.

Notes to pp. 247-248

14. Li was trying to get rid of units subordinate to Li Fu-lin, and units which had been closely identified with Chang Fa-k'uei. KWCP, V, No. 27, (July 15th, 1928), ta-shih, p.4.
15. In July and August, two Hunanese units, the 44th Army, commanded by Yeh Kai-hsin, and the 21st. Army, commanded by Hsiang Ch'eng-chieh, were forcibly disbanded. See TFTC, XXV, No. 18 (September 25th, 1928), p.125; and TCSSNCKCSS, II, p.450. Details of the reorganisation of units within the 4th Group Army are contained in Chung-yang Chou-pao, No. 25 (November 26th, 1928) p.6.
16. Chung-yang Chou-pao, No. 17 (October 1st, 1928), p.4; and No. 25 (November 26th), p.6.
17. Early in 1929, the 4th Group Army contained 230,000 men, and the 8th Route Army, as troops in Kwangtung and Kwangsi had been reorganised, 120,000. See Ho Ying-ch'in, "Ch'üan-kuo Chün-shu Ching-kuo," in KMWH, XXIV, p.24-5.
18. Chiang Kai-shek, "Kuan-yü kuo-chün Pien-ch'ien wei-yuan-hui chih Hsi-wang", in KMWH, XXIV, pp.3-15.
19. This unwillingness of the leading regional militarists to accept Chiang as the leader of the National Government rather than of a regional grouping had been apparent in summer of 1928, when

Notes to pp. 249-254

discussions on disbandment first took place. See above, Note 12.

20. KWCP, VI, No.4. (February 8th, 1929), ta-shih, pp.1-2.

21. T.V. Soong, "Ch'ueh-ting Chün-fei Er Shih-hsing T'ung-i Ts'ai-cheng Pan-fa T'i-an," in KMWH, XXIV, p.32.

22. Chang Ch'i-yün, op.cit., II, p.695.

23. F.F. Liu, op.cit., p.74.

a. Shun ?

24. Chun-t'ien Shih-pao, August 14th, 1928, in Hatano, op.cit., August, 1928, p.165. Other Right-wing leaders, such as Hu Han-min and Tsou Lu were abroad.

25. Tang Leang-li, The Inner History of the Chinese Revolution, p.344.

26. Other themes were the role of the Party, the question of mass movements, the drafting of a constitution, and the Tutelary Programme.

27. The Branch Council at Canton was first set up at the end of 1926, after the Kuomintang government had moved to Wuhan; the one at Peking was set up after the fall of the city in June 1928.

28. "Ti-wu-tz'u Chung-yang Chih-hsing Wei-yuan-hui Ch'üan-t'i Ta-hui chi, pt.2," in KWCP, V, No.33, (August 26th, 1928), p.6.

29. The whole Plenum was marked by such walk-outs.

Those who walked out always took the first train to

Notes to pp. 254-258

Shanghai, and Chiang Kai-shek spent a good part of the time that the Plenum was in session going back and forth between Nanking and Shanghai, trying to ensure a quorum from day to day.

30. KWCP, V, No. 33 (August 26th, 1928), ta-shih, p.6. At the end of December, the time-limit on the Councils was extended to March, 1929, to coincide with the opening of the 3rd Congress.

31. Ibid, ta-shih, p.1; and No. 34 (September 2nd) ta-shih, p.2.

32. Chennankuan is the pass ~~pass~~ between Kwangsi and Tongking, Shanhaikuan the pass between Hopei and Manchuria. Wen Shih (pseud.), "Ti-ch'i-chuñ ti Mo-lo yü Li-Pai ti Hsia-ch'ang," Ch'un-Ch'iu, No 12 (January 1st, 1958), p.3. Pai Ch'ung Hsi pointed out publicly that his Kwangsi troops had done better than the Taipings, who only got to Tientsin. See Hsien Yün (pseud.), Li, Pai shi tsen-yang T'ao-hui tao Kuang-hsi ti? pt.1," Ch'un-Ch'iu, No. 65 (March 16th, 1960), p.3.

33. Huang Hsü-ch'u, "Nanning ti-i-tz'u Wei-ch'eng-chan Ch'in-li-chi, pt.1," Ch'un-Ch'iu, No. 46 (June 1st, 1959), p.4. Rivalries occasionally arose between the leaders themselves, but only when they were in Kwangsi, as between Li Tsung-jen and Huang Shao-hsiung, in 1924, and between Li and

Notes to pp. 258-259

Pai Ch'ung-hsi in the early 1930's. Even then, these rivalries did not come out into the open, and never led to serious splits.

34. NCH, July 14th, 1928, p.84.

35. Sinkiang had been ruled since 1912 by Yang Tseng-hsin, who had kept Sinkiang independent of China, and maintained friendly but independent relations with Soviet Russia. Yang came out for the Kuomintang in June, 1928, but shortly afterwards he was assassinated. His successor, Chin Shu-jen, was far more pro-Soviet. See A.S. Whiting, Sinkiang, Pawn or Pivot, (Ann Arbor, 1958) pp.8-12.

36. See Ching Pao, November 24th, in Hatano, op.cit., November, 1928, pp.315-8. Tso Tsung-t'ang had suppressed the Moslem Uprising in the North-west in the late 1860's and early 1870's. For Pai's plans to go to Sinkiang, see Chung-yang Chou-pao, No. 23 (November 12th, 1928), p.5; and No. 30, (December 31st), p.8.

37. Pai almost went to Sinkiang in 1917, after his graduation from Paoting in 1917, but returned instead to Kwangsi. See Ching Pao, November 4th, in Hatano, op.cit., November, 1928, pp.53-5.

38. TFTC, XXV, No. 21 (November 10th, 1928), p.146 and No. 24 (December 25th), p.121.

Notes to pp.259-264

39. Shih-chieh Jih-pao, December 21st, in Hatano, op.cit., December, 1928, p.298.
40. KMWH, XXV, pp.24-5.
41. Ch'en Pao, May 29th, in Hatano, op.cit., May, 1928, p.396.
42. NCH, May 26th, 1928, p.318.
43. Huang Hsü-ch'u, "Pa-kuei I-wang Lu, pt.31," Ch'un-Ch'iu, No. 183 (February 25th, 1965), p.12.
44. Yin Shih (pseud.), Li-Chiang Kuan-hsi yü Chung-kuo, p.39.
45. Chung-yang Chou-pao, No. 25 (November 26th), p.4; and No. 29 (December 24th), p.3.
46. NCH, December 22nd, 1928, p.478.
47. Huang Hsü-ch'u, loc.cit.
48. Yin Shih, loc.cit. Although Li Tsung-jen was the official chairman of the Wuhan Branch Political Council, he seldom attended its meetings. The Council was run by Chang Chih-pen, the deputy chairman of the Council, Hu Tsung-to and Chang Hua-fu, the chief-of-staff of the 4th Group Army, all Hupei natives. Between July 1928, and October, Li did not attend any meetings: he was in Nanking for most of this period. See Wu-han Cheng-chih Fen-hui Yüeh-pao, (Wuhan, July-October, 1928), Hui-i Lu sections. In encouraging the Hupei natives to manage their own affairs, Li was

Notes to pp. 264-266

possibly hoping to encourage local chauvinism in Hupei, which could be used as a weapon against Nanking.

49. Hollington Tong, Chiang Kai-shek, Soldier and Statesman, I, p.252.

50. Ch'en Ming-shu was not chairman of Kwangtung for the whole of 1928 and early 1929, but he held the post for the greater part of the period.

51. Chang P'u-ch'üan (Chang Chi), Chang P'u-ch'üan Hsien-sheng Chüan-chi, p. 245. Chang had previously been associated with the Kwangsi Clique on the Special Committee. With him on the Council was Li Shih-tseng, another prominent Right-wing politician. The Council superseded the underground Kuomintang organisation which had existed in Peking and Tientsin before the defeat of the Northern warlords, and the failure to give the leaders of this organisation adequate representation on the Council aroused deep local resentment.

52. NCH, November 10th, 1928, p.478.

53. Ibid, November 3rd, p.196; and November 10th, p.217

54. Ching Pao, December 12th, in Hatano, op.cit., December, 1928, pp.173-5. One of the worst examples of the physical decline of Peking was the chopping down of trees in the part surrounding the Temple

Notes to pp. 266-273

of Heaven. This was particularly serious, because the trees were laid out in intricate patterns, and were an integral part of the whole ceremonial area.

55. NCH, December 1st, 1928, p.480.

56. Ibid, February 23rd, 1929, p.308.

57. Ching Pao, January 21st, in Hatano, op.cit., January, 1929, p.250.

58. Tang Leang-li, op.cit., pp.325-6.

59. The Kwangsi leaders went to considerable pains to present themselves as plain-living men, uninterested in garnering wealth from their positions. On public appearances, they always appeared simply dressed, though Li Tsung-jen had a passion for knee boots. This frugality was probably only an outward show. Huang Shao-hsiung's wife for example had 10,000 yuan and a quantity of jewelry in her luggage when Huang Shao-hsiung was almost kidnapped in 1927, which she used to buy her way out of captivity. See Huang Shao-hsiung, Wu-shih Hui-i, p.195; Li Chi-shen was said to lead a private life of great luxury. See Ya Yen (pseud.) "Li Chi-shen Chih Yüeh Shih," Hsien-tai Shih-liao, III, pp.85-91.

60. Gustav Amann, Chiang Kai-shek und die Regierung der Kuomintang in China, p.109.

Notes to pp.273-273

61. Hu's main post was as head of the Legislative Yuan, which gave him an important role in the drafting of a legal code, and of a constitution.

Tang Leang-li, op.cit., p.328.

62. Sheridan, op.cit., pp.238-9. After the fall of the city, Peking was officially known as Peiping.

63. Anatole Kotenev, New Lamps for Old, p. 338.

64. NCH, June 30th, 1928, p.540.

65. Chang Kue-p'ing, Pai Ch'ung-hsi Chiang-chün Chuan, p.38.

66. NCH, July 14th, 1928, p.50.

67. Ching Pao, July 13th, in Hatano, op.cit., July, 1928, p.176.

Shun^a

68. Hsun-t'ien Shih-pao, August 3rd, in Hatano, August, 1928, p.37.

69. Initially, after the fall of the Peking/Tientsin region, Yen had two divisions, in Peking, two in Tientsin, and seven in between the two cities.

Pai's maximum strength in North China was twelve divisions. TCSSNCKCSS, II, p.470. Yen's troop representation in the Peking/Tientsin region

declined after the withdrawal of some of his troops from the region in August. See KMWH, XXI, p.1549.

But though he appeared to be weaker numerically, this was only true of the immediate Peking/Tientsin region. Elsewhere in North China, his influence was much stronger than Pai's.

Notes to pp.273-275

70. Ching Pao, August 17th, in Hatano, op.cit., August, 1928, p.217.
71. P'eng Te-huai was then a brigadier in the Hunan Army, serving under Ho Chien. See Jerome Ch'en, Mao and the Chinese Revolution, (London, 1965), p.149. See also NCH, August 25th, p.309; and September 1st, p.351.
72. Hsun-t'ien Shih-pao, August 26th, in Hatano, op.cit., August, 1928, pp.338-9.
73. KMWH, XXI, p.1673. See also NCH, July 21st, 1928, p.91.
74. KMWH, XXI, pp.1564-9.
75. F.F. Liu, op.cit., p.40; and Hollington Tong, op.cit., I, p.241. The unease about Chang's full entry into the Kuomintang was shared by many older associates of the Kuomintang, who would have preferred Chang to have been less generously handled.
76. Feng Yü-hsiang was no longer interested in Peking; he was caught up in subduing rebellious subordinates in Shensi, and with Chang Tsung-ch'ang's remnants in Shantung. Hsun-t'ien Shih-pao, August 28th, in Hatano, op.cit., August, 1928, p.359.
77. Yen withdrew further troops into Shansi in December. TFTC, XXVI, No. 3 (February 10th, 1929), p.139.

Shan

Notes to pp. 276-282

78. Ching Pao, July 6th, in Hatano, op.cit., July, 1928, p.88.
79. KWCP, V, No. 32 (August 19th, 1928), ta-shih, ^{See} p.6; and TFTC, XXV, No. 18, (September 25th, 1928), p.125.
80. TFTC, XXV, No. 24 (December 25th, 1928), p.121; and KWCP, V, No. 47 (December 2nd), jih-chi.
81. TFTC, XXV, No. 24 (December 25th), p.121; and KWCP, V, No. 42 (October 28th), ta-shih, p.3. Pai also tried repeatedly to get his resignation accepted in January and February, 1929, but without success. See TFTC, XXVI, No.6 (March 25th, 1929), p.145; and No. 7 (April 10th), p.134.
82. TFTC, XXV, No. 22 (November 25th, 1928), p.131.
83. NCH, October 13th, 1928, p.49; and Ching Pao, November 24th, in Hatano, op.cit., November, 1928, p.327.
84. Accounts of the Opium Scandal are contained in:-
Tang Leang-li, op.cit., p.354; KWCP, V, No. 47 (December 2nd, 1928), ta-shih, p.1 and No. 48 (December 9th), ta-shih, pp.7-8, and jih-chi; NCH, December 1st, p.345, December 8th, p.396, December 15th, p.430, December 22nd, p.480.
85. Kuei K'o (pseud.) "Li Tsung-jen Shih Lueh," Hsien-tai Shih-liao, III, p.94.

Notes to pp. 282-283

86. Lu Ti-p'ing was Hunanese, and a former subordinate of T'an Yen-k'ai in the 2nd. Army. T'an was now chairman of the Executive Yüan, and an important figure at Nanking. Lu's appointment as chairman of Hunan was made on the insistence of Chiang Kai-shek, when he succeeded in stopping the fighting between the remnants of T'ang Sheng-chih's forces and those of the Kwangsi Clique, early in 1928. Lu was disliked by the Kwangsi leaders, and by T'ang's former subordinates, who echoed their chief's long-standing enmity with T'an Yen-k'ai. See Wu Hsiang-hsiang, "Ho Chien ti I-sheng, Chung-kuo Hsien-tai Shih Ts'ung-k'an, (Taipei, 1964), VI, p.240, for an account of the relations between the various Hunanese generals.
87. KWCF, VI, No.8 (March 8th, 1929), ta-shih, p.1.
88. Hsin Ch'en Pao, April 2nd, in Hatano, op.cit., April, 1929, p.30. Another financial explanation was that Lu may have refused to share Hunan revenues with other Hunanese commanders, the former subordinates of T'ang Sheng-chih. NCH, March 2nd, 1929, p.343.
89. See Hsien Yün, op.cit., (Note 32 above); and Huang Hsü-ch'u, "Pa-kuei I-wang Lu, pt.31," Ch'un-Ch'iu, No. 183 (February 26th, 1962), p.13.

Notes to pp. 283-287

90. F.F. Kiu, op.cit., pp.61-3.
91. They made a distinction between themselves, as overall leadership of the Kwangsi Clique, and the men on the spot in Wuhan, especially the Hupei generals, Hu Tsung-to and T'ao' Chün. Chang Kuo-p'ing op.cit., p.37.
92. Huang Hsü-ch'u, loc.cit.
93. Hsien Yün, "Li, Pai shi tsen-yang T'ao-hui tao Kuang-hsi ti? pt.2," Ch'un-Ch'iu, No. 66, (April 1st, 1960), p.4.
94. TFTC, XXVI, No.4 (February 25th, 1929), p.135; and No.6 (March 25th), p.145. There were rumours that the Kwangsi leaders planned to take advantage of the troubled situation in Kiangsi, where the communists dominated much of the province, to send in their own troops, and annexe the province. NCH, September 8th, 1928, p.403. Such plans, if they existed, would have demanded a much firmer grip on Hunan than the Kwangsi Clique had.
95. Chou Fu-hai, Sheng-shuai Yüeh-chin Hua Ts'ang-sang (Hong Kong, 1956), p.5.
96. KWCP, VI, No. 8 (March 8th, 1929), ta-shih, p.3. Ts'ai was a member of the Elders Group.
97. KWCP, VI, No.9 (March 15th, 1929), ta-shih, p.2; NCH, March 9th, p.390; TFTC, XXVI, No. 9 (May 10th,

Notes to pp. 287-289

1929), p.138. Li and Pai probably realised that the position of the Kwangsi Clique was weak, and may have briefly hoped for a settlement.

98. See "Military Operations in 1929," in CYB, 1929-30, p.732.

99. Hsin Ch'en Pao, March 10th, in Hatano, op.cit., March 1929, p.133.

100. Hsin Ch'en Pao, March 27th, ibid, pp.356-360.

101. Hsin Ch'en Pao, April 1st, Hatano, op.cit., April, 1929, p.2.

102. TFTC, XXVI, No.9 (May 10th, 1929), p.137.

103. Sheridan, op.cit., pp.253-4. Feng made one miscalculation in failing to foresee how much the defeat of the Kwangsi Clique would strengthen Nanking. He may have been banking on a prolonged war, which would weaken Nanking. Instead, the speed of the Nanking victory, and the number of defections from the Kwangsi Clique allowed Nanking to turn very soon against a second regional militarist, himself.

104. KWCP, VI, No.10 (March 29th, 1929), ta-shih, p.3.

105. After the defeat of the Kwangsi Clique, Ho was rewarded by being reappointed chairman of Hunan, a post he held until 1937. Ho had at first been prepared to support the Kwangsi Clique, but

Notes to pp.289-291

when he realised that Nanking would probably win, he switched sides. See Ho Chien ti I-sheng, p.240. (Note 86 above).

106. TFTC, XXVI, No. 6 (March 25th, 1929), pp.144-5; and No. 8 (April 25th), p.145.

107. There is no proof as to whether either Li or Pai were ill. Pai's illness, which caused him to spit blood, and to go bald, gained more popular credence than did Li's facial troubles. KWCP, VI, No. 5 (February 15th, 1929), ta-shih, p.4. But his biography suggests that beyond severe depression, he was not ill. See Chang Kuo-p'ing, op.cit., p.38.

108. Hsiung, who had briefly been premier under Yuan Shih-k'ai, in 1913, was a leading Peking citizen. In 1928 he was chairman of the committee which ran the city in the interim between the withdrawal of Chang Tso-lin and the arrival of Kuomintang forces. At Hsiangshan, in addition to his private villa, he ran an orphanage.

109. Ching Pao, March 15th, in Hatano, op.cit., March, 1929, p.200; and Hsin Ch'en Pao, March 8th, ibid, p.98; and March 11th, ibid, p.136.

110. Ts'ao Chü-jen, Chiang Pai-li P'ing-chuan (Hong Kong, 1963), p.29.

111.

Notes to pp. 291-295

112. Ibid. Li P'in-hsien and Liao Lei subsequently left T'ang Sheng-chih, and returned to their native province, where they held high military posts under the Kwangsi Clique.

113. See Chang Kuo-p'ing, op.cit., p.39. And Yi Shih Fao, March 24th, in Hatano, op.cit., March, 1929, p.322.

114. Accounts of Pai's escape are contained in:- Yin Shih, op.cit., p.40, p.44; Huang Shao-hsiung, op.cit., p.133; NCH, March 23rd, 1929, p.474; and Hsien Y'un, loc.cit. (See note 93 above).

115. Kung Ch'u, Wo yü Hung-chün, p.165; and Yin Shih, op.cit., p.39-40.

116. Huang Hsü-ch'u, "Pa-kuei I-wang Lu, pt.31," Ch'un-Ch'iu, No. 183 (February 26th, 1965), p.14.

117. Chou Fu-hai, op.cit., p.52.

118. TFTC, XXVI, No. 9 (May 10th, 1929), p.139.

The same meeting decreed the winding up of the branch political councils; the following day, the councils at Wuhan, Peking and Canton announced their dissolution.

119. KWCP, VI, No. 11 (March 29th, 1929), ta-shih, ppl-2

120. CYB, 1928/9, p.733. (See above, Note 98).

121. Hollington Tong, op.cit., I. p.275.

122. Maurice Cohen and Charles Drage, Two Gun Cohen, p.202.

Notes to pp. 295-297

123. TFTC, XXVI, No. 9 (May 10th, 1929), p.163.
124. Hsin Ch'en Pao, April 2nd, in Hatano, op.cit., April, 1929, pp.31-3.
125. Shang-hai Hsin-wen Pao, March 29th, in Hatano, op.cit., April, 1929, pp.62-9.
126. Hsin Ch'en Pao, March 27th, in Hatano, op.cit., March, 1929, p.357.
127. CYB, 1928/9, p.734. (See above, Note 98).
 Chang had recently been recalled from the disgrace into which he had fallen after the events at Canton at the end of 1927. His troops had been moved to Kiangsi from Shantung, where they were transferred in 1928. See Lo Ch'ao-p'ing, Kwang-tung Ti-fang Ming-jen Lu, (Canton, 1948), p.18.
128. Huang Hsü-ch'u, loc.cit. (See Note 116 above).
129. TFTC, XXVI, No. 11 (June 10th, 1929), p.117.
130. Pai may have intended to go to Wuhan from Peking to remedy this weakness of command. Li Tsung-jen also tried to fly to Wuhan from Canton, where he arrived, shortly before the defection of Ch'en Chi-t'ang and Ch'en Ming-shu. NCH, March 30th, 1929, p.518.
131. KWCP, VI, No. 12 (April 5th, 1929), jih-chi.
132. Hsin Ch'en Pao, March 27th, in Hatano, op.cit., March, 1929, p.358; and March 30th, *ibid*, p.404.

133. Hsin Ch'en Pao, April 1st, in Hatano, op.cit., April, 1929, p.1; and April 2nd, ibid, p.22.

134. Bauer had a distinguished career in the First World War, as chief of operations under Field Marshall Ludendorff. He came to China at the end of 1927, and took over the post vacated by the Russian General Galen, as adviser to Chiang Kai-shek. F.F. Liu, op.cit., p.62. In 1928, a further group of advisers arrived.

135. NCH, April 13th, p.51. F.F. Liu, pp.62-3. George Sokolsky ascribed the failure of the Kwangsi Clique to "a lack of real organisation, an unmodern view-point, Nanking's superior treasury, Chiang Kai-shek's alertness and Colonel Bauer." See George Sokolsky, "The Kuomintang," in CYB, 1929/30, p.1199.

136. TFTC, XXVI, No. 11 (June 10th, 1929), p.117.

137. See Yin Shih, op.cit., p.40, for Li's orders to Hu and T'ao. CYB 1928/9, p.734 (see above Note 98), gives details on the conditions for their surrender to Nanking.

138. Huang Shao-hsiung, op.cit., p.198.

139. KWCP, VI, No. 14 (April 19th, 1929), ta-shih, p.3; and NCH, April 27th, 1929, p.136. Ch'en Ming-shu also suggested to Huang that he would make things easier for himself if he handed Li and Pai over to Nanking for punishment. Huang Hsu-ch'u,

Notes to pp.302-304

"Pa-kuei I-wang Lu, pt.32," Ch'un-Ch'iu, No. 185, (March 26th), p.18.

140. Huang Hsü-ch'u, op.cit., p.19.

141. Huang Shao-hsiung, op.cit., p.198.

142. TFTC, XXVI, No. 12 (June 25th, 1929), p.138.

143. The Kwangsi leaders occasionally found it convenient to remind the people of Kwangsi of their Taiping forbears, though with reference to the heroism and contempt for hardship of the Taipings rather than to their revolutionary programme.

144. TFTC, XXVI, No. 11 (June 10th, 1929), p.118.

145. KWCP, VI, No. 16 (May 3rd, 1929), ta-shih, p.1.

The composition of the campaign against Kwangsi suggests that Nanking was not putting great importance on it, since only the Hunanese could be expected to put up a good showing against Kwangsi.

146. TFTC, XXVI, No. 12 (June 25th, 1929), p.136.

Fan's career as an itinerant warlord, which had taken him all over South China, was nearing its end. Soon afterwards, most of his troops were detached by Chu Te, and became part of the communist forces in Kiangsi. Fan was forced to fall back on his subsidiary career, and went to Shanghai, where he set up as a practitioner of Chinese medicine. See Ch'en Kung-po Chou Fu-hai Hui-i Lu Ho-pien, pp.82-3.

147. TFTC, XXVI, No. 12 (June 25th, 1929), p.137.
148. Hsin Ch'en Pao, May 15th, in Hatano, op.cit., May, 1929, p.203.
149. TFTC, XXVI, No. 12 (June 25th, 1929), p.138.
150. Ibid, No. 13 (July 10th, 1929), p.125.
151. Huang Shao-hsiung, op.cit., p.199; Yin Shih, op.cit., p.42; and Sheridan, op.cit., p.260. Such a title was necessary to give the actions of the Kwangsi forces some semblance of political motivation, rather than to display them for what they were, the attempt by militarists to extend their power. This practice of giving high-sounding titles to campaigns, already widespread during the early warlord period, became imperative during the period of residual warlordism. It is not clear whether there was already any connection between the Kwangsi Clique and Feng Yü-hsiang at this time.
152. Ts'ai T'ing-k'ai Tzu-chuan, I, p.244; and TFTC, XXVI, No. 13 (July 10th, 1929), p.126.
153. Amann, op.cit., p.156.
154. Hsin Ch'en Pao, May 11th, in Hatano, op.cit., May, 1929, p.148.
155. TFTC, XXVI, No. 13 (July 10th, 1929), p.127.
156. Hsin Ch'en Pao, May 15th, ibid, p.201.
157. Huang Hsü-ch'u, "Pa-kuei I-wang Lu, pt.31,"

Notes to pp. 307-311

Ch'un-Ch'iu, No. 184 (March 1st, 1965), p.20.

158. Ibid.

159. Huang Shao-hsiung, op.cit., p.199.

160. BSME, 92, (August, 1929), p.493.

161. Li Tsung-ssu-ling Tsui-chin Yen-chiang Chi, p.2.

Notes to pp. 313-315

1. Huang Shao-hsiung, Wu-shih Hui-i, pp. 200-203
2. Chang had started south in the intention of joining up with Yuⁿ Tso-po, but before he reached Kwangsi Yuⁿ had fallen, and Chang had no alternative but to join with the new power holders in the province, his old enemies, the leaders of the Kwangsi Clique. See Tang Leang-li, The Inner History of the Chinese Revolution, pp. 300-301
3. Huang Shao-hsiung, op.cit., p. 207
4. Wang Ching-wei and the Left-wing of the Kuomintang were now bitterly hostile to Nanking. They believed that the only way to oust the Nanking leaders, whom they regarded as traitors to the Kuomintang, was to reorganise the Party and government, hence the name Reorganisationists. Wang was anxious to ally with any military grouping which would put its military strength behind his political authority. To this end, he allied in 1930 with Feng and Yen, and in 1931 with the Cantonese militarist, Ch'en Chi-t'ang.
5. Two close associates of the Kwangsi Clique, Mai Huan-chang and Chang Chih-pen, attended the inaugural meeting of the Expanded Conference in Peking. KWCP, VII, No.28 (July 21st, 1930), see photograph of opening of Conference.
6. Ts'ai T'ing-k'ai Tzu-chuan, 266-265.
7. Yin Shih, Li-Chiang Kuan-hsi yü Chung-kuo, pp. 48/49
8. After this setback, the cooperation between the Kwangsi Clique and Chang Fa-k'uei broke down. Chang went abroad and his troops moved into Kwangtung and were incorporated in the Kwangtung Army, Chang Kuo-p'ing, Pai Ch'ung-hsi Chiang-chün Chuan, pp.46-48

Notes to 315-318

9. Huang subsequently worked for the Nanking government. From 1932 to 1935, he was Minister of the Interior, and then held posts as provincial chairman in Hupei and Chekiang.
- 9A. Lung's loyalty to Nanking was purely nominal; it provided him with a useful pretext to attack enemies that he shared with Nanking, notably the Kwangsi Clique, with whom Lung had constant quarrels over the opium trade between Yunnan and Kwangsi.
10. Hu's enmity towards Chiang Kai-shek had a long history. Hu, as one of Sun Yat-sen's closest associates, resented his eclipse, after 1925, first by Wang Ching-wei and then by Chiang. Hu was released from imprisonment later in 1931, and spent the rest of his life in Hong Kong, inveighing and scheming against Chiang. He died in 1936.
11. Many of the participants had taken part in the Expanded Conference in Peking the year before, though the military backing was of course different. Ho Shao-ch'ung, Ch'en Chi-t'ang Hsien-sheng Chi-hien Chi (Hong Kong, 1957), p. 75
12. Chiang Kai-shek resigned at the end of 1931, in accordance with the terms of the Nanking/Canton settlement, but returned in March, 1932, after the collapse of a short-lived administration headed by Sun Fo. Hollington Tong, Chiang Kai-shek, Soldier and Statesman, I, pp.320-342.
13. KWCP, IX, No.6 (January 2nd, 1932), Fu-lu, pp. 2-3
14. The Yunnanese seldom had the strength to attack Kwangsi on their own. However, they were in the habit of taking advantage of Cantonese actions against Kwangsi to launch their own attacks; these attacks were an expression of the constant hostility between the two provinces, centred on the opium trade. Yunnanese troops, notoriously poor in quality, for opium smoking was widespread in the Yunnan Army, were

Notes to pp. 319-321

no match for the Kwangsi Army and could only attack when they had overwhelming numerical superiority, i.e. when the Kwangsi Army was involved with other enemies.

15. This unity of over-all command and division of functional authority was one application of the term San-wei I-t'i, which is discussed below. This term was also used as a translation of the Christian 'Trinity', and as a blanket term for the triple policy of alliance with the Soviet Union, the Communists and the peasantry held by the Kuomintang between 1924 and 1927. See Wang Tso-shih, Chung-kuo Wen-t'i ti Fen-hsi (Shanghai, 1935), p. 170
16. Huang Hsi⁴-ch'u, Chung-kuo Chien-she yü Kuang-hsi chien-she (Kweilin, 1939), p. 2.
17. Ibid, p.226; and Li Tsung-jen et al., Kuang-hsi chih Chien-she, p.53. Hereafter cited by title; Li Tsung-jen was only one of many contributors to this volume.
18. Ibid, p.53. In citing Confucius, Li was responding to the revival in interest in Confucian values apparent in China at this time, inspired by Chiang Kai-shek. Other military leaders were drawn to re-assert Confucian values, a friendly refuge in a time of great ideological confusion. Ho Chien, in Hunan, published a series of articles and speeches on Confucian virtues. The interest shown by intellectual circles in any kind of western idea was a similar search for an ideological anchor and a viable political system, among people whose rejection of Confucianism was so absolute that there could be no easy retreat into the past.
19. "Le Nouveau Kouangsi, pt.1," BSME, No. 149 (May, 1934), p. 310.

Tsao 造

Ch'ien Chien-⁴ (Chung)
1930, 2000
factum

Notes to pp. 321-326

20. P'ang Tun-chih, Ch'ing-suan Kuei-hsi (Canton, 1950), p.18. This source is violently antagonistic towards the Kwangsi Clique, and may not be reliable. The same source accuses the Kwangsi leaders of having harboured Trotskyites. Ibid, p.14. Whatever Kwangsi's leanings towards the Fascist system of internal government, Pai Ch'ung-hsi early attacked Mussolini for his aggressive external policy. See Huang Heng, "Kuang-hsi chih Min-t'uan chi ch'i I-i," KWCP, XI, No. 17 (April 30th, 1934), p.4. Pai was possibly more attracted by his fellow-Moslem, Kemal Ataturk, the leader of Turkey's struggle for national independence, and a proponent of authoritarian reform and modernisation.
21. George Taylor, The Reconstruction Movement in China (London, 1936), p.35. Interest in Fascism was particularly strong in Nanking; with time, interest in fascist political forms was lost, though its influence remained in fascist-style police methods, notably in the behaviour of Chiang Kai-shek's Blue Shirts.
22. T.C. Woo, The Kuomintang and the Future of the Chinese Revolution (London, 1928), gives the complete Outline of National Reconstruction in an Appendix.
23. Huang Hsu⁴-ch'u, op.cit., pp. 194-198.
24. Ibid, p. 199.
25. Kuang-hsi Yin-hsiang Chi (1935, n.p.), p. 44.
26. "Le Nouveau Kouangsi, pt. 1," BSME, No. 149 (May, 1934), p. 316.
27. China Weekly Review, October 14th, 1933, p. 282.

Notes to pp. 326-328

28. Kuan-hsi Chien-she Chi-p'ing (1935, n.p.), p.173. Clan rivalries in south-eastern Kwangsi also led to the creation of clan/village militias. See Huang Heng, "Kuang-hsi chih Min-t'uan chi ch'i I-i," KWCP, XI, No.16 (April 23rd, 1934), pp. 1-2
29. Huang Shao-hsiung, op.cit., p. 210.
30. Lai Yen-yü⁴, Kuang-hsi I-lan (Nanning, 1935), "Min-t'uang, The People's Militia," p. 3.
31. Ibid, pp. 16-17.
32. The men may have had time to spare. Kwangsi men were renowned for their idleness; it was customary in Kwangsi for women to do the bulk of the farm work. Women not only worked on family farms, but also sold their labour at special markets. Along the West River, large numbers of women worked as coolies. See Kuang-hsi Chien-she Chi-p'ing, p.242; Kuang-hsi Yin-hsiang Chi, p.4, p.10; TFTC, XXXII, No. 6 (March 16th, 1935), pp.98-99. Ma Chün-wu⁴, the head of Kwangsi University, calculated that many Kwangsi men worked only 40 days a year; he saw militia service as a cure for their sloth. Huang Heng, op.cit., p.2.
33. Kuo-min Ko-ming-chün⁴ Ti-ssu Chi-t'uan-chün⁴ Tsung-ssu-ling-pu T'uan-wu Ch'u, Kuang-hsi Min-t'uan Kai-yao (n.d.,n.p.)
34. Kuang-hsi Sheng-cheng-fu T'ung-chi Ch'u, Kuang-hsi Nien-chien, Ti-erh Hui (Kweilin, 1936), pp. 114-7
35. Kuang-hsi chih Chien-she, pp. 200-201.

Notes to pp. 328-332

36. League of Nations, Report of the Council Committee on Technical Cooperation between the League of Nations and China (Geneva, 1935), p.233. This report comments very favourably on the Kwangsi militia, and on the Reconstruction Movement, comparing it tacitly to the areas under the direct control of Nanking.
37. Kuang-hsi chih Chien-she, p.208.
38. Ibid, p.321
39. Huang Hsü^u-ch'u, op.cit., p.210.
40. Liang had a special influence in Kwangsi, for he was technically a Kwangsi native; his family came from Kwangsi, though he was born in Peking. In the late 1920s, he worked in Kwangtung under Li Chi-shen. Liang's solutions to China's problems were close to the ideas of the Populists in 19th Century Russia, and lay in drafting intellectuals to the countryside to lead the rural population out of its apathy and to unleash the latent forces of the peasantry to work for the rebirth of China; at the same time, the intellectuals would be remoulded by the peasantry. See a discussion of Liang's ideas in Chung-kuo Wen-t'i ti Ko-p'ai Ssu-ch'ao (Shanghai, 1934), pp. 429-454,
41. Franklin Ho, Rural Economic Reconstruction in China (Honolulu, 1936), p,56.
42. Details of the training of these men are contained in Kuang-hsi Chien-she Chi-p'ing p.35, p.59; and Kuang-hsi chih Chien-she, pp.68-69, p.145 and pp. 321-328.
43. Huang Hsü^u-ch'u, op.cit., p.242; Kuang-hsi chih Chien-she, pp. 328-329.
44. The full Outline of Reconstruction is given in Kuang-hsi Chien-she Kang-ling, published by Kuang-hsi Sheng Tang-cheng-chün Lien-hsi Hui-i (n.p.,n.d.).

Notes to pp. 332-336

45. Kuangsi chih Chien-she, p.200
46. Ibid, p.209, p.334.
47. Huang Hsü^m-ch'u, op.cit., pp.244-247.
48. Ibid, p.4. This form of population control was very ambitious, and there is little evidence to show how well it worked, though travellers in the province mention the frequent inspection of travel and residence permits.
49. P'ang Tun-chih, Kuang-hsi She-hui T'e-chih (Hong Kong, 1950), p.13.
50. Hu Shih, writing in 1935, was very impressed with the schools he was taken to visit. See Hu Shih, Nan-yu Tsa-i (Shanghai, 1935), pp.56-57. Another complementary account of primary schools is given by the historian of the Taipings, Chien Yu-wen (a Kwangsi native) in Chin-t'ien chih Yu chi Ch'i-ta (Kweilin, 1944), p.56.
51. Kuang-hsi chih Chien-she, p.96, p.139.
52. Kuang-hsi Sheng-cheng-fu T'ung-chi Ch'u, Kuang-hsi Nien-chien, Ti-erh Hui, p.1085.
53. Kuang-hsi chih Chien-she, p.336.
54. T'ao Chü^m-yin, Chin-tai I-wen, p.93.
55. "Kwangsi, Province of Spartans," People's Tribune, V, No. 1 (August 1st, 1933), p.8.
56. BSME, No. 149 (May 1934), p.313.
57. Kuang-hsi chih Chien-she, p.145, pp.148-9.
58. Ibid, p.298.
59. At least 50% of provincial government income went to

Notes to pp. 336-339

- the army. China Weekly Review, September 9th, 1933, p. 54.
60. The average trade gap between 1926 and 1931, as shown in the reports of the Maritime Customs, was 10,000,000 H.K. taels, but this figure did not include goods carried in native boats. K.P. King, "The Economic Reconstruction of Kwangsi," Chinese Economic Journal, XV, No. 3 (September, 1934), p.275.
61. Kuang-hsi Sheng-cheng-fu T'ung-chi Ch'u, Kuang-hsi T'ung-chi Ts'ung-shu (Nanning, 1934-1935), No.5, p.1.
62. Ch'ien Chia-chu et al., Kuang-hsi Sheng Ching-chi Kai-k'uang, p.21.
63. Cheng Chien-lu, Kuei-yu I-yueh Chi (Shanghai, 1935), p.10.
64. See Huang Heng, op.cit., p.2; and K.P. King, op.cit., pp.298-299.
65. Kuang-hsi chih Chien-she, p.375.
66. Ibid, p.60; and Hu Shih, op.cit., p.55.
67. CYB, 1933, p.139; and "Le Nouveau Kouangsi, pt.3," BSME, No.152 (August, 1934), p.528. After the Mukden Incident, there was a deliberately manufactured invasion scare in Kwangsi. "At night, criers went round the street shouting: 'sleepers awake! China is in danger.'" BSME, No. 120 (December, 1931), p.907.
68. Kuang-hsi chih Chien-she, p.366.
69. Ibid, p.61. The interest rates offered to potential investors by the Kwangsi Bank were too low to attract investors. K.P. King, op.cit., p.300. However, in 1934, Huang Hsu-ch'u was able to negotiate a U.S. \$9,000,000 loan from a group of Shanghai bankers, at 9% interest. China Weekly Review, May 19th, 1934, p.472.

Notes to pp. 339-341

70. A.H. George, Trade and Economic Conditions in China (London, 1935), p. 94.
71. Kuang-hsi chih Chien-she, p.400. Other exports were manufactures from secondary agricultural products, such as paper, alcohol and sugar. The fall in the price of rice, formerly an important export, brought attempts to encourage the peasantry to diversify their products. K.P. King, op.cit., p.285. Alcohol produced from corn or potatoes was also used within the province as a petrol substitute. Ibid, p.290.
72. Huang Hung-ch'ao, Kuang-hsi Chih-yeh Tiao-ch'a Chuan-k'an (Canton, 1933), p.5.
73. Ch'ien Chia-ch'ü, op.cit., pp.10-15. By 1937, there had been a considerable increase in mining activity, particularly of tin, antimony, coal and manganese. See "Recent Developments in the Kwangsi Mining Industry," Chinese Economic Journal, XVIII, No.2 (September, 1937), pp.398-404.
74. Cheng Chien-lu, op.cit., p.90.
75. Kuang-hsi chih Chien-she, p.398.
76. Ibid, p.378. There was a considerable amount of smuggling into the province, to avoid import duties. K.P. King, op.cit., p.307.
77. Kuang-hsi Yin-hsiang Chi (1935, n.p.). p.255.
78. Kuang-hsi Chih Chien-she, pp.343-344. The simplification of taxes appears to have been carried out, though the collection of many taxes remained in the hands of tax farmers. Ibid, p.351.
79. Ibid, pp.352-354.
80. Ibid.

Notes to pp. 341-345

81. Kuang-hsi Chien-she Chi-p'ing, p.61.
82. Ch'ien Chia-chüⁿ, op.cit., p.19. Opium shipments were frequently transported under the protection of government troops. China Weekly Review, January 20th, 1934, pp.300-301.
83. See Hollington Tong, op.cit., p.399; Chiang-shang-ch'ing (Pseud.) Cheng-hai Pi-wen, p.10; Daniel Lew, Southwest China - A Survey of a Great Potential (Harvard, 1939, unpublished dissertation), p.31, p.52.
84. Lo Yün-yen, The Opium Problem in the Far East (Shanghai, 1933), p.70.
85. Hu Shih, op.cit., p.64; and K.P. King, op.cit., p.304. According to King, military expenditure accounted for 60% of provincial government revenue in the year 1933/4.
86. George Taylor, op.cit., p.225.
87. "Le Nouveau Kouangsi, pt.3," in BSME, No. 152 (August, 1934), p.530.
88. George Taylor, op.cit., p.244. Peasant wheelbarrows were forbidden on the roads; since this vehicle was widely used, this order had the effect of debarring many peasants from the roads. See K.P. King, op.cit., p.294.
89. E. Fischer, Travels in China (Tientsin, 1941), pp.255-257; and BSME, (March, 1935), p.197.
90. A.H. George, op.cit., p.56.
91. See Hu Shih, op.cit., p.31; and Chiang Heng-yüan, Hsi-nan Lüⁿ-hsing Tsa-hsieh (Shanghai, 1937), p.61.
92. "Le Nouveau Kouangsi, pt.5," BSME, No.154 (October, 1934), p.682.

Notes to pp. 345-349

93. Chiang Heng-yūⁿ, op.cit., pp.74-76. In 1933 theatrical performances were banned; expensive marriages were forbidden, and it was laid down that all wedding presents must be Kwangsi products, and that guests were only to be offered tea. China Weekly Review, December 30th, 1933, p.214.
94. Compte Rendu, 1932 (Paris, 1933), p.157.
95. BSME, No.137 (May, 1933), p.356.
96. "Le Nouveau Kouangsi, pt.5," BSME, No.154 (October, 1934), p.697.
97. T'an-tang-tang-chai-chu, Hsien-tai Chung-kuo Ming-jen Wai-shih, (Peking, 1935), pp.297-298.
98. T'ao Chūⁿ-yin, Chin-tai I-wen, p.94.
99. Kuang-hsi Nien-chien, Ti-erh Hui, pp.906-907. This was in contrast to the situation under Huang Shao-hsiung's rule, when primary education had been virtually ignored.
100. Ch'ien and his team were seconded to Kwangsi by the Academica Sinica.
101. Kuang-hsi chih Chien-she, p.90.
102. Kuang-hsi Chien-she Chi-p'ing, pp.245-249.
103. Huang Shao-hsiung, op.cit., p.163.
104. Institute of Pacific Relations, Agrarian China (London, 1939), p.
105. Li Ch'i-pao, "Kuang-hsi Yung-shun ti Hsiang-ts'un Chien-she yūⁿ Nung-min," TFTC, XXXII, No.2 (January 16th, 1935), p.10.
106. Kuang-hsi chih Chien-she, p.50.

Notes to pp. 349-352

107. Ibid, pp. 264-265p.
108. Cheng Chien-lu, op.cit., p. 11.
109. Kuang-hsi I-lan, "Education," p. 39
110. Kuang-hsi chih Chien-she, pp. 264-265
111. During the War, when Pai was Vice Chief-of-Staff and Director of Military Training in the National Army, he applied the principles of officer training that he had worked out in the 1930s on a much wider scale.
112. Li Po-sheng, "How Kwangsi Trains Troops," People's Tribune, XXI, No.3 (May 27th, 1938), p. 7
113. Huang Hsu^u-ch'u, op.cit., p.236; and Hu Shih, op.cit., p. 65
114. China Weekly Review, March 24th, 1934, p.151; and Huai Hsing (pseud.), Lun Li Tsung-jen yu Chung-Mei Fan-tung-p'ai (Hong Kong, 1948), p. 70
115. Kuang-hsi chih Chien-she, p. 70
116. Chang Kuo-p'ing, op.cit., pp.62-64. This is perhaps an unconvincing explanation of the speed of the passage of the Red Armies through Kwangsi; there is the possibility that the Kwangsi leaders had some prior arrangement with the Communists though I have found no evidence to suggest this. Agnes Smedley describes the same tactics as does Pai, in an account of a conversation with a Long March veteran: "He told of the cruel cunning of the [Kwangsi] militarists: 'As our Army passed through northern Kwangsi mountains, officials beat gongs in the villages and cried that bandits were coming! The peasants fled. We marched through empty villages, but never molested a home. I fell ill with malaria, and along with a great many sick and wounded men fell behind the Army. We some-

Notes to pp. 352-355

times saw officials and policemen, thinking our army had passed, return to the villages, burn or loot homes, and then, when the peasants returned, tell them that the crimes were the work of the Red Army. The people were turned against us." See Agnes Smedley, Battle Hymn of China (London, 1944), p. 91.

117. Hollington Tong, op.cit., p. 537.
118. China Weekly Review, December 9th, 1933, pp. 54-55
119. Hallett Abend, My Years in China (London, 1944); and China Weekly Review, July 7th, 1933, p. 236
120. The Kwangsi leaders were accused of being openly opposed to Japan but secretly in league with her. In 1934 and 1935, various leading Japanese in China were said to have visited China, to arrange the supply of munitions and arsenal equipment to Kwangsi. By the end of 1935, there were said to be 60 Japanese officers in Kwangsi. See Chou Ch'uan, Kuei-hsi Chieh-p'ou (Hong Kong, 1949), p. 11; and K.B. Vaidya, Reflections on the Recent Canton Revolt and After (Canton, 1936), Section 2, p. 8. But the first of these sources is bitterly hostile to the Kwangsi Clique, and the second not friendly to it, and this information may be biased. I have not been able to substantiate these accusations elsewhere.
121. Oriental Affairs, III, No. 14 (January, 1935), p. 14, p. 43
122. Wu Hsiang-hsiang, "Wu Chung-hsin An-ting Pien-chiang," in Chuan-chi Wen-hsueh, VII, No. 1, p. 27.
123. The lower estimate is given in Vaidya, op.cit., Section 1, p. 4; the higher in Abend, op.cit., p. 197.
124. The lower estimate is again Vaidya's - Ibid, p. 5; the higher is Abend's - loc.cit.

Notes to pp. 355-359.

125. Hollington Tong, op.cit., p.393; and Chang Kuo-p'ing, op.cit., p.65.
126. Ts'ai T'ing-k'ai Tzu-chuan, p.545.
127. Feng Chu^u-p'ei, K'ang-chan chung ti Ti-wu Lu-chu^u Hankow, 1938), p.11. The Japanese were delighted about the prospect of fighting between Nanking and the South-West, which was a clear indication of the disunity and weakness of China. They claimed that the actions of the South-West were directed against Nanking, no against themselves. See KWCP, XIII, No. 23 (June 13th, 1936), I-chou Chien-p'ing, p.1; and Ibid, No.24 (June 22nd), I-chou Chien-p'ing, p.1.
128. Abend, op.cit., pp. 197-198.
129. Compte Rendu, 1937 (Paris, 1938), p.107.
130. Kuang-hsi chih Chien-she, p.378; and BSME, No.177 (September, 1936), p.665.
131. Chang Kuo-p'ing, op.cit., p. 68.
132. Ts'ai T'ing-k'ai Tzu-chuan, p. 547
133. Ibid, p.548; Abend, op.cit., p.198, p.223; and Vaidya, op.cit., Section 1, p.14. This campaign was a continuation of the earlier campaign of the same nature. See Note 120 above.
134. The full conditions are listed in Vaidya, op.cit., Section 2, p.27.
135. Feng Chu^u-p'ei, op.cit., p.14.
136. T.A. Bisson, Japan in China (New York, 1938), p.279; and Chang Kuo-p'ing, op.cit., p.70.
137. Voice of China, I, No.3 (July 1st, 1936), p.3.

ConclusionNotes to pp. 364-368.

1. Between 1931 and 1936, Anhwei, Chekiang and Kiangsu all had three provincial chairmen, Hupei and Fukien four. These changes in chairmen usually involved also changes in lower posts, such as commissioner of Civil Affairs and commissioner of Finance. See CYB, 1931, p.579; 1931/2, pp.694-5; 1933, pp.402-6; 1934, pp.479-480; and 1935, p.78; 1936, pp.158-9.
2. Pai wrote the preface for an adulatory volume on Chiang published in 1946 by the Ministry of National Defence, of which Pai was then head, and also contributed an article extolling Chiang's military talents. The large photographic section contains many pictures of Pai and Chiang together. See Wei-ta ti Chiang Chu-hsi (Shanghai, 1946).
3. Pai died in Taipei in 1967.
4. Li Chi-shen held several high but probably nominal posts after 1949, including that of chairman of the Revolutionary Committee of the Kuomintang. He died in 1959. Huang Shao-hsiung held lesser posts, from which he was excluded in 1957 after being denounced as a rightists. He did not emerge again until 1965 when, with other former Kuomintang militarists, including Ts'ai T'ing-k'ai and Ch'eng Ch'ien, he was brought out to welcome Li Tsung-jen.

SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY

I. Newspapers and Periodicals in Western Languages

Asia, 1917-1944, New York.

Bulletin de l'Association Amicale Franco-Chinoise, 1909,
Paris.

v Bulletin de la Société des Missions-Etrangères de Paris,
1922 to present, Paris.

China Weekly Review (Millard's Review), ed. J.B. Powell,
1918-1949, Shanghai.

China Year Books, ed. H.G.W. Woodhead, 1912-1939, Tientsin
and Shanghai.

Chinese Economic Journal, 1926-1937, Shanghai.

v Compte Rendu des Travaux de la Société des Missions-
Etrangères de Paris, 1918 to present, Paris.

North China Herald, 1910-1941, Shanghai.

Oriental Affairs, 1933-1937, Shanghai.

People's Tribune (New Series), 1931-1937, Shanghai.

Voice of China, 1936-1937, Shanghai.

II. Books and Major Articles in Western Languages

- Abend, Hallett, My Years in China, 1926-1942, London, 1944.
- Amann, Gustav, Chiang Kai-shek und die Regierung der Kuomintang in China, Berlin, 1936.
- Anderson, Mary, R., Protestant Mission Schools for Girls in South China, New York, 1943.
- Baudrit, Andre, Betail Humain: Rapt, Vente, Infanticide dans l'Indochine et dans la China du Sud, Saigon, 1942.
- Beasley, William, Select Documents on Japanese Foreign Policy, 1853-1863, London, 1955.
- Bisson, T.A., Japan in China, New York, 1938.
- Burton, Wilbur, The French Stranglehold on Yunnan, Shanghai, 1933.
- Chang, C.C., China Tung Oil and its Future, Hong Kong, 1940.
- Chapman, H.O., The Chinese Revolution, 1926-7, London, 1928.
- Ch'en, Jerome, Mao and the Chinese Revolution, London, 1965.
- _____. Yüan Shih-k'ai: Brutus assumes the Purple, London, 1961.
- Chesneaux, Jean, Le Mouvement Ouvrier en Chine, Paris, 1962.
- Chi Ch'ao-ting, Key Economic Areas in Chinese History, London, 1936.
- Ch'ien Tuan-shang, The Government and Politics of China, Cambridge, Mass., 1948.
- _____. "The Role of the Military in Chinese Government," Pacific Affairs, XXI, No.3 (Sept., 1948), pp.239-251.

- Cohen, M. and Drage, C., Two Gun Cohen, London, 1954.
- Cuenot, Joseph, Au Pays des Pavillons Noirs, Hong Kong, 1925.
- Economic Geography of South China, JPRS, 14,954, Washington, 1962.
- Fairbank, J.K., introductory article to North, R.C., Kuomintang and Chinese Communist Elites, Stanford, 1952.
- Fischer, E., Travels in China, Tientsin, 1941.
- Fischer, Louis, The Soviets in World Affairs, London, 1930.
- George, A.H., Trade and Economic Conditions in China, 1933-5, London (Department of Overseas Trade), 1935.
- Ho, Franklin, Rural Economic Reconstruction in China, Honolulu, 1936.
- Hobart, Alice, T., Within the Walls of Nanking, London, 1928.
- Houn, Franklin, The Central Government of China, 1911-1928, Madison, Wisconsin, 1957.
- Hsieh Pao-chao, The Government of China, 1644-1911, Baltimore, 1925.
- Hsieh, Winston, "The Ideas and Ideals of a Warlord: Ch'en Chiung-ming, 1878-1933," in Harvard Papers on China, XVI (1962), pp.198-244.
- Gillin, Donald, Warlord: Yen Hsi-shan in Shansi Province, 1911-1949, Princeton, 1967.
- Institute of Pacific Affairs, Agrarian China, London, 1939.
- Iriye, Ikeda, After Imperialism, Cambridge, Mass., 1965.
- Isaacs, Harold, The Tragedy of the Chinese Revolution (2nd Revised Edition), New York, 1966.
- Johnson, Chalmers, Peasant Nationalism and Communist Power, Stanford, 1963.

- Kotenev, Anatole, New Lamps for Old, Shanghai, 1931.
- Laai Yi-fai, "The River Strategy of the Taipings," in Oriens, V (1952).
- League of Nations, Reports and Annexes of the First Opium Conference (Geneva, 1924-5), Geneva, 1926.
- Levenson, Joseph, "The Province, the Nation and the World: The Problem of Chinese Identity," in Feuerwerker, A., Murphey, R., Wright, M., eds., Approaches to Modern Chinese History, Berkeley, 1967.
- Lew, Daniel Hong, Southwest China: a Survey of a Great Potential, Harvard, unpublished dissertation, 1939.
- Li Chien-nung, The Political History of China, 1840-1928, (trans. Teng SSu-yu and Ingalls, Jeremy), New York, 1956.
- Li Tsung-jen, unpublished autobiography, deposited in the Butler Library, Columbia University, New York.
- Lin, Jermyn Chi-hung, Political Parties in China, Peking, 1930.
- Linebarger, P.M.W., Government in Republican China, New York, 1938.
- Liu, F.F., A Military History of Modern China, Princeton, 1956.
- Lo Yun-yen, The Opium Problem in the Far East, Shanghai, 1933.
- MacNair, H.F., China in Revolution, Chicago, 1930.
- McAleavy, Henry, Black Flags in Vietnam, London, 1968.
- Michael, Franz, The Taiping Rebellion, Seattle, 1966.
- _____. "Regionalism in Nineteenth Century China," introduction to Spector, Stanley, Li Hung-chang and Huai Army, Seattle, 1964.

- Naval Intelligence Department, China Proper, London, 1945.
- Paauw, Douglas, "The Kuomintang and Economic Stagnation,"
Journal of Asian Studies, XVI (1957)
- Powell, J.B., My Twenty-Five Years in China, New York, 1945.
- Powell, R.L., The Rise of Chinese Military Power, 1895-1912,
Princeton, 1955.
- Pye, Lucian, "Armies in the Process of Political Modernisation,"
in Johnson, J., ed., The Role of the Military in Under-
developed Areas, Princeton, 1962.
- _____. The Politics of Tuchunism in North China, Yale,
unpublished dissertation, 1951.
- Ransome, Arthur, The Chinese Puzzle, London, 1927.
- Ray, Rex, Cowboy Missionary in Kwangsi, Nashville, Tennessee,
1964.
- Ristelhuebber, Rene, "Notre Conflit avec la Chine au Sujet
de Tonkin," Revue d'Histoire Diplomatique, III (1954).
- Schulze, Dieter, Das Politisch-geographische Kräfteverhältnis
zwischen den drei Chinesischen Südwest Provinzen, Heidel-
berg, unpublished dissertation, 1940.
- Sheridan, James, Chinese Warlord: The Career of Feng Yü-hsiang,
Stanford, 1966.
- Smedley, Agnes, The Great Road, the life and times of Chu Te,
London, 1958.
- Sokolsky, George, China, Shanghai, 1920.
- _____. "The Kuomintang," two parts, in China Year Book, 1928,
pp.1309-1401; and *ibid*, 1929/30, pp.1157-1216.
- Spector, Stanley, Li Hung-chang and the Huai Army, Seattle, 1964.
- Spencer, J.E., "On Regionalism in China," Journal of Geography,
XLVI (1947).

- Sun Yat-sen, Fundamentals of National Reconstruction (ed. Z.B. Toong), Chungking, 1944.
- Tang Leang-li, The Inner History of the Chinese Revolution, London, 1930.
- Taylor, G.E., The Reconstruction Movement in China, London, 1936.
- Tong, Hollington, Chiang Kai-shek, Soldier and Statesman (Authorised biography), Shanghai, 1937.
- Treagar, T.R., A Geography of China, London, 1965.
- Trois Mois au Kouangsi (Souvenirs d'un Officier en Mission), Paris, 1906.
- Tyau, T.Z., Two Years of Nationalist China, Shanghai, 1930.
- Vaidya, K.B., Reflections on the Recent Canton Revolt and After, Canton, 1936.
- Wang Wen-yuan, Les Relations entre l'Indochine française et la Chine, Paris, 1937.
- Whiting, A.S., Sinkiang, Pawn or Pivot? East Lansing, Michigan, 1958.
- Wiens, H.J., Han Chinese Expansion in South China, Hampden, Connecticut, 1967.
- Wilbur, C.M. and Ho, J.L.Y., Documents on Communism, Nationalism and Soviet Advisers in China, 1918-1927, New York, 1956.
- Woo, T.C., The Kuomintang and the Future of the Chinese Revolution, London, 1928.
- Wright, Mary.C., "Modern China in Transition," Annals of the American Academy, Philadelphia, 1959.
- _____. The Last Stand of Chinese Conservatism, Stanford, 1957.

- Wright, M.C., review of Spector, Stanley, Li Hung-chang and the Huai Army, Journal of Asian Studies, XXV (1965)
- Yu, George, Political Parties in Republican China, 1912-1924, Berkeley, 1966.

III. Periodicals in Chinese

- Chien-she 建設 Nanking, 1928-1937.
- Chin-tai Shih-tzu-liao 近代史資料 Peking, 1957 - .
- Chuan-chi Wen-hstleh 傳記文學 Taipei, 1962 - .
- Ch'un-Ch'iu 春秋 Hong Kong, 1957 - .
- Chung-kuo Chien-she 中國建設 Nanking, 1930-1937.
- Chung-yang Cheng-chih Hui-i Wu-han Cheng-chih Fen-hui
Ytsh-pao 中央政治會議武漢政治分會月報
Wuhan, 1928-1929.
- Chung-yang Chou-pao 中央週報 Nanking, 1928 - .
- Hsiang-tao Chou-pao (The Guide Weekly) 嚮導週報
Shanghai, 1922-1927.
- Hsien-tai Shih-liao 現代史料 Shanghai, 1934-1935.
- Hung-ch'i P'iao-p'iao 紅旗飄飄 Peking, 1957 - .
- Kuo-wen Chou-pao (The Weekly Gazette) 國聞週報
Tientsin, 1924-1937.
- Shan-hou Hui-i Kung-pao 善後會議公報 Peking, 1925.
- Tung-fang Tsa-chih 東方雜誌. Shanghai, 1904-1948.

IV. Books and Articles in Chinese

Chang Ch'i-yün 張其鈞, Chung-hua Min-kuo Shih-kang
中華民國史綱 Taipei, 1954.

_____. Tang-shih Kai-yao 黨史概要 Taipei, 1951-2.

Chang Kuo-p'ing 張國平, Pai Ch'ung-hsi Chiang-chün
CHuan 白崇禧將軍傳, Hankow, 1938.

Chang P'u-ch'üan, 張溥泉, Chang P'u-ch'üan Hsien-sheng
Chüan-chi 張溥泉先生全集, Taipei, 1952.

Chang Tzu-sheng 張特生, "Kuo-min Ko-ming-chün Pei-fa
Chan-cheng chih Ching-kuo," Tung-fang Tsa-chih, XXV, No.15 (August 10th,
1928), pp.21-32; No.16 (August 25th), pp.25-38; No.17
(September 10th), pp.41-66.

Chang Yu-i, ed. 章有義, Chung-kuo Chin-tai Nung-yeh Shih-tzu-
liao 中國近代農業史資料, Peking, 1957.

Ch'en Hui, 陳暉, Kuang-hsi Chiao-t'ung Wen-t'i 廣西交通
問題, Changsha, 1938.

Ch'en Kung-po Chou Fu-hai Hui-i-lu Ho-pien 陳公博周佛
源回憶錄合編, Hong Kong, 1967.

Ch'en Shao-chiao (pseud.) 陳少校, Chün-fa Pieh-chuan
軍閥別傳, Hong Kong, 1966.

Cheng Chian-lu 鄭健盧, Kuei-yu I-yüeh Chi 程濟一
月記, Shanghai, 1935.

Chiang Heng-yüan, ed. 江恆源, Hsi-nan Lü-hsiang Tsa-hsieh
西南旅行雜寫, Shanghai, 1937.

Chiang-shang-ch'ing (pseud.) 江上清, Cheng-hai Pi-wen 政
海秘聞, Hong Kong, 1966.

- Chiang Tsung-t'ung Yen-lun Hui-pien Pien-chi Wei-yüan-hui
 蔣總統言論彙編編輯委員會, Chiang Tsung-t'ung
 Yen-lun Hui-pien 蔣總統言論彙編, Taipei, 1956.
- Chiang Yung-ching 蔣永敬, Pao-lo-t'ing yü Wu-han Cheng-
 ch'üan 鮑羅廷與武漢政權, Taipei, 1963.
- Ch'ien Chia-chü 千家駒 Han Te-chang 韓德章 Wu Pan-nung
 吳半農, Kuang-hsi Sheng Ching-chi Kai-k'uang 廣西
 省經濟概況, Shanghai, 1936.
- Chien Tuan-sheng 錢端生, Min-kuo Cheng-chih Shih 民國
 政治史, Chungking, 1946.
- Chien Yu-wen 簡又文, Chin-t'ien chih Yu chi Ch'i-ta 金田
 之游及其他, Kweilin, 1944.
- Chou Ch'üan 周全, Kuei-hsi Chieh-p'ou 桂系解剖,
 Hong Kong, 1949.
- Chou Fu-hai 周佛海, Sheng-shuai Yüeh-chin Hua-ts'ang-
 sang 盛衰閱盡話滄桑, Hong Kong, 1956.
- Chu Chung-yü, ed. 朱仲五, Wei Pa-chün 韋拔羣,
 (Chung-kuo Li-shih Hsiao Ts'ung-shu, No.8), Peking, 1960.
- Chu Wei 儲禕, Chün-fa Pien-luan 軍閥變亂, Shanghai,
 1936.
- Chung-kuo Kuo-min-tang Kuang-hsi Kuo-min Ko-ming-chün T'e-pieh
 Tang-pu Chou-pan Hsüan-ch'uan-pu 中國國民黨廣西國民
 革命軍特別黨部籌辦宣傳部, Kuang-hsi
 Ko-min-chün Pan-yüeh K'an 廣西革命軍半月刊
 Part 2, 1926, July.
- Chung-kuo Kuo-min-tang Chung-yang Chih-hsing Wei-yüan-hui, 中
 國國民黨中央執行委員會, Chung-kuo Kuo-min-
 tang ti-er-tz'u Tai-piao Ta-hui Hsüan-yen chi Chüeh-i-an
 中國國民黨第二次代表大會宣言及決議案,
 Canton, 1926.

already
 listed

- Fang Kuang-han 方光漢, Kuang-hsi 廣西, Shanghai, 1939.
- Feng Ho-fa 馮合法, Chung-kuo Nung-ts'un Ching-chi Tzu-liao 中國農村經濟資料, Shanghai, 1935.
- Feng Chü-p'ei 馮菊沛, K'ang-ghan chung ti Ti-wu Lu-chün 抗戰中的第五路軍, Hankow, 1938.
- Feng Tzu-yu 馮自由, Ko-ming I-shih 革命軼史, Ch'angsha, 1939.
- Feng Yü-hsiang 馮玉祥, Feng Yü-hsiang Hui-i Lu 馮玉祥回憶錄, Shanghai, 1949.
- Hatano, Ken'ichi, Gendai Shihna no kiroku (Hsien-tai Chih-na chih Chi-lt'eh 現代支那之記錄), Enjin-sha, n.p., n.d.
- Ho Kan-chih, 何幹之, Chung-kuo Hsien-tai Ko-ming Shih 中國現代革命史, Peking, 1957.
- Ho Shao-ch'ung 何紹瓊 et al., eds., Ch'een Chi-t'ang Hsien-1 sheng Chi-nien Chü 陳濟棠先生紀念集, Hong Kong, 1957.
- Hsieh Fu-chih 謝扶民, "Chuang-tsu Jen-min Yu-hsiu ti Erh-tzu Wei Pa-chün," 僮族人民優秀的兒子事拔羣, Hung-ch'i P'iao-p'iao, V (December, 1957), pp.55-61.
- Hsü Chin-ch'eng 許金城 Min-kuo Wai-shih 民國外史 Hong Kong, 1957.
- Hu Hua 胡華, Chung-kuo Hsin-min-chu Chu-i Ko-ming Shih 中國新民主主義革命史, Peking, 1950.
- Hu Shih 胡適, Nan-yu Tsa-i 南遊雜憶, Shanghai, 1935.
- Huai Hsiang (pseud.) 懷鄉, Lun Li Tsung-jen yü Chung-mei Pan-tung-p'ai 論李宗仁與中美反動派, Hong Kong, 1948.
- Huang Hsü-ch'u 黃旭初, Chung-kuo Chien-she yü Kuang-hsi Chien-she 中國建設與廣西建設, Kweilin, 1939.
- Huang Hung-ch'ao 黃弘超, Kuang-hsi Shih-yeh Tiao-ch'a Chuan-k'an 廣西實業調查專刊, Canton, 1933.
- Huang Shao-hsiung 黃紹雄, Wu-shih Hui-i 五十四回憶. Shanghai, 1945.

Kao Yin-tsu 高蔭祖, Chung-hua Min-kuo Ta-shih Chi 中華
民國大事記, Taipei, 1957.

Kuang Hsiao-an 鄺笑菴, "Chien-she-hua ti Kuang-hsi," 3 pts.,
建設化的廣西, Kuo-wen Chou-pao V (1928), Nos 43-45.

Kuang-hsi Chien-she Chi-p'ing 廣西建設集言甲, 1935, n.p.

Kuang-hsi Chuang-tsu Tzu-chih-ch'ü Ch'ou-pei Wei-yüan-hui
廣西僑族自治區籌備委員會, Kuang-hsi Chuang-tsu
Tzu-chih-ch'ü 廣西僑族自治區, Peking, 1958.

Kuang-hsi Chuang-tsu Tzu-chih-ch'ü Jen-min Ch'u-pan-she
廣西僑族自治區人民出版社, Kuang-hsi Ko-ming Hui-i Lu
廣西革命回憶錄, Nanning, 1959.

Kuang-hsi Shao-shu Min-tsu She-hui-li-shih Tiao-ch'a-tsu
廣西少數民族社會歷史調查組, Kuang-hsi Hsin-hai Ko-ming
Tzu-liao 廣西辛亥革命資料, Nanning, 1960.

Kuang-hsi Sheng-cheng-fu T'ung-chi-ch'ü 廣西省政府
統計處, Ku-chin Kuang-hsi Lü-kuei Jen-ming Chien
古今廣西旅桂人名鑑, Kweilin, 1934.

_____, Kuang-hsi Nien-chien, Ti-erh Hui (1935) 廣西年
鑑, 第二回, Kweilin, 1936.

_____, Kuang-hsi T'ung-chi Ts'ung-shu 廣西統計叢書,
Nanning, 1934-1935.

Kuang-hsi Sheng Hsüan-ch'uan-pu 廣西省政府宣傳部, Ch'ing-
tang Ts'ung-shu 清黨叢書, Nanning, 1927.

Kuang-hsi Sheng Tang-cheng-chün Lien-hsi Hui-i 廣西省政府
黨政軍聯(系)會議, Kuang-hsi Chien-she Kang-ling
廣西建設綱領, Nanning, 1935.

Kuang-hsi Yin-hsiang Chi 廣西印象記, 1935, n.p.

Kung Ch'u 龔楚, Wo yü Hung-chün 我與紅軍, Hong Kong,
1955.

Kuo-fang-pu 國防部 , Pei-fa Chan-shih 北伐戰史 , Taipei, 1959.

_____. Wei-ta ti Chiang Chu-hsi 偉大的蔣主席 , Shanghai, 1946.

Kuo-li Wu-han Ta-hstleh 國立武漢大學 , Kuo-li Wu-han Ta-hstleh I-lan 國立武漢大學一覽 , Hankow, 1936.

Kuo-min Ko-ming-cht'n Ti-ssu Chi-t'uan-cht'n Tsung-ssu-ling-pu T'uan-wu-ch'u 國民革命軍第四集團總司令部團
賴處 , Kuang-hsi Min-t'uan Kai-yao 廣西民團概要 , n.p., n.d.

_____. Kuang-hsi Min-t'uan T'iao-li Chang-tse 廣西民團條例章則 , n.p., 1934.

Kuo Mo-jo 郭沫若 , Pei-fa T'u-tz'u 北伐途次 , Shanghai, 1947.

Lai Yen-yü, ed., 賴彥子 , Kuang-hsi I-lan 廣西一覽 , Nanning, 1935.

Li Tsung-huang 李宗黃 , Chung-kuo Kuo-min-tang Tang-shih 中國國民黨黨史 , Nanking, 1935.

Li Tsung-jen Battle Collection. Collection of military documents, on microfilm at Columbia University.

Li Tsung-jen et al., Kuang-hsi chih Chien-she 廣西之建設 , Kweilin, 1939.

Li Tsung-jen ti Sheng-yin 李宗仁的聲音 , Hong Kong, 1965.

Li Tsung-jen Yin-hsiang Chi 李宗仁印象記 , Hong Kong, 1937.

Li Tsung-jen 李宗仁 , Li Tsung-ssu-ling Tsui-chin Yen-chiang Chi 李總司令最近言講集 , n.p., 1935.

- Li Yün-han 李雲漢 , Ts'ung Jung-kung tao Ch'ing-tang 從容
共到清黨 , Taipei, 1966.
- Liang Sheng-chün 梁升俊 , Chiang-Li Tou-cheng Nei-mu 蔣李
鬥爭內幕 , Hong Kong, 1954.
- Liang Sou-ming 梁漱溟 , Chung-kuo Min-tsu Tzu-chiu Yün-tung
chih Tsui-hou Ch'ieh-wu 中國民族自救運動之最後
警悟 , Peking, 1932.
- Lo Ch'ao-p'ing 駱超平 , Kuang-tung Ti-gang Ming-jen Lu
廣東地方名人錄 , Canton, 1948.
- Lo Chia-lun, ed., 羅家倫 , Ko-ming Wen-hsien 革命文獻
Taipei, 1953 - .
- _____ . Kuo-fu Nien-p'u Ch'u-kaio 國父年譜初稿, Taipei,
1959.
- Lo Yün-yen 羅雲炎 , Chung-kuo Ya-p'ien Wen-t'i 中國鴉片
問題 , Shanghai, 1929.
- Lu Chien 陸鑑 , Kuang-hsi Chün Yüan-cheng Chi 廣西軍遠
征記 , Hankow, 1938..
- Mao Ssu-ch'eng 毛思城 , Min-kuo Shih-wu-nien i-ch'ien chih
Chiang Chie-shih Hsien-sheng 民國十五年以前之蔣介
石先生 , Shanghai, 1936.
- P'ang Tun-chih 龐敦志 , Ch'ing-suan Kuei-hsi 清算程系 ,
Canton, 1950.
- _____ . Kuang-hsi She-hui T'e-chih 廣西社會特質 , Hong
Kong, 1950.
- P'eng Hst'eh-pei 彭學沛 , Kuang-hsi Sheng Nung-ts'un Tiao-
ch'a 廣西烟農村調查 , Nanking, 1934.
- T'an-tang-tang-chai-chu 坦蕩齋主 , Hsien-tai Chung-
kuo Ming-jen Wai-shih 現代中國名人外史 , Peking,
1935.

T'ang Chi-yao 唐繼堯, (biography, speeches and poetry),
Taipei, 1967.

T'ao Chü-yin 陶菊隱, Chiang Pai-li Hsien-sheng Chuan
蔣百里先生傳, Shanghai, 1948.

_____. Chin-tai I-wen 近代軼聞, Shanghai, 1945.

_____. Pei-yang Chün-fa T'ung-chih Shih-ch'i Shih-hua
北洋軍閥統治時期史話, Peking, 1957.

_____. Wu P'ei-fu Chiang-chün Chuan 吳佩孚將軍傳,
Shanghai, 1941 $\frac{1}{2}$.

T'eng Yen-ta Hsien-sheng I-chu 鄧演達先生遺著, Hong
Kong, 1949.

Ti-i-tz'u Kuo-nei Ko-ming Chan-cheng Shih-ch'i ti Nung-min
Yün-tung 第一次國內革命戰爭時期的農民運動,
Peking, 1954.

Ting Ku Tsung-han-shih Wen-chiang Shih-shih Nien-chou-nien
Chi-nien-k'an 丁敬總辦育文江浙世廿週念. 紀
念刊, Taipei, 1956.

Ting Wen-chiang 丁文江, Chung-hua Min-kuo Hsin Ti-tu
中華民國新地圖, Shanghai, 1934.

Ts'ai T'ing-k'ai 蔡廷鍇, Tzu Chuan 自傳, Hong Kong,
1946.

Ts'ao Chü-jen 曹聚仁, Chiang Pai-li P'ing-chuan 蔣百
里評傳, Hong Kong, 1963.

Ts'en Ch'un-hsüan 岑春煊, Lo-chai Man-pi 樂齋漫筆,
(ed. Wu Hsiang-hsiang), Taipei, 1962.

Tsou Lu 鄒魯, Chung-kuo Kuo-min-tang Shih-kao 中國國
民黨史稿, Chungking, 1944.

_____. Hui-ku Lu 回顧錄, Chungking, 1943.

- Wang Ching-wei, Li Tsung-jen et al., 汪精衛李宗仁 , T'ao Chiang Yen-lun-chi 討蔣言論集 , Canton, 1931.
- Wen Kung-chih 文公直 , Chung-hua Min-kuo Ko-ming Shih 中華
民國革命史 , Shanghai, 1936.
- _____ . Tsui-chin San-shih-nien Chung-kuo Chün-shih Shih
最近三十年中國軍事史 , Taipei, 1962. (Peprint of
edition published Shanghai, 1930).
- Wu Hsiang-hsiang, ed., Chung-kuo Chin-tai Shih Lun-ts'ung
中國近代史論叢 , Taipei, 1957 - ,
- Yang Chia-ming 楊宗鎰 , Min-kuo Shih-wu-nien Hst'eh-sheng
Yün-tung 民國十五年學生運動 , Shanghai, 1927.
- Yin Shih (pseud.) 隱士 , Li-Chiang Kuan-hsi yü Chung-kuo
- Yin Shih (pseud.) 隱士 , Li-Chiang Kuan-hsi yü Chung-kuo
蔣與中國 , Hong Kong, 1954.

GLOSSARY

This glossary is not exhaustive, and lists only persons who were closely connected with Kwangsi or the Kwangsi Clique. There is a separate list of all Chinese phrases quoted in the text and footnotes.

1. People

Chang Chih-pen	張知本	Chou Tsu-huang	周祖晃
Chang Hua-fu	張華輔	Chung Tsu-p'ei	鍾祖培
Chang Jen-min	張任民		
Chang Kan	張淦	Fan Shih-sheng	范石生
Chang Yün-i	張雲逸	Feng Pao-ch'u	馮葆初
Ch'en Chi-t'ang	陳濟棠		
Ch'en Chiung-ming	陳炯明	Han Ts'ai-feng	韓彩鳳
Ch'en Hsieh-wu	陳協五	Hsia Wei	夏威
Ch'en Hsiung	陳友佳	Hsiung K'ao-wu	熊克武
Ch'en Li-ya	陳立亞	Hsü Ch'i-ming	徐啟明
Ch'en Mien-shu	陳勉	Hsü Ching-t'ang	徐景唐
Ch'en Ming-shu	陳銘樞	Hsüeh Tu-pi	薛篤弼
Ch'en Ping-k'un	陳炳焜	Hu Tsung-to	胡宗鑑
Ch'eng Ssu-yuan	程思遠	Huang Chen-kuo	黃鎮國
Chiang Pai-li	蔣百里	Huang Chia-chih	黃家植
Chou Hsi-huan	周錫樞	Huang Hsü-ch'u	黃旭初

Huang Hua-piao	黃華表	Lu Ti-p'ing	魯海平
Huang Jih-k'uei	黃日葵	Lu Yung-t'ing	陸榮廷
Huang Shao-hsiung	黃紹堯	Lung Chi-kuang	龍濟光
Kung Ch'u	龔楚	Lung Chin-kuang	龍勤光
		Lung Yün	龍雲
Lei Pei-hung	雷沛鴻	Ma Chi	馬濟
Lei Pei-t'ang	雷沛濤	Ma Chün-wu	馬君武
Li Ch'ao-fang	李朝芳	Ma Hsiao-chün	馬曉軍
Li Chi-shen	李濟璋	Mai Huan-chang	麥煥章
Li Ming-jui	李明瑞	Meng Chih	蒙志
Li P'in-hsien	李品仙		
Li Tsung-jen	李宗仁	Pai Ch'ung-hsi	白崇禧
Liang Ch'ao-chi	梁朝璣		
Liang Han-sung	梁瀚嵩	Sheng Hung-ying	沈鴻英
Liang Liu-tu	梁六度	Shen Pao-i	申保藩
Liang Sou-ming	梁漱溟	Su Yüan-ch'un	蘇元春
Liao Lei	廖磊		
Lin Hu	林虎	T'an Ch'ao	覃超
Lin Chün-t'ing	林俊廷	T'an Hao-ming	譚浩明
Liu Chen-huan	劉震寰	T'an Lien-fang	覃連芳
Liu Pai-k'uei	劉百揆	T'an Tao-yuan	譚道源
Lu Ching-ts'un	呂競存	T'an Yen-k'ai	譚延闓
Lu Huan-yen	呂煥炎	T'ang Chi-yao	唐繼堯

T'ang Sheng-chih	唐生智	Wu Chung-hsin	吳忠信
T'aó Ch'án	陶敏鈞	Wu T'ing-yang	伍廷耀
Teng Pen-ying	鄧本殷	Yang Hsi-min	楊希閔
Teng Yen-ta	鄧演達	Yang Teng-hui	揚騰輝
Ts'en Ch'un-hsüan	岑春煊	Yeh Ch'i	葉琪
Ts'en Yü-ying	岑毓英	Yi Pei-chi	易培基
Wei Pa-ch'án	韋拔羣	Yü Chih-fang	俞志芳
Wei Yün-sung	章雲淞	Yü Tso-po	俞作柏
Wei Yung-ch'eng	章永成	Yü Tso-yü	俞作預

2. Phrases

Cheng-li Shui-wu Wei-yuan-hui 整理稅務委員會

ch'i-min 旗民

Chiang-chiao Chiang-hsi Suo 將校講習所

Chien-kuo Ta-kang 建國大系團

ch'ien-ti tsung-chih-hui 前敵總指揮

Ch'ing-nien T'uan 青年團

Ch'ing-tang 清黨

ch'iuung tso-fa 窮作法

chu-i, chu-i ti ch'ün-tui 主義, 主義的軍隊

ch'ün, ch'ün-fa 軍, 軍閥

Chung-kuo Hui-chiao Hui 中國回教會

Chung-shan | Shih-pien 中山事變
| ch'ien | 艦

20/3/206 ?

Chung-yang Chih-hsing Wei-yüan-hui Hsi-nan 中央執行委員
Chih-hsing Pu 會西南執行部

fen-chih ho-tso 分治合作

hao-wan ti tung-hsi 好玩的東西

Hsi-shan Hui-i 西山會議

hsiang 鄉

hsien 縣

hsiu-ts'ai 秀才

Hu-fa, Hu-fa Chün 護法, 護法軍

Hu-kuo, Hu-kuo Chün 護國, 護國軍

Hu-tang Chiu-kuo Chün 護黨救國軍

Jung-kung 容共

Kang-jih Chiu-kuo Chün 抗日救國軍

kao-teng yu-min 高等游民

k'o-chün 客軍

kuan hua 官話

Kuang-hsi Chien-she Kang-ling 廣西建設軍團令領

Kuang-hsi Lu-chün Hsiao-hstieh 廣西陸軍小學

Kuang-hsi Lu-chün Su-ch'eng Hsiao-hstieh 廣西陸軍連成小學

Kuang-nan Sheng 廣南省

K'uang-ta Hui-i 擴大會議

Kuo Fu 國父

Kuo-min Cheng-fu Hsi-nan Cheng-wu 國民政府西南政務
Wei-yüan-hui 委員會

Kuo-min Cheng-fu Hsi-nan Chün-shih 國民政府西南軍事
Wei-yüan-hui 委員會

Liu-i Yün-tung 六一運動

Lu-chün Chung-hsteh 陸軍中學

Lu-chün Yü-pei Hsteh-hsiao 陸軍預備學校

Min-cheng Hui-i 民政會議

Min-cheng Kung-shu 民政公署

mou 畝

Nan-Lu 南路

pao-ching an-min 保境安民

Pao-ting Chün-hsiao 保定軍校

Pei-ching Lu-chün Ta-hsteh 北京陸軍大學

Pi Yün Ssu 碧雲寺

San-wei I-t'i 三位一體

San-tzu Cheng-ts'e 三自政策

San-yü Cheng-ts'e 三富政策

Shan-hou Hui-i 善後會議

Shan-hou Hui-pan 善後會辦事

後

Shan-hou Tu-pan 善後督辦
 shih 師
 ssu-ling 司令

Ta Kuang-hsi Chu-i 大廣西主義
 T'ao-fa Kuei-hsi Hstlan-ch'uan Ta-kang 討伐桂系宣傳大會
 T'ao Tse Chün 討賊軍
 Ting Kuei Chün 定程軍
 ts'un kung-suo 村公所
 tu-chün, tu-pan 督軍, 督辦
 t'u-pu 土布
 t'ung chih kuo 桐之國
 t'ung-hsiang 同鄉
 tsu-li wei-wang 自立為王

wei-lao-tui 慰勞隊
 Wu-sheng Lien-fang Hui-i 五省聯防會議

yang-nu 洋奴
 yao-jen 粟人
 yüan 元

TABLE I

	<u>Birthplace in Kwangsi</u>	<u>Early Education</u>	<u>Further Education</u>	<u>Early Military Service</u>
Chang Jen-min	Liuchow	<u>KHLCHH</u>	Paoting Academy	<u>KHMFY</u>
Chang Kan	?	"	"	"
Ch'en Hsiung	Jung hsien	"	"	"
Chou Tsu-huang	Kweilin	?	"	In Hunan
Chung Tsu-p'ei	Kungeh'eng	<u>KHLCHH</u>	?	In Kwangsi
Hsia Wei	Jung hsien	"	Paoting Academy	<u>KHMFY</u>
Hsü Ch'i-ming	?	"	"	"
Huang Chen-kuo	Liuchow	?	"	?
Huang Hsü-ch'u	Jung hsien	<u>KHLCHH</u>	Pei-ching Lu-chün	<u>KHMFY</u>
Huang Shao-hsiung	Jung hsien	"	Ta-hsdeh	"
Li Ch'ao-fang	Jung hsien	"	Paoting Academy	In Kwangsi
Li Ming-ju	Kueip'ing	"	"	In Kwangsi
Li P'in-hsien	Peiliu	In Kwangtung	?	In Hunan
Li Tsung-jen	Wuchow	<u>KHLCHH</u>	Paoting Academy	In Kwangtung
Liang Ch'ao-chi	Kweilin	"	None	<u>KHMFY</u>
Liang Han-sung	Peiliu	"	Paoting Academy	?
Liao Lei	P'ingyang	"	"	In Hunan
Lu Ching-ts'un	Luch'uan	"	"	?
	Kweilin	?	"	


TABLE I - continued


	<u>Birthplace in Kwangsi</u>	<u>Early Education</u>	<u>Further Education</u>	<u>Early Military Service</u>
Iu Huan-yen	Iuch'uan	<u>KHLCHH</u>	<u>Paoting Academy</u>	In Kwangsi
Meng Chih	?	"	?	In Kwangsi
Pai Ch'ung-hsi	Kweilin	"	<u>Paoting Academy</u>	<u>KHMFY</u>
T'an Lien-fang	Liuchow	"	"	In Kwangsi
Wei Yün-sung	Jung hsien	?	?	In Kwangsi
Wu T'ing-yang	Jung hsien	<u>KHLCHH</u>	?	In Kwangsi
Yang Teng-hui	Shanglin	?	?	In Kwangsi
Yeh Ch'i	Jung hsien	<u>KHLCHH</u>	<u>Paoting Academy</u>	In Hunan
Yü Chih-fang	?	"	"	<u>KHMFY</u>

Table I lists the main military supporters of the Kwangsi Clique, and shows their place of birth, education and early military service. Most of these men remained with the Clique until 1949.

KHLCHH -- Kuang-hsi Lu-chün Hsiao-hsteh KHMFY -- Kuang-hsi Mo-fang-ying
(Model Battalion)

MAP I The First Base of the Kwangsi Clique, 1922-3





MAP III

The Kwangsi Soviet, 1929-30.

