A STUDY OF THE POLITICO-ECONOMIC CONDITIONS

AND ADMINISTRATIVE STRUCTURE OF THE MECCAN

EMIRATE DURING THE BURJI PERIOD

(784-923 A.H./1382-1517 A.D.)

by

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ABSTRACT

Paradoxically, the religio-commercial importance of the Meccan region turned out to be little in favour and more against the interest of the <u>Sha</u>rifs of Mecca. They had long been compelled to acknowledge the sovereignty of various rulers and during the <u>Burji</u> period have also forfeited much of the their revenue as well as their control of/administration.

2 +

The present study deals with various aspects associated with the hisory of Mecca and shows the effect of the manifold grip of the Burji Sultans.

The first two chapters concentrates on the manifestation of political activities of local <u>Ashrāf</u>. The dependencies of Mecca have also been examined with particular reference to the elevation of certain <u>Sh</u>arifs to the in the Hijāz exalted position of <u>Nā'ib al-Sultān</u>/and the nature of relationship between the <u>Sh</u>arifs of Mecca and non Egyptian Sultans.

Chapters III-VII of this thesis discusses the general economic condition and various sources of income and expenditures of the <u>Sharifs</u> of Mecca are examined. The survey reveals that the <u>Sharifs</u> obtained a considerable amount of money from tolls, custom dues and other sources not related to trade. These various financial gains of the <u>Sharifs</u> diminished greatly after 828/1425 in consequence of the diversion of most of the revenue to Cairo by the Egyptian Sultans. Their other direct or indirect exploitation had a very detrimental effect on the general prosperity of the region.

The last three chapters are devoted to treat issues relevant to local administration. It shows that almost entire administration was controlled by the <u>Sharifi</u> officials until 828/1425. From that year onwards their authority dwindled and the Sultani officials acquired ever increasing influence and dominance. The simultaneous functioning of these two groups of officials caused occasional friction which were usually resolved in favour of the Sultani officials.

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Finally I should like to express my most profound gratitude to my father, <u>Shaykh Abū</u> Said Abdullah, and to other members of the family whose continuous endurance and encouragement made possible the continuation of this research for a rather lengthy period.

Consonants		-	<u>Consonants</u>	
۶	<pre>* (except when initial)</pre>		خى	ġ
e_	đ		b	ţ
لمت	t		Б	Ş
E	th		٤	t
で	j		ě	gh
て	þ.		ڡ	f
Ż	<u>kh</u>		Ï	q
フ	d		Ś	k
ż	<u>dh</u>		5	l
ノ	r		٢	m
Ĵ	z		$\dot{\upsilon}$	n
uu	S		8	h
س ت ص	sh		و	W
ص	5		S	у
Long vowels			Short vowels	<u>5</u>
and i	a		1	a
	π			u
	ĩ		7	i
	Diphthongs			
	9 <u>_</u>	aw		
	ت ی	ay		
		iyy (fina	l form I)	
	~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~	und (fina	1 form 57)	

## SYSTEM OF TRANSLITERATION OF ARABIC CHARACTERS

k

Finally,

S

9

S

 $d_{j}$  at (construct state) and  $\Im$  (article) al-.

uww (final form ū)

## ABBREVIATIONS

A 1117	Maktaba 'Ārif Hikma, Medina, Saudi Arabia.
A. HK	•
AR.	Arabic
art.	article
A.S.	Library of Aya Sofya, Istanbul, Turkey.
B.A.	Library of Besir Aga, Istanbul, Turkey.
Ed.	edited or edition.
E.E.	Library of Esat Effendi, Istanbul, Turkey.
E.I. ¹	Encyclopaedia of Islam, 1st edition, Leiden, 1913-42.
<u>E.I.</u> 2	Encyclopaedia of Islam, 2nd edition, Luzac and Co.,
	London, 1960 - in progress.
Ex.	Extract.
FAT	Library of Fatih, Istanbul, Turkey.
KOP	Library of Köprulu, İstanbul, Turkey.
L.U.I.	Library of the University of Istanbul, Turkey.
M.H.M.	Maktabat al-Haram al-Makki, Mecca.
N.OS.	Library of Nuri Osmaniye, Istanbul, Turkey.
pub.	published or publisher.
T.S.	Library of Topkapi Sarayi Muzesi, Istanbul, Turkey.
U.P.	"Unpublished pages", title given by M. Mustafa to
	a portion of Ibn I'yas's Bada'i which the former
	had editted and published.

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#### INTRODUCTION

#### AND SOME NOTES ON THE SOURCES

#### Introduction

The region of Mecca - which is the focal point of all the aspects dealt with in this thesis - lies, as is well known, within the region of the Hijāz,¹ once the keystone of the political structure of the Muslim empire. But before the end of the first century of the Hijra/8th century of the Christian era, the Hijāz found itself without real political influence and importance. Events in and around the region had reduced its status from that of an imperial province to that of a dependency of one or the other of the new centres of gravity of the Islamic world such as Syria, 'Irāq, Egypt, and even the Yemen. But this did not and could not deprive the region of its great and unique religious significance as the region was the cradle of Islam and contained <u>al-Harámayn</u>.² It was this very advantage of the region which, somewhat ironically, caused its

¹The Arab geographers as well as the historians differ from each other in their definitions of this region and none of their conflicting views seems to be conclusive and satisfactory. How confusing some of these definitions are is well illustrated in a thesis entitled The Hijaz as defined by the Arab geographers submitted for the degree of Ph.D. by Mr. A. Al-Wehaibi, now Dr., in the University of London in 1969. Obviously it is not possible to go through all the complicated details concerning the definition of the Hijāz, as this would be feasible only at the expense of other more relevant and important topics in connection with this thesis. This region, as is well known, lies in the north-western part of the Arabian peninsula and at present it is well defined. Much of what is known now as Tihāmat al-Shām and Tihāmat Asīr was during the <u>Burji</u>period;, as will be seen, among the dependencies of Mecca. For several useful details about the Hijāz, see B. Lewis, <u>The Arabs</u> in History (Hutchinson University Library, London, 1960), pp. 21-22; G. Rentz, E.I.², art. "Al-Hidjaz", pp. 362-64; idem, E.I.², art. "Djazirat Al- Arab", pp. 533-56 and works cited in its bibliography.

²Two holy places, usually meaning Mecca and Medina, but occasionally Jerusalem and Hebron. B. Lewis, <u>E.I.²</u>, art. "Al-Haramayn", pp. 175-76. See also: O. Grapar, <u>E.I.²</u>, art. "Al-Haram al-<u>Sh</u>arif", pp. 173-75.

domination by various rival Muslim rulers. In the period eventually the issue was settled, and for good, in favour of the late <u>Bahri</u> Sultans and their hegemony over the Hijāz was consolidated further by the <u>Burjī</u> Sultans.¹

There can be little, if any, doubt that the importance of the area rested on its unique religious significance and that the greatest reason behind the desire and competition of several rulers for its domination was to acquire prestige and an enviable position. But this was not the only reason and other considerations, especially commercial, must also have been present in the minds of these contenders, who were more than willing to derive material benefit through control of the Hijäz.

The geographical location of the Hijāz, with its long coast and several sea ports, and the annual ceremony of the pilgrimage, had made it eminently suitable as a transit route for the east-west trade and had made Mecca a centre of the overland commercial transaction with the Yemen, 'Irāq, Syria, Egypt, and figured as one or the other, or both simultaneously, at various times in its history.

¹The <u>Mamluk</u>/Sultans (655-923/1257-1517) are usually divided into two groups: <u>Babri</u> and <u>Burjī</u>, after the location of their regimental residence. The former were usually stationed on the isle of al-Rawda in the River Nile(<u>Bahr al-Nil</u>) and the latter in the tower (Abrāj, sing. Burj) of Cairo citadel. Both groups, or the majority, to be more exact, differed from each other on ethnical grounds too. The <u>Babris</u> were Qipčaq Turks and the <u>Burjis</u> Circassians, known also as <u>Jarakisa</u> (sing. Jarkas). The rule of the <u>Babri</u> Sultans practically ended in 784/1382 and the <u>Burji</u> rule lasted until 923/1517. For the points mentioned and further details, see B. Lewis, "Egypt and Syria" in <u>The Cambridge History of Islam</u>, 2 vols. (Cambridge University Press, London, 1970), vol.I, p.209/219; D. Ayalon, <u>E.I.</u>², art. "Babriyya", pp. 944-45; idem, <u>E.I.</u>², art. "Burdjiyya", pp. 1324-25; idem, Halil Inalcik and others, <u>E.I.</u>², art. "Cerkes", pp. 21-25; G. Wiet, <u>E.I.</u>², art. "Barkuk", pp. 1050-51.

Though most of the <u>Burji</u> Sultans were Circassians, there were among them Sultans of other ethnical origin. For instance, Sultan <u>Khushqadam (865-72/1460-67)</u> and Sultan Tamarbugha (Jumādā I, 872/ "From very early times Arabia has formed a transit area between the Mediterranean countries and the further east, and its history has to a large extent been determined by the vicissitudes of east-west traffic communication both within Arabia and through Arabia have been directed by the geographical configuration of the peninsula into certain well defined lines. The first of these is the Hijāz route, running from the Red Sea ports and the border ports of Palestine and Transjordan along the inner flank of the Red Sea coastal range and onwards to the Yemen..."

This commercial significance of the region and the resulting financial gains were not confined to any specific period but increased tremendously during the <u>Burji</u> period and, with this, the grip of the Egyptian Sultan over the area.

Long before the period under examination the Hijāz had been politically in a state of fragmentation and had come to consist of several small principalities ruled usually by a <u>Sharif</u>.² The most

Rajab 872/Dec. 1467-Feb.1468) were of Rumi origin. See: Yüsuf b. Taghri Birdi, <u>al-Nujūm al-Zahira fi Mulūk Mişr wa'l-Qahira</u> (Ms. A.S. No. 3499), vol. VII, fol. 310; idem, <u>Hawadith al-Duhūr fi mada</u> al-Ayyām wa'l-Shuhūr (Ex. ed. by W. Popper in three parts, California, 1930-32), part III, p.657; Muhammad b. Ahmad b. Iyās, <u>Bada'i al-Zuhūr fi waqā'if al-Duhūr</u>, 2 vols. (Bulaq, 1311/1893), vol. II,pp.70 and 87-89; idem, <u>Badā'i</u> (a portion dealing with the events between 857-72/1453-67 which was left out of Istanbul's edition (vols. III-V, 1931-36 A.D.), is ed. and pub. under the title Şafhat lam tunshar (i.e. Unpublished pages) by M. Mustafa (Cairo, 1951), p.195; see also: 'Abd al-Hayy b. Ahmad b. al-'Imād, Shadharāt al-Dhahab fi akhbār man Dhahab, 8 vols. (Cairo, 1350-51/ 1931-32), vol. VII, pp. 315 and 326.

¹B.Lewis, <u>The Arabs in History</u>, p.22. See also: idem, "The Fatimids and the route to India" in <u>Revue de la Faculté des Sciences economiques</u> <u>de l'Université d'Istanbul</u>, XI (1949-50), pp. 50-54; H.Lammens, <u>E.I.</u>¹, art. "Mecca", pp. 437-42; Map of "Trade routes and main products", <u>Atlas of the Arab world and the Middle East</u> (Macmillan and Co. Ltd., London, 1960).

²The term <u>Sharif</u> (plur. <u>Ashraf</u>, <u>Shurafa</u>), "noble, exalted", the root of which expresses the <u>idea of elevation</u> and prominence, means primarily a freeman, who can claim a distinguished position because of his descent from illustrious ancestors. This term is generally used in the <u>Hijaz</u> to signify a descendant of the Prophet Muhammad through his grandsons Hasan and Husayn, sons of the Prophet's daughter Fatima and son-in-law 'Ali. This term is frequently used to denote the Amirs of the local principalities but has no exclusive connection with the prominent of these local emirates were those of Mecca, Medina, and Yanbu'. The <u>Sharifs</u> of Mecca and Yanbu' belonged to the Hasani branch and those of Medina to the Husayni. Both these groups were divided into several sub-groups on the basis of their immediate family ties. In addition to the three above stated main emirates, there were other less important small principalities such as the emirates of <u>Khulays</u>, Haly, al-Qunfudha, which were on the whole under the control of the <u>Sharifs</u> of Mecca. The latter also enjoyed, intermittently, authority over the <u>Sharifs</u> of Medina and Yanbu' when elevated to the status of <u>Nä^{*}ib al-Sultán</u> (deputy of the Sultan) in the Hijāz.

In view of what has been said, it is evident that the <u>Sharifs</u> of Mecca were the most influential and strongest in the region and it is therefore by no means surprising that the Egyptian Sultans as well as other rulers considered their relationship with the <u>Sharifs</u> of Mecca far more important than those with any other Amir in the region. The <u>Sharifs</u> of Mecca were undoubtedly the richest and most powerful among the local Amirs but this should not be over-estimated, as their power was confined within the region and was far from being unchallenged. The elevation of the <u>Sharif</u> of Mecca to the status of <u>Na²ib al-Sultān</u> was bound to give him considerable authority but, to judge by the information available, it could be said with certainty that the actual authority <u>Ma²ib al-Sultān</u> was far less than that which the title

emirate itself, as many non-Sharifs were in control of these principalities and particularly Mecca. But from the later part of the <u>Bahri</u> period all the Amirs appointed were and had to be <u>Sharifs</u>. For the points mentioned and further details, see B. Lewis, <u>E.I.</u>², art. "Alids", pp. 400-403 and the genealogical table; C. van Arendonk, <u>E.I.</u>¹, art. "Sharif", pp. 324-29; G.Rentz, <u>E.I.</u>², art. "Hashimids, Al-Hawashim", pp. 262-63; A.J.Wensinck, <u>E.I.</u>¹, art. "Mecca", pp. 437-48; Fr. Buhl, <u>E.I.</u>¹, art. "Alids", pp. 1158-59.

indicates. It implies, in theory, that the whole region of the Higaz was placed under the control of <u>Na'ib al-Sultān</u> but in fact it was seldom more than a symbolic change in his status. True that the <u>Sharifs</u> of Medina and Yanbu usually acknowledged the formal superiority of <u>Na'ib al-Sultān</u> but without surrendering much of their own authority and control of their respective areas.

The <u>Sharifs</u> of Mecca have established friendly relationship with non Egyptian Muslim rulers. The former, however, could no longer play off one Sultan against another for their political or financial gains. The <u>Burji</u> Sultans have consolidated their hegemony to such an extent that it could not be opposed or altered by local or other forces. The <u>Sharifs</u> often received envoys and gifts from various Muslim rulers. The sender may or may not have entertained some political design but there is nothing to suggest that the <u>Sharifs</u> of Mecca made such contact on the basis of a politically motivated external policy directed against the hegemony of their <u>Mamlūk</u> overlords. Occasionally some of the Trăqī or the Yemenite rulers enjoyed minor privileges. But this was never without the approval of, or at the expense of, the <u>Burjī</u> Sultans.

The financial position and the administrative ability of the <u>Sharifs</u> of Mecca were relatively stronger than other local Amirs.But their Egyptian overlords not only diverted most of the revenue to Cairo but also,by their ever increasing interference in local administration, deprived the <u>Sharifs from much of their wealth and authority</u>.

It is worth pointing out that the extension of the <u>Sharifs</u> of Mecca's influence over the local chiefs-particularly those between Jedda and the Yemen-seems to had the blessing of the Egyptian Sultans to ensure the safety of the merchants heading for Mecca or Jedda or further north, by land or by sea, from or across the Yemen and were a great source of the revenue. It can even be assumed that the occasional elevation of some of the Meccan <u>Sharifs</u> to the status of <u>Na^{*}ib al-Sultan</u> was motivated by reasons of security as the latter was, at least supposedly, in control of the eastern coast of the Red Sea with its adjoining areas towards the hinterlands from Jazan onwards up to almost its northernmost limit.

In connection with this official or <u>de facto</u> influence of the Meccan <u>Sharifs</u> it is worth mentioning that neither they nor their Egyptian overlords ever tried seriously to make the region a single political entity. In fact, all the factual evidence, local events, the desire of the local Amirs to retain their principalities as separate entities, and the policies of the Egyptian Sultans, point to the contrary. Obviously it was in the interest of the Sultans to keep the region as it was, in political fragmentation and therefore powerless.

Charities sent to or distributed in Mecca by Muslim rulers, officials and pilgrims played a considerable part in the economic life of the city in that they accounted for a very substantial part of its total influx of money as well as a huge quantity of grain and other foodstuffs. Obviously its ostensible aim was to benefit the poor and needy, but in actual fact they were rarely the main beneficiaries. The religio-commercial importance of the region brought, before and during the period under examination, a large number of multi-national Muslim merchants with various merchandise. Some of these items such as grain and other foodstuff - were for local need, while others, especially spices, were in international demand and were of great value in the east-west trade. This commercial activity in J&dda and Mecca and subsequently the revenue of the <u>Sh</u>arif increased tremendously around 827/1424 when the Indian merchants made J&dda, at the expense

of Aden, centre of their trade. The change brought to the economic life of Mecca by the arrival of the Indian merchants had far reaching political, economic and administrative consequences for the <u>Sharifs</u> of Mecca. Trade blossomed so rapidly and the revenue from it shot up so dramatically that it awakened the greed of the Egyptian Sultans who suddenly felt unwilling to leave most of the benefit to the <u>Sharifs</u> of Mecca. The <u>Sharifs</u> were not <u>callowed</u> to keep this substantial income, most of which was reserved for the treasury in Cairo, and only a portion was granted to them. The <u>Sharifs</u>, however, were entitled to other incomes derived from tolls, escheat, and their customary share in charities.

Paradoxically enough, this economic growth of the area turned out to be little in favour and more against the financial interest of the Sharifs of Mecca. They forfeited, in one way or the other, a considerable part of their reduced revenue to the Egyptian Sultans or dignitaries. In addition, the political hegemony of the Egyptian Sultans was strengthened further as they tightened their grip on the administration to such an extent that it amounted to their virtual take over of the local administration. All the key officials were directly appointed by the Sultans in Cairo, a fact which dwarfed the stature of the officials of the Sharif to such a degree that they appeared insignificant by comparison. The stationing of a permanent Mamluk garrison in Mecca could be interpreted as a final seal on the subordination of the local Amirs. Politically the Sharifs of Mecca had for centuries never enjoyed complete freedom, but now they found themselves hampered right and left in their relations with their equals as well as with their subordinates. They found greater difficulty in dealing with rebellious Ashraf and Quwwad, if only because

because the funds on which the drew to settle sporadic frictions had dwindled.

The frequent internal strife in the region was also indirectly connected with the arrival of a large number of foreign merchants in the region as well as with the reduced strength of the <u>Sharifs</u>. The opponents of the ruling <u>Sharifs</u> of Mecca often chose these merchants as their target to secure material gains. Thus, not only were commercial activities in the area reduced, and subsequently the revenue, but also the ruling <u>Sharif</u> was caused additional material loss and was often compelled to appease his antagonists by payment of a substantial amount of money to stabilize the situation.

Evidently the reduction of the <u>Sharif's share</u> in the revenue and his various financial obligations and usual expenditure made him live under continuous material pressure from one quarter or the other. This may explain, though in no way justify, why the <u>Sharifs</u> of Mecca often resorted to the acquisition of money by illegal channels.

This very financial pressure, together with the personal greed and need, may account for the reprehensible conduct of many Sultani officials in pursuit of material profit during the term of their office. Many of them, especially those sent to J2dda as tax collectors, secured their appointments in return for considerable amounts of money already paid or deferred until the return of the official in question to Cairo - and did their best to increase their personal gains regardless of the method. Various examples testify to the ill-treatment meted out to merchants and other citizens by these officials to secure their ill-gotten fortune.

# Some Notes on the Sources

Almost all the principal Arabic sources used in this thesis are well known and hardly require more than a few essential points concerning their reliability in general and their contribution to this thesis in particular.² Some biographical details of certain historians which were helpful in realizing the value of their works have also been mentioned. Before we evaluate each primary source

¹In the period under examination a large number of prolific historians and other scholars lived and wrote several valuable works. In view of the religious significance of the holy cities almost all the historians refer to some event in the Hijāz and thus it was possible to increase the number of sources by including those who have made no real contribution, but this was avoided. On the other hand, some useful source may have been unintentionally omitted. In fact, a research which deals with so many aspects of the history of a region over a rather lengthy period is bound to have some deficiency.

²Several indispensable works contain valuable information about certain historians, including some of those used in this research, or the general trend in the Muslim historiography. The following works are particularly useful: B.Lewis and P.M.Holt, <u>Historians of the Middle East</u> (London, 1962); F.Rosenthal, <u>Technique and approach of the</u> <u>Muslim Scholarship</u> (Rome, 1947); idem, <u>A History of Muslim Historiography</u>, 2nd ed. (Leiden, 1968); Jean Sauvaget, <u>Introduction to the</u> <u>History of the Muslim East</u> (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1965); Carl Brockelmann, <u>Geschichte Der Arabischen Litterature</u> with its supplements ( Leiden, 1898-1942); D.S.Margolioth, <u>Lectures on Arabic</u> <u>Historians</u> (Calcutta, 1930); Hajji Khalifa, Kashf al-Zunun An <u>Asma' al-Kutub wa'l-Funun</u>, 2 vols. (Cairo, 1340/1921); Isma Il Pasha, I'dah al-Maknun fi al-Dhayl 'Ala Kashf al-Zunun, 2 vols. (Cairo, 1364/1945).

A number of articles in <u>E.I.</u>¹ and <u>E.I.</u>² provide a fair amount of information about most of the contemporary sources used in this thesis and are referred to in appropriate places. However, as a number of pre-<u>Burji</u> and late sources have been marginally used but are not discussed individually the following articles are mentioned (in the chronological order of the historians) as token reference to some useful sources of information: C.H.Pellat, <u>E.I.²</u>, art. "Ibn Djubayr", p.755; M. Miquel, <u>E.I.²</u>, art. "Ibn Battuta", pp. 735-36; G. Rentz, <u>E.I.²</u>, art. "Ibn al-Mudjawir", pp. 880-81; C.Brockelmann, <u>E.I.²</u>, art. "Al-Nahrawāli", pp. 835-36; J.Shaw, <u>E.I.²</u>, art. "Al-Bakri", p.965; F.Rosenthal, <u>E.I.²</u>, art. "Ibn al-'Amād", p.807; J. Schacht, <u>E.I.²</u>, art. "Dahlān", p.91. individually, the following points are given as general remarks about the nature of information, method of use and reference, together with other relevant details and are worth our special consideration.

The sources are not used in connection with a subject confined to a specific issue or to them?- which is often the case in research but in relation to a study dealing with the several aspects relevant to the history of Mecca over a rather lengthy period. Therefore, it was very difficult, and at times practically unattainable, to pinpoint the contribution of each source or to single outits version in relation to each issue discussed. This was not only due to the numerous topics but also to the similarity of essential points in the information of various sources concerning most of the aspects dealt with in this thesis. Because of this, the sources referring to a certain issue or situation are often given collectively in the relevant footnote.

The data concerning the events and institution in Mecca, both in quantity and quality, usually do not admit of logical analysis of the majority of the topics discussed. The prevailing informative and descriptive treatment of various aspects may not appear too scholarly and attractive, but the nature of the evidence often left no choice in this respect. The relative lack of argument has resulted also from the almost undisputed nature of the topics discussed. What records can be found are not pragmatic, and the accounts of events make relationship of cause and effect often difficult to establish. Most of the available information is of socio-religious nature, and there is relative dearth of useful information concerning the politicoeconomic and administrative aspects.

Considering these points, it is by no means surprising that this period of Meccan history has found so little favour with scholars.

The lack of controversial issues, spectacular upheavals, and dramatic events may have made it appear singularly drab and unattractive.¹

Discussion of all the aspects is strictly from the Meccan point of view and does not go into other details relevant to other countries or even to other parts of the Hijāz.² This limitation was due partly to the inadequate information and partly to the fact that many aspects dealt with in this thesis, such as charities, the spice trade, and the expedition of Amir Husayn al-Kurdī against the Portuguese are topics with so many international connections and developments that within their proper examination was not possible in a few pages / this

¹This should not be taken to mean that modern **scholars** have not made any contribution. The following are token references to such works: Gerald de Gaury, <u>Rulers of Mecca</u> (London, 1951); C. Snouck Hurgronje, <u>Mekka</u> (The Hague, 1888-89); and various valuable articles in <u>E.I.¹</u> and <u>E.I.²</u> which have been used in different parts of this thesis in connection with specific points.

Arab scholars and especially those of Saudi Arabia have begun making valuable contributions. The following are again a token reference: 'Abd al-Quddus al-Ansari, Ta'rikh Madinat Judda (J2dda, 1383/ 1963); Ahmad al-Siba'i, Ta'rikh Makka (Cairo, 1372/1952), and various treatises by Hamad al-Jasir.

Though all have their value and usefulness they were neither intended as nor are a detailed examination, and are more useful for the post-Burji period.

²It will not be amiss to state that the present work was initially intended to cover a longer period and to provide inclusive treatment of the whole region of the Hijãz. However, after years of research in the sources, collecting and assembling data up to the stage of a first draft, it became evident that to deal with the three main principalities in the region (Mecca, Medina and Yanbu), each of which has its own character, was not possible with a reasonable degree of cohesion and, moreover, that it would exceed, in volume, the admissible limits of a thesis, and the original plan was abandoned and confined to the present form. thesis, and there was no other alternative but to refer to these and other similar issues briefly and only from the angle of their effect on or relationship with the situation in Mecca.

The sources often either differ slightly from eachother or fail to record the exact date of certain events. Usually such discrepancies are due to the difference in the residential area of the historians and the place where the event occurred. In such cases the dates accepted are those mentioned by the sources whose authors were nearest, in time and space, to the scene of the event. Should there be too many variations in the date concerning an event and the exactness of the date was of no great significance, only the month and year usually agreed upon are mentioned in relation to that event.

Arabic sources usually refer to the location of places in relation to Mecca, with terms indicating only the general direction, (towards Syria) and Jihat al-Yaman such as Jihat al-Sham/(towards the Yemen). These simply indicate north or south of Mecca and not the actual geo-political entity. Such references seldom stress the proximity or distance of the place in questinn from Mecca. But the distance of certain places is occasionally mentioned in relation to other places in vague terms, such as "A" lies in the east of "B" at the distance of two days' journey. Such definition is hardly useful, as the place in question may be northeast or south-east, and the distance given may have been that covered by foot or mounted. Moreover, certain names of the places in the sources are no longer used and subsequently do not exist on modern This, in addition to the general negligence by the sources to maps. define the areas under the control of the local Amirs, made the determination of the territories of the local emirates very difficult indeed. Obviously, the positions of main cities with the adjoining

areas, the main ports, and some well known valleys poses no problem and their relation with these emirates is easily recognizable. But the main problem lies in determining the position of the areas in between or around the centres of these emirates - Mecca, Medina, and Yanbu' - as well as about the areas between them and some of their known dependencies. For instance, Jazan was among the dependencies of Mecca but it cannot be established that the area between Mecca and Jazan was also controlled by the Sharifs of Mecca. Likewise, when a Sharif of Mecca was elevated to the status of Na'ib al-Sultan he enjoyed, at least supposedly, influence and authority over the Amirs of Medina and Yanbu' and other local chiefs. But to what extent his authority was recognized, especially by the local chiefs in between Mecca and the two above mentioned cities, is not clear. This lack of information and the vagueness in the available data were the main reasons for not appending the maps showing the territories of these local principalities.

To conclude these general remarks, the following points are given in connection with the footnotes and some other relevant information.

At the end of the following discussion concerning the primary sources reference is made to a number of works which contain information about the source in question. This somewhat "unorthodox" reference is by no means inclusive of all the sources and is intended primarily to point to some of the relevant sources for further information.

In the footnotes relevant to certain institutions, practices, or general situations discussed in the thesis, the primary sources are cited in chronological order and those which were late or not too

important have been mentioned separately, usually with their short titles, after the term 'See also'; the full titles of these works are given in the bibliography. It is also worth mentioning that certain footnotes contain sources of different periods. This is due to the fact that the institution or situation in question continued to be almost the same and subsequently the nature of evidence did not change with the difference of time.

The pagination in certain manuscripts was found to be similar to that of printed books. This has not been altered to avoid confusion.

Certain sources have not been published except in part, or had not been at the time when the author consulted them. The unpublished parts of such sources were used in manuscript and the parts were often in different libraries. Though the relevant details are provided in the first mention of these sources, should there be any confusion the details given in the bibliography will suffice to clarify any such vagueness.

Hajji Khalifa and Isma'il Pasha, the authors of Kashf and I'dah respectively, use the word '<u>Amūd</u>' (column) as numbers in their reference to works. These '<u>Amūd</u>' have been mentioned in this thesis as they were usual Arabic numerals.

The following discussion concerning the sources, extensively or marginally used, is arranged in the order given below:

- 1. The contemporary Hijazi sources.
- 2. The contemporary Egyptian sources.
- 3. The contemporary Yemenite sources.

4. The contemporary Travellers.

5. The sources written before or after the Burji period.

6. Modern works and articles.

### 1. The contemporary Hijazi sources

Fasi (775-832/1373-1429), a Sharif of the Hasani branch, was undoubtedly the pioneer of historiography in Mecca. He was the first, after centuries of negligence by other scholars, who paid proper attention to recording the events related to Mecca and other parts of the region. His two works, Shifa and al- Iqd, have been used and both are most useful, reliable, and indeed indispensible sources. Fasi, like other contemporary historians, recorded most of the events of his time on the basis of his personal knowledge but he had to trace back the history of Mecca for several centuries. This was not an easy task but Fasi did his best to bridge some of the gaps between his own time and the distant past. Obviously he did so by using the works of earlier historians of Mecca such as  $Azraqi^2$  and  $Fakihi^3$  and added valuable information from other sources in order to give the narratives in his own work some continuity. Among other earlier works used marginally by Fasi was a local history of Mecca by Muhammad b. Mahfuz al-Juhani (d. around 770/1368).⁴ Fasi refers to another local history, written about 676/1277 by a Sharif named Zayd b. Hashim, but this seems to have been lost and was not used by Fasi.⁵ The latter's father, also a notable scholar, provided his son with valuable information about certain events which took place in his time.⁶ Fasi used inscriptions

- ⁴Fasi, al-Iqd, vol. I, part I, fols. 245b-46a.
- ⁵Fasi, <u>Sh</u>ifa, vol. I, p.5.
- ⁶Fasi, <u>al-'Iqd</u>, vol. I, part I, fol. 103a.

¹Muhammad b, Ahmad al-Fasi, i) <u>Shifa'al-Gharam bi Akhbar al-Balad al-Haram</u>, 2 vols. (Cairo, 1375/1956); ii) <u>Al- lqd al-Thamin fi Ta'rikh al-Balad al-Amin</u>, 2 vols., each consists of two parts (Ms., KOP. No. 247-48).

²Muhammad b. 'Abd al-Karim al-Azraqi (d. 223/838).

²Muhammad b. Ishaq al-Fakihi (d. 272/885).

and epigraphs which he found on tomb-stones or buildings to check dates and gather information.¹ He used Ibn Farhūn's work <u>Nasibat</u> al-Mushāwir which deals with the history of Medina.²

Fasi's relationship with prominent Egyptian scholars and historians was cordial and they seem to have exchanged information or to have used each other's works. Fasi, for instance, used the works of Ibn al-Furat³ and Ibn <u>Khaldun.⁴</u> Ibn Hajar refers to Fasi as one of his sources⁵ and was among those whose efforts led to the appointment of Fasi in 807/1405 as the first independent <u>Qadi</u> Maliki in Mecca.⁶ Ibn Taghri Birdi refers to Fasi with great respect,⁷ and Sakhawi regards Fasi among the greatest scholars of the Hijaz.⁸

In view of such cordiality, it is by no means surprising that Ibn Hajar, following the deposition of Fasi from <u>Qada</u>, is reported to have written to Sultan Barsbay stating that the assigning of this post, at the expense of Fasi, to anyone else was a sinful act. Sakhawi too describes the replacement of Fasi by another official as a calamity.⁹

¹Fāsi, <u>Shifā</u>, vol. I, pp. 2-4; idem, <u>al-'Iqd</u>, vol. I, part I, fol. 220b; Part II, fols. 347b-48a and 372b-73a.
²Fāsi, <u>al-'Iqd</u>, vol. I, part II, fols. 277a-77b.
³<u>Ibid</u>., vol. I, part I, fol. 150a.
⁴<u>Ibid</u>., vol. I, part II, fol. 377b.
⁵Ahmad b. Ali b. Hajar, <u>Inbā</u> <u>al-Ghumr bi abnā</u> <u>al-'Umr</u>, 2 vols. (Ms., FAT. No. 4190-91), vol. I, fols. 1b-2a.
⁶<u>Ibid</u>., fol. 216b.
⁷Yūsuf b. Taghrī Birdī, <u>al-Manhal al-Şāfī wa</u>'l-Mustawfā ba'd al-Wāfī, 2 vols. (Ms., N.OS. Nos. 3428-29), vol. II, fols. 249b-50b.
⁸Muḥammad b. 'Abd al-Raḥmān al-Sakhāwī, al-Dhayl al-Tāmm 'ala Duwal <u>al-Islām</u> (Ms. KOP. No. 1189), fol. 94b; <u>idem, al-Paw' al-Iami li</u> <u>ahl al-Qarn al-Tāsi</u>', 12 vols. (Cairo, 1353-55/1934-36), vol. VII, pp. 18-20.
⁹Sakhāwī, <u>al-Daw</u>, vol. IX, pp. 4-5.

Obviously, such cordial relationships with great historians of his time, his high education, his several journeys within the Arabian peninsula, Egypt, Syria and Palestine in search of knowledge must have contributed a great deal in his scholarly achievements. In Mecca too he enjoyed great respect, not only as a historian or <u>Qadi</u> but on the basis of his high social status. He was a <u>Sharif</u> and his sister was married to the Amir of Mecca, <u>Sharif</u> Hasan. Though this marriage did not last long, Fasi's personal relationships with the Amir of Mecca, as well as with other Ashraf, remained friendly, which was apparently the reason for his being able to record several events related to the family quarrels or alliances.

Fasi's <u>Shifa</u>', a general history of Mecca, contains valuable information on several aspects of Meccan history but <u>al-'Iqd</u>, a biographical dictionary, is far richer in the quantity and variety of the information which was required in this thesis. <u>Al-'Iqd</u> begins with the biographies of those whose first name was Muhammad and continues with those named Ahmad, as respect for the name of the Prophet Muhammad, and then goes on in alphabetical order. It was completed around <u>Shawwal 828/August 1425.¹</u> There are several abridgments of <u>Shifa</u>² and one of <u>al-'Iqd</u>³ and both these works, with their abridgments, have made Fasi an outstanding historian of his time. His accuracy is great and it is to his credit that whenever in doubt he made this clear. In 801/1398, for instance, reporting the construction of an arch in connection with a building in Mecca, he points out that owing

¹Fasi, <u>al-'Iqd</u>, vol. I, part I, fol. 66a.

²These are - short titles - <u>Tubfat al-Kirām</u>, <u>Tabsil al-Marām</u>, <u>Hādi</u> <u>Dhawi al-Ifhām</u>, and <u>al-Zuhur al-Muqtatafa</u>.

³Entitled 'Ijalat al-Qira li'l-Raghib fi Umm al-Qura.

to his absence at the time of construction, he is not sure whether it was newly built or repaired.¹ Fasi, when anticipating a possible confusion about a certain point, took precautions to clarify the basis of his information. Thus, for instance, reporting the total period of the rule of <u>Sharif</u> Hasan, he states that this is given on the basis of the date on which <u>Sharif</u> Hasan was appointed in Cairo and not on the basis of the date on which the news reached Mecca and was acted upon.² This clarification by Fasi provides incidentally a reason for the frequent differences between the Egyptian and Meccan sources about the date of a certain event in Mecca or Cairo. The reason for such difference is obvious and other historians must have been aware of this but they seldom point out which of the two (i.e. the decision in Cairo or its implementation in Mecca) was the basis of the date given.

Fasi's contribution in various aspects dealt with in this thesis hardly need any particular reference. In fact, no research work about Mecca in the late Bahri and early <u>Burji</u> periods is possible without resorting to Fasi's indispensable works.³

The most important historian of Mecca, after Fasi, during the Burji period was Al-Najm Ibn Fahd (812-85/1409-80), whose work Ithaf  $\underline{al-Wara}^4$  is extensively used in various sections of this thesis.

¹Fasi, <u>Shifa</u>, vol. I, p.315.

²Fasi, <u>al-'Iqd</u>, vol. I, part II, fol. 399a.

⁵For further details concerning Fasi and his work; see: Fasi, <u>al-'Iqd</u>, vol. I, part I, fols. lb-lOa, 66b, 70b and 107b-8b: part II, fol. 377t; idem, <u>Shifa'</u>, vol. I, pp. 2-9, 65, 206 and 315; Ahmad b. 'Ali al-Maqrizi, <u>al-Suluk li Ma'rifat Duwal al-Muluk</u>, vol. III (Ms. A.S. No. 3371), fol. 250a; Ibn Hajar, <u>Inba</u>', vol. I, fols. lb-2a and 216b; Ibn Taghri Birdi, <u>al-Manhal</u>, vol. II, fols. 249b-50b; Sakhāwi, <u>al-Dhayl</u>, fol. 84a and 94b; idem, <u>al-Daw'</u>, vol. II, pp. 35-36, vol. VII, pp. 18-20, vol. VIII, p.41, Vol. IX, pp. 4-5; Ibn al-'Imād, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. VII, pp. 134-35, 156 and 199; Hajji <u>Khalifa</u>, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. I, pp. 306-7: vol. II, pp. 1051-52, 1125 and 1150; F. Rosenthal, <u>E.I.¹</u>, art. "Al-Fāsi", pp. 828-29 and the works cited in its bibliography. 4Al-Najm (Najm al-Din) 'Umar (also Muhammad but 'Umar is most used) b.

He belonged to a prominent Meccan family whose several members were well known scholars and historians and are known as Ibn Fahd.¹

Al-Najm's Ithaf covers the period from the birth of the Prophet Muhammad up to the early days of Sha ban 885/November 1480. He is an annalist and gives a brief account of the events of each year with particular reference to those related to Mecca and, at the end, gives a list of those who died in that year and were regarded by him as worth mentioning. Needless to say, the real value and contribution of this source is for the period after the death of Fasi. Al-Najm's account is particularly useful in relation to matters connected with trade, taxation and other financial aspects. He also provides valuable information about local administration. The details relevant to events in Mecca are reasonably sufficient but his reports concerning the deceased, including prominent dignitaries, are amazingly brief. For instance, the death of Fasi, the famous historian of Mecca, and of Sultan Barsbay are reported so briefly that information hardly exceeds the more dates.²

Muhammad b. Fahd, Ithaf al-Wara' bidkhbar Umm al-Qura', 2 vols. (Ms., M.H.M. No. 2, Ta'rikh).

¹F. Rosenthal, <u>E.I.</u>², art. "Ibn Fahd", pp. 759-60. Owing to the fact that Ibn Fahd, as well as his son and grandson, is usually known by the common title "Ibn Fahd", it was imperative to mention them in this thesis with separate distinctive forms to avoid confusion. Therefore, "Al-Najm" has been added as prefix to the title of the above mentioned historian, and "Al- Izz" and "Jar Allah" respectively to his son and grandson. As the actual title of all these three historians is Ibn Fahd and the additions, mentioned above, care simply to distinguish them from each other, the first letter of both the pre-fix and the actual surname is mentioned throughout in capitals.

²AlNajm Ibn Fahd, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. II, fols. 209 and 229 respectively.

Fortunately, Al-Najm's son Al-'Izz Ibn Fahd (<u>Shawwal 850</u>/ Jumada I 922/January 1447-July 1516) wrote, after his father's death, <u>Bulugh al-Qira</u> as continuation of his father's work and on the same pattern, and recorded the events in Mecca until almost the end of the Burji period.

Both these historians visited Egypt, among other places, and were on friendly terms with their contemporary Egyptian historians and particularly with Sakhawi and seems to have exchanged information².

Al- 'Izz Ibn Fahd, like any other local historian, was obviously not too keen to antagonize the authorities but at times he criticises outspokenly some unjust acts of the officials and even of the ruling <u>Sharif of Mecca.</u> For example, he criticised the behaviour of Meccan <u>Qadis for their failure to do justice to a man of humble origin against</u> his influential opponent in <u>Shawwal 888/December 1483.</u>³ He did not hide his disapproval of the conduct of these Meccan <u>Qadis</u> during a dispute between a <u>Qadi Maliki</u> and a <u>Shaybi</u>⁴ in Muharram 901/September

¹Al- [°]Izz ([°]Abd al- [°]Azīz) Muhammad b. [°]Umar b. Fahd, <u>Bulūgh al-Qira fi</u> <u>Dhayl Ithāf al-Warā bi Akhbār Umm al-Qurā</u>, 2 vols. (Ms., M.H.M. No.l, Ta[°]rikh).

²Ibn Taghri Birdi, <u>Hawadith</u>, part III (ed. W. Popper), p.595; Sakhawi, <u>al-Daw</u>, vol. VI, pp. 126-31; idem, <u>al-Dhayl al-Tamm</u> <u>ala Duwal al-Islam</u> (a portion of this work up to <u>850/1446</u> has been used, as referred to earlier, from the Ms. of Kop., but the portion covering the period between <u>850-98/1446-92</u>, which has been edited by Mr. A.A.Al-Hassu and submitted in August 1968 in the University of 'Ayn <u>Shamsh</u> (Egypt) for the degree of M.A., has been used with the kind permission of the editor), p.123; Al-'Izz Ibn Fahd, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. I, fols. 22, 165 and 211-13.

³Al-'Izz Ibn Fahd, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. I, fols. 43-44.

⁴The historical and official significance of this term is explained in detail later. Here it may suffice to say that a <u>Shaybi</u> is a member of the family known as Banu <u>Shayba</u> who are entrusted with the key of the door of the Ka^sba.

or October 1495. The <u>Qadis</u> seem to have closed ranks against the <u>Shayhi</u>.¹ Al-'Izz, reporting the distribution of certain charities in Mecca by the <u>Qadi Shafa'i</u>, which was usually the case in relation to most charities, uses phrases which indicate that the <u>Qadi</u> was unfair in distribution.² This should not be taken to mean/the conduct of the Meccan <u>Qadis</u> with the exception of the few above mentioned cases was exemplary. Similarly, the behaviour of other officials was not ideal. In fact, frequent references, in both <u>Ithaf</u> and <u>Bulugh</u>, show the deplorable acts of several Sultani and <u>Sharifi officials</u> in both Mecca and J2dda but none of these appear to have been expected to be as fair as the <u>Qadis</u> and thus the wrongs of the latter seem to have been regarded by Al-'Izz as more unacceptable than those of other officials.

Al-'Izz, referring to a raid of <u>Sharif Muhammad against a group</u> of Arabs in Rabi' I 887/May or June 1482, comments that these Arabs have committed no offence and that the reason was simply to secure booty. Al-'Izz even indicates his joy on the escape of would-be victims and the failure of the Sharif's raid.³

The reliability and usefulness of both these Meccan sources is almost undisputed but occasional errors are found which (may have resulted from the mistake of the copyist and not of the historian himself. For instance, the date of Ibn Taghri Birdi's death is given wrongly as being around Jumäda I 899/March 1494.⁴ But this is the

¹Al-1zz Ibn Fahd, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. I, fols. 186-87. ²Al-'Izz Ibn Fahd, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. I, fols. 44, 51 and 186. ³Al-'Izz Ibn Fahd, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. I, fol. 19. ⁴Al-'Izz Ibn Fahd, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. I fol. 165. only serious mistake found and this most likely occured as a result of a copyist's carelessness. It is very unlikely that Al-'Izz, who, referring to a local dispute in Dhu'l-Qa da 903/August 1498, refrained from giving details on the basis of his uncertainty,¹ would have reported the death of Ibn Taghri Birdi on the date given above.

The contribution of the data provided by these historians to various aspects discussed is self-evident throughout the thesis and particularly in the sections relevant to local events, dependencies of Mecca, local tolls and taxes, distribution of charities, and local administration.²

The remaining contemporary sources, though useful and reliable, have made little contribution to this thesis, as much of their information is related to Medina and only occasional references are found to the matters related to Mecca. Therefore no detailed examination of these sources is necessary.

Marāghī (d. 816/1413) - his work <u>Tabolīg al-Nusra</u>³ is marginally used.⁴

Ibn 'Uqba (d. 828/1425) - his work <u>'Undat al-Talib</u>' provides useful information but only in relation to some minor points. He was a <u>Sharif of Hijazi origin but not a permanent resident of the area</u> and his work is mentioned here for its close connection with the aspects

³Abi Bakr b. al-Husayn al-Maraghi, Tahqiq al-Nusra bi Talkhis Ma'alim

30,

¹<u>Ibid.</u>, fol. 230.

²For some additional useful information concerning these historians and their works, see: Ibn Taghri Birdi, Hawadith, part III (ed. W. Popper), pp. 595-96; Sakhawi, <u>al-Daw</u>, vol. VI, pp. 126-31; idem, al-Dhayl (ed. A. Al-Hassu), pp. 123 and 270; idem, al-Tibr al-Masbuk fi Dhayl al-Suluk (Bulaq, 1315/1896), p.146; Al- Izz Ibn Fahd, op. <u>cit.</u>, vol. I, fols. 1-2, 22, 35, 37-38, 132-33 and 135-37; JarAllah (Muhammad) b. 'Abd al-'Aziz b. Fahd, <u>Tuhfat al-Lata</u>'if fi fada'il al-<u>Hibr Ibn 'Abbas wa Masjid al-Ta'if</u> (Ms. M.H.M. No. 15 - Ta'rikh), fols. 37-38; Hajji Khalifa, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. I, p.7; Isma'il Pasha, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. I, p.21; F.Rosenthal, <u>E.I.</u>², art. "Ibn Fahd", pp. 759-60 and the works cited in its bibliography.

relevant to the Ashraf.1

Samhüdi (844-911/1440-1505), the famous historian of Medina, his work <u>Wafa</u> and its abridgement <u>Khulaşa</u> have been used.² The work deals mainly with the local topography, matters related to some religious rules and the virtues of certainpious performances, and thus contributes little to the history of Medina itself and far less to that of Mecca from the politico-economic point of view.³

# 2. The contemporary Egyptian 4 sources

Fortunately, several historians beginning with Ibn al-Furāt and ending with Ibn Iyās form a neatly linked chain of the sources covering the entire <u>Burjī</u> period. This was particularly useful in furthering this research as a similar continuous chain of Meccan historians made it possible to look at a certain issue from both the Egyptian and Meccan points of view. However, the versions of the Egyptian and the Hijāzi sources, as already mentioned, seldom differ from each other in their reports concerning events in Mecca, which is the main reason for citing them frequently together in reference to certain issues, institutions, or general situations.

### Dar al-Hijra (Cairo, 1374/1955).

⁴For information relevant to this historian or his work, see: Maraghi's introduction to his work and pp. 145-46 and 210-11; Maqrizi, <u>Suluk</u> (Ms. M.H.M. No. 6, Ta'rikh), vol. II, fol. 260; Ibn Hajar, <u>Inba'</u>, vol. I, fol. 246a; Sakhāwi, <u>al-Dhayl</u>, fol. 81a; idem, <u>al-Daw'</u>, vol. XI, pp. 28-31; idem, <u>al-Tuhfa al-Latifa fi Ta'rikh Fudalā' al-Madina</u> al-Sharifa, 2 vols. (Ms. Top. Nos. 6481-82 (also M.527 and M.512 respectively)), vol. II, fols. 267-70; Hajji <u>Khalifa</u>, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. I, p.378.

²Ahmad b. ⁴Ali al-Hasani b. ⁴Uqba (mentioned also as Ibn ⁴Utba), <u>⁴Umdat al-Talib fi Ansab Al Abi Talib</u> (Beirut, undated).

¹For some useful details about Ibn ⁶Uqba and his work, see: Ibn ⁶Uqba, <u>op.cit.</u>, pp. 5-7, 123 and 279; Hajji <u>Khalifa</u>, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. II, p.1161.

² Ali b. Abdullah al-Samhūdi, i) Wafa al-Wafa' bi akhbar Dar al-Muştafa, 2 vols. (Cairo, 1326/1908); ii) Khulaşat al-wafa' bi akhbar Dar al-<u>Mustafa</u> (Mecca, 13¹⁶/1898).

⁵For some information relevant to Samhūdi and his works, see: Samhūdi,

Both the local and Egyptian historians were not only aware of the important happenings in Mecca but their information was often complementary to one another. This, to a large extent, must have resulted from the simplicity and similarity of issues and occurrencies and lack of arguable points but was due also to the fact that almost all the Egyptian historians visited Mecca and seem to have exchanged information with the local historians. Yet slight variations and minor differences were inevitable. These are usually overlooked unless they were of any significance and in these cases preference has been always given to the historian who was closest to the event in question from the viewpoint of either time or space, or both.

Ibn al-Furat (735-807/1334-1404) - his universal history, only l the later part of which is published, entitled <u>Ta'rikh</u>, - has been used. This work is the earliest and among the most important Egyptian sources and, despite its being relatively of poor standard from the linguistic point of view it is the most reliable and useful source and the data available in this work was of great value in various

Wafa², pp. 2-4, 457 and 461; Sakhāwī, <u>al-Daw²</u>, vol. V, pp. 245-47; Ibn al- Imād, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. VIII, pp. 50-51; Hajji Khalifa, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. II, pp. 2016-17; F. Krenkow, <u>E.I.¹</u>, art. "Al-Samhūdi", pp. 134-35 and works cited in its bibliography.

⁴This regional term is used here rather loosely without much attention to ethnical origin and thus is applied to all those historians who were born in Egypt, lived and worked there permanently, or chose Egypt for their permanent residence in the later part of their life. This latter phrase permits the inclusion of historians like Ibn Khaldun and Ayni who reached Cairo only in the later part of their lives and entered the service of the Mamlük Sultans.

¹Muhammad b. 'Abd al-Rahim b. al-Furāt, <u>Tā'rikh Ibn al-Furāt</u>, <u>3</u> vols. (ed. Q.Zurayq and Najlā' 'Izz al-Dīn, Beirut, <u>1936-42</u> A.D.). This title is that ascribed by the editors to this work and is generally accepted. However the title - which actually amounts to <u>Tā'rikh</u> is far from being a complete title. Hajji <u>Khalifa seems to mention</u> this work with the title <u>Al-Tarīq al-Wadih al-Maslūk</u> (<u>Kashf</u>, vol. I, p.279). But this too is not complete and must have been part of the original title. Cl. Cahen refers to this work with the title <u>Tā'rikh</u> al-duwal wa'l-mulūk (E.I.2, art. "Ibn al-Furat", p.768). sections of this thesis and is used by the later historians.

Ibn <u>Khaldun</u> (732-808/1332-1406) - his universal history <u>al-'Ibar</u>² is marginally used. He was a genius and enjoys almost universal fame as historian, sociologist and philosopher. Among the Arab historians only Ibn Hajar, on the basis of an alleged anti-Husayn remark by Ibn <u>Khaldun</u>, and Sa<u>khāwi</u>, because of Ibn <u>Khaldun</u>'s belief in the authenticity of Fatimids' claim concerning their descent, were somewhat critical of Ibn <u>Khaldun</u>.³ But their criticism was on the basis of Ibn <u>Khaldun</u>'s view and not against his high qualities and reliability as a historian. Ibn <u>Khaldun</u>, despite his arrival in Cairo at the beginning of the <u>Burji</u> period and the posts he held there, his pilgrimage to Mecca and his apparent contacts with Meccan and other scholars, provides surprisingly little data relevant to the history of Mecca or other parts of the Hijāz.⁴

Qalqashandi (756-821/1355-1418) - his two works, <u>Subb</u> and <u>Ma'athir</u>,² written in the order of mentioning, have been used. The first of these two works contains a variety of information and is correctly described by Professor B. Lewis as "the encyclopaedia of administrative practice

² Abd al-Rahman b. Muhammad b. <u>Khaldun, Kitab al- Ibar wa Diwan al-</u> <u>Mubtada wa l-Khabar fi ayyam al- Arab wa l- Ajam wa l-Barbar wa</u> <u>man asarahum min Dhawi al-Sultan al-Akbar</u>, 7 vols. (Bulaq, 1284/1867).

⁵Sawkhāwi, <u>al-Daw</u>, vol. IV, pp. 147-48.

⁴Any detailed examination of Ibn Khaldun's work is impossible in a brief note. For some useful information, see: Maqrizi, <u>Suluk</u>, vol. III, fols. 113a, 115a and 259a; Ibn Hajar, <u>Inba</u>, vol. I, fol. 71b; Sakhāwi, <u>al-Daw</u>, vol. IV, pp. 145-49; Ibn al-'Imād, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. VII, pp. 76-77; Hajji Khalifa, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. II, p.1124; M. Talbi, <u>E.I.²</u>, art. "Ibn Khaldun", pp. 825-31 and many works cited in its bibliography.

Ahmad b. 'Ali al-Qalqashandi: i) Subh al-A'sha fi Sina'at al-Insha;

¹For some useful information about Ibn al-Furāt and his work, see: Sakhāwī, al-Dhayl, fol. 72a; idem, <u>al-Daw</u>, vol. VIII, p.51; Ibn al-Imad, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. VII, p.72; Hajji Khalifa, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. I, p.279; Cl. Cahen, <u>E.I.²</u>, art. "Ibn al-Furat", pp. 768-69 and the works cited in its bibliography.

of Qalqashandī".¹ Though both these works contain some useful information their data have made no significant contribution to the aspects dealt with in this thesis. <u>Subh</u>'s data are comparatively richer than <u>Ma'athir</u>'s and provide more useful information.

Maqrīzī (766-845/1374-1442) - his two works, <u>Sulūk</u> and <u>Nubdha</u>³ have been used. The latter is a short numismatic treatise and its data regarding local coins' were not found of great value. <u>Sulūk</u>, on the other hand, is greatly useful for various topics and particularly those related to commercial activities and local administration. Maqrīzī's several pilgrimages to Mecca, his friendly relationship with several Egyptian as well as Meccan scholars and historians, his cordial relationship with many dignitaries in Cairo and his easy access to some official records, especially in his capacity of <u>Muhtasib</u> of Cairo which he held several times, all this must have contributed in enriching the data, both in quantity and variety, in his works.

Maqrizi's relationship with his Egyptian contemporaries was, on the whole, good but with 'Ayni, on the basis of their rivalry over the post of <u>Hisba</u>, was rather unfriendly. This animosity between 'Ayni

¹⁴ vols. (Cairo, 1332-38/1913-19); ii) <u>Ma'athir al-Inafa fi Ma'alim</u> al-<u>Khilafa</u>, 3 vols. (Kuwait, 1964).

¹B.Lewis, "Egypt and Syria" in <u>The Cambridge History of Islām</u>, vol. I, p.224.

²For some useful information concerning Qalqashandi and his works, see: Qalqashandi's introduction to his work Ma'athir, and vol. II, p.211; idem, <u>Subh</u>, vol. IV, p.301; Sakhawi, al-Dhayi, foi. 85a; Ibn al-'Imad, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. VII, p.149; Hajji Khalifa, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. II, pp. 1070 and 1573; C.Brockelmann, <u>E.I.</u>, art. "Al-Kalkashandi", pp. 699-700.

⁹Details concering Suluk have already been given. The other work is: Nub<u>dha Latifa fi Umur al-Nuqud al-Islamiyya</u> (Ms. A.HK. No. 264).

and Maqrizi seems to have been also on the basis of their different <u>madhhab</u> (creed; belief). Maqrizi was initially Hanafi but then became <u>Shafa'i</u> and rather unduly critical of the Hanafi school. This was criticised by Ibn Taghri Birdi who was, like 'Ayni, a Hanafi. However, Maqrizi's greatness as a historian was not to be damaged by such criticism or animosity. The fact that Ibn Taghri Birdi and Sakhawi wrote <u>Hawadith</u> and <u>al-Tibr</u> respectively as continuations of Maqrizi's <u>Sulük</u> reflects clearly their great respectifor him.¹

Ibn Hajar (773-852/1372-1449) is among the most prolific and important scholars of <u>Ilm al-Hadith</u> (i.e. the science developed in relation to and about the tradition of the Prophet Muhammad) and historians of Egypt. His two works, <u>Inbā⁹</u> and <u>al-Durar</u>³ have been used. The first is an annual account of the events, particularly those related to Egypt, and a list of those who died in each year and were regarded by Ibn Hajar as worthy of mention. <u>Al-Durar</u> is a biographical dictionary of the notables of the 8th century of the Hijra/14th century of the Christian era. Though both these works contain useful information the data in <u>Inbā⁹</u> is far more relevant and useful from the viewpoint of the topics discussed in this thesis.

Ibn Hajar's journeys to various parts of the Egyptian domain, including the Hijãz, and his cordial relations with many scholars and historians, his official responsibilities in Cairo and particularly as

²Details relevant to <u>Inba^{*}</u> have already been given.

³The full title is: <u>al-Durar al-Kāmina fi A'yān al-Mi'at al-Thāminā</u>, 4 vols. (Hyderabad, <u>1348-50/1929-31</u>).

¹For details relevant to Maqrizi and his works, see: Ibn Taghri Birdi, Hawadith al-Duhur (Ms. A.S. No. 3185), vol. I, fols. 2 and 8-9; Al-Najm Ibn Fahd, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. II, fol. 210; Sakhawi, <u>al-Daw</u>, vol. II, pp. 21-25, vol. IV, pp. 147-48, vol. VIII, pp. 71-72; idem, <u>al-Tibr</u>, pp. 21-24; Muhammad b. Ahmad b. Iyas, <u>'Uqud al-Juman fi Waqa'i' al-</u> Zaman (Ms. A.S. No. 3311), vol. II, p.178; Ibn al-'Imad, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. VII, pp. 254-55; Hajji Khalifa, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. II, p.1000; C. Brockelmann, <u>E.I.</u>¹, art. "Al-Makrizi", pp. 175-76 and workscited in its bibliography.

<u>Qadi</u> had kept him in close contact with the official circle and above all with the Egyptian Sultans. This must have enabled Ibn Hajar to remain aware and record accurately and in detail the Sultani decisions in relation to events in the Hijāz as well as the main occurrences there.¹

'Ayni (762-855/1361-1451) - his general history <u>'Iqd al-Juman</u>² is used in this thesis but on a modest scale. 'Ayni was born in 'Ayntāb and visited Cairo in 788/1386 and was well received there. His high education and knowledge of both Arabic and Turkish enabled him to gain popularity in <u>Mamlūk</u> circles and he enjoyed particularly the favour of Sultan Bārsbāy and his Amirs. He held several posts simultaneously or at different times, in Cairo. The post of <u>Hisba</u> was assigned to him for the first time in 801/1399, at the expense of Maqrīzī, but the latter regained this post shortly after. This seems to have been the beginning of animosity between 'Ayni and Maqrīzī and several remarks of the former reflect clearly his grudge against Maqrīzī.³

The accuracy of 'Ayni's history, especially in the later part of his life, is suspected, and particularly by Ibn Hajar⁴ and Ibn Taghri Birdi.⁵ Sakhāwi, however, gives a fairly detailed biography of 'Ayni and does not seem to question his reliability.⁶

²Mahmud b. Ahmad al-'Ayni, 'Iqd al-Juman fi Ta'rikh ahl al-Zaman, 4 vols. (Ms., B.A. Nos. 454-57).

¹For some useful information related to Ibn Hajar or his works, see: Ibn Hajar, <u>Inba</u>, vol. I, fols. 1b-2a; Ibn Taghri Birdi, <u>al-Nujum</u>, vol. VII, fol. 349; idem, <u>Hawadith</u>, vol. I, fols. 14-15, 60, 70, 77 and 84; Sakhawi, <u>al-Daw</u>, vol. II, pp. 36-40; idem, <u>al-Tibr</u>, pp. 140 and 230-36; idem, <u>al-Dhayl</u> (ed. A.Al-Hassu), pp. 1 and 17-18; Ibn al-'Imad, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. VII, pp. 267, 270-73 and 279; <u>Hajji Khalifa</u>, <u>op.</u> <u>cit.</u>, vol. II, p.748; F. Rosenthal and C. van Azendonk <u>J.Schacht</u>, <u>E.I.</u>², art. "Ibn Hadjar al-'Askalani", pp. 776-79.

³ Ayni, <u>op.cit</u>., vol. IV, fols. 506b-7a and 687a.

⁴Inba², vol. I, fols. 1b-2a.

⁵Hawadi<u>th</u>, vol. I, fol.2.

⁶<u>Al-Daw</u>, vol. X, pp. 131-35; idem, <u>al-Tibr</u>, pp. 375-80; idem, <u>al-</u> <u>Dhayl</u> (ed. A.Al-Hassu), p.8.

'Ayni's contribution in the history of Mecca is rather insignificant, but at times at least, thanks to his favourable position with the Egyptian Sultan, he was the first among the Egyptian historians to learn and report certain happenings in the Hijāz. In 830/1426, for instance, 'Ayni read in person to Sultan Barsbay a letter from the <u>Sharif of Medina concerning details of an internal dispute there</u>.¹ Obviously, 'Ayni's recording must have been the first and other Egyptian historians became aware of this occurrence later, and probably through 'Ayni himself.²

Ibn Taghri Birdi (812-74/1410-70) is among the outstanding historians of Egypt. His three works, <u>al-Nujum</u>, <u>al-Manhal</u>, and <u>Hawadith</u>³ contain valuable information and have been extensively used in various sections of this thesis.

He is reported to have turned to the writing of history after he had heard that 'Ayni's history was read to Sultan Barsbay. His first work was <u>al-Manhal</u>, a biographical dictionary, then <u>al-Nujūm</u>, a general history of Egypt, and finally <u>Hawadith</u> to continue Maqrizi's Sulūk.⁴

Ibn Taghri Birdi was the greatest historian of Rumi origin during the <u>Burji</u> period and is described by Ibn Iyas as "unique" among his race.⁵

¹ Ayni, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. IV, fol.654b.

⁹The titles of these works and other relevant information have already been mentioned.

⁴W. Popper, <u>E.I.²</u>, art. "Abu'l-Mahasin Yusuf b. Taghribirdi", p.138.
⁵Ibn Iyas, <u>Bada'i al-Zuhur</u>, 3 vols. (Parts III-V Istanbul, 1931-36),

For further useful information concerning 'Ayni and his work, see: 'Ayni, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. I, fols. 67b-68a: vol. IV, fols. 506b-7a, 519a-19b, 668a, 687a and 691a; Ibn Hajar, <u>Inba</u>, vol. I, fols. 1b-2a, 65a, 72a, 169b and 171b; Ibn Taghri Birdi, Hawadith, vol. I, fols. 2, 8, 14 and 195; Sakhāwī, al-Dhayl (ed. A.Al-Hassu), pp. 1 and 55; idem, <u>al-Tibr</u>, pp. 140 and 375-80; idem, <u>al-Daw</u>, vol. X, pp. 131-35; Ibn al- Imād, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. VII, pp. 286-88; Hajji Khalifa, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. II, pp. 1000 and 1150; W. Marçais, <u>E.I.</u>², art. "Al- Ayni", pp. 790-91.

His father was among the Mamlúk dignitaries and was the sonin-law of the last Bahri Sultan, al-Salih (or al-Mansur), Hajji, and later married an ex-wife of Sultan Barquq and gave his daughter in marriage to Sultan Faraj b. Barquq.¹ In view of such connections, it is no wonder that Ibn Taghri Birdi himself was respected by many Mamluk officers and Amirs and enjoyed the favour of the Egyptian Sultans and especially Barsbay, but he showed no interest in entering the service. His being free of official responsibilities must have been a reason for his unbiased account of the events and his boldness in criticising those whom he regarded as unjust or not fulfilling their responsibilities. Thus, for instance, he criticised strongly the conduct of 'Ali b. Ramadan (d. 871/1466), a Sultani tax collector in J&dda, for his exploitation and unjust treatment of the merchants and went as far as to describe the said official as being a "disgrace to the human race".² He even criticised in moderate phrases the Egyptian Sultans for their failure to provide the pilgrims and other travellers to Mecca with sufficient supplies of water.³

Ibn Taghri Birdi performed several pilgrimages between 826-63/ 1423-59 and had established friendly relationships with local historians and the officials in the Hijaz. This, in addition to his being on cordial terms with many of the Egyptian historians and dignitaries, must have been of great help for him to obtain details of many events and institutions relevant to Mecca, among other places, and indeed the data

vol. III, p.43.

¹Ibn Taghri Birdi, <u>Hawadith</u>, vol. I, fol. 127. ²Ibn Taghri Birdi, <u>Hawadith</u>, part III (ed. W. Popper), pp. 534-36. ³Ibid., Part II,pp. 306-7.

available is of significant value.1

Sakhāwī (831-902/1427-97) - his four works:² al-Dhayl, al-Daw', al-Tibr and al-Tuhfa have been used and were very useful in furthering this research. Al-Dhayl was written as a continuation of Dhahabi's  $T\bar{a}$ 'rikh al-Islām and covers the period between 745-898/1344-1493. Al-Daw' is a biographical dictionary covering the 9th century of the Hijra/15th century of the Christian era. Al-Tibr, an annal of Egypt, was written as a continuation to Maqrīzī's <u>Sulūk</u> up to Rabi' I 857/ March 1452. <u>Al-Tuhfa</u> is a history of Medina in the form of a biographical dictionary.

The data available in these works of Sakhāwi about the events and institutions in the Hijāz is far richer than that provided by any other Egyptian source within the period under examination. Sakhāwi and his works are usually held in great respect by his contemporaries but Suyüți's attitude towards Sakhāwi seems to have been unfriendly as he is reported to have written "al-Kāwi fi Tā'rikh al-Sakhāwi" to undermine the value of Sakhāwi's <u>al-Daw'</u>.³ Ibn Iyās too was somewhat critical of Sakhāwi on the basis of his tendency to disclose weak points of certain individuals.⁴

⁴Bada'i, vol. III, p.352.

¹For information concerning Ibn Taghri Birdi and his works, see: Ibn Taghri Birdi, al-Nujūm, vol. VII, fol. 45; idem, <u>al-Manhal</u>, vol. I, fols. lb-2a: vol. II, fols. 251a-51b; idem, <u>Hawadith</u>, part III (ed. W. Popper), pp. 297-98 and 343; Sakhawi, <u>al-Dhayl</u> (ed. A.Al-Hassu), p.195; Ibn Iyās, <u>Badā'i'</u>, vol. III, pp. 42-43; idem, <u>Uqud</u>, vol. II, fol. 243; Ibn al-Imad, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. VII, pp. 109-110 and 317-18; Hajji Khalifa, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. II, pp. 1000, 1932-33 and 1884-85; W. Popper, <u>E.I.</u>², art. "Abu'l-Mahasin Yusuf b. Taghri Birdi", p.138.

²Full titles of these works, with other relevant details, have been mentioned earlier.

³Hajji <u>Khalifa, op.cit</u>., vol. II, p.1089.

Despite such minor criticism the greatness and reliability of Sakhawi were recognised by almost all the scholars and historians both in Egypt and the Hijaz. Sakhawi, like any other historian, criticised or praised certain officials or rulers but his criticism was not excessive nor based on personal grudge, but was directed against the general conduct or certain practices. Sakhawi, for instance, shows his disapproval of the practice of selling offices and of the spread of bribery in Cairo but does not single out individuals for blame.¹ He, when reporting the death of Wali Mecca, 'Ali b. Qargmas-b.Halima in Rabi' I 893/March 1488, does not hide his disregard for the deceased but does not show any personal hatred.2 Several references in the works of Sakhawi and others show that his relationships with his contemporaries were cordial and that they exchanged information. Sakhawi's several pilgrimages and his lengthy stay in the Hijaz, the longest of which was in the closing years of his life, mostly in Medina where he died, had made him much respected in the Hijaz and led to very cordial relationships between him and several notable Hijazi historians such as Al-Najm Ibn Fahd, his son Al-'Izz, and Samhudi. It is not therefore surprising that the data available in Sakhawi's works contains an abundant amount, both in quantity and variety, of valuable information relevant to the events or institutions in the Hijāz.³

¹Sa<u>kh</u>āwi, al-<u>Dh</u>ayl, fol. 103b.

²Sakhāwi, al-<u>Dh</u>ayl (ed. A.Al-Hassu), p.410.

⁵Any detailed examination of Sakhāwi's works and their share in this research needs far lengther discussion, which is not possible for reasons of space. For useful information about Sakhāwi and his works, see: Sakhāwi, al-Dhayl, fols. 3a, 63b, 69b, 74b, 93b, 103b and 108a; idem, al-Dhayl (ed. A.Al-Hassu), pp. 8, 123, 156, 270, 277, 287, 295, 376-77, 393-94, 410, 413, 425-26, 447, 502, 521 and 534; idem, al-Daw', vol. I, pp. 4-6: vol. VI, pp. 201-11: vol. VIII, pp. 7-14 and 20; idem, al-Tubfa, vol. I, fols. la-2a; idem, al-Tibr, pp. 2-5, 146 and 386; Al- Izz Ibn Fahd, op.cit., vol. I, fols. 114, 132-33, 135-37, 159 and 185; Ibn Iyās, Bada'i, vol. III, p.352; Ibn al- Imād,

Suyuti (849-911/1445-1505) is among the most prolific scholars of Egypt and by his own account the number of his works has exceeded three hundred, excluding many others which he had discarded.¹ Thus, supposing that he began writing at the age of twenty, his average annual contribution in various fields was seven works before his death in 911/1505.² But surprisingly Suyuti's contribution in the field of history is rather trivial. In addition to <u>Husn al-Muhidara</u> his two other works <u>Ta'rikh al-Khulafa'</u> and <u>Badā'i', al-Zuhūr'</u> are relevant to history and in this work only the first two named have been marginally used;⁵ the third - being the history of the ancient world - was of no use for this thesis.⁶

op.cit., vol. VII, p.196: vol. VIII, pp. 15-17: Hajji Khalifa, op.cit., vol. II, pp. 762 and 1089; Ismā'il Pasha, op.cit., vol. I, p.217. See also: M.H.Faqi's introduction to the published portion of <u>al-Tuhfa</u>, 3 vols. (Cairo, 1376-77/1956-57), vol. I, pp. 9-14.

- ¹ Abd al-Rahmān b. Abi Bakr al-Suyūti, <u>Husn al-Muhādara fi ākhbār Misr</u> <u>wa¹l-Qāhira</u>, 2 vols. (Idarat al-Watan Press, Egypt, 1299/1881 or 1882), vol. I, p.190.
- ²This is generally accepted as being the year in which he died. But in his <u>Husn al-Muhādara</u> references are made to the events around 928/ 1522 which seem to be inserted by the copyist.
- ³Full name of Suyūti and title of <u>Husn</u> with relevant details have already been mentioned. His second work is: <u>Ta'rikh al-Khulafā' al-</u> <u>'Abbāsiyya</u> (3rd ed. Cairo, 1383/1963).
- ⁴Badā'i al-**2**uhūr fi waqā'i al-Duhūr (4th ed., Singapore, 1374/1954). In this edition the work is ascribed erroneously to Ibn Iyās but in fact is the work of Suyūti and is mentioned as such by Brockelmann in his art. "Al-Suyuti", <u>E.I.</u>¹, p.574.
- ⁵In the text, however, when a reference to Suyūţī is made it is his Ta[•]rikh al-Khalafā[•] which is meant and referred to, as <u>Husn al-Mubādara</u> is occasionally used in footnotes only.
- ⁶For some further information about Suyūti and his works, see: Suyūti, <u>Husn al-Muhādara</u>, vol. I, pp. 2-3 and 188-95; idem, Ta'rikh al-<u>Khulafā'</u>, pp. 516-17; Hajji <u>Khalifa</u>, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. I, <u>p.229</u>: vol. II, <u>p.667</u>; Brockelmann, <u>E.I.</u>¹, art. "Al-Suyuți", pp. 573-75 and works cited in its bibliography.

Ibn Iyās (852-930/1448-1524) - his two works <u>Badā'i'</u> and <u>'Ucūd¹</u> have been used. He is among the most important historians of Egypt and almost the only one in the closing years of the <u>Burji</u> period and the beginning of the Ottoman period. Ibn Iyās is, on the whole, fairly accurate in his details but some mistakes or peculiarities are observable. Thus, for instance, he gives the years 846/1442 and 854/ 1450, contrary to other sources, as being the years in which Maqrīzī and Ibn Hajar died.² This may have been a mistake on the part of the copyist or of an earlier source which he had used, but what is more surprising is his description of the isle of Kamrān and Zabid (in the Yemen) as "<u>day'a</u>" (estate) of India in 922/1516.³

Though he, like other Egyptian sources, was mainly concerned with the events within or related to Egypt and there was much to record in that eventful period, he provides also a fair amount of information about the events in Mecca or other parts of the Hijāz. He performed the pilgrimage in 883/1478 and was present in Medina when a local <u>Qādi</u> was killed at the hand of a <u>Shi'i'</u> who had a personal former grudge against the / who had demolished the <u>Shi'i's</u> house to facilitate the expansion of the Medini sanctuary.⁴ Ibn Iyās is probably the only source to report under 910/1504 that Sultan al-<u>Ghawrī</u> bought from the Arabs of Banū Ibrāhim in Yanbu' some alleged relics of the Prophet Muhammad in return for 60,000 dirhams.⁵

¹Full titles of these works with some other relevant details have already been given.

²Ibn Iyas, <u>Bada'i</u>, vol. II, pp. 28 and 32 respectively.

³<u>Ibid</u>., vol. V, p.81.

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⁴<u>Ibid</u>., vol. III, p.140.

⁵<u>Ibid.</u>, vol. IV, pp. 68-69. Most probably some of these are among the items preserved - as relics of the Prophet Muhammad - in the museum of Topkapi Sarayi (Istanbul).

The data available in Ibn Iyas's works was particularly useful in the section dealing with local administration and in relation to Egyptian expedition against the Portuguese.¹

#### 3. The contemporary Yemenite sources

These like other regional or local historians were interested more in recording events within their own country and only occasionally refer to events in Mecca.

Ibn Wahhās (d. 812/1410) is the earliest² Yemenite source, during the <u>Burji</u> period; his work <u>al-'Uqūd</u>³ is used but its data was of little significance in furthering this research.⁴

²Sakhāwi (<u>al-Daw</u>, vol. II, p.299) followed by Ismā'il Pasha, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. II, p.101 refers to a Rusulid ruler of the Yemen, Ismā'il b. al-'Abbās (d.803/1400) as being the author of two works dealing with the history of the Yemen and entitled: i) <u>Al-'Asjad al-Masbūk wa'l-Jawhar</u> al-Mahbūk fi <u>Akhbār al-Khulafā' wa'l-Mulūk; ii) Al-'Uqūd al-Lu-lu'iyya</u> <u>Ti Akhbār al-Dawla al-Rasuliyya</u>. Unfortunately, the author failed to obtain and use these sources. As will be noticed, there is a striking similarity between the titles of these works and those of Ibn <del>al-</del> Wallay Bayba' and <u>Khazraji</u> discussed above, but there is no evidence to the effect that these Yemenite historians were not the original writers of their work.

³ Ali b. Hasan b. Wahhas, al- Uqud al-lu'lu'iyya fi Tâ'rikh al-Dawla al-<u>Rasūliyya</u>, 2 vols. (Cairo, 1329-32/1911-14).

Wahlay For some information concerning Ibn <del>al Dayba</del> and his work, see: Ibn Taghri Birdi, <u>al-Manhal</u>, vol. II, fol. 105a; Sakhāwī, <u>al-Daw</u>, vol. V, p.210; Ibn al-Imād, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. VII, pp. 97-98; Ismā il Pasha, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. II, pp. 81 and 115.

¹For some information concerning Ibn Iyas and his works, see: Ibn Iyas, <u>Bada'i'</u>, vol. III, p.140: vol. IV, p.47; <u>Hajji Khalifa</u>, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. I, p.229; W.M.Brinner, <u>E.I.</u>², art. "Ibn Iyas", pp. 812-13 and works cited in its bibliography. See also: Introduction of the editors of <u>Bada'i'</u> (Istanbul ed.), and also M.Mustafa's introduction to <u>Bada'i'</u> (U.P.).

<u>Khazraji</u> (d. after 858/1454) - his work <u>al-'Asjād</u>,¹ which seems to be a part of the larger work, as the manuscript used consists of Chapters IV and V and ends rather abruptly;² this was useful but only in relation to some minor points.

Ibn al-Dayba' (866-944/1461-1537) - his work, <u>Bughya</u> with its two supplements, <u>al-Fadl</u> and <u>Qurra</u>, has been used in certain sections of this thesis.³ The data available in these sources concerning events in or related to Mecca is comparatively richer than that provided by other Yemenite sources. <u>Al-Fadl</u> particularly is useful for details related to the Egyptian invasion of the Yemen and the subsequent overthrow of the Tahirid rule.⁴

Abu (Bā) Makhrama (870-947/1465-1540) - his history of Aden⁵ has been consulted or used in relation to some minor points. Despite the fact that he lived in a very eventful period and was in contact with some celebrated historians such as  $Sakhawi^6$  he did little more than compile this book by using the data of earlier historians such as

- ¹ Ali b. al-Hasan al-Khazraji, <u>al-'Asjad al-Masbuk fi man tawalla al</u> <u>Yaman min al-Muluk</u> (Ms., M.H.M. No. 48, Tā'ri<u>kh</u>).
- ²The last pages of this manuscript refer to some events related to the early part of 858/1454. See <u>Khazraji</u>, <u>op.cit.</u>, fol. 505.
- ³ Abd al-Rahman b. 'Ali b. al-Dayba', <u>Bughyat al-Mustafid fid.khbar</u> <u>Madinat Zahid</u> (Ms. A.S.No.2988) and its supplements: i) <u>Al-Fadl al-</u> <u>Mazīd 'ala Bughyat al-Mustafīd</u> (Ms. A.S. No. 2988); ii) <u>Qurrat</u> al-'Uyun fid.khbar al-Yaman al-Maymun (Ms., M.H M.No. 71, Ta'rikh).

⁴For some useful information about Ibn al-Dayba' and his works, see: Ibn al-Dayba's introduction to his <u>Qurra</u>; Hajji <u>Khalifa</u>, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. I, p.225; Isma'il Pasha, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. II, pp. 225 and 1150; C. van Arendonk <u>/G.Rentz</u>7; <u>E.1.</u>², art. "Ibn al-Dayba'", p.746, and works referred to in its bibliography.

⁵ Abdullah b. ^{(Abdullah Abū (Bā) Makhrama, Tā^{*}rikh Thaghr ^(Adan, 2) vols. (Leiden, 1936).}

⁶Sa<u>khāwi</u>, <u>al-Daw</u>, vol. V, pp. 8-9.

Ibn al-Mujāwir, al-Janadī and al-Ahdal.¹ In fact, the contribution of this source, in this thesis, is almost negligible.

## 4. <u>The contemporary travellers</u>

The only available account of a traveller is that given by the Italian Ludovico Di Varthema² (d. after 1508 A.D.) who visited Mecca and Medina in 1503 A.D., disguised as a Muslim Mamlúk after bribing in Damascus a commander of a Mamlúk force about to leave for Mecca as escort to the pilgrim caravan.³

The reliability of Varthema, on the basis of his bias and deliberate or unintentional distortion of the facts, is limited and the data available should not be accepted without due precaution and close examination. Varthema's statement that the Caliphs 'Alī, 'Uthmān and the Prophet Muhammad's daughter Fāțima are buried in <u>al-Hujra al-</u> <u>NahaWiyya</u>, in addition to the Prophet himself and the Caliphs Abū Bakr and 'Umar⁴, is absolutely wrong and <u>al-Hujra</u> does not contain the bodies of the first three mentioned. Similarly, his report that a mountainous area near Medina was inhabited by Jews⁵ is baseless. Moreover, his report about a well near Medina and its being made by St.

¹Abu Makhrama, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. I, pp.2, 10-12, 20,&24-5.

²The travels of Ludovico Di Varthema, published by Bürt Franklin (reprinted by permission of the Hakluyt Society, London 1863).
³Varthema, <u>op.cit.</u>, p.16.
⁴<u>Ibid.</u>, pp. 26-28.
⁵Ibid., pp. 22-25. Mark the Evangelist is absurd.¹ But he may have made these mistakes simply through lack of information and understanding, as any person in his position could not have grasped the correct details and background of such places. But certain of his remarks clearly indicate his bias and hostility, as when he describes Mecca, on the basis of its being barren, as a cursed city,² and MuslimSaspagan.³ In fact, his several other reports, such as his self-claimed romance with a wife of the Yemenite Sultan and his alleged adventures in southern India, are, to say the least, difficult to believe.

However, in various other respects, Varthema's reports are valuable and have been used. Thus, for instance, he is the only source to give some figures concerning the local population, a description of the buildings, and various other useful information such as the commercial decline, sources of food supply, and the scarcity of water in J2dda.

### 5. The sources written before or after the Burji period

A number of such sources have been marginally used in relation to certain specific points and the late sources have been cited in footnotes after the primary sources. The titles and other relevant details have been given in the footnotes, when mentioned for the first time, and also in the bibliography in which the Arabic sources have been arranged in chronological order. The period in which each of these historians lived is easily distinguishable from the year in which he died.

¹<u>Ibid</u>., p.32. ²<u>Ibid</u>., p.37. ³<u>Ibid</u>., p.52.

The real value of these sources lies either before or after the period under consideration and there is hardly any need for their evaluation. Probably what will be more appropriate here is to give some reason or justification for their use.

The pre-Burji sources have been occasionally used in connection with certain issues or matters on which the information available in the contemporary sources is somewhat inadequate. These sources

have been equally useful on certain aspects of practices in the <u>Burji</u> period which are characterized by a certain continuity so that they can be traced back to the pre-<u>Burji</u> period.

The late sources occasionally provide some useful link between a disconnected chain of events or fill gaps or have been mentioned simply as complementary, or more correctly, as additional sources. But the discussion or conclusion is always on the basis of evidence available in the primary sources.

# 6. <u>Modern works and articles</u>

As has already been mentioned, modern scholars have paid, so far, little attention to the history of Mecca or other parts of the Hijāz. Most of their contribution in this respect is in the form of brief articles and even these are mainly to deal with a situation from the Egyptian point of view and contain only occasional remarks about the causes and effects from the Meccan angle. The titles and other relevant details concerning these works are given in appropriate places and need not be repeated here. Undoubtedly, these works were useful but their share in furthering this research was not too great.

#### Chapter I

AN	ACC	OUNT	0	F TH	E	SUCC	ESS	IVE	
SHAR	IFS	OF	MEX	CCA	AG	AINS	r	THE	
BACK	GROU	ND	OF	THE	LO	CAL	HI	STOR	

One may wonder why this introductory chapter has been entirely devoted to readily accessible information. The simple reason is that, to the best of my knowledge, there has hitherto been no proper attempt to correlate the scattered pieces of information in the form of a reasonably complete picture of the events. This chapter is probably the first contribution intended to fill this gap.

An additional purpose is to provide a general background for many aspects discussed in the following chapters.

### The first Sharif of Mecca within the Burji period

On the eve of the <u>Burji</u> period <u>Sharif Ahmad b.</u> 'Ajlān (d. 19th or 20th Sha'bān 788/15th or 16th Sept. 1386) was able to acquire a dominant position in the local politics. He was able to take advantage of a minor dispute and force his father, 'Ajlān (d. 777/1375), to abdicate. Subsequently, he took control of Mecca as sole Amir in 772 or 774/1370 or 1372. His abilities and strength of character enabled him to impose his authority on the various sections of the population and local forces. Even the opposing groups of <u>Ashrāf</u> and <u>Quwwād</u>² had

¹See supra.pp.11-12 fn. 2.

²This term (sing. Qa'id) literally means leaders, or commanders of the armies. In the sources, particularly the Meccan, this term is frequently applied to freed slaves and occasionally to Sharifs if they were warriors and in command of a body of fighting men. A Qa'id of slave_origin used a title similar to those of the Ashraf, such as al-Hasani, al-'Ajalani, etc. This sometimes gave occasion to confusion between a Sharif and the other of a slave origin. However, the sources usually point to the slave origin of the person using such title and it is very rare that the confusion occurs. Some of these freed slaves, as well as those still slaves, were assigned important

to acknowledge, at least initially, his authority. Sharif Ahmad enjoyed unchallenged: rule for a few years and the stability in the area served its population well.

In 780/1378 Sharif Ahmad appointed his young son Muhammad his co-Amir. Though it did not alter the factual position, this appointment was a significant step intended to prevent a clash over the succession at his death.

The emergence of Ahmad and his success in consolidating his position almost coincided with a far more significant change in Egypt. On 19th Ramadān 784/26th November 1382 the last of the <u>Babri</u>Sultans, al-Sālih Hajji, was swept away by Barqūq. The latter, an able <u>Mamlūk</u> officer of the Circassian origin, inaugurated a new line of <u>Mamlūk</u> Sultans who are known as <u>Burji</u> or Circassians.¹ This change in Egypt was not, at the time, viewed by Sharif Ahmad with any concern. Initially, the relationship between <u>Sharif Ahmad</u> and Sultan Barqūq did not differ from the usual pattern. In 785/1383 the Sultan confirmed his subordinate <u>Sharif Ahmad</u> and his son in the emirate and the latter showed no reluctance in acknowledging Barqūq as their overlord.²

Ibn Khaldün, op. cit. vol. IV, pp. 107-8, vol. V, p. 474; Qalqashandi, Subh, vol. III, p. 438, vol. IV, pp. 10-11 and 274; idem, <u>Ma'athir</u>, vol. II, pp. 175 and 194-95; Fasi, <u>Shifa'</u>, vol. II, p. 206; idem, <u>al-Iqd</u>, vol. I, part I, fols. 57a, <u>103a</u>, 189b and 190a; part II, fols. 286a-87a; Ibn Hajar, al-Durar al-Kamina, 4 vols. (Haydrabad,

2.

posts by the Sharifs of Mecca. According to a late source, this was a deliberate policy of the Sharifs of Mecca. 'Ali b. 'Abd al-Qadir al-Tabari, <u>Al-Arj al-Miski</u> (MS., M.H.M. No. 3 Dihlawi), fol. 125. Qalqashandi describes these <u>Quwwad</u> as prominent <u>Ashraf</u> whose status under the <u>Sharifs</u> of Mecca was comparable to that of the Amirs under the Sultans. Qalqashandi, <u>Subh</u>, vol. IV, p.276.

¹The last <u>Bahri</u> Sultan, al-Şālih Hajji, was able to regain the Sultanate for a brief period between 791-2/1389-90 but Barquq managed to regain the throne in Şafar 792/February 1392, G.Wiet, <u>E.I.</u>², art. "Barkuk", pp. 1050-51.

Sharif Ahmad's rather harsh attitude towards a group of Ashraf made the latter resentful. By refusing to pay these Ashraf , including 'Anan b. Mughamis and Hasan b. Thugba, their share of the revenue, Sharif Ahmad had so seriously antagonised them that they went to Cairo in 786/1384 and secured a decision of the Sultan in their favour. However, returning to Mecca with an order to Sharif Ahmad to pay them their dues, they were denied justice, and the dispute flared up with renewed intensity. The Sharifs 'Anan and Hasan learned that Sharif Ahmad was planning to have them assassinated and fled to Yanbu' with the intention of approaching the Sultan again. This aroused the solicitude of Sharif Ahmad, who no doubt realized that to adopt an arrogant and stubborn attitude towards the Ashraf was far easier than to defy a clear order of the Sultan. He therefore sent his brother Sharif Muhammad to bring back 'Anan and Hasan, having been assured by Sharif Muhammad and the Egyptian Amir who,

1348-50/1929-31), vol. I, pp. 201-2; idem, <u>Inba</u>, vol. I, fol. 88a; Ibn Taghri Birdi, <u>al-Nujūm al-Zapira</u>, 12 vols. (Cairo, 1929-56), vol. XI, p.4 and pp. 139-40; idem, <u>al-Manbal</u>, 1 vol. (Cairo, 1375/1955), vol. I, pp. 369-70; 2 vols (MS., N.OS. No. 3428-29), vol. II, fol. 249a-49b and 323b; Al-Najm Ibn Fahd, <u>Itpaf al-Wara</u>, 2 vols. (MS., M.H.M. No. 2, Ta rikh), vol. II, fols. 96-97, 100 and 102; Sakhāwī, al-Dhayl (MS., Kop. No. 1189), fol. 51b; Ibn Iyās, <u>Badā i</u>, 2 vols. (Bulāq, 1311/1893), vol. I, pp. 257-59, 268-75 and 289; idem, <u>Uqūd al-Jumān</u>, 2nd vol. (MS., A.S.No. 3311), vol. II, fols. 110a; see also: Ibn Uqba, <u>op.cit.</u>, p.123; Suyūți, <u>op.cit.</u>, p.504; JAbd al-Qādir b. Mahammad al-Jaziri, <u>Durar al-Fawa'id</u> (Cairo, 1384/1964), p.584; Mustafa b. Hasan al-Janābi, <u>Ta rikh</u> (MS., A.S. No. 3033), fol. 304a; Ibn al- Imād, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. VI, pp. 282, 286 and 322, vol. VII, pp. 6-7; Abd al-Malik b. Husayn/al- Isāmī, <u>Simt al-Nujūm al-'Awāli</u>, 4 vols. (Cairo, 1380/1960), vol. IV, pp. 245-47; Ali al-Hanafi al-Sinjāri, <u>Manā'ih al-Karam</u>, 3 vols. (MS., M.H.M. No. 30, Ta'rikh), vol. I, fols. 325-27; Mubammad b, 'Ali, al-Țabari, <u>Itpāf Fudalā' al-Zaman</u>, 3 vols. (MS., M.H.M. No. 126, Ta'rikh), vol. I, fols. 58-59 and 61; Ahmad b. Zaynī Dahlān, <u>Khalāşat al-Kalām</u> (Cairo, 1305/1887), pp. 33-34.

¹Fasi, <u>al-'Iqd</u>, vol. I, part I, fols. 190a, part II, fols. 287a-b, vol. II, part III, fols. 252a; Ibn Hajar, <u>Inba</u>, vol. I, fol. 204a; Al-Najm Ibn Fahd, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. II, fols. 98-99 and 103; Sakhawi, <u>al-Daw</u>², vol. IV, p.147. See also: 'Isami, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. IV, p.247: Sinjari, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. I, fol. 328.

<u>al-Hajj</u> that their dues would be restored to them, they returned to Mecca. Contrary to their expectations, they were not only denied their rights but also were ill-treated and imprisoned. Sharif Muhammad protested but in vain and he too was thrown into prison. The news reached Cairo and Sultan Barquq sent an order for the release of these <u>Ashraf</u> but it was ignored by <u>Sharif Ahmad who appears</u>

¹Here it might not be amiss to point out that the Egyptian pilgrims travelled in two separate caravans. The first to depart was called al-Rakb al-Awwal and the second Rakb al-Mahmal. Though the Amirs of both caravans were high-ranking dignitaries and enjoyed respect and authority in Mecca the Amir of the second caravan enjoyed particular importance, as the Mahmal, a palanquin, a Kiswa (veil) of Ka ba, symbolizing the political hegemony of the Egyptian Sultan, were in this caravan. The Sharifs of Mecca usually gave formal reception to both Amirs, but it was obligatory for the Amir al-Mahmal, otherwise his loyalty was in question. For further details, see: J.Jomier, <u>E.I.</u>², art. "Amir al-Hadjdj", pp. 443-44; Fr. Buhl, <u>E.I.</u>, art. "Mahmal", pp. 123-24; A.J.Wensinck, <u>E.I.</u>², art. "Hadjdj", p.34; Halil Inalcik, "The rise of the Ottoman Empire" in The Cambridge History of Islam, vol. I, p.321. As explained above, the Mahmal(palanquin) symbolized the political hegemony. But for this the Mahmal itself was not sufficient. The real importance of the Egyptian Mahmal, apart from its leading position, lay in the fact that it brought the Kiswa for the Ka ba sent annually from Egypt. As will be seen, there were non-Egyptian Mahmals but none of these brought Kiswa. No non-Egyptian Sultan within the Burji period except Shah Rukh enjoyed this privilege. The Kiswa sent by the latter, as will be seen, was by way of Egypt and was used for the interior of the Ka ba. It will not be irrelevant to mention here that the annual ceremony of taking the Egyptian Mahmal in pro cession to various parts of Cairo, usually celebrated in the month of Rajab, was a silent announcement that the route to Hijāz was safe, and that the Egyptian pilgrim caravan would depart in due course. Those intending to perform the pilgrimage were thus urged to prepare themselves and join the caravan. See Ibn Hajar, <u>Inba</u>, vol. II, fol. 94b; Sakhāwi, <u>al-Tibr</u>, pp. 95-6. For details concerning the procession of Mahmal, see: Qalqashandi, Subh, vol. IV, pp. 57-8.

to have begun over-estimating his position and authority.1

In Jumädä I, 788/June 1386 an attempt to escape by the imprisoned <u>Ashraf</u> was foiled, only one, 'Anan, succeeding. He managed to reach Cairo and was able to lodge a complaint with the Sultan against <u>Sharif</u> Ahmad. Sultan Barquq ordered <u>Sharif</u> Ahmad to release the imprisoned <u>Ashraf</u> but was again ignored. Infuriated by this persistent defiance, the Sultan would no doubt have punished the <u>Sharif</u> severely had death not removed him from the Sultan's jurisdiction in <u>Sha</u> ban or Ramagan 788/September or October 1386. <u>Sharif</u> Muhammad had succeeded his father, under the guardianship of his paternal uncle, Kubay<u>sh</u>,² and it was he who had to bear the brunt of the Sultan's anger.

Sharif Muhammad and Kubaysh must have been aware of Sultan Barquq's order; the wise course would have been to release the prisoners. However, they failed to do so and, moreover, affronted the Sultan further by blinding the captives. This act was regarded as a challenge in Cairo and the reaction washarsh. 'Anan was secretly appointed to the emirate and departed for Mecca with the Egyptian pilgrim caravan. In Dhuy'l-Qa'da 788/December 1386 Sharif Muhammad, while giving the usual reception³ to the Egyptian <u>Mahmal</u>, was assassinated during the

¹ Alī b. al-Hasan Ibn Wahhās, <u>al- Uqūd al-Lu'lu'iyya</u>, 2 vols. (Cairo, 1329-32/1911-14), vol. II, pp. 187-88; Fāsī, <u>al- Iqd</u>, vol. I, part I, fol. 190¢, part II, fol. 269b and 287b-88a, vol. II, part III, fol. 252a-52b, part IV, fol. 287b; Ibn Hajar, <u>Inbā</u>, vol. I, fol. 204a; Ibn Taghri Birdi, <u>al-Manhal</u>, vol. II, fol. 323b-24a; Al-Najm Ibn Fahd, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. II, fols. 103-5; Sakhāwi, <u>al-Daw</u>, vol. III, p.97, vol. IV, p.147; see also: <u>Khazraji</u>, <u>op.cit.</u>, fol. 434; Janabi, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. I, fol. 304a; <u>Isāmi</u>, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. IV, pp. 247-48; Sinjāri, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. I, fol. 328; Dahlān, <u>op.cit.</u>, p.34.

²According to Ibn 'Uqba this Kubaysh was an illegitimate son of Sharif 'Ajlan. See: <u>'Umdat al-Talib</u>, pp. 123-24.

⁹This meant meeting the Amir at the outskirts of Mecca and kissing the hoof of the camel carrying <u>Kiswat al-Ka⁵ba</u>.

ceremony by two men in the same caravan.¹ The simultaneous attempt to assassinate Kubay<u>sh</u> failed and he escaped to JEdda. 'Anān was declared Amir of Mecca and was able, with Egyptian assistance, to crush the resistance of Sharif Muhammad's supporters. However, JEdda was occupied by Kubay<u>sh</u> which was an economic blow to the newly appointed 'Anān.²

#### 'Anan's feeble control over Mecca

The circumstances preceding and surrounding the appointment of "Anan had deprived him of the support of many prominent local <u>Ashraf</u>, who held him, not without justification, responsible for the assassination of <u>Sharif Muhammad</u> and were unwilling to co-operate.

Shortly after his appointment, Sharif 'Anan had released the imprisoned Ashraf. He had expected to win them over and consequently

². Ibn Wahhās, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. II, pp. 188-89; Qalqashandi, <u>Subh</u>, vol. IV, pp. 274-75; idem, Ma'athir, vol. II, pp. 195-96; Fasi, <u>Shifa'</u>, vol. II, pp. 206 and 250; Fasi, <u>al-'Idd</u>, vol. I, part I, fols. 57a, 190a-90b and 103a-3b, part II, fols. 269b and 288a, vol. II, part III, fols. 252b-53a, part IV, fol. 287b; Maqrizi, <u>Suluk</u>, vol. II, fol. 230, vol. III, fols. 105b, 106b and 107b-8a; Ibn Hajar, <u>Inba'</u>, vol. I, fol. 85b, 88a and 204a; Ibn Taghri Birdi, <u>al-Manhal</u>, vol. II, fols. 167b-68a, 249a-49b and 324a; idem, al-<u>Nujum</u>, vol. XI, pp. 245-46 and 308; Al-Najm Ibn Fahd, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. II, fols. 105-8; Sakhāwi, <u>al-Baw'</u>, vol. VI, pp. 147-48; Ibn Iyās, <u>Badā'i</u>, vol. I, p265; idem, <u>Ugūd</u>, vol. II, fols. 113b-14a; see also: Ibn 'Uqba, <u>op.cit.</u>, p.123; <u>Khazraji</u>, <u>op.cit.</u>, fols. 434-35; Jazīrī, <u>op.cit.</u>, pp. 314 and 584-85; Janābī, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. VI, pp. 299-300; Isāmī, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. IV, pp. 248-49; Sinjārī, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. I, fols. 326-29; Tabarī, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. I, fols. 61-62; Dahlān, <u>op.cit.</u>, pp. 34-35.

¹Most sources relate the episode of the assassination without further commentary, but some of them imply that it was done with the approval of Sultan Barquq. Ibn Hajar states clearly that these assassins had been sent by the Sultan for that purpose. See : <u>Inba</u>, vol. I, fol. 204a. It is interesting to note that this assassination was among the charges brought against Barquq during his temporary deposition. See : Muhammad b. 'Abd al-Rahim Ibn al-Furat, Ta'rikh, 3 vols. (ed. Q. Zurayq and N. 'Izz al-Din, Beirut, 1936-42), vol. IX, part I, p.157; Ibn Hajar, <u>Inba</u>, vol. I, fol. 103b; Ibn Taghri Birdi, <u>al-Nujum</u>, vol. XI, p.359; Ibn 'Iyas, <u>Bada'i</u>, vol. I, p.282.

consolidate his position. This hope was not unfounded as 'Anan, helped by Muhammad b. 'Ajlan, managed to regain the control of J2dda. He appointed Sharif Muhammad his deputy there but kept watch on him as a precaution. In so doing, 'Anan was evidently motivated by the fear that family ties might induce Muhammad to go over to the side of Kubaysh. In the early part of 789/1387 'Anan's spy became overzealous and Sharif Muhammad noticed that he was being spied upon and taking reacted by/control of J2dda as independent ruler. He formed an alliance with Kubaysh against 'Anan. Kubaysh and his supporters availed themselves of this unexpected opportunity to plunder rich merchants in the city and thus improved their financial position. Their resistance to 'Anan was thereby considerably strengthened.¹

The alliance between Sharif Muhammad and Kubay<u>sh</u> and their hold on J&dda had further weakened 'Anān's already feeble control over the region. The loss of J&dda was bad enough, from the political point of view, but it also meant a loss of revenue, which resulted in a financial crisis, so that a number of 'Anān's men joined the opposing camp. Those who remained demanded their dues and maintenance allowances which 'Anān was unable to pay.

In Jumādā I 789/May 1387 Kubay<u>sh</u> and Muhammad b. 'Ajlān set out with their forces and pitched camp in a place near Mecca. This move caused dismay to 'Anān, especially as the loyalty of his remaining

¹ Ibn al-Furāt, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. IX, part I, p.7; Ibn Wahhās, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. II, p.189; Fāsi, Shifā', vol. II, pp. 206-7; idem, <u>al-'Iqd</u>, vol. I, part I, fols. 57a, 189b and 221a, vol. II, part III, fols. 253a-53b, part IV, fols. 287b-88a; Maqrizi, Sulūk, vol. III, fol. 109a; Ibn Hajar, <u>Inbā'</u>, vol. I, fols. 91a and 204a-4b; Ibn Taghri Birdi, <u>al-Manhal</u>, vol. II, fols. 323a-b; Al-Najm Ibn Fahd, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. II, fols. 108-10; Sakhāwi, <u>al-Daw'</u>, vol. VI, pp. 147-48. See also: Khazraji, <u>op.cit.</u>, fol. 435; Jaziri, <u>op.cit.</u>, p.585; Janābi, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. I, fols. 329-30; Dahlān, <u>op.cit.</u>, p.35.

disgruntled supporters was in doubt. Aware that only money could save him he resorted to the confiscation of goods stored by merchants in the warehouses including some of the Sultan's property. His financial position, as well as his miliyary strength, having been enhanced by this legally dubious move, 'Anan won over some prominent men from the opposing camp. The most influential among them were the Sharifs Ahmad b. Thugba, 'Agil b. Mubarak and his brother 'Ali. So anxious was 'Anan to retain their support that he appointed themco-Amirs, reserving, however, for himself the position of first among equals. All this was done on 'Anan's personal initiative and was not confirmed by the Sultan in Cairo. Though 'Anan's increased strength deterred his opponents from launching an offensive, it did not suffice to launch a counter-offensive and oust his opponents from Jfdda.¹ The latter did their best to disrupt law and order in the region and were seldom checked by 'Anan. Not only were merchants and inhabitants victimized but also the property of the Sultan himself was plundered. The news of these events reached Cairo where they were viewed with concern, especially as they led to an almost complete breakdown of law and order.

Sultan Barquq simply could not permit such a situation to continue. In or around Sha'ban 789/August or September 1387, Sharif 'Anan, by virtue of an edict, was deposed by Sharif 'Alī b. 'Ajlān. 'Anan, though deposed, was unwilling to leave Mecca and to acknowledge 'Alī's official position. Resulting friction led to a battle in the proximity

Fasi, Shifa, vol. II, p.207; idem, al-'Iqd, vol. I, part I, fol. 57a, part II, fol. 269b, vol. II, part III, fol. 163a, 198a and 253b, part IV, fols. 288a-b; Maqrizi, Suluk, vol. II, fols. 230; Ibn Taghri Birdi, al-Manhal, vol. I, pp. 241-42, vol. II, fol. 120a; Al-Najm Ibn Fahd, op.cit., vol. II, fol. 110; Sakhawi, al-Daw, vol. VI, p.148. See also: Jaziri, op.cit., p.585; Isami, op.cit., vol. IV, p.250; Sinjari, op.cit., vol. I, fol. 330; Tabari, op.cit., vol. I, fol. 62; Dahlan, op.cit., p.35.

of Mecca. Kubay<u>sh</u>, a brother of 'Ali b. 'Ajlān, was at the head of 'Anān's opponents and his death, in the early stage of the battle, impaired the morale of 'Ali's supporters and 'Anān secured an easy victory and consequently remained in control of Mecca.

Sharif 'Ali went to Cairo to complain of 'Anān's refusal to comply with the Sultan's order and to secure military support against him. Sultan Barquq does not appear to have, at least ostensibly, felt too bitter about 'Anān's failure to act according to the Sultani edict as the Sultan is said to have assured 'Anān that if he gave the Egyptian <u>Mahmal</u> the customary reception he would be appointed co-Amir with 'Ali. 'Anān, however, apparently finding the situation reminiscent of the assassination, in the immediate past, of <u>Sharif</u> Muhammad on an analogous occasion, suspected a trap and left Mecca in the pilgrimage season of the same year without implementing the Sultan's order. Consequently, 'Alī was proclaimed sole Amir of Mecca.¹ 'Anān had left Mecca but remained in its neighbourhood and particularly in the valley of Marr.² 'Anān's subsequent policy of

¹Ibn al-Furāt, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. IX, part I, pp. 18-19 and 21; Ibn Wahhās, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. II, p.194; Qalqashandi, <u>Subh</u>, vol. IV, p.275; idem, <u>Ma'athir</u>, vol. II, p.196; Fasi, <u>Shifa'</u>, vol. II, p.207; idem, <u>al-'Iqd</u>, vol. I, part I, fols. 57a, 291a-b and 246a, vol. II, part III, fol. 192a and 253b; <u>Maqrizi</u>, <u>Sulūk</u>, vol. III, fols. 110a; Ibn Hajar, <u>Inbā'</u>, vol. I, fols. 91a-b, 99a, 137b and 204a-b; Ibn Taghri Birdi, <u>al-Manhal</u>, vol. II, fol. 120a and 384a; Al-Najm Ibn Fahd, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. II, fols. 110-12; <u>Sakhāwi</u>, <u>al-Paw'</u>, vol. I, p.266; vol. V, p.149: vol. VI, p.148. Ibn Iyās, <u>Badā'i</u>, vol. I, p.268; idem, <u>'Uqūd</u>, vol. II, fol. 114b. See also: <u>Khazraji</u>, <u>op.cit.</u>, fol. 438; Jaziri, <u>op.cit.</u>, p.585; Janābi, <u>op.cit.</u>, fol. 304a; **I**sāmi, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. IV, p.250.

²This valley, about 28 km. to the north-east of Mecca, is known by various names, such as: Batn Marr, Marr al-Zahran, and presently as Wadi Fatima. It was and still is among the most fertile valleys in the region of Mecca. For further details, see: Yūsuf b. Ya'qūb b. al-Mujāwir, Ta'rikh al-Mustahsir, 2 vols. (Leiden 1951-2), vol. I, p.14; Muhammad b. Abdullah b. Battūta, <u>Tuhfat al-Nuzzar</u>, 2, vols. (Cairo, 1357/1938), vol. I, pp. 78-79; Abī Bakr b. al-Husayn/Marāghi <u>Tahqīq al-Nusra</u> (Cairo, 1374/1955), p.161; Qalqashandi, <u>Subh</u>, vol. IV, pp. 259-60; Ayni, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. I, fol. 30a; Ibn Taghri Birdi, <u>al-</u> <u>Manhal</u>, vol. I, pp. 369-70; Samhūdi, <u>Wafa'</u>, vol.TI, p.174; idem, <u>Khulāsat</u>, p.229; Tabari, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. I, fol. 30; Abd al-Quddūs al-Ansari, <u>Tahqīq Amkina fi'l-Hijaz wa Tihama</u>, a supplement to the magazine <u>Al-Manhal</u>, Mecca. intercepting supplies of food and other commodities to Mecca by threatening and attacking caravans, merchants, and travellers alike, developed into a nuisance which Sharif 'Alī could not tolerate. He launched an offensive against 'Anān and forced him to flee from the vicinity of Mecca.

Early in 790/1388 'Anan tried to occupy Mecca by a surprise attack but failed and retreated to the valley of Marr and from there marched with his supporters and took control of JEdda by a sudden attack. Having established himself firmly there, he sent the Sultan apologies for his disobedience attributing it to fear and not to disloyalty. The version of Ibn al-Furat implies that 'Anan's purpose was to secure a Sultani edict declaring Jedda a separate entity and confirming him in control of the city. However, other sources indicate that 'Anan's approach was mainly intended to secure both the favour of the Sultan and the co-emirate. Sharif 'Ali, aware of 'Anan's move, sent his brother Hasan to Cairo to nip any attempt by 'Anan to ingratiate himself with the Sultan in the bud. The decision of the Sultan, however, was that both 'Anan and 'Ali were to share the emirate of Mecca. An edict to this effect reached Mecca in Rabi^c II or Jumáda I 790/April or May 1388, but 'Anan was unable to participate in the affairs of the emirate. By then he had become too unpopular and even many of his own supporters had deserted him, thus weakening 'Anan's military strength considerably, especially as he could not rely on the loyalty of his remaining supporters, who patently lacked zeal. Moreover, 'Anan was deprived of his share in the revenue and was unable to rectify the situation.

'Anan's journey to Cairo, in <u>Shawwal</u> 790/October 1388, seems to have been motivated by the wish to air his grievances and to gain

Rajab 1379/January 1960 (J&dda, 1379/1959-60), pp. 4-5.

the Sultan's sympathy. But the reception he met with was cool, nor was any help forthcoming. To make matters worse, Sultan Barquq was deposed and imprisoned in the citadel of al-Karak in Jumada II or Rajab 791/June or July 1389. The new Sultan, al-Mansur (or al-Şalih) Hajji showed himself favourably disposed to Sharif 'Ali and 'Anan was imprisoned in the Citadel of Cairo with a number of <u>Mamluks</u> and supporters of the deposed Barquq.¹

## 'Anan appointed co-Amir of Mecca

For Sharif 'Anān the contact with the <u>Mamlūks</u> of Barqūq resulted in a superficial and marginal involvement in Egyptian politics on Barqūq's side and he gained the goodwill of his fellow captives. Barqūq's escape from al-Karak in Ramadān 791/September 1389 marks a dramatic change in the fortunes of Barqūq as well as of 'Anān. When Barqūq's <u>Mamlūks</u>, by a happy coincidence, made an equally successful bid for freedom and seized the Cairo Citadel in the name of their master, 'Anān was among those who brought Barqūq the good news. After the latter's victorious entry to Cairo in Şafar 792/February 1390 he rewarded 'Anān with the coveted co-emirate of Mecca, to which he returned. He was accompanied by an Egyptian Amir on whom it was incumbent to bring about a reconciliation between the two co-Amirs

¹ Ibn al-Furāt, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. IX, part I, pp. 21-22, 25, 27, 35, 93-94 and 132; Qalqashandi, <u>Subh</u>, vol. III, p.438; Fāsi, <u>Shifa</u>, vol. II, p.207; idem, <u>al-'Iqd</u>, vol. I, part I, fol. 190b, part II, fol. 399b, vol. II, part III, fols. 192a-b and 253b-54a; Maqrizi, <u>Suluk</u>, vol. III, fol. 110b, 111b and 113b; Ibn Hajār, <u>Inbā</u>, vol. I, fols. 91a-b, 96a, 103b, 137b and 204b; Ibn Taghri Birdi, <u>al-Manhal</u>, vol. II, fol. 120a-b, 167b-68a and 324a; Al-Najm Ibn Fahd, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. II, fols. 112-13; Sakhāwi, al-Dhayl, fols. 56a-b, Sakhāwi, <u>al-Daw</u>, vol. III, pp. 11 and 105, vol. IV, p.148. See also: Jaziri, <u>op.cit.</u>, p.585; Janābi, <u>op.cit.</u>, fols. 304a, 304b; 'Işāmi, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. I, fol. 62; Dahlān, <u>op.cit.</u>, p.35.

By the middle of 792/1390 a peculiar arrangement was arrived at. From the details given in the sources, and particularly by Fasi followed by al-Najm Ibn Fahd, it is evident that both co-Amirs lacked any willingness to co-operate with each other. The most important points of this arrangement were as follows: Both Sharifs were to share, in equal parts, the/revenue, and both had to renounce the privilege of a permanent residence in the city, which was to remain under the joint control of their deputies. Moreover, by mutual consent, each co-Amir was assigned his own group of supporters: 'Anān was henceforth to rely on the exclusive support of Quwwād, and 'Alī on that of Ashrāf.

This strange agreement remained in force for a brief period only. Early in 793/1390-91 their mutual resentment and disputes flared up again, a state of affairs which led to an abortive attempt to assassinate 'Anān in Şafar 794/January 1392. After 'Anān's escape, his deputy and some of his officials were expelled from the city and his name was omitted from the prayer on the roof of Zamzam.¹ The <u>Khatib</u>, however, refused to comply with an order to this effect. This was only the prelude to a spate of humiliations to which 'Anān was subjected and which culminated in his final downfall.²

¹Zamzam - a historical and sacred well within the Meccan sanctuary, near the Ka'ba. The Muslims revered its water and drank it as health-giving and to seek the blessing. See B. Carra de Vaux, <u>E.I.¹</u>, art. "Zamzam", pp. 1212-13. These prayers were said daily in the evening for the Amir or Amirs of Mecca and the inclusion or exclusion of a name had its political implication. However, this practice was not as significant as the mentioning of the name in the Friday Khutba (i.e. sermon).

² Tbn al-Furāt, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. IX, part I, pp. 157, 192-93, 199, 205 and 208; Fasi, <u>Shifa</u>, vol. II, p.207; idem, <u>al-'Iqd</u>, vol. II, part III, fols. 193a and 254a-b; Ibn Hajar, <u>Inba</u>, vol. I, fols. 103b-4a, 108b-9a, 137b and 204b; Ibn Taghri Birdi, <u>al-Manhal</u>, vol. II, fol. 120b, 168a and 324a; Al-Najm Ibn Fahd, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. II, fols. 113-16; Sakhāwi, <u>al-Daw</u>, vol. III, pp. 10-12, vol. VI, p.148; Ibn Iyās, <u>Badā'i</u>, vol. I, pp. 268-75, 277-82 and 284-89. See also: Jazīri, <u>op.cit.</u>, p.585; Janābi, <u>op.cit.</u>, fol. 304b; Sinjāri, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. I, fol. 331; Dahlān, <u>op.cit.</u>, p.36.

# 'Ali appointed sole Amir of Mecca

The situation in Mecca having become chaotic in the early part of 794/1392, the Sultan summoned both co-Amirs to Cairo. Sharif 'Anān, anxious to remain in the Sultan's favour, responded immediately to the call and departed rather hurriedly in Jumādā II of the same year (May 1392). 'Alī's strategy seems to have been shrewder: he went first to Medina and held there a special ceremony of reading the Qur'ān followed by special prayers for the Sultan, and with a <u>Mahdar</u>¹ began his journey. On his arrival in Cairo in Shabān 794/July 1392, he presented the <u>Mahdar</u> and several valuable gifts to the Sultan. Sharif 'Alī made the better impression on the Sultan and was appointed sole Amir of Mecca. 'Anān was deposed and detained in Cairo.²

By a strange irony of fate, it was 'Ali's very success that cost him his life. One of his prominent supporters, Jar AMLah b. Hamza, who had misinterpreted the Sultan's summons to the co-Amirs as a sign of the impending deposition of both, tried to secure the emirate for himself and went to Cairo with this aim in view. He returned not only disappointed in his ambitions, but also as a bitter foe of Sharif 'Ali, and found willing assistance among the ranks of the supporters of the deposed 'Anān. Therefore Sharif 'Ali, on his return, was forced to take up arms against these opponents. 'Ali's sudden split with his

¹A report detailing certain events, signed by a number of religious and notable persons to vouch for its authenticity.

²Ibn al-Furāt, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. IX, part II, pp. 303-4, 306, 308 and 310; Qalqashandi, <u>Subh</u>, vol. IV, p.275; idem, <u>Ma'āthir</u>, vol. II, p.196; Fāsi, <u>Shifā'</u>, vol. II, pp. 207-8; idem, <u>al- Iqd</u>, vol. I, part I, fol. 190b, vol. II, part III, fol. 193a-b and 254b-55a; Maqrizi, <u>Sulūk</u>, vol. III, fols. 155a-56a; Ibn Hajar, <u>Inba'</u>, vol. I, fols. 120a, 137b and 204b; Ibn Taghri Birdi, <u>al-Manhal</u>, vol. II, fols. 120b, 168a and 324a; Al-Najm Ibn Fahd, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. <u>II</u>, fols. 116-17; Sakhawi, <u>al-Daw'</u>, vol. VI, p.148; see also: Jaziri, <u>op.cit.</u>, p.585; Janābī, <u>op.cit.</u>, fol. 304b; 'Işāmi, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. IV, p.252;. Sinjāri, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. I, fol. 332; Dahlān, <u>op.cit.</u>, p.36.

brother Hasan¹ and the resulting division among his own ranks weakened his military strength considerably. As so often, the reason for this sudden deterioration in the relations between Hasan and 'Alī cannot be ascertained. Possibly it began as a financial dispute which soon developed into an armed conflict. In or around Jumädā II 797/April 1395 Hasan tried to take Mecca but failed and fled to Cairo where he was imprisoned. Meanwhile, the hostility of the groups antagonistic to Sharif 'Alī continued, and the latter was assassinated on 7th <u>Shawwal 797/28th July 1395.²</u>

#### Sharif Hasan appointed Amir of Mecca

The fear of the Meccans, following the assassination of <u>Sharif</u> 'Alī, that anarchy and looting would ensus fortunately did not materialize, as <u>Sharif Muhammad</u>, a blind brother of 'Alī, managed with the help of the deceased's men and slaves, to maintain law and order and notified the Sultan of what had happened. In <u>Dh</u>**U**'l Qa'da 797/September 1395, the Sultan released Hasan and appointed him Amir of Mecca.

The latter reached Mecca in Rabi' II 798/February 1396. His immediate task, in accord with the tribal practice, was to retaliate against the assassins of his brother, and he succeeded. Unable to meet Hasan in an open battle, his opponents did their best to disrupt law and order. This led the merchants to avoid coming to J2dda and Mecca and thus caused great financial losses for the Sharif and the

¹Qalqashandi alone describes him as a nephew of 'Ali, <u>Subh</u>, vol. IV, p.275.

² Ibn al-Furât, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. IX, part II, pp. 332-33,413-14 and 420; Qalqashandi, <u>Suph</u>, vol. IV, p.275; Fāsi, <u>Shifā</u>, vol. II, p. 208; idem, <u>al-'Iqd</u>, vol. I, part I, fols. 57a-b, part II, fol. 367b, vol. II, part III, fols.193b-95a; Macrizi, <u>Suluk</u>, vol. III, fols. 157b and 171b; Ibn Hajar, <u>Inbā</u>, vol. I, fols. 120b, 135b, 137b and 204b; Ibn Taghri Birdi, <u>al-Manhal</u>, vol. II, fol. 120b; idem, <u>al-Nujūm</u>, vol. XII, pp. 144-45; Al-Najm Ibn Fahd, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. II, fols. 117-20; Sakhāwi, <u>al-Dhayl</u>, fol. 61b; Ibn Iyās, <u>Badā</u>, vol. I, p.304; see also: Jaziri, <u>op.cit.</u>, p.585; Janābi, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. IV, p.252; Sinjāri, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. I, fol. 331-32; Dahlān, <u>op.cit.</u>, p.36.

merchants in the area. Thanks to the efforts of the energetic Hasan law and order, and with it ... stability and prosperity, returned to the region in 799/1396-97.¹

Sharif Hasan was able, by persuasion or force, to unite various groups under his command. His relations with the Sultan, Barquq, (d. 15th <u>Shawwal 801/20th</u> June 1399) and then his son, Faraj (d. 815/1412) were, on the whole, good and this must have enhanced Hasan's influence and power in the region. In 804/1401, Hasan's relations with al-Muhalli, a prominent afficial of Sultan Faraj, deteriorated for reasons discussed later.² Al-Muhalli secured the release of Sharif 'Anān and made him hopeful of retrieving the emirate of Mecca at the expense of Hasan. The latter took the threat seriously and it caused him great anxiety. He did not receive the Egyptian <u>Amir</u> <u>al-Hajj</u> except with observable reluctance. However, the death of 'Anān in Jumādā II 805/December 1402 and then of al-Muḥalli himself in the following year relieved Hasan from a great politico-economic pressure.³

# Hasan appointed Na ib al-Sultan

Between 809/1406 and 811/1408 Sharif Hasan appointed two of his sons, Barakāt I and Ahmad, his co-Amirs, and the appointment was officially confirmed. In 811/1408 the Sultan granted Hasan the status

²See <u>infra</u>, pp. 159-60.

¹Ibn al-Furāt, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. IX, part II, pp. 414, 434 and 442-43; Fāsi, <u>Shifā</u>, vol. II, p.208; idem, <u>al-'Iqd</u>, vol. I, part I, fol. 189b, part II, fols. 399b-402a, vol. II, part III, fol. 195a; Maqrizi, <u>Sulūk</u>, vol. III, fols.171b, 172a and 174a; Ibn Taghri Birdi, <u>al-Manhal</u>, vol. II, fols. 120b and 323a; Al-Najm Ibn Fahd, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. II, fols. 120-24; Sakhāwī, <u>al-Daw</u>, vol. III, pp. 103-4. See also: Janābi, <u>op.cit.</u>, fol. 304b; 'Işāmi, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. IV, pp. 252-53; Sinjāri, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. I, fols. 333-34; Țabari, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. I, fol. 63; Dahlān, <u>op.cit.</u>, pp. 36-37.

³Fasi, <u>al-'Iqd</u>, vol. I, part II, fols. 403b-4a, vol. II, part III, fol. 255a; Maqrizi, <u>Suluk</u>, vol. III, fols. 233b and 241b; Ibn Hajar, <u>Inba</u>, vol. I, fol. 204b; Ibn Taghri Birdi, <u>al-Manhal</u>, vol. II, fol. 168a;

of <u>Na'ib al-Sultan</u> (deputy of the Sultan) in the Hijaz.¹ This was undoubtedly the most remarkable achievement of Hasan and was a step of great significance for the region. But in 812/1409, the attitude of the Sultan became markedly cooler and he instructed the Egyptian <u>Amir al-Hajj</u> to replace Hasan by another <u>Sharif</u>, 'Ali b. Mubärak.

What caused this sudden change in the Sultan's attitude is not clear. From the version of certain sources, such as Fasi, followed by al-Najm Ibn Fahd and others, it appears that this change was due, at least partly, to the efforts of Jabir al-Harashi,² an official of Hasan whose relations were at the time unfriendly, and to some financial dispute. Be it as it may, this much is certain, that after the departure of the Egyptian caravan some courtiers amicably disposed towards Hasan interceded with the Sultan on his behalf, assuring him that Hasan would pay a considerably sum to the treasury after he was re-instated.³ Sultan agreed and sent his servant Firüz al-Sāqī with a decree confirming Hasan in the same position and the Egyptian <u>Amir</u> al-Hajj was instructed to disregard the previous order.⁴

It was during the emirate and <u>Niyabat al-Saltana</u> of <u>Sharif Hasan</u> that the rule of Sultan al-Nasir Faraj ended in or around Safar 815/ June 1412 and a period of intense inter-faction rivalry began in Egypt and Syria, and the Caliph al-Musta'in, on the suggestion of Amir

Al-Najm Ibn Fahd, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. II, fols. 129 and 131-33; Sakhāwi, al-Dhayl, fol. 70b; idem, <u>al-Daw</u>, vol. I, pp. 112-13 and 197. See also: Janabi, <u>op.cit.</u>, fol. 305b; Sinjāri, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. I, fol. 332; Țabari, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. I, fol¥ 62.

¹See <u>infra</u>, pp.113-17.

²See <u>infra</u>, p.245.

³See <u>infra</u>, p-227.

⁴Fasi, Shifa, vol. II, pp. 208-9 and 252-54; idem, <u>al-'Iqd</u>, vol. I, part 1, fols. 57b, 63b-64a, part II, fols. 408a-b and 605b-6a;vol. II, part III, fols. 195a and 197b-98a; Al-Najm Ibn Fahd, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. II, fols. 142-43; Sa<u>khawi</u>, <u>al-Dhay</u>1, fol. 80a; idem, <u>al-Daw</u>, vol. III, pp.13 and 51, vol. V, p.277. See also: Jaziri, <u>op.cit.</u>,

<u>Shaykh</u> al-Mahmūdī, was declared Sultan. The Abbāsid caliphs of Egypt were "little more than minor court pensioners with purely ceremonial duties to perform on the accession of a new Sultan.", with the only exception of Caliph al-Musta'in who "became a stop-gap ruler for six months in the course of a feud between rival claimants to the Sultanate."²

Al-Musta'in's accession to the Sultanate had pleased the pious circles who regarded this episode a revival of the bygone glory of the Caliphate. But those aware of the real situation knew from the start that it had no real significance. Even the Caliph himself had no illusions that the Sultanate was assigned to him for life-long tenure. He had only accepted it on condition that he would remain Caliph even when removed from the Sultanate. In Jumada II 815/ October 1412, al-Musta in confirmed Sharif Hasan and his sons and sent an investiture of rule and the robe of honour. This was the first and the them / last time in the Burji period that an Abbasid caliph did so as sovereign. Al-Musta in's name was subsequently mentioned in the Khutba, and prayers were said for him in the sanctuary of Mecca. In Sha ban 815/ December 1412, Amir Shaykh became himself Sultan, taking the regal name al-Mu'ayyad (d. Muharram 824/January 1421) but retained al-Musta'in as Caliph. This sudden change in al-Musta'in's status confused the Meccan Khatibs and some continued to mention his name, while others omitted it occasionally. It was finally excluded in

¹B.Lewis, <u>E.I.</u>², art. "Abbasids", p.21.

p.319; Janābi, <u>op.cit.</u>, fols. 305a-b; 'Isāmi, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. IV, pp. 253-55; Sinjāri, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. I, fols. 339-41; Ţabari, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. I, fol. 75; Dahlan, <u>op.cit.</u>, pp. 37-38.

²Ibid. See also: B.Lewis, "Egypt and Syria" in <u>The Cambridge History</u> <u>of Islam</u>, vol. I, p.221; W.Wansbrough, <u>E.I.</u>², art. "Faradj".

Rabi[•] II 817/July 1414.¹

Though not as a result of the above stated change of ruler in Egypt, it was shortly after that Sharif Hasan was facing internal dissension. In Jumada I or II 816/August or September 1413, the hitherto tolerable relationship between Hasan and his nephew, Rumaytha, changed, possibly in the wake of some financial dispute, to open hostility. In the absence of Hasan, Rumaytha occupied Mecca for a short period, but fled on the approach of the former, and was allowed to escape unmolested.² This leniency was interpreted by Rumaytha and his supporters as a sign of Hasan's weakness, and they ventured outside the precincts of Mecca trespassing on the neighbouring territory. When Hasan launched an offensive they suffered defeat and fled in the direction of the Yemen.

Having renounced hope of occupying Mecca, they took control of J2dda by a surprise attack in Ramadan 816/December 1413 and proceeded to loot it. Incensed by what had happened and fearing the loss of revenue, Sharif Hasan made preparations for an attack but desisted from it in view of the reluctance of his supporters. Instead, he solicited the help of Muqbil, the Amir of Yanbu'. Meanwhile, after a prolonged negotiation, Rumaytha agreed to a truce until the end of the pilgrimage season and left J2dda but remained in its neighbourhood.³

²Fasi, Shifa, vol. I,p.11; idem, <u>al-'Iqd</u>, vol. I, part I, fol. 10a; Ibn Hajar, <u>Inba'</u>, vol. II, fol. 1b; 'Ayni, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. IV, fol. 592b; Al-Najm Ibn Fahd, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. II, fol. 154; Sakhāwi, <u>al-Daw'</u>, vol. VIII, p.100. See also: Janābi, <u>op.cit.</u>, fol. 305b.

¹ Qalqashandi, <u>Subh</u>, vol. III, pp. 267, 279-80, 439 and 442; Fasi, <u>Shifa</u>, vol. II, pp. 254-55; idem, <u>al-'Iqd</u>, vol. I, part I, fol. 64a, part II, fol. 407b; Maqrizi, <u>Suluk</u>, vol. II, fols. 251 and 253; Al-Najm Ibn Fahd, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. II, fols. 152, 154 and 160; Sakhawi, <u>al-Dhayl</u>, fols. 63b-64a, 79a and 80a-b; Ibn Iyas, <u>Bada'i</u>, vol. I, pp. 355-59, vol. II, pp. 2-3; idem, <u>Uqud</u>, vol. II, fol. 183. See also: Muhammad b. Ahmad al-Nahrawali, <u>al-I'lam bi A'lam Bayt Allah al-Haram</u>, ex. published by F.Wüstenfeld in: <u>Die Chroniken der Stadt Mekka</u> (Leipzig, 1857), p.201; Ibn al-'Imād, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. VII, p.108.

⁵Fasi, <u>al-'Iqd</u>, vol. I, part II, fol. 409a; Al-Najm Ibn Fahd, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. II, fol. 155.

Sharif Muqhil reached Mecca with his forces during the pilgrimage. Soon after the expiry of the truce, Hasan and Muqhil marched jointly against Rumaytha, who fled towards Haly¹ with his supporters and was not pursued.²

Shortly after, Rumaytha went to the Yemen and paid a visit to its Sultan who received him cordially and gave him financial aid. The relations of Sharif Hasan with the Yemenite Sultan, at the time, where far from being friendly.³ This may have been the reason for the favour shown by the Yemenite Sultan towards Rumaytha. The former may/or may not have encouraged Rumaytha to renew hostilities against Hasan but it may be too much of a coincidence that Rumaytha marched against Hasan shortly after his return from the Yemen. In Ramadan 817/December 1414, Rumaytha with his supporters reached a valley near Mecca. Hasan went out to meet him with a strong force. However, on the intervention of some men of goodwill a truce was agreed upon by the two rivals which was intended to/last until 10th Muharram 818/23rd March 1415.⁴

The hostilities between Hasan and Rumay<u>tha</u> and the resulting lack of law and order appear to have affected the commercial activities of the area, especially as the Yemenite Sultan seems to have imposed an embargo.⁵ Moreover, Sharif Hasan was compelled to pay a considerable

¹A coastal town and port about 385 km to the south of J£dda also known as Haly b. Ya qub. For further details, see, Qalqashandi, Subh, vol. V, p.13; Maqrizi, Suluk, vol. II, fol. 331; Ibn Hajar, <u>Inba</u>, vol. I, fol. 241b; 'Ayni, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. I, fol. 31a; Ibn Taghri Birdi, <u>al-Manhal</u>, vol. II, fol. 124a; Ansari, <u>op.cit.</u>, p.12.

²Fasi, <u>al-'Iqd</u>, vol. I, part II, fols. 409a-b; Al-Najm Ibn Fahd, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. II, fols. 155 and 157-58.

³See <u>infra</u>, pp.166 - 68.

⁴Fásí, <u>al-'Iqd</u>, vol. I, part II, fol. 409b; Al-Najm Ibn Fahd, op.cit., vol. II, fols. 155 and 158.

⁵See <u>infra</u>, p.168.

amount of money to secure the favour of Sultan Faraj and thus Hasan's financial position was rather weak. Consequently, in Dhull Qa'da 817/February 1415, he was unable - in spite of reiterated demands, to pay the Egyptian Amir al-Hajj the price of grain sent by the Egyptian Sultan for sale. Though Hasan made a vague promise of payment in the near future it did not satisfy the Egyptian Amir, who did not hide his displeasure.² The latter, probably anticipating some hostility on the part of Sharif Hasan, had, on his arrival, forbidden the carrying of arms within the precincts of Mecca. Unaware of that order, a certain Qa'id was found to be armed and was arrested. This led to an armed clash between the Egyptians and various groups of Quwwad. Sharif Hasan took care to remain uninvoled and managed to pacify his supporters by obtaining the release of the captive. However, the Amirs of both Egyptian caravans departed with a grudge against Hasan. The failure of the latter to pay the price of grain and to protect the Egyptians from the attack of the Quwwad gave these Amirs valid reasons to make their report to Sultan al-Mu'ayyad Shaykh unfavourable to Hasan. The Amirs even seem to have gone so far as to recommend Hasan's replacement by Rumaytha.³

¹See <u>supra</u>, p.63 and <u>infra</u>, p.227.

²Fasi, <u>al-'Iqd</u>, vol. I, part II, fol. 410a; Al-Najm Ibn Fahd, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. II, fol. 158. See also: Jaziri, <u>op.cit.</u>, p.320.

³Fāsi, <u>Shifa</u>, vol. II, pp. 255-57; idem, <u>al-'Iqd</u>, vol. I, part II, fols. <u>410a-b</u>; <u>Maqrizi</u>, <u>Suluk</u>, vol. II, fol. 263; Ibn Hajar, <u>Inba</u>, vol. II, fol. 7a; <u>Al-Najm Ibn Fahd</u>, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. II, fols. <u>158-60</u>. See also: Jaziri, <u>op.cit.</u>, p.320; <u>Isami</u>, vol. IV, pp. 255-56; Sinjāri, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol.I, fols. <u>342-43</u>; <u>Tabari</u>, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. I, fols. 78-79; Dahlān, <u>op.cit.</u>, pp. 38-39.

#### Hasan faces various problems

By the end of 817/1415, the period of relative stability which Hasan had enjoyed ended, and he was to face new internal crises and external pressures. In Rabi'I 818/June 1415, a decree reached Mecca by which Hasan was deposed by Rumaytha, but he remained in control until the pilgrimage season. Though Rumaytha was declared not only the Amir of Mecca but <u>Na'ib al-Sultán</u> as well¹ but his authority was hardly acknowledged beyond the immediate neighbourhood of Mecca. This was mainly due to the continuous hostility on the part of the pro-Hasan group. As a result, Rumaytha's authority was practically non-existent outside Mecca and he even found it difficult to hold his own in Mecca.²

In a successful attempt to retrieve lost ground, Sharif Hasan sent his son Barakāt I to Cairo with gifts for the Sultan in Rajab 819/September 1416. Hasan's re-appointment in Shawwal 819/December 1416 met with a determined opposition from Rumaytha. On 24th Shawwal of the same year, Sharif Hasan supported by the Amir of Yanbu', Sharif Muqhil, launched an offensive, defeated Rumaytha, and took control of the city. He, however, granted Rumaytha and his men five days of grace to depart safely.³ The magnanimity shown by Hasan to

¹See <u>infra</u>, p.117.

²Fasi, Shifa', vol. II, p.209; idem, <u>al-'Iqd</u>, vol. I, part I, fol. 57b, part II, fols. 410b-11a, vol. II, part III, fols. 195a-b; Maqrizi, <u>Suluk</u>, vol. II, fol. 272; Ibn Hajar, <u>Inba</u>', vol. II, fols. 10a and 14b; Al-Najm Ibn Fahd, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. II, fols. 162-64; Sakhawi, <u>al-Daw</u>', vol. III, pp. 13 and 104. See also: Jaziri, <u>op.cit.</u>, p.585; Janābi, <u>op.cit.</u>, fol. 305b; 'Isāmi, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. IV, pp. 254 and 256-57; Sinjāri, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. I, fol. 344; Tabari, <u>op.cit.</u>; vol. I, fol. 80; Dahlān, <u>op.cit.</u>, p.39.

³Fāsī, Shifā', vol. I, p.11, vol. II, pp. 209-10; idem, <u>al-'Iqd</u>, vol. I, part I, fols. 57b-58a, part II, fols. 4Ia-12a and 415a-16a, vol. II, part III, fol. 195b; Maqrizī, <u>Sulūk</u>, vol. II, fols. 277-78; Ibn Hajar, <u>Inbā'</u>, vol. II, fols. 19b-20b; Al-Najm Ibn Fahd, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. II, fols. 164-65; Sakhāwī, <u>al-Daw'</u>, vol. III, pp. 13 and 104. See also: Jazīrī, <u>op.cit.</u>, p.585; Janābi, <u>op.cit.</u>, fol. 305b; 'Alī al-Tabarī, <u>op.cit.</u>, fol. 70; 'Isāmī, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. IV, pp. 254 and 257-58; Sinjāri, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. I, fols. 344-45; Țabarī, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. I, fol. 80; Dahlān, <u>op.cit.</u>, p.38.

Rumay<u>tha</u> on this and previous occasions induced the latter to come to Mecca in Safar 820/March 1417 to declare his loyalty to Hasan. He was received with unusual cordiality and respect. According to Fasi (<u>al-'Iqd</u>), Rumay<u>tha</u>'s name was mentioned in the <u>Khutba</u>. Coins bearing his namewere minted in Mecca to commemorate this reconciliation. It was not unwelcome to many on both sides, but was resented by most of Rumay<u>tha</u>'s supporters who, in Jumādā I or II 820/July or August 1417, set up a rival emirate choosing <u>Sharifs Melib</u> b. 'Ali and <u>Th</u>uqba b. Ahmad as their Amirs, and a few weeks later occupied JEdda.

Sharif Hasan reacted quickly and decisively, sending a force led by Rumaytha who, after minor skirmishes, was able to oust the rebels and regain the control of J&dda in Rajab 820/September 1417.² In Ramadän 820/November 1417, Hasan's opponents retaliated by attacking Mecca in Sharif Hasan's absence. His deputy did his best to defend the city but was defeated and killed. The victors, however, made no attempt to occupy Mecca and pitched camp in a neighbouring valley.³ Surprisingly enough, Sharif Hasan reacted to such provocation by concluding a truce with his opponents which was to last until 10th Muharram 821/18th February 1418.⁴ Probably Hasan did so partly from his weakness and partly to secure the safety of merchants and pilgrims.

- ¹Fasi, Shifa', vol. II, p.210; idem, <u>al-'Iqd</u>, vol. I, part II, fol. 412a-12b, vol.II, part III, fol. 195b, part IV, fols. 331b-32a; Al-Najm Ibn Fahd, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. II, fols. 167-8. See also: 'Isami, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. IV, pp. 258-59; Sinjari, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. I, fols. 345-46; Dablan, <u>op.cit.</u>, p.39.
- Fasi, <u>al-'Iqd</u>, vol. I, part II, fols. 412b-13a, vol. II, part IV, fol. <u>332a</u>; Al-Najm Ibn Fahd, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. II, fol. 168. See also: 'Işami, <u>op.cit.</u>, IV, p.259; Sinjari, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. I, fol. <u>346</u>; Dahlan, <u>op.cit.</u>, p.39.
- ²Fasi, <u>als Iqd</u>, vol. I, part II, fol. 413a, vol. II, part IV, fol. 33a; Al-Najm Ibn Fahd, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. II, fols. 168-69; Sakhawi, <u>al-Daw</u>, vol. X, p.166. See also: 'Isami, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. IV, p.259; Sinjari, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. I, fol. 346; Dahlan, <u>op.cit.</u>, p.39.
- ⁴Fasi, <u>al-'Iqd</u>, vol. I, part II, fol. 413a; Al-Najm Ibn Fahd, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. II, fol. 169.

Possibly this mild attitude of Hasan was due to his preoccupation with other problems and particularly his rather uneasy relations with Sultan al-Mu'ayyad <u>Shaykh</u>. This appears to have been due to some financial dispute including the failure of Hasan to pay the price of grain referred to earlier.¹ In Rabi' I, 821/April 1418, the Sultan sent a rather harshly worded epistle to <u>Sharif</u> Hasan giving vent to his anger about the latter's failure to pay his debt to him, and warned Hasan of the consequences if he failed to effect immediate payment. Hasan's wish to abdicate in favour of his son, Barakāt I, was not approved by the Sultan.² But this mere desire antagonized another of Hasan's sons, Ahmad, who regarded himself as being neglected and went to Yenhu' in anger.³ This encouraged various groups of <u>Ashrāf</u> and <u>Quwwād</u>, previously at daggers drawn with Hasan, to challenge his authority and induce Rumaytha to join them, and occupied J**E**dda early in 824/1421.⁴

Sharif Hasan, content for a while with the rôle of a passive spectator, let the events take their course at first. Meanwhile Sultan al-Mu'ayyad <u>Shaykh</u> died and was succeeded by his son al-Muzaffar Ahmad. The new Sultan confirmed <u>Sharif</u> Hasan and granted his earlier request by appointing Barakāt I co-Amir of Mecca. Moreover, Sultan Ahmad gratified <u>Sharif</u> Hasan further by avoiding any reference to the amount due from him.⁵ But the appointment of BarakātI

¹See <u>supra</u>, pp. 66-67.

²G. Rentz states that Sharif Hasan abdicated in favour of his son Barakat I in &21/1418, <u>E.I.</u>², art. "Barakat", p.1032. But judging from the information given in the sources used in this work this abdication did not take place.

³Fasi, <u>al-'Ind</u>, vol. I, part II, fols. 413b-14a, 415a and 416a; Al Najm Ibn Fahd, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. II, fols. 170, 172-3 and 177; Sakhawi, <u>al-Daw'</u>, vol. III, p.13. See also: 'Işami, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. IV, p.259; Sinjari, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. I, fol. 346; Dahlan, <u>op.cit.</u>, p.40.

⁴Fasi, <u>al-'Iqd</u>, vol. I, part II, fol. 418a; Al-Najm Ibn Fahd, <u>op.cit.</u>, Vol. II, fol. 179.

^PFasi, <u>Sh</u>ifa', vol. II, pp. 210-11 and 258; idem, al-'Iqd, vol. I,

was resented by his brother Ibrahim who had been trying to secure this position for himself and he left Mecca in rebellious mood. He later returned to Mecca with a strong body of supporters and demanded the inclusion of his name in the offering of prayers. To avoid further dissension in the family Sharif Hasan acceded to his request, but the practice was soon discontinued.¹

For lack of a sufficiently strong military contingent, Hasan was at first compelled to remain inactive and made no attack on Rumay<u>tha</u> and his supporters who had occupied J£dda earlier. Early in 825/142.2. , by intrigue rather than by force of arms, he lured many of Rumay<u>tha's supporters into his camp</u> and secured the aid of the Amir of Yanhu', <u>Sharif Muqhil</u>, in re-occupying J£dda, but succeeded in regaining it himself without Muqhil's help. Rumay<u>tha</u> himself had no choice but to deprecate his disloyalty and set out, together with Hasan and Muqhil, against the dissident groups, only to slip away during the march.

Rumaytha's flight caused general surprise and gave rise to rumours which even threw suspicion on Muqbil as the instigator of this move, thus presumably sowing the seeds of discord between Hasan and Muqbil. It is no wonder that Sharif Hasan called off the expedition and returned to Mecca in Jumada I 825/May 1422. Muqbil returned to Yanbu' with some resentment towards Sharif Hasan.²

part II, fols. 417a-b; Al-Najm Ibn Fahd, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. II, fol. 179; Sakhawi, <u>al-Daw</u>, vol.III, p.13. See also: Janābi, <u>op.cit.</u>, fol. 305b; 'Isāmi, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. IV, pp. 258-59; Sinjāri, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. I, fols. 346-47; Tabari, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. I, fol. 81; Dahlān, <u>op.cit.</u>, p.40.

¹Fasi, <u>al-'Iqd</u>, vol. I, part II, fols. 417b and 418b-19a; Al-Najm Ibn Fahd, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. II, fols. 180 and 184; Sakhāwi, <u>al-Daw</u>, vol. III, p.104. See also: Janābi, <u>op.cit.</u>, fol. 305b; ¹Işāmi, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. IV, p.259; Sinjāri, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. I, fol. 347; Dablān, <u>op.cit.</u>, p.40.

²Fasi, <u>al-'Iqd</u>, vol. I, part II, fol. 418a; Ibn Hajar, <u>Inba'</u>, ¥ol.II, fol. 62a; Al-Najm Ibn Fahd, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. II, fol. 181.

Whatever the truth of the matter, Rumay<u>tha</u> was naturally encouraged and by a swift move re-occupied J2dda, but was ousted shortly after and fled to Yanbu'. There he was well received and joined Sharif Muqhil against the latter's nephews who were at war with their uncle. The already cool relations between Hasan and Muqhil seem to have further deteriorated and Sharif Hasan's support went to Muqhil's nephews. He even prepared to march in person against Muqhil and Rumay<u>tha</u>, but in order to forestall this danger, Muqhil hurried to Mecca. He succeeded in convincing Hasan that he had been innocent of treachery, but had to expel Rumay<u>tha</u> from Yanbu' for his relations with Hasan to be normalized. Rumay-<u>tha</u> went to Medina and asked its Amir, Sharif 'Ajlān b. Nu'ayr, to mediate between him and Hasan. His intervention having been successful, Rumay<u>tha</u> returned to Mecca in Rabi' I 826/March 1423. He was well received and allowed to stay there honourably.¹

### Hasan deposed by 'Ali b. 'Anan

Ironically enough, no sooner had Hasan consolidated his position than things began to move against him from a new and unexpected quarter. His relations with some of his relatives having become adverse, the latter went to Cairo early in 826/1423, possibly to promote their appointment to the emirate of Mecca. Hasan felt rather uneasy at their departure but his anxiety was somewhat reducedon receiving a reassuring letter from Sultan Barsbay (825/1422-841/1438). Nevertheless, Hasan avoided meeting the Egyptian <u>Amir al-Hajj</u> in the pilgrimage season of the same year and instructed his son Barakāt I

¹Fāsī, <u>al-'Iqd</u>, vol. I, part II, fols. 418a-b; Ibn Hajar, <u>Inbā</u>, vol. II, fol. 69b; Al-Najm Ibn Fahd, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. II, fols. 181-82 and 184; see also: Janābī, <u>op.cit.</u>, fols. 305-b-306a.

to deputize for him at the official reception.^{$\perp$}

How far Hasan's fear was justified is open to question. Only 'Avni states with any clarity that, owing to the objectionable behaviour of Hasan's men, the Egyptian Amirs had intended to arrest him had he appeared at the reception. Be it as it may, this much is certain, that the Egyptian Amirs regarded Hasan's absence as an affront and made no attempt to hide their animosity towards Hasan at their departure.² The most incensed was Amir Qarqmas who stayed in Yanbu' and asked the Sultan to send an expedition against Hasan, a request to which the Sultan acceded towards the end of Muharram 827/December 1423. Sharif 'Ali b. 'Anan, sojourning in Cairo at that time, was appointed Amir of Mecca in partnership with Amir Qaromas. In Rabi'I 827/February 1424, Sharif 'Ali reached Yanbu' with a strong force, which had been placed under the command of Amir Qargmas. On the approach of the two co-Amirs Sharif Hasan left Mecca and the co-Amirs took control of the city in Jumādā I/ 827/April 1424 as well as JEdda and other main centres shortly after.³

Sharif 'Ali and Amir Qarqmas had met no opposition, but remained apprehensive of a counter-move by Hasan, but their fears

³Fasi, Shifa', vol. II, p.211; idem, <u>al-'Iqd</u>, vol. I, part I, fol. 58a and 65b, part II, fol. 419b-20a; Maqrizi, Suluk, vol. II, fols. 328-31; 'Ayni, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. IV, fols. 638a-b; Ibn Hajar, <u>Inba'</u>, vol. II, fols. 70a, 76a-b and 80a; Ibn Taghri Birdi, <u>al-Manhal</u>, vol. I, fol. 284a, vol. II, fols. 124a, 164a and 201a; idem, <u>al-Nujum</u>, vol. VII, fols. 49 and 170; Al-Najm Ibn Fahd, <u>op.</u> cit, vol. II, fols. 185 and 187-88; Sakhāvi, <u>al-Paw'</u>, vol. III, pp. 13 and 104, vol. V, p.272, vol. VI, pp. 219-20; see also: Jaziri, <u>op.cit.</u>, pp. 585-86; Janābi, <u>op.cit.</u>, fol. 306a; 'Işāmi, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. IV, pp. 259-60; Sinjāri, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. I, fols. 348-49; Tabari, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. I, fol. 84; Dahlān, <u>op.cit.</u>, p.41.

¹Fasi, <u>al-'Iqd</u>, vol. I, part II, fol. 419a; Ibn Hajar, <u>Inba'</u>, vol. II, fol. 70a; Al-Najm Ibn Fahd, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. II, fol. 184; Sakhāwi, <u>al-Daw'</u>, vol. III, p.104.

²Fasi, <u>al-'Iod</u>, vol. I, part I, fol. 65b, part II, fols. 419a-b; 'Ayni, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. IV, fols. 638a and 652a; Al-Najm Ibn Fahd, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. II, fol. 185. See also: Sinjāri, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. I, fol. 348; Tabari, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. I, fols. 81-82; Dahlān, <u>op.cit.</u>, p.40.

were unfounded. However, late in 827/1424, Sharif Rumaytha, once a rival but then in close association with Hasan, visited Mecca. Suspected of subversive activities, he was arrested and sent to Cairo.¹

In the pilgrimage season of the same year Sharif Hasan received a spurious message to the effect that he had been re-appointed and was expected in Mecca for the usual ceremony. Sharif Hasan, thanks to the timely warnings of his son Barakāt, managed to avoid the trap. In Jumādā I 828/April 1425 'Alī and Qarqmāş marched with a strong force against Hasan and went as far as Haly but failed to trace him and returned to Mecca empty-handed.²

#### Hasan re-appointed and succeeded by Barakat I

Though both 'Ali and Qarqmas were more than willing to attack Hasan he, on his part, did not let himself be drawn into any armed conflict with them. Instead, he made an approach to Sultan Barsbay in the matter of his re-appointment, which was given sympathetic consideration in Cairo. This is supported by the fact that the Egyptian Amir al-Mahmal, prior to his entry into the city in the pilgrimage season of 828/September or October 1426, sent a friendly letter to Sharif Hasan inviting him to Mecca to give the <u>Mahmal</u> the usual reception. The Amir had both assured Hasan of his personal safety and made it clear that the reception - a duty as well as a privilege

¹Maqrizi, <u>Suluk</u>, vol. II, fol. 334; Al-Najm Ibn Fahd, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. II, fol. 188. See also: 'Işami, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. IV, p.260.

²Fasi, <u>al-'Iqd</u>, vol. I, part I, fols. 65a-b, part II, fols. 420a-b (the copyist points out that Fasi, due to some personal problems, left a blank space on this folio of part II. Therefore, he (the copyist) added the missing portion from Al-Najm Ibn Fahd's <u>Ithaf</u>); Maqrizi, <u>Suluk</u>, vol. II, fol. 336; Al-Najm Ibn Fahd, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. II, fols. 188-89 and 191. See also: 'Işami, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. IV, p.260. of the Amirs of Mecca - was a condition for his re-appointment.

Sharif Hasan, recalling a similar message earlier and warned of his experience then,¹ made sure that the message was genuine before acceding to the request. The fact that no opposition was raised by either 'Ali or Qarqmas shows that the initiative of the Egyptian <u>Amir al-Mahmal</u> had the prior approval of the Egyptian Sultan.²

Such importance was attached to this positive response of <u>Sharif</u> Hasan that a special envoy was immediately dispatched to Cairo to bring the news to the Sultan. The latter is said to have been so pleased that he bestowed an unusually precious robe of honour on the envoy.³ Realizing that he had been deposed, <u>Sharif</u> 'Ali (d. 833/ 1429) left Mecca for Maghrib where he was well received by Sultan Abū Fāris and then for Cairo, where he spent the rest of his life.⁴

Hasan's reappointment having been made conditional on a prior visit to the Sultan, he reached Cairo early in Muharram 829/November 1425. The Sultan, as a gesture of goodwill, had released Rumay<u>tha</u>⁵ prior to the arrival of Hasan, who was cordially received. He was confirmed but not without acquitting himself of the payment of a substantial amount of money.⁶ In Jumādā II 829/May 1426 Hasan died just as he was getting out of Cairo on his return journey to Mecca,

³ Ayni, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. IV, fol. 645a.

⁴ Ibn Hajar, <u>Inba</u>, vol. II, fol. 154a; Ibn Taghri Birdi, <u>al-Manhal</u>, vol. II, fol. 124a; Sakhāwi, <u>al-Daw</u>, vol. V, pp. 272-73. See also: Janābi, <u>op.cit.</u>, fol. 306b.
 ⁵See <u>supra</u>, p. 74.

⁶See <u>infra</u>, p. 228.

¹See <u>supra</u>, p. 74.

Fasi, Shifa, vol. II, p.211; idem, <u>al-'Iqd</u>, vol. I, part I, fol. 58a, part II, fol. 420a (see <u>supra</u>, p. 74 fn 2.); Mazrizi, <u>Suluk</u>, vol. II, fol. 338; Ibn Taghri Birdi, <u>al-Manhal</u>, vol. I, fol. 284a, vol. II, fol. 124a; idem, <u>al-Nujum</u>, vol. VII, fol. 49; Al-Najm Ibn Fahd, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. II, fols. 192-93; Sakhāwi, <u>al-Daw</u>, vol. III, p.104; see also: 'Isāmi, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. IV, pp. 260-61; Sinjāri, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. I, fol. 349; Dahlān, <u>op.cit.</u>, p.41.

and was buried in Cairo. His son Barakāt I was summoned to Cairo and was appointed on similar financial conditions as his father in Ramadān 829/August 1426.¹

The financial obligations imposed upon and accepted by Barakät I caused dissension between him and his brothers, which eventually developed into a serious challenge to Barakāt I.² In 832/1428, he was compelled to pay an agreed amount of money to his opponents in order to conclude a truce.³

Between 832/1428-29 and 842/1438-39 Sharif Barakāt I enjoyed a decade of relative stability and almost unchalleneged authority. until the accession to the throne of Sultan Jaqmaq (842/1438 -857/1453). The past relations between Barakāt I and Jaqmaq appear to have been somewhat unfriendly and the former viewed the accession of the latter to the throne with concern.⁴ This developed into anxiety when 'Alī, a rival brother of Barakāt I, went to Cairo. Afraid of being supplanted by his brother, Barakāt I disregarded a summons to Cairo in 843/1439. The Sultan considered this a sign of

¹Fasi, Shifa, vol. II, p.ll; idem, <u>al-'Iqd</u>, vol. I, part I, fol. 58a, part II, fols. 420b-21a (see <u>supra</u>, p. 74 fn.2 ); Maqrizi, <u>Suluk</u>, vol. II, fols. 339 and 343-44; Ibn Hajar, <u>Inba</u>, vol. II, fols. 85b and 89a; 'Ayni, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. IV, fols. 650b-51a and 652a; Ibn Taghri Birdi, <u>al-Manhal</u>, vol.I, fols. 181a and 284a; idem, <u>al-Nujum</u>, vol. VII, fol. 49; Al-Najm Ibn Fahd, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. II, fols. 193-96; Sakhāwi, <u>al-Daw'</u>, vol. III, pp. 13 and 104-5; see also: Jaziri, <u>op.cit.</u>, pp. 322-24 and 586; Janābi, <u>op.cit.</u>, fol. 306a; 'Isāmi, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. IV, pp. 261, 265 and 267; Sinjāri, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. I, fol. 351, vol. II, fols. 1-2; Tabari, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. I, fols. 84 and 88-89; Dahlān, <u>op.cit.</u>, pp. 41-42; G.Rentz, <u>E.I.²</u>, art. "Barakat", p.1032.

# ²See <u>infra</u>, p.2.70.

³Fasī,<u>al-Iqd</u>,vol.I,part II,fol.415b;Al-Najm Ibn Fahd,op.cit.,vol.II,fol.175.

⁴This was due, most likely, to the clash which occurred in Mecca between Jaqmaq, then <u>Amir al-Hajj</u>, and a group of <u>Quwwad</u> in 817/1415. Though Barakāt and his father Hasan, then Amir of Mecca, took no part in the clash Jaqmaq had departed with a grudge against them, see <u>supra</u>, P. 67. disloyalty and for a time entertained the idea of replacing him by 'Ali, but desisted from it after an attempt at mediation by some of his courtiers.¹

It seems that Barakat I was unduly apprehensive of the Sultan who does not appear to have borne any serious grudge against him. Not only the above stated change of the Sultan's mind about replacing Barakat I indicates this, but also the fact that the Sultan relieved Barakat in 843/1439 of the obligation to kiss the hoof of the camel which had brought the Egyptian Mahmal, which the Sultan may have regarded as a humiliating or degrading practice.² Besides, he was exempted, together with the Amirs of Medina and Yanbu', from paying the Egyptian Amir al-Hajj their customary dues.³ Moreover, had the Sultan felt any personal grudge or resentment against Barakat I he could have easily deposed and arrested him without calling him to Cairo. What is more convincing is that Barakat I, by his over-cautious and suspicious attitude to the invitation of the Sultan did more damage than the service to his own interest, as he was a subordinate and it was his duty to obey the order of his overlord. Barakat's refusal to do so was bound to convince the Sultan that the former was disloyal and as such unsuitable to be left in control of Mecca.

### Barakat I deposed by Ali

Barakāt I regarded his second summons to Cairo in 844/1440 with equal anxiety. Since caution forbade him to refuse it flatly, he

³See <u>infra</u>, p.225.

¹Al-Najm Ibn Fahd, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. II, fols. 226 and 228; Sakhāwi, <u>al-Daw</u>, vol. III, pp. 13 and 73. See also: Janābi, <u>op.cit.</u>, fol. 306b; Isāmi, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. IV, p.267; Sinjāri, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. II, fol. 4; Dablān, <u>op.cit.</u>, p.42.

²Maqrizi, <u>Sulūk</u>, vol. II, fol. 435; Al-Najm Ibn Fahd, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. II, fol. 229. See also: Jaziri, <u>op.cit.</u>, p.328; Sinjari, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. II, fol. 5; Dahlan, <u>op.cit.</u>, p.42.

requested to be allowed to remain in Mecca for the maintenance of law and order and offered to pay a substantial amount of money in return.¹ Many inhabitants and officials of Mecca supported Barakāt's request, possibly in response to his desire, and permission was granted.²

Another invitation by the Sultan in Rabi I 845/August 1441 met with a similar refusal and the Sultan was angered by the defiance of Barakāt I. The latter was deposed by Sharif 'Alī b. Hasan b. 'Ajlān in Jumādā I 845/October 1441. Barakāt I decided to leave Mecca without resistance in Rajab 845/December 1441 and 'Alī arrived in Mecca in the following month.³

### Ali replaced by Abu'l Qasim

Sharif 'Ali had won the emirate easily but owing to accident rather than personal merit. It soon became evident that he lacked ability, appreciation of his official responsibilities and, above all, the power and will to maintain law and order in the area. Consequently, complaints against him and his men began piling up in Cairo. Although the exact nature of these complaints is unknown they seem to have convinced the Sultan, às 'Ali was deposed, arrested

¹See <u>infra</u>, pp.228-29.

³^c. Ibn Hajar, <u>Inba</u>, vol. II, fols. 172b and 173b-74a; 'Ayni, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. IV, fol. 686b; Ibn Taghri Birdi, <u>al-Manhal</u>, vol. I, fol. 181a; idem, <u>al-Nujūm</u>, vol. VII, fol. 125; idem, <u>Hawadith</u>, vol. I, fol. 5; Al-Najm Ibn Fahd, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. II, fols. 235 and 237-39; Sakhāwi, <u>al-Tibr</u>, pp. 14-15, 19-20 and 40-41; idem, vol. III, pp. 13, 73 and 256, vol. V, p.211. See also: Muhammad b. Jar Allah Ibn Zuhayra, <u>al-Jām'i al-Latīf</u> (Cairo, 1340/1921), p.321; Janābi, <u>op.cit.</u>, fol. 306b; 'Isāmi, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. IV, pp. 266-67; Sinjāri, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. II, fol. 5; Tabari, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. I, fol. 104; Dahlān, <u>op.cit.</u>, p.42.

²Maqrizi, <u>Suluk</u>, vol. II, fol. 441; Al-Najm Ibn Fahd, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. II, fol. 233.

and sent to Cairo in <u>Shawwal</u> or <u>Dhu</u>²1 Qa'da 846/March or April 1443. His brother Abu³1 Qāsim, at that time in Cairo, was proclaimed Amir of Mecca in his stead. Abu³1 Qāsim's son Zāhir took control of Mecca on behalf of his father.¹ It seems that among the immediate reasons for 'Alī's deposition was the excessive practice of <u>al-Nuzla</u>. This term means a grant of requested or unsolicited protection by the notables to those who were in need of such protection. Once a person, even if guilty of a crime, was accorded protection, he was defended against both individuals and authority.²

The assumption that the practice of <u>al-Nuzla</u> had caused the downfall of 'Ali is indicated by the fact that its abolition was imposed on his successor by order of the Sultan as a condition of appointment and was, as a matter of course, declared an illegal practice by the new Amir soon after his arrival in Mecca in Dhu! Qa'da 846/April 1443. This seems to have been bitterly opposed by a group of <u>Ashraf</u> and <u>Quewad</u> who were expelled from the city.³ This appears to have been opposed by Zahir, who early in 847/1443, left Mecca in anger to join them. In a deliberate challenge to Abu'l Qasim, they entered Mecca in <u>Sha</u>'ban 847/December 1443, abducted a

² Ibn Hajar, <u>Inba</u>, vol. II, fol. 177b; Sakhawi, <u>al-Tibr</u>, pp. 45-46. See also: Janabi, <u>op.cit.</u>, fol. 306b. The term <u>al-Nuzla</u> appears to have been a Meccan usage denoting the classical <u>1</u> jara which too has a similar meaning. See: W.Montgomery Watt, <u>E.I.</u>², art. "Idjara", pp. 1017-8.

⁵Al-Najm Ibn Fahd, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. II, fol. 245-6

¹ Ibn Hajar, Inba², vol. II, fol. 177b; Ibn Taghri Birdi, Hawadith, vol. I, fol. 14; idem, <u>al-Manhal</u>, vol. I, fol. 181a; idem, <u>al-Nujūm</u>, vol. VII, fol. 128; Al-Najm Ibn Fahd, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. II, fols. 240-45; Sakhāwi, <u>al-Daw⁴</u>, vol. I, p.41, vol. V, p.211,vol. XI, p.134; idem, <u>al-Tibr</u>, pp. 45-46; idem, <u>al-Dhayl</u> (ed. A. Al-Hassu), pp. 37-38 and 57. See also: Ibn Zuhayra, <u>op.cit.</u>, p.321; Jaziri, <u>op.cit.</u>, p.329; Janabi, <u>op.cit.</u>, fols. 306b-7a; 'Ali al-Tabari, <u>op.cit.</u>, fol. 70; 'Isami, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. IV, pp. 267-69; Sinjari, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. II, fols. 5-6; Tabari, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. I, fols. 104-5; Dahlān, <u>op.cit.</u>, p.42.

rich merchant and fled. This incensed Abu'l Qasim who immediately marched with a strong force against the offenders, whom he compelled to free the captive without ransom.¹

A lenient father, Sharif Abu'l Qāsim refrained from reprisals in the hope that Zāhir would desist from similar acts in the future. Butsince his forebearance merely seemed to stimulate Zāhir to further disobedience, Abu'l Qāsim had him imprisoned in or around Jumādā I 849/September 1445 but released him a few months later on his promise to reform.² This act of Abu'l Qāsim reflects his concern for justice of law and order and the maintenance/and certainly did him credit. Yet his rule was not destined to last long.

#### Abu'l Qasim deposed by Barakat I

The melationship between Abu'l Qasim and his brother Barakat I became strained in the early part of 849/1445 and the latter was denied access to the local market to buy his provisions.³ This restriction widened the gulf and aggravated their hostility.

According to some late sources, <u>Sharif Barakāt I ousted Abu'l</u> Qāsim from Mecca in Rabi^c I 849/July 1445 (Sinjārī gives the alternative date under 850/1446). This angered Sultan Jaqmaq, who instructed the Egyptian <u>Amir al-Hajj</u> to help Abu'l Qāsim to regain control. But Barakāt's strength was such that these Amirs refrained from complying with the order and even presented Barakāt I with the customary robe of honour. Feeling insecure, however, and apprehensive of any sudden move by the Egyptian Amirs, Barakāt I left the city.

¹Al-Najm Ibn Fahd, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. II, fols. 247-51 and 253-54; Sakhawi, <u>al-Tibr</u>, pp. 73-74; idem, <u>al-Daw</u>, vol. III, p.232.
²Al-Najm Ibn Fahd, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. II, fols. 257-58.
³<u>Abid.</u>, fol. 259.

Sharif Abu'l Qāsim took control of Mecca and remained so till deposed by Barakāt I in Rabi' I or II 851/June or July 1447.¹

In the contemporary and some of the later sources, however, the sequence of events differs from the above. The gist of these reports is that, early in Muharram 850/April 1447, Sharif Barakāt I accepted an invitation to Cairo but sent his son Muhammad in Şafar of the same year (May 1447) as his deputy with valuable gifts for the Sultan. This, no doubt, caused anxiety to Abu'l Qāsim, especially as Barakāt had moved with his supporters to a place near Mecca.

Sharif Muhammad reached Cairo in or around Rabi' I 850/June 1447 and was well received. He succeeded in securing the re-appointment of his father. A decree to this effect having reached Mecca by the end of Rabi' I of the same year. Abu'l Qāsim left Mecca with his men for a neighbouring valley. <u>Bāsh al-Mamālik</u>, maintained law and order and remained in control of the city until the ceremonial entry of Sharif Barakāt I in Jumādā I 850/August 1447.² Having secured his re-appointment, <u>Sharif Barakāt I decided to pay a visit to Sultan</u> Jaqmaq to express his gratitude and loyalty. In Rajab or <u>Sha</u>'bān 851/October or November 1447 he reached Cairo where he was treated with courtesy during his stay and on his departure for Mecca in

² Ayni, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. IV, fols. 698b-99a; Ibn Taghri Birdi, <u>al-Manhal</u>, vol. I, fols. 181a-b; idem, <u>al-Nujūm</u>, vol. VII, fol. 130; idem, Hawādith, vol. I, fol. 46; Al-Najm Ibn Fahd, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. II, fols. 260-61; Sakhāwi, al-Dhayl (ed.A.Al-Hassu), pp. 1-2; idem, <u>al-Daw'</u>, vol. III, p.13, vol. VII, p.152, vol. X, p.184 and 209, vol. XI, p.134; idem, <u>al-Tibr</u>, pp. 143-44; idem, <u>al-Tuhfa</u>, vol. I, fol. 747. See also: Ibn Zuhayra, <u>op.cit.</u>, p.321; Janābi, <u>op.cit.</u>, fol. 306b.

¹ Isami, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. IV, pp. 269-70; Sinjari, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. II, fols. 6-7; Tabari, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. I, fols. 105-6; Dahlan, <u>op.cit.</u>, pp. 42-43.

## Ramadan 851/December 1447.1

Since his deposition, <u>Sharif Abu'l Qasim had been living in</u> or around Mecca unharassed by Barakat or his men. Still hopeful of a sudden change in his fortunes, he grew less sanguine as time progressed and decided to go to Cairo in <u>Dhu'l Hijja 852/March 1449</u>. His death there in Safar 853/April 1449 put an end to whatever hopes he may have cherished for his re-appointment.²

Sultan Jaqmaq's favour to Sharif Barakāt I enabled the latter to remain in effective control of the region till his death. But he from time to time had to deal with dissident groups. Early in 857/ 1453, in the face of a serious threat from a group of <u>Ashrāf</u> and <u>Quwwād</u>, Barakāt I had to conclude a truce on a financial basis.³ It is interesting to note that during this conflict between Barakāt I and his opponents, a number of <u>Sharifs</u> resident in Cairo and believed to be in sympathy with the opponents of Barakāt I, were arrested.⁴ This act, undoubtedly intended to support Barakāt I, must have sapped the morale of Barakāt's opponents, and he was able to assert his authority.

#### Sharif Muhammad succeeds Barakat I

The relationship: between Sultan Inal (857/1153-865/1461) and BaraKati Sharif Muhammad was better than normal. Early in 859/1455 Sharif

¹Ibn Taghri Birdi, <u>al-Manhal</u>, vol. I, fol. 181b; idem, <u>al-Nujūm</u>, vol. VII, fols. 136-37; idem, Hawādith, vol. I, fol. 59, part II (ed. W. Popper), pp. 368-69; Al-Najm Ibn Fahd, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. II, fols. 266-67; Sakhāwi, <u>al-Dhayl</u> (ed. A.Al-Hassu), p.10; idem, <u>al-Daw'</u>, vol. III, p.13; idem, <u>al-Tibr</u>, ppl 184-85; Ibn Iyās, <u>Badā'i</u>, vol. II, p.34. See also: Jazīri, <u>op.cit.</u>, p.331; Janābi, <u>op.cit.</u>, fol. 306b; 'Isāmi, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. IV, p.270; Sinjāri, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. II, fols. 7-8; Tabari, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. I, fol. 106; Dahlān, <u>op.cit.</u>, p.43.

²Ibn Taghri Birdi, Hawadith, vol. I, fols. 87, 89 and 112; idem, <u>al-Manhal</u>, vol. I, fol. 265b; Al-Najm Ibn Fahd, op.cit., vol. II, fols.-268-70; Sakhawi, <u>al-Daw</u>, vol. XI, p.134; idem, <u>al-Tibr</u>, pp. 282-83; idem, <u>al-Dhayl</u> (ed. A.Al-Hassu), pp. 37-38. See also: Janabi, <u>opcit.</u>, fol. 307a; Tabari, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. I, fols. 106-7.

²Al-Najm Ibn Fahd,<u>op.cit.</u>,vol.II,fol:277-80. ⁴Ibn Taghri Birdi, Hawadi<u>th</u>, vol. I, fol. 276

Barakāt I fell seriously ill and secured the appointment of his son Muhammad by the intercession of a Sultāni official in J@dda and, in return for the payment of a sum of money.¹ Shortly after <u>Sharif Barakāt's death on 19th Sha'bān 859/4</u> August 1455 an official edict confirming <u>Sharif Muhammad in the emirate reached Mecca.²</u>

Having inherited a fairly stable emirate, Sharif Muhammad (859/ 1455-903/1497) enjoyed the longest period of rule among the Sharifs of Mecca within the <u>Burji</u> period. Despite various problems such as internal strife and financial difficulties at times he was able to ensurepolitical stability and economic prosperity to the Meccan region.-He also succeeded in extending his influence over various parts of the Hijāz and was finally awarded the status of <u>Na'ib al-Sultān</u> in the region.³

Among the most serious problems during the rule of <u>Sharif Muhammad</u> was that caused by the deterioration of his relations with his <u>wazir</u>, Budayr (or Budayd). Unrest set in in the area in the year 864/ 1459-60 and continued until 867/1462-63 when they were reconciled.⁴

Shortly after Sharif Muhammad's relations with his brother 'Ali became strained and the latter escaped to Cairo in or around 872/ 1467-68. The fear of being deposed by his brother caused great anxiety to Sharif Muhammadat the time, but eventually he was relieved, possibly as a result of the financial offering to the Sultan.⁵ Sharif Muhammad

¹See <u>infra</u>, pp. 229, and 290.

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² Ton Taghri Birdi, Hawādith, vol. I, fols. 347: and 362-63; idem, <u>al-Nujūm</u>, vol. VII, fols. 239 and 274; Al-Najm Ton Fahd, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. II, fol. 283; Sakhāwi, <u>al-Tuhfa</u>, vol. I, fol. 747; idem, <u>al-Dhayl</u> (ed. A.Al-Hassu), p. 86; idem, <u>al-Daw</u>, vol. III, p.14, vol. VII, p.152; Ton Iyās, <u>Badā'i</u>, vol. II, pp. 52-53; idem, <u>Badā'i</u> (U.P.), pp. 32-33. See also: Ton Zuhayra, <u>op.cit.</u>, pp. 321-22; Jaziri, <u>op.cit.</u>, p.333; Janābi, <u>op.cit.</u>, fols. 307a-b; Ibn al-"Imād, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. VII, p.294; 'Isāmi, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. IV, pp. 275-76; Sinjāri, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. II, fols. 9-10; Tabari, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. 21, fols. 108 and 110-11; Dablān, <u>op.cit.</u>, pp. 43-44; G. Rentz, <u>E.I.</u>, art. "Barakat", p.1032.

suspected some of his officials and prominent members of the community and the Amir of Jazan to have conspired to effect this escape. Consequently, he dismissed one of his officials¹, executed a number of suspects,² and attacked Jazan.³

A few years later <u>Sharif</u> Muhammad learned, to his dismay, that Abu'l Qāsim's son Rumay<u>tha</u> was trying to secure the emirate of Mecca. However, he was reassured by the assurance in Rabi' I 877/September 1472 from Cairo that the Sultan was not contemplating his replacement by anybody else. Nevertheless, when invited to Cairo in the pilgrimage season of the same year, <u>Sharif</u> Muhammad preferred to send instead his son Barakāt II. Whatever the motive of the Sultan may have been, he was morally obliged to appreciate the services of <u>Sharif</u> Muhammad who had reacted so sharply to the Irāqi affront and thus proved his loyalty to the Egyptian Sultan.⁴ <u>Sharif</u> Barakāt II and the <u>Qādi</u> <u>Shāfa</u>î of Mecca - then deposed - went to Cairo taking with them the Irāqi captives. Barakāt II and the <u>Qādi</u> were well received. They are reported to have offered a considerable amount of money to the Sultan.⁵ The sources do not specify a purpose but it cannot have been a mere coincidence that, after their return to Mecca in <u>Sha</u>'bān 878/January 1474

³See <u>infra</u>, pp.118-20. ⁴Al-Najm Ibn Fahd, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. II, fols. 296-300, 302, 307-8 and 312; Sakhāwi, <u>al-Daw</u>, vol.III, p.4; idem, <u>al-Dhayl</u> (ed. A.Al-Hassu), p.154. ⁵See <u>infra</u>, p.230. ¹See <u>infra</u>, p.240. ²See <u>infra</u>, p.240. ²See <u>infra</u>, p.238. ³See <u>bnfra</u>, p.110. ⁴For this incident, see <u>infra</u>, pp.139-40. ⁵For this payment, see <u>infra</u>, p.265. the Qadi was re-appointed and Sharif Barakat II co-Amir of Mecca.1

Sultan Qa'it Bay performs the Pilgrimage

Qa'it Bay (873/1468-901/1495) was the only Egyptian Sultan, within the <u>Burji</u> period, to perform the pilgrimage. He reached Mecca early in <u>Dh</u>'l Hijja 884/March 1480.² Shortly after the departure of Sultan Qa'it Bay from Cairo, the news reached Sharif Muhammad and he sent anadvance welcoming party to greet the Sultan and hold a feast in his honour. Having sent this party, <u>Sharif Muhammad him-</u> self came out of Mecca with a number of notables to welcome the Sultan, who had broken his journey in Medina. <u>Sharif Muhammad camped near al-</u> Badr³ to welcome the Sultan. There the <u>Sharif arranged a grandiose</u> feast in honour of the sovereign. Then he took leave of the Sultan to give him another ceremonial welcome in the outskirts of Mecca. <u>Sharif Muhammad did his best to make the Sultan's stay in Mecca as</u> pleasant as possible, and indeed the latter departed for Cairo greatly appreciative of Sharif Muhammad's loyalty.⁴

#### Barakat II succeeds Sharif Muhammad

During the later part of <u>Sharif Muhammad's</u> reign the region had enjoyed far greater stability and prosperity than under any of his

¹ Al-Najm Ibn Fahd, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. II, fols. 338, 342, 344-45 and 347; Sakhāwi, <u>al-Daw</u>, vol. I, pp. 95-96, vol. III, p.14; idem, <u>al-Dhayl</u> (ed. A.Al-Hassu), pp. 218-19; Ibn Iyas, <u>Badā i</u>, vol. III, <u>pp. 89-90</u>. See also: Isāmi, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. IV, pp. 276 and 279; Sinjāri, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. II, fol. 12; Tabari, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. I, fol. 125; Dahlān, <u>op.cit.</u>, p.44; G. Rentz, <u>E.I.²</u>, art. "Barakat", p.1032.

²Only Ibn Iyas mentions this (in <u>al-'Uqud</u>) under 885/1481, but it is evidently a slip of the pen of the author or the scribe. as Ibn Iyas himself mentions (in <u>Bada'i</u>), 884/1480.

³Badr, or Badr Hunayn, a small town south-east of Medina, a night's journey from the coast. See: W. Montgomery Watt, <u>E.I.</u>², art. "Badr or Badr Hunayn", pp. 867-68.

⁴Al-Najm Ibn Fahd, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. II, fols. 371-73; Sakhāwi, <u>al-Daw</u>, vol. VI, pp. 206-7; Ibn Iyās, <u>Badā i</u>, vol. III, pp. 155-57; idem, <u>Uqūd</u>, vol. II, fols. 229a-b. See also: Jaziri, <u>op.cit.</u>, pp. 339-40

predecessors within the period in question. His just treatment of the various sections of the community had won that general popularity which eluded most of the <u>Sharifs</u> of Mecca. In Rabi'II 903/December 1497 <u>Sharif Muhammad died in the neighbourhood of Mecca; his body</u> was brought to Mecca and buried with more than customary honours. His funeral was attended by a huge crowd among which were many notables and dignitaries. The people of Mecca appear to have felt genuine grief at his death. According to Al-'Tzz Ibn Fahd, the local market was closed for several days and many women mourners, against the teaching of <u>Sharī'a</u>, cut their hair and marched through the city crying and beating their chests as a sign of bereavement.

Sharif Barakāt II had succeeded his father and shortly after received the decree of confirmation together with a letter of condolence from the Sultan.² When his relationship with his brothers, especially Hazzā^{*},³ deteriorated soon after his appointment, a period of political chaos set in which was to last for eight years. Meccans were to suffer bloodshed, plunder and other atrocities, which contrasted sadly with the long period of prosperity under the deceased <u>Sharif Muhammad</u>.

and 682-86; Nahrawali, <u>al-'llam</u>, pp. 229-31; 'Isami, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. IV, pp. 45-47 and 277-78; Sinjari, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. II, fols. 15-17; Tabari, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. I, fols. 128-32; Dahlan, <u>op.cit.</u>, p.45.

<u>Sharī'a</u>. The revealed Holy law of Islam, derived in theory from the Qur'an, Hadith, the consensus (<u>ijmā'</u>) of the <u>Ulamā'</u>, and analogical reasoning (<u>giyās</u>). It is surprising that no objection to this defiance of <u>Sharī'a</u> by these mourners was made by the <u>Qadis</u> and other authorities.

Al-'Izz Ibn Fahd, op.cit., vol. I, fols. 217-18 and 222-23; Ibn Iyas. Badā'i', vol. III, p.371. See also: 'Abd al-Rahman b. 'Ali Ibn al-Dayba'al-Fadl al-Mazid 'Ala, Bughyat al-Mustafid, (MS., A.S.No. 2988), fol. 99b; idem, Qurrat al- Uyun, fol. 220; Ibn Zuhayra, op.cit., p.322; Jaziri, op.cit., p.348; Janābi, op.cit., fol. 307b; Isāmi, op.cit., vol. IV, pp. 278-80, 282 and 301; Sinjari, op.cit., vol.II, fols. 18-19; Tabari, op.cit., vol. I, fol. 134; Dahlān, op.cit., pp.44 and 46; G. Rentz, E.I.², art. "Barakat", p.1032.

³Among the sources, given in the footnote below, only Ibn Iyas describes Hazza as Barakat's nephew.

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The dispute appears to have begun over the Amir's refusal to pay his brothers their share of the revenue. In Jumadā I 903 or 904/Junuary 1498 or 1499 a clash between Barakāt and Hazzā' was no longer to be avoided but the intervention of an Egyptian Amir speedily brought about a temporary suspension of hostilities. The trouble in Mecca was welcomed by the Amir of Yanbu', <u>Sharif Yahya</u>, who was at odds with Barakāt as he had been with his deceased father. Yahya had secured his appointment almost simultaneously with Barakāt at the expense of <u>Sharif Darrāj</u> who was held in great esteem by Barakāt.¹

#### A period of acute strife in Mecca

For the sake of space it will not be possible to give here a detailed account of this rather lengthy period of confrontation, clashes, intrigues, moves and counter moves between Barakāt II and his opponents. As explained earlier, the dispute between Barakāt II and his brothers had begun shortly after the appointment of the former but a temporary reconciliation prevented further hostilities.

Early in 906/1500 a number of Egyptian Sultans followed each other in quick succession. One of them, Sultan Tuman Bay, had exilad an Amir named Qanşawh al-Burj to Mecca. He was ignored by Sharif Barakāt II, which filled him with resentment. But his relations with Hazzā^{*}, on the contrary, became rather friendly. In <u>Shawwal</u> 906/ May 1501 Qānşawh al-<u>Ghawri (Shawwal</u> 906-Rajab 922/May 1501-September 1517) became Sultan and appointed Amir Qanşawh al-Burj his deputy in Syria. An edict to this effect reached Mecca in <u>Dh</u>I^{*}1 Qada (i.e. June) of the same year. <u>Sharif Barakāt II went to Qanşawh's residence</u> to congratulate him but was slighted. The latter, whose fortunes had changed so suddenly, sent Hazzā^{*} to Yanbu^{*} with instructions to the Egyptian Amir al-Hajj to instal Hazzā^{*} in the emirate of Mecca.

¹Al-'Izz Ibn Fahd, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. I,fols.227-28,230,232,237-38 and 250; Ibn Iyas, <u>Bada'i'</u>, vol. III,pp.376-77,382,400 and 414. See also: Jaziri, <u>op.cit.</u>, p.348; Janabi, <u>op.cit.</u>, fol.308b; 'Isami, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. IV,p.382 and 301; Sinjari, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol.II,fol.20; Dahlan, <u>op.cit.</u>, p.46. Hazza^{*}, having been assured by the Egyptian <u>Amir al-Hajj</u> of his support, marched from Yanbu^{*} with his men and, overtaking the caravan, reached a point near Mecca. <u>Sharif Barakat II</u>, forewarned, ambushed him and put him to flight. With the support of the Egyptians, however, Hazza^{*} turned the tables on Barakat, who fled to J&dda, abandoning his camp and valuables to the victor . Hazza^{*} took control of Mecca without further opposition and was proclaimed its Amir. The hostilities and their outcomes, together with the subsequent political changes, caused considerable suffering to the inhabitants and merchants of both Mecca and J&dda.¹

Sharif Barakat II remained inactive until the departure of the pilgrims, and then marched on Mecca. Unable to resist, Sharif Hazza^{*} left Mecca under the pretext of escorting the pilgrims. Consequently, by the end of 906 or early in 907/July 1501, Sharif Barakat II entered Mecca unopposed and was given an enthusiastic reception.²

Al- 'Izz Ibn Fahd reports, with a touch of doubt, that Sharif Barakat II received in Rabi' I 907/October 1501 the robe of honour and a letter from the Sultan assuring him that the support given to Hazza' by the Egyptian <u>Amir al-Hajj</u> had failed to meet with his approval. Whatever the merits of the case, Hazza' decided on a second march to Mecca by the end of Rabi' II 907/November 1501. In addition, to his own impressive forces, he was accompanied by the Amir of Yanbu',

¹ Al'Izz Ibn Fahd, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. I, fol. 256 and 261; Ibn al-Dayba', <u>al-Fadl</u>, fols. 114a-15a; idem, <u>Qurra</u>, fols. 222-23. See also: Ibn Zuhayra, <u>op.cit.</u>, p.322; Jaziri, <u>op.cit.</u>, p.349; Janābi, <u>op.cit.</u>, fol. 308b; 'Isāmi, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. IV, pp. 282-83 and 301; Sinjāri, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. II, fols. 20-21; Țabari, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. I, fols. 135-36; Dablan <u>op.cit.</u>, p.46.

² Al-'Izz Ibn Fahd, <u>op.cit.</u> vol. I, fols. 262-63; Ibn al-Dayba', <u>al-Fadl</u>, fol. 115b; idem, <u>Qurra</u>, fol. 223; see also: Ibn Zuhayra, <u>op.cit.</u>, p.322; Jaziri, <u>op.cit.</u>, p.349; Janabi, <u>op.cit.</u>, fol. 308b; Isami, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. IV, pp. 283 and 301; Sinjari, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. II, fol. 21; Tabari, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. I, fols. 136-37; Dablan, op.cit., p.46.

Sharif Yahya, the Arabs of Zahid, and Banu Ibrahim. In Jumada I 907/December 1501 a fierce battle was fought which ended in the crushing defeat of Barakat who fled towards the Yemen. Hazza took control of Mecca and the inhabitants had to pay a considerable ransom to avoid plunder. Shortly after, Hazza received the robe of honour and, in an official ceremony of investiture, was proclaimed Amir of Mecca.¹

Sharif Hazzā' died on 15th Rajab 907/24th January 1502 in a neighbouring valley of Mecca. His body was brought to the city and buried with due honour. His sudden death was followed by a new outbreak of the age old struggle for the succession. <u>Sharif Abmad al-</u> Jazāni² (known also as Jazān) and <u>Sharif Humayda</u>, brothers of the deceased Hazzā', both desired the emirate, and a general meeting was called to decide which of the two should succees. Malik b. Rūmī, chief of Zabid and a maternal uncle of Abmad, supported the latter, and was seconded in this by the <u>Qādi Shā</u>fa'i of Mecca³ and eventually general agreement was reached and Abmad was proclaimed Amir of Mecca. The fait accompli was later confirmed by the Sultan.

The majority of the indigenous population, however, did not view his rule favourably and their ever increasing sufferings filled them with hatred of Jazani and his supporters. This accounts for the overwhelming support given to Barakat II in his successful attempt to take Mecca shortly after the appointment of Jazani in Sha'ban 907/

¹Al-'Izz Ibn Fahd, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. II, fols. 2-9; Ibn al-Dayba', <u>al-Fadl</u>, fols. 116b-17a; idem, <u>Qurra</u>, fol. 223. See also: Ibn Zuhayra, <u>op.cit.</u>, p.322; Janabi, <u>op.cit.</u>, fol. 308b; 'Isami, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. IV, p.284 and 301; Sinjari, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. II, fols. 21-22; Tabari, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. I, fol. 137; Dahlan, <u>op.cit.</u>, p.47.

²Apparently so named because of his birth in the region of Jazan. See 3G. Rentz, <u>E.I.²</u>, "<u>Dj</u>ayzan", p.517.

⁵The <u>Qadi</u> paid dearly for this. See <u>infra</u>, pp.252-53.

March 1501 and Ahmad had to flee and took refuge in Yanbu'.

In Shawwal 907/May 1501, Barakat II launched an offensive against the Arabs of Zabid, near Rabigh,² but without much success. The situation remained, on the whole, calm and stationary until the arrival of the Egyptian pilgrim caravan in the same year. The sources give different accounts of the attitude of the Egyptian Amir al-Hajj towards Jazani. Al- Izz Ibn Fahd states that the Egytian Amir was so impressed by Jazani's strength that he, to avoid endangering the safety of pilgrims, handed over to Jazani both the decree and the robe of honour bestowed by the Sultan on Barakat II. Ibn Iyas attributes this to a financial deal between the Egyptian Amir and Jazani. According to Jaziri, this was done to lure Jazani into a trap. Other sources narrate the general course of events without reference to the background. In any case, there is no doubt that Jazani trusted in the support of the Egyptian Amir when he marched with his supporters to Mecca. But he decided against continuing his journey when he began to suspect the Egyptian Amir and Barakat of conspiring against him. The ceremony of Hajj ended without serious incident, but the Egyptian caravan refused to depart unless Barakat II agreed to escort them. Near Yanbu' Jazani lay in ambush and he attacked and inflicted heavy casulaites on the caravan and its escort, and Barakat II had to flee to Mecca. In Safar 908/August 1502, Jazani launched a fierce attack on Mecca and Barakat had little choice but to abandon the city, which was occupied by Jazani.

¹Al-'Izz Ibn Fahd, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. II, fols. 10-13; Ibn al-Dayba', <u>al-Fadl</u>, fols. 117b-18a; see also Jaziri, <u>op.cit.</u>, pp. 349-50 and 353; Janabi, <u>op.cit.</u>, fol. 308b; 'Isami, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. IV, pp. 284 and 301-2; Sinjari, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. II, fols. 22-23; Tabari, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. I, fols. 137-38; Dahlan, <u>&p.cit.</u>, p.47.

²Anchorage and town on the western coast of the Red Sea, midway between Mecca and Medina.

³Al-'Izz Ibn Fahd, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. II, fols. 15-19; Ibn Iyas, <u>Bada'i</u>, vol. IV, pp. 35-39 and 317; Ibn al-Dayba', <u>al-Fadl</u>, fol. 120b. See also: Ibn Zuhayra, <u>op.cit.</u>, pp. 322-23; Jaziri, <u>op.cit.</u>, pp. 350-52; Janabi, <u>op.cit.</u>, fol. 308b; 'Isami, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. IV, p.285; Sinjari, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. II, fol. 27; Tabari, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. I, fol. 147; Dahlan, <u>op.cit.</u>, p.47.

The inhabitants were made to pay dearly for their support of Barakat II. who attempted to oust Jazan in Rajab 908/February 1503 but, to the disappointment of the Meccans, had to flee defeated.¹

But two months later Barakāt took control of Mecca by a surprise move and was assured by the Meccans of their full support. Jazāni launched a number of attacks but they were all repulsed. In <u>Shawwal 908/May 1503 Musa b. Barakūt, deputy of Barakāt II in al-</u> Qunfu<u>dha</u>, attacked J**2**dda by a naval force but was unable to gain victory and returned to al-Qunfu<u>dha</u>. In the following month Jazāni took the city of Mecca by storm and Barakāt fled. The inhabitants were again subjected to various atrocities by Jazāni and his men.²

#### Egyptian expedition and arrest of Barakat

The news of these frequent clashes in or around Mecca and the resulting breakdown of law and order had been reaching Cairo and the Sultan could no longer tolerate this state of affairs. In the pilgrimage season of the same year, the Sultan sent an expedition composed of about six hundred soldiers under the command of Amir QT to enforce law and order and bring the culprits to justice. As a precaution, the Sultan banned women from participating in the pilgrimage. The news of this expedition reached Mecca and Jazānī felt so alarmed that he fled, and Barakāt II took control of Mecca. He waited eagerly for the arrival of the Egyptian force, assuming that it was sent against his opponents. Early in Dhull Hijja of the same year (908/July 1503), Amir

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¹Al-'Izz Ibn Fahd, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. II, fols. 20 and 23-26; Ibn al-Dayba', <u>al-Fadl</u>, fols.120b and 121b; see also Jaziri, <u>op.cit</u>., p.353.

²Al-'Izz Ibn Fahd, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. II, fols. 27-31; Ibn Iyas, <u>Bada'i</u>, vol. IV, pp. 47-48; Ibn al-Dayba', <u>al-Fadl</u>, fol. 122b; idem, <u>Gurra</u>, fol. 224. See also: Ibn Zuhayra, op.cit., p.323; Janabi, <u>op.cit.</u>, fol. 308b; 'Isami, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. IV, pp. 285-86; Sinjari, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. II, fols. 28-9; Tabari, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. I, fols. 147-48; Daplan, <u>op.cit.</u>, pp. 47-48; Ludovico diVarthema, <u>The travels of Ludovicodi</u>, Varthema, pp. 35-6;

QTt reached Mecca and was warmly received by Barakāt II. The latter was given a robe of honour and treated with deference. But only a short time later, to the surprise of the Meccans, both Barakāt II and his brother Qā⁹it Bāy were arrested, their property was confiscated, and they were sent to Cairo as captives. As far as one can judge, Barakāt II was not guilty of any offence which would justify this harsh treatment. In fact, the various atrocities of his opponents had made them the real culprits and logically liable for punishment. But it seems that they, by offering money and presenting false reports damaging to Barakāt II, had induced Amir QTt to adopt a pro-Jazān attitude.

Be it as it may, the harsh treatment of Barakāt could not have taken place without the prior approval of the Sultan or his giving a free hand to Qīt. to act according to his decision. This is supported by the simple fact that Barakāt II was not released on reaching Cairo. Nor was he allowed to return to Mecca.¹

#### Humayda succeeds Jazan

Though Jazan had gained the emirate, he was unable to win the love of the people and remained unpopular. In or around Rajab 909/ January 1504 the relations of Jazan with his brother Humayda became strained and the latter was ordered to leave Mecca and was threatened if he failed to do so. Humayda, ill at the time, took a number of <u>Mamlük</u> soldiers, with whom he was on friendly terms, into his confidence

¹Al-'Izz Ibn Fahd, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. II, fols. 32-38; Ibn Iyas, <u>Bada'i</u>, vol. IV, pp. 48-50 and 54-57; Ibn al-Dayba', <u>al-Fadl</u>, fol. 128b; idem, <u>Qurra</u>, p.224; see also: Ibn Zuhayra, <u>op.cit.</u>, p.323; Jaziri, <u>op.cit.</u>, p.353; Janabi, <u>op.cit.</u>, fol. 308b; 'Isami, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. IV, pp. 286-88 and 308; Sinjari, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. II, fols. 29-30; Tabari, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. I, fol. 148; Dablan, <u>op.cit.</u>, p.48; G.Rentz, <u>E.I.</u>², art. "Barakat", p.1032.

and told them of Jazān's threat and elicited an angry reply. On 9th or 10th Rajab 909/28th or 29th December 1503, Jazānwas assassinated within the Meccan sanctuary by some <u>Mamlūk</u> soldiers with the apparent approval of Humayda. The local population was pleased and Jazān's body was exposed to much humiliation before it was buried without/a proper funeral.

This assassination resulted in utter confusion. <u>Bash al-Mamalik</u> took the initiative, appointing Humayda Amir of Mecca pending the approval of the Sultan which was presumably granted. This assumption is based on the fact that no opposition by the Sultan is reported in the sources.¹

#### Barakat's escape and the appointment of Qait Bay

As a captive in Cairo, Sharif Barakāt was treated gently but was kept under constantwatch. It appears, especially from the version of Ibn Iyās, that as a pre-condition of release the Sultan had demanded from Barakāt a certain amount of money which the latter, whose property had been confiscated, was unable to pay. Early in <u>Shawwāl 909/April</u> 1504, Barakāt II managed to escape with his brother and supporters, who were also held captive there, and headed for Mecca. He was joined, in the course of his journey, by some nomadic and other Arabs and thus acquired a strong body of supporters. His escape greatly angered the Sultan whowas particularly worried about the safety of the pilgrims who were due to depart. Barakāt, however, did no harm to the phlgrim caravan. The Egyptian <u>Amir al-Hajj</u>, greatly appreciative of Barakāt's conduct, sent the Sultan a letter in pràise of Barakāt II.

¹Al- [']Izz Ibn Fahd, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. II, fols. 42-44 and 46-49; Ibn Iyās, <u>Badā'i</u>, vol. IV, p.62; Ibn al-Dayba', <u>al-Fadl</u>, fol. 124a; idem, <u>Qurra</u>, fol. 225. See also: Ibn Zuhayra, <u>op.cit.</u>, p.323; Jaziri, <u>op.cit.</u>, pp. 353-54; Janābi, <u>op.cit.</u>, fol. 308b; 'Isami, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. IV, pp. 288 and 303; Sinjāri, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. II, fol. 33; Tabari, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. I, fol. 155 Dahlan, <u>op.cit.</u>, p.48.

The Sharif encamped near Mecca and made no attempt to enter the city or to force a meeting with Humayda. This was partly due to Barakat's own unwillingness to disruptothe pilgrimage ceremony and partly to the presence of the Egyptian and other Amirs who, anxious to maintain a peaceful situation for the duration of the pilgrimage, arranged a temporary truce between Barakat and Humayda. Soon after the ceremony a meeting was held in Mecca. Among those present were the Egyptian Amir al-Hajj, Barakat II, Humayda, Amir of Yanbu' and various other dignitaries. The decision arrived at in Safar 910/July 1504, after prolonged negotiations, was in favour of Barakat II. He was confirmed by an edict of the Sultan as well. but he however, declined the emirate for himself and, on his suggestion, his brother Qa'it Bay and son 'Ali were appointed joint Amirs of Mecca. But it was Barakat II who remained in actual control. Humayda left with his men for Yanbu' and the Meccans celebrated this change for the better with a great show of joy.

In Rajab 910/December 1504 the news reached Mecca that Sharif Humayda was heading towards Mecca with his supporters. Humayda sent a message to Mecca that he had no aggressive plans and was coming simply as a visitor. In the absence of Wit Bay and Barakat from the city the matter was considered by <u>Bash al-Mamalik</u> whodecided to allow Humayda to enter and remain in Mecca for a few days. The news had caused great anxiety among the inhabitants of Mecca and especially among the wealthy, who took the precaution of hiding their valuables

¹Al-'Izz Ibn Fahd, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. II, fols. 51-58 and 60. See also: Ibn Iyas, <u>Bada'i'</u>, vol. IV, p.62; Ibn al-Dayba', <u>al-Fadl</u>, fol. 126b; idem, <u>Qurra</u>, fols. 225; Ibn Zuhayra, <u>op.cit.</u>, p.323; Jaziri, <u>op.cit.</u>, p.354; Janābi, <u>op.cit.</u>, fol. 308b; 'Ali al-Tabari, fols. 70-71; 'Isāmi, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. IV, pp. 288-89 and 303-4; Sinjāri, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. II, fols. 33-34 and 38; Tabari, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. I, fols. 154-55; Dahlān, <u>op.cit.</u>, pp. 48-49; G.Rentz, <u>E.I.²</u> art. "Barakat", p.1032.

in safer places. In the end of the same month Humayda reached the outskirts of Mecca and, having undertaken an oath not to cause disturbance, was allowed to stay for three days. But only two days later, Humayda provoked a fierce clash with <u>Bash al-Mamalik</u>, in consequence of which he took to flight after suffering heavy casualties.¹

Humayda and his men felt so humiliated and vindictive that they revived their old alliance with Yahya, the Amir of Yanbu, and the Arabs of Zabid, Banu Ibrahim, and others. These acknowledged Yahya as their leader. Their attacks on merchants and travellers seem to have been initially motivated by the wish to enrich themselves by plunder, but they soon began to defy openly the authority of the Sultan. The activities of these rebellious groups were ignored at first, but by the end of 911/1505 had become so alarming that the Sultan had to suspend, for the first time during the Burji period, the Egyptian pilgrim caravans. He began preparations for an expedition which reached Yanbu' in Rajab or Sha'ban 912/December 1506 or January 1507. It consisted of six hundred soldiers and was led by Amir Khayr Bek a1-Sayfi. Shortly after, Sharif Barakat II joined forces with the Egyptian Amir and they launched a series of attacks against the rebel groups. Yahya and his supporters suffered repeatedly crushing defeats and the heads of these rebels were sent to Cairo as trophies on several occasions. Early in 913/May 1507 the strength of these rebellious groups was shattered and the victorious Egyptian force returned to Cairo in Rabif I 913/August 1507. Barakat II continued a mopping-up operation and settled his old accounts with Yahya and his allies and it was not until early in 914/1508 that the region returned

¹Al-'Izz Ibn Fahd, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. II, fols. 58 and 64-68; Ibn_al-Dayba', <u>al-Fadl</u>, fol. 127b; idem, <u>Qurra</u>, fol. 225; See also: Jaziri, <u>op.cit.</u>, pp. 354-55.

to its normal condition.1

Prior to the arrival of the Egyptian expedition, <u>Sharif Barakāt</u> II had left practically all the affairs of the emirate to his brother Qa'it Bāy and his son, 'Alī.Barakāt's, self-imposed passive attitude changed with the arrival of the Egyptian expedition and Barakāt's active participation and vigorous efforts contributed much to the victory of the Sultani forces. It was during this campaign that 'Alī died, and Barakāt II replaced him by another of his sons, Muḥammad al-<u>Sh</u>āfa'i², who survived his brother only a short time. His place was taken by another of Barakāt's sons, Abū Numayy II, then still a child. Qā'it Bāy continued co-Amir with all his nephews and all acknowledged Barakāt II as their superior.³

Qa'it Bay's death on 21st Rabi'I or II 918/6th June or July 1512 left Barakāt II encumbered by the entire burden of government. Abū Numayy II was a child and his being co-Amir was hardly more than a symbolic position. Moreover, <u>Sharif Barakāt II was granted around</u> this time the status of <u>Na'ib al-Sultān</u> as well.⁴ He showed his great ability in discharging his responsibilities. Invited to Cairo, Barakāt sent Abū Numayy II in his place. He reached Cairo in <u>Shawwāl</u>

¹Al-'Izz Ibn Fahd, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. II, fols. 79, 81, 120-22, 126, 130, 134-35 and 138-40; Ibn Iyas, <u>Bada'i</u>, vol. IV, pp. 82, 89, 93, 95, 97-99, 101, 103-6, 108-9, 116-17 and 122-24, vol. V, p.14. See also: Jaziri, <u>op.cit.</u>, pp. 355-57; 'Isāmi, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. IV, pp. 304-5; Sinjāri, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. II, fols. 34-35; Tabari, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. I, fol. 156; Dahlan, <u>op.cit.</u>, p.49.

²So named because of his birth in Egypt, while Barakat was held in Cairo in semi-detention from the end of 908/July 1503 until <u>Shawwal</u> 909/April 1504. See: Janabi, <u>op.cit.</u>, fol. 309a.

³Al-'Izz Ibn Fahd, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. II, fols. 144 and 149; see also: Janabi, <u>op.cit.</u>, fol. 309a; Sinjari, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. II, fol. 35; Tabari, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. I, fol. 156; Dahlan, <u>op.cit.</u>, p.49.

⁴See <u>infra</u>, p.126.

918/January 1513 and was cordially received by the Sultan who showered almost fatherly affection on this young <u>Sharif</u>. The latter returned to Mecca at the end of the same year grateful and well pleased.¹

## Relations between Mecca and Cairo in the closing years of the Burji period.

Sharif Barakāt II (d. 931/1524) and his son Abū Numayy II (d. 991/1583) were the last Sharifs of Mecca appointed by the last <u>Mamlūk</u> Sultan and were the first to be confirmed by the Ottomans. One of the most conspicuous traits of this relationship between these two <u>Sharifs and their last Mamlūk</u> overlord was their warmth and cordiality in the last years of the period in question. It seems as if both sides were unconsciously taking farewell of each other, with the nicest possible impression.

In <u>Shawwal 920/December 1514</u> the news reached Mecca that the wife and son of Sultanal <u>Ghawri</u> were on their way to Mecca for pilgrimage. <u>Sharif Abu Numayy II went with other notables to Yanbu</u> to greet the distinguished visitors. On their arrival in Mecca <u>Sharif</u> Barakāt II and Abu Numayy II brought them valuable gifts and made such a show of their affection and loyalty that the royal family invited Barakāt II to accompany them to Cairo. Throughout Barakāt's stay there he was treated with unprecedented cordiality and at his departure for Mecca was shown a courtesy unusual on the part of a sovereign.

¹Al-'Izz Ibn Fahd, <u>or p.cit.</u>, vol. II, fols. 176, 178-79, 181-82, 219-20 and 222; Ibn Iyas, <u>Bada'i</u>, vol. IV, p.287; Ibn al-Dayba', <u>al-Fadl</u>, fol. 156b. See also: Ibn Zuhayr <u>a op.cit.</u>, pp. 323-24; Jaziri, <u>op.cit.</u>, pp. 357-59; Janābi, <u>op.cit.</u>, fol. 309a; Ibn al-'Imad, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. VIII, p.87; 'Isami, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. IV, pp. 289, 305-6 and 309-11; Sinjāri, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. II, fols. 35 and 38-39; Tabari, <u>op.cit.</u>, Vol. I, fol. 156; Dahlān, <u>op.cit.</u>, pp. 49-50.

This was to be the last meeting between Sultan al-<u>Ghawri</u> and <u>Sharif</u> Barakāt II.¹

Relations between Sultan al-Ghawri and the Ottoman Sultan, Selim I, had been uneasy for some time. The allegedly pro-Safavid attitude of the Mamluk Sultan was one of the reasons which had led the Ottoman Sultan Selim I to invade Syria and with this a direct clash between the Ottomans and the Mamlüks had begun. On 25th Rajab 922/ 24th August 1516 a battle was joined on the plain of Marj Dabig, north of Aleppo, and the Mamlüks were routed and al-Ghawri killed. This battle decided the fate of the Mamlük regime. Tuman-Bay, a nephew of al-Ghawri, was declared by the Mamluks in Cairo as the new Sultan. He tried in vain to halt the advance of the Ottomans but there was little he could do. On 29th Dhad Hijja 922/January 1517 the battle of al-Raydaniyya, near Cairo, destroyed any hope the Mamluks might have had of repulsing the Ottomans. It is true that Tuman-Bay held out for a few more months but he himself realized that he was fighting a lost battle. Eventually he was betrayed and, on 22nd Rabif I 922/14th Mpril 1517 was hanged. Egypt and Syria were incorporated into the Ottoman domain and the last of the caliphs, al-Mutawakkil, was sent to Istanbul. Sultan Selim I is said to have intended to send a force to Mecca but to have given up the idea at the request of a MeccanQādi. Instead, he sent an investiture of rule to Barakat II and his son Abu Numayy II. In Jumada II 923/July 1517, Sharif Abu Numayy II visited the Sultan in Cairo to pay homage and was received favourably.

¹Al-'Izz Ibn Fahd, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. II, fols. 250-52, 254-57 and 259-63; Ibn Iyas, <u>Bada'i'</u>, vol. IV, pp. 409-12, 432-33, 437-40, 442-, 444-49, 455-57 and 459; Ibn al-Dayba', <u>al-Fadl</u>, fols. 165a-b. See also: Jazīri, <u>op.cit.</u>, pp. 360 and 706; 'Isāmi, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. IV, pp. 289 and 317-18; Sinjāri, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. II, fols. 45-46; Dablān, <u>op.cit.</u>, p.50. This event was of greater importance for the Ottoman Sultan than for the Amir of Mecca. For the former, to gain control over Mecca and other parts of the Hijāz was a fact of great significance. It lent the Ottoman dominion a spiritual touch conveying immense prestige. For the latter, it meant no less but no more than a change of sovereign.¹

¹Ibn Iyās, <u>Badā'i</u>, vol. IV,pp.230, 268-69, 391-92 and 409, vol. V, pp. 33, 37-38, 40, 58-59, 62-63, 66-69, 103, 122-23, 126, 130-31, 140-48, 150-64, 167-74, 179-81, 185, 189, 201, 203, 205-11, 214-15 and 222-23. See also: Ibn Zuhayra, <u>op.cit.</u>, p.324; Jazīrī, <u>op.cit.</u>, pp. 126-27, 361 and 364; Nahrawāli, <u>al-1'lām</u>, pp. 69, 243 and 284-87; idem, <u>al-Barg al-Yamānī</u> (ed. Hamad al-Jāsir, <u>Riyād</u>, 1387/1967), pp.24-27; Mubammad b. Muhammad¹¹Bakarī, <u>Fayd al-Mannān</u> (MS., A.S. No. 3345), fols. 38 and 49-50; Ibn al- Imād, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. VIII, pp. 102 and 113-15; 'Isāmī, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. IV, pp. 52-57, 70-72, 292-93 and 318; Sinjārī, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. II, fols. 51-54; Tabarī, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. I, fols. 176-79; Dahlān, <u>op.cit.</u>, pp. 50-51; B.Lewis, "Egypt and Syria", in <u>The Cambridge History of Islām</u>, vol. I, pp. 229-30; Halil Inalcik, "The rise of the Ottoman Empire", in <u>The Cambridge History of Islām</u>, vol. I, pp. 318-19; G. Rentz, <u>E.I.²</u>, art. "Barakat", p.1032.

#### Chapter II

## EXPOSITION OF ASPECTS RELEVANT TO THE POLITICAL SITUATION IN MECCA

#### A. The dependencies of Mecca

The Sharifs of Mecca, whether they enjoyed the privileges and the status of <u>Na'ib al-Sultan</u> or not, succeeded in extending their influence over various small principalities of the Hijaz. Most of these had not been originally part of the Meccan emirate and were, sometimes forcibly, incorporated at different times into the territory of Mecca. But what was the original territory? In fact, no exact definition is feasible, though it is possible with regard to certain towns and valleys.

The nucleus of the entire territory of the Meccan emirate, including the parts incorporated into it prior to and during the <u>Burjí</u> period, was Mecca. The city is situated in a valley surrounded by mountains which formed a natural wall barring access to the city. Entrance to Mecca could be gained only at certain points in mountain passes at which three man made walls (<u>Sūr</u>) were erected, each with a gate (<u>Bāb</u>) guarded by the menof the ruling Sharif. <u>Sūr Bāb al-Ma'lā'</u> guarded the eastern approach to the upper part of Mecca; the west was protected by <u>Sūr Bāb al-Shubayka</u>, and the southern and lower part by <u>Sūr Bāb al-Yaman</u> also known as <u>Sūr Bāb al-Mājin</u>. The existence of these walls and gates is borne out by a number of direct and indirect references to occasional damage and repairs within the Burjī period.¹

¹Fasi, Shifa', vol. I, pp. 10-12, 339-40, 342-43, 346, vol. II, pp. 209-10, 253, 257 and 269; idem, <u>al-'Iqd</u>, vol. I, part I, fols. 10a and 67a, part II, fols. 408b, 409b-10b and 411b-12a; Maqrizi, <u>Suluk</u>, vol. II, fol. 277; Ibn Hajar, <u>Inba</u>, vol.II, fol. 20a; Al-Najm Ibn Fahd, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. II, fols. 112, 154-55,166, 164-65, 174-75, 183 and 188; <u>Sakhāwi</u>, <u>al-Tibr</u>, p. 147; Al-'Izz Ibn Fahd, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. I, fols. 119 and 183, vol. II, fols. 28 and 104. See also: Jaziri, <u>op.cit.</u>, p. 320; Nahrawāli, <u>al-I'lām</u>, pp. 13-15; Janabi, <u>op.cit.</u>, fol. 305b; 'Işāmi, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. IV, pp. 257-58; Sinjari, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. I, fols. 6-7 and 345, vol. II, fols. 28-29; Dablān, <u>op.cit.</u>, pp. 39 and 47.

Ludovico Varthema, who visited Mecca in the pilgrimage season of 908/May 1503, describes the city as "most beautiful", "The houses are extremely good, like our own, and there are houses worth three or four thousand ducats each", and assesses its population at six thousand families. He fails to mention the existence of the man-made wall. "The walls of the said city are the mountains, and it has four entrances."^{$\perp$} This was presumably because it did not encircle the city as such walls Judging by Varthema's report, the city was well-populated usually did. and was possibly the largest in the region. Its population, like that of any other city, fluctuated in accordance with the circumstances which were determined by the policies of the Sharif in question, especially by his ability to keep law and order and ensure reasonable economic prosperity. It seems that the internal strife between Barakat II and his brothers² in the closing years of the Burji period resulted in the loss of a considerable part of its population by emigration to places of comparative safety. According to Nahrawali, Mecca was depopulated towards the end of the period in question and that wild animals, at times, could enter the Meccan sanctuary and leave it unhindered. Caravans bringing a supply of grain to Mecca found difficulty in selling their merchandise; so sparse was the population and so reduced its purchasing power that the caravans either returned with their goods unsold or had to offer deferred payment to stimulate demand.³

Second in importance but, like Mecca, an integral part of the emirate, was the port town of JEdda. It is referred to by Varthema

³Nahrawāli, <u>al-I'lām</u>, pp. 10-12. Allowance should be made for Nahrawāli's pro-Ottoman attitude. His statement may have been motivated by the wish to discredit the <u>Mamlük</u> Sultan al-<u>Ghawri</u> and his subordinate, the <u>Sharif</u> of Mecca.

¹Varthema, <u>op.cit</u>., pp. 35-36.

²See <u>supra</u>, pp. 86-96 *

in the following words: "This city is not surrounded by walls, but very beautiful houses, as is the custom in Italy. It is a city of very extensive traffic..." The same traveller states that the inhabitants were suffering from the shortage of drinking water. He estimates its population at about five hundred families.¹ The reason why this important commercial centre appears to have been rather underpopulated was, apart from the scarcity of drinking water, that the absence of a protecting wall rendered it so insecure that it presented an easy target to unruly elements as well as to opponents of the ruling Amir of Mecca, which deterred many from living there.

Ta'if, now a flourishing city, was then hardly more than a village whose permanent residents were so few that the Friday prayer was not held² in the famous mosque of Ibn 'Abbās unless by previous arrangement, as was the case in 915/1509.³ Tā'if, with the surrounding rural areas, especially the valleys of Wajj and Liyya, was among the territories of the Meccan emirate.⁴ Though Tā'if proper housed only an insignificant number of people, the surrounding areas were quite densely populated, which is indicated by the amounts of money collected in sporadic levies by the Sharifs of Mecca.⁵ The dwindling population of Tā'if could be ascribed to the simple fact that, though agriculturally

¹Varthema, <u>op.cit.</u>, pp. 52-53. His remark about the wall is correct, as it was not built until later as will be seen.

²According to some, the presence of forty persons is an essential requirement for the Friday prayer. Otherwise, the people should perform the normal Zuhr prayer.

³Jar Allah b. 'Abd al-'Aziz(Al-'Izz) Ibn Fahd, <u>Tuhfat al-Latā'if</u> (MS., M.H.M. No. 15, Ta'rikh), fols. 67-68; Muhammad b. 'Ali Ibn 'Alan, <u>Tayf</u> <u>al-Tā'if</u> (MS., M.H.M. No. 120, Ta'rikh), fols. 65-66; Hasan b. 'Alial-'Ujaymi, <u>I'hdā' al-Latā'if</u> (MS., M.H.M. No. 14, Ta'rikh), fols. 33-34.

⁴Fasi, Shifa', vol. I, p.25; idem, <u>al-'Iqd</u>, vol. I, part I, fol. 10b. See also: Jar Allah Ibn Fahd, <u>op.cit.</u>, fol. 4; Ibn 'Alan, <u>op.cit.</u>, folsd. 31-32.

⁵See <u>infra</u>, pp.104-7.

prominent, it had long been deprived of any politico-commercial significance and, hence gone into an ever-increasing decline.

The area between these three main centres and the stretch of country in its immediate vicinity, consisting of valleys and rural areas, remained as a rule under the control of the Meccan Amirs throughout the <u>Burji</u> period. The coastal area in the north of J**2**dda up to Rābigh, with its adjoining rural areas in the east, was assigned to the Amirs of Mecca officially and it was administered by them and they were held responsible, by the Egyptian Sultans, for whatever occurred in these areas.¹ The coastal area in the south of J**2**dda, together with its eastern stretch, as far as al-Lay<u>th</u>², can also be considered an integral part of the Meccan emirate.

The <u>Sharifs</u> of Mecca, probably on the basis of a well-calculated plan, seem to have been intent more on extending their influence to the south of Mecca and J2dda than to their horth. As will be seen, several dependencies of Mecca existed in the areas between al-Layth and the northern part of the Yemen.³ The obvious aim, beside the acquisition of new territory and influence, was to control the sea and land routes to J2dda and Mecca which were normally used by the Yemenite and Indian merchants. The <u>Sharifs</u> were concerned about the safety of the merchants and the revenue derived from trade. The best way to attain both was the direct or indirect control over the area and it

¹See <u>infra</u>, p.159.

²At the distance of about 220 km. south of J**2**dda. See. Anşari, <u>op.cit.</u>, p.10.

³At present part of this area is known as 'Asir, which is a new regional name, after a confederation of tribes in al-Sarat, but then it was regarded as the southernmost extension of the region of the Hijāz. The concept of a separate region intervening between al-Hijāz and the Yemen developed in the 19th century and was sanctioned fairly recently by the Saudi Arabian government and became a well-defined geo grafifical entity. See R.Headley,  $E_{12}^2$ , art. "'Asir", pp. 707-10.

was this precisely which they did. They secured further material gains, as will be seen, through the levy or tribute imposed on the inhabitants or chiefs of these dependencies. According to Fasi, the dependencies of Mecca were in his time less numerous than they had originally been and were confined to: al-Hasaba, a small town whose location is given as at one day's distance from Qanuna'¹ and two days' from Haly in the direction of the Yemen; Dawqa;² al-Wadiyan; ³ and al-Layth. All these places, evidently with the adjoining areas, and Hadat Bani Jabir, near Harr al-Zahran, were dependencies of Mecca and the chiefs and inhabitants of al-Hasaba and Dawqa paid annually to the Sharifs of Mecca one hundred <u>gharara</u>, and those of al-Wadiyan and al-Layth two hundred <u>gharara</u> of grain.⁴ Apart from levy or tributes in kind, the <u>Sharifs</u> of Mecca received, from time to time, a certain amount of money from the inhabitants of the neighbouring valleys of

²A coastal town roughly midway between al-Qunfudha and al-Layth.

³Literally means "two valleys" but it is a proper name for a coastal town about sixty miles to the north of Haly. Al-Wadiyan is known also as al-Sirrayn. See: Qalqashandi, Subh, vol. V, p.15; 'Ayni, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. I, fols. 31a; Al-Najm Ibn Fahd, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. II, fols. 60 and 67.

⁴Fasi, Shifa', vol. I, p.25; idem, <u>al-'Iqd</u>, vol. I, part I, fols. 10b-11a. The term <u>gharara</u> is applied to a unit of weight used particularly for grain. See Qalqashandi, <u>Subh</u>, vol. IV, p.276. This unit had different equivalents, all of which are based on smaller units explained later. Seet<u>infra</u>, p.**10**5 fn. ( . According to Fasi, one <u>gharara</u> equalled forty Meccan <u>Ruba</u> (literally "a quarter" but of what is not clear. But presumably it meant <u>mudd</u>?) See <u>Shifa</u>, vol. II, p.276. Magrizi describes it as equal to seven Egyptian <u>wayba</u>. (See<u>Suluk</u>, vol. II, fol. 306. The same source mentions in another place that it was equal toone hundred <u>Qadah</u>. <u>Suluk</u>, vol. III, fol. 9a. Nahrawali states that one <u>gharara</u> is the quantity of grain which an average camel could be expected to carry. <u>Al-I'lam</u>, p.202. It seems that the weight of <u>gharara</u> differed from region to region. A Syrian <u>gharara</u> is defined as being equal to twelve <u>kayla</u>, each of which was slightly less than one-fourth of an Egyptian <u>wayba</u>, Qalqashandi, <u>Subh</u>, vol. IV, p.181. This is much less than that mentioned by Magrizi above (i.e. 7 Egyptian <u>wayba</u>).

¹A town and port on the western coast of the Arabian peninsula about 385 km south of J&dda. Later known as al-Qunfudha. See: Ansari, <u>op.cit.</u>, p.12.

Ta'if. These sums of money, usually referred to by the term <u>QatTa'</u>, were most likely fines imposed in retaliation for disloyalty.

In <u>Shawwal 801/July 1399</u>, <u>Sharif Hasan marched against a group</u> of rebellious Arabs named Hamada, in the region of Ta'if, subdued them and exacted 80,000 dirhams from them. A similar amount was paid by another group of Arabs named Banu Musa, in the valley of Liyya, near Ta'if.² Shortly after, the Sharif summoned a third group of Arabs

¹This term was originally applied to one of the units in the Troy weight system of the Arabs which is based on Habha (grain) and was later used for coins . Any detailed examination of the various units of weight and coing is neither intended nor is possible, for the sake of space. But it will not be amiss to mention briefly some of them which are referred to in one way or the other in the various sections of this thesis. The weight of 4,200 wild mustard, or about 52 mature grains of barley, with chopped off edges, was equal to one dirham. Some preferred to give the equivalent of one dirham in Qirat (onetwentyfourth of a unit or 22 cg). The number of Qirat in each dirham is given differently between 14 and 24. The variation is mainly based on the difference in the number of mustard, barley, wheat, or locustbeans (Habb kharruh) grains which were regarded as equal to one Qirat, about 20 or 22 of which are considered to be one Mithgal. Seven Mithqal are usually regarded as equal to seven dinars or ten dirhams. Both Mithgal and dirham were used in weighing silver and gold, but gradually the former became exclusively used for gold (frequently called dinar) and the dirham was usually reserved for silver. Many larger units of weight or measurement (Kayl or Mikyal) are usually based on the above stated smaller units. The points mentioned above are merely general remarks and by no means are conclusive. For further details about these and other traditional units of weight or measurement, see Ibn al-Mujawir, op.cit., vol. I, p.13; Qalqashandi, <u>Subh</u>, vol. III, pp. 440-41, 443 and 445; Maqrizi, <u>Suluk</u>, vol. II, fol. 265; idem, Nubdha Latifa fi 'Umur al-Nuqud al-Islāmiyya (M.S., A.HK. No. 264), fols. 3-4; Anistas Mari Karmly, al-Nuqud al- Arabiyya A.H. No. 2047, 1018. 5-4; Hilstas Part Harmy, <u>al-Muquu al Haves</u> wa I'lm al-Nummiyyat (Cairo, 1939), pp. 9, 25, 27-28, 38 and 76-79; G.C.Miles, <u>E.I.</u>², art. "Dinār", pp. 297-99; idem, <u>E.I.</u>², art. "Dirham", pp. 319-20; E.C.Zambur, <u>E.I.</u>², art. "Habba", pp. 10-11; J.Allan, <u>E.I.</u>¹, art. "Sikka", pp. 423-24; idem, <u>E.I.</u>¹, art. "Mithqāl", p. 558; E.V. Zambaur, E.I.1, art. "Kirat", pp. 1023-24, and various works cited in the bibliography of these articles.

²The valley of Liyya is one of the neighbouring valleys of Ta'if at the distance of about eight miles. See: Maraghi, <u>op.cit.</u>, p.165; Samhudi, <u>Wafa'</u>, vol. II, p.184; idem, <u>Khulasa</u>, p.232; Jar Allah Ibn Fahd, <u>op.cit.</u>, fol. 4; Ibn 'Alan, <u>op.cit.</u>, fols. 31-32. named Al Bani al-Nimr (known also as Al Abi'l Khayr) to appear in person and to acquit themselves of the amount due, but they refused. The resultant anger of the Sharif was exploited by the Arabs of Hamada, who were at daggers drawn with Bani al-Nimr, and urged the Sharif to attack them. They not only offered to join forces with the Sharif but also paid him 40,000 dirhams as a further inducement. Sharif Hasan had no reason to turn their offer down, launched an offensive and inflicted great losses on Bani al-Nimr. Whether or not the latter paid the amount due is uncertain.¹ Fasi followed by Al-Najm Ibn Fahd reports that Sharif Hasan visited these areas again in 802 and 803/ 1399 and 1400 and brought the amount imposed on them back to  $\mathtt{Mecca.}^2$ It was presumably paid without defiance at least for several years in succession. But in 808/1405, some of the above-named suspended payment and Sharif Hasan had to go on several punitive raids against them to secure his dues.³ In 817/1414 the Sharif received the tribute without serious opposition.4

The amount imposed was increased at some time between 818 and 820/1415 and 1417, which aroused strong resentment and the groups concerned refused to pay. They were raided and made to comply by force of arms in 821 and the following year/1418 and 1419.⁵

Fasi, <u>al-'Iqd</u>, vol. I, part II, fols. 40lb and 402a; Al-Najm Ibn Fahd, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. II, fol. 126.
Fasi, <u>al-'Iqd</u>, vol. I, part II, fols. 402a-b; Al-Najm Ibn Fahd, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. II, fols. 127-28.
Fasi, <u>al-'Iqd</u>, vol. I, part II, fol. 404b; Al-Najm Ibn Fahd, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol.II, fol. 135.
Fasi, <u>al-'Iqd</u>, vol. I, part II, fol. 409b; Al-Najm Ibn Fahd, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. II, fol. 158.

²C. Fasi, <u>al-'Iqd</u>, vol. I, part II, fols. 414b-15b; AlNajm Ibn Fahd, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. II, fols. 173-75.

Though no clear reference to the payment of this tribute is made for several successive years, the usage appears to have continued. In Safar 847/June 1443, Sharif Barakat I, deposed at the time, pitched camp near the valley of Liyya. His presence there may or may not have been intended as a threat but it caused anxiety to the ruling Amir, Sharif Abu'l Qaşim. He, toward off a possible danger, sent Barakat I 1,900 Iflori¹ previously levied from the area. Barakāt I, having received this together with a further amount, 1,100 Iflori delivered on Abu'l Qasim's instruction by inhabitants of a valley near Ta'if, departed.² This account proves that these tributes were indeed paid regularly and that their payment, when outstanding, was usually enforced. It also indicates the possibility of an arrangement between the ruling Sharif and his deposed brother, giving the latter the right to claim part of the dues, for Barakat I could hardly have exacted, and obtained, payment without use of force, unless there was a previous arrangement in this respect.

In the following year, however, the share of Barakāt I in the levy appears to have been withheld. as he carried out a number of raids on these valleys in Rabi⁶ II 848/August 1444 and forced their inhabitants to pay him 2,400 Iflori. This resulted in a tension between him and Abu⁹l Qāsim, an armed clash was only averted by a compromise in which Barakāt agreed to pay back 2,000 Iflori and was in return promised a share in the revenue of JCdda, together with some other minor financial concessions.³ After this, references to the levies from this area cease in the sources and whether they continued and for how long after the events described is uncertain. But an

## ¹Florence.

²Al-Najm Ibn Fahd, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. II, fol. 250. ³Al-Najm Ibn Fahd, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. II, fols. 253-55.

abrupt end to such references suggests that these inhabitants either refused to pay in future or were relieved by the Sharifs themselves from the payment of tribute. This, however, should not be taken to mean that the Sharifs of Mecca abandoned it in connection with other areas as well. In 913/1507, for instance, Sharif Barakāt II during a campaign against Yahya and his supporters¹ imposed on the Arabs of Banū Ibrāhīm an annual tribute of 6,000 dinars.² Various references in the sources are found during the <u>Burjī</u> period to the effect that the Sharifs of Mecca often resorted to force in exacting dues, tributes, or simply material gains through plundering or punitive raids against certain areas and tribes. These often yielded considerable booty, and some of these expeditions could have been made with the object of enforcing payment of previously imposed levies.³

The Sharifs of Mecca usually allowed the Amirs of the areas under their influence to continue as before, provided they acknowledged the former as their overlords and to pay the tribute, if imposed, regularly. The three most outstanding dependencies of Mecca were al-Qunfudha, Haly and Jazan. The first was more or less incorporated into the Meccan territory and was ruled by deputies of the Meccan Amirs. The most active and famous among these deputies was Musa b. Barakut (d.91)/1505.

¹See <u>supra</u>, pp. 95-96.

²Al-'Izz Ibn Fahd, <u>op.cit</u>., vol. II, fol. 266.

³For the relevant details, see; Fasi, <u>al-'Iqd</u>, vol. I, part II, fol. 415b; Maqrizi, <u>Suluk</u>, vol. II, fol. <u>392</u>; Ibn Hajar, <u>Inba'</u>, vol. II, fol. 135b; Al-Najm Ibn Fahd, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. II, fols. <u>126</u>, 175, 181, 269, 295, 306, 322. 324, 331, 335 and 363-64; Sakhāwi, al-Dhayl (ed. A.Al-Hassu), pp. <u>144</u>, 188 and 352; Al-'Izz Ibn Fahd, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. I, fol. 25, 39, 85, 94, 100-101, 104-5, 167-9, 112, 117, 119, 178, 180-81, 252 and 259-60, vol. II, fols. 85, 155 and 196; Ibn Iyas, <u>Bada'i</u>, vol. IV, pp. 106 and 122; See also: Jaziri, <u>op.cit.</u>, p.336; Işami, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. IV, p.276; Sinjāri, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. II, fols. 11 and <u>34-35</u>; Tabari, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. I, fols. 82 and 124; Dahlān, <u>op.cit.</u>, p.44.

⁴See <u>supra</u>, p.91.

Haly Bani Ya (or simply Haly) Haly Bani Ya (or simply Haly) The Amir of Haly, Ahmad b.I'sā al-Harāmi, was subjugated by the Sharif of Mecca, 'Ajlān b. Rumaytha (d. 777/1375), in 763/1361, but was allowed to remain in control of Haly as vassal of the Meccan Amir. Their relations became closer in consequence of a marriage between a son of 'Ajlan and a daughter of Amir 'Isa.¹ Sharif 'Ajlān, either immediately after the conquest of Haly or at some later date, imposed on the Amir of Haly a tribute of which no figure is given in the source. The tribute seems to have been paid regularly until around 780/1378 when Sharif Ahmad b. 'Ajlān increased that tribute by an unspecified sum which the Amir of Haly refused to pay. Sharif Ahmad marched at the head of his men to attack Haly, but on his approach there a compromise solution was reached by peaceful negotiation.²

The Sharifs of Mecca continued in the position of overlords over the successive Amirs of Haly with a possible and short interruption around 828/1424-25 when the Amir of Haly appear to have been under the protection of the Vemenite Sultan. This is borne out by a report of Fasi that an Egyptian Amir, Qarqmas, came as far as Haly on his search for Sharif Hasan³ but avoided entering it on the grounds that it was a dependency of the Vemen.⁴ This, however, does not appear to have lasted long. as ample evidence is found to show that the Amirs of Mecca were enjoying again authority over the Amirs of Haly shortly after that year. The influence of the Sharifs of Mecca in Haly was particularly strong in the closing years of the <u>Burji</u> period, when a

Fasi, <u>al-'Iqd</u>, vol. I, part II, fols. 534b, vol.II, part III, fol. 150a; Ibn Hajar, <u>Inba'</u>, vol. I, fol. 28a; Al-Najm Ibn Fahd, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. II, fols. 89 and 91. See also: Janābi, <u>op.cit.</u>, fol. 304a; 'Isāmi, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. IV, p.245; Sinjārī, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. I, fols. 325-26; Tabarī, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. I, fol. 61.
 ²Fasī, <u>al-'Iqd</u>, vol. I, part II, fols. 287a-b.
 ³See <u>supra</u>, p. 74.
 ⁴Fasī, <u>al-'Iqd</u>, vol. I, part I, fols. 65a-b.

contingent of Meccan soldiers was sent to establish a garrison there.¹

The last but not the least dependency of Mecca was the emirate of Jazan (or Jizan) which formed the southernmost limit of the area controlled by the Meccan Sharifs. When exactly the emirate of Jazan became a dependency of Mecca is not clear, but it appears that it was during the rule of Abu'l Ghawa'ir Ahmad, who had succeeded his father Outb al-Din Durayb al-Hasani in 876/1471.² In Rabi' I 882/July 1477 (according to some late sources in 884/1479) the Amir of Mecca, Sharif Muhammad b. Barakat, who suspected Abu'l Ghawa'ir of having connived at the escape of his disloyal brother to Cairo,³ attacked him. Abu'l Ghawa'ir was to suffer a humiliating defeat and his lands were devastated by the victorious Sharif of Mecca. The former was, however, allowed to retain his position but as a subordinate of the Meccan Amir. Al-Najm Ibn Fahd alone among the sources states that Abu'l Ghawa" ir had to pay an annual tribute of which he gives no figure to the Sharif of Mecca. From the few scattered items of information in the sources, it could be ascertained that the Sharifs of Mecca continued in control over Abu'l Ghawa'ir and his successors in the emirate of Jazan.4

¹For the relevant details, see Fasi, <u>al-'Iqd</u>, vol. I, part II, fols. 402b, 403b, 404a, 415a and 416a; Ibn Hajar, <u>Inbā</u>, vol. I, fol. 241b, vol. II, fol. 25b; Ibn Taghrī Birdī, Hawādith, vol. I, fol. 224; idem, <u>al-Nujūm</u>, vol. VII, fols. 349; Al-Najm Ibn Fahd, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. II, fols. 129-30, 132, 174, 177, 275, 312 and 316; Sakhāwi, <u>al-Daw</u>, vol. III, pp. 217-18, vol. X, pp. 176 and 191; idem, <u>al-Tibr</u>, p.394; idem, <u>al-Dhayl</u> (ed. A.Al-Hassu), pp. 60 and 154; Al-'Izz, Ibn Fahd, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. I, fols. 236, 242-43 and 248-49, vol. II, fol. 266 See also: Janābi, <u>op.cit.</u>, fol. 307a; 'Isāmi, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. IV, p.262; Tabarī, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. I, fol. 64; R.B.Serjeant, <u>The</u> Portuguese off the South Arabian Coast (Londonm 1963), p.5.

², . Sakhāwi, <u>al-Paw⁹</u>, vol.III, p.218.

³See <u>supra</u>, pp. 83-84.

⁴ Al-Najm Ibn Fahd, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. II, fols. 360-61; Sakhawi, <u>al-Daw</u>, vol. I, pp. 33 and 299, vol. VII, p.152; idem, al-Dhayl (ed. A.Al-Hassu),

# B. Occasional elevation of the Sharif of Mecca to the status of <u>Na^{*}ib al-Sultān</u>

The region of Hijaz, as is evident from the preceding pages, was not a single political entity but was divided into three main emirates: Mecca, Medina, and Yanbu. The Sharifs of Mecca surpassed the others in wealth, military strength, influence and administration. Some aspect of their supremacy in the region has already been explained and others are given in the following chapters. Owing to all these factors, the Sharifs of Mecca were able to impose and maintain their authority on various parts of the region, as shown earlier, which, at least, was not opposed by their Egyptian overlords. The latter often received, as will be seen, considerable amounts of money and valuables from the Sharifs of Mecca and must have been aware of their greater politico-economic importance. Therefore, it was not strange to find that the relations between the Sharifs of Mecca and the Egyptian Sultans, on the whole, were much friendlier than those of Yanbu and Medina. In view of all this, it is not surprising that the status of Na'ib (deputy) of the Egyptian Sultan in the Hijaz was bestowed exclusively on certain Sharifs of Mecca. As the term Na'ib al-Sultan indicates, the Sharif who held this position had, at least in theory, supreme authority over all the chiefs and Amirs in the region, as deputy of the Egyptian Sultan. The assignment of this position to a Sharif of Mecca was usually preceded by the payment of a considerable sum of money to the Sultan. This, however, does

p.249; Al- Izz Ibn Fahd, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. I, fol. 217; Ibn Iyās, <u>Badā'i</u>, vol. III, p.129; Ibn al-Dayba', Bughyat al-Mustafid (MS., A.S. No. 2988), fol. 60b; idem, <u>Qurra</u>, fol. 202. See also: Jaziri, <u>op.cit.</u>, pp. 338-39; Janābi, <u>op.cit.</u>, fol. 307b; Isāmi, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. IV, p.277; Sinjāri, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. II, fol. 14; Țabari, <u>op. <u>cit.</u>, vol. I, fol. 128; Dahlān, <u>op.cit.</u>, p.45; G.Rentz, <u>E.I.</u>², art. "Djayzān", pp. 516-18; Serjeant, <u>op.cit.</u>, p.5.</u> not necessarily imply permanent or lifelong tenure of office. Nor could this office be regarded as hereditary. A deposed  $\underline{Na'ib}$  al-Sultän could be later re-appointed mere Amir, which is sometimes confusing when his status and the basis of his relationship to other Amirs have, at certain times, to be determined. Some sources, especially the late ones, occasionally refer to a certain <u>Sharif</u> erroneously with the title of <u>Na'ib al-Sultān</u> before he actually acquired that advantageous position, or continue to refer to him as such long after he had lost this status and was no more than a mere <u>Sharif</u> of Mecca. Needless to say, all such references are carefully examined and excluded unless supported by other contemporary sources and proved to be correct.

<u>Sharif Ahmad b. 'Ajlān was the ruling Amir of Mecca at the be-</u> ginning of the <u>Burji</u> period. Most sources refer to him and his father 'Ajlān as <u>Sharif of Mecca</u>. But there are some passages in certain sources which indicate that both these Sharifs enjoyed authority in other parts of the Hijāz. That is to say, in addition to the usual territories of Mecca and its dependencies. Al-Najm Ibn Fahd uses once, when referring to <u>Sharif</u> 'Ajlān, the title <u>Sultān al-Haramayn</u> (i.e. Sultan of the holy cities of Mecca and Medina) and speaks of his son <u>Sharif Ahmad as being appointed to the "Sultanat Makka wa</u> <u>sā'ir al-Bilād al-Hijāziyya</u>" (i.e., Sultanate of Mecca and all the areas within the region of the Hijāz¹). The term <u>Ra'īs al-Hijāz</u> (denoting either ruler or the wealthy person in the region) is also not used in a reference to <u>Sharif Ahmad.</u>² It is/very likely that this term has here any political significance. It is apparently used to indicate Sharif Ahmad's wealth which is reported to have been

¹Al-Najm Ibn Fahd, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. II, fols. 97 and 99. ²Fasi, <u>al-'Iqd</u>, vol. I, part II, fol. 286a; Ibn Taghri Birdi, <u>al-Manhal</u>, vol. I, pp. 369-70.

considerable.¹ Ibn Hajar gives <u>Sharif Ahmad the title "Sultan al-</u><u>Hijaz"</u>, but only once.²

Though the use of these titles indicates that both these Sharifs possessed influence in the Hijāz, there is no clear factual evidence to confirm beyond doubt that they enjoyed the authority of overlords. Sharif Hasan b. 'Ajlan was the first Amir of Mecca who definitely acquired the position of Na'ib al-Sultan in the Hijaz. This elevation was the natural cubmination of the career of a man of his personal ability. Shortly after his appointment to the emirate of Mecca in 797/1394, he was able to compel the Amir of Yanbu' to pay him the Egyptian price of grain which had been a gift to him from the Sultan, 3 and to take revenge on the assassing of his brother 'Ali." Hasan's military strength enabled him to pursue his opponents in far distant areas, to meet and defeat them. In or around Rabi' II 798/February 1396, Sharif Hasan went to Yanbu' in pursuit of his opponents, and, despite the recent dispute between them, received a fairly friendly reception by the Amir of Yanbu'. According to Ibn al-Furat, Hasan on his return journey was ambushed by his opponents who were supported by the Amir of Yanbu'. But the latter suffered defeat and were put to flight.⁵ According to Magrizi, Amir of Yanbu' supported Hasan against his opponents who suffered defeat.⁶ Whatever the merits of the case, the mere fact that Hasan, shortly after his appointment, was able to

1 See infra, p. 155.

² . Ibn Hajar, <u>Durar</u>, vol. I, pp. 201-2.
³See <u>infra</u>, p.193.
⁴See <u>supra</u>, pp. 61-62.
⁵Ibn al-Furāt, <u>op.cit</u>., vol. IX, part II, p.434.
⁶Magrīzī, <u>Sulūk</u>, vol.III, fol. 174a.

take revenge for his brother and to chase his opponents to distant areas, and that he was strong and shrewd enough to win victory even though taken by surprise, reflects his great personal merit. This enabled him to gather, on several occasions, a huge number of supporters and occasional followers who often helped him to achieve his goal.¹

By increasing his military strength, Hasan acquired considerable influence over the chiefs and Amirs of the area, who must have known that to maintain good relations with a powerful Amir in the region was far better than to be at loggerheads with him. Especially as the Sultan was unlikely to intervene should one of them be attacked by another, unless his own position was challenged. This is clearly indicated by the passive attitude of the Egyptian Sultan to the expansionist policy of the Meccan Amirs who had several dependencies, as shown earlier, in the south of their territory.

One can easily see that the concept "might is right" was not looked upon disapprovingly by the <u>Mamfuks</u>, especially the <u>Burji</u> Sultans. Thus, for instance, in 809/1406 <u>Sharif Thabit</u> and Jammaz, at enmity "Egyptian" trying to secure appointment to the emirate of Medina. The Sultan's reaction was rather strange; he sent a message to both rivals suggesting that they should resolve the situation between them at the point of the sword. An armed encounter actually took place and Jammaz, who gained the upper hand, appears to have been declared Amir of Medina.²

² Ibn Hajar, <u>Inba</u>, vol. I, fol. 233a; Sakhawi, <u>al-Tuhfa</u>, vol. I, p..385.

¹As token examples, see: Fasi, <u>Shifa</u>, vol. II, pp. 252-53; idem, <u>al-</u> <u>'Iqd</u>, vol. I, part II, fols. 403b, 404b and 406a; AlNajm Ibn Fahd, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. II, fols. 122, 128-30, 140, 142 and 154; Sakhāwi, <u>al-</u> <u>Tuhfa</u>, vol. I, p.477; See also: Janabi, <u>op.cit.</u>, fol. 305a; Sinjāri, op.cit., vol. I, fols. 340-41; Dahlān, <u>op.cit.</u>, p.37.

There can be little doubt that it was the growing military might of Hasan which compelled Muqhil and Wubayr, joint Amirs of Yanbu' whose relations with Hasan were strained, to visit him in Mecca and normalize their mutual relations in Ramadān 809/March 1407.¹ Hasan's ever-increasing power must have contributed in the decision of the Egyptian Sultan to grant the former the status of <u>Nā'ib al-Sultān</u> in Rabi' I 811/August or September 1408. Hasan was authorized to depose or appoint the local Amirs, and to deal with all the affairs of the region.

Shortly before this, a Sharif named Thabit b. Nu ayr had, at the expense of the above-mentioned Jammaz b. Hiba, secured the emirate of Medina, but as he had not yet received the formal decree, Jammaz had remained in control. The newly appointed Na'ib al-Sultan confirmed Thabit but the latter died before taking actual control. Jammaz had hoped that he would be allowed to remain in control of Medina, but Hasan decided to replace him by 'Ajlan b. Nu'ayr, a brother of the deceased. This became known to Jammaz who appropriated various valuables from the sanctuary and fled. In Rabi' II or Jumädä I of the same year (i.e. 811/September or October 1408), Sharif 'Ajlan and Sharif Barakat I b. Hasan reached Medina with a strong force and the former was declared Amir of Medina as deputy of Hasan. An attempt was made to arrest Jammaz but in vain. Hasan's name was mentioned in the Khutba and prayers were said for him immediately after prayers for the Sultan and before those for 'Ajlan. This usage prevailed until the end of 812/May 1410, when it was suspended following the deposition of f 'Ajlan, for the reason explained later,

¹Fasi, <u>al-'Iqd</u>, vol. I, part II, fol. 405a; Al-Najm Ibn Fahd, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. II, fol. 136. by Jammäz or Sulayman b. Hiba but was resumed later. In connection with the offering of prayers for Hasan in the sanctuary of Medina² it is worth pointing out that the sources rarely if ever refer to this usage for any Na^{*}ib al-Sultan or for the Sultan himself in any mosque other than the sanctuaries in Mecca and Medina. The obvious reason was that the practice in ordinary mosques had no political significance. It can safely be assumed that Sharif Hasan was acknowledged Na'ib al-Sultan in Yanbu' and the prayers were said for him in the local mosques there and indeed in others in the region. As to the temporary suspension of the offering of prayers for Sharif Hasan in Medina, as mentioned earlier, it was in all probability due to the supposed deposition of Hasan at the end of 812/May 1410 which, however, was averted at the last moment.³ The offering of prayers must have been resumed following the re-instating of Hasan. The assumption is corroborated by the recourse to a number of sources which state that Sharif Hasan remained

¹For the points mentioned and further details about this episode, see: Fasi, Shifa', vol. I, p.332, vol. II, pp. 208-9 and 252-53; idem, <u>al-'Iqd</u>, vol. I, part I, fol. 57b, part II, fols. 376b-77a and 405a-b, vol. II, part III, fol. 195a; Maqrizi, Suluk, vol. II, fols. 230, 263 and 344, vol. IV, fol. 14b; Ibn Hajar, <u>Inba'</u>, vol. I, fol. 246a, vol. II, fols. 4b and 6b; Ibn Taghri Birdi, <u>al-Manhal</u>, vol. I, fol. 181b, 245b and 284a; idem, <u>al-Nujum</u>, vol. VII, fols. 48-49; Al-Najm Ibn Fahd, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. II, fols. 139-41; Sakhāwi, <u>al-Tuhfa</u>, vol. I, fols. 747; idem, <u>al-Tuhfa</u>, vol. I, p.62, 80-81, 159 and 476-77, vol. II, p.229, vol. III, pp. 408-9; idem, <u>al-Dhayl</u>, fols. 76a-77a and 82b; idem, <u>al-Daw'</u>, vol. II, pp. 13, 50, 78 and 103-4, vol. VII, p.152; Samhūdi, <u>Wafa'</u>, vol. I, pp. 418-9; idem, Khulāsa, pp. 145-46. See also: Qalqashandi, Ma'āthir, vol. II, p.207; Jaziri, <u>op.cit.</u>, p.585; Nahrawāli, <u>al-I'lām</u>, p.200; Janābi, <u>op.cit.</u>, fols. 304b-5a and 310a; 'Işāmi, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. IV, pp. 35 and 252-53; Sinjāri, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. I, fols. 338-39; Țabari, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. I, fols. 73-74; Dahlān, op.cit., p.37. The similar practice in Mecca should be taken for granted for all the Sharifs of Mecca.

³See <u>supra</u>, pp. 62-63.

<u>Na'ib al-Sultan</u> for about seven years after the acquisition of that status.¹ Had Hasan's name been permanently dropped from the <u>Khutba</u>, the status of <u>Na'ib al-Sultan</u> would have become meaningless. In Safar 818/May 1415, <u>Sharif Hasan</u> was deposed by his nephew Rumay<u>tha</u>.² That, in some sources,³ the title Amir of Mecca is used for both, does not necessarily mean that Hasan had ceased to be <u>Na'ib al-Sultan</u>, or that Rumay<u>tha</u> had not been assigned the same status, since a <u>Sharif had to be Amir first before he could acquire a higher status</u>. Many sources state unequivocally that Rumay<u>tha</u> had replaced his cousins Barakāt I and Aḥmad in the emirate, and his uncle Hasan in Niyāhat al-Sultana.⁴

Sharif Rumaytha, however, does not seem to have enjoyed any authority outside the Meccan territory, which may have been partly caused by the continuous opposition by Hasan's supporters and partly be the brevity of his rule, for he was replaced by Hasan in Ramadan 819/November 1416. The latter appears to have remained, henceforward, merely Amir of Mecca. This did not prevent the energetic and tactful Hasan from retaining part of his previous official influence in Medina and Yanbu'.⁵

⁵See <u>supra</u>, pp.68-72.

<sup>Fasi, Shifa', vol. II, p.209; idem, al-'Iqd, vol. I, part I, fol. 57b, part II, fols. 399a, vol. II, part III, fol. 195a; Ibn Taghri Birdi, al-Manhal, vol. I, fol. 284a; Sakhawi, al-Tuhfa, vol. I, p.477; idem, al-Daw', vol. III, p.13. See also: Jaziri, op.cit., p.585; 'Isami, op.cit., vol. IV, pp. 254-55.
For the circumstances leading to this change, see <u>supra</u>, pp.66-68³ Ibn Hajar, <u>Inba'</u>, vol. II, fol. 10b; Sakhawi, al-Daw', vol. III, pp. 13 and 104. See also: Janabi, op.cit., fol. 305b.
⁴ Fasi, Shifa', vol. II, p.209; idem, <u>al-'Iqd</u>, vol. II, part III, fol. 195a; Maqrizi, <u>Sulük</u>, vol. II, fol. 272; AlNajm Ibn Fahd, op.cit., vol. II, fol. 163. See also: 'Isami, op.cit., vol. IV, p. 256; Sinjari, op.cit., vol. I, fol. 344; Tabari, op.cit., vol. I, fol. 80; Dahlan, op.cit., p.39.</sup> 

Sinjārī, reporting the deposition of Hasan by 'Alī in Jumādā I '827/April 1424¹, states that the latter was appointed <u>Nā'ib al-Sultān</u> in the Hijāz.² But this statement is, insofar as it can be ascertained, not supported by other sources. <u>Sharif</u> Barakat I had succeeded his father Hasan in Ramadān 829/August 1426.³ Despite some vague references to him with the title "<u>Sābib al-Hijāz</u>",⁴ there is no conclusive evidence to the effect that Barakāt I ever acquired the status of <u>Nā'ib al-Sultān</u>.

Sharif Barakāt I was succeeded by his son Muhammad who not only enjoyed the longest period of rule and cordial relations with the Sultan but was also the most popular and able <u>Sharif</u> of Mecca within the <u>Burji</u> period.⁵ This combination served him well in extending his influence and authority, officially or otherwise, in the various parts of the Hijāz. Though he was granted the status of <u>Na'ib al-Sultān</u> the actual date of the appointment is uncertain.

In 870/1465 Sakhāwī, referring to the appointment of a <u>Sharif</u> named Zuhayr to the emirate of Medina ascribes it to the favour shown by <u>Sharif Muhammad</u>, the <u>Sāhib al-Hijāz</u> (the ruler of the Hijāz).⁶ This implies that in this year, if not earlier, <u>Sharif Muhammad enjoyed</u> the status of <u>Nā'ib al-Sultān</u>. According to some later sources, this

¹See <u>supra</u>, p. 73.
²See Sinjāri, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. I, fol. 349.
³See <u>süpra</u>, p. 76.
⁴ <u>Sakhāwi</u>, <u>al-Tibr</u>, p.198; idem, <u>al-Dhayl</u> (ed. A.Al-Hassu), pp. 1-2 and 10.
⁵See <u>supra</u>, pp. 85-86.
⁶Sakhāwi, <u>al-Tuhfa</u>, vol. II, pp. 320-21.

status was assigned to <u>Sh</u>arif Muhammad in 872/1467.¹ Al-Najm Ibn Fahd refers to Sharif Muhammad in 872/1467 as Sultan of Mecca.² This term, in itself, does not point to any additional authority but may have been used to indicate the hegemony of Mecca over other parts of the Hijaz. This assumption is supported by the above stated version of Sakhawi and some other sources as well as by a report by Ibn Iyas that in Dhull Qada 872/July 1468 an expedition was sent from Mecca to subdue the unruly elements in Yanbu³ In 874/1469, Sharif Muhammad is referred to again with the titla "Sahib al-Hijaz".4 Nevertheless, two Sharifs, one in Medina in 874/1469⁵ and the other in Yanbu' in Egyptian 875/1470,⁶ were appointed by the/Sultan himself. Obviously, the Sultan had the power to appoint or depose any Amir, including his Na'ib in the Hijaz. But it was the usual practice, as will be seen, that he at least consulted his Na'ib in the Hijaz when considering the appointment or deposition of an Amir in Yanbu' or Medina. That he did not do so in this case implies some doubt about the credibility of the earlier references to Sharif Muhammad as Na ib al-Sultan in the Hijaz. However, it should be stated that according to Sakhawi's reports Sharif Muhammad was enjoying this status from 870/1465 onwards. Bakhawi's several

¹ Nahrawāli, <u>al-I'lām</u>, p.223; Ţabari, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. I, fol. 124.
²Al-Najm Ibn Fahd, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. II, fol. 319.
³Ibn Iyās, <u>Badā'i</u>, vol. III, p.14.
⁴Sa<u>khāwi</u>, <u>al-Dhayl</u> (ed. A.Al-Hassu), p.188.
⁵ Sa<u>khāwi</u>, <u>al-Tuhfa</u>, vol. II, p.321; idem, <u>al-Dhayl</u> (ed. A.Al-Hassu), p.196.
⁶Ibn Iyās, <u>Badā'i</u>, vol. III, p.57.

references to the <u>Sharif in that capacity hawe already been mentioned</u>. References to <u>Sharif Muhammad as "<u>Sāhib al-Hijāz</u>" are made by the same source in 878/1473 and 881/1476 again.¹ In fact, it is in or after 878/1473 that <u>Sharif Muhammad appears</u> to have begun enjoying some real influence over the Amirs of Yanbu' and Medina which developed into full official control around 883/1478 in his capacity of <u>Nā'ib</u> <u>al-Sultān</u>. This is supported by several evidential examples. In 878/1473, for instance, a <u>Sharif named Abū Fāris <u>Shāmān</u> beleaguered Medina with a strong body of supporters to claim his dues from its Amir, <u>Sharif Dughaym</u>. The former threatened to storm the city unless his dues were paid. On receiving this news, <u>Sharif Muhammad sent</u> to <u>Shamān</u> orders/to depart peacefully, and was obeyed.²</u></u>

In the same year the Egyptian Sultan deposed the Amir of Yanbu', <u>Sharif Saba'</u> b. Hajjān, and authorized <u>Sharif Muhammad</u> to appoint whom he chose to the emirate of Yanbu'.³ Who was appointed by <u>Sharif Muhammad</u> is not clear but it was presumably <u>Sharif Saqr</u> who was replaced in Rajab 883/November 1478 by Saba'.⁴

In Ramadān 883/January 1479, <u>Sharif Muhammad</u>, at the instruction of the Egyptian Sultan, went to Medina personally to investigate the **murder** of a local <u>Qādi</u> in the previous year and also to rebuke its Amir, <u>Sharif Dughaym</u> for his failure to bring the murderer to justice and to give the Egyptian <u>Amir al-Hajj</u> the customary reception. <u>Dughaym</u> was rather apprehensive, and left Medina before the arrival of <u>Sharif</u> Muhammad. When <u>Dughaym</u> disregarded Muhammad's invitation to co-operate

1							
-Sakhawi,	al_Dhayl	(ed.	A.al-Hassu),	pp.	218 and	241	respectively.

² Sakhawi, al-Tuhfa, vol. II, p.321.

⁴Ibn Iyas, <u>Bada'i</u>, vol. III, p.143.

³Al-Najm Ibn Fahd, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol.II, fol. 342. See also: Jaziri, <u>op.cit.</u>, p.337.

in tracking down the murderer, <u>Sharif Muhammad left Medina in</u> anger, leaving a force to maintain law and order. <u>Sharif Muhammad</u> had obviously sent an unfavourable report, about <u>Dughaym</u>, to Cairo which led to the replacement of <u>Dughaym</u>, shortly after, by <u>Sharif</u> Qusaytil.¹

In <u>Shawwal 883/February 1479</u>, the Amir of Yanbu', <u>Sharif Saba'</u> b. Hajjan, whose relations with Muhammad were strained, paid him a visit and, as a friendly gesture, offered him 8,000 /dinars/ as blood money for some men killed in earlier hostilities. Magnanimously <u>Sharif Muhammad accepted only half of the amount and their relations</u> improved.² Though not clearly mentioned, it is more than acceptable to assume that Saba' acted as he did in fear of <u>Sharif Muhammad's</u> authority and to avoid the fate of <u>Dughaym</u>.

The fact that <u>Sharif Muhammad</u> alone among the local Amirs played the rôle of main host to Sultan Qa'it Bay during the latter's pilgrimage is a clear indication that he already enjoyed the status of <u>Na'ib</u> <u>al-Sultan</u> in the Hijāz.

In Rabi' II or Jumādā I 887/June or July 1482, <u>Sharif Muhammad</u>, following the death of Saba' and the dissatisfaction of the inhabitants in Medina with Qusayțil, appointed the <u>Sharifs Darrāj</u> and Zubayrī his deputies in Yanbu' and Medina respectively. Whether the name of <u>Sharif</u> Muhammad was mentioned and prayers said for him in Friday's <u>Khutba</u> in Medini sanctuary prior to this year is open to question. But in 887/ 1482 and the following years several references are made to the effect that this was the practice in the sanctuaries of Mecca and Medina and

²Al-Najm Ibn Fahd, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. II, fol. 368.

³See supra, p.85.

¹ Al-Najm Ibn Fahd, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. II, fol. 368; Sakhāwi, al-Dhayl (ed. A.Al-Hassu), pp. 250 and 256-57; idem, <u>al-Daw</u>, vol. IV, p.2, vol. VI, p.221, vol. IX, pp. 102-3; idem, <u>al-Tuhfa</u>, vol. I, p. 440, 82, vol. II, pp. 321-22; idem, <u>al-Tuhfa</u>, vol. I, fol. 690 and 706, vol. II, fols. 13-14; Ibn Iyās, <u>Badā'i</u>; vol. III, p.140.

that <u>Sharif Muhammad</u> continued to enjoy the privileges of <u>Na^{*}ib al-</u> <u>Sultan.¹</u> In Ramadan 888/November 1483, <u>Sharif Zubayri</u> died and <u>Sharif</u> Muhammad appointed Hasan, a son of the deceased, his deputy in Medina.²

Relations between <u>Sharif Darraj</u>, the deputy of <u>Sharif Muhammad</u> in Yanbu', and Yahya b. Saba' became rather hostile shortly after the appointment of Darraj. The reason was that <u>Sharif Yahya tried</u>, following the death of his father Saba', for his appointment in Yanbu' but in vain. as the choice of <u>Sharif Muhammad fell</u> on <u>Sharif Darraj</u>. This was bitterly resented by Yahya and the resultant tension led to a clash between Darraj and Yahya in the early part of 890/1485. It was Darraj who suffered greater losses, was practically besieged, and was forced to pay Yahya a sum of money to conclude a truce.³

Shortly after, the two rivals - whether spontaneously or in answer to a summons is not known - paid a visit to <u>Sharif Muhammad in</u> Mecca. What exactly happened there is unclear, but it is safe to assume that <u>Nā'ib al-Sultān</u> tried to reconcile Yahya and Darrāj with each other. However, shortly after the return of Yahya and Darrāj to Yanbu' hostility flared up again. Yahya secured the support of Banū Ibrāhim, a powerful tribe in Yanbu' about 2,000 strong, and Darrāj was hard pressed and in real trouble. He sent to <u>Sharif Muhammad re-</u> qu'esting his help. In Rabi' II 891/May 1486, <u>Sharif Muhammad himself</u> marched with a strong force against Yahya and inflicted a crushing defeat on him. But soon after the <u>Sharif's return to Mecca Darrāj found himself</u>

1 Sakhāwi, al-Tuhfa, vol. I, p.82, vol. II, p.95; idem, al-Tuhfa, vol. I, fols. 690 and 747; idem, al-Dhayl (ed. A.Al-Hassu), pp. 289, 295 and 329-30; idem, al-Daw', vol. III, pp. 217, 232 and 243, vol. VI, p.221, vol. VII, p.152; Al-'Izz Ibn Fahd, op.cit., vol. I, fols. 20-22, 32, 72 and 110. See also: Janabi, op.cit., folt.307b; 'Işāmi, op.cit., vol. IV, p.278.

². Sakhāwi, al-Dhayl (ed. A.Al-Hassu), p.304; idem, <u>al-Tuhfa</u>, vol. I, p.82, vol. II, p.95; idem, <u>al-Daw</u>, vol. III, pp. 100 and 232-33; Al-⁵Izz Ibn Fahd, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. I, fol. 40.

³AL-'Izz Ibn Fahd, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. I, fol. 63.

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again under pressure and the <u>Na'ib al-Sultan</u> <u>Sharif</u> Muhammad went again to the rescue of his deputy in Yanbu'.¹

Late in 891 or early in 892/December 1486, Sharif Yahya requested the Sultan to appoint him to the emirate of Yanbu' and offered to pay in return 30,000 dinars. Despite this financial temptation, the Sultan left the matter to the decision of his <u>Na'ib</u> in the Hijāz whose respons e was not favourable to Yahya.² This stand of the Sultan must have convinced the local Amirs that the position of <u>Na'ib</u> <u>al-Sultān</u> was not a mere symbol but conveyed on its incumbent not only corresponding authority but the support of the Sultan. This must have enhanced Sharif Muhammad's influence in the region.

In 902/1496-97 Yahya tried again to persuade the Sultan to grant him the appointment to the emirate of Yanbu' but in vain. On his failure, Yahya renewed hostilities against Darrāj but when Yahya's supporters, particularly the Arabs of Banu Ibrāhīm, became a menace to the authority of the <u>Sharif Muhammad</u>, they were subdued and forced to pay tribute.³

The deputies of <u>Sharif Muhammad</u> in Yanbu' and Medina were, on the whole, loyal but some were, or became, unwilling to act as "deputy". They may have thought that it detracted from their dignity. <u>Sharif</u> Hasan b. Zubayri, the deputy of <u>Sharif Muhammad</u> in Medina, was becoming increasingly dissatisfied with his subordinate position, especially as he believed that he was being deprived of his share in the revenue of the fiefs and endowments made in favour of Medina. Early in Rabi' I

¹ . Sakhawi, al-Dhayl (ed. A.Al-Hassu), p.330; Al-'Izz Ibn Fahd, op.cit., vol. I, fols. 73 and 75-76.

² Sakhawi, al-Dhayl (ed. A.Al-Hassu), p.352; Al-'Izz Ibn Fahd, op.cit., vol. I, fols. 84-85.

3 Sakhāwī, al-Dhayl (ed. A.Al-Hassu), p.352; Al-'Izz Ibn Fahd, op.cit., vol. I, fols. 201-2 and 204; see also: Jazīrī, op.cit., pp. 347-48.

901/December 1495, Hasan took possession of a number of valuables which belonged to the sanctuary and escaped from Medina. <u>Sharif</u> Muhammad sent an expeditionary force to arrest Hasan and recover the loot, but in vain. <u>Sharif Muhammad appointed Sharif Faris b. Shaman</u> his deputy in Medina.¹

<u>Sharif Muhammad continued to wield effective power, not only</u> in the Meccan territory, in Medina and Yanbu', but also in various other parts of the Hijāz until his death early in Muharram 903/September 1497.² He was succeeded by his son Barakāt II who seems to have initially inherited his father's status. A reference of 897/1491-92 in which Barakāt II is described as "<u>Gasīm /partner7</u>" of his father referred to as "<u>Sābib al-Hijāz</u>" indicates this.³ the more so as Barakāt is mentioned, shortly after his appointment, as ruler of the Hijāz. He is reported to have confirmed the <u>Sharifs Fāris and Darrāj in their posi-</u> tions.⁴ This proves that Barakāt II possessed initially the privilege of <u>Nā'ib al-Sultān</u>. Otherwise, his being <u>Qasīm</u> and his confirmation of Fāris and Darrāj would have been devoid of meaning. But this official status did not last long. Most likely Barakāt's split with his brother and the resultant clashes contributed much in dwindling his authority

¹ Sakhāwi, <u>al-Tuhfa</u>, vol. I, fol. 681; idem, <u>al-Tuhfa</u>, vol. I, pp. 82 and 474-75; Samhudi, <u>Wafa</u>, vol. I, p.422; Al- Izz Ibn Fahd, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. I, fol. 189, 193-95 and 216; Ibn Iyas, <u>Bada i</u>, vol. III, p.311.

² Sakhāwi, <u>al-Daw</u>, vol. VII, pp. 150-53; Al-'Izz Ibn Fahd, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. I, fol. 217; Ibn al-Dayba', <u>al-Fadl</u>, fol. 99b; idem, <u>Qurra</u>, fol. 220; See also: Janābi, <u>op.cit.</u>, fols. 307b-8a; 'Işāmi, <u>op.cit.</u>: vol. IV, pp. 278-79.

²Sakhāwi, al-Dhayl (ed. A.Al-Hassu), pp. 540 and 543; idem, <u>al-Daw</u>, vol. VII, p.152.

⁴ Al-'Izz Ibn Fahd, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. I, fol. 223; Ibn al-Dayba',<u>al-Fadl</u>, fol. 99b; see also: 'Isami, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. IV, pp. 282 and 301; Sinjari, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. II, fols. 18-19.

in the region as well as the favour of the Sultan in Cairo.^{$\perp$}

In Jumada II or <u>Sha</u> ban 903/February or April 1498 <u>Sharif</u> Yahya at last succeeded in his lifelong endeavour and secured, against the wish of Barakat II and at the expense of Darraj, his appointment to the emirate of Yanbu' direct from the Sultan. Darraj, having been deposed and expelled from Yanbu', went to Mecca where he died an exile.²

In 906-7/1500-1501 some references to Barakat and his rival brother Hazza' under the use of the title "Sahib al-Hijaz" are found in certain sources. Some other rather late sources state that Sharif Barakat II was appointed ruler of Mecca and the rest of the Hijaz in 910/1504 or 1505.4 But both these statements, at this stage, are not supported either by a clear official edict or by the factual evidence in the sources. In fact, under the rival brothers the situation in Mecca remained rather chaotic for several years between 906-10/1500-04 and was not stabilized until 910/1504, when Barakat II secured the emirate of Mecca and had his brother Qa'it Bay appointed in his stead. There is no conclusive evidence to the effect that either Barakat II or his brother enjoyed the status of Na'ib al-Sultan in this year. In fact, there are clear indications to the contrary. In the latter part of 911/1505, for instance, Sultan Qansawh al-Ghawri deposed Yahya from the emirate of Yanbu' and appointed Sharif Hajjar b. Darraj instead.

¹See <u>supra</u>, pp.86-92,

Al-'Izz Ibn Fahd, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. I, <u>fols.</u> 227 and 250; Ibn Iyas, <u>Bada'i</u>, vol. III, p.377; see also: Jaziri, <u>op.cit.</u>, p.348; 'Isami, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. IV, p.301.

³. Al-'Izz Ibn Fahd, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. I, fol. 256, vol. II, fols. 2-4, 10-11 and 26; Ibn al-Dayba, <u>al-Fadl</u>, fol. 114a.

⁴ Işami, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. IV, p.289; <u>Tabari</u>, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. I, fol. 154. ⁵See <u>supra</u>, pp.**93-94**.

⁶Ibn Iyas, <u>Bada'i</u>, vol. IV, p.89.

There is nothing to suggest that this was done at the request of or in consultation with Sharif Barakat II, which should have been the case had the latter or his brother Qa'it Bay enjoyed the status of Na'ib al-Sultan. In Ramadan 914/February 1509, the Sultan had pardoned Sharif Yahya against a strong current of public opinion.¹ Yahya had recently led a movement of rebellion² and it is almost certain that, had Barakat's status equalled that of his father, he would have made every effrot to prevent Yabya from obtaining the Sultan's forgiveness. However, Yahya does not appear to have been granted the coveted emirate of Yanbu' as Sharif Hajjar remained Amir of Yanbu' until his death at the end of 916/February or March 1511. In Muharram 917/April 1511, Yahya, despite strenuous efforts on his part, was again overlooked in favour of <u>Sharif Ajwad.</u>³ The date is significant since Ajwad's appointment was made after Barakat II had finally acquired the status of Na'ib al-Sultan as it is from 916/1510 onwards that clear references to this effect appear in the sources.⁴ It was most probably Barakāt's opposition which deprived Yahya of his prize.

It was obviously because Barakāt II was <u>Nā'ib al-Sultān</u> that the Ottoman Sultan Selim I considered the homage paid to him by <u>Sharif</u> Abū Numayy II, Barakāt's son,⁵ sufficiently representative of all other Amirs in the region not to exact any other homage. Indeed, it seems that

1. Al-'Izz Ibn Fahd, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. II, fol. 157; Ibn Iyas, <u>Bada'i</u>, vol. IV, pp. 130 and 138.

²See <u>supra</u>, pp. 95-96.

²Ibn Iyas, Bada i, vol. IV, pp. 211 and 214.

⁴ Al-'Izz, Ibn Fahd, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. II, fols. 171, 178, 182-83, 198, 222, 258-60 and 262; Ibn Iyās, <u>Badā'i</u>, vol. IV, p.455; Ibn al-Dayha', <u>al-Fadl</u>, fol. 156b; see also: Janābi <u>op.cit.</u>, fol. 309a; 'Isāmi, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. IV, pp. 289, 305-6 and 317; Sinjāri, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. II, fols. 35 and 38-39; Dablān, <u>op.cit.</u>, pp. 49-50.

⁵See <u>supra</u>, pp. 98-99.

none was paid to the Sultan by the Amirs of Medina and Yanbu[•] after the incorporation of Hijāz into the Ottoman domain.

## C. <u>Relations of the Sharifs of Mecca with the rulers of</u> Egypt, ^cIraq and the Yemen.

In the pre-<u>Burji</u> period the rulers of 'Irāq and the Yemen competed with the <u>Mamlūk</u> Sultans of Egypt for the hegemony over <u>Haramayn</u> (Mecca and Medina) and other parts of the Hijāz. But the issue was finally settled in favour of the Egyptian Sultans. Though  $\infty$  casionally the <u>Sharifs</u> of Mecca and other principalities in the Hijāz adopted a more independent position, this was not tolerated by the <u>Mamlūk</u> Sultans who were determined to keep the reginn of Hijāz within their domain and under/control and reserve the prestige and other advantages for themselves.¹

The privileges reserved for and enjoyed by the <u>Mamlūk</u> Sultans in the Meccan region in particular and in otherparts of the Hijāz in general are well exemplified by the oath of allegiance taken by <u>Sharif Abū</u> Numayy I to the Egyptian Sultan Baybars in 667/1268 and more particularly to Sultan Qalawūn in 681/1282, which remained essentially the same for the successive <u>Sharifs</u> of Mecca. In that oath, <u>Sharif Abū</u> Numayy I acknowledged the sovereignty of the Egyptian Sultan and promised to continue observing the mention of hishame in the <u>Khutba</u> and on the <u>sikka</u> (i.e. coins), giving precedence to the Egyptian <u>Mahmal</u> and the flag, and using exclusively the <u>Kiswa</u> sent by the Egyptian Sultan to cover the Ka'ba.² Thereafter, the sovereignty of the Egyptian Sultan

¹B. Lewis, "Egypt and Syria", in <u>The Cambridge History of Islam</u>, vol. I, pp. 216-17 and 223.

² Ibn al-Furāt, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. VII, pp. 247-48; Fasi, <u>al-'Iqd</u>, vol. I, part I fols. 148b-49a and 150a; Maqrizi, <u>Sulūk</u>, (ed. M. Ziyada, Cairo, 1934-42), vol. I, part**1**II, pp. 706-707; AlNajm Ibn Fahd, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. II, fol. 33.

was recognized, on the whole, by the local Amirs and the Sultans or rulers of the neighbouring countries and remained uncontested throughout the <u>Burji</u> period.

The main reasons for the original rivalry between the Egyptian and other Sultans, in the pre-Burji period, were manifold, politicoeconomic interests of a general nature. But by far the strongest motive was the overwhelming desire of the contestants to enhance personal prestige by obtaining control of the Hijaz - the cuadle of Islam, which contained the two most sacred sanctuaries of Mecca and Medina and possessed in the Muslim world a unique religious significance - and becoming the guardian of the holy cities, as whoever obtained this status was bound to enjoy immense prestige. The Egyptian Sultans have regarded this a point of distinction and honour over all other Sultans.¹ These, or other rulers whose domain included the region of the Hijaz, boasted the title "Khadim al-Haramayn al-Sharifayn"² and enjoyed great prestige.³ The importance of this title and the respect enjoyed by its bearer throughout the Muslim world was and is still tremendous and this is not surprising. But what is of particular interest is that the non-Muslim rulers and princes, in the period under examination, were not unaware of its value. This is illustrated by an account to the effect that a Georgian prince, visited Sultan Barquq in 788/1386 and claimed that he saw a dream in which the Prophet Muhammad enjoined him to adopt Islam

Qalqashandi, Subh, vol. IV, pp. 57-58.

²This phrase means "the servant of the holy sanctuaries of Mecca and Medina". The use of the term 'servant' instead of 'ruler' is justified by the consideration of their sacredness.

³As: token references, see: Ibn Iyas, <u>Bada'i</u>, vol. V, p.203; Mara'i (or Mira'i) b. Yusuf Al-Hanbali, <u>Qala'id al-Uayan</u> (MS., E.E.No. 2340), fol. 50. The Ayyubid Saladin is reported to have been the first to bear this title. see: Et. Combe, J.Sauvaget and G.Wiet, <u>Repertoire</u> <u>Chronologique de l'epigraphie arabe</u> (Cairo, 1931), ix, no. 3464, inscription of 587/1191. See also: B. Lewis, "Egypt and Syria" in <u>The Cambridge History of Islam</u>, vol. I, pp. 216-17; Hasan al-Basha, <u>al-Algab al-Islamiyya</u> (Cairo, 1957), p.268.

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at the hands of <u>Khādim al-Haramayn</u>. The prince may have been telling the truth but he also may have been using this to gain Barqūq's favour, Whatever the case may have been, the Christian prince was well received, converted to Islām, and honourably treated during his stay in Cairo.¹

The possession of this title must have appeared as the most shining prize and most coveted of objectives to the Ottoman Sultan Selim I on his march against Qansawh al-Ghawri. Thus it is no wonder that Sultan Selim I cried with joy in public when, after the battle of Marj Dabiq, the <u>Khatib</u> of Aleppo Mosque mentioned hishame with this title in the <u>Khutba</u> and that the Sultan showed great favour to the <u>Khatib</u>.² Prior to his entry into Egypt and after the battle of Marj Dabiq, Sultan Selim I sent a letter to Sultan Tuman Eay inviting him to accept the status of an Ottoman deputy and offering him the rule of Egypt. The Ottoman Sultan has described himself as caliph, possessing a greater right than any other ruler to serve <u>al-Haramayn</u>. But the proud Tuman-Eay rejected both the Ottoman claim and offer.³ It was not long, however, until the name of Selim I,followed by this title, was mentioned in the <u>Khutba</u> throughout the Ottoman domains.⁴

The Sharifs of Mecca, subordinate as they were to the Egyptian Sultans, had no independent foreign policy of their own. The nature of their relations with non-Egyptian rulers was, of necessity, fully aligned with the conduct of foreign affairs of their Egyptian overlords.

¹ For the points mentioned and further details, see Maqrizi, <u>Suluk</u> , vol. III, fol. 105b; Ibn Hajar, <u>Inba</u> , vol. I, fol. 86b; Ibn Iyas, <u>Ugud</u> , vol. II, fol. 113a; idem, <u>Bada</u> i, vol. I, p.264.
² Tabari, <u>op.cit.</u> , vol. I, fols. 176-77. See also: Halil Inalcik, "Rise of the Ottoman Empire" in <u>The Cambridge History of Islam</u> , vol. I, p.320.
³ Ibn Iyas, <u>Bada'i</u> , vol. V, pp. 122-23.
4 Ibn Ivas, Bada [*] i ^c vol. V. pp.144-45: Nahrawali, al-T'lam.

pp. 278-79; Al-Bakari, <u>op.cit.</u>, fol. 38.

The <u>Sharifs</u> were nevertheless the immediate rulers of the area. Their names were mentioned and prayers were said for them in the <u>Khutba</u> immediately after the Egyptian Sultan and, as such, the <u>Sharifs</u> enjoyed considerable prestige among the Muslim rulers. Though the authority of the <u>Sharifs</u> in the area was rather limited they could bestow minor privileges on other Muslim rulers on condition that the dominant rights of the Egyptian Sultans were not affected. It was the implied objective of the frequent gifts sent to the <u>Sharifs</u> of Mecca by the Muslim rulers to propitiate them and obtain their co-operation <u>permission</u> and/for certain charitable undertakings and pious works in Mecca. Likewise, the maintenance of friendly relations with these <u>Sharifs</u> was not only a matter of prestige but the best way for these rulers to secure fair treatment of their merchants and pilgrims.

The non-Egyptian rulers generally accepted without demur that they could not challenge the authority of the Egyptian Sultans in the Hijáz. They were more than satisfied with some minor and purely ceremonial privileges such as the permission to send their <u>Mahmal</u> and being prayed for in the sanctuary and so on. Even if granted, such concessions never put any other ruler on an equal footing with the Egyptian Sultans. Come what may, the Egyptian <u>Mahmal</u> had always to be in the leading position; The Syrian <u>Mahmal</u> came second, then those sent by other Egyptian domains and only at the very end the <u>Mahmals</u> sent by the other rulers. Likewise, the prayers in the <u>Khutba</u> were said first for the Egyptian Sultan, then for the <u>Sharif</u> of Mecca and only in the last place for any other ruler. This sequence was always observed, and will be taken for granted in the following discussion, whenever reference is made to the presence of the Irāqī or the Yemeni Mahmal or of prayers being said for a non-Egyptian ruler.

If and when an attempt was made to alter this order, the offender was brought to account.

#### The Sharifs of Mecca and the Iraqi rulers

On the eve and in the early part of the <u>Burji</u> period the tripartite relations between the Egyptian Sultans, the <u>Sharifs</u> of Mecca, and the Trāqī rulers were amicable. That is why the Trāqī rulers were granted, as will be seen minor privileges in Mecaa. But before we examine these in some detail, it is essential to mention briefly the 'Irāqī rulers, or rather the dynasties within the <u>Burjī</u> period. It is neither intended nor is it required and possible to give a detailed account of all these rulers. Therefore, the following is a mere hint of the successive dynasties and at the end of the passage a number of sources are given for further details.

The Il-Khanid¹ empire in 'Irāq and its adjoining areas - once a serious rival of the <u>Mamluk</u> Sultans - had disintegrated following the death of Bū Said (or Abū Said) in 737/1336 without heirs. Among the successor-dynasties were the Jalāyirid of Baghdād. The most important of these, for the present discussion, were Uways b. Hasan (d. 776/1374) and his two sons, Husayn (d.783/1381) and Ahmad (d. 813/1410). The latter was ousted, for a short period, from Baghdād by Timūr² but

^CProperly Temur, the Turkish word for 'iron'. He was crippled, probably by a war wound, and is known to history as Timur-i-Lang (Timur the Lame). The europeanized form of the name is Tamerlane. See B.Spuler, "The disintegration of the Caliphate in the east", in <u>The Cambridge</u> <u>History of Islam</u>, vol. I, p.170.

¹ Îl-Khans (i.e. 'viceroys'), a title given to the successors of Hülegü (d. 663/1265). See B. Spuler, "The disintegration of the Caliphate in the east", in <u>The Cambridge History of Islam</u>, vol. I, p.165.

regained its control shortly after the death of Timūr in 807/1404 and remained its ruler until his death. Ahmad was killed during a clash with Qara Yūsuf, a ruler of the Turcomans of the 'Black sheep' (Qara Qoyunlo), and Baghdād fell to the latter. Qara Qoyunlu remained in control until 872/1467-68 when Baghdād passed to 'White sheep' (Aq Qoyunlu). After the death of Uzūn Hasan (Hasan al-Tawīl, the 'tall Hasan') in 883/1478 his empire was divided up among several of his sons. But Baghdād, after a period of occupation by the Safawid in 914/1507-8, remained under the control of Aq Qoyunlu until 921/1515.¹

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None of the above-mentioned dynasties formed a threat to the Egyptian hegemony over the Hijāz. It was due to this that the Irāqī pilgrim caravan and <u>Mahmal</u> were, on the whole, fairly treated in Mecca. Once or twice the rulers of Aq Qoyunlu, especially Uzūn Hasan, tried to challenge the dominant position and exclusive privileges of the <u>Mamlük</u> Sultans but his <u>Amir al-Hajj</u> and other dignitaries were to suffer arrest and humiliation.

But these 'Iraqi rulers, particularly on the eve and in the early part of the <u>Burji</u> period, were on friendly terms with the Egyptian Sultans

¹For the points mentioned and further details, see: Fasi, <u>al-'Iqd</u>, vol. I, part I, fols. 63b and 97a; Maqrizi, <u>Suluk</u>, vol. III, fols. 93a and 114a; Ibn Hajar, <u>Inbas</u>, vol. I, fols. 18b-19a, 66b, 72a, 86a, 123b-24b, 171b-72a and 216b, vol. II, fols. 14a-14b; idem, <u>al-Durar</u>, vol. I, p.501; Ibn Taghri Birdi, <u>al-Manhal</u>, vol. I, fols. 294a and 296a; idem, <u>Hawadith</u>, vol. T, fol. 204, part II (ed. W. Popper), pp. 283, 292, 305-6 and 345, part III (ed. W. Popper), pp. 494, 505-6, 523-24, 546, 591-93 and 662-63; Al-Najm Ibn Fahd, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. II, fols. 147, 204 and 262-63; Sakhāwi, <u>al-Daw</u>, vol.III, p.80; idem, al-Dhayl, fol. 72a; idem, <u>al-Dhayl</u> (ed. A.Al-Hassu), pp. 215 and 226; Al-Tzz Ibn Fahd, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. II, fols. 15, 99 and 113, vol. II, fol. 157; Ibn Iyas, <u>Bada</u>'i, vol. III, p.145; idem, <u>Bada</u>'i (U.P.), pp. 48-49; Ibn al-Imād, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. VI, pp. 241-42, vol. VII, p.2; B. Lewis, "Egypt and Syria", in <u>The Cambridge History of Islam</u>, vol. I, pp. 167- and 171-72; B. Spuler and R.Ettinghausen, <u>E.12</u>, art. "Tikhāns", pp. 1120-27; J.M.Smith, JR., <u>E.1.2</u>, art. "Djalāyir, <u>Djalāyirid</u>", pp. 401-2; V.Minorsky, <u>E.1.</u>¹, art. "Uwais I (Sultan Uwais)," pp. 1061-62; idem, <u>E.1.2</u>, art. "Ak Koyunlu", pp. 311-12; A.A.Al-Duri, <u>E.1.2</u>, art. "Baghdād", pp. 894-908; M.Miquel and others, <u>E.1.2</u>, art. "Irāk", pp. 1250-68.

as well as with the Sharifs of Mecca and were granted minor privileges in Mecca. Thus, for instance, Uways b. Hasan Buzurg (d. 776/ 1374), the Jalayirid ruler of Baghdad, Tabriz, and other places, is reported to have sent four large chandeliers, two silver and two gold ones, to Mecca, which were used, for a short period, in the Ka ba but were then removed to some other place.¹ Uways also sent valuable gifts to the <u>Sharif</u> of Mecca, 'Ajlan b. Rumaytha (d. 777/ 1375) and his son Ahmad (d. 788/1386). A Meccan <u>Qadi</u> and <u>Khatib</u>, on the instructions of these two <u>Sharifs</u>, said the prayer in the <u>Khutba</u> for 2 Sultan Uways, but this arrangement was not permanent.

Uways' son Ahmad was also on the best of terms with the Egyptian Sultan Barquq to whom he sent gifts in 785/1383, repeating this friendly gesture later.³ It was Sultan Ahmad who in 788/1386, following a clash between him and Timur, warned Sultan Barquq against certain movements of Timur's troops near the Egyptian frontier.⁴ In 795/ 1392-93, Sultan Ahmad took refuge in Cairo, following the fall of Baghdad to Timur.⁵ The latter sent an envoy to Barquq to demand Ahmad's return but the Egyptian Sultan responded by putting Timur's envoy to death.⁶

Fasi, Shifa', vol. II, p.250; idem, <u>al-'Iqd</u>, vol. I, part I, fols. 18b and 63a.
²Fasi, Shifa', vol. II, p.250; idem, <u>al-'Iqd</u>, vol.I, part I, fols. 63a and 97a; Ibn Hajar, <u>Inba'</u>, vol. I, fols. 18b-19a. See also: Ibn al-'Imād, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. VI, pp. 241-42.
³Maqrīzi, <u>Sulūk</u>, fols. 93a and 105b.
⁴ Ibn Hajar, <u>Inba'</u>, vol. I, fol. 86a; Ibn Iyās, <u>Badā'i</u>, vol. I, fols. 264-65; idem, <u>'Uqūd</u>, vol. II, fol. 113b.
⁵Maqrīzi, <u>Sulūk</u>, vol. III, fol. 159b; Ibn Hajar, <u>Inba'</u>, vol. I, fols. 123b-24b; Ibn Iyās, <u>Badā'i</u>, vol. I, pp. 299-300; B.Lewis, "Egypt and Syria" in <u>The Cambridge history of Islam</u>, vol.I, p.401.
⁶B. Lewis, "Egypt and Syria", in <u>The Cambridge History of Islam</u>,

vol. I, p.220.

These facts sufficiently exemplify the friendliness of their relations. But whether Ahmad was ever prayed for, as his father had been, in the <u>Khutba</u> cannot be borne out by evidence from the sources.

The relations between the <u>Mamlūk</u> Sultans and the Timurid ruler were generally unfriendly and the former, together with the <u>Sharif</u> of Mecca, felt somewhat uneasy on the occupation of Baghdād by Timūr. But this must not be interpreted as complete lack of communication between them. In 807/1404, for instance, the <u>Sharif</u> of Mecca sent an envoy to Irāq, probably to the Timūrids, in an attempt to secure a financial grant but the mission met with failure.¹

In the pilgrimage season of the same year a rumour spread in Mecca, following the arrival of Trāqī pilgrims with their <u>Mahmal</u> sent by a Timūrid prince, that the latter was on his way to Mecca with a strong force. The <u>Sharif</u> was apprehensive, the more so as some Trāqī had measured the walls of the Ka'ba and reportedly said that it was intended to be used for sending a <u>Kiswa</u> for the Ka'ba in the following year. The <u>Sharif</u> had sent the news by a dispatch to Cairo but this was eventually proved incorrect.²

### Shah-Rukh and Kiswat al-Ka ba

Timur had died in Shawwal 807/May 1405,³ and among his successors the most able ruler was <u>Shah-Rukh</u> (d. 851/1447) who gained power in 809/1407 in Samarqand, Bukhara, and in the greater part of Persia.⁴

³. Fasi, <u>Shifa</u>, vol. II, p.251; idem, <u>al-'Iqd</u>, vol. I, part I, fol. 63b. ⁴B. Spuler, "The disintegration of the Caliphate in the east", in <u>The</u> <u>Cambridge history of Islam</u>, vol. I, p.171.

lot. Fasi, al-'Iqd, vol. II, part IV, fol. 356a; Al-Najm Ibn Fahd, op.cit., vol.II, fol. 134.

²( . Fasi, Shifa', vol. II, p.251; idem, <u>al-'Iqd</u>, vol. I, part I, fol. 63b; Maqrizi, <u>Suluk</u>, vol. III, fol. 252a; Ibn Taghri Birdi, <u>al-Nujum</u>, vol. XII, p.322; Al-Najm Ibn Fahd, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. II, fds. 134-35; see also: Jaziri, <u>op.cit.</u>, p.315.

The rumour concerning the intention of a Timurid prince to send a <u>Kiswa</u> for the Ka'ba, as mentioned above, may not have proved, at the time, correct but it is possible that the Timurid prince referred to there was <u>Shah-Rukh</u>. He was the only Timurid and in fact the only non-Egyptian ruler, during the <u>Burji</u> period, who was granted the privilege of sending a <u>Kiswa</u> for the Ka'ba.

Initially, relations between Shah-Rukh and the Sharif of Mecca and the Egyptian Sultan had been normal, which is confirmed by the fact that Sharif Hasan sent an envoy to Shāh-Rukh with giffs in 823/ 1420. Prior to 830/1426-27, two sons of Sharif Hasan, Ahmad and 'Ali, visited a Timurid prince, possibly Shah-Rukh, and received valuable gifts.² A Meccan Qadi frequently visited Shah-Rukh and received a considerable amount of money and other valuables as a gift.³ Similarly, relations between Shah-Rukh and the Egyptian Sultans appear to have been friendly up to the early years of Sultan Barsbay's rule. In or around 828/1424-25, Shäh-Rukh seems to have sought, for the first time, the permission of Barsbay to send a Kiswa for the Ka ba to fulfil an oath, but he was politely denied the favour. 4 In the period between 833-39/1429-35, several envoys were sent to Cairo, most of them to secure the desired permission, but in vain. Consequently, their relations deteriorated and Shah-Rukh began criticizing Barsbay's conduct, particularly for participating in commercial transactions and taking taxes from the merchants in J£dda and Mecca.²

¹Fasi, <u>al-'Iqd</u>, vol. I, part II, fol. 416b.

² Maqrizi, <u>Suluk</u>, vol. II, fol. 349; Ibn Hajar, <u>Inba</u>, vol. II, fol. 90b; Al-Najm Ibn Fahd, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol.II, fol. 199.

³See <u>infra</u>, pp. 258-59.

⁴Ibn Hajar, <u>Inba</u>, vol. II, fol. 80a.

⁵For the relevant details, see Maqrizi, <u>Suluk</u>, vol. II, fols. 361, 375, 383-84, 387 and 433; Ibn Hajar, <u>Inba</u>, vol. II, fols. 101b, 126a-b, 131a, 134b-35a and 136b; Ibn Taghri Birdi, <u>al-Nujum</u>, vol. VII, fols. 17-18, 20 and 121-22; idem, <u>al-Manhal</u>, vol. I, fols. 373b-74a; Al-Najm Ibn Fahd, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. II, fol. 230.

According to Halil Inalcik, the request of <u>Shāh-Rukh</u> was rejected "on the ground that it was tantamount to a claim to overlordship".¹ This may be a slight exaggeration as <u>Shāh-Rukh</u> repeatedly requested but never tried to take or send the <u>Kiswa</u> direct to Mecca. <u>Shāh-Rukh</u> may genuinely have taken the oath and was simply seeking the permission to fulfil it but, on the other hand, and equally likely, was his political ambition. What seems to be more convincing is the following analysis by B. Lewis:

"... Shah-Rukh, while avoiding open conflict, carried on the old feud against the Mamluk Sultanate by indirect means - through his Turcoman allies in the north, and by seeking to gain influence in Arabia. This is no doubt the meaning of the request to the Sultan in Cairo for permission to provide a veil (Kiswa) to cover the Ka'ba, 'if only for one day'. The request was refused, on the grounds that the privilege of providing the Kiswa belonged by ancient custom to the rulers of Egypt, who had established great waqfs for this purpose. Barsbay had good reason for not wishing to grant his rival a foothold, however tenuous, in the Hijaz."2

This was bound to increase the existing tension between Barsbay and <u>Shah-Rukh</u>. In Rajab 839/February or March 1436, an insulting letter from <u>Shah-Rukh</u> reached Barsbay in which he was described as the deputy of <u>Shah-Rukh</u> and was ordered to wear a robe and a crown, sent with the envoy, and to mention the name of <u>Shah-Rukh</u> in the <u>Khutba</u> and to strike it on the <u>sikka</u> in acknowledgement of the sovereignty of <u>Shah-</u> Rukh. This outrageous epistle incensed Barsbay. He wreaked his wrath upon the envoys who were humiliated, thrown into a pool and almost beaten to death. The robe was torm to pieces and Sultan Barsbay uttered several insulting remarks about <u>Shah-Rukh</u>. Barsbay's reply was scornful and he challenged <u>Shah-Rukh</u> to meet him in combat. <u>Shah-Rukh</u> was so awe-struck that he did not dare to raise the issue of the <u>Kiswa</u> again while Barsbay's rule lasted.³

¹"Rise of the Ottoman empire" in <u>The Cambridge Mistory of Islam</u>, vol. I, fol. 321.
 ²B.Lewis, "Egypt and Syria" in <u>The Cambridge Mistory of Islam</u>, vol. I, p. 223.
 See also: G.Wiet, <u>E.I.</u>², art. "Barsbay", p.1054.
 ³Maqrizi, <u>Suluk</u>, vol. II, fols. 391-92; Ibn Hajar, <u>Inba</u>, vol. II, fols.

It is therefore no wonder that the accession of Sultan Jaqmaq early in 842/1438 was considered by <u>Shan-Rukh</u> an event worth celebrating. Between 843-48/1439-44, friendly letters, envoys and gifts were repeatedly exchanged and <u>Shan-Rukh</u> reiterated his request to be allowed to send a <u>Kiswa</u> for the Ka ba to fulfil his old oath. This was finally granted on condition that the <u>Kiswa</u> was sent to Cairo, and was to be used only for the interior of the Ka ba. <u>Shah-Rukh</u> naturally agreed but when his <u>Kiswa</u> reached airo in 848/1444 and the news spread there it provoked such a violent re-action on the part of the local population that they attacked, humiliated and plundered the envoys of <u>Shah-Rukh</u>. After harsh measures to quell the riots the <u>Kiswa</u> was sent to Mecca with the Egyptian pilgrim caravan and was used for the interior of the Ka ba.¹

In Ramadan 856/October 1452 the <u>Kiswa</u> of <u>Shah-Rukh</u>, together with that of <u>Barsbay</u>, were removed and only the <u>Kiswa</u> of Jaqmaq was retained.² <u>Shah-Rukh</u> was the only non-Egyptian ruler during the <u>Burji</u> period whose <u>Kiswa</u> was used for the Ka'ba. But this was done in agreement with the Egyptian Sultan and not in defiance of the latter's exclusive privilege.

fols. 135a-b; Ibn Taghri Birdi, <u>al-Nujum</u>, vol. VII, fols. 26-27; idem, <u>al-Manhal</u>, vol. I, fols. 373b-74a; Sa<u>khawi</u>, <u>al-Daw</u>, vol. III, p.297.

Maqrizi, Sulūk, vol. II, fol. 438; Ibn Hajar, Inbā', vol.II, fols. 163a and 167a; Ibn Taghri Birdi, <u>al-Nujūm</u>, vol. VII, fols. 121-23 and 131-32; idem, <u>al-Manhal</u>, vol. I, fols. 374a-b; idem, Hawadith, vol. I, fols. 6, 14, 25 and 33-35; Sakhawi, <u>al-Dhayl</u>, fols. 107a and 111b-12a; idem, <u>al-Dhayl</u> (ed. A.Al-Hassu), p.15. idem, <u>al-Daw'</u>, vol. III, pp. 297-98; idem, <u>al-Tibr</u>, pp. 17, 45, 67 and 96-98; Al-Najm Ibn Fahd, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. II, fol. 257; see also: Nahrawali, <u>al-I lam</u>, p.217; Sinjāri, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. II, fol. 6; Tabari, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. I, fol. 105; M.Sobernheim, E.I.², art. "Čakmak", p.6.

². Al-Najm Ibn Fahd, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. II, fols. 275-76; Sakhawi, al-Dhayl (ed. A.Al-Hassu), p.60; idem, <u>al-Tibr</u>, p.391. See <u>also</u>: Jaziri, <u>op.cit.</u>, p. 332; Nahrawali, <u>al-I lam</u>, p.219; Sinjari, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. II, fol. 8; Tabari, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. I, fol. 107.

There was, as a rule, no restriction on the entry of Iragi pilgrims or their Mahmal to Mecca, provided their behaviour was correct and that they infringed in no way upon the exclusive prerogatives of the Egyptian Sultans. Obviously the pilgrims from any other areas were not barred from Mecca in normal circumstances. But whether or not any Mahmal sent by a Timurid prince, apart from those who were in control of Baghdad early in the 9th/15th century, was allowed in Mecca is uncertain. There is regular mention in the sources of the sporadic arrivals in Mecca of the Iraqi pilgrim caravan, usually after prolonged and frequently occurring absence, with or without their Mahmal. Though the sources seldom mention the name of the ruler who sent the Mahmal and simply ascribe the Mahmal as having been "Iraqi" there can be little doubt that it was sent by the Jalayirid and the rulers The 'Iraqi of the Turcoman dynasties of Qara Qoyunlu and Aq Qoyunlu. pilgrim caravans and their Mahmal were, on the whole, fairly treated and their arrival was usually looked upon favourably by the local population, apparently because of the expected distribution of charities. Even the sources take notice of their absence and usually mention the reason for their delay or absence. This reflects that the Iraqi pilgrims and their Mahmal were not only expected and accepted but also, at least occasionally, awaited in Mecca.¹

Relations between the Qara Qoyunlu dynasty, the ruler of Baghdad, and the <u>Mamluk</u> Sultan of Egypt were, on the whole, friendly. In 861/1456-57,

L For the relevant details, see Ibn al-Furat, op.cit., vol. IX, part II, pp. 312-13 and 350; Fasi, Shifa', vol. II, pp. 250-51, 254 and 257; idem, al- Iqd, vol. I, part I, fols. 63a-b; Maqrizi, Suluk, vol. II, fols. 298, 306, 318 and 334; vol. III, fols. 98a, 160a and 252a; Ibn Hajar, Inba', vol. I, fols. 76b and 225a; vol. II, fols. 90b and 95a; Ibn Taghri-Birdi, Hawadith, vol. I, fols. 282 and 366-67, part II (ed. W.Popper), pp. 305-6, part III, p.546 and 549; Al-Najm Ibn Fahd, op.cit., vol. II, fols. 103, 119, 121, 131, 135, 137, 147, 156, 160, 163, 166, 171, 174, 178, 204, 262-63, 270 and 316; Sakhawi, al-Dhayl fol. 69a; idem, al-Dhayl (ed. A.Al-Hassu), pp. 164, 386 and 467; idem, al-Daw', vol. IIT, p.50; Ibn Iyas, Bada'i; vol. II, p.54; idem, Bada'i (U.P.), pp. 17, 35 and 48-49. See also: Jaziri, op.cit., pp. 313, 315, 317-21, 325, 330-31, 335-36, 343 and 590.

a ruler of the former dynasty is reported to have sent an envoy with gifts for the Egyptian Sultan.¹ The matter may have reciprocated and there may have been other similar exchanges. However, relations between the Egyptian Sultan and the last Qara Qoyunlu ruler, Jahan Shäh, does not appear to have been friendly. In Rabi'II or Jumädä I 872/ December 1467 or January 1468, when Jahan Shah was killed during a clash with Uzun Hasan, the latter sent the former's head to Cairo where it/hung for several days.² This would hardly have been allowed by the Egyptian Sultan if Jahan Shah had been on friendly terms with the Sultan in Cairo. In 872/1467-68 Baghdad passed to Aq Qoyunlu and mitially their pilgrim caravan and Mahmal were also treated fairly in Mecca and no hostility against them is reported. But in 876/1471 the Amir al-Hajj of the Iraqi pilgrim caravan tried to secure a leading position in the procession for the Mahmal sent by Uzun Hasan and suffered personal humiliation and the Iraqi Mahmal was pushed back to the rear.³

In the following year, the Iraqi <u>Amir al-Hajj</u> made a deliberate attack on the exclusive privileges of the Egyptian Sultan by forcing the <u>Khatib</u> in Medina to say prayers for Uzun Hasan in the <u>Khutba</u>. The 'Iraqi <u>Amir al-Hajj</u>, according to Ibn Iyas, compelled the <u>Khatib</u> to use the title <u>Khadim al-Haramayn al-Sharifayn</u> as well for Uzun Hasan. The officials and inhabitants in Medina sent the news to Mecca with the warning that the 'Iraqis intended to repeat this performance in Mecca. The <u>Sharif</u> and <u>Bash al-Mamalik</u> of Mecca awaited the 'Iraqi caravan with a strong force in the outskirts of Mecca. Their <u>Amir al-</u>

¹Ibn Iyas, <u>Bada'i</u>, vol. II, p.60.
 ²Ibn Taghri Birdi, <u>Hawadith</u> (ed. W.Popper), part III, pp. 662-63.
 ³Al-Najm Ibn Fahd, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. II, fol. 335. See also: Jaziri, <u>op.cit.</u>, p.337.

Hajj and Wadi were arrested and, though they were first allowed to perform the pilgrimage under custody, were taken to Cairo together with their <u>Mahmal</u> and imprisoned there. The ordinary pilgrims, however, were not harassed and were allowed to perform pilgrimage and depart.¹ In Rabi II 878/October 1473 these Iraqi captives were released as a conciliatory gesture to Hasan al-Tawil (Uzun Hasan).²

But the attitude of the Amirs of Mecca and Medina appears, as a result of this incident, to have become rather hostile to the 'Irāqī. Consequently, the 'Irāqī ruler asked the Egyptian Sultan in Muḥarram 879/May 1474, to instruct the Sharifs of Mecca and Medina to treat his pilgrims fairly.³ Whatever the response of the Egyptian Sultan, the treatment meted out to the 'Irāqī for a further several years, as will be seen, remained rather unfriendly, if not harsh. It is possible that this was in accord with the instructions of Sultan Qā'it Bāy, who does not seem to have forgotten the incident and was still resentful. Probably the support given by the governor of Aleppo in Rabi' II 880/ September 1475 to Muḥammad, a disloyal son of Uzūn Ḥasan,⁴ was with the approval of Sultan Qā'it Bāy.

In 880 or 881/1475 or 1476, the Iraqi <u>Mahmal</u> was barred from Mecca and other places of pilgrimage but were eventually, after a good deal of effort and, according to Al-Najm Ibn Fahd followed by Jaziri, in return for money paid to the Egyptian <u>Amir al-Hajj</u> and the <u>Bash al-</u> <u>Mamalik</u>, allowed to enter.⁵ In the pilgrimage season of 886/January 1482,

¹. Al-Najm Ibn Fahd, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. II, fols. 338 and 344; Sakhāwi, al-Dhayl (ed. A.Al-Hassu), p.215; Ibn Iyās, <u>Badā'i</u>, vol. III, pp. <del>84</del> and 86. See also: Jazīri, <u>op.cit.</u>, p.337; Janābi, <u>op.cit.</u>, fol. 307b; 'Isāmi, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. IV, pp. 276-77; Sinjāri, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. II, fol. 12.
²Ibn Iyās, <u>Badā'i</u>, vol. III, p.87.
³Al-Najm Ibn Fahd, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. II, fol. 347; Sakhāwi, <u>al-Dhayl</u> (ed. A.Al-Hassu), p.226.
⁴Ibn Iyās, <u>Badā'i</u>, vol. III, p.105.

² ... Al-Najm Ibn Fahd, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. II, fols. 352 and 356-57. See also:

the 'Irāqī <u>Mahmal</u> was again denied access to Mecca and the 'Irāqī <u>Amir al-Hajj</u> was arrested and sent in captivity, together with the <u>Mahmal</u>, to Cairo.¹ In Rabi' II 887/June 1482, Sultan Qā'it Bāy sent a letter to <u>Sharif Muhammad</u> b. Barakāt I and thanked him for his loyal attitude and his action against the 'Irāqī <u>Amir al-Hajj</u>.² In Ramadān 887/November 1482, the Sultan urged the <u>Sharif</u> to remain on guard against a possible 'Irāqī pilgrim caravan whose Amir was reportedly instructed to use an 'Irāqī <u>Kiswa</u> for the Ka'ba.³ This appears to have been a mere rumour, as no such action is reprted. This is further supported by the fact that the Egyptian Sultan released the above mentioned 'Irāqī <u>Amir</u> al-Hajj at the end of 887/January or February 1483.⁴

In the closing years of the <u>Burji</u> period, especially from 892/ 1487 ohwards, the treatment of the Iraqi pilgrims and their <u>Mahmal</u> in Mecca improved as a result of better relations between Cairo and Baghdad. Even the <u>Sharif</u> occasionally gave the Iraqi <u>Amir al-Hajj</u> reception on the outskirts of Mecca.⁵

#### The Sharifs of Mecca and the Yemenite Sultans

As already stated, the <u>Sharifs</u> of Mecca had no independent foreign policy and were and had to be in line with that followed by their Egyptian overlords. The latter were, on the whole, on friendly

Jazīri, <u>op.cit.</u>, p.338; 'Işāmi, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. IV, p.277; Sinjāri, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. II, fols. 12-13.
¹Sakhāwi, <u>al-Dhayl</u> (ed. A.Al-Hassu), p.282; al-'Izz Ibn Fahd, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. I, fol. 15. See also: Jaziri, <u>op.cit.</u>, p.341.
²Al-'Izz Ibn Fahd, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. I, fol. 18.
³Al-'Izz Ibn Fahd, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. I, fol. 25.
⁴Ibn Iyās, <u>Badā'i</u>, vol. III,p.186.
⁵Sakhāwi, al-Dhayl (ed. A.Al-Hassu),pp.364, 467, 526, 547 and 573;

Sakhawi, al-Dhayi (ed. A.Al-Hassu), pp.364, 467, 526, 547 and 573; idem, <u>al-Daw</u>, vol. III, pp. 56-57; Al- Izz Ibn Fahd, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. I, fols. 89-90, 99, 113, 124-25, 151 and 198; Ibn Iyas, <u>Bada</u>i, vol. III, p.466, vol. IV, pp. 7 and 145; idem, <u>Bada</u>i (U.P.), pp. 48-49.

terms with the Yemenite Sultans and had granted them some minor privileges. Therefore, the Sharifs of Mecca had to carry out the directives of the Egyptian Sultan.

The Yemenite Sultans unlike the Jalayirid of Baghdad and those who followed them, were once a serious rival to the Egyptian Sultan. There can be little doubt that the grant of minor privileges to them was not on a conciliatory basis but for commercial and other financial considerations. This is supported by the fact, as will be seen, that the Rasulid Sultans of the Yemen lost these privileges shortly after the desertion of Aden by the Indian merchants. On the eve and in the early part of the Burji period the Yemenite Sultans enjoyed the privilege of having their names mentioned and prayers said for them in the Khutba. They were also entitled to send their Mahmal and flag to Mecca and other places connected with the pilgrimage ceremony. It was, on the whole, fairly treated but was sometimes slighted. This occurred only when the Yemenite Amir al-Hajj tried to infringe the exclusive privileges of the Egyptian Sultan or the Yemenite Mahmal reached Mecca after a long suspension. In the pilgrimage season of 780 or 781/March 1379 or 1380, for instance, the Yemenite Sultan had, after a long period of suspension, sent his flag, his Mahmal, and, according to Maqrizi, Ibn Hajar and Al-Najm Ibn Fahd, his own Kiswa for the Ka'ba as well. Not only the arrival of the Yemenite Mahmal was unexpected but the presence of the Kiswa in particular infuriated the Egyptian Amir al-Hajj. He refused to allow the Mahmal and even individual Yemenite pilgrims to enter Mecca. Eventually, on the intervention of Sharif Ahmad b. 'Ajlan, the Yemenite pilgrims were allowed, with their Mahmal, to perform their pilgrimage unmolested. Permission to use the Kiswa was out of the question and the Yemenite apparently

had to take it back. 1 Some other sources mention the arrival of the Yemenite Mahmal and flag in the pilgrimage season of 781/March 1380 but without reporting any opposition on the part of the Egyptian of the Amir al-Hajj. Nor is the subsequent intervention /Sharif referred to.2 According to Ibn Wahhas, the Yemenite Amir al-Hajj was imprisoned for a few months on his return to the Yemen in Safar 782/June 1380.² Whether or not this was connected with some incident during the pilgrimage is not certain. According to Al-Najm Ibn Fahd, followed by Jaziri, the Yemenite Sultan, following the above stated incident of 780 or 781/1379 or 1380, desisted from sending the Mahmal until 800/ 1397-98.4 However, a report of Ibn Hajar entered under 784/1382-83 differs from the above. It indicates that the Yemenite Mahmal reached Mecca in the pilgrimage season of either 784/February or March 1383 or a year before. But the Mahmal was either not allowed to enter Mecca or roughly treated. In consequence of this relations between the Yemenite Sultan and the Sharif of Mecca deteriorated and the former imposed an embargo on Mecca and Jtdda.⁵ It is this embargo that may have been partly responsible for the absence of the Yemenites in the pilgrimage ceremony of 785/January 1384.⁶ Thus it is highly probable that, in the closing years of the eighth century of the Hijra/fourteenth century of the Christian era, the Yemenite Mahmal was suspended; what

¹ Fasi, Shifa', vol. II, p.250; idem, <u>al-'Iqd</u>, vol. I, part I, fol. 63a; Maqrizi, <u>Suluk</u>, vol. III, fol. 66b; Ibn Hajar, <u>Inba'</u>, vol. I, fol. 45b; Al-Najm Ibn Fahd, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. II, fols. 100-101; see also: Jaziri, <u>op.cit.</u>, p.312.

². , Ibn Wahhās, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. II, p.154; <u>Khazrajī</u>, <u>op.cit.</u>, fol. 424; Ibn al-Dayba^{*}, <u>Qurra</u>, fol. 168. See also: Janābī, <u>op.cit.</u>, fol. 313b.
³Ibn Wahhās, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. II, pp. 170-71.
⁴Al-Najm Ibn Fahd, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. II, fol. 101. See also: Jazīrī, <u>op.cit.</u>, pp. 312-13.

⁵Ibn Hajar, <u>Inba</u>, vol. I, fols. 71b-72a.

^{6 ^} Maqrizi, <u>Sulük</u>, vol.III, fol. 98a; Al-Najm Ibn Fahd, <u>op.cit</u>., vol. II, fol. 103.

is doubtful is when this was done. Despite the suspension of the Mahmal, the Yemenite Sultan continued to send his flag during these years as a symbol of Yemenite participation in the ceremony of pilgrimage.¹ This substitution of the flag for the <u>Mahmal</u> may have originated in the prevention of the Yemenite Mahmal from entering Mecca. This can be inferred from the fact that, in 798/1395-96, the Yemenite Sultan requested the Egyptian Sultan's permission to send the Mahmal to Mecca every year.² This appears to have been granted as, in 800/ 1397, Sharif Muhammad b. 'Ajlan, a brother of the ruling Amir of Mecca, Sharif Ahmad, visited the Yemenite ruler; he was cordially received and given valuable gifts. He accompanied, on his return journey to Mecca, the Yemenite pilgrims and Mahmal, which does not seem to have met with any opposition. The same Sharif went to the Yemen in the following year, no doubt with the intention of rendering the Yemenites the same service, but the Sultan there decided, for an unknown reason, to refrain from sending a Mahmal that year.³ Whether the Yemenite Mahmal was sent in the following years is not clear, but it is safe to assume that the custom was resumed. The more so, as the prayers said for the Yemenite Sultan were continued at least, as will be seen, until early in Jumādā I 827/May 1424.

¹ Ibn Wahhās, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. II, pp. 211-12; Fāsī, <u>al-'Iqd</u>, vol. I, part I, fols. 221a-b; <u>Kh</u>azrajī, <u>op.cit.</u>, fol. 445; Sa<u>khāwī</u>, <u>al-Tubfa</u>, vol. I, fol. 841.

²Qalqa<u>sh</u>andi, <u>Subh</u>, vol. VIII, p.75.

³ Ibn Wahhās, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. II, p.298; Fāsi, <u>Shifa</u>, vol. II, p.251; idem, <u>al-'Iqd</u>, vol. I, part I, fols. 63a and 190b, part II, fols. 401a-b; Ibn Hajar, <u>Inba</u>, vol. I, fol. 176b; <u>Khazraji</u>, <u>op.cit.</u>, fols. 479-80; Ibn Taghri Birdi, <u>al-Manhal</u>, vol. II, fols. 324a; Al-Najm Ibn Fahd, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. II, fols. 124-25; Sakhāwi, <u>al-Daw</u>, vol. VIII, pp. 150-51. See also: Jaziri, <u>op.cit.</u>, p.316.

Prayers for the Yemenite Sultan in the Meccan sanctuary used to be said on the eve and in the early part of the Burji period. According to Fasi, a Meccan Qadi and Khatib (d. 786/1384) said prayers in the Khutba for the Yemenite Sultan, and performed certain other religious services on his behalf. He did so, no doubt, with the approval of the Sultan in Cairo and the Sharif of Mecca. The Qadi was very generously rewarded for his services with favours and substantial amounts of money, which in some years amounted to 27,000 dirhams.¹ The prayers for the Yemenite Sultan continued to be said until 801/1398, when they were suspended following the objection on the part of an Egyptian Amir.² The practice was resumed some time later but was suspended again in Rabi^c II 804/December 1401 by an Egyptian Amir named Baysaq acting as the deputy of Sharif Hasan during the absence of the latter from Mecca in a campaign. But it was resumed shortly after the return of Sharif Hasan to Mecaa.³ This cycle of suspension and resumption repeated itself again and the prayers were suspended in the pilgrimage season of 826/around November 1423 and resumed again in Jumada I 827/May 1424.4

How long the Yemenite Sultan still continued to enjoy this privilege is not exactly known but, to judge from the absence of references in the sources to the Yemenite <u>Mahmal</u> and the offering of prayer, it is apparent that he lost both privileges shortly after. It is possible that these privileges were conceded to the Yemenite Sultan only for

¹Fāsī, <u>al-'Iqd</u>, vol. I, part I, fol. 97a.

²Fāsi, <u>al-'Iqd</u>, vol. I, part II, fols. 401b and 402b; Al-Najm Ibn Fahd, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. II, fol.125.

³Fasi, <u>al-'Iqd</u>, vol. I, part II, fols. 402b-3a; Al-Najm Ibn Fahd, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. II, fol. 30.

⁴Fāsī, <u>al-'Iqd</u>, vol. I, part I, fol. 65a, part II, fol. 420a; Maqrīzī, <u>Sulūk</u>, vol. II, fol. 331; Al-Najm Ibn Fahd, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. II, fols. 186 and 188.

commercial_consideration.But the desertion of Aden by the Indian merchants around 827/1424,as will be seen,diminished,if not completely wiped out,the need for a concession of this kind, and most likely it was abandoned for good at a later date.

The Egyptian pilgrim caravan and <u>Mahmal</u> reached Mecca annually and maintained its leading position among all others.Only twice within the <u>Burji</u> period did the Egyptian <u>Mahmal</u> absent itself.Their first absence, in 911/1506, can be ascribed to the rebellious movement in certain areas of the Hijaz and is said to have been later regretted by Sultan Qanşawh al-<u>Ghawri</u> as detracting from his prestige.The second occurred in 922/1516, when the <u>Mamlūk</u> régime had already received the mortal blow in Marj Dābiq, at the hand of the Ottomans.Shortly after the final overthrow of the <u>Mamlūk</u> régime in 923/1517 the Ottoman Sultan Selim 1 secured all the privileges once enjoyed by the <u>Mamlūk</u> Sultans in the region of the Hijaz.

¹See <u>supra</u>, pp.**q**5-96.

²Ibn Iyās, <u>Bada'i</u>, vol. 1V, pp. 89, 93 and 95. See also: Jazīrī, <u>op. cit</u>., p. 355.

³Ibn Iyas, <u>Bada'i</u>, vol. 1V, p. 112. Seealso: Jaziri, <u>op. cit.</u>, pp. 127, 361 and

364; Isami, op. cit. vol. 1V, p. 318.

⁴Ibn Iyās, <u>Bada'i</u> vol. V, pp. 201, 205-6, 208-11and 214-15. See also: Jazīrī, <u>op. cit.</u>, pp. 126-27 and 361; Nahrawālī, <u>al-I'Lām</u>, pp. 69 and 284-87; Al-Bakarī, <u>op. cit.</u>, fols. 38 and 49-51; Işāmī, <u>op. cit.</u>, vol. 1V, p. 57; Sinjārī, <u>op. cit.</u>, vol. 11, fols. 51-54; Tabarī, <u>op. cit.</u>, vol. 1, fols. 177-78; Dahlān, op. cit., p. 51.

### Chapter III

# ILLUSTRATION OF ASPECTS RELATED TO TRADE AND COMMERCE IN MECCA AND JEDDA

#### A. The commercial significance of the Pilgrimage

The annual ceremony of the pilgrimage has always been an occasion of great religio-economic significance. A large number of pilgrims and merchants from all over the Muslim world gathered in the city of Mecca and other places connected with the ceremony of the pilgrimage and intense commercial activities developed simultaneously and parallel with worship and religious ritual. The merger of religious and commercial interests is not incompatible with the teachings of the <u>SharT'ā</u>. The pilgrimage provided the merchants with a unique opportunity for commercial transactions and was exploited fully in furthering the trading interests of the merchants. For a few days Mecca and its neighbourhood became an emporium to which various merchandise was brought from different countries and was sold, bought, or exchanged without any adverse effect on the city's religious character and significance. Needless to say, the pattern of this activity was familiar in Mecca long before the period under examination.¹

In the <u>Burji</u> period this commercial significance of the pilgrimage not only continued but increased. It was due, in addition to Mecca's religious significance, to the ever-increasing commercial importance of the area, enhanced by a very suitable geographical location, and facilities made specially available during the pilgrimage. Moreover, the

¹See as token references: Muhammad b. Ahmad b. Jubayr, Tadhkira bi'lakhbar an ittifaqat al-Asfar (or simply <u>Ribla</u>), 2nd ed. (Leiden, 1907), pp. 119-22 and 178-79; A.J.Wensinck /J. Jomier/ and B. Lewis, <u>E.I.²</u>, art. "Hadjdj", pp. 31-38. See also: R.B.Serjeant, <u>op.cit</u>., p.5.

area was ruled by a <u>Sharif</u> appointed by the Egyptian Sultan and the former was comparatively less likely and able to exploit or harm merchants than a powerful Sultan such as those of Egypt or the Yemen. This relative safety must have inspired the Indian merchants to choose Jidda, after their desertion of Aden, instead of other ports which were directly controlled by the Egyptian Sultan. They naturally could not have foreseen that their arrival would lead the Egyptian Sultan to take almost full control of Jidda and that they were to suffer the same restriction and exploitation which had forced them to desert Aden.

Usually merchants from the neighbouring countries accompanied the pilgrim caravan, but the advantages of trading in Mecca were so great that they took occasionally the not inconsiderable risk of travelling on their own. Thus, for instance, in 808/1405, when the Syrian pilgrim caravan was not sent to Mecca, some Syrian merchants congregated and set out together on the arduous journey to Mecca.¹

The commercial importance of Mecca was not confined within the pilgrimage season, as this may not coincide with the season suitable was for navigation and thus/occasionally unattainable by the foreign merchants coming by sea. Nor was it only professional merchants who participated in the commercial activities. There is evidence to the effect that the visitors who came to Mecca for the <u>'Umra</u>² (lesser pilgrimage), and even pilgrims proper, were able to secure material gains through petty trading. For the greater part of the <u>Burji</u> period a yearly caravan called al-Rajabiyya,³ consisting of visitors for the

¹Fasi, <u>Shifa</u>, vol. II, p.252; see also: Jaziri, <u>op.cit</u>., p.317.

²<u>Umra</u>, could be performed at any time while the proper <u>Hajj</u> takes place only between 8th and 12th or 13th Dhu¹1-Hijja.

³So named because it usually departed in or around the month of Rajab.

lesser pilgrimage, officials, and other travellers departed from Cairo.¹ Permission to join this caravan was eagerly solicited, as it promised spiritual as well as material benefits and both prospects were so attractive that those turned down were greatly disappointed.²

The intensity of the commercial activities, particularly in Minā,³ and the resultant great financial gains at times motivated merchants to persuade the Egyptian <u>Amir al-Hajj</u> to delay his departure so that they could engage in more trade transactions. It can be said that the merchants succeeded in convincing him more often than not, though at a considerable cost to themselves.⁴ But when the Egyptian <u>Amir al-Hajj</u> found the financial offer of the merchants less than satisfactory, he sometimes even departed prior to schedule - out of

¹This Rajabi caravan seems to have been suspended in 783/1381 and was not resumed until 801/1398. See: Al-Najm Ibn Fahd, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. II, fol. 125; Ibn Iyās, <u>Badā'i'</u>, vol. I, p.313. However, this caravan was suspended shortly after and was not sent until 825/1422. Ibn Hajar, <u>Inbā'</u>, vol. II, fol. 64b. It is worth mentioning that this long suspension was in the period preceding the desertion of Aden by the Indian merchants and their making J2dda the centre of their activities in 827/1424. But from this year onwards the caravan reached Mecca fairly regularly. Obviously, the increased commercial activities in the area were, at least partly, the reason for this regularity. It was not so during the period of relative decline of commercial activities in the area. Ibn Taghri Birdi, for instance, reporting the departure of Rajabi caravan in 871/1466, states that it was sent after several years (Hawādith, part III (ed. W.Popper), p. 527).

²Magrīzī, <u>Sulūk</u>, vol. II, fols. 371, 375 and 398; Ibn Hajar, <u>Inbā</u>, vol. II, fols. 127b, 134b and 140b-41a.

⁵An important seasonal market place, three miles south-east of Mecca, where several ceremonies of the pilgrimage ware performed. Mina was an important commercial centre long before the <u>Burji</u> period and the merchandise bought or sold there varied from petty items to precious pearls and stones. Ibn Jubayr, <u>op.cit.</u>, pp. 178-79. This importance of Mina increased considerably during the <u>Burji</u> period when it became a centre for the spice trade. See:Gaston Wiet, "Les Marchands d'epices sous less Sultans Mamlouks" editions der <u>Cahiere d'histoire</u> <u>Exyptienne</u>(Le Cairo 1955, 5 Juin), p. 94.

⁴For relevant details, see: Fasi, Shifa', vol. II, p.254; idem, <u>al-</u> <u>'Iqd</u>, vol. I, part I, fol. 64a; Ibn Hajar, <u>Inba'</u>, vol. II, fol. 80a; Al-Najm Ibn Fahd, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. II, fols. 147-48; Al-'Izz Ibn Fahd, op.cit. vol. I, fol. 15. spite - to deprive them of their financial gains.

Realizing, on the occasion of his visit to Mecca in 1503 A.D., the religio-commercial significance of the pilgrimage, Varthema states: "Truly I never saw so many people collected in one spot as during the twenty days I remained here. Of these people some had come for the purpose of trade, and some on pilgrimage for their pardon..."²

The chance of material gain in Mecca was so ample that, according to Fāsī, it induced many Egyptian traders to settle there permanently, Soon they were able, to the great resentment of the indigenous traders, to dominate the local market. This was not welcomed by the local authorities, but they could do little as these merchants were able to secure, in return for money, the protection of <u>Mamlūk</u> soldiers and prominent men of <u>Ashrāf</u> and <u>Quwwād</u>. The predominant position and exploitation of these merchants continued long after Fāsī's death until they were, according to Maqrīzī followed by later sources, expelled from Mecca by the order of the Egyptian Sultan in 843/1439.³

The huge profit obtainable during the pilgrimage season even through petty trade led some traders to use part of the Meccan sanctuary, against the teaching of the <u>Sharī'ā</u>, for the display and sale of various goods. This practice is observable in the pre-<u>Burjī</u> period⁴ as well as in the period under consideration until it was forbidden by the Egyptian Sultan in Dhu'l-Hijja 830/October 1427.⁵ But this practice was resumed

¹Ibn Hajar, <u>Inba</u>, vol. II, fol. 140a.

²Varthema, <u>op.cit</u>., pp. 37-38.

³Fāsi, <u>al-'Iqd</u>, vol. I, part II, fol. 421b; Magrizi, <u>Sulūk</u>, vol. II, fol. 435; Al-Najm Ibn Fahd, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. II, fol. 229. See also: Jaziri, <u>op.cit.</u>, p.328; Sinjāri, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. II, fol. 5.

⁴Ibn Jubayr, <u>op.cit</u>., p.181.

^bMaqrizi, <u>Suluk</u>, vol. II, fol. 349; Ibn Hajar, <u>Inba</u>, vol. II, fol. 90a; Al-Najm Ibn Fahd, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. II, fol. 200; Sakhawi, <u>al-Dhayl</u>, fol. 92b. See also: Jaziri, <u>op.cit.</u>, p.324.

later, which is obvious from the report of Varthema who visited Mecca in 1503 A.D. (908 A.H.).¹

Though the commercial activities in Mecca were considerably less in the later part of the <u>Burji</u> period, it was attractive enough formany Egyptian traders to settle again in Mecca and  $\tau e$ -embark on the same course of exploitation which had led to the expulsion of earlier settlers. This is borne out by a Sulțani edict of 916/ 1510 ordering the repatriation of these merchants, with the exception of those whose long sojourn in Mecca had gained them the right of residence there.²

Two important points should be mentioned here. First, that the local resentment and the Sultan's opposition to immigrant traders were obviously not directed against all merchants and traders alike, but only against such whose exploitation exceeded the boundaries of legitimate profit and whose conducto conflicted with the interests of the local traders. Second, most of the references to the commercial activities and the collection of taxes occur in connection with foreign merchants. This should not be taken to mean that the commercial activities were left entirely in the hands of foreign merchants, as the native and immigrant merchants of Mecca cannot have remained inactive. Indeed, there is ample evidence to the effect that a numerous community of merchants and traders existed in Mecca and J&dda in the Burji period and took a very active part in the commercial activities at home and abroad. Many of these merchants possessed great wealth and some sailed their own vessels. They went on commercial journeys and voyages to various neighbouring and distant countries

¹Varthema, <u>op.cit.</u>, pp. 38-39.

²Al-'Izz Ibn Fahd, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. II, fol. 190.

and evidently paid, on their return or on the arrival of their goods, the usual taxes.¹

# B. Revenue of the Sharifs from the local tolls and occasional dues

As there is a singular dearth of references to this aspect of the economic life in Mecca in the period in question inferences have had to be drawn, to a certain extent, from evidence about the immediately preceding period, especially as many of them are backed by the contemporary sources as well, which vouch for the continuity of certain facts.

from 832/1429 Unlike other commercial dues which/were shared with the Egyptian Sultan the revenue yielded by the tolls belonged in its entire ty to Sharifs of Mecca. Most references to the collection of tolls concern grain and other food stuffs imported to Mecca, but the methods of their collection and in what proportion they stood to the total value of the goods is seldom made clear.

¹For the sake of space it is not possible to elaborate this point further but the following sources not only contain evidence supporting the above mentioned statement but also provide valuable additional information: Fasi, al- Iqd, vol. I, part I, fol. 38b, 97a, 147b, 207a, 214a-14b, 282b, 283a, 290a and 311a: part II, fol. 269b, 368a, 410b, 462b, 470b, 474b and 531b: vol. II, part III, fols. 7d, 59b, 65a, 74a, 160b-61a, 199b, 204b, 214a-14b, 234a and 259a-b: part IV, fols. 273a and 381a; Ibn Hajar, Inba, vol. II, fols. 123b-24a; Ibn Taghri Birdi, al-Manhal, vol. I, fol. 254a; Al-Najm Ibn Fahd, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. II, fol. 162, 179, 212-13, 222-23, 229, 231, 245, 247-49, 258, 264-65, 291-93, 329 and 346-47; Sakhawi, al-Daw, vol. III, pp. 45 and 127: vol. V, pp. 28-29, 148, 165, 177, 220-21 and 281-82: Vol. VI, pp. 30-31 and 80: vol. X, pp. 50 and 160; idem, al-Tibr, pp. 100-101 and 276; idem, al-Dhayl (ed. A.Al-Hassu), pp. 14-15, 282, 310, 517 and 544-45; Al- Izz Ibn Fahd, op.cit., vol. I, fols. 15, 23, 30, 49, 51, 54, 57-58, 64-65, 67, 81-82, 95, 97-98, 108, 114, 125-26, 131, 136, 145-46, 150, 156, 162,172, 189, 194-95, 214 and 258: vol. II, fols. 4, 7-8, 11, 15, 18, 40-41, 64, 72, 74, 78, 80, 92-96, 98, 105-7, 117-18, 130, 134, 137, 155, 158, 162-63, 165-66, 177, 184, 193, 205, 212, 215-17, 221, 223 and 231; Ibn Iyas, Bada'i vol. IV, p.270; Abū Makhrama, op.cit., vol. II, pp. 69, 118 and 2.54.

Obviously, these tolls were no burden to the traders who must have increased the price of the goods to the consumer. Thus the local population was naturally resentful at being forced to pay higher prices for grain and other food stuffs. It is to the credit of the Egyptian Sultans that they repeatedly abolished these tolls, at a certain cost to the treasury, as they often granted the Sharifs of Mecca appropriate compensation for the lost revenue.

The fact that for the early part of the Burji period no clear reference to the collection of tolls in Mecca can be traced in the available sources is connected with their abolition in the pre-Burji period by the Egyptian Sultan in Sha'ban 766/May 1365./Sharif of Mecca was granted 160,000 dirhams in cash and 1,000  $Irdab^1$  of wheat to be sent from Cairo each year as compensation for the financial loss of the Sh arif of Mecca.² Though not complete, some very useful information, especially in the Meccan sources, shows that the abolished tolls used to be levied :

- On each camel-load of grain coming from Ta'if³ or Bajila⁴ 1.  $1^{\perp}/4$  mudd and on that coming from J&dda one mudd.⁵
- On each camel-load of fine plain dates 8 Mas'ūdi a local coin 2. equal to/dirham - and on ordinary stuffed dates 3 Mas'udi.

On each sheep and goat 6 Mas 'udi. 3.

On certain items such as butter, honey and vegetables  $\frac{1}{6}$ 4. of the value.

¹A weight, particularly used in Egypt.

²This gives an idea of the amount of revenue the <u>Sharif</u> drew from these tolls.

⁵A town about 75 miles S.E. of Mecca around 5,000 feet above sea level in the mountains of Sarat. For further details, see: H.Lammens, E.I.¹, art. ".Ta'if", pp. 621-22.

⁴Bajila, an Arab tribe, the <u>nisba</u> (ascription) is Bajali, part of which lived near the mountain chain of the Sarat, south of Mecca. For further details, see: W.Montgomery Watt, E.I.², art. "Badjila", p.865. ⁵A Meccan measurement used for grain. This difference was presumably

An excessive amount was charged - in addition to tolls - on the sale of these items in the Meccan market by the local authority, but no relevant details are known.¹

The abolition of the toll did not materially affect the <u>Sharif's</u> financial position, not only because he received the above-mentioned adequate compensation but also because the tax collected from the Indian , Kārimi, 'Irāqī and other foreign merchants was left, in its entirety, to the <u>Sharif</u> of Mecca.² The latter retained, moreover, the rights to impose, as before, certain charges on the traders in the market, craftsmen, measurers, weighers, and brokers. This right was voluntarily renounced by <u>Sharif</u> Ahmad b. 'Ajlān in 774/1372.³

due to the fact that the grain coming from JEdda was brought there via sea and the merchant most likely had already paid some tax in JEdda and thus was entitled to reduce toll. While on that brought from Ta'if or BajIla no other tax was paid before its entry to Mecca.

¹Though all the sources given below confirm the facts of the abolition and compensation, they vary in other details. The account given above is based on the version of Fasi followed by Al-Najm and others and is supported in its essential details by the Egyptian sources as well. Ibn Khaldun, <u>'Ibar</u>, vol. IV, pp. 107-8; Fasi, Shifa', vol. II, pp. 249-50; idem, <u>al-'Iod</u>, vol. I, part I, fol. 63a: part II, fol. 540a; Maqrizi, <u>Suluk</u>, vol. III, fols. 9b and 66a; Ibn Hajar, <u>Inba'</u>, vol. I, fol. 28a; Ibn Taghri Birdi, <u>al-Manhal</u>, vol. II, fol. 74a; idem, <u>al-</u> <u>Nujum</u>, vol. XI (of the portion published in 12 vols., Cairo, 1929-56), p. 34; Al-Najm Ibn Fahd, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. II, fol. 92; see also: Jaziri, <u>op.cit.</u>, p.311; Janabi, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. I, fol. 304a; 'Isami, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. IV, p.244 and 246-47; Sinjari, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. I, fol. 325; Tabari, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. I, fol. 59; Dahlan, <u>op.cit.</u>, p.33.

²Fasi, Shifa', vol. II, p.249; Maqrizi, <u>Suluk</u>, vol. III, fol. 9b; Al-Najm Ibn Fahd, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. II, fols. 92 and 97.

²Al-Najm Ibn Fahd, <u>op.cit</u>., vol. II, fol. 97.

The revenue of <u>Sharif Ahmad around this year(774/1372</u>) appears to have been at least 300,000 dirhams. This is borne out by the fact that when <u>Sharif Ahmad forced his father 'Ajlan</u> to abdicate in this year or two years earlier - sources differ - the latter did so on several conditions, including that his son would pay to him annually 300,000 dirhams, which was accepted and honoured by <u>Sharif Ahmad.¹</u> There can be little doubt that the amount promised and paid by <u>Sharif</u> Ahmad formed a part of his total revenue, which seems to have been fairly considerable.

This compensation appears to have been sent regularly to Mecca, at least until the early years of the9th century of the Hijra. As Fasi (d. 832/1429) states in his mention of the abolition of these tolls and the compensation received by the Sharif, the arrangement was observed "till the time of writing". Though Fasi does not mention the specific year in which he wrote that passage, it is evident from the following that it must have been before 824/1421, as in Rabi' I of that year (March 1421) an edict was sent to Mecca to order the abolition of the recently re-introducted tolls. But whether or how much compensation was paid this time is not clear. Some sources such as Fasi followed by Al-Najm Ibn Fahd refer to the dispatch by the Sultan of a sum of 1,000 dinars in another context, where this amount is said to have been given by the Sharif of Mecca to the Egyptian Amir al-Hajj but sent back by the Sultan, where it is clearly not a question of compensation. However, the passage seems to have been misinterpreted

¹Fasi, <u>al-'Iqd</u>, vol. I, part II, fol. 286b; Ibn Taghri Birdi, <u>al-Manhal</u>, vol. I (of the partly published part of this source, Cairo, 1375/ 1955), pp. 369-70; Al-Najm Ibn Fahd, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol.II, fols. 96-97. See also: 'Işāmi, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. IV, pp. 246-47.

²Fasi, <u>Shifa</u>, vol. II, p.250.

by later authors as a reference to the compensatory grant and, among them, 'Işāmī gives the amount of compensation as 20,000 dinars.¹

Probably the arrival of a large number of Indian merchants in J&dda, and the subsequent improvement of the <u>Sharif's financial</u> position, had rendered the petty gains obtained from local tolls of little value. This may be the reason why no reference to such tolls is made for many years. As will be seen, within a decade or two after their arrival many Indian merchants drifted back to Aden and thus caused a setback to the commercial prosperity of the Meccan region. It seems that in this period the tolls were repeatedly re-imposed and abolished but other details are unfortunately seldom provided.

In Rabi[•] I, 850/July 1446, for instance, an edict abolishing these tolls was sent to Mecca, which indicates that they were reimposed earlier.² But whether or not the order was implemented is uncertain. The doubt arises from the fact that Sakhāwi reports a clash in Dhu^{*}1-Hijja 851/February or March 1448, between a group of [•]Arabs and the men of the Sharif over the toll on the sheep brought by the [•]Arabs for sale, but the latter were unwilling to pay the toll demanded.³ This indicates that the Sultani order of the previous year was either not carried out or the tolls had been re-imposed. But another version of Sakhāwi and of Al-Najm Ibn Fahdpoints to the fact that the clash was not over tolls but over an attempt at appropriation of some of the sheep.⁴ In any case, these tolls were definitely

¹Fāsi, <u>al-'Iqd</u>, vol. I, part I, fol. 65a: part II, fol. 417b; Al-Najm Ibn Fahd, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. II, fols. 179-80; see also: Nahrawāli, <u>al-T'lām</u>, p.205; 'Isāmi, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. IV, p.38; Sinjāri, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. I, fol. 347; Tabari, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. I, fol. 81; Dahlān, <u>op.cit.</u>, p.40.
²Al-Najm Ibn Fahd, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. II, fol. 261.
³Sakhāwi, <u>al-Tibr</u>, pp. 186-87; idem, <u>al-Daw</u>, vol. X, p.272.
⁴Sakhāwi, al-Dhayl (ed. A.Al-Hassu), p.11; Al-Najm Ibn Fahd, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. II, fol. 267.

re-imposed some time before 855/1451, as can be inferred from an edict sent from Cairo in this year by which they were abolished again.¹ This ruling appears to have been observed for a fairly long period, but the old practice must have reappeared some time before 872/1467when it was forbidden again,² only to be re-introduced in time to give a <u>Sharif</u> of Mecca the opportunity of abolishing voluntarily in 903/1497. This reference of Al-'Izz Ibn Fahd mentions only that the abolished toll was collected from the caravan of Bajīla and amounted to half an Ashrafi on each camel's load of grain.³

The Egyptian Sultan interfered little with the activities of the traders in the local market of Mecca. But in 890/1485 the traders were instructed, apparently for reasons of hygiene, to transfer their activities to shops which had been recently built by order of the Sultan.⁴ Presumably these were rented and the amounts obtained sent to the royal treasury. It could be assumed that the Sultan's concern with the health of the Meccans was motivated by financial considerations.

There are some vague references in the sources from 817/1414 onwards, but with a long interruption in between, to the effect that occasionally the pilgrims, particularly the Iraqis, were subjected to the payment of a tax on their entry into Mecca or at their departure from the city. These references, however, do not give any amount obtained from them, nor make it clear whether it was imposed on the pilgrims themselves or on the goods brought into or bought by them in Mecca.⁵

¹Al-Najm Ibn Fahd, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. II, fol. 273.
²<u>Ibid.</u>, fol. 319. See also: Nahrawālī, <u>al-I'lām</u>, p.223; 'Isāmī, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. IV, p.43; Sinjārī, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. II, fol. II; Ţabarī, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. II, fol. II; Ţabarī, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. I, fol. 124; Dablān, <u>op.cit.</u>, p.44.
³Al-'Izz Ibn Fahd, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. I, fol. 218.
⁴<u>Ibid.</u>, fol. 63.
⁵For relevant details, see: Fasī <u>Shifā</u>', vol. II, p.257; AlNajm Ibn Fahd, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. II, fol. 16; Al-'Izz Ibn Fahd, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. I, fol. 20.

There are a few direct or indirect examples in various sources to the effect that slave trade was conducted in Mecca and some indications are found in Al-Najm Ibn Fahd's reports showing that the local <u>Sharifs</u> obtained certain amounts as their dues on transactions of this kind, but there is otherwise remarkably little information on this subject.¹

In 909/1503 a toll of a completely new kind was introduced in Mecca. On each camel or  $\underline{Shuqduf}^2$  six Muhallaq - a Meccan coin/replaced Masūdi - and on each donkey three Muhallaq were levied on the departure of the caravan on behalf of the <u>Sharif</u> of Mecca³ and were presumably exclusively imposed on the mounts of the merchants.

Varthema, who visited Mecca in 1503 A.D., may have been referring to these tolls in his statement that two "Seraphim" (evidently a misnomer for Ashrafi) were charged on each camel-load of spices.⁴ However, this report of Varthema may have meant a different tax, as the value of two Ashrafi was much higher than six Muhallaq and moreover this tax, being imposed on/spices, was most likely collected for the royal treasury in Cairo, and not on behalf of the <u>Sh</u>arif of Mecca.

In addition to these tolls and his share in the <u>Ushr</u> - discussed later - the <u>Sharif</u> of Mecca obtained occasionally a considerable

⁴Varthema, <u>op.cit.</u>, p.51.

¹For the relevant details, see: Maqrīzī, <u>Sulūk</u>, vol. II, fols. 277 and 372; ^Aynī, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. IV, fol. 645b; Al-Najm Ibn Fahd, <u>op.</u> <u>cit.</u>, vol. II, fols. 99, 166, 244 and 247; Sakhāwī, <u>al-Dhaỳl</u> (ed. Al-Hassu), p.545; Sakhāwī, <u>al-Daw</u>, vol. V, p.70: vol. VI, p.11; Al-^IIzz Ibn Fahd, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. I, fols. 5, 99, 117 and 228; vol. II, fols. 132 and 162.

²A kind of wooden chair or seat usable by two persons fastened on the back of a camel and used by the travellers, one person on each side of the camel.

³Al- Izz Ibn Fahd, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. II, fols. 54-55.

amount of money, as their dues, from the merchants in certain circumstances, and often on the basis of an arrangement between themselves and the merchants. But before going into detail, it is imperative to mention a few points relevant to the payment of such dues by the merchants.

As has been seen during the discussion of the occasional elevation of the Sharif to Niyahat al-Saltana and the Meccan dependencies, the authority of the Meccan Amirs extended to the almost entire coastal area between Jedda and the Yemen. When the Sharif acquired the status of Na'ib al-Sultan it was extended, theoretically at least, to all the coastal and other areas in the Hijaz. But when the Sharif of Mecca was no longer Na ib al-Sultan his official authority in the north of Jfdda, particularly the coastal area, was recognised between Jfdda and Rabigh.¹ The <u>Sharifs</u> took possession of all the goods aboard a foundered or abandoned vessel within their territory,² but only a quarter of the cargo of the damaged but unabandoned vessels which were bound elsewhere but unable to continue their journey. In Safar 804/October 1401, for instance, a Kārimi vessel was damaged on its voyage from the Yemen to Egypt near JEdda. The Sharif of Mecca claimed the quarter of the goods but the merchants paid him 65,000 Mithqal, apparently of gold, instead. The cargo aboard this vessel belonged to a son of al-Muhalli, a prominent courtier of the Egyptian Sultan, and al-Muhalli's reaction was quite vehement and he almost brought about the downfall of the Sharif in question." A mixture of

¹Fasi, <u>al- ^cIqd</u>, vol. I, part I, fol. lla; Al-Najm Ibn Fahd, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. II, fol. 350

²Fasi, <u>al-'Iqd</u>, vol. I, part I, fol. lla.

³Fāsī, <u>al-'Iqd</u>, vol. I, part II, fol. 403b: vol. II, part III, fol. 255a; Al-Najm Ibn Fahd, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. II, fol. 129.

⁴See <u>supra</u>, p.62.

diplomacy and luck enabled the <u>Sharif</u> to get away, to keep the amount and to secure further gains from the death of al-Muhalli's son.¹

In 809/1406, the <u>Sharif</u> obtained again a considerable sum of money from the owners of goods aboard a <u>Karimi</u> vessel damaged near JEdda. The exact amount paid by the merchants, in return for the <u>Sharif's customary quarter</u>, is not clear, but the sources refer to thispayment. together with the amount derived from the confiscation of the property of Jabir al-Har<u>ash</u>i, an official of the <u>Sharif</u> in JEdda,² stating that the total sum obtained by the <u>Sharif</u> was 40,000 Mithgal.³ In view of the figure given earlier for a similar situation there can be little doubt that most of it came from the merchants.

<u>Sharifs of Mecca even took one quarter of the charitable gifts</u> which constituted the load of a damaged ship; such was the case in 813/1410, when a ship carrying gifts from a ruler of Bengal for the Amir and inhabitants of Medina was damaged south of Jfdda.⁴

In 822/1419 the <u>Sharif</u> of Mecca obtained from a damaged Kärimi vessel, evidently in return for his traditional claim of a quarter of the cargo, 10,000 Afranti (or Iflori).⁵ In the following year, the <u>Sharif</u> obtained from a Kärimi vessel, on the same basis, 2,000 Afranti. Unfortunately for him, the cargo belonged to the Egyptian

²See <u>infra</u>, p. 245.

⁵Fasi, <u>al-'Iqd</u>, vol. I, part II, fol. 404b; Al-Najm Ibn Fahd, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. II, fol. 136.

⁴Fasi, <u>al-'Iqd</u>, vol. I, part II, fol. 406b; Al-Najm Ibn Fahd, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. II, fol. 147. See also: Nahrawali, <u>al-I'lam</u>, p.200; 'Işami, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. IV, p.35; Tabari, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. I, fol.74.

²Fasi, <u>al-'Iqd</u>, vol. I, part II, fols. 415b-16a; Al-Najm Ibn Fahd, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. II, fol. 175.

¹ See inpid, p. 200.

Sultan who rebuked him but took no further action. This incident may account for a change in the attitude of the <u>Sharif</u>, as there is no evidence to support the continuation of this practice in years to come, despite the intensity of the commercial traffic.

¹Fāsī,<u>al-Iqd</u>,vol.1,part 11,fol.416a;Al-Najm Ibn Fahd,<u>op.cit.</u>,vol.11, fol.177.

#### Chapter IV

## SHARE OF THE SHARIFS IN THE USHR OBTAINED

# IN JEDDA WITH PARTICULAR REFERENCE

#### TO THE YEMENITE AND THE INDIAN MERCHANTS

The gist of a statement by Qalqashandi indicates that though J&dda and Mecca were the destination of merchants from various countries, the Yemenites and the Indians, even prior to their desertion of Aden, represented the most considerable source of income for the Sharifs of Mecca.¹

There is evidence to the effect the merchants from Sawākin, Zayla' and Berbera were also active and brought supplies of grain and other foodstuffs. The Trāqī merchants too brought occasionally merchandise for sale in Mecca. What exactly these were is not clear, but the quantity seems to have been considerable. Thus, for instance, in Dhu'l Hijja 830/October 1427, an Trāqī caravan was plundered during its journey to Mecca and many merchants were to suffer great material loss. The goods belonging to one merchant alone were loaded on 100 camels.³ Obviously these and other merchants coming from the areas within the Egyptian domain have benefitted, in one way or the other, the <u>Sharifs of Mecca and the local merchants</u>. These paid taxes which, in the pre-<u>Burjī</u> period, were reserved for the <u>Sharifs of Mecca</u>⁴ but most of during the period under consideration/such revenues seem to have been reserved for the treasury in Cairo.

Qalqashandi, Subh, vol. IV, p.276.

²For details see: Fasi, <u>Shifa</u>, vol. II, pp. 274 and 276; Al-Najm Ibn Fahd, <u>op. cit.</u>, vol. II, fol. 369; Sakhāwī, <u>al-Dhayl</u>(ed. A. Al-Hassu), p. 545; Al-Izz Ibn Fahd, <u>op. cit.</u>, vol. I, fols. 70, 86, 101, 119, 153, 160 and 168: vol. II, fols. 21, 32, 56, 62-63, 71, 119, 123, 133, 141, 205-6, 253 and 268; Jazīrī, op. cit., p. 339.

3Maqrīzī, Sulūk, vol. II, fol. 349.

4See supra, p.154.

#### A. The revenue obtained from the Yemenite merchants

As the revenue obtained from the Yemenite merchants was left, usually in its entirety, for the Sharifs of Mecca, it will be appropriate to illustrate the great benefits which the local Amirs must have derived from the visits of the Yemenite merchants in respect of revenue and of the import of various goods, particularly spices. It is a known fact that in the early part of the Burji period the Yemen, and particularly the port of Aden, was among the most important centres of the spice trade and most of the Indian merchants made Aden their favourite port where they sold their merchandise, which was carried to other places, including Megca, by the Karim or other Yemenite merchants. It was this commercial importance of the Yementhat found reflection in its cordial relations with neighbouring areas and far distant countries. The close examination of the Yemen's politico-commercial relationships with other countries is outside the scope of this thesis. But a brief glimpse of the influential position of the Yemenite Sultan, which occasionally affected the affairs and internal situation of Mecca, will not be out of place. To begin with, the privileges/enjoyed in Mecca by the Yemenite Sultans¹ were apparently due to commercial considerations. Likewise, the valuable gifts sent by the ruler of Dahlak² in 787/1385 and later,³ by the Amir of Haly in 790/1388,⁴ and the gifts sent by the Qadi and Muslim merchants of Calicut, in southern India, and the far more significant fact that the prayers were said for the Yemenite Sultan in Khutba there in 795/1392 or 1393 and possibly in the following years Khutba

¹See <u>supra</u>, pp.142-46.

4<u>Ibid</u>., p.198.

⁵Ibn Wahhas, <u>op.cit.</u>, p.244; <u>Khazraji</u>, <u>op.cit.</u>, fol. 460.

²Archipelago off the west coast of the Red Sea, opposite Muşawwa (Eritrea). For further details, see: S.H.Longrigg, <u> $\underline{\mathbf{x}}$ .I²</u>, art. "Dahlak", pp.90-91.

³Ibn Wahhas, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. II, pp. 182 and 193.

as well, were all due to the same commercial interests.

This long established relationship between the Yemen and other parts of the world wasebound to develop cordial personal between Yemenite Sultans and various other rulers. the Thus, for instance, in 798/1395, an Indian prince, during a political crisis in his homeland, took refuge in the Yemen.¹ In 802/1399, an Indian ruler sent valuable gifts to the Yemenite Sultan.² In 800/1397 or 1398 an envoy sent by the ruler of Ceylon (now called Sri Lanka) reached Yemen with friendly greetings and valuable gifts. In this very year, eighteen embassies of various rulers went to the Yemen, including the envoys of Egypt, India and the Sharif of Mecca.³ In 811/1408 a Muslim ruler of Habasha" requested the help of the Yemenite Sultan against a Christian ruler in the same region.⁵ This request was apparently based, in addition to religious sentiment and geographical proximity, on commercial reasons. The same considerations kept the relation between the Yemenite and the Egyptian Sultans more or less cordial, especially in the early part of the Burji period, and there were frequent exchanges of envoys and valuable gifts.

¹Ibn Wahhās, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. II, p.285; <u>Khazrajī</u>, <u>op.cit.</u>, fols. 474-75.
²Ibn Wahhās, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. II, p.310; <u>Khazrajī</u>, <u>op.cit.</u>, fols. 584-86.
³Ibn Wahhās, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. II, p.297; <u>Khazrajī</u>, <u>op.cit.</u>, fol. 479; Ibn al-Dayba'. <u>Qurra</u>, p.174.

⁴Haba<u>sh</u>, Haba<u>sh</u>a (Abyssinia), a name applied in 'Arabic usage to the land people of Ethiopia, and at times to the adjoining areas in the Horn of Africa. For further details, see: E. Ullendorf: and thers, <u>E.I.²</u>, art. "Habash, Habasha", pp. 2-8.

⁵Khazraji, <u>op.cit.</u>, fol. 493.

⁶For the relevant details, see: Ibn al-Furat, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. IX, part II, pp. 458-59; Ibn Wahhās, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. II, pp.182, 186, 193, 198, 283, 294-95 and 307; Qalqashandi, <u>Subh</u>, vol. V, p.37: vol. VIII, pp.72-76; Fasi, <u>al-'Iqd</u>, vol. I, part I, fols. 65b and 95b; Maqrīzi, <u>Sulūk</u>, vol. II, fol. 341; 'Ayni, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol.IV, fol. 650b; Ibn Hajar, Inba', vol. II, fol. 43a; <u>Khazraji</u>, <u>op.cit.</u>, fols. 434, 437, 474, 478, 480 and 484; Al-Najm Ibn Fahd, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. II, fols. 191-92; Sakhāwi, <u>al-Tuhfa</u>, vol. I, fol. 629; idem, <u>al-Daw</u>, vol. III, p.35; Al-'Izz Ibn Fahd, op.cit.,

By 823/1420 the commercial importance of the Yemen seems to have reached its highest point with the arrival of three Chinese vessels bearing various goods and bringing also an envoy of the Chinese ruler with valuable gifts for the Yemenite Sultan. The Chinese envoy was well received, and the Yemenite Sultan reciprocated.¹ These Chinese envoys seem to have been sent by the Ming emperors and this may not have been the first and the only contact between China and the Yemen. Professor B. Lewis, referring to the commercial activities of the Chinese, states:

"... In the early fifteenth century, Chinese junks began to sail as far as the Red Sea. Under the Ming emperors, China had entered on a new era of commercial prosperity, and sought new outlets in the west. Efforts to re-open the overland routes through Persia came to nothing, and the Chinese directed their main efforts to the Red Sea, where they exchanged embassies with the Yemen."²

There can be little doubt that this Chinese move was motivated by their wish to find an important market to sell their merchandise, and they seem to have succeeded.

It is against this background that the commercial activities of the Yemenite merchants in Mecca and Jfdda and the subsequent revenue of the <u>Sharifs</u> of Mecca can and should be viewed. Though substantial evidence clearly indicates that the Yemenite merchants frequently reached Mecca and Jfdda and played a significant role in the commercial activities there, very little is known about the nature of their merchandise or about the sums they paid in taxes. However, it can be

vol. II, fol.189; Ibn al-Dayba', <u>al-Fadl</u>, fol. 113b; Ibn Iyas, <u>Bada'i'</u>, vol. I. p.307; idem, <u>'Uqud</u>, vol. II, fol. 143b.

¹<u>Khazraji, op.cit.</u>, fol. 494; Ibn al-Dayba', <u>Qurra</u>, pp. 177-78. ²B.Lewis, "Egypt and Syria", in <u>The Cambridge History of Islam</u>, vol. I, p.224. inferred from some clear evidence or oblique remarks in the sources that, in the early part of the period in question, spices were the main merchandise and that the dues paid on them were considerable.

The Yemenite Sultans were fully aware of the importance of their merchants for the commercial prosperity of the Meccan region. Whenever their relations with the <u>Sharifs</u> of Mecca were strained, they imposed commercial embargo to compel the <u>Sharif</u> in question to accept the Yemenite point of view in commercial or other matters. In 784/1382, for instance, following a dispute over the Yemeni <u>Mahmal</u>, an embargo of this kind was imposed and was only lifted after attempts at conciliation on the part of <u>Sharif Ahmad</u> b. 'Ajlān.¹ The Yemenites do not seem to have returned to Mecca or Jædda before 786/1384, as in the previous year not even the Yemenite pilgrims reached Mecca.²

In 799/1396-97, the Yemenite merchants, deterred by the lack of law and order, avoided J2dda and went to Yanbu[•] instead. Consequently <u>Sharif Hasan b. [•]Ajlan suffered a considerable loss of revenue and had</u> to take certain measures, including reductions in taxes, before he succeeded in bringing the merchants back to J2dda.³

Obviously, any embargo imposed on Mecca was a financial loss to the Vemenite merchants and the state treasury, as well, but they seem to have managed to sell their goods elsewhere without much difficulty or suffering material loss. This may account for the over-sensitivity and harsh reaction of the Vemenite Sultan against any objectionable act of the <u>Sharifs</u> of Mecca and explain also why the Vemenite merchants observed fully such decisions. In 812/1409, <u>Sharif</u> Hasan ill-treated

¹Ibn Hajar, <u>Inba²</u>, vol.I, fols. 71b-72a.

²Maqrizi, <u>Suluk</u>, vol. III, fol. 98a; Al-Najm Ibn Fahd, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol.II, fol. 103.

³Fasi, al-'Igd, vol. I, part II, fol. 400b; Al-Najm Ibn Fahd, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. II, fol. 123.

a Yemenite notable named al-Hibbi and extorted money from him during his sojourn in Mecca. This incesed the Yemenite Sultan who imposed an embargo on trade with Mecca which was not lifted until the Sharif sent his apology to the Sultan and promised to repay the extorted amount. L But whether or not the merchants returned to J&dda or Mecca on their usual scale is not certain. In any case, shortly after a fresh dispute led to the re-imposition of the embargo. This new dispute originally began from the delay of the Sharif in the settlement of compensation which caused the anger of Ibn Jumay', a relative of al-Hibbi and a prominent Yemenite courtier who, in 813/1410, confiscated the property of one of the Sharif's men in the Yemen. The Sharif retaliated by confiscating the belongings of Ibn Jumay' in Mecca and J2dda. Though the Sharif had informed the Yemenite Sultan that this act of retaliation was against Ibn Jumay' alone and not against the Yemenites in general, this justification or assurance was not accepted and an embargo was imposed in 814/1411. The resulting severe repercussions compelled the Sharif to send an envoy to the Yemen in 815/1412 with 10,000 Mithgal, apparently gold, and to promise to pay 20,000 more as repayment of the amount which he took from al-Hibbi. Simultaneously, the Sharif asked for the embargo to be lifted; this request was eventually granted but not without some reluctance.² It is significant to note that in 815/1412-Ibn Hajar hesitates between this year and 825/ 1422 - the Egyptian Sultan, in urgent need of a large quantity of spices and particularly pepper, could not secure his requirements but through the Yemenite merchants in Mecca.³ In 816/1413, however, the Yemenite merchants in Mecca.³ /the embargo was imposed again, an

¹Fasi, <u>al-'Iqd</u>, vol. I, part II, fol. 405b; Al-Najm Ibn Fahd, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. II, fols. 142-43.

²Fasi, <u>al-'Iqd</u>, vol. I, part II, fols. 406b-7a and 408a-8b; Al-Najm Ibn Fahd, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. II, fols. 148-51 and 153.

²Maqrizi, <u>Suluk</u>, vol. II, fol. 255; Ibn Hajar, <u>Inba</u>, vol. II, fols. 30b; Al-Najm Ibn Fahd, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. II, fol. 153. act which was provoked partly by the ill-treatment of the Yemenite merchants in Mecca and partly by the <u>Sharif's failure</u> to acquit himself of the remaining two-thirds of the debt. It was at this time that Rumay<u>tha</u>¹ went to the Yemen and was shown favour by the Yemenite Sultan which was no doubt the consequence of his displeasure with <u>Sharif Hasan</u>. The embargo remained in force for several years and may have been maintained for such a lengthy period because of the internal instability in Mecca, which led the merchants to substitute Yanbu' for Jfdda. It was not until 821/1418 that the Yemenite merchants returned to Jfdda and Mecca and the region, thanks to <u>Sharif Hasan's various efforts</u>, regained its lost commercial activities, prosperity and importance.²

Not only in Mecca but in Cairo too the affect of the Yemenite embargo was felt, especially when the relationship between the Egyptian and the Yemenite Sultans was. not too cordial. Thus, for instance, in 816/1413, when the Yemenite Sultan imposed embargo on trade with Mecca, this seems to have been extended, intentionally or accidentally, to Egypt itself and the absence of direct commercial links seems to have affected badly the Egyptian economy. This is evident from the fact that the Egyptian Sultan requested the Yemenite ruler to send merchants to Egypt but does not seem to have received a favourable reply.³

Here, it should be mentioned that the visit of the Yemenite merchants to other Hijāzi ports was not confined to the period when a Yemenite embargo was imposed on J2dda but they went to these ports in normal circumstances as well. Thus, for instance, in 823/1420, a number

¹See <u>supra</u>, p.66.

²Fasi, <u>al-'Iqd</u>, vol. I, part II, fols. 409b, 410b-11a and 413a-14b; Al-Najm Ibn Fahd, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. II, fols. 155, 157-58, 162, 164, 169-70 and 172-73.

²Fasi, <u>al-'Iqd</u>, vol. I, part II, fol. 270a; Ibn Hajar, <u>Inba</u>, vol. II, fol. 2a; <u>Sakhawi</u>, <u>al-Daw</u>, vol. I, p.268.

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of Yemenite vessels called at J2dda but went on to Yanbu¹

The commercial vessels reaching J2dda during the pilgrimage season were - with the exception of the early days of  $\underline{Dhu}^*1-\underline{H}ijja$  not allowed to unload their goods anywhere but on the pier of J2dda especially reserved for this purpose. This was evidently devised with a dual aim in view: it was intended to ensure the easy collection of the full dues, and the safety of the merchants and merchandise. An official of <u>Sharif</u> Hasan who disregarded this rule in 800/1397 was punished by being blinded.²

The sources seldom specify the number of commercial vessels which actually reached JEdda or the amount of tax obtained, in cash or kind, by the local authorities. However, occasionally available figures usually quoted in connection with the amount paid by the owners of damaged or foundered vessels or paid by the <u>Sharifs</u> of Mecca to their Egyptian overlords to secure the continuation/rule and subsequently the revenue — prove that both were considerable. This is supported further by the fact that in the later part of the period under consideration the revenue was shared, as will be seen, by the Egyptian Sultans. Obviously the amount must have been attractive enough to induce these Sultans to disregard the exclusive right of the <u>Sharifs</u> of Mecca.

The fact that about twenty Yemenite vessels are said to have sunk in the pilgrimage season of 790/November or December 1388,⁵

l Fasi vol.	, <u>al</u> . II,	fol.	vol. 177.	I,	part	II,	fol.	416a;	Al-Najm	Ibn	Fahd,	op.cit.,
2 _{Fāsi} vol.	, <u>al</u> . . II,	fol.	vol. 124.	I,	part	II,	fol.	401a;	Al-Najm	Ibn	Fahd,	op.cit.,
³ See <u>supra</u> , pp. 159-61.												
4 _{See}	infr	a,pp.	226		33.							
						I, p	.199;	Khazr	aji, <u>op.</u>	cit.	, fol.	440.

and over thirty in 794/October or November 1392.¹ in the course of a storm on their way to JEdda, indicates that the commercial activities of the Yemenites and the revenue obtained by the <u>Sharifs</u> of Mecca were substantial. The above mentioned foundered vessels were apparently carrying both merchants and pilgrims and phyiously they were only a part of the Yemenite fleet, and the remainder presumably reached JEdda in safety. In Ramagan 802/June 1400, more than ten large Karimi vessels reached JEdda together with other Yemenite ships. Though no exact figure is given the tax collected by Sharif Hasan is described as quite considerable.²

Though the Yemenite merchants continued to enjoy commercial importance throughout the <u>Burji</u> period, their impact was far greater prior to 825/1422, the year of the Indian traders' exit from Aden. Any absence of the Yemenite merchants, whatever its causers, not only unfailingly resulted in financial loss for the <u>Sharif</u> and the local trade, but also in the concomitant rise of prices and shortage of certain goods in Mecca. Thus was the case in 792/1390,³ 817/1414,⁴ and 824/1421.⁵

The desertion of Aden by the Indian merchants was undoubtedly a great but not a fatal blow to the Yemenite economy. As will be seen, not only the Yemenite merchants continued on a reduced scale their activities, but it was not long before some of the Indian merchants

¹Ibn al-Furāt, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. IX, part II, pp. 312-13; Fāsi, <u>al-'Iqd</u>, vol. II, part III, fol. 193b; Magrīzī, <u>Sulūk</u>, vol. III, fol. 156a; Al-Najm Ibn Fahd, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. II, fol. 117. See also: Jazīrī, <u>op.cit.</u>, p.315.

²Fasi, <u>al-'Iqd</u>, vol. I, part II, fol. 402a; Al-Najm Ibn Fahd, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. II, fol. 127.

³Ibn al-Furat, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. IX, part I, p.327.

⁴ Ayni, op.cit., vol. IV, fol. 601b.

⁵Ibn Hajar, <u>Inba</u>, vol. II, fol. 59b.

themselves chose Aden again as a centre of their trade. One of the results of this revival of the commercial importance of the Yemen was, as will be seen, that the revenue obtained from the Yemenite merchants, usually left in its entirety for the <u>Sha</u>rifs of Mecca, was shared from time to time by the Egyptian Sultans.

The Yemenite merchants usually came via the sea but occasionally used a land route. The Sharifs of Mecca were evidently indifferent to the route these merchants used as long as they paid the taxes. But in the closing years of the Burji period the Sharifs of Mecca, faced with serious financial problems and suspecting the Yemenites of using land routes to avoid payment of dues, discouraged and sometimes prevented such caravans from coming to Mecca. In the pilgrimage season of 914/March or April 1509, adverse winds prevented the Yemenite vessels from maintaining the desired speed on their voyage to JEdda. A group of the Yemenite merchants and pilgrims, led by a certain 'AfTf b. Marzuq, disembarked and headed for Mecca by land. They were regarded as ordinary pilgrims and allowed in the city and the merchants paid no dues. Sharif Barakat II resented this loss of revenue and instructed his deputy in al-Qunfudha to prevent the Yemenites - apparently the merchants - from travelling to Mecca by land, which the deputy did in the following year. Another group of Yemenite merchants reached JEdda by sea and the Sharif took from them, in addition to the usual dues, 2,400 Ashrafi as a loan.¹

## B. The revenue obtained from the Indian merchants

As already pointed out, the Indian merchants used to go to Mecca and J $\pounds$ dda well before the <u>Burji</u> period,² and the levy imposed on their

¹Ibn al-Dayba', <u>al-Fadl</u>, fols. 145b-46a; idem, <u>Qurra</u>, fols. 227-28. ²See <u>supra</u>, p. goods must have been of great value for the <u>Sh</u>arifs of Mecca. The interest of the Egyptian Sultan in the Red Sea and eastern trade could also be traced long before the period under examination.¹

However, despite the arrival of some Indian merchants and the availability of the Indian merchandise in Mecca and J2dda, it was the Yemen and more precisely the port of Aden which had become a favourite port for the Indian merchants and subsequently a far more important centre of trade in spices and other eastern commodities, and remained so for many years in the <u>Burjī</u> period. According to Heyd, the Yemenite Sultans imposed restrictions on trade with Egypt which were resented by the Indian merchants.² In view of this the <u>Mamlūk</u> Sultans of Egypt were - for obvious commercial and financial reasons - more than desirous to divert this important trade to their own domain but only Sultan Barsbay (825-41/1422-38) succeeded.

"A period of upheaval and extortion in the Yemen, coinciding with the consolidation of Egyptian control in the Hijāz, gave Bārsbāy his opportunity. Rather than face the exactions and uncertainties of Aden, the eastern merchants sailed right past the southern port, and made for Jedda, where the Egyptians tried to create conditions attractive to them. As 'Aden declined, Jedda rose, becoming one of the main commercial ports of the Mamluk empire."³

The desertion of Aden by the Indian merchants and their arrival at J2dda was at the invitation of Sultan Barsbay.⁴ This must have been resented by the Yemenite Sultan but there was little he could do. In 825/1422, an Indian <u>Nakhudha</u> from Calicut named Ibrahim,

resenting the lack of equity on the part of the Yemenite Sultan, bypassed Aden and, desirous of finding a substitute for the port of Aden

¹ See, for instance, B. Lewis, "Egypt and Syria", in <u>The Cambridge History</u> of Islam, vol. I, pp. 223-224; R. Hartmann /Phebe Ann Marr7, <u>E.I.</u> ² , art. "Djudda", p.572.
² W.Heyd, <u>Histoire du commerce du Levant au moyen-age</u> , 2 vols. (Leipzig, 1923), vol.II, p.445.
³ B.Lewis, "Egypt and Syria" in <u>The Cambridge History of Islam</u> , vol. I, pp. 224-25. ⁴ G. Wiet, E.I. ² art. "Barsbay", p.1054.

for himself and his compatriots, anchored at J2dda. <u>Sharif Hasan b.</u> 'Ajlan failed to realize the significance of this move and, presumably under some economic pressure and financial need, or simply motived by his greed, appropriated Ibrahim's goods and Ibrahim, dismayed, departed with a grudge. In the following year Ibrahim tried the ports of Sawäkin and Dahlak but also had reason to be more than dissatisfied with the treatment he received there. Meanwhile, the news of <u>Sharif Hasan's un-</u> justifiable act had reached Cairo and Sultan Barsbay instructed the <u>Sharif</u> to make good the losses suffered by the Indian merchants, but this order does not appear to have been obeyed. This defiance may account for the deposition of Hasan by 'AlT b. 'Anan.¹

This concern of Sultan Barsbay for the injustice suffered by Ibrahim was evidently for reasons of his own financial interest and not for the sake of justice itself, as he himself can hardly be regarded as a just ruler. According to G. Wiet, "From the moment Barsbay acceded to the Sultanate, he displayed the salient features of his nature: greed, bad temper, and cruelty..."²

The newly appointed Amir of Mecca, Sharif 'Ali, was apparently instructed by Sultan Barsbay to do his best to induce the Indian merchants to come and to treat them fairly. Therefore, when in JumādāI 827/ May 1424, Ibrāhim returning with two vessels intended to by-pass J2dda, he was most cordially invited by Sharif 'Ali and Qarqmas, commander of an Egyptian force, to anchor at J2dda. Ibrāhim accepted and was fairly treated, he sold his own goods and those of other merchants with reasonable profit and paid the usual <u>'ushr</u>. The merchants having made large gains departed satisfied.³ Thus, in this year, the Indian merchants

²G.Wiet, <u>E.I.</u>², art. "Barsbay", pp. 1053-54. ³Fasi, <u>al-'Iqd</u>, vol. I, part II, fol. 420a; idem, <u>Shifa</u>, vol. II, p.211;

¹Fasi, <u>al-'Iqd</u>, vol. I, part II, fol. 419a; Maqrizi, <u>Sulük</u>, vol. II, fols. <u>334-35</u>; Al-Najm Ibn Fahd, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. II, fols. 182 and 184-85. See also: Jaziri, <u>op.cit.</u>, pp. <u>322-23</u>; W. Heyd, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. I, p.379: vol. II, p.445; G.Wiet, <u>Les Marchands</u>, p.98.

finally chose, among the Red Sea ports, JEdda for their main commercial centre. The exact amount obtained in <u>fushr</u> is not clear but whatever it may have been it was left in its entirety for <u>Sharif</u> 'Ali. But after this year the sum obtained from the Indian merchants in <u>ushr</u> and other dues was reserved, completely or mostly, for the treasury in Cairo.

The Yemenite Sultan seems to have been thinking of preventing the Indian commercial vessels from crossing the straits of Bāb al-Mandab for J2dda which became known to Sultan Bārsbāy, who decided to send, in or around Jumādā I 828/April 1425, two Egyptian vessels to Haly.¹ This was evidently intended to be a warning to the Yemenite Sultan who seems to have promised to leave the Indians' trade unhindered.²

In 828/1425, fourteen Indian vessels reached J£dda with various goods and paid <u>'ushr</u> to the Sultani officials in J£dda. The amount thus obtained was sent to Cairo. According to Maqrīzī, followed partly or fully by other sources, forty Indian and other vessels called at J£dda in 829/1426. He states that the total amount of the revenue sent to Cairo exceeded 70,000 dinars, an act which is commented upon bitterly by Maqrīzī and others. There is some uncertainty whether this amount consisted of the revenue of both 828-29/1425-26 or was exclusively of the later year. Be it as it may, it indicates the remarkable growth of J£dda, at the expense of Aden, a fact explicitly pointed out by Maqrīzī and other sources³.

Maqrizi, <u>Suluk</u>, vol. II, fol. 335; Ibn Hajar, <u>Inba</u>, vol. II, fol. 76b; AlNajm Ibn Fahd, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. II, fol. 188; see also: Janābi, <u>op.cit.</u>, fol. 306a; Isāmi,<u>op.cit.</u>, vol. IV, p.260; Sinjāri, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. I, fol. 349; W.Heyd, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. II, p.445; G.Wiet, <u>Les Marchands</u>, p.98.

¹Al-Najm Ibn Fahd, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. II, føl. 191.

²W.Heyd, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. II, p.445.

⁹Maqrīzī, <u>Sulūk</u>, vol. II, fols. 335, 339-40 and 383; Ibn Taghri Birdi, <u>al-Nujūm</u>, vol. VII, fol. 53; Al-Najm Ibn Fahd, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. II, fols. 192 and 215. See also: Jazirī, op.cit., pp. 322-23; Sinjāri, <u>op.cit.</u> In view of the facts mentioned above, it is by no means surprising that Sultan Barsbay decided to divert to Cairo all the revenue obtained from the Indian merchants in 828-29/1425-26 which exceeded 70,000 dinars. In 831/1428, various spices and a quantity of cloth obtained as <u>'ushr</u> in J2dda were brought to Cairo and valued there at about 50,000 dinars.¹

Thus, in these last years, the <u>Sharifs</u> of Mecca were not to profit from the huge amount of revenue obtained from the Indian merchants, as it was delivered in its entirety to Cairo. This was obviously an unjustifiable act, as the <u>Sharifs</u> of Mecca were after all the immediate rulers of the area and thus were entitled legally and morally to the local revenue.

Whether it was the influence of pious circles in Egypt,² or the opposition on the part of the brothers of Barakāt I,³ and above all the resentment of the <u>Sharif himself against the Sultan being the</u> only beneficiary of the <u>'ushr</u> collected from the Indian merchants, <u>Sharif Barakāt I was given</u>, in Rabi' I 832/January 1429, the legal right to one-third of the yield of this tax. However, what was the amount to be received is not made clear in the sources.⁴ But in view of the figures given in connection with the previous years it is safe to assume that it was substantial.

vol.I,fols.349-50;W.Heyd,<u>op.cit.</u>,vol.II,p.445;G.Wiet,<u>Les Marchands</u>,p.98. ¹Maqrīzī, <u>Sulūk</u>, vol. II, fol. 351. See also: G.Wiet, <u>Les Marchands</u>, p.99.

²Though such circles hardly enjoyed sufficientpower to influence the Sultan's policies they did, at least at times, register their disapproval. For instance, in 833/1429, they suggested as a remedy against the plague, a curb on the malpractices of the Sultan which affected the merchants. See: Ibn Hajar, <u>Inba</u>, vol. II, fol. 103a.

³See <u>supra</u>, p.76 and <u>infra</u>, pp.228 and 2.70.

⁴Al-Najm Ibn Fahd, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. II, fols. 205 and 208. See also: Jaziri, <u>op.cit.</u>, p.325; Sinjari, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. II, fol. 3; Dahlan, <u>op.cit.</u>, p.42. The Indian commercial vessels reached J&dda with their usual merchandise almost annually but the references to their arrival seldom provide data related to their number, quantity of goods, and the amount of money obtained from these merchants, but both the merchandise and subsequently customs dues seem to have been substantial. Professor B. Lewis states:

Earsbay's Red Sea policies gave him greater control of commerce, and a great increase in customs revenue from Jedda and from the Egyptian ports on African side. 'Every year', says a near contemporary author,¹ 'more than a hundred ships call at Jedda, some of them with seven sails, and provide an average annual revenue of 200,000 dinars.'²

This may have been the case - especially in the period which immediately followed 828/1425 - but the data in the contemporary sources used in this thesis is not so explicit.

Maqrīzī followed by Ibn Hajar and others relates that, in or around Shawwāl 835/July 1432 a number of Chinese junks laden with various merchandise such as silk, china ware, and perfume, arrived in Aden but, unable to effect a sale there, went to J£dda where they were well received and paid the usual <u>'ushr</u> and were able to sell their goods.³ This shows, on the one hand the decline of Aden and, on the other, the extent of J£dda's growth. Though no exact figure is given concerning the amount paid by these Chinese as <u>'ushr</u>, it must have been considerable and one-third of this revenue was apparently given to <u>Sh</u>arif Barakāt I. Whether or not the Chinese merchants re-visited J£dda is uncertain.

 ¹He, as referred to by Professor B. Lewis, was: Khalil al-Zahiri, <u>Zubdat Kashf al-Mamalik</u>, ed. P. Ravaisse (Paris, 1894), p.14.
 ²B.Lewis, "Egypt and Syria", in <u>The Cambridge History of Islam</u>, vol. I, p.225.
 ³Maqrizi, <u>Suluk</u>, vol. II, fol. 372; Ibn Hajar, <u>Inba</u>, vol. II, fol. 111b. See also: W.Heyd: <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. II, p.445; G.Wiet, <u>Les Marchands</u>, p.99.

The unfair treatment of the Indian merchants by the officials of Sultan Barsbay in J2dda seems to have increased, particularly around 837/1433. These merchants were subjected to various exploitation, being made to pay, in addition to the usual 'ushr, a certain amount on behalf of and to the officials of the Sultan in J&dda, and furthermore they were compelled to buy certain goods such as coral and copper which were sent by Barsbay or his officials. This was strongly resented by the merchants, some of whom decided in 837/1433 to choose Aden again as their port of call.² This renewed preference for Aden must have caused great concern to Barsbay whose financial position seems to have been rather weak at this time.³ To counter this drift back to Aden, Sultan Barsbay sent an edict to Mecca in 838/1434, to the effect that the 'ushr was to be the only tax collected from the Indian merchants, that Egyptian and Syrian merchants who had purchased merchandise in Aden and transferred it to Jfdda, or any other place in the Egyptian domain for that matter, were to pay two-tenths of its invalue as double 'ushr, a punitive tax/tended to act as deterrent which must have been felt as a strong blow by these merchants. The edict also ruled that the goods brought to J£dda by Yemenite merchants were to be confiscated. The edict was rather harsh where it related to the

¹According to R.B.Serjeant the Egyptian Pasha of J£dda (meaning the official in charge of J£dda) was granted a portion of the custom duty itself. See: <u>The Portuguesen p.5</u>. As will be seen, this is indicated in the latter part of the <u>Burji</u> period by the contemporary sources.

²Maqrīzi, <u>Sulūk</u>, vol. II, fol. 383; 'Aynī, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. IV, fol. 670a; Al-Najm Ibn Fahd, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. II, fols. 215-16. See also: G.Wiet, Les Marchands, p.100.

³Maqrizi, <u>Sulūk</u>, vol. II, fol.380.

Syriams and Egyptians and particularly to the Yemenites. Sharif Barakāt I felt compelled to ask for the withdrawal of these orders - evidently with the exception of the one concerning the Indians - and his request was granted.¹ Obviously, Sharif Barakāt I was more concerned with what happened to the Yemenites, as he must have been most anxious that nothing should prevent them from coming to J&dda, which would result in a loss of dues which they had hitherto paid exclusively to the Sharifs of Mecaa.

This withdrawal of the edict by Sultan Barsbay was obviously ascribable in a higher degree to practical commercial considerations than to his sense of justice, for oppression unalterably remained a dominant feature of his policy. Even the envoys were, at times, ill-treated as a result of some occurrencies which were not of their doing. This manifests itself most clearly in the cruel treatment of the Bengali envoys. Sultan Bärsbay had, prior to 839/1435-36, sent an envoy with gifts to a ruler of Benga, Jalal al-Din Abu'l-Muzaffar Muhammad. The latter selected some return gifts, which were valued at about 12,000 gold "tanka",² a figure given by most sources, apart from Ibn Hajar who briefly refers to the event without supplying any figures. But Jalal al-DIn died before he could send the gifts. His successor, al-Malik al-Muzaffar Ahmad Shäh, transmitted the gifts of his father with additional presents from himself. During the voyage to Cairo, Barsbay's envoy died on the island of Maldive. Its yruler took possession of the

¹Maqrizi, <u>Suluk</u>, vol. II, fols. 383; Ibn Hajar, <u>Inba</u>, vol. II, fol. 127b; Al-Najm Ibn Fahd, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. II, fols. 215-16. See also: W.Heyd, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. II, p.446; G.Wiet, <u>Les Marchands</u>, p.99-100.

²So, in Arabic text, but this may have been a corruptiform of some other terms, such as "taka", still used as a major currency in Bengal equal to Indo-Pak rupees. According to Qalqashandi, one "tanka" was a unit equal to three mithqal. There were silver and gold "tanka" called white and red "tanka" respectively. One hundred thousand tankas equalled a "Lukk" (apparently the present Lakh in Indo-Pakistani usage). See: Subh, vol. V, pp. 84-85. belongings of the deceased envoy, but made no attempt to appropriate the gifts themselves. The vessel carrying the Bengali envoys and gifts foundered near Jedda and, though some of the gifts were salvaged and the envoys survived, the greater part of the gifts was lost. The envoys could hardly be made responsible for this misfortune but were, by order of the Sultan, arrested and taken to Cairo where their personal belongings were confiscated. Sultan Barsbay, in retaliation against the ruler of Maldive, confiscated the goods which belonged to the merchants of that area.¹

Despite the Sultan's cruel propensities, his relations with <u>Sharif</u> Barakāt I appear to have remained rather friendly. The share of the <u>Sharif</u> in the revenue obtained from the Indian merchants was raised in Jumādā II 840/January 1347 from the hitherto one-third to one-half of the total amount obtained.²

Though Sultan al-Zāhir Jaqmaq (842-57/1438-53) is praised for his piety he too was unwilling or unable to put an end to the policy of state monopolies of spices and other trade initiated by Bārsbāy.³ However, he sought and secured in 843/1439 by a well-phrased <u>fatwa</u>⁴

Maqrizi, <u>Suluk</u>, vol. II, fol. 393; Ibn Hajar, <u>Inba</u>, vol. II, fols. 134b-35a; Al-Najm Ibn Fahd, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. II, fols. 214-15 and 218-19; see also: G.Wiet, <u>Les Marchands</u>, pp. 100-101.

²Al-Najm Ibn Fahd, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. II, fol. 219. See also: Jaziri, <u>op.cit.</u>, p.327; Sinjari, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. II, fols. 3-4; Jabari, <u>oplcit.</u>, vol. I, fol. 102; Dahlan, <u>op.cit.</u>, p.42.

²For relevant details, see: Ibn Taghri Birdi, Hawadith, part II (ed. W. Popper), pp. 349-52. See also: M.Sobernheim, <u>E.I.</u>2, art. "^Wakmak", p.6; G.Rentz, <u>E.I.</u>², art. "Barsbay", pp. 1053-54.

⁴This term means a formal statement of <u>ulama</u> (sing. <u>alim</u>; a scholar of the Islamic sciences relating to the <u>Qur'an</u>, <u>Hadith</u>, theology and jurisprudence) on a point of <u>Shari'a</u>. Though <u>fatwa</u> could be given by any <u>any <u>alim</u></u>, usually it was done by a jurisconsult known as a <u>mufti</u>. See: J.R.Walsh, <u>E.I.</u>², art. "Fatwa", pp. 866-67. the approval of the <u>'ulama'</u>. It is interesting to note that he tried to justify the collection of taxes by his**fina**ncial need to maintain a body of soldiers in Mecca to guard the safety of the merchants.¹

In the same year Sultan Jaqmaq issued a decree to the effect that henceförth only <u>'ushr</u> was to be collected and that all additional dues were to be abolished.² Jazmaq's attitude towards <u>Sharif Barakāt I</u> seems to have been somewhat unfriendly, as he reduced, in the same year, the share of the <u>Sharif in the 'ushr</u> from one-half to one-quarter only.³ Sinjārī states that the <u>Sharif was completely deprived of all</u> the revenue except that obtained as escheat.⁴ But Sinjārī, who is a late source, cannot be given credence against Al-Najm Ibn Fahd, a contemporary source, who was obviously more award of the details concerning the decision in question.

For reasons mentioned earlier,⁵ <u>Sharif Barakāt I was deposed by</u> his brother 'Alī in Jumādā I 845/September 1441, who too was deposed in the following year by Abu'l Qāsim. A few years later Barakāt I was re-appointed and remained in control well after Jaqmaq's death.⁶ Whether or not the share of any of these <u>Sharifs</u> of Mecca was officially

²Maqrīzī, <u>Sulūk</u>, vol. II, fol. 435; Al-Najm Ibn Fahd, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. II, fol. 129; see also: Jaziri, <u>op.cit.</u>, p.328; Sinjāri, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. II, fol. 5.

³Al-Najm Ibn Fahd, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. II, fol. 229.

⁴Mana⁹ih, vol. II, fols. 4-5.

⁵See <u>supra</u>, pp. 76-78.

⁶For the relevant deails, see supra, pp. 81-83.

¹Maqrīzī, <u>Sulūk</u>, vol. II, fols. 433-35; Ibn Taghrī Birdī, <u>al-Nujūm</u>, vol. VII, fols. 121-22; Al-Najm Ibn Fahd, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. II, fols. 229-30; see also: G.Wiet, <u>Les Marchands</u>, p.102.

raised from one-quarter to a higher proportion is uncertain. Assuming that the reduction made in the share of Barakät I continued to be the case for his successors, it may not have weakened their financial position too badly as Jaqmaq's comparatively fair treatment revived the commercial importance of Jedda. In <u>Dhu</u>'l-Hijja 845/April or May 1442, for instance, a large number of mercantile vessels reached Jedda with various goods, including valuable items such as pearls and cornelian. About five hundred camel-loads of various merchandise were taken daily to Mecca.¹ How long this continued is not clear, but if it lasted only a few days on such a scale it must have involved a huge quantity of goods which is indicative of a lively commercial activity in the area and, subsequently, the amount obtained in <u>'ushr</u> must have been substantial but, as so often, no figure is given by the sources.

In Şafar 846/June or July 1442, from the details concerning a conflict between Barakāt I and his brother and ruling Amir of Mecca, <u>Sharif 'Alī</u>, it could be assumed that the revenue obtained from the merchants in Jedda was considerable and that the shareof <u>Sharif 'Alī</u> in the <u>'ushr</u> was raised to half the total amount obtained from the Indian merchants in thatport. This assumption is made on the basis that Barakāt I, during his occupation of Jedda, demanded from the merchants aboard a number of Indian and other vessels anchored at the port 4,000 dinars as <u>'ushr</u> on each vessel. The merchants showed willingness to pay provided that Barakāt I assessed the amount due from each vessel according to the value of its goods. During the argument with Barakāt I the merchants went as far as to offer him a total sum of 40,000 dinars - as equivalent to half the <u>'ushr</u> which they seem to have already paid to <u>Sharif 'Alī</u> - but Barakāt I refused

^LIbn Hajar, <u>Inba</u>, vol. II, fol. 173b; Sakhāwī, <u>al-Tibr</u>, pp. 18-19. See also: G.Wiet, <u>Les Marchands</u>, p.102. to accept it, and demanded 100,000 dirhams (dinars).¹ Whether Barakāt I received any amount of money from them is not clear as he was ousted from Jedda by his brother shortly after.²

In any case, this clearly shows that the part of Jedda was called at by a large number of the merchants and the <u>ushr</u> paid by them was considerable. In 854/1450 Timrāz, an official of Jaqmaq in Jedda escaped with the total tax collected there, the figure of which is reported to have been either 30,000 or 50,000 dinars.³ Presumably this figure represented the share of the Sultan alone and was not the total revenue, as most likely the share of <u>Sharif Barakāt I was</u> already paid.

During the Sultanate of al-Malik al-Ashraf Ināl (857-65/1453-61) both the commercial activities and the revenue obtained from the merchants in Jedda seem to have been fairly considerable. Ibn Taghrī Birdī states that at the end of Dhul'l-Hijja 863/October 1459, the <u>'ushr</u> in Jedda was paid by the merchants in kind and the quantity brought to Cairo amounted to 7,400 <u>takrā</u> of pepper. He describes the revenue obtained as being so substantial that it had no precedent.⁵ Though no clear reference to the share of the then ruling Amir of Mecca, <u>Sharif Muhammad</u> b. Barakāt I, is made apparently his share must have been equally significant.

Though the port of Jedda was never completely abandoned in the <u>Burji</u> period by the Indian and other merchants, from the time of Sultan <u>Khushqadam</u> (865-72/1461-7) it began losing ground to the port of Aden. This decline of Jedda is more observable during the rule of

¹In the source: the word dinar is used several timesexcept at this point where the word dirham is mentioned instead, which is confusing. Which of the two it was in reality is difficult to ascertain. However, in view of the fact that in the text dinar is used several times one can assume that the use of dirham was a slip of the pen.

²Al-Najm Ibn Fahd, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. II, fols. 237-39.

³See <u>infra</u>, pp. 291-92.

⁴What exactly this term meant is not clear, but possibly it was used

Sultan Qa'it Bay (873-901/1468-95). Obviously this has weakened the financial position of these two Sultans as well as of the Amir of Mecca, <u>Sharif Muhammad</u>, who outlived them both. As so often, the sources do not provide explicit data relevant to the causes of this decline but from some indications it can be established that the frequent internal strife in the region of Mecca and the resulting suffering of the merchants who were harassed by the unruly elements or exploited by the <u>Shariff</u> or Sultani officials had accelerated the decline of Jedda. Possibly the comparative political stability and fairness of the new Tähirid rule in the Yemen which began in 860/1456¹ had much to do with the renewed commercial activities in Aden, especially as some Tähirid rulers abolished certain tolls and taxes, obviously to attract merchants,² and their justicewas noted and praised even by foreign travellers.³

Sultan Qa'it Bay is reported to have been faced with financial difficulties soon after his accession to the throne.⁴ This obviously was not entirely due to the relative decline of Jedda but this must have aggravated his difficulties. It is attributable to his desire, as well as of those who followed him, to stop the decline of trade in Jedda and other ports that they issued decrees ordering the just

for sacks.

⁵Hawadi<u>th</u>, part II (ed. W.Popper), p.327.

- ¹Ibn Taghri Birdi, Hawadith, vol. I, fol. 397: part II (ed. W.Popper), p.284; Ibn al-Dayba, <u>Qurra</u>, fol. 189-91.
- ²Al-'Izz Ibn Fahd, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. II, fol. 87; Ibn al-Dayba', <u>Qurra</u>, fol. 195.

³G.Wiet, <u>Les Marchands</u>, p.102.

⁴Ibn Taghri Birdi, <u>Hawadith</u>, part III (ed. W.Popper), p.635.

treatment of the merchants.¹ The restrictions imposed in 881/1476 on the export of coral and other merchandise, so desired by the Indian merchants, from Cairo to the Yemen were apparently connected with the wish to lure the Indian merchants back to Jedda.²

The revival of the port of Aden seems to have benefitted Sharif Muhammad more than the Sultan, in the sense that the Yemenite merchants were able again to bring to Jedda considerable quantities of goods which were much in demand, such as spices, and paid large sums in ushr. It is known that the tax obtained from the Yemenites was left in its entireby for the Sharifs of Mecca and was not shared by the Egyptian Sultans. Thus, the increase in this revenue benefitted the Sharifs of Mecca but not their Egyptian overlords. In 881/1476, however, Sultan Qa'it Bay ruled that the revenue obtained from the levy imposed on Indian or other merchandise brought to Jedda was to be shared equally between himself and Sharif Muhammad.³ Such merchandise was usually brought by Yemenite vessels and this ruling of the Sultan meant that the revenue was no longer reserved for the Sharif, who thus lost half of his revenue from this quarter, and the treasury in Cairo benefitted from this encroachment on a long established and recognized right of the Sharifs of Mecca.

However, from 886/1481, the whole revenue obtained from the Yemenite vessels was restored to <u>Sharif Muhammad</u>.⁴ But from 895/1490, the share of the Sharif in the revenue obtained from the Yemenites or

¹Al-Najm Ibn Fahd, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. II, fol. 319; Sakhāwi, <u>al-Daw</u>, vol. VI, pp. 202 and 205-6; Al-'Izz Ibn Fahd, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. I, fol. 35, 38 and 214: vol. II, fols. 134-35 and 149; Ibn Iyas, <u>Bada'i'</u>, vol. III, p.51.

²Al-Najm Ibn Fahd, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. II, fol. 356. See also: Sinjārī, <u>op.</u> <u>cit.</u>, vol. II, fol. 12.

³Al-Najm Ibn Fahd, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol.II, fols. 356 and 368. See also: Jazirī,<u>op.cit.</u>, p.338; Isāmī, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. IV, p.277; Sinjārī, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. II, fol. 12.

⁴Al-Najm IbnFahd, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. II, fol. 374. See also: Jazīrī, <u>op.cit.</u>, pp. 340 and 685.

those regarded as such was again reduced to one half and the other half reserved for the royal treasuryin Cairo.¹

Sultan Qa'it Bay is praised for his fairness and justice,² but his financial encroachment on the <u>Sharif's rights reflect the extent of</u> his financial need. It was this which led him to issue an order in 894/1489 to his officials in Jedda instructing them to take <u>ushr</u> on the merchandise which belonged to Egyptian dignitaries - apparently without differentiating between imports and exports - whose privileged tax position was thus terminated.³

From a report of Ibn Iyas concerning the sinking of an Egyptian vessel in 912/1506 it is evident that the involvement of the Egyptian Amirs in trade transactions to and from Jedda was considerable. The merchandise sent by some was valued at 10,000 dinars.⁴

Though it was not unusual for the Egyptian Sultans or the <u>Sharifs</u> of Mecca to extort money from merchants or to confiscate their goods, the deportation of some merchants from Mecca to Cairo between 894-5/ 1489-90 for the purpose of extorting money from them was an extraordinary act indicative of **Ga'it Bay's** weakened financial position.⁶

Despite the fact that the general population of Mecca had little direct connection with the commercial activities in the region, their financial position was undoubtedly affected in one way or another

¹Al-'Izz Ibn Fahd, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. I, fols. 120, 157, 159, 168 and 213. See also: Jazīrī, <u>op.cit</u>., p.346.

²Sakhāwi, <u>al-Daw</u>, vol. VI, pp. 202 and 205-6; Ibn Tyas, <u>Bada'i</u>, vol. III, p.51.

⁵Al- ^cIzz Ibn Fahd, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. I, fol. 108.

⁴Bada'i', vol. IV, p.103.

⁵This sometimes went so far that some left Mecca for good. See: Fasi, <u>al-'Iqd</u>, vol. I, part II, fol. 462b: vol. II, part III, fol. 65a and 78b; Abū (Bā) Makhrma, op.cit., vol. II, p.69.

⁶For further details, see: Sakhawi, al-Dhayl (ed. A.Al-Hassu), pp. 436 and 460-61.

with the intensity or decline of trade in the region. Various references in the sources show that in the later part of the period under consideration the commercial activities in the area were in continuous decline¹ and consequently the financial position of many Meccans was weakened and they suffered hardship.²

This decline must have reduced the revenue obtained from the merchants in Jedda, affecting the financial position of Sultan Qa'it Bay as well as of <u>Sharif Muhammad</u>, especially the latter, whose income from the Yemenites was also cut by half. However, no figures are given in the sources concerning the total revenue and the share of the Sultan or the <u>Sharif</u> in the closing years of the 9th century of the Hijra/15th century of the Christian era.

Qa'it Bay's son and successor, al-Malik al-Nasir Muhammad (<u>Dhu'l-</u> Qa'da 901-Rabi' I 904/August 1496-November 1498) had inherited acute financial difficulties. Unable to improve the revenue through better commercial policy, he seems to have adopted a policy of exploitation. Thus, for instance, in <u>Shawwal</u> 902/June 1497 the Sultan instructed <u>Sharif Muhammad and officials in Jedda to buy pepper for</u> the Sultan at the price of the previous year - which was obviously cheaper - and in the same quantity. The officials were ordered to prevent the Syrian merchants from leaving Jedda with their merchandise.³ This presumably implied sending them to Egypt for the payment of dues and the order was apparently carried out.

¹For details, see: Sakhawi, al-Dhayl (ed. A.Al-Hassu), pp. 427, 458, 495 and 544-45; Al- ⁶Izz 1bn Fahd, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. I, fols: 9, 18-19, 23-24, 30, 33, 107, 119, 129, 156, 228, 248 and 258; vol. II, fols. 29, 39, 80-81, 92, 141, 158 and 193.

²Sakhāwi, al-Dhayl (ed. A.Al-Hassu), pp. 257, 317, 354,4271, 454 and 458; Al-Izz Ibn Fahd, op.cit., vol. I, fol. 119.

⁵Al-'Izz Ibn Fahd, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. I, fols. 213-14.

Varthema who visited Mecca in 1503 A.D. found that the quantity and variety of goods in Mecca failed to come up to his expectations, but describes them nevertheless as considerable.¹ He found in the port of Jedda about one hundred vessels of various sizes,² many of which must have served purely commercial ends.

It seems that the frequent disruption of law and order in the area by Yahya and his supporters³ had made the merchants rather reluctant to come to Jedda and Mecca and they preferred to carry out their commercial transactions in the relative safety of Aden. This port seemed to have regained much of its old importance and was teeming again with ships. Thus, for instance, early in 911/June or July 1505, about eighty Indian and other commercial vessels were anchored there.

This seems to have made the Sultani officials in Jedda envious and they sent a messenger to these merchants with an invitation to come to Jedda. They are reported to have shown willingness but made certain undisclosed conditions. So the messenger had to return to discuss them with the <u>Sharif</u> and the <u>Na'ib</u> of Jedda, who presumably agreed, as the messenger rushed back to Aden in order to deliver the reply before the merchants' departure from that port.⁴ Apparently it was in response to this invitation that, at the end of the same year, about thirty-seven vessels of Indian, Hurmuzi and Yemenite origin reached Jedda.⁵

¹<u>The travels</u>, pp. 38-39 and 49-50. ²<u>Ibid</u>, p.54. See also: G.Wiet, <u>Les Marchands</u>, p.102. ³See <u>supra</u>, pp.**95**-96. ⁴Al-'Izz Ibn Fahd, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. II, fol.87. ⁵<u>Ibid</u>., fol.109. The rebellious movement of Yahya grew to unforeseen proportions and <u>Na^{*}ib</u> Jedda Amir Husayn al-Kurdi felt obliged to instruct the ruler of Sawākin in Ramadān911/February 1506 to refrain from sheltering Yahya's supporters. Amir Husayn had also instructed the ruler of Sawākin, for obvious commercial reasons, to deny entry to such vessels as did not anchor there as a rule.¹ This appears to have been disregarded which, in/addition to the Portuguese threat, may have contributed to the occupation of Sawākin by the Egyptians in the following year.²

Amir Husayn had, for political as well as financial reasons, imposed a commercial blockade on Yanbu^c. In Safar 912/June or July 1506, three commercial vessels heading for Yanbu^c were intercepted by an Egyptian combat vessel. Two of them, with their cargo, and goods of the third vessel, which was damaged, were brought to Jedda and the merchandise sold to the merchants.³

In view of such internal disorder, the harmful effect of the Portuguese, and the exploitation by the local authorities, the decline of Jedda is not surprising. The wonder is that the commercial activities there continued, even on a modest scale, despite all the unfavourable conditions and obstacles. The revenue must have been decreased but it was not negligible. In 913/1507, for instance, the share of <u>Sharif Barakāt II and his brother Qa</u>⁹ it Bay in the revenue of Jedda is reported to have been 10,000.⁴ Obviously a similar amount at least was sent for the treasury in Cairo. In 915/1509, the

¹Al-'Izz Ibn Fahd, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. II, fol. 103. ²Ibn Iyas, <u>Bada'i'</u>, vol. IV, p.96. ³AlfIzz Ibn Fahd, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. II, fol.123. ⁴<u>Ibid.</u>, fol. 131. amount obtained in Jedda for Sultan al-<u>Ghawri</u> is said to have been in 70,000¹ but the references mention/neither of these two cases whether it was a question of dinars or of dirhams.

Ibn Iyās, reporting under 920/1514, states that since 914/1508 no commercial vessel reached Jedda.² Evidence from others sources amply proves that this was not the case. In addition to the figures mentioned above, the fact that in 916/1510 four Indian commercial vessels managed to reach Jedda, though some of them were chased by the Portuguese, indicates clearly that the port of Jedda was by no means abandoned or ceased to function as an important commercial centre. The captains of these vessels informed the local authorities that three more Indian boats were on their way to Jedda.³ G.Wiet⁴ points to quite a lively trade in Cairo which received spices and other merchandise from India, Persia and Mecca as late as 918/1512.⁵

In the closing years of the <u>Burji</u> period, the Portuguese became a serious threat to Jedda itself. Ibn Iyas reports the arrest of three <u>Faranj⁶</u> spies in Mecca in Jumādā I 916/September 1510. These were disguisedas Turks and were sent in chains to Cairo.⁷ In all

¹<u>Ibid.</u>, fol. 165.
²<u>Badāi</u>, vol. IV, p.359.
³Al-'Izz Ibn Fahd, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. II, fol. 177.
⁴On the basis of the account given by J.Thenaud.
⁵<u>Les Marchands</u>, p.95.
⁶The Auchie term for the Evente. For fourther details, east B.Leni

⁶The Arabic term for the Franks. For further details, see: B.Lewis, and J F.P.Hopkins, <u>E.I.</u>², art. "Ifran<u>dj</u>", pp. 1044-46.

⁷Badā'i', vol. IV, p.191. See also: Ahmad Darrāj, <u>al-Mamālik wa'l-</u> Faranj fi'l-Qarn al-Tāsi' al-Hijrī (Cairo, 1961), p.147. probability, they were Portuguese and were busy gathering information on the political, commercial and military strength of the area. Though no Portuguese attack on Jedda, during the period in question, occurred,  $\perp$  their activities in other parts of the world, particularly in India and the Red Sea, was the main reason for its decline. Ibn lyas, followed by al-Bakari, attributes this to the unjust treatment of the indigenous and foreign merchants in Jedda and other Egyptian ports by the Sultan and his officials but, from his own account and details provided by a number of modern scholars it is evident that such appressive policies were contributory factors and not the main cause, as after all this was not the exclusive case in the closing years of the Burji period but had been a long established practice. Thus, it is certain that this decline was not brought about by certain individuals, but by a combination of several reasons - both local and international - including the Portuguese menaces which were undoubtedly a major factor and dealt a heavy blow to the Egyptian domination of the spice trade. From the early tenth/sixteenth century the Portuguese fleets had almost continuously harassed and intercepted the Indian and other commercail vessels and had made several armed attacks on various Muslim rulers. They were able to establish their naval supremacy in eastern water and subsequently took control of the spice trade. Lisbon had been growing fast at the expense of Jedda and other Egyptian ports and had become the most important centre of the spice trade. It is interesting to note that Ibn Jyas, while

¹A Portuguese commander, Lapo Soares de Albergaria, is reported to have sailed to the Jedda harbour in 923/1517 in pursuit of the <u>Mamlük</u> fleet commanded by Salman Re'is but declined to attack the city because of its powerful fortifications. See: R.Hartmann, <u>E.I.²</u>, art. "<u>Dj</u>udda", p.572.

referring to the scarcity of various commodities in Egypt in the closing years of the period in question does not refer to spices, which implies that this trade had been diverted from Egypt to Portugal, a fact explicitly mentioned by modern scholars.¹

¹For details, see: Ibn Iyas, <u>Bada'i'</u>, vol. IV, pp. 44-46, 109, 287, 317, 359 and 433: vol. V, pp. 88 and 186; Al-Bakarī, <u>op.cit.</u>, fol. 29; B.Lewis, "Egypt and Syria" in <u>The Cambridge History of Islam</u>, vol. I, pp. 228-29; R.B.Serjeant, <u>op.cit.</u>, pp. 13-17 and 35; A.Darrāj, <u>op.cit.</u>, pp. 127-29, 132-34, 136-38, 146 and 154-56; W.Heyd, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. II, p.427, 510-14, 517-29, 533-37 and 547-50. See also the sources mentioned on p.**26**[4] infra, fn. [.

#### Chapter V

FINANCIAL		 	 	
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#### A <u>Gifts</u>

The personal gifts the <u>Sharifs</u> of Mecca received from the Egyptian Sultans, the royal family or the Egyptian nobility were usually of great value. These when sent by their Egyptian overlords, were either a form of hep from sovereign to subordinate, or were compliments returned. They were not politically motivated as the hold of the <u>Burji</u> Sultans over the Hijāz was so great that they hardly needed to propitiate the <u>Sharifs</u> of Mecca. But such gifts were not only materially useful for the <u>Sharifs</u>, they had political significance as well. They obviously reflected the favour of the Sultan and the <u>Sharif</u> in question must have exploited the occasion to boost the morale of his supporters, to put pressure on his opponents, to strengthen his authority within the Meccan region and to enhance his prestige, if not influence, among other local chiefs and Amirs.

The first grant of valuable gifts, during the period under consideration, was during the rule of Sultan Barquq. In <u>Sha</u> ban 794/ July1392, the Sultan summoned to Cairo the <u>Sharifs</u> 'Ali and 'Anan, joint Amirs of Mecca, on receiving the news of their animosity against each other and appointed 'Ali sole Amir of Mecca.¹ The Sultan showered the <u>Sharif</u> with costly gifts. They consisted of 3,000 Irdab of wheat, 1,000 Irdab of barley, 1,000 Irdab of beans, ten <u>Mamlüks</u> and forty horses, including a mount which had belonged to the Sultan and whose

¹See <u>supra</u>, pp. 60-61.

saddle and bridle were ornamented with pure gold. A number of Egyptian Amirs also presented the <u>Sharif</u> with various valuable gifts including Mamlūks and horses.¹

In or around <u>Shawwal 797/August 1394</u>, <u>Sharif Hasan was released</u> and appointed Amir of Mecca following the assassination of his brother 'Ali in Mecca.² Sultan Barquq granted him, on his departure from Cairo, military and financial support which included a quantity of grain which had earlier been sent to Yanbu' for sale. Early in 798/ November or December 1395, <u>Sharif Hasan reached Yanbu'</u> and demanded its Amir, Wubayr b. Mikhbar: should hand over the grain. The latter showed reluctance and Hasan prepared for battle, but this was averted when Hasan was compensated for the grain by the Amir of Yanbu' with 35,000 dirhams.³

In Jumādā I 845/October 1441, <u>Sharif</u> 'Alī was appointed Amir of Mecca following the deposition of Barakāt I by Sultan Jaqmaq.⁴ <u>Sharif</u> 'Alī, before leaving Cairo, was granted 5,000 dinars by the Sultan.⁵

¹Meccan sources confirm the details as mentioned above, but the accounts of Egyptian sources - though agreeing in essential points - differ slightly. Ibn al-Furat followed by Maqrīzī, for instance, gives most of the over-stated details but differs from other sources on the gifts of <u>Mamlūks</u> and horses by the Egyptian Amirs. Instead they add that 'Ali was allowed to employ one hundred <u>Mamlūks</u>. Ibn Hajar followed by Ibn Taghri Birdi and Janābi merely refer to various gifts describing them as being substantial but without giving details of each item. For the points mentioned above and other relevant details, see: Ibn al-Furāt, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. IX, part II, pp. 303-4, 306 and 308; Fāsi, <u>al-'Iqd</u>, vol. II, part III, fols. 193a-93b; Maqrīzī, <u>Sulūk</u>, vol. III, fols. 155a-55b; Ibn Hajar, <u>Inba'</u>, vol. I, fol. 137b; Ibn Taghri Birdi, <u>al-Manhal</u>, vol. II, fol. 120b; Al-Najm Ibn Fahd, <u>op. cit.</u>, vol. II, fols. 116-17. See also: Janābi, <u>op.cit.</u>, fol. 304b.

²See <u>supra</u>, p.61.

⁴See <u>supra</u>, p. 78.

⁵ Ayni, op.cit., vol.IV, fol. 686b; Sakhawi, al-Tibr, pp. 14-15.

⁵Fasi, <u>al-'Iqd</u>, vol. I, part II, fols. 499b-500a; Al-Najm Ibn Fahd, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. II, fol. 121. See also: Sakhāwi, <u>al-Daw</u>, vol. III, pp. 103-4; Sinjāri, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. I, fol. 333; Țabari, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. I, fol. 63.

In <u>Shawwal 918/January 1513</u>, <u>Sharif Abu Numayy II</u>, accompanied by a number of Meccan notables, paid a visit to Sultan al-<u>Ghawri</u> in Cairo and were well received.¹ Al-'Izz Ibn Fahd states that the <u>Sharif was given valuable gifts but provides no further details</u>. He mentions, however, that those who had accompanied Abu Numayy II received between 60-200 dinars each.² According to Jazīrī, the Sultan granted the <u>Sharif 3,000 gold dinars and minor sums to his companions</u>.³ 'Işāmī states that the gifts received by Abu Numayy II consisted of a flag and forty Mamlūks.⁴

Early in 921/1515, <u>Sharif Barakāt II accompanied the royal family</u> to Cairo.⁵ During his stay and on his departure he was treated with unusual courtesy and was presented with various gifts which included several thousand dinars, a number of <u>Mamlūks</u>, horses, and a quantity of cloth.⁶

As will be seen, several Indian rulers took a keen interest in charitable works in Mecca and often sent valuable gifts to the <u>Sharifs</u> of Mecca. The gifts sent by these or the rulers of other areas -excluding Egypt - may not have been given without ulterior motives. The intention might have been to win minor concessions such as permission for their men to gather together in the sanctuary and say prayers for their ruler at private meetings. Though the offering of prayers at such meetings was neither of any political significance nor was restricted unless opposed by the authorities for one reason or another, it cas not without some importance and at least it must have provided some satisfaction to the rulers concerned. These rulers seem to have

¹See <u>supra</u>, pp. 96-97.
²<u>Bulügh</u>, vol. II, fols. 220-21.
³<u>Durar</u>, p.359.
⁴<u>Simt</u>, vol. IV, pp. 309-11.
⁵See <u>supra</u>, pp. 97-98.
⁶For details, see: Al-'Izz Ibn Fahd, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. II, fols. 256 and

sent their gifts also to secure the <u>Sharif's</u> help in building and maintaining pious and charitable institutions, or last but not least, to ensure that their merchants and pilgrims were fairly treated in Mecca.

Several mentions/gifts of Indian provenance, in cash or kind, occur in the sources within the period in question. But the data available seldom provides additional information.¹

Occasional references to gifts of the Yemeni Sultan to the <u>Sharifs</u> and officials of Mecca are found in the sources. They mostly concern the early <u>Burji</u> period and do not seem to have been of great material value.²

Sharifs of Mecca seem to have been entitled to the meccipt of some fixed amounts from the rulers of certain countries and there are effect references to the / . that they occasionally claim their dues by sending special envoys to Egypt,³ 'Iraq⁴ and Hurmuz.⁵

Varthema states that he, during his stay in Mecca in May, 1503 A.D., saw two unicorns which were presented by 'a king of Ethiopia, that is, by a Moorish king" to the <u>Sharif of Mecca</u>, either Barakat II

259-60; Ibn Iyas, <u>Bada'i</u>, vol. IV, pp. 436-42, 445-49 and 453-57. See also: Jaziri, <u>op.cit.</u>, p.360; 'Işami, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. IV, p.317.

¹Fasi, <u>Shifa</u>, vol. I, p.11; idem, <u>al-'Iqd</u>, vol. I, part II, fols. 288b, 405a and 406b; Maqrizi, <u>Suluk</u>, vol.II, fol. 349; Ibn Hajar, <u>Inba</u>, vol. I, fol. 242a; Al-Najm Ibn Fahd, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. II, fols. 104, 112, 136-37, 147 and 164-65; Al-'Izz Ibn Fahd, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. I, fol. 151. See also: Nahrawali, <u>al-I'lam</u>, pp. 13 and 198-99; Janabi, <u>op.cit.</u>, fols. 304a and 305a; 'Isami, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. IV, pp. 34-35; Sinjari, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. I, fol. 338; Tabari, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. I, fols. 73-74; Dahlan, <u>op.cit.</u>, p.37.

²For details, see: Ibn Wahhas, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. II, p.298; Fasi, <u>al-'Iqd</u>, vol. I, part I, fol. 97a; Al-Najm; Ibn Fahd, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. II, fol. 150; <u>Kh</u>azraji, <u>op.cit.</u>, fols. 479-80

²Fasi, <u>al-'I</u>d, vol. I, part II, fol. 404b; Al-Najm Ibn Fahd, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. II, fol. 136.

4 Magrīzī, <u>Sulūk</u>, vol. II, fol. 349.

⁵Al-Najm Ibn Fahd, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. II, fol. 204.

or his brother, Ahmad al-Jazanī, as a prelude to an alliance.¹ However, this statement is not supported by any other source and it is difficult to believe that a foreign ruler had attempted to form an alliance with a <u>Sharif</u> whose military strength, at its best, could hardly have been able to assist a distant ally.

### B. <u>Sharif's customary claim to one-third of the Sadagat</u>

As will be seen, a number of Muslim rulers, officials and dignitaries sent to or distributed in Mecca a considerable amount of charities. They consisted partly of personal donations, in cash or kind, and partly of the revenue of  $\underline{Awgaf}^3$  set up in favour of the holy cities, Mecca and Medina, or for other pious purposes.

Though figures or quantities of such donations are rarely mentioned in the sources the use of certain set phrases or occasional reference in the sources to the figures and quantities of such donations, as will be seen, indicates that the amounts in question were considerable and their obvious aim was to benefit the poor and needy. However, to judge by the details found in the sources, especially in Al-Najm Ibn Fahd and his son Al-⁴Izz Ibn Fahd, this was rarely the

¹The Travels, pp. 46-49.

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³Sing. "<u>Waqf</u>", endowment. The term <u>waqf</u> or <u>Habs</u> in Muslim legal terminology means primarily to protect a thing, to prevent it from becoming the property of a third person (<u>tamlīk</u>), but it is widely used for a pious endowment. For further details,see: Heffening, <u>E.I.¹</u>, art. "Wakf or Habs", pp. 1096-1103. Endowments established for pious purposes are usually called "Waqf khayri", while those for the benefit of the donor's family are referred to as "<u>waqf Ahli</u>".

²Sing. "<u>Sadaga</u>", charity. This term is sometimes used as synonymous with <u>Zakat</u>, that is, the legal and compulsory poor-tax (<u>sec-appen</u>) <u>persity</u>. But more frequently and accurately this term₁ is used to denote the voluntary alms-giving. See: T.H.Weir, <u>E.I.</u>, art."Sadaka", pp. 33-35.

case. The general pattern of the distribution observed with all charitable donations - on the basis of the details provided by the aforesaid Meccan historians - was almost immutable. The distribution lay - with the exception of the Egyptian <u>al-Surr al-Hukmi</u> and <u>al-Dhakhira¹</u> - seemingly sent separately to the <u>Gadis</u> of each particular school or to the individual concerned respectively- in the hand of the <u>Gadi Shafa</u> of Mecca. The <u>Sharifs</u> of Mecca took, exclusive of the Egyptian <u>Sadaga</u>, one-third² of the wholdamount as his due and the lion's share of the remainder was distributed among the <u>Gadis</u> and various other officials, especially among those attached to the Meccan sanctuary. This may have been a long established practice but explicit references to this effect are found from 881/1476 onwards.³

This claim of the <u>Sharifs</u> of Mecca to one-third of the donation, or the exclusive privilege of the <u>Qadi Shafa'i</u> were rarely questioned; neither was the eligibility of the <u>Qadis</u>, <u>Imams</u> and other officials as recipients of large portions of the charities. The share of the poor,

²R.B.Serjeant, referring to the revenues of the <u>Sharifs</u> of Mecca; states that <u>Sharif</u> Barakāt I took one-fourth of these contributions. See: <u>The Portuguese</u>, pp. 5-6. This, however, does not seem to have been confined to this <u>Sharif</u> but was common to all the <u>Sharifs</u> who claimed usually one-third as their due.

¹The word <u>Surr</u> literally means "a sealed bag of money" and the whole term <u>al-Surr al-Hukmi</u> denotes the allowance or the salary derived from the revenue of endowments. As to <u>al-Dhakhira</u>, the term which is vaguely translated as "treasure or treasury", was applied to sums sent *to* individually, from the state treasury or the personal fortune of the Egyptian Sultan in grants or for the benefit of certain welfare works. See: Fasi, <u>al-'Icd</u>, vol. I, part II, fols. 303a-3b and 306a-6b; Nahrawali, <u>al-I'lam</u>, p.285; Al-Bakari, <u>op.cit.</u>, fol. 51; Sinjari, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. II, fols. 53-54; 'Ali al-Tabari, <u>op.cit.</u>, fols. 130 and 132; Tabari, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol.I, fol. 178.

³For details, see: Al-Najm Ibn Fahd, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. II, fol. 359; Al-'Izz Ibn Fahd, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. I, fols. 44, 46, 51, 59, 64, 124, 138-39, 151-52, 186, 192, 198 and 216: vol. II, fols. 83, 114, 123-24, 152 and 211-13.

the ostensible beneficiaries, was the smallest, and it appears doubtful, in the light of the above mentioned pattern, in respect of the distribution, whether it was a question of abuse by local authorities or whether part of these donations was intended, from the outset, as grants for these officials.

The customary claim of the <u>Sharifs</u> of Mecca to one-third of the <u>Sadaqa</u> was, on the whole, recognized by the Egyptian Sultans as well as by the contributors. The Ottoman Sultan Selim I (918-26/ 1512-20) seems to have been reluctant to accept this right of the <u>Sharifs</u>. This is evident from a report of Al-'Izz Ibn Fahd that in 919/1513 the Egyptian Sultan informed <u>Sharif Barakāt II that the</u> Ottoman Sultan had consulted him about the validity of this claim and that he (i.e. al-<u>Ghawri</u>) had confirmed that the practice was long established and observed.¹

As has already been stated, the figures concerning the amount of contributions is seldom given in the sources and thus it is not possible to give the exact figures concerning the revenue of the Sharifs of Mecca through their customary share in the <u>Sadaqat</u>, but a rough estimate is possible on the basis of the few figures available mentioned in the chapter dealing exclusively with <u>Sadaqat</u>.

## C. Sharif's right in al-Mawarith al-Hashariyya (escheat).²

This was one of the sources of revenue for the <u>Sharifs</u> of Mecca and of the Egyptian Sultans.

## ¹Bulügh, vol.II, fol. 226.

²It is necessary to explain a few essential points before going into details relevant to the revenue of the <u>Sharifs</u> of Mecca through this source. <u>Mawarith</u> (sing. <u>Mirath</u>, legacy); <u>Hashariyya</u> (derived from <u>Hashr</u>, doomsday). The term al-<u>Mawarith</u> al-<u>Hashariyya</u> means "succession to the inheritance of persons dying without legal heirs". See: N.J.Coulson and others, <u>E.I.²</u>, art. "Bayt al-Mal", p.1144. The nearest English equivalent to al-Mawarith al-<u>Hashariyya</u> is

escheat which is used in this discussion with some reservation. It

The amount of money obtained from escheat appears to have formed a regular and fairly substantial portion of the total revenue and officials who were mainly concerned to claim it were appointed in both Cairo¹ and Mecca.² It seems that from 896/1491, if not earlier, <u>Nazir al-Mawarith al-Hashariyya</u> even accompanied the Egyptian pilgrim caravan in order to secure the escheat.³

In the early part of the <u>Burji</u> period, the escheat of those died in the Meccan region was claimed in its entirely for the <u>Sharifs</u> of Mecca, who seem to have refrained from encroaching on the rights of the legal heirs. Thus, for instance, when at the time of <u>Sharif</u>

is known that the term escheat denotes the acquisition by the state of the property of a person who dies intestate and without issue or next of kin. Al-Mawarith al-Hashariyya also is taken over by the state but differs from escheat in the sense that in certain circumstances it could be acquired by the state even despite the existence of some heirs. This is due to the fact that according to Muslim law of inheritance the distribution of legacies is based on a twofold consideration. Certain relatives are entitled to inherit their fixed share and are termed Ashab al-Furud while some others take - in addition to their fixed share - residue after each of the Ashab al-Furud has received his recognized percentage of the total estate, and are termed <u>Usba</u> (sing. <u>Asib</u>). The details concerning both these groups are too long and complicated and could not be given in such a brief note. The important point is respect of this discussion is that if there were no heirs the estate was taken over by the state unless there was a will which was, at least supposedly, carried out. But if there were Ashab al-Furud and no Usba the former were given their share while residue was taken over by the state. See: Qalqashandi, Subh, vol. III, p.464. See also: N.J.Coulson and others, E.I.², art. "Bayt al-Mal", p.1144; Th. W.Jøynholl, E.I.², art. "Fara id", p.783; Joseph Schacht, E.I.¹, art. "Mirath", pp. 508-14.

¹For details see: Qalqashandi, Subh, vol. III, p.464; Maqrīzī, Sulūk, vol. III, fols. 101b and 111a; Ibn Taghri Birdi, Hawādith, part II (ed. W.Popper), p.321; Sakhāwi, al-Tibr, p.215; idem, al-Daw, vol. I, pp. 185 and 293: vol. III, p.184: vol. VII, p.158.

²For details, see: Al-Najm Ibn Fahd, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. II, fols. 281 and 333-34; Sakhāwi, <u>al-Daw</u>, vol. III, p.256; Al-'Izz Ibn Fahd, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. I, fol. 51: vol. II, fols. 149-50 and 223.

⁵Al-'Izz Ibn Fahd, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. I, fol. 138; Jaziri, <u>op.cit.</u>, p.344.

Ahmad b. 'Ajlān a rich merchant died in Mecca, his son anticipating a claim by the <u>Sharif</u> to a share in the estate sent him 200,000 dirhams. The <u>Sharif</u> did not accept it and sent it back. The son of the merchant, supposing that the <u>Sharif</u> had found the sum inadequate, doubled it, and it is to the credit of the <u>Sharif</u> that he declined it again stating that he did not consider himself entitled to a share.¹

But when there were no heirs, the Sharifs of Mecca were more than willing to take fortunes to which there were no legal claimants. The right of the Sharifs to the escheat was not confined to the amounts left by persons of Meccan origin but applied to the belongings of all those who died intestate and without legal heirs in Mecca. Thus, for instance, when a rich Egyptian merchant, Ahamad al-Muhalli,² died, on his return journey from the Yemen, in Mecsa in Dhu'l-Qa'da 806/June 1404. According to Ibn Hajar followed by Sakhawi the deceased had brought to Mecca six thousand sacks of spices. Ahmad's sudden death in Mecca, shortly after the death of his father in Egypt, benefitted Sultan Faraj b. Barquq who appears to have gained 100,000 dinars.⁵ According to Fasi followed by Al-Najm Ibn Fahd Sharif Hasan's share in the fortune left by Ahmad al-Muhalli amounted to 1,400 sacks of spices.⁴ Though the market value of this quantity is not made clear it must have been in the vicinity of 75,000 Mithqal of gold, asonly a few years later one thousand sacks of spices reported to have been sold in Egypt

¹Fasi, al-'Iqd, vol. I, part II, fols. 288b-89a.

²See <u>supra</u>, p.62.

- ⁵Ibn Hajar, <u>Inba</u>, vol. I, fol. 209b; Sa<u>kh</u>äwi, <u>al-Daw</u>, vol. I, pp. 112-13 and 197.
- ⁴Fasi, <u>al-'Iqd</u>, vol. I, part II, fol.404a; Al-Najm Ibn Fahd, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. II, fols. 132-33.

for 50,000 Mithqal of gold.

The right of the <u>Sharifs</u> of Mecca to the escheat seems to have been inclusive of the fortunes left in Mecca by the merchants or others who have died elsewhere. Thus, for example, when a Karimi merchant - who had been living in Mecca for some time - went to Yanbu' and died there, heirless, early in 819/March or April 1416, his fortune in Mecca was taken possession of by <u>Sharif Rumaytha</u>.²

In 843/1439, Sultan Jaqmaq confined Sharif Barakat I's right to the escheat to Meccans and reserved the escheat of others for himself.³

In 876/1471, Sultan Qa'it Bay imposed a further limit leaving to Sharif Muhammad the right to claim escheat up to the value of 1,000 dinars, reserving amounts above this figure for himself.⁴ This was re-affirmed by the same Sultan in 881/1476,⁵ and by Sultan al-<u>Ghawri</u> in 915/1509.⁶

Though the rights of legal heirs seem to have been usually respected in the early part of the period under consideration, from around 830/1426-27 there is abundant evidence to the effect that officials of the Egyptian Sultans or of the <u>Sharifs</u> of Mecca took possession, partly or fully, of estates in spite of the existence of heirs to the deceased, and the appointment of <u>Qadi Shafa</u>'i or some other high ranking

¹See <u>infra</u>, p.Z.Z.7.
²Fasi, <u>al-'Iqd</u>, vol. II, part III, fol. 65a.
³Al-Najm Ibn Fahd, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. II, fol. 229. See also: Sinjāri, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. II, fol. 5.
⁴Al-Najm Ibn Fahd, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. II, fols. 333-34.
⁵Al-Najm Ibn Fahd, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. II, fol. 356. See also: Jazīri, <u>op.cit.</u>, p.338; 'Işāmi, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. IV, p.277.
⁶Al-'Izz Ibn Fahd, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. II, fol. 170.

official by the testator as executor of his will. The appointment of these officials by the legator as executor of his will was obviously to safeguard the interest of the legatee but this seldom prevented such encroachment. The figures or the value of such acquisitions is seldom given in the sources. But the simple fact that this welldocumented disregard of the religious and ethical aspects shown, particularly by the officials of the Egyptian Sultans with financial gain in view, proves that the amounts obtained must have been considerable.¹

It appears that, upto 881/1476, the amount obtained for the Cairo treasury by escheat, or by usurpation of inheritance remained, under the care of the <u>Gadi Shafa</u> if of Mecca. But this responsibility was assigned to the <u>Na</u> ib of Jedda in the same year.²

Sultan Qa'it Bay showed ever-increasing interest in escheat. In 887/1482, the Sultan receiving the news of the death of a wealthy merchant in Mecca and anticipating benefitting by a large amount of money from the estate of the deceased, sent his personal slave to Mecca, who even went to India to enforce the Sultan's claim.³

From 888/1483 onwards the Sultan repeatedly instructed <u>Sharif</u> Muhammad and officials in Mecca to sendhim reports on the number of merchants who had died and on the amount they had secured for the treasury from their estates. He occasionally summoned a legatee to Cairo to obtain money for the treasury.⁴

¹For details, see: Al-Najm ibn Fahd, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. II, fols. 199, 202, 205-6, 291-3 and 362; Sakhāwi, <u>al-Tuhfa</u>, vol. I, fol. 629; idem, al-<u>Dhayl</u> (ed. A.Al-Hassu), pp. 316, 331-2, 457 and 528-31; idem, <u>al-Daw</u>, vol. II, p.257: vol. V, p.165: vol. VI, pp. 61 and 270: vol. VII, p.203; Al- Izz Ibn Fahd, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. I, fols. 34, 37, 52, 54, 68, 72, 75, 84, 91, 96-97, 172, 177-79, 183, 200-201, 203, 212, 226-27, 244-45, 253-54 and 258: vol. II, fols. 2, 15, 18, 20, 40-41, 56, 59, 62, 79-80, 84-85, 134-35, 137, 155-56, 158-59, 164-66, 168-70, 174, 178, 189, 210, 214, 221, 225, 228, 231 and 257; Ibn Iyās, <u>Badā'i</u>, vol. IV, pp. 270 and 284.

²Al-Najm Ibn Fahd, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. II, fols. 355-56. See also: Jaziri, <u>op.cit.</u>, p.338; 'Işāmi, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. IV p.277.
 ³Al-'Izz Ibn Fahd, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. I, fols. 21-23.
 ⁴Sakhāwi, al-Dhayl (ed. A.Al-Hassu), p.331; Al?'Izz Ibn Fahd, <u>op.cit.</u>,

Though the exact yield from the escheat is seldom mentioned in the sources, it is obvious from occasional details that it was substantial. Thus, for instance, in 903/1497, Sultan Muhammad b. Qa'it Bay secured from the estate of a deceased merchant in Jedda several boxes of coral, jars of quick silver, a considerable quantity of pure silver, and other valuables. The deceased had several heirs who protested against this but in vain. The Sultani officials sent these items to Cairo together with 4,000 dinars obtained from escheat.¹

The <u>Sharifs</u> of Mecca and their officials were obviously more aware of the fortunes left by a deceased and evidently secured, with or without justification, considerable amounts of money but surprisingly the sources provide very little information concerning the amounts obtained.

The last <u>Burji</u> Sultan, Qanşawh al-<u>Ghawri</u>, is said to have maintained, at least around 915/1509, a spy in Mecca to check on the honesty of his officials and on the prospective income from escheat.² He is particularly criticized for his excessive disregard of the law of inheritance and some of the sources, such as Nahrawali (<u>al-Barq</u>) regards this as the reason for the overthrow of the <u>Mamluk</u> regime.³

vol. I, fols. 38-39, 78, 197 and 214.
¹Al-'Izz Ibn Fahd, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. I, fds. 224-25.
²Al-'Izz Ibn Fahd, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. II, fols. 168-70.
³Nahrawāli,<u>al-I'lām</u>, p.242; idem, <u>al-Barg</u>, pp. 25-26; Ibn al-'Imād, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. VIII, p.114; 'Işāmī, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. IV, p.51.

#### Chapter VI

A BRIEF SURVEY OF THE SADAQAT AND OTHER CONTRIBUTION SENT TO MECCA FOR CHARITABLE WORKS¹

## A. <u>Charities of the Egyptian Sultans and dignitaries sent, in</u>

cash or kind, to assist individuals or maintain welfare

#### institutions.

Various useful points concerning the Egyptian and other charities have already been mentioned,² and from these points one can easily conclude that the Egyptian Sultans took a keen interest in charitable works. The amounts sent by them in financing projects of this kind were derived, from their personal fortune and state treasury, as well as from the revenue of the endowments made in favour of the sanctuaries of Mecca and Medina.

While the revenue of the endowments had to be sent to these holy cities to fulfil the socio-religious obligation, the other contributions made by the non-Egyptian Sultans were in all probability out of piety or simply to acquire personal prestige. But the personal contributions of the Egyptian Sultans, within the period in question, may or maynot have been out of piety and religious sentiment but were definitely a political necessity to justify their hold over the Hijaz.

The first <u>Burji</u> Sultan, Barquq, who is described by Sakhāwi as greedy and mean³ and in the light of such description it may seem unlikely that he made generous contributions. However, various sources including Sawkhāwi praise his good deeds, his charitable donations both in cash

²See <u>supra</u>, pp. 196-98.

³See: Sakhawi, <u>al-Daw</u>, vol. III, p.12; idem, <u>al-Tibr</u>, p.12. See also: Ibn al-Imad, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. VII, pp. 6-7.

¹Obviously, a detailed examination of such a vast subject with its several side issues and relevant institutions was not possible in a single chapter. Therefore, it was inevitable to confine this discussion to mere hints at various contributions, and local practices and institutions.

and kind, and his concern for the welfare of the pilgrims.

Similar credits are given to Sultan al-<u>Shaykh</u>,² Sultan Barsbay,³ and Sultan Jaqmaq whose most important contribution was the distribution of Da<u>shisha⁴</u> in both Mecca and Medina.⁵

An unrivalled position in this respect was held by Sultan Qa'it Bay who by his generous and varied donations by far surpassed all other <u>Burji</u> Sultans. In addition to the usual contributions, he left to Mecca and Medina, as a lasting monument, various buildings and institutions for pious and charitable: purposes such as Mosques, <u>Madrasa</u> (Schools), and <u>Rubat</u>.⁶ He had places of religious significance, including the sanctuary of Mecca, repaired and that **D**f Medina, which had been almost completely destroyed, rebuilt. He destined vast endowments to benefit charitable institutions including a Da<u>shTsha</u> service in

For details, see: Fasi, Shifa', vol. I, pp. 304 and 315: vol. II, p.274; Ibn Taghri Birdi, <u>al-Manhal</u>, vol. I, fol. 180b; Al-Najm Ibn Fahd, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. II, fol. 115; Sakhāwi, al-Dhayl, fol. 64a; idem, <u>al-Daw'</u>, vol. III, p.12; idem, <u>al-Tibr</u>, p.12; idem, <u>al-Tuhfa</u>, vol. I, p.355; <u>Ibid.</u>, vol. I, fol. 690; Ibn Iyas, <u>Bada'i'</u>, vol. I, p.315; idem, <u>Uqud</u>, vol. II, fols. 149b-50a. See also: Jaziri, <u>op.cit.</u>, pp. 315#16.

²Fasi, Shifa, vol. I, p.348; idem, <u>al-'Iqd</u>, vol. I, part I, fols. 27a and 40b, part II, fol. 363a; Al-Najm Ibn Fahd, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. II, fols. 161-63, 173-75 and 178; Sakhawi, <u>al-Tuhfa</u>, vol. I, fol. 629. See also: Jaziri, <u>op.cit.</u>, pp. 21, 25 and 326-27; Nahrawali, <u>al-I'lam</u>, p.204; Tabari, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. I, fol.79.

³Al-Najm Ibn Fahd, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. II, fols. 196-97 and 204; Sakhawi, <u>al-Daw'</u>, vol.III, p.126.

⁴The alternative form is <u>Jashisha</u>, and both these terms describe the free distribution of prepared meals among the needy.

⁵Sakhāwī, <u>al-Daw</u>, vol. III, p.73: vol. X, pp. 155-56. See also: Sakhāwī, <u>al-Tuhfa</u>, vol. I, p.413; Nahrawālī, <u>al-I`lām</u>, p.333; Ibn al-'Imād, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. VII, p.291; Marʿī Hanbalī, <u>op.cit.</u>, fol. 58; 'Alī al-Ţabarī, <u>op.cit</u>., fol. 131.

⁶Also <u>Ribāt</u>, the term originally meant a fortified place but here it is used for the places built to serve as free lodgings for the pilgrims, travellers, or needy inhabitants. For further details see: Georges Marçais, <u>E.I.</u>, art. "Ribāt", pp. 1150-53. Medina on a grand scale around 885/1480.¹

There is no clear reference in the sources to a simultaneous introduction of <u>Dashisha</u> on the same scale in Mecca at the expense of the same Sultan. However, the existence of this service in Mecca before Qa'it Bay is reported.² The Sultan himself seems to have arranged the distribution of <u>Dashisha</u> in Mecca prior to that in Medina.

In 875/1470, Ibn al-Zaman, an official of Sultan Qa'it Bay, who was engaged by order and at the expense of the Sultan in some construction work in Mecca, undertook arrangements for <u>Dashīsha</u> to be distributed among the poor and needy of Mecca and made several endowments to provide the necessary funds for this purpose.³ Though these free meals could have been Ibn al-Zaman's personal contribution to the welfare services of Mecca, it is more likely that they were financed by the Sultan himself, an assumption which is not disproved by the fact that this particular charity is named after Ibn al-Zaman. According to Nahrawālī, this <u>Dashīsha</u> of Ibn al-Zaman continued functioning until well after the <u>Burjī</u> period.⁴

¹For details, see: Al-Najm Ibn Fahd, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. II, fol. 372; Sakhāwi, <u>al-Tuhfa</u>, vol. I, fol. 688; idem, <u>al-Daw</u>, vol. VI, pp. 206-7; idem, <u>al-Dhayl</u> (ed. A.Al-Hassu), pp. 189-90, 257, 262, 296 and 305; Samhūdi, <u>Wafa</u>, vol. I, pp. 462-65, 507 and 515-16; idem, <u>Khulāsa</u>, pp. 160-61; <u>Al- Izz</u> Ibn Fahd, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. I, fol. 57; Ibn Iyas, <u>Bada</u>i, vol. III, pp. 156, 160, 206 and 321-22; idem, <u>'Uqud</u>, vol. II, fols. 229b-30a and 240b-41a. See also: Jazīrī, <u>op.cit.</u>, pp. 336, 338-40, 343 and 682-85; Nahrawālī, <u>al-I lām</u>, pp. 100, 223-36 and 426; Ibn al- Imād, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. VIII, pp. 6-9; Mar'i Hanbalī, <u>op.cit.</u>, fol. 58; 'Alī al-Tabari, <u>op.cit.</u>, tols. 131-32; Sinjārī, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. II, fols. 11-17; 'Işāmi, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. IV, pp. 43-47 and 277; Tabari, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. I, fols. 124-33.

²See <u>supra</u>, p.2.05.

³Sakhāwi, <u>al-Daw</u>, vol. VIII, pp. 260-62. See also: Nahrawāli, <u>al-I'lām</u>, pp. 105-6.

4A1-I'lam, pp. 225-26. See also: 'Işami, op.cit., vol. IV, p.44.

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Sakhāwi referring to the grant of Qā'it Bāy a maintenance allowance to the staff of his school in Mecca in 882/1477 states that the Sultan had destined for this purpose the revenue of a number of endowments to the amount of 2,000 dinars annually, apart from an unspecified but large: quantity of wheat. This may have been sent for use in the Sultan's <u>Dashīsha</u>, the existence of which is confirmed around this year and later by the sources.¹

The death of a Sultan may have occasionally exercised a disruptive influence on the <u>Dashīsha</u> service, but did not necessarily cause an interruption in the distribution of the meals, not only because his successor was most likely ready to finance it but also because the income from the endowments alone may have sufficed in case of need. This is corroborated by a remark of Al-'Izz Ibn Fahd that in <u>Dhu'l-Hijja 889/December 1484</u> or January 1485, two parallel <u>Dashīsha</u> services were in existence in Mecca, one endowed by Sultan Jaqmaq (d. 857/1453), and the other by the then ruling Sultan, Ga'itBāy, and that they were functioning side by side, but independently of each other.²

The <u>Dashisha</u> of some Sultans was occasionally suspended in his lifetime. There is corroborative evidence to this effect in Sakhawi. In 893 and early in 894/1487-88, the distribution of bread and Sultan Qa'it Bay's <u>Dashesha</u> in Medina was suspended and it was almost at the same time that many people were deprived of their share

²Al-'Izz Ibn Fahd, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. I, fol. <u>5</u>8.

¹Sakhāwī, al-Daw², vol. VI, pp. 206-7: vol. XI, pp. 58-60; Al-⁴Izz Ibn Fahd, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol.I, fols. 43 and 45. See also: Ibn al-⁴Imād, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. VIII, pp. 6-9.

of freely distributed bread in Mecca, well before Qa'it Bay's death.¹ This suspension was evidently due to some financial difficulty, as in 896/1491, if not earlier, the distribution of bread and <u>Dashīsha</u> in Mecca seems, according to an entry made by Al-'Izz Ibn Fahd, restored to its former level.² Qā'it Bāy's <u>Dashīsha</u> seems to have also been resumed in Medina at a later date as its suspension in Medina is referred to by Ibn Iyās under a date following Qā'it Bāy's death in Dhu'l-Qa'da 901/August 1496.³ It can be assumed that it was also suspended in Mecca at about the same time, as in both Mecca and Medina the distribution of <u>Dashīsha</u> is reported to be in full swing again in 907/1501⁴ and 912/1506⁵ respectively.

Ibn Iyas describes the last <u>Burji</u> Sultan, Qanşawh al-<u>Ghawri</u>, as mean and greedy,⁶ an allegation which may or may not have been true. It is, however, an indisputable fact that welfare services under al-<u>Ghawri</u> left much to be desired. But it must be admitted that, though the financial problems facing him were many and arduous, several references in the sources, including Ibn Iyas himself, confirm it beyond doubt that the Sultan made some contribution to charity and general welfare in Mecca, even if it was on a modest scale.⁷

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<sup>1</sup>Sakhāwī, al-Dhayl (ed. A.Al-Hassu), p.426.
<sup>2</sup>Al-'Izz Ibn Fahd, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. I, fol. 135.
<sup>3</sup>Ibn Iyās, <u>'Uqūd</u>, vol. II, fol. 241a.
<sup>4</sup>Al- 'Izz Ibn Fahd, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. II, fol. 8.
<sup>5</sup>Ibn Iyās, <u>Badā'i'</u>, vol. IV, p.103.
<sup>6</sup><u>Badā'i'</u>, vol. IV, p.441.
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⁷Ibn Iyās, <u>Badā</u>i, vol. IV, pp.133, 144, 151-52 and 163: vol. V, p.93; See also: Ibn Zuhayra, <u>op.cit.</u>, pp. 338-39; Jaziri, <u>op.cit.</u>, <u>pp. 25-</u> 26; Nahrawālī, <u>al-I'lām</u>, pp. 240, 244, 338 and 420; Al-Bakari, <u>op.</u> <u>cit.</u>, fol. 31; Ibn al- Imād, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. VIII, pp. 113-14; Sinjāri, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. II, fols. 19-20 and 38; 'Isāmī, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. IV, pp. 52-53 and 84; Tabari, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. I, fol. 158. The Egyptian Sultans sent frequently, if not annually, a considerably amount to a large number of Meccans through <u>al-Surr</u> <u>al-Hukmi</u> and <u>al-Dhakhira</u>. The institution of <u>al-Surr</u> can be traced back, as will be seen, to the pre-<u>Burji</u> period, while <u>al-Dhakhira</u> seems to have been introduced at a later date. Many Meccans depended for their livelihood on their share in these contributions. The beneficiaries were either officials or chosen arbitrarily from among the local population. The amounts of these contributions are not mentioned, but must have been at least on the level of subsistence. The fact that both <u>al-Dhakhira</u> and <u>al-Surr al-Hukmi</u> could be also sent as or in lieu of a salary indicates that they were not pure charities but verged on remuneration for services rendered.

It appears that whatever the character of <u>al-Surr</u> - that is, whether it was a grant, an allowance, a charitable donatim or a salary proper - it represented a lifelong entitlement, and one that could be expected with a certain regularity. <u>Al-DhakhTra</u>, on the other hand, appears to have represented an occasional rather than a regular payment. <u>Al-DhakhTra</u> exhibits the same slightly ambiguous character of half grant and half salary as <u>al-Surr</u>. When <u>al-DhakhTra</u> first appeared in Mecca and Medina on a regular basis is not clear; this much is certain that it became quite substantial under Sultan Jaqmaq. He is reported to have granted numerous allowances and salaries, ranging between ten and one hundred dinars from <u>al-DhakhTra</u>. The sources contain occasional references - during the period under consideration - to the arrival of <u>al-DhakhTra</u> in the holy cities, but seldom provide further details.²

¹Sakhāwi, <u>al-Daw</u>, vol. III, pp. 72-73: vol. X., p.125.

²Sakhāwi, <u>al-Daw</u>, vol. V, p.247: vol. IX, p.33: vol. X, p.125; idem, <u>al-Tuhfa</u>, vol. I, fol. 688; Samhūdi, <u>Wafa</u>, vol. I, pp. 11-14 and 516-17; idem, <u>Khulā</u>sa, p.165; Al- Izz Ibn Fahd, <u>op.cit</u>., vol. II,

Regular remittance of <u>al-Surr</u> to Mecca can be established for the whole of the <u>Burji</u> period and there is evidence to indicate that the practice existed before. This regularity is ascribable to the fact that, to many officials of the Meccan sanctuary, <u>al-Surr</u> was identical with their salary long before the period in question. Al-Fasi, for instance, states that a well-to-do Meccan <u>Gadi</u>, <u>Shihāb</u> al-Dīn Ahmad al-Tabarī (d. 760/1359), used to lend money to officials of the Meccan sanctuary and other recipients of <u>al-Surr</u> (<u>ahl al-</u> <u>Surar</u>) and claimed it back when their <u>Surr</u> arrived in the following year.¹ This corroborates the fact that the regularity of the <u>Surr</u> payment could be unfailingly relied on.

That, with regard to the officials of the Meccan sanctuary at least, <u>al-Surr</u> represented a salary is further borne out by the fact that, on the death of an official, it could be inherited, together with the post, by his sons and that some of them could sell his share to others, in return for an agreed amount of money.² Amounts were sent, during the <u>Burji</u> period, to people working in other institutions, such as <u>Rubat</u>.³ It could also be regarded as payment for their services, which shows that <u>al-Surr</u> in its salarial character was not confined to the Meccan sanctuary.

What the total of all <u>al-Surr al-Hukmi</u> remittances amounted to, and what the number of recipients in Mecca was is not clear, but it can be safely assumed that both were considerable.

fols. 129, 158 and 176. See also: Nahrawalī, <u>al-I'lām</u>, p.285;
'Alī al-Ţabarī, <u>op.cit.</u>, fols. 130 and 132; Sinjāri, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. II, fols. 53-54; Ţabarī, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. I, fol. 178.
¹Fāsī, <u>al-'lad</u>, vol. I, part II, fol. 306a.
²Fāsī, al-'lad, vol. I, part II, fols. 303a-3b; Sakhāwī, al-Daw'

²Fasi, <u>al-'Iqd</u>, vol. I, part II, fols. 303a-3b; Sakhawi, <u>al-Daw</u>, vol. II,pp. 139-40.

²Fasi, al-'Iqd, vol. I, part II, fol. 352a.

# B. <u>Contribution of the Ottoman Sultans in the material</u>

#### well-being of the Meccans

In extent and regularity, <u>Sadaqāt al-Rūm</u>, the Ottoman charities, seem to have rivalled the Egyptian donations. The composition of both these charities was comparable in that they were partly derived from the state treasury and partly from the revenue of endowments. The Ottoman charity was often sent with the Syrian pilgrim caravan and was not, at least initially, connected with any political design over the Hijāz. But there is little doubt that their generous contributions must have won them the good will of large numbers among the population of the region which obviously had paved the way for their dominion over the region after the overthrow of the <u>Mamlūk</u> regime.

The Ottoma'n charities were apparently distributed in Mecca in accordance with the established pattern.¹ But, judging by the details given in the sources concerning its distribution, it is evident that the common people benefitted more from <u>Sadaqat al-Rum</u>, mostly in cash, than other contributions with the possible exception of that sent from Egypt. According to Sakhāwī, the Ottoman charities surpassed, at times, the Egyptian in both the amount and regularity. Though this fact is stressed under 895/1490 by Sakhāwī, who adds that many people received as much as 100 dinars, it may not have been confined to this year alone.² Indeed, several evidences, as will be seen, show that the amounts of the Ottoman charities were, in centain years, far more considerable than those sent by the <u>Mamlūks</u> and incomparably greater than others.

¹See <u>supra</u>, p. **1**97. ²Al-<u>Dhayl</u> (ed. A.Al-Hassu), pp. 464 and 467. The Ottoman Sultans may well have sent their contributions prior to the period under consideration but it is within this period that the Arab historians refer to their contributions. A number of Meccan and other historians, writing during the Ottoman period, indicate that a number of Ottoman Sultans, especially from: Eayezid I, called Yildrim 'the Thunderbolt' (791-805/1389-1402), took a keen interest in sending the charities and reached its peak during the rule of Sultan Selim I, known as Yavuz,'the Grim' (918-26/1512-20). The contribution of these Sultans is often referred to as <u>al-Surr al-Rumi</u> and is reported to have varied between 3,000-14,000 dinars annually and many individuals appear to have been given the right to a permanent annual allowance.¹

The contemporary Egyptian and Meccan sources do not seem to confirm or deny the contributions of the earlier Ottoman Sultans but they do not refer clearly to the contributions of the Ottoman Sultans or their dignitaries except from 850/1446 onwards and usually with long interruption between the years in which these charities actually reached Mecca. In the pilgrimage season of 850/in or around February 1447, a <u>wazīr</u> of the Ottoman Sultan Murād II (824-55/1421-51) came to Mecca to perform the pilgrimage and is reported to have distributed a considerable amount of <u>Sadaga</u> among the Meccans together with supplying to pilgrims with sweetened drink.²

¹For details, see: Nahrawalī, <u>al-1'lām</u>, pp. 256, 261-64, 283-85 and 287; Mar'i Hanbali, <u>op.cit.</u>, fols. 58-59; Al-Bakari, <u>op.cit.</u>, fols. 6-7, 13-14 and 51; 'Ali al-Jabari, <u>op.cit.</u>, fols. 130-32; Ibn al-'Imād, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. VIII, pp. 86-87; 'Isāmi, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. IV, pp. 65-66 and 68-69; Sinjāri, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. II, fols. 50-54; Jabari, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. I, fols. 114 and 177-79; Dahlān, <u>op.cit.</u>, pp. 50-51.

²Al-Najm Ibn Fahd, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. II, fols. 263 and 316; Sakhāwi, al-Dhayl (ed. A.Al-Hassu), p.2; idem, <u>al-Tibr</u>, p.148; see also: Jaziri, <u>op.cit.</u>, pp. 331 and 695; Nahrawali, <u>al-I'lam</u>, p.218; Sinjari, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. II, fol. 8; Tabari, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. I, fol. 105. In the last quarter of the 9th/15th century several times a wakil¹ was sent to Istanbul to collect the revenue of endowments or other charitable donations and bring them back to the Hijāz. The emissary was given a certain portion of the total amount, usually  $10^{\circ}/\circ$ , in return for his services.² Possibly the bearers of other charities were also given similar amounts or were able to derive material bene-fit through their services. Some of the bearers of the Egyptian charity were able, mainly on account of their personal relations with the Qādi Shāfa'i of Mecca, to secure considerable material gain.³

The fact that occasionally a <u>wakil</u> was sent to Rum to collect the donations, as mentioned above, is indicative of the irregularity in the sending of the Ottoman charity to Mecca. This is further supported by the fact that often several years elapsed before the next mention of a new arrival in the local sources is made. However, in view of the rather limited number of available sources used, this should not be regarded as conclusive for the late <u>Burji</u> period. The less so as Sakhāwi explicitly stresses the regularity of the Ottoman donations.⁴

The figures given in the sources show the amounts fluctuated from one year to another. In both 888 and 889/1483-84 the Ottoman charity equalled 1,600 dinars.⁵ In 895/1490 it amounted to about 2,900 dinars.⁶ In 896/1491, it was 5,620 dinars⁷ and in the following year

³Sakhāwi, <u>al-Daw</u>, vol. V, pp. 47-48.

⁴See <u>supra</u>, p. 2 11.

⁵Al-'Izz Ibn Fahd, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. I, fols. 45-46 and 59 respectively.
⁶Al-'Izz Ibn Fahd, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. I, fol. 124. See also: Sakhāwi, <u>al-Tuhfa</u>, vol. I, fol. 718.
⁷Al-'Izz Ibn Fahd, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. I, fol. 138; See also: Sakhāwi, <u>al-Dhayl</u>

¹The term <u>wakil</u> is derived from <u>wakala</u> (or <u>wikala</u>), mandate, authorization, is a contract (and) by which the contracting party, the <u>Muwakkil</u> commissions the other, the mandatory (<u>wakil</u>) to perform some service for him. See: Otto Spies, <u>E.I.</u>², art. "Wakala", pp. 1094-95.

²See details in: Sakhawi, al-Daw, vol. II, pp. 224-25: vol. VI, p.315: vol. VII, p.82: vol. IX, p.226; idem, al-Tuhfa, vol. I, fols. 717-18; Al- Izz Ibn Fahd, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. I, fols. 90, 124, 152 and 160-61.

only 600 dinars.¹

The amounts sent in charitable donations to Medina at times far exceeded those destined for Mecca. In 898/1493, for instance, Medina received 10,000 dinars while the amount sent to Mecca was only 400 dinars.² This great discrepancy is possibly accounted for by the fact that the figures for Medina included its share in the revenue of endowments for a few preceding years, while those for Mecca merely represented a personal donation of the Ottoman Sultan or some of his Amirs. The same may have been the case in 898/1494 and 900/1495 when only 300³ and 900⁴ dinars reached Mecca respectively.

Sometimes part of the amount sent from Istanbul for charitable purposes was used by the ruling <u>Sharif</u> of Mecca to appease his opponents and thereby ward off potential danger to the pilgrims. Thus Al-'Izz Ibn Fahd relates, without stating the exact figure of the Ottoman donation in question, that in the pilgrimage seasonof 909/May 1504 <u>Sharif Humayda took 1,000 dinars to conclude a truce with his rival</u> brother Barakāt II and make him consent, for 2,000 dinars, to a suspension of hostilities until the end of the pilgrimage ceremony.⁵ Though the exact amount of the above mentioned Ottoman charity is not made clear, it can safely be assumed that it was considerable. as the Ottoman charities in the closing years of the <u>Burji</u> period were politically motivated or not - substantial and often impressive. In

(ed. A.Al-Hassu), p.504; Jazīrī, <u>op.cit.</u>, p.344. ¹Al-'Izz Ibn Fahd, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. I, fol. 152. ²Sakhāwi, <u>al-Daw'</u>, vol. VI, p.315; idem, <u>al-Tuhfa</u>, vol. I, fols. 717-18; Al-'Izz Ibn Fahd, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. I, fols. 160-61. ³Al-'Izz Ibn Fahd, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. I, fol. 171. ⁴Al-'Izz Ibn Fahd, <u>op.cit.</u>, fols. 186 and 198. ⁵Al-'Izz Ibn Fahd, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. II, fol. 53. 910/1505, for instance, the bearer of the Ottoman charity was travelling with the Syrian pilgrim caravan. During his journey to Mecca the caravan was harassed by a group of Arabs which forced the Syrian Amir al-Hajj to pay 20,000 dinars in ransom to secure the safety of the pilgrims. The amount paid was raised partly from the pilgrims and the Amir but, for the most part, borrowed from the Ottoman emissary. This loan of about 13,000 dinars was supposed to be repaid on their arrival at Mecca but the Syrian Amir was unable to fulfil his promise despite repeated attempts to raise the money. During the argument about the return of the money, it was agreed - on the intervention of the Na'ib Jedda - that the amount for general distribution should be reduced to only 2,200 dinars, which was apparently as much as was left in the possession of the Ottoman emissary. This incident appears to have been resented by the Ottomans which may account for dispatching the next donation, in 912/1506, in the amount of 2,000 dinars, via Its bearer refused to pay Sharif Barakat II his customary one-Cairo. third of the total and gave him instead only 150 dinars as an ordinary recipient.² No precedent for such a clear denial of the customary right of the Sharif to one-third of the charity is reported. Presumably, the bearer had been instructed to do this as retaliation against the Sharif for his failure to help the Ottoman emissary to obtain the repayment of the amount lent to the Syrian Amir during the above related episode of 910/1505.

In 913/1507, <u>Sadagat al-Rum</u> reached Mecca, but no figure is specified.³ In the following year 14,000 dinars for Mecca and 27,000

¹Al-⁵Izz Ibn Fahd, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. II, fol. 83. ²Al-⁶Izz Ibn Fahd, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. II, fols. 110 and 132-33. ³Al-⁶Izz Ibn Fahd, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. II, fol. 146. dinars for Medina was sent from Istanbul.¹ Ibn Ivas, under 915/1509, reporting the arrival of an Ottoman Amir in Cairo, states that he was bearing 40,000 dinars for distribution in Mecca and Medina.² Al- 'Izz Ibn Fahd confirms the arrival of an Ottoman emissary via Egypt to Mecca in Dhu'l-Hijja 915/March 1510, with donation, but gives no exact figure. However, the details given in connection with its distribution imply that the amount was substantial. The greater part of the total was shared, as usual, among those entitled to fixed annual allowances. The shares of 300 recipients who were absent at the time were deposited with the Bash al-Mamalik and Muhtasib of Mecca to be handed over to the destinated on their return. The allowances of deceased persons were distributed according to judgment of the Ottoman envoy. Sharifs Barakāt II and Qa'it Bay tried to obtain their customary third of the total amount but in vain.³ Al-'Izz Ibn Fahd registered the arrival of the Ottoman charity in Mecca, by way of Egypt, in the pilgrimage season of 916/March 1511, but without mentioning a figure. But the amount seems to have been substantial as the share of a beneficiary could reach one hundred dinars or more. The joint Amirs of Mecca unsuccessfully claimed their usual third, but they were given only about 800 dinars as a conciliatory gesture.⁴ In the pilgrimage season of 918/February 1513 the Sharifs of Mecca received 1,700 dinars, which is not likely to have been a third of an unspecified total of the Ottoman charities but rather a conciliatory grant, and the ordinary people received their usual share. The only departure from the routine was that those

¹Al-'Izz Ibn Fahd, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. II, fol. 160, ²<u>Badā'i'</u>, vol. IV, p.168. ³Al-'Izz Ibn Fahd, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. II, fol. 175. ⁴Al-'Izz Ibn Fahd, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. II, fol. 191. who were not present in person lost their share.¹

In his repeated and futile attempts to press his claim to the traditional third, <u>Sharif Barakāt II seems</u> to have annoyed the Ottoman Sultan Selim I, who consulted his Egyptian counterpart, Sultan al-<u>Ghawri</u>, on the merit of the case and the latter seems to have supported the validity of the <u>Sharif's claim in 919/1513²</u> and advised the <u>Sharif also</u> to send an explanatory letter to the Ottoman Sultan.³ The <u>Sharif may have sent an envoy but Selim I does not seem to have recognized this claim. This is indicated by the fact that in 921/ 1515 the sum of 60,000 dinars was sent by Selim I for distribution in Mecca and Medina in two equal parts, but nothing in the account of Al-'Izz Ibn Fahd suggests that the <u>Sharif</u> was given his customary third of the total amount.⁴</u>

According to Halil Inalcik, Selīm I tried to win over the <u>Sharif</u> of Mecca who in 922/1516 despatched a delegation to Selīm I which the <u>Mamlūk</u> did not allow to proceed to Istanbul.⁵ But, in view of the rather uneasy relationship between Selīm I and <u>Sharif</u> Barakāt II, on the basis of the former's refusal to accept the <u>Sharif's claim</u> to one-third of the total Ottoman charity, which is evident from the various above mentioned examples given by Al-'Izz Ibn Fahd, it is

¹Al-'Izz Ibn Fahd, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. II, fol. 223.
²See <u>supra</u>, p. 198 *
³Al-'Izz Ibn Fahd, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. II, fol. 226.
⁴Al-'Izz Ibn Fahd, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. II, fol. 270.
⁵See: "Rise of the Ottoman Empire" in <u>The Cambridge History of Islam</u>, vol. I, p.318.

difficult to accept that the <u>Sharif</u> had become pro-Ottoman prior to the final downfall of the <u>Mamlüks</u>. Especially as several evidences clearly show that the relationship between the <u>Sharifs</u> of Mecca and their Egyptian overlord in the closing years of the <u>Burji</u> period was extremely cordial.¹

# C. <u>Participation of the Indian rulers in the works</u> of general welfare.

Muslim rulers in India took a lively interest in the pious works in Mecca as well as in the welfare of its population but, as so often, the sources are usually silent on the extent of their financial contributions. The most munificent of these rulers were those of Bengal, and the first important contribution to come from there in the Burji. period was made by Sultan Ghayath al-Din A'zam Shah Abu'l-Muzaffar (d. 814 or 815/1411 or 1412) and his wazir Khan Jahan. Their contributions seem to have progressively increased from 810/1407 until they reached their peak around 813/1410. Between these years there are frequent references to the arrival in Mecca of their charities, both in cash and kind. It was mostly accompanied by the ruler's personal gifts to Sharif Hasan. The Bengali ruler financed the construction of a school and the repairs made to an Ayn to improve the supply of water to the inhabitants of Mecca and endowed several properties for the benefit of his school in Mecca. The Sharif, personally derived considerable gain from the donations of the Bengali ruler either by taking directly part of a donation for himself, or by selling some of his own property at a high price to Bengali envoys to house the school as

¹ See supra, pp.  $qq_-qq$ .

² This word has several meanings including Spring; source of water and it is used here in that meaning but in a slightly different sense. It is applied to a canal or tunnel supplying water to Mecca by interlinking a number of <u>Ayn</u> and their subsidiaries outside Mecca proper.

well as to be endowed on its behalf.

Scarcely less generous was another ruler of Bengal, Jalal al-Din Muhammad (d. 837/1433) who was newly converted to Islam and seems therefore particularly eager to establish cordial relations with the Abbasid Caliph, the Egyptian Sultan, and the <u>Sharif</u> of Mecca. Sultan Jalal al-Din sent valuable gifts to Cairo and according to Maqrīzī followed by other sources such as Ibn Hajar and Ibn Taghri Birdi received from the Abbasid Caliph an investiture of rule and a robe of honour. He also made valuable contribution to the welfare works in Mecca. His son and successor, Abu'l-Muzaffar Ahmad <u>Sha</u>h seems tohave followed the policies of his father and sent charitable donations to Mecca.²

'Ali al-Tabari, a late source, referring to a large amount of money which was distributed in Mecca, without giving the date of the distribution or the name of the donor, only states that it was known as al-Jalaliyya.³ It is more than probable that it is a question here of a contribution of the above mentioned Jalal al-Din, the ruler of Bengal.

Another ruler of Bengal is said tohave sent a quantity of perfume and some gold and silver chandeliers, evidently for Ka^tba, together with

¹For details, see: Fasi, Shifa', vol. I, pp. 328-30; idem, <u>al-'Iqd</u>, vol. I, part I, fol. 38a: part II, fols. 346b-47a, 404b-5a; Ibn Hajar, <u>Inba'</u>, vol. I, fol. 242a: vol. II, fols. 22b-23a; Ibn Taghri Birdi, <u>al-Manhal</u>, vol. I, fol. 125a; Al-Najm Ibn Fahd, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. II, fols. 136-37 and 147; Sakhawi, <u>al-Tuhfa</u>, vol. I, p.319; idem, <u>al-Dav</u>, vol. II, p.313. See also: Nahrawali, <u>al-I'lam</u>, pp. 198-200; Janabi, <u>op.cit.</u>, fol. 305a; 'Isami, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. IV, pp. 34-35; Sinjari, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. I, fols. 338-39; Tabari, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. I, fols. 73-74.

²For details, see; Maqrīzī, <u>Sulūk</u>, vol. II, fols. 349 and 382; Ibn Hajar, <u>Inbā</u>, vol. II, fols. 23a and 125b; Ibn Taghri Birdi, <u>al-Manhal</u>, vol. II, fol. 344b; idem, <u>al-Nujūm</u>, vol. VII, fol. 66; Al-Najm Ibn Fahd, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. II, fols. 200 and 208; Sakhāwi, <u>al-Dhayl</u>, fols. 100a-b; idem, <u>al-Daw</u>, vol. III, p.280. See also: Ibn al- Imad, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol.VII, p.225.

³<u>Al-Arj al-Miskī</u>, fol. 132.

a few hundred dinars for the Meccan <u>Imams</u> and <u>Qadis</u> and a quantity of cloth which was apparently sent for general distribution.¹

In Rabi[•] II 901/January 1496 contributions sent by a ruler of Bengal - described as being of Hahashi origin - were distributed in Mecca. The amount of charity is reported to have amounted to thirty to sixty thousand dinars, together with some large silver chandeliers and a quantity of cloth. However, the Bengali emissaries on reaching Aden received the news that their master had died. They dispatched the cloth together with the chandeliers to Mecca but appropriated the money and fled to different countries. The cloth was subsequently sold in Mecca for about 2,100 dinars and the proceeds distributed.²

Among the rulers of Gulbarga,³ another Muslim principality in India, <u>Shihābal-Dīn Abu'l-Maghāzī Abmad Shāh</u> (d. Rajab 838/March 1435) showed marked interest in the welfare institutions of Mecca.⁴

The Muslim rulers of Mandwa (India) usually referred to by the title of al-KhiljI, are reported to have sent frequent donations of money to Mecca and to have occasionally financed some charitable works such as <u>DashTsha</u> and appear to have been on friendly terms with the <u>Mamlūk</u> Sultans as well as with the <u>Sharifs</u> of Mecca.⁵

Al-'Izz Ibn Fahd, op.cit., vol. I, fol. 77.

²AL-'Izz Ibn Fahd, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. I, fols. 191-92.

⁵A town and district in the north of Mysore on the western border of "the Deccan" in India. See: J. Burton-Page, <u>E.I.</u>², art. "Gulbarga", p.1135.

⁴For details, see: Maqrīzī, <u>Sulūk</u>, vol. II, fol. 349: Ibn Taghri Birdi, <u>al-Nujūm</u>, vol. VII, fol. 67; idem, <u>al-Manhal</u>, vol. I, p.215; Al-Najm Ibn Fahd, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. II, fols. 199-200 and 203; Sakhāwi, <u>al-Daw</u>, vol. I, p.210; idem, <u>al-Tubfa</u>, vol. I, p.262. See also: Jazīrī, <u>op.</u> <u>cit.</u>, p.343.

⁵For details, see: Fasi, <u>al-'Idd</u>, vol. I, part II, fol. 346b; Al-Najm Ibn Fahd, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. II, fols. 333 and 351; Sakhawi, <u>al-Daw</u>, vol. X, pp. 148-49 and 166; idem, <u>al-Dhayl</u> (ed. A.Al-Hassu), p.504; Al-'Izz Ibn Fahd, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. I, fols. 23, 41, 44, 139 and 151.

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#### Chapter VII

# FINANCIAL OBLIGATIONS AND PERSONAL EXPENDITURE OF THE SHARIFS OF MECCA

## A. Amounts spent to maintain the family, or paid as allowances

### and salaries.

It has been seen that exact figures of the revenue are rarely given in the sources, and the same is true of most of the expenditure. It can be established, however, that the expenditure and various financial obligations of the <u>Sharifs</u> of Mecca were quite considerable. A very great part of the revenue must have obviously been expended on the upkeep of their families, concubines, slaves, and other members of the household in a manner befitting their station.

The <u>Sharifs</u> of Mecca must have received and entertained, in accordance with the traditional Arab hospitality, a number of tribal chiefs, heads of the clans, individual guests and may also have made generous gifts to these visitors. Moreover, hospitality to a visiting Sultan or members of the royal family must have cost them substantial amounts of money.¹ They must also have spent a considerable amount on the formal receptions they gave almost annually to the Egyptian <u>Amir al-Hajj</u>, and freguently to other high ranking Egyptian officials, dignitaries and envoys.

As will be seen, the <u>Sharifs</u> of Mecca employed a fairly large number of officials, the maintenance of whom, together with that of his supporters and a bodyof paid soldiers, their horses, camels, arms, accommodation, clothes and food, must also have cost the <u>Sharif</u> a huge sum. It is impossible not to mention, in this context, the huge amounts the <u>Sharifs</u> <u>must have</u> of Mecca/paid out to the <u>Ashraf</u> and <u>Quwwad</u> either as their dues, for

¹See <u>supra</u>, pp. 85 and 97.

their upkeep, or to appease them. Though unfortunately it is not possible to determine the exact total amounts spent by the <u>Sharifs</u> of Mecca on these and other similar expenditures, it is easy to see that they must have absorbed a considerable portion of their total revenue.

#### B. Sums of money spent by the Sharifs in financing the benevolent works.

Though several Sharifs of Mecca, as will be seen, personally contributed to works of charity and general welfare, they rarely did so on a grand scale. Possibly the large influx of contributions from various parts of the Muslim territory to Mecca catered adequately for its needs in this respect. The relatively insignificant contributions of the Sharifs may have been motivated too by their desire to keep their wealth secret. It is said that Sharif Hasan once spent 50,000 dirhams on repairs to an 'Ayn and intended further to donate a similar amount for the same purpose. But, on the advice of one of his officials, he renounced the idea for fear that he might arouse the greed of the Egyptian Sultan.² There is another remotely possible reason for the reluctance of the Sharifs - at least some of them - to finance pious institutions on the basis of regarding most of their revenue as being not Halal, ³ which is regarded as detracting from the acceptability of a pious contribution. Thus, for instance, in 921/1515, Sharif Barakat II, on a visit to Medina, asked his officials in Meccca to send some Halal money for distribution in Medina. Obviously, both the Sharif and his officials must have possessed money but seem not to have considered it sufficiently Halal to be used for a pious purpose. Consequently, a number of the Sharif's palm trees were

lSee Chapter VI.
²Tabari, op.cit., vol. I, fol. 82.
³Halal, earned in a religiously justified way.

sold for 700 dinars and the proceeds sent to the <u>Sharif</u> in Medina.¹ True, such great respect for the teaching of the <u>Shari</u> a was not generally shown by the <u>Sharifs</u>, but the example of Barakat II indicates that it was not completely lacking.

Though the contributions of the <u>Sharifs</u> of Mecca to charitable works were far less than those expected from the immediate rulers of the area, they were not deprived of this credit and may have used the income derived from their personal estates and sources other than taxes and tolls to financ their pious and charitable institutions.

Fasī, followed by others, describes <u>Sharif</u> Hasan as the first Amir of Mecca - during the <u>Burji</u> period - to make significant contributions to the charitable works of Mecca.² In fact, <u>Sharif</u> Hasan's various contributions are not only impressive but also indicative of his solid financial position, genuine concern for the general welfare of the Meccans as well as the pilgrims and other visitors. His charitable works included the financing of the construction of or repairs to schools, <u>Rubat</u>, a <u>BIMARISTAN</u>,³ an <u>Ayn</u>, a <u>Sabīl</u>.⁴ He endowed a number of profit earning establishments in favour of these institutions.⁵

¹Al-'Izz Ibn Fahd, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. II, fol. 261.

²Fasi, Shifa', vol. I, p.332; idem, <u>al-'Iqd</u>, vol. I, part I, fol. 38b: part II, fol. 402b; Al-Najm Ibn Fahd, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. II, fol. 128; Sakhāwī, <u>al-Daw'</u>, vol. III, p.104. See also: Janābī, <u>op.cit.</u>, fol. 306a; Jabarī, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. I, fol. 63.

²Bīmāristān, often contracted to <u>Maristān</u> - from Persian <u>bīmār</u> 'sick' and the suffix "istān" denoting place, a hospital. See: Bedi N.Şehsuvaroğlu, <u>E.I.²</u>, art. "Bīmāristān", pp. 1222-26.

⁴It denotes, among other meanings, a public drinking fountain, which is meant here. See: T.W.Haig, <u>E.I.¹</u>, art. "Sabīl", pp. 22-23.

⁵See details in: Fasī, Shifa', vol. I, pp. 332-33, 335, 337-38 and 347-48; id m, <u>al-'Iqd</u>, vol. I, part I, fols. 38b-39b; part II, fols. 402b, 404b-5a, 407b, 408b, 421a-21b and 478b; Al-Najm Ibn Fahd, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. II, fols. 127-28, 137, 147, 149, 152, 155-56 and 160-61; Sakhāwī, <u>al-Daw'</u>, vol. III, pp. 88 and 104: vol. V, pp. 30-31; Vol. IX, p.106; Samhūdī, <u>Wafā'</u>, vol. II, p.174. See also: Nahrawālī, <u>al-I'lām</u>,pp.194, 202-3 and 337; Janābī, <u>op.cit.</u>, fol. 306a; 'Iṣāmī, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. IV, pp. 35, 84 and In 847/1443, an <u>Ayn</u> was repaired in <u>Khulays</u>¹ by order, and apparently at the expense, of <u>Sharif Abu'l-Qāsim.² Sharif Barakāt I</u> is also given the credit for constructing some <u>Rubāt</u>, digging new wells or making existing ones fit for use, and for endowments in favour of welfare works.³ Similar contributions, including the construction of a school and a <u>Sabīl</u>, are attributed to <u>Sharif Muhammad</u> b. Barakāt I.⁴

Sharif Barakāt II seems to have been particularly careful not to use anything but amounts obtained from <u>Halal</u> sources⁵ for charitable purposes and apparently this was the reason for his rather modest charitable contributions.⁶

#### C. Voluntary or compulsory payments to the Egyptian Sultan or his Amirs.

There is occasional evidence to the effect that the <u>Sharifs</u> of Mecca were obliged to pay a certain unspecified amount of money to the Egyptian <u>Amir al-Hajj</u>. It is not clear why this payment was imposed nor is it easy to ascertain how far this obligation goes back. Presumably such payments were made initially on a voluntary basis to secure his goodwill, and possibly in return for his bringing the customary robe of honour and edicts for the <u>Sharifs</u> of Mecca, but later became compulsory. So much so that some of the <u>Sharifs</u> of Mecca had to incur debts in order

161-62; Sinjarī, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. I, fols. 341 and 351; Tabarī, <u>op.cit.</u>, fols. 63, 72, 77-78 and 84; Dahlan, <u>op.cit.</u>, p.41.

¹A place in the north-east of Mecca, which lies roughly midway between Mecca and Rabigh. See: Qalqashandi, <u>Subh</u>, vol. IV, p.260.

²Al-Najm Ibn Fahd, <u>op.cit</u>., vol. II, fol. 251.

³Al-Najm Ibn Fahd, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. II, fols. 151 and 226; Sakhāwī, <u>al-Daw</u>, vol. III, p.14. vol. V, pp. 30-31. See also: Janabī, <u>op.cit.</u>, fol. 307a; 'Işāmī, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. IV, pp. 275-76 and 292.

⁴Al-Najm Ibn Fahd, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. II, fol. 371; Sakhāwī, <u>al-Daw</u>, vol. VII, pp. 150-53; idem, <u>al-Dhayl</u> (ed. A.Al-Hassu), pp. 416-17; Al-'Izz Ibn Fahd, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. I, fols. 22 and 100-101: vol. II, fols. 11-12. See also: Janabi, <u>op.cit.</u>, fols. 307b-8a; 'Isamī, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. IV, pp. 278-79; Sinjārī, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. II, fol. 18; Tabarī, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. I, fol. 134.

5See supra, pp.222-23-Al- Izz Ibn Fahd, op.cit., vol. II, fols. 141 and 261; see also: to make the payments. In 823/1420, for instance, <u>Sharif Hasan</u> borrowed 1,000 Iflori from a merchant in order to pay the dues of the Egyptian <u>Amir al-Hajj</u>. Sultan Tatar, disapproving of such compulsion, not only abolished this practice in the following year but also sent back the amount already paid by <u>Sharif Hasan</u> under duress.¹

Commenting on this, Ibn Hajar states that this edict of the Sultan was, in fact, more beneficial to the merchants than to the <u>Sharif</u>, as the latter borrowed from the merchants to pay the <u>Amir al-Hajj</u>, but seldom regarded the loan as repayable.²

This practice seems to have been resumed during the rule of Sultan Barsbay, as in 826/1423 Sharif Barakat I paid, on behalf of his father Sharif Hasan, 5,000 or 6,000 dinars to some Egyptian Amirs including Amir al-Hajj.³ This payment may have been intended primarily to ease the tension between these Amirs and Sharif Hasan,⁴ but the possibility of the resumption of the compulsory annual payment cannot be excluded as in 844/1440 it was abolished again by an edict of Sultan Jaqmaq.⁵ This annual offering seems to have been resumed in the closing years of Sultan Qa'it Bey's rule and continued. In 896/1491, the Egyptian Amir al-Mahmal demanded from Sharif Muhammad 5,000 dinars as his customary due. The Sharif was unable to raise more than 4,000 dinars, which he offered to the Amir, promising to pay the rest later. But the Egyptian

'Isami, op.cit., vol. IV, p.292.

Fasi, <u>al-'Iqd</u>, vol. I, part II, fols. 416b and 417b; Al-Najm Ibn Fahd, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. II, fols. 179-80. See also: Jaziri,<u>op.cit.</u>, p.321; Jabari, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. I, fol. 81.

²Inba, vol. II, fol. 59a.

³Fasi, <u>al-'Iqd</u>, vol. I, part II, fol. 419b; Al-Najm Ibn Fahd, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. II, fol. 185.

⁴See <u>supra</u>, pp. 72-73.

⁵Maqrīzī, <u>Sulūk</u>, vol. II, fol. 441; Al-Najm Ibn Fahd, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. II, fol. 233. See also: Jazīrī, <u>op.cit.</u>, p.328. Amir insisted on full payment before his departure. Friction ensued and the Egyptian Amir withheld the presentation of the customary robe of honour for a while, but eventually presented it and departed. According to Sakhawi, the Sharif sent the remaining part of the payment to Yanbu' where the Egyptian Amir received it onhis way back to Egypt.¹

A similar dispute occurred in 910/1505 when the Egyptian Amirs refused to hand over the robe of honour until <u>Sharif Barakāt II</u> promised to pay 8,000 dinars.² In 913/1508 the <u>Sharif paid 1,000 dinars</u> to the Egyptian Amir and promised to pay later a further sum of 3,000 dinars.³ In the same year the <u>Sharif is reported to have paid to the commander of</u> the Egyptian expedition⁴ ten thousand - apparently dinars - which appears to have been taken from the share of the <u>Sharif in the revenue of Jedda</u>.⁵ In <u>Sha</u> ban 918/November 1512, <u>Sharif Barakāt II again either promised</u> or paid to an Egyptian Amir 4,000 dinars plus fifty camels.⁶

Far from content with the political hegemony and with the dominant position of their officials in the local administration, the Egyptian Sultans found the lion's share of the Meccan revenue, overwhelming as it was, still unsatisfactory. Greed drove them to extort further financial gains, with or without pretext, from the <u>Sharifs of Mecca</u>.

Several references in the sources are made to the gifts sent by the <u>Sharifs</u> of Mecca to their Egyptian overlords between 786-811/1384-1408. These usually consisted of horses and some other **met-tec-valuable** goods,

¹ Sa <u>kha</u> wi, al-Dhayl (ed. A.Al-Hassu), p.505; Al-'Izz Ibn Fahd, <u>op.cit.</u> , vol. I, fols. 138-39.
² Al-'Izz Ibn Fahd, <u>op.cit.</u> , vol. II, fols. 81-82.
³ <u>Ibid</u> ., fol. 131.
⁴ See <u>supra</u> , pp. 95-96.
⁵ Al-IZz Ibn Fahd, <u>op.cit.</u> , vol. II, fol. 131.

Ibid., fols. 217-18.

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and were sent voluntarily by the <u>Sharifs</u> to express their loyalty.¹ However, it was not long before the <u>Sharifs</u> of Mecca were often compelled to pay considerable sums of money to the Egyptian Sultan, to secure their appointment to the emirate; then, occasionally, a further payment in cash or kind - to extend the term of office or simply to remain in favour.

Probably the first significant financial payment - within the period in question - for the re-instatement was made in 813/1410 by the recently reappointed <u>Sharif Hasan.</u>² The <u>Sharif is reported</u> to have sent Sultan Faraj one thousand sacks of various spices which were sold in Cairo for fifty thousand <u>Mithqal</u> (apparently gold).³ But not even this huge amount seems to have satisfied the Sultan in Cairo who, in the following year, appears to have expressed his displeasure with <u>Sharif Hasan's neg-</u> ligence in sending the gifts. The <u>Sharif</u> was not slow to realize the danger and sent further valuable gifts.⁴ In 819/1416, the same <u>Sharif</u>, deposed at the time, sent his son Barakāt I with gifts to Sultan <u>Shaykh</u> and secured his re-appointment.⁵ Though the sources reporting this agree that the re-appointment of Hasan was granted in return for money, they do not specify the figure. Only FasT followed by AlNajm Ibn Fahd relates that the amount imposed was 30,000 MithqaT (apparently gold).⁶ Sharif Hasan

¹See details in: Ibn al-Furat, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. IX, part II, pp. 303-4; Fasi, <u>al-'Iqd</u>, vol. I, part II, fols. 405a-5b: vol. II, part III, fol. 193a; Maqrīzī, <u>Sulūk</u>, vol. III, fol. 101a; Ibn Taghri Birdī, <u>al-Manhal</u>, vol. II, fol. 120a; Al-Najm Ibn Fahd, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. II, fols. 117 and 139.

²See <u>supra</u>, p.63.

³Fasī, <u>al-'Igd</u>, vol. I, part I, fol. 57b: part II, fol. 406a; Al-Najm Ibn Fahd, <u>op.cit.</u>, fol. 142-43. See also: Jazīrī, <u>op.cit</u>., p.319.

⁴Fasī, <u>al-'Iqd</u>, vol. I, part II, fols. 407a-7b; Al-Najm Ibn Fahd, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. II, fol. 150.

See supra, p.68.

⁶Fasī, <u>al-'Iqd</u>, vol. I, part I, fols. 57b-58a: part II, fols. 411a, 412a, 415a and 416a; Maqrīzī, <u>Sulūk</u>, vol. II, fols. 277 and 286; Ibn Hajar, Inba', vol. II, fols. 20a-20b and 31b; Al-Najm Ibn Fahd, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. II, fols. 164-5 and 177. See also: Janabī, <u>op.cit.</u>, fol. 305b.

appears to have paid only two-thirds of the amount and the Sultan in 821/1418 and later exacted payment of the remainder under threats, but whether he received it is uncertain.

Local and other events having caused the downfall of <u>Sharif</u> Hasan, he found himself soon in the position again to curry favour with the Sultan.² In Muharram 829/November or December 1425, <u>Sharif</u> Hasan paid a visit to Sultan Barsbay and was re-appointed in return for 30,000 dinars, The <u>Sharif</u>, after affecting a part payment, departed for Mecca in Jumada II 829/May 1426, but died at the very outset of his journey. His son, Barakat I, was summoned to Cairo and appointed but on condition that he paid the rest of his father's debt, paid annually 10,000 dinars, and did not claim any part of the revenue obtained from the Indian merchants in Jedda.³

Sultan Barsbay had sent his servant named Yaqut to Mecca to claim payment. Yaqut left for Cairo in Şafar 830/December 1426 or January 1427 with 13,000 dinars;⁴ the remainder was apparently paid later.

In Ramadān 842/March 1439, Sharif Barakāt I sent to Sultan Jaqmāq valuable gifts consisting of a ruby and a diamond weighing 15 and  $17^{1}/2$  carat respectively. The gift also included two slaves, two concubines, five horses and two hundred pieces of cloth.⁵

In 843/1439, Barakāt I was called to Cairo but was reluctant to go⁶ and secured the permission of Sultan Jaqmāq to remain in Mecca against

6_{See supra, pp. 76-78}.

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^{For details see: Fasi, al. Iqd, vol.I, part II, fols. 415a and 416a;} Al-Najm Ibn Fahd, op.cit., vol. II, fols. 172-73 and 177.
See supra, pp. 79-81. 73-75.
For details, see: Magrīzī, Sulūk, vol. II, fols. 339 and 343-44; Ibm Hajar, Inbā', vol. II, fols. 85b and 89a; Al-Najm Ibn Fahd, op.cit., vol. II, fols. 192-96; Sakhāwī, al-Daw', vol. III, pp. 13 and 104-5. See also: Jazīrī, op.cit., pp. 322-24 and 586; Janābī, op.cit., fol. 306a; Işāmī, op.cit., vol. IV, pp. 261, 265 and 267; Sinjārī, op.cit., vol. II, fols. 1-2.
⁴⁷ Maqrīzī, Sulūk, vol. II, fol. 346; Al-Najm Ibn Fahd, op.cit., vol. II, fol. 196. See also: Jazīrī, op.cit., pp. 323-24.

the payment of an amount of money in 844/1440 which, according to Maqrīzī, was 10,000 dinars¹ but which, according to Al-Najm Ibn Fahd, was 15,000 dinars. The latter adds that one-third of the amount was paid in order to secure the permission to bring back to Mecca some of his exiled officials.²

In 850/1446 Barakāt I, who was deposed at the time, sent his son Muḥammad with gifts to Sultan Jaqmāq in a successful attempt to secure his re-appointment.³ Most of the sources reporting the re-instatement of Barakāt I only refer to a gift but Ibn Taghrī Birdī (in <u>al-Manhal</u> and <u>Hawādith</u>) and Sakhāwī (in <u>al-Daw'</u>) refer to a payment of money to the Sultan by the Amir of Yanbu', <u>Sharif Hilmān</u>, on behalf of Barakāt I.⁴

In 859/1455, Sharif Muhammad was appointed in return for a payment of 50,000 dinars to Sultan I'nal.⁵ This figure was, so far, the largest sum paid by a Sharif for his appointment and it is possible that its size was proportionate to the large fortune Sharif Muhammad had inherited from his father, which is reported to have consisted of 30,000 dinars, 10,000 camels, 600 horses, and great numbers of sheep, tents, and arms.⁶ It will

¹Magrizi, Suluk, vol. II, fols. 438 and 441.

²Al-Najm Ibn Fahd, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. II, fols. 228-29 and 233.

³See <u>supra</u>, p. 81.

⁴See dtails in: 'Ayni, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. IV, fols. 698b-99a; Ibn Taghri Birdi, Hawadith, vol. I, fols. 46 and 199; idem, <u>al-Nujum</u>, vol. VII, fols. 130 and 133; idem, <u>al-Manhal</u>, vol. I, fols. 181a-81b: vol. II, fol. 441a; Al-Najm Ibn Fahd, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. II, fols. 260-62; Sakhawi, <u>al-Tibr</u>, pp. 143-44 and 380-81; idem, al-Dhayl (ed. A.Al-Hassu), pp. 1-2; idem, <u>al-Daw</u>, vol. III, p.13: vol. VII, p.152: vol. X,pp.184 and 209. See also: Ibn Zuhayra, <u>op.cit.</u>, p.341; Janabi, <u>op.cit.</u>, fol. 306b.

⁵ Ton Taghri Birdi, <u>al-Nujum</u>, vol. VII, fol. 239; idem, Hawadith, vol. I, fols. 347 and 363; Ibn Iyas, <u>Bada'i'</u>, vol. II, pp. 52-53; idem, <u>Bada'i'</u> (U.P.), pp. 32-33.

⁶Ibn Taghri Birdi, Hawadith, vol. I, fol. 363.

be noted that this list does not include immovable property which must also have been considerable.

Sharif Muhammad paid to Sultan Qa'it Bay in 872/1467 or shortly after a substantial amount of money in return for keepig a disloyal brother in Cairo.¹ Ibn Taghri Birdi followed by Ibn Iyas states that the <u>Sharif</u> agreed to pay 60,000 dinars.² Sakhawi referred to the payment of a substantial amount by the <u>Sharif</u> but gives no figure.³

Sultan Qa'it Bay, when on pilgrimage,⁴ is reported to have received gifts from the local Amirs, officials and merchants. Their value is given by Ibn Iyas as 200000 dinars.⁵ To this, <u>Sharif Muhammad does not seem</u> to have contributed to any remarkable extent, as from other sources it is evident that the <u>Sharif's gifts were horses and some other not too</u> valuable presents but no payment is cash is reported on this occasion.⁶

In 894/1489, <u>Sharif Muhammad is reported to have paid 2,000 dinars to</u> Sultan Qa'it Bay but it is not clear on what grounds it was made.⁷ But this seems to have been one of several such small offerings of <u>Sharif</u> Muhammad to Sultan Qa'it Bay - both of whom enjoyed the longest period of rule among other <u>Sharifs and Sultans during the Burji</u> period - and it is supported by a statement of <u>Sakhawi</u> implying that the huge size of the amounts of money paid by <u>Sharif Muhammad to the Sultan was</u>:

¹See <u>supra</u>, pp. 83-84.

²Hawadith (ed. W.Popper), part III, p.628; Ibn Iyas, <u>Bada'i'</u>, vol. III, pp. 9-10.

³<u>Al-Daw</u>, vol. V, pp. 197-98.

4 See <u>supra</u>, p.85.

⁵Badai, vol. III, pp. 157-58.

⁶Al-Najm Ibn Fahd, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. II, fol. 372. See also: Jazīrī, <u>op.cit.</u>, pp. 340 and 686; Nahravalī, <u>al-I'lām</u>, p.235; 'Isāmī, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. IV, p.47; Țabarī, <u>op.cit</u>., vol. I, fol. 130.

⁷Sakhawi, al-Dhayl (ed. A.Al-Hassu), p.427.

unprecedented.1

In Rabi' II 903 December 1497, Barakat II succeeded his father, Sharif Muhammad, and seems to have been confirmed by Sultan Muhammad in return for a certain amount, the figure of which is not given but which he was unable to pay.² probably on account of discord between him and his brothers which developed into armed hostilities.³ This, however, was to serve the royal treasury well. According to Jaziri followed by 'Isami, the opponents of Barakat II offered to Sultan Muhammed early in 904/1498 100000 dinars in return for the appointment of Hazza". The amount in question was so large that some of the Egyptian Amirs, advised the Sultan to grant the request. But some pro-Barakāt Amirs apposed this and it is to the credit of the Sultan that he did not succumb to the temptation.4 But according to Sinjari and Tabari this offer was made to Sultan al-Ghawri in 906/1501 and these sources create the impression that the Sultan responded positively.⁵ However, from the account of Al-'Izz Ibn Fahd, a contemporary source, it is evident that Sharif Barakat II was left in control of Mecca in return for a sum of money, but the source is hesitant in giving the figure which is supposed to have varied between a few thousand and a hundred thousand dinars. In Jumada I 906/December 1500, an emissary of Sultan Janblat reached Mecca to demand payment from Barakat II, but whether any amount of money was paid or not is uncertain.⁶ Meanwhile, in Egypt Janblat was replaced by Tuman Bay who too was deposed in Shawwal

¹Sakhāwī, <u>al-Daw</u>, vol. III, p.153.
²Al-'Izz Ibn Fahd, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. I, fols. 228-29.
³See <u>supra</u>, pp. 86 - 94.
⁴Jazīrī, <u>op.cit.</u>, p.348; 'Işāmī, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. IV, p.301.
⁵Sinjārī, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. II, fols. 20-21; Țabarī, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. I, fols. 135-36.
⁶Al-'Izz Ibn Fahd, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. I, fols. 237 and 253.

906/May 1501 by Sultan al-<u>Ghawri</u>. These changes indirectly involved Barakat II and he was deposed in Dhu'l-Qa'da 906/June 1501.¹

In or around <u>Sha</u> ban 908/March 1503, <u>Sharif Ahmad al-Jazani secured</u> his appointment to the emirate in return for a promise to pay Sultan al-<u>Ghawri 100,000 dinars.²</u> But whether or not this amount was actually paid is uncertain as he was shortly after ousted by Barakat II and Jazani had to secure the support of Amir Qit to regain the control of Mecca.³ Jazani eeems to have promised or paid Amir Qit between 40,000 and 100,000 dinars to achieve his objectives. Part of the amount appears to have been offered as a bribe to the Amir but the greater portion must have been destined for the royal treasury. Jazani had also promised to pay the Egyptian <u>Amir</u> <u>al-Hajj</u> and <u>Amir al-Mahmal</u> a joint amount of 16,000 dinars.⁴

In Şafar 910/July 1504, following the escape of Barakāt II from Cairo,⁵ Qā³it Bāy was appointed to the emirate in return for a payment of 50,000 dinars to the Sultan, a total of 22,000 dinars which seems to have included the **arrears** in payment of his predecessor Humayda, to Egyptian <u>Amir</u> <u>al-Hajj</u> and <u>Amir al-Mahmal</u>, and a further 5,200 dinars in allowance and compensation to a number of <u>Ashrāf</u> including the Amir of Yanbu⁶.

In or around 915/1509, Sharif Barakat II sent valuable gifts to Sultan al-Ghawri which consisted of 20,000 dinars and a number of slaves

³See <u>supra</u>, pp. 91-92.

⁴Al-'Izz Ibn Fahd, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. II, fols. 35-37. See also: 'Isami, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. IV, pp. 285-88; Sinjari, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. II, fol. 29; Tabari, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. I, fols. 148-49; Dahlan, <u>op.cit.</u>, p.48.

⁵See <u>supra</u>, pp.93-94-

⁶Al-'Izz Ibn Fahd, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. II, fol. 57.

¹See <u>supra</u>, pp. **87-88**.

²Al-'Izz Ibn Fahd, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. II, fol. 26.

together with several horses and 3,000 dinars to an Egyptian Amir.¹

In 920/1514 the wife and the son of the Sultan came to Mecca for the pilgrimage² and Barakāt II is said to have presented them with 20,000 dinars in cash and various other valuable gifts. A number of Amirs in the retinue of these distinguished visitors received a total amount of 10,000 dinars.³ Sharif Barakāt II accompanied the royal/family on their return journey and was cordially received. He brought the Sultan valuable gifts including an amount of cash which is reported to have exceeded 100,000 dinars.⁴ In view of such valuable gifts - at a time when the Sultan was faced with a financial crisis - it is not surprising that the Sultan received the <u>Sharif with unusual cordiality⁵ and re-affirmed the Sharif's</u> position as <u>Na'ib al-Sultān</u> and gave him authority over the SultanT <u>Muhtasib and Bash</u> in Mecca,⁶ but the real wonder is that the <u>Sharif was</u> able to present such huge amounts at a time when the revenue of the <u>Sharif</u> from the traders - particularly the Indians - as well as from other channels of income, was at its lowest scale.

- ¹Al-'Izz Ibn Fahd, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. II, fols. 176 and 178-79. See also: Jazīrī, <u>op.cit.</u>, p.357; Isāmī, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. IV, p.305; Sinjārī, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. II, fol. 35; Tabarī, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. I, fol. 160; Dahlān, <u>op.cit.</u>, P.49.
- ²See <u>supra</u>, p.qq.
- ³Al-'Izz Ibn Fahd, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. II, fol. 252. See also: Ibn Iyas, <u>Bada'i'</u>, vol. IV, p.433; 'Isami, <u>op.cit</u>., vol. IV, p.317.
- ⁴Al-'Izz Ibn Fahd, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. II, fols. 256-57 and 262. See also: Jazīrī, <u>op.cit.</u>, p.360.

⁵See <u>supra</u>, pp.97-98.

⁶Al-'Izz Ibn Fahd, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. II, fol. 262.

#### Chapter VIII

# THE EXTENT OF THE SHARIFS OF MECCA'S PARTICIPATION IN THE LOCAL ADMINISTRATION

### A. The officials appointed by and responsible to the Sharifs of Mecca

Qalqashandi's statement that the Megcan emirate was nomadic in character¹ cannot be accepted for the period underconsideration and he, himself, may not have meant this period when making that comment. To do so unreservedly would be to imply that the emirate of Mecca had no proper administrative institutions, which was not the case, even if they were not too elaborate.

There are several references in the sources to a number of persons who served the <u>Sharifs</u> of Mecca in one way or another, mostly in the early part of the <u>Burji</u> period. But these references very seldom offer useful information about their official status and responsibilities.² They were functioning, as will be seen, with the Sultani officials appointed to a number of religious, judicial and administrative posts.

That, and to what extent, the <u>Sharifs</u> of Mecca owed allegiance to the <u>Mamluk</u> Sultans is reflected in his modest share in the administration and rather narrow limits of his authority over the Sultani officials. In comparison with the fairly large amount of historical and politicoeconomic detail on Sultani officials found in the sources, there is a positive dearth of information even on the principal officials nominated

## ¹See Qalqashandi, Subh, vol. IV, p., 276.

²For details, see: Fasī, Shifā', vol. II, p.208; idem, <u>al-'Iqd</u>, vol. I, part I, fols. 189b, 221b, 246a and 248b-49a: part II, fols. 269b, 272b-73a, 288a-88b, 311a, 401b and 488b: vol. II, part III, fols. 39b, 192a-93a, 194a-95b, 210b and 253a-54b: part IV, fol. 288b; Ibn Hajar, <u>Inba</u>', vol. I, fols. 99a and 192a; Ibn Taghri Birdi, <u>al-Manhal</u>, vol. II, fols. 323a-23b and 383b; Al-Najm Ibn Fahd, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. II, fols. 109-10, 114, 116, 120, 122-23, 127-29, 172 and 244; Sakhawi, al-Daw', vol. III, pp. 231 and 256: vol. V, pp. 220 and 231: vol. VIII, p.150: vol. X, pp. 42-43 and 158; Al-'Izz Ibn Fahd, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. I, fol. 39. See also: Janabi, <u>op.cit.</u>, fols. 305a-5b; Ibn al-'Imad, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. VII, p.39; Sinjari, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. I, p.333; Tabari, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. I, fol. 63.

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by and directly dependent on the <u>Sharif</u> in both Mecca and Jedda, such as the <u>wazīr</u>,¹ the <u>Nā'ib al-Balad</u>², the <u>walī</u>, the <u>Hākim</u>,⁴ and the <u>Muhtasib</u>.⁵ Most of the available information on these and other officials of minor rank hardly amounts to more than a few names, dates and minor details. Nevertheless, the data available suffice to prove that the officials of the <u>Sharifs</u> played a fairly active and important role in the local administrative system.

Many of the <u>Sharif's officials were - or had been - slaves of the</u> ruling <u>Sharif or his father</u>. According to a late source, this practice was a deliberate policy of the <u>Sharifs of Mecca</u>.⁶ Apparently the quality they most valued in an official was not so much efficiency as reliability and personal loyalty. The <u>Sharifs could hardly consider leaving the city</u> of Mecca or the port of Jedda under one of the prominent <u>Ashraf</u>. This would have been distinctly unwise, not to say risky, as the <u>Ashraf</u> were inclined to challenge his authority and could easily become a rival.⁷

¹This term, in a general sense, means: assistant, but usually describes an official enjoying great authority and, more specifically, a minister. See: Franz Bahinger, <u>E.I.¹</u>, art. "Wazir", pp. 1135-36.

²Applied to the person in charge of the city in the absence of the <u>Sharif</u>, as his deputy.

³This title, from the Arabic root <u>waliya</u>, means to govern, to rule, and to protect someone. See: B. Carra de Vaux, <u>E.I.</u>¹, art. "Wall", pp. 1109-1111. See also: Heffening, <u>E.I.</u>¹, art. "Wilaya", pp. 1137-38. However, judging from the available information about the <u>Walis</u> in Mecca, this title had, at that time, a sense reminiscent of the modern police officer.

4 Roughly similar to <u>Wali</u>.

^DThis term is applied to the person entrusted with the hisba, which means, on the one hand, the duty of every Muslim to "promote good and forbid evil" and, on the other, the function of the person who is effectively entrusted in a town with the application of this rule in the supervision of moral behaviour and, more particularly, of the markets. See: Cl. Cahen and others, <u>E.I.</u>², art. "Hisba", pp. 485-93; R.Levy, <u>E.I.</u>¹, art. "Muhtasib", pp. 702-3.

⁶ Alï al-Tabarī, op.cit., fol. 125. ⁷See <u>supra, pp.54-55</u>. Wazir

Sharif Ahmad b. 'Ajlān¹ was served by several<u>wazīrs</u>. The first was Ahmad b. Sulaymān, who died in the lifetime of the <u>Sharif</u>. The post was then assigned to Mas'ūd b. Ahmad al-Azraq. A third <u>wazīr</u> of the <u>Sharif</u> was Ibrāhīm b. 'Aṭiyya al-Ḥamāmī, who retained the same post during the rule of <u>Sharifs Muḥammad and 'Anān</u>. Ibrāhīm played an active role against <u>Sharif</u> 'Alī, one of 'Anān's opponents, and had to flee to a neighbouring valley when the former replaced 'Anān.² Later, however, Ibrāhīm was allowed to return and remained in Mecca until his death in <u>Sha</u>'bān 791/August 1389.³

'Ali b. Mas'ūd al-Azraq (d. 798 or 799/1395-96), a son of the abovementioned Mas'ūd, had served <u>Sharif Ahmad and then his son as an ordinary</u> clerk. But during the emirate of <u>Sharif</u> 'Anān he acquired the status of <u>wazīr</u>, which he retained under <u>Sharif</u> 'Alī b. 'Ajlān.⁴

A <u>Qa'id</u> named 'Ali b. Sinān (d. around 805/1402) is also referred to as the <u>Wazīr</u> of <u>Sha</u>rif Ahmad b. 'Ajlān.

Another Qa'id, Zayn al-Din Shukr, is mentioned among the prominent officials of <u>Sharif Hasan b.</u> 'Ajlan, and seems to have been his <u>Wazir</u>. <u>Shukhr's efforts brought the embargo imposed by the Vemenite ruler to an end in 815/1412.</u> Early in Muharram 829/November 1425, he accompanied <u>Sharif Hasan to Cairo</u>⁷ and, following the re-appointment of the <u>Sharif</u>, in return for the payment of a sum of money,⁸ <u>Shukhr returned to Jedda</u>

¹See <u>supra</u>, pp. 48-52.
²See <u>supra</u>, pp. 55-56.³Fasī, <u>al-'Iqd</u>, vol.I, part II, fols. 274b and 324a.
⁴Fasī, <u>al-'Iqd</u>, vol. II, part III, fol. 209b.
⁵Sa<u>khāwī</u>, <u>al-Daw</u>, vol. V, p.229.
⁶Fasī, <u>al-'Iqd</u>, vol. I, part II, fol. 408b; Al-Najm Ibn Fahd, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. II, fol. 151. See also: <u>supra</u>, p.243.167.
⁷See <u>supra</u>, pp. 75-76.
⁸See supra, p. 248-

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totake charge of the port and its revenue.¹ Presumably <u>Shukr</u> was supposed to return to Cairo with the required sum of money but refrained from the return journey when the death of <u>Sharif Hasan</u> and the appointment of Barakät I on new terms rendered it unnecessary.² In 843/1439 Sultan Jaqmaq, for some not further specified reason, ordered the <u>Sharif</u> to expel from Mecca <u>Shukhr</u> and his sons, Budayr and <u>Ali</u>, with some of their subordinates. Though the <u>Sharif</u> complied with this order, he secured in the cfollowing year, in return for 5,000 dinars, the Sultan's permission for the return of the exiled to Mecca.³ <u>Shukr</u> appears to have remained <u>wazīr</u> until his death in Jumādā I 845/October 1441.⁴

In 845/1441, Barakāt I was deposed by his brother 'Ali who had, prior to his entry into Mecca, sent his <u>wazīr</u>, Mazrū' al-'Ajalānī, to take control of the city, which he did without meeting any resistance.⁶

Another local dignitary, named Khurs, is described as the wazīr of Sharif ^{Ali}. Late in 846/1443 he appears to have been taken captive and sent to Cairo together with the deposed ^{Ali}. They both died there in 853/ 9 and seems to have been taken to Cairo too-1449. ^{Ali} b. Barakāt, deputy of the deposed <u>Sharif</u> ^{Ali}, was arrested.

In 847/1443 Abu'l-Qāsim's wazīr, 'Alī b. Muḥammad al-Shubaykī, seems to have enjoyed great influence. Little is known about him except that he seems to have played an active part in an expedition against a group of disloyal Ashrāf headed by Abu'l Qāsim's son Zāhir.¹⁰

¹Al-Najm Ibn Fahd, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. II, fol. 194. See also: Jazīrī, <u>op.cit.</u>, p.323.
²Maqrīzī, <u>Sulūk</u>, vol. II, fol. 392; Al-Najm Ibn Fahd, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. II, fol. 217. See also <u>infra</u>, p.2 38.
³Al-Najm Ibn Fahd, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. II, fols. 228 and 233.
⁴Al-Najm Ibn Fahd, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. II, fols. 237 and 267-68; Sakhāwī, <u>al-Daw'</u>, vol. III, p.306.
⁵See <u>supra</u>, pp.77-78.
⁶Al-Najm Ibn Fahd, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. II, fol. 235. See also: 'Isāmī, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. I, fol. 1V, p.267; Sinjārī, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. II, fol. 5; Tabarī, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. I, fol. 104.
⁷See <u>supra</u>, pp.78-79.

From 850/1446 onwards Budayr b. Shukr served Barakat I in the capacity of wazir and retained this post during the rule of Sharif Muhammad and served him faithfully until he began to suspect, early in 864/1459, that the Sharif wanted to arrest him. Consequently, his relations with the Sharif became hostile and he took control of Jedda but was forced to leave after a short time. Budayr, having suffered great financial losses and having been deserted by most of his supporters, took refuge among nomadic Arabs until he was reconciled with the Sharif. In 866/1462, Sultan Khushqadam, on receiving a report about some objectionable acts of Budayr, was so displeased that he ordered the Sharif to bar Budayr from residing in Mecca. According to Al-Najm Ibn Fahd, Sharif Muhammad secured in the following year the Sultan's permission for the return of Budayr to Mecca against a payment of 6,000 dinars. Budayr continued to enjoy great favour of the Sharif, and prestige in Mecca, until his death in Jumādā I 869/February 1465.¹

Whether Budayr had an immediate successor is not clear. But whoever may have been appointed to that post did not come from his family, as they were not on friendly terms with the Sharif. In 872/1467 a disloyal brother of Sharif Muhammad escaped to Cairo.² The Sharif learned that one of Budayr's sons and his maternalfuncle had caused this split and retaliated by putting both to death early in 873/July or August 1468.³

⁸Sakhawī, <u>al-Dhayl</u> (ed. A.Al-Hassu), p.37.
⁹Al-Najm Ibn Fahd, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. II, fol. 242.
¹⁰Al-Najm Ibn Fahd, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. II, fol. 249. See also, <u>supra</u>, pp. <del>85-86.</del>

¹ Ibn Taghri Birdi, <u>al-Nujum</u>, vol. VII, fol. 349; idem, <u>Hawadith</u> (ed. W. Popper), part II, p.343: part III, p.579; Al-Najm Ibn Fahd, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. II, fols. 282-84, 291-93, 296-300, 305, 307-8 and 312; Sakhawi, <u>al-Daw</u>, vol. III, p.4: vol. V, p.21; idem, <u>al-Dhayl</u> (ed. A.Al-Hassu), p.154; Ibn Iyas, <u>Bada'i</u> (U.P.), p.150.

²See <u>supra</u>, pp.83-84 and 110.

⁵Al-Najm Ibn Fahd, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. II, fol. 321; Sakhawi, <u>al-Daw</u>, vol. II, p.64; vol. VII, p.149.

After the death of Budayr until about 791/1486 a clear reference to a <u>wazīr</u> does not appear in the sources. In this year Qunayd b. Mithqāl al-Hasani is described as <u>wazīr</u> of <u>Sharif</u> Muḥammad.¹ Sakhāwī, too, refers to Qunayd as <u>wazīr</u>, adding that his son Masʿūd held the same post.² Masʿūd acted as <u>Naʾib al-Balad</u> too, and his brother 'Anān is said to have been the <u>wālī</u> of Mecca.³ Masʿūd is reported to have introduced, in <u>Sh</u>aʿbān 909/ February 1504, a number of taxes the details of which are not given, except that they included  $1^{1}/4$  Ashrafi imposed on the family of a deceased.⁴

Though the <u>wazīr</u> was the higher in rank among the <u>Sharif's officials</u> he does not seem to have been held in great respect by the Sultani officials and not even by the <u>Mamluk</u> rank and file. In <u>Dhu'l-Qa'da 914/April 1509</u>, for example, 'Ali b. Mubārak, a <u>wazīr</u> of <u>Sharif Barakāt II</u>, was beaten by an ordinary soldier and the offender was not brought to account.⁵ 'Alī appears to have remained <u>wazīr</u> until 917/1511 and to have acted occasionally as <u>Nā'ib al-Balad</u>.⁶

#### Na'ib al-Balad

As the title indicates, this post was assigned for the duration of the <u>Sharif's</u> absence from the city. This official was usually a Meccan and frrquently a slave of the ruling <u>Sharif</u>, but exceptions are reported. In Şafar 804/September or October 1401, for instance, an Egyptian Amir named Baysaq was appointed <u>Na'ib al-Balad</u> on the departure of <u>Sharif</u> Hasan for Haly.⁷ This was the first and last time that a <u>Sharif</u> assigned this post

¹Al-'Izz Ibn Fahd, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. I, fol. 70.
²Sakhāwī, <u>al-Daw</u>, vol. X, p.157.
³Sakhāwī,/vol. VI, p.147.
⁴Al-'Izz Ibn Fahd, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. II, fol. 46.
⁵Al-'Izz Ibn Fahd, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. II, fols. 59 and 159.
⁶Al-'Izz Ibn Fahd, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. II, fols. 197-99.
⁷Fasī, <u>al-'Iqd</u>, vol. I, part II, fols. 402b-3a; Al-Najm Ibn Fahd, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. II, fols. 129-30.

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outside his own entourage. The first duty of the  $\underline{Na'ib}$  was to defend the city against any attack. On 12th Ramadan 820/23rd October 1417, for instance, Miftah al-Ziftawi, a <u>Na'ib</u> of <u>Sharif</u> Hasan, lost his life in a battle with a group of Hasan's opponents who were trying to seize control of the city.¹

Among his duties was to keep close watch on subversive elements and those suspected of being potentially disloyal to the ruling <u>Sharif</u>. In Rabi' II 832/February 1429, 'Ali b. Kubayshb. 'Ajlan (d. 838/1428-29), the deputy of <u>Sharif Barakat I in Mecca</u>, arrested a number of persons who were spying on behalf of the opponents of the <u>Sharif</u>.²

What the <u>Sharif</u> expected from his officials, and particularly from his <u>Na'ib</u>, was, first and foremost, personal loyalty and those suspected of disloyalty were immediately brought to account. Thus, in Ramadan 872/ April 1468, after the decret departure of a disloyal brother of <u>Sharif</u> Muhammad to Cairo, the <u>Na'ib al-Balad</u>, 'Abdullah, was suspected of connivance in his flight and was deposed and expelled from the city.³

The sources mention a number of other <u>Na'ib al-Balad</u> but little is known beyond their names, and the dates of their appointment.⁴

#### Wali

The term "wall", as mentioned earlier, was used in Mecca to denote a police officer.⁵ This usage is observable in Sakhawi who, having mentioned an officer in charge of the <u>Shurta</u> (i.e. police) in Medina in the early part of the 9th/15th century, then refers to his brother to whom the

¹Fasi, <u>al-'Iqd</u>, vol. I, part II, fols. 413a: vol. II, part IV, fols. 33a and 331b-32a; Al-Najm Ibn Fahd, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. II, fols. 149-50 and 168-69; Sakhawi, <u>al-Paw'</u>, vol. X, p.166; see also: 'Işami, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. IV, p.259; Sinjari, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. I, fol. 346; Dahlan, <u>op.cit.</u>, p.39.

²Fasi, <u>al-'Iqd</u>, vol. I, part II, fols. 400a and 401b; Al-Najm Ibn Fahd, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. II, fol. 206; Sakhawi, al-Daw', vol. V, p.276.

³Al-Najm Ibn Fahd, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. II, fol. 318.

⁴See: Al-Najm Ibn Fahd, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol.II, fols. 215, 225, 248-49, 259, 261-62, 264-65, 282-83, 303 and 336-38; Sakhāwī, <u>al-Daw</u>, vol. I, p.304: vol. III, p.256;

post was assigned after the resignation of his brother as a "wall".¹ This interpretation is confirmed by the fact that from the reported activities of several walls it is evident that their principal responsibility was to enforce respect for law and order, prevention of crime, and to punish the guilty and to protect the inhabitants from unruly elements within or outside the city.² This is further borne out by an interesting report of Al-'Izz Ibn Fahd in <u>Sha</u>'ban 903/April 1498 of certain peculiar behaviour of Sultan Muhammad, who used to roam Cairo at night "like a <u>walf</u>".³

The existence of a fairly large and well-guarded jail in Mecca is documented by numerous references in the sources. It is obvious that a large number of jailers must have been employed, but it cannot be a mere coincidence that most mentions of jailers are accompanied, in the sources especially in Al-Najm Ibn Fahd and his son Al-'Izz Ibn Fahd - by the phrase "son of Ibn Qunayd", which indicates that most jailers were from this family, many of whom held the post of <u>wall</u> in Macca . The prison appears to have been used simultaneously for political opponents, petty offenders and a hard core of criminals.⁴

vol. VI, p.225: vol. VII, p.253; Al-'Izz Ibn Fahd, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. I, fols. 6-7 and 10: vol. II, fols. 63 and 199. See also: Dahlan, <u>op.cit.</u>, p.39.

⁵See <u>supra</u>, p.235 fm 3.

¹Sakhāwī, al-Tuhfa, vol. I, fols. 629.

²For the relevant details, see: Al-Najm Ibn Fahd, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. II, fols. 178, 318 and 324; Sakhawi, <u>al-Daw</u>, vol. IV, p.143; idem, <u>al-Dhayl</u> (ed. A.Al-Hassu), p.410; Al- Izz Ibn Fahd, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. I, fols. 31, 84-85, 92, 104-7 and 250-51: vol. II, fols. 8-9, 21, 24-25, 33-34, 41, 58 and 109.

³Al-'Izz Ibn Fahd, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. I, fol. 228.

⁴ For the relevant details, see: Ibn Wahnas, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. II, pp. 187-88; Fasī, <u>al-'Iqd</u>, vol. I, part I, fols. 103a and 190a: part II, fol. 288a: vol. II, part III, fols. 193b and 252b; Maqrīzī, <u>Sulūk</u>, vol. III, fol. 105b; Ibn Hajar, <u>Inba</u>, vol. I, fol. 204a; <u>Khazrajī</u>, <u>op.cit.</u>, fol. 434; Ibn Taghri Birdī, <u>al-Manhal</u>, vol. II, fols. 168a, 249b and 324a; Al-Najm Ibn Fahd, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol.II, fols. 105, 136, 158, 318 and 336-38; Sakhāwī, <u>al-Daw</u>, vol. VI, p.147; Al-Aizz Ibn Fahd, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. I, fols. 6-7, 10, 19, 31, 39-40, 62, 100, 105-7, 109, 136, 158, 178, 234, 239, 245 and 247-48: vol. II, fols. 13-14 and 98. See also: Janabī, <u>op.cit.</u>, fol. 304a; Işāmī, <u>op.cit.</u> vol. IV, p.248; Sinjārī, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. I, fol. 327; Țabarī, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. I,fol. 61; Dahlān, <u>op.cit.</u>, p.3⁴.

#### Hakim

This title is used in reference to a number of officials, especially from 908/1502 onwards. Most of them are also occasionally referred to by other titles such as <u>wazīr</u> and <u>walī</u> which creates the impression that the term "<u>Hakim</u>" did not designate the holder of a particular post, but it seems more probable that other titles applied to the official in question indicate his consecutive and not simultaneous positions. Little information is available about the sphere of the <u>Hakim's</u> activities with exhibit a striking similarity to the responsibilities of the <u>walī</u>.

#### Muhtasib

As will be seen, the post of <u>Hisba</u> was often assigned by the Egyptian Sultans to the <u>Qadi Shafa'i</u> and <u>Bash al-Mamalik</u> in Mecca. There are references to the effect that the <u>Sharifs</u> of Mecca were given control of this office for an interim period, or instructed to supervise the performance of the <u>Muhtasib</u> appointed by the Sultan.

It is obvious that the <u>Sharifs</u> passed on this office to one or another of their own officials. Therefore, when these responsibilities were withdrawn from the <u>Sharif</u> it did not in the least affect the reputation of the <u>Sharif</u> or his official.

There are a few evidential examples to support the fact that two <u>Muhtasib</u>, one appointed by the <u>Sharif</u> and the other by the Sultan, performed their duties separately and that the <u>Sharifs</u> of Mecca controlled at times both posts. In <u>Sha</u> ban 848/December 1444, for instance, Sultan Jaqmaq instructed <u>Sharif</u> Abu'l Qasim to investigate an accusation of bribery

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¹For details concerning the <u>Hakim</u>, see: Al- ¹Izz Ibn Fahd, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. II, fols. 24-25, 63, 96, 98, 130, 135, 137, 151, 187, 200, 212, 224-25, 228-29, 249 and 272.

raised against the Sultani <u>Muhtasib</u> and, if he were found guilty, to depose him and assign the <u>Hisba</u> to somebody else. The charge appears to have been proved, for the <u>Sharif</u> replaced him by the <u>wali</u> of Mecca, 'Abd al-Rahman b. <u>Ghanim.¹</u> He, however, does not seem to have held this post very long, as in <u>Dhu'l-Qa'da 849/March 1446</u> it was assigned to a <u>Qadi Shafa'i</u> of Mecca.²

In the following year, the <u>Hisba</u> together with other posts was entrusted to an Egyptian Amir named Bayram <u>Kh</u>uja.³

In Rajab 872/March 1468 the <u>Hisba</u> seems to have been again assigned by Sultan Qa'it Bay to <u>Sharif</u> Muhammad, as <u>Shahin</u>, a slave of the <u>Sharif</u>, is explicitly referred to as a <u>wali</u> and <u>muhtasib</u>.⁴ He appears to have held the post of <u>Hisba</u> only until <u>Dhu'l-Qa'da 872/July 1468</u> when it was assigned to Bash al-Mamalik.⁵

Later, probably around 874/1469, the <u>Hisba</u> was again assigned to <u>Sharif Muhammad</u>⁶ An edict sent in Jumādā I 875/November 1470, proves that the <u>Sharif</u> was reluctant tokeep the post which subsequently was assigned, by the end of 875/May or June 1471, to Bāsh al-Mamālik.⁷

This reluctance of the <u>Sharif</u> may have been due to the difficulties resulting from the dual responsibilities or his dislike of taking charge of the duties for an interim period. However, whether or not the duties of

¹Al-Najm Ibn Fahd, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. II, fol. 256. See also: Sakhāwī, <u>al-Daw</u>, vol. IV, p.143.
²Al-Najm Ibn Fahd, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. II, fol. 259.
³Al-Najm Ibn Fahd, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. II, fol. 263.
⁴Al-Najm Ibn Fahd, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. II, fol. 318.
⁵Al-Najm Ibn Fahd, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. II, fol. 319.
⁶Al-Najm Ibn Fahd, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. II, fol. 322.
⁷Al-Najm Ibn Fahd, op.cit., vol. II, fols. 325 and 332-33.

Sultani <u>Muhtasib</u> were placed under the supervision of the <u>Sharif</u>, his right to appoint his own <u>Muhtasib</u> was not affected and the simultaneous existence of Sultani and <u>Sharifi Muhtasib</u> is well documented. Al-Najm Ibn Fahd and his son Al-'Izz Ibn Fahd, for instance, refer to Amir Sunqur al-Jamali as Sultani <u>Muhtasib</u> in Mecca prior to, during, and after 890/ 1485.¹ But in this very year, during Sunqur's tenure of this office, the <u>Sharif</u> appointed one of his men, 'Ali al-'Ajalani, to the post of Hisba in Mecca.²

In Rabi[•] I or II 905/November or December 1499, reference is made to the presence of two <u>Muhtasibs</u> at a social gathering in Mecca.³ Obviously one of these was appinted by the Egyptian Sultan and the other by the Sharif of Mecca.

In <u>Shawwal 905/June 1500</u>, after the deposition of the Sultani <u>Muhtasib</u>, the responsibilities of the post were assigned to <u>Sharif Barakat</u> II, who entrusted his own <u>Muhtasib</u> with the duties until the arrival of an official from Cairo, Qanşawh al-Jawshan, in the capacity of <u>Bash</u> and <u>Muhtasib</u> in <u>Dhu'l-Qa'da 905/July 1500.⁴</u> This, however, does not mean that the <u>Muhtasib</u> appointed by the <u>Sharif</u> ceased to function, as shortly after the <u>Sharif</u> appointed his slave <u>Dughan</u> to the post of <u>Hisba</u>.⁵

The simultaneous presence of two officials with the identical title and the same or similar responsibilities cannot but have resulted in occasional friction and some arrangement or other to facilitate their peaceful, not to say harmonious, co-existence must have been made. Unfortunately, no details of this kind are given in the sources. Possibly

¹Al-Najm Ibn Fahd, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. II, fols. 369 and 374; Al-'Izz Ibn Fahd, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. I, fols. 47, 63-64 and 68.
²Al-'Izz Ibn Fahd, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. I, fol. 62.
³Al-'Izz Ibn Fahd, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. I, fols. 243-44.
⁴Al2'Izz Ibn Fahd, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. I, fols. 247-50.
⁵Al-'Izz Ibn Fahd, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. I, fol. 250.

there was a clear-cut division in their responsibilities so that, for example, the authority of the <u>Sharifi Muhtasib</u> was confined to the supervision of the local markets and petty trade, while the <u>Sultani Muhtasib</u> enjoyed a somewhat superior position and dealt with the matters of greater importance. In 899/1493-94, for instance, <u>Sharif Muhammad asked the</u> Sultani <u>Muhtasib</u> and hot his own to prevent the Egyptian visitors from trading in grain.¹

The Egyptian Sultans have left the administration as well as the revenue of the port of Jedda in their entirety to the Sharifs of Mecca in the early part of the Burji period. There are occasional references to officials of the Sharifs in Jedda in this period, but usually no mention is made of their official status, responsibilities, or methods of work. Among the ablest was Jabir al-Harashi, who was appointed by Sharif Hasan as official in charge of Jedda around 806/1403-4. His most important achievement was the construction of a pier of Jedda which greatly increased the commercial activities in the port, and consequently its revenue. Jabir became rather arrogant and boastful of his achievements which soon led to the deterioration of his relations with Sharif Hasan. Jabir fled once the to Egypt and then to/Yemen, and his intrigues created occasional tension between the Sultans of these countries and Sharif Hasan. Shortly after, however, Jabir was reconciled with the Sharif and restored to his former position in Jedda. Their relations, however, were subject to further fluctuations. In 816/1413 Sharif Hasan suspected Jabir of being in sympathy with Rumaytha,² and reacted sharply by arresting Jabir together with his son and hanging them in Mecca in Dhu'l-Hijja 816/April 1414.²

¹Al-'Izz Ibn Fahd, <u>op.cit</u>., vol. I, fol. 166. ²See <u>supra</u>, pp. 65-66.

⁵Fasi, <u>al-'Iqd</u>, vol. I, part I, fols. 141a-41b: part II, fols. 366a-67a, 404a-6a and 408a-8b; Ibn Hajar, <u>Inba'</u>, vol. II, fol. 3b; Ibn Taghri Birdi, <u>al-Manhal</u>, vol. II, fol. 275b; Al-Najm Ibn Fahd, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. II, fols. 132, 136, 138, 141-42, 146, 152-53 and 155; Sakhawi, <u>al-Daw'</u>, vol. III, vol.IV, p.51: vol. VII, p.208. See also: Janabi, <u>op.cit.</u>, fol. 305b; Isami, <u>op.cit.</u>, / pp. 254-55. While Jabir was still in charge of Jedda, another official, Mas^{ud} al-Subbi also appears to have held a responsible position and possibly was in control of the revenue. This assumption is confirmed by an account in Fasi followed by others of how Mas^{ud} al-Subbi suffered in 815/1412 grievous bodily harm from a nephew of <u>Sharif</u> Hasan, to whom he had failed to pay the remainder of a draft. That this incident led to a confrontation between the <u>Sharif</u> and his hephew proves in what esteem this official was held by the <u>Sharif</u>.¹

Fasī followed by Sakhāwī refer to another official of <u>Sharif Hasan</u> in Jedda, 'Abdullah b. 'Alī, known as al-Muzriq (d. 826/1423) whose official responsibility appears to have been the collection of taxes.² Most of the officials of the <u>Sharifs</u> who are referred to under mention of their titles were appointed in the later part of the <u>Burjī</u> period and fall into the following categories, analogous to those existing in Mecca.

#### Wazīr

Strange as it may seem, few individuals are referred to with the title "Wazīr Jedda" in addition to those who held this post in Mecca. This indicates that the post was assigned on a reginnal basis and that the <u>Sharif</u> may have been served by more than one <u>wazīr</u>. The most important <u>wazīr</u> was official in Jedda in the capacity of/Rājih b. <u>Shumayla</u> who, like his father, had been initially an official of minor rank but soon reached prominence and eventually became <u>wazīr</u> of <u>Sharif</u> Muhammad. Rājih seems to have possessed considerable wealth. According to al-Najm Ibn Fahd, Rājih offered the <u>Sharif</u> financial help during the hostility between the <u>Sharif</u> and Budayr. During this confrontation Kājih joined Budayr under duress

¹Fasi, <u>al-'Iqd</u>, vol. I, part II, fols. 407b-8a; Al-Najm Ibn Fahd, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. II, fols. 151 and 155; Sakhawi, <u>al-Daw'</u>, vol. X, p.158.

²Fasī, <u>al-'Iqd</u>, vol. II, part III, fol. 39b; Sa<u>khāwī</u>, <u>al-Daw'</u>, vol. V, pp.35-36. 3This <u>Sh</u>umayla too is reported to have been a <u>Wazīr</u> of <u>Sh</u>arif Hasan b.Ajlān See:Muhammad(?)b.Ahmad b.Muhammad b.Faraj,<u>al-Silāh wa'l-Udda fī Ta'rikh</u> Bandar Jidda (MS I U I Adbimat Kuturbanani V. Z445(407), a. 100 but then deserted when the opportunity arose. The <u>Sharif</u> abstained from reprisals against him; nor did he withold his favours and Rājib seems to have retained the post until his death in Rabi' I 887/May 1482.¹ Another official, Badr al-Habashī, described by <u>Sakhāwī</u> as <u>wazīr</u> Jedda around 887/1482, was probably appointed after Rājib's death ². Al-'Izz Ibn Fahd in the same year describes Badr, not as <u>wazīr</u> but as <u>al-</u> <u>Muqaddām</u>³ of Jedda.⁴ It may, however, be a question of the successive positions, or the official in question acting in both capacities simultaneously.

When <u>Sharif Hazza</u>', after defeating his brother Barakāt II, appointed his own officials in Jedda in Jumādā I 907/December 1501, he seems to have nominated his <u>wazīr</u> Muḥammad, son of above mentioned Rājiḥ, a governor of Jedda, who, thus, may have acted as <u>wazīr</u> Jedda.⁵ Al-'Izz Ibn Fahd does not mention Muḥammad b. Rājiḥ's official capacity at the time of his appointment⁶ but describes him much later during the emirate of Barakāt II as the head of the <u>Sharif's officials (Kabīr al-Mubāshirīn</u>) in Jedda.⁷

¹Al-Najm Ibn Fahd, <u>op.cit.</u>, fols. 293-300 and 319; Sakhawi, <u>al-Daw</u>, vol. III, p.223; Al- Izz Ibn Fahd, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. I, fol. 18. See also: Ibn Faraj, <u>op.cit.</u>, fol. 19b.

²Sakhāwī, <u>al-Daw</u>, vol. X, p.166.

⁵Literally - head of a group. Evidently it is used here to describe the official in charge of the pier of Jedda which belonged to the <u>Sh</u>arif.

4. Al-'Izz Ibn Fahd, op.cit., vol. I, fol. 23

⁵Ibn al-Dayba', <u>al-Fadl</u>, fol. 116b; idem, <u>Gurra</u>, p.223. See also: 'Işāmī, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. IV, p.284; Sinjārī, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. II, fol. 22.

⁶Bulügh, vol. II, fol. 6.

⁷Bulūgh, vol. II, fol. 262.

#### Na'ib al-Balad

In Şafar 846/June or July 1442, Miftāh Abū 'Alī al-Hasanī, a slave of <u>Sharif</u> Hasan, is referred to as the deputy of <u>Sharif</u> Barakāt I in Jedda. Nothing much is known about him except that he was killed during a clash between his deposed master and the newly appointed Amir of Mecca, <u>Sharif</u> 'Alī.¹

Presumably there were many other officials who acted as deputy of the <u>Sharif in Jedda</u>. For many years, however, the sources make no clear reference to the existence of <u>Na^{*}ib al-Balad</u> in Jedda until Jumādā II 919/August 1513.²

The deputy or other officials of the <u>Sharif</u> enjoyed reasonable authority over the indigenous population and a fair share in local administration. But they do not seem to have been treated with much respect by the Egyptian dignitaries and the Sultani officials. In <u>Sha</u> ban 919/November 1513, for instance, the then <u>Na'ib</u> of the <u>Sharif</u> in Jedda tried to prevent an Egyptian dignitary from monopolizing the grain trade. He not only did not succeed, but was rebuked and insulted. Unable to retaliate, he left the city in anger, taking other officials of the <u>Sharif</u> with him.³ In Rajab 920/September or October 1514, <u>Na'ib</u> of the <u>Sharif</u> in Jedda, Mas'ūd, was humiliated by Amir Husayn al-Kurdī.⁴ No retaliatory measures on his part or that of <u>Sharif</u> Barakāt II are reported.⁵

¹Al-Najm Ibn Fahd, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. II, fol. 239; Sakhawi, <u>al-Paw</u>, vok.X., pp. 40-41 and 166; idem, <u>al-Tibr</u>, p.61.
²Al-'Izz Ibn Fahd, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. II, fols. 231-32.
³Al-'Izz Ibn Fahd, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. II, fol. 234.
⁴See <u>infra</u>, pp.<u>293-97</u>.
⁵Al-'Izz Ibn Fahd, <u>op.cit.</u>, fols. 247-48.

There may have been several successive <u>walls</u> but surprisingly only one person is clearly referred to as such. He was Yaqut al-'Uqayli (or al-'Aqili) and appears to have acted as <u>wall</u> during the emirate of Barakat I and his son Muhammad. In Rajab 860/July 1456, Yaqut was attacked and killed by the slave of a man he was trying to arrest.¹

#### Hakim

In the sources several references indicate that a number of officials acted in Jedda in that capacity. But what little information is available does not exceed this fact.²

#### Tax collectors

In fact the spheres of activity of administrators and tax-collectors, among the officials of the <u>Sharifs</u> in Jedda, cannot be effectively separated so that the distinction is somewhat artificial. However, a number of officials whose prime concern it was to collect taxes were in attendance at the <u>Furga</u> (i.e. pier) of Jedda, which was divided between the Egyptian Sultans and the <u>Sharifs</u> of Mecca and was called <u>Furgat al-Sultān</u> and <u>Furdat al-Sharīf</u> respectively.³ The officials of the latter are usually referred to by the vague term "<u>Rijāl al-Sharīf</u>" (i.e. the men of the <u>Sharif</u>) and very occasional specific titles are used to indicate their rank and duties. Thus an official of Barakāt I, 'Alī b. Muḥammad al-Yamāni (d. Ṣafar 840/August or September 1436) is described as <u>Mustawfī</u>⁴ in Jedda,⁵

¹Sakhāwī, al-Daw', vol. X, p.214.

²Al-¹Izz Ibn Fahd, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. I, fols. 41-42, 59, 151, 247 and 262: vol. II, fols. 38, 42 and 59; Ibn al-Dayba^{*}, <u>al-Fadl</u>, fols. 116b-17a; idem, <u>Qurra</u>, fol. 223. See also: ^{*}Işamī, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. IV, p.284; Sinjārī, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. II, fol.22; Tabarī, op.cit., vol. I, fol. 137.

²Al- ⁴Izz Ibn Fahd, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. I, fol. 168: vol. II, fols. 96-97, 108, 115, 164, 172 and 209.

⁴<u>Mustawf</u>, an official in charge of government accounts. See: R.Levy, <u>E.I.</u>,

### Wali

Another official in Jedda named 'Umar al-Yamānī (d. Dhu'l-Qa'da 865/September 1461) seems to have been acting as tax collector.¹

Another, Muwaffaq**al-Habashi**by name (d. Ramādan 888/November 1483), is designated as <u>al-Mutasarrif bi amr Bandar Jedda</u> (i.e. the official in charge of Jedda's port).²

A number of the officials appointed by the <u>Sharifs</u> are described as <u>Mubashir³</u> in Jedda or with other similar title, but little else is known about them.⁴

The existence of two parallel groups of Sultani and <u>Sharifi</u> officials, together with the division of Jedda's pier and the revenue between them was bound to create financial disputes over the distribution of the revenue levied on certain vessels and these were usually settled in favour of the Sultan's officials.⁵

#### B. The influence of the <u>Sharifs</u> over the Sultani officials

The influence of the <u>Sharifs</u> over the Sultani officials was rather limited. Nevertheless, it was not negligible as, after all, they were the

art. "Mustawfi", pp. 772-73. The duties of this official in Jedda appear to have been similar to those of a modern auditor.

²Al-Najm Ibn Fahd, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. II, fol. 220; Sakhāwī, <u>al-Daw</u>, vol. VI, p.34.

¹Sakhāwī, <u>al-Daw</u>, vol. VI, p.77.

²Al- Izz Ibn Fahd, <u>op.cit</u>., vol. I, fol. 41.

⁵From Bashara "to manage", "to conduct" etc; it does not designate the holder of a specific post but is often used as a general term with reference to those officials in Jedda who were appointed for the collection of taxes.

⁴See: Al-Najm Ibn Fahd, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. II, fol. 290; Sakhawī, <u>al-Daw</u>, vol. III, p.307; vol. IV, p.77; vol. X, p.166; idem, <u>al-Dhayl</u> (ed. A.Al-Hassu), pp. 101, 546 and 571; Al- Izz Ibn Fahd, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. I, fols. 3-4, 23, 39, 142-43 and 262: vol. II, fols. 40, 194 and 259.

^bFor details, see: Al-[']Izz Ibn Fahd, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. I, fol. 168; vol. II, fols. 96-97, 108, 115, 142, 172, 260-64 and 272-73.

immediate rulers of the area and their views were given some consideration by their Egyptian overlords themselves, so that it would have been sheer folly for an official to disregard or ignore them completely.

The influence of the <u>Sharifs</u> was comparatively greater on those Sultani officials who were of local origin than on those who had been sent from Cairo. For an appointee to a local post it was imperative to be on good terms with the <u>Sharif</u> so as to be able to perform his duties satisfactorily; if he was not, snags were bound to occur almost immediately. Thus, in Jumadá I 788/July 1386, Sultan Barquq deposed, at the suggestion of <u>Sharif</u> Ahmad, a <u>Gadi</u> Shafa'i of Mécca who held the posts of <u>Khitaba¹</u> and <u>Nagr al-Haram²</u> as well, and appointed another official instead.³

Early in 820/February or March 1417, a newly appointed <u>Qadi</u> Māliki, whose relations with <u>Sharif</u> Hasan were not friendly, was unable to dis-, charge his official responsibilities and - whether it was the doing of the <u>Sharif</u> or not - was shortly after replaced by another <u>Qadi</u>.⁴

There is evidence to the effect that some <u>Shaykh al-Hajaba</u>,⁵ in the early part of the period in question, were appointed by the <u>Sharifs</u>

¹The official assigned to this post is mentioned with the title <u>Khatib</u>, who delivers <u>Khutba</u> (i.e. sermon) at the Friday congregational prayer in the mosque. See: John Pederson, <u>E.I.</u>¹, art. "<u>Khatib</u>", pp. 927-29; A.J.Wen-sinck, <u>E.I.</u>¹, art. "<u>Khutba</u>", pp. 980-83.

²The official who held this post supervised the functions and matters related to the Meccan sanctuary and enjoyed authority over most of its officials. The office of "<u>Nazr al-Haram</u>", in the pre-<u>Burji</u> period, was called "<u>Mashikhat al-Haram</u>". See: Fast, <u>al-'Iqd</u>, vol. I, part I, fol. 96b. Maqrizi, <u>Suluk</u>, vol.III, fol. 105b; Al-Najm Ibn Fahd, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. II,fol.109. ⁴Fast, <u>al-'Iqd</u>, vol. I, part II, fol. 289b; Ál-Najm Ibn Fahd, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. II, fol. 170; Sakhawi, <u>al-Daw</u>, vol. II, p.8.

⁵This term is used in its plural form (sing. <u>Hajib</u>). The title <u>Hajib</u> has neveral meanings, such as "sheltering", "veiling", but is used here in the sense of "chamberlain". This title is applied to the senior member of the Shaybi family who, since the time of the Prophet Muhammad, enjoyed the exclusive privilege of being the custodian of the Ka ba and holding the key to its door. of Mecca and were usually confirmed by the Egyptian Sultans.¹

In Jumādā I or II 824/June or July 1421 the two joint officials to the posts of <u>Khiţāba</u>, <u>Hisba</u>, and <u>Nazr al-Haram</u>, found it difficult to work in harmony with each other. At the suggestion of <u>Sharif</u> Hasan, they agreed to a suspension in favour of a candidate recommended by the <u>Sharif</u> to perform their duties temporarily. The <u>Sharif</u> sent the news to Sultan Tațar with the suggestion that these posts should be assigned to a single official, a request which was viewed with favour by the Sultan, so that one of the two previous incumbents was appointed.²

In 837/1433, a certain merchant, Da'wud al-Kilani by name, secured, by offering a sum of money to Sultan Barsbay, the post of <u>Nagr al-Haram</u>. But <u>Sharif Barakat I refused to acknowledge him as such and replaced him</u> by another Egyptian official and his decision was confirmed by the Sultan.³ In <u>Dhu'l-Qa'da 882/March 1478</u>, Sultan Qa'it Bay appointed a candidate, on the recommendation of <u>Sharif Muhammad</u>, to the post of <u>Qada'</u> in Jedda.⁴

It is unnecessary to say that any decision of the <u>Sharifs</u> was valid only if confirmed by the Sultan. In Jumādā II 799/April 1397, for instance, a <u>Gadī Shafa'i</u> of Mecca appointed the sons of a deceased Māliki <u>Imām</u> to the post held by their father. This was opposed by <u>Sharif</u> Hasan, who put forward a favourite of his own. But Sultan Barquq confirmed the previous appointment of the <u>Gadi</u> and the <u>Sharif</u>'s nominee was deposed.⁵

The Sultani officials usually did not take sides during the frequently ensuing internal strife. Some of those who did were to suffer dire

¹ See: Fasī, <u>al-'I</u> dd, vol. I, part II, fol. 313b; Ibn Taghri Birdi, <u>al-Manhal</u> , vol. II, fols. 127b-28a; Al-Najm Ibn Fahd, <u>op.cit.</u> , vol. II, fols. 81, 98, 105 and 109; Sakhāwī, <u>al-Daw</u> , vol. V, pp. 295-96.
² Fasi, <u>al-'Iqd</u> , vol. I, part I, fols. 123a-23b;Al-Najm Ibn Fahd, <u>op.cit.</u> , vol. II, fol. 180; Sakhawi, <u>al-Daw</u> , vol. IX, p.214; idem, <u>al-Tibr</u> ,p.31.
³ Maqrīzī, <u>Sulūk</u> , vol. II, fols. 379 and 382-83; Ibn Hajar, <u>Inbā</u> , vol. II, fol. 127b; Al-Najm Ibn Fahd, <u>op.cit.</u> , fols. 214 and 216; Sakhāwī, <u>al-Daw</u> , vol. III, pp. 214 and 285-86; idem, <u>al-Tibr</u> , pp. 152-53.
4 Al-Najm Ibn Fahd, op.cit., vol. II, fol. 364.
⁵ Fāsī, al-'Igd, vol. I, part II, fol. 289a; Sakhāwī, <u>al-Daw'</u> , vol. IX, p. 78.

consecuences. This is evident from the fate of a <u>Qadi Shafa</u>'i of Mecca who supported <u>Sharif Hazza</u>'l and was later brought to account by <u>Sharif</u> Barakāt II. <u>Qadi</u>'s property was confiscated and he himself was imprisoned, tortured, and eventually put to death by drowning near al-Qumfudha about 908/1502. There is nothing in the sources to suggest that the Egyptian Sultan tried to intervene or showed displeasure at this harsh treatment of the <u>Qadi</u> and his tragic death.² sent from Cairo

Unlike other officials, the Sultani <u>Muhtasib</u> was under somewhat greater influence of the <u>Sharifs</u>.³ Though he was not obliged to, some fought with the <u>Sharif</u> against his opponents. In 907/1502, for instance, the Sultani <u>Muhtasib</u> was killed during a clash with the opponents of the ruling <u>Sharif</u> of Mecca.⁴

However, when the post of <u>Hisba</u> was assigned to <u>Bāsh al-Mamālik</u>, official in his dual capacity the influence of the <u>Sharif</u> on this/was almost negligible. Though the Sultan sometimes sent explicit instructions to <u>Bāsh</u> and <u>Muhtasib</u> of Mecca to pay heed to the views of the <u>Sharif</u> and to avoid harming the people,⁵ they were seldom obeyed.⁶ The <u>Sharifs</u> of Mecca were very occasionally able to impose their decision on the <u>Bāsh</u> and <u>Muhtasib</u> of Mecca. In 905/1499, for instance, someone complained to <u>Sharif Barakāt II</u> that the <u>Bāsh</u> had extorted forty dinars from him, the <u>Sharif</u> intervened

²Al- ¹Izz Ibn Fahd, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. II, fols. 6, 13-16 and 18; Ibn al-Dayba, <u>Qurra</u>, p.223; idem, <u>al-Fadl</u>, fols. 117b-19a. See also: Jazīrī, <u>op.cit.</u>, pp. 352-53; Ibn al- ¹Imad,<u>op.cit.</u>, vol. VIII, p.36; ¹Isamī, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. IV, pp. 284-85 and 301-2; Sinjarī,<u>op.cit.</u>, vol. II, fols. 20-24 and 27; Tabarī, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. I, fol. 137-39; Dahlan,<u>op.cit.</u>,p.47.

³See <u>supra</u>, pp. 2.42-+445.
⁴Al- Izz
⁵Al-Najm Ibn Fahd, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. II, fols. 5-6 and 27-28.
⁵Al-Najm Ibn Fahd, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. II, fols. 284 and 350.
⁶See<u>infra</u>, pp. 2.473-80.

¹See <u>supra</u>, p.89.

and the <u>Bāsh</u> had to return the amount to his victim.¹ In the same year, a number of <u>Mamluk</u> soldiers,guilty of causing disturbances, were expelled from Mecca at the order of Egyptian Sultan who appears to have responded to <u>Sharif's request.²</u> In 906/1500, the Egyptian Sultan instructed the <u>Sharif</u> to keep the conduct of <u>Bāsh</u> and <u>Muhtasib</u> in Mecca under strict supervision.³ This and other similar instructions obviously meant that the <u>Sharif</u> was authorized to intervene whenever he regarded it necessary. Early in 915/April or May 1509, <u>Sharif Barakāt II sent a strongly worded</u> warning to the <u>Bāsh</u> to desist from his harmful policies. This angered the <u>Bāsh</u> who thought of sending back a harsh reply. But on the advice of a local <u>gādi</u> he replied politely, and even in an apologetic manner.⁴

¹Al- 'Izz Ibn Fahd, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. I, fol. 242. ²Al- 'Izz Ibn Fahd, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. I, fols. 247-48. ³Al- 'Izz Ibn Fahd, <u>op.cit.</u> vol. I, fol. 256. ⁴Al- 'Izz Ibn Fahd, <u>op.cit.</u> vol. II, fol. 162.

## Chapter IX

#### THE POSTS HELD BY THE SULTANI OFFICIALS IN MECCA

## A. The officials appointed to the posts related to the Meccan sanctuary

The politico-economic hegemony of the Egyptian Sultans was fully reflected in the dominant position of their officials in the local administration. The Sultani officials, in both Jedda and Mecca, enjoyed a far greater measure of authority than those appointed by the <u>Sharifs</u> of Mecca.

The usual duties of officials such as the <u>imams</u>, <u>Khatibs</u> and <u>Mu'adhdhins</u>¹are well known, but it may not be amiss to mention certain local particularities. Long before the <u>Burji</u> period four <u>Magamat</u>² were erected in the Mecgan sanctuary, where the <u>Imams</u> of the four Sunni schools³ led the five prayers⁴ for their followers.⁵ This remained the case throughout the <u>Burji</u> period. The <u>Shafa'i Imam</u>, as the first to lead the prayer, held the dominant position; second in order was the Maliki, who was followed by the Hanafi and Hanbali <u>Imams</u>. In 792/1389-90, however, a change in the sequence occurred and the Hanafi preceded both his Maliki

¹Mu'adhdhin is a title used for the caller to the prayer.

²Maqamat, sing. Magam, were four small semi-enclosed places located at a short distance away from the Ka'ba, each facing one of its four walls.

³The <u>Sh</u>afa'i, Hanbali, Maliki, and Hanafi.

⁴Fajr, Zuhr, 'Asr, Maghrib, and 'Isha', held daily in the order of mentioning, shortly before dawn, shortly after noon, early evening, immediately after sunset, roughly two hours after Maghrib.

⁷Ibn Jubayr, <u>op.cit.</u>, pp. 101-4; Ibn Battūta,<u>op.cit.</u>, vol. I, pp. 83-84, 92-94, 98-99 and 102-3. and Hanbali colleagues. This sequence was observed in four out of the five prayers: only the prayer of Maghrib was led by all four <u>Imams</u> simultaneously, which often gave rise to confusion. In or around 811/1408, the <u>Shafa'i alone was authorised to lead this prayer but around 816/1413 the original practice was restored.¹</u>

Several Mua'<u>dhdhin</u> were employed at the Meccan sanctuary and followed their chief in adhan.² who determined the time appropriate by the traditional method according to the position of the sun and the stars, with the additional use of the sundial.³

In the early part of the period in question the post of <u>Khitaba</u> was exclusively assigned to the <u>Shafa'i</u> but a <u>Hanafi</u> <u>KhatIb</u> was also appointed at a later date. The Maliki and <u>Hanbali</u> were not appointed in this post until usage changed in the Ottoman period around 1030/ 1620-21.⁴

Shaykh al-Hajaba,⁵ held the key to the Ka'ba's door and was alone, except for his deputy, entitled to open it for visitors.⁶ He was in charge of the maintenance of order, cleanliness and minor repairs in the Ka'ba.⁷ The gifts sent for the Ka'ba were obviously kept under his custody. Some of these are said tohave been occasionally appropriated

¹Fasī, Shifa', vol. I, pp. 243-46 and 256; Al-Najm Ibn Fahd, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. II, fols. 4, 6, 8, 125, 133 and 141; Al- ⁶Izz Ibn Fahd, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. II, fols. 115, 138, 141 and 156. See also: Ibn Zuhayra, <u>op.cit.</u>, pp. 209-16; Jazīrī, <u>op.cit.</u>, pp. 314 and 317; Nahrawalī, <u>op.cit.</u>, p.196; ⁶Ali al-Tabarī, <u>op.cit.</u>, fols. 107-8 and 116-18; Sinjārī, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. I, fols. 281, 334-35, 337-39, 341-42 and 344; Tabarī, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. I, fols. 73-75 and 77.

²This word means "announcement" but it is used as a technical term for the call to prayers. See: Th. W.Joynboll, <u>E.I.</u>², art. "Adhan", pp. 187-88.

⁵Fasī, <u>al-'Iqd</u>, vol. II, part III, fol. 113b; idem, <u>Shifa</u>', vol. I, p.242; Al-'Izz Ibn Fahd, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol.II, fols. 38 and 90. See also: Ibn Zuhayra, <u>op.cit.</u>, p.216; 'Alī al-Ţabarī, <u>op.cit.</u>, fols. 40 and 119.

4. Ali al-Jabari, op. cit., fol. 118.

⁵See <u>supra</u>, p. 251 fn 5.

⁶Ibn Taghri Birdi, al-Manhal, vol. II, fol. 128a; Al-Najm Ibn Fahd, op.cit., vol. II, fol. 109; Sakhawi, al-Paw', vol. XI, p.7. See also: 'Ali al-Jabari, by this or other officials.¹

The Shaykh al-Hajaba was not only almost entirely free of financia obligation to the Sultan but also drew a substantial financial income. This was derived partly from gifts of gold, silver and precious woods donated by the Egyptian Sultans whenever the Ka'ba's door was altered and the reject became the property of this official. The majority of the references to such gifts or ornamentation come from the pre-Burji period, and the sources assess the value of the gold and silver alone at 35,000 dirhams, but occasional references are found during the Burji period though the amount spent was not great. The wood of the door was also of great value, as it was usually cut into pieces and sold for considerable sums of money.² The <u>Shaykh</u> al-Hajaba also benefited by the annual replacement of the Kiswa of the Ka'ba, as he claimed the old Kiswa, pieces of which were offered for sale to the faithful. This gift, however, was shared with Sharif of Mecca who received a portion in kind or the sum of five In 788/1386, Sharif 'Anan voluntarily renounced or six thousand dirhams. his share but in 798/1396 Sharif Hasan claimed it again and the practice seems to have continued thereafter. The Shaykh al-Hajaba's income was further eked out by the traditional tips paid by the pilgrims and other faithful on entering the Ka ba.4

op.cit., fol. 124; Sinjarī, op.cit., vol. I, fols. 88-89.

⁷Al-Najm Ibn Fahd, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. II, fols. 185-86; Al-'Izz Ibn Fahd, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. I, fols. 174, 179-80 and 190. See also: Tabari, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. I, fols. 127-28.

¹Ibn Zuhayra, <u>op.cit.</u>, p.113; Nahrawali, <u>al-1'lam</u>, pp. 62-63.

²Fasī, <u>al-'Iqd</u>, vol. I, part I, fol. 17a: vol. II, part IV, fol. 387b; idem, <u>Shifa</u>, vol. I, pp. 103-4 and 116; Al-Najm Ibn Fahd, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol.II, fols. 59, 98, 101 and 126; Suyūtī, <u>op.cit.</u>, p.486; Ibn Iyās, <u>Bada</u>'i', vol. I, p.166. See also: Jazīrī, <u>op.cit.</u>, p.25; Nahravalī, <u>al-I'lām</u>, pp. 54-55; Sinjārī, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. I, p.342; Tabarī, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. I, fol.100.

³Qalqashandī, <u>Subh</u>, vol. IV, pp. 276 and 283; Fasī, <u>Shifā</u>, vol. I, pp. 125-26; idem, <u>al-</u>Iqd, vol. II, part III, fol. 255b; <u>AI-Najm</u> Ibn Fahd, op.cit., vol. II, fol. 108. See also: Ibn Zuhayra, <u>op.cit.</u>, p.108; Nahrawalī, <u>al-I'Iām</u>, pp. 71-72; Sinjārī, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. I, fol. 84: 'Işāmī, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. IV, pp. 249-50.

This official was occasionally appointed to other posts. In <u>Sha</u>'ban 830/July 1427, for instance, Muhammad al-<u>Shaybi</u>, then the incumbent of the post, was nominated <u>Qadi Sha</u>fa'i of Mecca, a position he retained until his death in Rabi' II 837/December 1433 or January 1434.¹ In Ramadan 907/April 1502, a <u>Shaykh al-Hajaba</u> was offered by <u>Sharif Barakat I some</u> of the responsibilities of <u>Nazir al-Haram</u> but the official declined the offer.² As the post could not but be assigned to one of the <u>Shaybis</u>, and no outsider could compete, disputes were rare and far between and were usually amicably settled.³

B. Qadis of four Sunni schools and the dominant position of the Shafa'i

In the early part of the <u>Burji</u> period, the <u>Gadi</u> of Mecca was exclusively of Shafa'i madhhab.⁴

The first appointment of a Hanafi <u>Qadi</u> in Mecca is reported in 806/ 1404⁵ or 807/1405⁶, and of the first Maliki <u>Qadi</u> in 807/1405.⁷ A year or two later, the first Hanbali <u>Qadi</u> was appointed in Mecca and later he was offered and accepted a parallel appointment in Medina, and subsequently held both positions until his death in <u>Shawwal 853</u>/December 1449. He is said to have often visited <u>Shah</u> Rukh or his son. The <u>Qadi</u> was honourably

²Al-'Izz Ibn Fahd, <u>op.cit</u>., vol. II, fol. 13.

³Al-'Izz Ibn Fahd, <u>op.cit</u>., vol. I, fols. 94 and 107.

⁴Usually translated 'rite', 'provenance' or 'school'. A madhhab is one of four legal systems recognized as orthodox by Sunni Muslims. They are named after their founders - the Hanafi, Hanbali, Maliki, and Shafa'i madhhab.

⁶Ibn Hajar, Inba², vol. I, fol. 216b; 'Aynī, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. IV, fol. 543a. See also: Janabi, <u>op.cit.</u>, fol. 305a. 7Fasī, <u>al-'Iqd</u>, vol. I, part I, fols. 107b and 122a; Ibn Hajar, <u>Inb⁻a'</u>,

¹Maqrīzī, <u>Sulūk</u>, vol. II, fol. 382; Ibn Hajar, <u>Inba</u>, vol. II, fol.90a; Ibn Taghrī Birdī, <u>al-Manhal</u>, vol. II, fol. 331a; Al-Najm Ibn Fahd, <u>op.</u> <u>cit.</u>, vol. II, fols. 198 and 214; Sakhāwī, <u>al-Paw</u>, vol. IX, pp. 13-14; idem, <u>al-Dhayl</u>, fols. 92b and 99b; see also: Ibn al-Imād, <u>op.cit</u>., vol. VII, pp. 223-24.

⁵Fāsī, <u>al-'Iqd</u>, vol. I, part II, fol. 307b; Ibn Taghri Birdi, <u>al-Manhal</u>, vol. I, fols. 80a-80b; Al-Najm Ibn Fahd, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. II, fols. 132-33: Sakhāwī, al-<u>Daw</u>, vol. II, p.189.

treated by these Timurid rulers and received from them a substantial sum of money as a grant.¹ All <u>Qadis</u> of Mecca were generally selected from certain prominent local families, but there were exceptions to this custom. In 848/1444, for instance, the post of <u>Qada'</u> in Mecca was assigned to an Egyptian for a short period.²

The <u>Qadi Shafa</u>'i enjoyed a dominant position among the <u>Qadis</u> of Mecca. His judicial authority was undisputed, and unlike that of others, was recognized in Mecca itself as well as in other places in the region.³ His supremacy was rarely challenged but there were sporadic occurrences of that kind. In Rajab 916/November 1510, for instance, the <u>Qadi</u> Māliki of Mecca secured a decree by which he obtained, like the <u>Shafa</u>'i, judidal authority in the whole region of Mecca which was regarded by the <u>Qadi</u> <u>Shafa</u>'i as a serious infringement of his exclusive position, and he refused to acknowledge the Māliki's equal status. In Ramadān of the same year (January 1511) the <u>Shāfa</u>'i secured an edict re-affirming his exclusive position.⁴

vol. I, fol. 216b; 'Aynī, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. IV, fol. 543a; Ibn Taghrī Birdi, <u>al-Manhal</u>, vol. II, fol. 250b; Al-Najm Ibn Fahd, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. II, fol. 133; Sakhāwī, <u>al-Daw</u>', vol. VII, p.19; idem, <u>al-Tuhfa</u>, vol. I, fols. 726-27. See also: Janabī, <u>op.cit.</u>, fol. 305a; Ibn al- Imād, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. VII, p.199.

¹Ibn Taghri Birdi, <u>al-Manhal</u>, vol. II, fols.78b-79a; idem, <u>Hawādith</u>, vol. I, fols. 107 and 117-18; idem, <u>al-Nujūm</u>, vol. VII, fols. 189 and 200; Al-Najm Ibn Fahd, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. II, fols. 133, 138 and 270-71; Sakhāwī, <u>al-Daw</u>, vol. IV, pp. 333-34; idem, <u>al-Dhayl</u> (ed. A.Al-Hassu), p.36; idem, <u>al-Tuhfa</u>, vol. I, p.46; idem, <u>al-Tibr</u>, pp. 281-82. See also: Ibn al-<u>Imād</u>, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. VII, pp. 277-78.

²Al-Najm Ibn Fahd, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. II, fol. 255; Sakhāwī, <u>al-Tibr</u>, pp. 94-95, 114 and 140.

⁵Fasī, Shifā', vol. I, p.25; idem, <u>al-'Iqd</u>, vol. I, part I, fol. 10b, part II, fol. 274a: vol. II, part III, fol. 260b; Al-Najm Ibn Fahd, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. II, fols. 161, 163, 211, 239, 259 295, 333-34 and 345; Sakhawi, <u>al-Daw</u>, vol. I, pp. 303-4: vol. II, pp. 190-93; vol. IV, p.20; vol. V, pp. 209 and 219: vol. VI, pp. 9-10, 156 and 269; vol. VIII, pp. 208-9; vol. IX, pp. 92, 144, 193 and 266-67; idem, <u>al-Tibr</u>, pp. 124, 290-91 and 374; idem, <u>al-Dhayl</u> (ed. A.Al-Hassu), p.338; Al- Izz Ibn Fahd, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. I, fols. 54, 57, 79-80, 126, 133, 144, 223 and 251: vol. II, fols. 101 and 188. See also: 'Ali al-Tabari, <u>op.cit.</u>, fols. 120-21; Ibn al-'Imād, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. VII, p.168. ⁴Al-'Izz Ibn Fahd, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. II, fols. 185-86 and 188. The superior status and wider influence of the <u>Gadi Sha</u>fa'i was due to a large extent to the fact that he often held several other posts such as: <u>Khitaba</u>, <u>Hisba</u>, <u>Nagr al-Haram</u>, distributed various donations and supervised various charitable and welfare institutions, which is confirmed by several references in the sources.¹ This, however, was not an unbreakable rule. At times, some of these posts were assigned to a person or persons other than the <u>Gadi Sha</u>fa'i of Mecca.² The assignment of more than one post to an official was occasionally beyond the reasonable limit and one wonders how that incumbent could have performed the conflicting duties of his various posts. Thus, for instance, an official, Bardbek al-Taji, sent to Mecca in <u>Sha</u>'bān 854/October 1450, acted, until his dismissal in 857/1453, as <u>Mubtasib</u>, <u>Nazir al-Haram</u>, <u>Sha</u>dd al-'Amā'ir,³ <u>Sha</u>dd Jedda,⁴ and the supervision of various endowments and general works of welfare.⁵

¹For details,see: Fasī, <u>al-'Iqd</u>, vol. I, part I, fols. 96a-97a, 121b-23b, 168a-70a and 230a-30b: part II, fols. 295b-96a; Maqrīzī, <u>Sulūk</u>, voll II, fols. 263 and 417: vol. III, fols. 101a, 102a and 105b; Ibn Taghri Birdi, <u>al-Manhal</u>, vol. II, fols. 251a, 258b, 313b-14b, 381b and 512b; idem, <u>Hawadith</u>, vol. I, fol. 118: part II (ed. W.Popper), p.316; Al-Najm Ibn Fahd, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. II, fols. 27, 104, 109, 124,128, 132, 135, 138, 142, 146, 156, 160-61, 170-71, 176-77, 189, 197, 226, 239, 250, 259, 333-34 and 345; Sakhāwī, al-Dhayl (ed. A.Al-Hassu), pp. 32, 198-200 and 436; idem, <u>al-Tuhfa</u>, vol. I, fols. 719-20 and 729-30; idem, <u>al-Daw</u>, vol. I, pp. 88-89: vol. II, pp. 190-93 and 306; vol. VII, pp. 7, 45-46 and 84-85: vol. VIII, pp. 92-95: vol. IX, pp. 13-14, 77-78, 143-44 and 214-16; idem, <u>al-Tibr</u>, pp. 75, 124, 290-91 and 334; Al-'Izz Ibn Fahd, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. I, fol. 80: vol. II, fols. 37: 133; Ibn Iyäs, <u>Badā'i</u>, vol. II, p.58; idem, <u>Badā'i</u> (U.P.), pp. 43-44. See also: Ibn al-'Imad, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. VI, p.292 and 322-23: vol. VII, pp. 148, 278 and 292.

²For details, see: Fasī, <u>al-'Iqd</u>, vol. I, part I, fol. 168a-70a: part II, fol. 363b; Maqrīzī, <u>Sulūk</u>, vol. II, fols. 263, 379, 382, 390 and 392; Ibn Hajar, <u>Inba</u>, vol. II, fols. 90a and 134b; Ibn Taghri Birdi, <u>Hawaddth</u>, vol. I, fols. 52, 111-12 and 272; idem, <u>al-Manhal</u>, vol. II, fols. 251a, 313b-14b,331a and 344b-45a; Al-Najm Ibn Fahd, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. II, fols. 156, 160, 189, 198, 214, 217-18 and 263; Sakhawī, al-Dhayl, fol. 90b; idem, al-Dhayl (ed. A.Al-Hassu), pp. 7-8, 11, 38 and 248; idem, <u>al-Tuhfa</u>, vol. II, fols. 845-46; idem, <u>al-Tibr</u>, pp.289-90 and 320; idem, <u>al-Daw</u>, vol. III, pp. 22 and 127: vol. IV, p.10; vol. VIII, pp. 281-82. See also: Nahrawalī, <u>al-I'lam</u>, p.217; Sinjārī, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. II, fol. 8; Tabarī, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. I, fol. 105.

⁵This official was in charge of the construction works.

Several references in the sources concerning the activities of <u>Nazir al-Haram</u> show that it was his duty to prevent unauthorized persons from performing duties connected with the sanctuary, to provide certain facilities for the pilgrims such as drinking water, to supervise the repairs or cleaning of the sanctuary, especially after the entering of flood water and the rubbish it brought with it to the sanctuary.¹ In this task he was often helped by volunteers. The <u>Nazir</u> enjoyed authority over the minor officials of the sanctuary and could dismiss, suspend or reinstate them.²

The <u>Qadi Sha</u>fa'i of Mecca not only enjoyed authority in various fields, but also a number of exclusive privileges. Each year,³ on the

⁴This official (described often as Mushidd) was entrusted with the collection of taxes in Jedda. The term Shadd is often used in connection with the officials appointed to carry out minor duties such as "Shadd al-Ghanam" (means roughly the supplier of sheep and goats). See: Sakhawi, al-Tibr, p.210 and 215) or for the officials in charge of catering, bringing in the supply of water etc., see: Jazīrī, <u>op.cit.</u>, pp. 134-38.

⁵For details, see: Ibn Taghri Birdi, Hawadith, vol. I, fols. 146-48, 218, 242, 272 and 276; Al-Najm Ibn Fahd, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. II, fols. 272-73, 276-77 and 280; Sakhawi, <u>al-Daw</u>, vol. III, pp. 6, 45 and 61; idem, <u>al-Tibr</u>, pp. 320 and 344. See also: Nahrawali, <u>al-I'lam</u>, pp. 219-20; Sinjari, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. II, fols. 8-9; Tabari, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. I, fol. 107.

¹It is known that the sanctuary lies in the lowest part of the city and was - and is still - disposed to the entering of flood water after heavy rain.

²For details, see: Fasi, <u>al-'Iqd</u>, vol. I, part I, fols. 67a, 97a and 222b; idem, <u>Shifa</u>', vol. I, p.339; vol. II, pp. 267-69; Maqrīzī, <u>Suluk</u>, vol. II, fol. 379; Inn Hajar, <u>Inba</u>', vol. I, fols. 169b: vol. II, fols. 121a-21b, 126b, 128a and 172b-73a; <u>Aynī, qucit.</u>, vol. IV, fol. 670a; <u>Khazrajī</u>, <u>op.cit.</u>, fol. 485; Ibn Taghri Birdi, <u>Hawādith</u>, vol. I, fol. 52; idem, <u>al-Nujum</u>, vol. VII, fol. 188; Al-Najm Ibn Fahd, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. II, fols. 45, 127, 166, 170, 182-83, 188, 223, 236, 267-70, 272, 276, 284, 288, 302, 308-9, 333 and 338; Sakhāwī, al-Dhayl, fol. 65b; idem, al-Dhayl (ed. A. Al-Hassu), pp. 7-8, 11, 30, 82, 123, 136, 289-90, 419, 426, 453-54 and 542; idem, <u>al-Tibr</u>, pp. 16-18 and 152-53; idem, <u>al-Daw</u>', vol. I, pp. 86-87; Al-'Izz Ibn Fahd, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. I, fols. 3, 26-29, 32, 45, 47, 50, 66-67, 72, 101-2, 104, 116, 140, 143, 147, 173-74, 179-82, 189-91, 196, 200-2,222, 243-44, 248-49 and 251: vol. II, fols. 115, 133, 142, 242-43, 227-28 and 268; Ibn Iyās, <u>Badā'i</u>', vol. III, p.193 and 264; vol. IV, pp. 375-76. See also: Ibn al-Dayba', <u>Qurra</u>, fol. 208; Jazīrī, <u>op.cit.</u>, p.21; Nahrawālī, <u>al-I'Iām</u>, pp. 216-19; Alī al-Ţabarī, <u>op.cit.</u>, fol. 110; Ibn al-'Imād, <u>op.</u> <u>cit.</u>, vol. VII, pp. 218, 294, 304, 306 and 346; Sinjārī, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. II, fols. 4 and 8; Ţabarī, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. I, fols. 103-6. ³The references in the sources to this effect are found in the late <u>Burjī</u> night of 12th Rabi[•] I, he led a procession from the Meccan sanctuary to the birthplace of the Prophet Muhammad to celebrate the Prophet's birthday. In the procession many dignitaries, including occasionally the <u>Sharifs of Mecca, participated</u>. This was followed on the next morning by a feat (<u>Simāt al-Mawlad</u>) given by the <u>Qādi</u> <u>Shāfa</u>[•]i of Mecca.¹

The <u>Qadi</u> wore a white garment over his dress as a mark of distinction and strongly opposed the use of a similar garment by other Meccan officials.²

In his capacity of <u>Nazir al-Awqaf</u> he was entitled to rent a <u>waqf</u> or exchange it for a sum of money or another place.³

The <u>Qadi</u> was often entrusted with the legacies left to orphaned minors, and is said to have discharged this duty faithfully and efficiently. His influential position offered the best possible protection to the interest of these orphans. This is illustrated by the fact that, in 809 or 810/1407-8 <u>Sharif</u> Hasan paid the <u>Qadi</u> <u>Shafa'i</u> 30,000 dirhams in compensation for an orphan's property which had been seized by the <u>Sharif</u> earlier.⁴ This sum may have been given voluntarily, but that the <u>Qadi</u> had used his influence to obtain it cannot be ruled out.

His honesty, even when deposed, was never doubted. In <u>Shawwal</u> 875/ April 1471, for instance, a deposed <u>Qadi Sha</u>fa'i presented to the new appointee 16,000 or 20,000 dinars which belonged to the orphans but the newly appointed official left it under the care of the deposed.⁵

period. This indicates that this usage was not familiar in Mecca in the early and the middle part of the period.

¹Al-Najm Ibn Fahd, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. II, fols. 333 and 343; Sakhawi, al-Dhayl (ed. A.Al-Hassu), pp. 425, 456 and 534; Al- Izz Ibn Fahd, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. 1, fols. 117, 127, 143, 153, 164, 174, 183, 189, 219, 221, 243 and 251: vol. II, fols. 39, 61, 89, 115, 133, 149-50, 165, 179, 194, 228, 245, 257 and 273. See also: Ibn Zuhayra, <u>op.cit.</u>, pp. 325-26.

²Al^{\$}Izz Ibn Fahd, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. I, fol. 221.

³Fasi, Shifa', vol. I, p.337; idem, <u>al-'Iqd</u>, vol.I, part II, fol. 408b; Al-Najm Ibn Fahd, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. II, fols. 152 and 272-73; Sakhawi, <u>al-Tibr</u>, p.354; idem, <u>al-Dhayl</u> (ed. A.Al-Hassu), p.52. See also: Nahrawali, <u>al-I'lam</u>, pp. 202-3 and 219; Tabari, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. I, fols. <u>77-78</u> and 107.

Fasī, al-'Iqd, vol. I, part II, fol. 404b; Al-Najm Ibn Fahd, op.cit., vol.II, fol. 136.

The beginning of certain months in the Islamic calendar, such as Ramadān,¹ Shawwāl,² or Dhu'l-Hijja³ is of particular importance for the beginning or end of certain occasions of religious significance. The timing of the lunar months was usually left to the decision of the Qādī Shāfa'i and was rarely questioned.⁴

As no proper courthouse for judicial functions appears to have existed in Mecca, the <u>Qadis</u> presumably used their personal residences or the sanctuary for this purpose. The <u>Qadi Shafa</u>'i alone seems to have used, as a mark of distinction, a <u>dikka</u>,⁵ for the performance of his judicial duties. The first clear reference to the <u>dikka</u> goes back to around 826/ 1423⁶ but it seems to have later fallen into disuse and was not re-introduced until 845/1441 when a new <u>dikka</u> was erected in the proximity of the <u>Qadis</u> house and adjoining a gate of the sanctuary. However, owing to the opposition of Sultan Jaqmaq it was demolished after several meetings and heated discussions in 846/1442 or the following year.⁷

The respect enjoyed by the <u>Gadi Shafa'i</u> of Mecca is well reflected in the fact that, in Rabi' I 871/November 1446 Sultan <u>Khushqadam</u> blamed <u>Sharif</u> Muhammad for failing to take action against a <u>Khatib</u> who was showing disrespect to the <u>Gadi Shafa'i</u> and ordered the expulsion of the <u>Khatib</u> in

5Sakhawi, al-Dhayl (ed. A.Al-Hassu), pp. 198-200; idem, <u>al-Daw</u>, vol. I, pp. 94-95; vol. II, p.191.

¹The month of fasting.

²It follows Ramadan and its first day is <u>'Id al-Fitr</u>, the feast of the breaking of the fast.

³In this month the Muslims perform pilgrimage.

⁴Al-Najm Ibn Fahd, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. II, fol. 259; Sakhawi, <u>al-Tibr</u>, pp. 16 and 18-19: Al-'Izz Ibn Fahd, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. I, fols. 68, 78 and 239: vol. II, fols. 45, 142, 201-2, 205-6, 239 and 269.

⁵A platform. For further details, see: J. Jomier, <u>E.I.</u>², art."Dikka",p.276. ⁶Al-Najm Ibn Fahd, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. II, fol. 186; see also: Nahrawālī, <u>al-</u> I'lām, p.211; Ţabarī, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. I, fol. 83.

⁷Al-Najm Ibn Fahd, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. II, fol. 236, 240 and 244-45; Sakhawī, <u>al-Tibr</u>, pp. 16 and 47.

question from Mecca.1

In sources and edicts of the last years of the <u>Burji</u> period, the title "<u>Shaykh al-Islām</u>"² is often used for the acting or preceding <u>Qādī</u> <u>Shāfa'i</u> of Mecca.³ It was occasionally used by the Māliki <u>Qādī</u>⁴ but the <u>Shāfa'i</u> seem to have protested and it remained exclusively reserved for them.

Indicative of the fact that the <u>Gadī</u> <u>Sh</u>āfa'i's dominent status was accompanied by considerable wealth is the fact that he was often obliged to pay substantial sums of money to the Egyptian Sultans. Sultan Barqūq appears to have introduced this policy for new appointments, or in return for confirmation in their posts.⁵ Similar practice is reported with regard to later Sultans.⁶

<u>Qadi</u> Muhammad b. Zuhayra (d. around 819/1416) is reported by Sakhawi to have been the first Meccan <u>Qadi</u> to secure his appointment in return for an unspecified amount of money.⁷ But, in reporting the payment of 500 dinars by a Meccan<u>Qadi</u> in 841/1438, Maqrizi states that such extortion was unprecedented.⁸ Commenting on this figure, Sakhawi remarks that, in his time, such an amount would not even satisfy a servant of the Egyptian Sultan.⁹ From 861/1457 onwards the amounts paid by the

¹Al-Najm Ibn Fahd, op.cit., vol. II, fol. 314.

²This is one of the honorific titles reserved for <u>'Ulama</u>' which first appear in the second half of the fourth century A.H./second half of the tenth century A.D. For further details, see J.H.Kramers, <u>E.I.</u>, art. "Shaikh Al-Islam", pp. 275-79.

³Al-'Izz Ibn Fahd, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. I, fols. 36, 42, 46, 54-55, 60, 62, 64-65, 68-69, 76-77, 80, 101, 115, 123, 127, 139, 161, 176, 222, 245 and 250. See also: Nahrwali, <u>al-I'lam</u>, p.233; <code>Tabari</code>, <u>op.cit.</u>, voll I, fols. 128-29.

⁴Al- 'Izz Ibn Fahd, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. II, fol. 72. See also: 'Işāmī, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. IV, p.309.

⁵Sakhāwī, <u>al-Tibr</u>, p.12;idem, <u>al-Paw</u>, vol. III, p.12. ⁶Maqrīzī, <u>Sulūk</u>, vol. II, fol. 401; Ibn Taghrī Birdī, <u>al-Nujūm</u>, vol. VII, Meccan <u>Gadis</u> to the Egyptian Sultans or their officials were fairly large. In 861/1457, a candidate for the post of <u>Gada' al-Shafa'iyya</u> in Mecca secured his appointment by paying <u>Mushidd</u> Jedda together with other gifts 2,500 Ashrafi.¹ This was presumably paid in return for the intercession of this official on behalf of the applicants with the Sultan, but part of the sum at least must have gone to the Cairo treasury.

Ga'it Bay, before becoming Sultan, is reported to have criticized this practice, but continued in it himself after his accession to the throne.² It was during his rule that in 876/1471 the brother of a deposed <u>Gadi Sh</u>afa'i of Mecca went to Cairo to pave the pay, evidently on a finacial basis, for the re-appointment of his brother.³ At the end of 877/May 1474, the deposed <u>Gadi</u> in the company of <u>Sh</u>arif Barakāt II and several Meccan dignitaries went to Cairo. These took with them the Irāqi captives and appear to have used this incident successfully to their advantage. The <u>Gadi</u> was re-appointed and Barakāt II was granted the co-emirate with his father. Among the sources only Sakhāwī (in <u>al-Daw'</u>) and Ibn Iyās clearly mention that a payment of money was made. Ibn Iyās specifies the figure of about 100,000 dinars but without giving the individual shares of these Meccan dignitaries.⁵

fol. 20; Sakhawi, al-Daw', vol. I, pp. 95-96: vol.IV, pp. 204-5; Ibn Iyās, <u>Badā'i</u>, vol. III, p.86. Various evidence to this effect is to be found in the following pages.
⁷<u>Al-Daw'</u>, vol. IX, pp. 77-78.
⁸<u>Sulūk</u>, vol. II, fol. 401.
⁹<u>Al-Daw'</u>, vol. IX, p.78; idem, al-Dhayl, fol. 103b.
¹Al-Najm Ibn Fahd, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. II, fols. 288-89.
²Sakhāwī, <u>al-Daw'</u>, vol. VI,pp. 204-5.
³Sakhāwī, <u>al-Daw'</u>, vol. I, p.95; idem, al-Dhayl (ed. A.Al-Hassu), pp. 200 and 206; Ibn Iyas, <u>Badā'i</u>, vol. III, p.59.
⁴See <u>supra</u>, pp.84 and 139-40.
⁵For further details, *See*: Al-Najm Ibn Fahd, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol.II, fols. 340-43; In 891/1486, a dispute between a <u>Khatib</u> and <u>Gadi Shafa'i</u> of Mecca resulted in the involvement of <u>Sharif Muhammad</u> who supported the <u>Gadi</u> and suspended the <u>Khatib</u>. But the dispute continued until the death of the <u>Gadi</u> whose son, at the request of the <u>Sharif</u>, was appointed. Al-'Izz Ibn Fahd relates that the <u>Sharif</u> paid 10,000 dinars to Sultan Qa'it Bay; the circumstances in which this payment was made indicate that the intention was to secure the appointment of the <u>Gadi's</u> son. Other sources agree on the main point but do not refer to this payment clearly.¹

In 894/1489, the <u>Qadi Shafa</u>'i of Mecca paid 2,000 dinars either to the Sultan or the <u>Sharif</u>. The doubt arises because Al-'Izz Ibn Fahduses the word "<u>al-Dawla</u>" (i.e. state) instead of naming the ruler.²

In 903/1497 <u>Sharif Barakat II and others were ordered by an edict</u> to pay 10,000 dinars to an Egyptian Amir who was visiting Mecca. The prospective share of the <u>Qadi Shafa'i</u> in this payment was to have been the 2,000 dinars, but the sudden death of/Egyptian/amir made the payment superfluous.³

Following the tragic death of a <u>Qadi Sha</u>fa'i of Mecca in 908/1502⁴ Sultan al-<u>Ghawri</u> authorized <u>Sharif Jazani</u> to appoint a successor to the office, provided that the appointee gave 15,000 dinars to the Sultan.⁵ The next year a son of the deceased <u>Qadi</u> was appointed, but the sum he paid at the time amounted to only 5,000 dinars.⁶ The remainder

Sakhawi, al-Daw', vol. I, pp. 95-96; idem, al-Dhayl (ed. A.Al-Hassu), pp. 200 and 218-19; Ibn Iyas, Bada'i', vol. III, pp. 86 and 89-90. See also: Sinjari, op.cit., vol. II, fol. 12; Tabari, op.cit., vol. I, fol. 125; Dahlan, op.cit., p.44.

²Al-'Izz Ibn Fahd, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. I, fol. 115.

- ³AL-'Izz Ibn Fahd, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. I, fol. 230.
  ⁴See supra, pp. *89* and *252-53*.
  ⁵Al-'Izz Ibn Fahd, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. II, fol. 26.
- ⁶Al-'Izz Ibn Fahd, <u>op.cit</u>., vol. II,fols. 37-38.

¹Sakhawi, al-Dhayl (ed. A.Al-Hassu), pp. 329-32, 337-38 and 362; idem, <u>al-Daw'</u>, vol. II, pp.168-70: vol. IX, pp. 193-94; Al- Izz Ibn Fahd, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. I, fols.70-73, 76-80, 84 and 89; Ibn Iyas, <u>Bada'i'</u>, vol. III, pp. 22930 and 229-300. See also: Jazīrī, <u>op.cit.</u>, p.342.

was apparently left unpaid since, in 914/1508, the <u>Gadi</u> was warned that unless he paid a further 10,000 dinars he would be brought in custody to Cairo. Unable or unwilling to pay he was taken to Cairo,¹ and the Sultan appears to have reduced the debt to 5,000 dinars in Rabi[°] II 915/August 1509. This amount was lent to the <u>Gadi</u> by an Egyptian Amir and the <u>Gadi</u> was allowed to leave for Mecca.² A later reference indicates that the <u>Gadi</u> had paid the whole 10,000 dinars, as in 921/ 1515 a servant of the Sultan had claimed and obtained 500 dinars from the <u>Gadi</u> as the usual 5[°]/o share of any offering to the Sultan.³

The wording of some sources creates the impression that the <u>Qadi</u>, after being taken to Cairo, was kept as a semi-captive until released by the Ottoman Sultan Selim I in 923/1517.⁴

Modest sums of money were occasionally paid by the <u>Gadis</u> of other schools. Thus, in 899/1494, a Hanbali <u>Gadi</u> paid 300 or 500 dinars in return for his appointment.⁵ which, however, is mentioned by another source without reference to a payment.⁶ In 919/1513, a Maliki <u>Gadi</u> secured his appointment for 500 dinars, but payment was not enforced owing to the intervention of <u>Sharif Barakat II.</u>⁷

¹Al-'Izz Ibn Fahd, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. II, fols. 160-61. See also: Jazīrī, <u>op.cit.</u>, p.357.
²Al-'Izz Ibn Fahd, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. II, fols. 167, 169, 175 and 181.
³Al-'Izz Ibn Fahd, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. II, fols. 270-71.
⁴Tbn Iyās, <u>Badā'i</u>, vol. V, pp. 78-79; Nahrawālī, <u>al-I'lām</u>, p.284; 'Isāmī, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. IV, p.318; Sinjārī, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. II, fol. 51; Dablān, <u>op.cit.</u>, p.50.
⁵Al-'Izz Ibn Fahd, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. I, fol. 171.
⁶Tbn Iyās, <u>Badā'i</u>, vol. III, p.297.
⁷Al-'Izz Ibn Fahd, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. II, fols. 229 and 234-35.

#### C. <u>Muhtasib</u>

From what has been said earlier,¹ it is evident that the office very seldom had an incumbent who had no other responsibilities. References to officials who held no post apart from the <u>Hisba</u> are rare: and usually occur from 883/1479 onwards.²

Among the traditional responsibilities of the <u>Muhtasib</u> was the prevention of improper behaviour and the supervision of affairs connected with the local market such as correctness of scales and prices. This gave the <u>Muhtasib</u> considerable authority over the traders. References are made to the effect that the <u>Muhtasib</u> punished those who were guilty of using in-, correct scales or who failed to observe the official exchange rates of the currencies.³

The <u>Muhtasib</u> was helped in his duties by subordinate officials. Should any of the latter act with undue harshness, he could be deposed and even imprisoned.⁴

Whether or not the Sultani <u>Muhtasib</u> in Mecca was officially entitled to collect taxes from the trader is uncertain. But the <u>Muhtasib</u> in Cairo seems to have been authorized to do so,⁵ and the Meccan <u>Muhtasib</u> may have felt encouraged to emulate him and is reported to have imposed a tax on traders in Mecca.⁶ However, the amounts or percentages are not made clear; nor is it known whether it was done with the approval of the Sultan. In fact there is evidence to suggest that such collection was opposed by the

¹See <u>supra</u>, pp. 242-45 and 260.

²Al-Najm Ibn Fahd, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. II, fols. 369 and 374; Sakhāwī, <u>al-Daw</u>['], vol. III, p.273; Al- [']Izz Ibn Fahd, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. I, fols. 3-5, 7-8, 41-44, 49-50, 56-58, 63, 68,79, 87-89, 118, 122, 133, 144, 157, 159, 172-73, 185, 196, 198, 204, 214, 216, 233, 256, 258, 260 and 262: vol. II, fols. 5-6, 15, 26-27, 270 and 273; Ibn Iyās, <u>Badā'i</u>, vol. IV, pp. 454-55.
³Al- [']Izz Ibn Fahd, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. II, fols. 38, 245, 253 and 258.
⁴Al- [']Izz Ibn Fahd, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. II, fol. 272.
⁵Ibn Hajar, <u>Inbā'</u>, vol. II, fols.135a and 167a.
⁶Al- [']Izz Ibn Fahd, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. I, fol. 233.

EgyptianSultan. In 904/1498, for instance, a Sultani <u>Muhtasib</u> was ordered by an edict not to collect taxes but the official failed to comply and was deposed.¹

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Should the decision of the <u>Muhtasib</u> in some matters be opposed by a proper authority, it was the view of the latter which prevailed. In 905/1499, for instance, the matter of a debt was settled in accordance with the wishes of a <u>Qadi Sha</u>fa'i which seems to have been against the desire of the <u>Muhtasib</u>.²

The <u>Muhtasib</u> was allowed reasonable freedom to inspect goods but in the presence of its owners. In 905/1499, the <u>Muhtasib</u> of Mecca opened a warehouse to be inspected in the absence and without the knowledge of the merchant, who complained to Sultan Qanşawh or Janblat claiming that he had suffered material loss, and the <u>Muhtasib</u> was deposed.³

Despite the above stated action against the <u>Muhtasib</u> the Egyptian Sultans did not oppose the exploitation when it was for the benefit of the royal treasury. In Ramadan 906/May 1501, for instance, a recently appointed <u>Muhtasib</u> of Mecca is reported to have extorted money from some merchants, apparently in accordance with the Sultan's wish, and to have sent the amount to Cairo.⁴

## D. Bash al-Mamalik

This is the title most frequently used for the commander of the <u>Mamluk</u> garrison in Mecca. There is some uncertainty about the year from which the sending of these soldiers dated. Nahrawali, referring to the

¹Al-'Izz Ibn Fahd, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. I, fols. 233 and 236-37.
²Al-'Izz Ibn Fahd, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. I, fol. 242.
³Al-'Izz Ibn Fahd, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. I, fols. 247-48.
⁴Al-'Izz Ibn Fahd, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. I, fols. <del>247-48</del>. 256-57.

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distribution of charity in Mecca in 818/1415, by an Egyptian Amir, Taghri Barmash (d. 823/1420), describes him as <u>Bash</u> of the <u>Mamluk</u> soldiers stationed in Mecca.¹ But several contemporary and late sources, which refer to his reforms in socio-religious customs do not describe him as <u>Bash al-Mamalik</u>.²

The sending of military contingents to Mecca, for one reason or another, was not rare. But these returned to Cairo after performing their specified duties. Thus, for instance, in 827/1424, a force led by Amir Qarqmass reached Mecca to support <u>Sharif</u> 'Ali³ and it was their persuasion which led Ibrahim to anchor at Jedda.⁴ But this force was not sent as garrison and, though reinforced in the end of 828/October 1425, was recalled to Cairo in the following year and was not immediately replaced.⁵

Most likely it was in 831/1428 when Barakāt I's brothers, resenting the reduction of the former's share in the revenue, 6 adopted a threatening attitude towards their brother and began to endanger the safety of the merchants and the Sultani officials that Sultan Barsbay sent to Mecca. a body of fifty <u>Mamlük</u> soldiers to remain their for a year and form the garrison of the city.⁷ From this year onwards regular references are found in the sources to the arrival of a new <u>Bash</u> at the head of a cavalry soldiers to replace the contingent of the previous year. The sources often simply refer to their departure from Cairo or arrival in Mecca without

¹Nahrawali, <u>al-I'lam</u>, p.204.

²Fasī, <u>al-'Iqd</u>, vol. I, part II, fols. 362b-64b; <u>Al-Najm Ibn Fahd</u>, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. II, fols. 161, 163 and 178; <u>Sakhawi</u>, <u>al-Dhayl</u>, fol.87a; idem, <u>al-Daw</u>, vol. III, pp. 31-33; see also: Ibn al-'Imad, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. VII, pp. 159-60.

²See <u>supra</u>, pp. 73-74.

⁴See <u>supra</u>, p.173.

⁵Maqrīzī, <u>Sulūk</u>, vol. II, fols. 334 and 342; Ibn Hajar, <u>Inbā</u>, vol. II, fol. 80a; <u>Ayni</u>, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. IV, fol. 650b;Al-Najm Ibn Fahd, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. II, fols. 192-94 and 196.

⁶Seesupra, pp. 75-76,175 and 2.2.8.
⁷Magrīzī, Sulūk, vol. II, fol. 354; Ibn Hajar, <u>Inbā</u>, vol. II, fol. 95a; Ayni, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. IV, fol. 656b; Al-Najm Ibn Fahd, <u>op.cit.</u>,vol.II,fol.202.

giving further details. But from time to time other references permit the inference that they usually numbered fifty. As far as can be ascertained, their number never fell below this level but was occasionally increased. The presence of this garrison not only enhanced the authority of the Egyptian Sultan but also often gavegreat assistance to the <u>Sharifs</u> of Mecca in the maintenanceof law and order.¹

But the services of the <u>Bash</u> and his soldiers to the <u>Sharifs</u> were rendered, not by subordinates to a superior, but by representatives of the Egyptian hegemony: Thus, for instance, in <u>Sha</u> ban 845/January 1442, the <u>Bash</u> supported <u>Sharif</u> 'Ali² but in the following year, when he forfeited the favour of Sultan Jaqmaq, the <u>Sharif</u> was arrested and sent to Cairo.³ Likewise, in 910/1504 they fought and expelled Mumayda, a rival brother of the ruling Amirs Barakat II and Qa'it Bay.⁴

¹For the relevant details, see: Magrīzī, <u>Sulūk</u>, vol. II, fols. 354, 375, 390-92, 429-30 and 432; Ibn Hajar, Inba, vol. I, fols. 91b and 137b: vol. II, fols. 76a, 80a, 95a, 136a-36b, 141a, 162a, 172b and 173b-74a; 'Aynī, op.cit., vol. IV, fols. 650b, 656b, 670a and 686b; Khazrajī, op. cit., fol. 438; Ibn Taghri Birdi, al-Nujum, vol. VII, fols. 125-27; idem, Hawadith, vol. I, fols. 5, 12 and 276: part III (ed. W.Popper), pp. 444 and 557; idem, al-Manhal, vol. I, fol. 181a: vol. II, fols. 120a, 123b and 164a; Al-Najm Ibn Fahd, op.cit., vol. II, fols. 121, 125-26, 128, 187-88, 202, 204, 206-7, 209, 212-14, 217-19, 226, 238-40, 255, 277-78, 281 and 305; Sakhāwī, <u>al-Tibr</u>, pp. 14-15 and 40-43; idem, <u>al-Dhayl</u> (ed. A.Al-Hassu), pp. 459 and 541; idem, <u>al-Daw</u>, vol. III, pp. 103-4; Al-¹Izz Ibn Fahd, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. I, fols. 172 and 194: vol. II, fols. 5-6, 27-30 and 130; Ibn Iyas, <u>Bada'i</u>, vol. III, fol. 199: vol. IV, pp. 480-81; Ibn al-Dayba', Qurra, pp.223 and 225; idem, al-Fadl, fol. 116b. See also: Nahrawali, al-I'lam, p.216; Janabi, op.cit., fols. 304a-4b and 306b; 'Isami, op.cit., vol. IV, pp. 40, 60, 252, 265-67, 284-85 and 304; Sinjari, op. cit., vol. I, fols. 331-33: vol. II, fols. 3-4 and 21; Tabari, op.cit., vol. I, fols. 62-63, 103 and 163; Dahlan, op.cit., pp. 35-36 and 41-42. ²See supra, pp. <del>84-85</del>. 78-79. 3For details, see: Ibn Hajar, Inba', vol. II, fol. 177b; Ibn Taghri Birdi, al-Manhal, vol. I, fols. 181a and 237a; idem, al-Nujum, vol. VII, fols. 127-28; idem, Hawadith, vol. I, fol. 14; Al-Najm Ibn Fahd, op.cit., vol. II, fol. 241; Sakhawi, al-Tibr, pp. 14-15 and 45-46. See also: Jazīrī, op.cit., p.329; Janabi, op.cit., fol. 306b; Ali al-Tabarī, op.cit., fol. 70; Isamī, op.cit., vol. IV, pp. 267-68; Sinjarī, op.cit., vol. II, fols. 5-6; Țabarī, op.cit., vol. I, fol. 104; Dahlan, op.cit., p.42. ⁴See <u>supra</u>, pp. 94-95.

Occasionally, on the deposition of a ruling <u>Sharif</u> and the absence of the newly appointed Amir of Mecca, the <u>Bāsh</u> took control of the city to maintain law and order until the arrival of the appointee.¹ Similarly, some of the official responsibilities connected with a certain post were, at times, temporarily assigned to the <u>Bāsh</u> when the current official was dismissed or when doubts were raised concerning his legal position.² The <u>Bāsh</u>, from time to time, took keen interest in tracking down wrong doers and bringing them to justice. At times, however, he acted with undue cruelty and even hanged some offenders without previous consultation with the local authorities.³ Fully aware of his powerful position, the <u>Bāsh</u> interfered in matters which were not among his responsibilities. Thus, for instance, in Rabi⁶ I 832/January 1429, a Meccan who had secured the <u>Gādi⁶s</u> permission to build his residence on a piece of endowed land was prevented by the Bā<u>sh</u> from so doing.⁴

Likewise, in Rabi' I 900/January 1495, the <u>Bash</u> arrested a <u>Mu'adhdhin</u>, on the suspicion of drinking wine, had him beaten and suspended. The accused, possibly innocent, sought the help of the <u>Mazir al-Haram</u> who was, as explained earlier, in charge of all such officials, but the <u>Mazir</u> could do no more than mediate. The <u>Bash</u>, impressed by the rather polite approach, responded positively and restored the suspended official to his post.⁵ In the same year a dispute over a joint property assumed such proportions that it could not be settled without involving a higher authority, and the parties concerned took the case to the <u>Bash</u>. The mere fact that a judiciary

¹Al-Najm Ibn Fahd, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. II, fols. 261-62.
²Al-Najm Ibn Fahd, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. II, fol. 333.
³Al-Najm Ibn Fahd, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. II, fols. 222-23; Al-^cIzz Ibn Fahd, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. I, fols. 10, 41-42,118, 126,215 and 239.
⁴Al-Najm Ibn Fahd, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. II, fol. 208.
⁵Al-^cIzz Ibn Fahd, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. I, fol. 174.

case was taken to the <u>Bash</u> instead of the <u>Qadis</u> proves the degree of his influence and authority in local matters. He called the four <u>Qadis</u> to his redience, and the matter was settled after prolonged negotiations.¹ It is also noteworthy that the <u>Qadis</u> responded to the <u>Bash</u>'s summons without objectin. Shortly after, it so happened that the <u>Bash</u>'s men arrested a number of professional entertainers who appear to have been guilty of disturbing the peace in the city and the <u>Bash</u> again invited the <u>Qadis</u> to his house to decide the fate of these prisoners. Only the <u>Qadi</u> <u>Shafa'i</u> showed reluctance but was compelled to follow in their footsteps.²

In Sha'ban 910/February 1505, the <u>Bash</u> compelled the merchants to contribute to the costs of a road which cut across a residential area in Mecca.³

In addition to the interference referred to earlier, the general conduct of the <u>Bāsh</u> and his soldiers was far from preiseworthy. Maqrīzī, reporting there turn of a body of <u>Mamlūk</u> soldiers from Mecca to Cairo in 842/1438, accuses them of a number of offences.⁴ Evidently it was the objectionable interference of the <u>Bāsh</u> and his soldiers in the local affairs of Mecca which led Sultan Jaqmaq to send an edict in 848/1444, explicitly limiting the authority of the <u>Bāsh</u> to <u>Mamlūk</u> military affairs, and restraining him from interfering in other matters.⁵ The main objections seem to have been directed against the personal involvement of the <u>Bāsh</u> and his soldiers in local trade and the special protection they

¹Al-'Izz Ibn Fahd, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. I, fol. 174.
²Al-'Izz Ibn Fahd, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. I, fol. 180.
³Al-'Izz Ibn Fahd, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. II, fol. 70.
⁴Maqrīzī, <u>Sulūk</u>, vol. II, fols. 410-11.
⁵Al-Najm Ibn Fahd, op.cit., vol. II, fol. 255.

granted to certain merchants for financial remuneration.¹ The extortion of money by illegal means was by no means confined to <u>Mamlūks</u> stationed in Mecca. By the end of 861/1457, the <u>Mamlūks</u> had become so strong in Egypt itself that the people sought their support in return for money in regaining their rights from the others, instead of resorting to the proper authorities .² Likewise, a body of <u>Mamlūk</u> soldiers, who were sent as escort to the Egyptian pilgrim caravan in 862/1458, committed various offences including the forcible extortion of money.³

The atrocities of the <u>Bash</u> and his soldiers often went unpunished but occasionally were brought to account. In Rabi[•] I 866/January 1462, for instance, a <u>Bash</u>, guilty of harmful activities, was deposed, degraded to the rank of an ordinary <u>Mamlūk</u> and ordered to serve under the command of his successor. The <u>Mamlūk</u> soldiers too were rebuked and ordered to abstain from taking part in the local trade.⁴

The unruly behaviour of <u>Mamlük</u> soldiers increased, particularly from 868/1433, which may have been due to the fact that from this year onwards the <u>Mamlüks</u> sent to Mecca were mostly those exiled by Sultan <u>Khushqadam</u>.⁵ This policy may have been followed by his successors. Obviously, these resentful soldiers were bound to indulge themselves in various atrocities. It is interesting to note that between 866-79/1461-74 several edicts reached Mecca in which the conduct of <u>Mamlük</u> soldiers were criticised and the portion which contained rebuke was not read in public.⁶

¹Maqrīzī, <u>Sulūk</u>, vol. II, fol. 435; Al-Najm Ibn Fahd, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. II, fol. 229.

³Ibn Taghri Birdi, <u>al-Nujum</u>, vol. VII, fol. 249.

⁴Al-Najm Ibn Fahd, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. II, fol.305.

⁷Ibn Taghri Birdi, Hawadi<u>th</u>, (ed. W.Popper), part III, p.444.

⁶Al-Najm Ibn Fahd, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. II, fols. 305, 314-15, 334, 345 and 347.

²Ibn Taghri Birdi, <u>Hawadith</u> (ed. W.Popper), part II,pp. 307-8, 324, 327, 330 and 334-36.

This indicates clearly that these soldiers became a menace rather than a help to the Meccan authorities. Al-'Izz Ibn Fahd reports several confrontations between the <u>Bāsh</u> and his soldiers. Frequently it was the former who suffered personal humiliation and had to accept the demands of his soldiers in order to avoid a further deterioration of military morale and even insubordination.¹

The successive <u>Bash</u> were not only unwilling or unable to control their soldiers but themselves became involved again in the local trade and some even had compelled many traders to sell their goods near his house, apparently to secure personal financial gain. This appears to have aroused such resentment on the part of the traders that they complained to Sultan Qa'it Bay. In <u>Dhu'l-Hijja 882/March 1478</u>, by a decree the <u>Bash</u> was forbidden to do so but he failed to comply and was deposed. The new <u>Bash</u> was instructed to refrain from committing the same blunder.²

The temptation of material gain led the <u>Mamluk</u> soldiers to interfere in commercial transactions in Jedda as well and sometimes so harassed the indigenous and foreign merchants that they had to be prevented from going to Jedda.³ From a version of Varthema it appears that around 1503 A.D. the commander of the <u>Mamluk</u> escort of a pilgrim caravan had the right to take spices from Mecca without paying the usual dues imposed on the merchants,⁴ but this is not supported by other sources. Should this have been the case, the <u>Bash</u> of the Meccan garrison would have been entitled to this privilege in the first place and there is no evidence to support this.

Though the interference of the Bash in local trade was mainly for personal gain, it must be admitted that this was not always unjustified.

lAl-'Izz	Ibn	Fahd,	<u>op.cit.</u> ,	vol.	II,	fols.	172 <b>-</b>	-73,	181,	211	and	214.	
² Al-Najm	Ibn	Fahd,	op.cit.,	vol.	II,	fols.	365	and	369.				
³ Al-Najm vol. II	Ibn , fol	Fahd, ls. 92	<u>op.cit.</u> , and 182.	vol.	II,	fol.	281;	Al-	'Izz	Ibn	Fahd	op.c	<u>:it.</u> ,
4 Varthema	i, op	.cit.,	p.51.										

His assignment, at times, to the post of <u>Hisba</u> had given him wide authority over the traders, and it was only right that he should exercise it when necessary. There is evidence to prove that he occasionally intervened in the interest of the buyer to foil the extortionate demands of the traders or money exchangers.¹

The <u>Bash</u> always enjoyed a great measure of influence in Mecca but to in the closing years of the <u>Burji</u> period this rose/an unprecedented level, and in 899/1493 he was given, probably for the first time, formal reception by the <u>Sharif</u> of Mecca and other notables at the outskirts of Mecca. Similar receptions are reported for later years, which indicates that the practice was not allowed to lapse.²

Obviously it was the favour of Sultan Qa²it Bay which permitted the Bash in these years to act as if he were a regent, rather than a garrison commander. The extent of this favour is reflected in an edict of 900/ 1495 sent to the Bash, in which the Sultan signed with the word "waliduhu" (his father). It is no wonder, therefore, that the Bash noticed with displeasure, at the very ceremony at which the decree was read, that his seat was placed below the seats of the <u>Sharif</u> and his brother, which detracted from his dignity.³ It is not surprising to notice that in these years the Bash had personal servants and assistants at his disposal.⁴

One of the most surprising aspects of the arrogance of the <u>Bāsh</u> and his soldiers is observed in closing years of the period when they proved their ability to insult the <u>Sharif</u>. In Jumādā II 900/April 1495, for instance, a trivial dispute between a slave of the <u>Sharif</u> and a pilgrim

	⊥Al~	Izz	Ibn	Fahd,	op.cit.,	vol.	II,	fols.	139-40	and	248
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²Al-'Izz Ibn Fahd, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. I, fols. 170, 195 and 198.

³Al-'Izz Ibn Fahd, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. I, fol. 177.

⁴Al-Îzz Ibn Fahd, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. I, fols. 180, 21-12, 214-15 and 228: vol. II, fols. 191, 199 and 219. led the Bash to imprison a man of Sharif Muhammad. To make matters worse, the Bash went to the extent of uttering insulting remarks about Sharif Muhammad, to whom he referred to as "one-eyed cripple". The Sharif was informed about it, but he acted with amazing humility and sent a flattering message to the Bash describing him as the ruler, entitled This obviously delighted the Bash and he released to do as he pleased. the prisoner.¹ Two years later, the Bash hired from a group of Arabs twenty camels for the transport of some goods. Shortly after, three of these camels were taken by the Sharif's men, apparently without the consent of their owners, to beused by the Sharif's wife for a journey. Informed of this, the Bash sent ten of his soldiers to bring back the camels. On their arrival, the lady had already mounted one and the other two were laden with her luggage, and she was ready to depart. The soldiers insisted on taking the camels immediately but the Sharif's men refused, and only the Sharif's wife prevented an armed clash by solemnly descending from her mount and ordering her escort to hand over the camels. The Sharif, though then absent from Mecca, was obviously notified of the incident, but no action, not even a protest by him, is reported.²

The internal clashes between Barakat II and his brothers appear to have increased the importance of the <u>Bash</u> and his soldiers. To a large extent, the occasional assignment of several posts such as <u>Hisba</u>, <u>Nazr</u> <u>al-Haram</u>, the supervision of the endowments, and many others, accounted for his growing authority in Mecca.⁴ This is best illustrated in the

¹Al-'Izz Ibn Fahd, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. I, fols. 179-80. ²Al-'Izz Ibn Fahd, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. I, fol. 205. ³See <u>supra</u>, pp.86-94. ⁴Al-'Izz Ibn Fahd, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. II, fol. 34.

assassination of Sharif Jazan by a number of Mamluk soldiers and the appointment of Sharif Humayda by the Bash on the emirate of Mecca. In Dhu'l-Hijja 910/June 1505, during a skirmish between some of the men of Barakat II and some Mamluk soldiers in which both the Sharif and the Bash did their best to prevent the fight from spreading, some soldiers attacked the Sharif who, however, escaped injury but left the city, possibly in both anger and fear, as the assassination of Jazan in the near past must have made him rather apprehensive. The Sharif, sometime later, returned to Mecca and neither he nor the Bash took any punitive action against the offenders.² The Sharif's relative weakness in face of the unruly behaviour of the <u>Mamluk</u> soldiers is mirrored fyrther by an incident in Safar 911/July or August 1505, when he turned to an Egyptian Amir for help in preventing them from harming the people. An announcement made in Mecca to this effect invited the victims of Mamluk soldiers to bring their cases before the Bash.³ But such an announcement was hardly expected to influence the conduct of the Mamluks. Some of them, only shortly after, abducted a Meccan youth out of motives which appear to have been immoral. Indignant, some Meccans complained to the Bash, whose response was, to say the least, deplorable. He not only failed to take action against the offenders but insulted the plaintiffs arrogantly asserting that the Meccans were nothing but servants of the Turks, and forced them to disperse. Dismayed and angry, they returned to the sanctuary which resounded with the protesting and indignant voices of many Meccans, where prayers and other forms of worship came to a temporary halt. Though this upheaval eventually resulted in the culprits

¹See <u>supra</u>, pp. 92-93.

²Al-'Izz Ibn Fahd, <u>op.cit.</u>,.vol. II, fol.83.

³Al-'Izz Ibn Fahd, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. II, fol. 87.

releasing their captive, the slight punishment - light caning to which they were subjected was quite incommensurate with the gravity of their offence.¹ The most regrettable aspect of this deplorable affair was that the indigenous authorities did not bring the offenders to account. . Not even the Egyptian Sultan took any action, apart from a mild reprimand, without clearly referring to the incident, in Ramadan 911/March 1506.²

As time progressed, the behaviour of the <u>Bash</u> and his soldiers got more and more out of bounds. The sources contain several references to the oppression and exploitation by the <u>Mamlūks</u>, and almost always with impunity.³ Thus the main purpose of their presence in Mecca, namely the maintenance of law and order, proved self-defeating.

In the closing years of the periodunder examination the <u>Bash</u>, who often held the post of <u>Hisba</u> too, appears to have imposed on traders in the Meccan market a tax of around one Muhallaq for each mount entering Mecca with a load of fruit and vegetables. Ealy in 917/April or May 1511, this tax was increased to five Muhallaq per mount. The traders refused to pay and subsequently trading activities in the market came to a halt. The <u>Sharif</u> intervened and eventually a compromise tax, roughly half-way between the old and the newly imposed one, was agreedupon.⁴

The relation between the <u>Sharif</u> and the <u>Bash</u> seems to have improved in the final years of the period. Thus, for instance, in 919/1513, the at the request of the <u>Sharif</u> <u>Bash</u>/was allowed to remain in Mecca for another year.⁵ In Jumādā II 921/ August 1515, the <u>Sharif</u>'s influence was enhanced further when the posts

¹Al-'Izz Ibn Fahd, <u>op.cit</u>., vol. II, fols. 87-88.

²Al-'Izz Ibn Fahd, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. II, fol. 104.

³Al-'Izz Ibn Fahd, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. II, fols. 123-24, 162, 172-73, 175, 199, 212 and 229; Ibn Iyas, <u>Bada'i'</u>, vol. IV, pp. 288 and 297. See also: Jazīrī, <u>op.cit.</u>, p.26.

⁴Al-'Izz Ibn Fahd, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. II, fols.198-99.

⁵Al-'Izz Ibn Fahd, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. II, fol. 235.

of <u>Bashiyya</u> and <u>Hisba</u> were placed under the supervision of <u>Sh</u>arif 1 Barakāt 11.

The last of the officials to fill the posts of Ba<u>sh</u> and the Sultani Muhtasib in Mecca, named Baybardi and Qaraqur respectively, arrived there in <u>Dhu'l-Qada 921/January 1516.In 923/1517</u>, they went to Cairo with <u>Sha</u>rif Abū Numayy 11 to pay homage to the Ottoman Sultan Selim 1, who is reported to have intended to put these <u>Mamlūk</u> officers to death, but spared their lives at the request of <u>Sharif Abū Numayy 11</u> and sent them  $\frac{3}{1000}$ 

¹ Al-Izz Ibn Eahd, op. cit., ¥ol. 11, fols. 261-62.

²Al-Izz Ibn Fahd, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. 11, fol. 270.

³Ibn Iyās, <u>Badā'i</u>, vol. V, pp. 185-86, 189 and 212-13. See also: Al-Bakarī, <u>op. cit.</u>, fols. 49-50.

# <u>Chapter X</u> THE OFFICIALS SENT FROM CAIRO TO COLLECT TAXES IN JEDDA

Initially, the number of Egyptian officials sent to Jedda in 828/ 1425 to exact/dues does not seem to have exceeded four or five.¹ Some points relevant to their methods of collection and details of the rewenue obtained have been dealt with in previous chapters.

The use of alternative titles for the official in charge of Jedda is common in the sources. The titles most frequently used are  $\underline{Na'ib}$  Jedda,²  $\underline{Nazir}$  Jedda,³ <u>Shadd</u> Jedda, <u>Mubashir</u> Jedda,⁴ or simply collector of taxes. This is sometimes so confusing that it is difficult to establish the identity of their official capacity, apart from their general field of competence and common task of collecting the taxes. Especially as often the sources refer to a certain official by several titles, without indicating that a change of appointment has taken place in the meantime. Thus it is not easy to draw a dividing line between the ranks and responsibilties of various officials. The title  $\underline{Na'ib}$  Jedda was by rights only applicable to the official of the highest rank but was in practice sometimes used for those described elsewhere in the same source, or in other

¹G.Wiet seems to suggest that the tax collectors in Jedda belonged to the Egyptian administration alone. See: E.I.², art. "Barsbay", p.1054. But as already discussed there were many officials appointed by the Sharifs of Mecca for the same task and they not only shared the revcenue and administration but had their own pier, called Furdat al-Sharif.

²This title denotes the deputy of the Sultan in Jedda and the official referred to as such was supposed to be of highest rank among those sent to Jedda.

³This title, like the Shadd, refers to the official entrusted with the supervision of the process of collecting 'Ushr (tithe) as well as the general administration of the port.

⁴This is used, as explained earlier, as a general term for the official appointed to conduct certain duties in one field or another.

sources of the corresponding period, as <u>Nazir</u>, or <u>Shadd</u>, or even as <u>Mubashir</u> whose ranks were lower than <u>Na'ib</u> Jedda. It could be argued, therefore, that there was no fixed well defined title for these officials according to their rank and that the sources seem to have been at liberty to choose the description or title they regarded as best fitted for the activities of the official in question.¹

Apart from the principal officials, references are found to other officials of lower rank. The most important among these were the <u>Sayraff</u>,² <u>Mu'allim al-Qabbanin</u>,³ <u>Mu'allim al-Kayyalin</u>,⁴ and <u>Dallal</u>.⁵ All these offices provided facilities necessary for the conclusion of commercial transactions and for the determination of the correct amount of <u>'Ushr</u> to be levied, in cash or kind, on the merchants. Unfortunately, the information available about these officials and their posts hardly exceeds data such as names, approximate date of appointment in Cairo and arrival in Jedda.⁶ Nevertheless, a reasonably correct inference of what their

1 For various phrases and alternative titles used in the sources for the Sultani officials in Jedda, see: Maqrīzī, Sulūk, vol. II, fols. 334-35, 339-40, 354, 357, 362, 369, 371-72, 375 and 390-91; Ibn Hajar, Inba', vol. II, fols. 95a, 102a, 107a, 119a, 127b, 134b, 136a and 140b; 'Aynī, op.cit., vol. IV, fols. 665a and 674b; Ibn Taghri Birdi, al-Nujūm, vol. VII, fols. 25, 132-33, 154, 157, 159 and 231; idem, Hawadith, vol. I, fols. 53, 79, 160, 204, 237, 276, 311, 331-32 and 347: part II (ed. W. Popper), p.319; idem, al-Manhal, vol. I, fols. 251b and 254a: vol. II, fols. 75a, 473b and 474a; Al-Najm Ibn Fahd, op.cit., vol. II, fols. 192-93, 196-97, 202-3, 208, 210-11, 216, 219, 258, 281-82, 286, 288, 321, 325 and 335; Sakhāwī, al-Tuḥfa, vol. II, pp. 100 and 263-64; idem, al-Dhayl (ed. A.Al-Hassu), pp. 95, 208 and 457-58; idem, al-Tibr, pp. 243-44; idem, al-Paw', vol. I, p.184: vol. III, pp. 43-44, 56-59, 126 and 293-94: vol. IV, pp. 30-31 and 86; Al- ⁶Izz Ibn Fahd, op.cit., vol. I, fol. 175; vol. II, fol. 149; Ibn Iyās, Bada'i', vol.III, pp. 8-9, 38-9, 111 and 264; idem, Bada'i', (U.P.), pp. 14, 22 and 33. See also: Jazīrī, op.cit., pp. 322-3 and 325-6; Sinjārī, op.cit., vol. I, fols. 349-50: vol. II, fols. 3-4.

²Money changers.

³Inspector of weight (<u>Qabhan</u> is the singular form).

⁴Inspector of measures (<u>Kayyal</u> is the singular form).

²Broker, agent. For further details, see: C.M.Becker and G.S.Colin, E.I.², art. "Dallal", pp. 102-3.

⁶For details, see: Maqrīzī, <u>Sulūk</u>, vol. II, fol. 383; Al-Najm Ibn Fahd, <u>op.</u> <u>cit.</u>, vol. II, fols. 215, 229, 268 and 312; Sakhawī, <u>al-Daw</u>, vol. III, pp. 210 and 231: vol. IV, pp. 306-7: vol. V, pp. 220-21: vol. VII, p.238; duties were can easily be made from the meaning of their title and our knowledge of the manner in which similar functionaries in our day perform their duties.

Some of the officials of lower rank, like their superiors, were able to accumulate considerable fortunes. Thus, a <u>Sayrafi</u> in Jedda who was assigned some other duties as well was able to secure considerable material gains.¹ The post of <u>Sayrafi</u> was important enough to be assigned occasionally to the high ranking officials in Jedda.² The <u>Sayrafi</u> or other officials of secondary rank had to be on good terms with the official in charge, otherwise their ability to perform their duties was severely impaired, and there was a likelihood of their suffering ill-treatment their from superiors.³

The title <u>Shah Bandar-Jedda</u>⁴ is used with reference to a number of wealthy merchants in Jedda who were often granted a robe of honour sent from Cairo. These are sometimes mentioned with the title "<u>Malik al-Tujjar</u>" (King of the merchants) and seem to have possessed certain commercial privileges and may have carried out occasional commercial transactions on behalf of the Egyptian Sultans.⁵ This hypothesis is supported by the

vol. VIII, p. 231: vol. XI, p.51; idem, al-Dhayl (ed. A.Al.-Hassu), pp. 300, 308, 457-58, 494-95, 540-41 and 546; Al-'Izz Ibn Fahd, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. I, fols. 21, 36, 38-9, 48, 53, 74, 106-8, 119-20, 122, 135, 142, 144-46, 156, 168, 181-82, 196, 204, 212-13, 239 and 255-57: vol. II, fols. 1-2, 19, 113, 118, 133, 188 and 209; Ibn Iyas, <u>Bada'i'</u>, (U.P.), p.173; idem, <u>Bada'i'</u>, vol. III, pp. 96 and 268.

¹Sakhawi, al-Daw', vol. IV, pp. 306-7: vol. V, pp. 220-21. See also: Sakhawi, al-Dhayl (ed. A.Al-Hassu), p.170; Ibn Iyas, <u>Bada'i</u> (U.P.), p.173.

²Al-'Izz Ibn Fahd, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. I, fols. 156-57, 181-82 and 195-96; Ibn Iyas, <u>Bada'i'</u>, vol. III, p.96.

³Sakhāwī, <u>al-Daw</u>, vol. VII, p.238; idem, <u>al-Dhayl</u> (ed. A.Al-Hassu), pp. 457-58; Al- Izz Ibn Fahd, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. I, fol. 74.

⁴The word "Bandar" is a Persian word denoting a seaport. The term Shah Bandar, in Persian, means customs officer. See: Cl. Huart /H.Masse/,  $E.I.^2$ , art. "Bandar", p.1013. But in Jedda, the bearer of this title does not seem to have had any direct connection with the process of collecting taxes.

⁵For details, see: Al-Najm Ibn Fahd, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. II, fols. 179 and 212; Sa<u>khawi, al-Daw</u>, vol. II, p.43; Al- Izz Ibn Fahd, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. I, fols. the fact that in 899/1494 a merchant secured this title in return for twenty or thirty thousand dinars.¹ Obviously such an amount of money was not paid for a mere honorific title, and the merchant in question was aiming at enhancing his commercial interest.

#### A. Financial obligation of the officials towards the Egyptian Sultan

Some of the Sultani officials in Jedda do not appear to have been sent simply to obtain the Ushr and other dues and to bring back the revenue or transmit it to Cairo. There is sufficient evidence to the effect that many of them were under injunction or even pressure to amass for the treasury as much revenue as possible. Several others seem to have been sent on the clear understanding or under the explicit obligation to pay in return a certain minimum, in cash or in kind, without which they were to suffer unpleasant consequences. Thus, it was not a simple appointment but rather a sale of offices which may have been initiatedd earlier but increased greatly during the reign of Sultan Barsbay, who also showed little reluctance in the confiscation of fortune and monopolization of trade.² Those who bought the office, or were appointed, did not necessarily secure their expected gains and could even suffer financial loss. Thus, for instance, in 833/1430, Sultan Barsbay appointed a certain dignitary his wazir and the official in question accepted the post against the advice of his father, who had held that very post earlier and had lost 50,000 dinars of his own fortune.³ This was in Egypt but, as will be seen, many officials in Jedda were to suffer a similar fate.

Evidently many officials in Jedda could not come up to the expectations of the Sultan by virtue of the circumstances beyond their control and,

^{3, 34, 38, 80, 82, 120, 149, 168, 210} and 216-17: vol. II, fols. 65-66, 102, 149, 210, 231 and 235; Ibn al-Dayba', <u>al-Fadl</u>, fol. 156b.
¹Al-'Izz Ibn Fahd, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. I, fol.168.
²G.Wiet, <u>E.I.²</u>, art. "Barsbay", 1054.
³Ibn Taghri Birdi, <u>al-Manhal</u>, vol. II, fols. 74b-75a.

dreading to face his anger, sometimes had to bring considerable financial sacrifices out of their own resources to eke out the amounts collected. The other most obvious - and by no means rare - alternative for these officials was to collect, by fair means or foul, as much payment as was feasible. In their desire to please the Sultan, these officials sometimes sent goods to Cairo without paying their prices to the merchants,¹ and im - posed an arbitrary addition to the usually levied taxes.² It was to the same end that some of these officials sold goods sent from Egypt rather forcibly and at a price above their market value.³ Obviously, the profit thus secured was sent to the treasury in Cairo.

How closely the performance of these officials to further the material gains for the Sultan was watched is reflected by the fact that, in 895/1490, a consignment of pepper to Sultan Qa'it Bay was found to contain an undue amount of dust. The Sultan ordered the officials to investigate to discover the person or persons responsible and bring them to account.⁴ Should they fail to satisfy the Sultan, they aroused his displeasure and were often to suffer personal humiliation as well as material loss. In 839/143, for instance, the revenue brought back by a <u>Shadd</u> Jedda was found unsatisfactory by the Sultan, Barsbay, and the official was <u>deposed and his fortune confiscated.⁵ This case was not unique for several</u> ¹Al-'Izz Ibn Fahd, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. I, fols. 36-37. ²Al-'Izz Ibn Fahd, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. II, fol. 50.

³For details, see: Ibn Taghri Birdi, <u>al-Manhal</u>, vol. I, fols. 254a-b; Al-Najm Ibn Fahd, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. II, fols. 264-66: Sakhawi, <u>al-Tibr</u>, pp. 175-76 and 186; Al- Izz Ibn Fahd, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. II, fol. 52. ⁴Al- Izz Ibn Fahd, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. I, fol. 120.

²Ibn Hajar, <u>Inba</u>², vol. II, fol. 134b.

others had to face displeasure of the Sultans, and occasionally, imprisonment, fines and confiscation of their property.¹

But these officials obviously did not suffer as a rule, and they seem to have been entitled to a certain percentage of dues,² apparently to meet their financial obligations, and many were able to amass quite considerable wealth for themselves.³ There are occasional references to a special official being sent to Jedda to claim from the official in charge there the full amount destined for Cairo.⁴ This cannot but be taken to mean that the official in question must have been sent under obligation to send a fixed sum to Cairo.

It was evidently this obligation and the fear of harsh treatment which had deterred Muhammad b. 'Abd al-Rahmān, who previously had been sent these posts to Jedda as an assistant to the <u>Nazir</u> and <u>Sayrafi</u> from accepting.' He even paid a considerable amount of money to be rrelieved of the appointment. In 887/1482, however, he found it impossible to decline and was sent to Jedda to keep watch on a <u>Nazir</u> Jedda and, in the following year, was appointed to this post. The number of vessels was smaller than he had expected and he sent the news to Cairo, obviously to exonerate himself in advance for the unavoidable reduction in revenue. However, he did not live to see the end of his predicament, as he died in Jumādā II 888/ August 1483 before receiving a reply.⁵ In 896/1491, again, an appointee to the post of <u>Nazir</u> Jedda is said to have accepted his appointment with marked reluctance.⁶

¹See details in: Ibn Taghri Birdi, Hawadith, vol. I, fol. 96; Sakhawi, <u>al-Daw</u>, vol. VIII, p.44: vol. X, pp. 35-36: vol. XI, p.164; idem, <u>al-Tibr</u>, p.266; idem, <u>al-Dhayl</u> (ed. A.Al-Hassu), pp. 257, 308, 357-58 and 377; Al-'Izz Ibn Fahd, <u>op.cit.</u>, fols. 51, 78 and 95-97; Ibn Iyas, <u>Bada'i</u>, vol. III, pp. 200, 240, 247 and 359.

²See <u>supra</u>, p. 177.

³Ibn Taghri Birdi, <u>al-Nujum</u>, vol. VII, fols. 132-33; idem, <u>al-Manhal</u>, vol. I, fol. 254a; idem, <u>Hawādith</u> (ed. W.Popper), part III, pp. 495 and 534-36; Sakhāwi, <u>al-Daw</u>, vol. I, pp. 184-85: vol. III, pp. 57-59; idem, al-<u>Dh</u>ayl (ed. A.Al-Hassu), p.95.

"For details, see: Sakhawi, al-Dhayl (ed. A.Al-Hassu), p.541; Al-'Izz Ibn

Indian rulers usually sent gifts for the Egyptian Sultans via Jedda, and may occasionally have sent some for his officials who often went to Cairo in the company of these envoys.¹ The greed of the Egyptian Sultan and his officials in Jedda occasionally brought about a political crisis. In890/1485, for instance, an Indian envoy reached Jedda with valuable gifts, including a dagger ornamented with precious stones, which had been sent for the Ottoman Sultan. Shadd Jedda took the gifts to Cairo and presented them to Sultan Qa'it Bay. Consequently, the Mamluk-Ottoman relations became strained for a while and eventually the gifts were returned to the Ottoman Sultan with an apology.² Evidently the official, once appointed, had to acquit himself of the full obligation to remit the dues or imposed amount to the treasury whether he collected them in full or not. Equally, he possessed the privilege to collect his percentage of the taxes, whether he had performed the duties of his office person-In 907/1502, a Nazir and Sayrafi in Jedda was deposed, but ally or not. his successor was unable to take over in time and the duties were performed by the deposed official. Nevertheless, the new appointee claimed, on his arrival, the amount obtained and acquired 4,000 dinars.³

The financial obligation originally imposed on an official in Jedda could be increased in certain circumstances. Thus, for instance, in Sha'ban 900/June 1495, Sultan Qa'it Bay imposed on the official in charge of Jedda and some of his subordinates the obligation to pay an additional amount of 13,000 or 14,000 dinars.⁴ In Rabi' II 902/January 1497, the inspector

Fahd, op.cit., vol. I, fols. 17 and 168; Ibn Iyas, Bada'i, vol. III, pp. 8-9. ⁵Sakhāwi, <u>al-Daw</u>, vol. VIII, pp. 43-44. See also: Sakhāwi, <u>al-Dhayl</u> (ed. A.Al-Hassu), p.300; Al-'Izz Ibn Fahd, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. I, fols. 25, 32; 34 and 36; Ibn Iyās, <u>Bada'i</u>, vol. III, pp. 194 and 198.

⁶Sa<u>khā</u>wī, al-<u>Dh</u>ayl (ed. A.Al-Hassu), p.494.

¹As token references, see: Sakhawi, al-Dhayl, fols. 100a-b; idem, al-Dhayl (ed. A.Al-Hassu), p.297; idem, al-Daw, vol. III, p.280; Ibn Iyas, Bada'i, vol. III, p.153. See also: Ibn al-:Imad, op.cit., vol. VII, p.225. ²Ibn Iyas, <u>Bada'i'</u>, vol. III, p.210. 4Al- 1zz Ibn Fahd, op.cit., ³Al-Izz Ibn Fahd, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. II, fols. 1-2. vol. I, fol. 182.

of weights and the chief broker in Jedda were called to Cairo, probably for their failure to fulfil their financial obligations. Their journey to Cairo, on payment of a total sum of 3,000 dinars, was dispensed with.¹

Usually, the figure of the financial obligation of the officials towards the Sultan is not mentioned in the sources, which implies that it was not disclosed. That the sums in question were very substantial can be inferred from the few occasional figures, mentioned in the preceding pages, and from a statement of Al-'Izz Ibn Fahd, who says that in 917/ 1511, Sultan Qansawh al-Ghawrī imposed on the <u>Nazir</u> and a <u>Mubashir</u> in Jedda the obligation to pay to the treasury the sums of 15,000 and 10,000 dinars respectively.² Since, as has been seen, the port of Jedda was in decline in the closing years of the <u>Burji</u> period, and these amounts were by no means insignificant, it can be assumed with perfect safety that the financial obligation imposed on officials of this rank would have been considerably higher in its heyday when the commercial activities of the port were at their peak.

## B. The influence and authority of the principal official in Jedda.

The influence enjoyed by these officials was - by reason of the importance of the port as well as his being the representative of the Egyptian Sultan - great both locally and abroad. On the local level they regarded all matters connected with the port and the commercial activities their exclusive prerogative and resented any intrusion. The first most important construction work in Jedda by the Sultani officials was to build a new pier in 831/1428, thus raising this port to the standard of Aden.³ It was evidently this which is referred to as <u>Furdat al-Sultan</u>, while the old pier of Jedda⁴ was called Furdat al-Sharif.⁵

¹Al-'Izz Ibn Fahd, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. I, fols. 204-5.
²Al-'Izz Ibn Fahd, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. II, fol. 203.
³Ibn Hajar, <u>Inba</u>', vol. II, fol. 95a.
⁴See <u>supra</u>, p.245.
⁵See <u>supra</u>, p.249.

The authority of the principal Sultani official, judging by several direct or indirect references, was not confined to his staff but included other local officials. His ascendancy, in spiteof the occasional disputes, was never questioned while he was present in the city. ¹ He was strong enough to put an end to some harmful local practices. A Mastaba² was built in Jedda by a group of <u>Quwwad</u> known as <u>Dhawi</u> 'Umar. They used it as their meeting place and granted their special protection to all those who climbed over it. Since this occasionally enabled criminals to escape the consequences of their crime, the local authorities seem to have opposed this custom as interfering with the processes of justice, but failed to prevail. In 840/1436, however, when the Shadd Jedda demolished the Mastaba, this practice ended but there ensued a clash between the Shadd's men and the Quwwad's, which ended in favour of the former. Magrizi and Ibn Hajar mention the clash itself but without attributing it to the demolition of Mastaba, which is mentioned explicitly by the other sources.³

The influence of the <u>Shadd</u> or <u>Na'ib</u> Jedda in the Meccan region was a natural outcome of the favourable position enjoyed by most of them with the Egyptian Sultan. Obviously, it was precisely this which often enabled them to appoint, suspend, or depose a number of local officials. In 851/1447, for instance, the <u>Shadd</u> Jedda's displeasure with the <u>Khatibs</u> of the Meccan sanctuary resulted in their deposition.⁴ In 853/1449, a deposed <u>Qadi</u> was restored to his post in Mecca on the intercession of the <u>Shadd</u> Jedda.⁵ Two years later, a candidate for the post of <u>Khitaba</u> in the Meccan sanctuary secured his appointment on the recommendation of the

²Stone bench, fixed seat of masonry.

⁵For further details, see: Maqrīzī, <u>Sulūk</u>, vol. II, fol. 400; Ibn Hajar, <u>Inbā</u>, vol. II, fol. 143a; Ibn Taghri Birdī, <u>al-Manhal</u>, vol. I, fol. 251b; idem, <u>al-Nujūm</u>, vol. VII, fol. 73; Al-Najm Ibn Fahd, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. II,fols. 220 and 240-41.

¹Maqrīzī, <u>Sulūk</u>, vol. II, fols. 392; Al-Najm Ibn Fahd, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. II, fols. 218, 235, 347 and 350; Sakhāwī, al-Dhayl (ed. A.Al-Hassu), p.530; Al-[´]Izz Ibn Fahd, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. I, fols. 74, 167 and 195-96: vol. II, fols. 105-6 and 142.

the <u>Shadd</u> Jedda.¹ In or around Rajab 859/July 1455, <u>Sharif Barakāt I</u> fell seriously ill and secured, thanks to the help of the <u>Shadd</u> Jedda, the appointment of his son <u>Sharif Muhammad</u> to the emirate of Mecca before his death.² In 861/1457, a candidate for the post of Qada² al-<u>Shafa'iyya</u> in Mecca secured his appointment with the help of the <u>Shadd</u> Jedda.³ By the end of 866 or early 867/1461-62, <u>Sharif Muhammad's exiled</u> wazīr, Bu'dayr,⁴ was, on the intercession of the <u>Shadd</u> Jedda, allowed to return to Mecca.⁵

The ascendancy of the <u>Shadd</u> or <u>Na'ib</u> Jedda is further manifested by the ceremonial respect with which he was surrounded on his approach to Mecca in a formal receiption at which the <u>Sharif</u> himself and many of his and other Sultani officials and local dignitaries were present. Moreover, all these officials and the <u>Sharifs</u> of Mecca were repeatedly instructed by the Sultani edicts to cooperate with these principal officials in the execution of their duties.⁶

⁴Sakhāwī, al-Tibr, p.186.

⁵Ibn Taghri Birdi, <u>al-Manhal</u>, vol. II, fol.. 512b.

¹Sakhawi,al-Tibr, pp. 351-52.

²Ibn Taghri Birdi, Hawadith, vol. I, fol. 347; idem, <u>al-Nujum</u>, vol. VII, fol. 239; Al-Najm Ibn Fahd, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. II, fol. 283; Sakhawi, <u>al-Daw</u>, vol. VII, p.152; Ibn Iyas, <u>Bada'i</u>, vol. II, p.53; idem, <u>Bada'i</u> (U.P.), p.33. See also: Ibn Zuhayra, <u>op.cit.</u>, p.321; Janabi, <u>op.cit.</u>, fol. 307a; Isami, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. IV, pp. 41 and 276-76; Tabari, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. I, fol.110.

³See supra, prostant 265.

⁴See <u>supra</u>, **p. 238**.

²Al-NajmIbn Fahd, op.cit., vol. II, fols. 307-8.

⁶For details, see: Ibn Taghri Birdi, <u>al-Manhal</u>, vol. I, fols. 181a and 237a; Al-Najm Ibn Fahd, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. II, fols. 240-44, 268, 288-89, 311, 319, 321, 325, 334-5, 347, 350, 354, 364, 368 and 371; Sakhawi, <u>al-Tibr</u>, pp. 45-46; idem, <u>al-Dhayl</u> (ed. A.Al-Hassu), pp. 357 and 543; Al-¹Izz Ibn Fahd, <u>op.cit.</u>, wol. I, fols. 14, 35, 52, 63-64, 120, 135, 147, 156, 168, 182, 196, 213, 239 and 260: vol. II, fols. 103 and 111.

The influence of the principal Sultani official in Jedda also extended to foreign countries. This is best exemplified in the following episode. In Jumada II 854/August 1450, the Shadd Jedda Timraz escaped to India with the entire revenue of the port, reported to have been between 30,000-50,000 dinars, and tried in vain to anchor at several Indian ports. This was sostrongly opposed by the local Muslim merchants, who were thus protecting their own interest, that their rulers denied Timraz permission to land, not even to purchase provisions. The sources and particularly Ibn Taghri Birdi attribute this clearly to the influence of Amir Janbek, who had succeeded Timraz in the very post and was on good terms with several Indian rulers. Timraz kept cruising in his ship for six months and eventually, exhausted and despairing, anchored at Calicut without permission. The local ruler, under pressure from the merchants, contemplated arresting Timraz, but he avoided this by pretending that he had come to buy pepper for Sultan Jaqmaq. Timraz did in fact buy a large quantity of pepper, shipped part of the freight on a commercial vessel, loading the rest aboard his own ship, and departing. He had deliberately created the impression that he was heading for Jedda but in fact had decided to stay in the Yemen. On reaching Aden, he took possession of the pepper which he had sent by the commercial vessel and remained in the Yemen involved as guest of a Yemenite chief and, having become/in local politics, lost his life in battle in Ramagan 855/November 1451. Amir Janbek received the news and managed to bring the pepper and other belongings of Timraz back to Jedda and, hence, to the Sultan's satisfaction, to Cairo. ¹ Amir Janbek

¹Ibn Taghri Birdi, <u>al-Nujum</u>, vol. VII, fols. 145, 154-55 and 207; idem, <u>al-Manhal</u>, vol. I, fols. 237a-b and 254a-55a; idem, Hawadith, vol. I, fols. 158-60, 180-81, 191-92, 195 and 202-4; Al-Najm Ibn Fahd, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. II, fols. 270-72; Sakhawi, <u>al-Tibr</u>, pp. 270, 321, 347-8 and 357; idem, <u>al-Daw</u>, vol. III, pp. 35-36; idem, al-Dhayl (ed. A.Al-Hassu), pp.43-44.

was probably the ablest and most successful of the Sultani officials in Jedda. His shrewdness is well illustrated by the ease with which he foiled Timraz's attempt to get away with his ill-gotten gains, and is further supported by the fact that he was used by the Sultan as a political negotiator. In 854/1450, Sultan Jaqmaq received the news that the Christian ruler of Habasha was contemplating the invasion of the Hijāzī coast. Amir Janbek, on the Sultan's instruction, approached a Muslim ruler in that region in a counter-move with the suggestion that he should enter into an alliance with the Mamluk Sultan. Whether the attempt was successful or not, an envoy of the Muslim ruler of Habasha reached Cairo in 856/1452 and was well received. The Christian ruler, probably apprehensive of the possible outcome, thought it wise to normalize his relations with the Egyptian sultan in 857/1453.¹ Amir Janbek not only received friendly letters and gifts from the foreign rulers, particularly those of India, and possessed immense wealth, but also began to play a very important role in the local politics of Egypt, especially in the accession of Khushqadam to the throne in 865/1461, and after that practically ran the affairs of state. His ever-increasing influence and lavish expenditure excited the suspicion and jealousy of Sultan Khushqadam and Jahbek was consequently assassinated in Dhu'l-Hijja 867/ September 1463.² His sudden and tragic end had its repercussions to his men in Jedda who were arrested and taken to Cairo in Muharram 868/ September 1463.³

¹ Ibn Taghri Birdi, Hawadith, vol. I, fol. 163 and 213; Sakhawi, <u>al-Tibr</u>, p.386. See also: Darraj, <u>op.cit.</u>, pp. 65 and 69.

²Ibn Taghri Birdi, Hawadith (ed. W.Popper), part II, pp. 319, 321, 324, 327, 338 and 397-98: part III, pp. 566-69; idem, <u>al-Nujum</u>, vol. VII, fols. 321 and 340-42; idem, <u>al-Manhal</u>, vol. I, fols. 254a-55a; Sakhawi, <u>al-Daw</u>, vol. III, pp. 57-8; idem, al-Dhayl (ed. A.Al-Hassu), pp. 43-44, 95 and 137-38; Ibn Iyas, <u>Bada'i</u>, vol. II, pp. 72-73 and 76-77; idem, <u>Uqud</u>, vol. II, fol. 211b; idem, <u>Bada'i</u>, (U.P.), pp. 14-15, 22, 76, 99-100 and 128-30.

³Ibn Taghri Birdi, Hawadith (ed. W.Popper), part III, p.441.

Among the successors of Janbek in Jedda was 'Alī b. Ramadān who was sent earlier, about 849/1446, as <u>Sayrafī</u> and performed his duties under Janbek himself. In 869/1465, 'Alī was sent to Jedda again as tax collector, and seems tohave enjoyed considerable influence which he used for personal gains. His exploitation of the local merchants as well as those of the Yemen and India secured him considerable wealth - estimated to have been about 500,000 dinars - which enabled him to live a princely life until his death in Jumādā I 871/January 1467.¹

# C. The problems confronting the last Na'ib of Jedda and some of his achievements

The last <u>Na'ib</u> Jedda appointed by the last <u>Mamluk</u> Sultan, Qanşawh al-<u>Ghawri</u>, was Amir Husayn al-Kurdī. He was the only high ranking official of Kurdish origin. From a version of Al-'Izz Ibn Fahd, it appears that Amir Husayn considered himself a 'Turcoman² and resented being called a Kurd³ Nahrawalī states that Amir Husayn was disliked by the <u>Mamlūks</u> by reason of his Kurdish origin. Aware of this, Sultan al-<u>Ghawrī</u> decided to give Jedda as Timār⁴ to Amir Husayn to keep him away from Cairo.⁵

Amir Husayn's arrival in Jedda in Ramagan 911/March 1506 was in a period of serious internal instability, commercial decline and grave external danger on the part of the Portuguese. He, shortly after his arrival, paid full attention to fortifying Jedda, on the instruction of

¹Ibn Taghri Birdi, Hawadith (ed. W.Popper), part III, pp. 495 and 534-36.

²A Turkish people in Central Asia. For further details, see: W. Barthold and Köprülüzade Fu^{*}ad, <u>E.I.¹</u>, art. "Turkomans", pp. 896-99.

³Al-'Izz Ibn Fahd, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. II, fol. 210.

⁴Timár, a grant of land for military sevice; the term is the Turkish equivalent of <u>igta</u>. For details, see: J. Deny, <u>E.I.</u>, art. "Timár", pp. 767-76.

⁵Nahrawālī, <u>al-I'lām</u>, pp.245-46. see also: Ibn al-'Imād, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. VIII, p.115.

the Sultan, and built a wall. To judge by the reports of contemporary sources, and especially Al-'Izz Ibn Fahd, the wall was built in two stages. The work started on three landward sections which were completed early in 913/May or June 1507. This wall, as is obvious, did not encircle Jedda, which remained accessible from the coast. The seaward part of the wall was added later, around 917/1511. The sources do refer to the towers and gates built in the wall, but without sufficient detail. Ibn Faraj, a late source, states that six towers, two on the seaward and four on the landward sides, were built and that the wall had two gates one called Bab al-Nasr (Victory gate) and the other Bab al-Futuh, which has a similar meaning. Of later sources, Ibn Faraj mentions 911/1505-6 as the year in which the entire work was completed. Nahrawali (al-I'lam) refers to the completion of the whole work in 917/1511-12. Ibn al-Imad seems to suggest a far later completion around 920/1514-15. Amir Husayn used forced labour, extortion under threat, the exploitation and victimization of many innocent people during and after the completion of the work. His arrogant attitude and harsh treatment of the various sections of the local community, as well as of his own men, had made him extremely unpopular. Most sources mention that the Sultan contributed to the expenditure but give no exact figure for the total expenditure or the contribution of the Sultan. Only Ibn Faraj, a late source, mentions that the total amount spent was about 100,000 dinars and seems to suggest that most, if not all, was paid by the Sultan himself. Al- 'Izz Ibn Fahd and Ibn Iyas refer to similar fortifications in Yanbu too but give little further information about their construction or expenditure.²

²For details, see: Al-'Izz Ibn Fahd, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. II, fols. 98,101-9, 111-12, 114-21, 120-21, 132, 134-35, 140, 196, 199, 201, 203, 205-6, 209-10, 212,

29.4.

¹It seems that the version of these late sources confused some of the modern scholars. R.Hartmann, for instance, reports the construction of a wall around Jedda in 917/1511 and considers thereport of al-Batnuni, who states that it was built in 915/1509 as erroneous. See: R.Hartmann, <u>E.1.²</u>, art. "Djudda", p.572. In fact, neither of these years is quite accurate for the completinn of the wall which, as reported explicitly by Al-'Izz Ibn Fahd, was built in two different stages.

Amir Husayn was sent not only as Na'ib of Jedda but also as the commander of the Egyptian naval expedition. The discovery in 1497 A.D. (902-3 A.H.) of the route to India, via the Cape of Good Hope, by Vasco da Gama, was a shattering blow to the Egyptian monopoly of the spice trade and had changed - shortly after - the existing pattern of east-west trade and soon Lisbon became an important centre of this trade at the expense of Jedda, Mecca, Cairo, Alexandria and other places within the Egyptian domain. Sultan al-Ghawri, mainly for his own reason and partly in response to the cry for help from the Indian rulers, prepared a naval expedition against the Portuguese. In that, the Sultan received some help from the Ottoman Sultan and verbal encouragement from Venice. In the end of 913/May 1507 or early in 914/May1508, Amir Husayn departed from Jedda with a fairly strong naval force. There is some uncertainty about the exact number of soldiers and ships under his command in this expedition. The meximum reported number is fifty but this is given by the later sources rather ambiguously which does not make it clear whether this was in this or the second expedition. But from the account of contemporary Meccan sources, it is clear that this expedition consisted of at least fifteen vessels of various sizes. Amir Husayn reached Gujrat (India) in the first half of 914/1508 and seems to have secured some help from the ruler of Gujrat, Sultan Muzaffar II, and his governor in Diu, Malik Iyas. The first naval engagement took place near Chaul² and Amir Husayn gained the upper hand, but in the following year the Portuguese

214-19, 236 and 246; Ibn Iyas, <u>Bada'i</u>, vol. IV, pp. 84-85, 94-96, 109, 116, 131, 287 and 326: vol. V, p.93. See also: Ibn al-Dayba', <u>al-Eadl</u>, fol. 137b; Ibn Faraj, <u>op.cit.</u>, fols. 307b-10a and 16a; Nahrawalī, <u>al-I'lam</u>, pp. 244-46; idem, <u>al-Barq</u>, p.19; Al-Bakarī, <u>op.cit.</u>, fols. 29 and 31; Ibn al-'Imad, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. VIII, p.115; 'Isamī, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. IV, p.53; Sinjārī, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. II, fol. 38; Tabarī, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. I, fols. 158-59; Darrāj, <u>op.cit.</u>, p.137; R.B.Serjeant, <u>op.cit.</u>, appendix VI, pp. 160-62.

¹Diu, an island off the southern point of Saurashtra (Sawrashtra, Sorath), India, with a good harbour clear of the dangerous tides of the Gulf of Combay. See: J.B.Harrison, <u>E.I.</u>², art. "Diu", p.322.

²Near modern Bombay.

viceroy Francisco d'Almeida inflicted a crushing defeat and the Egyptian fleet was almost destroyed. In 917/1511, Amir Husayn reached Cairo, via Jedda, with few survivors. The Portuguese, after this victory, increased their activities in the Indian Ocean, the Arabian Gulf, and even in the southern part of the Red Sea area, and around 919/1513-14 attacked Aden twice and places on the eastern coast of Africa, and occupied for a period the island of Kamaran. Thus they posed a serious threat to all the ports on the Red Sea and particularly Jedda, but no Portuguese attack on Jedda took place within the period in question. Meanwhile, a second Egyptian naval force gathered together and in Shawwal 921/December 1515 it left Jedda, under the joint command of Amirs Husayn and Salman al-Rumi, supposedly to attack the Portuguese. Whether any encounter with them during the remaining part of the Burji period took place or whether this expedition went to India is not clear. Possibly the Ottoman threat had compelled Sultan al-Ghawri to decide to occupy the Yemen and thus secure his own domain, for the time being, from the Portuguese threat. This may have become known to the Yemenite Sultan and it is no wonder that, when the Egyptian naval force reached the Yemen, it was not only denied a cordial reception but even its supply of provisions was withheld. The Yemenite sources, particularly Ibn al-Dayba, mention the withholding of supplies as the principal reason for the Egyptian attack on the Yemen, but surely there must have been more serious political and military considerations behind the Egyptian onslaught. There were several fierce clashes and virtually the whole of the Yemen fell to the Egyptian invaders. It was one of the strange coincidences that while the Mamluk soldiers were putting an end to the Tahirid rule in the Yemen, their own regime was overthrown by the Ottomans. Meanhile, Amir Husayn had to return to Jedda in

¹This uncertainy is mainly due to the fact that certain source, such as Ibn Iyas, refer to the departure of this expedition to India, but at the same time describe places such as the isle of Kamran and Zabid in the Yemen itself as part of India. (Bada'i', vol. V, p.81). The word used is "Day'a ", estate, which generally means a rural property of a certain size. See:

early 923/1517 only to be drowned off the coast by the order of Sultan Selim I.¹

Cl.Cahen, E.I.², art. "Day'a", pp. 187-88. Describing the Yemen as being "Day'a" of India, Ibn Iyas is not only inaccurate but rather amazing too. ¹It was not possible - in this reference in passing - to consult all the sources and to mention various local and international aspects relevant to this expedition or to single out the sources for each point. The sources are given - rather unconventionally - in two groups, the first includes those sources which are particularly useful for the events within the Egyptian domain, including the Hijāz, and in the Yemen, while the second group contains sources or works which provide information about the general course of events or those not directly related to the areas mentioned above. i) Al-'Izz Ibn Fahd, op.cit., vol. II, fols. 101-3, 110, 113, 121, 124, 134-35, 138, 140, 142, 154, 163, 177, 181, 183, 209-12, 214, 217,225-31, 233-38, 240, 244-45, 247-48, 250, 255, 265-68 and 271-73; Ibn Iyas, Bada'i, vol. IV, pp. 82, 84-85, 96, 109, 116, 124, 284, 286-87, 307-8, 322-23, 326 and 383: vol. V, pp. 81, 113, 185-86 and 199; Ibn al-Dayba, Qurra, pp. 224 and 226-34; idem, al-Fadl, fols. 121a, 135b, 137b-38b, 161b-62a and 168a-75a; See also: Abū (Bā) Makhrama, op.cit., vol. I, pp. 16 and 21: Ibn Faraj, op.cit. fols. 8a-b; Jazīrī, op.cit., pp. 360-61; Nahrawali, <u>al-I'lam</u>, pp. 244-48 and 284; idem, <u>al-Barg</u>, pp. 18-25 and 27-31; Janabi, <u>op.cit.</u>, fols. 315a-15b; Ibn al-'Imad, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. VIII, pp. 60 and 115; 'Isami, <u>op.cit.</u>, vol. IV, p.53; Sinjari, op.cit., vol. II, fol. 53; Jabari, op.cit., vol. I, fols. 159, 170-71 and 177; Dahlan, op.cit., p.51; R.Hartmann, E.I.², art. "Djudda", p.572. ii) Varthema, op.cit., pp. 59-60, 91-92, 105-7, 11, 121-25, 178,179, 258-62, 265-90 and 297-98; Heyd, op.cit., vol. II, pp. 427, 443, 448-49, 475, 492, 510-14, 517-29, 533-37, 539-40 and 547-50; B.Lewis, "Egypt and Syria", in The Cambridge History of Islam, vol. I, pp. 228-29; Halil Inalcik, "The rise of the Ottoman Empire", in The Cambridge History of Islam, vol. I, pp. 317-18; R.B.Serjeant, op.cit., pp. 2, 12-18, 24-25 and 41-51; Darraj, <u>op.cit.</u>, pp. 7, 10-11, 127-29, 132-34, 136-38, 146, 148, 150-51 and 154-56; J.B.Harrison, <u>E.I.²</u>, art. "Diu", p.322; S.Maqbul Ahmad, <u>E.I.²</u>, "Ibn Madjid", pp. 856-59; G.Rentz, <u>E.I.²</u>, art. "Djazīrat Al- Arab", p.553.

#### CONCLUSION

It would be a repetition of the obvious to state that the foregoing study treats numerous aspects of the history of Mecca. This makes it rather difficult to mention here each conclusion relevant to all the aspects discussed without repeating many of the stated or easily deducible points from the discussion of various topics and thus prolonging this conclusion to the length of a miniature thesis. Obviously, the case would have been quite different if the theme of the thesis has been confined to a specific single issue.

However, some of the main conclusions drawn from the political aspect of this study are as follows:

1. The region of Mecca, like other parts of the Hijäz, had long been without any great political significance in its own right. But this had not and could not deprive the region of its unique religious importance. This rested on its being the cradle of Islam and containing <u>al-Haramayn</u>. Paradoxically, this advantageous position of the region did not enable the local Amirs to extend their influence in other parts of the Muslim world and instead caused them to suffer foreign domination for centuries. Various Muslim rulers established their hegemony mainly to secure personal prestige, but also for economic considerations.

During the period under examination the region was under the firm control of the <u>Burji</u> Sultans. Their sovereignty and exclusive privileges were acknowledged by the successive <u>Sharifs</u> of Mecca as well as by other Muslim rulers and remained practically unchallenged.
 The <u>Sharifs</u> of Mecca retained, however, reasonable autonomy

in local matters but not without frequent and effective intervention by their Egyptian overlords.

4. The <u>Sharifs</u> of Mecca had no independent foreign policy of their own but were not prevented from establishing friendly relations with non-Egyptian rulers. This, however, had to be in line with the external policies of their Egyptian sovereign. The latter never allowed such relations to develop to such an extent that they formed a threat to their political hegemony and financial interest in the region.

5. The <u>Sharifs of Mecca were the most powerful and capable among</u> the local Amirs from the political, military, administrative and financial points of view. They succeeded in extending and retaining their authority over several small principalities such as al-Qunfudha, Haly and Jazān. Moreover, they alone were intermittently elevated to the status of <u>Na^{*}ib al-Sultān</u> and thus enjoyed some authority over the entire region of the Hijāz.

6. The biggest set back for the <u>Sharifs of Mecca</u>, in local politics, was their failure to persuade various local groups to give up their petty rivalries and to accept the idea of peaceful co-existence. Consequently, the region remained without much desired political there stability and/was almost continuous internal strife, triggered off by rivalry, greed and ambition, which often led to the breakdown of law and order causing difficulties for the merchants, pilgrims and inhabitants.

7. The division of local forces was such that, despite frequent confrontations between the ruling <u>Sharif</u> and his opponents, the <u>Sharif</u> was often unable to subdue his antagonists by force of arms. Therefore, the Sharif was compelled to adopt a policy of appeasement

and often paid his opponents substantial amounts of money to secure temporary truces.

8. The principle of hereditary succession to the emirate was on the whole - recognized and practised in Mecca. But the succession itself was seldom without family dissension which occasionally de veloped into an armed clash. To avoid this, the ruling <u>Sharif</u> of Mecca usually secured, during his lifetime, the appointment of his eldest son as his co-Amir. The latter, following the death of his father, was normally confirmed by the Egyptian Sultans as the official Amir of Mecca unless his rival brother managed to secure the emirate for himself.

The main conclusions concerning the general economic condition and the financial position of the <u>Sharifs</u> of Mecca are: 1. The <u>Sharifs</u> of Mecca enjoyed exclusive right to the entire revenue until 828/1425. In that year, following the desertion of Aden by the Indian merchants and their selection of Jedda for commercial activities, Sultan Barsbay sent officials to take charge of the port and the revenue. From then onwards most of the revenue was reserved for the royal treasury in Cairo.

2. The region of Mecca has always been a centre of commercial activities but this increased tremendously during the <u>Burji</u> period. Though not exclusively, much of the commercial activity was connected with the annual ceremony of the pilgrimage. This was an occasion of great religio-economic significance and intense commercial activities developed almost parallel with worship. The economic growth of the area reached an unprecedented level after 828/1425 for the reason mentioned earlier. This, however, proved to be less in favour and more against the financial interest of the Sharifs of Mecca who,

after this year, forfeited, in one way or another, a considerable portion of their revenue in favour of the treasury in Cairo. Despite this, the financial position of the <u>Sharifs</u> of Mecca remained fairly strong. The bulk of their revenue was obtained from the tax paid by the Indian and Yemenite merchants but a further amount of money was secured from local tolls, occasional dues, escheat, tribute, gifts and the customary share of the Sharifs in charities.

The economic growth of the area also had social implications. 3. How far the common people benefited and to what extent the lower classes prospered as a result of intense trade in the area is difficult to ascertain. The historians in those days showed little, if any, interest in circumstances of life of the man in the street. But it may be supposed that small commission agents or brokers, carriers of goods or porters, owners of camels and other mounts and providers of accommodation benefited in a more or less modest proportion. 4 The distribution of various charities in Mecca not only benefited the needy but also played a considerable part in the economic life of the city, as it accounted for a considerable part of its total influx of money, grain, and other necessities of life. Strange as it may appear, the fact remains that the ruling Sharif of Mecca, officials, and other Meccan dignitaries benefited more from the donations sent to Mecca than the poor, the supposed beneficiaries. Though no exact figures for the various expenditures of the 5. Sharifs of Mecca - like the revenue - are given in the sources, this much is certain, that not only the greater portion of the Sharifs' revenue was diverted to Cairo but much of the remaining part of their income was used to meet other financial obligations. In addition to the huge amounts paid to the Egyptian Sultan or his Amirs, the

<u>Sharifs</u> spend a considerable part of their various financial gains on the upkeep of their families, slaves, soldiers and other members of the household. The salaries or maintenance allowances paid to the officials, <u>Ashraf</u> and <u>Quwwad</u> must also have been substantial. Moreover, hospitality to the visiting Sultan, members of the royal family, Egyptian Amirs, tribal chiefs, envoys and other guests must have been a heavy expense. All these and other expenditures such as the amount spent in financing benevolent works and in appeasement to dissident groups must have absorbed a considerable portion of their total revenue and kept them under continuous financial pressure. In view of this it is not surprising that they, at times, resorted to illegal means to secure additional material gains to meet their several obligations and expenditure.

The main conclusion drawn from examining the local administration could be summed up as follows:

1. The <u>Sharifs</u> of Mecca were able to establish, from the early part of the <u>Burji</u> period, a fairly organised system of administration. All the officials-with the exception of those related to the Meccan sanctuary-were appointed by and responsible to the <u>Sharifs</u>, who practically controlled the entire administration until 828/1425. From this year onwards almost all the key posts were held by the Sultani officials.

2. References to most <u>Sharifi</u> officials in both Mecca and Jedda are either anonymous or refer to named officials without specifying their responsibilities.Thus, their ranks or duties are extremely difficult to identify.Information on these officials and even on those referred to and under mention of their titles, hardly goes beyond confirming the appointment/ functioning of these officials.

3. Many of the <u>Sharifi</u> officials were - or had been - slaves of the ruling <u>Sharif</u> or his father. Their appointment to various posts was a deliberate policyof the <u>Sharifs</u> who preferred them for their reliability and personal loyalty. Obviously, the <u>Sharifs</u> regarded the assigning of these important posts to his relatives or other prominent <u>Ashrāf</u> - who could and often did become disloyal - unsafe and decided not to take the risk.

4. The dominant position of the <u>Sharifs</u> and his officials in local administration came to an end in 828/1425 when Sultan Barsbay sent officials from Cairo and assigned to them several posts in Jedda related to the collection of taxes. Shortly after, several other high ranking officials, such as <u>Muhtasib</u> and <u>Bash al-Mamalik</u>, were sent to Mecca. Henceforth, the Sultani officials enjoyed dominant positions in local administration.

5. Information concerning the Sultani officials - like those appointed by the <u>Sharifs</u> - is generally inadequate. Most often it is confined to the names of the officials and their posts, the date of appointment or deposition. Consequently, what could be ascertained about the functions, official responsibilities, mutual relationship and extent of their influence amounts to little and is usually indicated by the terms denoting their posts and general duties. Even this is not an easy task, as several high ranking officials held more than one post and interfered in various other fields, and it is often difficult to distinguish between acts performed in a specific official capacity and those purely personally motivated.

6. That the <u>Sharifs</u> of Mecca owed allegiance to the <u>Burji</u> Sultans, and to what extent, is reflected in their relatively modest share in

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the administration and the rather narrow limits of their authority over the Sultani officials. Some of these, for example, the <u>Bash</u> <u>al-Mamalik</u> and <u>Na'ib</u> Jedda enjoyed such great influence that they, at times, rivalled if not over-shadowed the authority of the ruling <u>Sh</u>arif of Mecca.

7. The <u>Sharifi</u> officials were able - on the whole - to discharge their duties without direct intervention by the Egyptian Sultan or his officials, but the authority of the <u>Sharifi</u> officials was far less than that enjoyed by the Sultani officials in judicial, financial and administrative fields.

8. The dominant position of the Sultani officials did not mean that the <u>Sharifi</u> officials no longer played a significant role in local administration. In fact, their services were indispensable the to both the <u>Sharifs and/indigenous</u> population and they remained active throughout the period under consideration.

9. The responsibilities of the <u>Sharifi</u> officials in Mecca were easily distinguishable from each other but in Jedda were more difficult to distinguish. This is due to the fact that the responsibilities of the officials there were of dual administrative-financial character. Though some officials were appointed to purely administrative posts and others for the collection of taxes, their activities were so interlinked that both groups cannot be effectively separated.

10. The deposition or arrest of a certain <u>Sharif</u> of Mecca did not necessarily imply that his officials were also to suffer unless their behaviour was exceptionally objectionable.

The <u>Sharifs of Mecca occasionally exercised a fairly strong in-</u>
 fluence our the Sultani officials but this never reached direct control.
 Though the encroachment of the Sultani officials on the authority

of those appointed by the <u>Sharifs</u> was common in both Mecca and Jedda, due to the clash of financial interests this was more obvious in Jedda.

13. The simultaneous presence and functioning of two groups of officials - one appointed by the Egyptian Sultans and the other by the <u>Sharifs of Mecca</u> - many with similar responsibilities, cannot but have resulted in occasional friction. Obviously, some arrangements were made to facilitate their peaceful co-existence but unfortunately no details of these are given in the sources. Needless to say, often, if not always, in cases of dispute it was theviews of the Sultani officials which prevailed and the matter was settled in their favour.

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